U.S. District Court District of New Jersey [LIVE] (Newark) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:15-cv-07647-KM-JBC

HICKOX v. CHRISTIE et al Assigned to: Judge Kevin McNulty Referred to: Magistrate Judge James B. Clark Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

Date Filed: 10/22/2015 Date Terminated: 06/16/2017 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Plaintiff KACI HICKOX

represented by EDWARD L. BAROCAS AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF NJ FOUNDATION P.O. BOX 32159 NEWARK, NJ 07102 (973) 642-2086 Fax: (973) 642-6253 Email: ebarocas@aclu-nj.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

JEANNE LOCICERO AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF NEW JERSEY FOUNDATION 89 Market Street, 7th Floor P.O. BOX 32159 NEWARK, NJ 07102 973-854-1715 Fax: 973-642-6523 Email: jlocicero@aclu-nj.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
CHRISTOPHER JAMES CHRISTIE

represented by JEFFREY SCOTT CHIESA CHIESA SHAHINIAN & GIANTOMASI PC

ONE BOLAND DRIVE WEST ORANGE, NJ 07052 973-530-2050 Fax: 973-530-2250 Email: jchiesa@csglaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
KEVIN R. JESPERSEN STATE OF NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF LAW 124 HALSEY STREET 5TH FLOOR P.O. BOX 45029 NEWARK, NJ 07101 973-648-7457 Email: kevin.jespersen@law.dol.lps.state.nj.us LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
MATTHEW EVAN BECK Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC One Boland Drive West Orange, NJ 07052 (973) 530-2024 Fax: (973) 530-2224 Email: mbeck@csglaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
RONALD LAWRENCE ISRAEL CHIESA SHAHINIAN & GIANTOMASI PC THE OFFICES AT CRYSTAL LAKE ONE BOLAND DRIVE WEST ORANGE, NJ 07052 (973) 530-2045 Fax: (973)530-2245 Email: risrael@csglaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
BENJAMIN HENRY ZIEMAN STATE OF NEW JERSEY OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY

Defendant MARY E. O'DOWD

GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF LAW & PUBLIC SAFETY 25 MARKET STREET P.O. BOX 116 TRENTON, NJ 08625 609-292-1575 Email: benjamin.zieman@dol.lps.state.nj.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
LINDSAY ANN DISCHLEY Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC ONE BOLAND DRIVE WEST ORANGE, NJ 07052 973-325-1500 Email: ldischley@csglaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by JEFFREY SCOTT CHIESA (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
KEVIN R. JESPERSEN (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
MATTHEW EVAN BECK (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
RONALD LAWRENCE ISRAEL (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
BENJAMIN HENRY ZIEMAN (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant CHRISTOPHER RINN
Defendant GARY LUDWIG

LINDSAY ANN DISCHLEY (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by JEFFREY SCOTT CHIESA (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
KEVIN R. JESPERSEN (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
MATTHEW EVAN BECK (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
RONALD LAWRENCE ISRAEL (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
BENJAMIN HENRY ZIEMAN (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
LINDSAY ANN DISCHLEY (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by JEFFREY SCOTT CHIESA (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
KEVIN R. JESPERSEN (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

MATTHEW EVAN BECK (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
RONALD LAWRENCE ISRAEL (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
BENJAMIN HENRY ZIEMAN (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
LINDSAY ANN DISCHLEY (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant JOHN DOE

represented by BENJAMIN HENRY ZIEMAN (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
JANE ROE Unidentified employees of the New Jersey Department of Health

represented by BENJAMIN HENRY ZIEMAN (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 10/22/2015
10/22/2015

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against CHRISTOPHER JAMES CHRISTIE, JANE ROE, JOHN DOE, GARY LUDWIG, MARY E. O'DOWD, CHRISTOPHER RINN ( Filing and Admin fee $ 400 receipt number 0312-6712672) with JURY DEMAND, filed by KACI HICKOX. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Civil Cover Sheet)(JB, ) (Entered: 10/22/2015)
2 SUMMONS ISSUED as to CHRISTOPHER JAMES CHRISTIE, GARY LUDWIG, MARY E. O'DOWD, CHRISTOPHER RINN Attached is the official court Summons, please fill out Defendant

11/05/2015 11/05/2015 11/05/2015 11/05/2015 11/23/2015 11/24/2015 12/01/2015 12/04/2015
12/06/2015
12/07/2015

and Plaintiffs attorney information and serve. Issued By *JACKELINE BARCO* (JB, ) (Entered: 10/22/2015)
3 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by KACI HICKOX. CHRISTOPHER JAMES CHRISTIE waiver sent on 10/27/2015, answer due 12/28/2015. (BAROCAS, EDWARD) (Entered: 11/05/2015)
4 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by KACI HICKOX. MARY E. O'DOWD waiver sent on 10/27/2015, answer due 12/28/2015. (BAROCAS, EDWARD) (Entered: 11/05/2015)
5 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by KACI HICKOX. GARY LUDWIG waiver sent on 10/27/2015, answer due 12/28/2015. (BAROCAS, EDWARD) (Entered: 11/05/2015)
6 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by KACI HICKOX. CHRISTOPHER RINN waiver sent on 10/27/2015, answer due 12/28/2015. (BAROCAS, EDWARD) (Entered: 11/05/2015)
7 NOTICE of Appearance by KEVIN R. JESPERSEN on behalf of CHRISTOPHER JAMES CHRISTIE, GARY LUDWIG, MARY E. O'DOWD, CHRISTOPHER RINN (JESPERSEN, KEVIN) (Entered: 11/23/2015)
8 Letter from Kevin R. Jespersen. (JESPERSEN, KEVIN) (Entered: 11/24/2015)
9 ORDER granting Defendants request for an extension of the motion schedule. Signed by Magistrate Judge James B. Clark on 12/1/2015. (anr) (Entered: 12/01/2015)
10 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice (with consent of all parties) by KACI HICKOX. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Certification of Edward Barocas, # 3 Certification of Steven J. Hyman, # 4 Certification of Kate Fletcher, # 5 Certification of Norman H. Siegel)(BAROCAS, EDWARD) (Entered: 12/04/2015)
Set/Reset Deadlines as to 10 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice (with consent of all parties). Motion set for 1/4/2016 before Judge Kevin McNulty. The motion will be decided on the papers. No appearances required unless notified by the court. (anr) (Entered: 12/06/2015)
11 ORDER granting 10 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice as to Steven J. Hyman, Kate Fletcher, Norman H. Siegel. Signed by

01/05/2016 01/15/2016 01/15/2016
01/20/2016 01/22/2016 01/29/2016 03/15/2016 04/14/2016 04/25/2016

Magistrate Judge James B. Clark on 12/7/2015. (anr) (Entered: 12/07/2015)
Pro Hac Vice fee of $ 300 received as to Kate Fletcher, Esq. and Norman H. Siegel, Esq., receipt number TRE064918 (mps) (Entered: 01/05/2016)
12 MOTION to Dismiss by CHRISTOPHER JAMES CHRISTIE, JANE ROE, JOHN DOE, GARY LUDWIG, MARY E. O'DOWD, CHRISTOPHER RINN. Responses due by 3/15/2016 (Attachments: # 1 Brief, # 2 Text of Proposed Order, # 3 Certificate of Service)(ZIEMAN, BENJAMIN) (Entered: 01/15/2016)
Set/Reset Deadlines as to 12 MOTION to Dismiss . Motion set for 2/16/2016 before Judge Kevin McNulty. Unless otherwise directed by the Court, this motion will be decided on the papers and no appearances are required. Note that this is an automatically generated message from the Clerk`s Office and does not supersede any previous or subsequent orders from the Court. (anr) (Entered: 01/15/2016)
13 TEXT ORDER - The Parties are advised that the Motion Return date is 5/16/2016. The parties are directed to follow the Order entered on 12/1/2015.. So Ordered by Magistrate Judge James B. Clark on 1/20/2016. (mw, ) (Entered: 01/20/2016)
14 NOTICE of Appearance by JEANNE LOCICERO on behalf of KACI HICKOX (LOCICERO, JEANNE) (Entered: 01/22/2016)
Pro Hac Vice fee of $ 150 received as to Steven J. Hyman, Esq., receipt number TRE065737 (mps) (Entered: 01/29/2016)
15 BRIEF in Opposition filed by KACI HICKOX re 12 MOTION to Dismiss (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Edward Barocas (with Exhibits), # 2 Certificate of Service)(BAROCAS, EDWARD) (Entered: 03/15/2016)
16 REPLY BRIEF to Opposition to Motion filed by CHRISTOPHER JAMES CHRISTIE, GARY LUDWIG, MARY E. O'DOWD, CHRISTOPHER RINN re 12 MOTION to Dismiss (Attachments: # 1Certificate of Service, # 2 Exhibit)(ZIEMAN, BENJAMIN) (Entered: 04/14/2016)
17 Letter from Plaintiff requesting permission to file Sur-reply Brief re 12 MOTION to Dismiss . (Attachments: # 1 Brief Proposed Surreply Brief, # 2 Certificate of Service)(BAROCAS, EDWARD) (Entered: 04/25/2016)

05/02/2016 09/02/2016 09/02/2016 09/16/2016 09/19/2016
09/27/2016 09/28/2016
09/28/2016
10/05/2016 10/05/2016

18 Letter from Kevin Jesperen. (Attachments: # 1 Supplement, # 2 Certificate of Service)(JESPERSEN, KEVIN) (Entered: 05/02/2016)
19 OPINION. Signed by Judge Kevin McNulty on 9/2/16. (nic, ) (Entered: 09/07/2016)
20 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 12 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Kevin McNulty on 9/2/2016. (nic, ) (Entered: 09/07/2016)
21 Application and Proposed Order for Clerk's Order to extend time to answer as to Christopher James Christie, Mary E. ODowd, Christopher Rinn, and Gary Ludwig.. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(ZIEMAN, BENJAMIN) (Entered: 09/16/2016)
Clerk`s Text Order - The document 21 Application for Clerk's Order to Ext Answer/Proposed Order submitted by GARY LUDWIG, MARY E. O'DOWD, CHRISTOPHER JAMES CHRISTIE, CHRISTOPHER RINN has been GRANTED. The answer due date has been set for 9/30/2016. (seb) (Entered: 09/19/2016)
22 Letter from DAG Benjamin H. Zieman seeking a 30-day extension to answer Plaintiff''s Complaint. (ZIEMAN, BENJAMIN) (Entered: 09/27/2016)
23 ORDER granting Defendants Christopher James Christie, Mary E. ODowd, Christopher Rinn, and Gary Ludwig an additional 30 thirty (30) days, or until October 31, 2016, to file an answer to Plaintiff's Complaint. Signed by Magistrate Judge James B. Clark on 9/28/2016. (seb) (Entered: 09/28/2016)
Answer Due Deadline Update - The document 22 Letter submitted by GARY LUDWIG, MARY E. O'DOWD, CHRISTOPHER JAMES CHRISTIE, CHRISTOPHER RINN has been GRANTED. The answer due date has been set for 10/31/2016. (seb) (Entered: 09/28/2016)
24 NOTICE of Appearance by JEFFREY SCOTT CHIESA on behalf of CHRISTOPHER JAMES CHRISTIE, GARY LUDWIG, MARY E. O'DOWD, CHRISTOPHER RINN (CHIESA, JEFFREY) (Entered: 10/05/2016)
25 NOTICE of Appearance by RONALD LAWRENCE ISRAEL on behalf of CHRISTOPHER JAMES CHRISTIE, GARY LUDWIG,

10/14/2016 10/14/2016 10/31/2016 11/03/2016 11/03/2016 11/03/2016 11/04/2016
11/14/2016 12/06/2016 12/07/2016

MARY E. O'DOWD, CHRISTOPHER RINN (ISRAEL, RONALD) (Entered: 10/05/2016)
26 NOTICE of Appearance by MATTHEW EVAN BECK on behalf of CHRISTOPHER JAMES CHRISTIE, GARY LUDWIG, MARY E. O'DOWD, CHRISTOPHER RINN (BECK, MATTHEW) (Entered: 10/14/2016)
27 NOTICE of Appearance by LINDSAY ANN DISCHLEY on behalf of CHRISTOPHER JAMES CHRISTIE, GARY LUDWIG, MARY E. O'DOWD, CHRISTOPHER RINN (DISCHLEY, LINDSAY) (Entered: 10/14/2016)
28 ANSWER to Complaint with JURY DEMAND by CHRISTOPHER JAMES CHRISTIE, GARY LUDWIG, MARY E. O'DOWD, CHRISTOPHER RINN.(CHIESA, JEFFREY) (Entered: 10/31/2016)
29 Notice of Request by Pro Hac Vice Kate Fletcher to receive Notices of Electronic Filings. (BAROCAS, EDWARD) (Entered: 11/03/2016)
30 Notice of Request by Pro Hac Vice Steven J. Hyman to receive Notices of Electronic Filings. (BAROCAS, EDWARD) (Entered: 11/03/2016)
31 Notice of Request by Pro Hac Vice Norman H. Siegel to receive Notices of Electronic Filings. (BAROCAS, EDWARD) (Entered: 11/03/2016)
Pro Hac Vice counsel, KATE FLETCHER, ESQ., NORMAN H. SIEGEL, ESQ. and STEVEN J. HYMAN, ESQ., have been added to receive Notices of Electronic Filing. Pursuant to L.Civ.R. 101.1, only local counsel are entitled to sign and file papers, enter appearances and receive payments on judgments, decrees or orders. (seb) (Entered: 11/04/2016)
32 LETTER ORDER - Scheduling an Initial Conference for 1/9/2017 at 11:00 AM before Magistrate Judge James B. Clark. Signed by Magistrate Judge James B. Clark on 11/14/2016. (mw, ) (Entered: 11/14/2016)
33 Letter from Ronald Israel. Esq. requesting guidance re: filing of motion. (ISRAEL, RONALD) (Entered: 12/06/2016)
34 ORDER: It is ORDERED that the Court will discuss Defendants' request to file a 12(c) motion during the initial R16 conference.

01/09/2017
01/10/2017 02/14/2017 02/15/2017 02/22/2017 02/24/2017
03/28/2017 03/29/2017 05/04/2017

Signed by Magistrate Judge James B. Clark on 12/7/2016. (seb) (Entered: 12/08/2016)
35 PRETRIAL SCHEDULING ORDER: Telephone Status Conference set for 4/26/2017 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge James B. Clark. Amended Pleadings due by 4/7/2017. Fact Discovery due by 7/21/2017. Joinder of Parties due by 4/7/2017, etc. Signed by Magistrate Judge James B. Clark on 01/09/2017. (ek) (Entered: 01/10/2017)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge James B. Clark: Scheduling Conference held on 1/10/2017. (mw, ) (Entered: 01/10/2017)
36 AFFIDAVIT/Certification in support of discovery confidentiality order by CHRISTOPHER JAMES CHRISTIE, GARY LUDWIG, MARY E. O'DOWD, CHRISTOPHER RINN. (Attachments: # 1Text of Proposed Order)(ISRAEL, RONALD) (Entered: 02/14/2017)
37 Discovery Confidentiality Order. Signed by Magistrate Judge James B. Clark on 02/15/2017. (ek) (Entered: 02/15/2017)
38 Letter from Ronald L. Israel, Esq. re 35 Scheduling Order,. (ISRAEL, RONALD) (Entered: 02/22/2017)
39 ORDER granting Defendants' 38 Letter requesting extension of time to complete responses to the initial interrogatories and document requests for one month, until April 3, 2017. All other deadlines in the January 9, 2017 Pretrial Scheduling Order be moved back by 30 days, etc. Telephone Conference set for 4/26/2017 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge James B. Clark. Signed by Magistrate Judge James B. Clark on 02/24/2017. (ek) (Entered: 02/24/2017)
40 ORDER that the Discovery shall be stayed pending the Telephone Conference adjourned to 5/4/2017 02:30 PM before Magistrate Judge James B. Clark. Signed by Magistrate Judge James B. Clark on 03/28/2017. (ek) (Entered: 03/28/2017)
41 Letter to Judge Clark from Alan Sash, Esq.. (ld, ) (Entered: 04/13/2017)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge James B. Clark: Telephone Conference held on 5/4/2017. (mw, ) (Entered: 05/08/2017)

05/05/2017 06/01/2017 06/16/2017 07/27/2017 07/28/2017 	  

42 ORDER setting telephone conference for 6/2/2017 at 02:30 PM with Magistrate Judge James B. Clark. Discovery is stayed pending the call. Signed by Magistrate Judge James B. Clark on 5/5/17. (jr) (Entered: 05/05/2017)
43 Letter from Ronald L. Israel, Esq. to Hon. James B. Clark, III, U.S.M.J. requesting 6/2/17 telephone conference be adjourned re 42 Order, Set Hearings. (ISRAEL, RONALD) (Entered: 06/01/2017)
44 Order Administratively Terminating Action - 60 Day, Pending Consummation of Settlement. Administrative Termination deadline set for 8/15/2017. Signed by Judge Kevin McNulty on 6/16/17. (nic, ) (Entered: 06/16/2017)
45 STIPULATION of Dismissal by CHRISTOPHER JAMES CHRISTIE, GARY LUDWIG, MARY E. O'DOWD, CHRISTOPHER RINN. (ISRAEL, RONALD) (Entered: 07/27/2017)
46 STIPULATION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE AND WITHOUT COSTS, etc. Signed by Judge Kevin McNulty on 07/28/2017. (ek) (Entered: 07/28/2017)

