CLOSED,TYPE-D
U.S. District Court District of Columbia (Washington, DC) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:05-cv-00071-PLF

A.N.S.W.E.R. et al v. NORTON et al Assigned to: Judge Paul L. Friedman Case in other court: USCA, 16-05047 Cause: 28:1331 Fed. Question

Date Filed: 01/14/2005 Date Terminated: 01/29/2016 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Defendant

Plaintiff
A.N.S.W.E.R. (Act Now to Stop War and End Racism) Coalition

represented by Carl L. Messineo PARTNERSHIP FOR CIVIL JUSTICE FUND 617 Florida Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20001 202-232-1180 Email: cm@JusticeOnline.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mara E. Verheyden-Hilliard PARTNERSHIP FOR CIVIL JUSTICE FUND 617 Florida Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20001 202-232-1180 Email: mvh@JusticeOnline.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Merrilyn Anne Onisko PARTNERSHIP FOR CIVIL JUSTICE 1901 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Suite 607 Washington, DC 20006 (202) 530-5630 Fax: (202) 530-5634

Plaintiff
GRAYLAN S. HAGLER Pastor, Plymouth Congregational Church

Email: monisko@justiceonline.org TERMINATED: 12/01/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrea Hope Costello FLORIDA LEGAL SERVICES 4260 West Newberry Road Suite 412 Newberry, FL 32669 (407) 801-0332 Email: andrea@floridalegal.org TERMINATED: 04/11/2014
Carol A. Sobel 429 Santa Monica Boulevard Suite 550 Santa Monica, CA 90401 (310) 393-3055 Fax: (310) 393-3605 Email: carolsobel@aol.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Radhika M. Singh NATIONAL LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 1901 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Suite 500 Washington, DC 20006 (202) 452-0620 ext. 207 Fax: (202) 872-1031 Email: radhikasingh4280@gmail.com TERMINATED: 03/25/2011
represented by Carl L. Messineo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mara E. Verheyden-Hilliard (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff MUSLIM AMERICAN SOCIETY FREEDOM FOUNDATION
Plaintiff NATIONAL COUNCIL OF ARAB AMERICANS

Merrilyn Anne Onisko (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/01/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carol A. Sobel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Carl L. Messineo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mara E. Verheyden-Hilliard (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Merrilyn Anne Onisko (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/01/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carol A. Sobel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Carl L. Messineo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mara E. Verheyden-Hilliard (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Merrilyn Anne Onisko (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/01/2005

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carol A. Sobel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant GALE A. NORTON In official capacity as Secretary of the Interior TERMINATED: 11/04/2008
Defendant FRAN MAINELLA In official capacity as Director, National Park Service TERMINATED: 11/04/2008
Defendant W. RALPH BASHAM In official capacity as Director, U.S. Secret Service

represented by Marina Utgoff Braswell U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 555 Fourth Street, NW Washington, DC 20530 (202) 252-2561 Fax: (202) 252-2599 Email: Marina.Braswell@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Marina Utgoff Braswell (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Marina Utgoff Braswell (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jane M. Lyons U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE for D.C. Civil Division 555 Fourth Street, NW Washington, DC 20530 (202) 252-2540 Fax: (202) 252-2599 Email: jane.lyons@usdoj.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
S. M. R. JEWELL Secretary, United States Department of the Interior

represented by Marina Utgoff Braswell (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jane M. Lyons (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 01/14/2005
01/14/2005 01/14/2005 01/14/2005
01/14/2005 01/18/2005 01/18/2005

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against GALE A. NORTON, FRAN MAINELLA, W. RALPH BASHAM (Filing fee $ 150) filed by NATIONAL COUNCIL OF ARAB AMERICANS, A.N.S.W.E.R., GRAYLAN S. HAGLER, MUSLIM AMERICAN SOCIETY FREEDOM FOUNDATION.(rje, ) Modified on 1/18/2005 (rje, ). (Entered: 01/18/2005)
2 NOTICE OF RELATED CASE by NATIONAL COUNCIL OF ARAB AMERICANS, A.N.S.W.E.R., GRAYLAN S. HAGLER, MUSLIM AMERICAN SOCIETY FREEDOM FOUNDATION. Case related to Case No. 01-72. (rje, ) (Entered: 01/18/2005)
3 SUPPLEMENT to the Related Case Notice 2 by Plaintiffs. (rje, ) Modified on 1/18/2005 (rje, ). (Entered: 01/18/2005)
4 EMERGENCY MOTION for Preliminary Injunction, MOTION for expedited Hearing by NATIONAL COUNCIL OF ARAB AMERICANS, A.N.S.W.E.R., GRAYLAN S. HAGLER, MUSLIM AMERICAN SOCIETY FREEDOM FOUNDATION. Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A(rje, ) Modified on 1/18/2005 (rje, ). (Entered: 01/18/2005)
Summons (3) Issued as to GALE A. NORTON, FRAN MAINELLA, W. RALPH BASHAM. (rje, ) Modified on 1/18/2005 (rje, ). (Entered: 01/18/2005)
Case Reassigned to Judge Paul L. Friedman. Judge Gladys Kessler no longer assigned to the case. (rje, ) (Entered: 01/18/2005)
5 UPON CONSIDERATION of Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs' Notice of Related Case, it is hereby ORDERED, nunc pro tunc, that the instant case is not related to Civil Action No. 01-72 and it is further ORDERED, nunc pro tunc, that this case be returned to the Court's

01/18/2005
01/18/2005 01/18/2005 01/18/2005 01/18/2005
01/18/2005 01/18/2005 01/18/2005

Calendar Committee for reassignment . Signed by Judge Gladys Kessler on 1/18/05. (CS, ) (Entered: 01/18/2005)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Paul L. Friedman : Motion Hearing held on 1/18/2005 re 4 MOTION for Expedited Hearing on MOTION for Preliminary Injunction, Granted; MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by A.N.S.W.E.R., GRAYLAN S. HAGLER, MUSLIM AMERICAN SOCIETY FREEDOM FOUNDATION, NATIONAL COUNCIL OF ARAB AMERICANS, heard and denied for the reasons stated on the record in open Court. (Court Reporter Linda Russo.) (bm) (Entered: 01/18/2005)
6 NOTICE of Appearance by Marina Utgoff Braswell on behalf of GALE A. NORTON, FRAN MAINELLA, W. RALPH BASHAM (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 01/18/2005)
7 RESPONSE to Notice of Related Case filed by GALE A. NORTON, FRAN MAINELLA, W. RALPH BASHAM. (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 01/18/2005)
8 Memorandum in opposition to motion re 4 filed by GALE A. NORTON, FRAN MAINELLA, W. RALPH BASHAM. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment A# 2 Attachment B# 3 Attachment C# 4 Attachment D# 5 Attachment E)(Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 01/18/2005)
9 AFFIDAVIT of Robbin Owen by GALE A. NORTON, FRAN MAINELLA, W. RALPH BASHAM. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G# 8 Exhibit H# 9 Exhibit I# 10 Exhibit J# 11 Exhibit K# 12 Exhibit L# 13 Exhibit M# 14 Exhibit N# 15 Exhibit O# 16 Exhibit P# 17 Exhibit Q# 18 Exhibit R# 19 Exhibit S# 20 Exhibit T# 21 Exhibit U# 22 Exhibit V)(Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 01/18/2005)
10 AFFIDAVIT of Donato Coyer by GALE A. NORTON, FRAN MAINELLA, W. RALPH BASHAM. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment 1# 2 Attachment 2# 3 Attachment 3)(Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 01/18/2005)
11 ORDER granting 4 Motion for Hearing, denying 4 Motion for Preliminary Injunction after hearing argument from counsel at an expedited hearing and for the reasons stated in open Court. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 1/18/2005. (bm) (Entered: 01/19/2005)
12 MOTION for Leave to Appear on behalf of plaintiffs pro hac vice for attorney Carol Sobel by NATIONAL COUNCIL OF ARAB AMERICANS, A.N.S.W.E.R., GRAYLAN S. HAGLER, MUSLIM

01/28/2005 03/10/2005 03/11/2005 03/18/2005 03/22/2005
07/07/2005
07/28/2005 07/28/2005 08/25/2005

AMERICAN SOCIETY FREEDOM FOUNDATION. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(td, ) (Entered: 01/25/2005)
MINUTE ORDER granting 12 plaintiffs' motion for admission pro hac vice of attorney Carol Sobel. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 28, 2005.(ma) (Entered: 01/28/2005)
13 ENTERED IN ERROR. . . .Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 1 Complaint by GALE A. NORTON, W. RALPH BASHAM. (Braswell, Marina) Modified on 3/11/2005 (td, ). (Entered: 03/10/2005)
DOCUMEN NO. 13 was "Entered In Error" and counsel was notified to refile said document. The first image should be the motion and then attach the order as an attachment to the motion. (td, ) (Entered: 03/11/2005)
14 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 1 Complaint by GALE A. NORTON, FRAN MAINELLA, W. RALPH BASHAM. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 03/18/2005)
MINUTE ORDER granting 14 defendants' unopposed motion to stay and for enlargement of time. Defendants need not respond to the complaint in this case absent further order of the Court; if plaintiffs file an amended complaint, defendants shall have thirty days thereafter in which to respond. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on March 22, 2005. (MA) (Entered: 03/22/2005)
15 ORDER that, on or before July 28, 2005, plaintiffs shall either file an amended complaint, submit a joint report with defendant under Local Civil Rule 16.3 describing the parties' views on how this case should move forward, or show cause in writing why this case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on July 7, 2005. (MA) (Entered: 07/07/2005)
16 NOTICE , Filing of Amended Complaint by A.N.S.W.E.R. re 15 Order, (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 07/28/2005)
17 AMENDED COMPLAINT against FRAN MAINELLA, W. RALPH BASHAMfiled by NATIONAL COUNCIL OF ARAB AMERICANS, A.N.S.W.E.R., GRAYLAN S. HAGLER, MUSLIM AMERICAN SOCIETY FREEDOM FOUNDATION.(td, ) (Entered: 07/29/2005)
18 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 17 Amended Complaint by GALE A. NORTON, FRAN

08/30/2005 09/29/2005 09/30/2005 10/14/2005 11/16/2005
11/17/2005 12/01/2005 12/16/2005

MAINELLA, W. RALPH BASHAM. (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 08/25/2005)
MINUTE ORDER granting 18 defendants' unopposed motion for enlargement of time up to and including September 30, 2005 in which to respond to the amended complaint. Signed by Judge Walton for Judge Paul L. Friedman on August 29, 2005. (MA) (Entered: 08/30/2005)
19 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer by GALE A. NORTON, FRAN MAINELLA, W. RALPH BASHAM. (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 09/29/2005)
MINUTE ORDER granting 19 defendants' unopposed motion for further enlargement of time up to and including October 14, 2005 in which to respond to the amended complaint. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 30, 2005. (MA) (Entered: 09/30/2005)
20 MOTION to Dismiss, or in the alternative for Summary Judgment by GALE A. NORTON, W. RALPH BASHAM. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2# 3 Exhibit 3# 4 Text of Proposed Order)(jeb, ) (Entered: 10/20/2005)
21 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 20 MOTION to Dismiss MOTION for Summary Judgment by NATIONAL COUNCIL OF ARAB AMERICANS, A.N.S.W.E.R., GRAYLAN S. HAGLER, MUSLIM AMERICAN SOCIETY FREEDOM FOUNDATION. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 11/16/2005)
MINUTE ORDER granting 21 plaintiffs' consent motion for enlargement of time up to and including December 16, 2005 to file opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss; defendants' reply is due on or before January 13, 2006. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on November 17, 2005. (MA) (Entered: 11/17/2005)
22 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to NATIONAL COUNCIL OF ARAB AMERICANS, A.N.S.W.E.R., GRAYLAN S. HAGLER, MUSLIM AMERICAN SOCIETY FREEDOM FOUNDATION. Attorney Merrilyn Anne Onisko terminated. (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 12/01/2005)
23 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 20 MOTION to Dismiss MOTION for Summary Judgment by NATIONAL COUNCIL OF ARAB AMERICANS, A.N.S.W.E.R., GRAYLAN S. HAGLER, MUSLIM AMERICAN SOCIETY

12/20/2005 01/13/2006 01/19/2006 01/23/2006 01/24/2006 01/30/2006 02/01/2006

FREEDOM FOUNDATION. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 12/16/2005)
MINUTE ORDER granting 23 plaintiffs' unopposed motion for further enlargement of time up to and including January 13, 2006 to file opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss 20 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on December 20, 2005. (MA) (Entered: 12/20/2005)
24 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 20 MOTION to Dismiss MOTION for Summary Judgment by NATIONAL COUNCIL OF ARAB AMERICANS, A.N.S.W.E.R., GRAYLAN S. HAGLER, MUSLIM AMERICAN SOCIETY FREEDOM FOUNDATION. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 01/13/2006)
MINUTE ORDER granting 24 plaintiffs' unopposed motion for further enlargement of time up to and including January 23, 2006 to file opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss. Defendants may file their reply up to and including February 28, 2006. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 19, 2006. (MA) (Entered: 01/19/2006)
25 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 20 MOTION to Dismiss MOTION for Summary Judgment by NATIONAL COUNCIL OF ARAB AMERICANS, A.N.S.W.E.R., GRAYLAN S. HAGLER, MUSLIM AMERICAN SOCIETY FREEDOM FOUNDATION. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 01/23/2006)
MINUTE ORDER granting 25 plaintiffs' consent motion for further enlargement of time up to and including January 30, 2006 to file opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss 20 . Defendants may file their reply up to and including March 7, 2006. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 24, 2006. (MA) (Entered: 01/24/2006)
26 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 20 MOTION to Dismiss MOTION for Summary Judgment by NATIONAL COUNCIL OF ARAB AMERICANS, A.N.S.W.E.R., GRAYLAN S. HAGLER, MUSLIM AMERICAN SOCIETY FREEDOM FOUNDATION. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 01/30/2006)
27 ORDER granting 26 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply re 20 MOTION to Dismiss MOTION for Summary Judgment; plaintiff shall file their responses due by 2/3/2006; defendants' replies due by 3/13/2006.. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 2/1/2006. (bm) (Entered: 02/01/2006)

02/03/2006
02/08/2006 02/17/2006 02/17/2006 02/17/2006 02/18/2006 02/22/2006 02/23/2006 03/09/2006

28 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 20 MOTION to Dismiss MOTION for Summary Judgment by NATIONAL COUNCIL OF ARAB AMERICANS, A.N.S.W.E.R., GRAYLAN S. HAGLER, MUSLIM AMERICAN SOCIETY FREEDOM FOUNDATION. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 02/03/2006)
MINUTE ORDER granting 28 plaintiffs' consent motion for further enlargement of time up to and including February 17, 2006 to file opposition to defencdants' motion to dismiss 20 ; defendants may file their reply up to and including March 22, 2006. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 7, 2006. (MA) (Entered: 02/08/2006)
29 Memorandum in opposition to re 20 and Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summar Judgment filed by A.N.S.W.E.R.. (Attachments: # 1 Statement of Facts in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment# 2 Statement of Facts in Support of Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 02/17/2006)
30 MOTION to Dismiss Without Prejudice Pursuant to Rule 56(f) the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment With Respect to Claim Related to the Prohibition on Lightweight Sign Supports by A.N.S.W.E.R.. (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 02/17/2006)
33 Cross MOTION for Judgment on the pleadings, or in the alternative, MOTION for Summary Judgment by A.N.S.W.E.R..; (see document no. 29 for image) (td, ) (Entered: 02/23/2006)
31 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by A.N.S.W.E.R.. (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 02/18/2006)
32 Memorandum in opposition to re 20 (Corrected) filed by NATIONAL COUNCIL OF ARAB AMERICANS, A.N.S.W.E.R., GRAYLAN S. HAGLER, MUSLIM AMERICAN SOCIETY FREEDOM FOUNDATION. (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 02/22/2006)
34 NOTICE of Bulky Exhibits by NATIONAL COUNCIL OF ARAB AMERICANS, A.N.S.W.E.R., GRAYLAN S. HAGLER, MUSLIM AMERICAN SOCIETY FREEDOM FOUNDATION re 32 Memorandum in Opposition (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 02/23/2006)
MINUTE ORDER granting 31 plaintiffs? motion to exceed page limitation by ten pages. Defendants may (if necessary) exceed the page limitation by ten pages in their reply. No further motions to exceed page limitations will be granted on the parties? cross-motions for

03/22/2006
03/23/2006 04/05/2006 04/14/2006
04/18/2006 04/21/2006
04/24/2006

summary judgment. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on March 8, 2006. (MA) (Entered: 03/09/2006)
35 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 33 MOTION for Judgment MOTION for Summary Judgment, 30 MOTION to Dismiss Without Prejudice Pursuant to Rule 56(f) the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment With Respect to Claim Related to the Prohibition on Lightweight Sign Supports by GALE A. NORTON, FRAN MAINELLA, W. RALPH BASHAM. (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 03/22/2006)
MINUTE ORDER granting 35 defendants' unopposed motion for enlargement of time up to and including April 14, 2006 in which to respond to plaintif's response to defendant's dispositive motion. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on March 23, 2006. (MA) (Entered: 03/23/2006)
36 NOTICE of Change of Address by Carl L. Messineo (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 04/05/2006)
37 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 33 MOTION for Judgment MOTION for Summary Judgment, 30 MOTION to Dismiss Without Prejudice Pursuant to Rule 56(f) the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment With Respect to Claim Related to the Prohibition on Lightweight Sign Supports by GALE A. NORTON, FRAN MAINELLA, W. RALPH BASHAM. (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 04/14/2006)
ORDER granting 37 defendants' unopposed motion for brief enlargement of time up to and including April 21, 2006 in which to respond to plaintiff's response to defendant's dispositive motion 33 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on April 18, 2006. (MA) (Entered: 04/18/2006)
38 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 33 MOTION for Judgment MOTION for Summary Judgment, 30 MOTION to Dismiss Without Prejudice Pursuant to Rule 56(f) the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment With Respect to Claim Related to the Prohibition on Lightweight Sign Supports by GALE A. NORTON, FRAN MAINELLA, W. RALPH BASHAM. (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 04/21/2006)
ORDER granting 38 defendants' unopposed motion for brief further enlagement of time up to and includin April 26, 2006 to File Response/Reply re 38 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 33 MOTION for Judgment MOTION for Summary Judgment, 30 MOTION to Dismiss Without Prejudice

04/26/2006 04/26/2006 04/26/2006 05/05/2006 05/08/2006

Pursuant to Rule 56(f) the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment With Respect to. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on April 24, 2006.(MA) (Entered: 04/24/2006)
39 Memorandum in opposition to re 30 MOTION to Dismiss Without Prejudice Pursuant to Rule 56(f) the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment With Respect to Claim Related to the Prohibition on Lightweight Sign Supports filed by W. RALPH BASHAM. (Attachments: # 1 Coyer Declaration# 2 Coyer Declaration, Exh. 1# 3 Coyer Declaration, Exh. 2# 4 Coyer Declaration, Exh. 3)(Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 04/26/2006)
40 REPLY to opposition to motion re 20 MOTION to Dismiss MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by GALE A. NORTON, FRAN MAINELLA, W. RALPH BASHAM. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 4# 2 Exhibit 5# 3 Exhibit 6# 4 Exhibit 7# 5 Exhibit 8# 6 Coyer Declaration# 7 Coyer Declaration Exh. 1# 8 Coyer Declaration Exh. 2# 9 Coyer Declaration Exhibit 3)(Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 04/26/2006)
41 Memorandum in opposition to re 33 MOTION for Judgment MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by GALE A. NORTON, FRAN MAINELLA, W. RALPH BASHAM. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 4# 2 Exhibit 5# 3 Exhibit 6# 4 Exhibit 7# 5 Exhibit 8# 6 Coyer Declaration# 7 Coyer Declaration Exhibit 1# 8 Coyer Declaration Exhibit 2# 9 Coyer Declaration Exhibit 3)(Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 04/26/2006)
42 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 33 MOTION for Judgment MOTION for Summary Judgment, 30 MOTION to Dismiss Without Prejudice Pursuant to Rule 56(f) the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment With Respect to Claim Related to the Prohibition on Lightweight Sign Supports by NATIONAL COUNCIL OF ARAB AMERICANS, A.N.S.W.E.R., GRAYLAN S. HAGLER, MUSLIM AMERICAN SOCIETY FREEDOM FOUNDATION. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 05/05/2006)
43 ORDER: Upon consideration of 42 Consent Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply re 42 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 33 MOTION for Judgment MOTION for Summary Judgment, 30 MOTION to DismissWithout Prejudice Pursuant to Rule 56(f) the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. It is hereby ordered that the motion in GRANTED. Plaintiff may file their reply to defendant's opposition to motion to dismiss; reply due by 6/30/2006. Plaintiffs' may file their reply to defendant's

06/30/2006
07/06/2006 07/14/2006 07/14/2006 01/11/2007
05/15/2007

opposition to plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment; reply due by 6/30/2006. Signed by Judge John D. Bates for Judge Paul L. Friedman on 05/08/06. (tb, ) (Entered: 05/09/2006)
44 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 33 MOTION for Judgment MOTION for Summary Judgment, 30 MOTION to Dismiss Without Prejudice Pursuant to Rule 56(f) the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment With Respect to Claim Related to the Prohibition on Lightweight Sign Supports by NATIONAL COUNCIL OF ARAB AMERICANS, A.N.S.W.E.R., GRAYLAN S. HAGLER, MUSLIM AMERICAN SOCIETY FREEDOM FOUNDATION. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 06/30/2006)
MINUTE ORDER granting 44 consent motion for enlargement of time up to and including July 14, 2006 for plaintiffs to file replies to defendants' oppositions to dispositive motions. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on July 6, 2006. (MA) (Entered: 07/06/2006)
45 REPLY to opposition to motion re 33 MOTION for Judgment MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by A.N.S.W.E.R.. (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 07/14/2006)
46 REPLY to opposition to motion re 30 MOTION to Dismiss Without Prejudice Pursuant to Rule 56(f) the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment With Respect to Claim Related to the Prohibition on Lightweight Sign Supports filed by A.N.S.W.E.R.. (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 07/14/2006)
ORDER denying 30 plaintiff's "Motion under Rule 56(f) Pertaining Solely to Claims Related to Sign Supports. The Court has considered plaintiff?s motion and the related opposition and reply briefs. The Court denies plaintiff's motion on the grounds that discovery is unnecessary to the resolution of the lengthy cross-motions for summary judgment pending before the Court, and plaintiff has not adequately justified its need for such discovery. See Messina v. Krakower, 439 F.3d 755, 762 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (trial court does not abuse its discretion when it denies Rule 56(f) motion ?where the requesting party has offered only a conclusory assertion without any supporting facts to justify the proposition that the discovery sought will produce the evidence required.?) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 11, 2007. (MA) (Entered: 01/11/2007)
47 NOTICE of Change of Address by Carl L. Messineo (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 05/15/2007)

06/13/2007 06/13/2007 06/13/2007 06/26/2007 07/17/2007 07/17/2007 08/03/2007
08/17/2007

48 ORDER granting in part and holding in abeyance in part 20 defendants' motion to dismiss; granting in part and holding in abeyance in part 20 defendants' motion for summary judgment. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on June 13, 2007.(MA) (Entered: 06/13/2007)
49 OPINION granting in part and holding in abeyance in part defendants' motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on June 13, 2007. (MA) (Entered: 06/13/2007)
Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference set for 6/26/2007 @ 11:00 AM in Courtroom 29A before Judge Paul L. Friedman. (mm) (Entered: 06/14/2007)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Paul L. Friedman: Status Conference held on 6/26/2007. Parties to submit supplemental authority by 7/17/2007; Plaintiffs' Rule 56(f) Motion due by 7/17/2007; Response due by 8/3/2007; Reply due by 8/17/2007. (Court Reporter Linda Russo) (mm) (Entered: 06/26/2007)
50 Cross MOTION to Dismiss Without Prejudice Pursuant to Rule 56(f) the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment With Respect to Claim Related to the Prohibition on Lightweight Sign Supports (Renewed) by A.N.S.W.E.R. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 - Affidavit of Carl Messineo# 2 Exhibit 2 - Presidential Advance Manual# 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 07/17/2007)
51 NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY by GALE A. NORTON, W. RALPH BASHAM (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 07/17/2007)
52 Memorandum in opposition to re 50 Cross MOTION to Dismiss Without Prejudice Pursuant to Rule 56(f) the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment With Respect to Claim Related to the Prohibition on Lightweight Sign Supports (Renewed)Cross MOTION to Dismiss Without Prejudice Pursuant to Rule 56(f) the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment With Respect to Claim Related to the Prohibition on Lightweight Sign Supports (Renewed) filed by GALE A. NORTON, FRAN MAINELLA, W. RALPH BASHAM. (Attachments: # 1 Coyer Declaration# 2 Coyer Declaration, Exh. 1# 3 Coyer Declaration, Exh. 2# 4 Coyer Declaration, Exh. 3# 5 Def. Mem., Exh. 2)(Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 08/03/2007)
53 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Reply in Support of Renewed Motion Pursuant to Rule 56(f) by A.N.S.W.E.R. (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 08/17/2007)

08/20/2007 08/20/2007 08/24/2007
10/19/2007 11/13/2007 01/09/2008 03/20/2008
03/20/2008

MINUTE ORDER granting 53 plaintiffs' consent motion for extension of time up to and including August 25, 2007 to file reply in support of its renewed motion pursuant to Rule 56(f). Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on August 20, 2007. (MA) (Entered: 08/20/2007)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Plaintiffs' reply in support of renewed motion pursuant to Rule 56(f) due by 8/25/2007. (mm) (Entered: 08/20/2007)
54 REPLY to opposition to motion re 50 Cross MOTION to Dismiss Without Prejudice Pursuant to Rule 56(f) the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment With Respect to Claim Related to the Prohibition on Lightweight Sign Supports (Renewed)Cross MOTION to Dismiss Without Prejudice Pursuant to Rule 56(f) the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment With Respect to Claim Related to the Prohibition on Lightweight Sign Supports (Renewed) filed by A.N.S.W.E.R.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 - after action report# 2 Exhibit 2 - status hearing transcript)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 08/24/2007)
55 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on 6/26/07 before Judge Paul L. Friedman. Court Reporter: Linda L. Russo. The public may view the document in the Clerk's Office between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m, Monday through Friday. (td, ) (Entered: 10/22/2007)
56 ORDER granting plaintiff's 50 renewed cross motion under Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pertaining solely to claims related to prohibition of lightweight sign supports. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on November 13, 2007. (MA) (Entered: 11/13/2007)
57 NOTICE of Change of Address by Carl L. Messineo (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 01/09/2008)
58 OPINION granting plaintiff's 33 motion for summary judgment on Count I of the amended complaint and denying defendants' 20 motion for summary judgment on Counts I and III of the amended complaint. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 3/20/08. (lcplf1) Modified on 3/20/2008 to link entry to appropriate motions (lcplf1). (Entered: 03/20/2008)
59 ORDER granting plaintiff's 33 motion for summary judgment on Count I of the amended complaint and denying defendants' 20 motion for summary judgment on Counts I and III of the amended complaint, and granting declaratory and injunctive relief to the plaintiff on Count I. See Order for specifics. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 3/20/08. (lcplf1) Modified on 3/20/2008 to link to appropriate motions (lcplf1). (Entered: 03/20/2008)

03/20/2008 03/28/2008 04/02/2008 04/28/2008
04/28/2008 05/15/2008 05/16/2008 05/16/2008 05/16/2008 05/28/2008

Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference set for 4/7/2008 01:45 PM in Courtroom 29A before Judge Paul L. Friedman. (mm) (Entered: 03/21/2008)
MINUTE ORDER: The Status Conference, formerly set for 4/7/2008 @ 1:45 p.m., is hereby reset to 4/14/2008 @ 10:30 a.m. in Courtroom 29A before Judge Paul L. Friedman. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 3/28/2008. (mm) (Entered: 03/28/2008)
MINUTE ORDER: The Status Conference, formerly set for 4/14/2008 @ 10:30 a.m., is hereby reset to 4/28/2008 @ 02:00 PM in Courtroom 29A before Judge Paul L. Friedman. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 4/2/2008. (mm) (Entered: 04/02/2008)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Paul L. Friedman: Status Conference held on 4/28/2008. Defendant NPS to file its responses to plaintiff's discovery requests on or before 5/16/2008. Defendant NPS to file a notice with the Court regarding its next steps and intentions on or before 5/28/2008. Next Status Conference set for 5/30/2008 @ 09:00 AM in Courtroom 29A before Judge Paul L. Friedman. (Court Reporter Linda Russo) (mm) Modified on 4/28/2008 (mm). (Entered: 04/28/2008)
NOTICE OF CORRECTED DOCKET ENTRY: Text of 4/28/2008 Minute Entry of Status Conference modified to include corrected deadlines.(mm) (Entered: 04/28/2008)
60 Consent MOTION to Continue Status Conference of May 30, 2008 by A.N.S.W.E.R. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 05/15/2008)
MINUTE ORDER granting 60 Plaintiff's Consent Motion to Continue. The status conference formerly scheduled for May 30, 2008 will take place on June 18, 2008 at 3:00 p.m. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 5/16/08. (lcplf1) (Entered: 05/16/2008)
61 RESPONSE to Discovery Request by GALE A. NORTON, W. RALPH BASHAM.(Braswell, Marina) Modified on 5/19/2008 (td, ). Modified on 5/20/2008 (counsel was instructed by the Court to file this document) (td, ). (Entered: 05/16/2008)
Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference set for 6/18/2008 03:00 PM in Courtroom 28A before Judge Paul L. Friedman. (mm) (Entered: 05/19/2008)
62 NOTICE to the Court by GALE A. NORTON, FRAN MAINELLA, W. RALPH BASHAM (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 05/28/2008)

06/18/2008
07/02/2008 07/08/2008 07/15/2008 07/15/2008 07/21/2008 07/22/2008 08/07/2008 08/25/2008

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Paul L. Friedman: Status Conference held on 6/18/2008. Plaintiff to submit proposed order to the Court by 7/2/2008. Response to proposed order due by 7/8/2008. Status Conference set for 7/22/2008 @ 04:30 PM in Courtroom 29A before Judge Paul L. Friedman. (Court Reporter Linda Russo) (mm) (Entered: 06/19/2008)
63 NOTICE of FIling of Proposed Order Pursuant to June 18, 2008 Status Conference by A.N.S.W.E.R. re Status Conference,, Set Deadlines/Hearings, (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Verheyden-Hilliard, Mara) (Entered: 07/02/2008)
64 MEMORANDUM re 63 Notice (Other) filed by A.N.S.W.E.R. by GALE A. NORTON, FRAN MAINELLA. (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 07/08/2008)
65 ORDER: Defendant Dirk Kempthorne, Secretary, United States Department of the Interior, shall file his responses to the questions posed in this Order no later than 7/21/2008. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 7/14/2008. (mm) (Entered: 07/15/2008)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Response to questions posed in 7/15/2008 order due by 7/21/2008. (mm) (Entered: 07/15/2008)
66 MEMORANDUM re 65 Order by GALE A. NORTON, FRAN MAINELLA. (Attachments: # 1 declarations (2))(Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 07/21/2008)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Paul L. Friedman: Status Conference held on 7/22/2008. Next Status Conference set for 9/3/2008 @ 09:30 a.m. in Courtroom 29A before Judge Paul L. Friedman. (Court Reporter Lisa Hand) (mm) (Entered: 07/23/2008)
67 NOTICE by GALE A. NORTON, FRAN MAINELLA (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 08/07/2008)
68 MOTION to Compel by A.N.S.W.E.R. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Ex. 1 - 7.25.08 Letter from Braswell to Messineo, # 3 Ex. 2 - Plaintiffs' First Set of RFPs, # 4 Ex. 3 - Defendants' Objections and Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of RFPs, # 5 Ex. 4 7.16.08 Letter from Messineo to Braswell, # 6 Ex. 5 - Presidential Advance Manual October 2002, # 7 Ex. 6 - 1.24.01 Email from Sebring to Haggerty, # 8 Ex. 7 - 54th Presidential Inaugural Parade Post Stander Briefing, # 9 Ex. 8 - 11.19.04 White House Press Release, # 10 Ex. 9 USSS Document Privilege Log)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 08/25/2008)

09/03/2008
09/05/2008
09/05/2008 09/10/2008 09/10/2008 09/10/2008 09/18/2008 09/19/2008 09/19/2008

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Paul L. Friedman: Status Conference held on 9/3/2008. Parties to mediate. Order to enter. Mediation to conclude by 11/4/2008. Government's oral motion for extension of time ro respond to 68 Motion to Compel GRANTED for the reasons stated on the record. Government's response due by 9/10/2008. Plaintiffs' reply due by 9/19/2008. Next Status Conference set for 10/8/2008 @ 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 29A before Judge Paul L. Friedman. (Court Reporter Linda Russo) (mm) (Entered: 09/03/2008)
MINUTE ORDER: The parties' agreed request, made in open court on September 3, 2008, for an enlargement of time to file opposition and response briefs to the pending Motion to Compel 68 is GRANTED. Defendants' opposition is due on or before 9/10/08 and plaintiff's response is due on or before 9/19/08. A status conference is scheduled for 10/8/08 at 10 AM. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 5, 2008. (MA) (Entered: 09/05/2008)
Set/Reset Deadlines/Hearings: Defendants' opposition to motion to compel due 9/10/2008. Plaintiff's response due 9/19/2008. Status Conference set for 10/8/2008 10:00 AM in Courtroom 29A before Judge Paul L. Friedman. (mm) (Entered: 09/08/2008)
69 ORDER referring the matter to mediation. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 9/5/08. (lcplf1). (Entered: 09/10/2008)
70 Memorandum in opposition to re 68 MOTION to Compel filed by GALE A. NORTON, FRAN MAINELLA, W. RALPH BASHAM. (Attachments: # 1 Wilson Declaration, # 2 MacLean Declaration, # 3 Walters Declaration)(Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 09/10/2008)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Mediation to conclude by 11/4/2008. (mm) (Entered: 09/12/2008)
71 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply Plaintiff's Consent Motion for A Two Day Enlargement to File Reply in Support of Motion to Compel (Document No. 68) by A.N.S.W.E.R. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 09/18/2008)
MINUTE ORDER: Plaintiffs consent motion for a two day enlargement of time to file a reply in support of its motion to compel 71 is hereby GRANTED. Plaintiffs reply is due on or before September 23, 2008. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 9/19/08. (lcplf1) (Entered: 09/19/2008)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Reply in support of plaintiffs' motion to compel due by 9/23/2008. (mm) (Entered: 09/19/2008)

09/23/2008 10/06/2008 10/08/2008 10/20/2008
11/04/2008 11/04/2008

72 REPLY to opposition to motion re 68 MOTION to Compel filed by A.N.S.W.E.R.. (Attachments: # 1 Ex. 1 - Attachment 1, # 2 Ex. 2Transcript of 4.28.2008 Status Hearing, # 3 Ex. 3 - Transcript of 6.18.08 Status Hearing, # 4 Ex. 4 - Transcript of 7.22.08 Status Hearing)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 09/23/2008)
MINUTE ORDER: The Status Conference, currently set for 10/8/2008 @ 10:00 a.m., is hereby reset to 11:00 a.m. the same day. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 10/6/2008. (mm) (Entered: 10/06/2008)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Paul L. Friedman: Status Conference held on 10/8/2008. Next Status Conference set for 11/6/2008 @ 03:00 p.m. in Courtroom 29A before Judge Paul L. Friedman. (Court Reporter Linda Russo) (mm) (Entered: 10/08/2008)
73 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Paul L. Friedman of proceedings held on September 3, 2008; Page Numbers: 1-13. Date of Issuance:October 20, 2008. Court Reporter/Transcriber Linda Russo, Telephone number 202 354-3244, Court Reporter Email Address : lindalrusso@gmail.com. For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi-page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.
NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty-one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at ww.dcd.uscourts.gov.
Redaction Request due 11/10/2008. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/20/2008. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/21/2009.(Russo, Linda) (Entered: 10/20/2008)
MINUTE ORDER: The status conference currently scheduled for 11/06/08 is postponed until 11/17/08 at 10:00 AM. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 11/04/08. (lcplf1). (Entered: 11/04/2008)
Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference set for 11/17/2008 10:00 AM in Courtroom 29A before Judge Paul L. Friedman. (mm) (Entered: 11/04/2008)

11/04/2008 11/14/2008 11/17/2008 11/17/2008 11/18/2008
11/19/2008 11/19/2008

74 NOTICE of Settlement Agreement by GALE A. NORTON, FRAN MAINELLA, W. RALPH BASHAM (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Map)(Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 11/04/2008)
75 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting in part plaintiff's motion to compel. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on November 14, 2008. (MA) (Entered: 11/14/2008)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Paul L. Friedman: Status Conference held on 11/17/2008, ( Government submission due by 11/19/2008., Plaintiff's submission due by 11/26/2008, Replies due by 12/2/2008.), (Status Conference set for 12/22/2008 09:15 AM in Courtroom 29A before Judge Paul L. Friedman.). (Court Reporter Linda Russo.) (zlin, ) (Entered: 11/17/2008)
76 NOTICE of Filing by Defendants for NPS Final Regulation by W. RALPH BASHAM (Attachments: # 1 Final NPS Regulation)(Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 11/17/2008)
MINUTE ORDER: As ordered at the November 17, 2008 status conference, on or before November 19, 2008, defendants shall file copies of all memoranda, e-mails, or other written documents issued to individuals charged with searching files at the Secret Service and the Department of the Interior regarding the scope of the searches that were to be conducted for documents relating to Count II of plaintiff's amended complaint. On or before November 26, 2008, plaintiff shall file a notice identifying the perceived areas of deficiency, if any, in these searches and the language it proposes be used in memoranda to be issued to these individuals directing them to conduct further searches in compliance with this Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order of November 14, 2008. Defendants shall file a response to this notice on or before December 2, 2008. The next status conference is scheduled for December 22, 2008 at 9:15 a.m. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on November 18, 2008. (MA) (Entered: 11/18/2008)
77 NOTICE of Filing by W. RALPH BASHAM (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Randolph J. Myers)(Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 11/19/2008)
78 NOTICE of Filing and Motion for Enlargement of Time by W. RALPH BASHAM (Attachments: # 1 Fithen Memorandum, # 2 Trotta Memorandum, # 3 Prewitt Memorandum, # 4 Bozzuto Memorandum, # 5 Herron Memorandum, # 6 Memorandum AD, # 7 IRMD 1 Memorandum, # 8 IRMD 2 Memorandum, # 9 Coyer Memorandum)(Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 11/19/2008)

11/19/2008 11/25/2008
11/25/2008 11/25/2008 12/02/2008 12/03/2008
12/03/2008 12/16/2008

79 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Further Documents in Response to the Court's November 18th Order by W. RALPH BASHAM (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 11/19/2008)
MINUTE ORDER: Defendants' unopposed motion for extension of time 79 is hereby GRANTED. Defendant Secret Services filing of additional documents responsive to the Court's November 18, 2008 Order is now due on or before November 25, 2008. Plaintiff's response to defendants' filings is due on or before December 2, 2008. Defendants' reply is due on or before December 8, 2008. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on November 25, 2008. (MA) (Entered: 11/25/2008)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Defendant Secret Service's filing of additional documents responsive to the Court's 11/18/2008 Order due 11/25/2008. Plaintiff's response due 12/2/2008. Defendants' reply due 12/8/2008. (Entered: 11/25/2008)
80 NOTICE of Filing of Supplemental Materials by W. RALPH BASHAM (Attachments: # 1 Attachment 1, # 2 Attachment 2, # 3 Attachment 3, # 4 Attachment 4, # 5 Attachment 5, # 6 Attachment 6, # 7 Attachment 7, # 8 Attachment 8)(Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 11/25/2008)
81 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Defendants' Filings Responsive to the Court's November 18, 2008 Order (Docket Nos. 77, 78 & 80) by A.N.S.W.E.R. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 12/02/2008)
MINUTE ORDER granting 81 plaintiff's consent motion for extension of time up to and including December 16, 2008 to file response to defendants' filings responsive to the court's 11/18/08 order; defendants shall have up to and including December 30, 2008 to file their reply. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on December 3, 2008. (MA) (Entered: 12/03/2008)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Response to defendants' filings responsive to the Court's 11/18/2008 Order due by 12/16/2008. Reply due by 12/30/2008. (mm) (Entered: 12/08/2008)
82 NOTICE Plaintiff's Praecipe to the Court Pursuant to November 18, 2008 Minute Order by A.N.S.W.E.R. re Order,,, 80 Notice (Other), Notice (Other), 77 Notice (Other), 78 Notice (Other), Notice (Other) (Attachments: # 1 Attachment 1, # 2 Attachment 2)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 12/16/2008)

12/18/2008 12/22/2008 12/23/2008
12/30/2008 01/02/2009

83 NOTICE of In Camera Submission by W. RALPH BASHAM (Attachments: # 1 Attachment A)(Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 12/18/2008)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Paul L. Friedman: Status Conference held on 12/22/2008. Next Status Conference set for 1/5/2009 @ 1:45 p.m. in Courtroom 29A before Judge Paul L. Friedman. (Court Reporter Bryan Wayne) (mm) (Entered: 12/22/2008)
84 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Paul L. Friedman of proceedings held on 11/17/08; Page Numbers: 1-25. Date of Issuance:12/23/08. Court Reporter/Transcriber Linda L. Russo, Telephone number 202 354-3244, Court Reporter Email Address : lindalrusso@gmail.com. For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi-page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.
NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty-one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at ww.dcd.uscourts.gov.
Redaction Request due 1/13/2009. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 1/23/2009. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 3/23/2009.(Russo, Linda) (Entered: 12/23/2008)
85 REPLY 82 to Plaintiff's Praecipe filed by W. RALPH BASHAM. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B- E)(Braswell, Marina) Modified on 12/31/2008 adding linkage(td, ). (Entered: 12/30/2008)
86 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Paul L. Friedman of proceedings held on 12/22/08; Page Numbers: 1 - 19. Date of Issuance:1/2/09. Court Reporter/Transcriber Bryan A. Wayne, Telephone number 202-354-3186, Court Reporter Email Address : bryanawayne@verizon.net. For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi-page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.

01/05/2009 01/13/2009 01/15/2009 06/18/2009
06/18/2009 07/02/2009 07/06/2009

NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty-one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at ww.dcd.uscourts.gov.
Redaction Request due 1/23/2009. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/2/2009. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/2/2009.(Wayne, Bryan) (Entered: 01/02/2009)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Paul L. Friedman: Status Conference held on 1/5/2009. Next Status Conference set for 1/13/2009 @ 1:45 p.m. in Courtroom 29A before Judge Paul L. Friedman. (Court Reporter Linda Russo) (mm) (Entered: 01/06/2009)
MINUTE ORDER: The status conference currently scheduled for January 13, 2009 is hereby continued until January 15, 2009 at 10:00 a.m. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 1/13/09. (lcplf1). (Entered: 01/13/2009)
MINUTE ORDER: The status conference scheduled for January 15, 2009 is hereby canceled at the parties' request. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 1/15/09. (lcplf1). (Entered: 01/15/2009)
87 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER that the court will adopt in part the recommendations in plaintiff's Praecipe to the Court 82 and will order defendants to conduct additional searches, as described in this memorandum opinion. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on June 18, 2009. (MA) (Entered: 06/18/2009)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Joint Report due by 7/2/2009. (mm) (Entered: 06/19/2009)
88 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to File Joint Written Report Pursuant to June 18, 2009 Memorandum Opinion and Order by W. RALPH BASHAM, A.N.S.W.E.R. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 07/02/2009)
MINUTE ORDER granting 88 parties' joint motion for extension of time up to and including July 16, 2009 to file joint written report. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on July 6, 2009. (MA) (Entered: 07/06/2009)

07/06/2009 07/16/2009 07/17/2009
07/17/2009 07/24/2009 07/28/2009
07/28/2009 07/29/2009

Set Deadlines: Joint written Status Report due by 7/16/2009. (cp, ) (Entered: 07/06/2009)
89 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to File Joint Report Pursuant to June 18, 2009 Memorandum Opinion and Order by W. RALPH BASHAM, A.N.S.W.E.R. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 07/16/2009)
MINUTE ORDER granting 89 parties' second joint motion for extension of time up to and including July 24, 2009 to file a joint written report pursuant to the 6/18/09 memorandum opinion and order. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on July 17, 2009. (MA) (Entered: 07/17/2009)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Joint Report due by 7/24/2009. (mm) (Entered: 07/20/2009)
90 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Joint Report, as per Court's June 18, 2009 Order by W. RALPH BASHAM, A.N.S.W.E.R. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 07/24/2009)
91 ORDER granting 90 Parties' Third Motion for Extension of Time to File Joint Written Report Pursuant to June 18, 2009 Memorandum Opinion and Order. Ordered that the parties shall have up to and including 8/6/2009 to file their report. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 7/27/2009. (mm) (Entered: 07/28/2009)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Joint Report due by 8/6/2009. (mm) (Entered: 07/28/2009)
92 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Paul L. Friedman held on 7-22-08; Page Numbers: 1-43. Date of Issuance:7-28-09. Court Reporter/Transcriber Lisa Hand, Telephone number 202-354-3269, Court Reporter Email Address : lisa_hand@dcd.uscourts.gov. For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi-page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.
NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty-one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five

08/06/2009 10/20/2009
10/20/2009 11/30/2009 12/01/2009 12/01/2009 12/11/2009 12/14/2009 12/14/2009

personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at ww.dcd.uscourts.gov.
Redaction Request due 8/19/2009. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/31/2009. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/27/2009.(Courtrep, ) (Entered: 07/29/2009)
93 RESPONSE TO ORDER OF THE COURT re 87 Memorandum & Opinion, in Joint Report to the Court, filed by GALE A. NORTON, FRAN MAINELLA, W. RALPH BASHAM. (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 08/06/2009)
MINUTE ORDER: The Court hereby orders the parties to submit a joint status report regarding the status of the searches to be performed by defendants, which were described in the Joint Report of August 6, 2009 93 , as well as the parties' proposal or proposals for how to proceed in this case, on or before November 30, 2009. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on October 20, 2009. (MA) (Entered: 10/20/2009)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Joint Status Report and parties' proposal for how to proceed in this case due by 11/30/2009. (zmm, ) (Entered: 10/21/2009)
94 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Joint Status Report by W. RALPH BASHAM, FRAN MAINELLA, GALE A. NORTON (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 11/30/2009)
MINUTE ORDER granting 94 defendants' unopposed motion for extension of time to and including December 11, 2009 in which to submit the parties' joint status report. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on December 1, 2009. (MA) (Entered: 12/01/2009)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Joint Status Report due by 12/11/2009. (zmm, ) (Entered: 12/02/2009)
95 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Joint Status Report by W. RALPH BASHAM, GALE A. NORTON (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 12/11/2009)
MINUTE ORDER granting 95 defendants' unopposed motion for extension of time up to and including January 14, 2010 for the parties to file their joint status report. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on December 14, 2009. (MA) (Entered: 12/14/2009)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Joint Status Report due by 1/14/2010. (zmm, ) (Entered: 12/16/2009)

01/14/2010 96 NOTICE of Appearance by Radhika M.S. Miller on behalf of A.N.S.W.E.R. (Miller, Radhika) (Entered: 01/14/2010)

01/14/2010

97 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Joint Status Report and Proposals by A.N.S.W.E.R. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Miller, Radhika) (Entered: 01/14/2010)

01/15/2010

MINUTE ORDER granting 97 plaintiff's unopposed Motion for Extension of Time up to and including February 5, 2010 to file the parties' joint status report. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 15, 2010. (MA) (Entered: 01/15/2010)

01/15/2010

Set/Reset Deadlines: Joint Status Report due by 2/5/2010. (zmm, ) (Entered: 01/20/2010)

02/05/2010

98 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Joint Status Report and Proposals by A.N.S.W.E.R. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Miller, Radhika) (Entered: 02/05/2010)

02/18/2010

99 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Joint Status Report by W. RALPH BASHAM, GALE A. NORTON (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 02/18/2010)

02/22/2010

MINUTE ORDER granting 99 defendants' unopposed Motion for Extension of Time up to and including March 15, 2010 in which to file the parties' joint status report for further proceedings in this case. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 22, 2010. (MA) (Entered: 02/22/2010)

02/22/2010

Set/Reset Deadlines: Joint Status Report due by 3/15/2010. (zmm, ) (Entered: 02/23/2010)

03/15/2010 100 STATUS REPORT , Joint by A.N.S.W.E.R., W. RALPH BASHAM, GALE A. NORTON. (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 03/15/2010)

03/15/2010 101 STATUS REPORT Supplement: Plaintiff's Proposal for Further Proceedings by A.N.S.W.E.R.. (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 03/15/2010)

03/15/2010

102 STATUS REPORT Supplement: Defendants' Proposal for Further Proceedings by W. RALPH BASHAM, GALE A. NORTON. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2)(Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 03/15/2010)

03/29/2010

103 NOTICE Identifying Documents for In Camera Review Withheld Based on Privilege by A.N.S.W.E.R. re 101 Status Report (Miller, Radhika) (Entered: 03/29/2010)

04/23/2010

104 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER that plaintiff may proceed with limited deposition discovery and conclude on or before June 15, 2010; the parties shall appear for a status conference on June 23, 2010. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on April 23, 2010. (MA) (Entered: 04/23/2010)

04/23/2010

MINUTE ORDER: A status conference is scheduled for June 23, 2010 at 9:15 a.m. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on April 23, 2010. (MA) (Entered: 04/23/2010)

04/23/2010

Set/Reset Deadlines/Hearings: Plaintiff's limited deposition discovery to conclude by 6/15/2010. Status Conference set for 6/23/2010 09:15 AM in Courtroom 29A before Judge Paul L. Friedman. (zmm, ) (Entered: 04/26/2010)

05/18/2010

105 MOTION to Enforce Injunction by A.N.S.W.E.R. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Ex. 1 - Transcript of June 18, 2008 Status Hearing, # 3 Ex. 2 - 73 Fed Reg 46215-46230 (August 8, 2008 Proposed Rule), # 4 Ex. 3 - 73 Fed Reg 67739-67750 (November 17, 2008 Final Rule), # 5 Ex. 4 - 75 Fed Reg 8806-8807 (February 26, 2010 Correcting Amendments))(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 05/18/2010)

