IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

CARLOS RAMOS-MACARlO, individually, )

and on behalf of all persons similarly situated; )

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

TRUMAN JONES, in his official capacity as )

Sheriff of Rutherford County and his individual )

capacity; BOB ASBURY, in his official capacity )

as Chief Deputy and Administrator of Detention )

in the Rutherford County Sheriff's Office and )

his individual capacity; RUTHERFORD

)

COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE -

)

RUTHERFORD COUNTY, TENNESSEE;

)

JOHN DOE 1, JOHN DOE 2, and JOHN

)

DOE 3, in their official capacities as employees )

ofthe Rutherford County Sheriff's Office and )

individually,

)

)

)

Defendants.

)

Case No. _ _ _ _ _ __
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Comes now the Plaintiff, by and through his undersigned attorney, and for his cause of action would state and allege as follows:
Introduction 1. "It is fundamental that the state cannot hold and physically punish an individual except in accordance with due process oflaw." Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977). This "[f]reedom from imprisonment -- from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint --lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects." Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).

. 1 Case 3:10-cv-00813 Document 1 Filed 08/30/10 Page 1 of 16 PageID #: 1

2. On June 14,2009, Plaintiff Carlos Ramos-Macario was arrested for driving on a suspended license. He was taken to the Rutherford County Jail, booked, and assigned a jail cell. When he was taken to court four days later, a judge sentenced him to five days in jail with credit for time served. On or around June 23,2009, Defendants' legal authority to detain Mr. Ramos-Macario had expired. Nevertheless, Defendants continued to detain him in the Rutherford County Jail, depriving him of his liberty, until October 27, 2009.
3. Plaintiff seeks compensation for the unconstitutional and tortious deprivation of his liberty without due process oflaw. On behalf of himself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff also seeks declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent Defendant from engaging in these unconstitutional and tortious deprivations ofliberty without due process oflaw in the future.
Jurisdiction and Venue 4. The jurisdiction of the Court is founded on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331(federal question), 1343(a)(3) and (4), 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (civil rights), and 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (declaratory relief). Jurisdiction over state law claims is based on this Court's supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 5. This court has personal jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) over the named defendants, all of whom are located in the Middle District of Tennessee, i.e., Truman Jones, Bob Asbury, and the Rutherford County Sheriffs Office - Rutherford County, Tennessee. 6. Venue is proper in this Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391 (b)(2), because Defendant Rutherford County Sheriffs Office - Rutherford County, Tennessee is located in this district, and on information and belief, it is alleged that each of the
2 Case 3:10-cv-00813 Document 1 Filed 08/30/10 Page 2 of 16 PageID #: 2

individual Defendants named in the preceding paragraph reside in this district and in the Nashville Division.
7. The causes of action alleged herein arise from factual allegations occurring in this judicial district.
8. This action arises under the Constitutions of the United States and Tennessee, under federal and state law, and under 42 USC §§ 1981, 1983, and 1988.
9. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages, attorneys' fees, expenses and costs, and such other relief that may be available to him.
Parties 10. Plaintiff resides in Smyrna, Rutherford County, Tennessee. 11. Defendant Truman Jones is currently the Sheriff of Rutherford County, Tennessee. He has ultimate supervisory authority over the Rutherford County Jail. He is sued in his official capacity for declaratory and injunctive relief and in his individual capacity for money damages. 12. Defendant Bob Asbury is a Chief Deputy in the Rutherford County Sheriffs Office and is the Administrator of Detention. In this capacity, he is the direct supervisor over the detention activities of the Rutherford County Jail. He is sued in his official capacity for declaratory and injunctive relief and in his individual capacity for money damages. 13. Rutherford County Sheriffs Office - Rutherford County, Tennessee (hereafter, RCSO) is the chieflaw enforcement agency of Rutherford County, Tennessee. It operates the jail and detention center for inmates in Rutherford County, Tennessee.
3 Case 3:10-cv-00813 Document 1 Filed 08/30/10 Page 3 of 16 PageID #: 3

14. John Doe 1, John Doe 2, John Doe 3, and John Doe 4 are RCSO officers assigned to the Detention Division inside the Rutherford County Jail. They are all sued in their official and individual capacities.
Factual Allegations A. Plaintiff's Arrest and Sentencing 15. At or around 4:00 A.M. on June 14, 2009, Plaintiff was arrested by the Smyrna Police Department for driving on a suspended license. (See Exhibit A, RCSO Intake Form). He was taken at that time to the Rutherford County Jail and processed to await a hearing in the Smyrna Municipal Court. 16. At his hearing in court on June 18, 2009, the judge sentenced him to 5 days in jail, with credit for time served.
B. The ICE Detainer 17. Sometime between June 14, 2009 and June, 19,2009, Defendant contacted U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") reporting Plaintiffs arrest and detention in the Ruthe~ford County Jail. 18. Sometime between June 14,2009 and June 19, 2009, ICE placed an immigrant detainer on Plaintiff pending his release on the local charge for driving without a license. Plaintiff does not admit, concede, or imply by this action that the detainer was legally authorized or correctly placed against him by ICE. 19. Upon information and belief, ICE sent Defendants a Form 1-247, Immigration Detainer - Notice of Action. A sample Form 1-247 is attached hereto as Exhibit B. ICE issued this immigration detainer pursuant to the authority and procedures set forth at 8 C.F.R. § 287.7. According to this regulation:
4 Case 3:10-cv-00813 Document 1 Filed 08/30/10 Page 4 of 16 PageID #: 4

"A detainer serves to advise another law enforcement agency that the Department
[of Homeland Security1seeks custody of an alien presently in the custody of that
agency, for the purpose of arresting and removing the alien. The detainer is a request that such agency advise the Department, prior to release of the alien, in order for the Department to arrange to assume custody, in situations when gaining immediate physical custody is either impracticable or impossible." 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a). 20. This regulation also explicitly states that immigration detainers authorize criminal justice agencies to detain the subject of a detainer "for a period not to exceed 48 hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays." 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d). In addition, Form 1-247 explicitly provides: "Federal Regulations (8 C.F.R. 287.7) require that you detain the alien for a period not to exceed 48 hours (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and Federal holidays) to provide adequate time for DHS to assume custody." 21. June 19, 2009 - the date upon which Plaintiff completed his sentence for driving on a suspended license - was a Friday. Defendants' legal authority to hold Plaintifffor 48 hours pursuant to a federal immigration detainer expired on or about Tuesday, June 23,2009.
C. Defendants' Liability 22. Beginning June 23,2009 and continuing until October 27,2009, Defendants imprisoned Plaintiff in the Rutherford County Jail without any legal authority. Defendants did so despite numerous entreaties from Plaintiff to various RCSO officials. 23. At no time between June 23,2009, and October 27,2009, was Plaintiff charged with any crime.
5 Case 3:10-cv-00813 Document 1 Filed 08/30/10 Page 5 of 16 PageID #: 5

24. At no time between June 23,2009, and October 27,2009, was Plaintiff permitted to make bailor post bond.
25. At no time between June 23,2009, and October 27, 2009, was Plaintiff permitted to contact his family, friends, or an attorney to inform them of his whereabouts.
26. On October 27,2009, ICE arrived and took Plaintiff from the custody ofthe Defendants. After processing by ICE, Plaintiff was released on his own recognizance.
27. From June 23,2009 until October 27,2009, a period exceeding four (4) months, Defendants illegally imprisoned Plaintiff and intentionally andlor negligently subjected him to severe emotional distress.
28. The acts alleged above were committed either on the instruction of Defendants Jones and Asbury, or with the knowledge and consent of these Defendants, or were thereafter approved and ratified by these Defendants.
Class Allegations 29. Plaintiff brings this Complaint as a class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff seeks to represent, pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2), a class of persons seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. This class is provisionally defined as follows: All (1) current prisoners ofRutheiford County Jail and (2) prisoners of Rutheiford County Jail released on or after August 30, 2009 who (a) have been subject to an immigration detainer; and (b) have completed their sentences such that they would otherwise be eligible for release; and (c) have been detained for more than forty-eight
6 Case 3:10-cv-00813 Document 1 Filed 08/30/10 Page 6 of 16 PageID #: 6

(48) hours (excluding Saturdays, Sundays and Federal holidays) after completion oftheir sentences made them eligible for release.
30. Upon information and belief, Defendants have engaged over an extended period of time in a pattern and practice of wrongfully and intentionally incarcerating prisoners after the expiration of the 48-hour "hold time" authorized by an immigration detainer. Whenever a person suspected of being foreign-born is booked into the Rutherford County Jail, the RCSO has an informal arrangement with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) whereby RCSO officials contact ICE and identify the person being held. ICE then processes this identification information through its databases and then makes a determination whether to issue a detainer as alleged above. IfICE issues a detainer, it authorizes RCSO to hold the subject for up to forty-eight (48) hours in RCSO custody. IfICE does not arrive within that 48-hour period to assume custody of the subject, RCSO is obligated to release the subject.
31. Upon information and belief, ICE is frequently unable to make transportation arrangements to enable assumption of ICE custody within the 48-hour detainer period, but despite this, RCSO continues to detain the subject ofthe 48-hour detainer beyond the 48-hour detainer period.
32. Upon information and belief, Defendants Jones and Asbury have instituted no rule, policy or procedure for identifying prisoners whose immigration detainers have expired.
33. Upon information and belief, Defendants Jones and Asbury have instituted no rule policy or procedure for training RSCO staff on the identification and release prisoners with expired immigration detainers.
7 Case 3:10-cv-00813 Document 1 Filed 08/30/10 Page 7 of 16 PageID #: 7

34. Upon infonnation and belief, Defendants Jones and Asbury have instituted no policy or procedure by which prisoners whose immigration detainers have expired and who have completed their sentences may be alerted to and challenge their continued, unlawful detention in the Rutherford County Jail.
35. All of the prerequisites to a class action as stated in Rule 23(a) are satisfied by the class:
a. The class includes a number of members unknown to Plaintiff, but well known to Defendants, of persons who have been detained beyond the time authorized by law. The class is likely to be so numerous, and are so geographically dispersed, that joinder of all members is impracticable.
b. There are questions oflaw and fact common to the Plaintiffs case. The common facts include the illegal incarceration ofpersons beyond the time authorized by law based upon the existence of an ICE detainer. Common legal questions include (1) whether the incarceration of class members exceeded legal authority; (2) whether the excessive incarceration to which class members were sUbjected (a) violates the Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment prohibition against illegal seizure, (b) violates the Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment; (c) violates the Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment prohibition against deprivation of procedural and substantive due process, (d) violates the equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, (e) constitutes false imprisonment without a mittimus actionable under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, (f) constitutes negligence actionable under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act
8 Case 3:10-cv-00813 Document 1 Filed 08/30/10 Page 8 of 16 PageID #: 8

and Tennessee common law, and (f) constitutes a reckless and deliberate and careless failure to implement essential and appropriate policies, training and supervision.
c. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the class; the common facts are the test for membership in the classes, and the common facts give rise to the common legal questions.
d. The named Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class: he has no interests antagonistic to the class and, like all class members who continue to reside in or travel through Rutherford County, Tennessee, may in the future again be subject to illegal seizure and false imprisonment; they seek declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of the entire class and such relief will benefit all members of the class.
e. The named Plaintiff is represented by competent counsel, fully capable of adequately representing and protecting the interests of the class.
36. The class satisfies Rule 23(b)(2) because the defendants have engaged in a course of conduct common to all members of the class, and final declaratory and injunctive relief in favor of the plaintiff class is therefore appropriate.
Necessity for Injunctive Relief 37. Plaintiffpresently resides in Rutherford County, Tennessee. 38. Plaintiff and the class he seeks to represent are threatened with substantial, immediate and irreparable injury at the hands of defendants. Upon information and belief, Defendants began their illegal practices of incarcerating persons subject to an immigration detainer in the Rutherford County Jail beyond the legal dates set for their release before the incidents involving the named Plaintiff, and Defendants continue to
9 Case 3:10-cv-00813 Document 1 Filed 08/30/10 Page 9 of 16 PageID #: 9

engage in these practices against the numerous members of the class described herein. Plaintiff avers that he may again be subjected to incarceration in the Rutherford County Jail and could again be detained illegally. Plaintiff further avers that the class he represents will be sUbjected to incarceration in the Rutherford County Jail and could be detained illegally. Unless restrained by this Court, Defendants will continue their unlawful practices.
39. Plaintiff and the class he represents have suffered irreparable injury and, in the absence of injunctive relief, will continue to suffer irreparable injury. He has no adequate remedy at law.
COUNT 1VIOLATIONS OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO FREEDOM FROM ILLEGAL SEIZURE, EIGHTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO BE FREE OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT AND 14TH AMENDMENT UNDER THE
U.S. CONSTITUTION 40. The allegations of paragraphs 1-39 are hereby incorporated by reference and are realleged as if set forth fully. 41. Each of the Defendants, individually and in concert with the others, acted under pretense and color oflaw and in their official capacity, but such acts were beyond the scope of their jurisdiction and without authorization oflaw. Each defendant, individually and in concert with the others, acted willfully, knowingly, and/or recklessly and with specific intent to deprive Plaintiff of his right to freedom from illegal seizure and detention of his person, papers, and effects, his right to freedom from unlawful detention and imprisonment, and cruel and unusual punishment, all of which rights are secured to Plaintiff and all those similarly situated by the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution ofthe United States, and by 42 USC §§ 1983 and 1988.
10 Case 3:10-cv-00813 Document 1 Filed 08/30/10 Page 10 of 16 PageID #: 10

42. As a direct and proximate result of these violations of his constitutional rights by Defendants, Plaintiff suffered personal injuries, emotional distress, and loss of mcome.
COUNT II VIOLATIONS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO PROCEDURAL AND
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND 14TH AMENDMENT UNDER THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
43. The allegations of paragraphs 1-42 are hereby incorporated by reference and are realleged as if set forth fully.
44. Procedural Due Process - Each Defendant, individually and in concert with the others, acted willfully, knowingly, and/or recklessly and with specific intent to deprive Plaintiff of his right not to be deprived ofliberty without complying with the procedural requirements of due process oflaw by illegally detaining Plaintiff without proper authorization by a court or a federal detainer to cover the period of incarceration.
45. Substantive Due Process - Each Defendant, individually and in concert with the others, acted willfully, knowingly, and/or recklessly and with specific intent to deprive Plaintiff of his fundamental right not to be deprived of liberty. This conduct was performed in such a manner as to be manifestly and grossly unjust to the extent that it shocks the conscience, falls outside the standards of civilized decency, and offends those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions ofjustice of English-speaking peoples; as such, this conduct was a violation of Plaintiffs right to substantive due process.
11
Case 3:10-cv-00813 Document 1 Filed 08/30/10 Page 11 of 16 PageID #: 11

