Case: 2:16-cv-15639 As of: 05/28/2019 12:14 PM CDT 1 of 14
U.S. District Court Eastern District of Louisiana (New Orleans) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:16−cv−15639−ILRL−MBN

CLOSED

Vo v. Gee, et al Assigned to: Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle Referred to: Magistrate Judge Michael North Cause: 28:2201 Constitutionality of State Statute(s)
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 10/18/2016 Date Terminated: 08/08/2017 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 950 Constitutional − State Statute Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Viet Anh Vo

represented by Mary C. Yanik New Orleans Workers' Center for Racial Justice 217 N. Prieur St. New Orleans, LA 70112 504−309−5165 Email: myanik@nowcrj.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alvaro Moises Huerta National Immigration Law Center (Los Angeles) 3435 Wilshire Blvd. Suite 2850 Los Angeles, CA 90010 213−674−2829 Email: huerta@nilc.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffery B. White Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, LLP (Los Angeles) 300 S. Grand Avenue Suite 3400 Los Angeles, CA 90071−3144 213−687−5191 Email: Jeffery.White@skadden.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jennifer Jean Rosenbaum New Orleans Workers' Center for Racial Justice 217 N. Prieur St. New Orleans, LA 70112 504−309−5165 Email: jjrosenbaum@nowcrj.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karen C. Tumlin National Immigration Law Center (Los Angeles) 3435 Wilshire Blvd. Suite 2850 Los Angeles, CA 90010 213−674−2850 Email: tumlin@nilc.org PRO HAC VICE

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ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa Gilford Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, LLP (Los Angeles) 300 S. Grand Avenue Suite 3400 Los Angeles, CA 90071−3144 213−687−5130 Email: Lisa.Gilford@skadden.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marley Ann Brumme Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, LLP (Los Angeles) 300 S. Grand Avenue Suite 3400 Los Angeles, CA 90071−3144 617−573−4861 Email: Marley.Brumme@skadden.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maximillian W. Hirsch Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, LLP (Los Angeles) 300 S. Grand Avenue Suite 3400 Los Angeles, CA 90071−3144 213−687−5106 Email: Maximillian.Hirsch@skadden.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nora A. Preciado National Immigration Law Center (Los Angeles) 3435 Wilshire Blvd. Suite 2850 Los Angeles, CA 90010 213−674−2823 Email: preciado@nilc.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stacy Horth−Neubert Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, LLP (Los Angeles) 300 S. Grand Avenue Suite 3400 Los Angeles, CA 90071−3144 213−687−5434 Email: stacy.horth−neubert@skadden.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
Rebekah E. Gee Secretary of the Department of Health

represented by Neal Risley Elliott , Jr. Louisiana Department of Health & Hospitals (Baton Rouge) Bureau of Legal Services

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Bienville Building 628 N. 4th St. P. O. Box 3836 Baton Rouge, LA 70821−3836 225−342−1128 Email: neal.elliott@la.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lance Sterling Guest Louisiana Department of Justice (1450 Poydras) 1450 Poydras Street Suite 900 New Orleans, LA 70112 504−599−1220 Fax: 504−599−1212 Email: guestl@ag.state.la.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Devin George State Registrar

represented by Neal Risley Elliott , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lance Sterling Guest (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Michael Thibodeaux Iberia Parish Clerk

represented by Kay Austin Theunissen Mahtook & LaFleur (Lafayette) 600 Jefferson St. Suite 1000 P. O. Box 3089 Lafayette, LA 70502 337−266−2189 Fax: 337−266−2303 Email: ktheunissen@mandllaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Julie I. Faulk Mantook & LaFleur 600 Jefferson St. Suite 1000 Lafayette, LA 70501 337−266−2189 Email: jfaulk@mandllaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Diane Meaux Broussard Vermilion Parish Clerk

represented by Kay Austin Theunissen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Julie I. Faulk (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant

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Louis J. Perret Lafayette Parish Clerk

represented by Stephen Joseph Oats Oats & Marino (Lafayette) Gordon Square 100 E. Vermilion St. Suite 400 Lafayette, LA 70501 337−233−1100 Fax: 337−233−1178 Email: oats@oatsmarino.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cearley Wilkinson Fontenot Oats & Marino (Lafayette) Gordon Square 100 E. Vermilion St. Suite 400 Lafayette, LA 70501 337−233−1100 Email: cfontenot@oatsmarino.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patrick B. McIntire Oats & Marino (Lafayette) Gordon Square 100 E. Vermilion St. Suite 400 Lafayette, LA 70501 337−233−1100 Fax: 337−233−1178 Email: pmcintire@oatsmarino.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant Constitutional Accountability Center

represented by Ellie T. Schilling Schonekas, Evans, McGoey & McEachin, LLC 909 Poydras Street Suite 1600 New Orleans, LA 70112 504−680−6050 Email: ellie@semmlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Louisiana

represented by Bruce W. Hamilton American Civil Liberties Union Foundation (New Orleans) 1340 Poydras St. Suite 2160 P. O. Box 56157 New Orleans, LA 70156 504−522−0628 x. 122 Email: bhamilton@laaclu.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant National Center for Lesbian Rights

represented by Ryan P. Delaney Delaney & Robb, Attorneys at Law, LLC 2800 Veterans Blvd. Suite 213

Case: 2:16-cv-15639 As of: 05/28/2019 12:14 PM CDT 5 of 14
Metairie, LA 70002 504−267−9700 Email: ryan@delaneyandrobb.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 10/18/2016
10/18/2016 10/18/2016
10/18/2016 10/18/2016 10/18/2016 10/18/2016 10/18/2016 10/18/2016 10/18/2016 10/18/2016 10/19/2016

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT with jury demand against All Defendants (Filing fee $ 400 receipt number 053L−5759062) filed by Viet Anh Vo. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Act 436, # 2 Civl Cover Sheet, # 3 Appendix to Civil Cover Sheet)Attorney Mary C. Yanik added to party Viet Anh Vo(pty:pla).(Yanik, Mary) Modified text on 10/18/2016 (mmv). (Entered: 10/18/2016)
2 Initial Case Assignment to Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle and Magistrate Judge Michael North. (jeg) (Entered: 10/18/2016)
3 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Alvaro M. Huerta (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number 053L−5759761) by Viet Anh Vo. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration in support, # 2 Certificate of Good Standing, # 3 Proposed Order, # 4 CMECF Registration Form)(Yanik, Mary) Modified text on 10/18/2016 (mmv). (Entered: 10/18/2016)
4 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 1 Complaint. **Attachment has duplicate description. For attachment, select either a category OR enter a description, selecting both will result in duplicate docket text. Clerk took corrective action.** (mmv) (Entered: 10/18/2016)
5 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Karen Tumlin (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number 053L−5760076) by Viet Anh Vo. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Proposed Order, # 4 CM/ECF Registration Form)(Yanik, Mary) (Entered: 10/18/2016)
6 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Stacy Horth−Neubert (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number 053L−5760153) by Viet Anh Vo. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Proposed Order, # 4 CMECF Registration Form)(Yanik, Mary) (Entered: 10/18/2016)
7 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Nora Preciado (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number 053L−5760222) by Viet Anh Vo. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Proposed Order, # 4 CMECF Registration)(Yanik, Mary) (Entered: 10/18/2016)
8 **DEFICIENT** EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Marley Ann Brumme (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number 053L−5760349) by Viet Anh Vo. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Proposed Order)(Yanik, Mary) Modified on 10/19/2016 (mmv). (Entered: 10/18/2016)
9 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Lisa Gilford (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number 053L−5760394) by Viet Anh Vo. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Proposed Order, # 4 CMECF Registration Form)(Yanik, Mary) (Entered: 10/18/2016)
10 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Jeffrey White (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number 053L−5759800) by Viet Anh Vo. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Proposed Order, # 4 CMECF Registration Form)(Yanik, Mary) (Entered: 10/18/2016)
11 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Maximillian W. Hirsch (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number 053L−5760865) by Viet Anh Vo. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Proposed Order, # 4 CM/ECF Registration)(Yanik, Mary) Modified text on 10/19/2016 (mmv). (Entered: 10/18/2016)
12 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 6 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Stacy Horth−Neubert (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number 053L−5760153). **The title of the attached proposed order should not include the word 'Proposed' but only reflect 'Order' on the actual document.** (mmv) (Entered: 10/19/2016)

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10/19/2016 10/19/2016 10/20/2016 10/20/2016 10/20/2016 10/21/2016 10/21/2016 11/03/2016
11/04/2016 11/07/2016 11/07/2016 11/08/2016 12/07/2016 01/06/2017

13 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 11 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Max Hirsch (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number 053L−5760865). **The title of the attached proposed order should not include the word 'Proposed' but only reflect 'Order' on the actual document.** (mmv) (Entered: 10/19/2016)
14 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Marley Ann Brumme (Fee previously paid) by Viet Anh Vo. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Proposed Order, # 3 CM/ECF Registration)(Yanik, Mary) Modified text on 10/19/2016 (mmv). (Entered: 10/19/2016)
15 Summons Submitted for Issuance (Attachments: # 1 Summons Gee, Rebekah, # 2 Summons George, Devin, # 3 Summons Perret, Louis, # 4 Summons Thibodeaux, Michael)(Yanik, Mary) (Entered: 10/20/2016)
16 NOTICE of Challenge to Constitutionality of State Statute by Viet Anh Vo . (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Yanik, Mary) Modified text on 10/21/2016 (mmv). (Entered: 10/20/2016)
19 ORDER GRANTING 3 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 14 Motions to Appear Pro Hac Vice as to Alvaro Moises Huerta, Karen C. Tumlin, Stacy Horth−Neubert, Nora A. Preciado, Lisa Gilford, Jeffery B. White, Maximillian W. Hirsch, Marley Ann Brumme. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle on 10/20/2016. (Attachments: # 1 Notice Pro Hac Vice Counsel) (mmv) (Entered: 10/24/2016)
17 Summons Issued as to Diane Meaux Broussard, Rebekah E. Gee, Devin George, Louis J. Perret, Michael Thibodeaux. (Attachments: # 1 Summons, # 2 Summons, # 3 Summons, # 4 Summons)(mmv) (Entered: 10/21/2016)
18 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 16 Notice (Other). **Document's signature line is either incomplete or blank. All future documents must reflect either an original signature or an electronic signature of the filing attorney following the format 's/ (attorney name)'. No further action is necessary.** (mmv) (Entered: 10/21/2016)
20 AFFIDAVIT of Service by Michael Thibodeaux and Robert Garcia of Summons and Complaint served on Defendants− Devin George, State Registrar on 10/26/2016; answer due 11/16/2016, Diane Meaux Broussard, Vermilion Parish Clerk; Rebekah E. Gee, Secretary of the Department of Health; Louis J. Perret, Lafayette Parish Clerk; and Michael Thibodeaux, Iberia Parish Clerk on 10/27/2016; answers due 11/17/2016. (mmv) (Entered: 11/04/2016) (Hirsch, Maximillian) (Main Document 20 replaced on 11/4/2016) (mmv). (Additional attachment(s) added on 11/4/2016: # 1 Exhibit A− Affidavits) (mmv). Modified text on 11/4/2016 (mmv). (Entered: 11/03/2016)
21 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 20 Affidavit of Service. **1) The Notice should have been the main document with Exhibit A as an attachment. Clerk has taken corrective action. **2) Exhibit A is on incorrect sized paper. Local Rule 10.1E states 'All papers drafted for filing in this court shall be on 8−1/2 by 11 inch paper'. Clerk has reduced images. No further action needed.**(mmv) (Entered: 11/04/2016)
22 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Extension of Time to Answer as to 1 Complaint by Rebekah E. Gee, Devin George. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)Attorney Neal Risley Elliott, Jr added to party Rebekah E. Gee(pty:dft), Attorney Neal Risley Elliott, Jr added to party Devin George(pty:dft).(Elliott, Neal) Modified text/event on 11/7/2016 (mmv). (Entered: 11/07/2016)
23 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 22 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply. **Filing attorney selected incorrect event. Correct event is MOTION for Extension of Time to Answer. Clerk took corrective action by changing the event.** (mmv) (Entered: 11/07/2016)
24 ORDER GRANTING 22 Motion for Extension of Time to Answer re 1 Complaint as to Rebekah E. Gee answer due 12/8/2016; Devin George answer due 12/8/2016. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle on 11/8/2016. (mmv) (Entered: 11/08/2016)
25 ANSWER to 1 Complaint, by Rebekah E. Gee, Devin George.(Elliott, Neal) (Entered: 12/07/2016)
26 NOTICE: Scheduling Conference set for 2/9/2017 11:15 AM before case manager by telephone. All parties are to call into the conference call at the toll free number

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01/13/2017
01/17/2017
01/17/2017 01/18/2017 01/27/2017 01/27/2017
02/02/2017 02/02/2017 02/03/2017 02/07/2017

provided. By Clerk.(ijg) (Entered: 01/06/2017)
27 **DEFICIENT** MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Viet Anh Vo. Motion(s) will be submitted on 1/13/2017. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support Of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, # 2 Affidavit Declaration Of Viet Anh Vo In Support Of Plaintiffs Motion For Preliminary Injunction, # 3 Affidavit Declaration Of Mary Yanik In Support Of Plaintiffs Motion For Preliminary Injunction, # 4 Exhibit Exhibits A − F to Declaration of Mary Yanik, # 5 Request for Oral Argument, # 6 Notice of Submission)(Yanik, Mary) Modified on 1/13/2017 (mmv). (Entered: 01/13/2017)
28 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Leave to File Memorandum in Excess of Page Limits by Viet Anh Vo. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Proposed Pleading− Motion for Preliminary Injunction, # 3 Proposed Pleading Memorandum in Support, # 4 Proposed Pleading Notice of Submission, # 5 Proposed Pleading Vo Declaration, # 6 Proposed Pleading Yanik Declaration, # 7 Proposed Pleading Exhibit A, # 8 Proposed Pleading Exhibit B, # 9 Proposed Pleading Exhibit C, # 10 Proposed Pleading Exhibit D, # 11 Proposed Pleading Exhibit E, # 12 Proposed Pleading Exhibit F, # 13 Proposed Pleading Exhibit G, # 14 Proposed Pleading Exhibit H)(Yanik, Mary) Modified text on 1/18/2017 (mmv). (Entered: 01/17/2017)
29 Request/Statement of Oral Argument by Viet Anh Vo re Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Yanik, Mary) Modified text on 1/18/2017 (mmv). (Entered: 01/17/2017)
30 ORDER DENYING 29 Request for Oral Argument. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle on 1/18/2017.(mmv) (Entered: 01/18/2017)
31 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Extension of Time to Answer 1 Complaint by Diane Meaux Broussard, Michael Thibodeaux. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)Attorney Kay Austin Theunissen added to party Diane Meaux Broussard(pty:dft), Attorney Kay Austin Theunissen added to party Michael Thibodeaux(pty:dft).(Theunissen, Kay) Modified text/added linkage/removed referral and submission date on 1/27/2017 (mmv). (Entered: 01/27/2017)
32 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 31 MOTION for Extension of Time to Answer . **1) Filing attorney should have selected 'Yes' at the question 'Is this an Exparte/Consent Motion Y/N?' before clicking the Next button. Clerk modified docket text to reflect 'Exparte'. Exparte/Consent motions are not set for hearing. Clerk has removed hearing date. **2) Document should have been linked to another document by checking the box 'Should the document you are filing link to another document' or by selecting a related document on other appropriate screen. Clerk took corrective action by linking document to document 1. **3) Filing attorney incorrectly changed 'N' to 'Y' at the question 'Is this motion to be decided by the Magistrate Judge Y/N?'. This motion will be decided by the district judge. Clerk took corrective action.**(mmv) (Entered: 01/27/2017)
33 ORDER GRANTING 28 Motion for Leave to File Memorandum in Excess of Page Limits; GRANTING 31 Motion for Extension of Time to Answer re 1 Complaint as to Diane Meaux Broussard answer due 2/2/2017; Michael Thibodeaux answer due 2/2/2017. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle on 2/2/2017. (mmv) (Entered: 02/02/2017)
34 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Viet Anh Vo. Motion(s) will be submitted on 2/1/2017. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Notice of Submission, # 3 Declaration of Viet Vo, # 4 Declaration of Mary Yanik, # 5 Exhibit A, # 6 Exhibit B, # 7 Exhibit C, # 8 Exhibit D, # 9 Exhibit E, # 10 Exhibit F, # 11 Exhibit G, # 12 Exhibit H)(mmv) (Entered: 02/02/2017)
35 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Extension of Time to Answer re 1 Complaint, by Louis J. Perret. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)Attorney Patrick B. McIntire added to party Louis J. Perret(pty:dft).(McIntire, Patrick) (Entered: 02/03/2017)
36 ORDER GRANTING 35 Motion for Extension of Time to Answer re 1 Complaint. Defendant, Louis J. Perret, Lafayette Parish Clerk, has until February 23, 2017 to file responsive pleadings. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle on 2/7/2017. (mmv) (Entered: 02/07/2017)

