Case: 3:18-cv-00154-N As of: 02/18/2019 07:59 PM CST 1 of 45
APPEAL,EXH−ADM
U.S. District Court Northern District of Texas (Dallas) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:18−cv−00154−N

Daves et al v. Dallas County Texas et al Assigned to: Judge David C Godbey Case in other court: USCA5, 18−11368 Cause: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights
Plaintiff
Shannon Daves

Date Filed: 01/21/2018 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Civil Rights Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Elizabeth Rossi Civil Rights Corps 910 17th Street NW Suite 200 Washington, DC 20006 202−681−2721 Fax: 202−609−8030 Email: elizabeth@civilrightscorps.org LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Akeeb Dami Animashaun Civil Rights Corps 910 17th Street NW Suite 200 Washington, DC 20006 202−670−9541 Fax: 202−609−8030 Email: dami@civilrightscorps.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alexander George Karakatsanis Civil Rights Corps 910 17th Street NW Suite 200 Washington, DC 20006 202−681−2721 Fax: 202−609−8030 Email: alec@civilrightscorps.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andre Segura ACLU Foundation of Texas 1500 McGowen Suite 250 Houston, TX 77004 713−325−7012 Email: asegura@aclutx.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrea Woods American Civil Liberties Union 125 Broad Street New York, NY 10004 212−549−2528 Email: awoods@aclu.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Plaintiff Shakena Walston

Brandon Buskey American Civil Liberties Union 125 Broad St 18th Floor New York, NY 10004 212−284−7364 Fax: 212−549−2654 Email: bbuskey@aclu.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Emily Gerrick Texas Fair Defense Project 314 E Highland Mall Blvd Suite 108 Austin, TX 78752 512−879−1189 Fax: 512−637−5224
Kali Alanna Cohn ACLU of Texas 6440 North Central Expressway, Ste 318 Dallas, TX 75206 214−346−6577 Fax: 713−942−8966 Email: kcohn@aclutx.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Premal Dharia Civil Rights Corps 910 17th Street NW, Suite 200 Washington, DC 20006 202−681−2721 Fax: 202−609−8030 Email: premal@civilrightscorps.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susanne Ashley Pringle Texas Fair Defense Project 314 E Highland Mall Blvd Suite 108 Austin, TX 78752 512−637−5220 Email: springle@fairdefense.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Trisha Trigilio American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Texas P.O. Box 8306 Houston, TX 77288−8306 713−942−8146 x114 Email: ttrigilio@aclutx.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Elizabeth Rossi (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Akeeb Dami Animashaun

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(See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alexander George Karakatsanis (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andre Segura (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrea Woods (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brandon Buskey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Emily Gerrick (See above for address)

Kali Alanna Cohn (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Premal Dharia (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susanne Ashley Pringle (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Trisha Trigilio (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Erriyah Banks

represented by Elizabeth Rossi (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Akeeb Dami Animashaun (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alexander George Karakatsanis (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andre Segura (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrea Woods

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(See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brandon Buskey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Emily Gerrick (See above for address)

Kali Alanna Cohn (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Premal Dharia (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susanne Ashley Pringle (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Trisha Trigilio (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Destinee Tovar

represented by Elizabeth Rossi (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Akeeb Dami Animashaun (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alexander George Karakatsanis (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andre Segura (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrea Woods (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brandon Buskey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Emily Gerrick (See above for address)

Kali Alanna Cohn (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Plaintiff Patroba Michieka

Premal Dharia (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susanne Ashley Pringle (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Trisha Trigilio (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Elizabeth Rossi (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Akeeb Dami Animashaun (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alexander George Karakatsanis (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andre Segura (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrea Woods (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brandon Buskey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Emily Gerrick (See above for address)
Kali Alanna Cohn (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Premal Dharia (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susanne Ashley Pringle (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Trisha Trigilio (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Plaintiff
James Thompson On Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated

represented by Elizabeth Rossi (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Akeeb Dami Animashaun (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alexander George Karakatsanis (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andre Segura (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrea Woods (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brandon Buskey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Emily Gerrick (See above for address)

Kali Alanna Cohn (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Premal Dharia (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susanne Ashley Pringle (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Trisha Trigilio (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Faith in Texas

represented by Akeeb Dami Animashaun (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alexander George Karakatsanis (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrea Woods (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE

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ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brandon Buskey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Emily Gerrick (See above for address)

Premal Dharia (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elizabeth Rossi (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Texas Organizing Project Education Fund

represented by Akeeb Dami Animashaun (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alexander George Karakatsanis (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrea Woods (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brandon Buskey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Emily Gerrick (See above for address)

Premal Dharia (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elizabeth Rossi (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Dallas County Texas

represented by Tammy Jean Ardolf Dallas County District Attorney's Office Federal Litigation Section Frank Crowley Courts Building 133 N. Riverfront Blvd., L.B. 19 Dallas, TX 75207−4399 214−653−3692 Fax: 214−653−2899 Email: Tammy.Ardolf@dallascounty.org LEAD ATTORNEY

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ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ben Stephens Husch Blackwell LLP 600 Travis St Suite 2350 Houston, TX 77002 713−525−6263 Fax: 713−647−6884 Email: ben.stephens@huschblackwell.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John Butrus Dallas County District Attorney Frank Crowly Courts Building 113 N. Riverfront Blvd, LB 19 Dallas, TX 75207 214−653−3691 Fax: 214−653−5774 Email: john.butrus@dallascounty.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katharine D David Husch Blackwell LLP 600 Travis St Suite 2350 Houston, TX 77002 713−525−6258 Fax: 713−647−6884 Email: kate.david@huschblackwell.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mike Stafford Husch Blackwell LLP 1800 Bering Drive, Suite 750 Houston, TX 77057 713−647−6800 Fax: 713−647−6884

Peter L Harlan Dallas County District Attorney's Office Frank Crowley Courts Building 133 N Riverfront Blvd., 11th Floor Suite C4−2 LB 19 Dallas, TX 75207 214−653−3690 Fax: 214−653−2899 Email: pharlan@dallascounty.org TERMINATED: 12/27/2018

Philip James Morgan Husch Blackwell LLP 600 Travis St Suite 77002 Houston, TX 77002 713−525−6262 Fax: 713−647−6884 Email: phil.morgan@huschblackwell.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Marian Brown

represented by Tammy Jean Ardolf (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

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ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ben Stephens (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John Butrus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katharine D David (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mike Stafford (See above for address)

Peter L Harlan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/27/2018

Philip James Morgan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Terrie McVea

represented by Tammy Jean Ardolf (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ben Stephens (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John Butrus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katharine D David (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mike Stafford (See above for address)

Peter L Harlan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/27/2018

Philip James Morgan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Lisa Bronchetti

represented by Tammy Jean Ardolf (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ben Stephens (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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John Butrus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katharine D David (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mike Stafford (See above for address)

Peter L Harlan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/27/2018

Philip James Morgan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Steven Autry

represented by Tammy Jean Ardolf (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ben Stephens (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John Butrus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katharine D David (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mike Stafford (See above for address)

Peter L Harlan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/27/2018

Philip James Morgan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Anthony Randall

represented by Tammy Jean Ardolf (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ben Stephens (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John Butrus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katharine D David (See above for address)

Case: 3:18-cv-00154-N As of: 02/18/2019 07:59 PM CST 11 of 45

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mike Stafford (See above for address)

Peter L Harlan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/27/2018

Philip James Morgan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Janet Lusk

represented by Tammy Jean Ardolf (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ben Stephens (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John Butrus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katharine D David (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mike Stafford (See above for address)

Peter L Harlan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/27/2018

Philip James Morgan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Hal Turley Dallas County Magistrates

represented by Tammy Jean Ardolf (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ben Stephens (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John Butrus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katharine D David (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mike Stafford (See above for address)

Peter L Harlan

Case: 3:18-cv-00154-N As of: 02/18/2019 07:59 PM CST 12 of 45

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/27/2018

Philip James Morgan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Ernest White 194th

represented by Eric A Hudson Office of the Attorney General of Texas PO Box 12548 Austin, TX 78711−2548 512−463−2120 Fax: 512−320−0667 Email: eric.hudson@oag.texas.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher Lee Lindsey Office of the Texas Attorney General − Law Enforcement PO Box 12548 Austin, TX 78711−2548 512−463−2080 Fax: 512−370−9314 Email: christopher.lindsey@oag.texas.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Demetri Anastasiadis Office of the Texas Attorney General 300 W 15th St 7th Floor Austin, TX 78701 512−463−2080 Fax: 512−370−9374 Email: demetri.anastasiadis@oag.texas.gov TERMINATED: 07/27/2018

Enrique Manuel Varela Office of the Attorney General of Texas 300 W 15th Street Austin, TX 78701 512−475−4080 Fax: 512−320−0667 Email: enrique.varela@oag.texas.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kelsey Warren Office of the Attorney General Administrative Law Division P.O. Box 12548 Austin, TX 78711−2548 512−936−1660 Fax: 512−370−9373 Email: kelsey.warren@oag.texas.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Hector Garza 195th

represented by Eric A Hudson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher Lee Lindsey

Case: 3:18-cv-00154-N As of: 02/18/2019 07:59 PM CST 13 of 45

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Demetri Anastasiadis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/27/2018

Enrique Manuel Varela (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kelsey Warren (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Teresa Hawthorne 203rd

represented by Eric A Hudson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher Lee Lindsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Demetri Anastasiadis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/27/2018

Enrique Manuel Varela (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kelsey Warren (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Tammy Kemp 204th

represented by Eric A Hudson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher Lee Lindsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Demetri Anastasiadis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/27/2018

Enrique Manuel Varela (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kelsey Warren (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Jennifer Bennett 265th

represented by Eric A Hudson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

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ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Tammy Jean Ardolf (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher Lee Lindsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Demetri Anastasiadis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/27/2018

Enrique Manuel Varela (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kelsey Warren (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Amber Givens−Davis 282nd

represented by Eric A Hudson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher Lee Lindsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Demetri Anastasiadis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/27/2018

Enrique Manuel Varela (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kelsey Warren (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Livia Liu Francis 283rd

represented by Eric A Hudson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher Lee Lindsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Demetri Anastasiadis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/27/2018

Enrique Manuel Varela (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kelsey Warren

Case: 3:18-cv-00154-N As of: 02/18/2019 07:59 PM CST 15 of 45

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Stephanie Mitchell 291st

represented by Eric A Hudson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher Lee Lindsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Demetri Anastasiadis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/27/2018

Enrique Manuel Varela (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kelsey Warren (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Brandon Birmingham 292nd

represented by Eric A Hudson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher Lee Lindsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Demetri Anastasiadis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/27/2018

Enrique Manuel Varela (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kelsey Warren (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Tracy Holmes 363rd

represented by Eric A Hudson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher Lee Lindsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Demetri Anastasiadis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/27/2018

Enrique Manuel Varela (See above for address)

Case: 3:18-cv-00154-N As of: 02/18/2019 07:59 PM CST 16 of 45

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kelsey Warren (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Robert Burns No 1

represented by Eric A Hudson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher Lee Lindsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Demetri Anastasiadis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/27/2018

Enrique Manuel Varela (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kelsey Warren (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Nancy Kennedy No 2

represented by Eric A Hudson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher Lee Lindsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Demetri Anastasiadis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/27/2018

Enrique Manuel Varela (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kelsey Warren (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Gracie Lewis No 3

represented by Eric A Hudson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher Lee Lindsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Demetri Anastasiadis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/27/2018

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Defendant Dominique Collins No 4
Defendant Carter Thompson No 5
Defendant Jeanine Howard No 6

Enrique Manuel Varela (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kelsey Warren (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Eric A Hudson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher Lee Lindsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Demetri Anastasiadis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/27/2018
Enrique Manuel Varela (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kelsey Warren (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Eric A Hudson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher Lee Lindsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Demetri Anastasiadis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/27/2018
Enrique Manuel Varela (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kelsey Warren (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Eric A Hudson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher Lee Lindsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Demetri Anastasiadis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/27/2018

Enrique Manuel Varela (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kelsey Warren (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Stephanie Fargo No 7 Judges of Dalas County Criminal District Courts

represented by Eric A Hudson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher Lee Lindsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Demetri Anastasiadis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/27/2018

Enrique Manuel Varela (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kelsey Warren (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Dan Patterson No 1

represented by Tammy Jean Ardolf (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ben Stephens (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John Butrus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katharine D David (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mike Stafford (See above for address)

Peter L Harlan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/27/2018

Philip James Morgan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Defendant
Julia Hayes No 2

represented by Tammy Jean Ardolf (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ben Stephens (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John Butrus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katharine D David (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mike Stafford (See above for address)

Peter L Harlan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/27/2018

Philip James Morgan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Doug Skemp No 3

represented by Tammy Jean Ardolf (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ben Stephens (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John Butrus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katharine D David (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mike Stafford (See above for address)

Peter L Harlan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/27/2018

Philip James Morgan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Nancy Mulder No 4

represented by Tammy Jean Ardolf (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Defendant Lisa Green No 5
Defendant Angela King No 6

Ben Stephens (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John Butrus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katharine D David (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mike Stafford (See above for address)
Peter L Harlan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/27/2018
Philip James Morgan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Tammy Jean Ardolf (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ben Stephens (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John Butrus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter L Harlan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/27/2018
represented by Tammy Jean Ardolf (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ben Stephens (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John Butrus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katharine D David (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mike Stafford (See above for address)
Peter L Harlan

Case: 3:18-cv-00154-N As of: 02/18/2019 07:59 PM CST 21 of 45

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/27/2018

Philip James Morgan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Elizabeth Crowder No 7

represented by Tammy Jean Ardolf (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ben Stephens (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John Butrus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katharine D David (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mike Stafford (See above for address)

Peter L Harlan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/27/2018

Philip James Morgan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Tina Yoo Clinton No 8

represented by Tammy Jean Ardolf (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ben Stephens (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John Butrus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katharine D David (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mike Stafford (See above for address)

Peter L Harlan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/27/2018

Philip James Morgan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Defendant Peggy Hoffman No 9
Defendant Roberto Canas, Jr. No 10
Defendant Shequitta Kelly No 11 Judges of Dallas County Criminal Courts at Law

represented by Tammy Jean Ardolf (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ben Stephens (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John Butrus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katharine D David (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mike Stafford (See above for address)
Peter L Harlan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/27/2018
Philip James Morgan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Tammy Jean Ardolf (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ben Stephens (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John Butrus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katharine D David (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mike Stafford (See above for address)
Peter L Harlan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/27/2018
Philip James Morgan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Tammy Jean Ardolf (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 3:18-cv-00154-N As of: 02/18/2019 07:59 PM CST 23 of 45
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ben Stephens (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John Butrus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katharine D David (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mike Stafford (See above for address)
Peter L Harlan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/27/2018
Philip James Morgan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Respondent Texas Attorney General's Office

represented by Eric A Hudson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher Lee Lindsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Demetri Anastasiadis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/27/2018

Date Filed 01/21/2018
01/21/2018

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against All Defendants filed by Shakena Walston, Shannon Daves, James Thompson, Erriyah Banks, Destinee Tovar, Patroba Michieka. (Filing fee $400; Receipt number 0539−8933069) Clerk to issue summons(es). In each Notice of Electronic Filing, the judge assignment is indicated, and a link to the Judges Copy Requirements is provided. The court reminds the filer that any required copy of this and future documents must be delivered to the judge, in the manner prescribed, within three business days of filing. Unless exempted, attorneys who are not admitted to practice in the Northern District of Texas must seek admission promptly. Forms, instructions, and exemption information may be found at www.txnd.uscourts.gov, or by clicking here: Attorney Information − Bar Membership. If admission requirements are not satisfied within 21 days, the clerk will notify the presiding judge. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) 1, # 2 Exhibit(s) 2, # 3 Exhibit(s) 3, # 4 Exhibit(s) 4, # 5 Exhibit(s) 5, # 6 Exhibit(s) 6, # 7 Exhibit(s) 7, # 8 Exhibit(s) 8, # 9 Exhibit(s) 9, # 10 Cover Sheet, # 11 Exhibit(s) 10) (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 01/21/2018)
2 MOTION to Certify Class with Brief in Support filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Patroba Michieka, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Class Certification, # 2 Appendix, # 3 Proposed Order) (Rossi, Elizabeth) Modified docket text on 1/22/2018 (ajb). (Entered: 01/21/2018)

Case: 3:18-cv-00154-N As of: 02/18/2019 07:59 PM CST 24 of 45

01/21/2018 01/21/2018 01/21/2018 01/21/2018 01/22/2018
01/22/2018
01/25/2018 01/26/2018 01/30/2018

3 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Patroba Michieka, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 01/21/2018)
4 MOTION for Leave to File Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Excess of 25 Pages filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Patroba Michieka, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Attachments: # 1 Memo in support of motion to file oversized brief, # 2 Proposed Order, # 3 Exhibit(s) 1 −− Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. 3)) (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 01/21/2018)
5 New Case Notes: A filing fee has been paid. Pursuant to Misc. Order 6, Plaintiff is provided the Notice of Right to Consent to Proceed Before A U.S. Magistrate Judge (Judge Horan). Clerk to provide copy to plaintiff if not received electronically. (ajb) (Entered: 01/22/2018)
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS/DISCLOSURE STATEMENT (See Document 1 −11 for image) by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Patroba Michieka, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston. (ajb) (Entered: 01/22/2018)
6 Summons Issued as to Jennifer Bennett, Steven Autry, Brandon Birmingham, Lisa Bronchetti, Marian Brown, Robert Burns, Roberto Canas, Jr., Tina Yoo Clinton, Dominique Collins, Elizabeth Crowder, Dallas County Texas, Stephanie Fargo, Livia Liu Francis, Hector Garza, Amber Givens−Davis, Lisa Green, Teresa Hawthorne, Julia Hayes, Peggy Hoffman, Tracy Holmes, Jeanine Howard, Shequitta Kelly, Tammy Kemp, Nancy Kennedy, Angela King, Gracie Lewis, Janet Lusk, Terrie McVea, Stephanie Mitchell, Nancy Mulder, Dan Patterson, Anthony Randall, Doug Skemp, Carter Thompson, Hal Turley, Ernest White. (ajb) (Entered: 01/22/2018)
7 Request for Clerk to issue Summons filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Patroba Michieka, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston. (Attachments: # 1 Additional Page(s), # 2 Additional Page(s), # 3 Additional Page(s), # 4 Additional Page(s), # 5 Additional Page(s), # 6 Additional Page(s), # 7 Additional Page(s), # 8 Additional Page(s), # 9 Additional Page(s), # 10 Additional Page(s), # 11 Additional Page(s), # 12 Additional Page(s), # 13 Additional Page(s), # 14 Additional Page(s), # 15 Additional Page(s), # 16 Additional Page(s), # 17 Additional Page(s), # 18 Additional Page(s), # 19 Additional Page(s), # 20 Additional Page(s), # 21 Additional Page(s), # 22 Additional Page(s), # 23 Additional Page(s), # 24 Additional Page(s), # 25 Additional Page(s), # 26 Additional Page(s), # 27 Additional Page(s), # 28 Additional Page(s), # 29 Additional Page(s), # 30 Additional Page(s), # 31 Additional Page(s), # 32 Additional Page(s), # 33 Additional Page(s), # 34 Additional Page(s), # 35 Additional Page(s), # 36 Additional Page(s), # 37 Additional Page(s)) (Cohn, Kali) (Entered: 01/22/2018)
8 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice with Certificate of Good Standing (Filing fee $25; Receipt number 0539−8945458) filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Patroba Michieka, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Certificate of Good Standing, # 2 Proposed Order) (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 01/25/2018)
9 ELECTRONIC ORDER granting 8 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice of Elizabeth Rossi. If not already done, Applicant must register as an ECF User within 14 days (LR 5.1(f)). (Ordered by Judge David C Godbey on 1/26/2018) (chmb) (Entered: 01/26/2018)
10 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT against All Defendants filed by Shakena Walston, Shannon Daves, James Thompson, Erriyah Banks, Destinee Tovar, Patroba Michieka, Faith in Texas, Texas Organizing Project Education Fund. Unless exempted, attorneys who are not admitted to practice in the Northern District of Texas must seek admission promptly. Forms, instructions, and exemption information may be found at www.txnd.uscourts.gov, or by clicking here: Attorney Information − Bar Membership. If admission requirements are not satisfied within 21 days, the clerk will notify the presiding judge. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) 1 − Daves Declaration, # 2 Exhibit(s) 2 − Walston Declaration, # 3 Exhibit(s) 3 − Banks Declaration, # 4 Exhibit(s) 4 − Tovar Declaration, # 5 Exhibit(s) 5 − Michieka Declaration, # 6 Exhibit(s) 6 − Thompson Declaration, # 7 Exhibit(s) 7 − Misdemeanor bail schedule, # 8 Exhibit(s) 8 − Felony bail schedule, # 9 Exhibit(s) 9 − Commissioners Court Order,

Case: 3:18-cv-00154-N As of: 02/18/2019 07:59 PM CST 25 of 45

01/31/2018 02/02/2018 02/06/2018 02/09/2018 02/09/2018 02/20/2018 02/21/2018 02/21/2018
02/22/2018
02/22/2018

# 10 Exhibit(s) 10 − Email to Sheriff, # 11 Exhibit(s) 11 − Response from Sheriff, # 12 Exhibit(s) 12 − Redlined version of FAC) (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 01/30/2018)
11 ELECTRONIC Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge David C Godbey: Telephone Status Conference held on 1/31/2018. Attorney Appearances: Plaintiff − Elizabeth Rossi; Defense − Peter Harlan and Demetri Anastasiadis. (Court Reporter: Not Recorded) (No exhibits) Time in Court − :25. (chmb) (Entered: 01/31/2018)
12 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice with Certificate of Good Standing (Filing fee $25; Receipt number 0539−8965362) filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Faith in Texas, Patroba Michieka, Texas Organizing Project Education Fund, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston Attorney Brandon Buskey added to party Faith in Texas(pty:pla), Attorney Brandon Buskey added to party Texas Organizing Project Education Fund(pty:pla) (Buskey, Brandon) (Entered: 02/02/2018)
13 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice with Certificate of Good Standing for Attorney Alexander George Karakatsanis (Filing fee $25; Receipt number 0539−8970685) filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Faith in Texas, Patroba Michieka, Texas Organizing Project Education Fund, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Certificate of Good Standing, # 2 Exhibit(s) Proposed Order) (Karakatsanis, Alexander) (Entered: 02/06/2018)
14 ELECTRONIC ORDER granting 12 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice of Brandon J. Buskey. If not already done, Applicant must register as an ECF User within 14 days (LR 5.1(f)). (Ordered by Judge David C Godbey on 2/9/2018) (chmb) (Entered: 02/09/2018)
15 ELECTRONIC ORDER granting 13 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice of Alexander Karakatsanis. If not already done, Applicant must register as an ECF User within 14 days (LR 5.1(f)). (Ordered by Judge David C Godbey on 2/9/2018) (chmb) (Entered: 02/09/2018)
16 First MOTION to Extend Time Exhibit filed by Steven Autry, Lisa Bronchetti, Marian Brown, Roberto Canas, Jr., Tina Yoo Clinton, Elizabeth Crowder, Dallas County Texas, Lisa Green, Julia Hayes, Peggy Hoffman, Shequitta Kelly, Angela King, Janet Lusk, Terrie McVea, Nancy Mulder, Dan Patterson, Anthony Randall, Doug Skemp, Hal Turley with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s)) (Harlan, Peter) (Entered: 02/20/2018)
17 RESPONSE filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Faith in Texas, Patroba Michieka, Texas Organizing Project Education Fund, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston re: 16 First MOTION to Extend Time Exhibit (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 02/21/2018)
18 Defendants' First Amended MOTION to Extend Time to File Answer and/or Other Responses to Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, Motion for Class Certification and Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Steven Autry, Lisa Bronchetti, Marian Brown, Roberto Canas, Jr., Tina Yoo Clinton, Elizabeth Crowder, Dallas County Texas, Lisa Green, Julia Hayes, Peggy Hoffman, Shequitta Kelly, Angela King, Janet Lusk, Terrie McVea, Nancy Mulder, Dan Patterson, Anthony Randall, Doug Skemp, Hal Turley with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s)) (Harlan, Peter) Modified text on 4/3/2018 (axm). (Entered: 02/21/2018)
19 ***Withdrawn***Filed in error per E Rossi...OBJECTION filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Faith in Texas, Patroba Michieka, Texas Organizing Project Education Fund, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston re: 18 Amended MOTION to Extend Time Time To File Answer and/Or Other Responses To Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint,Motion For Class Certification And Motion For Preliminary Injunction (Rossi, Elizabeth) Modified on 2/22/2018 filed in error (svc). (Entered: 02/22/2018)
20 RESPONSE filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Faith in Texas, Patroba Michieka, Texas Organizing Project Education Fund, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston re: 18 Amended MOTION to Extend Time Time To File Answer and/Or Other Responses To Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint,Motion For Class Certification And Motion For Preliminary Injunction (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 02/22/2018)

Case: 3:18-cv-00154-N As of: 02/18/2019 07:59 PM CST 26 of 45

02/26/2018 02/27/2018
03/02/2018 03/08/2018 03/12/2018
03/16/2018 03/26/2018
04/02/2018 04/02/2018 04/02/2018 04/02/2018

21 RESPONSE filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Faith in Texas, Patroba Michieka, Texas Organizing Project Education Fund, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston re: 18 Amended MOTION to Extend Time Time To File Answer and/Or Other Responses To Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint,Motion For Class Certification And Motion For Preliminary Injunction (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 02/26/2018)
22 ORDER: Defendants' deadline to file briefs responding to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification and Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and responsive pleadings to Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint is 4/2/2018. If Defendants do not file any motions Plaintiffs' deadline to file reply briefs is 4/16/2018. If Defendants do file motions, Plaintiffs' deadline to file reply briefs and responses to Defendants' motions is 4/23/2018. If Defendants file motions, Defendants' deadline for filing replies in support of those motions is 5/7/2018. (Ordered by Judge David C Godbey on 2/27/2018) (rekc) (Entered: 02/27/2018)
23 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File to Exceed Local Rule CV−7.2(c) 25 Page Brief Limitationfor Response Briefs filed by Texas Attorney General's Office (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order). Party Attorney General of Texas added.Attorney Demetri Anastasiadis added to party Texas Attorney General's Office(pty:res) (Anastasiadis, Demetri) (Entered: 03/02/2018)
24 ELECTRONIC ORDER granting 23 Motion for Leave to File Briefs in Excess of Page Limit. The Attorney General may file its briefs in excess of the 25−page limit; each brief not to exceed 50 pages. (Ordered by Judge David C Godbey on 3/8/2018) (chmb) (Entered: 03/08/2018)
25 Joint MOTION to Stay Briefing Deadlines filed by Jennifer Bennett, Steven Autry, Brandon Birmingham, Lisa Bronchetti, Marian Brown, Robert Burns, Roberto Canas, Jr., Tina Yoo Clinton, Dominique Collins, Elizabeth Crowder, Dallas County Texas, Stephanie Fargo, Livia Liu Francis, Hector Garza, Amber Givens−Davis, Lisa Green, Teresa Hawthorne, Julia Hayes, Peggy Hoffman, Tracy Holmes, Jeanine Howard, Shequitta Kelly, Tammy Kemp, Nancy Kennedy, Angela King, Gracie Lewis, Janet Lusk, Terrie McVea, Stephanie Mitchell, Nancy Mulder, Dan Patterson, Anthony Randall, Doug Skemp, Carter Thompson with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Harlan, Peter) (Entered: 03/12/2018)
26 RESPONSE filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Faith in Texas, Patroba Michieka, Texas Attorney General's Office, Texas Organizing Project Education Fund, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston re: 25 Joint MOTION to Stay Briefing Deadlines (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 03/16/2018)
27 REPLY filed by Jennifer Bennett, Steven Autry, Brandon Birmingham, Lisa Bronchetti, Marian Brown, Robert Burns, Roberto Canas, Jr., Tina Yoo Clinton, Dominique Collins, Elizabeth Crowder, Dallas County Texas, Stephanie Fargo, Livia Liu Francis, Hector Garza, Amber Givens−Davis, Lisa Green, Teresa Hawthorne, Julia Hayes, Peggy Hoffman, Tracy Holmes, Jeanine Howard, Shequitta Kelly, Tammy Kemp, Nancy Kennedy, Angela King, Gracie Lewis, Janet Lusk, Terrie McVea, Stephanie Mitchell, Nancy Mulder, Dan Patterson, Anthony Randall, Doug Skemp, Carter Thompson, Hal Turley, Ernest White re: 25 Joint MOTION to Stay Briefing Deadlines (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Exhibit A) (Anastasiadis, Demetri) Modified linkage on 3/27/2018 (rekc). (Entered: 03/26/2018)
28 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by Dallas County Texas with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Harlan, Peter) (Entered: 04/02/2018)
29 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by Marian Brown with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Harlan, Peter) (Entered: 04/02/2018)
30 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by Steven Autry, Lisa Bronchetti, Janet Lusk, Terrie McVea, Anthony Randall, Hal Turley with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Harlan, Peter) (Entered: 04/02/2018)
31 RESPONSE filed by Steven Autry, Lisa Bronchetti, Marian Brown, Roberto Canas, Jr., Tina Yoo Clinton, Elizabeth Crowder, Dallas County Texas, Julia Hayes, Peggy Hoffman, Shequitta Kelly, Angela King, Janet Lusk, Terrie McVea, Nancy Mulder, Dan Patterson, Anthony Randall, Doug Skemp, Hal Turley re: 2 MOTION to Certify Class (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Exhibit(s), # 4 Exhibit(s), # 5

Case: 3:18-cv-00154-N As of: 02/18/2019 07:59 PM CST 27 of 45

04/02/2018 04/02/2018 04/02/2018 04/02/2018 04/02/2018 04/02/2018 04/05/2018 04/06/2018 04/06/2018

Exhibit(s), # 6 Exhibit(s)) (Harlan, Peter) (Entered: 04/02/2018)
32 RESPONSE filed by Steven Autry, Lisa Bronchetti, Marian Brown, Roberto Canas, Jr., Tina Yoo Clinton, Elizabeth Crowder, Dallas County Texas, Julia Hayes, Peggy Hoffman, Shequitta Kelly, Angela King, Janet Lusk, Nancy Mulder, Dan Patterson, Anthony Randall, Doug Skemp, Hal Turley re: 3 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Exhibit(s), # 4 Exhibit(s), # 5 Exhibit(s), # 6 Exhibit(s), # 7 Exhibit(s), # 8 Exhibit(s)) (Harlan, Peter) (Entered: 04/02/2018)
33 MOTION to Dismiss for Pursuant to Civil Procedure 12(B)(1) and 12(B)(6) filed by Dan Patterson, Julia Hayes, Doug Skemp, Nancy Mulder, Lisa Green, Angela King, Elizabeth Crowder, Tina Yoo Clinton, Peggy Hoffman, Roberto Canas, Jr., Shequitta Kelly with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Harlan, Peter) Modified title on 4/3/2018 (axm). (Entered: 04/02/2018)
34 RESPONSE filed by Brandon Birmingham, Robert Burns, Dominique Collins, Stephanie Fargo, Livia Liu Francis, Hector Garza, Amber Givens−Davis, Teresa Hawthorne, Tracy Holmes, Jeanine Howard, Tammy Kemp, Nancy Kennedy, Gracie Lewis, Stephanie Mitchell, Carter Thompson, Ernest White re: 4 MOTION for Leave to File Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Excess of 25 Pages, 3 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) 1, # 2 Exhibit(s) 2) (Anastasiadis, Demetri) (Entered: 04/02/2018)
35 MOTION to Dismiss For Failure to State a Claim and Lack of Subject−Matter Jurisdiction filed by Jennifer Bennett, Brandon Birmingham, Robert Burns, Dominique Collins, Stephanie Fargo, Livia Liu Francis, Hector Garza, Amber Givens−Davis, Teresa Hawthorne, Tracy Holmes, Jeanine Howard, Tammy Kemp, Nancy Kennedy, Gracie Lewis, Stephanie Mitchell, Carter Thompson, Ernest White. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) 1, # 2 Exhibit(s) 2, # 3 Proposed Amendment) (Anastasiadis, Demetri) Modified text and filers on 4/3/2018 (axm). (Entered: 04/02/2018)
36 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint for Failure to State a Claim and Lack of Subject−Matter Jurisdiction filed by Jennifer Bennett, Brandon Birmingham, Robert Burns, Dominique Collins, Stephanie Fargo, Livia Liu Francis, Hector Garza, Amber Givens−Davis, Teresa Hawthorne, Tracy Holmes, Jeanine Howard, Tammy Kemp, Nancy Kennedy, Gracie Lewis, Stephanie Mitchell, Carter Thompson, Ernest White. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) 1, # 2 Proposed Order) (Anastasiadis, Demetri) Modified title on 4/3/2018 (axm). (Entered: 04/02/2018)
37 RESPONSE filed by Jennifer Bennett, Brandon Birmingham, Robert Burns, Dominique Collins, Stephanie Fargo, Livia Liu Francis, Hector Garza, Amber Givens−Davis, Teresa Hawthorne, Tracy Holmes, Jeanine Howard, Tammy Kemp, Nancy Kennedy, Gracie Lewis, Stephanie Mitchell, Carter Thompson, Ernest White re: 2 MOTION to Certify Class (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Anastasiadis, Demetri) (Entered: 04/02/2018)
38 RESPONSE filed by Jennifer Bennett, Brandon Birmingham, Robert Burns, Dominique Collins, Stephanie Fargo, Livia Liu Francis, Hector Garza, Amber Givens−Davis, Teresa Hawthorne, Tracy Holmes, Jeanine Howard, Tammy Kemp, Nancy Kennedy, Gracie Lewis, Stephanie Mitchell, Carter Thompson, Ernest White, Jennifer Bennett re: 3 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) 1, # 2 Exhibit(s) 2, # 3 Proposed Order) (Anastasiadis, Demetri) (Entered: 04/05/2018)
39 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice with Certificate of Good Standing (Filing fee $25; Receipt number 0539−9104721) filed by Dallas County, Texas, Marian Brown, Terrie McVea, Lisa Bronchetti, Steven Autry, Anthony Randall, Janet Lusk, Hal Turley, Dan Patterson, Julia Hayes, Doug Skemp, Nancy C. Mulder, Angela King, Elizabeth Crowder, Tina Yoo Clinton, Peggy Hoffman, Roberto Canas, Jr., and Shequitta Kelly added (pty:dft) (Morgan, Philip) Modified filers on 4/6/2018 (ran). (Entered: 04/06/2018)
40 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice with Certificate of Good Standing for Attorney Katharine D. David (Filing fee $25; Receipt number 0539−9104862) filed by Steven Autry, Lisa Bronchetti, Marian Brown, Roberto Canas, Jr., Tina Yoo Clinton,

Case: 3:18-cv-00154-N As of: 02/18/2019 07:59 PM CST 28 of 45

04/06/2018
04/09/2018 04/09/2018 04/09/2018 04/11/2018
04/13/2018 04/13/2018 04/18/2018
04/19/2018

Elizabeth Crowder, Dallas County Texas, Julia Hayes, Peggy Hoffman, Shequitta Kelly, Angela King, Janet Lusk, Terrie McVea, Nancy Mulder, Dan Patterson, Anthony Randall, Doug Skemp, Hal Turley (Morgan, Philip) (Entered: 04/06/2018)
41 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, Amended MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and Brief in Support () filed by Jennifer Bennett, Brandon Birmingham, Robert Burns, Dominique Collins, Stephanie Fargo, Livia Liu Francis, Hector Garza, Amber Givens−Davis, Teresa Hawthorne, Tracy Holmes, Jeanine Howard, Tammy Kemp, Nancy Kennedy, Gracie Lewis, Stephanie Mitchell, Carter Thompson, Ernest White with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Exhibit 1, # 2 Proposed Order Amended Proposed Order)Attorney Demetri Anastasiadis added to party Jennifer Bennett(pty:dft) (Anastasiadis, Demetri) (Entered: 04/06/2018)
42 ELECTRONIC ORDER finding as moot 36 Motion to Dismiss per 41 Amended Motion to Dismiss. (Ordered by Judge David C Godbey on 4/9/2018) (chmb) (Entered: 04/09/2018)
43 ELECTRONIC ORDER granting 39 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice of Philip J. Morgan. If not already done, Applicant must register as an ECF User within 14 days (LR 5.1(f)). (Ordered by Judge David C Godbey on 4/9/2018) (chmb) (Entered: 04/09/2018)
44 ELECTRONIC ORDER granting 40 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice of Katharine D. David. If not already done, Applicant must register as an ECF User within 14 days (LR 5.1(f)). (Ordered by Judge David C Godbey on 4/9/2018) (chmb) (Entered: 04/09/2018)
45 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice with Certificate of Good Standing (Filing fee $25; Receipt number 0539−9114822) filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Faith in Texas, Patroba Michieka, Texas Organizing Project Education Fund, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit(s) Certificate of Good Standing)Attorney Premal Dharia added to party Erriyah Banks(pty:pla), Attorney Premal Dharia added to party Shannon Daves(pty:pla), Attorney Premal Dharia added to party Faith in Texas(pty:pla), Attorney Premal Dharia added to party Patroba Michieka(pty:pla), Attorney Premal Dharia added to party Texas Organizing Project Education Fund(pty:pla), Attorney Premal Dharia added to party James Thompson(pty:pla), Attorney Premal Dharia added to party Destinee Tovar(pty:pla), Attorney Premal Dharia added to party Shakena Walston(pty:pla) (Dharia, Premal) (Entered: 04/11/2018)
46 CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS/DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by Steven Autry, Lisa Bronchetti, Marian Brown, Roberto Canas, Jr., Tina Yoo Clinton, Elizabeth Crowder, Dallas County Texas, Julia Hayes, Peggy Hoffman, Shequitta Kelly, Angela King, Janet Lusk, Terrie McVea, Nancy Mulder, Dan Patterson, Anthony Randall, Doug Skemp, Hal Turley. (Morgan, Philip) (Entered: 04/13/2018)
47 ELECTRONIC ORDER granting 45 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice of Premal Dharia. If not already done, Applicant must register as an ECF User within 14 days (LR 5.1(f)). (Ordered by Judge David C Godbey on 4/13/2018) (chmb) (Entered: 04/13/2018)
48 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to 28 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, 30 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, 41 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a ClaimAmended MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and Brief in Support, 33 MOTION to Dismiss for Pursuant to Civil Procedure 12(B)(1) and 12(B)(6)MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, 29 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Faith in Texas, Patroba Michieka, Texas Attorney General's Office, Texas Organizing Project Education Fund, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 04/18/2018)
49 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice with Certificate of Good Standing (Filing fee $25; Receipt number 0539−9135366) filed by Steven Autry, Lisa Bronchetti, Marian Brown, Roberto Canas, Jr., Tina Yoo Clinton, Elizabeth Crowder, Dallas County Texas, Julia Hayes, Peggy Hoffman, Shequitta Kelly, Angela King, Janet Lusk, Terrie McVea, Nancy Mulder, Dan Patterson, Anthony Randall, Doug Skemp, Hal Turley

Case: 3:18-cv-00154-N As of: 02/18/2019 07:59 PM CST 29 of 45

04/23/2018 04/23/2018 04/23/2018 04/23/2018 04/23/2018 04/23/2018 04/23/2018 04/24/2018

Attorney Benjamin R Stephens added to party Steven Autry(pty:dft), Attorney Benjamin R Stephens added to party Lisa Bronchetti(pty:dft), Attorney Benjamin R Stephens added to party Marian Brown(pty:dft), Attorney Benjamin R Stephens added to party Roberto Canas, Jr.(pty:dft), Attorney Benjamin R Stephens added to party Tina Yoo Clinton(pty:dft), Attorney Benjamin R Stephens added to party Elizabeth Crowder(pty:dft), Attorney Benjamin R Stephens added to party Dallas County Texas(pty:dft), Attorney Benjamin R Stephens added to party Julia Hayes(pty:dft), Attorney Benjamin R Stephens added to party Peggy Hoffman(pty:dft), Attorney Benjamin R Stephens added to party Shequitta Kelly(pty:dft), Attorney Benjamin R Stephens added to party Angela King(pty:dft), Attorney Benjamin R Stephens added to party Janet Lusk(pty:dft), Attorney Benjamin R Stephens added to party Terrie McVea(pty:dft), Attorney Benjamin R Stephens added to party Nancy Mulder(pty:dft), Attorney Benjamin R Stephens added to party Dan Patterson(pty:dft), Attorney Benjamin R Stephens added to party Anthony Randall(pty:dft), Attorney Benjamin R Stephens added to party Doug Skemp(pty:dft), Attorney Benjamin R Stephens added to party Hal Turley(pty:dft) (Stephens, Benjamin) (Entered: 04/19/2018)
50 ELECTRONIC ORDER granting 48 Motion to Extend Time to File Response/Reply. Plaintiffs' response to Defendants' motion to dismiss is due by April 30, 2018. Defendants' reply is due by May 14, 2018. (Ordered by Judge David C Godbey on 4/23/2018) (chmb) (Entered: 04/23/2018)
51 ELECTRONIC ORDER granting 49 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice of Benjamin R. Stephens. If not already done, Applicant must register as an ECF User within 14 days (LR 5.1(f)). (Ordered by Judge David C Godbey on 4/23/2018) (chmb) (Entered: 04/23/2018)
52 REPLY filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Faith in Texas, Patroba Michieka, Texas Attorney General's Office, Texas Organizing Project Education Fund, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston re: 4 MOTION for Leave to File Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Excess of 25 Pages, 3 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 04/23/2018)
53 MOTION for Leave to File Reply Brief in Excess of Page Limit filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Faith in Texas, Patroba Michieka, Texas Attorney General's Office, Texas Organizing Project Education Fund, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Reply Brief to County Defendants in support of Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction, # 2 Proposed Order Proposed Order) (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 04/23/2018)
54 MOTION for Leave to File Reply Brief in Excess of Page Limit filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Faith in Texas, Patroba Michieka, Texas Attorney General's Office, Texas Organizing Project Education Fund, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Omnibus Reply Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, # 2 Proposed Order) (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 04/23/2018)
55 MOTION for Leave to File Response Brief in Excess of Page Limit filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Faith in Texas, Patroba Michieka, Texas Attorney General's Office, Texas Organizing Project Education Fund, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to the Felony Judges' Motion to Dismiss, # 2 Proposed Order) (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 04/23/2018)
56 Proposed Order (Amended to Replace Dkt. 55−2) by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Faith in Texas, Patroba Michieka, Texas Organizing Project Education Fund, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston. (Rossi, Elizabeth) Modified text on 4/24/2018 (ctf). (Entered: 04/23/2018)
57 AMENDED DOCUMENT − PLTF'S REPLY TO FELONY JUDGES' RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Faith in Texas, Patroba Michieka, Texas Organizing Project Education Fund, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston. Amendment to 52 Reply. to Felony Judges' Response in Opposition to Preliminary Injunction. (Rossi, Elizabeth) Modified on 4/25/2018 ti enhance text(dss). (Entered: 04/24/2018)

Case: 3:18-cv-00154-N As of: 02/18/2019 07:59 PM CST 30 of 45

04/24/2018
04/27/2018 04/27/2018 04/27/2018 04/27/2018 04/27/2018 04/27/2018 04/30/2018
04/30/2018 04/30/2018 04/30/2018 04/30/2018 05/02/2018

