United States District Court Northern District of Illinois - CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.3.3 (Chicago)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:20-cv-03718

Chicago Freedom School et al v. City Of Chicago et al Assigned to: Honorable Thomas M. Durkin Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

Date Filed: 06/25/2020 Date Terminated: 08/17/2020 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Plaintiff Chicago Freedom School

represented by Joey L. Mogul People's Law Office 1180 N. Milwaukee Chicago, IL 60622 773-235-0070 Email: joeymogul@aol.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Tony Alvarado-Rivera

Sheila A Bedi Roderick Macarthur Justice Center 375 E. Chicago Avenue Chicago, IL 60611 (312) 503-2492 Email: sheila.bedi@law.northwestern.edu ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Joey L. Mogul (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jacqulyn Hamilton

Sheila A Bedi (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Joey L. Mogul (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant City Of Chicago
Defendant Chicago Police Superintendent David Brown
Defendant BACP Investigator Joseph W Sneed
Defendant BACP Investigator Ira Navarro, #338
Defendant BACP Investigator Richard Roe
Defendant Chicago Police Officer John Does

Sheila A Bedi (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 06/25/2020
06/25/2020 06/25/2020
06/25/2020
06/25/2020

# Docket Text

COMPLAINT filed by Chicago Freedom School; Jury Demand. Filing

1

fee $ 400, receipt number 0752-17143235.(Mogul, Joey) (Entered:

06/25/2020)

2 CIVIL Cover Sheet (Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 06/25/2020)

3 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Tony Alvarado-Rivera, Chicago Freedom School, Jacqulyn Hamilton by Joey L. Mogul (Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 06/25/2020)

CASE ASSIGNED to the Honorable Thomas M. Durkin. Designated as Magistrate Judge the Honorable Sunil R. Harjani. Case assignment: Random assignment. (gw, ) (Entered: 06/25/2020)

4 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Tony Alvarado-Rivera, Chicago Freedom School, Jacqulyn Hamilton by Sheila A Bedi (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 06/25/2020)

06/25/2020 06/25/2020 07/10/2020 07/10/2020
08/17/2020 08/17/2020

5 MOTION by Plaintiff Chicago Freedom School for preliminary injunction (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 7)(Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 06/25/2020)
6 DECLARATION of Plaintiffs Hamilton & Alvarado Rivera regarding motion for preliminary injunction 5 Exhibit 6 (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 06/25/2020)
7 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Thomas M. Durkin:A joint status report is due by 9/3/2020. Instructions for the status report may be found on Judge Durkin's webpage under new and reassigned cases. Mailed notice (srn, ) (Entered: 07/10/2020)
8 ORDER Fifth Amended General Order 20-0012 IN RE: CORONAVIRUS COVID-19 PUBLIC EMERGENCY Signed by the Chief Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on July 10, 2020. This Order does not extend or modify any deadlines set in civil cases. No motions may be noticed for in-person presentment; the presiding judge will notify parties of the need, if any, for a hearing by electronic means or in-court proceeding. See attached Order. Signed by the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 7/10/2020: Mailed notice. (Clerk10, Docket) (Entered: 07/10/2020)
9 MOTION by Plaintiffs Jacqulyn Hamilton, Tony Alvarado-Rivera, Chicago Freedom School to dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1) (Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 08/17/2020)
10 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Thomas M. Durkin: Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss 9 is granted. Case dismissed with prejudice. Civil case terminated. Mailed notice (ewf, ) (Entered: 08/17/2020)

 
 Case: 1:20-cv-03718 Document #: 1 Filed: 06/25/20 Page 1 of 20 PageID #:1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

CHICAGO FREEDOM SCHOOL, TONY

)

ALVARADO-RIVERA, JACQULYN HAMILTON, )

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

CITY OF CHICAGO; SUPERINTEDENT OF THE )

CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT DAVID

)

O’NEILL BROWN; DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS )

AFFAIRS AND CONSUMER PROTECTION

)

INVESTIGATORS JOSEPH W. SNEED, IRA

)

NAVARRO, #338, RICHARD ROE AND

)

CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS JOHN DOES,

)

)

Defendants.

)

No: Judge
JURY DEMAND

COMPLAINT

1. Plaintiff, the Chicago Freedom School, (“CFS”), is a well-respected and beloved

youth centered not for profit organization that provides critical support and educational

programs to young people in the City of Chicago. On May 30, 2020, City of Chicago Officials

—including members of the Chicago Police Department (“CPD”) and investigators from the

City’s Department of Business Affairs and Consumer Protection (“BACP”) — conducted an

illegal raid of CFS’s premises in retaliation for CFS’s support of the young people who, on that

day, were protesting the unrelenting police violence, anti-Black racism and white supremacy in

Chicago and throughout the U.S. Chicago officials then imposed upon CFS an unlawful cease

and desist order that subjects its employees to the threat of arrest for engaging in legal,

constitutionally protected activity.

2. CFS and Plaintiffs Tony Alvarado-Rivera, CFS’s Executive Director, and

Jacqulyn Hamilton, CFS’s Wellness Director, by and through their attorneys, file this complaint