05/21/2010

MINUTE ORDER granting nunc pro tunc 98 Motion for Extension of Time to File Joint Status Report and proposals as ordered by the Court's 10/20/2009 Minute Order. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 5/21/2010. (zmm, ) Modified event title on 5/24/2010 (znmw, ). (Entered: 05/21/2010)

05/28/2010

106 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 105 MOTION to Enforce Injunction by W. RALPH BASHAM, FRAN MAINELLA, GALE A. NORTON (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 05/28/2010)

06/02/2010

MINUTE ORDER granting 106 defendants' unopposed Motion for Extension of Time up to and including June 11, 2010 to respond to plaintiff's motion to enforce injunction. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on June 2, 2010. (MA) (Entered: 06/02/2010)

06/02/2010

Set/Reset Deadlines: Response to plaintiff's motion to enforce injunction due by 6/11/2010. (zmm, ) (Entered: 06/03/2010)

06/03/2010

107 NOTICE of In Camera Submission by FRAN MAINELLA, GALE A. NORTON (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 06/03/2010)

06/09/2010 108 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 105 MOTION to Enforce Injunction by W. RALPH BASHAM,

FRAN MAINELLA, GALE A. NORTON (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 06/09/2010)

06/10/2010

MINUTE ORDER: granting 108 unopposed motion for further enlargement of time. Defendants' response to plaintiffs' motion to enforce the injunction is now due by June 18, 2010. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 6/10/10.(lcplf1). (Entered: 06/10/2010)

06/10/2010

Set/Reset Deadlines: Response to motion to enforce injunction due by 6/18/2010. (zmm, ) (Entered: 06/10/2010)

06/11/2010

109 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery to Take Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of the United States Secret Service by A.N.S.W.E.R. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Ex. 1 May 28, 2010 Verheyden-Hilliard Email, # 3 Ex. 2 - May 28, 2010 Miller Letter, # 4 Ex. 3 - June 7, 2010 Braswell Email, # 5 Ex. 4 - June 8, 2010 Braswell Email, # 6 Ex. 5 - June 9, 2010 Braswell Email, # 7 Ex. 6 - October 23, 2009 Email Correspondence, # 8 Ex. 7 - Nov. 11, 2009 Miller Email, # 9 Ex. 8 - Nov. 6, 2009 Braswell Email, # 10 Ex. 9 - Nov. 17, 2009 Miller Email, # 11 Ex. 10 - Nov. 18, 2009 Braswell Email, # 12 Ex. 11 - Nov. 25, 2009 Braswell Email, # 13 Ex. 12 - Nov. 30, 2009 Braswell Email, # 14 Ex. 13 - Nov. 30, 2009 Verheyden-Hilliard Email, # 15 Ex. 14 - Dec. 4, 2009 Braswell Letter (enclosing USSS documents), # 16 Ex. 15 - Dec. 4, 2009 Braswell Letter (enclosing NPS documents), # 17 Ex. 16 - Dec. 11, 2009 Miller Email, # 18 Ex. 17 - Dec. 11, 2009 Braswell Email, # 19 Ex. 18 Mendelson-Ielmini Decl, # 20 Ex. 19 - Feb. 26, 2010 Braswell Letter)(Miller, Radhika) (Entered: 06/11/2010)

06/16/2010 110 NOTICE of In Camera Submission by W. RALPH BASHAM (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Declaration)(Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 06/16/2010)

06/18/2010

111 Memorandum in opposition to re 105 MOTION to Enforce Injunction filed by FRAN MAINELLA, GALE A. NORTON. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E)(Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 06/18/2010)

06/22/2010

MINUTE ORDER: The status conference scheduled for June 23, 2010 at 9:15 is hereby canceled and will be rescheduled for a later date by which the pending motions are ripe. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 6/22/10. (lcplf1). (Entered: 06/22/2010)

06/25/2010

AMENDED MINUTE ORDER granting 108 defendants' unopposed motion for further enlargement of time up to and including June 18, 2010 in which to respond to plaintiff's motion to enforce injunction;

plaintiff's reply is due on or before July 16, 2010. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on June 25, 2010. (MA) (Entered: 06/25/2010)

06/25/2010

Set/Reset Deadlines: Reply due by 7/16/2010. (zmm, ) (Entered: 06/28/2010)

06/28/2010

112 Memorandum in opposition to re 109 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery to Take Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of the United States Secret Service MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery to Take Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of the United States Secret Service MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery to Take Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of the United States Secret Service MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery to Take Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of the United States Secret Service MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery to Take Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of the United States Secret Service filed by W. RALPH BASHAM, FRAN MAINELLA, GALE A. NORTON. (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 06/28/2010)

07/08/2010

113 REPLY to opposition to motion re 109 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery to Take Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of the United States Secret Service MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery to Take Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of the United States Secret Service MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery to Take Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of the United States Secret Service MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery to Take Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of the United States Secret Service MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery to Take Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of the United States Secret Service filed by A.N.S.W.E.R.. (Miller, Radhika) (Entered: 07/08/2010)

07/16/2010

114 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 105 MOTION to Enforce Injunction Plaintiff's Consent Motion for Two Day Enlargement of Time by A.N.S.W.E.R. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 07/16/2010)

07/20/2010 115 REPLY to opposition to motion re 105 MOTION to Enforce Injunction filed by A.N.S.W.E.R.. (Attachments: # 1 Ex. 1 Dec. 31, 2004 NPS Memo)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 07/20/2010)

07/21/2010

MINUTE ORDER granting nunc pro tunc 114 plaintiff's consent Motion for Extension of Time up to and including July 20, 2010 to file a reply in support of its motion to enforce injunction. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on July 21, 2010. (MA) (Entered: 07/21/2010)

08/03/2010 116 Order referring review of the withheld documents to a magistrate judge and granting 109 plaintiff's motion for extension of time. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 8/3/10. (lcplf1). (Entered: 08/03/2010)

08/04/2010 117 Referral Order attached. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 8/3/10. (lcplf1). (Entered: 08/04/2010)

08/04/2010 118 CASE REFERRED to Magistrate Judge Alan Kay to conduct an in camera review of documents withheld by defendants on the basis of privilege. (kb) (Entered: 08/09/2010)

08/25/2010 119 NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY by W. RALPH BASHAM, FRAN MAINELLA, GALE A. NORTON (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 08/25/2010)

11/12/2010

MINUTE ORDER setting a brief Telephone Conference for 11/18/2010, at 10:15 AM, regarding the in camera document review. Counsel should jointly contact chambers at 202-354-3030 on that date/time. Signed by Magistrate Judge Alan Kay on 11/12/10. (DM) (Entered: 11/12/2010)

11/18/2010

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Alan Kay: Telephone Conference held on 11/18/2010. (DM) (Entered: 11/19/2010)

12/09/2010

120 VACATED PER MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ENTERED 6/23/2011.....MEMORANDUM ORDER containing privilege rulings regarding the National Park Service documents. Signed by Magistrate Judge Alan Kay on 12/09/10. (DM) Modified on 6/24/2011 (zmm, ). (Entered: 12/09/2010)

12/27/2010 121 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Objections to Magistrate Judge's Ruling by A.N.S.W.E.R. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 12/27/2010)

12/28/2010

122 ORDER granting 121 Plaintiff's Motion for Enlargement of Time to File Objections to Magistrate Judge's Ruling. Ordered that Plaintiff shall have up to and including January 4, 2011 to file any objections to the December 9, 2010 Memorandum Order. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 12/28/2010. (zmm, ) (Entered: 12/28/2010)

12/28/2010

Set/Reset Deadlines: Objections to the December 9, 2010 Memorandum Order due by 1/4/2011. (zmm, ) (Entered: 12/28/2010)

01/04/2011 123 RESPONSE TO ORDER OF THE COURT re 120 Order Objections to Magistrate Judge's Memorandum Order filed by A.N.S.W.E.R.. (Miller, Radhika) (Entered: 01/04/2011)

01/13/2011 124 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Plaintiff's Objections Filed at Docket No. 123 by FRAN MAINELLA, GALE A. NORTON (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 01/13/2011)

01/14/2011

MINUTE ORDER granting 124 defendants' unopposed Motion for Extension of Time up to and including January 24, 2011 to file response to plaintiffs' objections to Magistrate Judge Kay's 12/9/10 decision; plaintiff shall have up to and including February 7, 2011 in which to reply. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 14, 2011. (MA) (Entered: 01/14/2011)

01/14/2011

Set/Reset Deadlines: Defendants' response to plaintiffs' objections to Magistrate Judge Kay's 12/9/2010 decision due by 1/24/2011. Replu due by 2/7/2011. (zmm, ) (Entered: 01/18/2011)

01/24/2011

125 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to Docket No. 123 by W. RALPH BASHAM, FRAN MAINELLA, GALE A. NORTON (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 01/24/2011)

01/26/2011

MINUTE ORDER granting 125 defendants' unopposed Motion for Extension of Time up to and including February 2, 2011 to file its response to plaintiff's objections to Magistrate Judge Kay's December 9, 2010 decision; plaintiff's reply is due on or before February 16, 2011. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 26, 2011. (MA) (Entered: 01/26/2011)

01/26/2011

Set/Reset Deadlines: Defendants' response to plaintiff's objections to Magistrate Judge Kay's 12/9/2010 decision due by 2/2/2011. Plaintiff's reply due by 2/16/2011. (zmm, ) (Entered: 01/27/2011)

02/02/2011

126 RESPONSE to Docket No. 123 , Plaintiff's Objections to Magistrate Judge's Memorandum Order filed by FRAN MAINELLA, GALE A. NORTON. (Braswell, Marina) Modified text to read response 2/3/2011 (td, ). (Entered: 02/02/2011)

02/16/2011

127 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply in Support of Objections to Magistrate Judge's Ruling (Docket Number 123) by A.N.S.W.E.R. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Verheyden-Hilliard, Mara) (Entered: 02/16/2011)

02/17/2011

MINUTE ORDER granting 127 plaintiff's consent Motion for Extension of Time up to and including February 23, 2011 to file its reply in support of objections to Magistrate Judge's Ruling. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 17, 2011. (MA) (Entered: 02/17/2011)

02/17/2011

Set/Reset Deadlines: Reply in support of objections to magistrate judge's ruling due by 2/23/2011. (zmm, ) (Entered: 02/18/2011)

02/23/2011

128 REPLY re 123 Response to Order of the Court, 126 Reply to Document Plaintiff's Reply in Support of Objections to Magistrate Judge's Memorandum Order filed by A.N.S.W.E.R.. (VerheydenHilliard, Mara) (Entered: 02/23/2011)

03/25/2011

129 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to A.N.S.W.E.R.. Attorney Radhika M.S. Miller terminated. (Miller, Radhika) (Entered: 03/25/2011)

06/23/2011

130 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER setting aside Magistrate Judge Kay's Memorandum Order of December 9, 2010; the documents discussed herein must be disclosed promptly to the plaintiff. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on June 23, 2011.(MA) (Entered: 06/23/2011)

07/14/2011

MINUTE ORDER setting a Telephone Conference for 7/27/2011, at 02:30 PM before Magistrate Judge Alan Kay. Counsel shall JOINTLY contact chambers, at 202-354-3030, to discuss the status of the remaining documents which are to be reviewed by this Court. Signed by Magistrate Judge Alan Kay on 07/14/11. (DM) (Entered: 07/14/2011)

07/27/2011

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Alan Kay: Telephone Conference held on 7/27/2011. (DM) (Entered: 07/27/2011)

10/24/2011

MINUTE ORDER setting a telephone conference to discuss the outstanding requested supplementation of privilege log. Telephone Conference set for 10/31/2011, at 10:30 AM before Magistrate Judge Alan Kay. Counsel should jointly call the Court at that time. Signed by Magistrate Judge Alan Kay on 10/24/11. (DM) (Entered: 10/24/2011)

10/31/2011

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Alan Kay: Telephone Conference held on 10/31/2011. (DM) (Entered: 11/10/2011)

02/03/2012

131 MEMORANDUM ORDER setting forth privilege rulings resulting from the Court's in camera review of Secret Service documents. Signed by Magistrate Judge Alan Kay on 02/03/12. (DM) (Entered: 02/03/2012)

02/10/2012

132 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File Supplemental Pleading by A.N.S.W.E.R. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex. A, Supplemental Pleading, # 2 Text of Proposed Order Ex. B, Proposed Order Granting Leave to File Supplemental Pleading)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 02/10/2012)

02/10/2012

MINUTE ORDER: As the parties are aware, in response to the Court's March 20, 2008 Opinion and Order, the National Park Service amended certain parts of 36 C.F.R. Section 7.96(g). Subsequently, plaintiff filed a motion to enforce the existing permanent injunction in this case, requesting that the Court direct the Park Service to rescind part of 36 C.F.R. Section 7.96(g). See Dkt. No. 105. Today, plaintiff filed an unopposed motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint. See Dkt. No. 132. As plaintiff describes it, the supplemental complaint challenges the constitutionality of the amended permitting regulations, 36 C.F.R. Section 7.96(g). The parties are hereby directed to file a joint notice with the Court by February 17, 2012 addressing whether the pending motion to enforce the Court's injunction should be denied as moot if the Court were to grant plaintiff's unopposed motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint, and, if not, why not. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 10, 2012. (lcplf1) (Entered: 02/10/2012)

02/13/2012

Set/Reset Deadlines: Joint Notice to the Court due by 2/17/2012. (zmm, ) (Entered: 02/13/2012)

02/14/2012

133 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Objections to, or Comply with, Court ruling at Docket No. 131 by W. RALPH BASHAM (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 02/14/2012)

02/15/2012

MINUTE ORDER granting 133 defendants' consent Motion for Extension of Time up to and including February 29, 2012 in which to object or to comply with the court's February 3, 2012 ruling. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 15, 2012. (MA) (Entered: 02/15/2012)

02/15/2012

Set/Reset Deadlines: Defendants to either object to or comply with Court's 2/3/2012 ruling by 2/29/2012. (zmm, ) (Entered: 02/16/2012)

02/17/2012

134 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to the Court's February 10, 2012 Order by W. RALPH BASHAM (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 02/17/2012)

02/17/2012 135 NOTICE to Court of Plaintiff's Response to Mootness Inquiry Presented by Minute Order Dated February 10, 2012 by A.N.S.W.E.R. re Order,,,, (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 02/17/2012)

02/21/2012

MINUTE ORDER granting 134 defendants' unopposed Motion for Extension of Time up to and including February 29, 2012 in which to respond to the court's order dated 2/10/12 as to an issue of possible mootness in this case. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 21, 2012. (MA) (Entered: 02/21/2012)

02/24/2012

Set/Reset Deadlines: Response to Court's 2/10/2012 Order due by 2/29/2012. (zmm, ) (Entered: 02/24/2012)

02/29/2012

136 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to File Objection or Comply with Court's February 3, 2012 ruling, by W. RALPH BASHAM (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 02/29/2012)

02/29/2012 137 RESPONSE TO ORDER OF THE COURT re Order,,,, dated February 10, 2012, filed by W. RALPH BASHAM, GALE A. NORTON. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 02/29/2012)

03/02/2012

MINUTE ORDER granting 136 the parties' joint motion for extension of time up to and including March 5, 2012 in which to object to or comply with the Court's 2/3/12 ruling. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on March 2, 2012. (MA) (Entered: 03/02/2012)

03/05/2012

Set/Reset Deadlines: Time to object to or comply with the Court's 2/3/2012 ruling extended to 3/5/2012. (zmm, ) (Entered: 03/05/2012)

03/05/2012

138 OPINION AND ORDER denying ANSWER's motion to enforce the Court's injunction 105 ; granting ANSWER's unopposed motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint 132 ; and ordering that the Clerk of the Court shall file the supplemental pleading [132-1] on the docket. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on March 5, 2012. (lcplf1) (Entered: 03/05/2012)

03/05/2012 139 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to File Objections or Comply with the Court's February 3, 2012 ruling by W. RALPH BASHAM, GALE A. NORTON (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 03/05/2012)

03/05/2012 144 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM to re 17 Amended Complaint filed by A.N.S.W.E.R.. (td, ) (Entered: 03/15/2012)

03/06/2012

MINUTE ORDER granting 139 the parties' joint motion for an extension of time up to and including March 12, 2012 in which to object to or comply with the Court's February 3, 2012 131 ruling. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on March 6, 2012. (lcplf1) (Entered: 03/06/2012)

03/06/2012

Set/Reset Deadlines: Parties to object or comply with Court's 2/3/2012 131 ruling by 3/12/2012. (zmm, ) (Entered: 03/06/2012)

03/09/2012

MINUTE ORDER setting a Telephone Conference for 3/15/2012, at 03:00 PM, before Magistrate Judge Alan Kay. The call will involve Ms. Braswell only because the purpose of the call is clarification of privilege assertions on several in camera documents noted in this

Court's ruling. Signed by Magistrate Judge Alan Kay on 03/09/12. (DM) (Entered: 03/09/2012)

03/12/2012 140 STIPULATION by the by W. RALPH BASHAM, FRAN MAINELLA, GALE A. NORTON. (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 03/12/2012)

03/12/2012

141 RESPONSE TO ORDER OF THE COURT re 131 Order Plaintiff's Objections to Magistrate Judge's Memorandum Order filed by A.N.S.W.E.R.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 1: Deposition of John Bozzuto, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit 2: Deposition of Ramon Rendon, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit 3: Distribution List, # 4 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 03/12/2012)

03/14/2012 142 STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 3/14/2012. (zmm, ) (Entered: 03/14/2012)

03/14/2012

143 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer to Plaintiff's Supplemental Pleading by W. RALPH BASHAM, FRAN MAINELLA, GALE A. NORTON (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 03/14/2012)

03/15/2012

MINUTE ORDER granting 143 defendants' unopposed Motion for Extension of Time up to and including March 21, 2012 to respond to plaintiff's supplemental pleading. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on March 15, 2012. (MA) (Entered: 03/15/2012)

03/15/2012

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Alan Kay: Telephone Conference re: in camera documents held on 3/15/2012. (DM) (Entered: 03/15/2012)

03/16/2012

Set/Reset Deadlines: Response to plaintiff's supplemental pleading due by 3/21/2012. (zmm, ) (Entered: 03/16/2012)

03/21/2012 145 ANSWER to Complaint /Supplemental Pleading at Docket No. 144 by W. RALPH BASHAM, GALE A. NORTON.(Braswell, Marina) Modified to add linkage on 3/22/2012 (td, ). (Entered: 03/21/2012)

03/21/2012

146 MOTION to Dismiss Supplemental Pleading in Part by W. RALPH BASHAM, GALE A. NORTON (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 03/21/2012)

03/27/2012 147 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Plaintiff's Objections, Docket No. 141 by W. RALPH BASHAM, GALE A. NORTON (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 03/27/2012)

03/28/2012

MINUTE ORDER granting 147 defendants' unopposed Motion for Extension of Time up to and including April 5, 2012 in which to

respond to plaintiff's objections to the Magistrate Judge's 2/3/12 decision 141 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on March 28, 2012. (MA) (Entered: 03/28/2012)

04/02/2012

Set/Reset Deadlines: Response to plaintiff's objections to magistrate judge's 141 2/3/2012 decision due by 4/5/2012. (zmm, ) (Entered: 04/02/2012)

04/02/2012

148 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Plaintiff's Objections at Docket No. 141 by W. RALPH BASHAM, GALE A. NORTON (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 04/02/2012)

04/03/2012

MINUTE ORDER granting 148 defendants' unopposed Motion for Extension of Time up to and including April 9, 2012 in which to respond to plaintiff's objections to the magistrate judge's 2/3/12 decision. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on April 3, 2012. (MA) (Entered: 04/03/2012)

04/04/2012

Set/Reset Deadlines: Response to objections to magistrate judge 2/3/2012 decision due by 4/9/2012. (zmm, ) (Entered: 04/04/2012)

04/09/2012

149 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to Respond to Plaintiff's Objections to the Magistrate Judge's Decision by W. RALPH BASHAM (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 04/09/2012)

04/10/2012

150 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 146 MOTION to Dismiss Supplemental Pleading in Part by A.N.S.W.E.R. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 04/10/2012)

04/11/2012

MINUTE ORDER granting 149 defendants' unopposed Motion for Extension of Time up to and including April 11, 2012 to respond to plaintiff's objections to the magistrate judge's 2/3/12 decision. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on April 11, 2012. (MA) (Entered: 04/11/2012)

04/11/2012

MINUTE ORDER granting 150 plaintiff's consent Motion for Extension of Time up to and including April 23, 2012 to submit its opposition to defendant Salazar's motion to dismiss supplemental pleading. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on April 11, 2012. (MA) (Entered: 04/11/2012)

04/11/2012

Set/Reset Deadlines: Response to plaintiff's objections to the magistrate judge's 2/3/2012 decision due by 4/11/2012. (zmm, ) (Entered: 04/11/2012)

04/11/2012

Set/Reset Deadlines: Response to Defendant Salazar's motion to dismiss supplemental pleading due by 4/23/2012. (zmm, ) (Entered: 04/11/2012)

04/11/2012 151 RESPONSE to Plaintiff's Objections, Docket No. 141 filed by W. RALPH BASHAM. (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 04/11/2012)

04/16/2012 152 NOTICE of Filing of Exhibits by W. RALPH BASHAM re 151 Response to Document (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3)(Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 04/16/2012)

04/23/2012

153 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply IN SUPPORT OF PLANTIFFS OBJECTIONS TO MAGISTRATE JUDGES FEBRUARY 3, 2012 PRIVILEGE RULING by A.N.S.W.E.R. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 04/23/2012)

04/23/2012

154 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 146 MOTION to Dismiss Supplemental Pleading in Part by A.N.S.W.E.R. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 04/23/2012)

04/25/2012

MINUTE ORDER granting 153 plaintiff's unopposed Motion for Extension of Time up to and including April 30, 2012 to file its reply in support of objections to Magistrate Judge's Ruling. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on april 25, 2012. (MA) (Entered: 04/25/2012)

04/25/2012

MINUTE ORDER granting 154 plaintiff's unopposed Motion for Extension of Time up to and including April 25, 2012 to file its opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss; defendants shall file their reply on or before May 10, 2012. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on April 25, 2012. (MA) (Entered: 04/25/2012)

04/25/2012

Set/Reset Deadlines: Plaintiff's reply in support of objections to magistrate judge's ruling due by 4/30/2012. (zmm, ) (Entered: 04/25/2012)

04/25/2012

Set/Reset Deadlines: Response to defendant's motion to dismiss due by 4/25/2012. Reply due by 5/10/2012. (zmm, ) (Entered: 04/25/2012)

04/25/2012

155 Memorandum in opposition to re 146 MOTION to Dismiss Supplemental Pleading in Part filed by A.N.S.W.E.R.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Affidavit of Brian Becker)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 04/25/2012)

04/30/2012 156 REPLY re 151 Response to Document, 141 Response to Order of the Court, IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTIONS TO THE MAJISTRATE

JUDGES MEMORANDUM ORDER filed by A.N.S.W.E.R.. (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 04/30/2012)

05/10/2012

157 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 146 MOTION to Dismiss Supplemental Pleading in Part by GALE A. NORTON (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 05/10/2012)

05/11/2012

MINUTE ORDER granting 157 defendants' unopposed Motion for Extension of Time up to and including May 15, 2012 in which to respond to plaintiff's opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss supplemental pleading in part. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on May 11, 2012. (MA) (Entered: 05/11/2012)

05/14/2012

Set/Reset Deadlines: Reply due by 5/15/2012. (zmm, ) (Entered: 05/14/2012)

05/15/2012

158 REPLY to opposition to motion re 146 MOTION to Dismiss Supplemental Pleading in Part filed by GALE A. NORTON. (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 05/15/2012)

08/01/2012

MINUTE ORDER following up on Memorandum Order 131 directing Defendant Secret Service to provide the Court with a copy of documents labeled "Withheld 74-84" and "Withheld 85-98" for an in camera review. A copy of documents Bates Nos. 000668, 000682, 000726, 000734, 000735, 000740, 000750 and 000795-000797 should also be provided in camera with a clarification of any information that has been withheld. Signed by Magistrate Judge Alan Kay on 08/01/12. (DM) (Entered: 08/01/2012)

09/14/2012

159 NOTICE of Supplemental In Camera Submission and Memorandum in Response to Minute Order Dated August 1, 2012 by W. RALPH BASHAM (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 09/14/2012)

09/27/2012 160 MEMORANDUM ORDER re: privilege rulings on remaining Secret Service documents. Signed by Magistrate Judge Alan Kay on 09/27/12. (DM) (Entered: 09/27/2012)

10/15/2012

161 RESPONSE TO ORDER OF THE COURT re 160 Order Plaintiff's Objections to Magistrate Judge's Memorandum Order filed by A.N.S.W.E.R.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 10/15/2012)

10/31/2012

162 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Plaintiff's Objections filed at Docket No. 161 by W. RALPH BASHAM, GALE A. NORTON (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 10/31/2012)

11/02/2012

MINUTE ORDER granting 162 Defendants' Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to File Response to Plaintiff's Objections 161 to Magistrate Judge's Memorandum Order 160 . Defendants' Response is due November 6, 2012. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on November 2, 2012. (lcplf1) (Entered: 11/02/2012)

11/05/2012

Set/Reset Deadlines: Response to objections to magistrate judge's Memorandum Order 160 due by 11/6/2012. (zmm, ) (Entered: 11/05/2012)

11/06/2012 163 RESPONSE to Plaintiff's Objections at Docket No. 161 filed by W. RALPH BASHAM. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 3)(Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 11/06/2012)

11/16/2012

164 REPLY re 160 Order by Magistrate Judge Kay dated September 27, 2012 filed by A.N.S.W.E.R.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 11/16/2012)

01/14/2013 165 ORDER denying 146 defendant Ken Salazar's Motion to Dismiss supplemental pleading in part. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 14, 2013. (MA) (Entered: 01/14/2013)

01/14/2013

166 OPINION denying defendant Ken Salazar's motion to dismiss in part for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. An order consistent with this opinion will issue this same day. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 14, 2013. (MA) (Entered: 01/14/2013)

05/16/2013

167 OPINION AND ORDER overruling in part and sustaining in part plaintiff's objections 141 , 161 , to Magistrate Judge Kay's Memorandum Orders 131 , 160 . Plaintiff's request that defendant be compelled to produce certain documents specified in Opinion and Order is DENIED. Plaintiff's request for additional review of remainder of withheld documents is DENIED. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on May 16, 2013. (lcplf1) (Entered: 05/16/2013)

05/23/2013

MINUTE ORDER setting status conference for June 25, 2013 at 10:00 a.m. to discuss (a) whether any party plans to file additional dispositive motions in this case, (b) a schedule for any such motions or for trial, and (c) any other matters that the parties wish to bring to the Courts attention. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on May 23, 2013. (MA) (Entered: 05/23/2013)

05/29/2013

Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference set for 6/25/2013 10:00 AM in Courtroom 29A before Judge Paul L. Friedman. (zmm, ) (Entered: 05/29/2013)

06/24/2013 168 NOTICE of Appearance by Andrea Hope Costello on behalf of A.N.S.W.E.R. (Costello, Andrea) (Entered: 06/24/2013)

06/25/2013

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Paul L. Friedman: Status Conference held on 6/25/2013. (Court Reporter Lisa Foradori.) (zmm, ) (Entered: 06/25/2013)

07/17/2013 169 NOTICE of Joint Scheduling Report by A.N.S.W.E.R. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Scheduling Order)(VerheydenHilliard, Mara) (Entered: 07/17/2013)

07/19/2013 170 SCHEDULING ORDER. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on July 19, 2013. (MA) (Entered: 07/19/2013)

07/22/2013

Set/Reset Deadlines: Defendant National Park Service to file dispositive motion by 7/29/13. Plaintiff to file response/cross motion concerning claims related to NationalPark Service's regulations by 9/30/13. Defendant Secret Service to file dispositive motion by 9/30/13; Plaintiff to file opposition/cross motion concerning claims related to the prohibition on support for signs by 10/25/13; National Park Service to file reply/opposition to plaintiff's opposition/cross motion concerning claims related to National Park Service's regulations by 10/25/13; Plaintiff to file reply in support of cross motion by 11/21/13; Secret Service to file reply/opposition to plaintiff's opposition/cross motion concerning plaintiff's claims related to the prohibition on support for signs by 11/21/13; Plaintiff to file reply in support of cross motion concerning plaintiff's claims related to the prohibition on support for signs by 12/20/13.(zmm, ) (Entered: 07/22/2013)

07/29/2013

171 NOTICE of Filing of Declaration and Exhibits in Support of Defendant Jewel's Dispositive Motion by Sally Jewel (Attachments: # 1 2008 Owen Declaration, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit E)(Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 07/29/2013)

07/29/2013

172 NOTICE of Filing of Exhibits E-M to Owen Declaration by Sally Jewel (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit E, # 2 Exhibit F, # 3 Exhibit G, # 4 Exhibit H, # 5 Exhibit I, # 6 Exhibit J, # 7 Exhibit K, # 8 Exhibit L, # 9 Exhibit M)(Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 07/29/2013)

07/29/2013

173 NOTICE of Filing of Exhibits N-S to Owen Declaration by Sally Jewel (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit N, # 2 Exhibit O, # 3 Exhibit P, # 4 Exhibit Q, # 5 Exhibit R, # 6 Exhibit S)(Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 07/29/2013)

07/29/2013 174 STRICKEN PURSUANT TO ORDER FILED 1/28/2016..... MOTION to Dismiss and, MOTION for Summary Judgment with Exhibits T, W and X to Owen Declaration by Sally Jewel (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit T,

# 2 Exhibit W, # 3 Exhibit X)(Braswell, Marina) Modified on 1/29/2016 (znmw). (Entered: 07/29/2013)

07/30/2013

175 ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD (Notice of Filing of Administrative Record (Exhibit D to the Declaration of Robbin M. Owen) re Docket No. 171 by Sally Jewel. (Attachments: # 1 Index, # 2 Admin. Rec., part 1, # 3 Admin. Rec., part 2, # 4 Admin. Rec., part 3, # 5 Admin. Rec., part 4, # 6 Admin. Rec., part 5, # 7 Admin. Rec., part 6, # 8 Admin. Rec., part 7, # 9 Admin. Rec., part 8, # 10 Admin. Rec., part 9, # 11 Admin. Rec., part 10, # 12 Admin. Rec., part 11, # 13 Admin. Rec., part 12, # 14 Admin. Rec., part 13, # 15 Admin. Rec., part 14, # 16 Admin. Rec., part 15, # 17 Admin. Rec., part 16, # 18 Admin. Rec., part 17, # 19 Admin. Rec., part 18, # 20 Admin. Rec., part 19, # 21 Admin. Rec., part 20, # 22 Admin. Rec., part 21, # 23 Admin. Rec., part 22, # 24 Admin. Rec., part 23, # 25 Admin. Rec., part 24, # 26 Admin. Rec., part 25, # 27 Admin. Rec., part 26, # 28 Admin. Rec., part 27, # 29 Admin. Rec., part 28, # 30 Admin. Rec., part 29, # 31 Admin. Rec., part 30, # 32 Admin. Rec., part 31, # 33 Admin. Rec., part 32, # 34 Admin. Rec., part 33, # 35 Admin. Rec., part 34, # 36 Admin. Rec., part 35, # 37 Admin. Rec., part 36, # 38 Admin. Rec., part 37, # 39 Admin. Rec., part 38, # 40 Admin. Rec., part 39, # 41 Admin. Rec., part 40, # 42 Admin. Rec., part 41, # 43 Admin. Rec., part 42, # 44 Admin. Rec., part 43, # 45 Admin. Rec., part 44, # 46 Admin. Rec., part 45, # 47 Admin. Rec., part 46, # 48 Admin. Rec., part 47, # 49 Admin. Rec., part 48, # 50 Admin. Rec., part 49, # 51 Admin. Rec., part 50, # 52 Admin. Rec., part 51, # 53 Admin. Rec., part 52, # 54 Admin. Rec., part 53, # 55 Admin. Rec., part 54, # 56 Admin. Rec., part 55, # 57 Admin. Rec., part 56, # 58 Admin. Rec., part 57, # 59 Admin. Rec., part 58, # 60 Admin. Rec., part 59, # 61 Admin. Rec., part 60, # 62 Admin. Rec., part 61, # 63 Admin. Rec., part 62, # 64 Admin. Rec., part 63, # 65 Admin. Rec., part 64, # 66 Admin. Rec., part 65, # 67 Admin. Rec., part 66, # 68 Admin. Rec., part 67)(Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 07/30/2013)

08/09/2013

176 NOTICE (Notice of Filing of Designation and Certification of Administrative Record) by SALLY JEWELL re 175 Administrative Record,,,,,,,, (Attachments: # 1 Designation and Certification of Administrative Record)(Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 08/09/2013)

09/11/2013 177 Consent MOTION to Modify Scheduling Order by A.N.S.W.E.R. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 09/11/2013)

09/12/2013 178 MODIFIED SCHEDULING ORDER: Plaintiff's opposition/cross motion concerning plaintiff's claims related to the National Park Service's regulations due 10/11/2013. Defendant Secret Service to file

its dispositive motion concerning plaintiff's claims related to the prohibition on support for signs on or before 10/11/2013. Plaintiff to file its opposition/cross motion concerning plaintiff's claims related to the prohibition on support for signs on or before 11/8/2013. See Order for further deadlines. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 9/12/2013. (zmm, ) (Entered: 09/13/2013)

10/01/2013

179 Consent MOTION to Modify Scheduling Order by A.N.S.W.E.R. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 10/01/2013)

10/02/2013

MINUTE ORDER granting 179 plaintiff's consent Motion to Modify Scheduling Order. Plaintiff shall file its reply in support of its crossmotion concerning plaintiff's claims related to the National Park Service's regulations on or before February 3, 2014; defendant Secret Service shall file its reply/opposition to plaintiff's opposition/crossmotion concerning plaintiff's claims related to the prohibition on support for signs on or before February 3, 2014; plaintiff shall file its reply in support of its cross-motion concerning plaintiff's claims related to the prohibition on support for signs on or before March 3, 2014. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on October 2, 2013. (MA) (Entered: 10/02/2013)

10/03/2013

Set/Reset Deadlines: Defendant Secret Service's response to cross motion due by 2/3/2014. Plaintiff's reply in support of cross motion concerning claims related to the National Park Service's regulations due by 2/3/2014. Defendant Secret Service's reply to response to plaintiff's motion concerning claims related to prohibition on support for signs due by 2/3/2014. Plaintiff's reply in support of its cross motion concerning plaintiff's claims related to the prohibition on support for signs due 3/3/2014. (zmm, ) (Entered: 10/03/2013)

11/06/2013

180 Consent MOTION to Modify Scheduling Order by A.N.S.W.E.R. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 11/06/2013)

11/07/2013

MINUTE ORDER granting 180 plaintiff's consent Motion to Modify Scheduling Order for a two-business day enlargement of time. Plaintiffs shall have up to and including November 13, 2013 to file its opposition/cross motion concerning plaintiff's claims related to the National Park Service's regulations; defendants shall have up to and including November 13, 2013 to file their dispositive motion concerning plaintiff's claims related to the prohibition on support for signs. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on November 7, 2013. (MA) (Entered: 11/07/2013)

11/07/2013

Set/Reset Deadlines: Defendants' dispositive motion due by 11/13/2013. Plaintiffs' response/cross motion due by 11/13/2013. (zmm, ) (Entered: 11/07/2013)

11/13/2013

181 MOTION for Summary Judgment by W. RALPH BASHAM (Attachments: # 1 Coyer Declaration, # 2 Coyer Declaration Exh. 1, # 3 Coyer Declaration Exh. 2, # 4 Coyer Declaration Exh. 3, # 5 Callahan deposition, # 6 USSS Exhibits 1-3)(Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 11/13/2013)

11/13/2013

182 MOTION Exclude/Strike and Objections to Def.'s Statement of Material Facts re 174 MOTION to Dismiss and MOTION for Summary Judgment with Exhibits T, W and X to Owen Declaration by A.N.S.W.E.R. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit 3)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 11/13/2013)

11/13/2013

183 Memorandum in opposition to re 174 MOTION to Dismiss and MOTION for Summary Judgment with Exhibits T, W and X to Owen Declaration with Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts as to Which There Exists a Genuine Issue Necessary to be Litigated filed by A.N.S.W.E.R.. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit List of Exhibits, # 3 Exhibit 1, # 4 Exhibit 2, # 5 Exhibit 3, # 6 Exhibit 4, # 7 Exhibit 5, # 8 Exhibit 6, # 9 Exhibit 7, # 10 Exhibit 8, # 11 Exhibit 9, # 12 Exhibit 10, # 13 Exhibit 11, # 14 Exhibit 12, # 15 Exhibit 13, # 16 Exhibit 14, # 17 Exhibit 15, # 18 Exhibit 16, # 19 Exhibit 17, # 20 Exhibit 18, # 21 Exhibit 19, # 22 Exhibit 20, # 23 Exhibit 21, # 24 Exhibit 22, # 25 Exhibit 23, # 26 Exhibit 24, # 27 Exhibit 25, # 28 Exhibit 26, # 29 Exhibit 27, # 30 Exhibit 28, # 31 Exhibit 29, # 32 Exhibit 30, # 33 Exhibit 31, # 34 Exhibit 32, # 35 Exhibit 33, # 36 Exhibit 34, # 37 Exhibit 35, # 38 Exhibit 36, # 39 Exhibit 37, # 40 Exhibit 38, # 41 Exhibit 39, # 42 Exhibit 40, # 43 Exhibit 41, # 44 Exhibit 42, # 45 Exhibit 43, # 46 Exhibit 44, # 47 Exhibit 45, # 48 Exhibit 46, # 49 Exhibit 47, # 50 Exhibit 48, # 51 Exhibit 49, # 52 Exhibit 50, # 53 Exhibit 51, # 54 Exhibit 52, # 55 Exhibit 53, # 56 Exhibit 54, # 57 Exhibit 55, # 58 Exhibit 56, # 59 Exhibit 57, # 60 Exhibit 58, # 61 Exhibit 59, # 62 Exhibit 60, # 63 Exhibit 61, # 64 Exhibit 62, # 65 Exhibit 63, # 66 Exhibit 64, # 67 Exhibit 65, # 68 Exhibit 66, # 69 Exhibit 67, # 70 Exhibit 68, # 71 Exhibit 69, # 72 Exhibit 70)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 11/13/2013)

11/13/2013

184 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment with Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts as to Which Plaintiff Contends There is No Genuine Issue by A.N.S.W.E.R. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 11/13/2013)

12/02/2013 185 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to plaintiff's filings at Docket Nos. 182, 183 and 184 by SALLY JEWELL (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 12/02/2013)

12/03/2013

MINUTE ORDER granting 185 defendants' unopposed Motion for Extension of Time. Defendants shall respond to plaintiff's filings [Dkts. 182 and 183] on or before January 13, 2014; plaintiff shall repond to defendants' filing [Dkt. 181] on or before January 13, 2014; and plaintiff shall reply to defendants' opposition to plaintiff's motion to strike on or before February 3, 2014. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on December 3, 2013. (MA) (Entered: 12/03/2013)

01/06/2014 186 Consent MOTION to Modify Scheduling Order by A.N.S.W.E.R. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order (Modified Scheduling Order))(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 01/06/2014)

01/07/2014

MINUTE ORDER granting 186 plaintiff's consent Motion to Modify Scheduling Order. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 7, 2014. (MA) (Entered: 01/07/2014)

02/18/2014

187 Joint MOTION to Modify Scheduling Order by A.N.S.W.E.R. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order re Joint Motion to Modify Scheduling Order)(Verheyden-Hilliard, Mara) (Entered: 02/18/2014)

02/19/2014

MINUTE ORDER granting 187 Joint Motion to Modify Scheduling Order. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 19, 2014. (MA) (Entered: 02/19/2014)

03/19/2014

188 Unopposed MOTION to Amend/Correct Order on Motion to Modify Briefing Schedule by W. RALPH BASHAM, SALLY JEWELL, FRAN MAINELLA (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 03/19/2014)

03/20/2014

MINUTE ORDER granting 188 defendants' unopposed motion to amend briefing schedule. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on March 20, 2014. (MA) (Entered: 03/20/2014)

03/24/2014

Set/Reset Deadlines: NPS to respond to 182 motion to strike by 4/30/2014; NPS to respond to plaintiff's 184 cross motion for summary judgment by 4/30/2014; NPS's reply to plaintiff's response to 183 dispositive motion due 4/30/2014; Plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment and opposition to defendant Secret Service's 181 dispositive motion; Secret Service to reply to 181 motion and file cross motion by 5/21/2014; Plaintiff to reply to NPS's response to motion to strike and file cross motion for summary judgment by

5/21/2014; Plaintiff's reply to Secret Service's response to cross motion for summary judgment due 6/18/2014.(zmm, ) (Entered: 03/24/2014)

04/11/2014

189 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to A.N.S.W.E.R.. Attorney Andrea Hope Costello terminated. (Costello, Andrea) (Entered: 04/11/2014)

04/28/2014 190 Consent MOTION to Modify Scheduling Order by A.N.S.W.E.R. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 04/28/2014)

04/29/2014

MINUTE ORDER granting 190 plaintiff's consent motion to modify scheduling order. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on April 29, 2014. (MA) (Entered: 04/29/2014)

05/07/2014

191 Unopposed MOTION to Amend/Correct Order on Motion to Modify Briefing Schedule by W. RALPH BASHAM, SALLY JEWELL, FRAN MAINELLA, GALE A. NORTON (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 05/07/2014)

05/12/2014

MINUTE ORDER granting 191 defendant's unopposed motion to amend the briefing schedule. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on May 12, 2014. (MA) (Entered: 05/12/2014)

05/12/2014

Set/Reset Deadlines: NPS rsponse to motion to strike, response to cross motion for summary judgment regarding NPS regulations, and reply regarding their dispositive motion regarding regulations due 5/30/2014; Plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment due 5/30/2014; Secret Service's response and cross motion due 6/23/2014; Plaintiff's reply regarding motion to strike due 6/23/2014; Plaintiff's cross motion reply due 7/23/2014. (zmm, ) (Entered: 05/12/2014)

05/29/2014 192 Unopposed MOTION to Amend/Correct Order on Motion to Amend/Correct, Set/Reset Deadlines, by W. RALPH BASHAM, SALLY JEWELL (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 05/29/2014)

05/30/2014

MINUTE ORDER granting 192 defendants' unopposed motion to further amend briefing schedule. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on May 30, 2014. (MA) (Entered: 05/30/2014)

05/30/2014

Set/Reset Deadlines: NPS to file response to 184 and reply regarding 183 by 6/18/2014. Plaintiff to file cross motion for summary judgment and response to 181 by 6/18/2014. Secret Service to file reply and cross motion by 7/18/2014. Plaintiff to file reply to NPS response to motion to strike by 7/18/2014; Plaintiff to reply to Secret Service's opposition to plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment by 8/15/2014.(zmm, ) (Entered: 05/30/2014)

05/30/2014

193 Memorandum in opposition to re 182 MOTION Exclude/Strike and Objections to Def.'s Statement of Material Facts re 174 MOTION to Dismiss and MOTION for Summary Judgment with Exhibits T, W and X to Owen Declaration filed by SALLY JEWELL. (Attachments: # 1 Redfearn Declaration, # 2 Richardson Declaration)(Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 05/30/2014)

06/18/2014 194 NOTICE of Appearance by Jane M. Lyons on behalf of W. RALPH BASHAM, SALLY JEWELL (Lyons, Jane) (Entered: 06/18/2014)

06/18/2014 195 Unopposed MOTION to Amend/Correct Briefing Schedule by W. RALPH BASHAM, SALLY JEWELL (Lyons, Jane) (Entered: 06/18/2014)

06/19/2014

MINUTE ORDER granting 195 defendants' unopposed motion to further amend briefing schedule. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on June 19, 2014. (MA) (Entered: 06/19/2014)

06/23/2014

Set/Reset Deadlines: NPS to file response to plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment and to plaintiff's opposition to NPS's dispositive motion regarding NPS regulations by 7/25/2014; Plaintiff to file cross motion for summary judgment and response to Secret Service's dispositive motion by 7/25/2014; Secret Service to file response to plaintiff's opposition/cross motion regarding plaintiff's claims related to the prohibition on supports for signs by 9/25/2014; Plaintiff to file reply to NPS's response to motion to strike and cross motion for summary judgment by 9/25/2014; Plaintiff to file reply to Secret Service's opposition to plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment. (zmm, ) (Entered: 06/23/2014)

07/18/2014

196 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File Supplemental Briefing and Joint Motion to Amend Scheduling Order by A.N.S.W.E.R. (Attachments: # 1 Supplement Addressing Recent Rulings, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 07/18/2014)

07/22/2014

MINUTE ORDER granting 196 plaintiff's unopposed motion for leave to supplement briefing and joint motion to amend scheduling order by one week to accommodate supplemented briefing. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on July 22, 2014. (MA) (Entered: 07/22/2014)

07/22/2014

197 SUPPLEMENT addressing the recent rulings of McCullen v. Coakley, NO. 12-1168, 2014 U.S. Lexis 4499... filed by GRAYLAN S. HAGLER, MUSLIM AMERICAN SOCIETY FREEDOM FOUNDATION, NATIONAL COUNCIL OF ARAB AMERICANS. (td, ) (Entered: 07/28/2014)

07/29/2014 198 Joint MOTION to Amend/Correct Order on Motion for Leave to File by W. RALPH BASHAM, SALLY JEWELL (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 07/29/2014)

07/31/2014

MINUTE ORDER granting 198 joint motion to further amend scheduling order. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on July 31, 2014. (MA) (Entered: 07/31/2014)

09/18/2014

199 Consent MOTION to Modify Scheduling Order by A.N.S.W.E.R. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 09/18/2014)

09/18/2014

MINUTE ORDER granting 199 plaintiff's consent Motion to Modify Scheduling Order. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 18, 2014. (MA) (Entered: 09/18/2014)

10/02/2014

200 Joint MOTION to Modify Scheduling Order by A.N.S.W.E.R. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Verheyden-Hilliard, Mara) (Entered: 10/02/2014)

10/02/2014

MINUTE ORDER granting 200 Joint Motion to Modify Scheduling Order. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on October 2, 2014. (MA) (Entered: 10/02/2014)

10/02/2014

Set/Reset Deadlines: Plaintiff shall file its opposition/cross motionconcerning Plaintiffs claims related to the prohibition on support for signs (i.e., Plaintiffs response to Dkt. 181) by 10/17/2014; Defendant National Park Service shall file its reply/opposition to Plaintiffs opposition/cross motion [Dkts. 183 and 184] concerning Plaintiffs claims related to National Park Services regulations by 10/17/2014; On or before November 19, 2014, Plaintiff shall file its reply in support of its cross motion concerning Plaintiffs claims related to the National Park Services regulations[Dkt. 184] and its reply in support of its motion to exclude/strike [Dkt. 182]; On or before November 19, 2014, Defendant Secret Service shall file itsreply/opposition to Plaintiffs opposition/cross motion concerning Plaintiffs claims related to the prohibition on support for signs; On or before December 21, 2014, Plaintiff shall file its reply in support of its cross motion concerning Plaintiffs claims related to the prohibition on support for signs. (zmm, ) (Entered: 10/02/2014)

10/15/2014 201 Unopposed MOTION to Amend/Correct Order on Motion to Modify Briefing Schedule by W. RALPH BASHAM, SALLY JEWELL (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 10/15/2014)

10/16/2014

MINUTE ORDER granting 201 defendants' unopposed motion to further amend briefing schedule. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on October 16, 2014. (MA) (Entered: 10/16/2014)

10/20/2014

Set/Reset Deadlines: Defendant NPS response to cross motion for summary judgment 181 and reply to response to NPS's dispositive motion 183 due 10/30/2014; Plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment and response to Secret Service's dispositive motion 181 due 10/30/2014; Secret Service's response to plaintiff's opposition/cross motion due 12/3/2014; Plaintiff's reply to NPS response to motion to strike and cross motion for summary judgment due 12/3/2014; Plaintiff's reply to Secret Service's response to cross motion for summary judgment due 1/9/2015.(zmm, ) (Entered: 10/20/2014)

10/29/2014

202 Consent MOTION to Modify Scheduling Order by A.N.S.W.E.R. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Verheyden-Hilliard, Mara) (Entered: 10/29/2014)

10/31/2014

203 ORDER granting 202 plaintiff's consent motion to modify the scheduling order. No further extensions will be granted without extremely good cause. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on October 31, 2014. (MA) (Main Document 203 replaced on 10/31/2014) (zmm, ). (Entered: 10/31/2014)

10/31/2014

Set/Reset Deadlines: Plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment due 11/7/2014; NPS's response to cross motion and reply to response to disposition motion regarding NPS regulations due 11/7/2014; Plaintiff's reply to Secret Service's response to cross motion for summary judgment due 12/10/2014; Secret Service's reply to plaintiff's response and cross motion due 12/20/2014; Plaintiff's reply to Secret Service's response to cross motion for summary judgment due 1/16/2015. (zmm, ) (Entered: 10/31/2014)

11/07/2014

204 Memorandum in opposition to re 181 MOTION for Summary Judgment with Pl's Statement of Material Facts as to Which There Exists a Genuine Issue Necessary to be Litigated filed by A.N.S.W.E.R.. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 List of Exhibits, # 3 Exhibit A, # 4 Exhibit B, # 5 Exhibit C, # 6 Exhibit D, # 7 Exhibit E, # 8 Exhibit F, # 9 Exhibit G, # 10 Exhibit H, # 11 Exhibit I, # 12 Exhibit J, # 13 Exhibit K, # 14 Exhibit L, # 15 Exhibit M, # 16 Exhibit N, # 17 Exhibit O, # 18 Exhibit P, # 19 Exhibit Q, # 20 Exhibit R, # 21 Exhibit S, # 22 Exhibit T, # 23 Exhibit U, # 24 Exhibit V, # 25 Exhibit W, # 26 Exhibit X, # 27 Exhibit Y, # 28 Exhibit Z, # 29 Exhibit AA)(Verheyden-Hilliard, Mara) (Entered: 11/07/2014)

