IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 1

COMMISSION,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

V.

WOODBRIDGE CORPORATION,

Defendant.

w-90 gg-o~7O-I:v-

Civil Action No.

ECF

JURY TRIAL DEMAND

This is an action under Title I of t.he Ameri Disabilities Act of 1990 to correct unlawful employment practices on the basis of disability and to provide appropriate relief to Betty Ross, Delores Anderson and other similarly situated individuals who were adversely affected by such practices. The Commission alleges that Betty Ross, Delores Anderson and other applicants for employment were not hired by Woodbridge Corporation because of disability as more fully set forth in paragraph 8 below.
VENUE 1. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 451, 1331, 1337, 1343 and 1345. This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to Section 107(a) of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ('lADA1l), 42 U.S.C.

§ 12117(a), which incorporates by reference Section 706(f) (1) and (3) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. s200Oe-5(f)(l) and (3) and pursuant to Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. §1981a.
2. The employment practices alleged to be unlawful were and are now being committed within the jurisdiction of the Untied States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, Western Division.
3. Plaintiff, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "Commission"), is the agency of the United States of America charged with the administration, interpretation and enforcement of Title I of the ADA and is expressly authorized to bring this action by Section 107(a) of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 5 12117(a), which incorporates by reference Sections 706(f)(l) and (3) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(f) (1) and (3).
4. At all relevant times, Defendant, Woodbridge Corporation has continuously been a Wisconsin corporation doing business in the State of Missouri and the City of North Kansas City, and has continuously had at least 15 employees.
5. At all relevant times, Defendant has continuously been an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce under Section lOl(5) of the ADA, 42 U.S.C.§ 12111(5), and Section
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lOl(7) of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 5 12111(7), which incorporates by reference Sections 701(g) and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §s 2000e(g) and (h).
6. At all relevant times, Defendant has been a covered entity under Section lOl(2) of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2).
TEMGNT OF CT,7. More than thirty days prior to the institution of this lawsuit, Betty Ross and Delores Anderson filed charges with the Commission alleging violations of Title I of the ADA by Defendant. All conditions precedent to the institution of this lawsuit have been fulfilled. 8. Since at least May 1, 1994, Defendant has engaged in unlawful employment practices at its North Kansas City, Missouri facility, in violation of Section 102(a) and (b) (6) of Title I of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §12112(a) and (b) (6). Defendant failed and refused to hire Betty Ross, Delores Anderson and other applicants for employment because they had a disability or a record of a disability, carpal tunnel syndrome, or Defendant regarded them as having a disability, carpal tunnel syndrome. 9. The effect of the practices complained of in paragraph 8 above has been to deprive Betty Ross, Delores Anderson and other applicants for employment of equal employment
3

opportunities and otherwise adversely affect their status as applicants for employment, because of disability.
10. The unlawful employment practices complained of in paragraph 8 above were and are intentional.
11. The unlawful employment practices complained of in paragraph 8 above were and are done with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of Betty Ross, Delores Anderson and other similarly situated applicants for employment.
R FOR RETJ_EF Wherefore, the Commission respectfully requests that this Court:
A. Grant a permanent injunction enjoining Defendant, its officers, successors, assigns, and all persons in active concert or participation with it, from engaging in discrimination in hiring and any other employment practice which discriminates on the basis of disability.
B. Order Defendant to institute and carry out policies, practices, and programs which provide equal employment opportunities for qualified individuals with disabilities, and which eradicate the effects of its past and present unlawful employment practices.
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C . Order Defendant to make whole Betty Ross, Delores Anderson and other similarly situated individuals by providing appropriate backpay with prejudgment interest, in amounts to be determined at trial, and other affirmative relief necessary to eradicate the effects of its unlawful employment practices, including but not limited to the rightful place hiring of Betty Ross, Delores Anderson and other similarly situated individuals.
D. Order Defendant to make whole Betty Ross, Delores Anderson and other similarly situated individuals by providing compensation for past and future pecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful employment practices described in paragraph 8 above, in amounts to be determined at trial.
G. Order Defendant to make whole Betty Ross, Delores Anderson and other similarly situated individuals by providing compensation for past and future nonpecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful practices complained of in paragraph 8 above, including emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, loss of enjoyment of life, and humiliation, in amounts to be determined at trial.
H. Order Defendant to pay Betty Ross, Delores Anderson and other similarly situated individuals punitive damages for its malicious and reckless conduct, as described in paragraph 8 above, in amounts to be determined at trial.
5

I. Grant such further relief as the Court deems necessary and proper in the public interest.
J. Award the Commission its costs of this action. JURY TRIAT, DEMAND
The Commission requests a jury trial on all questions of fact raised by its complaint.
C. GREGORY STEWART General Counsel
BARBARA A! SEELY Senior Trial Attorney EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION St. Louis District Office Robert A. Young Bldg. Room 8.100 1222 Spruce St. St. Louis, MO 63103 (314) 539-7916 LOCAL COUNSEL:
THOMAS M. LARSON Assistant U.S. Attorney U.S. Courthouse 400 E. 9th St. Kansas City, MO 64106 (816) 426-3122
6

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff, vs. WOODBRIDGE CORPORATION,
Defendants

) ) ) ) ) Case No.: 99-0370-CV-W-BD ) ECF ) ) ))

COMPLAINT AND JURY TRIAL DEMAND

1. This is an action under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §

12117 et seq. (the “ADA”) to correct unlawful employment practices on the basis of

disability and to provide appropriate relief to Delores Anderson (“Plaintiff”). Plaintiff was

not hired and/or terminated from employment with Defendant Woodbridge Corporation

(“Woodbridge”) due to her disability, as that term is defined by the ADA.

2. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 451, 1331, 1337 & 1343. This

action is authorized and instituted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a), which incorporates

Section 706(f)(1) and (3) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-5(f)(1) and (3) and pursuant to Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42

U.S.C. § 1981a.

3. The employment practices alleged to be unlawful were and are now being committed within

the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri.

4. The EEOC filed suit on behalf of Plaintiff and others on April 12, 1999. Plaintiff has

intervened pursuant to the authority set forth in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1).

1

5. At all relevant times, Defendant has continuously been a Wisconsin corporation doing business in the State of Missouri and the City of North Kansas City, and has continuously had at least 15 employees.
6. At all relevant times, Defendant has been a covered entity under Section 101(2) of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2).
7. More than 30 days prior to the institution of this lawsuit, Plaintiff Delores Anderson filed a charge with the EEOC alleging violation of the ADA by Defendant. All conditions precedent to the institution of this lawsuit have been fulfilled.
8. Since at least January 1, 1997, Defendant has engaged in unlawful employment practices at its North Kansas City, Missouri facility, in violation of the ADA. Defendant hired and promptly fired Plaintiff due to the fact she was disabled, as that term is defined by the ADA.
9. In December, 1996, Plaintiff applied for employment at Woodbridge. 10. Plaintiff was hired by Woodbridge. 11. Shortly after she started work at Woodbridge, she was asked by Woodbridge management to
be examined by the company doctor—Occupational Medicine Associates. 12. Plaintiff was examined by the company doctor. 13. Woodbridge had similarly caused other employees and job applicants to be examined by the
company doctor for the purpose of identifying any disabled employees and/or job applicants. 14. The company doctor communicated to Woodbridge that he believed Ms. Anderson had
bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome.
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15. The company doctor had determined that other individuals referred by Woodbridge before and after Ms. Anderson, had carpal tunnel syndrome.
16. Consequently, Woodbridge informed the Plaintiff that it could not allow her to continue working in production positions because “working in such positions would place you at a high risk for further injury.” (See Exhibit 1 attached)
17. Woodbridge had similarly sent letters to other individuals before and after it sent the letter to Plaintiff, wherein, Woodbridge informed other individuals that they would not be permitted to work after medical examinations.
18. Woodbridge terminated Plaintiff’s employment because of the carpal tunnel syndrome diagnosis.
19. Woodbridge has terminated and failed to hire other employees because of the diagnosis of carpal tunnel syndrome.
20. Even after the EEOC found probable cause in this case, Woodbridge continued to terminate and fail to hire other employees because of the diagnosis of carpal tunnel syndrome.
21. Woodbridge continues to terminate and/or fail to hire employees who are diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome.
22. Woodbridge terminated Plaintiff’s employment because of a disability, as that term is defined by the ADA.
23. The unlawful employment practice complained of was intentional. 24. The unlawful employment practices complained of were and are done with malice or with
reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of Plaintiff.
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25. As a direct and proximate result of defendant’s unlawful acts, Plaintiff has suffered: a) Economic loss in the form of lost wages and lost benefits ; b) Vocational-Professional losses in the form of a detrimental job record, loss of employment, career damage, a diminished career potential, future pecuniary losses; and c) Emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, loss of enjoyment of life and mental
distress in the form of embarrassment, humiliation and anxiety. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully prays that the judgment and finding of this Court be
as follows: A) Declaring that defendant’s actions constitute disability discrimination and retaliation
in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. B) That a permanent injunction should issue prohibiting defendant from discriminating
or retaliating against Plaintiff or others similarly situated; and C) Awarding Plaintiff’s damages, including, but not limited to, backpay, interest on
backpay, reinstatement or future pecuniary losses, damages for emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish and loss of enjoyment of life, and D) Awarding punitive damages in an amount sufficient to punish and deter defendant and others similarly situated from like conduct in the future; and E) Awarding plaintiff the costs and disbursements of this action, including reasonable attorney’s fees, expert witness fees, other expenses, attorney’s fees and costs; and
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F) Retaining full jurisdiction over this action to assure full compliance with the orders of this Court and with applicable law and requiring defendant to file such reports as the Court deems necessary to evaluate compliance; and
G) Granting such additional relief as the court deems just and proper. JURY TRIAL DEMAND
Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury on all issues so triable.
S/ Lee J. Hollis Lee J. Hollis 32189 5100 W. 95th Street Prairie Village, KS 66207 913-385-5400 913-385-5402 (fax) ATTORNEY FOR DELORES ANDERSON
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE This certifies that a copy of the above was sent by
email on 6/16/99 to Barbara Seely at Barbara.Seely@EEOC.gov to Jerry Short at Jerry.Short@usdoj.gov and to Rowdy Meeks at rum@sonnenschein.com.
S/ Lee J. Hollis
5

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff, vs. WOODBRIDGE CORPORATION,
Defendants

) ) ) ) ) Case No.: 99-0370-CV-W-BD ) ECF ) ) ))

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND JURY TRIAL DEMAND

1) This is an action under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §

12117 et seq. (the “ADA”) to correct unlawful employment practices on the basis of disability

and to provide appropriate relief to Delores Anderson (“Plaintiff”). Plaintiff was discriminated

against by Defendant Woodbridge Corporation (“Woodbridge”) due to her disability, as that

term is defined by the ADA.

2) Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 451, 1331, 1337 & 1343. This

action is authorized and instituted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a), which incorporates

Section 706(f)(1) and (3) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-5(f)(1) and (3) and pursuant to Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42

U.S.C. § 1981a.

3) The employment practices alleged to be unlawful were and are now being committed within

the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri.

4) The EEOC filed suit on behalf of Plaintiff and others on April 12, 1999. Plaintiff has

intervened pursuant to the authority set forth in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1).

1

5) At all relevant times, Defendant has continuously been a Wisconsin corporation doing business in the State of Missouri and the City of North Kansas City, and has continuously had at least 15 employees.
6) At all relevant times, Defendant has been a covered entity under Section 101(2) of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2).
7) More than 30 days prior to the institution of this lawsuit, Plaintiff Delores Anderson filed a charge with the EEOC alleging violation of the ADA by Defendant. All conditions precedent to the institution of this lawsuit have been fulfilled.
8) Since at least January 1, 1997, Defendant has engaged in unlawful employment practices at its North Kansas City, Missouri facility, in violation of the ADA. Defendant hired and promptly fired Plaintiff due to the fact she was disabled, as that term is defined by the ADA.
9) In November, 1996, Plaintiff applied for employment at Woodbridge. 10) In late December, 1996, Anderson was asked by Woodbridge to undergo a physical
examination at the office of the company doctor—Occupational Medicine Associates (“OMA”). 11) Plaintiff reported for a medical examination to OMA on December 27, 1996. 12) The examination OMA conducted included a test (called a neurometry test). 13) Woodbridge contended the neurometry test was designed to identify persons who were at risk for repetitive stress injuries. 14) The neurometry test did not show that Plaintiff was at risk for repetitive stress injuries.
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15) The doctor’s note on the OMA form did note, however, that Plaintiff had filed a previous worker’s compensation claim and that she might have a “ condition which may result in increase chance of development of carpal tunnel.”
16) OMA did not identify any restrictions on Anderson’s ability to work. 17) After her medical examination, an employee of OMA called Woodbridge and told someone
there that Plaintiff was “fine.” 18) Consequently, Plaintiff was hired by Woodbridge and put to work. 19) Plaintiff was able to perform the essential functions of her job at Woodbridge. 20) Plaintiff had no physical problems doing her job as an inspector at Woodbridge. 21) OMA sent the results of Plaintiff’s physical to employees at Woodbridge, including, but not
limited to, Randy Haffee, manager of human resources. 22) After Haffee received Plaintiff’s medical information, he saw the doctor’s notation that several
years earlier Plaintiff had reported a worker’s compensation claim. 23) After Haffee received the report on Plaintiff, he called Dr. Carl Foster, an employee of OMA. 24) Woodbridge asked Dr. Foster to have an EMG test conducted on Anderson. 25) Haffee’s decision to request an EMG test was not based on Plaintiff’s work performance,
since she was performing her job satisfactorily. 26) An EMG test is a test which tests for carpal tunnel. 27) Plaintiff was then asked to report to Dr. Harold Joe Pryor on January 8, 1997 for an
examination at 9:15 a.m. 28) Dr. Pryor is not employed by OMA.
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29) Dr. Pryor frequently tested Woodbridge employees for carpal tunnel syndrome, but had never before tested a Woodbridge job applicant for carpal tunnel syndrome.
30) Plaintiff reported to Dr. Pryor at 9:15 a.m. on January 8, 1997. Plaintiff was tested by Dr. Pryor.
31) Plaintiff told Dr. Pryor that she had no symptoms of carpal tunnel in her hands. 32) Dr. Pryor nevertheless opined after testing Plaintiff that “the median nerve sensory and motor
latencies are prolonged across the wrists bilaterally, consistent with the presence of bilateral median nerve entrapment neuropathies and carpal tunnel syndrome.” 33) Dr. Pryor faxed his report on Plaintiff to Dr. Carl Foster at 10:10 a.m. on January 8, 1997. 34) After reviewing the report, Dr. Foster wrote a letter on January 8, 1997 to Roseann Ramsburg at Woodbridge in which he said he reviewed Dr. Pryor’s report, that it confirmed carpal tunnel syndrome and that it was his opinion that any repetitive motion would put Plaintiff at “increased risk for further deterioration of her problems referable to her wrists.” 35) Dr. Foster faxed the letter to Woodbridge on January 8, 1997. 36) On January 9, 1997, Randy Haffey, Woodbridge manager of human resources, advised Plaintiff that based on the test results, they would have to let her go. 37) He wrote a letter to Plaintiff confirming that fact on January 17, 1997. 38) Woodbridge terminated Plaintiff’s employment because she was regarded as disabled and had a record of a disability. 39) Anderson was an individual with a disability, in that she:
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a) Was regarded as having a physical impairment that substantially limited one or more of her major life activities; and
b) Plaintiff had a record of such an impairment. 40) Woodbrige discriminated against Plaintiff becaue of her disability by:
a) Terminating her employment; and b) Not making or discussing with Plaintiff the possibility of reasonable accomodations to the
physical limitations which Woodbridge believed she had; and c) Conducting a medical examination which
i) Was not performed on all job applicants; and ii) Was conducted after the commencement of employment duties; and iii) Performing such an examination when the inquiry was not job-related or consistent
with business necessity; and iv) Not treating the results of the examination as confidential. 41) The unlawful employment practice complained of was intentional. 42) The unlawful employment practices complained of were and are done with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of Plaintiff. 43) As a direct and proximate result of defendant’s unlawful acts, Plaintiff has suffered: a) Economic loss in the form of lost wages and lost benefits ; b) Vocational-Professional losses in the form of a detrimental job record, loss of employment, career damage, a diminished career potential, future pecuniary losses; and
5

c) Emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, loss of enjoyment of life and mental distress in the form of embarrassment, humiliation and anxiety.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully prays that the judgment and finding of this Court be as follows:
A) Declaring that defendant’s actions constitute disability discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act.
B) That a permanent injunction should issue prohibiting defendant from discriminating or retaliating against Plaintiff or others similarly situated; and
C) Awarding Plaintiff’s damages, including, but not limited to, backpay, interest on backpay, reinstatement or future pecuniary losses, damages for emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish and loss of enjoyment of life, and
D) Awarding punitive damages in an amount sufficient to punish and deter defendant and others similarly situated from like conduct in the future; and
E) Awarding plaintiff the costs and disbursements of this action, including reasonable attorney’s fees, expert witness fees, other expenses, attorney’s fees and costs; and
F) Retaining full jurisdiction over this action to assure full compliance with the orders of this Court and with applicable law and requiring defendant to file such reports as the Court deems necessary to evaluate compliance; and
G) Granting such additional relief as the court deems just and proper. JURY TRIAL DEMAND
Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury on all issues so triable. 6

S/ Lee J. Hollis Lee J. Hollis 32189 5100 W. 95th Street Prairie Village, KS 66207 913-385-5400 913-385-5402 (fax) ATTORNEY FOR DELORES ANDERSON
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE This certifies that a copy of the above was sent by
email on 7/6/99 to Barbara Seely at Barbara.Seely@EEOC.gov to Jerry Short at Jerry.Short@usdoj.gov and to Rowdy Meeks at rum@sonnenschein.com.
S/ Lee J. Hollis
7

 
 124 F.Supp.2d 1132 (2000)
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
WOODBRIDGE CORPORATION, Defendant.
No. 99-0370-CV-W-4-ECF.
United States District Court, W.D. Missouri, Western Division.
October 2, 2000.
1133 *1133 Barbara A. Seely, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, St. Louis, MO, Jerry L. Short, U.S. Attorney's Office, Kansas City, MO, for plaintiff.
Rowdy B. Meeks, Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal, Kansas City, MO, for defendant.
ORDER
FENNER, District Judge.
Presently before the Court is the Defendant, Woodbridge Corporation ("Woodbridge")'s Motion for Summary Judgment against the Plaintiff, The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") (Doc. # 73). Also under consideration at this time by the Court is Woodbridge's Motion for Summary Judgment against the Complaint filed by the Intervener Delores Anderson ("Anderson") (Doc. # 70). The EEOC brings this suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") on behalf of 19 job applicants at the Defendant's factory, including intervener Anderson. The EEOC claims that Anderson and other co-applicants were denied promotion due to perceived disabilities in violation of the ADA. For the reasons set forth below the Court hereby GRANTS both Motions brought by the Defendant.
DISCUSSION
I. Standards
Rule 56(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that summary judgment shall be rendered if the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, it is the court's obligation to view the facts in the light most favorable to the adverse party and to allow the adverse party the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Inland Oil and Transport Co. v. United States, 600 F.2d 725, 727-28 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 991, 100 S.Ct. 522, 62 L.Ed.2d 420, (1979). In this case the adverse party to the motion for summary judgment is the Plaintiff.
If there is no genuine issue about any material fact, summary judgment is proper because it avoids needless and costly litigation and promotes judicial efficiency. Roberts v. Browning, 610 F.2d 528, 531 (8th Cir.1979); United States v. Porter, 581 F.2d 698, 703 (8th Cir.1978). The summary judgment procedure is not a "disfavored procedural shortcut." Rather, it is "an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2555, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); see also City of Mt. Pleasant v. Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 273 (8th Cir.1988) . Summary judgment is appropriate against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish that there is a genuine issue for trial about an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 106 S.Ct. at 2553.