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02/08/2017 02/08/2017 02/08/2017
02/08/2017 02/09/2017
02/09/2017
02/09/2017 02/09/2017 02/09/2017 02/13/2017
02/23/2017

37 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Brief by Constitutional Accountability Center. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Proposed Pleading Brief of the Constitutional Accountability Center as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction)Attorney Ellie T. Schilling added to party Constitutional Accountability Center(pty:am).(Schilling, Ellie) (Entered: 02/08/2017)
38 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Leave to File Brief of Amicus Curiae by American Civil Liberties Union Foundation Of Louisiana. (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Submission, # 2 Memorandum in Support, # 3 Proposed Order, # 4 Proposed Pleading−Brief of Amicus Curiae)Attorney Bruce W. Hamilton added to party American Civil Liberties Union Foundation Of Louisiana(pty:am).(Hamilton, Bruce) Modified text/removed submission date on 2/8/2017 (mmv). (Entered: 02/08/2017)
39 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 38 First MOTION for Leave to File Brief of Amicus Curiae. **1) Filing attorney did not select category 'Proposed Pleading' when attaching document for which leave to file is being requested. Clerk took corrective action. **2) Filing attorney should have selected 'Yes' at the question 'Is this an Exparte/Consent Motion Y/N?' before clicking the Next button. Clerk modified docket text to reflect 'Exparte'. Exparte/Consent motions are not set for hearing. Clerk has removed hearing date.** (mmv) (Entered: 02/08/2017)
40 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Leave to File Brief as Amici Curiae by National Center for Lesbian Rights. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading − Proposed Amicus Brief, # 2 Notice of Submission, # 3 Memorandum in Support, # 4 Proposed Order)Attorney Ryan P. Delaney added to party National Center for Lesbian Rights(pty:am).(Delaney, Ryan) Modified text/removed submission date on 2/9/2017 (mmv). (Entered: 02/08/2017)
41 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 40 MOTION for Leave to File Brief as Amici Curiae. **1) Filing attorney should have selected 'Yes' at the question 'Is this an Exparte/Consent Motion Y/N?' before clicking the Next button. Clerk modified docket text to reflect 'Exparte'. Exparte/Consent motions are not set for hearing. Clerk has removed hearing date. **2) Filing attorney did not select category 'Proposed Pleading' when attaching document for which leave to file is being requested. Clerk took corrective action.** (mmv) (Entered: 02/09/2017)
42 ORDER GRANTING 37 Motion for Leave to File Brief of the Constitutional Accountability Center as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction; GRANTING 38 Motion of American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Louisiana for Leave to File Brief as Amicus Curiae; GRANTING 40 Motion of National Center for Lesbian Rights, GLBTQ Legal Advocates and Defenders, and Lambda Legal for Leave to File Brief as Amici Curiaein in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle on 2/9/2017. (mmv) (Entered: 02/09/2017)
43 Amicus Brief in Support by Constitutional Accountability Center re 34 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction (mmv) (Entered: 02/09/2017)
44 Amicus Brief in Support by American Civil Liberties Union Foundation Of Louisiana re 34 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction (mmv) (Entered: 02/09/2017)
45 Amicus Brief in Support by National Center for Lesbian Rights re 34 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction (mmv) (Entered: 02/09/2017)
46 ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's 34 Motion for Preliminary Injunction, originally set for submission on February 1, 2017, is set for hearing with oral argument on Wednesday, March 22, 2017 at 9:00 a.m. before Judge Lemelle. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a trial date of November 13,2017 has been selected and agreed upon by all parties. The Court's Case Manager shall schedule a telephone scheduling conference upon the filing of responsive pleadings by all parties. Said pleadings are to be filed no later than February 23, 2017, per Rec. Doc. 36 . Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle on 2/10/2017.(mmv) (Entered: 02/13/2017)
47 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim by Diane Meaux Broussard, Michael Thibodeaux. Motion(s) will be submitted on 3/15/2017. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Notice of Submission)(Theunissen, Kay) (Entered: 02/23/2017)

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02/23/2017 02/23/2017 02/23/2017 02/28/2017
03/01/2017
03/02/2017
03/06/2017 03/10/2017 03/10/2017
03/14/2017 03/14/2017 03/14/2017 03/14/2017 03/14/2017 03/14/2017 03/15/2017

48 MOTION to Transfer Case by Diane Meaux Broussard, Michael Thibodeaux. Motion(s) will be submitted on 3/15/2017. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Notice of Submission)(Theunissen, Kay) (Entered: 02/23/2017)
49 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim by Louis J. Perret. Motion(s) will be submitted on 3/15/2017. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Notice of Submission)(Fontenot, Cearley) (Entered: 02/23/2017)
50 MOTION to Transfer Case by Louis J. Perret. Motion(s) will be submitted on 3/15/2017. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Notice of Submission)(Fontenot, Cearley) (Entered: 02/23/2017)
51 **DEFICIENT** EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 49 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim , 47 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim , 50 MOTION to Transfer Case , 48 MOTION to Transfer Case by Viet Anh Vo. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Huerta, Alvaro) Modified on 3/1/2017 (mmv). Modified on 3/1/2017 (mmv). (Entered: 02/28/2017)
52 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 49 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim , 47 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim , 50 MOTION to Transfer Case , 48 MOTION to Transfer Case by Viet Anh Vo. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Preciado, Nora) (Entered: 03/01/2017)
53 ORDER GRANTING 52 Motion for Extension of Time to File Responsive Pleadings. Plaintiff, Viet Anh Vo, be and the same is hereby granted an extension of seven (7) days or until March 14, 2017, within which to file his opposition to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss and Motions to Transfer. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle on 3/2/2017. (mmv) (Entered: 03/02/2017)
54 ORDER SCHEDULING STATUS CONFERENCE for 3/17/2017 at 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Michael North. Signed by Magistrate Judge Michael North.(bwn) (Entered: 03/06/2017)
55 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by Rebekah E. Gee, Devin George re 34 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Elliott, Neal) Modified text on 3/10/2017 (mmv). (Entered: 03/10/2017)
56 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 55 Response/Memorandum in Opposition to Motion. **Filing attorney incorrectly linked document to document 27. Document 27 is a deficient document. Document should only be linked to document 34 as that is the pending Motion. Clerk removed linkage to deficient document.** (mmv) (Entered: 03/10/2017)
57 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by Louis J. Perret re 34 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction . (Fontenot, Cearley) (Entered: 03/14/2017)
58 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by Diane Meaux Broussard, Michael Thibodeaux re 34 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction . (Theunissen, Kay) (Entered: 03/14/2017)
59 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by Viet Anh Vo re 47 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim . (Yanik, Mary) (Entered: 03/14/2017)
60 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by Viet Anh Vo re 49 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim . (Yanik, Mary) (Entered: 03/14/2017)
61 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by Viet Anh Vo re 50 MOTION to Transfer Case . (Yanik, Mary) (Entered: 03/14/2017)
62 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by Viet Anh Vo re 48 MOTION to Transfer Case . (Yanik, Mary) (Entered: 03/14/2017)
63 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 58 Response/Memorandum in Opposition to Motion. **Name of attorney who electronically filed this document does not match name of signatory attorney on pleading. The user log−in and password serve as the required signature for purposes of Rule 11 of the FRCP. No further action is necessary.** (mmv) (Entered: 03/15/2017)

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03/16/2017 03/17/2017 03/17/2017 03/17/2017 03/17/2017 03/20/2017 03/20/2017 03/20/2017 03/20/2017 03/20/2017
03/21/2017
03/21/2017 03/22/2017
03/23/2017

64 EXPARTE/CONSENT Consent MOTION for Leave to File Reply in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction by Viet Anh Vo. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading, # 2 Proposed Order)(Yanik, Mary) (Entered: 03/16/2017)
65 ORDER granting 64 Motion for Leave to File Reply. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle on 3/17/2017. (cg) (Entered: 03/17/2017)
66 REPLY to Response to Motion 34 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Viet Anh Vo re. (cg) (Entered: 03/17/2017)
67 **DEFICIENT** EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Continue by Louis J. Perret. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Proposed Order)(Fontenot, Cearley) Modified on 3/20/2017 (mmv). (Entered: 03/17/2017)
68 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by Viet Anh Vo re rec. doc. 67 . (Yanik, Mary) Modified text/removed linkage to deficient document on 3/20/2017 (mmv). (Entered: 03/17/2017)
69 MOTION to Continue Hearing on Preliminary Injunction by Louis J. Perret. Motion(s) will be submitted on 4/5/2017. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Notice of Submission, # 3 Proposed Order)(Fontenot, Cearley) Modified text/added submission date on 3/20/2017 (mmv). (Entered: 03/20/2017)
70 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Expedite Consideration on rec. doc. 69 by Louis J. Perret. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Fontenot, Cearley) Modified text on 3/20/2017 (mmv). (Entered: 03/20/2017)
71 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 69 MOTION to Continue . **Filing attorney should have selected 'No' at the question 'Is this an Exparte/Consent Motion Y/N?'. Clerk took corrective action to set motion for submission on 4/5/2017 before Judge Ivan L. R. Lemelle. No further action is necessary.** (mmv) (Entered: 03/20/2017)
72 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memorandum in Support of rec. doc. 47 by Diane Meaux Broussard, Michael Thibodeaux. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Proposed Pleading− Reply Memo)(Theunissen, Kay) Modified text/removed referral on 3/20/2017 (mmv). (Entered: 03/20/2017)
73 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 72 MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memorandum in Support of Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss. **1) Filing attorney incorrectly changed 'N' to 'Y' at the question 'Is this motion to be decided by the Magistrate Judge Y/N?'. This motion will be decided by the district judge. Clerk took corrective action. **2) Filing attorney did not select category 'Proposed Pleading' when attaching document for which leave to file is being requested. Clerk took corrective action.** (mmv) (Entered: 03/20/2017)
74 ORDER: IT IS ORDERED that the 70 Motion for Expedited Hearing is GRANTED without need of oral argument or further briefing. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the 69 Motion to Continue Hearing of the Preliminary Injunction is DENIED without need for opposition. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the 47 , 49 Motions to Dismiss and the 48 , 50 Motions to Transfer are also set for oral argument on Wednesday, March 22nd at 10:00 a.m. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the 72 Motion for Leave to File Reply is GRANTED. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle on 3/21/2017.(mmv) (Entered: 03/21/2017)
75 Reply Memorandum filed by Diane Meaux Broussard, Michael Thibodeaux, in Support of 47 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim . (mmv) (Entered: 03/21/2017)
76 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle: Motion Hearing held on 3/22/2017 re 50 MOTION to Transfer Case filed by Louis J. Perret, 49 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by Louis J. Perret, 48 MOTION to Transfer Case filed by Diane Meaux Broussard, Michael Thibodeaux, 34 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Viet Anh Vo, 47 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by Diane Meaux Broussard, Michael Thibodeaux. See Court Order. (Court Reporter Jodi Simcox.) (ijg) (Entered: 03/22/2017)
77 OPINION: IT IS ORDERED that Defendants' 48 , 50 Motions to Transfer and 47 , 49 Motions to Dismiss are DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the 34 Motion for

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04/06/2017 04/11/2017 04/12/2017 04/12/2017 04/12/2017 04/13/2017 05/24/2017
05/24/2017 05/25/2017
05/25/2017 06/12/2017 06/13/2017
06/13/2017 06/19/2017

Preliminary Injunction is GRANTED. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle on 3/23/2017. (mmv) (Entered: 03/23/2017)
78 **DEFICIENT** MOTION for Leave to File Amended Complaint by Viet Anh Vo. Motion(s) will be submitted on 4/21/2017. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading, # 2 Notice of Submission, # 3 Proposed Order)(Yanik, Mary) Modified on 4/7/2017 (mmv). (Entered: 04/06/2017)
79 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Leave to Amend Complaint by Viet Anh Vo. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading, # 2 Proposed Order)(Yanik, Mary) Modified text on 4/12/2017 (jls). (Entered: 04/11/2017)
80 ANSWER to 1 Complaint by Louis J. Perret.(Fontenot, Cearley) Modified text on 4/13/2017 (mmv). (Entered: 04/12/2017)
81 ORDER GRANTING 79 Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle on 4/12/2017. (mmv) (Entered: 04/12/2017)
82 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT against Diane Meaux Broussard, Rebekah E. Gee, Devin George, Louis J. Perret, Michael Thibodeaux filed by Viet Anh Vo.(mmv) (Entered: 04/12/2017)
83 ANSWER to 1 Complaint, by Diane Meaux Broussard, Michael Thibodeaux.(Theunissen, Kay) (Entered: 04/13/2017)
84 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment , MOTION for Declaratory Judgment , MOTION for Permanent Injunction by Viet Anh Vo. Motion(s) will be submitted on 6/21/2017. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Statement of Contested/Uncontested Facts, # 3 Notice of Submission, # 4 Declaration, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Proposed Order)(Yanik, Mary) Modified event/text on 5/25/2017 (mmv). (Entered: 05/24/2017)
85 Request/Statement of Oral Argument by Viet Anh Vo regarding 84 First MOTION for Summary Judgment MOTION for Declaratory Judgment MOTION for Permanent Injunction (Yanik, Mary) (Entered: 05/24/2017)
86 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 84 MOTION for Summary Judgment MOTION for Declaratory Judgment MOTION for Permanent Injunction . **Filing attorney selected incorrect event. Correct event is MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment. Clerk took corrective action by changing the event.** (mmv) (Entered: 05/25/2017)
87 ORDER DENYING 85 Request/Statement of Oral Argument re 84 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment, MOTION for Declaratory Judgment, MOTION for Permanent Injunction.Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle on 5/25/2017.(mmv) (Entered: 05/25/2017)
88 **DEFICIENT** RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by Rebekah E. Gee, Devin George re 84 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment MOTION for Declaratory Judgment MOTION for Permanent Injunction . (Elliott, Neal) Modified on 6/14/2017 (jls). (Entered: 06/12/2017)
89 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition, filed by Diane Meaux Broussard, Michael Thibodeaux re 84 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment MOTION for Declaratory Judgment MOTION for Permanent Injunction , Adopting by Reference the 91 Opposition. (Theunissen, Kay) Modified text on 7/6/2017 (jls). (Entered: 06/13/2017)
90 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by Louis J. Perret re 84 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment MOTION for Declaratory Judgment MOTION for Permanent Injunction , Adopting the 91 Opposition. (Fontenot, Cearley) Modified text on 7/6/2017 (jls). (Entered: 06/13/2017)
91 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by Rebekah E. Gee, Devin George re 84 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment MOTION for Declaratory Judgment MOTION for Permanent Injunction . (Attachments: # 1 Statement of Contested/Uncontested Facts)(Elliott, Neal) Modified text on 6/19/2017 (jls). (Entered: 06/19/2017)

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06/20/2017 06/21/2017 06/21/2017 07/06/2017
08/08/2017 08/08/2017 08/09/2017
08/10/2017
08/14/2017
08/15/2017
08/16/2017 08/16/2017 08/18/2017 08/18/2017

