U.S. District Court Northern District of New York - Main Office (Syracuse) [NextGen CM/ECF
Release 1.3 (Revision 1.3.6)] (Prisoner) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 9:20-cv-00537-MAD-DJS

Williamson et al v. Maciol et al Assigned to: U.S. District Judge Mae A. D'Agostino Referred to: Magistrate Judge Daniel J. Stewart Case in other court: 2d Circuit, 20-02779 Cause: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

Date Filed: 05/12/2020 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 550 Prisoner: Civil Rights Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Plaintiff
Nicole Williamson on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated

represented by Joshua T. Cotter Legal Services of Central New York - Syracuse 221 South Warren Street Suite 300 Syracuse, NY 13202 315-703-6579 Fax: 315-475-2706 Email: jcotter@lscny.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Samuel C. Young Legal Services of Central New York - Syracuse 221 South Warren Street Suite 300 Syracuse, NY 13202 315-703-6591 Fax: 315-703-6520 Email: samyoung@lscny.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maurie G. Heins Legal Services of Central New York - Syracuse 221 South Warren Street Suite 300 Syracuse, NY 13202 Email: mheins3@gmail.com

Plaintiff Sarah Barrett on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated
Plaintiff Shannon Terrell on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sara Adams Legal Services of Central New York, Inc. - Utica 120 Bleecker Street, 2nd Floor Utica, NY 13501 585-943-5223 Email: sadams@lscny.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Joshua T. Cotter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel C. Young (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maurie G. Heins (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sara Adams (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Joshua T. Cotter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel C. Young (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maurie G. Heins (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Robert Maciol Oneida County Sheriff
Defendant Lisa Zurek Chief Deputy Oneida County Jail

Sara Adams (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David H. Walsh , IV Kenney Shelton Liptak Nowak LLP 4615 North Street Jamesville, NY 13078 315-492-3000 Fax: 716-853-0265 Email: DHWalsh@kslnlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Cartwright Kenney Shelton Liptak Nowak LLP 4615 North Street Jamesville, NY 13078 315-492-3000 Fax: 716-853-0265 Email: dkcartwright@kslnlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David H. Walsh , IV (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Cartwright (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 05/12/2020

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against Robert Maciol, Lisa Zurek (Filing fee $400 receipt number ANYNDC-5116096) filed by Nicole Williamson, Shannon Terrell, Sarah Barrett. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet)(meb) (Entered: 05/12/2020)

05/12/2020 2 Summons Issued as to Robert Maciol. (Attachments: # 1 Summons Issued as to Lisa Zurek)(meb) (Entered: 05/12/2020)

05/12/2020

3 G.O. 25 FILING ORDER ISSUED: Initial Rule 16 Conference set for 8/10/2020 at 9:30 AM in Albany before Magistrate Judge Daniel J. Stewart. Civil Case Management Plan must be filed and Mandatory Disclosures are to be exchanged by the parties on or before 8/3/2020. (Pursuant to Local Rule 26.2, mandatory disclosures are to be exchanged among the parties but are NOT to be filed with the Court.) (meb) (Entered: 05/12/2020)

05/12/2020

4 TEXT-ONLY NOTICE REGARDING JUDGE D'AGOSTINO CASE DISPOSITION PILOT - Please refer to the Individual Rules and Practices of the Hon. Mae A. D'Agostino, U.S. District Judge, for guidance regarding the Case Disposition Pilot. https://www.nynd.uscourts.gov/sites/nynd/files/MAD_Rules_of_Pra ctice_04_14_2020.pdf. (meb, ) (Entered: 05/12/2020)

05/12/2020

5 NOTICE of Admission Requirement as to Parties Nicole Williamson, Sarah Barrett, Shannon Terrell; Attorney Sara Adams. Phone number is (315)-703-6500. Admissions due by 5/26/2020. (meb) (Entered: 05/12/2020)

05/12/2020

6 NOTICE of Admission Requirement as to Parties Nicole Williamson, Sarah Barrett, Shannon Terrell; Attorney Maurie Heins. Phone number is (315)-703-6500. Admissions due by 5/26/2020. (meb) (Entered: 05/12/2020)

05/14/2020 7 NOTICE of Appearance by David H. Walsh, IV on behalf of Robert Maciol, Lisa Zurek (Walsh, David) (Entered: 05/14/2020)

05/14/2020

8 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by Robert Maciol, Lisa Zurek. Robert Maciol waiver sent on 5/14/2020, answer due 7/13/2020. (Walsh, David) (Entered: 05/14/2020)

05/18/2020 9 NOTICE of Appearance by Maurie G. Heins on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Heins, Maurie) (Entered: 05/18/2020)

05/21/2020

10 MOTION to Certify Class Motion Hearing set for 7/7/2020 10:00 AM in Albany before U.S. District Judge Mae A. D'Agostino Response to Motion due by 6/22/2020 Reply to Response to Motion due by 6/26/2020. filed by Sarah Barrett, Shannon Terrell, Nicole Williamson. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum of Law in support of Plaintiffs' Motion, # 2 Declaration of Joshua Cotter in support of Plaintiffs' Motion, # 3 Exhibit(s) 1-3 to the Declaration of Joshua Cotter, # 4 Exhibit(s) 4-12 to the Declaration of Joshua Cotter) (Cotter, Joshua) (Entered: 05/21/2020)

05/26/2020 11 NOTICE of Appearance by Sara Adams on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Adams, Sara) (Entered: 05/26/2020)

05/26/2020

12 Letter Motion from Counsel for Sarah Barrett, Shannon Terrell, Nicole Williamson requesting Approval to file a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction submitted to Judge D'Agostino . (Cotter, Joshua) (Entered: 05/26/2020)

05/26/2020

13 Letter Motion from Defendants for Robert Maciol, Lisa Zurek requesting Extension of Time submitted to Judge D'Agostino . (Walsh, David) (Entered: 05/26/2020)

05/28/2020

14 TEXT ORDER granting 13 Letter Motion: It is hereby ORDERED that the Defendants shall file a reply to 12 Plaintiffs letter for permission to file a preliminary injunction, by 6/2/2020. SO ORDERED by Judge Mae A. DAgostino on 5/28/2020. (ban) (Entered: 05/28/2020)

06/01/2020

15 Letter Motion from Defendants for Robert Maciol, Lisa Zurek requesting Defendants' response to Plaintiffs' letter requesting permission to file motion for a preliminary injunction submitted to Judge D'Agostino . (Walsh, David) (Entered: 06/01/2020)

06/05/2020 16 NOTICE of Appearance by Daniel Cartwright on behalf of Robert Maciol, Lisa Zurek (Cartwright, Daniel) (Entered: 06/05/2020)

06/08/2020

TEXT Minute Entry for Telephone Pre-Motion Conference held on 6/8/2020 before U.S. District Judge Mae A. D'Agostino: Appearances by Samuel Young, Esq., Joshua Cotter, Esq., and Sara Adams, Esq. for the Plaintiffs; and David Walsh, Esq. for the defendants; Judge D'Agostino addresses counsel regarding the plaintiff's request for leave to file a motion for preliminary injunction and the already filed motion for class certification; Counsel for the plaintiff and counsel for the defense address the Court; After hearing from the parties, Judge D'Agostino will permit the plaintiff to file their motion for a preliminary injunction by 6/11/20; The motion return date shall be set for July 7, 2020 (ON SUBMIT) before Judge D'Agostino; Response papers will be due by 6/22/20; Reply papers will be due on or before 6/26/20; the motion will be decided on the submission of the papers only, unless otherwise directed by the Court; The Court will decide the motion for class action and the motion for preliminary injunction at the same time. (Court Reporter Lisa Tennyson, CRD Britney Norton [Time 1:58 p.m. - 2:16 p.m.]) (ban) (Entered: 06/08/2020)

06/09/2020 17 MAIL RETURNED UNDELIVERABLE: The # 6 Notice of Admission Requirement that was sent to Attorney Maurie Heins, Esq. at 221 South Warren Street, 3rd Floor, Syracuse, NY 13202 was returned undeliverable.

Envelope marked: "Not Here - Return to Sender - Not Deliverable as Addressed - Unable to Forward." (rep) (Entered: 06/09/2020)

06/10/2020

18 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Motion Hearing set for 7/7/2020 10:00 AM in Albany before U.S. District Judge Mae A. D'Agostino Response to Motion due by 6/22/2020 Reply to Response to Motion due by 6/26/2020. filed by Sarah Barrett, Shannon Terrell, Nicole Williamson. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Joshua Cotter in support of the Motion, # 2 Exhibit(s) 1-3 to the Declaration of Joshua Cotter, # 3 Exhibit(s) 4-12 to the Declaration of Joshua Cotter, # 4 Exhibit(s) 13-16 to the Declaration of Joshua Cotter, # 5 Memorandum of Law) (Cotter, Joshua) (Entered: 06/10/2020)

06/10/2020

19 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Sarah Barrett, Shannon Terrell, Nicole Williamson re 18 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction (Cotter, Joshua) (Entered: 06/10/2020)

06/15/2020 20 Letter Motion from David Walsh, Esq. for Defendants for Robert Maciol, Lisa Zurek requesting Extension of Time submitted to Judge D'Agostino . (Walsh, David) (Entered: 06/15/2020)

06/17/2020

21 TEXT ORDER granting 20 Letter Request re 10 MOTION to Certify Class , 18 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction : It is hereby ORDERED that the joint request for an extension of the Plaintiffs' and Defendants' response and reply dates for both motions is GRANTED. Defendants' response to motions are due on or before 6/24/2020; Plaintiffs' Reply to Response to Motions are due by 6/29/2020. Signed by U.S. District Judge Mae A. D'Agostino on 6/17/20. (ban) (Entered: 06/17/2020)

06/17/2020

Reset Deadlines as to 18 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction , 10 MOTION to Certify Class - Response to Motion due by 6/24/2020, Reply to Response to Motion due by 6/29/2020. (ban) (Entered: 06/17/2020)

06/24/2020

22 AFFIDAVIT re 10 MOTION to Certify Class filed by Robert Maciol, Lisa Zurek. (Walsh, David) Modified on 6/25/2020 to clarify docket text (rep). (Entered: 06/24/2020)

06/24/2020

23 AFFIDAVIT in Opposition re 18 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Robert Maciol, Lisa Zurek. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration Declaration of Maciol, # 2 Declaration Declaration of Zurek, # 3 Declaration Declaration of Harris, # 4 Memorandum of Law)(Walsh, David) (Entered: 06/24/2020)

06/29/2020 24 REPLY to Response to Motion re 18 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Sarah Barrett, Shannon Terrell, Nicole Williamson. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration Supplementing the initial Declaration of

Joshua Cotter in support of the motion, # 2 Exhibit(s) 1-5 to the Supplemental Declaration of Joshua Cotter)(Cotter, Joshua) (Entered: 06/29/2020)

07/01/2020

25 Letter Motion from Joshua Cotter for Nicole Williamson requesting Enclosing thumb drive with video files submitted to Judge D'Agostino (delivered to Clerk's Office). (Young, Samuel) (Entered: 07/01/2020)

07/01/2020

26 THUMB DRIVE: Received as an exhibit of the # 24 Reply. {Thumb drive on file in the Clerk's Office and is not available for public viewing}. (rep) (Entered: 07/02/2020)

07/13/2020 27 ANSWER to 1 Complaint by Robert Maciol, Lisa Zurek.(Walsh, David) (Entered: 07/13/2020)

08/03/2020

28 MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER: GRANTING Plaintiff's 10 Motion For Class Certification and DENYING Plaintiff's 18 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. The Court further orders that the Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of this MemorandumDecision and Order on all parties in accordance with the Local Rules. Signed by U.S. District Judge Mae A. D'Agostino on August 3, 2020. (rep) (Entered: 08/03/2020)

08/03/2020 29 CIVIL CASE MANAGEMENT PLAN by Robert Maciol, Lisa Zurek. (Walsh, David) (Entered: 08/03/2020)

08/07/2020

30 TEXT ORDER: The Rule 16 Initial Conference in this matter is set for August 10, 2020 at 9:30 AM before the undersigned and will be conducted by TELEPHONE. The Court will issue a separate notice setting forth the instructions to connect to the conference call. SO ORDERED by Magistrate Judge Daniel J. Stewart on 8/7/2020. (mab) (Entered: 08/07/2020)

08/10/2020

Text Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Daniel J. Stewart: Rule 16 Initial Pretrial Conference held on 8/10/2020. Appearances: Joshua Cotter, Esq. and Samuel Young, Esq. for Plaintiffs; Daniel Cartwright, Esq. for Defendants. The Court hears from counsel as to their positions in this matter and as to how they intend to proceed. Court discusses the potential for settlement. The Court discusses question of fact that remains as to Plaintiffs' exhaustion of administrative remedies pursuant to District Judge D'Agostino's Memorandum-Decision and Order. The Court believes that resolving these questions early on will be beneficial as the case progresses. The Court schedules an exhaustion hearing. Deadlines set. A Scheduling Order to be issued. (TIME: 9:31AM9:54AM). (mab) (Entered: 08/14/2020)

08/14/2020

31 TEXT ORDER: As per the Court's August 3, 2020 MemorandumDecision and Order (Dkt. No. 28), questions of fact exist as to Plaintiffs' exhaustion of administrative remedies. As such, the issue of exhaustion is referred to Magistrate Judge Daniel J. Stewart in order to set an exhaustion hearing with the parties. Signed by U.S. District Judge Mae A. D'Agostino on 8/14/2020. (ban) (Entered: 08/14/2020)

08/14/2020

32 UNIFORM PRETRIAL SCHEDULING ORDER: Anticipated length of trial: 4 Days. Preferred Trial Location: Albany, NY. Joinder of Parties due by 1/29/2021. Amended Pleadings due by 1/29/2021. Discovery due by 6/30/2021. Motions to be filed by 8/31/2021. Status Report due by 11/30/2020. Signed by Magistrate Judge Daniel J. Stewart on 8/14/2020. (mab) (Entered: 08/14/2020)

08/14/2020

33 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY DEFENDANTS SHOULD NOT OBTAIN SEPARATE COUNSEL as to Defendants Robert Maciol and Lisa Zurek. Signed by Magistrate Judge Daniel J. Stewart on 8/14/2020. (mab) (Entered: 08/14/2020)

08/14/2020

Set Deadlines: Defendants to respond to 33 Order to Show Cause on or before 10/13/2020. (mab) (Entered: 08/14/2020)

08/14/2020

34 TEXT ORDER: An Exhaustion Hearing in this matter is scheduled for October 15, 2020 at 9:30 AM before the undersigned. The parties are directed to file pre-hearing submissions, including witness lists and exhibit lists, on or before October 5, 2020. Two sets of exhibits shall be provided to the Court and a set provided to opposing counsel prior to the date of scheduled hearing. SO ORDERED by Magistrate Judge Daniel J. Stewart on 8/14/2020. (mab) (Entered: 08/14/2020)

08/20/2020

35 NOTICE OF INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL as to 28 Order on Motion to Certify Class,, Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, by Nicole Williamson. Filing fee $ 505, receipt number ANYNDC-5212444. (Young, Samuel) Modified on 8/20/2020 to indicate the appeal is interlocutory (rep, ). (Entered: 08/20/2020)

08/20/2020 36 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Nicole Williamson of Notice of Appeal (Young, Samuel) (Entered: 08/20/2020)

08/20/2020

37 ELECTRONIC NOTICE AND CERTIFICATION sent to US Court of Appeals regarding the 35 Notice of Interlocutory Appeal. (rep) (Entered: 08/20/2020)

08/20/2020

CLERK'S CORRECTION OF DOCKET ENTRY: The clerk modified the docket text of the # 35 Appeal to indicate that it is an Interlocutory Appeal. (rep) (Entered: 08/20/2020)

08/27/2020

USCA Case Number 20-2779 for 35 Notice of Appeal. (rep) (Entered: 08/27/2020)

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9:20-cv-00537-MADDJS
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 Case 9:20-cv-00537-MAD-DJS Document 1 Filed 05/12/20 Page 1 of 15

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK __________________________________________
NICOLE WILLIAMSON, SARAH BARRETT, SHANNON TERRELL, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
-vs-
ROBERT MACIOL, Oneida County Sheriff; LISA ZUREK, Chief Deputy Oneida County Jail.

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
9:20-cv-537 (MAD/DJS)

Defendants. _________________________________________________
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
1. Women incarcerated in the Oneida County Jail (“the Jail”) experience substantially more difficult conditions than do male inmates. The women spend most of their time in windowless cells or in a six-foot wide corridor while their male counterparts enjoy large open spaces with regular access to a recreation room. 2. Women also have inferior access to phones, showers, hot water for cooking, televisions, recreational equipment, reading materials, work programs, and trustee benefits. Defendants argue that the unequal treatment is acceptable because it would cost more to house women in a unit like the men’s. 3. In this civil rights lawsuit, plaintiffs Sarah Barrett, Nicole Williamson, and Shannon Terrell contend that Defendants have violated and continue to violate their right to Equal

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Protection under the law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I § 11 of the New York Constitution. 4. The plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief ending the unconstitutional policies and practices of Defendants. Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit on behalf of a putative class consisting of all female inmates who are, or should be, classified as "general custody" and who are now, or will be, incarcerated at the Oneida County Jail.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 5. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3). 6. This Court has jurisdiction to issue the declaratory relief requested pursuant to the Declaratory Relief Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202. This Court may also grant injunctive relief pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and has authority to award costs and attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 7. Venue is proper in the Northern District of New York, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391(b)(1) and (b)(2), as all relevant events giving rise to the claims in this action occurred in this district and all defendants reside within the district.
PARTIES 8. Sarah Barrett is a forty-five-year-old sentenced inmate at the Jail. She has been held there since November 27, 2019, and is due to be released on July 26, 2020. During her entire incarceration, Ms. Barrett has been classified as a general custody inmate. 9. Ms. Barrett has never received a disciplinary write-up at the Jail. She is currently housed in C-Unit with the other general custody women and experiences the gender-based discrimination described below.
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10. Nicole Williamson is a thirty-two-year-old woman who has been held at the Oneida County Jail since February 2, 2020. Her sentencing is scheduled for June 1, 2020. She is classified as a general custody inmate. 11. Ms. Williamson has never received a disciplinary write-up at the Jail. She is currently housed in C-Unit with the other general custody women and experiences the gender-based discrimination described below. 12. Shannon Terrell is a forty-five-year-old sentenced inmate who has been held at the Jail since October 8, 2019 and is scheduled for release on June 5, 2020. She is a general custody inmate. 13. Ms. Terrell is currently housed in C-Unit with the other general custody women and experiences the gender-based discrimination described below. 14. Robert Maciol is the Sheriff of Oneida County and head of the Oneida County Sheriff’s Office. Sheriff Maciol is an elected official and has final policy making authority for all policies that govern the Corrections and Custody units of the Sheriff’s Office. Sheriff Maciol has supervisory authority over all Sheriff’s Office staff and is personally involved in authorizing and maintaining the unconstitutional policies and customs challenged by the Plaintiffs. He is sued in his official capacity. 15. Lisa Zurek is the Chief Deputy of the Oneida County Jail. Chief Deputy Zurek is responsible for the management of the Oneida County Jail and is personally involved in authorizing, maintaining, and enforcing the unconstitutional policies and customs challenged by the Plaintiffs. Chief Deputy Zurek is sued in her official capacity.
FACTS General Custody Female Inmates are Similarly Situated to Male General Custody Inmates.
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16. The Jail is a correctional facility located in Oriskany, New York. It has the capacity to hold over six hundred inmates. The current population is approximately 260 inmates, 32 of whom are women. 17. The Jail holds both men and women who are awaiting trial or transfer to the New York State Department of Custody and Community Supervision, or who are serving a short local sentence. Men and women are held in the same building but in different sections. All the men and women held at the Jail are in the custody of the Oneida County Sheriff. 18. Upon admission to the Jail, all inmates go through an admission process including a medical and mental health screening. Inmates then have a five-day orientation period during which Jail staff set the inmates’ classification levels. The classification levels determine where inmates are housed. 19. There are two classifications at the Jail: “closed custody” and “general custody.” The Jail uses a point system to determine which classification an inmate is placed in. Inmates in special housing units such as those in disciplinary segregation or protective custody are automatically classified as “closed custody.” 20. Points for classification purposes are awarded based on the inmate’s present charge, criminal history, legal status, incarceration status, and disciplinary record/severity. The classification officer also takes into account the inmate’s mental health or disabilities, suicide attempts, propensity for violence, and vulnerability. 21. Once the classification officer has made a determination as to a particular inmate, that inmate is informed of score, classification designation, and housing assignment. Inmates who score between one and ten on the scale are classified as general custody inmates, and inmates who score above ten are classified as closed custody inmates.
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22. Closed custody inmates receive only the minimum privileges required by the New York State Minimum Standards. See 9 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 7000 et. seq. According to the Jail policies, general custody inmates receive all the privileges provided by the Jail. 23. The Jail monitors inmates’ positive and/or negative behaviors throughout their incarceration on “Inmate Behavioral Log Sheets.” An inmate, or the classification officer, can request a change in classification at any time based on the inmate’s behavior. The Jail Discriminates Against General Custody Women on the Basis of Their Gender.
Podular Housing Units 24. Men classified as general custody are housed in podular housing units (“pods”). Pods have fifty-six individual cells arranged around a central day room. When inmates are outside of their cells, there are no physical barriers between them and the corrections officer assigned to the unit. The Pods were added onto the jail during a renovation and remodel that was completed in 1996. Upon information and belief, there are eight pod style housing units in the Jail. 25. A recreation area attached to the pods has exercise equipment and a basketball hoop. A large window can be opened to let fresh air in. Men can access this area for at least three hours a day but it is usually available whenever they are not mandated to lock-in. 26. Cells on the pods are approximately eight feet wide by ten feet long. There are two windows in the cells. One, on the outside wall, lets in sunlight and allows the inmate to see outside. The other, a small window on the cell door allows corrections officers to see into the cell during their rounds. The cells have a bed, toilet, sink, mirror, desk, and a stool. 27. There are eight showers (one for every seven inmates if the pod is at maximum capacity) and seven telephones (one for every eight inmates if the pod is at maximum capacity) on each
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pod. The showers and phones are in separate areas so inmates can use the phone while others are showering. 28. The pods each have a small library with games, books, cards, and magazines for the inmates’ use. Another small room on each pod allows privacy during inmates’ video calls with their families and loved ones. 29. There are two cable televisions on each pod. The pods also have a hot water dispenser so inmates can have hot water for cooking and a microwave. 30. The pods have air conditioning. 31. The Jail’s stated goal in housing inmates in this environment is to give them more independence, reduce inmate misbehavior and decrease tensions with staff.1 An inmate who misbehaves is removed to a more restrictive environment such as the linear housing units in which all women in Defendants’ custody are housed. 32. The common area of one of the Jail’s pod housing units is pictured below:
Linear Housing Units used by the General Custody Women
1 Sheriff Robert Maciol, Oneida County Sheriff’s Office 2019 Annual Report, available at: hattp://ocsheriff.discoveregov.com/sites/default/files/OCSO%20annual%202019.pdf (last accessed May 11, 2017.)
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33. Women classified as general custody are housed in linear housing units. Otherwise, these units are predominantly used for men with histories of behavioral issues and/or disciplinary problems. They are also used for people with mental health or medical issues that necessitate separation from other inmates. 34. The Jail describes the linear units as “starkly different” from the pods. 2 The linear units have less physical space, and inmates’ movements are severely restricted. The Jail describes linear units as “the ideal option for housing inmates with special needs.” 35. The linear units are over fifty-five years old and have remained relatively unchanged since they were first built in 1965. 36. Women at the Jail were previously held in “Pod Four.” On the pod the women had access to the same benefits general custody men currently have. 37. On the pod the “general custody” women were housed with the “closed custody” women. Despite their differing classifications, there was very little conflict between the women. 38. On January 22, 2020, corrections officers moved the female inmates from the pod into the “Henry” Unit. The Henry Unit is a linear housing unit with two separate but identical sides each containing twenty small open-bar cells. It was formerly used as the men’s Disciplinary Segregation Unit or “the Box.” The officers gave the women no explanation for the move. Closed custody women were housed in “Henry Left” and general custody women were housed in “Henry Right”. The women housed on the separate sides of the unit cannot see, hear, or interact with one another. 39. The transferred inmates found the Henry Unit covered in dirt and human excrement with used toiler paper on the floors, walls, and ceiling. Urine and feces was smeared in cells and on walls. 2 Supra fn. 1
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40. Twelve female inmates were given only two gloves and two bottles of disinfectant to clean the unit. The block was so disgusting some of the women became sick during the cleaning. 41. For several weeks the general custody women housed on Henry Right had no access to tablets, hot water, television or books. 42. On April 1, 2020, all the women were moved to another linear housing unit, “Charlie Unit” (“C-Unit”). 43. The C-Unit is a smaller version of the Henry Unit. It contains two separate but identical sides of sixteen cells situated in a straight line. One side holds the women classified as general custody and the other houses the women classified as closed custody. The general custody women and closed custody women cannot see, hear or interact with one another. 44. Each side of the C-Unit has a six-foot wide catwalk outside the cells. The catwalk has four small picnic style tables on it. It is the only common area for the women to congregate. Because the four windows on each side of the unit are frosted, it is impossible to see outside. There is no air conditioning on the unit. 45. The cells on C-unit are smaller than the ones on the pods. They are approximately five feet wide by seven feet long. There is much less privacy in cells in linear units because they have open bars on the outside instead of doors. The cells contain only a bed, toilet, and a sink. There are no windows in the cells.
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46. Pictured below is a linear cell from the Henry Unit, which is identical to the C-Unit cells,
47. There is one shower and one phone on the general custody side of the unit. In theory, this would mean one shower for about every sixteen women and one phone for the all the sixteen women housed on the general custody side. However practical access is even more restricted. The showers and phone are in the same area, and only one woman is allowed into the phone/shower area at a time. Thus, there will be times when no one can use the phone as well as times when no one can take a shower, and no more than one woman at a time can take a shower. 48. There is no microwave on the general custody side of the unit. The women also do not have regular access to hot water or clean cold water. Room temperature water is delivered to them two or three times a day. 49. Women have access to a television every other day, but they can only watch DVDs. They watch the same DVD movies repeatedly. Because they cannot watch the news and do not get newspapers, they must rely on their phone conversations with friends and family for news of the outside world including news, highly relevant in the current environment, of the Covid-19 pandemic. Unlike the pods housing male inmates, C-unit has no library with books, and magazines Women are allowed only two books a week from the library.
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Case 9:20-cv-00537-MAD-DJS Document 1 Filed 05/12/20 Page 10 of 15 50. The general custody women have only one hour of recreation time a day. Their recreation yard is a small fenced-in basketball court with a covering over it. There is a basketball hoop on the yard, but the balls are hardly ever inflated enough to play. There is no exercise equipment. 51. When the closed custody side of C-Unit is at maximum capacity the Jail moves women to the general custody side of the unit. 52. One of the Jail’s linear housing units is pictured below:
Women are Not Given Equal Access to Programming and Benefits 53. Inmates who exhibit good behavior at the Jail can obtain “trustee” status. This allows the inmates to receive extra benefits in exchange for cleaning and helping out around their housing unit. Male trustees receive one free hour of video calls a week and extra commissary items. Women trustees receive neither. For example, Plaintiff Barrett quit her position as a trustee
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because the Jail continuously refused to give her the one-hour of free video calls she was entitled to. 54. The Jail offers work programs including laundry, food service, car wash, general library, print shop, grounds maintenance, building maintenance and janitorial. Women are only allowed to be on the laundry crew. 55. Inmates at the jail also have tablets available to make video-calls to their families. Men’s units have twelve tablets (one for approximately every five inmates). The general custody women have only two (one for every eight inmates). Defendants’ Discrimination against Women Does Not Serve an Important Governmental Objective and The Discriminatory Means Employed by Defendants are not Substantially Related to the Achievement of Those Objectives 56. Defendants cite the smaller female inmate population and the cost of operating a pod for them as justification for subjecting them to more onerous conditions and depriving them of programs and benefits. Specifically, Defendant Maciol references the cost of heating, electricity and staffing the pod with corrections officers. 57. The disparate treatment between general custody men and women at the Jail is not substantially related to any actual and important government objective. 58. Plaintiffs Barrett, Williamson, and Terrell filed several grievances to address the discrimination faced by women at the Jail, but the Jail has continuously refused to respond. The corrections officers tell the general custody women if they want to be treated better they should have never came to jail. 59. When confronted with the women’s complaints about unequal treatment, Defendant Maciol responded that the move of women to the more restrictive linear housing units is permanent unless there is a significant change in the population.
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CLASS ALLEGATIONS 60. All plaintiffs bring the First and Second Cause of action pursuant to Rule 23(a) and b(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of a class of “all female inmates who are, or should be, classified as "general custody" and who are now, or will be, incarcerated at the Oneida County Jail.” All class members face discrimination on the basis of their gender as a direct result of Defendants’ policies. 61. All four requirements of 23(a) are satisfied:
a. Numerosity: Joinder of all class members is impracticable because of the size of the class and the characteristics of the class members. Every woman who is, or will be, incarcerated at the Oneida County is subjected to or at risk of being subjected to their discriminatory policies and practices. In April 2020 there were thirty-two women held at the Oneida County Jail. Every month, additional class members cycle in and out of the Jail. In 2019 over seven hundred women were admitted into the Jail. Many of these women are unable to file lawsuits to address this discrimination on their own because of their lack of financial resources, and length of time they will be incarcerated.
b. Commonality: There are questions of law and fact common to all of the members of the class, including but not limited to:
 Whether the Defendants violate the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection rights of the putative class by housing them in the old linear style housing unit instead of the pods;
 Whether Defendants violate the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection rights of the putative class by denying them the privileges, services, and programs provided to male inmates at the jail;
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 Whether the Defendants have a genuine and exceedingly persuasive justification for their failure to treat putative class members and similarly situated men equally;
 Whether the Defendants denial of pod style housing and its concomitant benefits, services and programs to the putative class is substantially related to the achievement of important government interests; and
 Whether the Defendants violate the rights of the putative class under the Article I § 11 of the New York Constitution.
c. Typicality: The claims of the named Plaintiffs are typical of those of the class. Each named Plaintiff has been subjected to the challenged policies and practices.
d. Adequacy of Representation: The named Plaintiffs, their representatives, and class counsel will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class. The named Plaintiffs and their representatives have no interests in this matter that are antagonistic to other class members. Class counsel has many years of experience in civil rights and class action litigation. 62. Class-wide declaratory and injunctive relief are appropriate under rule 23(b)(2) because the Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class as a whole.
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF First Cause of Action
63. The Defendants’ actions or inactions have violated and continue to violate the named Plaintiffs’ and putative class members’ right to Equal Protection under the law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Second Cause of Action
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64. The Defendants’ actions or inactions have violated and continue to violate the named Plaintiffs’ and putative class members’ rights under Article I § 11 of the New York State Constitution

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray this Court to:

(1) Declare Defendants’ acts and omissions violate the named Plaintiffs’ and putative class members right to Equal Protection under the law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I § 11 of the New York State Constitution;

(2) Enter all necessary injunctive relief including but not limited to prohibiting Defendants from denying Plaintiffs and the putative class access to equal housing benefits and programs afforded to male inmates;

(3) Award Plaintiff’s costs, including reasonable attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and other relevant provisions of law; and

(4) Grant any other and further relief, as the Court may deem necessary and proper.

Date: 5/12/2020

Respectfully submitted,

/s/Joshua Cotter______________ LEGAL SERVICES OF CENTRAL NEW YORK, INC. Joshua Cotter (518217) Sara Adams* Samuel C. Young (508916) Attorneys for the Plaintiff 221 South Warren Street, 3rd Fl.

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*Application for admission pending

Syracuse, New York 13202 (315)-703-6500
Maurie Heins (101952) Attorney Emeritus Program 221 S. Warren St., 3rd Fl. Syracuse, New York 13202 315-703-6500

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 Case 9:20-cv-00537-MAD-DJS Document 28 Filed 08/03/20 Page 1 of 27

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ____________________________________________

NICOLE WILLIAMSON, et al.,

Plaintiffs, vs.
ROBERT MACIOL, Oneida County Sheriff, and LISA ZUREK, Chief Deputy Oneida County Jail,

9:20-CV-537 (MAD/DJS)

Defendants. ____________________________________________

APPEARANCES:

OF COUNSEL:

LEGAL SERVICES OF CENTRAL NEW YORK 221 South Warren Street Suite 300 Syracuse, New York 13202 Attorneys for Plaintiffs

JOSHUA T. COTTER, ESQ. SAMUEL C. YOUNG, ESQ. MAURIE G. HEINS, ESQ. SARA ADAMS, ESQ.

KENNEY SHELTON LIPTAK NOWAK LLP 4615 North Street Jamesville, New York 13078 Attorneys for Defendants

DAVID H. WALSH, IV, ESQ. DANIEL CARTWRIGHT, ESQ.

Mae A. D'Agostino, U.S. District Judge:

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Nicole Williamson, Sarah Barrett, and Shannon Terrell (collectively

"Plaintiffs"), on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, bring this action for alleged

violations of their rights to Equal Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United

States Constitution (Count I), and violations of their rights under Article I, § 11 of the New York

State Constitution (Count II). See Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 63–64. On May 21, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a

Case 9:20-cv-00537-MAD-DJS Document 28 Filed 08/03/20 Page 2 of 27
motion for an order certifying this proceeding as a class action. See Dkt. No. 10. On June 10, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction seeking an order requiring Defendants Robert Maciol and Lisa Zurek (collectively "Defendants") to transfer Plaintiffs to a less restrictive podular style housing unit and providing Plaintiffs with substantially equivalent privileges and benefits to those provided to their male equivalents. See Dkt. No. 18. Defendants do not oppose Plaintiffs' motion for certification of the class, see Dkt. No. 22, but do oppose Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. See Dkt. No. 23-4.
II. BACKGROUND Plaintiffs are currently housed at the Oneida County Jail, which is a correctional facility located in Oriskany, New York. See Dkt. No. 18-3 at 2. The Oneida County Jail is approximately two-hundred years old, and is comprised of various housing units. See Dkt. No. 23-2 at 3. As of June 17, 2020, the Oneida County Jail held 228 inmates, comprising of 202 males and 26 females. See id. at 2. All inmates are classified as either "general custody" or "closed custody." See id. In determining an inmate's security classification, the Oneida County Jail assigns points based on an inmate's present charge(s), criminal history, legal status, incarceration status, disciplinary record and the severity of that record, as well as the inmate's mental health, disabilities, suicide attempts, propensity for violence, and vulnerability. See Dkt. No. 18-3 at 70. Inmates who score between one and ten points are classified as general custody, and inmates who score above ten points are classified as closed custody. See id. Closed custody inmates receive only the minimum privileges required by the New York State Minimum Standards, and general custody inmates receive all privileges as set forth by facility rules and regulations. See id. at 70–71.
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Of particular importance to Plaintiffs' claims are the housing units at the Oneida County Jail, namely, the "podular units" ("pods") and "linear housing units." Id. at 3. A pod contains fifty-six individual cells, and the cells surround a central common area with benches and tables. See id. Each cell in the pods is approximately eight feet by ten feet in size, equipped with a bed, toilet, sink, desk, and chair, and has a clear glass window facing outside that is approximately one foot by three feet in size. See id. Each pod has seven telephones and eight showers for inmates to access. See id. There is a recreation unit attached to the pods. See Dkt. No. 18-2 at 9, 15. Inmates housed in pods also have access to two cable televisions, a room containing games and books, videophone equipment, a water cooler with hot and cold water, a microwave, and air conditioning. See id. at 9–11.
The linear housing units contain cells that are approximately five feet by seven feet in size, equipped with a bed, toilet, sink with hot and cold running water, have bars in front of the cells, and contain no windows. See Dkt. No. 23-2 at 3. H-Block consists of forty linear cells (with twenty cells on each side) and C-Block consists of thirty-two cells (sixteen on each side). See id. The cell blocks have an inner and outer catwalk. See id. at 4. Each cell block has one shower and one telephone. See id. at 3.1 Inmates housed in the linear housing units have access to one television with DVDs and movies, video tablets, a cabinet with games and books, water, fans, and access to a recreation area. See Dkt. No. 23-2 at 6–9. There have been plumbing incidents in both blocks, including toilet water flooding the unit. See Dkt. No. 18-2 at 9–10.
1 Plaintiffs state that the H-Block and C-Block units, both linear housing units, are identical with the exception that the Henry Unit contains four more cells and has one additional shower. Plaintiffs state that female inmates have been transferred between these units several times. See Dkt. No. 18-2 at 3, 10, 16.
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In addition to housing, Plaintiffs' claims involve the benefits and privileges that the general custody women receive. These benefits and privileges include, but are not limited to, recreation time, televisions, library access, digital tablets, the ability to cook food, water coolers, air conditioners, work assignments, and trustee status. See Dkt. No. 18-5 at 9–11; Dkt. No. 23-4 at 4–5.
Prior to January 2020, all female inmates were housed in a single pod unit. See Dkt. No. 23-2 at 4. In October 2019, the Commission of Correction completed its yearly "Minimum Standard Evaluation" of the Oneida County Jail. See id. at 4, 15–18. The Commission reviewed the classification standards, and required action to be taken because all female inmates were "housed together on the same unit regardless of classification level." Id. at 15. In January 2020, all female inmates were moved to linear housing units and separated based on classification. See id. at 5. At that time, thirteen women were classified as general custody and fifteen were classified as closed custody. See id. at 2. General custody women were moved to H-Block (Henry Right), and closed custody women were moved to H-Block (Henry Left); in April 2020, the entire unit was moved to C-Block. See id.
III. DISCUSSION A. Class Certification
"A district court enjoys broad discretion when it comes to resolving questions of class certification because it 'is often in the best position to assess the propriety of the class and has the ability . . . to alter or modify the class, create subclasses, and decertify the class whenever warranted.'" V.W. by and through Williams v. Conway, 236 F. Supp. 3d 554, 572 (N.D.N.Y. 2017) (quoting Sumitomo Copper Litig. v. Credit Lyonnais Rouse, Ltd., 262 F.3d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 2001) (collecting cases)).
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"'In evaluating a motion for class certification, the district court is required to make a "definitive assessment of Rule 23 requirements, notwithstanding their overlap with merits issues," and must resolve material factual disputes relevant to each Rule 23 requirement.'" Brown v. Kelly, 609 F.3d 467, 476 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 41 (2d Cir. 2006)). Rule 23 sets forth four requirements for class certification:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) questions of law and fact are common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims of defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). "A party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate [its] compliance with the Rule." Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 351 (2011) ("Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading standard"). "To certify a class seeking injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2), Plaintiffs must also show Defendants have 'acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.' Plaintiffs must establish each of these facts by at least a preponderance of the evidence." J.B. v. Onondaga Cnty., 401 F. Supp. 3d 320, 330 (N.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting Brown, 609 F.3d at 476). Additionally, "courts have written a third, 'implied requirement' into the Rule: a party seeking certification must demonstrate that the proposed class is 'ascertainable.'" V.W., 236 F. Supp. 3d at 573 (quoting Sykes v. Mel Harris & Assocs., LLC, 285 F.R.D. 279, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)). "Under this additional element, '[a]n identifiable class exists if its members can be ascertained by reference to objective criteria.'" Id. (quoting Stinson v. City of N.Y., 282 F.R.D. 360, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)).
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"In sum, '[c]lass certification is appropriate where the proposed class meets, by a preponderance of the evidence following a court's "rigorous analysis," the requirements of Rule 23(a) and the proposed class constitutes one of the types of classes enumerated in Rule 23(b).'" V.W., 236 F. Supp. 3d at 573 (quoting Stinson, 282 F.R.D. at 367).
Plaintiffs seek to certify a class composed of "all female inmates who are, or should be, classified as 'general custody' and who are now, or will be, incarcerated at the Oneida County Jail." Dkt. No. 10-1 at ¶ 7. Defendants do not oppose the motion for certification of the class. Dkt. No. 22. Nevertheless, because a party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate compliance with the requirements of Rule 23, the relevant findings are based on Plaintiffs' submissions in support of this motion and are set forth below.
1. Numerosity The first element of certification under Rule 23 requires Plaintiffs to demonstrate that "the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). This inquiry is "not strictly mathematical" but rather requires a court to
take into account the context of the particular case, in particular whether a class is superior to joinder based on other relevant factors including: (i) judicial economy, (ii) geographic dispersion, (iii) the financial resources of class members, (iv) their ability to sue separately, and (v) request for injunctive relief that would involve future class members. Pa. Pub. Sch. Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., 772 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931, 936 (2d Cir. 1993)). In other words, "[t]he numerosity requirement in Rule 23(a)(1) does not mandate that joinder of all parties be impossible—only that the difficulty or inconvenience of joining all members of the class make use of the class action
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appropriate." Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. Merck–Medco Managed Care, LLC, 504 F.3d 229, 244–45 (2d Cir. 2007).
As an initial matter, Plaintiffs need only "show some evidence of or reasonably estimate the number of class members" and "need not show the exact number." Robidoux, 987 F.2d at 935. Seven hundred and thirteen women were admitted to the Oneida County Jail in 2019. See Dkt. No. 10-4 at 9. Therefore, the Court may presume numerosity. See Pa. Pub. Sch. Emps.' Ret. Sys., 772 F.3d at 120 ("Numerosity is presumed for classes larger than forty members").
In addition, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that joinder is impractical based on contextual factors. Because of the "'"fluid composition" of the prison population'—new detainees are arrested and arraigned, and others are released, each day—joining all . . . detainees in [the county] verges on impossible." J.B., 401 F. Supp. 3d at 331 (quoting Clarkson v. Coughlin, 783 F. Supp. 789, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)); see also V.W., 236 F. Supp. 3d at 574 ("[W]hile the class members will obviously share the same geographic area, the ability of any one individual member of the class or the subclass to maintain an individual suit will necessarily be limited by the simple reality that they are being detained as part of the criminal justice process").
Furthermore, "[b]eing incarcerated, and fighting criminal cases, also saps [the proposed classes'] financial resources and affords them 'little freedom in their daily lives,' limiting their time and ability to consult civil counsel." J.B., 401 F. Supp. 3d at 331 (quoting A.T. by and through Tillman v. Harder, 298 F. Supp. 3d 391, 407 (N.D.N.Y. 2018)). Moreover, litigating this suit as a class action promotes judicial economy, because it "avoids multiple individual suits that raise the same issues and seek the same relief." V.W., 236 F. Supp. 3d at 574.
As such, Plaintiffs have demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the class is sufficiently numerous such that joinder of all members is impracticable.
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2. Commonality The second element of certification under Rule 23 requires Plaintiffs to demonstrate that there "are questions of law or fact common to the class." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). Plaintiffs contend that the "questions of law or fact common to the class" are as follows:
i) Whether the Defendants violate the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection rights of the putative class by housing them in the old style housing unit instead of the pods; ii) Whether Defendants violate the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection rights of the putative class by denying them the privileges, services, and programs provided to male inmates at the jail; iii) Whether the Defendants have a genuine and exceedingly persuasive justification for their failure to treat putative class members and similarly situated men equally; iv) Whether the Defendants' denial of pod style housing and its concomitant benefits, services and programs to the putative class is substantially related to the achievement of important government interests; and v) Whether the Defendants violate the rights of the putative class under the New York Constitution. Dkt. No. 10-1 at 10–11. This element "does not require all questions of law or fact to be common," and "even a single common question will suffice." Sykes, 285 F.R.D. at 286; see also Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 349–50 (explaining that class members' claims "must depend upon a common contention . . . of such a nature that it is capable of class wide resolution—which means that the determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke"). "Plaintiffs may satisfy the commonality requirement with 'significant proof' that a
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general policy or practice caused the alleged violations of class members' rights." J.B., 401 F. Supp. 3d at 331 (quoting Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 353).
Plaintiffs' claims challenge Defendants' policies and procedures that "deny all putative plaintiffs equal access to the housing and programs, benefits, and services afforded to similarly situated men." Dkt. No. 1-1 at 12. Each member of the putative class is subjected to the same policies and practices. See Dkt. No. 10-3 at 3–4, 9–11, 16–17. Plaintiffs further allege that these "policies and practices are not substantially related to achievement of any important government interest." Dkt. No. 10-1 at 12. The common answers to these questions will drive the resolution of the current litigation – whether Defendants' conduct violates the Constitution, federal law, or state law, and whether Defendants should therefore be enjoined from engaging in that course of conduct. See, e.g., V.W., 236 F. Supp. 3d at 575.
As "numerous courts have concluded that the commonality requirement can be satisfied by proof of the existence of systemic polices and practices that allegedly expose inmates to a substantial risk of harm," Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 681 (9th Cir. 2014), this Court finds that Plaintiffs have demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that there are questions of law or fact common to the class or subclass.
3. Typicality The third element of certification under Rule 23 requires Plaintiffs to demonstrate whether "the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). "Typicality requires that the claims of the class representatives be typical of those of the class[.] [It] is satisfied when each class member's claim arises from the same course of events and each class member makes similar legal arguments to prove the defendant's liability." Cent. States Se. and Sw. Areas Health and Welfare Fund v. Merck-Medco
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Managed Care, L.L.C., 504 F.3d 229, 245 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation and citation omitted). "Generally speaking, minor variations in the fact patterns underlying the individual claims will not preclude a finding of typicality unless there are 'unique defenses' that threaten to become the focus of the litigation." V.W., 236 F. Supp. 3d at 576 (citing Baffa v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 222 F.3d 52, 59 (2d Cir. 2000)).
Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden on this element for substantially the same reasons as set forth above. The members of the class share the same legal arguments because their claims are based on the common application of certain challenged policies and procedures. See id.; see also Sykes, 285 F.R.D at 287 ("The commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge such that similar considerations inform the analysis for both prerequisites"). "As with commonality. . . '[w]hen it is alleged that the same unlawful conduct was directed at or affected both the named plaintiff and the class sought to be represented the typicality requirement is usually met irrespective' of such 'minor variations in the fact patterns underlying the individual claims.'" J.B., 401 F. Supp. 3d at 332 (finding that typicality exists even when "[s]ome class members have not yet been arraigned") (quoting Robidoux, 987 F.2d at 936–37); see also Tillman, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 410 (certifying class where the representatives of the class and the subclasses have been subjected to the same common course of treatment by the same officials on the basis of the same policies).
As such, Plaintiffs have demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.
4. Adequacy of Representation The fourth element of certification under Rule 23 requires Plaintiffs to demonstrate whether "the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class."
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). "[T]he adequacy requirement is twofold: the proposed class representative must have an interest in vigorously pursing the claims of the class, and must have no interests antagonistic to the interests of other class members." Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 268 (2d Cir. 2006). A conflict of interest between the parties and the class they seek to represent "must be fundamental, and speculative conflict should be disregarded at the class certification stage." Sykes, 285 F.R.D. at 287. Only a conflict "that goes to the very subject matter of the litigation will defeat a party's claim of representative status." Stinson, 282 F.R.D. at 371. In addition, class counsel must be "qualified, experienced and able to conduct the litigation." Baffa, 222 F.3d at 60.
Plaintiffs have carried their burden on this element. As discussed previously, the representatives of the class have been subjected to the same policies and procedures. Each named Plaintiff has expressed a desire to seek prospective injunctive relief from these policies, a benefit that will effect any woman detained at the Oneida County Jail in the future. See Dkt. No. 10-3 at 5, 12, 18. Furthermore, these Plaintiffs have no foreseeable conflicts of interest with other class members. Moreover, class counsel have extensive litigation experience in the class action context. See, e.g., V.W., 236 F. Supp. 3d at 577 (collecting cases); J.B., 401 F. Supp. 3d at 332 ("Plaintiff's counsel, attorneys with the Legal Services of Central New York, have extensive experience in class action litigation and have previously represented classes of detainees seeking systemic reform in federal court class action lawsuits") (collecting cases).
As such, Plaintiffs have demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the qualifying representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
5. Rule 23(b)
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Plaintiffs rely on Rule 23(b)(2), which applies when "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). "'The key to the (b)(2) class is the indivisible nature of the injunctive or declaratory remedy warranted–the notion that the conduct is such that it can be enjoined or declared unlawful only as to all of the class members or as to none of them.'" V.W., 236 F. Supp. 3d at 577 (quoting Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 360).
Here, Plaintiffs seek "a single injunction or declaratory judgment" that "would provide relief to each member of the class," making certification under Rule 23(b)(2) appropriate. V.W., 236 F. Supp. 3d at 577 (citing Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 360) (certifying Rule 23(b)(2) class where "the members of the class and the subclass would benefit from the same remedy—an order enjoining defendants from application of the policies and practices resulting in the deprivations at issue"); see also Dkt. No. 10-1 at 14–15. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have met their burden on this element.
6. Ascertainability Plaintiffs have also satisfied this requirement. The members of the class are readily identifiable pursuant to objective criteria, including, but not limited to, the records maintained by Defendants. See V.W., 236 F. Supp. 3d at 577. In sum, Plaintiffs have affirmatively demonstrated their compliance with the requirements for class certification. B. Preliminary Injunction 1. Standard of Review A preliminary injunction "is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion." Moore v.
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Consol. Edison Co., 409 F.3d 506, 510 (2d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). "A decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction is committed to the discretion of the district court." Polymer Tech. Corp. v. Mimran, 37 F.3d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).
A party seeking a preliminary injunction must establish "'a threat of irreparable injury and either (1) a probability of success on the merits or (2) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits of the claims to make them a fair ground of litigation, and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in favor of the moving party.'" Allied Office Supplies, Inc. v. Lewandowski, 261 F. Supp. 2d 107, 108 (D. Conn. 2003) (quoting Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 322 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 2003)). "Irreparable harm is the single most important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction." Rodriguez ex rel. Rodriguez v. DeBuono, 175 F.3d 227, 233-34 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotations omitted).
Moreover, in certain circumstances, an even higher standard applies. "The moving party must make a 'clear' or 'substantial' showing of a likelihood of success where (1) the injunction sought 'will alter, rather than maintain, the status quo' – i.e., is properly characterized as a 'mandatory' rather than 'prohibitory' injunction; or (2) the injunction sought 'will provide the movant with substantially all the relief sought, and that relief cannot be undone even if the defendant prevails at a trial on the merits.'" Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 473 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Tom Doherty Assocs., Inc. v. Saban Enter., Inc., 60 F.3d 27, 33–34 (2d Cir. 1995)).2 The United States Supreme Court has distinguished between mandatory and prohibitory injunctions by describing a mandatory injunction as one that orders a party to "take action," whereas a
2 As the Second Circuit has noted, "'[t]he distinction between mandatory and prohibitory injunctions is not without ambiguities or critics,' . . . and that in a close case an injunction can be framed in mandatory or prohibitory terms[.]" Jolly, 76 F.3d at 473–74 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
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prohibitory injunction would "restrain" a party from unlawful action. Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 484 (1996).
Plaintiffs want the Court to "restrain" Defendants from continuing to allegedly violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Constitution of New York State. But the alleged discrimination lies precisely in Defendants' inaction (i.e., the failure of Defendants to provide Plaintiffs with the same housing and benefits as similarly-situated male inmates), and such alleged discrimination could only be "restrained" by this Court ordering Defendants to take positive action. The injunction that Plaintiffs seek would command Defendants move them from the linear style housing to pod housing and to provide Plaintiffs a different set of privileges and benefits, thus altering the status quo "by commanding some positive act." Tom Doherty Assocs., 60 F.3d at 34. The Court agrees with Defendants that the injunction sought by Plaintiffs is a mandatory injunction, and thus, this higher standard applies. See, e.g., N.J. v. New York, 872 F. Supp. 2d 204, 211-12 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) ("'This higher standard is particularly appropriate when a plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction against a government body such as a school district'") (quotation and other citations omitted).
The Supreme Court has observed that the decision of whether to award preliminary injunctive relief is often based on "procedures that are less formal and evidence that is less complete than in a trial on the merits." Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). Consonant with this view, the Second Circuit has held that a district court may consider hearsay evidence when deciding whether to grant preliminary injunctive relief. See Mullins v. City of New York, 626 F.3d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 2010). Therefore, the strict standards for affidavits under the Federal Rules of Evidence and in support of summary judgment under Rule 56(c)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requiring that an affidavit be made on personal knowledge are
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not expressly applicable to affidavits in support of preliminary injunctions. See Mullins v. City of New York, 634 F. Supp. 2d 373, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citations omitted). Nevertheless, courts have wide discretion to assess the affidavit's credibility and generally consider affidavits made on information and belief to be insufficient for a preliminary injunction. See 11A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2949 (2d ed. 1995); Mullins, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 373, 385, 390 n.115 (declining to fully credit the "defendants' hearsay affidavit" and noting that while the court "may consider hearsay evidence in a preliminary injunction hearing . . . , a court may weigh evidence based on whether such evidence would be admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence").
Moreover, even if Plaintiffs demonstrate irreparable harm and a likelihood of success on the merits, the remedy of preliminary injunctive relief may still be withheld if equity so requires. "An award of an injunction is not something a plaintiff is entitled to as a matter of right, but rather it is an equitable remedy issued by a trial court, within the broad bounds of its discretion, after it weighs the potential benefits and harm to be incurred by the parties from the granting or denying of such relief." Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 173 F.3d 63, 68 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
Importantly, the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") establishes additional requirements for granting a preliminary injunction involving prison conditions. The PLRA specifies that:
In any civil action with respect to prison conditions, to the extent otherwise authorized by law, the court may enter a temporary restraining order or an order for preliminary injunctive relief. Preliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm. The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the preliminary relief and shall respect the
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principles of comity . . . in tailoring any preliminary relief. Preliminary injunctive relief shall automatically expire on the date that is 90 days after its entry, unless the court makes the findings required . . . for the entry of prospective relief and makes the order final before the expiration of the 90-day period. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). The comity principles to which the Act refers include the following: The court shall not order any prospective relief that requires or permits a government official to exceed his or her authority under State or local law or otherwise violates State or local law, unless(i) Federal law requires such relief to be ordered in violation of State or local law; (ii) the relief is necessary to correct the violation of a Federal right; and (iii) no other relief will correct the violation of the Federal right. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(B). Importantly, in the prison context, "'a request for injunctive relief must always be viewed with great caution so as not to immerse the federal judiciary in the management of [ ] prisons."' V.W., 236 F. Supp. 3d at 581 (quoting Fisher v. Goord, 981 F. Supp. 140, 167 (W.D.N.Y. 1997)). In considering a request for injunctive relief, a court must give "substantial weight" to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system the relief might have. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). 2. Likelihood of Success on the Merits a. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies The PLRA states that "[no] action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This exhaustion requirement applies to all suits brought by inmates regarding
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aspects of prison life. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Inmates must exhaust all available administrative remedies even if they are seeking only money damages that are not available in prison administrative proceedings. See Giano v. Goord, 380 F.3d 670, 675 (2d Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850 (2016). The failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense that must be raised by the defendants and, as such, it is the defendants' burden to establish that the plaintiff failed to meet the exhaustion requirements. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007); Key v. Toussaint, 660 F. Supp. 2d 518, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citations omitted).
The Supreme Court has held that in order to properly exhaust an inmate's administrative remedies, the inmate must complete the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable state rules. See Jones, 549 U.S. at 218–19 (citing Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006)). In Woodford, the Court held that "proper" exhaustion means that the inmate must complete the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules, including deadlines, as a prerequisite to bringing suit in federal court. See Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90–103.
Although administrative remedies generally must be exhausted, a prisoner need not exhaust remedies if they are not "available." Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1855. "First, an administrative remedy may be unavailable when 'it operates as a simple dead end – with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates.'" Williams v. Corr. Officer Priatno, 829 F.3d 118, 123 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1859). "Second, 'an administrative scheme might be so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use.'" Id. (quoting Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1859). "In other words, 'some mechanism exists to provide relief, but no ordinary prisoner can discern or navigate it.'" Id. at 123–24 (quoting Ross, 136 S.
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Ct. at 1859). "Third, an administrative remedy may be unavailable 'when prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.'" Id. at 124 (quoting Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1860).
Defendants allege that Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their available administrative remedies, and that "as is evidenced by their own complaints and grievance[s], each and every one of their claims have been resolved to their satisfaction." Dkt. No. 23-4 at 12. However, with regards to Plaintiffs' claims related to their housing assignments, Plaintiffs assert that they were told by corrections staff that housing decisions are not grievable. See Dkt. No. 18-2 at 5, 11; Dkt. No. 24-2 at 3, 6. Additionally, a finding in the report generated by the Commission of Correction in October 2019 was that "[g]rievances . . . concerning housing decisions . . . were determined to be non-grievable." Dkt. No. 23-2 at 17. Courts in this Circuit "have also concluded that a claim is functionally exhausted when, as here, an inmate is told that [her] issue is not grievable." Gilbeau v. Pallito, No. 1:11-CV-232, 2012 WL 2416719, *5 (D. Vt. May 22, 2012) (collecting cases).
With regards to Plaintiffs' claims addressing benefits and privileges, the Court finds that questions of fact exist as to whether administrative remedies were available to Plaintiffs, and whether additional grievances may have been filed by Plaintiffs that were not maintained by Defendants. Lieutenant Deborah Harris, a Grievance Coordinator at the Oneida County Jail, attested that she searched her records to locate all complaints filed by female inmates since January 2020, and that "all female inmates who have filed a complaint or grievance pursuant to the inmate grievance procedure have voluntarily accepted a resolution of the complaint offered by the Correctional Facility, thereby waiving any and all rights they may have to proceed with a formal grievance hearing." Dkt. No. 23-3 at 8–9. However, Plaintiffs assert that more grievances
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have been filed than what the Oneida County Jail has records of, potentially "reveal[ing] a grievance system that is unavailable to address the concerns of the putative class." Dkt. No. 24-1 at 8. While Defendants assert that this argument is without merit because Plaintiffs "have not provided any copies of the allegedly discarded documents and have not identified the sum and substance of those grievances," Dkt. No. 23-4 at 14, Plaintiffs allege that requests for copies were refused. See Dkt. No. 18-2 at 4; Dkt. No. 24-2 at 3, 8, 11. Therefore, at this time, the Court will not bar Plaintiffs' claims for their alleged failure to exhaust.3
Even if the Court assumes that Plaintiffs did exhaust their administrative remedies at this phase, the claims asserted by Plaintiffs do not meet the high threshold to establish a likelihood of success on the merits for a mandatory preliminary injunction.
b. Equal Protection Violation Plaintiffs assert that the conditions in which general custody women are housed at Defendants' jail, as well as the privileges and benefits they receive, are inferior to those of similarly situated male inmates in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution as well as the Constitution of New York State. See Dkt. No. 18-5 at 13–23. Defendants state that female and male general custody inmates are treated substantially similar, and, in the alternative, that the reasons for this treatment serve
3 If questions of fact remain as to Plaintiffs' exhaustion of administrative remedies if, or when, this matter approaches the dispositive motion deadline, this Court will direct that a hearing be held to resolve the issue. See, e.g., Murray v. Palmer, No. 9:03-CV-1010, 2010 WL 1235591, *4 n.20 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2010) (citing Enigwe v. Zenk, No. 03-CV-0854, 2006 WL 2654985, *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2006) (finding that, at the summary judgment "stage of the proceedings, a genuine question of fact exists with respect to whether [plaintiff] should be excused from exhausting his administrative remedies with regard to claims relating to his confinement," and therefore "direct[ing] that a hearing be held" before a judge, to resolve this issue)).
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important governmental objectives and are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. See Dkt. No. 23-4 at 14–21.
The Equal Protection Clause generally requires the government to treat similarly situated people alike. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). Dissimilar treatment of dissimilarly situated persons does not violate equal protection. See Barket, Levy & Fine, Inc. v. St. Louis Thermal Energy Corp., 21 F.3d 237, 242 (8th Cir. 1994). Thus, the first step in an equal protection case is determining whether the plaintiff has demonstrated that she was treated differently than others who were similarly situated to her. See, e.g., Samaad v. City of Dallas, 940 F.2d 925, 940–41 (5th Cir. 1991). Absent a threshold showing that she is similarly situated to those who allegedly receive favorable treatment, the plaintiff does not have a viable equal protection claim. See id. at 941 (holding that black residents failed to state an equal protection claim where they did not allege the existence of a similarly situated group of white residents who were treated differently). "Thus, before this Court may reach the merits of their equal protection claim, a determination must be made as to whether general custody female inmates and general custody male inmates are similarly situated." Klinger v. Dep't of Corrs., 31 F.3d 727, 731 (8th Cir. 1994).
Plaintiffs first allege that women in general custody are similarly situated to men in general custody because "their circumstances are alike in all ways material to their claims." Dkt. No. 18-5 at 14. Defendants do not contest this allegation. See Dkt. No. 23-4 at 14–21. After examining the evidence submitted to the Court, most of the facts related to this element are not disputed. The population of female and male general custody inmates are all in the custody of Defendants and incarcerated in buildings within the same jail complex. See Dkt. No. 18-3 at 5–11; see also Victory v. Berks Cnty., No. 18-cv-15170, 2019 WL 5266147, *9 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 17,
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2019) ("Victory I"). While Defendants focus on the fact that male inmates comprise a larger percentage of the overall inmate population than female inmates, "the difference is insignificant when analyzing whether female and male inmates are similarly situated." Victory I, 2019 WL 5266147, at *9; see also Clarkson v. Coughlin, 898 F. Supp. 1019, 1051 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). Furthermore, Defendants admittedly use the same risk assessment classification system for both male and female inmates. See Dkt. No. 23-2 at 2–3 ("The classification process is the same for both male and female inmates"); Dkt. No. 18-3 at 20–21. Based on the record, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that women in general custody are similarly situated to men in general custody.
However, the Court agrees with Defendants that, at this time, Plaintiffs have not met the high threshold to demonstrate that general custody women do not receive substantially equivalent treatment to men in general custody. With regards to benefits and privileges, Defendants have outlined in detail in their submissions to the Court facts that support that both male and female inmates appear to have substantially equivalent access to similar benefits and privileges. With regards to books, the jail has a general library accessible to both male and female general custody inmates, with capacity for overflow books on an equal basis in cell blocks. See Dkt. No. 23-2 at 6. With regards to games, each cell block has a cabinet containing games, which are stocked on an equal basis for both male and female general custody inmates. See id. With regards to television, while men have access to basic cable channels, women have access to movies and DVDs. See id. at 7; see also Women Prisoners of Dist. of Columbia Dep't of Corrs. v. Dist. of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910, 927 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("Under the program-by-program method of comparison embraced by the dissent, any divergence from an identity of programs gives rise to equal protection liability. . . . Such an approach completely eviscerates the deference that federal courts are obliged to give prison administrators") (citing Turner v. Safley, 583 U.S. 78, 84–85
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(1987)). Additionally, the pod units currently housing men have two televisions for fifty men, while fewer than twenty women share one television.4 With regards to computer tablets, Defendants state that the tablets are provided to all inmates at a ratio basis (one tablet for every seven inmates, assuming full capacity), with seven female inmates sharing three tablets as of June 22, 2020. See Dkt. No. 23-2 at 2, 7. With regards to telephones, access is essentially equal as the pod units have seven telephones for fifty-six inmates (one for every eight inmates), and the linear units have one telephone for seven inmates at the present time. See id. at 8. With regards to showers, access is essentially equal as the pod units have eight showers for fifty-six inmates (one for every eight inmates), and the linear units have one shower for seven inmates at the present time. See id. With regards to recreation, each male and female inmate, assuming full capacity, has access to two hours of recreation time. See id. at 8–9. With regards to water, Defendants state that the water "supplied to all the cells, both pod and linear, comes from the same source and is subject to periodic inspections by the Health Department." Id. at 9. With regards to microwaves, while Defendants acknowledge that female inmates do not have access to a microwave due to the safety concerns present when using a long extension cord, female inmates are provided with hot water three times a day to provide inmates with a substantially similar alternative. See id. With regards to plumbing, Defendants state that any issues detailed by Plaintiffs "appear to be self created by the inmates and not a result of any deficiencies or inadequacies on behalf of the jail." Id. at 11.
4 While Plaintiffs allege that the ratios cited by Defendants should be disregarded as they employ actual female population numbers and maximum male population numbers, these ratios are constantly changing with the influx and release of female and male inmates, and do not remain stagnant. The Court finds, therefore, that for the purposes of this motion, the ratios are instructive.
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With regards to available jobs and work assignments, the Court finds that although not
every work assignment that is available for male inmates is available for female inmates,
Defendants note that male and female inmates cannot work in integrated work assignments, and
that when there are enough females inmates to staff a work assignment, that work assignment is
available to them. See Dkt. No. 23-2 at 10. Therefore, as there are not enough female inmates to
staff food service or the car wash (eighteen are required for food service alone), women cannot
participate in those work assignments; they can participate in all other work assignments. See id.
The Court also notes that there appear to be certain programs that female inmates participated in
that male inmates did not, such as the sewing program. See Dkt. No. 18-3 at 11. With regards to
trustee benefits, Defendants state that the same benefits are afforded to both male and female trustees. See Dkt. No. 23-2 at 10–11.5
However, the Court is concerned about the lack of air conditioning in the linear housing
units, and notes that the pods do indeed have air conditioning. While Defendant Zurek and the
Oneida County Jail have "endeavored to make up for the lack of air conditioning . . . by providing
large fans stationed at the end of the linear units," Dkt. No. 23-4 at 18, the Court is concerned by this disparity.6 The Court does note, however, that the ongoing dialogue between Defendants and
5 In conducting this inquiry, the Court notes that decisions relating to the available jobs and work assignments for inmates are the type of day-to-day judgments that rest firmly in the discretion of prison officials. See Pitts v. Thornburgh, 866 F.2d 1450, 1453–54 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (distinguishing between "cases involving regulations that govern the day-to-day operation of prisons" and those that involve "general budgetary and policy choices made over decades in the give and take of city politics," and concluding that the former is entitled to significantly more deference than the latter). "Second-guessing such judgments 'would seriously hamper [the prison officials'] ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison administration.'" Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 733 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89).
6 In light of this concern, the Court will ask that Magistrate Judge Stewart work with the
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Plaintiffs that has led to some of the changes that female inmates have requested previously, including an increase in the number of tablets, recreation time, water, DVDs, and fans. See id. at 25.
Despite this concern, the Court finds that, with regards to the housing provided for the general custody women, Defendants' reasons for moving Plaintiffs "serve important governmental objectives and [are] substantially related to achievement of those objectives." Clarkson, 898 F. Supp. at 1043.7 After the Commission of Correction performed an inspection of the Oneida County Jail in October 2019, a report was generated which notified the facility that it was noncompliant in housing both general custody and closed custody female inmates together in the same pod unit. See Dkt. No. 23-2 at 15. In response, in January 2020, Defendants moved all female inmates from the pod units to the linear housing units, and separated closed custody and general custody female inmates based on their classifications; general custody women were assigned to H-Block (Henry Right) and closed custody women were moved to H-Block (Henry Left). See id. at 5. Defendants outlined their reasoning for this decision in their submissions to the Court, which included the safety and security of the female inmates and corrections staff. See id. at 5. For example, leaving the female inmate population in the pod units (which, at the time of the move was approximately ten general custody and fifteen closed custody women) would have presented difficulties monitoring fewer inmates in a larger space, which could "create an
6(...continued)
parties to ensure that discovery is completed in this case in an expedient manner. 7 Plaintiffs argue that Defendants' decisions are "based on economic concerns born out of
a desire to benefit [Defendants] economically rather than out of a concern for what was in their best interests. Even assuming this is true, it does not raise an inference of discrimination on the basis of gender." Roubideaux v. North Dakota Dep't of Corrs. and Rehab., 570 F.3d 966, 974 (8th Cir. 2009).
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environment where inmates are able to evade effective observation by the corrections staff." Id. There is no evidence to suggest, at this time, that any resulting differences in the move of female inmates to comply with the Commission of Correction are caused by gender discrimination. While the housing conditions that female inmates are currently held in, based on the information currently before the Court, is not exactly the same to that of the male inmates, "Defendants have supported this disparate treatment by providing the court with evidence that important governmental objectives justify the difference in treatment, i.e., security and safety concerns." McCoy v. Nevada Dep't of Prisons, 776 F. Supp. 521, 527–28 (D. Nev. 1991).
After considering all of the arguments and evidence in the record, at this time, before discovery, the Court cannot agree that Plaintiffs are substantially likely to succeed on the merits of their claims based on the heightened burden required for a mandatory preliminary injunction. Therefore, the Court denies Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction.
3. Balance of Equities and Public Interest Where the plaintiffs seek a mandatory injunction against prison officials, the court must determine whether the equities tip in the plaintiffs' favor. See Burroughs v. County of Nassau, No. 13-cv-6784, 2014 WL 2587580, *14 (E.D.N.Y. June 9, 2014). Here, the balance of equities and public interest weigh decidedly against granting preliminary injunctive relief. As noted, the Supreme Court has found that "federal courts ought to afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials trying to manage a volatile environment ... especially ... in the fine-tuning of the ordinary incidents of prison life[.]" Sandin, 515 U.S. at 482. Prison administration is an onerous and difficult task and courts have traditionally accorded a large degree of deference in cases involving the administration of state penal institutions. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 85. The Court must balance the state's interest in providing
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inmates with appropriate housing and amenities and the safety of prisoners and staff against Plaintiffs' interest in receiving the requested relief. See Washington, 494 U.S. at 225. Given the deference afforded to prison officials and the general reluctance that federal courts should exhibit, the Court finds that the equities do not weigh in Plaintiffs' favor. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 540 n.23, 548 n.29 (1979) (explaining that maintaining security and order and operating institution in manageable fashion are considerations peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of corrections officials). The public's interest is better served by not presently interfering with penal administration. See Williams v. Gage, No. 14-cv-453, 2014 WL 6387348, *2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 14, 2014); Burroughs, 2014 WL 2587580, at *14; Lewis v. Allen, No. 3:10-cv-83, 2011 WL 7116310, *5 (D. Nev. Dec. 2, 2011).
The decision of a federal court to interfere in the daily operations of a local jail should not be made lightly. At this stage, the Court is unwilling to undertake this disfavored activity. Accordingly, the Court finds that the equities and public interest weigh decidedly against granting the requested injunctive relief.8
IV. CONCLUSION After careful review of the record, the parties' arguments, and the applicable law, the Court hereby ORDERS that Plaintiffs' motion for class certification (Dkt. No. 10) is GRANTED; and the Court further ORDERS that Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction (Dkt. No. 18) is DENIED; and the Court further
8 This result is further supported by the fact that staff at the Oneida County Jail have responded to many of the complaints raised by Plaintiffs by providing them with additional benefits and privileges, considerably in line with those provided to the male inmates.
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Case 9:20-cv-00537-MAD-DJS Document 28 Filed 08/03/20 Page 27 of 27 ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision
and Order on all parties in accordance with the Local Rules. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: August 3, 2020
Albany, New York
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