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating by reference to portions of pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, the absence of genuine issues 1134 of material fact. However, the moving party is not required to *1134 support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim. Id.
The nonmoving party is then required to go beyond the pleadings and by affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment cannot simply rest on allegations and denials in his pleading to get to a jury without any significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
A genuine issue of material fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. The evidence favoring the nonmoving party must be more than "merely colorable." Id. at 2511. When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (footnote omitted).
The inquiry to be made mirrors the standard for a directed verdict: whether the evidence presented by the party with the onus of proof is sufficient that a jury could properly proceed to return a verdict for that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. Essentially, the question in ruling on a motion for summary judgment and on a motion for directed verdict is whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. Id. at 2512.
II. Facts
Woodbridge is a Missouri corporation producing polyurethane foam pads used in automobile seat covers. Woodbridge employs approximately 160 workers at its Riverside, Missouri plant and is the only foam producing plant in the metropolitan area. The production area of the plant is fast paced and requires repetitive hand and wrist motions while working at the assembly line which moves at approximately 50 feet per minute. These jobs include repetitively placing metal frames on the line for hot polyurethane pouring, removing the molds, cleaning and scrubbing. These positions are known as online production employees because they work directly on the line. Off the line are inspection and repair workers who repetitively repair and pack the molds using knives, foam saws, and glue guns. Collectively these jobs are known as production or manufacturing jobs.
At all relevant times Defendant utilized the medical services of an occupational health clinic ("Clinic"), who conducted the Defendant's post hire/pre-employment physical screening. In 1994 the Clinic, at Defendant's request, developed a specific physical examination program to determine whether individual applicants were suitable for the rigorous demands of the Woodbridge factory. This Woodbridge specific examination was designed to minimize the risks associated with pain and upper extremities problems which had frequently been reported from Woodbridge employees. There were concerns among Woodbridge management of increased problems with Carpal Tunnel Syndrome ("CTS"), because of the repetitive motion of the production positions. Woodbridge apparently wanted to develop a screening program which could identify applicants with CTS or with a high likelihood of developing it. This concern for workers developing CTS arose from OSHA safety concerns and increased cost concerns.
The physicians designing the exam visited the plant and observed the operations and the potential physical difficulties in working there. Among other tests which the physicians implemented in their physical screening was 1135 a neurometry test. This test, while not 100% accurate, was utilized *1135 as a screening device to determine if applicants either had, or were at significantly increased risks of developing, CTS. If the applicant scored at a certain level on the neurometry test then the physicians reported possible median nerve impairment and recommended that the applicant be rejected for production work at Woodbridge.
All of the 19 applicants represented by the EEOC in this suit accepted positions as manufacturers at Woodbridge and subsequently had those offers revoked because their neurometry reports were abnormal. The record reflects

that Woodbridge consistently refused to place any applicant into an hourly production position with an abnormal neurometry score. The record also reflects that the Defendant hired persons regardless of an abnormal neurometry readings for other positions within the company including electricians, tool technicians, secretaries, and white collar positions. There is no evidence which indicates that any decision maker ever formulated an opinion as to whether these rejected applicants were qualified for repetitious positions outside of the Woodbridge company.
III. Analysis
A. Disability Under the ADA
In order to state a cause of action under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that an employer discriminated "against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of the individual." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). In the present Motion, the sole dispute between the parties is whether the applicants in question had a disability as defined in the ADA. The ADA defines a disability as: "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). In the present case the EEOC claims only that the applicants in question were disabled under section C in that they were regarded by Woodbridge as disabled.[1] The parties seem to be in agreement that the applicants' actual alleged condition of CTS is not itself a "disability" as defined in the ADA. See e.g., Gutridge v. Clure, 153 F.3d 898, 901 (8th Cir.1998). However, as discussed below, the erroneous perception of an impairment can be a disability in-and-of-itself under Section C of the ADA.
To be regarded as disabled the applicants in question must be thought of by Woodbridge as having an impairment which significantly limits a major life activity. EEOC v. R.J. Gallagher Co., 181 F.3d 645, 656 (5th Cir.1999). Major life activities include caring for one's self, sitting, standing, lifting, reaching, walking, performing manual tasks, hearing, seeing, breathing, learning, and working. Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 948 (8th Cir.1999). An impairment is considered to be substantially limiting if it
renders an individual unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform, or if it significantly restricts the condition, manner, or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to an average person in the general population.
Id. In determining whether a person is substantially limited in a major life activity a court should consider the nature and severity of the impairment, its anticipated duration, and its long-term impact. Id. This determination must be individualized and made on a case by case basis. Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir.1997).
1136 More specifically, the United States Supreme Court has recently announced a test of sorts for determining *1136 whether an individual is regarded as disabled under the ADA. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999). To make a case for discrimination under Section C of the ADA a plaintiff must show that; (1) the employer mistakenly believed that the applicants had an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity, or (2) the employer mistakenly believed that an actual, non-limiting impairment substantially limits a major life activity. Id. at 2149-50. In this case, the EEOC argues the first of these prongs. Plaintiff contends that Woodbridge mistakenly believed that the applicants were substantially limited in the major life activity of working because Woodbridge mistakenly believed that the applicants either had CTS or were at increased risks of developing it.
In order for an employer to have violated Section (C) of the ADA it is not enough that the employer simply regarded the person as disabled; i.e. "I believe this employee is disabled." Rather, the employer must regard the employee as disabled as defined in the statute. See Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516, 119 S.Ct. 2133, 2138, 144 L.Ed.2d 484 (1999). In other words, in order for the Defendant to have regarded the applicants as disabled from the major life activity of working, the Defendant must have regarded the Plaintiff as being "significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as

compared to the average person having comparable training, skills, and abilities." Id. "[T]o be regarded as substantially limited in the major life activity of working, one must be regarded as precluded from more than a particular job." Id.

The application of the facts of this case to the above stated rule depends in part on the interpretation of this very language. The Defendant only considered the applicants for one type of position, production line workers. So in the strictest sense it is difficult to determine whether the Defendant regarded the applicants as significantly restricted from a broad range or class of positions. However, if courts were to adopt this view then every employer sued under the ADA would simply argue that they only regarded the employee as restricted from performing the particular job for which they were considered. This would eviscerate the purpose behind the "regarded as" prong of the ADA. Therefore, it is this Court's judgment that a court must look to the rationale behind the employer's conclusion that a prospective employee is significantly restricted from performing a specific job.

In a recent unpublished summary judgment opinion this Court faced this very same issue. In Rule v. Missouri Gaming Co., No. 99-0554 (W.D.Mo. filed December 13, 1999), the defendant moved for summary judgment in a case brought by the plaintiff alleging that the defendant did not hire plaintiff as a security guard because of his diabetic condition. The defendant did not feel that a person with diabetes could perform the essential duties of the position which included; "providing security, handling problem situations, patrolling, over seeing boarding, checking IDs, providing crowd control, and helping with emergency situations." Id. at 9. The Court held that these perceptions, if based in reality, would severely limit the plaintiff's ability to engage in a broad range of positions. Id. at 8-9. This Court stated:

1137

Not being able to perform simple tasks such as "patrolling" which generally involves only walking, or checking IDs which involves seeing, would generally prohibit the Plaintiff from a broad range of positions. The Defendant's perception of the Plaintiff would at least prevent him from obtaining positions as any type of security personnel and perhaps an even broader class of positions involving any type of physical exertion or safety responsibility (cab driver, teacher, police person, air traffic controller?). In short, the Defendant's perception *1137 of the Plaintiff's condition, if true, would significantly restrict the Plaintiff's qualifications for a broad range of positions. Considering the evidence in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the Defendant regarded the Plaintiff as disabled.

Id. at 9. This Court continues to find this rationale sound, but it finds the case at bar distinguishable from the Rule case.

In Rule, the defendant did not hire the plaintiff because it felt that plaintiff was not able to sufficiently walk, stand, or see which were essential job functions. If indeed a person could not walk, stand or see then certainly they would be disabled under the ADA. Despite the fact that the plaintiff in Rule was only being considered for one specific position, the reasons he was not given that position (his inability to sufficiently see, stand, and walk) rendered him "disabled" in the eyes of his employer. See Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 188 (3rd Cir.1999). Because the Rule defendant perceived the plaintiff in this light, the Court found that the plaintiff was disabled under Section C.