92 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memorandum in Support of rec. doc. 84 by Viet Anh Vo. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading, # 2 Proposed Order)(Yanik, Mary) Modified text on 6/21/2017 (mmv). (Entered: 06/20/2017)
93 ORDER GRANTING 92 Motion for Leave to File Reply Memorandum. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle on 6/21/2017. (mmv) (Entered: 06/22/2017)
94 Reply Memorandum filed by Viet Anh Vo, in Support of 84 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment, MOTION for Declaratory Judgment, MOTION for Permanent Injunction . (mmv) (Entered: 06/22/2017)
95 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 89 Response/Memorandum in Opposition to Motion, 90 Response/Memorandum in Opposition to Motion, 91 Response/Memorandum in Opposition to Motion, 94 Supplemental Memorandum of Changed Circumstances regarding HB 439. (Hirsch, Maximillian) Modified text on 7/7/2017 (jls). (Entered: 07/06/2017)
96 OPINION AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION: IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs 84 Motions for Partial Summary Judgment, Declaratory Judgment and Permanent Injunction are GRANTED. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle on 8/8/2017.(jls) (Entered: 08/08/2017)
97 JUDGMENT entered in favor of Viet Anh Vo against Devin George, Diane Meaux Broussard, Louis J. Perret, Michael Thibodeaux, Rebekah E. Gee, along with pertinent employees, officers, agents and successors for the State of Louisiana. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle on 8/8/2017.(jls) (Entered: 08/08/2017)
98 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Telephone Conference for Clarification of Court's Opinion and Permanent Injunction Ruling (rec. doc. 96) by Rebekah E. Gee, Devin George. (Elliott, Neal) Modified text/removed submission date on 8/10/2017 (jls). (Additional attachment(s) added on 8/10/2017: # 1 Proposed Order) (jls). (Entered: 08/09/2017)
99 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 98 MOTION for Telephone Conference for Clarification of Court's Opinion and Permanent Injunction Ruling (rec. doc. 96) . **Filing attorney did not include a proposed order. Proposed Order subsequently provided to Clerk and has now been attached to the motion.** (jls) (Entered: 08/10/2017)
100 ORDER DENYING 98 Motion for Telephone Status Conference for Clarification of the Court's Opinion and Permanent Injunction. Parties may jointly propose additional language for the permanent injunction by August 18, 2017, which will be considered without guarantee of adoption. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle on 8/14/2017. (jls) (Entered: 08/14/2017)
101 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Enroll as Counsel of Record Lance Guest by Rebekah E. Gee, Devin George. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) Attorney Lance Sterling Guest added to party Rebekah E. Gee(pty:dft), Attorney Lance Sterling Guest added to party Devin George(pty:dft).(Guest, Lance) Modified text on 8/16/2017 (mmv). (Entered: 08/15/2017)
102 ORDER granting 101 Motion to Enroll Lance Guest as additional Counsel of Record. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle. (ijg) (Entered: 08/16/2017)
103 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Extension of Time to File Attorneys' Fees and Costs Petition by Viet Anh Vo. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Yanik, Mary) (Entered: 08/16/2017)
104 ORDER: IT IS ORDERED that the 103 motion is GRANTED IN PART, allowing only an extension to file an attorneys' fees motion on or before September 12, 2017. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle on 8/18/2017. (jls) (Entered: 08/18/2017)
105 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Extension of Time for Parties to Jointly Submit Proposed Procedures for Issuance of Marriage Licenses by Rebekah E. Gee, Devin George. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Elliott, Neal) Modified text/removed submission date on 8/21/2017 (jls). (Entered: 08/18/2017)

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08/21/2017 09/06/2017 09/07/2017 09/12/2017 09/20/2017 09/26/2017
10/10/2017 10/10/2017 10/10/2017 10/13/2017
10/19/2017
10/19/2017

106 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 105 MOTION for Extension of Time for Parties to Jointly Submit Proposed Procedures for Issuance of Marriage Licenses . **Filing attorney should have selected 'Yes' at the question 'Is this an Exparte/Consent Motion Y/N?'. Exparte/Consent motions are not set for submission. Clerk has removed submission date.** (jls) (Entered: 08/21/2017)
107 ORDER: IT IS ORDERED that the 105 motion is GRANTED, allowing the parties an extension of time to file proposed additional language for permanent injunction by 9/20/2017, as set forth in document. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle on 9/6/2017. (jls) (Entered: 09/06/2017)
108 EXPARTE/CONSENT Second MOTION for Extension of Time to File Attorneys' Fees and Costs Petition by Viet Anh Vo. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Huerta, Alvaro) (Entered: 09/07/2017)
109 ORDER Denying in part and Granting in part 108 Motion for a Second Extension of Time to File Attorneys' Fees and Cost Petition as set forth in document. Movant is warned that calling chambers soliciting an expected ruling date is unprofessional and sanctionable. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle. (ijg) (Entered: 09/12/2017)
110 EXPARTE/CONSENT Joint MOTION to Submit Proposed Procedures for Issuance of Marriage Licenses as Additional Language to the Permanent Injunction by Plaintiff Viet Vo, and by Rebekah E. Gee, Devin George. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Proposed Procedures for Issuance of Marriage Licenses, # 2 Exhibit Compilation of Prior Law, # 3 Exhibit Copy of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 74.3.1, # 4 Proposed Order)(Elliott, Neal) Modified text on 9/20/2017 (jls). (Entered: 09/20/2017)
111 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs by Viet Anh Vo. Motion(s) will be submitted on 10/18/2017. (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Submission, # 2 Proposed Order, # 3 Memorandum in Support, # 4 Tumlin Declaration, # 5 Exhibit A, # 6 Exhibit B, # 7 Exhibit C, # 8 Horth−Neubert Declaration, # 9 Exhibit A, # 10 Exhibit B, # 11 Exhibit C, # 12 Exhibit D, # 13 Exhibit E, # 14 Exhibit F, # 15 Exhibit G, # 16 Exhibit H, # 17 Exhibit I, # 18 Exhibit J, # 19 Yanik Declaration, # 20 Exhibit A, # 21 Exhibit B, # 22 Exhibit C, # 23 Exhibit D)(Yanik, Mary) Modified text on 9/27/2017 (jls). (Entered: 09/26/2017)
112 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by Diane Meaux Broussard, Michael Thibodeaux re 111 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Theunissen, Kay) Modified text on 10/11/2017 (jls). (Entered: 10/10/2017)
113 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by Louis J. Perret re 111 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs . (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit)(Fontenot, Cearley) (Entered: 10/10/2017)
114 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by Rebekah E. Gee, Devin George re 111 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs . (Guest, Lance) (Entered: 10/10/2017)
115 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memorandum re rec. doc. 111 by Viet Anh Vo. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading − Reply Memorandum, # 2 Proposed Order, # 3 Proposed Pleading − Reply Declaration of Horth−Neubert, # 4 Proposed Pleading − Exhibit A to Reply Declaration of Horth−Neubert, # 5 Proposed Pleading − Exhibit B Reply Declaration of Horth−Neubert, # 6 Proposed Pleading − Supplemental Declaration of Yanik, # 7 Proposed Pleading − Exhibit A to Supplemental Declaration of Yanik, # 8 Proposed Pleading − Reply Declaration of Preciado, # 9 Proposed Pleading − Exhibit A to Reply Declaration of Preciado, # 10 Proposed Pleading − Exhibit B Reply Declaration of Preciado)(Yanik, Mary) Modified text on 10/16/2017 (jls). (Entered: 10/13/2017)
116 ORDER: IT IS ORDERED that the foregoing 110 motion is GRANTED. The submitted Proposed Procedures for Issuance of Marriage Licenses as Additional Language to Permanent Injunction are hereby amended to the 96 Permanent Injunction, as additional language thereto, but only to the extent that procedures at issue comply with our prior decision and constitutional standards, procedurally and substantively. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle on 10/18/2017. (jls) (Entered: 10/19/2017)
117 ORDER GRANTING 115 Motion for Leave to File Reply Memorandum. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle on 10/18/2017. (jls) (Entered: 10/19/2017)

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10/19/2017 02/21/2018 04/20/2018

118 REPLY Memorandum in Support of 111 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs. (Attachments: # 1 Reply Declaration of Horth−Neubert, # 2 Exhibit A to Reply Declaration of Horth−Neubert, # 3 Exhibit B to Reply Declaration of Horth−Neubert, # 4 Supplemental Declaration of Yanik, # 5 Exhibit A to Supplemental Declaration of Yanik, # 6 Reply Declaration of Preciado, # 7 Exhibit A to Reply Declaration of Preciado, # 8 Exhibit B to Reply Declaration of Preciado)(jls) (Entered: 10/19/2017)
119 ORDER AND REASONS: IT IS ORDERED that the 111 Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs is Granted in part and Denied in part, as set forth in document. Defendants are hereby ordered to pay Plaintiff $144,614.05 in reasonable fees and $10,140.88 in recoverable costs, for a total of $154,754.93. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the State of Louisiana is directed to pay the Plaintiff's attorneys' fees as the local parish officials have been sued in their official capacity for enforcing an unconstitutional State statute. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle on 2/20/2018. (jls) (Entered: 02/21/2018)
120 SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT by Rebekah E. Gee, Devin George re 119 Order and Reasons (Guest, Lance) Modified text on 4/23/2018 (jls). (Entered: 04/20/2018)

 
 Vo v. Gee, et al, Docket No. 2_16-cv-15639 (E.D. La. Oct 18, 2016), Court Docket

Multiple Documents

Part

Description

1

22 pages

2

Exhibit A - Act 436

3

Civl Cover Sheet

4

Appendix to Civil Cover Sheet

© 2019 The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Terms of Service // PAGE 1

Case 2:16-cv-15639-ILRL-MBN Document 1 Filed 10/18/16 Page 1 of 22

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

Viet Anh Vo Plaintiff,
v.

CASE NO. 2:16-CV-15639 ___________

Rebekah E. Gee, Secretary of the Department of Health; Devin George, State Registrar;

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Michael Thibodeaux, Iberia Parish Clerk;

Diane Meaux Broussard, Vermilion Parish

Clerk; Louis J. Perret, Lafayette Parish

Clerk,

Defendants.

INTRODUCTION
No union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies the highest ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family. In forming a marital union, two people become something greater than once they were. As some of the petitioners in these cases demonstrate, marriage embodies a love that may endure even past death . . . . Their hope is not to be condemned to live in loneliness, excluded from one of civilization’s oldest institutions. They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them that right.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015).
1. As the United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed, marriage is a
fundamental right secured by the Constitution.
2. This lawsuit challenges the constitutionality of a state statute.
Specifically, this lawsuit challenges the State of Louisiana’s Act Number 436
(“Act 436”), also known as House Bill 836, which unduly burdens many marriage
license applicants and effectively prevents other applicants from getting married at
all, grossly violating their fundamental right to marriage and denying them the

Case 2:16-cv-15639-ILRL-MBN Document 1 Filed 10/18/16 Page 2 of 22
equal protection of the law, based solely on the place of their birth, in violation of the Constitution of the United States.
3. Plaintiff Viet “Victor” Anh Vo (“Mr. Vo” or “Plaintiff”) has been denied his fundamental right to marriage by Louisiana state officials acting pursuant to the provisions of Act 436.
4. Act 436, prevents certain individuals—principally marriage license applicants born outside of the United States and its territories and those who seek to marry them—from exercising their fundamental right to marry the person of their choosing. It does so by imposing additional burdens on those born outside of the United States and their intended spouses, making it harder, and in some cases impossible, to obtain a marriage license.
5. Among its many changes to the marriage license application process, Act 436 requires that all applicants for a marriage license provide a certified birth certificate and permits that requirement to be waived only for individuals born in the United States or one of its territories. Individuals born outside of the United States are denied the opportunity to have the birth certificate requirement waived.
6. Plaintiff was born in an Indonesian refugee camp after his parents— both Vietnamese nationals—fled Vietnam as refugees. His birth has never been officially recognized by Vietnamese or Indonesian authorities, and he was never issued a birth certificate. Mr. Vo has resided in Louisiana since he was three months old and became a United States citizen when he was eight years old.
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7. In 2016, Mr. Vo wished to marry his girlfriend of several years. He and his fiancée, a native-born U.S. citizen, attempted to obtain a marriage license from multiple Louisiana parish clerks, but were denied based on Mr. Vo’s inability to provide a certified birth certificate, a valid and unexpired passport, or an unexpired visa accompanied by a Form I-94 issued by the United States, as required by Act 436.
8. Mr. Vo meets all other requirements for obtaining a marriage license from the State of Louisiana, and would have been eligible for a marriage license but for his inability to provide the documents newly required by state law. The only impediments to Mr. Vo’s ability to obtain a marriage license are the barriers Act 436 imposes on him because he was born outside of the United States.
9. Because Mr. Vo attempted to obtain a marriage license and was denied, Defendants’ policies and procedures substantially and directly interfere with his fundamental right to marry. Defendants’ policies and procedures also discriminate against Mr. Vo because he was born outside the United States. Thus, these policies violate the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
10. Moreover, because Defendants are attempting to regulate the terms under which immigrants can marry within the State of Louisiana in an effort to combat purported marriage fraud in the realm of immigration, Defendants’ policies and procedures violate the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.
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11. Without the Court’s intervention, Mr. Vo—and others like him across the state—will continue to suffer irreparable injury from his inability to legally marry in his community, or anywhere in the state, under Louisiana state law.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 12. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1361 over Mr. Vo’s claims under the United States Constitution. 13. The Court has authority to grant declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202. 14. Venue is proper in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) because Defendants perform their official duties in and throughout the State of Louisiana, and Defendant Devin George performs his official duties in the Eastern District of Louisiana.
PARTIES Plaintiff
15. Plaintiff Viet Anh Vo is a United States citizen who resides in Lafayette, Louisiana. He was born in an Indonesian refugee camp after his parents—both Vietnamese nationals at the time of his birth—fled Vietnam as refugees. Mr. Vo was never issued a birth certificate or passport, and his birth has never been officially recognized by Vietnamese or Indonesian authorities.
16. On November 29, 2014, Mr. Vo became engaged to Heather Pham, a natural-born U.S. citizen. Approximately two weeks before their wedding, which was to take place on February 6, 2016, Mr. Vo and his fiancée, Ms. Pham, applied
4

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for a Louisiana state marriage license at the Vermilion Parish Clerk of Court’s office. They were, however, denied a marriage license because Mr. Vo could not provide a birth certificate or valid passport as required by Act 436.
17. Despite the fact that Mr. Vo provided other official documents to establish his identity, including a Social Security Number and a Louisiana state driver’s license, the Vermilion Parish Clerk of Court refused to approve Mr. Vo and Ms. Pham’s marriage license application, based on the provisions of Act 436.
18. Eager to obtain a marriage license before their impending wedding ceremony, Mr. Vo and Ms. Pham called the Iberia Parish Clerk of Court and were told that they could not obtain a marriage license without presenting Mr. Vo’s birth certificate. Mr. Vo and Ms. Pham also attempted to apply for a marriage license by visiting the Lafayette Parish Clerk of Court, but there too they were denied due to the birth certificate requirement. After obtaining advice from an immigration legal services office, about three days before the wedding, the couple returned to the Vermilion Parish Clerk of Court with a letter explaining why Mr. Vo did not have, and could not get, a birth certificate. They were denied a marriage license yet again.
19. Mr. Vo and his fiancée were devastated and felt a loss of hope. Although they were able to obtain a sacramental marriage through their church, their marriage was not legally recognized by the state. Because of this, the couple felt as though their wedding had been a sham. Despite being United States citizens
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and life-long residents of Louisiana, the state refuses to grant them a marriage license and thereby legally recognize their marriage. Defendants
20. At all times relevant to this action, Defendant Rebekah Gee has been the Secretary of the Department of Health and Hospitals for the State of Louisiana, a subdivision of which is the Office of the State Registrar. The State Registrar is responsible for compiling and issuing vital records for state residents, including marriage licenses. On information and belief, the Department of Health has actively sought to ensure parish clerks enforce the requirements of Act 436. Defendant Gee is responsible for oversight of the Department of Health and its subdivisions. Defendant Gee is sued in her official capacity.
21. At all times relevant to this action, Defendant Devin George has been the State Registrar and Director of the Office of Vital Records. As State Registrar, Defendant George is responsible for overseeing the compilation and issuing of vital records—including marriage licenses—for state residents. On information and belief, the State Registrar has actively worked to ensure parish clerks enforce the requirements of Act 436. Further, on information and belief, the State Registrar exercised its authority under Louisiana Revised Statute Section 251 to issue a consolidated marriage application and marriage license form that incorporates the provisions of Act 436. Defendant George is sued in his official capacity.
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22. At all times relevant to this action, Defendant Michael Thibodeaux has been the Clerk of Court for Iberia Parish. Iberia Parish is one of the parishes that refused to issue Plaintiff Vo a marriage license. Defendant Thibodeaux is sued in his official capacity.
23. At all times relevant to this action, Defendant Diane Meaux Broussard has been the Clerk of Court for Vermilion Parish. Vermilion Parish is one of the parishes that refused to issue Plaintiff Vo a marriage license. Defendant Broussard is sued in her official capacity.
24. At all times relevant to this action, Defendant Louis J. Perret has been the Clerk of Court for Lafayette Parish. Lafayette Parish is one of the parishes that refused to issue Plaintiff Vo a marriage license. Defendant Perret is sued in his official capacity.
BACKGROUND Act 436
25. Act 436 carves out a certain class of Louisiana residents, principally foreign-born residents as well as their intended spouses, who effectively no longer enjoy the freedom to marry. By its terms, Act 436 imposes cumbersome, and sometimes impossible to meet, new documentary requirements for obtaining a marriage license on Louisiana residents born outside of the United States.
26. Act 436 was known as House Bill 836 when it was proposed legislation in the Louisiana House of Representatives. House Bill 836, originally House Bill
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716, was introduced by Louisiana State Representative Valarie Hodges on April 3, 2015. It was heard before the House Committee on Civil Law and Procedure on May 5, 2015, and by the Senate Committee on Judiciary on May 26, 2015. After consideration by a conference committee of both houses of the State Legislature, HB 836 was passed by the Louisiana State Legislature on June 11, 2015. ThenGovernor Bobby Jindal signed it on July 1, 2015. After the bill was signed into law, HB 836 came to be known as Act 436.
27. Prior to the enactment of Act 436, the requirements for obtaining a marriage license in the State of Louisiana were much less onerous for all Louisiana residents. In Orleans Parish, for example, applications for a marriage license could be made by either party to the marriage and only one party needed to be present at the time of making the application. That party could provide the required documentation for both parties to the marriage. To obtain a marriage license, the State required:
(a) a current driver’s license, current state identification, or passport; (b) a certified copy of a birth certificate or a certified birth card for both parties (but applicants not born in Louisiana could apply to have this requirement waived by a judge of the First City Court); (c) Social Security Numbers for both parties (but if one or both parties did not have a Social Security Number, they could sign a statement to that effect and appear in person); (d) a certified copy of a final divorce decree if either party had been divorced;
8

