Co Mfi-A» NT _

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE- DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

RECEIVED
JAM 2 5 1239

M. WAYNE BATES, JR; ERNEST W. BUSBY, III; DALTON PREJEAN; and JOHN SULLIVAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

u. b. uiij.^ivji u u . i r
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

Plaintiffs,

v.
BRUCE LYNN, Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Corrections, and HILTON BUTLER, Warden of the Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, Louisiana,

Civil Action
No89-065

Defendants.

COMPLAINT
1. This is a class action on behalf of all prisoners under sentence of death in the State of Louisiana, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from the unlawful conditions under which they are confined during the many years that their appeals and post-conviction proceedings are pending. The action is brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983 to redress the violation by defendants, acting under color of state law, of plaintiffs' rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
2. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by 2 8 U.S.C. SS 1331, 1343(3) and (4), and 2201.

Bates v. Lynn
PC-LA-002-001

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS j
3. This action is brought as a class action pursuant to j i
Rules 23(a) and (b)(1) and (2) of' the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.

(a) Plaintiffs sue on behalf of all persons who are

Ji currently confined under sentence of death in the State of

Louisiana, and on behalf of an unknown number of persons who in

the future will be confined under sentence of death by the

Louisiana Department of Corrections either at the Louisiana State

Penitentiary at Angola or elsewhere.

(b) The class currently consists of approximately 39

members and is likely to grow in size during the pendency of this

lawsuit. It is so numerous that joinder of all its members is

impracticable.
ji

ji

(c) The conditions and p r a c t i c e s that are the basis of

t h i s c o m p l a i n t , and the q u e s t i o n s of law c o n c e r n i n g the

c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of those conditions and p r a c t i c e s , are common

j| to a l l members of the c l a s s .

(d) P l a i n t i f f s a r e a l l death-sentenced prisoners

confined in Louisiana. Their claims are typical of the claims of

the c l a s s , and they w i l l f a i r l y and a d e q u a t e l y p r o t e c t the

i n t e r e s t s of the c l a s s . They are represented by counsel who are

experienced in representation of death-sentenced prisoners and in

representation of cases concerning prison conditions.

|

(e) The prosecution of separate actions by individual

members of the c l a s s would c r e a t e a r i s k of i n c o n s i s t e n t

3

adjudications with respect to each that would establish

incompatible standards of conduct for defendants.

j

(f) The prosecution of separate actions by individual

members of the class would create a risk of adjudications that as

a practical matter would be dispositive of the interests of the

other members not parties to such adjudications, or would

substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their

interests.

(g) The defendants have acted or failed to act on

grounds generally applicable to all prisoners in their custody

who have been sentenced to death, and the appropriate injunctive

and declaratory relief would apply to the class as a whole.

PARTIES
A. Plaintiffs
4. Plaintiffs M. WAYNE BATES, JR.; ERNEST W. BUSBY, III;
DALTON PREJEAN; and JOHN SULLIVAN are in the custody of the State
of Louisiana at the Louisiana State Penitentiary under sentence
of death, awaiting the results of their appeals or post-
conviction proceedings.
B. Defendants
5 . D e f e n d a n t BRUCE LYNN i s S e c r e t a r y o f t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f
C o r r e c t i o n s o f t h e S t a t e o f L o u i s i a n a . He i s t h e c h i e f
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e o f f i c e r of the Louisiana Department of
ii
!i C o r r e c t i o n s , w h i c h i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e m a i n t e n a n c e a n d
jj
|i operation of all Louisiana prisons including the Louisiana State
h
i|
Ii Penitentiary.

4

6. Defendant HILTON BUTLER is Warden of the Louisiana

State Penitentiary, where Death Row prisoners are currently-

confined. He is responsible for the management and supervision j

of that facility and the prisoners confined therein, including

the plaintiff class confined under sentence of death. custody and control over plaintiffs.

He has j j

7. Both defendants are named in their official capacities.

FACTS

8. As a result of defendants' actions or failure to act,

the plaintiff class is confined under conditions that violate

plaintiffs' basic constitutional rights. Absent declaratory and

injunctive relief from this Court, plaintiffs will continue to

live under such conditions for the many years that their cases

are pending on appeal or post-conviction.

j

9. At all times relevant to the claims herein, defendants

have acted or failed to act under color of law of the State of

Louisiana.

A. Law Library

10. The plaintiffs are denied any direct access to a law

library. According to the rules which apply to all death row

prisoners, they are allowed to request and keep in their cells

only three books at a time, for three days at a time. They are
II
; not allowed to request copies of cases from these books to keep
ii
!| in their cells. No meaningful legal research can occur w i t h i n ji ji the constraints of this system. Because prisoners receive only
li i: w h a t t h e y r e q u e s t , a n d a r e o f t e n u n a w a r e o f r e s o u r c e s , t h e i r

5

ability to fully research applicable law is severely curtailed.

j Research is delayed by the inability to scan potentially fruitful

sources.

,

i

11. Two prisoner assistants are assigned to provide legal i

services to the 39 death row prisoners. Assistants are not

adequately trained or qualified to meet the needs of this large

group in lieu of direct access to a law library. There are often

delays in the delivery of necessary books and legal materials.
I These delays are critical for prisoners -to whom time is of the

essence.

12. Prisoners are required to do all their research and

writing in their cells. They have no desks or chairs, and

lighting is inadequate for this type of work. The atmosphere in

death row is often noisy and disruptive, and is not conducive to

II careful legal study.

13- For death row prisoners who have the wherewithal to do

their own legal research and writing, these restrictions are

severe, and result in the denial of meaningful access to the

courts. Death row prisoners are denied access to the law library

soley of their special status as death sentenced, with no

consideration of any realistic security risk, and no

!i corresponding attempt to meet their special need to challenge

their sentences of death.

B. Appointed Counsel

14. For prisoners who might be able to handle basic legal

claims with access to a law library, even that opportunity would

not be sufficient to meet the needs of death sentenced prisoners i in regard to complex post-conviction litigation. The state ! should assure the appointment of trained and qualified lawyers to all death sentenced prisoners in post-conviction proceedings.
15. Many prisoners on death row are illiterate or incapable , of researching and preparing complicated legal papers. No provisions are made by state officials to assure mea-ningful access to the courts for these prisoners for challenges to their capital sentences, in state or federal habeas corpus petitions or in civil rights actions. In this instance, trained and qualified legal assistance must be provided on a systematic basis for legal || needs other than post-conviction litigation.
C. Access to Counsel 16. The severe restrictions on visiting death row prisoners apply to counsel as well as all other visitors. Visiting occurs in a small room separated by a heavy mesh screen. Contact visits are routinely denied, the prisoner sits on one side of the screen, the lawyer on the other. 17. Prisoners remain shackled hand and foot even during non-contact visits with their lawyers. This procedure severely inhibits the review by prisoners of documents, inhibits the signing of d o c u m e n t s , and is e x t r e m e l y u n c o m f o r t a b l e , embarrassing and distracting. 18. It is impossible to review important papers between lawyer and client. In order to share p a p e r s , or to have

7 documents signed, a corrections officer must be summoned and requested to take the papers from one side of the room around the outside of the room to the person on the other side. This procedure invites breaches of confidence between lawyer and client.
19. The visiting room is often hot and uncomfortable, lighting is poor, and there is no provision for food or. water during long conferences. The room is extremely noisy, making it necessary to speak very loudly to communicate. Lawyers are often , required to wait for extended periods of time locked in their ,
i
side of the room while awaiting the appearance of their clients, ! even after making definite, approved appointments.
20. Because there is only one visiting room, only one visit I can occur at a time with any maintenance of the attorney-client
privilege. Because of the unique need for consultations between lawyer and a client facing death, the limitation to one attorneyclient visit at a time for the entire Death Row unreasonably interferes with legal access.

CAUSES OF ACTION

j

21. Defendants have violated and are violating plaintiffs'

I

j c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s to a c c e s s to the c o u r t s and to the
I

j assistance of counsel by failing to provide meaningful access to

| a law library or trained and qualified legal assistance in the

• preparation of legal papers, in violation of the Sixth and : Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

8

22. Defendants have violated and are violating plaintiffs'

constitutional rights of access to the courts and to counsel by j

failing to provide appointed counsel to death sentenced prisoners

in pursuit of post-conviction remedies in violation of the Sixth

and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

'

23- Defendants have violated and are violating plaintiffs' j

constitutional rights of access to the courts and to counsel by !

failing to provide them with appropriate and effective means of i

comunicating with counsel in violation of the Sixth and !

1

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

;

24. Plaintiffs and the class they represent have no j

adequate remedy at law to redress the wrongs suffered as set

forth in this complaint. Plaintiffs have suffered and will

continue to suffer irreparable injury as a result of the unlawful

if
!| acts, policies and practices of the defendants alleged herein

jt
!j unless they are granted the relief they request. This suit for

i.
•j d e c l a r a t o r y a n d i n j u n c t i v e r e l i e f ! II policies and p r a c t i c e s o f d e f e n d a n t s .

from the unlawful a c t s , The need for relief is

ii

jj pressing because the rights at issue a r e paramount rights under

the Constitution of the United States.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

25. WHEREFORE, plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the

II class they r e p r e s e n t , r e q u e s t t h a t t h i s C o u r t g r a n t them the
11
jj following relief:

|!

a. Certify this matter as a class action;

9 b. Adjudge and d e c l a r e t h a t the c o n d i t i o n s and p r a c t i c e s a l l e g e d herein are in v i o l a t i o n of the r i g h t s of i p l a i n t i f f s and the class the represent under the Constitution of the United S t a t e s ; c. Enjoin defendants, t h e i r agents and employees, and a l l persons a c t i n g in concert with them, from i n c a r c e r a t i n g p l a i n t i f f s and the c l a s s they r e p r e s e n t under the unconstitutional conditions and practices alleged herein; d. Enjoin defendants, t h e i r ag.ents and employees, and a l l persons acting in concert with them, from engaging in any a c t s of r e t a l i a t i o n a g a i n s t p l a i n t i f f s and the c l a s s they represent for having brought this lawsuit; e. Direct defendants to submit a plan for the prompt elimination of the u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s and p r a c t i c e s alleged herein; f. R e t a i n j u r i s d i c t i o n in t h i s cause u n t i l the unlawful conditions and practices alleged herein no longer exist and the Court is s a t i s f i e d that they will not recur; g. Grant p l a i n t i f f s the c o s t s and expenses of maintaining this action, including reasonable attorneys' fees; and; h. Grant such other and additional r e l i e f as the Court may deem just and proper.

10 Respectfully submitted,

DATED: January 24, 1989

Claudia W r i g h t { \ ACLU National Prison^Ppbject 1616 P Street, N.W. Suite 3^0 Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 331-0500
7.
William P. Cuigley
ion Center Blvd. Fulton Place, Suite 119 lew Orleans, LA 70130 (504) 524-0016
Counsel for Plaintiffs

PLEASE SERVE:
| Hilton Butler Warden Angola State Penitentiary Angola, LA 70712
Bruce Lynn Secretary of the Louisiana.Department.of Corrections Capitol Station P. O.Box 94304 ji Baton Rouge, LA 70804-9304

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

M. WAYNE BATES, J R . , e t a l . , )

Plaintiffs,

)

v.

)

)

BRUCE LYNN, e t a l . ,

)

Defendants. )

Civil Action No.

ij

Ij

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT QF PLAINTIFFS'

i!

MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

I. INTRODUCTION
The c o m p l a i n t in t h i s c a s e a l l e g e s t h a t p o l i c i e s and p r a c t i c e s affecting a l l death-sentenced prisoners in the custody of t h e L o u i s i a n a Department of C o r r e c t i o n s v i o l a t e the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s of such p r i s o n e r s . These p o l i c i e s and p r a c t i c e s deny meaningful a c c e s s to the c o u r t s and to c o u n s e l . The named p l a i n t i f f s , four p r i s o n e r s under sentence of death ir t h e c u s t o d y of t h e L o u i s i a n a D e p a r t m e n t of C o r r e c t i o n s , have f i l e d t h i s a c t i o n as a Rule 2 3 ( b ) ( 2 ) c l a s s a c t i o n on behalf oi a l l p r i s o n e r s in t h e c u s t o d y of t h e L o u i s i a n a Department oi C o r r e c t i o n s who a r e now or who w i l l be in t h e f u t u r e confinec under s e n t e n c e of d e a t h . The named p l a i n t i f f s seek d e c l a r a t o r ; and i n j u n c t i v e r e l i e f on b e h a l f of the c l a s s .
The motion f o r c l a s s c e r t i f i c a t i o n a l l e g e s that th membership of t h e c l a s s i s so numerous t h a t j o i n d e r of a l !i members i s not p r a c t i c a b l e ; t h a t t h e r e a r e q u e s t i o n s of law an

2 fact common to the c l a s s ; that the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e p l a i n t i f f s ' claims are t y p i c a l of the claims of the c l a s s ; that as the c l a s s j r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , the named p l a i n t i f f s will f a i r l y and adequately ; p r o t e c t the i n t e r e s t s of the e n t i r e c l a s s ; and that the ; defendants have acted or refused to a c t on grounds g e n e r a l l y applicable to the c l a s s , thereby making final injunctive r e l i e f appropriate for the class as a whole. Accordingly, a l l the requirements for the maintenance of a 23(b)(2) c l a s s action are
s
present in this case. II. ARGUMENT
Class Act i o n S u i t s Have Been t h e Trad i t ional A. V e h i G l e f o r C h a l i e n g i ng S y s tern i c a l l y
U n c o n s t jL t ut i o n a 1 Co nd i t i o n s o f P r i s o n
Confinement Before applying the formal requirements of Rule 23 to the facts of this case, an important historical fact deserves special emphasis. Over the past two decades, in cases similar to the present one, federal courts in this and other judicial circuits have routinely authorized such cases to proceed as class actions on behalf of all inmates confined in the challenged institutions. See Alberti v. Klevenhagen, 790 F.2d 1220, 1221 (5th Cir. 1986), rehearing denied, 799 F.2d 992; Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1126 (5th Cir. 1982); Jones v. Diamond, 519 F.2d 1090, 1099 (5th Cir. 1975); Newman v. Alabama, 503 F.2d 1320, 1322 (5th Cir. 1974), cert, denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975); Gates v. j Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1295 (5th Cir. 1974). See also Jones v.
1
j Metzger, 456 F.2d 854, 855 (6th Cir. 1972); French v. Owens, 777 i F.2d 1250, 1251 (7th Cir. 1985); Finney v. Arkansas Board of

3

Correction, 505 F.2d 194, 198 (8th Cir. 1974); Ramos v. Lamm, 639

I

F.2d 559, 562 (10th Cir. 198O).

.

Allowing cases that allege systemic abuses to proceed ,

as class actions is a sensible way to address such claims. A '

class action is an "effective weapon for an across-the-board |

attack against systematic abuse." Jones v. Diamond, 519 F.2d at

1100, supra. it is a mechanism "admirably suited-to the

adjudication of civil rights claims," (iji . at 1101) and a technique that makes it possible to assert rights effectively ;

that might otherwise go unprotected. Ici. at 1100 ("unless class

actions are hospitably received into our judicial system, many

valid constitutional claims may be stymied").

B. The Requisites of Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are Present in this Case

The parties who are asserting the existence of a class

have the burden of demonstrating that the requirements of

Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 have been satisfied. Horton v. Goose Creek Ind.

School Plat., 690 F.2d 470, 486, n.28 (5th Cir. 1982). This

means that they must show that all the prerequisites identified

in Rule 23(a) and one of the prerequisites identified in Rule

23(b) are present in the case. Horton, supra, at 483- However,

the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that "[i]n class

actions, particularly in the civil rights field, the general
ii

j| rules on burden of proof must not be applied rigorously or

\\ blindly; Ct]he court too bears a great responsibility to insure

!; the just resolution of the claims presented." Jones v. Diamond,

4

519 F.2d at 1099, supra (reversing lower court's denial of class

certification in civil rights action brought on behalf of

Mississippi prisoners).

!

Rule 23(a) permits one or more members of a class to

sue on behalf of all members of the class "if (1) the class is so I

numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there I

are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims

or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the

jl claims or defenses of the class, and (kj the representative

parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the j

class." All four of the Section (a) factors are present here.

1.
jl
!I now confined

Numerosity
i
The proposed class consists of 39 inmates who are !
|
I by the Louisiana Department of Corrections under j

| s e n t e n c e of d e a t h , as well as a l l persons who, in the future, I

ij w i l l b e s o c o n f i n e d b y t h e d e f e n d a n t s . T h e n u m e r o s i t y •

( r e q u i r e m e n t of Rule 2 3 ( a ) ( 1 ) " r e f e r s to the degree of | i impracticality of joinder of all the individual members of the
i
proposed class." Ledet v. Fischer, 548 F.Supp. 775 at 781

(M.D.La. 1982).

i

The F i f t h C i r c u i t Court of Appeals has made c l e a r

that in determining whether numerosity is met, "number requirements miss the p o i n t of the Rule." P h i l l i p s v. Joint |j il L e g i s l a t i v e C o m m i t t e e , 637 F . 2 d 1014 a t 1022 ( 5 t h C i r . 1 9 8 1 ) . In
j!
j| the Phillips case, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower
i court's denial of class certification to a group of 33 plaintiffs

5 who brought suit against various Mississipi state agencies for alleged employment discrimination. Having established that "the |
j problem... is not simply to say whether 33 class members are j enough or too few to satisfy Rule 23(a)(D," the court held that i the numerosity requirement is clearly met when the alleged class , !! includes future members, "necessarily unidentifiable," since ' jj "joinder of unknown individuals is certainly impracticable." Phillips, supra, at 1022, citing Jack v. American Linen Supply || Co. , 498 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) and Jones v. ' ij !! D iamond , 519 F.2d 1090, supra. Numbers are particularly ;j irrelevant where the plaintiff(s) "are seeking injunctive relief on behalf of future class members as well as past and present members." Jones v. Diamond, supra, at 1100.
In the present case, the fluid nature of the class (produced by the infusion of new inmates into the Department during the pendency of litigation) renders any joinder an impractical task. Accordingly, as the above discussion indicates, the requirement of nuraerosity under Rule 23(a)(1) is satisfied. In fact, a class action is "the procedural vehicle of choice" for the present litigation. See Hendrix v. Faulkner, 525 F.Supp. 435 at 443 (N.D.Ind. 1981); Green v. Johnson, 513 F.Supp. 965, 975 (D.Mass. 1981) (the actual number of inmates "considered in light of the fact that the inmate population at these facilities is constantly revolving, establishes sufficient numerosity that joinder of all potential members of the class is impracticable").

6 2. Commonality
The present case focuses upon the conditions of confinement for death-sentenced prisoners in the custody of the ; Louisiana Department of Corrections. The allegations expressed j in plaintiffs' complaint raise significant questions of fact and j law that are common to the entire class. All death-sentenced prisoners in Department of Corrections custody either live under, ; or are subject to living under, the conditions described in the complaint that allegedly produce deprivations of constitutional rights. These allegations raise factual questions that are common to the class. They also raise a number of legal issues that are common to the class: whether access to the prison law library is so restricted that death-sentenced inmates are being denied access to the courts and counsel as required by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; whether death sentenced prisoners are entitled to appointed counsel in post-conviction proceedings; whether conditions imposed by prison administrators so inhibit contact between plaintiffs and their lawyers as to deny meaningful access to counsel. The existence of these common questions satisfies the second condition to proceeding as a class.
3. Typicality Rule 23(a)(3) provides that a class action may be
ji maintained if the claims of the representative parties are typical of the claims of the c l a s s . The typicality and commonality requirements tend to m e r g e , both serving as

7;

" g u i d e p o s t s f o rd e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r u n d e r t h ep a r t i c u l a r j i

circumstances maintenance of a class action is economical and j

whether the named plaintiff's claim and the class claims are so

interrelated that the interests of the class members will be

fairly and adequately protected in their absence." General

Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157, n.13

(1982). The typicality requirement mandates that there be '

"common elements of law or fact such that the class action would :

be an economical way of prosecuting and defending claims."

Herbert v. Monsanto Company, 576- F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1977) vacated

on other grounds, 580 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1978). Typicality does

not require that all class members' claims be identical, but

! merely that the claims of named plainntiff(s) be "representative"

; of those of the entire class. Id_. The requirement is designed
t
i to insure "that the class action [ n o t be used a s ] a mere
i
i procedural umbrella for individual claims." Id.

|

In t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , t h e r e a r e no fundamental

| f a c t u a l d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h e
j

| representative p l a i n t i f f s and those of the c l a s s membership.

R a t h e r , t h e y s h a r e a common i n t e r e s t in e l i m i n a t i n g the

ij unconstitutional c o n d i t i o n s and p r a c t i c e s to which they as a

:! group are subjected. !i

;|

4. Adequacy of Representation

l|

The final requirement of Rule 23(a) is that the

i! representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the

i interests of the class. The adequacy requirement calls for "an

8

i n q u i r y into t h e zeal and competence of the [ c l a s s ]

r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ' s c o u n s e l , into t h e w i l l i n g n e s s of the

r e p r e s e n t a t i v e to take an a c t i v e r o l e in and c o n t r o l t h e I

l i t i g a t i o n , and to p r o t e c t the i n t e r e s t s of a b s e n t e e s . " Horton j

v. Goose Creek I n d . School D i s t . , 690 F.2d a t 484, supra. In j

a d d i t i o n , t h e r e must be no " r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y of antagonism within j

the class." Id. at 485.

;

P l a i n t i f f s ' a t t o r n e y s have had extensive experience !

and have gained c o n s i d e r a b l e competence in l i t i g a t i n g p r i s o n I

c l a s s a c t i o n c a s e s . The N a t i o n a l Prison T r o j e c t of t h e American <

Civil Liberties Union has litigated numerous federal class action j

prison conditions cases in all parts of this country including j
i
Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 707 F.2d 636 (1st Cir. 1983) (finding that j

the National Prison Project "had unique competence in the subject j

matter of this litigation"); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th '

Cir. 1980), cert, denied 450 U.S. 1041 (1981); Inmates of the

D.C. Jail v. Jackson, 416 F.Supp. 119 (D.C.D.C. 1976) (conditions

in the District of Columbia Jail); and James v. Wallace, 406

F.Supp. 318 (M.D.Ala. 1976), aff'd i_n substance sub nom. Newman

v. State of Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977) (system-wide

class action involving conditions in the Alabama prison system).

The question of antagonistic interests also poses

no barrier to certification here. There are no conflicts of

interest between the representative plaintiffs and the

represented body of the class. As noted previously, they share a

common concern that conditions affecting Death Row prisoners are

unconstitutional and a common interest in remedying those

conditions. The representative plaintiffs are seeking no special

considerations, favors, or relief through this suit and there is

no basis for believing that any palpable conflict of interest

will develop in this case. The only relief sought by the

representative plaintiffs is of an equitable nature that will

inure to the benefit of all death-sentenced prisoners.

