Case 2:11-cv-00041-KS-MTP Document 2 Filed 02/25/11 Page 1 of 10

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
HATTIESBURG DMSION
VERONICA COOK, YOLANDA PHELPS CHARLYN DOZIER, AND SELEATHA MCGEE, ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED

FEB 25 2011
J, T "UCCLLN. BV
PLAINTIFFS

v.

CIVIL ACTION NO: 2:11CV41KS-MTP

HOWARD INDUSTRIES, INC.

DEFENDANT

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT (Jury Trial Demanded)
COME NOW plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of those similarly situated, by and through their counsel, and bring this cause of action for racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the proposed class, seek a preliminary and permanent injunction as well as compensatory and punitive damages in an amount to be proven at trial. In support of their claims, Plaintiffs hereby allege the following:
JURISDICTION AND VENUE I.
This Court has jurisdiction of the action under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. This action arises under federal law, 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
2.
This Court has personal jurisdiction over the parties.

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Case 2:11-cv-00041-KS-MTP Document 2 Filed 02/25/11 Page 2 of 10
3.
Venue is proper in this judicial district and division pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 since all, or at least a substantial part, of the events giving rise to the plaintiffs' claims occurred in the Hattiesburg Division of the Southern District of Mississippi.
PARTIES 4.
The named Plaintiffs herein all are non-Latino, all applied for employment at Howard Industries' Laurel, Mississippi transformer manufacturing plant during the relevant time period, and all were not hired by Howard Industries due to their race. The individual plaintiffs are:
1. Yolanda Phelps is an adult African-American resident of Jones County, Mississippi.
2. Veronica Cook is an adult African-American resident of Jasper County, Mississippi.
3. Seleatha McGee is an adult African-American resident of Jones County, Mississippi.
4. Charlyn Dozier is an adult African-American resident of Erie County, Mississippi. 5.
The defendant, Howard Industries, Inc. ("Howard Industries"), is a Mississippi corporation with its principal place of business in Laurel, Mississippi. Howard Industries can be served with process through its registered agent, Richard L. Yoder, at 415 N. Magnolia Street, Suite 400, Laurel, Mississippi 39441.
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6. During the relevant times set forth herein, Howard Industries owned and operated a large transformer manufacturing plant in Laurel, Mississippi. Howard Industries hired hundreds of employees to work in its Laurel, Mississippi transformer plant, and Howard Industries devised, implemented, carried out, and controlled the discriminatory hiring policies and practices discussed herein. Howard Industries is responsible for the actions, omissions, and admissions of its employees and agents.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 7.
Plaintiffs bring this action on their own behalf and on behalfof a Class of persons pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3). The named Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf ofthe following class: All "non-Latino" persons who applied for employment at Howard Industries' transformer manufacturing plant in Laurel, Mississippi during the relevant time period and were refused employment by Howard Industries. As used herein, "Non-Latino" means persons of the Caucasian race and persons of the African-American race who are not of Latino or Hispanic descent.
8. The above-described individuals constitute the "Class" for the purposes of this action. Plaintiff reserve the right to amend this class identification.
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9. Plaintiffs seek to maintain this class, pursuant to Rules 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3), on the issue of whether the defendants engaged in unlawful discrimination in its hiring practices and the amount of damages owed to Plaintiffs and members of the Class as a result of such unlawful discrimination.
10. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all its members is impracticable. The defendants received hundreds of employment applications each year at its Laurel, Mississippi transformer manufacturing plant. Plaintiffs do not know the identity of the Class members or the precise number of rejected applicants but can ascertain this information from the defendant's records.
11. There exists a common question oflaw and fact as to all members of the Class that predominates over any questions solely affecting members of the Class, to wit, whether the defendant violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981 by discriminating against certain job applicants on the basis of race.
12. Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims ofthe members of the Class, and they are adequate representatives of the Class. Plaintiffs and members ofthe Class have sustained damages because of the defendant's unlawful activities alleged herein. Plaintiffs have retained counsel competent and experienced in race discrimination litigation and intend to prosecute this action vigorously. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class.
13. A class action is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of
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Case 2:11-cv-00041-KS-MTP Document 2 Filed 02/25/11 Page 5 of 10
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the controversy.

FACTS

14.

At all times material to this action, Howard Industries was a leading manufacturer of

electrical transmission and distribution equipment with a transformer manufacturing facility in

Laurel, Mississippi.

15.

As early as August2000, Howard Industries devised, implemented, carried out, and

controlled an employment policy whereby Latino job applicants, all or nearly all being

undocumented Mexican immigrants, were given preferential treatment in hiring at Howard

Industries' transformer manufacturing facility in Laurel, Mississippi. Pursuant to this policy,

non-Latino applicants for employment were intentionally and routinely refused employment at

Howard Industries' Laurel facility due to their race.

16.

In furtherance of this discriminatory policy, and as evidence of Howard Industries'

discriminatory preference for Latino applicants and employees, Howard Industries accepted false

identity documents from undocumented Latino applicants and employees, concealed the fact that

hundreds ofits employees were undocumented Latino immigrants, hired undocumented Latino

immigrants without regard for the fact that they did not have valid Social Security numbers,

instructed undocumented Latino applicants and employees regarding how to obtain false identity

documents, and wouid warn undocumented Latino employees if federal immigration officials

were expected to conduct an inspection at the Laurel facility.

17.

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Hwnberto Gonzalez, Howard Industries' Hwnan Resource Manager during the relevant time period, has been convicted offederal criminal charges arising from his participation in the scheme described herein. Howard Industries has been convicted of conspiracy to violate immigration laws arising out of its hiring and retention of undocwnented employees.
18. During the relevant time period, Howard Industries refused to hire non-Latino job applicants, or considered their applications with disfavor, due to their race.
19. There existed no compelling legal reason to justify Howard Industries' discriminatory preference for Latino applicants and employees.
20. Beginning in July of 2006 and continuing through July of2008, PlamtiffYolanda Phelps repeatedly applied for employment at Howard Industries' transformer manufacturing plant in Laurel. Yolanda Phelps was qualified to be hired was qualified to be hired inasmuch as she passed all examinations administered by Howard. Yolanda Phelps also passed the drug tests. Yolanda Phelps was not offered employment due to the fact that she was not Latino. Howard Industries concealed from Yolanda Phelps the fact that she was not hired due to her race. Howard Industries hired Yolanda Phelps on August 28, 2008, three days after its Laurel facility was raided and immigration officials found approximately 592 undocwnented employees. As a result of Defendant's conduct, Plaintiffhas suffered economic loss, humiliation, embarrassment, physical and emotional distress, and mental anguish.
21. Plaintiff Veronica Cook applied for employment at Howard Industries' transformer
6

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Case 2:11-cv-00041-KS-MTP Document 2 Filed 02/25/11 Page 7 of 10
manufacturing plant in Laurel in 2006. Veronica Cook was qualified to be hired was qualified to be hired inasmuch as she passed all examinations administered by Howard. Veronica Cook also passed the drug tests. Veronica Cook was not offered employment due to the fact that she was not Latino. Howard Industries concealed from Veronica Cook the fact that she was not hired due to her race. Howard Industries hired Veronica Cook after its Laurel facility was raided and immigration officials found approximately 592 undocumented employees. As a result of Defendant's conduct, Plaintiff has suffered economic loss, humiliation, embarrassment, physical and emotional distress, and mental anguish.
22. Beginning in July of 2006 and continuing through 2008, Plaintiff Seleatha McGee repeatedly applied for employment at Howard Industries' transformer manufacturing plant in Laurel. Seleatha McGee was qualified to be hired was qualified to be hired inasmuch as she passed all examinations administered by Howard. Seleatha McGee also passed the drug tests. Seleatha McGee was not offered employment due to the fact that she was not Latino. Howard Industries concealed from Seleatha McGree the fact that she was not hired due to her race. Howard Industries hired Seleatha McGee in October of2008, nearly three months after its Laurel facility was raided and immigration officials found approximately 592 undocumented employees. As a result of Defendant's conduct, Plaintiff has suffered economic loss, humiliation, embarrassment, physical and emotional distress, and mental anguish.
23. Plaintiff Charlyn Dozier applied for employment at Howard Industries' transformer manufacturing plant in Laurel every three to six months beginning in 2002 and continuing through
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Case 2:11-cv-00041-KS-MTP Document 2 Filed 02/25/11 Page 8 of 10

2008. Charlyn Dozier was qualified to be hired inasmuch as she passed all examinations administered by Howard. Charlyn Dozier also passed the drug tests. Charlyn Dozier was not offered employment due to the fact that she was not Latino. Howard Industries concealed from Charlyn Dozier the fact that she was not hired due to her race. Howard Industries hired Charlyn Dozier after its Laurel facility was raided and immigration officials found approximately 592 undocumented employees. As a result ofDefendant's conduct, Plaintiffhas suffered economic loss, humiliation, embarrassment, physical and emotional distress, and mental anguish.
VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. § 1981 25.
Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1-24, above, as if fully set forth herein.
26. This claim is brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and all member ofthe Class Plaintiffs represent.
27. By the actions described above, Defendant, on the basis ofrace and national origin, has denied Plaintiffs and members ofthe Class employment, and thereby the right to make and enforce contracts, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
DAMAGES AND RELIEF 28.
Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1-27, above, as if fully set forth herein.
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APR/20/20 11/WEDC1a1s:e532:1PM1-cvL-0IS0A04R1O-SKSSA-MTTTYP.@ LDAWocumenFtA2X NFoi.le6d010928/12759/1171 Page 9 of 10 P. 009

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, on behalf ofPlaintiffs and Class members, pray that the Court

grant them relief as follows:

I

• certify this action as a class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;

• enter ·a preliminary and·permanent injunction against Defendant and its directors,

officers, owners, agents, succes.sors and representatives, and any and all persons

acting in concert with them, from engaging in unlawful practices, policies, customs

and usages set forth herein;

• aw1JJ:d compensatory damages in an amount that would fully compensate Plaintiffs

and Class members for the eqononric loss, humiliation, embarrassment, physical

and emotional distress, and mental anguish caused by Defendant's violation of the
law alleged in 0is Complaint;

• award punitive damages to Plaintiffs and Class members in an amount that would

-h~~~~~~~-Pv.nisl1.Ue:fen4~~Utfur..th.~flJ!,_w.Jl,UtQJ;l,.,an!41"Ckle.s~Q®dq.qL~.eg¢.in-tQis...-.~.~~~-=1

Complaint and that would effectively deter Defendant from future discriminatory

behavior;

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Case 2:11-cv-00041-KS-MTP Document 2 Filed 02/25/11 Page 10 of 10
• award Plaintiffs and Class members their reasonable attorneys' fees, expert fees, and costs; and
• award any other relief the Court deems just and equitable. Respectfully submitted, LisaM. Ross Attorney for Plaintiffs
~·A. 4~,
Lisa M. Ross, Esq. MSB#9755 P.O. Box 11264 Jackson, MS 39283-1264 (601) 981-7900 (telephone) (601) 981-7917 (facsimile)
Cliff Johnson, Esq. Brad Pigott, Esq. Pigott & Johnson, P.A. 775 N. Congress Street Post Office Box 22725 Jackson, Mississippi 39225-2725 Telephone: (601) 354-2121 Facsimile: (601) 354-7854
10

 
 Case 2:11-cv-00041-KS-MTP Document 38 Filed 12/21/12 Page 1 of 3

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
HATTIESBURG DIVISION

VERONICA COOK, YOLANDA PHELPS

CHARLYN DOZIER, AND SELEATHA MCGEE,

ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES

AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED

PLAINTIF

FS

V.

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 2:11CV41-KS-MTP

HOWARD INDUSTRIES, INC.

DEFENDANT

JOINT MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT Plaintiffs Veronica Cook, Yolanda Phelps, Charlyn Dozier, and Seleatha McGee
(“Named Plaintiffs”), on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated (the “Class”),1 and Defendant Howard Industries, Inc., move for certification of the Class for settlement purposes and for final approval of the Settlement achieved in this action. The legal and factual bases supporting this Motion are more fully set forth in the Memorandum in Support of this Motion.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this the 21st day of December, 2012.

1 The Class is defined as all black and non-Hispanic white persons who applied for a bargaining unit position at Howard Industries’ Laurel, Mississippi transformer facility between January 1, 2003, and August 25, 2008, and were not hired.

Case 2:11-cv-00041-KS-MTP Document 38 Filed 12/21/12 Page 2 of 3

PIGOTT & JOHNSON, P.A.