46. Each Defendant acted under pretense and color oflaw and in their official capacity, but such acts were beyond the scope of their jurisdiction and without authorization oflaw.
47. These due process rights are secured to Plaintiff by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and by 42 USC §§ 1983 and 1988.
COUNT IIIFALSE IMPRISONMENT ACTIONABLE UNDER TENNESSEE GOVERNMENTAL TORT LIABILITY ACT AT TCA 29-20-101 48. The allegations of paragraphs 1-47 are hereby incorporated by reference and are realleged as if set forth fully. 49. Plaintiff avers that Defendants breached a duty of care owed to Plaintiff, so as not to deprive them of their personal liberty, by intentionally restraining or detaining Plaintiff without just cause and without mittimus from a court. 50. Plaintiff avers that Defendants, without probable cause, wrongfully and unlawfully detained and restrained Plaintiff against his will through use of force for a period of approximately four (4) months. 51. Plaintiff avers that Defendants are liable to him for false imprisonment. 52. As a direct and proximate result of the false imprisonment by Defendants, Plaintiff suffered personal injuries, emotional distress, and loss of income.
12 Case 3:10-cv-00813 Document 1 Filed 08/30/10 Page 12 of 16 PageID #: 12

COUNT IVNEGLIGENCE ACTIONABLE UNDER TENNESSEE GOVERNMENTAL TORT LIABILITY ACT AT TCA 29-20-101 53. The allegations of paragraphs I-52 are hereby incorporated by reference and are realleged as if set forth fully. 54. Each Defendant owed Plaintiff a duty to use due care during the time of his incarceration in the Rutherford County Jail. 55. In committing the aforementioned acts and/or omissions, each Defendant negligently breached said duty to use due care, which directly and proximately resulted in the injuries and damages to the Plaintiff as alleged herein.
COUNT VFAILURE TO IMPLEMENT APPROPRIATE AND ESSENTIAL POLICIES, TRAINING, AND SUPERVISION
ACTIONABLE UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 56. The allegations of paragraphs 1-55 are hereby incorporated by reference and are realleged as if set forth fully. 57. Defendants implicitly or explicitly adopted and implemented careless and reckless policies, customs, or practices that included continuing the incarceration of detainees beyond the time authorized by law for their detention in the Rutherford County Jail. 58. Defendants failed to train and supervise adequately employees ofRCSO to insure that detainees were timely released when their legally imposed detention period was ended. This failure by Defendants to train and supervise RCSO employees amounts to deliberate, reckless, and callous indifference to the constitutional rights of Plaintiff.
13 Case 3:10-cv-00813 Document 1 Filed 08/30/10 Page 13 of 16 PageID #: 13

59. Defendants had notice that their policies, training procedures, and supervision were inadequate and likely to result in constitutional violations.
60. Defendants demonstrated such a degree of failure to train, supervise, and discipline their subordinates that said failure constituted a reckless and callous indifference to the constitutional rights of citizens and residents of the United States, including Plaintiff.
61. The failure of Defendants to implement adequate programs to track detention and release times, and to train and supervise their subordinates was the proximate cause of the constitutional infringements committed by their subordinates against Plaintiff.
62. Defendants either authorized or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional actions of their subordinates, and they were deliberately indifferent to constitutional violations likely to result from serious deficiencies in the detention and scheduled release tracking program as well as the training program of personnel who staff the Rutherford County Jail.
63. As a result of this deliberate indifference to the Plaintiffs rights, Plaintiff has been injured. In depriving Plaintiff of his rights, Defendants acted under color of state law. This deprivation under color of state law is actionable under and may be redressed by 42 U.S.c. § 1983.
COUNT VIFAILURE TO IMPLEMENT APPROPRIATE AND ESSENTIAL POLICIES, TRAINING, AND SUPERVISION ACTIONABLE UNDER THE TENNESSEE GOVERNMENTAL TORT LIABILITY ACT AND TENNESSEE COMMON LAW 64. The allegations of paragraphs 1-63 are hereby incorporated by reference and are realleged as if set forth fully.
14 Case 3:10-cv-00813 Document 1 Filed 08/30/10 Page 14 of 16 PageID #: 14

65. Each Defendant owed Plaintiff a duty to use due care at or about the time of the aforementioned conduct.
66. Defendants Jones and Asbury negligently supervised other Defendants by failing to provide proper training and supervision and failing to implement adequate systems to provide for the timely release of Plaintiff.
67. In committing the aforementioned acts or omissions, each Defendant negligently breached said duty to use due care, which directly and proximately resulted in the injuries and damages to Plaintiffs as alleged herein.
PRAYERS FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, premises considered, Plaintiff demands: 1. That process issue to the Defendants and that they be required to answer in the time allowed by law. 2. That a declaratory judgment be rendered in favor of the Plaintiff and the class he represents and against the Defendants on all causes of action asserted herein. 3. That a preliminary, and then a permanent injunction barring all defendants and their officers, agents, servants, employees and attorneys and those persons in active concert or participation with them from illegally detaining Plaintiff and class members he represents until such time as Defendants able to provide adequate systems, training, and supervision of its employees and agents. 4. That Plaintiff be awarded those damages to which it may appear they are entitled by the proof submitted in this cause for their physical and mental pain and suffering, both past and future; loss of enjoyment of life; and medical and psychological expenses, both past and future.
15 Case 3:10-cv-00813 Document 1 Filed 08/30/10 Page 15 of 16 PageID #: 15

5. That Plaintiff be awarded punitive damages against the Defendants. 6. That Plaintiff be awarded reasonable expenses in this litigation, including reasonable attorney and expert fees, pursuant to 42 USC § 1988 (b) and (c). 7. That Plaintiff receive any other further and general reliefto which it may appear he is entitled.
(=~su;~
Elliott Ozment, Attorney at Law Immigration Law Offices of Elliott Ozment 1214 Murfreesboro Pike Nashville, TN 37212 (615) 321-8888 (0) (615) 321-5230 (F) Email: elliott@ozmentlaw.com
16 Case 3:10-cv-00813 Document 1 Filed 08/30/10 Page 16 of 16 PageID #: 16

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

CARLOS RAMOS-MACARIO, individually, )

and on behalf of all persons similarly situated; )

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

TRUMAN JONES, in his official capacity as )

Sheriff of Rutherford County and his individual)

capacity; BOB ASBURY, in his official capacity )

as Chief Deputy and Administrator of Detention )

in the Rutherford County Sheriff's Office and )

his individual capacity; RUTHERFORD

)

COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE -

)

RUTHERFORD COUNTY, TENNESSEE;

)

JOHN DOE 1, JOHN DOE 2, and JOHN

)

DOE 3, in their official capacities as employees )

of the Rutherford County Sheriff's Office and )

individually,

)

)

)

Defendants.

)

Case No. 3:10-cv-00813
SECOND AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Comes now the Plaintiff, by and through his undersigned attorney, and for his cause of action would state and allege as follows:
Introduction 1. "It is fundamental that the state cannot hold and physically punish an individual except in accordance with due process ofIaw." Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977). This "[fJreedom from imprisonment -- from government custody, detention, or other fOTITIS of physical restraint -- lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects." Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).

I
Case 3:10-cv-00813 Document 17 Filed 10/21/10 Page 1 of 22 PageID #: 146

2. On June 14,2009, Plaintiff Carlos Ramos-Macario was arrested for driving on a suspended license. He was taken to the Rutherford County Jail, booked, and assigned a jail cell. When he was taken to court four days later, a judge sentenced him to five days in jail with credit for time served. On or around June 23,2009, Defendants' legal autholity to detain Mr. Ramos-Macario had expired. Nevertheless, Defendants continued to detain him in the Rutherford County Jail, depriving him of his liberty, until October 27,2009.
3. On behalf of himself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff seeks compensation for the unconstitutional and tortious deprivation of his liberty without due process oflaw. On behalf of himself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff also seeks declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent Defendant from engaging in these unconstitutional and tortious deprivations of liberty without due process of law in the future.
Jurisdiction and Venue 4. The jurisdiction of the Court is founded on 28 U.S.c. §§ 1331(federal question), 1343(a)(3) and (4), 42 U.S.c. § 2000d-1 (civil rights), and 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (declaratory relief). Jurisdiction over state law claims is based on this Court's supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 5. This court has personal jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) over the named defendants, all of whom are located in the Middle District of Tennessee, i.e., Truman Jones, Bob Asbury, and the Rutherford County Sheriffs Office - Rutherford County, Tennessee. 6. Venue is proper in this Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.c. §§ 1391 (b)(2), because Defendant Rutherford County Sheriffs Office - Rutherford County, Tennessee is located in this district, and on information and belief, it is alleged that each of the
2 Case 3:10-cv-00813 Document 17 Filed 10/21/10 Page 2 of 22 PageID #: 147

individual Defendants named in the preceding paragraph reside in this district and in the Nashville Division.
7. The causes of action alleged herein arise from factual allegations occurring in this judicial district.
8. This action arises under the Constitutions of the United States and Tennessee, under federal and state law, and under 42 USC §§ 1981,1983, and 1988.
9. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages, attorneys' fees, expenses and costs, and such other relief that may be available to him.
Parties 10. Plaintiff resides in Smyrna, Rutherford County, Tennessee. 11. Defendant Truman Jones is currently the Sheriff of Rutherford County, Tennessee. He has ultimate supervisory authority over the Rutherford County Jail. He is sued in his official capacity for declaratory and injunctive relief and in his individual capacity for money damages. 12. Defendant Bob Asbury is a Chief Deputy in the Rutherford County Sheriff's Office and is the Administrator of Detention. In this capacity, he is the direct supervisor over the detention activities of the Rutherford County Jail. He is sued in his official capacity for declaratory and injunctive relief and in his individual capacity for money damages. 13. Rutherford County Sheriffs Office- Rutherford County, Tennessee (hereafter, RCSO) is the chieflaw enforcement agency of Rutherford County, Tennessee. It operates the jail and detention center for inmates in Rutherford County, Tennessee.
3 Case 3:10-cv-00813 Document 17 Filed 10/21/10 Page 3 of 22 PageID #: 148

14. John Doe I, John Doe 2, John Doe 3, and John Doe 4 are RCSO officers assigned to the Detention Division inside the Rutherford County Jail. They are all sued in their official and individual capacities.
Factual Allegations A. Plaintiff's Arrest and Sentencing 15. At or around 4:00 A.M. on June 14, 2009, Plaintiff was arrested by the Smyrna Police Department for driving on a suspended license. (See Exhibit A, RCSO Intake Form). He was taken at that time to the Rutherford County Jail and processed to await a hearing in the Smyrna Municipal Court. 16. At his hearing in court on June 18, 2009, the judge sentenced him to 5 days in jail, with credit for time served.
B. The ICE Detainer 17. Sometime between June 14, 2009 and June, 19,2009, Defendant contacted U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") reporting Plaintiffs arrest and detention in the Rutherford County Jail. 18. Sometime between June 14,2009 and June 19, 2009, ICE placed an immigrant detainer on Plaintiff pending his release on the local charge for driving without a license. Plaintiff does not admit, concede, or imply by this action that the detainer was legally authorized or correctly placed against him by ICE. 19. Upon information and belief, ICE sent Defendants a Form 1-247, Immigration Detainer - Notice of Action. A sample Form 1-247 is attached hereto as Exhibit B. ICE issued this immigration detainer pursuant to the authority and procedures set forth at 8 C.F.R. § 287.7. According to this regulation:
4 Case 3:10-cv-00813 Document 17 Filed 10/21/10 Page 4 of 22 PageID #: 149

"A detainer serves to advise another law enforcement agency that the Department [of Romeland Security] seeks custody of an alien presently in the custody of that agency, for the purpose of arresting and removing the alien. The detainer is a request that such agency advise the Department, prior to release of the alien, in order for the Department to arrange to assume custody, in situations when gaining immediate physical custody is either impracticable or impossible." 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a). 20. This regulation also explicitly states that immigration detainers authorize criminal justice agencies to detain the subject of a detainer "for a period not to exceed 48 hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays." 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d). In addition, Form 1-247 explicitly provides: "Federal Regulations (8 C.F.R. 287.7) require that you detain the alien for a period not to exceed 48 hours (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and Federal holidays) to provide adequate time for DRS to assume custody." 21. June 19, 2009 - the date upon which Plaintiff completed his sentence for driving on a suspended license - was a Friday. Defendants' legal authority to hold Plaintifffor 48 hours pursuant to a federal immigration detainer expired on or about Tuesday, June 23, 2009.
C. Defendants' Liability 22. Beginning June 23, 2009 and continuing until October 27,2009, Defendants imprisoned Plaintiff in the Rutherford County Jail without any legal authority. Defendants did so despite numerous entreaties from Plaintiff to various RCSO officials. 23. At no time between June 23,2009, and October 27,2009, was Plaintiff charged with any crime.
5 Case 3:10-cv-00813 Document 17 Filed 10/21/10 Page 5 of 22 PageID #: 150