5. The Criteria of Rule 23(b)(2) are Satisfied in the Present Case

As alluded to earlier, a prospective class action
s
j! can be maintained if, in addition to satisfying all requirements
ji

ij of Rule 23(a), the case falls under one of the subsections of

2 3 ( b ) . This action can fit comfortably under the rubric of

i 23(b)(2), which authorizes a class action if the party opposing
j

ij the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally

i applicable to the class, thereby making final injunctive relief

ii and corresponding declaratory relief appropriate for the class as

i|

!i a whole.

ii

As discussed previously, prison conditions suits

i

have traditionally been brought as class actions under Rule

23(b)(2). This subsection has been liberally applied in the area

of civil rights, including suits that have challenged conditions
It
h of confinement, because i t was s p e c i f i c a l l y designed for
ij
!'; situations in which broad injunctive and declaratory relief are
;i
|| sought. See Penson v. Terminal Transport Co., 631* F.2d 989 (5th
il
1 Cir. 1981); Jones v. Diamond, 519 F.2d at 1090, supra. Moreover,

ij in this action, the defendants bear direct responsibility for the

continuation of unconstitutional conditions of confinement for

10 death-sentenced prisoners. They have either acted or refused to act in the areas that give rise to this suit on grounds that have general application to the class as a whole. The conditions and practices at issue are not the result of actions, policies, or practices that are aimed at the named plaintiffs or at other particular prisoners. Instead, they are the products of policies and practices, as well as inaction, that have general application to death-sentenced prisoners as a group. Therefore, injunctive and declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole will be entirely appropriate.
CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed above, plaintiffs' motion for class certification should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,

!j Claudia Wright i| ACLU National Prison Project
1616 P Street, N.W., Suite 340 Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 331-0500

William P. Quigley
Attorney at Law Bar Number 7769 901 Convention Center Blvd Fulton Place, Suite 119 New Orleans, LA 70130 (504) 524-0016

Counsel for Plaintiffs

i Dated:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

M. WAYNE BATES, JR., et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v.

)

)

BRUCE LYNN, et al. ,

)

) Defendants. )

Civil Action No.

MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

Plaintiffs move this Court for an order certifying this

proceeding as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(2) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs bring this

action on their own behalf and on behalf of a class consisting of

all persons who are or will be confined under sentence of death

ji by the State of Louisiana. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and

jj injunctive relief to redress the denial by defendants of rights
I!
secured to the plaintiff class under the Constitution and laws of

the United States. Plaintiffs are prisoners who are or will be

confined under sentence of death by the Louisiana Department of

Corrections.

1. The c l a s s , consisting of 39 p e r s o n s , is so

j numerous as to make joinder of all members impracticable.

!

2. There are questions of law and fact common to the

! class, namely, whether the policies and practices of the

j defendants are denying the plaintiff class meaningful access to

2

the courts and to the assistance of counsel.

|

i i

3. The policies and practices that form the basis of |

this complaint affect a l l members of the c l a s s , and the r e l i e f j

sought will apply to the entire c l a s s .

i

h. The p l a i n t i f f s are a l l p r i s o n e r s sentenced to ;

death by the State of Louisiana. Their claims are typical of the \

claims of the c l a s s , and they will f a i r l y and adequately protect j
1
the i n t e r e s t s of t h e c l a s s . They a r e r e p r e s e n t e d by counsel who j
a r e e x p e r i e n c e d i n r e p r e s e n t a t i o n osf p r i s o n e r s i n c a s e s ';

concerning prison conditions. •

j

5 . The p r o s e c u t i o n of s e p a r a t e a c t i o n s by i n d i v i d u a l

members of t h e c l a s s could c r e a t e a r i s k of i n c o n s i s t e n t

Ii a d j u d i c a t i o n w i t h r e s p e c t t o e a c h t h a t w o u l d e s t a b l i s h !Ii! ij incompatible standards of conduct for defendants. The defendants
ji
|i have acted or failed to act on grounds generally applicable to
ii
a l l death-sentenced prisoners incarcerated by the Louisiana

Department of Corrections. The appropriate injunctive and

declaratory relief would apply to the class as a whole.

6. The prosecution of separate actions by individual

members of the class would create a risk of adjudication that as

jj a practical matter would be dispositive of the interests of other
ii
ii members not party to such adjudication, or would substantially

I impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.

jj

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs respectfully request the Court to

j; determine that this proceeding may be maintained as a class

action pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 23(a) and (b)(1) and (2).

Respectfully submitted,

Claudia Wright National Prison Project of the ACLUF, Inc. 1616 P Street, N.W. Suite 340 Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 331-0500

William P. Quigley Attorney at Law Bar Number 7769 901 Convention Center Blvd. Fulton Place, Suite 1J9 New Orleans, LA 70130 (504) 524-0016

Counsel for Plaintiffs

Dated:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

M. WAYNE BATES, JR., et al., )

Plaintiffs,

v.
BRUCE LYNN, et al. ,

Civil Action No.

Defendants.

MOTION TO PROCEED PRO HAC VICE

Counsel of Record moves this Honorable Court, pursuant to Rule 1 (e) Rules of the District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, to permit Claudia Wright to appear and participate as co-counsel for the plaintiffs in this case. Ms. Wright is a member in good standing of the Florida Bar and of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland.
Respectfully submitted,

William P. Quigley Bar Number 7769 901 Convention Center Blvd. Fulton Place, Suite 119 New Orleans, LA 70130 (504) 524-0016
Claudia Wright ACLU National Prison Project 1616 P Street, N.W. Suite 340 Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 331-0500

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

M. WAYNE BATES, JR., et al., Plaintiffs,
v. BRUCE LYNN, et al.,
Defendants.

Civil Action No. 89-65-B Magistrate Stephen Riedlinger

CONSENT DECREE This cause of action originated with the filing of a complaint on January 25, 1989. Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that they have suffered and are suffering violations of their rights under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. Defendants denied that any violations of plaintiffs' constitutional rights have occurred. On August 23, 1990, the Court denied plaintiffs' motion for class action status but further ordered that it will treat this case as in the nature of a class action. Desiring an amicable settlement of this matter, the parties have agreed to the entry of this decree without trial, the taking of any evidence, adjudication, or the admission of liability by any party with respect to any claim or allegation made in this action.
Bates v. Lynn

PC-LA-002-003

2 WHEREFORE, upon the consent of the parties it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED as follows:
I. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action and of all parties hereto.
II. A. Plaintiffs The plaintiffs consist of (l) all inmates presently confined under sentence of death at the Louisiana State Penitentiary (LSP) and (2) all inmates who may in the future be confined under sentence of death and in the physical custody of the Louisiana Department of Corrections (LDOC).
B. Defendants Defendants are the Secretary of LDOC and the Warden of the LSP. Pursuant to Rule 25(d), F.R.Civ.P., the successors in office of the above-named defendants will automatically be substituted as parties in this suit and in this decree.
III. A. TERMS 1. Legal Visits a. Death row inmates shall be entitled to contact legal visits subject to the terms below. b. A legal visit shall be defined as a visit between an inmate and an attorney, paralegal, or law clerk. A paralegal or law clerk must have a letter from his/her supervising attorney

accepting personal r esponsibility for the conduct of the paralegal or law clerk during the contact legal visit-
c." Legal, visits shall be private and confidential unless waived by the inmate and subject to the provisions of Department Regulation, 30-19B, April 20, 1986.
d. At t: request of the attorney, paralegal or law clerk, inmates shall not be handcuffed during contact legal visits, However, the LDOC m ay require an inmate to wear handcuffs during a contact legal vis it if he has committed a Schedule B offense within the past 3 0 days. Schedule B offenses are enumerated in Disciplinary Rules and Procedures for Adult Prisoners; Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, (February 5, 1986, as amended by memorandum entitled Changes To Disciplinary Rules and Procedure For Adult Prisoners. Dated 2/5/86. effective January 1, 1991, provided that no new Schedule B offenses are added).
e. Conditions for contact legal visits shall be such that at least two can occur simultaneously. In the event of an emergency (as defined by an attorney working on a post-conviction matter), which requires more than two simultaneous contact visits, and if the attorneys cannot work it out, then the warden shall accommodate the request.
f. The LDOC may deny a contact legal visit only for the following two reasons:
1. the contact visit may be denied in the absence of 24 hour notice; or
2. it may be denied for up to 90 days in the event of specific security risk behavior of either party during a

4 previous contact legal visit. Security risk behavior occurs when prison staff must intervene immediately during the visit to prevent harm, or when the inmate is caught with contraband coming in or out of the visiting room. Contraband is described as weapons, drugs, alcohol, currency, syringe, tattoo machine, tattoo paraphernalia or unauthorized medication. In the event of a legal emergency during the time the inmate is denied a contact legal visit, the inmate's attorney can request a hearing before this Court to obtain a contact legal visit.
g. Any restrictions on contact legal visits as provided for above may be overridden by the Warden.
h. Contact legal visits for current death row inmate's shall begin immediately. An incoming death row inmate must be free of Schedule B offenses for 3 0 days before he may have contact legal visits.
2. The Legal Assistance Program a. Paging System 1. Death row inmates must be allowed regular and
timely access to necessary law books and legal materials. This requires at least daily exchanges, except weekends and holidays for non-emergencies, between the inmate and inmate counsel substitute of sufficient duration for the inmate to be able to request law books and legal materials including copies of cases, statutes, annotations, regulations, forms, secondary sources research guides, and law library inventories.

5 2. Inmate counsel substitutes shall be permitted to have private conferences with death row inmates. 3. Upon request and the recommendation of the independent attorney supervisor, LDOC must allow an inmate to meet at least three hours each week with an inmate counsel substitute for a private legal conference; additional time shall be permitted to meet a filing or other legal deadline. 4. Private legal conferences between an inmate and inmate counsel substitute shall be contact visits subject to the limitations in Section III. Para. A. b. Law Library The minimal collection of the death row law library shall include the following:
• Louisiana Constitution • Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure • Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure • Louisiana Revised Statutes and Supplements • Southern Second Louisiana Series • Louisiana Digest (1809 to present) • Louisiana Rules of the Court • United States Code Annotated. Constitutional volumes; Title 18 and Federal Criminal Rules; Title 28 (sections 2241-2280) and Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Federal Rules of Evidence; Rules of the Supreme Court; Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; Title 42 (sections 1891-2000 d (6)) West.

I r *
6 Supreme Court Reporter. West 1960present. Federal Reporter 2d series West 1960present. Federal Supplement West 1960-present. (Soft bound copies as they become available from main law library.) Shepard's United States Citations. Shepard's Federal Citations. Louisiana Shepards. Rules of United States District Court. Middle District of Louisiana. West's Federal Practice Digest 3d and West's Federal Practice Digest (4th). Wright, Charles A. Federal Practice and Procedure West Volume 1-3A (Criminal 2d) and Volume 21-2 3, 25 (Wright & Graham's Evidence). Criminal Procedure, §1.1-10.6, Vol. 1; §11.1-22.3, Vol. 2; §23.1-End, Vol. 3; Lafave and Israel. Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure by James Liebman; The Michie Co., Charlottesville, Virginia. Graham, Michael H. Federal Rules of Evidence in Nutshell West current edition.

I I I f
7 • Manville, Daniel Prisoners' Self-Help
Litiaation Manual 2d ed. Oceana 1983. • Cohen, Morris L. and Robert C. Berring.
How to Find the Law 9th ed. West 1983. • Legal Research by Stasky • Black's Law Dictionarv West 1979 6th
edition or equivalent. • Corrections and Prisoner's Rights 3 ed.
Nutshell. • Prisoner Assistance Directory published
by National Prison Project of the American Civil Liberties Foundation. • The Rights of Prisoners ACLU Handbook (provided free for prisoners from ACLU National Headquarters). All items listed in paragraph 2 shall augment the current death row law library and include the current editions, supplements and pocket parts. 3. The death row library shall contain multiple copies of frequently requested cases and statutes. c. Training and Supervision of Inmate Counsel Substitutes LDOC must maintain a sufficient number of inmate counsel substitutes who are regularly trained and supervised by an attorney.

