2:10-cv-12183-AC-MJH Doc # 1 Filed 06/02/10 Pg 1 of 11 Pg ID 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

KEN ANDERSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
LaSHAWN PEOPLES and JOHN DOE, Detroit police officers, in their individual capacities,
Defendants.
/

Hon. Case No.
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Daniel S. Korobkin (P72842) Jessie J. Rossman (P72869) Michael J. Steinberg (P48085) Kary L. Moss (P49759) American Civil Liberties Union
Fund of Michigan 2966 Woodward Ave. Detroit, MI 48201 (313) 578-6824 dkorobkin@aclumich.org jrossman@aclumich.org msteinberg@aclumich.org
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
/

COMPLAINT

2:10-cv-12183-AC-MJH Doc # 1 Filed 06/02/10 Pg 2 of 11 Pg ID 2
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 1. Plaintiff Ken Anderson was charged with a crime for innocently sitting in his legally parked car on the side of the road, something law-abiding citizens do every day. 2. He brings this civil rights lawsuit because two police officers detained him without reasonable suspicion and, when he exercised his constitutional right to question their authority, charged him with a crime that does not exist. 3. He wishes to live in a free society where innocent people can park on the side of the road without fear of being harassed by police officers and forced to appear in court to defend against frivolous criminal charges. 4. In this action, Plaintiff alleges violations of his rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as enforceable through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He also brings a supplemental state law claim for malicious prosecution.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 5. This court has original jurisdiction over Plaintiff's federal claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 because this is a civil action seeking redress for the deprivation of rights secured by the United States Constitution. 6. This court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) because it is part of the same case or controversy as Plaintiff's federal claims. 7. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because the events giving rise to the claims asserted occurred in Wayne County, which is within the Eastern District of Michigan.
1

2:10-cv-12183-AC-MJH Doc # 1 Filed 06/02/10 Pg 3 of 11 Pg ID 3
PARTIES 8. Plaintiff Ken Anderson is 57 years old and a resident of Detroit, Michigan. 9. Defendant LaShawn Peoples is, or was at all times relevant to this Complaint, a police officer employed by the Detroit Police Department. He is being sued in his individual capacity. 10. Defendant John Doe is, or was at all times relevant to this Complaint, a police officer employed by the Detroit Police Department. He is being sued in his individual capacity. His true name is currently unknown to Plaintiff, and Plaintiff intends to amend this Complaint to name him as a Defendant as soon as his identity is disclosed.
FACTS 11. Ken Anderson was born and raised in Hamtramck and then drafted into the Army in 1972. He served honorably for two years. He then returned to Michigan and worked as an automotive design engineer for contractors to the Big Three automakers. 12. Like many working people in Michigan, Mr. Anderson has fallen on hard times. Due to the economic crisis and physical disability, he has been unemployed for several years. 13. In 2008, Mr. Anderson was living in a shelter for homeless veterans at 2770 Park Avenue in Detroit. He still had his car and a laptop computer, and during the day he often left the shelter and drove to a nearby parking space on the side of the road where he could sit quietly by himself and work on a business plan to get himself back on his feet. 14. At 2 p.m. on November 12, 2008, Mr. Anderson was seated alone in his car on Edmund Place, a public street, just east of Woodward Avenue in the City of Detroit. His car was parked just outside the Ecumenical Theological Seminary, approximately three blocks east of his
2

2:10-cv-12183-AC-MJH Doc # 1 Filed 06/02/10 Pg 4 of 11 Pg ID 4
own residence at 2770 Park Avenue, half a mile north of Comerica Park, and just one block south of the law offices of undersigned counsel.
15. Mr. Anderson's car was legally parked, and the engine was not running. 16. Mr. Anderson was not engaged in any unlawful activity or planning to engage in any unlawful activity, nor to his knowledge was any unlawful activity occurring in his presence. 17. For no apparent reason, a police vehicle stopped behind Mr. Anderson's car and activated its emergency lights. Two police officers -- Defendants LaShawn Peoples and John Doe -- approached Mr. Anderson's vehicle. Officer Peoples stood at the driver's side window, and Officer Doe stood at the opposite side of Mr. Anderson's car. 18. Officer Peoples asked Mr. Anderson for his identification. 19. Mr. Anderson asked Officer Peoples what probable cause he had to ask for ID. 20. Officer Peoples again asked for ID. 21. Mr. Anderson again asked Officer Peoples for his probable cause. 22. Officer Peoples told Mr. Anderson he was in an area where drugs were rampant and many break-ins had taken place. 23. Officer Doe then shouted at Mr. Anderson, "If you don't give us your ID, we're going to come in there and get it." 24. Fearing that he would be physically restrained if he did not immediately comply, Mr. Anderson reluctantly handed Officer Peoples his valid Michigan driver's license. 25. The officers returned to their police vehicle. 26. Upon information and belief, they verified Mr. Anderson's identity and discovered that he had no outstanding warrants or any criminal record. 27. Several minutes later, the officers exited their vehicle.
3

2:10-cv-12183-AC-MJH Doc # 1 Filed 06/02/10 Pg 5 of 11 Pg ID 5
28. Officer Peoples returned to Mr. Anderson's driver's side window. 29. As Officer Peoples approached Mr. Anderson's car, Officer Doe drew his service weapon and assumed a crouched, defensive posture. 30. Officer Peoples handed Mr. Anderson his driver's license and a citation. Then he said, "You're free to go." 31. The citation is a criminal complaint charging Mr. Anderson with "loitering in a known narcotic area." The complaint states that Mr. Anderson "was found loitering in an area where narcotics area [sic] bought, kept, or sold" in violation of section 38-11-8 of the Municipal Code of the City of Detroit. The complaint is signed by Officer Peoples. 32. In fact, there is no municipal ordinance against "loitering in a known narcotic area" or "loitering in an area where narcotics are bought, kept, or sold." 33. The ordinance number cited by Officer Peoples, section 38-11-8, does not prohibit loitering. It is titled "Civil forfeiture," and provides: "Any controlled substance that is manufactured with intent to sell, possessed with intent to use or sell, or sold in violation of this division shall be seized and forfeited to the City of Detroit." 34. Upon receiving the citation from Officer Peoples charging him with a crime for "loitering in a known narcotic area," Mr. Anderson drove immediately to the police station to complain about what had just taken place. 35. Initially Mr. Anderson went to police headquarters downtown, but he was directed to complain at the Central District at the corner of Woodward and Grand Ave. 36. At the Central District, Mr. Anderson was directed to speak with a female sergeant whose name is currently unknown to him.
4

2:10-cv-12183-AC-MJH Doc # 1 Filed 06/02/10 Pg 6 of 11 Pg ID 6
37. Mr. Anderson showed the sergeant his citation, and the sergeant called Officer Peoples on his cell phone in Mr. Anderson's presence. The sergeant told Officer Peoples that Mr. Anderson was at the police station to complain about the incident. After a pause, the sergeant said to Officer Peoples, "You don't want to dismiss this ticket because he was rude?" The sergeant ended her telephone call with Officer Peoples and told Mr. Anderson that Officer Peoples was going to prosecute him because he had been rude.
38. A few days later, Mr. Anderson received a notice to appear in 36th District Court for arraignment.
39. Upon information and belief, no prosecuting attorney independently reviewed Officer Peoples' criminal complaint before Mr. Anderson was sent a notice to appear for arraignment or before he was arraigned.
40. On the basis of Officer Peoples' criminal complaint, Mr. Anderson was arraigned in 36th District Court on February 10, 2009.
41. Mr. Anderson appeared without counsel. He asked the district judge to dismiss the case against him, but his motion was denied. Personal bond was set at $100. A trial was scheduled for April 20, 2009. The trial was subsequently rescheduled for June 15.
42. Mr. Anderson retained an ACLU attorney to represent him at trial. The ACLU attorney drafted and filed a motion to dismiss. Mr. Anderson and his attorney prepared for trial.
43. On June 15, 2009, Mr. Anderson and his attorney appeared for trial. Prosecuting attorney Nellie Lee told Mr. Anderson's attorney that she had not yet spoken to Officer Peoples about the case and that she would dismiss the case if Officer Peoples did not appear to testify.
44. Officer Peoples did not appear to testify, and the prosecution was dismissed.
5

2:10-cv-12183-AC-MJH Doc # 1 Filed 06/02/10 Pg 7 of 11 Pg ID 7
45. As a result of the Defendants' unlawful conduct, Mr. Anderson suffered the embarrassment, humiliation, indignity, fear, anger, anxiety, emotional distress, and personal inconvenience of being detained without reasonable suspicion; threatened with personal injury for no good reason; retaliated against for questioning the officers' authority; and prosecuted maliciously and without probable cause for allegedly committing a crime that does not exist.
COUNT ONE 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Violation of the Fourth Amendment Unlawful Detention 46. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, and the Fourth Amendment is incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. Persons violating the Fourth Amendment under color of state law are liable at law and in equity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 47. Under the Fourth Amendment, police officers may not conduct even a brief Terry stop without reasonable suspicion that the person being stopped is involved in criminal activity. 48. Defendants, while acting under color of state law, violated Plaintiff's clearly established right to be free from unreasonable seizure by unlawfully detaining him.
COUNT TWO 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Violation of the First Amendment
Retaliation 49. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits abridgement of the freedom of speech, and the First Amendment is incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth
6

2:10-cv-12183-AC-MJH Doc # 1 Filed 06/02/10 Pg 8 of 11 Pg ID 8
Amendment. Persons violating the First Amendment under color of state law are liable at law and in equity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
50. The First Amendment protects the right to express disagreement with a police officer, to question the correctness of a police officer's actions, and even to be "rude" to a police officer without fear of reprisal or retaliation.
51. Defendants, while acting under color of state law, violated Plaintiff's clearly established right against retaliation in violation of the First Amendment because Defendants' decision to charge Plaintiff with a crime was motivated at least in part by Plaintiff's constitutionally protected speech.
COUNT THREE 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process 52. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects against the deprivation of liberty without due process of law. Persons violating the Fourteenth Amendment under color of state law are liable at law and in equity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 53. The freedom to remain in a public place for innocent purposes is part of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 54. Defendants, while acting under color of state law, violated Plaintiff's clearly established right under the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving him of the liberty to remain in a public place because they charged him with a crime for "loitering in a known drug area" absent probable cause that Plaintiff was committing a drug offense, intended to commit a drug offense, or knew of a drug offense being committed in his presence.
7

2:10-cv-12183-AC-MJH Doc # 1 Filed 06/02/10 Pg 9 of 11 Pg ID 9
COUNT FOUR 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments Malicious Prosecution 55. The Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable seizures encompasses the right to be free from malicious prosecution. 56. Malicious prosecution is also prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee against the deprivation of liberty without due process of law. 57. Defendants, while acting under color of state law, violated Plaintiff's clearly established right under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments by unlawfully and maliciously causing a criminal prosecution to be instituted against him. 58. Defendants lacked probable cause to initiate criminal proceedings against Plaintiff; a reasonable person in Defendants' position would have known that the facts and circumstances were insufficient to justify a reasonable belief that Plaintiff had committed any offense; the criminal proceedings ended in Plaintiff's favor; and the criminal proceedings were the result of malice by Defendants.
COUNT FIVE Common Law and M.C.L. § 600.2907
Malicious Prosecution 59. In Michigan, malicious prosecution is recognized under the common law and by M.C.L. § 600.2907. 60. Defendants tortiously and maliciously prosecuted Plaintiff.
8

2:10-cv-12183-AC-MJH Doc # 1 Filed 06/02/10 Pg 10 of 11 Pg ID 10

61. Defendants caused criminal proceedings to be instituted against Plaintiff; the proceedings terminated in Plaintiff's favor; there was no probable cause to support the prosecution; and Defendant acted with malice.

DEMAND FOR RELIEF Plaintiffs request that this court:
a. assert jurisdiction over this matter; b. award compensatory and punitive damages to Plaintiff, in an amount to be
proved at trial; c. award Plaintiff costs and attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and d. grant or award such other relief that this Court deems just and proper.

Dated: June 2, 2010.

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Daniel S. Korobkin Daniel S. Korobkin (P72842) Jessie J. Rossman (P72869) Michael J. Steinberg (P48085) Kary L. Moss (P49759) American Civil Liberties Union
Fund of Michigan 2966 Woodward Ave. Detroit, MI 48201 (313) 578-6824 dkorobkin@aclumich.org jrossman@aclumich.org msteinberg@aclumich.org
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

9

2:10-cv-12183-AC-MJH Doc # 1 Filed 06/02/10 Pg 11 of 11 Pg ID 11

JURY DEMAND Plaintiff demands a jury on all issues so triable.

Dated: June 2, 2010.

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Daniel S. Korobkin Daniel S. Korobkin (P72842) Jessie J. Rossman (P72869) Michael J. Steinberg (P48085) Kary L. Moss (P49759) American Civil Liberties Union
Fund of Michigan 2966 Woodward Ave. Detroit, MI 48201 (313) 578-6824 dkorobkin@aclumich.org jrossman@aclumich.org msteinberg@aclumich.org
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

10

 
 2:10-cv-12183-AC-MJH Doc # 9 Filed 02/08/11 Pg 1 of 2 Pg ID 35

UNITED STATE DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

KEN ANDERSON, Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 10-12183 Honorable John Corbett O’Meara

LASHAWN PEOPLES and JOHN DOE,
Defendants. __________________________/

ORDER OF PARTIAL DISMISSAL

Plaintiff filed this action against two Detroit police officers, LaShawn Peoples and John

Doe, in their individual capacities, alleging the following causes of action: Count I, unlawful

detention in violation of the Fourth Amendment, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Count II, retaliation in

violation of the First Amendment, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Count III, lack of due process in

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Count IV, malicious

prosecution in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and

Count V, malicious prosecution in violation of Michigan common law and Mich. Comp. Laws

Ann. § 600.2907.

Counts I through IV give rise to federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

The remainder of Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges a cause of action based solely on state law. In

order to avoid jury confusion, the court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

the state law claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715

(1966); and Padilla v. City of Saginaw, 867 F. Supp. 1309 (E.D. Mich. 1994).

2:10-cv-12183-AC-MJH Doc # 9 Filed 02/08/11 Pg 2 of 2 Pg ID 36

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that Count V is DISMISSED.

Date: February 8, 2011 United

s/John Corbett O’Meara States District Judge

I hereby certify that on February 8, 2011, a copy of this order was served upon counsel of record using the ECF system.

s/W

illiam Barkholz

Case Manager

 
 2:10-cv-12183-AC-MJH Doc # 12 Filed 02/17/11 Pg 1 of 2 Pg ID 40

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

KEN ANDERSON, Plaintiff,

v.

Case No. 10-12183

LASHAWN PEOPLES, et al,

HONORABLE AVERN COHN

Defendants. /

ORDER OF CONSOLIDATION AND DISMISSAL The above case was reassigned to the do cket of the Honorable Avern Cohn as a companion case to Case No. 10-12182. They involve common questions of law or fact . IT IS ORDERED that these cases are consolidated in accordance with Rule 42(a) Fed. R. Civ. P. ALL PLEADINGS ARE TO DOCKETED AS FOLLOWS:

PHILLIP LETTEN, et al,

Case No. 10-12182

Plaintiffs, v.

SCOTT HALL, et al,

Defendants. _____________________________________________________/

Case No. 10-12183 is statistically DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 17, 2011

s/Avern Cohn AVERN COHN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

2:10-cv-12183-AC-MJH Doc # 12 Filed 02/17/11 Pg 2 of 2 Pg ID 41
10-12183 Anderson, et al v. Peoples, et al
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a copy ofthe foregoing document was maiel d to the attorneys of record on this date, February 17, 2011, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Julie Owens Case Manager, (313) 234-5160

 
 Case: 2:10-cv-12183-AC-MJH As of: 07/02/2012 09:22 AM EDT 1 of 2
CLOSED, reassigned
U.S. District Court Eastern District of Michigan (Detroit) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:10−cv−12183−AC−MJH

Anderson v. Peoples et al **CASE CLOSED − ALL ENTRIES MUST BE MADE IN 10−12182** Assigned to: District Judge Avern Cohn Referred to: Magistrate Judge Michael J. Hluchaniuk Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 06/02/2010 Date Terminated: 02/17/2011 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Ken Anderson

represented by Michael J. Steinberg American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan 2966 Woodward Avenue Detroit, MI 48201 313−578−6814 Email: msteinberg@aclumich.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel S. Korobkin American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan 2966 Woodward Avenue Detroit, MI 48201 (313) 578−6824 Fax: (313) 578−6811 Email: dkorobkin@aclumich.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant LaShawn Peoples
Defendant John Doe

represented by Jane K. Mills Detroit City Law Department 660 Woodward Avenue Suite 1650 Detroit, MI 48226−3491 313−224−4550 Fax: 313−237−5060 Email: millj@detroitmi.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 06/02/2010
06/03/2010 06/03/2010

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT filed by All Plaintiffs against All Defendants with Jury Demand. Plaintiff requests summons issued. Receipt No: 0645−2492292 − Fee: $ 350. County of 1st Plaintiff: Wayne − County Where Action Arose: Wayne − [Previously dismissed case: No] [Possible companion case(s): None] (Korobkin, Daniel) (Entered: 06/02/2010)
2 SUMMONS Issued for *LaShawn Peoples* (LHac) (Entered: 06/03/2010)
3 NOTICE of Appearance by Michael J. Steinberg on behalf of All Plaintiffs. (Steinberg, Michael) (Entered: 06/03/2010)

Case: 2:10-cv-12183-AC-MJH As of: 07/02/2012 09:22 AM EDT 2 of 2

06/17/2010 08/06/2010 10/24/2010
11/24/2010 12/29/2010 02/08/2011 02/08/2011 02/17/2011 02/17/2011 02/17/2011

4 ORDER Referring All Pretrial Matters and Dispositive Motions to Magistrate Judge Michael Hluchaniuk. Signed by District Judge John Feikens. (CCoh) (Entered: 06/17/2010)
5 CERTIFICATE of Service/Summons Returned Executed. LaShawn Peoples served on 8/4/2010, answer due 8/25/2010. (Korobkin, Daniel) (Entered: 08/06/2010)
6 ANSWER to Complaint with Affirmative Defenses with Jury Demand by LaShawn Peoples. (Mills, Jane)[DOCUMENT TITLE: RESERVATION OF RIGHT TO WITHDRAW DEFENSE AND/OR INDEMNIFICATION FOR DEFENDANT] Modified on 11/1/2010 (TMcg). (Entered: 10/24/2010)
7 NOTICE of reassignment from District Judge John Feikens to District Judge John Corbett O'Meara pursuant to Administrative Order 10−AO−033. (SSch) (Entered: 11/24/2010)
8 ORDER Vacating 4 Order Referring Pretrial Matters to Magistrate Judge. Signed by District Judge John Corbett O'Meara. (PPau) (Entered: 12/29/2010)
9 ORDER of Partial Dismissal regarding Count V of 1 Complaint, filed by Ken Anderson. Signed by District Judge John Corbett O'Meara. (WBar) (Entered: 02/08/2011)
10 NOTICE TO APPEAR: Scheduling Conference set for 2/23/2011 11:00 AM before District Judge John Corbett O'Meara, or file Rule 26(f) Plan. (WBar) (Entered: 02/08/2011)
11 ORDER REASSIGNING CASE for Docket Efficiency from District Judge John Corbett O'Meara in Ann Arbor to District Judge Avern Cohn in Detroit. (SSch) (Entered: 02/17/2011)
12 ORDER of consolidation and dismissal. Signed by District Judge Avern Cohn. (DWor) (Entered: 02/17/2011)
13 Notice to Parties Regarding Consolidated Case: Order of consolidation entered on *2/17/11*. Designated lead case number is *10−12182*. (DWor) (Entered: 02/17/2011)

 
 Settlement Agreement
\:r 1. This Settlement Agreement and Release ("Agreement") is made th~~-l·l,.o.,., day of (.Ltvl--v;
20 11 by and between Phillip Letten, Ken Anderson, the American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan ("ACLU Fund of Michi gan"), Officer Scott Hall, Officer LaShawn Peoples, and the City of Detroit ("the City") (collectively, the "Pm1ies").
2. This Agreement fu lly and completely resolves Letren v. Hall (Case No.1 0-cv-12182) and Anderson v. Peoples (Case No. I0-cv- 12183), two civil actions filed by Phillip Letten and
Ken Anderson on June 2, 2010, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, Southern Division, whi ch are now consolidated as a single case, Lellen v. Hall
(Case No. I0-cv-12182) ("this Action").
3. Attorney Daniel S. Korobkin is authorized to sign this Agreement on behalf of Phillip Letten, Ken Anderson, and the ACLU Fund of Michigan, and Jane K. Mills is authorized to sign this Agreement on behalf of Officer Scott Hall , Officer LaShawn Peoples, and the City.
4. Phillip Letten agrees, on behalf of himself, agents, family members, fr iends, pal1nerS, associates, attomeys, heirs and assigns, to release Officer Hall, the City, and all other employees and agents of the City from any and all claims, demands, damages, actions, causes of action, suits or injuries of any kind or nature whatsoever, known or unknown, to person, property or otherwise, which have resulted or may in the future arise out of his encounter with Officer Hall on July 31, 2009, including but not limited to those damages alleged in this Action.
5. Ken Anderson agrees, on behalf of himself, agents, family members, friends, partners, associates, attorneys, heirs and assigns, to release Officer Peoples, the John Doe police officer named as Officer Peoples' co-defendant, the City, and all other employees and agents of the City from any and all claims, demands, damages, actions, causes of action, suits or inj uries of ally kind or nature whatsoever, known or unknown, to person, property or otherwise, which have resulted or may in the [1lture arise out of his encounter with Officer Peoples and the John Doe defendant on November 12,2008, including but not limited to those damages alleged in this Action.
6. The City agrees to adopt "Training Directive - First Amendment Right to Distribute NonCommercial Pamphlets and Handbills" ("First Amendment Training Directive"), attached as Exhibit L
7. The City agrees to distribute copies of the First Amendment Training Directive to all members of the Detroit Police Department ("Department") via an A-Distribution within 30 days of this Agreement
Page 1 of3

8. The City agrees Ihat the First Amendment Training Directive shall be read aloud to every Depat1ment shift for a span of one week during roll call as an Administrative Messageffeletype within 30 days of this Agreement, and then again to every shift for a span of one week 6 months after the first reading.
9. The City agrees to adopt "Training Directive - Reta liation" ("Retaliation Training Directive"), attached as Exhibit 2 .
10. The City agrees to distribute copies of the Retali ation Training Directive to all members of the Department via at1 A-Distributi on within 30 days of this Agreement.
II . The City agrees that the Retaliation Training Directive shall be read aloud to every Department shi h for a span of one week during roll call as an Administrative Messagerreletype withi n 30 days of this Agreement, and then agai n to every shift for a span of one week 6 months after the first reading.
12. The City agrees to adopt "Training Directive - Loitering" ("Loitering Training Directive"), attached as Exhibit 3.
13. The City agrees to distribute copies of the Loitering Training Directive to all members of the Department via an A-D istribution within 30 days of this Agreement.
14. The City agrees that the Loitering Training D irective shall be read aloud to every Department shift for a span of one week during roll call as an Administrative Messageffeletype within 30 days of this Agreeme nt, and then again to every shift for a span of one week 6 months after the first reading.
s.1 The City agrees to place a direct link to its online citi zen complaint fOim on the main page of
the Department's website within 30 days of this Agreement.
16. The City agrees to ensure that posters explaining its ci tizen compla int form are on public display in the lobby and/or entrance of every precinct station and at the Department headquarters within 30 days of this Agreement.
17. The City agrees to ensure that printed brochures explaining its citizen complaint form are placed in racks andlor display areas at every precinct station and at the Department headquarters within 30 days of this Agreement. This Agreement does not requi re the City to create racks andlor display areas where none exist.
18. The City agrees that a citizen may file a citizen complaint form even if there are charges pending against him or her.
19. The City agrees to distribute a wri tten statement regarding paragraph 18 to all members of the Department via an A-Distribution within 30 days of this Agreement.
Page 2 of3

20. The City agrees that thi s statement regarding paragraph 18 shall be read aloud to every Department sh ift for a span of one week during rolJ call as an Administrative Messageffeletype withi n 30 days of this Agreement.

2 1. The City shall pay the total amount of$ 20,000.00 to Phillip Letten, Ken Anderson, and their counsel at the ACLU Fund of Michigan.

22. The Parties agree to the fonn and content of the proposed order dismissing this Acti on, attached as Exhibit 4. The proposed order shall be filed upon execution of this Agreement.

~led and agreed to by:
'0?-~~
J$ne K. Mills
Ci ty of Detroit Law Department 660 Woodward Ave., Ste. 1650
Detroit, MI48226
W s./<:..L
Daniel S. Korobkin ACLU Fund of Michigan 2966 Woodward Ave. Detroit, MJ 48201

DATE:

Page30f3

Exhibit 1 First Amendment Training Directive

Detroit Police Depa,tmeru(
Training Directive

Numbered Directives shall be retained by all members Number: ~
Date: 11/0/10

SUBJECT: FIRST AMENDME NT RIGHT TO DISTRIBUTE NONCOMMERPAL PAMIftLETS AND HANDBILLS
Th is Training Directive is intended to remind members of the department that the First Amendment protects the right of persons in public places to distribute non-commercia l handbills and pamphlets. No permit or license is required and there are no statutes or ordinances that limit an individual's right to do so.
Detroit City Code Section 3-2-1 does not apply to non-commercial handbills , circulars, pamphlets or other written material. Section 3-2- 1 states:
a. It shall be unlawful for any person to distribute or cause to be distributed any commercial handbills, circu lars or advertising cards that solicit patronage for goods, wares, merchandise. services , real ~state or any other thing with in the Loop or Loop District, which is defined in Section 1-1-2 of this Code as the area bounded on the south by the south line of East Jefferson Avenue and West Jefferson Ave nue; on the east by the east line of St. Antoi ne; on the north by the north line of Columbia Street; and on the west by the west line of First Street.
b. The provisions of this section shalf not apply to
established newspapers or pe riodica ls or to noncomm ercial ci rculars, ha ndbill~r or cards whi ch
do not solicit patronage for profit.
Furthermore, there is no perm it or license requ ired to distribute noncommercial handbills or pamphlets.
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution protects, among other things , the right of freedom speech and expression . The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly made it clear that this constitutional right includes written as well as verbal expres·sion. It is of the utmost importance that members understand ~~ and act in accordance with that understanding -- that the First Amendment protects a freedom of expression without regard to the content of the message or whether an officer or others find it offensive, contemptuous or objectionable.
Questions can be directed to the Police Legal Advisor at 596-2151 .

Delmit Police D~parlmenl

This Training DirecHve is [or Internal deparlmenlal use only, and violations of the procedures oulilned In Ihls Tralning Directive may form the basis for

Departmenlal admlnls\rallve sancllons, This dOl;umenl \s not Intended for Ullrd-parly use or benenl No criminal or elvll duly or standard of care Is

lnl<>nrl ..rl In h" nr I" 1".r.. "I"," h1J Ih" i.~"'''.n",,, nf thf.q Tr;olntnn fll,,,,,Uv,,

.

