Case: 1:14-cv-23933-PCH As of: 02/14/2019 11:09 AM EST 1 of 22
APPEAL,CLOSED,CMM,PERMSEAL,REF_DISCOV
U.S. District Court Southern District of Florida (Miami) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:14−cv−23933−PCH

Doe et al v. Miami−Dade County et al Assigned to: Senior Judge Paul C. Huck Referred to: Magistrate Judge Chris M. McAliley Case in other court: 15−14336−B
USCA, 19−10254−F Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff
John Doe #1 TERMINATED: 10/05/2017

Date Filed: 10/23/2014 Date Terminated: 12/19/2018 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Brandon Buskey American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 125 Broad Street New York, NY 10004 212−284−7364 Email: bbuskey@aclu.org LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Boaz Tilley ACLU Foundation of Florida, Inc. 4343 West Flagler Street Suite 400 Miami, FL 33134 United Sta 786−363−2714 Fax: 786−363−1257 Email: dtilley@aclufl.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ezekiel Edwards American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 125 Broad Street New York, NY 10004 212−284−7364 Email: eedwards@aclu.org LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nancy Gbana Abudu American Civil Liberties Union of Florida 4500 Biscayne Blvd Suite 340 Miami, FL 33137 786−363−2700 Email: nabudu@aclufl.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
John Doe #2 TERMINATED: 10/05/2017

represented by Brandon Buskey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Boaz Tilley

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(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ezekiel Edwards (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nancy Gbana Abudu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
John Doe #3 TERMINATED: 01/25/2018

represented by Brandon Buskey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Boaz Tilley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ezekiel Edwards (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey Martin Hearne Legal Services of Greater Miami 4343 W. Flagler St., Ste. 100 Suite 100 Miami, FL 33134 305−438−2403 Fax: 573−5800 Email: jhearne@legalservicesmiami.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nancy Gbana Abudu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Valerie Jonas Weitzner , Jonas, P.A. 1444 Biscayne Boulevard Suite 207 Miami, FL 33132 305−527−6465 Email: valeriejonas77@gmail.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Florida Action Committee, Inc. TERMINATED: 10/05/2017

represented by Brandon Buskey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Boaz Tilley

Case: 1:14-cv-23933-PCH As of: 02/14/2019 11:09 AM EST 3 of 22

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ezekiel Edwards (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nancy Gbana Abudu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff John Doe #6

represented by Brandon Buskey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Boaz Tilley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ezekiel Edwards (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey Martin Hearne (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nancy Gbana Abudu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Valerie Jonas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff John Doe #7

represented by Brandon Buskey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Boaz Tilley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ezekiel Edwards (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey Martin Hearne

Case: 1:14-cv-23933-PCH As of: 02/14/2019 11:09 AM EST 4 of 22

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nancy Gbana Abudu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Valerie Jonas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff John Doe #4

represented by Brandon Buskey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Rowinsky Quintian Legal Services of Greater Miami, Inc. 4343 W Flagler Street Suite 100 Miami, FL 33134 (305) 438−2419 Fax: (305) 438−2419 Email: drowinsky@legalservicesmiami.org LEAD ATTORNEY

Daniel Boaz Tilley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ezekiel Edwards (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey Martin Hearne (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nancy Gbana Abudu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Valerie Jonas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff John Doe #5

represented by Brandon Buskey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Rowinsky Quintian (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Daniel Boaz Tilley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ezekiel Edwards (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeffrey Martin Hearne (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nancy Gbana Abudu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Valerie Jonas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Miami−Dade County
Defendant Florida Department of Corrections TERMINATED: 10/05/2017
Defendant Sunny Ukenye Circuit Administrator for the Miami Circuit Office, Florida Department of

represented by Bernard Pastor Miami−Dade County Attorney's Office Metro Dade Center 111 NW 1st Street Suite 2810 Miami, FL 33128−1993 305−375−5151 Fax: 375−5634 Email: pastor@miamidade.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Beny Valdes Miami−Dade County Attorney's Office 111 NW 1st Street Suite 2810 Miami, FL 33128 (305) 375−5620 Email: mbv@miamidade.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by John Bajger Attorney General Office 1515 N Flagler Drive 9th Floor West Palm Beach, FL 33401−3432 Email: John.Bajger@myfloridalegal.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by John Bajger (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 1:14-cv-23933-PCH As of: 02/14/2019 11:09 AM EST 6 of 22

Corrections, in his full official capacity TERMINATED: 10/05/2017

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 10/23/2014
10/23/2014 10/23/2014 10/23/2014 10/23/2014 10/23/2014
10/23/2014 10/27/2014
10/29/2014
11/03/2014 11/03/2014 11/05/2014 11/05/2014 11/06/2014
11/10/2014

# Docket Text
1 Complaint pursuant to 42 USC 1983 against Miami−Dade County, Florida Department of Corrections, Sunny Ukenye. Filing fee $ 400.00, filed by John Doe(No. 1), John Doe(No. 2),John Doe(No. 3), Florida Action Committee, Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Cover Letter)(jas) (Entered: 10/23/2014)
2 Judge Assignment to Senior Judge Paul C. Huck (jas) (Entered: 10/23/2014)
3 MOTION for Leave to Proceed Anonymously by John Doe(No. 1), John Doe(No. 2), John Doe(No. 3), Florida Action Committee, Inc.. (jas) (Entered: 10/23/2014)
4 NOTICE OF CONVENTIONAL FILING of 1 Complaint 42 USC 1983, by John Doe(No. 1), John Doe(No. 2), Florida Action Committee, Inc., John Doe(No. 3) (jas) (Entered: 10/23/2014)
5 Summons Issued as to Florida Department of Corrections, Miami−Dade County, Sunny Ukenye. (jas) (Entered: 10/23/2014)
6 Clerk's Notice of Filing Deficiency Re: 1 Complaint 42 USC 1983, filed by John Doe, Florida Action Committee, Inc., 3 MOTION for Leave to File filed by John Doe,Florida Action Committee, Inc., 4 Notice of Conventional Filing filed by John Doe, Florida Action Committee, Inc., Document(s) missing required signature(s) (Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(a)). (jas) (Entered: 10/23/2014)
7 Clerks Notice of Receipt of Filing Fee received on 10/23/2014 in the amount of $ 400.00, receipt number FLS 1000 88762. (gp) (Entered: 10/24/2014)
8 SUMMONS (Affidavit) Returned Executed on 1 Complaint 42 USC 1983 or Bivens, with a 21 day response/answer filing deadline by John Doe #1, John Doe #2, Florida Action Committee, Inc., John Doe #3. Florida Department of Corrections served on 10/23/2014, answer due 11/13/2014. (Tilley, Daniel) (Entered: 10/27/2014)
9 SUMMONS (Affidavit) Returned Executed on 1 Complaint 42 USC 1983 or Bivens, with a 21 day response/answer filing deadline by John Doe #1, John Doe #2, Florida Action Committee, Inc., John Doe #3. Sunny Ukenye served on 10/28/2014, answer due 11/18/2014. (Tilley, Daniel) (Entered: 10/29/2014)
10 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice, Consent to Designation, and Request to Electronically Receive Notices of Electronic Filing for Brandon Buskey. Filing Fee $ 75.00. Receipt # 89334. (ksa) (Entered: 11/04/2014)
11 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice, Consent to Designation, and Request to Electronically Receive Notices of Electronic Filing for Ezekiel Edwards. Filing Fee $ 75.00. Receipt # 89333. (ksa) (Entered: 11/04/2014)
12 ORDER granting 11 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice, Consent to Designation, and Request to Electronically Receive Notices of Electronic Filing. Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 11/05/2014. (yar) (Entered: 11/06/2014)
13 ORDER granting 10 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice, Consent to Designation, and Request to Electronically Receive Notices of Electronic Filing. Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 11/05/2014. (yar) (Entered: 11/06/2014)
14 SUMMONS (Affidavit) Returned Executed on 1 Complaint 42 USC 1983 or Bivens, with a 21 day response/answer filing deadline by John Doe #1, John Doe #2, Florida Action Committee, Inc., John Doe #3. Miami−Dade County served on 10/23/2014, answer due 11/13/2014. (Tilley, Daniel) (Entered: 11/06/2014)
15 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to file response to Plaintiffs' complaint re 1 Complaint 42 USC 1983 or Bivens, by Florida Department of Corrections, Sunny Ukenye. Attorney John Bajger added to party Florida Department of Corrections(pty:dft), Attorney John Bajger added to party Sunny Ukenye(pty:dft). Responses due by 11/28/2014 (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Bajger, John) (Entered:

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11/12/2014 11/12/2014 11/13/2014 11/14/2014 11/24/2014 11/25/2014 11/26/2014 11/28/2014 12/12/2014
12/15/2014 12/20/2014 12/24/2014 12/30/2014 12/31/2014 01/06/2015

11/10/2014)
16 Paperless ORDER granting 15 Motion for Extension of Time. Defendants' responses or answers are due on or before November 28, 2014. Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 11/12/2014. (mle) (Entered: 11/12/2014)
Set/Reset Answer Due Deadline: Florida Department of Corrections response due 11/28/2014; Sunny Ukenye response due 11/28/2014. (mle) (Entered: 11/12/2014)
17 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer RE: Complaints re 1 Complaint 42 USC 1983 or Bivens, by Miami−Dade County. Attorney Michael Beny Valdes added to party Miami−Dade County(pty:dft). (Valdes, Michael) (Entered: 11/13/2014)
18 Paperless ORDER granting 17 Motion for Extension of Time to Answer RE: Complaints. Miami−Dade County answer due 11/24/2014. Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 11/14/2014. (mle) (Entered: 11/14/2014)
19 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer RE: Complaints re 1 Complaint 42 USC 1983 or Bivens, by Miami−Dade County. (Valdes, Michael) (Entered: 11/24/2014)
20 Paperless ORDER granting 19 Motion for Extension of Time to Answer. Miami−Dade County shall respond to Plaintiffs' Complaint on or before November 26, 2014. Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 11/25/2014. (mle) (Entered: 11/25/2014)
21 MOTION TO DISMISS 1 Complaint 42 USC 1983 or Bivens, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM by Miami−Dade County. Responses due by 12/15/2014 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Ordinance No. 05−206, # 2 Exhibit B − Ordinance No. 10−01, # 3 Exhibit C − Ordinance No. 10−67)(Valdes, Michael) (Entered: 11/26/2014)
22 MOTION TO DISMISS 1 Complaint 42 USC 1983 or Bivens, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM by Florida Department of Corrections, Sunny Ukenye. Responses due by 12/15/2014 (Bajger, John) (Entered: 11/28/2014)
23 Unopposed MOTION to stay consideration of pending motions to dismiss 21 22 until Plaintiffs file their amended complaint re 21 MOTION TO DISMISS 1 Complaint 42 USC 1983 or Bivens, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM , 22 MOTION TO DISMISS 1 Complaint 42 USC 1983 or Bivens, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM by John Doe #1, John Doe #2, John Doe #3, Florida Action Committee, Inc.. (Tilley, Daniel) (Entered: 12/12/2014)
24 ORDER granting Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion to Stay Briefing Pending Plaintiffs' Filing of An Amended Complaint 23 . Defendants' Motions to Dismiss 21 22 are denied as moot. Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 12/15/2014. (mle) (Entered: 12/15/2014)
25 AMENDED COMPLAINT against All Defendants, filed by John Doe #1, John Doe #2, Florida Action Committee, Inc., John Doe #3.(Tilley, Daniel) (Entered: 12/20/2014)
26 NOTICE of Hearing: Status Conference set for 1/7/2015 10:00 AM in Miami Division before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck. Counsel from out of Miami−Dade County may appear telephonically. Call instructions are in the attached notice. (mle) (Entered: 12/24/2014)
27 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to file response to Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint re 25 Amended Complaint by Florida Department of Corrections, Sunny Ukenye. Responses due by 1/16/2015 (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Bajger, John) (Entered: 12/30/2014)
28 PAPERLESS ORDER granting 27 Motion for Extension of Time. Responses due by 1/15/2015 Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 12/31/2014. (mle) (Entered: 12/31/2014)
29 MOTION TO DISMISS 25 Amended Complaint FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM by Miami−Dade County. Responses due by 1/23/2015 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Ordinance 05−206, # 2 Exhibit B − Ordinance 10−01, # 3 Exhibit C − Ordinance 10−67)(Valdes, Michael) (Entered: 01/06/2015)

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01/07/2015 01/07/2015 01/07/2015
01/14/2015 01/14/2015 01/15/2015
01/16/2015 01/30/2015 02/02/2015
02/03/2015
02/03/2015 02/06/2015 02/13/2015 02/23/2015

30 PAPERLESS ORDER granting 3 Motion for Leave to Proceed Anonymously. Clerks Notice: Filer must separately re−file the amended pleading pursuant to Local Rule 15.1, unless otherwise ordered by the Judge. Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 1/7/2015. (mle) (Entered: 01/07/2015)
Set/Reset Deadlines/Hearings Responses due by 1/20/2015 Deadline is being extended as per hearing held on January 7, 2015. (mle) (Entered: 01/07/2015)
31 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck: Status Conference held on 1/7/2015. Parties shall notify the Court by January 14 as to whether they wish to proceed with a mediator or arbitrator. Court Reporter: Gilda Pastor−Hernandez, 305−523−5118 / Gilda_Pastor−Hernandez@flsd.uscourts.gov (mle) (Entered: 01/07/2015)
32 Joint MOTION to Stay Proceedings and Joint Status Report by Miami−Dade County. Responses due by 2/2/2015 (Valdes, Michael) Modified to add missing event DE 33 Joint Status Report on 1/15/2015 (yar). (Entered: 01/14/2015)
34 STATUS REPORT by Miami−Dade County (See image at DE 32 ).(yar) (Entered: 01/15/2015)
33 Clerks Notice to Filer re 32 Joint MOTION to Stay Proceedings and Joint Status Report. Two or More Document Events Filed as One; ERROR − Only one event was selected by the Filer but more than one event was applicable to the document filed. The docket entry was corrected by the Clerk. It is not necessary to refile this document but in the future, the Filer must select all applicable events. (yar) (Entered: 01/15/2015)
35 ORDER GRANTING JOINT MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS; 32 Motion to Stay. Joint Status Report due by 1/30/2015. Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 01/15/2015. (yar) (Entered: 01/16/2015)
36 STATUS REPORT (Joint) and Joint Motion for Partial Stay and Briefing Schedule by John Doe #1, John Doe #2, Florida Action Committee, Inc., John Doe #3 (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Tilley, Daniel) Modified event type on 2/2/2015 (dgj). (Entered: 01/30/2015)
37 Clerks Notice to Filer re 36 Status Report. Two or More Document Events Filed as One; ERROR − Only one event was selected by the Filer but more than one event was applicable to the document filed. The docket entry was corrected by the Clerk. It is not necessary to refile this document but in the future, the Filer must select all applicable events.Wrong Event Selected − Document is a Motion; ERROR − The Filer selected the wrong event. A motion event must always be selected when filing a motion. The correction was made by the Clerk. It is not necessary to refile this document. (dgj) (Entered: 02/02/2015)
38 ORDER granting 36 Joint Motion for Partial Stay and Briefing Schedule. Re: 29 MOTION TO DISMISS 25 Amended Complaint FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by Miami−Dade County. Status Report due by 2/20/2015. Responses due by 2/16/2015. Response to Amended Complaint due 2/6/2015. Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 2/2/2015. (ls) (Main Document 38 replaced on 2/3/2015) (ls). (Entered: 02/03/2015)
Reset Answer Due Deadline: Florida Department of Corrections response due 2/6/2015; Sunny Ukenye response due 2/6/2015. (ls) (per DE # 38 ) (Entered: 02/03/2015)
39 MOTION TO DISMISS 25 Amended Complaint FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM by Florida Department of Corrections, Sunny Ukenye. Responses due by 2/23/2015 (Bajger, John) (Entered: 02/06/2015)
40 RESPONSE in Opposition re 29 MOTION TO DISMISS 25 Amended Complaint FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by John Doe #1, John Doe #2, John Doe #3, Florida Action Committee, Inc.. Replies due by 2/23/2015. (Tilley, Daniel) (Entered: 02/13/2015)
41 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to Submit Reply in Support of 29 MOTION TO DISMISS 25 Amended Complaint FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM by Miami−Dade County. (Valdes, Michael) Modified text on 2/23/2015 (yar). (Entered: 02/23/2015)

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02/23/2015 02/24/2015 02/24/2015 03/02/2015 03/02/2015
03/03/2015 03/03/2015 03/05/2015
03/06/2015 03/06/2015 03/16/2015 03/25/2015
03/27/2015
03/27/2015

42 Joint STATUS REPORT on Additional Discussions and Partial Stay by Miami−Dade County (Valdes, Michael) Modified text on 2/23/2015 (yar). (Entered: 02/23/2015)
43 Paperless ORDER granting 41 Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply to Motion 39 MOTION TO DISMISS 25 Amended Complaint FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by Florida Department of Corrections, Sunny Ukenye. Replies due by 3/2/2015. Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 2/24/2015. (mle) (Entered: 02/24/2015)
44 ORDER lifting stay regarding Plaintiffs' vagueness claim, as suggested in Parties' Joint Status Report. Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 2/24/2015. (mle) (Entered: 02/24/2015)
45 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply/Answer as to 29 MOTION TO DISMISS 25 Amended Complaint FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM by Miami−Dade County. (Valdes, Michael) (Entered: 03/02/2015)
46 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File Response to Motion to DismissOut of Time by John Doe #1, John Doe #2, John Doe #3, Florida Action Committee, Inc.. Attorney Nancy Gbana Abudu added to party John Doe #1(pty:pla), Attorney Nancy Gbana Abudu added to party John Doe #2(pty:pla), Attorney Nancy Gbana Abudu added to party John Doe #3(pty:pla), Attorney Nancy Gbana Abudu added to party Florida Action Committee, Inc.(pty:pla). (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant Ukenye and FDOC Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint)(Abudu, Nancy) Modified text on 3/2/2015 (yar). (Entered: 03/02/2015)
47 PAPERLESS ORDER granting 45 Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply in support of Motion to Dismiss 29 Reply due by 3/6/2015. Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 3/3/2015. (mle) (Entered: 03/03/2015)
48 PAPERLESS ORDER granting 46 Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Response to Motion to Dismiss Out of Time. Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 3/3/2015. (mle) (Entered: 03/03/2015)
49 Defendant's Agreed MOTION for Extension of Time to Submit Reply in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint re 46 First MOTION for Leave to File Out of Time by Florida Department of Corrections. Responses due by 3/23/2015 (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order)(Bajger, John) Modified text on 3/6/2015 (yar). (Entered: 03/05/2015)
50 PAPERLESS ORDER granting 49 Motion for Extension of Time. Defendants Florida Department of Corrections' and Sunny Ukenye's Reply Memorandum in support of their Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint shall be filed on or before March 16, 2015. Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 3/6/2015. (swe) (Entered: 03/06/2015)
51 REPLY in Support of Its Motion re 29 MOTION TO DISMISS 25 Amended Complaint FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by Miami−Dade County. (Valdes, Michael) Modified text on 3/9/2015 (yar). (Entered: 03/06/2015)
52 REPLY in Support of Motion re 46 First MOTION for Leave to File Out of Time , specifically Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint filed by Florida Department of Corrections, Sunny Ukenye. (Bajger, John) Modified text on 3/18/2015 (yar). (Entered: 03/16/2015)
53 ORDER Setting Hearing on 39 MOTION TO DISMISS Amended Complaint FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, 29 MOTION TO DISMISS Amended Complaint FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM: Argument set for 3/31/2015 10:30 AM in Miami Division before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck. Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 3/25/2015. (swe) (Entered: 03/25/2015)
54 NOTICE of RESCHEDULING Hearing on 39 MOTION TO DISMISS Amended Complaint and 29 MOTION TO DISMISS Amended Complaint. The hearing previously set for 10:30 a.m. has been RESCHEDULED for 3/31/2015 12:00 PM (NOON) in Miami Division before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck. Attorneys calling in to the hearing may refer to the prior notice of hearing 53 for call−in instructions. (swe) (Entered: 03/27/2015)
55 ORDER Requiring Response: Defendant Miami−Dade County shall file a supplemental memorandum as directed in the attached order. Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 3/27/2015. (swe) (Entered: 03/27/2015)

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03/30/2015 03/30/2015 04/01/2015
04/01/2015 04/03/2015

56 Supplemental MEMORANDUM to re 29 MOTION TO DISMISS 25 Amended Complaint FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM by Miami−Dade County. (Valdes, Michael) Modified text on 3/31/2015 (yar). (Entered: 03/30/2015)
57 NOTICE of RESCHEDULING Hearing on 39 MOTION TO DISMISS and 29 MOTION TO DISMISS 25 . The Hearing previously set for 12 p.m. HAS BEEN RESCHEDULED TO BEGIN AT 11:45 a.m., Tuesday, March 31, 2015, in Miami Division before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck. Attorneys calling in to the hearing may refer to the prior notice of hearing 53 for call−in instructions. (swe) (Entered: 03/30/2015)
58 PAPERLESS Minute Entry for proceedings held before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck: Motion Hearing held on 4/1/2015 re 29 MOTION TO DISMISS 25 Amended Complaint FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by Miami−Dade County, 39 MOTION TO DISMISS 25 Amended Complaint FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by Florida Department of Corrections, Sunny Ukenye. Order to follow. Court Reporter: Dawn Whitmarsh, 305−523−5598 / Dawn_Whitmarsh@flsd.uscourts.gov (swe) (Entered: 04/01/2015)
59 Notice of Supplemental Authority by John Doe #1, John Doe #2, Florida Action Committee, Inc., John Doe #3 (Abudu, Nancy) (Entered: 04/01/2015)
60 ORDER Granting Motion to Dismiss; granting 29 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; granting 39 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Closing Case. Motions Terminated: 29 MOTION TO DISMISS 25 Amended Complaint FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by Miami−Dade County, 39 MOTION TO DISMISS 25 Amended Complaint FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by Florida Department of Corrections, Sunny Ukenye. Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 4/3/2015. (asl)

04/24/2015 05/11/2015 05/21/2015 05/21/2015 06/11/2015 06/12/2015

NOTICE: If there are sealed documents in this case, they may be unsealed after 1 year or as directed by Court Order, unless they have been designated to be permanently sealed. See Local Rule 5.4 and Administrative Order 2014−69. (Entered: 04/03/2015)
61 MOTION for relief from Court's Order 60 dismissing this action with prejudice re 60 Order on Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim,,,,,,, by John Doe #1, John Doe #2, John Doe #3, Florida Action Committee, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit County facilities enforced as "schools", # 2 Exhibit 300 transient individuals, # 3 Exhibit Returned River Park evictees)(Tilley, Daniel) (Entered: 04/24/2015)
62 RESPONSE to Plaintiffs' Motion For Relief From Judgment re 61 MOTION for relief from Court's Order 60 dismissing this action with prejudice re 60 Order on Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim,,,,,,, filed by Miami−Dade County. Replies due by 5/21/2015. (Valdes, Michael) Modified text on 5/12/2015 (yar). (Entered: 05/11/2015)
63 ORDER Setting Hearing on Motion 61 MOTION for relief from Court's Order 60 dismissing this action with prejudice re 60 Order on Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim,,,,,,, : Motion Hearing set for 6/12/2015 09:20 AM in Miami Division before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck. Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 5/21/2015. (mle) (Entered: 05/21/2015)
64 REPLY to Response to Motion re 61 MOTION for relief from Court's Order 60 dismissing this action with prejudice re 60 Order on Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim,,,,,,, filed by John Doe #1, John Doe #2, John Doe #3, Florida Action Committee, Inc.. (Tilley, Daniel) (Entered: 05/21/2015)
65 PAPERLESS NOTICE of courtroom change. The hearing set for Friday, June 12, 2015 at 9:30 a.m. before the Honorable Paul C. Huck 63 will be held in Courtroom 13−3, 400 N. Miami Ave., Miami, FL 33128, and not courtroom 13−2, as previously noticed. All other details of the hearing remain unchanged. (swe) (Entered: 06/11/2015)
66 PAPERLESS Minute Entry for proceedings held before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck: Motion Hearing held on 6/12/2015 re 61 MOTION for relief from Court's Order filed by John Doe #1, Florida Action Committee, Inc., John Doe #2, John Doe #3. Order to follow. Court Reporter: Gilda Pastor−Hernandez, 305−523−5118 / Gilda_Pastor−Hernandez@flsd.uscourts.gov (swe) (Entered: 06/12/2015)

Case: 1:14-cv-23933-PCH As of: 02/14/2019 11:09 AM EST 11 of 22

06/23/2015 09/25/2015
09/25/2015 09/29/2015 10/05/2015 10/16/2015 10/16/2015
10/16/2015 10/16/2015 10/30/2015 11/28/2015
11/28/2015 03/04/2016

67 ORDER denying 61 Plaintiffs' Motion for Relief from Judgment. Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 6/23/2015. (swe) (Entered: 06/23/2015)
68 Notice of Appeal as to 67 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief, 60 Order on Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim,,,,,,, by John Doe #1, John Doe #2, John Doe #3, Florida Action Committee, Inc.. Filing fee $ 505.00 receipt number 113C−8111055. Within fourteen days of the filing date of a Notice of Appeal, the appellant must complete the Eleventh Circuit Transcript Order Form regardless of whether transcripts are being ordered [Pursuant to FRAP 10(b)]. For information go to our FLSD website under Transcript Information. (Tilley, Daniel) (Entered: 09/25/2015)
Transmission of Notice of Appeal and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals re 68 Notice of Appeal,, Notice has been electronically mailed. (hh) (Entered: 09/25/2015)
69 Acknowledgment of Receipt of NOA from USCA re 68 Notice of Appeal,, filed by John Doe #1, Florida Action Committee, Inc., John Doe #2, John Doe #3. Date received by USCA: 9/25/15. USCA Case Number: 15−14336−B. (hh) (Entered: 09/29/2015)
70 TRANSCRIPT INFORMATION FORM by John Doe #1, John Doe #2, John Doe #3, Florida Action Committee, Inc. re 68 Notice of Appeal,,. Hearing transcript(s) ordered. Order placed by Daniel B. Tilley. Email sent to Court Reporter Coordinator. (Tilley, Daniel) (Entered: 10/05/2015)
71 COURT REPORTER ACKNOWLEDGMENT re 70 Transcript Information Form,. Court Reporter: Dawn Whitmarsh, 305−523−5598 / Dawn_Whitmarsh@flsd.uscourts.gov. Estimated filing date of transcript 10−16−2015. USCA number 15−14336. (dwh) (Entered: 10/16/2015)
72 TRANSCRIPT of motion to dismiss held on 3−31−2015 before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck, 1−62 pages, Court Reporter: Dawn Whitmarsh, 305−523−5598 / Dawn_Whitmarsh@flsd.uscourts.gov. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased by contacting the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 11/9/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/19/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/19/2016. (dwh) (Entered: 10/16/2015)
73 TRANSCRIPT NOTIFICATION − Transcript(s) ordered on: 10−5−2015 by Daniel Tilley, Esq. has/have been filed by Court Reporter: Dawn Whitmarsh, 305−523−5598 / Dawn_Whitmarsh@flsd.uscourts.gov re 71 Court Reporter Acknowledgment. (dwh) (Entered: 10/16/2015)
74 TRANSCRIPT INFORMATION FORM by John Doe #1, John Doe #2, John Doe #3, Florida Action Committee, Inc. re 68 Notice of Appeal,,. Hearing transcript(s) ordered. Order placed by Daniel B. Tilley. Email sent to Court Reporter Coordinator. (Tilley, Daniel) (Entered: 10/16/2015)
75 COURT REPORTER ACKNOWLEDGMENT re 74 Transcript Information Form, 68 Notice of Appeal. Court Reporter: Gilda Pastor−Hernandez, 305−523−5118 / Gilda_Pastor−Hernandez@flsd.uscourts.gov. Estimated filing date of transcript 11−29−15. USCA number 15−14336. (gpz) (Entered: 10/30/2015)
76 TRANSCRIPT of Motion For Relief From Court's Order held on 06−12−15 before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck, 1−30 pages, re: 68 Notice of Appeal, Court Reporter: Gilda Pastor−Hernandez, 305−523−5118 / Gilda_Pastor−Hernandez@flsd.uscourts.gov. USCA Case Number: 15−14336. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased by contacting the Court Reporter before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 12/24/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 1/4/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/29/2016. (gpz) (Entered: 11/28/2015)
77 TRANSCRIPT NOTIFICATION − Transcript(s) ordered on: 10−16−15 by Daniel B. Tilley, Esq. has/have been filed by Court Reporter: Gilda Pastor−Hernandez, 305−523−5118 / Gilda_Pastor−Hernandez@flsd.uscourts.gov re 74 Transcript Information Form, 68 Notice of Appeal, 75 Court Reporter Acknowledgment. (gpz) (Entered: 11/28/2015)
78 ORDER of USCA. This appeal is hereby DISMISSED as to June 23, 2015order denying the Rule 60(b) motion but MAY PROCEED as to the April 3, 2015 order dismissing the

Case: 1:14-cv-23933-PCH As of: 02/14/2019 11:09 AM EST 12 of 22

06/01/2016 04/27/2017
04/28/2017 05/01/2017
05/08/2017 05/19/2017
05/22/2017 06/06/2017 06/06/2017 06/06/2017 10/02/2017 10/05/2017
10/05/2017

amended complaint with prejudice re 68 Notice of Appeal,, filed by John Doe #1, Florida Action Committee, Inc., John Doe #2, John Doe #3. USCA #15−14336−BB (amb) (Entered: 03/04/2016)
79 Pursuant to F.R.A.P. 11(c), the Clerk of the District Court for the Southern District of Florida certifies that the record is complete for purposes of this appeal re: 68 Notice of Appeal,, Appeal No. 15−14336−BB. The entire record on appeal is available electronically. (amb) (Entered: 06/01/2016)
81 MANDATE of USCA. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. We reverse the district courts grant of the County's motion to dismiss as to Doe #1 and Doe #3's ex post facto challenges and remand for further proceedings re 68 Notice of Appeal, filed by John Doe #1, Florida Action Committee, Inc., John Doe #2, John Doe #3; Date Issued: 4/27/2017; USCA Case Number: 15−14336−BB. (apz) (Entered: 04/28/2017)
80 ORDER Setting Status Conference: Telephonic Status Conference set for 5/1/2017 11:00 AM in Miami Division before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck. Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 4/28/2017. (ah01) (Entered: 04/28/2017)
82 PAPERLESS Minute Entry for proceedings held before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck: Status Conference held on 5/1/2017. Total time in court: 0 hour(s) : 15 minutes. Attorney Appearance(s): Brandon Buskey, Michael Beny Valdes, Oren Rosenthal. Court Reporter: Lisa Edwards, 305−523−5499 / Lisa_Edwards@flsd.uscourts.gov. (ah01) (Entered: 05/01/2017)
83 Joint SCHEDULING REPORT − Rule 16.1 by Miami−Dade County (Valdes, Michael) (Entered: 05/08/2017)
84 ORDER SETTING CIVIL NON−JURY TRIAL DATE AND PRETRIAL SCHEDULE, REQUIRING MEDIATION AND REFERRING CERTAIN MOTIONS TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE: ( Bench Trial set for 3/19/2018 in Miami Division before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck., Calendar Call set for 3/14/2018 08:30 AM in Miami Division before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck.), ORDER REFERRING CASE to Mediation., ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Chris M. McAliley for Discovery Matters Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 5/19/2017. (yha)
Pattern Jury Instruction Builder − To access the latest, up to date changes to the 11th Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions go to https://pji.ca11.uscourts.gov or click here. Modified text to reflect correct Trial Date on 5/22/2017 (yha). (Entered: 05/22/2017)
Reset Hearings Bench Trial reset for 3/19/2018 in Miami Division before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck. (yha) (Entered: 05/22/2017)
85 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Jeffrey Martin Hearne on behalf of John Doe #3. Attorney Jeffrey Martin Hearne added to party John Doe #3(pty:pla). (Hearne, Jeffrey) (Entered: 06/06/2017)
86 Certificate of Interested Parties/Corporate Disclosure Statement − NONE disclosed by John Doe #1, John Doe #3 (Tilley, Daniel) (Entered: 06/06/2017)
87 Certificate of Interested Parties/Corporate Disclosure Statement − NONE disclosed by Miami−Dade County (Valdes, Michael) (Entered: 06/06/2017)
88 Second MOTION to Amend/Correct Complaint by John Doe #1, John Doe #2, John Doe #3, Florida Action Committee, Inc.. Responses due by 10/16/2017 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Abudu, Nancy) (Entered: 10/02/2017)
89 ORDER granting 88 Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint and Join Additional Parties. The Second Amended Complaint attached to the Motion shall be deemed filed as of the date of this Order. Defendants shall respond to the Second Amended Complaint by October 26, 2017. Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 10/5/2017. (mc) (Entered: 10/05/2017)
90 SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT against Miami−Dade County filed in response to Order Granting Motion for Leave, filed by John Doe #3, John Doe #4, John Doe #5, John Doe #6, John Doe #7.(mc) (Entered: 10/05/2017)

Case: 1:14-cv-23933-PCH As of: 02/14/2019 11:09 AM EST 13 of 22

10/05/2017 10/26/2017 10/30/2017
11/22/2017 11/28/2017

Set Answer Due Deadline: Miami−Dade County response due 10/26/2017 per DE 89 . (mc) (Entered: 10/05/2017)
91 ANSWER and Affirmative Defenses to Amended Complaint by Miami−Dade County. (Valdes, Michael) (Entered: 10/26/2017)
92 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Valerie Jonas on behalf of John Doe #3, John Doe #4, John Doe #5, John Doe #6, John Doe #7. Attorney Valerie Jonas added to party John Doe #3(pty:pla), Attorney Valerie Jonas added to party John Doe #4(pty:pla), Attorney Valerie Jonas added to party John Doe #5(pty:pla), Attorney Valerie Jonas added to party John Doe #6(pty:pla), Attorney Valerie Jonas added to party John Doe #7(pty:pla). (Jonas, Valerie) (Entered: 10/30/2017)
93 Joint MOTION to Continue Trial ( Responses due by 12/6/2017), Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery and for Other Corresponding Deadlines by Miami−Dade County. (Valdes, Michael) (Entered: 11/22/2017)
94 ORDER RE−SETTING TRIAL AND CALENDAR CALL: (Jury Trial set for 4/30/2018 09:00 AM before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck., Calendar Call set for 4/25/2018 09:00 AM in Miami Division before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck.). Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 11/28/2017. (jas)

01/22/2018 01/25/2018
02/08/2018 02/09/2018

Pattern Jury Instruction Builder − To access the latest, up to date changes to the 11th Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions go to https://pji.ca11.uscourts.gov or click here. (Entered: 11/28/2017)
95 MOTION Motion to Drop Plaintiff John Doe #3 by John Doe #3. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Abudu, Nancy) (Entered: 01/22/2018)
96 ORDER granting 95 Motion to Drop Plaintiff John Doe #3. ORDERED that Plaintiff John Doe //3 is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Court directs the Clerk of the Court to restyle the caption to read: John Doe #4, John Doe #5, John Doe #6, and John Doe #7, Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 1/25/2018. (jas) (Entered: 01/25/2018)
97 Joint MOTION to Continue , Joint MOTION for Extension of Time for Mediation and Dispositive Motions ( Responses due by 2/22/2018) by Miami−Dade County. (Valdes, Michael) (Entered: 02/08/2018)
98 ORDER RE−SETTING TRIAL AND CALENDAR CALL: Bench Trial set for 6/25/2018 09:00 AM before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck. Calendar Call set for 6/20/2018 09:00 AM in Miami Division before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck. Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 2/9/2018. (kpe)

03/15/2018 03/15/2018 03/15/2018 03/16/2018 04/06/2018 04/09/2018

Pattern Jury Instruction Builder − To access the latest, up to date changes to the 11th Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions go to https://pji.ca11.uscourts.gov or click here. Modified text on 2/9/2018 (kpe). (Entered: 02/09/2018)
99 NOTICE by John Doe #4, John Doe #5, John Doe #6, John Doe #7 of Proposed Mediation Order (Hearne, Jeffrey) (Entered: 03/15/2018)
100 Clerks Notice to Filer re 99 Notice (Other). Parties/Mediator Not Added; ERROR − The Filer failed to add all parties/mediator. Filer is instructed to file a Notice of Entry of Parties/Mediator and add the additional parties/mediator. (jas) (Entered: 03/15/2018)
101 Notice of Entry of Parties Listed NOTE: New Filer(s) will appear twice, since they are also a new party in the case. New Filer(s)/Party(s): George F. Knox. (Hearne, Jeffrey) (Entered: 03/15/2018)
102 ORDER Scheduling Mediation before George Knox. Mediation Hearing set for 4/19/2018 09:30 AM. Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 3/16/2018. (jas) (Entered: 03/16/2018)
103 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Motion for Summary Judgment by Miami−Dade County. Responses due by 4/20/2018 (Valdes, Michael) (Entered: 04/06/2018)
104 ORDER Re−Setting Trial and Calendar Call and denying 103 Motion for Extension of Time. Bench Trial set for 10/22/2018 09:00 AM in Miami Division before Senior Judge

Case: 1:14-cv-23933-PCH As of: 02/14/2019 11:09 AM EST 14 of 22

04/21/2018 04/30/2018 05/05/2018 05/07/2018 06/11/2018
06/21/2018 06/22/2018 06/25/2018 07/12/2018 07/12/2018
07/13/2018 07/13/2018 07/16/2018

Paul C. Huck. Calendar Call set for 10/17/2018 09:00 AM in Miami Division before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck. Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 4/9/2018. (la00) (Entered: 04/09/2018)
105 Agreed MOTION for Extension of Time to Mediate by John Doe #4, John Doe #5, John Doe #6, John Doe #7. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Hearne, Jeffrey) (Entered: 04/21/2018)
106 PAPERLESS ORDER granting 105 Motion for Extension of Time to Mediate. The deadline for mediator to file a report has been extended to 6/22/2018. Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 4/30/2018. (la00) (Entered: 04/30/2018)
107 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File Amended Answer and Affirmative Defenses by Miami−Dade County. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Amended Answer, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Valdes, Michael) (Entered: 05/05/2018)
108 ORDER granting 107 Motion for Leave to File. Clerks Notice: Filer must separately re−file the amended pleading pursuant to Local Rule 15.1, unless otherwise ordered by the Judge. Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 5/7/2018. (jas) (Entered: 05/07/2018)
PAPERLESS NOTICE Set/Reset Hearings Telephonic Status Conference set for 6/13/2018 at 09:30 AM in Miami Division before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck. Counsel for both parties are instructed to take the following steps shortly before the scheduled conference time so that the telephonic conference may begin promptly:Call the Toll−Free Number: 1−888−684−8852. Enter the access code, 4825076, followed by the # sign. Enter the security code, 332010468, followed by the # sign. State your name and enter the conference. For technical assistance, please call 800−526−2655. (la00) (Entered: 06/11/2018)
109 PAPERLESS Minute Entry for proceedings held before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck: Telephone Conference held on 6/13/2018. Total time in court: 0 hour(s) : 10 minutes. Attorney Appearance(s): Daniel Boaz Tilley, Brandon Buskey, Michael Beny Valdes (la00) (Entered: 06/21/2018)
110 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to Mediate by John Doe #4, John Doe #5, John Doe #6, John Doe #7. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Hearne, Jeffrey) (Entered: 06/22/2018)
111 ORDER granting 110 Joint Motion for Extension of Time to Continue Mediation And Extend The Deadline For Mediator To File A Report. Mediation Deadline 8/17/2018. Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 6/25/2018. (vmz) (Entered: 06/26/2018)
112 MOTION for Leave to Expand the Number of Interrogatories by John Doe #4, John Doe #5, John Doe #6, John Doe #7. (Hearne, Jeffrey) (Entered: 07/12/2018)
113 PAPERLESS ORDER. The Court will a hold a telephonic hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Expand the Number of Interrogatories [DE 112] on July 18, 2018 at 4:00 p.m. Counsel should use the following dial−in information: telephone number: 1−888−684−8852; access code: 9675400 and security code: 5890. Defendant Miami−Dade County may file a response to the Motion, not to exceed two (2) pages in length, no later than July 16, 2018. Telephonic Motion Hearing set for 7/18/2018 04:00 PM in Miami Division before Magistrate Judge Chris M. McAliley. Signed by Magistrate Judge Chris M. McAliley on 7/12/2018. (nsy) (Entered: 07/12/2018)
114 PAPERLESS ORDER. The hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Expand the Number of Interrogatories previously set for July 18, 2018 is hereby CANCELLED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Chris M. McAliley on 7/13/2018. (nsy) (Entered: 07/13/2018)
115 ORDER Setting Hearing on 112 MOTION for Leave to Expand the Number of Interrogatories :. Telephonic Motion Hearing set for 7/19/2018 09:30 AM in Miami Division before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck. Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 7/13/2018. See attached document for full details. (jas) (Entered: 07/16/2018)
116 RESPONSE in Opposition re 112 MOTION for Leave to Expand the Number of Interrogatories filed by Miami−Dade County. Replies due by 7/23/2018. (Valdes, Michael) (Entered: 07/16/2018)

Case: 1:14-cv-23933-PCH As of: 02/14/2019 11:09 AM EST 15 of 22

07/18/2018 07/19/2018
07/19/2018 08/07/2018 08/07/2018 08/08/2018 08/08/2018
08/09/2018 08/09/2018 08/09/2018 08/09/2018 08/09/2018 08/13/2018 08/13/2018 08/13/2018

