UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

HAMID HASSAN RAZA; MASJID AL-ANSAR; ASAD DANDIA; MUSLIMS GIVING BACK; MASJID AT-TAQWA; MOHAMMAD ELSHINAWY,

ECFCASE

Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF NEW YORK; MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG, in his official capacity as Mayor ofthe City of New York; RAYMOND W. KELLY, in his official capacity as Police Commissioner for the City of New York; DAVID COHEN, in his official capacity as Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence for the City ofNew York,

COMPL~ANLON , MaJ.
Case No. - - - - Hon.
-----~
c.::t

Defendants.

INTRODUCTION 1. Since 2002, the New York City Police Department ("NYPD") has engaged in an unlawful policy and practice of religious profiling and suspicionless surveillance of Muslim New Yorkers. This policy and practice has a false and unconstitutional premise: that Muslim religious belief and practices are a basis for law enforcement scrutiny. 2. As documented extensively in the NYPD's own records, its Intelligence Division has singled out Muslim religious and community leaders, mosques, organizations, businesses, and individuals for pervasive surveillance that is not visited upon the public at large or upon institutions or individuals belonging to any other religious faith. That surveillance has included the mapping of Muslim communities and their religious, educational, and social institutions and businesses in New York City (and beyond); deploying NYPD officers and informants to infiltrate mosques and monitor the' conversations of congregants and religious leaders without any suspicion of wrongdoing; and conducting other forms of suspicionless surveillance of Muslim individuals, organizations, and institutions, including through the use of informants and monitoring of websites, blogs, and other online forums. Infonnation collected from these

activities has been entered into intelligence databases. According to th e commanding officer of the NYPD’s Intelligence Division, its mapping activities have not generated a single lead, nor led to a single terrorism investigation.
3. The unlawful policy and practice that these activities reflect are referred to here as the NYPD’s “Muslim Surveillance Program .” Through the Muslim Surveillance P rogram, the NYPD has imposed an unwarranted badge of suspicion and stigm a on law-abiding Muslim New Yorkers, including Plaintiffs in this action.
4. Plaintiffs are Muslim New Yorkers—religious and community leaders, m osques, and a charitable organization—caught in the dragnet of the NYPD’s sweeping Muslim Surveillance Program. Am ong other violations, Pl aintiffs have been va riously subjected to unlawful surveillance by NYPD inform ants, videocameras, and plainclothes officers, all based on their religion and without any evidence of wrongdoing.
5. As a resu lt of unlawful NYPD spying, each of the Plain tiffs’ religious goals, missions, and practices have been profoundly harm ed. For example, Plaintiffs who are religious leaders and m osques have curta iled the religious and personal gu idance that they provide to congregants for fear that this guidance m ight be misconstrued by NYPD officers or infor mants, resulting in additional unjustifie d scrutiny, or w orse. Religious leaders and mosques have also had to record sermons for fear that NYPD officers or informants will take their statements out of context, or accuse them of saying things that they did not say. P laintiff religious leaders’ ministry, expression, and study have been significan tly chilled. Knowl edge and justifiable fear of NYPD surveillance have dim inished congregants’ attendance at the Plaintiff m osques, prompted distrust of newcom ers out of concer n that they are NYPD inform ants, and prevented the mosques from fulfilling their mission of serving as religious sanctuaries. Kno wledge and justifiable fear of NYPD surveillance have also diminished the ability of a Plaintiff charity and one of its leaders to raise f unds, and interfered with their mission of prom oting and providing charity to needy New Yorkers in fulfillment of one of Islam’s primary tenets.
6. Through this action, P laintiffs seek a declaration that th e NYPD’s policy and practice of subjecting them to suspicionless surveillance because of their Muslim faith violates their fundamental rights to equal protection and free exercise of re ligion under the U.S. Constitution and the Constitu tion of the State o f New York, and the guarantee of governm ent neutrality toward all religions u nder the U.S. C onstitution. Pla intiffs also seek an injunction
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against the continua tion of the NYPD’s unconstitu tional policy and practice, and an order requiring the NYPD to destroy the information about them that it has secretly collected in violation of their constitutional rights.
JURISDICTION & VENUE 7. This Court has subje ct matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 becaus e this laws uit alleges vi olations of the U.S. Constitu tion and rais es questions of federal law. Jurisdiction is al so based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1343 because the lawsuit seeks relief for the deprivation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights under color of state law. 8. This Court has the auth ority to gr ant declaratory and injunctive relief, and any other appropriate relief pur suant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, 2201, and 2202. A substantial, actual, and continuing controvers y exists between the p arties with respect to the Plain tiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. 9. Venue is proper in the Eastern District of New York under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because a s ubstantial part of the events or omi ssions giving rise to th e claims occurred in this District.
PARTIES 10. Plaintiff Hamid Hassan Raza is a U.S. citi zen who is a resident of Brooklyn, New York, with his wife and child. He serves as im am at Masjid Al-Ansar, where his d uties include leading daily prayer services, conducting relig ious educational classes for the m osque community and especially its youth, and pr oviding spiritual and pe rsonal counseling to congregants. Since at least 2008, Imam Raza has been subject to NYPD surveillance. 11. Plaintiff Masjid Al-Ansar is a Muslim house of worship founded in 2008 and located at 2230 Bath Avenue in Brooklyn, New York. It is registered as a 501(c)(3) organization under the name Al-Ansar Center, Inc. In additi on to holding daily prayer services, Masjid AlAnsar provides religious education and counseling to its congregants and seeks to foster an inclusive religious community, es pecially for youth. Since at least 2008, Masjid Al-Ansar has been subject to NYPD surveillance. 12. Plaintiff Asad (“Ace”) Dandia is a twenty-y ear-old U.S. citizen who is a residen t of Brooklyn, New York. He is a sophomore at a City Univer sity of New York community college, studying liberal arts. He aim s to b ecome a social worker. Plaintiff Dandia is a practicing Muslim. He is a co-founder and Vice President of Muslims Giving Back, a charitable
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organization. Since at least March 2012, Pl aintiff Dandia has been subject to NYPD surveillance.
13. Plaintiff Muslims Giving Back is a New York organization th at promotes and engages in charitable activities in furtherance of Islam’s central tenet of charity and assistance to the needy. It also condu cts outreach and awaren ess raising about Islam . Muslims Giving Back collects donations from its members and community members, which it uses to provide food and other assistance to low-incom e individuals in New York City. Muslim s Giving Back was formerly known as Fesabeelillah Services of NYC , Inc. (“FSNYC”), which is registered as a 501(c)(3) organization. Since at least March 2012, Muslim s Giving Back has been subject to NYPD surveillance.
14. Plaintiff Masjid At-Taqwa is a Mus lim house of worship founded in 1981 and located at 1266 Bedford Avenue in Brooklyn, New York. It is incorporated under the nam e Masjid At-Taqwa, Inc. In addi tion to holding daily prayer serv ices, Masjid At-Taqwa provides religious education and counseling to its congregan ts and seeks to foster an inclusive religious community. Since at least 2004, Masjid At-Taqwa has been subject to NYPD surveillance.
15. Plaintiff Mohammad Elshinawy is a U.S. citizen who is a resident of Brooklyn, New York, with his wife and two children. Mr. Elshinawy is a pr acticing Muslim. For approximately eleven years, he has taught and lectured about Islam, giving sermons and teaching classes at various Muslim institutions in New York City. Since at least 2004, Mr. Elshinawy has been subject to NYPD surveillance.
16. Defendant City of Ne w York (“the C ity”) is a m unicipal corporation duly incorporated and existing under th e laws of the State of New York. The City of New York has established and m aintains the NYPD as a constitu ent department of the City. At all re levant times, the City, acting through the NYPD, was responsible for the policy, pr actice, supervision, implementation, and conduct of all NYPD m atters and was responsible for the appointm ent, training, supervision, and conduct of all NYPD personnel. In addition, at all relevan t times, the City was responsible for ensuri ng that NYPD personnel obey the laws of the United States and New York State.
17. Defendant Michael R. Bloom berg is the Mayor of the City of New York, with supervisory authority over the NYPD. He is sued here in his official capacity.
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18. Defendant Raymond W. Kelly is the Polic e Commissioner for the C ity of New York, with supervisory author ity over all officers and operati ons of the NYPD, including responsibility for training, recr uiting, and m anaging all m embers of the NYPD Intelligence Division. He is sued here in his official capacity.
19. Defendant David Cohen is the Deputy Co mmissioner of Intelligence for the City of New Yor k, with supervisory authority over the NYPD’s Inte lligence Division. In that role, Defendant Cohen oversees the gathering, analysis , and distribution of intelligence, and is responsible for training, recr uiting, and m anaging all m embers of the NYPD Intelligence Division. He is sued here in his official capacity.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS A. The NYPD’s Muslim Surveillance Program
20. Since at least 2002, the NYPD has conducted its Muslim Surveillance Program through its Intelligence Division, which currently includes, or previously included: (1) the Demographics Unit (which was renamed the Zone Assessment Unit in 2010); (2) the Intelligence Analysis Unit; (3) the Cyber Intelligence Unit; and (4) the Terrorist Interdiction Unit.
21. The NYPD developed its Muslim Surveillance Program under the leadership of David Cohen, a retired thirty-five- year veteran of the Central In telligence Agency, who becam e the NYPD’s Deputy Commissioner for Intelligence in 2002.
22. The analytic underpinnings of the Muslim Surveillance Program are reflected in a 2007 report titled “Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat,” written b y two senior analysts in the NYPD Intellige nce Division, and published by the NYPD (the “NYPD Radicalization Report”). The NYPD Radicalization Report claims to identify a linear, four-stage “radicalization process” by which individuals tran sform into ter rorists. The proces s laid out in the NYPD Radicalization Report draws a broad pr ofile and treats with suspicion those who identify as Muslim, harbor Islamic beliefs, and/or engage in Islamic practices.
23. According to the NYPD Radicalization Repor t, “[e]nclaves of ethnic populations that are largely Muslim often serve as ‘ideological sanctuaries’ for the seeds of radical thought.” Within these “Muslim enclaves,” the repo rt claims that p otential terrorists could range from members of m iddle-class families to “succes sful college students, the unemployed, the second and third generation, new immigrants , petty criminals, and prison paro lees.” It identifies as socalled “radicalization incubators” places frequented by Muslims, including mosques, “cafes, cab
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driver hangouts, flophouses, . . . student asso ciations, nongovernmental organizations, hookah

(water pipe) bars, butcher shops and book stores.” It also purports to identify as radicalization

“indicators” First Amendment-protected activities in which many, if not most, religious Muslims

participate—including “wearing traditional Islamic clothing [and] growing a beard,” abstaining

from alcohol, and “becoming involved in social activism and community issues.”

24. The NYPD Radicaliza tion Report stigm atizes an entire fa ith community and

invites discrimination. It spec ifically singles out Mus lims for profiling and s uspicionless

surveillance because of their relig ious beliefs and practices. Althoug h the NYPD claim ed in

2009 that its Radicalization Report “was not

intended to be policy prescriptive,” upon

information and belief, the NYPD Intellig ence Division continues to conduct s uspicionless

surveillance of Muslim New Yorkers in accordance with the framework set out in the report.

25. The NYPD’s own docum ents show that , beginning in at least 2003, the

Intelligence Division carried ou t the Muslim Surveillance Program by identifying, lo cating, and

mapping Muslim New Yorkers based on a list of “an cestries of interest.” The NYPD used U.S.

census data and inform ation from I-9 imm igration forms and government databases to locate

significant Muslim populations within New York communities associated with these “ancestries

of interest.”

26. The “ancestries of interest” include “American Black Muslims” and twenty-eight

countries or regions that repres ent eighty percent of the global Muslim population: Afghanistan,

Albania, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Chechnya, Egypt, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq,

Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Pakistan, Palest ine, Saudi Arabia, Som alia, Sudan, Syria,

Tunisia, Turkey, the United Arab Em irates, Uzbekistan, Yemen, and Yugoslavia. All but three

of these countries or regions have majority Mu slim populations. One of those rem aining three

countries—India—is home to eleven percent of the world’s Muslim population.

27. The NYPD’s m apping efforts sp ecifically excluded non-Muslim s from law

enforcement scrutiny. For exam ple, the Inte lligence Division’s Demographics U nit mapped

Iranian community institutions in one NYPD docum ent, but spec ifically noted when those

persons and institutions were Je wish or Christian—not Muslim—and therefore not of interest to

the NYPD. In a report m apping the Egyptian co mmunity in 2007, the NYPD noted that Coptic

Christian Egyptians were “the m ajority of th e Egyptian community in New York City. This

report does not represent the Coptic Egyptian co mmunity and is m erely an ins ight into th e