 
 Case 2:15-cv-07647-KM-JBC Document 1 Filed 10/22/15 Page 1 of 35 PageID: 1

Edward Barocas Jeanne LoCicero American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation Post Office Box 32159 Newark, New Jersey 07102 (973) 854- 1717 ebarocas@aclu-nj.org
Alan Sash McLaughlin & Stern, LLP 260 Madison Avenue, 18th Floor New York, New York 10016 (212) 448-1100 ASASH@mclaughlinstern.com
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY --------------------------------------------------------------------- X KACI HICKOX
VERIFIED COMPLAINT
DOCKET NO. __________
Plaintiff, JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

-against-

ECF CASE

CHRISTOPHER JAMES CHRISTIE, MARY E. O’DOWD, CHRISTOPHER RINN, GARY LUDWIG, and JOHN DOE and JANE ROE, unidentified employees of the New Jersey Department of Health,

Defendants. --------------------------------------------------------------------- X

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Plaintiff KACI HICKOX, a resident of Springfield, Oregon, may be contacted through her counsel, whose addresses are noted in this Complaint, so that her privacy is maintained. Defendant CHRISTOPHER JAMES CHRISTIE resides at 46 Corey Lane Mendham, New Jersey 07945. Defendant MARY E. O’DOWD resides at 240 Riverside Drive West, Princeton, New Jersey 085405432. The principal place of business for Defendants CHRISTOPHER RINN and GARY LUDWIG is at the New Jersey Department of Health, 369 South Warren Street, Trenton, New Jersey 08608-2308.
Plaintiff KACI HICKOX, by her attorneys, MCLAUGHLIN & STERN, LLP and AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF NEW JERSEY FOUNDATION, as and for her Complaint, alleges the following:
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 1. This is a civil rights action to vindicate Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States, and New Jersey common law. Defendants unlawfully and unreasonably detained, isolated and quarantined Plaintiff, without a valid medical or epidemiological basis, and without adequate legal recourse, pursuant to New Jersey’s statewide Ebola Preparedness Plan, the Additional Screening Protocols for Ebola at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York and at Newark Airport, and the Administrative Order Declaring Quarantine and Isolation of Kaci Hickox.
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JURISDICTION & VENUE 2. This action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C §§ 1983 and 1988, and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. 3. This Court has jurisdiction of the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3), and 1343(a)(4) as this is a civil action arising under the Constitution of the United States and the laws of the United States. This Court has jurisdiction over the supplemental claims arising under New Jersey state law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 4. This Court also has jurisdiction of the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1332 because Plaintiff and Defendants are citizens of different states, namely Oregon and New Jersey, and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 5. Venue is proper for the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1391 (a), (b), and (c) because the claims arose in this district.
PARTIES 6. Plaintiff KACI HICKOX is a 34-years-old nurse duly licensed to practice in Oregon, where she now resides. She received her Master of Science in Nursing, as well as a Master in Public Health, from Johns Hopkins University.
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Prior to that, in 2006, she earned a Diploma in Tropical Nursing from the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. After graduating from Johns Hopkins, Hickox worked for two years as an Epidemic Intelligence Service Fellow for the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”). Hickox’s work history also includes working as a Medical Team Leader and Nurse Manager for Médecins Sans Frontières (“MSF”) in Uganda, Nigeria, and Sudan, and as a Primary Health Care Manager for MSF in Myanmar. From September 23, 2014 to October 22, 2014, Hickox worked for MSF in Sierra Leone as Medical Team Leader at the Ebola Treatment Unit in Bo, Sierra Leone.
7. Defendant CHRISTOPHER JAMES CHRISTIE is the Governor of the State of New Jersey. The Governor’s office is located at the New Jersey State House, 125 West State Street, Trenton, NJ 08608. Defendant Christie is being sued in his individual capacity.
8. Defendant MARY E. O’DOWD was the Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Health during the relevant time period. She is being sued in her individual capacity. Defendant O’Dowd resides at 240 Riverside Drive West, Princeton, NJ 08540-5432.
9. Defendant CHRISTOPHER RINN is the Assistant Commissioner of the Division of Public Health Infrastructure, Laboratories and Emergency Preparedness of the New Jersey Department of Health. He is being
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sued in his individual capacity. The Department of Health is located at 369 South Warren Street, Trenton, NJ 08608-2308.
10. Defendant GARY LUDWIG is the Service Director of the Communicable Disease Service of the New Jersey Department of Health and is being sued in his individual capacity. The Department of Health is located at 369 South Warren Street, Trenton, NJ 08608-2308.
11. Defendants John Doe and Jane Roe et al., whose identities and number are presently unknown to Plaintiffs, are and were at all relevant times employees and/or agents of the New Jersey Department of Health and participated in the detention, isolation, and/or quarantine of Kaci Hickox. They are sued in their individual capacities.
12. At all relevant times Defendants Christopher James Christie, Mary O’Dowd, Christopher Rinn, Gary Ludwig, and John Doe and Jane Roe, et al. (“Defendants”) acted under color of state law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 13. Plaintiff Kaci Hickox (“Hickox”) spent roughly one month in Sierra Leone working for MSF, arriving in Bo, Sierra Leone on September 23, 2014 and departing on October 22, 2014.
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14. Upon arriving at Newark Liberty International Airport, Hickox was taken into custody and detained by Defendants without cause or legal justification for approximately 80 hours. Ebola Transmission
15. Ebola is caused by infection with one of the Ebola virus strains. Symptoms include, inter alia, fever, headache, joint and muscle aches, diarrhea, and vomiting.
16. Ebola is spread through direct contact with the body fluids— e.g., blood, sweat, vomit, feces—of a symptomatic person. It can also be spread through exposure to objects that are contaminated with the virus, such as needles.
17. Individuals who have been infected with Ebola but have yet to manifest any symptoms are not infectious and cannot transmit the disease.
18. The maximum incubation period for the virus is 21 days. Symptoms most commonly appear within 8 to 10 days of exposure, and 90 percent of cases become symptomatic within 14 days of exposure. Sierra Leone: September 23 – October 22, 2014
19. Prior to arriving in Sierra Leone, Hickox spent two days in Brussels, Belgium receiving special training from MSF regarding Ebola and infection control and prevention.
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20. While in Sierra Leone, Hickox worked at MSF’s Ebola Management Center as a nurse and medical team leader.
21. As medical team leader Hickox not only cared for patients but also carried out various management responsibilities, including, inter alia, training of staff, and creating and enforcing medical treatment protocols.
22. At all times while in Sierra Leone, Hickox carefully adhered to MSF’s strict infection control policies.
23. MSF’s infection control policies included, but were not limited to:
• always washing hands with 0.05 percent chlorinated water, • maintaining at least a three meter distance at all times from
persons who had not been tested but were suspected of having Ebola • wearing full personal protective equipment (“PPE”) at all times when in physical contact with confirmed Ebola patients at the Ebola Center • always spraying all PPE items with 0.5 percent chlorinated water when removing PPE and always washing hands after PPE has been fully removed
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• adhering to a country-wide “no touch” policy that prohibited any kind of physical contact with anyone, such as handshakes, hugs, and sharing any kind of item.
24. While in Sierra Leone, Hickox never experienced an incident that would put her at risk for infection, such as accidentally being pricked by a needle or being splashed with possibly infectious fluids from an Ebola patient.
25. All known contacts that Hickox had with persons infected with Ebola occurred while Hickox was in full PPE.
26. Hickox departed from Sierra Leone on October 22, 2014. From Sierra Leone, Hickox flew to Brussels. She spent two days at MSF in Brussels. She was not subject to detention, isolation, or quarantine of any kind upon entry into or while staying in Brussels.
27. That day, October 22, Defendant Christie publicly announced that he had signed Executive Order 164 creating a statewide Ebola Preparedness Plan (“EPP”). The EPP is posted on the website of the New Jersey Department of Health (“NJDOH”), of which Defendant O’Dowd was the Commissioner. The EPP calls for active screening of travelers who began their travel in an Ebola-affected country in West Africa. Under the EPP, such travelers are subject to temperature checks, visual inspection for symptoms of Ebola and questioning about their history of risk of exposure. The EPP also provides that travelers who are
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asymptomatic but who are at some or high risk of exposure may be quarantined upon a determination by the NJDOH. The EPP does not give any guidelines or parameters for making this determination. If determined to be subject to quarantine, travelers are to be served with a quarantine order. For symptomatic travelers, EPP requires that they be “immediately transferred to one of three designated New Jersey hospitals under [Customs Border Patrol] escort.” The EPP does not state that asymptomatic travelers are subject to such a transfer. Rather, under the EPP, asymptomatic, at-risk travelers who are in transit or are not New Jersey residents and are subject to quarantine will be transported to a “State temporary housing arrangement.” New Jersey residents will be transported to their homes. Arrival at Newark Liberty International Airport and Isolation at University Hospital: October 24 – October 27, 2014 Friday, October 24, 2014
28. From Brussels, Hickox flew to the United States, landing at Newark Liberty International Airport at or about 12:30 p.m. on Friday, October 24, 2014.
29. At airport immigration, Hickox informed the immigration officer that she had come from Sierra Leone. The officer said this would not be a problem and that she would probably be asked some questions. The officer then put on gloves and a mask, made a call, and escorted her to the nearby CDC
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Newark Quarantine Station (“Quarantine Station”), which is operated by the U.S. CDC. The officer held on to Hickox’s passport while escorting her, and Hickox understood that she did not have a choice about whether or not to accompany the officer to the Quarantine Station.
30. Hickox was initially placed in a walled off area outside the Quarantine Station and an airport employee stayed with her at all times, apparently standing guard and conveying to Hickox that she was not free to leave.
31. Hickox’s temperature was taken using a temporal scanning thermometer. The temporal thermometer indicated that her temperature was normal and she did not have a fever. According to the CDC’s Risk Assessment for Travelers from Ebola Outbreak-Affected Countries (“CDC Risk Assessment”), Plaintiff’s temperature was 98.6 degrees.
32. Personnel at the Quarantine Station donned protective coveralls, gloves, masks and disposable face shields before speaking with Hickox.
33. Hickox was questioned by numerous persons, one after the other, who repeatedly asked the same questions. There seemed to be no coordination among the persons who interviewed her.
34. Among those who questioned her was a man who spoke to Hickox aggressively as if she were a criminal and was wearing a weapon belt that protruded from his coveralls.
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35. Hickox was also interviewed by two officials, one of whom was from the CDC, about her medical work in Sierra Leone.
36. Hickox was tired from jetlag and traveling for two-days, hungry, thirsty, confused and emotionally exhausted. No one told her what was going on or what was going to happen to her.
37. After about an hour and a half, at or about 2:00 p.m., Hickox was able to contact her partner and her family. She also asked for some food and something to drink and was given water and a granola bar.
38. The CDC Risk Assessment indicates that the CDC cleared Plaintiff.
39. Upon information and belief, staff at the Quarantine Station contacted the NJDOH at some point that afternoon.
40. At or about 2:30 p.m., Hickox was informed that she might be quarantined and was told to wait to hear from the New Jersey Department of Health. At or about 3:00 p.m., Hickox spoke on her cell phone to Defendant Ludwig. Ludwig informed Hickox that she would be quarantined and that she would be transported by the New Jersey State Department to somewhere safe.
41. Hickox did not voluntarily consent to quarantine. Rather, Hickox explained to Ludwig that quarantine was unnecessary because she was exhibiting absolutely no symptoms of Ebola and posed no threat to anyone. Hickox
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did not receive a quarantine order and was not given any more information, nor
was she told what rights she had in the given situation.
42. At or about 4:30 p.m., at a news conference, Defendant Christie
and New York Governor Andrew Cuomo announced Additional Screening
Protocols for Ebola at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York and at
Newark Airport (“Additional Screening Protocols”). The Additional Screening
Protocols include that:
Each State Department of Health at JFK and Newark Liberty International Airports will, as permitted under applicable law, make its own determination as to hospitalization, quarantine, and other public health interventions for up to 21 days. There will also be a mandatory quarantine for any individual who had direct contact with an individual infected with the Ebola virus while in one of the three West African nations (Liberia, Sierra Leone, or Guinea), including any medical personnel having performed medical services to individuals infected with the Ebola virus. Additionally, all individuals with travel history to the affected regions of West Africa, with no direct contact with an infected person, will be actively monitored by public health officials and, if necessary, quarantined, depending on the facts and circumstances of their particular situation.
43. Upon information and belief, Defendant Christie authorized,
directed and/or promulgated the Additional Screening Protocols.
44. Upon information and belief, Defendant O’Dowd participated
in, consulted on, approved of, directed and/or acquiesced in the creation,
promulgation and/or implementation of the Additional Screening Protocols.
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45. At the news conference, Defendant Christie indicated that the NJDOH had made and he had confirmed the decision to quarantine a healthcare worker, i.e., Hickox, who had arrived at Newark Airport from West Africa, even though she had no symptoms of Ebola. It was also indicated during the press conference that Defendant O’Dowd was managing the healthcare worker’s situation.
46. Upon information and belief, Defendant Christie authorized, approved of, and/ or directed the quarantine of Hickox.
47. Upon information and belief, Defendant O’Dowd authorized, directed, and/or implemented the quarantine of Hickox.
48. According to an email dated October 24, 2014 at 5:35 p.m., the decision was made to quarantine Hickox when she was asymptomatic and there had been no elevated temperature readings.
49. At some time in the late afternoon or early evening—when Hickox was frustrated and flushed after being held and questioned for hours and being told she would be quarantined, even though it was not medically necessary to do so—a woman came to check Hickox’s temperature with a temporal scanning thermometer. The woman pushed the button on the temporal scanning thermometer several times. When Hickox asked her what the thermometer indicated, the woman told Hickox that it showed she had a fever. Hickox explained to the woman that
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her face was flushed from frustration. Hickox also said she did not believe the temporal scanner was accurate. Despite her emotional distress, Hickox felt physically healthy. She did not feel fevered.
50. Around this time, Hickox was moved into the Quarantine Station where she was placed in a room by herself and both doors were closed. An airport or Quarantine Station employee stood outside the door.
51. Later, Hickox was informed that because of her alleged fever she would have to undergo a medical evaluation. No one told her where she would be taken for her medical evaluation until she specifically asked for this information.
52. Throughout the time she was held at the Quarantine Station, Hickox felt there was a lack of communication as well as a lack of coordination, which caused her anxiety and distress.
53. At or about 6:00 p.m., Hickox was transported to University Hospital in Newark in an ambulance escorted by approximately eight police cars with lights and sirens blaring. At the hospital, Hickox was placed in an isolation tent. There were signs on the inside of doors of the tent stating “Do Not Enter” and indicating that Hickox could not leave the tent. At all times, a guard was stationed at the door to the building housing the tent where Hickox was detained.
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54. The isolation tent was located in a large building that appeared to be unfinished because the ceiling pipes were exposed. The area was not properly heated. It was cold in the tent and one nurse outside the tent was wearing a blanket over her shoulders. Hickox had to ask for extra blankets to keep warm. The tent had a portable toilet but no shower.
55. The isolation tent had no telephone in the tent and the only computer was used for keeping medical records. Hickox was able to insist that she be allowed to take her cellular phone and charger into the tent with her. Her cellular telephone was Hickox’s only access to the outside world as there was also no television in the tent. In addition, cellular telephone reception was not good in the tent so it was extremely difficult for Hickox to send or receive emails or documents for personal or legal business.
56. At University Hospital, Hickox’s temperature was within normal range initially, showing 99.1 degrees when taken with an oral thermometer. In contrast, the temporal scanning thermometer showed an exaggeratedly high temperature of 101.1 degrees.
57. Shortly thereafter, two doctors, one of whom was Dr. David Cennimo, an infectious disease doctor, and a paramedic met with Hickox in the isolation tent. They asked her a few questions, checked her vital signs, drew blood and took her temperature with an oral thermometer. The oral thermometer
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indicated that Hickox’s temperature was normal. The doctors seemed confused and said that they were told that Hickox had a fever. Hickox said that she believed the temporal thermometer used at the Quarantine Station was inaccurate. They then took her temperature again using a temporal thermometer. Only a minute or two after the oral thermometer indicated Hickox had no fever, the temporal scanning thermometer again indicated an exaggeratedly high temperature, showing 102 degrees. One of the doctors felt her neck with his gloved hand and said he did not think the temporal thermometer was accurate. He also agreed with Hickox that she was flushed.
58. Dr. Cennimo and Edward Lifshitz, Medical Director of the Communicable Disease Service of the New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Service, both cast doubts on the accuracy of the temperature readings taken from Hickox’s forehead, indicating that the oral readings were more reliable and were the “gold standard.”
59. At or about 8:30 p.m. Hickox’s temperature was taken with an oral thermometer. The oral thermometer indicated her temperature was a normal 98.1 degrees.
60. Hickox’s temperature was checked again around 9:50 p.m. Again there was a discrepancy between the temperatures indicated by the temporal scanning thermometer and the oral thermometer. The temporal thermometer
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indicated that Hickox had a fever, with a temperature of 100.5 degrees. But Hickox recalls that her temperature was taken at about the same time with an oral thermometer and that it showed her temperature to be about 98.2 degrees.
61. Hickox’s temperature was taken with a temporal thermometer again around 11:30 p.m. and it was only 99.5 degrees. An oral temperature reading taken only about 30 minutes later showed Hickox’s temperature was 98 degrees. And another oral reading taken about twenty minutes after that showed Hickox’s temperature was 98.6 degrees. During the remainder of her confinement, Hickox’s temperature never again rose above 99.5 degrees, regardless of the thermometer used.
62. Upon information and belief, normal body temperature can have a wide range from 97 degrees to 99 degrees, even going as high as 100 degrees. Upon information and belief a temperature of 100.4 degrees has been identified as a benchmark for when one has a fever caused by an infection or illness.
63. At some point on Friday evening, Hickox received a call from an employee of the New Jersey Department of Health asking if she had received a signed quarantine order. She had not. The person then said they would make sure Hickox got the order.