In the present case, Woodbridge has indicated no similar broad perceptions of the applicants in question. Defendant considered the applicants for very specific jobs (production worker), and determined that their medical condition (CTS or increased risk for CTS), made them unqualified for the position. The record reflects that the Defendant believed the applicants were generally employable, and indeed qualified for other positions at the Woodbridge plant; just not manufacturing positions. The record also clearly reflects that the Defendant's perception of the applicants, whether justified or not, was that they did not consider the applicants qualified for the repetitive motion positions at the Woodbridge plant. While repetitive motion positions can encompass a wide variety of positions, thus raising the Court's suspicions, in this case the Defendant's perceptions were narrow. The applicant's were simply not qualified to perform the high speed and strenuous assembly line and inspection work requiring extremely high volume repetitive motion which was found at the Woodbridge plant. Even construing the evidence in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the record does not reflect that the Defendant's perception of the applicant's abilities would prohibit the applicant's from a broad range or class of positions.

This conclusion is also consistent with, and supported by, the two major United States Supreme Court cases cited by both parties. For instance, in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999), the Court faced the issue of whether an employer/airline regarded an employee/pilot as disabled because the airline refused to hire pilots with severe myopia for global pilot positions. The Court rejected the notion that the airline had regarded the myopic pilots as unable to perform a "class of employment." Id. at 2150. Rather, like the unique Woodbridge manufacturing positions, the Court held that the position of global airline pilot was a single job, and thus the airline did not regard the pilots as having a substantially limiting impairment. Id. at 2151. Also similar to the Woodbridge applicants, the Sutton Court noted that even under the airline's restrictive assumptions concerning the myopic pilots, a wide range of positions were still available to them. Id. These positions even include other piloting positions such as regional pilot, pilot instructors, co-pilot, or courier pilot. Id.
This Court is following the same rationale that the Supreme Court did in Sutton. The record is clear that the only positions for which Woodbridge considered the applicants unqualified to perform due to their perceived risks of CTS was that of manufacturing positions at the Woodbridge plant. That perception, if based in reality, would not prevent the applicants from gaining employment in a wide variety of employment, including other manufacturing 1138 positions. More specifically, the *1138 applicants could still be qualified for manufacturing positions involving repetitive motions. The Defendant's only documented perception of the applicants is that they were not physically qualified to perform the unique requirements of the Woodbridge manufacturing positions. This perception does not prevent the applicants from obtaining employment in a broad class of jobs. Therefore, it is not a disability.
Similarly, in Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 119 S.Ct. 2133, 144 L.Ed.2d 484 (1999), the Supreme Court faced the issue of whether a defendant/employer regarded an employee/mechanic as disabled under the ADA when it refused to hire a mechanic with high blood pressure. Under DOT guidelines, mechanics who work on commercial vehicles were required to be certified. Persons with high blood pressure were not able to obtain such a certification and thus, the defendant refused to hire the mechanic in question. Id. at 2138. As to whether the employer had regarded the plaintiff as having a disability, the Court stated,
[t]he evidence that petitioner is regarded as unable to meet the DOT regulations is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether petitioner is regarded as unable to perform a class of jobs utilizing his skills. At most, petitioner has shown that he is regarded as unable to perform the job of mechanic only when that job requires driving a commercial motor vehicle 0907 a specific type of vehicle used on a highway in interstate commerce.
Id. Furthermore, the Court found that even under the employer's restrictive view of the hypertensive mechanic, he was still qualified for a wide variety of employment including almost any other type of mechanic's position. Id. The Court ultimately held that the mechanic's inability to qualify for one specific type of position could not rise to the level of a disability because an employer who only regards an employee as unable to perform one particular job does not regard the employee as disabled. Id. at 2139.
Once again, in the present case the Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Woodbridge regarded the applicants as unable to perform a class or wide array of employment. Rather, the clear record is that the Defendant only regarded the applicants as unable to perform the positions of Woodbridge manufacturing positions. Furthermore, it is also clear that even under Defendant's restrictive view of the applicants, the applicants were still qualified for a broad class of jobs including those involving repetitive motion. The Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence that the Defendant regarded the applicants as unable to perform any other repetitive motion jobs other than that of the unique and intensive manufacturing positions at Woodbridge. Finally, the Defendant, as the defendant in Murphy, has produced evidence that the applicants were capable of obtaining and performing a wide variety of employment positions. See id. at 2139.
When comparing the present case with the results of the Rule, Sutton, and Murphy cases, it is clear that this case must be dismissed. First, in all four of these cases the employers only actually considered the applicants for one particular position or a narrow range of jobs. However, extending the necessary inquiry into the implications of the employers' perceptions, the comparisons and contrasts between the cases become clear. In Sutton, Murphy, and the present case, the employers' perceptions of the applicants, whether based in reality or not, would not prevent

the applicants from obtaining employment in a broad class of jobs. Even assuming the employers' perceptions to be true, the applicants were still generally employable in numerous and broad classes of jobs.
Contrast that with this Court's decision in Rule. In Rule, this Court concluded that the employer's perception of 1139 the applicant 0907 that he could not perform simple employment tasks such as walking and *1139 seeing 0907 would
preclude the employee from obtaining a very broad class of employment positions. The employer certainly perceived the applicant as disabled because its perception of the employee would prevent the applicant from obtaining numerous positions that might require walking and seeing. Woodbridge held no such broad perceptions of the applicants in this suit. In fact, Woodbridge argues consistently that the applicants are generally employable, including non-manufacturing jobs at their plant. In sum, the facts of this case, applied to binding precedent, require this Court to dismiss the Plaintiff's (and Intervener's) case as to prong C of the ADA.
B. Record of Impairment
The Intervener to this suit, Anderson, has also made a claim under prong B of the ADA by claiming that she had a disability as defined in the ADA because Woodbridge had a record of an impairment to a major life activity. She thus claims that she was denied employment because of a disability in violation of the ADA. For reasons similar to her "regarded as" claim, this claim must also fail.
A person can be considered to be disabled under the ADA if the person is said to have "a record of such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102. In this cases, Anderson claims that Woodbridge had a record of an impairment because one of the Clinic physicians, Dr. Foster, sent Woodbridge a letter stating in relevant part that "it is my professional opinion that any repetitive motion would put this patient at increased risk for further deterioration of her problems referable to her wrists." Anderson claims that this statement creates a record of an impairment because if it were true it would prevent her from obtaining employment in a wide variety of positions. There are several problems with this argument.
First, the record is undisputed that the Clinic created the testing procedures exclusively for Woodbridge, and only evaluated applicants for positions at the Woodbridge plant. Therefore, Dr. Foster's statement must be viewed in that context and not the sweeping interpretation Anderson would have the Court adopt. Second, simply stating that someone is at an increased risk of developing an impairment which arguably removes Anderson from consideration in a broad category of jobs is not the same as saying the person is unqualified. The Doctor simply states that she is increasing her risk of CTS, not that she cannot perform the position. Third, CTS is usually not considered a disability under the ADA. Therefore, even if Anderson was "misclassified" as having CTS as she argues, it is of little consequence. Finally, an employer is allowed to reasonably rely on a doctor's assessment of an employee's abilities as long as the employer does not perceive the employee as disabled. Gerdes v. SwiftEckrich, Inc., 125 F.3d 634, 637-38 (8th Cir.1997). The record does not reflect any perception by Woodbridge that Anderson was disabled; i.e. that she was unable to perform a broad class or range of jobs. Therefore, Anderson has failed in her burden of demonstrating that she had a record of impairment.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the Court holds that the applicants at issue in this suit are not "disabled" as defined in Sections B or C of 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). The Court hereby GRANTS the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as to the claims brought by the EEOC and by the Intervener Anderson. This case is dismissed with prejudice to future actions.[2]
IT IS SO ORDERED
[1] Intervener Anderson also claims that she had a record of an impairment under Section B. This claim will be discussed separately below in Part B.
[2] Two motions remain outstanding; Plaintiff's Motion to File a Surreply Brief (Doc. # 97) and Defendant's Opposition to that Motion and a related Motion to Strike the filed Surreply Brief (Doc # 101). For purposes of the

record, the Plaintiff's Motion to File a Surreply Brief is GRANTED and the Defendant's Opposition and Motion to Strike are DENIED.
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EX, TERMED
U.S. District Court United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri (Kansas City)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:99-cv-00370-GAF

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission et al v. Woodbridge Corporation Assigned to: District Judge Gary A. Fenner Demand: $0 Cause: 42:12101 American with Disabilities Act

Date Filed: 04/12/1999 Date Terminated: 10/02/2000 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Plaintiff

Plaintiff
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

represented by Barbara A. Seely Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Robert Young Federal Building 1222 Spruce Street Room 8.100 St. Louis, MO 63103 (314)539-7916 Fax: (314)539-7895 Email: Barbara.Seely@EEOC.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jerry L. Short Assistant United States Attorney 400 E. 9th St. Room 5510 Kansas City, MO 64106 (816)426-3130 Fax: (816) 426-3165 Email: Jerry.Short@usdoj.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Delores Anderson

Thomas M. Larson United States Attorney 400 E 9th Street Suite 5510 Kansas City, MO 64105 (816)426-3130 Fax: (816) 426-3165 Email: tom.larson@usdoj.gov TERMINATED: 04/29/1999 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barbara A. Seely

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V. Defendant Woodbridge Corporation
Intervenor Delores Anderson

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jerry L. Short (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Michael L. Blumenthal Seyferth Knittig & Blumenthal LLC 300 Wyandotte Street Ste. 430 Kansas City, MO 64105 (816) 756-0700 Fax: (816) 756-3700 Email: mike@skblawfirm.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rowdy B. Meeks H & R Block 4400 Main Street Kansas City, MO 64111 (816) 932-1912 Fax: (816) 753-0037 Email: rowdy.meeks@hrblock.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Lee J Hollis 5100 W. 95th Street Prairie Village, KS 66207 913 385-5400 Fax: (913) 385-5402 Email: leehollis@hollislawfirm.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 04/12/1999
04/12/1999 04/12/1999