58 AMENDED DOCUMENT −PLTF'S REPLY TO COUNTY DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PLTF'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Faith in Texas, Patroba Michieka, Texas Organizing Project Education Fund, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston. Amendment to 53 MOTION for Leave to File Reply Brief in Excess of Page Limit. (Amendment to [53−1] Proposed Brief). (Rossi, Elizabeth) Modified on 4/25/2018 to enhance title of document(dss). (Entered: 04/24/2018)
59 ELECTRONIC ORDER granting 53 Motion for Leave to File. Plaintiffs are granted leave to file reply to the County Defendants' response in excess of page limit not to exceed 33 pages. Clerk to file reply filed as Exhibit 1. (Ordered by Judge David C Godbey on 4/27/2018) (chmb) (Entered: 04/27/2018)
60 ELECTRONIC ORDER granting 54 Motion for Leave to File. Plaintiffs are granted leave to file reply in support of class certification in excess of page limit not to exceed 20 pages. Clerk to file reply filed as Exhibit 1. (Ordered by Judge David C Godbey on 4/27/2018) (chmb) (Entered: 04/27/2018)
61 ELECTRONIC ORDER granting 55 Motion for Leave to File. Plaintiffs are granted leave to file response brief in opposition to the Felony Judges' Motion to Dismiss not to exceed 40 pages. Clerk to file Plaintiffs' response filed as Exhibit 1. (Ordered by Judge David C Godbey on 4/27/2018) (chmb) (Entered: 04/27/2018)
62 OMNIBUS REPLY re: 2 MOTION to Certify Class filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Faith in Texas, Patroba Michieka, Texas Organizing Project Education Fund, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston. (sss) (Entered: 04/27/2018)
63 RESPONSE re: 41 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Faith in Texas, Patroba Michieka, Texas Organizing Project Education Fund, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston. (sss) (Entered: 04/27/2018)
64 REPLY re: 3 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Faith in Texas, Patroba Michieka, Texas Organizing Project Education Fund, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston. (sss) (Entered: 04/27/2018)
65 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Katharine D David on behalf of Steven Autry, Lisa Bronchetti, Marian Brown, Roberto Canas, Jr., Tina Yoo Clinton, Elizabeth Crowder, Dallas County Texas, Julia Hayes, Peggy Hoffman, Shequitta Kelly, Angela King, Janet Lusk, Terrie McVea, Nancy Mulder, Dan Patterson, Anthony Randall, Doug Skemp, Hal Turley. (Filer will update contact info in ECF.) (David, Katharine) (Entered: 04/30/2018)
66 RESPONSE filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Faith in Texas, Patroba Michieka, Texas Attorney General's Office, Texas Organizing Project Education Fund, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston re: 28 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 04/30/2018)
67 RESPONSE filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Faith in Texas, Patroba Michieka, Texas Attorney General's Office, Texas Organizing Project Education Fund, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston re: 33 MOTION to Dismiss for Pursuant to Civil Procedure 12(B)(1) and 12(B)(6)MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 04/30/2018)
68 RESPONSE filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Faith in Texas, Patroba Michieka, Texas Attorney General's Office, Texas Organizing Project Education Fund, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston re: 30 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 04/30/2018)
69 RESPONSE filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Faith in Texas, Patroba Michieka, Texas Attorney General's Office, Texas Organizing Project Education Fund, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston re: 29 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 04/30/2018)
70 ORDER denying 25 Joint Motion to stay pending a decision by the Fifth Circuit on petitions for rehearing in a related case. (Ordered by Judge David C Godbey on 5/2/2018) (zkc) (Entered: 05/02/2018)

Case: 3:18-cv-00154-N As of: 02/18/2019 07:59 PM CST 31 of 45

05/04/2018
05/10/2018
05/11/2018 05/11/2018 05/11/2018 05/14/2018 05/14/2018 05/21/2018 05/21/2018 05/21/2018 05/21/2018 05/23/2018 05/25/2018

71 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to 66 Response/Objection, 68 Response/Objection, 67 Response/Objection, 69 Response/Objection, filed by Steven Autry, Lisa Bronchetti, Marian Brown, Roberto Canas, Jr., Tina Yoo Clinton, Elizabeth Crowder, Dallas County Texas, Lisa Green, Julia Hayes, Peggy Hoffman, Shequitta Kelly, Angela King, Janet Lusk, Terrie McVea, Nancy Mulder, Dan Patterson, Anthony Randall, Doug Skemp, Hal Turley (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)Attorney Benjamin R Stephens added to party Lisa Green(pty:dft) (Stephens, Benjamin) (Entered: 05/04/2018)
72 MOTION for Leave to File to Exceed Local Rule CV−7.2(c) 25 Page Brief Limitationto file reply to Pfs ECF 63 filed by Jennifer Bennett, Brandon Birmingham, Robert Burns, Dominique Collins, Stephanie Fargo, Livia Liu Francis, Hector Garza, Amber Givens−Davis, Teresa Hawthorne, Tracy Holmes, Jeanine Howard, Tammy Kemp, Nancy Kennedy, Gracie Lewis, Stephanie Mitchell, Carter Thompson, Ernest White (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Proposed Order) (Anastasiadis, Demetri) (Entered: 05/10/2018)
73 ELECTRONIC ORDER granting 4 Motion for Leave to File. (Unless the document has already been filed, clerk to enter the document as of the date of this order.) Plaintiffs' brief in support of motion for preliminary injunction may be filed in excess of 25 pages not to exceed 51 pages.Clerk to file Brief filed as Exhibit 3. (Ordered by Judge David C Godbey on 5/11/2018) (chmb) (Entered: 05/11/2018)
74 ELECTRONIC ORDER granting 71 Motion to Extend Time to File Response/Reply. The Dallas County Defendants' reply to their motion to dismiss is due by May 21, 2018. (Ordered by Judge David C Godbey on 5/11/2018) (chmb) (Entered: 05/11/2018)
75 Brief in Support filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Patroba Michieka, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston re 3 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (ran) (Entered: 05/11/2018)
76 ELECTRONIC ORDER granting 72 Motion for Leave to File. Defendants' Reply Brief may not exceed 20 pages. (Ordered by Judge David C Godbey on 5/14/2018) (chmb) (Entered: 05/14/2018)
77 REPLY filed by Jennifer Bennett, Brandon Birmingham, Robert Burns, Dominique Collins, Stephanie Fargo, Livia Liu Francis, Hector Garza, Amber Givens−Davis, Teresa Hawthorne, Tracy Holmes, Jeanine Howard, Tammy Kemp, Nancy Kennedy, Gracie Lewis, Stephanie Mitchell, Carter Thompson, Ernest White re: 63 Response/Objection (Anastasiadis, Demetri) (Entered: 05/14/2018)
78 REPLY filed by Dallas County Texas re: 30 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (David, Katharine) (Entered: 05/21/2018)
79 REPLY filed by Dallas County Texas re: 29 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (David, Katharine) (Entered: 05/21/2018)
80 REPLY filed by Dallas County Texas re: 28 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s)) (David, Katharine) (Entered: 05/21/2018)
81 REPLY filed by Roberto Canas, Jr., Tina Yoo Clinton, Elizabeth Crowder, Lisa Green, Julia Hayes, Peggy Hoffman, Shequitta Kelly, Angela King, Nancy Mulder, Dan Patterson, Doug Skemp re: 33 MOTION to Dismiss for Pursuant to Civil Procedure 12(B)(1) and 12(B)(6)MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s)) (David, Katharine) (Entered: 05/21/2018)
82 MOTION for Hearing on Pending Motions filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Faith in Texas, Patroba Michieka, Texas Attorney General's Office, Texas Organizing Project Education Fund, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 05/23/2018)
83 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Christopher Lee Lindsey on behalf of Jennifer Bennett, Brandon Birmingham, Robert Burns, Dominique Collins, Stephanie Fargo, Livia Liu Francis, Hector Garza, Amber Givens−Davis, Teresa Hawthorne, Tracy Holmes, Jeanine Howard, Tammy Kemp, Nancy Kennedy, Gracie Lewis, Stephanie Mitchell, Carter Thompson, Ernest White. (Filer confirms contact info in ECF is current.) (Lindsey, Christopher) (Entered: 05/25/2018)

Case: 3:18-cv-00154-N As of: 02/18/2019 07:59 PM CST 32 of 45

05/25/2018 05/29/2018 06/01/2018 06/04/2018
06/14/2018
06/15/2018 06/26/2018
06/28/2018 07/02/2018 07/16/2018

84 RESPONSE filed by Jennifer Bennett, Brandon Birmingham, Robert Burns, Dominique Collins, Stephanie Fargo, Livia Liu Francis, Hector Garza, Amber Givens−Davis, Teresa Hawthorne, Tracy Holmes, Jeanine Howard, Tammy Kemp, Nancy Kennedy, Gracie Lewis, Stephanie Mitchell, Carter Thompson, Ernest White re: 82 MOTION for Hearing on Pending Motions (Lindsey, Christopher) (Entered: 05/25/2018)
85 ELECTRONIC ORDER finding as moot 35 Motion to Dismiss per 41 amended motion to dismiss. (Ordered by Judge David C Godbey on 5/29/2018) (chmb) (Entered: 05/29/2018)
86 RESPONSE filed by Jennifer Bennett, Brandon Birmingham, Robert Burns, Dominique Collins, Stephanie Fargo, Livia Liu Francis, Hector Garza, Amber Givens−Davis, Teresa Hawthorne, Tracy Holmes, Jeanine Howard, Tammy Kemp, Nancy Kennedy, Gracie Lewis, Stephanie Mitchell, Carter Thompson, Ernest White re: 75 Brief/Memorandum in Support of Motion (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit(s) Exhibit 2) (Anastasiadis, Demetri) (Entered: 06/01/2018)
87 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction pursuant to 12(b)(1) and (6) () filed by Jennifer Bennett, Brandon Birmingham, Robert Burns, Dominique Collins, Stephanie Fargo, Livia Liu Francis, Hector Garza, Amber Givens−Davis, Teresa Hawthorne, Tracy Holmes, Jeanine Howard, Tammy Kemp, Nancy Kennedy, Gracie Lewis, Stephanie Mitchell, Carter Thompson, Ernest White with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) 1, # 2 Exhibit(s) 2) (Anastasiadis, Demetri) (Entered: 06/04/2018)
88 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice with Certificate of Good Standing (Filing fee $25; Receipt number 0539−9252518) filed by Plaintiffs. Attorney Andrea Woods added to party Erriyah Banks(pty:pla), Shannon Daves(pty:pla), Faith in Texas(pty:pla), Patroba Michieka(pty:pla), Texas Organizing Project Education Fund(pty:pla), James Thompson(pty:pla), Destinee Tovar(pty:pla), Shakena Walston(pty:pla). (Woods, Andrea) Condensed text on 6/15/2018 (dsr). (Entered: 06/14/2018)
89 ELECTRONIC ORDER granting 88 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice of Andrea Woods. If not already done, Applicant must register as an ECF User within 14 days (LR 5.1(f)). (Ordered by Judge David C Godbey on 6/15/2018) (chmb) (Entered: 06/15/2018)
90 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice with Certificate of Good Standing (Filing fee $25; Receipt number 0539−9276581) filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Faith in Texas, Patroba Michieka, Texas Organizing Project Education Fund, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Proposed Order) Attorney Akeeb Dami Animashaun added to parties Erriyah Banks(pty:pla), Shannon Daves(pty:pla), Faith in Texas(pty:pla), Patroba Michieka(pty:pla), Texas Organizing Project Education Fund(pty:pla), James Thompson(pty:pla), Destinee Tovar(pty:pla), Shakena Walston(pty:pla) (Animashaun, Akeeb) Modified text on 6/27/2018 (ykp). (Entered: 06/26/2018)
91 ELECTRONIC ORDER granting 90 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice of A. Dami Animashaun. If not already done, Applicant must register as an ECF User within 14 days (LR 5.1(f)). (Ordered by Judge David C Godbey on 6/28/2018) (chmb) (Entered: 06/28/2018)
92 ORDER granting 82 Motion for Hearing. Motion Hearing set for 8/10/2018 09:00 AM before Judge David C Godbey. (Ordered by Judge David C Godbey on 7/2/2018) (epm) (Entered: 07/02/2018)
93 NOTICE of Plaintiffs' Exhibits in Support Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Patroba Michieka, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston (Attachments: # 1 Declaration(s) Ex 1 Clarissa Kimmey Dec, # 2 Exhibit(s) Ex 2 Defendants' Admissions, # 3 Exhibit(s) Ex 3 Misdemeanor Bail Schedule, # 4 Exhibit(s) Ex 4 Felony Bail Schedule, # 5 Exhibit(s) Ex 5 Commissioner's Court Order, # 6 Declaration(s) Ex 6 Steven Demuth Dec, # 7 Exhibit(s) Ex 7 Demuth Works Consulted, # 8 Exhibit(s) Ex 8 Gupta Study, # 9 Exhibit(s) Ex 9 Heaton Study, # 10 Exhibit(s) Ex 10 Stevenson Study, # 11 Exhibit(s) Ex 11 Baughman Article, # 12 Exhibit(s) Ex 12 Demuth Expert Reports, # 13

Case: 3:18-cv-00154-N As of: 02/18/2019 07:59 PM CST 33 of 45

07/16/2018 07/18/2018
07/18/2018
07/18/2018 07/18/2018 07/18/2018 07/19/2018
07/23/2018

Exhibit(s) Ex 13 Leslie Report, # 14 Exhibit(s) Ex 14 Lum Study, # 15 Declaration(s) Ex 15 Michael Jones Dec, # 16 Exhibit(s) Ex 16 Jones Exhibit List, # 17 Exhibit(s) Ex 17 Jones References, # 18 Exhibit(s) Ex 18 Jones CV, # 19 Exhibit(s) Ex 19 Jones Unsecured Bond Study, # 20 Exhibit(s) Ex 20 Brooker Jefferson Study, # 21 Exhibit(s) Ex 21 Bechtel Paper, # 22 Exhibit(s) Ex 22 Lowenkamp Hidden Costs, # 23 Exhibit(s) Ex 23 Lowenkamp Impact of Detention, # 24 Exhibit(s) Ex 24 Lowenkamp Impact of Supervision, # 25 Exhibit(s) Ex 25 Holsinger Detention and Outcomes, # 26 Exhibit(s) Ex 26 Holsinger Bond Survey, # 27 Exhibit(s) Ex 27 Dobbie Study, # 28 Exhibit(s) Ex 28 Sacks Study, # 29 Exhibit(s) Ex 29 Kimbrell Study, # 30 Exhibit(s) Ex 30 Brooker Yakima Study, # 31 Exhibit(s) Ex 31 Gouldin Paper, # 32 Declaration(s) Ex 32 John Clark Dec, # 33 Exhibit(s) Ex 33 Clark Exhibits, # 34 Exhibit(s) Ex 34 Pretrial Justice Costs, # 35 Exhibit(s) Ex 35 Have You Asked, # 36 Exhibit(s) Ex 36 Financially Fragile Report, # 37 Exhibit(s) Ex 37 Economic Well−being Report, # 38 Exhibit(s) Ex 38 Six Months Kentucky Report, # 39 Exhibit(s) Ex 39 Predicting Violence Article, # 40 Exhibit(s) Ex 40 Van Nostrand, # 41 Exhibit(s) Ex 41 Heyerly Report, # 42 Exhibit(s) Ex 42 DC Release Rates, # 43 Exhibit(s) Ex 43 Keenan Article, # 44 Exhibit(s) Ex 44 Supervision Costs Less, # 45 Exhibit(s) Ex 45 Dallas Criminal Justice Data Sheet, # 46 Exhibit(s) Ex 46 DC 2017 Report, # 47 Declaration(s) Ex 47 Judge Truman Morrison Dec, # 48 Declaration(s) Ex 48 Insha Rahman Dec, # 49 Exhibit(s) Ex 49 Greene, # 50 Exhibit(s) Ex 50 NY Criminal Court Report, # 51 Exhibit(s) Ex 51 NYCJA Report, # 52 Exhibit(s) Ex 52 Philips Decade of Bail Research, # 53 Declaration(s) Ex 53 Jacob Sills Dec, # 54 Exhibit(s) Ex 54 Cooke Behavioral Science, # 55 Exhibit(s) Ex 55 Use of Notices, # 56 Affidavit(s) Ex 56 Banks, # 57 Affidavit(s) Ex 57 Daves, # 58 Affidavit(s) Ex 58 Michieka, # 59 Affidavit(s) Ex 59 Tovar, # 60 Affidavit(s) Ex 60 Walston, # 61 Affidavit(s) Ex 61 Thompson) (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 07/16/2018)
94 NOTICE of Plaintiffs' Exhibit List filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Patroba Michieka, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston (Woods, Andrea) (Entered: 07/16/2018)
95 MOTION for Discovery Leave to Seek Limited Discovery filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Faith in Texas, Patroba Michieka, Texas Attorney General's Office, Texas Organizing Project Education Fund, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Exhibit(s), # 4 Exhibit(s), # 5 Exhibit(s), # 6 Exhibit(s), # 7 Exhibit(s), # 8 Exhibit(s), # 9 Exhibit(s), # 10 Proposed Order) (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 07/18/2018)
96 MOTION for Protective Order filed by Steven Autry, Lisa Bronchetti, Marian Brown, Roberto Canas, Jr., Tina Yoo Clinton, Elizabeth Crowder, Dallas County Texas, Lisa Green, Julia Hayes, Peggy Hoffman, Shequitta Kelly, Angela King, Janet Lusk, Terrie McVea, Nancy Mulder, Dan Patterson, Anthony Randall, Doug Skemp, Hal Turley (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit(s) Exhibit B) (David, Katharine) (Entered: 07/18/2018)
97 MOTION to Quash filed by Dallas County Texas (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s)) (David, Katharine) (Entered: 07/18/2018)
98 MOTION to Quash filed by Dallas County Texas (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s)) (David, Katharine) (Entered: 07/18/2018)
99 MOTION to Quash filed by Dallas County Texas (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s)) (David, Katharine) (Entered: 07/18/2018)
100 RESPONSE AND OBJECTION filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Faith in Texas, Patroba Michieka, Texas Attorney General's Office, Texas Organizing Project Education Fund, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston re: 98 MOTION to Quash , 97 MOTION to Quash , 96 MOTION for Protective Order , 99 MOTION to Quash (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Proposed stipulations) (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 07/19/2018)
101 Order Referring 95 Motion for Leave to Seek Limited Discovery, 96 Motion for Protection or, in the Alternative, Motion for Continuance, 97 Motion to Quash Subpoena, 98 Motion to Quash Subpoena, 99 Motion to Quash Subpoena to Magistrate Judge David L. Horan for determination. (Ordered by Judge David C Godbey on 7/23/2018) (zkc) (Entered: 07/23/2018)

Case: 3:18-cv-00154-N As of: 02/18/2019 07:59 PM CST 34 of 45

07/23/2018
07/23/2018 07/25/2018 07/25/2018 07/25/2018 07/25/2018 07/25/2018 07/25/2018 07/25/2018

102 ELECTRONIC ORDER: Defendants must file a response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Seek Limited Discovery 95 by July 25, 2018 and must file a reply in support of Defendants' Motion for Protection or, in the Alternative, Motion for Continuance 96 , Jerry Christenson's Motion to Quash Subpoena 97 , Duane Steele's Motion to Quash Subpoena 98 , and Lynn Richardson's Motion to Quash Subpoena 99 by July 25, 2018. Plaintiffs may file a reply in support of their Motion for Leave to Seek Limited Discovery 95 by July 26, 2018. The Court will hear oral argument on Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Seek Limited Discovery 95 , Defendants' Motion for Protection or, in the Alternative, Motion for Continuance 96 , Jerry Christenson's Motion to Quash Subpoena 97 , Duane Steele's Motion to Quash Subpoena 98 , and Lynn Richardson's Motion to Quash Subpoena 99 on July 27, 2018 at 11:00 a.m. in Courtroom 1561, 1100 Commerce Street, Dallas, Texas 75242 before Magistrate Judge David L. Horan. (Ordered by Magistrate Judge David L. Horan on 7/23/2018.) (Entered: 07/23/2018)
103 Unopposed MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney (), MOTION to Withdraw filed by Jennifer Bennett, Brandon Birmingham, Robert Burns, Dominique Collins, Stephanie Fargo, Livia Liu Francis, Hector Garza, Amber Givens−Davis, Teresa Hawthorne, Tracy Holmes, Jeanine Howard, Tammy Kemp, Nancy Kennedy, Gracie Lewis, Stephanie Mitchell, Carter Thompson, Ernest White (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Anastasiadis, Demetri) (Entered: 07/23/2018)
104 Joint MOTION for Hearing Telephonically filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Faith in Texas, Patroba Michieka, Texas Organizing Project Education Fund, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 07/25/2018)
105 ORDER granting 104 Motion to Conduct the Hearing by Phone. (Ordered by Magistrate Judge David L. Horan on 7/25/2018) (mcrd) (Entered: 07/25/2018)
106 RESPONSE filed by Jennifer Bennett, Brandon Birmingham, Robert Burns, Dominique Collins, Stephanie Fargo, Livia Liu Francis, Hector Garza, Amber Givens−Davis, Teresa Hawthorne, Tracy Holmes, Jeanine Howard, Tammy Kemp, Nancy Kennedy, Gracie Lewis, Stephanie Mitchell, Carter Thompson, Ernest White re: 95 MOTION for Discovery Leave to Seek Limited Discovery (Hudson, Eric) (Entered: 07/25/2018)
107 MOTION for Protection, or, in the Alternative, Motion for Continuance filed by Jennifer Bennett, Brandon Birmingham, Robert Burns, Dominique Collins, Stephanie Fargo, Livia Liu Francis, Hector Garza, Amber Givens−Davis, Teresa Hawthorne, Tracy Holmes, Jeanine Howard, Tammy Kemp, Nancy Kennedy, Gracie Lewis, Stephanie Mitchell, Carter Thompson, Ernest White (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Hudson, Eric) Modified text on 7/26/2018 (rekc). (Entered: 07/25/2018)
108 REPLY filed by Steven Autry, Lisa Bronchetti, Marian Brown, Roberto Canas, Jr., Tina Yoo Clinton, Elizabeth Crowder, Dallas County Texas, Lisa Green, Julia Hayes, Peggy Hoffman, Shequitta Kelly, Angela King, Janet Lusk, Terrie McVea, Nancy Mulder, Dan Patterson, Anthony Randall, Doug Skemp, Hal Turley re: 98 MOTION to Quash , 97 MOTION to Quash , 96 MOTION for Protective Order , 99 MOTION to Quash (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Exhibit(s)) (David, Katharine) (Entered: 07/25/2018)
109 MOTION to Quash Judge Brandon Birmingham's Motion to Quash Subpoena filed by Jennifer Bennett, Brandon Birmingham, Robert Burns, Dominique Collins, Stephanie Fargo, Livia Liu Francis, Hector Garza, Amber Givens−Davis, Teresa Hawthorne, Tracy Holmes, Jeanine Howard, Tammy Kemp, Nancy Kennedy, Gracie Lewis, Stephanie Mitchell, Carter Thompson, Ernest White (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A, # 2 Exhibit(s) B, # 3 Proposed Order) (Hudson, Eric) (Entered: 07/25/2018)
110 RESPONSE filed by Steven Autry, Lisa Bronchetti, Marian Brown, Roberto Canas, Jr., Tina Yoo Clinton, Elizabeth Crowder, Dallas County Texas, Lisa Green, Julia Hayes, Peggy Hoffman, Shequitta Kelly, Angela King, Janet Lusk, Terrie McVea, Nancy Mulder, Dan Patterson, Anthony Randall, Doug Skemp, Hal Turley re: 95 MOTION for Discovery Leave to Seek Limited Discovery (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Exhibit(s), # 4 Exhibit(s), # 5 Exhibit(s)) (David, Katharine) (Entered: 07/25/2018)

Case: 3:18-cv-00154-N As of: 02/18/2019 07:59 PM CST 35 of 45

07/26/2018 07/26/2018 07/27/2018
07/27/2018
07/27/2018 07/30/2018 08/02/2018 08/02/2018

111 ELECTRONIC ORDER: By 9:00 a.m. tomorrow, July 27, 2018, Plaintiffs' counsel must circulate a dial−in number to the Court (at Horan_Orders@txnd.uscourts.gov) and Defendants' counsel for the telephonic oral argument set by Court order 102 105 for tomorrow, July 27, 2018 at 11:00 a.m. before Magistrate Judge David L. Horan. (Ordered by Magistrate Judge David L. Horan on 7/26/2018) (chmb) (Entered: 07/26/2018)
112 REPLY filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Faith in Texas, Patroba Michieka, Texas Attorney General's Office, Texas Organizing Project Education Fund, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston re: 95 MOTION for Discovery Leave to Seek Limited Discovery (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 07/26/2018)
113 ELECTRONIC ORDER: For the reasons and to the extent explained during the July 27, 2018 telephonic oral argument, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Seek Limited Discovery 95 , Defendants' Motion for Protection or, in the Alternative, Motion for Continuance 96 , and Defendants' Motion for Protection or, in the Alternative, Motion for Continuance 107 , and GRANTS Jerry Christenson's Motion to Quash Subpoena 97 , Duane Steele's Motion to Quash Subpoena 98 , Lynn Richardson's Motion to Quash Subpoena 99 , and Judge Brandon Birmingham's Motion to Quash Subpoena 109 , and, because the Court does not find good cause for expedited or early discovery in the form of depositions or document discovery other than as ordered below, the Court denies Plaintiffs' requested leave to seek limited discovery other than a document request to the appropriate defendant(s) to, by August 2, 2018, produce audio and video recordings of bail hearings over the course of three (consecutive or non−consecutive) days during the time period July 1−8, 2018 and quashes any other deposition or document subpoenas that Plaintiffs have served and that are the subject of these discovery motions. (Ordered by Magistrate Judge David L. Horan on 7/27/2018.) (Entered: 07/27/2018)
114 ELECTRONIC Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge David L. Horan: Motion Hearing held on 7/27/2018 re 98 Motion to Quash filed by Dallas County Texas, 97 Motion to Quash filed by Dallas County Texas, 96 Motion for Protective Order, filed by Terrie McVea, Lisa Bronchetti, Peggy Hoffman, Marian Brown, Dan Patterson, Nancy Mulder, Shequitta Kelly, Roberto Canas, Jr., Hal Turley, Lisa Green, Julia Hayes, Angela King, Doug Skemp, Dallas County Texas, Steven Autry, Tina Yoo Clinton, Anthony Randall, Elizabeth Crowder, Janet Lusk, 99 Motion to Quash filed by Dallas County Texas, 95 Motion for Discovery,, filed by Erriyah Banks, Shakena Walston, Texas Attorney General's Office, Shannon Daves, James Thompson, Texas Organizing Project Education Fund, Faith in Texas, Patroba Michieka, Destinee Tovar. Order to enter. Attorney Appearances: Plaintiff − Trisha Trigilio; Defense − Peter L Harlan, Philip James Morgan. (Court Reporter: Digital File) (No exhibits) Time in Court − :31. (mcrd) (Entered: 07/27/2018)
115 ORDER granting 103 Motion to Withdraw Counsel. Attorney Demetri Anastasiadis terminated. (Ordered by Judge David C Godbey on 7/27/2018) (zkc) (Entered: 07/27/2018)
116 NOTICE of Defendants' Exhibits filed by Steven Autry, Lisa Bronchetti, Marian Brown, Roberto Canas, Jr., Tina Yoo Clinton, Elizabeth Crowder, Lisa Green, Julia Hayes, Peggy Hoffman, Shequitta Kelly, Angela King, Janet Lusk, Terrie McVea, Nancy Mulder, Dan Patterson, Anthony Randall, Doug Skemp, Hal Turley (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) 1 ***WITHDRAWN***, # 2 Exhibit(s) 2, # 3 Exhibit(s) 3) (David, Katharine) Modified on 8/9/2018, Exhibit 1 withdrawn per 142 Electronic Order. (axm). (Entered: 07/30/2018)
117 ELECTRONIC Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge David L. Horan: Telephone Conference held on 8/2/2018. Order to enter. Attorney Appearances: Plaintiff − Elizabeth Rossi; Defense − Peter L Harlan, Philip James Morgan. (Court Reporter: Digital File) (No exhibits) Time in Court − :39. (mcrd) (Entered: 08/02/2018)
118 ELECTRONIC ORDER: As the Court discussed with counsel during today's telephone conference, the Court does not find good cause for, and denies, Plaintiffs' requests for additional limited, expedited discovery except for (1) production of any finalized jail population reports that have not been posted for, but are ready for, public release and (2) a possible, narrow document request for operational documents that implemented policy or protocol changes that Defendants report are currently in place,

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as the Court discussed with counsel and on which the Court ordered Plaintiffs' and Defendants' counsel to confer and attempt to reach agreement and ordered Defendants' counsel to discuss with his clients. The Court will reconvene a telephone conference with counsel on this possible, limited expedited discovery at 1:00 p.m. on August 3, 2018, using the same dial−in information as used for today's call. (Ordered by Magistrate Judge David L. Horan on 8/2/2018.) (Entered: 08/02/2018)
119 ELECTRONIC Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge David L. Horan: Telephone Conference held on 8/3/2018. Attorney Appearances: Plaintiff − Elizabeth Rossi; Defense − Peter L Harlan, Philip James Morgan, Eric Hudson, Katherine David. (Court Reporter: Digital File) (No exhibits) Time in Court − :17. (mcrd) (Entered: 08/03/2018)
120 ELECTRONIC ORDER: As the Court ordered on today's telephone conference, Plaintiffs may serve on the Dallas County Defendants a request for production stating "Produce documents showing formal, written policy changes to the bail system relating to financial and non−financial conditions of release that Defendants have made since the filing this lawsuit" −− with the understanding that these defendants will respond to this limited, expedited discovery request by obtaining and producing responsive documents from the chief magistrate judge only. The Court does not find good cause for any additional expedited discovery (including from the Felony Judge Defendants) other than what the Court has previously ordered. (Ordered by Magistrate Judge David L. Horan on 8/3/2018.) (Entered: 08/03/2018)
121 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Enrique Manuel Varela on behalf of Jennifer Bennett, Brandon Birmingham, Robert Burns, Dominique Collins, Stephanie Fargo, Livia Liu Francis, Hector Garza, Amber Givens−Davis, Teresa Hawthorne, Tracy Holmes, Jeanine Howard, Tammy Kemp, Nancy Kennedy, Gracie Lewis, Stephanie Mitchell, Carter Thompson, Ernest White. (Filer confirms contact info in ECF is current.) (Varela, Enrique) (Entered: 08/03/2018)
122 MOTION for Status Conference and For Leave to Serve Subpoenas filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Faith in Texas, Patroba Michieka, Texas Attorney General's Office, Texas Organizing Project Education Fund, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 08/03/2018)
123 RESPONSE filed by Steven Autry, Lisa Bronchetti, Marian Brown, Roberto Canas, Jr., Tina Yoo Clinton, Elizabeth Crowder, Dallas County Texas, Lisa Green, Julia Hayes, Peggy Hoffman, Shequitta Kelly, Angela King, Janet Lusk, Terrie McVea, Nancy Mulder, Dan Patterson, Anthony Randall, Doug Skemp, Hal Turley re: 122 MOTION for Status Conference and For Leave to Serve Subpoenas (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Exhibit(s)) (David, Katharine) (Entered: 08/06/2018)
124 MOTION to Strike Testimony of Stephen Demuth, Michael Jones, John Clark, Truman Morrison, Insha Rahman and Jacob Sills filed by Steven Autry, Lisa Bronchetti, Marian Brown, Roberto Canas, Jr., Tina Yoo Clinton, Elizabeth Crowder, Dallas County Texas, Lisa Green, Julia Hayes, Peggy Hoffman, Shequitta Kelly, Angela King, Janet Lusk, Terrie McVea, Nancy Mulder, Dan Patterson, Anthony Randall, Doug Skemp, Hal Turley (David, Katharine) (Entered: 08/06/2018)
125 NOTICE of Plaintiffs' Rebuttal Evidence re: 3 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Patroba Michieka, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) 62, Video of Bail−Setting Hearings from July 6, 2018, # 2 Exhibit(s) 63, Summary of Video Evidence, # 3 Exhibit(s) 64, Rebuttal Declaration of Clarissa Kimmey, # 4 Exhibit(s) 65, Declaration of Arjun Malik, # 5 Exhibit(s) 66, January 2018 Jail Population Committee Report, # 6 Exhibit(s) 67, May 2018 Jail Population Committee Report, # 7 Exhibit(s) 68, Declaration of Kali Cohn, # 8 Exhibit(s) 69, Spreadsheet tracking sample cases from January, June, and July 2018, # 9 Exhibit(s) 70, Declaration of Emily Gerrick, # 10 Exhibit(s) 71, Declaration of Karly Jo Dixon, # 11 Exhibit(s) 72, Declaration of Abel Arce, # 12 Exhibit(s) 73, Declaration of Jerome Athens Grant, # 13 Exhibit(s) 74, Declaration of Hariet Ogendi, # 14 Exhibit(s) 75, Declaration of Dequaceion Demarcus Jones, # 15 Exhibit(s) 76, Declaration of Lawrence Calvin Durham, # 16 Exhibit(s) 77, Declaration of Luis Miguel Westbrook, # 17 Exhibit(s) 78, Declaration of Roderick Moore, # 18 Exhibit(s) 79, Declaration of Jesse James Ramirez, # 19

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Exhibit(s) 80, Declaration of Fahad Shailsh, # 20 Exhibit(s) 81, DALLASCO_DAVES 0000885, # 21 Exhibit(s) 82, DALLASCO_DAVES 0000886, # 22 Exhibit(s) 83, DALLASCO_DAVES 0000887) (Trigilio, Trisha) (Entered: 08/06/2018)
126 RESPONSE filed by Jennifer Bennett, Brandon Birmingham, Robert Burns, Dominique Collins, Stephanie Fargo, Livia Liu Francis, Hector Garza, Amber Givens−Davis, Teresa Hawthorne, Tracy Holmes, Jeanine Howard, Tammy Kemp, Nancy Kennedy, Gracie Lewis, Stephanie Mitchell, Carter Thompson, Ernest White re: 122 MOTION for Status Conference and For Leave to Serve Subpoenas (Hudson, Eric) (Entered: 08/07/2018)
127 MOTION re 38 Response/Objection, filed by Jennifer Bennett, Brandon Birmingham, Robert Burns, Dominique Collins, Stephanie Fargo, Livia Liu Francis, Hector Garza, Amber Givens−Davis, Teresa Hawthorne, Tracy Holmes, Jeanine Howard, Tammy Kemp, Nancy Kennedy, Gracie Lewis, Stephanie Mitchell, Carter Thompson, Ernest White with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A, # 2 Proposed Order) (Hudson, Eric) (Entered: 08/07/2018)
128 Supplemental MOTION to Strike filed by Steven Autry, Lisa Bronchetti, Marian Brown, Roberto Canas, Jr., Tina Yoo Clinton, Elizabeth Crowder, Dallas County Texas, Lisa Green, Julia Hayes, Peggy Hoffman, Shequitta Kelly, Angela King, Janet Lusk, Terrie McVea, Nancy Mulder, Dan Patterson, Anthony Randall, Doug Skemp, Hal Turley (David, Katharine) Modified title on 8/8/2018 (awc). (Entered: 08/07/2018)
129 Exhibit List by Steven Autry, Lisa Bronchetti, Marian Brown, Roberto Canas, Jr., Tina Yoo Clinton, Elizabeth Crowder, Dallas County Texas, Lisa Green, Julia Hayes, Peggy Hoffman, Shequitta Kelly, Angela King, Janet Lusk, Terrie McVea, Nancy Mulder, Dan Patterson, Anthony Randall, Doug Skemp, Hal Turley. (David, Katharine) (Entered: 08/07/2018)
130 Appendix in Support filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Patroba Michieka, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston re 125 Notice (Other),,,,, Plaintiffs' Summary of Evidence Submitted in Support of Their Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Cohn, Kali) (Entered: 08/07/2018)
131 MOTION for Leave to File Evidentiary Exhibits (unopposed by County Defendants) filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Patroba Michieka, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Plaintiffs' Exhibit 84, # 2 Exhibit(s) Plaintiffs' Exhibit 85) (Cohn, Kali) (Entered: 08/07/2018)
132 Appendix in Support filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Patroba Michieka, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston re 94 Notice (Other) Amended Exhibit List (Cohn, Kali) (Entered: 08/07/2018)
133 MOTION Leave to Testify via Videoconference filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Patroba Michieka, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston (Attachments: # 1 Declaration(s) Declaration of Truman Morrison, # 2 Exhibit(s) Email Communication) (Woods, Andrea) (Entered: 08/08/2018)
134 ORDER: The Court denies Plaintiffs' request for leave to file an expedited reply in support of their motion. Plaintiffs may address the issues they wish to raise in the reply after the hearing. The Court grants Plaintiffs' motion to require Defendants to identify which declarants they intend to cross−examine at the hearing. Defendants must identify the declarants by 1:00 PM, Wednesday, 8/8/2018. The Court denies Plaintiffs' motion for leave to subpoena live witnesses. Instead, the Court grants Plaintiffs leave to depose (1) District Court Judge Amber Givens−Davis, (2) County Criminal Court at Law Judge Nancy Mulder; and (3) Magistrate Judge Janet Lusk within two weeks of the hearing. (Ordered by Judge David C Godbey on 8/8/2018) (ykp) (Entered: 08/08/2018)
135 ELECTRONIC ORDER denying 124 Motion to Strike. The Court will address the evidentiary objections in conjunction with the preliminary injunction. (Ordered by Judge David C Godbey on 8/8/2018) (chmb) (Entered: 08/08/2018)
136 ELECTRONIC ORDER denying 128 Motion to Strike. The Court will address the evidentiary objections in conjunction with the preliminary injunction. (Ordered by Judge David C Godbey on 8/8/2018) (chmb) (Entered: 08/08/2018)

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137 RESPONSE filed by Steven Autry, Lisa Bronchetti, Marian Brown, Roberto Canas, Jr., Tina Yoo Clinton, Elizabeth Crowder, Dallas County Texas, Lisa Green, Julia Hayes, Peggy Hoffman, Shequitta Kelly, Janet Lusk, Terrie McVea, Dan Patterson, Anthony Randall, Doug Skemp, Hal Turley re: 134 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief,,, (David, Katharine) (Entered: 08/08/2018)
138 RESPONSE filed by Steven Autry, Lisa Bronchetti, Marian Brown, Roberto Canas, Jr., Tina Yoo Clinton, Elizabeth Crowder, Dallas County Texas, Lisa Green, Julia Hayes, Peggy Hoffman, Shequitta Kelly, Janet Lusk, Nancy Mulder, Dan Patterson, Anthony Randall, Doug Skemp, Hal Turley re: 133 MOTION Leave to Testify via Videoconference (David, Katharine) (Entered: 08/08/2018)
139 ORDER granting 133 Motion for Judge Morrison to testify remotely. If Defendants wish to introduce evidence through Judge Morrison's testimony during cross−examination, Defendants must arrange for delivery of copies of the desired exhibits to Judge Morrison on an expedited basis before the hearing. Plaintiffs' counsel are directed to assist in such delivery. (Ordered by Judge David C Godbey on 8/8/2018) (lrl) (Entered: 08/08/2018)
140 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File Declaration of Judge Roberto Canas as Substitute and Withdraw Declaration of Judge Angela King filed by Steven Autry, Lisa Bronchetti, Marian Brown, Roberto Canas, Jr., Tina Yoo Clinton, Elizabeth Crowder, Dallas County Texas, Lisa Green, Julia Hayes, Peggy Hoffman, Shequitta Kelly, Angela King, Janet Lusk, Terrie McVea, Nancy Mulder, Dan Patterson, Anthony Randall, Doug Skemp, Hal Turley (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s)) (David, Katharine) (Entered: 08/09/2018)
141 Exhibit List Amended Exhibit List by Steven Autry, Lisa Bronchetti, Marian Brown, Roberto Canas, Jr., Tina Yoo Clinton, Elizabeth Crowder, Dallas County Texas, Lisa Green, Julia Hayes, Peggy Hoffman, Shequitta Kelly, Angela King, Janet Lusk, Nancy Mulder, Dan Patterson, Anthony Randall, Doug Skemp, Hal Turley. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Exhibit(s), # 4 Exhibit(s), # 5 Exhibit(s), # 6 Exhibit(s), # 7 Exhibit(s), # 8 Exhibit(s), # 9 Exhibit(s), # 10 Exhibit(s), # 11 Exhibit(s), # 12 Exhibit(s), # 13 Exhibit(s), # 14 Exhibit(s), # 15 Exhibit(s), # 16 Exhibit(s), # 17 Exhibit(s), # 18 Exhibit(s), # 19 Exhibit(s), # 20 Exhibit(s), # 21 Exhibit(s), # 22 Exhibit(s), # 23 Exhibit(s), # 24 Exhibit(s), # 25 Exhibit(s), # 26 Exhibit(s), # 27 Exhibit(s), # 28 Exhibit(s), # 29 Exhibit(s), # 30 Exhibit(s), # 31 Exhibit(s), # 32 Exhibit(s), # 33 Exhibit(s), # 34 Exhibit(s), # 35 Exhibit(s), # 36 Exhibit(s), # 37 Exhibit(s), # 38 Exhibit(s), # 39 Exhibit(s), # 40 Exhibit(s), # 41 Exhibit(s), # 42 Exhibit(s), # 43 Exhibit(s)) (David, Katharine) (Entered: 08/09/2018)
142 ELECTRONIC ORDER granting 140 Motion for Leave to File. The Declaration of Judge Angela King [116−1] is withdrawn and the Clerk to file the Declaration of Judge Roberto Canas filed as Exhibit 1. (Ordered by Judge David C Godbey on 8/9/2018) (chmb) (Entered: 08/09/2018)
143 NOTICE of Declaration of Judge Roberto Canas re: 116 Notice of Defendants' Exhibit List filed by Steven Autry, Lisa Bronchetti, Marian Brown, Roberto Canas, Jr., Tina Yoo Clinton, Elizabeth Crowder, Dallas County Texas, Lisa Green, Julia Hayes, Peggy Hoffman, Shequitta Kelly, Angela King, Janet Lusk, Terrie McVea, Nancy Mulder, Dan Patterson, Anthony Randall, Doug Skemp, Hal Turley. (axm) (Entered: 08/09/2018)
144 NOTICE of Filing of Plaintiffs' Amended Proposed Preliminary Injunction Order re: 3 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Patroba Michieka, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Brief In Support of Plaintiffs' Amended Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit(s) Ex. A to Brief In Support of Plaintiffs' Amended Proposed Order, # 3 Exhibit(s) Ex. B to Brief In Support of Plaintiffs' Amended Proposed Order) (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 08/09/2018)
145 Second Amended Exhibit List by Steven Autry, Lisa Bronchetti, Marian Brown, Roberto Canas, Jr., Tina Yoo Clinton, Elizabeth Crowder, Dallas County Texas, Lisa Green, Julia Hayes, Peggy Hoffman, Shequitta Kelly, Angela King, Janet Lusk, Terrie McVea, Nancy Mulder, Dan Patterson, Anthony Randall, Doug Skemp, Hal Turley. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Exhibit(s)) (David, Katharine) (Entered: 08/09/2018)