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against the City of Chicago, Superintendent Brown and individually named CPD officers and BACP investigators. This lawsuit seeks to enforce the Plaintiffs’ rights under the First and Fourth Amendments of the United States Constitution, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Illinois state law, including the Illinois Civil Rights Act of 2003, 740 ILCS 23/5. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief so that CFS employees can continue their vitally important work supporting the development of Chicago’s young people without the threat of arrest and further retaliatory action. The individual Plaintiffs individually seek monetary damages against the City of Chicago and individual City employees for the harm they incurred as a result of the City’s unlawful actions.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 3. The actions of the Defendants violated the United States Constitution, the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as Illinois law. This Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a) and over the Plaintiffs’ state law claims pursuant to the court’s supplemental jurisdiction, as codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 4. Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). The parties reside, or, at the time the events took place, resided in this judicial district, and the events giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims also occurred in this judicial district.
PARTIES 5. Plaintiff Chicago Freedom School (“CFS”), inspired by the Civil Rights era freedom schools in Mississippi, is a youth centered not for profit organization founded in 2007. CFS provides a space where young people and adult allies can study the work of past movements, deepen their understanding of current social problems, build new coalitions, and develop strategies for change. CFS supports new generations of critical and independent
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thinking young people who use their unique experiences and power to create a just world. CFS has an office at 719 S. State Street, Chicago, Illinois and it has a history of serving as a safe space for young people of color in the downtown area. It has frequently opened its doors to serve as a warming center, healing space, and a place where young people can decompress and rest in times of crisis.
6. Plaintiff Tony Alvarado-Rivera is the newly hired Executive Director of the CFS. On May 30, 2020, he was present at CFS’s premises.
7. Plaintiff Jacqulyn Hamilton is the Wellness Director at the CFS. On May 30, 2020, she was present at CFS’s premises.
8. Defendants Joseph W. Sneed, Ira Navarro and Richard Roe are investigators in the Department of Business Affairs and Consumer Protection (“BACP”), which is an agency of the City of Chicago. These Defendants were on duty and acting under color of law and within the scope of their employment with the City of Chicago at the time of this incident. They are sued in their individual capacities.
9. Defendant Does were, at the time of this incident, duly appointed Chicago police officers. These Defendants were on duty, acting under color of law and within the scope of their employment with the City of Chicago at the time of this incident. They are each sued in their individual capacities.
10. Defendant David O’Neill Brown is the Superintendent of the CPD. At all times relevant to the events at issue in this case, Defendant Brown was employed by the CPD. As such, he was acting under color of law. At all times relevant to the events at issue in this case, Defendant Brown promulgated practices of the CPD and is responsible for supervising all CPD officers and managing all operations at the CPD. He is sued here in his official capacity.
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11. Defendant City of Chicago is a municipal corporation, duly incorporated under the laws of the State of Illinois. It is authorized under the laws of the State of Illinois to maintain the CPD, which acts as the City’s agent in the area of municipal law enforcement and the BACP which acts as the City’s agent in the area of regulation and enforcement of municipal codes. The CPD and BACP Defendants are agents of the City of Chicago. The City is ultimately responsible for the actions of both the CPD and the BACP. It is the employer and principal of the Defendants Sneed, Navarro, Roe, the Doe Police Officers and Superintendent Brown.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 12. On May 30, 2020, the Chicago Freedom School was open serving as a drop-in center in the midst of the massive demonstrations in Chicago’s downtown area attended by thousands of people who were protesting the recent police murders of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, Tony McDade and other Black people in the City of Chicago and across the U.S. 13. The demonstrations on May 30th began early in the day with several thousands of people joining car caravans at different locations around the City of Chicago, driving downtown to converge at Federal Plaza in Chicago, Illinois at 2 p.m. 14. Prior to 2 p.m., several hundreds of protestors also gathered at the Federal Plaza on foot and shortly thereafter there were several demonstrations throughout the downtown area of Chicago, including on Lake Shore Drive, State Street, across from Trump Tower on Wacker Drive and along Michigan Avenue in the River North Area. 15. The demonstrations were attended and monitored by a heavy police presence, with many officers clad in riot gear and carrying batons. At various points in the demonstration, members of the CPD became aggressive and at times violent, hitting people with their batons and causing several protestors serious injuries requiring medical attention. CPD injured a
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number of young people affiliated with CFS. 16. At 5:30 p.m., CFS announced on Facebook that it was open and providing people
a place for “quick release and restoration,” access to a bathroom, phone chargers, as well as pizza, stating it was prioritizing space and services for young people and people of color. CFS suggested that if people were interested in donating, they could make a small donation at their website to facilitate CFS ordering pizza and bottled water since they were out of stock.1
17. Shortly thereafter, at around 6 p.m., the Chicago Transit Authority (“CTA”) suspended both its subway and bus service in the downtown area of Chicago.2
18. Throughout the afternoon and evening, City employees also shut down portions and then the entirety of Lake Shore Drive in the downtown area and there were several other road closures which resulted in a lack of taxi and ride share drivers driving to the downtown area.
19. Minutes before 7 p.m. that day, CFS posted again on Facebook thanking people for helping CFS open up. The post also thanked people for donating which enabled CFS employees and volunteers to purchase pizza, snacks and water. The post indicated that CFS was committed to remaining open until 9 p.m.
20. The CFS’s 7 p.m. post also included photos depicting that CFS was serving commercially bought take-out pizza in take-out boxes, and that they were offering juice packs, Clif bars, bags of peanuts and other snacks. In the background of the food, there were signs stating, “Black Lives Matter” and “Free Them All.”
1 CFS also announced it was providing individuals with masks and advised people to practice social distancing. 2 The Office of Emergency Communications (“OEMC”) announced via tweet that there were no CTA trains or buses running in the Chicago Loop or River North area. In order for people to access CTA transportation, they would have to walk miles away from the Loop and River North areas to 22nd and Wentworth, Grand Avenue and Halstead or North and Clark.
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21. None of the food items depicted in the pictures or distributed at CFS were prepared or packaged at the CFS.
22. Scores of young people, the majority of whom were Black and Brown participants in the protests, visited the CFS for rest, services and the supplies being offered by the CFS. A few of the young people received bandages and antiseptic to tend to wounds they sustained during the demonstrations.
23. At approximately 8:20 p.m. on May 30th, Mayor Lori Lightfoot announced at a press conference that she was imposing a curfew for the City of Chicago set to begin that very same night at 9 p.m. The curfew remained in effect until 6 a.m. the following day.
24. Mayor Lightfoot did not issue a tweet announcing the 9 p.m. curfew until 8:40 p.m. that same evening. Chicago’s OEMC did not issue a tweet announcing the 9 p.m. curfew until 9:04 p.m. that same evening.
25. Many individuals who were present at the protests did not receive any notice of
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the curfew until after it went into effect.3 26. At some point in the evening on May 30th, the bridges over the Chicago River on
Michigan and Wabash Avenues, State and Dearborn Streets were raised, splitting protestors from one another and preventing people from being able to get home if they lived south of the river.
27. In light of suspended CTA service, road closures, lack of taxis and ride share services transporting people from the downtown area, and the sudden imposition of a curfew, several people in downtown area, including scores of youth who live on the south and west sides, had no viable ways of getting home.
28. In response, CFS reached out to supportive community members and asked for people to transport youth home from CFS’s premises home.
29. Young people at the CFS were using social media to inform others that the CFS was arranging for such rides, in addition to providing youth access to food, water and other supplies.
30. At approximately 11 p.m. that night, individual Defendants from the BACP drove to 719 S. State with a Chicago Police Squad, whose mars lights were on, and parked next to the building.
31. Upon their arrival at the building, Defendant Does, who were in CPD uniforms, armed, and wearing their riot helmets, walked up to Plaintiff Hamilton who was present at the front entrance of the building.
3 The curfew remained in effect until June 7, 2020. According to the Chicago Sun Times, over 400 people were arrested for curfew violations and of those 400, 75% of the people arrested were Black. See Matthew Hendrickson & Matt Kiefer, Blacks make up 75% of those charged with violating city curfew, data shows, Chicago Sun Times (Jun 14, 2020), https://chicago.suntimes.com/crime/2020/6/14/21286741/chicago-city-curfew-african-americanarrest-aclu.
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32. Defendant Does demanded Plaintiff Hamilton allow them to enter the building and into the CFS’s premises.
33. A Defendant Doe claimed that they received a report that CFS was housing and feeding protestors.
34. Plaintiff Hamilton tried to talk with the Defendant Does and explain the services provided by CFS and ask why they needed to search the CFS’s premises.
35. The Defendant Does grew increasingly aggressive, repeatedly demanding to enter the building and insisting that Plaintiff Hamilton had to let them in.
