IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTItERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
~D Plai= ~

CIVIL ACTION NO.

2 4t

05C 1 109

£~LERK. U.S. DISTRIC’~ COUR~OMPLAINT

CONCENTRA IIEALTH SERVICES, INC., )

)

MAGISTR/ TE JUDGE ASHMAN

l)efendant.

)

JURY TRIAL DEMAND

NATURE OF THE ACTION This is an action under Title VIT of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.. ("Title VII"), and Title I of the Civil Rights Act o1"1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a, to correct tmlawful employment practices on the basis of retaliation, and to provide appropriate relief to Charles A. Horn ("IIom") who was adversely aftbcted by such practices. As alleged in paragraph seven (7) below, Defendant Con¢cntra Health Services, Inc. ("Concentra") discriminated against Horn by retaliating against him after he reported to Concentra’s Director of Human Resources that his Ibmale supervisor gave a male subordinate, with whom she was engaged in a sexual relationship, preferential treatment over similarly situated employees with respect to his employment.
,JURISDICTION AND VENUE I. Jurisdiction of this court is invoked pttrsuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 451, 1331, 1.337, 1343 and 1345. This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to Section 706(f)(1) and (3) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(t)(l) and (3), and

Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. §1981a.

2. The employment practices alleged to be unlawful were committed within the

jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern

Division.

PARTIES

3, Plaintiff, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, is the agency of the

t~’nited States of America charged with the administration, interpretation and enibrcement of

Title VII, and is expressly authorized to bring this action by Sections 706(f)(1) and (3) of Title

VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(1) and (3). 4. At all relevant times, Defendant Concentra has continuously been and is now

doing business in the State of Illinois and the City of Elk Grove, and has continuously had at

least fifteen (15) employees. 5. At all relevant times, Defendant Concentra has continuously been an employer

engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 701 (b), (g) and (h) o t’ Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), (g) and (h).
STATEMENT OF CLAIMS

6. More than thirty days prior to the institution of this lawsuit, Horn filed a charge

with the Commission alleging violations of Title VII by Detbndant Concentra. All conditions

precedent to the institution of this lawsuit have been fulfilled.

7. Since at least 2001, Del~endant has engaged in unlawful employment practices at

its Elk Grove location, in violation of Section 704(a) of Title VII~ 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Such

unlawful employme~lt practices include, but are not limited to, retaliating against Horn for

2

making a complaint with Concentra’s Director of Human Resources stating that his female supervisor gave a male subordinate, with whom she was having at~ inappropriate sexual relationship, preferential treatment over similarly situated employees with respect to his employment. Concentra’s retaliation includes, but is not limited to, issuing ttom unwarranted negative evaluations and terminating him.
8. The effect of the practices complained of in paragraph seven (7) above has been to deprive Horn of equal employment opportunities and otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of his participation in conduct protected by Title VII.
The ur~lawl’ul employment practices complained of in paragraph seven (7) were intentional.
10. The unlawful employment practices complained of in paragraph seven (7) were done with malice or with reckless indifference to Horn’s federally protected rights.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF Wherefore, the Conlmission respectfully requests that this Coart: A. Grant a permanent injunction enjoining Defendaa~t Concentra, its officers, successors, assigns, and all persons in active concert or participation with it, from engaging in any employment practice which retaliates against employees for their participation in conduct protected by Title VII; B. Order Defendant Conccntra to institute and carry out policies, practices, and programs which provide equal employment opportunities for employees who participate in conduct protected by Title VII, and which eradicate the effects of its past and present unlawful employment practices;

C. Order Defendam Concentra to make whole Horn by providing appropriate back pay witll pro-judgment interest, in amounts to be determined at trial, and other affirmative relief necessary to eradicate the effects of its tmlawful employment practices;
D. Order Defendemt Concentra to make whole Horn for his participation in conduct protected by Title VII by providing compensation for past and future non-pecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful practices complained of in paragraph seven (7) above, including emotional pain, suffcring, humiliation, inconvenience, and loss of enjoyment of life, in amounts to be determined at trial;
E. Order Defendant Concentra to make whole Horn for his participation in conduct protected by Title VII by providing compensation tbr past and future pecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful practices complained of in paragraph scven (7) above, in amounts to be determined at trial;
F. Order Defendant to pay punitive damages for its malicious and reckless conduct described in paragraph seven (7), in amounts to be determined at trial;
G, (]rant such further relief as the Court deems necessary and proper in the public interest; and
H, Award the Comrnission its costs of this action.
JURY TRIAL DEMAND The Commission requests a jury trial on all questions ot" fact raised by its Complaint.
4

Respectfully submitted,

ERIC S. DREIBAND General Counsel

JAMES LEE Deputy General Counsel

GWENDOLYN YOUNG REAMS Associate General Counsel

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNrI’Y

COMMISSION

1801 "I?’ Street, N.W.

Washington, ~D.C. 20507

.

RTonal Attorney
Diane I. Sma~on Supervisory Trial Attorney
~Aaron R. DeCamp Trial Attorney
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 500 West Madison Street Suite 2800 Chicago, Illinois 60661 (312) 353-7526

 
 IN TIlE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOiS
.EASTERN DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
v.
CONCENTRA HEALTH SERVICES, INC.,
Defendant.