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64. Also on Friday evening, the NJDOH issued a statement under Defendant O’Dowd’s name, which confirmed that the decision to quarantine “the healthcare worker,” i.e., Hickox, had been made despite her having no symptoms and indicated, incorrectly, that “the healthcare worker” had developed a fever. The statement also indicated that Hickox was in isolation and under evaluation at University Hospital in Newark. Saturday, October 25, 2014
65. At or about 3:14 a.m., Defendant O’Dowd received an email reporting the lab results from the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene’s Public Health Laboratory, which showed that Hickox tested negative for Ebola.
66. According to Hickox’s medical records, from at least 4:58 a.m. on October 25 until her discharge on October 27, Hickox was never characterized as febrile or in any way symptomatic. The Emergency Department Provider Notes for this period characterize Hickox as “afebrile,” “asymptomatic” or having “no active health issues,” despite occasional temperatures ranging from 99.1 to 99.5 degrees.
67. In an email dated October 25, 2014 8:04 a.m., notwithstanding that Hickox’s test results came back negative for Ebola, a NJDOH epidemiologist stated, “We are recommending keeping her in isolation and observe for 72 hours.”
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Upon information and belief, notwithstanding that Hickox had tested negative for Ebola and had no fever, Defendants O’Dowd and Christie authorized, approved of and/or directed the continued detention of Hickox.
68. That morning Hickox requested to take a shower and was brought water for a sponge bath. When she requested clean clothes to change into, she was given only thin paper scrubs.
69. At or about 12 p.m. The Dallas Morning News published on its website, www.dallasnews.com, an account by Hickox of her experience and treatment at Newark International Airport and at University Hospital. Later that afternoon Defendant Christie described Hickox as “obviously ill.” Defendant Christie went on to imply that she was exhibiting symptoms of Ebola, saying, “I’m sorry if in any way she was inconvenienced but inconvenience that could occur from having folks that are symptomatic and ill out amongst the public is a much, much greater concern of mine.”
70. At or about 3:14 p.m. NJDOH received the lab results from the CDC in Atlanta, Georgia, which showed that Hickox tested negative for Ebola (“Ebola RT-PCR was negative”).
71. Despite this second test confirming that Hickox was negative for Ebola, Hickox continued to be detained, isolated and quarantined.
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72. At or about 4:00 p.m., Hickox found the Administrative Order Declaring Quarantine and Isolation of Kaci Hickox (“the Order”), attached as Exhibit A, lying on top of the portable hand-washing station in the tent. The Order, which violated clearly established law, was signed by Defendant O’Dowd.
73. Upon information and belief, Defendant Christie knew of, authorized, approved, and/or directed the issuance of the Order.
74. Hickox was disturbed by the vagueness of the Order. She was confused and scared by what was happening to her and by the lack of communication from those responsible for holding her under quarantine and isolation.
75. The Order stated that “pursuant to N.J.S.A 26:4-2d and N.J.A.C 8:57-1.11, the Department [of Health] has the power to maintain and enforce proper and sufficient quarantine or isolation, whenever deemed necessary.”
76. N.J.S.A 26:4-2d states “In order to prevent the spread of disease affecting humans, the Department of Health, …, shall have the power to: Maintain and enforce proper and sufficient quarantine, wherever deemed necessary,” not “whenever deemed necessary.” (All emphasis added.)
77. The Order also stated that “pursuant to N.J.S.A 26:4-2e and N.J.A.C 8:57-1.11, the Department has the power to remove any person exposed to or infected with a communicable disease to a suitable place, if in its judgment,
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removal is necessary and can be accomplished without any undue risk to the
person infected.”
78. N.J.S.A. 26:4-2e states, “In order to prevent the spread of
disease affecting humans, the Department of Health . . . shall have power to: . . .
[r]emove any person infected with a communicable disease to a suitable place …”
Section 26:4-2e does not authorize removal of persons merely exposed to or at risk
of exposure to a communicable disease.
79. N.J.A.C. 8:57-1.11 states, in relevant part:
(a) A health officer or the Department, upon receiving a report of a communicable disease, shall, by written order, establish such isolation or quarantine measures as medically and epidemiologically necessary to prevent or control the spread of the disease.
1. If, in the medical and epidemiologic judgment of the health officer or the Department, it is necessary to hospitalize the ill person in order to provide adequate isolation, a health officer or the Department shall promptly remove, or cause to be removed, that person to a hospital.
…
(c) The Department . . . may, by written order, isolate or quarantine any person who has been exposed to a communicable disease as medically or epidemiologically necessary to prevent the spread of the disease, providing such period of restriction shall not exceed the period of incubation of the disease. (All emphasis added.)
80. N.J.A.C. 8:57-1.11 authorizes quarantine or isolation only of
persons who are infected or have actually been exposed to a communicable
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disease. N.J.A.C. 8:57-1.11 does not authorize quarantine of persons who are
merely at risk of exposure, regardless of the level of that risk.
81. The Order states, inter alia:
1. The traveler shall be maintained in isolation or quarantine until it is determined that she does not present a danger to the public health. Unless and until medical testing is able to show that she does not have Ebola, and unless and until appropriate medical professionals are able to determine that she does not present an immediate danger to the public health, she shall remain in isolation at University Hospital.
2. After such time the traveler shall remain in quarantine in such form and at such location as I [Mary E. O’Dowd, Commissioner, New Jersey Department of Health] deem appropriate. . . . Less restrictive alternatives would not be sufficient to guard against the spread of the disease.
. . .
5. The quarantine or isolation of any person shall be terminated by the Commissioner when the person no longer poses a threat of transmitting Ebola to others.
6. This order shall remain in force until modified or terminated by the Commissioner, or as set forth herein.
82. The Order does not state that Hickox was actually exposed to
Ebola, only that she was “at a high risk of having been exposed,” an assessment
which did not comport with CDC Interim Guidance classifying healthcare workers
who wore PPE as “at some risk” of exposure. (See infra.)
83. Paragraph five of the Order did not state meaningful conditions
for Hickox’s release. Paragraph five was effectively a nullity because Hickox
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never posed a threat of transmitting Ebola. At a minimum, by the time Hickox received the Order, Hickox—who had tested negative for Ebola and had no fever—should already have been removed from isolation and quarantine. There was no medical or epidemiological reason for her isolation and she posed no threat for the transmission of Ebola.
84. Regarding Hickox’s right to contest the order, the order stated only:
7. Any person or persons subject to this Order may seek relief from the Commissioner from the provisions of the Order by making a written application within 10 days to Office of Legal and Regulatory Compliance, New Jersey Department of Health, P.O. Box 360, Trenton, New Jersey 08625-0360 or OLRC@doh.state.nj.us. A person may obtain additional information by calling (609) 984-2177. 8. Unless stayed by order of the Commissioner, the written order for quarantine and isolation shall remain in force and effect until the proceeding commenced under paragraph 7 is finally determined and disposed of on its merits.
85. The Order did not mention the possibility of judicial review of the Order, the nature of the proceeding, or Hickox’s rights under any such proceeding, including the right to counsel.
86. Moreover, the conditions of Hickox’s confinement made it impossible for her to seek the relief described in paragraph seven of the Order because she did not have access to the materials necessary for a written application for relief, such as paper and writing utensils.
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87. At or about 6:00 p.m., Hickox received a call from Defendant Rinn. Hickox asked him to tell her what the plan was for her and to tell her what valid medical protocol justified her detention and isolation in quarantine. He did not have an answer for her and told her he would get back to her. Hickox did not hear from him for 24 hours, and even then he still did not have an answer for her.
88. At or about 6:55 p.m. Hickox’s mother called her. Hickox’s mother was afraid that Hickox might be sick because Defendant Christie had recently said in an interview that Hickox was “obviously ill.”
89. That evening, Hickox spoke with a doctor and asked what would happen to her given that she had tested negative for Ebola and remained asymptomatic. The doctor did not answer Hickox’s question, alluding to the fact that it was not his decision.
90. No one could or would tell Hickox why she was being held even after her blood sample twice tested negative for Ebola, causing Hickox further anxiety and distress.
91. Also that evening, an employee from MSF-USA brought Hickox warm clothes. The MSF employee was not allowed to enter the area where the tent was so that she could see and visit with Hickox, even though hospital staff entered the area and spoke to Hickox through the window without wearing any protective attire or equipment. Hickox felt frustrated, isolated, alone, and forgotten.
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Sunday, October 26, 2014 92. Hickox remained asymptomatic on Sunday, October 26 but she
continued to be held in the isolation tent. 93. At or about 7:30 a.m. Hickox asked to speak to the person who
was in charge of her detention so that she could ask to see her lawyer, Norman Siegel. The hospital employee in charge told Hickox that the no visitor policy was the Department of Health’s decision, not the hospital’s decision. Hickox explained that she wanted to see her lawyer and gave the hospital employee Siegel’s telephone number.
94. Finally, at or about 6:00 p.m., Hickox received another call from Rinn. Rinn said he wanted to discuss what would happen next, but still would not explain why Hickox continued to be detained when she had tested negative for Ebola and was completely asymptomatic. Hickox was distressed and felt like she was being manipulated. She told Rinn to contact her lawyer about next steps.
95. At or about 5:00 p.m., Hickox’s lawyers, Norman Siegel and Steven Hyman, were allowed into the area outside Hickox’s tent. They met and spoke with Hickox through the window in the tent. Monday, October 27, 2014
96. On Monday morning, no one from the hospital or the Department of Health told Hickox what would happen next. Rather, at or about
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9:30 a.m., Hickox received a text from her partner informing her that the media was reporting that Defendant Christie said Hickox would be released from isolation if the CDC gave its approval.
97. At or about 11:00 a.m., hospital staff entered the isolation tent without protective gear and shook Hickox’s hand. The hospital staff told Hickox that she would be released but they had no additional information.
98. At or about 1:30 p.m., Hickox was released from the hospital but was not released from custody and continued to be detained as she was driven to Maine in the company of three New Jersey Emergency Medical Technicians.
99. Upon information and belief, the treatment Hickox received in New Jersey and the communications between New Jersey and Maine officials affected the treatment Hickox received upon her return to Maine. CDC Interim Guidance for Monitoring and Movement of Persons with Potential Ebola Virus Exposure (“CDC Interim Guidance”)
100. According to the CDC Interim Guidance, as updated October 29, 2014, persons in countries with widespread transmission who have “direct contact while using appropriate PPE with a person with Ebola while the person was symptomatic” are classified as being at “some risk” of Ebola Exposure, not “high risk.” Hickox falls into the “some risk” category.
101. For asymptomatic persons classified in the “some risk” category, such as Hickox, the CDC recommends:
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direct active monitoring until 21 days after the last potential exposure. Public health authorities may consider additional restrictions based on a specific assessment of the individual’s situation. Factors to consider include the following: intensity of exposure (e.g., daily direct patient care versus intermittent visits to an Ebola treatment unit); point of time in the incubation period (risk falls substantially after 2 weeks); complete absence of symptoms; compliance with direct active monitoring; the individual's ability to immediately recognize and report symptom onset, self-isolate, and seek medical care; and the probability that the proposed activity would result in exposure to others prior to effective isolation. The “additional restrictions” that public authorities might consider do not include detention, quarantine or isolation.
102. At all times Hickox was willing to cooperate with and supported compliance with the CDC Interim Guidance.
103. Defendants’ conduct caused Hickox to be deprived of her liberty and to sustain suffering, and injury and psychological and emotional trauma. Their actions constituted outrageous and reckless conduct, and demonstrated a callous indifference to and willful disregard of Plaintiff’s federal and statutory rights.
104. In taking the actions described above, the Defendants were acting under color of state law as aforesaid.
105. On December 30, 2014 a notice of claim was mailed and on January 5, 2015, the notice of claim was received by the Tort and Recovery Unit of the Bureau of Risk Management at the New Jersey Department of the Treasury. At
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least six (6) months have elapsed since the service of such notice, and adjustment and/or payment has been neglected and/or refused.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF (VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES)
106. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation set forth above.
107. Defendants, acting under color of state law, unreasonably caused Plaintiff to be confined under quarantine without legal basis in violation of Plaintiff’s right to be free of an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and to be free of a deprivation of liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
108. Plaintiff suffered injury and damages as a result of Defendants’ conduct.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF (VIOLATION OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES) 109. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation set forth above.
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110. Plaintiff has a liberty interest in being free from restraint such as detention, isolation and/or quarantine.
111. Defendants, acting under of color of state law, unreasonably and unlawfully deprived Plaintiff of this liberty by detaining, isolating and quarantining her without medical or epidemiological justification, pursuant to, inter alia, New Jersey’s statewide Ebola Preparedness Plan, the Additional Screening Protocols for Ebola at Newark Airport, and the Administrative Order Declaring Quarantine and Isolation of Kaci Hickox.
112. Defendants violated Plaintiff’s clearly established substantive due process rights by, inter alia, (i) detaining, isolating, and quarantining her without an adequate individualized assessment of the risk, if any, that Hickox in particular posed to the public health; (ii) not using the least restrictive means available to protect the public health; (iii) subjecting Plaintiff to confinement the nature and duration of which did not bear a reasonable relation to the purpose for which Plaintiff was confined; and (iv) quarantining Plaintiff under a quarantine order that was not authorized by N.J.S.A 26:4-2d, N.J.S.A. 26:4-2e, or N.J.A.C. 8:57-1.11, which do not authorize quarantine of persons who are merely at risk of exposure, and not actually exposed to a communicable disease.
113. Plaintiff suffered injury and damages as a result of Defendants’ conduct.
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THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF (VIOLATION OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES)
114. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation set forth above.
115. Defendants’ detention, isolation and quarantine of Plaintiff pursuant to New Jersey’s statewide Ebola Preparedness Plan, the Additional Screening Protocols for Ebola at Newark Airport, and the Administrative Order Declaring Quarantine and Isolation of Kaci Hickox violated Plaintiff’s right to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States by failing to provide for a prompt hearing for judicial review of Plaintiff’s isolation and/or quarantine where Plaintiff could be represented by counsel and could present opposing evidence and argument and could cross examine witnesses.
116. In detaining, isolating and quarantining Plaintiff, Defendants were acting under color of state law.
117. Plaintiff suffered injury and damages as a result of Defendants’ conduct.
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FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF (FALSE IMPRISONMENT)
118. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation set forth above.
119. Defendants unlawfully detained and confined Plaintiff by authorizing, directing, approving and/or implementing the unlawful and unreasonable detention, isolation and/or quarantine of Plaintiff at Newark International Airport and at University Hospital. In so doing, Defendants substantially interfered with Plaintiff’s liberty.
120. Defendants intended to confine and did confine Plaintiff. Plaintiff did not consent to the confinement and the confinement was not otherwise privileged.
121. Defendants lacked proper legal authority or legal justification to detain, isolate and/or quarantine Plaintiff because they were acting pursuant New Jersey’s statewide Ebola Preparedness Plan, the Additional Screening Protocols for Ebola at Newark Airport, and the Administrative Order Declaring Quarantine and Isolation of Kaci Hickox, which are unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiff in this case.
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122. Defendants authorized, directed, and/or acquiesced to words and/or conduct that created a reasonable apprehension of force in Plaintiff and the means of coercion was at hand.
123. Plaintiff suffered injury and damages as a result of Defendants’ conduct.
124. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, this Court has pendant or supplemental jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate such claims.
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF (INVASION OF PRIVACY—FALSE LIGHT) 125. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation set forth above. 126. On October 25, 2014 Defendant Christie made a public statement falsely indicating that Plaintiff was obviously ill and implying that she was symptomatic for Ebola, despite medical evidence to the contrary. 127. Defendant Christie’s statement was untrue at the time it was publicized. 128. Falsely indicating that a person is sick with or symptomatic for a highly contagious and deadly disease would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
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129. When this statement was made, Defendant Christie had knowledge of and/or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which Plaintiff was placed.
130. Plaintiff suffered injury and damages as a result of Defendant Christie’s statement.
131. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, this Court has pendant or supplemental jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate such claims.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 132. Plaintiff demands trial by jury.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF Wherefore, Plaintiff requests the following relief:
A. Compensatory and punitive damages in the amount of at least $250,000.00 or another amount to be determined at trial.
B. The costs of this action, including reasonable attorney’s fees, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
C. Any further and different relief that this Court deems appropriate.
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Dated: Newark, New Jersey October 22, 2015
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF NEW JERSEY FOUNDATION By: /s/Edward Barocas_________ Edward Barocas Jeanne LoCicero Post Office Box 32159 Newark, New Jersey 07102 (973) 642-2086 ext. 1717
MCLAUGHLIN & STERN, LLP Alan Sash 260 Madison Avenue, 18th Floor New York, New York 10016 (212) 448-1100
Attorneys for Plaintiff
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO LOCAL RULE 11.2
The matter in controversy in Kaci Hickox v. Christopher James Christie, et al. is not the subject of any other action pending in any court, or of any pending arbitration or administrative proceeding.
I, Edward Barocas, certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on October 22, 2015.
/s/Edward Barocas_________ Edward Barocas
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 Case 2:15-cv-07647-KM-JBC Document 19 Filed 09/02/16 Page 1 of 36 PageID: 259

