2003 WL 23650786 (D.Mass.) (Trial Pleading) United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.
Paul DELEO, Jr., Plaintiff, v.
CITY OF BOSTON, Massachusetts; Thomas Menino, in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Boston; James Hussey, in his capacity as Acting Commissioner of the City of Boston; Mitt Romney, in his capacity as
Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Defendants.
No. 03 12538 PBS. December 17, 2003.
Complaint, Preliminary Injunctive and Compensatory Relief Requested, and Jury Demand
Harold L. Lichten, BBO #549689 Pyle, Rome, Lichten & Ehrenberg, P.C. 18 Tremont St., Ste. 500 Boston, MA 02108 (617) 367-7200
I. INTRODUCTION.
1. This is an action for injunctive and compensatory relief challenging the Defendants’ unconstitutional system for determining which individuals are hired for entry-level police officer positions in the Boston Police Department. In or about March of 2002, and again in October of 2003, the Plaintiff, despite having a score of one hundred and one (101) on the entry-level police officer examination for the City of Boston, and despite his experience as a Boston Municipal Police Officer, was not selected for the position of police officer in the City of Boston. Plaintiff was not selected because of his race (Caucasian) and because the Defendants continue to maintain or permit a quota-based system based on race to determine entry-level hiring when such system is no longer constitutionally permissible. Further, the Defendants have unlawfully failed to institute a nondiscriminatory selection procedure, as required by law, for such entry-level hiring.
II. JURISDICTION.
2. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 in that this claim arises under the Federal Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1
III. PARTIES.
3. The Plaintiff, Paul DeLeo, Jr., is an adult resident of East Boston, Massachusetts. The Plaintiff is a Caucasian male whose lifelong goal is to be a Boston Police Officer. The Plaintiff is currently a Boston Municipal Police Officer. The Plaintiff has been attempting to become a Boston Police Officer for the last seven (7) years.
4. The Defendant City of Boston is a duly incorporated municipality of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and it maintains a police department.
5. The Defendant Thomas Menino is the Mayor of the City of Boston and in that capacity is responsible for the overall operation and administration of the City of Boston.
6. The Defendant James Hussey is the Acting Commissioner of the Boston Police Department and in that capacity currently acts as the appointing authority for the City of Boston as that term is defined in M.G.L. Chapter 31.

7. The Defendant Mitt Romney is the Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and in that capacity is responsible for the overall administration of the Commonwealth’s Human Resources Division, which division administers entry-level hiring civil service lists for the City of Boston.
8. The Defendant Commonwealth of Massachusetts is a state of the United States of America and by statute is responsible for providing civil service lists to municipalities who are part of the civil service system for the purpose of entry-level hiring, see M.G.L. Chapter 31.
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS RELATING TO THE NON-SELECTION OF PLAINTIFF.
9. In or about 2000, the Plaintiff took the Massachusetts Civil Service examination for the position of police officer in the Boston Police Department.
10. The Plaintiff received a perfect score of one hundred on such examination. In addition, pursuant to the training and experience provisions of M.G.L. ch.31, the Plaintiff received an additional point for having served for several years as a Boston Municipal Police Officer. As a result, Plaintiff was listed on the Civil Service List as having a score of one hundred and one (101). As a result, the Plaintiff was ranked on the Civil Service List just below disabled veterans, veterans, and candidates whose parent was killed or injured in the line of duty as a police officer or fire fighter.
11. In or about March of 2002, the City of Boston hired approximately 48 new police officers from the Civil Service List described above. Plaintiffs name was not reached. In October of 2003, the Boston Police Department hired another 56 new police officers utilizing the Civil Service List described above. Again, Plaintiffs name was not reached.
12. On information and belief, during both rounds of hiring (March of 2002 and October of 2003), the Defendants utilized a hiring system for a majority of the individuals hired, in which it created at least two separate Civil Service Lists, one for minorities (Blacks and Hispanics) and one for Caucasians.2
13. A majority of the individuals hired were chosen by a quota-based system wherein one minority candidate was hired for every one Caucasian candidate hired regardless of the minority candidate’s score on the Civil Service examination and regardless of his or her qualifications.
14. Plaintiff ranked higher on the Civil Service List than many of the minority and female officers selected. In addition, had the Defendants utilized a race and sex neutral system based upon Civil Service examination score and qualifications, without consideration of race, Plaintiff would have been hired as a Boston Police Officer.
15. The Civil Service List for Boston Police Officers described above is about to expire. The Plaintiff has taken the new Civil Service examination given in the fall of 2003, and he has received a score of 97.
V. FACTS RELATING TO DEFENDANTS1 UNLAWFUL RELIANCE ON THE CASTRO V. BEECHER DECREE.
16. In or about 1975, after the City of Boston was found to have unintentionally discriminated against minority police officers with respect to the entrance exam for police officers and fire fighters, see Castro v. Beecher, 365 F.Supp. 655 (1973), the parties in that litigation entered into a proposed consent decree approved by this Court. See NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir., 1975). The parties to that litigation agreed that for the City of Boston, police applicants would be hired by selecting one minority police officer for each white police officer. See discussion in Castro v. Beecher, et al., 522 F.Supp. 873 (1981).,
17. Pursuant to the court’s decision, the City of Boston was also obligated to devise a job-related nondiscriminatory selection process for the entry-level position of police officer, so that in the future the Department would not use a discriminatory selection device for such hiring Id.

18. The City of Boston and the other Defendants were obligated under the consent decree to continue such hiring based on a one minority to one white ratio until such time as the number of minority police officers in the Boston Police Department approximated the number of minorities in the relevant labor pool.
19. As of the two rounds of hiring conducted by the Defendant City of Boston in March of 2002 and then later in October of 2003, the number of minority entry-level police officers for the City of Boston had achieved rough parity with the number of minorities in the relevant labor pool.
20. As of the two rounds of hiring described above, the Defendants had no constitutionally justifiable reason for setting a quota requiring a specific number of female police officers to be hired.
21. In addition, on information and belief, the Defendants have never complied with that part of the court’s order in Castro v. Beecher, supra, requiring them to devise a valid nondiscriminatory selection process for the position of police officer in the City of Boston, thereby making unlawful its continued reliance on a quota system 28 years after the Castro court decree.

COUNT I
(42 U.S.C. § 1983 - Fourteenth Amendment)
22. The action of the Defendants Menino, Hussey, and City of Boston in making numerous hiring decisions based on a system which makes race a determinative factor in such hiring, and which reserves a specific number of slots for females notwithstanding their test scores and qualifications, and the actions of the Defendants Commonwealth of Massachusetts and Mitt Romney in allowing, permitting and authorizing such hiring, violates Plaintiffs right to the equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This claim is asserted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

JURY DEMAND The Plaintiff requests a trial by jury on all of his claims.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays this Honorable Court to:

1. Issue a preliminary and permanent injunction forbidding Defendants utilizing an unlawful and unconstitutional selection process:

2. Order Defendants to hire Plaintiff forthwith with retroactive seniority; and

3. Award Plaintiff compensatory and equitable relief, attorney’s fees and costs.

Foot notes

1

There is also federal jurisdiction pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), however

that claim is yet to be perfected. Plaintiff will move to amend this complaint to add that claim and his Chapter 15 IB, §

4 claim, as soon as a proper exhaustion has taken place.

2

In addition, Plaintiff believes that on at least one occasion during this period of time a separate list of female candidates

was also utilized.

 
 Paul DELEO, Jr., Thomas Barrett, Michael Conneely,..., 2004 WL 1566631...
2004 WL 1566631 (D.Mass.) (Trial Pleading) United States District Court, D. Massachusetts. Paul DELEO, Jr., Thomas Barrett, Michael Conneely, Matthew Hogardt, Brendan Dever, Patrick Rogers, Christopher Carr, and Brian Dunford, Plaintiffs,
v. CITY OF BOSTON, Massachusetts; Thomas Menino, in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Boston; Kathleen O’Toole, in her capacity as Commissioner of the City of Boston; Mitt Romney, in his capacity as Governor of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts; and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Defendants. No. 03-12538-PBS. March 5, 2004.
First Amended Complaint, Preliminary Injunctive and Compensatory Relief Requested, and Jury Demand
Harold L. Lichten, BBO #549689, Pyle, Rome, Lichten & Ehrenberg, P.C., 18 Tremont St., Ste. 500, Boston, MA 02108, (617) 367-7200
I. INTRODUCTION. 1. This is an action for injunctive and compensatory relief challenging the Defendants’ unconstitutional system for determining which individuals are hired for entry-level police officer positions in the Boston Police Department. In or about March of 2002, and again in October of 2003, the Plaintiffs, despite having a score of one hundred (100) or better on the entry-level police officer examination for the City of Boston, and despite their law enforcement or related experience were not selected for the position of police officer in the City of Boston. Plaintiffs were not selected because of their race (Caucasian) and because the Defendants continue to maintain or permit a quota-based system based on race to determine entry-level hiring when such system is no longer constitutionally permissible. Further, the Defendants have unlawfully failed to institute a nondiscriminatory selection procedure, as required by law, for such entry-level hiring, and they have hired officers from all female lists without a legal basis for doing so.
II. JURISDICTION. 2. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § § 1331 and 1343 in that this claim arises under the Federal Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
III. PARTIES. 3. The Plaintiffs were at all times relevant hereto adult residents of Boston, Massachusetts. Their lifelong goal is to be a Boston Police Officer. Each of the Plaintiffs has experience in criminal justice and each is well qualified to be a police officer.
4. The Defendant City of Boston is a duly incorporated municipality of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and it maintains a police department.
5. The Defendant Thomas Menino is the Mayor of the City of Boston and in that capacity is responsible for the overall operation and administration of the City of Boston.
1