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146 MOTION for Leave to File Motion to Dismiss Out of Time filed by Steven Autry, Lisa Bronchetti, Marian Brown, Roberto Canas, Jr., Tina Yoo Clinton, Elizabeth Crowder, Dallas County Texas, Lisa Green, Julia Hayes, Peggy Hoffman, Shequitta Kelly, Angela King, Janet Lusk, Terrie McVea, Nancy Mulder, Dan Patterson, Anthony Randall, Doug Skemp, Hal Turley (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s)) (David, Katharine) (Entered: 08/09/2018)
147 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Kelsey Warren on behalf of Jennifer Bennett, Brandon Birmingham, Robert Burns, Dominique Collins, Stephanie Fargo, Livia Liu Francis, Hector Garza, Amber Givens−Davis, Teresa Hawthorne, Tracy Holmes, Jeanine Howard, Tammy Kemp, Nancy Kennedy, Gracie Lewis, Stephanie Mitchell, Carter Thompson, Ernest White. (Filer confirms contact info in ECF is current.) (Warren, Kelsey) (Entered: 08/10/2018)
149 Court's Exhibit and Witness List from Evidentiary Hearing held 8/10/2018. (epm) (Entered: 08/14/2018)
148 ELECTRONIC Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge David C Godbey: Evidentiary Hearing held on 8/10/2018. Attorney Appearances: Plaintiff − Kali Alanna Cohn, Akeeb Animashaun, Alexander Karakatsanis, Elizabeth Rossi, Trisha Trigilio and Andrea Woods; Defense − Katherine David, Peter Harlan, Phillip Morgan, Ben Stephens and Enrique Varela; Respondent, Eric Hudson. (Court Reporter: Shawn McRoberts) (Parties to submit admitted by CD) Time in Court − 4:00. (chmb) (Entered: 08/14/2018)
150 Notice of Filing of Official Electronic Transcript of Hearing On Motion For Preliminary Injunction Proceedings held on 08/10/2018 before Judge David Godbey. Court Reporter/Transcriber Shawn McRoberts, Telephone number (214) 753−2349. Parties are notified of their duty to review the transcript. A copy may be purchased from the court reporter or viewed at the clerk's office. If redaction of personal identifiers under MO 61 is necessary, file a Redaction Request − Transcript within 21 days. If no action is taken, the entire transcript will be made available through PACER without redaction after 90 calendar days. The clerk will mail a copy of this notice to parties not electronically noticed. (156 pages) Redaction Request due 9/4/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/14/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/13/2018. (smm) (Main Document 150 replaced on 11/1/2018) (chmb). (Entered: 08/14/2018)
151 Responses to Questions Posed by the Court filed by Steven Autry, Lisa Bronchetti, Marian Brown, Roberto Canas, Jr., Tina Yoo Clinton, Elizabeth Crowder, Dallas County Texas, Lisa Green, Julia Hayes, Peggy Hoffman, Shequitta Kelly, Angela King, Janet Lusk, Terrie McVea, Nancy Mulder, Dan Patterson, Anthony Randall, Doug Skemp, Hal Turley. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s)) (David, Katharine) Modified title on 8/16/2018 (sss). (Entered: 08/15/2018)
152 RESPONSE filed by Steven Autry, Lisa Bronchetti, Marian Brown, Roberto Canas, Jr., Tina Yoo Clinton, Elizabeth Crowder, Dallas County Texas, Lisa Green, Julia Hayes, Peggy Hoffman, Shequitta Kelly, Angela King, Janet Lusk, Terrie McVea, Nancy Mulder, Dan Patterson, Anthony Randall, Doug Skemp, Hal Turley re: 144 Notice (Other),, (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s)) (David, Katharine) (Entered: 08/15/2018)
153 RESPONSE AND OBJECTION filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Faith in Texas, Patroba Michieka, Texas Organizing Project Education Fund, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston re: 146 MOTION for Leave to File Motion to Dismiss Out of Time (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 08/21/2018)
154 RESPONSE AND OBJECTION filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Faith in Texas, Patroba Michieka, Texas Organizing Project Education Fund, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston re: 127 MOTION re 38 Response/Objection, (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 08/21/2018)
155 ***PLEASE DISREGARD PER ATTORNEY REFILED AS 156 *** NOTICE of Correction re: 149 Court's Exhibit/Witness List filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Patroba Michieka, James Thompson, Shakena Walston (Cohn, Kali) Modified on 8/22/2018 (ndt). (Entered: 08/21/2018)

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156 NOTICE of Correction re: 149 Court's Exhibit/Witness List filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Patroba Michieka, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston (Cohn, Kali) (Entered: 08/21/2018)
157 Notice of Filing of Official Electronic Transcript of Telephone Conference Proceedings held on 08/03/2018 before Judge David L. Horan. Court Reporter/Transcriber Kathy Rehling, kathyrehlingtranscripts@gmail.com, Telephone number 972−786−3063. Parties are notified of their duty to review the transcript. A copy may be purchased from the court reporter or viewed at the clerk's office. If redaction of personal identifiers under MO 61 is necessary, file a Redaction Request − Transcript within 21 days. If no action is taken, the entire transcript will be made available through PACER without redaction after 90 calendar days. The clerk will mail a copy of this notice to parties not electronically noticed. (16 pages). Redaction Request due 9/11/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/21/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/19/2018. (Rehling, Kathy) (Entered: 08/21/2018)
158 REPLY filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Patroba Michieka, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston re: 151 Request for Clerk to Issue Document, 144 Notice (Other),, 152 Response/Objection, (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 08/27/2018)
159 REPLY filed by Jennifer Bennett, Brandon Birmingham, Robert Burns, Dominique Collins, Stephanie Fargo, Livia Liu Francis, Hector Garza, Amber Givens−Davis, Teresa Hawthorne, Tracy Holmes, Jeanine Howard, Tammy Kemp, Nancy Kennedy, Gracie Lewis, Stephanie Mitchell, Carter Thompson, Ernest White re: 127 MOTION re 38 Response/Objection, (Hudson, Eric) (Entered: 09/04/2018)
160 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Emily Gerrick on behalf of Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Faith in Texas, Patroba Michieka, Texas Organizing Project Education Fund, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston. (epm) (Entered: 09/05/2018)
161 NOTICE of Supplemental Authority filed by Steven Autry, Lisa Bronchetti, Marian Brown, Roberto Canas, Jr., Tina Yoo Clinton, Elizabeth Crowder, Dallas County Texas, Lisa Green, Julia Hayes, Peggy Hoffman, Shequitta Kelly, Angela King, Janet Lusk, Terrie McVea, Nancy Mulder, Dan Patterson, Anthony Randall, Doug Skemp, Hal Turley (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Exhibit 1 Walker v Calhoun) (David, Katharine) (Entered: 09/10/2018)
162 RESPONSE filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Faith in Texas, Patroba Michieka, Texas Organizing Project Education Fund, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston re: 161 Notice (Other), (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Cullman County Preliminary Injunction Order (issued Sept. 13, 2018)) (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 09/14/2018)
163 Proposed Findings of Fact by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Patroba Michieka, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston. (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 09/18/2018)
164 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 3 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (Ordered by Judge David C Godbey on 9/20/2018) (aaa) (Entered: 09/20/2018)
165 PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION. (Ordered by Judge David C Godbey on 9/20/2018) (aaa) (Entered: 09/20/2018)
166 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 2 Motion to Certify Class. (Ordered by Judge David C Godbey on 9/20/2018) (aaa) (Entered: 09/20/2018)
167 MOTION to Extend Time Time to Implement the Preliminary Injunction filed by Steven Autry, Lisa Bronchetti, Marian Brown, Janet Lusk, Terrie McVea, Anthony Randall, Hal Turley (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Hikel Dec, # 2 Exhibit(s) Amber Givens Email, # 3 Exhibit(s) Dallas Commissioners Court Order, # 4 Exhibit(s) Rossi Email) (David, Katharine) (Entered: 10/18/2018)
168 JOINT MOTION BY PLAINTIFFS AND THE COUNTY DEFENDANTS FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ORDER 165 by Plaintiffs and the County Defendants filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Patroba Michieka, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston with

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Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Proposed Order) (Rossi, Elizabeth) Modified text on 10/22/2018 (svc). (Entered: 10/19/2018)
169 MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION AND MODIFICATION OF THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Patroba Michieka, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Proposed Order) (Rossi, Elizabeth) Modified text on 10/22/2018 (svc). (Entered: 10/19/2018)
170 NOTICE OF INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL as to 164 Memorandum Opinion and Order, 165 Order to the Fifth Circuit by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Patroba Michieka, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston. Filing fee $505, receipt number 0539−9529801. T.O. form to appellant electronically at Transcript Order Form or US Mail as appropriate. Copy of NOA to be sent US Mail to parties not electronically noticed. IMPORTANT ACTION REQUIRED: Provide an electronic copy of any exhibit you offered during a hearing or trial that was admitted into evidence to the clerk of the district court within 14 days of the date of this notice. Copies must be transmitted as PDF attachments through ECF by all ECF Users or delivered to the clerk on a CD by all non−ECF Users. See detailed instructions here. (Exception: This requirement does not apply to a pro se prisoner litigant.) Please note that if original exhibits are in your possession, you must maintain them through final disposition of the case. (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 10/19/2018)
171 Transcript Order Form: re 170 Notice of Appeal transcript not requested Reminder to appellant: this document must also be filed with the appeals court. (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 10/19/2018)
172 MOTION Requesting Modification and Clarification of the Court's Preliminary Injunction re 165 Order filed by Dallas County Texas (David, Katharine) (Entered: 10/19/2018)
173 ELECTRONIC ORDER granting 167 Motion to Extend Time. Defendants have until January 16, 2019, to implement the preliminary injunction. (Ordered by Judge David C Godbey on 10/22/2018) (chmb) (Entered: 10/22/2018)
174 NOTICE OF INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL as to 164 Memorandum Opinion and Order, 165 Order to the Fifth Circuit by Dallas County Texas. Filing fee $505, receipt number 0539−9533560. T.O. form to appellant electronically at Transcript Order Form or US Mail as appropriate. Copy of NOA to be sent US Mail to parties not electronically noticed. IMPORTANT ACTION REQUIRED: Provide an electronic copy of any exhibit you offered during a hearing or trial that was admitted into evidence to the clerk of the district court within 14 days of the date of this notice. Copies must be transmitted as PDF attachments through ECF by all ECF Users or delivered to the clerk on a CD by all non−ECF Users. See detailed instructions here. (Exception: This requirement does not apply to a pro se prisoner litigant.) Please note that if original exhibits are in your possession, you must maintain them through final disposition of the case. (David, Katharine) (Entered: 10/22/2018)
175 NOTICE OF INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL as to 164 Memorandum Opinion and Order, 165 Order to the Fifth Circuit by Jennifer Bennett, Brandon Birmingham, Robert Burns, Dominique Collins, Stephanie Fargo, Livia Liu Francis, Hector Garza, Amber Givens−Davis, Teresa Hawthorne, Tracy Holmes, Jeanine Howard, Tammy Kemp, Nancy Kennedy, Gracie Lewis, Stephanie Mitchell, Carter Thompson, Ernest White. Filing fee $505, receipt number 0539−9533714. T.O. form to appellant electronically at Transcript Order Form or US Mail as appropriate. Copy of NOA to be sent US Mail to parties not electronically noticed. IMPORTANT ACTION REQUIRED: Provide an electronic copy of any exhibit you offered during a hearing or trial that was admitted into evidence to the clerk of the district court within 14 days of the date of this notice. Copies must be transmitted as PDF attachments through ECF by all ECF Users or delivered to the clerk on a CD by all non−ECF Users. See detailed instructions here. (Exception: This requirement does not apply to a pro se prisoner litigant.) Please note that if original exhibits are in your possession, you must maintain them through final disposition of the case. (Hudson, Eric) (Entered: 10/22/2018)
USCA Case Number 18−11368 in USCA5 for 170 Notice of Appeal filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Shakena Walston, Patroba Michieka, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, and 174 Notice of Appeal filed by Dallas County Texas. (svc)

Case: 3:18-cv-00154-N As of: 02/18/2019 07:59 PM CST 42 of 45

10/31/2018 11/01/2018 11/02/2018 11/05/2018
11/06/2018 11/06/2018 11/06/2018 11/09/2018

(Entered: 10/26/2018)
176 RESPONSE filed by Dallas County Texas re: 169 MOTION to Amend/Correct 165 Order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) K David Ltr to Judge Rosenthal) (David, Katharine) (Entered: 10/31/2018)
177 ELECTRONIC ORDER finding as moot 127 Motion per 165 Preliminary Injunction. (Ordered by Judge David C Godbey on 11/1/2018) (chmb) (Entered: 11/01/2018)
178 Electronic Copy of Admitted Hearing or Trial Exhibit(s) re 170 Notice of Appeal admitted for preliminary injunction hearing filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Patroba Michieka, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston. Exhibits are available for public inspection at the clerk's office. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) 1−24, # 2 Exhibit(s) 25−49, # 3 Exhibit(s) 50−74, # 4 Exhibit(s) 75−85) (Cohn, Kali) (Entered: 11/02/2018)
179 Electronic Copy of Admitted Hearing or Trial Exhibit(s) re 170 Notice of Appeal filed by Dallas County Texas (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Declaration of Judge Roberto Canas, # 2 Exhibit(s) Declaration of Lt. David Guerra, # 3 Exhibit(s) Declaration of Judge Terrie McVea, # 4 Exhibit(s) Admitted Exhibit 1, Bond Failure Rates in Harris County Since Implementation of the Preliminary Injunction in ODonnell v Harris County, # 5 Exhibit(s) Admitted Exhibit 6, Robert Morris, Pretrial Release mechanisms in Dallas County (2013), # 6 Exhibit(s) Admitted Exhibit 7, Robert Morris, Pretrial Release mechanisms in Dallas County (2012 Data Update) (2014), # 7 Exhibit(s) Admitted Exhibit 8, Stephen Clipper, The Link Between Bond Forfeiture and Pretrial Release Mechanism (2017), # 8 Exhibit(s) Admitted Exhibit 9, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report, # 9 Exhibit(s) Admitted Exhibit 24, US Census Bureau Quick Facts − Dallas County Texas, # 10 Exhibit(s) Admitted Exhibit 31, Helland & Tabarrok, The Fugitive: Evidence on Public vs Private Law Enforcement from Bail Jumping (2004), # 11 Exhibit(s) Admitted Exhibit 33, Email, Steven Autry to Various, re. PR Bonds, 2/16/18, # 12 Exhibit(s) Admitted Exhibit 34, Email, Lisa Green to Terrie McVea, re. PR bonds on misdemeanor cases, 3/6/18, # 13 Exhibit(s) Admitted Exhibit 35, Email, Amber Givens−Davis to Various, re. Update: Financial Affidavit Form, # 14 Exhibit(s) Admitted Exhibit 36, Jail Population Committee Meeting Report, June 15, 2018, # 15 Exhibit(s) Admitted Exhibit 37, Jail Population Committee Meeting Report, July 13, 2018, # 16 Exhibit(s) Admitted Exhibit 38,Financial Affidavit Form (English), # 17 Exhibit(s) Admitted Exhibit 39, Financial Affidavit Form (Spanish), # 18 Exhibit(s) Admitted Exhibit 40, Dallas County Commissioners Court Order, Pretrial Plan for Dallas County, 2008−0936, 8/7/18, # 19 Exhibit(s) Admitted Exhibit 41, Dallas County Commissioners Court Order, TechShare Indigent DefenseMagistrate Portal Planning Project, 2018−0937, 8/7/18, # 20 Exhibit(s) Admitted Exhibit 42, Governors Announcement of the Damon Allen Act, # 21 Exhibit(s) Admitted Exhibit 43, Dallas County Court Indigent Defense Plan, 9/26/16, # 22 Exhibit(s) Admitted Exhibit 46, Declaration of Ed Wells, ODonnell v. Harris County, Texas, 4:16−cv−01414 (S.D. Tex.), ECF No. 402−5, # 23 Exhibit(s) Admitted Exhibit 47, Declaration of Ed Wells, ODonnell v. Harris County, Texas, 4:16−cv−01414 (S.D. Tex.), ECF No. 402−10) (David, Katharine) Modified event and text on 11/5/2018 (axm). (Entered: 11/05/2018)
180 NOTICE of Change of Address for Attorney Katharine D David on behalf of Dallas County Texas. (Filer confirms contact info in ECF is current.) (David, Katharine) (Entered: 11/06/2018)
181 NOTICE of Change of Address for Attorney Philip James Morgan on behalf of Dallas County Texas. (Filer confirms contact info in ECF is current.) (Morgan, Philip) (Entered: 11/06/2018)
182 NOTICE of Change of Address for Attorney Ben Stephens on behalf of Dallas County Texas. (Filer confirms contact info in ECF is current.) (Stephens, Ben) (Entered: 11/06/2018)
183 REPLY filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Faith in Texas, Patroba Michieka, Texas Attorney General's Office, Texas Organizing Project Education Fund, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston re: 169 MOTION to Amend/Correct 165 Order (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 11/09/2018)

Case: 3:18-cv-00154-N As of: 02/18/2019 07:59 PM CST 43 of 45

12/14/2018
12/21/2018
12/27/2018 01/17/2019 01/18/2019 01/18/2019 01/23/2019 01/24/2019 01/30/2019 02/05/2019

Record on Appeal for USCA5 18−11368 (related to 175 , 170 , 174 appeal): Record consisting of: 17 ECF electronic record on appeal (eROA) is certified, 2 Volume(s) electronic transcript, 7 Volume(s) electronic exhibits. PLEASE NOTE THE FOLLOWING: Licensed attorneys must have filed an appearance in the USCA5 case and be registered for electronic filing in the USCA5 to access the paginated eROA in the USCA5 ECF system. (Take these steps immediately if you have not already done so. Once you have filed the notice of appearance and/or USCA5 ECF registration, it may take up to 3 business days for the circuit to notify the district clerk that we may grant you access to the eROA in the USCA5 ECF system.) To access the paginated record, log in to the USCA5 ECF system, and under the Utilities menu, select Electronic Record on Appeal. Pro se litigants may request a copy of the record by contacting the appeals deputy in advance to arrange delivery. (svc) (Entered: 12/14/2018)
184 Unopposed MOTION to Substitute Attorney, and Withdraw. Motion filed by Dan Patterson, Julia Hayes, Dallas County Texas, Peggy Hoffman, Hal Turley, Lisa Bronchetti, Nancy Mulder, Steven Autry, Shequitta Kelly, Janet Lusk, Tina Yoo Clinton, Lisa Green, Terrie McVea, Roberto Canas, Jr., Anthony Randall, Marian Brown, Elizabeth Crowder, Doug Skemp, Angela King. Added Tammy Jean Ardolf for Dallas County Texas,Marian Brown, Dan Patterson, Julia Hayes, Doug Skemp, Nancy Mulder, Lisa Green, Angela King, Elizabeth Crowder, Tina Yoo Clinton, Peggy Hoffman, Roberto Canas, Jr., Shequitta Kelly, Terrie McVea, Lisa Bronchetti, Steven Autry, Anthony Randall, Janet Lusk. (Harlan, Peter) Modified parties on 12/28/2018 (axm). (Entered: 12/21/2018)
185 ORDER granting 184 Motion to Substitute Attorney. (Ordered by Judge David C Godbey on 12/27/2018) (epm) (Entered: 12/27/2018)
186 Emergency MOTION to Extend Time (Unopposed) filed by Dallas County Texas (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A, # 2 Exhibit(s) B) (Morgan, Philip) (Entered: 01/17/2019)
187 ORDER granting 186 Unopposed Emergency Motion to Extend Time. Dallas County is granted a two week extension to comply with the Court's Preliminary Injunction and is permitted not to have Pretrial Services staff present at the jail for the 3 pm to 11:30 pm shifts on 1/19/19, 1/20/19, 1/26/19, and 1/27/19 as required by Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Court's Preliminary Injunction. (Ordered by Judge David C Godbey on 1/18/2019) (aaa) (Entered: 01/18/2019)
188 MOTION Misdemeanor Judge's Request for Clarification of the Court's Preliminary Injunction re 165 Order filed by Roberto Canas, Jr., Tina Yoo Clinton, Elizabeth Crowder, Lisa Green, Julia Hayes, Peggy Hoffman, Shequitta Kelly, Angela King, Nancy Mulder, Dan Patterson, Doug Skemp (David, Katharine) (Entered: 01/18/2019)
189 ORDER: Motion Hearing set for 2/7/2019 10:00 AM before Judge David C Godbey, re: 188 MOTION Misdemeanor Judge's Request for Clarification of the Court's Preliminary Injunction, 172 MOTION Requesting Modification and Clarification of the Court's Preliminary Injunction, 168 MOTION OR CLARIFICATION OF THE 165 PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ORDER, 169 MOTION to Amend/Correct. (Ordered by Judge David C Godbey on 1/23/2019) (epm) (Entered: 01/23/2019)
190 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by John Butrus on behalf of Steven Autry, Lisa Bronchetti, Marian Brown, Roberto Canas, Jr., Tina Yoo Clinton, Elizabeth Crowder, Dallas County Texas, Lisa Green, Julia Hayes, Peggy Hoffman, Shequitta Kelly, Angela King, Janet Lusk, Terrie McVea, Nancy Mulder, Dan Patterson, Anthony Randall, Doug Skemp, Hal Turley. (Filer confirms contact info in ECF is current.) (Butrus, John) (Entered: 01/24/2019)
191 RESPONSE filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Faith in Texas, Patroba Michieka, Texas Organizing Project Education Fund, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston re: 188 MOTION Misdemeanor Judge's Request for Clarification of the Court's Preliminary Injunction re 165 Order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s)) (Animashaun, Akeeb) (Entered: 01/30/2019)
192 REPLY filed by Roberto Canas, Jr., Tina Yoo Clinton, Elizabeth Crowder, Dallas County Texas, Lisa Green, Julia Hayes, Peggy Hoffman, Shequitta Kelly, Angela King, Nancy Mulder, Dan Patterson, Doug Skemp re: 188 MOTION Misdemeanor

Case: 3:18-cv-00154-N As of: 02/18/2019 07:59 PM CST 44 of 45

02/06/2019 02/06/2019 02/06/2019 02/07/2019
02/07/2019

Judge's Request for Clarification of the Court's Preliminary Injunction re 165 Order (David, Katharine) (Entered: 02/05/2019)
193 NOTICE of Bench Memorandum re: 189 Order Setting Deadline/Hearing, filed by Jennifer Bennett, Brandon Birmingham, Robert Burns, Dominique Collins, Stephanie Fargo, Livia Liu Francis, Hector Garza, Amber Givens−Davis, Teresa Hawthorne, Tracy Holmes, Jeanine Howard, Tammy Kemp, Nancy Kennedy, Gracie Lewis, Stephanie Mitchell, Carter Thompson, Ernest White (Hudson, Eric) (Entered: 02/06/2019)
194 MOTION Joint Motion for Clarification filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Patroba Michieka, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Cohn, Kali) (Entered: 02/06/2019)
195 MOTION to Amend/Correct 169 MOTION to Amend/Correct 165 Order (Amended Motion for Clarification of the Preliminary Injunction) filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Patroba Michieka, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, Shakena Walston with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) (Appendix in support of Amended Motion), # 2 Proposed Order) (Cohn, Kali) (Entered: 02/06/2019)
196 ELECTRONIC Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge David C Godbey: denying 168 Motion ; denying 169 Motion to Amend/Correct. ; denying 172 Motion ; denying 188 Motion ; denying 194 Motion ; denying 195 Motion to Amend/Correct. ; Motion Hearing held on 2/7/2019 re 195 Motion to Amend/Correct, filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Shakena Walston, Patroba Michieka, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, 172 Motion for Miscellaneous Relief filed by Dallas County Texas, 168 Motion for Miscellaneous Relief, filed by Erriyah Banks, Shannon Daves, Shakena Walston, Patroba Michieka, James Thompson, Destinee Tovar, 184 Motion to Substitute Attorney,, filed by Terrie McVea, Lisa Bronchetti, Peggy Hoffman, Marian Brown, Dan Patterson, Nancy Mulder, Shequitta Kelly, Roberto Canas, Jr., Hal Turley, Lisa Green, Julia Hayes, Angela King, Doug Skemp, Dallas County Texas, Steven Autry, Tina Yoo Clinton, Anthony Randall, Elizabeth Crowder, Janet Lusk, 188 Motion for Miscellaneous Relief, filed by Peggy Hoffman, Dan Patterson, Nancy Mulder, Shequitta Kelly, Roberto Canas, Jr., Lisa Green, Angela King, Julia Hayes, Doug Skemp, Tina Yoo Clinton, Elizabeth Crowder, 169 Motion to Amend/Correct, filed by Erriyah Banks, Shakena Walston, Shannon Daves, James Thompson, Patroba Michieka, Destinee Tovar, 186 Motion To Extend Time filed by Dallas County Texas, 194 Motion for Miscellaneous Relief filed by Erriyah Banks, Shakena Walston, Shannon Daves, James Thompson, Patroba Michieka, Destinee Tovar. re: 195 MOTION to Amend/Correct 169 MOTION to Amend/Correct 165 Order (Amended Motion for Clarification of the Preliminary Injunction), 172 MOTION Requesting Modification and Clarification of the Court's Preliminary Injunction re 165 Order, 168 MOTION OR CLARIFICATION OF THE 165 PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ORDER, 184 Unopposed MOTION to Substitute Attorney, And Withdraw added attorney Peter L Harlan,Tammy Jean Ardolf for Dan Patterson,Tammy Jean Ardolf for Julia Hayes,Tammy Jean Ardolf for Dallas County Texas,Tammy Jean Ardolf for Peggy Hoffman,Tammy Jea, 188 MOTION Misdemeanor Judge's Request for Clarification of the Court's Preliminary Injunction re 165 Order, 169 MOTION to Amend/Correct 165 Order , 186 Emergency MOTION to Extend Time (Unopposed), 194 MOTION Joint Motion for Clarification Attorney Appearances: Plaintiff − Kali Cohn, Andre Segura and A. Dami Animashaun; Defense − Katharine David, Phil Morgan and Eric Hudson. (Court Reporter: Shawn McRoberts) (No exhibits) Time in Court − :55. (chmb) (Entered: 02/07/2019)
197 Notice of Filing of Official Electronic Transcript of Motion to Modify or Clarify Order of Preliminary Injunction Proceedings held on 02/07/2019 before Judge David Godbey. Court Reporter/Transcriber Shawn McRoberts, Telephone number (214) 753−2349. Parties are notified of their duty to review the transcript. A copy may be purchased from the court reporter or viewed at the clerk's office. If redaction of personal identifiers under MO 61 is necessary, file a Redaction Request − Transcript within 21 days. If no action is taken, the entire transcript will be made available through PACER without redaction after 90 calendar days. The clerk will mail a copy of this notice to parties not electronically noticed. (37 pages) Redaction Request due 2/28/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/11/2019. Release of Transcript

Case: 3:18-cv-00154-N As of: 02/18/2019 07:59 PM CST 45 of 45 Restriction set for 5/8/2019. (smm) (Entered: 02/07/2019)

 
 Case 3:18-cv-00154-N Document 10 Filed 01/30/18 Page 1 of 64 PageID 360

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

)

SHANNON DAVES,

)

SHAKENA WALSTON,

)

ERRIYAH BANKS,

)

DESTINEE TOVAR,

)

PATROBA MICHIEKA,

)

JAMES THOMPSON,

)

)

On behalf of themselves and all

)

others similarly situated,

)

)

FAITH IN TEXAS,

)

TEXAS ORGANIZING PROJECT EDUCATION FUND. )

)

On behalf of themselves

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS,

)

)

SHERIFF MARIAN BROWN,

)

)

TERRIE MCVEA,

)

LISA BRONCHETTI,

)

STEVEN AUTRY,

)

ANTHONY RANDALL,

)

JANET LUSK,

)

HAL TURLEY,

)

Dallas County Magistrates

)

)

ERNEST WHITE (194TH),

)

HECTOR GARZA (195TH),

)

TERESA HAWTHORNE (203RD),

)

TAMMY KEMP (204TH),

)

JENNIFER BENNETT (265TH),

)

AMBER GIVENS-DAVIS (282ND),

)

LIVIA LIU FRANCIS (283RD)

)

STEPHANIE MITCHELL (291ST),

)

BRANDON BIRMINGHAM (292ND),

)

Case No. 3:18-cv-154

1

Case 3:18-cv-00154-N Document 10 Filed 01/30/18 Page 2 of 64 PageID 361

TRACY HOLMES (363RD),

)

ROBERT BURNS (NO. 1),

)

NANCY KENNEDY (NO. 2),

)

GRACIE LEWIS (NO. 3),

)

DOMINIQUE COLLINS (NO. 4),

)

CARTER THOMPSON (NO. 5),

)

JEANINE HOWARD (NO. 6),

)

STEPHANIE FARGO (NO. 7),

)

Judges of Dallas County Criminal District Courts )

)

DAN PATTERSON (NO. 1),

)

JULIA HAYES (NO. 2),

)

DOUG SKEMP (NO. 3),

)

NANCY C. MULDER (NO. 4),

)

LISA GREEN (NO. 5),

)

ANGELA KING (NO. 6),

)

ELIZABETH CROWDER (NO. 7),

)

TINA YOO CLINTON (NO. 8),

)

PEGGY HOFFMAN (NO. 9),

)

ROBERTO CANAS, JR. (NO. 10),

)

SHEQUITTA KELLY (NO. 11),

)

Judges of Dallas County Criminal Courts at Law )

)

Defendants.

)

________________________________________________)

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT—CLASS ACTION

1. This case is about Dallas County jailing some of its poorest people because they

cannot afford to make a monetary payment. Named Plaintiff Shannon Daves is currently

unemployed and homeless. She was arrested for a misdemeanor offense on Wednesday, January

17, and Dallas County has detained her since then solely because she cannot afford to pay a $500

money bail.1 Because Ms. Daves is transgender and cannot afford to purchase her release, she is

1 At the time this lawsuit was filed on January 21, 2018, all six Named Plaintiffs were being kept in the Dallas County Jail because they could not afford to pay secured financial conditions of release. The monetary amounts were required pursuant to Dallas County’s predetermined money bail schedules and without any inquiry into or findings concerning their ability to pay.
Since the case was filed, the Named Plaintiffs have all been released. Texas Organizing Project and Faith in Texas posted cash bail for Ms. Daves, Ms. Tovar, and Mr. Michieka. Mr Michieka and Ms. Tovar were released late on January 21 or early on January 22. Ms. Daves was also “released” from Dallas County custody, but remained in
2

Case 3:18-cv-00154-N Document 10 Filed 01/30/18 Page 3 of 64 PageID 362
being kept in solitary confinement. The other Named Plaintiffs—Shakena Walston, Erriyah Banks, Destinee Tovar, Patroba Michieka, and James Thompson—are also impoverished individuals who were arrested on January 18 or 19, 2018 for misdemeanor or felony offenses in Dallas County. They are all being kept in jail cells at the Dallas County Jail because they cannot afford to pay the money bail amount required for release.
2. The Named Plaintiffs’ money bail amounts are being required pursuant to Dallas County’s schedules of secured monetary bail amounts and without any inquiry into their ability to pay or any consideration of or findings concerning alternative conditions of release. The legal proceedings at which conditions of release are determined take place inside the jail, and the public is prohibited from observing them. Because they are impoverished and cannot afford the payment required by the County for their release, the Plaintiffs—who are presumptively innocent—will be detained in Dallas County jail cells for days or weeks, until they are finally brought to court on the “jail chain.”
3. In Dallas County, while wealthier arrestees are released from custody almost immediately upon payment of money to the County, arrestees like the Named Plaintiffs who are too poor to purchase their freedom remain in jail because of their poverty. Misdemeanor arrestees, like Ms. Daves and Ms. Tovar, who cannot afford to purchase their release must wait at least four to ten days before they are brought to court on the jail chain for a first appearance. Felony arrestees,
the jail for another day. On January 23, the City of Carrollton picked her up and transferred her to its jail because she owed fines and fees in the municipal court in Carrollton. She was finally free on January 24.
Ms. Walston was released on January 24 after the District Attorney’s Office decided not to file charges. Mr. Thompson was released either late on January 26 or early on January 27 after certain errors relating to his charges and money bail amounts were corrected (e.g., two of the charged offenses were each listed twice, inflating by $50,000 the total amount he was required to pay to secure release). After nine or ten days, his family managed to make a partial payment of a 10% fee to a commercial bonding company. Mr. Thompson and his family sold various belongings to make that payment and will continue to owe the company money for months at least. A Judge reduced Ms. Banks’s two $25,000 money bail amounts to $5,000 each and converted them to unsecured bonds on January 23. The Court also imposed electronic monitoring and home detention as conditions of release. Ms. Banks was released pursuant to the order on January 25.
3

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like Ms. Walston, Ms. Banks, Mr. Michieko, and Mr. Thompson, must wait at least two to three weeks for this appearance if they waive indictment—and two to three months if they do not.
4. First appearance is the first even theoretical opportunity for an arrestee to speak to a judge who can consider ability to pay or challenge conditions of release. However, in practice, even this “appearance” is not a true opportunity to raise ability to pay and challenge conditions of release, because arrestees are not brought into the courtroom unless they are pleading guilty. And, faced with the prospect of lengthy pretrial detention, the majority of detained misdemeanor and low-level felony arrestees do plead guilty at this first appearance. These guilty pleas typically result in sentences of “time served” and release from Dallas County custody that same day.
5. Although the Supreme Court has explained that pretrial detention must be the “carefully limited exception” in our legal system, United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987), as a result of these policies and practices, almost 70% of people in the Dallas County Jail— thousands every night—have not been convicted of a crime. Instead, they languish in jail cells because they cannot afford to pay the amount of money required for their release.
6. This mass detention based on wealth has devastating consequences for Plaintiffs, for their families, and for the community. Pretrial detention of presumptively innocent human beings causes people to lose their jobs and shelter, interrupts vital medication cycles, and separates parents and children. It coerces guilty pleas and results in longer sentences. Even a few days of pretrial detention make people more likely to commit crimes in the future and cost Dallas County tens of millions of dollars every year.
7. On behalf of the many other arrestees subjected to Dallas County’s unlawful and ongoing post-arrest wealth-based detention scheme, Plaintiffs challenge Defendants’ use of money bail to detain only the most impoverished arrestees. Dallas County’s wealth-based pretrial
4

Case 3:18-cv-00154-N Document 10 Filed 01/30/18 Page 5 of 64 PageID 364
detention system violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution. It has no place in our society.
8. By and through their attorneys and on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs seek to enjoin Defendants’ wealth-based post-arrest procedures, and a declaration that Defendants cannot employ a system of wealth-based detention by imposing and enforcing secured money bail without an inquiry into and findings concerning the arrestee’s present ability to pay, and without individualized consideration of less-restrictive, alternative conditions of release. Plaintiffs also seek a permanent injunction requiring Dallas County to ensure that all legal proceedings at which conditions of release are determined, or which may result in the pretrial detention of a presumptively innocent person, are open to the public.
Nature of the Action 9. It is the policy and practice of Defendants to refuse to release arrestees from custody unless they pay a monetary sum. The amount of money required is determined by an offensebased, secured money bail schedule, and it is the policy and practice of Dallas County officials to require the generic, predetermined amount without considering the person’s ability to pay or alternatives to secured money bail, and without making the substantive findings or providing the procedural safeguards that the Constitution requires to ensure that a person’s resulting detention is necessary to further the government’s interests. 10. This policy and practice results in the systemic wealth-based detention of those arrestees who are too poor to pay money bail. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting Defendants’ wealth-based, post-arrest detention scheme. Plaintiffs also seek declaratory and injunctive relief requiring Defendants to provide public access to the legal
5

Case 3:18-cv-00154-N Document 10 Filed 01/30/18 Page 6 of 64 PageID 365
proceedings in which the government Defendants determine conditions of release and which result in pretrial detention.
Jurisdiction and Venue 11. This is a civil rights action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201, et seq., and the First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. 12. Venue in this Court is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
Parties 13. Named Plaintiff Shannon Daves is a 47-year-old woman. She was arrested on Wednesday, January 17, 2018, for an alleged misdemeanor offense. She is currently experiencing homelessness and does not have a job. She cannot afford the $500 money bail amount required for her release, without an inquiry or findings concerning her ability to pay. Because she is transgender and is being held in the men’s unit of the jail, Dallas County is keeping her in solitary confinement 24 hours a day. She represents herself as an individual and a class of similarly situated people subjected to Defendants’ wealth-based post-arrest detention scheme. See Exhibit 1, Declaration of Shannon Daves. 14. Named Plaintiff Shakena Walston is a 29-year-old woman. She was arrested on Friday, January 19, 2018, for an alleged felony offense. She is indigent and currently unemployed, and avoids homelessness by staying with her sister. She cannot afford the $15,000 money bail amount required for her release without an inquiry or findings concerning her ability to pay. She is trying to start a program at a local community college with the help of financial aid, but cannot pursue those plans while she is in custody. She represents herself as an individual and a class of
6

Case 3:18-cv-00154-N Document 10 Filed 01/30/18 Page 7 of 64 PageID 366
similarly situated people subjected to Defendants’ wealth-based post-arrest detention scheme. See Exhibit 2, Declaration of Shakena Walston.
15. Named Plaintiff Erriyah Jones is a 26-year-old woman. She was arrested on Friday, January 19, 2018, for two alleged felony offenses. She is currently unemployed and lives with and takes care of her mother, who receives disability payments and food stamps. She cannot afford the $50,000 money bail amount required for her release without an inquiry or findings concerning her ability to pay. She has health issues requiring medication and a special diet, but is not being provided either at the Jail. She represents herself as an individual and a class of similarly situated people subjected to Defendants’ wealth-based post-arrest detention scheme. See Exhibit 3, Declaration of Erriyah Jones.
16. Named Plaintiff Destinee Tovar is a 19-year-old woman. She was arrested on Janaury 19, 2018, for an alleged misdemeanor offense. She is currently unemployed and without stable housing. She cannot afford the $1,500 money bail amount required for her release without an inquiry or findings concerning her ability to pay. She represents herself as an individual and a class of similarly situated people subjected to Defendants’ wealth-based post-arrest detention scheme. See Exhibit 4, Declaration of Destinee Tovar.
17. Named Plaintiff Patroba Michieka is a 30-year-old man. He was arrested on January 19, 2018, for an alleged state-jail-felony offense. He struggles to meet the basic necessities of life and lives with his mother to avoid homelessness. He cannot afford the $500 money bail amount required for his release without an inquiry or findings concerning his ability to pay. He was working a few days a week before his arrest, but fears he will lose that job because he is in custody. He represents himself as an individual and a class of similarly situated people subjected to
7

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Defendants’ wealth-based post-arrest detention scheme. See Exhibit 5, Declaration of Patroba Michieka.
18. Named Plaintiff James Thompson is a 28-year-old man. He was arrested on Thursday, January 18, 2018, for two alleged state jail felonies. He is indigent and unemployed, and avoids homelessness by living with his parents. He cannot afford the $60,000 money bail amount that Dallas County requires for his release without an inquiry or findings concerning his ability to pay. He represents himself as an individual and a class of similarly situated people subjected to Defendants’ wealth-based post-arrest detention scheme. See Exhibit 6, Declaration of James Thompson.
19. Plaintiff Faith in Texas is a multi-racial faith movement for social justice that trains teams of leaders in local churches, mosques, and synagogues that serve low- and moderate-income people. These Justice Teams identify systemic problems that affect their communities and move entire congregations to action through policy campaigns like the Live Free campaign, which has as its chief goal ending mass incarceration in the state of Texas.
20. Texas Organizing Project (“TOP”) promotes social and economic equality for low to moderate income Texans through community and electoral organizing. TOP provides hard working Texans the opportunity to implement real change by organizing their own neighborhoods, investing their time and energy in causes relevant to their respective communities, and collectively taking ownership over TOP’s agenda, strategy and direction.
21. Defendant Dallas County is a municipal corporation organized under the laws of the State of Texas.2 The County, through the Commissioners Court, makes policy decisions about
2 The Dallas County Sheriff, Dallas County Commissioners Court, Dallas County Criminal Court at Law Judges, and Dallas County Criminal District Court Judges are all final policymakers for various aspects of Dallas County’s postarrest policies and practices. Each is named separately from the County as a Defendant in the event the Court concludes
8