GILCHRIST, SUMRALL, YODER & BOONE, PLLC

s/ Cliff Johnson Cliff Johnson (MSB #9383) Counsel for Plaintiffs

s/ Richard L. Yoder Richard L. Yoder (MSB #6640) Counsel for Defendant

PIGOTT & JOHNSON, P.A. 775 N. Congress Street Post Office Box 22725 Jackson, Mississippi 39225-2725 Telephone: (601) 354-2121 Facsimile: (601) 354-7854 cjohnson@pjlawyers.com
Em

T Facsim

GILCHRIST, SUMRALL, YODER & BOONE, PLLC 415 North Magnolia Street, Suite 400 Post Office Box 106 Laurel, Mississippi 39441-0106
elephone: (601) 649-3351 ile: (601) 426-9625
ail: rly@laurellaw.com

Lisa M. Ross, Esq.

Mark

Law Offices of Lisa Ross

Gordon

514 E. Woodrow Wilson Ave.

Jackson, Mississippi 39283-1264

Telephone: (601) 981-7900

Facsimile: (601) 981-7917

W

lross@lmrossatlaw.com

Telephone:

Facsim

mhopson@sidley.com

D. Hopson, admitted pro hac vice D. Todd, admitted pro hac vice
Danielle J. Carter, admitted pro hac vice SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP 1501 K Street NW
ashington, D.C. 20005 (202) 736-8000
ile: (202) 736-8711
gtodd@sidley.com djcarter@sidley.com

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT

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Case 2:11-cv-00041-KS-MTP Document 38 Filed 12/21/12 Page 3 of 3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Cliff Johnson, do hereby certify that on this the 21st day December, 2012, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following:
RICHARD L. YODER, MSB #6640 RICHARD LEWIS YODER, JR. MSB #100312 GILCHRIST SUMRALL YODER & BOONE, PLLC 415 North Magnolia Street, Suite 400 Post Office Box 106 Laurel, Mississippi 39441-0106 (601) 649-3351 – phone (601) 426-9625 – facsimile Email: rly@laurellaw.com Email: lewyoder@laurellaw.com
Mark D. Hopson admitted pro hac vice Gordon D. Todd admitted pro hac vice Danielle J. Carter admitted pro hac vice SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP 1501 K Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20005-1401 Telephone: (202) 736-8000 Facsimile: (202) 736-8711 Email: mhopson@sidley.com Email: gtodd@sidley.com Email: djcarter@sidley.com
Counsel for Howard Industries, Inc.

s/

Cliff Johnson

Cliff Johnson (MSB #9383)

Counsel for Plaintiffs

3

 
 Case 2:11-cv-00041-KS-MTP Document 43 Filed 01/04/13 Page 1 of 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
HATTIESBURG DIVISION

VERONICA COOK, ET AL

VS.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:11cv41-KS-MTP

HOWARD INDUSTRIES, INC.

CHIANA CA PERKINS

PLAINTIFF

VS.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:12cv205-KS-MTP

HOWARD INDUSTRIES, INC.

DEFENDANT

ORDER CONSOLIDATING

BE IT REMEMBERED that an Order was entered on this date in Case No. 2:12cv205KS-MTP, Perkins v. Howard Industries, Inc., consolidating it with Case No. 2:11cv41-KSMTP, Cook et al v. Howard Industries, Inc., insofar as and only insofar as, it relates to the class action issues and the class established in Case No. 2:11cv41-KS-MTP. The issues raised by Plaintiff, Chiana Perkins, regarding establishing a subclass, or other issues she has regarding her claim in the class action, will be addressed, if she so desires, at the Final Fairness Hearing set for January 23, 2013, in the Cook case. Any further filings by Ms. Perkins addressing class settlement or subclass certification relating to the Cook case shall be filed only in Case No. 2:11cv41-KS-MTP.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of this Court is directed to consolidate Case No. 2:12cv205-KS-MTP, Chiana CA Perkins v. Howard Industries, with Case No. 2:11cv41-KS-MTP, Veronica Cook, et al vs. Howard Industries, Inc., and to add Chiana Perkins, whose address is Post Office Box 1362, Taylorsville, Mississippi 39168, as a

Case 2:11-cv-00041-KS-MTP Document 43 Filed 01/04/13 Page 2 of 2 pro see plaintiff to be notified of all future filings. Said cases are consolidated as to the class action issues and the class established in Case No. 2:11cv41-KS-MTP only. Any further filings by Ms. Perkins addressing class settlement or subclass certification relating to the Cook case shall be filed only in Case No. 2:11cv41-KS-MTP.
SO ORDERED on this, the 4th day of January, 2013. s/Keith Starrett UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
HATTIESBURG DIVISION

VERONICA COOK, YOLANDA PHELPS, CHARLYN DOZIER, AND SELEATHA MCGEE, ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED

PLAINTIFFS

v.

No. 2:11cv41-KS-MTP

HOWARD INDUSTRIES, INC.

DEFENDANT

consolidated with

VERONICA COOK, et al.

PLAINTIFFS

v.

No. 2:11cv199-KS-MTP

HOWARD INDUSTRIES, INC.

DEFENDANT

ORDER GRANTING JOINT MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT AND MOTION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COST REIMBURSEMENT

This matter is before the Court on the parties’ Joint Motion for Final Approval of

Class Action Settlement [38]1 and Class Counsel’s Motion for Award of Attorney’s Fees

and Cost Reimbursement [41]. Having considered the motions, the supporting briefs,

the submissions of the parties at the Final Fairness Hearing, and the supplemental

briefing received from the parties following the Final Fairness Hearing, the Court finds

as follows:

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs in this case allege racial and national origin discrimination pursuant to