) )
) ) ) No. 05 C 1109 ) ) Wayne R. Andersen ) District Judge )
)
)

MEMORANDUM, OPINION AND ORDER This case is before the courl on the Defendant, Concenlra Health Services, Inc.'s
n: ("Concenlra"), motion to dismiss. Plainli Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC"), filed a complaint against Concentra alleging that it discriminated against Charles Horn ("Horn") by retaliating against him in violation ol'TitIe VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VlT"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), and Tille I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 US.C. § 198 I(a). For the reasons set {brlh below, the Defendant's motion is granted.
The EEOC llIed this lawsuit against Concentra on February 24, 2005 alleging thaI Cnncentra retaliated against Horn f<')f making a complainl with Concentra's Director ofIluman Resources. Horn's complaint stated that his female supervisor gave a male subordinate, wilh whom she was having an inappropriate sexual relationship, preferential trealment over similarly situated employees with respect 10 his employment. Concenlra conducted an investigation and detenllined that the alleged relationship violated the company policy and took various measureS to cOlTeet the situation. Following Horn's report to the Director of Human Resources, Horn claims that he was issued approximately eight unwalTanted written disciplinary warnings, all of

which were completed by his female supervisor whom he had previously reported. Approximately seven months after filing his complaint with the company's nir~ctor ol'Human Resources, Concentra terminated I·Iorn's employment.
ANALYSTS Courts review a motion to dismiss wIder Rule 12(b)(6) by taking a plaintiffs allegations as true and "drawing all reasonablc inferences in the plaintiirs favor." Veazey v. Communications & Cable olThicago. Inc., 194 F.3d 850,854 (7th Cif. 1999). Further, "[a1 Court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no reliel' could be granted under any set or facts that could be proved consistent with the allegatiuns" Hishon v. King & Spalding. 476 U.S. 69, 104 S.Ct. 2229 (1984). Defendant argues that the EEOC's claim should be dismissed because the complaint fails to stak a claim upon which relief can be granted. Specifically, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiff s claim that Conccntra retaliated against Hom cannot serve as a foundation ({)r a valid Title VII claim because alleged favoritism bestowed by a supcrvisor upon a paramour at work is not a violation ofTitic VlI and therefore, he fails to satisfy the first prong required for a Title VII complain!. To prove a case ofretaliation under Title VlI, plaintitf must show: (I) he cngaged in statutorily protcctcd expression; (2) she suflered an adverse action at the hands of her employer; and (3) then: was a causal link between thc two. Fine v. Ryan International Airlines, 305 F.3d 746, 751-52 (7th Cir. 2(02). For a plaintiff to prevail on a retaliation claim, the complaint must involve discrimination that is prohibited by Title VIT. Tn this case, the EEOC must establish that Horn "not only had a subjective (sincere, good faith) belief that he opposed an unlawful employment practice; his belief must also be objectively reasonable, which m"ans that th"
2

complaint must involve discrimination that is prohibited by Title VII. ... If a plaintiff opposed conduct that was not proscribed by Title VII, no matter how frequent or severe, then his sincere belief that he opposed an unlawful practice cannot be reasonable." Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr.. lne., 224 F.3d 701,707 (7th Cir. 2000).
The S<;lventh Circuit has held that "Title VII does not prevent empl()yers from favoring employees because ofper~onal relationships" Schohert v. Illinois Dep't of Transp., 304 F.3d 725,733 (7th Cir. 2(02); See also, PresIon v. Wisconsin Health Fund, 397 F.3d 539, 541 (7th CiT. 2(05)("Neither in purpose nor in consequence can lavoritism resulting foml a personal relationship be equated to sex discrimination.") Whether an employee favors ()ne employee over another because of a familial relationship, friendship, or love interest, that special treatment is permissible under Title VII as long as it is not based on an impermissible classification." Schoebert, 304 F.3d at 733 citing OcCintio v. Westchester County Mcdeical Center, 807 F.2d 304,306 (2nd CiL 1986) (rejecting the argument that male plaintifrs are discriminatcd against if a supervisor prefers his female love interest).
In the instant case, the activity that the EEOC alleged in its complaint is not proscribed by Title VII. Therefore, the EEOC cannot satisfY all three prongs necessary to bring a Tille VII complaint. Although a plaintiff need not estahlish a successful underlying Title VII e1aim to satisfY the first element of the prima facie case for a retaliation claim, he does have to show that he "reasonably believed in good faith that the practice he opposed violated Title VII" Firestine v. Parkview He"ILh System, 388 F.3d 229, 234 (7th Cir. 2003) citing Durkin v. City oj' Chicago, 341 F.3d 606, 615 (7th Cir. 2(03). The EEOC in this case has not present<;ld any filets to suggest that Hom objectively and reasonably believed in good faith that his fcmale supervisor's favoritism (0 a paramour was a violation of Title VII.
3

CONCLUSION Based on the facts set forth, Plaintiff has failed to "tate a claim upon which relief can be granted. For these reasons, we grant the Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs complaint Plaintiff is grant",d leave to file an amended complaint within 28 days. It is so ordered.
~7~""'''W-a-yn_eCIT~~derse~n -
United States Districl Court
4

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY )

COMMISSION,

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

)

CONCENTRA HEALTH SERVICES, INC., )

)

Defendant.

)

__________________________________________)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 05 C 1109 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT JURY TRIAL DEMAND

NATURE OF THE ACTION

This is an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §

2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a, to

correct unlawful employment practices on the basis of retaliation, and to provide appropriate

relief to Charles A. Horn (“Horn”) who was adversely affected by such practices. As alleged in

paragraph seven (7) below, Defendant Concentra Health Services, Inc. (“Concentra”)

discriminated against Horn by retaliating against him after he opposed conduct in the workplace

that he objectively and reasonably believed in good faith violated Title VII by reporting the

conduct to Concentra’s Director of Human Resources.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. Jurisdiction of this court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 451, 1331, 1337,

1343 and 1345. This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to Section 706(f)(1) and (3) of

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) and (3), and

Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. §1981a.