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Muslim Egyptian com munity of New York City.” Similarly, in its 2007 map of the Syrian community in New York City, the N YPD stated that the community is “divided into two parts, a Jewish Syrian and a M uslim Syrian community w ith the Jewish community being the larger of the two. This report will focus on the sm aller Muslim comm unity.” Although the NYPD acknowledged the religious dive rsity in New York’s Albanian population, police officials only mapped and photographed Albanian m osques for the NYPD’s Dem ographics Report on Albanians.
28. The NYPD further identified at least 263 so-called “hot spots”—such as cafés, bookstores, and restaurants—owned or frequented by Muslims.
29. The NYPD dispatched team s of plainclothes officers known as “rakers” into neighborhoods with concentrated communities associated with Muslim “ancestries of interest” to monitor daily life in th ose communities. In addition, the NYPD has engaged infor mants to conduct suspicionless surveillance of Muslims. So-called “seeded” informants work or reside in certain ethnic neighborhoods and report to th e police on neighborhood happenings. “Directed” informants gather inf ormation from locations that rakers have identified as “hot spots,” notwithstanding the absence of any indication of criminal activity.
30. Although the NYPD’s dragnet Muslim Surveillance Program has swept up Muslims as a faith community, specific Muslim individuals, organizations and groups have been further singled out by the NYPD be cause of real or perceived stronger devotion to their faith or to particular Islamic beliefs. For example, the NYPD sent officers and informants to spy on “hot spots” that were particularly identified as having “‘devout clientele.’” In addition, the NYPD has targeted individuals and mosques that it id entified as hav ing “ties to S alafism.” The NYPD defined Salafi in its Radicalizat ion Report as “a Sunni revivalist school of thought that takes the pious ancestors of the early pe riod of early Is lam as exemplary models.” The NYPD has also singled out for suspicionless surveillance Muslim religious institutions and leaders it perceives as particularly influential in the community.
31. Among the institutions on which the NYPD has specifically focused its suspicionless surveillance are m osques, which are central to Muslim religious life. The NYPD identified and mapped more than 250 area mosques in New York and neighboring states. NYPD officials then determ ined the “ethn ic orientation, leadership, and group affiliation s” of each mosque, either by surveilling it from the outside, or by enteri ng the mosque to m ake those
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determinations. Using rakers and inform ants, the NYPD identified fi fty-three “mosques of concern” in which the Department placed additional informants and plainclothes officers.
32. The NYPD has placed video cam eras outside of mosques to surveil congregants and collected license plate num bers of worshippers attending certain mosques, without any suspicion of criminal activity.
33. Upon information and belief, Defendant Cohen intended to place an NYPD source in every mosque within a 25 0-mile radius of New York City and succeeded in placing a source in many of them.
34. The NYPD has instructed its officers and inform ants to spy on and record th e First Amendment-protected speech and activities of Muslim religious and community lead ers and members, including students and activists . Infor mants known inform ally as “m osque crawlers” are sp ecifically dispatched to monitor sermons, scrutinize im ams, record conversations, and collect lists of mosque attendees, all absent evidence of wrongdoing. The NYPD’s own docum ents show that inform ants have recorded conversations among mosque congregants about current events, such as the Da nish cartoon controversy in early 2006 and the accidental crash of a plane into a Manhattan building in October 2006.
35. The NYPD’s mapping activities and its use of officers and informants to monitor and record Muslim New Yorkers’ conversations without any suspicion of wrongdoing continue. According to the cu rrent commanding officer of the NYPD’s Intelligence Division, members of the Division may be instructed to record and report on Muslim New Yorkers’ conversations to determine whether they are “upset” about world ev ents, such as “a drone attack,” or discussing information that would “identify what region or what type of people they are.”
36. The NYPD has also instruc ted and trained informants to bait Mu slim New Yorkers into making inflammatory rem arks, which are then reported to the police. One such technique is known as “create and capture,” by which an informant “creates” a conversation with a Muslim New Yorker about jihad or terrorism and then “captures” and reports that individual’s response to the NYPD.
37. For example, in January 2012, a plainclo thes NYPD officer re cruited nineteenyear-old Shamiur Rahman to serve as an info rmant following his third arrest on misdem eanor drug charges. Rahman was instructed to use the “create and capture” technique.
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38. The NYPD paid Rahman as much as $1,500 a month to: monitor conversations in mosques and among Muslim youths; listen for buzz words such as “jihad” and “revolution” and report any “radical rhetoric”; photograph im ams and congregan ts inside m osques; collect congregants’ cell phone num bers; and collect and photograph th e names of pe ople attending study groups and classes on Islam . Rahman provided all of this inform ation to the NYPD, eve n though none of it pertained to actual or suspected criminal activity of any kind.
39. For example, on the NYPD’s instructions, Rahm an attended the 2012 Muslim Day Parade in Manhattan and t ook pictures of people m arching, which he sent to the NYPD. The NYPD also assigned Rahman to spy on a February 23, 2012 lecture at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice, even though Rahm an’s NYPD handler adm itted to him that the police did not believe the Muslim Student Association there had done anything wrong. Rahman’s NYPD handler told him that the group should be mon itored because its mem bers were “religious Muslims” and “the NYPD considers being Muslim a terrorism indicator.”
40. The NYPD continues to use officers a nd informants to monitor mosques, sermons, imams, and congregants. The NYPD does not conduct sim ilar profiling or surveillance of individuals, houses of worship, or organizations affiliated with any religion other than Islam.
41. As part of the NYPD’s Muslim Surveillance Program, the Intelligence Division generated daily reports on innocent Muslim New Yorkers’ lives in New York City’s neighborhoods, and the nam es of thousands of i nnocent New York Cit y residents have been placed in secret police files, even absent evidence that they engaged in criminal activity.
42. The information gathered by the Intelligence Division is kept both in an intelligence database and on a standalone computer used to generate intelligence reports.
43. The highest-ranking New York Cit y and NYPD officials have em braced the Muslim Surveillance Program, defended it, and indicated tha t it will continue. Mayor Bloomberg has stated that, “We’re doing the right thing. We will continue to do the right thing.” He has asse rted that critic ism of the NYPD’s targeting of Muslims for surveillance was “jus t misplaced” and “pandering.”
44. None of the NYPD’s suspicion less surveillance activities described here is conducted against institutions or individuals belonging to any faith other than Islam, nor are they conducted against the public at large.
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B. Plaintiffs’ Allegations
NYPD Surveillance of Imam Hamid Hassan Raza and Masjid Al-Ansar
45. Plaintiff Masjid Al-Ansar provides Muslim worshippers in Brooklyn, New York a facility for communal prayer five times each day in accordance with the tenets of Islam, and is an important daily gath ering space for its cong regants. In addition, Masjid Al-Ansar’s staf f provides congregants with religious education and counseling.
46. Since September of 2008, Plaintiff Hamid Hassan Raza has served as the imam at Masjid Al-Ansar.
47. Imam Raza teaches and counsels children, youths, and adults about the Qur’an, its teachings, and other religious top ics. He also provides religious and personal co unseling to congregants. As i mam, his goal is to m ake Masjid Al-Ansar an inclusive religious site and community space, especially for its younger generation of congregants.
48. By the tim e Imam Raza becam e imam at Masjid Al-Ansar, he understo od from newspaper accounts and from conversations with other community members that NYPD officers and informants were monitoring mosques and sermons in New York City.
49. Because Imam Raza was concerned about law enforcement surveillance, he began recording on video the serm ons he delivered. Imam Raza records his serm ons because he is afraid that NYPD off icers or inf ormants are mon itoring what he says and will qu ote or record some isolated part of a serm on, or take it ou t of context, and subject Imam Raza to further law enforcement scrutiny, or worse.
50. Imam Raza’s belief that he and Masjid Al-Ansar were the subjects of law enforcement surveillance increased m arkedly as a result of a visit to the mosque by two NYPD officers in late 2009, which stru ck Imam Raza as odd. During this visit, the NYPD officers asked Imam Raza for his driver’s license, which he provided to them. The officers copied down some information from the license. They told Imam Raza that there was some confusion related to his identification number, but did not explain what the confusion might be or why they needed his driver’s license. The visit struck Imam Raza as especially unusual because the officers, who identified themselves as being from the 62nd Precinct, were not in uniform.
51. After this encounter with the plainclothes NYPD officers, Imam Raza and Masjid Al-Ansar took a num ber of actions out of concer n that they were under NYPD surveillance. In early 2010, Im am Raza substantially upgraded the video equipm ent he used to record his
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sermons. He replaced the m osque’s handheld video camera with a pr ofessional-grade video camera, at a cost of $1,800, and purchased for the m osque three external hard drives to save the recordings, at a cost of approximately $400. A congregant volunteered his time and labor to wire a sound system in the mosque to facilitate the recording of sermons.
52. Masjid Al-Ansar incurred these expenses in order to ensure that if NYPD officers or informants took anything in Imam Raza’s sermons out of context, the mosque and its im am would be able to defend themselves by providing a high-quality recording of the full sermon.
53. Because of the disconcerting visit by the plainclothes NYPD officers, Imam Raza also stopped m entioning, in his Friday serm ons, topics that m ight be consid ered controversial. These topics are discussed in greater detail below.
54. Imam Raza’s belief that the NYPD was spying on him and Masjid Al-Ansar was deepened by another encounter with NYPD offi cers at or around the end of 2010. Masjid AlAnsar had acquired a large number of books from another mosque that was shutting down. With help from congregants, Imam Raza unloaded ap proximately twenty to twenty-five garbage bag s full of these books from a double-parked truck, during the daytime, and brought them into the mosque. The next day, two NYPD officers cam e to the mosque and told Im am Raza that they had received “a com plaint” about a van double-park ing in front of the mo sque and bags being brought inside. The officers said they wanted to look inside the m osque “just to make sure.” The officers left when Im am Raza said that he c ould not allow them to look inside without first getting permission from Masjid Al-Ansar’s boa rd. Th ese NYPD officers also identified themselves as being from the 62nd Precinct. Th e officers were not the ones who visited Masjid Al-Ansar in 2009, but they were also in plainclothes, which again struck Imam Raza as strange.
55. In 2011, plainclothes NYPD officers claiming to be from the Departm ent’s community affairs branch visited Masjid Al-Ansar and said they wanted to “get to know the community.” This visit further heightened the c oncerns of the m osque’s leadership that Mas jid Al-Ansar was under N YPD surveillance. The mos que’s leadership decide d to sponsor a civil rights workshop in January 2012 to infor m congregants of their rights. That workshop took time away from Masjid Al-Ansar’s Qur’an curriculum.
56. In early 20 12, and again in July or August 2012, I mam Raza encountered newcomers to the mosque who, in Imam Raza’s experience, behaved unlike other congregants
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and whose interest in Islam seemed feigned or insincere. As a result, Im am Raza believed these men to be informants.
57. On the first occasion, in early 2012, Imam Raza was closing the mosque after late evening prayers when a m an he had never seen before entered, breathi ng hard, and appearing nervous. The man said he wanted to become a Muslim, but then asked Imam Raza for his views on the wars in Afghanistan and Ira q, and on how Muslims should deal with Christians and Jews. The man openly took o ut his phone to record Im am Raza’s answers. Im am Raza believed the man might be an informant because of this strange behavior, and tried to ward him off with short and quick answers. Imam Raza to ld the man that he was more concern ed with local affairs than those in other countries, and th at the Prophet Muhamm ad lived pe acefully with Christians and Jews. The man then suddenly asked to become a Muslim by taking the shahada, the declaration of Islamic faith, in front of the imam. The man also immediately asked for a copy of the Qu’ran. In Imam Raza’s experience, this behavior was extremely unusual and not how people typically convert to Islam, further strengthening his belief that the man was an informant.
58. On a later occasion, the behavior of anot her newcomer to the mosque heightened Imam Raza’s belief that he and the mosque we re under surveillance. In July or A ugust 2012, Imam Raza gave a workshop at Masjid Al-Ansar about da’wa, or how to invite people to Islam . A newcomer came in late, and, during a student practice exercise, took an approach that in Imam Raza’s experience was confrontatio nal and reflect ed a lack of seriousness about th e exercise. When Imam Raza’s assistant chas tised the newcomer, the newcomer became angry, and Im am Raza had to defuse the situation by calming everyone down. I mam Raza thought the entire interaction with the newcom er was strange. L ater in the fall, young congregants at Masjid A lAnsar showed Im am Raza a Facebook post in which th at newcomer identified himself as Shamiur Rahman and admitted to being an NYPD informant.
59. After confirmation that the NYPD had sent at least one inf ormant to spy on Masjid Al-Ansar and Im am Raza, the im am and the mosque’s leadership sponsored a second workshop to inform congregants of their civil ri ghts. L ike the civil ri ghts workshop held in January 2012, this one also took time away from Masjid Al-Ansar’s Qur’an curriculum.
60. The NYPD’s surveillance of Masjid Al -Ansar and its m embers has had a pronounced negative impact on Im am Raza’s relig ious ministry, Masjid Al-An sar’s religious mission and activities, and the religious practices of the mosque’s congregation.
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61. Imam Raza’s awareness and fear of NYPD surveillance grew with each incident described above and he has altered his religious sermons and teaching practices in response.
62. NYPD surveillance has particularly affected Imam Raza’s discussions of religious topics and the relig ious and spiritual counsel he feels comfortable givi ng about current events. For example, Imam Raza generally does not disc uss in his serm ons or with his congregants certain topics that m ight be perceiv ed by the NYPD or its inf ormants as controv ersial or that might be taken out of context. These topics include current events like the war in Afghanistan. They also include th e concept of jihad, which Im am Raza refrains fro m discussing despite his belief that jihad, which means “struggle,” concerns the internal and universal struggle for hum an self-improvement, that it is a strugg le in which all human beings are engaged, and that it is the most important struggle in Islam. Imam Raza believes that a Muslim cannot do anything in the name of jihad that would lead to harm or injustice to a fellow hum an being, Muslim and nonMuslim alike. But Im am Raza worries that if he were to discuss any of these top ics or beliefs with an individual who was an NYPD infor mant, that person m ight distort his explanation or take parts of it out of context in reporting to the NYPD.
63. For the same reasons, Im am Raza discourages congregants from discussing these religious concepts or current even ts generally at the m osque. He fears that if his congregants discuss what he might tell them, or their own views, with or in front of an inform ant, they would expose themselves and Masjid Al-Ansar to m isunderstanding and further scrutiny by the NYPD, or worse. Plaintiff Raza asks congregants to step out of the mo sque to discuss these topics, and he avoids answering congregants’ questions about them.
64. Avoiding discussion of current events and particular religious topics on which the NYPD is likely to focu s prevents Imam Raza fr om fulfilling his duty as a re ligious minister, educator, and scholar in the Masjid Al-Ansar community. Because of Imam Raza’s knowledge and fear of NYPD surveillance and the protective actions he has taken as a result, he feels he is failing the mosque’s congregatio n and especially its youth by not providing full religious education and discussion, and by not providing youthful congregants with a space in which they can explore their questions about all areas of their faith and life.
65. Knowledge and justifiable fear of NYPD surveillance have also chang ed Imam Raza’s practices with regard to his own studies. To further his religious expertise, Imam Raza used to listen to the lectures of English-speaking Islamic scholars. But because English-speaking
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scholars and their students are widely know n to be the more common targets for NYPD surveillance, he now avoids them , and has largely switched to Arabic-language lecturers. This impedes Imam Raza’s religious scholarship because his Arabic-language skills are not as stron g as his English. He also avoids listening to reli gious speakers who are fiery and em otional even though they may have important lessons to teach, fo r fear that following those speakers is m ore likely to attract police attention.
66. Knowledge and justifiable fear of NYPD surveillance have forced Imam Raza to keep his d istance from newcomers to the m osque. Imam Raza is hesitant to approach newcomers until they are better known in the Masjid Al-Ansar community, further impeding his ability to fulfill effectively his role as a religious and spiritual counselor and teacher.
67. Because Imam Raza knows the NYPD is liste ning to what he says and that, as a result, he is at risk of endi ng up in a police file ei ther for no reason or because of a wrongful accusation, he has considered leavin g the pulpit. Imam Raza is worried about the im pact on his family and children if he is targeted and victimized by the NYPD because he is an imam.
68. Each of the foregoing consequences for Im am Raza of the NYPD’s Muslim Surveillance Program has also had a profoundly negative impact on Masjid Al-Ansar’s ability to function as a center of religious and social life for its members and surrounding community.
69. The NYPD’s Muslim Surveillance Program has also cau sed other h arms to Masjid Al-Ansar. For instance, in 2009, at a tim e when many yout hs came to Masjid Al-Ansar for prayer, guidance and fellowship, a friend wa rned Imam Raza that NYPD surveillance te ams and informants were being taught “indicators” or criteria that single d out for scrutiny young, religious Muslims who grew their beards, wore Islamic garments like shorter pants, and attended mosque regularly.
70. These “indicators” are contained in the NYPD Radicalization Report. 71. Imam Raza understood the NYPD’s reliance on these in dicators to m ean that police officers were likely to place gatherin gs of religious, young Muslim men at Masjid AlAnsar under surveillance. As a result of the in formation from his friend and what Im am Raza knew to be the NYPD’s practices, he found ways to encourage youths to leave the m osque between prayers. Im am Raza stopped sitting and socializing with young worshipers between prayer services, so as not to encourage them to linger at the mosque. At other tim es, Imam Raza would simply announce that he was closing the mosque between prayers so people would leave.
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72. Had it not b een for NYPD surveillance and the existence of these dis criminatory and stigmatizing “indicators,” Imam Raza would not seek to limit his congregation’s presence in the mosque. I mam Raza’s role as relig ious leader of Masjid Al-Ansar would norm ally be to make worshipers feel comfortable and to turn the m osque into a second hom e for them. Imam Raza has felt forced to act contrary to his role as Masjid Al-Ansar’s im am because he does no t wish to expose worshipers to police surveillance.
73. Knowledge and justifiable fear of NYPD surveillance among Masjid Al-Ansar’s regular worshipers have bred a toxic, distrustful, and destruc tive atmosphere at the m osque, especially towards newcom ers. Al most every time that a new, unf amiliar person attends the mosque, one of the m osque’s regular worshipp ers warns Im am Raza about the n ewcomer and shares suspicions that he m ight be a police in formant. Newcom ers to Masjid Al-Ansar have reacted to this receptio n with alarm, telling Im am Raza that the env ironment at the m osque is hostile to them , that longstanding congregants view newcom ers with suspicion, and that newcomers are excluded from many facets of social life at the mosque.
74. Imam Raza has spent m any hours m ediating the resulting dispu tes among congregants, in an effort to defuse s uspicions and foster an open and trusting atm osphere at the mosque. Managing these instances of suspic ion and disruption in th e congregation is tim econsuming and prevents Im am Raza from dealing with the other pressing responsibilities he must fulfill as Masjid Al-Ansar’s religious leader.
75. The suspicion caused by NYPD surveillan ce also inte rferes with r eligious ministry and teaching at Masjid Al-Ansar. Imam Raza cannot minister or teach as effectively— and congregants cannot learn as well—when they are constantly worried whether they are saf e from police spying, or when they are suspicious of their fellow worshippers.
76. In August 2011, the Associated Press began reporting on the NYPD’s Musli m Surveillance Program, based in part on leaked NYPD docum ents, in what becam e a Pulitzer Prize-winning series. Once thos e stories became public, the envir onment of suspicion and fear only became m ore acute, both for Im am Raza a nd for Masjid Al-Ansar’s congregants. Congregants grew even more suspicious of newc omers, and a constant sense of suspicion now exists among the mosque’s congregants. There ha s been a steep decline in mosque attendance, as the number of worshippers attending aftern oon prayers on weekdays has declined from approximately twenty people to just two or three pe ople. Although congregan ts knew that the
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mosque was the subject of surveillance by the N YPD before the publication of the news stories, the confirmation of NYPD surveillance has in creased their fears and further dim inished what was once a vibrant and lively mosque community.
NYPD Surveillance of Asad Dandia and Muslims Giving Back
77. Since November 2011, Plaintiff Asad Dandi a has been a leader of a communitybased charitable organization first known as Fe sabeelillah Services of NYC, Inc. (“FSNYC”), and now known as Muslims Giving Back, which is also a Plaintiff.
78. Because charitable giving is one o f the core tenets of Islam , Mr. Dandia feels compelled to help the needy m embers of hi s community, whether they are Muslim or nonMuslim. His charitable work is an important p art of his religious practice and he believes that it helps him to be a better practicing Muslim.
79. FSNYC was a comm unity-based charitable organization f ounded in Nove mber 2011 to serve low-income Muslims living in New Yo rk City. It was in corporated in December 2011 with Mr. Dandia as the Vice President. It rece ived tax-exempt status as a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization in March 2012.
80. FSNYC hosted small events, invited speakers to a local m osque, and emphasized the importance of charitable giving in Islam . Key FSNYC activitie s included helping the homeless, finding housing for fam ilies, donating money to families in times of need (like when unexpected funeral expenses cam e up), and, gene rally, fundraising to support these and other community-based charitable activities.
81. Most FSNYC m embers were college-aged young men and most were students. FSNYC consisted of approxim ately ten to f ourteen active members. In total, app roximately thirty-five to forty individuals donated to FSNYC and regularly attended FSNYC events.
82. Mr. Dandia’s first contact with Sham iur Rahman, an NYPD infor mant, occurred on March 22, 2012. At the tim e, Mr. Dandia had no idea that Rahman was wor king for the NYPD as an informant. Mr. Dandia did not discover that Rahman was an NYPD informant until Rahman publicly admitted that f act almost seven months later. Rahman adm itted to being an informant after he had become an active member of FSNYC and, later, Muslims Giving Back, as well as after he became part of Mr. Dandia’s circle of friends.
83. On March 22, 2012, Rahm an sent a m essage to Mr. Dandia on Facebook. Mr. Dandia accepted Rahman’s “friend request” because he believed that they had several friends in
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common. On March 24, Rahm an sent another message to Mr. Dandia on Facebook, asking whether there were “any events or anything” he could attend soon.
84. Rahman told Mr. Dandia that he was trying to become a better practicing Muslim, and that he wanted to involve himself in FSNYC’s activities. Mr. Dandia wanted to help in what he thought was Rahm an’s quest for religious se lf-improvement, and introduced R ahman to his friends in FSNYC. Rahman joined FSNYC and started to attend all FSNYC meetings.
85. Rahman also began regularly attending Mr. Dandia’s m osque, Masjid Om ar in Brighton Beach, Brooklyn, even though Rahm an lived in Queens. Rahm an often arrived at the mosque early, before prayers, and would nap in the mosque.
86. On several occasions, Mr. Dand ia invited Rahman to his fam ily’s house, including once to spend the night. Rahman met Mr. Dandia’s parents and ate with his family.
87. Rahman asked people he m et in Mr. Da ndia’s company for their phone num ber, often within minutes of meeting them. Rahm an also often tried to take photographs with or of people he met through Mr. Dandia.
88. On April 13, 2012, Mr. Dandia convened a m eeting to discuss FSNYC m atters. Mr. Dandia invited about twenty-f ive youths, mostly people who re gularly prayed with him at the mosque and who had actively conducted outrea ch for FSNYC and publicized its activities. Rahman attended this meeting, which took place at Masjid Omar, and a photo of the group was posted on Facebook. Rahman had access to this photo and gave it to the NYPD.
89. On April 24, 2012, Mr. Dandia sent m essages on Facebook to several FSNYC members, including Rahm an, to seek donations for the organization. Rahm an responded and said he would raise money.
90. On April 25, 2012, a friend told Mr. Dandia that he had heard from a credible source in the NYPD Intelligence Division that an informant had infiltrated FSNYC.
91. On April 29, 2012, another friend told Mr . Dandia that he had heard that NYPD informants had been sent to infiltrate FSNYC. This friend strongly advised Dandia to step down from FSNYC because he was worried that Mr. Dandia would be targeted by the informants.
92. Mr. Dandia decided not to resign fro m FSNYC because he knew that h e had not done anything wrong. Nonetheless, as a result of learning that one or more NYPD infor mants had infiltrated FSNYC, Mr. Da ndia personally stopped publicizing FS NYC activities through social networking sites and stopped following up on many matters for FSNYC.
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93. On the evening of April 29, 2012, Mr. Dandia told some of his friends who were also FSNYC members about the N YPD informants. One F SNYC board member decided to be less active with the organization out of concern that it had been infiltrated by the NYPD.
94. Through the late spring of 2012, FSNYC operated at a significantly lower level of activity than it had be fore the FSNYC board and members learned th at there were NYPD informants in the organization’s midst.
95. After the FSNYC members learned about the NYPD informants, the organization hosted only one m ajor event, which had been long planned. FSNYC had invited Napoleon, a former rapper who had become an Islamic speaker, to headline the even t. Several members told Mr. Dandia that after th e Napoleon event was c oncluded, they would cease their activities with FSNYC, largely because they were fearful of being spied upon by an NYPD informant.
96. On June 3, 2012, the Napoleon event took pl ace at Masjid al-Farooq, a mosque in Brooklyn. Following this event, FSNYC ceased holding events and charitable activities.
97. Soon after, Mr. Dandia spoke with a ha ndful of friends about reviving their community involvement. They decided to create a new group of young m en who wanted to perform community service as part of their re ligious practice. This group continued FSNYC’s work under the nam e Muslims Giving Back, and Mr . Dandia serves as th e organization’s Vice President.
98. On July 7, 2012, Mr. Dandia participated in the first Muslim s Giving Back shopping trip to purch ase food for donation to n eedy families in their co mmunity. On July 8, Muslims Giving Back had its first informal organizational meeting.
99. Mr. Dandia obtained perm ission from a re ligious leader at Masjid Omar for Muslims Giving Back to construct a bulletin board at the back of the mosque in order to display photos of purchased food and to request donations. The a nnouncement on the bulletin board helped Muslims Giving Back raise m oney for the community and gave the organization legitimacy within the mosque.
100. Throughout the summer of 2012, Muslim s Giving Back worked to fundraise and distribute food donations to needy community m embers. During this tim e, Rahman rem ained active within the charity’s group of volunteers.
101. On at least one occasio n, in Septembe r 2012, Rahm an initiated a co nversation among Muslims Giving Back’s members about potentially controversial topics related to current
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events. That occasion took place af ter Friday prayers, when Mr. Dandia a nd eight or nine other Muslims Giving Back members were gathered together outside Masjid Omar. Rahman asked the group what it thought about the attacks on the Un ited States consulate in Benghazi, Libya, which had occurred earlier that week. His question caught Mr. Dandia and ot hers in the group by surprise as it was out of context g iven the specific setting, their preceding conversation, and that particular gathering. One of Mr. Dandia’s friends in the group attempted to end the conversation by saying there was no reason to discuss the topi c, and several of the young m en dispersed. A smaller group of the remaining youths, including Rahman, moved inside the mosque.
102. Once inside, Rahman again attempted to initiate a conversation, this time asking people for their opinions about political deve lopments in the Middle East, including the Benghazi attacks and the Syrian revolution. T he conversation got very heated because those present did not want to have the discussion with Rahman. Several of those present got up and left, saying that they were not comfortable having the discussion.
103. Later that day, Mr. Dandia received a call from one of his friends who had been part of the group at the mosque, asking Mr. Dandia to come to his home so that they could speak. Once Mr. Dandia arrived, he saw that another one of his friends was also there. Mr. Dandia’s two friends told him that they thought that Rahman was a “spy,” and the group discussed their concern that Rahman might be an informant.
104. On October 2, 2012, Rahman posted a message to his Facebook account in which he revealed that the NYPD had em ployed him as an informant and sent him to infiltrate Muslim communities and organizations.
105. Once it bec ame public that Rahm an had inf iltrated Muslims Giving Back as an NYPD informant, the charity was stigm atized, and its re putation and legitim acy within the Brighton Beach comm unity was deeply dam aged. Muslims Giving Back has not been able to maintain its previous level of activity in the community. Its ability to raise funds for, and fulfill, the charitable goals and activities it was formed to accomplish has suffered greatly.
106. About ten days after Rahm an disclosed that he was an NYPD inform ant, a religious leader at Mas jid Omar asked Mr. Dandia to rem ove the Muslims Giving Back bulletin board and told him that Muslims Giving Back would no longer be permitted to solicit donations from Masjid Omar community members after Friday services. These events have been a m ajor blow to the charity’s viability.
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107. To raise money for its charitable work, Muslim s Giving Back used to rely on the weekly solicitation of funds from the Masjid Om ar congregation after Friday prayers. Each week, Muslims Giving Back (and FSNYC before it ) typically raised a few hundre d dollars of donations in this way. The largest am ount of donations raised in one week was $800. Now, Muslims Giving Back struggles to raise funds to buy food and serve the community’s needs, and to raise the $308 per month required to rent the storage facility where it stores donated food.
108. The religious leader at Masjid O mar also asked Mr. Dandi a to stop holding Muslims Giving Back meetings at the mosque and to avoid bringing new people to the mosque. Before that point, M asjid Omar was the p rimary meeting place for Mus lims Giving Back, and new volunteers regularly cam e to the m osque. Muslims Giving Back m embers now gather in front of the mosque, but do not meet inside of it.
109. The revelation that Rah man was an NYPD inform ant has also harm ed the ability of Muslims Giving Back to publicize its charitable activities and attract new members.
110. On October 26, 2012, Muslim s Giving Back learned from a CNN news program that Rahman had sent a photo of some of its m embers to the NYPD. After that, the organization stopped posting public pictures of its m embers engaging in charitable work. Previously, Muslims Giving Back p osted such pictures as part of its community out reach, and to encourage other young Muslims to join. Now, its members are concerned that such visibility will draw law enforcement attention, and the organization only posts public photos of members with their faces blurred. This fear of public exposure has harmed the charity’s ability to promote its work and to serve as an example to other young Muslims.
111. Although Muslims Giving Back still aim s to serve the community by purchasing and delivering food to poor Muslim and non- Muslim families in Bro oklyn, the charity’s goals have been impeded by the NYPD’s inf iltration and surveillance. In ad dition to th e negative impact detailed above of NYPD spying on the organization’s fundraising and ability to engage in charitable work, the members’ sense of community has been damaged.
112. Since Rahman confessed to being an NYPD inform ant, Mr. Dandia fears further NYPD surveillance and as a result, he has changed his personal approach to the charitable community work that is so essential to his re ligious beliefs, to the d etriment of his beliefs and practices. In an effort to enc ourage other Muslims his age to part icipate in charitable work, Mr.
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Dandia used to try to be as inclusive and public as possible about his work. Now, Mr. Dandia communicates primarily with people he knows personally.
NYPD Surveillance of Masjid At-Taqwa
113. Masjid At-Taqwa is a mosque serving the Muslim co mmunity in Brooklyn, Ne w York, and is an im portant daily gathering spac e for its congregants. In addition to prayer services five tim es a day, Masjid At-Taqwa pr ovides its congregants a nd the community with classes on religious topics and re ligious and personal counseling fr om the mosque’s staff. The religious and personal counseling is vitally im portant for Masjid At-Taqwa’s congregants, and ranges from marital counseling to guidance on family affairs to funeral services.
114. Imam Siraj Wahhaj has led the Masjid At-Taqwa congregation since its founding in 1981. Im am Wahhaj is also a clergy liaison for the NYPD Comm unity Affairs Bureau and a member of the Majlis Ash-Shur a, the Islam ic Leadership Counc il of Metropolitan New Yor k. Osman A. Ada m is the Assistant Im am at Masjid At-Taqwa. Ali Abdul Karim is the head of security for Masjid At-Taqwa. He also serves a m inisterial role, counseling congregants and lecturing on Islamic topics. Mr. Abdul Karim further serves as a volunteer chaplain for the New York City Department of Correction on Rikers Island.
115. Imam Wahhaj, Assistant Imam Adam, and Mr. Abdul Karim serve as Masjid AtTaqwa’s primary religious staff and form part of its leadership.
116. In 2004 or 2005, the NYPD installed a surv eillance camera, prominently marked with the Department’s insignia, outside Masjid At-Taqwa. The cam era lens pointed toward the entrance of the m osque. Its installation dem onstrated both to the m osque’s leadership and the congregation that the mosque was under NYPD surveillance.
117. The camera intimidated congregants and caused anxiety among them. Masjid AtTaqwa’s religious leaders observed th at instead of staying at the m osque after prayer services to speak about religious matters and socialize as they normally would, congregants began leaving immediately following prayers. Som e congregants told the mosque’s leadership that they were concerned the cam era was recording their prayer patterns. Congregants started staying away from the mosque. Islam encourages communal prayer, and the NYPD surveillan ce interfered with the mosque’s ability to provide a forum for communal prayer and its congregants’ ability to practice their faith fully.
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118. Imam Wahhaj was specifically forced to ta ke time out of his schedule to reassure anxious congregants about surveillance both individually and in Friday sermons. These practices left Imam Wahhaj with less time to spend on religious and spiritual matters.
119. Anxiety ran particularly high am ong immigrant congregants, some of whom told the mosque’s leadership that they feared the NYPD’s s urveillance would som ehow lead to deportations or interfere with their ability to secure legal permanent residency. Indeed, after the installation of the cam era, a large group of immigrant congr egants left Masjid At-Taqwa permanently.
120. Because of the fear and anxiety that the camera generated in the Masjid At-Taqwa community, the mosque’s leaders met with the commanding officer of the NYPD’s 79th Precinct and the precinct’s community af fairs liaison to ask that it be rem oved. Masjid At-Taqwa’s leadership informed the NYPD offi cers that the camera’s presence was causing congregants to stay away from the mosque.
121. The NYPD moved the cam era across the str eet some time later, but it rem ains pointed at Masjid At-Taqwa today.
122. The presence of the NYPD surveilla nce camera added to the suspicion of Masjid At-Taqwa’s religious leaders a nd congregants that the NYPD was also placing infor mants or officers in the mosque to surveil them.
123. After the installation of the camera, religious leaders feared on a daily basis tha t the mosque was under unwarranted police scru tiny and they began taking precautionary measures to protect their congregation, all of which they continue to take.
124. Mosque leaders began asking new congregants for inform ation about their backgrounds and the nam es of previous m osques they had attended. Masjid At-T aqwa revised the forms given to new congregants to seek more personal information in order to help determine whether they were genuine new worshippers, or, instead, informants. The m osque’s religious leaders began the practice of making regular announcements to congregants about the possibility that informants were present. Each of these practices deeply troubles them because suspicio n towards other Muslims and doubt about the sincerity of their statements is contrary to im portant Islamic principles of community, brotherhood, and sisterhood.
125. As a further precaution, Masjid At-Taqwa’s leaders ensured they were recording their religious sermons and lec tures. Although they had prev iously recorded serm ons and
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lectures to sell and generate income for the mosque, after the installation of the NYPD cam era, Masjid At-Taqwa’s leaders took care to m ake and retain recordings to defend the mosque in the event that an NYPD officer or inform ant misrepresented the content of their religious speech or took it out of context. For the sam e reason, Masjid At-T aqwa’s leaders began to spend extra time in their sermons explaining their religious beliefs and statements.
126. Because of religious leaders’ concern th at any newcom er to Masjid At-Taqwa who sought religious and spiritual advice could be an inform ant, the mosque’s staff began to include a third party as a witness in their religious couns eling conversations, even though the conversations should norm ally be private. This precaution interferes with the ab ility of the mosque’s religious leaders to be accessible and welcoming to new congregants, who in turn are less likely to join the mosque as a result. Additionally, some congregants understandably do not feel comfortable with a third party’s presence in a counseling conversation that m ay involve private, personal m atters, which prevents th em from receiving complete relig ious guidance. Because religious lead ers fear m onitoring by the NYPD, they also tell new and exis ting congregants that they cannot guarantee the con fidentiality of any conversation, no matter how intimate the topic. This further im pairs the ability of congregants to seek religious guidance and personal counseling, and the ability of Masjid At-Taqwa’s staff to provide it.
127. The suspicion of Masjid At-Taqwa’s religious leaders that the NYPD was sending informants to infiltrate the m osque was conf irmed when it becam e public that the NYPD had placed informants in Masjid At-Taqwa as early as 2006 and as late as 2012.
128. In 2011, the Associated Press began publis hing its articles about the NYPD’s Muslim Surveillance Program based in part on the NYPD’s own docum ents. One NYPD document contained an informant’s report on a discussion with the informant about a plane crash in Manhattan on October 11, 2006, and telephone calls made by Assistant Imam Adam to others. In news accounts published the day after the crash, New York City officials dismissed the notion that it was a ter rorist attack. Nonetheless, the NYPD docum ent, an Inte lligence Division Intelligence Note dated October 16, 2006, summ arizes reports from informants and/or officers spying on the reactions of imams and congregants at five mosques in Brooklyn, Queens, Corona, and Jersey City, including Masjid A t-Taqwa. In the Intelligence Note, Assistant Imam Adam is described as “agitated after hearing news of cr ash.” W ith reference to “discu ssions with C I [confidential informant] about the possibility of another attack,” Assi stant Imam Adam is
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described as saying he was “not aware that som ething might happen.” The Inte lligence Note nevertheless states that a “Phone dum p will be conducted on subject’s phone for t hat day and time period.”
129. Assistant Imam Adam recalls that when the plane hit a Manha ttan building, he was concerned about the crash, tried to understa nd what had occurred, and spoke to people by phone. He and other congregants at Masjid At-Taqwa were fearful that blame would be ascribed to Muslims, or that someone might decide to hurt Muslims in a hate crime.
130. A second Associated Press article confirmed that Shamiur Rahman was an NYPD informant who had infiltrated the m osque. Ra hman also sp ied on and reported to the NYPD about the religious lectures and teachings of Imam Wahhaj and Mr. Abdul Karim.
131. Shamiur Rahman came to Masjid At-Taqwa in 2012. At the time, Assistant Imam Adam and other congregants susp ected that Ra hman was an infor mant because of his odd behavior. A congregant com plained to Assistant Imam Adam that a m an (later confirmed to be Rahman) was questioning people in the m osque about the Septem ber 11, 2001 attacks and Usama bin Laden, and saying that Muslim s “should take action and do som ething.” Assistant Imam Adam told the man that he was in a mosque and welcome if he wanted to pray, but that he should not discuss historical events like September 11 or people like bin Laden. Assistant Im am Adam told the m an not to bring up the subjects again, and that if he did, he would be banned from the mosque. The m an left a few m inutes later, and Assistant Imam Adam never saw him again.
132. On approximately twenty occasions in the past ten years, A ssistant Imam Adam has told individuals to leave th e mosque after congregants com plained that they behaved like informants by asking questions similar to those asked by Rahman.
133. Confirmation in the As sociated Press stories that Mas jid At-Taqwa has been under NYPD surveillance, as its religious leader s and congregants long suspected, has further stigmatized the m osque as som ehow involved w ith suspicious behavior. This negative im age constitutes an ongoing harm to Masjid At-Taqwa as a religious community. Masjid At-Taqwa used to hold social activities every three to six months, which were at tended by anywhere from fifty to 100 people and often included discussion of current events of interest to the community. Since the release of th e Associated Press stories, it has ceas ed holding these events for fear th at they will heighten NYPD surveillan ce of the c ongregation. The mosque has also cancelled
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annual community events, includ ing whitewater rafting, cam ping, and paintball trips. As a result, congregants lack important opportunities to socialize and bond with one another.
NYPD Surveillance of Mohammad Elshinawy
134. Plaintiff Mohammad Elshinawy has taught, lectured, and given serm ons about Islam at various Islamic institutions in New York City for the last eleven years.
135. Mr. Elshinawy offers all of his religi ous sermons, lectures, and classes on a voluntary basis. He do es not accept any fees or honoraria because he be lieves that religious outreach and instruction are part of his religious duties as a Muslim.
136. Mr. Elshinawy has suspected that the NYPD has been spying on him since approximately 2004, while he was a student at Brooklyn College. This suspicion was based on the fact that attendees at his lectures and congregants at m osques at which he delivered serm ons warned Mr. Elshinawy that the NYPD had questi oned them about him, or had asked them to inform on the contents of his religious lessons and sermons.
137. Over this sam e period, Mr. Elshinaw y was approached by individuals he suspected or later discovered were NYPD officers or informants.
138. Mr. Elshinawy suspected an individual nam ed Bilal of being an inform ant. In approximately the fall of 2004, Bilal began atte nding Mr. Elshinawy’s lectures and classes regularly. Mr. Elshinawy suspect ed that Bilal m ight be an in formant who was recording his lectures because, despite being the most frequent attendee, Bilal did not listen to the lectures and instead regularly fell asleep minutes after each one began.
139. Mr. Elshinawy’s suspicion that B ilal was an inform ant was heightened in 2006, when Bilal told M r. Elshinawy tha t he wanted to “do som ething” for Islam . M r. Elshinawy responded that Bilal should partake in outreach and spread the faith, but Bilal said he was “tired of talking.” Suspecting that Bilal m ight be steering the conversation towards discussion of violence, Mr. Elshinawy told him that he should channel any anger towards explaining Islam and exemplifying Islamic manners—and immediately ended the conversation. After that, Bilal stopped attending Mr. Elshinawy’s lectures.
140. In 2005, Mr. Elshinawy socialized with a young m an whom he later found out was an NYPD undercover officer going by the nam e Kamil Pasha. Not knowing that Pasha was an NYPD undercover officer, Mr. Elshinawy attended several com munity events with him, including a paintball trip organized by the Brooklyn College Islamic Society.
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141. In approximately 2008 or 2009, a young man who had been attending Mr. Elshinawy’s religious lectures told him that NYPD officers had offere d to pay the young m an money if he were to report to the NYPD on the content of the lectures.
142. In 2012, NYPD informant Shamiur Rahman was sent to spy on Mr. Elshinawy at two Brooklyn mosques at which he lectured, Masjid Al-Ansar and Masjid Al-Farouq.
143. The NYPD also directly approached Mr. Elshinawy on severa l occasions, which added to Mr. Elshinawy’s concern that he was being surveilled. The first tim e, in 2008, NYPD Detective O’Gara came to the Al-Noor School where Mr. Elshinawy was a teach er and asked him questions about a missing person.
144. In December 2009 or January 201 0, immediately after Mr. Elshinawy return ed from a trip to Egypt, where he had been visiting relatives, Detective O’Gara called and asked Mr. Elshinawy for a m eeting. Mr. Elshinawy told him that he would not m eet without an attorney. Later in 2010, Detective O’Gara left a message on Mr. Elshinawy’s answering m achine, again saying that he would like to meet.
145. Mr. Elshinawy’s knowledge of and c oncern about NYPD surveillance and informants attending his religious lectures have caused him to alter the content of those lectures. For example, he avoids teaching about certain periods in Islamic history, like the history of Islam in the Iberian Peninsula, because he worries th at his teachings will be m isreported to or misinterpreted by the NYPD. Similarly, Mr. Elshinawy feels that he must alter Islamic historical narratives, particularly those high lighting valor, heroism, or anything that can be construed as lauding Islamic achievements. In his Friday sermons, Mr. Elshinawy shies away from discussing potentially controversial, political topics, or current events.
146. Because Mr. Elshinawy fears his statem ents may be distorted or taken out of context, the NYPD surveillance prevents him from communicating his religious beliefs as fully and accurately as he would like.
147. Concerns about surveillance have also led Mr. Elshinawy to refrain from holding study circles in public locations, and to avoid part icipants he does not personally know. Before 2010, a group of young m en including Mr. Elshinawy would gather each week to eat Chinese food and discuss various Islamic topics. When two or three new individuals began attending the meetings, the orig inal group became concerned that they were inform ants. At first, the study group decided to move its meeting location, but ultimately they canceled the meetings entirely.
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148. Because of the m ultiple incidents involving Detective O’G ara and other NYPD agents in M r. Elshinawy’s immediate circles, he has acquired a reputation as som eone who is under NYPD surveillance. That reputation has been further entrenched by the common knowledge in New York’s Mus lim communities that the NYPD takes a keen in terest in Islamic scholars whom it considers Salafi in orientation and also influential.
149. Mr. Elshinawy’s reputation as someone who is under NYPD surveillance has affected the audiences for his religious lectures and his relationships with others in his community. Longtim e friends have stopped atte nding his serm ons and, in som e instances, stopped associating with Mr. Elshinawy altogether.
150. For example, approximately six or se ven years ago, a childhood friend of Mr. Elshinawy informed him that his mother had asked that he avoid interacting with Mr. Elshinawy. The friend’s mother believed Mr. Elshinawy was under law enforcement scrutiny because one of his fellow Brooklyn College Islam ic Society members had been visited by law enforcem ent and questioned about Mr. Elshinawy.
151. Similarly, in 2011, another friend of Mr. Elshinawy suddenly stopped his regular attendance at Mr. Elsh inawy’s sermons and lect ures. Mr. Elshinaw y believes this occurred because the friend’s fam ily expressed concern s about interacting with Mr. E lshinawy. Since 2011, Mr. Elshinawy has barely seen that friend.
152. Mr. Elshinawy’s reputation as a subject of NYPD surveillance has als o caused religious institutions to distance themselves from him in order to avoid similar scrutiny.
153. As an active member of the Brook lyn Islamic Center (“BIC”) m osque who was interested in maintaining and incre asing the m osque’s membership, Mr. Elshin awy regularly proposed prominent speakers whom he believed would attract large, young audiences. But in the period that he lectured at the m osque between Octobe r 2008 and Decem ber 2010, the BIC leadership rejected all but two of the nine speakers Mr. Elshinawy proposed. BIC leaders told Mr. Elshinawy that they were afraid to host speakers or events he proposed because those events or speakers would result in even more unwarranted NYPD scrutiny.
154. Likewise, Mr. Elshinawy’s reputation as someone likely to trigger baseless NYPD surveillance has prevented him from being for mally recognized as a m ember or leader within organizations with whom he works closely.
27

155. For example, when Masjid Al-Ansar in Brooklyn first opened in 2008, several of the founding members suggested that it would be unwise for Mr. Elshinawy to hold a leadership position or serve on the m osque’s board, even t hough he was ins trumental in es tablishing the new mosque. The board members were concerned that Mr. Elshinawy was young, considered by the NYPD to be Salafi, and wore a long beard—all factors that could invite discrim inatory and unjustified NYPD scrutiny. As a result, Mr. Elshinawy did not join the board.
156. Mr. Elshinawy’s continued role and involve ment with that mosque is precarious. He worries that the m osque’s leadership could easily ask him to leave in the event of any religious or strategic disagree ment, without providing any just ification or process. Mr. Elshinawy also does not derive any of the benefits and stature that would accompany his formal involvement in the institution. This, in turn, hinders his ability to pract ice, teach, provide counsel, and mentor Muslim youth.
157. Mr. Elshinawy believes that NYPD survei llance of Muslim organizations or groups also prevents him from fully exercising his religious dutie s to spread Islam ic teachings and reach large audiences with his religious message.
158. For example, in 2008 and 2009, news item s about NYPD interest in Muslim s participating in outdoor activities, described as “Jihad training,” prompted BIC to cancel summer camping trips that Mr. Elshinawy wished to orga nize. Mr. Elshinawy had hoped the trips would foster a greater sens e of community, but BIC leadership fear ed attracting unwarranted NYPD scrutiny.
159. Similarly, the BIC organizers of a lectur e by a prominent Islamic scholar forbade Mr. Elshinawy from helping to advertise the event among youth networks using e-m ail lists, social media, and other forms of outreach, which he hoped would draw a large attendance. One of the organizers told Mr. Elsh inawy that a large turnou t was precisely what the organizers wanted to avoid, for fear of prompting unjustified NYPD surveillance.
160. These fears that larg e events open to Muslim youth will resu lt in NYPD surveillance further hinders Mr. Elshinawy’s ability to serve as a mentor and advisor to Musli m youth. Mr. Elshinawy believes that it is his relig ious duty to provide counseling and guidance to young people, and to plan extrac urricular activities that would keep youth off the streets, avoiding drugs and other negative influences th at plague their comm unities and neighborhoods.
28

Because of knowledge and fear of unwarranted NYPD sur veillance, Mr. Elshinawy’s religious goals and practices have been curtailed.
29

CAUSES OF ACTION
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
VIOLATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Against all Defendants by all Plaintiffs)
161. As set forth above, Defendants have engage d in a policy and practice of targeting Plaintiffs for police surveillance because of Plaintiffs’ adherence to and practice of the religion of Islam. By intentionally singling out Plaintif fs in this manner, Defendants have stigmatized them as m embers of a religious community and condem ned their religion as one that is the subject of intense suspicion and distrust, different from any other religion. Defendants’ policy and practice is discrim inatory in purpose and e ffect. It does not serv e a legitimate government interest and is not narrowly tailored. By di scriminating against Plaintif fs in this m anner, Defendants have violated the E qual Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and will continue to do so if Plaintiffs are not afforded the relief sought below.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
VIOLATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Against all Defendants by all Plaintiffs)
162. As set forth above, Defendants have engage d in a policy and practice of targeting Plaintiffs for police surveillance because of Plaintiffs’ adherence to and practice of the religion of Islam. This policy and practice is not neutral or one of general applicability, and has placed a substantial burden on Plaintiffs’ religious exercise in the practice of their faith. It has unjustifiably subjected Plaintiffs to adverse treatment because of their religion. It do es not serve a legitimate government interest and is not narrowly tailored. As a result, Defendants have violated the Free Exerc ise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and will continue to do so if Plaintiffs are not afforded the relief sought below.
30

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION RIGHT TO FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION, ARTICLE I, § 3
Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367
(Against all Defendants by all Plaintiffs)
163. As set forth above, Defendants have engage d in a policy and pr actice of targeting Plaintiffs for police surveillance because of Plaintiffs’ adherence to and practice of the religion of Islam. This policy and practice is not neutral or one of general applicability, and has placed a substantial burden on Plaintiffs’ religious exercise in the practice of their faith. It has unjustifiably subjected Plaintiffs to adverse treatment because of their religion. It do es not serve a legitimate government interest and is not narrowly tailored. As a result, Defendants have violated Article I, § 3 of the New York State Constitution and will continue to do so if Plaintiffs are not afforded the relief sought below.
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
VIOLATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Against all Defendants by all Plaintiffs)
164. As set forth above, Defendants have engage d in a policy and practice of targeting Plaintiffs for police surveillance because of Plaintiffs’ adherence to and practice of the religion of Islam. This policy and practice has stigm atized Plaintiffs, and makes explicit and intentional distinctions between Plaintiffs and individuals o r institutions belonging to any oth er religious group. It h as had the effect of inhibiting Plaintiffs’ religious goals, conduct, and practice, and fosters an excessive governm ent entanglement with religion by, am ong other things, subjecting Plaintiffs to intrusive surv eillance, heightened police sc rutiny, and infiltration by police informants and officers. It do es not serve a legitim ate government interest and is not narrowly tailored. By targeting Plaintiffs for police surveillance because of Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs and practices, Defendants have violated the Establis hment Clause of the First Am endment of the
31

United States Constitution and will continue to do so if Plaintiffs are not afforded the relief sought below.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request judgment against Defendants as follows:
1. Declaring that the policies, practices , acts, and omissions of Defendants described here are unlawful and violate Plaintiffs’ rights under the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of New York;
2. Permanently enjoining the Defendants and their agents, employees, successors, and all others acting in concert with them, from subjecting Plaintiffs to the un constitutional and unlawful practices described here;
3. Ordering Defendants to expunge all records of Plaintiffs created and m aintained as a result of the unconstitutional and unlawful practices described here;
4. Prohibiting Defendants from engaging in surv eillance or other law enf orcement activity based solely or predominantly upon the religion of the indiv iduals or institutions against whom that surveillance or law enforcement activity is directed;
5. Appointing a monitor to ensure that the City of New York c omplies with the injunction provisions of any decree that the Court enters, and entering an order retaining jurisdiction over this action to ensure that the City complies with such a decree;
6. Awarding Plaintiffs’ counsel reasonable attorneys’ fees and litigation costs, including but not limited to fees, costs, and disbursements pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988;
7. Awarding pre-judgment and post-judgm ent interest, to the fullest extent allowable by law, on the foregoing monetary awards; and
8. Granting such other and further relief that the Court deems just and proper.
32

Dated: Jtme 18, 2013

Respectfully submitted,
(~~~M1~
Hia Shamsi (I-IS-6908) Nusrat J. Choudhury (NC-2676) Patrick Toomey (PT-4354) American Civil Liberties Union Fotmdation 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, NY 10004 T: 212.549.2500 F: 212.549.2654 hshamsi@aclu.org
Ramzi Kassem (RK-3567) Diala Shamas (DS-4123) CLEAR project Main Street Legal Services, Inc. CUNY School of Law 2 Court Square Long Island City, NY 111 01 T: 718.340.4558 F: 718.340.4478 ramzi.kassem@law.ctmy.edu
Arthur N. Eisenberg (AE-20l2) Mariko Hirose (MI-I-0313) New York Civil Liberties Union Fotmdation 125 Broad Street, 19th Floor New York, NY 10004 T: 212.607.3300 F: 212.607.3318 aeisenberg@nyclu.org

33

 
 Case 1:13-cv-03448-PKC-JO Document 121-1 Filed 01/07/16 Page 1 of 9 PageID #: 2515

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ---------------------------------------------------------------------------x HAMID HASSAN RAZA, MASJID AL-ANSAR, ASAD DANDIA, MUSLIMS GIVING BACK, MASJID AT-TAQWA, and MOHAMMAD ELSHINAWY,

-against-

Plaintiffs,

CITY OF NEW YORK, BILL DE BLASIO, in his official capacity as Mayor of the City of New York; WILLIAM J. BRATTON, in his official capacity as Police Commissioner for the City of New York; and JOHN J. MILLER, in his official capacity as Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence for the City of New York,

Defendants. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------x

13 CV 3448 (PKC) (JO)

STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT AND ORDER

WHEREAS, on June 18, 2013, Plaintiffs in the above-captioned action (“Raza”) filed a complaint alleging that Defendants have engaged and continue to engage in a policy and practice of targeting individuals for suspicionless surveillance and investigation on the basis of their religion of Islam, stigmatizing Plaintiffs and violating their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment, and the Free Exercise Clause of the New York State Constitution (the “Complaint”)1; and
WHEREAS, Defendants City of New York, Bill de Blasio, William J. Bratton, and John J. Miller have denied any and all liability arising out of Plaintiffs’ allegations; and 1 Because the defendants named in Plaintiffs’ complaint were sued in their official capacities, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), their successors in office are automatically substituted as parties to the action. The caption has been revised to reflect this substitution.
1