1 All docket entry numbers listed in this Order reference filings in case number 2:11cv41.

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”) against Howard Industries, Inc. (“HI” or “Defendant”). Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that HI refused to hire non-Hispanic job applicants, or considered their applications with disfavor, due to their race and/or national origin at its transformer plant in Laurel, Mississippi. On October 5, 2012, the Court entered its Memorandum Opinion and Order [34], granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Conditional Certification of the Class and for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement [29]. In that Order [34], the Court certified the following Class for settlement purposes only: “All black and non-Hispanic white persons who applied for a bargaining unit position at Howard Industries’ Laurel, Mississippi transformer facility between January 1, 2003, and August 25, 2008, and were not hired.” (Mem. Op. and Order [34] at p. 24.) The Court also preliminarily approved the proposed settlement between the parties, as evidenced by and delineated in the Stipulation and Class Action Settlement Agreement [29-2] (hereinafter referred to as the “Settlement” or “Settlement Agreement”), as fair, adequate, and reasonable, and set a Final Fairness Hearing date of January 23, 2013. (Mem. Op. and Order [34] at pp. 25, 26.) Prior to the Final Fairing Hearing (the “Hearing”), over 9,000 potential Class Members were each mailed a Notice of Class Action and Proposed Settlement, which included information regarding their right to opt-out and/or to object to the Settlement. Further, notice of the litigation, proposed Settlement, and Hearing was published in the Laurel Leader-Call once per week for three consecutive weeks starting November 1, 2012.
At the Hearing, counsel for the parties presented statements and documentary submissions in support of the Joint Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement
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[38] and Motion for Award of Attorney’s Fees and Cost Reimbursement [41]. No
potential Class Member had opted out or filed an objection to the proposed Settlement
prior to the Hearing, and no one objected to the proposed Settlement at the Hearing.
Given the Court’s duty to ensure the fairness of the Settlement for the entire Class,
particularly the unnamed Class Members not participating in the negotiation of the
Settlement, the Court requested further briefing from the parties at the conclusion of the
Hearing. Specifically, the parties were asked to present precedent in support of their
inclusion of the estimated value of seventy (70) bargaining unit positions to be offered to Qualified Class Members2 in their valuation of the Settlement, and to address how, if at
all, the valuation should be affected by the balance in the Settlement Fund reverting to
HI in the event that the Fund is not exhausted by payments to Class Members. The
parties subsequently addressed those issues in their Joint Memorandum of Points and
Authorities Regarding the Valuation of the Proposed Class Settlement (“Joint
Memorandum”) [49], and the Court is ready to rule on all pending matters.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Class Certification; Notice to Class Members; Appointment of Class Representatives; and Appointment of Class Counsel
2 A Qualified Class Member is any Class Member that has provided the Claims Administrator with the Class Member’s valid social security number and other tax information in the form required by law, completed a Verification Form, returned the Verification Form in the manner and time period set forth in the Verification Form, and for whom the Claims Administrator has verified that the information on the Verification Form is (a) accurate and (b) entitles the Class Member to payment of an Individual Benefit. (See Settlement Agreement [29-2] at § 1.19.) The parties have jointly selected L. Stephens Tilghman to serve as the Claims Administrator. (See Settlement Agreement [29-2] at § 1.4.) All capitalized words and terms used but not defined herein shall have the meanings set forth in the Settlement Agreement [29-2].
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The Court’s October 5, 2012 Order [34] certified the above-referenced Class pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3); held that the form, content, and manner of the parties’ Notice of Class Action and Proposed Settlement met the notice requirements of Rule 23(c)(2)(B) and (e)(1); appointed Plaintiffs Veronica Cook, Yolanda Phelps, Charlyn Dozier, and Seleatha McGee as representatives of the Class; and, appointed as Class Counsel the law firms of Pigott & Johnson, P.A., by Cliff Johnson, and the Law Offices of Lisa Ross, by Lisa M. Ross. The Court has not been apprised of any facts or circumstances militating against the correctness of these rulings. Therefore, the rulings will stand.
B. Final Approval of the Settlement As Fair, Reasonable, and Adequate A district court has discretion to approve a class action settlement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) if the proposed “settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.” Ayers v. Thompson, 358 F.3d 356, 368 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204, 1208-09 (5th Cir. Unit A 1982)). In assessing whether a proposed settlement satisfies this standard, the Fifth Circuit has identified six key points of analysis, known as the “Reed factors.” Union Asset Mgmt. Holding A.G. v. Dell, Inc., 669 F.3d 632, 639 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Reed v. Gen. Motors Corp., 703 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1983)), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 317 (2012). These six factors are: (1) the existence of fraud or collu sion behind the settlement; (2) t he complexity, expense, and likely duration of the litigation; (3) the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discover y completed; (4) the probability of plaintiffs’ success on the merits; (5) the range of possible recovery; and (6) the opinions of the class counsel, cl ass representatives, and absent class members. Id. at 639 n.11. The Court’s prior Order [34] found that the Reed factors supported the
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preliminary approval of the Settlement. Now, having reconsidered the Reed factors in light of the absence of any objections to the proposed Settlement, the fact that no Class Member has opted out of the Class, the information presented to the Court at the Final Fairness Hearing, and the supplemental briefing provided to the Court following the Hearing, the Court finds that the proposed Settlement should be finally approved.
The Settlement Agreement provides for two alternative forms of compensation for Qualified Class Members. First, the Settlement requires HI to establish a Settlement Fund of $1,300,000.00. Sums are to be paid from the Fund to Qualified Class Members in varying amounts, depending upon whether a Class Member was eventually hired by HI, qualified for employment, and/or is a named Plaintiff (the “Individual Settlement Benefit”). Second, HI will offer seventy (70) Qualified Class Members a bargaining unit position in its Laurel transformer plant (the “Employment Benefit”). The seventy (70) bargaining unit positions have been valued at $25,000.00 per position for purposes of the Settlement Agreement.3 Qualified Class Members must initially choose between the Individual Settlement Benefit and the Employment Benefit, but any Qualified Class Member not selected for employment will receive an Individual Settlement Benefit.
In its preliminary application of the Reed factors, the Court determined that the parties would be required to explain fully the justification for establishing payments in varying amounts per the Individual Settlement Benefit, so as to ensure that the Settlement does not improperly grant preferential treatment to certain Class Members.
3 HI has presented evidence showing that bargaining unit employees receive on average $25,000.00 per year, depending on the amount of time worked and the length of employment.
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The Court finds the bases for the varying payments subsequently offered by the parties, such as the Named Plaintiffs’ initiation of and participation in the lawsuit, to be sufficient.4 As noted above, the Court also requested further information from the parties regarding the valuation of the Settlement with respect to the reversion of any unclaimed portion of the Settlement Fund to HI, and the monetary value assigned to the seventy (70) bargaining unit positions. The Court finds that the information and authorities presented by the parties in their Joint Memorandum [49] support their valuation of the Settlement at $3,050,000.00 ($1,300,000.00 per the Individual Settlement Benefit plus $1,750,000.00 per the Employment Benefit). See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 481-82, 100 S. Ct. 745, 62 L. Ed. 2d 676 (1980) (holding that the district court properly assessed attorney’s fees based on the total fund available to the prevailing class rather than the amount actually recovered); Parker, 667 F.2d at 1209-10 (finding no abuse of discretion in the district court’s approval of a class action settlement that provided a cash recovery in excess of $1,440,000 and “specifications of employment enhancement” valued at “approximately $1,000,000”).
In consideration of the above-referenced circumstances and the record in this case, the parties’ proposed Settlement will be finally approved as “fair, reasonable, and adequate” pursuant to Rule 23(e).
4 “It is not unusual for a court to make an ‘incentive award’ to named plaintiffs because of their sacrifices in pursuit of litigation on behalf of the class.” In re Catfish Antitrust Litig., 939 F. Supp. 493, 503-04 (N.D. Miss. 1996) (citing Gaskill v. Gordon, 1995 WL 746091, *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 1995); White v. NFL, 822 F. Supp. 1389, 1406 (D. Minn. 1993); Bleznak v. C.G.S. Scientific Corp., 387 F. Supp. 1184, 1189 (E.D. Pa. 1974)).
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C. Attorney’s Fees Class Counsel seek an award of attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $457,500.00. This amount equals 15% of the Settlement value of $3,050,000.00. HI does not oppose Class Counsel’s request for $457,500.00. Attorney’s fees and costs are to be paid by HI outside of the Settlement Fund under the terms of the Settlement Agreement. The Fifth Circuit has held that in common fund cases, such as this case, district courts enjoy discretion to award attorney’s fees based on the lodestar method or the percentage-of-the fund method, so long as their analyses are informed by the Johnson reasonableness factors. See Dell, Inc., 669 F.3d at 644. District courts within the Fifth Circuit regularly use the percentage method cross-checked with the Johnson factors. See id. at 643. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi has found that the percentage fee approach “is the preferred method for determining awards of attorneys’ fees in common fund . . . cases.” Batchelder v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 246 F. Supp. 2d 525, 531 (N.D. Miss. 2003) (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 900, 104 S. Ct. 1541, 79 L. Ed. 2d 891 (1984)). The “Fifth Circuit has never reversed a district court judge’s decision to use the percentage method . . . .” Dell, Inc., 669 F.3d at 644. The Fifth Circuit has also noted “that the percentage method is more predictable, encourages settlement, and reduces incentives to protract litigation[.]” Id. at 344 n.34 (citation omitted). In accordance with the above-cited precedent, the Court exercises its discretion to award attorney’s fees in this class action based on the percentage-of-the
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fund method, and not the lodestar approach, as informed by the Johnson factors.5 In Dell, Inc., the district court found that class counsel’s fee request equaling 25%
of the fund was “entitled to a presumption of reasonableness”, but adjusted the fee to 18% in consideration of the Johnson factors and the stage of litigation at which the settlement was reached. 669 F.3d at 644. The Fifth Circuit affirmed this ruling over objectors’ contention that 18% was excessive because the action was terminated prior to discovery. Id. In Batchelder, Judge Davidson noted that most fee awards in common fund cases fall between 20% and 30%, and held that the 25% initial benchmark rate sought by class counsel was reasonable. 246 F. Supp. 2d at 531, 533 (citing In re Catfish, 939 F. Supp. at 501; In re Shell Oil Refinery, 155 F.R.D. 552, 573 (E.D. La. 1993); Camden I Condo. Assoc., Inc. v. Dunkle, 946 F.2d 768, 774 (11th Cir. 1991)). Class Counsel’s 15% fee rate request in this case is certainly reasonable given the 20% to 30% fee rate commonly approved in common fund class actions.
The Johnson factors do not necessitate a downward adjustment of Class Counsel’s request for attorney’s fees at the rate of 15%. “While all of the Johnson
5 The twelve Johnson “factors are (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the issues; (3) the skill required to perform the legal service adequately; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney because he accepted this case; (5) the customary fee for similar work in the community; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the undesirability of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.” Dell, Inc., 669 F.3d at 642 n.25 (citing Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 71719 (5th Cir. 1974)).
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factors are not necessarily relevant under a percentage fee approach, . . . those factors are the most proper standard with which to weigh the reasonableness of a fee award.” Batchelder, 246 F. Supp. 2d at 531. Class Counsel have thoroughly addressed the applicability of the Johnson factors in their Application for Award of Attorney’s Fees and Cost Reimbursement (“Application for Award”) [42], and have submitted in support thereof sworn declarations and detailed billing records. The following are some of the grounds offered by Class Counsel as justification for the fee award: 1) they have invested approximately 552 hours prosecuting this case, and expect to spend another 200 hours implementing the Settlement; 2) the difficulty of proving a multi-year pattern of employment discrimination; 3) in general, their experience, reputation, and professional ability, as well as the adequacy of their representation in this lawsuit; 4) the customary contingency fee for representation of plaintiffs in the Southern District of Mississippi ranges from 33% to 40%; 5) they accepted these cases on a 40% contingency basis and have yet to receive any remuneration; 6) the Settlement value of $3,050,000.00, which includes the value of 70 Class Members receiving the unusual benefit of full-time employment, is substantial; and 7) the 15% fee requested by Class Counsel is significantly lower than what has been awarded on average in hundreds of other federal class action lawsuits. The preceding grounds offered by Class Counsel are well taken. Upon review of the entirety of the Application for Award [42], the supporting documentation, and the record in this litigation, the Court determines that the Johnson factors, on the whole, support Class Counsel’s 15% fee request. The absence of any objection from HI or any Class Member to Class Counsel being awarded a 15% fee further supports the award. See, e.g., Bethea v. Sprint Commc’ns Co., No.
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3:12cv322, 2013 WL 228094, at *5 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 18, 2013); Batchelder, 246 F. Supp. 2d at 533; Ingram v. Coca-Cola Co., 200 F.R.D. 685, 695 (N.D. Ga. 2001). Therefore, Class Counsel’s request for attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $457,500.00, which is 15% of the Settlement value of $3,050,000.00, will be granted.
III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons: IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Joint Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement [38] and Motion for Award of Attorney’s Fees and Cost Reimbursement [41] are granted. All other pending motions are terminated as moot. Accordingly, I. CERTIFICATION OF THE CLASS FOR SETTLEMENT For purposes of determining whether the terms of the Settlement are fair, reasonable, and adequate, the Court hereby grants final approval of and certifies the following Class for settlement purposes only: All black and non-Hispanic white persons who applied for a bargaining unit position at Howard Industries’ Laurel, Mississippi transformer facility between January 1, 2003, and August 25, 2008, and were not hired. If for any reason the Settlement Agreement ultimately does not become effective, HI’s agreement to the certification of the Class shall be null and void in its entirety; this Order certifying the Class shall be vacated; the parties shall return to their respective positions in this lawsuit as those positions existed immediately before the parties executed the Settlement Agreement; and nothing stated in the Settlement Agreement, in settlement briefing, or in any settlement-related Order shall be deemed an admission of any kind by any of the parties or used as evidence against, or over the objection of,
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any of the parties for any purpose in this action or in any other action. II. FINAL APPROVAL OF THE TERMS OF THE SETTLEMENT The Settlement Agreement, as evidenced by and delineated in the Stipulation
and Class Action Settlement Agreement [29-2], and corresponding Settlement are hereby finally approved as fair, adequate, and reasonable.
III. FINAL APPROVAL OF THE FORM AND MANNER OF DISTRIBUTING THE SETTLEMENT NOTICE, VERIFICATION FORM, AND INSTRUCTIONS
1. The form and manner of distribution used to mail out the Class Settlement Notice6 and Verification Form are hereby finally approved.
2. Defendant’s use of a third-party vendor (“Claims Administrator”) to facilitate administrative matters and distributions to Qualified Class Members, in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Settlement Agreement is hereby finally approved.
3. The Claims Administrator properly notified Class Members of their right to opt-out of the Class and/or to object to the Settlement Agreement when it mailed a copy of the Class Settlement Notice incorporating the Final Fairness Hearing date and all other appropriate deadlines to the current address of each Class Member as provided by the National Change of Address service. The Class Settlement Notices were sent by first class mail, and the costs of sending the same were paid by Defendant. The Claims Administrator used reasonable efforts to complete the mailing of the Class Settlement Notice within thirty days of the date of entry of the Preliminary Approval Order. Class
6 Again, all capitalized words and terms used but not defined herein shall have the meanings set forth in the Settlement Agreement [29-2].
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Settlement Notices that were returned as undeliverable were forwarded to any forwarding address provided by the U.S. Postal Service.
4. The parties did not receive any requests from Class Members to opt-out of the Settlement. Accordingly, each Class Member shall waive and forfeit any and all rights that he or she may have to appear separately and/or to object and shall be bound by all the terms of the Settlement Agreement and by all proceedings, orders, and judgments in the litigation.
5. The Claims Administrator, in consultation with HI, shall evaluate, and approve as valid or disapprove, all Verification Forms timely sent by persons seeking to receive an Individual Settlement Benefit under the Settlement if, after 30 days from the entry of this Order and the accompanying judgment, no notice of appeal of the judgment or notice of appeal of any order in the Action has been filed, the time provided for in Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure to take any such appeal has expired, and any right to take such appeal has been waived or otherwise lost, or if each such appeal that has been taken has been finally adjudicated and the judgment and Final Approval Order has been upheld in all respects by each such final adjudication.
IV. CLASS COUNSEL’S APPLICATION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COST REIMBURSEMENT
Class Counsel are awarded $457,500.00 to be paid by HI outside of the Settlement Fund.
V. DEADLINE FOR SUBMITTING CLAIM FORMS AND REVERSION OF
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SETTLEMENT FUND Each Qualified Class Member who wishes to receive an Individual Settlement Benefit pursuant to the Settlement must complete in full, and send to the Claims Administrator, by first-class United States Mail, postmarked by the United States Postal Service no later than sixty days following the date of Final Approval, a completed Verification Form, signed under penalty of perjury and dated. Subject to the terms and conditions of the Settlement Agreement, the Claims Administrator shall make payments of Individual Settlement Benefits from the Settlement Fund to the Named Plaintiffs and Qualified Class Members. VI. PLAINTIFFS’ AND CLASS MEMBERS’ RELEASE By operation of the entry of the judgment and this Order, Plaintiffs, on behalf of the Class, Class Counsel, and each individual Class Member, forever and fully release Defendant and all Released Parties (as that term is defined in the Settlement Agreement), from: (i) conduct occurring on or before August 25, 2008, any and all past and present matters, claims, demands, rights, liabilities, losses, obligations, duties, actions, potential actions, and causes of action of any kind whatsoever, whether at common law, pursuant to statute, ordinance, or regulation, in equity or otherwise which any Class Member has or might have, known or unknown, including Unknown Claims (as that term is defined in the Settlement Agreement), of any kind whatsoever, including, but not limited to, claims of discrimination based on race and national origin; and (ii) all potential or actual matters, claims, demands, rights, liabilities, losses, obligations, duties, actions, potential actions, and causes of action of any kind (including those that are Unknown Claims) that are based in whole or in part on an allegation that
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HI failed to hire an individual, regardless of when the actions relating to the individual’s application for employment or the failure to hire occurred.
In addition, Defendant may require each Qualified Class Member who is offered a bargaining unit position as part of this Settlement or to whom any payment is to be made under the Settlement Agreement (or any person to whom a payment in respect of such Qualified Class Member is to be made) to execute, in connection with such payment, an individual Release of Claims not inconsistent with the release described herein.
VII. RELEASE OF FEES AND COSTS FOR SETTLED MATTERS Class Counsel and Plaintiffs, on behalf of the Class and each individual Class Member, irrevocably and unconditionally release, acquit, and forever discharge any claim that they may have against Defendant for attorneys’ fees or costs associated with Class Counsels’ representation of Plaintiffs and the Class upon Final Approval. Any fee payments made pursuant to Section IV above will be the full, final, and complete payment of all attorneys’ fees and costs associated with Class Counsels’ representation of the Class Members. VIII. REVERSION OF FUNDS TO DEFENDANT In the event that there is a remaining balance in the Settlement Fund after all Qualified Class Members who timely applied are paid, any such Unclaimed Funds shall revert to Defendant.
IX. NO FURTHER OBLIGATION
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The Settlement Amount, as that term is defined in the Settlement Agreement, and the attorneys’ fees awarded by the Court to Class Counsel are Defendant’s maximum financial obligations under the Agreement.
X. NO ADMISSION OF LIABILITY The parties entered into the Settlement Agreement solely for the purpose of compromising and settling disputed claims. Defendant in no way admits any violation of law or any liability whatsoever to Named Plaintiffs and the Class, individually or collectively. Defendant express denies all such liability. Defendant enters into this Settlement to avoid further protracted litigation and to resolve and settle all disputes with Plaintiffs and the Class. Wherefore, for all the reasons stated above, and based upon the totality of the record before this Court, the Settlement is determined to be fair, reasonable, and adequate. And, it is so ordered that this Court grants final approval to the Settlement Agreement, as this Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. A separate judgment will be entered pursuant to Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 11th day of March, 2013.
s/Keith Starrett UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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 Case 2:11-cv-00041-KS-MTP Document 34 Filed 10/05/12 Page 1 of 30

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
HATTIESBURG DIVISION

VERONICA COOK, YOLANDA PHELPS CHARLYN DOZIER, AND SELEATHA MCGEE, ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED

PLAINTIFFS

v.

No. 2:11cv41-KS-MTP

HOWARD INDUSTRIES, INC.