24. At no time between June 23, 2009, and October 27,2009, was Plaintiff permitted to make bail or post bond.
25. On October 27,2009, ICE arrived and took Plaintiff from the custody of the Defendants. After processing by ICE, Plaintiff was released on his own recognizance.
26. From June 23,2009 until October 27,2009, a period exceeding four (4) months, Defendants illegally imprisoned Plaintiff and intentionally and/or negligently subjected him to severe emotional distress.
27. The acts alleged above were committed either on the instruction of Defendants Jones and Asbury, or with the knowledge and consent of these Defendants, or were thereafter approved and ratified by these Defendants.
D. Defendants' Prior Notice and Repeated Violations of Clearly Established Constitntional Rights
28. No later than May 30,2007, Defendant Jones, Defendant Asbury, and Defendant RCSO were on actual notice that (a) ICE Detainers expire after forty-eight hours (excluding weekends and Federal holidays); and (b) they have no legal authority to continue detaining a prisoner whose ICE detainer expires; and (c) unlawful detention of a prisoner violates that prisoner's right under the U.S. and Tennessee Constitutions to be free from restraint on liberty without due process oflaw.
29. On May 30,2007, Chancellor Robert E. Corlew, III, Rutherford County, Tennessee, issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus to Defendant Jones, ordering him to provide a legal basis for the prolonged detention of Heraclio Palomo in the Rutherford County Jail. See attached Exhibit C, Writ of Habeas Corpus in Palomo v. Jones, No. 07-0722CV
(Rutherford Co. Chancery ct. May 30, 2007). Mr. Palomo had been held pursuant to an
ICE detainer lodged on or around May 25,2007.
6 Case 3:10-cv-00813 Document 17 Filed 10/21/10 Page 6 of 22 PageID #: 151

30. After hearing testimony from Defendant Jones and another witness,
Chancellor Corlew ordered Mr. Palomo's immediate release from custody. See attached
Exhibit D, Order, Palomo v. Jones (Jun. 6, 2007). The Court concluded:
I'm not aware of any authority we have to hold him... And unless some basis is shown for holding the gentleman further, I'm not aware of any discretion that we can constitutionally - of course, one can't be held on an indefinite basis under the current law and federal statute, can't be held, as we understand the law, no more than 48 hours without some criminal charge being against him on the state or federal level or some other unbelievable circumstance which, frankly, doesn't come to my mind at that moment. .. Thus, I think it's my duty here today, as far as any other reason for the holding of Mr. Palomo, to allow him to be released ...
See attached Exhibit E. Certified Transcript of Proceedings in Palomo v. Jones
(hereafter, "Palomo Transcript") at 40-41.
31. Defendant Jones stated under oath that he understood ICE detainers are
limited by the terms of the federal regulations authorizing the detainer for a period not to
exceed 48 hours. Palomo Transcript at 32-33.
32. While testifying under oath, Defendant Jones acknowledged his awareness of
a prior petition for the Writ of Habeas Corpus filed against him in a previous case
brought by undersigned counsel. He indicated that Defendant Asbury had researched
RCSO's authority to hold Mr. Palomo past the 48-hour detainer period. Specifically, he
was asked:
Q: WeI!, Sheriff, after the last case, did you ask your attorneys to -- or ask anybody on your staff to try to find out more information in light of this -- of that petition last week so that you would be prepared for these petitions when they are filed?
A. Major Asbury did make some calls and we still have not come up with the information that we need...
Palomo Transcript at 36.
7 Case 3:10-cv-00813 Document 17 Filed 10/21/10 Page 7 of 22 PageID #: 152

33. Thus, for over three years prior to the filing of this action, Defendants Jones, Asbury, and RCSO were on actual notice that holding prisoners in the Rutherford County Jail after their ICE detainers expire is illegal and in violation of the U.S. Constitution.
34. Defendants even received actual notice of the sorts of ameliorative steps they should take to avoid these illegal detentions in the future. Specifically, Chancellor Corlew suggested the failure release Mr. Palomo was due to:
an administrative issue at the Sheriffs Department and it may be helpful to start some tickler anytime somebody comes into custody that 48 hours later, either he needs to be released or if there are those who are watching and are vigilant on behalf of an individual, they should anticipate a petition such as Mr. Ozment has filed on behalf of this gentlemen here today. Palomo Transcript at 40. By willfully and recklessly disregarding the Chancellor's admonition, Defendants necessitated the action Plaintiff brings on behalf ofhimself and the class he seeks to represent.
Class Allegations 35. Plaintiff brings this Complaint as a class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
(a) Plaintiff seeks to represent, pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2), a class of persons seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. This class is provisionally defined as follows: All (1) current prisoners ofRutherford County Jail and (2) prisoners of Rutherford County Jail released on or after August 30, 2009 who (a) have been subject to an immigration detainer; and (b) have completed their sentences such that they would otherwise be eligible for release; and (c) have been detained for
8
Case 3:10-cv-00813 Document 17 Filed 10/21/10 Page 8 of 22 PageID #: 153

more than forty-eight (48) hours (excluding Saturdays, Sundays and Federal holidays) after completion oftheir sentences made them eligible for release.
(b) Plaintiff also seeks to represent, pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), a class of persons seeking damages. This class is provisionally defined as follows: All (1) current prisoners ofRutherford County Jail and (2) prisoners of Rutherford County Jail released on or after August 30, 2009 who (a) have been subject to an immigration detainer; and (b) have completed their sentences such that they would otherwise be eligible for release; and (c) have been detained for more than forty-eight (48) hours (excluding Saturdays, Sundays and Federal holidays) after completion oftheir sentences made them eligible for release; and (d) have suffered damages, both economic and non-economic, as a direct and foreseeable consequence oftheir illegal incarceration. 36. Upon infonnation and belief, Defendants have engaged over an extended period oftime in a pattern and practice of wrongfully and intentionally incarcerating prisoners after the expiration of the 48-hour "hold time" authorized by an immigration detainer. Whenever a person suspected of being foreign-born is booked into the Rutherford County Jail, the RCSO has an infonnal arrangement with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) whereby RCSO officials contact ICE and identify the person being held. ICE then processes this identification infonnation through its databases and then makes a detennination whether to issue a detainer as alleged above. InCE issues a detainer, it authorizes RCSO to hold the subject for up to forty-eight (48) hours in RCSO custody. InCE does not arrive within that 48-hour period to assume custody of the subject, RCSO is obligated to release the subject.
9 Case 3:10-cv-00813 Document 17 Filed 10/21/10 Page 9 of 22 PageID #: 154

37. Upon infonnation and belief, on occasions when ICE is unable to make arrangements to take the subjects oflCE detainers into custody within the 48-hour period, RCSO had continued to detain these subjects beyond the 48-hour detainer period.
38. Upon infonnation and belief, Defendants Jones and Asbury have instituted no rule, policy or procedure for identifying prisoners whose immigration detainers have expired.
39. Upon infonnation and belief, Defendants Jones and Asbury have instituted no rule policy or procedure for training RCSO staff on the identification and release prisoners with expired immigration detainers.
40. Upon infonnation and belief, Defendants Jones and Asbury have instituted no policy or procedure by which prisoners whose immigration detainers have expired and who have completed their sentences may be alerted to and challenge their continued, unlawful detention in the Rutherford County Jail.
41. All ofthe prerequisites to a class action as stated in Rule 23(a) are satisfied by the class:
a. The class includes a number of members unknown to Plaintiff, but well known to Defendants, of persons who have been detained beyond the time authorized by law. The class is likely to be so numerous, and is so geographically dispersed, that joinder of all members is impracticable.
b. There are questions oflaw and fact common to the Plaintiff's case. The common facts include the illegal incarceration of persons beyond the time authorized by law based upon the existence of an ICE detainer. Common legal questions include (i) whether the incarceration of class members exceeded legal authority; (2) whether the
10 Case 3:10-cv-00813 Document 17 Filed 10/21/10 Page 10 of 22 PageID #: 155

excessive incarceration to which class members were subjected (a) violates the Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment prohibition against illegal seizure, (b) violates the Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment; (c) violates the Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment prohibition against deprivation of procedural and substantive due process, (d) violates the equal protection provisions ofthe Fourteenth Amendment, (e) constitutes false imprisonment without a mittimus actionable under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, (f) constitutes negligence actionable under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act and Tennessee common law, and (f) constitutes a reckless and deliberate and careless failure to implement essential and appropriate policies, training and supervision.
c. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the class; the common facts are the test for membership in the classes, and the common facts give rise to the common legal questions.
d. The named Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class: he has no interests antagonistic to the class and, like all class members who continue to reside in or travel through Rutherford County, Tennessee, may in the future again be subject to illegal seizure and false imprisonment; they seek declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of the entire class and such relief will benefit all members of the class.
e. The named Plaintiff is represented by competent counsel, fully capable of adequately representing and protecting the interests of the class.
II Case 3:10-cv-00813 Document 17 Filed 10/21/10 Page 11 of 22 PageID #: 156

42. The class satisfies Rule 23(b)(2) because the defendants have engaged in a course of conduct common to all members of the class, and final declaratory and injunctive relief in favor of the plaintiff class is therefore appropriate.
Necessity for Injunctive Relief 43. Plaintiff presently resides in Rutherford County, Tennessee. 44. Plaintiff and the class he seeks to represent are threatened with substantial, immediate and irreparable injury at the hands of defendants. Upon information and belief, Defendants began their illegal practices of incarcerating persons subject to an immigration detainer in the Rutherford County Jail beyond the legal dates set for their release before the incidents involving the named Plaintiff, and Defendants continue to engage in these practices against the numerous members of the class described herein. Plaintiff avers that he may again be subjected to incarceration in the Rutherford County Jail and could again be detained illegally. Plaintiff further avers that the class he represents will be subjected to incarceration in the Rutherford County Jail and could be detained illegally. Unless restrained by this Court, Defendants will continue their unlawful practices. 45. Plaintiff and the class he represents have suffered irreparable injury and, in the absence of injunctive relief, will continue to suffer irreparable injury. He has no adequate remedy at law.
Injury to Plaintiff 46. As a direct and foreseeable result of his illegal detention, Plaintiff has suffered over $20,000 in economic damages. These losses include, but are not limited to:
12
Case 3:10-cv-00813 Document 17 Filed 10/21/10 Page 12 of 22 PageID #: 157

-~-~~~~
a. Lost wages in the amount of approximately $10,000. Plaintiff earns approximately $100 for each day of work. He works five or six days per week. He was illegally detained from June 23, 2009, through October 27,2009 (over four months), resulting in a loss of approximately $4000. Because of his emaciated condition, general poor health, and psychological trauma, Plaintiff was unable to work for approximately four weeks after his release, resulting in a loss of approximately $2000;
b. Loss of virtually all of his earthly possessions as a result of being evicted while he was illegally imprisoned, and the consequent removal ofthose belongings from his apartment. In addition to his rental deposit ($350) and deposits for utilities ($250), Plaintiffs lost belongings include, but are not limited to, Plaintiffs bed and bedding ($200), all his clothes and shoes ($1,500), a gold necklace ($1,235), a 32" television ($150), a DVD Player ($50), a stereo system ($300), and over 45 compact discs and DVDs ($200);
c. The loss of Plaintiffs automobile, which he was forced to leave in a parking lot after the traffic stop, and which Smyrna Police Department Officers assured him he could retrieve upon his release. Plaintiff purchased the automobile for $2,000, and the contents therein, the value of which was approximately $545;
d. The replacement cost of purchasing and registering a new automobile, which Plaintiff bought for $2,200, and registered for approximately $145;
e. The cost ofre-instating Plaintiff s car insurance, estimated to be $225; and f. Loss of Plaintiffs cellular phone ($250), and the replacement cost of activating a new phone ($350).
13 Case 3:10-cv-00813 Document 17 Filed 10/21/10 Page 13 of 22 PageID #: 158

47. As a direct and foreseeable result of his illegal detention, Plaintiff has suffered severe and extreme pain and suffering and emotional distress:
a. Plaintiff suffered severe and extreme strain on his physical health as a result of his time in jail. When he entered the Rutherford County Jail, records indicate Plaintiff weighed over 140 pounds. When he left four months later, he weighed less than 105 pounds. During his illegal detention, Plaintiff vomited more than twenty times, but received no treatment. He had constant headaches for which he was provided no treatment. He slept only two or three hours each night because he was terrified by the screams and taunts of other inmates, and was haunted by the knowledge that his wife and three small children had no way of knowing ifhe was dead or alive. When he did drift off, he was awakened by nightmares of his confinement. Consequently, Plaintiff suffered over four months of sleep deprivation and its attendant physiological and psychological consequences. Though the nightmare of his illegal detention is over, Plaintiff s nightmares and trouble sleeping still persist.
Approximately five days before his release, Plaintiffs feet were in such pain that he was unable to walk. He was taken to an infirmary, where a nurse treated him with a pill. He received another pill later than afternoon. Nonetheless, when he was finally freed from captivity, he could only limp out ofjail because of the tremendous pain in his feet. This condition continued for approximately two weeks after Plaintiff was released from his illegal detention.
b. Plaintiff has suffered severe emotional distress and deep psychological trauma, both during and after his illegal detention. Not long into his detention, he became severely depressed. He suffers from nightmares, intrusive thoughts, and extreme
14 Case 3:10-cv-00813 Document 17 Filed 10/21/10 Page 14 of 22 PageID #: 159

sensitivity to loud noises or yelling. He has still not been able to share the details of his illegal detention with his wife and children because of the shame and terror he feels whenever he recalls his time illegally detained in the Rutherford County Jail.
c. Plaintiffs time spent in illegal detention has left a deep and profoundly painful scar on his psyche that will never fully heal, and for which no amount of money can ever fully compensate him. "To a prisoner, time behind bars is not some theoretical or mathematical concept. It is something real, even terrifYing." Barber v. Thomas, _ U.S. _ _ (Jun. 7, 2010) (Kennedy, J. dissenting).
COUNT 1VIOLATIONS OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO FREEDOM FROM ILLEGAL SEIZURE, EIGHTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO BE FREE OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT AND 14TH AMENDMENT UNDER THE
U.S. CONSTITUTION 48. The allegations of paragraphs 1-47 are hereby incorporated by reference and are realleged as if set forth fully. 49. Each of the Defendants, individually and in concert with the others, acted under pretense and color oflaw and in their official capacity, but such acts were beyond the scope of their jurisdiction and without authorization oflaw. Each defendant, individually and in concert with the others, acted willfully, knowingly, and/or recklessly and with specific intent to deprive Plaintiff of his right to freedom from illegal seizure and detention of his person, papers, and effects, his right to freedom from unlawful detention and imprisonment, and cruel and unusual punishment, all of which rights are secured to Plaintiff and all those similarly situated by the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and by 42 USC §§ 1983 and 1988.
15 Case 3:10-cv-00813 Document 17 Filed 10/21/10 Page 15 of 22 PageID #: 160