#

Docket Text

1 COMPLAINT against Woodbridge Corporation. filed by Barbara A Seely of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Filing fee waived.(Mason, April) Modified on 4/14/1999 (Mason, April). (Entered: 04/14/1999)

NOTICE OF MAGISTRATE ASSIGNMENT handed to plaintiff . (Mason, April) (Entered: 04/14/1999)

2 Notice of Exclusion from EAP handed to plaintiff .(Mason, April)

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04/16/1999
04/19/1999
04/29/1999
05/04/1999 05/17/1999 05/17/1999 05/17/1999
05/18/1999 06/10/1999
06/14/1999 06/15/1999 06/16/1999 06/28/1999 07/06/1999

(Entered: 04/14/1999)
3 MOTION to withdraw/substitute attorney to enter Jerry Short and withdraw Thomas Larson as local counsel on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.(Short, Jerry) (Entered: 04/16/1999)
4 Notice of MAGISTRATE ASSIGNMENT RETURNED filed by Barbara A Seely of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.(Larson, Susan) (Entered: 04/21/1999)
5 ORDER by Judge Sarah W. Hays granting plt's motion to withdraw/substitute attorney Thomas Larson with Jerry L. Short for plt and all further proceedings (Related Doc # 3) (Larson, Susan) (Entered: 05/04/1999)
Remark: order doc. #5 was received for docketing on this date 5/4/99 . (Larson, Susan) (Entered: 05/04/1999)
6 MOTION to intervene on behalf of Delores Anderson.(Hollis, Lee) (Entered: 05/17/1999)
7 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT (related document(s)6) filed by Lee J Hollis on behalf of Delores Anderson.(Hollis, Lee) (Entered: 05/17/1999)
12 COMPLAINT (Intervenor) against. filed by Lee J Hollis on behalf of Delores Anderson.(Hollis, Lee) Modified on 6/16/1999 to show correct filing date of 5/17/99 per order, doc. #11 by Judge Hays (Larson, Susan). (Entered: 06/16/1999)
8 NOTICE OF FILING regarding exhibit attachment filed by Lee J Hollis on behalf of Delores Anderson.(Larson, Susan) (Entered: 05/19/1999)
11 ORDER by Judge Sarah W. Hays granting Delores Anderson's motion to intervene (Related Doc # 6). The clerk shall file Ms. Anderson's complaint and jury trial demand as of 5/17/99. (Larson, Susan) (Entered: 06/16/1999)
9 ANSWER to complaint (Related Doc # 1) (related document(s)1) filed by Rowdy B. Meeks of Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal on behalf of Woodbridge Corporation.(Meeks, Rowdy) (Entered: 06/14/1999)
10 RULE 16 NOTICE proposed scheduling order due by 8/10/1999,. (Gicinto, JoRita) (Entered: 06/15/1999)
13 NOTICE OF FILING Exhibit Attachment (related document(s)12) filed by Lee J Hollis on behalf of Delores Anderson.(Hollis, Lee) (Entered: 06/16/1999)
NOTICE OF MAGISTRATE ASSIGNMENT sent by FAX to defendant's counsel, Rowdy Meeks. Magistrate Return due by 7/19/1999,.(Rowland, Bonnie) (Entered: 06/28/1999)
14 First AMENDED COMPLAINT against Woodbridge Corporation. filed

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07/12/1999 07/19/1999 07/20/1999 07/22/1999 08/06/1999 08/27/1999 08/27/1999 08/27/1999 08/27/1999 08/31/1999 08/31/1999 08/31/1999

by Lee J Hollis on behalf of Delores Anderson.(Hollis, Lee) (Entered: 07/06/1999)
16 Notice of MAGISTRATE ASSIGNMENT RETURNED requesting for assignment of case to a district judge filed by Rowdy B. Meeks of Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal on behalf of Woodbridge Corporation. (Larson, Susan) (Entered: 07/20/1999)
15 ANSWER to amended complaint (Related Doc # 14) filed by Rowdy B. Meeks of Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal on behalf of Woodbridge Corporation.(Meeks, Rowdy) (Entered: 07/19/1999)
17 LETTER OF REASSIGNMENT from Hays, Sarah W. to Gary A. Fenner. The correct case number is now 99-0370-CV-W-4 .(Larson, Susan) (Entered: 07/20/1999)
18 RULE 16 NOTICE entered by Judge Gary A. Fenner. Proposed scheduling order due by 9/6/1999, rule 26 conference due by 8/26/1999,. (Mitchell, Lisa) (Entered: 07/22/1999)
19 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE of Defendant's Statement of Related Companies filed by Rowdy B. Meeks of Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal on behalf of Woodbridge Corporation.(Meeks, Rowdy) (Entered: 08/06/1999)
20 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF INITIAL RULE 26 DISCLOSURES filed by Rowdy B. Meeks of Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal on behalf of Woodbridge Corporation.(Meeks, Rowdy) (Entered: 08/27/1999)
21 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE of filing Joint Proposed Scheduling Order and Discovery Plan filed by Rowdy B. Meeks of Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal on behalf of Woodbridge Corporation.(Meeks, Rowdy) (Entered: 08/27/1999)
22 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF INITIAL RULE 26 DISCLOSURES filed by Lee J Hollis on behalf of Delores Anderson.(Hollis, Lee) (Entered: 08/27/1999)
23 Joint PROPOSED SCHEDULING ORDER AND DISCOVERY PLAN filed by Lee J Hollis, Rowdy B. Meeks, Barbara A Seely on behalf of All parties.(Kuhl, Carol) (Entered: 08/31/1999)
24 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF INITIAL RULE 26 DISCLOSURES filed by Barbara A Seely of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.(Seely, Barbara) (Entered: 08/31/1999)
25 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE filed by Barbara A Seely of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.(Seely, Barbara) (Entered: 08/31/1999)
26 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE filed by Barbara A Seely of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.(Seely, Barbara) (Entered: 08/31/1999)

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08/31/1999 08/31/1999
09/24/1999 09/24/1999 09/24/1999 09/30/1999 11/04/1999 11/04/1999 01/19/2000 01/19/2000 01/19/2000 01/27/2000

27 RULES OF TRIAL entered by Judge Gary A. Fenner.(Mitchell, Lisa) (Entered: 08/31/1999)
28 SCHEDULING ORDER entered by Judge Gary A. Fenner. Discovery due by 7/15/2000, pre-trial conference set for 12/22/2000 at 10:00 AM at Chambers, with jury trial to be held on 1/22/2001 at 09:00 AM at Courtroom 8A, Kansas City (GAF).(Mitchell, Lisa) (Entered: 08/31/1999)
29 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Responses and Objections to EEOC's First Irogs. and First Req. for Prod. of Docs. filed by Rowdy B. Meeks of Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal on behalf of Woodbridge Corporation.(Meeks, Rowdy) (Entered: 09/24/1999)
30 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE First Interrogatories and First Request for Production of Documents to plaintiff EEOC filed by Rowdy B. Meeks of Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal on behalf of Woodbridge Corporation.(Meeks, Rowdy) (Entered: 09/24/1999)
31 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE of First Interrogatories and First Request for Production of Documents to plaintiff Anderson filed by Rowdy B. Meeks of Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal on behalf of Woodbridge Corporation.(Meeks, Rowdy) (Entered: 09/24/1999)
32 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE of supplemental initial disclosures filed by Rowdy B. Meeks of Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal on behalf of Woodbridge Corporation.(Meeks, Rowdy) (Entered: 09/30/1999)
33 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE filed by Barbara A Seely of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.(Seely, Barbara) (Entered: 11/04/1999)
34 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE filed by Barbara A Seely of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.(Seely, Barbara) (Entered: 11/04/1999)
35 NOTICE OF DEPOSITION of Roger Morgan on 01/28/00 filed by Barbara A Seely of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.(Seely, Barbara) (Entered: 01/19/2000)
36 CERTIFICATE OF TRANSMISSION OF DEPOSITION of James Butler filed by Barbara A Seely, Jerry L. Short of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on behalf of all plaintiffs.(Kendall, Shelly) (Entered: 01/21/2000)
37 CERTIFICATE OF TRANSMISSION OF DEPOSITION of Randy Haffey filed by Barbara A Seely, Jerry L. Short of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on behalf of all plaintiffs.(Kendall, Shelly) (Entered: 01/21/2000)
38 MOTION to withdraw/substitute attorney Jennifer H. McCoy on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.(Mort, Mike) (Entered: 01/28/2000)

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01/28/2000 02/02/2000 02/04/2000 02/09/2000 02/11/2000
02/11/2000 02/14/2000 02/22/2000 02/22/2000 02/22/2000 02/29/2000 03/07/2000 03/13/2000