36. At one point, Defendant Sneed arrived at the entrance of the building and walked in between Plaintiff Hamilton and the Defendant Does and began talking with Hamilton.
37. Defendant Sneed told the Defendant Does to calm down and that he would handle this.
38. As Plaintiff Hamilton was asking questions of Defendant Sneed and continuing to refuse the individual Defendants entry, one of the Defendant Does attempted to lunge at Plaintiff Hamilton.
39. Plaintiff Alvarado-Rivera joined Plaintiff Hamilton at the front entrance of the building and attempted to speak with the individual Defendants.
40. BACP Defendants informed Plaintiffs Alvarado-Rivera and Hamilton that the CFS was violating its business license and they needed to inspect CFS’s premises immediately. They also re-iterated that they received reports that the CFS was housing and feeding protestors.
41. Plaintiffs Alvarado-Rivera and Hamilton repeatedly tried to explain to the individual Defendants that the CFS was a not for profit, and it was not a commercial business, to no avail.
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42. Plaintiff Alvarado-Rivera also tried to explain the purposes of the CFS and the fact that the CFS does not house any individuals.
43. The individual Defendants communicated in an insistent, disrespectful and intimidating manner. They refused to listen to Plaintiff Alvarado-Rivera’s description of the CFS’s activities and demanded entry to the CFS’s premises.
44. The Defendant Does continued their aggressive push to enter the building and the CFS’s premises declaring words to the effect of let’s go, we need to get moving, and we’ve been out here long enough.
45. The individual Defendants did not have a warrant to enter and search the CFS’s premises.
46. There was no probable cause, reasonable suspicion or legal justification to warrant the individual Defendants search of the CFS’ premises.
47. Neither Plaintiffs Hamilton, Alvarado-Rivera nor any other person present at CFS prepared any food or drink that was provided to any individuals present at CFS on May 30th.
48. BACP defendants, accompanied by Defendant Does, gained access and searched the CFS’s premises, taking pictures of the interior of the CFS’s premises, including the pizza boxes and all the pictures on the wall.
49. The individual Defendants did not find any evidence that employees or volunteers of the CFS were preparing food at the CFS.
50. Despite the lack of any evidence that food was being prepared at the CFS, Defendants Sneed and Navarro, issued an order to “CEASE AND DESIST” to the CFS in which they falsely claimed that the CFS failed to comply with Chi. Mun. Code 4-4-10 by “Preparing and serving food on the premises not described in the license for which a Retail Food
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Establishment Code 1106 is required.”4 51. The order to “CEASE AND DESIST” also threatened that the CFS would be
charged between $500.00 and $1,000.00 every single day if the CFS continued in the alleged violations of the Chi. Mun. Code.
52. The “CEASE AND DESIST” order also directed the Superintendent of the Police to “arrest any and all agents, and employees of the CFS if found engaging in in the business or occupation of Preparing and serving food on premises, not described on license without the required Retail Food Establishment license, properly displayed on said premises.” The order indicated that “[t]his order shall remain in full force and effect until the required license has been procured.”5
53. As the individual Defendants were leaving the premises, a Defendant from the BACP threatened Plaintiffs Alvarado-Rivera and Hamilton that if they returned and found the food observed on the premises, which included pizza slices located in the restaurant-bought pizza boxes, that Plaintiffs Alvarado-Rivera and Hamilton would be arrested.
54. The individual Defendants’ actions, including their aggressive behavior, illegal search, threats of future arrest and shutting down CFS alarmed, frightened and intimidated Plaintiffs Alvarado-Rivera and Hamilton causing them mental distress, anguish, and anger.
55. As part of the CFS’s programming, it regularly provides food to its youth and participants. This food is not prepared and served by the CFS nor is it sold to people who
4Pursuant to the Chi. Mun. Code 4-8-10, a “Retail Food Establishment” is defined as “any . . . place or establishment occupied and used as a place of business for the purpose of serving, storing, selling, offering for sale . . . any article of food, drink . . . ultimately used for or intended to be used for human consumption.” 5 While the individual Defendants were demanding entry into the CFS’s premises, and later during the search, individuals down the street were breaking into and removing items from the 711 and Urban Grocers. The individuals Defendants did not nothing to stop them.
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participate in their programs. Rather, it is purchased by employees and volunteers at restaurants and stores and provided to youth and others in the CFS’s space for free.
56. Distribution of commercially prepared food is a routine practice at youth organizations, including at the Boys and Girls Clubs of Chicago, YMCAs, and Boy or Girl Scout troops.
57. Upon information and belief, the BACP has not issued cease and desist orders to other youth organizations in the City of Chicago for providing their youth commercially prepared food even though they do not have a Retail Food Establishment License, nor has the BACP required other youth serving organizations to secure Retail Food Establishment Licenses.
58. While BACP members and other Chicago Health Officials search other restaurants and food establishments to ensure they are abiding by the Chi. Mun. Code, they frequently do not do it with the threatening and intimidating presence of uniformed, armed Chicago Police Officers. Rather, they provide notice to the establishment and set a date and time when the inspection will occur, none of which occurred in this instance.
59. Given all these circumstances of the BACP investigators and Defendant Does’ search of the CFS’s premises and the issuing of the unjustifiable “Cease and Desist” order, it is evident that the Defendants were retaliating against the CFS for its support of young Black and Brown protestors who were demonstrating against racist police violence.
Allegations against the City of Chicago and the Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department
60. As fully described above, on May 30, 2020, the City of Chicago imposed a number of restrictions on protestors with the full knowledge that the protesters’ demands included an end to racist, repressive, corrupt policing and focused on the anti-Black racism and disparities in the use of excessive force—including use of lethal force and arrest rates in the city
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of Chicago. 61. Upon information and belief, City of Chicago agents monitor the social media
accounts of activist organizations that criticize the CPD, including, but not limited to the CFS. Many of the groups monitored by the City of Chicago are led by Black and Brown people.
62. The City’s raid of CFS garnered widespread news coverage.6 In addition, through counsel, CFS sent BACP correspondence requesting that it rescind the cease and desist order. High level City of Chicago Officials—including those at the BACP and the CPD — are therefore aware of the cease and desist order imposed against the CFS. The City has failed to take any action to rescind the order or otherwise cure the Plaintiffs’ injuries.
63. Further, CPD Superintendent David Brown, who is directly empowered to enforce the cease and desist order, has failed to take any action to prohibit CPD officers from enforcing the unlawful cease and desist order imposed upon the CFS.
Count I 42 U.S.C. § 1983 First Amendment Claim (Plaintiff CFS against the City of Chicago for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief) 64. Plaintiff CFS re-alleges all of the preceding paragraphs and incorporates them in this count. 65. Plaintiff CFS was engaged in lawful First Amendment activity when providing support and space to protestors who were demonstrating against racist police violence on May
6 Justin Laurence, The Chicago Freedom School Offered Food, Water And Rest To Weary Protestors Trapped Downtown – And The City Cited Them For It, Block Club Chicago (Jun 8, 2020, 8:10 AM CT), https://blockclubchicago.org/2020/06/08/the-chicago-freedom-schooloffered-food-water-and-rest-to-weary-protesters-trapped-downtown-and-the-city-cited-them-forit/; Tonya Francisco, City cites Chicago Freedom School after they provided meals to protestors in Loop, WGN9 (Jun 8, 2020, 6:21 PM CT), https://wgntv.com/news/chicago-news/city-citeschicago-freedom-school-after-they-provided-meals-to-protesters-in-loop/; Maya Dukmasova, Police abolitionists find fuel in the protests, Chicago Reader (Jun 1, 2020), https://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/george-floyd-protests-policeabolition/Content?oid=80349691.
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30, 2020 and posting about its activities on social media. 66. The actions of Defendants Sneed, Navarro, Roe and Does described above violate
the Plaintiffs’ rights to freedom of speech, political expression and assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, in that CFS was abruptly prevented from further exercising its rights and suffered retaliation for having exercised its rights.
67. The Defendant City of Chicago engages in an ongoing violation of the CFS’s First Amendment rights by leaving the cease and desist order in effect against it thereby subjecting CFS employees to the threat of arrest if they engage in activities essential to the CFS’s mission and fines against the CFS that could effectively shut the organization down as a small not for profit.
61. Unless restrained by order of this Court, the CFS’ First Amendment rights will continue to be violated. CFS seeks injunctive and declaratory relief against the City to prevent the continued violation of its constitutional rights, plus the costs of this action, attorneys’ fees and such other relief as this Court deems equitable and just
Count II 42 U.S.C. § 1983 First Amendment Claim (All Plaintiffs against all Defendants for Damages) 68. Plaintiffs re-allege all of the preceding paragraphs and incorporates them in this count. 69. Plaintiffs CFS, Alvarado-Rivera and Hamilton were engaged in lawful First Amendment activity when providing support and space to protestors who were demonstrating against racist police violence on May 30, 2020. 70. The actions of Defendants Sneed, Navarro, Roe and Does described above violate the Plaintiffs’ rights to freedom of speech, political expression and assembly guaranteed by the
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First Amendment to the United States Constitution, in that Plaintiffs were abruptly prevented from further exercising their rights and suffered retaliation for having exercised their rights.
71. The City of Chicago further infringes on the Plaintiffs’ rights guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution in threatening to shut down CFS and arrest Plaintiffs Alvarado-Rivera and Hamilton for engaging in protected legal activity.