117 NOTICE by John Doe #4, John Doe #5, John Doe #6, John Doe #7 re 115 Order Setting Hearing on Motion, (Filing of Proposed Interrogatories) (Attachments: # 1 First Set of Interrogatories, # 2 Proposed Additional Interrogatories) (Tilley, Daniel) (Entered: 07/18/2018)
118 PAPERLESS Minute Entry for proceedings held before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck: Telephonic Discovery Hearing held on 7/19/2018. Total time in court: 30 minutes. Attorney Appearance(s): Daniel Boaz Tilley, Brandon Buskey, Jeffrey Martin Hearne, Michael Beny Valdes, Court Reporter: Diane Peede, 305−523−5048 / Diane_Peede@flsd.uscourts.gov. (la00) (Entered: 07/19/2018)
119 ORDER granting in part Plaintiff's 112 Motion for Leave to Expand the Number of Interrogatories. Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 7/19/2018. See attached document for full details. (jas) (Entered: 07/19/2018)
120 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages in Statement of Material Facts by Miami−Dade County. (Valdes, Michael) (Entered: 08/07/2018)
121 Unopposed MOTION to Seal Accompanying Exhibits to Motion for Summary Judgment and Statement of Material Facts per Local Rule 5.4 by Miami−Dade County. (Valdes, Michael) (Entered: 08/07/2018)
122 Defendant's MOTION for Summary Judgment by Miami−Dade County. Responses due by 8/22/2018 (Valdes, Michael) (Entered: 08/08/2018)
123 Statement of: Material Facts by Miami−Dade County (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Ordinance 05−206, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Greenfield 1997, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Snyder 2000, # 4 Exhibit 4 − NCVS 2016, # 5 Exhibit 5 − Deposition of Dr. Harris, # 6 Exhibit 6 − Youth Victimization, # 7 Exhibit 7 − Abel 1987, # 8 Exhibit 8 − Beck 1990, # 9 Exhibit 9 − Prentky 1997, # 10 Exhibit 10 − Prentky Research Report, # 11 Exhibit 11 − Expert Report of Dr. McCleary, # 12 Exhibit 12 − Bynum 2001, # 13 Exhibit 13 − Langevin 2004, # 14 Exhibit 14 − Walker 2001, # 15 Exhibit 15 − Page 2001, # 16 Exhibit 16 − Deposition of Dr. Levenson, # 17 Exhibit 17 − MDCPS Transportation Handbook, # 18 Exhibit 18 − SRTS Resolution, # 19 Exhibit 19 − SRTS 2017 Plan, # 20 Exhibit 20 − SRTS 2014 Plan, # 21 Exhibit 21 − SRTS 2015 Plan, # 22 Exhibit 22 − 2008 SPOU Report, # 23 Exhibit 23 − Ordinance 10−01, # 24 Exhibit 24 − Declaration of Josh Brashears, # 25 Exhibit 25 − 2010 Census Information (Miami−Dade))(Valdes, Michael) (Entered: 08/09/2018)
SYSTEM ENTRY − Docket Entry 124 [misc] restricted/sealed until further notice. (1241056) (Entered: 08/09/2018)
125 ORDER granting 120 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages in Statement of Material Facts. Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 8/8/2018. See attached document for full details. (vmz) (Entered: 08/09/2018)
126 Statement of: Material Facts (CORRECTED) by Miami−Dade County (Valdes, Michael) (Entered: 08/09/2018)
127 ORDER Granting 121 Unopposed Motion to Seal Accompanying Exhibits to Motion for Summary Judgment and Statement of Material Facts. Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 8/8/2018. See attached document for full details. (nc) (Entered: 08/09/2018)
SYSTEM ENTRY − Docket Entry 128 [misc] restricted/sealed until further notice. (1241056) (Entered: 08/09/2018)
129 STRICKEN per DE# 129 , Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply/Answer as to 122 Defendant's MOTION for Summary Judgment by John Doe #4, John Doe #5, John Doe #6, John Doe #7. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Hearne, Jeffrey) Modified text on 8/14/2018 (jas). (Entered: 08/13/2018)
130 NOTICE of Striking by John Doe #4, John Doe #5, John Doe #6, John Doe #7 (Hearne, Jeffrey) (Entered: 08/13/2018)
131 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply/Answer as to 122 Defendant's MOTION for Summary Judgment by John Doe #4, John Doe #5, John Doe #6, John Doe #7. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Hearne, Jeffrey) (Entered: 08/13/2018)

Case: 1:14-cv-23933-PCH As of: 02/14/2019 11:09 AM EST 16 of 22

08/15/2018 08/15/2018 08/28/2018 08/28/2018 08/29/2018
08/29/2018 08/29/2018 08/31/2018 09/04/2018
09/10/2018 09/10/2018 09/11/2018 09/12/2018 09/12/2018

132 PAPERLESS ORDER granting 131 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response to 122 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Miami−Dade County. Responses due by 8/29/2018. Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 8/15/2018. (la00) (Entered: 08/15/2018)
133 PAPERLESS ORDER striking 129 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response. Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 8/15/2018. (la00) (Entered: 08/15/2018)
134 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages for Response to Summary Judgment by John Doe #4, John Doe #5, John Doe #6, John Doe #7. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Hearne, Jeffrey) (Entered: 08/28/2018)
135 PAPERLESS ORDER granting 134 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Plaintiffs' response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment may be 27 pages. Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 8/28/2018. (la00) (Entered: 08/28/2018)
136 NOTICE by John Doe #4, John Doe #5, John Doe #6, John Doe #7 of Filing Exhibits for Response to Summary Judgment (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Expert Report − Greer, # 2 Exhibit Expert Report − Harris, # 3 Exhibit Expert Report − Harris Rebuttal, # 4 Exhibit Expert Report − Levenson, # 5 Exhibit Expert Report − Levenson Rebuttal, # 6 Exhibit Expert Report − Socia Amended, # 7 Exhibit Expert Report − Socia Rebuttal, # 8 Affidavit Berman Declaration, # 9 Affidavit Noriega Declaration, # 10 Transcripts Imbrone Deposition, # 11 Transcripts Mallette Deposition, # 12 Transcripts Poveda Deposition, # 13 Transcripts Sarria Deposition, # 14 Exhibit NYT article, # 15 Exhibit Ellman article, # 16 Exhibit HAND Spreadsheet, # 17 Exhibit Poveda / Mallette emails, # 18 Transcripts Commission Hearing Transcript, # 19 Transcripts Book Deposition) (Hearne, Jeffrey) (Entered: 08/29/2018)
137 Statement of: Material Facts and Response to Defendant's Statement of Material Facts by John Doe #4, John Doe #5, John Doe #6, John Doe #7 re 123 Statement,,,, (Hearne, Jeffrey) (Entered: 08/29/2018)
138 RESPONSE in Opposition re 122 Defendant's MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by John Doe #4, John Doe #5, John Doe #6, John Doe #7. Replies due by 9/5/2018. (Hearne, Jeffrey) (Entered: 08/29/2018)
139 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply/Answer as to 138 Response in Opposition to Motion by Miami−Dade County. (Valdes, Michael) (Entered: 08/31/2018)
140 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; granting 139 Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply to Motion. Responses due by 9/10/2018. Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 9/4/2018. See attached document for full details. (jas) (Entered: 09/04/2018)
141 REPLY to Response to Motion re 122 Defendant's MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Miami−Dade County. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Minutes from Committee Meeting, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Memo on Animal Service Unit, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Resolution No. R−893−05)(Valdes, Michael) (Entered: 09/10/2018)
142 Statement of: in Response to Plaintiffs' Statement of Additional Material Facts by Miami−Dade County re 137 Statement (Valdes, Michael) (Entered: 09/10/2018)
PAPERLESS NOTICE to Reset Hearings: Calendar Call reset for 10/18/2018 at 11:00 AM in Miami Division before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck. (la00) (Entered: 09/11/2018)
143 FINAL MEDIATION REPORT by George Knox. Disposition: Case did not settle.(Knox, George) (Entered: 09/12/2018)
PAPERLESS NOTICE to Set Hearings: Telephonic Status Conference set for 9/13/2018 at 11:00 AM in Miami Division before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck. Counsel for both parties are instructed to take the following steps shortly before the scheduled conference time so that the telephonic conference may begin promptly: Call the Toll−Free Number: 1−888−684−8852; Enter the access code, 4825076, followed by the # sign; Enter the security code, 332010468, followed by the # sign; State your name and enter the conference. (la00) (Entered: 09/12/2018)

Case: 1:14-cv-23933-PCH As of: 02/14/2019 11:09 AM EST 17 of 22

09/13/2018
09/13/2018 09/17/2018 09/18/2018
09/19/2018 09/19/2018 09/21/2018
10/12/2018 10/15/2018 10/15/2018 10/15/2018 10/18/2018 10/18/2018
10/18/2018 10/19/2018

144 PAPERLESS Minute Entry for proceedings held before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck: Telephone Conference held on 9/13/2018. Total time in court: 10 minutes. Attorney Appearance(s): Daniel Boaz Tilley, Brandon Buskey, Jeffrey Martin Hearne, Michael Beny Valdes, Court Reporter: Gilda Pastor−Hernandez, 305−523−5118 / Gilda_Pastor−Hernandez@flsd.uscourts.gov. (la00) (Entered: 09/13/2018)
145 ORDER Setting Hearing on Motion re 122 Defendant's MOTION for Summary Judgment : Motion Hearing set for 9/21/2018 09:30 AM in Miami Division before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck. Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 9/13/2018. See attached document for full details. (jas) (Entered: 09/14/2018)
PAPERLESS NOTICE Re: D.E. 145 **LOCATION CHANGE ONLY** Motion for Summary Judgment Hearing set for 9/21/2018 09:30 AM in Courtroom 13−4 in Miami Division before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck. (ac00) (Entered: 09/17/2018)
PAPERLESS NOTICE to Reset Hearings **TIME CHANGE ONLY** Calendar Call reset for 10/18/2018 at 10:30 AM in Miami Division before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck. For out−of−state counsel appearing by telephone, please take the following steps shortly before the scheduled hearing time so that the hearing may begin promptly: Call the Toll−Free Number: 1−888−684−8852; Enter the access code, 4825076, followed by the # sign; Enter the security code, 332010468, followed by the # sign; State your name and enter the conference. (ac00) (Entered: 09/18/2018)
146 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Bernard Pastor on behalf of Miami−Dade County. Attorney Bernard Pastor added to party Miami−Dade County(pty:dft). (Pastor, Bernard) (Entered: 09/19/2018)
147 REPORT REGARDING Proposed Procedures for Bench Trial by John Doe #4, John Doe #5, John Doe #6, John Doe #7 (Hearne, Jeffrey) (Entered: 09/19/2018)
148 PAPERLESS Minute Entry for proceedings held before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck: Motion Hearing held on 9/21/2018 re 122 Defendant's MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Miami−Dade County. Total time in court: 25 minutes. Attorney Appearance(s): Daniel Boaz Tilley, Brandon Buskey, Jeffrey Martin Hearne, Bernard Pastor, Michael Beny Valdes, Court Reporter: Stephanie McCarn, 305−523−5518 / Stephanie_McCarn@flsd.uscourts.gov. (ac00) (Entered: 09/21/2018)
149 PRETRIAL STIPULATION by Miami−Dade County (Attachments: # 1 Schedule of Trial Exhibits)(Valdes, Michael) (Entered: 10/12/2018)
PAPERLESS NOTICE Re. D.E. 104 **LOCATION CHANGE ONLY** Calendar Call set for 10/18/2018 at 10:30 AM and Bench Trial set for 10/22/2018 at 09:00 AM in **Courtroom 13−4** in Miami Division before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck. (ac00) (Entered: 10/15/2018)
150 Proposed Findings of Fact and Proposed Conclusions of Law by Miami−Dade County. (Valdes, Michael) (Entered: 10/15/2018)
151 Proposed Findings of Fact and Proposed Conclusions of Law by John Doe #4, John Doe #5, John Doe #6, John Doe #7. (Hearne, Jeffrey) (Entered: 10/15/2018)
152 NOTICE by John Doe #4, John Doe #5, John Doe #6, John Doe #7 of filing Doe #7 Trial Declaration (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Trial Declaration of Doe #7) (Tilley, Daniel) (Entered: 10/18/2018)
153 PAPERLESS Minute Entry for proceedings held before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck: Calendar Call held on 10/18/2018. Total time in court: 1 hour(s). Attorney Appearance(s): Daniel Boaz Tilley, Brandon Buskey, Jeffrey Martin Hearne, Bernard Pastor, Michael Beny Valdes, Court Reporter: Glenda Powers, 305−523−5022 / Glenda_Powers@flsd.uscourts.gov. (ac00) (Entered: 10/18/2018)
154 Unopposed MOTION to Bring Electronic Equipment into the courtroom by Miami−Dade County. Responses due by 11/1/2018 (Valdes, Michael) (Entered: 10/18/2018)
PAPERLESS NOTICE to Set Hearing: Telephonic Status Conference set for 10/19/2019 at 10:30 AM in Miami Division before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck. Counsel for both parties are instructed to take the following steps shortly before the scheduled hearing time so that the telephonic hearing may begin promptly: Call the Toll−Free Number:

Case: 1:14-cv-23933-PCH As of: 02/14/2019 11:09 AM EST 18 of 22

10/19/2018 10/19/2018
10/19/2018 10/21/2018 10/21/2018 10/21/2018 10/22/2018
10/22/2018
10/22/2018 10/23/2018 10/23/2018
10/24/2018
10/25/2018

1−888−684−8852. Enter the access code, 4825076, followed by the # sign. Enter the security code, 332010468, followed by the # sign. State your name and enter the conference. For technical assistance, please call 800−526−2655. (ac00) (Entered: 10/19/2018)
155 ORDER granting 154 Motion to Bring Electronic Equipment into the courtroom. Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 10/19/2018. See attached document for full details. (vmz) (Entered: 10/19/2018)
156 PAPERLESS Minute Entry for proceedings held before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck: Telephone Conference held on 10/19/2018. Total time in court: 7 minutes. Attorney Appearance(s): Daniel Boaz Tilley, Brandon Buskey, Jeffrey Martin Hearne, Bernard Pastor, Michael Beny Valdes, Court Reporter: Gizella Baan−Proulx, 305−523−5634 / Gizella_Baan−Proulx@flsd.uscourts.gov. (ac00) (Entered: 10/19/2018)
157 TRIAL BRIEF by John Doe #4, John Doe #5, John Doe #6, John Doe #7. (Hearne, Jeffrey) (Entered: 10/19/2018)
158 TRIAL BRIEF by Miami−Dade County. (Valdes, Michael) (Entered: 10/21/2018)
159 MEMORANDUM of Law on Statute of Limitations by Miami−Dade County. (Valdes, Michael) (Entered: 10/21/2018)
160 Notice of Supplemental Authority re Statute of Limitations by John Doe #4, John Doe #5, John Doe #6, John Doe #7 (Tilley, Daniel) (Entered: 10/21/2018)
161 PAPERLESS Minute Entry for proceedings held before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck: Miscellaneous Hearing held on 10/22/2018. Total time in court: 1 hour(s) : 20 minutes. Attorney Appearance(s): Daniel Rowinsky Quintian, Daniel Boaz Tilley, Brandon Buskey, Jeffrey Martin Hearne, Bernard Pastor, Michael Beny Valdes, Attorney added: Daniel Rowinsky Quintian for John Doe #4, Daniel Rowinsky Quintian for John Doe #5 Court Reporter: Gizella Baan−Proulx, 305−523−5634 / Gizella_Baan−Proulx@flsd.uscourts.gov. (ac00) (Entered: 10/22/2018)
162 PAPERLESS Minute Entry for proceedings held before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck: Bench Trial held on 10/22/2018. Total time in court: 1 hour(s) : 55 minutes. Attorney Appearance(s): Daniel Boaz Tilley, Brandon Buskey, Jeffrey Martin Hearne, Bernard Pastor, Michael Beny Valdes, Court Reporter: Gizella Baan−Proulx, 305−523−5634 / Gizella_Baan−Proulx@flsd.uscourts.gov. (ac00) (Entered: 10/22/2018)
163 Unopposed MOTION to Bring Electronic Equipment into the courtroom by Expert Witness Kelly Socia by John Doe #4, John Doe #5, John Doe #6, John Doe #7. Responses due by 11/5/2018 (Hearne, Jeffrey) (Entered: 10/22/2018)
164 ORDER granting 163 Motion to Bring Electronic Equipment into the courtroom. Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 10/23/2018. See attached document for full details. (jas) (Entered: 10/23/2018)
165 PAPERLESS Minute Entry for proceedings held before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck: Bench Trial held on 10/23/2018. Total time in court: 3 hour(s) : 50 minutes. Attorney Appearance(s): Daniel Boaz Tilley, Brandon Buskey, Jeffrey Martin Hearne, Daniel Rowinsky Quintian, Bernard Pastor, Michael Beny Valdes, Court Reporter: Gizella Baan−Proulx, 305−523−5634 / Gizella_Baan−Proulx@flsd.uscourts.gov. (ac00) (Entered: 10/23/2018)
166 PAPERLESS Minute Entry for proceedings held before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck: Bench Trial held on 10/24/2018. Total time in court: 6 hour(s) : 45 minutes. Attorney Appearance(s): Daniel Boaz Tilley, Brandon Buskey, Jeffrey Martin Hearne, Daniel Rowinsky Quintian, Bernard Pastor, Michael Beny Valdes, Court Reporter: Gizella Baan−Proulx, 305−523−5634 / Gizella_Baan−Proulx@flsd.uscourts.gov. (ac00) (Entered: 10/24/2018)
167 PAPERLESS Minute Entry for proceedings held before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck: Bench Trial held on 10/25/2018. Total time in court: 7 hour(s). Attorney Appearance(s): Daniel Boaz Tilley, Brandon Buskey, Jeffrey Martin Hearne, Daniel Rowinsky Quintian, Bernard Pastor, Michael Beny Valdes, Court Reporter: Gizella Baan−Proulx, 305−523−5634 / Gizella_Baan−Proulx@flsd.uscourts.gov. (ac00) (Entered: 10/25/2018)

Case: 1:14-cv-23933-PCH As of: 02/14/2019 11:09 AM EST 19 of 22

10/25/2018 10/26/2018 10/26/2018 10/26/2018 11/01/2018
11/07/2018 11/07/2018
11/08/2018 11/13/2018 11/19/2018

PAPERLESS NOTICE to Reset Hearing: **TIME CHANGE ONLY** Bench Trial set for 10/26/2018 at 10:00 AM in **Courtroom 13−4** in Miami Division before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck. (ac00) (Entered: 10/25/2018)
168 MOTION to conform pleading with the evidence by explicitly referencing an as−applied claim by John Doe #4, John Doe #5, John Doe #6, John Doe #7. (Tilley, Daniel) (Entered: 10/26/2018)
169 PAPERLESS Minute Entry for proceedings held before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck: Bench Trial completed on 10/26/2018. Total time in court: 6 hour(s) : 30 minutes. Attorney Appearance(s): Daniel Boaz Tilley, Brandon Buskey, Jeffrey Martin Hearne, Daniel Rowinsky Quintian, Bernard Pastor, Michael Beny Valdes, Court Reporter: Gizella Baan−Proulx, 305−523−5634 / Gizella_Baan−Proulx@flsd.uscourts.gov. (ac00) (Entered: 10/26/2018)
170 ORDER denying 168 Motion to Conform the Pleadings to the Evidence. Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 10/26/2018. See attached document for full details. (jas) (Entered: 10/26/2018)
171 TRIAL EXHIBITS (Plaintiffs') 1−9, 14−18, 21−35 by John Doe #4, John Doe #5, John Doe #6, John Doe #7. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 omitted, # 11 omitted, # 12 omitted, # 13 omitted, # 14 Exhibit 14, # 15 Exhibit 15, # 16 Exhibit 16, # 17 Exhibit 17, # 18 Exhibit 18, # 19 omitted, # 20 omitted, # 21 Exhibit 21, # 22 Exhibit 22, # 23 Exhibit 23, # 24 Exhibit 24, # 25 Exhibit 25, # 26 Exhibit 26, # 27 Exhibit 27, # 28 Exhibit 28, # 29 Exhibit 29, # 30 Exhibit 30, # 31 Exhibit 31, # 32 Exhibit 32, # 33 Exhibit 33, # 34 Exhibit 34, # 35 Exhibit 35)(Tilley, Daniel) (Entered: 11/01/2018)
172 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Post−Trial Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by Miami−Dade County. Responses due by 11/21/2018 (Valdes, Michael) (Entered: 11/07/2018)
173 TRIAL EXHIBITS A, B, D−M, O−AAA by Miami−Dade County. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − MDPD Herald Insert (Aug 2006), # 2 Exhibit B − MDPD Offense Incident Report Re: Doe #5, # 3 Exhibit D − FDLE Registration Form (Jan 22, 2006), # 4 Exhibit E − Composite of FDLE Printout, # 5 Exhibit G − FDOC Probation Affidavit (Oct 19, 2004), # 6 Exhibit H − FDOC Violation Report (Oct 19, 2004), # 7 Exhibit I − Probation Warrant (Oct 28, 2004), # 8 Exhibit J − FDOC Amended Probation Affidavit (Dec 1, 2004), # 9 Exhibit K − FDOC Amended Violation Report (Dec 1, 2004), # 10 Exhibit L − FDOC 2nd Amended Probation Affidavit (Dec 7, 2006), # 11 Exhibit M − FDOC 2nd Amended Violation Report (Dec 7, 2006), # 12 Exhibit O − Judgment and Sentence F06−036668, # 13 Exhibit P − Handwritten Arithmetic and Chart of Housing, # 14 Exhibit Q − Listing of DOR Codes, # 15 Exhibit R − Miami Herald Article (Sept. 25, 2018), # 16 Exhibit S − Socia (2012), # 17 Exhibit T − DSM−5 Excerpt, # 18 Exhibit U − Walker (2001), # 19 Exhibit V − List Shown to Robert Berman, # 20 Exhibit W − E−mail from Martinez to Mallette (Mar 8, 2018), # 21 Exhibit X − Hanson Declaration in N.D. Ca. Case, # 22 Exhibit Y − Excerpt from Hanson (2002), # 23 Exhibit EE − Transcript (Jun 21, 2005), # 24 Exhibit FF − Transcript (Aug 17, 2005), # 25 Exhibit GG − Transcript (Nov 15, 2005), # 26 Exhibit HH − Transcript (Dec 10, 2009), # 27 Exhibit II − Transcript (Jan 21, 2010))(Valdes, Michael) (Entered: 11/07/2018)
174 ORDER granting 172 Motion for Extension of Time to File Post−Trial findings of fact ad Conclusions of Law. Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 11/8/2018. See attached document for full details. (jas) (Entered: 11/08/2018)
175 FIRST Clerk's Notice of Undeliverable Mail re 166 Bench Trial − Held, 165 Bench Trial − Held, 162 Bench Trial − Begun,. US Mail returned for: Daniel Rowinsky Quintian. Updated address found and document resent to new address. Legal Services of Greater Miami, Inc.Legal Services of Greater Miami4343 W Flagler St Ste 100Miami, FL 33134−1585 (pgz) (Entered: 11/13/2018)
176 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Post−Trial Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by Miami−Dade County. Responses due by 12/3/2018 (Valdes, Michael) (Entered: 11/19/2018)

Case: 1:14-cv-23933-PCH As of: 02/14/2019 11:09 AM EST 20 of 22

11/19/2018 11/27/2018 11/27/2018 11/27/2018 11/29/2018
11/29/2018
11/29/2018 11/30/2018 12/04/2018 12/18/2018 12/19/2018 01/09/2019
01/09/2019

177 ORDER granting in part 176 Motion for Extension of Time. Both parties' post−trial Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are due Tuesday, 11/27/2018. Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 11/19/2018. See attached document for full details. (jas) (Entered: 11/20/2018)
178 MEMORANDUM in Support by John Doe #4, John Doe #5, John Doe #6, John Doe #7. (Hearne, Jeffrey) (Entered: 11/27/2018)
179 Proposed Findings of Fact and Proposed Conclusions of Law by John Doe #4, John Doe #5, John Doe #6, John Doe #7. (Hearne, Jeffrey) (Entered: 11/27/2018)
180 Proposed Findings of Fact and Proposed Conclusions of Law by Miami−Dade County. (Valdes, Michael) (Entered: 11/27/2018)
PAPERLESS NOTICE to Set Hearing Re. ECF No. 178 Telephonic Status Conference set for 11/29/2018 11:30 AM in Miami Division before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck. Counsel for both parties are instructed to take the following steps shortly before the scheduled hearing time so that the telephonic hearing may begin promptly: Call the Toll−Free Number: 1−888−684−8852. Enter the access code, 4825076, followed by the # sign. Enter the security code, 332010468, followed by the # sign. State your name and enter the conference. For technical assistance, please call 800−526−2655. (ac00) (Entered: 11/29/2018)
Paperless Notice to Reset Hearing **TIME CHANGE ONLY** Telephonic Status Conference set for 11/29/2018 11:45 AM in Miami Division before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck. Counsel for both parties are instructed to take the following steps shortly before the scheduled hearing time so that the telephonic hearing may begin promptly: Call the Toll−Free Number: 1−888−684−8852. Enter the access code, 4825076, followed by the # sign. Enter the security code, 332010468, followed by the # sign. State your name and enter the conference. For technical assistance, please call 800−526−2655. (ac00) (Entered: 11/29/2018)
181 PAPERLESS Minute Entry for proceedings held before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck: Telephone Conference held on 11/29/2018. Total time in court: 15 minutes. Attorney Appearance(s): Brandon Buskey, Jeffrey Martin Hearne, Bernard Pastor, Michael Beny Valdes. (ac00) (Entered: 11/29/2018)
182 Statement of: Response by Miami−Dade County re 178 Memorandum (Valdes, Michael) (Entered: 11/30/2018)
183 SECOND Clerk's Notice of Undeliverable Mail re 175 Clerk's Notice of Undeliverable Mail, 174 Order on Motion for Extension of Time. US Mail returned for: Danielle Marie Contini. Updated address found and document resent to new address. Law Offices of D D Archer P APO Box 2186Minneola, FL 34755−2186 (pgz) (Entered: 12/04/2018)
184 FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 12/18/2018. See attached document for full details. (jas) (Entered: 12/18/2018)
185 FINAL JUDGMENT in favor of Miami−Dade County against John Doe #4, John Doe #5, John Doe #6, John Doe #7. Signed by Senior Judge Paul C. Huck on 12/19/2018. See attached document for full details. (jas) (Entered: 12/19/2018)
186 TRANSCRIPT of Trial Day 1 held on 10−22−2018 before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck, 1−136 pages, Court Reporter: Gizella Baan−Proulx, 305−523−5634 / Gizella_Baan−Proulx@flsd.uscourts.gov. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased by contacting the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 1/30/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/11/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/9/2019. (gbx) Text Modified on 1/22/2019 (apz). (Entered: 01/09/2019)
187 TRANSCRIPT of Trial Day 2 held on 10−23−2018 before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck, 1−174 pages, Court Reporter: Gizella Baan−Proulx, 305−523−5634 / Gizella_Baan−Proulx@flsd.uscourts.gov. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased by contacting the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 1/30/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/11/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/9/2019. (gbx) (Entered: 01/09/2019)

Case: 1:14-cv-23933-PCH As of: 02/14/2019 11:09 AM EST 21 of 22

01/09/2019
01/09/2019
01/09/2019
01/18/2019
01/18/2019 01/23/2019 01/30/2019 01/30/2019 01/30/2019 01/30/2019 01/30/2019 02/01/2019 02/01/2019

188 TRANSCRIPT of Trial Day 3 held on 10−24−2018 before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck, 1−285 pages, Court Reporter: Gizella Baan−Proulx, 305−523−5634 / Gizella_Baan−Proulx@flsd.uscourts.gov. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased by contacting the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 1/30/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/11/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/9/2019. (gbx) (Entered: 01/09/2019)
189 TRANSCRIPT of Trial Day 4 held on 10−25−2018 before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck, 1−228 pages, Court Reporter: Gizella Baan−Proulx, 305−523−5634 / Gizella_Baan−Proulx@flsd.uscourts.gov. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased by contacting the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 1/30/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/11/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/9/2019. (gbx) (Entered: 01/09/2019)
190 TRANSCRIPT of Trial Day 5 held on 10−26−2018 before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck, 1−270 pages, Court Reporter: Gizella Baan−Proulx, 305−523−5634 / Gizella_Baan−Proulx@flsd.uscourts.gov. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased by contacting the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 1/30/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/11/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/9/2019. (gbx) (Entered: 01/09/2019)
191 Notice of Appeal as to 185 Judgment by John Doe #4, John Doe #5, John Doe #6, John Doe #7. Filing fee $ 505.00 receipt number 113C−11324016. Within fourteen days of the filing date of a Notice of Appeal, the appellant must complete the Eleventh Circuit Transcript Order Form regardless of whether transcripts are being ordered [Pursuant to FRAP 10(b)]. For information go to our FLSD website under Transcript Information. (Tilley, Daniel) (Entered: 01/18/2019)
Transmission of Notice of Appeal, Judgment under appeal and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals re 191 Notice of Appeal, Notice has been electronically mailed. (apz) (Entered: 01/18/2019)
192 Acknowledgment of Receipt of NOA from USCA re 191 Notice of Appeal, filed by John Doe #4, John Doe #5, John Doe #7, John Doe #6. Date received by USCA: 1/18/2019. USCA Case Number: 19−10254−F. (apz) (Entered: 01/23/2019)
193 Redacted Transcript of Trial Day 1 held on 10−22−2018 before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck, 1−136 pages, re: 186 Transcript,, Court Reporter: Gizella Baan−Proulx, 305−523−5634 / Gizella_Baan−Proulx@flsd.uscourts.gov. (gbx) (Entered: 01/30/2019)
194 Redacted Transcript of Trial Day 2 held on 10−23−2018 before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck, 1−174 pages, re: 187 Transcript,, Court Reporter: Gizella Baan−Proulx, 305−523−5634 / Gizella_Baan−Proulx@flsd.uscourts.gov. (gbx) (Entered: 01/30/2019)
195 Redacted Transcript of Trial Day 3 held on 10−24−2018 before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck, 1−286 pages, re: 188 Transcript,, Court Reporter: Gizella Baan−Proulx, 305−523−5634 / Gizella_Baan−Proulx@flsd.uscourts.gov. (gbx) (Entered: 01/30/2019)
196 Redacted Transcript of Trial Day 4 held on 10−25−2018 before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck, 1−228 pages, re: 189 Transcript,, Court Reporter: Gizella Baan−Proulx, 305−523−5634 / Gizella_Baan−Proulx@flsd.uscourts.gov. (gbx) (Entered: 01/30/2019)
197 Redacted Transcript of Trial Day 5 held on 10−26−2018 before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck, 1−270 pages, re: 190 Transcript,, Court Reporter: Gizella Baan−Proulx, 305−523−5634 / Gizella_Baan−Proulx@flsd.uscourts.gov. (gbx) (Entered: 01/30/2019)
198 TRANSCRIPT INFORMATION FORM by John Doe #4, John Doe #5, John Doe #6, John Doe #7 re 191 Notice of Appeal,. Hearing transcript(s) ordered. Order placed by Daniel B. Tilley. Email sent to Court Reporter Coordinator. (Tilley, Daniel) (Entered: 02/01/2019)
199 COURT REPORTER ACKNOWLEDGMENT re 198 Transcript Information Form,. Court Reporter: Gizella Baan−Proulx, 305−523−5634 / Gizella_Baan−Proulx@flsd.uscourts.gov. Estimated filing date of transcript 3−1−2019. USCA number 19−10254−F. (gbx) (Entered: 02/01/2019)

Case: 1:14-cv-23933-PCH As of: 02/14/2019 11:09 AM EST 22 of 22

02/01/2019

200 TRANSCRIPT of Telephonic Status Conference held on 10−19−2018 before Senior Judge Paul C. Huck, 1−6 pages, Court Reporter: Gizella Baan−Proulx, 305−523−5634 / Gizella_Baan−Proulx@flsd.uscourts.gov. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased by contacting the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 2/22/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/4/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/2/2019. (gbx) (Entered: 02/01/2019)

 
 Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/23/2014 Page 1 of 22

IN TH E IJN ITE D STA TES D ISTR ICT CO U R T FOR TH E SO U TH ERN DISTR IC T O F FL O RIDA

FILED by

D.C.

0C'I'28 2219

John Doe#1,Jolm Doe#2,

STEVEN M LARIMORE
CLERKU b DIEIT CT. s.D,of#L/.-I/IXMI

Jolm D oe#3,and Florida A ction Com m ittee,lnc.,'
Plaintiffs,

C aseN o:

*

14-CV-23933-Huck/Otazo-Reyes

*
M inm i-D adeCounty;Florida D epartm entO fCorrections; Sunny Ukenye,CircuitAdm inistrator forthe M iam iCircuitOffice,FloridaD epartm ent * ofCorrections,in hisofficialcapacity;
D efendants.
*

C O M PLA IN T

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/23/2014 Page 2 of 22

IN TRO DU CT IO N 1. D efendants' enforcem ent of M iam i-Dade County's Lauren Book Child Safety

Ordinance (the ttordinance''), which prolzibits individuals convicted of certain sexual
offensesfrom livingwithin 2,500feetofalischool,''hmsrepeatedlyforcedintohomelessness

htm dredsofindividualsin M inm i-D adeCotm ty.

Theseindividuals,whofrequently subsistonm eagerincom esafterbeingreleased

from pdson,are unable to locate stable,affordable housillg in M iam i-Dade County. Tltis

transience is prim arily because the Ordinance arbitrarily renders off-lim its broad sw aths of

housing.

A nother critical factor is that D efendant M iam i-Dade County's im precise

definition oftheterm lsschool''hasencouraged arbitrary and discrim inatory enforcem entof

theOrdinanceagainstthose with qualifying convictions.

4. Plaintiffs and num erous others have been directed by D efendants to an area

around theintersection of-N W

36t:CourtandN W

71stStreet ,

j n

uau

oorporated

M

inm

i-D

ade

County,neartheborderofH ialeah.

There isno housing atthislocaticm . Instead,dozensofindividualshave form ed

encam pm entsnearprivately-owned w arehousesand an activerailroad track.

6. Theareaiswithoutadequateshelter.Ithasno saniution facilities,potablewater,

orother bmsic necessities,placing Plaintiffs in im m inentrisk ofphysicalharm f'rom attack,

exposure,ordiseœse.

Defendantshave hampered Plaintiffs'effortsto obtain and m aintain affordable

housingatorneartheRiverPark M obileHomePark(2260NW 27thAvenue,M inmi,FL

33142)CtltiverPark''). Defendantspreviously deem edRiverPark avalid location tmderthe
O rdinance. H owever,the M inm i-D ade StateA ttolmey'sOffice and the M iam i-Dade County 2

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/23/2014 Page 3 of 22
H om elessTrustlobbied Defendantsto have a nearby youth em ergency sheltercalled M inm i
BridgeYouth and Fnm ily Services,Inc.(çEslèinm iBridge'l,classifed asaschool.Theiraim
w isto evictform ersexualoffendersin the area,though RiverPark and the Bridge coexisted w ithin 2,500 feetforyearsw ithoutincident.
8. Tllis lobbying pressure 1ed Defendant Florida Department of Corrections
(tTDOC'')to deem M iamiBridge a school. Itthen evicted f'rom RiverPark dozensof
probationers covered by the O rdinance. It did so despite the fact that Defendants had previously approved these residences and despite the fact that the M iam i-D ade Police Departm entdeclined to enfbrce M iamiBridge asa schoolforthose registrantsnotunder FD O C supervision.
9. Plaintiffsbringthisactionunder42U.S.C.j 1983tovindicatetheirrightsunder
the Fourteenth Am endm entto theU nited StatesConstitm ion againstvague crim inalstatutes, againstdeprivationsofliberty withoutdueprocessoflaw ,to personalsecurity,to acquire and to m aintain residentialproperty,asw ellastheirrightlm derthe Ex PostFacto Clausesofthe state and federalconstitutionsto befreefrom Ex PostFacto law s.
10. Plaintiffs seek a declaration from thisCout4 affirm ing thattheirrightshave been
violatedandapennanentinjunctionagainstfuttlreenforcementoftheOrdinance.
.H JRISDICTIO N A N D V EN UE 11. Plaintiffs'claim sadse tm dertheConstitm ion and law softhe United States. This
Courthasjurisdictionovertheseclaimstmder28U.S.C.jj1331,1343(a)(3). 12. TllisCourthastheauthoritytog'rantdeclaratoryand injunctivereliefunder28
U.S.C.j2201-2202 and Fed.R.Civ.P.57and 65. Thefederalrightsassertedby Plaintiffs areenforceableunder42U.S.C.j1983.

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/23/2014 Page 4 of 22
Venueisproperin the SouthernDistrictofFlolidalmder28U.S.C.j 1391(e).
Defendants M inm i-Dade Colm ty,and Sllnny Ukenye,as w ellas a1lPlaintiffs,reside in this
judicialdistrict. A11oftheeventsandomissionsby Defendantsgivingrisetothisaction occurredinthisjudicialdistrict.
PA R TIES
Plaintffà
PlaintiffJohn D oe#1 isa residentofM iam i-D ade County,w here he isregistered asatisex offender''undertheordinance.
15. Jolm Doe//1isamentallydisabledmaninhismid50's.
16. John D oe//1w msundersupervision by theFD O C tm tilJuly,2014. 17. ln 1992,John D oe //1 w ms convicted oflew d and lascivious conductw ith a 14 year old.
W hen he wasreleased from prison in 1994,John D oe//1 lived with hissister,but he waslaterincarcerated again.
19. W hen Jolm D oe #1w asreleased from prison in 2007,his sister's hom e w asno longeran eligiblelocation forhim to live.
Jolm Doe#1'sprobation officerinstnzcted him to go to a hom elessencnm pm ent ofform ersexualoffendersundertheJ'uliaTuttle Causew ay.
21. In 2012,John Doe//1w asincarcerated forfailing toregisterasa sex offender. 22. Jolm Doe//1wasreleasedfrom prisoni.nJanuary2014.
4

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/23/2014 Page 5 of 22
23. John D oe //1's probation officer instructed Jolm D oe #1 to go to the railroad trackslocated nearN W 36th courtand N w 71StstreetafterJolm D oe //1 ceuld notlocate housingunderthe Ordinance.
Jolm Doe//1hasbeensleepingattherailroadtrackssinceJanuary2014.The M inm i-D adePoliceD epartm entandtheFD O C approved thislocation asJolm D oe#1's residence.
25. On severaloccasions,John D oe//1hasbecom eillwhile sleeping atthetracks. Jolm D oe //1 would m ove back to Itiver Park butforthe Ordinance's residency
restriction and D efendants'arbitrary enforcem entoftherestriction. 27. John D oe //1 would m ove to anotherlocation in M inm i-D ade County butforthe
Ordinance'sresidency restriction and Defendants'arbitrary enfbrcem entoftherestriction. 28. PlaintiffJolm D oe//2 isaresidentofM inm i-DadeCounty,where he isregistered
asatisex offender''lm dertheordinance. Jolm D oe//2 isin hislate40'sandiscurrently undersupervision bytheFD OC .
30. ln 2006,John D oe#2 w asconvicted oflew d and lasciviousconducton a 14 year old.
31. John D oe//2 leftprisorlin 2010. U pon leavingprison,herented atraileratR-iver Park.
32. Unable to obG in em ploym ent, Jolm I7oe //2 could not afford the rent,and he m oved outofthetrailer.
33. During theday,Jolm Doe//2 would visithisAlmt'shom e. Although hisAlm t wouldhave allowed llim to livewith her,theresidency restrictionsprevented Jolm Doe//2 from living perm anently w ith hisA tm t.
5

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/23/2014 Page 6 of 22
34. Instead,John D oe //2 returned to R iverPark each nightand sleptoutside orin an abandoned trailer.
In 2013,John D oe #2w asincarcerated again. Hew msreleased in January 2014. 36. U pon release,hisprobation officerinstructed John D oe //2 to go to the com erof N W 71StstreetandN W 36thCourtin tm incorporatedM iam i-D adeCotm ty. 37. Jolm D oe //2 expected to find housing atthe location. Instead,he folm d the railroadtracksand aparking lot. 38. John D oe//2 lived atthe railroad tracksfrom January 2014 untilSeptem ber2014.
M iamiDadePoliceDepm mentCEM DPD''Iand theFDOC approved thislocation ashis
residence. 39. John Doe //2 sleptin a tentin the w arehouse parking 1otoralong the side ofthe
road. R ecently John D oe#2'sdesignated probation officerchanged,and hisnew officer
told Jolm D oe//2 he could m oveback to ltiverPark. 41. ln Septem ber2014,Jolm Doe #2m oved into atraileratR-iverPark. 42. PlaintiffJolm D oe #3 isa residentofM inm i-D ade Cotmty,w here he isregistered
asa ttsex offender''tm derthe Ordinance. Jolm Doe//3 isam an in his50's,and heiscurrently lm dersupervision by FD O C.
44. ln 1999,John D oe #3 w asconvicted of lew d and lascivious conductw ith a 15 yearold andllnlaw fulsexualactivityw ith a 16/17 yearold.
45. Jolm Doe#3w asreleased 9om prison in 2009.
6

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/23/2014 Page 7 of 22
46. In 2011,John Doe #-:;m oved to the Shorecrestneighborhood in M iam i-Dade County to be closerto hisplace .afem ploym ent. In M arch 2014,he w as evicted from his apartm ent.
47. AfterJolm Doe #3wasevicted,hisprobation officerinstnzcted llim to goto the tracks.
48. John D oe #3 hasbeen sleeping in hisvellicle along thetracks since M arch 2014. TheM iami-DadePoliceDepartmentand theFDOC approved tMslocation asJohnDoe#3's residence.
49. Jolm Doe //3 is cunrently em ployed. N onetheless, he has repeatedly and tm successfully triedtoobu in affordablerentalhousingin com pliance with the Ordinance.
50. But for the Ordinance's residency restriction and D efendants' arbitrary enforcem entofthe restriction,Jolm D oe//3 w ould havem ore availablehousing options,and hewould notbeforced to sleep in hisvehicleeach night.
51. PlaintiffFloridaActionCommittee(FAC)isanon-profitcorporationthatworks
to reform the sex offenderlaw sinFlolida. 52. FA C 'S m ission isto educate the m edia.legislators,and the public w ith the facts
surrotm ding sex offenderlaws. 53. FA C hasapproxim ately 200 m em bersacrossFlorida,m any ofwhom are required
to registerassexualoffenders. 54. FAC m emberssufferhnrm from theOrdinance. FAC mem berswho areformer
sexualoffenders desire to,butare unable to move to M inm i-Dade County because they cnnnotfind housing in com pliance w ith the Ordinance. A num ber ofFA C 'S m em bers are
7

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/23/2014 Page 8 of 22
currently living atthe railroad tracks.FA C m em bersw ere living in RiverPark dudng July andA ugust2013.
FAC m ust divert significant tim e and resources w orking and consulting w ith individualsin M inm i-DadeCounty who cnnnotfind available housing tmdertheOrdinance and who areforcedinto hom elessness.
56. FA C m ustalso divertsigrliticanttim e tm d resourceshelping individualsdesiring tom oveto M inm i-Dade Cotmty tind housingin com pliancew ith theO rdinance.
Defendants
57. D efendantM inm i-D ade County is a politicalsubdivision ofthe SG te ofFlodda organized under the law s of Flodda. lt enacted,and its police departm ent enforces,the tt auren BookChildSafetyOrdinpm cer''Art.XW 11,Ord.21-277through21-285.
58. D efendant Sunny U kenye is the Circuit A dm inistrator for the M inm i Circuit Oftice ofthe Florida D epartm entofCorrections. H e is charged w ith supervising probation officers in M inm i-Dade Cotmty. H is office evicted form erly com pliantprobationers from
RiverPark,anditdirectsprobationerssubjecttotheOrdinancetotheencnmpm ent.
DefendantFloridaDepartm entofCorrectionsisanagency ofthe StateofFlorida thatoversees,tluough itsprobation oftk ers,form erly incarcerated individuals on probation, com m llnity control, or post-release supervision. The FD O C, through its agents and em ployees,hascom m itted,and continuesto com m it,the constitutionalviolations alleged in
thiscomplaintwithinMiami-DadeCotmty.TheFDOC also directsprobationerssubjectto
theO rdinanceto theencam pm ent.
FAC TS
8

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/23/2014 Page 9 of 22

60. A s ofthe date of filirtg,dozens ofhom eless individuals form erly convicted of

certain sexualoffenses have form ed a m akeslliftencam pm entnearthe intersection ofN W

36'1'c ottrtand N w

71ststreet .