Case 1:13-cv-03448-PKC-JO Document 121-1 Filed 01/07/16 Page 2 of 9 PageID #: 2516
WHEREAS, over a period of time following the filing of the Complaint, Plaintiffs and Defendants (together, the “Parties”) engaged in litigation and discovery which became subject to a protective order dated March 20, 2014 and modified on June 24, 2014; and
WHEREAS, during the course of discovery certain Investigative Statements of the New York City Police Department’s Intelligence Bureau were made available to counsel for Plaintiffs (“Plaintiffs’ Counsel”) and further disclosures between the parties were ordered by the Court subject to the protective order; and
WHEREAS, on April 2, 2013, counsel for the plaintiff class in Handschu v. Special Services Division, 71-cv-2203 (CSH) (S.D.N.Y.) (“Handschu”) (“Handschu Counsel”) brought a Motion for Injunctive Relief and Appointment of a Monitor (the “Handschu Motion”) alleging that the NYPD had a policy or practice that violated the Handschu Guidelines by conducting surveillance and investigations of individuals and organizations associated with the Muslim religion solely on the basis of religion, and without a factual predicate; and
WHEREAS, in connection with the Handschu Motion, Defendants made available to Handschu Counsel certain Investigative Statements; and
WHEREAS, beginning in August 2014, the Parties and the parties in Handschu entered into a Joint Settlement Process, during which there was a stay of the Raza litigation and the Handschu Motion, with the Joint Settlement Process taking place subject to a strict protective order dated August 18, 2014 as subsequently modified by the Court on June 29, 2015, and July 31, 2015; and
WHEREAS, as part of the Joint Settlement Process, Plaintiffs’ Counsel and Handschu Counsel reviewed additional Investigative Statements; and
2

Case 1:13-cv-03448-PKC-JO Document 121-1 Filed 01/07/16 Page 3 of 9 PageID #: 2517
WHEREAS, during the Joint Settlement Process, the attorneys for the Parties and Handschu Counsel have met in person or through teleconferences over 20 times, during which both sides have made presentations about various topics and issues central to the cases; have discussed certain Investigative Statements that were made available to Plaintiffs’ Counsel and Handschu Counsel; and have discussed the Parties’ respective settlement positions; and
WHEREAS, the terms of this Stipulation of Settlement and Order (“Stipulation”) were extensively and vigorously negotiated in good faith over a period of several months; and
WHEREAS, on June 29, 2015, Magistrate Judge James Orenstein granted the Parties’ joint motion to modify the protective order governing the Joint Settlement Process to allow Plaintiffs’ Counsel to consult with Plaintiffs and continue the settlement process; and
WHEREAS, the terms of the Parties’ settlement include certain modifications to the consent decree entered in Handschu, which are set forth in the “Proposed Modified Handschu Guidelines,” attached hereto as Exhibit A; and
WHEREAS, these modifications are subject to approval by the court presiding over the Handschu litigation in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Handschu Court”); and
WHEREAS, the Defendants represent that they do not, have not, and will not rely upon the Radicalization in the West report to open or extend investigations; and
WHEREAS, the Parties agree that the NYPD must fulfill its responsibility to preserve public safety and security, and Defendants are committed to mitigating the potential impact that the investigation of potential unlawful conduct may have on the lawful political or religious activity of individuals, groups, or organizations, and the potential effect on persons
3

Case 1:13-cv-03448-PKC-JO Document 121-1 Filed 01/07/16 Page 4 of 9 PageID #: 2518
who, although not a target of the investigation, are affected by or subject to the NYPD’s investigative techniques; and
WHEREAS, the Parties’ negotiations have resulted in this Stipulation, which, subject to the approval of this Court and the conditions set forth in paragraph 5 below, settles the claims in Raza in the manner and upon the terms below; and
WHEREAS, counsel for the Parties are entering into this Stipulation after goodfaith negotiations for the purpose of settling any and all liability, claims, or rights of action alleging a violation of Plaintiffs’ civil rights and any and all related state law claims, to avoid the burden of further litigation, and to promote the lawful and nondiscriminatory activities of the NYPD to protect the City of New York; and
WHEREAS, the parties now regard as beneficial the resolution of the issues raised in this litigation, without further proceedings and without admitting any fault or liability.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED as follows:
1. It is the policy of the NYPD that investigations involving political activity conform to the guarantees of the U.S. and New York State constitutions, including the U.S. Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection. It is also the policy of the NYPD that care be exercised in the conduct of those investigations so as to protect constitutional rights, including the right to be free from investigation in which race, religion, or ethnicity is a substantial or motivating factor.
2. Defendants will remove the Radicalization in the West report from the NYPD website.
4

Case 1:13-cv-03448-PKC-JO Document 121-1 Filed 01/07/16 Page 5 of 9 PageID #: 2519
3. The Parties further agree that the consent decree in Handschu shall be revised to reflect the edits in the Proposed Modified Handschu Guidelines set forth in Exhibit A.
4. The Parties’ settlement and this Stipulation are contingent upon the Handschu Court (a) approving the Proposed Modified Handschu Guidelines and (b) incorporating them into the consent decree in that case. Accordingly, the Parties respectfully request that the Court approve and so-order this Stipulation only upon being notified that the Handschu Court has approved the Proposed Modified Handschu Guidelines. This Stipulation is not binding upon the Parties and has no effect until the date of this Court’s order approving and entering the Stipulation.
5. Nothing contained in this Stipulation shall be deemed to be an admission by Defendants, or an adjudication, or finding on the merits of any of Plaintiffs’ allegations, assertions, or claims made in this action, nor an admission by Defendants that they have in any manner or way violated the rights of Plaintiffs or the rights of any other person or entity as defined in the constitutions, statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations of the United States, the State of New York, or the City of New York or any other rules or regulations of any department or subdivision of the City of New York.
6. Nothing contained in this Stipulation shall be deemed an admission by Plaintiffs of the absence of any such fault, wrongdoing, culpability, or liability on Defendants’ part.
7. This Stipulation shall not be admissible in any other litigation or settlement negotiation, except to enforce the terms of this agreement. This Stipulation is not related to any other litigation or settlement negotiation except the Handschu litigation.
5

Case 1:13-cv-03448-PKC-JO Document 121-1 Filed 01/07/16 Page 6 of 9 PageID #: 2520

8. In consideration for the relief set out in this Stipulation, Plaintiffs Hamid

Hassan Raza, Masjid Al-Ansar, Asad Dandia, Muslims Giving Back, Masjid At-Taqwa, and

Mohammad Elshinawy agree to dismiss all of the claims against Defendants City of New York,

Bill de Blasio, William J. Bratton, and John J. Miller; and to release Defendants City of New

York, Bill de Blasio, William J. Bratton, and John J. Miller; their successors or assigns, the City

of New York, and all past and present officials, employees, representatives and agents of the City

of New York, or any entity represented by the Office of the Corporation Counsel (collectively,

“Releasees”) from any and all liability, claims, or rights of action alleging a violation of

Plaintiffs’ civil rights and any and all related state law claims, from the beginning of the world

to the date of the Parties’ execution of this Stipulation, including claims for costs, expenses and

attorneys’ fees. Within seven [7] days of the Parties’ execution of this Stipulation, Plaintiffs’

Counsel shall deliver to Defendants’ Counsel each Plaintiff’s executed release which shall be

held in escrow and become effective only if this Stipulation is ordered by the Court.

9.

This Stipulation, including Exhibit A, sets forth the entire agreement and

understanding between the Parties with respect to the subject matter hereof, except that the

protective order dated March 20, 2014 and modified on June 24, 2014, and the protective order

dated August 18, 2014 and modified on June 29, 2015 and July 31, 2015, separately continue in

effect.

10. The sole authority to allege that the NYPD has violated the Proposed

Modified Handschu Guidelines (Exhibit A hereto) remains with Handschu Counsel, and nothing

in this Stipulation shall be construed to mean otherwise. This Stipulation and Order does not

create any additional rights of enforcement, or forms of relief available, for alleged violations of

the Modified Handschu Guidelines.

6

Case 1:13-cv-03448-PKC-JO Document 121-1 Filed 01/07/16 Page 7 of 9 PageID #: 2521
11. The sole court empowered to hear a complaint from Handschu Counsel that there has been a violation of the Proposed Modified Handschu Guidelines remains the Handschu Court.
12. Upon approval by this Court, this Stipulation shall constitute full relief with respect to matters set forth in the Complaint, and resolves in full any and all claims or rights of action against Defendants and their predecessors, successors, or assignees, together with past, present, and future officials, employees, representatives, and agents of Defendants, the NYPD, and the City of New York that may have been based upon or arisen from any alleged policy, pattern, or practice that the NYPD conducted unlawful surveillance or investigations on the basis of race, religion, or ethnicity that could have been raised at this time, in this action.
13. The Parties acknowledge that the City of New York shall pay Plaintiffs reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses in the amount of $1,671,686.00 in full satisfaction of all claims by Plaintiffs and their counsel for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses arising out of this action. Plaintiffs shall direct the payment of these attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses to their counsel in a separately executed document. Plaintiffs and their counsel hereby agree and represent that no other claims for attorneys’ fees, costs or expenses arising out of this action shall be made by or on behalf of Plaintiffs against Releasees in any application for attorneys’ fees, costs or expenses at any time, and Plaintiffs and their counsel shall release and discharge Releasees for all claims for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses arising out of this action.
14. Plaintiffs and their attorneys shall each execute and deliver to Defendants’ attorneys all documents necessary to effect this settlement, including, without limitation, general releases based on the terms of this Stipulation, and Plaintiffs’ Counsel shall also execute and deliver IRS Form W-9 (Rev. Dec. 2014).
7

Case 1:13-cv-03448-PKC-JO Document 121-1 Filed 01/07/16 Page 8 of 9 PageID #: 2522

15. The undersigned counsel represent and warrant that they are authorized by their respective clients to execute this Stipulation.
16. Upon approval of this Stipulation by this Court, the Complaint is dismissed against Defendants with prejudice.

Dated: New York, New York January 7, 2016

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS
ZACHARY W. CARTER Corporation Counsel of the
B:'t/i2)J
Peter G. Farrel l Deputy Division Chief 100 Church Street New York, NY 10007 (212) 356-3532

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS

By:~ lkMfJ. (-m~ -s--i--=:._- · -

Ashley Gorski

Patrick Toomey

American Civil Liberties Union Foundation

125

Broad

Street,

18

1
h

Floor

New York, NY 10004

(212)-549-2500

F: (212)-549-2654

Ramzi Kassem Naz Ahmad CLEAR Project Mai1:1 Street Legal Services, Inc . CUNY School of Law 2 Court Square Long Island City, NY 11101 (718)-340-4558 F: (718)-340-4478

8

Case 1:13-cv-03448-PKC-JO Document 121-1 Filed 01/07/16 Page 9 of 9 PageID #: 2523

SO ORDERED:
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE PAMELA K. CHEN

AtihturNi . Eis~~c~ ):=
Beth Haroules New York Civil Liberties Union Foundation 125 Broad Street, 19th Floor New York, NY 10004 (212)-607-3300 F: (212)-607-3318
~L2-4d -- Hector Galle~ .--
Morrison & Foerster LLP 2000 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Suite 600 Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) -887- 1500 F: (202)-887-0763
Kyle Mooney Adam Hunt Morrison & Foerster LLP 250 West 55th Street New York, NY 1001 9 (212)-468 -8000 F: (212)-468-7900

Case 1:13-cv-03448-PKC-JO Document 121-2 Filed 01/07/16 Page 1 of 16 PageID #: 2524
Exhibit A

Case 1:13-cv-03448-PKC-JO Document 121-2 Filed 01/07/16 Page 2 of 16 PageID #: 2525
Proposed Modifications to the Handschu Guidelines
GUIDELINES FOR INVESTIGATIONS INVOLVING POLITICAL ACTIVITY
PREAMBLE Subsequent to the terrorist attacks on the City of New York on September 11, 2001 which resulted in the loss of thousands of lives and the total destruction of the World Trade Center complex, it became apparent that the City faces unprecedented threats to its continued safety and security. In the view of federal, state and local law enforcement agencies, the prevention of future attacks requires the development of intelligence and the investigation of potential terrorist activity before an unlawful act occurs.
As a result of a federal court order entered in 1985, the New York City Police Department was bound by guidelines, known as the Handschu Guidelines, which governed the investigation of political activity. The Handschu Guidelines (i) limited the investigation of political activity to those circumstances when there was specific information of criminal activity and (ii) established the Handschu Authority to oversee compliance. After evaluating the impact of the Handschu Guidelines on the need to investigate terrorism in a changed world, the City made an application to modify the order so as to eliminate the restrictions contained in the Handschu Guidelines and the oversight of the Handschu Authority with respect to those restrictions. The City did not seek to eliminate the Handschu Authority’s role to investigate an individual’s complaint that the NYPD had engaged in unconstitutional conduct in the investigation of political activity.
The Court granted the City’s application to modify the decree provided the City adopt the internal guidelines set forth below and distribute the guidelines to supervisory personnel who, in turn, were to make them known to those under their command. These guidelines were subsequently incorporated into an order of the Court in 288 F.Supp.2d 411, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) and are enforceable as set out in 679 F.Supp.2d 488, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). They shall remain in effect unless otherwise ordered by the Court. These guidelines are binding on all members of the service who are engaged in the investigation of political activity. It is the purpose of these guidelines to enable officers to perform their duties with greater certainty, confidence and effectiveness while at the same time protecting the guarantees of the Constitution.
I. STATEMENT OF POLICY It is the policy of the New York City Police Department that investigations involving political activity conform to the guarantees of the Constitution, including the guarantee of equal protection. It is the policy of the New York City Police Department that care be exercised in the conduct of those investigations so as to protect constitutional rights, including the right to be free from investigation in which race, religion, or ethnicity is a substantial or motivating factor. It is the policy of the New York City Police Department and that matters investigated be confined to those supported by a legitimate law enforcement purpose.
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES (1) In its effort to anticipate or prevent unlawful activity, including terrorist acts, the NYPD must, at times, initiate investigations in advance of unlawful conduct. It is important that such
1

Case 1:13-cv-03448-PKC-JO Document 121-2 Filed 01/07/16 Page 3 of 16 PageID #: 2526
investigations not be based solely on activities protected by the First Amendment. It is also important that investigations not intrude upon rights of expression or association in a manner that discriminates on the basis of race, religion or ethnicity, where such discrimination is a substantial or motivating factor for the investigation. When, however, statements advocate unlawful activity, or indicate an apparent intent to engage in unlawful conduct, particularly acts of violence, an investigation under these guidelines may be warranted, unless it is apparent, from the circumstances or the context in which the statements are made, that there is no prospect of harm.
(2) Based upon the circumstances of a given case, investigative action may be required under exigent circumstances. Exigent circumstances are circumstances requiring action before authorization otherwise necessary under these guidelines can reasonably be obtained, in order to protect life or substantial property interests; to apprehend or identify a fleeing offender; to prevent the hiding, destruction or alteration of evidence; or to avoid other serious impairment or hindrance of an investigation.
When any investigative action, taken under exigent circumstances, would require an approval under ordinary conditions, such approval shall be obtained as soon as practicable in accordance with the provisions of these guidelines. Where a regular approval or request is required to be in writing, the approval or request following exigent circumstances shall also be in writing.
(3) Investigations shall be terminated when all logical leads have been exhausted and no legitimate law enforcement purpose justifies their continuance.
III. APPLICABILITY These guidelines apply only to investigations which involve political activity. They do not apply to, or limit, other activities of the NYPD in the investigation or detection of unlawful conduct, the preservation of the peace and public safety or other legitimate law enforcement activities which do not involve political activity.
IV. ROLE OF THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISIONBUREAU (1) Investigation of political activity shall be initiated by, and conducted under the supervision of the Intelligence DivisionBureau. Nothing in this paragraph, however, is intended to prevent any member of the service from reporting his or her observations of suspicious conduct which involves political activity to his or her commanding officer or to the Intelligence DivisionBureau.
(2) The Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence shall periodically inform and advise the Police Commissioner concerning the status of any investigations conducted pursuant to these guidelines.
V. LEVELS OF INVESTIGATION These guidelines provide for three levels of investigative activity. They are intended to provide the NYPD with the necessary flexibility to act well in advance of the commission of planned terrorist acts or other unlawful activity. However, if the available information shows at the outset that the threshold standard for a Preliminary Inquiry or Full Investigation is satisfied, then the appropriate investigative activity may be initiated immediately, without progressing through more limited investigative stages.
2

Case 1:13-cv-03448-PKC-JO Document 121-2 Filed 01/07/16 Page 4 of 16 PageID #: 2527
A. Checking of Leads The lowest level of investigative activity is the “prompt and extremely limited checking out of initial leads,” which should be undertaken whenever information is received of such a nature that some follow-up as to the possibility of unlawful activity is warranted. This limited activity should be conducted with an eye toward promptly determining whether further investigation (either a Preliminary Inquiry or a Full Investigation) should be conducted.
Example: If the NYPD receives an allegation that an individual or group has advocated the commission of violence, and no other facts are available, an appropriate first step would be Checking of Leads to determine whether the individual, group, or members of the audience have the apparent ability or intent to carry out the advocated unlawful act.
B. Preliminary Inquiries (1) In cases where the NYPD receives information or an allegation not warranting an Full Iinvestigation - because there is not yet a “reasonable indication” of unlawful activity - but whose responsible handling requires some further scrutiny beyond the prompt and extremely limited checking out of initial leads, the NYPD may initiate an “inquiry” in response to the allegation or information indicating the possibility of unlawful activity. The possibility of unlawful activity to initiate a Preliminary Inquiry requires an allegation or information that is articulable and factual. However, such allegation or information need not have been verified as true or accurate. Whether it is appropriate to open a Preliminary Inquiry immediately, or instead to engage first in a limited Checking of Leads, depends on the circumstances presented.
Example: If the NYPD receives an allegation that an individual or group has advocated the commission of violence, and no other facts are available, an appropriate first step would be Checking of Leads to determine whether the individual, group, or members of the audience have the apparent ability or intent to carry out the advocated unlawful act.
(2) The authority to conduct inquiries short of a Full Investigation allows the NYPD to respond in a measured way to ambiguous or incomplete information, with as little intrusion as the needs of the situation permit. This is especially important in such areas as where there is no complainant involved or when an allegation or information is received from a source of unknown reliability. Such inquiries are subject to the limitations on duration under paragraph (4)four below and are carried out to obtain the information necessary to make an informed judgment as to whether a Full Investigation is warranted.
Example: Officers are not required to possess information relating to an Individual’s intended unlawful use of dangerous biological agents or toxins prior to iInitiating investigative activity. If an individual or group has attempted to obtain such materials, or has indicated a desire to acquire them, and the reason is not apparent, investigative action, such as conducting a Checking of Leads or initiating a Preliminary Inquiry, may be appropriate to determine whether there is a legitimate purpose for the possession of the materials by the individual or group. A Preliminary Inquiry is not a required step when facts or circumstances reasonably indicating unlawful activity are already available. In such cases, a Full Investigation can be immediately opened.
(3) A Preliminary Inquiry may be authorized by the Chief of IntelligenceCommanding Officer or Executive Officer of the Intelligence DivisionBureau, or the Commanding Officer of the
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Criminal Intelligence Section (“the Authorizing Officials”). The Authorizing Official must assure that the allegation or other information which warranted the inquiry has been recorded in writing. Upon such authorization a notification must be made for final approval by the Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence.
(4) Inquiries shall be completed within 180 days after initiation of the first investigative step. The date of the first investigative step is not necessarily the same date as the date on which the first incoming information or allegation was received. An extension of time in an inquiry for succeeding 90 day periods may be granted by the Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence. Any such request for extension shall be in writing and shall include a statement of the reasons why further investigative steps are warranted when there is no reasonable indication of unlawful activity. The action taken on any such request for extension shall also be recorded in writing.
(5) A Preliminary Inquiry shall be subject to a review every 6 months by the Chief of Intelligence, or an appropriate executive of the Intelligence Bureau designated by him, to discuss the status of the Preliminary Inquiry, including, what operational steps should be taken.
(6) A Preliminary Inquiry shall be presumptively limited to a total duration of 18 months. This presumptive period of duration may be exceeded in the sole discretion of the Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence, in consultation with the Handschu Committee, where the allegations or information continue to indicate the possibility of unlawful activity and either that some further leads should be lawfully investigated or that there is a legitimate law enforcement purpose to be pursued further. When the presumptive period of duration is exceeded all other provisions regarding a Preliminary Inquiry continue to apply.
(7) All lawful investigative techniques, including the use of undercover operations and the development of sources and informants may be used in an Preliminary Iinquiry except:
(a) Mail openings; and,
(b) Eavesdropping and Video Surveillance as those terms are defined in Article 700 of the New York State Criminal Procedure Law.
(86) The following investigative techniques may be used in a Preliminary Inquiry without any prior authorization from a supervisor:
(a) Examination of NYPD indices and files;
(b) Examination of records available to the public and other public sources of information;
(c) Examination of available federal, state and local government records;
(d) Interview of complainant, previously established informants, and other sources of information;
(e) Interview of the potential subject;
(f) Interview of persons who should readily be able to corroborate or deny the truth of the allegation, except this does not include pretext interviews or interviews of a potential subject’s employer or coworkers unless the interviewee was the complainant; and
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(g) Physical, photographic or video surveillance of any person, provided that such surveillance does not require a warrant. The use of any other lawful investigative technique that is permitted in a Preliminary Inquiry shall meet the requirements and limitations of Part VI and, except in exigent circumstances, requires prior approval by a supervisor.
The use of any other lawful investigative technique that is permitted in a Preliminary Inquiry shall meet the requirements and limitations of Part VII and, except in exigent circumstances, requires prior approval by a supervisor.
(97) Where a Preliminary Inquiry fails to disclose sufficient information to justify an investigation, the NYPD shall terminate the inquiry and make a record of the closing.
(108) All requirements regarding inquiries shall apply to reopened inquiries.
C. Full Investigation A Full Investigation may be initiated when facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that an unlawful act has been, is being, or will be committed. A Full Investigation may be conducted to prevent, solve or prosecute such unlawful activity.
(1) The standard of “reasonable indication” is substantially lower than probable cause. In determining whether there is reasonable indication of an unlawful act an investigator may take into account any facts or circumstances that a prudent investigator would consider. However, the standard does require specific facts or circumstances indicating a past, current, or future violation of law. There must be an objective, factual basis for initiating the investigation; a mere hunch is insufficient.
(2) Where an unlawful act may be committed in the future, preparation for that act can be a current violation of the conspiracy or attempt provisions of state law. The standard for opening an investigation is satisfied where there is not yet a current substantive or preparatory unlawful act, but facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that such unlawful conduct will occur in the future.
(3) Any lawful investigative technique may be used in a Full Investigation, subject to the requirements and limitations of Part VI hereof.
(4) Authorization and Renewal
a. A Full Investigation may be authorized by the Chief of IntelligenceCommanding Officer or Executive Officer of the Intelligence DivisionBureau or the Commanding Officer of the Criminal Intelligence Section (“the Authorizing Officials”) upon a written recommendation setting forth the facts or circumstances reasonably indicating that an unlawful act has been, is being or will be committed. Upon such authorization a notification must be made for final approval by the Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence.
b. A Full Investigation may be initially authorized for a period of up to a year. An investigation may be continued upon renewed authorization for additional periods each not to exceed a year. Renewal authorization shall be obtained from the Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence. All requests for renewal authorization, and action thereon, shall be in writing.
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c. Authorizations shall be reviewed by an Authorizing Official before the expiration of the period for which the investigation and each renewal thereof is authorized.
d. A Full Investigation shall be subject to a review every 6 months by the Chief of Intelligence, or an appropriate executive of the Intelligence Bureau designated by him, to discuss the status of the Full Investigation, including, what operational steps should be taken.
e. A Full Investigation shall be presumptively limited to a total duration of 3 years. This presumptive period of duration may be exceeded in the sole discretion of the Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence, in consultation with the Handschu Committee, where facts and circumstances continue to reasonably indicate that an unlawful act has been, is being, or will be committed and either that some further leads should be lawfully investigated or that there is a legitimate law enforcement purpose to be pursued further. When the presumptive period of duration is exceeded all other provisions regarding a Full Investigation continue to apply.
(5) An investigation which has been terminated may be reopened upon a showing of the same standard and pursuant to the same procedures as required for initiation of an investigation. All requirements regarding investigations shall apply to reopened investigations.
D. Terrorism Enterprise Investigation A Terrorism Enterprise Investigation is a Full Investigation but differs from a general investigation of unlawful conduct in several important respects. As a general rule, an investigation of a completed unlawful act is normally confined to determining who committed that act and securing evidence to establish the elements of the particular offense. It is, in this respect, self-defining. A Terrorism Enterprise Investigation must determine the identity and nature of the individual, group, or organization involved, its geographic dimensions, its past acts and intended goals, including unlawful goals, and its capacity for harm, among other factors. While a standard investigation of unlawful conduct terminates with the decision to prosecute or not to prosecute, a Terrorism Enterprise Investigation does not necessarily end, even though one or more of the participants may have been prosecuted. In addition, groups and organizations exhibitprovide a life and continuity of operation not normally found in other types of unlawful activity. As a consequence, these investigations may continue for several years. Furthermore, the focus of such investigations may be less precise than that directed against more conventional types of unlawful conduct. Unlike the usual case involving unlawful conduct, there may be no completed offense to provide a framework for the investigation. It A Terrorism Enterprise Investigation often requires the fitting together of bits and pieces of information, many meaningless by themselves, to determine whether a pattern of unlawful activity exists. For this reason, such investigations are broader and less discriminate than usual, involving the interrelation of various sources and types of information. This section focuses on investigations of enterprises that seek to further political or social goals through activities that involve force or violence, or that otherwise aim to engage in terrorism or terrorism-related crimes. It authorizes investigations to determine the structure and scope of the enterprise as well as the relationship of the members.
1. General Authority
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a. A Terrorism Enterprise Investigation may be initiated when facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that two or more persons are engaged in an enterprise for the purpose of:
(i) furthering political or social goals wholly or in part through activities that involve force, violence or other unlawful acts;
(ii) engaging in terrorism as defined in N.Y. Penal Law § 490.05, or
(iii) committing any offense described in N.Y. Penal Law §§ 490.10, 490.15, 490.20, 490.25, 490.30, or 490.35, or other related statutes currently in effect or subsequently enacted.
The standard of “reasonable indication” is identical to that governing Full Investigations generally. In determining whether an investigation should be conducted, the NYPD shall consider all of the circumstances including:
(i) the magnitude of the threatened harm;
(ii) the likelihood that it will occur;
(iii) the immediacy of the threat; and
(iv) any danger to privacy or free expression posed by an investigation.
In practical terms, the “reasonable indication” standard for opening a Terrorism Enterprise Investigation could be satisfied in a number of ways.
Example: Direct information about statements made in furtherance of an enterprise’s objectives which show a purpose of committing crimes described in N.Y. Penal Law §§ 490.10, 490.15, 490.20, 490.25, 490.30, 490.35 or other related statutes currently in effect or subsequently enacted, would satisfy the threshold.
Example: Activities such as attempting to obtain dangerous biological agents, toxic chemicals, or nuclear materials, or stockpiling explosives or weapons, with no discernible lawful purpose, may be sufficient to reasonably indicate that an enterprise aims to engage in terrorism.
b. While no particular factor or combination of factors is required, considerations that will generally be relevant to the determination as to whether the threshold standard for a Terrorism Enterprise Investigation is satisfied include, as noted, a group’s statements, its activities, and the nature of potential unlawful acts suggested by the statements or activities. Thus, where there are grounds for inquiry concerning a group, it may be helpful to gather information about these matters, and then to consider whether these factors, either individually or in combination, reasonably indicate that the group is pursuing terrorist activities or objectives as defined in the threshold standard. Findings that would weigh in favor of such a conclusion include, for example, the following:
(1) Threats or advocacy of violence or other covered unlawful acts. Statements are made in relation to or in furtherance of an enterprise’s political or social objectives that threaten or advocate the use of force or violence, or statements are made in furtherance of an enterprise that otherwise threaten or advocate unlawful conduct within the scope of N.Y. Penal Law §§ 490.10, 490.15, 490.20, 490.25, 490.30,
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490.35, or other related statutes currently in effect or subsequently enacted which may concern such matters as (e.g.), for example:
(i) engaging in attacks involving or threatening massive loss of life or injury, mass destruction, or endangerment of the national security;
(ii) killing or injuring public officials, or destroying public facilities, or defying lawful authority;
(iii) killing, injuring or intimidating individuals because of their status as United States nationals or persons, or because of their national origin, race, color, religion or sex; or
(iv) depriving individuals of any rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States or the State of New York.
(2) Apparent ability or intent to carry out violence or other covered activities. The enterprise manifests an apparent ability or intent to carry out violence or other activities within the scope of N.Y. Penal Law §§ 490.10, 490.15, 490.20, 490.25, 490.30, 490.35 or other related statutes currently in effect or subsequently enacted, for examplee.g.:
(i) by acquiring or taking steps towards acquiring, biological agents or toxins, toxic chemicals or their precursors, radiological or nuclear materials, explosives or other destructive or dangerous material (or plans or formulas for such materials), or weapons, under circumstances where, by reason of the quantity or character of the items, the lawful purpose of the acquisition is not apparent;
(ii) by the creation, maintenance, or support of an armed paramilitary organization;
(iii) by paramilitary training; or
(iv) by other conduct demonstrating an apparent ability or intent to injure or intimidate individuals, or to interfere with the exercise of their constitutional or statutory rights.
(3) Potential Unlawful Act. The group’s statements or activities suggest potential unlawful acts that may be relevant in applying the standard for initiating a Terrorism Enterprise Investigation - such as crimes under the provisions of the N.Y. Penal Law that set forth specially defined terrorism or support of terrorism offenses, or that relate to such matters as aircraft hijacking or destruction, attacks on transportation, communications, or energy facilities or systems, biological or chemical weapons, nuclear or radiological materials, assassinations or other violence against public officials or facilities, or explosives.
c. Mere speculation that force or violence might occur during the course of an otherwise peaceable demonstration is not sufficient grounds for initiation of an investigation under this sSubpart. But where facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that an individual or group has engaged or aims to engage in conduct described in paragraph 1.a. above in a demonstration, an investigation may be initiated in conformity with the standards of that paragraph. This does not limit the collection of information about public demonstrations by individuals or groups that are under active investigation pursuant to paragraph 1.a. above or any other provisions of these guidelines.
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2. Purpose The immediate purpose of a Terrorism Enterprise Investigation is to obtain information concerning the nature and structure of the enterprise as specifically delineated in paragraph (3) below, with a view to the longer range objectives of detection, prevention, and prosecution of the unlawful activities of the enterprise.
3. Scope a. A Terrorism Enterprise Investigation initiated under these guidelines may collect such information as:
(i) the identity and nature of an individual or group and its members, their associates, and other persons likely to be acting in furtherance of its unlawful objectives, provided that the information concerns such persons’ activities on behalf of or in furtherance of the suspected unlawful activity of the individual, group, or organization;
(ii) the finances of the individual, group, or organization;
(iii) the geographical dimensions of the individual, group, or organization; and
(iv) past and future activities and goals of the individual, group, or organization.
b. In obtaining the foregoing information, any lawful investigative technique may be used in accordance with the requirements of these guidelines.
4. Authorization and Renewal
a. A Terrorism Enterprise Investigation may be authorized by the Chief of IntelligenceCommanding Officer or Executive Officer of the Intelligence DivisionBureau or the Commanding Officer of the Criminal Intelligence Section (“the Authorizing Officials”), upon a written recommendation setting forth the facts or circumstances reasonably indicating the existence of an enterprise as described in paragraph 1.a. above. Upon such authorization a notification must be made for final approval by the Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence. When exigent circumstances exist, as described in these guidelines, a Terrorism Enterprise Investigation may be commenced upon the verbal authorization of an Authorizing Official. However, in such cases, the required written recommendation must be submitted as soon as practicable.
b. A Terrorism Enterprise Investigation may be initially authorized for a period of up to a year. An investigation may be continued upon renewed authorization for additional periods each not to exceed a year. Renewal authorization shall be obtained from the Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence. The request for renewal and action thereon shall be in writing.
c. Authorizations shall be reviewed by an Authorizing Official before the expiration of the period for which the investigation and each renewal thereof is authorized. In some cases, the enterprise may meet the threshold standard but be temporarily inactive in the sense that it has not engaged in recent acts of violence or other unlawful activities as described in 1.a., nor is there any immediate threat of harm - yet the composition, goals and prior history of the group suggest the need for continuing law enforcement
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interest. The investigation may be continued in such cases with whatever scope is warranted in light of these considerations.
d. All Terrorism Enterprise Investigations shall be subject to a review every 6 months by the Chief of Intelligence, or an appropriate executive of the Intelligence Bureau designated by him, to discuss the status of the Terrorism Enterprise Investigation, including, what operational steps should be taken.
e. A Terrorism Enterprise Investigation shall be presumptively limited to a total duration of 5 years, except where the subject of a Terrorism Enterprise Investigation is a designated foreign terrorist organization. This presumptive period of duration may be exceeded in the sole discretion of the Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence, in consultation with the Handschu Committee, where facts and circumstances continue to reasonably indicate that two or more persons are engaged in an enterprise for the purposes stated above and either that some further leads should be lawfully investigated or that there is a legitimate law enforcement purpose to be pursued further. When the presumptive period of duration is exceeded all other provisions regarding a Terrorism Enterprise Investigation continue to apply.
f. An investigation which has been terminated may be reopened upon a showing of the same standard and pursuant to the same procedures as required for initiation of an investigation.
VI. HANDSCHU COMMITTEE
(1) There is hereby established a committee (the “Handschu Committee”) whose members may attend and participate in monthly meetings at which investigations are presented for opening, extension or closure by the Deputy Commissioner for Intelligence. All attending members will be provided with the investigative statement pertaining to each proposed opening, extension or closing for the monthly meeting. At the monthly meeting, any member of the Handschu Committee may ask questions and offer opinions regarding the opening, extension or closure of an investigation presented.
(2) Members of the Handschu Committee from the NYPD will include the Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence, the Chief of Intelligence, the Executive Officer of the Intelligence Bureau, the Commanding Officer of IOAS (Intelligence Operations and Analysis Section), the Executive Officer of IOAS, the Commanding Officer (or the Executive Officer) of the Criminal Intelligence Section, the Director of Intelligence Analysis, the Deputy Commissioner of Legal Matters, Assistant Deputy Commissioner of Legal Matters, Assistant Commissioner of Legal Matters for Intelligence Affairs, Special Counsel for Intelligence Affairs, and/or their successors or persons who occupy similar positions of authority or expertise.
(3) There shall also be a Civilian Representative on the Handschu Committee who may attend and participate in the monthly meetings for opening, extension, or closure of investigations on the same terms and conditions as set forth in paragraph (1) above. The
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Civilian Representative shall be a lawyer who has never previously been an employee of the NYPD. The Civilian Representative shall be appointed by the Mayor upon consultation with the Police Commissioner. The Civilian Rrepresentative may be replaced by the Mayor for good cause, with 14 days’ advance notice to Class Counsel prior to such replacement. The position of Civilian Representative will exist for a minimum of five years from the appointment of the first person to fill that role. After that initial five year period, the position of Civilian Representative will continue unless abolished or modified by the Mayor, upon which Class Counsel will receive 90 days’ notice in advance of such abolition or modification.
(a) The Civilian Representative shall submit to a background investigation conducted by the Department of Investigation.
(b) The NYPD will facilitate an application for a federal security clearance for the Civilian Representative.
(c) The Civilian Representative shall execute a Non-Disclosure Agreement with the NYPD setting forth his or her undertaking that the proceedings of the Handschu Committee, as well as all materials reviewed by the Civilian Representative for or at the meetings of the Committee, shall be kept confidential and shall not be disclosed to any person except as set forth therein.
(d) The Civilian Representative shall be required to familiarize himself or herself with the Modified Handschu Guidelines governing the investigation of political activity by the NYPD.
(e) If the Civilian Representative concludes that an investigation is being opened or extended in violation of the Modified Handschu Guidelines, the Civilian Representative shall record his or her objection to the investigation and the grounds for the objection in the minutes of the Handschu Committee meeting.
(f) If the Civilian Representative concludes that an investigation is being opened or extended in violation of the Modified Handschu Guidelines, the Civilian Representative shall bring such investigation to the attention of the Police Commissioner. The Civilian Representative shall be provided with means to contact the Police Commissioner directly. The Police Commissioner shall inquire into the investigation and report the findings of the inquiry to the Civilian Representative.
(g) If the Civilian Representative concludes that the NYPD is systematically and repeatedly violating the Modified Handschu Guidelines to a degree sufficient to show a NYPD policy to act in such a fashion, the Civilian Representative shall report the alleged systematic violation to the Judge assigned to the Handschu case in the Southern District of New York. In the event the Civilian Representative decides to make a report to the Court based upon a perceived policy by the NYPD to violate the Guidelines, a copy of the report shall first be served confidentially upon the Police
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Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence seven (7) days prior to its submission to the Court. The report shall be submitted directly to the Judge in a confidential manner, shall be kept confidential, and shall be filed under seal. Class Counsel in the Handschu case shall be given notice that a report was submitted by the Civilian Representative to the Court. The parties will then agree to a confidentiality order governing disclosure of the contents of the report to Class Counsel or, in the event that the NYPD believes the report in whole or in part should not be disclosed to Class Counsel, the NYPD shall be provided an opportunity to inform the Court as to the basis for objecting to disclosure in whole or in part to Class Counsel.
(4) Nothing herein shall effect, limit, or diminish the authorization and approval provisions for investigations, which grant exclusive approval authority to the Authorizing Officials or the Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence.
VII. INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES
(1) When conducting investigations under these guidelines, the NYPD may use any lawful investigative technique permitted by these guidelines. The choice of investigative techniques is a matter of judgment, which should take account of:
(i) the objectives of the investigation and available investigative resources;
(ii) the intrusiveness of a technique, considering such factors as the effect on the privacy of individuals and potential damage to reputation;
(iii) the potential effect on the political or religious activity of individuals, groups or organizations and the potential effect on persons who, although not a target of the investigation are affected by or subject to the technique;
(ivii) the seriousness of the unlawful act; and
(iv) the strength of the information indicating its existence or future commission of the unlawful act.
(2) Where the conduct of an investigation presents a choice between the use of more or less intrusive methods, the NYPD should consider whether the information could be obtained in a timely and effective way by the less intrusive means. The NYPD should not hesitate to use any lawful techniques consistent with these guidelines in an investigation, even if intrusive, where the intrusiveness is warranted in light of the seriousness of the crime or the strength of the information indicating its existence or future commission. This point is to be particularly observed in investigations relating to terrorist activities.
(3) Authorized methods in investigations include, among others, use of confidential informants, undercover activities and operations, eavesdropping and video surveillance (as defined in Article 700 of the NY Criminal Procedure Law), pen registers and trap and trace devices, consensual electronic monitoring, and searches and seizures.
a. Undercover Operations
(i) Undercover operations, including confidential informants, may be used when taking into account all the circumstances of the investigation, including the need for the information
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and the seriousness of the threat, it has been determined that the information sought in the investigation could not be reasonably obtained in a timely and effective way by a less intrusive means such operations are the most effective means of obtaining information, taking into account all the circumstances of the investigation, including the need for the information and the seriousness of the threat. The use of undercovers and confidential informants must be authorized by the Deputy Commissioner of the Intelligence Division priorBureau prior to commencement of the undercover operation. The request to use undercovers or confidential informants and action taken on the request must be in writing and must include a description of the facts on which the investigation is based and the role of the undercover.
(ii) The use of an undercover or confidential informant will be approved for a period of 90120 days and may be extended for additional periods of 90120 days with the approval of the Deputy Commissioner of the Intelligence DivisionBureau. Such extensions may be approved for as long as the investigation continues when it has been determined that the information sought in the investigation could not reasonably be obtained in a timely and effective manner by less intrusive means the use of the undercover is the most effective means of obtaining information. The request to extend the use of undercovers and action taken on the request must be in writing and must include the reason for the extension.
(iii) Undercovers are strictly prohibited from engaging in any conduct the sole purpose of which is to disrupt the lawful exercise of political activity, from instigating unlawful acts or engaging in unlawful or unauthorized investigative activities.
b. Eavesdropping and Video Surveillance (as defined in Article 700 of the NY Criminal Procedure Law), Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices, and Consensual Electronic Monitoring
(i) All requirements for the use of such methods under the Constitution, applicable statutes, and NYPD regulations or policies must be observed.
(4) Whenever an individual is known to be represented by counsel in a particular matter, the NYPD shall follow applicable law and Department procedure concerning contact with represented individuals in the absence of prior notice to their counsel.
VIII. DISSEMINATION AND MAINTENANCE OF INFORMATION A. Dissemination
The NYPD may disseminate information obtained during the Checking of Leads, Preliminary Inquiries and investigations conducted pursuant to these guidelines to federal, state or local law enforcement agencies, or local criminal justice agencies when such information:
(i) falls within the investigative or protective jurisdiction or litigative responsibility of the agency;
(ii) may assist in preventing an unlawful act or the use of violence or any other conduct dangerous to human life;
(iii) is required to be disseminated by interagency agreement, statute, or other law.
B. Maintenance
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All documentation required under these Guidelines shall be maintained by the Intelligence DivisionBureau in accordance with general police department practice and applicable municipal record retention and destruction rules, regulations and procedures. Under these rules and practices documents are retained for no less than five years.
IXVIII. COUNTERTERRORISM ACTIVITIES AND OTHER AUTHORIZATIONS In order to carry out its mission of preventing the commission of terrorist acts in or affecting the City of New York and the United States and its people, the NYPD must proactively draw on available sources of information to identify terrorist threats and activities. It cannot be content to wait for leads to come in through the actions of others, but rather must be vigilant in detecting terrorist activities to the full extent permitted by law, with an eye towards early intervention and prevention of acts of terrorism before they occur. This Part accordingly identifies a number of authorized activities which further this end, and which can be carried out even in the absence of a checking of leads, Preliminary Inquiry, or Full Investigation as described in these guidelines. The authorizations include both activities that are specifically focused on terrorism and activities that are useful for law enforcement purposes in both terrorism and nonterrorism contexts. The authorized law enforcement activities of the NYPD include carrying out and retaining information resulting from the following activities.
A. COUNTERTERRORISM ACTIVITIES 1. Information Systems The NYPD is authorized to operate and participate in identification, tracking, and information systems for the purpose of identifying and locating potential terrorists and supporters of terrorist activity, assessing and responding to terrorist risks and threats, or otherwise detecting, prosecuting, or preventing terrorist activities. Systems within the scope of this paragraph may draw on and retain pertinent information from any source permitted by law, including information derived from past or ongoing investigative activities; other information collected or provided by governmental entities, such as foreign intelligence information and lookout list information; publicly available information, whether obtained directly or through services or resources (whether nonprofit or commercial) that compile or analyze such information; and information voluntarily provided by private entities. Any such system operated by the NYPD shall be reviewed periodically for compliance with all applicable statutory provisions and Department regulations and policies.
2. Visiting Public Places and Events For the purpose of detecting or preventing terrorist activities, the NYPD is authorized to visit any place and attend any event that is open to the public, on the same terms and conditions as members of the public generally. No information obtained from such visits shall be retained unless it relates to potential unlawful or terrorist activity.
B. OTHER AUTHORIZATIONS 1. General Topical Research The NYPD is authorized to carry out general topical research, including conducting online searches and accessing online sites and forums as part of such research on the same terms and conditions as members of the public generally. “General topical research” under this paragraph means research concerning subject areas that are relevant for the purpose of
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facilitating or supporting the discharge of investigative responsibilities. It does not include online searches for information by individuals’ names or other individual identifiers, except where such searches are incidental to topical research, such as searching to locate writings on a topic by searching under the names of authors who write on the topic, or searching by the name of a party to a case in conducting legal research.
2. Use of Online Resources Generally For the purpose of developing intelligence information to detect or prevent terrorism or other unlawful activities, the NYPD is authorized to conduct online search activity and to access online sites and forums on the same terms and conditions as members of the public generally.
3. Reports and Assessments The NYPD is authorized to prepare general reports and assessments concerning terrorism or other unlawful activities for purposes of strategic or operational planning or in support of other legitimate law enforcement activities.
IX. PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND OTHER LIMITATIONS A. General Limitations The law enforcement activities authorized by this Part do not include maintaining files on individuals solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment or the lawful exercise of any other rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Rather, all such law enforcement activities must have a valid law enforcement purpose and must be carried out in conformity with all applicable statutes and Department regulations and policies.
B. Construction of Part This Part does not limit any activities authorized by or carried out under other Parts of these guidelines. The specification of authorized law enforcement activities under this Part is not exhaustive, and does not limit other authorized law enforcement activities of the NYPD.
XI. RESERVATION Nothing in these guidelines shall limit the general reviews or audits of papers, files, contracts, or other records in the possession of the NYPD or City of New York, or the performance of similar services at the specific request of another government agency. Such reviews, audits, or similar services must be for the purpose of detecting or preventing violations of law which are within the investigative responsibility of the NYPD. Nothing in these guidelines is intended to limit the NYPD's responsibilities to investigate certain applicants and employees, or to pursue efforts to satisfy any other of its legal rights, privileges, or obligations. These guidelines are set forth solely for the purpose of internal NYPD guidance. They are not intended to, do not, and may not be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural; enforceable at law by any party in any matter, civil or criminal, nor do they place any limitation on otherwise lawful investigative and litigative prerogatives of the NYPD or City of New York.
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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ----------------------------------------------------------------x