DEFENDANT

consolidated with

VERONICA COOK, et al.

PLAINTIFFS

v.

No. 2:11cv199-KS-MTP

HOWARD INDUSTRIES, INC.

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Conditional

Certification of the Class and for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement [29].

For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that the Motion is well taken and should

be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

On February 25, 2011, Plaintiffs Veronica Cook, Yolanda Phelps, Charlyn Dozier

and Seleatha McGee, individually and on behalf of those similarly situated, brought suit

against Howard Industries, Inc. (“HI” or “Defendant”) in this Court alleging racial

discrimination in violation of Title 42 U.S.C. § 1981. (See Compl. [1] and 1st Am.

Compl. [2] in Case No. 2:11cv41.) On September 30, 2011, these same Plaintiffs filed a

separate action against HI in this Court alleging racial and national origin discrimination

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in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”). (See Compl. [1] in Case No. 2:11cv199.) Subject matter jurisdiction in both cases is asserted under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. On November 1, 2011, Plaintiffs’ separate actions were consolidated for all purposes, including trial, since the same parties and common questions of law and fact exist as between the two actions. (See Order Consolidating Cases [20].)1 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Conditional Certification of the Class and for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement [29] was filed on August 27, 2012. The Motion is unopposed by Defendant HI.
Plaintiffs and proposed class members consist of black and non-Hispanic white persons who applied for a position at HI’s transformer plant in Laurel, Mississippi from January 1, 2003, to August 25, 2008, and were not hired.2 Plaintiffs allege that HI violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII by discriminating against certain job applicants on the basis of race or national origin. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that HI refused to hire non-Hispanic job applicants or considered their applications with disfavor due to their race and/or national origin. Plaintiffs allege that they suffered economic loss, humiliation, embarrassment, physical and emotional distress, and mental anguish because they were not hired by HI. Plaintiffs, for themselves and for other similarly situated applicants to HI, seek compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorney’s fees, expert fees, and costs.
1 Unless otherwise noted, docket entry numbers listed in this Order pertain to filings in Case No. 2:11cv41.
2 Defendant and Plaintiffs’ counsel have estimated that the proposed class totals approximately 5,000 persons.
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The parties engaged in a series of settlement communications from the time the
complaints were filed. In February of 2012, the parties reached a settlement in
principle. Over the next seventy (70) days, the parties negotiated at arms-length the
precise language and specific terms of their Stipulation and Class Action Settlement Agreement (“Settlement Agreement”).3 The Settlement Agreement is the result of
extensive negotiations on the part of Plaintiffs’ counsel and HI’s counsel, all of whom
have experience in litigating class actions involving similar claims. The relief set forth in
the Settlement Agreement includes the opportunity for employment at HI or monetary compensation for “Qualified Class Members,”4 who applied for employment at HI from
January 1, 2003, to August 25, 2008.
As to the monetary relief afforded under the Settlement Agreement, HI will
establish a settlement fund of one million three hundred thousand dollars
($1,300,000.00). The $1,300,000.00 will be paid by Defendant into an account to be designated by the “Claims Administrator.”5 The Claims Administrator will accept claims
from purported members of the class and will determine whether those individuals are,
3 The Settlement Agreement is attached to Plaintiffs’ Motion [29] as Exhibit “2” (Doc. No. [29-2].)
4 Under the Settlement Agreement, a Qualified Class Member is any Class Member that has provided the Claims Administrator with the Class Member’s valid social security number and other tax information in the form required by law, completed a Verification Form, returned the Verification Form in the manner and time period set forth in the Verification Form, and for whom the Claims Administrator has verified that the information on the Verification Form is (a) accurate and (b) entitles the Class Member to payment of an Individual Benefit. (See Settlement Agreement [29-2] at § 1.19.)
5 The parties have jointly selected L. Stephens Tilghman to serve as the Claims Administrator. (See Settlement Agreement [29-2] at § 1.4.)
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in fact, class members and, if so, whether they are entitled to a payment under the
terms of the Settlement Agreement. The Claims Administrator will then pay out sums
from the settlement fund to Qualified Class Members under the terms of the Settlement
Agreement. The Qualified Class Members will be divided by the Claims Administrator
into four categories:
(a) Category A. Objective documentation shows Claimant applied for employment between Januar y 1, 2003, and August 25, 2008, was qualified for employment, was not hired (or offered em ployment by HI), HI’s records identify no ValidNon-Discriminatory Reason for NonHire, and the Claimant washired by HI (or offered employment by HI), on or after August 25, 2008.6
(b) Category B. Objective documentation shows Claimant applied for employment with HI between January 1, 2003, and August 25, 2008, was qualified for employment, was not hired (or offered employment by HI), and HI’s records identify no Valid Non-Discriminatory Reason for Non-Hire.
(c) Category C. Objective documentation shows Claimant applied for employment with HI between January 1, 2003, and August 25, 2008 and was not hired (or offered em ployment by HI) but does not affirmatively show that Claimant was qualified for employment.
(d) Category D. Named Plaintiffs in the Litigation.
(Settlement Agreement [29-2] at § 5.6.) These categories are mutually exclusive, such
that a class member may only qualify for up to one payment from the settlement fund
based on membership in one category. The Claims Administrator will determine a
Qualified Class Member’s payment from the settlement fund (according to the terms of
the Settlement Agreement) based on written evidence provided by Defendant or
6 On September 18, 2012, the Plaintiffs and Defendant submitted a Joint Notice [31], providing that a Qualified Class Member falling under “Category A” must have been hired on or after August 25, 2008, but before February 10, 2012, since February 9, 2012, is the date the parties advised the Court of a tentative settlement.
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Qualified Class Members. Defendant will also offer seventy (70) Qualified Class Members (who meet HI’s
established eligibility requirements for hire) a bargaining unit position7 in Defendant’s Laurel transformer plant within nine (9) months of the effective date of the settlement. The seventy Qualified Class Members will be selected by lottery from among all Qualified Class Members who apply for a bargaining unit position. Qualified Class Members who are not hired by Defendant or offered a position through the lottery process are eligible to receive their share (if any) of the monetary settlement fund.
Plaintiffs advise that prior to the fairness hearing to be conducted on the settlement, Plaintiffs’ counsel will petition the Court for an award of attorney’s fees and statutory costs not to exceed $457,500.00, which is 15% of the total settlement value.8 HI has agreed not to oppose Plaintiffs’ counsel’s request for a fee award not to exceed this amount. Attorney’s fees and costs will be paid by HI outside of the settlement fund under the terms of the Settlement Agreement.
II. DISCUSSION Plaintiffs’ unopposed Motion [29] principally seeks two forms of relief. First, Plaintiffs request that the Court certify the following class for settlement purposes only: “all black and non-Hispanic white persons who applied for a bargaining unit position at
7 A list of bargaining unit positions (such as janitor, painter, shipping operator, and electrical technician) is in the record. (See Doc. No. [29-3].) For purposes of the Settlement Agreement, the parties have valued each position at $25,000.00. (See Settlement Agreement [29-2] at § 3.2(g).)
8 The parties calculate total settlement value by combining the value of the seventy (70) bargaining unit positions and the $1,300,000.00 settlement fund.
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Howard Industries’ Laurel, Mississippi transformer facility between January 1, 2003, and August 25, 2008, and were not hired.” (Motion [29].) Second, Plaintiffs ask that the Court preliminary approve the proposed Settlement Agreement as fair, adequate, and reasonable. These requests implicate Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The provisions of Rule 23(a) and (b) apply to “settlement-only class certification.” Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 138 L. Ed. 2d 689 (1997). However, “the likely difficulties in managing a class action” under Rule 23(b)(3)(D) need not be considered for class certification purposes since settlement precludes the possibility of protracted litigation and trial. Id. The other provisions of the Rule designed to protect absent class members “demand undiluted, even heightened, attention in the settlement context” since the court will be unable to adjust the class as the litigation proceeds. Id. The propriety of class certification for settlement purposes only has been recognized by numerous courts and commentators. See, e.g., Passafiume v. NRA Group, LLC, 274 F.R.D. 424, 428 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“‘[C]ertification of a class for settlement purposes only is permissible and appropriate.’”); McNamara v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd., 214 F.R.D. 424, 425 (E.D. Tex. 2002) (granting request for conditional certification of class for settlement purposes only); Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth) § 21.612, at p. 313 (2004) (“Settlement classes . . . can provide significant benefits to class members and enable the defendants to achieve final resolution of multiple suits.”); 4 William B. Rubenstein et al., Newberg on Class Actions § 11:27 (4th ed. 2002) (“The settlement class has been recognized throughout the country as the best, most practical way to effectuate settlements involving large numbers of claims by relatively small claimants.”).
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Plaintiffs in this action assert that “‘questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and . . . a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.’” (Pls.’ Mem. of Law [30] at p. 10) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)). “A class may be certified under Rule 23(b)(3) only if it meets the four prerequisites found in Rule 23(a) and the two additional requirements found in Rule 23(b)(3).” Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d 620, 623 (5th Cir. 1999). The Fifth Circuit has also provided that Rule 23 implicitly requires that the settlement class “be adequately defined and clearly ascertainable”. John v. Nat’l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 501 F.3d 443, 445 n.3 (5th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). The Court will address below whether the implicit and explicit requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b) have been met with respect to Plaintiffs’ request for class certification.
If class certification is granted, settlement of the action requires court approval. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (“The claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the court’s approval.”). Obtaining court approval for a class-wide settlement is a two-step process. First, the Court makes a preliminary evaluation as to the fairness of the proposed settlement. Second, if the preliminary evaluation is met, a formal fairness hearing is held “at which arguments and evidence may be presented in support of and in opposition to the settlement.” McNamara, 214 F.R.D. at 426. A “full fairness analysis is unnecessary at th[e preliminary] stage” since all interested parties will have an opportunity to voice their positions regarding the proposed settlement at the formal fairness hearing. Passafiume, 274 F.R.D. at 430; see also In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prods.
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Liab. Litig., MDL NO. 2047, 2012 WL 92498, at *7 (E.D. La. Jan. 10, 2012) (“‘At the stage of preliminary approval, the questions are simpler, and the court is not expected to, and probably should not, engage in analysis as rigorous as is appropriate for final approval.’”) (quoting Manual for Complex Litigation § 21.6).
“[T]he district court maintains great discretion in certifying and managing a class action.” Mullen, 186 F.3d at 624 (citing Montelongo v. Meese, 803 F.2d 1341, 1351 (5th Cir. 1986)). Such discretion extends to approving a class action settlement. See In re Chicken Antitrust Litig. Am. Poultry, 669 F.2d 228, 238 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982). Also, the district court should not ignore the “overriding public interest in favor of settlement,” which applies “[p]articularly in class action suits” in considering whether or not to approve a class-wide settlement. Kincade v. Gen. Tire & Rubber Co., 635 F.2d 501, 507 (5th Cir. 1981).
A. Whether the Proposed Settlement Class Is Adequately Defined and Clearly Ascertainable
A class is adequately defined and clearly ascertainable under Rule 23 if “‘it is administratively feasible for the court to determine whether a particular individual is a member . . . .’” Johnson v. Kansas City S., 224 F.R.D. 382, 388 (S.D. Miss. 2004), aff’d, 208 Fed. Appx. 292 (5th Cir. 2006) (qouting McGuire v. Int’l Paper Co., 1994 WL 261360, at *3 (S.D. Miss. 1994)) (quoting 7A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure 2d § 1760, at 121 (1986)). The requirement is not met if the court must “answer numerous fact-intensive questions” or resolve “the merits of the individual claims to determine whether a particular person is a member of the class.” Morrow v. Washington, 277 F.R.D. 172, 187 (E.D. Tex. 2011) (citations omitted).
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In this case, Plaintiffs request certification of the following class: all black and non-Hispanic white persons who applied for a bargaining unit position at Howard Industries’ Laurel, Mississippi transformer facility between January 1, 2003, and August 25, 2008, and were not hired. Plaintiffs contend that class membership is “readily ascertainable” from Defendant HI’s employment records. HI has not rebutted this contention. The Court finds that the proposed settlement class is sufficiently defined and ascertainable under these circumstances.
B. Whether the Four Threshold Requirements of Rule 23(a) Are Met The requirements of Rule 23(a) are as follows: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
1. Rule 23(a)(1): Numerosity “Although the number of members in a proposed class is not determinative of whether joinder is impracticable,” a class with “100 to 150 members . . . is within the range that generally satisfies the numerosity requirement.” Mullen, 186 F.3d at 624 (citations omitted). HI and Plaintiffs’ counsel have estimated that approximately 5,000 black and non-Hispanic white individuals were denied employment at HI’s Laurel facility between January 1, 2003, and August 25, 2008. The Court finds that Rule 23(a)(1)’s numerosity requirement is met given the number of potential class members in this
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case; the likelihood that the class members are now “geographically dispersed”; and, the reasonable presumption that any class members hired by HI after August 25, 2008, “might be unwilling to sue individually or join a suit for fear of retaliation at their jobs.” Mullen, 186 F.3d at 624-25 (finding that it was within the district court’s discretion to hold that joinder of 100 to 150 individuals was impracticable).
2. Rule 23(a)(2): Commonality Until the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 180 L. Ed. 2d 374 (2011), the commonality inquiry was satisfied where there existed “at least one issue whose resolution will affect all or a significant number of putative class members.” James v. City of Dallas, Tex., 254 F.3d 551, 570 (5th Cir. 2001). Wal-Mart raised the bar for meeting Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement. See M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 675 F.3d 832, 839 (5th Cir. 2012). Now, Rule 23(a)(2) requires the existence of “a common issue of law or fact whose resolution ‘will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the [class member’s] claims in one stroke.’” Perry, 675 F.3d at 840 (quoting Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551). In determining whether such an issue exists, “it may be necessary for the court to probe behind the pleadings . . . .” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551. Frequently, such an analysis will involve “some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff’s underlying claim.” Id. The commonality requirement may be met if, for example, “examination of all the class members’ claims for relief will produce a common answer to the crucial question why was I disfavored.” Id. at 2552. Plaintiffs in this case claim that:
As early as August 2000, Howard Industries devised, implemented, -10-