The azea isin aw strehousedistrictin 'lnincorporated M inm i-

D adeCounty nextto an activerailroad track.

61. lnhabifnnts ofthe enc:unpmentare notthere by choice orcircllm stance. They

w ere forced into hom elessnessby Defendants'deliberate,long-standing policy of severely

restd cting w here individuals form erly convicted of certain sexualoffenses m ay reside in

M inm i-Dade,and by Defendants'arbitrary and discrim inatory enforcem entofthe O rdinance,

w hich im posesthese residency restrictions.

M iam i-DadeC ountv'sLauren Book Child Safew O rdinance

62. Afterthenearly five-yearpersistenceofanotoriousencampmentundertheJulia Tuttle Causew ay num bering m ore than one hundred people form erly convicted of certain sexualoffenses,M iam i-D ade County nm ended itsresidency restriction ordinance in January
2010. (Ord.No.10-01,1-21-10,amending Article X'Vl1ofChapter21ofthe Code of
M iam i-D ade Cotm ty tE-rhe M iam i-Dade County Sexual O ffender and Sexual Predator
Ordinr ce,,).1
63. The 2010 Ordinance repealed all m llnicipal ordinances esG blislting residency resG ctionsforthose labeled ûûsexualoffenders''ortisexualpredators.'' M iam i-Dade County
Code,j21-279(b).

1 The County renam ed theordinancetheCt atzren Book Cllild Safety Ordinance''in O ctober 2010.
9

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/23/2014 Page 10 of 22

64 .

The Ordinance prohibitsthose form erly convicted ofcertai.n crim es2involving a

victim lm der the age of 15 from residing w ithin 2,500 feet of any school. M iam i-D ade

CotmtyCode,j21-281(a).
65. TheOrdinancedefinesçtschool''asaltpublicorprivatekindergarten,elem entary,

middleorsecondary(high)school.''M inmi-DadeCountyCode,521-280(9).TheOrdinance
does'notincorporateanyotherdefinition ofRschool''underlocal,state,orfederallaw. 66. There is no centralized,accurate, or reliable process under the Ordinance for

regularly classifying new' schools, accolm ting for previously om itted schools,

declassifyingfacilitiesthatareno longerschools. 67. W hilethe M iam i-D adePoliceD epartm entprovidesonline m apping assistancefor

the residency restrictions,it expressly ltdoes not assllm e responsibility for the accuracy or tim elinessoftheintbrm ation displayed ,,3
.
68. Covered individuals rem ain entirely responsible for com plying w ith the statute,

even if their noncom pliance results from inaccurate or untim ely inform ation from

governm entofficials. 69. A violation of the residency restriction is punishable by a m u im tzm fine of'

$1,000and/orimprisonmentforupto364days.M inmi-DadeCotmtyCode,j21-281(c).
D efendants'A rbitraryE nforcem entoftheO rdinance Afterthe 2010 amendm ents,citjr,county,and stateofficialsdisbanded the Julia

Tuttle Causew ay encam pm ent.

2Sections794.011(sexualbattery),800.04(lewdandlasciviousactsuponorinpresenceof
personstmderage16),827.071(sexualperformanceblacllildl,847.0135(5)(sexualacts
transmittedovercomputer)or847.01,45(sellingorbuymgofm inorsforportrayalinsexually explicitconduct),FloridaStat-utes,orasimilarlaw ofanotherjurisdiction.
3httP://- .e nm idade.gov/police/zsoo-A-address-c.om plir ce.asp
10

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/23/2014 Page 11 of 22

Shorecrest

M anypeopledisplaced from theJulia TuttleCauseway encam pmentrelocatedto theShorecrestneighborhoodin theCity ofM inm i.
72. DOC probation officersdirectednllm erousothersto Shorecrestwhen they could notlocatecom plianthousing.
The encampmentdisbanded in 2412 after M iamiCity Commissioner M arc
Sarnoffconverted a vacantpiece ofnearby land into a ttpocketpark''to exclude registrants underthe stateresidency restriction.4

River Park

74. O thersdisplaced by the D efendantsm oved to or nearRiverPark M obile H om e

Park,located at 2260 N W

27thA venue,M

inm

i,FL

33142 .

R iver Park w as one the few

locationsthoughtto beeligibleundertheO rdinancew ith affordablerentalhousing.

The M iam i-D ade Police D epartm ent's Sex Crim es Bureau and the FD O C

regularly approvedthisareaundertheOrdinance.

76. O n M ay 7,2013,Elizabeth Regalado from the M inm i-D ade County H om eless

Trust notified M aria DiBem ardo, CircuitAdministrator for the FDOC,thatindividuals

formerly convictedofcertainsexualoffenseswerelivingnearafacilitycalledM inmiBridge

Y outh and Fnm ily Serviceslnc.

M inm i Bridge,located at2810 N W South River D rive,M inm i,Floridaa is an

em ergency youth shelter. lthasexisted forover2()years.

4 Fla

stat .

j 775.215.

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/23/2014 Page 12 of 22
78. Itiver Park is within 2:,500 feetofM iamiBridge'sproperty line as m easured by theO rdinance. TheM inm iltiverseparatesthetw o properties.
Prior to Regalado's com plaint,the M inmi-Dade Police Depm ment did not considerthe M inm iBridge a schoolbecause itw asnotincluded in the listofschoolsM D PD
receivedfrom theM iami-DadeCotmtyInformationTechnology(1&1T'')Depnrtment.
80. The M iam i-Dade Cotm ty IT D epartm entonly providesthis listto M D PD twice a yeaf.
81. The FD OC also did notconsiderthe M iam iBridge a schoolpriorto Regalado's com plaint.
82. On July 2,2013,staffofthe M iam i-D adePoliceD epm m entconvened a m eeting
with stafffrom Miami-Dade County Public Schools (<ûM DCPS'),and the M iami-Dade
County Attorney'sO ftk e. 83. M D PD called this m eeting after its LegalBureau declined to issue an official
position on theM iam iBridge'sstatustm dertheOrdinance. 84. The ofticialsatthe m eeting agreed thatthe definition ofschoolin the Ordinance
w asunclear. They subsequently decided to considerasa schoolany location w herechildren receive instnzction.
85. A tthe snm e m eeting,D irector of SchoolOperations M ark Zaher inform ed the M inm i-D ade Police D epm m entthat M D CPS considers the M inm iBridge a schoolunder state law because itisan tialternative educationalprogrnm ''provided ata pdvately ow ned facilitythrough acollaborativeagreementbetweenM inm iBridgeandM DCPS.
86. TheM iam iBridgeand M D CPS firstsigm ed theagreem entin 1990.
12

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/23/2014 Page 13 of 22

87. Potentially dozensofotherlocationshave similarcollaborativeagreementswith

M D CPS. How ever,M DCPS refused to providetheM inm i-D ade PoliceD epm m entw ith the

com pletelistofthesesites.

88. Follow ing the m eeting,the M DPD LegalBtlreau determ ined thatM iam iBridge

should be considered a school. Itthen requested thatthe County IT D epartm entinclude the

Bridgeon theschoollist.

89. Laterin July,both the M D PD 'S SpecialV ictim s Bttreau/sexualCdm es and the

FDOC decided to rem ove approximately 98 individuals residing within 2,500 feetofthe

M inm iBridgew hoselocationstheynow deem ed in violation oftheO rdinance.

90. Thetwo agenciesscheduledtheaction f'brJuly 29,2013.

91. On July 28,2013,M D PD withdrew from the action,citing ongoing negotiations

w ith M D CPS.

On or aboutJuly 29,,2013,the FD OC notified residents thattheirhom es were

now ineligible and thatthey had five daysto relocate orface arrest.Theresidentswere not

provided any processto challengethedeterm ination thattheirhom esw ereno longereligible

tm derthe Ordinance.

93. By August14,2013,54 individualsm oved outofRiverPark and thenearby area.

Ofthese,34 becnm e transient,3 w ereincarcerated,and 3 absconded. Only 14 w ere ableto

locate new residences.

94. FDOC em ployeessubsequently advised m any evicteesand otherprobationersto

go totheareanearNW

36thCourtandN W

7lX Street .

Fifty-oneindividllnlssubjecttotheOrdinancebutnotlmderFDOC supervision

rem ained atRiverPark.

13

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/23/2014 Page 14 of 22
96. The M iam i-D ade Police D epartm ent scheduled a second enforcem ent action, termed tçoperation M iam i Bridge,'' for A ugus't 22, 2013, to rem ove these rem aining residents.
97. TheM inm i-D adePoliceD epartm entcancelledtheoperation before itsexecution. 98. Operation M inm iBridge w as rescheduled and later executed on Septem ber 17, 2013. Targeted residentsreceived notices directing them to vacate w itltin five days. They w ere not provided any process to challenge the detennination that their hom es w ere no longervalid lm dertheO rdinance. 99. Thenextday,September18,2013,theM iami-DadePoliceDepartm entretrieved and rescinded thesenotifications,allow ing recipientstorem ain in theirresidences. 100. The M DPD SexualPredator & Offender Office then directed the M iam i-Dade Cotm ty IT D epartm entto rem ove M iam iBridgef'rom theschoollist. 101. Atpresent,state and localagencies have reached irreconcilable conclusions at differenttim esonthefullscopeofwhatconstitutesaschoolundertheOrdinance. 102. DefendantM inm i-D ade Police D epartm entdoes notenforce M inm iBridge asa school. ItdeferstoM D CPS on w lèatconstitutesaschooltm dertheO rdinance.
M D CPS refusesto issue officialguidanceon w hatqualifiesasa schoolunderthe O rdinance. M DCPS mssertsitisc'nly authorized t()interpretttschool''understatelaw ,notas itisused in theOrdinance.
104. DefendantsFDOC and Sllnny Ukenyearethe only ox cialsthatenforce M iami Bridge as a school. H ow ever,several probation officers in recentm onths have allow ed superd seesatthe encnm pm entto rettu'n totheRiverPark area.
14

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/23/2014 Page 15 of 22
105. D efendants have not determ ined whether to classify as schools tm der the Ordinance the potentially dozens of other alternative educational progrnm s like M inm i Bridge.
A s a resultof D efendants'arbitrary enforcem ent of the Ordinance,individuals seeking to escapehom elessnesshaveno asstlrancethathousing approved by Defendantsw ill notlaterbe deem ed in violation oftheOrdinance.
C onditionsattheR ailroad T raclksE ncam pm ent D efendants' arbitrary and discrim inatory enforcem ent of the O rdinance,along w ith D efendants' practice of directing individuals unable to securing housing to the encam pm ent,havecreated adangerously untenablesittmtion. 108. Conditions attherailroad tracks presentan ongoing threatofphysicaldangerto thoseforced and directedby D efendantstoresidethere. Thereare no restroom facilitiesatthetracks.People have no choicebutto usethe areasaround aprivately-ow ned w arehouseoralongtherailroad track. 110. Thereisno sanitary w atersotlrce atthetracks. 111. There isno shelterfrom therain atthetracks. 112. Priorto Jtm e4,2014,m ostofthe individualsliving atthetrackssleptarotm d the privately-owned warehouse;som eonm atson the loading dock;som ein theircars;othersin tents in the parking lot; still others in sleeping bags or under discarded tarp in the grass around thew arehouse. 113. The ownerofthew arehouse com plained on severaloccmsiorlsto 1aw enforcem ent aboutthe encam pm enton hisprivateproperty.
15

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/23/2014 Page 16 of 22

D udng the evening of June 4, 2014,M D PD ordered those at the warehouse,

including theJohn D oePlaintiffs,to vacatew ithin 48hottrsorfacetrespmssarrest.

1 15 .

M D PD officersinstructed the evicteesgo to an areanearN W 46thStreetand N W

37thA

venue

in

H

ialeah .

116. The only accessible area atthisintersection isaswalearound afenced-offlot.

On Jtme 5,2014,M len Davis,m anagerofthe FDOC'S localprobation office,

instructed probationers to retum to an area a fbw htm dred yards east of their previous w arehouselocation alongN W 71stStreet.

118. This new location isalso privately owned,and hasan em pty w arehouse on the

property.

A few dayslater,the FD O C'Slocalprobation office instnzctedtheprobationersto

return toN W

36thCourt,butto

sleep

severalhtm

dzed

feet north

of the

originalw

arehouse ,

on

thestrip ofland betw een thestreetand a chain lirlk fence.

120. Plaintiffs w ere instructed to m ove to 'the new encam pm entlocation atN W 71St

StreetandN W 36 A venue.

D efendants'Enforcem entofthe O rdinanceD oesN otA dvancePublicSafetv

121. Thelivesofthosetrapped by D efendantsattherailroad tracksencam pm enthave

been irreparably desGbilized by theirinability to secure safe,stable,and affordableshelter.

122. ThisdesGbilization directly underm inestherehabilitation and successfulre-entry

to society ofform eroffenderslikePlaintiffs.

Theinvoluntary transienceofthoseattherailroad tracksencam pm entm akes

them m oredio cultto superviseand increasestheriskthatthey willabscond.

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/23/2014 Page 17 of 22
124. Thesefactorstogetherdo notadvancepublic safety orany otherlegitim ate interestin M inm i-DadeCotmty,andthey are likelyto underm inepublicsafety.
CO U NT 1: TH E O RD INAN C E IS V O ID FO R V A G EIJN ESS. 125. The Ordinance is void for vagueness under the Fourteenth A m endm entto the U rlited States Constitm ion and article 1,section f? ofthe Florida Constitution by failing to define the term dtschool''w ith sufEcientprecision and particularity asto give Plaintiffs fair notice of where form er sexualoffenders m ay lanrftzlly reside underM iam i-D ade County's 2,500-footresidency restriction. The Ordinance isalso void forvaguenessbecause M inm i-D ade Colm ty's faillzre to define &tschool'' w ith the precision required by the federal and state constitm ions encourages and has resulted in arbitrary and discrim inatory enforcem ent by D efendants againstPlaintiffs. 127. Relying on the vagueness inherent in the Ordinalw e's residency restriction, D efendantshaveexpelled,threatened to expel,orexcluded individualsfrom residingatRiver Park based solely upon the arbitrary detennination thatM inm iBridge is a tdschool,''while allow ing otherstorem ain orreturn to RiverPark. 128. Defendants'arbitrary and discriminatory enfbrcem entofthe tmconstitutionally vague Ordinance prevents Plnintiffsf'rom knowing whether individualsw illbe arrested for violatingtheresidency restdctionsshouldtheyreturn to,orcontinueto reside atRiverPark. D efendants' arbikary and discrim inatory ee orcem ent ofthe unconstim tionally vague Ordinance preventsPlaintiffsfrom lcnow ing whether form er sexualoffendersw illbe
17

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/23/2014 Page 18 of 22

arrested for violating M inm i-D ade Cotm ty's residency restrictions and the term s of their probation ifthey securehousingatany otherlocation in the cotmty.

C O UN T Il: TH E OR D INA N CE W O LATE S PLM N TIFFS'PR O CEDU R AI,D UE PR O CE SS R IG H T S TO M EAM N G FUL N O TICE AN D O PPO R TU NITY TO BE H EA R D.

Both the Fourteenth A m endm ent m ld article section

the Florida

Constitutionprohibitstateactors9om depriving anindividualoflibertywithoutdueprocess

oflaw . Included w ithin thisprotection are the rightsto notice and a hearing when the state

deprivesan individualofftm dnm entalliberty interests.

131. Plaintiffs have ftm dnm.ental property and liberty interests in acquiring, and

rem aining in,residentialproperty.

D efendants have violated Plaintiffs' federal and state due process rights by

rem oving and excluding Plaintiffs from their hom es without providing notice and an

opportunity to beheard on w hetherthe RiverPark areaaorany location,isw ithin 2,500 feet

ofatçschool.''

C OU N T 111: D EFEN D A NT S A RE V IO LA TIN G PLAIN TIFFS'SU BSTA NTIVE D U E PR O C ESS
R IG H T T O PER SO N AL SEC UR ITY .

TheFourteenth A m endm entto U nited StatesConstitution and article 1,section 9 oftheFlorida Constitution protectfundnm entalliberty interestsagainstcertain governm ental intrtzsionsirrespectiveofthefaim essoftheprocedtlresutilized. Tllissubstantiveguarantee isintended to preventstate actorsfrom em ploying theirpower in an abusive oroppressive
m anner.

18

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/23/2014 Page 19 of 22

D efendants'ertforcem entofthe Ordinance violatessubstantive dueprocessby so

severely restdcting housing options for former offenders asto renderthem hom elessand

unableto safeguard theirflm dnm entalrighttopersonalsecurity.

135. Defendantshave also directed Plaintiffsand othersto the encnm pm entnearN W

36thCourtandN W

71Ststreet .

The conditions atthe encam pm ent presentim m inent and chronic threats to the

health and safety ofthose living tbere.

137. But for the Ordinance and D efendants' arbitrary and tm predicGble actions,

Plaintiffscould secureaffordablellousing w ithoutfearingthey m ay beforced to relocate.

138. D efendants have an affirm ative duty to protect Plaintiffs from these threats to

their personal security because their enforcem ent of the O rdinance has directly and

proxim ately caused theseconditions.

139. D efendants'obligation applies w ith special force to Plaintiff Jolm D oe 1,w ho

D efendantshavem adeparticularly vulnerable,given hiscognitive disabilities.

140. Forcing Plaintiffsinto hom elessnessarld depriving them oftheirability to secure

basic shelterisunconstitutionally arbitzat'y and doesnotserveany legitim atestateinterest.

C O UN T lV : TH E O R DINA N CE W O LATES PLM NT IFFS'SU BSTM TIV E DU E PR O C ESS R IG H T
TO ACQUIRE RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY
141. Plaintiffshavefundam entalrightsundertheFourteenth Am endm entto the United

States Constitution and article 1, section 2 of the Florida Constitution to acquire and to

m aintain residentialproperty.

19

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/23/2014 Page 20 of 22
142. Defendants'are violating Plaintiffs'substantive due processrightsby arbitrarily depriving Plaintiffs of their fundam enG l rights to acquire and to m ainG in residential property.
143. Defendants'interference w ith Plaintiffk'fundnm eni lrights is unconstitutionally arbitrary and doesnotserve any legitim ate sGteinterest.
COUNT V: TH E O RD IN A N CE IS A N U N C ON STIT UTIO N AL EX PO ST FA CTO LAW . 144. TheEx PostFacto Clause ofArticle1,Section 9 oftheU nited StatesConstitution and article 1, section 10 of the Florida Constitution prohibits Florida f'rom retroactively increasing an individual'spunishm entabovethatauthorized by the 1aw in effectatthe tim e the offensew ascom m itted. 145. D efendantM iam i-Dade County passed the Ordinance w ith the intentto plm ish those convicted ofthe offensesthe Ordinance designates Im derFlorida law ,irrespective of w hethera form eroffenderisactually required to registerunderFloridalaw .
R egardless oflegislative intent,the retroactive application ofthe Ordinance on Plaintiffsviolates the federaland state Ex PostFacto clause because its debilitating effects are clearlyp lnitive.
RELIEF REO UESTED
W H EREFORE,Plaintiff'srespectfully requestthatthisCourt:
a. EnterajudgmentdecladngM iami-DadeCounty'sLalzrenBookCltildSafetyOrdinance
void forvaguenessin violation oftheFourteenth Am endm entoftheUnited Stxates Constitution and article 1,section 9oftheFloridaConstitm ion;
b. EnterajudgmentdeclaringthatDefendants'faillzretoprovidePlaintiffswithnoticeand
an opportunity to beheard on w hetheraparticularproperty isw ithin 2,500 feetofa
20

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/23/2014 Page 21 of 22
ûtschool''violatestherighttodueprocessguaranteedbytheFourteenthAm endmentto theU nited StatesConstitution and article 1,section 9 oftheFloridaConstitution;
EnterajudgmentdeclaringthatDefendants'enforcementoftheOrdinanceviolates
Plaintiffs'substantive dueprocessrightto personalsecurity undertheFourteenth Am endm enttotheUnited StatesConstitution 1m d article 1,section 9 oftheFlorida Constitm ion.
EnterajudgmentdeclaringthatDefendants'enforcementoftheOrdinanceviolates
Plaintiffs'substantivedueprocessrightstoacquireandm ainGin residentialm opertyas gtzaranteed by theFourteenth A m endm entto theU nited StatesConstitution and article 1, section 9 oftheFloridaConstitution.
EnterajudgmentdeclringthattheOrdinanceviolatesthefederaland statem ohibitions
againstex postfacto laws.
IssueapennanentinjunctionprohibitingDefendantsfrom enforcingtheOrdinance; g. IssueapermanentinjunctionrequiringDefendantstoprovidenoticeandanopporttmity
to beheardon w hetheralocation violatestheresidency restrictionsin theOrdinance;
h. Awardcostsandattorney'sfeespursuantto42U.S.C.j1988*, GrantorawardatlyotherreliefthisCourtdeemsjustandproper.
Respectfully subm itted,

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/23/2014 Page 22 of 22

/s/D anielB.Tillev D nnielB .Tilley FloridaBarN o.102882 N ancyA budu* A CLU Foundation ofFlorida 4500BiscayneBlvd.,Suite 340 M iam i,FL 33137 T :786-363-2714 F:786-363-1257
dtilley@ aclufl.org nabudu@ aclufl.org
*Application foradm issionpending

BrandonJ.Buskey**(ASB2753A50B)
EzekielEdw ards**

A m erican CivilLibertiesUnion Fotm dation

CriminalLaw Reform Project

125

Broad

Street ,

18thFloor

N ew'Y ork,N Y 10004

T:212-284-7364

F:212-549-2654

bbuskey@ aclu.org

eedwards@ aclu.org

**Application foradmissionprohacvice fortltcom ing

Doe et al v. Miami-Dade County et al, Docket No. 1:14-cv-23933 (S.D. Fla. Oct 23, 2014), Court Docket
General Information

Court
Federal Nature of Suit Docket Number Status

United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida; United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
Civil Rights - Other[440]
1:14-cv-23933
CLOSED

© 2019 The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Terms of Service // PAGE 23

 
 Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 60 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/03/2015 Page 1 of 21

+
U NITED STA TES D ISTR ICT C O U RT FO R TH E SO UTH ERN D ISTR ICT O F FL O R IDA
C aseN o.1:14-cv-23933-PCH

JO HN D OE #1,JO HN D OE #2, JO HN D OE #3,and FLO RIDA A CTION C OM M ITTEE,IN C.,
Plaintiffs,
M IAM I-DA D E CO UN TY ;FLOR ID A D EPAR TM EN T OF CO RRECTION S SUNNY UKENYE,CircuitAdministrator FortheM iam iCircuitOffice,FLORID A D EPA RTM EN T O F CORRECTION S,in hisofficialcapacity,

C LO SED C W IL CA SE

D efendants.

O RD ER G R AN TIN G M O T IO N TO D ISM ISS TH IS CA U SE isbeforethe Courton them otionsto dism issPlaintiffs'A m ended
ComplaintfiledbyDefendantsM iami-DadeCounty(theCounty),SunnyUkenye,andthe FloridaDepartmentofCorrections(FDOC)(D.E.29& 39).TheCourtheldoralargumenton
them otionson M arch 31,20l5. TheCourthasconsidered the m otions,Plaintiffs'responses
(D.E.40& 46-11,andDefendants'replies(D.E.51& 52j,aswellastheparties'oralarguments.
Forthefollow ingreasons,them otionsto dism issareG RAN TED and Plaintiffs'Am ended Com plaintisD ISM ISSED .
BACK GROUND PlaintiffsJohn D oesnum berslthrough 3 and the Florida A ction Com m itteefiled suit againsttheCounty,U kenye,and the FDO C foralleged violationsoftheU nited States Constitution and the FloridaConstitution arising from M iam i-D ade County'sLauren Book Child
SafetyOrdinance,M IAMI-DADECOUNTYCODEj21-279etseq.TheM iami-DadeBoardof

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 60 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/03/2015 Page 2 of 21
County Com m issionersenacted the Book O rdinancein 2010 to Ctstrikeaproperbalancebetw een protecting children aroundthecrucialand vulnerable areasofschoolswhile stillleaving
availableresidentialunitsinwhich sexualoffenderscan findhousing.''1d.j21-279.According
to theA m ended Com plaint,the2010 ordinance repealed apatchw ork ofm unicipalregulations thathadresulted in atinotoriousencam pm entunderthe Julia TuttleC ausew ay ofm orethan one hundred''convicted sex offenders,and replaced itwith auniform county-w ide regulatory schem e.The Book Ordinance,in pertinentpart,prohibitssex offendersconvicted ofcertain enum erated sexualcrim esinvolving avictim undertheageof16 from establishing a new
residencewithin2,500feetofaschool.1d.j21-281.Theordinance,however,containsa
'sgrandfatherclause''granting exceptionsto sex offendersw ho established aresidence before
eithertheBookOrdinance'seffectivedateorthedatethattheschoolopened.Id j21-282(1)(a) & (c).TheordinancedefinesaSdschool''ast(apublicorprivatekindergm en,elementary,middle orsecondaryschool.''1d.,j21-28049).
Thefactsofthe case aretaken from Plaintiffs'A m ended Com plaint,astheCourtis bound to acceptPlaintiffs'w ell-pleaded factualallegationsastrue on am otionto dism iss.See
St.Joseph'sHosp.,Inc.v.Hosp.Corp.ofzqm.,795F.2d948,954(11thCir.1986).Following
the ordinance'senactm ent,the M iam i-DadeCounty PoliceD epartm ent'sSex Crim esBureau approved the RiverPark M obile Hom ePark at2260N W 27th A venue ascom pliantw iththe residency restriction.H owever,in 2013,adm inistratorsin M iam i-D ade County schoolsandthe M iam i-D ade County H om elessTnzstinform ed the County PoliceD epartm entand the FDO C that they considered theM iam iBridge- an em ergency youth shelter- to bea çischool''underthe m eaning ofthe Book Ordinance. Though theM iam iBridgeisseparated from theRiverPark by theM iam iRiverand isnotw ithin 2,500 feetin driving orw alking distanceofthe RiverPark,the
2

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 60 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/03/2015 Page 3 of 21
M iamiBridgeiswithin2,500feetoftheRiverParkasthecrow flies,which isthestandardof
measurementimposedbytheBookOrdinance.SeeM IAMI-DADECOUNTYCODEj21-281(b).
TheCounty IT Departm entsubsequently addedtheM iam iBridgetoalistoffacilitiesthatthe County considersto beschoolsforthepurposesofenforcing the Book O rdinance.
ln July 2013,theFD O C and the County PoliceD epartm entinform ed approxim ately 100 convicted sex offendersliving attheRiverPark thattheirresidencesw erenotin com pliancew ith theBook Ordinance. Then,forreasonsnotelaboratedon in the Am ended Com plaint,thetw o entities'approachesto theBook Ordinance diverged. The FD O C proceeded to evictthe approxim ately 50 convicted sex offendersw ho rem ained underitssupervision. TheCounty, however,eventually optednottoenforcetheM iam iBridgeasa school,and perm itted the rem aining convicted sex offendersto stay intheR iverPark.Plaintiffsallegethatm any ofthe RiverPark residentsevicted by the FD O C m oved to an encam pm entnextto railroad tracksand w arehousesin unincorporated M iam i-DadeCounty,neartheborderofthe City ofH ialeah. Plaintiffsfurtherallegethatsom eFD OC paroleofficershavedirected convicted sex offendersto thislocation asonethatisin com pliancew ith the Book O rdinance.
Plaintiffsconcedethat,followingtheCounty'sremovaloftheM iam iBridgefrom itslist ofschools,theFDOC haspennittedsomeconvicted sex offenderstoreturntotheRiverPark. H owever,thepartiesagreed atoralargum entthatno convicted sex offendersarebeingperm itted to establish new residencesatthe RiverPark,dueto am ore-recentschoolopening in the area. O ffenderswho establishedtheirRiverParkresidencesbeforethe school'sopeninghave rem ained pursuantto the Book Ordinance'sSfgrandfatherclause.''
N oneofthethreeJohn D oePlaintiffsin thisaction w eream ong thosethattheFD OC evicted from theRiverPark. John D oe//1w asconvicted in 1992 oflew d and lasciviousconduct

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 60 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/03/2015 Page 4 of 21
onal4-year-old.AccordingtotheAmendedComplaint,JohnDoe//1wasinjailatthetimeof
theFDOC'Seviction,and movedtotherailroadtrackencampm entuponhisreleaseinJanuary 2014.JohnDoe#2wasconvictedin 2006oflewdandlasciviousconductona l4-year-old. John D oe#2 m ovedto theR iverPark in 2010,butw assubsequently evicted forfailingtopay rent. Follow ing hiseviction,John D oe #2 wasincarcerated untilJanuary 2014 and washom eless untilSeptember2014,when hemovedbacktotheRiverPark,wherehecurrentlyresides. John Doe#3 w asconvicted in 1999 oflewd and lasciviousconductw ith a ls-year-old andunlaw ful sexualactivity with a 16/l7-year-old. John Doe //3 neverlived in the RiverPark neighborhood; rather,in M arch 2014,hew asevicted from hisShorecrestapartm entforfailure to payrent,and hasbeen hom elesssincethattim e.
A NA LY SIS Plaintiffs'A m ended Com plaintassertsfacialand as-applied constitutionalchallengesto theBook Ordinance,underthe United StatesConstitution and theFloridaConstitution. Plaintiffscontend that,on itsface,theBook O rdinance'sdefinition ofSéschool''is unconstitutionallyvague,and thattheBook Ordinance'sresidency restriction isan
unconstitutionalexpostfactolaw.Plaintiffsfurthercontendthat,asappliedtothem bythe
County and U kenye,1the Book OrdinanceviolatesPlaintiffs'allegedly fundnm entalrightsto housingand safety. TheD efendantshave separately m oved to dism issforfailureto stateaclaim
underRule 12(b)(6). W henconsideringamotiontodismissunderFederalRuleofCivilProcedure12(b)(6),a1l
w ell-pleaded fad ualallegationsin thecom plaintm.e considered true and areconstrued in the
lightmostfavorabletotheplaintiff.SeeSpeakerv.US.Dep'tofHealthdrHumanServs.Ctrs.
'Plaintiffs concede thatthe Eleventh A m endm entprovidesthe FD O C w ith sovereign im m unity from Plaintiffs'constitutionalclaim s,and havetherefore agreed to the FD O C 'Sdism issal.
4

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 60 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/03/2015 Page 5 of 21
forDiseaseControl(fPrevention,623F.3d1371,1379(11thCir.2010).UnderRule8,tsgaj
pleading thatstatesaclaim forreliefm ustcontain ...a shortand plain statem entoftheclaim
showingthatthepleaderisentitledtorelief,''anddsgejachallegationmustbesimple,concise,and direct.''Fed.R.Civ.P.8(a)(2),(d)(1).tig-flhestatem entneedonly dgivethedefendantfairnotice
ofwhatthe...claim isand the ground upon which itrests.'''Erickw n v.Pardus,551U .S.89,93
(2007)(citationomitted).However,theplaintiffmustpresenttsenoughfactstostateaclaim to reliefthatisplausibleon itsface.''BellAtlanticCorp.v.Twombly,550U.S.544,570(2007). iilclonclusoryallegations,unwarranteddeductionsoffactorlegalconclusionsmasqueradingas factswillnotpreventdismissal.''Bellv.JB.HuntTransp.,Inc.,427F.App'x 705,707(11th Cir.2011).dtA claim hasfacialplausibilitywhentheplaintiffpleadsfactualcontentthatallows
the courttodraw thereasonable inferencethatthedefendantisliable forthe m isconduct
alleged.''Ashcrojtv.Iqbal,556U.S.662,678(2009). 1. Expostfacto
TheEx PostFacto Clausesofthe United StatesC onstitution prohibittheenactm entofa
1aw thatretroactivelyenhancesthepunishmentforacriminaloffense.U.S.CoNsT.al't.l,j9,c1. 3& j10cl.1;seealsoCollinsv.Youngblood,497U.S.37,43(1990)(ttLegislaturesmaynot retroactivelyalterthedefinitionofcrimesorincreasethepunishmentforcrim inalacts.'').The SupremeCourthasdirectedthatcxpostfactochallengesshouldfirstbeevaluatedby
determ iningwhetherthelaw atissuewasintendedtobeacivilregulation oracriminalpenalty.
Smithv.Doe,538U.S.84,92 (2003).Here,PlaintiffsconcedethattheM iam i-DadeBoardof
County Com m issionersintendedfortheBook O rdinanceto be acivilregulation,ratherthan a criminalpenalty.TheBookOrdinanceclearlystatestheCountyComm issioners'intentto Skprom ote,protect,and im provethe health,safety and w elfareofthecitizensoftheCounty,

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 60 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/03/2015 Page 6 of 21
particularlychildren....''M IAMI-DADECOUNTYCODEj21-278(b).lndeed,eventhe
ordinance'sfulltitle Sd-f'he Lauren Book Child Safety Ordinance'' revealsalegislativeintent to protectchildren,ratherthan to furtherpunish convicted sex offenders.
Becausethe County Com m issionersintended fortheBook Ordinanceto becivilin nature,theSuprem e Courthasdirectedthattconly theclearestproofw illsufticeto override legislative intentand transform w hathasbeen denom inated acivilrem edy into a crim inal
penalty.''Smith,538U.S.at92(citations,quotationsom itted).AsstatedbytheSupremeCourt,
severalfactorsareparticularly relevantto adeterm ination ofw hetherapurportedly civillaw is, in effect,crim inal'.
The factors m ost relevant to our analysis are whether, in its necessary operation,the regulatory schem e:has been regarded in ourhistory and traditionsasapunishm ent;imposesan affirm ative disability orrestraint',prom otesthetraditionalaim sofpunishm ent', has a rationalconnection to a nonpunitive purpose;or is excessive w ith respectto thispurpose.
1d.at97(citationsomitted).ThoughSmithaddressedregistrationandnotification
restrictionson sex offenders,itsfram ew ork isSiequally instructive''to residency restrictions.See
Wallacev.New York,40F.Supp.3d278,311-12(E.D.N.Y.2014).Indeed,morethanadozen
federalcourtshaveevaluatedsuchclaim sundertheSmithframework,andal1butonehavefound thatresidency restrictionsprohibiting convicted sex offendersfrom living nearschoolsdid not
violatetheExPostFactoClause.Seeid.at312n.30(citingcases);seealsoM cGuirev.Strange, No.2:11-cv-1027,2015W L476207at*29(M .D.Ala.Feb.5,2015)(citationsomitted) (ûtResidencyrestrictions,employmentrestrictions,andcomm unity-notitication schemeshaveall been deem edindividuallytobereasonablemeasuresforincreasingpublicsafety.'')
6

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 60 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/03/2015 Page 7 of 21
A . R ationalconnection to a nonpunitive purpose ThoughtheSm ithfactorsareSçneitherexhaustivenordispositive,''theSupremeCourt notedthatthelsnonpunitivepup ose''considerationisçiamostsigniticantfactorinour
detennination.''1d.at102(citations,punctuationomitted).Here,theobviousnonpunitive
purposeofthe Book O rdinanceistoprotectchildrenand dim inish therisk ofrepeatsexual
offensesagainstminors.SeeM IAMI-DADECOUNTYCODEj21-278(b).Plaintiffs,however,
argue thatthe Book Ordinance failsto achievethispurpose,becauseitrestrictsonlyw here convictedsexoffenderslive,anddoesnotprohibitthem from visitingplacesfrequentedby children.Thisargum entconcernstheordinance'seffectiveness,notitsrationalcorm ection toa
nonpunitivepurpose,andtheSupremeCourthasmadeclearthatttgalstatuteisnotdeemed
punitive sim ply becauseitlacksacloseorperfed fitw ith thenonpunitiveaim sitseeksto advance.''Smith,538U.S.at103.Underthefram eworkelaboratedbytheSuprem eCourtin Sm ith,itisnotthisCourt'sroletoevaluatetheefficacy ofalaw enacted by theeleded political representativesofM iam i-D ade County.SeeJohn Doesl-4v.Snyder,932 F.Supp.2d 803,813
(E.D.Mich.2013)(rejectingargumentoneffectivenessofsexoffenderresidencyrestriction,
becauseiçitisnotforafederalcourttotellastatelegislaturewhetheraparticular1aw iseffective
ornof')
Rather,therestrictionmustsimplyadvancealegitim ategovernm entalinterest.See
l'lreczrl.&v.LittleRockPoliceDep 't,453F.3d 1010,1015(8th Cir.2006).Here,theCounty's
interestin protectingchildren from thethreatofrepeatoffensesposed by sex offendersis obvious,and the Book Ordinance'srestrictionsadvancethatinterestby reducing opportunities
forcontactbetween sex offendersand children.SeeSm ith, 538U.S.at103(citationsomitted) (notingthattheriskofrecidivism amongconvidedsexoffendersisSsfrighteningandhigh''). Mostfederalcourtsfacedwithanexpostfactochallengehavefoundthatarationalconnection

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 60 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/03/2015 Page 8 of 21
existsbetweenthepublicinterestinprotectingchildren from theriskofrepeatoffensesand
residencyrestrictionsforconvictedsexoffenders.SeeWeems,453F.3dat1015(;1gW jebelieve
thata residency restriction designed to reduceproxim ity between them ostdangerousoffenders and locationsfrequented by children isw ithin therangeofrationalpolicy optionsavailabletoa
statelegislaturechargedwithprotectingthehealthandwelfareofitscitizens.'l;Wallace,40F. Supp.3dat318(t$Byminim izingcontactbetweenchildrenandconvictedsexoffendersafter
theirreleasefrom prison,theserestrictionsreducethechancethatasexoffendermightre-offend
againstachildvictim.''l;Doev.Baker,No.1:05-cv-2265,2006W L 905368at*5(N.D.Ga. Apr.5,2006)(diprohibitingasexoffenderfrom livingnearaschoolordaycarecenteriscertainly an appropriatestepinachievingtheultim ategoalofprotectingchildren.'').ThisCourtagrees.
B. Excessiveness Plaintiffsarguethatthe Book Ordinance isexcessivedueto itslack ofany individualized risk assessm ent.Plaintiffscontend thatbecausetheordinanceappliesforlifew ithoutregardto the particularriskorlack thereofposed by particularindividuals,and becauseitfailsto account forrehabilitationandtreatm entimposedbyFloridalaw ona11convictedsexoffenders,it effed ively punishesindividualsw ho poseno threatto thepublic. H ow ever,theSuprem e Court hasm adeclearthatlegislativepolicym akersareempoweredtoimposeClregulatoryburdenson individualsconvicted ofcrim esw ithoutanycorrespondingrisk assessm ent.''Sm ith,538U .S.at
104 (citationsomitted).td-l-heState'sdetenninationtolegislatewithrespecttoconvictedsex
offendersasa class,ratherthan requireindividualdetennination oftheirdangerousness,doesnot m akethestatuteapunishm entundertheEx PostFacto Clause.''Id
Further,Plaintiffsoverstatethesw eep oftheBook O rdinance. Ratherthan applyingto any person convicted ofasexualcrim e,the Book O rdinanceistailored to coveronly those
8

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 60 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/03/2015 Page 9 of 21

offendersw ho pose the greatestdangerto children. Specifically,theordinance explicitly applies

to offendersconvicted ofany one oftiveenum erated Florida sexualcrim esin w hich thevictim

wasaminoraged15oryounger.SeeM IAMI-DADECOUNTYCODEj21-281(a).ltwascertainly
w ithintheCounty Com m issioners'policym aking discretion toconsideroffendersconvicted of

suchcrim estoposethegreatestrisktothepublic.See Wallace,40F.Supp.3dat32l(noting
thataconviction ofasexualoffensesin w hichthevictim w asam inorSldem onstratesthatthe

offenderiscapableofharm ingchildren and,thus,posespreciselythetltreatthattheserestrictions

seektoneutralize'').2

Indeed,the

M

iddle D

istrictofAlabam

a ,

in M

cGuirev.Strange,recently

upheldagainstanexpostfactochallengeAlabama'smuchbroadersexoffenderlaw,which

barred individualsconvicted ofsexualcrim esfrom residing orworking w ithin 2,000 feetofa

school,regardlessofthevictim

'sage.2015W

L

476207 at*293;seealso

W allace ,

40F.Supp.