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(e) a certified copy of a death certificate of the former spouse if either party was a widow or widower; and f) a $27.50 fee, plus $5 for each certified copy of the marriage certificate desired by the parties.
28. Act 436 amended Title 9, sections 221, et al. of the Louisiana Revised Statutes, and made significant changes in Louisiana’s requirements for obtaining a marriage license. In general, the Act put in place a complex web of new and sometimes unobtainable requirements for those born outside of the United States or who may lack a Social Security Number, a valid and unexpired passport, or an unexpired visa. Specifically, the new requirements in Act 436 include:
(a) requiring both parties to the marriage to swear to and sign the application before a notary public, deputy clerk, or deputy registrar; (b) presentation of either a valid and unexpired passport from the country of birth, or an unexpired visa accompanied by a Form 1-94 issued by the United States “[i]f a party does not have a Social Security Number issued by the United States Social Security Administration because the party is not a citizen or lawful permanent resident of the United States”; (c) an acknowledgement by the parties that they are “free to marry, that the information contained in the application is true and correct, and that each party understands that falsification of the application shall constitute the filing of false public records”;
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(d) presentation, by both parties, of a “valid and unexpired driver’s license, a government issued identification card, or a valid and unexpired passport from the country of his birth or an unexpired visa accompanied by Form I-94 as issued by the United States”; (e) presentation, by both parties, of a certified copy of their birth certificate, and if either party was born outside of the United States or its territories, that party must submit a birth certificate under the seal of the United States or all of the following:
(1) “a copy of the person’s birth certificate under the raised seal or stamp of the vital statistics registration authority of the person’s place of birth”; (2) “if the birth certificate is not printed in English, the party shall submit a translated copy in addition to the copy” of the original, and (3) “a valid and unexpired passport or an unexpired visa accompanied by a Form I-94 issued by the United States, verifying that the applicant is lawfully in the United States”; La. Stat. Ann. §§ 9:226(C)(1)(a), 226(C)(2) (2016), (Ex. A); (f) if no birth certificate is available for an applicant, the party is required to submit a letter signed by the proper registration authority of the state, territory or country of the place of birth of the applicant, and file the letter with a court conducting a hearing; and
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(g) the court conducting a hearing must demand proof of birth facts, including the letter mentioned previously and “other competent evidence that the applicant was born in any state or territory of the United States” before ordering that the issuing official issue a marriage license without the applicant submitting a birth certificate. La. Stat. Ann. § 9:228, (Ex. A). 29. The Act’s harmful impact on those born outside of the United States was no accident. Act 436 was intended to discriminate against those born outside of the United States. During the legislative debate on amendments to HB 836, legislators were aware of and discussed that the proposed legislation would bar immigrants, particularly undocumented immigrants or other immigrants who may lack Social Security Numbers or U.S.-issued birth certificates, from marrying in Louisiana. Senator Appel, for example, expressed concern that, unless the bill was amended to allow such immigrants to provide affidavits of their identity, Act 436 could block immigrants from being able to lawfully marry in Louisiana. Despite these concerns, the legislature failed to clarify or amend the law to ensure that immigrants would not be subject to burdensome requirements that would effectively deny them the fundamental right to marry their intended spouse. 30. Act 436 is an unlawful state attempt to usurp federal immigration law. On September 28, 2015, Act 436’s legislative sponsor, Valarie Hodges, issued a press release after the law was signed by the Governor. The press release indicated that the purpose of the law was to combat immigration fraud. The law would do so, the press release stated, by requiring applicants to sign an affidavit verifying
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that they are in the United States legally and by requiring them to present a Social Security Number or, if they are noncitizens, a valid, unexpired passport issued by the federal government. State Representative Hodges was quoted as saying that “[m]arriage fraud is a serious issue here in the United States that we must address. It is time that legislation be proposed across the country to maintain the legitimacy of the immigration process. HB 836 of the 2015 regular session (i.e., Act 436) has been put into place to ensure wedding applications and licenses here in Louisiana facilitate proper procedures and protect against marriage fraud” (emphasis added).
31. Critically, Act 436 does not provide a procedure for appealing the denial of an application for a marriage license. Nor does Act 436 provide the ability to waive its new identity document requirements in most cases, with the exception of the requirement to provide a certified birth certificate. However, the waiver of that requirement is only available to applicants born in a state or territory of the United States, not to naturalized citizens and noncitizens born outside of the United States or its territories. La. Stat. Ann. § 9:228 (2016), (Ex. A).
32. In short, since Act 436 became effective on January 1, 2016, the new document requirements for applicants attempting to obtain a marriage license have changed dramatically. For example, in Lafayette Parish, one of the locations where Mr. Vo attempted to obtain a marriage license, prior to Act 436, any applicant could obtain a waiver of the birth certificate requirement by presenting a signed
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“letter of no record” from the proper registration authority indicating the agency had made a thorough search and no birth record was found. This is no longer the case. This “letter of no record” must now be filed with a court specified by Act 436, the court must hold a hearing demanding additional birth facts, and the court must then issue an order to allow the issuance of a license. Foreign-born applicants like Mr. Vo are not eligible for the waiver at all.
33. On information and belief, Defendant Lafayette Parish has been aware of the obstacles to obtaining marriage licenses posed by the new document requirements of Act 436 to persons in situations similar to Mr. Vo—naturalized citizens who do not have a certified copy of their foreign birth certificate.
34. Additionally, on information and belief, Defendants are denying marriage licenses to various Louisiana residents, including foreign-born couples where at least one party is undocumented and cannot produce a birth certificate, and couples where one party is a naturalized citizen without a birth certificate and the other party is on a fiancée visa. Act 436’s Unconstitutional Requirements Deny Plaintiff the Fundamental Right to Marry
35. Mr. Vo, now 31 years old, was born in an Indonesian refugee camp after his parents fled Vietnam due to civil strife. When Mr. Vo was three months old, he and his parents moved to the United States as refugees, and Mr. Vo has lived in Louisiana since that time. Neither Mr. Vo nor his parents have any contemporaneous record of his birth. Due to the circumstances of his birth, Mr. Vo
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is unable to obtain a birth certificate from either Vietnam or Indonesia because neither the government of Indonesia nor the government of Vietnam has ever recognized his birth formally. If there exists a record of his birth, neither Mr. Vo nor his parents have it, nor are they able to obtain it. But many official documents from the United States government reflect Mr. Vo’s date of birth, including a document approving Mr. Vo’s refugee status, a biographical information document, and a document approving Mr. Vo’s lawful permanent resident status.
36. Mr. Vo was a lawful permanent resident from his arrival to the United States until he was eight years old. When Mr. Vo was eight years old, his father obtained United States citizenship. Because he was younger than 18 at the time, Mr. Vo automatically derived United States citizenship on the date that his father became a U.S. citizen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1431. Not realizing he had derived citizenship, in 2007, Mr. Vo mistakenly submitted an application for naturalization, which the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services denied because the agency recognized that Mr. Vo already had derived U.S. citizenship through his father. Mr. Vo is in the process of obtaining a certificate of citizenship and a United States passport, but neither document will be sufficient to meet the requirements of Act 436.
37. Mr. Vo was engaged to Heather Pham on November 29, 2014. Ms. Pham is a United States citizen by birth, born in Louisiana. Just two weeks before their wedding, which was slated to occur on February 6, 2016, Mr. Vo and Ms.
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Pham attempted to obtain a marriage license at the Vermilion Parish Clerk of Court.
38. Despite having a valid Social Security Number and Louisiana state driver’s license, Mr. Vo and Ms. Pham were denied a marriage license by the Vermilion Clerk of Court because Mr. Vo could not produce a birth certificate or valid passport, according to the terms of Act 436. Mr. Vo attempted to explain why he did not have a birth certificate and could not get one due to the circumstances of his birth, to no avail. They were similarly denied a marriage license by the Iberia and Lafayette Parish Clerks of Court.
39. Unable to obtain an official marriage license from the State of Louisiana, and feeling desperate and lost, Mr. Vo and Ms. Pham proceeded to hold a sacramental marriage through their Catholic church, St. Jude in Lafayette. They had been planning their wedding for over a year, already had spent thousands of dollars, and were expecting to be joined by 350 guests to celebrate their union on that day. Their sacramental marriage, however, is not officially recognized by the state of Louisiana and, to this day, they are not legally married.
40. Mr. Vo and Ms. Pham are frustrated and embarrassed by their inability to obtain a marriage license in Louisiana, the state they consider home, despite multiple attempts to do so at a number of parishes. Mr. Vo and Ms. Pham also have suffered the indignity of getting sacramentally married without official state recognition of their union. They have had to explain to friends and relatives that they are “not really” married, despite their wedding. The fact that his marriage
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to the woman he loves is not legally recognized by the state of Louisiana is constantly in the back of Mr. Vo’s mind.
41. Moreover, the denial of a marriage license has resulted in the denial of the multiple state and federal benefits that would accrue to the couple due to marriage. For example, a legally recognized marriage would allow Mr. Vo and Ms. Pham to file joint tax returns with federal and state authorities; claim Social Security, Medicare, and disability benefits for the spouse; make medical decisions if one spouse is incapacitated; and allow each spouse to inherit a share of the other spouse’s estate.
42. To obtain a valid marriage license, Mr. Vo and Ms. Pham would be forced to drive away from their home community for several hours and across the Louisiana state border to a nearby state that does not have the burdensome requirements of Act 436 and that would accept the identity documents that Mr. Vo is able to provide. This drive would be at great cost of both time and money, which is especially burdensome to Mr. Vo because of his responsibilities as a small business owner in his hometown of Lafayette. Additionally, Mr. Vo and Ms. Pham want to be married in the state that they call home and do not want to leave Louisiana to obtain a marriage license from another state to which they have no connection.
NEED FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF 43. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between Plaintiff and Defendants related to their respective rights and duties. Defendants have
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unlawfully failed to comply with the constitutional guarantees of Due Process and Equal Protection, and continue to violate the Supremacy Clause, by engaging in the acts and omissions described in this Complaint.
44. Plaintiff has no administrative remedy because Defendants’ policy is to deny the marriage license application of any applicant unable to submit the required documentation. Nor can Plaintiff avail himself of a waiver of the documentary requirements of Act 436, La. Stat. Ann. § 9:228 (2016), (Ex. A). There is no administrative procedure through which to appeal the denial of one’s marriage application.
NEED FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 45. Plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary and permanent injunction. Defendants have acted to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff has suffered irreparable harm and the loss of fundamental due process and equal protection under the law, and will continue to be subjected to the same irreparable harm as the result of being denied the ability to marry in Louisiana. Defendants have been and are aware of the deprivations complained of herein and have refused to remedy the harm by issuing a marriage license to Plaintiff. Plaintiff has no plain, adequate, or speedy remedy at law.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Right to Equal Protection
Discriminatory Denial of Marriage License) 46. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all of the allegations contained in the previous paragraphs of this complaint as though fully set forth herein.
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47. Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, all persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States are entitled to equal protection of the laws.
48. By requiring a birth certificate and passport or visa and Form I-94 and providing no possibility of waiving that requirement for foreign-born individuals, Sections 226(C)(1)(a), 226(C)(2) and 228 of Title 9 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes, as amended by Act 436, deny Plaintiff the equal protection of the law by discriminating against him based on his national origin (a suspect classification) through subjecting him to legal requirements not imposed on other persons born in the United States and its territories seeking to obtain a marriage license.
49. Sections 226(C)(1)(a), 226(C)(2) and 228 serve no, and are not narrowly tailored to address, any compelling government interest.
50. Sections 226(C)(1)(a), 226(C)(2) and 228 therefore violate Plaintiff’s constitutional right to equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Right to Due Process—Deprivation
of Fundamental Right to Marry Under State Law) 51. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all of the allegations contained in the previous paragraphs of this complaint as though fully set forth herein.
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52. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, those threatened with the loss of liberty or property are entitled to due process. The right to marry is a fundamental right recognized by the United States Constitution. The substantial and direct interference upon, including the denial of, the exercise of this fundamental right is a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
53. By requiring a birth certificate and passport or visa and Form I-94 and providing no possibility of waiving that requirement for foreign-born individuals, Sections 226(C)(1)(a), 226(C)(2) and 228 of Title 9 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes, as amended by Act 436, substantially and directly interfere with Plaintiff’s fundamental right to marry.
54. Sections 226(C)(1)(a), 226(C)(2) and 228 serve no, and are not narrowly tailored to address, any compelling government interest.
55. Sections 226(C)(1)(a), 226(C)(2) and 228 therefore violate Plaintiff’s constitutional right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Violation of the Supremacy Clause—Unlawful State Effort to Regulate
Immigration) 56. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all of the allegations contained in the previous paragraphs of this complaint as though fully set forth herein. 57. Article VI, Section 2 of the Constitution, the Supremacy Clause, mandates that federal law preempt any state regulation of any area over which Congress has expressly or impliedly exercised exclusive authority or which is
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constitutionally reserved to the federal government. Similarly, the Supremacy Clause mandates that federal law preempt any state regulation that conflicts with federal law, either when it is impossible to comply with both the state and federal regulations, or when the state law interposes an obstacle to the achievement of Congress’s discernible objectives.
58. The federal government has exclusive and plenary power over the regulation of immigration. The immigration laws of the United States do not bar, or substantially burden, foreign-born persons from obtaining a marriage license. In fact, the immigration laws of the United States explicitly recognize and permit the marriage of foreign-born persons.
59. Sections 226(C)(1)(a), 226(C)(2) and 228 of Title 9 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes, as amended by Act 436, legislate in an exclusive area occupied by the federal government by regulating marriage fraud in the immigration context, and create a conflict with the federal government’s power and ability to regulate and prosecute marriage fraud carried out to obtain an immigration benefit.
60. Sections 226(C)(1)(a), 226(C)(2) and 228 therefore violate the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution and are preempted.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests that the Court grant him the following relief: A. A declaration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202 that the denial of marriage licenses due to the inability to meet the unconstitutional requirements imposed by Sections 226(C)(1)(a), 226(C)(2) and 228 of Title 9 of the Louisiana
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Revised Statutes, as amended by Act 436, is a violation of Due Process and Equal Protection, attempts to regulate immigration in the state of Louisiana, and interferes with the federal regulation of immigration in the United States, in violation of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.
B. A preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining Defendants, their officials, agents, employees, assigns, and all persons acting in concert or participating with them from further denying a marriage license to Plaintiff because he cannot provide the documents required by Sections 226(C)(1)(a), 226(C)(2) and 228 of Title 9 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes, as amended by Act 436, including a certified birth certificate, a valid and unexpired passport, or a valid visa with a Form I-94 issued by the United States;
C. An order awarding Plaintiff costs of suit, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and any other applicable law;
D. Such other and further relief as the Court deems equitable, just, and proper. // // // // // // // // //
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Respectfully submitted this 18th day of October, 2016. By /s/

Mary Yanik, Trial Attorney (LA Bar No. 36973) Jennifer J. Rosenbaum (LA Bar No. 31946) Admitted to practice in the Eastern District of Louisiana NEW ORLEANS WORKERS’ CENTER FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 217 N. Prieur St New Orleans, LA 70112 T: (504) 309-5165 myanik@nowcrj.org jjrosenbaum@nowcrj.org
Karen C. Tumlin* (CA Bar No. 234691) Nora A. Preciado* (CA Bar No. 239235) Alvaro M. Huerta* (CA Bar No. 274787) NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1600 Los Angeles, CA 90010 T: (213) 639-3900 tumlin@nilc.org preciado@nilc.org huerta@nilc.org