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

HAd HICKOX, Plaintiff,
V.
CHRISTOPHER JAMES CHRISTIE, et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 15-7647 (KM) OPINION

KEVIN MCNULTY, U.S.D.J.:
This is a civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(“Section 1983”). The plaintiff, Kaci Hickox, is a nurse who cared for individuals affected by the 20 14—16 Ebola epidemic in West Africa, specifically in Sierra Leone. Upon her return to the United States, Ms. Hickox was stopped at Newark Liberty International Airport while her health was monitored. Hickox alleges that this quarantine, which lasted approximately 80 hours, violated her rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Hickox also alleges that defendants committed the New Jersey common law torts of false imprisonment and false light.
Hickox sues various State officials involved in her quarantine: Chris Christie, the Governor of New Jersey; Mary O’Dowd, then the Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Health (“DOH”); Christopher Rinn, Assistant Commissioner of the Division of Public Health Infrastructure, Laboratories and Emergency Preparedness of the DOH; and Gary Ludwig, the Service Director of the Communicable Disease Service of the DOH.
It is plain that Ms. Hickox was upset not only by the quarantine itself but by what she saw as an inefficient, unfriendly, and opaque process. As she sees it, there was a lack of communication regarding the quarantine and what would happen to her. It is also clear that Hickox disagreed with the assessment
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of her medical condition throughout the quarantine process. Bad science and irrational fear often amplify the public’s reaction to
reports of infectious disease. Ebola, although it has inspired great fear, is a virus, not a malevolent magic spell. The State is entitled to some latitude, howêer, in its prophylactic efforts to contain what is, at present, an incurable -añdoften fatal disease.
Nurse Hickox lent her medical skills to a humanitarian effort to relieve the suffering of people she had never met. Her courage and service perhaps merited a warmer welcome home. The issue here, however, is different: I am called upon to determine whether Hickox has stated a legally cognizable claim for damages under the Constitution or the common law. Now before the Court is the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For the reasons discussed below, I will grant the motion to dismiss the federal claims on grounds of qualified immunity. Public health officials responsible for containing the spread of contagious disease must be free to make judgments, even to some degree mistaken ones, without exposing themselves to judgments for money damages. As to the state causes of action, however, I will deny the motions to dismiss.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND For purposes of this motion to dismiss only, I take the allegations of the
complaint to be true. See Section II, infra. Events leading up to Hickox’s quarantine
The 2014—16 Ebola outbreak in West Africa resulted in the deaths of more than 11,000 people. See Medicins Sans Frontieres, Ebola, www.msf.org/en/diseases/ebola. The Ebola virus is spread through direct contact with the body fluids of a symptomatic person or with contaminated
objects, such as needles. (Id. ¶ 16) Symptoms commonly appear within 8 to 10 days of exposure, although it can take up to 21 days. (Id. ¶ 18)
Ms. Hickox, a trained nurse, has experience working for Medecins Sans Frontieres (“MSF”), also known as “Doctors Without Borders,” in places
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including Uganda, Nigeria, and Sudan. (ECF no. 1 (“Cplt.”) ¶ 6) From
September 23, 2014, until October 22, 2014, Hickox served as a Medical Team Leader at the Ebola Treatment Unit at Bo, Sierra Leone. (IcL) There, Hickox cared for patients with Ebola, and also managed and trained other workers. (Id.
¶ 21) During her time in Sierra Leone, Hickox followed MSF protocols, such as
the wearing of protective equipment, intended to prevent the spread of Ebola.
(Id. ¶ 23)
On October 22, 2014, just as Hickox was leaving Sierra Leone, Governor Christie announced that he had signed Executive Order 164, which created a
statewide Ebola Preparedness Plan (“EPP”). (Id. ¶ 27) The EPP provided that as
of October 16, 2014, active screening had been implemented for passengers arriving from West African countries. Id.; see EPP, available at http://nj.gov/governor/news/news/552014/pdf/20141022a.pdf.’ The screening for such passengers was to include “[t]emperature checks,” “[vjisual inspection for symptoms,” and an assessment of their “[h]istory of risk
exposure.” (Id. ¶ 27; EPP at 1) The EPP stated that “[i]f CDC advises DOH of a
traveler who is asymptomatic but has some high risk of exposure, DOH will determine whether that traveler will be subject to State quarantine.” EPP at 2.
If an asymptomatic individual to be quarantined lives within 100 miles of
Newark Airport, he or she will be taken home. (Cplt. ¶ 27; EPP at 2) An
individual who lives outside that radius will be placed in a “temporary housing arrangement.” (Id.) Symptomatic travelers are to be immediately transferred to
a designated hospital. (Cplt. ¶ 27)
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3

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Friday October 24, 2014 Hickox left Sierra Leone on October 22, 2014, and flew to Brussels,
where she spent two days before returning to the United States. (Id. ¶ 26) She landed at Newark airport around 12:30 p.m. on Friday, October 24. (Id. ¶ 28)
At the airport immigration checkpoint, Hickox told the officer her point of origin
was Sierra Leone. (Id. ¶ 29) She was then transferred to the CDC Quarantine
Station at the airport. (Id.) At the Quarantine Station, her temperature was
taken and found to be 98.6° F, i.e., normal. (Id. ¶ 31) Hickox was questioned by
multiple people, including one from the CDC. Those individuals wore protective clothing when they were in her presence. (Id. ¶j 32-35) After about 90 minutes, Hickox was given water and a snack, and was permitted to contact her family.
(Id. ¶ 37)
Around 2:30 p.m., approximately two hours after Hickox arrived at Newark airport, she was told that she might be quarantined and should await
the decision of the DOH. (Id. ¶ 40) At around 3:00 p.m., defendant Ludwig
informed Hickox by cell phone that DOH had decided to quarantine her. (Id.)
Tickox objected. (Id. ¶ 41)
At approximately 4:30 p.m. the same day, New Jersey Governor Christie, along with the Governor of New York, Andrew Cuomo, announced that there would be additional screening for individuals arriving at Newark Airport and
John F. Kennedy Airport. (Id. ¶ 42) That additional screening was to include
mandatory quarantine for individuals who had had contact with any individual infected with Ebola in Liberia, Sierra Leone or Guinea. (Id.) Individuals who had traveled to those countries but did not have direct contact with such a person would be actively monitored and quarantined, if necessary, depending on the facts of the case. (Id.) At the press conference, Governor Christie stated that a healthcare worker (not explicitly identified as Hickox) had been
quarantined and that O’Dowd was monitoring her condition. (Id. ¶ 45)
At some point in the late afternoon or early evening, Hickox’s temperature was taken with a temporal (forehead) thermometer, which
indicated that she had a fever. (Id. ¶ 49) Hickox did not feel feverish and
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believed that the thermometer reading was inaccurate. (Id.) Soon after, Hickox
was moved into a room by herself with someone stationed outside. (Id. ¶ 50)
Hickox was informed that she needed a medical evaluation because of
her fever. (Id. ¶ 51) Around 6:00 p.m., she was transported to University
Hospital in Newark and placed in an isolation tent with someone stationed
outside. (Id. ¶ 53) The tent had a portable toilet but did not have a shower. (Id. ¶ 54) Hickox was cold and requested more blankets, which she received. (Id.)
The tent did not have a television, but Hickox was allowed to bring in her cell
phone, though she found reception to be unreliable. (Id. ¶ 55)
At the hospital, Hickox’s temperature was taken several times, both temporally and orally. Initially, the temporal thermometer showed a
temperature of 101.1°, while an oral thermometer read 99.10. (Id. ¶ 56) Shortly
thereafter, Hickox’s blood was drawn, and her temperature was taken again. The temporal thermometer read 102°, but again the oral thermometer did not
reflect a fever. (Id. ¶ 57) At around 8:30 p.m., Hickox’s temperature was again taken with an oral thermometer which read 98.10. (Id. ¶ 59) At around 9:50
p.m., the temporal thermometer read 100.5°, and the oral thermometer read
98.2°. (Id. ¶ 60) At around 11:30 p.m., Hickox’s temperature was taken with a temporal thermometer which read 99.5°. (Id. ¶ 61) A short time later, it was
taken with an oral thermometer which read 98°. (Id.) Another oral reading soon afterward came in at 98.6°. (Id.) Thereafter, Hickox’s temperature readings remained at or below 99.5°, regardless of the method used. (Id.)
At some time on October 24, 2015—it is not clear exactly when—O’Dowd signed an “Administrative Order Declaring Quarantine and Isolation of Kaci Hickox.” (A copy is attached to the complaint, ECF no. 1-1 pp. 2-3) The Order
invokes the powers of the DOH under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 26:4 et seq. and N.J.A.C. § 8:57 et seq. (quoted in.fra). The order’s “Whereas” clauses state
administrative findings that Ebola is a contagious, often fatal disease, with an incubation period of up to 21 days; that CDC has instituted enhanced entry screening for travelers from Ebola-infected areas, including Sierra Leone; that Ms. Hickox had had contact with infected individuals as recently as October
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20, 2014, and was at high risk of exposure; that at the airport she experienced the onset of a fever; that she was currently in isolation at University Hospital for care and monitoring; that her medical status was uncertain; and that therefore the DOH could not rule out that she was infected and posed a danger
to public health. The Administrative Order provided that Ms. Hickox would be
quarantined “until it is determined that she does not present a danger to the public health.” (Id.) The Order advised that a person who is quarantined can seek relief by emailing or writing to the Office of Legal and Regulatory Compliance at the DOH. (Id. p. 3) It also provided a phone number for additional information. (Id.) The Order was to remain in effect until further order of the DOH Commissioner, or until the termination of a proceeding
seeking relief. Sometime in the evening, Hickox received a call from a DOH employee
asking whether she had received a signed copy of a quarantine order. (Id. ¶ 63)
Hickox said she had not, and the unidentified employee said that he or she
would get Hickox a copy. (Id.)
Saturday October 25, 2014 Around 3:14 a.m. on Saturday, October 25, 2014, O’Dowd received
emailed results of Hickox’s blood work from the Public Health Laboratory of the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. Those results
indicated that Hickox had tested negative for Ebola. (Id. ¶ 65) A DOH
epidemiologist nevertheless recommended keeping Hickox in isolation for 72
hours to permit observation. (Id. ¶ 67) Later that morning, Hickox asked to take a shower and was given water for a sponge bath. (Id. ¶ 68) She requested
clean clothes and was given paper scrubs. (Id.) At around 12:00 p.m., The Dallas Morning News published an interview
with Hickox regarding her experience in quarantine. (Id. ¶ 69) Later that
afternoon, Governor Christie made a public statement in which he allegedly described Hickox as “ill.” (Id.) Around 3:14 p.m., the DOH received results from
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the CDC’s lab, also reflecting that Hickox had tested negative for Ebola. (Id. ¶
70 (“Ebola RT—PCR was negative.”)) At around 4:00 p.m., Hickox found a copy of the Administrative Order of
quarantine, described above, on top of a portable handwashing station in her
tent. (Id. ¶ 72) At around 6:00 pm, Hickox received a call from defendant Rinn. (Id. ¶ 87) Hickox asked Rinn what would happen to her. He replied that he did
not have an answer and would get back to her. (Id.) Later that evening, an MSF
employee brought Hickox warm clothes. (Id. ¶ 91) The employee was not
allowed to enter the tent to visit Hickox. (Id.) Sunday October 26, 2014
At around 7:30 a.m. on October 26, 2014, Hickox asked to speak with
her lawyer. (IcL ¶ 93) At around 5:00 p.m., Hickox’s lawyers were allowed into the area outside Hickox’s tent. They spoke to her through a window. (Id. ¶ 95)
At around 6:00 p.m., Hickox received a call from Rinn to discuss the next steps. Hickox felt that Rinn did not adequately explain why she was being held,
and she told Rinn to contact her lawyer. (Id. ¶ 94)
Monday, October 27, 2014 At around 11:00 a.m. on October 27, 2014, hospital staff members
entered the isolation tent without protective gear, shook Hickox’s hand, and
told her she was being released. (Id. ¶ 97) Around 1:30 p.m., Hickox left the
hospital and was driven to Maine, where she then resided, by Emergency
Medical Technicians. (Id. ¶ 98).
II. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, in whole
or in part, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The moving party bears the burden of showing that no claim has been stated. Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005). In deciding a motion to dismiss, a court must take all allegations in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.s. 490, 501 (1975); Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc. v. Mirage Resorts Inc., 140
7

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F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Phillzs v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (“reasonable inferences” principle not undermined by later Supreme Court Twombly case, infra).
FED. R. Civ. p. 8(a) does not require that a complaint contain detailed factual allegations. Nevertheless, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”’ Bell Ati. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Thus, the factual allegations must be sufficient to raise a plaintiff’s right to relief above a speculative level, such that it is “plausible on its face.” See id. at 570; see also Umland v. PLANCO Fin. Serv., Inc., 542 F.3d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 2008). A claim has “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). While “[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement’ ... it asks for more than a sheer possibility.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (2009). III. FEDERAL CLAIMS: QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Plaintiff’s federal claims, Counts 1, 2, and 3, are brought pursuant to Section 1983, which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, to sufficiently set forth a Section 1983 claim, a
complaint must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. See Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep’t, 635 F.3d 606, 609 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see also West v. Atkins,
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487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Defendants contend that the Section 1983 claims should be dismissed in their entirety on the grounds of qualified immunity. For the reasons expressed in this section, I agree.
A. Qualified Immunity Standards “[Q]ualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability as long ‘as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 364 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 5. Ct. 2727 (1982)). “When properly applied, [qualified immunity] protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 331 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Mammaro v. New Jersey Div. of Child Protection and Permanency, 814 F.3d 164, 170 (3d. Cir. 2016) (noting that in circumstances where “the failure to act quickly and decisively ... may have devastating consequences” qualified immunity exists “unless clearly established law puts [officials] on notice that their conduct is a violation of the Constitution”).
Qualified immunity issues (such as whether a violation was “objectively apparent” under the circumstances at the time) may require the kind of factual context that is available only on summary judgment or at trial. Nevertheless, when a qualified immunity issue is raised on a motion to dismiss, the Court is obligated to address it. “[U]nless the plaintiffs allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before the commencement of discovery.” Thomas v. Independence Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 291 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S. Ct. 2806 (1985)). As Thomas implies, at the pleading stage such a clear violation need be alleged, not proven. “The focus of the qualified immunity inquiry is on the allegations ....“ Lagano, 769 F.3d at 859.
The qualified immunity analysis has two parts:
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(1) The court must “determine whether the facts, and inferences drawn therefrom, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, establish that the official’s conduct violated a constitutional right.” McGreevy, 413 F.3d at 364 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S. Ct. 2151 (2001)). This step is functionally equivalent to the standard employed on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss. (2) The court must “determine whether, as a legal matter, the right that
the defendant’s conduct allegedly violates was a clearly established one, about which a reasonable person would have known.” Id. (citing Gruenke v. Sezp, 225 F.3d 290, 298 (3d Cir. 2000)). This step requires “that in light of preexisting law, the unlawfulness of the official’s conduct was reasonably and objectively apparent.” McGreevy, 413 F.3d at 366 (citing Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615, 119 S. Ct. 1692 (1999)). See also Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739, 122
S. Ct. 2508 (2002). The court has the discretion to analyze the steps in either order. Pearson
v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009) (partially overruling Saucier, supra, and no longer requiring courts to determine issues (1) and (2) in that order). The parties direct their arguments to the second stage of the analysis, whether the defendants’ conduct violated a constitutional right that was “clearly established.” I do the same, although the analysis of either step is necessarily intertwined with that of the other.
B. Quarantine Case Law To assess whether defendants’ actions violated clearly established law, I look first to existing precedent involving quarantine and related public health measures. I find that this case law would not have placed the defendant officials on notice of a clear violation of Hickox’s constitutional rights. It authorizes preventive detention of a person exposed to others who suffer from a contagious, dangerous disease. Within broad boundaries, the length of such detention is a judgment call, calling for the application of expertise; there is no bright-line statutory or constitutional rule. (I consider an independent Fourth
Amendment analysis in the following section.)
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The federal government possesses the power to declare and enforce a quarantine. That power, based on the commerce clause, would appear to be at its zenith with respect to preventive measures at the border. Section 361 of the Public Health Service Act provides that “[t]he Surgeon General, with the approval of the Secretary [of Health and Human Services], is authorized to make and enforce such regulations as in his [sic] judgment are necessary to prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases from foreign countries into the States or possessions, or from one State or
possession into any other State or possession.” 42 U.S.C. § 264. Authority to
carry out these functions has been delegated to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). “Under 42 Code of Federal Regulations parts 70 and 71, CDC is authorized to detain, medically examine, and release persons arriving into the United States and traveling between states who are suspected of carrying these communicable diseases.” CDC website,
www . cdc . gov / quarantine! aboutlawsregulationsquarantineisolation . html. 2
In response to the Ebola outbreak, the CDC promulgated interim guidelines for screening. The CDC’s Interim Guidance recognizes the unfortunate risk of infection, even among trained healthcare workers:
rhrpuwTpseioirnrshcigooukrdeohevcremecceihsdroedpimcisggunrarenhergitoeasneizkfsdgtdoe,,oededltrdlxritayrahpneo,uneocbfdpssstrmoEeuefneobraicxehrscotapsehlhraitoaeeeoowlssintvurhhEirtrcaisebouicraunohrsrgilievangEianePwblavfsPpoedtiioEasrnlcdruat,tkiitistteohehinonraepiisntnnstaUaattataditlhnrrehmeieeinaetqroegstepuscdneeralgaeatSrccesaiethosnaraieueumtfaeaindteissulcteotd..rlochinteouicsipDsnnanl,rutteareetiimmhpneweoscationltyouesarndowkttitihmeoiinbitarngeehssl
(ECF no. 16-2 (“CDC Guidance”) at 6)3