Paul DELEO, Jr., Thomas Barrett, Michael Conneely,..., 2004 WL 1566631...
6. The Defendant Kathleen O’Toole is the Commissioner of the Boston Police Department and in that capacity currently acts as the appointing authority for the City of Boston as that term is defined in M.G.L. Chapter 31.
7. The Defendant Mitt Romney is the Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and in that capacity is responsible for the overall administration of the Commonwealth’s Human Resources Division, which division administers entry-level hiring civil service lists for the City of Boston.
8. The Defendant Commonwealth of Massachusetts is a state of the United States of America and by statute is responsible for providing civil service lists to municipalities who are part of the civil service system for the purpose of entry-level hiring, see M.G.L Chapter 31.
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS RELATING TO THE NON-SELECTION OF PLAINTIFF.
9. In or about 2000, the Plaintiffs took the Massachusetts Civil Service examination for the position of police officer in the Boston Police Department.
10. The Plaintiffs each received a perfect score of one hundred on such examination. In addition, pursuant to the training and experience provisions of M.G.L. ch.31, Plaintiff DeLeo received an additional point for having served for several years as a Boston Municipal Police Officer. As a result, Plaintiff was listed on the Civil Service List as having a score of one hundred and one (101). As a result, the Plaintiffs were ranked on the Civil Service List just below disabled veterans, veterans, and candidates whose parent was killed or injured in the line of duty as a police officer or fire fighter.
11. In or about March of 2002, the City of Boston hired approximately 48 new police officers from the Civil Service List described above. Plaintiffs’ names were not reached. In October of 2003, the Boston Police Department hired another 56 new police officers utilizing the Civil Service List described above. Again, Plaintiffs’ names were not reached.
12. On information and belief, during both rounds of hiring (March of 2002 and October of 2003), the Defendants utilized a hiring system for a majority of the individuals hired, in which it created at least two separate Civil Service Lists, one for minorities (Blacks and Hispanics) and one for Caucasians. In addition, Plaintiffs believe that on at least one occasion during this period of time a separate list of female candidates was also utilized.
13. A majority of the individuals hired were chosen by a quota-based system wherein one minority candidate was hired for every one Caucasian candidate hired regardless of the minority candidate’s score on the Civil Service examination and regardless of his or her qualifications. In addition, on information and belief, some hirings were made solely because the candidates were women.
14. Plaintiffs ranked higher on the Civil Service List than many of the minority and female officers selected. In addition, had the Defendants utilized a race and sex neutral system based upon Civil Service examination score and qualifications, without consideration of race, Plaintiffs would have been hired and/or considered to be Boston Police Officers.
15. The Civil Service List for Boston Police Officers described above is about to expire. The Plaintiffs have taken the new Civil Service examination given in the fall of 2003, and have received scores in the nineties.
V. FACTS RELATING TO DEFENDANTS’ UNLAWFUL RELIANCE ON THE CASTRO V. BEECHER DECREE.
16. In or about 1975, after the City of Boston was found to have unintentionally discriminated against minority police officers with respect to the entrance exam for police officers and fire fighters, see Castro v. Beecher, 365 F.Supp. 655 (1973), the parties in that litigation entered into a proposed consent decree approved by this Court. See NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir., 1975). The parties to that litigation agreed that for the City of Boston, police applicants would be hired by selecting one minority police officer for each white police officer. See discussion in Castro v. Beecher, et al., 522 F.Supp. 873 (1981).
2

Paul DELEO, Jr., Thomas Barrett, Michael Conneely,..., 2004 WL 1566631...
17. Pursuant to the court’s decision, the City of Boston was also obligated to devise a job-related nondiscriminatory selection process for the entry-level position of police officer, sio that in the future the Department would not use a discriminatory selection device for such hiring. Id. 18. The City of Boston and the other Defendants were obligated under the consent decree to continue such hiring based on a one minority to one white ratio until such time as the number of minority police officers in the Boston Police Department approximated the number of minorities in the relevant labor pool. 19. As of the two rounds of hiring conducted by the Defendant City of Boston in March of 2002 and then later in October of 2003, the number of minority entry-level police officers for the City of Boston had achieved rough parity with the number of minorities in the relevant labor pool. 20. As of the two rounds of hiring described above, the Defendants had no constitutionally justifiable reason for setting a quota requiring a specific number of female police officers to be hired. 21. In addition, on information and belief, the Defendants have never complied with that part of the court’s order in Castro v. Beecher, supra, requiring them to devise a valid nondiscriminatory selection process for the position of police officer in the City of Boston, thereby making unlawful its continued reliance on a quota system 28 years after the Castro court decree.
COUNT I
(42 U.S.C. § 1983 - Fourteenth Amendment) 22. The action of the Defendants Menino, Hussey, and City of Boston in making numerous hiring decisions based on a system which makes race a determinative factor in such hiring, and which reserves a specific number of slots for females notwithstanding their test scores and qualifications, and the actions of the Defendants Commonwealth of Massachusetts and Mitt Romney in allowing, permitting and authorizing such hiring, violates Plaintiffs’ rights to the equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This claim is asserted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
COUNT II
(Title VII) 23. The actions of the Defendants as set forth herein violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000, et. seq.
COUNT III
(M.G.L.ch.l501B, § 4) 24. The actions of the Defendants as set forth herein violate M.G.L. ch. 151B, § 4.
JURY DEMAND
3

Paul DELEO, Jr., Thomas Barrett, Michael Conneely,..., 2004 WL 1566631... The Plaintiffs request a trial by jury on all of their claims.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray this Honorable Court to: 1. Issue a preliminary and permanent injunction forbidding Defendants from utilizing an unlawful and unconstitutional selection process: 2. Order Defendants to hire Plaintiffs forthwith with retroactive seniority; and 3. Award Plaintiffs compensatory and equitable relief, attorney’s fees and costs.
End of Document
4

 
 (2004)
PAUL DELEO, JR., THOMAS BARRETT, MICHAEL CONNEELY, MATTHEW HOGARDT, BRENDAN DEVER, PATRICK ROGERS,
CHRISTOPHER CARR, and BRIAN DUNFORD, Plaintiffs, v.
CITY OF BOSTON, Massachusetts; RUTH BRAMSON, in her capacity as Chief Human Resources Officer of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts;
and COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, Defendants, BOSTON BRANCH OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE and MASSACHUSETTS ASSOCIATION OF MINORITY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS,
Intervenors.
Civil Action No. 03-12538-PBS.
United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.
November 23, 2004.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
PATTI SARIS, District Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs, eight white male applicants to be Boston police officers, contend that the consent decree that has governed police hiring in the City of Boston for over thirty years should no longer be in effect because, under the terms of the decree, the City has achieved parity between the percentage of police officers who are African-American or Hispanic and the percentage of these minorities in the City population. They also argue that the City's gender-based police hiring violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and Massachusetts law. The Court allowed the motion of the Boston Branch of the NAACP and the Massachusetts Association of Minority Law Enforcement Officers to intervene as party defendants. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24. Plaintiffs have moved for a preliminary injunction and summary judgment. The City has moved for clarification of the consent decree, and the Commonwealth, City and intervenors have all joined in opposition to plaintiffs' motions.
After hearing, the Court concludes that the City met its target under the consent decree at the time of the October 2003 police class hiring and holds that plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment with respect to the consent decree is ALLOWED. Boston is released from further compliance with the decree. Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment based on allegations of gender-based discrimination in July 2002 is DENIED.
II. BACKGROUND
Each of the following facts is undisputed, except as noted.

A. History of the Castro Decree
In 1970, six black and two Spanish-surnamed plaintiffs who had applied unsuccessfully to become Boston police officers filed suit against various Massachusetts public entities and public officials. Castro v. Beecher, 334 F. Supp. 930, 934 (D. Mass. 1971) [hereinafter Castro I]. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' police recruitment and hiring practices discriminated against them, in violation of the plaintiffs' rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983; and Massachusetts law. Id. at 934 n.1. At the time, the black population of the City was approximately 16.3% of the total population, but about 3.6% of the Boston police force was black. Id. at 935.
Eschewing quotas, Judge Wyzanski ruled that the civil service examinations that police applicants were required to take "were discriminatory against minorities which did not share the prevailing white culture." Id. at 943. On appeal, the First Circuit agreed, in part, but opted for stronger remedies with a more immediate impact. See Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 737 (1st Cir. 1972) [hereinafter Castro II]. It remanded the case for "further provision" as to the relief provided, which included the creation of a priority pool of certain black and Spanishsurnamed applicants who were to be hired according to a suggested range of ratios, provided they first passed a non-discriminatory job-related examination. Id. The First Circuit held: "We believe that preferential status for the priority pool will yield a significant increment of black and Spanish-surnamed police officers in the near term." Id.
On remand, Judge Wyzanski approved a consent decree ("the Castro decree") that was intended "[t]o counteract the unconscious lopsidedness of the [police] recruitment of the past." Castro v. Beecher, 365 F. Supp. 655, 659 (D. Mass. 1973) [hereinafter Castro III]; see id. app. A at 660 (Consent Decree and Final Judgment). In establishing civil service priority pools, Judge Wyzanski wrote:
[T]here is a prima facie presumption that on a jobrelated examination which is reasonably set to meet merely the requirements (and not something above the requirements) of a police patrolman's job, the percentage of successful black and Spanish-speaking persons who would choose to be patrolmen and who also would meet the requirements of the job would nearly approximate the percentage of blacks and Spanishspeaking persons in the population of the Commonwealth.
Id. app. B at 665 (Opinion of March 22, 1973). The Court has modified and supplemented the Castro decree in the years since its initial approval. See Castro v. Beecher, 386 F. Supp. 1281, 1286-87 (D. Mass. 1975) [hereinafter Castro IV]; Castro v. Beecher, 522 F. Supp. 873, 874-76 (D. Mass. 1981) [hereinafter Castro V] (describing history of the Castro decree and related litigation). In the process, Judge Caffrey established the parity target that mirrored the parity target established in the litigation over discrimination against firefighter applicants. Castro IV, 386 F. Supp. at 1286 (citing NAACP v. Beecher, 371 F. Supp. 507 (D. Mass. 1974), aff'd, 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974)).
B. Police Hiring Process
An applicant to the Boston Police Department ("BPD") must meet certain eligibility requirements to be considered for hiring as a police officer. Each applicant must (1) pass a police entrance examination; (2) be at least nineteen and younger than thirty-two years old (thirty-six if the applicant is a veteran); (3) have a valid Massachusetts driver's license; (4) be a citizen of the United States; (5) have a high school diploma, equivalency certificate, or three years of experience in the United States Armed Forces; (6) be able to read and understand English; (7) not have been convicted of a felony; and (8) be a resident of the City and have been so for at least one year. (Callahan Depo. at 12-16, 24-25; Callahan Depo. Ex. 1 (City of Boston website); McNeely Depo. Ex. 1 (HRD Announcement No. 6700), Ex. 2 (HRD Announcement No. 8655).)
Pursuant to the terms of the Castro decree, the Human Resources Department ("HRD") of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, which administers the police entrance examination, organizes BPD