Lisa Gilford* (CA Bar No. 171641) Stacy R. Horth-Neubert* (CA Bar No. 214565) Maximillian Hirsch** (CA Bar No. 301872) Douglas Smith** (CA Bar No. 290598) Jeffery B. White* (CA Bar No. 291086) SKADDEN, ARPS SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP 300 South Grand Avenue, Suite 3400 Los Angeles, CA 90026 T: 213.687.5000 lisa.gilford@skadden.com stacy.horth-neubert@skadden.com maximillian.hirsch@skadden.com douglas.smith@skadden.com jeffery.white@skadden.com
Marley Ann Brumme* (MA Bar No. 687822) SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP 500 Boylston Street Boston, MA 02116 T: 617.573.4800 marley.brumme@skadden.com

*Pro hac vice application pending ** Pro hac vice application forthcoming
Attorneys for Plaintiff

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Vo v. Gee, et al, Docket No. 2_16-cv-15639 (E.D. La. Oct 18, 2016), Court Docket
General Information

Court
Federal Nature of Suit Docket Number Status

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana; United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
Constitutionality of State Statutes[950]
2:16-cv-15639
CLOSED

© 2019 The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Terms of Service // PAGE 24

 
 Case 2:16-cv-15639-ILRL-MBN Document 77 Filed 03/23/17 Page 1 of 17

VIET ANH VO VERSUS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 16-15639

REBEKAH E. GEE, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ET AL

SECTION “B”(5)

OPINION Before the court are Defendant Perret’s “Motion to Transfer Pursuant to 28 U.S.C section 1404(a)” (Rec. Doc. 50), Plaintiff’s “Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant Louis J. Perret’s Motion to Transfer Venue” (Rec. Doc. 61), Defendants Broussard and Thibodeaux’s “Motion to Transfer Pursuant to 28 U.S.C section 1404(a)”( Rec. Doc. 48) and Plaintiff’s “Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Diane Meaux Broussard and Michael Thibodeaux’s Motion to Transfer Venue” (Rec. Doc. 62), Defendants Broussard and Thibodeaux’s “Rule 12 (b)(6) Motion to Dismiss” (Rec. Doc. 47), Plaintiff’s “Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Broussard and Thibodeaux’s Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss” (Rec. Doc. 59), Defendant Perret’s “Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss” (Rec. Doc. 49), Plaintiff’s “Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant Perret’s Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss” (Rec. Doc. 60),“Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction”

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(Rec. Doc 37), Defendants Gee and George’s “Incorporated Pre-Trial Brief and Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction” (Rec. Doc. 55), Defendant Perret’s “Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction” (Rec Doc. 57), “Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction” (Rec. Doc. 66), “Brief of Constitutional Accountability Center as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction” (Rec. Doc. 43), “Brief of Amicus Curiae the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Louisiana in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction” (Rec. Doc. 44), “Brief of Amici Curiae National Center for Lesbian Rights, GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders and LAMBDA Legal in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction” (Rec. Doc. 45). For the reasons set forth below, IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motions to Transfer and Motions to Dismiss are DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Preliminary Injunction is GRANTED. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Plaintiff has brought a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendant Rebekah Gee, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Hospitals for the State of Louisiana, Defendant Devin George, State Registrar and Director of the Office of Vital Records, Defendant Michael Thibodeaux, Clerk of Court for Iberia Parish, Defendant Diane Meaux Broussard, Clerk of Court for
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Vermilion Parish and Defendant Louis J. Perret, Clerk of Court for Lafayette Parish.
Plaintiff, Viet “Victor” Anh Vo was born in an Indonesian refugee camp after his parents (both Vietnamese nationals) fled Vietnam as refugees (Rec. Doc. 1). Given this circumstance, Indonesian and Vietnamese authorities have never recognized his birth and consequently he has never been issued a birth certificate from a government entity (Rec. Doc. 1). Plaintiff has resided in Louisiana since he was three months old and became a naturalized citizen when he was eight years old (Rec. Doc. 1). In 2016, Plaintiff and his girlfriend (a fellow United States citizen) decided to get married and applied for a marriage license from the state of Louisiana (Rec. Doc. 1).
Plaintiff was denied a marriage license pursuant to Act 436 which requires that all applicants for a marriage license provide a certified birth certificate, a valid and unexpired passport, or an unexpired visa accompanied by a Form I-94 (Rec. Doc. 1). Act 436 has a waiver of the birth certificate requirement but in order to qualify for the waiver an applicant must be a U.S. citizen that was born in the United States or one of its territories. Plaintiff was born outside of the United States and is naturalized citizen and therefore did not qualify for the waiver (Rec. Doc. 1). Plaintiff provided other official documents to the Clerk of Court including a social security number and a Louisiana state driver’s
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license, but without a birth certificate as required by Act 436, the state of Louisiana refused to issue him a marriage license (Rec. Doc. 1). II. FACTUAL AND LEGAL FINDINGS
A. Defendants’ Motions to Transfer Defendants Brossard, Thibodeaux and Perret jointly bring a motion to transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1404(a). Under the statute venue may be transferred to any other district where the action might have been brought for “the convenience of the parties of witnesses and in the interest of justice.” Id. However, “the plaintiff's privilege to choose, or not to be ousted from, his chosen forum is highly esteemed. The burden of proof in a motion to transfer is on the moving party. Unless the balance of factors strongly favors the moving party, the plaintiff's choice of forum generally should not be disturbed.” Carpenter v. Parker Drilling Offshore United States, Case No. 05-365, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11979, at*5 (E.D. La. June 16, 2005). In the Fifth Circuit the court looks at eight primary factors when determining if a transfer is appropriate. In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 2008). There are four private interest factors and four public interest factors. In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304. The private interest factors are: “(1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) the availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of
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witnesses; (3) the cost of attendance for willing witnesses; and (4) all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” Id. The four public interest factors are: “(1) the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; (2) the local interest in having localized interests decided at home; (3) the familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the case; and (4) the avoidance of unnecessary problems of conflict of laws [or in] the application of foreign law.” Id. None of the factors can be said to be of dispositive weight. Id. Nonetheless, in analyzing the eight factors collectively, this Court finds that the Defendants’ motion for a transfer is not appropriate.
1. The relative ease of access to sources of proof The instant legal dispute does not require intensive fact discovery and therefore access to sources of proof will not be a significant factor in this case. Both the Plaintiff and Defendants agree that the Plaintiff was denied a marriage license because of Act 436. The controversy is entirely legal and therefore this factor does not weigh in the favor of the Defendants motion to transfer venue. 2. The availability of compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses The Defendants argue that most of, if not all, of the witnesses in this case are located in the Western District of Louisiana and
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therefore in cities beyond the 100-mile subpoena power of this Court. They further argue that for an unwilling witness, this could be detrimental to the Defendants’ case. However, as Plaintiff explains, a person can be compelled to testify anywhere in the state where he or she resides or conducts business if the person is a “party or a party’s officer.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(1)(B)(i). All of the witnesses in this case reside and conduct business in Louisiana and therefore hailing them into court will not be an issue. Furthermore, this case does not hinge upon disputed facts but whether or not the law itself is unconstitutional. Therefore witnesses will not be a large concern as this case proceeds towards trial. This factor weighs against the Defendants’ motion to transfer venue.
3. The cost of attendance for willing witnesses Defendants argue that the costs for witnesses would be significant if the case is not transferred to the Western District. However, the Defendants have not explained with specificity why the Eastern District would be a burden and what key witnesses would be impacted. In a recent Eastern District case a Defendant similarly argued that “the costs for willing witnesses from Lake Charles to attend proceedings in Lake Charles would be minimal, but costs for their travel 205 miles to New Orleans would be significant.” Broussard v. First Tower Loan, LLC, 135 F. Supp. 3d 540, 547(E.D. La. 2015). However the court ruled that “this
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allegation is not sufficient to meet the movant's burden. Thus, this factor supports maintaining venue in the Eastern District.” Id. This Court follows this logic as well and given the Defendants’ lack of specificity, this factor also weighs in favor of denying the motion to transfer.
4. All other practical factors that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive
There is no indication that a transfer will have any impact on the trial of this case. This factor is neutral and therefore does not weigh in favor of the Defendants’ motion to transfer.
5. The administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion Defendants state that there are no known differences between the Western District and the Eastern District regarding court congestion. Plaintiff however cites compelling evidence from the Administrative Office of the United States Court. The Western District has a significantly longer resolution timeline than the Eastern District. This factor weighs heavily against a transfer in venue as it would lead to a protracted litigation schedule. 6. The local interest in having localized interests decided at
home The Defendants contend that because the three clerks reside in the Western District that the case should be transferred there because of a particularized local interest. However, as the Plaintiff points out, the actions of these clerks have nothing to
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do with their residence in the Western District. They are merely complying with the plain language of a statute that is uniformly enforced across the entire state of Louisiana. This factor does not weigh in favor of granting the Defendants’ motion to transfer.
7. The familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the case
Judges in the Eastern District and the Western District are both familiar with the forum law and therefore this factor does not support the Defendant’s motion to transfer.
8. The avoidance of unnecessary problems of conflict of law or in the application of foreign law
This Court does not find that there are any issues regarding conflict of law between the Eastern and Western Districts. This factor does not weigh in favor of the Defendants’ motion. None of the factors that the Fifth Circuit analyzes convinces this Court that the matter should be transferred to the Western District of Louisiana.
B. Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to move for dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Such a motion is rarely granted because it is viewed with disfavor. See Lowrey v. Tex. A & M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir.1997) (quoting Kaiser
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Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982)).
When reviewing a motion to dismiss, courts must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996). However, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Gonzales v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009)(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009))(internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court in Iqbal explained that Twombly promulgated a “two-pronged approach” to determine whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. First, courts must identify those pleadings that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. Legal conclusions “must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 1949.
Upon identifying the well-pleaded factual allegations, courts “assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief.” Id. at 1950. A claim has
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facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 1949. This is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The plaintiffs must “nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
Defendants Brossard, Thibodeaux and Perret jointly bring a motion to dismiss on the basis that they lack Monell liability. The Defendants argues that under the Supreme Court’s holding in Monell that they can only be sued if they were a moving force of the alleged unlawful constitutional deprivation at issue. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989). The clerks of the various parishes in the instant litigation argue that there is no allegation that the clerks engaged in any unlawful conduct or any unconstitutional custom, policy, or procedure that would permit Monell liability. In their motion to dismiss the clerks argue that even though they are responsible for the actual implementation of Act’s 436’s requirements, they had no choice but to follow the mandates of state law. In other words, the clerks argue that they were “just doing their job.”
The Plaintiff argues, and this Court agrees, that this is precisely why these clerks are appropriate parties to the instant lawsuit. The Fifth Circuit explained, “the State cannot dissociate
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itself from actions taken under its laws by labeling those it commands to act as local officials. A county official pursues his duties as a state agent when he is enforcing state law or policy. He acts as a county agent when he is enforcing county law or policy. It may be possible for the officer to wear both state and county hats at the same time, but when a state statute directs the actions of an official, as here, the officer, be he state or local, is acting as a state official.” Echols v. Parker, 909 F.2d 795, 801(5th Cir. 1990).
Furthermore, as Plaintiff points out, the Monell requirements that the defendants reference apply where a municipal official acts in a local capacity, not where the official preforms as a state actor. Cain v. City of New Orleans, Case No. 15-4479, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15124, at*53 (E.D. La. Feb. 3, 2017). The appropriate standard that should be used in the instant matter is the one found in Ex Parte Young. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-156 (1908); Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 411 (5th Cir. 2001). This standard is appropriate because (1) the clerks are acting as state officials when they enforce Act 436; (2) the constitutional violations are ongoing; and (3) the Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief. Cain v. City of New Orleans, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15124, at*52-53. Other Circuits have also found liability under Ex Parte Young to be appropriate in similar factual scenarios. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 371 n.3. (4th Cir. 2014)(City clerk that
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issued marriage licenses was a proper defendant under Ex Parte Young for suit challenging state law). Given that the Defendants are still liable under the relevant standard, this Court finds their motions to dismiss to be inappropriate. Nonetheless, given the factual allegations in the complaint this Court finds that it may be appropriate to amend the complaint to include 42 U.S. Code § 1983 jurisdictional claims. Any amendments to the complaint should be filed within 14 days from the issuance of this order.
C. Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction A threshold issue in the Defendant’s Opposition to the Motion for Preliminary Injunction is that the Plaintiff lacks standing. The Defendants contend that the particular facts of this case, the denial of a marriage license, do not confer article III standing to the Plaintiff. Nonetheless, in the Fifth Circuit, the very act of denying a marriage license to a plaintiff in contravention of their constitutional rights has been held to constitute article III standing. De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 646 (W.D. Tex. 2014). The Plaintiff in the instant matter was denied a marriage license on three separate occasions by each of the Clerk Defendants. This Court finds these facts sufficient to establish article III standing. To secure a preliminary injunction a Plaintiff must establish: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits ;(2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction
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is not issued; (3) that the threated injury if the injunction is denied outweighs any harm that will result is the injunction is granted; and (4) that the grant of the injunction will not disserve the public interest. Sells v. Livingston, 750 F.3d 478, 480 (5th Cir. 2014).
1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits In the Fifth Circuit in order “to assess the likelihood of success on the merits, we look to standards provided by the substantive law.” Jordan v. Fisher, 823 F.3d 805, 809 (5th Cir. 2016). Furthermore, “to show a likelihood of success, the plaintiff must present a prima facie case, but need not prove that he is entitled to summary judgment.” Daniels Health Scis., LLC v. Vascular Health Scis., LLC, 710 F.3d 579, 582 (5th Cir. 2013). In the instant matter Plaintiff has demonstrated that there is a likelihood of success on the merits. Plaintiff has established a prima facie case that the effects of the statute are likely unconstitutional under the Equal Protect Clause since it adversely treats naturalized citizens differently from citizens born in the United States. Specifically, the birth certificate provisions impermissibly discriminate against the Plaintiff based on his national origin and deny him, a naturalized U.S. citizen, the fundamental right to marry. The Equal Protection Clause protects all individuals from state discrimination. Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982). The
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Supreme Court has clarified that “these provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). Even though states retain a broad power to classify individuals under an Equal Protection analysis, “classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.” Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
Classifications, such as the one made by the state of Louisiana pursuant to Act 436 “must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny, that is, such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests.” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103, 105 (2001). The birth certificate provisions that the Louisiana legislature enacted creates adverse classifications that distinguish between United States citizens on the basis of their national origin. If the Plaintiff was born in the United States and lacked a birth certification he could apply for the waiver and the state of Louisiana would grant him a marriage license. However, because the Plaintiff was born overseas and then became a naturalized citizen he is ineligible to apply for the waiver. The state of Louisiana would have to demonstrate
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that these classifications further compelling governmental interest that justify treating the U.S. citizen Plaintiff differently from other U.S. citizens merely because of where he was born.
In addition, the Plaintiff has established a prima facie case that Act 436 is unconstitutional by denying him a fundamental right, the right to marriage. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602-2603 (2015). Even though states may impose reasonable regulations on marriage, the Supreme Court has applied a strict scrutiny test when regulations “interfere directly and substantially with the right to marry.” Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 387 (1978). The current birth certificate provisions completely bar the Plaintiff from obtaining a marriage license. Given the heighted level of scrutiny that classifications based on national origin require, this Court finds that the Plaintiff has a likelihood of success on the merits of his equal protection claims and therefore satisfies the first requirement of the Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction.
2. Threat of Irreparable Injury In order to meet this requirement for the preliminary injunction the Plaintiff must demonstrate that he is “likely to suffer irreparable harm, that is, harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law.” Daniels Health Scis., LLC, 710 F.3d 579, 585 (internal quotations omitted). The Fifth Circuit clarified and
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explained, “an injury is irreparable only if it cannot be undone through monetary remedies.” Deerfield Medical Center v. Deerfield Beach, 661 F.2d 328, 338, (5th Cir. 1981) (internal quotations omitted). Under Louisiana state law the Plaintiff is currently being denied the right to marriage. There is no monetary award that can provide him that right and therefore he is likely to suffer irreparable harm. In addition, the Fifth Circuit has held that the denial of constitutional rights “for even minimal periods of time constitutes irreparable injury justifying the grant of a preliminary injunction.” Deerfield Medical Center, 661 F.2d 328, 338. The Plaintiff has been denied the right to marry since early 2016. Act 436’s deprivation of the Plaintiff’s fundamental right to marriage satisfies the requirement that the Plaintiff face the threat of irreparable harm.
3. Weighing of the harms In order to obtain a preliminary injunction the Plaintiff must demonstrate that the threatened injuries outweigh any damage that the injunction will cause the defendant. Sells, 750 F.3d 478, 480. This Court finds that the balancing analysis weighs heavily in the favor of the Plaintiff. The state of Louisiana is not harmed by having to issue a marriage license to, in this case, a United States citizen who merely lacks a birth certificate due to circumstances beyond his control. Louisiana’s enjoinment from enforcing a likely unconstitutional law does not outweigh the
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Plaintiff’s fundamental right to marriage. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1145 (10th Cir. 2013).
4. Whether the injunction will disserve the public interest The Fifth Circuit has held that injunctions protecting constitutional freedoms are always in the public interest. Texans for Free Enter. v. Tex. Ethics Comm'n, 732 F.3d 535, 539, (5th Cir. 2013). In the instant matter the preliminary injunction would protect the fundamental right to marriage and the right to be free from unconstitutional discriminatory classifications based on national origin. Consequently, this factor also weighs in favor of the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction is appropriate and applies to all individuals whose constitutional rights would be curtailed by Act 436. As a nation we should welcome all United States citizens, born in the United States or naturalized, to enjoy all of the rights and privileges that are bestowed upon them through their citizenship. These rights should not be abridged just because a United States citizen was naturalized instead of being born on our soil.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 23rd day of March, 2017.
__________________________________ SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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 Case 2:16-cv-15639-ILRL-MBN Document 82 Filed 04/12/17 Page 1 of 23

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

Viet Anh Vo Plaintiff,
v.