72. The misconduct described in this Count was objectively unreasonable and was undertaken intentionally, with malice and knowing disregard for Plaintiffs’ clearly established constitutional rights.
73. As a result of the unjustified and unconstitutional conduct of the Defendants, Plaintiffs suffered damages, including but not limited to, ongoing infringement of their First Amendment rights, caused the loss of speech and expression, as set forth more fully above, actual damages, humiliation, pain, fear and emotional distress.
74. The actions of these Defendants were the direct and proximate cause of the violations of Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. Plaintiffs seek judgment against Defendants Sneed, Navarro, Roe and Does for compensatory damages jointly and severally, and punitive damages, plus the costs of this action, attorneys’ fees and such other relief as this Court deems equitable and just.
Count III 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Fourth Amendment Claim (Plaintiff Alvarado-Rivera and Hamilton against all Individual Defendants for Damages) 75. Plaintiffs Alvarado-Rivera and Hamilton re-allege all of the preceding paragraphs and incorporate them in this count. 76. Defendants Sneed, Navarro, Roe and Does’ search of the CFS’s premises without a warrant, probable cause, reasonable suspicion or legal justification to do so, violated the
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Plaintiffs’ rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution to be free from an unreasonable illegal search.
77. The aforementioned actions of Defendants Sneed, Navarro, Roe and Does were the direct and proximate cause of the constitutional violations set forth above.
78. The misconduct described in this Count was objectively unreasonable and was undertaken intentionally, with malice and knowing disregard for Plaintiffs’ clearly established constitutional rights.
79. As a result of the unjustified and unconstitutional conduct of the Defendants, Plaintiffs suffered damages, including but not limited to, infringement of their Fourth Amendment rights, as set forth more fully above, actual damages, humiliation, pain, fear and emotional distress.
80. The actions of these individually named Defendants were the direct and proximate cause of the violations of Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiffs AlvaradoRivera and Hamilton seek judgment against Defendants Sneed, Navarro, Roe and Does for compensatory damages jointly and severally, and punitive damages, plus the costs of this action, attorneys’ fees and such other relief as this Court deems equitable and just.
COUNT IV 42 USC §1983 Claim for Conspiracy (All Plaintiffs against all Individual Defendants for Damages) 81. Plaintiffs re-allege all of the preceding paragraphs and incorporates them in this count. 82. The actions of Defendants Sneed, Navarro, Roe and Does as set forth above constituted a conspiracy and/or joint action under the First and Fourth Amendments to illegally search CFS, issue a baseless Cease and Desist order to Plaintiffs CFS, Alvarado-Rivera and
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Hamilton, that threatens their liberty and seeks to prevent them from exercising their Constitutional Rights to freedom of speech and assembly.
83. Each of the Defendants, acting in concert with other known and unknown coconspirators, conspired by concerted action to accomplish an unlawful purpose by unlawful means. Each of the Defendants named in this count took concrete steps to enter into an agreement to unlawfully violate the Plaintiffs’ First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
84. The actions of Defendants Sneed, Navarro, Roe and Does in conspiring to deprive Plaintiffs CFS, Alvarado-Rivera and Hamilton of their rights were the direct and proximate cause of the violations of Plaintiffs CFS, Alvarado-Rivera and Hamilton’s rights as set forth above.
85. Each individual Defendant is therefore liable for the violation of Plaintiffs’ rights by any other individual Defendant.
86. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants’ conspiracy, Plaintiffs suffered damages, including mental distress, anguish, humiliation, violations of their First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and legal expenses, as set forth more fully above.
COUNT V Illinois State Law Claims for Violations of the Illinois Constitution
(All Plaintiffs against all Defendants for Damages) (Plaintiff CFS against the City of Chicago for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief)
87. Plaintiffs re-allege all of the preceding paragraphs and incorporate them in this count.
88. The actions taken by Defendants City of Chicago, Sneed, Navarro, Roe and Does denied Plaintiffs their state constitutional rights to be free from an unreasonable search; to expression and assembly in a peaceable manner; to due process and equal protection of the laws, as provided by the Illinois Constitution, Article I, sections 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, and were a direct and proximate cause of Plaintiffs’ injuries as set forth above.
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89. The actions of these Defendants were the direct and proximate cause of the violations of Plaintiffs’ Illinois State Constitutional Rights. Plaintiffs CFS, Alvarado-Rivera and Hamilton seek judgment against the Defendants City of Chicago, Sneed, Navarro, Roe and Does for declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory damages jointly and severally, and punitive damages, plus the costs of this action, attorneys’ fees and such other relief as this Court deems equitable and just.
COUNT VI Illinois State Law Claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Plaintiffs Alvarado-Rivera and Hamilton against all Individual Defendants for damages) 90. Plaintiffs re-allege all of the preceding paragraphs and incorporate them in this count. 91. The conduct and actions of Defendants Sneed, Navarro, Roe and Does set forth above were extreme and outrageous, were done intentionally, willfully and wantonly, and/or knowing that there was a high probability that their conduct would cause Plaintiffs AlvaradoRivera and Hamilton severe emotional distress as set forth above. 92. As a direct and proximate cause of the extreme and outrageous conduct of Defendants Sneed, Navarro and Does, Plaintiffs Alvarado-Rivera and Hamilton were injured and experienced severe emotional distress constituting intentional infliction of emotional distress under Illinois State law. 93. Plaintiffs Alvarado-Rivera and Hamilton seek judgment against Defendants Sneed, Navarro, Roe and Does for compensatory damages plus the costs of this action and such other relief as this Court deems equitable and just.
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COUNT VII Illinois State Law Claim for Conspiracy (All Plaintiffs against all Individual Defendants for Damages 94. Plaintiffs re-allege all of the preceding paragraphs and incorporate them in this count. 95. Defendants Sneed, Navarro and Does, together reached an understanding, engaged in and continue to engage in a course of conduct, and otherwise jointly acted and/or conspired among and between themselves to violate Plaintiffs CFS’s, Alvarado-Rivera’s and Hamilton’s rights guaranteed by the Illinois constitution and to intentionally inflict severe emotional distress on Plaintiffs Alvarado-Rivera and Hamilton. 96. In furtherance of this conspiracy or conspiracies, Defendants Sneed, Navarro, Roe and Does, together with their un-sued co-conspirators, committed the overt acts set forth above. 97. The conspiracy or conspiracies were and are continuing in nature. 98. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants’ conspiracy, Plaintiffs suffered damages, including mental distress, anguish, humiliation, violations of their First and Fourth Amendment rights, and legal expenses, as set forth more fully above.
COUNT VIII Violation of the Illinois Civil Rights Act of 2003, ILCS 23/5
(All Plaintiffs against all Defendants) 99. Plaintiffs re-allege all of the preceding paragraphs and incorporate them in this count. 100. The Defendants targeted the CFS and its employees for a regulatory enforcement action with the knowledge that CFS serves predominately Black and Brown young people and supports the leadership development of organizers and activists who advocate against the racially motivated and disparate policies and practices of the CPD.
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101. The Defendants are aware of the fact that other youth groups throughout the City of Chicago—and particularly those youth groups that serve predominately white youth— provide youth participants with commercially prepared food, pizza and other food items as part of their programming. These groups are not subject to any form of enforcement action, searches or seizures.
102. The criteria and methods that the BACP applied to target the CFS with a raid and regulatory enforcement action created a disparate impact on Black and Latinx youth and their allies, in violation of the Illinois Civil Rights Act of 2013, section 5(a)(2).
COUNT IX Illinois State Law Respondeat Superior Claim 103. Plaintiffs re-allege the foregoing paragraphs 1-63 and 88-102. 104. Defendants Sneed, Navarro, Roe and Does were, at all times material to this complaint, employees of the Defendant City of Chicago, were acting within the scope of their employment; and their acts, which violated state law, are directly chargeable to the Defendant City under state law pursuant to respondeat superior. 105. Plaintiffs CFS, Alvarado-Rivera and Hamilton demand judgment against the City of Chicago for any and all compensatory damages awarded on their state law claims, plus the costs of this action and whatever additional relief this Court deems equitable and just.
COUNT X 745 ILCS 10/9-102 Claim Against Defendant City of Chicago 106. Plaintiffs re-allege all of the preceding paragraphs and incorporate them in this count. 107. Defendants Sneed, Navarro, Roe and Does committed the acts alleged above under color of law and in the scope of employment as employees of the City of Chicago.
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108. Pursuant to 745 ILCS § 10/9-102, and otherwise pursuant to law, Plaintiffs CFS, Alvarado-Rivera and Hamilton demand judgment against Defendant City of Chicago in the amount awarded to the Plaintiffs against any and all Defendants as compensatory damages, attorneys’ fees, costs and interest, and for whatever additional relief this Court deems equitable and just.
JURY DEMAND Plaintiffs CFS, Alvarado-Rivera and Hamilton demand a trial by jury on all counts, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38 and the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Respectfully Submitted, Dated: June 25, 2020
By: /s/ Joey L. Mogul Joey L. Mogul One of the Plaintiffs’ Attorneys
Joey L. Mogul People’s Law Office 1180 N. Milwaukee Ave. Chicago, IL 60642 773-235-0070 joeymogul@peopleslawoffice.com Sheila Bedi Community Justice and Civil Rights Clinic Northwestern Pritzker School of Law 375 East Chicago Avenue Chicago, IL 60611-3609 312-503-8576 sheila.bedi@law.northwestern.edu Counsel for the Chicago Freedom School, Tony Alvarado-Rivera and Jacqulyn Hamilton
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 Case: 1:20-cv-03718 Document #: 5 Filed: 06/25/20 Page 1 of 19 PageID #:25