applicants who meet the eligibility requirements into two groups: one that contains all black and Hispanic applicants and another that contains all other applicants. (Consent Decree dated January 7, 1975 ¶¶ 2023; McNeely Depo. at 17, 19.) HRD ranks the applicants in each group, first according to certain statutory preferences, such as veteran status, and then by their exam scores. (Consent Decree dated January 7, 1975 ¶ 20; McNeely Depo. at 17, 19, 49, 70.) HRD then merges applicants from the two groups onto a certification list, alternating between applicants from each group. (McNeely Depo. at 17-18.) This system is intended to "facilitate the appointment ... of one minority policeman for each white policeman" that the City hires.[1] Castro V, 522 F. Supp. at 875. A municipality may also request a certification list from HRD for police hiring based on particular criteria, such as foreign language skill or gender. (Callahan Depo. at 76-78, 81-83.)
HRD forwards the certification list to the City. (McNeely Depo. at 14-16.) To be considered for hiring, each applicant must sign the list, thereby agreeing to accept police employment if it is offered. (Callahan Depo. at 17; McNeely Depo. at 41.) Under civil service requirements, the City may then consider for hiring, in rank order, a certain number of applicants who signed the list. That number is twice the number of police positions for which the City intends to hire, plus one. (McNeely Depo. at 47, 56; Callahan Depo. at 66-67.) The City is not strictly required to hire any particular applicant within this pool. (Intervenors' & Commonwealth Defendants' Rule 56.1 Statement at 9.) If an applicant is considered for hiring, the applicant must submit to a medical examination, a psychological examination, and a background investigation. (Callahan Depo. at 19-22.)
C. Release from the Castro Decree
The Castro decree applied to every Massachusetts municipality with a minority population of at least one percent. (Consent Decree dated January 7, 1975 ¶ 24.) A municipality may seek release from the terms of the decree when it "achieves a complement of minorities commensurate with the percentage of minorities within the community." (Consent Decree dated January 7, 1975 ¶ 24; Caggiano Aff. ¶¶ 3, 6-7.) If the Commonwealth and the original Castro plaintiffs agree that the municipality has reached this target, the municipality is released from further compliance with the decree. (Caggiano Aff. ¶¶ 3, 6-7; Wolfman Aff. ¶ 7.) Today, twelve municipalities, including the City, remain subject to the Castro decree. (Wolfman Aff. ¶ 9, Ex. A.)
D. The Present Litigation
Each of the eight plaintiffs in this case is a non-minority male who applied unsuccessfully to become a Boston police officer. Each took the police entrance examination in April 2001. Plaintiff Paul DeLeo scored 101 on that exam; each other plaintiff scored 100. Each plaintiff also satisfied the other eligibility requirements for BPD hiring. (DeLeo Aff.; Barrett Aff.; Conneely Aff.; Hogardt Aff.; Dever Aff.; Rogers Aff.; Carr Aff.; Dunford Aff.)
The City requested a certification list from HRD to hire forty-five police officers for its March 2002 class. (Callahan Depo. at 69-70, 73; Public Safety Civil Service Requisition dated Sept. 7, 2001.) Each of the plaintiffs' names appeared on the list that HRD provided and each signed the list. (Certification list dated Sept. 14, 2001.) However, none of the plaintiffs was reached for consideration for the March 2002 class. (HRD Certification #211023 Report Supplement.)
In July 2002, the City requested a certification list of female applicants to fill fifteen BPD positions. (Letter from Edward Callahan dated July 23, 2002.) None of the plaintiffs' names appeared on that list, from which the City subsequently hired eleven applicants. (Callahan Depo. at 104-05.)
The City requested another certification list from HRD to hire thirty-eight police applicants for its October 2003 class. (Public Safety Civil Service Requisition dated July 8, 2002.) As before, although each of the plaintiffs' names appeared on the list, none of the plaintiffs was reached for consideration. (HRD

Certification #220831 Report Supplement.) However, as defendants and intervenors concede, if the Castro decree had not been in effect and the applicants' rank on the certification list been based solely on statutory preferences and exam scores, at least plaintiff DeLeo would have been reached for consideration.
The City requested another certification list from HRD to hire additional police applicants for a new class scheduled to begin in October 2004. This list was based on the results of the April 2003 police entrance examination, which each of the plaintiffs took. None of the plaintiffs was selected from this list.
Plaintiffs brought this action to challenge the continued application of the Castro decree to the City. They argue that the City has "achieve[d] a complement of minorities commensurate with the percentage of minorities within the community" and, therefore, that its continued adherence to the terms of the Castro decree violates their equal protection rights. They also challenge the July 2002 female-only hiring as discriminatory.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
"Summary judgment is appropriate when `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Barbour v. Dynamics Research Corp., 63 F.3d 32, 36 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). "To succeed [on a motion for summary judgment], the moving party must show that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's position." Rogers v. Fair, 902 F.2d 140, 143 (1st Cir. 1990); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).
"Once the moving party has properly supported its motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the non-moving party, who `may not rest on mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Barbour, 63 F.3d at 37 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986)). "There must be `sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.'" Rogers, 902 F.2d at 143 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50) (citations and footnote in Anderson omitted). The Court must "view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Barbour, 63 F.3d at 36.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Standing
The Court first resolves intervenors' challenge to plaintiffs' standing to bring this action. Article III of the Constitution requires that the plaintiff "has suffered or is threatened by injury in fact to a cognizable interest, that the injury is causally connected to the defendant's action, and that it can be abated by a remedy the court is competent to give." New Eng. Reg'l Council of Carpenters v. Kinton, 284 F.3d 9, 17 (1st Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). "[A] plaintiff must ensure that he establishes standing for each claim and for each form of relief sought." Donahue v. City of Boston, 304 F.3d 110, 116 (1st Cir. 2002); see also Cotter v. City of Boston, 323 F.3d 160, 166 (1st Cir. 2003) ("The standing inquiry requires careful judicial examination of a complaint's allegations to ascertain whether the particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted.").
However, "a plaintiff may have standing to assert an equal protection claim for prospective relief, even if he or she does not have standing to pursue a claim for damages. Where a plaintiff challenges an on-

going race conscious program and seeks prospective relief ... the relevant injury ... is the inability to compete on equal footing. Thus, a plaintiff may have standing to pursue a claim for prospective relief if he or she has or is likely to be exposed to unequal treatment." Donahue v. City of Boston, 371 F.3d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 2004) (internal quotations and citations omitted), cert. denied, 73 U.S.L.W. 3296 (U.S. Nov. 15, 2004) (No. 04-345). Such a plaintiff "need not affirmatively establish that he would receive the benefit in question if race were not considered," Donahue, 304 F.3d at 119 (quoting Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18, 21 (1999) (per curiam)), but must "be able to show that he is able and ready to apply for the benefit and that the challenged discriminatory policy prevents him from doing so," Donahue, 371 F.3d at 12 (internal quotations and brackets omitted). See also Cotter, 323 F.3d at 166 (quoting Lesage, 528 U.S. at 21) (no standing where "it is undisputed that the government would have made the same decision regardless" of use of "impermissible criterion").
At hearing, defendants conceded that at least plaintiff DeLeo would have been reached for hiring consideration for the October 2003 class if the names on the certification list for that class had been ranked solely according to statutory preferences and exam scores. Therefore, the requirements of the Castro decree are the cause in fact of the City's failure even to consider plaintiff DeLeo for hiring in the October 2003 class.
Moreover, each plaintiff in this case has standing for an equal protection claim for prospective relief. See Donahue, 304 F.3d at 117, 119-20 (plaintiff did not have standing for damages claim regarding BPD hiring because he "was too far down the list to be even remotely considered for hiring" but showed unequal treatment necessary "to seek forward-looking relief."). Each is "able and ready" for hiring consideration because each satisfies all of the eligibility requirements requisite for BPD hiring consideration. See Donahue, 371 F.3d at 12. (Plaintiff Affs.) Therefore, although determination of the relief for which each plaintiff has standing may require a more particularized inquiry, the plaintiffs have standing to bring this action.
B. Applicability of Castro Decree to the City
Plaintiffs move for summary judgment primarily on the ground that the City has achieved "a complement of minorities commensurate with the percentage of minorities within the community" under the terms of the Castro decree and that, therefore, the City is released from further compliance.
"[D]istrict courts enforcing public law consent decrees have, in general, broad discretion in determining ... whether the objectives of the decree have been substantially achieved." Navarro-Ayala v. HernandezColon, 951 F.2d 1325, 1337 (1st Cir. 1991). "[C]ourts should be flexible in considering requests for relaxation of, or release from, decrees which were initially established to bring about needed institutional reforms." Mackin v. City of Boston, 969 F.2d 1273, 1275 (1st Cir. 1992). "What is requisite is a largeminded approach, with a willingness of ... courts constantly to re-examine what has been done, and what may still properly be done to achieve the best solution which the judicial process permits." Castro III, 365 F. Supp. at 663 (Opinion of March 22, 1973); see also Mackin, 969 F.2d at 1278 (Court decisions regarding consent decrees are "at bottom an exercise of equitable power.").
The party seeking release from a consent decree bears the burden of proof. See Quinn v. City of Boston, 325 F.3d 18, 37 (1st Cir. 2003) ("[T]he parties urging that parity has been achieved ... bear the burden of proof."); cf. Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 383 (1992) ("a party seeking modification of a consent decree bears the burden of establishing that a significant change in circumstances warrants revision of the decree"). "[A] central consideration ... is whether the agency in question has come into compliance with constitutional requirements. Put another way, an inquiring court should ask whether the goals of the litigation, as incorporated in the outstanding decree, have been completely achieved." Mackin, 969 F.2d at 1275; see also id. at 1276 ("An intrusion by a federal court into the affairs of local government should be kept to a bare minimum and not be allowed to continue after the violation has abated and its pernicious effects have been cured.").

The parties in the present litigation dispute several issues regarding the City's continued adherence to the Castro decree: (1) the method for calculating the "complement of minorities" within the BPD, (2) the method for calculating the "percentage of minorities within the community", (3) the numbers for the respective statistics, (4) the meaning of "commensurate with", and finally, whether, considering each of the previous issues, the City has achieved the threshold for release from the decree. The Court considers each of these issues in turn.
1. The Police Complement of Minorities
The first issue to resolve in determining whether the City has reached the threshold for release from the Castro decree is the method of measuring the "complement of minorities" within the BPD.
This Court is guided by the First Circuit decision in Quinn v. City of Boston, 325 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2003), which concerned the consent decree that governed Boston Fire Department hiring ("fire department decree"). See also Castro V, 522 F. Supp. at 876 ("The litigation involving the members of the Fire Department has followed a substantially similar course down through the years ...."). In Quinn, plaintiffs sought to extinguish the fire department decree as it applied to the City. 325 F.3d at 25. That decree contained a release provision nearly identical to the release provision in the Castro decree. Beecher, 371 F. Supp. at 523 (fire department decree allowing release of municipality when it "achieves a complement of minorities commensurate with the percentage of minorities within the community"). The parties in Quinn, like the parties in this case, disputed the components of the calculation necessary to trigger release. 325 F.3d at 28-36. In construing the fire department decree, the First Circuit articulated the governing legal principle: "[B]ecause this litigation challenges a judicial decree affording race-based relief, any interpretation of the decree or any application of it in practice must survive strict scrutiny. This standard obliges an inquiring court to make a binary finding that the race-based relief is not only justified by a compelling governmental purpose but also narrowly drawn to fit the contours of that purpose." Id. at 28 (citations omitted).
In Quinn, the First Circuit held that the relevant fire department statistic was the percentage of minorities within the entry-level rank only. Id. at 35. The court devoted much of its discussion to its limited interpretation of the term "firefighter" as used in the fire department decree. Id. at 30-35. However, the court also stated that "[t]he litigation underlying the [fire department] decree arose out of discriminatory practices in recruitment and hiring into entrylevel positions." Id. at 30 (emphasis in original). A broader reading of the term "firefighter" "would effectively transform an instrument carefully crafted to eliminate discrimination in recruitment and hiring into general leverage favoring minorities in a much wider variety of matters." Id. at 32 (emphasis added). "Logically, the parties must have intended that term to refer to the class of jobs open to external hiring: entry-level firefighter positions." Id. at 31.
The same reasoning applies here. The Castro litigation of the 1970s had the same origins as the fire department litigation. See Castro I, 334 F. Supp. at 934 ("This action ... presents claims that state and city officials in recruiting and hiring policemen discriminated against certain minorities." (emphasis added)). The respective consent decrees had the same aims and, indeed, used much of the same language.
Intervenors argue that "police officer", as used in the Castro decree, should receive a broader interpretation than the First Circuit gave "firefighter" in Quinn. However, the Castro decree mainly uses "police officer" in its description of the entry-level hiring process. (Castro decree dated January 7, 1975 ¶¶ 2 ("police officer appointments"), 7 ("police officer applicants"), 16 ("candidates for police officer positions").) The decree seems to use "police officer" synonymously with "patrolman." See Castro III, 365 F. Supp. at 660 (approving consent decree and addressing it to appointing authorities that have "requested certification of police patrolmen or equivalents"); id. at 656-58, 660, 664-66 (discussing case in context of "patrolmen" applicants). In other contexts, the term appears similarly limited. See Boston Police Superior Officers Fed'n v. City of Boston, 147 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 1998) (in context of consent decree concerning BPD promotions, "`police officers' means not all officers ... but instead `patrolmen,' or those officers who might be elevated to sergeant"); BPD Rules & Procedures Rule 101, May 4, 1998, at 2