CASE NO. 16-cv-15639-ILRL-MBN

Rebekah E. Gee, Secretary of the Department of Health; Devin George, State Registrar;

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND

Michael Thibodeaux, Iberia Parish Clerk; INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Diane Meaux Broussard, Vermilion Parish

Clerk; Louis J. Perret, Lafayette Parish

Clerk,

Defendants.

INTRODUCTION
No union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies the highest ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family. In forming a marital union, two people become something greater than once they were. As some of the petitioners in these cases demonstrate, marriage embodies a love that may endure even past death . . . . Their hope is not to be condemned to live in loneliness, excluded from one of civilization’s oldest institutions. They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them that right.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015).
1. As the United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed, marriage is a
fundamental right secured by the Constitution.
2. This lawsuit challenges the constitutionality of a state statute.
Specifically, this lawsuit challenges the State of Louisiana’s Act Number 436
(“Act 436”), also known as House Bill 836, which unduly burdens many marriage
license applicants and effectively prevents other applicants from getting married at
all, grossly violating their fundamental right to marriage and denying them the

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equal protection of the law, based solely on the place of their birth, in violation of the Constitution of the United States.
3. Plaintiff Viet “Victor” Anh Vo (“Mr. Vo” or “Plaintiff”) has been denied his fundamental right to marriage by Louisiana state officials acting pursuant to the provisions of Act 436.
4. Act 436, prevents certain individuals—principally marriage license applicants born outside of the United States and its territories and those who seek to marry them—from exercising their fundamental right to marry the person of their choosing. It does so by imposing additional burdens on those born outside of the United States and their intended spouses, making it harder, and in some cases impossible, to obtain a marriage license.
5. Among its many changes to the marriage license application process, Act 436 requires that all applicants for a marriage license provide a certified birth certificate and permits that requirement to be waived only for individuals born in the United States or one of its territories. Individuals born outside of the United States are denied the opportunity to have the birth certificate requirement waived.
6. Plaintiff was born in an Indonesian refugee camp after his parents— both Vietnamese nationals—fled Vietnam as refugees. His birth has never been officially recognized by Vietnamese or Indonesian authorities, and he was never issued a birth certificate. Mr. Vo has resided in Louisiana since he was three months old and became a United States citizen when he was eight years old.
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7. In 2016, Mr. Vo wished to marry his girlfriend of several years. He and his fiancée, a native-born U.S. citizen, attempted to obtain a marriage license from multiple Louisiana parish clerks, but were denied based on Mr. Vo’s inability to provide a certified birth certificate, a valid and unexpired passport, or an unexpired visa accompanied by a Form I-94 issued by the United States, as required by Act 436.
8. Mr. Vo meets all other requirements for obtaining a marriage license from the State of Louisiana, and would have been eligible for a marriage license but for his inability to provide the documents newly required by state law. The only impediments to Mr. Vo’s ability to obtain a marriage license are the barriers Act 436 imposes on him because he was born outside of the United States.
9. Because Mr. Vo attempted to obtain a marriage license and was denied, Defendants, in enforcing Act 436, substantially and directly interfered with his fundamental right to marry. Defendants, in enforcing Act 436, also discriminated against Mr. Vo because he was born outside the United States. Thus, these policies violate the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
10. Moreover, because Defendants, in enforcing Act 436, are attempting to regulate the terms under which immigrants can marry within the State of Louisiana in an effort to combat purported marriage fraud in the realm of immigration, Act 436 violates the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.
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11. Without the Court’s intervention, Mr. Vo—and others like him across the state—will continue to suffer irreparable injury from his inability to legally marry in his community, or anywhere in the state, under Louisiana state law.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 12. Plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 to redress the deprivation under color of state law of rights secured by the United States Constitution. 13. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1361 over Mr. Vo’s claims under the United States Constitution. 14. The Court has authority to grant declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202. 15. Venue is proper in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) because Defendants perform their official duties in and throughout the State of Louisiana, and Defendant Devin George performs his official duties in the Eastern District of Louisiana.
PARTIES Plaintiff
16. Plaintiff Viet Anh Vo is a United States citizen who resides in Lafayette, Louisiana. He was born in an Indonesian refugee camp after his parents—both Vietnamese nationals at the time of his birth—fled Vietnam as refugees. Mr. Vo was never issued a birth certificate or passport, and his birth has never been officially recognized by Vietnamese or Indonesian authorities.
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17. On November 29, 2014, Mr. Vo became engaged to Heather Pham, a natural-born U.S. citizen. Approximately two weeks before their wedding, which was to take place on February 6, 2016, Mr. Vo and his fiancée, Ms. Pham, applied for a Louisiana state marriage license at the Vermilion Parish Clerk of Court’s office. They were, however, denied a marriage license because Mr. Vo could not provide a birth certificate or valid passport as required by Act 436.
18. Despite the fact that Mr. Vo provided other official documents to establish his identity, including a Social Security Number and a Louisiana state driver’s license, the Vermilion Parish Clerk of Court refused to approve Mr. Vo and Ms. Pham’s marriage license application, based on the provisions of Act 436.
19. Eager to obtain a marriage license before their impending wedding ceremony, Mr. Vo and Ms. Pham called the Iberia Parish Clerk of Court and were told that they could not obtain a marriage license without presenting Mr. Vo’s birth certificate. Mr. Vo and Ms. Pham also attempted to apply for a marriage license by visiting the Lafayette Parish Clerk of Court, but there too they were denied due to the birth certificate requirement. After obtaining advice from an immigration legal services office, about three days before the wedding, the couple returned to the Vermilion Parish Clerk of Court with a letter explaining why Mr. Vo did not have, and could not get, a birth certificate. They were denied a marriage license yet again.
20. Mr. Vo and his fiancée were devastated and felt a loss of hope. Although they were able to obtain a sacramental marriage through their church,
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their marriage was not legally recognized by the state. Because of this, the couple felt as though their wedding had been a sham. Despite being United States citizens and life-long residents of Louisiana, the state refuses to grant them a marriage license and thereby legally recognize their marriage. Defendants
21. At all times relevant to this action, Defendant Rebekah Gee has been the Secretary of the Department of Health and Hospitals for the State of Louisiana, a subdivision of which is the Office of the State Registrar. The State Registrar is responsible for compiling and issuing vital records for state residents, including marriage licenses. On information and belief, the Department of Health has actively sought to ensure parish clerks enforce the requirements of Act 436. Defendant Gee is responsible for oversight of the Department of Health and its subdivisions. Defendant Gee is sued in her official capacity. Defendant Gee is a person under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and was acting under the color of state law at all times germane to this Amended Complaint.
22. At all times relevant to this action, Defendant Devin George has been the State Registrar and Director of the Office of Vital Records. As State Registrar, Defendant George is responsible for overseeing the compilation and issuing of vital records—including marriage licenses—for state residents. On information and belief, the State Registrar has actively worked to ensure parish clerks enforce the requirements of Act 436. Further, on information and belief, the State Registrar exercised its authority under Louisiana Revised Statute Section 251 to
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issue a consolidated marriage application and marriage license form that incorporates the provisions of Act 436. Defendant George is sued in his official capacity. Defendant George is a person under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and was acting under the color of state law at all times germane to this Amended Complaint.
23. At all times relevant to this action, Defendant Michael Thibodeaux has been the Clerk of Court for Iberia Parish. Iberia Parish is one of the parishes that refused to issue Plaintiff Vo a marriage license. Defendant Thibodeaux is sued in his official capacity. Defendant Thibodeaux is a person under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and was acting under the color of state law at all times germane to this Amended Complaint.
24. At all times relevant to this action, Defendant Diane Meaux Broussard has been the Clerk of Court for Vermilion Parish. Vermilion Parish is one of the parishes that refused to issue Plaintiff Vo a marriage license. Defendant Broussard is sued in her official capacity. Defendant Broussard is a person under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and was acting under the color of state law at all times germane to this Amended Complaint.
25. At all times relevant to this action, Defendant Louis J. Perret has been the Clerk of Court for Lafayette Parish. Lafayette Parish is one of the parishes that refused to issue Plaintiff Vo a marriage license. Defendant Perret is sued in his official capacity. Defendant Perret is a person under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and was acting under the color of state law at all times germane to this Amended Complaint.
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BACKGROUND Act 436
26. Act 436 carves out a certain class of Louisiana residents, principally foreign-born residents as well as their intended spouses, who effectively no longer enjoy the freedom to marry. By its terms, Act 436 imposes cumbersome, and sometimes impossible to meet, new documentary requirements for obtaining a marriage license on Louisiana residents born outside of the United States.
27. Act 436 was known as House Bill 836 when it was proposed legislation in the Louisiana House of Representatives. House Bill 836, originally House Bill 716, was introduced by Louisiana State Representative Valarie Hodges on April 3, 2015. It was heard before the House Committee on Civil Law and Procedure on May 5, 2015, and by the Senate Committee on Judiciary on May 26, 2015. After consideration by a conference committee of both houses of the State Legislature, HB 836 was passed by the Louisiana State Legislature on June 11, 2015. ThenGovernor Bobby Jindal signed it on July 1, 2016. After the bill was signed into law, HB 836 came to be known as Act 436.
28. Prior to the enactment of Act 436, the requirements for obtaining a marriage license in the State of Louisiana were much less onerous for all Louisiana residents. In Orleans Parish, for example, applications for a marriage license could be made by either party to the marriage and only one party needed to be present at the time of making the application. That party could provide the
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required documentation for both parties to the marriage. To obtain a marriage license, the State required:
(a) a current driver’s license, current state identification, or passport; (b) a certified copy of a birth certificate or a certified birth card for both parties (but applicants not born in Louisiana could apply to have this requirement waived by a judge of the First City Court); (c) Social Security Numbers for both parties (but if one or both parties did not have a Social Security Number, they could sign a statement to that effect and appear in person); (d) a certified copy of a final divorce decree if either party had been divorced; (e) a certified copy of a death certificate of the former spouse if either party was a widow or widower; and f) a $27.50 fee, plus $5 for each certified copy of the marriage certificate desired by the parties.
29. Act 436 amended Title 9, sections 221, et al. of the Louisiana Revised Statutes, and made significant changes in Louisiana’s requirements for obtaining a marriage license. In general, the Act put in place a complex web of new and sometimes unobtainable requirements for those born outside of the United States or who may lack a Social Security Number, a valid and unexpired passport, or an unexpired visa. Specifically, the new requirements in Act 436 include:
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(a) requiring both parties to the marriage to swear to and sign the application before a notary public, deputy clerk, or deputy registrar; (b) presentation of either a valid and unexpired passport from the country of birth, or an unexpired visa accompanied by a Form 1-94 issued by the United States “[i]f a party does not have a Social Security Number issued by the United States Social Security Administration because the party is not a citizen or lawful permanent resident of the United States”; (c) an acknowledgement by the parties that they are “free to marry, that the information contained in the application is true and correct, and that each party understands that falsification of the application shall constitute the filing of false public records”; (d) presentation, by both parties, of a “valid and unexpired driver’s license, a government issued identification card, or a valid and unexpired passport from the country of his birth or an unexpired visa accompanied by Form I-94 as issued by the United States”; (e) presentation, by both parties, of a certified copy of their birth certificate, and if either party was born outside of the United States or its territories, that party must submit a birth certificate under the seal of the United States or all of the following:
(1) “a copy of the person’s birth certificate under the raised seal or stamp of the vital statistics registration authority of the person’s place of birth”;
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(2) “if the birth certificate is not printed in English, the party shall submit a translated copy in addition to the copy” of the original, and (3) “a valid and unexpired passport or an unexpired visa accompanied by a Form I-94 issued by the United States, verifying that the applicant is lawfully in the United States”; La. Stat. Ann. §§ 9:226(C)(1)(a), 226(C)(2) (2016), (Ex. A); (f) if no birth certificate is available for an applicant, the party is required to submit a letter signed by the proper registration authority of the state, territory or country of the place of birth of the applicant, and file the letter with a court conducting a hearing; and (g) the court conducting a hearing must demand proof of birth facts, including the letter mentioned previously and “other competent evidence that the applicant was born in any state or territory of the United States” before ordering that the issuing official issue a marriage license without the applicant submitting a birth certificate. La. Stat. Ann. § 9:228, (Ex. A). 30. The Act’s harmful impact on those born outside of the United States was no accident. Act 436 was intended to discriminate against those born outside of the United States. During the legislative debate on amendments to HB 836, legislators were aware of and discussed that the proposed legislation would bar immigrants, particularly undocumented immigrants or other immigrants who may lack Social Security Numbers or U.S.-issued birth certificates, from marrying in Louisiana. Senator Appel, for example, expressed concern that, unless the bill was
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amended to allow such immigrants to provide affidavits of their identity, Act 436 could block immigrants from being able to lawfully marry in Louisiana. Despite these concerns, the legislature failed to clarify or amend the law to ensure that immigrants would not be subject to burdensome requirements that would effectively deny them the fundamental right to marry their intended spouse.
31. Act 436 is an unlawful state attempt to usurp federal immigration law. On September 28, 2015, Act 436’s legislative sponsor, Valarie Hodges, issued a press release after the law was signed by the Governor. The press release indicated that the purpose of the law was to combat immigration fraud. The law would do so, the press release stated, by requiring applicants to sign an affidavit verifying that they are in the United States legally and by requiring them to present a Social Security Number or, if they are noncitizens, a valid, unexpired passport issued by the federal government. State Representative Hodges was quoted as saying that (emphasis added).
32. Critically, Act 436 does not provide a procedure for appealing the denial of an application for a marriage license. Nor does Act 436 provide the ability to waive its new identity document requirements in most cases, with the exception of the requirement to provide a certified birth certificate. However, the waiver of that requirement is only available to applicants born in a state or territory of the United States, not to naturalized citizens and noncitizens born outside of the United States or its territories. La. Stat. Ann. § 9:228 (2016), (Ex. A).
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33. In short, since Act 436 became effective on January 1, 2016, the new document requirements for applicants attempting to obtain a marriage license have changed dramatically. For example, in Lafayette Parish, one of the locations where Mr. Vo attempted to obtain a marriage license, prior to Act 436, any applicant could obtain a waiver of the birth certificate requirement by presenting a signed “letter of no record” from the proper registration authority indicating the agency had made a thorough search and no birth record was found. This is no longer the case. This “letter of no record” must now be filed with a court specified by Act 436, the court must hold a hearing demanding additional birth facts, and the court must then issue an order to allow the issuance of a license. Foreign-born applicants like Mr. Vo are not eligible for the waiver at all.
34. On information and belief, Defendant Lafayette Parish has been aware of the obstacles to obtaining marriage licenses posed by the new document requirements of Act 436 to persons in situations similar to Mr. Vo—naturalized or derivative citizens who do not have a certified copy of their foreign birth certificate.
35. Additionally, on information and belief, Defendants are denying marriage licenses to various Louisiana residents pursuant to Act 436, including foreign-born couples where at least one party is undocumented and cannot produce a birth certificate, and couples where one party is a naturalized citizen without a birth certificate and the other party is on a fiancée visa. Act 436’s Unconstitutional Requirements Deny Plaintiff the Fundamental
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Right to Marry 36. Mr. Vo, now 31 years old, was born in an Indonesian refugee camp
after his parents fled Vietnam due to civil strife. When Mr. Vo was three months old, he and his parents moved to the United States as refugees, and Mr. Vo has lived in Louisiana since that time. Neither Mr. Vo nor his parents have any contemporaneous record of his birth. Due to the circumstances of his birth, Mr. Vo is unable to obtain a birth certificate from either Vietnam or Indonesia because neither the government of Indonesia nor the government of Vietnam has ever recognized his birth formally. If there exists a record of his birth, neither Mr. Vo nor his parents have it, nor are they able to obtain it. But many official documents from the United States government reflect Mr. Vo’s date of birth, including a document approving Mr. Vo’s refugee status, a biographical information document, and a document approving Mr. Vo’s lawful permanent resident status.
37. Mr. Vo was a lawful permanent resident from his arrival to the United States until he was eight years old. When Mr. Vo was eight years old, his father obtained United States citizenship. Because he was younger than 18 at the time, Mr. Vo automatically derived United States citizenship on the date that his father became a U.S. citizen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1431. Not realizing he had derived citizenship, in 2007, Mr. Vo mistakenly submitted an application for naturalization, which the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services denied because the agency recognized that Mr. Vo already had derived U.S. citizenship through his father. Mr. Vo is in the process of obtaining a certificate of
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citizenship and a United States passport, but neither document will be sufficient to meet the requirements of Act 436.
38. Mr. Vo was engaged to Heather Pham on November 29, 2014. Ms. Pham is a United States citizen by birth, born in Louisiana. Just two weeks before their wedding, which was slated to occur on February 6, 2016, Mr. Vo and Ms. Pham attempted to obtain a marriage license at the Vermilion Parish Clerk of Court.
39. Despite having a valid Social Security Number and Louisiana state driver’s license, Mr. Vo and Ms. Pham were denied a marriage license by the Vermilion Clerk of Court because Mr. Vo could not produce a birth certificate or valid passport, according to the terms of Act 436. Mr. Vo attempted to explain why he did not have a birth certificate and could not get one due to the circumstances of his birth, to no avail. They were similarly denied a marriage license by the Iberia and Lafayette Parish Clerks of Court.
40. Unable to obtain an official marriage license from the State of Louisiana, and feeling desperate and lost, Mr. Vo and Ms. Pham proceeded to hold a sacramental marriage through their Catholic church, St. Jude in Lafayette. They had been planning their wedding for over a year, already had spent thousands of dollars, and were expecting to be joined by 350 guests to celebrate their union on that day. Their sacramental marriage, however, is not officially recognized by the state of Louisiana and, to this day, they are not legally married.
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41. Mr. Vo and Ms. Pham are frustrated and embarrassed by their inability to obtain a marriage license in Louisiana, the state they consider home, despite multiple attempts to do so at a number of parishes. Mr. Vo and Ms. Pham also have suffered the indignity of getting sacramentally married without official state recognition of their union. They have had to explain to friends and relatives that they are “not really” married, despite their wedding. The fact that his marriage to the woman he loves is not legally recognized by the state of Louisiana is constantly in the back of Mr. Vo’s mind.
42. Moreover, the denial of a marriage license has resulted in the denial of the multiple state and federal benefits that would accrue to the couple due to marriage. For example, a legally recognized marriage would allow Mr. Vo and Ms. Pham to file joint tax returns with federal and state authorities; claim Social Security, Medicare, and disability benefits for the spouse; make medical decisions if one spouse is incapacitated; and allow each spouse to inherit a share of the other spouse’s estate.
43. To obtain a valid marriage license, Mr. Vo and Ms. Pham would be forced to drive away from their home community for several hours and across the Louisiana state border to a nearby state that does not have the burdensome requirements of Act 436 and that would accept the identity documents that Mr. Vo is able to provide. This drive would be at great cost of both time and money, which is especially burdensome to Mr. Vo because of his responsibilities as a small business owner in his hometown of Lafayette. Additionally, Mr. Vo and Ms.
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Pham want to be married in the state that they call home and do not want to leave Louisiana to obtain a marriage license from another state to which they have no connection.
NEED FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF 44. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between Plaintiff and Defendants related to their respective rights and duties. Defendants have unlawfully failed to comply with the constitutional guarantees of Due Process and Equal Protection, and continue to violate the Supremacy Clause, by engaging in the acts and omissions described in this Complaint. 45. Plaintiff has no administrative remedy because Defendants’ policy is to deny the marriage license application of any applicant unable to submit the required documentation. Nor can Plaintiff avail himself of a waiver of the documentary requirements of Act 436, La. Stat. Ann. § 9:228 (2016), (Ex. A). There is no administrative procedure through which to appeal the denial of one’s marriage application.
NEED FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 46. Plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary and permanent injunction. Defendants have acted to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff has suffered irreparable harm and the loss of fundamental due process and equal protection under the law, and will continue to be subjected to the same irreparable harm as the result of being denied the ability to marry in Louisiana. Defendants have been and are aware of the deprivations complained of herein and have
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refused to remedy the harm by issuing a marriage license to Plaintiff. Plaintiff has no plain, adequate, or speedy remedy at law.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF Deprivation of Equal Protection
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
47. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all of the allegations contained in the previous paragraphs of this complaint as though fully set forth herein.
48. Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, enforceable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, all persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States are entitled to equal protection of the laws.
49. By requiring a birth certificate and passport or visa and Form I-94 and providing no possibility of waiving that requirement for foreign-born individuals, Sections 226(C)(1)(a), 226(C)(2) and 228 of Title 9 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes, as amended by Act 436, deny Plaintiff the equal protection of the law by discriminating against him based on his national origin (a suspect classification) through subjecting him to legal requirements not imposed on other persons born in the United States and its territories seeking to obtain a marriage license.
50. Sections 226(C)(1)(a), 226(C)(2) and 228 serve no, and are not narrowly tailored to address, any compelling government interest.
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51. Sections 226(C)(1)(a), 226(C)(2) and 228 therefore violate Plaintiff’s constitutional right to equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
52. Plaintiffs move for relief on this claim directly under the United States Constitution, and as an action seeking redress of the deprivation of statutory rights under the color of state law, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF Deprivation of Due Process U.S. Const. Amend. XIV (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
53. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all of the allegations contained in the previous paragraphs of this complaint as though fully set forth herein.
54. Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, those threatened with the loss of liberty or property are entitled to due process. The right to marry is a fundamental right recognized by the United States Constitution. The substantial and direct interference upon, including the denial of, the exercise of this fundamental right is a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, enforceable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
55. By requiring a birth certificate and passport or visa and Form I-94 and providing no possibility of waiving that requirement for foreign-born individuals, Sections 226(C)(1)(a), 226(C)(2) and 228 of Title 9 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes, as amended by Act 436, substantially and directly interfere with Plaintiff’s fundamental right to marry.
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56. Sections 226(C)(1)(a), 226(C)(2) and 228 serve no, and are not narrowly tailored to address, any compelling government interest.
57. Sections 226(C)(1)(a), 226(C)(2) and 228 therefore violate Plaintiff’s constitutional right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
58. Plaintiffs move for relief on this claim directly under the United States Constitution, and as an action seeking redress of the deprivation of statutory rights under the color of state law, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF Violation of the Supremacy Clause; Preemption
U.S. Const. art. I § 8 59. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all of the allegations contained in the previous paragraphs of this complaint as though fully set forth herein. 60. Article VI, Section 2 of the Constitution, the Supremacy Clause, mandates that federal law preempt any state regulation of any area over which Congress has expressly or impliedly exercised exclusive authority or which is constitutionally reserved to the federal government. Similarly, the Supremacy Clause mandates that federal law preempt any state regulation that conflicts with federal law, either when it is impossible to comply with both the state and federal regulations, or when the state law interposes an obstacle to the achievement of Congress’s discernible objectives.
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61. The federal government has exclusive and plenary power over the regulation of immigration. The immigration laws of the United States do not bar, or substantially burden, foreign-born persons from obtaining a marriage license. In fact, the immigration laws of the United States explicitly recognize and permit the marriage of foreign-born persons.
62. Sections 226(C)(1)(a), 226(C)(2) and 228 of Title 9 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes, as amended by Act 436, legislate in an exclusive area occupied by the federal government by regulating marriage fraud in the immigration context, and create a conflict with the federal government’s power and ability to regulate and prosecute marriage fraud carried out to obtain an immigration benefit.
63. Sections 226(C)(1)(a), 226(C)(2) and 228 therefore violate the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution and are preempted.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests that the Court grant him the following relief: A. A declaration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the denial of marriage licenses due to the inability to meet the unconstitutional requirements imposed by Sections 226(C)(1)(a), 226(C)(2) and 228 of Title 9 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes, as amended by Act 436, is a violation of Due Process and Equal Protection, attempts to regulate immigration in the state of Louisiana, and interferes with the federal regulation of immigration in
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the United States, in violation of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.
B. A preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining Defendants, their officials, agents, employees, assigns, and all persons acting in concert or participating with them from further denying a marriage license to Plaintiff because he cannot provide the documents required by Sections 226(C)(1)(a), 226(C)(2) and 228 of Title 9 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes, as amended by Act 436, including a certified birth certificate, a valid and unexpired passport, or a valid visa with a Form I-94 issued by the United States;
C. An order awarding Plaintiff costs of suit, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and any other applicable law;
D. Such other and further relief as the Court deems equitable, just, and proper.
// // // // // // // // // //
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Respectfully submitted this 11th day of April, 2017. By /s/