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carried out, and controlled an employm ent policy whereby Latino job applicants, all or nearly all being undocumented Mexican immigrants, were given preferential treatment in hiri ng at Howar d Industries’ transformer manufacturing facility in Laur el, Mississippi. Pursuant to this policy, nonLatino applicants for employment were intentionally and routinely refused employment at Howard Industries’ Laurel facility due to their race. (1st Am. Compl. [2] at ¶ 15.) Plaintiffs further allege that HI “has been convicted of conspiracy to violate immigration laws arising out of its hiring and retention of undocumented employees.” (1st Am. Compl. [2] at ¶ 17.) Also, Plaintiffs contend that in August of 2008, immigration officials raided HI’s Laurel facility and “found approximately 592 undocumented employees.” (1st Am. Compl. [2] at ¶ 20.) HI has denied Plaintiffs’ claims of discrimination. However, HI has admitted to pleading guilty to conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. (See Answer [10] at ¶ 17.) HI also admits that “immigration officials found approximately 592 employees whom the government alleged were unlawfully in the United States” during an immigration sweep at its Laurel transformer facility. (See Answer [10] at ¶ 20.) In “prob[ing] behind the pleadings”9 the Court finds that Plaintiffs implicitly contend that HI discriminated against them in favor of hiring Hispanic/Latino job applicants because it could pay those individuals less than it would have had to pay black or non-Hispanic white persons. Such an allegation, if proven true, would support the merits of the Plaintiffs and all proposed class members’ claims of racial and/or national origin discrimination. Furthermore, each proposed class member could equally answer “because I am not of Hispanic/Latino descent” in response “to the crucial question why was I disfavored.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2552. Ultimately, Rule
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23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement is met in this case because resolution of the question of whether HI “refused to hire non-Latino job applicants, or considered their applications with disfavor, due to their race”10 would “‘resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each of the [individual plaintiff’s] claims in one stroke.’” Perry, 675 F.3d at 843 (quoting Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551).
3. Rule 23(a)(3): Typicality The test for typicality “‘focuses on the similarity between the named plaintiffs’ legal and remedial theories and the theories of those whom they purport to represent.’” Mullen, 186 F.3d at 625 (quoting Lightbourn v. County of El Paso, 118 F.3d 421, 426 (5th Cir. 1997)). In this case, the named Plaintiffs’ claims rest on the same arguments as the rest of the proposed class—i.e., that they applied for employment at HI’s transformer plant in Laurel, but were not hired due to HI’s discriminatory hiring policies and practices. Thus, named Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the proposed class.
4. Rule 23(a)(4): Adequacy of Representation “‘Rule 23(a)’s adequacy requirement encompasses class representatives, their counsel, and the relationship between the two.’” Stirman v. Exxon Corp., 280 F.3d 554, 563 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Berger v. Compaq Computer Corp., 257 F.3d 475, 479 (5th Cir. 2001)). In conducting the adequacy inquiry, the district court considers “[1] the zeal and competence of the representative[s’] counsel and . . . [2] the willingness and ability of the representative[s] to take an active role in and control the litigation and to protect
10 (1st Am. Compl. [2] at ¶ 18.) -12-