(distinguishing "police officer" position from other BPD non-civilian positions, such as "sergeant", "lieutenant", and "captain"). Indeed, the Quinn court cited favorably the definition of "police officer" as equivalent to "patrolman." 325 F.3d at 32 (citing Boston Police Superior Officers, 147 F.3d at 17-18).
Defendants and intervenors also argue that restricting the BPD analysis to the entry-level rank ignores their own past practice for measuring BPD progress under the Castro decree. See Mackin, 969 F.2d at 1276 ("Few things evidence a decree's meaning more persuasively than an immutable, decade-old pattern of past practice under the decree, consensually engaged in by all sides in the underlying litigation that produced the decree."). The First Circuit rejected a similar argument in restricting its analysis of fire department progress to the entry-level rank, however. See Quinn, 325 F.3d at 34-35 (rejecting defendants' reliance on "past practice" and "attempt to apply language derived from Mackin to that practice" where doing so would "change the meaning of plain language and thus ... validate an unlikely interpretation that is implausible in the context of the underlying litigation").
Finally, defendant Commonwealth and intervenors argue that limiting the calculation of the BPD "complement of minorities" to the entry-level rank creates a disincentive to the promotion of minorities. Again, the First Circuit rejected a similar argument in Quinn. See id. at 34 ("[A]lleging that unconstitutional hiring practices within the [fire department] have caused a disparate impact on the number of minorities in the higher echelons is a heavy charge. Such an allegation should not be addressed in the abstract, but, rather, should be squarely propounded by an injured party with standing to sue and litigated to a just conclusion."). As the Quinn court noted, for many years a separate consent decree governed promotions within the BPD. Id. at 32 (citing Boston Police Superior Officers, 147 F.3d at 17-18).
The First Circuit has recently validated the narrowly drawn affirmative action promotion of minority officers to further the compelling state interest in a diverse police force that meets the City's operational needs. Cotter, 323 F.3d at 172 n.10 ("We are much more sympathetic to the argument that communities place more trust in a diverse police force and that the resulting trust reduces crime rates and improves policing. This operational needs justification has been cited as a compelling state interest by other Circuits."). Nothing in the record suggests that the Castro decree was originally intended to address promotional discrimination through the use of priority hiring pools, nor would a priority hiring pool be a narrowly drawn solution for discrimination in promotion. See Quinn, 325 F.3d at 32 ("including higher ranks within the compass of the term `firefighter' would mean that the [fire department] decree was not narrowly tailored"); id. at 35 (broader interpretation "would open the decree to constitutional attack").
Previous Castro cases have occasionally referred to the percentage of minorities in the BPD as a whole. See Castro V, 522 F. Supp. at 876 (Judge Caffrey noting in 1981 that he had approved a supplemental decree in 1976 that released certain municipalities "which had attained parity of the percentage of blacks and hispanics in police service with the percentage of blacks and hispanics in [the] municipal population"). Apparently, however, a dispute over this standard has never been litigated. In light of the First Circuit's more recent analysis of similar circumstances in the fire department litigation, therefore, such references are not controlling here. See Quinn, 325 F.3d at 29 (rejecting "the assumption that [the definition of `firefighter'] had been fully litigated and settled in early proceedings"); id. at 35 (rejecting broader definition of "firefighter" in part because it was "never directly challenged").
Applying the doctrine of strict scrutiny, the Court concludes that the percentage of minorities within the BPD entry-level rank is the appropriate measure for the "complement of minorities" within the BPD.
2. The Percentage of Minorities within the Community
This Court has consistently defined "the percentage of minorities within the community" as the percentage of minorities in the City population. From the beginning, this Court has used this statistic as its yardstick. See Castro I, 334 F. Supp. at 935 (measuring minority population in City as a whole); see also Castro V, 522 F. Supp. at 876 (same); Beecher, 371 F. Supp. at 514 (same for fire department decree). In addition, the First Circuit held that language in the fire department decree nearly identical to that in the Castro

decree "unambiguously requires the use of the percentage of minorities in the general population." Quinn, 325 F.3d at 36 (citing Beecher, 371 F. Supp. at 523).
Plaintiffs contend that the Supreme Court has required reference to the "qualified labor pool", rather than the population at large, under the circumstances of this case. See City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 501-02 (1989) ("But where special qualifications are necessary, the relevant statistical pool for purposes of demonstrating discriminatory exclusion must be the number of minorities qualified to undertake the particular task."). Again, the First Circuit's experience with the fire department decree is instructive. In Quinn, the First Circuit held that use of the percentage of minorities in the City population to measure the fire department's progress under the consent decree was "fully consistent" with Supreme Court precedent. 325 F.3d at 36; see also Mackin, 969 F.2d at 1279 (upholding district court's use of general population instead of "the relevant labor pool").
Moreover, the eligibility requirements for BPD applicants are not "special qualifications" that require reference to the qualified labor pool. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 501-02. The Supreme Court has distinguished special qualifications from skills "that many persons possess or can fairly readily acquire." Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 n.13 (1977); see Boston Police Superior Officers, 147 F.3d at 21 (recognizing special qualifications for promotion of BPD sergeants to lieutenant where applicants were required to be BPD sergeants who had passed an exam for the lieutenant position). BPD entry-level positions, like other entry-level positions, "require no special prior abilities because they are, in fact, `designed to provide expertise.'" Peightal v. Metro. Dade County, 26 F.3d 1545, 1554 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 632 (1987)); id. at 1554 n.13 (neither driver's license requirement nor "educational requirement of a high school diploma or its equivalent" for entry-level firefighters constitute special skills).
Consequently, the percentage of minorities in the City population, not the qualified labor pool, is the appropriate measurement of "the percentage of minorities within the community."
3. The Numbers
The parties do not dispute how the numbers for the police line up: the percentage of minorities in the BPD entry-level rank reached 37.39% in March 2002, 38.79% in June 2003, and 38.82% in October 2003. The parties disagree, however, as to the minority population of the City. Plaintiffs contend that, based on the 2000 U.S. Census, the black and Hispanic population of the City is 38.26% of the total population. See Quinn, 325 F.3d at 37 (relying upon the district court's finding that as of 2000 "blacks and Hispanics constituted slightly over 38% of Boston's overall population"). Defendants and intervenors argue that this statistic excludes those who self-identified on the Census as biracial or multi-racial and that including those persons raises the relevant population to 40.12% of the total City population.[2]
As of June 2003, the percentage of minorities in the BPD entry-level rank, 38.79%, had surpassed plaintiffs' figure for the percentage of minorities within the total City population, 38.26%. If plaintiffs' statistic is the right one, by June 2003 the BPD had "achieve[d] a complement of minorities commensurate with the percentage of minorities within the community." However, even by October 2003 the percentage of minorities in the BPD entry-level rank, 38.82%, was still 1.3% below defendants' and intervenors' figure for the "percentage of minorities within the community."[3] If defendants' and intervenors' statistic is right, the City's release from the Castro decree as of October 2003 depends on the definition of "commensurate with" as used in the decree. The Court considers that definition below.
4. "Commensurate With"
This Court has previously referred to the "commensurate with" threshold for release from the Castro decree as "parity." See Castro V, 522 F. Supp. at 875 (describing the "parity target"). However, the First Circuit has since defined the "actual objective" of "commensurate with" in the fire department decree as

"rough parity." Mackin, 969 F.2d at 1277; see also Quinn, 325 F.3d at 28, 37 (requiring "parity (or, at least, rough parity)"); id. at 49 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (release threshold is "demonstrably attainable rough parity"). This Court finds no ground for interpreting "commensurate with" in the Castro decree any differently. Therefore, rough parity is the appropriate standard for release from the Castro decree.
However, neither this Court nor the First Circuit has established a mathematical measurement for either parity or rough parity. See, e.g., Quinn, 325 F.3d at 29 (noting no previous definition of parity). Defendants argue that the rough parity standard must be examined in the context of the particular municipality at issue. They assert that a margin of 1.3%, in the context of a municipality the size of Boston, is simply too large to constitute even rough parity.
This Court agrees that it must examine the rough parity standard in the context of this case and the City's experience under the Castro decree. When the Court entered the Castro decree in the 1970s, its purpose was "[t]o counteract the unconscious lopsidedness of the [police] recruitment of the past." Castro III, 365 F. Supp. at 659. At that time, black representation in the BPD was approximately one-fifth of the black population's percentage of the total City population. Castro I, 334 F. Supp. at 935. In over thirty years, the minority population as a percentage of the total City population has increased substantially. During the same period, minority representation within the BPD has grown even faster. As a result, thirty-four years after the original Castro litigation, continued application of the Castro decree to the City depends on, at most, the 1.3% margin between 38.82% and 40.12%.
In other words, circumstances have changed significantly in the three decades since the Court first entered the Castro decree. See Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 802 (1st Cir. 1998) (The continued validity of remedial action depends not only "on the mere existence of a past judicial finding [of discrimination], but, rather, on a variety of considerations, including what transpired since the time of that finding."); Mackin, 969 F.2d at 1276 ("Dissolution or relaxation of a consent decree may be justified in a variety of circumstances ...."); cf. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 384 ("A party seeking modification of a consent decree may meet its initial burden by showing ... a significant change either in factual conditions or in law."). As a result, in the context of this case, even if defendants' statistic is assumed to be true, the margin is sufficiently slim to constitute rough parity. The difference between plaintiffs' statistic for the minority population of the City and defendants' and intervenors' statistic is, therefore, immaterial.
Using either statistic, I conclude that the City had achieved the goal of the Castro decree as of October 2003. See Mackin, 969 F.2d at 1275. The City's adherence to the decree in the October 2003 hiring cycle was unconstitutional. See Quinn, 325 F.3d at 37 ("[T]he City's continued resort to race-based preferences from and after the time when parity was achieved fails the second prong of the strict scrutiny analysis."). The Court enters summary judgment in the plaintiffs' favor with respect to that hiring cycle.
C. Female Police Hiring
Plaintiffs also challenge as unconstitutional the City's July 2002 request for a certification list of female BPD applicants and the subsequent hiring from that list. Courts must subject such gender-based classifications to "heightened scrutiny." Nev. Dep't Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003). "Gender-based discrimination violates equal protection unless it `serves important governmental objectives and ... the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.'" Laro v. New Hampshire, 259 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)).
The City's July 2002 request and subsequent hiring satisfy both prongs of the heightened scrutiny standard. The City has an ongoing operational need to hire female police officers for investigations, the handling of female suspects and female prisoners, and interaction with female victims of sexual assault and rape. See Cotter, 323 F.3d at 172 n.10 (noting that other Circuits have held the "operational needs justification" to be a compelling state interest). Plaintiffs have put forth no evidence that defendants used discriminatory means not substantially related to the objective of hiring additional female police officers.