HAMID HASSAN RAZA, MASJID AL-ANSAR; ASAD DANDIA; MUSLIMS GIVING BACK; MASJID AT-TAQWA; and MOHAMMAD ELSHINAWY,

Plaintiffs, v.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER 13-CV-3448 (PKC) (JMA)

CITY OF NEW YORK; MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG, in his official capacity as Mayor of the City of New York; RAYMOND W. KELLY, in his official capacity as Police Commissioner for the City of New York; and DAVID COHEN, in his official capacity as Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence for the City of New York,

Defendants.

----------------------------------------------------------------x

PAMELA K. CHEN, United States District Judge:

Plaintiffs move for expedited discovery in support of an anticipated motion for a

preliminary injunction. (Dkt. 20.) For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiffs’ motion is

GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part, as follows: (1) Plaintiffs’ Document Request #1 is

granted, except with respect to potential redactions by Defendants; (2) Plaintiffs’ Document

Request #2 is granted to the extent that the investigations referenced therein relate to Plaintiffs;

(3) Plaintiffs’ Document Request #3 is granted, with modifications; (4) Plaintiffs’ Request # 4 is

granted, with modifications; (5) Plaintiffs’ Requests #5 through #9 are denied in their entirety;

and (6) Plaintiffs’ sole interrogatory, which contains three subparts, is granted. In addition,

Plaintiffs’ request for expedited discovery, pursuant to their proposed schedule, is DENIED. The

schedule that will govern the discovery permitted herein is set forth at the conclusion of this Memorandum and Order.
BACKGROUND Plaintiffs are three Muslim individuals, two mosques, and a non-profit Muslim organization. They allege that Defendants have violated, and continue to violate, their constitutional rights through unlawful, “suspicionless” surveillance and investigation conducted by the New York Police Department (“NYPD”) pursuant to its purported “Muslim surveillance program.” (Dkt. 1 at 1.) Plaintiffs’ complaint sets forth four causes of action: (1) violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment; (3) violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment; and (4) violation of the right to freely exercise their religion under Article I § 3 of the New York State Constitution. (Dkt. 1 at 30–32.) On September 10, 2013, one day after filing their answer, Defendants submitted a request for bifurcated discovery to the Honorable Joan M. Azrack, with the first phase of discovery being limited to whether Plaintiffs have standing to sue and whether they have suffered a constitutional violation. (Dkt. 11 at 2.) According to Defendants, the second phase, to which the parties would proceed if Plaintiffs established standing and a constitutional violation, would concern “the NYPD’s general investigative policies and practices.” (Dkt. 11 at 2.) Defendants’ motion for bifurcated discovery was principally based on the arguments that Plaintiffs would be unable to make either showing, and that non-bifurcated discovery would “open up innumerable discovery disputes regarding the law enforcement privilege and waste judicial resources.” (Dkt. 11 at 2.) Defendants advised Judge Azrack that, at the conclusion of the initial phase of
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bifurcated discovery, they would move to dismiss this action based on a lack of standing and the absence of any constitutional violation. (Dkt. 11 at 5.)
On September 11, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a response in which they opposed Defendants’ request for bifurcated discovery and informed Judge Azrack that Plaintiffs planned to seek leave to move for a preliminary injunction and for expedited discovery with respect to that motion. (Dkt. 12.)
On September 12, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a pre-motion conference request with this Court regarding the preliminary injunction motion and expedited discovery. (Dkt. 13.) Plaintiffs indicated that their motion would seek to have the Court: “(1) order the NYPD to segregate all existing records related to Plaintiffs’ religious identity, speech, beliefs, and practices that are not supported by any individualized suspicion of Plaintiffs’ wrongdoing, and prohibit any use or dissemination of such records; and (2) enjoin the NYPD from any investigation of Plaintiffs that is based solely or predominantly on their religion.” (Dkt. 13 at 2.)
On September 12, 2013, Judge Azrack held a conference with the parties regarding Defendants’ request for bifurcated discovery. (Dkts. 14, 15.) Judge Azrack reserved judgment on the bifurcation issue, and directed the parties to confer in the meantime regarding a confidentiality agreement to govern the exchange of documents and information during discovery, to which the parties have not yet agreed. (Dkt. 15 at 5–6; Dkt. 19.)
On September 19, 2013, Defendants submitted their opposition to Plaintiffs’ request for a pre-motion conference on their proposed preliminary injunction motion and for expedited discovery. (Dkt. 18.)
On October 7, 2013, the Court held a pre-motion conference, during which the Court heard argument from the parties regarding Plaintiffs’ request for expedited discovery. The Court
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set a briefing schedule to permit Defendants to object to the Plaintiffs’ proposed discovery requests.
The next day, October 8, Plaintiffs filed their motion for expedited discovery, including their proposed interrogatory and document requests. (Dkt. 20.) Defendants filed their opposition on October 30, 2013. (Dkt. 23.) Plaintiffs submitted their reply on November 7. (Dkt. 27.)
Through their proposed expedited discovery requests, Plaintiffs seek a wide range of documents and information relating not only to the NYPD’s surveillance and investigation of Plaintiffs, but the NYPD’s investigative policies and activities relating to all Muslim individuals and organizations, and relating to all non-Muslim individuals and organizations, where the policy or activity is or was based on the individual’s or organization’s religious speech, beliefs, practices, and activities. (Dkts. 20-1, 20-2.)
Defendants’ response, while not addressing Plaintiffs’ motion on a request-by-request basis, broadly interposes objections based on lack of relevance, overbreadth, and undue burden. (Dkt. 23 at 1–3.) Defendants also emphasize the heightened law enforcement sensitivity of the information being sought by Plaintiffs. (E.g., Dkt. 23 at 1.) In addition, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to meet the standard justifying expedited discovery. (Dkt. 23 at 21.)
DISCUSSION I. Standard for Expedited Discovery
The management of discovery, including the timing and scope of discovery, lies within the sound discretion of the Court. See In re Subpoena Issued to Dennis Friedman, 350 F.3d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 2003) (“the federal rules give district courts broad discretion to manage the manner in which discovery proceeds”); see also Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 906 F.2d 884, 891 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Where discovery is warranted, the court should exercise its inherent power
4

to limit and expedite it.”); United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. The Net, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 69, 71 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (“‘[T]he revisions in Rule 26(b)(2) are intended to provide the court with broader discretion to impose additional restrictions on the scope and extent of discovery . . . .’”) (citing Advisory Committee Notes to 1993 Amendment to Rule 26(b)(2)).
In deciding Plaintiffs’ request for expedited discovery, the Court applies the “flexible standard of reasonableness and good cause” set out in Ayyash v. Bank Al-Madina, 233 F.R.D. 325, 326–27 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), which is regularly employed in this district and elsewhere.1 See, e.g., KeyBank, Nat’l Assoc. v. Quality Payroll Sys., Inc., 2006 WL 1720461, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. June 22, 2006); New York v. Mountain Tobacco Co., 2013 WL 3488262, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 11, 2013) (rejecting Notaro and applying the “reasonableness” test); Digital Sin, Inc. v. Does 1– 176, 279 F.R.D. 239, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (applying standard of “reasonableness and good cause” in determining expedited discovery request). However, even under this more flexible standard, the Court does not find that Plaintiffs have shown sufficient cause to justify expedited discovery or that Plaintiffs’ proposed discovery schedule is reasonable, given the breadth of Plaintiffs’ document requests and the likelihood of disputes over assertions of privilege by Defendants. (See Dkt. 23 at 16–21.)
In support of their request for expedited discovery, Plaintiffs claim that the alleged harms they have suffered, and continue to suffer, as a result of Defendants’ conduct have “grown significantly more acute” since the filing of Defendants’ September 10th letter requesting bifurcated discovery (“September 10th Letter”). (Dkt. 20-3 at 14–15.) In that letter, Defendants
1 Defendants urge this Court to adopt the framework set forth in Notaro v. Koch, 95 F.R.D. 403, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). (Dkt. 23 at 21.) The Court declines to do so because employing a preliminary-injunction analysis to determine entitlement to expedited discovery makes little sense, since it requires a showing of “some probability of success on the merits” before the moving party has obtained any discovery. See, e.g., Ayyash, 233 F.R.D. at 326.
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set forth some of the facts that allegedly prompted the NYPD’s surveillance and investigation of
Plaintiffs. (Dkt. 11.) Plaintiffs assert that as a consequence of Defendants’ September 10th
Letter, Plaintiffs’ fear of discriminatory surveillance has “grown substantially, as has the
stigmatizing effect of this surveillance on Plaintiffs within their communities.” (Dkt. 20-3 at 15.)
Plaintiffs’ claims of heightened fear and stigmatization, which are largely unsupported,
do not demonstrate good cause warranting expedited discovery. Indeed, the allegations in
Plaintiffs’ complaint, as well as the documents they submitted in connection with their discovery
requests, plainly demonstrate that Plaintiffs were well aware of the scope of the NYPD’s
investigative activities relating to them, and more generally to the Muslim community in New
York City, prior to Defendants’ September 10th Letter and even before the filing of this lawsuit.
(Dkt. 1 at 5–29; Dkt. 20-5.) Accordingly, the discovery granted herein will not be conducted
pursuant to Plaintiffs’ proposed timeline, but according to the schedule set forth at the conclusion
of this Memorandum and Order, with modifications as may be determined appropriate by Judge Azrack.2
II. Plaintiffs’ Document Requests
The Court evaluates Plaintiffs’ document requests under the reasonableness standard set
forth above and is guided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly Rule 26. Rule 26
provides that the court:
On motion or on its own . . . must limit the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed by these rules or by local rule if it determines that the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the
2 The Court construes the parties’ submissions with respect to Plaintiffs’ discovery motion and their appearances before this Court and Judge Azrack as complying with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f), which requires, in relevant part, that parties meet and confer regarding a discovery schedule and other relevant discovery issues. Based on the parties’ competing positions, the Court concludes that further meet-and-confers would not be productive, and that the Court should set the discovery schedule for Plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction motion.
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needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues. Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (emphasis added); see, e.g., In re Subpoena Issued to Dennis Friedman, 350 F.3d at 69 (noting that Rule 26(b)(2) permits a district court to limit discovery); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Rule 26(b)(2) imposes general limitations on the scope of discovery in the form of a ‘proportionality test[.]’”); Tucker v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 281 F.R.D. 85, 91 (D. Conn. 2012) (“Under Rule 26(b)(2)(C), courts impose a proportionality test to weigh the interests of the parties to determine whether discovery, even if relevant, should be allowed to proceed.”); Lineen v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 1997 WL 73763, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 1997) (“In determining the limits of discovery, [courts] must balance the plaintiff’s need for the requested data against the burden imposed on the defendant.”) (collecting cases). A. Request #1
Request #1 Documents concerning Plaintiffs.
The documents requested by Plaintiffs in Request #1 clearly are relevant to their claims. In fact, Defendants have agreed to produce all documents and information in their possession regarding Plaintiffs. (Dkt. 24-1 at 11–14) (Defendants intend to produce all information that they have about Plaintiffs in discovery); (Dkt. 23 at 1–2) (“defendants’ pending proposal for bifurcated discovery would provide all information regarding any investigation or surveillance of these six plaintiffs, and the reasons for those actions”); (Dkt. 20-3 at 6) (“The parties appear to be in agreement that Plaintiffs are entitled to Intelligence Division documents concerning
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Plaintiffs themselves, whatever those documents may be formally labeled in the NYPD’s files.”); (Dkt. 11 at 2.) The Court accordingly grants Request #1.
Plaintiffs raise two objections with respect to the scope of Defendants’ responses to this request. (Dkt. 20-3 at 6–7.) First, Plaintiffs object to Defendants “narrowly defining what constitutes an ‘investigation’ or ‘surveillance’” in deciding which documents are responsive to this request. (Dkt. 20-3 at 6.) The Court agrees. Defendants must construe this request to include as responsive all documents they have about or referencing Plaintiffs, however those documents are labeled or classified.
Second, while Plaintiffs seek documents specifically pertaining to themselves, if those documents also contain information regarding other subjects, Plaintiffs request that such information be deemed responsive, and disclosed, as well. (Dkt. 20-3 at 6–7.) Plaintiffs argue that the information about other subjects referenced in these documents could, for example, “give[] rise to an inference that any investigation of Plaintiffs was part of a broader program of unwarranted surveillance of Muslims.” (Dkt. 20-3 at 6.) The Court denies, in part, this aspect of Request #1. The Court agrees that Plaintiffs’ inclusion in documents referencing other Muslims who were investigated, possibly without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, could be probative of discriminatory intent. Accordingly, while the Court will permit Defendants to redact the names of non-Plaintiff subjects, these redactions must be accompanied by an indication of: (1) whether the subject was a Muslim individual or organization; and (2) whether the subject was at any time investigated or surveilled by the NYPD. However, even though identifying information may be redacted, information describing investigative and surveillance actions taken with respect to these non-Plaintiffs must be disclosed, unless the disclosure of this
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information would indirectly reveal the subject’s identity or threaten to undermine an ongoing investigation. B. Request #2
Request #2 Documents concerning the following Investigations:
a. Preliminary Inquiry # 10/08; b. Terrorism Enterprise Investigation # 01/03; c. Terrorism Enterprise Investigation # 04/08. To the extent documents sought by this request pertain to Plaintiffs, those documents are responsive and must be produced. To the extent these documents do not pertain to Plaintiffs, they need not be produced, unless they are responsive to another permitted request. C. Request #3
Request #3 Organizational charts and Documents describing the Intelligence Division and its activities.
The Court construes Request #3 as seeking charts and information pertaining to the structure and organization of the NYPD Intelligence Division and a general description of its “activities,” i.e., areas of responsibility. Such information is relevant and discoverable. However, to the extent Plaintiffs’ request seeks production of documents regarding specific “activities” of the Intelligence Division, it is overly broad. Accordingly, Request #3 is granted, as limited (see below) to a general description of the Intelligence Division’s structure, organization, and activities:
“Organizational charts and Documents describing the structure, organization, general operation, and purpose/mission of the Intelligence Division.”
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D. Request #4 Request #4
Intelligence Division reports, assessments, presentations, memoranda, policy statements, operational directives, strategy documents, and training materials concerning any of the following as a basis for, or a factor relevant to, the decision to engage in Surveillance or Investigations:
a. Islam, its adherents, or its schools of thought, including, but not limited to, Salafis or Salafism; b. Non-Islamic religions, their adherents, or their schools of thought; c. “Ancestries of interest” as identified in an Intelligence Division presentation, available at http://bit.ly/1alTs2A. Plaintiffs’ Request #4 goes to the heart of their claims. Yet, as currently written, the request is overbroad and has the potential to reveal countless documents that are of limited probative value or relevance and may also be covered by the law enforcement privilege. Accordingly, the Court grants Request #4 as modified below. See infra at 21. 1. Relevance In order to prove their Equal Protection and First Amendment claims, Plaintiffs must show that Defendants have acted with a discriminatory purpose or intent with respect to their investigation and surveillance of Plaintiffs. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009) (with respect to claims of “invidious discrimination in contravention of the First and Fifth Amendments . . . the plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant acted with discriminatory purpose”); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 (1977) (requiring plaintiff to prove that “discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor in the
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[municipality’s] decision”). Indeed, on this issue, the parties appear to be in agreement. (Dkt. 20-3 at 3; Dkt. 23 at 4–6; Dkt. 27 at 7–8.)3
Plaintiffs can make this showing in several ways: “A plaintiff could point to a law or policy that ‘expressly classifies person on the basis of race.’ Or, a plaintiff could identify a facially neutral law or policy that has been applied in an intentionally discriminatory manner. A plaintiff could also allege that a facially neutral statute or policy has an adverse effect and that it was motivated by discriminatory animus.” Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 337 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Hayden v. Cnty. of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1999) (itself quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 213, 227–29 (1995)) (other internal citations omitted).
Plaintiffs indicate that they may seek to prove discriminatory intent in one or two of the ways identified in Brown: (1) an express classification theory—by showing that “the NYPD expressly classified Muslims by adopting a policy of singling them out for heightened policy scrutiny”; or (2) a discriminatory application theory—“to the extent that Defendants claim they had a legitimate law enforcement interest in Plaintiffs, . . . by showing that [Plaintiffs] were subject to NYPD investigations of unequal and unwarranted scope, duration, and invasiveness as a result of their religious beliefs and activities.” (Dkt. 20-3 at 3); Brown, 221 F.3d at 337 (“A plaintiff could point to a law or policy that expressly classifies persons on the basis of race . . . . Or, a plaintiff could identify a facially neutral law or policy that has been applied in an intentionally discriminatory manner.”). Plaintiffs maintain that documents reflecting a policy or
3 Although the parties spend little time in their submissions addressing Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims, Plaintiffs assert that the same arguments supporting the relevance of discriminatory motive evidence with respect to the Fourteenth Amendment apply to their First Amendment claims. (Dkt. 20-3 at 3 n.1) Defendants do not indicate any disagreement with this contention in their submission.
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program by Defendants to investigate and surveill Muslims as a group are not only directly relevant, but necessary, to making either of these showings. (Dkt. 20-3 at 3–4; Dkt. 27 at 6–7.)
As Plaintiffs note, Defendants effectively concede the relevance of the NYPD’s strategy and policy documents. (Dkt. 27 at 6; Dkt. 23 at 6–7 n.6) (acknowledging that NYPD strategy and policy documents “may be relevant to a Monell claim”). However, Defendants argue that, notwithstanding the potential relevance of policy documents to Plaintiffs’ Monell claims, Plaintiffs are not entitled to such documents at this time because Plaintiffs “must first establish an underlying constitutional violation, in other words, they must establish that the NYPD had an improper motive in surveilling them.” (Dkt. 23 at 6–7 n.6.) This is incorrect.
In contrast to a claim under the Fourth Amendment, the existence of criminal predication, e.g., reasonable suspicion or probable cause, does not automatically defeat an Equal Protection claim.4 An Equal Protection claim can be established where there exist “mixed motives” for the challenged government conduct. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 225 (1985); Vill. of Arlington Heights., 429 U.S. at 270; Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). Even if Defendants’ investigations of Plaintiffs were supported by criminal predication, if those investigations were improperly influenced by Plaintiffs’ religion, they may be unconstitutional. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (distinguishing between Section 1983 actions based on the Fourth Amendment, where the defendants’ “[s]ubjective intentions play no role,” and actions based on the Equal Protection Clause, which are based on “intentionally discriminatory application” of the law, and further noting that “the constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of
4 Although Plaintiffs assert that the same reasoning applies to their First Amendment claims, the parties did not address that issue in their submissions, and the Court need not resolve it, given that Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim is sufficient to justify discovery of the policy documents that Plaintiffs seek.
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laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment”); United States v. Avery, 137 F.3d 343, 352 (6th Cir. 1997) (“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides citizens a degree of protection independent of the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.”); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 786 (2d Cir. 1994) (Newman, C.J., concurring) (“Though the Fourth Amendment permits a pretext arrest, if otherwise supported by probable cause, the Equal Protection Clause still imposes restraint on impermissibly class-based discriminations.”).
In such “mixed motive” or “dual motivation” cases, the existence of permissible motives does not preclude a finding that an impermissible discriminatory purpose was a factor in the government’s actions. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 429 U.S. at 287 (existence of non-discriminatory reasons for the plaintiff’s firing did not preclude an Equal Protection claim, where the plaintiff alleged that the exercise of his right to free speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant school board’s decision to fire him); United States v. City of Yonkers, 96 F.3d 600, 611–12 (2d Cir. 1996) (discriminatory intent need not be the sole reason for the government’s action); Howard v. Senkowski, 986 F.2d 24, 29–30 (2d Cir. 1993) (“challenged action is invalid if motivated in part by an impermissible reason”) (emphasis added); Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 270 (“[Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)] does not require a plaintiff to prove that the challenged action rested solely on racially discriminatory purposes.”) (emphasis added).
Plaintiffs, however, must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the alleged “discrimination was a substantial or motivating factor” for the government’s action or decision. See Hunter, 471 U.S. at 225; see also City of Yonkers, 96 F.3d at 611–12 (a plaintiff making an Equal Protection claim must show that an impermissible factor, such as race, was “a motivating
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factor” for the state’s action) (quoting Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266) (emphasis in original); Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265 (“Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”). Plaintiffs, though, “need not show . . . that a government decisionmaker was motivated solely, primarily, or even predominantly by” improper concerns based on religion. See City of Yonkers, 96 F.3d at 611–12 (involving racially motivated government action).
The Court recognizes that, other than in the selective prosecution model, the application of the “dual motivation” framework to allegedly discriminatory law enforcement activities is not well-established.5 However, the Second Circuit’s decision in Pyke v. Cuomo supports the proposition that a plaintiff can bring an Equal Protection claim with respect to law enforcement conduct without alleging selective prosecution.6 In Pyke, residents of the Mohawk Indian reservation in upstate New York sued State officials for discriminatorily withholding police protection on the reservation. Pyke v. Cuomo, 258 F.3d 107, 108 (2d Cir. 2001). The district court granted summary judgment to the State on the grounds that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate disparate treatment and also had failed to plead express racial classification. Id. The Second Circuit vacated and remanded. Id. at 110.
5 The majority of cases cited in the prior Equal Protection discussion arose in the context of nonlaw enforcement governmental activities. 6 In selective prosecution cases, a plaintiff must allege and prove that similarly situated individuals outside of his protected class were treated differently (“Armstrong Rule”). Pyke, 258 F.3d at 109 (“[I]f a plaintiff seeks to prove selective prosecution on the basis of race, ‘he must show that similarly situated individuals of a different race were not prosecuted’” (citing United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996)); see also id. at 110. As the Pyke court noted, however, the Armstrong Rule applies exclusively in selective prosecution cases. Id. at 109 (“In the present case, however, plaintiffs do not make a claim of selective prosecution. The Armstrong rule has no application to their claim.”).
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The panel specifically held that: “A plaintiff alleging an equal protection claim under a theory of discriminatory application of the law, or under a theory of discriminatory motivation underlying a facially neutral policy or statute, generally need not plead or show the disparate treatment of other similarly situated individuals.” Id. at 108–09. The panel distinguished between Equal Protection claims alleging selective prosecution, for which disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals must be demonstrated, and claims “challenging a law or policy that contains an express, racial classification” for which “it is not necessary to allege the existence of a similarly situated non-minority group.” Id. at 109 (quoting Brown, 221 F.3d at 337). The panel’s decision was based, in part, on the reality that it can be difficult to make direct comparisons between different groups to demonstrate animus. Id. (“It would be difficult, if not impossible, to find other individuals whose situation is similar to [Plaintiffs’ situation as] Native Americans living on a reservation and exercising a substantial measure of self-government independent of New York State.”).
The panel also made clear that the Circuit’s holding in Brown, establishing that no showing of disparate treatment is necessary for an Equal Protection claim, is not limited to challenges to policies containing express racial classifications:
We now clarify—a plaintiff who, as in Brown, alleges an express racial classification, or alleges that a facially neutral law or policy has been applied in an intentionally discriminatory race-based manner, or that a facially neutral statute or policy with an adverse effect was motivated by discriminatory animus, is not obligated to show a better treated, similarly situated group of individuals of a different race in order to establish a claim of denial of equal protection. Id. at 110 (emphases added). Therefore, Plaintiffs may proceed with an Equal Protection claim based on Defendants’ allegedly discriminatory investigation and surveillance of Plaintiffs without alleging selective prosecution and without alleging or proving disparate treatment of a similarly situated non-Muslim group.
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Accordingly, because evidence of Defendants’ intent with respect to their investigative activities of Plaintiffs is central to Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claims, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs are entitled to discovery regarding any NYPD policy or program involving the investigation of Muslims as a group based, in whole or part, on their religion. Without this discovery, Plaintiffs would be preemptively and irreparably prohibited from proving that Defendants’ alleged discriminatory intent was a motivating factor in the investigation and surveillance of Plaintiffs. Contrary to Defendants’ contention, this is more than a mere “fishing expedition.” (Dkt. 23 at 8.) Indeed, documents attached to Plaintiffs’ submissions strongly suggest that Defendants have documents responsive to this request. (See, e.g., Dkt. 20-5.) At least two of the documents provided by Plaintiffs reference Plaintiff At Taqwa mosque. (Dkt. 20-5 at ECF 55, 112). Numerous other documents ambiguously reference “Taqwa.” (Dkt. 20-5 at ECF 84, 86, 90, 111, 114, 183.)7 Yet another document references Plaintiff Elshinawy. (Dkt. 20-5 at ECF 173.)
Defendants also argue that information about the NYPD’s investigations of non-Plaintiff Muslims and non-Muslims, which could include the strategic or policy documents sought by Request #4, is irrelevant because “the only information apt to prove or disprove discriminatory purpose” are documents pertaining to the investigations of Plaintiffs. (Dkt. 23 at 5–6.) In essence, Defendants’ argument is that no documents beyond those that specifically reference Plaintiffs or that Defendants identify as containing information that was factored into Plaintiffs’ investigations can be relevant to establishing a discriminatory intent or purpose to investigate Muslims as a group, including Plaintiffs. This argument falls short for several reasons.
7 The Court assumes that references to “Al Taqwa” in the document are, in fact, to Plaintiff At Taqwa mosque. (See, e.g., Dkt. 20-5 at ECF 66, 69, 88, 114, 135, 143, 174.) Citations to “ECF” reference the pagination of the Electronic Court Filing system, and not the document’s internal pagination.
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First, Defendants presume the outcome of the requested discovery in asserting that documents responsive to this request, i.e., policy or strategy documents, could never be relevant to a showing of discriminatory intent with respect to Defendants’ investigations of Plaintiffs. Defendants contend that their records will reveal criminal predication for their investigations, thereby precluding a finding of discriminatory intent. If the Court were to limit discovery in this way, Plaintiffs would not “ha[ve] the opportunity to take discovery on the existence of discriminatory motivation,” and would be constrained to the limited evidence pertaining directly to them. Pyke, 258 F.3d at 110.
Second, and relatedly, Defendants too narrowly define the purpose of discovery. While it may turn out that Plaintiffs are unable to demonstrate that their investigations were prompted or affected in any way by an alleged “Muslim surveillance program,” the purpose of discovery is to enable a party to obtain potentially relevant information with which to make this determination and argue its position. Limiting the scope of discovery is especially inappropriate when, as here, the central fact at issue, discriminatory intent, is difficult to establish. See Hunter, 471 U.S. at 228 (“Proving the motivation behind official action is often a problematic undertaking.”); Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266 (“Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.”); Gray v. Bd. of Higher Educ., City of New York, 692 F.2d 901, 906 (2d Cir. 1982) (reversing district court’s denial of discovery in part because “[t]he district court minimized the importance of appellants’ discovery needs in connection with” intent evidence and finding that “if unable to engage in discovery, [the plaintiff] cannot prove intent, and without
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proof of intent, he has no case”).8 Despite these principles encouraging broad discovery, here
the Court has limited discovery only to those documents necessary for Plaintiffs to prove their
case because of the sensitive nature of the requested discovery. Nevertheless, the Court cannot
go so far as to prevent Plaintiffs from taking otherwise proper discovery in a way that would
unfairly limit their ability to prove their claims.
Third, as discussed supra, given that Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the NYPD’s
investigations of them were motivated, at least in part, by a discriminatory purpose, and that a
showing of criminal predication for the investigations does not end the inquiry, Plaintiffs should
be permitted to obtain at this stage all potentially relevant information on the existence of a
policy or program that either expressly classifies Plaintiffs based on their religion or is applied to
them in a discriminatory fashion. If Plaintiffs are precluded from obtaining any information
about whether there exists an overarching policy or program to investigate or surveill Muslims as
a group, they will be unfairly hampered in arguing that religion was a substantial or motivating
factor in Defendants’ decisions relating to the initiation, continuation, scope, and methodology of
the investigations of Plaintiffs. See, e.g., Brown, 221 F.3d at 337 (affirming dismissal of equal
protection claims where plaintiffs could not identify “any law or policy that contain[ed] an
“express racial classification”).
8 Absent a “smoking gun,” which is especially rare in discrimination cases, plaintiffs in these cases frequently must rely on circumstantial evidence to demonstrate defendants’ discriminatory intent. See Chambers v. TRM Copy Centers Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that in employment discrimination cases, “[b]ecause an employer who discriminates is unlikely to leave a ‘smoking gun’ attesting to a discriminatory intent, a victim of discrimination is seldom able to prove his claim by direct evidence, and is usually constrained to rely on circumstantial evidence”); Rosen v. Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 528, 533 (2d Cir. 1991) (“An employer who discriminates is unlikely to leave a ‘smoking gun,’ such as a notation in an employee’s personnel file, attesting to a discriminatory intent. A victim of discrimination is therefore seldom able to prove his or her claim by direct evidence and is usually constrained to rely on the cumulative weight of circumstantial evidence.”) (citations omitted).
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The Court has carefully considered the bifurcated discovery proposed by Defendants, and
declines to adopt that approach for one principal reason. Even if, following the first phase of
bifurcated discovery, the NYPD presents information establishing that it had reasonable
suspicion and/or probable cause for the investigations of Plaintiffs and there also was no
information in Defendants’ records of Plaintiffs suggesting that a broader policy to investigate
Muslims as a group was applied to these Plaintiffs, the Court would still be compelled to find
that Plaintiffs are entitled to discovery as to whether such a broad-based policy exists, and
whether it applied or applies to Plaintiffs. Defendants do not make any satisfactory argument
against this point. (Dkt. 23 at 4–10.) For example, Defendants cite to no Equal Protection case
in which a court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint based solely on a finding of probable cause.
As discussed, information about an overarching policy, if one exists, could still be used by
Plaintiffs to argue that, notwithstanding the existence of criminal predication as to Plaintiffs, a
substantial or motivating factor behind Defendants’ initiation of its investigations of Plaintiffs,
and/or the length, scope, or intrusiveness of those investigations, was a broader discriminatory
policy to investigate Muslims. Therefore, there is no reason to delay discovery that Plaintiffs would be permitted to obtain regardless of the results of the first phase of bifurcated discovery.9
9 Defendants rely heavily on the Second Circuit’s decision in Dinler v. City of New York, 607 F.3d 923 (2d Cir. 2010) (“In re City of New York”). In Dinler, the Second Circuit panel issued a writ of mandamus overturning an order of the district court compelling the NYPD to produce intelligence reports prepared by undercover officers regarding potential security threats surrounding the Republican National Convention. However, Dinler is distinguishable from this case. In Dinler, the undercover reports that the defendants were ordered to produce were largely irrelevant to the plaintiffs’ case since the plaintiffs were challenging only their own arrests and not the undercover operations. Id. at 931 n.6. Here, by contrast, the documents sought through Request #4 are directly relevant to the discriminatory intent element of Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claims. The Dinler decision focused on the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment Claims, and therefore the defendants’ motive was irrelevant, unlike here. See id. at 931 (plaintiffs claim, inter alia, “that NYPD officers had arrested them without cause, subjected them to unreasonably long periods of detention, and fingerprinted them without authorization”). Moreover, the district
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In reaching this decision, the Court is mindful that, even if such a discriminatory policy exists, Plaintiffs will have to demonstrate causation, i.e., that Defendants’ investigations of Plaintiffs were motivated, at least in part, by that policy. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292, 294–96 (1987) (“to prevail under the Equal Protection Clause, [plaintiff] must prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose”) (emphasis in original). The Court also is aware that the existence of criminal predication with respect to those investigations is highly relevant to that determination. Cf. Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250. 260–61 (2006) (existence of probable cause is highly relevant to determination of but-for causation with respect to the allegedly retaliatory prosecution). However, the existence of criminal predication with respect to Plaintiffs’ investigations does not, in itself and as a matter of law, negate the possibility of causation between the allegedly discriminatory policy and Plaintiffs’ investigations. Furthermore, this determination is one that must be made at the conclusion, not the initiation, of discovery, and Plaintiffs should be permitted to obtain discovery that may be relevant to that determination.
Discriminatory intent is at the core of Plaintiffs’ claims—and the existence of a formal policy or practice, if one exists, certainly would be relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs are entitled to seek evidence that would tend to show Defendants’ discriminatory intent in investigating them. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) provides for broad discovery into evidence “regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to a party’s claim or defense” and
court in Dinler ordered production of documents over which the city had claimed law enforcement privilege. Id. at 931. The Second Circuit issued a writ of mandamus in Dinler at least in part on that basis—because the court ordered production of documents subject to the law enforcement privilege, mandamus was the only adequate means for the city to obtain the relief it sought. Id. at 934–35. The Court’s order today does not impinge upon Defendants’ ability to claim law enforcement privilege with respect to particular documents, which can be addressed on a document-specific basis. See infra at 27.
20

