UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MAINE

GEOFFREY V. V. WOOD, Plaintiff,

VS.
HANCOCK COUNTY, WILLIAM CLARK, SHERIFF, and LINDA HANNAN, JAIL ADMINISTRATOR,

Case no. CV-02-

Defendants.

COMPLAINT

Geoffrey V. V. Wood is an individual residing in Bar Harbor, Hancock County, Maine.

2. Hancock County is a political subdivision of the State of Maine

William Clark is the Sheriff of Hancock County, Maine, at all times relevant to this Complaint acting under color of State and County law.

° Linda Hannan is the Jail Administrator for the Hancock County Jail, at all times relevant to this Complaint acting under color of State and County law.

5. A jury trial is demanded.
o On May 27, 2001, the Plaintiff was arrested by the Mount Desert police, "patted down," and taken to the Hancock County Jail for booking.
o During the booking process, the Plaintiff asked for the assistance of an attorney to obtain advice regarding the paperwork he was being required to sign. The Plaintiff at no time became belligerent.
In response to Plaintiff’s requests for the right to consult with an attorney, jail personnel stated that "This can be done the hard way" while slowly donning rubber gloves and glaring at him in an intimidating manner.

The Plaintiff was escorted to the shower, stripped of his clothing, and required to shower while jail personnel surveilled him.
10. After the shower, the Plaintiff was subjected to a search of his person, including a visual body cavity search in which he was required to bend over and spread his buttocks apart so that the jail personnel could inspect his body.
11. The Plaintiff was released from the jail at 4:30 am on May 28, 2001.
12. The Plaintiff was extremely intimidated and humiliated by this process.
13. On July 10, 2001, in a separate incident, the Plaintiff was again arrested and brought to the Hancock County Jail after being "patted down."
14. After booking, the Plaintiff was subjected to a clothing search, and a shower during which he was surveilled, but not subjected to a visual body cavity search.
15. On July 11,2001, the Plaintiff was visited by his attorney at the jail at approximately 8:30 am, for a 5 - 10 minute meeting. The Plaintiff was not subjected to a strip search, clothing search, or visual body cavity search either before or after this meeting.
16. Approximately thirty minutes later, Plaintiff’s attorney returned to the jail to meet with the Plaintiff for another fifteen minutes. Plaintiff’s attorney was searched by way of a detection wand upon entry to the jail, and brought with her only a legal pad and a pen.
17. After the meeting was concluded and the Plaintiff and his attorney were leaving the visiting area, a member of the jail personnel informed the Plaintiff that he was to be strip searched prior to returning to the general jail population. The Plaintiff was then strip searched and subjected to a visual body cavity search.
18. Defendant Linda Hannan and Defendant William Clark have both stated that there is a "confidential" official jail policy to strip search anyone placed in the jail after any contact visit, and that this policy is exempt from the Freedom of Access laws.
19. Both strip searches were conducted in violation of the "Minimum Standards" of the State of Maine Department of Corrections standards for small jails and the State of Maine Attorney General’s standards.

20. In further violation of the above described standards, there is no record of the strip search or booking that occurred on May 27, 2001, or of the visual body cavity strip search that occurred on July 11,2001.

Count I: Violation of 42 U.S.C. ~ 1983

21. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 - 20 as if set forth fully herein.

22. The Plaintiff was strip searched and subjected to a visual body cavity search without a reasonable suspicion that he was in possession of contraband, or had violated any rule or law, in violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches of his person.

23. Defendants’ conduct deprived Plaintiff of his constitutional rights as stated in paragraph 22, above.

24. PlaintifFs right to be free from such unreasonable searches was a clearly defined right under the United States Constitution, and the laws of the United States and the State of Maine, including case law. Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

25. The May 27, 2001 strip search and visual body cavity search was further performed as direct retaliation for Plaintiff’s request to consult with an attorney in regard to his arrest, in violation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

26. The Plaintiff suffered intimidation, degradation, humiliation, and a loss of dignity as a result of the above described strip searches.

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff demands judgment in an amount to be proven at trial, compensatory damages, punitive damages, for his attorney’s fees, costs, interest, and for such other and further relief as may be just in the premises.

Date: t~ _~ ~- 0~---

~~.Y~ ~YKSandra Hylander Collier, ~ Attorney at Law 121 Main Street, PO Box 1391 Ellsworth, Maine 04605 207/667-6417

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT District of Maine

GEOFFREY V.V. WOOD, Plaintiff
go
HANCOCK COUNTY, WILLIAM CLARK, SHERIFF, and LINDA HANNAN, JAIL ADMINISTRATOR,
Defendants

DEFENDANTS’ ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES TO PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

NOW COME Defendants, by and through undersigned counsel, and hereby respond to the allegations contained in Plaintiff’s Complaint as follows:
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
A. Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a proper cause of action against any of the named Defendants.
B. To the extent that Defendants Clark and Hannan are sued in their individual capacities, said Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
C. Plaintiff’s Complaint is barred because Plaintiff has failed to avail himself of, and/or to exhaust, available state remedies, including administrative remedies.
D. Plaintiff has failed to mitigate his damages as required by law.
ANSWER
1. Defendants are without sufficient knowledge or information so as to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in Paragraph 1 of Plaintiff’s Complaint and therefore-deny same.
2. Defendants admit the allegations contained in Paragraph 2 of Plaintiffs Complaint.
3. Defendants admit that William Clark is currently the SheriffofHancock County, but are without sufficient knowledge or information so as to determine whether "at all times relevant" said

Defendant was acting under color of state law. That allegation is therefore denied. Finally, the Defendants are uncertain as to what "county law" Plaintiff refers to in his Complaint, and this allegation is therefore denied.
4. Defendants admit that Linda Hannan is currently the Jail Administrator for the Hancock County Jail, but are without sufficient knowledge or information so as to determine whether "at all times relevant" said Defendant was acting under color of state law. That allegation is therefore denied. Finally, the Defendants are uncertain as to what "county law" Plaintiff refers to in his Complaint, and this allegation is therefore denied.
5. Paragraph 5 of Plaintiff’s Complaint does not require a response.
6. Defendants, upon information and belief, admit that Plaintiff was arrested on or about May 27, 2001, and taken to the Hancock County Jail. Defendants are without sufficient knowledge or information so as to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 6 of Plaintiff’s Complaint and therefore deny ~ame.
7. Defendants are without sufficient knowledge or information so as to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in Paragraph 7 of Plaintiff’s Complaint and therefore deny same.
8. Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 8 of Plaintiff’ s Complaint.
9. Defendants admit that Plaintiff was required to take a shower before being placed into the general population of the Hancock County Jail, but are without sufficient knowledge or information so as to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations contained in Paragraph 9 of Plaintiff’ s Complaint, and those allegations are therefore denied.
10. The allegations contained in Paragraph 10 of Plaintiff’s Complaint are denied.
11. The allegations contained in Paragraph 11 of Plaintiffs Complaint are admitted, with the exception that the time at which Plaintiff was released may not have been precisely 4:30 a.m.
12. Defendants are without sufficient knowledge or information so as to form a belief as to the truth of Plaintiff’s allegations as to his state of mind and therefore deny same. To the extent that "this process", as that phrase is used in Paragraph 12 of Plaintiff’s Complaint, attempts to repeat or reassert prior allegations, Defendants, by reference, repeat and reassert each and every prior response to the allegations contained in Plaintiff’s Complaint.
13. Defendants admit that Plaintiff was again brought to the Hancock County Jail on or about July 10,2001, after having been arrested, but are without sufficient knowledge or information so as to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 13 of Plaintiff’s Complaint and therefore deny same.

14. Defendants admit the allegations contained in Paragraph 14 of Plaintiff’s Complaint, with the exception of the allegation that the Plaintiff was "surveilled" during his intake shower. Defendants are without sufficient knowledge or information so as to form a belief as to the truth of that specific allegation and therefore deny same.
15. Although Defendants generally believe the allegations contained in Paragraph 15 of Plaintiff’s Complaint to be true, they are without sufficient specific knowledge or information so as to form a belief as to the truth of those allegations and therefore deny same.
16. Although Defendants generally believe the allegations contained in Paragraph 16 of Plaintiff’ s Complaint to be true, they are without sufficient specific knowledge or information so as to form a belief as to the truth of those allegations and therefore deny same.
17. Defendants are without sufficient knowledge or information so as to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in Paragraph 17 of Plaintiff’s Complaint and therefore deny same.
18. Defendants deny that either Defendant Hannan or Defendant Clark have ever stated that there is a "confidential" official jail policy and that such a policy is exempt from Freedom of Access laws. These Defendants further and specifically aver that any statements made have been made in writing and that Plaintiff’s counsel is in possession of such writings. Such writings speak for themselves. Further, official jail policies are set forth in writing, and those policies speak for themselves. To the extent that any of the allegations contained in Paragraph 18 of Plaintiff’s Complaint deviate from the official jail policies or the written correspondence from Sheriff Clark, such allegations are denied.
19. Defendants deny that any searches of the Plaintiff were in violation of the standards referred to in Paragraph 19 of Plaintiff’s Complaint.
20. Defendants deny that there is no record of the clothing search or booking that occurred on May 27, 2001, and further and specifically deny that a strip search occurred on said date. Defendants are without sufficient knowledge or information so as to form a belief as to whether a "visual body cavity strip search" occurred on July 11,2001, but admit that if such a search occurred, it should have been documented as required by state statute and/or regulation and that no such documentation can be located at the present time.
Count I
21. Defendants repeat and reassert each and every response provided to the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 20 of Plaintiff’s Complaint as if fully set forth herein.

4
22. Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 22 of Plaintiff’ s Complaint and further and specifically aver that, if a visual body cavity search was conducted, it was conducted in compliance with all applicable laws.
23. Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 23 of Plaintiff’s Complaint.
24. The allegations contained in Paragraph 24 of Plaintiff’s Complaint state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent that a response is required, Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 24 of Plaintiff’s Complaint.
25. Defendants deny that any searches of the PlaintifFs person were performed in retaliation against Plaintiff for any reason, and therefore deny each and every- allegation contained in Paragraph 25 of PlaintifFs Complaint.
26. Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 26 of Plaintiff’s Complaint.
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray for judgment in their, favor against Plaintiff on PlaintifFs Complaint, plus their costs and interest thereon as permitted ,b,y law.

Dated: May 21, 2002

I // // Peter T-~’lkTfarchesi, Esq. Wheeler & Arey, P.A. Attorney for Defendants 27 Temple Street, P.O. Box 376 Waterville, ME 04903-0376

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT District of Maine

GEOFFREY V.V. WOOD, Plaintiff
go
HANCOCK COUNTY, WILLIAM CLARK, SHERIFF, and LINDA HANNAN, JAIL ADMINISTRATOR,
Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Peter T. Marchesi, Esq., attorney for Defendants hereby certify that Defendants’ Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint has been served this day on Plaintiff by mailing a copy thereof via United States Postal Service, postage prepared, to Plaintiff’s attorney, Sandra Hylander Collier, 121 Main Street, P.O. Box 1391, Ellsworth, ME 04605.

Dated: May 21, 2002
CC: Malcolm Ulmer Linda Hannan, Jail Administrator Sheriff William Clark

Pet~r.-’~’. Marchesi, Esq. Wheeler & Arey, P.A. Attorney for Defendants 27 Temple Street, P.O. Box 376 Waterville, ME 04903-0376

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MAINE

GEOFFREY V.V. WOOD,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

)

)

HANCOCK COUNTY et al.,

)

,)

Defendants.

)

VERDICT FORM

1. Was the Plaintiff strip searched on May 27, 2001 as a result of widespread Hancock County practice or custom?

Yes

No X

[If your answer to question 1 is "yes," proceed to question 2. If your answer to question 1 is "no," skip to question 3.]

2. What damages, if any, did the Plaintiff sustain as a result of the strip search on May 27, 2001?

$

(at least $1.00)

3. Was the Plaintiff strip searched on July 1 O, 2001 as a result of widespread Hancock County practice or custom?

Yes

No ~

[If your answer to question 3 is "yes," proceed to question 4. If your answer to question 3 is "no," skip to question 5.]

What damages, if.any, did the Plaintiff sustain as a result of the strip search on July 10, 2001?.

$

(at least $1.00)

Was the Plaintiff unreasonably strip searched following a contact visit on July 11, 2001?

Yes

No ,~

[If your answer to question 5 is "yes," proceed to question 6. If your answer to question 5 is "no," do not answer question 6.]

6. What damages, if any, did the Plaintiff sustain as a result of the strip search on July 11, 2001?

$

(at least $1.00)

Dated: ~]/~,~~ 9. ~ ¢ ~-0,~ 3

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT District of Maine

GEOFFREY V.V. WOOD, Plaimiff
VS.
. HANCOCK COUNTY, WILLIAM CLARK, SHERIFF, and LINDA HANNAN, JAIL ADMINISTRATOR,
Defendants

Docket No.: CV-02-69-B-S

STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL

NOW COME the parties, by and through their undersigned respective counsel, and hereby stipulate that the above entitled matter may be dismissed with prejudice, and without costs or interest to any party.

Dated: ~/~/~ ?" Dated:

Sandra Hyland~er Collier, Esq. Attorney for Plaintiff
~, Maine 04605
P~ Ix 1391
Pete r’~T. Marchesi, Esq. Attorney for Defendants P.O. Box 376 Waterville, Maine 04903-0376

 
 245 F.Supp.2d 231 (2003)
Geoffrey V.V. WOOD, Plaintiff v.
HANCOCK COUNTY, et al., Defendants
No. Civ.02-69-B-S.
United States District Court, D. Maine.
February 12, 2003.
232 *232 Sandra Hylander Collier, Ellsworth, ME, for Geoffrey V.V. Wood.
Peter T. Marchesi, Wheeler & Arey, P.A., Waterville., ME, for County of Hancock, Hancock County Sheriff, Linda Hannan.
ORDER AFFIRMING THE RECOMMENDED DECISION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SINGAL, District Judge.
The United States Magistrate Judge filed with the Court on January 7, 2003 her Recommended Decision. Defendants filed their objections to the Recommended Decision on January 29, 2003. Plaintiff responded to Defendants' objections on February 10, 2003. I have reviewed and considered the Magistrate Judge's Recommended Decision, together with the entire record; I have made a de novo determination of all matters adjudicated by the Magistrate Judge's Recommended Decision; and I concur with the recommendations of the United States Magistrate Judge for the reasons set forth in her Recommended Decision, and determine that no further proceeding is necessary.
1. It is therefore ORDERED that the Recommended Decision of the Magistrate Judge is hereby AFFIRMED.
2. It is further ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
3. It is further ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED.
RECOMMENDED DECISION ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
KRAVCHUK, United States Magistrate Judge.
Geoffrey Wood was taken into custody at the Hancock County Jail on May 27, 2001, and July 10, 2001, on domestic assault related charges. In this civil rights action he asserts that he was subjected to strip searches during his two detentions in contravention of his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,[1] and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. (Docket No. 1.) Wood seeks remedy from Hancock County as well as Hancock County Sheriff William Clark and Hancock County Jail Administrator Linda Hannan in their official capacity on the theory that the impermissible searches were the result of a policy or custom of which the defendants knew or should have known. Before me is the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings or, in the alternative, summary judgment (Docket Nos. 6 & 7), to which Wood has responded (Docket Nos. 14 & 15). I also address the defendants' motion to strike certain paragraphs of Wood's statements of material fact and one 233 paragraph of Wood's affidavit. (Docket No. 21.) Though I agree with some of the points *233 raised in the defendants' motion to strike, I conclude that it is unnecessary to strike any portions of Wood's pleadings and therefore DENY the motion. I have addressed the pertinent issues raised by the motion to strike while discussing

the summary judgment motion. Based on the reasons offered below I recommend that the Court DENY the motion for summary judgment.
Discussion
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
The defendants seek dismissal of the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) for failure to state a claim. I conclude that the defendants are not entitled to judgment on the pleadings. The allegations of Wood's complaint are sufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See generally Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512-13, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002). I recommend that the court DENY the motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Summary Judgment Standard
The defendants are entitled to summary judgment only if, "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits... show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact," Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c), and they are "entitled to a judgment as a matter of law," id. For his part, Wood "has a threshold burden to `set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Quaker State Oil Refining Corp. v. Garrity Oil Co., Inc., 884 F.2d 1510, 1512 (1st Cir.1989) (quoting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)). See also D. Me. Loc. R. Civ. P. 56(c),(e). In evaluating whether a genuine issue is raised, I view all facts in the light most favorable to Wood and give him, as nonmovant the benefit of all reasonable inferences in his favor. Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir.2000).
Material Facts
A. The Showers and Searches
Wood was arrested on May 27, 2001, for domestic assault and brought to the Hancock County Jail. When he arrived at the jail Wood was pat searched pursuant to Hancock County Jail Policies and Procedure number D-220(B)(1). Wood was denied bail until the following morning.
As part of the admissions process Wood was directed to strip naked in front of two corrections officers, shower behind a clear plastic curtain while being watched by the two officers, open his mouth and lift his tongue, lift his arms and expose his armpits, run his fingers through his hair, turn around, bend over, and spread his buttocks. (Wood Aff. ¶¶ 5,6,7; Wood Dep. at 57-67.) For purposes of this motion the defendants do not contest that Wood was intimidated by the corrections officers; one of them indicated that the shower and search could be done "the easy way or the hard way." The room in which the strip and inspection occurred has a window so that Wood was visible to anyone walking by, though there is no indication in this record that any one did see Wood at this time. Wood was told by one of the officers involved in the search that the search was "routine procedure."[2] The jail's 234 record *234 for this May 27, 2001, booking indicates only that Wood was subjected to a clothing search by corrections officer Chris Rivers and that he was included in the medium security classification.
On July 20, 2001, Wood was arrested and booked at the Hancock County Jail for violation of a protection order and bail conditions that arose from his May 27, 2001, domestic assault arrest. At this point he was pat searched and denied bail until the following afternoon. He was booked and housed within the general population at the jail.
Once again, after the booking, Wood was required to strip naked, take a shower during which he was not watched, open his mouth and lift his tongue, raise his arms and expose his armpits, run his fingers through his hair, and turnaround.[3] He was not required to bend over and spread his buttocks. The jail record for the July 10 booking indicates that Wood was subjected to a clothing search by corrections officer Chad Wilmot. Wood was classified as minimum security.

On July 11, 2001, Wood was allowed two contact visits with his attorney. He was not given a choice as to whether or not he would visit with this attorney or whether or not the visit would be a contact or noncontact visit. After the second contact visit Wood was required to under go a strip search, which, according to Wood, included being stripped naked in front of a corrections officer, opening his mouth and lifting his tongue, raising his arms and exposing his armpits, running his fingers through his hair, turning around, bending over and spreading his buttocks.[4]
B. Policies, Procedures, and Training

Per jail policy, all arrestees unable to be released on bail are required to shower as part of the admissions process, a process which includes disrobing and showering in the presence of a corrections officer. Policy C-120 is entitled "Strip Search/Documentation/Showers." It provides:

1. In order to ensure the health, safety and security of the inmates and staff, each inmate being assigned to a housing unit will be required to shower as part of the admissions process. Inmates will disrobe and shower while in the presence of the Corrections Officer (same sex) in the shower room located in the medical room.

2. The Corrections Officer will conduct a search of the inmate[`]s clothing and personal effects for contraband and vermin as the inmate prepares to shower....

3. Each inmate may be subject to a strip search as part of the admission process according to

Policy D-220: Search Procedures. Searches completed as part of the admissions process will be

235

documented in the inmates booking *235 noting the type and by whom the search was done.

(Hannan Dep. Ex. 4.)

The strip search policy for the Hancock County Jail vis-a-vis pre-trial detainees/arrestees charged with misdemeanors is set forth in "Policy D-220":

Jail Staff will conduct searches in the least degrading manner possible. At no time are searches to be used to intimidate, degrade, harass or punish any person.

.....

At the time of arrest or initial admission to the facility, a pre-trial inmate charged with a misdemeanor offense shall not be subjected to a strip search, unless the officer has a reasonable suspicion to believe that an inmate is concealing contraband and is about to come into contact with inmates of the facility. If an inmate charged with a misdemeanor crime is subjected to a strip search upon initial admission, documentation will be made ...

.....

Strip searches shall be conducted in private only by and in the presence of [ ] the minimum number of officers of the same sex as the inmate [ ] which are necessary to accomplish the search and to maintain security and protection.

(Clark Aff. Ex. A.)

Policy Number D-220 describes a strip search as: "A visual search of an inmate which requires the removal of all clothing, to include a search of the clothes removed." (Hannan Dep. Ex. at 1.) The policy provides:

Once the inmate has removed all their clothing and handed it to the officer, the officer shall conduct a visual search of the inmate to include having the inmate shake out their hair, check inside the mouth, ears, nose, their arm pits, bottoms of their feet, under the scrotum (where

applicable), lift breast (where applicable) and finally have the inmate bend over, spread their butt cheeks and cough. In addition, the inmate's clothing and footwear shall be searched.
(Id. at 2.) Thus, a strip search includes a visual body cavity search.
Wood contends that his post-arrest shower cum searches were pursuant to policy (PSMF ¶ 19) but the defendants contend that this search, if it did occur, was not undertaken pursuant to a jail policy or procedure (Defs' Resp. SMF ¶ 19; Hannan Aff. ¶ 2; Clark Aff. ¶ 2).
All jail staff members are trained at the beginning of their employment in the policy for searches of misdemeanant pre-trial detainees and arrestees. The defendants state that periodic updates of this training are provided during the course of employment. (Hannan Aff. ¶ 3; Clark Aff. ¶ 3.) The parties agree that after one forty-hour week of instruction the corrections officers are expected to be familiar with the circumstances under which strip searches could be performed on inmates at the jail. No instructions or directives are given to jail staff regarding strip searches of misdemeanor pre-trial detainees and arrestees that are in any way inconsistent with the contents of Policy D-220.
Hannan and Clark are the final decision and policymaking authorities for all day-today operations at the Hancock County Jail. Hannan wrote the Hancock County Policies and Procedures which were approved by Clark, as 236 sheriff.[5] Hannan was *236 present at the jail from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 or 7:00 p.m. Monday through Friday and occasional weekends. She covered several different positions. Neither Hannan nor Clark was involved in the alleged May 27, 2001, strip search as participants or directors or supervisors. Hannan and Clark assert that they were unaware of any deviation from the established policy with the sole exception of Wood's allegation with respect to the alleged May 27, 2001, strip search. (Hannan Aff. ¶ 5; Clark Aff. ¶ 5.) They had no passive knowledge of the May 27, 2001, search at the time of the search. They first became aware of the search in the late summer/early fall of 2001, as a consequence of communications with Wood's counsel.[6]
A "contact visit" is a visit during which "any"[7] physical contact between the inmate and the visitor is permitted.[8] The Hancock County Jail has a policy that requires strip searches following contact visits and this policy is specifically set forth in the Hancock County Jail Policy and Procedure Manual in the form of Policy No. F-150. All civilians, including attorneys, are subject to electronic search and must leave their property in a locker prior to entering the Hancock County Jail. The room in which the inmates are allowed contact visits has windows on two sides so that visits can be monitored by jail staff. According to policy, jail staff members are required to monitor visits, including visits with attorneys, in a manner that reasonably insures the privacy of both the inmate and the visitor without compromising the safety and security of the facility. However, the jail does not visually monitor visits between an inmate and his or her attorney and, because of staff shortages, cannot visually monitor every contact visit.
The reason that a strip and visual body cavity search follows contact visits is to protect and maintain institutional security at the jail and to provide a safe environment for inmates and jail staff.[9] One concern behind the policy is to prevent the admission of contraband into the jail. Hannan considers any item not provided to an inmate through the jail to be contraband, regardless of the list of allowed items in the inmate handbook. As jail administrator Hannan has had no personal experience with contraband being brought into the jail and transferred 237 to inmates by *237 individuals other than family members and friends. Hannan describes only two occasions in the State of Maine in which there was an attempt to introduce contraband into a county jail in a body cavity.
There are no jail records for May 27 through 28 nor July 10 through 11 that indicate that Wood was searched. There is no evidence that any jail employee harbored an individual reasonable suspicion that Wood was concealing contraband at the time of his May and July detentions.
Each inmate receives the inmate handbook when booked.[10] Wood acknowledged receiving, reading, and understanding all the rules and regulations in the inmate handbook at the time of his May 27, 2001, and his July 10, 2001, admissions. (DSMF Exs. C & D.) Wood states that he signed the form which included the acknowledgment that he read the inmate handbook with a corrections officer and was required to do so as part of the booking process. However, he did not receive or review the handbook, with or without a corrections officer,

until after he signed the form. (Wood Aff. ¶ 16.) It is standard procedure that an arrestee does not have an opportunity to look at the inmate handbook until after they have been placed in their housing cell and no one from the jail goes over the handbook with the arrestee. (Hannan Dep. p. 14, lines 23-25; p. 15, lines 1-14.)
The Constitutionality of the Strip Searches

With respect to the July search triggered by the contact visit Wood is attacking the official policy promulgated by Hannan and approved by Clark. "Local governing bodies ... can be sued directly under [42 U.S.C] § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where, as here, the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers." Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (footnote omitted). With regards to the alleged searches in May and July that occurred after Wood's arrest, Wood precedes on a theory that these searches were made pursuant to a "custom" that was not formalized as a policy. Id. at 690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018 ("[Although the touchstone of the § 1983 action against a government body is an allegation that official policy is responsible for a deprivation of rights protected by the Constitution, local governments, like every other § 1983 `person,' by the very terms of the statute, may be sued for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental `custom' even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body's official decisionmaking channels."). Because Wood is suing Hannan and Clark in their official capacities the suit against them is identical to the suit against Hancock County. Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 105 S.Ct. 873, 83 L.Ed.2d 878 (1985); see also Wilson v. Brown, 889 F.2d 1195, 1197 (1st Cir.1989) ("Obviously, state officials literally are persons. But a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office," citing Brandon).

Wood must meet two requirements to maintain a § 1983[11] claim of an unconstitutional municipal custom or practice:

238

*238 First, the custom or practice must be attributable to the municipality, i.e., it must be "so well

settled and widespread that the policymaking officials of the municipality can be said to have

either actual or constructive knowledge of it yet did nothing to end the practice." Bordanaro v.

McLeod, 871 F.2d 1151, 1156 (1st Cir.1989). Second, the custom must have been the cause of

and "the moving force" behind the deprivation of constitutional rights. Id. at 1157.

Miller v. Kennebec County, 219 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir.2000). This dispute does not generate a concern about the second part of this inquiry, in that if there is a custom or practice that calls for impermissible strip searches, then the custom must have been the cause of and "the moving force" behind the deprivation of constitutional rights. See id. at 13.

A. The Post-contact-visit Searches

Unquestionably the United States Supreme Court's decision Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) is the jumping off point for the Fourth Amendment analysis of the postcontact-visit search policy. Rejecting the lower court's insistence on a showing of probable cause, the majority concluded in Wolfish that a policy common to all Bureau of Prison facilities requiring strip searches with visual body cavity inspections after every contact visit did not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches. 441 U.S. at 558-60, 99 S.Ct. 1861. The defendants assert that the Hancock County Jail's policy of strip searching inmates after a contact visit is per se constitutional under Wolfish.
The First Circuit has addressed strip search policies in a series of cases post-Wolfish and in doing so has made it clear that it reads Wolfish to require an application of a balancing test on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., Roberts v. Rhode Island, 239 F.3d 107, 109-13 (1st Cir.2001); Miller, 219 F.3d at 12-13;[12]Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1, 5-9 (1st Cir.1997); Arruda v. Fair, 710 F.2d 886, 886-88 (1st Cir.1983); see also Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1272 (7th Cir.1983) ("We have observed previously that the balancing test prescribed in

Wolfish does not validate strip searches in detention settings per se. Although the majority in Wolfish did uphold the strip searches conducted there on less than probable cause, the detainees were awaiting trial on serious federal charges after having failed to make bond and were being searched after contact visits," citations omitted.).
In Wolfish the Court explained the balancing test as follows:
The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application. In each case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in 239 which it is conducted, *239 the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.
441 U.S. at 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861.
Blinded by their assumption that the jail's post-contact visit strip search policy is per se constitutional under Wolfish, the defendants have not set forth sufficient facts pursuant to which I can recommend granting judgment in their favor. They state that the policy is aimed at protecting and maintaining institutional security at the jail and providing a safe environment for inmates and jail staff. They also state that one concern behind the policy is to prevent the admission of contraband into the jail.
However, there is no evidence before me about the inmate population at the Hancock County Jail, see, e.g., Arruda, 710 F.2d at 887 (emphasizing the relative security needs of the institution, noting that the institution before it was a maximum security facility); the facility's experience with contraband being passed during contact visits in general, compare Roberts, 239 F.3d at 112 & n. 6 (finding evidence of a history of contraband problems but a lack of a record of instances where a body cavity search was necessary to discover the contraband) with Arruda, 710 F.2d at 888 (noting that the record demonstrated a lengthy history of contraband problems in the institution), let alone contact visits with attorneys; how the facility is structured in terms of the intermingling of inmates and the ease of passing contraband after a contact visit and whether Wood, in particular, was housed in a volatile area with access to other inmates, compare Roberts, 239 F.3d at 111 (emphasizing that the plaintiff, while housed in a maximum security facility, was not himself particularly dangerous in holding that the policy requiring a strip/body cavity search of all inmates upon admission did not pass constitutional muster) with Arruda, 710 F.2d at 887-88 (upholding constitutionality of post-contact-visit strip policy as applied to a plaintiff in a special security area0907"a prison within a prison"0907designed to hold the most dangerous inmates); what types of contraband might be smuggled and hidden in the various areas of the bodies that are searched, Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (noting that inmate attempts to secrete money, drugs, weapons, and other contraband were documented in the record before it). There is evidence that Hannan knows of only two incidents in the entire State involving the smuggling of contraband in body cavities. Also, the jail performs a security check of the incoming visitors and the contact visits at the jail can be monitored if staff were committed to that practice; these alternatives to the strip search practice may well come into play in making the reasonableness determination. See Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 559 n. 40, 99 S.Ct. 1861 ("assuming" without deciding "that the existence of less intrusive alternatives is relevant to the determination of the reasonableness of the particular search method at issue"); Roberts, 239 F.3d at 112 (noting that there were less invasive, less constitutionally problematic ways to conduct searches than via strip/ body cavity procedure). Additionally, it is uncontroverted on this record that Wood was not given the choice of having a noncontact-visit with his attorney.
I conclude that the defendants have not generated a summary judgment record sufficient to undertake the analysis of the post-contact-visit strip search policy under Wolfish and the First Circuit's post-Wolfish precedents on point. I am cognizant that the First Circuit has commended a thoroughgoing factual inquiry in making a reasonableness determination vis-à-vis post-contact visit strip searches. See Arruda, 710 F.2d at 886, 888. 240 Therefore I conclude that the defendants are not entitled *240 to judgment at this juncture and recommend that the Court DENY them summary judgment on this ground.

B. The Searches Incident to the Arrests
Much of the discussion above is applicable to the question of the constitutionality of strip and body cavity searches following an arrest. In brief, it is clear that a strip and visual body cavity search of an arrestee comports with the Fourth Amendment only if it is "justified by at least a reasonable suspicion that the arrestee is concealing contraband or weapons." Swain, 117 F.3d at 5, 7. These searches cannot be used as a device to humiliate, degrade, or retaliate against an arrestee. Id. at 8-9.
The defendants do not challenge this proposition or suggest that there was reasonable suspicion vis-a-vis Wood at the time of his two admissions to the jail. With respect to Wood's alleged searches in the aftermath of his two bookings, the defendants argue that they were rogue events, to which they were not a party and which were not attributable to any policy or custom.
Not having named the individual officers involved in these searches as defendants Wood skates on thin ice with respect to carrying his summary judgment burden. Wilson v. Town of Mendon, 294 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir.2002) (concluding that "in principle" the failure to name the constitutional tortfeasor was not fatal to a § 1983 case against a municipality but warning that once the plaintiff chooses this strategy the plaintiff must live with the evidentiary consequences). For, Wood must demonstrate that there is a genuine dispute of facts material to his claim that there is a "custom" at the jail to strip search misdemeanant arrestees without a reasonable suspicion that the arrestee harbored contraband and that he was searched and his constitutional rights were violated by the nondefendant officers who conducted the search. And, to reiterate, this must be a custom "so well settled and widespread that the policymaking officials of the municipality," here Hannan and Clark, "can be said to have either actual or constructive knowledge of it yet did nothing to end the practice." Bordanaro, 871 F.2d at 1156.
Wood's evidence on this score is that three different corrections officers on two different occasions subjected him to a strip search and on one of these occasions subjected him to a visual body cavity search. Vis-à-vis the May search Wood claims one of the officers indicated that these searches were "routine practice"[13] and Wood was told by one of the officers that the shower and search could be done "the easy way or the hard way." Wood also points to the policies of the jail arguing that policy C120 required non-bailed arrestees to undergo a shower as part of the admission process and that the definition of the shower process is not much different from that of the strip search. He reports that on both occasions that he underwent the shower procedure he was subjected to a visual inspection of his body and the only difference between these procedures and a visual body cavity search is that during the latter the detainee must bend over and spread his or her buttocks.
241 *241 There is also evidence that Hannan was aware that the policies that she promulgated with respect to booking and searches were not being followed to the letter. She admits that arrestees are routinely told to sign the acknowledgement of, among other things, having read the handbook with a corrections officer before they received or read the handbook. She also admits that the fact that Wood was not searched after his first contact visit with his attorney was in contravention to the policy, as was the fact that they were not monitored. Furthermore, during one of Wood's post-admission procedures he was not monitored by the corrections officers, in contravention to the showering policy. Also implicit in this record is a noncompliance with the recording requirements for strip searches, as the defendants admit that the postarrest searches were something more than a clothing inspection but were recorded as limited to that procedure.
The First Circuit has at least twice indicated that a plaintiffs own experience of being strip searched is probative that there is an existent practice. Miller, 219 F.3d at 12 (emphasizing that the plaintiffs own experience being strip searched is undisputed by defendant/county on summary judgment, citing Bordanaro, 871 F.2d at 1156); Bordanaro, 871 F.2d at 1156 ("Additional support for the existence of such a practice can be inferred from the event itself."); but see Swain, 117 F.3d at 11 (addressing a failure to train claim brought by strip searched arrestees, observing that "absent prior claim, it cannot be reasonably inferred," that the defendant police chief, "knew, or should have known, that his officers were not executing that policy"). And though it is undisputed that no instructions or directives are given to jail staff regarding strip searches of misdemeanor pre-trial detainees and arrestees that are in any way inconsistent with the contents of Policy D-220, there is sufficient evidence to infer

that there may be a practice of strip searching these arrestees in conjunction with the admission shower that is done outside the letter of the policies. A jury could infer that the practice at the jail is to conflate the strip search procedure with the shower procedure and that this is such a wide-spread practice that Hannan and Clark knew or should have known that it was occurring. Therefore, I recommend that the Court DENY the defendant's motion as to the post-arrest strip search allegations.
Conclusion
As discussed above, I DENY the defendants' motion to strike. With respect to the defendants' motion for summary judgment I recommend that the Court DENY their motion for judgment on the pleadings and DENY their motion for summary judgment
NOTICE
A party may file objections to those specified portions of a magistrate judge's report or proposed findings or recommended decisions entered pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) for which de novo review by the district court is sought, together with a supporting memorandum, within ten (10) days of being served with a copy thereof. A responsive memorandum shall be filed within ten (10) days after the filing of the objection.
Failure to file a timely objection shall constitute a waiver of the right to de novo review by the district court and to appeal the district court's order.
January 7, 2003.
[1] Wood's claims under the Fifth and Sixth Amendment are not addressed by either side. I have analyzed the case as a Fourth/Fourteenth Amendment case, as have they.
[2] The defendants want the court to strike Wood's Statement of Material Fact ¶ 22 which states "The search" described in ¶ 21 is "routine procedure" and the supporting ¶ 8 in the Wood Affidavit which states: "Prior to this strip search, upon questioning the corrections officers as to why I had to submit to this search, they indicated that it was `routine procedure.'" I agree with defendants that the conclusory ¶ 22 in Wood's Statement of Material Fact finds slim support in ¶ 8 of the Wood affidavit, which contains a representation that is quit different from the version of the searching officers' conduct that was given during his deposition.Whether his affidavit is so inconsistent with his deposition testimony as to be stricken is debatable.However, since in the final analysis, I do not believe that whether or not an unidentified officer said that the search was "routine procedure" is dispositive of this motion, I have not stricken the affirmation.
[3] The defendants assert that this search is immaterial because Wood is challenging the search on July 11 not July 10. However, Wood did include this search in his complaint (Compl.¶ 14) and it is relevant to whether there was an unwritten policy and procedure to conduct strip searches on misdemeanor detainees.
[4] The defendants explain that by policy there should have been a strip search following the first visit with the attorney also and that Hannan "spoke with jail staff" after learning that there was no such search.
[5] Based on Hannan's deposition testimony, Wood complains that Hannan is unable to answer questions concerning what the policies applicable to strip searches state without consulting the written policies. (Hannan Dep. at 48-49.) Without providing record citation, the defendants retort that Hannan did not want to answer the question under oath without first looking up the policy. This peevish dispute is not determinative of this motion.
[6] One target of the defendants' motion to strike is Wood's attempt to qualify this assertion by stating that his attorney first learned of the May 27, 2001, related allegations via a July 20, 2001, Freedom of Access request. (PSMF Ex. A.) I fail to see the materiality of this qualification unless Wood is trying to argue that Hannan and/or Clark should have learned of the May 27, 2001 search at some earlier time based upon jail records provided by way of the Freedom of Access request. But the record does not reveal that the May 27 booking report contains any evidence of a strip search, so I remain unconvinced that this qualification serves any purpose.

[7] The defendants picked this term "any." I am sure there are some limitations on what type of contact is permitted.
[8] Wood asserts that a "contact visit" is a visit where there is no plexi-glass between the parties. However, I could not find adequate support for this qualification in the cited Hannan deposition exhibits. (Hannan Dep. Exs. 6 & 8.)
[9] Again, in his reply statement of facts Wood simply denies this statement without referring to any record citation. In his response to the motion to strike he states this denial is further amplified by his Statement of Material Fact H 42. That being the case I address the latter, this denial being redundant.
[10] In his reply statement of facts Wood simply denies this statement without referring to any record citation and in response to the motion to strike he provides no reason why his denial should be countenanced.
[11] Section 1983 of title 42 provides are relevant:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress[.]
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
[12] Miller does not directly mention Wolfish but analyzes strip searches to determine if they were "justified by a reasonable suspicion" under Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.1997), a case applying Wolfish.
[13] Again, this statement has been challenged by defendants as inconsistent with Wood's deposition testimony. Even if the statement were stricken, the facts and circumstances attendant to the two separate searches, when viewed in the light most favorable to Wood, could give rise to the inference that Hannan and Clark knew or should have known of the "custom" of subjecting all arrestees to strip searches without regard for reasonable suspicion standards.
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 446

1

(End of discussion at sidebar.)

2

THE COURT: Members of the jury, in terms of

3 scheduling, it’s entirely possible this case will go to you

4 tomorrow for deliberation. I’m not promising that. It’s

5 3ossible. So I’d like a11 of you to make arrangements so

6 hat you can stay later than 2:30 tomorrow if you have to

7 deliberate later than that. I don’t want to spring it on you

8 at the last minute and you haven’t had a chance to make

9 arrangements. So at this point, it appears the case will go

~ i0 to you tomorrow. Make your arrangements so that you’re able

Ii to stay here into the late afternoon, early evening if

12 necessary.

13

A11 right. Mr. Marchesi, call yOUF next witness.

14

MR. MARCHESI: Call Chad Wilmot, please.

15

THE CLERK: Do you solemnly swear that the

16 testimony you shall give in the matter now in hearing shall

17 be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so

18 help you God?

19

THE WITNESS: I d.o.

20

THE CLERK: Please be seated, state your name, and

21 spell your last name for the record.

22

THE WITNESS: Chad Wilmot, W-i-l-m-o-t.

23 CHAD WILMOT, having been duly sworn, was examined and

24 testified as follows:

25

DIRECT EXAMINATION

447

1 BY MR. MARCHESI:

2Q

Mr. Wilmot, how are you presently employed?

3A

With the Ellsworth Police Department.

4Q

And where was your prior employment?

5A

With the Hancock County Sheriff’s Department.

6Q

And what did you do for the sheriff’s department?

7A

Worked full-time corrections and part-time as a deputy

8 sheriff.

9Q

When did you start working there in corrections?

I0 A

February of 2000.

Ii Q

And had you worked in corrections before that?

12 A

No, I had not.

13 Q

Did you have some training when you started working

14 ithere?

15 A

From Lieutenant Terry Robertson, yes.

16 Q

Were you provided with the policies and procedures of

17 the Hancock County Jail?

18 A

Yes, I was.

19 Q

Were you expected to learn those and know those?

20 A

Yes.

21 Q

And were you also trained at the Maine Criminal Justice

22 Academy?

23 A

Yes, I was.

24

What was the training that you received there, sir?

25

I’m not sure if you’re -- as far as corrections?

448

1Q

Yes, sir.

2

It was the full-time academy for corrections.

3

And how lon£ was that? Do you remember?

4

Two weeks, I believe.

5

And did you successfully complete that course?

6

Yes, I did, number one in my class.

7

As far as the trainin£ that you £ot at the jail, did

8 some of that training deal with issues of searching people

9 who were being booked into jail?

i0 A Yes.

Ii Q Were there different types of searches that you were

12 trained in?

13 A

Yes.

14 Q

What were those?

15 A

Pat search, clothing search, and strip search.

~16 Q

What’s pat search?

17 A

Pat search is upon arrival at the facility it’s an

18 outer patting of the clothes to find any weapons or

19 contraband.

20 Q And what were you trained in terms of what a clothing

21 search is?

22 A A clothing search is strictly a search of the clothes

23 themselves.

24 Q And how do you conduct a clothing search based on your

25 training7

449

1A

Based on my training, we’d ask for the shirt, fully

2 inspect the shirt, ask for the shoes, fully inspect the

3 shoes, socks, pants, underwear, and then they would get into

4 the shower.

5Q

What is it that you are looking for when you’re doing

6 that search?

7A

Any type of. contraband hidden in the clothes.

8Q

Are you -- what ’- what are you searching to look for

9 the contraband?

i0 A

Searching clothes.

ii

And how long is the person fully disrobed in front of

12 you?

13 A

From the time that he takes his 1.ast piece of clothing

14 off until he steps into the shower, no more than a few

15 seconds.

16 Q

Do you recognize Defendants’ Exhibit 17

17 A

Yes.

18 Q

What is that, sir?

19 A

That’s the apron for the shower.

2O Q

The curtain?

21 A

Curtain.

22 Q

And was there ever a different curtain in the shower in

23 the nurse’s station in booking when you worked there?

24 A

Not to my recollection.

25 Q

When an inmate got in there behind that, could you see

450

their genitals while they were showering7

A

No.

Q

Did I ask you what a strip search was? I don’t believe

SO.

A

No, you didn’t.

6Q

Could you tell us what a strip search is, please?

7A

A strip search is after you’ve gone through all their

8 clothes, you do a physical search of the body by having them

9 run their hands through their hair, open their mouth, check

I0 their ears, have them lift their arms, and then have them

ii lift their genitals, and then bend over, spread their

12 buttocks, and cough.

13 Q

Now, does everybody who comes into the jail get pat-

14 searched?

15 A

Yes.

16 Q

Does everybody who comes into the jail get clothing-

17 searched?

18 A

If they’re going to remain there, yes.

19 Q

What do you mean by if they’re going to remain there?

20 A

Well, if they’re going to bail out, then normally we

21 have -- they just kept them in a secure holding cell in

22 booking. They were pat-searched and placed in there after

23 they were booked. If they were going to be bailing out, 24 they’d stay right there. If they were going to be spending 25 the night or waiting to go to court, then they would be

451

i clothing-searched and placed inside the facility.

2 Q And was everybody strip-searched7

3 A The only ones that were strip-searched upon entering

4 the facility would be people that were already sentenced, or

5 anybody that was believed to have contraband on them, or

6 anybody that was charged with a felony.

7 Q So if somebody was charged with a misdemeanor, did they

8 or didn’t they get strip-searched7

9 A No, they got clothing-searched.

I0 Q Would there be any time you would strip-search someone

Ii who was charged with a misdemeanor7

12 A If they had probable cause to believe that the inmate

13 was going to be carrying some sort of contraband into the

14 facility.

15 Q Okay. I’m going to show you some documents. I’m going

16 to give you --

17

MR. MARCHESI: Are Joint 7 and Defendants’ 20 here7

18

THE CLERK: What was the first one7

19

MR. MARCHESI: Joint 7.

20

THE CLERK: 277

21

MR. MARCHESI:

22

THE CLERK: 7. I’m sorry. No.

23

THE COURT: Joint 7 has not been admitted. That

24 was 7-A.

25

MR. MARCHESI: Okay. But 20 is, and Defendants’ 12

452

1 I don’t believe.

2

THE CLERK: It is.

3

MR. MARCHESI: It is. Okay.

4 BY MR. MARCHESI:

5Q

I’m going to show you Defendants’ Exhibit 12, which is

6 in evidence. Can you tell us what that document is?

7A

That’s the main booking sheet for Mr. Wood.

8Q

On what date?

9A

On -- I’m searching for it -- 7/10/01.

i0 Q

I show you Joint Exhibit 7. Can you tell us what that

Ii document is?

12 A

That would be the booking summary sheet for Mr. Wood on

13 that date.

14 Q

I’m going to show you Defendants’ Exhibit 20. Can you

15 tell me what that is?

16 A

That would be the booking log for that date.

17 Q

Can you tell by looking at that what shift that booking

18 log is for?

19 A This would be for the evening shift.

2O Q

Looking at Defendants’ Exhibit 12, do you see your name

21 on there?

22 A

Yes, I do.

23 Q

And who is the person that would normally fill that

24 document out?

25 A

The booking officer.

453

iQ

And looking at that document, can you tell who the

2 booking officer was at that time?

3 A That would have been myself.

4 Q And looking at Joint Exhibit 7, is that document from

5 the inmate file?

6A

Yes, it is.

7

Can you tell who filled that document out?

8A

I did.

9

MR. MARCHESI: I move for the admission of Joint 7,

i0 Your Honor.

ii

THE COURT: Any objection?

12

MS. COLLIER: Only a question, Your Honor. Is that

13 not the same as 7-A?

14

THE COURT: I think 7-A is the original?

15

MR. MARCHESI: That’s correct.

16

MS. COLLIER: It’s just a copy of the same thing.

17 No objection.

18

THE COURT: All right. It’s admitted without

19 objection.

2O BY MR. MARCHESI:

21 Q 22 A

You filled out Joint Exhibit 7? The computerized part of it?

23 Q

Yes.

Yes. The handwritten part, no.

25 Q

Okay. The handwritten part is dated, the following day;

454

is that right?

A Correct.

3 Q Can you tell by.looking at that document who booked Mr.

4 Wood into the jail on that date?

5 A I did.

6 Q Can you tell by looking at that document what type of

7 search you did?

8 A Clothing search.

9 Q There’s evidence in this case that you booked Mr. Wood

i0 in, and you made him go through the whole strip-search

ii procedure, except for bending over and exposing his buttocks.

12 Do you know whether or not you did that?

13 A No, I did not.

14 Q How do you know that?

15 A I do remember Mr. Wood coming in on the day that I

16 booked him. I do remember he had an attitude when he came

17 in. That’s mainly the reason I remember him. Every time he

18 did, he did have an attitude. But it was a normal -- normal

19 run of the things. I went through the procedure, did a
20 llclothing search on him, and put him inside.

21 Q You’re sure you didn’t do a strip search?

22 A

Positive.

23

MR. MARCHESI: That’s all I have. Thank you, Your

24 Honor.

25

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Ma-rchesi. Cross-

455

1 examination?

2 3 BY MS. COLLIER:

CROSS-EXAMINATION

4 Q Officer Wilmot, when did you last work at the Hancock

5 County Jail7 6 A Honestly I couldn’t tell you. I don’t know. I don’t 7 know when my last date of work was.

8 Q Now, everything that you did on the night of July 10th, 9 2001, involving Mr. Wood, did you act in accordance with what i0 you understood to be the policies, practices, or customs of

II the Hancock County Jail7

12 A I followed the procedures and policies of the Hancock 13 County Jail, yes. 14 Q Now, with respect to the search of the clothing that

15 yo~ did of Mr. Wood, you took Mr. Wood into the medical room

16 or what’s called the nurse’s room --

17 A

Nurse’s station.

18 Q

-- to do that7

19 A

Yes, ma’am.

-

20 Q

Okay. And you asked Mr. Wood to take off all of his

21 clothing?

.

22 A

One item at a time.

23 Q

And did you ask him to hand those items to you?

24 A

Yes.

456

1 asked him to give you his clothing?

2 A We were in sight contact, yes.

3

You maintained eye Contact with him7

4 A Yes.

5

And, of course, maintained eye contact with his person,

6 as well as his --

7 A Yes.

8 Q Okay. So you would agree that this was a time during

9 which you were observing Mr. Wood’s person, as well as

i0 checking the clothing7

Ii A You’re going to maintain eye contact, and you’re going

12 to maintain a visual of him for officer safety reasons. Yes,

13 you are going to be in the same room with them, and you are

14 going to be asking them to take off a piece of clothing at a

15 time. You are going to be physically inspecting the clothes,

16 not the person.

17

But when you say. you’re going to maintain a visual on

18 them, you mean that you’re going to maintain a visual of

19 their body while they’re in the process of disrobing,

20 correct7

21 A Yes.

22 Q Okay. You’re not trained to look away while they’re in

23 that process7

24 A No, that would be an officer safety issue.

25

Okay. And once the individual, in this case Mr. Wood,

457

has removed all of his clothing, do you follow Mr. Wood into

the shower area and keep him under observation while he’s

showering?

A Where I would -- where we normally stand and where he

is is a matter of a few feet apart. We normally stand at the

6 entrance to the actual shower area where there’s a partial

7 partition, and then the shower is behind the partition. That

8 way we can keep a visual on the inmate and then get his

9 clothes, and then he turns around and goes into the shower.

I0 Q

So it’s your answer that you do maintain surveillance

Ii of the individual, in this case Mr. Wood, during the time

12 he’s actually showering?

13 A We do maintain -- yes, we are -- we’re -- yes, we do

14 maintain a visual on them. We’re not physical.ly inspecting

15 them, having them raise their arms or anything like that, and

16 we’re also bringing clothes and a towel so that they can dry

17 off and change up when they get out of the shower.

18 Q And when you in this -- you say you do have a clear

19 memory of Hr. Wood that night?

20 A Yes, I remember Mr. Wood coming in, yes.

21

And you’ve had a chance to look at these documents --

22 Defendants’ 20, Defendants’ 12 -- that have your name on

23 them, correct?

24 A Yes.

25 Q And you had a chance to.talk to Mr. Marchesi about your

458

testimony here today?

A Other than on the telephone briefly, no, we haven’t sat

down and talked.

Q You did talk to him about what happened that night and

what you were going to testify to?

6 A Well, yes, actually, we did have a couple meetings a

7 couple weeks ago or something along those lines.

8 Q How many -- wet1, strike that.

9

Is it your recollection that during the time period in

i0 question and specifically take July 10th, 2001, at any given

Ii time, you had approximately 45 to SO inmates at the Hancock

"12 County Jail?

13 A Oh, could be. I -- I’m not -- I’d have to look at

14 records to find out how many we had in there that day.

15 Q

And you have people coming in -- inmates, that is,

16 coming in and going out at all times of the day?

17 A

Yes.

18 Q

People being discharged, people being let out on bail?

19 A

Hm-hmm.

20 Q

People being arrested --

21 A

Yes.

22 Q

-- coming in? Okay. Can you estimate for the jury

23 about how many inmates came into the jail, let’s say, July

24 lOth, 2001?

25 A

If I can take a look at that, I can probably get a

459

1 pretty good estimate of who came in when.

2

Okay. And that is the --

3A

That’d be the booking

4Q

The booking log. Okay. You may have it there, sir.

5 Is it Defendants’ 20?

6A

Yes, ma’am.

7Q

Do you have it? All right. Would you take a look at

8 that?

9A

(Witness looking at exhibit.) There’d be approximately

I0 ieight people in and out of the facility that day while I was

ii in the booking room.

12 Q Okay. And on the third page of that document, if

13 could -- if I could ask you to look at that for me. Again,

14 this is the booking log for July IOth, 2001. Doesn’t the log

15 indicate that you did not book Mr. Wood, but, in fact, TBR,

16 who I believe we understand to be Troy Richardson, booked Mr.

17 Wood?

18 A

(Witness looking at exhibit.) No, I would have had to

19 have -- if I. signed it, I would have had to have booked him.

2O Q

We11,.you’re looking at a different piece of paper,

21 aren’t you?

22 A

Well, I’m looking at the booking log on January lOth --

23 or I’m sorry -- July 1Oth.

24 Q

Hm-hmm. Are you looking at Defendants’ Exhibit 20?

25 A

Yes, I am.

460

Q And am I reading that right? Isn’t that what this log.

indicates, that Sergeant Richardson booked Mr. Wood?

3 A This is an entry Log that said that, 9:40 at night,

4 Officer Rivers from Bar Harbor PD here with Geoffrey Wood,

5 his date of birth, 10-46 for a violation of a protection

6 order. Warrants check was negative by Sergeant Richardson.

7 That was his writing in the booking Log. That would not

8 indicate what -- who booked him.

9 Q If I suggested to you that Captain Hannan testified

i0 that that did indicate that it was Mr. Richardson and not

ii yourself who booked him, you’d disagree with that?

12 A WELL, if I signed the booking -- the booking sheets, I

13 would have done the booking. Mr. Richardson might have done

14 the -- actuaLLy typed in the Log, but he wouldn’t have done

15 the booking. If I put -- if I signed the booking, I did the

16 booking.

17 Q Is the booking Log maintained by the booking officer?

18 A Yes, it is for the most part, but generaLLy, sometimes

19 we do have other officers come in and fiLL information in if

20 someone has -- we’re busy up-front.

21

MS. COLLIER: Excuse me just a moment.

22 A

Wait a minute. I’m sorry. I read this wrong.

23

THE COURT: Just wait for another question.

24 BY MS. COLLIER:

25 Q

Officer, I’m just very.confused. On Defendants’

461

i Exhibit 20, this is the booking log for the afternoon and

2 into the evening of July lOth, 2001; am I correct7

3A

Yes, it is.

4Q

Ali right. And in the middle of this -- top of this

5 document, does it not indicate that your shift ended --

6A

Yes, it did.

7Q

-- at 3:15 that afternoon?

8A

Correct, yes. I was looking at the pages, not the

9 actual hours up top.

I0 Q

Okay. And isn’t it your understanding that Mr.~ Wood

ii was brought into the jail the evening of July lOth, 20017

12 A

That’s what it indicates, yes.

13 Q

You weren’t even there, were you7

14

Evidently not.

15

MS. COLLIER: I have no further questions.

16

THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Collier. Mr. Marchesi7

17

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

18 BY MR. MARCHESI:

19 Q

Did you signthe booking sheet?

20 A

Yes, I did.

21 Q

Defendants’ Exhibit 127

22 A

Yes, I did.

23 Q

Would you sign the booking sheet if you didn’t do the

24 booking?

25 A

No, I would not have.

462

1Q

Who booked Mr. Wood?

2

I would have if I signed it.

3

MR. MARCHESI: That’s all I have. Thank you,

4 Judge.

5

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Marchesi. Anything

6 else, Ms. Collier?

7

MS. COLLIER: No, Your Honor.

8

THE COURT: Thank you. You may step down. Just

9 leave everything there.

i0 :A

Thank you.

ii

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

12

(The witness left the witness stand.)

13

THE COURT: All right. Is next the video? All

14 right.

15

MR. MARCHESI: I’ve got to set the machine up, I

16 think.

17

THE COURT: Yeah, I think. The next item of

18 testimony in this case is a videotape of someone’s testimony,

19 members of the jury. In view of the fact that we’d have to

20 set up the equipment and then bring you back in here and

21 start it, you’d only watch a few minutes of it before I sent

22 you home at 2:30. So unless anyone on the jury violently

23 objects, I’m going to let you go home early. Tomorrow we’re

24 going to have a much longer day, I suspect. So, again, make

25 your arrangements.

463

1

I want to remind you not to reach any conclusions or

2 even start to think about reaching any conclusions. You’re

3 far from having heard all of the evidence in this case. Keep

4 an open mind. Don’t discuss this case. I don’t know if

5 there’s going to be any print or television or radio 6 ~ublicity about what’s happened in the courtroom. It’s very, 7 :very important that you not watch or listen or read any of

8 that because everybody in this case is -- is entitled to have

9 your decisions based upon what you’ve heard from the witness

i0 stand or from the exhibits and from nothing else. That

ii wouldn’t be right, and it isn’t legal either. So don’t

12 discuss this case with anyone and certainly don’t discuss it

13 with your fellow jurors.

14

Tomorrow morning I’m going to try to start right on the

15 button so we can move along with the presentation of

16 evidence. And with that, I’ll excuse you for the day and

17 thank you for your work. The jury’s excused.

18

(Jury exited at 2:16 p.m.)

19

THE COURT: All right. Counsel, tomorrow morning

20 make sure that at 8:30 your equipment is set up, and we’re

21 ready to go. All right. We’re in recess.

22

(Proceedings concluded at 2:16 p.m.)

23

24

25

464

1

CERTIFICATION

2

I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript

3 from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

4

5

6 J~lie G.OEdgecomb, RMR, CRR
7 Official Court Reporter

~ate"

8

9

i0

ii

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

 
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CLOSED, STANDARD
U.S. District Court District of Maine (Bangor) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:02-cv-00069-GZS

WOOD v. HANCOCK, COUNTY OF, et al Assigned to: JUDGE GEORGE Z. SINGAL Demand: $0 Case in other court: First Circuit Court of Appeals, 03-01564 Cause: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

Date Filed: 05/02/2002 Date Terminated: 06/15/2004 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Plaintiff GEOFFREY V V WOOD

represented by SANDRA HYLANDER COLLIER P.O. BOX 1391 121 MAIN STREET ELLSWORTH, ME 04605 (207) 667-6417 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant HANCOCK, COUNTY OF
Defendant SHERIFF, HANCOCK COUNTY
Defendant LINDA HANNAN Jail Administrator

represented by PETER T. MARCHESI WHEELER & AREY, P.A. 27 TEMPLE STREET P. O. BOX 376 WATERVILLE, ME 04901 873-7771 Email: pbear@wheelerlegal.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by PETER T. MARCHESI (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by PETER T. MARCHESI (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Date Filed 05/02/2002 05/02/2002 05/22/2002 05/22/2002
09/04/2002 09/12/2002 10/02/2002
10/02/2002 10/02/2002 10/02/2002 10/02/2002 10/02/2002 10/02/2002 10/02/2002 10/02/2002

#

Docket Text

1 COMPLAINT filed; FILING FEE $ 150.00 RECEIPT # 44728; jury demand (Service of Process Deadline 8/30/02 ) (err) (Entered: 05/02/2002)
SUMMONS(ES) issued for HANCOCK, COUNTY OF, SHERIFF, HANCOCK, LINDA HANNAN (err) (Entered: 05/02/2002)
2 ANSWER to Complaint by HANCOCK, COUNTY OF, SHERIFF, HANCOCK, LINDA HANNAN (Attorney PETER T. MARCHESI), (err) (Entered: 05/22/2002)
3 SCHEDULING ORDER setting Discovery cutoff 9/25/02 ; Deadline for filing of all motions 10/2/02 ; Ready for Trial Date 1/6/03 ; ( signed by MAG. JUDGE MARGARET J. KRAVCHUK ) cc: cnsl. CONSENT FORM mailed to pltf cnsl. (bld) (Entered: 05/23/2002)
4 REPORT of Conference of Counsel re: answers to interrogatories ( signed by MAG. JUDGE MARGARET J. KRAVCHUK ) cc: cnsl (jgw) (Entered: 09/04/2002)
5 REPORT of Telephone Conference of Counsel re. discovery at deposition of Captain Linda Hannan ( signed by MAG. JUDGE MARGARET J. KRAVCHUK ) cc: cnsl (err) (Entered: 09/16/2002)
6 MOTION with memorandum in support by HANCOCK, COUNTY OF, SHERIFF, HANCOCK, LINDA HANNAN for Judgment on the Pleadings , for Summary Judgment ; Response to Motion due 10/23/02 for GEOFFREY V V WOOD (err) (Entered: 10/02/2002)
7 STATEMENT of Material Fact by HANCOCK, COUNTY OF, SHERIFF, HANCOCK, LINDA HANNAN (err) (Entered: 10/02/2002)
8 AFFIDAVIT of Linda Hannan filed in support of #6 Mtn for Summary Judgment (err) (Entered: 10/02/2002)
9 AFFIDAVIT of William Clark filed in support of #6 Mtn for Summary Judgment (err) (Entered: 10/02/2002)
10 AFFIDAVIT of William Sturgeon filed in support of #6 Mtn for Sum Jgm (err) (Entered: 10/02/2002)
11 DISCOVERY Citations per Local Rule 26 by HANCOCK, COUNTY OF, SHERIFF, HANCOCK, LINDA HANNAN (err) (Entered: 10/02/2002)
DESIGNATION of Expert Witnesses by HANCOCK, COUNTY OF, SHERIFF, HANCOCK, LINDA HANNAN (err) (Entered: 10/02/2002)
DEPOSITION Transcript of Geoffrey V.V. Wood filed by HANCOCK, COUNTY OF, SHERIFF, HANCOCK, LINDA HANNAN (err) (Entered: 10/02/2002)
12 MOTION by GEOFFREY V V WOOD to Exclude and/or limit dfts proposed testimony of experts ; Response to Motion due 10/23/02 for LINDA HANNAN, for SHERIFF, HANCOCK, for HANCOCK, COUNTY OF (jgw) (Entered:

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10/18/2002 10/23/2002
10/23/2002 10/23/2002 10/23/2002 11/01/2002 11/04/2002
11/05/2002 11/12/2002 11/12/2002 11/12/2002 11/12/2002

10/03/2002)
13 RESPONSE by HANCOCK, COUNTY OF, SHERIFF, HANCOCK, LINDA HANNAN to [12-1] motion to Exclude and/or limit dfts proposed testimony of experts ; Reply to Response due 10/29/02 for GEOFFREY V V WOOD (bld) (Entered: 10/18/2002)
14 RESPONSE by GEOFFREY V V WOOD to [6-1] motion for Judgment on the Pleadings ; Reply to Response due 11/4/02 for LINDA HANNAN, for SHERIFF, HANCOCK, for HANCOCK, COUNTY OF, [6-2] motion for Summary Judgment ; Reply to Response due 11/4/02 for LINDA HANNAN, for SHERIFF, HANCOCK, for HANCOCK, COUNTY OF (bld) (Entered: 10/24/2002)
15 RESPONSE TO STATEMENT of Material Fact by GEOFFREY V V WOOD re: [7-1] fact statement (bld) (Entered: 10/24/2002)
16 AFFIDAVIT of Geoffrey Wood (bld) (Entered: 10/24/2002)
DEPOSITION Transcript of Linda Hannan filed by GEOFFREY V V WOOD (bld) (Entered: 10/24/2002)
17 MOTION by HANCOCK, COUNTY OF, SHERIFF, HANCOCK, LINDA HANNAN to Extend Time to file reply in support of mtn for s/j and a motion to strike ; Response to Motion due 11/22/02 for GEOFFREY V V WOOD (jgw) (Entered: 11/01/2002)
ENDORSEMENT on Motion granting [17-1] motion to Extend Time to file reply in support of mtn for s/j and a motion to strike, Reply to Response to Motion reset to 11/12/02 for LINDA HANNAN, for SHERIFF, HANCOCK, for HANCOCK, COUNTY OF for [6-1] motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, reset to 11/12/02 for LINDA HANNAN, for SHERIFF, HANCOCK, for HANCOCK, COUNTY OF for [6-2] motion for Summary Judgment ( signed by MAG. JUDGE MARGARET J. KRAVCHUK ) cc: cnsl (err) (Entered: 11/04/2002)
Deadline updated; Remember to place #12 under advisement when #6 is ready on 11/12/02 (jgw) (Entered: 11/05/2002)
18 Unopposed MOTION by HANCOCK, COUNTY OF, SHERIFF, HANCOCK, LINDA HANNAN for Leave to File Reply Memo in excess of 7 pages (err) (Entered: 11/12/2002)
Motion(s) referred: [18-1] motion for Leave to File Reply Memo in excess of 7 pages referred to MAG. JUDGE MARGARET J. KRAVCHUK (err) (Entered: 11/12/2002)
19 REPLY by HANCOCK, COUNTY OF, SHERIFF, HANCOCK, LINDA HANNAN to response to [6-1] motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, [6-2] motion for Summary Judgment (err) (Entered: 11/12/2002)
21 MOTION by HANCOCK, COUNTY OF, SHERIFF, HANCOCK, LINDA HANNAN to Strike portions of [16-1] affidavit (Mtn to strike Paragraph 8 of Affidavit and Paragraphs 2, 3, 9, 10, 12 & 22 of #15 resp to stmt of fact), [15-1] statement response by GEOFFREY V V WOOD ; Response to Motion due 12/3/02 for GEOFFREY V V WOOD (err) Modified on 11/12/2002 (Entered: 11/12/2002)

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11/12/2002 11/12/2002 11/16/2002 11/27/2002
12/09/2002 12/24/2002 12/27/2002 01/02/2003
01/07/2003
01/08/2003

20 REPLY TO RESPONSE TO STATEMENT of Material Fact by HANCOCK, COUNTY OF, SHERIFF, HANCOCK, LINDA HANNAN In re: [7-1] fact statement (err) Modified on 11/12/2002 (Entered: 11/12/2002)
ENDORSEMENT on Motion granting (w/o obj) [18-1] motion for Leave to File Reply Memo in excess of 7 pages ( signed by MAG. JUDGE MARGARET J. KRAVCHUK ) cc: cnsl (err) (Entered: 11/12/2002)
ON TRIAL LIST for 2/5/03 ; Final Pre-Trial Memorandum due 12/27/02 for LINDA HANNAN, for SHERIFF, HANCOCK, for HANCOCK, COUNTY OF, for GEOFFREY V V WOOD ; Final Pre-Trial Conference set for 2:30 1/7/03 before MAG. JUDGE MARGARET J. KRAVCHUK ; cc: cnsl (err) (Entered: 11/16/2002)
22 RESPONSE by GEOFFREY V V WOOD to [21-1] motion to Strike portions of [16-1] affidavit (Mtn to strike Paragraph 8 of Affidavit and Paragraphs 2, 3, 9, 10, 12 & 22 of #15 resp to stmt of fact), [15-1] statement response by GEOFFREY V V WOOD ; Reply to Response due 12/9/02 for LINDA HANNAN, for SHERIFF, HANCOCK, for HANCOCK, COUNTY OF (seal user) (Entered: 11/27/2002)
23 REPLY by HANCOCK, COUNTY OF, SHERIFF, HANCOCK, LINDA HANNAN to response to [21-1] motion to Strike portions of [16-1] affidavit (Mtn to strike Paragraph 8 of Affidavit and Paragraphs 2, 3, 9, 10, 12 & 22 of #15 resp to stmt of fact), [15-1] statement response by GEOFFREY V V WOOD (gbc) (Entered: 12/09/2002)
24 FINAL PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM by HANCOCK, COUNTY OF, SHERIFF, HANCOCK, LINDA HANNAN (err) (Entered: 12/24/2002)
25 FINAL PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM by GEOFFREY V V WOOD (jgw) (Entered: 12/30/2002)
Motion(s) referred: [21-1] motion to Strike portions of [16-1] affidavit (Mtn to strike Paragraph 8 of Affidavit and Paragraphs 2, 3, 9, 10, 12 & 22 of #15 resp to stmt of fact), [15-1] statement response by GEOFFREY V V WOOD referred to MAG. JUDGE MARGARET J. KRAVCHUK, [6-1] motion for Judgment on the Pleadings referred to MAG. JUDGE MARGARET J. KRAVCHUK, [6-2] motion for Summary Judgment referred to MAG. JUDGE MARGARET J. KRAVCHUK, [12-1] motion to Exclude and/or limit dfts proposed testimony of experts referred to MAG. JUDGE MARGARET J. KRAVCHUK (jgw) (Entered: 01/02/2003)
26 RECOMMENDED DECISION of MAG. JUDGE MARGARET J. KRAVCHUK Re: [6-1] motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, [6-2] motion for Summary Judgment; recommending denial of mtn for s/j and motion for judgment on pleadings ; Motion no longer referred Objections to R and R due by 1/27/03 for LINDA HANNAN, for SHERIFF, HANCOCK, for HANCOCK, COUNTY OF, for GEOFFREY V V WOOD ; cc:cnsl (bld) (Entered: 01/07/2003)
27 REPORT OF FINAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND ORDER filed, set trial brief deadline for 1/29/03 for LINDA HANNAN, for SHERIFF, HANCOCK, for HANCOCK, COUNTY OF, for GEOFFREY V V WOOD est time of trial 3 days ( signed by MAG. JUDGE MARGARET J. KRAVCHUK ) cc: cnsl (bld)

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01/08/2003 01/08/2003 01/17/2003 01/24/2003 01/24/2003
01/29/2003 01/29/2003 01/29/2003 01/29/2003 01/29/2003 01/29/2003
01/29/2003 01/29/2003 01/29/2003 01/29/2003

(Entered: 01/08/2003)
ENDORSEMENT on Motion ; deferring ruling on [12-1] motion to Exclude and/or limit dfts proposed testimony of experts until time of trial ( signed by Judge GEORGE Z. SINGAL ) cc: cnsl (jgw) (Entered: 01/08/2003)
Motions No Longer Referred: [12] Motion to Exclude(jgw, ) (Entered: 03/03/2003)
28 Letter MOTION by HANCOCK, COUNTY OF for Protection from Trial for dates of 2/6-10 and 2/17-21/03 (bld) (Entered: 01/17/2003)
29 MOTION by HANCOCK, COUNTY OF, SHERIFF, HANCOCK, LINDA HANNAN to Extend Time to file objections to R&R (bld) (Entered: 01/24/2003)
ENDORSEMENT on Motion granting [29-1] motion to Extend Time to file objections to R&R, Objections reset to 1/29/03 for LINDA HANNAN, for SHERIFF, HANCOCK, for HANCOCK, COUNTY OF, for GEOFFREY V V WOOD for [26-1] motion RECOMMENDED DECISION of MAG. JUDGE MARGARET J. KRAVCHUK Re: [6-1] motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, [6-2] motion for Summary Judgment; recommending denial of mtn for s/j and motion for judgment on pleadings (B. DeRoche, Deputy Clerk) cc: cnsl (bld) (Entered: 01/24/2003)
30 TRIAL BRIEF by HANCOCK, COUNTY OF, SHERIFF, HANCOCK, LINDA HANNAN (bld) (Entered: 01/29/2003)
Exhibit list by GEOFFREY V V WOOD, HANCOCK, COUNTY OF, SHERIFF, HANCOCK, LINDA HANNAN (bld) (Entered: 01/29/2003)
Witness list by HANCOCK, COUNTY OF, SHERIFF, HANCOCK, LINDA HANNAN (bld) (Entered: 01/29/2003)
Proposed voir dire questions by HANCOCK, COUNTY OF, SHERIFF, HANCOCK, LINDA HANNAN (bld) (Entered: 01/29/2003)
31 STIPULATIONS (bld) (Entered: 01/29/2003)
32 OBJECTION by HANCOCK, COUNTY OF, SHERIFF, HANCOCK, LINDA HANNAN to [26-1] motion RECOMMENDED DECISION of MAG. JUDGE MARGARET J. KRAVCHUK Re: [6-1] motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, [6-2] motion for Summary Judgment; recommending denial of mtn for s/j and motion for judgment on pleadings ; Response to Objections to RR due 2/18/03 for GEOFFREY V V WOOD ; (bld) (Entered: 01/29/2003)
33 TRIAL BRIEF by GEOFFREY V V WOOD (err) Modified on 01/30/2003 (Entered: 01/30/2003)
Proposed voir dire questions by GEOFFREY V V WOOD (err) Modified on 01/30/2003 (Entered: 01/30/2003)
Proposed Jury Verdict Form by GEOFFREY V V WOOD (err) (Entered: 01/30/2003)
Witness list by GEOFFREY V V WOOD (err) (Entered: 01/30/2003)

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02/03/2003 02/10/2003 02/11/2003 02/11/2003 02/12/2003
02/12/2003 02/12/2003 02/28/2003 02/28/2003 02/28/2003 03/06/2003 03/07/2003
03/11/2003 03/11/2003 03/11/2003 03/11/2003

ENDORSEMENT on Motion granting [28-1] motion for Protection from Trial for dates of 2/6-10 and 2/17-21/03 ( signed by Judge GEORGE Z. SINGAL ) cc: cnsl (bld) (Entered: 02/04/2003)
34 Response to Objection to Report and Recommended Decision re [26] Report and Recommended Decision, filed by GEOFFREY V V WOOD. (bld) (Entered: 02/11/2003)
Motions Taken Under Advisement: [26] Report and Recommended Decision(bld) (Entered: 02/11/2003)
35 Letter MOTION for Protection from Trial for dates of April 9-26, 2003 by SHERIFF, HANCOCK COUNTY. (jgw, ) (Entered: 02/12/2003)
36 ORDER AFFIRMING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS denying [6] Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Motion for Summary Judgment filed by HANCOCK, COUNTY OF, SHERIFF, HANCOCK COUNTY, LINDA HANNAN, [26] Report and Recommended Decision, Signed by Judge GEORGE Z. SINGAL on 2/12/03. (jgw, ) (Entered: 02/13/2003)
ORDER/endorsement granting [35] Motion for Protection from Trial 4/9-26/03 Signed by Judge GEORGE Z. SINGAL on 2/12/03. (jgw, ) (Entered: 02/13/2003)
Set Deadlines/Hearings : On Trial List for 3/11/2003.(err, ) (Entered: 02/21/2003)
37 Letter MOTION for Protection from Trial for dates of 2/18-19/03 by HANCOCK, COUNTY OF, LINDA HANNAN, SHERIFF, HANCOCK COUNTY. (jgw, ) (Entered: 02/28/2003)
Motions Taken Under Advisement: [37] Letter MOTION for Protection from Trial for dates of 2/18-19/03(jgw, ) (Entered: 02/28/2003)
ORDER/ENDORSEMENT denying [37] Motion for Protection from Trial Signed by Judge GEORGE Z. SINGAL on 2/28/03. (jgw, ) (Entered: 02/28/2003)
38 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge GEORGE Z. SINGAL : Conference of Counsel held. Dft. ordered to pay costs for pltf. to travel to Colorado for deposition. (Court Reporter NONE) (mo, ) (Entered: 03/07/2003)
39 REPORT OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE OF COUNSEL AND ORDER re. Defendant to pay out-of pocket expenses, lodging and airfare to site of deposition of expert witness Dr. William Sturgeon Signed by Judge GEORGE Z. SINGAL on 3/6/2003. (err, ) (Entered: 03/10/2003)
40 Amended Witness List by HANCOCK, COUNTY OF, LINDA HANNAN, SHERIFF, HANCOCK COUNTY. (err, ) (Entered: 03/11/2003)
41 Amended Consolidated Exhibit List by HANCOCK, COUNTY OF, LINDA HANNAN, SHERIFF, HANCOCK COUNTY.. (err, ) (Entered: 03/11/2003)
42 Proposed Jury Instructions by GEOFFREY V V WOOD. (err, ) Modified on 3/11/2003 (mlh, ). Modified on 3/11/2003 (mlh, ). (Entered: 03/11/2003)
43 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge MARGARET J. KRAVCHUK : Jury Selection held. (Court Reporter Julie Edgecomb) (jgw, ) (Entered:

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03/12/2003 03/13/2003 03/14/2003
03/14/2003
03/17/2003 03/17/2003 03/17/2003
03/17/2003 03/17/2003
03/17/2003 03/17/2003 03/17/2003
03/17/2003

03/12/2003)
Set/ResetHearings : Jury Trial set for 3/18/2003 08:30 AM in Main Courtroom, Bangor before Judge GEORGE Z. SINGAL.(jgw, ) (Entered: 03/12/2003)
44 Proposed Amended Jury Instruction #7 by GEOFFREY V V WOOD. (bld) (Entered: 03/14/2003)
45 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge GEORGE Z. SINGAL : Conference of Counsel held. Monday March 17 at 9:00 AM objections to deposition due, counsel to initiate conference call on same day at 2:00 PM for Judge Singal to rule on each individual objection. (Court Reporter C. PACKARD) (mo, ) (Entered: 03/17/2003)
52 REPORT OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE OF COUNSEL AND ORDER re. deposition of William Sturgeon, expert witness for Defendant. Parties to file supporting materials, case law/arguments by 9:00 a.m. in Bangor on 3/17/2003. Telehone Conference set for 2:00 p.m. on 3/17/2003. Signed by Judge GEORGE Z. SINGAL on 3/14/2003. (err, ) (Entered: 03/18/2003)
46 MOTION in Limine to Exclude and/or Limit Defendants' Proposed Testimony of William Sturgeon by GEOFFREY V V WOOD. (err, ) (Entered: 03/17/2003)
47 Proposed Jury Instructions by GEOFFREY V V WOOD. (err, ) (Entered: 03/17/2003)
48 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge GEORGE Z. SINGAL : Telephonic Motion Hearing held re [46] MOTION in Limine to Exclude and/or Limit Defendants' Proposed Testimony of William Sturgeon filed by GEOFFREY V V WOOD. (Court Reporter Julie Edgecomb) (jgw, ) (Entered: 03/17/2003)
Oral ORDER terminating [12] Motion to Exclude, terminating [46] Motion in Limine with respect to expert testimony Signed by Judge GEORGE Z. SINGAL on 3/17/03. (jgw, ) (Entered: 03/17/2003)
49 REPORT OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE OF COUNSEL AND ORDER re [46] Motion in Limine, [12] Motion to Exclude; trial to commence at 8:30 a.m.; parties allowed 30 minutes for opening statements. Signed by Judge GEORGE Z. SINGAL on 3/17/03. (jgw, ) (Entered: 03/17/2003)
50 Proposed Jury Verdict Form by HANCOCK, COUNTY OF, LINDA HANNAN, SHERIFF, HANCOCK COUNTY. (err, ) (Entered: 03/17/2003)
51 Proposed Jury Instructions by HANCOCK, COUNTY OF, LINDA HANNAN, SHERIFF, HANCOCK COUNTY. (err, ) (Entered: 03/17/2003)
53 RESPONSE to Motion re [46] MOTION in Limine to Exclude and/or Limit Defendants' Proposed Testimony of William Sturgeon filed by HANCOCK, COUNTY OF, LINDA HANNAN, SHERIFF, HANCOCK COUNTY. (err, ) (Entered: 03/18/2003)
54 OBJECTION to inquiry by Plaintiff's counsel of William Sturgeon re. [46] MOTION in Limine to Exclude and/or Limit Defendants' Proposed Testimony of William Sturgeon filed by HANCOCK, COUNTY OF, LINDA HANNAN, SHERIFF, HANCOCK COUNTY. (err, ) (Entered: 03/18/2003)

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04/11/2003 04/17/2003

Oral MOTION to Exclude reference to 7/10/2001 strip search at trial by HANCOCK, COUNTY OF, LINDA HANNAN, SHERIFF, HANCOCK COUNTY. (err, ) (Entered: 03/18/2003)
ORAL ORDER denying [] Motion to Exclude reference to 7/10/2001 strip search at trial by Judge GEORGE Z. SINGAL on 3/18/2003. (err, ) (Entered: 03/18/2003)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge GEORGE Z. SINGAL : Jury Trial Begun. (Court Reporter Julie Edgecomb) (err, ) (Entered: 03/18/2003)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge GEORGE Z. SINGAL : Jury Trial Continues. (Court Reporter Julie Edgecomb) (err, ) (Entered: 03/19/2003)
Oral MOTION for Judgment as a Matter of Law by HANCOCK, COUNTY OF, LINDA HANNAN, SHERIFF, HANCOCK COUNTY. (err, ) (Entered: 03/19/2003)
ORAL ORDER denying [] Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law Signed by Judge GEORGE Z. SINGAL on 3/19/2003. (err, ) (Entered: 03/19/2003)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge GEORGE Z. SINGAL : Jury Trial Continues. (Court Reporter Julie Edgecomb) (err, ) (Entered: 03/20/2003)
Oral MOTION for Judgment as a Matter of Law by HANCOCK, COUNTY OF, LINDA HANNAN, SHERIFF, HANCOCK COUNTY. (err, ) (Entered: 03/20/2003)
ORAL ORDER denying [] Renewed Oral Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law Signed by Judge GEORGE Z. SINGAL on 3/20/2003. (err, ) (Entered: 03/20/2003)
55 JURY VERDICT for Defendants. (err, ) (Entered: 03/21/2003)
56 Kepreos Order Prohibiting Post-Verdict Contact with Jurors (cc: jurors) Signed for the Court by Deputy Clerk: E. Richardson on 3/20/2003. (err, ) (Entered: 03/21/2003)
57 Court Jury Instructions and Approved Jury Notebook Contents including Preliminary Jury Instructions and Definitions. (err, ) (Entered: 03/21/2003)
58 Court Exhibit List (with attached receipt for return of Defendants' Exhibit 1) from Jury Trial held on March 18-20, 2003. (err, ) (Entered: 03/21/2003)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge GEORGE Z. SINGAL : Jury Trial Completed. (Court Reporter Julie Edgecomb) (err, ) (Entered: 03/24/2003)
59 JUDGMENT in favor of Defendants, HANCOCK COUNTY, SHERIFF, HANCOCK COUNTY and LINDA HANNAN against Plaintiff GEOFFREY V.V. WOOD Signed for the Court by Deputy Clerk: E. Richardson on 3/21/2003. (err, ) (Entered: 03/21/2003)
60 BILL OF COSTS by HANCOCK, COUNTY OF, LINDA HANNAN, SHERIFF, HANCOCK COUNTY.Responses due by 5/2/2003. (err, ) (Entered: 04/11/2003)
61 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to [59] Judgment by GEOFFREY V V WOOD. Filing fee $105 (Receipt #47084) (err, ) (Entered: 04/22/2003)

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01/05/2004 01/05/2004 01/23/2004 02/12/2004 02/12/2004
03/10/2004

COPIES of Notice of Appeal Sent to Counsel Re: [61] Notice of Appeal filed by GEOFFREY V V WOOD. (err, ) (Entered: 04/22/2003)
62 CLERK'S CERTIFICATE Re: [61] Notice of Appeal filed by GEOFFREY V V WOOD Documents Sent to U.S. Court of Appeals: 1 - 61 with depositions of Geoffrey V.V. Wood, Linda Hannan and William Sturgeon. (err, ) (Entered: 04/22/2003)
Transmission of Notice of Appeal and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals re [61] Notice of Appeal (err, ) (Entered: 04/22/2003)
63 RESPONSE to Motion re [60] BILL OF COSTS filed by GEOFFREY V V WOOD.Reply due by 5/5/2003. (err, ) (Entered: 04/24/2003)
USCA Case Number 03-1564 for [61] Notice of Appeal filed by GEOFFREY V V WOOD. (bld) (Entered: 05/13/2003)
TRANSCRIPT (Volume I of III) of Proceedings: Jury Trial held on 3/18/2003 before Judge George Z. Singal. Court Reporter: Julie Edgecomb. (err, ) (Entered: 06/03/2003)
TRANSCRIPT (Volume II of III) of Proceedings: Jury Trial held on 3/19/2003 before Judge George Z. Singal. Court Reporter: Julie Edgecomb. (err, ) (Entered: 06/03/2003)
TRANSCRIPT (Volume III of III) of Proceedings: Jury Trial held on 3/20/2003 before Judge George Z. Singal. Court Reporter: Julie Edgecomb. (err, ) (Entered: 06/03/2003)
64 CLERK'S First SUPPLEMENTAL CERTIFICATE Re: [61] Notice of Appeal filed by GEOFFREY V V WOOD Documents Sent to U.S. Court of Appeals: Transcript of Jury Trial of 3/18-20/2003 (Volumes 1-3) (err, ) (Entered: 06/03/2003)
65 Opinion of USCA Re: [61] Notice of Appeal filed by GEOFFREY V V WOOD Mandate due by 2/4/2004. (jgw, ) (Entered: 01/06/2004)
66 JUDGMENT of USCA (certified copy) re [61] Notice of Appeal Mandate due by 2/4/2004. Judgment of USDC is affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded for partial new trial.(jgw, ) (Entered: 01/06/2004)
67 MANDATE of USCA as to [61] Notice of Appeal filed by GEOFFREY V V WOOD Appeal Record due by 3/8/2004. (jgw, ) (Entered: 01/26/2004)
68 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge MARGARET J. KRAVCHUK : Telephone Conference held. Report of conference to follow. (cwp, ) (Entered: 02/12/2004)
69 REPORT OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE OF COUNSEL AND ORDER Status Report due by 4/22/2004 indicating if defendants have filed a petition for writ of certiorari; if not matter to be placed on next available trial list with Chief Judge Singal in Bangor. By Judge MARGARET J. KRAVCHUK. (jgw, ) (Entered: 02/12/2004)
Appeal Record Returned: [61] Notice of Appeal (jgw, ) (Entered: 03/10/2004)

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70 TRIAL LIST:. On Trial List for 6/15/2004.(err, ) (Entered: 05/04/2004)
71 NOTICE of Settlement by plaintiff and PROCEDURAL ORDER RE: SETTLEMENT: Counsel having advised the Court on 5/5/04 that settlement has been effected by mutual agreement of the parties herein, it is hereby ORDERED that counsel shall complete the settlement of this matter within thirty (30) days of this date and cause to be filed a stipulation of dismissal of this matter with prejudice and without costs. Stipulation of Dismissal due by 6/4/2004. By Brenda DeRoche, DEPUTY CLERK. (bld, ) (Entered: 05/05/2004)
72 LETTER STATUS REPORT by HANCOCK, COUNTY OF, LINDA HANNAN, SHERIFF, HANCOCK COUNTY. (bld) (Entered: 05/06/2004)
73 Unopposed MOTION to Extend Time to file Stipulation of Dismissal to July 5, 2004 by GEOFFREY V V WOOD. (bld, ) (Entered: 06/02/2004)
74 ORDER granting [73] Motion to Extend Time By Judge MARGARET J. KRAVCHUK. (bld) (Entered: 06/02/2004)
Reset Deadlines motion to extend time to file stipulation granted: Stipulation of Dismissal due by 7/6/2004.(bld) (Entered: 06/02/2004)
75 STIPULATION of Dismissal by HANCOCK, COUNTY OF, LINDA HANNAN, SHERIFF, HANCOCK COUNTY, GEOFFREY V V WOOD. (bld) (Entered: 06/15/2004)
76 Plaintiff's exhibits and joint EXHIBITS Returned to plaintiff Geoffrey V.V. Wood at the request of plaintiff's counsel. (err, ) (Entered: 04/18/2006)
77 Remark - Defendants' exhibits destroyed at the request of Attorney Peter Marchesi. (err, ) (Entered: 04/18/2006)

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 354 F.3d 57 (2003)
Geoffrey WOOD, Plaintiff, Appellant, v.
HANCOCK COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT; Sheriff, Hancock County; and Linda Hannan, Defendants, Appellees.
No. 03-1564.
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
Heard November 4, 2003. Decided December 31, 2003.
58 *58 Sandra Hylander Collier for appellant.
Peter T. Marchesi with whom Wheeler & Arey, P.A., was on brief for appellees.
Before SELYA, Circuit Judge, COFFIN and STAHL, Senior Circuit Judges.
COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge.
Appellant Geoffrey Wood claims that he was unconstitutionally strip searched on three separate occasions by correctional officers at the Hancock County Jail in Ellsworth, Maine. He filed a lawsuit seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 from the county, the sheriff, and the jail administrator, but a jury found in favor of the defendants.[1] 59 On appeal, Wood contends *59 that he is entitled to a new trial because the district court incorrectly instructed the jury on both the definition of a strip search and the law governing routine strip searches of inmates after contact visits. We see no error as to the law applicable to post-contact visits, but have concluded that a sufficiently misleading definition of a strip search warrants a partial new trial.
I. Factual Background
In mid-2001, appellant Wood was arrested twice on misdemeanor charges and required to completely disrobe three times in the presence of correctional officers. The first two episodes occurred as part of his processing into the Hancock County Jail following the arrests. Although Wood characterizes these events as strip searches, the county defendants maintain that the encounters were "clothing searches" and that any observation of Wood's naked body was incidental to the correctional officers' purpose to examine his clothing. The third search occurred on the morning after Wood's second arrest, following a contact visit with his attorney. The parties agree that Wood was subjected to a strip search at that time, but disagree about its constitutionality.
The details of these three incidents, with the facts largely depicted in the light most consistent with the jury's verdict, are described below. Before turning to those details, we briefly review the jail's relevant search policies.
According to Policy No. C-120, titled "Admissions Procedures 0907 Inmates Not Bailed," an individual who is being assigned to a housing unit in the jail 0907 whether charged with a misdemeanor or felony 0907 is subject to a clothing search and must shower after disrobing "in the presence of [a] Corrections Officer." Jail Policy D-220 (Procedure C(1)), titled "Search Procedures," states that a pre-trial inmate charged with a misdemeanor offense 0907 like appellant 0907 is subject to a more intrusive strip search only if the officer "has reasonable suspicion that [the] inmate is concealing contraband and is about to come into contact with inmates of the facility."
A "clothing search" is defined as "[t]he removal and search of all of an inmate's clothing,"[2] while a "strip search" is defined as "[a] visual search of an inmate which requires the removal of all clothing, to include a search of the 60 clothes removed." Policy D-220.[3] Thus, individuals *60 arrested for a broad range of minor offenses classified as misdemeanors, including failure to pay highway tolls or speeding, could be asked to disrobe completely and

shower if they are unable to post bail and must be assigned housing. Only felony detainees and those suspected of carrying contraband are subject to the more extensive examination that the policy describes as a "strip search."
Search # 1. On May 27, 2001, Wood was arrested on misdemeanor charges of domestic abuse and taken to the Hancock County Jail. He did not immediately post bail and therefore was required to shower and undergo a clothing search. He was escorted by a correctional officer into a room near the booking area known as "the nurse's station" or "medical room" and directed to disrobe, one article of clothing at a time, until he was naked. He was standing four to five feet from the officer. Wood contends that two officers were present, but jail records indicate that only Officer Christopher Rivers supervised the search and shower.
Officer Rivers testified that his standard practice in clothing searches is to instruct the inmates to turn over their underwear last and then to enter the nearby shower stall. Although Rivers said the objective of the search is to detect contraband in the clothing, he and a fellow officer, Chad Wilmot, both testified that they "maintain a visual" on the individuals as they disrobe and enter the shower. Rivers stated that, during the process, the inmates end up standing naked for "[s]econds," and Wilmot noted that "[w]e're not physically inspecting them, having them raise their arms or anything like that, and we're also bringing clothes and a towel so that they can dry off and change up when they get out of the shower."[4]
The jail's administrator, Linda Hannan, testified that the corrections staff attempts to provide as much privacy as possible in the circumstances.[5] She said that the shower curtain, which was admitted into evidence, is black from about shoulder height down, and she further stated that the officers are trained to avert their eyes from the inmate during the clothing search. She acknowledged that officers might observe the inmate's naked body "for a split second as [they] reach for that last piece of clothing." Hannan's depiction of the policy departed somewhat from the two officers' consistent report that they were trained to maintain eye contact with the inmate and that they were not trained to look away because "that would be an officer safety issue."
Search # 2. Wood was arrested again on July 10 and charged with violating a protection from abuse order. He 61 again was brought to the Hancock County Jail *61 and searched in similar fashion to the May occurrence.[6] He
remained at the jail overnight.
Search # 3. On the morning of July 11, appellant was twice visited by his attorney. Both encounters were "contact" visits, meaning that counsel and client were face-to-face without a glass partition or other divider separating them. Although jail policy calls for inmates to be strip searched after all contact visits,[7] appellant was not searched after the first session with his counsel. After the second, longer visit, however, as appellant and his counsel passed through the booking area, the booking officer stated that appellant needed to be strip searched pursuant to jail policy. He was taken into the same room where the previous searches had been conducted, and a full strip search was done. He was asked to fully disrobe, and then was ordered to stick out his tongue, hold his hands above his head, turn around, bend over, and manually spread his buttocks.
Appellant contends that all three of these searches violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and that the jury was led to conclude otherwise by the trial court's erroneous instructions. With respect to the first two searches, appellant argues that, despite being labeled "clothing searches," they effectively were strip searches. The parties agree that the search constitutes a Fourth Amendment violation if it was indeed a strip search. See infra at 62. Appellant asserts that the jury was led astray because the court's instruction improperly limited the definition of a strip search. See infra at 62. He claims that the instruction concerning the third search 0907 undisputedly a strip search 0907 erroneously established a presumption of reasonableness regarding strip searches after contact visits. See infra at 66-67.
Defendants assert in response that the court's instructions accurately reflected the law and that the jurors properly found no constitutional violation. They insist that the May 27th and July 10th searches were carefully limited clothing searches, not strip searches, and as such involved permissible incidental viewing of appellant's naked body. In any event, they say, the label given to the first two searches is unimportant because the jury's verdict is supportable even if appellant were subjected to unlawful strip searches. They assert that the verdict form may be interpreted to reflect a judgment that the defendants 0907 the county and its supervising officials 0907

were not liable for the officers' conduct because the officers' actions did not represent a widespread practice or custom. See Monell v. New York Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) ; Miller v. Kennebec County, 219 F.3d 8, 12-13 (1st Cir.2000). Finally, defendants assert that the July 11th strip search was "wholly constitutional" and that the court's instruction correctly set out the law governing routine strip searches following contact visits.
For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that appellant is entitled to a new trial on the claims related to the May 27th and July 10th searches, but we uphold the jury's judgment on the July 11th strip search.
62 *62 II. Discussion
A jury instruction that was objected to at trial will constitute reversible error "`only if it (i) is "misleading, unduly complicating, or incorrect as a matter of law"; and (ii) cannot be considered harmless....'" Richards v. Relentless, Inc., 341 F.3d 35, 46 (1st Cir.2003) (citations omitted). In probing whether the error could have affected the outcome of the jury's deliberations, we consider its impact in light of the entire record. See Tum v. Barber Foods, Inc., 331 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.2003) (citing Federico v. Order of St. Benedict, 64 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1995) and Allen v. Chance Mfg. Co., 873 F.2d 465, 469 (1st Cir.1989)).
With this guidance in mind, we consider in turn each of the challenged instructions.
A. Definition of Strip Search
The district court defined a strip search to the jury as follows:
A strip search involves a deliberate, visual inspection of the naked body of a prisoner which includes the examination of the mouth and armpits. A visual body-cavity search is a strip search that includes visual inspection or visual examination of the anal and genital areas.
Appellant objected to this instruction and proposed an alternative to the court that more broadly defined such a search, essentially classifying any required exposure of a private body part as a strip search.[8]
The definition of a strip search was crucial to appellant's case. Our case law holds that an individual detained on a misdemeanor charge may be strip searched as part of the booking process only if officers have reasonable suspicion that he is either armed or carrying contraband. See Savard v. Rhode Island, 338 F.3d 23, 27 (1st Cir.2003) (en banc) (opinion of Selya, J.), petition for cert. filed, 72 U.S.L.W. 3348 (U.S. Nov. 3, 2003) (No. 03-683); Roberts v. Rhode Island, 239 F.3d 107, 113 (1st Cir.2001). In so concluding, we have recognized that "strip searches are intrusive and degrading []and, therefore, should not be unreservedly available to law enforcement officers[]." Savard, 338 F.3d at 27. When such an intrusion is extended to relatively harmless offenders, "a severe incursion on privacy" occurs, Roberts, 239 F.3d at 111.
In Savard, for example, one of the strip-searched plaintiffs had been arrested for a traffic ticket that had been issued to his son six years earlier and never paid; another was arrested in error for failing to appear for a probation review after her probation had ended. See 338 F.3d at 33 (opinion of Bownes, J.). Requiring particularized suspicion to strip search misdemeanant arrestees balances institutional security needs with individual privacy, which includes "a reasonable expectation not to be unclothed involuntarily, to be observed unclothed or to have [one's] `private' parts observed or touched by others." Justice v. City of Peachtree City, 961 F.2d 188, 191 (11th Cir.1992) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). There is no dispute that Wood was not suspected of carrying a weapon or contraband either time he was arrested and booked. Thus, if he was strip searched, he suffered a constitutional injury.
63 Having carefully reviewed the relevant precedent, we believe the court's instruction *63 erroneously circumscribed the jury's evaluation of the evidence. Nearly twenty years ago, we defined a strip search as "an inspection of a naked individual, without any scrutiny of the subject's body cavities," Blackburn v. Snow, 771 F.2d 556, 561 (1st Cir.1985),[9] and we repeated substantially that same description in subsequent cases. See

Savard, 338 F.3d at 25 (defining strip searches as "visual inspections of the naked body"); Roberts, 239 F.3d at 108 n. 1 ("A `strip search' involves a visual inspection of the naked body of an inmate."). See also Peckham v. Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections, 141 F.3d 694, 695 (7th Cir.1998) ("strip search" refers to "a visual inspection of a naked inmate without intrusion into the person's body cavities").[10] The district court departed from these formulations by defining a strip search to include an "examination of the mouth and armpits," and by stating that the inspection must be "deliberate." Although strip searches often may involve additional steps, we decline to draw the line so narrowly that standing naked for inspection by officers falls short of being a strip search if unaccompanied by a demand to open one's mouth or lift one's arms. Unquestionably, the serious intrusion stems from exposing one's naked body to official scrutiny; the impact of that forced nudity is undervalued if focused attention on the mouth and underarms is also required to reach the threshold of a strip search.
Under the court's instruction, the most deliberate visual inspection of a naked body, even including a look in the mouth, would pass muster, simply because one or two armpits were not inspected. Alternatively, a complete and prolonged viewing of a naked body could survive challenge if a jury were to find that it was not sufficiently "deliberate" because it was designed to examine clothing rather than the body.
The court's instruction was therefore flawed in two respects. By adding the word "deliberate" to the definition we previously have adopted-stating in the first portion of its instruction that "[a] strip search involves a deliberate, visual inspection of the naked body of a prisoner"-the court unduly directed the jurors to the officers' subjective intent. The word "inspection" sufficiently connotes the need for a focused look. See The Random House Dictionary of the English Language (2d ed.1987) (unabridged) at 987 (defining "inspection" as "the act of inspecting or viewing, esp. carefully or critically ...," and, alternatively, as "formal or official viewing or 64 examination").[11] Whether or not the *64 officers set out deliberately to inspect a prisoner's naked body is not the question; it is, rather, whether the officers did, in fact, perform such a search. The remainder of the instruction then added specific elements to the definition 0907 scrutiny of the mouth and armpits 0907 that are not prerequisites for finding that a strip search took place.
These variations cannot be considered harmless in this case.[12] Although the jury may not have based its judgment for defendants on the scope of the searches 0907 an issue we discuss infra at 16 0907 the problems with the instruction were sufficiently critical to the jury's deliberations that appellant is entitled to have the issue resubmitted to a jury. We begin our explanation of that conclusion with a brief review of the evidence of what occurred.
Appellant testified that he was subjected to examinations that met the district court's definition of a strip search, including scrutiny of his mouth and armpits, see supra notes 4 & 6, while the officers testified that the only viewing of appellant's naked body occurred in the few seconds after he had completely disrobed while they "maintain[ed] a visual" on him before he entered the shower. Defendants emphasize that, even if the jurors had accepted appellant's version, the jury properly may have found no liability against the county.
As first set forth by the Supreme Court in Monell, a governmental entity may not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional violations committed by its employees unless the plaintiff's injury results from either an officially sanctioned policy or from a custom or practice that is "so well-settled and widespread that the policymaking officials ... can be said to have either actual or constructive knowledge of it yet did nothing to end the practice," Bordanaro v. McLeod, 871 F.2d 1151, 1156 (1st Cir.1989). In the latter case, "the custom must have been the cause of and the moving force behind the deprivation of constitutional rights." Id.; see also Miller, 219 F.3d at 12. Thus, in rejecting liability, the jury may have believed appellant but concluded that the officers acted randomly beyond the jail's policies.
65 *65 Another possibility, however, is that the jury believed the officers' description of what occurred and concludedconsistent with the jury instruction-that these were not strip searches because there was no check of appellant's mouth or underarms. Such a conclusion would have made unnecessary any further discussion about the specific nature of the search and whether the visual observation of appellant constituted an "inspection" that would qualify as a strip search.

In our view, if the jury had had such a discussion, with the benefit of the correct definition of "strip search," it could have reached a different result. Both officers testified that appellant was under constant watch as he disrobed. See supra at 60. Officer Wilmot stated that the officers are "physically inspecting the clothes, not the person," but he replied affirmatively when asked by counsel if the process necessarily included "maintain[ing] a visual of their body while they're in the process of disrobing." In addition, while Administrator Hannan stated that the only target of the search was appellant's clothing, she acknowledged that officers conducting clothing searches must at least observe inmates "out of the corner of [their] eye[s]" to be sure the prisoners do not take contraband from their clothing and hide it on their persons. She explained that the concern about concealment is why disrobing for a clothing search must be done in an officer's presence rather than behind a screen or in another private area.
Based on this evidence, a properly instructed jury could have decided that both clothing searches performed on appellant embraced a visual inspection of his naked body that 0907 albeit brief 0907 was focused on detecting contraband, and thus amounted to a strip search. Our precedent does not require that a search be either prolonged or thorough to be termed a strip search, and we decline to add such limitations. The critical question is whether viewing the naked body was an objective of the search, rather than an unavoidable and incidental byproduct. Had appellant been allowed to disrobe behind a screen, for example, and directed to enter the shower while officers examined the clothes he left behind, the momentary exposure as he walked from the screen to the shower clearly would have been incidental to the search of his clothing. By contrast, the procedure utilized by the Hancock County Jail in this case, as described by the officers, allowed visual inspection of appellant's body through the progressive stages of his undressing. Indeed, the combined effect of Administrator Hannan's and the officers' testimony permits 0907 although it does not compel 0907 the inference that, during clothing searches, officers routinely keep watch through the disrobing process, at least in part, to be sure no items are secreted on the body. [13]
Although less objectionable than more sustained inspections of an individual's naked body, and less intrusive 66 than a search that includes examination of the mouth and underarms, the search that occurred *66 here
unquestionably implicated the "reasonable expectation not to be unclothed involuntarily," Justice, 961 F.2d at 191 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Appellant is entitled to have a properly instructed jury decide whether it crossed the line from incidental observation to impermissible inspection.
Having determined that the erroneous instruction could have impacted the jury's verdict, we reject defendants' fallback contention that such error should not lead to a new trial because the jury's judgment may have signaled a determination that the searches 0907 lawful or not 0907 did not stem from a widespread practice or custom attributable to the defendants.[14] That possibility is not enough, however, to avoid retrial. Appellant is entitled to a new trial unless the error, which was preserved by objection, can be deemed harmless. On this record, we cannot say that the jurors probably would have found the defendants blameless if they found that a constitutional violation occurred.
The record contains adequate evidence to permit a jury to conclude that appellant's experience was typical of clothing searches at the Hancock County Jail. First, appellant testified that when he asked on May 27th at the outset of the search why he needed to take off his clothes, he was told it was "routine procedure." Second, Officer Rivers, after testifying that memos are generated on searches only when circumstances require multiple officers to participate, stated that no memo was prepared on the May 27th search because "[i]t was a routine search to me." Third, the fact that appellant himself experienced two separate searches conducted similarly by two different officers, on two different dates, further suggests a standard practice. Finally, the jurors could have viewed the standard clothing search as described by Administrator Hannan to include at least a brief inspection of inmates' naked bodies. On that basis 0907 and with the correct definition of a strip search in mind 0907 the jury may have found official knowledge of a practice of strip searching misdemeanants.
In so concluding, we hasten to add that the defendants' assertions to the contrary do not indicate an attempt to mislead. The labels applied to searches do not always reflect a common understanding of the procedures that will be utilized. Although the Hancock County Jail officers disclaimed doing strip searches, for example, their understanding of what such a search entails is informed by the jail's policy. And, while the strip search definition contained in Policy D-220 is consistent with our precedent 0907 "[a] visual search of an inmate which requires the

removal of all clothing, to include a search of the clothes removed" 0907 the detailed procedures spelled out for a strip search have the effect of narrowing the scope of the definition by requiring particularized scrutiny of certain body parts. See note 3 supra.[15] Thus, a jury could find that defendants truthfully denied conducting strip searches, within their understanding of what that entailed, but nonetheless committed a constitutional violation by inspecting appellant's body in a manner that federal law would deem a strip search.
67 We therefore conclude that appellant is entitled to a new trial on his claims of *67 constitutional injury arising from the searches on May 27th and July 10th.
B. Instruction on Post-Contact Visit Strip Search
Appellant's second complaint centers on the court's instruction on the July 11th strip search:
I'll now discuss with you the alleged July 11th, 2001 postcontact strip-search issue. I instruct you that without more strip-searching all prisoners after all contact visits in order to prevent smuggling of contraband is not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
However, plaintiff may present to you additional facts that make the application of a postcontact visit strip-searching policy unreasonable under the circumstances of this case. In the postcontact visit context, a search is reasonable where the need for the search outweighs the resulting invasion of privacy.
Among those things you should consider when making this determination are the scope of the search, the manner in which it was conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place where it was conducted. When balancing these interests, keep in mind that the central objective of jail administration is safeguarding institutional security. You should accord deference to the policies and practices that jail administrators consider necessary to preserve internal order and discipline.
Remember, in order to recover, plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his strip search following a contact visit on July 11th, 2001, was unreasonable....
Appellant argues that this instruction failed to follow the blueprint for evaluating strip searches that the Supreme Court set out in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-60, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). In considering the constitutionality of a prison's blanket policy of strip searching inmates after contact visits, the Court articulated a "test of reasonableness" that requires "a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails." Id. at 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861. Factors to be weighed are "the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted." Id. Applying that test, the Court in Bell upheld the strip searches at issue.
Appellant's two-pronged argument is, first, that the district court improperly preempted the jury's balancing by directing it to presume the July 11th search was reasonable, and, second, that the court then unfairly cemented the presumption by advising the jury to defer to jail policies and practices. We conclude that the instruction as given fairly presented the relevant law.
We agree with appellant that the Bell balancing test is the correct starting point for assessing any strip search. But Bell and other cases lead inevitably to the district court's conclusion that it is presumptively reasonable for a detention facility to conduct strip searches after contact visits. In Bell, the Court recognized that all such facilities are "fraught with serious security dangers," and that smuggling of drugs, weapons and other contraband "is all too common an occurrence," id. The Court further observed that the lack of reported cases of smuggling at the Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York, the institution at issue in Bell, "may be more a testament to the effectiveness of this search technique as a deterrent than to any lack of interest on the part of the inmates to secrete and import such items when the opportunity arises," id.
68 *68 The particular risk posed by contact visits is a theme repeated in the case law and substantiated by this record. In Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586, 104 S.Ct. 3227, 82 L.Ed.2d 438 (1984), the Supreme Court made the following observations in deciding that a detention facility could constitutionally prohibit contact visits:

Contact visits invite a host of security problems. They open the institution to the introduction of drugs, weapons, and other contraband. Visitors can easily conceal guns, knives, drugs, or other contraband in countless ways and pass them to an inmate unnoticed by even the most vigilant observers. And these items can readily be slipped from the clothing of an innocent child, or transferred by other visitors permitted close contact with inmates.
See also Goff v. Nix, 803 F.2d 358, 364-65 (8th Cir.1986) ("The record in this case reflects what this Court and other courts know and long have acknowledged, namely that weapons, drugs, and other items of contraband are serious problems in our nation's prisons. The director of security at [the facility] testified that a substantial portion of the contraband at the prison is introduced through contact visitation.").
In this case, both Administrator Hannan and the county's expert witness, William Sturgeon, testified that contact visits are a significant source of contraband in jails, and that seemingly harmless items 0907 such as pens and paper clips 0907 can be transferred innocently and used in harmful ways. Paper clips, for example, can be used to jam and open handcuffs, pick locks, or poke someone. Hannon stated that she was aware of about a dozen occasions during her correctional career when a family member or friend had tried to deliver, or had delivered, contraband to an inmate during a contact visit. Although the Hancock County Jail had reported in response to Sturgeon's inquiry no instances of contraband being found during a strip search, he-like the Supreme Court 0907 observed that the low numbers may be attributable to the deterrent effect of strip search policies.
Viewed from the perspective of our precedent on strip-searching misdemeanor detainees, Bell's teaching is that the widely acknowledged risk posed by contact visits furnishes sufficient suspicion to justify a blanket policy. And, guided by Bell, other courts evaluating the constitutionality of strip searches, including our own, have noted the distinctive need to search that arises from contact visits. See, e.g., Roberts, 239 F.3d at 111 ("Courts have given prisons far more leeway in conducting searches of inmates with outside contact than in searching everyone, simply because such visits often allow smuggling of contraband."); id. at 113 ("Both the Supreme Court in Bell and this court in Arruda [v. Fair, 710 F.2d 886 (1st Cir. 1983)] have suggested that an individualized reasonable suspicion is not necessary to search certain groups of inmates, such as those who receive visitors....");[16]Shain v. Ellison, 273 F.3d 56, 64 (2d Cir. 2001) ("... Bell authorized strip searches after contact visits, where contraband often is passed."); Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 332 (9th Cir.1988) ("Visual body cavity searches 69 conducted after contact visits as a means of preventing prisoners' possession of weapons and contraband, *69 even absent probable cause, have been found reasonable by the Supreme Court.").
We thus read Bell to hold that, except in atypical circumstances, a blanket policy of strip searching inmates after contact visits is constitutional. The Court acknowledged that circumstances may occur to render such a search unreasonable-"on occasion a security guard may conduct the search in an abusive fashion" 0907 and its opinion emphasizes that such treatment will not be tolerated. 441 U.S. at 560, 99 S.Ct. 1861 ("The searches must be conducted in a reasonable manner.").
The challenged instruction accurately reflected this state of the law, advising the jury that strip searching appellant following contact visits was permissible unless "additional facts ... make the application of a postcontact visit strip-searching policy unreasonable under the circumstances of this case." Appellant had the opportunity to argue that the search at issue here was unreasonable, and did so. Counsel's argument highlighted that the visitor with whom appellant had contact was his lawyer, an unlikely source of contraband. Counsel further urged jurors to consider that the jail's history showed an absence of contraband entering through contact visits, that the risks were low because minimum- and maximum-security inmates were housed separately, that appellant was never offered the option of a non-contact visit, and that other alternatives were available for detecting contraband.
The jury, however, heard testimony that even professionals such as lawyers and counselors may innocently transfer items that seem innocuous but can be used as tools or weapons. The county also responded to appellant's other suggestions of unreasonableness; Sturgeon testified, for example, that the alternative of a "correctional pat search" would involve significant physical contact that inmates may view as more distasteful than a quick visual search. Appellant did not contend that the search procedure itself was unreasonable, and the record reveals no unusual elements. It was done in a private area, by a single officer of the same gender, and without physical contact. Also unavailing is appellant's complaint that the jury's consideration of reasonableness

was compromised because the court invited undue deference to jail administrators. In Bell, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that
[p]rison administrators ... should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.
441 U.S. at 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861. The instruction largely mirrored this language.
To be sure, a more ideal charge could have been crafted. Rather than beginning with the presumption of constitutionality, we think it would have been preferable for the court to start with the general balancing test articulated in Bell before going on to say that the Supreme Court has sanctioned strip searches following contact visits so long as they are reasonable. Likewise, to fully inform the jury on the nature of the "wide-ranging deference" due to jail administrators, we think an instruction specifically noting its limits would be helpful. Appellant's Requested Jury Instruction # 12, drawn from our decision in Roberts, see 239 F.3d at 113, is one possible example: "A blanket strip search policy cannot be justified simply on the basis of administrative ease in addressing security considerations."
The instruction as given, however, adequately informed the jury of its task, and we therefore affirm the judgment 70 for defendants *70 on the post-contact strip search claim.
III. Conclusion
The overly narrow definition of "strip search" contained in the jury instructions improperly limited the jury's deliberations on the nature of the May 27th and July 10th searches. Appellant is therefore entitled to a new trial on his claims of constitutional injury arising from those searches. The jury charge on the July 11th post-contact strip search accurately reflected the law, however, and we therefore affirm the jury's judgment that no constitutional injury occurred in connection with that search.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for a partial new trial. No costs.
[1] The complaint, whose caption identifies Sheriff William Clark and Administrator Linda Hannan by their titles, and the verdict form, which asks for a single judgment against all three defendants, indicate that the individuals were sued only in their official capacities. As such, their liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is indistinguishable from the county's, and our analysis therefore proceeds on the assumption that only governmental liability is at issue. See Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 472 n. 21, 105 S.Ct. 873, 83 L.Ed.2d 878 (1985); Nereida-Gonzalez v. Tirado-Delgado, 990 F.2d 701, 705 (1st Cir.1993).
[2] The clothing search process is described by Policy D-220 (Procedure K(4)) as follows:
As the inmate removes each piece of clothing they will hand it to the officer who will thoroughly check it for contraband. Once all clothing has been checked the inmate will be given back the clothing he/she may retain. The rest of the clothing will be inventoried and placed in the property box assigned to that inmate.
Jail Policy C-120, which covers admissions procedures, also addresses clothing searches. It states, in relevant part:
1. In order to ensure the health, safety and security of the inmates and staff, each inmate being assigned to a housing unit will be required to shower as part of the admissions process. Inmates will disrobe and shower while in the presence of the Corrections Officer (same sex) in the shower room located in the medical room.
2. The Corrections Officer will conduct a search of the inmate[']s clothing and personal effects for contraband and vermin as the inmate prepares to shower....
[3] The strip search process is described by Policy D-220 (Procedure C(5)) as follows:

Once the inmate has removed all their clothing and handed it to the officer, the officer shall conduct a visual search of the inmate to include having the inmate shake out their hair, check inside the mouth, ears, nose, their arm pits, bottoms of their feet, under the scrotum (where applicable), lift their breasts (where applicable) and finally have the inmate bend over, spread their butt cheeks and cough. In addition, the inmate's clothing and footwear shall be searched.
[4] Contrary to the officers' report, Wood testified that, after he showered and while still naked, he was ordered to raise his hands over his head and to turn around completely. He further claimed that he was directed to open his mouth and move his tongue around and ordered to bend down, facing away from the officers, and to touch his toes.
[5] Multiple provisions of Policy D-220 call for sensitivity in implementing searches. Procedure A states that "[j]ail staff will conduct searches in the least degrading manner possible," and Procedures C(4) and K(3) state that strip searches and clothing searches "shall be conducted in private only by and in the presence of, the minimum number of officers of the same sex as the inmate, which are necessary to accomplish the search and to maintain security and protection."
[6] Appellant testified that he again was further searched after he showered, while naked. He stated that he was told to raise his hands over his head, turn around 360 degrees, open his mouth and move his tongue around, and rub his fingers through his hair.
[7] Policy F-150 on "Inmate Visiting" states that "[a]fter any contact visit, all inmates will be strip searched before being returned to their housing unit or work area."
[8] Appellant's requested version was as follows:
A strip search includes any exposure or observation of a portion of a person's body where that person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. This specifically includes prisoners who are watched by corrections personnel while they change from personal clothing into detention clothing.
[9] We recognized in Blackburn that "strip search" is an "umbrella term" covering several increasingly intrusive procedures. In addition to the general term, defined as quoted above, we noted that a "`visual body cavity search' extends to visual inspection of the anal and genital areas" and that a "`manual body cavity search' includes some degree of touching or probing of body cavities." 771 F.2d at 561 n. 3; see also Savard, 338 F.3d at 25 (separately defining "visual body cavity searches" as "inspections of the anal and genital areas.")
[10] We recognize that a strip search may occur even when an inmate is not fully disrobed, but this case does not require us to explore when "something less than full nudity," Stanley v. Henson, 337 F.3d 961, 964 (7th Cir.2003), would constitute a strip search. See, e.g., Amaechi v. West, 237 F.3d 356, 365 & n. 15 (4th Cir.2001) (noting that Virginia statutory definition, similar to most states, provides that "`[s]trip search shall mean having an arrested person remove or arrange some or all of his clothing so as to permit a visual inspection of the genitals, buttocks, anus, female breasts, or undergarments of such person'") (emphasis added and deleted).
[11] "Inspect" is defined as "to look carefully at or over; view closely and critically," as well as "to view or examine formally or officially." See The Random House Dictionary, at 987.
[12] We note that appellant's proposed alternative also was flawed. His version, defining a strip search to include any exposure or observation of private body parts, would seem to extend our accepted formulation by including incidental viewing of portions of the body.
That appellant's request overshot its mark does not nullify his objection to the court's instruction. Although he was not entitled to his request, see Estate of Keatinge v. Biddle, 316 F.3d 7, 17 (1st Cir.2002) ("A refusal to give a particular instruction constitutes reversible error only if the requested instruction was ... correct as a matter of substantive law ...."), his objection 0907 that the court too narrowly defined a strip search-was stated with sufficient specificity to meet the "distinctness" requirement of Fed.R.Civ.P. 51. The Rule provides that, to preserve an objection to an instruction, a party must "stat[e] distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection." Fed.R.Civ.P. 51(c)(1). Counsel made the following objection:

To the extent that your definition 0907 the court's definition of a strip search involves a ... deliberate ... visual inspection and continues on to include the phrase which includes the examination of the mouth and armpits. The basis for the objection is the First Circuit seemingly-it seems to have approved a broader definition of what a strip search might involve.
The court replied, "Any other objections?"
Particularly in light of our longstanding precedent on strip searches, counsel's objection served as adequate notice of appellant's claim of error. Cf. Keatinge, 316 F.3d at 15; Parker v. City of Nashua, 76 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir.1996).
[13] We note that, to the extent that a behind-a-screen disrobing would be less effective in detecting concealed items, that might simply be an unavoidable consequence of protecting an individual's right to privacy. Our case law on misdemeanor arrestees effectively holds that, even if the only way to be comprehensive in detecting contraband is to perform a strip search, the government must bear the risk of missing some items. We emphasize that we are not holding that "clothing searches" must allow private areas for undressing; we simply wish to point out that balancing constitutional rights and institutional needs may require that, in situations presenting only a remote risk of concealment, we accept less than perfect law enforcement procedures.
[14] The jury was not asked to consider whether the strip searches stemmed from an official policy, the other Monell prong. See supra at 64.
[15] Indeed, John Hinkley, the Maine Department of Corrections' jail inspector, testified that the state, through rules set by the attorney general's office, defines a strip search to include a body cavity search.
[16] We note that, in Miller v. Kennebec County, 219 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir.2000), we did not distinguish between a strip search conducted as part of the intake process and two subsequent strip searches following the plaintiff's contact visits with family members. Nor did we analyze the rationale for strip searching inmates following contact visits. We therefore do not view Miller as helpful authority on that issue.
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