Karen C. Tumlin*

Lisa Gilford*

Nora A. Preciado*

Stacy R. Horth-Neubert*

Alvaro M. Huerta*

Maximillian Hirsch*

NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW

Jeffery B. White*

CENTER

SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE,

3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1600

MEAGHER & FLOM LLP

Los Angeles, CA 90010

300 South Grand Avenue, Suite

T: (213) 639-3900

3400

tumlin@nilc.org

Los Angeles, CA 90026

preciado@nilc.org

T: (213) 687-5000

huerta@nilc.org

lisa.gilford@skadden.com

stacy.horth-neubert@skadden.com

maximillian.hirsch@skadden.com

jeffery.white@skadden.com

Mary Yanik, Trial Attorney

(LA Bar No. 36973)

Marley Ann Brumme*

Jennifer J. Rosenbaum

SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE,

(LA Bar No. 31946)

MEAGHER & FLOM LLP

NEW ORLEANS WORKERS’

500 Boylston Street

CENTER FOR RACIAL JUSTICE

Boston, MA 02116

217 N. Prieur St

T: (617) 573-4800

New Orleans, LA 70112

marley.brumme@skadden.com

T: (504) 309-5165

myanik@nowcrj.org

jjrosenbaum@nowcrj.org

*Admitted pro hac vice

Attorneys for Plaintiff

23

 
 Case 2:16-cv-15639-ILRL-MBN Document 96 Filed 08/08/17 Page 1 of 13

VIET ANH VO VERSUS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-15639

REBEKAH E. GEE, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ET AL

SECTION “B”(5)

OPINION AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION Before the court are “Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Declaratory Judgment, and Permanent Injunction” (Rec. Doc. 84), “Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Declaratory Judgment and Permanent Injunction”(Rec. Doc. 91), “Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment”(Rec. Doc. 89), “Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Declaratory Judgment and Permanent Injunction” (Rec. Doc. 90), “Reply in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Declaratory Judgment and Permanent Injunction” (Rec. Doc. 94) and “Notice of Changed Circumstances Regarding HB 439” (Rec. Doc. 95). For the reasons set forth below, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motions for Partial Summary Judgment, Declaratory Judgment and Permanent Injunction are GRANTED.

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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiff, Viet “Victor” Anh Vo was born in an Indonesian
refugee camp after his parents (both Vietnamese nationals) fled Vietnam as refugees (Rec. Doc. 1). Given this circumstance, Indonesian and Vietnamese authorities have never recognized his birth and consequently he has never been issued a birth certificate from a government entity (Rec. Doc. 1). Plaintiff has resided in Louisiana since he was three months old and became a naturalized citizen when he was eight years old (Rec. Doc. 1). In 2016, Plaintiff and his girlfriend (a fellow United States citizen) decided to get married and applied for a marriage license from the State of Louisiana (Rec. Doc. 1).
Plaintiff was denied a marriage license pursuant to Act 436 which requires that all applicants for a marriage license provide a certified birth certificate, a valid and unexpired passport, or an unexpired visa accompanied by a Form I-94 (Rec. Doc. 1). Act 436 has a waiver of the birth certificate requirement but in order to qualify for the waiver an applicant must be a U.S. citizen that was born in the United States or one of its territories. Plaintiff was born outside of the United States and is naturalized citizen and therefore did not qualify for the waiver (Rec. Doc. 1).
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Plaintiff provided other official documents to the Clerk of Court including a social security number and a Louisiana state driver’s license, but without a birth certificate as required by Act 436, the state of Louisiana refused to issue him a marriage license (Rec. Doc. 1).
Plaintiff brought this complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendants Rebekah Gee, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Hospitals for the State of Louisiana, Devin George, State Registrar and Director of the Office of Vital Records, Michael Thibodeaux, Clerk of Court for Iberia Parish, Diane Meaux Broussard, Clerk of Court for Vermilion Parish and Louis J. Perret, Clerk of Court for Lafayette Parish.
After hearing oral argument, this Court in its March 23, 2017 Order and Reasons granted the Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Rec. Doc. 77). FACTUAL AND LEGAL FINDINGS
A. Plaintiff’s Motion for Permanent Injunction The legal standard for obtaining a permanent injunction mirrors the legal standard for obtaining a preliminary injunction. Lionhart v. Foster, 100 F. Supp. 2d 383, 385-386 (E.D. La. 1999). A plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) actual success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat that failure to grant the injunction will result in irreparable injury; (3) the threatened injury outweighs
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any damage that the injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) the injunction will not disserve the public interest.” Causeway Med. Suite v. Foster, 43 F. Supp. 2d 604, 610 (E.D. La. 1999). However, the difference between the legal standard for a preliminary injunction and a permanent injunction is that the Plaintiff must demonstrate actual success on the merits and not just a likelihood of success. Lionhart, 100 F. Supp. 2d 383, 386. Nonetheless, all of these factors weigh in favor of the Court granting a permanent injunction.
1. Actual Success on the Merits Plaintiff seeks to demonstrate actual success on the merits through his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment regarding Counts I and II of the First Amended Complaint (Rec. Doc. 82). Count I alleges that Act 436 violates the Plaintiff’s Equal Protection rights (Rec. Doc. 82). Count II alleges that Act 436 violates the Plaintiff’s Due Process rights (Rec. Doc. 84). These are inherently purely questions of law and not fact and therefore this Court can adjudicate the summary judgment motion even in the absence of discovery. Brazos Valley Coalition for Life, Inc. v. City of Bryan Texas, 421 F.3d 314, 327 (5th Cir. 2005).
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Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, interrogatory answers, and admissions, together with any affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986). A genuine issue exists if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Although the Court must consider the evidence with all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the nonmovant must produce specific facts to demonstrate that a genuine issue exists for trial. Webb v. Cardiothoracic Surgery Assocs. of N. Texas, 139 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir. 1998).
The moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The movant must point to “portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56). If and when the movant carries this burden, the nonmovant must then go beyond the pleadings and use affidavits, depositions, interrogatory responses, admissions, or other evidence to establish a genuine issue. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
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Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). “[W]here the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial, the movant may merely point to an absence of evidence, thus shifting to the nonmovant the burden of demonstrating by competent summary judgment proof that there is an issue of material fact warranting trial. . . . Only when ‘there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party’ is a full trial on the merits warranted.” Lindsey v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 16 F.3d 616 (5th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, conclusory rebuttals of the pleadings are insufficient to avoid summary judgment. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Liljeberg Enter., Inc., 7 F.3d 1203, 1207 (5th Cir. 1993).
Throughout this litigation the record has not revealed any disputed issues of material fact. Both Plaintiff and Defendant agree upon the essential facts leading up to and including Plaintiff’s attempt to get a marriage license and the subsequent denial of the same by the State of Louisiana. Consequently, when deciding whether or not Plaintiff’s Partial Summary Judgment Motion is appropriate, we must analyze the basic legal questions involved, namely Equal Protection and Due Process claims.
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a. Equal Protection Under the United States Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause protects all individuals from state discrimination. Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982). The Supreme Court has clarified that “these provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). While states retain a broad power to classify individuals, under an Equal Protection analysis “classifications based on alienage like those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.” Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). The Supreme Court has held that classifications, such as the one made by the State of Louisiana pursuant to Act 436 “must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny, that is, such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests.” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103, 105 (2001). The birth certificate provisions that the Louisiana legislature enacted creates classifications that distinguish between United States citizens on the basis of their national origin. If Plaintiff was born in the United States and lacked a birth
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certificate he could have applied for the waiver of producing a birth certificate and the State of Louisiana would then under existing laws grant a marriage license. However, because Plaintiff was born overseas and thereafter became a naturalized citizen he is ineligible under Louisiana law to apply for the waiver. The State of Louisiana fails to demonstrate in their opposition that this classification based on national origin furthers a compelling governmental interest that justify treating this Plaintiff and other similarly situated U.S. citizens differently from U.S. born citizens merely because of where they were was born. Based on the undisputed facts and controlling case law it is clear that these classifications are unconstitutional. Plaintiff has demonstrated actual success on his equal protection claim and partial summary judgment is appropriate.
b. Due Process In addition, Act 436 is unconstitutional because it violates Plaintiff’s due process rights by denying him the fundamental right to marriage. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602-2603 (2015). The Supreme Court held that even though states may impose reasonable regulations on marriage, it applies a strict scrutiny test when regulations “interfere directly and substantially with
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the right to marry.” Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 387 (1978). The current birth certificate provisions completely bar the Plaintiff from obtaining a marriage license. Given the heightened level of scrutiny that classifications based on national origin require, and the failure of the State of Louisiana to proffer any evidence of why this regulation passes constitutional muster, this Court finds that the Plaintiff also has demonstrated actual success on the merits of his due process claim.
Nonetheless, Defendants argue that on June 8, 2017, the Louisiana Legislature passed HB 439 that allows marriage license applicants unable to provide the required documentation to seek a judicial waiver. Defendants argue that HB 439 makes the current controversy moot. Furthermore, Defendants also argue that the existing preliminary injunction order rendered Plaintiff’s claims moot and any additional relief would just replicate that prior decree. Moreover, Defendants also argue that any declaratory judgment should only apply to Mr. Vo.
None of these contentions are persuasive. First, the new law, HB 439, referenced in Defendants’ oppositions, does not remedy the constitutional deficiencies of Act 436 (Re. Doc. 95). Even though it addresses the judicial wavier issue in Act 436, Act 439 leaves intact other provisions of Act 436 such as passport and visa requirements that only foreign born or naturalized citizens have
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to provide. These documentary requirements also pose constitutional issues with Act 436 that the revised statute does not cure. Defendants’ notion that the preliminary injunction moots further actions is incorrect. Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 394-398(U.S. 1981). A preliminary injunction merely analyzes the likelihood of success on the merits. The previous order was not a final ruling or determination on the constitutionality of Act 436. Therefore, there is still an active controversy that requires adjudication. Third, there is no legally valid reason to limit a Declaratory Judgment to apply only to the Plaintiff and his “unique circumstances.” The Supreme Court has held that a single plaintiff in an as-applied challenge can invalidate a statute as it applies to everyone. See, Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2297 (2016). The unconstitutionality of Act 436 applies to all residents of the State of Louisiana, not just Mr. Vo. The scope of the preliminary injunction order applied to Plaintiff and all similarly situated U. S. citizens who are prevented from obtaining a marriage license under Act 436 (Rec. Doc. 77). This permanent injunction order will do the same.
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2. Threat of Irreparable Injury Plaintiff has demonstrated that he faces the threat of irreparable injury. The Fifth Circuit clarified and explained, “an injury is irreparable only if it cannot be undone through monetary remedies.” Deerfield Medical Center v. Deerfield Beach, 661 F.2d 328, 338, (5th Cir. 1981) (internal quotations omitted). Under Louisiana state law the Plaintiff is currently being denied the right to marriage. There is no monetary award that can provide him that right and therefore he is suffering irreparable harm. In addition, the Fifth Circuit has held that the denial of constitutional rights “for even minimal periods of time constitutes irreparable injury justifying the grant of a preliminary injunction.” Deerfield Medical Center, 661 F.2d 328, 338. Plaintiff has been denied the right to marry since early 2016. Act 436’s deprivation of Plaintiff’s fundamental right to marriage satisfies the requirement that Plaintiff faces the threat of irreparable harm. This factor weighs in favor of the permanent injunction.
3. Weighing of the harms Plaintiff has demonstrated the threatened injuries outweigh any damage that the permanent injunction will cause the Defendants. Sells, 750 F.3d 478, 480. This Court finds that the balancing analysis weighs heavily in the favor of Plaintiff. The State of Louisiana is not harmed by having to issue a marriage license to,
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in this case, a United States citizen who merely lacks a birth certificate due to circumstances beyond his control. Louisiana’s enjoinment from enforcing an unconstitutional law does not outweigh the fundamental right to marriage. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1145 (10th Cir. 2013).
4. Whether the injunction will disserve the public interest The Fifth Circuit has held that injunctions protecting constitutional freedoms are always in the public interest. Texans for Free Enter. v. Tex. Ethics Comm'n, 732 F.3d 535, 539, (5th Cir. 2013). In the instant matter the permanent injunction protects the fundamental right to marriage and the right to be free from unconstitutional discriminatory classifications based on national origin. Consequently, this factor also weighs in favor of Plaintiff and his motion for a permanent injunction is deemed appropriate.
PERMANENT INJUNCTION Under the equitable powers of this Court IT IS ORDERED that Defendants and their officers, agents, servants and employees are permanently ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from enforcing Act 436 insofar as it unconstitutionally deprives U.S. citizens like Plaintiff and similarly situated U.S. citizens the right to marry based on national origin.
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Case 2:16-cv-15639-ILRL-MBN Document 96 Filed 08/08/17 Page 13 of 13 Willful violation of this Order and Permanent Injunction may
subject any person who commits such an act to criminal and/or civil prosecution for contempt of this Court. Any violation of this Order and Permanent Injunction will result in immediate issuance of an order to show cause for service on the violator, who after appropriate hearings and findings, will be dealt with within the sanctions provided by law.
The Court shall retain jurisdiction of this action for all purposes, including without limitation, all proceedings involving the interpretation, enforcement or amendment of this Order and Permanent Injunction.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 8th day of August, 2017. ____________________________________ SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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 Case 2:16-cv-15639-ILRL-MBN Document 119 Filed 02/21/18 Page 1 of 11