that “the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action.” Here, if Defendants have a policy, whether formally adopted or adhered to in pattern or practice, its existence would make it more likely that Plaintiffs themselves were investigated on the basis of their religion, potentially in violation of their constitutional rights. Accordingly, artificially limiting discovery in the manner suggested by Defendants, to wit, exclusively to documents referring to Plaintiffs, would be inadequate under these circumstances.
As it must, the Court considers the potential burden and expense of Defendants’ compliance with Request #4. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). As currently framed, the request is overly broad, in that it could be interpreted as requiring the production of documents other than strategic or policy documents, e.g., case-specific “reports or assessments.” In order to tailor the request to specific information necessary to Plaintiffs’ claims and to minimize the potential burden on Defendants, the Court narrows the request as follows:
Request #4 Intelligence Division documents containing operational directives, presentations, memoranda, strategy initiatives, training procedures, and policies, concerning any of the following as a basis for, or a factor considered in, deciding to engage in Surveillance or Investigations: a. Islam, its adherents, or its schools of thought, including but not limited to Salafis or Salafism; b. Non-Islamic religions, their adherents, or their schools of thought with any alleged link or connection to terrorism; c. “Ancestries of interest” as identified as an Intelligence Division presentation, available at http://bit.ly/1aITs2A Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Request #4, as modified, is granted.
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E. Requests #5 and #6
Request #5 Documents, from 2004 through the present, concerning Surveillance of:
a. Muslim individuals and organizations; b. Non-Muslim individuals’ religious speech, beliefs, practices, or activities; c. Non-Muslim religious organizations’ religious speech, beliefs, practices, or activities.
Request #6 Documents, from 2004 through the present, concerning Investigations of:
a. Muslim individuals and organizations; b. Non-Muslim individuals’ religious speech, beliefs, practices, or activities; c. Non-Muslim religious organizations’ religious speech, beliefs, practices, or activities.
Requests #5 and #6 seek all records from 2004 through the present concerning investigations and surveillance of all Muslims, without limitation, and all non-Muslims on the basis of their religious beliefs or practices. These requests are, at best, of limited probative value or relevance and, at the same time, impossibly burdensome. See Lineen, 1997 WL 73763, at *2; Tucker, 281 F.R.D. at 91. The Court, therefore, denies these requests in their entirety.
Plaintiffs seek these documents in order to permit a comparison between Defendants’ investigations of Muslims and non-Muslims on the basis of their religious speech or practices. (Dkt. 20-3 at 13–14.) This information, Plaintiffs argue, would permit them to demonstrate unconstitutional disparate treatment between Muslims and non-Muslims. Plaintiffs then would seek to compare the frequency and intensity of investigations of Muslims with the “comparator” groups of other religious individuals and organizations in order to show that Defendants have disproportionately targeted Muslims because of their religion.
22

Defendants counter that this “comparator” evidence sought by Plaintiffs does not exist because there is no appropriate “comparator.” (Dkt. 23 at 11–12; Dkt. 25 ¶¶ 14–15.) Indeed, a disparate treatment analysis requires a comparison between the plaintiffs and those similarly situated to the plaintiffs who are outside the plaintiffs’ protected class. See Brown, 221 F.3d at 337 (“it is sometimes necessary to allege the existence of a similarly situated group that was treated differently”); Harlen Assocs. v. Incorporated Vill. of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494, 499 (2d Cir. 2001) (“The Equal Protection Clause requires that the government treat all similarly situated people alike.”) (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)).10
The Court agrees with Defendants that there is no meaningful way to compare all Muslims who were investigated by Defendants, including Plaintiffs, to all non-Muslim individuals and organizations investigated by Defendants on the basis of their religious beliefs or practices.11 Given the myriad of factors that go into every investigation and, indeed, every step of every investigation, attempting to compare hundreds, if not thousands, of different investigations to each other to discern a pattern of disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals would be futile. Furthermore, as Plaintiffs acknowledge, they need not allege or prove a similarly situated group that was treated differently than Muslims and/or Plaintiffs in order to prove their claims. (Dkt. 27 at 4 n.4.) See Pyke, 258 F.3d at 110 (“a plaintiff who . . . alleges an express racial classification, or alleges that a facially neutral law or policy has been
10 Notably, Plaintiffs are not alleging selective enforcement, which, as previously discussed, would require a comparison between Plaintiffs and similarly situated individuals and organizations outside the protected class. (Dkt. 27 at 4 n.4); see Pyke, 258 F.3d at 109 (“a plaintiff alleging a claim of selective prosecution in violation of the Equal Protection Clause must plead and establish the existence of similarly situated individuals who were not prosecuted”). 11 The Court, however, does not endorse Defendants’ reasoning as to why there is no adequate comparator group to Plaintiffs. (See, e.g., Dkt. 23 at 11–12; Dkt. 25 ¶¶ 14–15.)
23

applied in an intentionally discriminatory race-based manner . . . is not obligated to show a better treated, similarly situated group of individuals of a different race in order to establish a claim of denial of equal protection”).
The limited probative value of Requests #5 and #6 is balanced against the fact that they are impossibly burdensome.12 As Defendants explained, “[b]ecause the Intelligence Bureau does not categorize or maintain files or documents based upon religion, compliance with plaintiffs’ request would require a document by document review to determine if a document related to religious speech, beliefs, practices or activities of a non-Muslim individual or organization.” (Dkt. 23 at 16.) Although Requests #5 and #6 purport to be limited (Dkt. 27-3 at 13–15), the practical effect would be to require Defendants to review and analyze virtually all of its records over a nine-year period to determine whether they should be produced. (Dkt. 23 at 15–16) (Defendants explaining burden imposed by Requests #5 and #6: “it stands to reason that most of the Intelligence Bureau’s counter-terrorism investigations since September 11th have involved subjects who are Muslim” and that “plaintiffs’ requests call for the vast majority of Intelligence Bureau documents pertaining to all of its activities, not just its counter-terrorism efforts”).
In sum, balancing the minimal probative value and relevance of the requested documents against the unreasonable burden and expense, as well as the diversion of important government resources, that would be caused by compliance, Requests #5 and #6 are denied in their entirety.
12 Despite Plaintiffs’ claims that they sought to streamline their document requests to minimize burden to Defendants it is clear that the volume of documents that would be produced pursuant to Requests #5 and #6 would be tremendous.
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F. Requests #7 – #9
Request #7
Documents, from 2004 through the present, containing statistics concerning the number of Investigations of:
a. Muslim individuals; b. Muslim organizations; c. Non-Muslim individuals either investigated on the basis of religious affiliation, speech, belief or activities, or investigated when one or more of religious affiliation, speech, belief or activities were factors relevant to the decision to investigate; d. Non-Muslim religious organizations.
Request #8
Documents, from 2004 through the present, containing statistics concerning the number of individuals and organizations under Surveillance that are:
a. Affiliated with Islam; b. Affiliated with a religion other than Islam; c. Not affiliated with any religion.
Request #9
Documents, from 2004 through the present, containing statistics concerning criminal charges resulting from the activities of the Intelligence Division, including statistics broken down by each sub-unit and category below, brought against:
a. Muslim individuals; b. Muslim organizations; c. Non-Muslim individuals either investigated on the basis of religious affiliation, speech, belief or activities, or investigated when one or more of religious affiliation, speech, belief or activities were factors relevant to the decision to investigate; d. Non-Muslim religious organizations.
Requests #7 through #9 pose similar problems as Requests #5 and #6. First, Defendants
state that they do not possess the requested statistics because they do not maintain records of
their investigations according to the subjects’ religion. (Dkt. 23 at 15–16.) Defendants cannot
be compelled to produce documents or information that they do not possess. See Fed. R. Civ.
Proc. 34(a)(1) (providing that “[a] party may serve on any other party a request . . . to produce
[documents] in the responding party’s possession, custody, or control”); Shcherbakovskiy v. Da
Capo Al Fine, Ltd., 490 F.3d 130, 138 (2d Cir. 2007) (“a party is not obliged to produce, at the
25

risk of sanctions, documents that it does not possess or cannot obtain”). Nor are Defendants required to compile the requested statistics, even assuming arguendo that it could be done. See Shcherbakovskiy, 490 F.3d at 138 (a party is not required to produce documents not in its possession, custody or control); (Dkt. 23 at 16) (“plaintiffs’ proposed document requests seek statistics that do not exist” and Defendants would have to review “virtually every document maintained by the Intelligence Bureau over a nine year period”).
Furthermore, as with the documents responsive to Requests #5 and #6, the documents sought by Requests #7, #8, and #9, even if they existed, would be of limited probative value and relevance. Statistics concerning the number of Intelligence Bureau investigations, instances of surveillance, and criminal charges of Muslims and non-Muslims are not readily susceptible to the conclusion Plaintiffs seek to draw from them, or any conclusion for that matter, given, as previously discussed (supra at 23) the countless factors and variables behind any investigation.
Accordingly, given the impossibility of compliance, as well as the minimal probative value and relevance of the requested documents and information, Requests #7, #8, and #9 are denied. G. Interrogatory
Interrogatory #1 Does the Intelligence Division have, in its possession, custody, or control, a database or means of electronic analysis concerning the following information? If so, please describe the types of records and search functions available for each sub-category below: a. From 2004 through the present, statistics concerning the number of Investigations of: Muslim individuals; Muslim organizations; non-Muslim individuals either investigated on the basis of religious affiliation, speech, belief or activities, or investigated when one or more of religious affiliation, speech, belief or activities were factors relevant to the decision to investigate; and non-Muslim religious organizations. b. From 2004 through the present, statistics concerning the number of individuals and organizations under Surveillance that are: affiliated with Islam; affiliated with a religion other
26

than Islam; and, not affiliated with any religion. c. From 2004 through the present, statistics concerning criminal charges resulting from the activities of the Intelligence Division, including statistics broken down by each sub-unit, brought against: Muslim individuals; Muslim organizations; non-Muslim individuals either investigated on the basis of religious affiliation, speech, belief or activities, or investigated when one or more of religious affiliation, speech, belief or activities were factors relevant to the decision to investigate; and non-Muslim religious organizations.
Rather than oppose the interrogatory on legal grounds, Defendants state that the interrogatory’s topic, namely, a database containing statistics of investigations of Muslims and non-Muslims based on their religion, does not exist. (Dkt. 23 at 15–16.) The Court, therefore, grants Plaintiffs’ interrogatory, and Defendants may respond accordingly. III. Privilege
Among their objections to Plaintiffs’ discovery requests, Defendants assert that “disclosure of extremely sensitive and confidential investigations that do not directly relate to plaintiffs would jeopardize on-going and contemplated investigations, and the disclosure of such documents would harm the privacy interests of individuals who have been investigated, but not charged.” (Dkt. 23 at 3.) Defendants also assert that “such disclosure will endanger the safety and undermine the efficacy of undercover police officers and confidential sources who work with the Intelligence Bureau.” (Dkt. 23 at 3.)
The Court is mindful of the importance of protecting privileged information, especially relating to law enforcement investigations, operations, and techniques. See Dorsett v. Cnty. of Nassau, 762 F. Supp. 2d 500, 520 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (identifying types of information that are covered by the law enforcement privilege and holding that where the privilege is found to apply, there is a “strong presumption” against lifting it and ordering the production of documents) (citing In re The City of New York, 607 F.3d at 944). Nothing in this order in any way limits Defendants’ ability to claim law enforcement or any other privilege with respect to responsive
27

documents or portions thereof. Such assertions of privilege, if any, should be presented to Judge Azrack, who will preside over the discovery process.
CONCLUSION Plaintiffs’ motion for expedited discovery in support of its contemplated motion for a preliminary injunction is granted in part, and denied in part, to the extent set forth herein. The parties shall proceed with discovery and briefing of the preliminary injunction motion according to the schedule set forth below. Given the likelihood that Defendants will need additional time to compile and review documents responsive to Request #4, the schedule provides for two stages of discovery, the first requiring the production of documents and information responsive to Requests #1 – #3 and the sole Interrogatory, and second requiring the production of documents responsive to Request #4. Discovery and Briefing Schedule • 2 weeks from order – Parties serve their document requests and interrogatories. • 1 month thereafter – Defendants respond to Document Requests #1 – #3 and the Interrogatory; and Plaintiffs respond to Defendants’ discovery requests, if any. • 1 month thereafter – Defendants respond to Plaintiffs’ Document Request #4. • 3 weeks thereafter – Parties serve deposition notices. • 2 months thereafter – Depositions completed. • 2 weeks thereafter – Parties serve requests for admission. • 3 weeks thereafter – Parties respond to requests for admission. • 4 weeks thereafter – Plaintiffs serve their motion for preliminary injunction on Defendants. • 4 weeks thereafter – Defendants serve their response to the preliminary injunction motion on Plaintiffs.
28

• 3 weeks thereafter – Plaintiffs serve their reply regarding the preliminary injunction motion on Defendants. Parties file their preliminary injunction submissions with the Court.

Dated: November 22, 2013 Brooklyn, New York

SO ORDERED:
/s Pamela K. Chen PAMELA K. CHEN United States District Judge

29

 
 Case 1:13-cv-03448-PKC-JO Document 123 Filed 02/02/17 Page 1 of 6 PageID #: 2541

The Honorable Pamela K. Chen United States District Judge Courtroom 4F 225 Cadman Plaza East Brooklyn New York 11201
I~ rE ~IE ~\'UlE[O) FEB -2 2017 ]
PRO SE OFFICE
Via ECF

Hicham Azkour · · · 93 Pitt Street, 3B New York New York 10002
(917) 859-6550 hicham. azkour@icloud.com
February 2, 2017

Re: RAZA, ET AL. V. CITY OF NEW YORK, ET AL., No. 13CV-3448 (PKC)(JMA)

Dear Judge Ch en:

Pursua nt to Rule 24 of t h e Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, I respectfully request that the Court consider my instant intervention in the above-referenced matter.

To be granted intervention as of right or by permission, "an applicant must (1) timely file an application, (2) show an interest in the action, (3) demonstrate that the interest may be impaired by the disposition of the action, and (4) show that the interest is not protected adequately by the parties to the action." S ee Floyd v. City of New York, 770 F.3d 1051, 1057 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal citations omitted). As set forth below, this four-factor test is met.

The docket sheet reflects that the Court has not yet approved any settlement in the instant matter. Nor has it scheduled any trial. Therefore, my request to intervene is timely.

As shown by the December 1, 2016 letter, attached h ereto, the New York City Police Department ("NYPD") denies that two detectives of its Intelligence Division engaged, on or about

Case 1:13-cv-03448-PKC-JO Document 123 Filed 02/02/17 Page 2 of 6 PageID #: 2542
December 15, 2015, in acts prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 913, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b), 18 U.S.C. § 241, 18 U.S.C. § 242, and 42 U.S.C. § 3631. Said detectives, without identifying themselves, without a search or arrest warrant, without being invited, without having any probable cause or arguable probable cause that I committed or was about to commit a crime, without having any reasonable suspicion that I was engaging in some type of criminal activity, stormed into my home and began interrogating me.
Using tactics of intimidation and coercion 1 , they demanded that I "cooperate with them" and answer their questions about my alleged religious and political activities. They also demanded that I address their inquiries about my alleged involvement in acts of terrorism.
Without my permission, they searched my home, took pictures of my papers and belongings with their smartphones' cameras, and threatened to arrest me if I interfere with their investigation.
When I asked them to leave they flashed their guns and stated that they were federal agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
I never allowed those two detectives into my home. A 911 call made during their intrusion corroborates my claim. Moreover, there was no evidence that I had ever been involved in any criminal or terrorist activity. Clearly, their unlawful acts fall within the NYPD's policy or practice that violates the Handschu Guidelines2• Uncontestably, these are the very guidelines that prohibit the NYPD from conducting surveillance and investigations of individuals and organizations associated with the Muslim religion solely on the basis of religion, and without a factual predicate.
1 See, e.g., b.ttpf?_:f/www=nytim~s.com/20Jj/05/11/nYr_e_giQn/new-yor~-police: recruit-muslims-to-be-informers.html
2 See Handschu v. Special Services Div., 273 F. Supp. 2d 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
2

Case 1:13-cv-03448-PKC-JO Document 123 Filed 02/02/17 Page 3 of 6 PageID #: 2543
Had these detectives been lawfully assigned, in accordance with the Handschu Guidelines, to investigate some crime or, as they have been falsely claiming, a terrorist activity, they would have revealed their identities to me and to other witnesses. The following recorded testimony proves otherwise:
https://soundcloud.com/user118813203/conversation-with-kimpenater-brittany-nicholson/s- u w8BQ
Considering the facts herein articulated, it is clear that, as an individual of Muslim confession, who has been subjected to prohibited practices consisting of illegal surveillance, I have an immediate interest in the instant matter. My rights will be impaired if the Court denies my intervention.
As stated by the December 1, 2016 letter, hereto attached, the New York City Police Department denies any wrongdoing. Yet, it maintains that the detectives' search was legitimate on the ground that they had received an anonymous tip through the NYC SAFE Terrorism Hotline.
Even if one wanted to assume, arguendo, that the detectives' presence was caused by some anonymous tip, which is not true3, the letter's determination is not persuasive. Any reasonable officer would readily acknowledge that whenever an anonymous tip first alerts a law enforcement agency to possible wrongdoing, the question to be answered is whether the "tip, suitably corroborated, exhibits 'sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory stop."' Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270 (2000)(quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 327 (1990)). Reasonable suspicion "requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person." J.L., 529 U.S. at 272.
3 The NYPD has the technology and the resources to trace any call and identify the caller. See, e.g., https://www.wsj.com/articles/nypd-defends-itsuse-of-surveillance-technology-1455243710
3

Case 1:13-cv-03448-PKC-JO Document 123 Filed 02/02/17 Page 4 of 6 PageID #: 2544
In my case, it is evident that the tip was not reliable in its "assertion of illegality." Therefore, it is fair to conclude that the detectives' unwarranted presence was a manifest act of surveillance predicated on my religion, rather than on any criminal or terrorist activity.
My calm interaction with those detectives proved that their statements regarding matters to which no one could have been so privy, but the landlord's employees, support the fact that the individual who made the false report had an axe to grind. Yet, despite its determination that a crime was committed against me, i.e., false report by an identifiable individual, the NYPD has been speciously using Public Officers Law § 87(2)(e) and unlawfully denying me access to records or, at least, to the identity of the individual who allegedly made the false report. See letter dated January 24, 2017.
Obviously, the denial is discriminatory. It is a pretext and is contradicted by Public Officers Law § 95(8)4• In similar cases, where an individual willfully made a false report to the authorities, the NYPD would release to the large public and to the media all records pertaining to the investigation and the identity of the alleged perpetrator:
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/muslim-woman-reportedtrump-supporter-attack-made-story-article-1.2910944
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/14/nyregion/manhattan-yasminseweid-false-hate-crime.html
Such unequal treatment definitely corroborates the finding of this Court that the NYPD's investigatory authority is
4 Public Officers Law § 95(8) provides:
Nothing in this section shall limit, restrict, abrogate or deny any right a person may otherwise have including rights granted pursuant to the state or federal constitution, law or court order.
4

Case 1:13-cv-03448-PKC-JO Document 123 Filed 02/02/17 Page 5 of 6 PageID #: 2545
discriminatory when applied to Muslims. See, e.g. Raza v. City of New York, 998 F.Supp.2d 70, 78-81 (E.D.N.Y.2013).
This being stated, it is now inevitably clear that my interest in having the NYPD investigation's records disclosed will not be adequately protected by the parties in this action. Indeed, I have contacted the plaintiffs attorneys and, at the very instant of submitting this letter, I have not yet received any response from them.
Finally, I would like to stress that my intervention will not delay the adjudication of the present matter. Any requests herein made or to be made in the future are in consonance with the plaintiffs' requests for relief. More important, I do not and will not seek any monetary relief that would necessitate allocation of this Court's judicial resources.
WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth above, I
respectfully request that the Court:
1. Permit my intervention in the present action;
2. Hold the New York City Police Department and its officers in contempt for violating this Court Order and further engaging in activity strictly prohibited by the Hundschu Guidelines;
3. Refer NYPD Detective Yuriy Posternak and NYPD Detective Luis Torres to the U.S. Attorney's Office for willfully violating 18 U.S.C. § 913, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b), 18 U.S.C. § 241, 18 U.S.C. § 242, and 42 U.S.C. § 3631.
4. Order the New York City Police Department to immediately disclose to me and to the plaintiffs' counsel all records pertaining to the December 15, 1015 incident and any investigation thereof;
5

Case 1:13-cv-03448-PKC-JO Document 123 Filed 02/02/17 Page 6 of 6 PageID #: 2546
5. Enjoin the New York City Police Department from further conducting prohibited acts of unlawful surveillance on the Muslim community;
6. Enjoin the New York City Police Department from further engaging in discriminatory and retaliatory practices against Muslims who assert rights guaranteed and protected by the laws and Constitution of the United States; and
7. Grant me any other relief that this Court may deem proper and appropriate.
Respectfully submitted, Hicham Azkour, prose
6

 
 Case 1:13-cv-03448-PKC-JO Document 128-1 Filed 03/16/17 Page 1 of 19 PageID #: 2620
Revised Handschu Guidelines, approved by Judge Charles S. Haight, Jr. on March 13, 2017, in Handschu v. Special Services Division, 71-cv-2203
(CSH) (S.D.N.Y.)

Case 1:13-cv-03448-PKC-JO Document 128-1 Filed 03/16/17 Page 2 of 19 PageID #: 2621
GUIDELINES FOR INVESTIGATIONS INVOLVING POLITICAL ACTIVITY
PREAMBLE Subsequent to the terrorist attacks on the City of New York on September 11, 2001 which resulted in the loss of thousands of lives and the total destruction of the World Trade Center complex, it became apparent that the City faces unprecedented threats to its continued safety and security. In the view of federal, state and local law enforcement agencies, the prevention of future attacks requires the development of intelligence and the investigation of potential terrorist activity before an unlawful act occurs.
As a result of a federal court order entered in 1985, the New York City Police Department was bound by guidelines, known as the Handschu Guidelines, which governed the investigation of political activity. The Handschu Guidelines (i) limited the investigation of political activity to those circumstances when there was specific information of criminal activity and (ii) established the Handschu Authority to oversee compliance. After evaluating the impact of the Handschu Guidelines on the need to investigate terrorism in a changed world, the City made an application to modify the order so as to eliminate the restrictions contained in the Handschu Guidelines and the oversight of the Handschu Authority with respect to those restrictions. The City did not seek to eliminate the Handschu Authority’s role to investigate an individual’s complaint that the NYPD had engaged in unconstitutional conduct in the investigation of political activity.
The Court granted the City’s application to modify the decree provided the City adopt the internal guidelines set forth below and distribute the guidelines to supervisory personnel who, in turn, were to make them known to those under their command. These guidelines were subsequently incorporated into an order of the Court in 288 F.Supp.2d 411, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) and are enforceable as set out in 679 F.Supp.2d 488, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). They shall remain in effect unless otherwise ordered by the Court. These guidelines are binding on all members of the service who are engaged in the investigation of political activity. It is the purpose of these guidelines to enable officers to perform their duties with greater certainty, confidence and effectiveness while at the same time protecting the guarantees of the Constitution.
I. STATEMENT OF POLICY It is the policy of the New York City Police Department that investigations involving political activity conform to the guarantees of the Constitution, including the guarantee of equal protection. It is the policy of the New York City Police Department that care be exercised in the conduct of those investigations so as to protect constitutional rights, including the right to be free from investigation in which race, religion, or ethnicity is a substantial or motivating factor. It is the policy of the New York City Police Department that matters investigated be confined to those supported by a legitimate law enforcement purpose.
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES (1) In its effort to anticipate or prevent unlawful activity, including terrorist acts, the NYPD must, at times, initiate investigations in advance of unlawful conduct. It is important that such investigations not be based solely on activities protected by the First Amendment. It is also important that investigations not intrude upon rights of expression or association in a manner that discriminates on the basis of race, religion or ethnicity, where such

Case 1:13-cv-03448-PKC-JO Document 128-1 Filed 03/16/17 Page 3 of 19 PageID #: 2622
discrimination is a substantial or motivating factor for the investigation. When, however, statements advocate unlawful activity, or indicate an apparent intent to engage in unlawful conduct, particularly acts of violence, an investigation under these guidelines may be warranted, unless it is apparent, from the circumstances or the context in which the statements are made, that there is no prospect of harm.
(2) Based upon the circumstances of a given case, investigative action may be required under exigent circumstances. Exigent circumstances are circumstances requiring action before authorization otherwise necessary under these guidelines can reasonably be obtained, in order to protect life or substantial property interests; to apprehend or identify a fleeing offender; to prevent the hiding, destruction or alteration of evidence; or to avoid other serious impairment or hindrance of an investigation.
When any investigative action, taken under exigent circumstances, would require an approval under ordinary conditions, such approval shall be obtained as soon as practicable in accordance with the provisions of these guidelines. Where a regular approval or request is required to be in writing, the approval or request following exigent circumstances shall also be in writing.
(3) Investigations shall be terminated when all logical leads have been exhausted and no legitimate law enforcement purpose justifies their continuance.
III. APPLICABILITY These guidelines apply only to investigations which involve political activity. They do not apply to, or limit, other activities of the NYPD in the investigation or detection of unlawful conduct, the preservation of the peace and public safety or other legitimate law enforcement activities which do not involve political activity.
IV. ROLE OF THE INTELLIGENCE BUREAU (1) Investigation of political activity shall be initiated by, and conducted under the supervision of the Intelligence Bureau. Nothing in this paragraph, however, is intended to prevent any member of the service from reporting his or her observations of suspicious conduct which involves political activity to his or her commanding officer or to the Intelligence Bureau.
(2) The Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence shall periodically inform and advise the Police Commissioner concerning the status of any investigations conducted pursuant to these guidelines.
V. LEVELS OF INVESTIGATION These guidelines provide for three levels of investigative activity. They are intended to provide the NYPD with the necessary flexibility to act well in advance of the commission of planned terrorist acts or other unlawful activity. However, if the available information shows at the outset that the threshold standard for a Preliminary Inquiry or Full Investigation is satisfied, then the appropriate investigative activity may be initiated immediately, without progressing through more limited investigative stages.
A. Checking of Leads

Case 1:13-cv-03448-PKC-JO Document 128-1 Filed 03/16/17 Page 4 of 19 PageID #: 2623
The lowest level of investigative activity is the “prompt and extremely limited checking out of initial leads,” which should be undertaken whenever information is received of such a nature that some follow-up as to the possibility of unlawful activity is warranted. This limited activity should be conducted with an eye toward promptly determining whether further investigation (either a Preliminary Inquiry or a Full Investigation) should be conducted.
Example: If the NYPD receives an allegation that an individual or group has advocated the commission of violence, and no other facts are available, an appropriate first step would be Checking of Leads to determine whether the individual, group, or members of the audience have the apparent ability or intent to carry out the advocated unlawful act.
B. Preliminary Inquiries (1) In cases where the NYPD receives information or an allegation not warranting a Full Investigation - because there is not yet a “reasonable indication” of unlawful activity but whose responsible handling requires some further scrutiny beyond the prompt and extremely limited checking out of initial leads, the NYPD may initiate an “inquiry” in response to the allegation or information indicating the possibility of unlawful activity. The possibility of unlawful activity to initiate a Preliminary Inquiry requires an allegation or information that is articulable and factual. However, such allegation or information need not have been verified as true or accurate. Whether it is appropriate to open a Preliminary Inquiry immediately, or instead to engage first in a limited Checking of Leads, depends on the circumstances presented.
(2) The authority to conduct inquiries short of a Full Investigation allows the NYPD to respond in a measured way to ambiguous or incomplete information, with as little intrusion as the needs of the situation permit. This is especially important in such areas as where there is no complainant involved or when an allegation or information is received from a source of unknown reliability. Such inquiries are subject to the limitations on duration under paragraph (4) below and are carried out to obtain the information necessary to make an informed judgment as to whether a Full Investigation is warranted.
Example: Officers are not required to possess information relating to an Individual’s intended unlawful use of dangerous biological agents or toxins prior to initiating investigative activity. If an individual or group has attempted to obtain such materials, or has indicated a desire to acquire them, and the reason is not apparent, investigative action, such as conducting a Checking of Leads or initiating a Preliminary Inquiry, may be appropriate to determine whether there is a legitimate purpose for the possession of the materials by the individual or group. A Preliminary Inquiry is not a required step when facts or circumstances reasonably indicating unlawful activity are already available. In such cases, a Full Investigation can be immediately opened.
(3) A Preliminary Inquiry may be authorized by the Chief of Intelligence or Executive Officer of the Intelligence Bureau, or the Commanding Officer of the Criminal Intelligence Section (“the Authorizing Officials”). The Authorizing Official must

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assure that the allegation or other information which warranted the inquiry has been recorded in writing. Upon such authorization a notification must be made for final approval by the Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence.
(4) Inquiries shall be completed within 180 days after initiation of the first investigative step. The date of the first investigative step is not necessarily the same date as the date on which the first incoming information or allegation was received. An extension of time in an inquiry for succeeding 90 day periods may be granted by the Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence. Any such request for extension shall be in writing and shall include a statement of the reasons why further investigative steps are warranted when there is no reasonable indication of unlawful activity. The action taken on any such request for extension shall also be recorded in writing.
(5) A Preliminary Inquiry shall be subject to a review every 6 months by the Chief of Intelligence, or an appropriate executive of the Intelligence Bureau designated by him, to discuss the status of the Preliminary Inquiry, including, what operational steps should be taken.
(6) A Preliminary Inquiry shall be presumptively limited to a total duration of 18 months. This presumptive period of duration may be exceeded in the sole discretion of the Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence, in consultation with the Handschu Committee, where the allegations or information continue to indicate the possibility of unlawful activity and either that some further leads should be lawfully investigated or that there is a legitimate law enforcement purpose to be pursued further. When the presumptive period of duration is exceeded all other provisions regarding a Preliminary Inquiry continue to apply.
(7) All lawful investigative techniques, including the use of undercover operations and the development of sources and informants may be used in a Preliminary Inquiry except:
(a) Mail openings; and,
(b) Eavesdropping and Video Surveillance as those terms are defined in Article 700 of the New York State Criminal Procedure Law.
(8) The following investigative techniques may be used in a Preliminary Inquiry without any prior authorization from a supervisor:
(a) Examination of NYPD indices and files;
(b) Examination of records available to the public and other public sources of information;
(c) Examination of available federal, state and local government records;
(d) Interview of complainant, previously established informants, and other sources of information;
(e) Interview of the potential subject;
(f) Interview of persons who should readily be able to corroborate or deny the truth of the allegation, except this does not include pretext interviews or interviews of a

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potential subject’s employer or coworkers unless the interviewee was the complainant; and
(g) Physical, photographic or video surveillance of any person, provided that such surveillance does not require a warrant.
The use of any other lawful investigative technique that is permitted in a Preliminary Inquiry shall meet the requirements and limitations of Part VII and, except in exigent circumstances, requires prior approval by a supervisor.
(9) Where a Preliminary Inquiry fails to disclose sufficient information to justify an investigation, the NYPD shall terminate the inquiry and make a record of the closing.
(10) All requirements regarding inquiries shall apply to reopened inquiries.
C. Full Investigation A Full Investigation may be initiated when facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that an unlawful act has been, is being, or will be committed. A Full Investigation may be conducted to prevent, solve or prosecute such unlawful activity.
(1) The standard of “reasonable indication” is substantially lower than probable cause. In determining whether there is reasonable indication of an unlawful act an investigator may take into account any facts or circumstances that a prudent investigator would consider. However, the standard does require specific facts or circumstances indicating a past, current, or future violation of law. There must be an objective, factual basis for initiating the investigation; a mere hunch is insufficient.
(2) Where an unlawful act may be committed in the future, preparation for that act can be a current violation of the conspiracy or attempt provisions of state law. The standard for opening an investigation is satisfied where there is not yet a current substantive or preparatory unlawful act, but facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that such unlawful conduct will occur in the future.
(3) Any lawful investigative technique may be used in a Full Investigation, subject to the requirements and limitations of Part VI hereof.
(4) Authorization and Renewal
a. A Full Investigation may be authorized by the Chief of Intelligence or Executive Officer of the Intelligence Bureau or the Commanding Officer of the Criminal Intelligence Section (“the Authorizing Officials”) upon a written recommendation setting forth the facts or circumstances reasonably indicating that an unlawful act has been, is being or will be committed. Upon such authorization a notification must be made for final approval by the Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence.
b. A Full Investigation may be initially authorized for a period of up to a year. An investigation may be continued upon renewed authorization for additional periods each not to exceed a year. Renewal authorization shall be obtained from the Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence. All requests for renewal authorization, and action thereon, shall be in writing.

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c. Authorizations shall be reviewed by an Authorizing Official before the expiration of the period for which the investigation and each renewal thereof is authorized.
d. A Full Investigation shall be subject to a review every 6 months by the Chief of Intelligence, or an appropriate executive of the Intelligence Bureau designated by him, to discuss the status of the Full Investigation, including, what operational steps should be taken.
e. A Full Investigation shall be presumptively limited to a total duration of 3 years. This presumptive period of duration may be exceeded in the sole discretion of the Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence, in consultation with the Handschu Committee, where facts and circumstances continue to reasonably indicate that an unlawful act has been, is being, or will be committed and either that some further leads should be lawfully investigated or that there is a legitimate law enforcement purpose to be pursued further. When the presumptive period of duration is exceeded all other provisions regarding a Full Investigation continue to apply.
(5) An investigation which has been terminated may be reopened upon a showing of the same standard and pursuant to the same procedures as required for initiation of an investigation. All requirements regarding investigations shall apply to reopened investigations.
D. Terrorism Enterprise Investigation A Terrorism Enterprise Investigation is a Full Investigation but differs from a general investigation of unlawful conduct in several important respects. As a general rule, an investigation of a completed unlawful act is normally confined to determining who committed that act and securing evidence to establish the elements of the particular offense. It is, in this respect, self-defining. A Terrorism Enterprise Investigation must determine the identity and nature of the individual, group, or organization involved, its geographic dimensions, its past acts and intended goals, including unlawful goals, and its capacity for harm, among other factors. While a standard investigation of unlawful conduct terminates with the decision to prosecute or not to prosecute, a Terrorism Enterprise Investigation does not necessarily end, even though one or more of the participants may have been prosecuted. In addition, groups and organizations exhibit a life and continuity of operation not normally found in other types of unlawful activity. As a consequence, these investigations may continue for several years. Furthermore, the focus of such investigations may be less precise than that directed against more conventional types of unlawful conduct. Unlike the usual case involving unlawful conduct, there may be no completed offense to provide a framework for the investigation. A Terrorism Enterprise Investigation often requires the fitting together of bits and pieces of information, many meaningless by themselves, to determine whether a pattern of unlawful activity exists. For this reason, such investigations are broader and less discriminate than usual, involving the interrelation of various sources and types of information. This section focuses on investigations of enterprises that seek to further political or social goals through activities that involve force or violence, or that otherwise aim to engage in terrorism or terrorism-related crimes. It authorizes investigations to determine the structure and scope of the enterprise as well as the relationship of the members.

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1. General Authority a. A Terrorism Enterprise Investigation may be initiated when facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that two or more persons are engaged in an enterprise for the purpose of:
(i) furthering political or social goals wholly or in part through activities that involve force, violence or other unlawful acts;
(ii) engaging in terrorism as defined in N.Y. Penal Law § 490.05, or
(iii) committing any offense described in N.Y. Penal Law §§ 490.10, 490.15, 490.20, 490.25, 490.30, or 490.35, or other related statutes currently in effect or subsequently enacted.
The standard of “reasonable indication” is identical to that governing Full Investigations generally. In determining whether an investigation should be conducted, the NYPD shall consider all of the circumstances including:
(i) the magnitude of the threatened harm;
(ii) the likelihood that it will occur;
(iii) the immediacy of the threat; and
(iv) any danger to privacy or free expression posed by an investigation.
In practical terms, the “reasonable indication” standard for opening a Terrorism Enterprise Investigation could be satisfied in a number of ways.
Example: Direct information about statements made in furtherance of an enterprise’s objectives which show a purpose of committing crimes described in N.Y. Penal Law §§ 490.10, 490.15, 490.20, 490.25, 490.30, 490.35 or other related statutes currently in effect or subsequently enacted, would satisfy the threshold.
Example: Activities such as attempting to obtain dangerous biological agents, toxic chemicals, or nuclear materials, or stockpiling explosives or weapons, with no discernible lawful purpose, may be sufficient to reasonably indicate that an enterprise aims to engage in terrorism.
b. While no particular factor or combination of factors is required, considerations that will generally be relevant to the determination as to whether the threshold standard for a Terrorism Enterprise Investigation is satisfied include, as noted, a group’s statements, its activities, and the nature of potential unlawful acts suggested by the statements or activities. Thus, where there are grounds for inquiry concerning a group, it may be helpful to gather information about these matters, and then to consider whether these factors, either individually or in combination, reasonably indicate that the group is pursuing terrorist activities or objectives as defined in the threshold standard. Findings that would weigh in favor of such a conclusion include, for example, the following:
(1) Threats or advocacy of violence or other covered unlawful acts. Statements are made in relation to or in furtherance of an enterprise’s political or social

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objectives that threaten or advocate the use of force or violence, or statements are made in furtherance of an enterprise that otherwise threaten or advocate unlawful conduct within the scope of N.Y. Penal Law §§ 490.10, 490.15, 490.20, 490.25, 490.30, 490.35, or other related statutes currently in effect or subsequently enacted which may concern such matters as , for example:
(i) engaging in attacks involving or threatening massive loss of life or injury, mass destruction, or endangerment of the national security;
(ii) killing or injuring public officials, or destroying public facilities, or defying lawful authority;
(iii) killing, injuring or intimidating individuals because of their status as United States nationals or persons, or because of their national origin, race, color, religion or sex; or
(iv) depriving individuals of any rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States or the State of New York.
(2) Apparent ability or intent to carry out violence or other covered activities. The enterprise manifests an apparent ability or intent to carry out violence or other activities within the scope of N.Y. Penal Law §§ 490.10, 490.15, 490.20, 490.25, 490.30, 490.35 or other related statutes currently in effect or subsequently enacted, for example:
(i) by acquiring or taking steps towards acquiring, biological agents or toxins, toxic chemicals or their precursors, radiological or nuclear materials, explosives or other destructive or dangerous material (or plans or formulas for such materials), or weapons, under circumstances where, by reason of the quantity or character of the items, the lawful purpose of the acquisition is not apparent;
(ii) by the creation, maintenance, or support of an armed paramilitary organization;
(iii) by paramilitary training; or
(iv) by other conduct demonstrating an apparent ability or intent to injure or intimidate individuals, or to interfere with the exercise of their constitutional or statutory rights.
(3) Potential Unlawful Act. The group’s statements or activities suggest potential unlawful acts that may be relevant in applying the standard for initiating a Terrorism Enterprise Investigation - such as crimes under the provisions of the N.Y. Penal Law that set forth specially defined terrorism or support of terrorism offenses, or that relate to such matters as aircraft hijacking or destruction, attacks on transportation, communications, or energy facilities or systems, biological or chemical weapons, nuclear or radiological materials, assassinations or other violence against public officials or facilities, or explosives.
c. Mere speculation that force or violence might occur during the course of an otherwise peaceable demonstration is not sufficient grounds for initiation of an

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investigation under this subpart. But where facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that an individual or group has engaged or aims to engage in conduct described in paragraph 1.a. above in a demonstration, an investigation may be initiated in conformity with the standards of that paragraph. This does not limit the collection of information about public demonstrations by individuals or groups that are under active investigation pursuant to paragraph 1.a. above or any other provisions of these guidelines.
2. Purpose The immediate purpose of a Terrorism Enterprise Investigation is to obtain information concerning the nature and structure of the enterprise as specifically delineated in paragraph (3) below, with a view to the longer range objectives of detection, prevention, and prosecution of the unlawful activities of the enterprise.
3. Scope a. A Terrorism Enterprise Investigation initiated under these guidelines may collect such information as:
(i) the identity and nature of an individual or group and its members, their associates, and other persons likely to be acting in furtherance of its unlawful objectives, provided that the information concerns such persons’ activities on behalf of or in furtherance of the suspected unlawful activity of the individual, group, or organization;
(ii) the finances of the individual, group, or organization;
(iii) the geographical dimensions of the individual, group, or organization; and
(iv) past and future activities and goals of the individual, group, or organization.
b. In obtaining the foregoing information, any lawful investigative technique may be used in accordance with the requirements of these guidelines.
4. Authorization and Renewal
a. A Terrorism Enterprise Investigation may be authorized by the Chief of Intelligence or Executive Officer of the Intelligence Bureau or the Commanding Officer of the Criminal Intelligence Section (“the Authorizing Officials”), upon a written recommendation setting forth the facts or circumstances reasonably indicating the existence of an enterprise as described in paragraph 1.a. above. Upon such authorization a notification must be made for final approval by the Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence. When exigent circumstances exist, as described in these guidelines, a Terrorism Enterprise Investigation may be commenced upon the verbal authorization of an Authorizing Official. However, in such cases, the required written recommendation must be submitted as soon as practicable.
b. A Terrorism Enterprise Investigation may be initially authorized for a period of up to a year. An investigation may be continued upon renewed authorization for additional periods each not to exceed a year. Renewal

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authorization shall be obtained from the Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence. The request for renewal and action thereon shall be in writing.
c. Authorizations shall be reviewed by an Authorizing Official before the expiration of the period for which the investigation and each renewal thereof is authorized. In some cases, the enterprise may meet the threshold standard but be temporarily inactive in the sense that it has not engaged in recent acts of violence or other unlawful activities as described in 1.a., nor is there any immediate threat of harm - yet the composition, goals and prior history of the group suggest the need for continuing law enforcement interest. The investigation may be continued in such cases with whatever scope is warranted in light of these considerations.
d. All Terrorism Enterprise Investigations shall be subject to a review every 6 months by the Chief of Intelligence, or an appropriate executive of the Intelligence Bureau designated by him, to discuss the status of the Terrorism Enterprise Investigation, including, what operational steps should be taken.
e. A Terrorism Enterprise Investigation shall be presumptively limited to a total duration of 5 years, except where the subject of a Terrorism Enterprise Investigation is a designated foreign terrorist organization. This presumptive period of duration may be exceeded in the sole discretion of the Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence, in consultation with the Handschu Committee, where facts and circumstances continue to reasonably indicate that two or more persons are engaged in an enterprise for the purposes stated above and either that some further leads should be lawfully investigated or that there is a legitimate law enforcement purpose to be pursued further. When the presumptive period of duration is exceeded all other provisions regarding a Terrorism Enterprise Investigation continue to apply.
f. An investigation which has been terminated may be reopened upon a showing of the same standard and pursuant to the same procedures as required for initiation of an investigation.
VI. HANDSCHU COMMITTEE
(1) There is hereby established a committee (the “Handschu Committee”) whose members are expected and authorized to attend and participate in monthly meetings at which investigations are presented for opening, extension or closure by the Deputy Commissioner for Intelligence. For each monthly meeting, all attending members will be provided with the investigative statement pertaining to each proposed opening, extension or closing and any corresponding requests to use or extend the use of undercover officers or confidential informants. At the monthly meeting, any member of the Handschu Committee may ask questions and offer opinions regarding the opening, extension or closure of an investigation presented.
(2) Any member of the Handschu Committee may further inquire into the status and conduct of any investigation presented at the meeting, including the use of undercover operations pursuant to section VII herein, provided however that information pertaining to the identity of participants

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in undercover operations, including confidential informants, shall not be disclosed. A member of the Intelligence Bureau with detailed knowledge of operational steps taken in each investigation presented shall be present at the meeting to help address any questions that arise.
(3) Members of the Handschu Committee from the NYPD will include the Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence, the Chief of Intelligence, the Executive Officer of the Intelligence Bureau, the Commanding Officer of IOAS (Intelligence Operations and Analysis Section), the Executive Officer of IOAS, the Commanding Officer (or the Executive Officer) of the Criminal Intelligence Section, the Assistant Commissioner for Intelligence Analysis, the Deputy Commissioner of Legal Matters, Assistant Deputy Commissioner of Legal Matters, Special Counsel for Intelligence Affairs, and/or their successors or persons who occupy similar positions of authority or expertise.
(4) The Special Counsel for Intelligence Affairs shall lead a quarterly discussion for the Handschu Committee related to the NYPD’s compliance during that period in (i) obtaining timely approval in extending or closing investigations, (ii) obtaining timely approval of human source authorizations, and (iii) conducting reviews of Preliminary Inquiries, Full Investigations, and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations every 6 months, as provided in sections V(B)(5), V(C)(4)(d) and V(D)(4)(d) hereof. As part of this quarterly discussion, any member of the Handschu Committee may raise concerns regarding any other aspect of compliance with the Handschu Guidelines. The substance of these quarterly discussions shall be recorded in the minutes of the Handschu Committee meeting.
(5) There shall also be a Civilian Representative on the Handschu Committee who shall, unless unable to do so for good cause, attend and participate in all of the monthly meetings for opening, extension, or closure of investigations and in all of the quarterly discussions led by the Special Counsel for Intelligence Affairs on the same terms and conditions as set forth in paragraphs (1), (2) and (4) above. The Civilian Representative shall be a lawyer who has never previously been an employee of the NYPD. The Civilian Representative shall be appointed by the Mayor upon consultation with the Police Commissioner. The Civilian Representative may be replaced by the Mayor for good cause, with 14 days’ advance notice to Class Counsel prior to such replacement. In the event that the Civilian Representative resigns, the Mayor in consultation with the Police Commissioner will appoint a replacement. The position of Civilian Representative will exist for a minimum of five years from the appointment of the first person to fill that role. After that initial five year period, the position of Civilian Representative will continue unless the Mayor applies to the Court for an amendment to the Revised Handschu Guidelines abolishing the position, upon 30 days’ advance notice to Class Counsel prior to such application. The amendment to the Revised Handschu Guidelines abolishing the position shall be granted by the Court if the Court finds there have not been systematic and repeated violations of the Guidelines to a degree sufficient to show an NYPD policy to act in such a fashion for a period of three years immediately prior to the application, as shown in the reports submitted to the Court by the Civilian Representative.
(a) The Civilian Representative shall submit to a background investigation conducted by the Department of Investigation.

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(b) The NYPD will facilitate an application for a federal security clearance for the Civilian Representative.
(c) The Civilian Representative shall execute a Non-Disclosure Agreement with the NYPD setting forth his or her undertaking that the proceedings of the Handschu Committee, as well as all materials reviewed by the Civilian Representative for or at the meetings of the Committee, shall be kept confidential and shall not be disclosed to any person except as set forth therein.
(d) The Civilian Representative shall be required to familiarize himself or herself with the Revised Handschu Guidelines governing the investigation of political activity by the NYPD.
(e) If the Civilian Representative concludes that an investigation is being opened, extended, or conducted in violation of the Revised Handschu Guidelines, or that the NYPD is otherwise violating the Revised Handschu Guidelines, the Civilian Representative shall record his or her concerns regarding the purported violation and/or his or her objection to the investigation and the grounds for the objection in the minutes of the Handschu Committee meeting.
(f) If the Civilian Representative concludes that an investigation is being opened, extended, or conducted in violation of the Revised Handschu Guidelines, the Civilian Representative shall bring such investigation to the attention of the Police Commissioner. The Civilian Representative shall be provided with means to present his or her conclusion to the Police Commissioner directly (hereafter, “a VI(5)(f) communication”). The Police Commissioner shall inquire into the investigation and report the findings of the inquiry to the Civilian Representative within seven (7) days after receipt of the VI(5)(f) communication.
(g) If the Civilian Representative has concerns about the NYPD’s compliance with the Revised Handschu Guidelines, and the Police Commissioner has not provided a timely response to the Civilian Representative’s VI(5)(f) communication regarding such concerns, or the Civilian Representative is not satisfied with the Police Commissioner’s response, the Civilian Representative may communicate those concerns to the Judge assigned to the Handschu case in the Southern District of New York at any time. In the event the Civilian Representative decides to communicate such concerns to the Court, a copy of the communication shall first be served confidentially upon the Police Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence, and the Deputy Commissioner of Legal Matters seven (7) days prior to its submission to the Court. The Civilian Representative shall retain final authority over and responsibility for the content of the communication. Submission to the Court shall be effectuated in compliance with Section VI(5)(k) below.
(h) After complying with provision VI(5)(f) hereof, if the Civilian Representative concludes at any time that the NYPD is systematically and repeatedly violating the Revised Handschu Guidelines to a degree sufficient to show a NYPD policy to act in

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such a fashion, the Civilian Representative shall report the alleged systematic violation to the Judge assigned to the Handschu case in the Southern District of New York. In the event the Civilian Representative decides to communicate such concerns to the Court, a copy of the communication shall first be served confidentially upon the Police Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence, and the Deputy Commissioner of Legal Matters seven (7) days prior to its submission to the Court, provided that the Civilian Representative shall retain final authority over and responsibility for the content of the communication. Submission to the Court shall be effectuated in compliance with Section VI(5)(k) below.
(i) In addition, the Civilian Representative shall file an annual report with the Court related to his or her actions and observations as a member of the Handschu Committee. The annual report will (A) indicate whether the Civilian Representative has objected to any investigations over that period and the basis for that objection; (B) state whether the NYPD has (i) substantially obtained timely approval for extending and closing investigations, (ii) substantially obtained timely approval for the use of human sources, and (iii) substantially fulfilled its obligation to review Preliminary Inquiries, Full Investigations, and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations every 6 months, as provided in sections V(B)(5), V(C)(4)(d) and V(D)(4)(d) hereof; and (C) address any communication during the annual period by the Civilian Representative to the Court under VI(5)(g) or (h). Prior to submission of the annual report to the Court, the Civilian Representative shall first serve copies confidentially to the Police Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence, and Deputy Commissioner of Legal Matters 21 days prior to submission to the Court, provided that the Civilian Representative shall retain final authority over and responsibility for the content of the report.
(j) The report and communications permitted under VI(5)(g), (h) and (i) will not include the number of investigations reviewed over the term, information deemed classified by the federal government, information obtained from other law enforcement or government agencies, information that reveals the identity of an individual or organization, information subject to the law enforcement privilege or other applicable privileges, or information that is otherwise protected by state or federal law.
(k) At the time that the Civilian Representative submits a communication or report to the Court pursuant to VI(5)(g), (h) or (i), notice of the Court’s receipt of a communication or report from the Civilian Representative shall be entered on the Court’s docket. The content of the communication or report to the Court shall, in the first instance, be maintained by the Court confidentially and under seal. The NYPD shall have 21 days from the filing of the communication or report to notify the Court (i) whether it contains privileged information or information that is prohibited from disclosure as set forth in VI(5)(j); (ii) if it believes such information can be protected through redaction of the document; or (iii) if it asserts the need to maintain the entire document confidentially and under seal. The Court shall adjudicate the propriety and scope of any such invocation. If the NYPD does not assert any such concerns about the information contained in the document, or if the Court determines that the document should be made public without redactions despite such objections by the NYPD, a copy of the report or communication

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shall be filed in the public docket and served on class counsel. If the Court determines that redactions can cure the need for the sealing of the entire document, a copy of the report or communication with the redactions shall be filed in the public docket and served on Class Counsel while the original submission by the Civilian Representative shall be maintained under seal. If the Court determines that the communication or report contains privileged information or information that is prohibited from disclosure as set forth in VI(5)(j) and that redaction cannot cure the need for the sealing of the entire document, the communication or report shall be maintained under seal and there shall be an entry on the Court’s docket that the communication or report is being maintained under seal.
(6) Nothing herein shall effect, limit, or diminish the authorization and approval provisions for investigations, which grant exclusive approval authority to the Authorizing Officials or the Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence.
VII. INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES
(1) When conducting investigations under these guidelines, the NYPD may use any lawful investigative technique permitted by these guidelines. The choice of investigative techniques is a matter of judgment, which should take account of:
(i) the objectives of the investigation and available investigative resources;
(ii) the intrusiveness of a technique, considering such factors as the effect on the privacy of individuals and potential damage to reputation;
(iii) the potential effect on the political or religious activity of individuals, groups or organizations and the potential effect on persons who, although not a target of the investigation are affected by or subject to the technique;
(iv) the seriousness of the unlawful act; and
(v) the strength of the information indicating its existence or future commission of the unlawful act.
(2) Where the conduct of an investigation presents a choice between the use of more or less intrusive methods, the NYPD should consider whether the information could be obtained in a timely and effective way by the less intrusive means. The NYPD should not hesitate to use any lawful techniques consistent with these guidelines in an investigation, even if intrusive, where the intrusiveness is warranted in light of the seriousness of the crime or the strength of the information indicating its existence or future commission. This point is to be particularly observed in investigations relating to terrorist activities.
(3) Authorized methods in investigations include, among others, use of confidential informants, undercover activities and operations, eavesdropping and video surveillance (as defined in Article 700 of the NY Criminal Procedure Law), pen registers and trap and trace devices, consensual electronic monitoring, and searches and seizures.
a. Undercover Operations

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(i) Undercover operations, including confidential informants, may be used when taking into account all the circumstances of the investigation, including the need for the information and the seriousness of the threat, it has been determined that the information sought in the investigation could not be reasonably obtained in a timely and effective way by a less intrusive means. The use of undercovers and confidential informants must be authorized by the Deputy Commissioner of the Intelligence Bureau prior to commencement of the undercover operation. The request to use undercovers or confidential informants and action taken on the request must be in writing and must include a description of the facts on which the investigation is based and the role of the undercover.
(ii) The use of an undercover or confidential informant will be approved for a period of 90 days and may be extended for additional periods of 90 days with the approval of the Deputy Commissioner of the Intelligence Bureau. Such extensions may be approved for as long as the investigation continues when it has been determined that the information sought in the investigation could not reasonably be obtained in a timely and effective manner by less intrusive means. The request to extend the use of undercovers and action taken on the request must be in writing and must include the reason for the extension.
(iii) Undercovers are strictly prohibited from engaging in any conduct the sole purpose of which is to disrupt the lawful exercise of political activity, from instigating unlawful acts or engaging in unlawful or unauthorized investigative activities.
b. Eavesdropping and Video Surveillance (as defined in Article 700 of the NY Criminal Procedure Law), Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices, and Consensual Electronic Monitoring
(i) All requirements for the use of such methods under the Constitution, applicable statutes, and NYPD regulations or policies must be observed.
(4) Whenever an individual is known to be represented by counsel in a particular matter, the NYPD shall follow applicable law and Department procedure concerning contact with represented individuals in the absence of prior notice to their counsel.
VIII. DISSEMINATION AND MAINTENANCE OF INFORMATION A. Dissemination
The NYPD may disseminate information obtained during the Checking of Leads, Preliminary Inquiries and investigations conducted pursuant to these guidelines to federal, state or local law enforcement agencies, or local criminal justice agencies when such information:
(i) falls within the investigative or protective jurisdiction or litigative responsibility of the agency;
(ii) may assist in preventing an unlawful act or the use of violence or any other conduct dangerous to human life;

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(iii) is required to be disseminated by interagency agreement, statute, or other law.
B. Maintenance
All documentation required under these Guidelines shall be maintained by the Intelligence Bureau in accordance with general police department practice and applicable municipal record retention and destruction rules, regulations and procedures. Under these rules and practices documents are retained for no less than five years.
IX. COUNTERTERRORISM ACTIVITIES AND OTHER AUTHORIZATIONS In order to carry out its mission of preventing the commission of terrorist acts in or affecting the City of New York and the United States and its people, the NYPD must proactively draw on available sources of information to identify terrorist threats and activities. It cannot be content to wait for leads to come in through the actions of others, but rather must be vigilant in detecting terrorist activities to the full extent permitted by law, with an eye towards early intervention and prevention of acts of terrorism before they occur. This Part accordingly identifies a number of authorized activities which further this end, and which can be carried out even in the absence of a checking of leads, Preliminary Inquiry, or Full Investigation as described in these guidelines. The authorizations include both activities that are specifically focused on terrorism and activities that are useful for law enforcement purposes in both terrorism and non-terrorism contexts. The authorized law enforcement activities of the NYPD include carrying out and retaining information resulting from the following activities.
A. COUNTERTERRORISM ACTIVITIES 1. Information Systems The NYPD is authorized to operate and participate in identification, tracking, and information systems for the purpose of identifying and locating potential terrorists and supporters of terrorist activity, assessing and responding to terrorist risks and threats, or otherwise detecting, prosecuting, or preventing terrorist activities. Systems within the scope of this paragraph may draw on and retain pertinent information from any source permitted by law, including information derived from past or ongoing investigative activities; other information collected or provided by governmental entities, such as foreign intelligence information and lookout list information; publicly available information, whether obtained directly or through services or resources (whether nonprofit or commercial) that compile or analyze such information; and information voluntarily provided by private entities. Any such system operated by the NYPD shall be reviewed periodically for compliance with all applicable statutory provisions and Department regulations and policies.
2. Visiting Public Places and Events For the purpose of detecting or preventing terrorist activities, the NYPD is authorized to visit any place and attend any event that is open to the public, on the same terms and conditions as members of the public generally. No information obtained from such visits shall be retained unless it relates to potential unlawful or terrorist activity.
B. OTHER AUTHORIZATIONS

Case 1:13-cv-03448-PKC-JO Document 128-1 Filed 03/16/17 Page 18 of 19 PageID #: 2637
1. General Topical Research The NYPD is authorized to carry out general topical research, including conducting online searches and accessing online sites and forums as part of such research on the same terms and conditions as members of the public generally. “General topical research” under this paragraph means research concerning subject areas that are relevant for the purpose of facilitating or supporting the discharge of investigative responsibilities. It does not include online searches for information by individuals’ names or other individual identifiers, except where such searches are incidental to topical research, such as searching to locate writings on a topic by searching under the names of authors who write on the topic, or searching by the name of a party to a case in conducting legal research.
2. Use of Online Resources Generally For the purpose of developing intelligence information to detect or prevent terrorism or other unlawful activities, the NYPD is authorized to conduct online search activity and to access online sites and forums on the same terms and conditions as members of the public generally.
3. Reports and Assessments The NYPD is authorized to prepare general reports and assessments concerning terrorism or other unlawful activities for purposes of strategic or operational planning or in support of other legitimate law enforcement activities.
X. PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND OTHER LIMITATIONS A. General Limitations The law enforcement activities authorized by this Part do not include maintaining files on individuals solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment or the lawful exercise of any other rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Rather, all such law enforcement activities must have a valid law enforcement purpose and must be carried out in conformity with all applicable statutes and Department regulations and policies.
B. Construction of Part This Part does not limit any activities authorized by or carried out under other Parts of these guidelines. The specification of authorized law enforcement activities under this Part is not exhaustive, and does not limit other authorized law enforcement activities of the NYPD.
XI. RESERVATION Nothing in these guidelines shall limit the general reviews or audits of papers, files, contracts, or other records in the possession of the NYPD or City of New York, or the performance of similar services at the specific request of another government agency. Such reviews, audits, or similar services must be for the purpose of detecting or preventing violations of law which are within the investigative responsibility of the NYPD.
Nothing in these guidelines is intended to limit the NYPD's responsibilities to investigate certain applicants and employees, or to pursue efforts to satisfy any other of its legal rights, privileges,

Case 1:13-cv-03448-PKC-JO Document 128-1 Filed 03/16/17 Page 19 of 19 PageID #: 2638
or obligations. These guidelines are set forth solely for the purpose of internal NYPD guidance. They are not intended to, do not, and may not be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural; enforceable at law by any party in any matter, civil or criminal, nor do they place any limitation on otherwise lawful investigative and litigative prerogatives of the NYPD or City of New York.

 
 Case: 1:13-cv-3448 As of: 09/20/2018 12:21 PM EDT 1 of 25
U.S. District Court Eastern District of New York (Brooklyn) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:13−cv−03448−PKC−JO

CLOSED

Raza et al v. City of New York et al Assigned to: Judge Pamela K. Chen Referred to: Magistrate Judge James Orenstein Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff
Hamid Raza

Date Filed: 06/18/2013 Date Terminated: 03/20/2017 Jury Demand: Defendant Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Arthur Nelson Eisenberg Arthur N. Eisenberg 125 Broad Street 19th Floor New York, NY 10004 212−607−3300 Fax: 212−607−3318 Email: aeisenberg@nyclu.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ashley Marie Gorski American Civil Liberties Union 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, NY 10004 212−284−7305 Fax: 212−549−2654 Email: agorski@aclu.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Beth Haroules New York Civil Liberties Union Foundation 125 Broad Street, 17th Floor New York, NY 10004 212−344−3005 Fax: (212) 344−3005 Email: bharoules@nyclu.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Scannell Morrison & Foerster LLP 2000 Pennsylvania Avenue, Nw Suite 6000 Washington, DC 20006 202−887−1500 Fax: 202−887−0763 Email: dscannell@mofo.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Diala Shamas CUNY School of Law 2 Court Square Long Island City Ny, NY 11101 718−340−4533 Fax: 718−340−4455

Case: 1:13-cv-3448 As of: 09/20/2018 12:21 PM EDT 2 of 25
Email: diala.shamas@gmail.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Hector Gallegos Morrison & Foerster LLP 2000 Pennsylvania Avenue, Nw Suite 6000 Washington, DC 20006 202−887−1500 Fax: 202−887−0763 Email: hgallegos@mofo.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Hina Shamsi American Civil Liberties Union 125 Broad Street 19th Floor New York, NY 10004 212−519−7886 Fax: 212−519−2583 Email: hshamsi@aclu.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua Hartman Morrison & Foerster LLP 2000 Pennsylvania Avenue, Nw Suite 6000 Washington, DC 20006 202−887−1500 Fax: 202−887−0763 Email: jhartman@mofo.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kyle W.K. Mooney Morrison & Foerster LLP 250 W 55th Street New York, NY 10019 212−468−8000 Fax: 212−468−7900 Email: kmooney@mofo.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mariko Hirose New York Civil Liberties Union 125 Broad Street, 19th Floor New York, NY 10004 (212) 607−3322 Fax: (212) 607−3318 Email: mhirose@nyclu.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nusrat Jahan Choudhury American Civil Liberties Union 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, NY 10004 212−519−7876 Fax: 212−549−2680

Case: 1:13-cv-3448 As of: 09/20/2018 12:21 PM EDT 3 of 25

Email: nchoudhury@aclu.org TERMINATED: 01/14/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patrick Christopher Toomey American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, NY 10004 212−519−7816 Email: ptoomey@lrwlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ramzi Kassem Main Street Legal Services, Inc. Cuny School Of Law 2 Court Square Long Island City, NY 11101 718−340−4558 Fax: 718−340−4478 Email: ramzi.kassem@law.cuny.edu LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Adam James Hunt Morrison & Foerster LLP 250 West 55th Street New York, NY 10019 212−468−8000 Fax: 212−468−7900 Email: adamhunt@mofo.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Chandra Shekhara Bhatnagar American Civil Liberties Union 125 Broad Street New York, NY 10004 212−519−7840 Fax: 212−549−2654 Email: cbhatnagar@aclu.org TERMINATED: 02/25/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kiersten Ann Fletcher Morrison Foerster 250 W 55th Street New York, NY 10019 212−468−8000 Fax: 212−468−7900 Email: kfletcher@mofo.com TERMINATED: 12/16/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Masjid Al−Ansar

represented by Arthur Nelson Eisenberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ashley Marie Gorski (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 1:13-cv-3448 As of: 09/20/2018 12:21 PM EDT 4 of 25
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Beth Haroules (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Scannell (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Diala Shamas (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Hector Gallegos (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Hina Shamsi (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua Hartman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kyle W.K. Mooney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mariko Hirose (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nusrat Jahan Choudhury (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/14/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patrick Christopher Toomey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ramzi Kassem (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam James Hunt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-3448 As of: 09/20/2018 12:21 PM EDT 5 of 25

Chandra Shekhara Bhatnagar (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/25/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kiersten Ann Fletcher (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/16/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Asad Dandia

represented by Arthur Nelson Eisenberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ashley Marie Gorski (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Beth Haroules (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David Scannell (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Diala Shamas (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Hector Gallegos (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Hina Shamsi (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joshua Hartman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kyle W.K. Mooney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mariko Hirose (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-3448 As of: 09/20/2018 12:21 PM EDT 6 of 25

Nusrat Jahan Choudhury (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/14/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patrick Christopher Toomey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ramzi Kassem (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Adam James Hunt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Chandra Shekhara Bhatnagar (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/25/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kiersten Ann Fletcher (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/16/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Muslims Giving Back

represented by Arthur Nelson Eisenberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ashley Marie Gorski (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Beth Haroules (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David Scannell (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Diala Shamas (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Hector Gallegos (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Hina Shamsi

Case: 1:13-cv-3448 As of: 09/20/2018 12:21 PM EDT 7 of 25

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joshua Hartman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kyle W.K. Mooney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mariko Hirose (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nusrat Jahan Choudhury (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/14/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patrick Christopher Toomey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ramzi Kassem (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Adam James Hunt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Chandra Shekhara Bhatnagar (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/25/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kiersten Ann Fletcher (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/16/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Masjid At−Taqwa

represented by Arthur Nelson Eisenberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ashley Marie Gorski (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Beth Haroules (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 1:13-cv-3448 As of: 09/20/2018 12:21 PM EDT 8 of 25
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Scannell (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Diala Shamas (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Hector Gallegos (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Hina Shamsi (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua Hartman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kyle W.K. Mooney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mariko Hirose (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nusrat Jahan Choudhury (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/14/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patrick Christopher Toomey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ramzi Kassem (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam James Hunt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Chandra Shekhara Bhatnagar (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/25/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-3448 As of: 09/20/2018 12:21 PM EDT 9 of 25

Kiersten Ann Fletcher (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/16/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Mohammad Elshinawy

represented by Arthur Nelson Eisenberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ashley Marie Gorski (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Beth Haroules (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David Scannell (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Diala Shamas (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Hector Gallegos (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Hina Shamsi (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joshua Hartman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kyle W.K. Mooney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mariko Hirose (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nusrat Jahan Choudhury (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/14/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-3448 As of: 09/20/2018 12:21 PM EDT 10 of 25

Patrick Christopher Toomey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ramzi Kassem (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam James Hunt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Chandra Shekhara Bhatnagar (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/25/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kiersten Ann Fletcher (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/16/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant City of New York

represented by Peter G. Farrell NYC Office of Corporation Counsel Room 3−148 New York, NY 10007 212−356−3532 Fax: 212−788−9776 Email: pfarrell@law.nyc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alexis L. Leist New York City Law Department Special Federal Litigation Division 100 Church Street New York, NY 10007 212−356−2410 Fax: 212−788−9776 Email: aleist@law.nyc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Anthony M. DiSenso New York City Law Department 100 Church Street New York, NY 10007 212−356−2640 Fax: 212−788−9776 Email: adisenso@law.nyc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cheryl Leah Shammas NYC LAW DEPT 100 Church Street New York, NY 10007 212−356−2406 Fax: 212−788−9776 Email: cshammas@law.nyc.gov

Case: 1:13-cv-3448 As of: 09/20/2018 12:21 PM EDT 11 of 25

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Odile Maun Farrell New York City Law Department 100 Church Street Room 3−154 New York, NY 10007 212−356−2384 Fax: (212)788−9776 Email: ofarrell@law.nyc.gov TERMINATED: 07/17/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Michael R. Bloomberg in his official capacity as Mayor of the City of New York

represented by Peter G. Farrell (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alexis L. Leist (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Anthony M. DiSenso (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cheryl Leah Shammas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Odile Maun Farrell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/17/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Raymond W. Kelly in his official capacity as Police Commissioner for the City of New York

represented by Peter G. Farrell (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Alexis L. Leist (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Anthony M. DiSenso (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cheryl Leah Shammas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Odile Maun Farrell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/17/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
David Cohen in his official capacity as Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence for the City of New York

represented by Peter G. Farrell (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-3448 As of: 09/20/2018 12:21 PM EDT 12 of 25

Alexis L. Leist (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Anthony M. DiSenso (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cheryl Leah Shammas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Odile Maun Farrell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/17/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 06/18/2013
06/18/2013 06/18/2013 06/19/2013
06/20/2013 06/20/2013 06/20/2013 06/21/2013 06/21/2013 07/05/2013

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against Michael R. Bloomberg, City of New York, David Cohen, Raymond W. Kelly Disclosure Statement on Civil Cover Sheet completed −Yes,, filed by Muslims Giving Back, Masjid At−Taqwa, Masjid Al−Ansar, Mohammad Elshinawy, Asad Dandia, Hamid Raza. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet) (Davis, Kimberly) (Entered: 06/19/2013)
FILING FEE: $ 400, receipt number 4653060406 (Davis, Kimberly) (Entered: 06/19/2013)
2 Summons Issued as to Michael R. Bloomberg, City of New York, David Cohen, Raymond W. Kelly. (Davis, Kimberly) (Entered: 06/19/2013)
3 In accordance with Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 73.1, the parties are notified that if all parties consent a United States magistrate judge of this court is available to conduct all proceedings in this civil action including a (jury or nonjury) trial and to order the entry of a final judgment. Attached to the Notice is a blank copy of the consent form that should be filled out, signed and filed electronically only if all parties wish to consent. The form may also be accessed at the following link:http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/FormsAndFees/Forms/AO085.pdf. You may withhold your consent without adverse substantive consequences. Do NOT return or file the consent unless all parties have signed the consent. (Davis, Kimberly) (Entered: 06/19/2013)
Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack added. Magistrate Judge Vera M. Scanlon no longer assigned to case. (Gapinski, Michele) (Entered: 06/20/2013)
4 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Muslims Giving Back, Masjid At−Taqwa, Masjid Al−Ansar, Mohammad Elshinawy, Asad Dandia, Hamid Raza. Raymond W. Kelly served on 6/20/2013, answer due 7/11/2013. (Toomey, Patrick) (Entered: 06/20/2013)
5 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Muslims Giving Back, Masjid At−Taqwa, Masjid Al−Ansar, Mohammad Elshinawy, Asad Dandia, Hamid Raza. David Cohen served on 6/20/2013, answer due 7/11/2013. (Toomey, Patrick) (Entered: 06/20/2013)
6 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Muslims Giving Back, Masjid At−Taqwa, Masjid Al−Ansar, Mohammad Elshinawy, Asad Dandia, Hamid Raza. Michael R. Bloomberg served on 6/20/2013, answer due 7/11/2013. (Toomey, Patrick) (Entered: 06/21/2013)
7 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Muslims Giving Back, Masjid At−Taqwa, Masjid Al−Ansar, Mohammad Elshinawy, Asad Dandia, Hamid Raza. City of New York served on 6/20/2013, answer due 7/11/2013. (Toomey, Patrick) (Entered: 06/21/2013)
8 Letter MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer or Otherwise Respond by Michael R. Bloomberg, City of New York, David Cohen. (Farrell, Peter) (Entered: 07/05/2013)

Case: 1:13-cv-3448 As of: 09/20/2018 12:21 PM EDT 13 of 25

07/05/2013 07/08/2013
09/09/2013 09/10/2013 09/12/2013 09/13/2013 09/16/2013
09/17/2013
09/18/2013 09/18/2013
09/18/2013 09/19/2013 09/26/2013 10/08/2013

9 RESPONSE in Opposition re 8 Letter MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer or Otherwise Respond filed by All Plaintiffs. (Shamsi, Hina) (Entered: 07/05/2013)
ORDER granting 8 Motion for Extension of Time to Answer. The time for defendants to answer or otherwise respond to the complaint is hereby extended to September 9, 2013. An Initial Conference will be held in Courtroom 6E, 225 Cadman Plaza East, before Magistrate Judge Azrack on September 12, 2013 at 1:30 PM. All counsel must be present and are advised to review Judge Azrack's revised Individual Rules, which are available on the District Court's web site, prior to the conference. Any request for an adjournment must be made in the form of a letter motion filed on ECF at least forty−eight (48) hours before the scheduled conference and must indicate which parties consent to the adjournment.Ordered by Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack on 7/8/2013. (Terranova, Robert) (Entered: 07/08/2013)
10 ANSWER to Complaint by All Defendants. (Leist, Alexis) (Entered: 09/09/2013)
11 Letter in Anticipation of Initial Court Conference Set for 9−12−2013 by Michael R. Bloomberg, City of New York, David Cohen, Raymond W. Kelly (Farrell, Peter) (Entered: 09/10/2013)
13 Letter in Anticipation of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Requesting Pre−Motion Conference by Masjid Al−Ansar, Masjid At−Taqwa, Asad Dandia, Mohammad Elshinawy, Muslims Giving Back, Hamid Raza (Shamsi, Hina) (Entered: 09/12/2013)
14 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack. Initial Conference Hearing held on 9/12/2013. Decision reserved on discovery bifurcation. Counsel to confer regarding confidentiality stipulation. (Tape #1:40−1:55.) (Terranova, Robert) (Entered: 09/13/2013)
15 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on September 12, 2013, before Judge Azrack. Court Transcriber: Fiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc., Telephone number (203)929−9992. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 10/7/2013. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/17/2013. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/16/2013. (Rocco, Christine) (Entered: 09/16/2013)
SCHEDULING ORDER re 13 Letter filed by Asad Dandia, Muslims Giving Back, Mohammad Elshinawy, Hamid Raza, Masjid Al−Ansar, Masjid At−Taqwa: Pre Motion Conference set for 10/1/2013 at 2:00 PM in Courtroom 4F North before Judge Pamela K. Chen. Defendants shall respond to Plaintiffs' letter request for a pre−motion conference (Dkt. 13) on or before September 19, 2013. Ordered by Judge Pamela K. Chen on 9/17/2013. (Doerr, Mark) (Entered: 09/17/2013)
16 Letter Requesting Rescheduling of Pre−Motion Conference by Masjid Al−Ansar, Masjid At−Taqwa, Asad Dandia, Mohammad Elshinawy, Muslims Giving Back, Hamid Raza (Shamsi, Hina) (Entered: 09/18/2013)
ORDER re 16 Letter filed by Asad Dandia, Muslims Giving Back, Mohammad Elshinawy, Hamid Raza, Masjid Al−Ansar, Masjid At−Taqwa: On consent, Plaintiffs' request for an adjournment is granted. The premotion conference hereby is rescheduled to October 7, 2013 at 1:00 p.m. in Courtroom 4F North. Ordered by Judge Pamela K. Chen on 9/18/2013. (Doerr, Mark) (Entered: 09/18/2013)
17 NOTICE of Appearance by Cheryl Leah Shammas on behalf of All Defendants (aty to be noticed) (Shammas, Cheryl) (Entered: 09/18/2013)
18 Letter In Response to Plaintiffs' Request for Pre−Motion Conference for Expedited Discovery by Michael R. Bloomberg, City of New York, David Cohen, Raymond W. Kelly (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit September 10, 2013 Letter D.E. 11) (Farrell, Peter) (Entered: 09/19/2013)
19 Letter Re: Status of Confidentiality Stipulation by Michael R. Bloomberg, City of New York, David Cohen, Raymond W. Kelly (Leist, Alexis) (Entered: 09/26/2013)
20 MOTION for Discovery by Masjid Al−Ansar, Masjid At−Taqwa, Asad Dandia, Mohammad Elshinawy, Muslims Giving Back, Hamid Raza. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit to Notice, Schedule A, # 2 Exhibit to Notice, Schedule B, # 3 Memorandum in

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10/09/2013 10/11/2013 10/15/2013 10/15/2013
10/30/2013 10/30/2013 10/30/2013 11/01/2013 11/01/2013 11/07/2013 11/22/2013 12/26/2013 01/09/2014 01/09/2014 01/09/2014

Support, # 4 Declaration of Patrick Toomey, # 5 Exhibit to Declaration, Ex. A − J) (Shamsi, Hina) (Entered: 10/08/2013)
21 NOTICE of Appearance by Ashley Marie Gorski on behalf of All Plaintiffs (aty to be noticed) (Gorski, Ashley) (Entered: 10/09/2013)
22 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply To Plaintiffs' Motion For Expedited Discovery by Michael R. Bloomberg, City of New York, David Cohen, Raymond W. Kelly. (Leist, Alexis) (Entered: 10/11/2013)
ORDER granting 22 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply: Defendants' request for an enlargement of time is granted. Response due by 10/30/2013. Plaintiffs may reply by 11/7/2013. Ordered by Judge Pamela K. Chen on 10/15/2013. (Doerr, Mark) (Entered: 10/15/2013)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Pamela K. Chen: Pre Motion Conference held on 10/7/2013. Appearing for Plaintiffs, Hina Shamsi; for Defendants, Peter Farrell. The Court heard the parties' arguments with respect to Plaintiffs' motion for discovery in support of its proposed motion for a preliminary injunction. (Court Reporter Anthony Mancuso.) (Doerr, Mark) (Entered: 10/15/2013)
23 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 20 MOTION for Discovery filed by Michael R. Bloomberg, City of New York, David Cohen, Raymond W. Kelly. (Leist, Alexis) (Entered: 10/30/2013)
24 AFFIDAVIT/DECLARATION in Opposition re 20 MOTION for Discovery filed by Michael R. Bloomberg, City of New York, David Cohen, Raymond W. Kelly. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B) (Leist, Alexis) (Entered: 10/30/2013)
25 AFFIDAVIT/DECLARATION in Opposition re 20 MOTION for Discovery filed by Michael R. Bloomberg, City of New York, David Cohen, Raymond W. Kelly. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D) (Leist, Alexis) (Entered: 10/30/2013)
26 Letter re Enlargement of Page Limit for Pls.' Reply in Support of their Motion for Expedited Discovery by Masjid Al−Ansar, Masjid At−Taqwa, Asad Dandia, Mohammad Elshinawy, Muslims Giving Back, Hamid Raza (Shamsi, Hina) Modified on 11/1/2013 to correct ECF filing event. (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 11/01/2013)
ORDER granting 26 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Plaintiffs are granted leave to file a reply brief of no more than fifteen pages. Ordered by Judge Pamela K. Chen on 11/1/2013. (Galeotti, Matthew) (Entered: 11/01/2013)
27 REPLY in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Expedited Discovery filed by All Plaintiffs. (Shamsi, Hina) (Entered: 11/07/2013)
28 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 20 Motion for Discovery: For the reasons set forth in the attached Memorandum and Order, Plaintiffs' motion for expedited discovery is granted in part, and denied in part. Ordered by Judge Pamela K. Chen on 11/22/2013. (Doerr, Mark) (Entered: 11/22/2013)
29 Letter Re: Status of Confidentiality Stipulation and Discovery Process by Michael R. Bloomberg, City of New York, David Cohen, Raymond W. Kelly (DiSenso, Anthony) (Entered: 12/26/2013)
30 Joint Motion to Appear by Telephone on Monday, January 14th 2014 by Michael R. Bloomberg, City of New York, David Cohen, Raymond W. Kelly. (Leist, Alexis) (Entered: 01/09/2014)
31 Letter Seeking Clarification of the Court's November 22, 2013 Memorandum and Order by Masjid Al−Ansar, Masjid At−Taqwa, Asad Dandia, Mohammad Elshinawy, Muslims Giving Back, Hamid Raza (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B) (Shamsi, Hina) (Entered: 01/09/2014)
32 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney Nusrat J. Choudhury by Masjid Al−Ansar, Masjid At−Taqwa, Asad Dandia, Mohammad Elshinawy, Muslims Giving Back, Hamid Raza. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration, # 2 Proposed Order) (Choudhury, Nusrat) (Entered: 01/09/2014)

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01/10/2014
01/10/2014 01/13/2014 01/14/2014 01/16/2014 01/17/2014 01/17/2014 01/24/2014
02/06/2014
02/11/2014 02/14/2014
02/18/2014

ORDER granting 30 Motion to Appear by Telephone. A telephone conference is hereby scheduled with Magistrate Judge Azrack for Monday, January 13, 2014, at 4:30 pm to discuss the parties' protective order. Plaintiffs' counsel is directed to initiate the conference call and contact Chambers at (718) 613−2530 when all parties are on the line ten (10) minutes prior to the scheduled conference. Any requests for adjournment must be made via letter filed on ECF at least two days in advance of the scheduled conference and must indicate which parties consent to the adjournment. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack on 1/10/2014. (Christianson, Kienan) (Entered: 01/10/2014)
SCHEDULING ORDER re 31 : Defendants' response to letter 31 is due January 16, 2014. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack on 1/10/2014. (Christianson, Kienan) (Entered: 01/10/2014)
33 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack:Telephone Conference held on 1/13/2014. The parties are to submit their materials regarding the protective order by January 17, 2014. (Christianson, Kienan) (Entered: 01/13/2014)
ORDER granting 32 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Nusrat Jahan Choudhury terminated. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack on 1/14/2014. (Christianson, Kienan) (Entered: 01/14/2014)
34 Letter in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Request for Clarification of the Court's November 22, 2013 Memorandum & Order by Michael R. Bloomberg, City of New York, David Cohen, Raymond W. Kelly (Shammas, Cheryl) (Entered: 01/16/2014)
35 Letter re Plaintiffs' Proposed Protective Order by Masjid Al−Ansar, Masjid At−Taqwa, Asad Dandia, Mohammad Elshinawy, Muslims Giving Back, Hamid Raza (Shamsi, Hina) (Entered: 01/17/2014)
36 Letter re Defendants' Proposed Protective Order by Michael R. Bloomberg, City of New York, David Cohen, Raymond W. Kelly (Leist, Alexis) (Entered: 01/17/2014)
SCHEDULING ORDER: Judge Chen has referred to me the issues raised in letters 31 and 34 . In addition, I have received and reviewed the parties' respective submissions regarding the protective order, 35 and 36 . A conference to discuss both the protective order and the issues raised in letters 31 and 34 will be scheduled shortly. Prior to the conference, I will circulate to the parties a protective order with the Court's tentative revisions. At the conference, I will hear the parties regarding the revised protective order and the issues raised in letters 31 and 34 . Ordered by Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack on 1/24/2014. (Christianson, Kienan) (Entered: 01/24/2014)
SCHEDULING ORDER: On February 6, 2014, my Chambers circulated to the parties a revised Protective Order containing the Court's revisions. A conference to discuss the revised Protective Order will be held before me on February 12, 2014, at 12:30 in Courtroom 6E, 225 Cadman Plaza East. Counsel are directed to confer and ensure that all necessary parties are aware of the conference. Any requests for adjournment must be made via letter filed on ECF at least two days in advance of the scheduled conference and must indicate which parties consent to the adjournment. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack on 2/6/2014. (Christianson, Kienan) (Entered: 02/06/2014)
37 NOTICE of Appearance by Anthony M. DiSenso on behalf of Michael R. Bloomberg, City of New York, David Cohen, Raymond W. Kelly (aty to be noticed) (DiSenso, Anthony) (Entered: 02/11/2014)
38 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack:Status Conference held on 2/12/2014. Conference addressing the Court's revisions of the parties' Proposed Protective Order held. A briefing schedule is hereby set for the issue concerning intern support staff. Plaintiffs brief is due February 17, 2014. Defendants reply is due February 21, 2014. All other concerns raised at the conference will be discussed at the next conference scheduled for March 6, 2014, at 2:00 pm. (Christianson, Kienan) (entered 2/14/2014) (Entered: 02/14/2014)
39 Letter re Law Student Interns by Masjid Al−Ansar, Masjid At−Taqwa, Asad Dandia, Mohammad Elshinawy, Muslims Giving Back, Hamid Raza (Attachments: # 1 Exhibits) (Shamas, Diala) (Entered: 02/18/2014)

Case: 1:13-cv-3448 As of: 09/20/2018 12:21 PM EDT 16 of 25

02/21/2014 03/04/2014 03/04/2014
03/19/2014 03/19/2014
03/20/2014 03/20/2014 03/21/2014 03/24/2014 03/26/2014
03/26/2014 03/31/2014 04/03/2014

40 Letter in Response to Plaintiffs' Letter dated February 18th by Michael R. Bloomberg, City of New York, David Cohen, Raymond W. Kelly (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit) (Leist, Alexis) (Entered: 02/21/2014)
41 MOTION to Adjourn Conference on March 6, 2014 by Michael R. Bloomberg, City of New York, David Cohen, Raymond W. Kelly. (Leist, Alexis) (Entered: 03/04/2014)
ORDER granting 41 Motion to Adjourn Conference. For the reasons stated in letter 41 , the conference scheduled before Magistrate Judge Azrack on March 6, 2014, at 2:00 pm is hereby rescheduled for March 19, 2014, at 2:30 pm in Courtroom 6E, 225 Cadman Plaza East. Per the parties' request, the conference will be audiotaped. Counsel are directed to confer and ensure that all parties are aware of the new date and time. Any requests for adjournment must be made via letter filed on ECF at least two days in advance of the scheduled conference and must indicate which parties consent to the adjournment. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack on 3/4/2014. (Christianson, Kienan) (Entered: 03/04/2014)
42 NOTICE of Appearance by Odile Maun Farrell on behalf of Michael R. Bloomberg, City of New York, David Cohen, Raymond W. Kelly (aty to be noticed) (Farrell, Odile) (Entered: 03/19/2014)
43 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack:Discovery Hearing held on 3/19/2014. The parties are directed to file their submissions regarding the issue of financial records according to the following schedule: (1) Plaintiffs brief due by March 31, 2014; (2) Defendants response due by April 14, 2014. The parties are directed to submit their proposed document production schedule by March 24, 2014. In addition, the parties shall meet and confer regarding Defendants proposed interrogatories. The parties may request a conference with the Court to resolve any disputes regarding the interrogatories that they cannot resolve. The final draft of the Protective Order is due by March 20, 2014, at 11:00 am. (Tape #2:39:00 − 4:58:32.) (Christianson, Kienan) (Entered: 03/19/2014)
44 PROTECTIVE ORDER. The attached Protective Order is hereby SO ORDERED. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack on 3/20/2014. (Attachments: # 1 Parties' Signature Page)(Christianson, Kienan) (Entered: 03/20/2014)
45 REVISED PROTECTIVE ORDER. The attached Protective Order is hereby SO ORDERED. It does not differ in form or substance from the previous Protective Order. The only change is that the parties' signature page has now been fully integrated into the document and no longer appears as a separate attachment. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack on 3/20/2014. (Christianson, Kienan) (Entered: 03/20/2014)
46 Letter Preserving Protective Order Appeal by Masjid Al−Ansar, Masjid At−Taqwa, Asad Dandia, Mohammad Elshinawy, Muslims Giving Back, Hamid Raza (Kassem, Ramzi) (Entered: 03/21/2014)
47 Letter re: Joint Document Production Schedule by Michael R. Bloomberg, City of New York, David Cohen, Raymond W. Kelly (Leist, Alexis) (Entered: 03/24/2014)
48 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on 3/19/14, before Judge Azrack. Court Reporter/Transcriber ARIA SERVICES, INC., Telephone number 845−260−1377. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 4/16/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/28/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/24/2014. (Hong, Loan) (Entered: 03/26/2014)
ORDER re 47 . The document production schedule outlined in letter 47 is hereby SO ORDERED. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack on 3/26/2014. (Christianson, Kienan) (Entered: 03/26/2014)
49 MEMORANDUM in Support Concerning Disputed Discovery Requests filed by Masjid Al−Ansar, Masjid At−Taqwa, Asad Dandia, Mohammad Elshinawy, Muslims Giving Back, Hamid Raza. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Mariko Hirose in Support of Supplemental Briefing, # 2 Exhibit) (Toomey, Patrick) (Entered: 03/31/2014)
50 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack:Discovery telephone conference held on 4/2/2014. Reserved decision on defendants request to

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04/03/2014
04/10/2014 04/21/2014 04/24/2014
04/29/2014 05/01/2014 05/08/2014 05/27/2014 05/28/2014 05/30/2014 05/30/2014

strike plaintiffs post−discovery conference brief. (Pls. Mem. in Supp. Disputed Discovery Requests, ECF No. 49.)Telephone conference scheduled for April 3, 2014, at 2:30 PM. Defendants are to call Chambers at (718) 613−2530 when all parties are on the line. See attached minute entry. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack on 4/2/2014. (D'Antonio, Elizabeth) (Entered: 04/03/2014)
51 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack:Telephone Conference held on 4/3/2014. Plaintiffs brief, (Pls.' Mem. in Supp. of Disputed Discovery Requests, ECF No. 49), is: (1) in compliance with my Individual Rules; and (2) within the scope of the subject matter that I directed the parties to submit briefing on following the March 19, 2014 discovery hearing. Defendants are directed to respond to plaintiffs' arguments on the disputed document requests. However, plaintiffs' arguments related to the interrogatories are not ripe because they are not yet before the court for decision. Defendants request for an extension of time to file their reply brief is granted. Defendants have until April 21, 2014 to submit their reply brief. See attached minute entry. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack on 4/3/2014. (D'Antonio, Elizabeth) (Entered: 04/03/2014)
52 NOTICE of Appearance by Beth Haroules on behalf of All Plaintiffs (aty to be noticed) (Haroules, Beth) (Entered: 04/10/2014)
53 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Briefing Concerning Defendants' Disputed Discovery Requests filed by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Defs' Interrogatories and Requests for Documents) (Shammas, Cheryl) (Entered: 04/21/2014)
54 Order & Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack: Telephone Conference held on 4/24/2014. Plaintiffs' request to file a reply to defendants' opposition papers, [ECF No. 53], is granted. Plaintiffs' reply is limited to five (5) pages (not including exhibits) and must be filed by May 1, 2014. Defendants' request to file a sur−reply is also granted. Defendants' sur−reply is limited to five (5) pages (not including exhibits) and must be filed by May 8, 2014. See attached minute entry. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack on 4/24/14. (D'Antonio, Elizabeth) (Entered: 04/24/2014)
55 NOTICE of Appearance by Chandra Shekhara Bhatnagar on behalf of All Plaintiffs (aty to be noticed) (Bhatnagar, Chandra) (Entered: 04/29/2014)
56 REPLY in Support of Plaintiffs' Supplemental Brief Concerning Disputed Discovery Requests filed by All Plaintiffs. (Shamsi, Hina) (Entered: 05/01/2014)
57 REPLY in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Briefing Concerning Defendants' Disputed Discovery Requests filed by All Defendants. (Shammas, Cheryl) (Entered: 05/08/2014)
58 MOTION to Adjourn Conference Required by Section II(D) of the Stipulation and Protective Order for the Exchange of Confidential Materials by Michael R. Bloomberg, City of New York, David Cohen, Raymond W. Kelly. (DiSenso, Anthony) (Entered: 05/27/2014)
ORDER granting 58 Motion to Adjourn Conference. Upon consent of plaintiffs, the deadline for the parties to meet and confer regarding plaintiff's May 23, 2014 challenge to defendants' designations under the Protective Order is hereby extended to June 3, 2014. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack on 5/28/2014. (Terranova, Robert) (Entered: 05/28/2014)
59 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Filing fee $ 25, receipt number 0207−6962407. by Masjid Al−Ansar, Masjid At−Taqwa, Asad Dandia, Mohammad Elshinawy, Muslims Giving Back, Hamid Raza. (Gallegos, Hector) (Entered: 05/30/2014)
60 AFFIDAVIT/DECLARATION in Support re 59 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Filing fee $ 25, receipt number 0207−6962407. filed by Masjid Al−Ansar, Masjid At−Taqwa, Asad Dandia, Mohammad Elshinawy, Muslims Giving Back, Hamid Raza. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Certificate of Good Standing, # 2 Exhibit Certificate of Good Standing, # 3 Proposed Order, # 4 Certificate of Service) (Gallegos, Hector) (Entered: 05/30/2014)