8 1. Within four months of the entry of this order, LDOC shall offer legal training to inmate counsel substitutes who assist death row inmates. LDOC shall report on the details of the development and implementation of this legal training to the plaintiffs and the Court within two months of the order's entry.
In developing the legal training the following elements are required: (a) a minimum of sixty hours of instruction provided every twelve months; (b) lawyer instructors who have experience in the field(s) they are teaching; (c) a hands-on approach, including sessions in the law libraries allowing for immediate instructor student interaction; (d) a major focus on the fundamentals of legal research and writing, including use of basic reference books and materials; (e) regular written exercises required and returned with comments during each legal research and writing course; (f) a major focus on relevant doctrinal coverage of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and other major civil rights statutes, prison practices including disciplinary and classification measures, relevant tort law, and relevant areas of post conviction including appeals, collateral attacks and Habeas Corpus; (h) a mechanism for evaluating the inmate counsel's progress in each course; (i) a six month probationary period (for the most recent two and all future inmate counsel substitutes) prior to final approval based on a satisfactory evaluation by an independent attorney supervisor relying on the trainees' class record and quality of work during the probationary period; (j) continuous case review with inmate counsel substitutes by the independent attorney

9

supervisor or his/her certified paralegal or law student with

demonstrated competence in post-conviction and civil right law; and

(k) provision for certified paralegals and law students at all

times to work under the direction of a supervising attorney.

2. Subjects covered in the legal training shall

include but not necessarily be limited to the following:

A. Taught bv Attorneys

1. Legal research

6 hrs.

2. Legal writing (briefs and pleadings)

6 hrs.

3. State post-conviction (substantive issues)

6 hrs.

4. State post-conviction (procedural issues)

6 hrs.

5. Federal habeas corpus (substantive issues)

6 hrs.

6. Pardons and clemency

3 hrs.

7. Law of Drisoners riahts

3 hrs.

8. Federal civil rights litigation (42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and other major civil rights statutes)

6 hrs.

9. State and Federal civil

6 hrs.

procedure; Administrative

remedy procedure; 42 U.S.C.

Section 1997e

10. Relevant Tort law

3 hrs.

B. Taught by LDOC Personnel

1. Prison disciplinary system and grievance procedure "

6 hrs.

2. Prison classification system 3 hrs.

1
I t t
10 3. Selection
Inmates are eligible to become inmate counsel substitutes by successfully completing the legal training and obtaining approval by the Director of Legal Programs, and by agreeing to assist inmates and abide by the procedures governing inmate counsel substitutes. Inmates are eligible for legal training if (a) they have a high-school or GED diploma, or (b) pass a basic literacy skills test to the satisfaction of the instructor, or (c) are currently an inmate counsel substitute. Persons in this last category may continue as counsel substitutes during the implementation phase of this agreement, but must successfully complete the legal training when it first becomes available.
4. Number LDOC shall ensure that there are an adequate
minimum number of inmate counsel substitutes for death row inmates. Appropriate legal assistance must be made available to death row inmates who can not speak English.
5. Retention An inmate counsel substitute must demonstrate
at least minimal competence. Once a year, and at any other time that a counsel substitute's work receives complaints, his work will be evaluated. This may be done by submitting sufficient recent legal writings, including pleadings and memoranda, to the independent attorney supervisor for review. If necessary, the supervisor may require that the inmate counsel substitute complete an exercise or examination from the legal training course for

I
t I
11 evaluation. A determination to remove an inmate found not minimally competent must be made by the attorney supervisor in writing with specific reasons and examples, and the relevant work products attached (with identifying contents deleted). A copy of this determination shall be provided to the Director of Legal Programs. LDOC legal staff makes the final determination of termination. LDOC shall provide the inmate counsel in writing with the reasons for the termination. An inmate so terminated shall be reinstated upon successful completion of the training course.
6. Responsibilities An inmate counsel substitute should not
undertake or continue to assist another death row inmate if, because of workload, inexperience, conflict of interest or any other factor, he cannot do so in an effective and timely manner. Prior to refusing to assist a death row inmate, the inmate counsel substitute must present his reasons in writing to LDOC legal staff for approval. Absent the inmate's permission, an inmate counsel substitute should not disclose information about the inmate's legal issues.
d. Photocopying LDOC shall provide the necessary copies of eligible
legal papers and court related documents within three working days of the receipt of a request by a death row inmate, unless more rapid service is necessary to meet a legal deadline.
Eligible legal papers and documents include petitions, complaints, answers, motions, affidavits, exhibits,

12
memoranda and briefs, including attachments and appendices, required under Federal and State rules and materials necessary for discovery, including interrogatories and freedom of information requests. LDOC shall advise staff that inmate legal materials are confidential and may not be read. Legal materials submitted for copying may be initially examined, but not read, to determine eligibility. Copying shall be provided free of cost only if the prisoner is indigent as defined by LDOC's indigency standard.
B. An indigent death row inmate who has a retained or court appointed counsel shall not be entitled to free photocopy services for filing pleadings in only the case for which he has a retained or appointed counsel with the following exceptions:
(1) to petition the court to dismiss his appointed counsel.
(2) to send a copy of an original document to the attorney of record.
(3) to send a copy of an original document to an attorney upon the representation that it is for the purpose of seeking a new attorney.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION 1. Within one month of signing this order, the defendants shall provide the Court and plaintiffs with written progress reports detailing the steps taken to comply with the respective provisions of this agreement. The reports shall be made every three months thereafter until the Court's jurisdiction over this

13
case ends. Plaintiffs' counsel must respond in writing within 3 0 days of receipt of this report.
2. Plaintiffs' counsel and their paralegals shall have reasonable access to L.S.P. documents, facilities, personnel and death row inmates in order to monitor the progress of implementation.
3. Within two months of the date this agreement is approved by the Court the defendants will explain the terms of this agreement to their agents, servants, representatives, and employees (professional staff, correctional officers and other personnel), in order to ensure their understanding of the requirements of this agreement and the necessity for strict compliance. Defendants shall thereafter, periodically review the terms of the agreement with the above persons. Plaintiffs' counsel shall have responsibility for explaining the terms of this agreement to their clients as long as the court maintains jurisdiction over this matter.
4. By entering into this agreement, members of the plaintiffs' class are not waiving any right they might otherwise have to pursue individual claims for damages against defendants or LDOC personnel.
5. The parties to this agreement shall promptly submit it to the Court for its approval and entry of a consent decree.
6. The parties shall attempt to negotiate a settlement on attorney's fees and costs. However, should the parties be unable to reach a settlement as to attorneys' fees and costs within 60 days of entry of the decree, the matter shall be submitted to the

14

Court for its determination; provided, however,, that this time

period may be extended by stipulation of the parties if approved

by the Court.

Agreed to this

day of

, 1991.

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Attorneys for Defendants

Stuart H Adams, Jr. Alexa Freeman Elizabeth Alexander ACLU/National Prison Project 1875 Connecticut Avenue, NW Suite 410 Washington, DC 20009 (202) 234-4830

)seph E. Kops*a Assistant Attorney General of Louisiana P.O. Box 94095 Baton Rouge, LA 70804 (504) 342-8494
1

William P. Quigley 901 Convention Center Fulton Place - Suite 119 New Orleans, LA 70130 (504) 524-0016

Annette Deborah Rutledge P.O. Box^4304 Baton Rouge, LA 70804 (504) 342-6743
Defendant

John Whitley Warden Louisiana State Penitentiary Angola, LA 70712

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

M. WAYNE BATES, JR., et al., )

) Plaintiffs, )

)

)

V.

)

)

BRUCE LYNN, et al.,

)

) Defendants. )

Civil Action No. 86-897-B
Magistrate Stephen Riedlinger

QRDI IT IS ORDERED that the Consent Decree signed by the opposing parties in this case is approved and entered.

Dated:

Magistrate Stephen Riedlinger

 
 Bates v. Lynn

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

•• • •• •• •• • •
PC-LA-002-005

M. WAYNE BATES, ET AL VERSUS BRUCE N. LYNN, ET AL

CIVIL ACTION NUMBER 89-65-B-l

NOTICE

Please take notice that the attached Magistrate Judge's Report has been filed with the Clerk of the U. S. District Court.

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1), you have ten days after being served with the attached report to file written objections to the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations set forth therein. Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and recommendations within ten days after being served will bar you, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the District Court.

ABSOLUTELY NO EXTENSION OF TIME SHALL BE GRANTED TO FILE WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT.

Baton Rouge, Louisiana,

2000.

STEPHEN C. RIEDLINGER (7 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

4, DKT. & ENTERtU

NOTICE MAILED TO:

DATE

BY

FILED U.S. D.-SI COURT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT £*>/))

^'

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA ^ ^^ '^~AH 10= 20

M. WAYNE BATES, ET AL VERSUS BRUCE N. LYNN, ET AL

SGN
tiTDa^jprcLfHir—
CIVIL ACTION
NUMBER 89-65-B-l

MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT This matter is before the court on the motion of defendants Bruce N. Lynn and John P. Whitley to terminate the Consent Decree approved in this case. Record document number 195. Plaintiffs filed an opposition memorandum arguing that the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) upon which the defendants relied are unconstitutional. Because the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the PLRA, the United States intervened and filed a memorandum supporting the constitutionality of the PLRA. Plaintiffs filed suit in 1989 alleging violations of their constitutional rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.1 The parties engaged in discovery and thereafter settlement negotiations. These negotiations led to a Consent Decree which was approved by the court on April 22, 1991. Record document numbers 65 and 66. The terms of the Consent Decree required certain legal

1-Although the court denied the plaintiffs' motion for class certification, it ordered that the case would be treated in the nature of a class action. Record document number 49.

and law-related services to be provided to the inmates at Louisiana
State Penitentiary who were confined there under a death sentence.
Importantly, the Consent Decree acknowledged that "the parties have
agreed to the entry of this decree without trial, the taking of any
evidence, adjudication, or the admission of liability by any party with respect to any claim or allegation made in this action."2
Pursuant to the terms of the Consent Decree, the defendants
undertook the performance of the obligations imposed thereby, and subsequently filed progress reports in the record.3
Defendants' motion to terminate relief is based on section
3626(b)(2) of the PLRA, which states as follows:
In any civil action with respect to prison conditions, a defendant or intervenor shall be entitled to the immediate termination of any prospective relief if the relief was approved or granted in the absence of a finding by the court that the relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.
Defendants argued that they are entitled to immediate termination
of all. prospective relief afforded to the plaintiffs under the
Consent Decree because the Consent Decree was approved without any
findings by the court which would satisfy the requirements of
2 Record document number 66, page 1. 3 Defendants did not always promptly perform their Consent Decree obligations. Whether the defendants timely or properly complied with the terms of the Consent Decree is not relevant to their motion to terminate prospective relief.

section 3626 (b) (2) ."
Plaintiffs opposed the motion arguing that the termination
provision of the PLRA upon which the defendants relied is
unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds, deprives the
courts of their inherent power and duty to enforce effective
remedies in constitutional cases, unconstitutionally prescribes
rules of decision in cases pending before the courts, and denies
the plaintiffs their constitutional rights to Due Process and Equal
Protection. As intervenor, the United States argued that the
provisions of the PLRA called into question by the defendants'
4 This section of the PLRA provides for the termination of "any prospective relief." Defendants have not identified what "prospective relief" the plaintiffs may still be entitled to obtain under the Consent Decree. The PLRA defines prospective relief as "all relief other than compensatory monetary damages." 18 U.S.C. §3626(g)(7). The term "relief" is defined to include all relief in any form, including a consent decree but not including a private settlement. 18 U.S.C. §3626(g)(9).
Because the Consent Decree did not provide for any compensatory monetary damages, all relief contained in it constitutes prospective relief, as that term is defined in the PLRA. However, as a practical matter, much of the relief required by the Consent Decree has been provided and cannot be, or would not be, withdrawn. For example, books purchased for the prison's law library would likely not be discarded or made unavailable to the plaintiffs, even if updated or replacement volumes are not obtained. Inmate counsel substitutes would likely not be required to ignore or refuse to apply training previously received pursuant to the Consent Decree. Defendants may choose to reduce the number of inmate counsel substitutes available to serve the needs of death-sentence inmates, but they may also determine it is not in their best interest to do so.
Nevertheless, for the purpose of this report and recommendation, the court concludes that all of the relief afforded to the plaintiffs pursuant to the Consent Decree constitutes prospective relief under the PLRA.

motion are all constitutional.