See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 41, § 97B (2004) ("Each [police] department shall make efforts to employ women police officers" in a rape reporting and prosecution unit.); id. ch. 31, § 21 (Consideration for certain civil service positions may be limited by gender if the positions "require custody or care of a person of a particular sex."). Therefore, the court rejects plaintiffs' challenge to the July 2002 request and subsequent hiring. The motion for summary judgment on this issue is DENIED.
D. The Remedy
The circumstances have changed in the weeks since the Court took this case under advisement because the City has hired its October 2004 police class. Plaintiffs seek an injunction ordering the City to hire them. At oral argument, to obviate the need for the requested preliminary injunction, the City suggested the creation of a special hiring class for plaintiffs, like the special firefighter class created for the Quinn plaintiffs, in the event that (1) the Court declared that the City is released from the terms of the Castro decree, (2) plaintiffs are otherwise qualified, and (3) plaintiffs would have been reached for hiring consideration in the absence of the consent decree. See generally Quinn v. City of Boston, 279 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D. Mass. 2003) (order on remand requiring hiring and other equitable relief for Quinn plaintiffs). In supplemental briefing, the City stated that it would hire a new police class in spring 2005, and suggested that a special class would no longer be necessary.
As noted above, the parties agree that plaintiff DeLeo would have been reached for consideration for the October 2003 class. However, the record is insufficient to support a finding that DeLeo would have been hired in that class, or that any other plaintiff would have been reached or hired either in that class or in the October 2004 class. This decision also leaves open the question of whether the City had achieved rough parity as of the March 2002 hiring, and whether any plaintiff would have been reached by then.
It is worth adding that the Commonwealth opposes any prospective order that requires strict rank-order hiring because the Commonwealth may in the future institute certification of police applicants based on banding principles. See Boston Police Superior Officers, 147 F.3d at 24 n.5 ("[S]ome courts, endorsing the `banding' approach, have approved affirmative action plans allowing the employer to depart from strict rank order and promote minority candidates from within a band of scores.") (citations omitted). Banding makes sense because, to meet its operational law enforcement and community policing needs, the City may be indifferent to a minimal point difference between two candidates. The Court declines to issue a prospective order that crafts a hiring procedure to replace the Castro decree.
V. ORDER
Within 15 days, all counsel shall propose to the Court a form of equitable relief with respect to the named plaintiffs based on the rulings set forth above. Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED without prejudice. Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is ALLOWED with respect to the consent decree only. The motion for summary judgment with respect to the July 2002 gender-based hiring is DENIED.
[1] In the context of the Castro decree, "minority" means black or Hispanic.
[2] The 2000 U.S. Census was the first to provide this option for self-identification. The BPD has no comparable classifications or means for identifying BPD personnel.
[3] Intervenors suggest that the Court also consider evidence that the Census undercounts minorities. However, the courts, the City, and the original Castro plaintiffs each have consistently relied on the Census as the source of community population figures. See, e.g., Quinn, 325 F.3d at 37 (relying on district court finding based on 2000 Census). (Wolfman Aff. ¶ 6; Callahan Depo. at 27-28.)

 
 Case 1:03-cv-12538-PBS Document 96 Filed 01/26/05 Page 1 of 3
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-12538-PBS
PAUL DELEO, JR., THOMAS BARRETT, MICHAEL CONNEELY, MATTHEW HOGARDT, BRENDAN DEVER, PATRICK ROGERS, CHRISTOPHER CARR, and BRIAN DUNFORD, DONALD WIGHTMAN,
Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF BOSTON, Massachusetts, RUTH BRAMSON, in her capacity as Chief Human Resources Officer of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; and the COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS,
Defendants,
BOSTON BRANCH OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE and MASSACHUSETTS ASSOCIATION OF MINORITY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS,
Intervenors.
INTERIM ORDER REGARDING INSTATEMENT (PROPOSED) Pursuant to the Joint Motion of the Plaintiffs and lead Defendant, City of Boston ("City"), and this Court's Memorandum and Order of November 23,2004 in the above-entitled action, it is hereby ordered as follows:
I. Beginning effective with the date of this Order, the nine named Plaintiffs herein (DeLeo, Barrett, Conneely, Hogardt, Dever, Rogers, Carr, Dunford and Wightman)("Plaintiffs"), who are not currently employed as City of Boston police officers, will be considered for hire by the City in the next Boston Police Academy class to take place after the date of this Order.

Case 1:03-cv-12538-PBS Document 96 Filed 01/26/05 Page 2 of 3
2. The Commonwealth's Human Resources Division ("HRD") shall place the names of the above nine Plaintiffs at the top of the next regular certification list it issues to the Boston Police Department ("BPD").
3. Instatement eligibility for these Plaintiffs shall be contingent upon each Plaintiff's satisfaction of the requirements applicable to all candidates for police officer positions in BPD, specifically: (a) passing the BPD's medical and psychological examinations; (b) passing a background check and drug test; (c) passing the required physical agility test; (d) compliance with the City's residency requirement; and (e) successful completion of academy training. Age shall not be considered in determining the Plaintiffs' eligibility for patrol officer positions. The City shall begin the instatement process as soon as reasonably possible after issuance of this Order. Once a Plaintiff has met the eligibility requirements for instatement, he shall be hired by the City.
4. For retirement purposes, each Plaintiff who successfully meets the eligibility requirements for instatement shall be deemed to have begun his employment as a City of Boston police officer on the date he would have been hired had he been appointed with the successful candidates in the October 2003 class of new police officers. l Each Plaintiff who qualifies for instatement shall be paid at the step level that he would have achieved, in the normal course of employment, had he then been hired, along with a commensurate "bank" of personal time, sick time and vacation days. Any benefits granted pursuant to this Order impacting on the rights of other police officers shall be subject to agreement by the Union representing Boston police officers.
5. This Order is not intended to establish a precedent with respect to any other person who believes s/he was passed over for employment as a police officer by the City as a
1 For purposes of promotional opportunities, however, the Plaintiffs shall be deemed to have begun employment as a City of805too Police Officer on their actual date of hire, as pursuant to this Order.

Case 1:03-cv-12538-PBS Document 96 Filed 01/26/05 Page 3 of 3

result of the City's enforcement ofthe so-called Castro decree, who is not a named plainti ff herein.