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

CHICAGO FREEDOM SCHOOL, et al. Plaintiffs, v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants.

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No:

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Judge

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PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Plaintiff Chicago Freedom School (“CFS”), is a well-respected and beloved youthcentered not-for-profit organization that provides critical support and educational programs to young people in the City of Chicago. CFS provides a space where young people and adult allies can study the work of past movements, deepen their understanding of current social problems, build new coalitions, and develop strategies and coalitions for creating a just world. CFS has a long history of supporting campaigns and organizing in opposition to racially motivated police violence and in support of #BlackLivesMatter organizing.
On May 30, 2020, thousands of people came to downtown Chicago to protest the unrelenting police violence, anti-Black racism and white supremacy in Chicago and throughout the U.S. Many of the young people who work with and participate in CFS’ programming joined the demonstrations, and CFS as an organization fully supported people’s condemnation of the police murders of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, other Black people killed at the hands of police.
On May 30th, CFS opened up its space in support of young people protesting and the demonstrations. It promoted on social media that it was providing space for a brief rest, access to
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bathrooms, phone chargers and commercially prepared food.1 This support and these services furthered CFS’ long-standing mission to support Chicago-based social justice movements. In providing such support to protestors and describing its intentions and actions in social media posts, CFS affirmed its support for the protests against racially motivated police violence. These services and these posts were protected First Amendment expressive conduct.
The City of Chicago and members of the Chicago Police Department (CPD) responded to the May 30th uprisings with violence, an arguably unlawful curfew,2 road closures and the suspension of public transportation in the downtown area.3 As a result, many of the young people affiliated with CFS were stranded in downtown Chicago without any viable means to get home safely, quickly and without being under the threat of arrest and further police violence. In response, CFS leapt into action and reached out to its community members, who came to CFS premises and provided rides home for young people.4
Late in the evening on May 30, in an unlawful, retaliatory response to CFS’ political expression and its support of protestors, the City of Chicago—and specifically members of the CPD and the Department of Business Affairs and Consumer Protection (BACP)—conducted an unlawful raid of CFS’ space. City officials demanded entry to CFS’ space without a warrant, photographed the premises, falsely deemed this not-for-profit youth organization a “food retail establishment” and imposed upon CFS a “CEASE AND DESIST” order that makes serving food on its premises an arrestable offense. The cease and desist order remains in place today, putting
1 See Group Ex. 1, CFS’ Social Media Posts from May 30, 2020. 2 Mayor Lightfoot did not issue a tweet announcing the 9 p.m. curfew until 8:40 p.m. that same evening. Chicago’s Office of Emergency Communications (“OEMC”) did not issue a tweet announcing the 9 p.m. curfew until 9:04 p.m. that same evening. See Group Ex. 2, Mayor Lightfoot’s tweet on May 30, 2020. 3 The OEMC announced via tweet that there were no CTA trains or buses running in the Chicago Loop or River North area. In order for people to find a bus they would have to walk miles away from the Loop and River North area to 22nd and Wentworth, Grand Avenue and Halstead and North and Clark for CTA service. See Group Ex. 3, CTA’s Tweet. 4 See Group Ex. 4, Tweets from Essence Jade at 6:21 p.m., 10 p.m. and 10:46 p.m.
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CFS’s staff and participants at risk of arrest whenever it provides food for program participants, regardless of the fact that the food is not prepared at CFS. It also threatens to fine CFS $500 to $1,000 for every instance when food is provided to people, which could ultimately bankrupt and shut down this not-for-profit entirely.
Pursuant to Rule 65 of the Fed. R. Civ. P., CFS seeks a preliminary injunction ordering the City of Chicago to: (1) rescind the cease and desist order subjecting anyone who serves food on CFS premises to arrest; (2) provide CFS with all pictures (and all existing copies of pictures) taken during the May 30, 2020 raid of CFS; and (3) prohibit CPD and City regulators from conducting future unlawful raids of CFS.5
Preliminary injunctions are granted in extraordinary situations where there is a clear showing of need. Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997); Cooper v. Salazar, 196 F.3d 809 (7th Cir. 1999). The need here could not be more obvious or more immediate. For close to 20 years, CFS has served as a safe space for young Black and Brown people to seek refuge, educational programs, adult allies and support, and community. Like several other not-for-profit organizations providing services to youth from sports teams to church groups, CFS regularly provides food for participants during trainings, strategy sessions and other community building events. Chicago’s imposition of a retaliatory cease and desist order imperils CFS’ essential functions and violates CFS’ Constitutional rights.
5 Prior to filing this motion, undersigned counsel requested that the City voluntarily take these actions. The City failed to respond in a timely manner, thus necessitating the request for emergency relief. See Ex. 5.
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FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS On May 30, 2020, the Chicago Freedom School was open serving as a drop-in center in the midst of the massive demonstrations in Chicago’s downtown area attended by thousands of people who were protesting the recent police murders of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, Tony McDade and other Black people in the City of Chicago and across the U.S. Specifically, at 5:30 p.m, the CFS announced on Facebook that it was open and offering people a place for “quick release and restoration,” access to a bathroom, phone chargers, as well as pizza, stating it was prioritizing space and services for young people and people of color. CFS suggested that if people were interested in donating they could make a small donation at their website to facilitate CFS’ ordering pizza and bottled water since it was out of stock.6 Minutes before 7 p.m. that day, CFS posted again on Facebook thanking people for helping the CFS open up. The post also thanked people for donating which enabled the CFS employees and volunteers to purchase pizza, snacks and water. The post indicated that the CFS was committed to remaining open until 9 p.m. This post also included photos depicting that CFS was serving commercially bought take-out pizza in take-out boxes, and that it was offering juice packs, Clif bars, bags of peanuts and other snacks. In the background of these photos, there were signs stating “Black Lives Matter” and “Free Them All.”7 None of the food items depicted in the pictures or distributed at CFS was prepared or packaged at CFS.8 Young people, the majority of whom were Black and Brown participants in the protests, visited the CFS for rest, services and the supplies being offered by the CFS. A few of the young people received bandages and antiseptic to tend to wounds they sustained during the
6 Group Ex. 1. 7 Group Ex. 1. 8 See Group Ex. 6, Declaration of Plaintiff Tony Alvarado-Rivera and, Declaration of Plaintiff Jacqulyn Hamilton (to be forthcoming).
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demonstrations. In light of suspended CTA service, road closures, lack of taxis and ride share services transporting people from the downtown area, and the sudden imposition of a curfew, several people in the downtown area, including many youth who live on the south and west sides, had no viable means of getting home.9 In response, the CFS reached out to supportive community members and asked for people to transport youth at CFS’ premises home. Several youth at CFS were using social media to inform others that CFS was arranging for such rides, in addition to providing youth access to food, water and other supplies.10
At approximately 11 p.m. that night, individual Defendants from the BACP drove to 719 S. State with a Chicago Police Squad and parked next to the building. Upon their arrival at the building, Defendant Does, who were in CPD uniforms, armed, and wearing their riot helmets, walked up to Plaintiff Hamilton who was present at the front entrance of the building. Defendant Does demanded Plaintiff Hamilton allow them to enter the building and into CFS’ premises. A Defendant Doe claimed that they received a report that CFS was housing and feeding protestors. Plaintiff Hamilton tried to talk with the Defendant Does and explain the services provided by CFS and ask why they needed to search CFS’ premises. The Defendant Does grew increasingly aggressive, repeatedly demanding to enter the building and insisting that Plaintiff Hamilton had to let them in.11
At one point, Defendant Sneed arrived at the entrance of the building and walked in between Plaintiff Hamilton and the Defendant Does and began talking with Hamilton. Defendant Sneed told the Defendant Does to calm down and that he would handle this. As Plaintiff
9 Id. 10 See Group Ex. 4. 11 See Group Ex. 6.
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Hamilton was asking questions of Defendant Sneed and continuing to refuse the individual Defendants entry, one of the Defendant Does attempted to lunge at Plaintiff Hamilton.12
Plaintiff Alvarado-Rivera joined Plaintiff Hamilton at the front entrance of the building and attempted to speak with the individual Defendants. BACP Defendants informed Plaintiffs Alvarado-Rivera and Hamilton that CFS was violating its business license and they needed to inspect CFS’ premises immediately. They also reiterated that they had received reports that CFS was housing and feeding protestors. Plaintiffs Alvarado-Rivera and Hamilton repeatedly tried to explain to the individual Defendants that CFS was a not for profit, and it was not a commercial business, to no avail.13 Plaintiff Alvarado-Rivera also tried to explain the purposes of CFS and the fact that CFS does not house any individuals. The individual Defendants communicated in an insistent, disrespectful and intimidating manner. They refused to listen to Plaintiff AlvaradoRivera’s description of CFS’ activities and demanded entry toCFS’ premises. The Defendant Does continued their aggressive push to enter the building and CFS’ premises declaring words to the effect of “let’s go,” “we need to get moving,” and “we’ve been out here long enough.”14
The individual Defendants did not have a warrant to enter and search CFS’ premises. There was no probable cause, reasonable suspicion or legal justification to warrant the individual Defendants search of CFS’ premises.
BACP defendants, accompanied by Defendant Does, gained access and searched CFS’ premises, taking pictures of the interior of CFS’ premises, including the pizza boxes and all the pictures on the wall. The individual Defendants did not find any evidence that employees or
12 See Group Ex. 6. 13Id. . 14Id..
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volunteers of CFS were preparing food at CFS. Neither Plaintiffs Hamilton, Alvarado-Rivera nor any other person present at CFS prepared any food or drink that was provided to any individuals present at CFS on May 30th.15
