UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

TREVOR RICHARDSON, on his own )

behalf and on behalf of those similarly

)

situated,

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

vs.

)

)

MONROE COUNTY SHERIFF, in his )

official capacity, and, MONROE COUNTY )

COMMISSIONERS, in their official

)

capacity,

)

Defendants.

)

1:08-cv-0174-RLY-JMS

ENTRY ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT and PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO
CERTIFY CASE AS CLASS ACTION Before the court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative For Summary Judgment and Plaintiff’s Motion to Certify Case As Class Action. For the reasons herein set forth, the court DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Certify Case As Class Action. I. Background Plaintiff, Trevor Richardson (“Plaintiff”), filed a Class Action Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief in this court on February 13, 2008. At that time, Plaintiff was an inmate at the Monroe County Jail (“MCJ”). The MCJ is overseen by the Board of Commissioners of Monroe County (“Board of Commissioners”), and is

1

administered by the Monroe County Sheriff (“Sheriff”). Both the Board of Commissioners and the Sheriff are named defendants in this action and will be referred to herein collectively as “Defendants.”
Plaintiff’s incarceration at the MCJ began in August 2007. (Affidavit of Trevor Richardson (“Richardson Aff.”) ¶ 3). On September 19, 2007, Plaintiff was sentenced to a year in the MCJ. (Affidavit of William Wilson (“Wilson Aff.”) Exs. 1, 2). With good time credit, Plaintiff’s release date was determined to be February 18, 2008. (Id.).
Plaintiff served his time in an area of the MCJ known as J Block. Plaintiff alleges that the MCJ was so overcrowded that for the first four months of his incarceration, he was “forced to sleep on the floor.” (Class Action Complaint ¶ 37). In addition, Plaintiff alleges that the overcrowding caused:
tension among the [inmates], violence among the [inmates], dirty showers and living conditions, cold food, complete lack of recreation, and, in general, unsafe and hazardous conditions. (Id. ¶ 38). On December 26, 2007, Plaintiff filed a grievance with a correctional officer which went unanswered. (Richardson Aff. Ex. 1). Plaintiff treated the MCJ’s lack of response as a denial of his grievance and filed an appeal on January 10, 2008. (Id. Ex. 2). Having received no response or acknowledgment of his appeal from anyone at the MCJ, Plaintiff filed yet another appeal on January 26, 2008. (Id. Ex. 3). On February 13, 2008, Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit and motion for class certification. Plaintiff alleges that the unsafe conditions described above persist today.
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(Id. ¶¶ 19-31, 35). Plaintiff’s proposed class is defined as “any and all persons currently confined, or who will in the future be confined, in the Monroe County Jail.” (Complaint ¶ 11).
Plaintiff was released from the MCJ on February 18, 2008. II. Discussion
A. Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment 1. Dismissal Standard
Defendants attached as evidence the Affidavit of William Wilson, the jail commander of the Monroe County Detention Center. Attached to his affidavit are three exhibits: Plaintiff’s Judgment of Conviction and Sentencing Order of Probation/Commitment; a page from Plaintiff’s docket sheet which contains a minute entry dated September 18, 2007, documenting his sentencing; and the Monroe County Correctional Center Operations Directive, which provides the standard operating procedure to file a grievance in the MCJ. (See Wilson Aff. Exs. A-C). Defendants submitted these exhibits as evidence that Plaintiff was sentenced to one year in the MCJ and was released on February 18, 2008. No other facts are alleged.
Defendants styled their motion as one to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), or in the alternative, as one for summary judgment under Rule 56. Seventh Circuit law provides that a “district court may properly look beyond the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint and view whatever evidence has been submitted on the issue to determine whether in fact subject matter jurisdiction [under
3

Rule 12(b)(1)] exists.” Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 554 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Bastein v. AT&T Wireless Serv., Inc., 205 F.3d 983, 990 (7th Cir. 2000); Commodity Trend Serv. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm., 149 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 1998); Sanner v. Board of Trade of City of Chicago, 62 F.3d 918, 925 (7th Cir. 1995). “However, where the jurisdictional question is intertwined with the merits of the case, the court will treat the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Kim v. Potter, 474 F.Supp.2d 1175, 1184 (D. Ha. 2007); Weidner Comm., Inc. v. H.R.H. Prince Bandar Al Faisal, 859 F.2d 1302, 1310 n.11 (7th Cir. 1988). The jurisdictional facts raised by Defendants’ motion are not intertwined with the merits of this case. Accordingly, the court elects to treat this motion as one to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1).
2. Merits The issue presented in this case is whether Plaintiff, who filed his Complaint and Motion to Certify Case as Class Action while an inmate at the MCJ, but whose individual claims for relief are now moot due to his release from the MCJ, has standing to pursue the motion for class certification. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that when a class action is sought, the mooting of the plaintiff’s individual claims for relief does not moot the case if, as in this
4

case, the plaintiff’s individual claims are inherently transitory.1 For example, in Gerstein
v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), the named plaintiffs filed a class action challenging pretrial
detention conditions. The Court assumed that the named plaintiffs were no longer
awaiting trial at the time the trial court certified the class of pretrial detainees. Id. at 111
n. 11. In addition, there was no indication that the named plaintiffs might again be
subject to pretrial detention. Id. Nevertheless, the Court held that the case was not moot:
This case belongs, however, to that narrow class of cases in which the termination of a class representative’s claim does not moot the claims of the unnamed members of the class. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 [] (1975). Pretrial detention is by nature temporary, and it is most unlikely that any given individual could have his constitutional claim decided on appeal before he is either released or convicted. The individual could nonetheless suffer repeated deprivations, and it is certain that other persons similarly situated will be detained under the allegedly unconstitutional procedures. This claim, in short, is one that is distinctly ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review.’
Id.
Similarly, in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991), a class action
was brought by arrestees challenging the manner in which the defendant county provided
probable cause determinations to persons who had been arrested without a warrant. Id. at
47. At the time the suit was filed, the named plaintiffs had standing. Id. at 51. However,
1 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims are not inherently transitory because he did not file his Complaint and Motion to Certify Case as Class Action until five days before he was released. The facts taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff reflect that he filed a grievance on December 26, 2007, an appeal of the grievance on January 10, 2008, and yet another appeal on January 26, 2008. Plaintiff filed his Complaint and Motion to Certify Case as Class Action on February 13, 2008. These facts persuade the court that Plaintiff filed his Complaint and Motion for Class Certification in a timely fashion.
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by the time the class was certified, their individual claims were moot. Id. at 51-52. The
Court found that the case itself was not moot and that the class was properly certified:
That the case was not certified until after the named plaintiffs’ claims had become moot does not deprive us of jurisdiction. We recognized in Gerstein that “[s]ome claims are so inherently transitory that the trial court will not have even enough time to rule on a motion for class certification before the proposed representative’s individual interest expires.” . . . In such cases, the “relation back” doctrine is properly invoked to preserve the merits of the case for judicial resolution.
Id. at 52; see also United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980)
(holding that where class certification was denied in a case challenging federal parole
guidelines, the putative class representative had the right to appeal the denial, even
though he was released from prison and his claims were therefore moot); Brist v. County
of Delaware and Borough of Darby, 1995 WL 50954 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 1995) (quoting
Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 975 F.2d 964, 974-75 (3d Cir. 1992) (“Nevertheless, a named
plaintiff whose individual claim has expired may continue in his representative capacity
to litigate class certification issues . . .”)). But see Holstein v. City of Chicago, 29 F.3d
1145, 1147 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that the named plaintiff, who did not move for class
certification prior to the expiration of his individual claims, “cannot avail himself of the
class action exception to the mootness doctrine.”).
Here, Plaintiff filed the Complaint and Motion to Certify Case as Class Action
while an inmate at the MCJ, challenging the “unconstitutional and unlawful conditions of
confinement at the [MCJ] which is consistently and dangerously overcrowded.”
(Complaint ¶ 1). Plaintiff alleged in his Complaint that he and the class suffered a direct
6

and current injury as a result of their detention, and that the overcrowding conditions continue today. (See generally Complaint). Thus, at the time Plaintiff filed his Complaint and Motion to Certify Case as Class Action, Plaintiff’s injury was capable of being redressed through injunctive and declaratory relief. The fact that Plaintiff’s individual claims for relief have been rendered moot because he is no longer incarcerated “does not moot the claims of the unnamed members of the class.” McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 52. This is because Plaintiff’s claims, like those of the class, “are so inherently transitory that the trial court will not have even enough time to rule on a motion for class certification before the proposed representative’s individual interest expires.” Id. at 53 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Thus, the relation back doctrine applies “to preserve the merits of the case for judicial resolution.” Id. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is therefore DENIED.
B. Motion for Class Certification Having found Plaintiff is not precluded from representing the class, the court now turns to the issue of whether the class itself should be certified.
1. Standard Class action suits are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. A party seeking class certification bears the burden of establishing that certification is appropriate. Retired Chicago Police Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 7 F.3d 584, 596 (7th Cir. 1993). The decision whether to grant or deny a motion for class certification lies within the broad discretion of the trial court. Id.
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Rule 23 prescribes a two-step analysis to determine whether class certification is appropriate. First, a plaintiff must satisfy all four requirements of Rule 23(a): (1) numerosity; (2) commonality; (3) typicality; and (4) adequacy of representation. Clark v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 256 Fed.Appx. 818, 821 (7th Cir. 2007); Williams v. Chartwell Financial Serv., Ltd., 204 F.3d 748, 760 (7th Cir. 2000); Harriston v. Chicago Tribune Co., 992 F.2d 697, 703 (7th Cir. 1993). The failure to meet any one of these requirements precludes certification of a class. Retired Chicago Police Ass’n, 7 F.3d at 596. Second, the action must also satisfy one of the conditions of Rule 23(b). Clark, 256 Fed.Appx. at 821; Williams, 204 F.3d at 760; Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 565 F.2d 975, 977 (7th Cir. 1977). Plaintiff seeks certification under Rule 23(b)(2), which requires that the party opposing the class must have “acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.”
2. Merits Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s motion on several grounds. First, Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not meet the typicality requirement of Rule 23(a)(3). Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not meet the adequacy of representation requirement of Rule 23(a)(4). The court will address each of these arguments in turn below.
a. Typicality Defendants contend that “[Plaintiff’s] claims are moot at the beginning of the litigation and consequently, are hardly typical.” (Defendants’ Memorandum at 2). To
8

satisfy the typicality requirement of Rule 23(a)(3), the court must find that “the claims and defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3). “The typicality requirement, although closely related to the commonality question, focuses on the class representative.” Whitten v. ARS Nat’l Serv., Inc., 2001 WL 1143238, at * 4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2001); In re Prudential Ins. Co. Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 311 (3d Cir. 1998) (“The typicality requirement is designed to align the interests of the class and the class representatives so that the latter will work to benefit the entire class through the pursuit of their own goals.”). “‘A plaintiff’s claim is typical if it arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members and his or her claims are based on the same legal theory.’” De La Fuente v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 713 F.2d 225, 232 (7th Cir. 1983) (quoting H. Newberg, Class Actions § 1115(b) at 185 (1977)).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that the overcrowding in the MCJ is unconstitutional and violates state law. His individual claims for relief arose from the same conditions that the MCJ’s inmates (allegedly) currently experience. The court finds, for the reasons set forth more fully below, that Plaintiff will work for the benefit of the proposed class, even though his individual claims for relief are now moot. Accordingly, Plaintiff satisfies the typicality requirement of Rule 23(a)(3).
b. Adequacy of Representation Although Plaintiff may continue to pursue the certification of the proposed class despite the mootness of his individual claims, the court must still address whether
9

Plaintiff may adequately represent the interests of the class. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S.
at 403 (1975) (holding that mootness of the named plaintiff’s claim does not require
immediate dismissal of class action and noting that mootness of named plaintiff’s claim
“shift[s] the focus of examination from the elements of justiciability to the ability of the
named representative to ‘fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class.’”). In
addressing this factor, the focus of the court’s inquiry is whether Plaintiff has the
incentive to vigorously and zealously represent the interests of the class. Retired Chicago
Police Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 7 F.3d 584, 598 (7th Cir. 1993). The court therefore
finds it imperative to engage in this inquiry.
In Brist v. County of Delaware and Borough of Darby, 1995 WL 50954 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 7, 1995), the plaintiff commenced litigation on behalf of a class of motorists who
had been cited for weight restriction violations. At the time the class was certified the
limitation period for prosecuting the plaintiff had expired and thus, his claim was
arguably moot. Id. at *5. The court nevertheless found that plaintiff met the
requirements of Rule 23(a)(4) because he had the ability and incentive to vigorously
represent the claims of the class. Id. at *6.
Since filing his original class action complaint on February 28, 1994, [plaintiff], through his counsel, responded to two motions to dismiss the original complaint, filed a motion to certify the class, filed an amended complaint, conducted discovery on the class certification issues and filed a second class certification motion. Nothing before the court indicates that [plaintiff] will not continue to advocate the interests of the class as vigorously as he has done thus far.
Id.; see also Sosna, 419 U.S. 393, 403 (1975) (finding the named plaintiff was an
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appropriate class representative due, in part, to the fact that she continued to competently pursue the interests of the class throughout the litigation although her claim on the merits expired after class certification).
Here, Plaintiff has submitted his affidavit, stating that he is still in contact with his attorney and plans to “make [him]self available, as necessary, for any depositions or court hearings in this matter.” (Richardson Aff. ¶ 15). He further states that “[he] ha[s] friends in the [MCJ] and [is] aware of the current situation there.” (Id. ¶ 16). Given this testimony, the court finds that Plaintiff has knowledge of the current situation in the MCJ and expresses a willingness to vigorously and diligently participate in this litigation as a named plaintiff. The court further finds that his counsel is experienced in class action litigation. Accordingly, Plaintiff meets the requirement of Rule 23(a)(4).
c. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies Defendants also argue that Plaintiff is not an adequate class representative because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to bringing the present suit. The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e) requires that a prisoner fully exhaust his administrative remedies prior to initiating litigation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Although not depriving the district court of subject-matter jurisdiction, the provision requires dismissal of any case in which an available administrative remedy has not been exhausted.” Massey v. Wheeler, 221 F.3d 1034 (7th Cir. 2000). However, failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense “and the burden of proof is on the defendants.” Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006).
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Defendants cite to the Affidavit of William Wilson for the proposition that
Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit. (Wilson Aff. ¶
6). In response, Plaintiff filed his affidavit and attached copies of the following: a
grievance dated December 26, 2007; an appeal of the grievance dated January 10, 2008;
and a second appeal of his grievance dated January 26, 2008. (See Richardson Aff. Exs.
1, 2, 3). This evidence reflects, taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, that Plaintiff
followed the Inmate Grievance Procedure of the MCJ. (See Wilson Aff., Ex. C). The
PLRA requires nothing more. Dole, 438 F.3d at 809 (“Prison officials may not take
unfair advantage of the exhaustion requirement, however, and a remedy becomes
‘unavailable’ if prison employees do not respond to a properly filed grievance . . . .”); see
also Lewis v. Washington, 300 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that a prisoner “must
exhaust only those administrative remedies that are available to him.”).
Given the evidence submitted by Plaintiff, the court finds that, for purposes of the
motions before the court, Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies.2 Because there
2A related issue raised, but not vigorously argued, by the Defendants is whether the class members themselves should be required to exhaust their administrative remedies in order to be members of the class. Stated differently, the issue presented is whether the “vicarious” exhaustion approach of Title VII applies to prisoner class actions seeking only declaratory and injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2). As applied in Title VII cases, a class representative’s exhaustion of administrative remedies is sufficient for the entire class. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1975) (“The Courts of Appeals that have confronted the issue are unanimous in recognizing that backpay may be awarded on a class basis under Title VII without exhaustion of administrative procedures by the unnamed class members.”); Hartman v. Duffey, 88 F.3d 1232, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Although the Seventh Circuit has not had occasion to address this issue, this court recently found, relying upon precedent from the Eleventh Circuit and other district courts, that the vicarious exhaustion requirement applies to cases brought under the PLRA. See
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are no other objections to his fitness to serve in a representative capacity, the court further finds Plaintiff satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(a)(4).
d. Rule 23(b)(2) In order to certify the class, Plaintiff must also satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2), which provides that the party who opposes the class must have “acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.” Defendants do not dispute that this requirement is met. Accordingly, the court finds Plaintiff satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b) and thus, Plaintiff’s Motion to Certify Case as a Class Action is GRANTED.
Meisberger v. Donahue, 245 F.R.D. 627, 629-30 (S.D. Ind. 2007). The court sees no reason to diverge from its earlier ruling.
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III. Conclusion Although Plaintiff’s individual claims for relief are moot, the court finds Plaintiff
has standing to represent the class in this action. The court further finds Plaintiff satisfies the requirements for class certification imposed by Rule 23. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Docket # 15) is DENIED, and Plaintiff’s Motion to Certify Case as a Class Action (Docket # 6) is GRANTED.

SO ORDERED this 4th day of August 2008.

Electronic Copies to:
Kenneth J. Falk ACLU OF INDIANA kfalk@aclu-in.org
Ronald J. Semler STEPHENSON MOROW & SEMLER rsemler@stephlaw.com
James S. Stephenson STEPHENSON MOROW & SEMLER jstephenson@stephlaw.com

R__IC__H_A__R_D___L_._Y__O_U__N_G__, _J_U_D__G_E____
URInCitHedARStDatLes. YDOisUtrNicGt ,CJoUuDrtGE SUonuittehderSntaDteisstDricstroicft ICnoduiartna Southern District of Indiana

14

 
 Case 1:08-cv-00174-RLY-MJD Document 1 Filed 02/13/08 Page 1 of 8 PageID #: 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DNISION

TREVOR RICHARDSON, on his own behalf and on

)

behalf of class of those similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

MONROE COUNTY SHERIFF, in his official capacity, )

and, MONROE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, in their )

official capacity,

1)

)

Defendants.

)

No.
Complaint-Class Action
: 0 8 -cv- 01.7 h. -RLY -JMS

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF

Introduction

1. This is a class action complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief challenging

unconstitutional and unlawful conditions ofconfinement at the Monroe County Jail which is

consistently and dangerously overcrowded.

Jurisdiction

2. This Court has jurisdiction of this cause pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.

3. Venue is proper in this judicial district pursuant to 28 US.C. § 1391.

4. Declaratory relief is authorized by 28 U.S.c. §§ 2201, 2202 and by Rule 57 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.

5. This action is brought, pursuant to 42 US.c. § 1983, to redress the deprivation, under color

of state law, of rights secured by the Constitution of the United States.

6. This Court has jurisdiction of the supplemental state law claims pursuant to 28 US.c. §

Case 1:08-cv-00174-RLY-MJD Document 1 Filed 02/13/08 Page 2 of 8 PageID #: 2
1367. Parties 7. Trevor Richardson is an adult male who is confined in the Monroe County Jail. 8. The office of the Monroe County Sheriff is sued pursuant to Rule 25(d)(2) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 9. The office of the Monroe County Commissioners is sued pursuant to Rule 25(d)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Class Action Allegations 10. This action is brought by plaintiff on his own behalf and on behalf of a class of those
similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(2) ofthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 11. The class is defined as:
any and all persons currently confined, or who will in the future be confined, in the Monroe County Jail. 12. All requirements of Rule 23(a) are met in this cause in that: a. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. Although the capacity ofthe Monroe County Jail is approximately 200, it operates with many more prisoners than 200. b. There are questions of law or fact common to the class: whether conditions in the Monroe County Jail violate the United States Constitution and Indiana law. c. The claims of the representative party are typical of those of the class. d. The representative party will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 13. The further requirements of Rule 23(b)(2) ofthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are met in this cause in that the defendants, at all times, have acted or have refused to act in a manner
2

Case 1:08-cv-00174-RLY-MJD Document 1 Filed 02/13/08 Page 3 of 8 PageID #: 3
generally applicable to the class, thereby making final injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate with respect to the class as a whole. Le2al Background 14. Indiana law provides that the sheriff of a county must "[t]ake care ofthe county jail and the prisoners there ...." IND. CODE § 36-2-13-5(a)(7). 15. The county commissioners of each Indiana county, as the county's executive, have the statutory duty to "establish and maintain a ... countyjail ...." IND. CODE § 36-2-2-24. This includes providing ajail and keeping it in good repair. Weatherholt v. Spencer County, 639 N.E.2d 354 (Ind.Ct.App. 1994). Factual Allegations 16. The Monroe County Jail has a rated capacity of approximately 200 beds, excluding booking and isolation cells. 17. The Jail operates over the rated bed capacity for much, ifnot all, of the time. 18. A number ofthe living areas in the Jails are grossly overcrowded. 19. Because of overcrowding, prisoners are forced to sleep in day room areas outside of cells. 20. Because of overcrowding, prisoners are forced to sleep on the floor ofthe gymnasium. 21. This prevents the prisoners ofthe Jail from having recreation opportunities. 22. There are no bathroom or showers in the gymnasium. 23. In order that prisoners who are forced to reside on the floor of the gymnasium may have access to toilets and showers the door in J Block to the gymnasium is kept open so that the prisoners in the gym can access toilets and showers in J Block.
3

Case 1:08-cv-00174-RLY-MJD Document 1 Filed 02/13/08 Page 4 of 8 PageID #: 4
24. J Block has approximately 24 permanent beds in it in 16 cells. 25. Because ofthe overcrowding, however, there have been at times more than 40 people on the
floor of either J Block or the gymnasium. 26. All these prisoners are forced to share two showers and limited toilets. 27. A number of other cell block areas in the Jail are also overcrowded. 28. The overcrowding leads to increased tension between the prisoners that frequently erupts into
violence. 29. For example, prisoners have fought over bed space. 30. Because ofthe overcrowding, the cell blocks and particularly the showers, become extremely
dirty. 31. Because of the overcrowding, meals are frequently served cold. 32. Living conditions for those in the overcrowded cell blocks, are inhumane, unsanitary,
dangerous and harsh. 33. The cell areas are too crowded for prisoners to be able to effectively exercise. There is no
ability for prisoners to engage in recreation in the indoor recreation area because prisoner are housed on its floor. Prisoners are not taken for outdoor recreation. 34. At times, some of the blocks are so overcrowded that it is impossible to walk in the areas outside the cells that are open to the prisoners during the day. There are simply too many people on the floor. 35. Because of the overcrowding there is a lack of supervision over the inmates which is extremely dangerous.
4

Case 1:08-cv-00174-RLY-MJD Document 1 Filed 02/13/08 Page 5 of 8 PageID #: 5
36. Trevor Richardson has been in the Monroe County Jail for almost six months. 37. For more than four months he was forced to sleep on the floor in J Block because of
overcrowding. 3S. He has experienced the extreme overcrowding of J Block and the other problems that
accompany the overcrowding: tension among the prisoners, violence among the prisoners, dirty showers and living conditions, cold food, complete lack of recreation, and, in general, unsafe and hazardous conditions. 39. He is currently placed on J Block. 40. Trevor Richardson has filed a number of grievances concerning conditions at the Jail, but has received no response despite complying with the Jail's grievance procedure. 41. After receiving no response at all from the Jail to his initial grievances Trevor Richardson attempted to fully comply with the grievance requirements by filing another initial grievance on December 26, 2007. A copy is attached as Attachment 1. 42. At no time did he receive any reply to this grievance or even an acknowledgement. 43. Nevertheless, after 14 days, there being no response, Trevor Richardson deemed the
grievance to be denied and filed an appeal on January to, 200S. A copy is attached as
Attachment 2. 44. Mr. Richardson was not supplied an appeal form by anyone at the Monroe County Jail, but
utilized an appeal form received from his counsel. 45. Again, there was no response, or even acknowledgement, of the grievance appeal. 46. After 15 days, during which time no response or acknowledgement was made of the appeal,
5

Case 1:08-cv-00174-RLY-MJD Document 1 Filed 02/13/08 Page 6 of 8 PageID #: 6
Mr. Richardson filed a further appeal. That further appeal is attached as Attachment 3. 47. Again, at no time was Mr. Richardson supplied an appeal form by anyone associated with the
Jail. He received one from his counsel. 48. No response or even acknowledgement has been received ofthis last appeal. 49. Mr. Richardson has exhausted all administrative remedies that are available to him. 50. The conditions in the Monroe County Jail result in the denial ofbasic human needs and the
minimal civilized measures of life's necessities and amount to punishment. 51. Defendants have been on notice for some time concerning the deficiencies in the Jail but
have failed to take the necessary steps to resolve the overcrowding and other problems. At all times defendants have acted and have failed to act in a deliberate and purposeful manner. 52. At all times the defendants have known ofthe risk of serious harm faced by plaintiff and the class and have failed to take reasonable measures to abate the risk. 53. The defendant County Commissioners have failed in their mandatory, non-discretionary duty to establish and maintain the county jail. 54. Defendant Sheriff has failed in his mandatory, non-discretionary duty, to take care of the Monroe County Jail and the prisoners and detainees housed there. 55. The actions and inactions ofthe defendants are causing the plaintiff and the class irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law. 56. At all times defendants have acted under color of state law. Claims for Relief 57. The conditions at the Monroe County Jail violate the 14th Amendment to the United States
6