50. As a direct and proximate result of these violations of his constitutional rights by Defendants, Plaintiff suffered personal injuries, emotional distress, and loss of mcome.
COUNT II VIOLATIONS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO PROCEDURAL AND
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND 14TH AMENDMENT UNDER THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
51. The allegations of paragraphs I-50 are hereby incorporated by reference and are realleged as if set forth fully.
52. Procedural Due Process - Each Defendant, individually and in concert with the others, acted willfully, knowingly, and/or recklessly and with specific intent to deprive Plaintiff of his right not to be deprived of liberty without complying with the procedural requirements of due process oflaw by illegally detaining Plaintiff without proper authorization by a court or a federal detainer to cover the period of incarceration.
53. Substantive Due Process - Each Defendant, individually and in concert with the others, acted willfully, knowingly, and/or recklessly and with specific intent to deprive Plaintiff of his fundamental right not to be deprived of liberty. This conduct was performed in such a manner as to be manifestly and grossly unjust to the extent that it shocks the conscience, falls outside the standards of civilized decency, and offends those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples; as such, this conduct was a violation of Plaintiffs right to substantive due process.
16 Case 3:10-cv-00813 Document 17 Filed 10/21/10 Page 16 of 22 PageID #: 161

54. Each Defendant acted under pretense and color oflaw and in their official capacity, but such acts were beyond the scope of their jurisdiction and without authorization oflaw.
55. These due process rights are secured to Plaintiff by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and by 42 USC §§ 1983 and 1988.
COUNT IIIFALSE IMPRISONMENT ACTIONABLE UNDER TENNESSEE GOVERNMENTAL TORT LIABILITY ACT AT TCA 29-20-101 56. The allegations of paragraphs I-55 are hereby incorporated by reference and are realleged as if set forth fully. 57. Plaintiff avers that Defendants breached a duty of care owed to Plaintiff, so as not to deprive them of their personal liberty, by intentionally restraining or detaining Plaintiff without just cause and without mittimus from a court. 58. Plaintiff avers that Defendants, without probable cause, wrongfully and unlawfully detained and restrained Plaintiff against his will through use of force for a period of approximately four (4) months. 59. Plaintiff avers that Defendants are liable to him for false imprisonment. 60. As a direct and proximate result of the false imprisonment by Defendants, Plaintiff suffered personal injuries, emotional distress, and loss of income.
17 Case 3:10-cv-00813 Document 17 Filed 10/21/10 Page 17 of 22 PageID #: 162

COUNT IVNEGLIGENCE ACTIONABLE UNDER TENNESSEE GOVERNMENTAL TORT LIABILITY ACT AT TCA 29-20-101 61. The allegations of paragraphs 1-60 are hereby incorporated by reference and are realleged as if set forth fully. 62. Each Defendant owed Plaintiff a duty to use due care during the time of his incarceration in the Rutherford County Jail. 63. In committing the aforementioned acts and/or omissions, each Defendant negligently breached said duty to use due care, which directly and proximately resulted in the injuries and damages to the Plaintiff as alleged herein.
COUNTVFAILURE TO IMPLEMENT APPROPRIATE AND ESSENTIAL POLICIES, TRAINING, AND SUPERVISION
ACTIONABLE UNDER 42 U.S.c. § 1983 64. The allegations of paragraphs 1-63 are hereby incorporated by reference and are realleged as if set forth fully. 65. Defendants implicitly or explicitly adopted and implemented careless and reckless policies, customs, or practices that included continuing the incarceration of detainees beyond the time authorized by law for their detention in the Rutherford County Jail. 66. Defendants failed to train and supervise adequately employees of RCSO to insure that detainees were timely released when their legally imposed detention period was ended. This failure by Defendants to train and supervise RCSO employees amounts to deliberate, reckless, and callous indifference to the constitutional rights of Plaintiff.
18 Case 3:10-cv-00813 Document 17 Filed 10/21/10 Page 18 of 22 PageID #: 163

67. Defendants had notice that their policies, training procedures, and supervision were inadequate and likely to result in constitutional violations.
68. Defendants demonstrated such a degree of failure to train, supervise, and discipline their subordinates that said failure constituted a reckless and callous indifference to the constitutional rights of citizens and residents of the United States, including Plaintiff.
69. The failure of Defendants to implement adequate programs to track detention and release times, and to train and supervise their subordinates was the proximate cause of the constitutional infringements committed by their subordinates against Plaintiff.
70. Defendants either authorized or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional actions of their subordinates, and they were deliberately indifferent to constitutional violations likely to result from serious deficiencies in the detention and scheduled release tracking program as well as the training program of personnel who staffthe Rutherford County Jail.
71. As a result of this deliberate indifference to the Plaintiffs rights, Plaintiff has been injured. In depriving Plaintiff of his rights, Defendants acted under color of state law. This deprivation under color of state law is actionable under and may be redressed by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
COUNT VIFAILURE TO IMPLEMENT APPROPRIATE AND ESSENTIAL POLICIES, TRAINING, AND SUPERVISION ACTIONABLE UNDER THE TENNESSEE GOVERNMENTAL TORT LIABILITY ACT AND TENNESSEE COMMON LAW 72. The allegations of paragraphs 1-71 are hereby incorporated by reference and are realleged as if set forth fully.
19 Case 3:10-cv-00813 Document 17 Filed 10/21/10 Page 19 of 22 PageID #: 164

73. Each Defendant owed Plaintiff a duty to use due care at or about the time of the aforementioned conduct.
74. Defendants Jones and Asbury negligently supervised other Defendants by failing to provide proper training and supervision and failing to implement adequate systems to provide for the timely release of Plaintiff.
75. In committing the aforementioned acts or omissions, each Defendant negligently breached said duty to use due care, which directly and proximately resulted in the injuries and damages to Plaintiffs as alleged herein.
PRAYERS FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, premises considered, Plaintiff demands: I. That process issue to the Defendants and that they be required to answer in the time allowed by law. 2. That a declaratory judgment be rendered in favor of the Plaintiff and the class he represents and against the Defendants on all causes of action asserted herein. 3. That a preliminary, and then a pennanent injunction barring all defendants and their officers, agents, servants, employees and attorneys and those persons in active concert or participation with them from illegally detaining Plaintiff and class members he represents until such time as Defendants able to provide adequate systems, training, and supervision of its employees and agents. 4. That Plaintiff be awarded those damages to which it may appear they are entitled by the proof submitted in this cause for their physical and mental pain and suffering, both past and future; loss of enjoyment of life; and medical and psychological expenses, both past and future.
20 Case 3:10-cv-00813 Document 17 Filed 10/21/10 Page 20 of 22 PageID #: 165

5. That Plaintiff be awarded punitive damages against the Defendants. 6. That Plaintiff be awarded reasonable expenses in this litigation, including reasonable attorney and expert fees, pursuant to 42 USC § 1988 (b) and (c). 7. That Plaintiff receive any other further and general reliefto which it may appear he is entitled.
Respectfully submitted, Is Elliott Ozment Elliott Ozment, Attorney at Law Immigration Law Offices of Elliott Ozment 1214 Murfreesboro Pike Nashville, TN 37212 (615) 321-8888 (0) (615) 321-5230 (F) Email: elliott@ozment1aw.com
21 Case 3:10-cv-00813 Document 17 Filed 10/21/10 Page 21 of 22 PageID #: 166

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Service of the foregoing with all attachments was accomplished through the Court's Electronic Filing System on this October 21,2010, upon the following: D. Randall Mantooth Bank of America Plaza 414 Union Street, Suite 1900 Nashville, TN 37219-1782
s/Elliott Ozment
22 Case 3:10-cv-00813 Document 17 Filed 10/21/10 Page 22 of 22 PageID #: 167

 
 Ramos-Macario v. Jones, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2011)

2011 WL 831678 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee,
Nashville Division.
Carlos RAMOS–MACARIO, Plaintiff, v.
Truman JONES, et al., Defendants.
No. 3:10–00813. | March 2, 2011.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Harry Elliott Ozment, Law Offices of Elliott Ozment, Nashville, TN, for Plaintiff.
David Randall Mantooth, Leitner, Williams, Dooley, and Napolitan, PLLC, Nashville, TN, for Defendants.
Opinion

MEMORANDUM

WILLIAM J. HAYNES, JR., District Judge.
*1 Plaintiff, Carlos Ramos–Macario, filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (“TGTLA”), Tenn.Code Ann. § 29–20–101 et seq., against the Defendants Truman Jones, individually and in his official capacity as Rutherford County Sheriff, Bob Asbury, individually and in his official capacity as Chief Deputy and Administrator of Detention in the Rutherford County Sheriff’s Department, Rutherford County, Tennessee,1 and John Does 1–3. Plaintiff’s claims arise out of his arrest and detention in the Rutherford County jail. In essence, Plaintiff asserts claims under the Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment2 rights for his unlawful detention in jail after the expiration of his sentence and a claim for failure to train and supervise. Plaintiff also asserts state law claims for false imprisonment and negligence under TGTLA. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action.

1

Plaintiff names the Rutherford County Sheriff’s Office

in conjunction with Rutherford County, Tennessee as a

Defendant. Claims against sheriff’s departments are not

actionable under federal law. Buchanan v. Williams, 434 F.Supp.2d 521, 529 (M.D.Tenn.2006). Accordingly, any claims against the Rutherford County Sheriff’s Office should be dismissed.

2

Plaintiff also asserts Due Process violations under the

Fifth Amendment in conjunction with the Fourteenth

Amendment. However, “[t]he Fifth Amendment’s Due

Process Clause circumscribes only the actions of the

federal government.” Bybee v. City of Paducah, 46

Fed.Appx. 735, 737 (6th Cir.2002). Plaintiff does not

assert any claims against the federal government.

Accordingly, any claims for violation of the Fifth

Amendment’s Due Process Clause should be dismissed.

Before the Court are Defendants’ motions to dismiss and for summary judgment (Docket Entry Nos. 18–20), contending, in sum: (1) that the Court should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims; (2) that Plaintiff fails to show that Defendants had a custom or policy that was the moving force behind the alleged constitutional violations; (3) that the individual Defendants did not engage in any acts or omissions that establish liability under federal and state law; (4) that the individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity; (5) that Plaintiff’s claims against the individual Defendants in their official capacities should be dismissed; (6) that the undisputed facts do not support Plaintiff’s claims for deliberate indifference; and (7) that Plaintiff cannot meet the prerequisites as a class action under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a).
In response (Docket Entry Nos 33–35), Plaintiff asserts, in essence, that the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims and that genuine issues of material fact exist as to Plaintiff’s federal claims and summary judgment would be inappropriate because the parties have not conducted even minimal discovery. Plaintiff agrees that this action is not suitable for class treatment.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that issues of material fact exist as to whether Rutherford County violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, Plaintiff’s federal and state law claims against Jones and Asbury should be dismissed and Plaintiff’s state law claims against Rutherford County, except false imprisonment, should be dismissed.
1

Ramos-Macario v. Jones, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2011)

I. ANALYSIS OF MOTIONS
The parties have presented affidavits and other evidence in support and opposition to the motions to dismiss. In deciding a motion under 12(b)(6), if “matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). In such an instance, “[a]ll parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” Id. Yet, a court may consider certain documents without converting the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. “When a court is presented with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it may consider the Complaint and any exhibits attached thereto, public records, items appearing in the record of the case and exhibits attached to defendant’s motion to dismiss so long as they are referred to in the Complaint and are central to the claims contained therein.” Bassett v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir.2008). “Courts may also consider public records, matters of which a court may take judicial notice, and letter decisions of governmental agencies.” Jackson v. City of Columbus, 194 F.3d 737, 745 (6th Cir.1999) overruled on other grounds by Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002).
*2 Under Sixth Circuit precedent, where the materials submitted by a party fall outside the pleadings, “a party cannot raise for the first time on appeal an argument that she was surprised by the conversion of the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment when the party was aware that materials outside the pleading had been submitted to the court before the court granted the motion.” Song v. City of Elyria, 985 F.2d 840, 842 (6th Cir.1993) (citing Wright v. Holbrook, 794 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir.1986)); Morton v. ICI Acrylics, Inc., 69 F.Supp.2d 1038, 1041 (W.D.Tenn.1999) ( “[W]here the plaintiff responds to the motion to dismiss by also relying on evidence outside the pleadings and by suggesting to the court that the motion be treated as one for summary judgment, no notice is necessary, and no surprise should result from the conversion.”).
Defendants invite the Court to consider the affidavits of Jones, Asbury and JoAnne LeCroy as matters outside the pleading and treat their motions to dismiss as motions for summary judgment under Rule 56. Plaintiff submits his

affidavit along with other documents in support of his claims in his amended complaint. Plaintiff also invites the Court to convert Defendants’ motions to dismiss into motions for summary judgment. Because matters outside the pleadings have been submitted by the parties and the parties are aware of a possible conversion, the Court concludes that the affidavits and other documents attached to the parties’ memoranda in support and opposition to Defendants’ motions to dismiss do not fall within the pleadings for purposes of Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and Defendants’ motions to dismiss should be converted to motions for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.

II. REVIEW OF THE RECORD3

3

Upon a motion for summary judgment, the factual

contentions are viewed in the light most favorable to

the party opposing the motion for summary judgment.

Duchon v. Cajon Co., 791 F.2d 43, 46 (6th Cir.1986).

As will be discussed infra, upon the filing of a motion

for summary judgment, the opposing party must come

forth with sufficient evidence to withstand a motion for

directed verdict, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S.

242, 247–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986),

particularly where there has been an opportunity for

discovery. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106

S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Because material

factual disputes exist, this section does not constitute a

findings of fact under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d).