DATED:

~~~~Svvw Hon. Patti B. Saris United States District Court

 
 Case: 1:03-cv-12538 As of: 07/01/2010 04:52 PM EDT 1 of 15
United States District Court District of Massachusetts (Boston) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:03−cv−12538−PBS

Deleo v. City of Boston, Massachusetts et al Assigned to: Judge Patti B. Saris Cause: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Race)
Intervenor Plaintiff
Boston Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People

Date Filed: 12/17/2003 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Harry T. Daniels Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP (Bos) 60 State Street Boston, MA 02109 617−526−6196 Fax: 617−526−5000 Email: Harry.Daniels@wilmerhale.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mark D. Selwyn Wilmer Hale LLP 60 State Street Boston, MA 02109 617−526−6923 Fax: 617−526−5000 Email: mark.selwyn@wilmerhale.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nadine M. Cohen Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law Suite 443 294 Washington Street Boston, MA 02108 617−482−1145 Fax: 617−482−4392 Email: ncohen@gbls.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robin L. Alperstein Becker, Glynn Melamed &Muffly, LLP 299 Park Avenue 16th Floor New York, NY 10171 212−888−3033 Fax: 212−888−0255 Email: ralperstein@beckerglynn.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher R. Noyes Wilmer Hale LLP 60 State Street Boston, MA 02109 617−526−6436 Fax: 617−526−5000 Email: christopher.noyes@wilmerhale.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:03-cv-12538 As of: 07/01/2010 04:52 PM EDT 2 of 15

Intervenor Plaintiff
Massachusetts Association of Minority Law Enforcement Officers

represented by Harry T. Daniels (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark D. Selwyn (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine M. Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robin L. Alperstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher R. Noyes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Paul Deleo

represented by Alfred Gordon Pyle, Rome, Lichten &Ehrenberg, P.C. Suite 500 18 Tremont Street Boston, MA 02108 617−367−7200 Fax: 617−367−4820 Email: agordon@prle.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Harold L. Lichten Lichten &Liss−Riordan, P.C. 100 Cambridge Street 20th Floor Boston, MA 02114 617−994−5800 Fax: 617−994−5801 Email: hlichten@llrlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Brian Dunford

represented by Alfred Gordon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Harold L. Lichten (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Christopher Carr

represented by Alfred Gordon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 1:03-cv-12538 As of: 07/01/2010 04:52 PM EDT 3 of 15

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Harold L. Lichten (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Patrick Rogers

represented by Alfred Gordon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Harold L. Lichten (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Brendan Dever

represented by Alfred Gordon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Harold L. Lichten (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Matthew Hogardt

represented by Alfred Gordon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Harold L. Lichten (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Michael Conneely

represented by Alfred Gordon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Harold L. Lichten (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Thomas Barrett

represented by Alfred Gordon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Harold L. Lichten (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Donald Wightman

represented by Alfred Gordon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:03-cv-12538 As of: 07/01/2010 04:52 PM EDT 4 of 15

V. Defendant City of Boston, Massachusetts
Defendant Thomas Menino In his capacity as Mayor of the City of Boston TERMINATED: 04/01/2004

represented by Stephen G. Cox City Of Boston Law Department One City Hall Plaza Room 615 Boston, MA 02201 617−635−4064 Email: scoxlaw@gmail.com TERMINATED: 01/23/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Victoria S. Cole Mass. Attorney General Room 2019 1 Ashburton Place Boston, MA 02108 617−727−2200 Fax: 617−727−5785 Email: victoria.cole@ago.state.ma.us TERMINATED: 06/16/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan M. Weise City of Boston Law Department Boston City Hall Room 615 Boston, MA 02201 617−635−4040 Fax: 617−635−3199 Email: susan.weise@cityofboston.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Betsy J. Facher Abbey &Ellis 212 East 39th Street New York, NY 10016 617−343−4550 Fax: 617−343−4609 Email: facherb.bpd@ci.boston.ma.us TERMINATED: 01/04/2005 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William V. Hoch Massachusetts Port Authority Legal Department One Harborside Drive Boston, MA 02128−2909 617−568−3136 Fax: 617−568−3163 Email: whoch@massport.com TERMINATED: 04/14/2004 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Stephen G. Cox (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:03-cv-12538 As of: 07/01/2010 04:52 PM EDT 5 of 15

William V. Hoch (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/14/2004 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
James Hussey in his capacity as Acting Commissioner of the city of Boston

represented by William V. Hoch (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/14/2004 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Governor Mitt Romney in his capacity as Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts

represented by Ginny Sinkel Bowman &Penski 29 Prospect Street Acton, MA 01720 617−312−2323 Email: gskremer@bowmanpenski.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert L. Quinan , Jr. Attorney General's Office One Ashburton Place Room 2019 Boston, MA 02108−1698 617−727−2200 Fax: 617−727−5785 Email: Robert.Quinan@ago.state.ma.us LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Victoria S. Cole (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/16/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Commonwealth of Massachusetts

represented by Ginny Sinkel (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert L. Quinan , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Victoria S. Cole (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/16/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Juliana deHaan Rice Town of Arlington Legal Department 50 Pleasant Street Arlington, MA 02476 781−316−3150 Fax: 781−316−3159 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:03-cv-12538 As of: 07/01/2010 04:52 PM EDT 6 of 15

Defendant Kathleen M. O'Toole TERMINATED: 04/01/2004
Intervenor Defendant Massachusetts Association of Minority Law Enforcement Officers
Intervenor Defendant NAACP Boston Branch

Christopher R. Noyes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Stephen G. Cox (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William V. Hoch (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/14/2004 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Harry T. Daniels (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mark D. Selwyn (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Harry T. Daniels (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mark D. Selwyn (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 12/17/2003
02/11/2004
02/11/2004 02/11/2004 02/11/2004 02/24/2004 02/24/2004
02/26/2004

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against City of Boston, Massachusetts, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, James Hussey, Thomas Menino, Mitt Romney Filing fee: $ 150, receipt number 52602, filed by Paul Deleo.(Simeone, Maria) (Entered: 12/19/2003)
2 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed City of Boston, Massachusetts waiver sent on 1/9/2004, answer due 3/9/2004; James Hussey waiver sent on 1/9/2004, answer due 3/9/2004. (Simeone, Maria) (Entered: 02/18/2004)
3 SUMMONS Returned Executed Commonwealth of Massachusetts served on 2/6/2004, answer due 2/26/2004. (Simeone, Maria) (Entered: 02/18/2004)
4 SUMMONS Returned Executed Thomas Menino served on 2/3/2004, answer due 2/23/2004. (Simeone, Maria) (Entered: 02/18/2004)
5 SUMMONS Returned Executed Mitt Romney served on 2/6/2004, answer due 2/26/2004. (Simeone, Maria) (Entered: 02/18/2004)
6 NOTICE of Appearance by Ginny Sinkel on behalf of Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Mitt Romney. c/s (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 02/26/2004)
7 Assented to MOTION for Extension of Time to March 31, 2004 to File Answer or Otherwise Respond to 1 Complaint by Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Mitt Romney. c/s(Patch, Christine) (Entered: 02/26/2004)
Judge Patti B. Saris : Electronic ORDER entered granting 7 Assented to Motion for Extension of Time to Answer or Otherwise Respond to the Complaint, by Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Mitt Romney. cc/cl (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 02/26/2004)

Case: 1:03-cv-12538 As of: 07/01/2010 04:52 PM EDT 7 of 15

03/05/2004 03/05/2004 03/05/2004
03/08/2004
03/10/2004 03/11/2004 03/12/2004 03/31/2004 03/31/2004 04/14/2004 04/28/2004 05/05/2004 05/06/2004 05/12/2004 05/12/2004 05/12/2004 05/19/2004
05/19/2004
05/19/2004

8 NOTICE of Appearance by William V. Hoch on behalf of City of Boston, Massachusetts, James Hussey, Thomas Menino (Hoch, William) (Entered: 03/05/2004)
9 MOTION for Extension of Time to March 31, 2004 to File Answer re 1 Complaint Assented To By Plaintiff by City of Boston, Massachusetts, James Hussey, Thomas Menino.(Hoch, William) (Entered: 03/05/2004)
10 First AMENDED COMPLAINT, Preliminary Injunctive and Compensatory Relief Requested, and Jury Demand against all defendants, filed by Brian Dunford, Christopher Carr, Patrick Rogers, Brendan Dever, Matthew Hogardt, Michael Conneely, Thomas Barrett, Paul Deleo.(Patch, Christine) (Entered: 03/09/2004)
Judge Patti B. Saris: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered granting 9 MOTION for Extension of Time to March 31, 2004 to File Answer to Complaint filed by Thomas Menino, City of Boston and James Hussey. (Alba, Robert) Modified on 3/8/2004 (Alba, Robert). (Entered: 03/08/2004)
12 NOTICE of Appearance by Stephen G. Cox on behalf of City of Boston, Massachusetts, Thomas Menino, Kathleen M. O'Toole (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 03/15/2004)
11 NOTICE of Appearance by William V. Hoch on behalf of Kathleen M. O'Toole (Hoch, William) (Entered: 03/11/2004)
13 NOTICE of Appearance by Robert L. Quinan Jr. on behalf of Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Mitt Romney (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 03/16/2004)
14 STIPULATION of Dismissal by Thomas Menino, Kathleen M. O'Toole. (Cox, Stephen) (Entered: 03/31/2004)
15 ANSWER to Amended Complaint by City of Boston, Massachusetts.(Hoch, William) (Entered: 03/31/2004)
16 NOTICE of Withdrawal of Appearance Attorney William V. Hoch terminated. (Hoch, William) (Entered: 04/14/2004)
17 ANSWER to Amended Complaint and Jury Demand by Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Mitt Romney.(Patch, Christine) (Entered: 04/30/2004)
18 MOTION to Intervene by Massachusetts Association of Minority Law Enforcement Officers, NAACP.(Selwyn, Mark) (Entered: 05/05/2004)
Judge Patti B. Saris : Electronic ORDER entered granting without opposition 18 Motion to Intervene (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 05/06/2004)
19 MOTION to Stay Proceedings by City of Boston, Massachusetts.(Cox, Stephen) (Entered: 05/12/2004)
20 NOTICE of Scheduling Conference. Scheduling Conference set for 6/2/2004 at 2:00 PM in Courtroom 13 before Judge Patti B. Saris. (Alba, Robert) (Entered: 05/12/2004)
21 NOTICE of Scheduling Conference Scheduling Conference set for 6/2/2004 02:00 PM in Courtroom 13 before Judge Patti B. Saris. (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 05/13/2004)
22 RESPONSE to Motion re 19 MOTION to Stay Proceedings filed by Thomas Barrett, Christopher Carr, Michael Conneely, Paul Deleo, Brendan Dever, Brian Dunford, Matthew Hogardt, Patrick Rogers. (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 05/24/2004)
23 MEMORANDUM in Response re 19 MOTION to Stay Proceedings filed by Thomas Barrett, Christopher Carr, Michael Conneely, Paul Deleo, Brendan Dever, Brian Dunford, Matthew Hogardt, Patrick Rogers. (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 05/24/2004)
24 MOTION to Intervene, should the Court Grant Defendant City of Boston's Request to Consider Clarification of Consent Decree by Thomas Barrett, Christopher Carr, Michael Conneely, Paul Deleo, Brendan Dever, Brian Dunford, Matthew Hogardt,

Case: 1:03-cv-12538 As of: 07/01/2010 04:52 PM EDT 8 of 15

05/19/2004
05/26/2004
05/27/2004 05/27/2004 05/27/2004 05/27/2004 05/27/2004 05/27/2004 05/27/2004 05/27/2004 05/27/2004 06/01/2004
06/02/2004 06/02/2004
06/02/2004 06/02/2004
06/02/2004

Patrick Rogers.(Patch, Christine) (Entered: 05/24/2004)
25 MEMORANDUM in Support re 24 MOTION to Intervene, should the Court Grant Defendant City of Boston's Request to Consider Clarification of Consent Decree filed by Thomas Barrett, Christopher Carr, Michael Conneely, Paul Deleo, Brendan Dever, Brian Dunford, Matthew Hogardt, Patrick Rogers. (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 05/24/2004)
26 MOTION for Extension of Time to June 1, 2004 to Respond to Motion to Stay and Motion For Clarification (Unopposed) by Boston Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Massachusetts Association of Minority Law Enforcement Officers.(Selwyn, Mark) (Entered: 05/26/2004)