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the interests of absentees[.]” Id. This inquiry further “serves to uncover conflicts of interest between the named plaintiffs and the class they seek to represent.” Feder v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 429 F.3d 125, 130 (5th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).
Class “‘counsel must be qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct the litigation.’” In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall, 2012 WL 92498, at *10 (quoting Rubenstein, 1 Newberg on Class Actions § 3:21). Plaintiffs in this case represent the following: “Class Counsel have extensive experience in trial litigation, including litigating class action and employment-related claims. In addition, Class Counsel have the ability and resources to vigorously pursue the claims; indeed, they have already incurred tens of thousands of dollars in expenses during this litigation and in pursuing this settlement.” (See Pls.’ Mem. of Law [30] at pp. 9-10.) The Court has no reason to doubt these representations. The Court therefore concludes that proposed class counsel will adequately represent and protect the proposed class.
“Differences between named plaintiffs and class members render the named plaintiffs inadequate representatives only if those differences create conflicts between the named plaintiffs’ interests and the class members’ interests.” Mullen, 186 F.3d at 625-26 (citing Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 472 (5th Cir. 1986)). The Court does not perceive any significant differences between the named Plaintiffs and the proposed class members. Each member of the proposed class, including the named Plaintiffs, was denied employment at HI’s Laurel facility between January 1, 2003, and August 25, 2008, allegedly because of their race or national origin. The interests of the named Plaintiffs and proposed class members are sufficiently aligned under Rule 24(a) and the adequacy of representation requirement is met in this cause.
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C. Whether Certification Is Appropriate Pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) Certification under Rule 23(b)(3) requires the Court to find “[1] that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and [2] that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The Fifth Circuit refers “to these two requirements respectively as the ‘predominance’ and ‘superiority’ criteria.” Regents of Univ. of Cal. Credit v. Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372, 382 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Steering Committee v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 461 F.3d 598, 600 (5th Cir. 2006)).
1. Rule 23(b)(3): Predominance The “predominance inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.” Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623. “[C]ommon issues must constitute a significant part of the individual cases” so as to predominate. Mullen, 186 F.3d at 626 (citing Jenkins, 782 F.2d at 472). The Court finds that the following issues common to the proposed settlement class predominate in this action: 1) whether HI violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981 by discriminating on the basis of race in favoring Hispanic job applicants over black and non-Hispanic white applicants for bargaining unit positions at its transformer plant in Laurel, Mississippi from January 1, 2003, to August 25, 2008 (the “relevant time period”); and 2) whether HI violated 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 by discriminating on the basis of race or national origin in favoring Hispanic job applicants over black and non-Hispanic white applicants for bargaining unit
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positions at its transformer plant during the relevant time period.11 The fact that federal law, as opposed to state law, will determine these issues weighs in favor of the predominance inquiry being met in this case.12 Each proposed class member essentially suffering the same type of injury–not being hired by HI–also supports a finding of predominance under Rule 23(b)(3). See Cordes & Co. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 502 F.3d 91, 107 (2d Cir. 2007) (common legal issue existed for purposes of predominance inquiry where class members “suffered the same type of injury”); Frank v. Gov’t of the Virgin Islands, No. 2009-66, 2010 WL 1286077, at *7 (D.V.I. Mar. 31, 2010) (predominance requirement met where the “same type of injuries . . . unite[d] the class”).
2. Rule 23(b)(3): Superiority The Court finds the following factors listed under Rule 23(b)(3) useful in determining whether a class action is superior to other methods for effectively adjudicating this controversy: “(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of
11 Plaintiffs assert that HI’s policies and practices related to hiring, and its personnel involved in hiring, remained largely unchanged during the relevant time period. (Pls.’ Mem. of Law [30] at p. 11.) Thus, members of the proposed class were subject to basically the same hiring processes wielded by the same decision makers. (Pls.’ Mem. of Law [30] at p. 11.) HI has not rebutted this contention. Further, the Information [1] filed against HI in Criminal Case No. 2:11cr8 lends credence to this allegation.
12 Compare Mullen, 186 F.3d at 627 (affirming the district court’s predominance finding where federal law controlled and there were “no individual choice-of-law issues”), with Stirman, 280 F.3d at 564 (finding that the district court “did not take into account significant variations in state law that defeat predominance”).
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any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members; [and] (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum . . . .”13
First, the proposed class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution of separate actions are relatively low “because it is likely that each individual class member could only pursue relatively small claims,”14 and because questions of federal law will apply to each proposed class member. See Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106, 1112 (5th Cir. 1978) (finding a class action superior where the individual claims were relatively small and the question of law applied alike to all), aff’d sub nom. Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank, Jackson, Miss. v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 100 S. Ct. 1166, 63 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1980). Second, a review of all cases pending in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi reveals none alleging discrimination on the basis of race or national origin against HI, other than this action. Third, certification would promote judicial economy and further one of the central purposes of the class action vehicle, “‘enhanc[ing] the efficacy of private actions by permitting citizens to combine their limited resources to achieve a more powerful litigation posture.’” Roper, 578 F.2d at 1113 (quoting Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 266, 92 S. Ct. 885, 893, 31 L. Ed. 2d 184 (1972)). The alternative, potentially thousands of virtually identical individual lawsuits, is in no way superior.
13 The Court need not consider “the likely difficulties in managing” the trial of the class action under Rule 23(b)(3)(D) since the parties seek class certification for settlement purposes only. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620.
14 Wright v. Linkus Enters., Inc., 259 F.R.D. 468, 474 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (certifying class for settlement purposes).
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In light of the forgoing, the court concludes that the requirements for class certification under Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) are satisfied in this cause. Thus, the Court will certify Plaintiffs’ proposed class for purposes of settlement only. The Court’s grant of certification may be altered or amended if any basis for such action comes to light at any time before final judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(C). The Court further finds that the law firms of Pigott & Johnson, P.A., by Cliff Johnson, and the Law Offices of Lisa Ross, by Lisa M. Ross, will be appointed Class Counsel pursuant to Rule 23(g). The submissions before this Court evidence that these attorneys have performed substantial work in pursuing the claims at issue in this action, and that they have experience in handling similar claims. Further, it is evident that these attorneys have knowledge of the applicable law and that they have and will contribute significant resources to implementing the proposed settlement.
D. Whether, As a Preliminary Matter, the Proposed Settlement Agreement Is Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable
A district court has discretion to approve a class action settlement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) if the proposed “settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.” Ayers v. Thompson, 358 F.3d 356, 368 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204, 1208-09 (5th Cir. Unit A 1982)). In assessing whether a proposed settlement satisfies this standard, the Fifth Circuit has identified six key points of analysis, known as the “Reed factors.” Union Asset Mgmt. Holding A.G. v. Dell, Inc., 669 F.3d 632, 639 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Reed v. Gen. Motors Corp., 703 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1983)). These six factors are:
(1) the existence of fraud or co llusion behind the settlement; (2) the complexity, expense, and likely duration of the litigation; (3) the stage of the
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proceedings and the amount of discovery completed; (4) the probability of plaintiffs’ success on the merits; (5) the range of possible recovery; and (6) the opinions of the c lass counsel, class representatives, and absent class members. Id. at 639 n.11. Notwithstanding the breadth of these factors, the court is not to “adjudicate the dispute” or “try the case” in determining the adequacy and reasonableness of the settlement since “[t]he very purpose of the compromise is to avoid the delay and expense of such a trial.” Parker, 667 F.2d at 1209 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Young v. Katz, 447 F.2d 431, 433 (5th Cir. 1971)). The court should also bear in mind the “overriding public interest in favor of settlement” in considering a request to approve a class-wide settlement. Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1331 (5th Cir. 1977). Since the Court will have an opportunity to hear fully from the parties, their counsel and any potential objectors regarding the adequacy of the proposed settlement at the fairness hearing, a detailed application of the Reed factors is not required at this time. Cf. In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall, 2012 WL 92498, at *7; McNamara, 214 F.R.D. at 430. Nonetheless, the Court finds the factors useful in determining as a preliminary matter whether the settlement should be approved.
1. Evidence of Fraud or Collusion No evidence of fraud or collusion concerning the settlement is apparent at this point in time. Instead, it appears that the Settlement Agreement is the product of substantial, arms-length negotiations between the parties over a period of months.
2. Complexity, Expense, and Duration of Litigation This action is still in its initial stages since discovery on the merits of Plaintiffs’
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claims and HI’s defenses has been stayed pending resolution of the class certification issues. (See Case Mgmt. Order [14].) Thus, “settling now avoids the risks and burdens of potentially protracted litigation” and allows for the conservation of substantial litigation expenses and scarce judicial resources. Ayers, 358 F.3d at 369. Furthermore, because statistical evidence is often necessary for a plaintiff make out a prima facie case under Title VII, the “complex” nature of an “employment discrimination” case is well-recognized. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 995 n.3, 108 S. Ct. 2777, 101 L. Ed. 2d 827 (1988).
3. The Stage of Litigation and Available Discovery “[F]ormal discovery is not a prerequisite to approving a settlement as reasonable.” Dell, Inc., 669 F.3d at 639. What is required under the third Reed factor is that “‘the parties and the district court possess ample information with which to evaluate the merits of the competing positions.’” Id. (quoting Ayers, 358 F.3d at 369). The Court notes that the parties have exchanged initial disclosures and participated in some discovery relating to class certification. Further, Plaintiffs contend that the parties are well aware of the strengths and weaknesses of their positions regarding class certification and that the Settlement Agreement is the product of substantial negotiations informed by the knowledge of those strengths and weaknesses. At this stage, the Court will accept Plaintiffs’ representation that the parties have “achieved the desired quantum of information necessary to achieve a settlement.” Cotton, 559 F.2d 1332. The Court will reserve final judgment on the third Reed factor until after it receives further information regarding the parties’ competing positions at the formal fairness hearing.
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“[A]bsent fraud or collusion, the most important factor is the probability of the plaintiffs’ success on the merits.” Parker, 667 F.2d at 1209 (citations omitted). The settlement offer can be deemed “inadequate only in light of the strength of the case presented by the plaintiffs.” Id. Plaintiffs have pointed out several weaknesses in their case. For instance, a significant amount of time has passed since the relevant hiring decisions were made, making proof of what occurred more difficult to discover, and key personnel making employment decisions during the relevant time period no longer work for Defendant. Furthermore, each individual applicant’s qualifications for employment and Defendant’s demand for workers at specific times would be greatly disputed at trial. The Court also takes notice of several potentially meritorious defenses asserted in Defendant’s Answer [10], including, but not limited to, the running of the applicable statute of limitations. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit has often recognized the difficult nature of proving claims of employment discrimination.15 Plaintiffs' concerns over their ability to prove their claims at trial are legitimate and the likelihood of Plaintiffs obtaining a jury verdict in their favor is far from certain.
5. The Range of Possible Recovery The Settlement Agreement requires HI to establish a settlement fund of
15 See, e.g., Cordovi v. N.E. Med. Center Hosp., 95 F.3d 50, 1996 WL 457407, at *2 (5th Cir. July 15, 1996) (“Though it is often difficult to prove employment discrimination, the plaintiff must establish more than subjective beliefs . . . .”); Kelly v. Boeing Petroleum Servs., Inc., 61 F.3d 350, 359 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[I]n employment discrimination cases, . . . plaintiffs must face the difficult task of persuading the factfinder to disbelieve an employer’s account of its own motives.”); Marcantel v. La. Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 37 F.3d 197, 200 (5th Cir. 1994) (recognizing that Supreme Court precedent makes the problem of proving unlawful discriminatory intent “more difficult for many Title VII plaintiffs”); Parker, 667 F.2d at 1210 (noting problems of “showing discriminatory intent for Title VII claims not based on adverse impact”).
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$1,300,000.00. Sums will be paid from the fund to Qualified Class Members in varying amounts, depending upon whether a class member was eventually hired by HI, qualified for employment, and/or is a named Plaintiff.16 In addition, HI will offer seventy (70) Qualified Class Members a bargaining unit position in its Laurel transformer plant. The seventy (70) bargaining unit positions have been valued at $25,000.00 per position for purposes of the Settlement Agreement. Given the weaknesses in Plaintiffs’ case noted above, the Court cannot say at this time that the proposed relief under the Settlement Agreement “is pegged at a point in the range [of possible recovery] that is [un]fair to the plaintiff settlors.” Maher v. Zapata Corp., 714 F.2d 436, 460 (5th Cir. 1983) (citing In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195, 213 (5th Cir. 1981)).
6. The Opinions of Class Counsel, Class Representatives, and Absent Class Members
Class Counsel and the named Plaintiffs clearly favor the settlement as evidenced by the Motion [29]. HI and its attorneys also favor the settlement as evidenced by the Settlement Agreement [29-2] and the lack of opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion [29]. The opinions of absent class members have not yet been voiced since this Court must first preliminarily approve the settlement before notice of it is afforded to them.
As a whole, the Court concludes that the Reed factors support the preliminary approval of the Settlement Agreement. The Court will undertake a full examination of the fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness of the Settlement Agreement after it has
16 The Court will require the parties to explain fully the justification for establishing payments in varying amounts prior to final approval of the settlement, so as to ensure that the settlement does not improperly grant preferential treatment to certain class members.
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heard further from all interested parties at the fairness hearing. Also, the Court will address the issue of attorney’s fees and costs in favor of Class Counsel after a motion is filed in accordance with Rule 23(h).
E. Whether the Proposed Notice to Class Members Is Sufficient For classes certified under Rule 23(b)(3): [T]he court must direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effor t. The notice must clearly and concisely state in plain, easily understood language: (i) the nature of the action; (ii) the definition of the class certified; (iii) the class claims, issues, or defenses; (iv) that a class member may enter anappearance through an attorney if the member so desires; (v) that the court will exclude from t he class an y member who requests exclusion; (vi) the time and manner for requesting exclusion; and (vii) the binding effect of a class judgment on members under Rule 23(c)(3). Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). Rule 23(e) also requires courts to “direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class members who would be bound by the [settlement] proposal.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1). Individual notice by mail to class members who can be identified though reasonable efforts is usually sufficient. See In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litig., 552 F.2d 1088, 1098 (5th Cir. 1977). The form and manner of the Notice of Class Action and Proposed Settlement [29-4] and Class Action Settlement Verification Form [29-6], to be completed and returned by the Qualified Class Members, have been negotiated and agreed upon by all counsel. (See Exs. “3” and “5” to Pls.’ Motion [29].) The parties have proposed that
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upon entry of an Order granting Plaintiffs’ Motion [29], L. Stephens Tilghman as Claims Administrator will notify class members of their right to opt out of the class and/or to object to the Settlement Agreement by mailing a copy of the Notice of Class Action and Proposed Settlement (“Class Settlement Notice”) to the last known address of each class member. In addition, the Class Settlement Notice will be published in a local newspaper once per week for three weeks. Defendant will be responsible for the costs of the Class Settlement Notice.
The Court finds that the parties’ planned method of notifying class members of certification and the proposed settlement is reasonable and adequate under the circumstances. The Court also finds that the content of the proposed Class Settlement Notice discloses in readily understandable terms “sufficient information for individual class members to make informed choices about . . . [opting out of the class action] and accepting or objecting to the settlement.” In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d at 223. Class members are advised of the legal claims at issue in the action, HI’s denial of liability, and the class certification definition. Class members are also informed when and how to request exclusion from the lawsuit, and when and how to object to the proposed settlement. The Class Settlement Notice further advises of the binding effect of a class-wide judgment and informs class members how they can obtain more detailed information about the lawsuit and proposed Settlement Agreement.17 The
17 The Settlement Agreement [29-2] can be viewed online by any member of the public with a public access to court electronic records (“PACER”) account. An individual without a PACER account can view the Settlement Agreement by visiting the Clerk’s office at the U.S. District Court, 701 N. Main Street, Suite 200, Hattiesburg, Mississippi, 39401.
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notice requirements under Rule 23(c)(2)(B) and (e)(1) are met under these circumstances.
III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons: IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Conditional Certification of the Class and for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement [29] is granted. Accordingly, 1. Class Certification. The Court certifies the following Class for settlement purposes only pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3): All black and nonHispanic white persons who applied for a bargaining unit position at Howard Industries’ Laurel, Mississippi transformer facility between January 1, 2003, and August 25, 2008, and were not hired. If, for any reason, the Settlement Agreement ultimately does not become effective, Defendant’s agreement to the certification of the Class will be null and void in its entirety; the certification of the settlement class effected in this Order will be null and void in its entirety; the parties shall return to their respective positions in this lawsuit as those positions existed immediately before the parties executed the Settlement Agreement; and nothing stated in the Settlement Agreement or in this Order shall be deemed an admission of any kind by any of the parties or used as evidence against, or over the objection of, any of the parties for any purpose in this action or in any other action. 2. Class Representatives; Class Counsel. Plaintiffs Veronica Cook, Yolanda
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Phelps, Charlyn Dozier, and Seleatha McGee are appointed as representatives of the Class. The law firms of Pigott & Johnson, P.A., by Cliff Johnson, and the Law Offices of Lisa Ross, by Lisa M. Ross, are appointed as Class Counsel.
3. Preliminary Approval of the Proposed Settlement. The Court preliminary approves the proposed settlement between the parties, as evidenced by and delineated in the Settlement Agreement [29-2] (hereinafter referred to as the “Settlement” or “Settlement Agreement”) as fair, adequate, and reasonable.
4. Notice of Class Certification and the Proposed Settlement. The form and content of the proposed Notice of Class Action and Proposed Settlement [29-4] (attached to Plaintiffs’ Motion [29] as Exhibit “3”) are approved by the Court. In addition, the Court approves the protocol for dissemination of the “Notice” as set forth in Section 4.2 of the Settlement Agreement [29-2]. Therefore, upon entry of this Order, the Defendant via the Claims Administrator shall notify Class Members of their right to optout of the Class and/or to object to the Settlement by mailing a copy of the Notice incorporating the fairness hearing date and deadlines set forth in this Order to the last known address of each Class Member as it appears in Defendant’s records. The Notice shall be sent by first class mail and published in a local newspaper once per week for three weeks. The Claims Administrator shall use reasonable efforts to complete the mailing of the Notice by the later of October 10, 2012 or thirty (30) days after the date of entry of this Order. Any Notice returned as undeliverable shall be forwarded to any forwarding address provided by the U.S. Postal Service. If no such forwarding address is provided, the Claims Administrator shall utilize the services of a third-party vendor,
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such as National Change of Address Services or Mail Net Services, Inc., to attempt to obtain the most recent addresses for the undelivered Notices. The costs of Notice will be paid by Defendant.
5. Final Fairness Hearing. On January 23, 2013, at 10:00 a.m., the Court will hold a Final Fairness Hearing in Courtroom 1 at the United States Courthouse, 701 N. Main Street, Hattiesburg, Mississippi, 39401. The hearing will be held to determine, among other things: (a) whether this action may be permanently certified as a class action for settlement purposes only; (b) whether the Settlement Agreement and its terms and conditions are fair, reasonable, and adequate and should be finally approved by the Court; (c) whether a final judgment should be entered dismissing this action with prejudice; (d) the amount of attorney’s fees and costs to be awarded to Class Counsel; and (e) any other such matters the Court deems appropriate.
6. Deadlines for Motion for Judgment and Final Approval, Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs, and Related Filings. Plaintiffs and Defendant shall submit a Joint Motion for Judgment and Final Approval of Settlement no later than December 24, 2012. Plaintiffs shall also file a Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs no later than December 24, 2012. Any other papers in support of the certification of the Class and final approval of the Settlement Agreement shall be filed with the Court and served on all parties at least five (5) days before the fairness hearing. Any papers in response to any objection filed regarding any matter to be heard at the fairness hearing shall be filed with the Court and served on all parties and on the objector at least five (5) days before the hearing.
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7. Deadline for Members of the Class to Request Exclusion from the Lawsuit and Settlement. The deadline for Class Members to opt-out of the Class is set at November 29, 2012. To opt-out, Class Members must submit a request for exclusion to the Claims Administrator, who will provide copies to Class Counsel and Defendant’s counsel. The request for exclusion must be sent by registered mail, postmarked no later than November 29, 2012 and must include the individual’s full name, address, the name and cause number of this lawsuit (Cook v. Howard Industries, Inc., Case No. 2:11cv41), and a statement of the individual’s intention to opt-out of the Settlement. Class Counsel shall inform Defendant’s Counsel of any communication from a Class Member that implies in any way that the Class Member may not wish to participate in the Settlement. The request for exclusion shall be sent to:
L. Stephens Tilghman Tilghman & Co., P.C. P.O. Box 11250 Birmingham, AL 35202 8. Deadline for Filing Objections to Matters to Be Heard at the Fairness Hearing and for Filing Notices of Appearance. Any Class Member who wishes to object to the fairness, reasonableness, or adequacy of the proposed Settlement must file with the Clerk of the Court and serve his or her objection on all counsel, no later than ten (10) days before the Final Fairness Hearing. The written objection must include: (1) the name and cause number of this lawsuit (Cook v. Howard Industries, Inc., Case No. 2:11cv41); (2) the objector’s full name and current address; (3) the objector’s dated signature; (4) a statement of each specific reason the Settlement should not be approved; and (5) any legal or evidentiary support the objector wishes to
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bring to the Court’s attention in support of the objection. Class Members may so act
either on their own or through any attorney hired at their own expense. The Class
Member, or attorney acting on his or her behalf, also must: (1) file a notice of
appearance with the Clerk of Court no later than ten (10) days prior to the fairness
hearing, and (2) mail a copy of such notice of appearance by first class United States
Mail to Class Counsel and Defendant’s Counsel.
Class Counsel:
Cliff Johnson Pigott & Johnson, P.A. 775 N. Congress Street Post Office Box 22725 Jackson, Mississippi 39225-2725
Lisa M. Ross, Esq. Law Offices of Lisa Ross 514 E. Woodrow Wilson Ave. Jackson, Mississippi 39283-1264
Defendant:
Richard L. Yoder Richard Lewis Yoder, Jr. Gilchrist Sumrall Yoder & Boone, PLLC 415 North Magnolia Street, Suite 400 Post Office Box 106 Laurel, Mississippi 39441-0106
Jay T. Jorgensen Sidley Austin LLP 1501 K Street NW Washington, DC 20005
Any Class Member who files and serves a written objection in accordance with
this section may appear at the Final Fairness Hearing to object to any aspect of the
fairness, reasonableness, or adequacy of the Settlement Agreement. A Class Member
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who does not timely file and serve such a written objection shall not be heard at the fairness hearing.
Subject to the Court’s discretion, any Class Member (or attorney) who fails to comply with the provisions of this section, and who has not opted out of the Class as provided in the preceding section of this Order, shall waive and forfeit any and all rights the Class Member may have to appear separately and/or to object and shall be bound by all the terms of the Settlement Agreement and by all proceedings, orders and judgments in this action.
9. No Admission of Liability. The parties entered into the Settlement Agreement solely for the purpose of compromising and settling disputed claims. Defendant has in no way admitted any violation of law or any liability whatsoever to named Plaintiffs and the Class, individually or collectively. Defendant has expressly denied all such liability. Defendant has entered into the Settlement to avoid further protracted litigation and to resolve and settle all disputes with named Plaintiffs and the Class.
10. Effect of Failure to Grant Final Approval. In the event the Court does not enter judgment in accordance with the Settlement Agreement, or the Settlement does not receive final approval, this action shall continue as if the Settlement had not been attempted unless the Parties jointly agree to: (1) seek reconsideration or appellate review of the decision denying entry of judgment, or (2) attempt to renegotiate the settlement and seek Court approval of the renegotiated settlement. In the event any reconsideration and/or appellate review is denied, the Parties shall have no further
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Case 2:11-cv-00041-KS-MTP Document 34 Filed 10/05/12 Page 30 of 30 rights or obligations under the Settlement Agreement or this Order. If the Settlement is not ultimately approved, the case will proceed as if no Settlement had been attempted. In that event, the class certified for purposes of settlement shall be decertified, and Defendant retains the right to contest whether this case should be maintained as a class action and to contest the merits of the claims being asserted by Plaintiffs in this action.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 5th day of October, 2012. s/Keith Starrett UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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 Case: 2:11-cv-00041-KS-MTP As of: 09/27/2013 07:00 AM CDT 1 of 8
CLOSED,JURY,LEAD,MTP
U.S. District Court Southern District of Mississippi (Hattiesburg) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:11−cv−00041−KS−MTP