On or around 4:00 a.m. on June 14, 2009, Smyrna Police arrested Plaintiff for driving on a suspended license and transported him to the Rutherford County Adult Detention Center (“RCADC”). (Docket Entry No. 17, Second Amended Complaint, at ¶ 15). At Plaintiff’s hearing on June 18, 2009, the Smyrna Municipal Court judge sentenced Plaintiff to five days in jail, crediting him with four days served. Id. at ¶ 16. Plaintiff states that upon his return from his sentencing he showed an RCADC employee court papers regarding his probation terms and through a bilingual inmate told the RCADC employee that Plaintiff was given a suspended sentence. (Docket Entry No. 35, Exhibit A, Plaintiff Affidavit at ¶ 5). The RCADC employee informed Plaintiff that the Sheriff could not release him because of an immigration detainer. Id. at ¶¶ 5–6. According to Plaintiff, sometime between June 14, 2009, and June 19, 2009, an officer at RCADC reported Plaintiff’s arrest and detention at the RCADC to the United States Immigration & Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), and an immigration detainer was placed on
2

Ramos-Macario v. Jones, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2011)

Plaintiff, pending his release from RCADC. (Docket Entry No. 17, Second Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 17–18).
*3 JoAnne LeCroy, a corporal with the Rutherford County Sheriff’s Department who has been assigned to RCADC’s booking department since July 2002 and serves as the court liaison for the RCADC, oversees the coordination of interaction with the courts. (Docket Entry No. 23, LeCroy Affidavit at ¶¶ 2–4). LeCroy also inputs information into the RCADC computer regarding jail time for inmates and calculates the date that an inmate should be released. Id. According to LeCroy, on June 18, 2009, she received a mittimus from the Smyrna Municipal Court, directing that Plaintiff be confined until “legally discharged.” Id. at ¶ 5. The mittimus reflects that Plaintiff was sentenced to six months with credit for four days time served, but the mittimus does not reflect that the six month sentence was suspended. Id., attachment thereto, Exhibit 1. LeCroy states that a Smyrna Police officer transported Plaintiff to and from the Smyrna Municipal Court and Rutherford County officers were not present at the court hearing on June 18, 2009. Id. at ¶¶ 5–7. LeCroy states that she did not believe or suspect that the description of the sentence on the mittimus was incorrect. Id. at ¶ 8.
Plaintiff, however, cites records provided by RCADC to the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) regarding the length of his sentence. (Docket Entry No. 35, Exhibit F, Elliot Ozment Declaration).4 A handwritten note on top of the Smyrna Municipal Court’s mittimus states the municipal court’s telephone number and the following: “Pled guilty [illegible] ... 6 month suspended ... probation credit 4 days ... June 18, 2009.” Id., Exhibits B and E. Attached to the mittimus is a form entitled “Inmate Change Of Status” with a handwritten note in the upper left hand corner that reads: “4 day.” Id., Exhibit C.

4

Plaintiff’s counsel obtained these records through a

Freedom of Information Act request (“FOIA”) from the

Department of Homeland Security. (Docket Entry No.

33, Exhibit F, Elliot Ozment Declaration at ¶¶ 3–4).

Plaintiff completed his sentence on June 19, 2009, a Friday. (Docket Entry No. 17, Second Amended Complaint at ¶ 21). Over approximately the next twenty-five days, Plaintiff asked several guards for guidance on challenging his detention. (Docket Entry No. 35, Exhibit A, Plaintiff Affidavit at ¶ 7). Plaintiff challenged his detention in writing on three occasions-on

or around July 12, 2009, on or around August 15, 2009 and on or around October 12, 2009. Id. at ¶¶ 11, 13, 15. Each time Plaintiff received a written response stating “Immigration Hold.” Id. at ¶¶ 12, 14, 16. According to Plaintiff, he was held on the ICE detainer until October 27, 2009, when ICE took him into custody. (Docket Entry No. 17, Second Amended Complaint at ¶ 25). After being processed, ICE released Plaintiff on his own recognizance. Id. Plaintiff was not charged with any crime between the completion of his sentence and his release to ICE on October 27, 2009, nor was he permitted to make bail or post bond during that same time. Id. at ¶¶ 23–24.
LeCroy states that after computing Plaintiff’s credits for time served and good behavior, Plaintiff’s sentence expired on October 27, 2009. (Docket Entry No. 23, LeCroy Affidavit at ¶ 8). According to LeCroy, the RCADC detained Plaintiff until October 27, 2009, based upon the sentence reflected in the mittimus and not on the immigration detainer. Id. at ¶ 10. LeCroy states that she was unaware of any complaints or claims made by Plaintiff from June 18, 2009 to October 27, 2009 that he was being held longer than the Smyrna Municipal Court intended. Id. at ¶ 11.
*4 Bob Asbury, the Jail Administrator for the Rutherford County Sheriff’s Department, is responsible for overseeing RCADC’s operations. (Docket Entry No. 21, Asbury Affidavit at ¶¶ 2–3). However, as Sheriff of Rutherford County, Truman Jones has the ultimate responsibility over RCADC’s operations, although he is not involved in the day-to-day details of the facility’s operations. (Docket Entry No. 22, Jones Affidavit at ¶¶ 3, 5). Defendants deny any knowledge as to the facts of Plaintiff’s incarceration at RCADC, any decisions made with regard to Plaintiff’s incarceration or any claims or complaints made by Plaintiff regarding his detention at RCADC. (Docket Entry No. 21, Asbury Affidavit at ¶ 5; Docket Entry No. 22, Jones Affidavit at ¶ 5). Defendants state that from June 18, 2009, to October 27, 2009, they did not direct, allow, condone or encourage RCADC employees or officers to hold inmates beyond the expiration of their sentence except in accordance with the law governing immigration detainers. Id. at ¶¶ 7, 9.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were aware of at least two instances where inmates were unlawfully detained after the expiration of their ICE detainers. (Docket Entry No. 17, Second Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 28, 32). Plaintiff specifically cites one instance where the Rutherford County Chancery Court granted the Writ of Habeas Corpus and ordered the release of Herlacio
3

Ramos-Macario v. Jones, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2011)

Palomo on June 6, 2007. Id. at ¶ 30, Exhibits C and D. In that action, Palomo was detained at the RCADC past the expiration of his ICE detainer. Id. Chancellor Robert Corlew suggested that the failure to release Palomo was due to:
an administrative issue at the Sheriff’s Department and it may be helpful to start some tickler anytime somebody comes into custody, that 48 hours later, either he needs to be released or if there are those who are watching and are vigilant on behalf of an individual, they should anticipate a petition.
Id. at ¶ 34, Exhibit E at pp. 39–40.
According to Defendants Jones and Asbury, RCADC lack a policy or custom of detaining inmates for a period longer than allowed by federal law while waiting for transfer to immigration officers. (Docket Entry No. 21, Asbury Affidavit at ¶ 6; Docket Entry No. 22, Jones Affidavit at ¶ 6). Defendants state that following the release of Heracilo Palomo, they directed RCADC officers to review and change their practices to avoid a future occurrence. Id. Defendants are unaware of similar problems occurring since Palomo’s release. Id. Defendants state that they are unaware of any deficiencies in policies or procedures or in training or supervision that resulted in Plaintiff’s detention beyond the date intended by the Smyrna Municipal Court. Id. at ¶ 9. Further, Defendants delegated the responsibility for overseeing the adoption and enforcement of policies and procedures and the provision of training and supervision to officers at the RCADC. Id.
*5 LeCroy states that she and other RCADC officers regularly receive training and that Plaintiff’s detention was due to an error in the Smyrna Municipal Court’s mittimus and not because of a lack of training or a failure in policy. (Docket Entry No. 23, LeCroy Affidavit at ¶¶ 15–16). According to LeCroy, she was supervised by Lt. Bo Alexander and other superior officers between June 18, 2009 and October 27, 2009. Id. at ¶ 17. LeCroy also supervised other officers at the RCADC. Id.
III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

“The very mission of the summary judgment procedure is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.” Advisory Committee Notes on Rule 56, Federal Civil Judicial Procedure and Rules (West Ed.1989). Moreover, “district courts are widely acknowledged to possess the power to enter summary judgment sua sponte, so long as the opposing party was on notice that [he] had to come forward with all of [his] evidence.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 326, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); accord, Routman v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 873 F.2d 970, 971 (6th Cir.1989).
In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), the United States Supreme Court explained the nature of a motion for summary judgment:
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.
As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.
477 U.S. at 247–48 (emphasis in the original and added in part). Earlier the Supreme Court defined a material fact for Rule 56 purposes as “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’ ” Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (citations omitted).
A motion for summary judgment is to be considered after adequate time for discovery. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 326 (1986). Where there has been a reasonable opportunity for discovery, the party opposing the motion must make an affirmative showing of the need for additional discovery
4

Ramos-Macario v. Jones, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2011)

after the filing of a motion for summary judgment. Emmons v. McLaughlin, 874 F.2d 351, 355–57 (6th Cir.1989). But see Routman v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 873 F.2d 970, 971 (6th Cir.1989).
*6 There is a certain framework in considering a summary judgment motion as to the required showing of the respective parties, as described by the Court in Celotex:
Of course, a party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.... [W]e find no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent’s claim.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (emphasis deleted).
As the Court of Appeals explained, “[t]he moving party bears the burden of satisfying Rule 56(c) standards.” Martin v. Kelley, 803 F.2d 236, 239, n. 4 (6th Cir.1986). The moving party’s burden is to show “clearly and convincingly” the absence of any genuine issues of material fact. Sims v. Memphis Processors, Inc., 926 F.2d 524, 526 (6th Cir.1991) (quoting Kochins v. Linden–Alimak, Inc., 799 F.2d 1128, 1133 (6th Cir.1986)). “So long as the movant has met its initial burden of ‘demonstrat[ing] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact,’ the nonmoving party then ‘must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Emmons, 874 F.2d at 353 (quoting Celotex and Rule 56(e)).
Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit warned that “the respondent must adduce more than a scintilla of evidence to overcome the motion [and] ... must ‘present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.’ ” Street v. J .C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir.1989) (quoting Liberty Lobby ). Moreover, the Court of Appeals explained that:
The respondent must “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Further, “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find” for the

respondent, the motion should be granted. The trial court has at least some discretion to determine whether the respondent’s claim is “implausible.”
Street, 886 F.2d at 1480 (citations omitted). See also Hutt v. Gibson Fiber Glass Products, 914 F.2d 790, 792 (6th Cir.1990) (“A court deciding a motion for summary judgment must determine ‘whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’ ”) (quoting Liberty Lobby ).
If both parties make their respective showings, the Court then determines if the material factual dispute is genuine, applying the governing law.
More important for present purposes, summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is “genuine,” that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.
*7 ....
Progressing to the specific issue in this case, we are convinced that the inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits. If the defendant in a run-of-the-mill civil case moves for summary judgment or for a directed verdict based on the lack of proof of a material fact, the judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented. The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff. The judge’s inquiry, therefore,
5

Ramos-Macario v. Jones, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2011)

unavoidably asks whether reasonable jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict—“whether there is [evidence] upon which a jury can properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.”
Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248, 252 (citation omitted and emphasis added).
It is likewise true that:
In ruling on [a] motion for summary judgment, the court must construe the evidence in its most favorable light in favor of the party opposing the motion and against the movant. Further, the papers supporting the movant are closely scrutinized, whereas the opponent’s are indulgently treated. It has been stated that: ‘The purpose of the hearing on the motion for such a judgment is not to resolve factual issues. It is to determine whether there is any genuine issue of material fact in dispute....’
Bohn Aluminum & Brass Corp. v. Storm King Corp., 303 F.2d 425, 427 (6th Cir.1962) (citation omitted). As the Court of Appeals stated, “[a]ll facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom must be read in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Duchon v. Cajon Co., 791 F.2d 43, 46 (6th Cir.1986).
The Sixth Circuit further explained the District Court’s role in evaluating the proof on a summary judgment motion:
A district court is not required to speculate on which portion of the record the nonmoving party relies, nor is it obligated to wade through and search the entire record for some specific facts that might support the nonmoving party’s claim. Rule 56 contemplates a limited marshalling of evidence by the nonmoving party sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact for trial. This marshalling of evidence, however, does not require the nonmoving party to “designate” facts by citing specific page numbers. Designate means simply “to point out the location of.” Webster’s Third New InterNational Dictionary (1986).
Of course, the designated portions of the record must

be presented with enough specificity that the district court can readily identify the facts upon which the nonmoving party relies; but that need for specificity must be balanced against a party’s need to be fairly apprised of how much specificity the district court requires. This notice can be adequately accomplished through a local court rule or a pretrial order.
*8 InterRoyal Corp. v. Sponseller, 889 F.2d 108, 111 (6th Cir.1989). Here, the parties have given some references to the proof upon which they rely. Local Rules 56.01(b)-(d) require a showing of undisputed and disputed facts.
In Street, the Court of Appeals discussed the trilogy of leading Supreme Court decisions, and other authorities on summary judgment and synthesized ten rules in the “new era” on summary judgment motions:
1. Complex cases are not necessarily inappropriate for summary judgment.
2. Cases involving state of mind issues are not necessarily inappropriate for summary judgment.
3. The movant must meet the initial burden of showing “the absence of a genuine issue of material fact” as to an essential element of the non-movant’s case.
4. This burden may be met by pointing out to the court that the respondent, having had sufficient opportunity for discovery, has no evidence to support an essential element of his or her case.
5. A court should apply a federal directed verdict standard in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. The inquiry on a summary judgment motion or a directed verdict motion is the same: “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.”
6. As on federal directed verdict motions, the “scintilla rule” applies, i.e., the respondent must adduce more than a scintilla of evidence to overcome the motion.
7. The substantive law governing the case will determine what issues of fact are material, and any heightened burden of proof required by the substantive law for an element of the respondent’s case, such as proof by clear and convincing evidence, must be satisfied by the respondent.
8. The respondent cannot rely on the hope that the trier
6

Ramos-Macario v. Jones, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2011)

of fact will disbelieve the movant’s denial of a disputed fact, but must “present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.”
9. The trial court no longer has the duty to search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact.
10. The trial court has more discretion than in the “old era” in evaluating the respondent’s evidence. The respondent must “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Further, “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find” for the respondent, the motion should be granted. The trial court has at least some discretion to determine whether the respondent’s claim is “implausible.”
Street, 886 F.2d at 1479–80 (citations omitted).
The Court has distilled from these collective holdings four issues that are to be addressed upon a motion for summary judgment: (1) has the moving party “clearly and convincingly” established the absence of material facts?; (2) if so, does the plaintiff present sufficient facts to establish all the elements of the asserted claim or defense?; (3) if factual support is presented by the nonmoving party, are those facts sufficiently plausible to support a jury verdict or judgment under the applicable law?; and (4) are there any genuine factual issues with respect to those material facts under the governing law?
*9 Section 1983 provides a remedy against any person who, under color of state law, deprives another of rights protected by the United States Constitution. There are two essential elements to an action under § 1983:(1) whether the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) whether the conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
As a threshold matter, the Court notes that in addition to Rutherford County Plaintiff has sued Jones and Asbury in their official capacities, which is in essence a suit against Rutherford County, of which they are agents. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985). “As long as the government entity

receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity. It is not a suit against the official personally, for the real party in interest is the entity.” Id. at 166 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Thus, the Court concludes that naming Jones and Asbury in their official capacities is duplicative and they should be dismissed in their official capacities.
Moreover, Plaintiff asserts a failure to train claim against Jones and Asbury. However, liability for failure to train “attaches to a municipality rather than to an individual.” Caldwell v. Moore, 968 F.2d 595, 600 (6th Cir.1992). Thus, the Court will discuss Plaintiff’s failure to train claim in its discussion of Plaintiff’s claims against Rutherford County.