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referred I do not could

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Federal quarantine orders, as such, have been comparatively rare. Since as long ago as 1799, however, federal legislation has mandated federal noninterference and cooperation with the states’ execution of their quarantine laws. See Morgan’s La. & T.R. & S.S. v. Bd. of Health of State of La.. 118 U.S. 455, 464—65, 6 S. Ct. 1114 (1886) (citing Act of 1799, c. 53, Rev. Stat., and 1878, 20, Stat. 37, in the course of upholding state quarantine law designed to protect State against introduction of disease by seagoing and Mississippi River vessels). In the modern era, the CDC has most commonly played a supportive role, with the States taking the lead in quarantine matters. See CDC website,
supra. That is what happened here. After an initial screening at the CDC
Quarantine Station, the State of New Jersey took over, in accordance with the EPP. Ms. Hickox was detained by the Department of Health (DOH), pursuant to state law. By statute, the DOH or a local board of health has the power to:
M dcreoemaemimonmvteaaudilnniincsaeanncbdeelescseeasndrsfiyaosrreyca..e.saenp[adrtonodpc]aeanr Rabseneumdioatacvsbceulofemfaincppyilelianscphteee,qrdsuoiwafnriaitnhninotifuinettcest,aejndwuydhwguemnritedhveuneeart risk to the person infected.
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 26:4-2(d)-(e). The administrative rule cited by the State to
justify Ms. Hickox’s quarantine reads as follows: TqdsphuisreaeeraaDasdneetpoianafsertthmmaeneeyddniitcspeaoealrrlsysheo,eonarplwrteohhpvoiioddfehefmidacsieosrlubomecgehaincypa,leelbxryiyponodwesecrodieftstretseonasrtayroircctdotoeimorp,nmreissuvohnelanialcttlaebntholoeert exceed the period of incubation of the disease.
N.J. Admin. Code § 8:57-1.11(c).
More than a century ago, the United States Supreme Court upheld such exercises of the states’ general police powers to protect public health through quarantines and other measures. See Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25, 25 S. Ct. 358 (1905) (recognizing the “authority of a state to enact quarantine laws and health laws of every description”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Compagnie
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Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. La. State Bd. Of Health, 186 U.S. 380, 387 (1902)(”[T]he power of States to enact and enforce quarantine laws for the safety and the protection of the health of their inhabitants ... is beyond question.”); Ogden v. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203 (1824) (dicta that a state has the power “to provide for the health of its citizens” by quarantine laws).
In Jacobson, for example, the Court upheld a Massachusetts law requiring vaccination against smallpox. Id. at 39. The Court held that such a measure, enacted to protect public health, will not be struck down unless it “has no real or substantial relation to [that goal], or is, beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights” secured by the Constitution. Id. at 31. To uphold that law, the Court analogized to the unquestioned power to quarantine even an outwardly healthy individual entering the United States:
hdwaAmAwsaainshalcnsilyieaAgcodtrheyimtnicra,esetiabdco,nrpohfuieipcoanrtdaheirlnendasebrgoryaocesm,tifdpihtenh.risezesueceap,cvinderhoaccyalouttvraihfmreogiotsenvhsus,,ietengatclhghndooeicnaarsreteedpisanupa,hscnabeaatreedAeqadnhmumbtewaeloelyerdirnantifhgcnirnacettdineahnqusefepueerosaocsdrrmotoitaamlfinotdgyimntoeieisnnnluaelce,onaevwuisa,teenygstftshaehiaelivaitnlmetisltriatsntbhorehgeelrfie,s
Id. at 29. Courts facing similar public health issues have recognized that the authorities possess similarly broad discretion.
Thus Reynolds v. McNichols, 488 F.2d 1378 (10th Cir. 1993), relying in part on Jacobson, upheld an ordinance “authorizing limited detention in jail without bond for the purpose of examination and treatment for a venereal disease of one reasonably suspected of having a venereal disease” as a valid exercise of the police power. Id. at 1383.
In U.S. ex rel. Siegel v. Shinnick, 219 F. Supp. 789 (E.D.N.Y. 1963), the court permitted the quarantine of a woman who had arrived in the U.S. from Stockholm (deemed “a small pox infected area”) without presenting a certificate of vaccination. Id. at 790-91. The court upheld an administrative order that she be quarantined for 14 days, the length of the smallpox incubation period. Id. It
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acknowledged that public health officials “deal in a terrible context [wherej the consequences of mistaken indulgence can be irretrievably tragic.” A better-safethan-sorry determination was therefore entitled to deference, absent a “reliable

showing of error,” id. at 791:

Their conclusion, reached in obvious good faith, cannot be

challenged on the ground that they had no evidence of the

exposure ... to the disease; they, simply, were not free and

ceeexarprttoahisnuclroyeunledoxtiksbnteoodwundfduorrtionfogigufnrotoeureerndthdaeyaysfsaincwtsShtetohtchakethroooplrmpno,orttthutanhtietnyreofohorande

on been

exposure

Id. Courts have sometimes struck down quarantine orders, however, when
they were found to be arbitrary and unreasonable in relation to their goal of protecting the public health. In Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10 (C.C.D. Cal. 1900), the court found that sealing off an entire section of San Francisco to prevent the spread of the bubonic plague was “unreasonable, unjust, and oppressive.” Id. at 26. Such an overbroad order, the court declared, was “not in harmony with the declared purpose” of preventing the spread of the disease. Id.
at 23. Overbreadth was of similar concern in In re Smith, 101 Sickels 68, 76, 40
N.E. 497 (N.Y. 1895). There, the New York Court of Appeals rejected the blanket quarantine of individuals who refused vaccination, when there was no reason to believe they had been infected or even exposed to that disease.
Building on the principles of such cases, Hickox argues that the initial decision to quarantine her did not bear a “real or substantial relation” to

4tt2sbitqohmhi3uumee.btmaieqIrflrniaaaaugscrntaTerClthtyarahieopanlneesrmnateudstrtppitsasnfueoaptergriferoeeofnpncmmntcsoitoeoa;roelttnbFtoeefnhserdttiheafehsdonarttedrioievcsnideatocsighilsrss.dobeioeemfolSnc,qarSieattnusnaeesuneaaneporet1ssaorntF8,oenar6trmaysi,tariUnetelntbhahce.empreSiacesa.wtcaelrraaaonutaithtst’stsiiasheoeo3aben9ns“lils8osatqet—o-loiutecnata9isaernr9(ulLgxaalgseeconl(eptdtBlutheueioirdnoCscsofieuitwhoxpa”goinneennhnnodaa,a,priouJtdiylpot.pie,snhwhnsidooeeoenafilnwtf;,sdftCsaen)iadempchnewnttpiecdentelarilnyexnamsttshrcg.tepsaoel)u.Nte.oictdrTooThrhoiinhnehgsausegeuiprsnrtcosshe.heffiIopcidstu,.,inoaidnnt issue is pressed by the parties here.
14

Case 2:15-cv-07647-KM-JBC Document 19 Filed 09/02/16 Page 15 of 36 PageID: 273

protection of the public health, but instead was “arbitrary and oppressive.” (ECF no. 15 p. 34) At a minimum, she says, her quarantine became arbitrary and oppressive in the early hours of October 25, 2014, when her first blood test results came back negative for Ebola. She argues that the DOH epidemiologist’s subsequent recommendation that she be held for 72 hours for further observation was “entirely arbitrary, related neither to the incubation period nor to any symptoms displayed by Hickox at the time.” (IcL)
I sympathize with Hickox’s plight, but I cannot find that her isolation violated any clearly established constitutional principle embodied in quarantine case law. Of course, even as to a dread disease, it is possible to overreact; as it was with cholera and yellow fever, so it is with Ebola today. A restriction can be so arbitrary or overbroad as to be impermissible. The parties cite no case striking down a quarantine order, however, that is even close to Hickox’s factual scenario, or that would have clearly indicated to any of these defendants that their actions violated established law.
Hickox was returning from treating patients in a country then ravaged by an Ebola epidemic, thankfully now under control. The disease is a very serious one, and there is no vaccine or medicine to prevent or cure it. See www.cdc .gov /vhf/ ebola/ treatment! index.html. (“No FDA-approved vaccine or medicine (e.g., antiviral drug) is available for E5 bola.”) The State could reasonably have thought that prevention and containment were therefore paramount.
True, Ms. Hickox was not a patient, but a health care worker, and she was trained in the avoidance of infection. She alleges that she wore protective gear and took other appropriate measures to prevent the spread of the disease to herself or others. The authorities were not required, however, to take it on faith that Ms. Hickox had been 100% compliant, or the measures 100% effective. Exposure, or at least the risk of exposure, was conceded; she worked in close proximity to Ebola patients and other health care workers. Hickox

5

The best hope, it seems, is to keep the patient

immune system fights off the infection. See id.

alive

and

hydrated

while

the

15

Case 2:15-cv-07647-KM-JBC Document 19 Filed 09/02/16 Page 16 of 36 PageID: 274
returned to the United States just two days after having left Sierra Leone; if she had contracted an infection close to the end of her stay, she would have been in the very early, asymptomatic days of the incubation period. At the CDC quarantine station, Hickox was questioned regarding the nature and timing of her work in Sierra Leone. Based on her answers, DOH officials decided to detain her for further evaluation. Very early in her detention, certain thermometer readings reflected that she had an elevated temperature, and some continued to reflect a fever for a relatively short time thereafter. Other readings, however, did not; the main divergence seems to have been between the temporal and oral thermometer measurements. The allegations do not indicate that any other cause for the elevated temperature readings was
identified. On such facts, I cannot find that the decision to quarantine Hickox for a
limited additional period of observation violated clearly established law of which a reasonable officer would have been aware. The facts do not suggest arbitrariness or unreasonableness as recognized in the prior cases—i.e., application of the quarantine laws to a person (or, more commonly, vast numbers of persons) who had no exposure to the disease at all. Indeed, her quarantine fits well within the Supreme Court’s dicta in Jacobson, as well as the holdings in Reynolds and Shinnick. In Reynolds, the court authorized a short detention for the purpose of assessing whether an at-risk individual had the disease at issue. In Shinnick, the individual was held for the incubation period of the disease (14 days) to rule out her infection with smallpox during her travel in an infected area. In short, given the important public interests at stake, the cases give the authorities a great deal of leeway to detain persons who may turn out not to have been sick at all. Here, Hickox was quarantined, in total, for approximately 80 hours, and released well before the expiration of
even the shortest estimate of the incubation period (8 days). Pace Hickox’s argument, that a 72 or 80 hour quarantine is “unrelated” to the incubation period would seem to support a longer, not a shorter, quarantine period. It tends to suggest that the response of the authorities was measured and
16

Case 2:15-cv-07647-KM-JBC Document 19 Filed 09/02/16 Page 17 of 36 PageID: 275
reasonable, not arbitrary.
For the same reasons, I cannot find that the continued detention of Hickox following her negative blood results constituted a violation of clearly constitutional or statutory law. The State wished to determine whether Ms. Hickox’s symptoms would worsen, and remained concerned that she had previously registered a fever. That fever, for all that appears in the pleadings, remains unexplained. Once again, we are not in the extreme situation where a judgment call becomes a clear and unmistakable error. See Reynolds, 488 F.2d 1383; Shinnick, 219 F. Supp. at 790 (expressing deference to the judgment of public health officials dealing in emergency situations that carry serious consequences). To permit these constitutional claims to go forward would not be an implementation of clearly established law; it would be a judicial secondguessing of the discretionary judgments of public health officials acting within the scope of their (and not my) expertise.
In sum, I do not find that prior quarantine case law establishes any unconstitutionality, much less a violation of clearly established rights. To the extent that the Fourth Amendment may impose an independent limitation, I analyze it under the civil commitment case law, where the doctrine is more developed.
C. Civil Commitment Case Law
Plaintiff also argues that civil commitment case law put defendants on notice that their conduct violated clearly established law. Defendants reply that this body of law—analogous at best, and arising in a distinct factual context— did not provide the kind of notice required to defeat qualified immunity. I nevertheless consider it, to the extent it might have suggested to the defendants that their conduct violated Ms. Hickox’s rights.
To defeat qualified immunity, a plaintiff need not demonstrate that the defendants’ precise conduct has previously been declared unconstitutional. “The ultimate question ... is whether the defendant had ‘fair warning’ that his conduct deprived his victim of a constitutional right.” Schneyder 653 F.3d at 329. (citations omitted). On the other hand, “a constitutional duty is not clearly
17

Case 2:15-cv-07647-KM-JBC Document 19 Filed 09/02/16 Page 18 of 36 PageID: 276
established simply because of the existence of a broad imperative.” Id. It is not enough to state, for example, that it was “clearly established” that liberty and property may not be taken without due process of law. “[T]he usual rule is that the right the official is alleged to have violated must have been ‘clearly established’ in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense.” Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). “[W}hether “a new scenario is sufficiently analogous to previously established law to warn an official that his/her conduct was unconstitutional” depends on “whether the official should have related this established law to the instant situation.” Id. at 330 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
In such a context, to say that officials should have analogized from a parallel body of case law is highly problematic. The parties have not cited any case, and the court is not aware of any, in which an analogy to civil commitment law was found sufficient to strip the quarantining authorities of qualified i6 mmunity. The analogy, moreover, seems to be an imperfect one. The
6cdcqoooummanrmmoatniiPtthtmmilonaweeiennnettftviofcecfrraad,ossoebeaesdllseadarwwcrveiatsfwetosiorostuonahlmnedwaeqplaoussugattnaolirtoufeetisaecpdsgaeousirnmmiedasmbiasanlsuencinbedoilfteooyfinnicdneeterhftstheeedoirismensrscianuanloesactetioai.cosfeenqtuhtohafaarwtatanhlotetieotnhmkeee.prdToctrhioavericslyeiviclases JJ4oci2thtnuunhh5fo4ooddler9nssyteigmefpvtehie(vi2iin2om’ated,dadesInvrunelam2aetiraCyh0lzeoBleai0eipdfrdnczled3.aoeteteos)hy2rrdtft,uptteeso0eruaunara0sd.pcnrtsen4soiesSdsdood)ruutoe,.mnem2rafsrfatVs0enet’eiarmtsc0tntitteusno3eddattiecbmdoxhaetneWemecnnmtmbsrittLcuyseb’oseousicnfon2oSntlhHttrdh1onhttdthaa,7saoaeehitts6tsntrsieahppo7iatf.etopenl6,ofawrrwa)t5rwpsCde,t6ooaloieriavevuswnrbhi(.na.l’nsSideiscteNmTtt.ahiDrclashofvtpoohafb..eeNaedufaidh0trelgc.tliimaY3lgoeoiteadny-dn.uuin3sp— caJroag6asotruaprein5dbiurlrdpws,ytelrohaeqt2hqiobri3.lu0munioelj0seii0nirn,rctosd3tdeegetlt2ediehynlorW0df,te,en0eibarsLff.an3eofnsgs)teeTr2dirtrnoow1oh(eeatnue5xnehicdnna1tleobs,olmdv8imepaatsco8yputs,nopl2iolaundmleh91nytng,i1idmBtos(w5aaMSneuntrsi.hFistDnaulhht.eygib.etwNAiyapsrse.oen.eptY— rqurpAa.il1uxotdta8eedntot Tri“amnessulfauebenycaceohstrbtieceopGutufoelarrsoroesesssmetoxiuonspnbceqoCieiusavsroe.taceunErumdantldrnoaeotwtobsmliialnAsdebreadceu,otnsrp.rws,goTue2aonhnrs6faw3ahoatfiicslSacilencih.fnrEftaateg.imlp2cfleiettdicoilnroyamg6ncte6io.oio”t1rnttnoehId(ddboWut.yhucc.aestoaVtehmph6apir.6mohmo2ly1csdi.s9teemi8Ooldcf0ruienaa)nroc,nnetetadshooaehufrtgroanahapbdilepineeeave,rarelrstsasohtiothncnenoiosssfrWsfuswpiuuccuieefihtsafsheltwaprwtViaehmnshtiagiroatgtaimnfiotrnhnnoieehamfreor
18

Case 2:15-cv-07647-KM-JBC Document 19 Filed 09/02/16 Page 19 of 36 PageID: 277

civil commitment power permits the state to execute a quasi-arrest and includes the power to involuntarily hospitalize a citizen, sometimes for an indefinite period of years. The civil commitment precedents must therefore be applied with great care to the traditional and unquestioned power to detain persons coming from an area of infection at the border for a limited time, as a prophylactic measure. Nevertheless, particularly to the extent that they discuss more general Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment concerns, these cases have relevance, and I discuss them here.
1. Fourth Amendment limits
Civil commitment is subject to the Fourth Amendment, which guards against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “[T]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.” Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 54 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S Ct. 1943 (2006).7 In the civil commitment context, “it is not unreasonable to temporarily detain an individual who is dangerous to himself or others.” Cole v. Town of Morristown, 627 Fed. App’x 102, 106 (3d Cir. 2015). The standard is one of probable cause. See also Monday v. Oullette, 118 F.3d 1099, 1102 (6th Cir. 1997)(”The Fourth Amendment requires an official seizing and detaining a person for psychiatric evaluation to have probable cause to believe that the person is dangerous to himself or others.”) Probable cause for emergency civil commitment exists

pfafcaopoecrrpumtslnoisascnulea,flthf,pieoaoarnsenteddatnoftdoriaoaitshlmteleeyarmtslhseopeanoafgdreta-igatsrueylelraa.mdrsdeesct.eionnAmtiimtmosoniintnmagfteetctnhhtteie,otwubhsohinrifcdgohersmrttho.ineTbohecriosdpurecrortavtsfeoeonudhnweadtasesrrnmetoqhiunasitetrretawhdigehaheptthflhaoeeiranrwrtiaianfrfgd,in

tahpeesrtsaotCne’itscyotouuflbdNerbecewuailnorkvsiosul.ucJno.tSna.tr,riol6yl5s2ctoaAmtu.m2tdeit2tce6edr5.ta(iNn.Jm. oSdueprenr.sCtatn. dLaarwdsDoivf.