Cook et al v. Howard Industries, Inc. Assigned to: District Judge Keith Starrett Referred to: Magistrate Judge Michael T. Parker Cause: 42:1981 Job Discrimination (Race)
Plaintiff
Veronica Cook on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated

Date Filed: 02/25/2011 Date Terminated: 03/11/2013 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Lisa Mishune Ross LISA M. ROSS, ATTORNEY P. O. Box 11264 Jackson, MS 39283−1264 601/981−7900 Fax: 601/981−7917 Email: lross@lmrossatlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J. Clifton Johnson , II PIGOTT, REEVES, JOHNSON, P.A. 775 North Congress Street Jackson, MS 39202 601/354−2121 Fax: 601/354−7854 Email: cjohnson@pjlawyers.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Yolanda Phelps on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated also known as Ylounda Phelps

represented by Lisa Mishune Ross (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
J. Clifton Johnson , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Charlyn Dozier on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated

represented by Lisa Mishune Ross (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J. Clifton Johnson , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Seleatha McGee on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated

represented by Lisa Mishune Ross (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J. Clifton Johnson , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:11-cv-00041-KS-MTP As of: 09/27/2013 07:00 AM CDT 2 of 8

V. Defendant Howard Industries, Inc.

represented by Richard L. Yoder GILCHRIST, SUMRALL, YODER &BOONE, PLLC P. O. Box 106 Laurel, MS 39441−0106 601/649−3351 Fax: 601/426−9625 Email: rly@laurellaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cara Viglucci Lopez − PHV SIDLEY AUSTIN, LLP − Washington 1501 K Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20005 202/736−8447 Fax: 202/736−8711 Email: cviglucc@sidley.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Danielle Carter − PHV SIDLEY AUSTIN, LLP − Washington 1501 K Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20005 202/736−8925 Fax: 202/736−8711 Email: djcarter@sidley.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gordon D. Todd − PHV SIDLEY AUSTIN, LLP − Washington 1501 K Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20005 202/736−8700 Fax: 202/736−8711 Email: gtodd@sidley.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jay T. Jorgensen − PHV SIDLEY AUSTIN, LLP − Washington 1501 K Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20005 202/736−8020 Fax: 202/736−8711 Email: jjorgensen@sidley.com TERMINATED: 11/16/2012 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mark D. Hopson − PHV SIDLEY AUSTIN, LLP − Washington 1501 K Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20005 202/736−8188 Fax: 202/736−8711 Email: mhopson@sidley.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:11-cv-00041-KS-MTP As of: 09/27/2013 07:00 AM CDT 3 of 8

Interested Party Chiana CA Perkins

represented by Chiana CA Perkins P. O. Box 1362 Taylorville, MS 39168 PRO SE

Date Filed 02/25/2011
02/25/2011
03/03/2011 04/20/2011
04/21/2011
05/04/2011 05/05/2011 05/05/2011 05/05/2011 05/05/2011 05/06/2011
05/06/2011 05/06/2011 05/06/2011 05/10/2011 05/10/2011 05/13/2011

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against Howard Industries, Inc. ( Filing fee $ 350 receipt number 34643008322) filed by Veronica Cook, Yolanda Phelps, Seleatha McGee and Charlyn Dozier. (Attachment: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet)(mbs) (Entered: 02/28/2011)
2 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT against Howard Industries, Inc. filed by Veronica Cook, Yolanda Phelps, Seleatha McGee and Charlyn Dozier.(mbs) (Main Document 2 replaced on 4/20/2011) (ALJ). (Entered: 02/28/2011)
3 Summons Issued as to Howard Industries, Inc. (mbs) (Entered: 03/03/2011)
DOCKET ANNOTATION as to #2. Document replaced. Page 9 of amended complaint was not initially included. Clerk's Office inserted page 9 and replaced document. (ALJ) (Entered: 04/20/2011)
4 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Veronica Cook, Yolanda Phelps, Seleatha McGee, Charlyn Dozier Howard Industries, Inc. served on 4/19/2011, answer due 5/10/2011. (Ross, Lisa) (Entered: 04/21/2011)
5 NOTICE of Appearance by Richard L. Yoder on behalf of All Defendants (Yoder, Richard) (Entered: 05/04/2011)
6 NOTICE of Appearance by Richard L. Yoder, Jr on behalf of Howard Industries, Inc. (Yoder, Richard) (Entered: 05/05/2011)
7 MOTION for Gordon D. Todd to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Howard Industries, Inc. (Yoder, Richard) (Entered: 05/05/2011)
8 MOTION for Mark D. Hopson to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Howard Industries, Inc. (Yoder, Richard) (Entered: 05/05/2011)
9 MOTION for Danielle Carter to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Howard Industries, Inc. (Yoder, Richard) (Entered: 05/05/2011)
TEXT ONLY ORDER granting 7 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice; granting 8 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice; granting 9 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Gordon D. Todd, Mark D. Hopson and Danielle Carter are hereby admitted pro hac vice upon payment of the pro hac admission fees and registering for electronic filing. NO FURTHER WRITTEN ORDER WILL ISSUE. Signed by Magistrate Judge Michael T. Parker on May 6, 2011 (KPM) (Entered: 05/06/2011)
Pro Hac Vice fee paid by Danielle Carter $ 100, receipt number 34643009686 (mbs) (Entered: 05/06/2011)
Pro Hac Vice fee paid by Mark D. Hopson $ 100, receipt number 34643009687 (mbs) (Entered: 05/06/2011)
Pro Hac Vice fee paid by Gordon D. Todd $ 100, receipt number 34643009688 (mbs) (Entered: 05/06/2011)
10 ANSWER to 2 Amended Complaint by Howard Industries, Inc..(Yoder, Richard) (Entered: 05/10/2011)
11 Corporate Disclosure Statement by Howard Industries, Inc. (Yoder, Richard) (Entered: 05/10/2011)
12 Rule 16(a) Initial Order: Telephonic Case Management Conference set for 6/29/2011 9:30 AM before Magistrate Judge Michael T. Parker. Counsel for plaintiff is responsible for initiating the conference call and shall contact Judge Parker's chambers (601.544.9100) when all parties are connected. Confidential

Case: 2:11-cv-00041-KS-MTP As of: 09/27/2013 07:00 AM CDT 4 of 8

05/18/2011 05/19/2011
05/19/2011 06/27/2011
07/15/2011
08/10/2011
08/11/2011 09/30/2011
10/12/2011 10/13/2011
10/18/2011 10/20/2011 10/25/2011 10/31/2011 10/31/2011

settlement memoranda are due on or before 6/24/11. (KPM) (Entered: 05/13/2011)
13 NOTICE of Appearance by J. Clifton Johnson, II on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Johnson, J.) (Entered: 05/18/2011)
DOCKET ANNOTATION as to Document #13: Identification of filer is incomplete. L.U.Civ.R. Rule 11.(a) states that all filed, signed documents must contain counsel's name, address, telephone number, fax number, e−mail address and counsel's bar membership identification number. Attorney is advised to comply with this requirement in future filings. (DM) (Entered: 05/19/2011)
Rule 16(a) order mailed to J. Clifton Johnson, II (KPM) (Entered: 05/19/2011)
Reset Hearings: At the request of the parties, the Telephonic Case Management Conference is reset for 7/27/2011 1:30 PM before Magistrate Judge Michael T. Parker. Counsel for plaintiff is responsible for initiating the conference call and shall contact Judge Parker's chambers (601.544.9100) when all parties are connected. Confidential settlement memoranda are due on or before 7/22/11. (KPM) (Entered: 06/27/2011)
Reset Hearings: At the request of the parties and having confirmed their availability, the Telephonic Case Management Conference is reset for 8/10/2011 1:30 PM before Magistrate Judge Michael T. Parker. Counsel for plaintiff is responsible for initiating the conference call and shall contact Judge Parker's chambers (601.544.9100) when all parties are connected. Confidential settlement memoranda are due on or before 8/4/11. (KPM) (Entered: 07/15/2011)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Michael T. Parker: Telephonic Case Management Conference held on 8/10/2011. A case management order will be entered. PARTICIPANTS: Cliff Johnson and Lisa Ross for plaintiffs; Dick Yoder, Danielle Carter and Gordon Todd for defendant. (KPM) (Entered: 08/10/2011)
14 INITIAL CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER. Signed by Magistrate Judge Michael T. Parker on August 11, 2011 (KPM) (Entered: 08/11/2011)
NOTICE of Hearing: Telephonic Status Conference set for 11/1/2011 10:00 AM (Central Time) before Magistrate Judge Michael T. Parker. Counsel for plaintiff is responsible for initiating the conference call and shall contact Judge Parker's chambers (601.544.9100) when all parties are connected. (KPM) (Entered: 09/30/2011)
15 NOTICE of Service of Initial Disclosure by Howard Industries, Inc. (Yoder, Richard) (Entered: 10/12/2011)
Reset Hearings: Having confirmed the availability of counsel, the TELEPHONIC Status Conference is RESET for 10/31/2011 2:00 PM before Magistrate Judge Michael T. Parker. Counsel for plaintiff is responsible for initiating the conference call and shall contact Judge Parker's chambers (601.544.9100) when all parties are connected. (KPM) (Entered: 10/13/2011)
16 NOTICE of Service of Plaintiffs' Pre−Discovery Disclosure by Veronica Cook, Charlyn Dozier, Seleatha McGee, Yolanda Phelps (Johnson, J.) (Entered: 10/18/2011)
17 NOTICE of Service of Interrogatories by Howard Industries, Inc. (Yoder, Richard) (Entered: 10/20/2011)
18 NOTICE of Service of Interrogatories by Veronica Cook, Charlyn Dozier, Seleatha McGee, Yolanda Phelps (Johnson, J.) (Entered: 10/25/2011)
Joint Ore Tenus MOTION for Protective Order by Veronica Cook, Charlyn Dozier, Howard Industries, Inc., Seleatha McGee, Yolanda Phelps. (KM) (Entered: 10/31/2011)
19 ANSWER to Complaint by Howard Industries, Inc..(Yoder, Richard) (Entered: 10/31/2011)