11/07/2014

205 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment with Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts as to Which Plaintiff Contends There is No Genuine Issue by A.N.S.W.E.R. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Verheyden-Hilliard, Mara) (Entered: 11/07/2014)

11/07/2014

206 Memorandum in opposition to re 184 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment with Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts as to Which Plaintiff Contends There is No Genuine Issue filed by SALLY JEWELL. (Attachments: # 1 Response to Plaintiff's Statement of Facts, # 2 Exhibit 1)(Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 11/07/2014)

11/07/2014

207 REPLY to opposition to motion re 174 MOTION to Dismiss and MOTION for Summary Judgment with Exhibits T, W and X to Owen Declaration filed by SALLY JEWELL. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 11/07/2014)

12/04/2014 208 Joint MOTION to Amend/Correct 203 Order on Motion to Modify, by W. RALPH BASHAM (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 12/04/2014)

12/05/2014

MINUTE ORDER granting 208 joint motion to further amend scheduling order. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on December 5, 2014. (MA) (Entered: 12/05/2014)

12/08/2014

Set/Reset Deadlines: Plaintiff to file by 12/11/14 its reply in support of its cross motion concerning plaintiff's claims related to the National Park Service's regulations 184 and its reply in support of its motion to exclude/strike 182 ; Defendant Secret Service shall file by 12/11/14 its reply/opposition to plaintiff's opposition/cross motion concerning plaintiff's claims related to the prohibition on support for signs; Plaintiff to file its reply in support of its cross motion concerning plaintiff's claims related to the prohibition on support for signs by 1/16/15.(zmm, ) (Entered: 12/08/2014)

12/11/2014

209 REPLY to opposition to motion re 182 MOTION Exclude/Strike and Objections to Def.'s Statement of Material Facts re 174 MOTION to Dismiss and MOTION for Summary Judgment with Exhibits T, W and X to Owen Declaration filed by A.N.S.W.E.R.. (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 12/11/2014)

12/11/2014

210 REPLY to opposition to motion re 184 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment with Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts as to Which Plaintiff Contends There is No Genuine Issue filed by A.N.S.W.E.R.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Attachment A, # 2 Exhibit Attachment B)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 12/11/2014)

12/11/2014 211 Memorandum in opposition to re 205 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment with Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts as to Which Plaintiff

Contends There is No Genuine Issue filed by W. RALPH BASHAM. (Attachments: # 1 Statement of Facts Response, # 2 Exhibit 1)(Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 12/11/2014)

12/11/2014 212 REPLY to opposition to motion re 181 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by W. RALPH BASHAM. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 12/11/2014)

01/15/2015

213 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 205 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment with Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts as to Which Plaintiff Contends There is No Genuine Issue by A.N.S.W.E.R. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 01/15/2015)

01/16/2015

MINUTE ORDER granting 213 plaintiff's consent motion for an extension of time. Plaintiff shall file its reply in support of its motion for summary judgment on or before January 23, 2015. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 16, 2015. (lcplf3) (Entered: 01/16/2015)

01/20/2015

Set/Reset Deadlines: Reply to Motion for Summary Judgment due by 1/23/2015. (zmm, ) (Entered: 01/20/2015)

01/23/2015

214 REPLY to opposition to motion re 205 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment with Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts as to Which Plaintiff Contends There is No Genuine Issue (relating to supports for signs and placards) filed by A.N.S.W.E.R.. (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 01/23/2015)

09/03/2015

215 ORDER inviting counsel to consider whether oral argument on any of the pending motions would be helpful, and directing them to file a joint status report on or before September 11, 2015 advising the Court on this matter. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 3, 2015.(MA) (Entered: 09/03/2015)

09/04/2015

Set/Reset Deadlines: Joint Report due by 9/11/2015. (zmm) (Entered: 09/04/2015)

09/11/2015 216 Joint STATUS REPORT by W. RALPH BASHAM, SALLY JEWELL. (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 09/11/2015)

09/15/2015

MINUTE ORDER. Oral argument on the five pending motions before the Court, Docket Nos. 174, 181, 182, 184, and 205, is scheduled for 1:30 PM on October 22, 2015. Each side will have one hour. The parties are directed to meet and confer and file a joint statement on or before October 8, 2015 as to how the time for argument will be allocated between the various cross-motions and issues. Signed by

Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 15, 2015. (MA) (Entered: 09/15/2015)

09/16/2015

Set/Reset Deadlines/Hearings: Joint Statement due by 10/8/2015. Motion Hearing set for 10/22/2015 01:30 PM in Courtroom 29A before Judge Paul L. Friedman. (zmm) (Entered: 09/16/2015)

10/08/2015 217 NOTICE Joint Statement Pursuant to the Court's September 15, 2015 Minute Order by A.N.S.W.E.R. (Verheyden-Hilliard, Mara) (Entered: 10/08/2015)

10/14/2015

MINUTE ORDER. The Court hereby adopts the allocation of time for oral argument proposed in the parties' October 8, 2015 joint statement. The first hour and fifteen minutes of argument shall address plaintiffs' regulatory challenge and the remaining forty-five minutes shall address plaintiffs' challenge to the ban on supports for signs and placards. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on October 14, 2015. (MA) (Entered: 10/14/2015)

10/20/2015 218 NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY by A.N.S.W.E.R. (Verheyden-Hilliard, Mara) (Entered: 10/20/2015)

10/22/2015

Minute Entry for Proceedings held before Judge Paul L. Friedman: Motions Hearing held on 10/22/2015 re: Defendants' 174 Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment; Defendants' 181 Motion for Summary Judgment; Plaintiffs' 182 Motion to Exclude/Strike; Plaintiffs' 184 Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment; and Plaintiffs' 205 Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment; Motions were Heard and Taken Under Advisement. (Court Reporter: Lisa Foradori) (jth) (Entered: 10/22/2015)

01/28/2016

219 ORDER that defendant Sally Jewells motion for summary judgment on Counts III and IV 174 is GRANTED, judgment is entered for defendants Sally Jewell and Jonathan Jarvis on Counts III and IV, and defendant Sally Jewells motion to dismiss Count I 174 is DENIED; defendant Jeh Johnsons motion for summary judgment on Count II 181 is GRANTED and judgment is entered for defendants Jeh Johnson and Joseph Clancy on Count II; plaintiff ANSWERs crossmotion for summary judgment on Counts III and IV [183 and 184] and its cross-motion for summary judgment on Count II [204 and 205] are DENIED; and plaintiffs motion to strike 182 is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court shall remove this case from the court docket Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 28, 2016. (MA) (Entered: 01/28/2016)

01/28/2016

220 OPINION denying defendants' motion to dismiss Count I and granting summary judgment to defendants on Counts II, III, and IV; and granting plaintiff's motion to strike. An Order consistent with this

Opinion shall issue this same day. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 28, 2016. (MA) (Entered: 01/28/2016)

02/24/2016

221 NOTICE OF APPEAL TO DC CIRCUIT COURT as to 220 Memorandum & Opinion, 219 Memorandum & Opinion, Order,,,,,, by A.N.S.W.E.R.. Filing fee $ 505, receipt number 00904425433. Fee Status: Fee Paid. Parties have been notified. (VerheydenHilliard, Mara) (Entered: 02/24/2016)

02/25/2016

222 Transmission of the Notice of Appeal, Order Appealed, and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals fee was paid this date 2/24/16 re 221 Notice of Appeal to DC Circuit Court,. (td) (Entered: 02/25/2016)

03/02/2016

USCA Case Number 16-5047 for 221 Notice of Appeal to DC Circuit Court, filed by A.N.S.W.E.R. (zrdj) (Entered: 03/02/2016)

04/27/2016

223 MOTION for Attorney Fees Relating to Count I Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, and Accompanying Points and Authorities in Support by A.N.S.W.E.R. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit 3, # 5 Exhibit 4, # 6 Exhibit 5, # 7 Exhibit 6)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 04/27/2016)

05/02/2016

224 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 223 MOTION for Attorney Fees Relating to Count I Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, and Accompanying Points and Authorities in Support by W. RALPH BASHAM, SALLY JEWELL (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 05/02/2016)

05/05/2016

MINUTE ORDER. The government's unopposed motion for an extension of time to file its response to plaintiff's motion for attorney fees 224 is GRANTED. The government shall file its response on or before June 10, 2016. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on May 5, 2016. (MA) (Entered: 05/05/2016)

05/06/2016

Set/Reset Deadlines: Response to plaintiff's motion for attorney fees due by 6/10/2016. (zmm) (Entered: 05/06/2016)

06/02/2016

225 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Paul L. Friedman held on 10-22-15; Page Numbers: 1-118. Date of Issuance:6-2-16. Court Reporter/Transcriber Lisa M. Foradori, Telephone number 202354-3269, Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the <a href=http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/dcd/node/2189>Transcript Order Form.</a><P></P><P></P>For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats,

(multi-page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.<P>NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty-one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.<P></P> Redaction Request due 6/23/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 7/3/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/31/2016.(Foradori, Lisa) (Entered: 06/02/2016)

06/02/2016

226 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Paul L. Friedman held on 6-25-13; Page Numbers: 1-9. Date of Issuance:6-2-16. Court Reporter/Transcriber Lisa M. Foradori, Telephone number 202-3543269, Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the <a href=http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/dcd/node/2189>Transcript Order Form.</a><P></P><P></P>For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi-page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.<P>NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty-one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.<P></P> Redaction Request due 6/23/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 7/3/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/31/2016.(Foradori, Lisa) (Entered: 06/02/2016)

06/09/2016

227 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 223 MOTION for Attorney Fees Relating to Count I Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, and Accompanying Points and Authorities in Support by W. RALPH BASHAM, SALLY JEWELL (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 06/09/2016)

06/13/2016

MINUTE ORDER granting 227 defendants' unopposed motion for extension of time up to and including June 30, 2016 within which to respond to plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees and costs. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on June 13, 2016. (MA) (Entered: 06/13/2016)

06/28/2016 228 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 223 MOTION for Attorney Fees Relating to Count I Pursuant to the

Equal Access to Justice Act, and Accompanying Points and Authorities in Support by W. RALPH BASHAM, SALLY JEWELL (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 06/28/2016)

06/29/2016

MINUTE ORDER granting 228 defendants' unopposed motion for further extension of time up to and including July 25, 2016 within which to respond to plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees and costs; and plaintiff's reply is due on or before August 25, 2016. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on June 29, 2016. (MA) (Entered: 06/29/2016)

07/01/2016

Set/Reset Deadlines: Responses due by 7/25/2016 Replies due by 8/25/2016. (tj) (Entered: 07/01/2016)

07/22/2016

229 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 223 MOTION for Attorney Fees Relating to Count I Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, and Accompanying Points and Authorities in Support by W. RALPH BASHAM, SALLY JEWELL (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 07/22/2016)

07/25/2016

MINUTE ORDER granting 229 defendants' unopposed motion for further extension of time up to and including August 22, 2016 within which to respond to plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees and costs. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on July 25, 2016. (MA) (Entered: 07/25/2016)

08/22/2016

230 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 223 MOTION for Attorney Fees Relating to Count I Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, and Accompanying Points and Authorities in Support by W. RALPH BASHAM, S. M. R. JEWELL (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 08/22/2016)

08/23/2016

MINUTE ORDER granting 230 defendants' unopposed motion for further extension of time nunc pro tunc up to and including September 22, 2016 to respond to plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees and costs. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on August 23, 2016. (lcplf2) (Entered: 08/23/2016)

09/21/2016

231 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 223 MOTION for Attorney Fees Relating to Count I Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, and Accompanying Points and Authorities in Support by S. M. R. JEWELL (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 09/21/2016)

09/22/2016

MINUTE ORDER granting 231 defendants' unopposed motion for further extension of time up to and including October 14, 2016 to respond to 223 plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees and costs. Signed

by Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 22, 2016. (MA) (Entered: 09/22/2016)

09/28/2016

Set/Reset Deadlines: Response to plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees and costs due by 10/14/201.6 (tj) (Entered: 09/28/2016)

10/14/2016 232 STIPULATION of Settlement of Attorneys' Fees on Count I by S. M. R. JEWELL. (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 10/14/2016)

10/17/2016

MINUTE ORDER: In light of the joint stipulation of settlement of attorneys' fees on count I of the amended complaint, the plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees relating to count I 223 is now moot. The clerk of the court is directed to close the motion administratively. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on October 17, 2016. (MA) (Entered: 10/17/2016)

03/13/2017

233 MANDATE of USCA as to 221 Notice of Appeal to DC Circuit Court, filed by A.N.S.W.E.R. USCA Case Number 16-5047. (Attachments: # 1 judgment filed January 17, 2017)(zrdj) (Entered: 03/13/2017)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

__________________________________________

:

A.N.S.W.E.R. (Act Now to Stop War and End :

Racism) Coalition

:

1247 E Street, S.E.

:

Washington, D.C. 20003

:

:

:

Plaintiffs,

:

:

v.

: Case No. 05-71 (PLF)

:

Gale A. Norton, Secretary of the Interior and

:

Fran Mainella, Director, National Park Service, :

1849 C Street, N.W.

:

Washington, D.C., 20240

:

in official capacity

:

:

and

:

:

W. Ralph Basham

:

Director, U.S. Secret Service

:

245 Murray Drive

:

Washington, D.C., 20223

:

in official capacity

:

:

Defendants.

:

__________________________________________:

AMENDED COMPLAINT

(Violations of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause; Declaratory and Injunctive relief sought)

This lawsuit challenges the authority of the National Park Service to disregard the

existing constitutionally mandated public space permitting system and systematically exclude the

public and dissenters from nearly all points of space abutting the Presidential Inaugural Parade

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route, granting exclusive access to Pennsylvania Avenue only to those who are financial and political supporters of the administration and its representative Inaugural Committee.
The National Park Service, the government entity charged with stewardship of the public’s lands, has far exceeded its authority and insists that it may abridge freedom of speech and peaceable assembly along Pennsylvania Avenue, America’s “Main Street,” in connection with the recurring Presidential Inaugural Parades except for those whose speech is by invitation of the administration’s private advocacy organization, the Presidential Inaugural Committee (hereinafter “PIC”).
For the inaugural parade, the government privatizes vast portions of the sidewalks of Pennsylvania Avenue, reserving nearly all primary spaces along the route to those pre-approved by this single favored political group, in 2005, the Bush-Cheney Presidential Inaugural Committee.
The National Park Service asserts the right to delegate to this private advocacy organization (and to successor Inaugural Committees) the authority to decide who may and who may not line the Inaugural parade route at this public national ceremonial event to communicate with the administration, to petition for redress of grievances and engage in free speech and peaceable assembly. The government has conditioned access to these vast areas of Pennsylvania Avenue to those who have an association with, and who must financially support (through ticket purchase or otherwise) the private partisan Presidential Inaugural Committee.
This is a prior restraint based on political association or viewpoint that is repugnant to the Constitution and especially so when applied to prohibit the people from access to this most public of public political events.
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At the same time that the government seeks to deny the general public, including anti-war demonstrators, from having access to line the inaugural route on a first-come first-served basis, relegating the public to spaces behind the PIC’s bleachers, in 2005 the government also banned supports for signs and placards that would facilitate the public’s expression of its viewpoints in visible fashion.
The parade route, to some, perhaps looks better with limitations on visible dissent. The restrictions on disfavored groups are intended to create the appearance of uniformity and support for the policies of the administration when, in 2005, tens of thousands came from across the country to be able to demonstrate by their presence a different political message.
The signs, the manifestations of dissent, the cacophony of voices and images - - some of which support and some of which oppose certain government policies - - is what democracy looks like. Democracy cannot be stage managed or penned or suppressed or improperly restricted and maintain either legitimacy or vibrancy.
The government may not choose and approve the government’s own viewpoint as the preferred voice in this public forum and deny all others equal access or opportunity to be heard and seen.
In January 2005, however, the government excluded the public and dissenters from over 5600 linear feet - - over a mile - - of sidewalk space abutting the relatively short parade route. This is a recurring practice and policy that occurs year after year, but which evades judicial review upon a full record due to time constraints.
Plaintiffs represent tens of thousands of political dissenters, anti-war activists and ordinary people compelled to collective action, among other reasons, by the war policies of the
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Bush administration and its refusal to bring troops home now from Iraq. The NPS provides the Inaugural Committee preferential and favored treatment, including
the exclusive use of public fora and the ability to restrict access to most portions of the parade route to their hand selected invitees. Plaintiffs were burdened with restrictions and conditions not imposed on the favored PIC, including even the requirement that ANSWER provide volunteers to stay outdoors overnight in freezing cold weather without shelter or warmth and at risk to their health and safety, where the PIC and others were permitted trailers, heated rest stations and other measures needed for health, welfare and comfort.
Plaintiffs have concrete intentions to demonstrate at the next upcoming Presidential Inauguration and seek a declaration of their rights, as well as injunctive relief prohibiting the ongoing unconstitutional conduct of the NPS with respect to Inaugural Parade permitting.
Plaintiffs advance this litigation to vindicate the rights of all to equal access to the public parade portion of the Inaugural ceremony. Plaintiffs do not seek by this lawsuit to disturb the existing and exclusive systems of access to the inaugural ceremony on U.S. Capitol grounds or to Lafayette Park, where the Presidential bleachers and viewing area are located.
Plaintiffs seek the Court to issue injunctive relief prohibiting NPS from this repeated course of constitutional deprivation. They seek for the sidewalks along upcoming Inaugural Parades to be opened for equal access by all, without discrimination based on political association or viewpoint. They seek for dissenting groups and all groups to have equal rights to access the public fora, such as Freedom Plaza and other spaces suitable for group assembly in conformity with the existing permitting regulations. Plaintiffs also seek a declaratory judgment that their constitutional rights were violated by the defendants in connection with the 2005
4

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Inaugural demonstrations. PARTIES
1. Plaintiff ANSWER COALITION (Act Now to Stop War & End Racism) is an unincorporated grassroots organization that engages in community and national political organizing and activism including carrying out meetings, protests, mass demonstrations, and other educational activities in opposition to war and racism. It has organized the largest demonstrations against the war and occupation of Iraq and in support of civil rights and civil liberties in Washington, D.C. and in other cities around the country over the past four years since its inception on September 14, 2001. ANSWER’s national headquarters is in Washington, D.C. Plaintiff ANSWER seeks to organize and facilitate the showing of the mass sentiment in the United States of opposition to war, exploitation, and bigotry, though the tens of thousands of people who wish to line the Inaugural Route. In so doing, ANSWER in the past and in connection with the 2005 Inauguration secured demonstration permits that would enable anti-war protestors and political groups to stand and demonstrate without fear or risk of arrest. The ANSWER Coalition has concrete plans to organize mass demonstration activity for the 2009 Inaugural parade route and for the foreseeable future, and seeks to line the Inaugural Parade route with protestors and activists.
2. Defendant GALE NORTON is the Secretary of the Interior. One of the agencies within the Department of the Interior is the National Parks Service (“NPS”). Defendant FRAN MAINELLA is the Director of the NPS. The NPS is the entity responsible for promulgation and enforcement of lawful regulations for expressive activity on federal
5

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public fora. The Department of the Interior is also the federal entity designated by Congress to implement the Presidential Inauguration Committee Act. 3. Defendant W. RALPH BASHAM is the Director of the U.S. Secret Service. The Secret Service is the entity responsible for promulgating direction that supports for signs and placards be banned from the Inaugural Parade route.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 4. This Court has jurisdiction to hear this complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal
question), 28 U.S.C. §1343(a)(3) and (4) (civil rights jurisdiction). 5. Venue is appropriately vested in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391 because the acts
or omissions giving rise to the claims occur or will occur in the District of Columbia FACTS
6. The ANSWER COALITION has, in the past years, organized mass demonstrations in Washington, D.C. When applying for a permit for mass demonstration activity, ANSWER secures space that can be used for protest without fear of arrest for literally hundreds of thousands of individual protestors and thousands of political groups from across the nation.
7. In connection with the 2005 Inauguration, ANSWER anticipated the participation of tens of thousands of demonstrators who sought to engage in rallies, assemblies and to line the Inaugural Parade route with signs of dissent.
8. The National Park Service is the steward of the public spaces and lands under its jurisdiction and has established a first-come first-served regulatory system for the submission and approval of permit applications to use NPS administered public space for
6

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First Amendment protected activities. 9. It is the strict policy of the National Park Service to not accept, or to deny, any application
submitted more than one year in advance of the event start date. This policy is enforced to reject permit applications of organizations, including groups engaged in political dissent, which submit applications to engage in protest more than one year in advance of the event start date. In 2001, when a political group, the International Action Center, filed ten applications for the use of public space in connection with the 2005 - 2041 Presidential Inaugurations, by response dated May 8, 2001, the NPS returned as unaccepted all such applications citing this strict policy. 10. On January 2, 2004, the ANSWER COALITION filed a permit application with the National Park Service for Inaugural related events and setup for Inauguration Day protests, including for Freedom Plaza and other spaces for the purposes of a rally and demonstration, and for the sidewalks of Pennsylvania Avenue. 11. The dates of the ANSWER COALITION’s proposed activity and setup were from January 1, 2005 to January 20, 2005, a period that encompassed the Inauguration Day as well as the three weeks in advance. 12. Law enforcement has stated the intention or authority to arrest any groups of dissenters if there are 25 or more in one group - - while simultaneously allowing the assembly of busloads of tourists in far greater numbers - - and ANSWER also intended through the effect of its permit to protect its affiliated persons and other dissenters coming to Washington, D.C. from possibly being arrested should they happen to arrive or be present in groups of 25 or more.
7

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13. ANSWER’s application specifically encompassed a permit for a mass rally and demonstration on Freedom Plaza on the day of the Inauguration including the erection of anti-war bleachers at that location, for assemblies at the Navy Memorial and on the sidewalks adjacent to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Justice to be allowed without fear of arrest.
14. ANSWER’s permit application was not denied within 24 hours and was consequently “deemed granted” pursuant to regulation.
15. The NPS maintains a set of boards on which it posts all permits for the upcoming year. Each board contains a calendar for one month with a listing of the permits for each day. By reference to these boards, an applicant can observe whether there are conflicting priorin-time permit applications for any particular or desired space.
16. As of January 20, 2004, there existed on the public boards, an application submitted by the National Park Service to itself on behalf of the Presidential Inaugural Committee. The board identified the specific sites for which the NPS was seeking a permit from itself. Those sites did not include Freedom Plaza or the sidewalks of Pennsylvania Avenue, among other locations encompassed by the ANSWER permit.
17. As above, the NPS did not at that time deny the ANSWER permit request at all, including on the basis of any conflicting prior-in-time application.
18. The ANSWER COALITION made repeated requests of the NPS to identify what, if any, part of its permit would be revoked by the government for any reason. The NPS did not advise that any revocation was to be made.
19. In advance of any permitted demonstration, the NPS and organizers meet to discuss
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logistics and intended space usage. 20. The ANSWER organizers are experienced organizers and have over the past four years
organized political demonstrations in Washington, D.C. in which tens and hundreds of thousands have participated. Among ANSWER organizers are individuals who have organized mass demonstrations in Washington, D.C. and elsewhere for many years. 21. At the NPS logistical meetings, when mass demonstrations are planned such as those organized by ANSWER in the past, there is in attendance or invited representatives from the NPS, from the demonstration organizers, and from affected law enforcement such as the U.S. Park Police, the United States Secret Service and the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department. 22. The ANSWER organizers requested that the NPS convene a logistics meeting for their intended activities along the Inaugural Parade route. ANSWER was advised that NPS would not provide information nor schedule the normal pre-demonstration multi-agency logistics meeting with protest organizers until after the Bush-Cheney PIC had determined what space it intended to take along the route and so advised the NPS. 23. A meeting was finally scheduled for December 13, 2004 by the NPS. That date was explicitly chosen by the NPS because, as the NPS represented, prior to that date they would not know from the PIC what space it was planning to use. 24. On December 13, 2004, eleven months after ANSWER’s application, a logistical meeting was held regarding ANSWER’s permit. At the meeting with ANSWER, representatives of the NPS, the U.S. Park Police and the U.S. Secret Service were present. The D.C. Metropolitan Police Department chose to not attend.
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25. During the proceeding eleven months the NPS never denied ANSWER’s permit application in whole or in part.
26. The ANSWER representatives were advised in the meeting, as well as in response to their prior requests for information and phone calls with the NPS, that the NPS was communicating and meeting with the Bush-Cheney PIC and that only based on those discussions would they be able to determine the status of the ANSWER COALITION’s permit under which tens of thousands of anti-war activists and political dissenters were to assemble.
27. At the December 13, 2004 meeting, the ANSWER COALITION requested to know what, if any, permit applications existed that could be used by the NPS to adversely affect ANSWER’s identified and planned demonstration activities on the public space along the Inaugural Parade route. The NPS advised that the organizers should file a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to secure such details which, that afternoon, the ANSWER COALITION filed.
28. As above, the NPS refuses to accept permit applications submitted more than one year in advance. The information returned in response to the FOIA request showed that there was no other permit submitted within that period that was prior in time than the ANSWER application.
29. The information did show, however, that on November 12, 2004 and December 19, 2004, the NPS had submitted permit applications to itself outside the one year period and in violation of the generally applicable permitting regulations and policies.
30. The NPS applications were not submitted as “demonstration” applications, but were
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identified as “special event” applications. 31. Special event permits are strictly limited to three weeks in duration by regulation. 36
C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(5). Special events are not permitted to continue beyond the specified three week period even where no other applicant has requested use of the space. 40 Fed. Reg. 58,652 (1975). 32. The November 12, 2003 NPS permit application was not for a limited segment of the Pennsylvania Avenue sidewalks for the time of the Parade, but for the entire length of the Pennsylvania Avenue sidewalks (plus additional areas) for the six-month period from November 1, 2004 to April 1, 2005. 33. The December 19, 2003 NPS permit application was also not limited in scope and encompassed the period of December 19, 2004 through March 15, 2005, nearly three months in duration. 34. By regulation, permit applications are required to be “fully executed” in order to be processed. 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4). 35. The November 12, 2003 application NPS permit application was incomplete. 36. The November 12, 2003 NPS permit application reflected no substantive response to seven of the sixteen required categories of information. The NPS simply wrote “To Be Determined” in response to questions regarding: Estimated maximum number of participants; props, stage and sound equipment; whether disruption was anticipated; marshals; communications equipment; identification of marshals; plans for loading and unloading of busses. 37. Were the regulations and policies that are enforced against demonstration organizers
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applied to these two permits applications, the NPS applications would plainly be outside the standard regulations for permit issuance. 38. Because the NPS would not advise whether it intended to revoke the permits that had been granted for eleven months to ANSWER and provided ANSWER little substantive information in the initial meeting, ANSWER organizers were allowed to meet again with NPS representatives on December 20, 2004. By this time, the PIC had begun to erect bleachers on the space encompassed within ANSWER’s permit, which not having been revoked remained “deemed granted” under the permitting regulations. 39. In attendance at the December 20, 2004 meeting was Mr. Randy Myers of the Department of Interior Solicitor’s Office. Asked repeatedly, Mr. Myers stated that there had been no denial or revocation of the ANSWER permit. He acknowledged that the NPS had issued a permit to the Bush-Cheney PIC for exclusive use of space encompassed by ANSWER’s permit. When asked directly to confirm that NPS possessed the discretion or authority to grant ANSWER’s permit as requested, Mr. Myers expressly stated that he was refusing to answer that question. 40. When the media subsequently contacted the NPS to inquire about this apparently contradictory position, the NPS represented that there had been no final decisions as yet regarding use of the space requested by ANSWER and that the PIC’s use of space remained tentative. 41. The NPS repeatedly represented that demonstrators and the public would be allowed access to the “open space” that was leftover after the PIC claimed what it wanted, but the NPS refused to identify what open spaces would exist for public use.
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42. During the course of the December 20, 2004 meeting, the NPS continued to act as if ANSWER might still be allowed its permit or at least a substantial portion of the permit. During the meeting, the NPS asked detailed questions and received detailed answers regarding ANSWER’s intended use of Freedom Plaza for a rally. NPS required, and ANSWER provided, detailed specifications including the height and width of bleacher seating, stage size, amplified sound and sound relay stations, press risers, location and provision of first aid support stations, use of generators, tables and plans for sales and solicitations.
43. By letter dated December 23, 2004, ANSWER communicated with the NPS, advising that there remained the appearance that NPS was seeking to obstruct or frustrate resort to the Courts by delaying, providing contradictory information, or “run[ning] down the clock” by refusing to revoke ANSWER’s permit if that was in fact their intention.
44. On December 23, 2004, the NPS did revoke ANSWER’s permit. The NPS offered ANSWER space to gather at John Marshall Park which afforded a mere 210 feet abutting Pennsylvania Avenue (as compared to the PIC’s 5600+ feet of access to the parade); revoked ANSWER’s permit insofar as it preserved the sidewalks of Pennsylvania Avenue for access by the public, including anti-war demonstrators, to line the parade route with expressive activity; and revoked ANSWER’s permit for Freedom Plaza with the exception of five feet of space abutting Pennsylvania Avenue and other spaces located behind the towering PIC bleachers; allowed dissenters one site that was over 100 feet away from Pennsylvania Avenue and one other space that was literally behind a wall; and allowed dissenters to assemble in a total of four additional spaces that were also located
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behind the 10' to 14' tall PIC bleachers. 45. NPS-produced maps reflect that the PIC had over 5,600 linear feet of sidewalk space
along the parade route (as compared to the 215 linear feet allotted to the tens of thousands of dissenters assembling under the umbrella of ANSWER’s permit). 46. Tall PIC bleachers lined over one mile of space along Pennsylvania Avenue, effectively eliminating the usefulness of any space behind those bleachers for expressive activity directed at parade participants. 47. The NPS authorized and enforced exclusion zones for all space in front of PIC bleachers and encompassing space on the sides and around PIC bleachers. These exclusion zones encompassed virtually all useful space on the public sidewalks. This was a marked expansion of the exclusivity of the parade route such that it was now largely accessible only to persons vetted and invited by the Bush-Cheney PIC. In 2001, while the parade route was dominated by the exclusive space for the PIC, protestors could maintain a sharply limited presence by lining the parade route in the “open space” between and in front of the bleachers. In 2005, that space was no longer considered “open space.” 48. Access to the vast Pennsylvania PIC exclusion zones is afforded on an invitation only basis. The NPS delegates fully the authority and discretion to select who may enter upon these vast exclusion zones along the public fora of the parade route. This occurs for every Inauguration. 49. On the day of the Inauguration, the NPS and law enforcement use state and government authority to systematically exclude from these massive zones - - that go all the way up to the curb - - all those who have not been pre-approved and screened by the Inaugural
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Committee and who have supported the administration’s PIC with a payment for the ticket. 50. It is constitutionally impermissible for the NPS to maintain the discretion, or delegate the discretion, to restrict free speech activities along the parade route to those who support the administration or have a political affiliation or financial transaction with the BushCheney Inaugural Committee or that of any particular administration. 51. Plaintiffs challenge this system facially, as well as on an administered basis. Regardless of whether the PIC exercises its unconditional authority to decide who may attend the parade in the vast PIC-exclusive spaces, the system is constitutionally impermissible for multiple reasons, including that this system has no narrowly defined and objective criteria to prevent such discrimination. 52. The PICs do not make available seating along the parade route on a discrimination-free basis. In 2001, according to internal Bush-Cheney PIC documents secured in litigation, not a single ticket was distributed to the general public. The 2001 Bush-Cheney PIC created three lists of persons, “A” list persons, “B” list persons, and “C” list persons. The “C” list was the general public, not one of whom was allowed a ticket. 53. Both the 2001 and 2005 Bush-Cheney Presidential Inaugural Committees announced to the public that tickets to the parade were available from their Ticketmaster hotline. However, Ticketmaster will only sell a person a ticket if that person can present an “invitation number” issued by the PIC. Ticketmaster, the PIC, and the government refuse to make these tickets available to the public. There is no way for a member of the public to call the PIC and get an invitation number. They are reserved for those hand-selected by
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the PIC and who are willing to pay the PIC for a ticket. 54. At the 2001 Inauguration, not only did the Bush-Cheney PIC have an exclusive bleacher
policy, but the government actually enforced exclusion of the public from the bleachers even though many bleacher sections were entirely empty due to rainy and inclement weather and no-shows. 55. Whatever minimal space is allowed to the public and to dissenters, there is no opportunity for there to be a mass manifestation along the parade route - - except for the uniform support of the administration manifest by the privileged and selected PIC invitees. 56. Picket signs have long traditionally be displayed on sign supports so that the placards can, in fact, be seen. 57. At the 2005 Inaugural Parade, the Secret Service enacted a new ban on all supports for signs and placards - - a restriction even stricter than that imposed for those who assemble upon the White House sidewalks, which allows sign supports that meet certain criteria regarding size and construct. 58. This restriction has no basis in genuine security interests and encompasses items such as hollow cardboard supports that have no offensive or defensive value as potential weapons. The Secret Service, while prohibiting cardboard supports in the area of the parade, expressly allows umbrellas, which typically are constructed with long metal spines that are capable of being removed and wielded as weapons. 59. Each and every PIC space has a direct line of sight to and from the parade and its participants. While PIC hand-selected guests are given unobstructed front row access and literally are literally elevated through the use of bleachers, ordinary people including
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particularly dissenters are forced to display their signs without supports from behind ten or twenty foot high PIC bleachers. 60. It is plain that all points of view are not afforded an equal opportunity to win the attention of the administration members and President in the parade where such burdens and restrictions fall upon the shoulders of everyone who has not been selected in advance by the administration through its PIC. 61. In 2005, the government conditioned the limited access afforded the ANSWER COALITION upon compliance with burdensome, and inhumane, conditions that were not similarly imposed on the PIC permit holder. 62. On Tuesday, January 11, 2005, representatives of ANSWER engaged in a walk through of their severely restricted permitted space with the responsible NPS Park Rangers. During the walk through specific logistical needs and arrangements necessary to the use of the space were discussed and the NPS provided verbal assurances and agreements regarding what was permitted. On Friday, January 14, 2005, ANSWER filed a complaint in U.S. District Court after certain other NPS representatives simply refused to respond to communication and efforts at resolution. At 7:00 p.m. that night, just hours after the complaint was filed and served, the NPS sent correspondence revoking and rescinding the agreements that had been reached during the walk through. 63. The NPS required an unarmed guard be present at their site from January 19 through January 21, while any equipment was present. The overnight lows were below freezing, in the 20s, and with blowing wind subject to a wind chill that was life threatening during extended periods of exposure. During the January 11, 2005 walk through, the NPS
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Rangers suggested that ANSWER use three “warming tents” for the warmth and safety of persons standing guard duty overnight. In the January 14 letter, the NPS advised that warming tents would be prohibited because the tent sides could conceal activity therein. ANSWER responded that they would secure tents with clear sides that would not obstruct the view. When ANSWER raised this issue in the federal court hearing on the preliminary injunction in this matter, the government assured the Court that it need not address the issue because of ANSWER’s proposed clear sided tents. Hours later, the government banned the clear sided tents, barring any warming tents on the purported basis that there might be a momentary light reflection off the plastic panels that could obstruct the Secret Service from monitoring the activities inside the tent. 64. The PIC was allowed closed trailers along the route. The NPS authorized the placement of no less than six heated and enclosed areas for their and the PIC’s security and personnel. 65. The government thus conditioned ANSWER’s use of their permitted space on having a guard or guards spend the night unprotected in potentially sub-zero weather (with consideration for the wind chill factor). ANSWER had hired a professional security company to provide two unarmed security guards to provide overnight services each night. However, when advised in advance of these new and discriminatory conditions, no professional guard was willing to provide his or her services due to the necessary exposure to the life threatening cold. These conditions were below the minimal acceptable conditions for health, comfort and safety of every security firm contacted. 66. Law enforcement threatened that if ANSWER’s space was unattended for any amount of
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time, all of their equipment and setup would be dismantled and confiscated by the government. 67. The ANSWER organizers and dedicated youth volunteers, unwilling to lose the limited free speech and parade access that they were being allowed, organized themselves to stay outside in the freezing cold without warmth or shelter. Because the weather was so severe, and despite purchasing over six hundred dollars of extreme weather gear, the volunteers each could only stay outside in the night for a small number of hours. Through the night volunteers traded shifts to guard the space in John Marshall Park. 68. The NPS denied ANSWER permission to place a generator near their sound system, even though ANSWER documented and provided to the NPS a list of eleven (11) generators placed along Pennsylvania Avenue in a similar position to that required by ANSWER. While the PIC could place its generators within 12 feet of the parade route, ANSWER’s generator had to be placed 350 feet away because of “concerns” regarding its proximity to the parade route. This required additional expense, as well as the laying of hundreds of feet of covered cable through the length of the park. 69. The NPS barred ANSWER from having chairs for the use of the elderly and disabled, ostensibly because of concerns about their proximity to the U.S. Capitol, while allowing the PIC to place 30,000 chairs on the Mall in even closer proximity to the Capitol. 70. The government imposed additional arbitrary last minute conditions on the ANSWER COALITION, for example, stating just before the demonstration that they would need to surround their sound speakers with bike racks and that, if ANSWER failed to do so, their sound system would be confiscated by the government. It is impossible to secure bike racks from a Washington, D.C. supplier in the days leading to the Inauguration because the government itself has rented out miles of bike racks for its use: there are not any left.
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However, after a diligent search, ANSWER was able to locate a distributer in Baltimore and take volunteers off of other duties to locate a van and travel to pick up the bike racks. 71. Law enforcement then seized the bicycle racks, which were surrounding the sound system as ordered. They took them away and dumped them elsewhere where, fortunately, they were located by volunteers. 72. The government set up and administered check points in such a manner as to restrict access to the John Marshal Park, site of the sole location granted for mass assembly by protestors. Many thousands of protestors were thus barred from ever accessing the parade route. 73. Other burdensome restrictions, conditions and demands were imposed arbitrarily upon ANSWER in what appeared to be a calculated effort to create pretext for law enforcement to come in and dismantle and confiscate ANSWER’s setup, as threatened. Only through the dedication of ANSWER volunteers through extraordinarily unreasonable and harsh conditions was ANSWER able to protect its equipment and space from law enforcement confiscation or forfeit and to have its public protest.
STANDING 74. The unconstitutional policies challenged herein remain unabated and, as such, are
challenged as ongoing unconstitutional prior restraint on free speech and assembly. 75. The unconstitutional conduct manifests itself at every Presidential Inauguration, which
recur quadrennially as well as under exceptional circumstances. 76. The desire of persons to engage in political protest, assembly, association and expression
at the Presidential Inauguration will foreseeably recur so long as there are public Inaugurations. 77. ANSWER’s interests lie both in securing space for use as a rally and assembly site(s) and
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to ensure that ANSWER and those affiliated with ANSWER or who support its political message have the ability to line the parade route with a mass demonstration of collective action. 78. It is the declared policy and position of the National Park Service that for purposes of the Presidential Inauguration, it need not abide by the ordinarily applicable permitting regulations and that it may favor one private political advocacy group, the incoming administration’s Inaugural Committee, such that the public and dissenters are excluded from vast portions of the public sidewalks and public fora and are denied access to the public Inaugural Parade on the same terms and conditions which benefit the PIC. 79. The NPS’s overextension of its authority and desire to avoid a visible display of political discontent with the administration recurs regardless of which of the two dominant political parties is victorious in the Presidential election. 80. The NPS’s unconstitutional conduct has created the need for constitutional rights litigation by political dissenters in each of the past three immediately preceding Presidential elections, with each case proceeding without benefit of a full record due to sharp time constraints. 81. For the 1997 Inauguration of William J. Clinton, the NPS advised that protestors who opposed the incoming administration’s policies and who picketed in “space[s] assigned to the Presidential Inaugural Committee” would be subject to arrest. See, Mahoney v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d 1452, 1454 (D.C. Cir. 1997). That suit proceeded without benefit of a full record on an emergency basis with severe time restraints. Id., at 1455. 82. In Mahoney, due to the emergency basis on which the hearing was held, and due to an incomplete record, the Court was unable to address the underlying merits of that plaintiff's claims that the NPS had unconstitutionally violated its own regulations when it
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granted a massive permit to itself which failed to conform to the permitting regulations, in order to later transfer that permit to the Clinton-Gore Presidential Inaugural Committee, according it preferential treatment. Id. 83. For the 2001 Inauguration of George W. Bush, the NPS revoked the permit for Freedom Plaza and other spaces, deemed granted to political protestors, in order to transfer use of those spaces to the Presidential Inaugural Committee. Protestors alleged that the NPS refusal to abide by their own regulatory system in order to grant exclusive use of space to the favored PIC was unconstitutional. The motion for a preliminary injunction was heard on an emergency basis and was not based on a full record. International Action Center, et al. v. United States, et al., Civil Action No. 01-0072 (GK). 84. For the 2005 Inauguration of George W. Bush, again the NPS at the last minute revoked protestors’ demonstration and assembly permits in order to give exclusive use of that space to the PIC. The motion for a preliminary injunction was heard on an emergency basis and was not based on a full record. 85. Plaintiffs are advocates of social justice issues that transcend which of the two dominant political parties wins the Presidential election, and consequently have concrete intentions to demonstrate at the next Presidential Inauguration even at this time. They seek an adjudication of the unconstitutional policies and practices of the NPS and Secret Service that currently and concretely threaten to abridge their intended free speech, petition and assembly activities. 86. Litigation filed only upon the formal denial of a demonstration permit affords no opportunity for meaningful judicial review, including full appellate consideration, upon a full record due to the limited time constraints inherent in this particular nature of controversy.
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COUNT I (Unconstitutional Permitting Violations) First Amendment Freedom of Speech and Assembly; Right to Petition Government for Redress of Grievances; Equal Protection Clause 87. Paragraphs 1 through 86 are incorporated by reference herein. 88. The conduct complained of herein deprives plaintiffs and other members of the public of their constitutional rights pursuant to the First Amendment to assemble in public places and communicate their views to other members of the public, to present grievances to government officials, and to equal protection under the law. 89. The NPS is constitutionally obligated to apply to itself and the PIC, in issuing permits, the same narrowly-drawn and generally applicable regulations to which others must conform. It is constitutionally impermissible for the NPS to exempt itself or the PIC from the constitutionally mandated permitting system, particularly where such deviation works an abridgment of others’ free speech, petition and assembly rights. 90. The NPS action, in excluding the public and anti-war demonstrators from vast sections of
the Inaugural Parade route is not a reasonable time, place or manner regulation. 91. The NPS actions and policies constitute viewpoint-based and content-based
discrimination, favoring those approved by the administration’s Inaugural Committee and disfavoring those who are not so approved, especially those who wish to express their opposition to the current administration’s policies at this unique quadrennial political moment through mass assembly and visible protest. 92. The exclusion of the public and dissenters from vast sections of the public Inaugural Parade route in order to favor those selected by the PIC does not further any compelling state interest. Nor does it further any significant state interest. The government’s legitimate interest in the public Inaugural Parade is to provide access to all on the same
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terms and conditions, regardless of political associations or financial contributions to the prevailing administration or its inaugural committee. 93. The NPS actions and policies do not serve any significant government interest, let alone a compelling interest, by the broad exclusion of expressive activity along the parade route. 94. The government conduct is not narrowly tailored nor appropriately limited in discretion as it is expansive, flies in the face of the NPS’ own regulations and is made without any standards or guidelines to guide and restrain discretion to allot public space on the sidewalks along the Inaugural Parade. 95. The NPS actions and policies also fail to leave open ample alternatives for communication by those who are excluded from the vast area reserved for the Inaugural Committee’s supporters. 96. There is no constitutional basis to distinguish between those who have been pre-approved by a private political body to have expansive access to the parade route, while banning all others who lack such favored and privileged status from even assembling on most of Pennsylvania Avenue.
97. Plaintiffs suffer irreparable harm by the denial and abridgment of their free speech rights, as individuals and as groups, to line the parade route and engage in free speech, petition, assembly and associational activities. COUNT II (Prohibition on Sign Supports)
First Amendment Freedom of Speech and Assembly; Right to Petition Government for Redress of Grievances; Equal Protection Clause
98. Paragraphs 1 through 86 are incorporated by reference herein. 99. The conduct complained of herein deprives plaintiffs and other members of the public of
their constitutional rights pursuant to the First Amendment to assemble in public places
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and communicate their views to the administration, to other members of the public, to present grievances to government officials, and to equal protection under the law. 100. There is no legitimate basis for the prohibition on all sign supports, including those supports that are made of hollow cardboard and can be inspected at the checkpoints, particularly where these restrictions are not even required for demonstrations on the White House sidewalks - - which are the locations that have had the strictest restrictions on demonstration activity due to their proximity to the White House. 101. The ban on sign supports disproportionately burdens those who are not privileged to have been pre-approved by the PIC for bleacher seating and, in fact, is a mere cover for viewpoint based discrimination that favors pre-approved administration supporters and burdens all others. The PIC-approved attendees do not need sign supports because they are physically elevated by an enormous bleacher supports made of wood, metal and piping (elements which have a greater offensive risk than hollow cardboard sign supports). 102. Plaintiffs suffer irreparable harm by the denial and abridgment of their free speech rights, as individuals and as groups, to line the parade route with signs elevated on pickets and engage in free speech and petition activities.
Count III Injunctive Relief for Violation of First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause 103. Paragraphs 1 through 86 are incorporated by reference herein. 104. There is no substitute day for the intended expressive activity. The plaintiffs are not
seeking to secure access to the swearing-in ceremony on U.S. Capitol grounds. They are not seeking access to the spaces set aside by regulation for the exclusive use of the Inaugural Committee, on the sidewalks of the White House and in three-quarters of
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Lafayette Park. They are not seeking access to the many private balls and fundraisers at which the President will appear. All the people have is the sidewalks and public parkland. That is what plaintiffs seek, to allow all members of the public to line the Inaugural Parade route on a first-come first-served basis without suffering political discrimination.
105. The intended expressive activity of the demonstrators is to collectively line the parade route with their signs, their bodies and to amplify their presence with their collective voices. The exclusion of the public from vast portions of Pennsylvania Avenue that has been reserved for the favored Inaugural Committee prevents that mass expression.
106. There is no adequate substitute for allowing the public, including demonstrators, to line the parade route on a first-come first-served basis. The granting to ANSWER of permission in 2005 to use John Marshall park, with its 210 linear feet of access to the parade route, is not close to an adequate substitute for equal access to line the parade route by the demonstrating public. It simply does not remedy the problem, to provide demonstrators with a sliver of their rights or a sliver of access to the route.
107. In the instant case, plaintiffs have already suffered irreparable harm in their ability to organize and plan for their 2005 Inaugural demonstration. The uncertainty created by the NPS practice of revoking permits at the very last moment, notwithstanding long-standing knowledge and intention to do so, is terribly disruptive.
108. Without an injunction issued by this Court ordering equal access for the public and dissenters to the parade route, Plaintiffs and the public interest will suffer even greater irreparable harm.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request the following relief (none of which shall disturb the Inaugural Committee’s current allowance by regulation to exclusive access and use of the White House sidewalks and three-fourths of Lafayette Park on Inauguration Day):
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a. Declaratory judgment that the NPS policy and practice of exempting itself and/or the PIC from strict compliance with the generally applicable permitting regulations is unconstitutional; and an injunction prohibiting any such deviation in the future;
b. Declaratory judgment that the NPS policy and practice of granting to the PIC exclusive use of the public space abutting the Inaugural Parade route is unconstitutional; an injunction prohibiting such discriminatory conduct in the future; and a mandatory injunction that the NPS make the sidewalks abutting the Inaugural Parade generally open to the public for use, with accommodations for reasonable logistical needs and to afford access by the disabled where such reasonable accommodations neither favor nor burden any group on the basis of political association or viewpoint, and to also allow the continued traditional use of the sidewalk in front of the Wilson Building for a reviewing stand for District of Columbia officials and invitees consistent in size with that used in 2005;
c. Declaratory judgment that the prohibition on supports for signs and placards is unconstitutional, and a mandatory injunction that the NPS and/or Secret Service promulgate constitutionally permissible regulations regarding use of such supports if they have a constitutional basis for regulating such items;
d. Declaratory judgment that plaintiffs suffered a violation of their constitutional rights in connection with the 2005 Inauguration restrictions;
e. An award of plaintiff’s reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses; and f. Such other and further relief, including all appropriate equitable relief, as to the
Court may seem proper.
27

CasCea1s:e051-:0cv5--0c0v-007010-7P1L-FPLFDoDcoucmuemnetn1t617 FFilieledd0077//2288//200505PagPea2g8e o2f82o8f 28 Respectfully Submitted,

July 28, 2005

______________________________ Carl Messineo (#450033) Mara Verheyden-Hilliard (#450031) Merrilyn Onisko1
PARTNERSHIP FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, INC. 1901 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Suite 607 Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) 530-5630

_______________________________ Carol A. Sobel appearing pro hac vice LAW OFFICES OF CAROL A. SOBEL 429 Santa Monica Blvd, Ste. 550 Santa Monica, California 90401 (310) 393-3055
All attorneys also on behalf of the NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD MASS DEFENSE COMMITTEE

1
Admitted to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, and in the State of Michigan; Application pending for District of Columbia.
28

 
 Case 1:05-cv-00071-PLF Document 49 Filed 06/13/07 Page 1 of 22

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

__________________________________________

)

A.N.S.W.E.R. COALITION,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

)

DIRK KEMPTHORNE,

)

SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, et al.,1

)

)

Defendants.

)

__________________________________________)

Civil Action No. 05-0071 (PLF)

OPINION Plaintiff A.N.S.W.E.R. (Act Now to Stop War and End Racism) Coalition (“ANSWER”) filed this lawsuit against defendants Dirk Kempthorne, Secretary of the Interior, Fran P. Mainella, Director of the National Park Service (“NPS”), and Mark Sullivan, Director of the United States Secret Service, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on three claims, all alleging violations of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution with respect to policies and regulations relating to the Presidential Inaugural Parade in January 2005.2 This matter is now before the Court on defendants’ motion to dismiss or, in

1

Under Rule 25(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Secretary Dirk

Kempthorne has been substituted for former Interior Secretary Gale Norton and Secret Service

Director Mark Sullivan has been substituted for former Director W. Ralph Basham.