Despite the lack of any evidence that food was being prepared at CFS, Defendants Sneed and Navarro, issued an order to “CEASE AND DESIST” to CFS in which they falsely claimed that CFS failed to comply with Chi. Mun. Code § 4-4-10 by “Preparing and serving food on the premises not described in the license for which a Retail Food Establishment Code 1106 is required.” The order to “CEASE AND DESIST” also threatened that CFS would be charged between $500.00 and $1,000.00 every single day if CFS continued in the alleged, violations of the Chi. Mun. Code. The “CEASE AND DESIST” order also directed the Superintendent of the Police to “arrest any and all agents, and employees of the CFS if found engaging in the business or occupation of Preparing and Serving food on premises, not described on license without the required Retail Food Establishment license, properly displayed on said premises.” The order indicated that “[t]his order shall remain in full force and effect until the required license has been procured.”16 As the individual Defendants were leaving the premises, a Defendant from the BACP threatened Plaintiffs Alvarado-Rivera and Hamilton that if they returned and found the food observed on the premises, which included pizza slices located in the restaurant-bought pizza boxes, that Plaintiffs Alvarado-Rivera and Hamilton would be arrested.17
As part of the CFS’s programming, it regularly provides food to its youth and participants. This food is not prepared and served by CFS nor is it sold to people who participate in its programs. Rather, it is purchased by employees and volunteers at restaurants and stores and
15 Ex. Group Ex. 6. 16 See Group Ex. 7, the BACP Cease and Desist Order. 17 See Group Ex 6.
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provided to youth and others in CFS’ space for free. Distribution of commercially prepared food is a routine practice at youth organizations, including at the Boys and Girls Clubs of Chicago, YMCAs, and Boys or Girl’s Scout troops. Upon information and belief, the BACP has not issued Cease and Desist orders to other youth organizations in the City of Chicago for providing their youth commercially prepared food even though they do not have a Retail Food Establishment License, nor has the BACP required other youth serving organizations to secure Retail Food Establishment Licenses.
ARGUMENT A plaintiff must show: “(1) some likelihood of succeeding on the merits, and (2) that is has ‘no adequate remedy at law’” (3) it will “suffer irreparable harm if preliminary relief is denied.” Abbott Laboratories v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 11 (7th Cir. 1992). If the moving party meets this burden, then the court must consider the harm that the nonmoving party will suffer if preliminary relief is granted, balancing such harm against the irreparable harm the moving party will suffer if relief is denied, as well as “the public interest, meaning the consequences of granting or denying the injunction to non-parties.” Id. at 11-12. CFS prevails on each factor, as detailed below. Success on the merits is assured because the City of Chicago has retaliated against CFS for its exercise of its right guaranteed by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and imposed upon it an unreasonable infringement of its political expression. CFS faces irreparable harm because ongoing First Amendment violations always constitute irreparable harm and because the cease and desist orders threaten CFS’ ability to fulfill its mission. The balance of harms favors CFS because the protection of constitutional rights is always in the public interest. Thus, this Court must act in order to protect CFS from ongoing violations of its First Amendment Rights.
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I. CFS Will Succeed on the Merits of Its First Amendment Claims In order to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, a plaintiff must demonstrate “a plausible claim on the merits.” Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 2009). Courts should not “improperly equat[e] ‘likelihood of success’ with ‘success.’” Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765, 782 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 394 (1981)). “[T]he threshold for establishing likelihood of success is low.” Id. A plaintiff need “only to present a claim plausible enough that (if the other preliminary injunction factors cut in their favor) the entry of a preliminary injunction would be an appropriate step.” Id. at 783. To determine whether a plaintiff’s legal arguments has a likelihood of succeeding, courts use whatever existing test would be employed to decide the merits of the case. See S./Sw. Ass’n of Realtors v. Evergreen Park, IL., 109 F.Supp.2d 926, 927 (N.D. Ill. 2000). A. CFS’ Claim that the City of Chicago’s Raid of Its Premises and Imposition of a Cease and Desist Order Constitute Unlawful Retaliation in Violation of the First Amendment Will Succeed on the Merits
To succeed on a First Amendment retaliation claim, Plaintiffs must show that the Defendants took action to punish them for engaging in constitutionally protected conduct, such as speech or political expression. Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267, 275 (7th Cir. 1996). In particular, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that (1) their conduct was constitutionally protected and (2) their conduct “was a ‘substantial factor’ or ‘motivating factor’ in the defendant[s’] challenged actions.” Thomsen v. Romeis, 198 F.3d 1022, 1027 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Mt. Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). Each factor is present here.
1. CFS’ May 30, 2020 Conduct Was Constitutionally Protected
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On May 30, 2020, CFS engaged in two types of constitutionally protected conduct. First,
CFS engaged in protected political expression when it provided space, support, and food to
protesters. Second, CFS voiced its support for the uprisings and its solidarity with protests
against racist police violence and in support of #BlackLivesMatter on social media. Each type of
conduct is protected by the First Amendment.
CFS’ provision of space, food, sustenance, care and transportation to those protesting on
Saturday, May 30th was a form of assembly protected by the First Amendment. See NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). At issue in Button, was whether the NAACP’s enlistment of
plaintiffs for litigation whom they met at community meetings organized to discuss
desegregation efforts constituted unlawful solicitation of legal business in contravention of
Virginia-state-law protected constitutional expression. The U.S. Supreme Court, in this landmark
decision, found that such activity was protected by First Amendment declaring:
the First Amendment also protects vigorous advocacy, certainly of lawful ends, against governmental intrusion. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 259-264. Cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296; Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369; Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4. In the context of NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique of resolving private differences; it is a means for achieving the lawful objectives of equality of treatment by all government, federal, state and local, for the members of the [Black] community in this country. It is thus a form of political expression.
Button, 371 U.S. at 429. In so ruling, the Supreme Court recognized that expressive conduct
protected by the First Amendment comes in many different forms, beyond just the expression of
words, but also by acts of association for political ends. As the Court noted:
We need not, in order to find constitutional protection for the kind of cooperative, organizational activity disclosed by this record, whereby [Black people] seek through lawful means to achieve legitimate political ends, subsume such activity under a narrow, literal conception of freedom of speech, petition or assembly. For there is no longer any doubt that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect certain forms of orderly group activity. Thus we have affirmed the right "to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas."
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Id. at 430. In addition to its ruling in Button, the Supreme Court has repeatedly found that a diverse
array of actions undertaken by non-profit and advocacy organizations are protected under the First Amendment. In NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958), the Court protected the civil rights organization from revealing its membership lists, affirming the organization’s “freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas.” Id. at 460; see also Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 633 (1980) (finding that soliciting donations and making charitable contributions are protected under the First Amendment); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 538 (1945) (finding that regulations imposed on a union related to member solicitation violated the First Amendment); Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 422 (1988) (quoting Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632) (“. . . communication of information, the dissemination and propagation of views and ideas, and the advocacy of causes—that are within the protection of the First Amendment.”); Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 576 U.S. 155, 163, 164–65 (2015) (holding that a church’s posting of temporary signs to announce services was protected under the First Amendment from a municipal ordinance that imposed “content-based” restrictions); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (“No sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations”); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 428 (1978) (protecting a nonprofit’s solicitation of prospective litigants under the First Amendment as “a form of political expression” and “political association.”); United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 585–86 (1971) (“collective activity… to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the First Amendment.”); Fed. Election Comm'n v.
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Wisconsin Right To Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 457 (2007) (holding that a nonprofit corporation was protected under the First Amendment to air “issue advocacy… advertisements”).
Here, CFS’ actions when providing protestors with a space to rest, sustenance and other necessities was a form of “orderly group activity” intended to support the movement to eradicate racist police violence and anti-Black racism gripping the nation. The actions also furthered its mission to serve and build the capacities of social justice organizers and leaders. Thus, CFS’ actions were protected First Amendment activity.
CFS’ posts on Facebook regarding its services ensured its community knew that it was open and people were welcome to come to its space for “quick release and restoration,” as well as to use their bathrooms, use their phone chargers and eat pizza was also expressive speech.18 The posts which included pictures of signs proclaiming “Black Lives Matter” and “Free Them All,” popular affirmations and declarations of the current organizing moment, are also clearly expressive speech. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017); Doe v. Prosecutor, 705 F.3d 694, 697 (7th Cir. 2013) (“The statute clearly implicates Doe’s First Amendment rights. . . . [It] precludes expression through the medium of social media. . . .”); see also Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 236 (2d Cir. 2019) (“As a general matter, social media is entitled to the same First Amendment protections as other forms of media.”). Thus, CFS engaged in constitutionally protected conduct when it posted on its social media that it was serving food and offering shelter to youth trapped downtown in the midst of tense protests on May 30th and it clearly indicated its support of the protests by including the political signs in the posts.
18 See Group Ex. 1.