Case: 2:11-cv-00041-KS-MTP As of: 09/27/2013 07:00 AM CDT 5 of 8

10/31/2011
10/31/2011 11/01/2011 11/01/2011 11/01/2011 11/01/2011 11/01/2011 11/07/2011 11/09/2011 11/11/2011 12/16/2011 12/16/2011 02/09/2012
08/17/2012
08/17/2012

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Michael T. Parker: Telephonic Status Conference held on 10/31/2011. An order amending the case management order will be entered. PARTICIPANTS: Cliff Johnson for plaintiffs; Dick Yoder, Danielle Carter and Gordon Todd for defendant. (KM) (Entered: 10/31/2011)
Joint Ore Tenus MOTION to Consolidate Cases by Veronica Cook, Charlyn Dozier, Howard Industries, Inc., Seleatha McGee, Yolanda Phelps. (KM) (Entered: 10/31/2011)
20 ORDER granting Joint Ore Tenus Motion to Consolidate Cases. Signed by Magistrate Judge Michael T. Parker on November 1, 2011. (KM) (Entered: 11/01/2011)
21 Ore Tenus MOTION to Amend Case Management Order by Veronica Cook, Charlyn Dozier, Seleatha McGee, Yolanda Phelps. (KM) (Entered: 11/01/2011)
22 **DISREGARD THIS ENTRY**IT HAS BEEN REPLACED BY ORDER 23 **ORDER granting 21 Ore Tenus Motion to Amend Case Management Order. Signed by Magistrate Judge Michael T. Parker on November 1, 2011. (KM) Modified on 11/1/2011 (mbs). (Entered: 11/01/2011)
23 Amended ORDER granting 21 Ore Tenus MOTION to Amend Case Management Order filed by Yolanda Phelps, Seleatha McGee, Charlyn Dozier, Veronica Cook. Signed by Magistrate Judge Michael T. Parker on November 1, 2011. (KM) (Entered: 11/01/2011)
DOCKET ANNOTATION as to Doc. 22 : The Court has entered an Amended Order 23 , which amends and replaces Order 22 . Order 22 should be disregarded. (mbs) (Entered: 11/01/2011)
24 ORDER granting Joint Ore Tenus Motion for Protective Order. Signed by Magistrate Judge Michael T. Parker on November 7, 2011. (KM) (Entered: 11/07/2011)
25 NOTICE of Service of Plaintiffs' First Request for Production by Veronica Cook, Charlyn Dozier, Seleatha McGee, Yolanda Phelps (Johnson, J.) (Entered: 11/09/2011)
26 NOTICE of Service of Request for Production by Howard Industries, Inc. (Yoder, Richard) (Entered: 11/11/2011)
27 Joint MOTION to Extend Class Discovery Deadline by Howard Industries, Inc. (Yoder, Richard) (Entered: 12/16/2011)
28 ORDER granting 27 Motion to Extend Deadlines. Signed by Magistrate Judge Michael T. Parker on December 16, 2011. (KM) (Entered: 12/16/2011)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Michael T. Parker: Telephonic Status Conference held on 2/9/2012. The parties discussed the status of the case and reported that a tentative settlement has been reached. No action is requested at this time. The parties anticipate submitting an appropriate motion for settlement approval in the near future. Clifton Johnson for plaintiffs; Richard Yoder for defendant. (KPM) (Entered: 02/09/2012)
29 MOTION to Certify Class and for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement by Veronica Cook, Charlyn Dozier, Seleatha McGee, Yolanda Phelps Responses due by 9/28/2012 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Settlement Agreement, # 3 Exhibit 2A − Bargaining Unit Positions, # 4 Exhibit 3 − Class Notice, # 5 Exhibit 4 − Publication Notice, # 6 Exhibit 5 − Verification Form, # 7 Exhibit 6 − Trust Agreement)(Johnson, J.) (Entered: 08/17/2012)
30 MEMORANDUM in Support re 29 MOTION to Certify Class and for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement filed by Veronica Cook, Charlyn Dozier, Seleatha McGee, Yolanda Phelps (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Proposed Schedule for Class Settlement)(Johnson, J.) (Entered: 08/17/2012)

Case: 2:11-cv-00041-KS-MTP As of: 09/27/2013 07:00 AM CDT 6 of 8

09/18/2012 09/26/2012 09/26/2012 09/26/2012
10/01/2012 10/05/2012 10/30/2012 10/31/2012
11/16/2012 11/16/2012 11/19/2012
12/21/2012
12/21/2012 12/21/2012 12/21/2012

31 NOTICE (Joint) Clarifying Class Action Settlement Agreement by Veronica Cook, Charlyn Dozier, Seleatha McGee, Yolanda Phelps (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Stipulation and Class Action Settlement Agreement)(Johnson, J.) (Entered: 09/18/2012)
32 MEMORANDUM in Support re 29 MOTION to Certify Class and for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement (Supplemental) filed by Veronica Cook, Charlyn Dozier, Seleatha McGee, Yolanda Phelps (Johnson, J.) (Entered: 09/26/2012)
33 MOTION for Jay T. Jorgensen to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Howard Industries, Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing)(Yoder, Richard) (Entered: 09/26/2012)
TEXT ONLY ORDER granting 33 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Jay T. Jorgensen is hereby admitted pro hac vice upon payment of the pro hac admission fee and registering for electronic filing. No further written order will issue. Signed by Magistrate Judge Michael T. Parker on September 26, 2012 (KPM) (Entered: 09/26/2012)
Pro Hac Vice fee paid by Jay T. Jorgensen $ 100, receipt number 34643018141 (mbs) (Entered: 10/01/2012)
34 ORDER granting 29 Motion to Certify Class. Signed by District Judge Keith Starrett on October 5, 2012. (DM) (Entered: 10/05/2012)
35 NOTICE of Change of Address by Richard L. Yoder (Yoder, Richard) (Entered: 10/30/2012)
TEXT ONLY ORDER SETTING FINAL FAIRNESS HEARING. As per Order (Dkt. #34) entered October 5, 2012, a Final Fairness Hearing has been set in this case for Wednesday, January 23, 2013, at 10:00 A.M., Colmer Federal Building, Courtroom 1, Hattiesburg, before U.S. District Judge Keith Starrett. NO FURTHER WRITTEN ORDER SHALL ISSUE. Signed by District Judge Keith Starrett on October 31, 2012 (dsl) (Entered: 10/31/2012)
36 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Howard Industries, Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Proposed Order on Motion to Withdraw Appearance)(Yoder, Richard) (Entered: 11/16/2012)
TEXT ONLY ORDER granting 36 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Jay T. Jorgensen − PHV terminated. No further written order will issue. Signed by Magistrate Judge Michael T. Parker on November 16, 2012. (Parker, Michael) (Entered: 11/16/2012)
DOCKET ANNOTATION as to Doc. 36 : Proposed orders are not to be electronically filed as a separate pleading or as an attachment to a pleading, but instead are to be provided to chambers by e−mail (Court's Administrative Procedures for Electronic Case Filing Sec.5.B.). Attorney is directed to follow this procedure in future filings. (Entered: 11/19/2012)
37 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Cost Reimbursement by Veronica Cook, Charlyn Dozier, Seleatha McGee, Yolanda Phelps (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Declaration of Lisa Ross, # 2 Exhibit B − Declaration of Cliff Johnson, # 3 Exhibit C − An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements &Their Fee Awards)(Johnson, J.) (Entered: 12/21/2012)
38 Joint MOTION for Settlement (Final Approval of Class Action Settlement) by Veronica Cook, Charlyn Dozier, Seleatha McGee, Yolanda Phelps (Johnson, J.) (Entered: 12/21/2012)
39 MEMORANDUM in Support re 38 Joint MOTION for Settlement (Final Approval of Class Action Settlement) and Entry of Judgment of Dismissal filed by Veronica Cook, Charlyn Dozier, Seleatha McGee, Yolanda Phelps (Johnson, J.) (Entered: 12/21/2012)
40 NOTICE of In Camera Submission in Support by Veronica Cook, Charlyn Dozier, Seleatha McGee, Yolanda Phelps re 37 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Cost Reimbursement (Johnson, J.) (Entered: 12/21/2012)

Case: 2:11-cv-00041-KS-MTP As of: 09/27/2013 07:00 AM CDT 7 of 8

12/21/2012 12/21/2012 01/04/2013
01/10/2013 01/10/2013 01/11/2013 01/15/2013 01/23/2013
01/23/2013 02/06/2013 02/07/2013
02/07/2013 03/11/2013

41 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Cost Reimbursement by Veronica Cook, Charlyn Dozier, Seleatha McGee, Yolanda Phelps (Johnson, J.) (Entered: 12/21/2012)
42 MEMORANDUM in Support re 41 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Cost Reimbursement filed by Veronica Cook, Charlyn Dozier, Seleatha McGee, Yolanda Phelps (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Declaration of Lisa Ross, # 2 Exhibit B − Declaration of Cliff Johnson, # 3 Exhibit C − An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements &Their Fee Awards)(Johnson, J.) (Entered: 12/21/2012)
43 ORDER CONSOLIDATING: The Clerk of this Court is directed to consolidate Case No. 2:12cv205−KS−MTP, Chiana CA Perkins v. Howard Industries, with Case No. 2:11cv41−KS−MTP, Veronica Cook, et al vs. Howard Industries, Inc., and to add Chiana Perkins, whose address is Post Office Box 1362, Taylorsville, Mississippi 39168, as a pro se plaintiff to be notified of all future filings. Said cases are consolidated as to the class action issues and the class established in Case No. 2:11cv41−KS−MTP only. Any further filings by Ms. Perkins addressing class settlement or subclass certification relating to the Cook case shall be filed only in Case No. 2:11cv41−KS−MTP. Signed by District Judge Keith Starrett on January 4, 2013. (DM) (Entered: 01/04/2013)
44 MOTION for Cara Viglucci Lopez to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Howard Industries, Inc. (ALJ) (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/10/2013: # 1 Exhibit Certificate) (ALJ). (Entered: 01/10/2013)
Pro Hac Vice fee paid by (Cara Viglucci Lopez) $ 100, receipt number 34643019706 (ALJ) (Entered: 01/10/2013)
TEXT ONLY ORDER granting 44 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Cara Viglucci Lopez is hereby admitted pro hac vice upon registering for electronic filing. No further written order will issue. Signed by Magistrate Judge Michael T. Parker on January 11, 2013 (KPM) (Entered: 01/11/2013)
45 NOTICE of Filing Proof of Publication by Howard Industries, Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Proof of Publication)(Yoder, Richard) (Entered: 01/15/2013)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge Keith Starrett: A Final Fairness Hearing was held on January 23, 2013. Counsel for the parties presented oral argument, as well as one exhibit. After considering same, the Court requested briefing on several issues. Counsel shall submit their briefs within two weeks from date, making same due on or before February 6, 2013. After review of the briefs the Court will issue a written order. PARTICIPANTS: J. Clifton Johnson, II on behalf of Plaintiffs; Richard L. Yoder, Lew Yoder, and Gordon D. Todd on behalf of Defendant. (Court Reporter Fred Jeske 601−583−4383) (dsl) (Entered: 01/23/2013)
46 Exhibit List from Final Fairness Hearing held January 23, 2013. (dsl) (Entered: 01/23/2013)
48 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT re 38 Joint MOTION for Settlement (Final Approval of Class Action Settlement) filed by Howard Industries, Inc. (Yoder, Richard) (Entered: 02/06/2013)
DOCKET ANNOTATION as to Document [#48]: This document is not accompanied by a certificate of service. A certificate of service must be attached to a document [Administrative Procedures for Electronic Case Filing, Sec. 4.A.1, Sec. 4.B, and Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 5(d)(1)]. Attorney is directed to file a certificate as CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE and link it to the proper document (DM) (Entered: 02/07/2013)
49 MEMORANDUM in Support re 38 Joint MOTION for Settlement (Final Approval of Class Action Settlement) filed by Howard Industries, Inc. (Yoder, Richard) (Entered: 02/07/2013)
50 ORDER granting Joint 38 Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement and Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Cost Reimbursement. Signed by District Judge Keith Starrett on March 11, 2013 (dsl) (Entered: 03/11/2013)

Case: 2:11-cv-00041-KS-MTP As of: 09/27/2013 07:00 AM CDT 8 of 8

03/11/2013

51 JUDGMENT, This action is dismissed with prejudice. Signed by District Judge Keith Starrett on 3/11/2013 (ALJ) (Entered: 03/11/2013)