39 ORDER by Judge Gary A. Fenner granting motion to withdraw/substitute attorney (Related Doc # 38) (Mitchell, Lisa) (Entered: 01/28/2000)
40 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE of Supplemental Objections and Responses to First Interrogatories filed by Rowdy B. Meeks of Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal on behalf of Woodbridge Corporation. (Meeks, Rowdy) (Entered: 02/02/2000)
41 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE filed by Lee J Hollis on behalf of Delores Anderson.(Hollis, Lee) (Entered: 02/04/2000)
42 MOTION for leave to file Second Amended Complaint on behalf of Delores Anderson.(Hollis, Lee) (Entered: 02/09/2000)
43 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES TO EEOC'S FIRST INTERROGATORIES filed by Rowdy B. Meeks of Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal on behalf of Woodbridge Corporation.(Meeks, Rowdy) (Entered: 02/11/2000)
44 NOTICE OF DEPOSITION of DELORES ANDERSON on 2/29/00 filed by Rowdy B. Meeks of Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal on behalf of Woodbridge Corporation.(Meeks, Rowdy) (Entered: 02/11/2000)
45 CERTIFICATE OF TRANSMISSION OF DEPOSITION of Donald P. Watson on behalf of dft on 1/4/2000 filed by Rowdy B. Meeks of Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal on behalf of Woodbridge Corporation. (Kee, Georgia) (Entered: 02/14/2000)
46 NOTICE OF DEPOSITION of Lee Ann Eberth on 03/01/00 filed by Barbara A Seely of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.(Seely, Barbara) (Entered: 02/22/2000)
47 NOTICE OF DEPOSITION of Dr. H. Joe Pryor on 03/03/00 filed by Barbara A Seely of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.(Seely, Barbara) (Entered: 02/22/2000)
48 CERTIFICATE OF TRANSMISSION OF DEPOSITION of Randy Haffey filed by Barbara A Seely, Jerry L. Short of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on behalf of all plaintiffs.(Kendall, Shelly) (Entered: 02/23/2000)
49 ORDER by Judge Gary A. Fenner granting motion for leave to file second amended complaint. (Related Doc # 42) (Mitchell, Lisa) (Entered: 02/29/2000)
50 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE filed by Barbara A Seely of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.(Seely, Barbara) (Entered: 03/07/2000)
53 CERTIFICATE OF TRANSMISSION OF DEPOSITION of Joe Pryor, M.D. filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on behalf of

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03/15/2000 03/15/2000 03/17/2000 03/17/2000
03/21/2000 03/27/2000 03/27/2000 03/28/2000 04/05/2000 04/07/2000 04/10/2000

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.(Kendall, Shelly) (Entered: 03/16/2000)
51 MOTION to amend Answer with Suggestions on behalf of Woodbridge Corporation.(Meeks, Rowdy) (Entered: 03/15/2000)
52 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE filed by Barbara A Seely of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.(Seely, Barbara) (Entered: 03/15/2000)
54 SUGGESTIONS IN OPPOSITION filed by Barbara A Seely of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Reply Suggestions due by 3/29/2000. (Related motion(s)51) (Seely, Barbara) (Entered: 03/17/2000)
The SUGGESTIONS IN OPPOSITION filed by Barbara A Seely of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission which was given document #55 has been removed as it was aa duplicate of document #54. (Related motion(s)51) (Other related filing(s) 51) (Seely,Barbara) Modified on 3/28/2000 (Terry, Bill). (Entered: 03/17/2000)
56 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE of Responses to plaintiff EEOC's Second Request for Production of Documents filed by Rowdy B. Meeks of Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal on behalf of Woodbridge Corporation. (Meeks, Rowdy) (Entered: 03/21/2000)
57 CERTIFICATE OF TRANSMISSION OF DEPOSITION of Linda Christine Fulps filed by Barbara A Seely of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.(Honeycutt, Cassaundra) (Entered: 03/28/2000)
58 CERTIFICATE OF TRANSMISSION OF DEPOSITION of Leigh Ann Eberth filed by Barbara A Seely of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Honeycutt, Cassaundra) (Entered: 03/28/2000)
59 REPLY SUGGESTIONS in Support of Defendant's Motion to Amend Its Answer filed by Rowdy B. Meeks of Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal on behalf of Woodbridge Corporation. (Related motion(s)51) (Other related filing(s) 51) (Meeks, Rowdy) (Entered: 03/28/2000)
60 ORDER by Judge Gary A. Fenner granting motion to amend answer (Related Doc # 51) (Mitchell, Lisa) (Entered: 04/05/2000)
61 First AMENDED ANSWER to Plaintiff EEOC's Complaint (related document(s)1) Filed by Rowdy B. Meeks of Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal on behalf of Woodbridge Corporation.(Meeks, Rowdy) (Entered: 04/07/2000)
62 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Responses to EEOC's Second Interrogatories filed by Rowdy B. Meeks of Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal on behalf of Woodbridge Corporation.(Meeks, Rowdy) (Entered: 04/10/2000)

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63 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE of Objections and Responses to EEOC's Third Request for Production of Documents filed by Rowdy B. Meeks of Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal on behalf of Woodbridge Corporation. (Meeks, Rowdy) (Entered: 04/10/2000)
64 CERTIFICATE OF TRANSMISSION OF DEPOSITION of Rosanne Ramsburg filed by Barbara A Seely, Jerry L. Short of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.(Kendall, Shelly) (Entered: 04/12/2000)
65 CERTIFICATE OF TRANSMISSION OF DEPOSITION of William Rex Patty filed by Barbara A Seely, Jerry L. Short of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.(Kendall, Shelly) (Entered: 04/12/2000)
66 CERTIFICATE OF TRANSMISSION OF DEPOSITION of Mari-Beth Cline filed by Barbara A Seely of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Kendall, Shelly) (Entered: 04/12/2000)
67 CERTIFICATE OF TRANSMISSION OF DEPOSITION of Isabel Schockey filed by Barbara A Seely of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Kendall, Shelly) (Entered: 04/12/2000)
68 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE filed by Barbara A Seely of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.(Seely, Barbara) (Entered: 04/12/2000)
69 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE filed by Rowdy B. Meeks of Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal on behalf of Woodbridge Corporation. (Meeks, Rowdy) (Entered: 05/10/2000)
70 MOTION for summary judgment on Plaintiff Delores Anderson's Claims on behalf of Woodbridge Corporation.(Meeks, Rowdy) (Entered: 06/05/2000)
71 SUGGESTIONS IN SUPPORT of its Motion For Summary Judgment on Plaintiff Anderson's Claims (related document(s)70) Filed by Rowdy B. Meeks of Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal on behalf of Woodbridge Corporation.(Meeks, Rowdy) (Entered: 06/05/2000)
72 NOTICE OF FILING Documentary Appendix for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff Delores Anderson's Claims (related document(s)71) filed by Rowdy B. Meeks on behalf of Woodbridge Corporation.(Meeks, Rowdy) (Entered: 06/05/2000)
73 MOTION for summary judgment on Plaintiff EEOC's Claims on behalf of Woodbridge Corporation.(Meeks, Rowdy) (Entered: 06/05/2000)
74 SUGGESTIONS IN SUPPORT of its Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff EEOC's Claims (related document(s)73) Filed by Rowdy B. Meeks of Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal on behalf of Woodbridge Corporation.(Meeks, Rowdy) (Entered: 06/05/2000)

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75 NOTICE OF FILING Documentary Appendix for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff EEOC's Claims (related document(s)74) filed by Rowdy B. Meeks on behalf of Woodbridge Corporation.(Meeks, Rowdy) (Entered: 06/05/2000)
76 MOTION for extension of time on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.(Seely, Barbara) (Entered: 06/12/2000)
77 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE filed by Barbara A Seely of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.(Seely, Barbara) (Entered: 06/12/2000)
78 ORDER by Judge Gary A. Fenner granting motion for extension of time (Related Doc # 76) (Mitchell, Lisa) (Entered: 06/13/2000)
79 MOTION for extension of time to file opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment (related document(s)70) on behalf of Delores Anderson.(Hollis, Lee) (Entered: 06/16/2000)
80 ORDER by Judge Gary A. Fenner granting motion for extension of time (Related Doc # 79) (Mitchell, Lisa) (Entered: 06/16/2000)
81 CERTIFICATE OF TRANSMISSION OF DEPOSITION of Woodbridge Corporation filed by Barbara A Seely of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Kendall, Shelly) (Entered: 06/19/2000)
82 RESPONSE TO MOTION For Summary Judgment filed by Barbara A Seely of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Reply Suggestions due by 7/18/2000. (Related motion(s)73) (Seely, Barbara) Additional attachment (s) added on 9/26/2000 to add pages 25-27 which were omitted in original entry. (Kendall, Shelly). (Entered: 07/06/2000)
83 NOTICE OF FILING Documentary Appendix To Its Opposition to Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment on Plaintiff EEOC's Claims (related document(s)82) filed by Barbara A Seely on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.(Seely, Barbara) (Entered: 07/06/2000)
84 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE filed by Barbara A Seely of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.(Seely, Barbara) (Entered: 07/13/2000)
85 SUGGESTIONS IN OPPOSITION to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff Anderson's Claims filed by Lee J Hollis on behalf of Delores Anderson. Reply Suggestions due by 7/26/2000. (Related motion(s)70) (Hollis, Lee) (Entered: 07/14/2000)
86 MOTION for extension of time to File its Reply Brief Supporting its Summary Judgment Motion on plaintiff EEOC's claims on behalf of Woodbridge Corporation.(Meeks, Rowdy) (Entered: 07/17/2000)
87 MOTION for leave to file on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity

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Commission.(Seely, Barbara) (Entered: 07/19/2000)
88 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE filed by Barbara A Seely of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.(Seely, Barbara) (Entered: 07/19/2000)
89 MOTION for extension of time to file its Reply Brief supporting its Summary Judgment Motion on behalf of Woodbridge Corporation. (Meeks, Rowdy) (Entered: 07/24/2000)
90 ORDER by Judge Gary A. Fenner granting motion for leave to file (Related Doc # 87) (Mitchell, Lisa) (Entered: 07/24/2000)
91 ORDER by Judge Gary A. Fenner granting motion for extension of time (Related Doc # 89) (Mitchell, Lisa) (Entered: 07/24/2000)
92 NOTICE OF FILING Documentary Appendix for its Reply Brief in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment on EEOC's claims filed by Rowdy B. Meeks on behalf of Woodbridge Corporation.(Meeks, Rowdy) (Entered: 08/07/2000)
93 REPLY SUGGESTIONS in support of its Summary Judgment Motion on the EEOC's claims filed by Rowdy B. Meeks of Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal on behalf of Woodbridge Corporation. (Related motion(s)73) (Other related filing(s) 82) (Meeks, Rowdy) (Entered: 08/07/2000)
94 MOTION for extension of time to extend the page limit on its reply brief supporting its summary judgment motion on the EEOC's claims on behalf of Woodbridge Corporation.(Meeks, Rowdy) (Entered: 08/07/2000)
95 ORDER by Judge Gary A. Fenner granting motion to exceed page limit (Related Doc # 94) (Mitchell, Lisa) (Entered: 08/08/2000)
96 REPLY SUGGESTIONS in support of its summary judgment motion on plaintiff Anderson's cliams. filed by Rowdy B. Meeks of Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal on behalf of Woodbridge Corporation. (Related motion(s)70) (Other related filing(s) 85) (Meeks, Rowdy) (Entered: 08/14/2000)
97 MOTION for leave to file a surreply to defendant's reply brief in support of its motion for summary judgment on EEOC's claims on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.(Seely, Barbara) (Entered: 08/15/2000)
98 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE filed by Barbara A Seely of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.(Seely, Barbara) (Entered: 08/15/2000)
99 RESPONSE TO MOTION Plaintiff EEOC's Surreply to Defendant's Reply Brief In Support Of Its Motion For Summary Judgment On EEOC's Claims filed by Barbara A Seely of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Reply Suggestions due by 8/28/2000. (Related motion(s)73, 70) (Seely, Barbara) (Entered: 08/15/2000)

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100 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE filed by Barbara A Seely of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.(Seely, Barbara) (Entered: 08/15/2000)
101 RESPONSE TO MOTION and Defendant Woodbridge's Opposition to Plaintiff EEOC's Motion for Leave to File a Surreply and Motion to Strike filed by Rowdy B. Meeks of Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal on behalf of Woodbridge Corporation. Reply Suggestions due by 9/5/2000. (Related motion(s)97) (Other related filing(s) 97) (Meeks, Rowdy) (Entered: 08/22/2000)
102 NOTICE OF DEPOSITION of Dr. Alfred Franzblau on 9/8/2000 at 9:00 am filed by Rowdy B. Meeks of Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal on behalf of Woodbridge Corporation.(Meeks, Rowdy) (Entered: 08/23/2000)
103 ORDER by Judge Gary A. Fenner granting motion for summary judgment (Related Doc # 70), granting motion for summary judgment (Related Doc # 73) (Mitchell, Lisa) (Entered: 10/02/2000)
104 CLERKS JUDGMENT (related document(s)103).(Diefenbach, Tracy) (Entered: 10/02/2000)
105 NOTICE OF APPEAL to circuit court filed by Barbara A Seely of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Filing fee collected, receipt #waived. (Attachments: # 1)(Seely, Barbara) (Entered: 11/22/2000)
Delivered to USCA (related document(s)105)and NOA supp. Notice to counsel/parties by e-mail/regular mail. (Brogan, Shannon) (Entered: 12/14/2000)
106 PROPOSED BILL OF COSTS filed by Michael L. Blumenthal on behalf of all defendants. objections due by 10/12/2001, (Attachments: # 1 Notice Regarding Exhibit Attachment)(Blumenthal, Michael) (Entered: 09/27/2001)
107 Amended PROPOSED BILL OF COSTS filed by Michael L. Blumenthal on behalf of all defendants. objections due by 10/15/2001, (Attachments: # 1 Notice Regarding Exhibit Attachment)(Blumenthal, Michael) Notice Regarding Exhibit Attachment w/Exhibits received and maintained in Clerk's office on 09/28/01 (Kendall, Shelly). (Entered: 09/28/2001)
108 MOTION for order to delay in taxing costs filed by Barbara A Seely on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. suggestions in opposition due by 11/2/2001. (Larson, Susan) (Entered: 10/22/2001)
109 Order entered by Judge Gary A. Fenner on 11/13/2001 granting motion for order (Related Doc # 108) (Mitchell, Lisa) (Entered: 11/13/2001)
110 JUDGMENT AND ORDER from USCA - the judgment of the district court in this cause is affirmed in accordance with the opinion of the USCA. Mandate issued: 11/08/01. (Brogan, Shannon) (Entered: 11/19/2001)

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111 Notification Letter of Amended Proposed Bill of Costs; deadline for objections set for 01/25/02 (Related documents(s) 107) (Kendall, Shelly) (Entered: 01/10/2002)
112 COSTS TAXED (Related document(s)107) (Kendall, Shelly) (Entered: 02/06/2002)

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 FY 2002 Office of General Counsel Annual Report

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z EEOC v. Woodbridge Corp. No. 01-1045 (8th Cir.) Brief as Appellant Petition for Reh'g and Suggestion for Reh'g En Banc. Filed October 5, 2001
In 1994, Woodbridge, concerned about the increased incidence of carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS) among its production workers, added a "neurometry" test to its pre-employment medical examination in an effort to screen applicants for the presence or propensity to develop CTS. Although the company had been advised that the neurometry test is an unreliable screening tool for CTS, it used the test until April 1997.
Based on the test results, Woodbridge withdrew employment offers from applicants with abnormal neurometry scores. The Commission sought relief for 19 applicants on the theory that the company regarded them as substantially limited in working. Agreeing with the company, the district court granted summary judgment finding the claimants did not have a disability because Woodbridge did not regard them as substantially limited in working. The claimants were not perceived as precluded from a broad range or class of jobs; only the Woodbridge manufacturing jobs which the court deemed "unique."
On appeal, the panel looked at the jobs for which the test was used and held that the applicants were only regarded as precluded from those jobs. Thus, the company did not regard them as substantially limited in working.
Urging the court to rehear the case, the Commission argued that to determine whether an employer regards an individual as substantially limited in working, a court should consider all the evidence about the limitations that would flow from the perceived impairment. Here, the court should have considered: (1) the testimony of company officials that they believed the claimants could not perform jobs with high levels of repetitive motion; (2) the report of the Commission's vocational expert indicating that between 57% and 99% of the other jobs in the Kansas City area for which the rejected applicants were otherwise qualified had comparable levels of repetitive hand and wrist motion; and (3) testimony of doctors that persons with CTS would potentially be precluded from a broad range of jobs in the Kansas City area. This evidence supports a finding that the company regarded the applicants as substantially limited in working.

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 01-1045 Docket

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General Docket Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals

Court of Appeals Docket #: 01-1045
Nsuit: 1442 Jobs
EEOC v. Woodbridge Corp. Appeal From: U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City

Case Type Information: 1) Civil 2) United States as a party 3) null

Originating Court Information: District: 0866-4 : 99-370-CV-4 Trial Judge: Gary A. Fenner, U.S. District Judge Date Filed: 04/12/1999 Date Order/Judgment: 10/02/2000

Date NOA Filed: 11/02/2000

Prior Cases: None

Filed: 01/08/2001 Termed:
08/24/2001

Current Cases: None

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Plaintiff - Appellant

Julie Loraine Gantz Direct: 202-663-4718 [COR LD NTC Government] EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 1801 L Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20507-0000
Barbara A. Seely Direct: 314-539-7949 [COR LD NTC Government] EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION St. Louis District Office 1222 Spruce Room 8.100, Robert A. Young Federal Building St. Louis, MO 63103-0000
Jerry Lee Short, Assistant U.S. Attorney Direct: 816-426-3122

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v. Woodbridge Corporation
Defendant - Appellee
-----------------------------Delores Anderson
Intervenor plaintiff

[COR LD NTC US Attorney] U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE Firm: 816-426-3122 400 E. Ninth Street Suite 5510 Kansas City, MO 64106-2149
Michael L. Blumenthal Direct: 816-472-6400 [COR LD NTC Retained] CONSTANGY & BROOKS Firm: 816-472-6400 2600 Grand Boulevard Suite 300 Kansas City, MO 64108-0000

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Plaintiff - Appellant

v. WOODBRIDGE CORPORATION
Defendant - Appellee

------------------------DELORES ANDERSON
Intervenor Plaintiff

01/08/2001 01/08/2001
01/08/2001

Civil Case Docketed. Dist. Ct. Office: Kansas City
CERTIFIED copies notice of appeal, docket entries, judgment dated 10/2/00 [011045] [1346881]
BRIEFING SCHEDULE: [01-1045] Method of Apndx due on 1/18/01 ; DR aplnt due on 1/18/01 ; Aplee DR due on 1/29/01 ; Joint Apndx due on 2/20/01 ; Aplnt