1

2. The employment practices alleged to be unlawful were committed within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
PARTIES 3. Plaintiff, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, is the agency of the United States of America charged with the administration, interpretation and enforcement of Title VII, and is expressly authorized to bring this action by Sections 706(f)(1) and (3) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(1) and (3). 4. At all relevant times, Defendant Concentra has continuously been and is now doing business in the State of Illinois and the City of Elk Grove, and has continuously had at least fifteen (15) employees. 5. At all relevant times, Defendant Concentra has continuously been an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 701(b), (g) and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), (g) and (h).
STATEMENT OF CLAIMS 6. More than thirty days prior to the institution of this lawsuit, Horn filed a charge with the Commission alleging violations of Title VII by Defendant Concentra. All conditions precedent to the institution of this lawsuit have been fulfilled. 7. Since at least 2001, Defendant has engaged in unlawful employment practices at its Elk Grove location, in violation of Section 704(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Such unlawful employment practices include, but are not limited to, retaliating against Horn after he opposed conduct in the workplace that he objectively and reasonably believed in good faith
2

violated Title VII by reporting the conduct to Concentra’s Director of Human Resources. Concentra’s retaliation includes, but is not limited to, issuing Horn unwarranted negative evaluations and terminating him.
8. The effect of the practices complained of in paragraph seven (7) above has been to deprive Horn of equal employment opportunities and otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of his participation in conduct protected by Title VII.
9. The unlawful employment practices complained of in paragraph seven (7) were intentional.
10. The unlawful employment practices complained of in paragraph seven (7) were done with malice or with reckless indifference to Horn’s federally protected rights.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF Wherefore, the Commission respectfully requests that this Court: A. Grant a permanent injunction enjoining Defendant Concentra, its officers, successors, assigns, and all persons in active concert or participation with it, from engaging in any employment practice which retaliates against employees for their participation in conduct protected by Title VII; B. Order Defendant Concentra to institute and carry out policies, practices, and programs which provide equal employment opportunities for employees who participate in conduct protected by Title VII, and which eradicate the effects of its past and present unlawful employment practices; C. Order Defendant Concentra to make whole Horn by providing appropriate back pay with pre-judgment interest, in amounts to be determined at trial, and other affirmative relief
3

necessary to eradicate the effects of its unlawful employment practices; D. Order Defendant Concentra to make whole Horn for his participation in conduct
protected by Title VII by providing compensation for past and future non-pecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful practices complained of in paragraph seven (7) above, including emotional pain, suffering, humiliation, inconvenience, and loss of enjoyment of life, in amounts to be determined at trial;
E. Order Defendant Concentra to make whole Horn for his participation in conduct protected by Title VII by providing compensation for past and future pecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful practices complained of in paragraph seven (7) above, in amounts to be determined at trial;
F. Order Defendant to pay punitive damages for its malicious and reckless conduct described in paragraph seven (7), in amounts to be determined at trial;
G. Grant such further relief as the Court deems necessary and proper in the public interest; and
H. Award the Commission its costs of this action.
JURY TRIAL DEMAND The Commission requests a jury trial on all questions of fact raised by its Complaint.
4

Respectfully submitted,
JAMES LEE Deputy General Counsel GWENDOLYN YOUNG REAMS Associate General Counsel EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 1801 “L” Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20507
__/s/ John C. Hendrickson__________ John C. Hendrickson Regional Attorney
__/s/ Diane I. Smason______________ Diane I. Smason Supervisory Trial Attorney
__/s/ Aaron R. DeCamp____________ Aaron R. DeCamp Trial Attorney EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 500 West Madison Street Suite 2800 Chicago, Illinois 60661 (312) 353-7526
5

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Plaintiff,
v.
CONCENTRA HEALTH SERVTCES, TNC.,
Defendant.

) ) ) ) No. 05 C 1109 ) ) Wayne R. Andersen ) District .Judge ) ) ) )

MEMORANDUM, OPTNTQN AND ORDER

This case is before the court on Defendant Conccntra Health Services' 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's first amended complaint. For

the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion is granted.

BACKGROUND

I.

Procedural Historv

Plaintifr filed its original complaint on behalf of Charles Horn, an employee of the

Defendant, on February 24, 2005. The original complaint alleged that Defendant retaliated

against Horn by terminating his employment in violation of Title VII. It further alleged Hom

was discharged because Horn reported his supervisor's sexual relationship with a male

subordinate, to whom the supervisor allegedly gave preferential treatment.