27 JOINT STATEMENT re scheduling conference. (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 06/01/2004)
28 CERTIFICATION pursuant to Local Rule 16.1 by Paul Deleo.(Patch, Christine) (Entered: 06/01/2004)
29 CERTIFICATION pursuant to Local Rule 16.1 by Thomas Barrett.(Patch, Christine) (Entered: 06/01/2004)
30 CERTIFICATION pursuant to Local Rule 16.1 by Michael Conneely.(Patch, Christine) (Entered: 06/01/2004)
31 CERTIFICATION pursuant to Local Rule 16.1 by Matthew Hogardt.(Patch, Christine) (Entered: 06/01/2004)
32 CERTIFICATION pursuant to Local Rule 16.1 by Brendan Dever.(Patch, Christine) (Entered: 06/01/2004)
33 CERTIFICATION pursuant to Local Rule 16.1 by Patrick Rogers.(Patch, Christine) (Entered: 06/01/2004)
34 CERTIFICATION pursuant to Local Rule 16.1 by Christopher Carr.(Patch, Christine) (Entered: 06/01/2004)
35 CERTIFICATION pursuant to Local Rule 16.1 by Brian Dunford.(Patch, Christine) (Entered: 06/01/2004)
40 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 19 MOTION to Stay Proceedings and Motion for Clarification of Consent Decree filed by Boston Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Massachusetts Association of Minority Law Enforcement Officers. (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 06/08/2004)
36 CERTIFICATE OF CONSULTATION pursuant to Local Rule 16.1 by Stephen G. Cox on behalf of City of Boston, Massachusetts. (Cox, Stephen) (Entered: 06/02/2004)
ELECTRONIC Clerk's Notes for proceedings held before Judge Patti B. Saris: Scheduling Conference held on 6/2/2004. Briefs by the City and State on motion for clarification by: 7/15/04. Plaintiffs to file a motion for preliminary injunction by: 7/15/04. Oppositions to motion for PI by: 8/5/04. Reply by: 8/12/04. Hearing set for 8/20/2004 at 2:00 PM in Courtroom 13 before Judge Patti B. Saris. (Court Reporter Marie Cloonan.) (Alba, Robert) (Entered: 06/02/2004)
Judge Patti B. Saris : Electronic ORDER entered granting 26 Unopposed Motion by Intervenors for Extension of Time (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 06/03/2004)
37 Judge Patti B. Saris : ORDER entered SCHEDULING ORDER: City and State brief on Motion for Clarification due by 7/15/2004. Plaintiffs to file a Motion for Preliminary Junction by 7/15/04; opposition due 8/5/04; reply to opposition due 8/12/04. Hearing on Motions for Preliminary Injunction and Clarification set for 8/20/04 at 2:00 PM.(Patch, Christine) (Entered: 06/07/2004)
38 CERTIFICATION pursuant to Local Rule 16.1 by City of Boston, Massachusetts, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, James Hussey, Mitt Romney.(Patch, Christine) (Entered: 06/08/2004)

Case: 1:03-cv-12538 As of: 07/01/2010 04:52 PM EDT 9 of 15

06/02/2004 06/02/2004 06/02/2004 06/08/2004
06/09/2004 06/14/2004 06/23/2004 07/01/2004 07/01/2004 07/15/2004 07/15/2004 07/15/2004 07/15/2004 07/15/2004 07/15/2004
07/15/2004

39 Rule 26 disclosure statement by City of Boston, Massachusetts, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, James Hussey, Mitt Romney.(Patch, Christine) (Entered: 06/08/2004)
41 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Robin L. Alperstein Filing fee $ 50, receipt number 56284. by Boston Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Massachusetts Association of Minority Law Enforcement Officers, NAACP.(Patch, Christine) (Entered: 06/08/2004)
42 DECLARATION of Robin L. Alperstein re 41 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Robin L. Alperstein by Boston Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Massachusetts Association of Minority Law Enforcement Officers. (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 06/08/2004)
Judge Patti B. Saris : Electronic ORDER entered granting 41 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Added Robin L. Alperstein for Boston Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and Massachusetts Association of Minority Law Enforcement Officers (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 06/08/2004)
Judge Patti B. Saris : Electronic ORDER entered denying 19 Motion to Stay Proceedings (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 06/10/2004)
43 NOTICE of Appearance by Betsy J. Facher on behalf of City of Boston, Massachusetts (Facher, Betsy) (Entered: 06/14/2004)
44 NOTICE by Boston Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Massachusetts Association of Minority Law Enforcement Officers Notice Of Firm Name Change (Selwyn, Mark) (Entered: 06/23/2004)
45 MOTION for Protective Order to Quash the Intervenors' Noticed Deposition of the Plaintiffs by Thomas Barrett, Christopher Carr, Michael Conneely, Paul Deleo, Brendan Dever, Brian Dunford, Matthew Hogardt, Patrick Rogers.(Patch, Christine) (Entered: 07/13/2004)
46 MEMORANDUM in Support re 45 MOTION for Protective Order filed by Thomas Barrett, Christopher Carr, Michael Conneely, Paul Deleo, Brendan Dever, Brian Dunford, Matthew Hogardt, Patrick Rogers. (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 07/13/2004)
47 Second MOTION for Clarification of Consent Decree by City of Boston, Massachusetts.(Cox, Stephen) (Entered: 07/15/2004)
48 MEMORANDUM in Support re 47 Second MOTION for Clarification of Consent Decree filed by City of Boston, Massachusetts. (Cox, Stephen) (Entered: 07/15/2004)
49 RESPONSE to Motion re 47 Second MOTION for Clarification of Consent Decree filed by Commonwealth of Massachusetts. (Attachments: # 1)(Quinan, Robert) (Entered: 07/15/2004)
52 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 45 MOTION for Protective Order filed by Boston Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Massachusetts Association of Minority Law Enforcement Officers. (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 07/22/2004)
53 MOTION for Summary Judgment and/or for Preliminary Injunction, by Thomas Barrett, Christopher Carr, Michael Conneely, Paul Deleo, Brendan Dever, Brian Dunford, Matthew Hogardt, Patrick Rogers.(Patch, Christine) (Entered: 07/22/2004)
54 MOTION for Leave to File Memorandum of Law in Excess of Twenty Pages by Thomas Barrett, Christopher Carr, Michael Conneely, Paul Deleo, Brendan Dever, Brian Dunford, Matthew Hogardt, Patrick Rogers. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and/or for Preliminary Injunction)(Patch, Christine) (Entered: 07/22/2004)
55 STATEMENT of facts not in Material Dispute re 53 MOTION for Summary Judgment and/or for Preliminary Injunction. (Patch, Christine) (Entered:

Case: 1:03-cv-12538 As of: 07/01/2010 04:52 PM EDT 10 of 15

07/15/2004 07/16/2004
07/16/2004 07/21/2004 07/21/2004 07/22/2004 07/22/2004 07/27/2004 07/28/2004
07/30/2004 08/04/2004 08/05/2004 08/06/2004

07/22/2004)
56 NOTICE of Appearance by Alfred S. Gordon on behalf of Thomas Barrett, Christopher Carr, Michael Conneely, Paul Deleo, Brendan Dever, Brian Dunford, Matthew Hogardt, Patrick Rogers (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 07/22/2004)
50 Joint MOTION to Substitute the Commonwealth's Chief Human Resources Officer for the State's Governor as a Party Defendant by Thomas Barrett, Boston Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Christopher Carr, City of Boston, Massachusetts, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Michael Conneely, Paul Deleo, Brendan Dever, Brian Dunford, Matthew Hogardt, James Hussey, Massachusetts Association of Minority Law Enforcement Officers, NAACP, Patrick Rogers, Mitt Romney.(Patch, Christine) (Entered: 07/21/2004)
51 NOTICE of Appearance by Victoria S. Cole on behalf of City of Boston, Massachusetts, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Mitt Romney (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 07/21/2004)
Judge Patti B. Saris : Electronic ORDER entered granting 50 Motion to Substitute Party. (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 07/23/2004)
60 Letter to Christopher Noyes from Harold L. Lichten re response to Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Protective Order and Request for Hearing. (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 07/29/2004)
58 MOTION for Leave to File an Opposition to Defendant City of Boston's Renewed Motion for Clarification of Consent Decree by Thomas Barrett, Christopher Carr, Michael Conneely, Paul Deleo, Brendan Dever, Brian Dunford, Matthew Hogardt, Patrick Rogers.(Patch, Christine) (Entered: 07/28/2004)
59 MEMORANDUM in Support re 58 MOTION for Leave to File an Opposition to Defendant City of Boston's Renewed Motion for Clarification of Consent Decree filed by Thomas Barrett, Christopher Carr, Michael Conneely, Paul Deleo, Brendan Dever, Brian Dunford, Matthew Hogardt, Patrick Rogers. (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 07/28/2004)
57 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment by Defendants and by Boston Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Massachusetts Association of Minority Law Enforcement Officers.(Selwyn, Mark) (Entered: 07/27/2004)
Judge Patti B. Saris : Electronic ORDER entered granting 45 Motion for Protective Order to Quash the Intervenors' Noticed Depositions of the Plaintiffs. "Plaintiffs' letter dated July 21, 2004 with the attached affidavits seems to address the issues of education and residency. I agree that the "tie" issue cannot be resolved based on answers to deposition questions. If the affidavits are not complete on a point, the intervenors may send interrogatories." (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 07/29/2004)
61 Opposition re 57 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response to Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment by Defendants and filed by Thomas Barrett, Christopher Carr, Michael Conneely, Paul Deleo, Brendan Dever, Brian Dunford, Matthew Hogardt, Patrick Rogers. (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 08/04/2004)
Judge Patti B. Saris : Electronic ORDER entered granting 57 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response re 53 MOTION for Summary Judgment and/or for Preliminary Injunction. Responses due by 9/2/2004 (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 08/06/2004)
62 RESPONSE to Motion re 47 Second MOTION for Clarification of Consent Decree filed by Boston Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Noyes, Christopher) (Entered: 08/05/2004)
63 NOTICE OF RESCHEDULINGThe Motion Hearing re: Motion for Summary Judgment and/or Preliminary Injunction previously set for 8/20/04 has been rescheduled to 9/17/2004 02:00 PM in Courtroom 13 before Judge Patti B. Saris. (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 08/12/2004)

Case: 1:03-cv-12538 As of: 07/01/2010 04:52 PM EDT 11 of 15

09/02/2004 09/02/2004
09/02/2004 09/02/2004
09/03/2004 09/03/2004 09/03/2004 09/03/2004
09/03/2004 09/03/2004 09/03/2004 09/03/2004 09/07/2004 09/07/2004 09/10/2004

64 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by City of Boston, Massachusetts.(Cox, Stephen) (Entered: 09/02/2004)
65 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 53 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by City of Boston, Massachusetts. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G# 8 Exhibit H# 9 Exhibit I# 10 Exhibit J# 11 Exhibit K# 12 Exhibit L)(Cox, Stephen) (Entered: 09/02/2004)
66 STATEMENT of facts re 53 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction MOTION for Summary Judgment And City's Memorandum In Opposition. (Cox, Stephen) (Entered: 09/02/2004)
67 Assented to MOTION for Extension of Time to September 3, 2004 to Respond to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and/or for Preliminary Injunction by Boston Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Massachusetts Association of Minority Law Enforcement Officers.(Noyes, Christopher) (Entered: 09/02/2004)
68 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by Commonwealth of Massachusetts.(Quinan, Robert) (Entered: 09/03/2004)
69 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by Boston Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Massachusetts Association of Minority Law Enforcement Officers.(Noyes, Christopher) (Entered: 09/03/2004)
70 Opposition re 53 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Boston Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Massachusetts Association of Minority Law Enforcement Officers. (Noyes, Christopher) (Entered: 09/03/2004)
71 NOTICE by Boston Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Massachusetts Association of Minority Law Enforcement Officers re 70 Opposition to Motion, Notice of Filing with Clerk's Office of Intervenors and Commonwealth Defendants Rule 56.1 Statement of Disputed Material Facts and Statement of Additional Material Facts (Noyes, Christopher) (Entered: 09/03/2004)
72 Opposition re 53 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Commonwealth of Massachusetts. (Quinan, Robert) (Entered: 09/03/2004)
Judge Patti B. Saris : Electronic ORDER entered granting 67 Motion for a One−Day Extension of Time to Respond to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and/or for Preliminary Injunction. (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 09/08/2004)
Judge Patti B. Saris : Electronic ORDER entered granting 64 Motion for Leave to File Memorandum in Excess of Twenty Pages. (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 09/08/2004)
74 Rule 56.1 STATEMENT of Disputed Material facts and Statement of Additional Material Facts in response to 53 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction and/or for Summary Judgment. (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 09/13/2004)
Judge Patti B. Saris : Electronic ORDER entered granting 68 Motion for Leave to Submit a Memorandum of Law in Excess of Twenty Pages. (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 09/08/2004)