Case 1:08-cv-00174-RLY-MJD Document 1 Filed 02/13/08 Page 7 of 8 PageID #: 7
Constitution as applied to pre-trial detainees and the 8th Amendment to the United States Constitution as applied to convicted prisoners. 58. Defendant County Commissioners of Monroe County, Indiana, have failed to maintain a county jail as required by IND. CODE § 36-2-2-24. 59. Defendant Sheriff has failed in his duty to care for prisoners confined to the Monroe County Jail as required by IND. CODE § 36-2-13-5(a)(7). Request for Relief WHEREFORE, plaintiff requests that this Court: 1. Certify this cause as a class action with the class as defined above. 2. Declare that the actions and the inactions of the defendants violate the United States Constitution and Indiana law for the reasons specified above. 3. Enter a preliminary injunction, later to be made permanent, requiring defendants to take all steps necessary to operate the Jail in a manner free of constitutional infirmity. 4. Enter a preliminary injunction, later to be made permanent, requiring defendants to take all steps necessary to comply with all ofthe duties owed to plaintiff and the class under Indiana law. 5. Award plaintiff costs and reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.c. § 1988. 6. Award all other just and proper relief.
7

Case 1:08-cv-00174-RLY-MJD Document 1 Filed 02/13/08 Page 8 of 8 PageID #: 8 K n J. Falk 110.6 77-49 .~CLU of Indiana 1031 E. Washington St. Indianapolis, IN 46202 317/635-4059 ext. 229 fax: 317/635-4105 e-mail: kfalk@aclu-in.org Attorney for Plaintiff and the Putative Class
8

 
 Case 1:08-cv-00174-RLY-MJD Document 52 Filed 08/14/09 Page 1 of 8 PageID #: 209

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

TREVOR RICHARDSON, on his own behalf and on behalf of a class of those similarly situated,
Plaintiff,
v.
MONROE COUNTY SHERIFF, in his official capacity, and the MONROE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, in their official capacity,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) ) ) CAUSE NO. 1:08-CV-174-RLY-JMS ) ) ) ) ) )

STIPULATION OF PARTIES TO ENTER INTO PRIVATE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AFTER PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL GIVES NOTICE TO THE CLASS

Come now the parties, by their counsel, and stipulate and agree as follows:

I. Introduction

1. This is an action for injunctive relief brought by Trevor Richardson, a former

detainee at the Monroe County Jail, which challenges conditions in existence at the jail as

allegedly unconstitutional under the United State Constitution as well as unlawful under Indiana

law.

2. This action has been certified as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(2)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The class is defined as:

Any and all persons currently confined, or who will in the future be confined, in the Monroe County Jail.

3. The defendants do not concede the merits of any of the allegations of the

plaintiffs’ Complaint. However, the parties are desirous of attempting to reach a settlement of

this matter and therefore they enter into this Stipulation. Plaintiffs stipulate that defendants’

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entry into this Private Settlement Agreement (“Agreement”) is not an admission of any kind and imposes no liability on defendants for any violation of law, constitutional or otherwise.
4. Although plaintiffs’ counsel has signed this Stipulation, the parties agree that this Stipulation will not be deemed to be approved by the class until notice is given to the class as provided in paragraphs 20 and 21 and until plaintiffs’ counsel notifies the court and the parties following that notice and the court finds that this Agreement is a fair and just resolution of this matter. For purposes of this Stipulation this latter date will be referred to as “the effective date.”
5. Insofar as the plaintiffs have sought relief under 42 U.S.C., § 1983 for violations of the United States Constitution, this litigation is subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3626, et seq. This Act imposes certain requirements on agreements made in litigation such as this, but provides that the parties may enter into private agreements which are exempted from the requirements of the Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(c). However, such agreements are not subject to enforcement under federal law other than reinstatement of the proceedings, although they are enforceable under state law as breaches of contract. Id.
6. Accordingly, to the extent that the parties agree to the terms and conditions as set forth below, this is deemed to be a private settlement agreement under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. II. Private Settlement Agreement – Substantive Terms
7. At the current time the rated capacity of the Monroe County Jail, based on Indiana’s County Jail Standards and inspections by the Indiana Department of Correction, is 278.
8. In order to assist in addressing population pressures on the Monroe County Jail the defendants have met with the Judges of the Monroe Circuit Court with criminal jurisdiction, to discuss methods of decreasing the population at the Monroe County Jail.
2

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9. Defendants agree that during the pendency of this Agreement they shall make all reasonable efforts to continue to meet with the Judges of the Monroe Circuit Court on a regular basis to discuss ways of keeping the population of the Monroe County Jail under its capacity.
10. The parties agree that the population of the Monroe County Jail has remained at, or below its rated capacity, for at least the last 90 days.
11. The Monroe County Jail temporarily houses arrestees in its detoxification units, who are rarely sent to the housing units. Those individuals are not covered by this agreement. The jail also has 30 beds for trustees and offenders attending a special program. Those beds are presumed to be full. The remaining security beds are 248 in number. In the event that the population for the security beds exceeds 248 for more than twenty-four (24) hours or on more than three (3) occasions in one week, even if each or any occasion is less than twenty-four (24) hours in duration, the defendants agree that they shall take all reasonable steps to lower the population at the earliest reasonable opportunity. These efforts shall include, but not necessarily be limited to the following:
a) When the population for the available security beds reaches 244, the jail staff will immediately contact the Circuit Court judges with criminal jurisdiction or their designee and request an order releasing inmates in order to avoid the population exceeding the jail’s capacity. It is understood that the decision to release any inmate or the identity of those to be released lies solely within the discretion of the Circuit Court judges.
b) Members of the board of commissioners and the county council will be notified when the population in the security beds reaches 244.
3

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c) Plaintiffs’ counsel will be notified if the population in the available security beds exceed 248.
12. In the event that the population for the available security beds exceed 258 for more than twenty-four (24) hours or on more than three occasions in one week, even if each or any occasion is less than twenty-four (24) hours, the defendants agree that the Monroe County Sheriff shall, in addition to the steps noted in paragraph 11 above, also contact other Indiana jail facilities in order to transfer prisoners out of the Monroe County Jail for housing on a per diem basis until such time as the population of the Monroe County Jail is below the security bed capacity of the facility and shall transfer the prisoners if such out of county beds are available.
13. In the event that the population of the Monroe County Jail exceeds its security bed or rated capacity, all prisoners housed in the jail who do not have a permanent bed will be provided temporary bedding that is off the floor through the use of “Stack”A-Bunks”® or similar institutional-grade furniture.
14. To assist in controlling the population of the Monroe County Jail the defendants agree that the Monroe County Sheriff will not accept prisoners from other counties on a per diem basis and will only accept into the Monroe County jail prisoners whom the Monroe County Sheriff is legally bound to accept as a matter of law within the jurisdiction of Monroe County, Indiana.
15. In addition to time out of their cells, prisoners will be afforded the opportunity for at least two hours a week of vigorous physical exercise in either the indoor or outdoor recreation areas at the Monroe County Jail. Outdoor recreation will be allowed, weather permitting. This provision does not apply to those prisoners classified as maximum security. Those prisoners
4

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shall continue to have their one hour out of cell time, but be restricted to the dayroom of the cellblock.
16. In the event that defendant sheriff believes that additional staffing positions are necessary he agrees to request those positions as provided for by Indiana law.
17. Prisoners will not be housed in the Jail’s indoor gymnasium. 18. The parties agree to the following reporting requirements:
a. Beginning with 30 days after the effective date of this Agreement, and continuing every 30 days thereafter until the termination of the Agreement, the defendants will provide to plaintiffs’ counsel a listing of the daily population of the Monroe County Jail for each day since the prior report. The population is to be computed at a time of day to be selected by defendants and that time of day shall be used consistently to measure the population.
b. Every six months from the effective date of this Agreement the parties shall file a joint report with the court to apprise the court as to the status of this matter and any changes or problems in the intervening six month period.
19. Defendants agree to pay plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees and costs in the total amount of twenty thousand dollars ($20,000). The defendants specifically deny that the plaintiffs are prevailing parties as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 1988, or that plaintiffs are otherwise entitled to recover their attorney fees or costs from the defendants under any federal or state statute or legal theory. This Stipulation, and the effect of this Stipulation shall further not be allowed to be introduced as evidence of entitlement to attorney’s fees or costs accrued prior to the effective date of this Stipulation under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, a private attorney general theory, or any other federal or state statute or legal theory. The parties agree that absent any future agreement by the parties to the contrary, the plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys’ fees incurred after the effective date of this Agreement only if they demonstrate an entitlement under 42 U.S.C.§ 1988. However, if defendants comply with the terms of this stipulation and do not subsequently breach
5

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any terms thereof, plaintiffs and their attorney waive any claim of an entitlement to attorneys’

fees for work done subsequent to the effective date of this Stipulation.

III. Notice to the Class

20. The parties acknowledge that Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

requires that before a class action is dismissed or compromised that notice must be given to all

class members prior to approval of any settlement.

21. Attached to this Agreement is a proposed notice plaintiffs’ counsel has prepared

for the class. The parties agree that this notice, if approved by the court, should be given in the

following manner;

·

on a date selected by defendants, a copy of the attached notice will be

given to each prisoner in the Monroe County Jail at that time.

·

The attached notice will be posted in a prominent area in each living area

of the Monroe County Jail for thirty (30) days.

22. Following the thirty (30) day notice period specified above, counsel for plaintiffs

will report to the court and to the defendants as to the comments received by class members and

will make further recommendations as to whether, in counsel’s estimation, the Agreement is an

adequate and fair resolution of this matter pursuant to Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. Plaintiffs’ counsel believes that this Agreement is a just and equitable resolution of

the current contested matters in this cause but wishes to hear from the class before final approval

is given.

IV. Further Proceedings

23. As specified, the parties intend this to be a private settlement agreement resolving

all of the contested issues in this cause. After the effective date of this Agreement either party

reserves the right to seek a further hearing before the court if deemed appropriate. However,

6

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absent an emergency, prior to seeking any enforcement of this Agreement or prior to seeking that this case be placed back before the court, plaintiffs will communicate with the defendants’ counsel at least 10 days prior to the filing. Likewise, absent an emergency, prior to seeking any changes in this Agreement in court the defendants will communicate with the plaintiffs’ counsel at least 10 days prior to the filing.
24. The parties agree that absent an order from the court or a subsequent written agreement by the parties, this Agreement, if approved, should remain in effect until October 1, 2011, at which time the case should be dismissed. The parties agree that this dismissal should be with prejudice as to this action only, preventing this action from being revived by any class member. The parties agree, however, that nothing precludes a future class action brought after this time by a current prisoner at the Monroe County Jail. The parties request that this case be listed as inactive on this court’s docket, subject to being made active as specified above at the request of either the defendants or plaintiffs. The parties further agree that should Monroe County construct a new jail with a larger capacity this agreement shall terminate when the inmate population is moved to such new jail. V. Parties’ Further Requests of the Court
The parties request that this court find, after the required notice, that this proposed private settlement agreement is a fair and equitable settlement pursuant to Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
7

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For the plaintiffs: For the defendants:

/s/ Kenneth J. Falk Kenneth J. Falk, Attorney No. 6777-49 ACLU OF INDIANA 1031 East Washington Street Indianapolis, IN 46202 317/635-4059 ext. 014 Fax: 317/635-4105 Email: kfalk@aclu-in.org
Attorney for Plaintiffs
s/ Ronald J. Semler___________________ Ronald J. Semler, Attorney No. 248-32 STEPHENSON MOROW & SEMLER 8710 N. Meridian St., Ste. 200 Indianapolis, IN 46260 317/844-3830 Fax: 317/573-4194 Attorney for defendants Monroe County Sheriff and Monroe County Commissioners Email: rsemler@stephlaw.com

08-5655.ke

8

 
 Case 1:08-cv-00174-RLY-MJD Document 62 Filed 12/03/09 Page 1 of 5 PageID #: 252

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

TREVOR RICHARDSON, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

MONROE COUNTY SHERIFF, et al., )

)

Defendants.

)

No. 1:08-cv-174 RLY-JMS

ORDER FINDING PRIVATE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT TO BE FAIR, REASONABLE AND ADEQUATE PURSUANT TO RULE 23(e) OF THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

This cause comes before the Court after the filing of the Stipulation of Parties to Enter Into Private Settlement After Plaintiffs= Counsel Gives Notice to the Class. On December 3, 2009, this

Court held a fairness hearing pursuant to Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to

determine whether the proposed settlement is a fair, reasonable, and adequate resolution of this

matter. The parties appeared by counsel at the hearing.

Having considered the Private Settlement Agreement and the Report of Class Counsel

Following Notice to the Class, as well as the arguments of counsel at the fairness hearing, and the

record in this matter,

IT IS HEREBY FOUND that:

1. This action was filed on February 13, 2008 and alleged that conditions of confinement at the

Monroe County Jail violated Indiana law and the United States Constitution.

2. On August 4, 2008, this Court certified this case as a class action with the class defined as Aany and all persons currently confined, or who will in the future be confined, in the Monroe County Jail.@

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3. The Private Settlement Agreement is designed to settle all pending matters in this litigation. 4. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this cause and over all the parties,
including the members of the certified class. 5. The class has been given proper and adequate notice of the proposed resolution of this case
through the Private Settlement Agreement. This notice was given as required by the September 1, 2009, Order of this Court. 6. The notice invited class members to notify class counsel as to any objections to, or comments on, the proposed dismissal. The notice provided valid, due, and sufficient notice of these proceedings and the matters set forth therein and included information regarding the procedures for making any objections to the Private Settlement Agreement. 7. The notice given to the class fully satisfied the requirements of Rule 23, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the requirements of due process. 8. The Court has reviewed the comments of the class members. 9. Following the standards established by Synfuel Technologies, Inc. v. DHL Express, Inc., 463 F.3d 646, 653 (7th Cir. 2006), the Court finds that the Private Settlement Agreement and the planned dismissal of this action with prejudice on October 1, 2011, is fair, reasonable, and adequate for the following reasons.
A. The purpose of this litigation was to remedy the alleged unconstitutional conditions in the Monroe County Jail. At the time that the litigation was filed the Jail population consistently exceeded its rated capacity. The overcrowding appears to be the primary impetus to the filing of this case as it allegedly lead to numerous safety, environmental and other serious problems in the Jail. The parties agree that the population of the Jail has now been 2

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reduced so that the Jail=s population is below its rated capacity of 278. This appears to have lead to an amelioration of a number of the alleged problems that gave rise to this litigation. The Private Settlement Agreement provides for measures to be taken to attempt to prevent the Jail from exceeding its rated capacity and also provides for measures to assist in keeping the Jail=s population at or below capacity. Inasmuch as federal law, 18 U.S.C. ' 3626(a)(3) prohibits any order from this Court that places a population cap on the Jail absent less intrusive orders and the convening of a three-judge court in accordance with 28 U.S.C. ' 2284, it is unlikely that this Court would grant significantly different relief even if plaintiffs prevailed after trial. Given the marked change in factual circumstance since the filing of this case B the reduction in the Jail=s population B the Court finds that the comparison of the strength of this case with the settlement presented favors dismissal in this case. B. The complexity, length, and expense of continued litigation weigh in favor of finding the proposed dismissal to be fair, reasonable, and adequate. Continued litigation would require a lengthy trial and extensive trial preparation including extensive further discovery. Further delay and costs would not be in the best interests of the parties. Paragraph 23 of the Private Settlement Agreement allows either party to revive this litigation and seek further hearings in this Court. This will allow plaintiffs to seek further and immediate legal redress if the Private Settlement Agreement is not, in the class= estimation, successful in remedying the alleged problems at the Jail.
3

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C. As indicated, the Court has reviewed the reports filed by plaintiffs= counsel concerning comments received by the class. In response to the concerns that counsel had expressed defendants= counsel has indicated that the population of the Jail continues to be below the cap levels and that food is served at the appropriate temperatures. The Court has no opinion concerning the factual or legal merit of the comments of the class members or defendants= response. However, the Court does not find that the level of opposition is sufficient for the Court to question the Private Settlement Agreement.
D. There is no evidence of any collusion between the parties in entering into the Private Settlement Agreement. The Court is satisfied that the Private Settlement Agreement is the result of an arms-length negotiation.
E. Class counsel is experienced in class action litigation generally and class action litigation concerning jails in particular.
F. The stage of the proceedings and amount of discovery weigh in favor of finding that the Private Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. Discovery was conducted and plaintiffs had an expert tour the Jail prior to entering into the Private Settlement Agreement.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the Private Settlement Agreement is a fair , reasonable, and adequate resolution of this matter.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that, pursuant to the Private Settlement Agreement, this case is now deemed dismissed without prejudice. The parties shall move for dismissal with prejudice on October 1, 2011. The dismissal will be with prejudice as to this action only, preventing this action from being revived
4

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by any class member. However, after the dismissal, nothing will preclude a future class action from being brought by a prisoner of the Monroe County Jail.
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED 12/03/2009

cc: Kenneth J. Falk ACLU of Indiana kfalk@aclu-in.org
Ronald J. Semler STEPHENSON MORROW &
SEMLER rsemler@stephlaw.com
James S. Stephenson STEPHENSON MORROW &
SEMLER jstephenson@stephlaw.com

__________________________________
RICHARD L. YOUNG, CHIEF JUDGE United States District Court Southern District of Indiana

5

 
 Case 1:08-cv-00174-RLY-MJD Document 82 Filed 01/15/19 Page 1 of 1 PageID #: 297

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

TREVOR RICHARDSON, Plaintiff,
v. MONROE COUNTY SHERIFF, MONROE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,
Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

No. 1:08-cv-00174-RLY-MJD

)

)

)

)

)

ORDER This matter comes before the Court on the parties’ Further Agreed Motion to Modify the Parties’ Requirement to Move to Dismiss Case and Agreement to Extend Private Settlement Agreement Subject to Conditions. [Dkt. 81.] The Court hereby acknowledges that the parties have extended their Private Settlement Agreement to January 14, 2020, subject to the conditions noted in the parties’ filing, and the Court hereby modifies its prior orders to provide that the parties shall move for dismissal of this case, with prejudice, on or before January 14, 2020. SO ORDERED.

Dated: 15 JAN 2019

Distribution:
Service will be made electronically on all ECF-registered counsel of record via email generated by the Court’s ECF system.

 
 Case: 1:08-cv-174 As of: 02/10/2020 01:23 PM EST 1 of 7
U.S. District Court Southern District of Indiana (Indianapolis) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:08−cv−00174−RLY−MJD

CLOSED

RICHARDSON v. MONROE COUNTY SHERIFF et al Assigned to: Judge Richard L. Young Referred to: Magistrate Judge Mark J. Dinsmore Cause: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 02/13/2008 Date Terminated: 12/03/2009 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 555 Prisoner Petitions − Prison Condition Jurisdiction: Federal Question

TREVOR RICHARDSON on his own behalf and on behalf of class of those similarly situated

represented by Kenneth J. Falk ACLU OF INDIANA 1031 E. Washington Street Indianapolis, IN 46202 (317) 635−4059 x104 Fax: (317) 635−4105 Email: kfalk@aclu−in.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant MONROE COUNTY SHERIFF in his official capacity
Defendant MONROE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS in their official capacity

represented by James S. Stephenson STEPHENSON MOROW & SEMLER 3077 E. 98th Street Suite 240 Indianapolis, IN 46280 (317) 844−3830 Fax: (317) 573−4194 Email: jstephenson@stephlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ronald J. Semler STEPHENSON MOROW & SEMLER 3077 E. 98th Street Suite 240 Indianapolis, IN 46280 (317)844−3830 Fax: (317)573−4194 Email: rsemler@stephlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by James S. Stephenson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ronald J. Semler (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 02/13/2008

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT (for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief) against all defendants, filed by TREVOR RICHARDSON. (Attachments: # 1 inmate grievance complaint and appeal)(DWH) (Entered: 02/13/2008)

Case: 1:08-cv-174 As of: 02/10/2020 01:23 PM EST 2 of 7

02/13/2008 02/13/2008 02/13/2008 02/13/2008 02/13/2008 02/13/2008 02/18/2008 02/18/2008 02/25/2008 02/25/2008 02/28/2008 02/28/2008
03/04/2008 04/11/2008 04/11/2008 04/11/2008
04/11/2008 04/23/2008
04/25/2008

2 CIVIL COVER SHEET, filed by Plaintiff TREVOR RICHARDSON. (DWH) (Entered: 02/13/2008)
3 RECEIPT #IP005607 in the amount of $ 350.00 (DWH) (Entered: 02/13/2008)
4 MAGISTRATE JUDGE's NOTICE of Availability to Exercise Jurisdiction issued. (DWH) (Entered: 02/13/2008)
5 Summons Issued as to MONROE COUNTY SHERIFF and MONROE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS. (DWH) (Entered: 02/13/2008)
6 MOTION to Certify Class, filed by Plaintiff TREVOR RICHARDSON. (Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 02/13/2008)
7 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support re 6 MOTION to Certify Class, filed by Plaintiff TREVOR RICHARDSON. (Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 02/13/2008)
8 RETURN of Service by CMRRR, filed by all plaintiffs. MONROE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS served on 2/14/2008. (Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 02/18/2008)
9 RETURN of Service by CMRRR, filed by all plaintiffs. MONROE COUNTY SHERIFF served on 2/14/2008. (Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 02/18/2008)
10 NOTICE of Appearance by James S. Stephenson on behalf of Defendants MONROE COUNTY SHERIFF, MONROE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS. (Stephenson, James) (Entered: 02/25/2008)
11 NOTICE of Appearance by Ronald J. Semler on behalf of Defendants MONROE COUNTY SHERIFF, MONROE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS. (Semler, Ronald) (Entered: 02/25/2008)
12 NOTICE of Parties' First Extension of Time, filed by Defendants MONROE COUNTY SHERIFF, MONROE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS. (Stephenson, James) (Entered: 02/28/2008)
13 MOTION for Extension of Time to 4/11/08 to file response to 6 MOTION to Certify Class (Agreed), filed by Defendants MONROE COUNTY SHERIFF, MONROE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Stephenson, James) (Entered: 02/28/2008)
14 ORDER granting Defts' 13 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response re 6 MOTION to Certify Class. Response due by 4/11/2008. Signed by Judge Jane Magnus−Stinson on 3/4/08. (SWM) (Entered: 03/05/2008)
15 MOTION to Dismiss (or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment), filed by Defendants MONROE COUNTY SHERIFF, MONROE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS. (Semler, Ronald) (Entered: 04/11/2008)
16 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support re 15 MOTION to Dismiss (or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment), filed by Defendants MONROE COUNTY SHERIFF, MONROE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS. (Semler, Ronald) (Entered: 04/11/2008)
17 Designation of Evidence re 15 MOTION to Dismiss (or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment), 16 Brief/Memorandum in Support of Motion, filed by Defendants MONROE COUNTY SHERIFF, MONROE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit William Wilson, # 2 aff.wilson.ex.a (judgment of conviction), # 3 aff.wilson.ex.b (court docket entry), # 4 aff.wilson.ex.c (copy grievance procedure))(Semler, Ronald) (Entered: 04/11/2008)
18 RESPONSE in Opposition re 6 MOTION to Certify Class, filed by Defendants MONROE COUNTY SHERIFF, MONROE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS. (Semler, Ronald) (Entered: 04/11/2008)
19 MOTION for Extension of Time to May 12, 2008 to file reply to 15 MOTION to Dismiss (or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment), 6 MOTION to Certify Class, filed by Plaintiff TREVOR RICHARDSON. (Attachments: # 1 Supplement)(Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/23/2008)
20 ORDER granting pltf's 19 Motion for Extension of Time to File response and reply re 15 MOTION to Dismiss (or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment) and 6

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05/12/2008 05/12/2008 05/13/2008 05/15/2008 05/27/2008 05/29/2008 05/29/2008 08/04/2008
08/07/2008 08/18/2008 08/18/2008 08/19/2008 08/19/2008 08/19/2008

MOTION to Certify Class. Reply and Response due by 5/12/2008. Signed by Judge Jane Magnus−Stinson on 4/25/08. (SWM) (Entered: 04/28/2008)
21 RESPONSE in Opposition re 15 MOTION to Dismiss (or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment), filed by Plaintiff TREVOR RICHARDSON. (Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 05/12/2008)
22 MOTION for Extension of Time to May 16, 2008 to file response to 6 MOTION to Certify Class (Further Motion), filed by Plaintiff TREVOR RICHARDSON. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 05/12/2008)
23 ORDER granting pltf's 22 Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply re 6 MOTION to Certify Class. Reply due by 5/16/2008. Signed by Judge Jane Magnus−Stinson on 5/13/08. (SWM) (Entered: 05/13/2008)
24 REPLY in Support of Motion re 6 MOTION to Certify Class, filed by Plaintiff TREVOR RICHARDSON. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit)(Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 05/15/2008)
25 MOTION for Extension of Time to May 29, 2008 to file reply to 15 MOTION to Dismiss (or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment), filed by Defendants MONROE COUNTY SHERIFF, MONROE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Semler, Ronald) (Entered: 05/27/2008)
26 REPLY in Support of Motion re 15 MOTION to Dismiss (or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment), filed by Defendants MONROE COUNTY SHERIFF, MONROE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS. (Semler, Ronald) (Entered: 05/29/2008)
27 ORDER granting defts' 25 Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply re 15 MOTION to Dismiss (or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment). Reply due by 5/29/2008. Signed by Judge Jane Magnus−Stinson on 5/29/08. (SWM) (Entered: 05/29/2008)
28 ENTRY ON DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT and PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO CERTIFY CASE AS CLASS ACTION. Although Plaintiffs individual claims for relief are moot, the court finds Plaintiff has standing to represent the class in this action (see Entry). The court further finds Plaintiff satisfies the requirements for class certification imposed by Rule 23. Accordingly, DefendantsMotion to Dismiss 15 is DENIED, and Plaintiffs Motion to Certify Case as a Class Action 6 is GRANTED. Signed by Judge Richard L. Young on 08/04/08. (PG) (Entered: 08/04/2008)
29 SCHEDULING ORDER: Status Conference set for 8/19/2008 11:30 AM in Telephonic before Judge Jane Magnus−Stinson. Signed by Judge Jane Magnus−Stinson on 8/7/08.(SWM) (Entered: 08/07/2008)
30 MOTION for Reconsideration re 28 Order on Motion to Certify ClassOrder on Motion to Dismiss, filed by Defendants MONROE COUNTY SHERIFF, MONROE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS. (Stephenson, James) (Entered: 08/18/2008)
31 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support re 30 MOTION for Reconsideration re 28 Order on Motion to Certify ClassOrder on Motion to Dismiss, filed by Defendants MONROE COUNTY SHERIFF, MONROE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS. (Stephenson, James) (Entered: 08/18/2008)
32 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Jane Magnus−Stinson: Telephone Status Conference held on 8/19/2008 and case is set for an initial pretrial conference on 10/7/08 at 1:30 p.m. Separate entry to issue setting conference. (SWM) (Entered: 08/19/2008)
33 ENTRY regarding CMP and Initial Pretrial Conference. SCHEDULING ORDER: Initial Pretrial Conference set for 10/7/2008 01:30 PM in room #256 before Judge Jane Magnus−Stinson. The CMP is due no later than 14 days prior to the iptc (See Entry). Signed by Judge Jane Magnus−Stinson on 8/19/08.(SWM) (Entered: 08/19/2008)
34 ANSWER to 1 Complaint and Affirmative Defenses to Class Action Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, filed by MONROE COUNTY SHERIFF, MONROE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS.(Semler, Ronald) (Entered: 08/19/2008)

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09/02/2008 09/23/2008 09/30/2008 10/06/2008
10/06/2008
10/08/2008 10/14/2008 10/20/2008 10/24/2008 11/03/2008 01/06/2009 01/07/2009
04/08/2009 05/01/2009
05/13/2009

35 RESPONSE in Opposition re 30 MOTION for Reconsideration re 28 Order on Motion to Certify ClassOrder on Motion to Dismiss, filed by Plaintiff TREVOR RICHARDSON. (Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/02/2008)
36 CASE MANAGEMENT PLAN TENDERED, filed by Plaintiff TREVOR RICHARDSON, Defendants MONROE COUNTY SHERIFF, MONROE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS. (Attachments: # 1 Summary)(Stephenson, James) (Entered: 09/23/2008)
37 Entry Vacates the Initial Pretrial Conference set for 10/7/08. SCHEDULING ORDER: Initial Pretrial Conference reset for 10/6/2008 10:00 AM in room #256 before Judge Jane Magnus−Stinson. Signed by Judge Jane Magnus−Stinson on 9/30/08.(MAC) (Entered: 09/30/2008)
38 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Jane Magnus−Stinson: Initial Pretrial Conference held on 10/6/2008 and CMP approved as amended. SCHEDULING ORDER: Status Conference set for 1/6/2009 02:00 PM in Telephonic before Judge Jane Magnus−Stinson to discuss setting a settlement conference. (SWM) (Entered: 10/07/2008)
39 ORDER: CASE MANAGEMENT PLAN APPROVED AS AMENDED. Dispositive Motions due by 7/15/2009. If the required conference under LR 37.1 does not resolve discovery issues that may arise, the parties are advised to request a phone status conference prior to filing any motion to compel or for protective order. Additionally, the parties are advised to not only number but to add a descriptive identifier for any exhibits which are electronically filed (See Order for example). Signed by Judge Jane Magnus−Stinson on 10/6/08.(SWM) (Entered: 10/07/2008)
40 SCHEDULING ORDER: Telephonic Status Conference set for 10/10/2008 11:00 AM (Evansville Time) before Judge Richard L. Young. The purpose of this conference is to discuss Defendants Motion 30 for Reconsideration.(PG) (Entered: 10/08/2008)
41 ENTRY denying Defendants' 30 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge Richard L. Young on 10/14/08. (PG) (Entered: 10/14/2008)
42 NOTICE of Service of Initial Disclosures, filed by Plaintiff TREVOR RICHARDSON. (Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/20/2008)
43 NOTICE of Service of Initial Disclosures, filed by Defendants MONROE COUNTY SHERIFF, MONROE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS. (Semler, Ronald) (Entered: 10/24/2008)
44 Witness List and Exhibit List −Preliminary, filed by Plaintiff TREVOR RICHARDSON. (Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 11/03/2008)
45 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Jane Magnus−Stinson: Telephone Status Conference held on 1/6/2009 and settlement conference set for 4/8/2009 at 8:30 a.m. by separate order. (SWM) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
46 ORDER Setting Settlement Conference and Related Deadlines. SCHEDULING ORDER: Settlement Conference set for 4/8/2009 08:30 AM in room #361 before Judge Jane Magnus−Stinson. Confidential settlement statements due three business days prior to the conference (See Order). Signed by Judge Jane Magnus−Stinson on 1/7/09.(SWM) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
47 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Jane Magnus−Stinson: Settlement Conference held on 4/8/2009 and progress made. Status Conference set for 5/1/2009 03:30 PM in Telephonic before Judge Jane Magnus−Stinson. Counsel to call the Court at the number provided. (SWM) (Entered: 04/08/2009)
48 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Jane Magnus−Stinson: Telephone Status Conference held on 5/1/2009 and parties continue negotiations. Telephonic status conference set for May 26, 2009 at 11:30 a.m.Counsel to call the Court at the number provided. All deadlines in the CMP are stayed until after the upcoming conference. (SWM) (Entered: 05/04/2009)
49 SCHEDULING ENTRY: The telephone status conference set for May 26, 2009 is VACATED AND RESET for June 12, 2009, at 2:30 P.M. Counsel to call the Court at the number provided. Issued by Judge Jane Magnus−Stinson on 5/13/2009.(SWM)

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06/12/2009
07/16/2009
08/14/2009 08/14/2009 08/31/2009 09/03/2009 09/10/2009 09/11/2009 09/15/2009 11/24/2009 12/02/2009 12/03/2009 12/03/2009 05/25/2011 09/28/2011
09/30/2011

(Entered: 05/13/2009)
50 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Jane Magnus−Stinson: Telephone Status Conference held on 6/12/2009 and parties anticipate filing private settlement agreement within 30 days for court approval. All other CMP deadlines are therefore suspended. (SWM) (Entered: 06/15/2009)
51 ENTRY for 7/16/2009: The magistrate judge has been advised that the parties need additional time to submit their private settlement agreement. They are granted an additional 30 days within which to file said agreement. The CMP deadlines remain suspended. Signed by Judge Jane Magnus−Stinson on 7/16/2009.(SWM) (Entered: 07/16/2009)
52 STIPULATION of Parties to Enter Into Private Settlement Agreement After Plaintiff's Counsel Gives Notice to the Class, filed by Plaintiff TREVOR RICHARDSON. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed class notice)(Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 08/14/2009)
53 MOTION to Approve Notice to the Class and to Set Fairness Hearing, filed by Plaintiff TREVOR RICHARDSON. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 08/14/2009)
54 ORDER granting 53 Motion to Approve Notice to the Class and to Set Fairness Hearing. Hearing set for 11/5/2009 10:00 AM in room #349 before Judge Richard L. Young. Signed by Judge Richard L. Young on 8/31/2009. (PG) (Entered: 09/01/2009)
55 MOTION for Continuance Fairness Hearing, filed by Plaintiff TREVOR RICHARDSON. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/03/2009)
56 ORDER granting 55 Motion for Continuance. Fairness Hearing reset for 11/13/2009 02:00 PM in room #349 before Judge Richard L. Young. Signed by Judge Richard L. Young on 9/10/2009. (PG) (Entered: 09/10/2009)
57 Second MOTION for Continuance of Fairness Hearing, filed by Plaintiff TREVOR RICHARDSON. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/11/2009)
58 ORDER granting 57 Motion for Continuance. Fairness Hearing reset for 12/3/2009 09:00 AM in room #349 before Judge Richard L. Young. Signed by Judge Richard L. Young on 9/15/2009. (PG) (Entered: 09/16/2009)
59 NOTICE of Filing Report of Class Counsel Following Notice to the Class by TREVOR RICHARDSON (Attachments: # 1 Letter from Class Member) (Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 11/24/2009)
60 NOTICE of Filing Proposed Order by TREVOR RICHARDSON (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order) (Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 12/02/2009)
61 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Richard L. Young: Fairness Hearing held on 12/3/2009. (Court Reporter Fred Pratt.) (PG) (Entered: 12/04/2009)
62 ORDER FINDING PRIVATE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT TO BE FAIR and Dismissing cause of action without prejudice. Signed by Judge Richard L. Young on 12/3/2009.(PG) (Entered: 12/04/2009)
63 NOTICE of Change of Address by Ronald J. Semler (Semler, Ronald) (Entered: 05/25/2011)
64 MOTION to Modify the Parties' Requirement to Move to Dismiss Case and Agreement to Extend Private Settlement Agreement, filed by Plaintiff TREVOR RICHARDSON. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/28/2011)
65 ORDER granting Parties' 64 Motion to Modify Requirement to Move to Dismiss Case, with prejudice, to 10/1/2012. In all other respects this Court's Order of 12/3/2009 remains unmodified. Signed by Judge Richard L. Young on 9/30/2011. (MAC) (Entered: 10/03/2011)

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09/28/2012 10/01/2012 10/04/2012 09/16/2014 09/18/2014 09/01/2016 09/14/2016 09/28/2018 10/01/2018 10/12/2018 10/15/2018
10/22/2018
12/10/2018

66 MOTION to Modify the Parties' Requirement to Move to Dismiss Case and Agreement to Extend Private Settlement Agreement, filed by Defendants MONROE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, MONROE COUNTY SHERIFF, Plaintiff TREVOR RICHARDSON. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Semler, Ronald) (Entered: 09/28/2012)
67 ORDER granting 66 Motion to Modify the Parties' Requirement to Move to Dismiss Case and agreement to Extend Private Settlement Agreement. Signed by Judge Richard L. Young on 10/1/2012. (PG) (Entered: 10/03/2012)
68 NOTICE of Reassignment of Case to Magistrate Judge Mark J. Dinsmore. Judge Jane Magnus−Stinson no longer assigned to the case. Please include the new case number, 1:08−cv−174−RLY−MJD, on all future filings in this matter. (MSD) (Entered: 10/04/2012)
69 MOTION to Modify the Parties' Requirement to Move to Dismiss Case and Agreement to Extend Private Settlement Agreement (Further ), filed by Plaintiff TREVOR RICHARDSON. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/16/2014)
70 ORDER granting 69 Motion to Modify the Parties' Requirement to Move to Dismiss Case and Agreement to Extend Private Settlement Agreement (Further ) to 10/01/2016. Signed by Judge Richard L. Young on 9/18/2014. (TMD) (Entered: 09/18/2014)
71 Third MOTION to Modify the Parties' Requirement to Move to Dismiss Case and Agreement to Extend Private Settlement Agreement, filed by Plaintiff TREVOR RICHARDSON. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/01/2016)
72 ORDER granting 71 Motion to Modify the Parties' Requirement to Move to Dismiss Case and Agreement to Extend Private Settlement Agreement. Parties shall move for dismissal of this case, with prejudice, on October 1, 2018. In all other respects this Court's Order of December 3, 2009 remains unmodified. Signed by Judge Richard L. Young on 9/14/2016. (TMD) (Entered: 09/14/2016)
73 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to October 15, 2018 to File Dismissal or Other Documents, filed by Plaintiff TREVOR RICHARDSON. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/28/2018)
74 ORDER granting Plaintiff's 73 Motion for Extension of Time to File Dismissal or other Documents to 10/15/2018. Signed by Magistrate Judge Mark J. Dinsmore on 10/1/2018. (MAC) (Entered: 10/02/2018)
75 Second MOTION for Extension of Time to December 13, 2018 to File DIsmissal of Other Documents (Unopposed), filed by Plaintiff TREVOR RICHARDSON. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/12/2018)
76 SCHEDULING ORDER: This cause comes before the Court on Plaintiffs' Second Unopposed Motion to Extend Time to File Dismissal or Other Documents. [Dkt. 75 .] This matter is set for a telephonic hearing on the above− noted motion on Friday, October 19, 2018 at 3:20 p.m. (Eastern). Counsel shall attend the hearing by calling the designated telephone number, to be provided by the Court via email generated by the Court's ECF system. Signed by Magistrate Judge Mark J. Dinsmore on 10/15/2018.(SWM) (Entered: 10/15/2018)
78 MINUTE ORDER for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Mark J. Dinsmore: Telephonic Hearing held on 10/19/2018 re 75 Plaintiffs' Second Unopposed Motion to Extend Time to File Dismissal or Other Documents. Plaintiffs' Motion is hereby GRANTED. Parties shall file dismissal or other documents on or before 12/13/2018. *SEE ORDER.* Signed by Magistrate Judge Mark J. Dinsmore. (GD) (Entered: 10/22/2018)
79 Third MOTION for Extension of Time to January 14, 2019 to Extend Time to File Dismissal or Other Documents − UNOPPOSED −, filed by Plaintiff TREVOR RICHARDSON. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 12/10/2018)

Case: 1:08-cv-174 As of: 02/10/2020 01:23 PM EST 7 of 7

12/12/2018 01/11/2019 01/15/2019
12/31/2019 01/03/2020

80 ORDER granting Plaintiff's 79 Third Motion for Extension of Time to File dismissal or other documents to 1/14/2019. Signed by Magistrate Judge Mark J. Dinsmore on 12/12/2018. (SWM) (Entered: 12/12/2018)
81 MOTION FURTHER AGREED MOTION TO MODIFY THE PARTIES REQUIREMENT TO MOVE TO DISMISS CASE AND AGREEMENT TO EXTEND PRIVATE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS, filed by Plaintiff TREVOR RICHARDSON. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 01/11/2019)
82 ORDER: This matter comes before the Court on the parties' Further Agreed Motion to Modify the Parties' Requirement to Move to Dismiss Case and Agreement to Extend Private Settlement Agreement Subject to Conditions. [Dkt. 81 .] The Court hereby acknowledges that the parties have extended their Private Settlement Agreement to January 14, 2020, subject to the conditions noted in the parties' filing, and the Court hereby modifies its prior orders to provide that the parties shall move for dismissal of this case, with prejudice, on or before January 14, 2020. Signed by Magistrate Judge Mark J. Dinsmore on 1/15/2019. (SWM) (Entered: 01/15/2019)
83 MOTION to Modify the Parties' Requirement to Move to Dismiss Case and Agreement to Extend Private Settlement Agreement Subject to Conditions (FURTHER AGREED), filed by Plaintiff TREVOR RICHARDSON. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 12/31/2019)
84 ORDER: This matter comes before the Court on the parties Further Agreed Motion to Modify the Parties Requirement to Move to Dismiss Case and Agreement to Extend Private Settlement Agreement Subject to Conditions. [Dkt. [ 83 ] The Court, being duly advised, hereby GRANTS the motion. The Court hereby acknowledges that the parties have extended their Private Settlement Agreement to January 14, 2021, subject to the conditions noted in the parties' filing, and the Court hereby modifies its prior orders to provide that the parties shall move for dismissal of this case, with prejudice, on or before January 14, 2021. Signed by Magistrate Judge Mark J. Dinsmore on 1/3/2020. (SWM) (Entered: 01/06/2020)

Case #: 1:08−cv−00174−RLY−MJD