A. Rutherford County5

5

The Court will refer to each Defendant collectively as

“Defendants.”

Unlike states, municipalities are persons who may be liable under § 1983 for their illegal acts or those of their employees, but only under certain conditions, where:
[the employee’s] action ... implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers[;]
...
[There is] official municipal policy of some nature[; or]
...
[The] execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy....
Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, 691, 7

Ramos-Macario v. Jones, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2011)

694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).
A municipality is subject to liability for “only [those] deprivations [that are] visited pursuant to municipal ‘custom’ or ‘policy’ ” under § 1983. Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 818, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985). As to the quantum of proof required to establish liability of local governmental units under Monell, the plurality opinion of four Justices in Tuttle stated:
Proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability under Monell, unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused by an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy, which policy can be attributed to a municipal policymaker. Otherwise the existence of the unconstitutional policy, and its origin, must be separately proved. But where the policy relied upon is not itself unconstitutional, considerably more proof than the single incident will be necessary in every case to establish both the requisite fault on the part of the municipality, and the causal connection between the “policy” and the constitutional deprivation.
*10 Id. at 823–24 (footnote omitted).
An isolated act of any employee also does not establish a policy. Sargi v. Kent City Bd. of Educ. 70 F.3d 907, 912 (6th Cir.1995). However, a city or local governmental entity may be held liable in actions brought against its employees in the employee’s official capacity when it has notice of the action. Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471–72, 105 S.Ct. 873, 83 L.Ed.2d 878 (1985). In a word, “official capacity claims [against municipal employees] are essentially claims against the entity itself.” Frost v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 851 F.2d 822, 827 (6th Cir.1988). In such municipal official capacity suits, the § 1983 plaintiff “in order to recover, must meet the standards of liability established by Monell.” Collins v. City of Detroit, 780 F.2d 583, 584 (6th Cir.1986) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985)).

A claim against a municipality requires proof of “(1) the existence of an unconstitutional policy, (2) the connection of the policy to the municipality itself, and (3) a causal link between the unconstitutional policy and the particular injury alleged.” Robertson v. Johnson County, 896 F.Supp. 673, 682 (E.D.Ky.1995); accord Foster v. City of Cleveland Heights, 81 F.3d 160, No. 95–3591, 1996 WL 132181, at * 1 (6th Cir. March 21, 1996) (“When a § 1983 claim is made against a municipality, two issues must be analyzed: (1) whether the plaintiff’s harm was caused by a constitutional violation, and (2) if so, whether the city is responsible for that violation.”) (citing Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992)).
Moreover, a prerequisite for municipal liability is that the officer’s predicate acts must have violated the § 1983 plaintiff’s federal rights. In City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 106 S.Ct. 1571, 89 L.Ed.2d 806 (1986), the Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a city and its police commission stating that: “If a person has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police officer, the fact that the departmental regulations might have authorized the use of constitutionally excessive force is quite beside the point.” Id. at 799 (emphasis in original). In Hancock v. Dodson, 958 F.2d 1367, 1376 (6th Cir.1992), the Court also observed that “[b]ecause the only city police officer present committed no constitutional violation, the city cannot be liable for failure to train its police officers.”
In Barber v. City of Salem, 953 F.2d 232, 235–36 (6th Cir.1992), the Court distilled the City of Canton standard as follows:
Furthermore, a municipality may also be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in certain circumstances for constitutional violations arising from its failure to properly train its employees. In order for a plaintiff to prevail against a municipality, the plaintiff must show that inadequate training represented a city policy and that the need for better training was so obvious and the inadequacy so likely to result in a violation of constitutional rights, that the municipality can be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.
8

Ramos-Macario v. Jones, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2011)

*11 953 F.2d at 235–36 (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388–90, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989)); Sagan v. Sumner County Board of Educ., 726 F.Supp.2d 868, 886 (M.D.Tenn.2010) (“Liability based on failure to train or supervise will exist only if a plaintiff can prove that a municipality’s failure to train its employees in a relevant respect ‘reflects deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of its inhabitants.’ ”) (citation omitted).

Defendants contend that Plaintiff fails to show that a custom or policy was the moving force behind the alleged constitutional violations as Plaintiff was detained pursuant to the Smyrna Municipal Court’s mittimus and that the affidavits submitted by Defendants establish that Defendants did not have a custom or policy of detaining inmates on immigration detainers beyond the time allowed by federal law. Plaintiff contends that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Defendants were on notice that the mittimus was erroneous, but Defendants continued to detain Plaintiff due to their ICE detainer policy.

ICE detainers are issued pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 that provides:

Any authorized immigration officer

may at any time issue a Form

I–247,

Immigration

Detainer–Notice of Action, to any

other Federal, State, or local law

enforcement agency. A detainer

serves to advise another law

enforcement agency that the

Department seeks custody of an

alien presently in the custody of

that agency, for the purpose of

arresting and removing the alien.

The detainer is a request that such

agency advise the Department,

prior to release of the alien, in order

for the Department to arrange to

assume custody, in situations when

gaining immediate physical

custody is either impracticable or

impossible.

8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a). This regulation further provides that “such agency shall maintain custody of the alien for a period not to exceed 48 hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays in order to permit assumption of

custody by the Department.” 8 C.F.R. § 287 .7(d).
Plaintiff’s affidavit establishes that he challenged his detention both orally and in writing and that he was informed that he was being detained pursuant to an immigration detainer, directly contradicting LeCroy’s affidavit that Plaintiff’s detention was based upon the Smyrna Municipal Court’s mittimus, not on the immigration detainer, and that LeCroy was unaware of any complaints or claims made by Plaintiff regarding his detention. Further, Plaintiff establishes an issue of fact as to whether RCADC officers knew that Plaintiff’s sentence was suspended given the handwritten notation on the mittimus submitted by Plaintiff indicating that Plaintiff’s six month sentence was suspended with a credit of four days served. Construing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence establishing that a genuine issue of fact exists that Plaintiff was unconstitutionally detained pursuant to Defendants’ alleged immigration detainer custom, policy or practice.
*12 Plaintiff also submits evidence of past instances where inmates were unlawfully detained after the expiration of their ICE detainers. Chancellor Corlew suggested that certain steps should be implemented to prevent a reoccurrence. Defendants Jones and Asbury state that they directed RCADC officers to review and change their practices to avoid a future occurrence and that they delegated the responsibility of training and supervision to officers at the RCADC. “[F]inal policymaking authority may be delegated.” Miller v. Calhoun County, 408 F.3d 803, 814 (6th Cir.2005) (citing Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986)). Defendants do not provide any details as to the policies implemented or training and supervising protocols. The Court cannot resolve this issue based upon the disputed facts and the record before the Court at this stage of proceedings.
Accordingly, Defendants’ motions should be denied as to Plaintiff’s federal law claims against Rutherford County.
B. Truman Jones and Bob Asbury in Their Individual Capacities
Plaintiff does not allege any specific personal involvement by Jones or Asbury in violating his constitutional rights nor do the undisputed facts reveal
9

Ramos-Macario v. Jones, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2011)

that these Defendants were personally involved in any of the wrongful activity.
In asserting a § 1983 action against a supervisory official, a plaintiff must show that the defendant was either directly or personally involved in the alleged unconstitutional activity. Dunn v. State of Tennessee, 697 F.2d 121, 128 (6th Cir.1982). “What is required is a causal connection between the misconduct complained of and the official sued.” Id. Liability under § 1983 must be based on more than respondeat superior or the right to control employees. Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir.1999).
[A] supervisory official’s failure to supervise, control or train the offending individual is not actionable unless the supervisor “either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it. At a minimum a plaintiff must show that the official at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.”
Id. at 300 (citations omitted).
Plaintiff does not present any evidence that these Defendants had any direct or personal involvement in authorizing, approving, or knowingly acquiescing in any alleged unconstitutional conduct. Nor is there anything in the record that indicates otherwise. Defendants state that they delegated the responsibility for overseeing the adoption and enforcement of policies and procedures and the provision of training and supervision to officers at the RCADC. Miller, supra. In his responses, Plaintiff argues, in essence, that the alleged constitutional violations were based upon Defendants’ ICE detainer policies, practices and customs, not that Jones and Asbury were either directly or personally involved in the alleged unconstitutional activity.
*13 Accordingly, the Court concludes that the federal claims against Jones and Asbury in their individual capacities should be dismissed.
C. State Law Claims
Plaintiff asserts state law claims of false imprisonment and negligence against the Defendants. Plaintiff also asserts that Jones and Asbury “negligently supervised

other Defendants by failing to provide proper training and supervision and failing to implement adequate systems to provide for” Plaintiff’s timely release. (Docket Entry No. 17, at ¶ 74).
Under the “Supplemental Jurisdiction” statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the Court acquires jurisdiction over state law claims in § 1983 complaints. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1367 consolidates the former pendent and ancillary jurisdiction doctrines into a single “supplemental jurisdiction” concept. The statute, in essence, codifies the “common nucleus of operative fact” standard in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). Title 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) allows supplemental jurisdiction under the Gibbs test, but not in diversity jurisdiction actions. A district court is not required to entertain jurisdiction over these supplemental claims, particularly where it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,” or “in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)-(4).
Defendants argue that the Court should decline supplemental jurisdiction on the grounds that the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (“TGTLA”), Tenn.Code. Ann. §§ 29–20–101 et seq., forecloses review of these claims by the Court. TGTLA grants immunity to state governmental entities and their employees from suits based in negligence, but not for intentional torts such as “false imprisonment pursuant to a mittimus from a court, false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, invasion of right of privacy, or civil rights[.]” Tenn.Code. Ann. §§ 29–20–201, –205(2). For any action brought under TGTLA, the Tennessee circuit courts are granted “exclusive original jurisdiction over any [such] action....” Tenn.Code. Ann. § 29–20–307.
As to Plaintiff’s negligence claims against Rutherford County, the Court concludes that these claims qualify under TGTLA and should be heard by the a state court. The Court considers this to be an “exceptional circumstance” that compels the Court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims for the reasons stated in Beddingfield v. City of Pulaski, 666 F.Supp. 1064 (M.D.Tenn.1987), rev’d on other grounds 861 F.2d 968 (6th Cir.1988). The Beddingfield ruling on declination to entertain TGTLA claims retains its viability. Gregory v. Shelby County, Tennessee, 220 F.3d 433, 446 (6th Cir.2000); Fromuth v. Metropolitan Gov’t. of Nashville, 158 F.Supp.2d 787, 789
10

Ramos-Macario v. Jones, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2011)

(M.D.Tenn.2001); Spurlock v. Whitley, 971 F.Supp. 1166, 1185 (M.D.Tenn.1997) aff’d sub. nom Spurlock v. Satterfield, 167 F.3d 995 (6th Cir.1999).
*14 Yet, TGTLA’s jurisdictional limitations “do not apply to persons sued individually.” Timberlake v. Benton, 786 F.Supp. 676, 697 (M.D.Tenn.1992). However, “[w]here the TGTLA specifically removes immunity of a governmental entity for certain negligent acts and omissions, courts have held that the governmental employee may not be sued individually for the same tort pursuant to Tenn.Code Ann. § 29–20–310(b).” Arbuckle v. City of Chattanooga, 696 F.Supp.2d 907, 929 (E.D.Tenn.2010). Here, Jones and Asbury would be immune from liability from Plaintiff’s individual claims for negligence and false imprisonment under Tenn.Code. Ann. §§ 29–20–310(b) and 29–20–205. Rutherford County is not immune from these torts under § 29–20–205, and § 29–20–310(b) states that “[n]o claim may be brought against an employee ... for which the immunity of the governmental entity is removed.” Therefore, the Court concludes that these claims against Jones and Asbury should be dismissed without prejudice. Id. at 929–30.
As to Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim against Rutherford County, TGTLA does not apply because TGTLA does not waive a county’s state law immunity for false imprisonment. Tenn.Code Ann. § 29–20–205(2). While Defendants have presented evidence of a mittimus, Plaintiff has presented evidence that Plaintiff was detained as a result of an unlawful immigration detainer, not a mittimus. Thus, Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim remains the only viable state law claim in a federal forum and should therefore proceed before this Court under its supplemental jurisdiction.
Defendants seek the Court to enter final judgment in favor of Jones and Asbury under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states:
When an action presents more than one claim for relief—whether as a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim—or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just

reason for delay. Otherwise, any order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ right and liabilities.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b).
Entry of final judgment under Rule 54(b) requires two independent findings: that there is a final judgment “as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties” and that the district court “expressly determine[d] that there is no just reason for delay.” General Acquisition, Inc. v. GenCorp, Inc., 23 F.3d 1022, 1026 (6th Cir.1994) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b)). The final judgment “must be a ‘judgment’ in the sense that it is a decision upon a cognizable claim for relief, and it must be ‘final’ in the sense that it is ‘an ultimate disposition of an individual claim entered in the course of a multiple claims action.’ ” Id. at 1027 (quoting Curtiss–Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 7, 100 S.Ct. 1460, 64 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980)). As to a determination of no just reason for delay, the district court must balance the needs of the parties against the interests of efficient case management. Id. however, “ ‘[n]ot all final judgments on individual claims should be immediately appealable, even if they are in some sense separable from the remaining unresolved claims.’ ” Id. (quoting Curtiss–Wright, 446 U.S. at 8.
*15 A nonexhaustive list of factors that a district court should consider when making a Rule 54(b) determination is as follows:
(1) the relationship between the adjudicated claim and the unadjudicated claims; (2) the possibility that the need for review might or might not be mooted by future developments in the district court; (3) the possibility that the reviewing court might be obligated to consider the same issue a second time; (4) the presence or absence of a claim or counterclaim which could result in set-off against the
11