1993), read due process

into before

trFgSShee.ttle2aanadtttepeeirvessa1erl3Msvils6.tyoo,anKcnU,to1ihyan4nhemi0soati-e,wdd4sd4oee1e3mrvSae2er(ted3cars,Fdhttrei.IeC3csowadrivcsri..iols5vleMn2i1eila49zxobcu9,enol1rr5teemc)o2.iyawsm9Base-hi3edaticc0mcenaahueHu(e3tnwsfiedfteoroonncCurMataliasdrnst.neo.dbd2eHliea0nzaiw0,ctunek6.4naro)7dlr;xye3i’zcUasetsUncoci.tltSnhoae.aenidmbm5tSrl3saet1obaiw,nntaev5nitsoth3dhl9evvi.ani-er4tEta0othzhweed(ei1ennU9tbiet8anoen5kirrttd)umie;oe,dsrnU9., 3noS6ifteeed

19

Case 2:15-cv-07647-KM-JBC Document 19 Filed 09/02/16 Page 20 of 36 PageID: 278

where “there are reasonable grounds for believing that the person seized is subject to the governing legal standard.” Villanova v. Abrams, 972 F.2d 792, 795 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Cantrell v. City of Murphy, 666 F.3d 911, 923 (5th Cir. 2012) (“[P]robable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge at the time of the seizure are sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that an individual is mentally ill and poses a substantial risk of serious harm.”) Shorter detentions require “less compelling” evidence of dangerousness. Villanova, 972 F.2d at 796. Similarly, the larger “the magnitude of the harm the person may do if left at large, the stronger is the
case for commitment.” Id. For the “governing legal standard” the parties look to the New Jersey
administrative code provision cited above (and in Hickox’s quarantine order): TqdsephxuisecraeeeraaDeasddneetptiohanafseertthmpmaeeneeryddnioiitcsdpeaoealorrlsfsyheoi,neonacrpluwrteobhphvaioiotddifeohefmindacsieoosrflubomtceghehaiencyap,dleeilbxrysiyepoanodwseseecro.dieftstretseonasrtayorircctdotoeimorp,nmriessuvohnelainalcttlaebntholoeert
N.J. Admin. Code § 8:57-1.11(c). This provision is relevant to Ms. Hickox’s
detention, whether viewed through the lens of quarantine or civil commitment. The question here, as presented by the parties, is whether the authorities had
probable cause to believe that standard was met. I fail to see a lack of probable cause so clear as to overcome the officials’
qualified immunity. As discussed supra, plaintiff was returning from a country experiencing a severe Ebola epidemic, and she was consistently engaged in Ebola-related care while in Sierra Leone. It would not have been unreasonable for a public health official to believe that she had been “exposed” to Ebola. See id. Exposure does not necessarily equate to infection, but temporary quarantine is authorized based on a risk, or potential, for infection, not proof of infection i8 tself. Nor was it unreasonable that health officials remained

8

The

definitive,

motion to

bpuatrtsieusc,hinmtehdeiciralbrisiesfuse, sdissupruptaesws htheethsecrobpleooodf dismiss, and I do not consider them.

tests what

at this early stage I may consider on

are a

20

Case 2:15-cv-07647-KM-JBC Document 19 Filed 09/02/16 Page 21 of 36 PageID: 279

concerned, even following Hickox’s favorable blood work, because she had repeatedly registered a fever, for which no other explanation has been given.
Other factors found relevant to civil commitment support a finding of probable cause. See Villanova, supra. Ms. Hickox was not institutionalized on an ongoing basis; she was detained for approximately 80 hours. The fever appeared very early on, a few hours into the detention period. The magnitude of the harm that could have occurred had she been released, weighed against the relatively short period of d9 etention, also weighs in favor of finding that the detention was supported by probable cause. See Id.
Ms. Hickox argues that her compliance with anti-infection protocols in Sierra Leone should have indicated to any reasonable officer that she was not infected, and defeated probable cause. As noted above, this argument presupposes that the health officials were required to take at face value her statements, as well as to assume that such measures were fail-safe. The CDC’s Interim Guidance recognizes the unfortunate risk of infection, even among trained healthcare workers. (CDC Guidance, ECF no. 16-2 at 6, quoted at p. 11, supra.) Indeed, the CDC suggested direct active monitoring for such healthcare workers, even if asymptomatic, while noting that “[t]he public health authority, based on a specific assessment of the individual’s situation, will determine whether additional restrictions are appropriate.” CDC Guidance at 91O For healthcare workers showing symptoms, “rapid isolation” is recommended. Id.” The risk of such infection only underscores the

“Short,” that is, in relation to many an involuntary civil commitment. I do not minimize the annoyance and inconvenience of a three-day isolation.

10 While the “additional restrictions” do not specifically refer to quarantine, they include “controlled movement” and “exclusion from public places,” and they note that “other activities should be assessed.” CDC Guidance at 9. In any event, the CDC Guidance contains recommendations, and it notes the importance of public health officials’ exercise of their judgment. (Id.)

11

Plaintiff also points to In re Smith to argue that defendants needed to

demonstrate actual exposure as opposed to the risk of exposure. 101 Sickels 68, 40

N.E. 497 (N.Y. 1895). The definition of exposure in New Jersey’s administrative

provisions is not governed a New York state case. In any event, Smith certainly cannot

21

Case 2:15-cv-07647-KM-JBC Document 19 Filed 09/02/16 Page 22 of 36 PageID: 280
admirability of what Nurse Hickox did; it also, however, provides justification for the actions of the authorities.
Applying analogous civil commitment case law, I do not find that plaintiff’s border quarantine constituted a clear violation of her Fourth Amendment rights that would have been apparent to any reasonable officer,
exposing that officer to a claim for damages under § 1983.
2. Fourteenth Amendment requirements and civil commitment procedures
The Fourteenth Amendment provides in relevant part that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The “touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846, 118 S. Ct. 1708 (1998) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The Supreme Court has recognized that “civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.” Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425, 99 S. Ct. 1804 (1979); see also In Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492, 100 S. Ct. 1254 (1980)(transfer of state prisoner to a mental hospital implicates due process); O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575, 99 S. Ct. 2486 (1975)(mentally ill individuals cannot be confined if they are not dangerous).
Plaintiff argues that civil commitment case law demonstrates that defendants’ conduct in this case violated clearly established principles of substantive and procedural due process. Again, I do not find that the relevant case law should have placed defendants on notice that their conduct was a clear violation of Hickox’s rights.
a. Substantive Due Process The threshold question for a potential substantive due process violation is “whether the behavior of the governmental officer is so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.”
provide the type of clearly established case law capable of defeating qualffied immunity.
22

Case 2:15-cv-07647-KM-JBC Document 19 Filed 09/02/16 Page 23 of 36 PageID: 281
*1

See Benn v. Universal Health System, Inc., 371 F.3d 165, 174 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847, n.8, 118 S. Ct. 1708 (1998)). Plaintiff does not argue—nor does she point to any case law establishing—that defendants’ conduct in this case clearly shocks the conscience. Rather, for the reasons discussed previously, I find that under existing law a reasonable officer could have believed that a temporary quarantine for observation was appropriate, and not conscience-shocking.
Plaintiff contends that civil commitment law makes clear that her substantive due process rights were violated in three specific ways: (1) that she did not receive an individualized assessment, (2) that she did not receive the least restrictive means of treatment, and (3) that the nature and duration of her confinement were not reasonably related to public health.
i. Individualized assessment Plaintiff argues that she did not receive an individual assessment before being quarantined. She cites Best v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, Civ. No. 03-0365, 2003 WL 21518829 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2003), 2003 WL 21767656 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2003) (adopting Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation), vacated in part on other grounds, 115 F. App’x 459 (2d Cir. 2004).12 Best held that an individual with tuberculosis could not be involuntarily detained without “an individualized assessment” of whether he was likely to take his medication as directed; it found that such analysis was required in order to determine whether the patient “would constitute a danger to society,” and thus could be confined. 2003 WL 21518829 at *7
Plaintiff does not cite any other civil commitment cases using the “individualized assessment” language, much less any case law delineating the specific contours of such an assessment. That lack of a clear body of case law would itself seem fatal to the argument that there was a clearly established constitutional violation.
I will nevertheless assume without deciding that the Best “individualized

12

Although Best is

commitment case law.

a

decision

involving

quarantine,

it

discusses

and

relies

on

civil

23

Case 2:15-cv-07647-KM-JBC Document 19 Filed 09/02/16 Page 24 of 36 PageID: 282

assessment” of the individual’s illness and ability or willingness to abide by treatment can, mutatis mutandis, be adapted to the situation of a temporary detention for observation based on a risk of infection. I nevertheless disagree with the plaintiff’s contention that she did not receive an individual assessment suited to the circumstances. The complaint alleges that after Ms. Hickox told immigration personnel that she was arriving from Sierra Leone, she was questioned by numerous people, including an official from the CDC, for
approximately 90 minutes. (Cplt. ¶J 33-37) Her temperature was also taken;
although she did not initially register a fever, temperature measurements taken
soon afterward did register a fever. (Id. ¶ 31) This level of observation,
discussion, and interaction with public health officials for an extended period of time was not a generalized conclusion about the risk of Ebola; it was an individualized assessment of plaintiff’s situation and her potential risk to the
public. In that connection, I consider also the CDC’s recommended protocol for
asymptomatic individuals falling into the “some risk” category (plaintiff places herself in that c3 ategory).’ The CDC recommends that public health officials make “a specific assessment of the individual’s situation” that includes factors such as the “intensity of exposure (e.g., daily direct patient care versus intermittent visits to an Ebola treatment unit)” and the “point of time in the incubation period (risk falls substantially after 2 weeks).” CDC Guidance at 5. Those are precisely the factors that the officials assessed when they questioned Hickox and ascertained that she had engaged in daily patient care as recently
as two days before. Moreover, it appears that Hickox’s condition was continually reassessed
throughout her quarantine. Blood was taken, and her temperature was taken repeatedly, at times reflecting a fever. Thus, while plaintiff may disagree with

13

Plaintiff takes issue with the fact that her quarantine order stated that she was

aGtu“ihdiagnhceriscko”notafibnesinregceoxmpmoseenddtaotiEonboslfao. r(aEsCsFesnsoin. g1-i1ndpi.vi2d)u1anlso’terisakgalienvetlh. aMt othreeovCeDr,Cit

is not at all clear that the state DOH’s reference to “high risk” was intended to

correspond to the CDC’s method of categorization.

24

Case 2:15-cv-07647-KM-JBC Document 19 Filed 09/02/16 Page 25 of 36 PageID: 283

the outcome of her individual assessment, I cannot find that she did not receive o4 ne.’ And even an erroneous application of CDC guidelines does not correspond to a constitutional cause of action.

ii. Least restrictive means
The concept of a “least restrictive means” test comes from the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 81 S. Ct. 247 (1960). In Shelton, the court struck down a law that required teachers to file yearly affidavits listing every organization to which they belonged or contributed in the preceding five years. The Court held that even a legitimate government purpose “cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.” Id. at 488.
Plaintiff cites a handful of out-of-Circuit cases that apply Shelton’s reasoning in the civil commitment context. See e.g., Lynch v. Baxley, 744 F.2d 1452, 1458 (11th Cir. 1984)(detaining individuals in jail pending civil commitment proceedings was not the least restrictive means of keeping society safe from such individuals); Welsh v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 502 (D. Minn. 1974) aff’d, 525 F.2d 987 (8th Cir. 1975)(recognizing a “constitutional duty on the part of State officials to explore and provide the least stringent practicable alternatives to confinement of noncriminals”); see also ECF no. 15 p. 19. The

14

Plaintiff appears to argue that the quarantine could not

indivualized assessment because it was, in her view, a blanket

healthcare personnel returning from Ebola-affected areas. She

have been based on an quarantine order for all alleges that this is

reflected in the “Additional Screening Protocols” that Governors Cuomo and Christie

announced the afternoon of her quarantine, which called for a “mandatory

difsqdmruiueosbsmamccjrleeraoiScdnsptiitutaeiitrntrooeeren,ala”ysoLbhfufoeleptaorhonnwrenekeatefsauaatnlrcteqnadtrsukitnhiaeongarnfgadhhnateebtshiraieendleqetenihu.mcfatHomarrreraicieaengktxtrwioitannxeotgneirod,skEnoiehvberooesoswf.lfqnaie(ucoCvpietaepaslraltt,tliit.leoodenn¶gettiehms4ne.2gtoh),RfnaaIaasctfnttthirsdnathedhtreee,avtswthaetfnasahthtseaaerpfqttlmwueasirhaaanreskttahiifwnrnafet’gatitsnustrehnndaoitnt g

wptHhehveeoiarcaarstklrkouosenfaxhrratoseilromlewwync.e,etohriIusevnehledseadNwdbweaedewapictqstJaiuoelu“lnaripsnrf,raefioIonnymnrtmitDonhLteeieesdupddta.athwrhl(altIaiemtdggt.Heeisnn¶dhicfte4obko0rolm)fmaxHniTighknhehageaetstlhtobqhnere.uodr”aqtetr(ruhaIadalaonl.rtefta¶igqtnnheutedeia2nra9tdeaht-edn4acN0ttiaise)naniwoeAndanywrswkhohaaatosAhsdreidttrbroiptrielohemdercetnetta.eolmldtawhattceaodariet,rheteor

25

Case 2:15-cv-07647-KM-JBC Document 19 Filed 09/02/16 Page 26 of 36 PageID: 284

most recent example plaintiff cites is Best, an unreported case from the Southern District of New York. Best, 2003 WL 21518829 at *8. (“The existence of a substantial government interest is not enough to satisfy substantive due process however, unless the State utilizes the least restrictive means available
to advance that interest.”) The case law regarding the least restrictive means requirement falls far
short of a clear consensus capable of defeating qualified immunity in this c1as5 e. At any rate, assuming arguencio that such a principle of law exists and is controlling, I do not find that defendants clearly violated it on the facts
alleged here. The theoretical availability of less restrictive alternatives does not mean
that they are appropriate for a particular individual. See Best, 2003 WL 21518829 at *8 (rejecting less restrictive alternatives for TB patient as “inappropriate” based on his past failure to take medication); Welsch, 373 F. Supp. at 502 (noting that a less restrictive alternative must be “practicable” under the circumstances and requiring officials to make “good faith attempts to place [individualsi in settings that will be suitable and appropriate to their mental and physical conditions while least restrictive of their liberties”). Such a
determination is, at bottom, a judgment call. Here, public health officials made a judgment regarding the appropriate
means of containing the risk that Hickox had been exposed to or infected with Ebola, in light of the potential threat to the public. They found that quarantine

Indeed, defendants point, not to the least restrictive means test, but to a

distinct body of case law relating to conditions 406 U.S. 715, 92 S. Ct. 1845 (1972), infra; see

of confinement. also Youngberg

See Jackson ‘. Indiana, v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307,

“3wprep2rhsor1epefnseo(usln9tsmshi8ioepb2ntl)diea(veclecaojluicynstdiduvogiaantmlilliobdyeny”nsdttii,ofhdfpemnrcpaaoodcrtnotefbifcieabnessye,semioaotrehnpnsearttoladofineesfdscissinasuivroicdoonhnslaulaaonsantsanutrsodibulsyd“ctlehaicamnobatmoiijlaunimtldsytgidrtmmtaeetpaedeyanrittnbth”ued)a;riteivRmtihfderpeunoonampslieeeadarrvsce.oocnKnelplyetiend,

7smpt2aaa0tnyiedFnba.te2r)d.dcIo2itnn6isss6tt,ientau2odt7ti0oconlfe(a3talhdrleyCthlaiearda.tmsltt9hinr8iesi3ss)ltt(irenaircepetpdiovlfyteocinmaagsneeaYsin,nosvruaontteglhusbenterrttagotr’hsialayspnsrceotoshfmeseswmsoithoihtenteenard,lajwmnutodeipugnslmtdyaelcgnhhotoevtaeirlctnh.drBuugts

for qualified immunity purposes, that may be the point.