3dat326(citingcasesupholdingresidencyrestrictionsthatdidnotincludeanyindividualized

detenninationofriskandthat,inm anycases,appliedtoanyoffender).
ThefactthattheBookOrdinanceappliesforlifealsodoesnot,on itsown,mandatea

tinding ofexcessiveness. TheA laskastatuteunderreview in Sm ith also provided fora lifetim e

2At

oralargum

ent ,

Plaintiffs attem

pted

to

distinguish

W

allace's excessiveness analysis

by

noting

that

Wallaceexaminedaresidencyrestrictionthatincludedatieredsystem fordeterm ining individualrisk.

According to Plaintiffs,thisddindividualized determ ination''rendered the residency restriction atissue

in Wallace lesspunitivethantheBook Ordinance,andmorerationallyrelatedtothegoalofprotecting

children. A closerreading ofW allace,however,leadsto a differentconclusion. The group of

offendersin Wallacewhohadbeendeterminedtobemostdangerous,andthereforesubjectto them ost
sw eeping residency and registration restrictions,included two kindsofoffenders. First,thisgroup

included offendersw ho w ere individually determ ined to pose a substantialrisk ofre-offense,

regardlessoftheageoftheoffender'svictim. Wallace,40F.Supp.3dat320.Andsecond,these
offendersincluded any sex offenderw ho had com m itted an offense in w hich the victim w as underthe

age ofl8. ld. In otherw ords,the statute underreview in W allace,despiteproviding for individualized

determ inationsofrisk,actually employed abroaderstandard forthosesubjecttoitsmost-restrictive
conditionsthantheBook Ordinance,whichappliesonlyto offendersconvictedofaspecificsexual

crim e in which the victim w as 15 oryounger.

3M cG uire held thatA labam a's in-person w eekly registration requirem ents forhom elesssex
offenders- perhapsthe strictestsex offenderrestrictionsin the country were so punitive asto
constitutean unconstitutionalexpostfacto law./#.at*31. M cGuire,however,upheldthestate's
residency and w ork restrictionsasreasonable,nonpunitive,civilm easures. See id.

9

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 60 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/03/2015 Page 10 of 21
restrictiononcertainsexoffenders,andtheSuprem eCoul'tfoundthisrestrictionnottobe excessive,in lightof(tem piricalresearch''show ing thatûkm ostreoffensesdo notoccurwithin the firstseveralyearsafterrelease,butm ay occuraslateas20 yearsfollow ing release.''Sm ith,538
U.S.at105(citation,quotationsomitted).TheCounty Commissionerslikewisereasonably
concluded thatalifetim eresidency restriction w ould bestprotectthepublic from the risk of repeatsexualoffensesagainstm inors,w hich m ay occurlong aftertheoffender'sreleasefrom
prison.Seeïtf($1Theexcessivenessinquiryofourexpostfactojurispnldenceisnotanexercise
indeterminingwhetherthelegislaturehasm adethebestchoicepossibletoaddresstheproblem
itseekstoremedy.''l;seealsoValentinev.Stricklan4 No.5:08-CV-00993-JItA,2009W L 9052193,at*5(N .D.OhioAug.19,2009)(upholdinglifetim eresidencyrestrictionappliedto sexoffenderswithoutexplicitregardforthevictim 'sagel;Gautierv.Jones,No.ClV-08-445-C, 2009W L 1444533,at*8-9(W .D.Okla.May20,2009)rev'donothergrounds,364F.App'x 422(10thCir.2010)(upholdinglifetim eresidencyandregistrationrestrictions).
Finally,whiletheBookOrdinanceprohibitsaconvicted sex offenderfrom establishinga new residencew ithin 2,500 feetofa school,itgrantsexceptionsto covered individualswho established theirresidenceseitherbeforetheschool'sopening orthe ordinance'seffectivedate.
SeeM IAMI-DADECOUNTYCODEj21-282(1)(a)& (c).ThisStgrandfatherclause''further
underscoresthe Book Ordinance'scivil,nonpunitiveeffects.See Wallace,40 F.Supp.3dat326
(notingthatasimilard'grandfatherclause''alsomitigatedûsanyexcessivenessrelatingtothe lifetim eapplicationoftheserestrictions'');Snyder,932F.Supp.2dat811-12(ûtgrandfather clauses''alsodtsignificantlynegatetheharshestpotentialconsequencesoftheAct.'').

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 60 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/03/2015 Page 11 of 21
C . A ffirm ativedisability orrestraint
Theaffirmativedisabilityorrestraintprongofanexpostfactoanalysisexaminestshow theeffectsoftheActarefeltbythosesubjecttoit.''Smith,538U.S.at99.Stlfthedisabilityor
restraintism inorand indirect,itseffectsareunlikely to bepunitive.''Id. Thedisability or restraintim posed by the Book Ordinance isindisputably lessseverethan im prisonm ent,w hich theSupremeCourthascalled'ttheparadigm aticaffinnativedisability orrestraint.''ld Unlikea
prisoner,aconvictedsexoffendersubjecttotheBookOrdinance'sresidencyrequirementmay
seekemploym ent,m ovefreelythroughoutM iam i-DadeCounty,establisharesidenceatany locationnotwithin2,500feetofaschool,andrem ain inanexistingresidencepursuanttothe
ordinance'stsgrandfatherclause.''M IAMI-DADECOUNTYCODEjj21-281(a)& 21-28241);see also Wallace,40F.Supp.3dat317(tiAlthoughsexoffenderstowhom theserestrictionsapply
m ay belessfree than theaveragepersonto liveoreven travelw herethey w ant,theserestrictions arenottheequivalentofim prisonm ent,and theoffendersarenotakin to prisoners,w ithoutany
freedom ofmovement.'').
Plaintiffsneverthelessarguethattheordinanceconstitutesan affirm ativedisabilityor restraintbecauseitsresidency restrictionsSdareso onerousthatthey havecaused hundredsof individualsin M iami-DadeCountytobecom ehom elessortransient.''Smithindicatesthatsuch
broad,conjecturalclaimsareinsufficienttoestablishthatanaffirmativedisabilityorrestraintis
imposed by aregulatory restriction on convicted sex offenders.In Sm ith,the Suprem eCourt
rejectedthecontentionthatAlaska'sregistrationandnotiticationrequirem entswerelikelyto rendersexoffenderssubjecttotheserequirementsunemployableandincapableoffinding housing.TheCourtreasonedthatSsltlherecord inthiscasecontainsno evidencethattheActhas
ledto substantialoccupationalorhousing disadvantagesforform ersex offendersthatw ould not

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 60 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/03/2015 Page 12 of 21
have otherwiseoccurred through the use ofroutinebackground checksby em ployersand
landlords.''Smith,538U.S.at100 (em phasisadded).
Sim ilarly,Plaintiffshavepled no factsindicating thattheirdifficulty in obtaining housing Stw ould nothaveotherw ise occurred''dueto theirpersonalfinancialcircum stances. Indeed, Plaintiffs'own allegationsindicatethatfactorsotherthantheBookOrdinance'sresidency restridionhaveeausedtheirdiftk ultyinfindinghousing.Forexam ple,theAm endedCom plaint m akesclearthatJohn D oes//2 and 3becam ehom elessnotbecause ofthe Book Ordinance,but becausebothplaintiffsfailedtopaytheirrentand,asaresult,wereevictedfrom residencesthat com plied w iththeBook Ordinanceatthetim ethatboth Plaintiffslived in them . A sto John Doe #1,theA m ended Com plaintstatesthata probation ofticerdirected him to theencam pm entatthe railroad trackson theborderofthe City ofH ialeah asalocation in com pliancew ith theBook Ordinance',Plaintiffsdo notallege,and could notplausibly do so,thatthe Book Ordinance's residencyrestrictionisthesoleandexclusivecauseofhishom elessness.See Wallace,40F.
Supp.3dat327(findingdsnosupportforPlaintiffs'allegationthattheserestrictionsdirectly causeforcedordefactohomelessnessamongtheCounty'sregisteredsexoffenders').
Plaintiffsalso arguethattheapplication ofthe Book Ordinance in M iam i-Dade County is particularlyonerousbecausetiM iam i-DadeCountyispredom inantlyurban.''Thefactthattwo ofthreeJohnDoePlaintiffswere,asdescribedabove,ableto obtaincomplianthousingin some ofthe County'sm ostdensely populated areasbeliesthiscontention. Further,Plaintiffs' characterization ofM iam i-DadeCotm ty isim plausible. M iam i-D ade County islargerthanthe statesofRhodeIsland and Delaw are,and containsextensiveurban,suburban,and rural neighborhoods.4 Plaintiffshavepledno factssupportingaplausibleinferencethatsuchavast
4M IAM ID ADE.GOV,AboutM iam i-D ade County,http'.//w w w .m iam idade.gov/info/about m iam i-dade.asp

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 60 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/03/2015 Page 13 of 21
andvaried geographicalareahasnohousingthatiscompliantwiththeBookOrdinance's residency restriction 5
.
D . Sim ilaritiesto historicpunishm ents Plaintiffs'contention thattheBook Ordinance'seffectsare sim ilartothehistoriccrim inal punishm entsofbanishm entand probation isalso unsupported by the ordinance'splain term s. TheBook Ordinanceperm itsconvicted sex offendersfalling w ithin itspurview to travel throughoutM iam i-D ade County,to w ork w ithin the County,and to livew herethey choose,as
longastheirresidenceisnotwithin2,500feetofaschool.SeeM IAMI-DADECOUNTYCODEj 21-281(a).Thisisafarcryfrom thehistoricpunishmentofbanishment,which'sentailedthe
inabilitytoeverretum to theplacefrom whichan individualhadbeenbanished.''SeeDoev.
M iller,405F.3d700,719(8thCir.2005)(dsunlikebanishment,flowa'sresidencyrestrictionj restrictsonlywhereoffendersmayreside.');Wallace,40F.Supp.3dat316-17(citations omitted)(holdingthatNew York'sresidencyrestrictionstûcannotbeequatedtothehistoric
punishm entofbanishm ent,''becausethey Sfdo nothavethe effectofeitherputting the affected
individualsondisplayforridiculeorlrunningthem outoftown''').Further,thosecoveredbythe BookOrdinancearenotsubjecttothemandatoryconditions,supervision,orthreatofrevocation imposedonprobationers.SeeSmith,538U.S.at101(Alaska'sregistrationandnotitication requirementswerenotsimilartoprobation,becauseisoffenderssubjecttothe(1statutearefree.. . toliveandworkasothercitizens,withnosupervision'').
5Plaintiffsalso arguethattheBookO rdinance'sfailureto provideindividualizedrisk assessm entsfurthersupportsa findingthattheordinance im posesan affirm ativedisability orrestraint.And yet,asdescribedabove,theSuprem e Courthasclearlyheldthatalaw 'suniform application,standing alone,doesnotrenderitpunitive.Sm ith,538 U.S.
atl04(citationsomitted).

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 60 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/03/2015 Page 14 of 21
E . T raditionalaim sofpunishm ent TheCountyconcedesthattheBook Ordinanceservesonetraditionalaim of
punishm ent---deterrenceoffuturecrim es.H ow ever,given theordinance'splainly civil
legislative intentand theabsenceofotherfactsillustrating acrim inally punitive effect,thisfactor
aloneisfarfrom dispositive.SeeSmith,538U.S.at102CiAnynumberofgovenunental programsm ightdetercrim ewithoutimposingpunishment.''l;seealsoM iller,405F.3dat720 (holdingthatlowa'sresidencyrestrictionltcouldhaveadeterrenteffect,butwedonotagreethat thedeterrenteffectprovidesastronginferencethattherestrictionispunishm enf).Further,to
thelim ited extentthattheBook Ordinanceposessom eretributiveeffect,thiseffectisincidental to theordinance'scivil,regulatory aim ofprotecting thepublic from therisk ofrecidivism posed by sex offendersconvicted ofcrim esinvolving victim saged 15 and under. 6
F. C onclusion
In lightoftheSm ith factorsdescribed above,the CourtholdsthattheBook O rdinance doesnot,on itsface,violatetheU nited StatesConstitution'sEx PostFacto Clause.Therefore,
Plaintiffs'expostfactoclaim isdismissed.
I1. V agueness PlaintiffsalsocontendthattheBookOrdinanceisvoid forvagueness,initsdefinitionof
aCischool.'' The DueProcessC lauseoftheU nited StatesConstitution requiresthatlam nakers defineprohibited conductttw ith sufficientdefinitenessthatordinarypeoplecan understand w hat
6Plaintiffsfinallycontendthattheirexpostfactoclaim istoofact-intensivetoresolveonamotionto
dism iss,and thatthey are entitled to develop factualproofofthe B ook O rdinance'sexcessiveness and ineffectivenessatachieving itspurpose. Plaintiffsarguethat,forthisreason,mostcourtsfaced with sim ilarclaim s haveresolved them afterconducting bench trials or,atleast,taking evidence. N o precedent,binding orotherw ise,supportsthe proposition thataplaintiffwho haspleaded an
implausibleclaim maysurviveamotiontodismissunderRule12(b)(6)withthecontentionthat
subsequentdiscovery couldbolstertheclaim. Further,Plaintiffsignorethesubstantialnumberof decisionsthathave resolved such claim sasa m atterofIaw . See W allace,40 F.Supp.3d at285; W eems,453 F.3d atl012.,Snyders932 F.Supp.2d at807.

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 60 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/03/2015 Page 15 of 21
conductisprohibitedandinamannerthatdoesnotencouragearbitraryanddiscrim inatory
enforcement.''Kolenderv.fawson,461U.S.352,357-58(1983).Here,theBook Ordinance's
defnitionofatsschool'' asaS'publicorprivatekindergarten,elem entary,m iddleorsecondary school''- isconsistentwiththeplainmeaningandunderstandingoftheterm .Indeed,atoral argum ent,Plaintiffs'counselconcededthatthe ordinance'sdefinition oftdschool''isclearfor m ostfacilities.
lnStansberry v.Holmes,theform erFifthCircuitCourtofAppealsupheld alocalzoning ordinancethatdefined çsschool''asç$abuilding w herepersonsregularly assem ble forthepurpose ofinstructionoreducationtogetherwiththeplaygrounds,donnitories,stadium s,andother
structuresorgroundsusedinconjunctiontherewith.''613F.2d 1285,1292(5thCir.1980).7
ThefonuerFifth Circuitreversed thedistrictcourt'sruling ofthisdefinition as unconstitutionallyvague,becausethelanguage oftheordinance(tclearly narrow sthedefinition to schoolsforprim ary,secondary,and collegeeducation.''ld at1290.TheBook O rdinance's definition ofa schoolisclearerthan thatcontained in the statuteexam ined in Stansberry. M oreover,thetitleoftheordinanceand itsbroadercontextallm ake itsapplication to children obviousand understandable.8

7UnderBonnerv ,

City ofprichar4

Ala.,661F.2d1206,1207(11thCir.1981),thedecisionsoftheformerFifth

Circuitarebinding oncourtswithintheEleventh Circuit.

8Plaintiffs also arguethatStansberry doesnotcontrolthe Court'sanal sishere because itevaluated a
civilregulation,andtheSupremeCourthasdirected thatstatutesimposlng acriminalpenalty shouldbe
subjecttoastricterreview.W hilethismaybeacorrectstatementofthelaw,seeVillageoflioffman Estatesv,Flipside,HoffmanEstates,lnc.,455 U.S.489,498-99(1982),theCourtisnotconvinced that
thepurportedly heightened review applied to statutes im posing crim inalliability w ould m ake a
differencehere.lnCityofChicagov.Morales,theSujremeCourtstatedthatacriminallaw maybe
vagueeitherby failingto providefairnoticeofprohibltedconduct,orbyauthorizing orencouraging
arbitraryenforcement. 527U.S.4l,56(1999). Asdescribed above,theplainterm softheBook
Ordinance passm usterundereithertest.

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 60 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/03/2015 Page 16 of 21

Plaintiffs,how ever,arguethattheBook O rdinancefailsto provideconstitutionalt'fair notice''ofprohibited conduct,becausethe ordinance'sdefinition oftheterm Slschool''isunclear in thecontextofdtalternativeeducation program s''such asthe M iam iBridge.ln support, Plaintiffscitethe County'sand theFDO C 'Sallegedly arbitraryand inconsistentenforcem entof the ordinance. W hetherthesecontentionscould supportan as-applied challengeto the enforcem entoftheBook Ordinanceunderthese circum stancesorsim ilarcircum stancesin the future,how ever,isnotbefore the Court. Rather,the issueon Plaintiffs'facialchallengefor vaguenessiswhethertheplain language ofthe statuteitselfprovidesfairnoticeofthe prohibited
conduct.SeeSelingv.Young,531U .S.250,273-74(2001)(Thom as,J.,concurringin judgment)($((T1otheextentthattheconditionsresultfrom thefactthatthestatuteisnotbeing
applied according to itsterm s,theconditionsarenotthe effectofthe statute,butrathertheeffect
ofitsimproperimplem entation.'').TheCourtconcludesthattheBookOrdinance'sdefinitionof
aschoolclearly doesprovide such fairnotice ofwhata Stschool''is,and consequently,w herea convictedsexoffenderm ayestablish anew residence9
.
111. Substantive due process Finally,Plaintiffsbringtw o substantivedueprocessclaim s,based on Ukenye'sand the County'sallegedviolationsoftheirûtfundam entalrights''to personalsecurity andto acquire residentialproperty.N eitherofthesepurported rightshasbeen explicitly recognized by the Eleventh CircuitortheSuprem eCourtasdsftmdam ental.''See Washingtonv.Glucksberg,521
U.S.702,720(1997)(enum eratingtherightsrecognizedastdfundam ental'').Atbest,som e
decisionscited by Plaintiffshaverecognized a tdliberty interest''in personalseeurity in the

9 In

fact ,

the

M

iam

i-Dade

County

Police

Departm

ent provides

an

interactive

m

ap,readily

available

on

the Internet,thatdem onstrates the location ofallschools in the C ounty,a1lregistered sex offenders,

and the areasin which registered sex offenders m ay establish a new residence. See

http://gisweb.miam idade.gov/seopbuffer/.

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 60 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/03/2015 Page 17 of 21
contextofacustodialrelationshiporinvoluntarycom mitment,neitherofwhicharepresenthere.
Seee.g.Youngbergv.Romeo,457U .S.307,315(1982)(recognizingatilibertyinterest''insafety inthecontextofinvoluntarycomm itm entproceedings).Similarly,thecaserelied onm ost
heavily by Plaintiffsto supporttheexistenceofafundnm entalrightto acquireproperty,Coppage v.Kansas,doesnotsupportPlaintiffs'claim .Coppageaddressedthetslibertyofcontract''inthe
contextofemploymentnegotiations,236U.S.1,9-11(1915),and,astheEleventhCircuithas noted,CoppagetsSûinterpretationoftheDueProcessClause''hasbeenûéexpresslyrejectgedl''by theSupremeCourt.Whitney v.Heckler,780F.2d963,972n.13(11thCir.1986)(citingLincoln
FederalLaborUnionNo.l9,129v.NorthwesternIron& M etalCo.,335U.S.525,533-37
(1949)).Further,atleastoneCircuitCourtofAppealshasheldthatçswecannotagreethatthe
rightto choose one'splaceofresidence isnecessarily a fundam entalright.''Prostrollo v.Univ.
ofs.Dakota,507F.2d775,781(8thCir.1974). lk-f'hedoctrineofjudicialself-restraintrequiresustoexercisetheutmostcarewhenever
weareaskedtobreaknew groundin''therecognitionoffundam entalrights.SeeCollinsv.City
ofblarkerHeights,Texas,503U.S.115,125(1992).Thisisbecause,t'lblyextending
constitutionalprotection to an asserted rightorliberty interest,we,to a greatextent,placethe m atteroutsidethearenaofpublicdebate and legislative action.'' Gluckaberg,521U .S.at720. Becauseno controlling decision identitied by Plaintiffshaseverarticulated a fundam entalright
topersonalsecurity(inanon-custodialcontext)ortheacquisitionofhousing,theCourtdeclines todosohere.SeeMiller,405F.3dat710(1tW edonotbelievethattheresidencyrestrictionofj
692A .2A im plicatesany fundam entallightofPlaintiffsthatwould triggerstrid scrutiny ofthe
statute.'').Therefore,theBookOrdinanceissubjecttorationalbasisreview',thatis,review of whetherittirationallyadvancleslsom elegitimategovenunentalpurpose.''Renov.Flores,507

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 60 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/03/2015 Page 18 of 21
U.S.292,306(1993).Underthisdeferentialstandardofreview,thelaw inquestionneednotbe perfect,oreven superiorto otherpotentialoptions- itm ustonly be rational.Arm ourv. Cityof Indianapolis,132 S.Ct.2073,2083(2012);seealsoDoev.M oore,410F.3d 1337,1345(11th Cir.2005)($çgW )eholdlegislativeactsunconstitutionalunderarationalbasisstandardinonly them ostexceptionalcircumstances.'').
Plaintiffsarguethatthe Book Ordinanceisan ineffectivem eansto theend ofprotecting children. Plaintiffsallegethatm ostsexualabuseofchildren ispep etrated by individualsw ith a colm ectiontothechild'sfam ily,andthattheBook Ordinancedoesnothingtoprotectthese victim s. Plaintiffsalso contend that,becausetheBook Ordinanceregulatesonly w here convicted sex offenderslive,andnotw herethey travelthroughouttheirdays,itfailsto protect children from convicted sex offendersw ho m ightchooseto visitschoolzones. Plaintiffs, however,failtorecognizethatdeferentialrationalbasisreview doesnotentailanintensive investigation ofw hetherthe County Com m issionersenacted thebestand m osteffectivepublic policy available.Rather,theordinancem ustonly berationally related to a legitim atepurpose.
Thevastmajorityoffederalandstatecourtsfrom acrossthecountry,includingthe
United StatesSupremeCourt,theEleventhCircuit,andtheFloridaSuprem eCourt,havefound thatreasonable restrictionson convicted sex offendersservethe legitim atepublicinterestin protectingchildren from theédfrighteninglyhigh''riskofrecidivism posedbysuchindividuals.
SeeSmith,538U.S.at102-03(Alaska'ssexoffenderregistrationrequirem enthadalegitim ate connectiontopublicsafety);M oore,410F.3d at1345(holdingthatFlorida'ssexoffender registrationactwasrationallyrelatedtothegovernmentalinterestinprotectingthepublicl; Miller,405F.3dat714(rejectingargumentthatlegislaturewasrequiredtobasearesidency
restriction on scientificdata show ing itseffectiveness,because itSsunderstatestheauthority ofa
18

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 60 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/03/2015 Page 19 of 21
statelegislaturetomakejudgmentsaboutthebestmeanstoprotectthehealthandwelfareofits
citizensin an areaw here precisestatisticaldata isunavailableand hum an behaviorisnecessarily
unpredictable'');Westerheidev.State,831So.2d93,104(F1a.2002)(holdingthatFlorida1aw compellinginvoluntarycommitmentofsexuallyviolentpredatorswasjustifiedbythestate's Stcompellingandproper''interestsinprotectingthepublicandtreatingpredators).Plaintiffshave
offered no com pelling reason fortheCourtto deviate from the rationale ofthesew ell-established decisions,andtheCourtthereforeconcludesthattheBook Ordinancerationallyadvancesthe legitim ategovenunentalpurposeofprotecting children from therisk ofrecidivism posed by convicted sex offenders 10
.
Plaintiffs,how ever,arguethattheBook O rdinance'sresidency restrictionsare so onerous asto create acustodialrelationship with County and FD O C law enforcem ent. Plaintiffsnotethat theSuprem eCourthasheldthatastate'sttaftirm ativeactofrestrainingtheindividual'sfreedom toacton hisow n behalf'triggerssom e statedutiesto ensurethe restrained person'ssafety.
Deshaneyv.WinnebagoCn/y.Dept.ofsocialSrvs.,489U.S.189,200(1989).However,
Plaintiffsoverlook D eshaney'sfurtherstatem entthatsuch protectionsariseonly in eircum stancesofttincareeration,institutionalization,orothersim ilarrestraintofpersonalliberty . . . .'' Id at200.TheBook O rdinancedoesnotim pose arestraintthatissim ilarto incarceration orinstitutionalization.Theordinancepermitsconvicted sex offenderswithinitsambittotravel throughoutM iam i-D adeCounty,to w ork,and to establish aresidence- albeitnotone within

10 F oIlow

ing

oral argum

ent ,

Plaintiffsfiled

aNoticeofSupplementalAuthority

(D.E.59),citinga

recentC alifornia Suprem e Courtdecision thatheld California'ssex offenderresidency restriction to be

an unconstitutionaldueprocessviolation as applied to sex offendersliving in San D iego County. ln re

Taylor,60Cal.4th 1019(Cal.2015).TheCaliforniaSupremeCourt'sdecisionreliedonanextensive

investigation into the law 'seffectivenessatachieving itsaim s,id.at 1039-42, w hich,aspreviously described,would beinappropriatehere,undertherationalbasisstandardarticulatedbytheUnited

States Suprem e Courtand the Eleventh C ircuit.

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 60 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/03/2015 Page 20 of 21

2,500feetofaschool.Plaintiffsidentify noprecedentsupportingtheexistenceofacustodial relationship underthesecircum stances,and the Courtdeclinesto find onehere.
IV . Claim sbased on theFlorida C onstitution ln theirresponseto the County'sm otion to dism iss,Plaintiffscontend thattheirstate-law
substantivedueprocessclaims,predicatedontheFloridaConstitution,shouldbesubjecttoa
differentanalysisthan theirfederalcounterpartclaim s.!l PlaintiffsarguethatFlorida'srational basistestisstricterthanitsfederalcounterpart,andm andatesamoresearchinginquiryintothe efficacy ofthe Book Ordinanceatachievingitsaim s. To thecontrary,Floridacourtshaveruled thatstateandlocallawsim posingrestrictionson sex offendersarerelatedtothelegitimate interestofprotectingthepublic. W esterheide v.State,forexam ple,upheld a Floridalaw
compellinginvoluntarycommitmentofviolentsexoffendersagainstanexpostfactochallenge,
andconcludedthatthelaw dsservesthedualstateinterestsofprovidingm entalhealthtreatmentto sexuallyviolentpredatorsand protectingthepublic from these individuals.''831 So.2d at112. Further,in Calderon v.State,theThird D istrictCourtofAppealupheldtheBook Ordinance againstapreemptionchallenge,andalsodeclinedto addresstheplaintiffsClotherissues,''
concludingthattheyweretdmeritless.''93So.3d439,441(F1a.3dDCA 2012). PlaintiffshavenotpresentedanyargumentastowhytheirFlorida-law expostfactoand
vaguenessclaimsshouldbesubjecttoadifferentanalysisthantheirfederalcounterpartclaims, andFloridalaw indicatesthattheyarenot.See,e.g.,Westerheide,831So.2dat104(notingthat fitheFlorida(expostfactoclauseis1almostidenticalinwordingtothatofthefederal

11The

CourtnotesthatPlaintiffs.pleadingofitsclaim

s arising

undertheFloridaConstitutjon

jsitselfdeficient .

Ratherthan splittheircountsinto separateFloridaand federalclaim s,Plaintiffshavepledal1fourcountsasbased on

b0ththefederaland stateconstitutions.TheEleventh Circuitcharacterizedasim ilarcom plaintasaçç'shotgun'

pleadingy''andnoted thattçam oredetinitestatem ent,ifproperly drawn,willpresenteachclaim forreliefina

separatecount,asrequiredbyRulel0(b)....''Andersonv.Districtft;lofTrusteesofcent.Fla.Community College,77F.3d364,366(1lthCir.1996).

20

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 60 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/03/2015 Page 21 of 21

constitution,''andSithisCourthasnotconstruedgtheexpostfactoprovisionlinamanner differentfrom itsfederalcounterpalf').Therefore,Plaintiffs'claimsbasedontheFlorida
Constitution aredism issed forthe sam ereasonsastheirclaim sarising undertheU nited States Constitution.
U kenye'sspecificargum ents U kenye also contendsthatPlaintiffs'claim sagainsthim should bedism issed forlack of standing and causation. Because the Courthasalready concluded thatPlaintiffshavenotstated a claim upon w hich reliefm ay begranted,itdeclinesto addressthese additionalbasesfor disnzissal.
C O N CL USIO N
Fortheforegoingreasons,theCounty'sM otiontoDismiss(D.E.29)andtheFDOC'S andUkenye'sM otiontoDism iss(D.E.391areherebyGRANTED.Plaintiffs'Amended Complaint(D.E.25)isherebyDISM ISSED W ITH PREJUDICE.12
D ON E in Cham bers,M iam i,Florida,on April3,2015

C opiesfurnished to: A l1CounselofRecord

<7

PA U L C . H U CK

N

UN ITED STA TES D ISTRICT JU DG E

12Becauseanyamendm entofPlaintiffs'existingclaimswould befutile,dism issalwith prejudice is
appropriate. SeeBryantv.Dupree,252 F.3d ll61,1163 (11thCir.200l)(citingForman v.Davis,37l U.S.l78,182(1962))(ççA districtcourtneednot...allow anamendment...whereamendmentwould be futile.'').

 
 Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 184 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/18/2018 Page 1 of 45
UN ITED STA TES DISTR IC T CO UR T FO R TH E SO UTH ERN D ISTR IC T O F FLO R IDA
C aseN o.1:14-cv-23933-PC H JOlqx D o E #4,JOHN Do E //5
Joldx DoE#6,andJouxDoi#7,
Plaintiffs,
M IA M I-DA D E C OUN TY ,FLORID A , D efendant.
FIN D IN G S O F FA C T AN D C O N CLU SIO N S O F LA W Plaintiffs,John D oes#4-7,hom elessregistered sex offenders,broughtthisaction against
M iami-Dade County (t'the county'').1 They assertthat a M iami-Dade County ordinance,
prohibiting them from residing w ithin 2,500 feetof a school,on its face,violates the ex post facto clauses ofthe U nited States and Florida C onstitutions.The County raises the statute of
limitationsasanaffinnativedefense.ThisCourthasoriginalsubject-matterjurisdictionoverthis action pursuantto 28 U.S.C.j 1331 because one claim arises under the United States
Constitution. This m atter is before the Courtfornzling follow ing a bench trialheld October 22-26,
2018. The Court heard the testim ony of 20 witnesses,review ed the exhibits adm itted into evidence, considered the parties' Joint Pre--frial Stipulation, Proposed Findings of Fact and ConclusionsofLaw ,nm ended Proposed FindingsofFactand ConclusionsofLaw,supplem ental briefing,and otherpertinentportionsofthe record.Having considered theevidenceand being otherwisedulyadvised,theCourtfindsasfollow s.
1The Courtusestheterm slIhom eless''and Gttransient''interchangeably.W hen sex offendersregistertheiraddress w ith law enforcement,theyareconsideredlçtransient''ifthey donothaveaperm anentaddress.

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 184 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/18/2018 Page 2 of 45
1. BA CK G RO U ND A ND PR O CE DU R AL H ISTO R Y
On November15,2005,theCotmtyenactedOrdinanceNo.05-206(thetlordinance'').
The Ordinanceprohibitsan individualconvicted asan adultofcertain sexualoffenses2in which the victim is15 yearsoryoungerfrom residing within 2,500 feetofaschool.A schoolisdefined
asaûûpublicorprivatekindergarten,elem entary,middle,orsecondary (high)school.''Thestated
goalofthe Ordinance islûto prom ote,protectand im prove the health,safety and w elfare ofthe
citizensoftheCounty,particularlychildreng.j''
The Ordinance applies retroactively to sexual offenders convicted of covered crim es, even ifthe crim e w ere com m itted before the County enad ed the O rdinance in 2005.H ow ever, the Ordinancecontainsa ûûgrandfatherclause,''w hich providesthattheresidency restriction does
notapply to sexualoffenderswho:(1)established theirresidencepriorto the enactm entofthe Ordinance;or(2)establishedtheirresidencepriorto a schoolopening within 2,500 feetofthe
residence.Underthe O rdinance,anyonew ho violatesthe County'sresidency restriction shallbe
ptmishedby atinenottoexceed$1,000orimprisonmentintheCountyjailfornotmorethan
364 daysorby both fine and im prisonm ent. O riginally the Ordinance gave m tm icipalities the option to opt-out of the County's
residency restriction and enacttheir ow n residency restrictions.By 2010,24 m tmicipalities in M inm i-D ade County enacted ordinances thatw ere m ore restrictive,prohibiting sex offenders from living within 2,500 feetofvariouspoints including schools,daycares,parks,playgrounds, bus stops, and other places where children m ay congregate. These m tm icipal ordinances effectively reduced and shifted the available com pliant housing for sexual offenders to the
2The sexualoffensescovered by theOrdinance include violationsofFla. Stat.j794.011(sexualbattelyl;j800.04 (lewdandlasciviousactson/inpresenceofpersonsunderage 16);j827.071(sexualperfonnanceby achild)orj 847.0145(selling orbuying ofminorsforportrayalin sexually explicitconduct).ln 20l0,M iami-Dade County addedviolationsofFla.Stat.j847.0135(5)(sexualactstransm ittedovercomputer)tothequalifyingoffenses.

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 184 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/18/2018 Page 3 of 45
unincop orated areas ofthe County and to cities thathad notyet enacted sexual offender residency restrictions.On January 21,2010,the County enacted O rdinance N o. l0-01,w hich am ended the Ordinance to preem ptallofthem orerestrictive m unicipalordinances,applying the County'sresidency restriction countywide.TheB oard ofCounty Com m issionersfotm d thatthis m easure struck û$a properbalance betw een protecting children around the crucialand vulnerable areas ofschoolswhile stillleaving available residentialunitsin w hich sexualoffenderscan tind housing.''
On O ctober 23,2014,former plaintiffs,Jolm D oes #1,2,and 3,and the Florida A ction Com m ittee,Inc.,filed the initialCom plaint,alleging m ultiple constitutionalchallenges to the Ordinance.The Com plaintw as am ended on D ecem ber20,2014.On April3,2015,this Court dism issed the Am ended Com plaintforfailureto state a cause ofaction.Plaintiffsappealed.The Eleventh Circuitaffirm ed in partand reversed in pal4the ex postfacto claim ,holding thatD oes //1and 3 allegedplausibleex postfacto claim s.Doev.M iami-DadeC@.,Fla.,846F.3d 1180,
1182(11thCir.2017). On October 5,2017,Doe#3,along with fournew plaintiffs (Does#4-7),filed the
Second A m ended Com plaint,alleging only tw o counts againstthe County:facialex postfacto
violationsundertheUnited StatesConstitution(Count1)andFloridaConstitution (Count11).
Subsequently Doe //3 w ithdrew from the suit,w hich proceeded as to D oes #4-7.The Court denied the County's M otion for Sum m ary Judgm entand held a bench trialon O ctober22-26, 2018.
Atthe trial,the parties subm itted docum entary evidence and called num erous w itnesses to testify,including expertwitnesses.Plaintiffstestified aboutthe Ordinance's im pacton their ability to find housing.Plaintiffscalled witnessesfrom theM inm i-D ade County H om elessTnlst
3

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 184 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/18/2018 Page 4 of 45
(theûtl-lomelessTrusf'land CitnzsHea1th Network,including M anuelSarria,Rosa Noriega,
RobertBerm an,and PaulIm brone,who testified abouttheireffortsto find com plianthousing for registered sex offenders.RaulFernandezoftheFlorida Departm entofCorrectionstestitied about
an encam pm ent that developed near N W Streetand NW 36thAvenue (tj4e tkeyjststreet Encampm ent''),which wascomprised predominantly ofhom elessregistered sex offenders.Dr.
Sam irElm irfrom the Florida D epartm entofH ea1th testitied aboutthe 71stStreety,ncnm pm ent constituting a tssanitary nuisance.''Dr.Pedro Greer,an internal m edicine physician,testified aboutthe effectsofhom elessnesson health.D r.Kelly Socia,a crim inologist,testitied aboutthe
num berofhousingunitsavailableoutsidetheresidencyrestrictedareas(som etim esreferredtoas çlbufferzones'').Dr.JillLevenson,a professorof socialwork,and Dr.Andrew Hanis,a
psychologist,testified aboutrecidivism rates of sex offenders.LieutenantLuis Poveda of the M iam i-D ade Cotmty Police Departm ent,V ictoria M allette ofthe H om eless Trust,and Ronald Book,Chair of the Hom eless TnzstBoard of Directors,testified forboth parties.The County presented Sergeant Rodger lrvine,of the M iam i-D ade County Sexual Predator Enforcem ent Team , who testitied about sex offender registration procedures. D r. Richard M ccleary, a criminologist,testified aboutrecidivism ratesforsex offenders.Josh Brashearsofthe M iamiD ade Infonnation Technology D epartm enttestified aboutthe num berofhousing unitsavailable outsidethebufferzones.
Il. ISSU ES PRESENTED Thepartieshavestipulatedthattheissuesbeforethe Courtare:
1)W hetherthe County enacted the residency restriction with punitive intent? Ifthe
County did notenactthe restriction with punitive intent,whether Plaintiffs established by the

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 184 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/18/2018 Page 5 of 45
ûûclearest proof'' that the punitive effect of the residency restriction ovenides the County's legitim ateintentto enacta nonpunitive,civilm easure?
2)W hetherPlaintiffs'claimsarebarredbythestatuteoflimitations?
111. FIND IN G S O F FA C T The Court finds the follow ing detenninations to be im portant for analyzing the
applicability ofthe statute oflim itationsand them eritsofPlaintiffs'ex postfacto claim s:the circum stances of each Plaintiff',the recidivism rate for sex offenders;the effectiveness of the residency restriction-, the availability of housing outside of the buffer zones created by the
Ordinance;thenum berofhom elessregisteredsexoffenderssubjecttotheOrdinance;andcauses
of hom elessness in M iam i-D ade County. ln evaluating the evidence presented,the Court is cognizantthatifthe Ordinancew asnotenacted w ith punitive intent,Plaintiffsm ustestablish by the ûkclearestproof'thatthe residency restriction'spunitive effectovenides the County's civil intent.Thatis,theCourtdoesnotevaluate whethertheresidency restriction istheoptim alw ayto reduce recidivism by sex offenders against children.Instead, it detennines w hether Plaintiffs have established bythe ûtclearestproof'thattherestriction ispunitive.
A . ThePlaintiffs Plaintiffsarefourhomelessindividualswhowereccmvictedofqualifying sexualoffenses
thatoccurred before the Ordinance w as enacted in 2005.The pertinentcircum stances of each Plaintiffaresum m arized asfollow s.
D oe#4 On January 5,1994,D oe //4 w as convicted of lew d and lascivious assault on a m inor underthe age Of16.He w assentenced to probation ftlraperiod Ofthreeyears.A yearlater,Doe //4 w as found to have violated his probation by failing to subm itreports for five m onths,by
5

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 184 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/18/2018 Page 6 of 45
failing to m ake m onthly paym ents to the State, and by changing his residence w ithout first procuring the consentofhisprobation officer.A sa resultofthese probation violations,D oe //4 had hisprobation revoked and w assentenced to prison foraterm offour-and-a-halfyears.
ln July 2006,D oe //4 was arrested for failing to register the address where he w as residing.From 2006 to 2008,D oe //4 lived in a residence w ith hisw ife thatw asgrandfathered underthe O rdinance.H owever,when he and his w ife separated,he no longercould afford the leasepaym entsand becam ehom eless.In m id-2010,D oe//4 received housing assistancefrom the H om elessTrustand w asplaced in a residence in H om estead w ith tw o room m ates:hisbrother, w ho is also a registered sex offender,and a friend.D oe //4 resided in thathom e forfive years. H owever,afterhisbrotherw entback to prison and hisroom m atem oved out,Doe //4 could not afford the renton hisown.In July 2015,he m oved to the 71StStreetEncam pm entand rem ained thereuntilitw asclosed in M ay 2018.D oe//4 stilldoesnothaveaperm anentresidence.
D oe //4 suffersfrom schizophrenia and depression.The Social Security A dm inistration declared him disabled in 2009,and he receives Supplem ental Security lncome of $750 per m onth,plus$194permonthinfoodstamps.Heisretiredandhasnoothersourceofincom e.
D oe//5
Doe//5wasconvicted in 1994ofninecountsofrelated sexualoffenses:(a)lewdand lasciviousassaulton achild;and (b)attemptedsexualbattery on aminor.Thevictim was10
years old.H e w as incarcerated for probation violations from N ovem ber 1996 untilFebruary 2001andfrom N ovem ber2002untilSeptem ber2003.
A fter his release,D oe #5 w as not registering his address with the M inm i-Dade Police D epartm ent nor com m unicating w ith his probation officer as required by probation, so his location w as unknow n to authorities. D oe #5's last know'n address w as his sister's hom e;
6

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 184 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/18/2018 Page 7 of 45
however,1aw enforcement'svisitto hissister'shome revealed thathe wasnotresiding ather address.In 2006,he was arrested on a probation wazrant and charged with violating state registration requirem ents forformersexualoffenders.Afterpleading guilty to the registration violation,he w as sentenced to eightyears in prison,and w as incarcerated untilM arch 2014. Uponhisrelease,hisprobation officerdirectedhim to go to the71StstreetEncampment.Hehas been transienteversince.
D oe //5 hasParkinson'sdisease and suffersfrom significanttrem ors.He isunem ployed. From thetim e ofhisrelease from prison in 2014 untilM ay 2017,hisonly sotlrce ofincom e w as
foodstamps.Hiscun-entsolesourceofincom eis$750permonthindisabilitybenefits.Hefound Oneavailableresidenceoutsidethe bufferzonesthathe wasgoing to share with anotheroffender. How ever,the residence w as rented before they could acton it.H e has lim ited his search for availablehousing tothenorthern halfofM inm i-DadeCotm ty.
D oe//6 In Septem ber2004,D oe//6 pled guilty to onecharge oflew d and lasciviousm olestation ofa child less than 12 yearsofage.He lived in a grandfathered residence in Surfside until around January 2013,when theproperty m anagerfound outthatDoe //6 isasexualoffenderand did notrenew his lease.A fter m oving out,D oe //6 resided w ith different friends,but he w as advised thatthese addressesdid notcomply with the residency restriction when he registered them w ith theM iam i-D ade County SexualOffenderand PredatorU nit.H e eventually m oved to the71StstreetEncmnpm ent.
Doe//6isemployed in the culinary field and earnsabout$30,000 peryear.Hetestified thatin attemptto find housing,he walksthrough neighborhoodsthatare close to hiswork or easily accessible by public transportation.H e lim ited his search to residentialunitsthataze at

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 184 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/18/2018 Page 8 of 45
least 2,500 feet aw ay from schools,daycare centers,and parks.A lthough the Ordinance only applies to schools,D oe //6 w as,untiltrial,under a m istaken belief that the Ordinance also applied to daycares and parks.3 Doe //6 testified that he has not looked for housing in the southem pa.rtoftheCounty becauseitistoo farfrom hisw ork.
Doe//7 On June 2,2009,D oe //7 pled guilty to three pre-2005 sexualoffensesofsexualbattery and lewd and lascivious m olestation on a child betw een the age of 12-16,and lew d and lascivious m olestation on a child under the age of 12. ln his plea agreem ent, D oe //7
acknowledgedthathewould besubjecttotheresidencyrestriction intheOrdinance.Hewas
sentenced to eightyearsin prison and w asreleased in D ecem ber2014.Upon hisrelease,D oe //7 stayed athotelsorm otelsuntilrelocating to the71StStreetEncam pm ent. W hen the encnm pm ent closed,hem oved to anew encam pm ent.
Prior to D oe #7's incarceration,he lived with his parents in an apartm ent in M iam i Beach.By thetim e hew asreleased from prison in Decem ber2014,the apartm entw asno longer available to him becausehisparentshad passed away w hile hew asin prison and the apartm ent had been rented outto som eone else.Ifthatapartm enthad stillbeen available,he could have potentiallym ovedbackinafterhisrelease.
In addition,D oe #7's probation officer gave him an address to an apartm entthatwas com pliantw ith the Ordinance.D oe //7 testified thathe planned to rentthe apartm ent w ith a roomm ate;however,hedid notrentitbecauseitwastoo farfrom theSpecialVictimsBureau,
3W hiletheStateofFloridahasaresidencyrestriction(F1a.Stat.j775.2l5)thatprohibitsaperson convicted of
certain sexualoffensesfrom livingw ithin 1,000 feetofaschool,child carefacility,park,orplayground,itdoesnot apply to anyone whose qualifying sexualoffense occurred priorto the enactm entofthe statute in O ctober2004. Thus,the Florida stateresidency restriction doesnotapply to Plaintiffs,since their offensesoccurred priorto its
enactm ent.
8

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 184 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/18/2018 Page 9 of 45

where D oe //7 isrequired to reportin person once a m onth.4Doe //7 further testified aboutthe concem thatifthepotentialroom m atew ereto stop contributing totherent,Doe #7 w ould notbe able to afford the lease paym ents on his own.D oe //7 acknow ledged thathe has been denied housingbypotentiallandloxdsduetohiscrim inalhistory.
Doe #7 isin his70's,usesawheelchairform obility,and hasan anxiety disorder.His only sourceofincom eisfood stam ps.
B . R ecidivism The Ordinance's residency restriction aim s to prevent certain sex offenders from
reoffending byprohibiting them from living w ithin closeproxim ity to schools.Plaintiffscontend thatthe O rdinance is ineffective atachieving this goalbecause there is no evidence that the residency restriction reducesrecidivism .The CourtfindsthatPlaintiffshavenotestablished the rateofrecidivism forsex offenders,norhavethey proven thatthe Ordinance isineffective.
1. RateofRecidivism forSex Offenders
Therecidivism rateforregisteredsexoffendersissubjecttomuchinconclusivedebate.
For instance,one of Plaintiffs'experts,Dr.Levenson,testified that dozens of studies across N orth A m erica show that sexual red divism rates average 5 to 15 percent depending on the sam ple size and length offollow -up period.A notherofPlaintiffs'experts,D r.H anis,testified thatastudy foundthatafter15yearsoflivinginthecom munity,73percentofsexualoffenders had notbeen charged w ith or convicted of another sexualoffense- m eaning that at least 27 percenthad recidivated.The County'sexpert,Dr.M ccleary,testified thattheem piricalliterature does not suppod any credible, reliable estim ate of the recidivism rate for registered sex

4 H

ow

ever ,

LieutenantPoveda

testitied

thatwhiletransientoffendersarerequired

to

register once a

m

onth,ifthey

findaperm anentresidence,they only havetoregisteronce everytlzreem onthsoronceevery six m onths,depending

onthenatureoftheirconviction.HealsotestifiedthatM iami-DadeCountyofferstransportationservicestodisabled

individualsthatcan beused togettotheregistration office.

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 184 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/18/2018 Page 10 of 45
offenders.A ssupport,Dr.M ccleary notesthatstudieshave estim ated recidivism ratesf'r()m as low aszero to as high as 75 percent.The CourtfindsD r.M ccleary'stestim ony to bethe m ost
objective,persuasive,andinfonnativeonthispoint.
A sD r.M ccleary explained,one ofthe reasons forthe disparate recidivism estim ates is thatstudies use differentdefinitions ofrecidivism ,so they are notcom paring apples to apples. Forexam ple,som e studieslim itrecidivism to Cûsex offenserecidivism ,''m eaning they only count subsequentoffensesthatare sexualin nature,whereasothersuse ûlgeneralrecidivism y''m eaning they include any subsequent crim e. M ore im portantly, Drs. Levenson and H arris defined recidivism asanew arrest,conviction,orretum to prisonafterbeingarrested and sanctioned for aprioroffense.Thus,theirstudiesdo nottake into accountsubsequentoffensesthatarenot officially reported.Dr.M ccleal'y testified that m ost sexualvictim izations are notreported or recorded either because the victim schoose notto reportthe incident,orbecause police choose notto record the victim ization asacrim e incident.In eitherevent,the data on w hich the various studiesrely substantially underestim atethetrue sexualvictim ization rate.Clim inologistscallthe
differencebetweentheknownandtrueratesthet(darkfigtlre.''5Dr. M cclearynotedthatûllalllof
the evidence suggests thatthenon-reporting rateforsexualcrim esism uch largerthan thenonreporting ratesforothercrim e.''
Forexnmple,accordingtotheNationalCrim eVictim ization survey,70percentofsexual victim izationsofadultw om en areurtreported.Sim ilarly,D r.Levenson testified thataccording to Bureau ofJusticeStatisticsin 2016,only 42 percentofallviolentcrim esand 23 percentofrapes orsexualassaultsw ere reported to police.D r.H anisalso acknow ledged thatsm dieshave found that79 percentofsex offensesgo unreported to 1aw enforcem ent.In fact,one study found that
5See, e.g.,AlbertD.Biderman& AlbertJ.Reiss,Jr.,OnExploringthe''DarkFigure''ofcrime,THEANNAL,SOF
THEAMERICAN Acr .OFPOL.& SOC.Scl.,1967,at1-15.

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 184 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/18/2018 Page 11 of 45

tûgajtotalof88.3% ofoffenderswouldhavebeenconsideredsexoffenserecidivistsiftheyhad

been caught,''and thattûltlhechild sexualabusersand exhibitionistsshowed highestratesof
recidivism ,and alm ostallreoffended ifundetected crim esw ereincluded.,,6

The Courttinds thatthe rate ofunreported sex crim esinvolving victim s under 16 years

old m ay be even higherthan fOroldervictim s.M oreover,studies show thatchildren under 16

yearsold arem ostlikely tobethevictim sofsexualoffenses.Forexam ple,a2000 study from the

U.S.DepartmentofJustice'sBureau ofJusticeStatisticsfoundthatCEltjhesingleagewith the
greatestproportion of sexual assaultvictim s reported to 1aw enforcem ent was age l4.,,7 The

sam e study found thatthe risk ot-being the victim offorcible zape increased drnm atically from

age 10 to age 14,where itpeaked.By age20,the risk had dropped to lessthan halfthepeak 14-

year-old rate.A nd,according to a reportissued by theD epm m entofJustice'sN ationallnstitute

of Justice, 86 percent of sexual assaults w ith victim s aged 12-17 w ent urtreported to any

authorities ,

including

police,child

protective

services,orschoolofficials.8Thisisconsistentw

ith

Dr.Levenson'stestim ony thatchild sex abuse reporting to police isoften delayed.Based on the

high num berof sex crim es againstchildren thatgo urlreported,the Courtfindsthatthe actual

reoffenserateishigherthan suggested by therecidivism studiesproffered by Plaintiffs.

Drs.H anis and Levenson both criticized the O rdinance for tzeating a11 offenders as a

singlecategory,ratherthan individually,becausenota1loffendersareequallylikely to reoffend.

Dr.Hanistestified to the ratherunremarkable propositionsthatone-time sexualoffenders are

significantly less likely to reoffend sexually than those w ith m ore than one previous sexual

conviction and offenders over the age of 50 are less likely to reoffend than younger offenders.
6SeeRon Langevin etal., ffetimeSexualOffenderRecidivism:W 25-YearFollow-upStudy,46CANADIANJ.OF CRIMINOLOGY& CRIM.JUST.531,547-.48(2004). 7SeeH owardN . Snyder,SexualAssaultofYoungChildrenasReportedtoLJwEnforcement.Victim,Incident,and OffenderCharacteristics,BUREAUoyJus-f.STATlsTlcs,July2000,at2,8.
8D EAX G .KILPATRICK ETAL.,tJ.S.DEP'ToFJus'r.NAT'LlxsT.oyJUsT.,YOUTH V ICTIMIZATION:PREVM ENCEAND
IMPLICATIONS6(2003).

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 184 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/18/2018 Page 12 of 45

He also testified thatthe longeroffendersareoffense-free in the com m unity,thelesslikely they are to reoffend.How ever,the study on w hich D r.Han'isreliesstates:ts-l-he extentto w hich the recidivism rates of child m olesters decreases w ith age is unknow n ''9 The County presented
.
studies thatshow m any reoffensesdo notoccurw ithin the firstseveralyearsafterrelease,and thatsom e child m olesters m ay reoffend as late as 20 yeazs follow ing release.10D r. Levenson testitied thatonly a sm allsubgroup ofoffendersare ûtserialpredatorsand pedophilic offenders'' who pose a high risk ofreoffending.H ow ever,she also acknow ledged thatforthose offenders who do have pedophilia disorder,the D SM -V- the principalauthority w ithin thepsychological com m unity fordiagnosing psychologicaldisorders- statesthatçipedophilia perse appearsto be a lifelong condition.''
Both Drs.Levenson and H arris assertthatthe better practice for identifying potential recidivists is to conduct individualized assessm ents, such as using the Static-ggR test,11 to distinguish between higherand lower-risk sex offenders.However,Plaintiffshave notproven thatthese m ethodsarereliableindicatorsofrecidivism .D r.M ccleary testifiedthateven the best instrum ents for assessing risks, such as the Static-ggR , only have a lim oderate'' degree of
accuracy,whichisinadequateforjudicialandpublic safetydecisions.EvenDr.Harrisadm itted
thatone study show ed thatpractitionersusing such instrum entsassigned individuals the correct risk scoreonly 48.3 percentofthetim e.

9SeeR. KarlHanson,Recidivism andAge:Follow-up DataFrom SexualOxenders,17J.OFINTERPERSONAL

VIOLENCE 1046,1047(2002). 10seeROBERTPRENTKYETAt,.,DEP'ToyJUsTa,CHILDSEXUALM OLESTATION:RESEARCHISSUES,13-14(1997).

Onestudy in thisreportexam inedrecidivism ofasam pleofrapistsand sexualoffendersovera25-yearperiod and

found that10yearsafterdischarge,therecidivism ratefornew sexualchargeswas30percent,and 25yearsafter

discharge,ithad increasedto 52percent.

11 D

r .

H

arris

explainedthatthe

Static-99

is a

lo-item

actuarialscaledeveloped in

1999 that assesses the recidivism

risk ofadultm ale sexualoffenders.The 10 item s cover factors such as thenature ofthe offense,the offender's

dem ographics,and crim inalhistory.TheStatic-99 resultsin ascorethatcan range9om 0 to l2.Depending ontheir

score,offenders are classified as having low,m oderate-low,m oderate-high,or high risk of reoffending.M ore

recently,researchershavebegtm usingthe Static-ggR,which isidenticaltothe Static-99 exceptittakesinto account

theageoftheoffenderatthetim ehew asreleasedfrom custody.

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 184 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/18/2018 Page 13 of 45
ltism eaningfulthatwhile the experts disagreed asto the extentoftherisk,they a11 acknowledged thatsexualrecidivism is an existentialdanger.A ccordingly,the Courtfindsthat Plaintiffshavenotestablishedareliablerateofrecidivism nm ong sex offenders,buttheCounty has a sufficientbasis to determine thatthe risk to children 15 years old and younger is substantial.
2. EffectivenessofResidencvRestrictionsinReducincRecidivism Plaintiffs also have not proven that the residency restriction is ineffective. In fact, Plaintiffs'expertDr.Socia testified thatstudies show thatafterthe imposition ofresidency restrictions,reoffenseratesw entdow n,although notin a statistically significantw ay.M oreover, Dr. M ccleary explained that to evaluate a residency restriction at the level of statistical significance,the sam ple size m ustbe suffciently large.He said thatvirtually a1lofthe snm ples
in thepolicy literature onresidency restrictions(includingthosereliedon by Dr.Levenson)are
too smallto detect their tnze effects.Dr.M ccleal'y also testified that finding a residency restriction hasno statistically significanteffectdoesnotim ply thatthe 1aw isineffective.
Dr.Levenson cited studies to supporther opinion that residency restrictions are not effective',however,these studiesevaluated differentlaws from differentstates,with different outcom es.For exam ple Dr. Levenson cited one study that com pared recidivism rates for registered sex offendersbefore and afterthe enactm entofresidency restrictions in M issouriand
M ichigan.Recidivism ratesroseinM ichiganbutfellinMissouri,whichsheinterpretedtomean
thatresidency restrictionsgenerally do notwork.The Courtispersuaded by Dr.M ccleary's interpretation thatthiscould,and likely does,m ean thattheparticular1aw in M issouriçEw orked,'' butthe1aw in M ichigan did not,asresidency restriction law svazy widely fzom state to state and

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 184 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/18/2018 Page 14 of 45
there m ay be other factors causing the differentresults,including differences in the data upon w hich theanalysesw erebased.
Dr.M ccleary testifed thatsince the County's Ordinance is substantively differentthan virtually allofthe law sexam ined in thestudiescited by D r.Levenson,itisnearly im possibleto generalizethe resultsofthose studiesto M iam i-D ade Cotm ty.Dr.M ccleary also explained that therearenum erouslim itationsin Plaintiffs'proffered research on the effectivenessofresidency restrictions,including:the sm allnum ber of studies, sm all sam ple sizes,differing law s,short
follow-up periods,theuseofdifferentrecidivism measures(making cross-study comparisons challengingatbest),litlleinfonnationaboutthespeciticelementsoftheprogrnm sthatarefotmd
to be successful,the inability to detennine w hetherthe preventative strategy being sttldied is what leads to the result, generizability problem s w ith certain geographic-specific studies, inadequate scientific rigor of som e studies that lack com parison groups,and,of signiticant im portance,theunderreporting ofsex crim esam ong m inorvictim s.Dr.Levenson acknow ledged thatoneofthereportson w hich sherelied also recognized these lim itationsin itsown evaluation oftheeffectivenessofresidency restrictions.
In addition,Dr.M ccleary testitied thatbecause the evidence on the effectiveness of a 2,500-foot residency restriction is inconclusive,the choice of a specific m eans to protectthe m ostvulnerable potential victim s,m inor children,m ust rely on practical considerations and com m on sense.Plaintiffs do notdispute D r.M ccleary's testim ony thatdefinitive proofofthe residency restriction's effectivenessislikely notpossible.The Cotu'tagrees,and findsthatthere are severalpracticaland legitim ate reasonsforthe County'sresidency restriction.Forinstance,
the County presented a study thatfound evidence ofa Ctrelationship between where (sexj

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 184 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/18/2018 Page 15 of 45
offenders live and where children congregate.5512 One of Plaintiffs' arguments against the
residency restriction is thatthe majority of child victimizations occur in victims'homes, Pemetrated by limilymembersorfriends.However,asDr.M ccleary testified,asigniticant
proportion of sex offenses against children still occur in public places and are perpetrated by strangers.He testified thata 2008 nationalstudy ofchild victims showed that25 percentof pem etrators were strangers, and 23 percent of victim izations occurred in a public place. M oreover,itseem sinttlitive thatafter a sexualpredatorisconvicted,he w illno longerhave the
same access to children of fnmily members and friends.Thus,a reoffender would,out of
necessity,seek victim swho azetm aw areofthepotentialdanger. Itisalso notew orthy thatsom e sex offendersagree thatresidency restrictionsare helpful
in preventing them from reoffending.The County presented a study in which 28.1 percentof
offendersadm itted thatthey w erebetterableto avoid therisk ofreoffendingbecausethey cnnnot live near a schoolordaycare center,31.6 percentadm itted thatresidency restrictions were effective in lim iting their access to children,22.1 percent thought that residency restrictions
helped preventthem from reoffending,and 35.9 percentthoughtthatresidencyrestrictionshelp protectchildren from sexualoffenders.13A lthough Dr. Socia questioned w hetherthe results of thatstudy could be generalized,itis com pelling thatD oe //6 testified thathe intentionally stays awayfrom schoolsinorderto avoid gettingthose(Gurges''again.W hileDr.Sociasuggestedthat
the respondentsin the study had an incentiveto overstatetheam eliorative effectsofresidency
12See Jeffrey W alker, eta1.,TheGeographicLinkBetween Sex Offendersand PotentialVictims:W Routine ActivitiesApproach,3JUST.& RES.POL'Y 15(2001).W alkersurveysrelevantliteratureonthebehavioralpatterns
ofsexualoffenders and explainsthatone way sex offendersmightgain accessto a child isûtby searching for neighborhoodswith childrena''1d.atl7.Henotesthatsomeresearchersinsistithatmanypedophilicactivitiesare prem editated''and thattherearettarticlesand otherm aterialsuggesting thatoffenderstargetplacessuch asarcades, schools,andplaygrounds.''1d.W alkeralso discussedthettroutineactivitiestheolw ''atheory ofcriminology that
positsçtcriminalsoftenpositionthemselvestonaturallycomeintocontactwithpotentialvictimsl.j''1d.at19.This
theory supportsthatsex offendersoften targetschools.
13SeeAm yPageeta1.pNorthCarolinaSexualOffenderLegislation:JWJ/L':)/Placeboq,5lJOURN.OFOFFENDER REHABILITATION 1l5,124(2012).
1 5

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 184 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/18/2018 Page 16 of 45
restrictions,in the Court'sview ,itseem sm ore reasonablethatoffenders,w ho m ay be adversely im pacted,have an incentive to dow nplay the effectiveness ofresidentialrestrictions.C ertainly, D oe //6 had no incentive to be dishonestaboutthe effectiveness ofthe O rdinance.ln fact,he w ould have had an incentive to say the O rdinance is not effective, as he is challenging its constitutionality.
C . C om pliantH ousing Availableto O ffenders N tzm berofA vailableCom pliantH ousing Unitsin M inm i-DadeCountv
Plaintiffs'expertD r.Sociaopined thatafteraccounting foraffordability and availability, thereareonly 338housing rentalunitsoutsidethebufferzones.The Courtfindsthatthisnum ber
istmreliableandunderstated.Dr.Sociadidnotjustcalculatethenumberofavailablehousing
tm itsunderthe Ordinance by excluding thosew ithin 2,500 feetofa school.H e also added three
additionalcriteria,only including housing thatis:1)rentalin nature,2)affordable,and 3) currentlyavailableforrent.Hedefinedaffordabilityasrentalunitsatorbelow $1,058permonth based onthefederalHousingandUrban Development's(ûûHUD'')affordability guidelinesfor
1ow incom e households.D r.Socia detennined availability forrentby using the 2015 A m erican Com m unity Survey Census data five-year estim ates.B y elim inating housing thatis notrental, notaffordable underthe HU D guidelines,and unavailable,D r.Socia elim inated 98.869 percent ofresidentialunitsin M iam i-D ade County forreasonsotherthan the residency restriction 14vjw
.
CourtfindsthatDr.Socia'sdetermination ofthe numberofhousing units available isunderinclusiveforthe followingreasons.
First,D r.Socia did notincludeanytm itsthatwerenot,in hisview ,affordablebecauseûtit seem stm likely thatthe taverage'released felon w ould have the financialresourcescom parable
14Dr. Socia estim ated thatthere are860,696 residentialunitsin M iam i-D adeCounty,and elim inated 850,960 units based on affordability,availability,and whether they were rentalproperties priorto considering the residency restriction.

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 184 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/18/2018 Page 17 of 45
to an area'sm edian income.''Therewasno evidenceto supporthisassumption thata1lorany reliable nllmber of offenders are 1ow incom e. ln fact, evidence in the record refutes this assum ption. Lieutenant Poveda testified that he observed som e sex offenders who w ere registeredaskûtransient''drivinghigh-endvehicles,including onedriving aPorscheand another
driving aM ercedes,and otherswearing expensivejewelry.Thissupportsthattheremay be
offenderswhocanaffordhousingthatcostsmorethan$1,058perm onth.Forexample,even Doe #6,employed in the culinazy field,enrnsabout$30,000 peryear,and did notsuggestthathe could notfind housingbecause oflow incom e.
Second,D r.Socia did notconsidernon-rentalhousing because a study found thataside from staying w ith fnm ily and friends,the m ostlikely option forfinding housing after release from prison is the private rental m arket. Y et, for the sam e reasons set forth above, som e offendersm ayhavethem eanstobuy,ratherthanrent,ahome.
Third,by only considering parcelsavailableforrentaspotentialhousing units,D r.Socia did nottake into accountthatsom e registered sex offendersm ay be able to livew ith friendsor fam ily who already own orrenthomesoutsidethe bufferzones.15And,some ojyenders may residein hom esthatare exem ptfrom the Ordinanceunderthe grandfatherclause.
Fourth,D r.Socia did notconsidera11typesofhousing.Forinstance,his originalreport excluded governm ent-owned properties and certain types ofsingle fnm ily hom es.W hile Dr. Socia's supplem ental rebuttal report added these properties, he still excluded other whole categories ofpotentialhousing units,such as improved agriculturalsingle-family residences, nursinghom es,andm otels.Thesecategorieswereexcludedeven though,forexnmple,thereare num erousresidentialIm itsinnlral,agriculturalareasofM iami-DadeCounty,andthoseunitsare
15The courtisaware thatthis is, in fact,the case in som e instances,based on sex offenderswho have appeared beforethe Court.

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 184 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/18/2018 Page 18 of 45
far less likely than tm its in urban areas to be w ithin the buffer zones.A lso, according Dr. M kf leary'sreport,re-entering offendersoften livein residentialm otels.
Finally,D r.Socia'sanalysisalso doesnottakeinto considerationthatthe Ordinance does notprohibitrelocating to anothercotmty where housing m ay be m ore affordable.Forexam ple, M r.Berm an,housing navigator for Citrus H ealth N etw ork,found residences for som e sex offenders outside ofM inm i-Dade County,including in Pahokee,Florida and in St.Petersbtlrg, Florida l6
.
On the other hand, the County's w itness, M r. Brashears, testified that there are approximately 124,694 residentialtmitsinM iam i-DadeCountythatlieoutsidethebufferzones. M r.Brashears tirst determ ined the num ber of units thatare at least 2,500 feet aw ay from a school,and then narrow ed the listto only residentialproperties;however,he did notelim inate housing based on affordability or availability.The Courtfinds M r.Brashears' number is substantially over-inclusive and unrealistic because it does not take into accountw hether the properties are available orexclude unitsthatare already registered as the owner's hom estead, suggesting the unitsarenotrentable.
Because Plaintiffshave notcanied theirburden ofproofon thisissue,theCourtisleftto speculate as to the actualntunberof com plianttmits available to registered sex offenders.The Courtfindsthatthe num berofcom pliantunits,which fallssom ewherebetw een Dr.Socia'sand M r.Brashears'unreliable estim ates,is adequate to m eetthe housing needsof sexualoffenders w how ould otherwisequalify forcom plianthousing 17
.
16Asdiscussedbelow, Dr.Socia'sestimatealsoseemsnotcrediblebecausethemajorityofregisteredsexoffenders havefoundcomplianthousing.Seeinh.aatPartI1I(C)(3).
12Asdiscussed furtherbelow ,there arenum erousfactors thatcause hom elessness,irrespective ofthe Ordinance,
thatpreventregisteredsexoffenders9om qualifyingforhousing.Seeinh'aPartIII(D). 1 8

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 184 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/18/2018 Page 19 of 45

Num berofTransientRecisteredSexOffendersSubiecttotheOrdinance Toputtheavailability ofhousingunitsinm eaningfulpezspective,theCourtattemptedto

ascertain how many transientsex offenders subjectto the Ordinance are competing forthe
available complianthousing.However,the Plaintiffshavenotestablished a reliablenumberof

transientregistered sex offenderswho areactually coveredbytheOrdinance.Plaintiffscontend

thatasofOctober11,2018,therewereatleast311sexoffenderssubjecttotheOrdinancewho

wereregistered

as transient.lB o

bviously ,

the

num

ber of transient registered

sex

offenders w

ould

beeven smallerwhen considering only thosewho are subjecttotheOrdinanceretroactively.

Plaintiffs agree thatas ofO ctober 11,2018,there w ere only about246 transientregistered sex

offenderssubjecttothe Ordinancewhose crimesoccurred beforeNovember15,2005.19vss

num ber,ofcourse,willdeclineasthe num berofpre-2005 offendersdeclines.

EvenifthentlmberoftransientsexualoffenderswhoaresubjecttotheOrdinancecould
be determ ined,thatnum ber would be greaterthan the realnum ber ofregistered sex offenders

w ho are actually hom eless.LieutenantPoveda estim ated thatonly 20 to 25 percentofregistered sex offenderswholisttransientaddressesareactuallyhom eless.Heexplainedthathisestim ateis based on:arreststhathistm itm ade of sex offendersthatwere registered astransient,butw ere

found to be residing atnon-registered perm anent addresses;seeing transient registrants who

appearednottobehomeless(e.g.,theydrovehigh-endvehicles,woreexpensivejewelry,were welldressed and wellgroomed);and visiting locationswheretransientoffendersclaim to be
residing,but finding that they do not actually reside at the location provided.He f'urther

18Plaintiffsreportedthattherew ereatleast3l1,andno m orethan 398,transientregistered sex offendersin M iam i-
DadeCounty who weresubjectto the OrdinanceasofOctober11,20l8.Plaintiffsverified thatfor311ofthe offenders,thevictim wasunderage16,sotheyweresubjecttotheOrdinance.However,for87otheroffenders, Plaintiffscouldnotdeterminetheexactageofthevictim,soitisunclearwhethertheyaresubjecttotheOrdinance.
19Plaintiffscontend thatthere were atleast246, and no m orethan 262,transientregistered sex offenderswhose
crimesoccurredbeforeNovember15,2005whoaresubjecttotheOrdinance.Plaintiffscouldonlyverifythat246of
thesex offenderscom m ittedcrim esagainstvictim stmderage l6.Plaintiffscouldnotverify theageofthevictim for an additional16 sex offenders.
19

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 184 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/18/2018 Page 20 of 45
explained thatwhen an offenderregistersan address,officersare m andated to notify the schools in the area in w hich a sexualpredatorhasm oved.Thus,LieutenantPovedaopined,based on his expedence,that som e sex offenders do not register their actual address in order to avoid m andated com m unity notification.Others,who are involved in ongoing crim inalactivity,do not registertheirtnleaddressto avoidlaw enforcem ent.
Doe #5's testim ony exem plitiesthatsom e offendersregisterinaccurate addresses.Prior to his re-arrestin 2006,Doe #5's lastknow n address w as his sister's hom e;how ever,he w as actually residing w ith hisnieceata residence in N orth M iam iatthattim e.D oe//5 adm itted that he failed to com ply w ith both the tenns of his probation and sex offender registration requirem ents by not disclosing his actual address to the authorities.Sim ilarly,D oe //4 w as arrested in 2006 for failing to provide his residence address to authorities. Plaintiffs also acknow ledge that m any m ore people were registered as residing at the N W 71st street Encam pm entthan everseem ed to bephysicallypresentattheencnm pm ent.A 1lofthishighlights the difticulty ofdetermining thetnzenum beroftransientregistered sex offenders.N evertheless, based on theevidence,and draw ing reasonable inferencesfrom it,the Courttindsthatthe actual
numberoftransientregistered sex offenders subjectto the Ordinance ismuch lowerthan
Plaintiffsassert.A ccordingly,the CourtfindsthatPlaintiffshavenotestablished thatthentlm ber
oftransientregisteredsexoffenderswhoaresubjecttotheOrdinanceisgreaterthanthenumber
ofcom plianthousing tm itsavailable.
TheMajorityofRecisteredSexOffendersHaveFoundHousinc
A lthough Plaintiffshave notestablished thenum berofcom plianthousing unitsavailable, orthe num ber of transient sex offenders covered by the Ordinance,the Courtfinds that the
majorityofregisteredsexoffendershavefoundcomplianthousing.Dr.Levensontestifiedthatas
20

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 184 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/18/2018 Page 21 of 45
of August 3,2017,according to public data provided by the Florida Departmentof Law
Enforcement(çTDLE''),26percentofa11registeredsex offendersinM iami-DadeCountywere
considered transient,meaning 74 percent were able to find hom es.This is consistentwith Plaintiffs'reportthatasofOctober 11,2018,approximately 25 percentofa1lregistered sex offenders in M iam i-Dade County were transient,m eaning approximately 75 percent found residences.20 w hile these statistics establish a reasonably accurate estim ate of the num ber of transientregistered sex offenders in M iam i-Dade County in total,they do notestablish the
numberoftransientregisteredsex offenderswhoaresubjecttotheOrdinance.21xevertheless,
theCourtfindsthatitisreasonable to extrapolate and inferfrom thesestatisticsthat,though to a
degreelessthanal1registeredsexoffenders,themajorityofregisteredsexoffendersinM iamiDadeCotmtywho are subjecttotheOrdinancehavefound compliantresidences.ln fact,the
Courtfindsthatitislikely thatan even greaterpercentageofoffendershave found compliant residences,in lightofLieutenantPoveda'stestim ony thatfarm oreoffendersregisterastransient than actually are hom eless.Thisdata strongly suggeststhat,absentothercausesofhom elessness invspective ofthe Ordinance's residency restriction,there are sufficient housing options to reasonablyaccomm odateallregisteredsexoffenders.
20plaintiffsreported thataccording to FD LE data,asofOctober l1,2018,there were443 transientregistered sex offendersinM iam i-D adeCounty,outof1,788registered sexoffendersin M iam i-DadeCotmtyintotal. 21Plaintiffs did notdetermine the numberoftransientregistered sex offenders,or the num ber ofregistered sex
offendersin total(includingtransientandnon-tzansient),whoaresubjecttotheOrdinancebecausetheFDLE data
doesnotindicate whetherthevictim wasunderage 16.Asnoted above,thenumberoftransientregistered sex
offenderswhoaresubjecttotheOrdinanceisatleast3l1,becausefor311oftheoffenders,itwasclearthattheir
victim w asundertheageofl6 basedon thespecitk crim echarged.For87 otheroffenders,thevictim w asa minor, butitisunclearwhetherthevictim wasunderage 16.BecausePlaintiffshavenotidentifiedtheexactnumberof
transientregisteredsex offenderswhoaresubjecttotheOrdinance,orthetotalnumberofregisteredsexoffenders (bothtransientandnon-transient)whoaresubjecttotheOrdinance,theCourtcannotdeterminethepercentageof offenderswhoaresubjecttotheOrdinancewhohavefoundcompliantresidences.
2 1

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 184 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/18/2018 Page 22 of 45

D . O therCausesofH om elessness

Even assum ing thatapproxim ately 25 percentofregistered sex offendersin M iam i-D ade

County are hom eless, the Court finds that there are num erous factors contributing to their

hom elessness irrespective of the Ordinance.M r.Sarria, A ssistant Director of the H om eless

Trust,and M r.Bennan both testitied thatregistered sex offendersoften have difficulty finding

housing becauseofanum beroffactorsunrelated to the Ordinance which resultin hom elessness

in general.Forinstance,landlords and housing associationsoften do backgrotmd checks and do

notaccepttenantswith criminalhistodes(especially sexoffensesagainstminors),poorcredit
scores,financialdifficulties,unstableemploym ent,mentalillness,orsubstanceabuseproblem s.

Landlords and housing associations often selecttenants with incom e atleastthree tim es the

am ountofrent.M r.Berm an also testified thatsom epotentiallandlordsdo notw anttenantswho

arereceivingrentalassistancefrom thegovernm ent.

M r.Sania also testified thatthe prim ary reasonsforhom elessness generally in M inm i-

DadeCotmty are1ow incom eand alack ofaffordablehousing in theCounty.AccordingtoM r. Sarria,w ho participated in outreach efforts to help hom eless sex offenders atthe 71StStreet

Encam pm ent find housing,the offenders'lack of m otivation to find housing is,as w ith the

hom eless in general,also abanier.Thisisparticularly true forthosew ho had previousnegative

experiences w ith law enforcem ent or service providers and are reluctant to accept their

assistance22 .

M

r. Sania

also

testitied

that

som e

offenders

sim ply

did

not w ant to

m ove

to

availablecomplianthousingincertainpartsoftheCountythatarefarfrom theirjobsorfamilies,
such assouthern and western M inm i-D ade County,furtherelim inating viablehousing options.ln

22M f.Sania,M r. Berm an,and M r.lm brone testified to the lack ofcooperation thatthey observed on the partof sexualoffenders whom the County attempted to assistin locating com plianthousing.Forexample,M r.Berm an testified thatver.y few ofthe sexualoffendersthathew orked with followed up with him ,and astim ew entby the follow-up rates declined further.Ultim ately,he only rem ained in contactw ith 2 or 3 ofthe approximately 70 individualstowhom hehad initiallyreached outin attem ptto helpthem findhousing.
22

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 184 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/18/2018 Page 23 of 45
fact,Does#5,6,and7adm ittedattrialthattheyhavenotlookedforanyavailablehousinginthe southern halfoftheCounty.
Inaddition,asdiscussedabove,sometransientsexoffenderswhoarenotsubjecttothe
Ordinance still have difficulty tinding housing.For exam ple, M r.B erm an testified that he
located a residence for One registered sex offenderwho was notsubjectto the residency restriction,butthatitwasjustaschallengingasfindinghousingforthosewhoaresubjecttothe
O rdinance.Ittook six attem ptsbefore M r.Bennan finally found an apartm entforthatoffender. This suggeststhatfactorsunrelated to the Ordinance m ake itdifficultto tind housing fora1l
registeredsexoffenders,notjustthosesubjecttotheOrdinance.23
ltisnotew orthy thatthere arevariousreasonsw hy each Plaintiffin thiscaseishom eless, irrespective ofthe Ordinance.For instance,three ofthe fourPlaintiffs are unem ployed and receive only disability benetk sand/orfood stam ps asincom e.D oe //4 could notafford the rent forhisresidencethatwasgrandfathered in afterheseparated from hiswife.He laterresidedin another com pliantresidence for five years,but could not afford the rent afterhis room m ates m ovedout.Doe//5locatedaresidencethatwasoutsidethebufferzones,butitwasrentedbefore he acted on it.Doe //6 wasrequired to move outofhishom e because hisproperty m anager leanzed ofhiscrim inalhistory.H ealso urm ecessarily excluded potentialhousing optionsdueto a m isunderstanding Ofthe scopeofthe residency restricticm.D oe #7,w ho isdisabled,did notrent acom pliantapartmentbecauseitwastoo farfrom theregistration office,despitetestim onythat the County provides transportation to disabled individuals.24 The Courtfinds thatthe housing
23 In fact1 som e non-sex offenders resided at the NW 7lSt street Encam pm ent, for reasons unrelated to the Ordinance. 24Interestingly, itappearsthattheoriginalDoes#2 and 3,who droppedoutofthiscase,sim ilarly becam ehom eless forareasonunconnectedtotheOrdinance:they wereevictedfrom theirresidencesforfailingtopayrent.

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 184 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/18/2018 Page 24 of 45
barriers discussed above,not the Ordinance,constitute the greatest negative im pact On sex offenders'ability to tind housing,com pliantornon-com pliant.
lV . C O NC LU SIO N S O F LA W The Court first addresses the County's threshold statute of lim itations affirmative
defense,follow ed by an analysisofthem eritsofPlaintiffs'ex postfacto claim s. A . StatuteofLim itations
Plaintiffsbroughtthisaction tmder42U.S.C.j 1983.tlsection 1983claim saresubjectto aforum state'sstatuteoflimitationsforpersonalinjtuy claims.''HillcrestProp.,LLC v.Pasco C@.,754 F.3d 1279,1281(11thCir.2014).InFlorida,thestatuteoflimitationsforapersonal injuryclaim isfouryears.Seeid.ûlGenerally,lthestatuteoflimitationsdoesnotbegin torun
untilthe facts which w ould supporta cause of action are apparentor should be apparentto a person with a reasonably prudentregard for his rights.'''fovettv.Ray,327 F.3d 1181, 1182
(11th Cir.2003)(citation omitted);Brownv.Ga.Bd ofpardons& Paroles,335F.3d 1259, 1261(11thCir.2003)(citationomitted).
The County argues that Plaintiffs' claim s are barred by the statute of lim itations. According to the County,Does#4,5,and 6's claims accrued in Novem ber2005 when the Ordinancewasenacted,becausetheyhadalreadybeen convictedofaqualifyingoffense.Thus,it
became apparentorshould have become apparentthatthey would be subjectto theresidency
restriction atthattim e.TheCounty contendsthatD oe #7'sclaim accrued in 2009 w hen hepled guilty to his qualifying offense and acknow ledged in his plea agreem ent that the residency restriction applied to him .Therefore,the County argues,each oftheirclaim slapsed before the initialCom plaintw asfiledon O ctober23,2014.