Ramos-Macario v. Jones, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2011)

judgment sought to be made final; (5) miscellaneous factors such as delay, economic and solvency considerations, shortening the time of trial, frivolity of competing claims, expense, and the like. Depending upon the facts of the particular case, all or some of the above factors may bear upon the propriety of the trial court’s discretion in certifying a judgment as final under Rule 54(b).
Corrosioneering, Inc. v. Thyssen Environmental Systems, Inc., 807 F.2d 1279, 1283 (6th Cir.1986).
Ultimately, a district court has “sound judicial discretion” “to determine the ‘appropriate time’ when each final decision in a multiple claims action is ready for appeal. This discretion is to be exercised ‘in the interest of sound judicial administration.’ ” Curtiss–Wright, 446 U.S. at 8 (citation omitted).
Here, Plaintiff asserts that he was unaware of a mittimus throughout his detention and in light of Defendants submitting the mittimus in support of their motions, Plaintiff intends to seek leave of the Court to amend his complaint and assert a claim against Jones and Asbury for

false imprisonment pursuant to a mittimus from a court. Defendants Jones and Asbury are not immune from suit under TGTLA as governmental entities retain immunity for this tort. Tenn.Code. § 29–20–205(2). Therefore, the Court concludes that Defendants’ request for entry of judgment under Rule 54(b) should be denied.
For these reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s federal claims against Jones and Asbury in their individual and official capacities should be dismissed. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims of negligence against the Defendants because the exclusive jurisdiction of TGTLA is an “exceptional circumstance” that is a “compelling reason for declining jurisdiction.” For the same reason, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim against Jones and Asbury. Defendants’ motions to dismiss/for summary judgment (Docket Entry Nos. 18–20) are otherwise denied.
An appropriate Order is filed herewith.
ENTERED this the ________ day of March, 2011.
	  

12

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

CARLOS RAMOS-MACARIO, Plaintiff,
v.
TRUMAN JONES, et aI., Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

No. 3:10-00813

)

JUDGE HAYNES

)

)

)

)

ORDER In accordance with the Memorandum filed herewith, Defendants' motions to dismiss and for summary judgment (Docket Entry Nos. 18-20) are GRANTED as to Plaintiffs federal claims against Truman Jones and Bob Asbury in their individual and official capacities. Plaintiffs state law claims against Jones and Asbury, Plaintiffs negligence claims against Rutherford County are DISMISSED without prejudice. Plaintiffs class action claims are DISMISSED. Defendants' motions are otherwise DENIED. It is so ORDERED. ENTERED this the 'ZJlday of March, 2011.

WILLIAM 1. H

Case 3:10-cv-00813 Document 43 Filed 03/02/11 Page 1 of 1 PageID #: 587

 
 CASE−CLOSED,CASE−MANAGER−BRYANT,CASE−REFERRED,PROTECTIVE−ORDER
U.S. District Court Middle District of Tennessee (Nashville) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:10−cv−00813

Ramos−Macario v. Jones et al Assigned to: Chief Judge William J. Haynes, Jr Referred to: Magistrate Judge John S. Bryant Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff
Carlos Ramos−Macario

Date Filed: 08/30/2010 Date Terminated: 04/23/2012 Jury Demand: Defendant Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Harry Elliott Ozment Law Offices of Elliott Ozment 1214 Murfreesboro Pike Nashville, TN 37217 (615) 321−8888 Email: elliott@ozmentlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

R. Andrew Free Law Office of R. Andrew Free P O Box 90568 Nashville, TN 37201 (615) 873−0837 Email: andrew@immigrantcivilrights.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Truman Jones in his official capacity as Sheriff of Rutherford County and his individual capacity
Defendant Bob Asbury in his official capacity a Shief Deputy and Administrator of Detention in the rutherford County sheriff's Office and his individual capacity
Defendant Rutherford County Sherif's Office ruthrford County, Tennessee
Defendant John Doe 1 In their official capacities as employees of the Rutherford County Sheriff's Office and individually

represented by David Randall Mantooth Leitner, Williams, Dooley, and Napolitan, PLLC 414 Union Street Suite 1900 Nashville, TN 37219−1782 (615) 255−7722 Fax: 615−780−2210 Email: randy.mantooth@leitnerfirm.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David Randall Mantooth (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David Randall Mantooth (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:10-cv-813 As of: 11/10/2013 09:35 AM CST 1 of 7

Defendant
John Doe 2 In their official capacities as employees of the Rutherford County Sheriff's Office and individually
Defendant
John Doe 3 In their official capacities as employees of the Rutherford County Sheriff's Office and individually

Date Filed 08/30/2010
08/30/2010 08/30/2010 08/30/2010 09/01/2010
09/02/2010
09/10/2010 09/11/2010 09/11/2010 09/11/2010 09/20/2010 09/21/2010

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against Bob Asbury, John Doe 1, John Doe 2, John Doe 3, Truman Jones, Rutherford County Sherif's Office ruthrford County, Tennessee, filed by Carlos Ramos−Macario. Filing Fee paid, $350.00, Summons issued. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Attachment Summons, # 4 Attachment Civil Cover Sheet)(afs) (Entered: 08/30/2010)
2 NOTICE from USDC Clerk regarding Corporate Disclosure Statement requirements. (afs) (Entered: 08/30/2010)
3 NOTICE of Initial Case Management Conference set for 11/8/2010 at 02:00 PM before District Judge William J. Haynes Jr.. (afs) (Entered: 08/30/2010)
BAR STATUS for attorney Harry Elliott Ozment of Tennessee verified as active. (afs) (Entered: 08/30/2010)
4 ORDER: This action is referred to the Honorable John Bryant, Magistrate Judge to hear and determine any pretrial motion, including discovery matters, to conduct any necessary conferences and hearings and to submit a report and recommendation for disposition of any motion filed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12, 15, 56 and 65. Therefore, the initial case management conference set for Monday, 11/8/10 at 2:00 p.m. is CANCELLED. The case management conference will be reset by Judge Bryant. Signed by District Judge William J. Haynes, Jr on 9/1/2010. (hb) (Entered: 09/01/2010)
5 ORDER: An initial case management conference is set for Tuesday, 11/16/10, at 9:30 a.m. in Courtroom 776, U.S. Courthouse, 801 Broadway, Nashville, Tennessee. The parties shall file a proposed case management order three (3) business days prior to 11/16/10. Signed by Magistrate Judge John S. Bryant on 9/2/10. (hb) (Entered: 09/02/2010)
6 AMENDED COMPLAINT against All Defendants, filed by Carlos Ramos−Macario.(Ozment, Harry) (Entered: 09/10/2010)
7 SUMMONS returned executed by Carlos Ramos−Macario. Bob Asbury served on 8/31/2010. (Ozment, Harry) (Entered: 09/11/2010)
8 SUMMONS returned executed by Carlos Ramos−Macario. Rutherford County Sherif's Office ruthrford County, Tennessee served on 8/31/2010. (Ozment, Harry) (Entered: 09/11/2010)
9 SUMMONS returned executed by Carlos Ramos−Macario. Truman Jones served on 8/31/2010. (Ozment, Harry) (Entered: 09/11/2010)
10 NOTICE of Appearance by David Randall Mantooth on behalf of Bob Asbury, Truman Jones, Rutherford County Sherif's Office ruthrford County, Tennessee (Mantooth, David) (Entered: 09/20/2010)
11 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 6 Amended Complaint by Bob Asbury, Truman Jones, Rutherford County Sherif's Office ruthrford County, Tennessee. (Mantooth, David) (Entered: 09/21/2010)

Case: 3:10-cv-813 As of: 11/10/2013 09:35 AM CST 2 of 7

09/21/2010 09/21/2010 09/23/2010
09/28/2010
10/20/2010 10/21/2010 10/21/2010 10/21/2010
11/04/2010 11/04/2010 11/04/2010 11/04/2010 11/04/2010 11/04/2010
11/04/2010
11/04/2010 11/04/2010 11/04/2010

Bar status for Atty. D. Randall Mantooth of TN verified as active on this date. (hb) (Entered: 09/21/2010)
12 AFFIDAVIT re 11 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 6 Amended Complaint by Bob Asbury, Truman Jones, Rutherford County Sherif's Office ruthrford County, Tennessee. (Mantooth, David) (Entered: 09/21/2010)
13 ORDER: Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Complaint by Defendants Jones, Asbury, and The Rutherford County Sheriff's Office 11 is GRANTED. Answers due 10/15/2010. Signed by Magistrate Judge John S. Bryant on 9/23/2010. (hb) (Entered: 09/23/2010)
14 MOTION to Amend/Correct Complaint by Carlos Ramos−Macario. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment (Proposed) Second Amended Complaint, # 2 Exhibit A −− Booking Sheet, # 3 Exhibit B −− I−247 Detainer Form, # 4 Exhibit C −− Writ of Habeas Corpus, # 5 Exhibit D −− Order Granting Release, # 6 Exhibit E −− Transcript of Habeas Hearing)(Ozment, Harry) (Entered: 09/28/2010)
15 RESPONSE to Motion re 14 MOTION to Amend/Correct Complaint filed by Bob Asbury, Truman Jones, Rutherford County Sherif's Office ruthrford County, Tennessee. (Mantooth, David) (Entered: 10/20/2010)
16 ORDER granting 14 Motion to Amend Complaint. Signed by Magistrate Judge John S. Bryant on 10/21/2010. (hb) (Entered: 10/21/2010)
E−mail to plaintiff's counsel regargding e−filing a signed amended complaint. (hb) (Entered: 10/21/2010)
17 AMENDED COMPLAINT (Second) against All Defendants, filed by Carlos Ramos−Macario. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A −− RCSO Intake Sheet, # 2 Exhibit B −− I−247 Form, # 3 Exhibit C −− Writ of Habeas Corpus, # 4 Exhibit D −− Order Granting Writ, # 5 Exhibit E −− Transcript)(Ozment, Harry) (Entered: 10/21/2010)
18 MOTION to Dismiss /for Summary Judgment by Rutherford County Sherif's Office ruthrford County, Tennessee. (Mantooth, David) (Entered: 11/04/2010)
19 MOTION to Dismiss /for Summary Judgment by Truman Jones. (Mantooth, David) (Entered: 11/04/2010)
20 MOTION to Dismiss /for Summary Judgment by Bob Asbury. (Mantooth, David) (Entered: 11/04/2010)
21 AFFIDAVIT re 20 MOTION to Dismiss /for Summary Judgment by Bob Asbury. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Mittimus)(Mantooth, David) (Entered: 11/04/2010)
22 AFFIDAVIT re 19 MOTION to Dismiss /for Summary Judgment by Truman Jones. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Mittimus)(Mantooth, David) (Entered: 11/04/2010)
23 AFFIDAVIT of Joanne Lecroy by Rutherford County Sherif's Office ruthrford County, Tennessee. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Mittimus, # 2 Exhibit Visitor Information, # 3 Exhibit Visitor Information, # 4 Exhibit Visitor Log)(Mantooth, David) (Entered: 11/04/2010)
24 STATEMENT of facts filed by Bob Asbury, Truman Jones, Rutherford County Sherif's Office ruthrford County, Tennessee in support of 20 Motion to Dismiss, 19 Motion to Dismiss, 18 Motion to Dismiss. (Mantooth, David) (Entered: 11/04/2010)
25 MEMORANDUM in Support of 18 MOTION to Dismiss /for Summary Judgment filed by Rutherford County Sherif's Office ruthrford County, Tennessee. (Mantooth, David) (Entered: 11/04/2010)
26 MEMORANDUM in Support of 19 MOTION to Dismiss /for Summary Judgment filed by Truman Jones. (Mantooth, David) (Entered: 11/04/2010)
27 MEMORANDUM in Support of 20 MOTION to Dismiss /for Summary Judgment filed by Bob Asbury. (Mantooth, David) (Entered: 11/04/2010)

Case: 3:10-cv-813 As of: 11/10/2013 09:35 AM CST 3 of 7

11/09/2010 11/10/2010 11/10/2010 11/12/2010
11/17/2010
11/29/2010
11/29/2010
11/29/2010
12/01/2010
12/07/2010 12/10/2010 01/18/2011 01/24/2011
01/26/2011 01/27/2011 03/02/2011 03/02/2011