Judge Patti B. Saris : Electronic ORDER entered granting 69 Motion for Leave to Submit a Memorandum of Law in Excess of Twenty Pages. (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 09/08/2004)
73 REPLY to Response to Motion re 53 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction MOTION for Summary Judgment and/or for Preliminary Injunction filed by Thomas Barrett, Christopher Carr, Michael Conneely, Paul Deleo, Brendan Dever, Brian Dunford, Matthew Hogardt, Patrick Rogers. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Attachment A Part 1# 2 Affidavit Attachment A Part 2# 3 Affidavit Attachment A Part 3# 4 Plaintiffs' Rule 56.1 Response to Defendants' and Intervenors' Statements of Disputed Material Facts and Statements of Additional Material Facts)(Gordon,

Case: 1:03-cv-12538 As of: 07/01/2010 04:52 PM EDT 12 of 15

09/17/2004
09/17/2004 09/22/2004 09/24/2004 09/24/2004 09/24/2004 09/24/2004 09/27/2004 09/27/2004 09/27/2004 09/28/2004 10/04/2004 11/23/2004

Alfred) (Entered: 09/10/2004)
ELECTRONIC Clerk's Notes for proceedings held before Judge Patti B. Saris: Motion Hearing held on 9/17/2004 re 53 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Paul Deleo, Christopher Carr, Patrick Rogers, Michael Conneely, Thomas Barrett, Matthew Hogardt, Brendan Dever, Brian Dunford. Court hears argumant od counsel. Court takes motion under advisement. Parties to file five page supplements. (Court Reporter Valerie O'Hara.) (Alba, Robert) (Entered: 09/17/2004)
75 Letter to Robert Alba from Stephen G. Cox indicating that he mistakenly attached exhibits (A through L) to his Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, when they were supposed to be exhibits to the Statement of Facts. (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 09/23/2004)
76 TRANSCRIPT of Motion Hearing held on September 17, 2004 before Judge Saris. Court Reporter: Valerie A. O'Hara. The original transcripts are maintained in the case file in the Clerk's Office. Copies may be obtained by contacting the court reporter at 617/737−2346 or the Clerk's Office. (Scalfani, Deborah) (Entered: 09/24/2004)
77 Second MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 53 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by City of Boston, Massachusetts. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Cox, Stephen) (Entered: 09/24/2004)
78 Supplemental MEMORANDUM in Support re 53 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Thomas Barrett, Christopher Carr, Michael Conneely, Paul Deleo, Brendan Dever, Brian Dunford, Matthew Hogardt, Patrick Rogers. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2# 3 Exhibit 3# 4 Exhibit 4# 5 Exhibit 5)(Gordon, Alfred) (Entered: 09/24/2004)
79 SUR−REPLY to Motion re 53 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Boston Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Massachusetts Association of Minority Law Enforcement Officers. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2)(Carpenter, Jennifer) (Entered: 09/24/2004)
80 SUR−REPLY to Motion re 53 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Commonwealth of Massachusetts. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Commonwealth's exhibits to its post−argument memo)(Quinan, Robert) (Entered: 09/24/2004)
81 Amended SUR−REPLY to Motion re 53 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Boston Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Massachusetts Association of Minority Law Enforcement Officers. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2)(Carpenter, Jennifer) (Entered: 09/27/2004)
82 Assented to MOTION to Correct 80 Sur−Reply to Motion filed by plaintiffs for summary judgment by Commonwealth of Massachusetts. (Attachments: # 1 Commonwealth's Corrected Post−Argument Brief# 2 Commonwealth's Corrected Post−Argument Exhibits)(Quinan, Robert) Additional attachment(s) added on 9/28/2004 (Hurley, Virginia). (Entered: 09/27/2004)
83 Corrected Brief in Opposition re 53 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction and/or for Summary Judgment, filed by Boston Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Massachusetts Association of Minority Law Enforcement Officers. (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 09/30/2004)
Notice of correction to docket made by Court staff. Correction: Document #82, attachment two refiled as 5 separate attachments, in that the original was 12MB in size. (Hurley, Virginia) (Entered: 09/28/2004)
84 NOTICE of Change of Address by Christopher R. Noyes (Noyes, Christopher) (Entered: 10/04/2004)
85 Judge Patti B. Saris : ORDER entered denying 53 Motion for Preliminary Injunction, granting 53 Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to the consent

Case: 1:03-cv-12538 As of: 07/01/2010 04:52 PM EDT 13 of 15

12/07/2004 12/08/2004 12/14/2004 12/16/2004
01/04/2005 01/07/2005
01/07/2005 01/07/2005 01/26/2005 01/26/2005 01/26/2005 01/27/2005
01/27/2005
01/27/2005 02/03/2005
02/04/2005

decree only. The motion for summary judgment with respect to the July 2002 gender−based hiring is DENIED. (Irwin, Nancy) (Entered: 11/23/2004)
86 MOTION for Extension of Time to January 28, 2005 to TO PROPOSE EQUITABLE RELIEF by City of Boston, Massachusetts.(Cox, Stephen) (Entered: 12/07/2004)
87 Response by Thomas Barrett, Christopher Carr, Michael Conneely, Paul Deleo, Brendan Dever, Brian Dunford, Matthew Hogardt, Patrick Rogers regarding Equitable Relief for the named Plaintiffs. (Gordon, Alfred) (Entered: 12/08/2004)
88 NOTICE of Hearing: Status Conference set for 1/7/2005 04:30 PM in Courtroom 19 before Judge Patti B. Saris. (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 12/14/2004)
89 Response by Boston Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Massachusetts Association of Minority Law Enforcement Officers To Plaintiffs' Proposal Regarding Equitable Relief For The Named Plaintiffs. (Selwyn, Mark) (Entered: 12/16/2004)
90 NOTICE of Withdrawal of Appearance Attorney Betsy J. Facher terminated. (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 01/11/2005)
ElectronicClerk's Notes for proceedings held before Judge Patti B. Saris : Status Conference held on 1/7/2005. Further Status Conference set for 1/27/2005 at 3:30 PM in Courtroom 19 before Judge Patti B. Saris. (Court Reporter Jim Gibbons.) (Alba, Robert) (Entered: 01/07/2005)
91 Judge Patti B. Saris : ORDER Compelling Disclosure of Civil Service Examination Scores from Defendant Commonwealth of Massachusetts entered. (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 01/19/2005)
92 Judge Patti B. Saris : ORDER of the Court entered. (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 01/19/2005)
Judge Patti B. Saris : Electronic ORDER entered granting 93 Motion to Add Plaintiff Donald Wightman and to Amend Caption accordingly. "Allowed without opposition." (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 02/03/2005)
Judge Patti B. Saris : Electronic ORDER entered granting 94 Joint Motion for Interim Order Regarding Instatement. "Allowed without opposition after hearing." (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 02/03/2005)
96 Judge Patti B. Saris : Interim ORDER Regarding Instatement Period entered. (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 02/04/2005)
93 MOTION to Amend Caption by Adding Plaintiff Donald Wightman by Paul Deleo, Brian Dunford, Christopher Carr, Patrick Rogers, Brendan Dever, Matthew Hogardt, Michael Conneely, Thomas Barrett. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Exhibit A)(Gordon, Alfred) (Entered: 01/27/2005)
94 Joint MOTION for Order to ENTER INTERIM ORDER REGARDING INSTATEMENT by City of Boston, Massachusetts. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order INTERIM ORDER REGARDING INSTATEMENT (PROPOSED))(Cox, Stephen) (Entered: 01/27/2005)
Electronic Clerk's Notes for proceedings held before Judge Patti B. Saris: Status Conference held on 1/27/2005. (Court Reporter Teri Gibson.) (Alba, Robert) (Entered: 01/27/2005)
95 Assented to MOTION for Extension of Time to March 3, 2005 to To FIle Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs by Paul Deleo, Brian Dunford, Christopher Carr, Patrick Rogers, Brendan Dever, Matthew Hogardt, Michael Conneely, Thomas Barrett.(Gordon, Alfred) (Entered: 02/03/2005)
Judge Patti B. Saris : Electronic ORDER entered granting 95 Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs. (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 02/10/2005)

Case: 1:03-cv-12538 As of: 07/01/2010 04:52 PM EDT 14 of 15

02/16/2005
03/03/2005 03/15/2005 03/15/2005 03/17/2005 03/17/2005 03/18/2005 03/25/2005
03/30/2005 03/31/2005 04/20/2005 05/02/2005

Documents terminated from Court's statistical report: 24 MOTION to Intervene filed by Paul Deleo,, Christopher Carr,, Patrick Rogers,, Michael Conneely,, Thomas Barrett,, Matthew Hogardt,, Brendan Dever,, Brian Dunford,, 54 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages filed by Paul Deleo,, Christopher Carr,, Patrick Rogers,, Michael Conneely,, Thomas Barrett,, Matthew Hogardt,, Brendan Dever,, Brian Dunford,, 82 Assented to MOTION to Correct 80 Sur−Reply to Motion filed by plaintiffs for summary judgment filed by Commonwealth of Massachusetts,, 47 Second MOTION for Clarification of Consent Decree filed by City of Boston, Massachusetts,, 58 MOTION for Leave to File filed by Paul Deleo,, Christopher Carr,, Patrick Rogers,, Michael Conneely,, Thomas Barrett,, Matthew Hogardt,, Brendan Dever,, Brian Dunford. (Alba, Robert) (Entered: 02/16/2005)
97 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs and for Entry of Final Judgment by Paul Deleo, Donald Wightman, Brian Dunford, Christopher Carr, Patrick Rogers, Brendan Dever, Matthew Hogardt, Michael Conneely, Thomas Barrett. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F)(Gordon, Alfred) (Entered: 03/03/2005)
98 Opposition re 97 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs and for Entry of Final Judgment filed by City of Boston, Massachusetts. (Cox, Stephen) (Entered: 03/15/2005)
99 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 97 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs and for Entry of Final Judgment filed by City of Boston, Massachusetts. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C)(Cox, Stephen) (Entered: 03/15/2005)
100 MOTION for Leave to File Response to Defendant City of Boston's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs by Paul Deleo, Donald Wightman, Brian Dunford, Christopher Carr, Patrick Rogers, Brendan Dever, Matthew Hogardt, Michael Conneely, Thomas Barrett.(Gordon, Alfred) (Entered: 03/17/2005)
102 NOTICE of Hearing on Motion 97 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs and for Entry of Final Judgment: Motion Hearing set for 5/2/2005 03:00 PM in Courtroom 19 before Judge Patti B. Saris. (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 03/28/2005)
Judge Patti B. Saris : Electronic ORDER entered granting 100 Motion for Leave to File a Response to Defendant City of Boston's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs. (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 03/22/2005)
101 REPLY to Response to Motion re 97 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs and for Entry of Final Judgment filed by Paul Deleo, Donald Wightman, Brian Dunford, Christopher Carr, Patrick Rogers, Brendan Dever, Matthew Hogardt, Michael Conneely, Thomas Barrett. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G)(Gordon, Alfred) (Entered: 03/25/2005)
103 MOTION for Extension of Time to April 20, 2005 to To respond to plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees by Commonwealth of Massachusetts.(Cole, Victoria) (Entered: 03/30/2005)
Judge Patti B. Saris : Electronic ORDER entered granting 103 Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Plaintiff's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs. (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 04/06/2005)
104 Opposition re 97 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs and for Entry of Final Judgment filed by Commonwealth of Massachusetts. (Cole, Victoria) (Entered: 04/20/2005)
Electronic Clerk's Notes for proceedings held before Judge Patti B. Saris: Motion Hearing held on 5/2/2005 re 97 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs and for Entry of Final Judgment filed by Paul Deleo, Christopher Carr, Patrick Rogers, Michael Conneely, Thomas Barrett, Matthew Hogardt, Brendan Dever, Brian Dunford, Donald Wightman. Court hears argument of counsel. (Court Reporter Marianne Kusa−Ryll.) (Alba, Robert) (Entered: 05/02/2005)

Case: 1:03-cv-12538 As of: 07/01/2010 04:52 PM EDT 15 of 15

05/23/2005 05/25/2005 05/31/2005 06/16/2005
06/16/2005 09/19/2005
01/20/2006 01/20/2006

105 NOTICE of Rejection of Filing re: Letter to Judge Saris sent to Stephen G. Cox. (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 05/23/2005)
106 Joint MOTION to Stay by City of Boston, Massachusetts.(Cox, Stephen) (Entered: 05/25/2005)
Judge Patti B. Saris : Electronic ORDER entered granting 106 Motion to Stay (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 06/01/2005)
107 NOTICE of Appearance by Juliana deHaan Rice on behalf of Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Rice, Juliana) Additional attachment(s) added on 6/20/2005 (Patch, Christine). (Entered: 06/16/2005)
108 NOTICE of Withdrawal of Appearance Attorney Victoria S. Cole terminated. (Cole, Victoria) (Entered: 06/16/2005)
109 SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT by Paul Deleo, Donald Wightman, Brian Dunford, Christopher Carr, Patrick Rogers, Brendan Dever, Matthew Hogardt, Michael Conneely, Thomas Barrett. (Gordon, Alfred) (Entered: 09/19/2005)
110 NOTICE of Appearance by Susan M. Weise on behalf of City of Boston, Massachusetts (Weise, Susan) (Entered: 01/20/2006)
111 NOTICE of Withdrawal of Appearance by Stephen G. Cox (Cox, Stephen) (Entered: 01/20/2006)