2

Additional plaintiffs Graylan S. Hagler, the Muslim American Society Freedom

Foundation and the National Council of Arab Americans were named in the original complaint

filed in this lawsuit. When the operative amended complaint was filed on July 28, 2005,

ANSWER Coalition was the only plaintiff named.

Case 1:05-cv-00071-PLF Document 49 Filed 06/13/07 Page 2 of 22

the alternative, for summary judgment and plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment.3
I. BACKGROUND The 2005 Inauguration of President George W. Bush took place on January 20, 2005 here in Washington, D.C. The inaugural parade route included, as it always does, Pennsylvania Avenue between the United States Capitol and the White House. Since 1996, much of the Pennsylvania Avenue corridor has been part of the Pennsylvania Avenue National Historic Park. It therefore is under the jurisdiction of the National Park Service, which is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations “for the use and management of parks[.]” 16 U.S.C. § 3. NPS issues regulations with respect to the presidential inaugural ceremonies and permits relating thereto. See generally 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g). The Presidential Inaugural Ceremonies Act (“PICA”), 36 U.S.C. § 501 et seq., which was enacted in 1956, also governs inaugural events. Plaintiff purports to represent “tens of thousands of political dissenters, anti-war activists and ordinary people compelled to collective action, among other reasons, by the war policies of the Bush administration and its refusal to bring troops home now from Iraq.” Am. Compl. at 3-4. Plaintiff asserts that it has “concrete intentions to demonstrate at the upcoming

3

The papers submitted in connection with these motions include: Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, for Summary Judgment (“Defs’ Mot.”); Memorandum

in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, for Summary Judgment

(“Defs’ Mem.”); Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative,

for Summary Judgment and Cross Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or, in the alternative,

for Summary Judgment (“Pl’s Mot.”); Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Cross Motion for

Summary Judgment and Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in

the alternative, for Summary Judgment (“Defs’ Opp.”); and Reply in Support of Plaintiff’s Cross

Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pl’s Reply”).

2

Case 1:05-cv-00071-PLF Document 49 Filed 06/13/07 Page 3 of 22
Presidential Inauguration” regardless of which party’s candidate is elected, and that it advances this litigation to “vindicate the rights of all to equal access to the public parade portion of the Inaugural ceremony.” Id. at 4.
Plaintiff alleges that it is the strict policy of the NPS not to accept any permit applications submitted more than one year in advance of the start date for any event on Park Services land, see Am. Compl. ¶ 9, and that this policy is used to reject permit applications of organizations, “including groups engaged in political dissent.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that the policy is waived or disregarded for the Presidential Inaugural Committee, which effectively is permitted to submit its application earlier than other groups and is given exclusive use of most of the parade route. See id. at 4 and ¶¶ 16, 29, 32, 33. On January 2, 2004, ANSWER filed a permit application with the NPS for 2005 Inauguration events and setup, covering a time period from January 1, 2005 to January 20, 2005. See id. ¶¶ 10-11; see also Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts as to Which There is No Genuine Issue (“DSMF”) ¶ 12. ANSWER’s application “was not denied within 24 hours and was consequently ‘deemed granted’ pursuant to regulation.” Am. Compl. ¶ 14.4
Plaintiff alleges that on November 12, 2003 and December 19, 2003, NPS submitted permit applications to itself in connection with the 2005 Inauguration, “outside the one year period and in violation of the generally applicable permitting regulations and policies.” Am.

4

36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(3) provides that “[a]ll demonstration applications . . . are

deemed granted, subject to all limitations and restrictions applicable to said park area, unless

denied within 24 hours of receipt.”

3

Case 1:05-cv-00071-PLF Document 49 Filed 06/13/07 Page 4 of 22

Compl. ¶ 29.5 Defendants respond that NPS “has traditionally submitted applications on behalf of PIC [the Presidential Inaugural Committee] because no committee is formed until after a presidential election has been decided.” DSMF ¶ 4. The PICA specifically authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to “grant to the Inaugural Committee a permit to use [any of the Federal] reservations or grounds during the inaugural period, including a reasonable time before and after the inaugural period.” 36 U.S.C. § 503(a).
By January 20, 2004, plaintiff alleges, the applications submitted by NPS to itself were visible on the public boards maintained by NPS and on which applicants “can observe whether there are conflicting prior-in-time permit applications for any particular or desired space.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15-16. The November 12, 2003 NPS application was “for the entire length of the Pennsylvania Avenue sidewalks (plus additional areas) for the six-month period from November 1, 2004 to April 1, 2005.” Id. ¶ 32; see also DSMF ¶ 2. Plaintiff argues that the December 19, 2003 NPS application was “not limited in scope” and “encompassed the period of December 19, 2004 through March 15, 2005.” Am. Compl. ¶ 33. These permits, submitted on behalf of the Presidential Inaugural Committee (“PIC”), reserved some areas for the exclusive use of the PIC and its guests. See id. ¶¶ 47-54; see also DSMF ¶¶ 1, 6. As of January 20, 2004, the sites designated did not include Freedom Plaza or the sidewalks of Pennsylvania Avenue, “among other locations encompassed by the ANSWER permit.” Am. Compl. ¶ 16.
ANSWER alleges that it made repeated requests of NPS to identify what, if any, part of its permit would be revoked, but received no response. See Am Compl. ¶¶ 17-18.

5

The amended complaint states that the dates were November 12, 2004 and

December 19, 2004, but the Court concludes that plaintiff intended to say “2003.” See Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 35-36 (referring to the November 12, 2003 permit application).

4

Case 1:05-cv-00071-PLF Document 49 Filed 06/13/07 Page 5 of 22

ANSWER then requested “that the NPS convene a logistics meeting for their intended activities along the Inaugural Parade route” and “was advised that NPS would not provide information nor schedule the normal pre-determination multi-agency logistics meeting with protest organizers until after the Bush-Cheney PIC had determined what space it intended to take along the route . . .” Id. ¶ 22; see also id. ¶ 26. The meeting finally was held on December 13, 2004, with representatives of the NPS, the United States Park Police and the Secret Service. See id. ¶ 24. ANSWER alleges that it was advised at the meeting that NPS was meeting and talking with the Bush-Cheney PIC and that “only based on those discussions would they be able to determine the status of the ANSWER Coalition’s permit . . . .” Id. ¶ 26. There was a second logistics meeting on December 20, 2004. See id. ¶¶ 38-39.
Plaintiff alleges that on December 23, 2004, NPS “revoke[d] ANSWER’s permit” and offered ANSWER much more limited space for its use than it had requested in its January 2004 permit application. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 44-46.6 Defendants characterize this determination

6

According to plaintiff:

44. The NPS offered ANSWER space to gather at John Marshall Park which afforded a mere 210 feet abutting Pennsylvania Avenue (as compared to the PIC’s 5600+ feet of access to the parade); revoked ANSWER’s permit insofar as it preserved the sidewalks of Pennsylvania Avenue for access by the public, including antiwar demonstrators, to line the parade route with expressive activity; and revoked ANSWER’s permit for Freedom Plaza with the exception of five feet of space abutting Pennsylvania Avenue and other spaces located behind the towering PIC bleachers; allowed dissenters one site that was over 100 feet away from Pennsylvania Avenue and one other space that was literally behind a wall; and allowed dissenters to assemble in a total of four additional spaces that were also located behind the 10' to 14' tall PIC bleachers.

5

Case 1:05-cv-00071-PLF Document 49 Filed 06/13/07 Page 6 of 22
as the Park Service “grant[ing] in part the plaintiff’s permit application.” DSMF ¶ 13. Defendants also claim that “[t]he nine park areas for plaintiff’s permits were sufficient to fully accommodate the requested numbers of participants for their demonstration activities and in many areas allowed the plaintiff’s group to see and be seen from the parade route.” Id.
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on January 14, 2005, seeking an expedited preliminary injunction against the National Park Service and the United States Secret Service “to preclude denial of access to the 2005 Inaugural Parade Route.” Complaint at 1. A hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction was held before the undersigned on January 18, 2005. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court denied the motion, explaining its reasons in an oral opinion. See January 18, 2005 Order; Transcript of Excerpt of January 18, 2005 Preliminary Injunction Hearing (“PI Transcript”). ANSWER filed an amended complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief on July 28, 2005. The parties subsequently briefed the motions that are now before the Court.
Plaintiff states that it “advance[s] this litigation to vindicate the rights of all to equal access to the public parade portion of the Inaugural ceremony,” and that it does not “seek to disturb the existing and exclusive system of access to the inaugural ceremony on the U.S.
45. NPS-produced maps reflect that the PIC had over 5,600 linear feet of sidewalk space along the parade route (as compared to the 215 linear feet allotted to the tens of thousands of dissenters assembling under the umbrella of ANSWER’s permit). 46. Tall PIC bleachers lined over one mile of space along Pennsylvania Avenue, effectively eliminating the usefulness of any space behind those bleachers for expressive activity directed at parade participants. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 44-46.
6

Case 1:05-cv-00071-PLF Document 49 Filed 06/13/07 Page 7 of 22

Capitol grounds or to Lafayette Park[.]” Am. Compl. at 4. Rather, it seeks “injunctive relief prohibiting NPS from this repeated course of constitutional deprivation[,]” and “a declaratory judgment that their constitutional rights were violated by the defendants in connection with the 2005 Inaugural demonstrations.” Id.7
Count I of the amended complaint alleges “unconstitutional permitting violations” under the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 87-97. More specifically, plaintiff asserts that “it is constitutionally impermissible for NPS to exempt itself or the PIC from the constitutionally mandated permitting system, particularly where such deviation works an abridgement of others’ free speech, petition and assembly rights.” Id. ¶ 89. Plaintiff also asserts that the “NPS action, in excluding the public and anti-war demonstrators from vast sections of the Inaugural Parade route is not a reasonable time, place or manner regulation[,]” and that the “NPS actions and policies constitute viewpoint-based and content-based discrimination, favoring those approved by the administration’s Inaugural Committee and disfavoring those who are not so approved, especially those who wish to express their opposition to the current administration’s policies at this unique quadrennial political moment through mass assembly and visible protest.” Id. ¶¶ 90-91.
Count II alleges that the prohibition on sign supports also violates the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 98-102.
Finally, Count III requests injunctive relief for the violation of plaintiff’s First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause rights, seeking “equal access for the public and

7

The complaint also includes allegations about the imposition of specific “arbitrary

last minute conditions on the ANSWER COALITION” imposed by NPS in 2005. Am. Compl.

¶ 70.

7

Case 1:05-cv-00071-PLF Document 49 Filed 06/13/07 Page 8 of 22

dissenters to the parade route.” Am. Compl. ¶ 108.8 Plaintiff requests that no one, including the PIC, be given exclusive access to the parade route on Inauguration Day, but rather that all of the

8

Plaintiff requests the following relief in its amended complaint:

a. Declaratory judgment that the NPS policy and practice of exempting itself and/or the PIC from strict compliance with the generally applicable permitting regulations is unconstitutional; and an injunction prohibiting any such deviation in the future;

b. Declaratory judgment that the NPS policy and practice of granting to the PIC exclusive use of the public space abutting the Inaugural Parade route is unconstitutional; an injunction prohibiting such discriminatory conduct in the future; and a mandatory injunction that the NPS make the sidewalks abutting the Inaugural Parade generally open to the public for use, with accommodations for reasonable logistical needs and to afford access by the disabled where such reasonable accommodations neither favor nor burden any group on the basis of political association or viewpoint, and to also allow the continued traditional use of the sidewalk in front of the Wilson Building for a reviewing stand for District of Columbia officials and invitees consistent in size with that used in 2005;

c. Declaratory judgment that the prohibition on supports for signs and placards is unconstitutional, and a mandatory injunction that the NPS and/or Secret Service promulgate constitutionally permissible regulations regarding use of such supports if they have a constitutional basis for regulating such items;

d. Declaratory judgment that plaintiffs suffered a violation of their constitutional rights in connection with the 2005 Inauguration restrictions;

e. An award of plaintiff’s reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses; and

f. Such other and further relief, including all appropriate equitable relief, as to the Court may seem proper.

Am. Compl. at 27. 8

Case 1:05-cv-00071-PLF Document 49 Filed 06/13/07 Page 9 of 22

public be able to mingle freely throughout the parade route. See id. ¶¶ 104, 106.9 In their motion to dismiss, defendants first argue that plaintiff’s claims are moot,
because the 2005 Inauguration is “long since passed.” Defs’ Mem. at 1. Defendants also argue that ANSWER lacks standing, both to represent all of the general public and to complain about the permits issued. See id. at 1-2. In the alternative, defendants seek summary judgment on the merits because, they argue, plaintiff was afforded adequate space and NPS did not violate its regulations or policies, or the PICA. See id. at 3. Defendants further maintain that the ban on sign supports “were not directed at any First Amendment activity but were imposed solely for the safety and security of those participating in, and attending, the Inauguration.” Id. at 4. Plaintiff’s cross motion for partial summary judgment is “on the claim that it is a constitutional violation for the NPS to deviate from the regular permitting system and established policies in order to grant preferential treatment to a favored group, the Presidential Inaugural Committee, in the permitting of spectator space along the Inaugural Parade Route.” Pl’s Mot. at 54.

9

ANSWER does not “seek to disturb the existing and exclusive system of access to

the inaugural ceremony on the U.S. Capitol grounds or to Lafayette Park[.]” Am. Compl. at 4;

see also Pl’s Mot. at 15; Pl’s Reply at 10.

The plaintiffs are not seeking to secure access to the swearing-in ceremony on U.S. Capitol grounds. They are not seeking access to the spaces set aside by regulation for the exclusive use of the Inaugural Committee, on the sidewalks of the White House and in three-quarters of Lafayette Park. They are not seeking access to the many private balls and fundraisers at which the President will appear. All the people have is the sidewalks and public parkland. That is what plaintiffs seek, to allow all members of the public to line the Inaugural Parade route on a first-come first-served basis without suffering political discrimination.

Am. Compl. ¶ 104. 9

Case 1:05-cv-00071-PLF Document 49 Filed 06/13/07 Page 10 of 22
The threshold questions that must be resolved before addressing the parties’ claims on the merits are whether plaintiff has standing to sue (and on whose behalf) and whether the claims are moot because the 2005 Inauguration already has taken place. For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that plaintiff has standing – though it is more limited than the requests for relief made by plaintiff – and that only one of plaintiff’s four primary requests for relief is moot. A status conference will be scheduled to determine how to proceed with respect to the merits of plaintiff’s surviving claims and requests for relief.
II. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD “Three inter-related judicial doctrines – standing, mootness, and ripeness – ensure that federal courts assert jurisdiction only over ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’ U.S. Const. art. III § 2.” Worth v. Jackson, 451 F.3d 854, 855 (D.C. Cir. 2006). “A federal court is constitutionally forbidden to render advisory opinions or ‘to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before [the Court].’” Better Government Ass’n v. Department of State, 780 F.2d 86, 90-91 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (quoting North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971)). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, with the ability to hear only cases entrusted to them by a grant of power contained in either the Constitution or in an act of Congress. See, e.g., Beethoven.com LLC v. Librarian of Congress, 394 F.3d 939, 945 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Hunter v. District of Columbia, 384 F. Supp. 2d 257, 259 (D.D.C. 2005). A federal court has no subject matter jurisdiction where the plaintiff lacks standing, or where the case is not justiciable because it is either moot or not yet ripe. See Worth v. Jackson, 451 F.3d at 857. On a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the court
10

Case 1:05-cv-00071-PLF Document 49 Filed 06/13/07 Page 11 of 22
has jurisdiction. See Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence v. Ashcroft, 339 F. Supp. 2d 68, 72 (D.D.C. 2004).
In considering whether to dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court must accept all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, but may in appropriate cases consider certain materials outside the pleadings. See Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253-54 (D.C. Cir. 2005). “[W]here necessary, the court may consider the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record, or the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts.” Herbert v. National Academy of Sciences, 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1992). While the complaint is to be construed liberally, the Court need not accept factual inferences drawn by plaintiff if those inferences are not supported by facts alleged in the complaint, nor must the Court accept plaintiff's legal conclusions. See Primax Recoveries, Inc. v. Lee, 260 F. Supp.2d 43, 47 (D.D.C. 2003).
III. DISCUSSION A. Standing
Standing is a requirement under which plaintiffs must show, at an “irreducible constitutional minimum”: (1) that they have suffered an injury in fact – the invasion of a legally protected interest; (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct (a causal connection); and (3) that a favorable decision on the merits likely will redress the injury. See Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)); Worth v. Jackson, 451 F.3d at 858; Gettman v. DEA,
11

Case 1:05-cv-00071-PLF Document 49 Filed 06/13/07 Page 12 of 22
290 F.3d 430, 433 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The alleged injury in fact must be concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural, hypothetical or speculative. See Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 180-81; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560-61; Worth v. Jackson, 451 F.3d at 858; Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 898 (D.C. Cir. 2002). If plaintiff cannot meet all three prongs of this test, the Court must dismiss the suit for lack of standing.
“An organizational plaintiff . . . may have standing to sue on its own behalf ‘to vindicate whatever rights and immunities the association itself may enjoy. . . .’” Common Cause v. Federal Election Commission, 108 F.3d 413, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975)). To sue on its own behalf, however, an organization “must demonstrate that the organization has suffered injury in fact, including such concrete and demonstrable injury to the organization’s activities – with [a] consequent drain on the organization’s resources – constituting . . . more than simply a setback to the organization’s abstract social interests.” National Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1428, 1433 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quotations and citations omitted).10
An association may also have “standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Hunt v.
10 Individuals, of course, also may have standing in particular cases. To have individual standing, “[t]he plaintiff must show that the conduct of which he complains has caused him to suffer an ‘injury in fact’ that a favorable judgment will redress.” Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11-12 (2004).
12

Case 1:05-cv-00071-PLF Document 49 Filed 06/13/07 Page 13 of 22
Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). This is so-called “representational standing.” National Ass’n of Clean Air Agencies v. Environmental Protection Agency, – F.3d –, 2007 WL 1574609, at * 4 (D.C. Cir. June 1, 2007); Center for Law and Education v. Dep’t of Education, 396 F.3d 1152, 1159 n. 1 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
Defendants argue that plaintiff lacks Article III standing to represent all members of the general public. See Defs’ Mem. at 19-23. Plaintiff responds that it does not claim to have standing to represent the general public. See Pl’s Mem. at 39. Rather, plaintiff argues, “ANSWER’s interests lie both in securing space for use as a rally and assembly site(s) and to ensure that ANSWER and those affiliated with ANSWER or who support its political message have the ability to line the parade route with a mass demonstration of collective action.” Id. at 39-40 (quoting Am. Compl. at 20-21). Plaintiff ANSWER argues that it has both “direct” (organizational) standing and “third-party” (representational) standing on behalf of those who would “organize under its banner and through its facilitation.” Pl’s Reply at 11.
B. Mootness As the D.C. Circuit has succinctly explained: “By constitutional design, a federal court is authorized only to adjudicate “actual, ongoing controversies,” and thus may not “give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or . . . declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.” Beethoven.com LLC v. Librarian of Congress, 394 F.3d at 950 (internal citations omitted). Thus, “[i]f events outrun the controversy such that the court can grant no meaningful relief, the case must be dismissed as moot.” McBryde v. Comm. to Review, 264 F.3d 52, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also Safe Energy
13

Case 1:05-cv-00071-PLF Document 49 Filed 06/13/07 Page 14 of 22
Coalition of Michigan v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 866 F.2d 1473, 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit has noted that “[p]ast injury from alleged unconstitutional conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief, if unaccompanied by current adverse effects.” Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1308 (11th Cir. 2004). The requirement that a case not be moot “applies independently to each form of relief sought[.]” McBryde v. Comm. to Review, 264 F.3d at 55 (citing Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 185).
Defendants argue that plaintiff’s claims are moot because the 2005 Inauguration is long since over. See Defs’ Mem. at 15-18. Plaintiff responds that this case falls within a recognized exception to the doctrine of mootness – claims that are “capable of repetition, yet evading review” are not moot. See Pl’s Mem. at 11-13. The “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception was first recognized by the Supreme Court nearly a century ago in Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911). As the D.C. Circuit has succinctly explained:
In order to invoke this exception . . . [plaintiff] must demonstrate that “(1) the challenged action [is] in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there [is] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party [will] be subjected to the same action again.” Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975) (per curiam). Beethoven.com LLC v. Librarian of Congress, 394 F.3d at 950 (last two alterations in original); see also Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982); First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 774-75 (1978); Christian Knights of the Ku Klux Klan Invisible Empire, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 972 F.2d 365, 370-71 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Washington Post v. Robinson, 935
14

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F.2d 282, 286 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The burden is on the complaining party to show that these requirements are met. See Southern Company Services v. FERC, 416 F.3d 39, 44 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
With respect to the first prong of this test, both the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit have held that “orders of less than two years duration ordinarily evade review.” Beethoven.com LLC v. Librarian of Congress, 394 F.3d at 951 (citing Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. at 514-16) (internal quotations and other citations omitted); see also Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Surface Transportation Board, 73 F.3d 685, 690 (D.C. Cir. 1996). As a quick review of litigation surrounding the past several Presidential Inaugurations will confirm, orders relating to inaugural events do ordinarily evade full review. See Mahoney v. Babbitt, Civil Action No. 96-2827 (D.D.C. 1996) and 105 F.3d 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (emergency preliminary injunction litigation regarding the 1997 Inauguration); International Action Center v. United States, Civil Action No. 01-0072 (D.D.C. 2001) (emergency preliminary injunction litigation regarding the 2001 Inauguration). With respect to the second prong, “[c]ourts have “interpreted ‘same action’ to refer to particular agency policies, regulations, guidelines, or recurrent identical agency actions.” Beethoven.com LLC v. Librarian of Congress, 394 F.3d at 951 (citing Public Utilities Comm'n of Cal. v. FERC, 236 F.3d 708, 714-15 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
C. Analysis With these principles in mind, the Court will turn to each of plaintiff’s specific claims and requests for relief to determine whether plaintiff has standing to sue (and on whose
15

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behalf) and whether a justiciable case or controversy exists. As the D.C. Circuit recently has noted, the “Supreme Court has made clear that when considering whether a plaintiff has Article III standing, a federal court must assume arguendo the merits of [plaintiff’s] legal claim.” Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 377 (D.C. Cir. 2007). “Indeed, in reviewing the standing question, the court must be careful not to decide the questions on the merits for or against the plaintiff, and must therefore assume that on the merits the plaintiffs would be successful in their claims.” Id. (quoting and citing Waukesha v. E.P.A., 320 F.3d 228, 235 (D.C. Cir. 2003)) (internal quotations omitted).
Plaintiff’s first request for relief, related to Count I of the amended complaint, is for a “[d]eclaratory judgment that the NPS policy and practice of exempting itself and/or the PIC from strict compliance with the generally applicable permitting regulations is unconstitutional” under the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause, and “an injunction prohibiting any such deviation in the future[.]” Am. Compl. at 27.11 With respect to standing, the ANSWER Coalition has organizational standing to litigate claims with respect to denials of permit applications that the organization itself has submitted or will submit. If a plaintiff is an object of the action at issue, “there is ordinarily little question that the action or inaction has caused him injury, and that a judgment preventing or requiring the action will redress it.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561-62. Furthermore, the courts “have consistently treated a license or permit denial pursuant to a state or federal administrative scheme as an Article III injury.” Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d at 376.
11 It is on this claim that plaintiff has cross-moved for partial summary judgment. See Pl’s Mot. at 54.
16

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Taking the allegations in the amended complaint as true, the Court concludes that ANSWER Coalition and its members suffered an injury in fact – the invasion of a legally protected interest, in this case their asserted First Amendment rights; that the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct (a causal connection); and that a favorable decision on the merits likely will redress the injury. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560-61; Worth v. Jackson, 451 F.3d at 858. Causality and redressability cannot be contested; NPS controls the permitting process, and thus cause plaintiff’s asserted injury, and after a declaration favorable to plaintiff from this Court, NPS would redress that injury in the future. Specifically with respect to the injury prong, the Court concludes that ANSWER has “allege[d] facts showing that [it is itself] adversely affected” by the challenged practices of the defendants. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 473 (1982); see also Christian Knights of the Ku Klux Klan Invisible Empire, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 972 F.2d at 371.
While “‘some day’ intentions – without any description of concrete plans, or indeed any specification of when the some day will be – do not support a finding of . . . ‘actual or imminent’ injury,” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 564 (emphasis in original), the plaintiff in this case does have concrete plans to demonstrate on a specific date; January 20, 2009. See Affidavit of Brian Becker ¶ 10, Exh. 6 to Pl’s Mot. Plaintiff alleges both that it suffered an injury in fact in the lead-up to the Inauguration on January 20, 2005, and that it will suffer a future injury in fact in the lead-up to the next Inauguration on January 20, 2009. Plaintiff ANSWER Coalition itself sought a permit that was granted in part and denied in part for the 2005 Inauguration, and it intends to seek a permit again for the 2009 Inauguration. The Court
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concludes that this is sufficient injury in fact to support the conclusion that ANSWER has standing to pursue this claim; it is not an impermissible speculative “some day” intention within the meaning of Lujan.12
With respect to mootness, the Court concludes that this claim is not moot because it is capable of repetition, yet evading review. Plaintiff has demonstrated that “the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration,” and that there is a “reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subjected to the same action again.” Beethoven.com LLC v. Librarian of Congress, 394 F.3d at 950 (citing Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. at 149 (brackets omitted)). Plaintiff ANSWER Coalition has submitted a sworn declaration stating its intent to protest at the next Inauguration, regardless of which political candidate or party wins the 2008 election. See Affidavit of Brian Becker ¶ 10, Exh. 6 to Pl’s Mot. When ANSWER does protest again, there is a “reasonable expectation” that it will be subject to the policies and procedures of the National Park Service, which controls the Pennsylvania Avenue National Historic Park. See Christian Knights of the Ku Klux Klan Invisible Empire, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 972 F.2d at 370-71 (finding issues surrounding issuance of permits to demonstrate “capable of repetition, yet evading review” because there was “a reasonable likelihood . . . that the Klan will again seek a permit to march in the District” and
12 Plaintiff puts forth an alternative theory of standing. See Pl’s Reply at 11. “[I]n the First Amendment context, litigants are permitted to challenge a statute not because their own rights of free expression are violated, but because of a judicial prediction or assumption that the statute’s very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.” Virginia v. American Booksellers Assoc., 484 U.S. 383, 392-93 (1988) (internal ellipses, quotations and citations omitted) (citing Secretary of State of Maryland v. J.H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 956-57 (1984) and quoting Broaderick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973)). The Court does not analyze or rely on this theory of standing because unlike the cases cited, this case does not present a challenge to a statute.
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affirming the grant of a preliminary injunction). As in Christian Knights, the Court finds that there is a reasonable expectation that
the ANSWER Coalition, a regular protester in the District, will seek to protest at an Inaugural Parade in the future. The Court concludes that there is (far more than) a “reasonable expectation,” see Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 318 n. 6 (1988), that the NPS will apply for a permit on behalf of the PIC for inauguration events in January 2009, and that plaintiff also will apply for a permit. See Affidavit of Brian Becker ¶ 10, Exh. 6 to Pl’s Mot. Without passing on the merits of plaintiff’s claims, the Court concludes that the allegations in the amended complaint are enough to demonstrate that this claim is not moot because it is capable of repetition, yet evading review. To paraphrase the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Christian Knights, “[b]ecause [ANSWER] may [protest] again, in which event the circumstances attending its permit request in this case would likely recur, [the Court] hold[s] that the case continues to present a live controversy.” Christian Knights of the Ku Klux Klan Invisible Empire, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 972 F.2d at 367.
Plaintiff’s second request for relief, also related to Count I of the amended complaint, is for a “[d]eclaratory judgment that the NPS policy and practice of granting to the PIC exclusive use of the public space abutting the Inaugural Parade route is unconstitutional; an injunction prohibiting such discriminatory conduct in the future; and a mandatory injunction that the NPS make the sidewalks abutting the Inaugural Parade generally open to the public for use, with accommodations for reasonable logistical needs and to afford access by the disabled where such reasonable accommodations neither favor nor burden any group on the basis of political association or viewpoint, and to also allow the continued traditional use of the sidewalk in front
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of the Wilson Building for a reviewing stand for District of Columbia officials and invitees consistent in size with that used in 2005[.]” Am. Compl. at 27 (emphasis added).
First, the Court concludes that plaintiff has no standing to make requests generally on behalf of “the public,” the “disabled,” or “District of Columbia officials and invitees.” With respect to the request for a declaratory judgment “that the NPS policy and practice of granting to the PIC exclusive use of the public space abutting the Inaugural Parade route is unconstitutional; [and] an injunction prohibiting such discriminatory conduct in the future,” the Court concludes that the ANSWER Coalition does have standing, for the same reasons explained above. ANSWER and its members wish to view the 2009 Inaugural Parade from the sidewalks all along Pennsylvania Avenue and to engage in political dissent there. ANSWER therefore has both organizational and representational standing to litigate for such non-exclusive access to those sidewalks.
The Court concludes that this claim also is not moot because it is capable of repetition, yet evading review. As with the claim discussed above, plaintiff has demonstrated that “the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration,” and that there is a “reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subjected to the same action again.” Beethoven.com LLC v. Librarian of Congress, 394 F.3d at 950 (citing Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. at 149 (brackets omitted)). These requests are legitimately “directed at the legality of the standards utilized” by the defendants and therefore are not moot. Better Government Ass’n v. Department of State, 780 F.2d at 91.
Plaintiff’s third request for relief, related to Count II of the amended complaint, is for a “[d]eclaratory judgment that the prohibition on supports for signs and placards is
20

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unconstitutional, and a mandatory injunction that the NPS and/or Secret Service promulgate constitutionally permissible regulations regarding use of such supports if they have a constitutional basis for regulating such items[.]” Am. Compl. at 27. It is undisputed that defendant United States Secret Service decided to exclude certain items from the Inauguration parade route, and that among the prohibited items were sign supports. See Declaration of Donato Coyer (“Coyer Decl.”) ¶¶ 16-18. The “list of prohibited items was distributed to the National Park Service on December 17, 2004, and was subsequently forwarded to groups who were issued permits by the National Park Service for space along the parade route.” Id. ¶ 11. This claim is not moot because it, too, is capable of repetition, yet evading review. Plaintiff has demonstrated a “reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subjected to the same action again.” Beethoven.com LLC v. Librarian of Congress, 394 F.3d at 950 (citing Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. at 149 (brackets omitted)).
In Bourgeois v. Peters, the Eleventh Circuit held that the city of Columbus, Georgia’s decision to implement magnetometer searches at an annual protest fit within this exception to the mootness doctrine. See Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d at 1310. The City argued that the exception did not apply because “the decision to implement magnetometer searches is made anew each year, based on circumstances as they exist at that time.” Id. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, concluding that there was a reasonable expectation that the searches would continue “because all of the circumstances that the City deemed sufficient to implement the search in 2002 continue to exist today, and by all indications will continue to persist into the indefinite future.” Id. The same is true here; the Court does not find it plausible in this post-9/11 world that the Secret Service will implement any fewer or less stringent security measures for
21

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Presidential Inauguration events in 2009 than it did in 2005. Accordingly, with respect to the ban on sign supports challenged by the plaintiff, the Court concludes that there is a very “reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subjected to the same action again.” Beethoven.com LLC v. Librarian of Congress, 394 F.3d at 950. And as with the claims discussed above, “the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration[.]” Id. (citing Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. at 149 (brackets omitted)).
Plaintiff’s fourth request for relief, related to Counts I and III of the amended complaint, is for a “[d]eclaratory judgment that plaintiffs suffered a violation of their constitutional rights in connection with the 2005 Inauguration restrictions[.]” Am. Compl. at 27. The Court concludes that because it is unable now to grant any meaningful relief to the parties with respect to the events surrounding the 2005 Inauguration, this is a request for an improper advisory opinion; that is to say, this claim is moot. See McBryde v. Comm. to Review, 264 F.3d at 55; Payne Enterprises v. United States, 837 F.2d 486, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (requested declaration from the court that prior government activity was unlawful would be an improper advisory opinion.); Better Government Ass’n v. Department of State, 780 F.2d at 91 (same).
In sum, the Court concludes that each of plaintiff’s three claims and three of its four requests for substantive relief, including both declaratory and injunctive relief, are justiciable; only the request for a declaratory judgment with respect to the 2005 inaugural events is moot. An Order consistent with this Opinion will be issued this same day.

DATE: June 13, 2007

______/s/_________________________ PAUL L. FRIEDMAN United States District Judge
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 Case 1:05-cv-00071-PLF Document 56 Filed 11/13/07 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

__________________________________________

)

A.N.S.W.E.R. COALITION,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

)

DIRK KEMPTHORNE,

)

SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

__________________________________________)

Civil Action No. 05-0071 (PLF)

ORDER Upon careful consideration of plaintiff’s Renewed Cross Motion Under Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Pertaining Solely to Claims Related to Prohibition of Lightweight Sign Supports, and the opposition and reply, it is ORDERED that the Rule 56(f) motion [50] is GRANTED; and it is FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment shall be DENIED in part without prejudice, specifically with respect to the claims related to the prohibition of lightweight sign supports at the 2005 Presidential Inaugural Parade; the other issues remain open, and are fully briefed and ripe for decision. It is FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff is authorized to propound requests for production of documents and things, no more than twenty-five (25) interrogatories, the deposition of the U.S. Secret Service pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6), the deposition of persons whose affidavits have been or are submitted by the defendants, and, absent further leave of Court, no

Case 1:05-cv-00071-PLF Document 56 Filed 11/13/07 Page 2 of 2

more than five additional individuals or entities “involved in the decision making process for the establishment of the ban [on sign supports] or who have been otherwise involved in the operation of the checkpoints implementing the ban,” see Motion at 2, or who have relevant information concerning the sign support ban as determined through responses to interrogatories or document production. See id.
SO ORDERED.

DATE: November 13, 2007

__________/s/___________________ PAUL L. FRIEDMAN United States District Judge

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 Case 1:05-cv-00071-PLF Document 58 Filed 03/20/08 Page 1 of 38

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

__________________________________________

)

A.N.S.W.E.R. COALITION,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

DIRK KEMPTHORNE,

)

Secretary of the Interior, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

__________________________________________)

Civil Action No. 05-0071 (PLF)

OPINION Plaintiff A.N.S.W.E.R. (Act Now to Stop War and End Racism) Coalition (“ANSWER”) filed this lawsuit against defendants Dirk Kempthorne, Secretary of the Interior, Mary Bomar, Director of the National Park Service (“NPS”),1 and Mark Sullivan, Director of the United States Secret Service, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on three claims, all alleging violations of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution arising from policies and practices engaged in with respect to the Presidential Inaugural Parade in January 2005.2 This matter is before the Court on defendants’ motion for summary judgment and plaintiff’s cross motion for partial summary judgment.3 The Court

1

National Park Service Director Mary Bomar has been substituted for former

Director Fran P. Mainella by operation of Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

2

Additional plaintiffs were named in the original complaint. When the operative

amended complaint was filed on July 28, 2005, ANSWER was the only named plaintiff.

3

The papers submitted in connection with these motions include: Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, for Summary Judgment (“Defs’ Mot.”); Memorandum

in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, for Summary Judgment

Case 1:05-cv-00071-PLF Document 58 Filed 03/20/08 Page 2 of 38
previously addressed the justiciability of the claims in this case in an Opinion and Order dated June 13, 2007. See A.N.S.W.E.R. Coalition v. Kempthorne, 493 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 2007). The Court described the background of this case in that Opinion, so it will repeat only relevant portions here.
I. BACKGROUND The 2005 Inauguration of President George W. Bush took place on January 20, 2005 here in Washington, D.C. The inaugural parade route included, as it always does, Pennsylvania Avenue between the United States Capitol and the White House. Since 1996, much of the Pennsylvania Avenue corridor, including Pershing Park, Freedom Plaza, the Navy Memorial and John Marshall Park, has been part of the Pennsylvania Avenue National Historic Park. See Declaration of Robbin Owen (“Owen Decl.”) ¶ 14. It therefore is under the jurisdiction of the National Park Service, which generally is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations “for the use and management of parks[.]” 16 U.S.C. § 3. NPS issues regulations specifically with respect to the parklands in the National Capital Region and permits relating to activities within them. See generally 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g). The Presidential Inaugural Ceremonies Act (“PICA”), 36 U.S.C. § 501 et seq., which was enacted in 1956, also governs
(“Defs’ Mem.”); Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts as to Which There is No Genuine Issue (“DSMF”); Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, for Summary Judgment and Cross Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or, in the alternative, for Summary Judgment (“Pl’s Mot.”); Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts as to Which There Exists a Genuine Issue (“PSMFD”); Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, for Summary Judgment (“Defs’ Opp.”); and Reply in Support of Plaintiff’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pl’s Reply”).
2

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inaugural events.4 Plaintiff purports to represent “tens of thousands of political dissenters, anti-war
activists and ordinary people compelled to collective action, among other reasons, by the war policies of the Bush administration and its refusal to bring troops home now from Iraq.” Am. Compl. at 3-4. Plaintiff asserts that it has “concrete intentions to demonstrate at the upcoming Presidential Inauguration” on January 20, 2009 regardless of which party’s candidate is elected, and that it advances this litigation to “vindicate the rights of all to equal access to the public parade portion of the Inaugural ceremony.” Id. at 4.
Plaintiff alleges that it is the strict policy of the NPS not to accept any permit applications submitted more than one year in advance of the start date for any event on Park Services land. See Am. Compl. ¶ 9; PSMFD ¶ 4. Defendants agree that this is their policy. See Owen Decl. ¶ 12. Plaintiff argues that this policy is used to reject permit applications of organizations, “including groups engaged in political dissent.” Am. Compl. ¶ 9.5 Plaintiff also asserts that the policy is waived or disregarded for the Presidential Inaugural Committee (“PIC”), which is given priority over everyone else by being allowed to submit its permit application earlier than any other group, and that it then is given exclusive use of most of the parade route.

4
below.

As relevant, the applicable statutes and regulations are described more fully

5

Plaintiff’s evidence in support of the NPS policy of not accepting applications

submitted more than one year in advance of an event start date consists of an affidavit of

ANSWER National Staff Director Sarah Sloan. See Affidavit of Sarah Sloan, Exh. 1 to Pl’s

Mot., (“Sloan Aff.”) ¶ 5. Plaintiff also includes a December 15, 2004 letter to plaintiff’s counsel,

including a footnote referencing an NPS response dated May 8, 2001 returning as unaccepted

“ten unfiled applications that prematurely sought the use of Freedom Plaza and Lafayette Park for

the 2005-2041 Presidential Inaugurations.” December 15, 2004 Letter from NPS to Messineo,

Exh. 61 to Pl’s Mot. and Exh. J to the Owen Decl. (“December 15, 2004 NPS Letter”).

3

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See Am. Compl. at 4 and ¶¶ 16, 29, 32, 33. On November 12, 2003 and December 19, 2003, NPS submitted special event
permit applications to itself, on behalf of the yet-to-be-formed PIC, in connection with the 2005 Inauguration. See Owen Decl., Exh. B (“November 12, 2003 NPS Application”); see also DSMF ¶ 1.6 The application was “for the parade route from the National Capital Area, 3rd Street to 17th Street including sidewalks on both sides of the street, Lafayette Park, White House sidewalk[.]” DSMF ¶ 5 (citing and quoting the November 12, 2003 NPS Application). Plaintiff argues that the application submission was “outside the one year period and in violation of the generally applicable permitting regulations and policies.” Am. Compl. ¶ 29.7
Plaintiff notes that the NPS has a policy, codified in the regulations, that permits for special events and demonstrations have a maximum duration of three weeks. See PSMFD ¶ 5; see also 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(5)(iv). The November 12, 2003 NPS/PIC application was “for the entire length of the Pennsylvania Avenue sidewalks (plus additional areas) for the six-month period from November 1, 2004 to April 1, 2005.” Am Compl. ¶ 32 (emphasis added); see also DSMF ¶ 2.8 Defendants have submitted a declaration stating that “based on past experience, the Park Service knew that set-up takes a substantial amount of time greater than three weeks for

6

Defendants note that NPS has traditionally submitted applications on behalf of the

Presidential Inaugural Committee because, for obvious reasons, one cannot be formed until after

a presidential election has been decided. See DSMF ¶ 4.

7

The amended complaint states that the dates were November 12, 2004 and

December 19, 2004, but the Court concludes that plaintiff intended to say “2003.” See Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 35-36 (referring to the November 12, 2003 permit application); see also DSMF ¶ 1.

8

The Court notes that the period between November 1 and April 1 is five months,

rather than six.

4

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special events. Indeed, it expected that a reasonable anticipated set-up times [sic] would be from November 1, 2004-January 19, 2005 and that a reasonable anticipated dismantling times [sic] would be from January 21, 2005 to April 1, 2005.” Owen Decl. ¶ 33.
On January 2, 2004, ANSWER filed a permit application with the NPS for 2005 Inauguration demonstration events and setup, covering a time period from January 1, 2005 to January 20, 2005. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 10-11; see also DSMF ¶ 12; PSMFD ¶ 2. ANSWER’s application “was not denied within 24 hours and was consequently ‘deemed granted’ pursuant to regulation.” Am. Compl. ¶ 14.9
By January 20, 2004, plaintiff alleges, the applications submitted by NPS to itself on behalf of the PIC were visible on the public boards maintained by NPS and on which applicants “can observe whether there are conflicting prior-in-time permit applications for any particular or desired space.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15-16. Within a month of submitting its permit application, plaintiff therefore was aware of the conflicting NPS/PIC special event application encompassing some or all of the same areas as its own demonstration permit application.
ANSWER alleges that it made repeated requests of the NPS to identify what, if any, part of its permit would be revoked, but received no response. See Am Compl. ¶ 18; see also Owen Decl. ¶ 47. ANSWER requested “that the NPS convene a logistics meeting for their intended activities along the Inaugural Parade route” and “was advised that NPS would not provide information nor schedule the normal pre-determination multi-agency logistics meeting with protest organizers until after the Bush-Cheney PIC had determined what space it intended to

9

36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(3) provides that “[a]ll demonstration applications . . . are

deemed granted, subject to all limitations and restrictions applicable to said park area, unless

denied within 24 hours of receipt.”

5

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take along the route . . .” Am Compl. ¶¶ 22, 26. A meeting was held on December 13, 2004 with plaintiff, representatives of the NPS, the United States Park Police and the Secret Service, but no representatives of the Bush-Cheney PIC were present. See id. ¶ 24. At that meeting, ANSWER was advised by NPS representatives that the NPS was meeting separately with and talking to the Bush-Cheney PIC and that “only based on those discussions would they be able to determine the status of the ANSWER Coalition’s permit . . . .” Id. ¶ 26. There was a second logistics meeting held on December 20, 2004. See id. ¶¶ 38-39. Meanwhile, on December 15, 2004, NPS issued a permit to the Bush-Cheney PIC “for the parkland along the Inaugural parade route, including Pennsylvania Avenue National Historic Park.” DSMF ¶ 8.10
On December 15, 2004, NPS also sent a letter to plaintiff’s counsel in response to a FOIA request for information regarding “all applications seeking the use of Federal parkland along Pennsylvania Avenue for the Presidential Inauguration on January 20, 2005.” December 15, 2004 NPS Letter. The NPS letter was accompanied by five “responsive applications, in order of receipt: applications 04-0466 and 04-0634 by the NPS on behalf of the Presidential Inaugural Committee pursuant to the Presidential Inaugural Ceremonies Act, application 05-011 by A.N.S.W.E.R. Coalition, application 05-0004 by D.C. Chapter of Free Republic, and application 05-0005 by the Christian Defense Coalition.” Id. At that point at the latest, then, plaintiff must have been aware that NPS deemed there to be an earlier permit application than the one that plaintiff had submitted. But plaintiff alleges that the response to their FOIA request “showed
10 While defendants’ Statement of Material facts state that the date was December 15, 2005, a review of the exhibits shows that the permit date is December 15, 2004. See Exh. D to the Owen Decl. There were several subsequent amendments to the permit, included as exhibits to defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
6

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that ANSWER had first in time applications for public space in conformity with NPS regulations. It also showed that NPS had submitted permit applications to itself outside the one year period of the 2005 Inauguration on behalf of the PIC.” PSMFD ¶ 18. Plaintiff argues that NPS “violated its own regulations for the benefit of PIC,” and was giving PIC a higher priority than ANSWER under their “first come, first serve” policy. Id.
Plaintiff asserts that on December 23, 2004, NPS “revoke[d] ANSWER’s permit” and offered ANSWER much more limited space for its use than it had requested in its January 2, 2004 permit application. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 44-46; see also Owen Decl. ¶¶ 55-59; Exh. L to the Owen Decl. (“December 23, 2004 NPS Letter”). Defendants characterize this determination as the Park Service “grant[ing] in part the plaintiff’s permit application.” DSMF ¶ 13. Despite defendants’ characterization of the action as “granting in part” the permit application, as noted above, applicable regulations provide that “[a]ll demonstration applications . . . are deemed granted, subject to all limitations and restrictions applicable to said park area, unless denied within 24 hours of receipt.” 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(3).11 Accordingly, plaintiff’s permit application had already been “deemed granted,” and defendants therefore were, in fact, revoking it in part.
The December 23, 2004 letter revoking plaintiff’s permit in part described those areas that would be available for ANSWER’s use, and explained the defendants’ view that the NPS/PIC permit application was first in time under the applicable regulations. The defendants’ letter also assured plaintiff that “consistent with the First Amendment, the Presidential Inaugural
11 This regulation was foreshadowed by one of the holdings of the D.C. Circuit in its Quaker Action Group series of cases, A Quaker Action Group v. Morton, 516 F.2d 717, 735-37 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (“Quaker Action IV”) (“We have ruled that a permit must be deemed granted unless denied within a stated time (24 hours unless the district court specifies another time period).”) (parentheses in original).
7

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Ceremonies Act and National Park Services regulations, the public and demonstrators – regardless of their message – will be fully allowed onto all of the many open areas on the Pennsylvania Avenue sidewalk on January 20, 2005.” December 23, 2004 NPS Letter at 4; see also DSMF ¶ 10. Plaintiff responds that “NPS reiterated many times that all areas not permitted to PIC or another group or designated for the handicapped would be public. However, NPS refused to identify where these areas were. Almost all areas of public space were obstructed by PIC structures and NPS would not allow the general public to enter the space in front of PIC bleachers.” PSMFD ¶ 26 (citing Sloan Affidavit at 5-6; Exhibit 57; Exhibit 58; Exhibit 59) (emphasis added). Plaintiff argues that “NPS had, in effect, closed off most of the public parade route for exclusive use by private Bush supporters.” Id.
NPS sent a letter to plaintiff on January 14, 2005 explaining, among other things, that plaintiff was “earlier provided a copy of the Presidential Inaugural Committee’s (PIC) Permit 04-0466 Amendment 1, which fully detailed PIC’s permit areas and that it included not just the bleachers themselves but also the area in front of them.” See Exh. R to the Owen Decl. (“January 14, 2005 NPS Letter”) at 3 (pages not numbered). NPS stated that the reserved sidewalk area in front of the bleachers – that is, between the bleachers and the parade itself – “allows bleacher access, where ticketed handicapped guests may sit, and allows all ticket holders to be able to freely observe the parade.” Id.
The January 14, 2005 NPS letter makes clear that the defendants did intend to exclude non-ticket-holders from the sidewalks in front of the bleachers within the PIC permit
8

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areas along Pennsylvania Avenue.12 Only those who have an invitation issued by the PIC could get tickets to the event and therefore enter the PIC bleachers or occupy the Pennsylvania Avenue sidewalk space in front of them along the parade route. See Exh. 46 to Pl’s Mot., Affidavit of Anne Wilson ¶¶ 5-6.
Defendants state that for the 2005 Inaugural Parade, there was: a total of approximately 8,414 lineal feet of sidewalks curb-to-curb from 4th Street to 15th Street. Of these sidewalks, the Presidential Inaugural Committee has approximately 3,882 feet for its bleachers, approximately 95 feet for announcer and media stands, and approximately 104 feet for the Armed Forces Inaugural Committee trailers. For the remaining 4,333 feet, there was approximately 3,878 feet available for the general public, of which approximately 1,252 feet was designated by the Park Service for the handicapped general public. Owen Decl. ¶ 86. Plaintiff asserts that “ANSWER was given the following spaces: John Marshall Park which afforded 210 feet abutting Pennsylvania Avenue, five tiny areas behind bleachers constructed by PIC, one area in Pershing Park behind a wall, and five feet of space abutting Pennsylvania Avenue in Freedom Plaza. In effect, the opposition assembly was placed in tiny pockets away from the front of the parade route and frequently behind massive bleachers of Bush supporters.” PSMFD ¶ 22 (citing Sloan Affidavit, Exh. 1 at 4; Exh. 34; Exh. 35). Plaintiff also observes that the “area in Freedom Plaza was the only area other than John Marshall Park that was not behind bleachers and abutted the route. However, at five feet of linear space along
12 Defendants included a map of the federal parkland along Pennsylvania Avenue, detailing the location of permit areas and the PIC’s bleachers as Exhibit W to the Owen Declaration, but the map does not appear in the Court’s electronic case filing system. See Owen Decl. ¶ 82.
9