26

Case 2:15-cv-07647-KM-JBC Document 19 Filed 09/02/16 Page 27 of 36 PageID: 285
for a limited period, up to and including the incubation period, was appropriate and that “[ljess restrictive alternatives would not be sufficient.” (ECF no. 1-1 p. 3) That decision could be criticized, or portrayed as erroneous. I cannot find, however, that a reasonable officer would have to have known it was a violation of Hickox’s rights to detain her temporarily rather than, for example, allow her immediately to return home and self-report any symptoms. A reasonable officer could have determined that, as a practical matter, “no less restrictive alternatives exist[ed] in this case.” Best, 2003 WL 21518829 at *8.
iii. Nature and duration of confinement “At the least, due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed.” Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 736, 92 S. Ct. 1845 (1972) (holding that a person charged with a criminal offense who is committed due to incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held indefinitely on that basis alone); see also Selig v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 265, 121 S. Ct. 727 (200 1)(noting that “due process requires that the conditions and duration of confinement under [a civil commitment act] bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which persons are committed”). Plaintiff contends that the nature and duration of her confinement did not bear a reasonable relation to protecting the public health once her first blood test results came back negative for Ebola. In support, Hickox points to the differences between the temporal and oral thermometer readings taken by health officials. She believes that these inconsistent readings called into question whether she was ill at all, and that the first blood test results confirmed that she was not. Her detention thereafter, she says, was not reasonable.
I do not agree that the nature and duration of Hickox’s detention was clearly unreasonable and unrelated to protecting the public. Plaintiff takes issue with the variation in her temperature readings, but the bottom line is that some of these temperature readings reflected a fever. I cannot rule as a matter of statutory or constitutional law that these medical professionals
27

Case 2:15-cv-07647-KM-JBC Document 19 Filed 09/02/16 Page 28 of 36 PageID: 286
should have ignored the temporal thermometer readings and considered only the oral readings. Under the circumstances, the officials had to make a judgment, and they did so. The indications of fever are not attributed to some other, benign cause. Under the circumstances, ignoring indications of a fever in someone returning from working with Ebola patients in Sierra Leone could very well be deemed reckless.
Nor can I find that the DOH epidemiologist’s recommendation that Hickox be held for observation for 72 hours after her first set of blood results was not reasonably related to protecting the public health. That, too, was a medical judgment made in light of Hickox’s work in Sierra Leone and her temperature readings. Her quarantine following the blood results was not excessive. The results were received on Saturday, and her release was announced on Monday morning. I cannot say that this detention for additional monitoring and observation was objectively unreasonable. And a detention for a term that does not exceed the incubation period of the disease self-evidently bears a relation to the stated purpose of the quarantine—i.e., to determine whether the disease was present.
b. Procedural Due Process Procedural due process requires that a deprivation of liberty be “accompanied by minimum procedural safeguards, including some form of notice and a hearing.” Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 624, 94 S. Ct. 1895 (1974) (citing Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 164, 94 S. Ct. 1633 (1974)). A court considers three factors in assessing procedural due process: “(1) the private interest affected by the official action; (2) the risk that the plaintiff will suffer an erroneous deprivation through the procedure used and the probable value if any of additional procedural safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976). “[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Id. at 334 (internal quotations and
citation omitted). Hickox argues that her procedural due process rights were violated by
28

Case 2:15-cv-07647-KM-JBC Document 19 Filed 09/02/16 Page 29 of 36 PageID: 287
the state’s (1) failure to provide a hearing on her confinement and (2) failure to provide her with adequate notice of her rights.
i. Right to a hearing Plaintiff contends that she was entitled to a hearing in this case to assess whether her quarantine was “medically and epidemiologically necessary” to prevent the spread of Ebola. (ECF no. 15 p. 41) Without one, she argues that defendants’ discretion inappropriately went unchecked. Where practicable, due process generally requires notice and a hearing in advance of a deprivation of liberty. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127, 110 S. Ct. 975 (1990). In an emergency situation, however, a post-deprivation hearing is acceptable. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 582-83, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975) (in emergency school suspension context, allowing for notice and a hearing “as soon as practicable”); Benn, 371 F.3d at 174 (“[I]n an emergency situation, a short-term commitment without a hearing does not violate procedural due process.”) In such a case, the hearing should take place “as soon as practicable.” Goss, 419 U.S. at 582-83; see also In re Barnard, 455 F.2d 1370, 1374 (D.C. Cir. 1971)(individual is entitled “to a hearing within a reasonable time to test whether the confinement is based on probable cause.”). Civil commitment case law does not establish a firm time frame within which a hearing must be held. Such a determination is dependent on the facts of the particular case, and courts have found varying lengths of time to be acceptable. See, e.g., Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 975 (2d Cir. 1983)(providing hearing within five days of request for hearing); Best, 2003 WL 21518829 at *11 (same); Ananno v. Hayman, 384 Fed. App’x 144, 150 (3d Cir. 2010) (preliminary hearing within twenty days of temporary civil commitment order); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 388 (M.D. Ala. 1974)(probable cause hearing within seven days of detention and full hearing within thirty days); Barnard, 455 F.2d at 1372 (permitting detention for 48 hours without a court order and requiring hearing within 24 hours of request for hearing). Here, I cannot find that the failure to provide plaintiff with a hearing regarding her detention was a clear violation of due process. The entitlement to
29

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a hearing must be understood in the context of an order of quarantine, which is necessarily prophylactic and peremptory. Plaintiff was released before such a hearing was required, or for that matter even practical. She was quarantined on a Friday afternoon and released on Monday, a period of approximately 80 hours. No body of clearly established quarantine or civil commitment case law establishes that she was entitled to a hearing within that timeframe. Once she was released from quarantine, the need for a hearing was mooted. Accordingly, I cannot find that any reasonable officer would have been aware that plaintiff’s relatively short quarantine without a hearing was a violation of her
constitutional right to due process. ii. Notice
Plaintiff also argues that the Quarantine Order did not adequately provide her with notice about what was happening to her or adequately explain
her rights. In relevant part, the Quarantine Order states as follows: Any person or persons subject to this Order may seek relief from the Commissioner from the provisions of the Order by making a written application within 10 days to the Office of Legal and Regulatory Compliance, New Jersey Department of Health, P.O. Box 360, Trenton, New Jersey 08625-360 or OLRC@doh.state.nj.us A person may obtain additional information by calling (609) 9842177.
(ECF no. 1-1 p. 3) Plaintiff raises a number of issues as to this section of the order. She
argues that it is inadequate because: (1) the only recourse it identifies involves the Commissioner of DOH, rather than a neutral decision-maker; (2) it provides no timeframe during which the Commissioner must respond to a challenge to the quarantine; (3) it requires her to seek relief on her own initiative; and (4) it does not state that she has a right counsel. (See ECF no. 15 pp. 3942)16

16

She also notes in passing that the order did not mention N.J. Admin. Code

8:57-1, Appx. B., under which plaintiff says she was entitled to immediate judicial

review. (See ECF no. 15 p. 44 n.25)

30

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Plaintiff has put forth civil commitment case law reflecting that a hearing before a judge or other neutral decision-maker is required within a relatively short time of confinement. See supra. In addition, the opportunity to be heard must be state-initiated. See B.S. v. Somerset County, 704 F.3d 250, 272 (3d Cir. 2013). There is a right to c7 ounsel’ at civil commitment hearings. See Project Release, 722 F.2d at 976; Barnard, 455 F.2d at 1375-76.
Plaintiff has not, however, identified any authority reflecting that the failure to deliver complete, Miranda-style warnings in an initial confinement order is a per se violation of procedural due process. Procedural due process requires “some form of notice,” Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 624, which is dependent on the particular facts of the situation, see Matthews, 424 U.S. at 334. See also Goss, 419 U.S. at 579 (in school suspension case, noting that the “content of the notice ... will depend on appropriate accommodation of competing interests involved”).
Relying on the Matthews factors, I note that the private liberty interest at issue here, freedom of movement, is significant. The risk of an erroneous deprivation is also present, though to some degree it is minimized by the fact that this confinement is tied to a disease with a specific incubation period; in other words, the confinement will at some natural point expire. Thus, the risk of an extended erroneous deprivation is less than in a case where indefinite civil commitment is sought. Finally, the government’s interest is weighty, as it has a responsibility to protect its citizens from the spread of deadly communicable disease.
Keeping in mind these considerations, I do not find that Hickox’s initial
17 In addition to her notice argument, Hickox also suggests that her counsel was prevented from meeting with her. (ECF no. 15 p. 40) The complaint, however, suggests otherwise. The relevant allegations are as follows: On Sunday morning, 1-lickox requested to see her lawyer. (Cplt. ¶ 93) She was told that the Department of Health had determined that she could have not have visitors. (Id.) Nevertheless, she gave her lawyer’s contact information to a hospital employee. (Id.) Later that day, Hickox’s lawyers met with her through the window in her isolation tent. (Id. ¶ 95) Thus, it appears that Hickox was permitted to meet with her lawyer the same day that she requested, albeit while observing the safety measures health officials had proscribed.
31

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‘

b

confinement order, on its face, violated due process. This was a unique, emergency situation, and the order was prepared on an expedited basis. In addition plaintiff’s confinement was short—essentially encompassing a single weekend. The procedures, whatever they might or should have been, simply did not have the opportunity to play out.
For purposes of qualified immunity, I cannot find that any reasonable officer would have known that the quarantine order violated Ms. Hickox’s right to procedural due process. The content of such an order does not appear to be clearly prescribed by civil commitment or quarantine case law.

In sum, I do not find that either the directly applicable quarantine case law or the analogous civil commitment case law placed defendants on notice that their conduct violated clearly established federal constitutional or statutory rights. Accordingly, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to plaintiff’s federal Section 1983 claims, Counts 1, 2, and 3. The federal claims are therefore dismissed in their entirety.

D. State Law Claims

I nevertheless retain jurisdiction over Hickox’s state law claims. True, the

prompt dismissal of all federal claims tends to undermine her assertion of

supplemental subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. In the

alternative, however, her complaint asserts diversity jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1332. (Cplt. ¶J 3, 4) It appears to be undisputed that, at the time of
filing, the plaintiff was a citizen of O8 regon,’ the defendants were citizens of

New Jersey, and the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000.

1.

False Imprisonment (Count 4)

The tort of false imprisonment requires (1) “an arrest or detention of the

person against his or her will” and (2) “lack of proper legal authority or legal

18 Diversity is measured as of the time of filing of the complaint. Ms. Hickox also appears to have been a citizen of a state other than New Jersey (Maine) at the time of the events in suit.
32

Case 2:15-cv-07647-KM-JBC Document 19 Filed 09/02/16 Page 33 of 36 PageID: 291
justification.” Leang v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 198 N.J. 557, 969 A.2d 1097, 1117 (2009) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Defendants say that plaintiff cannot successfully allege such a claim because they are entitled to immunity under New Jersey’s Tort Claims Act
(“TCA”), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:3-1 et seq. The TCA governs public employee and
entity tort liability under New Jersey law. Defendants invoke the TCA’s “quarantine immunity” provision, which provides:
Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury resulting from the decision to perform or not to perform any act to promote the public health of the community by preventing disease or controlling the communication of disease within the community.
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:6-3. The comment accompanying this provision states:
This section declares a specific rule of discretionary immunity for acts or omissions relating to quarantine or other similar measures for the prevention or control of communicable diseases. This rule is consistent with the recognized approach taken by the New Jersey courts. See Valentine v. Englewood, 76 N.J.L. 509, 71 A. 344 (E. & A. 1908); Bedrock Foundations, Inc. v. George H. Brewster & Son, Inc., 31 N.J. 124, 155 A.2d 536 (1959).
Id. This section appears to apply directly to quarantine decisions like the one
taken h9 ere.’ The immunity provided by this section, however, is not absolute. It only
applies where the official “exercised his [sic] judgment and discretion in good faith; it is “inapplicable where the administrative official’s action was actuated by malice or bad faith.” Bedrock Foundation, Inc. v. George H. Brewster & Son, Inc., 31 N.J. 124, 140 155 A.2d 536 (1959); see also Valentine v. Englewood, 76 N.J.L. 509, 515, 71 A. 344 (E. & A. 1908)(immunity not applicable in cases of
“fraud or malice”); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:3-14 (stating that a public employee is
not immune under the TCA if his conduct “constituted a crime, actual fraud, actual malice, or willful misconduct”).
Unlike the § 1983 qualified immunity, the TCA’s grant of immunity for an employee who “acts in good faith in the execution or enforcement of any law” is specifically withheld as to claims “for false arrest or false imprisonment.” N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 59:3-3. Defendants therefore do not invoke it.
33

Case 2:15-cv-07647-KM-JBC Document 19 Filed 09/02/16 Page 34 of 36 PageID: 292

TCA immunity, unlike qualified immunity, is an affirmative defense, and

the burden of pleading and proving it rests on the defendants. See Leang, 198

N.J. at 582 (“[T]he public employee has the burden to plead and prove his

immunity under the TCA.”) (citing Kolitch v. Lindedahl, 100 N.J. 485, 497, 497

A.2d 183 (1985)); see also Charpentier v. Godsil, 937 F.2d 859, 863 (3d Cir.

199 1)(”Under New Jersey law ... immunity under the State Tort Claims Act is

regarded as an affirmative defense that must be pled by the public entity or

employee.”) (citing Kolitch).

Therefore, I find that application of TCA quarantine immunity at this

stage is premature. I will allow this claim to proceed, and deny the motion to

dismiss Count 4.

2.

Invasion of Privacy/False Light (Count 5)

The tort of false light, although couched as an invasion of privacy, has a

“conceptual affinity” with defamation. Romaine v. Kallinger, 537 A.2d 284, 290

(N.J. 1988). This tort involves “publicity that unreasonably places the other in

a false light before the public.” Romaine u. Kallinger, 537 A.2d 284, 289 (N.J.

1988). The false light tort has two essential elements: “(1) the false light in

which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person,”

and (2) “the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the

falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be

placed.” Leang v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 969 A.2d at 1116; see also Cibenko

v. Worth Publishers, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 761, 766 (D.N.J. 1981). A “reckless

disregard” of the truth requires that the speaker had a “high degree of

awareness of [the statement’s] probable falsity.” Durando v. Nutley Sun, 37 A.3d

449, 458-59 (N.J. 2012) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

Hickox’s false light claim is based on a public statement Governor

Christie made on Saturday, October 25, 2014, less than 24 hours after

Hickox’s quarantine began. According to the complaint, Governor Christie,

34

Case 2:15-cv-07647-KM-JBC Document 19 Filed 09/02/16 Page 35 of 36 PageID: 293
without using Hickox’s n2 ° ame, stated that she was “obviously ill” and continued:
I’m sorry if in any way she was inconvenienced but inconvenience that could occur from having folks that are symptomatic and ill out amongst the public is a much, much greater concern of mine.
(Cplt. ¶ 69)
Plaintiff contends that a reasonable person would be highly offended by falsely being described as “ill” with Ebola, and at being portrayed as a potential or actual threat to the public. She also argues that the complaint supports the contention that Governor Christie made these statements with reckless disregard as to their falsity, because Hickox’s initial set of blood results had already come back negative and because her temperature readings were “consistently showing that she was not ill.” (ECF no. 15 p. 46).
The viability or not of this claim cannot be settled from the face of the complaint.
The offensiveness and falsity, or not, of the imputation of illness must be explored. The factual context may or may not establish that this was, directly or by innuendo, a statement that Ms. Hickox herself had E2 ’ bola.
The recklessness of the statement, too, will have to be explored in discovery. At the time, medical professionals were apparently concerned that Hickox might be ill. The allegations of the Complaint will bear the interpretation, however, that no one had yet concluded that Hickox was in fact ill and symptomatic. Of course the allegations of the complaint are allegations

20 Hickox apparently identified herself to the media by name. (See Cplt. ¶ 69
(alleging that Hickox gave an interview to The Dallas Morning News about her experience)).

21

The imputation of a “loathsome disease” has some historical pedigree in the law

of defamation. At common law, in an action for slander, damages would be presumed

for an “accusation of a crime, a loathsome disease, misfeasance in business, or

serious sexi.ial misconduct.” WJ.A. v. D.A., 43 A.3d 1148, 1154 (N.J. 2012). Afortiori,

such a statement may be regarded as offensive to the average person.

35

Case 2:15-cv-07647-KM-JBC Document 19 Filed 09/02/16 Page 36 of 36 PageID: 294
only, and defendants’ side of the story has yet to be told. 22 Other issues, such as privilege, also remain to be explored.
For now, however, the motion to dismiss Count 5 is denied. IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I will grant the motion to dismiss Counts 1, 2, and 3 with prejudice, based on qualified immunity. The motion to dismiss Counts 4 and 5 is denied. An appropriate order is filed with this opinion.
Dated: September 2, 2016 Newark, New Jersey
KEVIN MCNULTY United States District Judge

22

Indeed, plaintiffs brief, though not the complaint, mentions that Governor

Christie stated at the press conference that her blood results had come back negative

for Ebola. (See ECF no. 15 p. 46)

36

 
 Case 2:15-cv-07647-KM-JBC Document 46 Filed 07/28/17 Page 1 of 1 PageID: 378

Jeffrey S. Chiesa, [sq.

Ronald L. ISThCI, I%sq. CHIESA SHAHINIAN

&

CIA

WIOMASI

PC

Onc B&and Drive

Wesi Orange, NJ 07052
Telephone: (973) 325-1500 AFCnthrcrasirisnmtociypleih:feor(r9R7Ci3mh)4ri3sa2wn5-pd1h5Gc0ra1rJyamLueds nCihgHslle, Aiwy g 0 Dowct

UNiTED FOR ThE

SThTES D1s-rRicr COURT DItVIRICE OF NEW .JERSEY

KACI HICKOX, Plaintiff,

Civil Action No.: 2:15-cv-07647-KM-JEC

STIPULATION 01? PREJUDICE AND

DISMISSAL WITH VITHOUT COSTS

uCaLnUHiOdDR’cWIDnSiOTItGiOWc,dPDaHne,dEiCnRJHpOlJRoHAIyNSMoTsEDOSoOPfEHCthhEaeRnRNdISeRJTwAININEJNeE,,iMcDGyAOARERY,Y
Department of Health,

DOCUMENT ELECTRONICALLY FILED

Defendants.

THE MAfl’BR in ftfterencc in the above-entitled aelion Iisvin been amicably

adjusted by and among the padies, 11 is hereby stipulated and bgrecd that the within action be

and i hereby dismissed with prejudice and without costs against any party.

MCLAUGHLIN & STERN Attorneys fertlaintiff

CHIESA SHAHINIAN & GIANIDMASI [‘C Attorneys for Defern Chxistopln
Christ

Dated: July?17, 2017

Dateth iul272oI7

6005005

K yin McNuky, U.S.D.J. Date:

 
 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT This Settlement Agreement (the "Agreement"), dated July __, 2017, is by and among (11) Plaintiff Kad Hickox ("Plaintiff'), and (b) Defendants Christopher James Christie, 1vlary E. O'Dowd, Christopher Rinn and Gary Ludwig ("Defondants") (Plaintiff and Defondants, collectively, Hw "Parties'}
\VI TN F: S S ETH: WHEREAS, on or about October 22, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defondants in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, captioned _Kac~ Hickox,y. Christogher Jarnes Chrj_fil~, Case No., 2: l 5-cv-07647-KM-JBC (the "Action"), WHEREAS the Parties, after discussions through counsel, have reached a settlement of their disputes; WHEREAS the Parties agree that by entering into this Agreement neither Party makes any admission of liability to the other \\;hatsoever; and WHEREAS the Parties desire to forthcr memorialize the tenns of said settlement. NO'W, THEREFORE, it is agreed as follows: (1) TERMS, The Parties have agreed to the issuance of an Addendum to the "New Jersey Mandatory Quarantine and Screening Protocols" for Ebola Virus Disease issued by the New Jersey Department of Health, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A. (2) STIPULATlON OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE AND WITHOUT
Counsel for the Parties shall execute a Stipulation of Dismissal dismissing the Action with prejudice and without costs in the form annexed to this A.&,rreement as Exhibit B. Counsel for Defendants shall submit the Stipulation of Dismissal fbr filing within three (3) business days after this Agreement has been fully executed.
6768019

(3)

(a) Plaintiff: on the one hand, and (b} Defondanls, on

the other hand, each hereby release and give up any and all claims, demands, rights, causes of

action or liabilities, of every nature and description \Vhatsoever, whether based in law or equity,

on fodernl, state, local, statutory or com1mm law, or any other law, rule or regulation, which they

may have against each other resulting from anything which has happened from the beginning of

time until the date of this Agreement including but not lirnited to both known claims and

unknown claims that have been or could have been asserted directly, indirectly, individually,

representatively, derivatively or in any other capacity, in the Action.

(4) NO ADMISSION OF LIABILITV. The Parties U\.~knowledge and represent that by

entering into this Agreement neither Pa1iy makes any admission of liability to the other

whatsoever.

(5) EACH PARTY TO BEAH OWN FEES AND COSTS. The Parties agree that they wilt ead; hear their own attorneys' fees and costs.
(6) ENTIRE AGREEMENT. This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement

bct\veen the Parties, and no promise, ai:,rreement, or consideration other than that recited herein

has been made or exchanged in return ior the releases and discharges affected by this Agreement.

All prior understandings, representations, or agreements, if any, are rncrged in this Agreement,

and this Agreement shall not be modified in any manner except by written instrument signed by

each of the Parties hereto.

(7) COUNTERPARTS. This Agreen1ent may be executed in counterparts, each of

which when executed and delivered shall be deemed an original, but all of which together shall

constitute one and the same instrument. Any signatory hereto may indicate acceptance of this

Agreement with an dcctrnnic signature, provided an original signature !s provided to all Parties

thereafter.

2 6168019

(8) HEADINGS. The headings in this Agreement arc provided for convenience of
reference only and in no way define, lirnit or describe the scope or intent of this Agreement or
any particular paragraph hereof, nor the proper construction hereof. (9) CONSTRUCTION. The Parties hereto agree that each party and its counsel have
reviewed this Agreement and that the normal rnle of construdion tu the effect that any ambiguities are to be resolved against the drafting party shall not be employed in the interpretation of this Agreement or any amendments, exhibits or schedules hereto.
(10) REPRESENTATIONS REGARDING COUNSEL/OPPORTUNITY FOR REVIE\>V. The Parties acknowledge and represent (a) that each has been represented by competent counsel of their choosing or has had an opportunity to consult with competent counsel of his or her choosing for purposes of this Agreement and the underlying dispute; and (b) that each enters into this Agreement with full knowledge and understanding of its tenns and after having the opportunity to consult with independent, competent legal eounseL
( Jl) REI'RESENTATlONS. Each of the Parties hereto represents and warrants that
it is authorized to enter into this Agreement, that this Agreement is binding and enforceable, and
that this Agreement does not violate any other agreement to which it is a signatory or othen.vise bound.
(12) VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT~ The Parties hereto further represent and declare
that they have carefolly read this Agreement and knovv the contents thereof and that they sign the
same freely and voluntarily.
3 6768019

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have ex.IX:Uted this Agreement and have set forth
their signatures below:

By: ___,~t:._,_,..,-,,-_-.)·--L--,~_-·,- -
l{aci Hickox

Date: July&2017

. Date: July}!J2017

Christopher RJnn Gary Ludwig

Date: July -J 2017
Date: July_, 2017
Date: July__. 4017
4
6768019

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement and have set fo1ih
their signatures below;

By: Kaci Hickox.
By: Christopher James Christie
By:

Date: July_, 2017 Date: July __, 2017
2h Date: July 2017

By: -------~-- ....,....~.- - - - Christopher Rinn

Date: July····" 2017

Gary Ludwig

Date: July·--···' 2017
4 61S8019

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement and have set forth their signatures below:

Kaci Hickox Christopher James Christie

Date: July_, 2017 Date: July_, 2017

Mary E. 0 'Dowd Christopher Rinn Gary Ludwig

Date: July_, 2017
Date: July Z.I, 2017
Date: July_, 2017 4
6768019

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the patties have executed this Agreement and have set forth their signatures below:

By: Kaci Hickox
Christopher James Christie

Date: July_, 2017 Date: July_, 2017

Mary E. O' Dowd

Date: July_, 2017

Christopher Rinn
By: G~---

Date: July_, 2017 Date: Julyc20,2017

4 6768019
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To: From: Date: Subject:

NJ Local Health Departments and Public Health Partners
NJ Department of Health
July_, 2017
Addcndmn: "New Jersey Mundatory Quarantine and Screening Protocols" for Ebola Virus Discm;e

The New Jersey Department of Health (the Department) and its state, local, and foderal public health partners have taken a cornprchensive approach in responding lo th•' Fholn Virm; Disease (EVD) through coordinated steps to prevent potential exposure, ensure the health care system's preparedness, and provide community education. On October 16, 2014, federal officials began active screening for EVD at Newark Liberty International Airport for passengers who traveled in an affected West African country" Shortly thereafter, New Jersey released its "Mandatory Quarantine and Screening Protocols" to provide EVD guidance to its public health partners and to document the protocols already implemented in the State.
This addendum supplements and clarifies certain aspects of that EVD guidance. The provisions of this addendum supersede conflicting provisions, if any, of the "Mandatory Quarnntine and Screening Protocols," the "Ebola Preparedness Plan" or the "Additional Screening Protocols for Ebola at John F. Kennedy International Airpmi in New York and at Nev.-ark Airport," but only to the extent and insofar as any such conflicting provisions apply to New Jersey.
L Policy and Procedures

A. Isolation or quarantine measures shall be taken in the State only insofar as medically and epi<lexniologically necessary to prevent or control the spread of EVD. Such measures shall be implemented by the least restrictive means necessary to prevent the spread of EVD and shal1 be undertaken only after less restrictive measures such as, but not limited to, active monitoring and direct active monitoring have, at a minirnum, been explicitly explored. Quarantine nH.~asures may include, but are not limited to, confinement to private homes, other private premises, or public premises.
B. An order providing for quarantine or isolation of an individual due to EVD shall include the following:

i.

The identity of the individi.m! or group to be isolated or quarantined;

n. The premises subject to isolation or quarantine;

m. The date and time at which isolation or quarantine commences and, to the extent known, until which it will continue;

iv. Identification of EVD as the suspected communicabk disease and the facts in support thereof;

v. The legal authority under which the order is issued;

v1. The medical basis upon which isolation or quarantine is justified;

vii. A description of the less restrictive alternatives attempted without success, or the iess restrictive alternatives considered and rejected, and the reasons such alternatives were rejected;

vn1. A statement advising the individual or group of the right lo retain an attorney and to appeal the written order of isolation or quanrntinc; and

ix. A statement advising of the consequences for foil me to abide by the order, including but not limited to civil penalties.

x.

A copy of the written order shall be provided to the individual or group lo be

isolated or quarantined within 24 hours of issuance ofthe order, in

accordance with any applicable process authorized by New Jersey law. If

the order applies to a group of individuals and it is impractical to provide

individual copies, public health officials may post the order in a conspicuous

place in the isolation or quarantine premises.

H. Tem[!en1ture Checks
Screening and monitoring for EYD typically involves: (1) temperature checks; (2) visual inspection for symptoms; and (3} history of risk of exposure. Temperature checks shall be conducted as follows:

A FDA-approved thcnnomctcrs must be used. The use of non-FDA approved thcnnomctcrs and technology such as smart phone applications are not permitted.

B. f:\dµJts aml.ChU<,_'h.:cn 4 years.Pf age or older; Temperature can be taken rectally,
orally, tympanic (ear), forehead (temporal scanner), or axiitary (armpit), Of these methods, orally is the prefoned way to measure temperature so long as the patient has no! recently consumed either hot or cold beverages and the thermometer is placed under the tongue. The axillary method is least accurate, typically running about 0.5-
l .O !O\ver than oral, and its use should be discouraged. Rectal temperature reading may nm higher than an oral temperature, and is likely to be a less preferred method of
temperature monitoring for adults or children over 4 years of age,

if exigent circumstances require the use of a non-oral thermometer when screening or monitoring an individual for EVD in the State, the readings of the non-oral them1omcter should be eonfirmed by om! thermometer. If the non-oral thcnnometer
and the oral thennorncter indicate different temperatures, the temperature indicated
by the ornl thennometer shall be presumed to be more accurate so long as the patient

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has not recently consumed either hot or cold beverages and that the thermometer is placed under the tongue.
C. (~hi1dren.\ll}QQL1YS'.ll.rn.QL~: Oral measurement is not recommended. Rectal, tympanic, or temporal is recommended.
Ht Treating Physician's Role in Isolation
A. State law authorizes the Department and the local boards of health, within their respective jurisdictions, to do the following: (1) rnaintain and enforce proper and sufficient quarantine, wherever deemed necessary, and (2) remove any person infected with a communicable disease to a suitable place ifrcmoval is necessary and can be accfJmplisbed without any undue risk to the person infocted. N.J.S.A. 26:42(d), (e).
B, A decision to continue to hold a person in isolation due to possible infection with
EVD frorn actual and direct contact with the Ebola vims shall be made by the Department, in consultation with the treating physieian(s) and the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention. The decision shall be made consistent with medical and epidemiological necessity. The Department shall request that the treating physician(s) and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC'') advise the
Department in writing of their respective positions on whether isolation is medically and epidemiologically necessary and the Dcpaiimcnt shall consider the opinions of
the treating physician(s) and the CDC in determining whether isolation is medically and cpidcmiologica1ly necessary. However, any such writing supplied by the treating physician(s) or CDC would not be subject to release under the New Jersey Open Public Records Act ("OPRA"), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 et seq. Nothing in this parat,:rraph shall be constmed to limit a plaintiffs or petitioner's right to obtain infommtion about his or her isolation for puq1<1ses of a court or administrative proceeding.
C, A decision to release a person from isolation shall be made by the Depa1iment, in
consultation with the treating physician(s) and the CDC. The decision shall made consistent with medical and epidemiological necessity. The Department shall request that the treating physician(s) and the CDC advise the Department in writing of their respective positions on whether isolation is medically and epidemiologically necessary and the Department shall consider the opinions of the treating physician(s) and the CDC in determining whether isolation is medically and epidemiologically necessary. However, any such writing supplied by the treating physician or CDC would not be subject to release under OPRA. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to limit a plaintiff's or petitioner's right to obtain information about his or her isolation for purposes of a court or administrative proceeding.
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IV. Rights and Responsibilities of Individuals Subject to Isolation or Quarantine
A. The Department is committed to ensuring that individuals who are subject to isolation or quarantine for EVD are informed of their rights and responsibilities.
B. The Department will provide written infonnation to individuals who arc subject to isolation or quarantine for EVD, no later than 12 hours from the time they arc taken
into custody. Such information shall include the items listed below in Section lV.C.
C. Any individual or group subject to isobtion or quarantine for EVD shall have the
following rights:
i. The right to retain and consult with legal counsel tclcphonically or by other
means, including in person, where possible in a medically safo manner;
1i. The right to legally challenge the quarantine and/or isolation order. If an individual seeks to legally challenge quarantine or isolation on an emergent basis in a court with jurisdiction, the Department agrees not to request an adjournment of any related hearing for u period of more than 48 hours. Unless stayed by the Commissioner or a court with jurisdiction, a written order for quarantine or isolation shall rernain in full force and effoct for the period stated in the order until disposed of on the merits through judicial review.
iii. The right to be provided with prior notice of the date, time, and location of any
hearing related to the individual's condition or confinement;
iv. The right to send and receive communications;
v. The right to have visitor:> so 1ong as visitntion can be accomplished in a
reasonable and medically safe manner;
vi. The right to participate in any hearing, which could be by telephonic or electronic means when a personal appearance cannot be facilitated in a medically safo manner,
vii. The right to respond and present evidence and argument on the individual's own behalf in any hearing; and
viii. The right !o cross-examine witnesses 1,vho testity against the individual.
D. Monitoring and treatment protocols associated with quarantine or isolation due to EVD will he explained to individuals by public health or health care profossionals, as appropriate. Any individual placed in quarantine or isolation shall be supplied wilh
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information \vritten in layman's terms describing the monitoring and treatment protocols, so long as doing so would not pose a risk of transmitting EVD. Individuals shall acknowledge receipt that written information by !heir signature, including date and time of receipt, so long as doing so \vould not pose a risk of transmitting EVD.
v.
A. The Dcpaiimcnt is committed to protecting an individual's privacy and does not release personally identifiable information or protected health information to rncmbers of the public in press releases, press interviews, oral or written responses to information requests, or responses to requests made pursuant to the Open Public Records Act, N.J.S.A. 47: l A-l et seq.
B. The Department publicly shares information related to EVD only insofar as necessary
to protect the public health or if otherwise justified by compelling circumstances. If
limited disclosure about a suspected or confirmed case of EVD in the State is necessary, the Department will confi1111 the medical accuracy of the shared infrmnation with a member or members of the patient's treatment team.
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I ~sq. Jeffrey S. Chiesa,
I Ronald L, Israel, bsq.
CHIESA SHAHINIAN & G!ANTOfv1ASl PC One Boland Drive \:Vest Orange, NJ 07052 Telephone: (973) 325-1500 Facsimile: (973) 325-1501 Attomeys for Christopher James Christie. Mar.r' E. 0 'Doivd, Christopher Rinn, and Gary Ludwig
UNITF~D STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

KACI HICKOX,

Civil Action No.: 2: l 5-cv-07647-KM-JBC

Plaintiff, v.

STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE AND WITHOUT COSTS

CHRISTOPHER JA1V1ES CHRISTIE, MARY E. O'DOWD, CHRISTOPHER RINN, GARY LUDWIG, and JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, unidentified einployees of the New Jersey
Depatiment of Health,

DOCUMENT ELECTRONlCALLY FILED

Defendants.

THE MATTER in difference in the above-entitled action having been amicably

adjusted by and among the parties, it is hen:by stipulated and agreed that the within action be

and is hereby dismissed with prejudice and without costs against any pmiy.

l'vfCLAUGHLIN & STERN Attorneys for Plaintiff Kaci Hickox

CHIESA SHAHINIAN & GJANTOMASI PC Attorneys for Defondants Christopher James Christie, lvfary E. O'Dowd, Christopher Rinn and Gary Ludwig

By: STEVEN .f. HYlVIAN
Dated: July _ , 2017

By: -----·----,,····---RONALD L. ISRAEL
Dated: July _, 2017

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