28 First MOTION to Continue Case Management Conference by Carlos Ramos−Macario. (Ozment, Harry) (Entered: 11/09/2010)
29 NOTICE by Bob Asbury, Truman Jones, Rutherford County Sherif's Office ruthrford County, Tennessee of Jury Demand (Mantooth, David) (Entered: 11/10/2010)
30 RESPONSE to Motion re 28 First MOTION to Continue Case Management Conference filed by Bob Asbury, Truman Jones, Rutherford County Sherif's Office ruthrford County, Tennessee. (Mantooth, David) (Entered: 11/10/2010)
31 ORDER: Motion to Reschedule Case Management Conference 28 is GRANTED. Initial Case Management Conference rescheduled to 12/15/2010 at 10:30 AM before Magistrate Judge John S. Bryant. Signed by Magistrate Judge John S. Bryant on 11/12/2010. (hb) (Entered: 11/12/2010)
32 First MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 20 MOTION to Dismiss /for Summary Judgment, 19 MOTION to Dismiss /for Summary Judgment, 18 MOTION to Dismiss /for Summary Judgment by Carlos Ramos−Macario. (Ozment, Harry) (Entered: 11/17/2010)
33 RESPONSE in Opposition re 18 MOTION to Dismiss /for Summary Judgment by Rutherford County filed by Carlos Ramos−Macario. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G)(Ozment, Harry) (Entered: 11/29/2010)
34 RESPONSE in Opposition re 19 MOTION to Dismiss /for Summary Judgment by Truman Jones filed by Carlos Ramos−Macario. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H)(Ozment, Harry) (Entered: 11/29/2010)
35 RESPONSE in Opposition re 20 MOTION to Dismiss /for Summary Judgment by Bob Asbury filed by Carlos Ramos−Macario. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H)(Ozment, Harry) (Entered: 11/29/2010)
36 ORDER granting 32 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response to 19 MOTION to Dismiss /for Summary Judgment, 20 MOTION to Dismiss /for Summary Judgment, 18 MOTION to Dismiss /for Summary Judgment. Signed by Magistrate Judge John S. Bryant on 12/1/2010. (hb) (Entered: 12/01/2010)
37 Second MOTION to Continue Case Management Conference by Carlos Ramos−Macario. (Ozment, Harry) (Entered: 12/07/2010)
38 ORDER granting 37 Second Motion to Reschedule Case Mgmt Conf. Initial Case Mgmt Conference RESCHEDULED to 1/24/2011, at 1:30 p.m. Signed by Magistrate Judge John S. Bryant on 12/10/10. (tmw) (Entered: 12/10/2010)
39 PROPOSED CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER filed by Carlos Ramos−Macario. (Ozment, Harry) (Entered: 01/18/2011)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge John S. Bryant: Initial Case Management Conference held on 1/24/2011. Counsel to submit a revised proposed initial case management order by 1/31/11. (Court Reporter:Taped #2011−3 JSB.) (tm) (Entered: 01/24/2011)
40 PROPOSED CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER Revised filed by Bob Asbury, Truman Jones, Rutherford County Sherif's Office ruthrford County, Tennessee. (Mantooth, David) (Entered: 01/26/2011)
41 REVISED INITIAL CASE MANANGEMENT ORDER: Discovery due by 9/30/2011. Dispositive Motions due by 11/30/2011. Signed by District Judge William J. Haynes, Jr on 1/27/2011. (hb) (Entered: 01/27/2011)
42 MEMORANDUM signed by District Judge William J. Haynes, Jr. on 3/2/2011. (Attachments: # 1 Text Search Memorandum)(hb) (Entered: 03/03/2011)
43 ORDER: In accordance with the Memorandum filed herewith, Defendants' motions to dismiss and for summary judgment (Docket Entry Nos. 18 , 19 , and 20 ) are

Case: 3:10-cv-813 As of: 11/10/2013 09:35 AM CST 4 of 7

03/02/2011 03/03/2011 03/17/2011 03/25/2011 03/25/2011 03/29/2011 04/07/2011 04/29/2011 04/29/2011 05/20/2011 05/20/2011 05/31/2011 05/31/2011 06/08/2011 06/10/2011 06/10/2011 06/10/2011 06/24/2011

GRANTED as to Plaintiff's federal claims against Truman Jones and Bob Asbury in their individual and official capacities. Plaintiff's state law claims against Jones and Asbury, Plaintiffs negligence claims against Rutherford County are DISMISSED without prejudice. Plaintiff's class action claims are DISMISSED. Defendants' motions are otherwise DENIED. Signed by District Judge William J. Haynes, Jr on 3/2/2011. (Attachments: # 1 Text Search Order)(hb) (Entered: 03/03/2011)
CASE CLOSED IN ERROR. CASE REOPENED ON THIS DATE. (hb) (Entered: 03/03/2011)
44 ***DISREGARD − CASE CLOSED IN ERROR*** ENTRY OF JUDGMENT re 43 Order. (hb) Modified text on 3/3/2011 (hb). (Entered: 03/03/2011)
45 ANSWER to 17 Amended Complaint, by Rutherford County Sherif's Office ruthrford County, Tennessee.(Mantooth, David) (Entered: 03/17/2011)
46 MOTION in Limine Regarding Immigration Status by Carlos Ramos−Macario. (Ozment, Harry) (Entered: 03/25/2011)
47 MEMORANDUM in Support of 46 MOTION in Limine Regarding Immigration Status filed by Carlos Ramos−Macario. (Ozment, Harry) (Entered: 03/25/2011)
48 RESPONSE in Opposition re 46 MOTION in Limine Regarding Immigration Status filed by Rutherford County Sherif's Office ruthrford County, Tennessee. (Mantooth, David) (Entered: 03/29/2011)
49 MOTION for Leave to re 48 Response in Opposition to Motion by Carlos Ramos−Macario. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Proposed Memo of Law to File in Reply)(Ozment, Harry) (Entered: 04/07/2011)
50 ORDER granting 49 Motion for Leave to File a Reply. Signed by Magistrate Judge John S. Bryant on 4/29/2011. (hb) (Entered: 04/29/2011)
51 REPLY to Response to Motion re 46 MOTION in Limine Regarding Immigration Status filed by Carlos Ramos−Macario. (hb) (Entered: 04/29/2011)
52 DISCOVERY DISPUTE STATEMENT by Carlos Ramos−Macario.(Ozment, Harry) (Entered: 05/20/2011)
53 MOTION to Compel by Carlos Ramos−Macario. (Ozment, Harry) (Entered: 05/20/2011)
54 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 53 MOTION to Compel by Rutherford County Sherif's Office ruthrford County, Tennessee. (Mantooth, David) (Entered: 05/31/2011)
55 AFFIDAVIT re 54 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 53 MOTION to Compel of Luis A. Botero by Rutherford County Sherif's Office ruthrford County, Tennessee. (Mantooth, David) (Entered: 05/31/2011)
56 ORDER granting 54 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply re 53 MOTION to Compel. Signed by Magistrate Judge John S. Bryant on 6/8/2011. (hb) (Entered: 06/08/2011)
57 RESPONSE in Opposition re 53 MOTION to Compel Production filed by Rutherford County Sherif's Office ruthrford County, Tennessee. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1−First Set of Disc Req to RCSO)(Mantooth, David) (Entered: 06/10/2011)
58 MOTION for Protective Order Regarding Inmate Files by Rutherford County Sherif's Office ruthrford County, Tennessee. (Mantooth, David) (Entered: 06/10/2011)
59 MOTION to Compel Responses to Written Discovery by Rutherford County Sherif's Office ruthrford County, Tennessee. (Mantooth, David) (Entered: 06/10/2011)
60 RESPONSE to Motion re 59 MOTION to Compel Responses to Written Discovery and Motion for Protective Order filed by Carlos Ramos−Macario. (Ozment, Harry)

Case: 3:10-cv-813 As of: 11/10/2013 09:35 AM CST 5 of 7

06/24/2011 08/02/2011 08/25/2011 08/26/2011 09/13/2011 09/16/2011
09/16/2011
09/16/2011 09/30/2011 10/03/2011
10/20/2011 10/20/2011 10/27/2011 11/02/2011 11/02/2011 11/04/2011 11/08/2011

(Entered: 06/24/2011)
61 RESPONSE in Opposition re 58 MOTION for Protective Order Regarding Inmate Files filed by Carlos Ramos−Macario. (Ozment, Harry) (Entered: 06/24/2011)
62 SUPPLEMENT filed by Rutherford County Sherif's Office ruthrford County, Tennessee re 59 Motion to Compel. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Psychological Immigration Evaluation)(Mantooth, David) (Entered: 08/02/2011)
63 Joint MOTION Suspend Scheduling Deadlines by Carlos Ramos−Macario, Rutherford County Sherif's Office ruthrford County, Tennessee. (Mantooth, David) (Entered: 08/25/2011)
64 MOTION for Psychiatric Examination by Rutherford County Sherif's Office ruthrford County, Tennessee. (Mantooth, David) (Entered: 08/26/2011)
65 ORDER denying 46 Motion in Limine. Signed by District Judge William J. Haynes, Jr on 9/12/2011. (hb) (Entered: 09/13/2011)
66 ORDER: Deft's 59 Motion to Compel Responses to Written Discovery is GRANTED subject to the conditions on page 5 of this motion for which counsel shall submit an Agreed Protective Order. Signed by District Judge William J. Haynes, Jr. on 9/16/11. (rd) (Entered: 09/16/2011)
67 ORDER granting 58 Motion for Protective Order. This motion is GRANTED for the conditions sought by the Defendants except that Plaintiff upon a showing of good cause cannot use this information for purposes other than this action. The Court will decided if good cause is shown. Counsel have 10 days to submit an Agreed Order consistent with the Court's Orders. Signed by District Judge William J. Haynes, Jr on 9/16/2011. (hb) (Entered: 09/16/2011)
68 ORDER granting 53 Motion to Compel. This motion is GRANTED subject to an agreed protective order given the Court's related Orders. Signed by District Judge William J. Haynes, Jr on 9/16/2011. (hb) (Entered: 09/16/2011)
69 MOTION to Extend Scheduling Deadlines by Rutherford County Sherif's Office ruthrford County, Tennessee. (Mantooth, David) (Entered: 09/30/2011)
70 ORDER: A telephone case management conference is set in this case for Thursday, October 20, 2011, at 9:30 a.m. Counsel for the plaintiff shall initiate this conference call. Counsel during this conference shall be prepared to discuss the current status of discovery in this case, as well as any revisions in the pretrial deadlines that may be necessary. Signed by Magistrate Judge John S. Bryant on 10/3/2011. (hb) (Entered: 10/03/2011)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge John S. Bryant: Telephone Status Conference held on 10/20/11. Counsel to submit a revised case management order next week. (tm) (Entered: 10/20/2011)
71 ORDER granting 64 Motion for Psychiatric Examination. Signed by Magistrate Judge John S. Bryant on 10/20/2011. (hb) (Entered: 10/20/2011)
72 PROPOSED CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER Second Revised filed by Carlos Ramos−Macario, Rutherford County Sherif's Office ruthrford County, Tennessee. (Mantooth, David) (Entered: 10/27/2011)
73 ORDER denying as moot 63 Joint Motion to Suspend Scheduling Deadlines. Signed by District Judge William J. Haynes, Jr on 11/2/2011. (hb) Modified text on 11/2/2011 (hb). (Entered: 11/02/2011)
74 ORDER denying as moot 69 Motion to Extend Scheduling Deadlines. Signed by District Judge William J. Haynes, Jr on 11/2/2011. (hb) (Entered: 11/02/2011)
75 NOTICE of Appearance by R. Andrew Free on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Free, R.) (Entered: 11/04/2011)
Bar status for Atty. R. Andrew Free of TN verified as active on this date. (hb) (Entered: 11/08/2011)

Case: 3:10-cv-813 As of: 11/10/2013 09:35 AM CST 6 of 7

12/01/2011
12/13/2011
12/30/2011 12/30/2011 01/23/2012 01/23/2012 03/08/2012 03/23/2012 03/23/2012
03/27/2012
04/20/2012 04/23/2012 04/23/2012

76 SECOND REVISED CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER: Dispositive Motions due by 4/13/2012. Jury Trial set for 8/28/2012 09:00 AM before District Judge William J. Haynes Jr. Pretrial Conference set for 8/15/2012 03:00 PM before District Judge William J. Haynes Jr. (SEE ORDER FOR OTHER DEADLINES) Signed by Magistrate Judge John S. Bryant on 12/1/11. (hb) (Entered: 12/01/2011)
77 CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER NO. 2: Jury Trial set for 8/28/2012 09:00 AM in Courtroom A859 before District Judge William J. Haynes Jr. Pretrial Conference set for 8/13/2012 03:00 PM in Courtroom A859 before District Judge William J. Haynes Jr. Proposed Pretrial Order due by 8/3/2012. Joint Proposed Pretrial Order due by 8/3/2012. (SEE ORDER FOR OTHER DEADLINES) Signed by District Judge William J. Haynes, Jr on 12/13/2011. (hb) (Entered: 12/13/2011)
78 NOTICE by Rutherford County Sherif's Office ruthrford County, Tennessee of Deposition of Unknown Custodian of Records for U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and/or Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) (Mantooth, David) (Entered: 12/30/2011)
79 NOTICE by Rutherford County Sherif's Office ruthrford County, Tennessee of Deposition of Unknown Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Agent(s) and/or Employee(s) (Mantooth, David) (Entered: 12/30/2011)
80 NOTICE to Take Deposition of Gloria Arecely Pivaral de Valenzuela by Rutherford County Sherif's Office ruthrford County, Tennessee.(Mantooth, David) (Entered: 01/23/2012)
81 NOTICE to Take Deposition of Husband of Gloria Arecely Pivaral de Valenzuela by Rutherford County Sherif's Office ruthrford County, Tennessee.(Mantooth, David) (Entered: 01/23/2012)
82 Joint MOTION for Case Status Conference to Present Provisional Settlement Agreement by Carlos Ramos−Macario, Rutherford County Sherif's Office ruthrford County, Tennessee. (Free, R.) (Entered: 03/08/2012)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge John S. Bryant: Telephone Conference held on 3/23/12. (tm) (Entered: 03/23/2012)
83 ORDER: The parties' 82 Joint Motion for Case Status Conference to Present Provisional Settlement Agreement is GRANTED. The conference is set for 4:00 p.m. on 4/16/12 in Courtroom A859 before District Judge William J. Haynes Jr. Signed by District Judge William J. Haynes, Jr. on 3/23/12. (rd) (Entered: 03/23/2012)
84 ORDER: Based upon the Court's one week continuance of the criminal trial in United States v. Adan, et al., 3:10−cr−00260, the status conference in this action is reset for Friday, April 20, 2012, at 4:30 p.m. It is so ORDERED. ENTERED this the 27th day of March, 2012. Signed by District Judge William J. Haynes, Jr on 3/27/12. (afs) (Entered: 03/27/2012)
85 NOTICE of Voluntary Dismissal by Bob Asbury, John Doe 1, John Doe 2, John Doe 3, Truman Jones, Carlos Ramos−Macario, Rutherford County Sherif's Office ruthrford County, Tennessee (Free, R.) (Entered: 04/20/2012)
86 ORDER: Based upon the parties' joint stipulation of dismissal of all claims with prejudice (Docket Entry No. 85), this action is DISMISSED with prejudice. This is the Final Order in this action. It is so ORDERED. ENTERED this the 23rd day of April, 2012. (afs) (Entered: 04/23/2012)
87 ENTRY OF JUDGMENT re DE 86 Order. (afs) (Entered: 04/23/2012)

Case: 3:10-cv-813 As of: 11/10/2013 09:35 AM CST 7 of 7