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2. CFS’ Social Media Posts and Political Activities Motivated City Officials Actions on May 30, 2020
CPD and BACP’s search of CFS’ premises to determine whether CFS was abiding by the Chi. Mun. Code regarding food distribution was an illegal, pretextual justification to punish CFS for its support of protests against police violence and its support of young Black and Brown people who participated in the demonstration that evening. The timing of such an investigation reveals that the individual Defendants did not have valid concerns regarding CFS’ actions in distributing commercially prepared food, but instead were seeking to retaliate against CFS’ protected expressive conduct.
Plaintiffs may use evidence that infers causation, such as suspicious timing, to show that their protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor for Defendants’ action. Kidwell v. Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957, 966 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that “suspicious timing... give[s] rise to an inference of causation” when it “follows close on the heels of protected expression,” and “the person who decided to impose the adverse action knew of the protected conduct.”); see also Greene v. Doruff, 660 F.3d 975, 980 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding that “the timing [of Defendant’s retaliatory] action” showed Plaintiff’s protected speech was a motivating factor for their conduct). Once a Plaintiff makes this showing, the burden rests on the Defendants to demonstrate that they would have taken the same actions even in the absence of a potentially discriminatory motive. Mays v. Springborn, 719 F.3d 631, 635 (7th Cir. 2013).
Three facts give rise to powerful inferences that the City retaliated against CFS for its speech and political expressions. First, the raid occurred at 11:00 p.m. at night after CFS had— for hours— publicly documented its support of protestors. Second, upon demanding entry to the premises, a CPD officer explicitly said to Plaintiff Hamilton that CFS was housing and feeding
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protestors. Third, the City fails to regulate apolitical groups, including other youth organizations that engage in the exact same conduct that now places CFS employees under threat of arrest.
The timing of Defendants’ actions, as well as inconsistencies with typical operating procedures, reveal that they are retaliatory in nature. Defendants—approximately four to five police officers and three city officials from the Department of Business Affairs and Consumer Protection (BACP) —arrived at CFS unannounced and late at night (11:00 p.m.) to conduct a search of the premises and issue a cease and desist order. This “investigation” occurred shortly after CFS made two posts on its Facebook page advertising food and shelter to Black and Brown Chicago youth participating in various protests across the city.
This late raid was a deviation from standard BACP practice. Upon information and belief, administrative investigations related to BACP policy typically occur during normal business hours, not during the weekend or late at night as it did on the night in question. Additionally, the investigation was characterized by an unusually accelerated time frame not consistent with Department standards. These suspicious circumstances paired with the Defendants’ accusations that CFS was “housing protestors” provide strong inferences that the “investigation” was in fact discriminatory retaliation against CFS.
It is common knowledge that many advocacy organizations, elected officials and youth services organizations serve food to the youth engaged in their programing. For example, a quick internet search reveals that non-profit Get Behind the Vest hosts a fundraiser pancake breakfast to raise money for police officer equipment and wellness.19 Saint Paul’s Church promotes its youth groups, stating that, once a week, young people gather in the church for “games, pizza,
19 Jesse Kirchhttps://www.msn.com/en-us/health/nutrition/6th-annual-get-behind-the-vest-pancake-breakfast-raisesfunds-for-cpd-patrol-officers/ar-BB10iuWj.
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faith, friendship and fun.”20 Chicago Cub Scouts promote a pancake breakfast and park picnic.21 These and thousands of other organizations provide food to their constituencies either as fundraising efforts or to support programming. Upon information and belief, the City has not instructed any comparable organizations to cease serving food, or else face arrest. The only difference between these organizations and CFS, is that CFS actively trains movement leaders and supported the protesters demanding transformational change from the City of Chicago.
Indeed, a review of the over 50,000 Chicago-based retail food establishments regulated by the City provides further support for the City’s retaliatory intent.22 Not even one other entity similarly situated to CFS is listed as a retail food establishment. While a handful of schools are so designated almost all of those are licensed in connection with a national food-service corporation. Thus, CFS can easily carry its burden to demonstrate unlawful retaliation in violation of the First Amendment.
B. The Chicago Freedom School Will Prevail on Tts Claim that the City of Chicago’s Regulatory Actions Against It Constitute an Impermissible Infringement on First Amendment Activity The City of Chicago deemed CFS a food retail establishment and declared that if its
employees continued to serve food on its premises, its employees will be subject to arrest. This regulatory action—independent of any retaliation—violates the First Amendment. As fully described above, when CFS engages in the act of serving food to protesters, it is engaging in a political expression. Government regulation of political expression is “sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial
20 Saint Paul’s United Church of Christ, https://www.spucc.org/connect-learn/youth-groups (last accessed June 24, 2020).
21 Chicago Cub Scouts, https://chicagocubscouts.com/ (last accessed June 24, 2020).
22 Retail Food Establishments, Chicago Data Portal (June 24, 2020), https://data.cityofchicago.org/CommunityEconomic-Development/Retail-Food-Establishments-Chicago/efs4-hghf.
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governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.” U. S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). The City of Chicago’s regulatory acts against the CFS fail this test.
While the City of Chicago has a substantial interest in regulating retail food establishments to ensure the well-being of those served by such establishments, it has no legitimate interest in misclassifying CFS as a retail food establishment. Given the City’s historic failure to regulate youth organizations that serve food incidental to their programing, the City simply cannot proffer a legitimate—let alone a substantial—interest in regulating the CFS as a retail food establishment. Finally, the City has imposed on CFS’ political expression of providing food, support and community to protestors the most serious consequence in its arsenal—the threat of an arrest, the levying of criminal charges and the deprivation of CFS employees’ liberty.
When regulating First Amendment activity, “precision of regulation must be the touchstone.” Nat’l People's Action v. Vill. of Wilmette, 914 F.2d 1008, 1011 (7th Cir. 1990). Here, the City of Chicago attempts to chill CFS’ political expression with the blunt hammer of an arrest. But the First Amendment forbids the City from doing so. Id. at 1012. (“[R]estrictions on expression must be content-neutral and ‘narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest,’ and they must ‘leave open ample alternative channels’ ...” ).
II. Plaintiff Has No Adequate Remedy at Law and Will Suffer Irreparable Harm in the Absence of a Preliminary Injunction
The City of Chicago has deemed CFS’ protected speech and political expression punishable by arrest. This continuing harm is not the sort of injury that can be healed later through monetary damages. No amount of money damages will relieve the CFS of the burdens of
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operating under the City’s unlawful cease and desist order—only an order from this Court can accomplish this. See Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 859 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that loss of First Amendment freedoms presumptively constitutes irreparable injury “for which money damages are not adequate”).
The City’s continual deprivation of CFS’ First Amendment rights, as previously described, is an irreparable harm sufficient to warrant a preliminary injunction. Higher Soc’y of Indiana v. Tippecanoe Cty., Indiana, 858 F.3d 1113, 1116 (7th Cir 2017) (“even short deprivations of First Amendment rights constitute irreparable harm”); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (“The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”); Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 589 (7th Cir. 2012) (same); Preston v. Thompson, 589 F.2d 300, 303 n.3 (7th Cir. 1978) (“The existence of a continuing constitutional violation constitutes proof of an irreparable harm, and its remedy certainly would serve the public interest.”).
The fact that CFS employees have not yet been arrested for their political expression does not mitigate the irreparable harm imposed upon CFS’ First Amendment Rights. “The Supreme Court has often noted that a realistic threat of arrest is enough to chill First Amendment rights.” City of Houston, Texas v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 459 n.7 (1987); Hodgkins ex rel. Hodgkins v. Peterson, 355 F.3d 1048, 1056 (7th Cir. 2004) (“When the plaintiff has alleged an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder, he should not be required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief.”).
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IV. The Balance of Harms Favors the Entry of a Preliminary Injunction The City would suffer no harm by withdrawing the cease and desist order and allowing CFS to continue to function in the same manner as hundreds of other youth groups throughout the City. On the other hand, the cease and desist order imposes considerable harm on CFS— chilling its political expression, imposing a fear of arrest on its employees and costing CFS to pay excessive fines that could shut it down as a small not-for-profit organization. Moreover, it is in the public interest to ensure that the City of Chicago does not violate the First Amendment rights of CFS. See Christian Legal Soc’y, 453 F.3d at 859 (“injunctions protecting First Amendment freedoms are always in the public interest”); Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 590 (7th Cir. 2012) (public interest is not harmed by preliminarily enjoining government action that is probably unconstitutional). V. The Court Should Waive Bond Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c), district courts have discretion to determine the amount of the bond accompanying a preliminary injunction, and this includes the authority to set a nominal bond. In this case, the Court should waive bond because the requested preliminary injunction is in the public interest, and the injunction is necessary to vindicate constitutional rights. See Davis v. Mineta, 302 F.3d 1104, 1126 (10th Cir. 2002) (“minimal bond amount should be considered” in public interest case); Complete Angler, L.L.C. v. City of Clearwater, 607 F.Supp.2d 1326, 1335 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (“Waiving the bond requirement is particularly appropriate where a plaintiff alleges the infringement of a fundamental constitutional right.”).
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court should order an evidentiary hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction at the earliest possible date and/or enter a preliminary injunction
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requiring the City of Chicago to (1) rescind the cease and desist order subjecting anyone who

serves food on CFS premises to arrest; (2) provide CFS with all pictures (and all existing copies

of pictures) taken during the May 30, 2020 raid of CFS; and (3) prohibit CPD and City regulators

from conducting future unlawful raids of CFS.

Respectfully Submitted,

Dated: June 25, 2020

By: /s/ Sheila Bedi

Joey L. Mogul People’s Law Office 1180 N. Milwaukee Ave. Chicago, IL 60642 773-235-0070 joeymogul@peopleslawoffice.com

Sheila Bedi Community Justice and Civil Rights Clinic23 Northwestern Pritzker School of Law 375 East Chicago Avenue Chicago, IL 60611-3609 312-503-8576 sheila.bedi@law.northwestern.edu

Counsel for Chicago Freedom School, Tony Alvarado-Rivera and Jacqulyn Hamilton

23 Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Students Allison Clark, Lucien Ferguson, William Hameline and Taylor Jachman made significant contributions to this brief.
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 Case: 1:20-cv-03718 Document #: 6 Filed: 06/25/20 Page 1 of 16 PageID #:64

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

CHICAGO FREEDOM SCHOOL, et al. Plaintiffs, v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants.

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No:

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)

Judge

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)

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PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Exhibit 6 Declarations of Plaintiffs
Jacqulyn Hamilton & Tony Alvarado Rivera

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