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Pennsylvania Avenue, it was too small for a large scale protest.” PSMFD ¶ 23 (citing Sloan Affidavit at 5). By contrast, the plaintiff claims that the “breadth of Pennsylvania Avenue that abuts the parade route set aside exclusively for PIC was over 4,272 feet of the route. This was 22 times the access given to the public and protestors.” PSMFD ¶ 25 (citing Sloan Affidavit at 5; Exhibit 48).13
Defendants respond that “[t]he nine park areas for plaintiff’s permits were sufficient to fully accommodate the requested numbers of participants for their demonstration activities and in many areas allowed the plaintiff’s group to see and be seen from the parade route.” DSMF ¶ 13; see also Owen Decl. ¶¶ 69-76 (describing in detail areas allowed to plaintiff under its permit).
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on January 14, 2005, seeking an expedited preliminary injunction against the National Park Service and the United States Secret Service “to preclude denial of access to the 2005 Inaugural Parade Route.” Complaint at 1. A hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction was held before the undersigned on January 18, 2005. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction, explaining its reasoning in an oral opinion. See January 18, 2005 Order; Transcript of Excerpt of January 18, 2005 Preliminary Injunction Hearing (“PI Transcript”). Plaintiff did not appeal the Court’s denial of the motion for a preliminary injunction.
ANSWER filed an amended complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief on July 28, 2005. The parties subsequently briefed the dispositive motions that are now before the
13 The Court assumes, based on mathematics, that by the phrase “the public and protesters” plaintiff means the access given for its – ANSWER’s – exclusive use.
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Court. Plaintiff states that it “advance[s] this litigation to vindicate the rights of all to equal access to the public parade portion of the Inaugural ceremony,” and makes clear that it does not “seek to disturb the existing and exclusive system of access to the inaugural ceremony on the U.S. Capitol grounds or to Lafayette Park[.]” Am. Compl. at 4. Rather, plaintiff seeks “injunctive relief prohibiting NPS from this repeated course of constitutional deprivation[.]” Id.
Count I of the amended complaint alleges “unconstitutional permitting violations” under the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 87-97. More specifically, plaintiff asserts that “it is constitutionally impermissible for NPS to exempt itself or the PIC from the constitutionally mandated permitting system, particularly where such deviation works an abridgement of others’ free speech, petition and assembly rights.” Id. ¶ 89. Plaintiff also asserts that the “NPS action, in excluding the public and anti-war demonstrators from vast sections of the Inaugural Parade route is not a reasonable time, place or manner regulation[,]” and that the “NPS actions and policies constitute viewpoint-based and content-based discrimination, favoring those approved by the administration’s Inaugural Committee and disfavoring those who are not so approved, especially those who wish to express their opposition to the current administration’s policies at this unique quadrennial political moment through mass assembly and visible protest.” Id. ¶¶ 90-91.
Count II alleges that the prohibition on sign supports also violates the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 98-102. On November 13, 2007, the Court granted plaintiff’s motion for discovery under Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, solely with respect to the claims relating to the prohibition of sign supports, and denied without prejudice defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to those claims.
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See November 13, 2007 Order. This Opinion will not address Count II of the amended
complaint because there is no motion before it with respect to that claim.
Finally, Count III requests injunctive relief for the violation of plaintiff’s First
Amendment and equal protection rights, seeking “equal access for the public and dissenters to
the parade route.” Am. Compl. ¶ 108. In Count III, plaintiff requests that no one, including itself
and the PIC, be given exclusive access to the parade route on Inauguration Day, but rather that
everyone – demonstrators and administration supports and tourists alike – be able to mingle
freely on the sidewalks of Pennsylvania Avenue.14
Plaintiff requests the following relief, in relevant part, in its amended complaint:
a. Declaratory judgment that the NPS policy and practice of exempting itself and/or the PIC from strict compliance with the generally applicable permitting regulations is unconstitutional; and an injunction prohibiting any such deviation in the future;15
14 As the amended complaint makes clear:
[P]laintiffs are not seeking to secure access to the swearing-in ceremony on U.S. Capitol grounds. They are not seeking access to the spaces set aside by regulation for the exclusive use of the Inaugural Committee, on the sidewalks of the White House and in three-quarters of Lafayette Park. They are not seeking access to the many private balls and fundraisers at which the President will appear. All the people have is the sidewalks and public parkland. That is what plaintiffs seek, to allow all members of the public to line the Inaugural Parade route on a first-come first-served basis without suffering political discrimination.
Am. Compl. ¶ 104. 15 In its Opinion addressing the justiciability of the claims in this case, the Court
concluded that plaintiff has standing to litigate claims relating to the denial of permit applications that it has submitted or will submit. See A.N.S.W.E.R. Coalition v. Kempthorne, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 45-46. The Court also concluded that this claim is capable of repetition, yet evades review. See id. at 46. The first request for relief, related to Count I, therefore is ripe for adjudication.
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b. Declaratory judgment that the NPS policy and practice of granting to the PIC exclusive use of the public space abutting the Inaugural Parade route is unconstitutional; an injunction prohibiting such discriminatory conduct in the future; [and a mandatory injunction that the NPS make the sidewalks abutting the Inaugural Parade generally open to the public for use, with accommodations for reasonable logistical needs and to afford access by the disabled where such reasonable accommodations neither favor nor burden any group on the basis of political association or viewpoint, and to also allow the continued traditional use of the sidewalk in front of the Wilson Building for a reviewing stand for District of Columbia officials and invitees consistent in size with that used in 2005;]16
c. [Declaratory judgment that the prohibition on supports for signs and placards is unconstitutional, and a mandatory injunction that the NPS and/or Secret Service promulgate constitutionally permissible regulations regarding use of such supports if they have a constitutional basis for regulating such items;]17
d. [Declaratory judgment that plaintiffs suffered a violation of their constitutional rights in connection with the 2005 Inauguration restrictions;]18
16 With respect to the second request for relief, specifically the requests for a declaratory judgment “that the NPS policy and practice of granting to the PIC exclusive use of the public space abutting the Inaugural Parade route is unconstitutional; [and] an injunction prohibiting such discriminatory conduct in the future,” the Court concluded that the ANSWER Coalition has both organizational and representational standing to litigate for such non-exclusive access to those sidewalks. See A.N.S.W.E.R. Coalition v. Kempthorne, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 47. This claim also is capable of repetition yet evades review. See id. Thus, the first portion of the second request for relief, related to Count III, is currently before the Court.
The Court concluded, however, that plaintiff has no standing to make requests generally on behalf of “the public,” the “disabled,” or “District of Columbia officials and invitees.” See A.N.S.W.E.R. Coalition v. Kempthorne, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 47. The portion of the request for relief that is in brackets therefore is not before the Court.
17 As explained above, plaintiff’s request for relief with respect to the ban on sign supports (Count II) is not before the Court at this time.
18 With respect to plaintiff’s fourth request for relief, the Court concluded that because it is unable now to grant any meaningful relief to the parties with respect to the events
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Am. Compl. at 27. Defendants seek summary judgment on the merits because, they argue, plaintiff
was afforded adequate space, any restrictions were reasonable time, place or manner limitations, and NPS did not violate its regulations or policies, or the PICA . See Defs’ Mem. at 3. Plaintiff moves for summary judgment only on Count I, “on the claim that it is a constitutional violation for the NPS to deviate from the regular permitting system and established policies in order to grant preferential treatment to a favored group, the Presidential Inaugural Committee, in the permitting of spectator space along the Inaugural Parade Route.” Pl’s Mot. at 54.
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK A. Summary Judgment Standard Summary judgment may be granted only if the “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits [or declarations], if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986); Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2006). “A fact is ‘material’ if a dispute over it might affect the outcome of a suit under the governing law; factual disputes that are ‘irrelevant or unnecessary’ do not affect the summary judgment determination.” Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d at 895 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248). An issue is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could
surrounding the 2005 Inauguration, this is a request for an improper advisory opinion; that is to say, this claim is moot. See A.N.S.W.E.R. Coalition v. Kempthorne, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 48. That question therefore is not before the Court.
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return a verdict for the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248; Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d at 895. When a motion for summary judgment is under consideration, “the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 255; see also Mastro v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 447 F.3d 843, 849-50 (D.C. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1140 (2007); Aka v. Washington Hosp. Center, 156 F.3d 1284, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc); Washington Post Co. v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 865 F.2d 320, 325 (D.C. Cir. 1989). On a motion for summary judgment, the Court must “eschew making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.” Czekalski v. Peters, 475 F.3d 360, 363 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
B. The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment The First Amendment provides, in relevant part, that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. Demonstration activities such as those plaintiff wants to engage in are expressive activities involving “speech” protected by the First Amendment. See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176 (1983). Indeed, the activities at issue are core political speech. See Mahoney v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d 1452, 1455 (D.C. Cir. 1997). And as the D.C. Circuit has observed, the “general concepts of First Amendment freedoms are given added impetus as to speech and peaceful demonstrations in Washington, D.C., by the clause of the Constitution which assures citizens of the right to assemble peaceably at the seat of government and present grievances.” Quaker Action Group v. Morton, 460 F.2d 854, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (“Quaker Action III”).
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There are three types of forums that may be implicated in a First Amendment
analysis: (1) the traditional public forum, (2) the designated public forum, and (3) the nonpublic
forum. A traditional public forum is one that has traditionally been available for public
expression, such as public streets and parks, and any restriction on speech in such a forum is
subject to strict scrutiny. See International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S.
672, 678 (1992); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. at 177; Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); White House Vigil for the ERA Committee v. Clark,
746 F.2d 1518, 1526 (D.C. Cir. 1984).19 The D.C. Circuit observed in White House Vigil for the
ERA Committee v. Clark, 746 F.2d at 1526 n. 66, that Justice Owen Roberts wrote the “classic
statement of the public forum doctrine”:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general
19 With respect to the other two types of forums, not at issue in this case: A designated public forum consists of property not traditionally open for assembly and debate but that has been opened for expressive activity by part or all of the public. See International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. at 678. It may be either limited or unlimited in character. See id. The standards for designated public forums are the same as those governing traditional public forums. See id. So long as the designation as public remains, the government “is bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional public forum.” Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46. All remaining public properties are nonpublic forums, and content-neutral limitations on speech therein must survive “only a much more limited review.” International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. at 678-79.
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comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied. Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J., concurring in the judgment). The sidewalks of Pennsylvania Avenue and the other areas at issue in this case are a “quintessential public forum,” Mahoney v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d at 1457, and as such “occupy a privileged position in the hierarchy of First Amendment jurisprudence.” White House Vigil for the ERA Committee v. Clark, 746 F.2d at 1526-27. In public forums such as the areas within the Pennsylvania Avenue National Historic Park at issue in this case, “the government’s ability to permissibly restrict expressive conduct is very limited: the government may enforce reasonable time, place and manner restrictions as long as the restrictions ‘are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.’” United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. at 177 (quoting Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45 and citing Heffron v. International Society of Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647, 654 (1981); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972); and Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965)); see also Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Kerrigan, 865 F.2d 382, 387 (D.C. Cir. 1989); White House Vigil for the ERA Committee v. Clark, 746 F.2d at 1527. “The principal inquiry in determining content neutrality, in speech cases generally and in time, place, or manner cases in particular, is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.” Ward v. Rock
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Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). “Government regulation of expressive activity is content neutral so long as it is ‘justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.’” Id. (internal citations omitted).
The “‘narrowly tailored’ portion of the time place or manner test requires that there be a real nexus between the challenged regulation and the significant governmental interest sought to be served by the regulation.” Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Kerrigan, 865 F.2d at 389 (emphasis in original). “It is not enough that a regulation is facially reasonable, or that a governmental interest is significant; rather, it must be shown that a reasonable regulation is narrowly tailored to substantially serve a significant governmental interest.” Id. (emphasis in original).
In contrast to content-neutral time, place or matter restrictions, any content-based restriction on political speech in a public forum “must be subjected to the most exacting scrutiny.” Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988); see also Mahoney v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d at 1455. In such cases, the government must show that the “regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.” Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. at 322. Additional restrictions beyond reasonable time, place and manner restrictions “such as an absolute prohibition on a particular type of expression will be upheld only if narrowly drawn to accomplish a compelling governmental interest.” United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. at 177 (citing Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45; Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981)). “It is axiomatic that the government may not regulate speech based on its substantive content or the message it conveys.” Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995). “Our tradition of free speech commands
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that a speaker who takes to the street corner to express his views . . . should be free from interference by the State based on the content of what he says.” Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 578 (1995). Moreover, “‘regulations which permit the Government to discriminate on the basis of the content of the message cannot be tolerated under the First Amendment.’” Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 135 (1992) (quoting Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984)).
Restrictions on the basis of a particular viewpoint are even more suspect than viewpoint-neutral content-based restrictions. When the government targets particular viewpoints taken by speakers, “the violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant.” Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. at 829. Viewpoint discrimination is “an egregious form of content discrimination,” and “[d]iscrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional.” Id. The government therefore violates the First Amendment where it “denies access to a speaker solely to suppress the point of view [the speaker] espouses on an otherwise includible subject.” Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985). The Supreme Court has observed:
Necessarily, then, under the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the First Amendment itself, government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial views. And it may not select which issues are worth discussing or debating in public facilities. There is an equality of status in the field of ideas, and government must afford all points of view an equal opportunity to be heard. Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by some groups, government may not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the basis of what they intend to say. Police Dep’t of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (footnote omitted) (holding
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that the government may not allow picketing on one topic while prohibiting it on other topics). In short, “no court will tolerate any attempt to discriminate among protestors on the basis of viewpoint or subject matter.” White House Vigil for the ERA Committee v. Clark, 746 F.2d at 1527.
C. Permitting System “Although there is a ‘heavy presumption’ against the validity of a prior restraint, the [Supreme] Court has recognized that government, in order to regulate competing uses of public forums, may impose a permit requirement on those wishing to hold a march, parade, or rally[.]” Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. at 130 (citing Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)). “Such a scheme, however, must meet certain constitutional requirements. It may not delegate overly broad licensing discretion to a government official. Further, any permit scheme controlling the time, place, and manner of speech must not be based on the content of the message, must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and must leave open ample alternatives for communication.” Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. at 130 (internal citations omitted) (citing Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. at 70; Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. at 574-76; Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 56 (1965); and United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. at 177). The government “bears the burden of justifying its restrictions.” Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989); see also ISKCON of Potomac, Inc. v. Kennedy, 61 F.3d 949, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Opinion of Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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This Court and the District of Columbia Circuit previously have had occasion to
consider various aspects of NPS regulations governing federal parklands within the capital city,
particularly when those regulations have conflicted with the rights of citizens to engage in
political speech. In a case challenging a previous iteration of the NPS regulations governing
federal parkland in Washington, D.C., which at that time exempted National Park Service
sponsored events – in that case, the Christmas Pageant of Peace – from the permitting rules
governing non-NPS events – there, an anti-war display by Women Strike for Peace – Judge J.
Skelly Wright observed:
[T]he Government’s regulations do discriminate between applicants on a constitutionally unacceptable basis. Whereas all other events require permits before they can be held, NPS events are permitted to proceed without a permit. Furthermore, NPS events – unlike all other events – are permitted to preempt an entire park area. Taken together, these two provisions mean that the Government-sponsored displays are always given preference over other displays which do not meet with the approval of Government officials. Such discrimination cannot be analogized to evenhanded enforcement of the rules of the road. It constitutes instead the kind of blatant government censorship which the framers of the First Amendment intended to outlaw forever.
Women Strike for Peace v. Morton, 472 F.2d 1273, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (footnotes omitted)
(Opinion of Wright, J., concurring in a per curiam affirmance of the district court’s order
granting injunctive relief to the plaintiffs).20 Under Women Strike for Peace, therefore, NPS
20 Another member of the panel, Judge Harold Leventhal, explicitly agreed with Judge Wright that the government’s park use regulations were “unconstitutionally discriminatory and overbroad” in light of this preference for NPS sponsored or co-sponsored events over all other events. See Women Strike for Peace v. Morton, 472 F.2d at 1294-95 (Opinion of Leventhal, J., concurring in a per curiam affirmance of the district court’s order granting injunctive relief to the plaintiffs). Judge Roger Robb, the third member of the panel, agreed that “[i]f structures on park land are allowed then permission must be granted with an even hand.” Women Strike for Peace v. Morton, 472 F.2d at 1304 (Opinion of Robb, J., concurring in a per
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must subject itself to the same permitting regulations as other applicants for permits. A few years later, the court of appeals reminded NPS that the provisions of any
permitting system – which is by definition a prior restraint on activity protected by the First Amendment – must be “enforced uniformly and without discrimination. . . [T]here will be no deviation from the regulation’s language that works an abridgement of communication by the applicant group.” Quaker Action Group v. Morton, 516 F.2d 717, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (“Quaker Action IV”) (affirming in part district court decision upholding permit regulations, but modifying specifics).
With respect to the discretion of a licensing or permitting official, the Supreme Court has explained that a “government regulation that allows arbitrary application is inherently inconsistent with a valid time, place, and manner regulation because such discretion has the potential for becoming a means of suppressing a particular point of view. To curtail that risk, a law subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license must contain narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority.” Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. at 130-31 (internal citations and quotations omitted) (citing Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. at 649; Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271 (1951); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305 (1940); and Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553 (1975)); see also Thomas v. Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. 316, 323 (2002) (“Where the licensing official enjoys unduly broad discretion in determining whether to grant or deny a permit, there is a risk that he will
curiam affirmance of the district court’s order granting injunctive relief to the plaintiffs). 22

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favor or disfavor speech based on its content.”). A “prior restraint without adequate standards is precisely the sort of abuse against which the First Amendment was primarily directed.” Women Strike for Peace v. Morton, 472 F.2d at 1286 (Opinion of Wright, J.).
Since the sidewalks abutting Pennsylvania Avenue became federal lands in 1996, members of this Court have been called upon to apply these principles when faced with disputes about the rights of protesters on Inauguration Day – every four years, without fail. See, e.g., Mahoney v. Babbitt, Civil Action No. 96-2827 (Greene, J.) (1997 Inauguration of President William Jefferson Clinton); International Action Center v. United States, Civil Action No. 01-0072 (Kessler, J.) (2001 Inauguration of President George W. Bush); A.N.S.W.E.R. Coalition v. Norton, Civil Action No. 05-0071 (Friedman, J.) (the case at bar, 2005 Inauguration of President George W. Bush).
In Mahoney v. Babbitt, persons seeking to protest at the second Inauguration of President Bill Clinton sought a preliminary injunction against the Park Service. See Mahoney v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d at 1453-55. Judge Harold Greene denied the request for a preliminary injunction, and the plaintiffs appealed. Writing for the D.C. Circuit, Judge Sentelle characterized one set of the Mahoney plaintiffs’ arguments as follows:
[Plaintiff protestors] argue that the asserted inconsistency of their use of the sidewalk area with that of the prior and subsequent permittees is a pretext and further that the previous applications did not comply with the regulations and should not have been considered in any event. For example, while the regulations require a “fully executed prior application” as a basis for the denial provisions of 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(A), NPS’s application to itself that was used in the ouster of appellants was incomplete in that it was undated, did not state the maximum number of participants as required by the regulation, and did not state whether equipment would be installed in the area under permit.
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Furthermore, while the regulations permit a duration of no more than seven days, the NPS application to itself covered the period from November 1, 1996, to April 1, 1997, and presumably would oust appellants from that entire time frame. See 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(5)(iv)(A)-(B). Appellants argued that their ouster from the sidewalk area under cover of that less than perfect application was a contrived cover for viewpoint-based discrimination, and that they should have been permitted to participate as a “reasonably permitt[ed] multiple occupancy” of the area covered by the permits[.] Mahoney v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d at 1455. The court of appeals specifically declined to address these arguments, relating to the alleged permitting violations themselves, because of the emergency basis on which the court reviewed, and reversed, the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction. See id.21 These arguments, however, foreshadow some of those made by ANSWER in this case. One question in this case is whether the practices and procedures engaged in by the NPS to reserve most of the Pennsylvania Avenue sidewalks for the PIC in 2005 were themselves a violation of the First Amendment, insofar as they deviated from the permitting regulations promulgated by NPS and published in the Code of Federal Regulations in order to favor the permit application that NPS submitted on behalf of the PIC (Count I). Another question is how much, if any, of the Pennsylvania Avenue sidewalks can be reserved for the exclusive use of the government and its ticketed guests on Inauguration Day, and how much must
21 Specifically, the court of appeals reversed the portion of the district court’s opinion “which permitted [the government] to bar groups of twenty-five or fewer of [appellant protesters] from engaging in sign bearing protests against the policies of the Clinton Administration on the sidewalks of Pennsylvania Avenue during the second Inaugural Parade[.]” Mahoney v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d at 1460.
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be left open so that any peaceful speakers may be granted access regardless of viewpoint or message (Count III).
III. DISCUSSION A. Count I – Permitting Violations The Court will grant plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on Count I of the Amended Complaint and deny defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to Count I. The Court concludes that the permitting system is not being “enforced uniformly and without discrimination” and that, contrary to the mandate from our court of appeals in Quaker Action IV, there was a “deviation from the regulation’s language that works an abridgement of communication by the applicant group.” Quaker Action Group v. Morton, 516 F.2d at 727. The Court also concludes that the government’s reading of the Presidential Inaugural Ceremonies Act has no foundation in the language of the statute, and that the government’s interpretation of the powers purportedly granted to it by the PICA results in impermissible “overly broad licensing discretion” for the NPS. Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. at 130; see also id. at 135 (“This Court has held time and time again: ‘Regulations which permit the Government to discriminate on the basis of the content of the message cannot be tolerated under the First Amendment.’”) (quoting Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. at 648-49) (other citations omitted); Quaker Action Group v. Morton, 516 F.2d at 728 (permitting regulations must be “precise in order to minimize the possibility of any inadvertent or deliberate abuse of official discretion.”).
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1. Regulatory and Statutory Framework Under the applicable NPS regulations, there are two types of events that take place on parklands in the National Capital Region, both of which require permits issued by NPS: “demonstrations” and “special events.” 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(1)-(2). The “term ‘special events’ includes sports events, pageants, celebrations, historical reenactments, regattas, entertainments, exhibitions, parades, fairs, festivals and similar events (including such events presented by the National Park Service), which are not demonstrations under paragraph (g)(1)(i) of this section, and which are engaged in by one or more persons, the conduct of which has the effect, intent or propensity to draw a crowd or onlookers.” 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(1)(ii). The Inaugural Parade, organized by the PIC, is a “special event.” See November 12, 2003 NPS Application. “The term ‘demonstrations’ includes demonstrations, picketing, speechmaking, marching, holding vigils or religious services and all other like forms of conduct which involve the communication or expression of views or grievances, engaged in by one or more persons, the conduct of which has the effect, intent or propensity to draw a crowd or onlookers. This term does not include casual park use by visitors or tourists which does not have an intent or propensity to attract a crowd or onlookers.” 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(1)(i). The activities engaged in by plaintiff during Inaugural celebrations are “demonstrations.” Under the regulations, with a few exceptions not relevant to this case, both “demonstrations and special events may be held only pursuant to a permit issued in accordance with [the regulations].” 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(2). Permit applications must be submitted at least 48 hours in advance of a proposed demonstration or special event. See 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(3).
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There is no limit prescribed in the regulations regarding the maximum amount of time before a demonstration or special event a permit application may be submitted.
Paragraph (g)(3) of the regulation provides that “[a]ll demonstration applications . . . are deemed granted, subject to all limitations and restrictions applicable to said park area, unless denied within 24 hours of receipt. However, where a permit has been granted, or is deemed to have been granted pursuant to this subsection, the Regional Director may revoke that permit pursuant to paragraph (g)(6) of this section.” 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(3) (emphasis added).
Paragraph (g)(6), in turn, provides that a “permit issued for a demonstration is revocable only upon a ground for which an application therefor would be subject to denial under paragraphs (g)(4) or (5) of this section. Any such revocation, prior to the conduct of the demonstration, shall be in writing and shall be approved by the Regional Director.” 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(6) (emphasis added). A “permit may be denied in writing by the Regional Director upon the following grounds: (A) A fully executed prior application for the same time and place has been received, and a permit has been or will be granted authorizing activities which do not reasonably permit multiple occupancy of the particular area[.]” 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(iii).
Paragraph (g)(4) provides that “[p]ermit applications for demonstrations and special events are processed in order of receipt, and the use of a particular area is allocated in order of receipt of fully executed applications, subject to the limitations set forth in this section. Provided, however, that the following national celebration events have priority use of the particular park area during the indicated period[,]” including the “White House sidewalk and Lafayette Park, exclusive of the northeast quadrant, for the exclusive use of the Inaugural Committee on Inauguration Day.” 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(i). The regulations do not mention the
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sidewalks of Pennsylvania Avenue along the parade route or the other areas at issue in this lawsuit as having exclusive or priority use by the Inaugural Committee during the Inauguration.
Paragraph (g)(5) provides that “[n]o permit will be issued authorizing demonstrations or special events in excess of the time periods set out below: Provided, however, that the stated periods will be extended for demonstrations only, unless another application requests use of the particular area and said application precludes double occupancy . . . [for] all other park areas: Three weeks.” 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(5)(iv) (emphasis added).
The Presidential Inaugural Ceremonies Act provides: “With the approval of the officer having jurisdiction over any of the Federal reservations or grounds in the District of Columbia, the Secretary of the Interior may grant to the Inaugural Committee a permit to use the reservations or grounds during the inaugural period, including a reasonable time before and after the inaugural period.” 36 U.S.C. § 503(a). The “inaugural period” is defined as five calendar days before and four calendar days after the Inauguration. See 36 U.S.C. § 501(2).
2. Analysis Plaintiff asserts that “the law is clear and well established that the NPS is constitutionally obligated to subject itself, when it applies for a permit within the regular permit system, and all other applicants to the same rules and regulations without discrimination.” Pl’s Mot. at 5. Plaintiff continues: “When it comes to the Inauguration, however, the NPS refuses to enforce its permitting system in a uniform manner, insists on discriminating to favor the President’s Inaugural Committee, and deviates from the permitting regulations in a manner that abridges the free speech, petition and assembly activities of the plaintiff.” Pl’s Mot. at 5-6.
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Plaintiff then argues: “Permitting systems and practices are unconstitutional if not applied in a non-discriminatory manner or if the restrictions fail to serve a significant government interest or if they fail to be narrowly tailored or if they fail to leave open ample alternatives for communication. The failure to satisfy any single prong of these tests renders a permitting system or practice unconstitutional.” Pl’s Mot. at 24 (citing Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45; United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. at 177; Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. at 130; Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 781; Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 293) (emphasis in original).
Plaintiff is not challenging the constitutionality of the permitting system as written in the regulations. Rather, plaintiff challenges the deviation by NPS from that carefully crafted system in order to afford preferential treatment to supporters of the government over those who seek access to a public forum to criticize the government on Inauguration Day. See Pl’s Mot. at 24. Plaintiff’s “primary challenge . . . is that the manner of issuance of the permit to PIC was unconstitutional, as was the revocation of ANSWER’s permit.” Pl’s Reply at 12. Plaintiff argues that the granting of the PIC’s permit was a violation of the express terms of the NPS regulations and of NPS policy because the application accepted by NPS on behalf of the PIC – and then granted by NPS – was submitted more than a year in advance, it was incomplete, and the duration of the event was longer than that allowed by regulation. See Pl’s Mot. at 28-29. The Court agrees with plaintiff that NPS violated its own regulations in its treatment of the special event permit application that NPS submitted to itself on behalf of the PIC, specifically with respect to the duration of the special event and the related timing of the submission of the application. The Court therefore grants plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on Count I.
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Defendants assert that the departures from the regular permitting system are authorized by the Presidential Inaugural Ceremonies Act. See Defs’ Reply at 28. They argue that “in granting PIC’s permit, the Park Service neither violated its own regulations nor policy, as PIC is accorded special status under the Presidential Inaugural Ceremonies Act, 36 U.S.C. § 503.” Defs’ Mem. at 3.22
The government argues that the PIC’s special event permit application was granted because it was received first, which entitles the PIC, as the first applicant in the door, to preference under the applicable regulations. See Defs’ Reply at 24 (citing 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(i)). It acknowledges that the Park Service has a policy of only “accepting permit applications no farther in advance than one year from the dates sought to [be] included in a permit, and that the regulations provide that a special event permit may be granted for three weeks.” Defs’ Mem. at 26. The government argues that “plainly the PIC formed after the 2004 election needed a reasonable amount of time before January 20th in which to prepare the massive undertaking that the Inauguration on January 20th entails.” Id. The government maintains that the PIC permit application was not submitted more than a year in advance of the start date of the event because the application was submitted on November 12, 2003 and the start date for the
22 As noted above, the Presidential Inaugural Ceremonies Act provides: With the approval of the officer having jurisdiction over any of the Federal reservations or grounds in the District of Columbia, the Secretary of the Interior may grant to the Inaugural Committee a permit to use the reservations or grounds during the inaugural period, including a reasonable time before and after the inaugural period.
36 U.S.C. § 503(a). It further provides that the “inaugural period” is five calendar days before and four calendar days after the Inauguration. See 36 U.S.C. § 501(2).
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Inauguration special event was November 1, 2004, because of the setup time defendants included. See id. at 28.
The duration of the PIC special event permit was five months, from November 1, 2004 to April 1, 2005. See November 12, 2003 NPS Application. As the government acknowledges, under the regulations permits may not be granted for a duration of more than three weeks. See 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(5)(iv). The regulations explicitly provide that under certain circumstances, demonstration permits may be granted for a duration exceeding three weeks, but that exception does not apply to special event permits. See id. It is only because the NPS assumes that the three-week duration limit does not apply to the PIC – as a result of the PICA – that the application submitted by NPS on behalf of the PIC was not refused as a result of its submission more than a year in advance of the start date of the event. See Defs’ Mem. at 26-27 (“And the Presidential Inaugural Ceremonies Act . . . would control any regulatory time limitation that could otherwise seem applicable to a permit for the Inauguration.”). It is this assumption that the Court concludes is impermissible.
Defendants attempt to justify this preferential treatment for the PIC by noting that the Presidential Inaugural Ceremonies Act provides that the PIC’s Inauguration special event permit may be for “a reasonable time before and after the inaugural period.” 36 U.S.C. § 503(a). The “inaugural period” itself is defined by statute as five calendar days before and four calendar days after the Inauguration. See 36 U.S.C. § 501(2). Defendants argue that the five-month period of the PIC’s special event permit application is a “reasonable time before and after the Inaugural period” within the meaning of the PICA, and that the three week duration limitation in the regulations therefore does not apply to the PIC special event permit. See Defs’ Reply at 27-28.
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Plaintiff agrees that this is the primary issue with respect to Count I, framing the question as “whether the PICA overrides the subsequent D.C. Circuit rulings that mandate the NPS to uniformly apply its regular permitting system, including to permit applications filed by itself or for events it co-sponsors.” Pl’s Reply at 2. That is indeed the relevant question, and the answer is plain.
As plaintiff points out, the PICA “is hardly the carte blanche the government makes it out to be.” Pl’s Reply at 21. Nothing within the PICA purports to address issues relating to “demonstrators or the constitutional standards to which NPS is subject with respect to the First Amendment.” Pl’s Mot. at 33. Nowhere in the PICA does Congress explicitly exempt or purport to exempt the NPS or the Presidential Inaugural Committee from the regular permitting process provided for in the regulations, 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g). Nor does anything in the statute indicate that it was the intent of Congress to exempt the PIC from the regulations governing special events and demonstrations in the federal parklands. Thus, defendants’ argument that the PICA exempts the government from complying with the permitting process laid out painstakingly in 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g) must rest on an implicit exemption. In light of the D.C. Circuit precedent holding that a regulation that explicitly exempted NPS from the requirements of the permitting regulations was unconstitutional, the Court is unable to conclude that the language in the PICA on which the government relies implicitly has that same impermissible effect. See Women Strike for Peace v. Morton, 472 F.2d at 1293 (Opinion of Wright, J.); see also Quaker Action Group v. Morton, 516 F.2d at 727. Congress could not by statute expressly exempt the National Park Service or the Presidential Inaugural Committee from compliance with the First Amendment. The Court is even more unwilling to infer such an impermissible Congressional intent from a statute that does not
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speak directly to the issue. Under the defendants’ reading of the statute, the purported waiver by the PICA of
the three-week time limit found in the regulations – solely for the NPS/PIC and no one else – has the effect that the permit application submitted by NPS to itself on behalf of the yet-to-be-formed PIC would always be the first permit application received. That is fundamentally discriminatory. If the Court were to credit the government’s interpretation of the statute, the NPS/PIC application can be submitted one year before “a reasonable time” period before the Inauguration – and the NPS unilaterally determines what constitutes a “reasonable time.” Meanwhile, demonstration permits can only be submitted a year before an Inauguration demonstration that may last, at maximum, three weeks. Such a system – used by the defendants with respect to the 2005 Inauguration – demonstrates a preference for the government over all other speakers. Such a preference is constitutionally impermissible. See Quaker Action Group v. Morton, 516 F.2d at 727 (“the premise of our holding [upholding various aspects of NPS regulations] is that the provisions of the permit system will be enforced uniformly and without discrimination and that there will be no deviation from the regulation’s language that works an abridgement of communication by the applicant group.”); Women Strike for Peace v. Morton 472 F.2d at 1293 (Opinion of Wright, J.) (when “Government-sponsored displays are always given preference over other displays which do not meet with the approval of Government officials” there is not “evenhanded enforcement of the rules of the road.”).
Such a system also delegates impermissible discretion to NPS in the permitting system with respect to the meaning of the term “a reasonable time” under the PICA. See Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. at 130 (permitting schemes “may not delegate
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overly broad licensing discretion to a government official”); see also Thomas v. Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. at 323 (same); Women Strike for Peace v. Morton 472 F.2d at 1293 (Opinion of Leventhal, J.) (an “official regulatory scheme that empowers regulatory officials to pick and choose among those seeking to use public facilities for communicative activity, without providing narrowly drawn standards for the exercise of official discretion” are “condemn[ed]” as “an invalid prior restraint”) (citing Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); and Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972)). If the government thinks it appropriate to lengthen the amount of time for which permits may be granted under the regulations – perhaps even only for the Inauguration period and no other time – the government may explicitly amend the regulations that apply to all permit applicants. The government may not, however, simply conclude that because of its interpretation of a phrase in a statute – “a reasonable time” – the existing policies and regulations apply as written to some applicants, such as plaintiff, and not to others, such as the PIC.
In sum, the Court concludes that the permitting system, in the context of Inaugural events and demonstrations relating to the Inauguration, is not being “enforced uniformly and without discrimination” and that, contrary to the mandate from our court of appeals in Quaker Action IV, there has been a “deviation from the regulation’s language that works an abridgement of communication by the applicant group.” Quaker Action Group v. Morton, 516 F.2d at 727. The government’s interpretation of the powers granted to it by the PICA also gives impermissible discretion to the NPS. See Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. at 130. The Court therefore will grant plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on Count I of the Amended
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Complaint, and it will deny defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to Count I.
B. Count III – Access to the Parade Route The government moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment on Count III. Plaintiff did not move for summary judgment on Count III. The government continues to argue that plaintiff is not entitled to “insert itself into PIC’s permitted activities.” Defs’ Mem. at 31. The government asserts that the “Park Service acts to ensure that groups or individuals obtaining a permit for a demonstration or special event may express their views free from interference or unwarranted intrusion from other groups or individuals.” Id. at 32. Plaintiff argues in response that there “may be nothing more repugnant to the First Amendment than the government excluding from vast areas along the Inaugural parade route all those whose views fail to conform to that of a particular political group or who are excluded because they have not been hand-picked by the President’s representatives to be allowed to stand on the sidewalks of Pennsylvania Avenue with an ability to view or communicate with the Inaugural parade.” Pl’s Mem. at 17. The government cites a number of cases for the proposition that a “physical intrusion into another event for the purpose of interjecting one’s own convictions or beliefs is by definition an interference, regardless of how insubstantial or insignificant it might appear. As such, it is an interference with the rights of other citizens to enjoy the event or demonstration in which they have chosen to participate, and in an area reserved for them.” Defs’ Mem. at 33 (quoting Sanders v. United States, 518 F. Supp. 728, 730 (D.D.C. 1981), aff’d without opinion, 679 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1982) and citing Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
35

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Group of Boston, 515 U.S. at 578; Kroll v. United States Capitol Police, 847 F.2d 899 (D.C. Cir. 1988); and Torossian v. Hayo, 45 F. Supp. 2d 63, 67 (D.D.C. 1999)).
The cases cited by the government are not only completely unpersuasive, they are only marginally even relevant. Hurley discussed the First Amendment in the context of direct participation in a privately organized parade. The plaintiffs in that case were seeking the right to participate in the private parade itself – not to protest in adjacent public forums. As the D.C. Circuit has held, Hurley is completely irrelevant – “not remotely parallel” – for purposes of analyzing the First Amendment rights of protesters on sidewalks in the context of the Inauguration. See Mahoney v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d at 1456 (“There are two distinctions between Hurley and this case which are so critical as to make the cases not remotely parallel.”). Kroll is a case about qualified immunity rather than the First Amendment. See Kroll v. United States Capitol Police, 847 F.2d at 902 (The “sole issue on appeal is whether this aspect of First Amendment law was so ‘clearly established’ . . .”). As for Torossian, it also discussed qualified immunity for purported violations of the First Amendment rights of counter-protesters during a private event, the Million Man March, rather than a public event. See Torossian v. Hayo, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 64.
The Inauguration is not a private event. See Mahoney v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d at 1458. Nor are plaintiff’s members seeking the right to participate in the Inaugural parade itself. The interest the government asserts here, and the citation to Sanders, are very similar to an asserted interest that was entirely rejected by the court of appeals in Mahoney. Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Sentelle explained:
[T]he government has offered no compelling governmental interest
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and no convincing argument that its policy was narrowly crafted to achieve such a legitimate end. Indeed, the only justification offered for barring groups of demonstrators of twenty-five or fewer is that their presence on the Pennsylvania Avenue sidewalks would constitute a “physical intrusion into another event for the purpose of interjecting one's own convictions or beliefs.” Government Brief at 12. The goal of the government to prevent that action on appellants’ part hardly constitutes a compelling state interest, or, in the face of the First Amendment, any legitimate state interest at all . . . . It is only the “purpose of injecting [their] own convictions or beliefs” that causes the government to exclude them. But it is also the appellants' desire to “interject” their own convictions and beliefs that entitles them to the protection of the First Amendment. If the free speech clause of the First Amendment does not protect the right of citizens to “interject” their own convictions and beliefs into a public event on a public forum then it is difficult to understand why the Framers bothered including it at all.
Mahoney v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d at 1458-59 (emphasis added). In other words, protesters are
entitled to engage in political speech in a public forum during the Inaugural parade. As the
Supreme Court has observed, the “government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose
views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more
controversial views.” Police Dep’t of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96. “And it may not
select which issues are worth discussing or debating in public facilities. There is an ‘equality of
status in the field of ideas,’ and government must afford all points of view an equal opportunity to
be heard. Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by some groups, government may
not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the basis of what they intend to say.” Id.
(footnote omitted).
The National Park Service on behalf of the PIC cannot reserve all of Pennsylvania
Avenue for itself, leaving only the Ellipse and the northern part of John Marshall Park to
protesters. See Mahoney v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d at 1458. That proposition having been recognized
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by the court of appeals in Mahoney – and not being the least bit qualified by the irrelevant cases cited by the government – the question now is this: How much, if any, of the Pennsylvania Avenue sidewalks can be reserved for the exclusive use of the government and its ticketed guests on Inauguration Day, and how much must be left open for any peaceful speaker or demonstrator to have access regardless of viewpoint or message?23
The government is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Count III. The Court therefore will deny defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to Count III of the amended complaint. Plaintiff is invited either to file its own motion for summary judgment on Count III, or to request a trial date.
An Order consistent with this Opinion will be issued this same day.

DATE: March 20, 2008

________/s/_________________ PAUL L. FRIEDMAN United States District Judge

23 The Court also doubts that the five month duration of the permit, in violation of an existing regulation, could satisfy the narrow tailoring requirement. See Mahoney v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d at 1458 (“NPS, however . . . issued itself a permit not for a limited segment of the Pennsylvania Avenue sidewalks for the time of the Parade, but for the entire length of Pennsylvania Avenue sidewalks for a five-month period, a time frame more than twenty times as long as permitted under its own regulation. There can be no doubt that the standard of narrow tailoring to meet a compelling state interest applies and has been violated.”) (emphasis added). The government has failed to show that it has a compelling state interest or that its actions were narrowly tailored.
38

 
 Case 1:05-cv-00071-PLF Document 87 Filed 06/18/09 Page 1 of 5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

__________________________________________

)

A.N.S.W.E.R. COALITION,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

KEN SALAZAR,

)

Secretary of the Interior, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.1

)

__________________________________________)

Civil Action No. 05-0071 (PLF)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER This matter is before the Court as a result of the parties’ dispute about the meaning of the Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order of November 14, 2008. By that Opinion, the Court granted in part plaintiff’s motion to compel the defendants to provide additional discovery under Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See A.N.S.W.E.R. Coalition v. Kempthorne, Civil Action No. 05-0071, Memorandum Opinion and Order at 3 (Nov. 14, 2008) (the “Opinion”). At a status conference on November 17, 2008, counsel for defendants requested clarification about the requirements of the Opinion. Following the status conference, the Court issued the following Minute Order: As ordered at the November 17, 2008 status conference, on or before November 19, 2008, defendants shall file copies of all memoranda, e-mails, or other written documents issued to

1

The Court has substituted Ken Salazar, the current Secretary of the Interior, for

the former Secretary, Dirk Kempthorne, as a defendant in this case pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Case 1:05-cv-00071-PLF Document 87 Filed 06/18/09 Page 2 of 5

individuals charged with searching files at the Secret Service and the Department of the Interior regarding the scope of the searches that were to be conducted for documents relating to Count II of plaintiff’s amended complaint. On or before November 26, 2008, plaintiff shall file a notice identifying the perceived areas of deficiency, if any, in these searches and the language it proposes be used in memoranda to be issued to these individuals directing them to conduct further searches in compliance with this Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order of November 14, 2008. Defendants shall file a response to this notice on or before December 2, 2008.
A.N.S.W.E.R. Coalition v. Kempthorne, Civil Action No. 05-0071, Minute Order (D.D.C. Nov.
18, 2008).
Defendants subsequently filed hundreds of pages of documents regarding the
scope of their searches. As required by the Court’s Minute Order, plaintiff then identified what it
saw as multiple areas of deficiency, and proposed its own directive for a supplemental search.
See Plaintiff’s Praecipe to the Court Pursuant to November 18, 2008 Minute Order. In their
Response to Plaintiff’s Praecipe, defendants argued that no further search should be required.
After reviewing its earlier Opinion as well as the parties’ filings, the Court maintains its position
that defendants must conduct additional searches; it also concludes, however, that the searches
plaintiff proposes are broader than the Court intended and not necessary under Rule 56(f) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2
The essence of the parties’ discovery dispute is whether defendants have met their
discovery obligations with respect to Count II of plaintiff’s Amended Complaint by searching

2

Limited discovery is permitted under Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure when a party opposing summary judgment shows by affidavit or declaration that “for

specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f);

see also Bourbeau v. Jonathan Woodner, Co., 600 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3-4 (D.D.C. 2009).

2

Case 1:05-cv-00071-PLF Document 87 Filed 06/18/09 Page 3 of 5
only for documents that relate to the Secret Service’s decision to ban sign supports. In its earlier Opinion the Court stated:
The Court’s Order of November 13, 2007, directing the defendants to provide discovery under Rule 56(f), was not, as defendants characterize it, limited to discovery relating to “the decision by the Secret Service to ban supports for signs at the 2005 inauguration.” . . . [T]he Court’s Order was broader, encompassing the production of all documents respecting plaintiff’s “claims relating to the prohibition of sign supports” at the 2005 Presidential Inaugural Parade. . . . Opinion at 1-2. The word “prohibition” connotes something much broader than a particular “decision.” Through defendants’ filings, as well as in defendants’ counsel’s representations in open court, it has become clear to the Court that defendants have not been willing to acknowledge this distinction — a distinction between the decision by the Secret Service to ban sign supports at the 2005 Inauguration and the full scope of plaintiff’s claims which are embodied in Count II: Does the prohibition of sign supports violate the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause? See A.N.S.W.E.R. Coalition v. Kempthorne, 537 F. Supp. 2d 183, 191 (D.D.C. 2008); see also Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s Praecipe to the Court (“Def. Resp.”) at 3. Although documents uncovered as a result of a search for records relating to a decision made by the Secret Service to ban sign supports may constitute a significant part of the discovery that is relevant to the prohibition claim in Count II, such a search is not sufficient. Defendants have yet to convince either plaintiff or this Court that they have not unduly limited the scope of their search for responsive documents. In addition, defendants do not account for the other two areas of deficiency identified in the Court’s November 2008 Opinion. First, they do not address the Secret Service’s
3

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failure to produce communications with various governmental entities and individuals. See Opinion at 2. Such communications must be provided if they relate to plaintiff’s claims. Second, defendants’ filings have yet to convince the Court that they have conducted adequate searches for copies of the Presidential Advance Manual from October 2002. See Opinion at 3.
Defendants correctly point out that the Court did not grant plaintiff a whole new bite at the discovery apple, see Def. Resp. at 2, and that many of the searches requested by plaintiff in its Praecipe go beyond what the Court ordered or intended (for example, documents relating to the 2001 Inauguration) and are otherwise overbroad. Therefore the Court will eliminate subsections a, b, and f as well as the proposed search terms: “protest,” “protestor,” “protester,” “demonstration,” “demonstrate,” “demonstrator,” and “parade” from plaintiff’s proposed directive. In addition, it will direct the parties to meet and confer and attempt to agree upon (1) a methodology for defendants’ searches that is consistent with this Memorandum Opinion; (2) a list of files and electronic databases likely to contain responsive records and a list of individuals likely to possess, have possessed or have responsibilities relating to the records to be searched for and produced; and (3) a list of search directives that are likely to result in documents relating to the prohibition on sign supports and plaintiff’s corresponding constitutional claims in Count II, but that are not broader than the limited discovery provided for by Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and by this Memorandum Opinion. Accordingly, it is hereby
4

Case 1:05-cv-00071-PLF Document 87 Filed 06/18/09 Page 5 of 5

ORDERED that the Court will adopt in part the recommendations in plaintiff’s

Praecipe to the Court [82], and will order defendants to conduct additional searches, as described

in this Memorandum Opinion, utilizing the method and protocol described in the immediately

preceding paragraph; it is

FURTHER ORDERED that on or before July 2, 2009, the parties shall file a joint

written report to inform the Court of the expected deadline for the production of the documents

by defendants to plaintiff, as well as how the parties wish to proceed with the remainder of the

case.

SO ORDERED.

DATE: June 18, 2009

/s/_______________________ PAUL L. FRIEDMAN United States District Judge

5

 
 Case 1:05-cv-00071-PLF Document 166 Filed 01/14/13 Page 1 of 17

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

__________________________________________

)

A.N.S.W.E.R. COALITION,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

KEN SALAZAR, Secretary,

)

United States Department of the Interior, et al., )

)

Defendants.1

)

__________________________________________)

Civil Action No. 05-0071 (PLF)

OPINION Plaintiff A.N.S.W.E.R. (Act Now to Stop War and End Racism) Coalition (“ANSWER”) filed this lawsuit in January 2005 against the Secretary of the Interior, the Director of the National Park Service (“NPS”), and the Director of the Secret Service, challenging the constitutionality of certain policies that restrict ANSWER’s ability to engage in expressive activity during the Presidential Inaugural Parade in Washington, D.C. This matter is now before the Court on the Secretary of the Interior’s motion on behalf of NPS to dismiss ANSWER’s Supplemental Pleading in part, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Secretary claims that ANSWER lacks standing to challenge the regulations governing access to the parade route to the extent that the regulations apply to areas outside of Freedom Plaza on Pennsylvania Avenue. After carefully considering the parties’ papers, the relevant legal authorities, and the entire record

1

Jonathan Jarvis, the current Director of the National Park Service, has been

substituted for former Director Mary Bomar, and Mark Sullivan, the current Director of the

Secret Service, has been substituted for former Director W. Ralph Basham pursuant to Rule

25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

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in this case, the Court concludes that ANSWER has met its burden of showing standing at the pleadings stage, such that ANSWER may pursue its claim in full.2 The Court therefore denies the Secretary’s motion to dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND The pending motion stems from ANSWER’s ongoing efforts to secure sufficient space for its members and affiliates to engage in political dissent during the Presidential Inaugural Parade. This Court has previously described the factual and procedural background of this case. See A.N.S.W.E.R. Coalition v. Kempthorne, 493 F. Supp. 2d 34, 37-41 (D.D.C. 2007) (“ANSWER I”); A.N.S.W.E.R. Coalition v. Kempthorne, 537 F. Supp. 2d 183, 186-93 (D.D.C. 2008) (“ANSWER II”); A.N.S.W.E.R. Coalition v. Salazar, Civil Action No. 05-0071, at 2-4 (D.D.C. March 5, 2012) (“ANSWER III”). It therefore will limit its discussion accordingly. ANSWER is an unincorporated grassroots organization that engages in political organizing and activism in opposition to war and racism. Am. Compl. ¶ 1. Every four years since 2005, ANSWER has attempted to organize a mass demonstration along Pennsylvania Avenue to engage in political dissent during the Presidential Inaugural Parade. Id.; Supp. Pleading ¶ 1. This dispute arises from National Park Service regulations, as now amended, that grant the Presidential Inaugural Committee (“PIC”) exclusive access to some of these same areas

2

The papers reviewed in connection with the pending motion include: plaintiff’s

amended complaint (“Am. Compl.”) [Dkt. No. 17]; plaintiff’s supplemental pleading (“Supp.

Pleading”) [Dkt. No. 144]; defendant’s motion to dismiss in part for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction (“Def.’s Mot.”) [Dkt. No. 146]; plaintiff’s brief in opposition to defendant’s motion

(“Pl.’s Opp.”) [Dkt. No. 155] including Exhibit 1, Affidavit of Brian Becker (“Becker Decl.”);

and defendant’s reply brief in support of its motion to dismiss in part (“Def.’s Reply”) [Dkt. No.

158].