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01/16/2001 01/16/2001 01/17/2001 02/23/2001 02/23/2001 03/06/2001 03/23/2001
03/23/2001 03/29/2001 03/30/2001 03/30/2001 04/09/2001 04/10/2001 04/11/2001 04/26/2001 05/09/2001 06/01/2001 06/08/2001 06/14/2001
08/24/2001

brief due on 2/20/01 ; Aplee brief due on 3/22/01 ; Reply brief due on 4/5/01 ;
DESIGNATION of record received from Appellant EEOC. Type of appendix: separate [01-1045]
APPEARANCE for appellant, attorney Julie L. Gantz [01-1045] [1350230]
APPEARANCE for appellee, attorney Rowdy Meeks [01-1045] [1354389]
BRIEF FILED - Brief of Appellant- EEOC 30 pages w/addendum 10 copies w/service 2/20/01 w/diskette . [01-1045] [1364409]
RECORDS received: Appendix filed by Appellant EEOC consisting of 3 Volume (s), 3 Copies. [01-1045]
Corporate Disclosure Statement filed. Filed by Woodbridge Corp. FOR CAL.
BRIEF FILED - Brief of Appellee - Woodbridge Corp.. 827 lines - 10 copies w/service 3/22/01 . w/diskette Defects: point typesize too small [01-1045] [1374865]
RECORDS received: Appendix filed by Appellee Woodbridge Corp. consisting of 1 Volume(s), 3 Copies. [01-1045]
Brief Correction (in form of corrected brief replacing defective brief no. 1374865) received from Appellee Woodbridge Corp.. Correction(s): point type size. [01-1045]
MOTION of aplnt, EEOC, for extension of time to file reply brief until 4/23/01 . [01-1045] [1377165] w/service 3/27/01
ORDER filed:granting appellant motion extension of time to file reply brief. [1377165-1] [1377166] Reply brief now due on 4/23/01 .
APPEARANCE for appellee, attorney Michael L. Blumenthal [01-1045] [1381043]
TO SCREENING to rw. [01-1045]
RETURNED from Screening (20) [01-1045]
BRIEF FILED - Reply brief - EEOC . 3,991 words 10 copies - w/service 4/23/01 . w/diskette [01-1045] [1386598], TO COURT.
*SET FOR ARGUMENT* - June 2001 in St. Louis.
28(j) citation received and filed from Appellee Woodbridge Corp. TO COURT. [011045] [1399471]
Oral argument time has been reduced from 20 to 15 minutes per side. [01-1045]
ARGUED AND SUBMITTED IN ST. LOUIS TO JUDGES James B. Loken, Circuit Judge, James M. Rosenbaum, Visiting Judge Minneapolis, MN, Robert T. Dawson, Visiting Judge Fort Smith, AR. Julie L. Gantz for Appellant EEOC . Michael L. Blumenthal for Appellee Woodbridge Corp. Rebuttal: Julie L. Gantz. . RECORDED. [01-1045]
THE COURT: James B. Loken, James M. Rosenbaum, Robert T. Dawson. OPINION FILED by Robert T. Dawson, Authoring Judge PUBLISHED . [01-1045] [1429560]

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08/24/2001
10/05/2001 10/26/2001
11/08/2001 11/23/2001

JUDGMENT: James B. Loken, James M. Rosenbaum, Robert T. Dawson. The judgment of the lower court is AFFIRMED in accordance with the opinion. [011045] [1429561]
PETITION for REHEARING with petition for rehearing en banc. Filed by Appellant EEOC, w/service ., TO COURT. [01-1045]
JUDGE ORDER: denying petition for Rehearing with petition for rehearing en banc [1442493-1] filed by EEOC . Petition for panel Rehearing is also denied. [01-1045] [1449081] - Published Order.
MANDATE ISSUED [01-1045]
RECEIPT for Mandate. [01-1045] [1458587]

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 263 F.3d 812 (2001)
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff/Appellant, v.
WOODBRIDGE CORP., Defendant/Appellee.
No. 01-1045.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted: June 14, 2001. Filed: August 24, 2001.
Rehearing and Rehearing Denied: October 26, 2001.
813 *813 Julie L. Gantz, EEOC, argued, Washington, DC (Vincent J. Blackwood, EEOC, Washington, DC, on the brief), for appellant.
Michael L. Blumenthal, argued, Kansas City, PA (Rowdy B. Meeks, Kansas City, MO, on the brief), for appellees.
Before LOKEN, Circuit Judge, and ROSENBAUM[1] and DAWSON,[2] District Judges.[3]
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied: October 26, 2001.
DAWSON, District Judge.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission appeals from the district court's grant of summary judgment to Woodbridge Corp. ("Woodbridge"). The issue is whether applicants for employment on a specific manufacturing line can be excluded from employment based upon test results that indicate those applicants may be susceptible to sustaining injuries from repetitive motion. The district court determined that the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") was not violated as the applicants were not "disabled" as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). We agree and affirm.
I. Background.
The EEOC brought this action on behalf of nineteen workers at Woodbridge, a producer of polyurethane foam pads used in automobile seats, who were denied employment based upon the results of a test designed to reflect abnormal wrist neurometric readings. Woodbridge contended that the test was intended to determine those 814 applicants who were more likely to develop carpal tunnel syndrome. The test *814 was tailored for the repetitive motion required for those working on a specific foam line in the one plant in Kansas City. Several applicants were tested, and those applicants with abnormal neurometry readings were not hired for the foam line production position although they were considered to be eligible for jobs in other areas within the plant. The EEOC contended that Woodbridge discriminated against the nineteen applicants on the basis of a perceived disability, as Woodbridge regarded the applicants as substantially limited in the ability to work. The district court[4] granted summary judgment to Woodbridge and EEOC appeals.
II. Discussion.
A. Standard of Review
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo and apply the same standard as the district court. Rothmeier v. Inv. Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328, 1331 (8th Cir.1996). Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c);

Fisher v. Pharmacia & Upjohn, 225 F.3d 915, 919 (8th Cir.2000). Because discrimination cases often turn on inferences rather than on direct evidence, we are particularly deferential to the nonmovant. Crawford v. Runyon, 37 F.3d 1338, 1341 (8th Cir.1994). Notwithstanding these considerations, summary judgment is proper when a plaintiff fails to establish a factual dispute on an essential element of her case. See Bialas v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 59 F.3d 759, 762 (8th Cir.1995).
B. ADA Discrimination Claim
The ADA defines disability as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Major life activities include caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, breathing, learning and working. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1998). In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 492, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999), the Supreme Court indicated, but did not specifically state, that working was a major life activity. The parties did not raise this issue, and we therefore assume for purposes of this decision that working is a major life activity.
An impairment is "substantially limiting" if it renders an individual unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform, or if it significantly restricts the condition, manner, or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to an average person in the general population. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)-(ii). The determination of whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity must be made on a case by case basis. Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 949 (8th Cir.1999) citing Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1048, 118 S.Ct. 693, 139 L.Ed.2d 638 (1998).
The EEOC contends that Woodbridge regarded the nineteen applicants as substantially limited in the major life 815 activity of working. The district court rejected *815 this contention stating that the "only documented perception of
the applicants is that they were not physically qualified to perform the unique requirements of the Woodbridge manufacturing positions. This perception does not prevent the applicants from obtaining employment in a broad class of jobs."
A person is substantially limited in working if he is "significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills, and abilities." Fjellestad, 188 F.3d at 949 (8th Cir.1999). The factors to be considered include: the number and type of jobs from which the impaired individual is disqualified; the geographical area to which the individual has reasonable access; and the individual's job training, experience, and expectations. Fjellestad, 188 F.3d at 949 (8th Cir.1999) citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii). This court has stated, "the ADA is concerned with preventing substantial personal hardship in the form of significant reduction in a person's real work opportunities." Webb v. Garelick Manufacturing Co., 94 F.3d 484, 488 (8th Cir.1996). A court must ask if a person's particular impairment constitutes a significant barrier to employment in a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs. Id. The person's expertise, background, and job expectations are relevant in defining the class of jobs used to determine whether the person is disabled. Id.
The facts alleged by the EEOC are insufficient to show that Woodbridge regarded these nineteen applicants as being substantially limited in working. The test was conducted on all applicants, and some of those who received abnormal results were employed in jobs other than the foam production jobs which were sought by these nineteen applicants.[5] While it may be desirable for a test to be designed and administered that could determine an activity that may prove harmful, that is not the issue before us. There are groups, to include some governmental agencies, who would state that a worthwhile goal for an employer would be to develop protocols that would limit injuries in the workplace and to include tests designed to determine those who may be predisposed to such injuries.
The issue is whether the nineteen applicants were regarded as "significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having

comparable training, skill, and abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i).
In order to find that an individual is substantially limited in working, there must be a showing that his or her overall employment opportunities are limited. Fjellestad, 188 F.3d at 949 (8th Cir.1999) citing Miller v. City of Springfield, 146 F.3d 612, 614 (8th Cir.1998). One must be precluded from more than one type of job, a specialized job, or a particular job of choice. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999). If jobs utilizing an individual's skills (but perhaps not his or her unique talents) are available, one is not precluded from a substantial class of jobs. Id. Similarly, if a host of different types of jobs are available, one is not precluded from a broad range of jobs. Id.
816 *816 The evidence in this case, when construed in the manner most favorable to the EEOC, reflects that the test administered was specifically designed for the activities required on a specific foam line job in a specific plant. An employer that regards an individual as having an impairment that disqualifies him or her from a narrow range of jobs does not regard him or her as substantially limited in the major life activity of working. See Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382, 386 (8th Cir.1995).
The neurometric test, however faulty, was an effort to screen out individuals who were likely to become disabled or sustain an injury while performing one specific type function on one foam line in one plant. As such, the EEOC's argument that Woodbridge regarded these nineteen applicants as substantially limited in their ability to work must fail. The evidence shows that Woodbridge only regarded the nineteen applicants as unable to perform one particular specialized job at one particular plant. It did not regard these applicants as unable to perform any other job which required repetitive motion as evidenced by the fact that it employed some applicants with abnormal test results in positions other than the foam production line.
III. Conclusion.
We find that these nineteen individuals were not precluded from more than one type of specialized job, and summary judgment is affirmed.
[1] The Honorable James M. Rosenbaum, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.
[2] The Honorable Robert T. Dawson, United States District Judge for the Western District of Arkansas, sitting by designation.
[3] Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(b), the Chief Judge certified the existence of a judicial emergency necessitating the designation of a panel consisting of fewer than two members of the Court of Appeals.
[4] The Honorable Gary A. Fenner, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.
[5] The test administered by Woodbridge is no longer used as there were concerns by the company about its reliability.
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