Plaintiffs' arguments that the provision of the PLRA at issue

in this case unconstitutionally violates separation of powers

principles and unconstitutionally proscribes rules of decision are

now effectively foreclosed by the U. S. Supreme Court's decision in

Miller v. French.

U.S. , 120 S.Ct. 2246 (2000). Although

the constitutionality of the provision relied upon by the

defendants here, section 3626(b)(2), was not challenged in Miller,

the same separation of powers argument was relied upon in Miller to

challenge the constitutionality of the automatic stay provision of

the PLRA found in section 3626(e)(2). The Court's separation of

powers analysis in Miller seems equally applicable in this case.

By establishing new standards for the enforcement of prospective relief in §3626(b), Congress has altered the relevant underlying law. The PLRA has restricted courts' authority to issue and enforce prospective relief concerning prison conditions, requiring that such relief be supported by findings and precisely tailored to what is needed to remedy the violation of a federal right.... As Plaut Tv. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 115 S.Ct. 1147 (1995)] and rPennsylvania v. Wheeling & Bellmont Bridge Co.. 59 U.S. 421, 18 How. 421 (1856)] Wheeling Bridge II instruct, when Congress changes the law underlying a judgment awarding prospective relief, that relief is no longer enforceable to the extent it is inconsistent with the new law. Although the remedial injunction here is a "final judgment" for purposes of appeal, it is not the "last word of the judicial department." Plaut, 514 U.S. at 227, [115 S.Ct. at 1457]. The provision of prospective relief is subject to the continuing supervisory jurisdiction of the court, and therefore may be altered according to subsequent changes in the law. See, Rufo v". Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 388 [112 S.Ct. 748, 762] (1992). Prospective relief must be "modified if, as it later turns out, one or more of the obligations placed upon the

parties has become impermissible under federal law." Ibid. (Some internal citations omitted.)

The overwhelming number of the courts which have considered

challenges to the constitutionality of section 3626(b)(2) have held

that it may be applied to existing consent decrees. Gilmore v.

People of the State of California, F.3d

(9th Cir., Nos. 98-

15160 and 98-15198, August 4, 2000), 2000 WL 1070235; Berwanaer v.

Cottey, 178 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 1999); Imprisoned Citizens Union v.

Ridae, 169 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 1999); Hadix v. Johnson, 133 F.3d 940

(6th Cir. 1998); Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rouse, 129 F.3d

649 (1st Cir. 1997); Douaan v. Sincrletarv. 129 F.3d 1424 (11th Cir.

1997), cert, denied, 524 U.S. 956, 118 S.Ct. 2375 (1998); Gavin v.

Branstad, 122 F.3d 1081 (8th Cir. 1997), cert, denied, 524 U.S. 955, 118 S.Ct. 2394 (1998) .5 All of these decisions have been

considered. Their analysis is convincing, as explained by the

Eleventh Circuit in Douaan.

The consent decrees that the PLRA requires courts to

review under the statute's more stringent standards are

not final judgments for separation-of-powers purposes.

As the Court explained in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms,

Inc./ a true "final judgment" here means not an

appealable judgment, but one that represents the "last

word of the judicial department with regard to a

particular case or controversy." [ ] Consent decrees

are final judgments, [ ] but not the "last word of the

judicial department."

District courts retain

5 A panel of the Ninth Circuit issued a decision on May 4, 1998, holding that section 3626(b)(2) is unconstitutional. On November 3, 1998, the Ninth Circuit ordered rehearing en bane. The Ninth Circuit subsequently decided that the case was moot. Taylor v. United States, 181 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 1999).

jurisdiction over such decrees not only to ensure compliance, but also to amend them as significant changes in law and fact require. [ ] Plaut invalidated a statute that resurrected claims that had been dismissed with prejudice on statute-of-limitations grounds, a judgment that can be modified only under the most extraordinary circumstances; §3626(b)(2)' s effect on comparatively adaptable consent decrees is distinguishable. The PLRA's termination provision thus does not undermine the finality of a final judgment in the separation-of-powers sense. [ ] The provision accordingly does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine as contended. [ ] {Footnotes omitted.)6
Plaintiffs argued that the termination provision of section
3626(b) strips the courts of their inherent power and duty to
enforce"effective remedies in constitutional cases. Neither the
defendants nor the United States dispute that the courts have the
duty to enforce effective remedies in constitutional cases, and
must have the power to do so. The simple fact is that the PLRA
does not deprive the courts of either the duty or the power to
enforce effective remedies for constitutional violations. The PLRA
simply requires that prospective relief extend no further than
necessary to correct the violation of a federal right and that it
be narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means to correct the
violation. While it is true that in the past consent decrees did
not require the court to actually find that a constitutional
violation had occurred, nor require that a defendant admit to a
constitutional violation, the PLRA does not strip the courts of
their authority to remedy a constitutional violation. It requires
the courts to first find that a constitutional violation occurred,
6 Douqan, 129 F.3d at"1426.
6

and then to carefully tailor the remedy to fit the violation. This is consistent with the well-established limitations already imposed on the courts for issuing prospective relief in cases litigated to judgment. See, Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 2179, 2183 (1996); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 2757 (1977); Swan v. Charlotte-Mecklenbera Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 16, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 1276 (1971); Gilmore, at
; Smith v. Arkansas Department of. Corrections, 103 F.3d 637, 645-46 (8th Cir. 1996); Ruiz v. Eatelle. 679 F.2d 1115, 1145, vacated in part on other grounds, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982), cert, denied. 460 U.S. 1042, 103 S.Ct. 1438 (1983).
As a component of their argument that the PLRA strips the courts of .their inherent power and duty to enforce effective remedies in constitutional cases, the plaintiffs also argued that the PLRA imposes burdens on plaintiffs to make a repeated showing of constitutional violations in order to maintain ongoing prospective relief. When this factor is considered along with the PLRA's automatic stay provision, plaintiffs asserted, the effect is to abolish the court's ability to effectively enforce constitutional rights.
The merits of this argument need not be resolved in order to decide the defendants' motion. There has been no requirement in this case that the plaintiffs repeatedly prove the existence of a separate and independent or an ongoing constitutional violation in order to maintain any prospective relief properly awarded to them

in accordance with the PLRA.
Next, the plaintiffs argued that the termination provisions of
the PLRA are unconstitutional because the Congress cannot proscribe
for the courts rules of decision. But as the intervenor argued,
and the Supreme Court stated in Miller, this prohibition does not
apply when Congress amends the applicable law. Miller, U.S. at
, 120 S.Ct. at 2258-59. The PLRA provides a standard which the
court must apply in order to determine whether prospective relief
may be continued. Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365, 372 (4th Cir.
1996), cert, denied, 520 U.S. 1277, 117 S.Ct. 2460 (1997). The
PLRA does not direct the courts to reach a particular decision.
Furthermore, a strict reading of section 3626(b) (2) reveals
that it requires only the termination of prospective relief
afforded by a' consent decree; it does not require the court to
vacate the consent decree which provides for such relief. Gilmore,
at . If a showing required by the PLRA is made, then the
district court is bound to maintain or modify the relief necessary to correct a current or ongoing constitutional violation. Id.7
Lastly, the plaintiffs argued that the termination provisions
7 Where a consent decree awards only prospective relief, the distinction between requiring a court to terminate prospective relief if certain conditions are not met, and ordering the court to terminate the consent decree itself may become blurred. Gilmore, at ; Benjamin v. Jacobson, 172 F.3d 144, 179-80 (2d Cir. 1999) (en bane), (Calabresi, J., concurring). Yet, maintaining the distinction is important. The Congress can enact a law which changes the standard for modifying a consent decree,
but it cannot order the court to terminate a consent decree
outright without abridging the inherent powers of the courts to decide cases properly before them. See, Gilmore, at .
8

of the PLRA deny them Due Process and violate their.right to Equal Protection. Neither argument is persuasive.8 Plaintiffs do not have a vested right in the continued enforcement of the Consent Decree. Plyler, 100 F.3d at 374-75. Unlike a money judgment, the Consent Decree is subject to modification, even termination, to the extent equity requires. Thus, it creates no vested rights. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rouse. 129 F.3d at 658.
Plaintiffs also argued that the termination provisions of PLRA exceed the extent to which the federal government can enact legislation that has a detrimental effect on a preexisting contract. This argument is premised on the assertion that the Consent Decree is a contract as well as court decree. Assuming that the Consent Decree is a contract, because the federal government is not a party to it judicial scrutiny of legislation affecting the Consent Decree is minimal. National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Railway Co., 470 U.S. 451, 472, 105 S.Ct. 1441, 1456 (1985). Thus, the plaintiffs must overcome a presumption of constitutionality and establish that the Congress has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way. Id.; Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rouse, 129 F.3d at 658-59.
Relying on Garcia v. San Antonio. Metro. Transit Auth., 4 69 U.S. 528, 105 S.Ct. 1005 (1985), the plaintiffs attempt to have this court employ heightened scrutiny to the termination provisions

8 Gilmore, at

("No circuit court has found the PLRA to

violate due process or the Equal Protection Clause.... We

decline to stray from these precedents.")

of the PLRA by aligning the interests of both the state and federal governments. This attempt has been rebuffed previously. "There is, however, no basis in Garcia or elsewhere to suggest that federal legislation which benefits state governments is tantamount to self-dealing and thus subject to heightened scrutiny." Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rouse, 129 F.3d at 659. Having failed to impose the burden of heightened scrutiny, the plaintiffs also failed to demonstrate that the termination provisions of the PLRA represent arbitrary or irrational legislation by the Congress.
The termination provision at issue here is neither arbitrary nor irrational. The Congress has determined that in certain kinds of prisoner cases, prospective injunctive relief will not be available unless the court finds, or the defendant admits, a violation of a federal right. The termination provision found in section 3626(b)(2) provides a reasonable mechanism for the defendants to obtain termination of a Consent Decree when the requirements of the PLRA are not met.
Plaintiffs' Equal Protection arguments fair no better. It is well established that prison inmates are not a suspect class, and the plaintiffs do not contend otherwise. They do argue that the PLRA burdens a fundamental right, and for that reason is subject to strict .scrutiny. The fundamental right which they assert is burdened by the PLRA is the right of access to the courts. While neither the defendants nor the intervenor contest that the plaintiffs do not have a right of access to the courts, that right
10

of access "guarantees no particular methodology but rather the

conferral of a capability—the capability of bringing contemplated

challenges to sentences or conditions of confinement before the

courts." Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. at 356, 116 S.Ct. at 2182.

Nonetheless, section 3626(b)(2) does not unconstitutionally impair

that capability. As noted in Gavin, "nothing in this section of

the law affects access to the courts; nothing divests prisoners of

*"a reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed violations

of fundamental constitutional rights to the courts."'" Gavin, 122

F.3d at 1090, quoting, Lewis,

U.S. at , 116 S.Ct. at 2180,

quoting. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 1496

(1977).

The only right the prisoners will lose under the immediate termination provisions of the PLRA is the right to enforce those terms of the consent decree that are not necessary to protect their constitutional rights. The right to enforce a consent decree that goes beyond the bounds of constitutional necessity is not equivalent to the right to bring constitutional grievances to the attention of the courts. As the Fourth Circuit has stated, x[s]imply put, the Inmates have confused the right of access to the courts with the scope of available substantive relief.'

Gavin, 122 F.3d at 1090, quoting, Plvler, 100 F.3d at 373.

Because neither a suspect classification or a fundamental

right is at issue, the termination provisions are subject to only

rational basis review. Plaintiffs do not seriously argue that the

termination provisions do not withstand rational basis review.

Again, as noted by the court in Gavin, the termination provisions

are rationally related to the prison litigation reforms enacted by

11

the PLRA. Id. The findings required by the PLRA to support the continuation
of the prospective relief afforded to the plaintiffs by the Consent Decree cannot possibly be made based on the current record. Although the parties filed pretrial stipulations, record document number 35, in which they agreed to a substantial number of facts, they also agreed that formal discovery is required to develop the facts of the case. As noted previously, the prospective relief approved in the Consent Decree was not supported by findings of a constitutional violation. Nor did the court determine at the time the Consent Decree was approved that the prospective relief was narrowly tailored within the meaning of section 3626 (b) (2). Based on a review of the current record, the court cannot find that the prospective relief proved in the Consent Decree is necessary to correct .a current or ongoing violation of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Yet, the plaintiffs have not requested an opportunity to offer evidence to establish such a violation.9
RECOMMENDATION It is the recommendation of the magistrate judge that the motion of defendants Bruce N. Lynn and John P. Whitley to terminate the Consent Decree previously issued in this case be granted, but

9 Gilmore, at

(When requested by plaintiffs, the court

is obliged to take evidence on current circumstances with respect

to remedies for current or ongoing violation).

12

limited to the termination of the prospective relief provided to the plaintiffs by the Consent Decree.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, LSV(/&/JL&2{ J>/ , 2000. C. RIEDLINGB^
'TED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
13

 
 •*"•* H*'J

"•"."•' •<

PILED
us.. p;sr. COURT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

M. WAYNE BATES, ET AL VERSUS

SIGN.
by CthJTY'CLtfa
CIVIL ACTION

BRUCE N. LYNN, ET AL

No. 89-065-B-M1

OPINION

After independently reviewing the entire record in this case

and for reasons set forth in the Magistrate Judge's Report to which

no objection was filed:

IT IS ORDERED that the motion of defendants Bruce N. Lynn and

John P. Whitley to terminate the Consent Decree previously issued

in this case is GRANTED, but limited to the termination of the

prospective relief provided to the plaintiffs by the Consent

Decree.1

--. -

Baton Rouge, Louisiana,

^A^j&t- /o

, 2000.

FRANK J. POLOZOBA, CHIEF JUDGE MIDDLE DISTRICT OP LOUISIANA
Bates v. Lynn
•HUM

1 Rec. Doc. No. 195 DKT. & ENTERED
NOTICE MAILED TO: DATE B W

INITIALS DOCKET*

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

LA
p.

M. WAYNE BATES, ET AL VERSUS BRUCE N. LYNN, ET AL

JUDGMENT

c • • ~- CIVIL ACTION
No. 89-065-B-M1

For the written reasons assigned: IT IS ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that motion of defendants Bruce N. Lynn and John P. Whitley to terminate the Consent Decree previously issued in this case is GRANTED, but limited to the termination of the prospective relief provided to the plaintiffs by the Consent Decree and this matter is hereby DISMISSED.

Baton Rouge, Louisiana,

, 2000.

FRANK J. POLOZOLA, CHIEF JUDGE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
Bates v. Lynn
PC LA 002-007

IVDKT. & ENTERED
DATE NOTICE MAILED TO:
DATE BY

INITIALS DOCKET*
if

 
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CLOSED, FRC, REFERRED
U.S. District Court Middle District of Louisiana (Baton Rouge) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:89-cv-00065-FJP-SCR

Bates, et al v. Lynn, et al Assigned to: Chief Judge Frank J. Polozola Referred to: Mag. Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger Demand: $0 Cause: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

Date Filed: 01/25/1989 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 550 Prisoner: Civil Rights Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Plaintiff M. Wayne Bates, Jr.

represented by Claudia Wright 1875 Connecticut Ave, N.W. Washington, DC 20009 LEAD ATTORNEY

Elizabeth Alexander 1875 Connecticut Ave, N.W. Washington, DC 20009 LEAD ATTORNEY

Stephen Andrew Dixon 614 Leaway Drive Baton Rouge, LA 70802 225-343-5942 LEAD ATTORNEY

Plaintiff Ernest W. Busby

William Patrick Quigley Loyola Law School 7214 St. Charles Ave. New Orleans, LA 70118 504-861-5590 Email: quigley@loyno.edu LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Claudia Wright (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Elizabeth Alexander (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Stephen Andrew Dixon

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Plaintiff Dalton Prejean
Plaintiff John Sullivan
V. All Plaintiffs All Plaintiffs

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY
William Patrick Quigley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Claudia Wright (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY
Elizabeth Alexander (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY
Stephen Andrew Dixon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY
William Patrick Quigley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Claudia Wright (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY
Elizabeth Alexander (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY
Stephen Andrew Dixon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY
William Patrick Quigley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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V. Defendant Bruce N. Lynn

represented by Annette Marie Viator 1956 Glendale Avenue Baton Rouge, LA 70806 225-344-4691 LEAD ATTORNEY
David Glen Sanders Louisiana Department of Justice P.O. Box 94005 1885 North 3rd Street Baton Rouge, LA 70804-9005 225-326-6300 Email: sandersd@ag.state.la.us LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Debra A. Rutledge Department of Public Safety & Corrections P. O. Box 94304 Baton Rouge, LA 70804 225-342-6743 Email: drutledge@corrections.state.la.us LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Carl Hrdlicka Louisiana Department of Education Legal Division Post Office Box 94064 Baton Rouge, LA 70804-9064 225-392-3572 Email: james.hrdlicka@la.gov TERMINATED: 06/29/1995 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph Erwin Kopsa 15353 Seven Pines Baton Rouge, LA 70817 225-752-2577 TERMINATED: 08/02/1993 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Pamela LeBato Courtney

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Defendant Hilton R. Butler

Attorney General's Office P.O. Box 94005 Baton Rouge, LA 70804-9005 225-326-6300 TERMINATED: 12/27/1995 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Suzanne Quinlan Mooney Louisiana Department of Justice 451 Florida Blvd Third Floor Baton Rouge, LA 70802 225-342-8495 TERMINATED: 10/05/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Annette Marie Viator (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY
David Glen Sanders (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Debra A. Rutledge (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Carl Hrdlicka (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/29/1995 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph Erwin Kopsa (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/02/1993 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Pamela LeBato Courtney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/27/1995 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Intervenor Plaintiff United States of America
V. Notice Only John Gaupp
Plaintiff Abdulla Hakim El-Mumit
Plaintiff George Brooks, Jr.

Suzanne Quinlan Mooney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/05/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by John Joseph Gaupp United States Attorney's Office Middle District of Louisiana 777 Florida Street Suite 208 Baton Rouge, LA 70801 225-389-0443 Email: usa-lam-ecf@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by John Gaupp U. S. Attorney 339 Florida Street 6th Floor Baton Rouge, LA 70801 225-389-0443 PRO SE
represented by Claudia Wright (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY
Elizabeth Alexander (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY
William Patrick Quigley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Claudia Wright (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

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Plaintiff Clarence Smith
Movant United States of America

Elizabeth Alexander (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY
William Patrick Quigley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Claudia Wright (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY
Elizabeth Alexander (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY
William Patrick Quigley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by John Joseph Gaupp (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 01/25/1989 01/25/1989 01/25/1989
01/25/1989 01/25/1989
02/03/1989
02/08/1989

#

Docket Text

This case is skeleton docketed 4/14/93 (rgm) (Entered: 04/14/1993)

1 COMPLAINT (rgm) (Entered: 04/14/1993)

3 MOTION by M. Wayne Bates Jr., Ernest W. Busby, Dalton Prejean, John Sullivan for Claudia Wright to Appear Pro Hac Vice (rgm) (Entered: 04/14/1993)

Set magistrate assignment. (rgm) (Entered: 04/14/1993)

SUMMONS(ES) issued for Bruce N. Lynn, Hilton R. Butler . Service deadline set for 2/8/89 . Consent Notices Mailed. (rgm) (Entered: 04/14/1993)

5 ORDER granting [3-1] motion for Claudia Wright to Appear Pro Hac Vice ( signed by Mag. Judge Christine Noland ), issued notices. (rgm) (Entered: 04/14/1993)

6 ORDER; referred to SCR... ( signed by Judge Frank J. Polozola ), issued notices. (rgm) (Entered: 04/14/1993)

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02/08/1989 02/08/1989 02/10/1989
03/01/1989 03/21/1989
03/28/1989
08/24/1990
09/24/1990
04/23/1991 06/06/1991 06/21/1991
08/26/1991 09/25/1991
01/15/1992
03/25/1992 06/04/1992 08/13/1992

Set magistrate assignment. (rgm) (Entered: 04/14/1993)
CASE REFERRED to Mag. Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger (rgm) (Entered: 04/14/1993)
7 SUMMONS Returned Executed as to Bruce N. Lynn, Hilton R. Butler 2/6/89 Answer due on 2/26/89 for Hilton R. Butler, for Bruce N. Lynn (rgm) (Entered: 04/14/1993)
10 ANSWER to Complaint by Bruce N. Lynn, Hilton R. Butler (Attorney Joseph Erwin Kopsa), (rgm) (Entered: 04/14/1993)
12 AMENDED ANSWER to Complaint by Bruce N. Lynn, Hilton R. Butler : amends [10-1] answer by Hilton R. Butler, Bruce N. Lynn (rgm) (Entered: 04/14/1993)
16 ORDER; A. Viator, D. Rutledge & B. Kline enrolled as co-counsel for defts... ( signed by Mag. Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger ), issued notices. (rgm) (Entered: 04/14/1993)
48 ORDER; allowing E. Alexander to appear pro hac vice for pltfs... ( signed by Mag. Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger ), issued notices. (rgm) (Entered: 04/14/1993)
53 ORDER; allowing S. Dixon be enrolled as addl cnsl for pltfs... ( signed by Mag. Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger ), issued notices. (rgm) (Entered: 04/14/1993)
66 CONSENT DECREE/Joint (rgm) (Entered: 04/14/1993)
68 FIRST Month Progree Report/defts (rgm) (Entered: 04/14/1993)
74 AMENDED COMPLAINT (Answer due 7/1/91 for Hilton R. Butler, for Bruce N. Lynn ) by M. Wayne Bates Jr., Ernest W. Busby, Dalton Prejean, John Sullivan amending [1-1] complaint adding Abdulla Hakim El-Mumit, George Brooks Jr., Clarence Smith (rgm) (Entered: 04/14/1993)
83 SECOND Monthly Progress Report/defts (rgm) (Entered: 04/14/1993)
88 RESPONSE by M. Wayne Bates Jr., Ernest W. Busby, Dalton Prejean, John Sullivan in opposition to [83-1] remark (Defts' 2nd Progress Report) (rgm) (Entered: 04/14/1993)
103 ORDER; mot to enroll G. Strickler as co-counsel is GRANTED as to pltfs.. ( signed by Mag. Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger ), issued notices. (rgm) (Entered: 04/14/1993)
106 TRANSCRIPT filed for dates of 1/17/92 (106A docketed) (rgm) (Entered: 04/14/1993)
118 ADDRESS CHANGE/Quigley (rgm) (Entered: 04/14/1993)
121 SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE by M. Wayne Bates Jr., Ernest W. Busby, Dalton Prejean, John Sullivan, Abdulla Hakim El-Mumit, George

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09/15/1992 10/15/1992
12/29/1992 01/28/1993
03/26/1993 04/16/1993 04/21/1993 04/22/1993 04/23/1993
04/23/1993
04/28/1993
05/05/1993
05/11/1993 05/11/1993 05/27/1993 07/28/1993

Brooks Jr., Clarence Smith in opposition to [83-1] remark (to Defts' 2nd Progress Report) (rgm) (Entered: 04/14/1993)
126 THIRD Progress Report/Defts (rgm) (Entered: 04/14/1993)
129 RESPONSE by M. Wayne Bates Jr., Ernest W. Busby, Dalton Prejean, John Sullivan, Abdulla Hakim El-Mumit, George Brooks Jr., Clarence Smith in opposition to [126-1] remark (Defts' 3rd Progress Report) (rgm) (Entered: 04/14/1993)
130 FOURTH Progress Report/Defts (rgm) (Entered: 04/14/1993)
131 RESPONSE by M. Wayne Bates Jr., Ernest W. Busby, Dalton Prejean, John Sullivan, Abdulla Hakim El-Mumit, George Brooks Jr., Clarence Smith in opposition to [130-1] remark (Defts' 4th Progress Report) (rgm) (Entered: 04/14/1993)
134 LETTER/Adams re: summary of discussion & agreements during conf. call (rgm) (Entered: 04/14/1993)
135 LETTER/Stuart Adams re: tele conf 4/14/93 (rgm) (Entered: 04/22/1993)
Tele-conference held (rgm) (Entered: 04/23/1993)
136 LETTER/Stuart Adams re: unable to sched stat conf. (rgm) (Entered: 04/22/1993)
137 Minute entry:; tele cnf held 4/21/93...parties shall file a compliance statement by 4/28/93..w/o obj from parties, the education programs shall be scheduled to begin by 9/1/93... ( signed by Judge Frank J. Polozola ) ,issued notices (rgm) (Entered: 04/23/1993)
138 ORDER; parties to file a compliance statement by 4/28/93...w/o obj of parties, the education programs shall be sched to begin 9/1/93... set Notice of Compliance deadline to 4/28/93 ( signed by Judge Frank J. Polozola ), issued notices. (rgm) (Entered: 04/23/1993)
139 RESPONSE by Bruce N. Lynn, Hilton R. Butler in support of [138-1] order set Notice of Compliance deadline to 4/28/93 RE: Compliance Statement (rgm) (Entered: 04/29/1993)
140 ORDER; affirming the letter in re fifth progrees report falls due on 7/21/93... ( signed by Judge Frank J. Polozola ), issued notices. (rgm) (Entered: 05/05/1993)
141 LETTER/Kopsa re: on 4/29/93 met w/Mr. Crawford of CALS. (rgm) (Entered: 05/11/1993)
142 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL/Counsel Alexa P. Freeman (rgm) (Entered: 05/11/1993)
143 LETTER/Stuart Adams re: failing to file a compliance statement pursuant to order of 4/23/93 (rgm) (Entered: 05/27/1993)
144 MOTION by Bruce N. Lynn, Hilton R. Butler to Substitute Attorney

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07/28/1993 08/02/1993
08/24/1993 10/28/1993 10/28/1993 11/01/1993
12/13/1993 01/31/1994 06/02/1994 06/17/1994
09/01/1994 01/25/1995 03/16/1995

(rgm) (Entered: 07/29/1993)
145 RESPONSE by Bruce N. Lynn, Hilton R. Butler (FIFTH PROGRESS REPORT) in support of [138-1] order set Notice of Compliance deadline to 4/28/93 (rgm) (Entered: 07/29/1993)
146 ORDER granting [144-1] motion to Substitute Attorney terminated attorney Joseph Erwin Kopsa for Hilton R. Butler, attorney Joseph Erwin Kopsa for Bruce N. Lynn Added James Carl Hrdlicka ( signed by Mag. Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger ), issued notices. (rgm) (Entered: 08/02/1993)
147 RESPONSE by M. Wayne Bates Jr., Ernest W. Busby, Dalton Prejean, John Sullivan, Abdulla Hakim El-Mumit, George Brooks Jr., Clarence Smith in opposition to [145-1] support response (Fifth Progress Report) by Hilton R. Butler, Bruce N. Lynn (jh) (Entered: 08/25/1993)
148 MOTION by Abdulla Hakim El-Mumit For Contempt (rgm) (Entered: 10/28/1993)
149 SIXTH PROGRESS REPORT/Defts (rgm) (Entered: 10/29/1993)
150 ORDER; pltf has filed a motion for contempt and it was not signed by counsel of record...if deficiency is not corrected w/in 10 days it will be stricken from record... set Notice of Compliance deadline to 11/12/93 ( signed by Mag. Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger ), issued notices. (rgm) (Entered: 11/01/1993)
151 RESPONSE by M. Wayne Bates Jr., Ernest W. Busby, Dalton Prejean, John Sullivan, Abdulla Hakim El-Mumit, George Brooks Jr., Clarence Smith in opposition to [149-1] 6th Progress Report (rgm) (Entered: 12/13/1993)
152 SECOND QUARTERLY REPORT For 1993-94/Defts (rgm) (Entered: 02/01/1994)
153 NOTICE of Filing Third Quarterly Report for 1993-94 by Bruce N. Lynn, Hilton R. Butler (rgm) (Entered: 06/02/1994)
154 RESPONSE by M. Wayne Bates Jr., Ernest W. Busby, Dalton Prejean, John Sullivan, Bruce N. Lynn, Abdulla Hakim El-Mumit, George Brooks Jr., Clarence Smith in opposition to [153-1] notice of filing defts' 3rd Quarterly Report for 1993-94 by Hilton R. Butler, Bruce N. Lynn (rgm) (Entered: 06/17/1994)
155 NOTICE of THIRD QUARTERLY REPORT by Bruce N. Lynn, Hilton R. Butler (rgm) (Entered: 09/01/1994)
156 RESPONSE by M. Wayne Bates Jr., Ernest W. Busby, Dalton Prejean, John Sullivan in support of [66-1] consent decree which was ordered (RESPONSE TO 3RD QUARTERLY REPORT FOR 1993-1994) (rgm) (Entered: 01/25/1995)
157 NOTICE of Conference: set Status Conference for 3:00

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03/24/1995 03/29/1995
03/31/1995 05/01/1995 05/04/1995 06/19/1995 06/19/1995 06/28/1995 06/29/1995
06/30/1995 07/10/1995
07/28/1995

3/24/95 ...purpose of cnf is to address the need for a hrg to determine the defts compliance w/ the consent decree, (PS CRD) issued notices. (slh) (Entered: 03/16/1995)
Status Conference held (hcj) (Entered: 03/29/1995)
158 ORDER ... Defendants shall file their next quarterly status report as schedued...The court will determine whether a status conference should be held to discuss implementation of the plan or a hearing should be held to determine defendants' compliance with the consent decree and possible sanctions.` ( signed by Mag. Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger ), issued notices. (hcj) (Entered: 03/29/1995)
159 NOTICE of by Bruce N. Lynn, Hilton R. Butler Quarterly Report for March, 1995. (hcj) (Entered: 04/03/1995)
160 Preliminary Plan to provide Legal Training for Inmate Counsel Substitutes for Death Row Inmates filed by Defendant Department of Public Safety and Corrections (hcj) (Entered: 05/03/1995)
161 RESPONSE by M. Wayne Bates Jr., Ernest W. Busby, Dalton Prejean, John Sullivan to defendants quarterly report for March, 1995 in support of [158-1] order (hcj) (Entered: 05/05/1995)
162 LETTER to Magistrate Judge Riedlinger from Mohamedu F. Jones Re: Extension of time on the defendants draft plan for compliance with the consent decree. (hcj) (Entered: 06/20/1995)
Endorsed Order: granting [162-1] letter requesting an extension of time ( signed by Mag. Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger ) (hcj) (Entered: 06/20/1995)
163 MOTION by Bruce N. Lynn, Hilton R. Butler to Substitute Attorney (hcj) (Entered: 06/29/1995)
164 ORDER granting [163-1] motion to Substitute Attorney terminated attorney James Carl Hrdlicka for Hilton R. Butler, attorney James Carl Hrdlicka for Bruce N. Lynn Added Pamela J. Lebato ( signed by Mag. Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger ), issued notices. (hcj) (Entered: 06/29/1995)
165 QUARTERLY REPORT for June 1995/Defts (rgm) (Entered: 07/03/1995)
166 RESPONSE by M. Wayne Bates Jr., Ernest W. Busby, Dalton Prejean, John Sullivan, Abdulla Hakim El-Mumit, George Brooks Jr., Clarence Smith in opposition to [165-1] defts preliminary plan to provide legal studies for inmate counsel substitutes for death row inmates (ph) (Entered: 07/11/1995)
167 ORDER, It is ordered that the defendant set Motion Filing deadline to 8/18/95 file a Revised Preliminary Plan...Plaintiffs shall have until 9/1/95 to file any response to the revised Preliminary Plan. ( signed by Mag. Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger ), issued notices. (hcj) (Entered:

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08/16/1995 08/21/1995
08/25/1995 09/07/1995 09/07/1995 09/11/1995
09/29/1995 10/05/1995
10/23/1995 11/01/1995
12/21/1995 12/27/1995
01/05/1996

07/28/1995)
168 MOTION by Bruce N. Lynn, Hilton R. Butler to Extend Time to comply with the courts order dated 7/27/95 (hcj) (Entered: 08/17/1995)
169 ORDER granting [168-1] motion to Extend Time to comply with the courts order dated 7/27/95, defts are given until 8/25/95 to filed its revised Preliminary Plan in this matter set Notice of Compliance deadline to 8/25/95 ( signed by Mag. Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger ), issued notices. (ph) (Entered: 08/21/1995)
170 Defendants revised preliminary plan to provide legl trining for inmate counsel substitutes for death row inmates pursuant to Court Order, date 7/27/95 (hcj) (Entered: 08/28/1995)
171 MOTION by Bruce N. Lynn, Hilton R. Butler for Leave to File Revised preliminary plan to provide Legal Training for inmate Counsel substitute for Death Row Inmates... (hcj) (Entered: 09/08/1995)
Holding Inventory of Death Row,CCR/Camp J Law Library (hcj) (Entered: 09/08/1995)
172 ORDER granting [171-1] motion for Leave to File Revised preliminary plan to provide Legal Training for inmate Counsel substitute for Death Row Inmates... ( signed by Mag. Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger ), issued notices. (ph) (Entered: 09/11/1995)
173 QUARTERLY Report for 9/95/defts (ph) (Entered: 10/02/1995)
174 ORDER, a hearing be held before Judge Polozola on... set Hearing for 9:00 10/17/95 to determine whether the defendants are in compliance with the Court's order and whetther any changes or other modifications need to be made to the Court's order. ( signed by Judge Frank J. Polozola ), issued notices. (hcj) (Entered: 10/05/1995)
175 Minute entry: The ourt notifies the defndants that if there are violations noted in the quarterly reports then sanctions shall be impossed. ( signed by Judge Frank J. Polozola ) ,issued notices (hcj) (Entered: 10/24/1995)
176 RESPONSE by M. Wayne Bates Jr., Ernest W. Busby, Dalton Prejean, John Sullivan, Abdulla Hakim El-Mumit, George Brooks Jr., Clarence Smith in opposition to dfts 9/95 Report [173-1] remark (slh) (Entered: 11/01/1995)
177 MOTION by Bruce N. Lynn, Hilton R. Butler to Substitute Attorney (hcj) (Entered: 12/22/1995)
178 ORDER granting [177-1] motion to Substitute Attorney terminated attorney Pamela J. Lebato for Hilton R. Butler and Bruce N. Lynn Added Suzanne Elizabeth Quinlan as attorney. ( signed by Mag. Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger ), issued notices. (hcj) (Entered: 12/27/1995)
179 QUARTERLY REPORT for 12/1995 by dfts for the purpose of filing a compliance statement in accordance with court's order of 4/21/91. (hcj)

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03/07/1996
04/12/1996 04/18/1996 04/18/1996 04/22/1996
04/22/1996 07/12/1996 07/16/1996 07/16/1996 07/17/1996 07/17/1996 10/21/1996 11/18/1996
01/23/1997 04/30/1997

(Entered: 01/08/1996)
180 RESPONSE by M. Wayne Bates Jr., Ernest W. Busby, Dalton Prejean, John Sullivan, Abdulla Hakim El-Mumit, George Brooks Jr., Clarence Smith in opposition to [179-1] remark (defts' Report Pursuant to order of 4/23/91) (rgm) (Entered: 03/07/1996)
181 Quarterly Report for March, 1996. (hcj) (Entered: 04/15/1996)
182 MOTION by Bruce N. Lynn, Hilton R. Butler to Amend [181-1] Quarterly Report of Leagal Education for January to March, 1996 (hcj) (Entered: 04/19/1996)
Amended Quarterly Report of Legal Education for January to March, 1996. (hcj) (Entered: 04/19/1996)
183 ORDER granting [182-1] motion to Amend [181-1] Quarterly Report of Legal Education for January to March, 1996 with the original affidavit of Dora Rabalais. ( signed by Mag. Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger ), issued notices. (hcj) (Entered: 04/22/1996)
184 AFFIDAVIT of Dora Rabalais Re: [181-1] Quarterly Report of Legal Education for January to March of 1996 (hcj) (Entered: 04/22/1996)
185 QUARTERLY Report for June, 1996 (hcj) (Entered: 07/15/1996)
186 MOTION by Bruce N. Lynn, Hilton R. Butler to supplement Quarterly Report of Legal Education for April to June of 1996 ( Affidavit submitted) (hcj) Modified on 07/17/1996 (Entered: 07/17/1996)
Holding Affidavit of Dora Rabalais...Motion to supplement Quarterly Report.... (hcj) (Entered: 07/17/1996)
187 ORDER granting [186-1] motion by dfts' to supplement Quarterly Report of Legal Education for April to June of 1996 ( signed by Mag. Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger ), issued notices. (hcj) (Entered: 07/18/1996)
188 AFFIDAVIT by Dora Rabalais to supplement [185-1] Quarterly Report of Legal Education for April to June, 1996 submitted by dfts (hcj) (Entered: 07/18/1996)
189 QUARTERLY Report for September 30, 1996 (hcj) (Entered: 10/22/1996)
190 RESPONSE by M. Wayne Bates Jr., Ernest W. Busby, Dalton Prejean, John Sullivan, Abdulla Hakim El-Mumit, George Brooks Jr., Clarence Smith in opposition to [189-1] defts' Quarterly Reports (rgm) (Entered: 11/18/1996)
191 QUARTERLY Report for December 31, 1996 (hcj) (Entered: 01/27/1997)
192 MOTION by Bruce N. Lynn, Hilton R. Butler to Extend Time to file Quarterly Report for the first quarter of 1997 (kdc) (Entered: 05/01/1997)

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05/01/1997 05/16/1997 05/28/1997 05/28/1997 06/24/1997 06/24/1997 06/26/1997 07/01/1997 07/10/1997
07/22/1997 08/08/1997 08/11/1997
08/15/1997

193 ORDER granting [192-1] dft's motion to Extend Time to file Quarterly Report for the first quarter of 1997...an additional 15 days is granted. ( signed by Mag. Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger ), issued notices. (kdc) (Entered: 05/01/1997)
194 NOTICE of Filing QUARTERLY REPORT for 3/31/97 by Bruce N. Lynn, Hilton R. Butler (rgm) (Entered: 05/19/1997)
195 MOTION by Bruce N. Lynn to Terminate the Prospective Relief ( Motion Hearing set for 9:00 10/17/97 ) (kdc) (Entered: 05/29/1997)
196 MEMORANDUM by Bruce N. Lynn in support of [195-1] motion to Terminate the Prospective Relief by Bruce N. Lynn (kdc) (Entered: 05/29/1997)
197 MEMORANDUM by M. Wayne Bates Jr., Ernest W. Busby, Dalton Prejean, John Sullivan, Abdulla Hakim El-Mumit, George Brooks Jr., Clarence Smith in opposition to [195-1] motion to Terminate the Prospective Relief by Bruce N. Lynn (ph) (Entered: 06/24/1997)
198 EXHIBIT(S) to memo in opposition to defts mot to terminate propective relief (ph) (Entered: 06/24/1997)
199 ORDER [195-1] defts motion to Terminate the Prospective Relief referred to Mag. Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger ( signed by Judge Frank J. Polozola ), issued notices. (ph) (Entered: 06/27/1997)
200 ORDER, Motion Hearing reset for 9:00 8/15/97 for [195-1] motion to Terminate the Prospective Relief ( signed by Mag. Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger ), issued notices. (hcj) (Entered: 07/02/1997)
201 ORDER [195-1] motion to Terminate the Prospective Relief referred to Mag. Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger; The US shall advise the Court in writing on or before 8/8/97 whether the US will participate in these proceedings, an appropriate order will be issued setting forth a briefing schedule. . . set Notice of Compliance deadline to 8/8/97 The Clerk of Court shall serve a copy of this noticew on the Attorney General and US Attorney. ( signed by Judge Frank J. Polozola ), issued notices. (hcj) (Entered: 07/10/1997)
RETURN on Green Receipt as to Atty Gen Janet Reno 7/15/97 (rgm) (Entered: 07/22/1997)
202 MOTION by US (atty John Gaupp) to Extend Time to file a mot to respond to 7/10/97 Notice (rgm) (Entered: 08/08/1997)
203 ORDER granting [202-1] US's motion to Extend Time to file a mot to respond to 7/10/97 Notice, US shall advise the court in writing on or before 8/15/97 whether it will participate in these proceedings set Notice of Compliance deadline to 8/15/97 ( signed by Mag. Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger ), issued notices. (ph) (Entered: 08/11/1997)
204 MOTION to Intervene by USA (kdc) (Entered: 08/15/1997)

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08/18/1997 08/29/1997 09/03/1997
09/25/1997
09/25/1997 10/14/1997
11/17/1997 11/21/1997 12/10/1997 12/23/1997 05/11/1998 05/27/1998 05/27/1998 05/28/1998
05/28/1998
06/08/1998 06/09/1998

205 ORDER granting [204-1] motion to Intervene by USA ( signed by Judge Frank J. Polozola ), issued notices. (hcj) (Entered: 08/18/1997)
206 MOTION by USA to Extend Time to File its Memo Concerning the Constitutionality of 18:3626 (rgm) (Entered: 09/02/1997)
207 ORDER granting [206-1] US's motion to Extend Time to File its Memo Concerning the Constitutionality of 18:3626, Response to Motion reset to 9/26/97 for [195-1] motion to Terminate the Prospective Relief ( signed by Mag. Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger ), issued notices. (kdc) (Entered: 09/03/1997)
208 MEMORANDUM by USA in support of [207-1] order Response to Motion reset to 9/26/97 for [195-1] motion to Terminate the Prospective Relief, [207-2] relief (ph) (Entered: 09/25/1997)
209 EXHIBIT(S) to [208-1] support memorandum by USA (ph) (Entered: 09/25/1997)
210 RESPONSE by All Plaintiffs in opposition to [208-1] support memorandum by USA "Plas Reply to Brief of US" (ph) (Entered: 10/20/1997)
211 LETTER/Wayne to FJP...re: letter sent to Mr. Kline consent decree (ph) (Entered: 11/17/1997)
212 NOTICE of Recent Decision by USA (ph) (Entered: 11/21/1997)
213 NOTICE of Recent Decision and Notice of Amendents by All Plaintiffs (kdc) (Entered: 12/10/1997)
214 LETTER to FJP/James Wayne, Sr. re: response recieved from Bill Kline to letter of 11/6/97 (rgm) (Entered: 12/24/1997)
215 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs of recent decision of the Ninth Circiut decision in Taylor v. U.S. (hcj) (Entered: 05/12/1998)
216 MOTION by USA for Leave to File Supplemental memo (kdc) (Entered: 05/27/1998)
Holding Amended Complaint (kdc) (Entered: 05/27/1998)
217 ORDER granting [216-1] motion for Leave to File Supplemental memo by USA ( signed by Mag. Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger ), issued notices. (kdc) (Entered: 05/28/1998)
218 BRIEF(Supplemental Memo concerning the constitutionality of the challenged provision of the prison litigation reform act by USA (kdc) (Entered: 05/28/1998)
219 RESPONSE by All Plaintiffs to [216-1] motion for Leave to File Supplemental memo by USA (ph) (Entered: 06/09/1998)
220 ORDER granting [219-1] motion for leave to file a supplementalresponse by All Plaintiffs Ordered that the plft's are to respond to US's

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06/15/1998 11/20/1998 10/04/1999 10/05/1999
09/01/2000
09/20/2000 09/20/2000
09/20/2000 08/08/2002

supplemental memo within 14 days of the date of this order ( signed by Mag. Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger ), issued notices. (kdc) (Entered: 06/09/1998)
221 RESPONSE (TO US's supplemental memo concerning the constitutionality of the challenged provision of the prison litigation reform act) by All Plaintiffs in support of [220-1] order (kdc) (Entered: 06/16/1998)
222 NOTICE of Recent Decision by USA (elp) (Entered: 11/23/1998)
223 MOTION by Bruce N. Lynn, Hilton R. Butler (Attorney ) to Substitute David Sanders as Attorney (nlt) (Entered: 10/05/1999)
224 ORDER granting [223-1] motion to Substitute David Sanders as Attorney by Hilton R. Butler, Bruce N. Lynn terminated attorney Suzanne Quinlan Mooney for Hilton R. Butler, attorney Suzanne Quinlan Mooney for Bruce N. Lynn; Added David Glen Sanders ( signed by Mag. Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger ), issued notices. (bnw) (Entered: 10/05/1999)
225 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS of Mag. Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger Re: [195-1] motion to Terminate the Prospective Relief...it is recommended that the motion to terminate the Consent Decree previously issued in this case be granted, but limited to the termination of the prospective relief provided to the plas by the Consent Decree ; Motion no longer referred Objections to R and R due by 9/18/00 (elp) (Entered: 09/01/2000)
226 OPINION granting [195-1] motion to Terminate the Prospective Relief by Bruce N. Lynn, but limited to the termination of the prospective relief provided to the plas by the Consent Decree... ( signed by Chief Judge Frank J. Polozola ), issued notices. (elp) (Entered: 09/20/2000)
227 JUDGMENT granting [195-1] motion to Terminate the Prospective Relief by Bruce N. Lynn, but limited to the termination of the prospective relief provided to the plas by the Consent Decree and this matter is hereby dismissed... ( signed by Chief Judge Frank J. Polozola ) (elp) (Entered: 09/20/2000)
Case closed (elp) (Entered: 09/20/2000)
**Set FRC Flag ..Record located at Federal Records Center in Fort Worth, TX (clp) (Entered: 08/08/2002)

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