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05/30/2014 05/30/2014
05/30/2014 05/30/2014
05/30/2014 05/30/2014 05/30/2014 05/30/2014 05/30/2014 05/30/2014 06/06/2014
06/10/2014 06/18/2014
06/19/2014

61 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Filing fee $ 25, receipt number 0207−6962448. by Masjid Al−Ansar, Masjid At−Taqwa, Asad Dandia, Mohammad Elshinawy, Muslims Giving Back, Hamid Raza. (Hartman, Joshua) (Entered: 05/30/2014)
62 AFFIDAVIT/DECLARATION in Support re 61 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Filing fee $ 25, receipt number 0207−6962448. filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Certificate of Good Standing, # 2 Exhibit Certificate of Good Standing, # 3 Proposed Order, # 4 Certificate of Service) (Hartman, Joshua) (Entered: 05/30/2014)
63 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Filing fee $ 25, receipt number 0207−6962483. by Masjid Al−Ansar, Masjid At−Taqwa, Asad Dandia, Mohammad Elshinawy, Muslims Giving Back, Hamid Raza. (Scannell, David) (Entered: 05/30/2014)
64 AFFIDAVIT/DECLARATION in Support re 63 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Filing fee $ 25, receipt number 0207−6962483. filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Certificate of Good Standing, # 2 Exhibit Certificate of Good Standing, # 3 Proposed Order, # 4 Certificate of Service) (Scannell, David) (Entered: 05/30/2014)
65 NOTICE of Appearance by Kyle W.K. Mooney on behalf of All Plaintiffs (aty to be noticed) (Mooney, Kyle) (Entered: 05/30/2014)
66 NOTICE of Appearance by Adam James Hunt on behalf of All Plaintiffs (aty to be noticed) (Hunt, Adam) (Entered: 05/30/2014)
67 NOTICE of Appearance by Kiersten Ann Fletcher on behalf of All Plaintiffs (aty to be noticed) (Fletcher, Kiersten) (Entered: 05/30/2014)
ORDER granting 59 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack on 5/30/2014. (Christianson, Kienan) (Entered: 05/30/2014)
ORDER granting 61 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack on 5/30/2014. (Christianson, Kienan) (Entered: 05/30/2014)
ORDER granting 63 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack on 5/30/2014. (Christianson, Kienan) (Entered: 05/30/2014)
68 First MOTION for Extension of Time to File Application Disputing Defendants confidentiality designations, pursuant to Section II(D) of the Stipulation and Protective Order for the Production and Exchange of Confidential Materials by Masjid Al−Ansar, Masjid At−Taqwa, Asad Dandia, Mohammad Elshinawy, Muslims Giving Back, Hamid Raza. (Haroules, Beth) (Entered: 06/06/2014)
ORDER granting 68 Motion for Extension of Time to File: For the reasons stated in plaintiffs' letter motion 68 , the June 9, 2014 and June 12, 2014 deadlines are hereby extended to June 18, 2014. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack on 6/10/2014. (D'Antonio, Elizabeth) (Entered: 06/10/2014)
69 First MOTION for Protective Order designations dispute pursuant to IID Protective Order dkt. no. 45, MOTION for Discovery by Masjid Al−Ansar, Masjid At−Taqwa, Asad Dandia, Mohammad Elshinawy, Muslims Giving Back, Hamid Raza. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Defendants' Categorical Privilege Log for Redactions Contained in April 21, 2014 Prodcution, # 2 Exhibit Defendants' Redaction Key for April 21, 2014 Production, # 3 Exhibit 5/23/2014 Letter from Haroules to Farrell disputing various Protective Order designations ascribed to April 21, 2014 Production) (Haroules, Beth) (Entered: 06/18/2014)
SCHEDULING ORDER re 69 : A telephone conference is hereby scheduled for June 19, 2014, at 4:00 pm. Defense counsel is directed to initiate the conference call and contact my Chambers at (718) 613−2530 when all parties are on the line. Counsel are directed to confer and ensure that all parties are aware of this conference. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack on 6/19/2014. (Christianson, Kienan) (Entered:

Case: 1:13-cv-3448 As of: 09/20/2018 12:21 PM EDT 19 of 25

06/19/2014 06/20/2014 06/20/2014 06/23/2014 06/24/2014 06/26/2014
06/27/2014 06/30/2014 07/01/2014 07/01/2014 07/02/2014
07/02/2014

06/19/2014)
SCHEDULING ORDER: A telephone conference is hereby scheduled with Magistrate Judge Azrack for June 20, 2014 at 12:00 noon to address the parties' discovery disputes. Plaintiff's counsel is directed to initiate the conference call and contact Chambers at (718) 613−2530 when all parties are on the line. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack on 6/19/2014. (Terranova, Robert) (Entered: 06/19/2014)
70 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack: Telephone Discovery Conference held on 6/19/2014. See attached minute entry for details. (Terranova, Robert) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
71 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack:Telephone Discovery Conference held on 6/20/2014. See attached minute entry for details. (Terranova, Robert) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
72 Joint MOTION for Protective Order ; Letter Requesting Modification of the March 20, 2014 Protective Order by Masjid Al−Ansar, Masjid At−Taqwa, Asad Dandia, Mohammad Elshinawy, Muslims Giving Back, Hamid Raza. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Modifying the March 20, 2014 Protective Order) (Hunt, Adam) (Entered: 06/23/2014)
ORDER granting 72 Motion for Protective Order: The parties' Joint Proposed Order [72−1] to modify the Protective Order 45 is granted. The parties are directed to execute and upload to ECF a First Amended Protective Order incorporating this amendment by July 1, 2014. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack on 6/24/2014. (D'Antonio, Elizabeth) (Entered: 06/24/2014)
73 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on June 20, 2014, before Judge Azrack. Court Transcriber: TypeWrite Word Processing Service, Telephone number 718−966−1401. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 7/17/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 7/28/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 9/24/2014. (Rocco, Christine) (Entered: 06/26/2014)
74 Letter MOTION for Protective Order to Shield Field Officers from Designation as Custodians by Michael R. Bloomberg, City of New York, David Cohen, Raymond W. Kelly. (DiSenso, Anthony) (Entered: 06/27/2014)
75 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack:Telephone Conference held on 6/30/2014. Plaintiffs to provide their privilege log by the close of business on June 30, 2014. Parties to file a stipulation extending any impacted deadlines. (Christianson, Kienan) (Entered: 06/30/2014)
76 Letter Re: Proposed Dates for Conference by Masjid Al−Ansar, Masjid At−Taqwa, Asad Dandia, Mohammad Elshinawy, Muslims Giving Back, Hamid Raza (Hunt, Adam) (Entered: 07/01/2014)
77 Amended MOTION for Protective Order − First Amended Stipulation and Protective Order for the Production and Exchange of Confidential Materials by Masjid Al−Ansar, Masjid At−Taqwa, Asad Dandia, Mohammad Elshinawy, Muslims Giving Back, Hamid Raza. (Mooney, Kyle) (Entered: 07/01/2014)
SCHEDULING ORDER: An in−person conference is hereby scheduled with Magistrate Judge Azrack on July 9, 2014, at 2:00 pm. The Court will hear the parties on any outstanding issues that they have met and conferred on. The parties are forewarned that, unless they have met and conferred about a particular issue, the Court will not hear them on it. In addition, the Court will address the issues raised in letters 74 and 76 . Plaintiffs may file a three−page response to letter 74 , which is due on July 8, 2014, by 1:00 pm. No other letters will be permitted prior to this conference. Any requests for an adjournment must be made in the form of a letter motion filed on ECF at least forty−eight (48) hours in advance of the conference. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack on 7/2/2014. (Christianson, Kienan) (Entered: 07/02/2014)
78 Letter Advising Court of Modification of Defendants' Time Under the Protective Order to Challenge Plaintiffs' Confidentiality Designations by Michael R. Bloomberg, City of New York, David Cohen, Raymond W. Kelly (Shammas, Cheryl) (Entered:

Case: 1:13-cv-3448 As of: 09/20/2018 12:21 PM EDT 20 of 25

07/08/2014 07/08/2014
07/10/2014 07/15/2014 07/16/2014
07/16/2014 07/22/2014 07/22/2014 07/22/2014 07/22/2014 07/22/2014 07/22/2014 07/23/2014

07/02/2014)
79 Letter Concerning Field Officer Discovery by Masjid Al−Ansar, Masjid At−Taqwa, Asad Dandia, Mohammad Elshinawy, Muslims Giving Back, Hamid Raza (Shamsi, Hina) (Entered: 07/08/2014)
ORDER. At the discovery conference scheduled for tomorrow July 9, 2014 at 2:00 PM, the parties should be prepared to discuss a stipulation in which plaintiffs would stipulate that: (a) only Masjid Al−Ansar and Muslims Giving Back are asserting economic injuries; and (b) Masjid Al−Ansar's economic injury is limited to the purchase of video recording equipment. Defendants should be prepared to address how such a stipulation would impact Defendants' Document Requests Nos. 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 28, 29, 44, 45, and 47. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack on 7/8/2014. (Terranova, Robert) (Entered: 07/08/2014)
80 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack:Discovery Hearing held on 7/9/2014. The attached minute entry contains rulings and deadlines for the parties. See attached minute entry for more details. Next in−person conference scheduled for September 4, 2014, at 1:00 pm. (Tape #2:05:54 − 4:23:42.) (Christianson, Kienan) (Entered: 07/10/2014)
81 Letter dated 7/14/14 from Ashley Gorski to Kienan, re: language of stipulations and the parties intentions on calling the Court on 7/15/14 at 11:00 a.m. (Galeano, Sonia) (Entered: 07/15/2014)
82 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on 7/9/14, before Judge Azrack. Court Reporter/Transcriber TRANSCRIPTION PLUS II. Email address: laferrara44@gmail.com. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 8/6/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/18/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/14/2014. (Hong, Loan) (Entered: 07/16/2014)
83 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack:Telephone Conference held on 7/15/2014 regarding plaintiffs' proposed stipulation and defendants' outstanding document requests. See attached minute entry and stipulation. (FTR 11:09:46 − 11:22:08) (D'Antonio, Elizabeth) (Entered: 07/16/2014)
84 ORDER granting 77 Motion for Protective Order. The attached Protective Order is hereby SO ORDERED. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack on 7/22/2014. (Christianson, Kienan) (Entered: 07/22/2014)
85 Letter MOTION to Stay Time Within Which to Move For Reconsideration by Michael R. Bloomberg, City of New York, David Cohen, Raymond W. Kelly. (Leist, Alexis) (Entered: 07/22/2014)
86 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack:Discovery Hearing held on 7/22/2014. Plaintiffs' privilege log shall remain "attorneys' eyes only." See attached minute entry for more details. (Christianson, Kienan) (Entered: 07/22/2014)
ORDER granting 85 Motion to Stay. The time for defendants to move for reconsideration of the Court's decision discussed in letter 85 is hereby extended to August 15, 2014. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack on 7/22/2014. (Christianson, Kienan) (Entered: 07/22/2014)
ORDER terminating 74 Motion for Protective Order. This issue was discussed and resolved at the July 9, 2014 conference. See 80 . Ordered by Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack on 7/22/2014. (Christianson, Kienan) (Entered: 07/22/2014)
ORDER terminating 69 Motion for Protective Order; terminating 69 Motion for Discovery. The issues raised in letter 69 were discussed and resolved in 70 and 71 . Ordered by Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack on 7/22/2014. (Christianson, Kienan) (Entered: 07/22/2014)
87 Letter MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Plaintiffs' Motion Concerning Defendants' Interrogatories by Michael R. Bloomberg, City of New York, David Cohen, Raymond W. Kelly. (Shammas, Cheryl) (Entered: 07/23/2014)

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07/23/2014
08/01/2014 08/01/2014
08/06/2014 08/08/2014
08/15/2014 08/15/2014 08/18/2014
08/26/2014 10/01/2014 10/01/2014 11/17/2014 11/17/2014 01/06/2015 01/13/2015

ORDER granting 87 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply: For the reasons articulated in letter motion 87 ,Defendants' deadline to file their opposition to Plaintiff's motion objecting to Defendants' Interrogatories is extended to August 1, 2014. Plaintiffs' reply briefing is due August 8, 2014. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack on 7/23/2014. (D'Antonio, Elizabeth) (Entered: 07/23/2014)
88 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery by Masjid Al−Ansar, Masjid At−Taqwa, Asad Dandia, Mohammad Elshinawy, Muslims Giving Back, Hamid Raza. (Shamsi, Hina) (Entered: 08/01/2014)
89 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Objections to Defendants' Interrogatories Purportedly on Grounds of First Amendment Associational Privilege and So−Called "Retroactive Justification" filed by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Cheryl L. Shammas, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C) (Shammas, Cheryl) (Entered: 08/01/2014)
ORDER granting 88 Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery. For the reasons stated in letter 88 , the deadline for the parties to complete document discovery is hereby extended to and includes September 30, 2014. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack on 8/6/2014. (Christianson, Kienan) (Entered: 08/06/2014)
90 REPLY in Support of Plaintiffs' Challenge to Interrogatories on Grounds of First Amendment Privilege and Retroactive Justification filed by Masjid Al−Ansar, Masjid At−Taqwa, Asad Dandia, Mohammad Elshinawy, Muslims Giving Back, Hamid Raza. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Ashley Gorski) (Toomey, Patrick) (Entered: 08/08/2014)
91 Joint MOTION for Protective Order to facilitate Settlement Process, Joint MOTION to Stay to facilitate Settlement Process by Michael R. Bloomberg, City of New York, David Cohen, Raymond W. Kelly. (Farrell, Peter) (Entered: 08/15/2014)
92 Letter MOTION for Reconsideration of the Court's July 9, 2014 ruling on field−level custodians by Michael R. Bloomberg, City of New York, David Cohen, Raymond W. Kelly. (Leist, Alexis) (Entered: 08/15/2014)
ORDER granting 91 Motion for Protective Order and Motion to Stay. The provisions outlined in letter 91 are hereby SO ORDERED. This action is hereby stayed until October 2, 2014, pending the parties' settlement efforts. The parties are directed to file a status report by October 1, 2014. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack on 8/18/2014. (Christianson, Kienan) (Entered: 08/18/2014)
SCHEDULING ORDER: In light of the parties settlement negotiations, the conference presently scheduled for September 4, 2014, at 1:00 pm is hereby adjourned sine die. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack on 8/26/2014. (Christianson, Kienan) (Entered: 08/26/2014)
93 STATUS REPORT AND REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF STAY JOINTLY WITH DEFENDANTS by Masjid Al−Ansar, Masjid At−Taqwa, Asad Dandia, Mohammad Elshinawy, Muslims Giving Back, Hamid Raza (Shamsi, Hina) (Entered: 10/01/2014)
ORDER. The stay in this action is hereby extended until November 18, 2014. The parties are directed to file a status report by November 17, 2014. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack on 10/1/2014. (Terranova, Robert) (Entered: 10/01/2014)
94 STATUS REPORT and Joint Request for Extension of Stay by Michael R. Bloomberg, City of New York, David Cohen, Raymond W. Kelly (Farrell, Peter) (Entered: 11/17/2014)
ORDER: In light of 94 , the stay in this action is hereby extended until January 16, 2015. The parties are directed to file a status report by January 15, 2015. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack on 11/17/2014. (Petilla, Charlotte) (Entered: 11/17/2014)
95 Notice of Related Case (Bowens, Priscilla) (Entered: 01/07/2015)
Case Assigned to Magistrate Judge James Orenstein. Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack, (Marziliano, August) Modified on 1/14/2015 (Marziliano, August). (Entered: 01/13/2015)

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01/14/2015 01/15/2015
02/13/2015 02/13/2015
02/25/2015 02/25/2015 03/13/2015 03/13/2015
04/29/2015 04/29/2015
05/29/2015 06/01/2015
06/19/2015 06/22/2015

96 STATUS REPORT and Joint Request for Extension of Stay by Masjid Al−Ansar, Masjid At−Taqwa, Asad Dandia, Mohammad Elshinawy, Muslims Giving Back, Hamid Raza (Shamsi, Hina) (Entered: 01/14/2015)
ORDER re 96 Status Report filed by Asad Dandia, Muslims Giving Back, Mohammad Elshinawy, Hamid Raza, Masjid Al−Ansar, Masjid At−Taqwa −− The stay is extended until February 17, 2015. The parties shall submit a joint status report by February 13, 2015, and I will then schedule further proceedings as appropriate. Ordered by Magistrate Judge James Orenstein on 1/15/2015. (Hill, Lucy) (Entered: 01/15/2015)
97 STATUS REPORT and Request For Extension of Stay by Michael R. Bloomberg, City of New York, David Cohen, Raymond W. Kelly (Leist, Alexis) (Entered: 02/13/2015)
ORDER re 97 Status Report filed by Michael R. Bloomberg, David Cohen, Raymond W. Kelly, City of New York −− The application is granted. The stay is extended until March 17, 2015. The parties shall submit a joint status report by March 13, 2015, and I will then schedule further proceedings as appropriate. Ordered by Magistrate Judge James Orenstein on 2/13/2015. (Hill, Lucy) (Entered: 02/13/2015)
98 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney Chandra Bhatnagar by Masjid Al−Ansar, Masjid At−Taqwa, Asad Dandia, Mohammad Elshinawy, Muslims Giving Back, Hamid Raza. (Bhatnagar, Chandra) (Entered: 02/25/2015)
ORDER granting 98 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. −− The motion is granted. Attorney Chandra Shekhara Bhatnagar terminated. Ordered by Magistrate Judge James Orenstein on 2/25/2015. (Hill, Lucy) (Entered: 02/25/2015)
99 STATUS REPORT and Joint Request for Extension of Stay by Masjid Al−Ansar, Masjid At−Taqwa, Asad Dandia, Mohammad Elshinawy, Muslims Giving Back, Hamid Raza (Shamsi, Hina) (Entered: 03/13/2015)
ORDER re 99 Status Report filed by Asad Dandia, Muslims Giving Back, Mohammad Elshinawy, Hamid Raza, Masjid Al−Ansar, Masjid At−Taqwa −− The application is granted. The stay is extended until May 1, 2015. The parties shall submit a joint status report by April 29, 2015, and I will then schedule further proceedings as appropriate. Ordered by Magistrate Judge James Orenstein on 3/13/2015. (Hill, Lucy) (Entered: 03/13/2015)
100 STATUS REPORT and Joint Request for Extension of Stay by Michael R. Bloomberg, City of New York, David Cohen, Raymond W. Kelly (Leist, Alexis) (Entered: 04/29/2015)
ORDER re 100 Status Report filed by Michael R. Bloomberg, David Cohen, Raymond W. Kelly, City of New York −− The application is granted. The stay is extended until June 1, 2015. The parties shall submit a joint status report by May 29, 2015, and I will then schedule further proceedings as appropriate. Ordered by Magistrate Judge James Orenstein on 4/29/2015. (Hill, Lucy) (Entered: 04/29/2015)
101 STATUS REPORT and Joint Request for Extension of Stay by Masjid Al−Ansar, Masjid At−Taqwa, Asad Dandia, Mohammad Elshinawy, Muslims Giving Back, Hamid Raza (Shamsi, Hina) (Entered: 05/29/2015)
ORDER re 101 Status Report filed by Asad Dandia, Muslims Giving Back, Mohammad Elshinawy, Hamid Raza, Masjid Al−Ansar, Masjid At−Taqwa −− The application is granted. The stay is extended until June 22, 2015. The parties shall submit a joint status report by June 19, 2015, and I will then schedule further proceedings as appropriate. Ordered by Magistrate Judge James Orenstein on 6/1/2015. (Hill, Lucy) (Entered: 06/01/2015)
102 STATUS REPORT and Joint Request For Extension of Stay by Michael R. Bloomberg, City of New York, David Cohen, Raymond W. Kelly (Farrell, Peter) (Entered: 06/19/2015)
ORDER re 102 Status Report filed by Michael R. Bloomberg, David Cohen, Raymond W. Kelly, City of New York −− The application is granted. The stay is extended until August 3, 2015. The parties shall submit a joint status report by July 31, 2015, and I will then schedule further proceedings as appropriate. Ordered by Magistrate Judge James Orenstein on 6/22/2015. (Hill, Lucy) (Entered: 06/22/2015)

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06/29/2015 06/29/2015 07/17/2015 07/17/2015 07/17/2015 07/31/2015 07/31/2015
08/31/2015 08/31/2015
09/28/2015 09/28/2015 10/30/2015 11/02/2015 12/01/2015 12/01/2015 12/15/2015

103 Joint MOTION to Amend/Correct/Supplement Order on Motion for Protective Order, Order on Motion to Stay,, by Masjid Al−Ansar, Masjid At−Taqwa, Asad Dandia, Mohammad Elshinawy, Muslims Giving Back, Hamid Raza. (Shamsi, Hina) (Entered: 06/29/2015)
ORDER granting 103 Motion to Amend/Correct/Supplement −− The proposed modification is so ordered. Paragraph 4 of the confidentiality agreement in docket entry 91 is modified as set forth in docket entry 103 . Ordered by Magistrate Judge James Orenstein on 6/29/2015. (Hill, Lucy) (Entered: 06/29/2015)
104 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Odile Farrell by Michael R. Bloomberg, City of New York, David Cohen, Raymond W. Kelly. (Farrell, Odile) (Entered: 07/17/2015)
105 DECLARATION re 104 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Odile Farrell by Michael R. Bloomberg, City of New York, David Cohen, Raymond W. Kelly (Farrell, Odile) (Entered: 07/17/2015)
ORDER granting 104 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. −− The motion is granted. Attorney Odile Maun Farrell terminated. Ordered by Magistrate Judge James Orenstein on 7/17/2015. (Hill, Lucy) (Entered: 07/17/2015)
106 Joint MOTION to Amend/Correct/Supplement ; Status Report; and Joint Request for Extension of Stay by Masjid Al−Ansar, Masjid At−Taqwa, Asad Dandia, Mohammad Elshinawy, Muslims Giving Back, Hamid Raza. (Shamsi, Hina) (Entered: 07/31/2015)
ORDER granting 106 Motion to Amend/Correct/Supplement −− The motion is granted. Paragraph 4 of docket entry 103 is amended as set for in docket entry 106 . Additionally, the stay is extended until September 1, 2015. The parties shall submit a joint status report by August 31, 2015. Ordered by Magistrate Judge James Orenstein on 7/31/2015. (Hill, Lucy) (Entered: 07/31/2015)
107 STATUS REPORT and Joint Request For Extension of Stay by Michael R. Bloomberg, City of New York, David Cohen, Raymond W. Kelly (Leist, Alexis) (Entered: 08/31/2015)
ORDER re 107 Status Report filed by Michael R. Bloomberg, David Cohen, Raymond W. Kelly, City of New York −− The application is granted. The stay is extended until October 1, 2015. The parties shall submit a joint status report by September 28, 2015, and I will then schedule further proceedings as appropriate. Ordered by Magistrate Judge James Orenstein on 8/31/2015. (Howley, Thomas) (Entered: 08/31/2015)
108 STATUS REPORT and Joint Request for Extension of Stay by Masjid Al−Ansar, Masjid At−Taqwa, Asad Dandia, Mohammad Elshinawy, Muslims Giving Back, Hamid Raza (Shamsi, Hina) (Entered: 09/28/2015)
ORDER re 108 Status Report −− The motion is granted. The stay is extended until November 2, 2015. Ordered by Magistrate Judge James Orenstein on 9/28/2015. (Howley, Thomas) (Entered: 09/28/2015)
109 Joint MOTION to Stay Litigation Pending Settlement Negotiations by Michael R. Bloomberg, City of New York, David Cohen, Raymond W. Kelly. (Leist, Alexis) (Entered: 10/30/2015)
ORDER granting 109 Motion to Stay −− The motion is granted. The stay is extended until December 2, 2015. Ordered by Magistrate Judge James Orenstein on 11/2/2015. (Howley, Thomas) (Entered: 11/02/2015)
111 Joint MOTION to Stay Litigation Pending Settlement Negotiations by Masjid Al−Ansar, Masjid At−Taqwa, Asad Dandia, Mohammad Elshinawy, Muslims Giving Back, Hamid Raza. (Shamsi, Hina) (Entered: 12/01/2015)
ORDER granting 111 Motion to Stay −− The motion is granted. The stay is extended until January 2, 2016. Ordered by Magistrate Judge James Orenstein on 12/1/2015. (Howley, Thomas) (Entered: 12/01/2015)
117 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Masjid Al−Ansar, Masjid At−Taqwa, Asad Dandia, Mohammad Elshinawy, Muslims Giving Back, Hamid Raza. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Fletcher, Kiersten) (Entered: 12/15/2015)

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12/15/2015 12/16/2015 12/31/2015 01/06/2016
01/07/2016
01/13/2016 01/13/2016 02/25/2016 02/02/2017 02/03/2017 02/23/2017
02/23/2017 02/28/2017 03/06/2017 03/15/2017

118 AFFIDAVIT/DECLARATION in Support re 117 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney filed by Masjid Al−Ansar, Masjid At−Taqwa, Asad Dandia, Mohammad Elshinawy, Muslims Giving Back, Hamid Raza. (Fletcher, Kiersten) (Entered: 12/15/2015)
ORDER granting 117 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney −− The motion is granted; attorney Kiersten Ann Fletcher terminated. Ordered by Magistrate Judge James Orenstein on 12/16/2015. (Howley, Thomas) (Entered: 12/16/2015)
120 Joint MOTION to Stay Litigation Pending Settlement Negotiations by Michael R. Bloomberg, City of New York, David Cohen, Raymond W. Kelly. (Leist, Alexis) (Entered: 12/31/2015)
SCHEDULING ORDER re 120 Joint MOTION to Stay −− In light of the multiple similar reports over many months, I respectfully direct the parties to appear before me to explain the delay in finalizing settlement at a conference on January 19, 2016 at 11:30 a.m. Ordered by Magistrate Judge James Orenstein on 1/6/2016. (Howley, Thomas) (Entered: 01/06/2016)
121 Joint MOTION for Settlement Seeking Entry of Settlement Stipulation and Order by Masjid Al−Ansar, Masjid At−Taqwa, Asad Dandia, Mohammad Elshinawy, Muslims Giving Back, Hamid Raza. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order and Stipulation of Settlement, # 2 Exhibit A to Stipulation of Settlement and Order) (Shamsi, Hina) (Entered: 01/07/2016)
122 Joint MOTION to Adjourn Conference by Masjid Al−Ansar, Masjid At−Taqwa, Asad Dandia, Mohammad Elshinawy, Muslims Giving Back, Hamid Raza. (Shamsi, Hina) (Entered: 01/13/2016)
ORDER granting 122 Motion to Adjourn Conference −− The motion is granted. The status conference previously scheduled for January 19, 2016 is cancelled. Ordered by Magistrate Judge James Orenstein on 1/13/2016. (Howley, Thomas) (Entered: 01/13/2016)
ORDER finding as moot 120 Motion to Stay. See docket entry 121 . Ordered by Magistrate Judge James Orenstein on 2/25/2016. (Guy, Alicia) (Entered: 02/25/2016)
123 Letter dated February 2, 2017 to Judge Chen from Hicham Azkour requesting "instant intervention in the above−referenced matter". (See attachment for details). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibits) (Basnight, Jasmine) (Entered: 02/02/2017)
ORDER: Any party who would like to respond to the 123 request to intervene shall do so by February 24, 2017. Ordered by Judge Pamela K. Chen on 2/3/2017. (Gregorio, Heather) (Entered: 02/03/2017)
124 Letter on behalf of Raza Plaintiffs concerning the letter dated February 2, 2017 to the Court from Hicham Azkour requesting instant intervention in the above−referenced matter (Docket No. 123) and the Courts February 3, 2017 order directing that any response to Mr. Azkours request be submitted before February 24, 2017 by Masjid Al−Ansar, Masjid At−Taqwa, Asad Dandia, Mohammad Elshinawy, Muslims Giving Back, Hamid Raza (Haroules, Beth) (Entered: 02/23/2017)
125 Letter Responding to ECF No. 123 by Michael R. Bloomberg, City of New York, David Cohen, Raymond W. Kelly (Ceriello, Colin) (Entered: 02/23/2017)
ORDER: Oral argument on the 123 motion to intervene by Hicham Azkour shall take place on March 22, 2017 at 2 P.M. in Courtroom 4F North. Ordered by Judge Pamela K. Chen on 2/28/2017. (Gregorio, Heather) (Entered: 02/28/2017)
126 Letter on behalf of both parties, updating the Court on developments concerning the parties' proposed settlement by Masjid Al−Ansar, Masjid At−Taqwa, Asad Dandia, Mohammad Elshinawy, Muslims Giving Back, Hamid Raza (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A to letter) (Shamsi, Hina) (Entered: 03/06/2017)
127 Letter on behalf of both parties, updating the Court on settlement developments and requesting that the Court approve and so−order the settlement stipulation by Masjid Al−Ansar, Masjid At−Taqwa, Asad Dandia, Mohammad Elshinawy, Muslims Giving Back, Hamid Raza (Attachments: # 1 Opinion, Handschu v. Special Services Division, 71−cv−2203 (CSH) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2017)) (Shamsi, Hina) (Entered: 03/15/2017)

Case: 1:13-cv-3448 As of: 09/20/2018 12:21 PM EDT 25 of 25

03/16/2017 03/16/2017 03/19/2017 03/20/2017
03/20/2017
03/20/2017 05/05/2017

ORDER: The parties are directed to file, by end of day today (March 16, 2017), a clean, non−blacklined version of the approved, revised Handschu Guidelines that were approved by Judge Haight on March 13, 2017. Ordered by Judge Pamela K. Chen on 3/16/2017. (Gregorio, Heather) (Entered: 03/16/2017)
128 Letter on behalf of both parties, in accordance with the Court's March 16, 2017 order by Masjid Al−Ansar, Masjid At−Taqwa, Asad Dandia, Mohammad Elshinawy, Muslims Giving Back, Hamid Raza (Attachments: # 1 Revised Handschu Guidelines) (Shamsi, Hina) (Entered: 03/16/2017)
129 Letter on behalf of both parties, attaching updated joint stipulation of settlement by Masjid Al−Ansar, Masjid At−Taqwa, Asad Dandia, Mohammad Elshinawy, Muslims Giving Back, Hamid Raza (Attachments: # 1 Updated Joint Stipulation of Settlement, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B) (Shamsi, Hina) (Entered: 03/19/2017)
130 ORDER DISMISSING CASE: The Court so orders the parties' Stipulation of Settlement and Order (Dkt. 129 −1]) including Exhibits A & B (Dkts. 129 −2 and 129 −3). The Complaint in this action is dismissed with prejudice. This matter is terminated, except that the Court retains jurisdiction with respect to enforcement of the Settlement. Ordered by Judge Pamela K. Chen on 3/20/2017. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B) (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 03/20/2017)
ORDER: The Court denies the motion of Hicham Azkour (Dkt. 123 ) to intervene in this action and cancels the oral argument scheduled for March 22, 2017 at 2:00 p.m. on the motion. In light of the parties' settlement of this matter and the termination of this case, as well as other factors that shall be more fully detailed in a written decision to follow, the Court finds that intervention, either as of right or by permission, by Mr. Azkour should not be granted. Ordered by Judge Pamela K. Chen on 3/20/2017. (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 03/20/2017)
131 REPLY re 125 Letter filed by Hicham Azkour (Basnight, Jasmine) (Entered: 03/20/2017)
ORDER. The Court is in receipt of Mr. Hicham Azkour's letter 131 . As the court has denied Mr. Azkour's request to intervene, (see Order dated March 20, 2017), the Court will not take any action as to Mr. Azkour's complaints against the City Defendants. Furthermore, Mr. Azkour is directed not to make other filings in regards to matter. Ordered by Judge Pamela K. Chen on 5/5/2017. (Fletcher, Camille) (Entered: 05/05/2017)