Exhibit 2 Retaliation Training Directive

SUBJECT: RETALIATION

DPD Training Directive ~"'N

The First Amendment protects the rights of individuals to verbally oppose, verbally criticize, or verbally question police action without thereby risking arrest or a citation. Although the First Amendment does not protect the right to physically obstruct a police officer or refuse to comply with a lawful police order, verbally opposing, criticizing or questioning police action does not constitute physical obstruction or resistance. These expressions are not criminal and cannot be punished constitutionally.

An individual has the right to question the basis for a police stop, ask for the ordinance underlying a police stop, and express his displeasure with a police stop. This protection extends to expletives and other language that an officer may find annoying or provocative. In the face of such verbal challenges, an officer must exercise a higher degree of restraint than the average citizen.

It is unlawful to arrest or ticket an individual for speech that verbally opposes or verbally questions police action. It is similarly unlawful to retaliate against an individual who verbally opposes or verbally questions police action by arresting or ticketing them for another offense. An officer cannot arrest such an individual for another offense unless the same action would have been taken even in the absence of the speech.

This directive is constitutionally required. It also is in keeping with our Law Enforcement Code of Ethics, in which every officer pledges Uta maintain courageous calm in the face of danger, scorn or ridicule; develop self restraint and be constantly mindful of the welfare of others:

Exhibit 3 Loitering Training Directive

SUBJECT: LOITERING

DPD Training Directive
13 ' t~'J~fI

Members of the department are reminded that "loitering," by itself, is not a crime, and cannot be the basis for an arrest or an investigative stop.

The Constitution protects the right to loiter or remain in a public place for an innocent purpose, or for no purpose at all. LOitering is not a crime in itself and cannot be punished constitutionally. Merely being present in an area where illegal activity is taking place or tends to take place is not illegal.

Section 38-1-3 of the Detroit City Code provides:

It shall be unlawful for any person to loiter on any street, sidewalks,
overpass or public place. For the purpose of this section, loitering is
defined as the act of standing or idling in or about any street, sidewalk,
overpass or public place so as to hinder or impede or tend to hinder or impede the passage of pedestrians or vehicfes.

No violation of section 38-1-3 occurs unless the person is engaged in conduct that hinders or impedes, or tends to hinder or impede, pedestrian or veh icle traffic. The act of standing or idling in or about a public place is not, by itself, a loitering offense.

Section 38-11-6 of the Detroit City Code provides:

A person shall not knowingly remain in any building, apartment, store, automobile, boat, boathouse, airplane, or any other place where any controlled substance is illegally sold, dispensed, furnished, given away, stored, or kept with the intent to unlawfully use or possess such controlled substance.

No violation of section 38-1 1-6 occurs unless the person knows of a drug offense in that place and intends to commit a drug offense. Merely being present in a place where a drug offense occurs is not illegal.

Because loitering by itself is not a criminal offense, it does not give rise to the "reasonable suspicionn required to justify an investigatory stop. The reasonable suspicion standard is not satisfied merely by loitering in a high-crime area or near a place where illegal activity occurs. To justify an investigatory stop for loitering, there must be reasonable suspicion of unlawful conduct, purpose, or intent on the part of the person being stopped.

Exhibit 4 Stipulated Order of Voluutary Dismissal

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICf COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICf OF MlCmGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

PHILLIP LETTEN, et ai., Plaintiffs,
vs.

HOIl. Avern Calm
Case No. 10-ev-12182

SCOTT HALL, et ai.,

Defendants. I

STIPULATED ORDER OF VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL

A settlement having been reached in this matter, and the parties having stipulated

to thi s order by and through counsel, it is hereby ORDERED that this case is

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Dated:
Stipulated to by: lsi Jessie 1. Rossman Daniel S. Korobkin Counsel for Plaintiffs Dated:

Is! Hon. Avern Cohn United States District Judge
Is! Jane K. Mi ll s
Counsel for Defendants Dated: