Case: 1:13-cv-08449 Document #: 1 Filed: 11/22/13 Page 1 of 18 PageID #:1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

VERNITA GRAY and PATRICIA EWERT, Plaintiffs,
v. DAVID ORR, in his official capacity as COOK COUNTY CLERK,
Defendant.

) ) ) ) ) Case No. 1:13-cv-8449 ) ) Hon. Judge ) Magistrate Judge ) ) )

VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 1. This civil rights case ch allenges as unconstitutional the statutes excluding lesbian
and gay couples from marriage in Illinois, 750 ILCS 5/212(a)(5); 750 ILCS 5/201; 750 ILCS 5/203(2), and 750 ILCS 5/213.1 (collectively, the “marriage ban”), which, absent relief from this Court, will rem ain in effect until J une 1, 2014. Plaintiffs VERNITA GRAY (“Vernita”) an d PATRICIA EWERT (“Pat”) (together, “Plaintiffs”) are two women that have been in a long-term committed relationship f or m ore tha n f ive year s, and in 20 11 ente red into a c ivil union when civil unions becam e availab le in Illinois. Vernita suffers from term inal breas t can cer tha t has metastasized to her bones and brai n. Vernita m ay only have weeks le ft to live. Vernita and her long-time partner, Pat, wish to be married in the State of Illinois before Vernita passes away.

2. An i mmediate injunction prohibiting enfor cement of the Illinois m arriage ban is the only way to ensure that Plaintiffs’ hope of be ing legally married will be realized during their lifetimes. Although the Illinois le gislature recently enacted a la w that will allow sam e-sex couples to marry, S.B. 10, Ill. 98th Gen. Assemb., First Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013), that law does not go into effe ct until June 1, 2014. This delay of more than six m onths effectively bars Vernita

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and Pat from marriage altogether in violation of the guarantees of Equal Protection and Due Process in the United S tates Constitution. Allo wing Vernita and Pat to m arry now is the only way to avoid denying them their constitu tionally guaranteed right to marry, and the benef its and protections that accrue to a surviving spouse.
3. Plaintiffs seek a temporary restrain ing order, prelim inary injunction, and permanent injunction that prohibits Defendant DAVID ORR from enforcing the Illinois marriage ban as applied to Vernita and Pat, requires OR R to issue a m arriage license to Vernita and Pat upon their application and satisfaction of all lega l requirements for a marriage in Cook County except for the requ irement th at they be of differ ent sexes, and requires ORR to register their solemnized m arriage as is presen tly required fo r all oth er m arriages. Plai ntiffs fu rther seek a declaration that the marriage ban is unconstitutional.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 4. Plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 to redress the deprivation under color of state law of rights secured by the United States Constitution. 5. Jurisdiction over the federal claims is conferred on this Court by 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1343(a)(3) and (a)(4). Jurisd iction to grant the declaratory relief requested is provided under 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
PARTIES 6. Plaintiff VERNITA GRAY is a citizen of th e United States. She resides in Cook County, Illinois. She is in a long-term, committed relationship with PATRICIA EWERT.
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7. Plaintiff PATRICIA EW ERT is a citiz en of the United State s. She reside s in Cook County, Illinois. She is in a long-term, committed relationship with VERNITA GRAY.
8. Defendant DAVID OR R (“COOK COUNTY CLER K”) is sued in his official capacity as COOK COUNTY CLERK and has offices at 50 W est Washington Street, Chicago, Illinois 60602. The C OOK COUNTY CLE RK is au thorized and required by law to issue marriage licenses and certificates for marriage licenses in Cook County. 750 ILCS 5/203.
9. Parties to a prospective m arriage in Cook County m ay apply for and obtain a marriage license from the COOK COUNTY CLERK. 750 ILCS 5/203.
10. If all legal requirem ents for a m arriage in Cook County are m et by applicants for a marriage license, the COOK COUNTY CLERK “sha ll issue a license to marry and a m arriage certificate.” 750 ILCS 5/203.
11. A license to marry is effective the day after issuance and permits a marriage to be solemnized only in the county in which it was issued. 750 ILCS 5/207.
12. The marriage certificate for m arriage in Cook County m ust be com pleted within ten days after the m arriage is solemnized, and returned to the COOK COUNTY CLER K. 750 ILCS 5/209.
13. The COOK COUNTY CLERK m ust register solemnized marriages and “make to the [Illinois] Departm ent of Public Health a return of su ch m arriage” by forwarding required forms and data to the Department. 750 ILCS 5/209, 5/210, 5/211; 410 ILCS 535/23.
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14. Applicants for a m arriage license for a Cook County m arriage m ust furnish the COOK COUNTY CLERK with “satisfactory proof th at the m arriage is not prohibited.” 750 ILCS 5/203.
15. On or about Nove mber 20, 2013, Pat called the office of the COOK COUNT Y CLERK located at 50 West W ashington, Chicago, Illinois 60602. Pat stated to an e mployee of the COOK COUNTY CLER K that she and Vernita wished to m arry each other before June 2014, and wished to apply for a m arriage license. An employee of Defendant COOK COUNT Y CLERK informed Pat that the office of the COOK COUNTY CLERK could not issue a marriage license to Plaintiffs until June 2014 solely becau se each is a lesbian person who seeks to marry a person of the same sex.
FACTS A. Vernita Gray’s Background 16. VERNITA GRAY, 64, has lived in Illino is all her lif e. Vernita r eceived her undergraduate degree in Creative Writing from Columbia College in Chicago. Vernita has been active in the LGBT community in Chicago since her time at Columbia College.
17. Vernita has dedicated her professional life to public se rvice. Vernita spent 20 years working as a victim s’ advocate in the Cook County court system s. Vernita served as the LGBT liais on in the Cook County State’s Attorney ’s Office. In reco gnition of her work to combat hate crim es, Vernita was invited to the W hite House in 2009 for the signing of The Matthew Shepard and Jam es Byrd, Jr. Hate Cr imes Prevention Act of 2009, 18 U.S.C. § 249. Vernita feels very fortunate to have served Cook County and the LGBT community.
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B. Pat Ewert’s Background 18. PATRICIA EW ERT, 65, has been a resi dent of Cook County since 1980. Pat currently w orks as the community outreach coordinator for Illinoi s State Representative Kelly Cassidy. S he was previously the Executive Di rector of a nonprofit organization, Lives on Target. Pat is a breast cancer survivor.
C. Pat and Vernita’s Introduction 19. Vernita and Pat have been a committed couple for m ore than five years. They met at an event hosted by the Cook County Stat e’s Attorney’s Office . Pat attended as a representative of the C hicago Foundation for Wom en’s Lesbian L eadership Council. At their first meeting, Vernita invited Pat to join the S tate’s Attorney’s contingent at the Chicago Pride Parade.
20. While attending the Pride Parade, Vernita and Pat became acquainted and bonded over a m utual love of comm unity activism and politics. They attended a second political event together and then decided to go on their first date. Vernita and Pat spent their first date enjoying a play at the Chicago Shakespeare Theater. After their first date they became inseparable.
D. Pat’s and Vernita’s Engagement and Commitment 21. Neither Ver nita nor Pat expec ted to f all in love quickly, but th ey bo th realized early on that they had found their match in one another. They began a committed relationship of mutual love and support that continues to this day.
22. Vernita knew she wanted to spend the rest of her life with Pat and decided to propose at Christmas in 2009. Vernita surprised Pat with an engagement ring and they solidified their lifelong commitment to one another.
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23. Vernita and Pat have participated in several commitment ceremonies but are eager to have their relationship recognized as m arriage. On June 2, 2011, Vernita and Pat w ere among the first 29 couples to participate in a civ il union ceremony in Millennium Park. Then, on August 13, 2011, Vernita and Pat exchanged vows in a religious ceremony.

E. 24. brain.

Vernita’s Illness Vernita is c urrently battling breast cancer that has m etastasized to her bones and

25. Vernita was first diagnosed with breast cancer in 1996 a nd she underwent a lumpectomy as well as chemotherapy and radiation to fight the cancer. Vernita’s cancer returned seven years later, and in 2003 Vernita had a b ilateral m astectomy and surgery to rem ove her ovaries. Eventually the cancer required Vernita to have a full hysterectomy.

26. In 2009, Vernita went to a doctor com plaining of chest pain. After a biopsy, it was determined that her breast cancer had return ed and had m etastasized to the breast bone, and that, because of its proximity to her heart, the cancer was inoperable.

27. In 2010, Vernita developed an untreatable cough. The cancer spread to the lymph nodes behind her lungs and she was subsequently treated with radiation.

28. In 2012, the cancer spread to the lymph node s under her left arm and she required surgery to remove them.

29. In June 2013, after being ta ken to the hospital in an ambulance, Vernita and Pat learned the devastating news that V ernita’s cancer had spread to her brain. On June 11, 2013, Vernita underwent brain surgery to rem ove a golf ball-sized tumor from her cereb ellum. As a
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result of this surgery, V ernita has undergone ex tensive rehabilitation ther apy to re-learn how to walk and read and perform other basic functions that came easily before her surgery.
30. The brain s urgery left Vernita almost co mpletely debilitated and she has had to work very hard to regain her strength and energ y. Vernita and Pat know that, as a result of her brain cancer, Vernita’s final decline, when it happens, will be swift, and she may have only days or weeks left to live as of the date of filing this Complaint.
31. Throughout Vernita’s battle with cancer, Pat has been a constant source of love and support. Vernita reli es on Pat to help her m ake small and large decisions a bout her health. Vernita and Pat have faced trem endous challeng es throughout their relationship as a result of Vernita’s struggle with breast cancer, but their love and commitment has never wavered. Vernita and Pat truly understand what it means to love someone “in sickness and in health.”
F. Illinois Prohibits Marriage of Same-Sex Couples Until June 1, 2014 32. Illinois law excludes lesbian and gay c ouples from marriage. T he Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, 750 ILCS 5/201 (the “Marri age Act”) authorizes marriages “between a m an and a wom an,” 750 ILCS 5/201, expressly prohibits m arriage “between 2 individuals of the sam e sex,” 750 IL CS 5/212(a)(5), and states that marriages of same-sex couples are “contrary to the public policy of this state,” 750 ILCS 5/213.1. The provisions of the Marriage Act that individually and collectively exclude lesbian and gay couples from marriage are referred to herein as the “marriage ban.”
33. The Marria ge Act further s tates that any m arriage contracted in another jurisdiction that would be prohibi ted if solem nized in I llinois “shall b e null and void f or all purposes in this state with the sam e effect as though such prohibited m arriage had been entered
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into in this state.” 750 ILCS 5/216(a). A m arriage between pe rsons of the sam e-sex legally entered into in another jurisd iction is recogn ized in Illino is solely as a civil union. 750 ILCS 75/60.
34. To be valid under the Illinoi s statutes, a m arriage must be “licensed, solem nized, and registered” in accordance with the Marriage Act. 750 ILCS 5/207.
35. Plaintiffs ar e unable to enter into a le gally sanctioned civil marriage in Illinois without a marriage license. Common law marriages are not valid in Illinois. 750 ILCS 5/214.
36. Civil m arriage plays a unique role in soci ety a s the univ ersally recogn ized an d celebrated hallm ark of a couple’s comm itment to build fam ily life together. Although civil unions provide substantially sim ilar legal responsi bilities and legal rights to sam e-sex couples under Illinois law, differences rem ain between th e two statuses. Because of these differences, coupled with the stigm a of exclusion and of ha ving their fa milies branded as inferior by th eir government, same-sex couples suffer both tangible and dignitary harms due to the currently stillin-effect marriage ban, all of which are of constitutional dimension.
37. The status of m arriage has unique soci al signif icance and recognition. W ithout access to the fa miliar language and label o f m arriage, Plaintiffs are unable instan tly or adequately to communicate to others the depth or perm anence of their commitment, or to obtain respect for that commitment as others do simply by invoking their married status.
38. Plaintiffs’ exclusion from marriage frustrates their life goals and dream s, their ability to fulfill their personal values, their happiness and self-determination. For Plaintiffs ,
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marriage is a deeply held value. Vernita wants to be married in Illinois, her home state. Vernita was born in Illinois and has lived in Illinois for her entire life.

39. There is no social or cultural instituti on, legal m echanism, or status that can substitute f or leg al m arriage and pr ovide Vern ita and Pat what m arriage would provide them . Civil unions are a novel status in Illinois without the sam e expressive value or communicative weight and significance as m arriage. Many peopl e encountered by Plaintiffs express confusion, or otherwise indicate that they do not understand what the term “civil union” m eans, or what legal protections and responsibilities should accrue to members of a civil union. Plaintiffs m ust explain and defend their family relationship in numerous contexts.

40. Further, the federal governm ent does not accord the sam e recognition and

corresponding rights, benefits, obligations, and privileges to couples united in a civil union that it

gives to m arried couples. For example, under the federal Fam ily and Medical Leave Act,

eligible employees m ay take unpaid, job-protect ed leave for specified fam ily and m edical

reasons, with continuation of group health in surance coverage under the sam e term s and

conditions as if the em ployee had not taken leave. See 29 U.S.C. § 2614(c)(1). H owever, to

qualify as a spouse for purposes of this benefit, federal guidance currently requires a couple to be

married under the law of “the state where the employee r esides.” See 29 C.F.R. § 825.102

(emphasis added); http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs28f.htm (last viewed Nov. 18,

2013). The m arriage ban in Illinois prevents couples in civil unions from m eeting this

requirement, as couples in civil unions are not m arried in the state where they reside, and even if

they were to marry in another st ate, they s till would rem ain ine ligible f or this f ederal b enefit,

which is of particular im portance to c ouples facing serious health concerns.

See

http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs28f.htm (last viewed Nov. 18, 2013). Couples

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who are in civil unions , but not married, also will be denied spousal tax benefits, including exemption from certain esta te tax obliga tions. See United States v. Windsor , 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013); see also http://www.irs.gov/irb/2013-44_IRB/ar10.html (last viewed Nov. 19, 2013) (for federal tax purposes, the term s spouse, husband, and wife, do not include individuals who have entered into a civil union, but refer only to those who are validly married under state law).

41. The government’s ongoing enforcement of the marriage ban encourages and leads to discrim ination by others. Bearing the im primatur of the governm ent, the State of Illinois marriage ban, which relegates sam e-sex couples to the lesser status of civil union, not only causes confusion regarding the legal rights of sam e-sex couples, but also invites others to follow the governm ent’s example in discri minating against them. Vernita and Pat fea r that they will face discrimination in h ealth care s ettings and el sewhere as a result of their inability to m arry, and confusion concerning their civil union status.

G. Illinois Recently Amended the Illinois Marriage Act to Allow Marriage of Same-Sex Couples

42. On Nove mber 5, 2013, both houses of th e Illinois General Assem bly passed

Senate Bill 10, which am ends the Illinois Marriage Act to allow sam e-sex couples to be legally

married in Illinois. S.B. 10, Ill. 98th Gen.

Assemb., Fi rst Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013). This

amendment, however, does not become effective until June 1, 2014.

43. On June 1, 2014, Defendant DAVI D ORR will be required to accept applications to marry from sa me-sex couples who are of lawful age, are not m arried to any other person, are prepared to pay all applicable fees, and who otherwise meet all legal requirements to marry.

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44. Because Senate Bill 10 was passed after May 31, it canno t “becom e effective prior to June 1 of the ne xt calendar year unless the General Assembly by the vote of three-fifths of the m embers elected to each house provides for an earlier effective date.” Ill. Const. art. IV, § 10. The General Assem bly did not provide for an earlier effective date and therefore, without action from this Court, the Illinois marriage ban will continue to be enforced until June 1, 2014.
45. The passage of Senate Bill 10 removes a ny remaining doubt that, as a m atter of policy, there is no legitim ate governm ental inte rest served by denying same-sex couples the ability to marry. Because, however, that law doe s not take effect until June 1, 2014, Vernita and Pat will experience ongoing depriva tion of their constitutional right to marry in the interim, and this delay may constitute an absolute bar to marrying, preventing them ever from being married.
H. Need for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction 46. Vernita and Pat have been in love for more than five years. They very much want the world to officially remember and record their relationship as the union of a married couple.
47. Unfortunately, Vernita may pass away in th e near f uture. Unless this Court acts, Vernita and Pat will be perm anently denied th e benef its, both tangib le and dignitary, of legal marriage. For exam ple, unless Plain tiffs ar e allowed to lega lly m arry, they m ay f ace discrimination in hospital se ttings, an esta te tax burden, a nd other h arms, including challenges establishing eligib ility f or social s ecurity be nefits as a surviving spouse. Given Vernita’s extensive m edical expe nses, th e ad ditional cos t of being denied acce ss to lega l m arriage is particularly burdensome.
48. Because the Illinois Marriage Act prohibits marriages between two indiv iduals of the same sex, Defendant DAVID ORR is required to deny a m arriage license to two persons of
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the same sex who wish to be legally m arried. The Illinois m arriage ban is unconstitutional and Defendant should be enjoined from enforcing the ban as applied to Plaintiffs.
49. There is no adequate rem edy at law. Vernita and Pat are suffering irrep arable harm as described herein. There is no har m to the State of Illinois by granting a tem porary restraining order and prelim inary injunction prohibiting enforcement of the ch allenged statute as applied to the Plaintiffs with respect to the issuance of a marriage license. The harm to Plaintiffs is sever e. The public inte rest is c learly serv ed by this Court acting to order Defendant to immediately stop enforcing the Illinois marriage ban as applied to Plaintiffs. Only prompt action by this federal court ordering injunctive relief will serve the public interest.
CLAIM FOR RELIEF 50. Because Defendant is prohibited by th e m arriage ban f rom issuing m arriage licenses to Plaintiffs, Defendant, acting under color of law, has violated, and continues to violate, the rights secured to Pla intiffs by th e Fourteenth Amendment to the United Sta tes Constitution, including the right to due process of law and the right to equal protection under the law.
COUNT ONE: DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS 51. Plaintiffs realleg e and incorporate all p rior a llegations m ade in this Com plaint into this Count as if fully restated herein. 52. The United States Constitution’s Due Pro cess Clause, U.S. Const. am end. XIV, § 1, provides that no S tate shall “deprive any person of life, lib erty, or propert y without due process of law.”
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53. The right to m arry the unique person of one’s choice and to di rect the course of one’s life in this intim ate realm without undue gove rnment restriction is one of the fundam ental liberty interests protected for all by the United States Constitution. The guarantees of liberty, privacy, dignity, and autonomy contained in this Clause protect each individual’s rights to family integrity and association, and to make decisions about personal relationships and about whether and when to create a family free of unwarranted government interference.
54. The inability of Defendant to issu e m arriage licen ses to Plaintiffs because th e Illinois Marriage Act prohibits m arriages between two individuals of the sam e sex has harm ed Plaintiffs.
55. Ongoing enforcem ent of the m arriage ban in terferes directly and substantially with Plaintiffs’ choice of whom to m arry, inte rfering with a core, life-altering, and intim ate personal choice.
56. Ongoing enforcem ent of the m arriage ban in terferes directly and substantially with each P laintiff’s deeply intim ate, personal, and private decis ions regarding family life, and precludes them from obtaining full liberty, dignity, integrity, autonomy, and security for themselves and their family.
57. Ongoing enforcem ent of the m arriage ban thus denies and abridges Plaintiffs’ fundamental right to m arry, fundamental right of privacy, and gua rantee of personal liberty, and penalizes Plaintiffs’ self-determination in the most intimate sphere of their lives.
58. Ongoing enforcem ent of the m arriage b an has no co mpelling or otherwis e sufficient justification, especially co nsidering the passage of Senate Bill 10, which removes any
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remaining doubt that, as a matter of policy, there is no legitimate governmental interest served by denying Pla intiffs the a bility to m arry. Defen dant’s actio ns as a re sult of th e m arriage ba n violate Plaintiffs’ righ t of substan tive du e process under the United States Constitu tion, Amendment XIV, § 1.
COUNT TWO: DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION 59. Plaintiffs realleg e and incorporate all p rior a llegations m ade in this Com plaint into this Count as if fully restated herein.
60. The United States Constitu tion’s Equal Protection Clause, U.S. Const. a mend. XIV, § 1, provides that no State shall “deny to any person within its jurisd iction the equa l protection of the laws.”
61. Ongoing enforcem ent of the m arriage ban violates Plaintiffs ’ right to equal protection of the laws by discriminating impermissibly on the basis of sexual orientation and sex.
62. The Illinois m arriage b an violates the e qual protection guarantee of the United States Constitution, amend. XIV, § 1, both facially and as applied to Plaintiffs.
63. Plaintiffs are sim ilarly situated to different -sex spouses in every relevant respect. Plaintiffs are as worthy of respect, dignity, so cial a cceptance, and leg itimacy as different-sex spouses and their children. The emotional, rom antic, and dignitary reasons Plaintiffs seek to marry are similar to those of different-sex couples who choose to marry.
64. Ongoing enforcement of the marriage ban has harmed the Plaintiffs.
65. The Illinois marriage ban denies Plaintiffs equal dignity and respect and relegates them to a status tha t is demonstrably inferior. The Illinois marriage ban brands lesbians and gay
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men as members of less worthy families through a message of government-imposed stigma, and causes private bias and discrimination.
66. The Illinois m arriage ban reflects anim us, moral disapproval, and antipathy toward lesbians and gay men.
67. The Illinois m arriage ban targe ts lesbian an d gay Illin oisans as a class f or exclusion from m arriage and disc riminates against Plaintiffs ba sed on their sexual orientation and sex both facially and as applied.
68. The Illinois marriage ban also discriminates against Plaintiffs in the enjoyment of equal liberties and equal exercise of fundamental rights.
69. Regardless of the level of scrutin y applied, Def endant’s inability to issue Plaintiffs a m arriage license lack s even a rati onal justif ication, le t alone an important or compelling one, especially considering the pa ssage of Senate Bill 10, which removes any remaining doubt that, as a matter of policy, there is no legitimate governmental interest served by denying sam e-sex couples the ab ility to m arry. There is no rational justificatio n for denying Plaintiffs the equal righ t to m arry now, which for them is the only m eaningful time when they may be able to exercise that right. Defendant’s actions, as required by the Illinois marriage ban, violate Plaintiffs’ right of equal protection under the United States Constitu tion, Am endment XIV, § 1.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request that this Court:
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70. Declare that Defendant’s inability to issue a marriage license to Plaintiffs viola tes the due process and equal protection guarantees of the United States Constitution.
71. Issue a tem porary restraining order, followed by prelim inary and perm anent injunctions, against Defendant and all those acting in concer t enjoining Defendant from enforcing the Illinois marriage ban as applied to Plaintiffs.
72. Award to Plaintiffs reasonable costs, expenses, and attorney fees. 73. Award such other and further relief as this Court shall deem just and reasonable.
Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Jordan M. Heinz Emily Nicklin, P.C. (Atty No. 2050560) Jordan M. Heinz (Atty No. 6286377) Jeremy Press (Atty No. 6309943) Mishan Wroe (Atty No. 6314306) KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP 300 North LaSalle Street Chicago, Illinois 60654 Tel: (312) 862-2000 Fax: (312) 862-2200
Camilla B. Taylor Christopher R. Clark LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, INC. Midwest Regional Office 105 West Adams, Suite 2600 Chicago, Illinois 60603 Tel: (312) 663-4413 Fax: (312) 663-4307
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Dated: November 22, 2013

John A. Knight Harvey Grossman Karen Sheley ROGER BALDWIN FOUNDATION OF ACLU, INC. 180 North Michigan Avenue, Suite 2300 Chicago, Illinois 60601 Tel: (312) 201-9740 Fax: (312) 288-5225
Marc O. Beem (Atty No. 00155284) Zachary J. Freeman (Atty No. 06281413) M. David Weisman (Atty No. 6230714) Kay L. Dawson (Atty No. 6312631)\ MILLER SHAKMAN & BEEM LLP 180 North LaSalle Street, Suite 3600 Chicago, Illinois 60601 Tel: (312) 263-3700 Fax: (312) 263-3270
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Jordan M. Heinz, an attorney, certif y that on November 22, 2013, I caused the foregoing document to be served via same-day messenger on the following counsel:

Kent Ray Sisavahn Baker ASSISTANT STATE’S ATTORNEYS 500 Richard J. Daley Center 50 West Washington Street Chicago, IL 60602
Counsel for Defendant David Orr
Richard Huszagh Malini Rao OFFICE OF THE ILLINOIS ATTORNEY GENERAL 100 West Randolph Street Chicago, IL 60601
Counsel for the State of Illinois

_/s/

Jordan M. Heinz________________

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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

VERNITA GRAY AND PATRICIA EWERT,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

and

)

)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

)

EX REL. LISA MADIGAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL )

OF ILLINOIS,

)

)

Intervenor,

)

v.

)

)

DAVID ORR, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS

)

COOK COUNTY CLERK,

)

)

Defendant.

)

No. 13 C 8449 Judge Thomas M. Durkin

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Under current Illinois law, same-sex partners cannot be married. That will

change on June 1, 2014. On that date, Illinois will recognize marriages between

same-sex partners. Between now and then, however, same-sex couples must wait to

marry in Illinois and also wait to have their lawful marriages in other states

recognized in Illinois. Due to extraordinary and compelling circumstances, Plaintiffs

Vernita Gray and Patricia Ewert asked this Court to order Defendant Cook County

Clerk David Orr to issue them a marriage license and allow them to marry in

Illinois before June 1, 2014.

The issue presented here is a narrow one: whether the State of Illinois has

any remaining governmental interest in a law prohibiting same-sex marriage when

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it has effectively disavowed any prior justification for that law by enacting a new law that will allow same-sex couples to marry. Underlying that narrow issue is the even narrower issue of when balancing the equities in this case, have Plaintiffs demonstrated a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits of their as-applied equal protection challenge to the current Illinois law prohibiting same-sex marriage such that temporary injunctive relief should be granted.
On November 25, 2013, the Court held a hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”). Following lengthy argument from, and discussion with, the parties, this Court granted the TRO that day, finding that the balancing of equities and hardships weighed strongly in Plaintiffs’ favor. R. 21. This Order memorializes the oral findings the Court made at the hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion.1
Factual Background For purposes of evaluating Plaintiffs’ request for a TRO, the following facts are taken as true. See Ridge Chrysler Jeep, LLC v. Daimler Chrysler Servs. North Am., LLC, No. 03 C 760, 2006 WL 2808158, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 6, 2006); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). The facts of this case are compelling. Plaintiffs Vernita Gray and Patricia Ewert are Chicago residents who have been in a committed relationship for more than five years. When the Illinois General Assembly authorized civil unions for gay and lesbian couples in 2011, Gray and Ewert
1 Following the entry of the TRO, Plaintiffs married in Cook County on November 27, 2013.
2

expressed their commitment to each other by joining in such a union, taking part in both civil and religious ceremonies. Gray is now terminally ill with cancer and does not have long to live. Sadly, Gray may only have weeks to live. She and Ewert wish to marry before Gray passes away. A marriage recognized under Illinois law would allow Gray and Ewert to enjoy the same personal, emotional benefits and satisfactions that accrue to couples whose marriages are recognized by society and the State. A marriage recognized under Illinois law would also entitle Ewert to make health decisions on Gray’s behalf and receive survivor benefits, including social security and estate tax benefits.
As it stands, current Illinois law prohibits marriages between two individuals of the same sex. 750 ILCS 5/212(a)(5). On November 5, 2013, the General Assembly passed Public Act 98-597 (Senate Bill 10), which amended the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act to permit same-sex couples to legally marry in Illinois. The Governor of Illinois signed this bill into law on November 20, 2013. This amendment did not become effective immediately, however. Instead, the amendment becomes effective on June 1, 2014. See Ill. Const. art. IV, § 10. Gray’s illness will almost certainly prevent her from living until that date. Given the seriousness of Gray’s medical condition, Ewert called the Office of the Cook County Clerk, inquiring about whether the Clerk would issue a marriage license to a samesex couple before June 1, 2014. An employee informed Ewert that the Clerk could not issue that license before that date.
3

Soon thereafter, Plaintiffs filed a two-count complaint against Defendant Clerk Orr, raising both a facial and as-applied constitutional challenge to the current Illinois law. They allege that the law violates both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs also requested that the Court issue a TRO and a preliminary injunction prohibiting Clerk Orr from enforcing the Illinois statutes excluding lesbian and gay couples from marrying in Illinois as applied to them, ordering Clerk Orr to issue a marriage license to Plaintiffs, and requiring Clerk Orr to register their solemnized marriage in the same manner as all other marriages in Illinois are registered. The Illinois Attorney General moved to intervene in the litigation, but not to defend the constitutionality of the Illinois law. Rather, the Illinois Attorney General joined in Plaintiffs’ claim that the current Illinois law prohibiting same-sex marriage discriminates against individuals who wish to marry based on their sexual orientation and that such discrimination violates the Equal Protection Clause as applied to Plaintiffs.
On November 25, 2013, the Court held a hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion. At the hearing, Plaintiffs stressed the urgency of Gray’s medical condition. The Illinois Attorney General reiterated that the State did not object to the injunctive relief Plaintiffs sought; nor would such relief, the State represented, disserve the public interest. Clerk Orr, through his counsel the Cook County State’s Attorney, indicated his desire to immediately issue a marriage license to Plaintiffs but his
4

unwillingness to do so absent a court order given the constraints imposed by the current law.
Legal Standard In determining whether to grant preliminary injunctive relief, this Court must, as a threshold matter, determine whether the moving party has demonstrated: (1) some likelihood of success on the merits of the underlying claim; (2) the absence of an adequate remedy at law; and (3) the suffering of irreparable harm if preliminary relief is denied. Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 11 (7th Cir. 1992). If the moving party clears these thresholds, the Court then balances the harm to the non-moving party if preliminary relief is granted against the harm to the moving party if relief is denied, and further considers the consequences to the public interest of granting or denying relief.2 Id. at 11-12. This equitable balancing process employed by the Seventh Circuit involves a “sliding scale” analysis, “weighting harm to a party by the merit of [her] case,” Cavel Int’l, Inc. v. Madigan, 500 F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir. 2007), with the aim “to minimize the costs of a wrong decision,” Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 665 (7th Cir. 2013). “The strength of the moving party’s likelihood of success on the merits affects the balance of harms.” Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc. v. Comm’r of the Ind. State Dep’t of Health, 699 F.3d 962, 972 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Abbott, 971 F.2d at 12 (“[T]he more likely it is the plaintiff will succeed on the merits, the less the balance of irreparable harms
2 The standards for issuing a TRO are identical to those for a preliminary injunction. Long v. Bd. of Educ., Dist. 128, 167 F. Supp. 2d 988, 990 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
5

need weigh towards its side; the less likely it is the plaintiff will succeed, the more the balance need weigh towards its side.”). In other words:
Irreparable injury is not enough to support equitable relief. There also must be a plausible claim on the merits, and the injunction must do more good than harm (which is to say that the “balance of equities” favors the plaintiff). How strong a claim on the merits is enough depends on the balance of harm: the more net harm an injunction can prevent, the weaker the plaintiff’s claim on the merits can be while still supporting some preliminary relief. Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted).
Analysis At the outset, the Court briefly addresses the question of whether Plaintiffs have standing to pursue this litigation. Constitutional standing is a jurisdictional inquiry; indeed it is “an essential component of Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement.” Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 572 F.3d 440, 443 (7th Cir. 2009); see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Article III standing requires a: (1) concrete injury-in-fact; (2) causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61; see also United States v. Windsor, — U.S. —, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2685-86 (2013). There are also prudential limitations to a federal court’s exercise of jurisdiction, but these rules “are more judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.” Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2685 (internal quotation marks omitted). As the parties invoking federal
6

jurisdiction, Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing that they have standing. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
Plaintiffs here have suffered a concrete redressable injury. Clerk Orr has represented to the Court that given the current state of Illinois law, which neither allows nor recognizes same-sex marriages, he cannot issue Plaintiffs a marriage license absent a court order. Clerk Orr maintains this position despite the Illinois Attorney General’s representation that the State is not defending the constitutionality of the current Illinois law as applied to these two plaintiffs. Accordingly, because Plaintiffs have suffered a “concrete, persisting, and unredressed” injury, Article III standing exists. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2685.
The Illinois Attorney General’s decision not to defend the constitutionality of the Illinois law in court while County Clerk Orr continues to deny a marriage license to Plaintiffs presents a prudential limitation on the exercise of jurisdiction. But such a prudential limitation does not deprive the Court from exercising Article III jurisdiction. Indeed, the procedural posture here is similar to the posture of the parties in Windsor. And there, the Supreme Court concluded that Article III standing existed in the district court despite the Government’s position to agree with Windsor’s legal claim and yet refuse to give it legal effect. Id. at 2684-85, 268687 (relying on reasoning of INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)). Accordingly, a justiciable controversy under Article III exists.
Both the Illinois Attorney General and Clerk Orr have represented that they agree with Plaintiffs’ as-applied equal protection challenge to the current Illinois
7

law prohibiting marriages between same-sex partners. They submit that the current Illinois law discriminates against individuals who wish to marry based on their sexual orientation, and that the law, which classifies on the basis of sexual orientation, should be subjected to heightened equal protection scrutiny. Alternatively, they contend that the discrimination underpinning the current Illinois law cannot, as applied to Plaintiffs, withstand a rational basis review. Because Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim is the claim on which the parties focus, that is where the Court will direct its attention.
In 1977, Illinois passed the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. See Public Act 80-293; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 40, § 101, et seq. Although the Act did not explicitly prohibit same-sex couples from being married, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 40, § 212, that was the understanding when the legislation was passed, see 80th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate, Transcript of May 19, 1977, at 286-87. Nearly twenty years later, Illinois amended its Marriage Act to explicitly prohibit same-sex marriages, 750 ILCS 5/212(a)(5) (2006), and to declare same-sex marriages to be contrary to Illinois public policy, see Public Act 89-459; 750 ILCS 5/213.1 (2006).
In 2011, the Illinois General Assembly authorized “civil unions” for gay and lesbian partners, granting those couples the same rights and privileges under Illinois law afforded to opposite-sex married couples except the right to marital status and the federal rights that accompany that status. See Public Act 96-1513; 750 ILCS 75/10. Recently, the General Assembly passed, and Governor Quinn signed into law, Senate Bill 10, which permits same-sex marriages. Because Senate
8

Bill 10 was passed after May 31, 2013—it was passed by both General Assembly bodies on November 5, 2013—it could not become effective prior to June 1 of the next calendar year (i.e. 2014) absent a three-fifths vote from the members of each house of the General Assembly providing for an earlier effective date. See Ill. Const. art. IV, § 10.3 The General Assembly did not provide for an earlier effective date in Senate Bill 10, and the bill thus becomes effective on June 1, 2014.
Against this backdrop, Plaintiffs seek preliminary injunctive relief, arguing that if forced to wait to marry until June 1, 2014, they will suffer real, immediate, and irreparable harm for which there will be no adequate remedy at law. Given Gray’s medical condition and imminent death, Gray and Ewert may not be able to wait to marry until June 1, 2014 or until final resolution of their claims on the merits. Should Gray pass away before either of these two events, Gray and Ewert will never be able to obtain the relief they seek here. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have cleared the initial threshold of demonstrating entitlement to temporary injunctive relief by showing the absence of an adequate of remedy at law should temporary relief be denied.
Plaintiffs have further demonstrated that absent temporary injunctive relief, irreparable injury would result. Concomitant with official marriage status conferred
3 Section 10 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution provides: “The General Assembly shall provide by law for a uniform effective date for laws passed prior to June 1 of a calendar year. The General Assembly may provide for a different effective date in any law passed prior to June 1. A bill passed after May 31 shall not become effective prior to June 1 of the next calendar year unless the General Assembly by the vote of three-fifths of the members elected to each house provides for an earlier effective date.”
9

under Illinois law are important federal rights and benefits, including for example, the right to take leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2614(c)(1); the right to file a joint income tax return; spousal tax benefits such as exemption from certain estate tax obligations; and eligibility for Ewert for social security benefits as a surviving spouse. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692-96 (holding that federal laws based on marriage status must apply to same-sex marriages recognized under state law). Marriage will thus confer concrete financial benefits to Plaintiffs, and denying Gray and Ewert the opportunity to marry before Gray passes away will cause irreparable harm by preventing them from realizing those benefits. Equally, if not more, compelling is Plaintiffs’ argument that without temporary relief, they will also be deprived of enjoying the less tangible but nonetheless significant personal and emotional benefits that the dignity of official marriage status confers. See id. at 2692 (stating that a state’s recognition of samesex marriage “is more than a routine classification for purposes of certain statutory benefits” but is a status that is a “far-reaching legal acknowledgement of the intimate relationship between two people, a relationship deemed by the State worthy of dignity in the community equal with all other marriages”). Ultimately, by passing Senate Bill 10, the General Assembly has officially recognized the value of all the benefits that official marriage status imparts and determined that these are benefits same-sex couples are entitled to enjoy.
Plaintiffs claim that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their equal protection claim as applied to them. Windsor certainly informs the analysis of the
10

merits. In Windsor, the Supreme Court invalidated section 3 of the Federal Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), and in doing so, gave married same-sex couples the same rights under federal law as those now enjoyed by opposite-sex couples. 133 S. Ct. at 2695-96. In reaching this conclusion, the Court denounced section 3 of DOMA, which was based on legislative “animus” toward gays and lesbians, as having “no legitimate purpose”:
DOMA seeks to injure the very class [of married gay couples that] New York seeks to protect. By doing so it violates basic due process and equal protection principles applicable to the Federal Government. The Constitution’s guarantee of equality must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot justify disparate treatment of that group. Id. at 2693 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), 2696; see also id. at 2694 (stating that “DOMA’s principal effect is to identify a subset of statesanctioned marriages and make them unequal” and noting that DOMA “tells [samesex] couples, and all the world, that their otherwise valid marriages are unworthy of federal recognition”). An examination of the Illinois Marriage Act’s history and the 1996 amendment declaring same-sex marriages to be against Illinois public policy reveals a similar animus towards same-sex couples. See 80th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate, Transcript of May 19, 1977, at 286-87; Public Act 89-459, 89th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate, Transcript of Mar. 28, 1996, at 97, 100-101. Further informing the analysis is the fact that on November 5, 2013, the Illinois General Assembly recognized marriage (and the rights and privileges that come with it) as a fundamental right to which same-sex couples are entitled. Despite this recognition, however, same-sex couples must still wait until June 1,
11

2014 to enjoy that right. Any policy justification for the current Illinois law has been undercut and since rejected by the Illinois General Assembly with its passage of Senate Bill 10, which now seeks to protect same-sex couples. See new.livestream.com/blueroomstream/events/2448173 (98th Ill. Gen. Assem., House, Livestream Debate of Nov. 5, 2013). There is no legislative history that the parties have pointed to, or that the Court could find, that provides either a legitimate governmental justification or a rational basis for the General Assembly’s decision to delay the effective date of Senate Bill 10. Nowhere is there any mention or suggestion that a delay in the effective date is necessary to, for example, change forms in county clerks’ offices to allow for an orderly transition to the new law. Indeed, the only reason the parties have cited for the delay is the functioning of the state’s logistical process of passing a law.
Ultimately, the General Assembly’s recent enactment of the new law permitting same-sex marriages and the attendant policy goal of that new law undermines any reason for applying the justification underlying the current law to these plaintiffs in these compelling circumstances. In any event, at least at this stage, Plaintiffs have demonstrated the requisite “some likelihood of success” on the merits of their as-applied equal protection claim, a conclusion that supports granting preliminary relief.
Both the balance of harms and the public interest as determined by the people of the State of Illinois—the two other components of the preliminary injunctive relief calculus—weigh heavily in favor of granting temporary injunctive
12

relief. Should a final determination of Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim reveal that it has no merit, the harm to Clerk Orr and the State of Illinois by permitting Gray and Ewert to marry would be relatively minor. Given the Illinois General Assembly’s enactment of Senate Bill 10, any harm by an erroneous decision only results in moving up the date for them to marry by a relatively short period of time. Far weightier is the harm that will be done to Plaintiffs should the injunction not issue and Plaintiffs are forced to wait until the end of the suit for relief, relief which could be moot as to Plaintiffs should Gray pass beforehand.
For similar reasons, the public interest is not disserved by granting temporary injunctive relief given these compelling circumstances. Indeed, the Illinois Attorney General, the State’s chief law enforcement officer charged with defending the State’s interests, has disavowed any interest the State has in defending the constitutionality of the current Illinois law as applied to these Plaintiffs and has instead argued that the public interest is advanced, not thwarted, by granting the requested injunctive relief. The General Assembly has officially extended the institution of marriage to same-sex couples and, by doing so, has demonstrated its belief that such a policy serves the public interest. On June 1, 2014, Clerk Orr will be required to issue marriage licenses to, and register the solemnized marriages of, same-sex couples. In light of this fact, the Court is hardpressed to articulate a reason why the public interest would be disserved by allowing Gray and Ewert, given their compelling circumstances, to marry a few months earlier than permitted under the current timeline. At bottom, the harm
13

Plaintiffs will suffer should relief not be granted far outweighs what little harm, if any, the State will suffer as a result of granting temporary relief.
Balancing the equities and hardships strongly militates in favoring of granting temporary injunctive relief. At this balancing stage, though, the Court must still weigh in its analysis the strength of Plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits against the balancing of harms.4 Given that the balancing of harms strongly weighs in favor of granting Plaintiffs the temporary injunctive relief they request, only a lesser showing of likelihood of success on the merits is required here. See Abbott, 971 F.3d at 12. Plaintiffs have demonstrated that their likelihood of success in challenging the constitutionality of the current Illinois law prohibiting same-sex marriage as applied to them is at least plausible. And, given the irremediable harm to Plaintiffs that would result from delaying injunctive relief, as well as the comparatively minor harm that granting injunctive relief would cause Clerk Orr and the State of Illinois, plausibility is all that is required at this stage. See Hoosier Energy, 582 F.3d at 725.
4 At the threshold stage, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that there is some likelihood of success on the merits. Storck USA, L.P. v. Farley Candy Co., 14 F.3d 311, 314 n. 1 (7th Cir. 1994). It is at the later balancing stage that the court determines how great that likelihood is. Id.
14

Conclusion It must be noted that the relief granted here is limited and extends no further than Vernita Gray and Patricia Ewert. The parties are in agreement on this point.5 To be sure, Plaintiffs seek a broader ruling from this Court that the current Illinois law is facially unconstitutional because it violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. That request may be moot in light of this Order. But the request for temporary injunctive relief applies solely to Gray and Ewert. The Court has found after weighing all the factors applicable to determining whether injunctive relief should issue, that given the compelling circumstances surrounding Gray’s medical condition and her potentially imminent death, the injury she and Ewert would suffer by denying injunctive relief would be irreparably great. When balancing the equities as the Court is required to do, the Court concludes that the requested injunctive relief is the only equitable result.
ENTERED:

Dated: December 5, 2013

Thomas M. Durkin United States District Judge

5 Indeed, Clerk Orr has represented that despite the ruling granting injunctive relief in this case, absent a ruling that the current Illinois law is facially unconstitutional, he will continue to deny same-sex couples marriage licenses until Senate Bill 10 becomes effective on June 1, 2014.
15

 
 Case: 1:13-cv-08449 As of: 09/14/2014 09:50 AM CDT 1 of 5
GILBERT,TERMED
United States District Court Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6,1 (Chicago)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:13−cv−08449

Gray et al v. Orr Assigned to: Honorable Thomas M. Durkin Demand: $0 Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff
Vernita Gray

Date Filed: 11/22/2013 Date Terminated: 12/09/2013 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Camilla Bronwen Taylor Lambda Legal Defense &Education Fund, Inc. 11 East Adams Suite 1008 Chicago, IL 60603 (312) 663−4413 Email: ctaylor@lambdalegal.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Harvey Michael Grossman Roger Baldwin Foundation of ACLU, Inc. 180 North Michigan Avenue Suite 2300 Chicago, IL 60601−7401 (312) 201−9740 Email: hgrossman@aclu−il.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John A. Knight Roger Baldwin Foundation of ACLU, Inc. 180 N. Michigan Suite 2300 Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 201−9740, x335 Email: jknight@aclu−il.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen A. Sheley ACLU of Illinois 180 North Michigan Avenue Suite 2300 Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 201−9740 Email: ksheley@ACLU−il.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
M. David Weisman Miller Shakman &Beem LLP 180 North LaSalle Street Suite 3600 Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 263−3700 Email: dweisman@millershakman.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marc Oliver Beem Miller Shakman &Beem LLP 180 North LaSalle Street Suite 3600

Case: 1:13-cv-08449 As of: 09/14/2014 09:50 AM CDT 2 of 5

Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 263−3700 Fax: (312) 263−3270 Email: mbeem@millershakman.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Zachary J. Freeman Miller Shakman &Beem LLP 180 N. LaSalle Street, Suite 3600 Chicago, IL 60601 312−263−3700 Fax: 312−263−3270 Email: zfreeman@millershakman.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jordan Mitchell Heinz Kirkland &Ellis LLP 300 North LaSalle Street Chicago, IL 60654 (312)469−7027 Email: jheinz@kirkland.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Patricia Ewert

represented by Camilla Bronwen Taylor (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Harvey Michael Grossman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John A. Knight (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karen A. Sheley (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

M. David Weisman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marc Oliver Beem (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Zachary J. Freeman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jordan Mitchell Heinz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
David Orr in his official capacity as Cook County Clerk,

represented by Paul Leo Fangman Cook County State's Attorney's Office 50 W. Washington Street

Case: 1:13-cv-08449 As of: 09/14/2014 09:50 AM CDT 3 of 5

Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 603−5480 Email: pfangman@hotmail.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kent Stephen Ray Cook County State's Attorney's Office Conflicts Counsel Unit 69 West Washington Street Suite 2030 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 603−1427 Email: kent.ray@cookcountyil.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Plaintiff
AG Lisa Madigan 100 W. Randolph St. Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 814−3000

represented by Christopher J. Kim Office Of The Attorney General − State Of Illinois 100 West Randolph Street 11th Floor Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 793−2403 Email: ckim@atg.state.il.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Malini Rao Illinois Attorney General's Office (100 W) 100 West Randolph Street Chicago, IL 60601 312 814 3909 Email: mrao@atg.state.il.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard Scott Huszagh Office of the Attorney General 100 West Randolph Street Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 814−2587 Email: rhuszagh@atg.state.il.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 11/22/2013
11/22/2013 11/22/2013 11/22/2013 11/22/2013
11/22/2013

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief filed by Vernita Gray, Patricia Ewert; Filing fee $ 400, receipt number 0752−8962489.(Heinz, Jordan) (Entered: 11/22/2013)
2 CIVIL Cover Sheet (Heinz, Jordan) (Entered: 11/22/2013)
3 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Patricia Ewert, Vernita Gray by Jordan Mitchell Heinz (Heinz, Jordan) (Entered: 11/22/2013)
4 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Patricia Ewert, Vernita Gray by Camilla Bronwen Taylor (Taylor, Camilla) (Entered: 11/22/2013)
5 MOTION by Plaintiffs Patricia Ewert, Vernita Gray for temporary restraining order , MOTION by Plaintiffs Patricia Ewert, Vernita Gray for preliminary injunction (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Heinz, Jordan) (Entered: 11/22/2013)
6 MEMORANDUM by Patricia Ewert, Vernita Gray in support of motion for temporary restraining order, motion for preliminary injunction 5 (Heinz, Jordan) (Entered: 11/22/2013)

Case: 1:13-cv-08449 As of: 09/14/2014 09:50 AM CDT 4 of 5

11/22/2013 11/22/2013 11/22/2013 11/22/2013 11/22/2013 11/22/2013 11/22/2013 11/22/2013 11/22/2013 11/22/2013 11/22/2013 11/22/2013 11/22/2013 11/25/2013
11/25/2013
11/25/2013 11/25/2013 11/25/2013 12/05/2013
12/09/2013

CASE ASSIGNED to the Honorable Thomas M. Durkin. Designated as Magistrate Judge the Honorable Jeffrey T. Gilbert. (daj, ) (Entered: 11/22/2013)
7 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Patricia Ewert, Vernita Gray by Harvey Michael Grossman (Grossman, Harvey) (Entered: 11/22/2013)
8 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Patricia Ewert, Vernita Gray by Karen A. Sheley (Sheley, Karen) (Entered: 11/22/2013)
9 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Patricia Ewert, Vernita Gray by Marc Oliver Beem (Beem, Marc) (Entered: 11/22/2013)
10 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Patricia Ewert, Vernita Gray by Zachary J. Freeman (Freeman, Zachary) (Entered: 11/22/2013)
11 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Patricia Ewert, Vernita Gray by M. David Weisman (Weisman, M.) (Entered: 11/22/2013)
12 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant David Orr by Paul Leo Fangman (Fangman, Paul) (Entered: 11/22/2013)
13 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant David Orr by Kent Stephen Ray (Ray, Kent) (Entered: 11/22/2013)
14 MOTION by Intervenor Plaintiff Lisa Madigan for leave to appear as General (Huszagh, Richard) (Entered: 11/22/2013)
15 MOTION by Intervenor Plaintiff Lisa Madigan to intervene (Huszagh, Richard) (Entered: 11/22/2013)
16 MOTION by Intervenor Plaintiff Lisa Madigan to intervene −− Proposed Pleading in Intervention (Huszagh, Richard) (Entered: 11/22/2013)
17 ATTORNEY Appearance for Intervenor Plaintiff Lisa Madigan by Malini Rao Assistant Attorney General (Rao, Malini) (Entered: 11/22/2013)
18 ATTORNEY Appearance for Intervenor Plaintiff Lisa Madigan by Christopher J. Kim Assistant Attorney General (Kim, Christopher) (Entered: 11/22/2013)
19 MEMORANDUM by Lisa Madigan in support of motion for temporary restraining order, motion for preliminary injunction 5 (Huszagh, Richard) (Entered: 11/25/2013)
20 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Thomas M. Durkin:Plaintiff's motion for a Temporary Restraining Order 5 is granted. Intervenor Lisa Madigan's motions for leave to appear 14 and, intervene 15 16 are granted. Motion hearing held on 11/25/2013. Status hearing set for 12/9/2013 at 09:00 AM.Mailed notice (srn, ) (Entered: 11/25/2013)
21 TEMPORARY Restraining Order Signed by the Honorable Thomas M. Durkin on 11/25/2013:Mailed notice(srn, ) (Entered: 11/25/2013)
22 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Patricia Ewert, Vernita Gray by John A. Knight (Knight, John) (Entered: 11/25/2013)
23 Ill. Att'y Gen'l Pleading as Intervenor by Lisa Madigan (Huszagh, Richard) (Entered: 11/25/2013)
24 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order:When balancing the equities as the Court is required to do, the Court concludes that the requested injunctive relief is the only equitable result. Signed by the Honorable Thomas M. Durkin on 12/5/2013:Mailed notice(srn, ) (Entered: 12/05/2013)
25 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Thomas M. Durkin:Status hearing held on 12/9/2013. By agreement this action is dismissed without prejudice with leave to move to reinstate on or before 12/19/13. Absent a timely filed motion, this order will become final with prejudice on 12/20/13. Civil case terminated. Mailed notice (srn, ) (Entered: 12/09/2013)

Case: 1:13-cv-08449 As of: 09/14/2014 09:50 AM CDT 5 of 5

12/10/2013

26 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 11/25/13 before the Honorable Thomas M. Durkin. Court Reporter Contact Information: Laura Renke, laura_renke@ilnd.uscourts.gov, 312.435.6053.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

12/30/2013

Redaction Request due 12/31/2013. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 1/10/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 3/10/2014. (Renke, Laura) (Entered: 12/10/2013)
27 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Thomas M. Durkin:This action is hereby dismissed with prejudice.Mailed notice (srn, ) (Entered: 12/30/2013)