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 184 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/18/2018 Page 25 of 45
Plaintiffsarguethatnoneoftheirclaim saretim ebarred becausetheyassertacontinuing
violation oftheirconstitm ionalrights.Plaintiffscontendthatthey experienceanew thepunitive
effectsoftheOrdinance every day itisin effect,every day they aredenied therightto live in the
2,500footbufferzones,andevel'y30dayswhentheymustregisterto confinnthattheirreported
residencecom pliesw ith the Ordinance.
The Courtnotes thatthere isno controlling precedentfrom the Eleventh Circuiton the
continuing violation doctrine in this factual context. W hile the Eleventh Circuit addressed
w hetherthe continuing violation doctrine applied to ex postfacto claim s in Brown and fovett,
finding it did not apply, those cases and their progeny involved ex post facto challenges to
adverse changes in parole procedures, not to post-release restrictions, such as ongoing restrictions on sex offenders.25see Lovett,327 F.3d at 11824Brow n,335 F.3d at 1261-62.A s
then-district court Judge Carnes aptly pointed out in 1992, whether the continuing violation
doctrineappliestoviolationsofconstitutionalrightsttappearstobeaclosequestionl.j''SeeW:#./' v.Slaton,806F.Supp.993,996(N.D.Ga.1992).Tothisday,whetherthecontinuing violation
doctrineappliesto alleged ex postfacto violationsappearsto be a closeand perplexing question, w ith rationaldecisionsgoing both w ays.26
In its attem ptto resolve w hether Plaintiffs'ex post facto challenge to the Ordinance
involves an alleged continuing constitutionalviolation,and w ithout clear precedent from the
25Atleast one districtcourthas distinguished ex post facto challenges to parole procedures from challenges to restrictionsim posed post-release.SeeD oev.H aslam,N os.3:16-cv-02862,3:17-cv-00264,2017 W L 5187117,at
*13(M .D.Tenn.Nov.9,2017)C1(l!tisdebatablewhetherPlaintiffs'allegationsshouldbeconsideredtmderthe
sam e rubric applied to claim s challenging changes to parole procedttres.Those prisoners are stillincarcerated ptzrsuant to their original, law fully imposed sentences and m erely challenge the procedures associated with determ iningtheirrelease.ThePlaintiffs'challengesinvolvetheim position ofwholly new blzrdens,unrelated totheir
initial,lawfulsentences''). 26 Compare Haslam, 2017W L 5187117,at*13 (fmding continuingviolation doctrineappliedtoexpostfacto challengeto sexoffenderregistration actçtlblecausethe infliction ofan alleged ex postfacto punishmenton Plaintiffsisongoingn),andDoev.Gwy'n,No.3:17-cv-504,20l8WL 1957788,at*5-6(E.D.Tenn.Apr.25,20l8) (same),withMoorev.Olens,No.l:13-cv-0374-AT,2013WL 12097640,at*6(N.D.Ga.Nov.18,2013)(fmding
continuing violation doctrine did notapply to ex postfacto claim because itarose outofa one-tim e :çdecision to
imposethepunishment''retroactively,iûratherthanthepunishmentitself').

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 184 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/18/2018 Page 26 of 45
Suprem e Courtor the Eleventh Circuit,the Courtfinds helpful,and adopts,the continuing
violationstandardsetforthbytheSixth CircuitinEidsonv.TennesseeDepartmentofchildren's Services,510F.3d 631,635 (6th Cir.2007).TheSixth Circuitdetermined thatacontinuing
violation m ustm eetthree criteria:CtFirst,the defendant'sw rongfulconductm ustcontinue after
theprecipitating eventthatbeganthepattern....Second,injury to theplaintiffmustcontinueto accnze afterthatevent.Finally,furtherinjttrytotheplaintiftl1m usthavebeen avoidableifthe defendantshad atany timeceasedtheirwrongfulconduct.''f#.(citation omitted).Thisthree-
prong standard hasbeen persuasively applied by otherdistrictcourtsto ex postfacto challenges to sex offenderregistration laws.See D oe v.G wy'n,N o.3:17-cv-504,2018 W L 1957788,at*5
(E.D.Tenn.Apr.25,2018).
Here,each ofthe Eidson criteria issatisfied.The County's alleged w rongfulconductenforcing the residency restriction- iscontinuous:the Plaintiffsare excluded from living w ithin the 2,500 footbufferzones and,because they are transient,required to registertheiraddresses
every30days.Iftheyresidein abufferzoneorfailtoregister,theyaresubjecttoprosecution. Thus,thePlaintiffs'allegedinjuriescontinueto accrueafterenactmentoftheOrdinance,and
after Plaintiffs w ere firstaware,or should have been aware,that they m ust com ply w ith the Ordinance.A nd,ifthe County w ere to repealthe Ordinance,Plaintiffs w ould no longersuffer
thoseinjuries.SeeDoev.Haslam,Nos.3:16-cv-02862,3:17-cv-00264,2017W L 5187117,at *13 (M .D.Term.Nov.9,2017)(holdingthe continuingviolation doctrineappliedto ex post factochallengeto sex offenderregistration actbecauseçtgilnsofarastherequirementsoftheAct
are,asPlaintiffsallege,apunishm ent,itisapunishm entthatisinflicted on Plaintiffs every day
andwillcontinuetobeinflictedeverydayintheforeseeablefuture'');Gwyw,2018W L 1957788, at*6(holdingcontinuingviolation doctrineapplied toex postfacto challengetosex offender

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 184 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/18/2018 Page 27 of 45

registration actbecauseplaintifffacesthepossibilityofcrim inalprosecutioneverydayifhedoes

notcomply with the actl;Wallace v.New York,40 F.Supp.3d 278,303 (E.D.N.Y.2014)

(holdingexpostfactoclaim schallenging thestate'scurrentsex offenderregim eareûtcontinually

accnling').Accordingly,theCourtconcludesthatthecontinuingviolation doctrineapplieshere

and

Plaintiffs' claim s are not tim e b=

ed.27 H ow ever ,

as discussed below,Plaintiffs cannot

prevailon the m eritsoftheirex postfacto claim s.

B. Ex PostFactoC hallenge To begin,the partiesstipulatethatthe issuein thisfacialex postfacto challenge to the

O rdinance is properly frnm ed as: whether the County enacted the residency restriction w ith

punitive intent,and ifnot,whetherPlaintiffsestablished by the tlclearestproof'thatthepunitive

effectofthelaw overridestheCounty'slegitim ateintentto enactanonpunitive,civilm easure.

BoththefederalandFloridaconstitutionsprohibitthepassageofex postfactolaws.See

U .S.Const.art.Ij9,cl.3',id.art.1,j 10,c1.1',Fla.Const.art.1,j 10.AstheU .S.Supreme
Cou.rthas explained,to evaluate an ex post facto claim ,a courtm ust çsascertain whether the

legislattlrem eantthestatuteto establish tcivil'proceedings....Iftheintention ofthelegislature

w as to im pose ptm ishm ent,that ends the inquiry.If, however,the intention w as to enact a

27TheCottrtnotesthatifthecontinuing violation doctrine did notapply,D oes# 4,6,and 7'sclaim sw ouldbetim e barredbecauseitwasapparentorshouldhavebeen apparentthattheOrdinancewouldberetroactively applied to them morethan fouryearsbefore theComplaintw asfiled on October23,2014.The partiesstipulated thatin July 2006,Doe//4wasarrestedforfailingtoprovidetheaddresswherehewasresiding,so itwasapparentthathewas
subjecttotheresidencyrestrictionin July2006.AlthoughDoe#6testifiedthathewasnotawareoftheOrdinance
untilhemovedoutofhisgrandfatheredresidencein January2013,healsotestitiedthatheinitially registeredhis address in January 2006,and hisregistration form s show thathe reported to aregistration oftk eron January 23, 2006and October1,2009.Sgt.lrvinetestified thatwhen offendersregistertheiraddresses,itisstandard practicefor ofticersto advise them ofallapplicableresidency restrictions.Thus,theCourttindsthatitshould havebeen
apparentto Doe//6thathewassubjecttotheOrdinancewhenheregisteredhisaddressin January2006.Doe//7 acknowledgedthathewould besubjectto theresidencyrestriction in hispleaagreementin June2009.However,
Doe#5'sclaim wouldnotbetimebm ed,becausehewasnotawareoftheresidencyrestriction untilhisrelease from prison in M arch 2014.Although he would have been infonned had he registered his addressaûerthe Ordinancew asenacted,he wasnotregistering hisaddressorcomm unicating w ith hisprobation oftk erasrequired from 2004-2006,and he wasincarcerated from 2006-2014.Thus,the Courtwould proceed to the m erits on Doe
#5'sclaim .

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 184 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/18/2018 Page 28 of 45

regulatory schemethatiscivilandnonptmitive,(thecourtjmustfurtherexnminewhetherthe statutory scheme isûso punitive eitherin purpose oreffectasto negate (the government'sj

intention'to deem itûcivil.'''Smith v.Doe,538U.S.84,92 (2003)(citationsand quotations

om

itted).28Becausecourtsdlordinarily

defer to

the

legislature's

stated

intent ,

. . .

ûonly the clearest

proof w illsufficeto ovenidelegislative intentandtransform w hathasbeen denom inated a civil

rem edy into acrim inalpenalty.''Id.(citationsandquotationsom ittedl;seealso UnitedStatesv. W B.H ,664F.3d848,855(11thCir.2011)(tûgsjomeevidencewillnotdo;substantialevidence willnotdo;and apreponderanceoftheevidencewillnotdo.û(Ojnlytheclearestproof will

do.'')(citingSmith,538U.S.at92).
The Courtconcludesthatthe Cotmty did notenactthe Ordinance'sresidency restriction

w ith ptm itive intent,and Plaintiffshave notestablished by the ûlclearestproof'thatthe punitive

effectoftheOrdinanceoverridestheCounty'sintentto enactanonptm itive,civilregulation.

1. Punitive lntent

ttW hether a statutory schem e is civil or crim inaltis firstof a1la question of statutory

constnzction.'''Smith,538U.S.at92(citingKansasv.Hendriclu',521U .S.346,361(1997)).To

determinethelegislativeobjective,cotlrtstlconsiderthestatute'stextanditsstructure.''f#.ç1A

conclusion thatthe legislature intended to punish would satisfy an expostfacto challenge
w ithoutfurtherinquiry into its effects,so considerable deference m ustbe accorded to the intent

asthelegislaturehasstated it.''1d.at92-93.

Here,the M iam i-D ade County Com m ission expressed the intentofthe Ordinance in the

statutory text itself:

The intentofthisA rticle isto serve theCounty's com pelling interestto prom ote, protectand im prove the health,safety and w elfare ofthe citizensofthe Cotmty,

28TheCourtevaluatesboth thefederaland stateexpostfacto challengestm derSm ith. SeeDoev.M iami-DadeC@., 846F.3datll83n.2(citingHoustonv.Williams,547F.3d1357,1364(11thCir.2008)).

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 184 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/18/2018 Page 29 of 45
particularly children, by prohibiting (sexual offendersl from establishing
tem porary orpermanentresidence in certain areasw here children are know n to regularly congregate... The County Comm ission furtherexpressed itsintentin the Ordinance'swhereasclauseswhich note:thatthe Comm ission is concerned aboutconvicted child molesters who reoffend after incarceration,thatthe County has a kûcom pelling interestin protecting children f'rom predatory
sexualactivity,''andthattheCommission intendstottregulatge)where(childmolestersjlive''
and lim itçûtheir access to children in an effortto protectchildren ofthe County from sexual abuse.,,29 Protectj.ng children from sex offenders is a legitim ate, nonpunitive governm ent
objective.SeeSmith,538U.S.at93-94(ûtlW jherealegislativerestriction isanincidentOfthe
State'spow erto protectthehealth and safety ofitscitizens,itw illbe considered asevidencing
an intentto exercisethatregulatory power,and nota puposeto add to the ptmishment.'') (citationsandquotationsomitted).
The Com m issicm 's nonpunitive intent is further dem onstrated by the fact that the residency restriction is lim ited to schools.In lim iting therestriction to schools,the Com m ission
rejectedextendingtherestrictiontootherlocations,includingbusstops,childcarefacilities,and
parks.A s the prim e sponsorof the Ordinance Com m issioner Jose ûtpepe''D iaz explained,the enacted Ordinance w aslim ited to schoolsçtto balance''com peting interests.The County'sefforts to rationally balance com peting interests isalso retlected by the O rdinance's grandfatherclause, which exemptsresidencesestablished priorto theenactm entoftheOrdinanceorpriortoanew school opening within 2,500 feet,and by the 2010 am endment,which preempted stricter
29Inaddition,attheCountyCommissionhearingontheOrdinance,MajorBuchholzfrom theMiami-DadeCounty
Sex Crim esUnittestifed in supportoftheresidency restriction,statingthatlaw enforcem entistryingtottm inim ize
theopportunity for(sexualoffenderslto attack''furtherretlectingthatthegoaloftherestriction isto protect
children.

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 184 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/18/2018 Page 30 of 45
m unicipalordinances,in orderto strike $:a properbalance betw een protecting children ...while stillleaving availableresidentialunits.''
Plaintiffs contend that statem ents by severalcom m issioners dem onstrate the County's punitiveintentin enactingtheO rdinance.They also argue thatthe Ordinance ispunitivebecause M r.Book,ChairoftheH om elessTrustBoard ofD irectorsand lobbyist,w asthe m ostinfluential individual behind the residency restriction, and he m ade vitriolic statem ents about sexual offenders.H owever,statem entsby certain com m issioners,particularly w hen there are contrary statem ents by other com m issioners, do not ovenide the clear expression of intent in the
Ordinance itself.SeeN L.R.B.v.SW Gen.,Inc.,137 S.Ct.929,943 (2017)(explaining that
tttloorstatem entsby individuallegislatorsrank am ong the leastillum inating form soflegislative
history''because differentlegislatorsm ay offercontradicting accotmtsl;see id.at942 CsW hat
Congressultim ately agreeson isthe textthatitenacts,notthe preferencesexpressed by certain
legislators.'').Thecommissioners'commentsabouttheproposed Ordinancewereboth varied
and conflicting.M oreover,such com m ents do not ovenide the text of the O rdinance itself. Likewise,com m ents by individuals w ho are not com m issioners,such as M r. Book,do not overridethe textofthe Ordinance.Thus,the Courtconcludesthatthe County did notenactthe Ordinancew ith punitiveintent.
Punitive Effects To determ ine whether the ptm itive effects of the O rdinance outw eigh the Cotmty's nonpunitive intent,the Courtis guided by factors setforth by the Suprem e Court,including whethertheregulatory schem e:ûshasbeen regarded in ourhistory and traditionsasapunishm ent; im posesan affinnative disability orrestraint;prom otesthetraditionalaim sofpunishm ent;hasa rationalconnection to anonpunitivepurpose;orisexcessivew ith respecttothispurpose.''Sm ith,

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 184 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/18/2018 Page 31 of 45
538 U .S.at98.The Courtaddresses each factorin ttu'n.In considering these factors,the Court notes that itis notdetermining whetherthe Ordinance'sresidency restriction isthe optim al meansto preventsex offenserecidivism ;itmerely isdetermining whethertherestriction passes constitutionalm uster.
H istorically RegardedasPunishm ent Plaintiffs argue thatthe residency restriction resembles the historicalpunishm ents of banishm entand probation.H ow ever,therestriction isnotakin to banishm entbecauseitdoesnot restrictw here registered sex offendersm ay visitorwork,and only prohibitsthem from residing
withincloseproximitytoaschool.See,e.g.,Doev.M iller,405F.3d700,719(8th Cir.2005) (rejecting argumentthatresidency restriction isequivalentto banishmentbecauseitdoesnot completelyexpeloffendersfrom thecommunity);Shaw v.Patton,823F.3d556,566-67 (10th Cir.2016)(same).Nordoestheresidency restriction resembleprobation,becauseitdoesnot subjecttheoffendertobroadcontrol,supervision,ozthreatofrevocation.See Vasquezv.Foxx, 895 F.3d 515,521(7th Cir.2018),petitionforcert.-#/c#,No.18-386 (U.S.Sept.21,2018) (EtAlthough theIllinoisresidencyrestrictionslim itwheresex offendersmaylive,thestatutedoes
notcontrolany otheraspectoftheirlivesand thusdoesnotresem blethe com prehensive ccmtrol
ofprobationandsupervisedrelease.'').Thus,theCourtconcludesthattheresidencyrestrictionis
nothistorically regarded asaptm ishm ent.
b. PromotestheTraditionalAimsofpunishment
Plaintiffs also assertthat the O rdinance advances the traditional aim s of punishm ent: deterrence and retribution.The County respondsthatthe Ordinance's goalofdeterring future crimesagainstchildren doesnotrenderitpunitive,and thattheresidencyrestriction isrem edial, notretributive.The Courtagreeswith the County.The factthattheresidency restriction aim sto

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 184 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/18/2018 Page 32 of 45
deterreoffending doesnotmake itpunitive.See Smith,538 U.S.at 101 (tlAny numberof
governm entalprogram s m ight deter crim e w ithout im posing punishm ent....To hold that the m ere presence of a deterrent purpose renders such sanctions Scrim inal' ... w ould severely
tmderminetheGovernm ent'sabilitytoengagein effectiveregulation.'')(citationsandquotations omitted);seealsoM iller,405F.3dat720 (residencyrestriction'sgoalofreducingthelikelihood ofreoffensedidnotrenderitpunitive).BecausetheOrdinance'sgoalisto preventsexoffenders
from reoffending by lim iting their access and opportunity,it is rem edial,not retributive.See
Vasquez,895 F.3dat522 (tinding thatûttheresidency restrictionsareso clearly notretributive'' becauseçlgaqsinSmith,theobviousaim ofthestatuteistoprotectchildren from thedangerof recidivism byconvictedchildsexoffenders'')(emphasisinoriginal).TheCourtthusconcludes
thattheO rdinancedoesnotprom otethetraditionalaim sofpunishm ent.
UndueAy rmativeDisabilityorRestraint
U nder the ttaffinnative disability or restraint''factor,the Courtm ustûtinquire how the
effectsoftheActarefeltbythosesubjecttoit.''Smith,538U.S.at99-100.çt'Whilerestrictive
law s are not necessarily ptm itive,they are m ore likely to be so.''M iller,405 F.3d at 720. (ûlm prisonm ent is the tparadigm atic'affirm ative disability or restraint,...butotherrestraints, such asprobation oroccupationaldebannent,also can im pose som erestriction on aperson's activities-''f#.
Plaintiffsarguethe Ordinance im poses an undue affirm ative disability orrestraint,citing
Does #1-5 v.Snyder,834 F.3d 696 (6th Cir.2016).ln Snyder,the ordinance prohibited
registrants from living,w orking,or ûsloitering''within 1,000 feetof a school.1d.at698.This im posed a fargreateraffirm ative restraintor disability than the residency restriction here,as it did not only lim it where covered individuals can reside,but also where they m ay w ork or

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 184 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/18/2018 Page 33 of 45
Ctloiter.''See id.at703-04.Here,theresidency restriction doesnotpreventsex offendersfrom working in orvisiting any partofthe Cotmty;itonly limitswhere they may establish a new residence.
On the other hand,the residency restriction is m ore disabling than the sex offender registration 1aw atissue in Sm ith,548 U .S.at100,as itim poses a directrestrainton Plaintiffs' freedom to selectnew residences.SeeDoe v.M iami-Dade C@.,846 F.3d at1185.Plaintiffs contend thatthe Ordinance has led to substantialhousing disadvantages for sex offenders that would nothave othenvise occurred.W hile it is true that the Ordinance exacerbates housing
difficultiesforindividualssubjecttotheresidency restriction,theimpactoftheOrdinanceon
offenders'ability to find housing isnotofthe m agnitude suggested by Plaintiffs.A s described
above,mostregistered sex offenderssubjecttotheOrdinancehavefoundhousing.Seesupra at PM 1l1(C)(3).M oreover,therecord reflectsthatthere are othermore signifcantcausesof homelessnessinM inmi-DadeCounty,irrespectiveoftheOrdinance.SeesupraatPM I1I(D).
Accordingly,the Court concludes that while the Ordinance im poses an aftirmative
disabilityorrestraint,itisnonpunitive.See5l> ,823F.3dat570(explainingthatanordinance
prohibiting sex offendersfrom living within 2,000 feetofa school,playgrotmd,park,orchild care center was less harsh than a ban on working in a particular field,which is considered
nonpunitive).Nevertheless,thisfactordirectstheCourttothecrux ofthecase,thelasttwoSmith
factors:whetherthe 1aw isrationally colm ected to anonpunitivepurpose,and ifso,w hetheritis excessivein relation tothatpurpose.SeeM iller,405 F.3d at721.
RationalConnection to aN onpunitivePurpose W hen evaluating an ex postfacto claim ,thelaw 'stlrationalcormection toanonptmitive
purposeisaCgmjostsignificant'factorin gthecourt'sjdeterminationthatthestatute'seffectsare

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 184 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/18/2018 Page 34 of 45

nonpunitive.''Smith,538U.S.at102(citationomitted).1ûA statuteisnotdeemedpunitivesimply
because itlacksa closeorperfectfitw ith the nonpunitive aim sitseeksto advance.''1d.at103.

In

other w

ords ,

the question

is w

hethertheO

rdinance

passesrationalbasisscrutiny.30

In the Ordinance's w hereas clauses, the County Com m ission finds that ttprohibiting

sexualoffendersfrom living w ithin 2,500 feetofschools ...willreducetheam ountofincidental

contact sexual offenders have w ith children,''and that this will decrease the opportunity for

sexual offenders to com m it new sex offenses against children. The Court m ust detennine

whetherthere is,in fad ,arationalconned ion betw een theO rdinance'sresidency restridion and

the County'sgoalofprotecting children from sexualoffenserecidivism .

Plaintiffs argue that the residency restriction has no rational colm ection to its stated

purpose ofprotecting children because itonly dictates where an offender sleeps,butdoes not

lim itw here an offendergoesduring the day.Plaintiffs also argue thatthe County prem ised the

Ordinance on the erroneous idea thatsexualoffenders are likely to repeattheiroffenses,which,

Plaintiffs say,hasbeen debtm ked.A lthough both sidesagree there isrecidivism am ong sexual

offenders,they disagree asto the extent.Each pointsto variousstudiesto supportitsrespective

position.ln thatregard,the County contendsthatthe recidivism rates are m uch higherthan the

ratesreported in som eofPlaintiffs'studiesdue to substantial,docum ented underreporting ofsex

30plaintiffsarguethatthestandardforrationalbasisscrutiny undertheFloridaconstitution ism orerigorousthanthe
federalstandard,citingEstateofMccallv.UnitedStates,134 So.3d894(F1a.2014).InMccall,theFlorida
Supreme Courtheld thatthe cap on non-econom ic dam ages in m edicalm alpractice claims contained in Section 766.118,Florida Statm es,violated therationalbasistestoftheequalprotection clause ofFlorida'sconstitution as
appliedtowrongfuldeathcases.A majorityofjustices,however,didnotapeeonarationalefortheholding.ln SilvioMembreno(:tFloridaAssociationofVendorsv.Cityofliialeah,l88So.3d13(Fla.3dDCA 2016),theThird DistrictCourtofAppealrejectedasimilarargumentthatM ccallchangedFlorida'srationalbasistesttoonemore
rigorousthan the federalstandard.The courtexplained thatthe Florida rationalbasistestistûbased on precedent
from theUnitedStatesSupremeCourq''andhasbeenappliedthesamewayasthefederaltestforover50years.1d. at 20.The courtfurther explained thatneither ofthe plurality opinions in M ccallexpressly indicated intentto overrule Florida casesapplying the rationalbasistestconsistently with the federaltest.1d.at31.The Courttinds
Silvio persuasive, and concludes that the rational basis test is the sam e under both the Florida and federal constitutions.TheEleventh Circuitalso evaluatedtheFloridaex postfacto challengeunderthe sam estandardasthe federalchallengeinDoev.M iami-DadeC@.,846F.3dat1l83n.2.

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 184 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/18/2018 Page 35 of 45
crim es.TheCotmtyalso arguesthatitisam atterofcomm on sensethatlimitingthefrequencyof contactbetween childm olestersand areaswherechildren arelocated islikely toreducetherisk ofarepeatoffense,andthatcredibleevidencesupportsthiscomm onsensenotion.
TheCourtagreeswiththeCounty thattheresidencyrestrictionisrationallyrelatedtothe goalofprotecting children.First,the Courtconcludesthatthere was enough evidence forthe County to reasonably determ ine that the risk of registered sex offenders reoffending is signitk ant.A s discussed above,the estim ates ofrecidivism rates for sex offendersrange from
zero to 75 percent.Seesupra atPartI1l(B)(1).Even Plaintiffs'expertsdo notcontend that
recidivism does not exist, and as Dr. M ccleary testified, m ost studies underestim ate the reoffense rate becauseofthe ttdark figure''ofsexualvictim ization.1d.U nderreporting isan even greaterproblem forsex offensesinvolving child victim s.1d.Justasin Sm ith,the evidence here provides a sufficient basis to tind that the risk of recidivism posed by sex offenders is very
signifcant.SeeSmith,538 U.S.at103 Cl-f'he legislature'sfindingsareconsistentwith grave
concernsoverthehighrateofrecidivism am ongconvicted sex offendersandtheirdangerousness
asaclass.Theriskofrecidivism posedby sexoffendersisûfrightening andhigh.''')(citation omitted).
Second, the Court concludes that the residency restricticm is a legitim ate m eans to m anage this risk of recidivism .The factthatthe residency restriction only lim its where an offendersleeps,butnotwherean offendergoesduring theday,m ay mean itisnotthe optim al solution to the recidivism problem ;butifithassom eam eliorative effect,thatisenough to be ttrationally colm ected''to the Cotm ty's goalofprotecting children.Plaintiffs'experts presented
studiesrelating to otherjurisdictions'lawsto show thatresidency restrictionsdid notreduce
recidivism toastatisticallysignificantextent.However,asDr.M cclearytestified,studiesthatdo

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 184 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/18/2018 Page 36 of 45

not show a statistically signiticant effect do not m ean that the residency restrictions are

ineffective.Dr.M cc learly explained thatthere are signitk antshortcom ingsin the studiesupon

w hich Plaintiffs'expertsrely to contend thatresidency restrictionsarenotaparticularly effective

toolin deterring reoffending.These shortcom ings include:the sm allnum ber of studies,sm all

sam plesizes,varyingresidency restrictionsin differentJ'urisdictions,short-follow -up periods,the

useofdifferentdetinitionsofrecidivism ,and theunderreporting ofsex crim es.See supra atPart

II1(B)(2).Thus,Plaintiffs have not established by the ûsclearest proof'thatthe County's
residency restriction hasno rationalconnection to itsgoalofprotecting children.

ln reaching its conclusion,the Courtis also m indfulthat in order to survive a rational

basischallenge,the legislative choice ttm ay be based on rationalspeculation unsupported by

evidence orempiricaldata.''See,e.g.,Doev.M oore,410F.3d 1337,1346 (11th Cir.2005)

(citing FCC v.Beach Commc'ns,Inc.,508 307,313-15 (1993)$ In the absence of
com pelling evidence to the contrary,which evidence isnotpresenthere,it is rationalfor the

County to determ ine that prohibiting registered sex offenders from residing w ithin close

proxim ity to schools will reduce their access to children and,therefore, the opportunity to

reoffend.

Although justifying its decision based on ûtrational speculation''would be legally
sufficientto satisfy the ttrationalcolm ection''factor,the County neverthelesspresented credible

evidence to supportits determination that the residency restliction is likely to help prevent

reoffending.31A

s

discussed

above ,

this

includes

a

study

that found

evidence

of a

relationship

betweenwheresexoffendersliveandwherechildrencongregate.SeesupraatPM I1I(B)(2).In
31And, even some ofthe evidence presented by Plaintiffs supports thatthe residency restriction has a rational connection to protecting children.For instance,as discussed above,Dr.Levenson cited a study thatcom pared recidivism ratesforregistered sexoffendersbeforeand ahertheenactm entofresidency restrictionsin M issouriand
inMichigan.Recidivism ratesroseinMichiganbutfellinMissouri.ThissupportstheCotmty'sdeterminationthat
residency restrictionsm ay beeffective atdecreasing recidivism ,asw asthe M issourirestriction.Seesupra atPart
llI(B)(2).

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 184 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/18/2018 Page 37 of 45

addition,atleastone study hasshown that20 to 30 percentofregistered sex offendersreported

that they find residency restrictions helpf'ul in preventing them from reoffending 32 u x ud

.

.

,

notably,D oe //6 acknow ledged thatavoiding schoolshelpshim preventgetting tûurges''tow ards

children.

It is noteworthy thatCourts ofAppeals and other districtcourts have found sim ilar

residency restrictions to be ûtrationally designed to reduce sex offenders' tem ptations and

opportunitiesto reoffend.''See ksWtzw,823 F.3d at574.Forinstance,in Shaw ,the Tenth Circuit

explained thatresidency restrictions tûplace children out ofsightand m ind,beyond senses that

could stir the perversions of known child sex offenders. A t least arguably, a 2,000-foot

restriction reduces opportunity,dim inishes tem ptation,and thereby decreases the risk that a

proven childsex offenderwillreoffend.''f#.(citation omitted).Similarly,inM iller,theEighth
Circuitheld thatan ordinance prohibiting registered sex offenders from residing within 2,000

feetofa schoolorregistered child carefacility wasareasonable way to m inim izetûtherisk of

repeated sex offenses againstm inors.''405 F.3d at721.A nd,in Vasquez,the Seventh Circuit

held thata residency restriction prohibiting sex offenders from residing w ithin 500 feetof a

playground, school, child care center, child daycare hom e and group daycare hom e w as

rationally related to protecting children.See 895 F.3d at522.The courtexplained thateven ifit

accepted theplaintiffs'assertion tlthatsex offendersdo notreoffendm orethanothercrim inals''

astrue,ttsimilarrecidivism ratesacrossdifferentcategoriesofcrim ewouldnotestablishthatthe

nonpunitive aim ofthis statute protecting children is a shnm .''1d.at522.,see also W eem sv.

fittleRockPoliceDep't,453F.3d 1010,1015(8thCir.2006)(ç1(W 1ebelievethataresidency
32AlthoughPlaintiffscriticizetheCounty'srelianceon studieslikethesefrom otherjurisdictionstobolsterthe
theoreticalbasis for the residency restriction,the Courtagrees with Dr.M ccleary thatstudies of a law's effectivenessm aybetûpracticallysignifkant''eveniftheydonotestablishstatisticalsignitkance.Inotherwords,a lawm akerm ay fm dastudyuseful,even ifitdoesnotstatistically establish how effectivearesidency restriction m ay be.Thesm diesproduced bytheCounty show thatithad arationalbasisforconcludingthattheresidency restriction isareasonablem eanstoaddressrecidivism .

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 184 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/18/2018 Page 38 of 45
restriction designed to reduce proxim ity between the m ost dangerous offenders and locations
frequented by children is within the range of rational policy options available to a (local govermnentjcharged with protectingthehealth and welfareofitscitizens''l;D oev.Baker,No. 1:05-cv-2265,2006W L 905368at*5(N.D.Ga.Apr.5,2006)(lçprohibitingasexoffenderfrom
livingnearaschoolordaycareiscertainly an appropriatestep in achieving theultim ategoalof
protectingchildren.'').Here,theevidenceattrial,including Doe#6'stestimony,supportsthe
reasonableness ofthe County's strategy to reduce sex offenders'tem ptationsand opporttm ities through the residency restriction.Therefore,the Courtconcludesthatthe Ordinance'sresidency restriction isrationally connected to the nonpunitive pup ose ofprotecting children from sex offenders.
Excessivew ithRespectto theN onpunitivePurpose
ts-f'heexcessivenessinquiryof(theSupremeCourt'sqexpostfactojuïisprudenceisnotarl
exercisein detenminingwhetherthelegislaturehasm adethebestchoicepossibleto addzessthe problem itseekstorem edy.Thequestion iswhethertheregulatorym eanschosen arereasonable
inlightofthenonplmitiveobjective-''Smith,538U.S.at105.
As an initialmatter,the Ordinance'sresidency restriction islessrestrictive and m ore lim ited in scope than som e other sim ilarrestrictions enacted by localgovernm ents.33v r.sook testified thatthe County'sresidency restriction w as lessrestrictivethan the versions lobbied for
andenactedinmanyotherjurisdictionsthroughoutthestateofFloridaandaroundthecountry.
Forinstance,otherregulationsnotonly prohibitregistered sex offendersfrom residing w ithin a certain distance of a school,they also prohibitthem from living w ithin a certain distance of
33IndeterminingthatDoes//1and3pleadedan expostfactoclaim,theEleventhCircuitpanelstated:tûAccepting thefactsalleged in thecomplaintastrue,the County'sresidency restriction isEam ong the strictestin thenation.''' Doev.Miami-DadeC/y.,846 F.3datll85.However,Plaintiffsdidnotprovethisallegation attrial.lnstead,the
evidenceshowedthatmanyjurisdictionshavestricterresidencyrestrictions.

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 184 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/18/2018 Page 39 of 45
daycares,parks,busstops,orplaceswherechildren congregate.Someofthesemorerestrictive
lawshave survived constitutionalchallenges.See,e.g.,M iller,405F.3d at704 (upholding law
thatprohibitedaperson convicted ofcertainsex offensesinvolvingminorsfrom residingwithin
2,000feetofaschoolorregisteredchildcarefacility);Shaw,823F.3d at559(upholding1aw
that prohibited certain registered sex offenders from living w ithin 2,000 feet of a school,
playground,park,or child care center).Even Plaintiffs' experts,who were familiar with residency restrictionsin otherjurisdictions,agreed thatotherlawsareoften morerestrictiveby applying to abroadergroup ofoffenders(i.e.,a11offendersregardlessofvictim age)orto a
broadercategory ofprohibited locations. The County's Ordinance is also less restrictive than som e other residency restriction
ordinancesbecause ofitsgrandfatherclausewhich exemptsresidencesestablished priorto the enactment of the Ordinance or the opening of a new school.See 5lJw,823 F.3d at 570
(grandfather clause made ordinance çtless disabling than other state lawsthatrequire sex
offendersto relocate ifthey livein an areathathad been compliantbutbecnm enon-com pliant
becauseofaninterveningopeningofanearby school,playgrotmd,park,orchildcarecenter'l; seealso Wallace,40F.Supp.3d at326(û1(A1ny excessiveness...isfurthermitigatedby the grandfather clause exempting an offender's prior-established residence.'').ln Vasquez,the
Seventh Circuit affirmed the dism issalof plaintiffs' ex post facto claim ,even though the plaintiffswererequired to m ovewithin 30 daysafternew child daycare homesopened within 500 feetoftheirresidences.895 F.3d 518-22.
In addition,the County's residency restriction only applies to offenders who were convicted asadultsforone offive enum erated sexualoffenses,even though an individualcan be designated a ûtsexual offender'' under Florida 1aw based upon a conviction for 17 additional

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 184 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/18/2018 Page 40 of 45
offenses. And,the residency restriction only applies to crim es against the m ost vulnerable victim s:children tmder 16.Thus,the residency restriction isnarrow ly tailored to only apply to individuals w ho com m itted certain sexual offenses against particularly vulnerable victim sspecitk ally,thosew ho presentthegreatestdangerto children.
Nevertheless,Plaintiffscontend thattheresidency restriction isexcessivebecause it:(1)
appliesbased solely on thefactofpriorconviction,irrespectiveofthe offender'srecidivism risk
overtime;(2)appliestotheoffenderforlife;(3)marks2,500feetby straightlines,ratherthan bypedestrianordrivingroutes',(4)persistsdespitetheabseneeofany demonstratedempirical link betweenresidentialproxim ityto schoolsandrecidivism ',and (5)exacerbatestransienceand homelessnessnmongoffenderssubjecttotheOrdinance,increasingtheirriskofrecidivism.The CourtrejectsPlaintiffs'contentionforthefollowingreasons.
First, even the O rdinance, applying to all covered sex offenders w ithout an individualized risk assessm ent,is notthe tçbest ehoiee,''thatdoes notnAake itunreasonably disproportionate to the aim of protecting children.See W allace,40 F.Supp. 3d at 326.D r. M cclearytestifiedthatindividualized risk assessmentprogram s,which Plaintiffsprom ote,only haveaûtm oderate''degree ofaccuracy.Dr.Harrisacknowledged thatastudy showedthatsuch progrnm sonly assigned individualstheeorred risk score48.3pelventofthetime.Seesupra at
Part1II(B)(1).Legislattlresarenotrequiredtorelyon such falliblemeasttresforpolicymaking
decisions.A sthe Suprem eCourthasexplained:
The Ex PostFacto Clause does notpreclude a State (ormunicipalityjfrom making reasonable categoricaljudgments that conviction ofspecified crimes
should entailparticularregulatory consequences.W e haveupheld againstexpost
factochallengeslawsimposingregulatoryburdenson individualsconvicted of
crim es without any corresponding risk assessm ent... The detennination to legislate with respectto convicted sex offenders as a class,rather than require individual determ ination of their dangerousness, does not m ake the statute a punishm entundertheEx PostFacto Clause.
40

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 184 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/18/2018 Page 41 of 45
Sm ith,538 U .S.at103-04;seealso M iller,405F.3d at721. Second,theOrdinanceisnotexcessiveeventhough itappliestothecoveredoffenderfor
life.Although Dr.Harristestified thatthelongeroffendersare offense-free,thelesslikely they aretoreoffend,theCountypresented evidencethatasubstantialpercentageofsex offendersre-
offendover20yearsafterrelease.SeesupraatPal't1lI(B)(1).This,coupledwithDr.M ccleary's
testim onyontheinabilitytoaccuratelypredictthelikelihoodofzeoffendingozwhenreoffending may occur,supports thatthe Cotmty may reasonably determine thatthe residency restriction should apply for offenders'entire lives.See Valentine v.Strickland,N o.5:08-cv-00993-JRA ,
2009 W L 9052193,at*5 (N.D.Ohio Aug.19,2009)(finding registration requirementand
residency restriction thatappliedto certain sex offendersforlifewasnotexcessive becauseof
the risk ofrecidivism).The Courtalso notesthatin 2003,the U.S.Congress enacted the PROTECT ACT,whichamended18U.S.C.j3583toprovidefederaljudgeswithdiscretionto extendtheterm ofpost-releasesupervisionofoffendersuptoamaximum oflifewhen,ûûlujnder
currentlaw,the m axim llm period ofpost-release supervision in Federalcasesw asgenerally tive
yearseven forthemostseriouscrimes.''H.R.CONF.REP.108-66at49 (2003).Thischange cnmeinresponsetoçlthelong-standingconcernsofFederaljudgesandprosecutorsregardingthe
inadequacyoftheexistingsuperdsionperiodsforsexoffenders,particularlyforthepep etrators Ofchild sexualabuse crimes,whose crim inalconductmay reflectdeep-seated aberrantsexual disordezsthatazenotlikely to disappearwithin a few yearsofreleasefrom prison.''1d.at49-50.
Third,measuring the 2,500 feetrestriction by a straightline also doesnotrender the Ordinance excessive.Although Plaintiffswould preferthatthe County calculatethe2,500 feet differently,the question isnotwhetherthere isa bettersolution to therecidivism threat;itis whether the O rdinance violates the Plaintiffs'constitutionalrights.A s D r.M ccleary testified,

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 184 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/18/2018 Page 42 of 45

becausethe evidence on theeffectivenessofresidency restrictionsisinconclusive,the choice of a specific m eans to protect children m ustrely on practicalconsiderations and com m on sense. The County selected a 2,500-foot distance based on its determ ination thatm inor children are m ore likely to w alk withoutan adultwithin 2,500 feetof a sehooland beeause the County is m aking an effortto enhancethe w alkability ofareas within 2,500 feetofa schoolto encotlrage m ore studentsto walk to school.In fact,M iam i-D ade County public schoolsdo notprovidebus transportation for students living w ithin 2,500 feet of a school because it is considered a ttreasonable walking distance.'' The County's decision to select a 2,500-foot restriction,
measured as the crow flies,is reasonable.See M iller,405 F.3d at 722 (explaining the
legislature's decision to selecta 2,000-footrestriction w asreasonable even though no w itness ûtw asable to articulate a precise distancethatoptim ally balanced the benefitofreducing risk to
childrenwiththebtzrden oftheresidencyrestrictionson sex offenders'l.34
Fourth, Plaintiffs failed to show that the residency restriction does not deter sexual recidivism against children. A s discussed above,the Plaintiffs' experts' opinions estim ating sexualrecidivism rates,based on various studies,aze unreliable.This isbecause,am ong other reasons,the recidivism data on w hich theirstudiesare based do nottake into accotm tthe ttdark tigure''ofsexualvictim ization.Therefore,the CourtconcludesthatPlaintiffs'experts'opinions based on those studies do notestablish by the Slclearestproof'thatthe residency restriction is ineffective.
Plaintiffscontendthatthe Ctm ostsignificantfactorin the analysisofexcessiveness''isthe County's failure to present any evidence of the residency restriction's benetits, citing Snyder,

34Thecourtnotesthat25500feetis

also the distance used

in

other law

sthatcreatebufferzonesaround

schools .

See,

e.g.,Fla.Stat.j847.0134(providingthatcertainadultentertainmentvenuesmaynotbelocatedwithin2,500feetof

schoolsl;MIAMI-DADECOUNTY CODE j33-150 (providing that,unlessapprovedby aspecialexemption,ûûno
prem isesshallbe used forthesaleofalcoholicbeveragesto beconsum edon oroffprem ises''within 2,500 feetofa

church or public school).

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 184 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/18/2018 Page 43 of 45
834F.3d at705,andHoffmanv.VillageofpleasantPrairie,249 F.Supp.3d951,960(E.D. W is.2017).PlaintiffsrelianceonSnyderismisplaced,becauseinthatcase,unlikehere,tlnothing theparties...pointed to in the record suggestgedqthatthe residentialrestrictionshaldlany
beneficialeffecton recidivism rates.''834 F.3d at705.Furthermore,Snyder involved an asapplied challengeto am uch broaderrestriction thatprohibited certain registrantsfrom living,
working,orûsloitering''within 1,000feetofaschool.Similarly,inHoffman,thecourtfotmdthat theordinancewasbased solely ontheVillage'sûcownconjectureaboutthedangersposedbysex offenders,''ratherthanon studiesorevidence.249F.Supp.3dat960 (t1IftheVillagehadeven a
sliveroffactualm aterialto supportthe stated goalsofthe Ordinance,the outcom e ofthisclaim
would likely be different.'').Here, in contrast,there is credible evidence that residency
restrictions deter the opportunity and ûturge''to reoffend,including unrefuted evidence that a significant percentage of sex offenders find residency restrictions helpful in preventing them from reoffending,including Doe #6,w ho acknowledged thatavoiding schoolshelpshim prevent tturges.''Thisevidence iscertainly farm orethan a Ctsliver,''reflecting the am eliorative effectof
theresidency restriction.SeeM iller,405 F.3d at722 (holding residency restriction wasnot
kûexcessive''even though therew asno scientific evidenceofitseffectivenessbecause tkthere w as experttestim ony thatreducing the frequency ofcontactbetw een sex offenders and children is likely to reduce tem ptation and opportunity,w hich in turn is im portantto reducing the risk of
reoffense'').
Fifth,Plaintiffs did not establish by the çûclearest proof'thatthe residency restriction
placesanundueburdenonthosesubjecttoitorisasignificantcauseofhomelessness.W hilethe
County understatestheburdensim posed by O rdinance,Plaintiffsoverstate them .O n balance,the Court concludes Plaintiffs have not proven that there is inadequate housing available to
43

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 184 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/18/2018 Page 44 of 45
registeredsexoffendersasaresultoftheresidencyrestriction.SeesupraatPart11I(C).W hile
there are a lim ited num ber oftnzly hom eless offenders,Plaintiffs have notproven thattheir hom elessness isthe resultof the residency restriction as opposed to other com m on causes of hom elessness am ong the generalpopulation in M inm i-D ade County.Tellingly,w ith regard to each Plaintiff,therecord reflects thatthere are m any causes ofhishom elessnessotherthan the Ordinance,including the reluctance oflandlordsand housing associationsto accepttenantsw ith a crim inal history,low incom e,unem ploym ent,m entalillness and/or physical disability.See
supraatPM III(D).Forinstance,Doe//6resided in acompliantresidenceuntilhisproperty
m anagerfound outabouthiscrim inalhistory and refused to renew hislease;Doe //4 lived in a com pliantresidencewith hiswife untilthey separated,and hecould no longerafford thelease paym ents,and later lived in another com pliant hom e untilhis room m ates m oved outand he could no longerafford therent.See id.Som e Plaintiffshave also lim ited theirhousing searches to certain geographic regions ofthe Cotmty,further elim inating housing options.1d.Thus,the evidenceshowsthatthe Ordinanceisnotthecause ofeach Plaintiff'shomelessness.Seeuo tzuz,
823F.3dat574 (rejecting argumentthatresidency restrictionsincreasedhomelessnessnmong sexoffendersandcausedplaintiff'shomelessness).35
Plaintiffsalso suggestsom e viable optionsthatthe County could have chosen to reduce the risk of sexual recidivism , including registration, notification, m andatory probation,
35plaintiffsalsocriticizetheOrdinancefornotcontainingany exceptionsforoffenderswithparticularhardships, such asthreeofthePlaintiffs,who have mentalorphysicaldisabilities.TheCourtnotesthattherem ay beinstances when such offenderscould have a potentialççasapplied''challengeto the Ordinance,such asDoe #7,who is in a
wheelchair.However,noDoehasallegedantûasapplied''claim here.TheCourtnotesthatitrejectedPlaintiffs' MotiontoConform PleadingwiththeEvidence(ECFNo.1681,whichsoughttoaddanas-appliedclaim tothe SecondAmended Complaint,becauseitwouldhaveprejudicedtheCounty sinceitwasnotrequesteduntilthelast day ofthenon-jurytrial,despitePlaintiffs'repeatedrepresentationsthroughouttheextensivepretrialproceedings thattheywerenotassertinganûtasapplied''challenge(ECFNo.170j.
44

Case 1:14-cv-23933-PCH Document 184 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/18/2018 Page 45 of 45

m

andatory

treatm

ent ,

and

GPS

m

onitoring.36Butagain,theissuehere

isnotwhetherthe

C

ounty

hasm adetheûtbestchoicepossible''to addressthe existentialthreatofrecidivism .SeeSm ith,538

U .S.at105.Fortheabovereasons,the County'sselection ofthe2,500-footresidency restriction

w asreasonable.A ccordingly,the Courtconcludesthatthe residency restriction isnotexcessive

w ith respectto itsnonpunitivepurpose.

V . CO N C LU SIO N

For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiffs' claim s are not barred by the statute of

lim itations.H owever,Plaintiffshave notproven thatthe Ordinance w as enacted with ptmitive

intentorcarried theirblzrden ofestablishing by theEûclearestproof'thatthe ptm itive effectofthe

Ordinance ovenidesthe County'slegitim ate intentto enacta nonpunitive,civilm easure.Thus,

Plaintiffscnnnotprevailon theirclaim thatthe Ordinance,on itsface,violatesthe ex postfacto

clauses of the United States and Florida Constitutions. Finaljudgment will be entered
accordingly.

D O N E and O RD ER ED in Cham bers,in M iam i,Florida,on Decem ber18th,2018.

Copies furnished to: CounselofRecord

w

'

e/.'.A.
.

.' ..e'
....cw.....' .> .'z'

Paul .H uck United StatesD istrictJudge

36 W hile these options m ay be m eritorious, Plaintiffscould raise theirsuggestionsand critiques ofthe residency restriction to the County Com m ission.H ow ever,here,the Court'sroleislim ited to evaluating the constitutionality oftheOrdinance,notwhetherthereisatheoretically betterordinance.
45

 
 U N IT ED STA TES DIST RIC T C O U RT FOR THE SOUTH ERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
C aseN o.1:14-cv-23933-PCH JO HN D OE #1,JO HN D O E #2, JO HN D OE #3,and FLO RIDA A CTION COM M ITTEE,lN C.,
Plaintiffs,
M IA M I-D A DE COU N TY ;FLO RIDA DEPA RTM EN T O F CORM CTION S SIJN NY UK EN Y E,CircuitA dm inistrator FortheM iam iCircuitO ftice,FLO RID A D EPA RTM EN T O F CO RRECTION S,in hisofficialcapacity,
D efendants.
O RDER DENYING M O TIO N FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGM ENT
THISCAUSE isbeforetheCourtonPlaintiffs'M otionforRelieffrom Judgment(D.E. 61).TheCourtheldoralargumentonthemotiononJune12,2015.TheCourthasconsidered themotion,DefendantM iami-DadeCounty'sresponse(D.E.621,andPlaintiffs'reply(D.E.641,
aswellastheparties'oralargum ents.Forthefollowingreasons,Plaintiffs'motionisDEN IED.
1. BA CK G R O UN D
PlaintiffsJohnDoesnumbers1tluough3suedM iami-DadeCounty(theCounty)andthe FloridaDepartmentofCorrections(theFDOC)foralleged constitutionalviolationsarising from theCounty'sLauren Book Child Safety Ordinance,M IAMI-DADECOUNTY CODE j 21-277e/
seq.,w hich prohibits convicted sex offenders from residing w ithin 2,500 feet of a school.
Plaintiffs,whoareconvictedsexoffenderssubjecttotheBook Ordinance'sresidencyrestriction,
claim ed that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague on its face and violated the United
StatesConstitution'sexpostfactoclause,andthattheCounty'sandtheFDOC'Senforcementof

the ordinance violated Plaintiffs'substantive due process rights. The Courtdismissed these
claimswithprejudiceonApril3,2015(D.E.60j.OnApril24,20l5,Plaintiffsmovedforrelief from theCourt'sorderpurjtlanttoFederalRuleofCivilProcedure60(b)(1).
lntheirmotionforrelieffrom judgment(D.E.611,PlaintiffsarguethattheCourterredin dismissing theircomplaintwith prejudice,because- according to Plaintiffs- they could have am ended the complaintto asserta viable as-applied vaguenesschallenge.1 (P1aintiffs do not contesttheCourt'sdismissàloftheirexpostfactoandsubstantivedueprocessclaims.)Plaintiffs
indicatethey wouldbasetheirproposedas-appliedchallengeon the County'sallegedly arbitrary enforcem entand interpretation ofthe Book Ordinance. As described in the Court's orderof dismissal,Plaintiffs have alleged that,in 2013,politicalofficials from M iam i-Dade Public
SchoolsandtheM iami-DabeHomelessTnzstaskedtheCountyPoliceDepartmenttore-classify
theMiamiBridge,anemergencyyouthshelter,asaCtschool''subjecttotheBook Ordinance's
residency restriction. The FD OC then evicted approxim ately 50 paroled sex offendersfrom the RiverPark,am obile home comm unity separated from the M inm iBridgeby the M iam iRiver, butwithin 2,500feetoftheM iam iBridgeasthe crow flies. TheCounty,in contrast,optednot to evictthe approximately 50 sex offenderswho rem ained atthe RiverPark. The FDOC has apparently reconsidered its detennination,and has allowed a number of the convicted sex offendersthatitevicted in 2013 to reestablish residence attheRiverPark.N o new convicted sex
1Asdescribed in detailin the Court'sorderofdismissal(D.E.601,Plaintiffs'counsel
repeatedly confirm ed that Plaintiffs brought their vagueness challenge exclusively
underthetheorythattheBookOrdinance'sdefinitionofaStschool''isvajueonitsface.
Therefore,the Courtevaluated this challenge only by reviewing the plaln language of the ordinance. The C ouylheld thatthe ordinance's definition of a S'school''as i$a public or private kindergarten,elem entary,m iddle,or secondary school''w as consistent w ith
theplainmeaningoftheterm ,andthereforewasnotvagueon itsface. Order(D.E.60)
at15-17.

offendersmaylivethere,izowever,becauseatraditionalschoolhassinceopenedwithin2,500
feetoftheRiverPark. A sthey did in theirresponsesto Defendants'm otionsto dism iss,Plaintiffsargue in their
motion forrelieffrom judgmentthattheFDOC'SRiverPark evictionsforced manyconvicted
sex offenders into hom elessness. Plaintiffsthem selves,how ever,w ere notnm ong those evicted from theRiverPark orm adehomelessbytheFDOC'Sactions.AccordingtoPlaintiffs'amended
complaint(D.E.251,JohnDoe//1wasinjailatthetimeoftheRiverPark eviction. Plaintiffs allegedthat,uponJohnDoe#1'sreleasefrom jail,hisprobationofficersuggestedanabandoned
lotin Hialeah asa residency location in com pliancew ith the Book Ordinance. John Doe #2 w as
evictedfrom theRiverPark(beforetheFDOC'Senforcementaction)forfailingtopayrent,and
hasrecently m oved back to the RiverPark,w ith hisprobation officer'sapproval. And John D oe #3,like John D oe #1,neverlived in the RiverPark;rather,his Shorecrestlandlord evicted him forfailingtopay rent.
Plaintiffs, however, claim that the County's and the FD O C'S prior inconsistent enforcem entof the Book Ordinance,coupled w ith the ordinance's vagueness,has leftthem in constantfearand doubtaboutw here they m ay orm ay notreside. Plaintiffsclaim thatJohn D oe //2 is afraid that,atany m om ent,the County m ay again reverse course on w hetherthe M iam i Bridge is a dtschool''underthe Book Ordinance and evicthim from the RiverPark. Plaintiffs also claim thatJohn D oes //1 and #3,though they do notlive atthe RiverPark,are concem ed thatthey m ay accidentally m ove into aresidence w ithin 2,500 feetofan Stalternative educational program ''sim ilarto the M iam iBridge. Plaintiffs contend that,because County policym akers retain considerable discretion on w hetherto classify such program sas Stschools''underthe Book O rdinance,itislikely thattheCounty could re-classify any one ofm any such facilitiesin M iam i-
3

Dade County as a Stschool''subjectto the ordinance's residency restriction,and evictor
prosecute convicted sex offenders living w ithin the vicinity. Plaintiffs urge thata declaratory

judgmentfrom thisCourtzon whethersuch çsalternativeeducationalprograms''are tsschools''
w ithin the m eaning of the Book Ordinance would assuage their fears of potential fm ure prosecution oreviction.2

Il. A NA LY SIS

A.Rule 60(b)(1)doesnotpermitPlaintiffsto reopen a judgmentto raisea
claim thatthey could have pursued w hile this case w aspending.
Plaintiffsseekreconsideration oftheCourt'sorderdism issing theirAm ended Complaint

withprejudiceunderFederalRuleofCivilProcedure60(b)(1).Rule60(b)(1)providesthatClthe

courtmayrelieveapartyoritslegalrepresentativefrom afinaljudgment,order,orproceeding

for ...mistake,inadvertence,sumrise,or excusable neglect.'' FED.R.C1V.P.60(b)(1).

A

lthough

not every

Circuit

Coul'tofA

ppeal apparently

agrees3 ,

the

Eleventh

Circuithas

held

thatétgtjheSmistakes'ofjudgesmayberemediedunderthisprovision.''Parkav.US.L4/?and CreditCorp.,677F.2d 838,839(11thCir.1982)(citation omitted).However,kûthedistrictcourt

2 M ostof Plaintiffs' argum ents concern the effects of D efendants' enforcem ent of the
B ook O rdinance on other convicted sex offenders. Plaintiffs'm otion references the 50 individuals thatthe FD O C evicted from the R iver Park,the 98 convicted sex offenders originally living atthe River Park,the 11 offenders that the FDO C has perm itted to return to the River Park,the unknow n num berofoffendersw ho did notlive atthe R iver Park during the FD O C 'S eviction,butreside there now ,and the isroughly 170 covered
individualswho unwitti/gly reside atcurrently-approved locations within 2,500 feetof
M iam i-D ade'snearly fourdozen alternative educationalprogram s ....t( See Pls.'M tn.
(D.E.611at8-10. The Court,however,declinesto considerthe Book Ordinance's
purported effectson non-parties,asfurtherdescribed below .

3 The First C ircuit ,

forexample,has expressed skepticism

on whetherRule 60(b)(1)

appliestothelegalStmistake''ofajudge.SeeSilkv.Sandoval,435F.2d 1266,1267-68 (1stCir.1971)(:$W eneitherunderstandthebasisforthisinterpretation,norsympathize

w ith it. If the courtm efely w rongly decides a point of law ,that is not linadvertence,

surprise,orexcusablenejlect.'''). Ofcourse,ifadistrictcourtwronglydecidesacase,
the losing party has the rlghtto appeal.

4

isnotrequired to grantreliefunlessthe legalerrorisobvious.'' Chambersv.Florida Parole
Comm 'n,257F.App'x258,259(11thCir.2007)(citingFackelmanv.Bell,564F.2d734,736 (5thCir.1977)).
ThoughRule60(b)(1)isthelegalbasisforPlaintiffs'm otion forrelief,Plaintiffsdo not
quote the Rule, and cite no precedent applying it in an analogous case. Instead, despite
concedingthatSkgtlhereisnoRule l5motionbeforetheCourt,''PlaintiffsrelylargelyonFederal RuleofCivilProcedure15(a)(2)tosupporttheirargument.Plaintiffsseem tobearguingthatthe
Court's purported Sim istake''w as m ade by failing to ûûfreely''perm it the am endm ent of their
complaintasdirected by Rule 15. SeeFED.R.CIV.P.15(a)(2). Rule 15,however,Skby itsplain language,governsamendmentofpleadingsbeforejudgmentisentered',ithasno application ajterjudgmentisentered.''Jacobsv.Tempur-pedicInt'l,Inc.,626F.3d 1327,1344(11thCir. 2010).Rather,apost-judgmentRule60(b)(1)motionpredicatedonajudge'sCtmistake''facesa
m uchhigherbarthan a Rule 15requestforleaveto am end:
There is authority thatwhere a districtcourt'sm istake w as çiclear ontherecord''and involved alsplain misconstnzction''ofthelaw and the erroneousapplication ofthat1aw to the facts,tttcom pelling
policiesofbasic fairness and equity reflected by 60(b)'''may mandatenmendmenttotsconform itsjudgmenttothelaw.'' Nissonv.Lundy 975F.2d802,806(11thCir.1992)(quotingComptonv.AltonSteamship Co., 608F.2d96,104(4th Cir.1979)). PlaintiffscontendthattheCourtcommittedalegaltdmistake''justifyingreliefunderRule 60(b)(1)bydismissingtheiram endedcom plaintwithprejudice.PlaintiffsarguethattheCourt's dism issalshouldhavebeen'withoutprejudice,asPlaintiffsbelievethattheycouldhaveam ended
theirfacialvaguenesschallengeto state aviableclaim thatD efendants'enforcem entoftheBook Ordinance is unconstitutionalas applied to them . Plaintiffs,how ever,have notidentified any
legal m istake in the order of dism issal that w as Sçcleaz on the record'' and a çsplain 5

misconstruction''ofthe law. Instead,Plaintiffs argue thatthe Courterred by failing to grant

them reliefthatthey neverrequested- while thiscase was open and pending,Plaintiffsnever

raised an as-applied vaguenessclaim ,and in factrepeatedly confirm ed thatthey wereexclusively
raisingafacialvaguenessclaim.SeePls., Resp.(D.E.401at2.4 Plaintiffsoffernoexplanation

fortheirfailureto previously argue an as-applied claim ,otherthan stating that(çsuprem e Court

precedentsuggestled)thatfacialchallengesmay bebroughtagainstcriminalstatutes.'' Pls.'

M

tn.

(D.E.61)at3.5

In

otherwords ,

Plaintiffs'previousreliance on

a

facialvaguenesstheory

appearstobetheresultoftheconsideredjudgmentofPlaintiffs'counselthatafacialchallenge

alonew asm orelikely to succeed than achallengeincluding an as-applied theory.

However,Plaintiffs'decision to forego an available legaltheory while theircase was

pendingdoesnotprovidea'basisforreliefunderRule60(b)(1). In fact,theEleventh Circuithas repeatedlyheldthatadistrictcourtdoesnotabuseitsdiscretion indenying aRule60(b)m otion

diwhenthejudgmentororderfrom whichthemovantseeksreliefwasenteredasaresultofthe

m ovant'schoice to rely on an unsuccessfullegaltheory.''M aradiaga v.United States,679 F.3d

1286,1294 (11th Cir.2012)(citation omitted). InAldana v.DelMonteFresh ProduceNA.,

lnc.,741 F.3d 1349,1357 (11th Cir.2014),forexample,the Eleventh Circuitrejected a
plaintiffsrequesttoreopen acasetoassertalegaltheorythattheplaintiffcouldhavepreviously

4 Indeed Plaintiffs'counsel insisted on asserting a facial vagueness challenge despite ,
the Court'srepeated obsirvation thattheirlegaltheoryappearedto beas-applied. See OralArg.Tr.at5:5-12(THE COURT:...CsgW lhatconcernsmeisthatyou'vethrown
a 1ot of issues out there that aren't appropriate in a facial challenge to this ordinance .
. . (PLAINTIFFS):No,your honor,we state very clearly in ourpleadings thatour vaguenessandexpostfactochallengesarefacialchallenges....'').
5The Supreme Courtprecedentcited by Plaintiffs is City of Chicago v.Morales,in
w hich a plurality of the Court found that C hicago's crim inal loitering ordinance w as
subjectto afacialchallengeforvagueness. 527U.S.41,55(1999). M oralesdoesnot
state that a plaintiff challenging a crim inal ordinance is required to raise a facial vaguenessclaim .
6

raised,butdid notraise. In Aldana,the plaintiffsattem pted to defeata motion to dism issf0r
forum nonconveniensby initiallyarguingthattheforeignjurisdiction urgedby thedefendants
w as inadequate. 1d. A fterfailing on theirinitialinadequacy argum ent,the plaintiffsm oved for
relieffrom judgmentunderRule60(b)(6),6onthebasisthatthe foreign fonzm w asunavailable. ld TheEleventhCircuitcharacterizedtheplaintiffs'post-judgmentresorttoanew legaltheory
ask'gam esm anship,''and held thattheplaintiffswerenotentitled to reliefunderRule60,because
theyhadnotpreviouslyraisedtheirunavailabilitytheory,andhadofferednojustificationforthe
oversight. 1d.
ln ToolBox,Inc.v.Ogden Cfry Corp.,4l9 F.3d 1084,1085-86 (10th Cir.2005),the
Tenth Circuitapplied the sam eprinciplesin a case in which theplaintiff,like Plaintiffshere,
soughtrelieffrom ajudgmentrejectingafacialvaguenesschallengetopleadanew as-applied
challenge. ln ToolBox,the plaintiffinitially raised a facialFirstAm endm entchallengeto a
.'
city'sprotectivecovenants,whichhadprohibitedtheplaintifffrom openinganude-dancingclub.
A n en banc panel of the Tenth Circuit held that the ordinance w as not, on its face,
unconstitutional.Id Follow ing the Tenth Circuit'sen bancruling,the plaintiffm oved in district
courtforrelieffrom judgmentunderRule60(b),andforleavetoamenditscomplaintunderRule
, '
l5(a),to assertatspotentiallymeritoriousas-appliedchallenge.''Id at1086. Inaffirmingthe
districtcourt's denial of the motion,the Tenth Circuit noted that the plaintiff Séhad every
opportunity to pursuean as-applied challenge during the m eritsproceedings,butchose notto do
so;indeed,itasked the districtcourtnotto considersuch a challenge.'' 1d at 1089. The court
6Rtlle60(b)(6)isacatch-allprovision thatprovidesforreconsideration forStan!other
reason thatjustifiesrelief.'' W hile the standard applied to Rule 60(b)(6)motlons is differentfrom the Rule60(b)(1)standard,Aldana based itsdecision on the plaintiffs'
failure to raise an available theory w hile the case w as pending,rather than the specific
Rule60(b)(6)standard forrelief.

concludedthat,dtgtlorthisreason,ToolBox didnotestablish mistake orsupriseunderRule 60(b)(1).''Id.at1089n.3(citationsom ittedl.?
Plaintiffs,however,urge the Courtto follow the Supreme Court'sdecision in Foman v.
Davis,371U.S.178 (1962). In Foman,theSupremeCourtheld thatadistrictcourterredin denyingaplaintiff'smotiontovacateajudgmentinordertoamendhercomplainttoassertan
alternativelegaltheory.Id at180.Foman isdistinguishable.W hilenotexplicitlystatedinthe
Suprem e Court's order,it appears that the district court's initial dism issal of the plaintiffs
complaintin Foman waswithoutprejudice;therefore,theissuein thatcasewaswhetherthe
districtcourtshould have granted leave to am end underRule 15. See id.at179. Indeed,the
SupremeCourtbased itsrulingonFederalRuleofCivilProcedure 15(a)'sadmonishmentthat courtsshouldfreelygrantleavetoamend.1d at182.BasedonthetextofRule15(a),theCourt in Foman elaborated the much-cited rule thatksgiln the absence ofany apparentordeclared
reason ...the leave soughtshould,astherulesrequire,be çfreely given.''' 1d. Here,however,
becausePlaintiffsneverm ovedtoam endtheircom plainttheRule 15(a)standard isinapplicable, y.'
aspreviously discussed.Jacobs,626F.3dat1344. Further,Foman also stated thatCdthe grantordenialofan opportunity to am end iswithin
the discretion ofthe D istrictCourt....'' Fom an,371U .S.at182. And decisionsboth pre-and
post-datingFoman havem adeclearthatadistrictcourtiswellwithin itsdiscretion indenyinga
z'
motion forrelieffrom judgmentbasedon alitigant'sfailureto raiseanavailablelegaltheory
during the pendency of a case. Here, like the plaintiffs in Toolbox and Aldana,Plaintiffs
1 The Tenth C ircuit's resolution of the Toolbox plaintiff's m otion for relief from
judgmentultimately restçd on the plaintiff'sfailureto file the motion within the one-
yeartim e lim itsetby Rùle 60. f#.at1088-89. The Tenth Circuit'sobservation on the m erits ofthe ToolBox plaintiff's Rule 60 m otion,how ever,is consistentw ith Eleventh Circuitprecedentand fully relevantto Plaintiffs'm otion forrelief.

deliberately elected to pursue asinglelegaltheory thatultim ately proved unsuccessful. Plaintiffs now moveforreconsideration solely onthebasisthatanas-appliedvaguenesstheorythey could
haveraisedpreviouslymightleadtoabetterresultnow.However,kûltlheremustbean endto
litigation som e day,and free,calculated and deliberate choices are notto be relieved from .''
Parlçs,677F.2d at841(quotingAckermannv.UnitedStates,340 U.S.193,198(1950)). As repeatedly confirm ed by theEleventh Circuit,(sgiltisnotan abuse ofdiscretion forthedistrict courttodenyam otionunderRule60(b)whenthatm otionisprem iseduponanargum entthatthe movantcouldhave,butdidnot,advancebeforethedistrictcourtenteredjudgment.''Maradiaga,
679F.3d at1294.
ln short,theCourtconcludesthatRule60(b)(1)providesnobasisforPlaintiffstoobtain relieffrom the Court'sjudgmentdismissing theiramended complaintwith prejudice. The
Court'sfailure to penuitPlaintiffsto furtheramend theiram ended complaint,when Plaintiffs could have requested butdid notrequestam endm ent,isnotalegalkdm istake''thatis'kclearon the
record''orthatinvolvedatdplainmisconstructionofthelaw,''suchaswouldjustifythereliefthat Plaintiffsseek. SeeNisson,975F.2d at806 (citation omitted). Therefore,Rule60 doesnot
apply. Even ifRule60 prbvided a legally viable route by which Plaintiffscould obtain relief
from theCourt'sdismissaloftheiramendedcomplaintwithprejudice,itwould bewithinthe
Court'sdiscretion whetherto grantsuch relief. Foman,83 S.Ct.at230. Based ontherecord beforeit,theCourtw ouldnotexerciseitsdiscretioninfavorofgrantingPlaintiffs'motion.
B . Plaintiffs canuotstate a viable as-applied challenge. Despite having the discretion, and exercising it,to deny Plaintiffs' m otion for the proceduralreasons described above,the Courtnevertheless w ill brietly address the m erits of Plaintiffs' as-applied claim . Plaintiffs contend that the Coul't erred in concluding that any
9

am endmentoftheirexisting claim swould have been futile. tdlweaveto amend a complaintis futile when the complaintas amended would stillbe properly dism issed or be im mediately
subjecttosummaryjudgmentforthedefendant.''Cockrellv.Sparks,510F.3d 1307,1310(11th Cir.2007)(citationom itted). In otherwords,forPlaintiffstoprevailon theircontentionthatthe Courtmadeattmistake''indismissingtheiramendedcomplaintwithprejudice,Plaintiffswould haveto show thatthey cah statean as-applied claim thatwould notbesubjectto immediate
dismissal. TheCourt,however,concludesthatPlaintiffs'proposed as-applied claim would be
subjecttoimmediatedismissal,becausePlaintiffshavefailedtopresentacaseorcontroversy
thatisripe forreview underArticle111oftheU nited StatesConstitution. ûtRipeness doctrine originates from the Constitution's A rticle lIl requirem ent thatthe
jurisdictionofthefederalcourtsbelimitedtoactualcasesorcontroversies.''Harrisv.M exican SpecialtyFoods,lnc.,564F.3d 1301,1308(11thCir.2009)(citation,punctuationomitted).$1A claim isnotripeforadjudicationifitrestsuponcontingentfutureeventsthatmaynotoccuras anticipated,orindeedma/notoccuratall.'' Texasv.UnitedStates,523U.S.296,300(1998) (citation omitted). Of particularrelevance to Plaintiffs' as-applied theory is the Eleventh Circuit'sobservation that,lslblecause the question ofripenessdependson thetiming ofthe adjudication ofaparticularissue ...,itappliesdifferently to facialand as-applied challenges.'' Harris,564F.3dat1308(Jitationomitted).Therefore,whileafacialchallengemayberesolved
asapurequestion oflaw ,Plaintiffs'as-applied theory iénecessarily requiresthe developm entofa
factualrecordforthecourttoconsider.''1d.(citationom itted).
Plaintiffs'factualsupportfortheripenessoftheiras-applied theory,how ever,isvirtually
nonexistent. An as-applièù challenge addressesifwhethera statute isunconstitutionalon the
10

factsofaparticularcaseortoaparticularperson.''8 Id.(citingBLAcK'sLAw DICTIONARY at

223). Theparticularpeople to whom the Book Ordinancehasallegedly been applied in an
unconstitutionalm nnnerin thiscasearePlaintiffsJohn Doesnumbers1through 3',yet,noJolm

Doe Plaintiffcurrently faces eviction orprosecution forviolating the Book Ordinance. And

while the Jolm Doe Plaintiffs have each struggled to find stable housing,Plaintiffs'own

allegationsam ply dem onstrate thatthe Book Ordinancedid notcause theirstnzggles. Jolm D oe

#3,forexam ple,w asevicted from his Shorecrestapartm entforfailure to pay rent. W hen Jolm

D oe#1wasreleased from prison,hisprobation officersuggested an abandoned lotin H ialeah as

a location in com pliance w ith the Book Ordinance,butdid nottellhim thatthe Book O rdinance

required him to live there. Plaintiffsreadily adm itthatDefendantsno longerenforcethe M iam i

Bridgeasadksehool''subjecttotheBookOrdinanee'sresidencyrestriction,andJolm Doe#2now

livesintheRiverParkwith'hisprobationoftk er'sapproval.

In

other w ords ,

the

County9

h as

not (tapplied''the

Book

Ordinance

to

any

John

D oe

Plaintiffin thiscase.Plaintiffs,how ever,contend thatthey should notberequiredto w aitforthe

County to evictor prosecute them before challenging the ordinance'svagueness as applied to

8Ratherthan identify any enforcem entaction currently pending againstany Plaintiffin thiscase ,
Plaintiffsdevotea substantialportion oftheirbriefstorelating factsthatare irrelevantto theirasapplied challenge. Plaintiffs,forexam ple,repeatedly referto theplightofhundredsofconvicted sex offendersin finding and rem aining in suitable housing in M iam i-Dade County. See P1s.'
M tn.(D.E.611at8-10.Yçt,theseallegationscannotsupportaclaim thattheBookOrdinanceis vague asapplied to the John Does,becauseûtgajplaintiffwho engagesin some conductthatis
clearly proscribed cannotcom plain ofthe vagueness of the 1aw as applied to the conduct of
others.'' Hoffman Estates v.Flipside,Hoffman Estates,Inc.,455 U.S.489,495 (1982).
Therefore, the Court has not considered Plaintiffs' contentions on the Book Ordinance's application to non-parties.
9 Plaintiffs conceded at oral argum ent that they have no viable as-applied challenge
againsttheFDOC andSynnyUkenye.

them .

Though Plaintiffsdo notexplicitly referenceitassuch,10theirargum entsm ake clearthat

they areraising a pre-enforcem entconstitutionalchallenge. Plaintiffsclaim thatthey are entitled

toraisesuch achallenge because they have raised a ikuestion offact''asto StltqheCounty's futureintenttoenforcetheOrdinance....''P1s.'Reply(D.E.64Jat5(emphasisadded).This,
however,is notthe standard applicable to Plaintiffs'pre-enforcem entchallenge. Rather,to

demonstratethe existenceofacasethatisripeforreview,Plaintiffsmustshow 1$(1)thatan

actualthreatofprosecutionwasmade,(2)thatprosecution islikely,or(3)thatacrediblethreat

ofprosecution existsbased on thecircum stances.'' Georgiacarry org,Inc.v.Georgia,687 F.3d

1244 ,

1252(11thCir.2012).11

Plaintiffsobviously'havenotidentifiedan Csactualthreatofprosecution,''andtherefore,to

dem onstrate a tûlikely or credible threat,''they iûm ustshow thatthere is 'a realistic danger of

sustainingdired injuryasaresultofthe statute'soperation orenforcement.''' Id (citingAm. CivilLibertiesUnionvFloridaBar,999F.2d 1486,1492(11thCir.1993)).,seealsoBabbittv. UnitedFarm WorkersNat.'lUnion,442U.S.289,299(1979)(stpersonshavingnofearsofstate
prosecution exceptthose thatare im aginary orspeculative,are notto be accepted asappropriate

10 Plaintiffs do selectively cite to a few Suprem e Court and Eleventh Circuit cases that have evaluated and perm itted pre-enforcem ent challenges. Plaintiffs'citations to those cases, how ever,are selective and incom plete. For exam ple, Plaintiffs cite Babbitt v.
United Farm WorkersNat'1Union,442 U.S.289,299 (1979)fortheproposition thata
person need notexpose him selfto arrestorprosecution before bringing a constitutional
challengeto criminalstatute. Pls.'Br.(D.E.611at7. Plaintiffs,however,neglectto
offer a full exam ination of Babbitt,w hich w ent on to note as described below that tûpersons having no fears of state prosecution except those that are im aginary or speculative, are not to be accepted as appropriate plaintiffs'' in a pre-enforcem ent challenge.
11 plaintiffs bringing pre-enforcem ent challenges also m ust show that the challenged law interferes w ith a constitutionalright. See G eorgiacarry.org,687 F.3d at 1251. A s described in the C ourt's orderofdism issal,itis notatallclearthatPlaintiffs have even show n thism uch.
12

plaintiffs''in apre-enforcementchallenge)(citations,quotationsomitted). Plaintiffshavenot
show n,howeverthatany Jolm Doe faces a credible threatofprosecution oreviction underthe Book O rdinance. John Doe //2 currently lives in the River Park with his probation ofticer's express perm ission. lf anything,this indicates that John D oe //2 is facing a low or entirely nonexistentrisk ofprosecution. Plaintiffs do noteven state where John D oes //1 and //3 live, m uch lessw hetherany particular aspectsoftheirliving arrangem entsindicate a credible threat thatJolm D oe#1orJohn D oe//3 w illbeprosecutedforviolating theBook Ordinance.
Theonly factsidentifiedby Plaintiffsthateven arguably indicateathreatofprosecution
are (1)the 2013 River Park eviction,(2) the discretion exercised by County ofticials in
determ ining w hetherûsalternative educationalprogram s''such asthe M iam iBridge are Skschools''
subjecttotheBookOrdinance'sresidencyrestriction,and(3)thefactthatsomeCountyagencies
appearto disagree w ith oneanotheron whethercertain facilitiesare k'schoo1s.''12 Taken together oron theirown,however,these facts are insufticientto establish a credible threatoffuture prosecution.The2013 RiverPark eviction,forexam ple,didnotinvolveanyJohnDoePlaintiff Further,even assum ing thattheFD OC hadpreviously evicted any oftheJohn D oePlaintiffs,and even assum ing that this.hypothetical eviction w as prom pted by the County's arbitrary interpretation ofthe Book Ordinance,Slpastexposureto illegalconductdoesnotin itselfshow a
presentcaseorcontroversy....''City ofLosAngelesv.Lyons,103 S.Ct.1660,1665(1983)

12 Plaintiffs

contend ,

for çxam

ple,thatthe

C

ounty

and

M

iam

i-D

ade

Public

Schools

have

reached contradictory po'sitions on the definition ofldschool''underthe Book Ordinance,

despite the fact thatthe County claim s to defer to M iam i-D ade Public Schools on this

point. A ccording to Plaintiffs,M iam i-D ade Public Schools officials considerthe M iam i

Bridge and similar dtalternative educationalprogram s''to be itschools''subjectto the
Book O rdinance's residency restrictions,and yet,the County itself does notcategorize

thosefacilitiesasSlschools.'' SeePls.'Br.(D.E.61qat4-5. Plaintiffsalsoallegethat
the Florida Departm entof Education considers num erous facilities to be ddschools''that

the County doesnotcurrently enforce as such,and vice versa. 1d.

@
(citation,punctuationomitted). Rather,to establish dstheprospectoffutttreinjury,''aplaintiff
previously subjectedtoaconstitutionalviolation byastateactormustCtcrediblyallegethathe
facedarealisticthreatfrom thef'utureapplicationof(adefendant'slpolicy.''1d.at1667-68n.7.
The Eleventh Circuit has since m ade clear that only the m ostcom pelling facts w ould
dem onstrate a threat of enforcem ent that w as sufficiently realistic to m erit the exercise of
jurisdictionoverapre-enforcementchallengethat,likePlaintiffs'proposedchallenge,restsonan
as-applied theory'.
Plaintiffs argue thatthe Carry Law ,as applied to them ,violates theirconstitutionalrights,even though the Carry Law hasnotyet been applied to them . To us,this appears to be an inherent
contradiction....Evengassumingthatlsomehow itispossibleto
bring an as-applied challenge in a pre-enforcem ent review of a
statutethathasyetto beappliedg,lwe believe thatthere are few
situations where that type of challenge w ould prevail. Such a situation could arisew hen the factualcontextofthe challengeisso clear and uncontroverted that there is no question as to how the statutew illbeapplied. Georgiacarry org,687 F.3d at 1255 n.20. Plaintiffs have not identified a tdfactual context''
where there isiçno question''asto how the County w illapply the Book O rdinance to them . A t
best,the factspresented by Plaintiffs indicatethat,w hile the County currently doesnotenforce
dtaltem ative educationalprogram s''as schools under the ordinance, som e ofticials in County
agenciesbelieve(orbelievedin2013)thatitshould.W hiletheydonotdisputethattheCounty
yê
doesnotcurrently enforce these program sasschools,Plaintiffsneverthelessstressthatofticials'
inconsistentview son the ordinanceindicatethattheCounty çscould reversecourseatanytim e.''
Even ifPlaintiffs'allegations are taken as true,this w ould be insufticientto supporta
pre-enforcem entchallengethatisripeforreview ,asgovem m entofficials'strugglesto interpreta
potentiallyvague1aw donot,ontheirown,supportthepresentexerciseofArticlel1ljurisdiction. In VillageofHoffmanEstatesv.Flipside,HoffmanEstates,Inc.,455U.S.489,503(1982),for
14

e

example,the Suprem eCourtexamined acase in which municipalofticials'confusion overan
ordinance's specific meaning and application raised an apparent dsrisk of discrim inatory
enforcem ent.''However,the Courtrefused to address this risk atthe pre-enforcem entstage.
lnstead,the Courtnoted tizatthemunicipality couldadopt,through administrativeregulations
and public input,clarificationsto the potentially overbroad provisionsofthe ordinance. See id. at504. And,ifthemunicipalityultim ately undertook apotentially overbroadorarbitrary action
to enforce the ordinance,çditw illbe tim e enough to consider any such problem s w hen they
' ,
arise.''Id (citingJosephE.Seagram drSons,Inc.v.Hostetter,384U.S.35,52(1966)).More recently,theCourtheldthatpublicinterestorganizationscouldnotestablishaninjuryinfactl3
based on whatthe organizations alleged was an ilobjectively reasonable likelihood''that
government officials would,in the future, exercise the discretion provided by the Foreign
K'
Intelligence SurveillanceActto illegally acquiretheorganizations'com munications.Clapperv.
Amnesty1nt'l,133S.Ct.1138,1143(2013). TheCourtreasonedthataplaintiffsuncertainty
over a govermnent agency's future and potentially arbitrary enforcem ent is insufficientto
establish Article lI1standing,because a kithreatened injury mustbe certainly impending to constituteinjuryinfact.''1d.at1147-48(quotingWhitmorev.Arkansas,110S.Ct.1717,172425 (1990)).
LiketheHoffman and Clapperplaintiffs,whoseclaimswererejected bytheSupreme Courtforjurisdidionaldefkiencies,Plaintiffsherehaveatmostidentifiedastatutethatmight

13Though Clapper addressed the injury in factrequirementforArticle lll standing

,

rather than ripeness, it is nevertheless relevant here, as standing and ripeness issues

frequently arise together in the context of pre-enforcem ent challenges .

See D erm er v.

M iami-Dade County, 599 F.3d 1217, (11th Cir. 2010) ($$ln cases involving pre-

enforcementreview,there isoften ddoctrinaloverlay between standing and ripeness

analysis' because these claim s Sinvolve the possibillty of wholly prospective future

injury.''')(quotingElendv.Basham,471F.3d 1199,1204(11thCir.2006)).

#

possibly be improperly enforced againstthem orothers in the future. Indeed,Plaintiffsm ake clear thatitis thepossibility,and notthe certainty,ofenforcem entthatconcernsthem .14 The Eleventh Circuit, however, has directed that only a Ctclear and uncontroverted'' risk enforcem entw ould be ripe forreview on an as-applied challenge. Georgiacarry org,687 F.3d at 1255 n.20. That is certainly not the case here. Therefore, while their uncertainty over D efendants'interpretation of the Book O rdinance m ay be frustrating forPlaintiffs,itdoesnot
giveriseto acasethatisripeforadjudicationunderan as-appliedtheory. Rather,itindicates
thatany fm ure arbitrary enforcem entactionspredicted by Plaintiffsw ould bebestaddressed ifor
when theyarise.15 seeDigitalprops., Inc.v.cï/yofplantation,121F.3d 586,589(11th Cir. 1997)(ripenessdoctrineCtprotectsfederalcourtsfrom engaging inspeculation orwastingtheir resourcesthroughthereview ofpotentialorabstractdisputes').
111. CO NC LU SIO N
Fortheforegoingreasons,Plaintiffs'M otionforRelief(D.E.611isherebyDENIED.

'4Plaintiffs contend,for exam ple,thatthe Book O rdinance's vagueness Sfprevents them

from knowing''whethertheCountymayexerciseitsdiscretion in amannerthatsubjects
Plaintiffs to eviction orprosecution in the future;thatneither they nor num erous other
non-parties ûlknow if D efendants m ay return to their doorsteps w ith eviction notices'''
and thatthe uncertainty created by the B ook O rdinance w orks a çschilling effect ...on

theirattem ptsto identify''','housing.'' P1s.'Br.(D.E.611at7-9.

15Though

the

Florida

A

ction

C

om

m

ittee

is

also

a

nam

ed

Plaintiff

in

this

case ,

Plaintiffs

have scarcely addressed how their proposed as-applied challenge presents a live case or

controversyasappliedtoit. Plaintiffsstate,forthefirsttimeintheirreplybrief,that
the Florida Action Com m ittee tdw illbe forced to expend resources helplng covered

individualsnavigatethisminefield.'' Pls.'Reply (D.E.64jat6. To actually establish organizationalstanding,however,Plaintiffs must show that (a) the Florida Action
Com m ittee'siûm em bersFould otherw isehavestandingto sue in theirown right',(b)the interestsitseeksto protectaregermane to the organization'spurpose;and (c)neither
the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of the individual

membersin thelawsuit.'' Doe v.Stincer,175 F.3d 879,882 (11th Cir.1999)(quoting H unt v. W ashington State Apple A dvertising Com m 'n, 432 U .S. 333, 343 (1977)).
Plaintiffshave noteven attem pted to dem onstrate how the allegationsin theiram ended
com plaintsatisfy these three elem ents.

16

DONE AN D ORDERED inChambers,M iami,Florida,June23,2015.

Copiesfurnished to: Counselofrecord

P UL C. CK UN ITED STA TES D ISTRICT JU D GE

 
 Case: 15-14336 Date Filed: 01/25/2017 Page: 1 of 15
[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 15-14336 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cv-23933-PCH
JOHN DOE #1, JOHN DOE #2, JOHN DOE #3, FLORIDA ACTION COMMITTEE, INC.,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
versus
MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, SUNNY UKENYE, Circuit Administrator for the Miami Circuit Office, Florida Department of Corrections, in his full official capacity,
Defendants - Appellees. ________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida ________________________ (January 25, 2017)

Case: 15-14336 Date Filed: 01/25/2017 Page: 2 of 15
Before TJOFLAT, WILSON, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges. WILSON, Circuit Judge:
We vacate our prior opinion, Doe v. Miami-Dade Cnty., No. 15-14336, 2016 WL 5334979 (11th Cir. Sept. 23, 2016), and substitute the following opinion in its place.
Plaintiffs-Appellants John Doe #1, John Doe #2, John Doe #3, and the Florida Action Committee, Inc. (FAC) (collectively, the Plaintiffs), appeal the district court’s dismissal of their ex post facto challenges to the residency restriction in Miami-Dade County’s Lauren Book Child Safety Ordinance (the Ordinance). On appeal, the Plaintiffs argue that they pleaded sufficient facts to state a claim that the residency restriction is so punitive in effect as to violate the ex post facto clauses of the federal and Florida Constitutions. At this stage, we conclude that Doe #1 and Doe #3 have alleged plausible ex post facto challenges to the residency restriction. Therefore, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I On November 15, 2005, Miami-Dade County (the County) adopted the Ordinance, which imposes, inter alia, a residency restriction on “sexual offenders”
2

Case: 15-14336 Date Filed: 01/25/2017 Page: 3 of 15
and “sexual predators.”1 See Miami-Dade Cty., Fla., Code of Ordinances ch. 21, art. XVII. The Ordinance prohibits a person who has been convicted of any one of several enumerated sexual offenses involving a victim under sixteen years of age from “resid[ing] within 2,500 feet of any school.” Id. § 21-281(a). The 2,500-foot distance is “measured in a straight line from the outer boundary of the real property that comprises a sexual offender’s or sexual predator’s residence to the nearest boundary line of the real property that comprises a school,” rather than “by a pedestrian route or automobile route.” Id. § 21-281(b). There are three exceptions to the County’s residency restriction: (1) “[t]he sexual offender or sexual predator established a residence prior to the effective date of th[e] [O]rdinance”; (2) “[t]he sexual offender or sexual predator was a minor when he or she committed the sexual offense and was not convicted as an adult”; and (3) “[t]he school was opened after the sexual offender or sexual predator established the residence.” Id. § 21-282(1). Violations of the Ordinance are punishable by a fine up to $1,000, imprisonment for up to 364 days, or both. Id. § 21-281(c).
On December 20, 2014, the Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the County, the Florida Department of Corrections, and the Florida Department of Corrections Miami Circuit Administrator, Sunny Ukenye, in his official capacity (collectively,
1 The present text of the Ordinance is reproduced in the Appendix in relevant part. Any differences between the 2005 version, which went into effect on November 25, 2005, and the present version of the Ordinance are immaterial to this appeal.
3

Case: 15-14336 Date Filed: 01/25/2017 Page: 4 of 15
the Defendants), challenging the constitutionality of the County’s residency restriction. Specifically, the Plaintiffs challenged the County’s residency restriction (1) as void for vagueness under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Florida Constitution; (2) as a violation of their substantive due process rights to personal security and to acquire residential property under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Florida Constitution; and (3) as an unconstitutional ex post facto law under the federal and Florida Constitutions. The Defendants moved to dismiss, and the district court dismissed all the claims with prejudice under Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6). The Plaintiffs properly appealed only the dismissal of their ex post facto challenges against the County.
II “We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Hill v. White, 321 F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
III Both the federal and Florida Constitutions prohibit the passage of ex post facto laws. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; Fla. Const. art. I, § 10. An ex post facto law is a law that “appl[ies] to events occurring before its enactment” and that “disadvantage[s] the offender affected by it, by altering the
4

Case: 15-14336 Date Filed: 01/25/2017 Page: 5 of 15
definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime.” Lynce
v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 441, 117 S. Ct. 891, 896 (1997) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). In Smith v. Doe, the Supreme Court outlined a framework
for determining whether Alaska’s sex offender registration and notification
requirements violated the federal Ex Post Facto Clause. See 538 U.S. 84, 92–93,
97, 123 S. Ct. 1140, 1146–47, 1149 (2003). We join our sister circuits in applying
the Smith framework to evaluate an ex post facto challenge to a residency restriction on sexual offenders.2 See Doe v. Snyder, Nos. 15-1536, 15-2346, 15-
2486, slip op. at 5–7 (6th Cir. Aug. 25, 2016) (consolidated); Shaw v. Patton, 823
F.3d 556, 561–62 (10th Cir. 2016); Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 718 (8th Cir.
2005).
The Smith Court noted that Alaska’s statute was retroactive and applied the
following framework to determine whether the statute violated the Ex Post Facto
Clause:
We must ascertain whether the legislature meant the statute to establish civil proceedings. If the intention of the legislature was to impose punishment, that ends the inquiry. If, however, the intention was to enact a regulatory scheme that is civil and nonpunitive, we must further examine whether the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the State’s intention to deem it civil.
2 We evaluate both the federal and state ex post facto challenges under Smith. See Houston v. Williams, 547 F.3d 1357, 1364 (11th Cir. 2008).
5

Case: 15-14336 Date Filed: 01/25/2017 Page: 6 of 15
538 U.S. at 92, 123 S. Ct. at 1146–47 (alteration adopted) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). After determining that the Alaska legislature
intended to “create a civil, nonpunitive regime,” the Court explained that several
factors guide the second part of the analysis:
whether, in its necessary operation, the regulatory scheme: [1] has been regarded in our history and traditions as a punishment; [2] imposes an affirmative disability or restraint; [3] promotes the traditional aims of punishment; [4] has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose; or [5] is excessive with respect to this purpose. See id. at 96–97, 123 S. Ct. at 1149.3 Ultimately, the Court concluded that the
Alaska statute was not punitive and, therefore, did not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause. See id. at 105–06, 123 S. Ct. at 1154.
IV
The County does not contest that its residency restriction applies to
individuals “convicted” of relevant sexual offenses before the passage of the
Ordinance. See Ordinance § 21-281(a); Lynce, 519 U.S. at 441, 117 S. Ct. at 896
(a statute is only retroactive if it “appl[ies] to events occurring before its
enactment” (internal quotation mark omitted)). Therefore, we accept for purposes
3 None of the factors is dispositive and two other factors may be considered in the second step of the Smith framework: whether the regulatory scheme “comes into play only on a finding of scienter” and whether “the behavior to which it applies is already a crime.” See Smith, 538 U.S. at 97, 105, 123 S. Ct. at 1149, 1154. However, the Court explained, these two factors carried little weight in the Court’s analysis of the Alaska statute. See id. at 105, 123 S. Ct. at 1154.
6

Case: 15-14336 Date Filed: 01/25/2017 Page: 7 of 15
of this appeal that the residency restriction applies retroactively. Additionally, the
Plaintiffs do not contest the County’s assertion that the County intended the
Ordinance to be civil and non-punitive. Therefore, we also accept for purposes of
this appeal that the County intended to “create a civil, nonpunitive regime” under
the first step of the Smith analysis. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 96, 123 S. Ct. at 1149.
Finally, only Doe #1 and Doe #3 have properly alleged that the County’s
residency restriction applied retroactively to them—that the restriction applied to
their pre-enactment convictions for qualifying sexual offenses.4 Accordingly, we
need only decide whether Doe #1 and Doe #3 alleged sufficient facts to state a
plausible claim that the County’s residency restriction is so punitive in effect as to
violate the federal and Florida ex post facto clauses under Smith. See Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–79, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949–50 (2009). We conclude they
have done so.
The complaint sufficiently alleged that the County’s residency restriction
4 Construing the complaint in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, Doe #1 was convicted of his relevant sexual offense in 1992, and Doe #3 was convicted of his relevant sexual offense in 1999—both before the County’s residency restriction was enacted in 2005. See Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 17, 48, Doe v. Miami-Dade Cty., No. 1:14-cv-23933-PCH (S.D. Fla. Apr. 3, 2015) [hereinafter Amended Complaint]. Both are also “sexual offenders” under the Ordinance because they are residents of Miami-Dade County and are registered as sexual offenders. Id. at ¶¶ 14, 45; see Ordinance § 21-280(10) (citing Fla. Stat. § 943.0435).
However, Doe #2 only alleged that he was convicted of his relevant sexual offense in 2006. See Amended Complaint at ¶ 32. Thus, Doe #2 failed to allege that the County’s residency restriction retroactively increased his punishment. Similarly, FAC—a non-profit corporation that works to reform the sexual offender laws in Florida—failed to allege that any of its members were convicted of, or even committed, a relevant sexual offense before November 15, 2005. See id. at ¶¶ 55–63.
7

Case: 15-14336 Date Filed: 01/25/2017 Page: 8 of 15
imposes a direct restraint on Doe #1’s and Doe #3’s freedom to select or change residences. Under the “affirmative disability or restraint” factor, “we inquire how the effects of the [Ordinance] are felt by those subject to it.” See Smith, 538 U.S. at 99–100, 123 S. Ct. at 1151 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that the County’s residency restriction severely limits housing options for individuals subject to the restriction, “drastically exacerbat[ing] transience and homelessness.” See Amended Complaint at ¶ 74. Doe #1 and Doe #3 have specifically alleged that they are homeless and that their homelessness resulted directly from the County’s residency restriction “severely restricting available, affordable housing options.” Id. at ¶ 54; accord id. at ¶ 28. Doe #1 was twice instructed by probation officers to live at homeless encampments after the County’s residency restriction made him unable to live with his sister and he could not find other housing compliant with the restriction. See id. at ¶¶ 18–28. He currently lives at a makeshift homeless encampment near “an active railroad track” (the Encampment).5 See id. at ¶¶ 5, 25. Similarly, Doe #3 sleeps in his car at the Encampment because, “despite repeated attempts, he has been unable to obtain available, affordable rental housing in compliance with the Ordinance.” See id. at ¶¶ 52–53.
5 There are no restroom facilities, sanitary water, or designated shelter at the Encampment, which is technically on private property. See id. at ¶¶ 120–23.
8

Case: 15-14336 Date Filed: 01/25/2017 Page: 9 of 15
Doe #1 and Doe #3 also sufficiently alleged that the County’s residency restriction is excessive in comparison to its public safety goal of addressing recidivism.6 See Smith, 538 U.S. at 105, 123 S. Ct. at 1154 (regulation is excessive if “[un]reasonable in light of [its] nonpunitive objective”). Accepting the facts alleged in the complaint as true, the County’s residency restriction is “among the strictest in the nation.” See Amended Complaint at ¶ 74. An individual becomes subject to the restriction based solely on the fact of his or her prior conviction for a listed sexual offense, without regard to his or her individual “risk of recidivism over time.” See id. at ¶¶ 72–73. And the County’s residency restriction applies for life, even after an individual no longer has to register as a sexual offender under Florida law and is no longer subject to the state law 1,000-foot residency restriction. See id. at ¶ 72. The County’s residency restriction also applies “even if there is no viable route to reach the school within 2500 feet.” Id. at ¶ 141. The County adopted this broad residency restriction even though “there is no evidence that residency restrictions have any impact on recidivism or public safety, or that an individual’s residential proximity to a school, is a salient risk factor in sexual offending.” Id. at ¶ 140.
6 The stated intent of the Ordinance “is to serve the County’s compelling interest to promote, protect and improve the health, safety and welfare of the citizens of the County, particularly children, by prohibiting sexual offenders and sexual predators from establishing temporary or permanent residence in certain areas where children are known to regularly congregate.” The County made findings that, inter alia, “[s]exual offenders are extremely likely to use physical violence and to repeat their offenses.” See Ordinance § 21-278.
9

Case: 15-14336 Date Filed: 01/25/2017 Page: 10 of 15
The Plaintiffs further argue that the County’s residency restriction not only fails to advance, but also directly undermines, the goal of public safety. The complaint stated that “[t]he only demonstrated means of effectively managing reentry and recidivism [of former sexual offenders] are targeted treatment, along with maintaining supportive, stable environments that provide access to housing, employment, and transportation,” rather than by “[making] categorical assumptions about groups of former sexual offenders.” See id. at ¶¶ 137, 143. The complaint also alleged that the transience and homelessness that the residency restriction causes undermine sexual offenders’ abilities to successfully re-enter society and increase the risk of recidivism by “mak[ing] it more difficult for Plaintiffs and others to secure residences, receive treatment, and obtain and maintain employment.” See id. at ¶¶ 146, 149. In light of the foregoing, we conclude that Doe #1 and Doe #3 have stated a plausible claim that the County’s residency restriction is so punitive in effect as to violate the ex post facto clauses of the federal and Florida Constitutions.
V Our role in reviewing the grant of a 12(b)(6) motion merely is to determine whether the plaintiffs stated a plausible claim, such that they should be permitted to proceed to discovery. See Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). Here, Doe #1 and Doe #3 alleged sufficient facts to
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raise plausible claims that the County’s residency restriction is so punitive in effect that it violates the ex post facto clauses of the federal and Florida Constitutions. Whether Doe #1 and Doe #3 ultimately prevail is a determination for a future stage of this litigation. Thus, we reverse the district court’s grant of the County’s motion to dismiss as to Doe #1 and Doe #3’s ex post facto challenges and remand for further proceedings.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
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Appendix
ARTICLE XVII. - THE LAUREN BOOK CHILD SAFETY ORDINANCE
Sec. 21-277. - Title.
Article XVII shall be known and may be cited as “The Lauren Book Child Safety Ordinance.”
Sec. 21-278. - Findings and Intent.
(a) Repeat sexual offenders, sexual offenders who use physical violence and sexual offenders who prey on children are sexual predators who present an extreme threat to the public safety. Sexual offenders are extremely likely to use physical violence and to repeat their offenses. Most sexual offenders commit many offenses, have many more victims than are ever reported, and are prosecuted for only a fraction of their crimes. This makes the cost of sexual offender victimization to society at large, while incalculable, clearly exorbitant.
(b) The intent of this article is to serve the County’s compelling interest to promote, protect and improve the health, safety and welfare of the citizens of the County, particularly children, by prohibiting sexual offenders and sexual predators from establishing temporary or permanent residence in certain areas where children are known to regularly congregate, to prohibit renting or leasing certain property to sexual offenders or sexual predators if such property is located where children are known to regularly congregate and to restrict sexual offenders’ and sexual predators’ access to parks and child care facilities.
. . . .
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Sec. 21-280. - Definitions.
The following terms and phrases when used in this article shall have the meanings ascribed to them in this section unless the context otherwise requires:
. . . .
(4) “Convicted” or “conviction” means a determination of guilt which is the result of a trial or the entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, regardless of whether adjudication is withheld. A conviction for a similar offense includes, but is not limited to: a conviction by a federal or military tribunal, including courts-martial conducted by the Armed Forces of the United States, and includes a conviction or entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere resulting in a sanction in any state of the United States or other jurisdiction. A sanction includes, but is not limited to, a fine, probation, community control, parole, conditional release, control release, or incarceration in a state prison, federal prison, private correctional facility, or local detention facility.
. . . .
(7) “Permanent residence” means a place where a person abides, lodges, or resides for fourteen (14) or more consecutive days.
(8) “Reside” or “residence” means to have a place of permanent residence or temporary residence.
(9) “School” means a public or private kindergarten, elementary, middle or secondary (high) school.
(10) “Sexual offender” shall have the meaning ascribed to such term in Section 943.0435, Florida Statutes.
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(11) “Sexual offense” means a conviction under Section 794.011, 800.04, 827.071, 847.0135(5) or 847.0145, Florida Statutes, or a similar law of another jurisdiction in which the victim or apparent victim of the sexual offense was less than sixteen (16) years of age, excluding Section 794.011(10), Florida Statutes.
(12) “Sexual predator” shall have the meaning ascribed to such term in Section 775.21, Florida Statutes.
(13) “Temporary residence” means a place where the person abides, lodges, or resides for a period of fourteen (14) or more days in the aggregate during any calendar year and which is not the person’s permanent address, or a place where the person routinely abides, lodges, or resides for a period of four (4) or more consecutive or nonconsecutive days in any month and which is not the person’s permanent residence.
Sec. 21-281. - Sexual Offender and Sexual Predator Residence Prohibition; Penalties.
(a) It is unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a violation of Section 794.011 (sexual battery), 800.04 (lewd and lascivious acts on/in presence of persons under age 16), 827.071 (sexual performance by a child), 847.0135(5) (sexual acts transmitted over computer) or 847.0145 (selling or buying of minors for portrayal in sexually explicit conduct), Florida Statutes, or a similar law of another jurisdiction, in which the victim or apparent victim of the offense was less than sixteen (16) years of age, to reside within 2,500 feet of any school.
(b) The 2,500-foot distance shall be measured in a straight line from the outer boundary of the real property that comprises a sexual offender’s or sexual predator’s residence to the nearest boundary line of
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the real property that comprises a school. The distance may not be measured by a pedestrian route or automobile route, but instead as the shortest straight line distance between the two points.
(c) Penalties. A person who violates section 21-281(a) herein shall be punished by a fine not to exceed $1,000.00 or imprisonment in the County jail for not more than 364 days or by both such fine and imprisonment.
Sec. 21-282. - Exceptions.
(1) A sexual offender or sexual predator residing within 2,500 feet of any school does not commit a violation of this section if any of the following apply:
(a) The sexual offender or sexual predator established a residence prior to the effective date of this ordinance. The sexual offender or sexual predator shall not be deemed to have established a residence or registered said residence for purposes of this section, if the residence is an illegal multifamily apartment unit within a neighborhood zoned for singlefamily residential use.
(b) The sexual offender or sexual predator was a minor when he or she committed the sexual offense and was not convicted as an adult.
(c) The school was opened after the sexual offender or sexual predator established the residence.
(2) Section 21-282(1)(a) and (1)(c) herein shall not apply to a sexual offender or sexual predator who is convicted of a subsequent sexual offense as an adult after residing at a registered residence within 2,500 feet of a school.
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

David J. Smith Clerk of Court

ELBERT PARR TUTTLE COURT OF APPEALS BUILDING 56 Forsyth Street, N.W. Atlanta, Georgia 30303
January 25, 2017

MEMORANDUM TO COUNSEL OR PARTIES
Appeal Number: 15-14336-BB Case Style: John Doe #1, et al v. Miami-Dade County, Florida, et al District Court Docket No: 1:14-cv-23933-PCH

For rules and forms visit www.ca11.uscourts.gov

This Court requires all counsel to file documents electronically using the Electronic Case Files ("ECF") system, unless exempted for good cause. Enclosed is a copy of the court's decision filed today in this appeal. Judgment has this day been entered pursuant to FRAP 36. The court's mandate will issue at a later date in accordance with FRAP 41(b).
The time for filing a petition for rehearing is governed by 11th Cir. R. 40-3, and the time for filing a petition for rehearing en banc is governed by 11th Cir. R. 35-2. Except as otherwise provided by FRAP 25(a) for inmate filings, a petition for rehearing or for rehearing en banc is timely only if received in the clerk's office within the time specified in the rules. Costs are governed by FRAP 39 and 11th Cir.R. 39-1. The timing, format, and content of a motion for attorney's fees and an objection thereto is governed by 11th Cir. R. 39-2 and 39-3.
Please note that a petition for rehearing en banc must include in the Certificate of Interested Persons a complete list of all persons and entities listed on all certificates previously filed by any party in the appeal. See 11th Cir. R. 26.1-1. In addition, a copy of the opinion sought to be reheard must be included in any petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. See 11th Cir. R. 35-5(k) and 40-1 .
Counsel appointed under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) must submit a voucher claiming compensation for time spent on the appeal no later than 60 days after either issuance of mandate or filing with the U.S. Supreme Court of a petition for writ of certiorari (whichever is later) via the eVoucher system. Please contact the CJA Team at (404) 335-6167 or cja_evoucher@ca11.uscourts.gov for questions regarding CJA vouchers or the eVoucher system.
For questions concerning the issuance of the decision of this court, please call the number referenced in the signature block below. For all other questions, please call Carol R. Lewis, BB at (404) 335-6179.
Sincerely,
DAVID J. SMITH, Clerk of Court
Reply to: Djuanna Clark Phone #: 404-335-6161

OPIN-1 Ntc of Issuance of Opinion

 
 974 F.3d 1333 (2020)
John DOE #6, John Doe #5, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.
MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 19-10254.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
September 9, 2020.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cv-23933-PCH.
Brandon Jerel Buskey, Ezekiel Edwards, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, New York, NY, Nancy Gbana Abudu, Southern Poverty Law Center, Decatur, Ga, Jeffrey M. Hearne Legal Services of Greater Miami, Inc., Miami, FL, Valerie Jonas, Weitzner Jonas, PA, Miami, FL, Daniel Boaz Tilley, ACLU Foundation of Florida, Inc., Miami, FL, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Michael B. Valdes, Bernard Pastor, Miami-Dade County Attorney's Office, Miami, FL, for DefendantAppellee.
Before MARTIN and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges, and WATKINS,[*] District Judge.
1335*1335 MARTIN, Circuit Judge.
John Doe #5 and John Doe #6 (the "Does") are former sex offenders and currently homeless residents of Miami-Dade County, Florida (the "County"). Asserting violations of the federal and Florida constitutions, the Does sued the County over County Ordinance No. 05-206 (the "Ordinance"), which restricts certain sex offenders from living within 2,500 feet of a school. They alleged that the Ordinance violates the ex post facto clauses of both the federal and state constitutions because the residency restriction amounted to an impermissible retroactive criminal punishment.
On the last day of a five-day bench trial, the Does moved to conform their pleadings to the evidence under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b). To this point, the Does had only pursued a facial challenge to the Ordinance. Through their motion, they hoped to add an as-applied challenge, because they believed the trial evidence supported such a challenge. The District Court denied their motion and ruled against the Does on the merits of their facial challenge.
On appeal, the Does argue that the District Court should have granted their Rule 15(b) motion and permitted them to bring an as-applied challenge to the Ordinance. Their argument fails. Rule 15(b) allows parties to add unpled issues to a case if those issues have been tried with the express or implied consent of the parties. But one must comply with the notice demands of procedural due process before an unpled issue can be added. And here, the Does did not give fair notice to the County of their as-applied theory of relief. Beyond this, the County says it would have defended the Ordinance differently had it known that the Does sought this relief. For this reason, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Does' Rule 15(b) motion.

I.
In 2005, the County enacted Ordinance No. 05-206, which prohibits people convicted of certain sex offenses against a victim 15 years or younger from residing within 2,500 feet of a school. The Ordinance applies retroactively to sex offenders convicted before its enactment. The Ordinance contains a "grandfather clause" that exempts offenders who established their residence before the Ordinance was enacted, or who established their residence before a school opened within 2,500 feet of their residence. Initially, the Ordinance allowed municipalities within the County to opt out of the Ordinance and enact more restrictive ordinances to the same effect. Twenty-four municipalities in the County chose to adopt more restrictive measures, which caused affected sex offenders to be relegated to unincorporated areas of the County or to cities without sex offender residency restrictions. In January 2010, the County amended the Ordinance to preempt these more restrictive municipal ordinances.
At some point after the Ordinance was passed, a homeless encampment (the "71st Street Encampment") overwhelmingly occupied by former sex offenders sprung up in the County. At its busiest, the 71st Street Encampment sheltered up to 270 homeless people. John Doe #5 and John Doe #6 are two homeless men who once lived in the 71st Street Encampment. Both were convicted of sex offenses against a minor before the Ordinance became law in 2005.
Mr. Doe #5 was convicted in 1994 of lewd and lascivious assault on a child and attempted sexual battery on a minor. He 1336*1336 spent time in prison for violating his probation from 1996 to 2001 and 2002 to 2003. From 2006 to 2014, he was incarcerated for failing to report his address in compliance with sex offender registration requirements. Since his release from prison in March 2014, he has been homeless. Mr. Doe #5 lives with advanced Parkinson's disease, which causes significant tremors. He is unemployed and receives disability benefits as his only source of income. Currently, Mr. Doe #5 spends his days at a family member's home, but he cannot sleep there because doing so would violate the Ordinance. At night, he sleeps in the front seat of his son's car, parked in front of a warehouse.
Mr. Doe #6 pled guilty in 2004 to one charge of lewd and lascivious molestation of a child less than 12 years of age. He lived in a home that was grandfathered in under the Ordinance until 2013, when his landlord learned he was a sex offender and refused to renew his lease. From 2013 to 2015, Mr. Doe #6 lived with various friends, but this arrangement put him in violation of the Ordinance because his friends' homes were within 2,500 feet of a school. In January 2015, he was arrested and charged with violating the sex offender registration requirement by not living at his reported address. He was sentenced to probation and, because he was unable to find Ordinance-compliant housing, he became homeless. His probation officer directed him to the 71st Street Encampment, where he lived from August 2015 until April 2018. Mr. Doe #6, who works in the culinary field, searched for housing close to his work. He has not been successful in his search, so he sleeps on a street corner.
In October 2014, John Does #1, #2, and #3 filed suit against the County bringing multiple constitutional challenges to the Ordinance. The District Court dismissed their complaint for failure to state a claim. On appeal, this Court reversed dismissal of their claims under the ex post facto clause of the Florida and United States constitutions. Doe v. Miami-Dade County, 846 F.3d 1180, 1182 (11th Cir. 2017).
In October 2017, John Doe #3—along with new plaintiffs John Does #4, #5, #6, and #7—filed a second amended complaint alleging ex post facto clause violations under the Florida and federal constitutions. The complaint styled their suit as a facial challenge. It asked the District Court to "[i]ssue a permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants from enforcing the Ordinance against anyone

whose qualifying offense occurred before the enactment of the Ordinance." John Doe #3 then withdrew from the case, leaving only Does #4-7. Throughout the pretrial proceedings, the Does maintained they were asserting a facial challenge to the Ordinance.
The County moved for summary judgment, and the District Court denied the motion. The court heard the claims at a five-day bench trial on October 22-26, 2018. John Does #4, #5, #6, and #7 testified at the trial about their criminal history and their search for housing. On the next-to-last day of trial, the District Court remarked:
Since this is a facial and not an as-applied challenge, we heard a lot from the Does about their individual circumstances. Some of them are pretty compelling. Maybe they would survive the asapplied challenge because it's so onerous for them to be able to comply with the statute and go about any kind of reasonable existence. But we don't have an as-applied case here. So think about that. I'm kind of addressing the plaintiffs' counsel in this case.
The next day, Does #4-7 moved to conform the pleadings to the evidence under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b). In their motion, they asked to "add an as-applied 1337*1337 challenge to their second amended complaint." They argued that they already established an as-applied ex post facto claim at trial by introducing evidence of the individual Does' circumstances, and that the County implicitly consented to allow the Does to try this theory of the case.
The County objected. The County said it had not received notice of an as-applied constitutional claim and would suffer prejudice if the Does were allowed to amend. The District Court agreed with the County that the parties had not implicitly litigated an as-applied attack on the Ordinance, and that the County would suffer prejudice if the claim were to be added.
After the bench trial, the District Court ruled for the County based on its findings of fact and conclusions of law. It held that Does #4-7 could not succeed on their facial challenge to the Ordinance because the County established the Ordinance as rationally related to the goal of protecting children in the community. The court also held that the Ordinance's effect was not excessive with respect to its purpose of public safety. The court noted that the plaintiffs "could have a potential `as applied' challenge to the Ordinance" based on their "particular hardships ... [including] mental or physical disabilities," but that "no Doe has alleged an `as applied' claim here." The District Court then entered final judgment for the County.
Does #4-7 appealed. Tragically, John Doe #4 and John Doe #7 both passed away in 2019 while this appeal was pending. John Does #5 and #6 are the sole remaining plaintiff-appellants. On appeal, the Does dispute the denial of their Rule 15(b) motion.
II.
We review the District Court's ruling on a Rule 15(b) motion for an abuse of discretion. See Jimenez v. Tuna Vessel Granada, 652 F.2d 415, 421-22 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981).[1]
III.
Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs amendments to pleadings, is the unlikely centerpiece of this appeal. Rule 15(b) permits amendments during and after trial. The Does travel under Rule 15(b)(2), which allows amendment of pleadings "for issues tried by consent." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b)(2). Rule 15(b)(2) reads:

When an issue not raised by the pleadings is tried by the parties' express or implied consent, it must be treated in all respects as if raised in the pleadings. A party may move—at any time, even after judgment—to amend the pleadings to conform them to the evidence and to raise an unpleaded issue.
Id. Relying on this subsection, the Does say the County implicitly consented to an as-applied challenge to the Ordinance.[2] And based on this implied consent, they argue that the District Court should have enjoined the Ordinance from being applied to Mr. Doe #5 and Mr. Doe #6.
1338*1338 Rule 15(b) is, at best, an imperfect vehicle for the Does' arguments. This is because a plaintiff asserting a facial challenge does not need to amend her complaint to bring an as-applied challenge. The Supreme Court has explained that "the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges is not so well defined ... that it must always control the pleadings and disposition in every case involving a constitutional challenge." Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 331, 130 S. Ct. 876, 893, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010). Instead, the distinction "goes to the breadth of the remedy employed by the Court, not what must be pleaded in a complaint." Id. Plaintiffs' arguments suggest that if facial and as-applied challenges are identically pled, it follows that a party does not need to amend his pleadings under Rule 15(b) in order to add a facial claim where he has pled an as-applied claim, or vice versa.
Our Court has expressed some support for this argument when the switch in focus from facial to asapplied relief happens at the summary judgment stage. In American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees Council 79 v. Scott ("AFSCME"), 717 F.3d 851 (11th Cir. 2013), we considered the difference between a facial and an as-applied challenge in the context of amending a complaint. The plaintiff, a government employees' union, asserted a Fourth Amendment claim against a Florida executive order requiring drug testing of all state employees. Id. at 857, 859. Like the Does' complaint, the AFSCME union's complaint used "the terminology of a facial challenge," asking the District Court to enjoin "all employee drug-testing mandated by [the] Executive Order." Id. at 859. The union also "expressly maintained that its challenge was facial prior to filing a motion for summary judgment." Id. at 862. At summary judgment, however, "the Union began recasting its complaint in the terminology of an as-applied challenge," arguing that the statute was unconstitutional "as applied" to certain union members. Id. at 860. The District Court ultimately agreed that the policy was unconstitutional as applied to these members and granted summary judgment to the union. Id. at 861-62.
On appeal, the State argued that "the district court could not have construed the Union's suit as an as-applied challenge at all because the Union's complaint requested only facial relief and the Union insisted during discovery that it was mounting a facial challenge." Id. at 863. The AFSCME Court rejected this argument. The Court explained: "Ordinarily, it is true that, at the summary judgment stage, the proper procedure for plaintiffs to assert a new claim is to amend the complaint in accordance with [Rule] 15(a)," which provides for amending a complaint before trial. Id. (alteration adopted and quotation marks omitted). But it observed that the union did not need to amend its complaint under Rule 15 because it was "not stating a new claim, only clarifying the scope of its desired remedy." Id. Our Court stated that "the line between facial and as-applied relief is a fluid one" and "perhaps the best understanding of constitutional challenges is that there is no single distinctive category of facial, as opposed to as-applied, litigation." Id. at 865 (alteration adopted and quotation marks omitted).
The Does argue that their case is just like AFSCME, and thus they should receive as-applied relief from the Ordinance. Unlike the AFSCME plaintiffs, however, the Does have styled their arguments under Rule 15 as a requested amendment to the pleadings. And, unlike AFSCME, the Does did not seek to introduce an as-applied challenge at summary judgment. Instead, they waited to raise the

issue at the end of trial. On this record, the parties agree that the Does' ability to receive asapplied 1339*1339 relief turns on the requirements of Rule 15(b).
Despite our misgivings about Rule 15(b)'s application, we evaluate the Does' arguments under the framework of that Rule. We do not decide whether the Does might have succeeded by making arguments outside of Rule 15(b). Only in their reply brief on appeal do the Does acknowledge that, while they "used a Motion under Rule 15(b) to request as-applied relief,... AFSCME suggests that it was not necessary to amend the pleading" to receive this relief.[3] Because this argument appeared for the first time in the Does' reply brief, we consider it waived. See McGinnis v. Ingram Equip. Co., 918 F.2d 1491, 1495-96 (11th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
Thus, we return to the text of Rule 15(b). As we've said, Rule 15(b) permits amendment where unpled issues have been tried by the implied consent of the parties. "[I]mplied consent under Rule 15(b) will not be found if the defendant will be prejudiced; that is, if the defendant had no notice of the new issue, if the defendant could have offered additional evidence in defense, or if the defendant in some other way was denied a fair opportunity to defend." Cioffe v. Morris, 676 F.2d 539, 541-42 (11th Cir. 1982). We affirm the judgment of the District Court because the County had no notice of the as-applied challenge and that it would be prejudiced if such a challenge were added to the pleadings at the close of trial.
A. Notice of the As-Applied Challenge
First, the County did not receive sufficient notice of the Does' as-applied ex post facto claim. "[T]rial of unpled issues by implied consent is not lightly to be inferred" and must comply with "the notice demands of procedural due process." Jimenez, 652 F.2d at 422. The presence of implied consent "depends on whether the parties recognized that an issue not presented by the pleadings entered the case at trial." Id. at 421. For example, "[f]ailure to object to evidence raising issues outside of the pleadings constitutes implied consent as long as the evidence is not relevant to issues already within the pleadings." United States ex rel. Seminole Sheet Metal Co. v. SCI, Inc., 828 F.2d 671, 677 (11th Cir. 1987). On the other hand, "[t]he introduction of evidence arguably relevant to pleaded issues cannot serve to give a party fair notice that new issues are entering the case." Wesco Mfg., Inc. v. Tropical Attractions of Palm Beach, Inc., 833 F.2d 1484, 1487 (11th Cir. 1987).
The Does do not show that the County had notice of its as-applied theory of relief. First, the County did not agree to the admission of evidence supporting an as-applied ex post facto challenge that was irrelevant to the facial ex post facto challenge. Of course, evidence introduced at trial about the individual Does' experiences with the Ordinance, the criminal justice system, housing, and homelessness could have supported an as-applied challenge. But the Does admit that the evidence about their personal experiences was also 1340*1340 relevant to their facial challenge. For this reason, the Does did not have implied consent from the County by way of the introduction of evidence that was irrelevant to their already-pleaded claims.
Second, the County did not have notice of an as-applied claim because it received assurances that the Does were not interested in an as-applied claim. Indeed, the County points to as many as 20 instances since the filing of the initial complaint in October 2014 in which the Does arguably disclaimed an as-applied challenge. See Appellee's Br. at 27-29.
The Does urge us to look only at their representations about the second amended complaint—the operative pleading—which they filed in October 2017. They point out that the second amended complaint, while using broad language evocative of a facial challenge, does not expressly limit the Does' ex post facto claim to a facial theory. But, even addressing only their second amended

complaint, the Does continued to assert from this point on that their ex post facto claim was facial, not as-applied. For instance, at a pretrial calendar call in October 2018 (prior to the bench trial), the District Court asked, "[I]t's a facial challenge only; right?" The Does' counsel replied, "Yes." And on the first day of trial, the Does' counsel remarked, "As the County has pointed out numerous times, [this case] is a facial challenge."
Relying on AFSCME, the Does seem to argue that a defendant litigating a facial challenge always implicitly consents to an as-applied challenge. Under Rule 15(b)'s framework, we do not see how this could be so. Rule 15(b) requires notice to the opposing party, and the Does did not provide this notice. The District Court therefore did not abuse its discretion in holding that Rule 15(b) did not permit adding an as-applied challenge.
B. Substantial Prejudice from the Addition of an AsApplied Challenge
Beyond this, the County made a showing of substantial prejudice from the addition of an as-applied challenge. "[A]n implied amendment of the pleadings will not be permitted where it results in substantial prejudice to a party." Int'l Harvester Credit Corp. v. E. Coast Truck, 547 F.2d 888, 890 (5th Cir. 1977). Prejudice turns on "whether [the defendant] had a fair opportunity to defend and whether [the defendant] could offer any additional evidence if the case were to be retried on a different theory." Id. (quotation marks omitted); see also 6A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Proc. § 1493 (3d ed. Apr. 2020 update) ("Prejudice in [Rule 15(b)'s] context means a lack of opportunity to prepare to meet the unpleaded issue."). The District Court also did not abuse its discretion by holding that the County would be unduly prejudiced if the Does added an as-applied challenge.
Some background on the ex post facto clause is helpful to understanding the parties' arguments. Article I, § 10, of the Constitution prohibits States from enacting any ex post facto, or retroactive, increases in criminal punishment or changes in the definition of crimes. See Cal. Dep't of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 504, 115 S. Ct. 1597, 1601, 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995). A civil law that applies retroactively, like the Ordinance, can violate the ex post facto clause in two ways. First, the law is unconstitutional if the legislature intended to impose punishment. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92, 123 S. Ct. 1140, 1147, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003). Second, the law is unconstitutional if "the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the State's intention to deem it civil." Id. (alteration adopted and quotation marks omitted). At trial, the Does argued the Ordinance was 1341*1341 unconstitutional in both ways. The District Court rejected both arguments, holding that the County had not enacted the Ordinance with punitive intent and that the punitive effect of the Ordinance was not so excessive as to transform it into a criminal penalty.
On appeal, the Does say that the County would not be prejudiced by the addition of an as-applied challenge. The Does point out that the County sought ample information about the individual plaintiffs in discovery. The County asked Does #5 and #6 about their addresses, employment, income and savings, government benefits, search for Ordinance-compliant housing, history of homelessness, thoughts on the burden imposed by the Ordinance, budget for rent, relationship and family history, supervised release history, potential roommates, and history of sexual activity with minors. The Does also identify portions of the trial during which the County questioned the Does about their offenses, their acceptance of responsibility, and their housing search.
The County says it would be prejudiced. It points out that to survive a facial constitutional challenge, the County needed to show that the Ordinance's overall effect on all covered sex offenders was not so punitive that it constituted a criminal penalty. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 92, 123 S. Ct. at 1147. After

trial, the District Court held that the County made this showing because the Ordinance was not excessively punitive toward covered offenders. For example, the court found that "most registered sex offenders subject to the Ordinance have found housing" and "there are other more significant causes of homelessness in Miami-Dade County, irrespective of the Ordinance." The court also held that the Ordinance's restrictions were not excessive in relation to their purpose, because "there is credible evidence that residency restrictions deter the opportunity and `urge' to reoffend, including unrefuted evidence that a significant percentage of sex offenders find residency restrictions helpful in preventing them from reoffending."
But to refute an as-applied challenge, the County would have needed to show that the Ordinance's effect on the Does was not excessively punitive in relation to its purpose. For this reason, the County argues that it would have litigated its case differently if it had known the Does sought individualized relief from the Ordinance. The County says it would have cross-examined the Does more extensively, introduced more evidence to impeach the Does, asked the Does to undergo physical or mental examinations, hired expert witnesses to evaluate the Does' "individualized recidivism concerns," and called as witnesses the professionals who treated the Does. Instead, while defending against the facial challenge, the County limited its cross-examination of the Does and introduced no evidence about the Does' personal risks of recidivism. We are persuaded that the County would have made different choices at trial had it anticipated an as-applied challenge to the Ordinance, because would have needed to show the Ordinance's effects on the Does were proportional to the Does' risks of recidivism. For this reason, we cannot reverse the denial of the Does' Rule 15(b) motion.
* * *
On this record, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Does' motion. The County did not implicitly consent to the Does' as-applied challenge within the meaning of Rule 15(b), and it would suffer prejudice from the addition of such a challenge.
AFFIRMED.
[*] Honorable W. Keith Watkins, United States District Judge for the Middle District of Alabama, sitting by designation.
[1] In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this Court held that decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down before close of business on September 30, 1981, are binding on the Eleventh Circuit. Id. at 1209.
[2] The Does do not argue that the County expressly consented to the as-applied challenge. Nor could they, because the County objected to the Rule 15(b) motion and continues to oppose amendment of the pleadings on appeal. See Borden, Inc. v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 772 F.2d 750, 758 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that "objection to the amendment at the close of trial and [an] appeal indicates that [a party] did not expressly consent to the trial of [unpled] issues").
[3] True, the Does referenced AFSCME in their opening brief to this court. However, they did so to say that their facial challenge to these ordinances was not actually so different from what an as-applied challenge would have looked like. Essentially the argument made in the Does's opening brief is that the as-applied claim it now seeks to assert is not really so different than the facial challenge it actually asserted. As the Does point out, our court has recognized that the difference between a facial challenge and an as-applied challenge is "not so well defined." AFSCME, 717 F.3d at 863. However that recognition has less application here where the Does affirmatively disavowed that they were making an as applied challenge. See id. at 864.