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which arrestees are eligible for release on unsecured bond or non-financial conditions, and which arrestees, among those arrested by Dallas County law enforcement officers, may be released on a citation instead of being arrested. The County also makes policy decisions about whether and at what level to fund the County’s jail, courts, and pretrial services agency. The County’s policies result in systemic wealth-based pretrial detention of Dallas County arrestees.
22. The Dallas County Sheriff is a County official, the head of the Dallas County Sheriff’s Department, and the keeper of the County Jail. The Dallas County Sheriff, Defendant Marian Brown, is the final policymaker for running and administering the jail in Dallas County. She is sued in her official capacity.
23. Roberto Canas, Jr., Elizabeth Crowder, Lisa Green, Julia Hayes, Peggy Hoffman, Shequitta Kelly, Angela King, Nancy C. Mulder, Dan Patterson, Doug Skemp, and Tina Yoo Clinton are the Dallas County Criminal Court at Law Judges (“misdemeanor Judges”). Sitting en banc as an administrative body, the misdemeanor Judges promulgate the generally applicable bail misdemeanor schedule applied by the County systemically to determine the conditions of pretrial release for all misdemeanor arrestees. Exhibit 7. Each misdemeanor Judge is sued in her individual and official capacities for injunctive and declaratory relief.
24. Jennifer Bennett, Brandon Birmingham, Robert Burns, Dominique Collins, Stephanie Fargo, Livia Liu Francis, Hector Garza, Amber Givens-Davis, Teresa Hawthorne, Tracy Holmes, Jeanine Howard, Tammy Kemp, Nancy Kennedy, Gracie Lewis, Stephanie Mitchell, Carter Thompson, and Ernest White are the Dallas County District Court Judges (“felony Judges”). Sitting en banc as an administrative body, the felony Judges promulgate the generally applicable
any of them is acting on behalf of the State or that the Judges are acting judicially with respect to any particular function. If the Court agrees that these Defendants are final policymakers for Dallas County, then Plaintiffs agree that naming them individually is redundant of a suit against the County.
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felony bail schedule applied by the County systemically to determine the conditions of pretrial release for all felony arrestees. Exhibit 8. Each felony Judge is sued in her individual and official capacities for injunctive and declaratory relief.
25. Steven Autry, Lisa Bronchetti, Janet Lusk, Terrie McVea, Anthony Randall, and Hal Turley are all Dallas County Magistrates. Each is a County employee who is appointed by a unanimous vote of Defendant Judges.3 The Magistrates can be fired by a majority vote of the Defendant Judges.4 The Magistrates act only at the direction of the Judges, and have only whatever authority or discretion the Judges allow them to exercise.5 The Magistrates are sued for declaratory relief only.
Factual Background A. The Named Plaintiffs Are in Jail Because They Are Unable to Pay the Money
Bail Demanded for Their Release 26. At Dallas County Jail, each Plaintiff appeared before a Magistrate, in a room at the jail that is closed to the public, and the Magistrate informed them of the charges and the money bail amount required for release. Ex. 1 ¶ 5; Ex. 2 ¶ 4; Ex. 3 ¶ 3; Ex. 4 ¶ 3; Ex. 5 ¶ 6; Ex. 6 ¶¶ 5–7. They were told by Dallas County Sheriff’s Deputies not to speak at the hearing. Ex. 1 ¶ 4; Ex. 3 ¶ 3; Ex. 4 ¶ 5; Ex. 5 ¶ 5. The hearings each lasted less than 60 seconds and, pursuant to the policies and practices described in this Complaint, no inquiry was made into any Plaintiff’s ability to pay,
3 Tex. Code Ann. § 54.301(a) (authorizing the Judges of the District Courts and County Criminal Courts to “appoint a magistrate to perform the duties authorized by this subsection.”); id. at §54.401(c) (“If a magistrate serves more than one court, the magistrate’s appointment must be made with the unanimous approval of all the judges under whom the magistrate serves.”). 4 Tex. Code Ann. § 54.305(b) (“The services of a magistrate who serves more than one court may be terminated by a majority vote of all the judges whom the magistrate serves.”). 5 Davis v. State, 956 S.W.2d 555, 559 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (“However, a magistrate is not a judge in his own right and acts as a surrogate of the duly elected judge. . . .”); Gambling Paraphernalia, Devices, Equipment, & Proceeds v. State, 22 S.W.3d 625, 627 (Tex. App.—Dall. 2000, no pet.) (“[The Magistrate] acts as an agent of the district courts and has no authority of his own.”).
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nor was there any consideration of alternative, non-financial conditions of release. Ex. 1 ¶ 5; Ex. 2 ¶ 5; Ex. 3 ¶ 4; Ex. 4 ¶ 4; Ex. 5 ¶ 7; Ex. 6 ¶ 8.
27. Plaintiff Shannon Daves is a 47-year-old woman. Ex. 1 ¶ 1. Ms. Daves is currently unemployed and experiencing homelessness. Id. ¶ 10–11. She struggles to meet the basic necessities of life. Id. ¶ 11.
28. Ms. Daves was arrested on Wednesday, January 17, and taken into Dallas County custody for an alleged misdemeanor offense. Id. ¶ 2. She was informed that, because of the Dallas County bail schedule, she would be released immediately, but only if she paid a money bail amount of $500—an amount predetermined by the Dallas County bail schedule. See id. ¶ 5. She was told that she would be detained by Dallas County if she does not pay. See id. ¶¶ 2–5.
29. Because she cannot afford to purchase her freedom, and because of the jail’s policies relating to people who are transgender, Ms. Daves is being kept in solitary confinement 24 hours a day, segregated from the rest of the jail population. Id. ¶¶ 7–8. She has not been permitted to exercise, and she eats alone in her cell. Id. ¶ 8.
30. Plaintiff Shakena Walston is a 29-year-old woman. Ex. 2 ¶ 1. Ms. Walston is currently unemployed and living with her sister to avoid homelessness. Id. ¶¶ 6–7. She struggles to meet the basic necessities of life. Id. ¶ 6.
31. Ms. Walston was arrested on Friday, January 19, and taken into Dallas County custody for an alleged felony offense. Id. ¶¶ 2–3. She was informed that, because of the Dallas County bail schedule, she would be released immediately, but only if she paid a money bail amount of $15,000—an amount predetermined by the Dallas County bail schedule. See id. ¶ 4. She was told that she would be detained by Dallas County if she does not pay. See id. ¶¶ 4–5, 10. Because she cannot afford to purchase her freedom, she remains in the Dallas County Jail. Id. ¶ 10. She was
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trying to start a program at a local community college with the help of financial aid, but cannot pursue those plans until she is released. Id. ¶ 9.
32. Plaintiff Erriyah Banks is a 29-year-old woman. Ex. 3 ¶ 1. Ms. Banks is currently unemployed and living with her mother to avoid homelessness. Id. ¶¶ 6–7. Her mother relies on her as her caretaker. Id. ¶ 10. Ms. Banks struggles to meet the basic necessities of life. Id. ¶ 6.
33. Ms. Banks was arrested on Friday, January 19, and taken into Dallas County custody for an alleged state jail felony and felony offense. Id. ¶ 2. She was informed that, because of the Dallas County bail schedule, she would be released immediately, but only if she paid a money bail amount of $50,000—an amount predetermined by the Dallas County bail schedule. See id. ¶ 3. She was told that she would be detained by Dallas County if she does not pay. See id. ¶¶ 3–7. Because she cannot afford to purchase her freedom, she remains in the Dallas County Jail. Id. ¶ 7. She has not been given the medication or special diet that she needs to treat ongoing health issues, and her mother remains without a caretaker. Id. ¶¶ 8, 10.
34. Plaintiff Destinee Tovar is a 19-year-old woman. Ex. 4 ¶ 1. Ms. Tovar is currently unemployed and without stable housing. Id. ¶ 6. She struggles to meet the basic necessities of life. Id.
35. Ms. Tovar was arrested on Friday, January 19, by the Mesquite Police Department for an alleged misdemeanor and taken to Mesquite’s jail. Id. ¶ 2. She was informed by a judge there that she would be released immediately, but only if she paid a bond amount of $500. Id. ¶ 2. She could not afford to pay, so she remained in custody until she was transferred to the Dallas County Jail. Id. ¶ 3. At the Dallas County Jail, she saw a Magistrate Judge, who informed her that she would be released immediately, but only if she paid a bond amount of $1,500—an amount predetermined by the Dallas County bail schedule. Id. She was told that she would be detained by
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Dallas County if she does not pay. See id. Because she cannot afford to purchase her freedom, she remains in the Dallas County Jail. Id. ¶¶ 3, 7.
36. Plaintiff Patroba Michieka is a 30-year-old man. Ex. 5 ¶ 1. Before his arrest, Mr. Michieka was working a few days a week and was living with his mother to avoid homelessness. Id. ¶¶ 9–10. He struggles to meet the basic necessities of life. Id. ¶ 8.
37. Mr. Michieka was arrested on Friday, January 19, for an alleged state-jail felony offense. Id. ¶ 2. He was informed that, because of the Dallas County bail schedule, he would be released immediately, but only if he paid a money bail amount of $500—an amount predetermined by the Dallas County bail schedule. See id. ¶ 6–7, 11. He was told that he would be detained by Dallas County if he did not pay. See id. ¶¶ 6–7, 11. Because he cannot afford to purchase his freedom, he remains in the Dallas County Jail. Id. ¶ 11. He fears he may lose his job because he is unable to go to work. Id. ¶ 10.
38. Plaintiff James Thompson is a 38-year-old man. Ex. 6 ¶ 1. He is currenly unemployed and living with his parents to avoid homelessness. Id. ¶ 10. He struggles to meet the basic necessities of life. Id.
39. Mr. Thompson was arrested on Thursday, January 18, by the Garland Police Department for two alleged state-jail felony offenses and taken to Garland’s jail. Id. ¶ 2. He was informed by a judge there that he would be released immediately, but only if he paid a bond amount of $90,000. Id. ¶ 2. He could not afford to pay, so he remained in custody until he was transferred to the Dallas County Jail. Id. ¶ 3–4. At the Dallas County Jail, he saw a Magistrate Judge, who informed him that he would be eligible for release from Dallas County custody, but only if he paid a bond amount of $60,000—an amount predetermined by the Dallas County bail schedule. Id. ¶ 7.
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He was told that he would be detained by Dallas County if he does not pay. See id. Because he
cannot afford to purchase his freedom, he remains in the Dallas County Jail. Id. ¶¶ 9, 12.
B. Defendants’ Wealth-Based Detention System Detains Arrestees Who Cannot Pay Secured Money Bail Amount While Releasing Those Who Can Pay
40. As a matter of policy and practice, Dallas County requires all arrestees to pay
secured money bail to be released from jail. The bail amounts are not individualized; they are set
according to a “bail schedule”—a list of monetary amounts that correspond to the offense charged.
Dallas County uses a bail schedule to determine conditions of release, even though Texas law
allows Dallas County to permit release on nonfinancial conditions or unsecured bail, and to issue citations for various misdemeanor offenses, instead of making arrests.6
41. “Bail” means “conditions of release.” The phrase “money bail” or “secured money
bail” means that the person’s release is conditioned on the pre-payment of a monetary amount, i.e.
the person must pay some amount of money upfront in order to be released. The phrase “unsecured
bail” or “unsecured bond” means that the person’s release is conditioned on a promise to make a
monetary payment if the person does not appear for court; the person is not required to make a monetary payment upfront in exchange for release.7
42. Arestees who cannot afford the predetermined money bail amount are detained
pursuant to the bail schedule—without even a theoretical opportunity to raise ability to pay and
6 Texas law gives Dallas County the authority to cite and release a person accused of certain misdemeanor offenses. Tex. C.C.P. Art. 14.06(b)–(d). However, Dallas County has rejected the cite-and-release option as a matter of policy for all eligible offenses except possession of less than four ounces of marijuana. See Kevin Cokely, Dallas ‘Cite and Release’ Policy Goes Into Effect Friday For Small Amounts of Marijuana, Dall. Morning News, Nov. 28, 2017, available at https://www.nbcdfw.com/news/local/Dallas-Hosts-Forum-in-Preparations-for-Cite-and-ReleaseProgram-460489773.html. 7 See Tim Schnacke, United States Department of Justice, National Institute of Corrections, Fundamentals of Bail: A Resources Guide for Pretrial Practitioners and a Framework for American Pretrial Reform 112–13 (2014), available at http://www.clebp.org/images/2014-11-05_final_bail_fundamentals_september_8,_2014.pdf (“[B]ail is best defined in terms of release, and most appropriately as a process of conditional release. . . . The purpose of bail, rather, is to effectuate and maximize release. There is ‘bail’—i.e., a process of release—and there is ‘no bail[]’—a process of detention.”).
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challenge the generic, secured financial condition required automatically by Dallas County—until their first appearance in court. As a matter of policy and practice, impoverished misdemeanor arrestees are detained pursuant to the bail schedule for four to ten days before they are brought to court. Felony arrestees who waive indictment are detained pursuant to the bail schedule for two to three weeks. Felony arrestees who do not waive indictment are detained pursuant to the bail schedule for two to three months.
43. In practice, this first court appearance is not a true opportunity to raise ability to pay or challenge conditions of release, because arrestees are brought into the courtroom to speak to the Judge only if they are pleading guilty, and most misdemeanor and low-level-felony arrestees do plead guilty, typically accepting sentences of time served.
44. As a result of Defendants’ policies and practices, impoverished arrestees are kept in jail for days or weeks solely because they cannot afford to make a monetary payment, while arrestees with access to money are released.
1. Arrest and transport to the Dallas County Jail 45. The Dallas County Sheriff’s Department, the City of Dallas Police Department, and numerous other agencies within Dallas County have the authority to arrest people for misdemeanor and felony offenses. Dallas County and the City of Dallas are responsible for the vast majority of the arrests in Dallas County. 46. The post-arrest process is substantially the same for all arrestees, regardless of which agency makes the arrest, and regardless of whether the person is arrested pursuant to a warrant or was the subject of a warrantless arrest.8
8 However, people who are arrested by agencies other than Dallas County or the City of Dallas are typically subjected to longer periods of wealth-based detention than those arrested by Dallas County or the City of Dallas, because they are kept initially in the local lockup of the arresting authority before they are transferred to the Dallas County Jail.
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47. When a person is arrested by an agency other than Dallas County or the City of Dallas, she will be taken first to the local lockup run by that agency.
48. In about half of the jurisdictions that make arrests within Dallas County, a local magistrate informs the arrestee of her bail amount in person at the local jail.9 Some of these Magistrates apply the Dallas County bail schedules, and some apply their own local policies for setting bail.
49. In the other jurisdictions, arrestees appear by videolink before the Defendant Dallas County Magistrates. In these jurisdictions, Dallas County Magistrates refer to the Dallas County misdemeanor and felony bail schedules to determine the amount of secured money bail required for release.
50. Dallas County transports arrestees to the Dallas County Jail from the local lock-ups run by agencies other than Dallas County and the City of Dallas.
51. It can take two or three days for a person arrested by an agency other than Dallas County or the City of Dallas to be transported to the Dallas County Jail. Arrestees who are kept at these local jails have no access to appointed counsel during this entire period of time, but they can leave the local jail at any time if they pay the money bail amount.
52. People arrested by Dallas County or the City of Dallas are taken directly to the Dallas County Jail, known locally as “Lew Sterrett.”
Often, several days pass prior to transfer from one of these outlying jails. For example, Dallas County transports arrestees from Richardson City Jail every one to three days. Some municipal jails transport arrestees only once or twice per week. Arrestees who are detained initially at these other jail facilities learn the money bail amount required for release soon after they are taken to the local lockup. 9 At some of the municipal jails, local Magistrates visit the jail once per day to inform newly arrested individuals of the money bail amounts required for their release. At others, the local Magistrates visit the municipal jail several times a day for this purpose. As a result, the amount of time after arrest and before a person who has been transported to a municipal jail learns the money bail amount required for release varies from municipal jail to municipal jail.
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53. On average, Dallas County books 182 new arrestees into the Dallas County Jail, every day.
54. The Defendant Sheriff detains arrestees at the Dallas County Jail, which houses all inmates to be held pending trial in the Dallas County courts.
55. Regardless of the arresting agency, once an arrestee arrives at the Dallas County Jail, a Magistrate determines probable cause for warrantless arrests on the basis of documents filed by the arresting officer.
56. If the Magistrate concludes that probable cause existed for a warrantless arrest, or if the arrest was pursuant to a warrant, the booking process will begin.
2. Arraignment 57. Arrestees are informed during the booking process of the money bail amount required for release during a proceeding that is closed to the public, and is referred to locally as “arraignment.” 58. During the booking process at the jail, and typically within a few hours of arriving there, Sheriff’s deputies take groups of arrestees to appear for “arraignment” in person, in the jail, before a Magistrate.10 Sheriff’s Department employees and agents supervise, monitor, and give instructions to the arrestees before, during, and after “arraignment.” 59. Although the proceedings are called “arraignments,” the purposes of arraignments as set forth in Texas law—to “fix[]” the arrestee’s identity and “hear[] his plea,” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 26.02—are not fulfilled by these proceedings.
10 Arrestees who appeared before a magistrate while being kept at an outlying jail will also appear before a Dallas County Magistrate during the booking process at the Dallas County Jail.
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60. Instead, at so-called “arraignments,” Magistrates inform the arrestees of certain rights, as required by Article 15.17 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, as well as the offense charged and the monetary payment required for release pending trial.11 The allegations giving rise to the charges are not read aloud at arraignment, and no plea is entered.
61. If a person is too sick to be kept with the general population, or if the person does not speak English and needs an interpreter to understand the proceedings, the person’s appearance before a Magistrate at the Dallas County Jail will be delayed, sometimes several days, until the person’s health stabilizes, or a translator can be located.
62. The number of people who appear before Magistrates for arraignment at one time varies. Dockets can regularly be as small as two or three people, or as large as fifteen to twenty arrestees, and sometimes more.
63. There are no defense attorneys or prosecutors at these hearings. 64. Arraignments occur at intervals every day of the week around the clock. 65. Before an arraignment docket begins, Sheriff’s deputies order arrestees not to speak and not to ask questions unless the Magistrate gives them permission. 66. Some deputies also tell arrestees that the Magistrate will increase the money bail amount required for their release if the arrestees say anything during the hearing. 67. When the hearings begin, the Magistrate first informs the group of arrestees of certain rights, for example, to remain silent, and to appointed counsel if they cannot afford an attorney, as required by Article 15.17 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
11 Most warrants do not have a money bail amount written on them. However, warrants for probation violations or bond forfeitures typically do have bond amounts on them. Arrestees who are aware of the existence of a warrant and have access to money can post a bond without ever being fully booked into the jail. Those who know about active warrants for their arrest can avoid even being arrested if they pay for a “non-arrest” bond.
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68. Then, the Magistrate begins calling individual names and informs the arrestee of the charge or charges against her (but not the allegations underlying the charge or charges), and the amount of money she must pay to be released.
69. The process of setting bail is a rote exercise. The Magistrate simply recites the secured money bail amount required by the County’s bail schedule.
70. The Sheriff’s Office has closed the hearings to the public and refused a request by undersigned counsel to observe the hearings. A deputy at the jail recently refused another request by a member of the public to observe the hearings, stating that the proceedings are “for inmates and no one else.”
71. It would be extremely difficult for a member of the public to learn the foregoing facts about what takes place in these hearings unless they themselves are booked into the Dallas County Jail. Without the ability to observe the way Magistrates apply the money bail schedule and the way Magistrates conduct bail proceedings, the community, the media, and the public are not only unable to view specific legal proceedings that the Constitution requires to be public, but they are missing out on key facts that are critical to ongoing public debate about reforming the Dallas County bail system. Closing the hearings has blocked the public from a complete understanding of the judicial system in Dallas County.
72. On January 18, 2018, Plaintiffs Faith in Texas and Texas Organizing Project sent a letter to the Sheriff’s Office asking the Sheriff to permit them to begin observing the arraignment hearings “as soon as possible and no later than February 1.” See Exhibit 10.
73. The organizations explained that they intend “to take notes on what happens at the hearings” and to use the notes “for outreach to the community, including . . . to provide information
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to the families of the people in the hearings who are in urgent need of real-time information about what’s happening to their loved one who has just been arrested.” Id.
74. Faith in Texas and Texas Organizing Project hope to “identify the factors that determine a person’s money bail and eligibility for release.” They are concerned that people from low-income communities and communities of color are overrepresented in the jail population.
75. Attending the hearings in-person is central to the organizations’ missions. As they explained in their letter to the Sheriff: “Matthew 25:36 says, ‘I was in prison and you visited me.’ As faith and community leaders, we are called to be physically present with people in their bail hearings.” Access to the hearings “is critical to us living out this calling.”
76. On Saturday, January 27, one of Faith in Texas’s clergy leaders, Reverend Ray Jordan, went to the jail in person to request access to the hearings. The deputy at the information booth inside the North/West tower told Rev. Jordan that he could not attend the hearings. When Rev. Jordan pressed the issue and again asked the deputy again for access, the deputy told him to visit the Magistrate Office down the hall and ask the person there.
77. Rev. Jordan then walked down the hall to the Magistrate Office and requested access to the hearings. The employee staffing the Magistrate Office told him that he should ask the jail information booth. Rev. Jordan told the employee of the Magistrate Office that he had just requested access from the jail information booth. The employee with the Magistrate Office said simply, “Sorry,” and turned him away.
78. On January 27, 2018, Brianna Brown, Deputy Director of Texas Organizing Project, called the Detentions Administration Office to request access to the bail hearings. No one answered her call. Ms. Brown left a message.
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79. On Monday, January 29, Chief Deputy J.E. Hartgraves with the Dallas County Sheriff’s Department responded to the e-mail request sent by Faith in Texas and Texas Organizing Project on January 18 and denied the groups’ request for access. He stated, “Due to logistics and security concerns, we will unfortunately not be able to grant the access you requested at this time. Please contact me if you have any questions in the future.” Exhibit 11.
80. The fact that these hearings are shrouded in secrecy promotes the perception among members of Faith in Texas, Texas Organizing Project, and the general public, that Dallas’s money bail scheme is inherently unfair.
81. The County and the Sheriff have precluded Faith in Texas and Texas Organizing Project—along with all members of the public—from attending and observing these hearings, which result in the disproportionate pretrial detention of impoverished people and people of color.
82. Most hearings are not even recorded on audio or video, despite a Texas statute requiring that the hearings be recorded.12 See Tex. C.C.P. 15.17(a), (e). Therefore, it is not possible for members of the public to view the hearings remotely, or even at a later date.
83. Neither the Sheriff nor the County has ever offered any justification for the complete and total prohibition on the public’s ability to observe and attend the hearings.
3. The bail schedules 84. During each “arraignment,” a Magistrate sets money bail amounts according to the predetermined money bail schedules promulgated by the Defendant Judges.
12 Other arraignments which take place by videolink from outlying jails are recorded. Additionally, when a person is already in jail and charges are enhanced or reduced, or new charges are levied, a Defendant Magistrate will conduct an arraignment by videolink. These hearings are also recorded. Videos of these recorded hearings can be viewed in the discretion of the Chief Magistrate Judge, Terrie McVea. An attorney with the ACLU of Texas was permitted to watch a few magistration dockets in the jail before the Sheriff made the decision to close the hearings to the public. Allegations about what happens during the hearing are based on undersigned counsel’s review in Judge McVea’s office of about 20 video recordings and the recollections of the attorney who was permitted to watch the dockets in person before they were closed to the public.
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85. The misdemeanor Judges, voting en banc as an administrative body, promulgated a money bail schedule that applies to misdemeanor arrestees, see Exhibit 7 (bail schedule for misdemeanor arrestees).
86. The felony Judges, voting en banc as an administrative body, promulgated a money bail schedule that applies to felony arrestees, see Exhibit 8 (bail schedule for felony arrestees).
87. The bail schedules are the exclusive means for determining conditions of pretrial release for arrestees who are taken to the Dallas County Jail.
88. The bail schedules require Magistrates to impose secured money bail in every case. 89. The misdemeanor bail schedule states explicitly that “[a]ll bonds are cash or surety unless otherwise specified by the Judge.” 90. The misdemeanor Judges permit Magistrates to adjust the specific amount of secured money bail required, in light of only the following factors: “the nature of the offense, the safety of the complaining witness and the community, as well as ensuring the appearance of the Defendant at court settings.”13 Id. 91. The misdemeanor Judges have not authorized Magistrates to consider ability to pay or alternative methods of reasonably assuring appearance in court. 92. Upon information and belief, the misdemeanor Judges recently authorized—but did not require—Magistrates to grant release on unsecured bond if a misdemeanor arrestee is charged with a non-violent offense and has no or minimal criminal history. 93. However, the Magistrates are not exercising this limited authority to consider nonfinancial conditions. The Magistrates continue their well-settled, widespread practice of requiring
13 A previous version of the bail schedule prohibited Magistrates from reducing the money bail amount in any case.
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secured money financial conditions in every case consistent with the formally promulgated policy. The Magistrates do not inquire about ability to pay in any case.
94. The felony bail schedule is similar to the misdemeanor bail schedule. 95. As a matter of policy and practice, the Magistrates interpret the felony Judges’ bail schedule to require secured money bail in every case, and the felony Judges acquiesce in that interpretation. 96. The felony Judges permit Magistrates to deviate from the bail amounts “if justified by the facts of the case and the circumstances of the defendant.” Exhibit 8. 97. Whatever authority the felony judges have granted Magistrates to deviate from the bail schedule, Magistrates do not use it: Magistrates have a well-settled, widespread practice of requiring secured money bail pursuant to the bail schedule. 98. Magistrates do not consider an arrestee’s ability to pay when determining conditions of release in misdemeanor or felony cases. 99. Indeed, Magistrates cannot consider ability to pay—in misdemeanor or felony cases—because they have no financial information about the arrestees who appear before them, and they make no inquiry into arrestees’ ability to pay any particular money bail amount. 100. Moreover, arrestees are told that they may not speak until after everyone’s hearing is concluded and the Magsitrate has informed each arrestee of the charge or charges against them and the money bail amounts required for release. 101. Nor do the Magistrates—or any other government official—consider alternatives to secured financial conditions of release, or make findings that a secured financial condition of release is necessary to meet any governmental interest.
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102. In addition to making no affirmative inquiry into or findings concerning ability to pay, Magistrates affirmatively refuse to hear any argument from an arrestee who is bold enough to raise her inability to pay. If an arrestee does ask for a lower money bail amount or for release on non-financial conditions, as a matter of policy and practice, the Magistrate refuses to change the money bail amount required by the Judges’ schedule and tells the person to speak with her lawyer. Of course, indigent arrestees do not yet have a lawyer.
103. Magistrates refuse to reduce money bail amounts or grant release on unsecured bail or non-financial conditions, even when the Magistrate knows or should know that the person will be detained as a result of a secured financial condition of release.
104. Magistrates do not make any findings, on the record or otherwise, about the appropriateness of the conditions of release they require or alternative conditions of release in light of any government interest.
105. Magistrates also do not make any findings concerning the arrestee’s ability to pay money bail, or the reasons for the specific amount of money bail required for release.
106. Each person’s entire judicial hearing for determining the conditions of release (or resulting in de facto money-based orders of pretrial detention) lasts about one minute or less.
4. After the arraignment docket 107. After arraignment, the officers and employees of the Sheriff’s Department are authorized by County policy to accept money bail as predetermined by the schedule and to release arrestees who pay money bail in accordance with the bail schedule. 108. After each arraignment docket concludes, Sheriff’s deputies ask arrestees whether they can afford the secured money bail required for their release.
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109. Arrestees who were booked into the Dallas County Jail with sufficient cash on hand to pay the money bail amount will be taken to the “vault”14 in the jail to get the money necessary for their release.
110. Other arrestees who can afford the money bail amount, but do not have cash on hand, will be escorted to an ATM machine located in the booking area of the jail. Using this ATM, arrestees with sufficient funds in personal bank accounts can access their bank accounts, withdraw money, and purchase their release.
111. Arrestees who cannot afford the full amount of money bail on their own can make a phone call to ask a friend or family member to pay the monetary amount on their behalf, or they can contact a for-profit bonding company to assist in making the payment.
112. Arrestees who tell the Sheriff’s deputies that they cannot afford to make the monetary payment will be assigned to a housing unit and confined to a jail cell after arraignment. Arrestees are housed together with convicted prisoners, under the exact same conditions.
5. The moment of differential treatment 113. From the moment an arrestee who is otherwise eligible for release (i.e., who is not subject to an immigration detainer, parole hold, or out-of-county warrant) learns the amount of money required for her release, a person with access to money can make the monetary payment required for release and be released within a few hours. This is the moment of differential treatment. 114. Secured money bail prolongs the detention of even those individuals who would be detained for other reasons, for example, those who are subject to probation holds or out-of-county warrants. Although these individuals would not be released from detention entirely if they paid the
14 When someone is arrested, their personal clothing and belongings are inventoried and stored in a vault.
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money bail amount, they would be released from Dallas County custody and eligible for transport to the other jurisdiction that requires their presence, or they could potentially secure release in the other jurisdiction. A secured financial condition of release thus prolongs the detention of a person who faces other proceedings if she is too poor to pay the money bail amount required by the Dallas County bail schedule.
115. For arrestees who cannot afford money bail, the secured financial condition of release operates as a de facto order of pretrial detention, even though Defendants do not provide the findings or procedures that the Constitution requires prior to the entry of an order of pretrial detention. None of the robust procedures required for a valid order of preventative detention exist in Dallas County, including that there is no inquiry, let alone an inquiry with counsel and basic evidentiary standards, into whether a compelling interest exists to detain a particular defendant, whether any particular identifiable danger or risk exists, and whether there are alternatives to the use of secured money bail that could mitigate any particularized risk.
116. No transparent legal standards are applied to the decision that results in the de facto pretrial detention orders.
117. The Magistrates’ custom of requiring secured money bail as a condition of release in every case, the Judges’ acquiescence in this custom, and the Sheriff’s policy of enforcing unconstitutional orders conditioning release on a monetary payment cause systemic and automatic wealth-based detention in Dallas County.
6. Delays in appointing counsel for indigent arrestees 118. Dallas County routinely jails arrestees who cannot afford to pay money bail for two or three days before appointing a lawyer to represent them.
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119. However, arrestees typically wait another several days after appointment, and sometimes a week or two, for meaningful representation to begin. The delay is caused in part by Dallas County’s refusal, as a matter of policy, to computerize or automate the process for appointing counsel. The entire appointment process is done on paper and, as a result, takes several days.
120. Public defenders’ crushing caseloads cause further delays in the beginning of meaningful representation for indigent arrestees.
121. Sheriff’s deputies distribute election-of-counsel forms after the arraignment dockets. Arrestees who wish to be appointed an attorney must provide financial information on the form. The Judges and their court coordinators15 use the financial information to determine each arrestee’s eligibility for appointed counsel.
122. Sheriff’s Department employees sort the forms into the Judges’ mailboxes. (When a person is arrested for a misdemeanor, the case is randomly assigned to a specific Judge.16 New felony arresetes are randomly assigned to a specific Judge at arraignment.)
123. Court coordinators collect the forms once each day from the mailbox of the Judge for whom they work.
124. The court coordinators review the forms to determine which arrestees assigned to the Judge requested appointed counsel and, applying both county-wide and Judge-specific criteria, whether those arrestees qualify.
15 Each Judge employs a “court coordinator,” who is responsible for managing the Judge’s docket, including appointing attorneys to impoverished arrestees in accordance with that judge’s individual policies and the Countywide policies. 16 All misdemeanor family violence cases are assigned to County Courts at Law Numbers 10 and 11.
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125. Because court coordinators do not work on evenings, weekends, or holidays, and only retrieve the forms once each day, an individual who is arrested on a Thursday or Friday will not be appointed an attorney until Monday or Tuesday at the earliest.
126. As a matter of policy and practice, if an arrestee is in jail because she has not paid a monetary bail amount, Judges and their court coordinators presume that the individual is indigent and assign the individual appointed counsel.
127. Once court coordinators determine that an arrestee is entitled to appointed counsel, the court coordinators assign an attorney to the case and notify the attorney of the appointment.
128. All appointed attorneys are required to contact new clients within 24 hours of appointment by visiting in person, by videolink, or by sending a letter.
129. However, there is no oversight or enforcement of this rule, and many defense attorneys do not comply with it.
130. As a result, even once an attorney is appointed, representation is further delayed. 131. Arrestees lack any ability to contact an attorney who has been appointed to represent them because Judges have directed court coordinators to refrain from informing arrestees when an attorney has been appointed. Arrestees must wait until the attorney affirmatively contacts and meets with them, at the attorney’s initiative. 132. Even if an arrestee being kept in the Dallas County Jail somehow did know the name and contact information of her assigned attorney, contacting the attorney would be slow, expensive, or impossible: the arrestee’s options for contacting an attorney are to send a letter, which would take days to reach the attorney, or pay to use a phone to call the attorney. There is no way to make a no-cost call to a lawyer from the jail, where the phone system has been contracted to a private, multi-billion dollar corporation called Securus.
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133. As a result of these policies and practices, arrestees who are in jail because they cannot afford to pay money bail routinely wait two or three days days, and sometimes a week, before being appointed an attorney.
134. Most wait even longer before meeting their attorneys: impoverished arrestees who cannot pay money bail typically meet their lawyers when they are brought to court for a first appearance, which will occur only after the District Attorney’s Office decides to file the charge.
7. Delay in the DA’s decision to file charges 135. The misdemeanor Judges allow the District Attorney’s (“DA”) Office four business days (or almost a week) to decide whether to file a misdemeanor case. 136. The felony Judges allow the DA’s Office five business days (or one calendar week) to decide whether to file most felony cases, and ten business days (or two calendar weeks) to file thirty-six more serious felony cases, and thirty days to file three of the most serious felonies. 137. The DA’s Office can request additional time to file any charge. 138. If charges are not filed within the relevant period of time, the arrestee must be released from jail, though the DA’s Office retains the option to pursue the case. 139. The time period within which charges must be filed or the arrestee released begins on the “date aware,” which the Judges have defined as “the date the Dallas County Sheriff’s Office enters the arrested person’s information” into its database. 140. If the arrested person’s information is entered after 8:00 a.m., Dallas County considers the information to have been entered the next day. Id. 141. As a result of the Judges’ policies, indigent arrestees who cannot afford money bail are routinely kept in jail cells for eight days (if charged with a misdemeanor) and more than two weeks (if charged with a felony) before an ADA even files a charge.
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142. This time period will be longer if there is an intervening holiday.

143. The total time period that a person is detained before charges are filed will also be

longer if the person was arrested by an agency other than the City of Dallas or Dallas County.

These arrestees are kept for several days at outlying jails before being transferred to the Dallas

County Jail, but the “date aware”—which triggers the five- or ten-business-day clock for filing

charges—occurs only after the person arrives at the Dallas County Jail.

144. If the DA’s Office does not file charges within the permitted time periods,

impoverished arrestees who have been kept in jail since their arrest due to their inability to pay

money bail will be released on their own recognizance after days or weeks of wealth-based

detention.17

145. In felony cases, after the DA’s Office files charges, arrestees are entitled to

indictment by a grand jury. Because of backlogs at the grand jury, it can take two to three months

for the indictment process to conclude.

146. The DA’s Office must first file charges and (if the case is a felony case) a grand

jury must issue an indictment before an arrestee will be brought to court for a first appearance.

147. Due to the grand jury backlogs, felony arrestees—especially those charged with

low-level felony offenses—routinely waive indictment so that they can be brought to court as soon

as the ADA files charges.

8.