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

VIET ANH VO

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 16-15639

REBEKAH E. GEE, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ET AL

SECTION “B”(5)

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is counsel for Plaintiff Viet Anh Vo’s

“Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs” (Rec. Doc. 111) and Reply

(Rec. Doc. 118), Defendants, Diane Broussard, Vermilion Parish

Clerk of Court and Michael Thibodeaux, Iberia Parish Clerk of

Courts’ Memorandum in Opposition (Rec. Doc. 112), Louis J. Perret,

Lafayette Parish Clerk of Court’s Memorandum in Opposition (Rec.

Doc. 113), and Secretary for the Louisiana Department of Health,

Rebekah Gee, and the Louisiana State Registrar, Devin George’s

Memorandum in Opposition (Rec. Doc. 114).

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs

is Granted in part and Denied in part.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Viet Anh Vo (“Plaintiff”) filed suit against Rebekah Gee as
Secretary for the Louisiana Department of Health, Diane Broussard as Vermilion Parish Clerk of Court, Michael Thibodeaux, as Iberia Parish Clerk of Court, Louis J. Perret as Lafayette Parish Clerk of Court, and Devin George as the Louisiana State Registrar
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(collectively herein referred to as “Defendants”), in October 2016. (Rec. Doc. 1). Plaintiff asserted that the Louisiana statute requiring United States citizens to provide a certified birth certificate for a marriage and not permitting a waiver of the requirement for naturalized United States citizens born outside of the United States or one of its territories was unconstitutional. (Rec. Doc. 1 at 2). After oral argument (Rec. Doc. 76), the Court granted a preliminary injunction (Rec. Doc. 77), which was converted into a permanent injunction and declaratory judgment on August 8, 2017 (Rec. Doc. 96).
Plaintiff files the instant motion pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and Federal Rules for the Eastern District of Louisiana Local Rules 54.2 and 54.3, as the “prevailing party” for an award of attorney’s fees and costs. (Rec. Doc. 111). Plaintiff requests this Court to order Defendants to pay $212,580.00 in attorneys’ fees and $11,267.65 in costs1. Defendants’ Responses in Opposition object to: 1) the reasonableness of Plaintiff’s requested attorney’s fees and costs, 2) the reasonableness of the number of attorneys and support staff, 3) the amount hours and fees associated with locating a potential plaintiff, 4) plaintiff
1 Plaintiff’s original Motion For Attorneys’ Fees (Rec. Doc. 111) requested $386, 714 in fees; however, counsel for Plaintiff reduced said request in its Reply (Rec. Doc. 118) to $212, 580.
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counsel’s lack of exercise billing judgment, and 5) duplicative work.
Further, defendants Diane Broussard as Vermilion Parish Clerk of Court, Michael Thibodeaux, as Iberia Parish Clerk of Court, and Louis J. Perret as Lafayette Parish Clerk of Court (collectively herein referred to as “Clerk Defendants”) contend that the State is solely responsible for paying the prevailing party’s attorney’s fees and costs. They argue that as the Clerk Defendants they were acting in their official capacity on behalf of the State in enforcing the challenged Louisiana state law.
LAW AND ANALYSIS Title 42 of the United States Code, Section 1988 provides the
Court with discretion to award attorney’s fees and costs to the prevailing party in Civil Rights’ litigation. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2018). On August 8, 2017, this Court granted Plaintiff’s Motions for Partial Summary Judgment, Declaratory Judgment, and Permanent Injunction (Rec. Doc. 96). As final Judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiff (Rec. Doc. 97), it is clear that Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this litigation.2 However, the reasonableness of the submitted fees and costs remains to be determined.
2 See e.g., Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Virginia Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 604 (2001) “[E]nforceable judgments on the merits and court-ordered consent decrees create the “material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties” necessary to permit an award of attorney's fees.”; see
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Determination of a reasonable attorney’s fee involves calculating the lodestar, which is a two-step process. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 324 (5th Cir. 1995). In the first step, this Court is to determine the reasonable number of hours expended on the litigation and the reasonable hourly rates for the participating attorneys. Id. Next, this Court is to multiply the determined hours by the determined rate. Id. This calculation comprises the lodestar. Id. The lodestar is then either accepted or adjusted according to the twelve factors delineated in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Exp., which are:
(1) the time and labor involved; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal services properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to this case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations; (8) the amount involved and results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation. And ability of counsel; (10) the undesirability of the case; (11) the nature and length of the proceedings; and (12) awards in similar cases. 488 F. 2d 714, 717-19.
also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) “[P]laintiffs may be considered ‘prevailing parties' for attorney's fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.”
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Calculation of Lodestar Reasonable Hours Expended
The first step necessary for calculation of the lodestar is a determination of the number of hours reasonably expended in the case. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 50 F.3d at 324 (5th Cir. 1995). “The fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hour’s expended and hourly rates.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437.
Here, the nine (9) attorneys, legal assistant (1), and paralegal (1) involved in this case submit an exorbitantly high number of hours expended on this litigation. Rec. Doc. 111. Even after a subsequent reduction in their Reply (Rec. Doc. 118), Plaintiff’s counsel is seeking payment for an alleged 960.0 hours expended, in less than 12 months of litigation.
Attorneys must “exercise billing judgment by excluding time that is unproductive, excessive, duplicative, or inadequately documented when seeking fee awards.” Creecy v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 548 F. Supp. 2d 279, 286 (E.D. La. 2008). “The remedy for failing to exercise billing judgment is to reduce the hours awarded as a percentage and exclude hours that were not reasonably expended.” Id.
Upon review of the revised billing entries submitted by Plaintiff’s counsel we find many entries are either unproductive or duplicative. For example, seven (7) attorneys on Plaintiff’s
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legion of counsel expended a total of at least 51.4 hours drafting, editing, and discussing the twenty-two (22) paged Complaint in this case. Rec. Docs. 118-3, 119-5, and 118-7). A large majority of Plaintiff counsel’s expended hours reflect a voluminous amount of time spent on co-counsel phone calls and “follow up” among the numerous attorney’s working on this matter on behalf of Plaintiff. Id.
While the Court recognizes the challenges in drafting pleadings and briefs for a constitutional civil rights case, the number of hours counsel reportedly expended is unreasonable. A team of pro bono attorneys, with the experience and reputation of a firm like Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, and organizations like NILC and NOWCRJ could have produced an identical outcome through implementation of s reasonable and more efficient litigation strategy. It is important for our review of this case to state that there was no traditional discovery taken in this case, allowing counsel to engage primarily in straight-forward motion practice on clearly established legal principles. We commend them and their opposing counsel for their professional advocacy. However, this was not a complex case, factually or legally. We cautioned at an early stage the need to vigilantly guard against excessive and duplicative work.
An overall reduction in Plaintiff counsel’s expended hours is appropriate considering the above analysis and application of
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relevant Johnson factors. Additionally, in the Fifth Circuit, only

fees for attorneys and paralegals are recoverable. See Vela v.

City of Houston, 276 F.3d 659, 681 (5th Cir. 2001).

Accordingly, we will apply a thirty percent (30%) reduction

in addition to the revised hours expended in this case, as follows:

Firm

Attorney

Revised 30% Reduction

Hours

1. Skadden Horth-Neubert

48.9

34.23

2. Skadden Brumme

182.9

128.03

3. Skadden Hirsch

84.5

59.15

4. Skadden Coquelin

61.5

43.05

5. Skadden Travaglini (legal 49

34.3

assistant)

6. NOWCRJ

Yanik (pre-barred) 11.6

8.12

7. NOWCRJ

Yanik (post-barred) 183.0

128.1

8. NILC

Tumlin

34.2

23.94

9. NILC

Preciado

78.93

55.251

10.

NILC Huerta

148.05

103.95

11.

NILC Alcala-Ruiz

77.4

54.18

(paralegal)

Total:

638.001

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Reasonable Hourly Rate

The second requisite step is the determination of a reasonable

hourly rate by counsel involved in the litigation. “Reasonable

fees” are calculated based from prevailing market rates in the

relevant community. Blum v. Stetson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984).

“Determination of the reasonable hourly rate for a particular

community is generally established through affidavits of other

attorneys practicing there.” Chisholm v. Hood, 90 F. App'x 709,

710 (5th Cir. 2004). These determinations of rates are performed

on case-by-case basis. Id.

Plaintiff’s counsel submits the following rates:

Firm

Attorney

Rate

1. Skadden 2. Skadden 3. Skadden 4. Skadden 5. Skadden
6. NOWCRJ 7. NOWCRJ 8. NILC 9. NILC

Horth-Neubert

$325

Brumme

$250

Hirsch

$200

Coquelin

$200

Travaglini (legal

$125

assistant)

Yanik (pre-barred) $125

Yanik (post-barred) $200

Tumlin

$325

Preciado

$300

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10. NILC 11. NILC

Huerta Alcala-Ruiz (paralegal)

$250 $75

Upon review, this Court finds the above rates reasonable given the parties’ experience and credentials. See Rec. Doc. 118-3 Exhibit B to Reply Declaration of Horth-Neubert; Rec. Doc. 118-4 Supplemental Declaration of Yanik; Rec. Doc. 118-6 Reply Declaration of Preciado. The Court also notes recognition of Plaintiff counsel’s removal of two experienced Skadden attorneys who performed work on this matter. Rec. Doc. 118-3. Johnson Factors
As indicated above, after the lodestar is determined, the Court may then adjust the lodestar upward or downward depending on the twelve Johnson factors. However, “to the extent that any Johnson factors are subsumed in the lodestar, they should not be reconsidered when determining whether an adjustment to the lodestar is required.” Migis v. Pearle Vision, Inc., 135 F.3d 1041, 1047 (5th Cir.1998). Here, we already considered the Johnson factors above, which resulted in a reduction of the reasonable expended hours in this matter.

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Costs Plaintiff counsel also seeks payment for its costs and
expenses incurred throughout this litigation, totaling $11,267.65. 28 U.S.C. § 1920 provides that a court may tax the following costs:
[F]ees of the clerk and marshal; fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case; fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses; fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for use in the case; docket fees; compensation of court-appointed experts, interpreters, and special interpretation services. Mota v. Univ. of Texas Houston Health Sci. Ctr., 261 F.3d 512, 529 (5th Cir. 2001). “Litigation expenses” are also recoverable. Plaintiff’s counsel are seeking: Skadden - $4,651.11 NILC - $4,619.54 NOWCRJ - $1,997.00 The above costs, while recoverable are unreasonably high and this Court will add a 10% reduction. From the itemized list of costs submitted, much of the costs are attributed to the cost of travel for the numerous attorneys involved; including food and lodging. There was no traditional discovery taken. The straightforward nature of this action and clearly established law did not warrant a battery of attorneys expending duplicative time and expenses. Therefore, a cost award of $10,140.88 is reasonable in view of above findings.
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Considering the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs (Rec. Doc. 111) is GRANTED in Part. Defendants are hereby ordered to pay Plaintiff $144,614.05 in reasonable fees and $10,140.88 in recoverable costs, for a total of $154,754.93.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the State of Louisiana is directed to pay the Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees as the local parish officials have been sued in their official capacity for enforcing an unconstitutional State statute. See Echols v. Parker, 909 F.2d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 1990) (“A county official pursues his duties as a state agent when he is enforcing state law or policy. . . Thus, the district court correctly ordered the State of Mississippi to pay Echols' § 1988 attorney's fees.”).
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 20th day of February, 2018.
___________________________________ SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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