2

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on and in connection with events relating to the Presidential Inauguration. See 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(iii) (2012).
A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework The Department of the Interior has the authority to issue and implement, through NPS, rules and regulations that oversee the use of federal grounds within the National Park System. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3. Pursuant to this authority, NPS has promulgated regulations for a permitting system that allows the use of National Park System land around the national capital region for special events and demonstrations. See generally 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g). The Secretary has additional statutory authority under the Presidential Inaugural Ceremonies Act to “grant to the Inaugural Committee a permit to use [federal] reservations or grounds during the inaugural period.” 36 U.S.C. § 503(a). When ANSWER initiated this suit in 2005, the relevant NPS regulations set aside only the White House sidewalk and three-quarters of Lafayette Park for the exclusive use of the PIC for inaugural activities. 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(i)(F) (2005).3 The regulations provided that permits for demonstrations and special events for other areas would be issued on a first-come, first-served basis, id. at § 7.96(g)(4)(i), and NPS had a “strict policy” to not “accept any permit applications submitted more than one year in advance of the start date for any event on Park Services land.” ANSWER II, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 186-87. In practice, however, NPS deviated from its policy and submitted permit applications for itself over a year in advance of Inauguration Day activities to reserve for the PIC over one-third of the sidewalk space on Pennsylvania

3

In 1996, the sidewalks abutting Pennsylvania Avenue were designated as federal

lands and became subject to NPS’ regulatory authority. See ANSWER II, 537 F. Supp. 2d at

198.

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Avenue between 4th Street and 15th Street, Northwest, in addition to the Lafayette Park and White House sidewalk areas set aside by regulation. See id. at 187, 190.
B. Procedural History ANSWER’s first claim (“Count I”) challenged NPS’ actions to exempt itself and the PIC from the relevant permitting regulations. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 87-97. ANSWER’s second claim (“Count II”) challenged the Secret Service’s prohibition on supports for signs and placards. Id. ¶¶ 98-102. ANSWER’s third claim (“Count III”) challenged NPS’ policy of granting to the PIC exclusive use of space along the parade route, regardless of whether such policy was inconsistent with NPS’ regulations. Id. ¶¶ 103-08. ANSWER asserted that the conduct described in each count violated the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause, and requested declaratory and injunctive relief, including a “[d]eclaratory judgment that the NPS policy and practice of granting to the PIC exclusive use of the public space abutting the Inaugural Parade route is unconstitutional; an injunction prohibiting such discriminatory conduct in the future; and a mandatory injunction that the NPS make the sidewalks abutting the Inaugural Parade generally open for the public for use[.]” Id. at 27. ANSWER did not challenge the regulatory set-aside of the White House sidewalk and Lafayette Park. Id. ¶ 104. The Court addressed the justiciability of ANSWER’s claims in an Opinion and Order dated June 13, 2007, in which the Court held that ANSWER had both organizational and representational standing to challenge NPS’ then-uncodified policy and practice of granting PIC exclusive use of public space along the parade route. See ANSWER I, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 42-48. NPS then moved for summary judgment on Counts I and III, and ANSWER moved for summary
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judgment on Count I. See ANSWER II, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 192-93.4 In an Opinion and Order dated March 20, 2008, the Court denied NPS’ motion for summary judgment and granted ANSWER’s motion for summary judgment on Count I. See ANSWER II, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 206. The Court held that NPS’ “policy and practice of exempting itself and/or the [PIC] from compliance with the generally applicable permitting regulations, 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g) [was] unconstitutional” and enjoined NPS from doing so “with respect to events relating to the Inauguration.” Id. The Court also denied NPS’ motion for summary judgment on Count III. Noting that the Inauguration is a public event at which protestors have a right to engage in political speech, the Court rejected the government’s argument that ANSWER was “not entitled to ‘insert itself into PIC’s permitted activities.’” Id. at 204 (internal citation omitted). The Court did not reach the question of “[h]ow much, if any, of the Pennsylvania Avenue sidewalks can be reserved for the exclusive use of the government and its ticketed guests on Inauguration Day.” Id. at 205-06.
Following the Court’s decision, NPS amended its regulations regarding permits for demonstrations and special events for Inaugural activities. See Areas of the National Park System, National Capitol Region, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,739 (Nov. 17, 2008); 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4). The regulations now provide, in relevant part:
(i) NPS processes permit applications for demonstrations and special events in order of receipt. NPS will not accept applications more than one year in advance of a proposed continuous event (including set-up time, if any). Use of a particular area is allocated

4

Neither party moved for summary judgment on Count II, see ANSWER II, 537 F.

Supp. 2d at 191, and the parties are currently engaged in discovery regarding Count II before

Magistrate Judge Kay.

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in order of receipt of fully executed applications, subject to the limitations in this section.
. . .
(iii) In connection with Presidential Inaugural Ceremonies the following areas are reserved for priority use as set forth in this paragraph.
(A) The White House sidewalk and Lafayette Park, exclusive of the northeast quadrant for the exclusive use of the Presidential Inaugural Committee on Inaugural Day.
(B) Portions of Pennsylvania Avenue, National Historic Park and Sherman Park, as designated in the maps included in paragraph (g)(4)(iii)(E) of this section, for the exclusive use of the Presidential Inaugural Committee on Inaugural Day for:
(1) Ticketed bleachers viewing and access areas, except that members of the public may use a ticketed bleacher seat that has not been claimed by the ticket holder 10 minutes before the Inaugural Parade is scheduled to pass the bleacher's block[.]
36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4). The referenced maps show reserved PIC bleacher space on portions of
Pennsylvania Avenue between 7th Street and 15th Street, Northwest, including most of Freedom
Plaza (located on Pennsylvania Avenue between 13th Street and 14th Street), and parts of
Sherman Park (located at 15th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue). 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(E).
According to NPS, these regulations grant the PIC additional priority and exclusive use of
approximately fourteen percent of Pennsylvania Avenue along the Inaugural Parade route.
ANSWER III at 10 (citing Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce Injunction,
Dkt. No. 111 at 8, 25).
ANSWER subsequently filed a motion to enforce the injunction against NPS on
the grounds that the amended regulations violated the Court’s March 20, 2008 Order. See Dkt.
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No. 105. The Court denied that motion. ANSWER III at 16. Although the amended regulations expanded the reach of the regulatory set-aside, the Court found that they did not contravene the terms of the Court’s injunction, which merely enjoined NPS’ practice of deviating from its regulations and established policies in order to discriminate in favor of PIC. ANSWER III at 12-14. Although the Court concluded that the injunction did not preclude the expansion of the regulatory set-aside,“[t]hat conclusion does not mean that NPS’ amended regulations are constitutional; it just means that the Court has not addressed the issue.” Id. at 14-15. The Court then granted ANSWER leave to file a supplemental pleading containing facial and as-applied challenges to 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(B). Id. at 16; see also Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Complaint, Dkt. No. 132.
C. ANSWER’s Supplemental Pleading ANSWER presents a fourth claim in its Supplemental Pleading, which alleges that the expanded regulatory set-aside, 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(B)(1), does not constitute a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction, and favors individuals affiliated with the administration while disfavoring others, in violation of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause (“Count IV”). Supp. Pleading ¶¶ 10, 14, 21-23. ANSWER challenges the regulations on their face and as applied to ANSWER and its members. Id. ¶ 15. Along with the Supplemental Pleading, ANSWER enclosed its application for a permit to conduct a demonstration relating to the 2013 Inauguration at and around Freedom Plaza. See Supp. Pleading Attachment 1. ANSWER also included NPS’ confirmation of its first-in-time application, in which NPS informed ANSWER of the regulatory priority for certain
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designated areas at Freedom Plaza relating to the Inaugural Parade. See Supp. Pleading Attachment 2. Under the regulatory priority, although ANSWER’s application was “deemed granted,” NPS retained authority to revoke ANSWER’s permit for any parts of Freedom Plaza that the PIC intended to use once the PIC formed in November 2012. Id.
ANSWER now requests declaratory and permanent injunctive relief and asks the Court to hold 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(B)(1) unconstitutional, enjoin its operative effect, and order NPS to remove from the incorporated regulatory maps those areas reserved for the “PIC Bleacher area.” Supp. Pleading ¶ 26(a).
D. The Government’s Motion to Dismiss The Secretary of the Interior filed the instant motion to dismiss the Supplemental Pleading in part for lack of standing, arguing that ANSWER impermissibly seeks relief that is far broader than its injury. Because ANSWER’s permit application was limited to Freedom Plaza, NPS contends that ANSWER has standing “only to the extent that the regulation grants a regulatory preference to PIC’s Bleacher Area at Freedom Plaza.” Def.’s Mot. at 6 (emphasis added). Moreover, to the extent that ANSWER asserts injury related to other areas along Pennsylvania Avenue, NPS contends that ANSWER alleged such injury only in its opposition papers and failed to include such allegations in its pleadings. See Reply at 2.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS A. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(1) On a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the Court has jurisdiction. See Sierra Club v.
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Jackson, 813 F. Supp. 2d 149, 154 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence v. Ashcroft, 339 F. Supp. 2d 68, 72 (D.D.C. 2004)). “While the burden of production to establish standing is more relaxed at the pleading stage than at summary judgment, a plaintiff must nonetheless allege “‘general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct.’” Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. E.P.A., 667 F.3d 6, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see also NB ex. rel. Peacock v. District of Columbia, 682 F.3d 77, 82 (D.C. Cir 2012) (noting that “at the pleadings stage, ‘the burden imposed’ on plaintiffs to establish standing ‘is not onerous’”). The Court must accept all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint as true, but may in appropriate cases consider certain materials outside the pleadings. See Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253-54 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The Court must construe the complaint liberally in the plaintiff’s favor, but the Court need not accept factual inferences drawn by the plaintiff if those inferences are not supported by facts alleged in the complaint, nor must the Court accept the plaintiff's legal conclusions. See Sierra Club v. Jackson, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 154 (citing Primex Recoveries, Inc. v. Lee, 260 F. Supp. 2d 43, 47 (D.D.C. 2003)).
B. Standing “Because Article III limits the constitutional role of the federal judiciary to resolving cases and controversies, a showing of standing ‘is an essential and unchanging’ predicate to any exercise of [the Court’s] jurisdiction.” Nat’l Assn. of Home Builders v. E.P.A., 667 F.3d at 11. To establish standing, plaintiff must show “at an irreducible constitutional minimum”: (1) that it has suffered an injury in fact; (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to defendant’s conduct; and (3) that a favorable decision on the merits likely will redress the injury.
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See ANSWER I, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 42 (citing Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv. (TOC) Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000)); see also Worth v. Jackson, 451 F.3d 854, 857-58 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The alleged injury must be concrete and particularized, and actual or imminent, not conjectural, hypothetical, or speculative. See Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv. (TOC) Inc., 528 U.S. at 180-81; Worth v. Jackson, 451 F.3d at 858. “The standing inquiry is particularly rigorous when a court is considering the asserted unconstitutionality of actions taken by another branch of the government.” Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Business v. Architectural & Transp. Barriers Compliance Bd., 461 F. Supp. 2d 19, 23 (D.D.C. 2006) (citing Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819 (1997)).
To sue on its own behalf, an organizational plaintiff must “demonstrate that it has suffered injury in fact” that concretely and demonstrably injures the organization’s resources, constituting “more than simply a setback to the organization’s abstract social interests.” Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. E.P.A., 667 F.3d at 11 (internal quotations omitted). An association also may have representational standing to sue on behalf of its members when “(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Id. at 12.
III. DISCUSSION The government does not dispute that ANSWER has standing to challenge the regulatory preference in the amended regulations for the PIC bleacher area at Freedom Plaza. Def.’s Mot. at 5-6. As detailed above, NPS contends that ANSWER can challenge only the
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bleacher area within Freedom Plaza because ANSWER’s injury is limited to the effect of the Freedom Plaza permit denial. Id. at 5. According to NPS, ANSWER “cannot demonstrate standing to challenge the Park Service’s amended regulations as they pertain to areas other than the PIC Bleacher Area at Freedom Plaza, because such provisions have no concrete effect on plaintiff.” Id. To the extent that ANSWER intends to use space in areas other than Freedom Plaza, NPS argues that ANSWER did not state this intention in its Supplemental Pleading and is thus barred from relying upon its intention to show injury. Def.’s Reply at 5.
NPS’ arguments against ANSWER’s recently added claim – which challenges the regulations both on their face and as applied – fail. By alleging in its Supplemental Pleading that its permit application was denied because of the challenged regulations, ANSWER has made the requisite showing of injury to establish organizational and representational standing for purposes of a facial challenge. In addition, by alleging in its Amended Complaint and Supplemental Pleading that it plans to engage in protests along Pennsylvania Avenue at the upcoming Inaugural Parade, ANSWER has shown the requisite injury (at least at the pleadings stage of this litigation) to establish organizational and representational standing to challenge the regulations as applied to sidewalk areas outside of Freedom Plaza.
A. ANSWER Has Alleged Injury Sufficient to Establish Standing for Facial Challenge ANSWER challenges the regulations on their face and as-applied. See Supp.
Pleading ¶ 15. In a facial challenge, the plaintiff seeks to invalidate a statute or regulation, or portions thereof, and obtain a permanent injunction against its enforcement. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 127 (2007) (reviewing facial challenge to abortion law); McConnell v.
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Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 134 (2003) (reviewing facial challenge to campaign finance law). By definition, the relief sought in a facial challenge sweeps more broadly than the relief required to redress the particular plaintiff’s injury. As a result, the plaintiff must show that the law is invalid not only as applied to plaintiff, but also as applied in many or all other circumstances, even though the plaintiff is not subject to every possible application. See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1587 (2010) (“To succeed in a typical facial attack, [plaintiff] would have to establish ‘that no set of circumstances exists under which [the law] would be valid’”) (internal citations omitted); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 167 (noting cases requiring plaintiff to show that law would be invalid “in a large fraction of the cases in which [it] is relevant”).
A plaintiff presenting a facial challenge still must show an injury to establish Article III standing. See Anderson v. Holder, 647 F.3d 1165, 1172 (D.C. Cir. 2011). But there is no question that ANSWER has made that showing here, as defendants agree that ANSWER has demonstrated injury with regard to Freedom Plaza. Def.’s Mot. at 5-6 (“Plaintiff has standing to challenge the Park Service’s 2008 amended regulation . . . only to the extent that the regulation grants a regulatory preference to PIC’s Bleacher Area at Freedom Plaza.”). Furthermore, the Court previously held that ANSWER had organizational and representational standing to litigate claims with respect to denials of permit applications for areas along the 2009 Inaugural Parade route. See ANSWER I, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 45 (D.D.C. 2007).
Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff’s facial challenge survives defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s supplemental pleading in part. If ANSWER were to prevail on its
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facial challenge to 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(B)(1), that regulatory provision would be enjoined in its entirety.
B. ANSWER Has Adequately Pled its Intent to Use Space Outside of Freedom Plaza NPS’ motion seems to attack ANSWER’s as-applied challenge on two grounds.
NPS argues that ANSWER, in its supplemental complaint, never alleged that it planned to use areas outside of Freedom Plaza, and thus cannot show injury. See, e.g., Def.’s Mot. at 2-3; Def.’s Reply at 2. NPS also suggests that a permit denial is necessary for plaintiff to demonstrate standing. See id. at 2. The Court disagrees and finds that ANSWER has pled an interest in accessing sidewalk space outside of Freedom Plaza, and that ANSWER has sufficiently shown injury resulting from the application of the regulations to that area.
The Supplemental Pleading must be viewed in conjunction with the Amended Complaint. See 6A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, MARY KAY KANE, AND RICHARD L MARCUS, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1504 at 254 (3d ed. 2010) (Supplemental pleadings, in contrast to amended pleadings, “deal with events subsequent to the pleading to be altered and represent additions to or continuations of the earlier pleadings.”) (emphasis added). Read together, these pleadings indicate that ANSWER and its members and affiliates intend to access the entirety of the parade route along Pennsylvania Avenue at each Inaugural Parade. See e.g. Am. Compl. ¶ 1 (“ANSWER Coalition has concrete plans to organize mass demonstration activity for the 2009 Inaugural Parade route and for the foreseeable future, and seeks to line the Inaugural Parade route with protesters and activists.”) (emphasis added); id. ¶ 77 (“ANSWER’s interests lie both in securing space for use as a rally and assembly site(s) and to ensure that ANSWER and those affiliated with ANSWER or who support its political message have the
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ability to line the parade route with a mass demonstration of collective action.”); id. ¶ 105 (“The intended expressive activity of the demonstrators is to collectively line the parade route with their signs, their bodies and to amplify their presence with their collective voices.”) (emphasis in original). Although the Supplemental Pleading focuses primarily on the restrictions on ANSWER’s access to Freedom Plaza, which ANSWER plans to use as a rally and assembly site, this pleading does not indicate that ANSWER had abandoned its intention to line the parade route at the 2013 Presidential Inaugural Parade.
While the Court finds ANSWER’s pleadings sufficient, it may also consider materials outside of the pleadings to resolve a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d at 1253-54; ANSWER I, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 46 (considering affidavit attached to opposition brief when analyzing standing); Vietnam Veterans of Am. v. Peake, Civil No. 08-1934, 2009 WL 6179013 at *2 (D.D.C. June 23, 2009) (same). NPS has submitted no evidence to counter ANSWER’s assertion that it intends to use space beyond Freedom Plaza during the 2013 Inauguration. In contrast, ANSWER has filed a declaration of the organization’s National Director, Brian Becker, who states that ANSWER anticipates that ten thousand or more members and affiliates will come to Washington for the Inauguration, intending to engage in free expression activities along the route. See Becker Decl. According to ANSWER, “[t]he sheer number of ANSWER coalition constituents anticipated to be present along the Inaugural Route will exceed the capacity of Freedom Plaza, and will necessitate the presence of persons in locations along the route including in areas designated as ‘PIC Bleacher Areas on NPS regulatory maps.’” Id. ¶ 10. These members, along with others who may not make it to Freedom Plaza because of pedestrian traffic and security
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checkpoints, will instead “fill[] in along the parade route on a first come first serve basis.” Pl.’s Opp. at 9.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that ANSWER has pleaded facts sufficient to demonstrate its interest in accessing portions of the Inaugural Parade route beyond Freedom Plaza.
C. ANSWER’s Lack of Permit for Areas Outside of Freedom Plaza Does Not Deprive ANSWER of Standing to Challenge the Set-Aside in those Areas
This Court noted in ANSWER I that plaintiff had organizational and representational standing to litigate claims related to an anticipated permit denial in 2008, as “the courts ‘have consistently treated a license or permit denial pursuant to a state or federal administrative scheme as an Article III injury.’” ANSWER I, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 45, 47 (citing Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 376 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). A permit denial, however, is not a prerequisite to establish standing. See, e.g., Dearth v. Holder, 641 F.3d 499, 502 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (upholding plaintiff’s claim against standing challenge in the absence of permit denial). The fact that ANSWER did not apply for, and thus was not denied, a permit for sidewalk space along Pennsylvania Avenue does not bar ANSWER from establishing standing with respect to its lack of access to those areas.
ANSWER maintains, and NPS does not contest, that ANSWER is not required to obtain a permit to engage in its intended conduct along Pennsylvania Avenue, which includes lining the parade route on a first-come, first-served basis, and peacefully distributing leaflets and literature. Pl.’s Opp. at 4 n.4; Becker Decl. ¶¶ 6-12. A permit generally is not needed to engage
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in this kind of conduct; in fact, ANSWER asserts that it has previously attempted to file permit applications for non-exclusive use of public sidewalks, but that these applications have been rejected by NPS on the grounds that “no permit or request is needed for such assembly.” Pl.’s Opp. at 4 n.4. But for the presence of the reserved PIC bleachers, ANSWER and its members would be able to join other members of the public in lining the parade route along Pennsylvania Avenue.5
ANSWER has sufficiently alleged that the challenged regulation injures both ANSWER’s members and the organization itself—specifically, that the regulation interferes with their asserted First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights to assemble and engage in political dissent along the Inaugural Parade route. This injury is “concrete and particularized.” See In re Navy Chaplaincy, 697 F.3d 1171, 1175 (D.C. Cir 2012); Am. Compl. ¶ 1 (“ANSWER Coalition has concrete plans to organize mass demonstration activity for the 2009 Inaugural Parade route and for the foreseeable future, and seeks to line the Inaugural Parade route with protesters and activists.”); Becker Decl. ¶¶ 2-3 (ANSWER “anticipates in excess of ten thousand persons, and potentially tens of thousands of persons” to come to Washington with the intent to “collectively line the parade route.”). The alleged injury is “fairly traceable” to NPS’ conduct –

5

ANSWER notes that NPS filed its own permit application for Freedom Plaza and

other portions of Pennsylvania Avenue on behalf of the PIC and pursuant to the Presidential

Inaugural Ceremonies Act, after ANSWER submitted its application. Supp. Pleading ¶ 5. Thus,

while ANSWER had the first-in-time application for Freedom Plaza, NPS may have had the

first-in-time application for other portions of Pennsylvania Avenue. NPS does not address

whether this application exists, and it is unclear whether it was submitted to provide a separate

and independent basis for granting the PIC exclusive use of certain areas on Pennsylvania

Avenue (an action that arguably falls within the scope of ANSWER’s third claim against NPS),

or whether NPS’ permit application is merely the implementation of the revised regulations

(conduct that would fall within the scope of ANSWER’s fourth and newest claim).

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specifically, NPS’ anticipated enforcement of regulations that reserve portions of Pennsylvania Avenue for exclusive PIC use – and a favorable declaration from this Court would “likely . . . redress” ANSWER’s injury. See In re Navy Chaplaincy, 697 F.3d at 1175 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560-61). NPS has not provided any evidence or legal authority to the contrary. The Court therefore concludes that ANSWER has met its burden of presenting factual allegations of injury resulting from NPS’ conduct sufficient to support its as-applied challenge to the regulatory set-aside of both Freedom Plaza and other portions of the Inaugural Parade route.

IV. CONCLUSION

The facts as alleged in ANSWER’s pleadings, and supported in its briefs and

declaration, suffice to show that ANSWER has standing to challenge the PIC regulatory set-aside

in 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(B)(1), on its face and as applied to ANSWER and its members.

Accordingly, the Court will deny the Secretary’s motion to dismiss in part for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction.

An Order consistent with this Opinion will issue this same day.

SO ORDERED.

DATE: January 14, 2013

/s/____________________________ PAUL L. FRIEDMAN United States District Judge

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 Case 1:05-cv-00071-PLF Document 219 Filed 01/28/16 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

_________________________________________

)

A.N.S.W.E.R. COALITION,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

SALLY JEWELL, Secretary,

)

United States Department of the Interior, et al., )

)

Defendants.1

)

_________________________________________ )

Civil Action No. 05-0071 (PLF)

ORDER For the reasons stated in the accompanying Opinion issued this same day, it is hereby ORDERED that defendant Sally Jewell’s motion for summary judgment on Counts III and IV [Dkt. No. 174] is GRANTED; it is FURTHER ORDERED that judgment is entered for defendants Sally Jewell and Jonathan Jarvis on Counts III and IV; it is FURTHER ORDERED that defendant Sally Jewell’s motion to dismiss Count I [Dkt. No. 174] is DENIED; it is

1

Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court

substitutes as defendants the current Secretary of the Interior, Sally Jewell, for former Secretary

Ken Salazar, the current Director of the National Park Service, Jonathan Jarvis, for former

Director Fran Mainella, the current Director of the Secret Service, Joseph Clancy, for former

Director Mark Sullivan, and the current Secretary of Homeland Security, Jeh Johnson, for former

Acting Secretary Rand Beers.

Case 1:05-cv-00071-PLF Document 219 Filed 01/28/16 Page 2 of 2
FURTHER ORDERED that defendant Jeh Johnson’s motion for summary judgment on Count II [Dkt. No. 181] is GRANTED; it is
FURTHER ORDERED that judgment is entered for defendants Jeh Johnson and Joseph Clancy on Count II; it is
FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff ANSWER’s cross-motion for summary judgment on Counts III and IV [Dkt. Nos. 183 and 184] and its cross-motion for summary judgment on Count II [Dkt. Nos. 204 and 205] are DENIED; it is
FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to strike [Dkt. No. 182] is GRANTED; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall remove this case from the docket of this Court. This is a final appealable order. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a).2
SO ORDERED.

DATE: January 28, 2016

/s/____________________________ PAUL L. FRIEDMAN United States District Judge

2

Judgment has previously been entered for plaintiff on Count I. See Order of

March 20, 2008 [Dkt. No. 59].

 
 Case 1:05-cv-00071-PLF Document 220 Filed 01/28/16 Page 1 of 34

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

_________________________________________

)

A.N.S.W.E.R. COALITION,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

SALLY JEWELL, Secretary,

)

United States Department of the Interior, et al., )

)

Defendants.

)

_________________________________________ )

Civil Action No. 05-0071 (PLF)

OPINION Plaintiff A.N.S.W.E.R. (Act Now to Stop War and End Racism) Coalition (“ANSWER”) filed this lawsuit in January 2005 against the Secretary of the Interior, the Director of the National Park Service (collectively “NPS”), and the Director of the Secret Service, an agency within the Department of Homeland Security (“Secret Service”), challenging the constitutionality of certain policies that restrict ANSWER’s ability to engage in expressive activity during the Presidential Inaugural Parade in Washington, D.C.1 This matter is before the Court on the Secretary of the Interior and National Park Service’s motion to dismiss Count I and for summary judgment on Counts III and IV, the Secretary of Homeland Security’s motion for

1

Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court

substitutes as defendants the current Secretary of the Interior, Sally Jewell, for former Secretary

Ken Salazar, the current Director of the National Park Service, Jonathan B. Jarvis, for former

Director Fran Mainella, the current Director of the Secret Service, Joseph Clancy, for former

Director Mark Sullivan, and the current Secretary of Homeland Security, Jeh Johnson, for former

Acting Secretary Rand Beers.

Case 1:05-cv-00071-PLF Document 220 Filed 01/28/16 Page 2 of 34
summary judgment on Count II, plaintiff ANSWER’s cross-motions for summary judgment on Counts II, III, and IV, and plaintiff ANSWER’s motion to strike.2
The Court heard oral argument on these motions on October 22, 2015. After carefully considering the parties’ papers, the relevant legal authorities, the arguments presented by counsel, and the history of and record in this case, the Court grants summary judgment to the defendants on Counts II, III, and IV. The Court also denies defendants’ motion to dismiss Count I and grants ANSWER’s motion to strike.

2

The papers reviewed in connection with the pending motions include: plaintiffs’

amended complaint (“Am. Compl.”) [Dkt. 17]; plaintiffs’ supplemental pleading (“Supp.

Pleading”) [Dkt. No. 144]; NPS’ motion to dismiss in part and motion for summary judgment re

Counts III and IV (“NPS Mot.”) [Dkt. No. 174]; NPS’ statement of material facts (“NPS Stmt.”)

[Dkt. No. 174]; declaration of Robbin M. Owen, NPS’ Chief of the Division of Permits

Management, National Mall and Memorial Parks in the National Capital Region (“Owen Decl.”)

[Dkt. No. 171-1]; plaintiffs’ opposition and cross-motion for summary judgment re Counts III

and IV (“Pl. Opp. & Cross-Mot. re Counts III and IV”) [Dkt. No. 183]; plaintiffs’ statement of

material facts re Counts III and IV (“Pl. Stmt. re Counts III and IV”) [Dkt. No. 183]; NPS’

opposition to plaintiff’s cross-motion and reply in support its motion for summary judgment re

Counts III and IV (“NPS Opp. & Reply”) [Dkt. Nos. 206]; NPS’s response to plaintiffs’

statement of material facts (“NPS Resp.”) [Dkt. No. 206-1]; plaintiff’s reply in support of its

cross-motion for summary judgment (“Pl. Reply re Count III and IV”) [Dkt. No. 210]; plaintiff’s

motion to strike (“Pl. Mot. to Strike”) [Dkt. No. 182]; NPS’ opposition to plaintiff’s motion to

strike (“NPS Opp. to Mot. to Strike”) [Dkt. No. 193]; plaintiff’s reply in support of its motion to

strike (“Pl. Reply re Mot. to Strike”) [Dkt. No. 209]; Secret Service’s motion for summary

judgment (“Secret Serv. Mot.”) [Dkt. No. 181]; Secret Service’s statement of material facts

(“Secret Serv. Stmt.”) [Dkt. No. 181]; declaration of Donato Coyer, Special Agent in Charge of

the Dignitary Protective Division (“Coyer Decl.”) [Dkt. No. 181-1]; deposition of William J.

Callahan, deputy assistant director in the Office of Protective Operations for the Secret Service

(“Callahan Dep.”) [Dkt. No. 181-5]; plaintiffs’ opposition and cross-motion for summary

judgment re Count II (“Pl. Opp. & Cross-Mot. re Count II”) [Dkt. No. 204]; plaintiff’s statement

of material facts re Count II (“Pl. Stmt. re Count II”) [Dkt. No. 204]; Secret Service’s opposition

to plaintiffs’ cross-motion and reply in support of its motion for summary judgment on Count II

(“Secret Serv. Opp. & Reply”) [Dkt. No. 211]; Secret Service’s response to plaintiff’s statement

of material facts (“Secret Serv. Resp.”) [Dkt. No. 211-1]; and plaintiff’s reply in support of its

cross-motion for summary judgment (“Pl. Reply re Count II”) [Dkt. No. 214].

2

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I. BACKGROUND The pending motions stem from ANSWER’s ongoing efforts to secure sufficient space for its members and affiliates to engage in political dissent during the Presidential Inaugural Parade. This Court has previously described the factual and procedural background of this case. See A.N.S.W.E.R. Coalition v. Kempthorne, 493 F. Supp. 2d 34, 37-41 (D.D.C. 2007) (“ANSWER I”); A.N.S.W.E.R. Coalition v. Kempthorne, 537 F. Supp. 2d 183, 186-93 (D.D.C. 2008) (“ANSWER II”); A.N.S.W.E.R. Coalition v. Salazar, No. 05-0071, 2012 WL 8667570, at *1-3 (D.D.C. March 5, 2012) (“ANSWER III”); and A.N.S.W.E.R. Coalition v. Salazar, 915 F. Supp. 2d 93, 96-99 (D.D.C. 2013) (“ANSWER IV”). It therefore will limit its discussion accordingly. ANSWER is an unincorporated grassroots organization that engages in political organizing and activism in opposition to war and racism. Am. Compl. ¶ 1. Every four years since 2005, ANSWER has organized or attempted to organize a mass demonstration along Pennsylvania Avenue or in Freedom Plaza to engage in political dissent during the Presidential Inaugural Parade. Id.; Supp. Pleading ¶ 1. Counts III and IV of the complaint and supplemental pleading concern National Park Service regulations, as now amended, that grant the Presidential Inaugural Committee (“PIC”) exclusive access to some of these same areas in connection with events relating to the Presidential Inauguration. See 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(iii) (2012). Count II of the complaint challenges the United States Secret Service’s ban on allowing physical supports for signs into the secure areas of Pennsylvania Avenue along the Presidential Inaugural Parade route.
3

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A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework The Secret Service, a federal law enforcement agency within the Department of Homeland Security, is charged with protecting the President, the Vice President, the President-elect, the Vice President-elect, and the immediate families of those individuals. 18 U.S.C. § 3056(a). Because the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security designated the Presidential Inaugural Parade a National Special Security Event, the Secret Service has the responsibility “to ensure the overall operational security of the day.” Coyer Decl ¶ 4. The Department of the Interior has the authority to issue and implement, through NPS, rules and regulations that oversee the use of federal grounds within the National Park System. See 54 U.S.C. §§ 100101, 100751. Pursuant to this authority, NPS has promulgated regulations for a permitting system that allows the use of National Park System land around the national capital region for special events and demonstrations. See generally 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g). The Secretary of the Interior has additional statutory authority under the Presidential Inaugural Ceremonies Act (“PICA”) to “grant to the Inaugural Committee a permit to use [federal] reservations or grounds during the inaugural period, including a reasonable time before and after the inaugural period.” 36 U.S.C. § 503(a). When ANSWER initiated this suit in 2005, the relevant NPS regulations set aside only the White House sidewalk and three-quarters of Lafayette Park for the exclusive use of PIC for inaugural activities. 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(i)(F) (2005). The regulations provided that permits for demonstrations and special events in other areas would be issued on a first-come, first-served basis, 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(i), and NPS had a “strict policy” to not “accept any permit applications submitted more than one year in advance of the start date for any event on Park Services land.” ANSWER II, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 186-87. In practice, however, NPS
4

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deviated from its policy and submitted permit applications for itself over a year in advance of Inauguration Day activities to reserve for PIC over one-third of the sidewalk space on Pennsylvania Avenue between 4th Street and 15th Street, Northwest, in addition to the Lafayette Park and White House sidewalk areas set aside by regulation. See id. at 187, 190.
B. Procedural History ANSWER’s amended complaint contained three counts. The first claim (Count I) challenged NPS’ actions to exempt itself and PIC from the relevant permitting regulations. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 87-97. ANSWER’s second claim (Count II) challenged the Secret Service’s prohibition on supports for signs and placards. Id. ¶¶ 98-102. ANSWER’s third claim (Count III) challenged NPS’ policy of granting to PIC exclusive use of space along the parade route, regardless of whether such policy was inconsistent with NPS’ regulations. Id. ¶¶ 103-08. ANSWER asserted that the conduct described in each count violated the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause, and requested declaratory and injunctive relief, including a “[d]eclaratory judgment that the NPS policy and practice of granting to PIC exclusive use of the public space abutting the Inaugural Parade route is unconstitutional; an injunction prohibiting such discriminatory conduct in the future; and a mandatory injunction that the NPS make the sidewalks abutting the Inaugural Parade generally open for the public for use[.]” Am. Compl. ¶ 27. ANSWER did not challenge the regulatory set-aside of the White House sidewalk and Lafayette Park. Id. ¶ 104. The Court addressed the justiciability of ANSWER’s claims in an Opinion and Order dated June 13, 2007, in which the Court held that ANSWER had both organizational and representational standing to challenge NPS’ then-uncodified policy and practice of granting PIC exclusive use of public space along the parade route. See ANSWER I, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 42-48.
5

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NPS then moved for summary judgment on Counts I and III, and ANSWER moved for summary judgment on Count I. See ANSWER II, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 192-93.3 In an Opinion and Order dated March 20, 2008, the Court denied NPS’ motion for summary judgment and granted ANSWER’s motion for summary judgment on Count I. See id. at 206. The Court held that NPS’ “policy and practice of exempting itself and/or the [PIC] from compliance with the generally applicable permitting regulations, 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g), [was] unconstitutional” and enjoined NPS from doing so “with respect to events relating to the Inauguration.” Id. The Court also denied NPS’ motion for summary judgment on Count III. Noting that the Inauguration is a public event at which protestors have a right to engage in political speech, the Court rejected the government’s argument that ANSWER was “not entitled to ‘insert itself into PIC’s permitted activities.’” Id. at 204 (internal citation omitted). The Court did not reach the question of “[h]ow much, if any, of the Pennsylvania Avenue sidewalks can be reserved for the exclusive use of the government and its ticketed guests on Inauguration Day.” Id. at 205-06.
Following the Court’s decision, NPS amended its regulations governing permits for demonstrations and special events for Inaugural activities. See Areas of the National Park System, National Capitol Region, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,739 (Nov. 17, 2008); 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4) (2012). The regulations now provide, in relevant part:
(i) NPS processes permit applications for demonstrations and special events in order of receipt. NPS will not accept applications more than one year in advance of a proposed continuous event (including set-up time, if any). Use of a particular area is allocated in order of receipt of fully executed applications, subject to the limitations in this section.
. . .

3

Neither party, at that time, moved for summary judgment on Count II, relating to

sign supports. See ANSWER II, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 191.

6

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(iii) In connection with Presidential Inaugural Ceremonies the following areas are reserved for priority use as set forth in this paragraph.
(A) The White House sidewalk and Lafayette Park, exclusive of the northeast quadrant for the exclusive use of the Presidential Inaugural Committee on Inaugural Day.
(B) Portions of Pennsylvania Avenue, National Historic Park and Sherman Park, as designated in the maps included in paragraph (g)(4)(iii)(E) of this section, for the exclusive use of the Presidential Inaugural Committee on Inaugural Day for: (1) Ticketed bleachers viewing and access areas, except that members of the public may use a ticketed bleacher seat that has not been claimed by the ticket holder 10 minutes before the Inaugural Parade is scheduled to pass the bleacher’s block[.]
36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4). The referenced maps show reserved PIC bleacher space on portions of
Pennsylvania Avenue between 7th Street and 15th Street, Northwest, including approximately
three-quarters of Freedom Plaza (located on Pennsylvania Avenue between 13th Street and 14th
Street), and parts of Sherman Park (located at 15th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue). 36 C.F.R.
§ 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(E). According to NPS, these regulations grant PIC additional priority and
exclusive use of approximately fourteen percent of Pennsylvania Avenue along the Inaugural
Parade route. ANSWER III, 2012 WL 8667570 at *5.
ANSWER subsequently filed a motion to enforce this Court’s injunction against
NPS on the ground that the amended regulations violated the Court’s March 20, 2008 Order.
The Court denied that motion. ANSWER III, 2012 WL 8667570 at *8. Although the amended
regulations expanded the reach of the regulatory set-aside, the Court found that they did not
contravene the terms of the Court’s injunction, which merely enjoined NPS’ practice of deviating
from its then-existing regulations and established policies in order to discriminate in favor of
PIC. Id. at *6-7. Although the Court concluded that the injunction did not preclude the
7

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expansion of the regulatory set-aside, “[t]hat conclusion does not mean that NPS’ amended regulations are constitutional; it just means that the Court has not addressed the issue.” Id. at *7. The Court then granted ANSWER leave to file a supplemental pleading containing facial and as-applied challenges to 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(B). Id. at *8.
C. ANSWER’s Supplemental Pleading In addition to the three claims set forth in its Amended Complaint, see supra at 4-5, ANSWER presents a fourth claim in its Supplemental Pleading. It alleges that enforcement of the regulatory set-aside contained in the amended regulations, 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(B), constitutes identity-based, viewpoint-based and/or content-based discrimination; that there is no compelling purpose served by favoring PIC or the Administration and disfavoring others; and that the challenged exemption does not constitute a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction, all in violation of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Count IV). Supp. Pleading ¶¶ 10, 14, 21-23. ANSWER challenges the regulations on their face and as applied to ANSWER and its members. Id. ¶ 15. Along with the Supplemental Pleading, ANSWER enclosed its application for a permit to conduct a demonstration relating to the 2013 Inauguration, seeking a permit for “Freedom Plaza, [and] sidewalks adjacent to Freedom Plaza.” See id., Attachment 1. ANSWER also included NPS’ confirmation of ANSWER’s first-in-time application, in which NPS informed ANSWER of the regulatory priority for certain designated areas at Freedom Plaza relating to the Inaugural Parade, but authorized ANSWER to use a 160-foot by 35-foot-wide segment of the western portion of Freedom Plaza. See id., Attachment 2. Although ANSWER’s application was “deemed granted,” NPS claimed to retain authority to revoke ANSWER’s permit for “certain designated areas at Freedom Plaza relating to the Inaugural Parade” that PIC intended to use once it was
8

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formed in November 2012. Id. ANSWER now requests declaratory and permanent injunctive relief and asks the Court to hold 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(B)(1), as amended, unconstitutional, enjoin its operative effect, and order NPS to remove from the incorporated regulatory maps those areas reserved for the “PIC Bleacher area.” Supp. Pleading ¶ 26(a).
In an Opinion and Order dated January 14, 2013, the Court denied NPS’ motion to dismiss ANSWER’s Supplemental Pleading for lack of standing. See ANSWER IV, 915 F. Supp. 2d at 100-04. The Court held that ANSWER has standing to challenge the PIC regulatory set-aside in 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(B)(1), on its face and as applied to ANSWER and its members. Id.4

II. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE Before reaching the parties’ cross-motions, the Court must resolve an initial matter — ANSWER seeks to strike from the record one sentence from the Owen Declaration, submitted by NPS in support of its motion, and a related paragraph in NPS’ accompanying statement of material facts as to which there is no genuine issue. Pl.’s Reply in Support of its Mot. to Strike at 1. The sentence at issue states: “I understand that PIC traditionally sells tickets for their bleacher seats to help recoup some of their expenses that they incur as being in charge of the Presidential inaugural ceremony and functions and activities connected with the ceremony under 36 U.S.C. [§ 501(1)].” Owen Decl. ¶ 10.5 Because this statement is not based on the

4

“[T]he distinction between facial and as-applied challenges . . . goes to the

breadth of the remedy employed by the Court, not what must be pleaded in a complaint.”

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 331 (2010). The relevant legal standards therefore are

“the same for both challenges.” Edwards v. Dist. of Columbia, 755 F.3d 996, 1002 (D.C. Cir.

2014) (citing Legal Aid Servs. Of Or. V. Legal Servs. Corp., 608 F.3d 1084, 1096 (9th Cir.

2010)).

5

Paragraph 17 of NPS’ Statement of Material Facts, which cites paragraph 10 of

the Owen Declaration, similarly states that “PIC traditionally sells tickets for its bleacher seats to

9

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declarant’s personal knowledge as required for a declaration submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56(c)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court will grant plaintiff’s motion. The first sentence of paragraph 10 of the Owen Declaration and paragraph 17 of NPS’ Statement of Material Facts therefore are stricken from the record and will not be considered with respect to the pending motions.
III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK A. Summary Judgment Standard Summary judgment is appropriate only if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see Baumann v. Dist. of Columbia, 795 F.3d 209, 215 (D.C. Cir. 2015); FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a), (c). In making that determination, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. Baumann v. Dist. of Columbia, 795 F.3d at 215; see Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014) (per curiam); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 255; Talavera v. Shah, 638 F.3d 303, 308 (D.C. Cir. 2011). A disputed fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Talavera v. Shah, 638 F.3d at 308 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248). A dispute over a material fact is “genuine” if it could lead a reasonable jury to return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007); Grimes v. Dist. of Columbia,
help recoup some of PIC’s expenses that it incurs for being in charge of the Presidential inaugural ceremony and the functions and activities connected with the ceremony under 36 U.S.C. § 501(1).” NPS Stmt. ¶ 10.
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794 F.3d 83, 94-95 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Paige v. DEA, 665 F.3d 1355, 1358 (D.C. Cir. 2012). “Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge at summary judgment. Thus, [the court] do[es] not determine the truth of the matter, but instead decide[s] only whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Barnett v. PA Consulting Group, Inc., 715 F.3d 354, 358 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting Pardo-Kronemann v. Donovan, 601 F.3d 599, 604 (D.C. Cir. 2010)); see also Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. at 1866; Baumann v. Dist. of Columbia, 795 F.3d at 215; Allen v. Johnson, 795 F.3d 34, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
B. The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment The First Amendment provides, in relevant part, that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. Demonstration activities such as those in which plaintiff seeks to engage are expressive activities involving “speech” protected by the First Amendment. See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176 (1983). Indeed, the activities at issue are core political speech. See Initiative and Referendum Inst. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 417 F.3d 1299, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citing Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421-22 (1988)). And, as the D.C. Circuit has observed, the “general concepts of First Amendment freedoms are given added impetus as to speech and peaceful demonstrations in Washington, D.C., by the clause of the Constitution which assures citizens of the right to assemble peaceably at the seat of government and present grievances.” A Quaker Action Group v. Morton, 460 F.2d 854, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (“Quaker Action III”). There are three types of forums that may be implicated in a First Amendment analysis: (1) the traditional public forum, (2) the designated public forum, and (3) the nonpublic
11

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forum. A traditional public forum is one that has traditionally been available for public expression, assembly, and debate, such as public streets and parks. See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. at 177; Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). These places “have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.” Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009). Such use of the streets and public places is “a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.” White House Vigil for the ERA Comm. v. Clark, 746 F.2d 1518, 1526 n.66 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citation omitted). Freedom Plaza and the sidewalks of Pennsylvania Avenue are “quintessential public forum[s],” Mahoney v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d 1452, 1457 (D.C. Cir. 1997), that “occupy a privileged position in the hierarchy of First Amendment jurisprudence.” White House Vigil for the ERA Comm. v. Clark, 746 F.2d at 1526-27.
In these quintessential public forums, the government may not prohibit all communicative or expressive activity. Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45. The government may, however, regulate speech in these forums through the promulgation of rules and regulations, and it may require permits for the exercise of expressive rights — so long as such regulation of speech is content-neutral and does not favor one person’s or cause’s views over another. McCullen v. Coakley, 135 S. Ct. 2518, 2519 (2014); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). As the Chief Justice recently noted:
[T]he guiding First Amendment principle that the “government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content” applies with full force in a traditional public forum. Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). As a general rule, in such a forum the government may not “selectively . . . shield the public from some kinds of speech on the
12

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ground that they are more offensive than others.” Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975). McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. at 2519. Regulations that are unrelated to the content or viewpoint of speech are subject to what has been termed an intermediate level of scrutiny because, generally, “they pose a less substantial risk of excising certain ideas or viewpoints from the public dialogue.” Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994); see Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 293-94. So long as the restrictions “are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication,” the government may enforce reasonable time, place and manner restrictions. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. at 177 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45); see also Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Kerrigan, 865 F.2d 382, 387 (D.C. Cir. 1989); White House Vigil for the ERA Comm. v. Clark, 746 F.2d at 1527.6 By contrast, when the restriction on speech is not content-neutral, but content-based, such a restriction on political speech in a public forum is “subjected to the most

6

“The principal inquiry in determining content neutrality, in speech cases generally

and in time, place, or manner cases in particular, is whether the government has adopted a

regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.” Ward v. Rock

Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 791. “Government regulation of expressive activity is content

neutral so long as it is ‘justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.’” Id.

(internal citations omitted); see also United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).

The “‘narrowly tailored’ portion of the time place or manner test requires that there be a real nexus between the challenged regulation and the significant governmental interest sought to be served by the regulation.” Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Kerrigan, 865 F.2d at 389 (emphasis in original). “It is not enough that a regulation is facially reasonable, or that a governmental interest is significant; rather, it must be shown that a reasonable regulation is narrowly tailored to substantially serve a significant governmental interest.” Id. (emphasis in original). To put it another way, there must be “a close fit between ends and means.” McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. at 2534.
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exacting scrutiny” – so-called strict scrutiny. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988); see also Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2231 (2015); Mahoney v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d at 1455. Because “the government may not regulate speech based on its substantive content or the message it conveys,” Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995); see Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 578 (1995); Forsyth Cty., Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 135 (1992), content-based laws – “those that target speech based on communicative content – are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.” Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. at 2226; see Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. at 321-22; United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. at 177.
Viewpoint discrimination is a subset of content-based discrimination, a more “egregious form of content discrimination.” Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. at 829. Both under the First Amendment and under the Equal Protection Clause, “government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial views. . . . [G]overnment must afford all points of view an equal opportunity to be heard.” Police Dep’t of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (footnote omitted) (holding that the government may not allow picketing on one topic while prohibiting it on others). The courts “will not tolerate any attempt to discriminate among protestors on the basis of viewpoint or subject matter.” White House Vigil for the ERA Comm. v. Clark, 746 F.2d at 1527.
C. Permitting System In order to regulate competing uses of public forums, the government may impose a permit requirement on those wishing to hold a march, parade, or rally, or otherwise use the
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parks and streets for expressive activity. Forsyth Cty., Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. at 130. As a prior restraint on speech, however, any permitting scheme must meet certain constitutional requirements. It may not delegate overly broad licensing discretion to a government official. Furthermore, consistent with the principles just discussed, any permitting scheme controlling the time, place, and manner of speech “must not be based on the content of the message, must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and must leave open ample alternatives for communication.” Id.; see United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. at 177. A “government regulation that allows arbitrary application is inherently inconsistent with a valid time, place, and manner regulation because such discretion has the potential for becoming a means of suppressing a particular point of view. To curtail that risk, a law subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license must contain narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority.” Forsyth Cty., Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. at 130-31 (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 323 (2002) (“Where the licensing official enjoys unduly broad discretion in determining whether to grant or deny a permit, there is a risk that he will favor or disfavor speech based on its content.”). The government “bears the burden of justifying its [permitting] restrictions.” Bd. of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
Both this Court and the District of Columbia Circuit have previously had occasion to consider various aspects of NPS permitting regulations governing federal parklands within the capital city, particularly when those regulations have conflicted with the rights of citizens to engage in political speech. A previous iteration of the NPS regulations exempted National Park Service sponsored events entirely – in that case, the Christmas Pageant for Peace, a so-called
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“National Celebration Event” – from the permitting rules governing non-NPS events. The
district court enjoined NPS from refusing permission to erect a temporary anti-war display on the
Ellipse by Women Strike for Peace, and the court of appeals affirmed. Judge Wright observed:
[T]he Government’s regulations do discriminate between applicants on a constitutionally unacceptable basis. Whereas all other events require permits before they can be held, NPS events are permitted to proceed without a permit. Furthermore, NPS events – unlike all other events – are permitted to preempt an entire park area. Taken together, these two provisions mean that the Government-sponsored displays are always given preference over other displays which do not meet with the approval of Government officials. Such discrimination cannot be analogized to evenhanded enforcement of the rules of the road. It constitutes instead the kind of blatant government censorship which the framers of the First Amendment intended to outlaw forever.
Women Strike for Peace v. Morton, 472 F.2d 1273, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (footnotes omitted)
(Wright, J., concurring in a per curiam affirmance of the district court’s order granting injunctive
relief to the plaintiffs). Under Women Strike for Peace, therefore, and as this Court held in
ANSWER II, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 197, NPS must subject itself to the same permitting regulations
as other applicants for permits. See also A Quaker Action Group v. Morton, 516 F.2d 717, 727
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (“Quaker Action IV”) (NPS permitting system must be “enforced uniformly and
without discrimination”).
Since the sidewalks abutting Pennsylvania Avenue became federal lands in 1996,
members of this Court have been called upon to apply these principles when faced with disputes
about the rights of protesters on Inauguration Day — every four years, without fail. See, e.g.,
Mahoney v. Babbitt, Civil Action No. 96-2827 (Greene, J.) (1997 Inauguration of President
William Jefferson Clinton); Int’l Action Ctr. v. United States, Civil Action No. 01-0072
(Kessler, J.) (2001 Inauguration of President George W. Bush); A.N.S.W.E.R. Coalition v.
Norton, Civil Action No. 05-0071 (Friedman, J.) (the case at bar, 2005 Inauguration of President
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George W. Bush). In response to this Court’s decision of March 20, 2008, that NPS may not reserve all of the sidewalks on Pennsylvania Avenue for PIC, ANSWER II, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 205, the NPS amended its regulations, expressly eliminating any ability to exempt itself from generally applicable permitting regulations or to provide itself with application priority. See ANSWER III, 2012 WL 8667570, at *3-5. While NPS’s regulations have, since 1980, set-aside the White House sidewalks and three-quarters of Lafayette Park for the exclusive use of PIC during the period surrounding the Inauguration, the amended regulations expand the set-aside to include portions of Freedom Plaza and approximately the final seven blocks of Pennsylvania Avenue along the parade route. Id. at *4-5.
The question that remains in this case, aside from ANSWER’s challenge to the Secret Service’s ban on supports for signs, is how much, if any, of the Pennsylvania Avenue sidewalks and Freedom Plaza can constitutionally be reserved for the exclusive use of PIC and its ticketed guests on Inauguration Day, and how much must be left open so that any peaceful demonstrators may be granted a permit regardless of viewpoint or content.
IV. ANALYSIS A. Count I – Permitting Violations NPS argues that Count I should be dismissed because the regulations have been amended and PIC no longer is exempted from the permitting system; if the policy no longer exists, the claim is moot. In response, ANSWER correctly maintains that this portion of defendants’ motion is not moot but already has been decided in plaintiff’s favor: this Court granted summary judgment to plaintiff on Count I and entered the requested injunction on March 20, 2008. See ANSWER II, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 204. Defendants did not appeal the Court’s decision. NPS’ motion to dismiss Count I therefore will be denied.
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B. Counts III and IV: Set-Aside of Pennsylvania Avenue and Freedom Plaza 1. The Regulatory Set-Aside is Content-Neutral and Therefore Subject to Intermediate Scrutiny
Freedom Plaza and the Pennsylvania Avenue sidewalks are traditional public forums. Thus, as defendants concede, “the government ordinarily may not regulate speech based on the content of the message – i.e., the subject matter – conveyed.” NPS’s Mot. at 15 (citing Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96); ANSWER II, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 195). Defendants argue that the regulations are content-neutral, and therefore are subject only to intermediate scrutiny, because “until an election is held the views of the incoming administration are completely unknown.” NPS Mot. at 17.7 By contrast, ANSWER maintains that the amended regulations are content and viewpoint-based; they favor the incoming Presidential Administration, the President-elect’s views and policies, or the government of the United States, whose policies ANSWER intends to protest no matter which party’s candidate is elected president. Pl. Opp. & Cross-Mot. re Counts III & IV at 13-17. ANSWER therefore argues that the Court must determine if the regulations pass muster under a strict scrutiny analysis, not intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 19.
To determine whether the regulatory set-aside constitutes content or viewpoint-based discrimination, however, the Court first must answer a threshold question: does PIC’s speech in the set-aside areas at the Inaugural Parade constitute government speech or private speech? As the Fourth Circuit has explained:
This threshold inquiry is generally dispositive in viewpoint discrimination cases because of three common assumptions: first,

7

As an initial matter, the Court rejects defendants’ related argument that, because

ANSWER does not challenge the long-standing regulatory set-aside of the White House

sidewalks and Lafayette Park, ANSWER has “concede[d] that PIC may in fact be given some

kind of priority use of federal parkland for the Inauguration.” NPS Mot. at 20-21. That separate

regulatory set-aside is not at issue in this case and plaintiff has made no such concession.