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the original complaint, which was granted by this

Court. In our opinion dismissing the complaint, we held that in order to state a cause of action

j'lr retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that he engaged in statutorily protected expression, For this expression to be statutorily protected, the employee must bave reasonably belicved that he opposed an unlawful employment practice. For the employee's belief to be reasonable, the conduct he opposed and reported must actually be prohibited by Title VII. However, Title VI! does not prohibit favoritism in the workplace based on personal relationships. Consequently, because the conduct that Horn opposed and reported was favoritism based on a personal relationship, his belief that such conduct violated Title VII could not be reasonable because such conduct does not violate Title VII. Accordingly, we held that Plaintiff failed to state a cause of action and granted Defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
Plaintitffiled this amended complaint on November 29,2005 under Title VII o1'the Civil Rights Act of 1664 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of
1991,42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). In the amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant retaliated
against Horn in violation of Title VII because Horn rcported conduct that he reasonably believed violated Title VII. Defendant has now moved to dismiss the amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). II. The Allegations in the Amended Complaint
Plaintiffs amended complaint is even more vague than the original complaint It contains only two sentences which address the nature of its claim:
Since at least 2001, Defendant has engaged in unlawful employment practices...Such unlawful employment practices include. but are not limited to, retaliating against Horn after he opposed conduct in tlle workplace that he objectively and reasonably believed in good faith violated Title VII by reporting the conduct to Concentra's Director of Human Resources." (Amended Complaint, ~7). The amended complaint provides no description ofthe "conduct" that Hom reported, and does not allege any facts iliat would even provide a clue as to the nature of this "conduct." In fact, the
2

amended complaint is exaclly the same as the original complaint, except that the sentence in the original complaint alleging that Horn opposed preferential treatment based on a sexual relationship was changed in the amended complaint to say that Horn opposed conduct he believed violated Title VII.
111. The Allegations in the EEOC Char~e While the amended complaint does not allege any facts ahout the "conduct" that I-lorn
opposed, the EEOC Charge that Horn filed regarding Defendant's alleged retaliation sets forth the facts underlying the situation. The EEOC Charge shows that the "conduct" Hom allegedly opposed in the amended complaint is the same conduct specified in the original complaint: conduct that we previously held did not violate Title VII and could not form the basis for a retaliation claim.
Hom alleges in the EEOC Charge that his supervisor (tlle "supervisor") at Defendant company was having an affair with an employee under her supervision (the "supervisee") and with other employees, ineluding her superiors. The EEOC Charge further claims that other employees told Hom that they believed that the supervisor gave the supervisee preferential treatment because oftheir sexual relationship. The EEOC Charge alleges that Horn reported to Defendant's Human Resource Manager that his supervisor was having an affair with the supervisee and that this affair was adversely affecting the work environment and Horn's ability to perfOtTII his job duties. The EEOC Charge alleges that Horn was then subjected to unwarranted disciplinary warnings and fired. Finally, the EEOC Charge alleges that the reason Hom was giwn IllY heing fired was that Detendant had received a complaint about him, but lhal
when he requested his personnel me, it did not contain a complaint or a reference to a complaint.
3

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ . _...._"".

In sum, the amended complaint alleges that Defendant retaliated against Horn because

Hom reported "conduct" that he believed to violate Title VII. The EEOC Charge makes clear

that the "conduct" referred to in the amended complaint is an alleged affair between Horn's

supervisor and a supervisee, and possibly other affairs that this supervisor allegedly engaged in

with other employees. We will now consider Defendant's motion to dismiss the amended

complaint.

DISCUSSION

In reviewing a motion to dismiss, courts take the plaintiff's factual allegations as true and

draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor. Veazey v. Communications & Cable of

Chicago, Inc., 194 F.3d 850, 853 (7th Cir. 1999). The court may dismiss a complaint when "it

appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set offacts in support of his claim which would

entitle him to relieC" Conley v. Gihson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).

1.

Does The Amended Complaint Provide Adequate Notice To The Defendant Of The

Charges Against It?

The amended complaint in this case fails to provide adequate notice to the Defendant

because it offers only a conclusory allegation rather than offering any facts to support the claim.

The amended complaint does not specify what conduct Hom believed to violate Title VII and

lorn) the basis for a retaliation elaim. Instead, it alleges only that Hom "opposed conduct in the

workplace that he objectively and reasonably believed in good faith violated Title VII by

reporting tlle conduct to Concentra's Director of Human Resources." (Amended Complaint, "if7).

This allegation is a legal conclusion, unsupported by any facts, and gives Defendant no

indication of the nature or scope of the allegedly unlawful conduct. Thus, the amended

complaint taken by itself does not provide adequate notice to the Defendant. This deficiency is

reason enough to dismiss the amended complaint.

4

II. Does The Amended Complaint Together With The EEOC Charge Allege Unlawful Conduct?
The amended complaint alone fails to provide adequate notice of the charges and, when read with the EEOC Charge, it still rails to state a cause of action. Defendant correctly argues that the court may consider the EEOC Charge in order to determine the scope of a Title VII complaint. See Whitehead v. AM 1m 'I, Inc., 860 F. Supp. 1280, 1286 (N.D. Ill. 1994). The Seventh Circuit has held that documents attached to a motion to dismiss, such as the EEOC Charge here, are considered part ofthe pleadings if'they are referred to in the plaintiff s complaint and are central to his claim. Venture Associates v. Zenith Data Systems, 987 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1993). While Plaintiff contends that the EEOC Charge is not central to Plaintifi's amended complaint, Plaintiffs amended complaint would not exist without the Charge. The EEOC Charge alleges factual circumstances surrounding the conduct Horn experienced and reported. Once the Charge is considered, it is clear that the facts that Plaintifffailed to provide in the amended complaint, taken as true, still do not state a cause of action.
The first element of a claim of retaliation under Title VII is that the plaintiff "engaged in statutorily protected expression." Fine v. Ryan International Airlines, 305 F.3d 746, 751-52 (7th CiT. 2002) (citing Dey v. Colt Con.l'tr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1457 (7th Cir.1994). This element has also been described as opposing an employment practice which is unlawful under Title VII. Hamna v. Sf. Vincent Hasp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701,705 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Cullom v. Brown, 209 !i.3d 1035, 1040 (7th Cir. 2000). To establish this first element, an employee must show two things: (1) that the employee reasonably believed that the employer engaged in conduct that violated Tille VII; and (2) that the employee reported this
5

conduct. Because we conclude that Plaintiff cannot meet this element, we need not evaluate the remaining elements of a Title VII retaliation claim.
To establish that the employee reasonably believed that the conduct violated TiUe VII, the employee "must not only have a subjective (sincere, good faith) belief tbat he opposed an unlawful practice; his belief must also be objectively reasonable, which means that the complaint must involve discrimination that is prohibited by Title VII." Hamner, 224 F.3d at 707. Conversely, if the type of conduct at issue is not prohibited by Title VII, tlle employee's complaints about it are no! "statutorily protected" under Title VII. However, an employee need not actually succeed on a separate claim against the offending conduct in order for the conduct to be a valid basis for tile retaliation claim. See Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446 (71h
Cir. 1994); Firestine v. Parkview Health System, inc., 388 F.3d 229, 234 (7lh Cir. 2004). In other
words, if Title VII prohibits the type of conduct reported, the conduct can serve to meet this element even if it docs not rise to tile level of creating an independent successful claim.
Next, the employee must have opposed, or reported, this unlawful conduct. Thus, if the plainti IT believed that the employer was engaged in conduct that violated Title VII, but never made the employer aware of his opposition to this conduct, there can be no claim for retaliation.
Plaint; fr, in its EEOC Charge and in its response brief, has suggested that the unspecified "conduct" that Horn believed to violate Title VII is workplace favoritism or a hostile work envirorunent. The EEOC Charge alleged that Horn reported an affair between a supervisor and a supervisee, and that the supervisor gave the supervisee preferential treatment. Plaintil1's original complaint also alleged this theory of workplace favoritism. Plaintiff disclaimed the favoritism theory in its response brief and suggests instead that Horn alleged conduct in tile EEOC Charge that could constitute a claim of hostile work environment. We will consider eaeh theory,
6

favoritism and hostile work environment, by analyzing whether the conduct at issue violated Title VII and whether Horn reported such conduct.
A. Can Plaintiff Establish a Retaliation Claim Premised Upon Complaints of a Supervisor's Favoritism for a Paramour?
To establish a retaliation claim, an employee must have reasonably believed that his employer engaged in conduct that violated Title VII, and he must have reported (his conduct. The EEOC Charge alleges that Horn reported an affair between a supervisor and a supervisee, and that this affair was adversely affecting thc work environment. Hom allegedly believed (hat the supervisor was giving the supervisee preferential treatment. Because the conduct Hom believed to violate Title VII docs not actually violate Title VII, it docs not constitute a claim of retaliation, even if what Horn reported conveyed his belief that his supervisor favored the supervisee in the workplace.
As we held in the dismissal of the original complaint, Tille VII does not prohibit an employer from favoring an employee based on a personal relationship, including a paranlOur relationship. Schobert v. Ill. Dept. (?fTrans., 304 F.3d 725,733 (7'h Cir. 2002); see also Pres/on v. Wimmsin Health Fund, 397 F.3d 539 (7lh Cir. 2005). As the EEOC's own Policy Guidance states, an isolated instance offavoritism does not constitute discrimination in violation of Title VII. EEOC Policy Guidance on Employer Liability under Title VII for Sexual Favoritism, EEOC Notice No. 915-048 (Jan. 12, 1990). We again find that Hom's belief that the supervisor's alleged relationship with the supervisee, or any preferential trcatment that the supervisor gave the supervisee because or that alleged relationship, violated Title VII cannot be reasonahle because Title VII docs not prohibit an employer From granting preferential treatment to a paramour.
7

Whether or not the alleged relationship between the supervisor and the supervisee was consensual has no bearing on Plaintiff's claim. Plaintiff contends that whether the relationship alleged in the EEOC Charge was consensual is a question of fact, but it is a question that is not rclevant to this claim. If this alleged relationship was consensual, any resulting favoritism is paramour favoritism and does not violate Title VTT, as noted above. If the alleged relationship was not consensual, then only thc tarf:et of the harassment has a claim of sex discrimination, Schobert, 304 F.3d at 733, and thus Hom's opposition to harassment of the supervisee would not be protected under Title VII. In either circumstance, Hom opposed conduct that did not actually violate Title VII and thus cannot serve as a basis for a retaliation claim.
Additionally, a plaintitImust report conduct in order for it to servc as the basis for a retaliation claim. We necd not reach this issue since Plaintiff has failed to allege conduct that actually violated Title VII, as discussed above.
In conclusion, wc again hold that because Title VII does not prohibit a supervisor from giving preferential treatment to a supervisee with whom she has a relationship, Hom could not have reasonably believed that the alleged aflair he reported violated Title VII. Consequently, Hom cannot state a cause of action for retaliation under a theory of workplace favoritism.
B. Can Plaintiff Establish a Retaliation Claim Premised Upon Complaints Of Hostile Work Environment?
Although Plaintiff's amended complaint makes no mcntion ofhostilc work environment or even of multiple workplace affairs, because Plaintiff argues in its response bricfthat the EEOC Charge itself suggests such a claim, we will address this argument. For Plaintiff to establish a claim of retaliation premised upon reporting conduct (hat constitutes a hostile work environment, PlaintilTmust establish that the conduct at issue is prohibited by Title VTI's
8

protection against hostile work envirornnents and that Hom actually reported this conduct. Because the conduct at issue could not constitute a hostile work environment, and because Horn did not even report the conduct that Plaintiff argues can constitute a hostile work envirornnent, Plaintiff has not stated a cause of action under a theory of retaliation for reporting a hostile work environment.
I. Could the Conduct at Issue Allege a Hostile Work ArlVironment in Violation (j'Title VII?
Plaintiff argues that because the EEOC Charge alleges that Hom discovered that his supervisor was engaged in multiple affairs, the Charge alleges conduct thaI "could be" prohibited by Title VII. However, even jf Hom had reported such additional alleged affairs, as discussed below, they catmot reasonably be construed to allege a hostile work envirornnent at Defendant company.
Discrimination based on sexual harassment creating a hostile or abusive work environment can violate Title VII. Merilor v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986). There are two lypes of such sexual harassment: I) quid pro quo, involving sexual favors exchanged for employmenl benefits; or 2) hostile envirornnent, when sexual harassment creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment. ld. at 65. Though the EEOC's Policy Guidance suggests that a party who is not the target of harassment can state a claim for hostile envirornnent, EEOC Policy Guidance on Employer Liability under Title VII for Sexual Favoritism, EEOC Nolice No. 915-048 (Jat1. 12, 1990), the Seventh Circuit disagrees. The Seventh Circuit finds that to prevail on a claim of hostile work environment, an employee muSl show thaI: "( I) she wa~ subjected to unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature; (2) the conduct was severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment; (3) the conduct was directed at her because of her
9

sex; and (4) there is a basis for employer liability." Rhodes v. Illinois Dept. o{Trans.• 359 F.3d 498,505 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Hall v. Bodine Elec. Co., 276 F.3d 345,355 (7th Cir. 2002».
In evaluating a bostile work environment claim, the court should consider th~ "totality of the circumstances," MeritOf, 477 U.S. at 69 (citing 29 CFR § 1604.1 I(b) (1985». The conduct must be both subjectively and objectively offensive. M,Xenzie v. Milwaukee County, 381 F.3d
619,624 (7'" Cir. 2004). The Seventh Circuit has found tbe severity requirement very high,
saying that the workplace must be "hellish" to be actionable. Whi/laker v. Northern Illinois Univ., 424 F.3d 640,645 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Perry v. Harris Chernin. Inc., 126 FJd 1010, 1013 (7th Cir. 1997». Even if offensive conduct is directed at tbe employee, il'most of it occurs unbeknownst to the employee, it is not severe enough to create a hostile environment. Whittaker, 424 F.3d at 645. Relatively isolated instances of conduct that are not severe are
insufficient to support a claim. Id. at 646 (citing Saxton v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d
526, 533 (7th Cir. 1993». lIere, tbe neither the amended complaint nor the facts of the EEOC Charge support a
basis for a violation of Title VII premised on hostile work environment. Th" conduct at issue must actually be prohibited by Title VII in order to form the basis for a retaliation claim, tll0ugb it do~s not have to rise to the level of being actionable alone. Here, the conduct claimed cannot meet tbe Seventh Circuit's standard for hostile work environment because none ofthe alleged affairs involved lIorn at all.
First, Horn cannot meet the first element, that he was subjected to unwelcome sexual advances, requ"sts for sexual favors or conduct of a sexual nature, for two reasons: he was not the target of any of this alleged conduct; and he does not claim that the alleged affairs were unwelcome. Horn was not involved in the alleged affairs and does not allege that any sexual
10

conduct was directed at him. Additionally, there is no allegation that there were any unwelcome sexual advanccs, directed at Horn or anyonc else. Consensual affairs among co-employees are not particularly uncommon, nor are they prohibited by Title VII. Consequently, to hold that any inter-office affairs constitute a hostile work environment would stretch the claim of hostile work environment beyond the statutory proscription. The Charge does not claim that these alleged affairs, other than the one alleged to exist between the supervisor and a specific supervisee, were accompanied by any preferential treatment, much less the sort of preferential treatment that would constitute a widespread system of sexual favoritism.
Horn's lack of involvement with the alleged conduct also undermines the second element, the severity ofthc conduct. Not only was Horn uninvolved with the alleged affairs, but these allcged affairs occurred almost unbeknownst to Horn: he knew of them only becausc the supervisor allcgedly mentioncd their existence. Consequently, any misconduct would not be severe or pervasive enough to constitute an objectively hostile work environment for Horn. Additionally, there is no suggestion that these other affairs werc in any way illegal: there is no allegation that they were engaged in to procure employment benefits, that they were coerced, or that any actual misconduct was sevcre and pervasive enough to come close to meeting the high standards for a hostile work environment claim.
In conclusion, even if Hom had reported thesc alleged multiple affairs to Defendant, his belief that thcy violated Titlc VII could not be reasonable because mere affairs betwccn cocmployees, without more, do not create a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII. Becausc it is clear that Horn cannot possibly meet the first and second elements of a hostile work environment claim, we nced not address the remaining clements.
11

2. Did Horn Report the Conduct thaI PlainlijfContends Establishes a flostile Work Environment?
Here, for Hom to have a claim of retaliation, he must have reported the conduct that he believed violated Title VII. According to the EEOC Charge, the conduct that Horn reported was that his supervisor was allegedly having an affair with a specified supervisee---the Charge docs not allege that Horn reported his knowledge of the supervisor's alleged additional affairs. Plainti rr~ contention that Hom opposed conduct that constitutes a hostile work environment thus fails because Horn never reported the alleged additional affairs that plaintiff contends suggest a hostile wOrk environment. Consequently, Horn never engaged in the "expression" that is statutorily protected with regard to these additional affairs. Like the plaintiff in Durkin v. Cily (d'Chicago, 341 F.3d 606, 614-15 (7'h Cir. 2003), even if Horn had experienced conduct that was prohibited by Title VII, since he did not report it, there is no retaliation claim. Consequently, since Horn did not report the additional affairs his supervisor allegedly engaged in, he cannot have a claim of retaliation for reporting such affairs because there was nothing for Defendant to retaliate against.
In conclusion, Plaintiff has not stated a retaliation claim premised on a theory of hostile work environment for two separate and independent reasons: (I) the conduct allegedly occurring, affairs between co-employees, docs not constitute a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII; and (2) Horn never reported the alleged affairs that Plaintiff contends establishes such a claim.
CONCLUSION Overall, Plaintiff has not stated a retaliation claim because: (1) the amended complaint itself provides no notice as to the nature of the allegedly unlawful conduct; and (2) even considering the EEOC Charge, the Plaintiff has failed to show that Horn reported any conduct
12

that violated Title VI!, either under a theory of favoritism or under a theory of hostile work environment. Under the theory of favoritism, the alleged single affair that Hom reported does not violate Title VII even if it did result in preferential treatment. Under the theory of hostile work environment, the alleged additional affairs are insut1icient to constitute a claim of hostile work environment and additionally were never reported to Defendant. Consequently, the EEOC charge establishes that the laels upon which this amended complaint is premised cannot create a cause of action for retaliation.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We grant the Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs amended complaint with prejudice. This case is hereby terminated.
It is so ordered.

Dated: ~ I:;' 1Cl 000

I Wayne R. Ande&lR:-
United States District Court

13

 
 CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket Report

Page 1 of 5

APPEAL, ASHMAN
United States District Court Northern District of Illinois - CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 (Chicago)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:05-cv-01109

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Concentra Health Services, Inc. Assigned to: Honorable Wayne R. Andersen Case in other court: 06-03436 Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

Date Filed: 02/24/2005 Date Terminated: 07/12/2006 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Plaintiff

Plaintiff
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

represented by Aaron R. DeCamp Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 500 W. Madison Street 2800 Chicago, IL 60661 (312)353-7582 Email: aaron.decamp@eeoc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Diane Ilene Smason United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 500 West Madison Street Suite 2800 Chicago, IL 60661 (312) 353-7568 Email: diane.smason@eeoc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John C. Hendrickson United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 500 West Madison Street Suite 2800 Chicago, IL 60661 (312) 353-8551 Fax: (312) 353-8555 Email: john.hendrickson@eeoc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?243030053895655-L_353_0-1

6/1/2007

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket Report

Page 2 of 5

Concentra Health Services, Inc.

represented by James J. Oh Littler Mendelson, P.C. 200 North LaSalle Street Suite 2900 Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 372-5520 Email: joh@littler.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Asilia S Backus Littler Mendelson, P.C. 200 North LaSalle Street Suite 2900 Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 372-5520 Email: abackus@littler.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Preston L Pugh General Electric Healthcare 3000 N. Grandview Boulevard Waukesha, WI 63188-1615 (262) 548-2868 Email: ppugh@sonnenschein.com TERMINATED: 09/26/2005

Date Filed 02/24/2005 02/24/2005 02/24/2005
03/21/2005 03/28/2005
04/25/2005

#

Docket Text

1 COMPLAINT filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; Jury Demand.(rbf, ) (Entered: 02/28/2005)

2 CIVIL Cover Sheet (rbf, ) (Entered: 02/28/2005)

3 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission by Aaron R. DeCamp, John C. Hendrickson, Diane Ilene Smason (rbf, ) (Entered: 02/28/2005)

4 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Concentra Health Services, Inc. by Preston L Pugh, James J. Oh. (rbf, ) (Entered: 03/23/2005)

5 WAIVER OF SERVICE returned executed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Concentra Health Services, Inc. waiver sent on 3/4/2005, answer due 5/3/2005. (rbf, ) (Entered: 03/30/2005)

6 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ORDER:Case referred to magistrate judge Martin C. Ashman for discovery supervision and to conduct necessary proceedings and enter orders on all discovery motions and nondispositive pretrial motions. Signed by Executive Committee on 4/25/05. (For further details see order).(cem) (Entered: 04/28/2005)

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?243030053895655-L_353_0-1

6/1/2007

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket Report

Page 3 of 5

05/03/2005 05/03/2005 05/03/2005 05/05/2005 05/10/2005 05/12/2005
06/10/2005 06/24/2005 09/26/2005 11/03/2005
11/03/2005 11/29/2005 12/13/2005 12/13/2005 12/13/2005

7 MOTION by Defendant Concentra Health Services, Inc. to dismiss (ntf, ) (Entered: 05/04/2005)
8 NOTICE by Concentra Health Services, Inc. of motion to dismiss7 before Honorable Wayne R. Andersen on 5/12/2005 at 09:00 AM. (ntf, ) (Entered: 05/04/2005)
9 MEMORANDUM by Concentra Health Services, Inc. in Support of its motion to dismiss7 (ntf, ) (Entered: 05/04/2005)
10 MINUTE entry before Judge Martin C. Ashman : Status hearing set for 5/18/2005 at 10:00 AM. in courtroom 1386. Judicial staff mailed notice (is, ) (Entered: 05/05/2005)
11 MINUTE entry before Judge Martin C. Ashman : Status hearing of 5/18/2005 is stricken. Judicial staff mailed notice (is, ) (Entered: 05/10/2005)
12 MINUTE entry before Judge Wayne R. Andersen : Motion to dismiss7 is entered and briefed as follows: Responses due by 6/10/2005 Replies due by 6/24/2005. Ruling will be made by mail. Judicial staff mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 05/13/2005)
13 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to defendant's motion to dismiss (Exhibits); Notice of filing. (rbf, ) (Entered: 06/16/2005)
14 REPLY memorandum by Defendant Concentra Health Services, Inc. in support of its motion to dismiss (Exhibits). (rbf, ) (Entered: 06/30/2005)
15 MOTION by Defendant Concentra Health Services, Inc. to withdraw as attorney (Preston L. Pugh withdrawing) (Backus, Asilia) (Entered: 09/26/2005)
16 MINUTE entry before Judge Wayne R. Andersen: Enter Memorandum, Opinion and Order: Based on the facts set forth, plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For these reasons, we grant the defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint 7. Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint within 28 days. Mailed (vmj, ) (Entered: 11/08/2005)
17 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order (vmj, ) (Entered: 11/08/2005)
18 First AMENDED complaint by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission against Concentra Health Services, Inc. (DeCamp, Aaron) (Entered: 11/29/2005)
19 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Concentra Health Services, Inc. by Asilia S Backus (Backus, Asilia) (Entered: 12/13/2005)
20 MOTION by Defendant Concentra Health Services, Inc. to dismiss First Amended Complaint (Backus, Asilia) (Entered: 12/13/2005)
21 NOTICE of Motion by Asilia S Backus for presentment of motion to dismiss20 before Honorable Wayne R. Andersen on 12/22/2005 at 09:00

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?243030053895655-L_353_0-1

6/1/2007

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket Report

Page 4 of 5

12/13/2005
12/22/2005
01/20/2006
02/03/2006
02/03/2006 07/12/2006
07/12/2006 07/12/2006 09/11/2006 09/11/2006 09/12/2006 09/13/2006
09/13/2006

AM. (Backus, Asilia) (Entered: 12/13/2005)
22 MEMORANDUM by Concentra Health Services, Inc. in Support of motion to dismiss20 First Amended Complaint (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A-Charge of Discrimination# 2 Exhibit B-Unreported Cases)(Backus, Asilia) (Entered: 12/13/2005)
23 MINUTE entry before Judge Wayne R. Andersen : Asilia S. Backus' motion to dismiss20 is entered and briefed as follows : Responses due by 1/20/2006 Replies due by 2/3/2006. Ruling will be made by mail. Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 12/22/2005)
24 RESPONSE by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to MOTION by Defendant Concentra Health Services, Inc. to dismiss First Amended Complaint20 and Notice of Filing (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C)(DeCamp, Aaron) (Entered: 01/20/2006)
25 REPLY by Concentra Health Services, Inc.in Support of MOTION by Defendant Concentra Health Services, Inc. to dismiss First Amended Complaint20 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A-Unreported Cases# 2 Exhibit B-Charge of Discriminatiion)(Backus, Asilia) (Entered: 02/03/2006)
26 CERTIFICATE of Service by Asilia S Backus on behalf of Concentra Health Services, Inc. regarding reply to response to motion, 25 (Backus, Asilia) (Entered: 02/03/2006)
27 MINUTE entry before Judge Wayne R. Andersen : Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order: Defendant Concentra Health Services' 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss 20 plaintiff E.E.O.C's first amended complaint is granted. Civil case terminated. Mailed notices (gcy, ) (Entered: 07/17/2006)
28 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by Judge Wayne R. Andersen on 7/12/2006:(gcy, ) (Entered: 07/17/2006)
29 ENTERED JUDGMENT(gcy, ) (Entered: 07/17/2006)
30 NOTICE of appeal by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission regarding orders 28, 27, 29 ; (waived) (dj, ) (Entered: 09/12/2006)
31 DOCKETING Statement by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission regarding notice of appeal30 (dj, ) (Entered: 09/12/2006)
32 TRANSMITTED to the 7th Circuit the short record on 9/12/06 notice of appeal30. Notified counsel (dj, ) (Entered: 09/12/2006)
33 MINUTE entry before Judge Martin C. Ashman : Case having been dismissed, all matters relating to the referral of this action having been resolved, the case is returned to the assigned judge. Judge Martin C. Ashman no longer referred to the case. No notice. (is, ) (Entered: 09/13/2006)
34 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT of receipt of short record on appeal regarding notice of appeal30 ; USCA Case No. 06-3436. (gcy, ) (Entered:

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?243030053895655-L_353_0-1

6/1/2007

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket Report

Page 5 of 5

09/14/2006 09/29/2006 09/29/2006

09/14/2006)
35 RECORD on Appeal by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; Notice. (vkd, ) (Entered: 09/19/2006)
36 TRANSMITTED to the USCA for the 7th Circuit the long record on appeal 30 (USCA no. 06-3436) consisting of 1 volume of pleadings. (dj, ) (Entered: 09/29/2006)
37 USCA RECEIVED on 9/29/06 the long record on appeal (06- 3436). (dj, ) (Entered: 10/02/2006)

PACER Service Center
Transaction Receipt

PACER Login: Description: Billable Pages:

06/01/2007 10:11:20

hs0328

Client Code:

Docket Report Search Criteria:

3

Cost:

eeoc 1:05-cv-01109 0.24

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?243030053895655-L_353_0-1

6/1/2007