Arrestees cannot challenge conditions of release before charges are

filed

17 Some impoverished arrestees, after being subjected to days or weeks of wealth-based detention but before the ADA makes a charging decision, manage to scrape together enough money from family and friends to pay a for-profit bonding company a non-refundable fee of hundreds, or thousands, of dollars to secure release from jail. Even if the ADA decides not to pursue the case, that person will never get her money back.
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148. In theory, once a defense attorney is appointed and meets her client after approximately four days to one week of detention, the attorney could file a motion seeking alternative conditions of release for an arrestee who cannot afford the money bail amount required by the bail schedule.
149. In practice, however, some judges refuse to entertain these motions before the DA files formal charges. Some Judges even claim that they lack jurisdiction to consider bond-reduction motions before a case is formally filed.
150. Even when a defense attorney files a bond-reduction motion, Judges typically schedule the hearing for days or a week in the future.
151. During this period of time, an arrestee who cannot afford to pay money bail will be kept in jail.
152. The Presiding Judge of the misdemeanor courts referred to the four-to-ten-day period before a misdemeanor case is filed as a “black hole”: during this time, nothing can happen in the case, and impoverished arrestees are left to languish in jail cells.
9. First appearance 153. Even after a case is filed, an arrestee may wait even longer to be taken to court. As of January 21, 2018, there were at least two individuals, arrested on January 9, 2018—one for possession of less than two ounces of marijuana and the other for trespass—who were being kept in the Dallas County Jail due to their inability to pay a $500 money bail amount. The cases were filed on January 16 and January 17, respectively, but neither has been assigned an attorney, and neither has been taken to court. 154. First appearance is not an adequate opportunity to raise ability to pay or challenge conditions of release. Instead, the Judges’ policies concerning first appearance ensure that a guilty
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plea is the fastest way for an impoverished arrestee to secure freedom. The Judges leverage Dallas County’s money-based post-arrest system to minimize the backlog of cases on their dockets so that they can process as many cases as possible per week, and prosecutors use it to increase conviction rates.
155. One of the purposes and effects of Dallas County’s post-arrest money-based detention scheme is to coerce and process large numbers of guilty pleas prior to any person conducting any legal or factual investigation into the charges, let alone the complete and zealous investigation and defense required by professional standards and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
156. The system begins with court coordinators, to whom the Judges give responsiblity for scheduling arrestees’ first appearances.
157. As a matter of County policy, court coordinators do not schedule first appearances until the DA’s Office files charges and (if applicable and not waived) an indictment has issued.
158. As a result of Dallas County’s policies to allow the DA’s Office four business days to file charges in misdemeanor cases, and five or ten business days to file most felony charges, first appearances for misdemeanor arrestees occur between four and ten days after arrest; first appearances for felony arrestees who waive indictment occur between two and three weeks after arrest; and first appearances for felony arrestees who do not waive indictment occur between two and three months after arrest.
159. On the day of an arrestee’s first appearance, officers and employees of the Sheriff’s Department will transport the arrestee from the jail to the “lock-up”—which is a holding cell that is connected to, but outside of, the courtroom—on the so-called “jail chain.”
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160. “Jail chain” is the term used to refer to the group of impoverished detained arrestees who are brought to court, shackled with metal chains, for their first appearance.
161. In theory, first appearance is the first opportunity an arrestee who cannot afford to purchase her release has to speak or make any challenges to the conditions of release required by the Magistrate at “arraignment.”
162. But, as a matter of policy and practice, there is no meaningful review of the money bail amount previously imposed pursuant to the schedule. Instead, judges refuse to permit arrestees to enter the courtroom from lock-up unless they have agreed to plead guilty.
163. If an arrestee agrees to plead guilty at first appearance, she will be brought into the courtroom to enter a guilty plea.
164. Most misdemeanor and low-level felony arrestees who are detained at first appearance plead guilty.
165. In fact, some court coordinators delay bringing detained arrestees to court until they believe, based on past experience, that the individual is likely to plead guilty.
166. Most misdemeanor and low-level felony arrestees who plead guilty at first appearance accept a sentence of time served and are then released from jail that day.18
167. Others who plead guilty at first appearance but are not released that day accept sentences that nonetheless result in their release well before any subsequent court appearance would occur. The defense attorney is responsible for scheduling subsequent court appearances.
168. Although requesting a bail reduction or seeking release on a personal bond is a theoretical possibility at the first appearance, it almost never happens. When it does, a hearing on
18 The policies and practices in Dallas County are similar to the system that was enjoined in Harris County, where 67% of detained misdemeanor arrestees who pled guilty at their first appearance were released within a day of conviction, and 83% who pled guilty at first appearance were released within five days of conviction. ODonnell v. Harris County, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1114 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2017).
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the motion is typically set for about a week in the future as a matter of policy. Defense attorneys must ask the judge to break with custom to hear any matters at first appearance related to arrestees who are not pleading guilty.
169. Even when Judges finally rule on bail reduction applications, they refuse to consider ability to pay, basing the decision instead on other factors, such as the person’s criminal history or current charge. Judges very rarely grant bond reductions or permit release without requiring secured money bail.
170. Due to these policies and practices, for people who cannot afford money bail, a guilty plea at first appearance is typically the fastest way out of jail.
171. If an arrestee does not plead guilty at the first appearance, she will be taken back to Dallas County Jail, where she will be kept in a jail cell until her attorney decides to schedule another court appearance.
172. It can take weeks or months for a subsequent appearance. As opposed to the federal system, which imposes strict time limits on pretrial detention through the Speedy Trial Act, Texas has mandated no strict time limits on pretrial detention.
10. Summary of the post-arrest process 173. The above-described policies and practices mean that a typical individual without financial means will be detained solely because of her inability to make a monetary payment for at least one week if charged with a misdemeanor, at least two weeks if charged with a felony and the arrestee decides to waive indictment, and for two or three months if charged with a felony and the arrestee does not waive indictment, before there is even a theoretical opportunity to challenge conditions of release.
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174. Many arrestees will be kept in jail even longer solely because they cannot pay money bail and are not willing to plead guilty.
175. At any moment in the post-arrest process, an arrestee who is otherwise eligible for release can pay the money bail required by the County’s bail schedule and walk out the doors of the jail.
176. Defendants’ foregoing policies have consistently, for years, resulted in the needless and devastating jailing of impoverished arrestees in Dallas County.
177. In 2017, about 50% of misdemeanor cases and about 50% of felony cases were resolved while the arrestee was in a jail cell because she could not afford secured money bail.
C. Arrestees who cannot afford to pay secured money bail will be detained in the Dallas County Jail for days or weeks due to their inability to pay
178. In Dallas County, there are four types of bonds an arrestee can post to secure release from jail after arrest and before disposition: cash bonds, surety bonds, pretrial-release bonds, and personal bonds (also referred to as “personal-recognizance bonds”).
179. Each of these mechanisms of release requires either an upfront monetary payment, or significant time in jail.
180. A person will be released on a “cash bond” if she pays the full money bail amount required for release. Arrestees who can afford to pay a cash bond typically do so quickly after arrest and are generally released the same day as their arrest, usually within hours of being arrested.
181. A “surety bond” involves a contract between an arrestee and a for-profit bail bond company. Arrestees securing release from jail using a surety bond typicially pay the company a nonrefundable fee equal to 10% of the total money bail amount required for release.
182. In 2016 (as in September 2017), Dallas County arrestees who contracted with bail bond companies to secure release suffered, on average, four days of wealth-based detention before
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paying the non-refundable premium to a commercial bonding company. Thus, arrestees who eventually manage to pay the bond company’s “[r]ansom”19 to purchase their release, must still spend days or weeks in jail due to their inability to pay while their family and friends try to come up with the money.20
183. “Pretrial-release bonds” are a third type of bond. A pretrial-release bond is the term used for the low-cost bonds for which Dallas County’s Pretrial Services Department screens arrestees. These bonds require arrestees to pay an administrative fee of either 3% of the full bond amount or $20, whichever is greater, to secure release. They are issued pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 17.03(g) and Article 17.42.
184. Arrestees who are released on pretrial-release bonds remain in jail an average of three days before being released.
185. Dallas County’s Pretrial Services agency—which is chronically understaffed and under-resourced as a matter of County policy, and does not provide meaningful pretrial supervision—screens arrestees for pretrial-release bonds according to criteria that the Dallas County Commissioners Court set forth in a generally applicable Order issued in 1999. Exhibit 9.
186. The Order constitutes a policy decision regarding the categories of arrestees who are ineligible for pretrial release without paying the full amount of the secured financial condition required by the bail schedule. It renders the vast majority of arrestees ineligible for a pretrial-
19 As Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg observed more than 50 years ago in the Forward to the 1965 book by Ronald L. Goldfarb, Ransom: A Critique of the American Bail System, “If it is true that ‘the quality of a nation’s civilization can be largely measured by the methods it uses in the enforcement of its criminal law,’ then the American bail system as it now operates can no longer be tolerated. At best, it is a system of checkbook justice; at worst, a highly commercialized racket.” 20 In this way, the use of surety bonds effectuates the transfer of wealth from some of the poorest members of the community to private for-profit companies and traps arrestees in cycles of debt and imprisonment. See generally, Campaign for Smart Justice, Selling Off Our Freedom: How Insurance Corporations Have Taken Over Our Bail System 26–33 (2017), available at https://colorofchange.org/bail-industry-report/.
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release bond. 187. The criteria an arrestee must satisfy to be eligible for a pretrial-release bond, as set
forth in the Order, include: (1) residence in Dallas County or an adjoining county and (2) the ability to provide contact information for two (previously four) “references” who can confirm both the arrestee’s residence and employment.
188. Because people who are homeless have no residence that their “references” could “verify,” the Commissioners’ Order renders them categorically ineligible for pretrial-release bonds. This policy affects hundreds of people every month: in September 2017 alone, 399 people who were homeless were booked into the Dallas County Jail.
189. Arrestees are ineligible if they were convicted in the previous ten years of any violent felony, or if they were convicted in the last 12 months, or are currently charged with, any misdemeanor involving assault. Arrestees are also ineligible if they were convicted of a felony in the past year, or more than two felonies within the past ten years.21
190. Arrestees are ineligible if they have ever forfeited a bond in a felony case, if they forfeited a bond in a misdemeanor case in the last three years, or if they forfeited bonds in two misdemeanor cases in the past ten years.
191. Arrestees must “exhibit a demeanor which implies a willingness to cooperate with the conditions of Pre-Trial Release” to be eligible for a pretrial-release bond, a criterion that invites arbitrary and discriminatory decision-making by County employees making this decision.
21 This exclusion affects hundreds of impoverished arrestees every year because in Texas, many non-violent and minor offenses are crimes of poverty and are considered felonies, including, for example, third-offender theft under $750 (i.e. an enhanced misdemeanor offense). See Cary Aspinwall, Why Dallas County Can Set $150,000 Bail for a $105 Shoplifting Charge—and How Taxpayers Lose, Dall. Morning News, Dec. 29, 2016, available at https://www.dallasnews.com/news/social-justice-1/2016/12/29/dallas-county-demands-150000-bail-105-shopliftingcharge-taxpayers-lose. Many other felonies are non-violent drug possession charges.
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192. Pretrial Services does not consider a person’s ability to pay when determining eligibility.
193. Pretrial Services also does not consider the availability of non-financial alternative conditions of release that would reasonably assure appearance and community safety.
194. Because of the strict criteria set forth by the Commissioners in this written policy, the vast majority of arrestees are deemed ineligible for release on a pretrial-release bond. Once all of the restrictions on eligibility are applied, it is generally only first-time offenders charged with non-violent offenses who are even eligible to receive pretrial-release bonds.
195. Neither Pretrial Services nor any other official assesses an arrestee’s eligibility for pretrial-release bonds prior to arraignment and booking.
196. If a person appears to be eligible based on all the criteria in the Commissioner’s Court’s 1999 order, a Pretrial Services agent will interview the person after booking.
197. Interviews generally take place the first business day after an arrest, but they can be delayed for several reasons, including that Pretrial Services agents work only Monday through Friday, so a person arrested on Thursday or Friday will not be assessed for eligibility until Monday or Tuesday at the earliest. In September 2017, 132 people were interviewed: an average of about 4.4 interviews per day. This number is typical.22
198. During the interview, arrestees are asked to provide their current address, information about how they can be contacted, and employment information. Pretrial Services also asks the arrestee for the contact information of two or more “references” who will have to verify the arrestee’s address before a pretrial-release bond can be granted.
22 Between October 2016 and September 2017, the average monthly number of interviews was 153.5 (about 5 interviews per day). The number of interviews per month ranged from a low of 119 in June 2017 to a high of 199 in January 2017.
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199. Pretrial Services does not collect information about the person’s finances or education history, and does not screen arrestees to determine indigency.
200. Not everyone who is interviewed will be released on a pretrial-release bond. For example, in September 2017, only 83 of the 132 people who were interviewed were released on a pretrial-release bond. In August 2017, only 99 of the 166 people who were interviewed were released on a pretrial-release bond. The gap between the number of people interviewed for pretrialrelease bonds and the number of people released on pretrial-release bonds is due primarily to the fact that many arrestees are homeless, and that people’s references cannot be contacted.
201. Other arrestees who are interviewed are never released because their references cannot be reached or cannot confirm the arrestee’s information.
202. The raw numbers correspond to very low percentages of arrestees being released on pretrial-release bonds. In 2016, about 3.3% of people booked into the jail were released on pretrial-release bonds; in 2015, about 4.6% of people booked into the jail were released on pretrialrelease bonds. As of September 2017, the year-to-date monthly average for 2017 was 3.2%.
203. If the arrestee’s information is not verified, she will not be released on a pretrialrelease bond, though at any time during the verification process, an arrestee can pay the money bail amount required by the bail schedule and be freed.
204. Some arrestees who cannot afford the money bail required for their release resolve their cases before the verification process can conclude.
205. Even once the person’s references are verified, release is not certain. The arrestee must then agree to follow the rules of the program, which include checking in by phone every two weeks with a Pretrial Services agent and agreeing to notify Pretrial Services of any new arrest or
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other court-related information, changes in address, or changes in any other information provided to Pretrial Services during the interview process.
206. Contrary to best practices, Dallas County’s Pretrial Services agency does not provide varying levels of supervision tailored to the arrestee’s specific needs, and Pretrial Services agents and Judges do not impose the kind of non-financial conditions proven to mitigate heightened risks of nonappearance and new criminal activity, such as more intense supervision including in-person check-ins, drug treatment, mental health care, or curfews.
207. If the Pretrial Services agent determines that the risk someone poses of nonappearance or new criminal activity cannot be effectively mitigated by the standard conditions, that person will be denied a pretrial-release bond.
208. Finally, to be released on a pretrial-release bond, the arrestee must make an upfront monetary payment of 3% of the bond amount or $20, whichever is the greater amount, though this fee can be waived in the discretion of the Manager of Pretrial Services.
209. An arrestee approved for release on a pretrial-release bond who cannot afford to pay the reduced fee required for release will be kept in jail for at least one more day: the Director, who has discretion to waive the fee, generally will not consider a waiver until the business day following approval of a pretrial-release bond. Thus, if the pretrial-release bond was approved on a Friday, and the arrestee cannot afford the fee, she will be kept in jail at least until Monday, although the Director routinely attempts to expedite the review process for people who are approved for pretrial-release bonds on a Friday.
210. This policy further extends the wealth-based detention of those individuals who are deemed eligible for release pursuant to the County’s strict criteria for pretrial-release bonds and yet are too poor to pay the fee.
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211. The County’s strict criteria for pretrial-release bonds render the vast majority of arrestees ineligible to receive them.
212. The fourth type of bond in Dallas County is a “personal-recognizance bond,” sometimes referred to as a “personal bond.” Personal-recognizance bonds are unsecured bonds, meaning that the arrestee is released without any up-front payment, but will be required to pay the full amount of the bond if she fails to appear and the bond is forfeited.
213. In 2016, people who were released on personal-recognizance bonds were kept in jail, on average, for more than three weeks (25 days) prior to release. Between January and September 2017, the average time to release for people released on personal-recognizance bonds was 19 days, with a high of 24 days in February 2017, and a low of 16 days in September 2017.
214. In order to be released on a personal-recognizance bond, a person’s attorney must either file a motion or informally ask the Judge to consider a request for a bond reduction.
215. Some judges refuse to hear such a request until the case has been filed, i.e. one-tothree weeks after arrest, at a minimum.
216. Since April 2017, Dallas County has begun to use personal-recognizance bonds to divert people with mental illnesses from the jail and to expedite the release of people booked into the jail who are suffering from mental illnesses.23
217. People charged with certain offenses, or who have active warrants in other counties, are ineligible for mental-health bonds. As a matter of policy and practice, anyone who is homeless is deemed ineligible for a mental-health bond. In fact, very few arrestees with mental-health
23 The Dallas County Jail is the second-largest mental health care provider in Texas, second only to the Harris County Jail. One-third of inmates at the Dallas County Jail have a diagnosed mental illness. See Stephanie Kuo, Dallas County Plan Strives To Help People With Mental Illness Avoid Unnecessary Jail Time, KERA News, Apr. 5, 2017, available at http://keranews.org/post/dallas-county-plan-strives-help-people-mental-illness-avoid-unnecessaryjail-time.
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diagnoses are released on mental-health bonds; the rest are kept in jail, largely because they are homeless and cannot afford money bail. Most individuals who are released pursuant to this new policy spend several days in jail prior to their release.
D. Defendants know that arrestees in Dallas County are kept in jail solely because they cannot afford money bail amounts set pursuant to the bail schedule without an inquiry and findings
218. The Defendant Judges—and every other actor in the County’s post-arrest system, as well as anyone who has observed the bail hearings (before they were closed to the public) or first appearances—know that many of the detained individuals who appear in front of them are being confined in jail solely because they are too poor to pay the money bail amount required by the predetermined schedule.
219. Each Judge is aware of the Magistrates’ well-settled, widespread practice of requiring secured money bail based on the bail schedule without an inquiry into or findings concerning an arrestee’s present ability to pay the amount set.
220. Each Judge knows that Magistrates refuse to consider ability to pay—indeed, that Magistrates have no financial information about arrestees, and therefore cannot consider ability to pay. Each Judge also knows that Magistrates do not make findings concerning alternative conditions of release during the bail-setting hearings.
221. Each Judge knows that, as a result of these practices, thousands of individuals are detained in Dallas County every day solely because they are too poor to pay the money bail amounts imposed pursuant to the predetermined bail schedules that they promulgated.
222. For example, Judges receive a “24-hour list,” which is a list of individuals assigned to their court who were booked into the jail in the last 24 hours. From this list, each Judge can
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determine whether an arrestee is in jail solely because she is unable to pay a secured financial condition of release.
223. Each Judge accepts guilty pleas and issues time-served sentences every day from arrestees who are in jail solely because of a money bail amount they cannot afford. Those same judges routinely find those arrestees to be indigent for purposes of appointing counsel.
224. The Defendants know that, for thousands of arrestees in the jail every day, there is no reason for detention other than the inability to pay a secured financial condition of release.
225. The Defendants know that secured money bail amounts are imposed in every case without an inquiry or findings concerning ability to pay and without consideration of or findings concerning alternatives, and without any of the findings or procedures required for a valid order of pretrial detention under federal law.
226. The Judges are aware of the Magistrates’ systemic failure to consider ability to pay. 227. The Judges are also aware of the Magistrates’ systemic failure to consider nonfinancial alternative conditions, or to make findings concerning ability to pay or the necessity of any particular condition of release to meet a specific government interest. 228. Each Defendant Judge knows that the Sheriff’s Department enforces the Magistrates’ secured money bail orders for every individual the Sheriff’s Department arrests, or accepts into custody after arrest by another agency, without an inquiry into or findings concerning the person’s ability to pay the predetermined amount required and without meaningful consideration of alternative conditions of release. 229. Each Judge has acquiesced in the Magistrates’ custom of failing and refusing to consider ability to pay and of consistently requiring secured money bail that results in the pretrial detention of impoverished arrestees. Each Judge has also acquiesced in the Sheriff’s enforcement
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of these unconstitutional detention orders. The misdemeanor and felony Judges have not taken any formal action to correct these constitutional violations.
230. For example, the presiding Judges of the felony and misdemeanor courts have each admitted to news outlets that they know people who cannot afford their bond under the bail schedule are detained just because they are poor. The presiding Judge of the misdemeanor courts recently stated, “There’s a lot of people who end up in jail who can’t afford a bond, who lose their jobs, lose their apartment and end up homeless.”24
231. Yet the Judges have left the bail schedules in place, and have taken no formal action to correct the widespread practices that result in wealth-based detention. The Sheriff, too, knows that secured money bail is required of arrestees without any inquiry into or findings concerning a person’s ability to pay the amount set. The Sheriff knows that bail is set in hearings that are closed to the public, during which arrestees are prohibited from presenting evidence or making any arguments.
232. The Sheriff knows that secured money bail results in the post-arrest detention of hundreds of presumptively innocent arrestees every week, and thousands every month. The Sheriff has ready access to the list of detainees in her custody, which provides the basis for each inmate’s detention, including whether any inmate would be released if she paid a monetary bail amount, and the amount of money that any inmate is required to pay for immediate release. The Sheriff therefore knows that the imposition of secured money bail results in systemic, wealth-based detention, and that there are thousands of people in the jail every night who would be released but
24 Tanya Eiserer, Dallas County Program to Get More Prisoners Out on Bond, WFAA, Jun. 23, 2017, available at http://www.wfaa.com/news/local/dallas-county/dallas-county-program-to-get-more-prisoners-out-onbond/451683951.
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for their inability to pay a predetermined money bail amount required pursuant to Dallas County’s bail schedules.
233. The Sheriff has discretion under state law to refuse to enforce unlawful orders. 234. But, by policy and practice, the Sheriff chooses to enforce secured money bail amounts that operate as de facto orders of pretrial detention entered without any of the substantive findings or procedural safeguards required for valid orders of pretrial detention under federal law. 235. The Sheriff enforces these de facto detention orders even though she knows or should know that they were issued without an inquiry and findings concerning ability to pay, without meaningful consideration of or findings concerning alternative less-restrictive conditions, without application of any transparent legal standard governing detention, and without the arrestee receiving notice and opportunity to be heard at an adversarial hearing. The Sheriff knows or should know that they operate to detain only impoverished arrestees. 236. Even if the Judges and the Sheriff did not actually know about the foregoing practices and resulting constitutional violations, they would have constructive knowledge of them. These practices occur frequently and flagrantly. They result in severe and obvious constitutional violations, to which the Judges’ and the Sheriff’s attention has been called, and which have been the subject of considerable public debate:
a. Magistrates require arrestees to pay secured money bail pursuant to the bail schedule and without any individualized determination of ability to pay or the need for particular conditions of release in well over 100 cases every day.
b. Magistrates issue these orders flagrantly, by rote imposition of secured money bail amounts from the bail schedule in proceedings lasting approximately 60 seconds, without any inquiry into ability to pay. Indeed, the Magstrates do not have any
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information about the arrestees’ ability to pay and do not permit arrestees to speak prior to conditions of release being determined. Sheriff’s deputies attend these proceedings every day.
c. The constitutional violations resulting from the bail schedule are severe. People are locked in jail cells for days or weeks, without the rigorous procedures or substantive findings required for issuing a valid order of preventive detention, just because they are poor.
d. The constitutional violations resulting from the bail schedule are obvious. Arrestees do not get any meaningful opportunity to challenge the bail amounts mandated by the schedule for days or weeks. There can be little question that people who remain locked up are unable to afford their bail: immediately following arraignment, sheriff’s deputies collect financial affidavits from people who are requesting appointed counsel because they are too poor to afford a lawyer. The Judges then make an affirmative finding that these individuals qualify for appointed counsel because they are, in fact, too poor to afford one. The Sheriff herself has ready access to a list of detainees, which shows that the vast majority of detainees in her jail are held pretrial under a secured bond they have not been able to pay. And it is no secret that this system is unconstitutional: Harris County, which operates the largest jail in Texas, was recently enjoined from detaining people using a bail schedule that operates in a substantially similar manner.
e. The Judges and Sheriff have discussed these policies with other officials, system stakeholders, and affected people. They sit on a committee that discusses ways to reduce the jail population, including adoption of a pretrial assessment tool.
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f. There has been significant public discussion about Dallas’s unconstitutional, ineffective, and costly post-arrest system. For example, the Dallas Morning News and other local news outlets have repeatedly reported on how the County’s use of access to money to make release and detention decisions results in the systemic pretrial detention of impoverished arrestees. The Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs produced a white paper on pretrial detention highlighting Dallas as an example of an unconstitutional system. The County’s post-arrest system and its use of rigid secured money bail schedules have been topics of debate in the election for district attorney. E. Detention in the Dallas County Jail Causes Serious and Irreparable Harm 237. The Dallas County Jail is one of the largest jails in Texas. In 2016, the jail booked 67,122 people total: an average of 5,594 people every month, and 183 people every day.25 238. On any given day, the vast majority of people in Dallas County Jail cells—almost 70%—are presumptively innocent people who are there because they cannot afford to make a monetary payment. 239. One-third of the Dallas County Jail population has a mental illness.26 240. The Dallas County Jail is a notoriously dangerous place. Between January 2012 and the present, 20 people died while being kept there in pretrial custody.27
25 Jail Population Committee Meeting Report, at 3 (Oct. 13, 2017), available at https://www.dallascounty.org/Assets/uploads/docs/criminal-justice/jail-pop/2017/2017%20-%2009.pdf. 26 See Kuo, supra note 22. 27 An analysis of the Texas Attorney General’s Custodial Death Report revealed that at least 20 people died while in pretrial custody at the Dallas County Jail between January 1, 2012, and November 19, 2017. See Custodial Deaths Report, available at https://oagtx.force.com/cdr/cdrreportdeaths, and Dallas County Felony and Misdemeanor Courts Case Information, available at https://www.dallascounty.org/criminalBackgroundSearch/captcha.
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241. There is a documented history of inmate abuse by jail guards, deaths and suicides
in the jail, inadequate training of jail staff, sexual abuse, and lack of access to medications and
medical services.28
242. For years, the County has been aware of these intolerable conditions, and has failed
to remedy them.29
243. None of the people being detained in the Dallas County Jail due to their inability to
pay a secured financial condition of release received an inquiry into their ability to pay or
consideration of alternative, less restrictive conditions. In no case were findings made that secured
money bail was necessary to achieve any government interest. Only those individuals who are too
poor to purchase their release are subjected to these conditions and to the health and safety risks
of pretrial jailing.
F. Secured Money Bail Is Not as Effective as Many Other Methods in Securing Court Attendance or Public Safety
28 See also Cary Aspinwall & Stephanie Lamm, Unresponsive: Women are Going to Jail in Need of Drug and Alcohol Treatment. Help Often Comes Too Late, Dall. Morning News, Dec. 17, 2017, available at https://interactives.dallasnews.com/2017/ unresponsive/; Naomi Martin, Brutal Killing Inside Dallas County Jail Leaves Experts Asking Whether It Could Have Been Prevented, Dall. Morning News, Jan. 7, 2017, available at https://www.dallasnews.com/news/dallas-county/2017/01/07/brutal-killing-inside-dallas-county-jail-leaves-expertsasking-whether-prevented. 29 E.g., J.D. Miles, Caught On Video: Inmate Claims Abuse At Dallas County Jail, CBS DFW, May 14, 2013, available at http://dfw.cbslocal.com/2013/05/14/caught-on-video-inmate-claims-abuse-at-dallas-county-jail/; Kevin Krause, Dallas County Doesn’t Want to Defend Jail Guards Accused of Causing Inmate’s Death, Dall. Morning News, May 5, 2010, available at https://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/2010/05/04/dallas-county-doesnt-want-to-d; Kevin Krause, UPDATE: Dallas County Jail Guard Arrested for Having Sex With An Inmate, Dall. Morning News, July 23, 2009, available at https://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/2009/07/23/dallas-county-jail-guard-arres-1; Kevin Krause, Former Dallas County Jail Guard Alleges Abuse in the Slammer in Tell-All Book, Dall. Morning News, Dec. 16, 2009, available at https://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/2009/12/16/former-dallas-county-jail-guar; Diane Jennings, Dallas County Detention Officer Accused of Sexually Abusing Inmate, Dall. Morning News, Apr. 2, 2013, available at https://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/2013/04/02/dallas-county-detention-officer-arrested-forabusing-an-inmate; Kevin Krause, Dallas County Jail Guard Admits Inmate Danced for Her, Dall. Morning News, Dec. 31, 2009, available at https://www.dallasnews.com/news/news/2009/12/31/20091230-Dallas-County-Jail-guardadmits-inmate-8227.
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244. Empirical evidence does not show any relationship between monetary conditions of release and arrestees’ rates of appearance in court.30
245. While tying pretrial freedom to wealth status is the norm in Dallas County, other jurisdictions throughout the country do not detain people in jail because of their poverty. Instead of relying on money, other jurisdictions release arrestees with pretrial supervision practices and procedures that can help increase court attendance and public safety without requiring detention.
246. Other jurisdictions employ numerous less-restrictive methods of maximizing public safety and court appearances when necessary to guard against a particular risk. These include: unsecured bond (which does not require payment up front for release but instead allow immediate release upon a promise to pay the monetary amount if the person does not appear as required), phone and text message reminders of court dates, rides to court for those without transportation, pretrial supervision, counseling, stay-away orders, inpatient and outpatient treatment, and, in the most serious cases, curfew, home detention, and electronic GPS surveillance.
247. Jurisdictions that make full use of less-restrictive alternative conditions of release achieve much higher release rates than Dallas County. While Dallas County releases only about half of all arrestees prior to disposition—many of whom are released only after days or weeks of illegal and unnecessary wealth-based detention, New York City releases 97% of all misdemeanor arrestees, and Washington, DC releases 94.5% of all arrestees.
30 See e,g., Arpit Gupta et al., The Heavy Costs of High Bail: Evidence from Judge Randomization 5 (2016), available at http://www.columbia.edu/~cjh2182/ GuptaHansmanFrenchman.pdf (“We find no evidence that money bail increases the probability of appearance.”); Michael Jones, Unsecured Bonds: The As Effective and Most Efficient Pretrial Release Option 3 (2013), available at http://www.pretrial.org/download/research/ Unsecured+Bonds,+The+As+Effective+and+Most+Efficient+Pretrial+Release+Option+-+Jones+2013.pdf (“Higher monetary amounts of secured bonds are associated with more pretrial jail bed use but not increased court apperance rates.”); Claire M.B. Brooker et al., The Jefferson County Bail Project: Impact Study Found Better Cost Effectiveness for Unsecured Recognizance Bonds Over Cash and Surety Bonds (June 2014) (finding that unsecured bail is equally effective as secured money bail at reasonably assuring appearing and mitigating the risk of new criminal activity).
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248. Defendants are permitted by state law to use these less-restrictive alternatives but, as a matter of routine, choose not to. Instead, Dallas County makes release and detention decisions on the basis of blunt access to cash, eschewing non-monetary alternatives that increase pretrial release while effectively mitigating risks of nonappearance or new criminal activity. As a matter of policy and practice, Defendants do not consider less restrictive alternatives to detention based on money bail that a person cannot afford.
249. Jurisdictions with robust pretrial services and non-monetary conditions of release achieve court-appearance rates of 90% for all appearances throughout the life of the cases, with more than 91% of those released pretrial remaining arrest-free (and 98-99% remaining arrest-free for violent crimes).
250. Empirical evidence suggests that unsecured bond alone is just as effective at ensuring appearance in court as secured money bail.
251. Moreover, studies show that those detained pretrial face worse outcomes at trial and sentencing than those released pretrial, even when charged with the same offenses. Detention on money bail increases the likelihood of conviction. One reason is that detained defendants are more likely to plead guilty just to shorten their jail time, even if they are innocent. Detained defendants also have a harder time preparing for their defense, gathering evidence and witnesses, and meeting with their lawyers.
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252. Using data from Philadelphia, researchers have found that a person who is detained pretrial is 13% more likely to be convicted and 21% more likely to plead guilty.31 Additionally, individuals detained pretrial receive longer jail sentences.32
253. People who are detained—instead of released on money bail or on a personal bond—when their case is resolved have significantly worse case outcomes.33
254. Moreover, pretrial detention due to inability to pay money bail makes a person more likely to commit crime in the future and to fail to appear.34
255. Studies also show that just two days of pretrial detention increases the likelihood of future arrests and future missed court appearances of low level offenders.

31 Megan Stevenson, Distortion of Justice: How the Inability to Pay Bail Affects Case Outcomes 18 (2017), available

at

https://www.law.upenn.edu/cf/faculty/mstevens/workingpapers/Stevenson%20Job%20Market%20Paper

%20Jan%202016.pdf; see also Gupta, et. al, supra note 30, at 13 (finding a 12% increase in the likelihood of

conviction using the same data); Paul Heaton, et al., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial

Detention, 69 Stan. L. Rev. 711 (2017).

32 Stevenson, supra note 30, at 18; Heaton, supra note 30, at 21.

33 Stevenson, supra note 30, at 18; Gupta, supra note 29, at 13 (finding a 12% increase in the likelihood of conviction using the same data); Heaton, supra note 30, at 21; Sarah R. Guidry, et al., A Blueprint for Criminal Justice Policy Solutions in Harris County 13 (2015), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/ legal_aid_indigent_defendants/2015/ls_sclaid_summit_03_tcjc_2015_harris_county_blueprint.authcheckdam.pdf (“[D]efendants who are not released pre-trial are more likely to be incarcerated following a conviction, and they generally receive longer sentences upon conviction.”); Lise Olson, Study: Inmates Who Can’t Afford Bond Face Tougher Sentences, Hous. Chron., Sept. 15, 2013, available at http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houstontexas/houston/article/Study-Inmates-who-can-t-afford-bond-face-tougher-4817053.php (discussing Carlos Mathis, an African-American man, who was held in jail for seven months on minor drug and theft charges because he could not afford money bail, and whose charges were dismissed); Isami Arifuku & Judy Wallen, Racial Disparities at Pretrial and Sentencing and the Effects of Pretrial Services Programs (2013), available at http://www.pretrial.org/download/research/Racial%20Disparities%20at%20Pretrial%20and%20Sentencing%20and %20the%20Effects%20of%20Pretrial%20Services%20Programs%20-%20NCCD%202013.pdf; Cynthia E. Jones, “Give Us Free”: Addressing Racial Disparities in Bail Determinations, 16 N.Y.U. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 919 (2013); Tina L. Freiburger, et. al, The Impact of Race on the Pretrial Decision, Am. J. of Crim. Just. (2010), available at http://libres.uncg.edu/ir/asu/f/Marcum_CD_2010_Impact_of_Race.pdf.

34 Heaton, supra note 30, at 787; Lowenkamp, et al., The Hidden Costs of Pretrial Detention 3, 19 (2013), available at https://www.pretrial.org/download/research/The%20Hidden%20Costs%20of%20Pretrial%20Detention%20%20LJAF%202013.pdf (studying 153,407 defendants and finding that “when held 2-3 days, low risk defendants are almost 40 percent more likely to commit new crimes before trial than equivalent defendants held no more than 24 hours”); Arnold Foundation, Pretrial Criminal Justice Research Summary 5 (2013), available at: http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/sites/default/files/pdf/LJAF-Pretrial-CJ-Research-brief_FNL.pdf (finding that “low-risk defendants held 2–3 days were 17 percent more likely to commit another crime within two years” and that those detained “4–7 days yielded a 35 percent increase in re-offense rates.”).

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256. Setting secured money bail without an inquiry into ability to pay and in an amount higher than a person can afford by definition defeats the purpose of money bail—to incentivize a person to return to court—and removes any legitimate (let alone compelling) state interest in requiring a financial condition.
257. Nor is setting money bail without findings concerning ability to pay or consideration of alternatives the most narrowly tailored way to meet any other legitimate or compelling government interest.
258. Pretrial detention causes instability in employment, housing, and care for dependent relatives.
259. Pretrial detention is far more expensive than effective pretrial supervision programs. Through non-monetary tools, pretrial supervision programs can save taxpayer money while creating higher public safety and court appearance rates.
260. The detention of arrestees who do not pose significant (let alone immitigable) risks but who cannot pay the required amount for release, is a main driver of the jail population.
261. Defendants’ use of money bail leads disproportionately to the detention of people of color. Regardless of the amount of money bail imposed, people of color are more likely to be detained at disposition than people who are white.35
35 Megan Stevenson, et al., Bail Reform: New Directions for Pretrial Detention and Release 8–9 (2017), available at http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2747&context=faculty_scholarship; Jones, supra note 32; Marie VanNostrand, Legal and Evidence-Based Practices: Applications of Legal Principles, Laws, and Research to the Field of Pretrial Services (2007) (“Research has identified financial terms of bail as resulting in disparate outcomes due to a person's financial status and may be a form of de facto racial and ethnic discrimination”); Stephen Demuth, Racial and Ethnic Differences in Pretrial Release Decisions and Outcomes: A Comparison of Hispanic, Black, and White Felony Arrestees, 41 Criminology 873 (2003).
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262. It costs Dallas County $225,321 per day—or $82.2 million per year—to incarcerate presumptively innocent people in the Dallas County Jail.36
263. Researchers at the University of Pennsylvania recently published a study of the Harris County, Texas misdemeanor money bail system and concluded that if, from 2008 to 2013, those misdemeanor arrestees for whom the minimum $500 money bail was imposed had instead been released without requiring $500 money bail, the County would have released 40,000 additional people, avoided almost 5,900 criminal convictions, reduced incarceration days by more than 400,000, and prevented the commission of 1,600 felonies and 2,400 misdemeanors due to the criminogenic effects of even brief pretrial custody. The County would have saved roughly $20 million in supervision costs alone.37
264. Dallas County would almost certainly see similar or greater savings if Defendants stopped imposing and enforcing automatic secured financial conditions of release that operate to detain impoverished arrestees.
265. Pretrial detention has devastating effects on people’s lives, exacerbating the effects of poverty by causing people to lose jobs, housing, cars, medical care, and even child custody. Pretrial detention also leads to more crime, increases the likelihood that the arrestee will be convicted and sentenced to jail, and leads to longer jail sentences.
Class Action Allegations 266. The named Plaintiffs bring Claims 1 and 2 in this action, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, as a class action under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
36 See Dallas County, Texas, Adult Criminal Justice Data Sheet, Texas Criminal Justice Coalition (2016), available at https://www.texascjc.org/system/files/publications/Adult%20Dallas%20County%20Data%20Sheet%202016_0.pdf. 37 Heaton, supra note 30, at 787.
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267. A class action is a superior means, and the only practicable means, by which the named Plaintiffs and unknown Class members can challenge the Defendants’ unlawful wealthbased post-arrest detention scheme.
268. This action is brought and may properly be maintained as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(a)(1)–(4) and Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
269. This action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements of those provisions.
270. The Plaintiffs propose one class, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief: All arrestees who are or will be detained in Dallas County custody because they are unable to pay a secured financial condition of release.
A. Numerosity and Impractability of Joinder. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). 271. Every person who is detained in the Dallas County Jail because she cannot afford to pay money bail and has not been ordered detained pursuant to lawful procedures is subjected to Defendants’ wealth-based detention scheme in which an arrestee must either pay for her liberty or remain in a jail cell. 272. The average daily jail population in 2016 was 5,338 people.38 273. In September 2017, a typical month and the most recent month for which data could be located, the average daily population of misdemeanor arrestees being detained pretrial was 409 people. The average daily population of state-jail felony39 arrestees being held pretrial was 253.
38 Jail Population Committee Meeting Report, supra note 24, at 3. 39 In the early 1990s, as part of its effort to address overcrowding in its state prisons and facilitate treatment during incarceration for people struggling with drug addiction, the Texas legislature created a new category of felony offense: the state jail felony. So-called “state jail” facilities were brought within the control of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, and individuals convicted of state jail felonies were no longer sent to Texas prisons, but rather to “state jails.” State-jail felony offenses are typically non-violent offense and, in many instances, are misdemeanor offenses enhanced by prior misdemeanor convictions. Although specific data on the frequency of charges is not
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And the average daily population of felony arrestees (excluding state-jail-felony arrestees) being held pretrial was 1,639. The vast majority of people being held prior to trial would be released if they could afford to pay a secured financial condition of release.40
274. On any given day, there are hundreds of outstanding arrest warrants issued in Dallas County, and every day more are issued.
275. Even arrestees who eventually pay the monetary amount required for release, or who are eventually released on unsecured bail, suffer wealth-based detention prior to being released. In 2016, arrestees who were released on surety bonds spent an average of four days in jail prior to release; arrestees who were released on pretrial-release bonds spent an average of two days in jail prior to release (between January and September 2017, the average increased to three days in jail); and arrestees who were released on personal bonds spent an average of twenty-five days in jail prior to release.
276. The amount of time arrestees are held in jail depends on how long it takes them to come up with the money required for their release. Some arrestees are forced to wait days or weeks until they or family members can make the payment required by the surety comopany. Others will never be able to come up with any amount of money to pay for their release. The number of current and future arrestees subject to Defendants’ policies and practices—if it is not enjoined—numbers well into the tens of thousands every year.
277. Joinder is impracticable because the members of the class are impoverished and
available in Dallas County, in Harris County, a majority of state-jail felony charges are for possession of less than a gram of a controlled substance (40% of state-jail felony arrests), and third-offender theft under $2,500 (14%), which is a misdemeanor offense unless the person charged has two prior convictions for the same misdemeanor offense. 40 Some are being held “no bond,” meaning that they have been ordered detained pretrial, albeit without the procedures required for issuing a valid detention order. They are therefore not subjected to wealth-based detention, though their constitutional rights are being violated in other ways. Others would not be released from custody even if they paid the money bail amount because they are subject to out-of-county warrants, immigration detainers, or other holds, though they would be eligible for transfer to the jurisdiction that requires their presence.
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cannot hire lawyers to bring independent claims.
B. Commonality. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
278. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the class. The named
Plaintiffs seek common relief concerning whether the Defendants’ wealth-based policies,
practices, and procedures violate the rights of the class members, and relief mandating that the
Defendants stop these constitutional violations.
279. The Plaintiffs’ claims raise common legal and factual questions arising from one
central set of policies and practices: Defendants’ post-arrest wealth-based detention scheme.
Defendants operate this scheme openly and in materially the same manner every day with respect
to all arrestees. Resolution of these legal and factual issues will determine whether all of the
members of the class are entitled to the constitutional relief that they seek.
280. Among the most important common questions of fact for the class are:
x Whether the Defendants have a policy and practice of determining the amount of money required to secure post-arrest release without inquiry into ability to pay or consideration of or findings concerning alternative conditions of release;
x Whether the Defendants require an amount of money be paid up front before releasing a person from the jail;
x Whether Defendants, at any stage in the post-arrest process, inquire into a person’s ability to pay the predetermined amount of money, or make findings concerning an arrestee’s present ability to pay any amount set or that any particular condition of release is necessary to address a specific government interest;
x How long arrestees must wait in jail after arrest before they have an opportunity to raise their inability to pay for their release or to request alternative, non-financial conditions.
281. Among the most important common questions of law are:
x Whether requiring arrestees to pay money up front to secure release from postarrest detention without an inquiry into or findings concerning the arrestee’s present ability to pay the amount required, and without meaningful consideration of less restrictive alternative conditions of release, violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection clauses;
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x Whether it is lawful to impose a secured financial condition of release that operates as a de facto order of pretrial detention because of a person’s inability to pay without complying with the substantive findings, legal standards, and procedures required for issuing and enforcing a transparent order of preventive detention.
C. Typicality. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). 282. The Named Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the class. Each class member suffers the same injury because Defendants refuse to comply with basic constitutional requirements: class members are confined in jail because they could not afford to pay the Defendants’ secured money bail. The answer to whether the Defendants’ policies and practices are unconstitutional will determine the claims of the Named Plaintiffs and every other class member. D. Adequacy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). 283. The Named Plaintiffs are adequate representatives of the class because their interests in the vindication of the legal claims they raise are entirely aligned with the interests of the other class members, each of whom has the same basic constitutional claims. The Named Plaintiffs are members of the class, and their interests do not conflict with those of the other class members. 284. There are no known conflicts of interest among members of the proposed class. All of the members of the class have a similar interest in vindicating their constitutional rights in the face of Defendants’ pay-for-freedom post-arrest detention system. 285. Plaintiffs are represented by attorneys from Civil Rights Corps, Texas Fair Defense Project, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the American Civil Liberties Union of Texas, who have experience litigating complex civil rights matters in federal court and extensive knowledge of both the details of Defendants’ scheme and the relevant constitutional and statutory law. Counsels’ relevant qualifications are more fully set forth in the contemporaneously filed
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Motion for Class Certification. 286. The combined efforts of class counsel have so far included extensive investigation
into fixed money bail schemes over a period of months, including numerous interviews with witnesses, court employees, jail inmates, families, judges, attorneys practicing in courts throughout the region, community members, statewide experts in the functioning of state and local courts, empirical researchers, and national experts in constitutional law, post-arrest procedure, law enforcement, judicial procedures, criminal law, pretrial services, and jails.
287. Class counsel have a detailed understanding of state law and practices as they relate to federal constitutional requirements. Counsel have studied the way that these systems function in other cities and counties in order to investigate the wide array of lawful options in practice for municipalities.
288. Counsel have devoted significant time and resources to becoming intimately familiar with Defendants’ scheme and with all of the relevant state and federal laws and procedures that can and should govern it. Counsel have also developed relationships with many of the individuals and families victimized by unlawful wealth-based pretrial detention practices. The interests of the members of the class will be fairly and adequately protected by the Plaintiffs and their attorneys.
E. Injunctive or Declaratory Relief. Rule 23(b)(2). 289. Class-action status is appropriate because the Defendants, through the policies, practices, and procedures that make up its wealth-based post-arrest detention scheme, have acted in the same unconstitutional manner with respect to all class members. The Defendants apply and enforce a wealth-based system of pretrial justice: some arrestees can purchase their immediate release, while other arrestees must remain in jail solely because they cannot pay.
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290. The class therefore seeks declaratory and injunctive relief that will prevent the Defendants from detaining arrestees who cannot afford cash payments. Because the putative class challenges the Defendants’ scheme as unconstitutional through declaratory and injunctive relief that would apply the same relief to every member of the class, Rule 23(b)(2) is appropriate and necessary.
Claims for Relief Count One: Defendants Violate Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection and Due Process Right Against Wealth-Based Detention by Jailing Them Because They Cannot Afford A Monetary Payment.
By the Six Named Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, against all Defendants
291. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-290. 292. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses prohibit jailing a person because of her inability to make a monetary payment. Defendants violate Plaintiffs’ substantive right against wealth-based detention by enforcing against them a system of wealth-based detention that keeps them in jail solely because they cannot afford to make a monetary payment. Defendants also infringe on Plaintiffs’ rights to the presumption of innocence and to a fair trial.
Count Two: Defendants Violate Plaintiffs’ Right to Pretrial Liberty by Jailing Them Without Procedural Due Process.
By the Six Named Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, against all Defendants
293. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-292. 294. The Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental substantive right to pretrial liberty, the presumption of innocence, and the right to a fair trial.
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295. The Due Process Clause prohibits the government from depriving anyone of the fundamental right to pretrial liberty without notice that a hearing will occur, that the issue at the hearing will be whether the arrestee is a flight risk or poses a danger to the community, and a neutral decision-maker to preside over the hearing. The arrestee must have an opportunity to testify at the hearing, to present evidence on her behalf, and to contest the evidence offered against the arrestee.
296. Further, to issue a transparent order of pretrial detention—or to issue a de facto order of pretrial detention by requiring a condition of release that operates to detain—the judicial officer must make written findings, on the record, that no condition or combination of conditions could reasonably assure the appearance of the person in court and the safety of any other person or the community, and she must explain her reasons for so concluding.
297. Defendants violate Plaintiffs’ fundamental right to pretrial liberty by requiring secured money bail amounts that operate to detain without making these substantive findings or providing these necessary procedures.
Count Three: The First and Fourteenth Amendments Protect a Right of Access to All Legal Proceedings During Which Conditions of Pretrial Release Are Determined or That Result in Pretrial Detention. By Faith in Texas and Texas Organizing Project against the County and the Sheriff
298. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-297. 299. The First Amendment protects the public’s right of access to court proceedings. The County and the Sheriff prevent the public from observing the legal proceedings during which the Defendants in this lawsuit order presumptively innocent arrestees detained and determine conditions of release, including conditions of release that operate as de facto orders of pretrial detention against impoverished arrestees.
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300. These legal proceedings implicate fundamental rights, including the right to pretrial
liberty and the presumption of innocence. Defendants close these proceedings as a matter of
generally applicable policy, without any specific, substantive findings that closure is necessary in
an individual case to protect a compelling state interest. The First Amendment, incorporated
against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, requires that these proceedings be open to the
public.
Requests for Relief
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs and the other Class members request that this Court issue the
following relief:
a. A declaratory judgment that Defendants violate the Named Plaintiffs’ and class members’ constitutional rights by operating a system of wealth-based detention that keeps them in jail because they cannot afford to pay a secured financial condition of release required without an inquiry into or findings concerning ability to pay, without consideration of nonfinancial alternatives, and without findings that a particular release condition—or pretrial detention—is necessary to meet a compelling government interest;
b. An order preliminarily and permanently enjoining Defendants from operating and enforcing a system of wealth-based detention that keeps the Named Plaintiffs and class members in jail because they cannot afford a secured financial condition of release required without an inquiry into or findings concerning ability to pay, without consideration of nonfinancial alternatives, and without any findings that a particular release condition—or pretrial detention—is necessary to meet a compelling government interest.
c. Any other order and judgment this Court deems necessary to preliminarily and permanently enjoin Defendants—whether acting on behalf of the State, the County, or some other government entity—from implementing and enforcing a system of wealth-based pretrial detention that keeps arrestees in jail because they cannot afford a secured financial condition of release required without an inquiry into or findings concerning ability to pay, without consideration of non-financial alternatives, and without any findings that a particular release condition—or pretrial detention—is necessary to meet a compelling government interest;
d. A permanent injunction requiring the Sheriff and the County to provide public access to all legal proceedings during which conditions of pretrial release are determined or that result in pretrial detention;
e. An order certifying the class defined above;
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f. An order and judgment granting reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and any other relief this Court deems just and proper.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Elizabeth Rossi Elizabeth Rossi* (admitted Pro Hac Vice) Maryland Attorney No. 1412180090 Alec Karakatsanis (Pro Hac Vice Application forthcoming) D.C. Bar No. 999294 Premal Dharia (Pro Hac Vice Application forthcoming) D.C. Bar No. 484091 Civil Rights Corps 910 17th Street NW, Suite 200 Washington, DC 20006 Tel: 202-599-0953 Fax: 202-609-8030 elizabeth@civilrightscorps.org alec@civilrightscorps.org premal@civilrightscorps.org
*Admitted solely to practice law in Maryland; not admitted in the District of Columbia. Practice is limited pursuant to D.C. App. R. 49(c)(3).*
/s/ Trisha Trigilio Trisha Trigilio Texas Bar No. 24065179 Andre Segura N.Y. Bar No. 5021647 American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Texas 1500 McGowen Street, Suite 250 Houston, Texas 77004 Tel: 713.942.8146 Fax: 713.942.8966 ttrigilio@aclutx.org
/s/ Kali Cohn Kali Cohn Texas Bar. No. 24092265 American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Texas 6440 N. Central Expressway Dallas, TX 75206 Tel: 214-346-6577 Fax: 713-942-8966
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kcohn@aclutx.org /s/Brandon J. Buskey Brandon J. Buskey Alabama Bar Number: ASB-2753-A50B American Civil Liberties Union Foundation Criminal Law Reform Project 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, NY 10004 Tel: (212) 284-7364 Fax: (212) 549-2654 bbuskey@aclu.org /s/ Susanne Pringle Susanne Pringle Texas Bar No. 24083686 springle@fairdefense.org Emily Gerrick (Application for Admission forthcoming) Texas Bar No. 24092417 Texas Fair Defense Project 314 E. Highland Mall Blvd., Suite 180 Austin, Texas 78752 Telephone: (512) 637-5220 Facsimile: (512) 637-5224 Attorneys for Plaintiffs
63

Case 3:18-cv-00154-N Document 10 Filed 01/30/18 Page 64 of 64 PageID 423 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 30th day of January, 2018, I electronically filed the foregoing with the clerk of the court for the U.S. District Court, Northern District of Texas, using the electronic case filing system of the Court. The Summons and Complaint will be served in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
By: /s/ Elizabeth Rossi Elizabeth Rossi* (Pro Hac Vice Application forthcoming) Maryland Attorney No. 1412180090 Civil Rights Corps 910 17th Street NW, Suite 200 Washington, DC 20006 Tel: 202-599-0953 Fax: 202-609-8030 elizabeth@civilrightscorps.org *Admitted solely to practice law in Maryland; not admitted in the District of Columbia. Practice is limited pursuant to D.C. App. R. 49(c)(3).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

SHANNON DAVES, ET AL. Plaintiff v.
DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS, ET AL. Defendant

Civil Action No.

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS
(This form also satisfies Fed. R. Civ. P. 7.1)
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 7.1 and LR 3.1(c), LR 3.2(e), LR 7.4, LR 81.1(a)(4)(D), and LR 81.2,
Shannon Daves, Shakena Walston, Erriyah Banks, Destinee Tovar, Petroba Michieka, James Thompson

provides the following information: For a nongovernmental corporate party, the name(s) of its parent corporation and any
publicly held corporation that owns 10% or more of its stock (if none, state "None"): *Please separate names with a comma. Only text visible within box will print.
Not applicable

A complete list of all persons, associations of persons, firms, partnerships, corporations, guarantors, insurers, affiliates, parent or subsidiary corporations, or other legal entities that are financially interested in the outcome of the case: *Please separate names with a comma. Only text visible within box will print.
Shannon Daves, Shakena Walston, Erriyah Banks, Destinee Tovar, Petroba Michieka, James Thompson, Civil Rights Corps, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Texas, the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Texas Fair Defense Project, Dallas County (Texas), Sheriff Marian Brown, Terrie McVea, Lisa Bronchetti, Steven Autry, Anthony Randall, Janet Lusk, Hal Turley, All Judges of Dallas County Criminal District Courts, All Judges of Dallas County Criminal Courts at Law, Members of the Proposed Class as Defined in the Complaint (ECF No. 1)

Case 3:18-cv-00154-N Document 1-11 Filed 01/21/18 Page 2 of 2 PageID 83

Date: Signature: Print Name: Bar Number: Address: City, State, Zip: Telephone: Fax: E-Mail:

January 21, 2018 /s/ Kali Cohn Kali Cohn 24092265 6640 N. Central Expw, Suite 403 Dallas, TX 75206 214-346-6577 713-942-8966 kcohn@aclutx.org

NOTE: To electronically file this document, you will find the event in our Case Management (CM/ECF) system, under Civil/Other Documents/Certificate of Interested Persons

 
 Case 3:18-cv-00154-N Document 1 Filed 01/21/18 Page 1 of 59 PageID 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

SHANNON DAVES, SHAKENA WALSTON, ERRIYAH BANKS, DESTINEE TOVAR, PATROBA MICHIEKA, JAMES THOMPSON,
On behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS,
SHERIFF MARIAN BROWN,
TERRIE MCVEA, LISA BRONCHETTI, STEVEN AUTRY, ANTHONY RANDALL, JANET LUSK, HAL TURLEY,
Dallas County Magistrates
ERNEST WHITE (194TH), HECTOR GARZA (195TH), TERESA HAWTHORNE (203RD), TAMMY KEMP (204TH), JENNIFER BENNETT (265TH), AMBER GIVENS-DAVIS (282ND), LIVIA LIU FRANCIS (283RD) STEPHANIE MITCHELL (291ST), BRANDON BIRMINGHAM (292ND), TRACY HOLMES (363RD), ROBERT BURNS (NO. 1), NANCY KENNEDY (NO. 2), GRACIE LEWIS (NO. 3), DOMINIQUE COLLINS (NO. 4),

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CARTER THOMPSON (NO. 5),

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JEANINE HOWARD (NO. 6),

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STEPHANIE FARGO (NO. 7),

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Judges of Dallas County Criminal District Courts )

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DAN PATTERSON (NO. 1),

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JULIA HAYES (NO. 2),

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DOUG SKEMP (NO. 3),

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NANCY C. MULDER (NO. 4),

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LISA GREEN (NO. 5),

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ANGELA KING (NO. 6),

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ELIZABETH CROWDER (NO. 7),

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TINA YOO CLINTON (NO. 8),

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PEGGY HOFFMAN (NO. 9),

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ROBERTO CANAS, JR. (NO. 10),

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SHEQUITTA KELLY (NO. 11),

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Judges of Dallas County Criminal Courts at Law )

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Defendants.

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________________________________________________)

COMPLAINT—CLASS ACTION

1. This case is about Dallas County jailing some of its poorest people because they

cannot afford to make a monetary payment. Named Plaintiff Shannon Daves is currently

unemployed and homeless. She was arrested for a misdemeanor offense on Wednesday, January

17, and Dallas County has detained her since then solely because she cannot afford to pay a $500

money bail. Because Ms. Daves is transgender and cannot afford to purchase her release, she is

being kept in solitary confinement. The other Named Plaintiffs—Shakena Walston, Erriyah

Banks, Destinee Tovar, Petroba Michieka, and James Thompson—are also impoverished

individuals who were arrested this week for misdemeanor or felony offenses in Dallas County.

They are all being kept in jail cells at the Dallas County Jail because they cannot afford to pay the

money bail amount required for release.

2. The Named Plaintiffs’ money bail amounts are being required pursuant to Dallas

County’s schedules of secured monetary bail amounts and without any inquiry into their ability to

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pay or any consideration of or findings concerning alternative conditions of release. Because they are impoverished and cannot afford the payment required by the County for their release, the Plaintiffs—who are presumptively innocent—will be detained in Dallas County jail cells for days or weeks, until they are finally brought to court on the “jail chain.”
3. In Dallas County, while wealthier arrestees are released from custody almost immediately upon payment of money to the County, arrestees like the Named Plaintiffs who are too poor to purchase their freedom remain in jail because of their poverty. Misdemeanor arrestees, like Ms. Daves and Ms. Tovar, who cannot afford to purchase their release must wait at least four to ten days before they are brought to court on the jail chain for a first appearance. Felony arrestees, like Ms. Walston, Ms. Banks, Mr. Michieko, and Mr. Thompson, must wait at least two to three weeks for this appearance if they waive indictment—and two to three months if they do not.
4. First appearance is the first even theoretical opportunity for an arrestee to speak to a judge who can consider ability to pay or challenge conditions of release. However, in practice, even this “appearance” is not a true opportunity to raise ability to pay and challenge conditions of release, because arrestees are not brought into the courtroom unless they are pleading guilty. And, faced with the prospect of lengthy pretrial detention, the majority of detained misdemeanor and low-level felony arrestees do plead guilty at this first appearance. These guilty pleas typically in sentences of “time served” and release from Dallas County custody that same day.
5. Although the Supreme Court has explained that pretrial detention must be the “carefully limited exception” in our legal system, United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987), as a result of these policies and practices, almost 70% of people in the Dallas County Jail— thousands every night—have not been convicted of a crime. Instead, they languish in jail cells because they cannot afford to pay the amount of money required for their release.
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6. This mass detention based on wealth has devastating consequences for Plaintiffs, for their families, and for the community. Pretrial detention of presumptively innocent human beings causes people to lose their jobs and shelter, interrupts vital medication cycles, and separates parents and children. It coerces guilty pleas and results in longer sentences. Even a few days of pretrial detention make people more likely to commit crimes in the future and cost Dallas County tens of millions of dollars every year.
7. On behalf of the many other arrestees subjected to Dallas County’s unlawful and ongoing post-arrest wealth-based detention scheme, Plaintiffs challenge Defendants’ use of money bail to detain only the most impoverished arrestees. Dallas County’s wealth-based pretrial detention system violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution. It has no place in our society.
8. By and through their attorneys and on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs seek to enjoin Defendants’ wealth-based post-arrest procedures, and a declaration that Defendants cannot employ a system of wealth-based detention by imposing and enforcing secured money bail without an inquiry into and findings concerning the arrestee’s present ability to pay, and without individualized consideration of less-restrictive, alternative conditions of release.
Nature of the Action 9. It is the policy and practice of Defendants to refuse to release arrestees from custody unless they pay a monetary sum. The amount of money required is determined by an offensebased, secured money bail schedule, and it is the policy and practice of Dallas County officials to require the generic, predetermined amount without considering the person’s ability to pay or alternatives to secured money bail, and without making the substantive findings or providing the
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procedural safeguards that the Constitution requires to ensure that a person’s resulting detention is necessary to further the government’s interests.
10. This policy and practice results in the systemic wealth-based detention of those arrestees who are too poor to pay money bail. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting Defendants’ wealth-based, post-arrest detention scheme.
Jurisdiction and Venue 11. This is a civil rights action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201, et seq., and the First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. 12. Venue in this Court is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
Parties 13. Named Plaintiff Shannon Daves is a 47-year-old woman. She was arrested on Wednesday, January 17, 2018, for an alleged misdemeanor offense. She is currently experiencing homelessness and does not have a job. She cannot afford the $500 money bail amount required for her release, without an inquiry or findings concerning her ability to pay. Because she is transgender and is being held in the men’s unit of the jail, Dallas County is keeping her in solitary confinement 24 hours a day. She represents herself as an individual and a class of similarly situated people subjected to Defendants’ wealth-based post-arrest detention scheme. See Exhibit 1, Declaration of Shannon Daves. 14. Named Plaintiff Shakena Walston is a 29-year-old woman. She was arrested on Friday, January 19, 2018, for an alleged felony offense. She is indigent and currently unemployed, and avoids homelessness by staying with her sister. She cannot afford the $15,000 money bail amount required for her release without an inquiry or findings concerning her ability to pay. She
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is trying to start a program at a local community college with the help of financial aid, but cannot pursue those plans while she is in custody. She represents herself as an individual and a class of similarly situated people subjected to Defendants’ wealth-based post-arrest detention scheme. See Exhibit 2, Declaration of Shakena Walston.
15. Named Plaintiff Erriyah Jones is a 26-year-old woman. She was arrested on Friday, January 19, 2018, for two alleged felony offenses. She is currently unemployed and lives with and takes care of her mother, who receives disability payments and food stamps. She cannot afford the $50,000 money bail amount required for her release without an inquiry or findings concerning her ability to pay. She has health issues requiring medication and a special diet, but is not being provided either at the Jail. She represents herself as an individual and a class of similarly situated people subjected to Defendants’ wealth-based post-arrest detention scheme. See Exhibit 3, Declaration of Erriyah Jones.
16. Named Plaintiff Destinee Tovar is a 19-year-old woman. She was arrested on Janaury 19, 2018, for an alleged misdemeanor offense. She is currently unemployed and without stable housing. She cannot afford the $1,500 money bail amount required for her release without an inquiry or findings concerning her ability to pay. She represents herself as an individual and a class of similarly situated people subjected to Defendants’ wealth-based post-arrest detention scheme. See Exhibit 4, Declaration of Destinee Tovar.
17. Named Plaintiff Patroba Michieka is a 30-year-old man. He was arrested on January 19, 2018, for an alleged state-jail-felony offense. He struggles to meet the basic necessities of life and lives with his mother to avoid homelessness. He cannot afford the $500 money bail amount required for his release without an inquiry or findings concerning his ability to pay. He was working a few days a week before his arrest, but fears he will lose that job because he is in custody.
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He represents himself as an individual and a class of similarly situated people subjected to Defendants’ wealth-based post-arrest detention scheme. See Exhibit 5, Declaration of Patroba Michieka.
18. Named Plaintiff James Thompson is a 28-year-old man. He was arrested on Thursday, January 18, 2018, for two alleged state jail felonies. He is indigent and unemployed, and avoids homelessness by living with his parents. He cannot afford the $60,000 money bail amount that Dallas County requires for his release without an inquiry or findings concerning his ability to pay. He represents himself as an individual and a class of similarly situated people subjected to Defendants’ wealth-based post-arrest detention scheme. See Exhibit 6, Declaration of James Thompson.
19. Defendant Dallas County is a municipal corporation organized under the laws of the State of Texas.1 The County, through the Commissioners Court, makes policy decisions about which arrestees are eligible for release on unsecured bond or non-financial conditions, and which arrestees, among those arrested by Dallas County law enforcement officers, may be released on a citation instead of being arrested. The County also makes policy decisions about whether and at what level to fund the County’s jail, courts, and pretrial services agency. The County’s policies result in systemic wealth-based pretrial detention of Dallas County arrestees.
20. The Dallas County Sheriff is a County official, the head of the Dallas County Sheriff’s Department, and the keeper of the County Jail. The Dallas County Sheriff, Defendant
1 The Dallas County Sheriff, Dallas County Commissioners Court, Dallas County Criminal Court at Law Judges, and Dallas County Criminal District Court Judges are all final policymakers for various aspects of Dallas County’s postarrest policies and practices. Each is named separately from the County as a Defendant in the event the Court concludes any of them is acting on behalf of the State or that the Judges are acting judicially with respect to any particular function. If the Court agrees that these Defendants are final policymakers for Dallas County, then Plaintiffs agree that naming them individually is redundant of a suit against the County.
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Marian Brown, is the final policymaker for running and administering the jail in Dallas County. She is sued in her official capacity.
21. Roberto Canas, Jr., Elizabeth Crowder, Lisa Green, Julia Hayes, Peggy Hoffman, Shequitta Kelly, Angela King, Nancy C. Mulder, Dan Patterson, Doug Skemp, and Tina Yoo Clinton are the Dallas County Criminal Court at Law Judges (“misdemeanor Judges”). Sitting en banc as an administrative body, the misdemeanor Judges promulgate the generally applicable bail misdemeanor schedule applied by the County systemically to determine the conditions of pretrial release for all misdemeanor arrestees. Exhibit 7. Each misdemeanor Judge is sued in her individual and official capacities for injunctive and declaratory relief.
22. Jennifer Bennett, Brandon Birmingham, Robert Burns, Dominique Collins, Stephanie Fargo, Livia Liu Francis, Hector Garza, Amber Givens-Davis, Teresa Hawthorne, Tracy Holmes, Jeanine Howard, Tammy Kemp, Nancy Kennedy, Gracie Lewis, Stephanie Mitchell, Carter Thompson, and Ernest White are the Dallas County District Court Judges (“felony Judges”). Sitting en banc as an administrative body, the felony Judges promulgate the generally applicable felony bail schedule applied by the County systemically to determine the conditions of pretrial release for all felony arrestees. Exhibit 8. Each felony Judge is sued in her individual and official capacities for injunctive and declaratory relief.
23. Steven Autry, Lisa Bronchetti, Janet Lusk, Terrie McVea, Anthony Randall, and Hal Turley are all Dallas County Magistrates. Each is a County employee who is appointed by a unanimous vote of Defendant Judges.2 The Magistrates can be fired by a majority vote of the
2 Tex. Code Ann. § 54.301(a) (authorizing the Judges of the District Courts and County Criminal Courts to “appoint a magistrate to perform the duties authorized by this subsection.”); id. at §54.401(c) (“If a magistrate serves more than one court, the magistrate’s appointment must be made with the unanimous approval of all the judges under whom the magistrate serves.”).
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Defendant Judges.3 The Magistrates act only at the direction of the Judges, and have only whatever authority or discretion the Judges allow them to exercise.4 The Magistrates are sued for declaratory relief only.
Factual Background A. The Named Plaintiffs Are in Jail Because They Are Unable to Pay the Money
Bail Demanded for Their Release 24. At Dallas County Jail, each Plaintiff appeared before a Magistrate, in a room at the jail that is closed to the public, and the Magistrate informed them of the charges and the money bail amount required for release. Ex. 1 ¶ 5; Ex. 2 ¶ 4; Ex. 3 ¶ 3; Ex. 4 ¶ 3; Ex. 5 ¶ 6; Ex. 6 ¶¶ 5–7. They were told by Dallas County Sheriff’s Deputies not to speak at the hearing. Ex. 1 ¶ 4; Ex. 3 ¶ 3; Ex. 4 ¶ 5; Ex. 5 ¶ 5. The hearings each lasted less than 60 seconds and, pursuant to the policies and practices described in this Complaint, no inquiry was made into any Plaintiff’s ability to pay, nor was there any consideration of alternative, non-financial conditions of release. Ex. 1 ¶ 5; Ex. 2 ¶ 5; Ex. 3 ¶ 4; Ex. 4 ¶ 4; Ex. 5 ¶ 7; Ex. 6 ¶ 8. 25. Plaintiff Shannon Daves is a 47-year-old woman. Ex. 1 ¶ 1. Ms. Daves is currently unemployed and experiencing homelessness. Id. ¶ 10–11. She struggles to meet the basic necessities of life. Id. ¶ 11. 26. Ms. Daves was arrested on Wednesday, January 17, and taken into Dallas County custody for an alleged misdemeanor offense. Id. ¶ 2. She was informed that, because of the Dallas County bail schedule, she would be released immediately, but only if she paid a money bail amount
3 Tex. Code Ann. § 54.305(b) (“The services of a magistrate who serves more than one court may be terminated by a majority vote of all the judges whom the magistrate serves.”). 4 Davis v. State, 956 S.W.2d 555 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (“However, a magistrate is not a judge in his own right and acts as a surrogate of the duly elected judge. . . .”); Gambling Paraphernalia, Devices, Equipment, & Proceeds v. State, 22 S.W.3d 625, 627 (Tex. App.—Dall. 2000, no pet.) (“[The Magistrate] acts as an agent of the district courts and has no authority of his own.”).
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of $500—an amount predetermined by the Dallas County bail schedule. See id. ¶ 5. She was told that she would be detained by Dallas County if she does not pay. See id. ¶¶ 2–5.
27. Because she cannot afford to purchase her freedom, and because of the jail’s policies relating to people who are transgender, Ms. Daves is being kept in solitary confinement 24 hours a day, segregated from the rest of the jail population. Id. ¶¶ 7–8. She has not been permitted to exercise, and she eats alone in her cell. Id. ¶ 8.
28. Plaintiff Shakena Walston is a 29-year-old woman. Ex. 2 ¶ 1. Ms. Walston is currently unemployed and living with her sister to avoid homelessness. Id. ¶¶ 6–7. She struggles to meet the basic necessities of life. Id. ¶ 6.
29. Ms. Walston was arrested on Friday, January 19, and taken into Dallas County custody for an alleged felony offense. Id. ¶¶ 2–3. She was informed that, because of the Dallas County bail schedule, she would be released immediately, but only if she paid a money bail amount of $15,000—an amount predetermined by the Dallas County bail schedule. See id. ¶ 4. She was told that she would be detained by Dallas County if she does not pay. See id. ¶¶ 4–5, 10. Because she cannot afford to purchase her freedom, she remains in the Dallas County Jail. Id. ¶ 10. She was trying to start a program at a local community college with the help of financial aid, but cannot pursue those plans until she is released. Id. ¶ 9.
30. Plaintiff Erriyah Banks is a 29-year-old woman. Ex. 3 ¶ 1. Ms. Banks is currently unemployed and living with her mother to avoid homelessness. Id. ¶¶ 6–7. Her mother relies on her as her caretaker. Id. ¶ 10. Ms. Banks struggles to meet the basic necessities of life. Id. ¶ 6.
31. Ms. Banks was arrested on Friday, January 19, and taken into Dallas County custody for an alleged state jail felony and felony offense. Id. ¶ 2. She was informed that, because of the Dallas County bail schedule, she would be released immediately, but only if she paid a
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money bail amount of $50,000—an amount predetermined by the Dallas County bail schedule. See id. ¶ 3. She was told that she would be detained by Dallas County if she does not pay. See id. ¶¶ 3–7. Because she cannot afford to purchase her freedom, she remains in the Dallas County Jail. Id. ¶ 7. She has not been given the medication or special diet that she needs to treat ongoing health issues, and her mother remains without a caretaker. Id. ¶¶ 8, 10.
32. Plaintiff Destinee Tovar is a 19-year-old woman. Ex. 4 ¶ 1. Ms. Tovar is currently unemployed and without stable housing. Id. ¶ 6. She struggles to meet the basic necessities of life. Id.
33. Ms. Tovar was arrested on Friday, January 19, by the Mesquite Police Department for an alleged misdemeanor and taken to Mesquite’s jail. Id. ¶ 2. She was informed by a judge there that she would be released immediately, but only if she paid a bond amount of $500. Id. ¶ 2. She could not afford to pay, so she remained in custody until she was transferred to the Dallas County Jail. Id. ¶ 3. At the Dallas County Jail, she saw a Magistrate Judge, who informed her that she would be released immediately, but only if she paid a bond amount of $1,500—an amount predetermined by the Dallas County bail schedule. Id. She was told that she would be detained by Dallas County if she does not pay. See id. Because she cannot afford to purchase her freedom, she remains in the Dallas County Jail. Id. ¶¶ 3, 7.
34. Plaintiff Patroba Michieka is a 30-year-old man. Ex. 5 ¶ 1. Before his arrest, Mr. Michieka was working a few days a week and was living with his mother to avoid homelessness. Id. ¶¶ 9–10. He struggles to meet the basic necessities of life. Id. ¶ 8.
35. Mr. Michieka was arrested on Friday, January 19, for an alleged state-jail felony offense. Id. ¶ 2. He was informed that, because of the Dallas County bail schedule, he would be released immediately, but only if he paid a money bail amount of $500—an amount predetermined
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by the Dallas County bail schedule. See id. ¶ 6–7, 11. He was told that he would be detained by Dallas County if he did not pay. See id. ¶¶ 6–7, 11. Because he cannot afford to purchase his freedom, he remains in the Dallas County Jail. Id. ¶ 11. He fears he may lose his job because he is unable to go to work. Id. ¶ 10.
36. Plaintiff James Thompson is a 38-year-old man. Ex. 6 ¶ 1. He is currenly unemployed and living with his parents to avoid homelessness. Id. ¶ 10. He struggles to meet the basic necessities of life. Id.
37. Mr. Thompson was arrested on Thursday, January 18, by the Garland Police Department for two alleged state-jail felony offenses and taken to Garland’s jail. Id. ¶ 2. He was informed by a judge there that he would be released immediately, but only if he paid a bond amount of $90,000. Id. ¶ 2. He could not afford to pay, so he remained in custody until he was transferred to the Dallas County Jail. Id. ¶ 3–4. At the Dallas County Jail, he saw a Magistrate Judge, who informed him that he would be eligible for release from Dallas County custody, but only if he paid a bond amount of $60,000—an amount predetermined by the Dallas County bail schedule. Id. ¶ 7. He was told that he would be detained by Dallas County if he does not pay. See id. Because he cannot afford to purchase his freedom, he remains in the Dallas County Jail. Id. ¶¶ 9, 12.
B. Defendants’ Wealth-Based Detention System Detains Arrestees Who Cannot Pay Secured Money Bail Amount While Releasing Those Who Can Pay
38. As a matter of policy and practice, Dallas County requires all arrestees to pay secured money bail to be released from jail. The bail amounts are not individualized; they are set according to a “bail schedule”—a list of monetary amounts that correspond to the offense charged. Dallas County uses a bail schedule to determine conditions of release, even though Texas law
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allows Dallas County to permit release on nonfinancial conditions or unsecured bail, and to issue citations for various misdemeanor offenses, instead of making arrests.5
39. “Bail” means “conditions of release.” The phrase “money bail” or “secured money bail” means that the person’s release is conditioned on the pre-payment of a monetary amount, i.e. the person must pay some amount of money upfront in order to be released. The phrase “unsecured bail” or “unsecured bond” means that the person’s release is conditioned on a promise to make a monetary payment if the person does not appear for court; the person is not required to make a monetary payment upfront in exchange for release.6
40. Arestees who cannot afford the predetermined money bail amount are detained pursuant to the bail schedule—without even a theoretical opportunity to raise ability to pay and challenge the generic, secured financial condition required automatically by Dallas County—until their first appearance in court. As a matter of policy and practice, impoverished misdemeanor arrestees are detained pursuant to the bail schedule for four to ten days before they are brought to court. Felony arrestees who waive indictment are detained pursuant to the bail schedule for two to three weeks. Felony arrestees who do not waive indictment are detained pursuant to the bail schedule for two to three months.
5 Texas law gives Dallas County the authority to cite and release a person accused of certain misdemeanor offenses. Tex. C.C.P. Art. 14.06(b)–(d). However, Dallas County has rejected the cite-and-release option as a matter of policy for all eligible offenses except possession of less than four ounces of marijuana. See Kevin Cokely, Dallas ‘Cite and Release’ Policy Goes Into Effect Friday For Small Amounts of Marijuana, Dall. Morning News, Nov. 28, 2017, available at https://www.nbcdfw.com/news/local/Dallas-Hosts-Forum-in-Preparations-for-Cite-and-ReleaseProgram-460489773.html. 6 See Tim Schnacke, United States Department of Justice, National Institute of Corrections, Fundamentals of Bail: A Resources Guide for Pretrial Practitioners and a Framework for American Pretrial Reform 112–13 (2014), available at http://www.clebp.org/images/2014-11-05_final_bail_fundamentals_september_8,_2014.pdf (“[B]ail is best defined in terms of release, and most appropriately as a process of conditional release. . . . The purpose of bail, rather, is to effectuate and maximize release. There is ‘bail’—i.e., a process of release—and there is ‘no bail[]’—a process of detention.”).
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41. In practice, this first court appearance is not a true opportunity to raise ability to pay or challenge conditions of release, because arrestees are brought into the courtroom to speak to the Judge only if they are pleading guilty, and most misdemeanor and low-level-felony arrestees do plead guilty, typically accepting sentences of time served.
42. As a result of Defendants’ policies and practices, impoverished arrestees are kept in jail for days or weeks solely because they cannot afford to make a monetary payment, while arrestees with access to money are released.
1. Arrest and transport to the Dallas County Jail 43. The Dallas County Sheriff’s Department, the City of Dallas Police Department, and numerous other agencies within Dallas County have the authority to arrest people for misdemeanor and felony offenses. Dallas County and the City of Dallas are responsible for the vast majority of the arrests in Dallas County. 44. The post-arrest process is substantially the same for all arrestees, regardless of which agency makes the arrest, and regardless of whether the person is arrested pursuant to a warrant or a warrantless arrest.7 45. When a person is arrested by an agency other than Dallas County or the City of Dallas, she will be taken first to the local lockup run by that agency.
7 However, people who are arrested by agencies other than Dallas County or the City of Dallas are typically subjected to longer periods of wealth-based detention than those arrested by Dallas County or the City of Dallas, because they are kept initially in the local lockup of the arresting authority before they are transferred to the Dallas County Jail. Often, several days pass prior to transfer from one of these outlying jails. For example, Dallas County transports arrestees from Richardson City Jail every one to three days. Some municipal jails transport arrestees only once or twice per week. Arrestees who are detained initially at these other jail facilities learn the money bail amount required for release soon after they are taken to the local lockup.
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46. In about half of the jurisdictions that make arrests within Dallas County, a local magistrate informs the arrestee of her bail amount in person at the local jail.8 Some of these magistrates apply the Dallas County bail schedules, and some apply their own local policies for setting bail.
47. In the other jurisdictions, arrestees appear by videolink before the Defendant Dallas County Magistrates. In these jurisdictions, Dallas County Magistrates refer to the Dallas County misdemeanor and felony bail schedules to determine the amount of secured money bail required for release.
48. Dallas County transports arrestees from the local lock-ups run by agencies other than Dallas County and the City of Dallas.
49. It can take two or three days for a person arrested by an agency other than Dallas County or the City of Dallas to be transported to the Dallas County Jail. Arrestees who are kept at these local jails have no access to appointed counsel during this entire period of time, but they can leave the local jail at any time if they pay the money bail amount.
50. People arrested by Dallas County or the City of Dallas are taken directly to the Dallas County Jail, known locally as “Lew Sterrett.”
51. On average, Dallas County books 182 new arrestees into the Dallas County Jail, every day.
52. The Defendant Sheriff detains arrestees at the Dallas County Jail, which houses all inmates to be held pending trial in the Dallas County courts.
8 At some of the municipal jails, local Magistrates visit the jail once per day to inform newly arrested individuals of the money bail amounts required for their release. At others, the local Magistrates visit the municipal jail several times a day for this purpose. As a result, the amount of time after arrest and before a person who has been transported to a municipal jail learns the money bail amount required for release varies from municipal jail to municipal jail.
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53. Regardless of the arresting agency, once an arrestee arrives at the Dallas County Jail, a Magistrate determines probable cause for warrantless arrests on the basis of documents filed by the arresting officer.
54. If the Magistrate concludes that probable cause existed for a warrantless arrest, or if the arrest was pursuant to a warrant, the booking process will begin.
2. Arraignment 55. Arrestees are informed during the booking process of the money bail amount required for release during a proceeding that is closed to the public, and is referred to locally as “arraignment.” 56. During the booking process at the jail, and typically within a few hours of arriving there, Sheriff’s deputies take groups of arrestees to appear for “arraignment” in person, in the jail, before a Magistrate.9 Sheriff’s Department employees and agents supervise, monitor, and give instructions to the arrestees before, during, and after “arraignment.” 57. Although the proceedings are called “arraignments,” the purposes of arraignments as set forth in Texas law—to “fix[]” the arrestee’s identity and “hear[] his plea,” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 26.02—are not fulfilled by these proceedings. 58. Instead, at so-called “arraignments,” Magistrates inform the arrestees of certain rights, as required by Article 15.17 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, as well as the offense charged and the monetary payment required for release pending trial.10 The allegations giving rise to the charges are not read aloud at arraignment, and no plea is entered.
9 Arrestees who appeared before a magistrate while being kept at an outlying jail will also appear before a Dallas County Magistrate during the booking process at the Dallas County Jail. 10 Most warrants do not have a money bail amount written on them. However, warrants for probation violations or bond forfeitures typically do have bond amounts on them. Arrestees who are aware of the existence of a warrant and have access to money can post a bond without ever being fully booked into the jail. Those who know about active warrants for their arrest can avoid even being arrested if they pay for a “non-arrest” bond.
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59. If a person is too sick to be kept with the general population, or if the person does not speak English and needs an interpreter to understand the proceedings, the person’s appearance before a Magistrate at the Dallas County Jail will be delayed, sometimes several days, until the person’s health stabilizes, or a translator can be located.
60. The number of people who appear before Magistrates for arraignment at one time varies. Dockets can regularly be as small as two or three people, or as large as 15 to 20 arrestees, and sometimes more.
61. There are no defense attorneys or prosecutors at these hearings. 62. The Sheriff’s Office has closed the hearings to the public and refused a request by undersigned counsel to observe the hearings. A deputy at the jail recently refused another request to observe the hearings, stating that the proceedings are “for inmates and no one else.” 63. Most hearings are not recorded on audio or video, despite a Texas statute requiring that the hearings be recorded.11 See Tex. C.C.P. 15.17(a), (e). 64. Arraignments occur at intervals every day of the week around the clock. 65. Before an arraignment docket begins, Sheriff’s deputies order arrestees not to speak and not to ask questions unless the Magistrate gives them permission. 66. Some deputies also tell arrestees that the Magistrate will increase the money bail amount required for their release if the arrestees say anything during the hearing.
11 Other arraignments which take place by videolink from outlying jails are recorded. Additionally, when a person is already in jail and charges are enhanced or reduced, or new charges are levied, a Defendant Magistrate will conduct an arraignment by videolink. These hearings are also recorded. Videos of these recorded hearings can be viewed in the discretion of the Chief Magistrate Judge, Terrie McVea. An attorney with the ACLU of Texas was permitted to watch a few magistration dockets in the jail before the Sheriff made the decision to close the hearings to the public. Allegations about what happens during the hearing are based on undersigned counsel’s review in Judge McVea’s office of about 20 video recordings and the recollections of the attorney who was permitted to watch the dockets in person before they were closed to the public.
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67. When the hearings begin, the Magistrate first informs the group of arrestees of certain rights, for example, to remain silent, and to appointed counsel if they cannot afford an attorney, as required by Article 15.17 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
68. Then, the Magistrate begins calling individual names and informs the arrestee of the charge or charges against her (but not the allegations underlying the charge or charges), and the amount of money she must pay to be released.
69. The process of setting bail is a rote exercise. The Magistrate simply recites the secured money bail amount required by the County’s bail schedule.
3. The bail schedules 70. During each “arraignment,” a Magistrate sets money bail amounts according to the predetermined money bail schedules promulgated by the Defendant Judges. 71. The misdemeanor Judges, voting en banc as an administrative body, promulgated a schedule that applies to misdemeanor arrestees, see Exhibit 7 (bail schedule for misdemeanor arrestees). 72. The felony Judges, voting en banc as an administrative body, promulgated a schedule that applies to felony arrestees, see Exhibit 8 (bail schedule for felony arrestees). 73. The bail schedules are the exclusive means for determining conditions of pretrial release for arrestees who are taken to the Dallas County Jail. 74. The bail schedules require Magistrates to impose secured money bail in every case. 75. The misdemeanor bail schedule states explicitly that “[a]ll bonds are cash or surety unless otherwise specified by the Judge.” 76. The misdemeanor Judges permit Magistrates to adjust the specific amount of secured money bail required, in light of only the following factors: “the nature of the offense, the
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safety of the complaining witness and the community, as well as ensuring the appearance of the Defendant at court settings.”12 Id.
77. The misdemeanor Judges have not authorized Magistrates to consider ability to pay or alternative methods of reasonably assuring appearance in court.
78. Upon information and belief, the misdemeanor Judges recently authorized—but did not require—Magistrates to grant release on unsecured bond if a misdemeanor arrestee is charged with a non-violent offense and has no or minimal criminal history.
79. However, the Magistrates are not exercising this limited authority to consider nonfinancial conditions. The Magistrates continue their well-settled, widespread practice of requiring secured money financial conditions in every case consistent with the formally promulgated policy. The Magistrates do not inquire about ability to pay in any case.
80. The felony bail schedule is similar to the misdemeanor bail schedule. 81. As a matter of policy and practice, the Magistrates interpret the felony Judges’ bail schedule to require secured money bail in every case, and the felony Judges acquiesce in that interpretation. 82. The felony Judges permit Magistrates to deviate from the bail amounts “if justified by the facts of the case and the circumstances of the defendant.” Exhibit 8. 83. Whatever authority the felony judges have granted magistrates to deviate from the bail schedule, Magistrates do not use it: Magistrates have a well-settled, widespread practice of requiring secured money bail pursuant to the bail schedule. 84. Magistrates do not consider an arrestee’s ability to pay when determining conditions of release in misdemeanor or felony cases.
12 A previous version of the bail schedule prohibited Magistrates from reducing the money bail amount in any case.
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85. Indeed, Magistrates cannot consider ability to pay—in misdemeanor or felony cases—because they have no financial information about the arrestees who appear before them, and they make no inquiry into arrestees’ ability to pay any particular money bail amount.
86. Moreover, arrestees are told that they may not speak until after everyone’s hearing is concluded and the Magsitrate has informed each arrestee of the charge or charges against them and the money bail amounts required for release.
87. Nor do the Magistrates—or any other government official—consider alternatives to secured financial conditions of release, or make findings that a secured financial condition of release is necessary to meet any governmental interest.
88. In addition to making no affirmative inquiry into or findings concerning ability to pay, Magistrates affirmatively refuse to hear any argument from an arrestee who is bold enough to raise her inability to pay. If an arrestee does ask for a lower money bail amount or for release on non-financial conditions, as a matter of policy and practice, the Magistrate refuses to change the money bail amount required by the Judges’ schedule and tells the person to speak with her lawyer. Of course, indigent arrestees do not yet have a lawyer.
89. Magistrates refuse to reduce money bail amounts or grant release on unsecured bail or non-financial conditions, even when the Magistrate knows or should know that the person will be detained as a result of a secured financial condition of release.
90. Magistrates do not make any findings, on the record or otherwise, about the appropriateness of the conditions of release they require or alternative conditions of release in light of any government interest.
91. Magistrates also do not make any findings concerning the arrestee’s ability to pay money bail, or the reasons for the specific amount of money bail required for release.
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92. Each person’s entire judicial hearing for determining the conditions of release (or resulting in de facto money-based orders of pretrial detention) lasts about one minute or less.
4. After the arraignment docket 93. After arraignment, the officers and employees of the Sheriff’s Department are authorized by County policy to accept money bail as predetermined by the schedule and to release arrestees who pay money bail in accordance with the bail schedule. 94. After each arraignment docket concludes, Sheriff’s deputies ask arrestees whether they can afford the secured money bail required for their release. 95. Arrestees who were booked into the Dallas County Jail with sufficient cash on hand to pay the money bail amount will be taken to the “vault”13 in the jail to get the money necessary for their release. 96. Other arrestees who can afford the money bail amount, but do not have cash on hand, will be escorted to an ATM machine located in the booking area of the jail. Using this ATM, arrestees with sufficient funds in personal bank accounts can access their bank accounts, withdraw money, and purchase their release. 97. Arrestees who cannot afford the full amount of money bail on their own can make a phone call to ask a friend or family member to pay the monetary amount on their behalf, or they can contact a for-profit bonding company to assist in making the payment. 98. Arrestees who tell the Sheriff’s deputies that they cannot afford to make the monetary payment will be assigned to a housing unit and confined to a jail cell after arraignment. Arrestees are housed together with convicted prisoners, under the exact same conditions.
5. The moment of differential treatment
13 When someone is arrested, their personal clothing and belongings are inventoried and stored in a vault.
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99. From the moment an arrestee who is otherwise eligible for release (i.e., who is not subject to an immigration detainer, parole hold, or out-of-county warrant) learns the amount of money required for her release, a person with access to money can make the monetary payment required for release and be released within a few hours. This is the moment of differential treatment.
100. Secured money bail prolongs the detention of even those individuals who would be detained for other reasons, for example, those who are subject to probation holds or out-of-county warrants. Although these individuals would not be released from detention entirely if they paid the money bail amount, they would be released from Dallas County custody and eligible for transport to the other jurisdiction that requires their presence, or they could potentially secure release in the other jurisdiction. A secured financial condition of release thus prolongs the detention of a person who faces other proceedings if she is too poor to pay the money bail amount required by the Dallas County bail schedule.
101. For arrestees who cannot afford money bail, the secured financial condition of release operates as a de facto order of pretrial detention, even though Defendants do not provide the findings or procedures that the Constitution requires prior to the entry of an order of pretrial detention. None of the robust procedures required for a valid order of preventative detention exist in Dallas County, including that there is no inquiry, let alone an inquiry with counsel and basic evidentiary standards, into whether a compelling interest exists to detain a particular defendant, whether any particular identifiable danger or risk exists, and whether there are alternatives to the use of secured money bail that could mitigate any particularized risk.
102. No transparent legal standards are applied to the decision that results in the de facto pretrial detention orders.
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103. The Magistrates’ custom of requiring secured money bail as a condition of release in every case, the Judges’ acquiescence in this custom, and the Sheriff’s policy of enforcing unconstitutional orders conditioning release on a monetary payment causes systemic and automatic wealth-based detention in Dallas County.
6. Delays in appointing counsel for indigent arrestees 104. Dallas County routinely jails arrestees who cannot afford to pay money bail for two or three days before appointing a lawyer to represent them. 105. However, arrestees typically wait another several days after appointment, and sometimes a week or two, for meaningful representation to begin. The delay is caused in part by Dallas County’s refusal, as a matter of policy, to computerize or automate the process for appointing counsel. The entire appointment process is done on paper and, as a result, takes several days. 106. Public defenders’ crushing caseloads cause further delays in the beginning of meaningful representation for indigent arrestees. 107. Sheriff’s deputies distribute election-of-counsel forms after the arraignment dockets. Arrestees who wish to be appointed an attorney must provide financial information on the form. The Judges and their court coordinators14 use the financial information to determine each arrestee’s eligibility for appointed counsel.
14 Each Judge employs a “court coordinator,” who is responsible for managing the Judge’s docket, including appointing attorneys to impoverished arrestees in accordance with that judge’s individual policies and the Countywide policies.
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108. Sheriff’s Department employees sort the forms into the Judges’ mailboxes. (When a person is arrested for a misdemeanor, the case is randomly assigned to a specific Judge.15 New felony arresetes are randomly assigned to a specific Judge at arraignment.)
109. Court coordinators collect the forms once each day from the mailbox of the Judge for whom they work.
110. The court coordinators review the forms to determine which arrestees assigned to the Judge requested appointed counsel and, applying both countywide and Judge-specific criteria, whether those arrestees qualify.
111. Because court coordinators do not work on evenings, weekends, or holidays, and only retrieve the forms once each day, an individual who is arrested on a Thursday or Friday will not be appointed an attorney until Monday or Tuesday at the earliest.
112. As a matter of policy and practice, if an arrestee is in jail because she has not paid a monetary bail amount, Judges and their court coordinators presume that the individual is indigent and assign the individual appointed counsel.
113. Once court coordinators determine that an arrestee is entitled to appointed counsel, the court coordinators assign an attorney to the case and notify the attorney of the appointment.
114. All appointed attorneys are required to contact new clients within 24 hours of appointment either by visiting in person, by videolink, or by sending a letter.
115. However, there is no oversight or enforcement of this rule, and many defense attorneys do not comply with it.
116. As a result, even once an attorney is appointed, representation is further delayed.
15 All misdemeanor family violence cases are assigned to County Courts at Law Numbers 10 and 11.
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117. Arrestees lack any ability to contact an attorney who has been appointed to represent them because Judges have directed court coordinators to refrain from informing arrestees when an attorney has been appointed. Arrestees must wait until the attorney affirmatively contacts and meets with them, at the attorney’s initiative.
118. Even if an arrestee being kept in the Dallas County Jail somehow did know the name and contact information of her assigned attorney, contacting the attorney would be slow, expensive, or impossible: the arrestee’s options for contacting an attorney are to send a letter, which would take days to reach the attorney, or pay to use a phone to call the attorney. There is no way to make a no-cost call to a lawyer from the jail, where the phone system has been contracted to a private, multi-billion dollar corporation called Securus.
119. As a result of these policies and practices, arrestees who are in jail because they cannot afford to pay money bail routinely wait two or three days days, and sometimes a week, before being appointed an attorney.
120. Most wait even longer before meeting their attorneys: Impoverished arrestees who cannot pay money bail typically meet their lawyers when they are brought to court for a first appearance, which will occur only after the District Attorney’s Office decides to file the charge.
7. Delay in the DA’s decision to file charges 121. The misdemeanor judges allow the District Attorney’s (“DA”) Office four business days (or almost a week) to decide whether to file a misdemeanor case. 122. The felony judges allow the DA’s Office five business days (or one calendar week) to decide whether to file most felony cases, and ten business days (or two calendar weeks) to file thirty-six more serious felony cases, and thirty days to file three of the most serious felonies. 123. The DA’s Office can request additional time to file any charge.
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124. If charges are not filed within the relevant period of time, the arrestee must be released from jail, though the DA’s Office retains the option to pursue the case.
125. The time period within which charges must be filed or the arrestee released begins on the “date aware,” which the Judges have defined as “the date the Dallas County Sheriff’s Office enters the arrested person’s information” into its database.
126. If the arrested person’s information is entered after 8:00 a.m., Dallas County considers the information to have been entered the next day. Id.
127. As a result of the Judges’ policies, indigent arrestees who cannot afford money bail are routinely kept in jail cells for eight days (if charged with a misdemeanor) and more than two weeks (if charged with a felony) before an ADA even files a charge.
128. This time period will be longer if there is an intervening holiday. 129. The total time period that a person is detained before charges are filed will also be longer if the person was arrested by an agency other than the City of Dallas or Dallas County. These arrestees are kept for several days at outlying jails before being transferred to the Dallas County Jail, but the “date aware”—which triggers the five- or ten-business-day clock for filing charges—occurs only after the person arrives at the Dallas County Jail. 130. If the DA’s Office does not file charges within the permitted time periods, impoverished arrestees who have been kept in jail since their arrest due to their inability to pay money bail will be released on their own recognizance after days or weeks of wealth-based detention.16
16 Some impoverished arrestees, after being subjected to days or weeks of wealth-based detention but before the ADA makes a charging decision, manage to scrape together enough money from family and friends to pay a for-profit bonding company a non-refundable fee of hundreds, or thousands, of dollars to secure release from jail. Even if the ADA decides not to pursue the case, that person will never get her money back.
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131. In felony cases, after the DA’s Office files charges, arrestees are entitled to

indictment by a grand jury. Because of backlogs at the grand jury, it can take two to three months

for the indictment process to conclude.

132. The DA’s Office must first file charges and (if the case is a felony case) a grand

jury must issue an indictment before an arrestee will be brought to court for a first appearance.

133. Due to the grand jury backlogs, felony arrestees—especially those charged with

low-level felony offenses—routinely waive indictment so that they can be brought to court as soon

as the ADA files charges.

8.

Arrestees cannot challenge conditions of release before charges are

filed

134. In theory, once a defense attorney is appointed and meets her client after

approximately four days to one week of detention, the attorney could file a motion seeking

alternative conditions of release for an arrestee who cannot afford the money bail amount required

by the bail schedule.

135. In practice, however, some judges refuse to entertain these motions before the DA

files formal charges. Some Judges even claim that they lack jurisdiction to consider bond-reduction

motions before a case is formally filed.

136. Even when a defense attorney files a bond-reduction motion, Judges typically

schedule the hearing for days or a week in the future.

137. During this period of time, an arrestee who cannot afford to pay money bail will be

kept in jail.

138. The Presiding Judge of the misdemeanor courts referred to the four-to-ten-day

period before a misdemeanor case is filed as a “black hole”: during this time, nothing can happen

in the case, and impoverished arrestees are left to languish in jail cells.

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9. First appearance 139. Even after a case is filed, an arrestee may wait even longer to be taken to court. As of January 21, 2018, there were at least two individuals, arrested on January 9, 2018—one for possession of less than two ounces of marijuana and the other for trespass—who were being kept in the Dallas County Jail due to their inability to pay a $500 money bail amount. The cases were filed on January 16 and January 17, respectively, but neither has been assigned an attorney, and neither has been taken to court. 140. First appearance is not an adequate opportunity to raise ability to pay or challenge conditions of release. Instead, the Judges’ policies concerning first appearance ensure that a guilty plea is the fastest way for an impoverished arrestee to secure freedom. The Judges leverage Dallas County’s money-based post-arrest system to minimize the backlog of cases on their dockets so that they can process as many cases as possible per week, and prosecutors use it to increase conviction rates. 141. One of the purposes and effects of Dallas County’s post-arrest money-based detention scheme is to coerce and process large numbers of guilty pleas prior to any person conducting any legal or factual investigation into the charges, let alone the complete and zealous investigation and defense required by professional standards and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 142. The system begins with court coordinators, to whom the Judges give responsiblity for scheduling arrestees’ first appearances. 143. As a matter of County policy, court coordinators do not schedule first appearances until the DA’s Office files charges and (if applicable and not waived) an indictment has issued.
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144. As a result of Dallas County’s policies to allow the DA’s Office four business days to file charges in misdemeanor cases, and five or ten business days within to file most felony charges, first appearances for misdemeanor arrestees occur between four and ten days after arrest; first appearances for felony arrestees who waive indictment occur between two and three weeks after arrest; and first appearances for felony arrestees who do not waive indictment occur between two and three months after arrest.
145. On the day of an arrestee’s first appearance, officers and employees of the Sheriff’s Department will transport the arrestee from the jail to the “lock-up”—which is a holding cell that is connected to, but outside of, the courtroom—on the so-called “jail chain.”
146. “Jail chain” is the term used to refer to the group of impoverished detained arrestees who are brought to court, shackled with metal chains, for their first appearance.
147. In theory, first appearance is the first opportunity an arrestee who cannot afford to purchase her release has to speak or make any challenges to the conditions of release required by the Magistrate at “arraignment.”
148. But, as a matter of policy and practice, there is no meaningful review of the money bail amount previously imposed pursuant to the schedule. Instead, judges refuse to permit arrestees to enter the courtroom from lockup unless they have agreed to plead guilty.
149. If an arrestee agrees to plead guilty at first appearance, she will be brought into the courtroom to enter a guilty plea.
150. Most misdemeanor and low-level felony arrestees who are detained at first appearance plead guilty.
151. In fact, some court coordinators delay bringing detained arrestees to court until they believe, based on past experience, that the individual is likely to plead guilty.
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152. Most misdemeanor and low-level felony arrestees who plead guilty at first appearance accept a sentence of time served and are then released from jail that day.17
153. Others who plead guilty at first appearance but are not released that day accept sentences that nonetheless result in their release well before any subsequent court appearance would occur. The defense attorney is responsible for scheduling subsequent court appearances.
154. Although requesting a bail reduction or seeking release on a personal bond is a theoretical possibility at the first appearance, it almost never happens. When it does, a hearing on the motion is typically set for about a week in the future as a matter of policy. Defense attorneys must ask the judge to break with custom to hear any matters at first appearance related to arrestees who are not pleading guilty.
155. Even when Judges finally rule on bail reduction applications, they refuse to consider ability to pay, basing the decision instead on other factors, such as the person’s criminal history or current charge. Judges very rarely grant bond reductions or permit release without requiring secured money bail.
156. Due to these policies and practices, for people who cannot afford money bail, a guilty plea at first appearance is typically the fastest way out of jail.
157. If an arrestee does not plead guilty at the first appearance, she will be taken back to Dallas County Jail, where she will be kept in a jail cell until her attorney decides to schedule another court appearance.
17 The policies and practices in Dallas County are similar to the system that was enjoined in Harris County, where 67% of detained misdemeanor arrestees who pled guilty at their first appearance were released within a day of conviction, and 83% who pled guilty at first appearance were released within five days of conviction. ODonnell v. Harris County, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1114 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2017).
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158. It can take weeks or months for a subsequent appearance. As opposed to the federal system, which imposes strict time limits on pretrial detention through the Speedy Trial Act, Texas has mandated no strict time limits on pretrial detention.
10. Summary of the post-arrest process 159. The above-described policies and practices mean that a typical individual without financial means will be detained solely because of her inability to make a monetary payment for at least one week if charged with a misdemeanor, at least two weeks if charged with a felony and the arrestee decides to waive indictment, and for two or three months if charged with a felony and the arrestee does not waive indictment, before there is even a theoretical opportunity to challenge conditions of release. 160. Many arrestees will be kept in jail even longer solely because they cannot pay money bail and are not willing to plead guilty. 161. At any moment in the post-arrest process, an arrestee who is otherwise eligible for release can pay the money bail required by the County’s bail schedule and walk out of the doors of the jail. 162. Defendants’ foregoing policies have consistently, for years, resulted in the needless and devastating jailing of impoverished arrestees in Dallas County. 163. In 2017, about 50% of misdemeanor cases and about 50% of felony cases were resolved while the arrestee was in a jail cell because she could not afford secured money bail.
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C. Arrestees who cannot afford to pay secured money bail will be detained in the Dallas County Jail for days or weeks due to their inability to pay
164. In Dallas County, there are four types of bonds an arrestee can post to secure release from jail after arrest and before disposition: cash bonds, surety bonds, pretrial-release bonds, and personal bonds (also referred to as “personal recognizance bonds”).
165. Each of these mechanisms of release requires either an upfront monetary payment, or significant time in jail.
166. A person will be released on a “cash bond” if she pays the full money bail amount required for release. Arrestees who can afford to pay a cash bond typically do so quickly after arrest and are generally released the same day as their arrest, usually within hours of being arrested.
167. A “surety bond” involves a contract between an arrestee and a for-profit bail bond company. Arrestees securing release from jail using a surety bond typicially pay the company a nonrefundable fee equal to 10% of the total money bail amount required for release.
168. In 2016 (as in September 2017), Dallas County arrestees who contracted with bail bond companies to secure release suffered, on average, four days of wealth-based detention before paying the non-refundable premium to a commercial bonding company. Thus, arrestees who eventually manage to pay the bond company’s “[r]ansom”18 to purchase their release, must still
18 As Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg observed more than 50 years ago in the Forward to the 1965 book by Ronald L. Goldfarb, Ransom: A Critique of the American Bail System, “If it is true that ‘the quality of a nation’s civilization can be largely measured by the methods it uses in the enforcement of its criminal law,’ then the American bail system as it now operates can no longer be tolerated. At best, it is a system of checkbook justice; at worst, a highly commercialized racket.”
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spend days or weeks in jail due to their inability to pay while their family and friends try to come up with the money.19
169. “Pretrial-release bonds” are a third type of bond. A pretrial-release bond is the term used for the low-cost bonds for which Dallas County’s Pretrial Services Department screens arrestees. These bonds require arrestees to pay an administrative fee of either 3% of the full bond amount or $20, whichever is greater, to secure release. They are issued pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 17.03(g) and Article 17.42.
170. Arrestees who are released on pretrial-release bonds remain in jail an average of three days before being released.
171. Dallas County’s Pretrial Services agency—which is chronically understaffed and under-resourced as a matter of County policy, and does not provide meaningful pretrial supervision—screens arrestees for pretrial-release bonds according to criteria that the Dallas County Commissioners Court set forth in a generally applicable Order issued in 1999. Exhibit 9.
172. The Order constitutes a policy decision regarding the categories of arrestees who are ineligible for pretrial release without paying the full amount of the secured financial condition required by the bail schedule. It renders the vast majority of arrestees ineligible for a pretrialrelease bond.
173. The criteria an arrestee must satisfy to be eligible for a pretrial-release bond, as set forth in the Order, include: (1) residence in Dallas County or an adjoining county and (2) the ability to provide contact information for two (previously four) “references” who can confirm both the arrestee’s residence and employment.
19 In this way, the use of surety bonds effectuates the transfer of wealth from some of the poorest members of the community to private for-profit companies and traps arrestees in cycles of debt and imprisonment. See generally, Campaign for Smart Justice, Selling Off Our Freedom: How Insurance Corporations Have Taken Over Our Bail System 26–33 (2017), available at https://colorofchange.org/bail-industry-report/.
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174. Because people who are homeless have no residence that their “references” could “verify,” the Commissioners’ Order renders them categorically ineligible for pretrial-release bonds. This policy affects hundreds of people every month: in September 2017 alone, 399 people who were homeless were booked into the Dallas County Jail.
175. Arrestees are ineligible if they were convicted in the previous ten years of any violent felony, or if they were convicted in the last 12 months, or are currently charged with, any misdemeanor involving assault. Arrestees are also ineligible if they were convicted of a felony in the past year, or more than two felonies within the past ten years.20
176. Arrestees are ineligible if they have ever forfeited a bond in a felony case, if they forfeited a bond in a misdemeanor case in the last three years, or if they forfeited bonds in two misdemeanor cases in the past ten years.
177. Arrestees must “exhibit a demeanor which implies a willingness to cooperate with the conditions of Pre-Trial Release” to be eligible for a pretrial-release bond, a criterion that invites arbitrary and discriminatory decision-making by County employees making this decision.
178. Pretrial Services does not consider a person’s ability to pay when determining eligibility.
179. Pretrial Services also does not consider the availability of non-financial alternative conditions of release that would reasonably assure appearance and community safety.
180. Because of the strict criteria set forth by the Commissioners in this written policy, the vast majority of arrestees are deemed ineligible for release on a pretrial-release bond. Once all
20 This exclusion affects hundreds of impoverished arrestees every year because in Texas, many non-violent and minor offenses are crimes of poverty and are considered felonies, including, for example, third-offender theft under $750 (i.e. an enhanced misdemeanor offense). See Cary Aspinwall, Why Dallas County Can Set $150,000 Bail for a $105 Shoplifting Charge—and How Taxpayers Lose, Dall. Morning News, Dec. 29, 2016, available at https://www.dallasnews.com/news/social-justice-1/2016/12/29/dallas-county-demands-150000-bail-105-shopliftingcharge-taxpayers-lose. Many other felonies are non-violent drug possession charges.
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of the restrictions on eligibility are applied, it is generally only first time offenders charged with non-violent offenses who are even eligible to receive pretrial-release bonds.
181. Eligibility for pretrial-release bonds is never assessed prior to arraignment and booking.
182. If a person appears to be eligible based on all the criteria in the Commissioner’s Court’s 1999 order, a pretrial services agent will interview the person after booking.
183. Interviews generally take place the first business day after an arrest, but they can be delayed for several reasons, including that Pretrial Services agents work only Monday through Friday, so a person arrested on Thursday or Friday will not be assessed for eligibility until Monday or Tuesday at the earliest. In September 2017, 132 people were interviewed: an average of about 4.4 interviews per day. This number is typical.21
184. During the interview, arrestees are asked to provide their current address, information about how they can be contacted, and employment information. Pretrial Services also asks the arrestee for the contact information of two or more “references” who will have to verify the arrestee’s address before a pretrial-release bond can be granted.
185. Pretrial Services does not collect information about the person’s finances or education history, and does not screen arrestees to determine indigency.
186. Not everyone who is interviewed will be released on a pretrial-release bond. For example, in September 2017, only 83 of the 132 people who were interviewed were released on a pretrial-release bond. In August 2017, only 99 of the 166 people who were interviewed were released on a pretrial-release bond. The gap between the number of people interviewed for pretrial-
21 Between October 2016 and September 2017, the average monthly number of interviews was 153.5 (about 5 interviews per day). The number of interviews per month ranged from a low of 119 in June 2017 to a high of 199 in January 2017.
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release bonds and the number of people released on pretrial-release bonds is due primarily to the fact that many arrestees are homeless, and that people’s references cannot be contacted.
187. Other arrestees who are interviewed are never released because their references cannot be reached or cannot confirm the arrestee’s information.
188. The raw numbers correspond to very low percentages of arrestees being released on pretrial-release bonds. In 2016, about 3.3% of people booked into the jail were released on pretrial-release bonds; in 2015, about 4.6% of people booked into the jail were released on pretrialrelease bonds. As of September 2017, the year-to-date monthly average for 2017 was 3.2%.
189. If the arrestee’s information is not verified, she will not be released on a pretrialrelease bond, though at any time during the verification process, an arrestee can pay the money bail amount required by the bail schedule and be freed.
190. Some arrestees who cannot afford the money bail required for their release resolve their cases before the verification process can conclude.
191. Even once the person’s references are verified, release is not certain. The arrestee must then agree to follow the rules of the program, which include checking in by phone every two weeks with a Pretrial Service officer and agreeing to notify Pretrial Services of any new arrest or other court-related information, changes in address, or changes in any other information provided to Pretrial Services during the interview process.
192. Contrary to best practices, Dallas County’s Pretrial Services agency does not provide varying levels of supervision tailored to the arrestee’s specific needs, and Pretrial Services agents and Judges do not impose the kind of non-financial conditions proven to mitigate heightened risks of nonappearance and new criminal activity, such as more intense supervision including in-person check-ins, drug treatment, mental health care, or curfews.
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193. If the Pretrial Services agent determines that the risk someone poses of nonappearance or new criminal activity cannot be effectively mitigated by the standard conditions, that person will be denied a pretrial-release bond.
194. Finally, to be released on a pretrial-release bond, the arrestee must make an upfront monetary payment of 3% of the bond amount or $20, whichever is the greater amount, though this fee can be waived in the discretion of the Manager of Pretrial Services.
195. An arrestee approved for release on a pretrial-release bond who cannot afford to pay the reduced fee required for release will be kept in jail for at least one more day: the Director, who has discretion to waive the fee, generally will not consider a waiver until the business day following approval of a pretrial-release bond. Thus, if the pretrial-release bond was approved on a Friday, and the arrestee cannot afford the fee, she will be kept in jail at least until Monday, although the Director routinely attempts to expedite the review process for people who are approved for pretrial-release bonds on a Friday.
196. This policy further extends the wealth-based detention of those individuals who are deemed eligible for release pursuant to the County’s strict criteria for pretrial-release bonds and yet are too poor to pay the fee.
197. The County’s strict criteria for pretrial-release bonds render the vast majority of arrestees ineligible to receive them.
198. The fourth type of bond in Dallas County is a “personal recognizance bond,” sometimes referred to as a “personal bond.” Personal-recognizance bonds are unsecured bonds, meaning that the arrestee is released without any up-front payment, but will be required to pay the full amount of the bond if she fails to appear and the bond is forfeited.
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199. In 2016, people who were released on personal-recognizance bonds were kept in jail, on average, for more than three weeks (25 days) prior to release. Between January and September 2017, the average time to release for people released on personal-recognizance bonds was 19 days, with a high of 24 days in February 2017, and a low of 16 days in September 2017.
200. In order to be released on a personal-recognizance bond, a person’s attorney must either file a motion or informally ask the Judge to consider a request for a bond reduction.
201. Some judges refuse to hear such a request until the case has been filed, i.e. one-tothree weeks after arrest, at a minimum.
202. Since April 2017, Dallas County has begun to use personal-recognizance bonds to divert people with mental illnesses from the jail and to expedite the release of people booked into the jail who are suffering from mental illnesses.22
203. People charged with certain offenses, or who have active warrants in other counties, are ineligible for mental-health bonds. As a matter of policy and practice, anyone who is homeless is deemed ineligible for a mental-health bond. In fact, very few arrestees with mental-health diagnoses are released on mental-health bonds; the rest are kept in jail, largely because they are homeless and cannot afford money bail. Most individuals who are released pursuant to this new policy spend several days in jail prior to their release.
D. Defendants know that arrestees in Dallas County are kept in jail solely because they cannot afford money bail amounts set pursuant to the bail schedule without an inquiry and findings
22 The Dallas County Jail is the second-largest mental health care provider in Texas, second only to the Harris County Jail. One-third of inmates at the Dallas County Jail have a diagnosed mental illness. See Stephanie Kuo, Dallas County Plan Strives To Help People With Mental Illness Avoid Unnecessary Jail Time, KERA News, Apr. 5, 2017, available at http://keranews.org/post/dallas-county-plan-strives-help-people-mental-illness-avoid-unnecessaryjail-time.
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204. The Defendant Judges—and every other actor in the County’s post-arrest system, as well as anyone who has observed the bail hearings (before they were closed to the public) or first appearances—know that many of the detained individuals who appear in front of them are being confined in jail solely because they are too poor to pay the money bail amount required by the predetermined schedule.
205. Each Judge is aware of the Magistrates’ well-settled, widespread practice of requiring secured money bail based on the bail schedule without an inquiry into or findings concerning an arrestee’s present ability to pay the amount set.
206. Each Judge knows that Magistrates refuse to consider ability to pay—indeed, that Magistrates have no financial information about arrestees, and therefore cannot consider ability to pay. Each Judge also knows that Magistrates do not make findings concerning alternative conditions of release during the bail-setting hearings.
207. Each Judge knows that, as a result of these practices, thousands of individuals are detained in Dallas County every day solely because they are too poor to pay the money bail amounts imposed pursuant to the predetermined bail schedules that they promulgated.
208. For example, Judges receive a “24-hour list,” which is a list of individuals assigned to their court who were booked into the jail in the last 24 hours. From this list, each Judge can determine whether an arrestee is in jail solely because she is unable to pay a secured financial condition of release.
209. Each Judge accepts guilty pleas and issues time-served sentences every day from arrestees who are in jail solely because of a money bail amount they cannot afford. Those same judges routinely find those arrestees to be indigent for purposes of appointing counsel.
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210. The Defendants know that, for thousands of arrestees in the jail every day, there is no reason for detention other than the inability to pay a secured financial condition of release.
211. The Defendants know that secured money bail amounts are imposed in every case without an inquiry or findings concerning ability to pay and without consideration of or findings concerning alternatives, and without any of the findings or procedures required for a valid order of pretrial detention under federal law.
212. The Judges are aware of the Magistrates’ systemic failure to consider ability to pay. 213. The Judges are also aware of the Magistrates’ systemic failure to consider nonfinancial alternative conditions, or to make findings concerning ability to pay or the necessity of any particular condition of release to meet a specific government interest. 214. Each Defendant Judge knows that the Sheriff’s Department enforces the Magistrates’ secured money bail orders for every individual the Sheriff’s Department arrests, or accepts into custody after arrest by another agency, without an inquiry into or findings concerning the person’s ability to pay the predetermined amount required and without meaningful consideration of alternative conditions of release. 215. Each Judge has acquiesced in the Magistrates’ custom of failing and refusing to consider ability to pay and of consistently requiring secured money bail that results in the pretrial detention of impoverished arrestees. Each Judge has also acquiesced in the Sheriff’s enforcement of these unconstitutional detention orders. The misdemeanor and felony Judges have not taken any formal action to correct these constitutional violations. 216. For example, the presiding judges of the felony and misdemeanor courts have each admitted to news outlets that they know people who cannot afford their bond under the bail schedule are detained just because they are poor. The presiding Judge of the misdemeanor courts
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recently stated, “There’s a lot of people who end up in jail who can’t afford a bond, who lose their jobs, lose their apartment and end up homeless.”23
217. Yet the Judges have left the bail schedules in place, and have taken no formal action to correct the widespread practices that result in wealth-based detention. The Sheriff, too, knows that secured money bail is required of arrestees without any inquiry into or findings concerning a person’s ability to pay the amount set. The Sheriff knows that bail is set in hearings that are closed to the public, during which arrestees are prohibited from presenting evidence or making any arguments.
218. The Sheriff knows that secured money bail results in the post-arrest detention of hundreds of presumptively innocent arrestees every week, and thousands every month. The Sheriff has ready access to the list of detainees in her custody, which provides the basis for each inmate’s detention, including whether any inmate would be released if she paid a monetary bail amount, and the amount of money that any inmate is required to pay for immediate release. The Sheriff therefore knows that the imposition of secured money bail results in systemic, wealth-based detention, and that there are thousands of people in the jail every night who would be released but for their inability to pay a predetermined money bail amount required pursuant to Dallas County’s bail schedules.
219. The Sheriff has discretion under state law to refuse to enforce unlawful orders. 220. But, by policy and practice, the Sheriff chooses to enforce secured money bail amounts that operate as de facto orders of pretrial detention entered without any of the substantive findings or procedural safeguards required for valid orders of pretrial detention under federal law.
23 Tanya Eiserer, Dallas County Program to Get More Prisoners Out on Bond, WFAA, Jun. 23, 2017, available at http://www.wfaa.com/news/local/dallas-county/dallas-county-program-to-get-more-prisoners-out-onbond/451683951.
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221. The Sheriff enforces these de facto detention orders even though she knows or should know that they were issued without an inquiry and findings concerning ability to pay, without meaningful consideration of or findings concerning alternative less-restrictive conditions, without application of any transparent legal standard governing detention, and without the arrestee receiving notice and opportunity to be heard at an adversarial hearing. The Sheriff knows or should know that they operate to detain only impoverished arrestees.
222. Even if the Judges and the Sheriff did not actually know about the foregoing practices and resulting constitutional violations, they would have constructive knowledge of them. These practices occur frequently and flagrantly. They result in severe and obvious constitutional violations, to which the Judges’ and the Sheriff’s attention has been called, and which have been the subject of considerable public debate:
a. Magistrates require arrestees to pay secured money bail pursuant to the bail schedule and without any individualized determination of ability to pay or the need for particular conditions of release in well over 100 cases every day.
b. Magistrates issue these orders flagrantly, by rote imposition of secured money bail amounts from the bail schedule in proceedings lasting approximately 60 seconds, without any inquiry into ability to pay. Indeed, the Magstrates do not have any information about the arrestees’ ability to pay and do not permit arrestees to speak prior to conditions of release being determined. Sheriff’s deputies attend these proceedings every day.
c. The constitutional violations resulting from the bail schedule are severe. People are locked in jail cells for days or weeks, without the rigorous procedures or
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substantive findings required for issuing a valid order of preventive detention, just because they are poor.
d. The constitutional violations resulting from the bail schedule are obvious. Arrestees do not get any meaningful opportunity to challenge the bail amounts mandated by the schedule for days or weeks. There can be little question that people who remain locked up are unable to afford their bail: immediately following arraignment, sheriff’s deputies collect financial affidavits from people who are requesting appointed counsel because they are too poor to afford a lawyer. The Judges then make an affirmative finding that these individuals qualify for appointed counsel because they are, in fact, too poor to afford one. The Sheriff herself has ready access to a list of detainees, which shows that the vast majority of detainees in her jail are held pretrial under a secured bond they have not been able to pay. And it is no secret that this system is unconstitutional: Harris County, which operates the largest jail in Texas, was recently enjoined from detaining people using a bail schedule that operates in a substantially similar manner.
e. The Judges and Sheriff have discussed these policies with other officials, system stakeholders, and affected people. They sit on a committee that discusses ways to reduce the jail population, including adoption of a pretrial assessment tool.
f. There has been significant public discussion about Dallas’s unconstitutional, ineffective, and costly post-arrest system. For example, the Dallas Morning News and other local news outlets have repeatedly reported on how the County’s use of access to money to make release and detention decisions results in the systemic pretrial detention of impoverished arrestees. The Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs produced a white paper on pretrial detention highlighting Dallas as an example of
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an unconstitutional system. The County’s post-arrest system and its use of rigid secured money bail schedules have been topics of debate in the election for district attorney. E. Detention in the Dallas County Jail Causes Serious and Irreparable Harm 223. The Dallas County Jail is one of the largest jails in Texas. In 2016, the jail booked 67,122 people total: an average of 5,594 people every month, and 183 people every day.24 224. On any given day, the vast majority of people in Dallas County Jail cells—almost 70%—are presumptively innocent people who are there because they cannot afford to make a monetary payment. 225. One-third of the Dallas County Jail population has a mental illness.25 226. The Dallas County Jail is a notoriously dangerous place. Between January 2012 and the present, 20 people died while being kept there in pretrial custody.26 227. There is a documented history of inmate abuse by jail guards, deaths and suicides in the jail, inadequate training of jail staff, sexual abuse, and lack of access to medications and medical services.27
24 Jail Population Committee Meeting Report, at 3 (Oct. 13, 2017), available at https://www.dallascounty.org/Assets/uploads/docs/criminal-justice/jail-pop/2017/2017%20-%2009.pdf. 25 See Stephanie Kuo, Dallas County Plan Strives To Help People With Mental Illness Avoid Unnecessary Jail Time, KERA News, Apr. 5, 2017, available at http://keranews.org/post/dallas-county-plan-strives-help-people-mentalillness-avoid-unnecessary-jail-time. 26 An analysis of the Texas Attorney General’s Custodial Death Report revealed that at least 20 people died while in pretrial custody at the Dallas County Jail between January 1, 2012, and November 19, 2017. See Custodial Deaths Report, available at https://oagtx.force.com/cdr/cdrreportdeaths, and Dallas County Felony and Misdemeanor Courts Case Information, available at https://www.dallascounty.org/criminalBackgroundSearch/captcha. 27 See also Cary Aspinwall & Stephanie Lamm, Unresponsive: Women are Going to Jail in Need of Drug and Alcohol Treatment. Help Often Comes Too Late, Dall. Morning News, Dec. 17, 2017, available at https://interactives.dallasnews.com/2017/ unresponsive/; Naomi Martin, Brutal Killing Inside Dallas County Jail Leaves Experts Asking Whether It Could Have Been Prevented, Dall. Morning News, Jan. 7, 2017, available at https://www.dallasnews.com/news/dallas-county/2017/01/07/brutal-killing-inside-dallas-county-jail-leaves-expertsasking-whether-prevented.
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228. For years, the County has been aware of these intolerable conditions, and has failed
to remedy them.28
229. None of the people being detained in the Dallas County Jail due to their inability to
pay a secured financial condition of release received an inquiry into their ability to pay or
consideration of alternative, less restrictive conditions. In no case were findings made that secured
money bail was necessary to achieve any government interest. Only those individuals who are too
poor to purchase their release are subjected to these conditions and to the health and safety risks
of pretrial jailing.
F. Secured Money Bail Is Not as Effective as Many Other Methods in Securing Court Attendance or Public Safety
230. Empirical evidence does not show any relationship between monetary conditions
of release and arrestees’ rates of appearance in court.29
231. While tying pretrial freedom to wealth status is the norm in Dallas County, other
jurisdictions throughout the country do not detain people in jail because of their poverty. Instead
28 E.g., .D. Miles, Caught On Video: Inmate Claims Abuse At Dallas County Jail, CBS DGW, May 14, 2013, available at http://dfw.cbslocal.com/2013/05/14/caught-on-video-inmate-claims-abuse-at-dallas-county-jail/; Kevin Krause, Dallas County Doesn’t Want to Defend Jail Guards Accused of Causing Inmate’s Death, Dall. Morning News, May 5, 2010, available at https://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/2010/05/04/dallas-county-doesnt-want-to-d; Kevin Krause, UPDATE: Dallas County Jail Guard Arrested for Having Sex With An Inmate, Dall. Morning News, July 23, 2009, available at https://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/2009/07/23/dallas-county-jail-guard-arres-1; Kevin Krause, Former Dallas County Jail Guard Alleges Abuse in the Slammer in Tell-All Book, Dall. Morning News, Dec. 16, 2009, available at https://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/2009/12/16/former-dallas-county-jail-guar; Diane Jennings, Dallas County Detention Officer Accused of Sexually Abusing Inmate, Dall. Morning News, Apr. 2, 2013, available at https://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/2013/04/02/dallas-county-detention-officer-arrested-forabusing-an-inmate; Kevin Krause, Dallas County Jail Guard Admits Inmate Danced for Her, Dec. 31, 2009, available at https://www.dallasnews.com/news/news/2009/12/31/20091230-Dallas-County-Jail-guard-admits-inmate-8227. 29 See e,g., Arpit Gupta et al., The Heavy Costs of High Bail: Evidence from Judge Randomization 5 (2016), available at http://www.columbia.edu/~cjh2182/ GuptaHansmanFrenchman.pdf (“We find no evidence that money bail increases the probability of appearance.”); Michael Jones, Unsecured Bonds: The As Effective and Most Efficient Pretrial Release Option 3 (2013), available at http://www.pretrial.org/download/research/ Unsecured+Bonds,+The+As+Effective+and+Most+Efficient+Pretrial+Release+Option+-+Jones+2013.pdf (“Higher monetary amounts of secured bonds are associated with more pretrial jail bed use but not increased court apperance rates.”); Claire M.B. Brooker et al., The Jefferson County Bail Project: Impact Study Found Better Cost Effectiveness for Unsecured Recognizance Bonds Over Cash and Surety Bonds (Pretrial Justice Institute, June 2014) (finding that unsecured bail is equally effective as secured money bail at reasonably assuring appearing and mitigating the risk of new criminal activity).
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of relying on money, other jurisdictions release arrestees with pretrial supervision practices and procedures that can help increase court attendance and public safety without requiring detention.
232. Other jurisdictions employ numerous less restrictive methods of maximizing public safety and court appearances when necessary to guard against a particular risk. These include: unsecured bond (which do not require payment up front for release but instead allow immediate release upon a promise to pay the monetary amount if the person does not appear as required), phone and text message reminders of court dates, rides to court for those without transportation, pretrial supervision, counseling, stay-away orders, inpatient and outpatient treatment, and, in the most serious cases, curfew, home detention, and electronic GPS surveillance.
233. Jurisdictions that make full use of less-restrictive alternative conditions of release achieve much higher release rates than Dallas County. While Dallas County releases only about half of all arrestees prior to disposition—many of whom are released only after days or weeks of illegal and unnecessary wealth-based detention, New York City releases 97% of all misdemeanor arrestees, and Washington, DC releases 94.5% of all arrestees.
234. Defendants are permitted by state law to use these less-restrictive alternatives but, as a matter of routine, choose not to. Instead, Dallas County makes release and detention decisions on the basis of blunt access to cash, eschewing non-monetary alternatives that increase pretrial release while effectively mitigating risks of nonappearance or new criminal activity. As a matter of policy and practice, Defendants do not consider less restrictive alternatives to detention based on money bail that a person cannot afford.
235. Jurisdictions with robust pretrial services and non-monetary conditions of release achieve court-appearance rates of 90% for all appearances throughout the life of the cases, with
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more than 91% of those released pretrial remaining arrest-free (and 98-99% remaining arrest-free
for violent crimes).
236. Empirical evidence suggests that unsecured bond alone is just as effective at
ensuring appearance in court as secured money bail.
237. Moreover, studies show that those detained pretrial face worse outcomes at trial
and sentencing than those released pretrial, even when charged with the same offenses. Detention
on money bail increases the likelihood of conviction. One reason is that detained defendants are
more likely to plead guilty just to shorten their jail time, even if they are innocent. Detained
defendants also have a harder time preparing for their defense, gathering evidence and witnesses,
and meeting with their lawyers.
238. Using data from Philadelphia, researchers have found that a person who is detained pretrial is 13% more likely to be convicted and 21% more likely to plead guilty.30 Additionally, individuals detained pretrial receive longer jail sentences.31
239. People who are detained—instead of released on money bail or on a personal bond—when their case is resolved have significantly worse case outcomes.32
30 Megan Stevenson, Distortion of Justice: How the Inability to Pay Bail Affects Case Outcomes 18 (Jan. 8, 2017), available at https://www.law.upenn.edu/cf/faculty/mstevens/workingpapers/Stevenson%20Job%20Market%20Paper %20Jan%202016.pdf; see also Gupta, et. al, supra note 29, at 13 (finding a 12% increase in the likelihood of conviction using the same data); Paul Heaton, et al., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 Stan. L. Rev. 711 (2017). 31 Stevenson, supra note 30, at 18; Heaton, supra note 30, at 21. 32 Stevenson, supra note 30, at 18; Gupta, supra note 29, at 13 (finding a 12% increase in the likelihood of conviction using the same data); Heaton, supra note 30, at 21; Sarah R. Guidry, et al., A Blueprint for Criminal Justice Policy Solutions in Harris County 13, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/ legal_aid_indigent_defendants/2015/ls_sclaid_summit_03_tcjc_2015_harris_county_blueprint.authcheckdam.pdf (“[D]efendants who are not released pre-trial are more likely to be incarcerated following a conviction, and they generally receive longer sentences upon conviction.”); Lise Olson, Study: Inmates Who Can’t Afford Bond Face Tougher Sentences, Hous. Chron., Sept. 15, 2013, available at http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houstontexas/houston/article/Study-Inmates-who-can-t-afford-bond-face-tougher-4817053.php (discussing Carlos Mathis, an African-American man, who was held in jail for seven months on minor drug and theft charges because he could not afford money bail, and whose charges were dismissed); Isami Arifuku & Judy Wallen, Racial Disparities at
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240. Moreover, pretrial detention due to inability to pay money bail makes a person more likely to commit crime in the future and to fail to appear.33
241. Studies also show that just two days of pretrial detention increases the likelihood of future arrests and future missed court appearances of low level offenders.
242. Setting secured money bail without an inquiry into ability to pay and in an amount higher than a person can afford by definition defeats the purpose of money bail—to incentivize a person to return to court—and removes any legitimate (let alone compelling) state interest in requiring a financial condition.
243. Nor is setting money bail without findings concerning ability to pay or consideration of alternatives the most narrowly tailored way to meet any other legitimate or compelling government interest.
244. Pretrial detention causes instability in employment, housing, and care for dependent relatives.
Pretrial and Sentencing and the Effects of Pretrial Services Programs (2013), available at http://www.pretrial.org/download/research/Racial%20Disparities%20at%20Pretrial%20and%20Sentencing%20and %20the%20Effects%20of%20Pretrial%20Services%20Programs%20-%20NCCD%202013.pdf; Cynthia E. Jones, “Give Us Free”: Addressing Racial Disparities in Bail Determinations, 16 N.Y.U. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 919 (2013); Tina L. Freiburger, et. al, The Impact of Race on the Pretrial Decision, Am. J. of Crim. Just. (2010), available at http://libres.uncg.edu/ir/asu/f/Marcum_CD_2010_Impact_of_Race.pdf. 33 Heaton, supra note 30, at 787; Lowenkamp, et al., The Hidden Costs of Pretrial Detention at 3, 19 (Nov. 2013), available at http://www.pretrial.org/download/research/The%20Hidden%20Costs%20of%20Pretrial%20Detention% 20-%20 LJAF%202013.pdf (studying 153,407 defendants and finding that “when held 2-3 days, low risk defendants are almost 40 percent more likely to commit new crimes before trial than equivalent defendants held no more than 24 hours”); Arnold Foundation, Pretrial Criminal Justice Research Summary 5 (2013), available at: http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/sites/default/files/pdf/LJAF-Pretrial-CJ-Research-brief_FNL.pdf (finding that “low-risk defendants held 2–3 days were 17 percent more likely to commit another crime within two years” and that those detained “4–7 days yielded a 35 percent increase in re-offense rates.”).
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245. Pretrial detention is far more expensive than effective pretrial supervision programs. Through non-monetary tools, pretrial supervision programs can save taxpayer money while creating higher public safety and court appearance rates.
246. The detention of arrestees who do not pose significant (let alone immitigable) risks but who cannot pay the required amount for release, is a main driver of the jail population.
247. Defendants’ use of money bail leads disproportionately to the detention of people of color. Regardless of the amount of money bail imposed, people of color are more likely to be detained at disposition than people who are white.34
248. It costs Dallas County $225,321 per day—or $82.2 million per year—to incarcerate presumptively innocent people in the Dallas County Jail.35
249. Researchers at the University of Pennsylvania recently published a study of the Harris County, Texas misdemeanor money bail system and concluded that if, from 2008 to 2013, those misdemeanor arrestees for whom the minimum $500 money bail was imposed had instead been released without requiring $500 money bail, the County would have released 40,000 additional people, avoided almost 5,900 criminal convictions, reduced incarceration days by more than 400,000, and prevented the commission of 1,600 felonies and 2,400 misdemeanors due to the criminogenic effects of even brief pretrial custody. The County would have saved roughly $20 million in supervision costs alone.36
34 Megan Stevenson, et al., Bail Reform: New Directions for Pretrial Detention and Release 8–9 (2017), available at http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2747&context=faculty_scholarship; Jones, supra note 32; Marie VanNostrand, Legal and Evidence-Based Practices: Applications of Legal Principles, Laws, and Research to the Field of Pretrial Services (2007) (“Research has identified financial terms of bail as resulting in disparate outcomes due to a person's financial status and may be a form of de facto racial and ethnic discrimination”); Stephen Demuth, Racial and Ethnic Differences in Pretrial Release Decisions and Outcomes: A Comparison of Hispanic, Black, and White Felony Arrestees, 41 Criminology 873 (2003). 35 See Dallas County, Texas, Adult Criminal Justice Data Sheet, Texas Criminal Justice Coalition (2016), available at https://www.texascjc.org/system/files/publications/Adult%20Dallas%20County%20Data%20Sheet%202016_0.pdf. 36 Heaton, supra note 30, at 787.
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250. Dallas County would almost certainly see similar or greater savings if Defendants stopped imposing and enforcing automatic secured financial conditions of release that operate to detain impoverished arrestees.
251. Pretrial detention has devastating effects on people’s lives, exacerbating the effects of poverty by causing people to lose jobs, housing, cars, medical care, and even child custody. Pretrial detention also leads to more crime, increases the likelihood that the arrestee will be convicted and sentenced to jail, and leads to longer jail sentences.
Class Action Allegations 252. The named Plaintiffs bring this action, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, as a class action under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 253. A class action is a superior means, and the only practicable means, by which the named Plaintiffs and unknown Class members can challenge the Defendants’ unlawful wealthbased post-arrest detention scheme. 254. This action is brought and may properly be maintained as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(a)(1)–(4) and Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 255. This action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements of those provisions. 256. The Plaintiffs propose one class, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief: All arrestees who are or will be detained in Dallas County custody because they are unable to pay a secured financial condition of release. A. Numerosity and Impractability of Joinder. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). 257. Every person who is detained in the Dallas County Jail because she cannot afford to pay money bail and has not been ordered detained pursuant to lawful procedures is subjected to
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Defendants’ wealth-based detention scheme in which an arrestee must either pay for her liberty or
remain in a jail cell. 258. The average daily jail population in 2016 was 5,338 people.37
259. In September 2017, a typical month and the most recent month for which data could
be located, the average daily population of misdemeanor arrestees being detained pretrial was 409 people. The average daily population of state-jail felony38 arrestees being held pretrial was 253.
And the average daily population of felony arrestees (excluding state-jail-felony arrestees) being
held pretrial was 1,639. The vast majority of people being held prior to trial would be released if they could afford to pay a secured financial condition of release.39
260. On any given day, there are hundreds of outstanding arrest warrants issued in Dallas
County, and every day more are issued.
261. Even arrestees who eventually pay the monetary amount required for release, or
who are eventually released on unsecured bail, suffer wealth-based detention prior to being
released. In 2016, arrestees who were released on surety bonds spent an average of four days in
jail prior to release; arrestees who were released on pretrial-release bonds spent an average of two
days in jail prior to release (between January and September 2017, the average increased to three
37 Jail Population Committee Meeting Report, supra note 24, at 3. 38 In the early 1990s, as part of its effort to address overcrowding in its state prisons and facilitate treatment during incarceration for people struggling with drug addiction, the Texas legislature created a new category of felony offense: the state jail felony. So-called “state jail” facilities were brought within the control of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, and individuals convicted of state jail felonies were no longer sent to Texas prisons, but rather to “state jails.” State-jail felony offenses are typically non-violent offense and, in many instances, are misdemeanor offenses enhanced by prior misdemeanor convictions. Although specific data on the frequency of charges is not available in Dallas County, in Harris County, a majority of state-jail felony charges are for possession of less than a gram of a controlled substance (40% of state-jail felony arrests), and third-offender theft under $2,500 (14%), which is a misdemeanor offense unless the person charged has two prior convictions for the same misdemeanor offense. 39 Some are being held “no bond,” meaning that they have been ordered detained pretrial, albeit without the procedures required for issuing a valid detention order. They are therefore not subjected to wealth-based detention, though their constitutional rights are being violated in other ways. Others would not be released from custody even if they paid the money bail amount because they are subject to out-of-county warrants, immigration detainers, or other holds, though they would be eligible for transfer to the jurisdiction that requires their presence.
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days in jail); and arrestees who were released on personal bonds spent an average of 25 days in jail prior to release.
262. The amount of time arrestees are held in jail depends on how long it takes them to come up with the money required for their release. Some arrestees are forced to wait days or weeks until they or family members can make the payment required by the surety comopany. Others will never be able to come up with any amount of money to pay for their release. The number of current and future arrestees subject to Defendants’ policies and practices—if it is not enjoined—numbers well into the tens of thousands every year.
263. Joinder is impracticable because the members of the class are impoverished and cannot hire lawyers to bring independent claims.
B. Commonality. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). 264. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the class. The named Plaintiffs seek common relief concerning whether the Defendants’ wealth-based policies, practices, and procedures violate the rights of the class members, and relief mandating that the Defendants stop these constitutional violations. 265. The Plaintiffs’ claims raise common legal and factual questions arising from one central set of policies and practices: Defendants’ post-arrest wealth-based detention scheme. Defendants operate this scheme openly and in materially the same manner every day with respect to all arrestees. Resolution of these legal and factual issues will determine whether all of the members of the class are entitled to the constitutional relief that they seek. 266. Among the most important common questions of fact for the class are:
x Whether the Defendants have a policy and practice of determining the amount of money required to secure post-arrest release without inquiry into ability to pay or consideration of or findings concerning alternative conditions of release;
x Whether the Defendants require an amount of money be paid up front before
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releasing a person from the jail; x Whether Defendants, at any stage in the post-arrest process, inquire into a person’s
ability to pay the predetermined amount of money, or make findings concerning an arrestee’s present ability to pay any amount set or that any particular condition of release is necessary to address a specific government interest; x How long arrestees must wait in jail after arrest before they have an opportunity to raise their inability to pay for their release or to request alternative, non-financial conditions. 267. Among the most important common questions of law are:
x Whether requiring arrestees to pay money up front to secure release from postarrest detention without an inquiry into or findings concerning the arrestee’s present ability to pay the amount required, and without meaningful consideration of less restrictive alternative conditions of release, violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection clauses;
x Whether it is lawful to impose a secured financial condition of release that operates as a de facto order of pretrial detention because of a person’s inability to pay without complying with the substantive findings, legal standards, and procedures required for issuing and enforcing a transparent order of preventive detention.
C. Typicality. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
268. The Named Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the
class. Each class member suffers the same injury because Defendants refuse to comply with basic
constitutional requirements: class members are confined in jail because they could not afford to
pay the Defendants’ secured money bail. The answer to whether the Defendants’ policies and
practices are unconstitutional will determine the claims of the Named Plaintiffs and every other
class member.
D. Adequacy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
269. The Named Plaintiffs are adequate representatives of the class because their
interests in the vindication of the legal claims they raise are entirely aligned with the interests of
the other class members, each of whom has the same basic constitutional claims. The Named
Plaintiffs are members of the class, and their interests do not conflict with those of the other class
members.
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270. There are no known conflicts of interest among members of the proposed class. All of the members of the class have a similar interest in vindicating their constitutional rights in the face of Defendants’ pay-for-freedom post-arrest detention system.
271. Plaintiffs are represented by attorneys from Civil Rights Corps, Texas Fair Defense Project, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the American Civil Liberties Union of Texas, who have experience litigating complex civil rights matters in federal court and extensive knowledge of both the details of Defendants’ scheme and the relevant constitutional and statutory law. Counsels’ relevant qualifications are more fully set forth in the contemporaneously filed Motion for Class Certification.
272. The combined efforts of class counsel have so far included extensive investigation into fixed money bail schemes over a period of months, including numerous interviews with witnesses, court employees, jail inmates, families, judges, attorneys practicing in courts throughout the region, community members, statewide experts in the functioning of state and local courts, empirical researchers, and national experts in constitutional law, post-arrest procedure, law enforcement, judicial procedures, criminal law, pretrial services, and jails.
273. Class counsel have a detailed understanding of state law and practices as they relate to federal constitutional requirements. Counsel have studied the way that these systems function in other cities and counties in order to investigate the wide array of lawful options in practice for municipalities.
274. Counsel have devoted significant time and resources to becoming intimately familiar with Defendants’ scheme and with all of the relevant state and federal laws and procedures that can and should govern it. Counsel have also developed relationships with many of the individuals and families victimized by unlawful wealth-based pretrial detention practices. The
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interests of the members of the class will be fairly and adequately protected by the Plaintiffs and their attorneys.
E. Injunctive or Declaratory Relief. Rule 23(b)(2). 275. Class action status is appropriate because the Defendants, through the policies, practices, and procedures that make up its wealth-based post-arrest detention scheme, have acted in the same unconstitutional manner with respect to all class members. The Defendants apply and enforce a wealth-based system of pretrial justice: some arrestees can purchase their immediate release, while other arrestees must remain in jail solely because they cannot pay. 276. The class therefore seeks declaratory and injunctive relief that will prevent the Defendants from detaining arrestees who cannot afford cash payments. Because the putative class challenges the Defendants’ scheme as unconstitutional through declaratory and injunctive relief that would apply the same relief to every member of the class, Rule 23(b)(2) is appropriate and necessary.
Claims for Relief Count One: Defendants Violate Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection and Due Process Right Against Wealth-Based Detention by Jailing Them Because They Cannot Afford A Monetary Payment. 277. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-262. 278. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses prohibit jailing a person because of her inability to make a monetary payment. Defendants violate Plaintiffs’ substantive right against wealth-based detention by enforcing against them a system of wealth-based detention that keeps them in jail solely because they cannot afford to make a monetary payment. Defendants also infringe Plaintiffs’ rights to the presumption of innocence and to a fair trial.
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Count Two: Defendants Violate Plaintiffs’ Right to Pretrial Liberty by Jailing Them Without Procedural Due Process.
279. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-264. 280. The Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental substantive right to pretrial liberty, the presumption of innocence, and the right to a fair trial. 281. The Due Process Clause prohibits the government from depriving anyone of the fundamental right to pretrial liberty without notice that a hearing will occur, that the issue at the hearing will be whether the arrestee is a flight risk or poses a danger to the community, and a neutral decision-maker to preside over the hearing. The arrestee must have an opportunity to testify at the hearing, to present evidence on her behalf, and to contest the evidence offered against the arrestee. 282. Further, to issue a transparent order of pretrial detention—or to issue a de facto order of pretrial detention by requiring a condition of release that operates to detain—the judicial officer must make written findings, on the record, that no condition or combination of conditions could reasonably assure the appearance of the person in court and the safety of any other person or the community, and she must explain her reasons for so concluding. 283. Defendants violate Plaintiffs’ fundamental right to pretrial liberty by requiring secured money bail amounts that operate to detain without making these substantive findings or providing these necessary procedures.
Requests for Relief WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs and the other Class members request that this Court issue the following relief: a. A declaratory judgment that Defendants violate the Named Plaintiffs’ and class members’ constitutional rights by operating a system of wealth-based detention that keeps them in jail because they cannot afford to pay a secured financial condition of release required
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without an inquiry into or findings concerning ability to pay, without consideration of nonfinancial alternatives, and without findings that a particular release condition—or pretrial detention—is necessary to meet a compelling government interest;
b. An order preliminarily and permanently enjoining Defendants from operating and enforcing a system of wealth-based detention that keeps the Named Plaintiffs and class members in jail because they cannot afford a secured financial condition of release required without an inquiry into or findings concerning ability to pay, without consideration of nonfinancial alternatives, and without any findings that a particular release condition—or pretrial detention—is necessary to meet a compelling government interest.
c. Any other order and judgment this Court deems necessary to preliminarily and permanently enjoin Defendants—whether acting on behalf of the State, the County, or some other government entity—from implementing and enforcing a system of wealth-based pretrial detention that keeps arrestees in jail because they cannot afford a secured financial condition of release required without an inquiry into or findings concerning ability to pay, without consideration of non-financial alternatives, and without any findings that a particular release condition—or pretrial detention—is necessary to meet a compelling government interest;
d. An order certifying the class defined above;
e. An order and judgment granting reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and any other relief this Court deems just and proper.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Elizabeth Rossi Elizabeth Rossi* (Pro Hac Vice Application forthcoming) Maryland Attorney No. 1412180090 Alec Karakatsanis (Pro Hac Vice Application forthcoming) D.C. Bar No. 999294 Premal Dharia (Pro Hac Vice Application forthcoming) D.C. Bar No. 484091 Civil Rights Corps 910 17th Street NW, Suite 200 Washington, DC 20006 Tel: 202-599-0953 Fax: 202-609-8030 elizabeth@civilrightscorps.org alec@civilrightscorps.org premal@civilrightscorps.org
*Admitted solely to practice law in Maryland; not admitted in the District of Columbia. Practice is limited pursuant to D.C. App. R. 49(c)(3).*
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/s/ Trisha Trigilio Trisha Trigilio Texas Bar No. 24065179 Andre Segura N.Y. Bar No. 5021647 American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Texas 1500 McGowen Street, Suite 250 Houston, Texas 77004 Tel: 713.942.8146 Fax: 713.942.8966 ttrigilio@aclutx.org
/s/ Kali Cohn Kali Cohn Texas Bar. No. 24092265 American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Texas 6440 N. Central Expressway Dallas, TX 75206 Tel: 214-346-6577 Fax: 713-942-8966 kcohn@aclutx.org
/s/Brandon J. Buskey Brandon J. Buskey Alabama Bar Number: ASB-2753-A50B American Civil Liberties Union Foundation Criminal Law Reform Project 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, NY 10004 Tel: (212) 284-7364 Fax: (212) 549-2654 bbuskey@aclu.org
/s/ Susanne Pringle Susanne Pringle Texas Bar No. 24083686 springle@fairdefense.org Emily Gerrick (Application for Admission forthcoming) Texas Bar No. 24092417 Texas Fair Defense Project 314 E. Highland Mall Blvd., Suite 180 Austin, Texas 78752 Telephone: (512) 637-5220 Facsimile: (512) 637-5224
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
58

Case 3:18-cv-00154-N Document 1 Filed 01/21/18 Page 59 of 59 PageID 59 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 21st day of January, 2018, I electronically filed the foregoing with the clerk of the court for the U.S. District Court, Northern District of Texas, using the electronic case filing system of the Court. The Summons and Complaint will be served in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
By: /s/ Elizabeth Rossi Elizabeth Rossi* (Pro Hac Vice Application forthcoming) Maryland Attorney No. 1412180090 Civil Rights Corps 910 17th Street NW, Suite 200 Washington, DC 20006 Tel: 202-599-0953 Fax: 202-609-8030 elizabeth@civilrightscorps.org *Admitted solely to practice law in Maryland; not admitted in the District of Columbia. Practice is limited pursuant to D.C. App. R. 49(c)(3).
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Case 3:18-cv-00154-N Document 1-11 Filed 01/21/18 Page 1 of 2 PageID 82
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

SHANNON DAVES, ET AL. Plaintiff v.
DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS, ET AL. Defendant

Civil Action No.

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS
(This form also satisfies Fed. R. Civ. P. 7.1)
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 7.1 and LR 3.1(c), LR 3.2(e), LR 7.4, LR 81.1(a)(4)(D), and LR 81.2,
Shannon Daves, Shakena Walston, Erriyah Banks, Destinee Tovar, Petroba Michieka, James Thompson

provides the following information: For a nongovernmental corporate party, the name(s) of its parent corporation and any
publicly held corporation that owns 10% or more of its stock (if none, state "None"): *Please separate names with a comma. Only text visible within box will print.
Not applicable

A complete list of all persons, associations of persons, firms, partnerships, corporations, guarantors, insurers, affiliates, parent or subsidiary corporations, or other legal entities that are financially interested in the outcome of the case: *Please separate names with a comma. Only text visible within box will print.
Shannon Daves, Shakena Walston, Erriyah Banks, Destinee Tovar, Petroba Michieka, James Thompson, Civil Rights Corps, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Texas, the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Texas Fair Defense Project, Dallas County (Texas), Sheriff Marian Brown, Terrie McVea, Lisa Bronchetti, Steven Autry, Anthony Randall, Janet Lusk, Hal Turley, All Judges of Dallas County Criminal District Courts, All Judges of Dallas County Criminal Courts at Law, Members of the Proposed Class as Defined in the Complaint (ECF No. 1)

Case 3:18-cv-00154-N Document 1-11 Filed 01/21/18 Page 2 of 2 PageID 83

Date: Signature: Print Name: Bar Number: Address: City, State, Zip: Telephone: Fax: E-Mail:

January 21, 2018 /s/ Kali Cohn Kali Cohn 24092265 6640 N. Central Expw, Suite 403 Dallas, TX 75206 214-346-6577 713-942-8966 kcohn@aclutx.org

NOTE: To electronically file this document, you will find the event in our Case Management (CM/ECF) system, under Civil/Other Documents/Certificate of Interested Persons

 
 Case 3:18-cv-00154-N Document 164 Filed 09/20/18 Page 1 of 17 PageID 6080

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

SHANNON DAVES, et al.,

§

§

Plaintiffs,

§

§

v.

§

§

DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS, et al.,

§

§

Defendants.

§

Civil Action No. 3:18-CV-0154-N

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This Order addresses Plaintiffs Shannon Daves, Shakena Walston, Erriyah Banks,

Destinee Tovar, Petroba Michieko, and James Thompson’s motion for preliminary

injunction [3]. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ motion and issues

the Preliminary Injunction filed contemporaneously with this Order. The Court has also

granted Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification [2] in a separate order. The preliminary

injunction shall apply to the class the Court certified in that Order.

I. ORIGINS OF THE DISPUTE

This case is about Dallas County’s pretrial detention system. Plaintiffs are recent

arrestees in custody at the Dallas County Jail. Plaintiffs allege that the County, the Sheriff,

the Magistrates, the Felony Judges, and the Misdemeanor Judges employ an unconstitutional

“system of wealth-based detention by imposing and enforcing secured money bail without

an inquiry into and findings concerning the arrestee’s present ability to pay.” Compl. ¶ 8 [1].

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER – PAGE 1

Case 3:18-cv-00154-N Document 164 Filed 09/20/18 Page 2 of 17 PageID 6081
Plaintiffs seek both injunctive and declaratory relief against the County’s procedures. Now before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction.
The disposition of this case is greatly simplified by the Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in ODonnell v. Harris Cty, 892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018) (on rehearing) (ODonnell I). See also ODonnell v. Goodheart, 900 F.3d 220 (5th Cir. 2018) (ODonnell II) (reversing aspects of the injunction entered on remand from ODonnell I). This case differs from ODonnell in two respects: (1) it includes felony arrestees; and (2) Plaintiffs raise a substantive due process argument not raised in ODonnell. The Court holds that neither of those differences is material and issues a preliminary injunction in the form suggested in ODonnell I.
II. FACTUAL FINDINGS The Court makes the following findings. 1.0. The post-arrest system in Dallas County has four main actors.
1.1. First are the Dallas County Criminal Court at Law Judges (“Misdemeanor Judges”).1 1.2. Second are the Dallas County Criminal District Court Judges (“Felony Judges”).2 The Felony Judges hire and fire Magistrate Judges.
1 These are Defendants Dan Patterson, Julia Hayes, Doug Skemp, Nancy C. Mulder, Lisa Green, Angela King, Elizabeth Crowder, Tina Yoo Clinton, Peggy Hoffman, Roberto Canas, Jr., and Shequitta Kelly.
2 These are Defendants Ernest White, Hector Garza, Teresa Hawthorne, Tammy Kemp, Jennifer Bennett, Amber Givens-Davis, Livia Liu Francis, Stephanie Mitchell, Brandon Birmingham, Tracy Holmes, Robert Burns, Nancy Kennedy, Gracie Lewis, Dominique Collins, Carter Thompson, Jeanine Howard, and Stephanie Fargo.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER – PAGE 2

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1.3. Third are the Magistrate Judges.3 Magistrate Judges report to the Felony Judges, and are subject to the policies and guidance the Felony Judges promulgate. Magistrate Judges also routinely follow the guidance and policies Misdemeanor Judges distribute, but they do not report to Misdemeanor Judges. Magistrate Judges are responsible for determining the conditions of release for arrestees in Dallas County. 1.4. Fourth is the Dallas County Sheriff, Defendant Marian Brown. The Sheriff is responsible for enforcing the Magistrate Judges’ bail determinations. 2.0. The court finds that the County’s post-arrest system operates in the following way. 2.1. The process begins with an arrest. This arrest can be made by a number of agencies, including the Dallas County Sheriff’s Office, and the City of Dallas Police Department. 2.2. If either of these two agencies make the arrest, the arrestee will be taken directly to the Dallas County Jail. If another agency makes the arrest, the arrestee is taken to the jail the arresting authority operates. 2.3. The arrestee is then scheduled for a hearing that is locally referred to as an arraignment. Arraignments are held in front of Magistrate Judges, either in person or by video-link.
3 These are Defendants Terrie McVea, Lisa Bronchetti, Steven Autry, Anthony Randall, Janet Lusk, and Hal Turley.
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Case 3:18-cv-00154-N Document 164 Filed 09/20/18 Page 4 of 17 PageID 6083
2.4. At arraignments, Magistrate Judges inform the arrestee of the offense charged and set the condition required for release. 2.5. In Texas, release is generally contingent on one of two types of bonds. The first is an unsecured, or personal release bond. These require the arrestee to make a payment only if he or she fails to appear. The second is a secured bond. These require an arrestee to make an up-front payment in order to avoid detention. 2.6. In February 2018, the Felony Judges granted Magistrate Judges the authority to grant personal release, or unsecured bonds. 2.7. Video evidence taken in July 2018, however, reveals that Magistrate Judges routinely deny personal release bonds. The vast majority of arrestees are instead given secured financial conditions of release. 2.8. The Misdemeanor Judges have given Magistrate Judges a generally applicable schedule of secured financial conditions that apply to every misdemeanor arrestee in the County. 2.9. The Felony Judges have given Magistrate Judges a similar schedule for felony arrestees. 2.10. These schedules operate like a menu, associating various “prices” for release with different types of crimes and arrestees. 2.11. Magistrate Judges routinely treat these schedules as binding when determining bail. The schedules are the policy of Dallas County.
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2.12. Video evidence taken in July 2018 reveals that arraignments typically last under 30 seconds, and consist of the Magistrate Judge: (1) calling the arrestee by name, (2) informing the arrestee of the crime he or she is accused of and the bail associated with that crime, and (3) asking the arrestee if he or she is a United States citizen. 2.13. Prior to February 2018, Magistrate Judges did not take an arrestee’s ability to pay into consideration when setting bail. In February 2018, Magistrate Judges were instructed to consider a financial affidavit that arrestees have the opportunity to fill out prior to arraignment. The form asks arrestees to indicate the maximum amount of secured bail they could afford. 2.14. Yet, Magistrate Judges still routinely treat the schedules as binding, and make no adjustment in light of an arrestee’s inability to pay. The postFebruary 2018 affidavits have made no material difference in the Magistrate Judges’ practices. Routine reliance on the schedules is still the policy of Dallas County. 2.15. Once an arrestee knows the amount required for release, he or she can pay the sum and obtain release. 2.16. An arrestee who cannot access money through a bank account can call a family member or friend, or contact a commercial bonding company. If he or she still cannot access the required funds, he or she is kept in jail, assigned to a housing unit, and confined in a cell until his or her first appearance.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER – PAGE 5

Case 3:18-cv-00154-N Document 164 Filed 09/20/18 Page 6 of 17 PageID 6085
2.17. Misdemeanor arrestees typically wait between four and ten days for their first appearance before a misdemeanor judge. Felony arrestees who waive indictment typically wait two weeks for their first appearance before a felony judge. Felony arrestees who do not waive indictment typically wait two to three months. 2.18. Most misdemeanor and low level felony arrestees who are detained at the time of their first appearance elect to plead guilty. Doing so most often results in sentences of time served and immediate release. 2.19. If arrestees do not plead guilty, they will be detained until their next appearance. 2.20. Judges decline to hold an on-the-record hearing regarding bond reduction or pretrial release at the first appearance. In order to obtain such a hearing, a defense attorney must file a written motion for bond reduction. The hearing is usually scheduled for a week or more after the motion is filed. 3.0. The Court thus finds that the County’s post-arrest system automatically detains those who cannot afford the secured bond amounts recommended by the schedules. This detention can last for days, weeks, and, in some cases, even months. This detention results solely because an individual cannot afford the secured condition of release. 4.0. The County’s policy of routinely relying on the schedules thus causes the pretrial detention of indigent arrestees. The February 2018 changes that the County
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Case 3:18-cv-00154-N Document 164 Filed 09/20/18 Page 7 of 17 PageID 6086
implemented had minimal effect; the policy is still firmly in place, and the resulting harms are ongoing. 5.0. Pretrial detention has severe consequences beyond deprivation of liberty. Some examples include: loss of employment, loss of education, loss of housing and shelter, deprivation of medical treatment, inability to care for children and dependents, and exposure to violent conditions and infectious diseases in overcrowded jails.
III. THE FELONY AND MISDEMEANOR JUDGES ARE PROPER DEFENDANTS UNDER SECTION 1983; THE SHERIFF IS NOT Plaintiffs sue Dallas County under 42 U.S.C. §1983. To succeed, Plaintiffs must first “‘show that (1) an official policy (2) promulgated by the municipal policymaker (3) was the moving force behind the violation of a constitutional right.’” ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 251 F. Supp. 3d. 1052, 1148 (S.D. Tex, 2018) (quoting Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 847 (5th Cir. 2009)).4 These requirements are met as to the Felony and Misdemeanor Judges. When the Felony and Misdemeanor Judges promulgated the bail schedules, they were not acting in their judicial capacity, but rather in “their capacity as county policymakers.” ODonnell I, 892 F.3d at 156. While the schedules may not appear to be “official policy” in the traditional sense of the term, the Magistrate Judges’ routine reliance on the schedules was clearly a practice “so common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy.” ODonnell I, 892 F.3d at 155 (finding “official policy” to “include . . .
4The governmental entity here is a county, of course, rather than a municipality.
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Case 3:18-cv-00154-N Document 164 Filed 09/20/18 Page 8 of 17 PageID 6087
practices that are ‘so common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy’”) (quoting Johnson v. Moore, 958 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir. 1992)). That reliance, furthermore, is the factual foundation upon which the Plaintiffs’ constitutional theories rest. The administration of the schedules was thus, in other words, an official policy promulgated by a municipal policymaker that became the driving force behind an alleged constitutional violation. As such, the Court finds the judges are proper defendants under section 1983.
Because the Felony and Misdemeanor Judges are acting as policymakers for the County, in these circumstances, their actions can subject the County to liability under section 1983. Thus, the County is also a proper defendant. Because the County is a proper defendant, any injunction against the County would reach the Magistrate Judges, who are acting on behalf of the County. The Court, therefore, need not consider whether the Magistrate Judges are themselves proper defendants.5
The Sheriff, however, is not a proper defendant under section 1983. The Sheriff does not have policy making authority, but rather “is legally obliged to execute all lawful process” and follow the instructions of the magistrate. ODonnell I, 892 F.3d at 156. She, thus, cannot act as a policymaker like the Felony and Misdemeanor Judges. Accordingly, the Court holds that the Sheriff is not a proper defendant under section 1983.
5The Magistrate Judges here are analogous to the Hearing Officers in ODonnell I. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the injunction against the Hearing Officers, ODonnell I, 892 F.3d at 165, but did not specifically address whether they were proper defendants.
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IV. THE COURT GRANTS PLAINTIFFS’ REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
To obtain a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs must establish:
(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction is not issued, (3) that the threatened injury if the injunction is denied outweighs any harm that will result if the injunction is granted, and (4) that the grant of an injunction will not disserve the public interest.
Janvey v. Alguire, 647 F.3d 585, 595 (5th Cir. 2011). The Court holds that Plaintiffs have
satisfied each of these elements.
A. Plaintiffs Have Shown a Likelihood of Success on the Merits
1. Equal Protection Claim.6 — First, Plaintiffs have shown it is substantially likely
that Dallas County’s current post-arrest procedures violate their equal protection rights. The
Fifth Circuit in ODonnell I concluded that the equal protection issue essentially amounted
to the following:
[T]ake two misdemeanor arrestees who are identical in every way–same charge, same criminal backgrounds, same circumstances, etc.–except that one is wealthy and one is indigent. Applying the County’s current custom and practice, with their lack of individualized assessment and mechanical application of the secured bail schedule, both arrestees would almost certainly receive identical secured bail amounts. One arrestee is able to post bond, and the other is not. As a result, the wealthy arrestee is less likely to plead guilty, more likely to receive a shorter sentence or be acquitted, and less likely to bear the social costs of incarceration. The poor arrestee, by contrast, must bear the brunt of all of these, simply because he has less money than his wealthy counterpart.
6The Court is aware that in the intersection of indigency and the criminal justice system, the Supreme Court has observed that “[d]ue process and equal protection principles converge in the Court’s analysis . . . .” Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665 (1983). This Memorandum follows ODonnell I in discussing the two theories separately.
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ODonnell I, 892 F.3d at 163. That Plaintiffs’ case involves felony and misdemeanor arrestees does not change the analysis.7 The fact remains that two arrestees similar in every way except their ability to pay will have vastly different pretrial outcomes as a result of the Magistrate Judges’ mechanical application of the bond schedules. Wealthy arrestees — regardless of the crime they are accused of — who are offered secured bail can pay the requested amount and leave. Indigent arrestees in the same position cannot. Indeed, the equal protection issue that plagued ODonnell I is not cured by adding more arrestees to the mix. The Court thus finds that Plaintiffs have a substantial likelihood of succeeding on their equal protection claim.
2. Procedural Due Process Claim. — The Court reaches a similar conclusion with respect to Plaintiffs’ procedural due process arguments. To succeed on a procedural due process theory, Plaintiffs must show: (1) that there exists a liberty or property right that has been infringed by the State, and (2) that the procedures protecting that right were constitutionally deficient.” ODonnell I, 892 F.3d at 157 (citing Meza v. Livingston, 607 F.3d 392, 399 (5th Cir. 2010)).
Plaintiffs first identify a fundamental right against wealth based detention. Pls.’ Br. in Supp. of the Named Pls.’ Mot. for Class-Wide Prelim. Inj., 20-24 [4-3] (“Pls.’ Br.”). Presented with an almost identical slate of facts, the Fifth Circuit in ODonnell found this
7Although Dallas County argues that this Court should afford lesser relief than ODonnell I allowed because of the presence of felony defendants, this Court sees no reason the procedural due process or equal protection analysis would differ if a defendant were charged with a felony.
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Case 3:18-cv-00154-N Document 164 Filed 09/20/18 Page 11 of 17 PageID 6090
right to be too broad, and instead chose to recognize only the right to be “bailable upon sufficient sureties.” ODonnell I, 892 F.3d at 158. The Court finds the same reasoning applies here, and thus recognizes only the right to be bailable upon sufficient sureties.
The County’s existing procedures surrounding this right are constitutionally deficient. As stated above, the decision to impose secured bail is essentially automatic. Even after the financial affidavit was introduced, decisions are still made in an overtly mechanical way that routinely detains indigent arrestees because they cannot afford bail. That this case involves felony arrestees, again, does not change the analysis.8 The Fifth Circuit’s balancing exercise further reveals that there are procedures the County can implement that would better protect the right, without causing an untenable administrative burden. ODonnell I, 892 F.3d at 160-1. The Plaintiffs have thus shown there is a substantial likelihood that the County’s post-arrest procedures violate procedural due process.
3. Substantive Due Process Claim. — Some words are owed, however, to Plaintiffs’ alleged pretrial liberty right. Pls.’ Br., 24-6 [4-3]. Plaintiffs contend that there is a substantive due process right to pretrial liberty that requires more relief than the right to be bailable upon sufficient sureties. Id. Specifically, they seek to require a substantive finding by the Magistrate Judges that no other alternative to secured release would serve the State’s interest before detaining an individual before trial. The Court disagrees for two reasons.
8As noted above, this is in large part because the procedures for setting bail are the same regardless of the crime of which the arrestee is accused. The Court acknowledges, however, that the type of crime may impact the risk analysis when deciding the amount of bail or other security required.
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Case 3:18-cv-00154-N Document 164 Filed 09/20/18 Page 12 of 17 PageID 6091
First, while the plaintiffs in ODonnell did not raise this argument, the broader right to pretrial liberty was still a factor in ODonnell I’s balancing exercise. ODonnell I, 892 F.3d at 159 (noting that the “the right to pretrial liberty of those accused” was “particularly important”). With this right in full view, the Fifth Circuit nonetheless found that the procedures required in the model injunction struck the proper constitutional balance. This Court will follow their guidance.
Even if ODonnell I lacked this guidance, however, the Court would reach the same result. Plaintiffs chief support for their argument is United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). There, the Supreme Court upheld procedures in the Bail Reform Act that required detention of individuals “charged with certain serious felonies [only] if the Government demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence after an adversary hearing that no release conditions ‘will reasonably assure . . . the safety of any other person and the community.’” Salerno, 481 U.S. at 739 (quoting 18 U.S.C. §3142(e)).
There is no denying that Salerno firmly emphasizes the importance of the right to pretrial liberty. Id. at 750. But that alone does not establish that the right to pretrial liberty can be stretched by substantive due process to require the finding Plaintiffs seek. There is a difference between requiring that arrestees be granted some condition of release absent a showing that they are a flight risk, and requiring that arrestees be granted a condition of release they can afford absent a showing that no other condition of release is feasible. The Court accepts that due process requires the former, but declines to extend it to cover the latter.
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This is in large part because the law requires “that if a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the . . . Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process.” Walker v. City of Calhoun, GA, 2018 WL 400052, at *7 (11th Cir. Aug. 22, 2018) (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.9 (1997)). The Eighth Amendment states that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required.” U.S. CONST. Amend. VIII. Plaintiffs do not raise an Eighth Amendment claim and do not contend they can show a violation under Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) (holding that “excessive” bail under the Eighth Amendment is bail set at a higher figure than the amount reasonably calculated to assure the accused will stand trial).
The moment that Plaintiffs transition from advocating for reformed procedures to advocating for the abolition of or lessening of monetary bail, they must traverse through the Eighth Amendment. Requiring courts to use detention only as a last resort does just that. The Court declines to use substantive due process as an end-around of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiffs have thus not shown a likelihood of success on their substantive due process arguments.
B. Plaintiffs Have Shown a Risk of Irreparable Harm Failure to grant an injunction would risk irreparable harm. The status quo deprives the Plaintiff class of an established liberty interest without procedural due process and in violation of their equal protection rights. The record clearly indicates that this constitutional deprivation is ongoing and routine. The injury also extends well beyond the initial
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deprivation of liberty. Those detained lose their jobs, their homes, and much more. Without an injunction, these injuries will linger unchecked and untreated. Indeed, these were the exact facts that led the district court in ODonnell to find a risk of irreparable harm. 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1157-8. This Court agrees.
C. The Balance of Harms and the Public Interest Favor an Injunction The balance of harms also tilts heavily in favor of an injunction. Defendants fail to produce credible evidence of harm that competes with the severity of the harm to the Plaintiff class’s liberty interest at stake. Much of the evidence they lean on to support their allegations of increased failed appearances, heightened risks to the public, and exorbitant costs is the same that was presented to the district court in ODonnell. See Dallas County Defs.’ Resp. to Pls. Mot. for Prelim. Inj., 14-17 [32] (“Defs.’ Resp.”). The court there found that “the reliable, credible evidence in the record” showed that secured financial conditions fare no better than unsecured or non-financial conditions at assuring appearance or lawabiding behavior, and that community supervision was actually more cost effective than pretrial detention.9 ODonnell, 251 F. Supp. at 1131-2, 1145. This Court agrees, and none of the additional evidence Defendants produce compels a different finding. As to the public interest, “it is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional rights.” ODonnell, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1159 (quoting Simms v.
9In spite of the evidence presented on costs, nothing in the injunction the Court is granting today requires community supervision. Today’s injunction follows the guidance of the Fifth Circuit, mandating only additional procedures at the moment bail is set. This is examined in more detail in the next section.
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District of Columbia, 872 F. Supp. 2d 90, 105 (D.D.C. 2012)). The County’s post-arrest system routinely violates indigent arrestees’ constitutional rights. As such, the Court finds an injunction to be in line with the public interest.
V. RELIEF Both parties request the Court to stray from the Fifth Circuit’s model injunction in one way or another. Plaintiffs urge the Court to require a substantive finding that detention is strictly necessary before imposing it on an indigent arrestee, and to prohibit any amount of wealth based detention. See Pls. Reply to County Defs.’ Resp. in Opp’n. to Pls.’ Mot. For Prelim. Inj., 10-14 [58]. Defendants argue less relief — if any — should be granted because this case includes felony arrestees. Defs.’ Resp., 16, 22 [32]. The Court respectfully declines to do either. This case shares the same roots as ODonnell. Much like ODonnell, there is a clear showing of routine wealth based detention. There is also a clear showing this detention violates procedural due process and equal protection rights. That some of those impacted are accused of felonies, as examined above, does not meaningfully change the analysis. The apple ought not to fall far from the tree. The Fifth Circuit has designed appropriate relief for an almost identical case. Doing anything different here would put the Court in direct conflict with binding precedent. The Court thus finds that the procedures
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required to protect the rights currently in jeopardy are those articulated by the Fifth Circuit in ODonnell I.10
Broadly, those procedures include “notice, an opportunity to be heard and submit evidence within 48 hours of arrest, and a reasoned decision by an impartial decision-maker.” ODonnell I, 892 F.3d at 163. Specifically, the Court is by separate order requiring the relief set forth in the Fifth Circuit’s model injunction, slightly modified to fit the facts of this case.
CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction. Following ODonnell, the Court exercises its discretion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) to waive the bond requirement. ODonnell, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1160 (citing City of Atlanta v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, 636 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1981)). Plaintiffs are indigent and “have brought this suit to enforce their constitutional rights.” Id. The relief shall apply to the class the Court certified in a separate order, and shall take effect within thirty (30) days.
10 It is worth noting that the injunction is not absent an instruction to consider alternatives to secured release. In reaching its conclusion, ODonnell I cited case law requiring “meaningful consideration of other possible alternatives” before imposing secured conditions of release an arrestee could not afford. ODonnell I, 892 F.3d at 161 (citing Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1057 (5th Cir. 1978)). This instruction was further reflected in the model injunction: twice it states the need for consideration of whether “other condition[s]” will provide “sufficient sureties.” Id. at 164, 165. The Court adopts this language, but declines to speculate as to whether the Fifth Circuit intended this instruction to further require the precise substantive finding Plaintiffs seek.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER – PAGE 16

Case 3:18-cv-00154-N Document 164 Filed 09/20/18 Page 17 of 17 PageID 6096 Signed September 20, 2018. _________________________________ David C. Godbey United States District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER – PAGE 17

 
 Case 3:18-cv-00154-N Document 165 Filed 09/20/18 Page 1 of 7 PageID 6097

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

SHANNON DAVES, et al.,

§

§

Plaintiffs,

§

§

v.

§

§

DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS, et al.,

§

§

Defendants.

§

Civil Action No. 3:18-CV-0154-N

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

By separate Memorandum Opinion and Order of this same date, the Court has found

and held that (1) Plaintiffs are substantially likely to prevail on the merits of their procedural

due process and equal protection claims, (2) Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm if no

preliminary injunction issues, (3) the balance of harms favors the Plaintiffs, and (4) the

public interest favors issuance of a preliminary injunction. It is, therefore, ordered that the

Felony Judges and Misdemeanor Judges (as defined in the Memorandum Opinion) and

Dallas County, Texas (collectively, “Dallas County” or the “County”), together with their

respective officers, agents, attorneys, and employees, and all those acting in active concert

with them with notice of this preliminary injunction, are enjoined as follows:

1. Dallas County is enjoined from imposing prescheduled bail amounts as a

condition of release on arrestees who attest that they cannot afford such

amounts without providing an adequate process for ensuring there is individual

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION – PAGE 1

Case 3:18-cv-00154-N Document 165 Filed 09/20/18 Page 2 of 7 PageID 6098
consideration for each arrestee of whether another amount or condition provides sufficient sureties. 2. Pretrial Service staff, as County employees and subject to its policies, must verify an arrestee’s ability to pay a secured financial condition of release by an affidavit, and must explain to arrestees the nature and significance of the verification process. 3. The purpose of the explanation is to provide the notice due process requires: that a defendant’s state constitutional right to be bailable by sufficient sureties is at stake in the proceedings. Pretrial services must deliver completed affidavits to the Dallas County Sheriff’s Office before a declarant’s probable cause hearing. 4. The affidavit must give the arrestee sufficient opportunity to declare under penalty of perjury, after the significance of the information has been explained, the maximum amount of financial security the arrestee would be able to post or pay up front within 24 hours of arrest. The affidavit should ask the arrestee to provide details about his or her financial situation sufficient to help the County make reliable determinations regarding the amount of bail that would provide sufficient sureties, including: 1) arrestee and spouse’s income from employment, real property, interest and dividends, gifts, alimony, child support, retirement, disability, unemployment payments, public-assistance, and other sources; 2) arrestee and spouse’s employment history for the prior two
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION – PAGE 2

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years and gross monthly pay; 3) arrestee and spouse’s present cash available and any financial institutions where cash is held; 4) assets owned, e.g., real estate and motor vehicles; 5) money owed to arrestee and spouse; 6) dependents of arrestee and spouse, and their ages; 7) estimation of itemized monthly expenses; 8) taxes and legal costs; 9) expected major changes in income or expenses; 10) additional information the arrestee wishes to provide to help explain the inability to pay. The question is neither the arrestee's immediate ability to pay with cash on hand, nor what assets the arrestee could eventually produce after a period of pretrial detention. The question is what amount the arrestee could reasonably pay within 24 hours of his or her arrest, from any source, including the contributions of family and friends. 5. The purpose of this requirement is to provide a better, easier, and faster way to get the information needed to determine a defendant's ability to pay. 6. The affidavit can be completed within 24 hours after arrest. 7. The court does not order relief against the Magistrates, the Misdemeanor Judges, or the Felony Judges in their judicial or legislative capacities. 8. Defendants who are not subject to: (1) formal holds preventing their release from detention; (2) pending mental-health evaluations to determine competency; or (3) pretrial preventive detention orders for violating a condition of release for a crime of family violence, have a constitutionally protected state-created liberty interest in being bailable by sufficient sureties
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION – PAGE 3

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before trial. If a defendant has executed an affidavit showing an inability to pay secured money bail and the Magistrate does not order release either: (1) on an unsecured personal bond with nonfinancial conditions of release; or (2) on a secured money bond for which the defendant could pay a commercial surety's premium, as indicated on the affidavit then the defendant is entitled to a hearing within 48 hours of arrest in which an impartial decision-maker conducts an individual assessment of whether another amount of bail or condition provides sufficient sureties. At the hearing, the arrestee must have an opportunity to describe evidence in his or her favor, and to respond to evidence described or presented by law enforcement. If the decision-maker declines to lower bail from the prescheduled amount to an amount the arrestee is able to pay, or impose an alternative condition of release, then the decisionmaker must provide written factual findings or factual findings on the record explaining the reason for the decision, and the County must provide the arrestee with a formal adversarial bail review hearing before a Misdemeanor or Felony Judge. The Dallas County Sheriff is thus authorized to decline to enforce orders requiring payment of prescheduled bail amounts as a condition of release for said defendants if the orders are not accompanied by a record showing that the required individual assessment was made and an opportunity for formal review was provided. All nonfinancial conditions of release
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ordered by the Magistrates, including protective orders, drug testing, alcohol intake ignition locks, or GPS monitoring, will remain in effect. 9. The purpose of this requirement is to provide timely protection for the state-created liberty interest in pretrial release and to prevent the pretrial detention of a defendant on a financial condition when that defendant would be able to obtain release by paying but is unable to do so. By "promptly," the court means on the same time frame of release that a defendant who paid a secured money bail would receive being bailable by sufficient sureties and to prevent the automatic imposition of prescheduled bail amounts without an adequate process for ensuring that there is individualized consideration of whether another amount or condition provides sufficient sureties. 10. To enforce the 48-hour timeline, the County must make a weekly report to the district court of defendants identified above for whom a timely individual assessment has not been held. The County must also notify the defendant's counsel and/or next of kin of the delay. A pattern of delays might warrant further relief from the district court. Because the court recognizes that the County might need additional time to comply with this requirement, the County may propose a reasonable timeline for doing so. 11. The purpose of this requirement is to give timely protection to the state-created liberty interest in being bailable by sufficient sureties by enforcing federal standards indicating that 48 hours is a reasonable time frame for completing
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION – PAGE 5

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the administrative incidents to arrest. The 48-hour requirement is intended to address the endemic problem of arrestees being detained until case disposition and pleading guilty to secure faster release from pretrial detention. 12. For defendants who are subject to formal holds and who have executed an affidavit showing an inability to pay the secured financial condition of release, the Sheriff must treat the limitations period on their holds as beginning to run the earliest of: (1) after the probable cause hearing; or (2) 24 hours after arrest. The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that defendants are not prevented from or delayed in addressing their holds because they are indigent and therefore cannot pay a secured financial condition of release. 13. Defendants who do not appear competent to execute an affidavit may be evaluated under the procedures set out in the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 16.22. If competence is found, the defendant is covered by the relief the court orders, with the exception that the 24-hour period begins to run from the finding of competence rather than from the time of arrest. As under Article 16.22, nothing in this order prevents the misdemeanor arrestee from being released on secured bail or unsecured personal bond pending the evaluation. Absent further Order of this Court, this preliminary injunction will take effect thirty (30) days from the date of this order. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c), the Court waives the requirement of a bond.
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION – PAGE 6

Case 3:18-cv-00154-N Document 165 Filed 09/20/18 Page 7 of 7 PageID 6103 Signed September 20, 2018. _________________________________ David C. Godbey United States District Judge
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION – PAGE 7

 
 Case 3:18-cv-00154-N Document 166 Filed 09/20/18 Page 1 of 8 PageID 6104

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

SHANNON DAVES, et al.,

§

§

Plaintiffs,

§

§

v.

§

§

DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS, et al.,

§

§

Defendants.

§

Civil Action No. 3:18-CV-0154-N

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This Order addresses Plaintiffs Shannon Daves, Shakena Walston, Erriyah Banks,

Destinee Tovar, Petroba Michieko, and James Thompson’s motion for class certification [2].

For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ motion and certifies the following

class:

All arrestees who are or will be detained in Dallas County custody because they are unable to pay a secured financial condition of release.

If a preliminary injunction is granted, the class period will extend from the date of this order

through the final disposition of this case, or until further order from the Court.

I. ORIGINS OF THE DISPUTE

This case concerns Dallas County’s pretrial detention system. Plaintiffs are recent

arrestees in custody at the Dallas County Jail. Plaintiffs allege that the County, the Sheriff,

the Magistrates, the Felony Judges, and the Misdemeanor Judges employ an unconstitutional

“system of wealth-based detention by imposing and enforcing secured money bail without

an inquiry into and findings concerning the arrestee’s present ability to pay.” Compl. ¶ 8 [1].

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Plaintiffs seek both injunctive and declaratory relief against the County’s procedures. Now before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification.
II. THE LEGAL STANDARD FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth two main requirements that must be satisfied before a class is certified. First, Rule 23(a) states:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). Additionally, the proposed class must satisfy at least one element of Rule 23(b). FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). Here, Plaintiffs rely on 23(b)(2), which applies when “injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs’ proposed class satisfies both Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b).
III. THE PROPOSED CLASS SATISFIES RULE 23(a) Defendants do not contest that the Plaintiffs’ proposed class meets the numerosity requirement under Rule 23(a)(1), or the adequacy requirement under Rule 23(a)(4). The Court finds that Plaintiffs have proven those elements. Defendants instead argue that the proposed class lacks sufficient commonality and typicality to be certified under Rules 23(a)(2) and 23(a)(3). See Defs.’ Resp. to Mot. for Class Certification 9–11 [31]; Defs.’ Resp. to Mot. to Certify Class 8–9 [37]. The Court respectfully disagrees.
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A. The Proposed Class is Sufficiently Common To satisfy the commonality requirement under Rule 23(a)(2), Plaintiff must demonstrate that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). The key question is whether resolution of the common issues will resolve “each one of the claims in one stroke.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011). The proposed class is sufficiently cohesive for this type of relief to be granted. It does not “encompass any person arrested in Dallas County for any reason and subject to any bail.” Resp. 9 [37]. It is instead explicitly limited to those people that would not be detained but for their inability to pay the secured financial condition of release. That some of those people were arrested for felonies and others were arrested for misdemeanors does not change the analysis. Every arrestee is exposed to the same procedures that allegedly result in wealthbased pretrial detention. The process, not the result, is the origin of this dispute. Indeed, the common question in this case is not, as Defendants suggest, “why was my bail set at an amount I could not afford.” Resp. 10 [31]. Rather, it is whether or not the alleged procedures that apply to all arrestees and result in unaffordable bail deprive the proposed class members of constitutionally required process. Resolving that question will resolve the claims of every proposed class member, regardless of what crime they committed. The Court thus finds that the proposed class satisfies the requirements for commonality under Rule 23(a)(2).
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B. The Proposed Class has Requisite Typicality Plaintiffs must also demonstrate that “the claims of the representative parties are typical of the claims of the class.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3). As the Supreme Court has noted, “commonality and typicality . . . tend to merge,” as both requirements “serve as guideposts for determining . . . whether the named plaintiff’s claim and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class members will be fairly and adequately protected in their absence.” Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 378 n.5. Plaintiffs’ claims meet this mark for similar reasons to those stated above. The Plaintiffs are not challenging individual bail determinations. If they were, each claim would be unique, and satisfying the typicality requirement would be a tall order. Instead, this action challenges universal policies and practices that allegedly results in certain individuals being detained solely because they could not pay the set bail. The constitutional challenges brought by Plaintiffs against these procedures are the same challenges that any member of the class would bring. The Court thus finds that the proposed class meets the typicality requirement under Rule 23(a)(3). Accordingly, the proposed class satisfies the requirements under Rule 23(a).
IV. THE PROPOSED CLASS SATISFIES RULE 23(B) The proposed class must also satisfy one of the elements under Rule 23(b) to be certified. Plaintiffs seek certification under Rule 23(b)(2). Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when: A single injunction or declaratory judgment would provide relief to each member of the class. It does not authorize class certification when each individual class member would be entitled to a different injunction or declaratory judgment against the defendant.
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Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 360. Here, a single injunction would provide relief to each proposed class member. If the
Plaintiffs requested an injunction mandating affordable bail, the Court would be presented with the same issue the Fifth Circuit encountered in Maldonado v. Ochsner Clinic Foundation: “individualized issues [would] overwhelm class cohesiveness.” 493 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 2007) (denying certification to a proposed class seeking an injunction to require the provision of “mutually affordable health care” under 23(b)(2)). In such a case, deciding what qualifies as “affordable” bail would require individual assessments for each class member, and relief could not be granted to all class members in a single injunction. Yet that is not the injunction Plaintiffs request. They instead request an order that enjoins Defendants from using one universally applicable set of procedures, and requires them to replace it with another set of universally applicable procedures.1 Relief in the form of reformed procedures is relief for every class member. Accordingly, the Court finds that the proposed class satisfies Rule 23(b)(2).
1 Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants “must make an inquiry and findings concerning ability to pay if they demand payment of a secured financial condition of release so that they can determine whether the condition of release will actually result in detention. If the arrestee cannot afford the required payment, and the condition of release will operate to detain her, then Defendants must make the findings and provide the procedural safeguards required by the Constitution for a valid order of pretrial detention. . .”. Pls.’ Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Class Certification 8-9 [62].
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V. LACK OF NEED DOES NOT PREVENT CERTIFICATION Defendants also urge the Court to deny certification by arguing that certification is not necessary to provide the relief Plaintiffs seek. Resp. 3-9 [31]. The Court respectfully declines to do so. As a preliminary matter, it is not clear that this Court must evaluate whether certification is necessary before certifying a proposed class that satisfies Rule 23. The Circuit courts are currently split on the issue, with the Fifth Circuit yet to pick one side over the other. See Johnson v. City of Oelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1069-70 (5th Cir. 1981) (“There is a division of authority on whether a trial judge properly may deny certification to an otherwise eligible class solely because of ‘lack of need’ i.e., because all potential class members will benefit automatically from any relief granted to the named plaintiff. We need not reach that issue in this case because we believe that the substantial risk of mootness presented by the facts of this dispute was sufficient to create a need for certification.”). The Fifth Circuit has decided, however, that it is an abuse of discretion to refuse “to certify an otherwise appropriate class because of ‘lack of need’” when there is a risk of mootness. Id. at 1070. The Court finds this decision applicable and binding here. The Supreme Court’s note in Gerstein v. Pugh is particularly on point: Pretrial detention is by nature temporary, and it is most unlikely that any given individual could have his constitutional claim decided on appeal before he is either released or convicted. The individual could nonetheless suffer repeated deprivations, and it is certain that other persons similarly situated will be detained under the allegedly unconstitutional procedures. The claim, in short, is one that is distinctly ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review.’ 420 U.S. 103, 110-11 n.11 (1975).
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There is a high probability that the named Plaintiffs’ claims will become moot at some point during the litigation. Thus, under Johnson, it would seemingly be an abuse of discretion to deny certification due to lack of need. Even if it were not, however, Supreme Court “cases leave no doubt” that even if the “claims of the named plaintiffs have since been rendered moot . . . by obtaining class certification, plaintiffs preserved the merits of the controversy for review.” County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 51 (1991).
Thus, even if the Court is required to rule on the necessity of the class in addition to the requirements in Rule 23, it would be error to deny certification here due to a lack of need. Much like in Johnson, the “risk of mootness is great . . . and the issue raised is important not only to [Plaintiffs] but others similarly situated.” Johnson, 658 F.2d at 1069. Accordingly, the Court declines to deny certification due to a lack of need.
VI. CLASS CERTIFICATION IS NOT PREMATURE Defendants also allege that it would be premature for the Court to certify the proposed class before ruling on the motions to dismiss in this case. The Court disagrees. Rule 23 plainly states that a district court should rule on motions for class certification “as soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class action.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1). Where mootness problems like the one presented in this case arise, the Supreme Court has urged “district courts [to] heed strictly” to this requirement. Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 213-14 n.11 (1978). The decision is thus discretionary, though the law encourages courts to decide on certification sooner rather than later, especially when there is a risk of mootness. Given the
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Case 3:18-cv-00154-N Document 166 Filed 09/20/18 Page 8 of 8 PageID 6111 risk of mootness and request for a preliminary injunction here, the Court finds it is apt to decide on the motion for certification prior to the motions to dismiss. As such, the decision to certify the Plaintiffs’ proposed class is not premature.
CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ motion. This case may be maintained as a class action under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The named Plaintiffs are appointed as class representatives. The following class is certified: all arrestees who are or will be detained in Dallas County custody because they are unable to pay a secured financial condition of release. If a preliminary injunction is granted, the class period will extend from the date of this order through the final disposition of this case, or until further order from the Court.
Signed September 20, 2018.
_________________________________ David C. Godbey
United States District Judge
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