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that all speech is either government speech or private speech; second, that when the government speaks for itself and is not regulating the speech of others, it may discriminate based on viewpoint; and third, that the government may not discriminate based on viewpoint when it regulates private speech. Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 792 (4th Cir. 2004). “When the government speaks, it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause from determining the content of what it says.” Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2245 (2015); see Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. at 833 (“[W]hen the State is the speaker, it may make content-based choices.”). The government may “favor its own expression” and is “free to establish venues for the exclusive expression of its own viewpoint.” Oberwetter v. Hilliard, 639 F.3d 545, 553-54 (D.C. Cir. 2011). In short, “[t]he First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause does not apply to the government as communicator.” People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Gittens, 414 F.3d 23, 30-31 (D.C. Cir. 2005). It follows that if PIC’s speech constitutes government speech, then the regulatory set-aside of 16% of the parade route for the government, and the restriction for all others to 84% of the route, does not discriminate among private speakers based on content or viewpoint. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470-73 (2009) (holding that when the government erects a monument on public property, it is not obligated to allow other monuments expressing alternative viewpoints); People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Gittens, 414 F.3d at 30 (“No one could plausibly argue that an Inauguration Parade has to have balance, or that the losing Presidential candidate must — if he requests — be allowed to have a float of his own.”). And if favoring the government’s own speech does not constitute content or viewpoint discrimination, intermediate scrutiny — not strict scrutiny — applies when evaluating under the First Amendment any restrictions by the government on the private speech of others. See supra at 12-13.
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NPS conceded at oral argument that PIC is not a governmental entity. Rather, it is “the privately funded, non-profit, non-governmental, partisan organization that represents the interests of the President-Elect.” AUDREY CELESTE CRANE-HIRSCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42891, THE PRESIDENTIAL INAUGURATION: BASIC FACTS AND INFORMATION 2 (January 9, 2013) [Dkt. No. 183-9] [hereinafter Crane-Hirsch Report].8 That fact does not end the inquiry, however, as speech ostensibly made by a private actor still may constitute government speech. See Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2251 (“The fact that private parties take part in the design and propagation of a message does not extinguish the governmental nature of the message or transform the government’s role into that of a mere forum-provider.”); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. at 472-73 (holding that city display of privately donated monuments in public park constituted government speech because city “effectively controlled” message conveyed by its selection of monuments); Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 560 & n.4, 562 (2005) (declining to decide whether the entity responsible for the advertising at issue was governmental or non-governmental because “[t]he message . . . [was] effectively controlled by the Federal Government itself”). The Court therefore must determine whether PIC’s speech constitutes government speech.
Complicating the analysis of this issue, as Judge Mehta recently noted, is the fact that “[t]he government-speech doctrine is a relatively recent development in federal case law and the test to determine if something is an example of government speech has not been clearly

8

See also Saffron v. Wilson, 481 F. Supp. 228, 235 (D.D.C. 1979) (“The Inaugural

parade in 1973 was an event organized, financed and staged by a private organization called the

1973 Inaugural Committee.”); U.S. Office of Government Ethics, Legal Advisory 12-10:

Presidential Inaugural Events (Dec. 20, 2012) (“[N]ote that the official Presidential Inaugural

Committee (PIC) is not a political organization but rather a 501(c)(4) organization.”); Fed.

Election Commission Advisory Opinion 1980-144 (“[T]he Committee is a District of Columbia

non-profit corporation organized pursuant to 36 U.S.C. 721 et. seq.”).

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established.” Nat’l Ass’n of Manufacturers v. Perez, 103 F. Supp. 3d 7, 15 n.4 (D.D.C. 2015). Although the Supreme Court has not articulated a precise test for distinguishing government speech from private speech, the Court recently identified three relevant factors in Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2248-50 (2015), and Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. at 470-73: (1) the history of the speech at issue; (2) a reasonable observer’s perception of the speaker; and (3) control and final authority over the content of the message. Applying these factors, the five Justice majority in Walker held that specialty license plates issued by the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles constituted government speech, concluding that: (1) license plates “long have communicated messages from the States;” (2) license plates “are often closely identified in the public mind with the State,” such that reasonable observers “interpret them as conveying some message on the [State’s] behalf;” and (3) Texas has “effectively controlled” the content of the messages contained on the license plates because it retained final approval authority. 135 S. Ct. 2248-49 (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. at 470, 472, 473).
Although the Court recognizes that this is a close and novel question, it concludes that PIC’s speech constitutes government speech after considering the three factors identified by the Supreme Court in Walker and Summum. First, since the founding of this nation, the United States government has used the Presidential Inauguration Ceremony and its attendant celebrations to “speak to the public.” See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. at 470. Going back to George Washington’s Inaugural Address at the first Inauguration in 1789 and the first organized Inaugural Parade in 1809 at the Inauguration of James Madison, the Inauguration Ceremony and the Parade are used every four years as a platform for the government to communicate with the public. INAUGURAL PARADE, JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE ON
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INAUGURAL CEREMONIES (Jan. 13, 2015), http://www.inaugural.senate.gov/days-events/daysevent/inaugural-address. Second, the Inauguration Ceremony and Parade are “closely identified in the public mind with” the United States government. Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2248 (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. at. 472). Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of speech more closely associated with the government than the oath-of-office of the Chief Executive of the United States and the celebration of his or her Inauguration. “[A] reasonable and fully informed observer would understand [such] expression to be government speech, as distinct from private speech[.]” Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. at 487 (Souter, J., concurring).9
The third factor identified by the Supreme Court in Walker and Summum is not so cut-and-dried. While the involvement of PIC in planning the Inauguration and Inaugural Parade certainly is not fatal to the government speech paradigm, Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2247, there is no direct evidence in the record as to the extent to which, if any, the government retains control and final authority over PIC’s expressive activities — such as the signs, flags, or banners displayed — within the set-aside areas at the Inaugural Parade. What is clear is that PIC ultimately is “in charge of the Presidential inaugural

9

Indeed, even ANSWER itself, throughout its briefs, characterizes PIC as

representing the government, even going so far at times as to label PIC’s speech ‘government

speech.’ See, e.g., Pl. Opp. & Cross-Mot. re Counts III and IV at 2 (PIC is “the advocacy and

fundraising vehicle of the government.”); id. at 11 (referring to the set-aside as a “permanent ban

. . . in favor of the government’s supporters and speech”); id. at 13 (describing PIC as

“represent[ing] [the] government’s viewpoint” and the set-aside as a “favored reservation of

public forum space for government speech”); id. at 14 (“government sponsored expression”); id.

at 15 (set-aside is “viewpoint-based discrimination in favor of government speech”); id. at 18

(PIC “represent[s] the viewpoint of the government” and “its expressive activities are co-

sponsored by the government”); id. at 27 (“The Inauguration will go on regardless of reserved

PIC bleacher seats for government speech.”); Pl. Reply re Counts III and IV at 3 (describing

PIC’s speech as “that of the government”); id. at 4 (“PIC uses these areas to express the

viewpoint of the government”); id. at 23 (“the government’s speech”).

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ceremony and functions and activities connected with the ceremony.” 36 U.S.C. § 501(1). “The
Presidential Inaugural Committee . . . organizes, plans, and executes most of the inaugural
celebration activities, including the . . . inaugural parade” and even “is responsible for choosing
the participants.” Crane-Hirsch Report at 5.
On the other hand, PIC is controlled by the President-Elect, see Crane-Hirsch
Report at 2, who becomes the Chief Executive of the United States government upon taking the
oath-of-office at noon on Inauguration Day — hours before the Inaugural Parade begins and
ANSWER and others wish to protest in the set-aside areas of Freedom Plaza and the seven-block stretch of Pennsylvania Avenue.10 And, although PIC is “in charge” of the Parade, the United
States government contributes significant public funds, in addition to the private funding raised by PIC. See id. at 2.11
Taken together, the three considerations identified in Walker and Summum lead
the Court to conclude that PIC’s speech constitutes government speech. Although the final, and
perhaps most important, factor — control over content — arguably weighs to some extent
against finding government speech, the first two factors weigh strongly in favor. The Inaugural
10 The oath-of-office is administered at noon on Inauguration Day, US. CONST. amend. XX, § 1, while the Inaugural Parade takes place “[a]fter the conclusion of the Inaugural Ceremonies and the luncheon.” INAUGURAL PARADE, JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE ON INAUGURAL CEREMONIES (Jan. 13, 2015), http://www.inaugural.senate.gov/days-events/daysevent/inaugural-address. In 2013, for example, the Parade was scheduled to commence at 2:30 pm. INAUGURATION SCHEDULE OF EVENTS, DOD SUPPORT TO THE 57TH PRESIDENTIAL INAUGURATION, JOINT TASK FORCE – NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION (Jan. 13, 2015), http://inauguralsupport.mdw.army.mil/public-information/schedule-of-events.
11 For the 2009 Inauguration, $3.6 million was appropriated to the Architect of the Capitol for “Capitol building inaugural support,” $1.24 million to the Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies, and $2 million to NPS “for security and visitor safety activities related to the Presidential Inaugural Ceremonies.” Crane-Hirsch Report at 2. The Joint Task Force-Armed Forces Inaugural Committee and the Department of Defense further reported spending $21.6 million for “military personnel, operation and maintenance, and procurement” related to the Inaugural Celebration. Id.
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Parade has long served as a very public platform for the speech of the Administration of the new President — he or she, not PIC, ultimately “sets the overall message to be communicated.” Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n, 543 U.S. at 562. And reasonable observers would readily identify the Parade and the activities surrounding it, including the official viewing stands for the President’s ticketed guests, as representing the viewpoint of the United States government. Moreover, just as with speech emanating directly from a governmental entity — perhaps even more so — PIC’s speech is “ultimately ‘accountable to the electorate and the political process for its advocacy,’” Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. at 468, because PIC “is directly responsible to the new elected President.” Crane-Hirsch Report at 5.12
Of course, this conclusion — that PIC’s speech is government speech — “does not mean that the [regulatory set-aside] do[es] not also implicate the free speech rights of private persons.” Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2252. Although, for the reasons just discussed, PIC’s speech itself is not subject to First Amendment scrutiny, the restriction of the expressive activities of ANSWER and all other private persons and entities to limited portions of the parade route and Freedom Plaza is. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. at 467 (“The Free Speech Clause restricts government regulation of private
12 For these reasons, ANSWER’s bare-bones Equal Protection Clause argument also fails because PIC is not “similarly situated” to plaintiff. Muwekma Ohlone Tribe v. Salazar, 708 F.3d 209, 215 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“To prevail on an equal protection claim, the plaintiff must show that the government has treated it differently from a similarly situated party and that the government’s explanation for the differing treatment ‘does not satisfy the relevant level of scrutiny.’”) (quoting Settles v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 429 F.3d 1098, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). Moreover, as discussed further below, “in a case like this one, in which there is no doubt that the interests invoked in support of the challenged legislative classification are legitimate, and no doubt that the classification was designed to vindicate those interests rather than disfavor a particular speaker or viewpoint, the challengers ‘can fare no better under the Equal Protection Clause than under the First Amendment itself.’” Wagner v. FEC, 793 F.3d 1, 33 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 55 n.4 (1986)).
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speech; it does not regulate government speech.”). Because the regulatory set-asides for the government of portions of the sidewalks of Pennsylvania Avenue and Freedom Plaza are content and viewpoint-neutral restrictions on private speech, however, the regulations are subject only to an intermediate scrutiny analysis. Emergency Coalition to Defend Educ. Travel v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 545 F.3d 4, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)). The regulatory set-aside therefore is valid if (1) it is within the constitutional power of the government; (2) it furthers an important or substantial government interest; (3) the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (4) “the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.” Id.; see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. at 662. The regulation also must leave open ample alternative channels for communication. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
As ANSWER has made no argument challenging the government’s constitutional power, and because the Court has concluded that the restriction is content-neutral, the only issues that remain are: (1) does the regulatory set-aside further an important or substantial government interest; (2) is the restriction on First Amendment freedoms substantially no greater than necessary to further that interest; and (3) are there ample alternative channels available for communication? The Court concludes that the regulation satisfies this standard.
2. The Regulation is Narrowly Tailored to Serve Significant Government Interests A regulation is narrowly tailored when it does not “burden substantially more
speech than is necessary to further the government’s interests.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 799. Further, a “narrowly tailored regulation need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of serving the government’s content-neutral interests.” American Library Ass’n
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v. Reno, 33 F.3d 78, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. at 2535; Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. at 662; Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 288, 299. Rather, the regulation is valid “if a substantial portion of the burden it imposes furthers the Government’s interest, even though a less intrusive alternative might also exist.” American Library Ass’n v. Renom 33 F.3d at 88.
NPS argues that, as this Court has noted, PIC is “recognized by statute as ‘the committee appointed by the President-elect to be in charge of the Presidential inaugural ceremony and functions and activities connected with the ceremony,’” ANSWER III, 2012 WL 8667570, at *1 (quoting Newdow v. Roberts, 603 F.3d 1002, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 2010)), and the government thus has a significant interest in “assist[ing] PIC in meeting its statutory duties to plan inauguration ceremonies and activities.” NPS Mot. at 21; see NPS Reply re Counts III and IV at 23-27.
The Court agrees that the government has a significant and important interest in planning and executing the Inaugural Parade, and that the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The government’s interest is undoubtedly significant — the Inaugural Parade is an event followed worldwide that celebrates “the observance of the inauguration of the Chief Executive of the United States.” Mahoney v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d 1452, 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Inauguration Day has been recognized by Congress as a federal holiday. Crane-Hirsch Report at 1. And Congress expressly has placed PIC “in charge of the Presidential inaugural ceremony and functions and activities connected with the ceremony.” 36 U.S.C. § 501(1). To further the government’s interest in PIC fulfilling that statutory mandate, NPS has reserved approximately 16% of the parade route for PIC’s exclusive use for facilities directly related to effective execution of the Parade. The reserved spaces are used to provide reasonable viewing areas for
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the President’s ticketed guests — a substantial source of PIC’s private fundraising — facilities for the media outlets from across the globe that cover the Inaugural Ceremony and Parade, and portable toilets for the public. That modest restriction of the space available to the general public is narrowly tailored and cannot be said to burden “substantially more speech than is necessary” to further the government’s interest. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 799.
3. The Regulation Leaves Open Ample Alternative Channels for Communication As noted, the regulatory set-aside reserves only 16% of the Inaugural Parade
route, leaving the vast majority of the Pennsylvania Avenue sidewalks and portions of Freedom Plaza open to ANSWER and the general public. At past inaugurations, ANSWER has been granted use of several different spaces, including John Marshall Park and a small portion of Freedom Plaza. NPS Mot. at 27-78 (citing Owen Decl. ¶¶ 20, 23, 25). Although ANSWER argues that “Freedom Plaza is decidedly unique,” Pl. Opp. and Cross-Mot. re Counts III and IV at 38, it has cited no case law supporting the proposition that ANSWER is entitled to protest at the specific location that it believes will be most effective. Compare Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981) (“[T]he First Amendment does not guarantee the right to communicate one’s views at all times and places or in any manner that may be desired.”). ANSWER’s argument that there is “no other suitable or alternative space along the parade route for its intended rally,” Pl. Opp. and Cross-Mot. re Counts III and IV at 10, similarly is unpersuasive — ANSWER has engaged in expressive activity at every Inaugural Parade since 2005, previously has received a permit for space in the unreserved portions of Freedom Plaza, and itself has touted its demonstrations as a success. See NPS Reply, Ex. 1. ANSWER and the general public retain access to 84% of the parade route for their expressive
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activities. The Court therefore easily concludes that the regulatory set-aside provides ample alternative channels for ANSWER’s communication at the Inaugural Parade.
C. Count II – Sign Supports 1. The Sign Support Ban is Content-Neutral and Subject to Intermediate Scrutiny
In 2001, the government first established a checkpoint and perimeter system restricting access to the public spaces along the Presidential Inaugural Parade route. Pl. Opp. & Cross-Mot. re Count II at 3. At that Inaugural Parade, the Secret Service permitted wooden sign supports with cross-sectioned dimensions no greater than three-quarters of an inch by three-quarters of an inch. Id. Beginning in 2005, however, the Secret Service banned all supports for signs and placards from the Presidential Inaugural Parade route. Secret Serv. Mot. at 2. The Secret Service states that the heightened security measures were instituted in response to the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, law enforcement experience in dealing with disruptions at other demonstrations and specifically the 2001 Inauguration, and to ensure efficient access through Pennsylvania Avenue checkpoints. Id.
The Secret Service justifies its ban on sign supports as a precautionary measure established to protect the President, Vice President, other federal officials, law enforcement officers, and parade attendees. The Secret Service maintains that it placed restrictions on the sign supports due to safety concerns: the supports can be used as weapons once detached from the sign or they can be used to carry weapons within. Secret Serv. Mot. at 2; see also Coyer Dec. ¶¶ 15-17 & Attachment 2. The government thus claims that the ban on sign supports is content-neutral because the restriction applies to “all demonstrators, regardless of their views, to PIC ticket-holders and to members of the public.” Secret Serv. Mot. at 15 (emphasis added). ANSWER responds that the Secret Service prohibits supports for lawful expressive signs and
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placards, but allows supports for non-expressive functions such as “metal supports for rain protection (i.e., umbrellas), supports for commercial restaurant signs, supports for cameras (i.e., large heavy metal tripods), supports for cords used to create lanes (i.e., heavy metal stanchions), supports for sitting (i.e., metal legged stools), metal supports for trash bags, supports for infants (i.e., strollers).” Pl. Reply re Count II at 4. Further, ANSWER disputes the Secret Service’s justification and contends that the ban on sign supports is based on their function as a means of holding up political signs for extended periods of time, not for their physicality as a potentially dangerous weapon or weapon concealer. Id. at 5.
The Court agrees with the Secret Service that the ban on sign supports is content-neutral — no evidence in the record indicates that it was adopted because of disagreement with any particular message conveyed or the content of speech. It applies to all sign-holders no matter who they are, what organization they represent, or the views they are expressing. The sign support ban therefore is subject to intermediate scrutiny. See Emergency Coalition to Defend Educ. Travel v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 545 F.3d at 12 (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377, 388). The Court is satisfied that the Secret Service’s ban on sign supports at the Inaugural celebration meets the intermediate scrutiny standard.13
2. The Sign Support Ban is Narrowly Tailored to Serve a Significant Government Interest The Secret Service argues that its restriction on sign supports prohibits only the
items that raise safety and security concerns or that would require careful examination that would
13 The Secret Service argues that supports for signs and placards merely facilitate conduct and therefore are not entitled to the same level of First Amendment protection accorded to pure speech. See White House Vigil for the ERA Comm. v. Clark 746 F.2d at 1540. The Court need not address this argument, however, because it concludes that the regulation readily satisfies intermediate scrutiny. See infra at 30-32.
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impede the efficient flow of people through the checkpoints. Secret Serv. Mot. at 15. It asserts that the ban ensures prompt admission through the security checkpoints because agents may check for banned item categories that have been determined to raise security concerns, rather than take time to measure items against size restrictions. Id. The Secret Service thus maintains that the restrictions on sign supports are narrowly tailored and serve a substantial government interest in protecting the President, Vice President, other federal officials, law enforcement, and the general public at the Inaugural Parade. Id. ANSWER contends that the Secret Service did not narrowly tailor its ban on sign supports because attendees can bring in larger and allegedly more dangerous items such as umbrellas and tripods. Pl. Opp. & Cross-Mot. re Count II at 31. Further, ANSWER argues that the Secret Service has failed to present substantial evidence that its hypothetical risks and concerns cannot be addressed through less restrictive means, such as restrictions on size and composition for sign supports, as distinguished from an outright ban. Id. at 27, 31.
The Court is persuaded that the sign support ban is narrowly tailored to the government’s substantial interest in ensuring safety and managing the flow of pedestrian traffic. The evidence proffered by the government demonstrates that sticks have been used by protesters around the world “to inflict injury on law enforcement officers or on other demonstrators.” Coyer Decl. ¶ 16; see also id. ¶ 17; Callahan Dep. at 41-42. And the Secret Service has not only banned sign supports but also other items — including sticks, laser pointers, coolers, backpacks, and folding chairs — that it reasonably believes could be used as weapons or to conceal weapons. Coyer Decl. ¶ 16 & Ex. 1 (Secret Service letter describing the prohibited categories of items). The government’s evidence also demonstrates the risk of imposing the size restrictions advanced by ANSWER — in 2001, the only Inaugural Parade at which the Secret Service
30

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allowed some sign supports, “individuals were able to burst through a checkpoint due in part to
the number of people present at the checkpoint waiting to be screened.” Id. ¶ 19; see Cmty. for
Creative Non-Violence v. Kerrigan, 865 F.2d at 389; White House Vigil for the ERA Comm. v. Clark, 746 F.2d at 1531.14 By contrast, plaintiff has pointed to no evidence that umbrellas,
tripods or the other various items — the items it cites as comparable to sign supports but that are
allowed by the Secret Service — have ever been used as weapons or to conceal weapons in such circumstances.15 Nor has plaintiff offered evidence that a size restriction would allow for
efficient security screening despite the Secret Service’s experience to the contrary.
Although ANSWER contends that other less restrictive security measures, such as
pre-screening in advance, could permit sign supports without security delays, a regulation does
not fail to satisfy intermediate scrutiny simply “because there are less speech-restrictive
alternatives that could have satisfied the Government interest.” Clark v. Cmty. for Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 299; see id. at 288; McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. at 2535; White
14 For this reason, this case is distinguishable from Edwards v. Coeur d’Alene, 262 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2001). In Edwards, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a complete ban on sign supports “burden[ed] substantially more speech than is necessary” because the government had offered “little empirical evidence” and “little factual support” that less drastic alternatives were not feasible. Id. at 866, 864-65. That case, however, did not involve security checkpoints or demonstrated problems with efficient security screening when “regulating the length, width, composition, and sharpness of sign supports.” Id. The Court concludes that the less-restrictive alternative endorsed by the Ninth Circuit in Edwards is not feasible in the very different context of a Presidential Inauguration and Inaugural Parade. Moreover, Edwards was decided before September 11, 2011, and did not involve an event attended by countless high ranking U.S. government officials, including the President of the United States. The security concerns in this case therefore are significantly greater than those facing the City of Coeur d’Alene in Edwards. The Secret Service’s ban on sign supports burdens substantially no more speech than is necessary.
15 The Secret Service also has explained its fear that supports for signs and placards can be used to conceal weapons, although it has not cited specific examples of this happening. Coyer Decl. ¶ 17; see Secret Serv. Opp. & Reply at 10.
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House Vigil for the ERA Comm. v. Clark, 746 F.2d at 1531-32 (under intermediate scrutiny, “[a] court may not require that the agency adopt ‘the least restrictive alternative.’”). “[T]he requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied ‘so long as the . . . regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.’” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 799. “At its heart, the task of devising a security scheme is inherently a predictive process, requiring planners to make assumptions as to what threats there are, how likely they are to occur, and what harm might result if they do.” American Civil Liberties Union of Colo. v. City and Cty. of Denver, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1175-76 (D. Colo. 2008); accord White House Vigil for the ERA Comm. v. Clark, 746 F.2d at 1531 (“A Court may not require that the agency adopt the ‘least restrictive alternative,’ thereby substituting its judgment for that of the regulators.”); Quaker Action IV, 516 F.2d at 731. The Court therefore is satisfied that the Secret Service’s ban on sign supports burdens substantially no more speech than necessary to further the government’s substantial interest in an efficient and effective security screening process at the Inaugural Parade.
3. The Sign Support Ban Leaves Open Ample Alternative Channels for Communication Having concluded that the ban on sign supports is narrowly tailored, the Court
next must consider whether the prohibition leaves open ample alternative channels of communication. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 293; see also Forsyth Cty., Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. at 130; ISKCON of Potomac, Inc. v. Kennedy, 61 F.3d 949, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The Court concludes that it does. ANSWER is free to hold signs or banners by hand, communicate orally, or hand out leaflets. See Mahoney v. Doe, 642 F.3d 1112, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[Plaintiff] was free to announce any ‘verbal’ message he chose. And, [plaintiff] could depict visual messages on signs, banners, and leaflets.
32

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And it has done so at every Inauguration since 2005. Thus, ample alternative channels of communication existed.”).
The Court disagrees with the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion in Edwards v. Coeur d’Alene that no ample alternative channels of communication exist when sign supports are banned because “there is no other effective and economical way for an individual to communicate his or her message to a broad audience during a parade or public assembly than to attach a handle to his sign to hoist it in the air." 262 F.3d at 867. Although, to be sure, a sign support is far more effective than holding up signs by hand, shouting, or passing out leaflets, the ban does not, as the Ninth Circuit concluded, “effectively prevent[] [a speaker] from reaching his intended audience.” Id. ANSWER itself has touted its prior demonstrations at Inaugurations as a success, see Secret Serv. Mot., Ex. 2, and demonstrators retain the ability to “reach the minds of willing listeners” through an “opportunity to win their attention.” Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. at 655 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Secret Serv. Mot., Ex. 2 (stating that ANSWER’s “antiwar mass rally . . . was broadcast live on C-Span 2 for 4 hours and 25 minutes” and containing photographs showing demonstrators’ signs to be clearly visible to television cameras).
33

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V. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies defendants’ motion to dismiss Count I and grants summary judgment to defendants on Counts II, III, and IV. It also grants plaintiff’s motion to strike. An Order consistent with this Opinion shall issue this same day.

DATE: January 28, 2016

/s/________________________ PAUL L. FRIEDMAN United States District Judge

34

 
 A.N.S.W.E.R. Coalition v. Salazar, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2012) 2012 WL 8667570

2012 WL 8667570 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
A.N.S.W.E.R. COALITION, Plaintiff, v.
Ken SALAZAR, Secretary, United States Department of the Interior, et al., Defendants.1
Civil Action No. 05–0071 (PLF). |
March 5, 2012.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Carl L. Messineo, Mara E. Verheyden–Hilliard, Partnership for Civil Justice, Inc., Washington, DC, Carol A. Sobel, Santa Monica, CA, for Plaintiff.
Marina Utgoff Braswell, U.S. Attorneys Office for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, District Judge.
*1 This matter is before the Court on the motion of plaintiff, A.N.S.W.E.R. Coalition (“ANSWER”), to enforce the injunction issued against defendant, the National Park Service (“NPS”), on March 20, 2008. On that date, the Court granted ANSWER’s motion for summary judgment on Count I of its amended complaint; declared that the NPS “policy and practice of exempting itself and/or the Presidential Inaugural Committee from compliance with the generally applicable permitting regulations, 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g) is unconstitutional”; and enjoined NPS “from exempting itself and/or the Presidential Inaugural Committee from compliance with the generally applicable permitting regulations, 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g), with respect to events relating to the [Presidential] Inauguration[.]” A.N.S.W.E.R. Coal. v. Kempthorne (“ANSWER II”), 537 F.Supp.2d 183, 206
1

(D.D.C.2008).
In response to the Court’s March 20, 2008 Opinion and Order, NPS amended certain parts of 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g), the federal permitting regulations relating to, among other things, the Presidential Inaugural Parade. See 73 FED.REG. 67,739, at 67,739–40 (Nov. 17, 2008); see generally 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g) (2008). The motion now before the Court presents the question whether these amended regulations—specifically, 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(B) (1)—violate the terms of the Court’s injunction. Upon consideration of the parties’ papers, the relevant legal authorities, and the entire record in this case, the Court concludes that NPS’ amended regulations do not violate the terms of the Court’s injunction. The Court therefore will deny ANSWER’s motion to enforce.2

I. BACKGROUND
The Court previously has described the factual and procedural background of this case, see ANSWER II, 537 F.Supp.2d at 186–93; A.N.S.W.E.R. Coal. v. Kempthorne (“ANSWER I”), 493 F.Supp.2d 34, 37–41 (D.D.C.2007), and therefore will limit its discussion accordingly.
This case arises from the permitting policy and practice that NPS engaged in on behalf of the Presidential Inaugural Committee (“PIC”) with respect to the 2005 Presidential Inaugural Parade. ANSWER II, 537 F.Supp.2d at 186. PIC is the private coordinating group of the President-elect, “recognized by statute as ‘the committee appointed by the President-elect to be in charge of the Presidential inaugural ceremony and functions and activities connected with the ceremony.’ ” Newdow v. Roberts, 603 F.3d 1002, 1006 (D.C.Cir.2010) (quoting 36 U.S.C. § 501(1)).
ANSWER, an unincorporated grassroots organization that engages in political organizing and activism in opposition to war and racism, Am. Compl. ¶ 1, filed this lawsuit in 2005 to challenge

the authority of ... [NPS] to

disregard

the

existing

A.N.S.W.E.R. Coalition v. Salazar, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2012) 2012 WL 8667570

constitutionally mandated public space permitting system and systematically exclude the public and dissenters from nearly all points of space abutting the Presidential Inaugural Parade route, granting exclusive access to Pennsylvania Avenue only to those who are financial and political supporters of the administration and its representative Inaugural Committee.
*2 Id. at 1–2. As ANSWER described it,
[NPS], the government entity charged with stewardship of the public’s lands, ... far exceeded its authority and insists that it may abridge freedom of speech and peaceable assembly along Pennsylvania Avenue ... in connection with the recurring Presidential Inaugural Parades except for those whose speech is by invitation of the [incoming] administration’s private advocacy organization, [the PIC].
Am. Compl. at 2. ANSWER’s amended complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief on three claims, all alleging violations of the First Amendment to and the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. ANSWER II, 537 F.Supp.2d at 186.
The Court addressed the justiciability of ANSWER’s three claims in an Opinion and Order dated June 13, 2007. See ANSWER I, 493 F.Supp.2d at 44–48. NPS then moved for summary judgment on Counts I and III, and ANSWER moved for summary judgment only on Count I. See ANSWER II, 537 F.Supp.2d at 192–93.3 The Court resolved the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment by an Opinion and Order dated March 20, 2008. See id. at 206.
2

II. THE COURT’S MARCH 20, 2008 OPINION AND ORDER
In ANSWER II, the Court denied NPS’ motion for summary judgment in its entirety and granted ANSWER’s motion for summary judgment on Count I. See ANSWER II, 537 F.Supp.2d at 206. In granting judgment on Count I, the Court declared that the NPS “policy and practice of exempting itself and/or the [PIC] from compliance with the generally applicable permitting regulations, 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g), is unconstitutional.” Id. Furthermore, the Court enjoined NPS “from exempting itself and/or the [PIC] from compliance with generally applicable permitting regulations, 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g), with respect to events relating to the Inauguration.” Id. NPS did not appeal the Court’s decision. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (the courts of appeals have jurisdiction over appeals from interlocutory orders of district courts granting injunctions).
As the Court described it in ANSWER II, there are two types of events that take place on park lands in the National Capital Region, both of which require permits issued by NPS in accordance with its regulations: special events (e.g., the Presidential Inaugural Parade organized by PIC); and demonstrations (e.g., the activities engaged in by ANSWER during Inaugural celebrations). ANSWER II, 537 F.Supp.2d at 199–200. The applicable NPS regulations in effect as of March 20, 2008 established a non-discriminatory first-come first-served permit application process; permit applications were deemed granted unless denied within 24 hours of receipt; and permits, when issued, had a maximum duration of three weeks. See id. As NPS acknowledged, the agency also employed a strict-but-uncodified policy not to accept any permit applications submitted more than one year in advance of the start date for any event on park land, including the Presidential Inaugural Parade. Id. at 186–87.
*3 According to ANSWER, NPS did not enforce its generally applicable permitting system in a uniform manner. See ANSWER II, 537 F.Supp.2d at 201. Instead, ANSWER alleged, NPS discriminated in favor of PIC with respect to the 2005 Presidential Inaugural Parade in the following way: NPS, on PIC’s behalf, submitted and granted for itself a permit application more than one year in advance of the 2005 Presidential Inaugural Parade, and that permit was issued for the entire length of the Pennsylvania Avenue sidewalks (plus additional areas) for the five month period from November 1, 2004 to April 1, 2005. See id. at 187. ANSWER alleged that NPS’ deviation from its strict-but-uncodified policy on the

A.N.S.W.E.R. Coalition v. Salazar, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2012) 2012 WL 8667570

timing of permit applications, as well as NPS’ deviation from its generally applicable permitting regulations abridged ANSWER’s free speech, petition, and assembly rights. See id. at 191. Thus, in Count I of its amended complaint, ANSWER asserted unconstitutional permitting violations under the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 87–97. More specifically, ANSWER asserted that it was “constitutionally impermissible for the NPS to exempt itself or the PIC from the constitutionally mandated permitting system, particularly where such deviation works an abridgement of others’ free speech, petition and assembly rights.” Id. ¶ 89.
As ANSWER made clear, however, its first claim did “not challeng[e] the constitutionality of the permitting system as written in the regulations,” ANSWER II, 537 F.Supp.2d at 201 (emphasis added), which have included, since 1980, a regulatory set-aside of certain parks lands—the sidewalks of the White House and three-quarters of Lafayette Park—for the priority and exclusive use of PIC on Inauguration Day. See 73 FED.REG. at 67,741 (citing 45 FED.REG. 84,997, at 84,997 (Dec. 24, 1980)); see also 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(i)(F) (2007). ANSWER expressly disclaimed any challenge to that priority and exclusive regulatory set-aside of park land for PIC. ANSWER II, 537 F.Supp.2d at 191 n. 14.
Instead, ANSWER’s first claim challenged “the deviation by NPS from th[e] carefully crafted [permitting] system in order to afford preferential treatment to supporters of the government over those who seek access to a public forum to criticize the government on Inauguration Day.” ANSWER II, 537 F.Supp.2d at 201 (emphasis in original). The Court agreed with ANSWER and concluded
that NPS violated its own regulations in its treatment of the special event permit application that NPS submitted to itself on behalf of the PIC, specifically with respect to the duration of the special event and the related timing of the submission of the application. The Court therefore grant[ed] [ANSWER’s] motion for summary judgment on Count I.
3

Id.
III. DISCUSSION
In response to the Court’s March 20, 2008 Opinion and Order, NPS amended its regulations relating to, among other things, the Presidential Inaugural Parade. See 73 FED.REG. at 67,739–40; see generally 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g) (2008). On August 8, 2008, NPS published proposed amended regulations, see 73 FED.REG. 46,215, at 46, 215–16 (Aug. 8, 2008), and, following a comment period and review, NPS published its final amended regulations on November 17, 2008. See 73 FED.REG. at 67,739; see also Opp. at 7–9. The present dispute between the parties centers on one part of the amended regulations, 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(B)(1) (2008), that expands on a prior grant of priority and exclusive use of park lands for PIC, as previously set forth in 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(i)(F) (2007).
*4 As of the time of the Court’s March 20, 2008 Opinion and Order, NPS regulations provided, in relevant part:
(g) Demonstrations and special events—....
(4) Permit processing.
(i) Permit applications for demonstrations and special events are processed in order of receipt, and the use of a particular area is allocated in order of receipt of fully executed applications, subject to the limitations set forth in this section. Provided, however, that the following national celebration events have priority use of the particular park area during the indicated period....
(F) Inaugural ceremonies. The White House sidewalk and Lafayette Park, exclusive of the northeast quadrant, for the exclusive use of the Inaugural Committee on Inauguration Day.
36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(i)(F) (2007) (emphasis added).4 The regulatory set-aside of the White House sidewalk and three-quarters of Lafayette Park for PIC was codified in the regulations in 1980. See 73 FEG. REG.. at 67,741 (citing 45 FED.REG. at 84,997). ANSWER’s amended complaint made clear that it did not challenge that priority and exclusive regulatory set-aside of park land. See Am.

A.N.S.W.E.R. Coalition v. Salazar, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2012) 2012 WL 8667570

Compl. at 4 (“Plaintiffs do not seek by this lawsuit to disturb the existing and exclusive systems of access ... to Lafayette Park, where the Presidential bleachers and viewing area are located.”); id. ¶ 104 (Plaintiffs “are not seeking access to the spaces set aside by regulation for the exclusive use of the Inaugural Committee, on the sidewalks of the White House and in three-quarters of Lafayette Park.”); see also ANSWER II, 537 F.Supp.2d at 191 & n. 14. The Court therefore has never addressed it in this lawsuit.
As the Court noted in its March 20, 2008 Opinion and Order, NPS’ regulations did not at that time “mention the sidewalks of Pennsylvania Avenue along the parade route or the other areas at issue in this lawsuit as having exclusive or priority use by the Inaugural Committee during the Inauguration.” ANSWER II, 537 F.Supp.2d at 200. But now they do—and ANSWER contends that it is that change in the regulations that violates the Court’s March 20, 2008 injunction.

The regulations, as amended in 2008, provide:
(g) Demonstrations and special events—....
(4) Permit processing.
(i) NPS processes permit applications for demonstrations and special events in order of receipt. NPS will not accept applications more than one year in advance of a proposed continuous event (including set-up time, if any). Use of a particular area is allocated in order of receipt of fully executed applications, subject to the limitations in this section.
(ii) Specific national celebration events have priority use of particular park areas as shown in the following table:

The following event ...

Has priority use of the following At the following time ... area ...

(F) Presidential Inaugural Ceremonies

See paragraph (g)(4)(iii) of this See paragraph (g)(4)(iii) of this

section.

section.

*5 (iii) In connection with Presidential Inaugural Ceremonies the following areas are reserved for priority use as set forth in this paragraph.
(A) The White House sidewalk and Lafayette Park, exclusive of the northeast quadrant for the exclusive use of the Presidential Inaugural Committee on Inaugural Day.
(B) Portions of Pennsylvania Avenue, National Historic Park and Sherman Park, as designated in the maps included in paragraph (g)(4)(iii)(E) of this section, for the exclusive use of the Presidential Inaugural Committee on Inaugural Day for:
The Presidential Inaugural Committee may use the following area ...
4

(1) Ticketed bleachers viewing and access areas, except that members of the public may use a ticketed bleacher seat that has not been claimed by the ticket holder 10 minutes before the Inaugural Parade is scheduled to pass the bleacher’s block ....
(D) The Presidential Inaugural Committee may also use portions of its designated areas reasonably necessary for setting up and taking down stands, bleachers, media and parade support structures as show in the following table:
During the following period ...

A.N.S.W.E.R. Coalition v. Salazar, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2012) 2012 WL 8667570

(1) The White House sidewalk and Lafayette Park
(2) Pennsylvania Avenue, National Historic Park and Sherman Park
(3) The National Mall between 14th and 1st Streets

November 1 through March 1 December 7 through February 10 January 6 through January 30

36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(i)-(iii) (emphasis added). As ANSWER sees it, the part of the amended regulations italicized above, specifically, 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(B)(1), does “precisely what is prohibited: The NPS, by regulation, directly exempts the Presidential Inaugural Committee from compliance with the generally applicable demonstration and special event permitting regulations with respect to events relating to the Inauguration.” Mot. at 2. ANSWER therefore requests that the Court enforce its injunction by directing NPS “to rescind 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4) (iii)(B)(1), which grants the PIC permanent permits for Freedom Plaza and other areas designated on the related maps located at 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(E).” Mot. at 1.
NPS disagrees with ANSWER. The agency argues that its amended regulations do not violate the terms of the Court’s March 20, 2008 injunction, and that ANSWER’s motion is an “improper attempt to expand the scope of” the injunction. Opp. at 1. According to NPS, the regulation at issue permissibly grants to PIC additional priority and exclusive use of “only 14% of Pennsylvania Avenue along the Inaugural Parade route.” Id. at 25; see id. at 8. NPS therefore argues that ANSWER’s motion should be denied; in order for ANSWER to properly bring its new challenge before the Court, NPS contends, ANSWER “must seek to amend or supplement its current complaint[.]” Id. at 12.
5

A. Judicial Authority to Enforce an Injunction
NPS’ papers suggest that there are two separate issues to be addressed: (1) whether ANSWER’s motion is the proper procedural vehicle for bringing its objection to the amended regulations before the Court; and (2) whether the amended regulations violate the terms of the Court’s injunction. See Opp. at 1–2. The only question that the Court need resolve, however, is the latter. If the amended regulations violate the Court’s injunction, the Court clearly has the power to grant the relief requested by ANSWER. See Fund for Animals v. Norton, 390 F.Supp.2d 12, 15 (D.D.C.2005) (“[D]istrict courts clearly have the authority to enforce the terms of their mandates.”); see also International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union v. Donovan, 733 F.2d 920, 922 (D.C.Cir.1984) ( “The power of an original panel to grant relief enforcing the terms of its earlier mandate is clearly established in this Circuit, both with respect to cases that have been remanded to a District Court for further proceedings, ... as well as in cases that have been remanded directly to an administrative agency.”) (internal citations omitted); id. at 922 (emphasizing that a court’s exercise of its authority to enforce a prior order “is particularly appropriate ... where an administrative agency plainly neglects the terms of a mandate”); cf. Habitat Educ. Ctr., Inc. v. Kimbell, 250 F.R.D. 397, 400–01 (E.D.Wis.2008).

A.N.S.W.E.R. Coalition v. Salazar, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2012) 2012 WL 8667570

B. Amended NPS Regulations
*6 The Court concludes that the amended regulations do not violate the terms of its injunction. In ANSWER II, the Court stated that Count I presented the question
whether the practices and procedures engaged in by the NPS to reserve most of the Pennsylvania Avenue sidewalks for the PIC in 2005 were themselves a violation of the First Amendment, insofar as they deviated from the permitting regulations promulgated by NPS and published in the Code of Federal Regulations in order to favor the permit application that NPS submitted on behalf of the PIC (Count I).
ANSWER II, 537 F.Supp.2d at 198–99 (emphasis in original). The Court held unconstitutional NPS’ policy and practice of deviating from its regulations and its strict-but-uncodified timing requirements to discriminate in favor of PIC. See id. at 201, 204.
NPS’ deviation from its generally applicable permitting regulations and its strict-but-uncodified policy on the timing of permit applications to favor PIC were unconstitutional because they were “fundamentally discriminatory,” demonstrating a constitutionally impermissible “preference for the government over all other speakers.” ANSWER II, 537 F.Supp.2d at 203 (citing Quaker Action Grp. v. Morton (“Quaker Action IV”), 516 F.2d 717, 727 (D.C.Cir.1975)). So the question ultimately is this: are NPS’ amended regulations, as ANSWER contends, see Reply at 1–2, a codification of the fundamentally discriminatory policies and procedures held unconstitutional and enjoined by the Court in ANSWER II? The Court concludes that they are not.
In ANSWER II, the Court held that NPS violated its own regulations “with respect to the duration of ... [PIC’s]
6

special event [permit] and the related timing of the submission of [PIC’s] application.” ANSWER II, 537 F.Supp.2d at 201. The duration of the PIC special event permit at issue at the summary judgment stage was five months, from November 1, 2004 to April 1, 2005. Id. at 202. Under the regulations in effect at that time, however, permits could not be granted for a duration of more than three weeks. Id. As for the timing of the submission of an application, NPS’ deviation in favor of PIC from its policy of not accepting any permit applications submitted more than one year in advance of the start date for the Presidential Inaugural Parade had the effect that PIC “would always be the first permit application received.” Id. at 203 (emphasis in original).
The amended regulations do not codify those unconstitutional deviations. With respect to the duration of permits, the amended regulations have created an extended period of time for which permits may be granted during inaugural activities, see 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(vi) (2008), and ANSWER does not challenge those changes in its motion to enforce. See Reply at 6–7.
As for the timing of submission of applications, the amended regulations expressly provide that “NPS will not accept applications more than one year in advance of a proposed continuous event (including set-up time, if any).” 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4) (i) (2008). ANSWER argues that under the amended regulations, PIC “doesn’t even need to submit an application. It is exempt.” Mot. at 5. But as NPS points out, ANSWER cites no language in the amended regulations to support this claim. See Opp. at 22 (“[T]here is no evidence that the Park Service’s amended regulations waive the permit application requirement or any permit requirements for PIC.”); id. at 13–14. Nothing in the regulations relieves PIC of its obligation to obtain a permit, like any other applicant, for its inaugural activities. Under the amended regulations, NPS cannot accept an application on behalf of PIC, or any other applicant, more than one year in advance of the Inaugural Parade. See 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(i).
*7 As for the new provision in the amended regulations that grants to PIC additional priority and exclusive use of park land along Pennsylvania Avenue, see 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(B)(1), the Court agrees with NPS that this regulatory change does not violate the Court’s injunction. The Court’s injunction did not preclude NPS from amending its regulations to grant to PIC additional priority and exclusive use of certain parts of Pennsylvania Avenue on Inauguration Day.

A.N.S.W.E.R. Coalition v. Salazar, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2012) 2012 WL 8667570

As discussed, by regulation in effect since 1980, PIC has been granted priority and exclusive use of the White House sidewalk and three-quarters of Lafayette Park on Inauguration Day. 73 FED.REG. at 67,741; see 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(i)(F) (2007). ANSWER has never challenged that regulatory set-aside in this lawsuit, and the Court’s March 20, 2008 Opinion and Order therefore did not address it. See ANSWER II, 537 F.Supp.2d at 191.
The amended regulations have expanded the reach of that regulatory set-aside: PIC now has been granted additional priority and exclusive use of portions of Pennsylvania Avenue, National Historic Park, and Sherman Avenue on Inauguration Day. See 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(B) (2008). ANSWER argues that this expansion violates the Court’s injunction. According to ANSWER, by means of this additional regulatory set-aside of park land, NPS has “directly exempt[ed] the [PIC] from compliance with the generally applicable ... permitting regulations with respect to events relating to the Inauguration.” Mot. at 2.

set-aside in the amended regulations. See Reply at 11–12; see also Mahoney v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d at 1459 (“[I]t cannot rightly be said that all [public] forums are equal.”); Quaker Action IV, 516 F.2d at 727. Whatever the case may be, the Court’s March 20, 2008 Opinion and Order does not does control, and these other constitutional questions are not properly before the Court on ANSWER’s motion to enforce. Consequently, ANSWER’s motion to enforce the Court’s injunction must be denied.
*8 In order to properly challenge the amended regulations on constitutional grounds, ANSWER must seek leave to amend or supplement its complaint, or must file a new lawsuit. Recently, on February 10, 2012, ANSWER filed an unopposed motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint that presents a facial and an as-applied challenge to 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(B). The Court will grant ANSWER’s unopposed motion.

The Court disagrees. If, as ANSWER contends, the additional regulatory set-aside for PIC of portions of Pennsylvania Avenue, National Historic Park, and Sherman Avenue violates the Court’s injunction—that is, if it constitutes an exemption from compliance with generally applicable permitting regulations, see ANSWER II, 537 F.Supp.2d at 206—then so would the regulatory set-aside for PIC of the White House sidewalk and three-quarters of Lafayette Park. But the Court’s injunction plainly did not address, much less enjoin, the regulatory set-aside of the White House sidewalk and three-quarters of Lafayette Park for PIC, because ANSWER never contested it. The Court’s injunction therefore cannot fairly be read to preclude the expansion set forth in 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(iii) (B)(1).

IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that ANSWER’s motion to enforce the Court’s March 20, 2008 injunction [Dkt. No. 105] is DENIED; it is
FURTHER ORDERED that ANSWER’s unopposed motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint [Dkt. No. 132] is GRANTED; and it is

That conclusion does not mean that NPS’ amended regulations are constitutional; it just means that the Court has not addressed the issue. If the regulatory set-aside of

FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall file the supplemental pleading [Dkt. No. 132–1] on the docket.

the White House sidewalk and Lafayette Park is constitutionally permissible, then there may an argument

SO ORDERED.

that a regulatory set-aside for additional limited portions

of Pennsylvania Avenue similarly is constitutionally permissible.5 On the other hand, as ANSWER argues in

All Citations

its reply papers, perhaps the White House sidewalk and Lafayette Park are uniquely ceremonial and are

Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2012 WL 8667570

distinguishable from the portions of Pennsylvania Avenue

Footnotes

7

A.N.S.W.E.R. Coalition v. Salazar, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2012) 2012 WL 8667570

1

The Court has substituted Ken Salazar, the current Secretary of the Interior, for the former Secretary, Dirk

Kempthorne, as a defendant in this case under Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

2

The papers reviewed in connection with the pending motion include: plaintiff’s amended complaint (“Am.Compl.”)

[Dkt. No. 17]; plaintiff’s motion to enforce injunction (“Mot.”) [Dkt. No. 105]; defendant’s opposition to plaintiff’s

motion to enforce injunction (“Opp.”) [Dkt. No. 111]; and plaintiff’s reply in support of its motion to enforce

injunction (“Reply”) [Dkt. No. 115].

3

Neither side moved for summary judgment on Count II. See ANSWER II, 537 F.Supp.2d at 191.

4

By statute, the “Inaugural Committee” is defined as the PIC—“the committee appointed by the President-elect to be

in charge of the Presidential inaugural ceremony and functions and activities connected with the ceremony[.]” 36

U.S.C. § 501(a)(1); see Newdow v. Roberts, 603 F.3d at 1006.

5

All three of these areas—the White House sidewalk, Lafayette Park, and Pennsylvania Avenue—are established as

quintessential traditional public forums under First Amendment jurisprudence. See Mahoney v. Doe, 642 F.3d 1112,

1117 (D.C.Cir.2011) (“There is little dispute the street in front of the White House is a public form.”); United States v.

Doe, 968 F.2d 86, 87 (D.C.Cir.1992) (“We are ... spared the need for any extended forum analysis in this case, as no

one disputes that Lafayette Park is a quintessential public forum[.]”) (quotations omitted); Quaker Action IV, 516

F.2d at 736 (“[T]he White House sidewalk and Lafayette Park are a unique situs for the exercise of First Amendment

rights[.]”) (quotations omitted); ANSWER II, 537 F.Supp.2d at 194 (“The sidewalks of Pennsylvania Avenue and the

other areas at issue in this case are a quintessential public forum, ... and as such occupy a privileged position in the

hierarchy of First Amendment jurisprudence.”) (quotations and internal citations omitted). In such traditional public

forums, “the government’s ability to permissibly restrict [speech and] expressive conduct is very limited[.]” United

States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177, 103 S.Ct. 1702, 75 L.Ed.2d 736 (1983). NPS concedes, as it must, that under the

court of appeals’ decision in Mahoney v. Babbit, 105 F.3d 1452 (D.C.Cir.1997), “[t]he National Park Service on behalf

of the PIC cannot reserve all of Pennsylvania Avenue for itself, leaving only the Ellipse and the northern part of John

Marshall Park to protesters.”ANSWER II, 537 F.Supp.2d at 205 (emphasis in original) (citing Mahoney v. Babbit, 105

F.3d at 1458).

8

 
 845 F.3d 1199 (2017)
A.N.S.W.E.R. COALITION (ACT NOW TO STOP WAR AND END RACISM), Appellant
Graylan Scott Hagler, Pastor, Plymouth Congregational Church, et al., Appellees v.
W. Ralph BASHAM, In official capacity as Director, U.S. Secret Service and Sally Jewell, Secretary, United States Department of the Interior,
Appellees.
No. 16-5047.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued November 14, 2016. Decided January 17, 2017.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, No. 1:05-cv-00071.
Mara Verheyden-Hilliard, Washington, DC, argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was Carl L. Messineo, Washington, DC.
Marina Utgoff Braswell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief was R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney.
Before: SRINIVASAN, MILLETT and PILLARD, Circuit Judges.
1202*1202 PILLARD, Circuit Judge:
On the occasion of a U.S. Presidential Inauguration, thousands of people gather along the sidewalks, parks, and plazas that line the Inaugural Parade route. On January 20th, the parade travels the 1.2-mile, sixteen-block portion of Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington, D.C. that runs from the Capitol Building to the White House — a stretch sometimes referred to as America's Main Street. The Inaugural Parade tradition dates back to April 30, 1789, when George Washington was sworn in as the nation's first President. See Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies, Inaugural Parade, J.A. at 1236. With a new government forming and the public eye focused on the event, demonstrators also turn out on Inauguration Day to voice their dreams and demands. One of the great accomplishments of our Constitution is its guarantee of the people's right to take to the streets to say what they think.
The National Park Service is responsible for managing the open-air, traditional-public-forum spaces along the Inaugural Parade route. A 2008 Park Service regulation authorizes a priority permit setting aside a fraction of those spaces for identified Presidential Inaugural Committee uses on Inauguration Day. The priority permit allocates thirteen per cent of the footage alongside the parade route for ticketed spectator bleachers constructed and

administered by the Inaugural Committee. One of the designated bleacher areas is on Freedom Plaza. Plaintiff-Appellant ANSWER (Act Now to Stop War and End Racism) Coalition contends that authorizing Freedom Plaza bleachers in the priority permit violates ANSWER's First Amendment right to instead use the same space for a mass demonstration. Allocating that prime spot to ticketed bleachers, ANSWER 1203*1203 asserts, unconstitutionally prefers the government's message to its own.
The permit the Park Service regulation authorizes for the Inaugural Committee takes priority over any conflicting permit to demonstrate in the same space on Inauguration Day, but the ordinary permit system remains effective along most of the parade route. Seventy per cent of the footage immediately adjacent to the route remains available on a first-come, firstserved basis to individuals and permitted groups. ANSWER does not challenge the Park Service's regulatory prerogative, consistent with the First Amendment, to exclude the public from some areas reserved for the Inaugural Committee, including areas exclusively for spectator bleachers. See Appellant Br. at 60. But ANSWER strongly prefers to demonstrate at Freedom Plaza because it is an open, elevated space that is easily visible from the Avenue and is historically associated with political protest. With its sightlines down the Avenue eastward toward the Capitol, Freedom Plaza is also, however, a salutary location for media staging and spectator seating. The Park Service thus included it within the fraction of the roadway-adjacent footage that the regulation assigns to the Inaugural Committee for such specified uses.
The Park Service regulation authorizing the priority permit, including the space on Freedom Plaza for the bleachers, is not a content- or viewpoint-based speech restriction, but a reasonable time, place, and manner regulation of the use of a public forum. It sets aside bleacher areas, including on Freedom Plaza, for the Inaugural Committee's use as part of the package the rule reserves to the Committee as event organizer. The First Amendment requires that any reasonable, content-neutral regulation limiting expression along the parade route leave ample space available for peaceful demonstrations. The First Amendment does not, however, support ANSWER's claim of a right to displace spectator bleachers with its own demonstration at Freedom Plaza.
I. Background
ANSWER, a group that "engages in political organizing and activism in opposition to war and racism," sought to engage in "expressive, free speech activities" on Freedom Plaza during the 2013 Presidential Inauguration. Decl. of Brian Becker ¶ 5 (Nov. 13, 2013), J.A. at 435; Suppl. Pleading ¶ 1, A.N.S.W.E.R. Coalition v. Jewell, 153 F.Supp.3d 395 (D.D.C. 2016) (No. 05-cv-71) (2016 A.N.S.W.E.R.). As soon as the Park Service started accepting permit applications to demonstrate on Inauguration Day 2013, ANSWER filed an application to use Freedom Plaza and its adjacent sidewalks. ANSWER's permit application sought permission to use the space for a multimedia demonstration, with "[s]igns, placards, banners, stage, sound, bleachers, art installation, props, canopies, and other facilitative materials." Attach. 1 to Suppl. Pleading at 2, ANSWER Application for 2013 Inauguration, J.A. at 117. The Park Service informed ANSWER that it would be permitted to use only a 160-foot long by 35-foot wide portion of Freedom Plaza for its Inauguration Day demonstration because, pursuant to a 2008 amendment to the Park Service's regulations

governing areas of the National Park system in the National Capital Region, most of the Plaza was reserved for the priority use of the Inaugural Committee.
The 2008 amendment created a "regulatory priority use for limited, designated park areas for the P[residential] I[naugural] C[ommittee], the Armed Forces Inaugural Committee, and the Architect of the Capitol or the Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies." 73 Fed. 1204*1204 Reg. 67,739, 67,740 (Nov. 17, 2008). Referring to Freedom Plaza by its Park Service designation as part of "Pennsylvania Avenue, National Historic Park," the regulation states:
In connection with Presidential Inaugural Ceremonies the following areas are reserved for priority use as set forth in this paragraph .... (B) Portions of Pennsylvania Avenue, National Historic Park and Sherman Park ... for the exclusive use of the Presidential Inaugural Committee on Inaugural Day for: (1) Ticketed bleachers viewing and access areas, except that members of the public may use a ticketed bleacher seat that has not been claimed by the ticket holder 10 minutes before the Inaugural Parade is scheduled to pass the bleacher's block; (2) Portable toilets, except that they will be available to the public; (3) Television and radio media and Armed Forces Inaugural Committee parade support structures; (4) The area in front of the John A. Wilson Building for the District of Columbia reviewing stand; (5) Viewing areas designated for individuals with disabilities, except that they will be available to any disabled persons.
36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(B) (2016). Maps separately identifying the areas allocated to each of the uses authorized in subsections (1) through (5) accompany the regulation. See id. § 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(E).
The regulation leaves open to the public, including demonstrators, 70 per cent of the footage on Pennsylvania Avenue abutting the Inaugural Parade route. Id.; 73 Fed. Reg. at 67,741. Of the 30 per cent that is not open to the public, the regulation designates 13 per cent for Inaugural Committee bleachers. See id. The Inaugural Committee, which comes into being after the presidential election and is responsible for organizing, planning, and executing "most of the inaugural celebration activities," decides how tickets for bleacher seats will be distributed. See Audrey Celeste Crane-Hirsch, Congressional Research Service, The Presidential Inauguration: Basic Facts and Information at 5 (Jan. 9, 2013); 73 Fed. Reg. at 67,742.
In this appeal, ANSWER challenges the regulation's allocation of most of Freedom Plaza to the priority permit instead of to the public under the "generally applicable permitting regulations, governed by a `first-come first-served' system of priority." Suppl. Pleading ¶ 14. ANSWER argues that the Park Service's promulgation and application of subsection (B)(1), the portion of the priority-permit regulation authorizing bleacher seating on Freedom Plaza, constitutes "identity-based, viewpoint-based and/or content-based discrimination," in violation of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. Id. ¶ 21; see generally Compl., 2016 A.N.S.W.E.R., 153 F.Supp.3d 395 (No. 05-cv-71). ANSWER contends that the regulation authorizing spectator bleachers on the Plaza is an

unconstitutional content-based restraint of dissent in favor of pro-government speech. Suppl. Pleading ¶ 22; Appellant Br. at 42.
This case presents a controversy likely to arise every four years. ANSWER has protested both Republican and Democratic inaugurations and has been granted a permit to demonstrate on a portion of Freedom Plaza for the imminent 2017 Inauguration. See Decl. of Brian Becker ¶ 9, J.A. at 436; ANSWER Coalition, Permits Secured for Jan. 20 Mass Protest at the Inauguration!, (Jan. 5, 2017), http://www. answercoalition.org/permits_secured_for_jan_20_mass_protest_at_the_inauguration; 1205* 1205 National Park Service, National Mall First Amendment Permit Applications (Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.nps.gov/aboutus/foia/upload/NAMA_InaugurationPermit Requests_0104-17.pdf. ANSWER does not challenge the priority permit's allocation of space on any day other than Inauguration Day. ANSWER seeks a declaration that subsection (B)(1) is unconstitutional, and an injunction barring its enforcement.
The National Park Service, on behalf of itself and its parent agency the United States Department of the Interior, defends the challenged subsection on two alternative grounds. The Park Service's second defense, which we hold determinative here, is that the provision is a reasonable and content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation of a public forum. The priority permit, the Park Service asserts, is narrowly tailored to the government's significant interest in conducting a public Inaugural ceremony. See Gov't Br. at 39-40. The Park Service also argues that any speech that occurs in the Inaugural Committee's bleachers would be government speech not subject to the First Amendment's restrictions. Because we conclude that the challenged regulatory subsection is a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction, we do not reach the government speech question.
A. Earlier Cases Challenging Park Service Regulations in the Nation's Capital
Political protestors and the Park Service have been here before. In Mahoney v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1997), we enjoined a Park Service permit to President William Jefferson Clinton's 1997 Inaugural that displaced all demonstrator permits along the entire Inaugural Parade route, and that did so not only during the parade, but for several months leading up to Inauguration Day. The Park Service in that case lacked the regulatory support it invokes today. It instead sought to preempt first-in-time permitted demonstrators by issuing itself a "blocking permit" for the "entire length of Pennsylvania Avenue sidewalks for a five-month period." Id. at 1458-59. The Service then compounded the constitutional flaw of that sweeping prohibition by stating that it would not in practice exclude all demonstrations from the sidewalks, but only those whose message was "inconsistent" with the government's intended use. See id. at 1457-59.
We held in Mahoney that the Park Service's viewpoint-based exclusion of disfavored demonstrators violated the First Amendment. We took pains to dispel any suggestion that the "government can never control the use of segments of its own property against actual inconsistent usage by persons attempting First Amendment expression." Id. at 1458. The constitutional violation there was the government's attempt to "suppress opposing viewpoints" by excluding only disfavored demonstrators, and by taking the space out of

general public use for several months. Id. at 1456. We held that the government may not "by fiat take a public forum out of the protection of the First Amendment" and purport to completely exclude all demonstrators as a ruse to exclude only those "citizens whose views it fears or dislikes." Id. at 1457, 1459.
The Park Service's regulatory authority has not always been as constrained as it is today. In A Quaker Action Grp. v. Morton, 516 F.2d 717 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Quaker Action IV) and Women Strike for Peace v. Morton, 472 F.2d 1273 (D.C. Cir. 1972), for example, this Court reviewed challenges to a Park Service regulation that required a permit for any public gathering in National Park areas, but "excepted" events sponsored or co-sponsored by the Park Service 1206*1206 ("NPS events") and provided that events to which the Service chose to lend its sponsorship "may preempt any such areas to the exclusion of other public gatherings." Quaker Action IV, 516 F.2d at 737 (App.) (citing 36 C.F.R. §§ 50.19(a)(5), (b)). The regulation contained no "expressed standards for selection of `NPS events.'" Quaker Action IV, 516 F.2d at 728. We noted that because such unconstrained discretion in the administration of a public permitting regulation invited discriminatory enforcement, it was "patently inconsistent with the Constitution." Women Strike for Peace, 472 F.2d at 1290 (opinion of Wright, J.); Quaker Action IV, 516 F.2d at 728.
In response to that litigation, the Park Service promulgated a regulation establishing National Celebration Events that "occur at the same time and location" every year, 46 Fed. Reg. 55,959, 55,960 (Nov. 13, 1981) — or in the case of Inauguration Day, quadrenially, 45 Fed. Reg. 84,997, 84,997 (Dec. 24, 1980). The events continued to receive priority use of designated areas, but the Park Service's discretion was constrained by the limitation of space afforded and the specification of the events in the Federal Register. 46 Fed. Reg. at 55,960.
B. ANSWER's Initial Complaint, Preceding the Challenged 2008 Regulation
ANSWER initiated this case in 2005, after President George W. Bush's second Inauguration, when it filed a complaint challenging the National Park Service's since-furtheramended regulatory approach. Since 1980, the Park Service's regulations have designated the White House sidewalk and portions of Lafayette Park for the "exclusive use of the Inaugural Committee on Inauguration Day." 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(A); 45 Fed. Reg. at 84,997-98. When ANSWER brought this case in 2005, all other areas immediately adjacent to the Inaugural Parade route, including Freedom Plaza, were open to the public for use by individuals or groups who obtain Park Service special-event or demonstration permits on a first-come, first-served basis. See 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(i) (2004). The Inaugural Committee did not then have a regulatory priority permit to use Freedom Plaza. Instead, on an ad hoc basis before the one-year permit application period opened, the Park Service granted a permit to the second Bush Inaugural Committee for "the entire length of the Pennsylvania Avenue sidewalks (plus additional areas)." See A.N.S.W.E.R. Coalition v. Kempthorne, 537 F.Supp.2d 183, 187 (D.D.C. 2008) (2008 A.N.S.W.E.R.).
ANSWER's initial complaint included three counts. It challenged: the Park Service's ad hoc deviation from the Service's general permitting regulation in favor of the Inaugural

Committee (Count I); the ban on sign supports (rods or sticks on which handheld signs could be held aloft) (Count II); and the ad hoc permit's broad exclusion of protestors from vast portions of Pennsylvania Avenue (Count III). See 2016 A.N.S.W.E.R., 153 F.Supp.3d at 402. The parties cross-moved for partial summary judgment on Count I, and the district court ruled in ANSWER's favor that the Park Service unconstitutionally failed to follow its own generally applicable permitting regulations. See 2008 A.N.S.W.E.R., 537 F.Supp.2d at 206. The court reasoned that the Park Service's departure from the regulations' procedural requirements in order to give special treatment to the Inaugural Committee worked "an abridgement of communication" against other permit seekers. Id. at 199 (quoting Quaker Action IV, 516 F.2d at 727). The Park Service did not appeal that adverse decision, but responded by promulgating the 2008 amended regulation, 1207*1207 including the priority permitting provision for bleachers at Freedom Plaza now before us.
C. ANSWER's Supplemental Pleading Adding its Claim Against the 2008 Rule's Grant of Bleacher Space to the Inaugural Committee
On December 7, 2011, ANSWER applied for a permit to demonstrate on Freedom Plaza and its adjacent sidewalks during the 2013 Inauguration. The Park Service then filed an application that invoked the priority permit regulation on behalf of the Inaugural Committee. In accordance with the 2008 regulation, the priority permit included "designated portions of Freedom Plaza" specifically for "bleachers for viewing during the Inaugural Parade." Letter from Robbin Owen, Division of Permits Management, to Brian Becker, ANSWER Coalition National Coordinator (Jan. 4, 2012), J.A. at 687; Inaugural Committee Permit Application for 2013 Inauguration at 4, J.A. at 598. As set forth above, the Park Service's regulatory priority displaced ANSWER's first-in-time-application for all but a fraction of Freedom Plaza 160 feet deep, with 35 feet abutting Pennsylvania Avenue. ANSWER then supplemented its complaint to add Count IV challenging subsection (B)(1) of the regulation as "identity-based, viewpoint-based and/or content-based discrimination in violation of the First Amendment." Suppl. Pleading ¶ 21.
The Park Service informed ANSWER that after the Presidential election and formation of the Inaugural Committee, some eleven months in the future, ANSWER might discuss with that Committee whether it would be willing to accommodate ANSWER's planned protest on its regulatory priority portion of Freedom Plaza. ANSWER also could apply to demonstrate at other locations abutting the route, including John Marshall Park, another park area on Pennsylvania Avenue. See 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(E) (Maps 1-2).
Once the election was over and the new Inaugural Committee was formed, ANSWER diligently sought to coordinate with the Committee regarding the possibility of using more space on Freedom Plaza. After meeting with ANSWER, the Inaugural Committee told ANSWER that it intended to use its entire allocated space on Freedom Plaza. Having failed to persuade the Committee to cede its bleacher space at Freedom Plaza, ANSWER would have to resort to space elsewhere along the parade route.
Several months after the 2013 Inauguration, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment as to Counts II, III and IV. The district court granted judgment to the Park

Service. 2016 A.N.S.W.E.R., 153 F.Supp.3d at 400-01. On Count II, the court held that the ban on sign supports was narrowly tailored to ensuring safety and managing pedestrian traffic at the Inauguration, id. at 417, a decision ANSWER did not appeal. On Counts III and IV, the court conducted a two-step analysis. It first assumed that bleachers were authorized as an expressive activity or venue for expression, and decided that — like the parades and orations elsewhere in the priority-permitted Inauguration areas — bleacher speech constitutes government speech not subject to First Amendment scrutiny for content or viewpoint. Id. at 410-13.
The district court acknowledged that, although the government may express its own viewpoint in a public forum, any regulatory restriction on private expression in the forum remains subject to constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 413-14 (citing Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, 1208*1208 Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2239, 192 L.Ed.2d 274 (2015)). The court therefore next analyzed the regulation's effect on demonstrators under intermediate scrutiny, holding it narrowly tailored to the government's significant interest in planning and executing the Inaugural Ceremony and Parade. Id. at 415. The court determined that the regulation's incidental restrictions on speech are no greater than necessary to serve the government's significant interest and that it leaves sufficient alternative channels for communication, as it designates only a modest portion of the Inaugural Parade route for the Inaugural Committee's use. Id. at 415.
II. Analysis
ANSWER appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment on Counts III and IV in the Park Service's favor, pressing its challenge to the Park Service's regulation both on its face and as applied in the 2013 Inauguration permitting cycle to give the Inaugural Committee's permit priority at Freedom Plaza. We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. See Hodge v. Talkin, 799 F.3d 1145, 1155 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
The regulation designates areas of priority use along the Pennsylvania Avenue sidewalk. That space, including Freedom Plaza, is a quintessential public forum. See Mahoney, 105 F.3d at 1457. Its importance to public dialogue is acute on Inauguration Day. See id. at 1458.
The constitutionality of regulation of public forums depends first on whether the regulation is content based. Content-based regulations are "presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests." Reed v. Town of Gilbert, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2218, 2226, 192 L.Ed.2d 236 (2015). Second, because traditional public forums are vital places for speech, even a content-neutral public-forum regulation is subjected to additional First Amendment scrutiny to determine whether it is a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction "narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest" that "leave[s] open ample alternative channels for communication." Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989); see also Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983).

A. The Regulation Is Not A Content-Based Speech Restriction Subject to Strict First Amendment Scrutiny
1. The Regulation is Facially Content Neutral. To be subject to evaluation under the more lenient, "intermediate" scrutiny applicable to time, place, and manner regulations, a rule must not itself be content based, see Reed, 135 S.Ct. at 2228, and must be "justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech," Ward, 491 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746. "Government regulation of speech is content based if a law applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed." Reed, 135 S.Ct. at 2227. Facial distinctions based on message, whether they regulate the speech's subject matter, function, or purpose, are content based and so subject to strict scrutiny. Id. Meanwhile, "laws that confer benefits or impose burdens on speech without reference to the ideas or views expressed are in most instances content neutral." Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 643, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994).
The challenged regulation is content neutral on its face. It authorizes the 1209*1209 Inaugural Committee to construct and administer "[t]icketed bleachers viewing and access areas," along with space for disabled spectators, media, toilets, and the District of Columbia's reviewing stand. 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(B)(1); see id. §§ 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(B)(2)-(5). Contrary to the district court's background assumption, the regulatory priority granted to the Inaugural Committee by subsection (B)(1) to provide spectator bleachers turns not on the content of any speech, but on the desirability of providing to the Inaugural Committee as the event organizer a limited amount of reserved seating for ticketed spectators.
Subsection (B)(1)'s provision for bleachers at Freedom Plaza is "not a `regulation of speech,'" but a "regulation of the places where some speech may occur." Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 719, 120 S.Ct. 2480, 147 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000). The Colorado statute in Hill made it unlawful to knowingly approach within eight feet of another person, without consent, "for the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling with such other person" within 100 feet of the entrance to any health care facility. Id. at 707, 120 S.Ct. 2480. The Court held the Colorado law was not viewpoint based, but that it imposed a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction on knowingly approaching, for specified purposes, patients entering the clinics. Id. at 725-26, 120 S.Ct. 2480. There was no evidence in Hill that Colorado enacted its law "because of disagreement with" the message of the regulated speech: The regulation applied "equally to all demonstrators, regardless of viewpoint, and the statutory language ma[de] no reference to the content of the speech." Id. at 719, 120 S.Ct. 2480.
The regulation at issue here is even more clearly content neutral, because it makes no reference at all to speech, let alone the content of speech. It simply provides for permitting of spectator bleachers and a cluster of non-speech functions on Freedom Plaza in service of the Inaugural celebration, and it only indirectly regulates where demonstrations may occur by displacing them from that spot. Any displaced speakers' content is irrelevant: Nothing in the regulation would prohibit a ticketholder to the Inaugural Committee's bleacher area from publicly endorsing ANSWER's message. See McCullen v. Coakley, ___ U.S. ___,

134 S.Ct. 2518, 2531, 189 L.Ed.2d 502 (2014) (regulation excluding people from a 35-foot buffer zone outside clinics where abortions are performed did not "draw content-based distinctions on its face"). The record contains no evidence that the Park Service would have pared back the scope of the priority permit at Freedom Plaza if demonstrators with a message more to the government's liking had asked. Cf. Mahoney, 105 F.3d at 145556; R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 272-73, 71 S.Ct. 325, 95 L.Ed. 267 (1951). And the regulation provides a rule under which non-ticketholders may occupy bleacher seats if they remain unclaimed ten minutes before the Inaugural Parade is scheduled to pass. 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(B)(1). Inaugural Committees are entitled to the priority permit, on behalf of any President-elect, no matter the views of the Committee or Presidentelect. The regulation also equally excludes anyone who might elbow into the reserved area, regardless of whether she or he wishes to protest, show support, or simply get a better view. Here, the regulatory preference for "[t]icketed bleachers viewing and access areas" draws no content distinction.
1210*1210 2. The Regulation is Justified Without Reference to the Content of Speech. The facially neutral regulation is also "justified without reference to the content" of any potential speaker's alternative use of the Plaza space and was not adopted "because of disagreement with the message" of any anticipated expression on Inauguration Day. See Reed, 135 S.Ct. at 2227; see also United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968). The inquiry into regulatory purpose ensures that a facially neutral regulation affecting speech is not designed to suppress content the government disfavors. By its nature, a restriction on use of a public forum is bound to curtail some speech. But a "regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others." Ward, 491 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746.
The function of the challenged provision, subsection (B)(1), is to provide "viewing and access areas." 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(B)(1). The governmental purpose is unrelated to the content of expression. There is no evidence in the record that the regulation was adopted because of any disagreement with ANSWER's — or any demonstrators' — message, nor any evidence of desire generally to suppress dissent or otherwise discriminate with regard to content. The regulation is therefore content neutral. See Reed, 135 S.Ct. at 2227; see also O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673.
ANSWER argues that the regulation is content based because it restricts ANSWER demonstrating at Freedom Plaza while favoring the incoming administration's supporters. See Appellant Br. at 6, 42. ANSWER's admittedly viewpoint-based reason for seeking access to the Plaza does not, however, make any rule that stands in its way content based. The regulation excludes ANSWER from portions of Freedom Plaza not because it seeks to demonstrate, nor due to the content of the message ANSWER wishes to communicate, but to ensure some premium space for "[t]icketed bleachers viewing and access areas" as part of the event package reserved for the Inaugural Committee. 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(B)(1). The Park Service's provision for the Inaugural Committee to construct its bleachers, even as 70 per cent of the Inaugural route remains available for demonstration permits, is no more content based than the unchallenged provisions

reserving areas for portable toilets, media stands, or viewing areas for individuals with disabilities. See id. §§ 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(B)(2), (3), (5).
We see no record evidence suggesting that the government intended the bleacher area to be a conduit for communicating any content to the public, that the government controls the content of spectator expression in the bleachers, or that the public will perceive the government to be speaking via the bleachers. See Appellant Br. at 36. But see 2016 A.N.S.W.E.R., 153 F.Supp.3d at 412-13 (concluding otherwise). The regulation makes no suggestion that the purpose of the Freedom Plaza bleacher seating is communicative. The bleachers are for ticketed spectators to view the parade. The Final Rule's only reference to control of the bleachers' use is that "[t]raditionally, each P[residential] I[naugural] C[ommittee] decides how, and to whom, to distribute P[residential] I[naugural] C[ommittee] bleacher seat tickets." 73 Fed. Reg. at 67,742.
ANSWER's contrary characterization is unpersuasive. It casts subsection (B)(1) as an impermissible content-based effort to provide supporters of the administration an enhanced "visible presence" on Inauguration Day to the exclusion of ANSWER, 1211*1211 an avowed government critic. See Appellant Br. at 42-43. ANSWER quotes the Park Service's counsel in the district court contending that the Inaugural Committee "wants to be able to provide a presence" for ticketholders along the Pennsylvania Avenue sidewalks. Appellant Br. at 42 (quoting Tr. of Mot. Hr'g at 10). ANSWER takes that comment out of context. The Service there acknowledged that the sidewalk adjoining the Inaugural Parade route is valuable both for expression by demonstrating parties seeking a "visible presence" (such as ANSWER), and for those wishing to reserve choice viewing areas (such as the Park Service on the Committee's behalf). ANSWER's desire to demonstrate at Freedom Plaza — an undeniably expressive use — does not render the Park Service's intended use expressive. Cf. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376, 88 S.Ct. 1673.
The regulation itself is agnostic as to whether the persons to be seated will even be supporters of, or chosen by, the incoming president, let alone whether they will express themselves in any particular way. Consistent with the rule, President Obama's 2009 Inaugural Committee, for example, offered some of its bleacher seats at a nominal price to any member of the public. See Gone in 60 Seconds, Politico (Jan. 10, 2009), http://www.politico.com/story/2009/01/gone-in-60-seconds-inaugural-parade-tickets-017310 (noting publicly available Inaugural Committee tickets for 2009 Inauguration sold out in under one minute). And the rule itself contains a 10-minute release provision that allows any member of the public to occupy a ticketed seat for free if the ticketholder has not claimed it ten minutes before the parade passes. 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(B)(1); 73 Fed. Reg. at 67,741. The set-aside of viewing areas on Freedom Plaza "open to members of the public who have disabilities" also reflects the rule's premise that spectators are present to watch, rather than to engage in some kind of loyalty performance. 73 Fed. Reg. at 67,741; see also 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(B)(5); id. § 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(E) (Map 8). The decision by the Park Service to grant the Inaugural Committee space to provide viewing areas was neither expressly nor implicitly conditioned on the ticketholders communicating anything on Inauguration Day. The mere possibility that a priority permit might be susceptible of such use does not make it a content-based regulation of speech. Cf. Turner, 512 U.S. at 652, 114 S.Ct. 2445 ("Appellants' ability to hypothesize a content-based purpose for [the law at

issue] rests on little more than speculation and does not cast doubt upon the content-neutral character of [the law].").
Content-neutral regulatory line-drawing may incidentally burden speech without running afoul of the First Amendment. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746; Turner, 512 U.S. at 643, 114 S.Ct. 2445. In Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 103 S.Ct. 1997, 76 L.Ed.2d 129 (1983), for instance, the Supreme Court upheld statutory authorization for veterans' organizations to use tax exempt contributions for lobbying purposes while other nonprofits lacked authority to do the same. The line drawn between veterans' groups and other non-profits reflected the country's "long standing policy of compensating veterans for their past contributions." Id. at 551, 103 S.Ct. 1997. The Park Service's priority permit for the Inaugural Committee planning a "national celebration event" reflects a similarly well-established policy of enabling a public ceremony to recognize the start of a new presidential administration. See 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(1)(iii). The Park Service's regulation, including subsection (B)(1) authorizing bleachers at Freedom 1212*1212 Plaza, is no more content based than the line drawn between veterans' groups and other nonprofits that the Court upheld in Regan, or the restrictions on leafletting and handbilling sustained in Hill.
Finally, this case is easily distinguished from the content-based enforcement scheme that we invalidated in Mahoney. The Christian Defense Coalition sought permission in 1997 for its members "to stand on the sidewalk and peacefully note their dissent" as the Inaugural Parade passed, but were told that its members would be subject to arrest if they picketed at any point alongside Pennsylvania Avenue. 105 F.3d at 1455-56. The Park Service in Mahoney issued to itself a permit for the entirety of Pennsylvania Avenue for several months, thus displacing all permits to demonstrate anywhere along the Inaugural Parade route. 105 F.3d at 1457-58. The government's putative, content-neutral justification was to prevent demonstrators' "physical intrusion" into the Inaugural event. Id. at 1458. But the government's proffered justification was revealed to be pretextual when the Park Service "conceded that if appellants were carrying no signs or, indeed, if they were carrying signs favorable to the administration whose second Inaugural was being celebrated, their `physical intrusion' would be welcomed." Id. Here, there is no hint of any such contentbased purpose by the Park Service to pick and choose among demonstrators based on their messages.
ANSWER contends that the Obama Inaugural Committee in 2012 conducted a "political vetting" to decide whether to invite ANSWER to share some of the Plaza space included in the Committee's permit, and that the Committee unconstitutionally concluded "on the basis of viewpoint that ANSWER had `competing interests' for expression along the parade route." Appellant Br. at 62. The First Amendment presumptively bans political vetting as a condition of access to a public forum, but the fleeting assertion in ANSWER's brief that a past Inaugural Committee engaged in "vetting" fails for several overlapping reasons to raise an issue of fact material to the claim ANSWER pleaded and litigated here. First, the "vetting" contention is vague and conclusory, resting on a single statement that unidentified members of the Inaugural Committee asked unidentified ANSWER representatives "about our goals, messaging, and how we do outreach and organize." Decl. of Brian Becker ¶ 33, J.A. at 443. Second, it is unclear how the "vetting" contention relates to this case as ANSWER has framed it. The Inaugural Committee, the putative vetter, is not a defendant;

the vetting of which ANSWER complains does not help to show the asserted constitutional defect in the regulatory subsection (B)(1) that ANSWER challenges; and ANSWER has no evidence that vetting is likely to recur such that it could be redressable by the declaratory and injunctive relief ANSWER seeks.
We conclude that the regulation is content neutral and is justified without reference to the content of regulated speech. Having determined that the regulation is facially content neutral and justified without reference to the content of expression, we have no occasion to rely on any notion that the regulations involve government speech of the kind described in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 129 S.Ct. 1125, 172 L.Ed.2d 853 (2009), and Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2239, 192 L.Ed.2d 274 (2015). The public forum analysis suffices.
B. The Priority Permit for the Inaugural Committee Is a Reasonable Time, Place, and Manner Restriction
Because the regulation is content neutral, any incidental effect it has on 1213*1213 speech is subject to the intermediate scrutiny that governs time, place, and manner restrictions. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746. To survive such scrutiny, the regulation must be "narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest" and "leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information." Id.; Henderson v. Lujan, 964 F.2d 1179, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
1. The Regulation Serves a Significant Governmental Interest. The regulation is directed to the government's significant interest in facilitating the President-elect's public Inaugural ceremony. See Gov't Br. at 39-40. The date of the Presidential transition is mandated by the Constitution, see U.S. Const. amend XX, § 1, and its attendant celebration is contemplated in federal legislation, see Presidential Inaugural Ceremonies Act, Pub. L. No. 84-986, 70 Stat. 1049, 1049 § 1 (1956), codified at 36 U.S.C. § 501(2). For its part, ANSWER does not contest the Inauguration's importance as a national celebration. See Appellant Br. at 48 ("The public Inaugural Parade is deeply rooted in the American tradition...."); 73 Fed. Reg. at 67,739. Nor does it argue that the governmental interest in giving a committee control over some public space to organize an open-air, public Inaugural ceremony is insignificant. Rather, ANSWER argues that the government cannot show that the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. See Appellant Br. at 47.
The reason the Park Service created a priority permit regulation is to facilitate a public "Inauguration celebration for a newly elected President." Gov't Br. at 39; 73 Fed. Reg. at 67,739 (describing Inauguration as "a national celebration event for the benefit of all citizens"); 36 C.F.R. §§ 7.96(g)(1)(iii), (4)(ii) (designating Inauguration as National Celebration Event). To achieve that goal, the regulation creates a "regulatory priority use for limited, designated park areas for the P[residential] I[naugural] C[ommittee], the Armed Forces Inaugural Committee, and the Architect of the Capitol or the Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies, entities whose role in the Inaugural has traditionally necessitated such use." 73 Fed. Reg. at 67,740. That regulatory priority makes sense. Congress put the Inaugural Committee "in charge of the Presidential inaugural ceremony and functions and activities connected with the ceremony." 70 Stat. at 1049 § 1, codified at

36 U.S.C. § 501(1). To support that role, the Act allows the Secretary of the Interior to "grant to the Inaugural Committee a permit to use [federal land] during the inaugural period." Id. § 503.
The Park Service's designation of space for reserved seating is a reasonable component of a priority permit for a public Inaugural celebration. Part of organizing the Inauguration is providing seating for spectators; the Inaugural Committee's regulatory priority allows just that. See 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(B)(1); see also Inaugural Committee Permit Application for 2013 Inauguration at 4, J.A. at 598 ("For all proposed bleacher space, we will be placing bleachers for viewing during the Inaugural Parade on January 21st."). The Park Service also asserts a more particular interest in facilitating the Inaugural Committee's fundraising efforts by allowing it to sell bleacher tickets, see Gov't Br. at 40-41, but we neither find record support for such an interest nor do we believe it material to the validity of the Park Service rule under the First Amendment.
2. The Regulation is Narrowly Tailored to the Governmental Interest. In order to satisfy the requirement that the regulation be narrowly tailored to the government's significant interest, the government must show "a close fit between 1214*1214 ends and means." McCullen, 134 S.Ct. at 2534. We must satisfy ourselves that the regulation "promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation." Ward, 491 U.S. at 799, 109 S.Ct. 2746. The regulation "need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of serving the government's interests," but it "must not `burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government's legitimate interests.'" McCullen, 134 S.Ct. at 2535 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799, 109 S.Ct. 2746); see also Ward, 491 U.S. at 797, 109 S.Ct. 2746 ("[R]estrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech are not invalid `simply because there is some imaginable alternative that might be less burdensome on speech.'" (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689, 105 S.Ct. 2897, 86 L.Ed.2d 536 (1985))); cf. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 299, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984) (declining under a time, place, and manner analysis to "judge how much protection of park lands is wise and how that level of conservation is to be attained").
The government has cleared this hurdle. The Park Service's regulation sets aside 13 per cent of the parade route along Pennsylvania Avenue for Inaugural Committee bleachers, including the bleachers on Freedom Plaza. It leaves open 70 per cent of the route for the public. The total of the ticketed bleacher area under the current rule is substantially reduced from the amount of space the bleachers have occupied in the past. See 73 Fed. Reg. at 67,741 (noting current regulation reduces bleacher area to 24 bleachers from 49 bleachers in 2005); id. ("[T]he final rule substantially increases the park areas available to the public and demonstrators."); cf. Mahoney, 105 F.3d at 1458-59 (doubting that Park Service permit blocking demonstrators from entire parade route for five-month period satisfies narrow tailoring). No doubt there are significantly more spectators who wish to attend the Inauguration than these bleachers can accommodate. The reservation of limited space along the parade route for bleachers as part of the event package afforded to the Inaugural Committee allows the Committee to offer a moderate number of seats to ticketed spectators, while also leaving most "front row" space along Pennsylvania Avenue available to others, including demonstrators.

We are also satisfied that the governmental interest would be "achieved less effectively absent the regulation." Ward, 491 U.S. at 799, 109 S.Ct. 2746. ANSWER contends that the Constitution requires that ticketed bleacher space be limited to what the Inaugural Committee might be able to obtain in a first-come, first-served public permit application process. Suppl. Pleading ¶¶ 14-15, 17; Appellant Br. at 48, 58; Appellant Reply Br. at 30. That process, however, opens eleven months before the election of the incoming president has even occurred, when no Inaugural planning committee exists to submit such an application. This regulation is a practical and reasonable response to that problem.
ANSWER's arguments to the contrary are unavailing. First, ANSWER argues that the government has not met its burden because it fails to show that Inaugural ceremonies would be cancelled absent the regulation. See Appellant Br. at 48-49. ANSWER also argues that the regulation is not narrowly tailored because in 2009, pursuant to a settlement with the Park Service, ANSWER was able to use part of the area on Freedom Plaza that the regulation allocates to the Inaugural Committee's bleachers and the Inaugural ceremony still happened. Appellant Br. at 49. Otherwise valid restrictions arising from conflicting uses need not be struck down, 1215*1215 however, "merely because the government has for a time stayed its hand." Henderson, 964 F.2d at 1183. The narrow tailoring requirement is not a "least intrusive" or "least restrictive" means test. Ward, 491 U.S. at 798, 109 S.Ct. 2746.
Next, ANSWER argues that Freedom Plaza has unique symbolic and historic characteristics that merit special analysis. See Appellant Br. at 4, 40-41. There may well be circumstances in which the Plaza's admittedly salutary aspects and symbolic value could be relevant to a time, place, and manner analysis. But ANSWER cites no case in which the quality of particular public-forum space means that the First Amendment places it out of reach of any exclusive event permit. Two reasons support the contrary conclusion. For one, ANSWER is not necessarily entitled to its favored place for expression. "[T]he First Amendment does not guarantee the right to communicate one's views at all times and places or in any manner that may be desired." Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 69 L.Ed.2d 298 (1981). For instance, in White House Vigil for the ERA Comm. v. Clark, 746 F.2d 1518 (D.C. Cir. 1984), we upheld a prohibition against protestors standing still with signs in the center portion of the White House sidewalk, despite the plaintiff's contention that the center portion is "particularly evocative ... for symbolic protest." Id. at 1534-38.
A second flaw is ANSWER's failure to distinguish the Freedom Plaza bleachers from other historically significant areas, including the White House sidewalk and Lafayette Park. See 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(A). Those areas are similarly "controlled by the Inaugural Committee through a reserved ticket system." 73 Fed. Reg. at 67,741. And those areas have historic and symbolic importance. See Quaker Action IV, 516 F.2d at 725 ("[T]he White House sidewalk, Lafayette Park, and the Ellipse constitute a unique situs for the exercise of First Amendment rights."); Women Strike for Peace, 472 F.2d at 1287 (opinion of Wright, J.) ("There is an unmistakable symbolic significance in demonstrating close to the White House or on the Capitol grounds ...."). Aside from alluding to "unique ceremonial and security issues" associated with the Presidential reviewing stands, ANSWER does not provide a principle for drawing a constitutional line between ticketed access to Lafayette Square and ticketed access to bleachers at Freedom Plaza. Appellant Br. at 60.

Finally, ANSWER asserts that Freedom Plaza has unique physical characteristics that make it more hospitable for public demonstrations than other available areas such as John Marshall Park. See Appellant Br. at 41, 56. ANSWER rejects John Marshall Park as unable to accommodate "sizeable bleachers, stage or sound platforms." Decl. of Brian Becker ¶ 39, J.A. at 445. That argument cuts both ways. Freedom Plaza also offers a particularly desirable vantage point for spectators and media. It was thus reasonable for the Park Service to include space on a Plaza that can accommodate such activities within the package of areas covered by the priority permit.
3. The Regulation Leaves Ample Alternative Channels for Expression. To stand as a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction, the priority permit regulation must also leave open ample alternative channels for communication. See Boardley v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 615 F.3d 508, 524 (D.C. Cir. 2010). ANSWER disagrees that demonstrators have adequate access, principally by framing the issue as whether alternative channels remain at Freedom Plaza itself. See Appellant Br. at 54; Appellant Reply Br. at 27-28. The relevant question here, however, 1216*1216 as ANSWER itself comes close to acknowledging, is whether ANSWER retains channels for expression at the Inaugural Parade. See Appellant Br. at 25 ("[T]he object of proper analysis is the Pennsylvania Avenue sidewalks and parklands on Inauguration Day...."). As ANSWER described its objections in 2005, for example, it wished to express its opposition to "the war policies of the Bush administration," Compl. at 3-4, and it then anticipated that it would demonstrate "at the next [2009] Presidential Inauguration," Id. ¶ 85. In 2013, ANSWER similarly sought to "engage in expressive, free speech activities in connection with the January 20, 2013 Presidential Inauguration and related parade." Suppl. Pleading ¶ 1. ANSWER criticizes governmental policies, and its Inaugural demonstrations are "directed at parade participants" including "the Administration members and [the] President in the parade." Compl. ¶¶ 46, 60. ANSWER has not persuaded us that the relevant forum here is limited to Freedom Plaza, such that alternative channels alongside the celebration and parade that are directly visible to its target audiences are inadequate.
The 2008 regulation is dramatically narrower than the permit we invalidated in Mahoney. There, the Park Service "issued itself a permit not for a limited segment of the Pennsylvania Avenue sidewalks ... but for the entire length of Pennsylvania Avenue sidewalks for a five-month period." 105 F.3d at 1458; see also 2008 A.N.S.W.E.R., 537 F.Supp.2d at 187 (invalidating Inaugural Committee permit for the parade route "from the National Capital Area, 3rd Street to 17th Street including sidewalks on both sides of the street"); and see Women Strike for Peace, 472 F.2d at 1293 (opinion of Wright, J.) (government "may not preempt the entire Ellipse when only a partial preemption would fully vindicate its interest"). As described above, the current regulation sets aside 13 per cent of the Inaugural Parade route along Pennsylvania Avenue for Inaugural Committee bleachers. 73 Fed. Reg. at 67,741. Another 17 per cent is prioritized for other logistical purposes, including media. See Tr. of Mot. Hr'g at 11. Seventy per cent of the portion of Pennsylvania Avenue abutting the parade route is available for members of the public, including groups with permits to demonstrate. 73 Fed. Reg. at 67,741. By excluding from the priority permit "certain park areas that have been allocated to the [Committee] in past Inaugural Parades," the 2008 regulation "substantially increases the park areas available to the public and demonstrators." 73 Fed. Reg. at 67,741. We decline to establish where on the continuum — between Mahoney's total exclusion of protestors for several months and

the current regulation's allocation of 70 per cent of the Parade route's sidewalks to the public — the government's priority allocation of space becomes reasonable. We simply hold that this regulation is content neutral, reasonable, and provides ample alternative channels for communication.
* * *
We accordingly affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Park Service.
So ordered.

 
 Case 1:05-cv-00071-PLF Document 232 Filed 10/14/16 Page 1 of 4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

A.N.S.W.E.R. COALITION,
Plaintiff,
v.
SALLY JEWEL, Secretary, United States Department of the Interior, et al.,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) Civil No. 05-0071 PLF ) ) ) ) ) ) )

JOINT STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES ON COUNT I OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT

In this case brought under the First Amendment to the

Constitution, on March 20, 2008, this Court entered judgment for

Plaintiff A.N.S.W.E.R. Coalition (“Plaintiff”) on Count I of the

Amended Complaint. Dkt. No. 59. The case was fully disposed of by

this Court on January 28, 2016. Dkt. Nos. 219 & 220. Portions of

that decision are currently on appeal. Dkt. No. 221. No appeal was

taken of this Court’s ruling on Count I of the Amended Complaint.

Accordingly, it is hereby agreed and stipulated between

Plaintiff and Defendant Sally Jewel, Secretary, United States

Department of the Interior (“Defendant”), collectively referred to

hereinafter as “the Parties,” by and through their respective

attorneys, as follows:

1. The Parties agree to settle and compromise Plaintiff’s

claim for attorneys’ fees and costs with respect to Count I of the

Case 1:05-cv-00071-PLF Document 232 Filed 10/14/16 Page 2 of 4
Amended Complaint in this action under the terms and conditions set forth herein.
2. In consideration of Plaintiff’s agreement to dismiss all claims to attorneys’ fees and costs with respect to Count I of the Amended Complaint, Defendant agrees to pay Plaintiff the total sum of ninety thousand dollars ($90,000). The request for this payment will be made within five (5) days from the date this stipulation is filed.
3. By this Stipulation, Plaintiff waives, releases, discharges, and abandons any and all claims to attorneys’ fees and costs, whether asserted or un-asserted, against Defendant in connection with the claims raised in Count I of the Amended Complaint.
4. The undersigned counsel represent that they are authorized to make this agreement on behalf of their clients.
5. This Stipulation shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the Parties hereto and their respective successors and assigns.
6. The Parties agree that facsimiles of the signatures of counsel will be equally effective as original signatures.
7. The Parties understand that this Stipulation contains the entire agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant; that no promise or inducement has been made except as set forth herein; and that no representations, oral or otherwise, between Plaintiff and Defendant,

Case 1:05-cv-00071-PLF Document 232 Filed 10/14/16 Page 3 of 4

or their respective counsel, not included herein shall be of any force

and effect.

8. This Stipulation of Settlement may not be amended,

modified, waived, or supplemented except by written instrument

executed by all Parties.

October 14, 2016

Respectfully submitted,

CHANNING D. PHILLIPS, D.C. BAR # 415793 United States Attorney
for the District of Columbia

DANIEL F. VAN HORN, D.C. BAR # 924092 Chief, Civil Division

/s/ Marina Utgoff Braswell MARINA UTGOFF BRASWELL, D.C. BAR #416587 Assistant United States Attorney U.S. Attorney=s Office 555 4th Street, N.W. - Civil Division Washington, D.C. 20530 (202) 252-2561 Marina.Braswell@usdoj.gov
Attorneys for Defendant Sally Jewell, Secretary, U.S. Department of the Interior
/s/ Mara Verheyden-Hilliard Carl Messineo (#450033) Mara Verheyden-Hilliard (#450031) PARTNERSHIP FOR CIVIL JUSTICE FUND 617 Florida Ave., NW Washington, D.C. 20001 (202) 232-1180 cm@justiceonline.org mvh@justiceonline.org
Counsel for Plaintiff

Case 1:05-cv-00071-PLF Document 232 Filed 10/14/16 Page 4 of 4

APPROVED AND SO ORDERED: DATE _____________

__________ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE