Case 1:13-cv-00285-WYD-BNB Document 2 Filed 02/04/13 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 30
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. STEPHEN W. BRISCOE; CONTINUUM HEALTH PARTNERSHIPS, INC.; CONTINUUM HEALTH MANAGEMENT, LLC; and MOUNTAIN STATES HEALTH PROPERTIES, LLC,
Plaintiffs, v. KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, in her official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services; SETH D. HARRIS, in his official capacity as Acting Secretary of the United States Department of Labor; NEAL WOLIN, in his official capacity as Acting Secretary of the United States Department of the Treasury; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; and UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,
Defendants.
VERIFIED COMPLAINT
PLAINTIFFS STEPHEN W. BRISCOE, CONTINUUM HEALTH PARTNERSHIPS, INC., CONTINUUM HEALTH MANAGEMENT, LLC, and MOUNTAIN STATES HEALTH PROPERTIES, LLC, by and through their attorneys Michael J. Norton of Alliance Defending Freedom and Natalie L. Decker of the Law Office Of Natalie L. Decker, LLC, for their complaint against the Defendants above-named, state and allege as follows:
NATURE OF THE CASE
1. This case is about religious freedom. In this action, Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief for the Defendants’ violations of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1

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2000bb et seq. (hereinafter “RFRA”), the First and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (hereinafter “APA”) caused by the actions of the Defendants in implementing the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Pub. L. 111-148, March 23, 2010, 124 Stat. 1029) and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act (Pub. L. 111-152, March 30, 2010, 124 Stat. 1029) (collectively known and hereinafter referred to as “PPACA”), in ways that force Plaintiffs and thousands of other individuals to violate their deepest held religious beliefs. 2. Plaintiff Stephen W. Briscoe is a believing and practicing Evangelical Christian. Mr. Briscoe owns, directly or indirectly, several separate Colorado limited liability companies or Colorado for-profit corporations, organized as such for liability purposes, which, in turn, own and operate several senior independent living residences, assisted living centers or skilled nursing facilities and related businesses which manage such centers or facilities. All of the Colorado for-profit corporations are S Corporations. Mr. Briscoe’s businesses (sometimes referred to herein as “Mr. Briscoe’s Businesses”) collectively employ in excess of 200 fulltime employees. 3. Mr. Briscoe’s Businesses provide health insurance for the employees of his businesses pursuant to a self-insurance plan which renews each year on April 1. Thus, the next renewal date for such plan is April 1, 2013. Negotiations for the renewal plan are now underway and must be finalized by February 15, 2013 at the latest in order for the plan to be in place effective on and after April 1, 2013. 4. Mr. Briscoe sincerely holds religious beliefs that God mandates respect for the sanctity of each human life and that abortion and abortion-inducing drugs result in the wrongful taking
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of a human life. Mr. Briscoe seeks to run his businesses in accord with his sincerely held religious beliefs. 5. On February 15, 2012, the Defendants issued final rules through the Departments of HHS, Labor, and Treasury entitled “Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,” 77 Fed. Reg. 8725-30 that forces Plaintiffs to pay for and otherwise facilitate the insurance coverage and use of abortion-inducing contraception drugs, abortifacient drugs, and related education and counseling. 6. With significant exceptions, all group health plans and health insurance issuers that offer non-grandfathered group or individual health coverage must provide coverage for certain preventive services without cost-sharing. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13. These services have been defined by the Health Resources and Services Administration (“HRSA”) to include “[a]ll Food and Drug Administration approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures and patient education and counseling for all women with reproductive capacity.” HRSA, Women’s Preventive Services: Required Health Plan Coverage Guidelines, http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/ (referred to hereinafter the “HHS Mandate”). 7. In the category of “FDA-approved contraceptives” included in this HHS Mandate are several drugs or devices that may cause the demise of an already-conceived but not-yet- implanted human embryo, such as “emergency contraception” or “Plan B” drugs (the so-called “morning after” pill) and “ella” (the so-called “week after” pill) which studies show can function to kill embryos even after they have implanted in the uterus, by a mechanism similar to the abortion drug RU-486.
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8. Over the last several months, Mr. Briscoe has become aware that many citizens of the United States of America hold the same or similar religious beliefs as does Mr. Briscoe and have, as a result, challenged the application of the HHS Mandate to them and to their businesses.
9. As the controversy surrounding the HHS Mandate arose, Mr. Briscoe discovered in about January 2013 that his businesses’ self-insurance plan covered “FDA-approved contraceptives.” Mr. Briscoe learned that FDA-approved contraceptives included Plan B drugs and ella, drugs that are, in fact, abortifacients.
10. Mr. Briscoe has instructed the company that provides his businesses with insurance not to cover such abortifacients. He has been informed that, without relief from this Court, the company may not provide such insurance and must provide coverage compliant with the HHS Mandate.
11. Thus, the HHS Mandate illegally and unconstitutionally coerces Mr. Briscoe and his businesses to violate his sincerely held religious beliefs under threat of heavy fines and penalties. The HHS Mandate also forces Mr. Briscoe and his businesses to fund governmentdictated speech that is directly at odds with the religious ethics derived from his deeply held religious beliefs that he strives to embody in his businesses.
12. Defendants’ refusal to accommodate the religious and conscience objections of Mr. Briscoe and his businesses is highly selective. The PPACA exempts a variety of health plans from the HHS Mandate and, upon information and belief, the Defendants and other government officials have provided thousands of exemptions or waivers from the PPACA for various
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other entities, such as large corporations.1 But Defendants’ HHS Mandate does not exempt Plaintiffs’ employee health insurance plan or those of many other religious Americans. 13. Defendants’ actions violate Plaintiffs’ right freely to exercise religion protected by the RFRA and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 14. Defendants’ actions also violate Plaintiffs’ right to the freedom of speech as secured by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and their due process rights secured by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 15. Additionally, Defendants violated the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553, by imposing the HHS Mandate without prior notice or public comment, and for other reasons. 16. Plaintiffs are now faced with imminent harm due to Defendants’ HHS Mandate. The HHS Mandate by its terms forces Plaintiffs to obtain and pay for insurance coverage of the objectionable items in their April 1, 2013 employee health insurance plan. 17. Absent injunctive relief from this Court on or before February 15, 2013, by virtue of the number of full-time employees employed by Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs must either comply with the HHS Mandate or be illegally and unconstitutionally coerced into violating sincerely held religious beliefs under threat of heavy fines and penalties. 18. The HHS Mandate would force Plaintiffs to fund government-dictated speech concerning education and counseling related to abortion-inducing contraception drugs and abortifacient drugs that is directly at odds with Plaintiffs’ deeply held religious beliefs and the moral ethics Plaintiffs strive to embody in their businesses. 19. Defendants’ coercion tramples on the freedom of conscience of Plaintiffs and of millions of other Americans who seek to abide by their religious convictions, to comply with moral
1 One Court has estimated that “191 million Americans belong to plans which may be grandfathered under the ACA.” Newland v. Sebelius, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104835 at *4 (D. Colo. July 27, 2012); accord Tyndale House Publ’rs. V. Sebelius, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163965 at *57-61 (D.D.C. Nov 16, 2012).
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imperatives decreed by God Himself in His Holy Bible, and to participate in the public square through their businesses in a way that is consistent with their deeply held religious beliefs, and the ethical imperatives decreed by God Himself. 20. Defendants’ refusal to accommodate Plaintiffs’ sincerely held religious beliefs is highly selective. PPACA exempts a wide variety of employee health insurance plans from the HHS Mandate and, upon information and belief, the federal government has provided thousands of exemptions from PPACA and the HHS Mandate for various entities, including large corporations and others. However, Defendants’ HHS Mandate does not exempt Plaintiffs’ employee health insurance plan or the health insurance plans of thousands of other religious American citizens and their businesses. 21. Defendants’ actions violate Plaintiffs’ right to freely exercise their religion, rights protected by the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, rights secured by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, due process rights secured by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and rights protected by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. 22. Additionally, Defendants’ actions have violated the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553, by imposing the HHS Mandate on Plaintiffs and other Americans without prior notice or public comment, and for other reasons alleged herein. 23. Plaintiffs are faced with immediate, imminent and irreparable harm due to Defendants’ HHS Mandate which, by its terms, forces Plaintiffs to obtain and pay for insurance coverage for objectionable abortion-inducing contraception drugs, abortifacient drugs, and related education and counseling in their employee health insurance plan. Plaintiffs provide employee health insurance through a company-owned self-insurance plan which must be
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renewed on or by April 1, 2013. To effectuate Plaintiffs’ company-owned self-insurance plan on or by April 1, 2013, Plaintiffs must negotiate, coordinate, and arrange the details for that company-owned self-insurance plan by February 15, 2013 at the latest. 24. Plaintiffs therefore will suffer irreparable harm by or before February 15, 2013 unless this Court enters declaratory and injunctive relief to protect Plaintiffs from Defendants’ deliberate attack on Plaintiffs’ consciences, religious freedoms, and speech freedoms which would result from forced compliance with the HHS Mandate.
PARTIES
25. Plaintiff Stephen W. Briscoe (hereafter “Mr. Briscoe”) is an individual and resident of Greeley, CO. Mr. Briscoe indirectly owns several senior independent living residences, assisted living centers or skilled nursing facilities and related service and support entities. Each of the senior independent living residences, assisted living centers or skilled nursing facilities, as well as related service and support entities, are, for liability reasons, owned by separate Colorado limited liability companies or Colorado for-profit corporations. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a diagram of the organizational structure of Mr. Briscoe’s Businesses each of which is described in more detail below. By virtue of his ownership of these entities, Mr. Briscoe is solely responsible for implementing compliance with the HHS Mandate.
26. Plaintiff Continuum Health Partnerships, Inc. is a Colorado corporation resident at 1990 59th Avenue, Greeley, CO 80633 (hereafter “CHP”). Mr. Briscoe owns 100 percent of the stock of CHP. CHP is the sole member, i.e., owner, of: a. CH-Denver, II, LLC is a Colorado limited liability company resident at 1990 59th Avenue, Greeley, CO 80633 (hereafter “CH-Denver”), which is an oxygen supply company which services the various the senior independent living residences, assisted 7

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living centers or skilled nursing facilities owned and operated by Mr. Briscoe’s Businesses. Mr. Briscoe is the manager of CH-Denver. b. Connessione Investments, LLC is a Colorado limited liability company resident at 1990 59th Avenue, Greeley, CO 80633 (hereafter “Connessione Investments”), which is an investment company. Mr. Briscoe is the manager of Connessione Investments. c. Continuum at Pueblo, LLC is a Colorado limited liability company resident at 1990 59th Avenue, Greeley, CO 80633 (hereafter “Continuum Pueblo”), which owns independent living homes for seniors in Pueblo, CO. Mr. Briscoe is the manager of Continuum Pueblo. d. Continuum at Spring Ridge Park, LLC is a Colorado limited liability company resident at 1990 59th Avenue, Greeley, CO 80633 (hereafter “Continuum Spring Ridge Park”), which owns a senior assisted living center in Wheat Ridge, CO. Mr. Briscoe is the manager of Continuum Spring Ridge Park. e. Continuum at Chateau, Inc., is a Colorado corporation resident at 1990 59th Avenue, Greeley, CO 80633 (hereafter “Continuum Chateau”), provides senior assisted living services in Pueblo, CO. Mr. Briscoe is the president of Continuum Chateau. f. Continuum at Sharmar, Inc., is a Colorado corporation resident at 1990 59th Avenue, Greeley, CO 80633 (hereafter “Continuum Sharmar”), which provides skilled nursing services for seniors in Pueblo, CO. Mr. Briscoe is the president of Continuum Sharmar. g. Continuum at Foxhill Meadows, LLC is a Colorado limited liability company resident at 1990 59th Avenue, Greeley, CO 80633 (hereafter “Continuum Foxhill”), which
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owns undeveloped land in Fort Collins, CO. CHP is the member (owner) of Continuum Foxhill. Mr. Briscoe is the manager of Continuum Foxhill. h. Continuum at Abriendo, Inc. ., is a Colorado corporation resident at 1990 59th Avenue, Greeley, CO 80633 (hereafter “Continuum Abriendo”), which owns the land and improvements leased to Continuum Sharmar and Continuum Chateau in Pueblo, CO. CHP is the sole stockholder of Continuum at Abriendo. Mr. Briscoe is the president of Continuum Abriendo. 27. Plaintiff Mountain States Health Properties, LLC is a Colorado limited liability company resident at 1990 59th Avenue, Greeley, CO 80633 (hereafter “MSH”). Mr. Briscoe is the sole member, i.e., owner, of MSH. Mr. Briscoe is also the manager of MSH. MSH, in turn, owns WGCC, LLC, a Colorado limited liability company resident at 1990 59th Avenue, Greeley, CO 80633 (hereafter “WGCC”). WGCC, which is managed by Mr. Briscoe, in turn, owns an independent living residence, senior assisted living center and skilled nursing facility. 28. Plaintiff Continuum Health Management, LLC is a Colorado limited liability company resident at 1990 59th Avenue, Greeley, CO 80633 (hereafter “CHM”). CHP is the sole member, i.e., owner of CHM. Mr. Briscoe is the manager of CHM. CHM, pursuant to management agreements with the owner of each senior independent living residence, assisted living center or skilled nursing facility, provides daily management to the senior independent living residences, assisted living centers or skilled nursing facilities operated by Continuum Pueblo, Continuum Spring Ridge Park, Continuum Chateau, Continuum Sharmar, and/or WGCC. Management is provided for the assets of Continuum Foxhill and Continuum Abriendo.
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29. In addition, CHM is the member (owner) and manager of CH-Greeley, LLC, a Colorado limited liability company resident at 1990 59th Avenue, Greeley, CO 80633 (hereafter “CHGreeley”), which operates the Continuum office in Greeley, CO.
30. Mr. Briscoe’s Businesses, including CHP, MSH, and CHM and related entities Mr. Briscoe owns, directly or indirectly, are self-insured pursuant to a single healthcare insurance plan which is held by CHM. As the current healthcare insurance plan ends on March 31, 2013, the new healthcare insurance plan, which must be negotiated and under contract by no later than February 15, 2013 so as to provide appropriate notices, including the summary of benefits, to employees by March 1, 2013 for the plan that is to take effect on and after April 1, 2013.
31. Absent an order of this Court, Mr. Briscoe and Mr. Briscoe’s Businesses, on and after March 1, 2013 will be required to contract for and implement compliance with the HHS Mandate for all employees of Mr. Briscoe’s Businesses.
32. Defendants are appointed officials of the United States government and United States Executive Branch agencies responsible for issuing and enforcing the HHS Mandate.
33. Defendant Kathleen Sebelius (herein “Sebelius”) is the Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services (herein “HHS”). In that capacity, she is responsible for the operation and management of HHS. Sebelius is sued in her official capacity only.
34. HHS is an executive agency of the United States government and is responsible for the promulgation, administration, and enforcement of the HHS Mandate.
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35. Defendant Seth D. Harris (herein “Harris”) is the Acting Secretary of the United States Department of Labor (herein “DOL”). In that capacity, he is responsible for the operation and management of DOL. Harris is sued in his official capacity only.
36. Defendant DOL is an executive agency of the United States government and is responsible for the promulgation, administration, and enforcement of the HHS Mandate.
37. Defendant Neal Wolin (herein “Wolin”) is the Acting Secretary of the United States Department of the Treasury (herein “Treasury”). In that capacity, he is responsible for the operation and management of Treasury. Wolin is sued in his official capacity only.
38. Defendant Treasury is an executive agency of the United States government and is responsible for the promulgation, administration, and enforcement of the HHS Mandate. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
39. This action arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1361; jurisdiction to render declaratory and injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1, 5 U.S.C. § 702, and Fed. R. Civ. P. 65; and authority to award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
40. Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). A substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to this Verified Complaint occurred in this district and MR. Briscoe and Mr. Briscoe’s Businesses are all domiciled and/or resident in this district.
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FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
41. Plaintiffs reallege all matters set forth above and incorporate them herein by reference. I. Plaintiffs’ Religious Beliefs 42. Mr. Briscoe is a believing and practicing Evangelical Christian and believes that the Holy
Bible is the inerrant Word of God. 43. As is set forth in Plaintiffs’ Mission Statement (attached hereto as Exhibit B), Mr. Briscoe’s
Businesses are committed to “honor and love God by caring for people.” 44. One of the religious and moral teachings which Mr. Briscoe embraces, based on the Holy
Bible, is that a preborn child is, from the moment of conception, i.e., a fertilized embryo, a human being created in the image of God. See, e.g., Ps. 51:5; 139:13; Luke 1:41-44; 18:15; 2 Tim. 3:15. 45. Based on these religious and moral teachings, Mr. Briscoe sincerely believes that the termination of the life of a preborn child by, among other ways, abortion-inducing contraception drugs, abortifacient drugs, and related education and counseling, is an intrinsic evil and a sin against God for which Mr. Briscoe will be held accountable. Therefore, abortion and any abortifacient contraceptive drug or procedure that may terminate the life of a fertilized embryo is morally wrong and objectionable to Mr. Briscoe. 46. Mr. Briscoe, who owns and is solely responsible for the management of all of Mr. Briscoe’s Businesses, seeks to conduct his business operations with integrity and in compliance with these pro-life beliefs. 47. Consequently, Mr. Briscoe believes that it would be immoral and sinful for Mr. Briscoe’s Businesses to knowingly and intentionally participate in, pay for, facilitate, or otherwise support abortion-inducing contraception drugs, abortifacient drugs, and related education and
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counseling, as is required by the HHS Mandate, through their inclusion in health insurance coverage offered by Plaintiffs to Plaintiffs’ employees.
II. Plaintiffs’ Health Insurance Plan 48. As part of fulfilling their organizational mission and Christian beliefs and commitments, Mr.
Briscoe, through CHM, provides generous health insurance for their employees. 49. Mr. Briscoe’s Businesses employ more than 200 full-time employees throughout its various
locations, all of which are in the State of Colorado. At present, 108 of these employees are health insurance plan participants, along with 89 of their dependents, resulting in 197 covered lives. 50. Plaintiffs maintain, through CHM, a self-insured group plan for their employees, in which CHM acts as its own insurer. 51. The plan year for CHM’s self-insured plan begins on April 1 of each year, with the next plan year starting on April 1, 2013. 52. To implement the plan for the new year beginning April 1, 2013 and/or to make substantial plan changes as a result of the HHS Mandate, Plaintiffs must make insurance coverage decisions and logistical arrangements before or by February 15, 2013, in order for the plan to be arranged, reviewed, finalized, and offered to employees for open enrollment in time for the plan year’s April 1, 2013 start date.
III. The PPACA and the HHS Mandate 53. Under the PPACA, employers with over 50 full-time employees are required to provide a
certain minimum level of health insurance to their employees.
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54. Nearly all such plans must include “preventive services,” i.e., abortion-inducing contraception drugs, abortifacient drugs, and related education and counseling which must be offered with no cost-sharing by the employee.
55. On February 10, 2012, the Department of Health and Human Services finalized a rule implementing the HHS Mandate that imposes a definition of preventive services to include all FDA-approved “contraceptive” drugs, surgical sterilization, and education and counseling for such services.
56. This final rule was adopted without giving due weight to the tens of thousands of public comments submitted to HHS in opposition to the HHS Mandate.
57. In the category of “FDA-approved contraceptives” included in this HHS Mandate are several drugs or devices that may cause the demise of an already-conceived but not-yet- implanted human embryo, such as “emergency contraception” or “Plan B” drugs (the so-called “morning after” pill).
58. The FDA approved in this same category a drug called “ella” (the so-called “week after” pill) which studies show can function to kill embryos even after they have implanted in the uterus, by a mechanism similar to the abortion drug RU-486.
59. The manufacturers of some such drugs, methods and devices in the category of “FDAapproved contraceptive methods” indicate that they can function to cause the demise of an early human embryo.
60. The HHS Mandate also requires group health care plans to pay for the provision of counseling, education, and other information concerning contraception (including devices and drugs such as Plan B and ella that cause early abortions or harm to human embryos) and sterilization for all women beneficiaries who are capable of bearing children.
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61. The HHS Mandate applies to the first health insurance plan-year beginning after August 1, 2012.
62. An entity cannot escape the HHS Mandate by self-insuring; Plaintiffs’ plan is thus subject to the HHS Mandate even though it is self-insured.
63. As Plaintiffs’ self-insurance plan does not qualify for grandfathered status, Plaintiffs are, absent relief from this Court, subject to the HHS Mandate’s requirement of coverage of the above-described items starting in Plaintiffs’ April 1, 2013 plan.
64. The HHS Mandate makes little or no allowance for the religious freedom of individuals and the entities they own and operate, including Plaintiffs, who object to paying for or providing insurance coverage for such items.
65. An entity cannot freely avoid the HHS Mandate by simply refusing to provide health insurance to its employees, because the PPACA imposes monetary penalties on entities that would so refuse.
66. The exact magnitude of these penalties may vary according to the complicated provisions of the PPACA, but the fine is approximately $2,000 per employee per year.
67. PPACA also imposes monetary penalties if Plaintiffs were to continue to offer their selfinsured plan but omitted abortifacients, contraceptives and sterilization.
68. The exact magnitude of these penalties may vary according to the complicated provisions of the PPACA, but the fine is approximately $100 per day per employee, with minimum amounts applying in different circumstances.
69. If Plaintiffs do not submit to the HHS Mandate they also trigger a range of enforcement mechanisms that exist under ERISA, including but not limited to civil actions by the Secretary of Labor or by plan participants and beneficiaries, which would include, but not be
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limited to, relief in the form of judicial orders mandating that Plaintiffs violate their sincerely held religious beliefs and provide coverage for abortifacients to which they religiously object. 70. The HHS Mandate applies not only to sponsors of group health plans like Plaintiffs, but also to issuers of insurance. Accordingly, Plaintiffs cannot avoid the HHS Mandate by shopping for an insurance plan that accommodates their right of conscience, because the Administration has intentionally foreclosed that possibility. 71. The HHS Mandate offers the possibility of a narrow exemption to religious employers, but only if such religious employers meet all of the following requirements:
(1) “The inculcation of religious values is the purpose of the organization; (2) The organization primarily employs persons who share the religious tenets of the
organization; (3) “The organization serves primarily persons who share the religious tenets of the
organization; and (4) The organization is a church, an integrated auxiliary of a church, a convention or
association of churches, or is an exclusively religious activity of a religious order, under Internal Revenue Code 6033(a)(1) and (a)(3)(A).” 72. The HHS Mandate imposes no constraint on the government’s discretion to grant exemptions to some, all, or none of the organizations meeting the HHS Mandate’s definition of “religious employers.” 73. Plaintiffs are not “religious” enough under this definition in several respects, including but not limited to because they have purposes other than the “inculcation of religious values,” they do not primarily hire or serve Christians, and because Plaintiffs are not a church, integrated auxiliary of a particular church, convention or association of a church, or the exclusively religious activity of a religious order.
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74. The HHS Mandate fails to protect the statutory and constitutional conscience rights of religious Americans like Plaintiffs even though those rights were repeatedly raised in the public comments.
75. The HHS Mandate requires that Plaintiffs provide coverage for abortion-inducing contraception drugs, abortifacient drugs, and related education and counseling related to the same, against their conscience and in violation of their religious beliefs, in a manner that is contrary to law.
76. The HHS Mandate constitutes government-imposed coercion on Plaintiffs to change or violate their sincerely held religious beliefs.
77. The HHS Mandate exposes Plaintiffs to substantial fines for refusal to change or violate their religious beliefs.
78. The HHS Mandate will impose a burden on the Plaintiffs’ employee recruitment and retention efforts by creating uncertainty as to whether or on what terms they will be able to offer health insurance different from or beyond the HHS Mandate’s effect or will suffer penalties therefrom.
79. The HHS Mandate will place Plaintiffs at a competitive disadvantage in their efforts to recruit and retain employees and students.
80. Plaintiffs have a sincere conscientious religious objection to providing coverage for abortioninducing contraception drugs, abortifacient drugs, and related education and counseling.
81. The HHS Mandate does not apply equally to all religious adherents or groups. 82. PPACA and the HHS Mandate are not generally applicable because they provide for
numerous exemptions from their rules.
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83. For instance, the HHS Mandate does not apply to members of a “recognized religious sect or division” that conscientiously objects to acceptance of public or private insurance funds. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 5000A(d)(2)(a)(i) and (ii). Plaintiffs do not meet this exemption.
84. In addition, as described above, the HHS Mandate exempts certain churches narrowly considered to be religious employers. Plaintiffs do not meet this exemption.
85. Furthermore, the PPACA creates a system of individualized exemptions because, under the PPACA’s authorization, the federal government has granted discretionary compliance waivers to a variety of businesses, including large businesses, for purely secular or political reasons. Plaintiffs have not been granted any such exemption.
86. The HHS Mandate does not apply to employers with preexisting plans that are “grandfathered.”
87. Plaintiffs’ plan is not grandfathered under PPACA, nor will its plan year that starts on April 1, 2013 have grandfathered status.
88. The HHS Mandate does not apply through the employer mandate to employers having fewer than 50 full-time employees. Plaintiffs, having more than 50 full-time employees, do not meet this exemption.
89. President Obama held a press conference on February 10, 2012, and later (through Defendants) issued an “Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking” (“ANPRM”) on March 21, 2012 (77 Fed. Reg. 16501–08), claiming to offer a “compromise” under which some religious non-profit organizations not meeting the above definition would still have to comply with the HHS Mandate, but by means of the employer’s insurer offering the employer’s employees the same coverage for “free.”
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90. This “compromise” is not helpful to Plaintiffs because, among other reasons, Plaintiffs are not non-profit entities and Plaintiffs’ plan is self-insured.
91. The ANPRM is neither a rule, a proposed rule, nor the specification of what a rule proposed in the future would actually contain. It in no way changes or alters the final status of the February 15, 2012 HHS Mandate. It does not even create a legal requirement that Defendants change the HHS Mandate at some time in the future.
92. On February 10, 2012 a document was also issued from the Center for Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight (CCIIO), Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), of HHS, entitled “Guidance on the Temporary Enforcement Safe Harbor for Certain Employers, Group Health Plans and Group Health Insurance Issuers with Respect to the Requirement to Cover Contraceptive Services Without Cost Sharing Under Section 2713 of the Public Health Service Act, Section 715(a)(1) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, and Section 9815(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code.”
93. Under this “Guidance,” an organization that truthfully declares “I certify that the organization is organized and operated as a non-profit entity; and that, at any point from February 10, 2012 onward, contraceptive coverage has not been provided by the plan, consistent with any applicable State law, because of the religious beliefs of the organization,” and that provides a specified notice to plan participants, will not “be subject to any enforcement action by the Departments for failing to cover recommended contraceptive services without cost sharing in non-exempted, non-grandfathered group health plans established or maintained by an organization, including a group or association of employers within the meaning of section 3(5) of ERISA, (and any group health insurance coverage
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provided in connection with such plans),” until “the first plan year that begins on or after August 1, 2013.” 94. The “Guidance” categorically disqualifies Plaintiffs from making use of this “extra year” because, among other reasons, Plaintiffs are not non-profit entities. 95. Therefore while President Obama’s “compromise” and guidance purport to accommodate the religious beliefs of even more groups beyond the HHS Mandate’s initial exemption for churches, none of these measures will stop the HHS Mandate from imposing its requirements on Plaintiffs’ plan year beginning April 1, 2013. 96. Unless relief issues from this Court, Plaintiffs are forced to take the HHS Mandate into account now and no later than February 15, 2013, as Plaintiffs plan expenditures, including employee compensation and benefits packages, for the April 1, 2013 plan year and thereafter. Additionally, Plaintiffs will have to negotiate contracts for new and existing employees and these contracts will extend into the time frame when the HHS Mandate begins to apply to Plaintiffs’ health insurance plan. 97. The HHS Mandate will have a profound and adverse effect on Plaintiffs and how they negotiate contracts and compensate their employees. 98. The HHS Mandate will make it difficult for Plaintiffs to attract quality employees because of uncertainty about health insurance benefits. 99. Any alleged interest Defendants have in providing free FDA-approved abortion-inducing contraception drugs, abortifacient drugs, and related education and counseling without costsharing could be advanced through other, more narrowly tailored mechanisms that do not burden the religious beliefs of Plaintiffs and do not require them to provide or facilitate coverage of such items through their health plan.
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100. Without injunctive and declaratory relief as requested herein, including preliminary injunctive relief issued on or before February 15, 2013, Plaintiffs are suffering and will continue to suffer irreparable harm.
101. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law. FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb)
102. Plaintiffs reallege all matters set forth above and incorporate them herein by reference. 103. Plaintiffs’ sincerely held religious beliefs prohibit them from knowingly providing
coverage for abortion-inducing contraception drugs, abortifacient drugs, and related education and counseling in their employee health insurance plan. 104. When Plaintiffs comply with Christian ethical and moral teachings on abortion-inducing contraception drugs, abortifacient drugs, and related education and counseling and with their sincerely held religious beliefs, they exercise religion within the meaning of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. 105. The HHS Mandate imposes a substantial burden on Plaintiffs’ religious exercise and coerces them to change or violate their sincerely held religious beliefs. 106. The HHS Mandate chills Plaintiffs’ religious exercise within the meaning of RFRA. 107. The HHS Mandate exposes Plaintiffs to substantial fines and/or financial burdens for their religious exercise. 108. The HHS Mandate exposes Plaintiffs to substantial competitive disadvantages because of uncertainties about their health insurance benefits caused by the HHS Mandate. 109. The HHS Mandate furthers no compelling governmental interest and is not narrowly tailored to any compelling governmental interest.
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110. The HHS Mandate is not the least restrictive means of furthering Defendants’ stated interests.
111. The HHS Mandate violates RFRA. WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs pray for the relief set forth below.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Violation of Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
to the United States Constitution) 112. Plaintiffs reallege all matters set forth above and incorporate them herein by reference. 113. Plaintiffs’ sincerely held religious beliefs prohibit them from knowingly providing
coverage for abortion-inducing contraception drugs, abortifacient drugs, and related education and counseling in their employee health insurance plan. 114. When Plaintiffs comply with Christian ethical and moral teachings on abortifacients, contraception, and sterilization and with their sincerely held religious beliefs, they exercise religion within the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause. 115. The HHS Mandate is not neutral and is not generally applicable. 116. Defendants have created categorical exemptions and individualized exemptions to the HHS Mandate. 117. The HHS Mandate furthers no compelling governmental interest. 118. The HHS Mandate is not the least restrictive means of furthering Defendants’ stated interests. 119. The HHS Mandate coerces Plaintiffs to change or violate their sincerely held religious beliefs. 120. The HHS Mandate chills Plaintiffs’ religious exercise.
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121. The HHS Mandate exposes Plaintiffs to substantial fines and/or financial burdens for their religious exercise.
122. The HHS Mandate exposes Plaintiffs to substantial competitive disadvantages because of uncertainties about its health insurance benefits caused by the HHS Mandate.
123. The HHS Mandate imposes a substantial burden on Plaintiffs’ religious exercise. 124. The HHS Mandate is not narrowly tailored to any compelling governmental interest. 125. By design, Defendants framed the HHS Mandate to apply to some religious Americans
but not to others, resulting in discrimination among religions. 126. Defendants have created exemptions to the HHS Mandate for some religious believers
but not others based on characteristics of their beliefs and their religious exercise. 127. Defendants designed the HHS Mandate, the religious exemption thereto, and the
“compromise” and guidance allowances thereto, in a way that makes it impossible for Plaintiffs and other similar religious Americans to comply with their sincerely held religious beliefs. 128. Defendants promulgated both the HHS Mandate and the religious exemption/allowances with the purpose and intent to suppress the religious exercise of Plaintiffs and others. 129. The HHS Mandate violates Plaintiffs’ rights secured to them by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs pray for the relief set forth below.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution) 130. Plaintiffs reallege all matters set forth above and incorporate them herein by reference.
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131. The First Amendment’s Establishment Clause prohibits the establishment of any religion and/or excessive government entanglement with religion.
132. To determine whether religious persons or entities like Plaintiffs are required to comply with the HHS Mandate, are required to continue to comply with the HHS Mandate, are eligible for an exemption or other accommodations, or continue to be eligible for the same, Defendants must examine the religious beliefs and doctrinal teachings of persons or entities like Plaintiffs.
133. Obtaining sufficient information for the Defendants to analyze the content of Plaintiffs’ sincerely held religious beliefs requires ongoing, comprehensive government surveillance that impermissibly entangles Defendants with religion.
134. The HHS Mandate discriminates among religions and among denominations, favoring some over others, and exhibits a hostility to religious beliefs.
135. The HHS Mandate adopts a particular theological view of what is acceptable moral complicity in provision of abortifacient, contraceptive and sterilization coverage and imposes it upon all religionists who must either conform their consciences to the HHS Mandate or suffer the penalties.
136. The HHS Mandate violates Plaintiffs’ rights secured to them by the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs pray for the relief set forth below.
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment
to the United States Constitution) 137. Plaintiffs reallege all matters set forth above and incorporate them herein by reference.
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138. Defendants’ requirement of knowingly providing insurance coverage for abortioninducing contraception drugs, abortifacient drugs, and related education and counseling forces Plaintiffs to speak in a manner contrary to their religious beliefs.
139. Defendants have no narrowly tailored compelling interest to justify this compelled speech.
140. The HHS Mandate violates Plaintiffs’ rights secured to them by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs pray for the relief set forth below. FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution)
141. Plaintiffs reallege all matters set forth above and incorporate them herein by reference. 142. Because the HHS Mandate sweepingly infringes upon religious exercise and speech
rights that are constitutionally protected, it is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in violation of the due process rights of Plaintiffs and other parties not before the Court. 143. Persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at the meaning, scope, and application of the HHS Mandate and its exemptions. 144. This HHS Mandate lends itself to discriminatory enforcement by government officials in an arbitrary and capricious manner. 145. The HHS Mandate vests Defendants with unbridled discretion in deciding whether to allow exemptions to some, all, or no organizations meeting whatever definition of “religious employers” it decides to craft. 146. This HHS Mandate is an unconstitutional violation of Plaintiffs’ due process rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
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WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs pray for the relief set forth below. SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Violation of the Administrative Procedure Act) 147. Plaintiffs reallege all matters set forth above and incorporate them herein by reference. 148. Because they did not give proper notice and an opportunity for public comment,
Defendants did not take into account the full implications of the regulations by completing a meaningful consideration of the relevant matter presented. 149. Defendants did not consider or respond to the voluminous comments they received in opposition to the interim final rule. 150. Therefore, Defendants have taken agency action not in accordance with procedures required by law, and Plaintiffs are entitled to relief pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D). 151. In promulgating the HHS Mandate, Defendants failed to consider the constitutional and statutory implications of the HHS Mandate on Plaintiffs and similar persons. 152. Defendants’ explanation (and lack thereof) for its decision not to exempt Plaintiffs and similarly situated religionists and their entities from the HHS Mandate runs counter to the evidence submitted by religious Americans during the comment period. 153. Thus, Defendants’ issuance of the HHS Mandate was arbitrary and capricious within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) because the HHS Mandate fails to consider the full extent of its implications and it does not take into consideration the evidence against it. 154. As set forth above, the HHS Mandate violates RFRA and the First and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 155. The HHS Mandate is also contrary to the provisions of the PPACA which state that “nothing in this title”—i.e., title I of the Act, which includes the provision dealing with “preventive services”—“shall be construed to require a qualified health plan to provide
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coverage of [abortion] services . . . as part of its essential health benefits for any plan year.” Section 1303(b)(1)(A). As is described in detail above, some of the drugs included as “FDAapproved contraceptives” under the HHS Mandate cause abortions by causing the demise of human embryos before and/or after implantation. 156. The HHS Mandate is also contrary to the provisions of the Weldon Amendment of the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act of 2009, Public Law 110 329, Div. A, Sec. 101, 122 Stat. 3574, 3575 (Sept. 30, 2008), which provides that “[n]one of the funds made available in this Act [making appropriations for Defendants Department of Labor and Health and Human Services] may be made available to a Federal agency or program . . . if such agency, program, or government subjects any institutional or individual health care entity to discrimination on the basis that the health care entity does not provide, pay for, provide coverage of, or refer for abortions.” 157. The HHS Mandate also violates the provisions of the Church Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(d), which provides that “No individual shall be required to perform or assist in the performance of any part of a health service program or research activity funded in whole or in part under a program administered by the Secretary of Health and Human Services if his performance or assistance in the performance of such part of such program or activity would be contrary to his religious beliefs or moral convictions.” 158. The HHS Mandate is contrary to existing law and is in violation of the APA under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)f.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs pray for the relief set forth below. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Plaintiffs respectfully request the following relief:
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A. That this Court enter a judgment declaring the HHS Mandate and its application to Plaintiffs and others similarly situated but not before the Court to be an unconstitutional violation of their rights protected by RFRA, the Free Exercise, Establishment, and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the Administrative Procedure Act, and therefore invalid in any way applicable to them;
B. That this Court enter a preliminary and a permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants from applying the HHS Mandate to Plaintiffs and others similarly situated but not before the Court in a way that substantially burdens the religious beliefs of Plaintiffs or any other person in violation of RFRA and the Constitution, and prohibiting Defendants from continuing to illegally discriminate against Plaintiffs and others not before the Court by requiring them to provide health insurance coverage for abortion-inducing contraception drugs, abortifacient drugs, and related education and counseling to their employees;
C. That this Court award Plaintiffs their court costs and reasonable attorney's fees, as provided by the Equal Access to Justice Act and RFRA (as provided in 42 U.S.C. § 1988);
D. That this Court grant such other and further relief as may be just and proper. JURY DEMAND
Plaintiffs demand a jury on all issues so triable.
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Respectfully submitted this 4th day of February, 2013.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs:
__s/ Natalie L. Decker_____________ Natalie L. Decker The Law Office of Natalie L. Decker, LLC 26 W. Dry Creek Cr., Suite 600 Littleton, CO 80120 (O) 303-730-3009 (F) 303-484-5631 natalie@denverlawsolutions.com
and
s/ Michael J. Norton__________ Michael J. Norton ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM 7951 E. Maplewood Avenue, Suite 100 Greenwood Village, CO 80111 (O) 720-689-2410 (F) 303-694-0703 mjnorton@alliancedefendingfreedom.org
Steven H. Aden Matthew S. Bowman M. Casey Mattox Catherine Glenn Foster Alliance Defending Freedom 801 G Street, NW, Suite 509 Washington, DC 20001 Tel.: 202-393-8690 Fax: 202-347-3622 saden@alliancedefendingfreedom.org mbowman@alliancedefendingfreedom.org cmattox@alliancedefendingfreedom.org cfoster@alliancedefendingfreedom.org
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VERIFICATION OF VERIFIED COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1746
I declare under penalty of perjury that the facts set forth in foregoing Verified Complaint are true and correct.
Executed on this 4th day of February, 2013.
__ s/ Stephen W. Briscoe______________ STEPHEN W. BRISCOE State of Colorado ) ) ss. County of Arapahoe ) Acknowledged, subscribed, and sworn to before me by Stephen W. Briscoe this 4th day of February, 2013. Witness my hand and seal. My commission expires:1/22/2017. s/Marilyn Kuipers Notary Public
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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Senior Judge Wiley Y. Daniel
Civil Action No. 13-cv-00285-WYD-BNB
STEPHEN W. BRISCOE; CONTINUUM HEALTH PARTNERSHIPS, INC.; CONTINUUM HEALTH MANAGEMENT, LLC; and, MOUNTAIN STATES HEALTH PROPERTIES, LLC,
Plaintiffs,
v.
KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, in her official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services;
SETH D. HARRIS, in his official capacity as Acting Secretary of the United States Department of Labor;
NEAL WOLIN, in his official capacity as Acting Secretary of the United States Department of the Treasury;
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; and, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,
Defendants.
ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court on plaintiffs’ Motion For Temporary
Restraining Order [ECF No. 16], filed on February 19, 2013. The defendants (“the
Government”) responded on February 21, 2013, and the plaintiffs filed a reply on
February 22, 2013. On February 22, 2013, the American Civil Liberties Union and The
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Colorado filed an amicus curiae brief [ECF
No. 23] opposing the plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order. For the
reasons discussed below, the motion is DENIED.
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BACKGROUND On February 19, 2013, plaintiffs, Stephen W. Briscoe, Continuum Health Partnerships, Inc., Continuum Health Management, LLC, and Mountain States Health Properties, LLC, filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) [ECF No. 16], arguing that the Patient Protection and Affordable Health Care Act (“AHCA”), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), violates their religious rights because it forces them to provide insurance plans providing free contraceptives, abortifacients, and sterilization procedures to women. The plaintiffs allege that the AHCA violates: (1) the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-4; and, (2) the Free Exercise, Establishment, and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Based on the pleadings filed by the plaintiffs, Briscoe is an Evangelical Christian and owns Continuum Health Partnerships, Inc., Continuum Health Management, LLC, and Mountain States Health Properties, LLC. Briscoe’s secular, for-profit companies manage and operate senior care assisted living centers and skilled nursing facilities. Briscoe is the sole member and manager of Continuum Health Management, LLC and Mountain States Health Properties, LLC. Briscoe is also the lone shareholder of Continuum Health Partnerships, Inc. Briscoe’s companies employ over 200 persons and they offer a self-insurance plan. In January 2013, Briscoe learned that the insurance provided no-cost preventative care for women, including contraceptives, abortifacients, and sterilization procedures as required by the AHCA. Briscoe contacted his insurance provider and requested that any provision providing such coverage be omitted from his companies’
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insurance plan. The insurance provider stated that the provisions must be included in the plan in order to comply with the AHCA.
Briscoe’s self-insurance plan becomes effective April 1, 2013. The plan must be disclosed to employees between February 26, 2013, and March 1, 2013. New plan inclusions must be agreed on by March 1, 2013, in order to be included in the plan year beginning April 1, 2013. Briscoe alleges that his religious beliefs prevent him from including in his companies’ insurance plan any provision providing coverage for contraceptives, abortifacients, and sterilization procedures. Briscoe alleges that the AHCA’s mandate for the inclusion of such provisions and punitive penalties for not including them, violate his religious rights and his right to free speech. Briscoe filed this motion to prevent the inclusion of such provisions in his insurance plan for the April 1, 2013, plan year.1
ANALYSIS A. The Patient Protection and Affordable Health Care Act (“AHCA”), Pub. L. No.
111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) On March 23, 2010, President Barack Obama signed into law the AHCA. The
AHCA contains numerous health care reforms. Among one of the reforms is a mandate that group health plans must provide no-cost coverage for preventative care and screening for women. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-12(a)(4):
(a) In general. A group health plan and a health insurance issuer offering group or individual health insurance coverage shall, at a minimum provide coverage for and shall not impose any cost sharing requirements for--
* * * *
1 Briscoe also filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction [ECF No. 15] on February 15, 2013, advancing identical arguments, which is currently pending.
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(4) with respect to women, such additional preventive care and screenings not described in paragraph (1) as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health Resources and Services Administration for purposes of this paragraph. While the AHCA mandates no-cost coverage for preventative care and screening for women, it does not define or establish what constitutes preventative care and screening for women. The AHCA delegated this responsibility to the Health Resources and Services Administration (“HRSA”). See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-12(a)(4). On August 1, 2011, the HRSA adopted Required Health Plan Coverage Guidelines that established the scope of preventative care and screening for women. See HRSA, Women’s Preventative Services: Required Health Plan Coverage Guidelines, http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/ (last visited 2/27/13). Pursuant to the HRSA’s guidelines, preventative care and screening for women includes “[a]ll Food and Drug Administration approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for all women with reproductive capacity.” Id. If a group insurance plan fails to provide such care for women, the insurer shall pay a penalty tax of $100 per day “for each day in the noncompliance period with respect to each individual to whom such failure relates.” 26 U.S.C. § 4980D(b)(1). There are three exemptions from the mandate. First, the mandate does not apply to certain healthcare plans existing on March 23, 2010. See Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Coverage Relating to Status as a Grandfathered Health Plan Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 34538, 34540 (June 17, 2010). Second, “religious employers” are exempted
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from the mandate.2 Third, there is a “safe harbor” provision exempting non-profit
organizations with religious objections to contraceptive coverage that do not qualify for
the religious employer exemption. See Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health
Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8726-27.
Briscoe’s companies do not qualify for any of the three exemptions. Thus, they
are required by law to provide no-cost preventative care and screening for women as
defined by the HRSA.
B. Legal Standard for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
The requirements for issuing a TRO mirror the requirements for issuing a
preliminary injunction. In order to obtain a temporary restraining order, a plaintiff must
establish: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm will
ensue if the request for a TRO is denied; (3) the threatened injury outweighs the harm
2 Pursuant to 45 C.F.R. §§ 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(A) and 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(B):
In developing the binding health plan coverage guidelines specified in this paragraph (a)(1)(iv), the Health Resources and Services Administration shall be informed by evidence and may establish exemptions from such guidelines with respect to group health plans established or maintained by religious employers and health insurance coverage provided in connection with group health plans established or maintained by religious employers with respect to any requirement to cover contraceptive services under such guidelines.
(B) For purposes of this subsection, a "religious employer" is an organization that meets all of the following criteria:
(1) The inculcation of religious values is the purpose of the organization.
(2) The organization primarily employs persons who share the religious tenets of the organization.
(3) The organization serves primarily persons who share the religious tenets of the organization.
(4) The organization is a nonprofit organization as described in section 6033(a)(1) and section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
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that the TRO may cause the defendant; and, (4) if issued, the TRO will not adversely affect the public interest. General Motors Corp. v. Urban Gorilla, LLC, 500 F.3d 1222, 1226 (10th Cir. 2007).
Certain types of TROs are disfavored and required a heightened standard of proof. The three types of disfavored TROs are those that: (1) disturb the status quo; (2) are mandatory as opposed to prohibitory; or, (3) provide the movant substantially all the relief he may recover after a full trial on the merits. Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 955 (10th Cir. 2001). In these three situations, the movant must show that the four factors used in determining whether to issue a TRO “weigh heavily and compellingly in [his] favor . . . ” Id. (citation omitted). If the TRO does not fall into one of the disfavored categories, and the movant establishes that the latter three factors “tip strongly in his favor, the test is modified.” Okla. ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Int’l Registration Plan, Inc., 455 F.3d 1107, 1113 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Davis v. Mineta, 302 F.3d 1104, 1111 (10th Cir. 2002)). Under the modified test, the movant “may meet the requirement for showing success on the merits by showing that questions going to the merits are so serious, substantial, and difficult, and doubtful as to make the issue for litigation and deserving of more deliberate investigation.” Id. (citation omitted).
Injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy.” Schrier v. Univ. of Colo., 427 F.3d 1253, 1252 (10th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Thus, the right to relief must be “clear and unequivocal.” Id.
The TRO at issue does not fall into the disfavored category. Further, initial inquiry establishes that the latter three factors do not tip strongly in the plaintiffs’ favor and the plaintiffs have not shown that questions going to the merits are so serious,
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substantial, difficult, and doubtful as to make the issue for litigation. Thus, I will analyze the plaintiffs’ TRO request under the normal standard.
1. Substantial Likelihood of Success on the Merits The plaintiffs argue that the AHCA violates the RFRA and the Free Exercise, Establishment, and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment.
a. Plaintiffs’ RFRA Claim “The genesis of the RFRA lies in a protracted exchange between the Supreme Court and Congress over the proper standard to apply when reviewing laws that burden religion.” United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1279 (10th Cir. 2011). In 1990, the Supreme Court of the United States held that neutral laws of general applicability burdening the exercise of religion are subject to rational-basis scrutiny. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In response to Smith, Congress passed the RFRA and stated that its purpose was “to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1). In 1997, the Supreme Court held the RFRA unconstitutional as applied to states. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). However, the RFRA remains constitutional as applied to the federal government. See United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1279 (10th Cir. 2011). Pursuant to the RFRA, the “Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability . . . ” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a). However, the RFRA provides an exception. The government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion if the regulation: (1) is in
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furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and, (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. Id. at § 2000bb-1(b). Thus, a movant alleging an RFRA violation must first establish that a federal regulation substantially burdens his exercise of religion. If the movant meets that requirement, the burden then shifts to the government to justify the regulation by showing that it is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest.
i. Threshold Issue: Standing The Government argues that Continuum Health Partnerships, Inc., Continuum Health Management, LLC, and Mountain States Health Properties, LLC do not have the capacity to bring a claim under the RFRA because they are not a “person” under the RFRA and do not “exercise” religion. In a recent case with similar facts, Judge Heaton of the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma held that secular, for-profit corporations do not exercise religion and are not persons under the RFRA. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1291 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 19, 2012). In Hobby Lobby, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Martel, Inc. along with several individual plaintiffs, filed suit against Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services, alleging that the AHCA’s preventative care mandate violated the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause and the RFRA. In analyzing whether the plaintiff corporations had standing to sue under the RFRA, the Court stated that, “[g]eneral business corporations do not, separate and apart from the actions or belief systems of their individual owners or employees, exercise religion. They do not pray, worship, observe sacraments or take other religiously-motivated actions separate and
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apart from the intention and direction of their individual actors.” 870 F. Supp. 2d at 1291. The Court further stated that religious exercise is “purely personal” and “not the province of a general business corporation.” Id. Thus, the Court concluded that Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Martel, Inc. lacked standing to assert claims under the RFRA. Id. at 1292. The plaintiffs appealed the decision and a United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit motions panel affirmed the district court’s ruling. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 26741 (10th Cir. 2012). In affirming the district court, the Tenth Circuit motions panel remained silent on the distinction between corporate and individual plaintiffs asserting a RFRA claim. 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 26741 at *8-9, n.4. (“We do not distinguish at this preliminary stage of the proceedings between the corporate and individual plaintiffs, as their common failure to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the RFRA prima facie case suffices to dispose of the motion before us”).
The plaintiffs cite case law from other jurisdictions supporting their argument that secular, for-profit corporations have capacity to assert RFRA claims. See Korte v. Sebelius, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 26734, *9 (7th Cir. 2012) (“That the Kortes operate their business in the corporate form is not dispositive of their claim”); Tyndale House Publrs., Inc. v. Sebelius, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163965, *23-24 (D. D.C. Nov. 16, 2012) (“Nor is there any dispute that Tyndale’s primary owner, the Foundation, can ‘exercise religion’ in its own right, given that it is a non-profit religious organization; indeed, the case law is replete with examples of such organizations asserting cognizable free exercise and RFRA challenges”); Monaghan v. Sebelius, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182857, *9 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 30, 2012) (“Therefore, even though the ACA does not
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literally apply to Monaghan, the Court is in no position to declare that acting through this company to provide certain health care coverage to his employees does not [sic] violate Monaghan’s religious beliefs”). Tyndale dealt with an admittedly religious organization, rather than a secular organization, which is not the case here. The Court in Monaghan unequivocally stated that it took “no position as to whether DF, as a for-profit business, has an independent right to freely exercise religion.” Monaghan, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182857 at *10. Korte is only the case cited by plaintiffs in which a Court specifically dismissed a corporation’s corporate status as a bar to asserting claims under the RFRA.
I disagree with the Court’s analysis in Korte. I find Judge Heaton’s analysis in Hobby Lobby clear, concise, and persuasive. Secular, for-profit corporations neither exercise nor practice religion. Thus, secular, for-profit corporations lack standing to assert an RFRA claim that a federal regulation burdens their “exercise of religion.” Therefore, analysis under the RFRA will proceed only as to whether the AHCA mandate violates Briscoe’s personal exercise of religion.
ii. Substantial Burden Briscoe alleges that the AHCA’s preventative care mandate substantially burdens the exercise of his religion because it forces the companies he owns to provide contraceptives, abortifacients, and sterilization procedures to women, which runs counter to his Evangelical Christian beliefs. Neither the Tenth Circuit nor the Supreme Court has defined “substantial burden” in the context of a RFRA claim.3 The present facts dictate that I need not define what
3 In Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301 (10th Cir. 2010), the Tenth Circuit defined what constitutes a substantial burden in the context of a claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5. The Court stated that:
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constitutes a substantial burden under the RFRA. The AHCA’s mandate applies to
health insurance issuers, not to Briscoe himself. Hobby Lobby, 870 F. Supp. at 1294
(“The mandate in question applies only to Hobby Lobby and Mardel, not to its officers or
owners”); Monaghan, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *9 (stating that the AHCA “does not
literally apply to Monaghan [individual plaintiff] . . . ”). Briscoe claims a substantial
burden based on what his companies must do, rather than what he himself must do.
The AHCA’s mandate does not prevent Briscoe from personally exercising his religion:
Briscoe is free to worship, pray, and engage in Evangelical Christian religious activities
as he pleases. The AHCA’s mandate does not force Briscoe to personally endorse,
support, or engage in pro-abortion and pro-contraception activity. More importantly, the
AHCA’s mandate does not prevent Briscoe from personally opposing abortion and
contraception. Thus, any burden Briscoe claims on his ability to exercise his religion
based on his companies’ compliance with the AHCA mandate, is slight and attenuated.
Further, Briscoe’s argument implicitly requests that I disregard the distinction
between a corporation and its officers and owners. Briscoe cannot use corporate status
to shield himself from liability and at the same use it as a sword to assert an RFRA
claim. The court in Conestoga Wood Specialties, Inc. v. Sebelius, 2013 U.S. Dist.
We conclude that a religious exercise is substantially burdened under 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) when a government (1) requires participation in an activity prohibited by a sincerely held religious belief, or (2) prevents participation in conduct motivated by a sincerely held religious belief, or (3) places substantial pressure on an adherent either not to engage in conduct motivated by a sincerely held religious belief or to engage in conduct contrary to a sincerely held religious belief, such as where the government presents the plaintiff with a Hobson's choice--an illusory choice where the only realistically possible course of action trenches on an adherent's sincerely held religious belief. 600 F.3d 1301 at 1315. I am not aware of any Tenth Circuit decision which explicitly states that this definition applies to an RFRA claim.
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LEXIS 4449 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2013), succinctly explained why recognizing the
corporate status is important when analyzing a RFRA claim. The Court stated:
It would be entirely inconsistent to allow the Hahns [the individual plaintiffs] to enjoy the benefits of incorporation, while simultaneously piercing the corporate veil for the limited purpose to challenge these regulations [the AHCA]. We agree with the Autocam court, which stated that this separation between a corporation and its owners “at a minimum [ ] means the corporation is not the alter ego [sic] of its owners for the purposes of religious belief and exercise.”
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *27 (quoting Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 184093, *20 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 24, 2012)). I agree with the Court in Conestoga
Wood that a corporation’s status as a separate and distinct entity prevents its owner
from asserting a RFRA claim.
Based on the preceding statements, I find that the AHCA’s mandate does not
substantially burden Briscoe’s exercise of religion and he therefore does not have a
viable RFRA claim. Because Brisoce’s exercise of religion is not substantially
burdened, I need not analyze whether the AHCA’s mandate serves a compelling
governmental interest and whether the mandate is the least restrictive means of
furthering that interest.
b. Plaintiffs’ Free Exercise Claim The First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause states that, “Congress shall make
no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].” U.S. Const. amend. I. The purpose
of the Free Exercise Clause is “to secure religious liberty in the individual by prohibiting
any invasions thereof by civil authority.” Sch. Dist. Of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 223 (1963). “While the First Amendment provides absolute protection to
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religious thoughts and beliefs, the [F]ree [E]xercise [C]lause does not prohibit governments from validly regulating religious conduct.” Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 649 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
“Neutral rules of general applicability normally do not raise free exercise concerns even if they incidentally burden a particular religious practice or belief.” Grace United Methodist Church, 451 F.3d at 649 (citing Employment Division, 494 U.S. at 879 (stating that the Free Exercise Clause “does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)” (internal quotation omitted))). “Thus, a law that is both neutral and generally applicable need only be rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest to survive a constitutional challenge.” Id. “[I]f a law that burdens a religious practice is not neutral or generally applicable, it is subject to strict scrutiny, and the burden on religious conduct violates the Free Exercise Clause unless it is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling governmental interest.” Id. (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 546).
The plaintiffs argue that the AHCA’s mandate is not generally applicable and fails the strict scrutiny test. The plaintiffs argue that the mandate is not generally applicable because it contains several “massive” exemptions: (1) insurance plans that are grandfathered in; (2) small employers who have the option of dropping insurance; (3) religious sects opposed to insurance; and, (4) religious employers. ECF No. 15, p. 19, ¶ 3. The plaintiffs argue that the mandate fails the strict scrutiny test because it does not serve a compelling governmental interest, and if it did, the mandate is not the least
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restrictive means of furthering that interest. As an initial matter, I find as I did under the plaintiffs’ RFRA claim, that
Continuum Health Partnerships, Inc., Continuum Health Management, LLC, and Mountain States Health Properties, LLC lack standing to assert a Free Exercise Claim because secular, for-profit corporations do not “exercise religion.” See Hobby Lobby, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 1288 (“emphasis added”) (“Hobby Lobby and Mardel are not religious organizations. Plaintiffs have not cited, and the court has not found, any case concluding that secular, for-profit corporations such as Hobby Lobby and Mardel have a constitutional right to the free exercise of religion”).
The ACHA’s exemptions do not target religion for discriminatory purposes. Rather, the religious employer and safe harbor exemptions recognize and protect the practice of religion: they protect religious organizations from governmental imposition of regulations that would unconstitutionally burden the exercise of religion. The grandfather exemption applies equally to secular and non-secular entities: the point of reference is a date in time, not a religious denomination or practice. Briscoe cannot point to any AHCA provision that targets religion for discriminatory purposes. Briscoe’s chief complaint is that the exemptions do not cover his companies. That however, is insufficient to state that a regulation is not neutral and generally applicable. Thus, I find that the AHCA’s mandate is neutral and generally applicable, and as such, the mandate is subject to rational basis scrutiny. Being the lowest level of scrutiny applied to a constitutional claim, there are no facts to support a finding that the ACHA’s mandate is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. Therefore, Briscoe has not established that the AHCA’s mandate violates the Free Exercise Clause.
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c. Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause Claim The First Amendment’s Establishment Clause states that, “Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . ” U.S. Const. amend. I. “At is core,
the Establishment Clause enshrines the principle that government may not act in ways
that ‘aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.” Weinbaum v.
City of Las Cruces, 541 F.3d 1017, 1029 (10th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). “Despite
scattered signals to the contrary, the touchstone for Establishment Clause analysis
remains the tripartite test set out in Lemon.” Id. at 1030 (citations omitted). “To pass
constitutional muster [under the Establishment Clause], the governmental [regulation]
(1) must have a secular legislative purpose, (2) its principal or primary effect must be
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) it must not foster an excessive
government entanglement with religion.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
The plaintiffs argue that the AHCA’s religious employer exemption violates the
Establishment Clause because it involves an impermissible Government inquiry into
what qualifies an employer as “religious.” Pursuant to 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(B):
(B) For purposes of this subsection, a "religious employer" is an organization that meets all of the following criteria:
(1) The inculcation of religious values is the purpose of the organization.
(2) The organization primarily employs persons who share the religious tenets of the organization.
(3) The organization serves primarily persons who share the religious tenets of the organization.
(4) The organization is a nonprofit organization as described in section 6033(a)(1) and section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
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The AHCA’s mandate does not violate the Establishment Clause because it does not grant any denominational preference or otherwise discriminate amongst religions. The exemption defines religious employer broadly. The definition does not define religious employer by listing specific types of religious practices or specific religious beliefs that are necessary in order to fall under the exemption. The most specific requirement of the definition is that the employer employ and serve those people who believe in the organization’s religious tenets. The AHCA’s mandate has a secular purpose, does not advance or inhibit religion, and does not cause excessively entanglement with religion. Thus, there is no violation of the Establishment Clause.
d. Plaintiffs’ Free Speech Clause Claim The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment states that, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . ” U.S. Const. amend. I. The plaintiffs argue that the AHCA mandate violates the Free Speech Clause by coercing them to provide for speech that is contrary to their religious beliefs. A threshold issue in analyzing any claim under the Free Speech Clause is whether the alleged conduct qualifies as speech. Here, plaintiffs argue that issuing insurance plans that provide no-cost preventative care for women, including contraception, abortifacients, and sterilization procedures qualifies as speech. The plaintiffs cite no authority and I am not aware of any authority holding that such conduct qualifies as speech so as to trigger First Amendment protection. Therefore, I find that such conduct does not qualify as speech and is not protected by the First Amendment.
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CONCLUSION After careful reviewing and analyzing each of the plaintiffs’ claims under the first factor for issuing a TRO i.e., substantial likelihood of success on the merits, I find that the plaintiffs have not established that there is a substantial likelihood of success on the merits for their: (1) RFRA claim; and, (2) Free Exercise, Establishment, and Free Speech Clause claims under the First Amendment. Therefore, I need not analyze the remaining factors necessary for issuing a TRO because the record before me establishes that issuance of a TRO is not warranted. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the plaintiffs’ Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order [ECF No. 16] is DENIED. It is FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall file a Joint Status Report on or before Tuesday, March 12, 2013, stating whether a Preliminary Injunction Hearing is necessary, and if so, whether supplemental briefing for the hearing is required. Dated: February 27, 2013.
BY THE COURT: /s/ Wiley Y. Daniel Wiley Y. Daniel Senior U. S. District Judge
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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Senior Judge Wiley Y. Daniel
Civil Action No. 13-cv-00285-WYD-BNB
STEPHEN W. BRISCOE; CONTINUUM HEALTH PARTNERSHIPS, INC.; CONTINUUM HEALTH MANAGEMENT, LLC; and, MOUNTAIN STATES HEALTH PROPERTIES, LLC,
Plaintiffs,
v.
KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, in her official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services;
SETH D. HARRIS, in his official capacity as Acting Secretary of the United States Department of Labor;
NEAL WOLIN, in his official capacity as Acting Secretary of the United States Department of the Treasury;
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; and, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,
Defendants.
ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the plaintiffs’: (1) Motion For Preliminary
Injunction [ECF No. 15]; (2) Motion For An Order Or, In The Alternative, Request To Set
Motion For Preliminary Injunction For Hearing [ECF No. 34]; (3) Motion For An Order
Or, In The Alternative, Request To Set Plaintiffs’ Preliminary Injunction Motion For
Hearing And Request For Forthwith Consideration [ECF No. 39]; and, (4) Emergency
Application For A Temporary Restraining Order Pending The Court’s Ruling On
Plaintiff’s Motion For Preliminary Injunction And Request For Forthwith Consideration
[ECF No. 40]. For the reasons noted herein and in light of the United States Court of - 1 -

Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s ruling in Hobby Lobby Stores v. Sebelius, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 13316 (10th Cir. 2013), the motions are DEFERRED pending Judge Heaton’s resolution of the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 12-cv-01000-HE (W.D. Okla.), upon remand.
BACKGROUND On February 19, 2013, plaintiffs, Stephen W. Briscoe, Continuum Health Partnerships, Inc., Continuum Health Management, LLC, and Mountain States Health Properties, LLC, (“the Plaintiffs”) filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) [ECF No. 16], arguing that the Patient Protection and Affordable Health Care Act (“AHCA”), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), violates their religious rights because it forces them to provide insurance plans providing free contraceptives, abortifacients, and sterilization procedures to women. The Plaintiffs allege that the AHCA violates: (1) the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-4; and, (2) the Free Exercise, Establishment, and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. On February 25, 2013, I held a hearing and heard arguments from both parties regarding the plaintiffs’ Motion For Temporary Restraining Order [ECF No. 16]. On February 27, 2013, I issued an Order [ECF No. 25] denying the Plaintiffs’ Motion For Temporary Restraining Order [ECF No. 16]. Briscoe v. Sebelius, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 269911 (D. Colo. Feb. 27, 2013). In my opinion denying the Plaintiff’s Motion For Temporary Restraining Order [ECF No. 16], I relied on Judge Heaton’s opinion in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 19, 2012). In Hobby Lobby, Hobby
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Lobby Stores, Inc. and Martel, Inc. along with several individual plaintiffs, filed suit against Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services, alleging that the AHCA’s preventative care mandate violates the RFRA and the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause. The plaintiffs object to the AHCA’s preventative care mandate because it forces them to “provide health insurance coverage for abortion-inducing drugs and devices, as well as related education and counseling,” which runs counter to their sincerely held religious beliefs. Hobby Lobby, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 1283. Judge Heaton denied the plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction holding that: (1) the secular, for-profit corporate plaintiffs i.e., Hobby Lobby and Mardel, lack standing to bring their claims; and, (2) the individual plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a probability of success on their claims. Id. at 1296. The plaintiffs appealed the decision and moved for an injunction pending resolution of the appeal. A two-judge panel from the Tenth Circuit denied the plaintiffs’ injunction pending appeal. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 26741 (10th Cir. 2012).
While the plaintiffs’ appeal in Hobby Lobby was pending, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion For An Order Or, In The Alternative, Request To Set Motion For Preliminary Injunction For Hearing [ECF No. 34]. At my direction, one of my law clerks instructed the parties that I would not issue an order regarding the Plaintiffs’ pending Motion For Preliminary Injunction [ECF No. 15] until the Tenth Circuit issued a ruling on the Hobby Lobby appeal. On Thursday, June 27, 2013, the Tenth Circuit issued an en banc opinion regarding the Hobby Lobby appeal. In reversing and remanding the case back to Judge Heaton of the Western District of Oklahoma, the Tenth Circuit held that: (1) Hobby Lobby and Mardel have standing bring RFRA claims; (2) the plaintiffs have
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established a likelihood of success that their rights under the RFRA are substantially burdened by the AHCA’s preventative care mandate; and, (3) the plaintiffs have established that they will suffer irreparable harm if an injunction is not issued. Hobby Lobby, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 13316, * 2-3. Because the Tenth Circuit did not reach a majority opinion regarding the last two factors for issuance of a preliminary injunction i.e., whether the harm alleged by the movant outweighs any harm to the non-moving party and whether a preliminary injunction is in the public interest, the Tenth Circuit remanded the case to Judge Heaton to “address the remaining two preliminary injunction factors and then assess whether to grant or deny the plaintiffs’ motion.” Id. at 81. I learned from Judge Heaton’s chambers that in response to the Tenth Circuit’s ruling, Judge Heaton issued a TRO enjoining enforcement of the AHCA’s preventative care mandate against the plaintiffs and set a Preliminary Injunction Hearing for Friday, July 19, 2013.
CONCLUSION Upon review of the case file and the Tenth Circuit’s Hobby Lobby decision, I find that it is appropriate to defer a ruling on all pending motions in this case until I have considered Judge Heaton’s ruling on the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 12-cv-01000-HE (W.D. Okla.), upon remand. Therefore, it is ORDERED that a ruling on all pending motions in this case is DEFERRED until Judge Heaton issues a ruling on the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 12-cv-01000-HE (W.D. Okla.). It is
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FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall not telephone or otherwise contact chambers regarding this matter since there have been excessive and unproductive communications with my staff. If the parties seek clarification regarding any issue, they must file a motion. Failure to comply with this directive could result in the imposition of sanctions.
Upon Judge Heaton’s ruling regarding the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction, I will issue an Order apprising the parties on how this matter shall proceed.
Dated: July 3, 2013. BY THE COURT: /s/ Wiley Y. Daniel Wiley Y. Daniel Senior U. S. District Judge
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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Senior Judge Wiley Y. Daniel
Civil Action No. 13-cv-00285-WYD-BNB
STEPHEN W. BRISCOE; CONTINUUM HEALTH PARTNERSHIPS, INC.; CONTINUUM HEALTH MANAGEMENT, LLC; and, MOUNTAIN STATES HEALTH PROPERTIES, LLC,
Plaintiffs,
v.
KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, in her official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services;
SETH D. HARRIS, in his official capacity as Acting Secretary of the United States Department of Labor;
NEAL WOLIN, in his official capacity as Acting Secretary of the United States Department of the Treasury;
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; and, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,
Defendants.
ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Stephen W. Briscoe, Continuum Health
Partnerships, Inc., Continuum Health Management, LLC, and Mountain States Health
Properties, LLC’s (“the Plaintiffs”): (1) Motion For Preliminary Injunction [ECF No. 15];
(2) Motion For An Order Or, In The Alternative, Request To Set Motion For Preliminary
Injunction For Hearing [ECF No. 34]; (3) Motion For An Order Or, In The Alternative,
Request To Set Plaintiffs’ Preliminary Injunction Motion For Hearing and Request For
Forthwith Consideration [ECF No. 39]; (4) Emergency Application For A Temporary
Restraining Order Pending The Court’s Ruling On Plaintiffs’ Motion For Preliminary - 1 -

Injunction and Request For Forthwith Consideration [ECF No. 40]; and, (5) Second Emergency Application For A Temporary Restraining Order Pending The Court’s Ruling On Plaintiffs’ Motion For Preliminary Injunction Or, In The Alternative, A Request For A Preliminary Injunction and Request For Forthwith Consideration [ECF No. 42].
For the reasons stated below, the Plaintiffs’: (1) Motion For Preliminary Injunction [ECF No. 15] is GRANTED; (2) Second Emergency Application For A Temporary Restraining Order Pending The Court’s Ruling On Plaintiffs’ Motion For Preliminary Injunction Or, In The Alternative, A Request For A Preliminary Injunction and Request For Forthwith Consideration [ECF No. 42] is GRANTED to the extent the Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction; and, (3) Motion For An Order Or, In The Alternative, Request To Set Motion For Preliminary Injunction For Hearing [ECF No. 34], Motion For An Order Or, In The Alternative, Request To Set Plaintiffs’ Preliminary Injunction Motion For Hearing and Request For Forthwith Consideration [ECF No. 39], and, Emergency Application For A Temporary Restraining Order Pending The Court’s Ruling On Plaintiffs’ Motion For Preliminary Injunction and Request For Forthwith Consideration [ECF No. 40] are DENIED AS MOOT.
BACKGROUND On February 15, 2013, Stephen W. Briscoe, Continuum Health Partnerships, Inc., Continuum Health Management, LLC, and Mountain States Health Properties, LLC (collectively “the Plaintiffs”), filed a Motion For Preliminary Injunction [ECF No. 15], requesting that I enjoin Kathleen Sebelius, Seth D. Harris, Neil Wolin, the United States Department of Health and Human Services, the United States Department of Labor, and the United States Treasury (collectively “the Defendants”) from enforcing the Patient
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Protection and Affordable Health Care Act (“AHCA”), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), because it allegedly violates the Plaintiffs’ religious rights by forcing them to provide insurance plans providing free contraceptives, abortifacients, and sterilization procedures to women. Specifically, the Plaintiffs argue that the AHCA violates: (1) the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-4; and, (2) the Free Exercise, Establishment, and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Four days later, the Plaintiffs’ filed a Motion For Temporary Restraining Order [ECF No. 16], presenting identical arguments as set forth in their Motion For Preliminary Injunction [ECF No. 15].
Briscoe is an Evangelical Christian and owns Continuum Health Partnerships, Inc., Continuum Health Management, LLC, and Mountain States Health Properties, LLC. Briscoe’s secular, for-profit companies manage and operate senior care assisted living centers and skilled nursing facilities. Briscoe is the sole member and manager of Continuum Health Management, LLC and Mountain States Health Properties, LLC. Briscoe is also the lone shareholder of Continuum Health Partnerships, Inc.
On February 25, 2013, I held a hearing and heard arguments from both parties regarding the Plaintiffs’ Motion For Temporary Restraining Order [ECF No. 16]. On February 27, 2013, I issued an Order [ECF No. 25] denying the Plaintiffs’ Motion For Temporary Restraining Order [ECF No. 16]. ECF No. 25, p. 17.
On July 1, 2013, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion For An Order Or, In The Alternative, Request To Set Plaintiffs’ Preliminary Injunction Motion For Hearing and Request For Forthwith Consideration [ECF No. 39]. In that motion, the Plaintiffs request that I enter an order granting their Motion For Preliminary Injunction [ECF No. 15] in light of the
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United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 13316 (10th Cir. June 27, 2013). On July 2, 2013, the Plaintiffs filed an Emergency Application For A Temporary Restraining Order Pending The Court’s Ruling On Plaintiffs’ Motion For Preliminary Injunction and Request For Forthwith Consideration [ECF No. 40]. In that motion, the Plaintiffs argue that in light of the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Hobby Lobby, I should enter a temporary restraining order in their favor until I rule on their Motion For Preliminary Injunction [ECF No. 15].
On July 3, 2013, I issued an Order deferring rulings on all pending motions until Judge Heaton of the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma ruled on the preliminary injunction at issue in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 12cv-01000-HE (W.D. Okla.) upon remand by the Tenth Circuit. On July 19, 2013, Judge Heaton issued an Order [ECF No. 76 in case no. 12-cv-01000-HE] granting Hobby Lobby’s motion for preliminary injunction.
On July 22, 2013, the Plaintiffs filed a Second Emergency Application For A Temporary Restraining Order Pending The Court’s Ruling On Plaintiffs’ Motion For Preliminary Injunction Or, In The Alternative, A Request For A Preliminary Injunction and Request For Forthwith Consideration [ECF No. 42]. The Plaintiffs argue that in light of the Hobby Lobby decision and Judge Heaton’s issuance of a preliminary injunction in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 12-cv-01000-HE (W.D. Okla.), I should either enter a temporary restraining order in their favor until I rule on the Motion For Preliminary Injunction [ECF No. 15], or grant their Motion For Preliminary Injunction [ECF No. 15].
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On September 5, 2013, I held a hearing to determine the precise scope of the
Plaintiffs’ objection to the AHCA’s preventative care mandate. The Plaintiffs’ stated that
their objection to the AHCA’s preventative care mandate is identical to that of the Hobby
Lobby plaintiffs’ objection. Based on the arguments presented at the hearing and the
parties’ multiple briefs, I stated on the record that I would grant the Plaintiffs’ Motion For
Preliminary Injunction [ECF No. 15]. This opinion outlines my reasons for doing so.
ANALYSIS A. The Patient Protection and Affordable Health Care Act (“AHCA”), Pub. L. No.
111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) On March 23, 2010, President Barack Obama signed into law the AHCA. The
AHCA contains numerous health care reforms. Among one of the reforms is a mandate
that group health plans must provide no-cost coverage for preventative care and
screening for women. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4):
(a) In general. A group health plan and a health insurance issuer offering group or individual health insurance coverage shall, at a minimum provide coverage for and shall not impose any cost sharing requirements for--
* * * *
(4) with respect to women, such additional preventive care and screenings not described in paragraph (1) as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health Resources and Services Administration for purposes of this paragraph.
While the AHCA mandates no-cost coverage for preventative care and screening for
women, it does not define or establish what constitutes preventative care and screening
for women. The AHCA delegated this responsibility to the Health Resources and
Services Administration (“HRSA”). See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-12(a)(4). On August 1,
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2011, the HRSA adopted recommendations from the Institute of Medicine that established the scope of preventative care and screening for women. See HRSA, Women’s Preventative Services: Required Health Plan Coverage Guidelines, http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/ (last visited 9/6/13). Pursuant to the HRSA’s guidelines, preventative care and screening for women includes “[a]ll Food and Drug Administration approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for all women with reproductive capacity.” Id. If a group insurance plan fails to provide such care for women, the insurer shall pay a penalty tax of one hundred dollars per day “for each day in the noncompliance period with respect to each individual to whom such failure relates.” 26 U.S.C. § 4980D(b)(1). If the Plaintiffs fail to offer employee health insurance altogether, they face significant penalties as well. See 26 U.S.C. § 4980H.
There are four exemptions from the AHCA’s preventative care mandate.1 The Plaintiffs do not qualify for any of the exemptions. Thus, they are required by law to provide no-cost preventative care and screening for women as defined by the HRSA. B. The Hobby Lobby Decision
On June 27, 2013, the Tenth Circuit issued its decision in Hobby Lobby regarding a similar challenge to the AHCA as is presented in the case at bar. The case was before the Tenth Circuit on appeal of Judge Heaton’s denial of the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. Judge Heaton denied the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction finding, inter alia, that: (1) Hobby Lobby was not a person under the RFRA and therefore could not bring such a claim; (2) the individual plaintiffs had not
1 For a detailed explanation of the four exemptions, see Hobby Lobby, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 13316 at 11-14.
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established under the RFRA that the AHCA’s mandate substantially burdened their religious exercise; and, (3) in light of those findings, the plaintiffs had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on their RFRA claim. Hobby Lobby, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, rev’d and remanded en banc, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 13316. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that: (1) Hobby Lobby and Mardel ( a Christian bookstore) are persons under the RFRA and are entitled to bring RFRA claims; (2) the plaintiffs demonstrated that the AHCA’s mandate substantially burdened their religious exercise; (3) the plaintiffs established a likelihood of success on their RFRA claims; and, (4) the plaintiffs established that they would suffer irreparable harm if an injunction was not issued. Hobby Lobby, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 133116 at 2. Because the en banc Tenth Circuit did not reach a majority on whether the plaintiffs satisfied the latter two requirements for issuance of a preliminary injunction i.e., whether the harm alleged by the movant outweighs any harm to the non-moving party and whether an injunction is in the public interest, it remanded the case back to Judge Heaton with instructions to “address the remaining two preliminary injunction factors and then assess whether to grant or deny the plaintiffs’ motion.” Id. at 81. C. Legal Standard For Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction
In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, the movant must establish: “(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm to the movant if the injunction is denied; (3) the threatened injury outweighs the harm that the preliminary injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) the injunction, if issued, will not adversely affect the public interest.” GMC v. Urban Gorilla, LLC, 500 F.3d 1222, 1226 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Flowers, 321 F.3d 1250, 1255
- 7 -

(10th Cir. 2003)). Pursuant to the Tenth Circuit’s Hobby Lobby decision, I need only analyze the latter two factors. See 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 133116 at 81 (Finding in Hobby Lobby’s favor regarding a substantial likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm, and stating “we . . . remand with instructions that the district court address the remaining two preliminary injunction factors and then assess whether to grant or deny the plaintiffs’ motion”).
1. Whether The Threatened Injury Outweighs The Harm That The Preliminary Injunction May Cause The Opposing Party
At the September 5, 2013, hearing, the Plaintiffs stated on record that they face up to five million dollars in fines, per year, if they choose to offer health insurance that does not comply with the AHCA’s preventative care mandate. The Plaintiffs further stated that if they choose not to offer health insurance at all, they face fines in the range of three to four hundred thousand dollars per year. The Plaintiffs state that they employ approximately 200 persons. If the Government is enjoined from enforcing the AHCA’s preventative care mandate on those 200 persons, the harm caused by such injunction is outweighed by the punitive fines the Plaintiffs face. Further, the Government has exempted a large quantity of persons from the AHCA’s preventative care mandate. While I will not speculate on the exact number of persons exempted, I note that the Tenth Circuit stated that “the government has already exempted health plans covering millions of others.” Hobby Lobby, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 133116 at 79. Exempting another 200 persons from the AHCA’s preventative care mandate will not deal a catastrophic blow to the Government such that the harm an injunction would cause the Government would be greater than the harm suffered by the Plaintiffs.
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The Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) approved twenty contraceptive methods that fall under the AHCA’s preventative care mandate. Hobby Lobby, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 133116 at 9. The Plaintiffs only object to four of the twenty FDA approved methods: an identical objection to that of the Hobby Lobby plaintiffs. Id. at 73. The Plaintiffs do not object to providing the other sixteen FDA approved methods. As such, “the government’s interest is largely realized while coexisting with [the Plaintiffs’] religious objections.” Id. at 79.
Therefore, I find that that the threatened injury to the Plaintiffs outweighs the harm an injunction may cause the Government.
2. Whether An Injunction Is In The Public Interest To be clear, the Plaintiffs’ rights under the RFRA are statutory. However, the RFRA implicates religious rights recognized by the Constitution of the United States e.g., the Free Exercise Clause. “[I]t is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional rights.” Hobby Lobby, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 133116 at 80 (citation omitted). Thus, an injunction is in the public interest.
CONCLUSION After careful consideration of the matters before this Court, I find that issuance of preliminary injunction is warranted. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the Plaintiffs’ Motion For Preliminary Injunction [ECF No. 15] is GRANTED, and the Defendants, their agents, officers, and employees are ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from enforcing the AHCA’s preventative care mandate on the Plaintiffs only with respect to the four objectionable FDA approved methods: (1) Ella; (2) Plan B, Plan B One-Step, and Next Choice (Levonorgestrel); (3) the Copper
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IUD; and, (4) the IUD with Progestin. The Defendants, their agents, officers, and employees are ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from enforcing the AHCA’s preventative care mandate as to the four objectionable FDA approved methods and any penalties related thereto until further order by this Court. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that the Plaintiffs’ Second Emergency Application For A Temporary Restraining Order Pending The Court’s Ruling On Plaintiffs’ Motion For Preliminary Injunction Or, In The Alternative, A Request For A Preliminary Injunction and Request For Forthwith Consideration [ECF No. 42] is GRANTED to the extent the Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction, and such injunction is limited in scope as stated in this order. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that the following motions filed by the Plaintiffs’ are DENIED AS MOOT: (1) Motion For An Order Or, In The Alternative, Request To Set Motion For Preliminary Injunction For Hearing [ECF No. 34]; (2) Motion For An Order Or, In The Alternative, Request To Set Plaintiffs’ Preliminary Injunction Motion For Hearing and Request For Forthwith Consideration [ECF No. 39]; and, (3) Emergency Application For A Temporary Restraining Order Pending The Court’s Ruling On Plaintiffs’ Motion For Preliminary Injunction and Request For Forthwith Consideration [ECF No. 40]. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that the Government shall immediately, upon notice, inform the Court whether it seeks to appeal either the Tenth Circuit’s Hobby Lobby decision and/or Judge Heaton’s order issuing a preliminary injunction in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 12-cv-01000-HE (W.D. Okla.).
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Dated: September 6, 2013. BY THE COURT: /s/ Wiley Y. Daniel Wiley Y. Daniel Senior U. S. District Judge
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 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 1:13-cv-00285-WYD-BNB
STEPHEN W. BRISCOE; CONTINUUM HEALTH PARTNERSHIPS, INC.; CONTINUUM HEALTH MANAGEMENT, LLC; and MOUNTAIN STATES HEALTH PROPERTIES, LLC;
Plaintiffs,
v.
SYLVIA M. BURWELL, in her official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services; THOMAS E. PEREZ, in his official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Labor; JACOB LEW, in his official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of the Treasury; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY;
Defendants.
INJUNCTION AND PARTIAL JUDGMENT
In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), it is hereby
ORDERED that defendants, their employees, agents, and successors in office
are enjoined
(a) from enforcing
(1) those provisions of federal law in existence on June 30, 2014, when the
Supreme Court decided Hobby Lobby, that require plaintiffs Continuum
Health Partnerships, Inc.; Continuum Health Management, LLC; and

Mountain States Health Properties, LLC to provide their employees with health coverage for “[a]ll Food and Drug Administration approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for all women with reproductive capacity,” 77 Fed. Reg. 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012), to which plaintiffs object on religious grounds, e.g., 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2713(a)(1)(iv); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2713(a)(1)(iv); 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(iv); and (2) any penalties, fines, or assessments for noncompliance with the coverage requirement described above in section (a)(1), including those found in 26 U.S.C. § 4980D and 29 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1185d; and (b) from taking any other actions based on noncompliance with the coverage requirement described above in section (a)(1) against Continuum Health Partnerships, Inc.; Continuum Health Management, LLC; and/or Mountain States Health Properties, LLC; their employee health plan(s); the group health coverage provided in connection with such plan(s); and/or Continuum Health Partnerships, Inc.’s; Continuum Health Management, LLC’s; and/or Mountain States Health Properties, LLC’s insurance issuers and/or third-party administrators with respect to Continuum Health Partnerships, Inc.; Continuum Health Management, LLC; and/or Mountain States Health Properties, LLC health plan(s); and it is FURTHER ORDERED that judgment is entered in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants on plaintiffs’ claim under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq.; and it is
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FURTHER ORDERED that all other claims against defendants are DISMISSED; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall meet and confer to reach agreement on attorneys’ fees and costs. The parties will file a joint status report, including a recommendation for further proceedings, by no later than March 2, 2015. If there is no resolution of the attorneys’ fees and costs matter, plaintiffs may file a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs within thirty days of March 2, 2015, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that this Injunction and Partial Judgment does not apply with respect to any changes in statute or regulation that are enacted or promulgated after this date, and nothing herein prevents plaintiffs from filing a new civil action to challenge any such future changes.
Dated: January 27, 2015. BY THE COURT:
/s/ Wiley Y. Daniel WILEY Y. DANIEL, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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 Case: 1:13-cv-285 As of: 07/24/2016 01:55 PM MDT 1 of 10
NDISPO,TERMED
U.S. District Court District of Colorado (Denver) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:13−cv−00285−WYD−NYW

Briscoe et al v. Sebelius et al Assigned to: Judge Wiley Y. Daniel Referred to: Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang Case in other court: USCA, 13−01461 Cause: 42:2000bb Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
Amicus

Date Filed: 02/04/2013 Date Terminated: 05/03/2016 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 890 Other Statutory Actions Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Defendant

American Civil Liberties Union

represented by Mark Silverstein American Civil Liberties Union−Denver 303 East 17th Street Suite 350 Denver, CO 80203 303−777−5482 Fax: 303−777−1773 Email: msilver2@att.net ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sara R. Neel American Civil Liberties Union−Denver 303 East 17th Street Suite 350 Denver, CO 80203 303−777−5482 Fax: 303−777−1773 Email: sneel@aclu−co.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Stephen W. Briscoe

represented by Matthew Scott Bowman Alliance Defending Freedom−DC 801 G. Street N.W. Suite 509 Washington, DC 20001 202−393−8690 Fax: 202−347−3622 Email: mbowman@alliancedefendingfreedom.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael Jeffrey Norton Thomas N. Scheffel &Associates, P.C. 3801 East Florida Avenue Suite 600 Denver, CO 80210 303−759−5937 Fax: 303−759−9726 Email: mnorton@tnslaw.com TERMINATED: 04/15/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY

Natalie L. Decker Natalie L. Decker, LLC, Law Office of P.O. Box 630664 26 West Dry Creek Road Suite 600 Littleton, CO 80163 303−730−3009

Case: 1:13-cv-285 As of: 07/24/2016 01:55 PM MDT 2 of 10

Fax: 303−484−5631 Email: ndecker@ADFlegal.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David Andrew Cortman Alliance Defending Freedom−Scottsdale 15100 North 90th Street Suite 165 Scottsdale, AZ 85260 480−444−0020 Fax: 480−444−0028 Email: dcortman@alliancedefendingfreedom.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Steven H. Aden Alliance Defending Freedom−DC 801 G. Street N.W. Suite 509 Washington, DC 20001 202−393−8690 Fax: 202−347−3622 Email: saden@alliancedefendingfreedom.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Continuum Health Partnerships, Inc.

represented by Matthew Scott Bowman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael Jeffrey Norton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/15/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY

Natalie L. Decker (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David Andrew Cortman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Steven H. Aden (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Continuum Health Management, LLC

represented by Matthew Scott Bowman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael Jeffrey Norton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/15/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY

Natalie L. Decker (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-285 As of: 07/24/2016 01:55 PM MDT 3 of 10

Plaintiff
Mountain States Health Properties, LLC

David Andrew Cortman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven H. Aden (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Matthew Scott Bowman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Jeffrey Norton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/15/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY
Natalie L. Decker (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Andrew Cortman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven H. Aden (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Kathleen Sebelius in her official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services
Defendant Seth D. Harris in his official capacity as Acting Secretary of United States Department of Labor
Defendant Neal Wolin in his official capacity as Acting Secretary of United States Department of Treasury
Defendant United States Department of Health and Human Services

represented by Bradley Philip Humphreys U.S. Department of Justice−DC−Mass. Ave. 20 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20530 202−514−3367 Email: bradley.p.humphreys@usdoj.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Bradley Philip Humphreys (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Bradley Philip Humphreys (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Bradley Philip Humphreys (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-285 As of: 07/24/2016 01:55 PM MDT 4 of 10

Defendant United States Department of Labor
Defendant United States Department of the Treasury

represented by Bradley Philip Humphreys (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Bradley Philip Humphreys (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 02/04/2013
02/04/2013
02/04/2013
02/04/2013 02/04/2013 02/05/2013
02/06/2013 02/06/2013 02/06/2013 02/06/2013
02/06/2013
02/08/2013
02/12/2013

# Docket Text
1 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT filed by Mountain States Health Properties, LLC, Stephen W Briscoe, Continuum Health Management, LLC, Continuum Health Partnerships, Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet)(Norton, Michael) Modified on 2/4/2013 to correct document title and event. No duplicate filing fee received for this filing (agarc, ). (Entered: 02/04/2013)
2 COMPLAINT against All Defendants (Filing fee $ 350, Receipt Number 1082−3213252), filed by Continuum Health Management, LLC, Continuum Health Partnerships, Inc., Stephen W Briscoe. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet)(Norton, Michael) (Entered: 02/04/2013)
3 NOTICE OF CASE ASSOCIATION Related Cases by Plaintiffs Stephen W. Briscoe, Continuum Health Management, LLC, Continuum Health Partnerships, Inc., Mountain States Health Properties, LLC (Norton, Michael) (Entered: 02/04/2013)
4 Case assigned to Judge Wiley Y. Daniel and drawn to Magistrate Judge Boyd N. Boland. Text Only Entry. (agarc, ) (Entered: 02/04/2013)
5 Magistrate Judge Consent Form issued. (agarc, ) (Entered: 02/04/2013)
6 SUMMONS REQUEST as to Kathleen Sebelius, Seth D. Harris, Neal Wolin re 2 Complaint, by Plaintiffs Stephen W. Briscoe, Continuum Health Management, LLC, Continuum Health Partnerships, Inc., Mountain States Health Properties, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Summons, # 2 Summons)(Norton, Michael) (Entered: 02/05/2013)
7 ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Boyd N. Boland by Judge Wiley Y. Daniel on 2/6/13. (wydcd, rrk) (Entered: 02/06/2013)
8 Administrative Notice: Duplicate filing fee received for Document 1 filed in error as a complaint with receipt number 1082−3213144. Financial notified and filing fee refunded. Text Only Entry. (agarc, ) (Entered: 02/06/2013)
9 SUMMONS issued by Clerk. (sgrim) (Entered: 02/06/2013)
10 NOTICE of Entry of Appearance Matthew S. Bowman by Michael Jeffrey Norton on behalf of Stephen W. Briscoe, Continuum Health Management, LLC, Continuum Health Partnerships, Inc., Mountain States Health Properties, LLC (Norton, Michael) (Entered: 02/06/2013)
11 NOTICE of Entry of Appearance Steven H. Aden by Steven H. Aden on behalf of Stephen W. Briscoe, Continuum Health Management, LLC, Continuum Health Partnerships, Inc., Mountain States Health Properties, LLC (Aden, Steven) (Entered: 02/06/2013)
12 NOTICE of Entry of Appearance by David Andrew Cortman on behalf of Stephen W. Briscoe, Continuum Health Management, LLC, Continuum Health Partnerships, Inc., Mountain States Health Properties, LLC (Cortman, David) (Entered: 02/08/2013)
13 ORDER Setting Scheduling Conference for 4/11/2013 10:00 AM in Courtroom A 401 before Magistrate Judge Boyd N. Boland by Magistrate Judge Boyd N. Boland on 02/12/13. (jjhsl, ) (Entered: 02/12/2013)

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02/15/2013 02/15/2013 02/19/2013
02/19/2013
02/21/2013 02/22/2013 02/22/2013 02/22/2013 02/22/2013 02/22/2013 02/25/2013 02/27/2013
02/28/2013
03/07/2013

14 NOTICE of Entry of Appearance by Bradley Philip Humphreys on behalf of All Defendants (Humphreys, Bradley) (Entered: 02/15/2013)
15 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Plaintiffs Stephen W. Briscoe, Continuum Health Management, LLC, Continuum Health Partnerships, Inc., Mountain States Health Properties, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Brief in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction)(Norton, Michael) (Entered: 02/15/2013)
16 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order by Plaintiffs Stephen W. Briscoe, Continuum Health Management, LLC, Continuum Health Partnerships, Inc., Mountain States Health Properties, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Continuation of Main Document, # 2 Proposed Order (PDF Only))(Norton, Michael) (Entered: 02/19/2013)
17 MINUTE ORDER re: 16 Plaintiff's MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order. The defendants shall file a response on or before Thursday, February 21, 2013, by 12:00 p.m. Motion Hearing set for 2/25/2013 03:00 PM in Courtroom A1002 before Judge Wiley Y. Daniel. By Judge Wiley Y. Daniel on 2/19/13. (mjgsl, ) (Entered: 02/20/2013)
18 RESPONSE to 16 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order filed by Defendants Seth D. Harris, Kathleen Sebelius, United States Department of Health and Human Services, United States Department of Labor, United States Department of the Treasury, Neal Wolin. (Humphreys, Bradley) (Entered: 02/21/2013)
19 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File an Amicus Curiae Brief by Amicus American Civil Liberties Union. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−Amicus Curiae Brief, # 2 Corporate Disclosure Statement)(Silverstein, Mark) (Entered: 02/22/2013)
20 REPLY to Response to 16 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order filed by Plaintiffs Stephen W. Briscoe, Continuum Health Management, LLC, Continuum Health Partnerships, Inc., Mountain States Health Properties, LLC. (Norton, Michael) (Entered: 02/22/2013)
21 NOTICE of Entry of Appearance by Sara J. Rich on behalf of American Civil Liberties Union (Rich, Sara) (Entered: 02/22/2013)
22 ORDER granting 19 Motion for Leave. The American Civil Liberties Union and the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Colorado (collectively "the ACLU") may file an amicus curiae brief in this action. by Judge Wiley Y. Daniel on 2/22/13. Text Only Entry(wydlc3, ) (Entered: 02/22/2013)
23 BRIEF in Opposition to 15 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction , 16 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order filed by Amicus American Civil Liberties Union. (Silverstein, Mark) (Entered: 02/22/2013)
24 MINUTE ENTRY for Motion Hearing held on 2/25/2013 proceedings held before Senior Judge Wiley Y. Daniel. Taking under advisement 16 Motion for TRO. Court Reporter: Tammy Hoffschildt. (wydcd, rrk) (Entered: 02/26/2013)
25 ORDER. ORDERED that the plaintiffs' Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order 16 is DENIED. ORDERED that the parties shall file a Joint Status Report on or before Tuesday, March 12, 2013, stating whether a Preliminary Injunction Hearing is necessary, and if so, whether supplemental briefing for the hearing is required by Judge Wiley Y. Daniel on 02/27/13.(jjhsl, ) (Entered: 02/27/2013)
26 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Continuum Health Management, LLC, Continuum Health Partnerships, Inc., Stephen W. Briscoe, Mountain States Health Properties, LLC. Seth D. Harris served on 2/11/2013, answer due 3/4/2013; Kathleen Sebelius served on 2/12/2013, answer due 3/5/2013; United States Department of Health and Human Services served on 2/12/2013, answer due 3/5/2013; United States Department of Labor served on 2/11/2013, answer due 3/4/2013. (Norton, Michael) (Entered: 02/28/2013)
27 Joint STATUS REPORT by Plaintiffs Stephen W. Briscoe, Continuum Health Management, LLC, Continuum Health Partnerships, Inc., Mountain States Health Properties, LLC. (Norton, Michael) (Entered: 03/07/2013)

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04/03/2013 04/08/2013 04/08/2013 04/15/2013 04/16/2013 04/22/2013 04/24/2013 04/29/2013 06/02/2013 06/03/2013
06/03/2013 07/01/2013 07/02/2013

28 MOTION for Hearing/Conference by Plaintiffs Stephen W. Briscoe, Continuum Health Management, LLC, Continuum Health Partnerships, Inc., Mountain States Health Properties, LLC. (Norton, Michael) (Entered: 04/03/2013)
29 RESPONSE to 28 MOTION for Hearing/Conference filed by Defendants Seth D. Harris, Kathleen Sebelius, United States Department of Health and Human Services, United States Department of Labor, United States Department of the Treasury, Neal Wolin. (Humphreys, Bradley) (Entered: 04/08/2013)
30 MINUTE ORDER: Scheduling Conference reset to 6/5/2013 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom A 401 before Magistrate Judge Boyd N. Boland. by Magistrate Judge Boyd N. Boland on 4/8/13. (bnbcd, ) (Entered: 04/08/2013)
31 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer or Otherwise Respond to Plaintiffs' Complaint by Defendants Seth D. Harris, Kathleen Sebelius, United States Department of Health and Human Services, United States Department of Labor, United States Department of the Treasury, Neal Wolin. (Humphreys, Bradley) (Entered: 04/15/2013)
32 MINUTE ORDER granting 28 Request Hearing Be Set On Plaintiff's Motion For Preliminary Injunction. ORDERED that the parties shall jointly contact chambers on or before Monday, April 22, 2013, to schedule a hearing on plaintiffs Motion For Preliminary Injunction [ECF No. 15] by Judge Wiley Y. Daniel on 04/16/13.(jjhsl, ) (Entered: 04/16/2013)
33 MINUTE ORDER granting 31 Motion for Extension of Time to Answer or Otherwise Respond. ORDERED that the defendants shall respond to the plaintiffs' complaint on or before the 30th day after this Court enters a ruling on the plaintiffs' Motion For Preliminary Injunction 15 by Judge Wiley Y. Daniel on 04/22/13.(jjhsl, ) (Entered: 04/22/2013)
34 MOTION for Order to by Plaintiffs Stephen W. Briscoe, Continuum Health Management, LLC, Continuum Health Partnerships, Inc., Mountain States Health Properties, LLC. (Norton, Michael) (Entered: 04/24/2013)
35 MINUTE ORDER. ORDERED that the Scheduling Conference set for June 5, 2013, is reset to 3:00 p.m. in Courtroom A 401 before Magistrate Judge Boyd N. Boland by Magistrate Judge Boyd N. Boland on 04/29/13. (jjhsl, ) (Entered: 04/29/2013)
36 MOTION to Continue June 5, 2013 Scheduling Conference by Defendants Seth D. Harris, Kathleen Sebelius, United States Department of Health and Human Services, United States Department of Labor, United States Department of the Treasury, Neal Wolin. (Humphreys, Bradley) (Entered: 06/02/2013)
37 MEMORANDUM regarding 36 MOTION to Continue June 5, 2013 Scheduling Conference filed by Neal Wolin, Kathleen Sebelius, United States Department of Health and Human Services, Seth D. Harris, United States Department of the Treasury, United States Department of Labor. Motion referred to Magistrate Judge Boyd N. Boland by Judge Wiley Y. Daniel on 6/3/13. Text Only Entry (wydcd, rrk) (Entered: 06/03/2013)
38 MINUTES ORDER granting 36 Motion to Continue Scheduling Conference. The Scheduling Conference is VACATED. The parties shall file a status report within seven days of any order resolving the plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction 15 . by Magistrate Judge Boyd N. Boland on 6/3/13.(bnbcd, ) (Entered: 06/03/2013)
39 MOTION for Order to be entered by Plaintiffs Stephen W. Briscoe, Continuum Health Management, LLC, Continuum Health Partnerships, Inc., Mountain States Health Properties, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order (PDF Only))(Norton, Michael) (Entered: 07/01/2013)
40 Emergency MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order Pending the Court's Ruling on Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction by Plaintiffs Stephen W. Briscoe, Continuum Health Management, LLC, Continuum Health Partnerships, Inc., Mountain States Health Properties, LLC. (Norton, Michael) (Entered: 07/02/2013)

Case: 1:13-cv-285 As of: 07/24/2016 01:55 PM MDT 7 of 10

07/03/2013
07/22/2013 08/01/2013 08/27/2013 08/28/2013 09/03/2013 09/03/2013 09/04/2013 09/05/2013
09/06/2013

41 ORDER. ORDERED that a ruling on all pending motions in this case is DEFERRED until Judge Heaton issues a ruling on the plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 12−cv−01000−HE (W.D. Okla.) ORDERED that the parties shall not telephone or otherwise contact chambers regarding this matter since there have been excessive and unproductive communications with my staff. If the parties seek clarification regarding any issue, they must file a motion. Failure to comply with this directive could result in the imposition of sanctions by Judge Wiley Y. Daniel on 07/03/13.(jjhsl, ) (Entered: 07/03/2013)
42 Second MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Plaintiffs Stephen W. Briscoe, Continuum Health Management, LLC, Continuum Health Partnerships, Inc., Mountain States Health Properties, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Norton, Michael) (Entered: 07/22/2013)
43 BRIEF in Opposition to 42 Second MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Defendants Seth D. Harris, Kathleen Sebelius, United States Department of Health and Human Services, United States Department of Labor, United States Department of the Treasury, Neal Wolin. (Humphreys, Bradley) (Entered: 08/01/2013)
44 ORDER that a hearing regarding the limited issue set forth in this Order is set for 9/5/2013 at 03:00 PM in Courtroom A1002 before Judge Wiley Y. Daniel. by Judge Wiley Y. Daniel on 8/27/2013. (trlee, ) (Entered: 08/27/2013)
45 RESPONSE to 44 Order Dated August 27, 2013 by Plaintiffs Stephen W. Briscoe, Continuum Health Management, LLC, Continuum Health Partnerships, Inc., Mountain States Health Properties, LLC. (Norton, Michael) (Entered: 08/28/2013)
46 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to Appear Telephonically re: 44 Order by Defendants Seth D. Harris, Kathleen Sebelius, United States Department of Health and Human Services, United States Department of Labor, United States Department of the Treasury, Neal Wolin. (Humphreys, Bradley) (Entered: 09/03/2013)
47 RESPONSE to 44 Order by Defendants Seth D. Harris, Kathleen Sebelius, United States Department of Health and Human Services, United States Department of Labor, United States Department of the Treasury, Neal Wolin. (Humphreys, Bradley) (Entered: 09/03/2013)
48 MINUTE ORDER granting 46 Motion for Leave to Appear Telephonically by Judge Wiley Y. Daniel on 09/04/13.(jjhsl, ) (Entered: 09/04/2013)
50 MINUTE ENTRY for Motion Hearing held on 9/5/2013 proceedings held before Judge Wiley Y. Daniel. Granting 15 Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Denying as moot 34 Plaintiffs Motion for an Order or, in the Alternative, Request to Set Motion for Preliminary Injunction for Hearing. Denying as moot 39 Plaintiffs Motion for an Order or, in the Alternate, Request to Set Plaintiffs Preliminary Injunction Motion for Hearing and Request for ForthwithConsideration. Denying as moot 40 Plaintiffs Emergency Application for a Temporary Restraining Order Pending the Courts Ruling on Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Request for Forthwith Consideration. Granting 42 Plaintiffs Second Emergency Application for Temporary Restraining OrderPending the Courts Ruling on Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Inunction or, in the Alternative, a Request for Preliminary Injunction and Request for Forthwith Consideration. Court indicates a written order to follow. Court Reporter: Mary George. (wydcd, rrk) (Entered: 09/09/2013)
49 ORDER. Ordered that the Plaintiffs' Motion For Preliminary Injunction 15 is Granted. Ordered that Second Motion for Preliminary Injunction 42 is Granted. Ordered that Motions 34 , 39 and 40 are Denied as Moot. ORDERED that the Government shall immediately, upon notice, inform the Court whether it seeks to appeal either the Tenth Circuits Hobby Lobby decision and/or Judge Heatons order issuing a preliminary injunction in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 12−cv−01000−HE (W.D. Okla.) by Judge Wiley Y. Daniel on 09/06/13.(jjhsl, ) (Entered: 09/06/2013)

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09/26/2013 10/02/2013 10/02/2013 10/03/2013
10/17/2013 10/21/2013
11/05/2013 11/05/2013 11/06/2013 11/07/2013

51 NOTICE of Filing a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari and Notice of Appeal in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius by Defendants Seth D. Harris, Kathleen Sebelius, United States Department of Health and Human Services, United States Department of Labor, United States Department of the Treasury, Neal Wolin (Humphreys, Bradley) (Entered: 09/26/2013)
52 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Plaintiffs Stephen W. Briscoe, Continuum Health Management, LLC, Continuum Health Partnerships, Inc., Mountain States Health Properties, LLC. (Norton, Michael) (Entered: 10/02/2013)
53 MOTION to Stay Case in Light of Lapse of Appropriations by Defendants Seth D. Harris, Kathleen Sebelius, United States Department of Health and Human Services, United States Department of Labor, United States Department of the Treasury, Neal Wolin. (Humphreys, Bradley) (Entered: 10/02/2013)
54 TRANSCRIPT of Motions Hearing held on February 25, 2013 before Judge Daniel. Pages: 1−65. <br><br> NOTICE − REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: Within seven calendar days of this filing, each party shall inform the Court, by filing a Notice of Intent to Redact, of the party's intent to redact personal identifiers from the electronic transcript of the court proceeding. If a Notice of Intent to Redact is not filed within the allotted time, this transcript will be made electronically available after 90 days. Please see the Notice of Electronic Availability of Transcripts document at www.cod.uscourts.gov.<br> Transcript may only be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber prior to the 90 day deadline for electronic posting on PACER. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/6/2014. (Hoffschildt, Tamara) (Entered: 10/03/2013)
55 Unopposed MOTION to Stay District Court Proceedings by Defendants Seth D. Harris, Kathleen Sebelius, United States Department of Health and Human Services, United States Department of Labor, United States Department of the Treasury, Neal Wolin. (Humphreys, Bradley) (Entered: 10/17/2013)
56 MINUTE ORDER. ORDERED that the Government's motion 55 is GRANTED for the reasons contained in the motion. ORDERED that this action is STAYED pending the Supreme Court of the United States' disposition of the Governments petition for writ of certiorari in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius. ORDERED that this stay is EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY and SHALL LAST for 14 days after the Supreme Court's decision in Hobby Lobby. The Government shall file a Status Report apprising this Court of the Supreme Court's decision within 7 days of the decision. ORDERED that the Governments Motion For A Stay Of Case In Light Of Lapse In Appropriations 53 is DENIED AS MOOT by Judge Wiley Y. Daniel on 10/21/13.(jjhsl, ) (Entered: 10/21/2013)
57 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 49 Order on Motion for Order,,,,,, Order on Motion for TRO,,, Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction,,,,, by Defendants Seth D. Harris, Kathleen Sebelius, United States Department of Health and Human Services, United States Department of Labor, United States Department of the Treasury, Neal Wolin (Humphreys, Bradley) (Entered: 11/05/2013)
58 LETTER Transmitting Notice of Appeal to all counsel advising of the transmittal of the 57 Notice of Appeal, filed by Neal Wolin, Kathleen Sebelius, United States Department of Health and Human Services, Seth D. Harris, United States Department of the Treasury, United States Department of Labor to the U.S. Court of Appeals. ( Retained Counsel, Fee not paid,) (Attachments: # 1 Docket Sheet, # 2 Preliminary Record)(dbrow, ) (Entered: 11/05/2013)
59 USCA Case Number 13−1461 for 57 Notice of Appeal, filed by Neal Wolin, Kathleen Sebelius, United States Department of Health and Human Services, Seth D. Harris, United States Department of the Treasury, United States Department of Labor. (dbrow, ) (Entered: 11/06/2013)
60 ORDER of USCA as to 57 Notice of Appeal, filed by Neal Wolin, Kathleen Sebelius, United States Department of Health and Human Services, Seth D. Harris, United States Department of the Treasury, United States Department of Labor. Proceedings in this appeal are ABATED pending further order of this court. (USCA Case No. 13−1461) (dbrow, ) (Entered: 11/26/2013)

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04/05/2016

61 ORDER of USCA as to 57 Notice of Appeal, filed by Neal Wolin, Kathleen Sebelius, United States Department of Health and Human Services, Seth D. Harris, United States Department of the Treasury, United States Department of Labor. The previously ordered abatement in this appeal remains in place.(USCA Case No. 13−1461) (dbrow, ) (Entered: 11/27/2013)
62 ORDER of USCA as to 57 Notice of Appeal, filed by Neal Wolin, Kathleen Sebelius, United States Department of Health and Human Services, Seth D. Harris, United States Department of the Treasury, United States Department of Labor. Accordingly, the abatement of this appeal is lifted and proceedings will resume. (USCA Case No. 13−1461) (dbrow, ) (Entered: 07/02/2014)
63 ORDER of USCA as to 57 Notice of Appeal, filed by Neal Wolin, Kathleen Sebelius, United States Department of Health and Human Services, Seth D. Harris, United States Department of the Treasury, United States Department of Labor. This appeal are ABATED until August 13, 2014. (USCA Case No. 13−1461) (dbrow, ) (Modified on 7/18/2014 to add text)(dbrow, ). (Entered: 07/18/2014)
64 ORDER of USCA as to 57 Notice of Appeal, filed by Neal Wolin, Kathleen Sebelius, United States Department of Health and Human Services, Seth D. Harris, United States Department of the Treasury, United States Department of Labor. This appeal will remain abated until September 5, 2014. (USCA Case No. 13−1461) (dbrow, ) (Entered: 08/18/2014)
65 ORDER of USCA as to 57 Notice of Appeal, filed by Neal Wolin, Kathleen Sebelius, United States Department of Health and Human Services, Seth D. Harris, United States Department of the Treasury, United States Department of Labor. Appeal Dismissed (USCA Case No. 13−1461) (evana, ) (Entered: 09/08/2014)
66 MANDATE of USCA as to 57 Notice of Appeal, filed by Neal Wolin, Kathleen Sebelius, United States Department of Health and Human Services, Seth D. Harris, United States Department of the Treasury, United States Department of Labor : (USCA Case No. 13−1461) (evana, ) (Entered: 09/08/2014)
67 ORDER of USCA as to 57 Notice of Appeal, filed by Neal Wolin, Kathleen Sebelius, United States Department of Health and Human Services, Seth D. Harris, United States Department of the Treasury, United States Department of Labor. (USCA Case No. 13−1461) (evana, ) (Entered: 09/09/2014)
68 ORDER Denying as moot 52 Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, by Judge Wiley Y. Daniel on 1/12/2015.(evana, ) (Entered: 01/12/2015)
69 Unopposed MOTION for Permanent Injunction on Plaintiffs' First Claim For Relief by Plaintiffs Stephen W. Briscoe, Continuum Health Management, LLC, Continuum Health Partnerships, Inc., Mountain States Health Properties, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order (PDF Only) Proposed Injunction and Judgment)(Norton, Michael) (Entered: 01/20/2015)
70 INJUNCTION and Partial Judgment, by Judge Wiley Y. Daniel on 1/27/2015.(evana, ) (Entered: 01/27/2015)
71 REASSIGNING MAGISTRATE JUDGE. This action is reassigned to Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang, upon her appointment. All future pleadings should reference Magistrate Judge Wang at the end of the civil action number (such as 15−cv−00001−REB−NYW). Unless otherwise ordered, the dates and times for all previously scheduled matters will be maintained and will now be handled by Magistrate Judge Wang in Courtroom C−205. Her chambers are located in Room C−254 of the Byron G. Rogers Courthouse. Her telephone number is 303−335−2600. (Text only entry) (kweck) Modified on 2/10/2015 to correct courtroom/chambers number (kweck). (Entered: 02/09/2015)
72 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE by Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang on 4/5/16. The Parties will FILE dismissal papers no later than April 19, 2016; or, alternatively, Plaintiff shall SHOW CAUSE, if any there be, in writing and on or before April 19, 2016, why this case should not be dismissed pursuant to D.C.COLO.LCivR 41.1 for lack of prosecution. (bsimm, ) (Entered: 04/05/2016)

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04/12/2016 04/15/2016 04/15/2016
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73 Joint STATUS REPORT by Plaintiffs Stephen W. Briscoe, Continuum Health Management, LLC, Continuum Health Partnerships, Inc., Mountain States Health Properties, LLC. (Bowman, Matthew) (Entered: 04/12/2016)
74 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney of Record for Plaintiffs by Plaintiffs Stephen W. Briscoe, Continuum Health Management, LLC, Continuum Health Partnerships, Inc., Mountain States Health Properties, LLC. (Norton, Michael) (Entered: 04/15/2016)
75 MEMORANDUM regarding 74 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney of Record for Plaintiffs filed by Stephen W. Briscoe, Continuum Health Partnerships, Inc., Mountain States Health Properties, LLC, Continuum Health Management, LLC. Motion referred to Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang by Judge Wiley Y. Daniel on 4/15/16. Text Only Entry (rkeec) (Entered: 04/15/2016)
76 MINUTE ORDER by Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang on 4/15/16. The Motion to Withdraw as Attorney of Record for Plaintiffs 74 is GRANTED. Attorney Michael Jeffrey Norton is withdrawn as counsel of record for Plaintiffs and is to be removed from electronic service. Text Only Entry(bsimm, ) (Entered: 04/15/2016)
77 RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE by Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang on 04/25/16. IT IS RECOMMENDED that this case be CLOSED due to resolution of all claims. (nmarb, ) (Entered: 04/25/2016)
78 ORDER that the Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge dated April 25, 2016 ECF No. 77 is AFFIRMED and ADOPTED. The case is hereby closed due to the resolution of all claims, and the parties have agreed that all attorneys fees and costs have been settled between them. It is FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall close the case, by Judge Wiley Y. Daniel on 5/3/2016.(evana, ) (Entered: 05/03/2016)