Case: 2:19-cv-2328 As of: 09/22/2019 05:27 PM EDT 1 of 4
U.S. District Court Southern District of Ohio (Columbus) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:19−cv−02328−GCS−CMV

JURY

Rotondo v. JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. Assigned to: Judge George C. Smith Referred to: Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura Cause: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 05/30/2019 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Derek Rotondo on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

represented by Freda J Levenson ACLU of OHIO 4506 Chester Avenue Cleveland, OH 44103 614/586−1959 Fax: 216−472−2210 Email: flevenson@acluohio.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Deirdre Aaron Outten & Golden LLP 685 3rd Avenue, 25th Floor New York, NY 10017 212−245−1000 Fax: 646−509−2025 Email: daaron@outtengolden.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Galen Sherwin American Civil Liberties Union Women's Rights Project 125 Broad Street 18th Floor New York, NY 10004 212−519−7819 Fax: 212−549−2580 Email: gsherwin@aclu.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter Romer−Friedman Outten & Golden LLP 601 Massachusetts Ave NW, Suite 200W Washington, DC 20001 202−847−4400 Fax: 646−952−9114 Email: prf@outtengolden.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Pooja Shethji Outten & Golden LLP 601 Massachusetts Ave NW, Suite 200W Washington, DC 20001 202−847−4400 Fax: 646−952−9114 Email: pshethji@outtengolden.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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V. Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A.

represented by Alyson A Terrell Ulmer & Berne, LLP 65 E. State Street Suite 1100 Columbus, OH 43215 614−229−0042 Fax: 614−229−0043 Email: aterrell@ulmer.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Emily M Loeb Jenner & Block LLP 1099 New York Ave NW, Suite 900 Washington, DC 20001−4412 202−639−6871 Email: eloeb@jenner.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeffrey S Dunlap Ulmer & Berne LLP 1660 West 2nd Street Suite 1100 Cleveland, OH 44113−1448 216−583−7026 Fax: 216−583−7027 Email: jdunlap@ulmer.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel C Birnbaum Jenner & Block LLP 1099 New York Ave NW, Suite 900 Washington, DC 20001−4412 202−639−6057 Email: sbirnbaum@jenner.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas J Perrelli Jenner & Block LLP 1099 New York Ave NW, Suite 900 Washington, DC 20001−4412 202−639−6004 Email: tperrelli@jenner.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 05/30/2019
05/30/2019

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT with JURY DEMAND against JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. ( Filing fee $ 400 paid − receipt number: 0648−6944481), filed by Rotondo Derek. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet Civil Cover Sheet) (Levenson, Freda) (Entered: 05/30/2019)
2 Unopposed MOTION for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, Conditional Certification of the Settlement Class, Appointment of Plaintiff's Counsel as Class Counsel, and Approval of the Proposed Notice of Settlement and Class Action Settlement Procedure and Memorandum in Support by Plaintiff Rotondo Derek. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Romer−Friedman Declaration with Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Sherwin Declaration, # 3 Exhibit Wickersham Declaration with Exhibits) (Levenson,

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05/30/2019 05/30/2019 05/30/2019 05/30/2019 05/31/2019 05/31/2019
06/03/2019
06/03/2019 06/03/2019 06/03/2019 06/04/2019 06/04/2019 06/04/2019 06/10/2019
06/10/2019
06/10/2019

Freda). Added MOTION to Certify Class, MOTION to Appoint Counsel, MOTION for Settlement on 5/31/2019 (eh). (Entered: 05/30/2019)
3 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice (Filing fee of $200 paid, receipt number 0648−6944640) of Galen Sherwin by Plaintiff Rotondo Derek. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Certificate of Good Standing) (Levenson, Freda) (Entered: 05/30/2019)
4 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice (Filing fee of $200 paid, receipt number 0648−6944705) of Peter Romer−Friedman by Plaintiff Rotondo Derek. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Certificate of Good Standing) (Levenson, Freda) (Entered: 05/30/2019)
5 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice (Filing fee of $200 paid, receipt number 0648−6944722) of Deirdre Aaron by Plaintiff Rotondo Derek. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Certificate of Good Standing) (Levenson, Freda) (Entered: 05/30/2019)
6 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice (Filing fee of $200 paid, receipt number 0648−6944755) of Pooja Shethji by Plaintiff Rotondo Derek. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Certificate of Good Standing) (Levenson, Freda) (Entered: 05/30/2019)
If this case is referred, it will be to Magistrate Judge Karen L. Litkovitz. (eh) (Entered: 05/31/2019)
7 ORDER transferring the case from the docket of the Hon. Michael R. Barrett to the Clerks Office for reassignment. Case reassigned to Judge Susan J. Dlott for all further proceedings. Signed by Judge Michael R. Barrett on 5/31/19. (sct) (Entered: 05/31/2019)
8 [FORMER DOC. 8 − PLEASE DISREGARD. FILED IN ERROR]. ORDER REASSIGNING CASE signed by Judge Susan J. Dlott on 6/3/2019. Case reassigned to Judge William O. Bertelsman for all further proceedings. Judge Susan J. Dlott no longer assigned to case. (eh) Modified docket text and document security on 6/3/2019 (eh). (Entered: 06/03/2019)
Notice of Correction: Please disregard [FORMER DOC. 8] − filed using incorrect ECF event in error. (eh) (Entered: 06/03/2019)
9 ORDER − This case is hereby TRANSFERRED from the docket of The Honorable Susan J. Dlott to the Clerk of this Court for reassignment in the Eastern Division in Colwnbus. Signed by Judge Susan J. Dlott on 6/3/2019. (eh) (Entered: 06/03/2019)
Case transferred in from Western Division at Cincinnati Division on 06/03/2019 Case Number 1:19−cv−408. Case assigned to Judge George C. Smith and Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura. (eh) (Entered: 06/03/2019)
10 NOTICE of Appearance by Alyson A Terrell for Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. (Terrell, Alyson) (Entered: 06/04/2019)
11 NOTATION ORDER granting 3 , 4 , 5 , & 6 Motions for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice of Galen Sherwin, Peter Romer−Friedman, Deirdre Aaron, and Pooja Shethji by Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura on 6/4/2019. (kk) (Entered: 06/04/2019)
NOTICE of Appearance by Jeffrey S Dunlap for Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. SEE DOCKET # 10 FOR DOCUMENT (kk) (Entered: 06/05/2019)
12 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice (Filing fee of $200 paid, receipt number 0648−6959166) of Thomas J. Perrelli by Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Certificate of Good Standing) (Terrell, Alyson) Modified on 6/11/2019 to correct atty name (kk) (Entered: 06/10/2019)
13 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice (Filing fee of $200 paid, receipt number 0648−6959221) of Samuel C. Birnbaum by Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Certificate of Good Standing) (Terrell, Alyson) (Entered: 06/10/2019)
14 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice (Filing fee of $200 paid, receipt number 0648−6959233) of Emily M. Loeb by Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Certificate of Good Standing) (Terrell, Alyson) (Entered: 06/10/2019)

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06/11/2019 06/21/2019
06/21/2019 06/27/2019 07/01/2019 07/02/2019 08/19/2019
08/20/2019

15 NOTATION ORDER granting 12 , 13 , & 14 Motions for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice of Thomas J Perrelli, Samuel C Birnbaum, & Emily M Loeb by Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura on 6/11/2019 (kk) (Entered: 06/11/2019)
16 ORDER Granting 2 Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, Conditional Certification of the Settlement Class, Appointment of Plaintiff's Counsel as Class Counsel, and Approval of the Proposed Notice of Settlement and Class Action Settlement Procedure. Fairness hearing set for OCTOBER 30, 2019 at 2:00 p.m. in Courtroom 4. Signed by Judge George C. Smith on 06/20/2019. (mdr) (Entered: 06/21/2019)
Set/Reset Hearings: Fairness Hearing set for 10/30/2019 02:00 PM in Courtroom 4 − Columbus before Judge George C. Smith. (mdr) (Entered: 06/21/2019)
17 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed. Waiver sent to JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. on 6/11/2019, answer due 8/12/2019. (Levenson, Freda) (Entered: 06/27/2019)
18 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time New date requested 7/12/2019. Joint Motion for Extension of Time to Mail Court−Approved Notice and Claim Form by Plaintiff Derek Rotondo. (Levenson, Freda) (Entered: 07/01/2019)
19 NOTATION ORDER granting 18 Motion for Extension of Time to Mail Court−Approved Notice and Claim Form. By Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura on 7/2/2019. (agm) (Entered: 07/02/2019)
20 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time New date requested 9/30/2019. JOINT MOTION TO EXTEND CLAIM FORM DEADLINE AND RESCHEDULE FAIRNESS HEARING by Plaintiff Derek Rotondo. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order GRANTING JOINT MOTION TO EXTEND CLAIM FORM DEADLINE AND RESCHEDULE FAIRNESS HEARING) (Levenson, Freda) (Entered: 08/19/2019)
21 Order Granting 20 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to file Claim Forms and Reschedule Fairness Hearing. Claim Form Deadline is 09/30/2019. Motion for Final Approval to be filed on or before 10/22/2019. The Fairness Hearing is REFERRED to Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura. Fairness Hearing set for 11/6/2019 02:00 PM in Courtroom 183 − Columbus before Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura. Signed by Judge George C. Smith on 08/20/2019. (mdr) (Entered: 08/20/2019)

 
 Case: 2:19-cv-02328-GCS-CMV Doc #: 1 Filed: 05/30/19 Page: 1 of 17 PAGEID #: 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

DEREK ROTONDO, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. JPMORGAN CHASE Bank, N.A.,
Defendant.

No. 1:19-cv-408 District Judge Magistrate Judge
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff Derek Rotondo (“Plaintiff” or “Mr. Rotondo”) brings this class action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated against Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“Defendant” or “Chase”). Plaintiff complains and alleges as follows:
INTRODUCTION 1. Mr. Rotondo brings this action to challenge Chase’s policies and practice of discriminating against birth fathers in the provision of paid parental leave. 2. During his employment with Chase, Mr. Rotondo and his wife have had two children. After the birth of both of his children, Mr. Rotondo was eligible for and took paid parental leave under Chase’s paid parental leave policy, but Chase limited the amount of paid parental leave that Mr. Rotondo was eligible to take on the basis of his sex. 3. Until revising its procedures in December 2017, Chase presumptively treated biological mothers as primary caregivers who are eligible for 16 weeks of paid parental leave and presumptively treated fathers as non-primary caretakers who are eligible for 2 weeks of paid parental leave. Chase’s policy previously afforded primary caregivers 12 weeks of paid parental

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leave while affording non-primary caregivers 1 week of paid parental leave. Beginning March 1, 2016, and retroactively for births occurring on or after December 8, 2015, Chase’s policy afforded primary caregivers 16 weeks of paid parental leave and afforded non-primary caregivers 2 weeks of paid parental leave. Under both versions of the policy prior to December 2017, as they were applied by Chase, fathers could only be treated as primary caregivers if they were able to show that their spouse or domestic partner had returned to work or that they were the spouse or domestic partner of a mother who was medically incapable of caring for the child. Birth mothers did not need to make a similar showing.
4. Mr. Rotondo initiated this action to challenge Chase’s policy that discriminated against male employees by affording birth fathers less parental leave than what Chase offered to birth mothers.
5. By depriving fathers of paid parental leave benefits that are equal to what Chase afforded to birth mothers, Chase’s policies and practices constituted sex discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment. These policies and practices constituted a sex-based classification and a sex-based stereotype that violates Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2), and equivalent antidiscrimination laws in effect in numerous other states. Chase’s policies replicated gender stereotypes about the caregiving roles of mothers and fathers and prevented Mr. Rotondo and other birth fathers from taking paid parental leave that was presumptively afforded to birth mothers unless they established that they were the primary caregiver.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 6. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331, because Plaintiff is asserting federal claims under Title VII of the Civil
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Rights Act. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
7. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant Chase, as the alleged unlawful employment practice was allegedly committed in this District, and employment records relevant to such employment practice are maintained and administered in this District.
8. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) because Chase operates and does business here, maintains business records in Ohio, and alleged unlawful employment practices were committed in this District.
PARTIES
Plaintiff
9. Named Plaintiff Derek Rotondo is and was at all relevant times a resident of Ohio and an employee of Defendant. He files this action on behalf of himself and others similarly situated. Defendant
10. Defendant is and was at all relevant times a financial services company with its home office, as designated by its articles of association, in Ohio.
11. Chase employs over 250,000 employees and operates branches and offices nationwide.
12. At all relevant times, Defendant was an employer within the meaning of Title VII, the Ohio Fair Employment Practices Law, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4112.02(A) (“FEPL”); the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. § 296 et seq. (“NYSHRL”); the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-101 et seq. (“NYCHRL”); the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, Cal. Gov. Code § 12940 et seq. (“FEHA”); the Washington State
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Law Against Discrimination, Rev. Code Wash. 49.60.010 et seq. (“WLAD”); the Alaska Human Rights Law, Alaska Stat. § 18.80.010 et seq. (“AHRL”); the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, Ky. Rev. Stat. § 334.010 et seq. (“KCRA”); the Maine Human Rights Act, Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 5, § 4572 (“MHRA”); the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J. Stat. Ann. 10:5-12 (“NJLAD”); the North Carolina Equal Employment Practices Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-422.1, et. seq. (“NCEEPA”); the South Dakota Human Relations Act, S.D. Codified Laws § 20-13-1 et seq. (“SDHRA”); the Vermont Fair Employment Practices Act, 21 Vt. Stat. Ann. § 495 (“VFEPA”); the West Virginia Human Rights Act, W. Va. Code § 5-11-1 et seq. (“WVHRA”); the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-123-107 et seq. (“ACRA”); the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23.301 et seq. (“LEDL”); Michigan’s Elliott Larsen Civil Rights Act, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 37.2101 et seq. (“MELCRA”); the Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minn. Stat. 363A et seq. (“MNHRA”); the Oregon Fair Employment Practice Act, Or. Rev. Stat. 659A et seq. (“OFEPA”); the Tennessee Human Rights Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-101 et seq. (“THRA”); and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act, 1. D.C. Code § 2-1401, et seq. (“DCHRA”).
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 13. Plaintiff filed a timely charge of Discrimination with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on June 15, 2017. 14. Plaintiff received his Right to Sue letter on February 8, 2019.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 15. Mr. Rotondo began working for Chase in 2010. Since that time, he has worked for Chase in Ohio. He has worked in several different positions during his time at Chase, and
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currently works as an Associate and Investigator in Global Security and Investigations on the National Vulnerable Adult Investigations team.
16. Mr. Rotondo’s first child was born in 2015. Chase’s parental leave policy in effect at that time (“the pre-2016 Policy”) provided that employees who were non-primary caregivers were eligible for 1 week of paid parental leave, while employees who were primary caregivers were eligible for 12 weeks of paid parental leave.
17. Following the birth of his first child on May 2, 2015, Mr. Rotondo took one week of paid parental leave pursuant to Chase’s pre-2016 Policy and one week of accrued paid time off. Mr. Rotondo would have served as the primary caregiver and would have taken more than one week of paid parental leave had he been eligible to do so under the pre-2016 Policy, but he was not eligible to receive a greater amount of paid parental leave as a primary caregiver because of the presumption in Chase’s policy that treated men differently from women.
18. Chase changed its parental leave policy in March 2016, retroactive to births occurring on or after December 8, 2015. The revised policy (“the 2016 Policy”) allowed primary caregivers of newly born or adopted children to receive up to 16 weeks of paid parental leave to care for a child and allowed non-primary caregivers to receive up to 2 weeks of paid parental leave to care for a child.
19. The 2016 Policy further specified that to change status from non-primary to primary caregiver, an employee would have to demonstrate that the employee had become the primary caregiver. To do so, Chase required that the employee’s spouse or domestic partner had returned to work, or that the employee was the spouse or domestic partner of a mother who is medically incapable of any care of the child.
20. In 2016, Mr. Rotondo’s wife became pregnant with their second child.
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21. On or about May 15, 2017, three weeks before the birth of his second child, Mr. Rotondo contacted Chase’s “Ask Access HR” service by phone to request that he be allowed to take 16 weeks of paid leave as a primary caregiver upon the birth of his second child. Ask Access HR is a unit within Chase that answers questions related to some of Chase’s human resources policies, including—at that time—Chase’s parental leave policy.
22. During Mr. Rotondo’s May 15 conversation with Access HR, a representative stated that Chase’s policy that was in effect at the time—the 2016 Policy—provided up to 16 weeks of paid parental leave to primary caregivers to be taken consecutively immediately following the birth or placement of a child, but provided 2 weeks of paid parental leave to nonprimary caregivers. But the AccessHR representative further informed Mr. Rotondo that Chase presumptively considers mothers to be primary caregivers, and that he could qualify as the primary caregiver if: (1) he showed that his wife had returned to work before the expiration of 16 weeks, or (2) he submitted documentation showing that his wife was “medically incapable” of providing any care for their child.
23. That same day, May 15, 2017, following Mr. Rotondo’s conversation with Access HR, Mr. Rotondo contacted Access HR in writing via a web portal to confirm that the information he had received over the phone was correct. Later that day, he received a response from an Access HR representative stating that “As per our policy Birth Mothers are what we consider as the Primary Caregivers [sic],” and confirming that per Chase’s policy, a father may be considered the primary caregiver if (1) his spouse or domestic partner who is the primary caregiver returns to work prior to using all 16 weeks, in which case the father could utilize the remaining balance of the 16 weeks; or (2) the mother is “medically incapable of any care of the
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child,” in which case the father must provide documentation from his spouse or domestic partner’s physician of that incapacity.
24. From these conversations, Mr. Rotondo understood that under Chase’s 2016 Policy, if he were a birth mother, he would be presumptively eligible to receive 16 weeks of paid parental leave as a primary caregiver, regardless of whether his spouse had returned to work or was medically capable of providing any care for their child, but that as a birth father, he was presumptively limited to two weeks of paid parental leave immediately following his child’s birth, unless he could make an additional showing that he fell under one of the two delineated exceptions to the default primary caregiver rule.
25. On June 6, 2017, Mr. Rotondo’s wife gave birth to their second child, another boy. His wife experienced a normal delivery without any complications and recovered well from childbirth.
26. In 2017, after the birth of his second child, Mr. Rotondo did not qualify as a primary caregiver under the first exception to Chase’s 2016 Policy, because his wife, as a teacher, has the summer off and therefore Mr. Rotondo could not demonstrate that his wife had returned to work. If Mr. Rotondo had been the child’s birth mother, he presumptively would have been able to receive the full 16 weeks of paid parental leave as a primary caregiver, regardless of whether or not his spouse was working during the 16-week parental leave period.
27. Mr. Rotondo did not qualify for the second exception as a primary caregiver under Chase’s 2016 Policy, because his wife had no medical limitations on her ability to provide “any care” for their child.
28. In June 2017, Mr. Rotondo was initially only approved to take paid parental leave for two weeks following the birth of his second child.
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29. On June 15, 2017, Plaintiff timely filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC challenging Chase’s policy and practice of denying primary caregiver leave to fathers and alleging class-wide discrimination on the basis of sex and sex stereotypes on behalf of himself and a class of other similarly situated male employees.
30. Upon information and belief, Chase’s practice of treating birth mothers as the presumptive primary caregiver prevented, discouraged, and deterred Mr. Rotondo and other birth fathers employed by Chase from seeking to apply to be primary caregivers, from being approved as primary caregivers, and from receiving the full amount of paid parental leave for which they would otherwise have been eligible had they been eligible birth mothers.
31. In addition, upon information and belief, Chase engaged in a pattern or practice of implementing the pre-2016 and 2016 Policies in which Chase’s staff and third-party agents informed birth fathers like Mr. Rotondo that birth fathers could not qualify as primary caregivers because mothers were presumptively considered primary caregivers, because men could not qualify as primary caregivers, and/or because certain birth fathers did not meet any of the exceptions that would permit them to be primary caregivers.
32. Upon information and belief, many birth fathers were prevented, discouraged, and deterred from applying to be primary caregivers or were outright denied the opportunity to be primary caregivers under Chase’s paid parental leave program, due to Chase’s pre-2016 and 2016 Policies and due to Chase’s pattern or practice in implementing its parental leave policies.
33. Chase has discriminated against Mr. Rotondo and other birth fathers employed by Chase pursuant to a company-wide policy, pattern, or practice that discriminates against men and that causes them to receive employee benefits that are inferior to those provided to birth mothers. Chase ’s 2016 Policy treated birth mothers as presumptive primary caregivers, eligible for 16
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weeks of paid parental leave, without regard to whether their domestic partner or spouse was working or able to provide care for the child, while it treated birth fathers as presumptively nonprimary caregivers, eligible for 2 weeks of paid parental leave, and requiring birth fathers to demonstrate that their spouses or domestic partners had returned to work or that the mothers of their children were medically incapable of any care of the children if they wished to qualify as primary caregivers.
34. In December 2017, Chase changed its policy to eliminate gender-specific language, and to make clear that fathers as well as mothers were eligible to be designated as primary caregivers.
CLASS ALLEGATIONS 35. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of a Plaintiff Class of male employees of Chase nationwide who were denied primary caregiver status or deterred by Chase from seeking primary caregiver leave following the birth of a child under Chase’s paid parental leave policy. Plaintiff will seek to certify the Plaintiff Class pursuant to Rules 23(a) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 23(a)
36. Plaintiff Class Definition. Plaintiff brings each claim set forth herein pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of the following persons:
All male employees of Chase nationwide who took the maximum amount of non-primary caregiver leave available under Chase’s policy in effect at the time for the birth of one or more child (either one week or two weeks depending on the time period, would have otherwise qualified for paid parental leave, but did not take primary leave, and whose
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request for non-primary or primary parental leave or leave was within the applicable statute of limitations period(s) for the federal and state claims raised herein. 37. The Plaintiff seeks class certification for purposes of the prosecution of all state and federal claims alleged herein. The limitations period for each federal or state law claim is the full statute of limitations period for each such claim. 38. Numerosity. The Plaintiff Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Chase employs hundreds of thousands of individuals in dozens of states across the United States. Upon information and belief, thousands of birth fathers employed by Chase were eligible to seek paid parental leave as a primary caregiver under Chase’s pre-2016 and 2016 Policies if they intended to serve as the primary caregiver of their child, and many of these individuals were disqualified or deterred from seeking or taking paid parental leave as primary caregivers under Chase’s policies and practices. 39. Commonality. There are numerous questions of law or fact that are common to the Class Members. Upon information and belief, proposed Plaintiff Class Members were subjected to and injured by the same policies and practices under which birth fathers were denied access to paid parental leave equal to that afforded to birth mothers. 40. Plaintiff and Plaintiff Class Members experienced the same type of harm due to Chase’s policies and practices, because Chase presumptively treated them as non-primary caregivers eligible for substantially fewer weeks of parental leave than birth mothers, while presumptively treating birth mothers as primary caregivers. 41. The questions of law or fact that are common to Class Members include:
(a) Whether the 2016 Policy and the pre-2016 Policy violated Title VII, the Ohio Fair Employment Practices Law, and other state anti-discrimination laws by
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denying birth fathers eligibility for paid parental leave as primary caregivers, unless they could demonstrate that they were a spouse or domestic partner of a mother who had returned to work or who was medically incapable of any care of the child, while birth mothers were presumptively treated as eligible primary caregiver leave without being required to make any such showing; (b) Whether the pre-2016 Policy violated the Ohio Fair Employment Practices Law, and other state anti-discrimination laws by limiting birth fathers to one week of paid parental leave while affording birth mothers access to a substantially greater number of weeks of paid maternity leave; (c) Whether and what types of injunctive and/or declaratory relief should be ordered with respect to Chase’s policies and practices; (d) Whether and what types and amounts of damages should be awarded to Plaintiff and members of the proposed Plaintiff Class. 42. Typicality. The claims of Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the Plaintiff Class he seeks to represent. The claims of Plaintiff arise from the same policies and practices and rely upon the same legal theories and factual allegations that the challenged policies and practices violate Title VII, the Ohio Fair Employment Practices Law and the equivalent state antidiscrimination statutes of other states in which Chase does business. 43. Adequacy. Plaintiff will adequately represent the members of the Class, does not have any conflicts with the other Class Members, and is represented by experienced counsel who have substantial experience in civil rights and employment discrimination and class action litigation, and who will vigorously prosecute the action on behalf of the Class. Plaintiff
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understands his obligations as a class representative, has already undertaken steps to fulfil them, and is prepared to continue to fulfill his duties as a class representative in this action. Rule 23(b)(3)
44. This action is also properly maintainable as a class action under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
45. The questions of law and fact common to the members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over questions affecting individual Class Members, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient resolution of this controversy.
46. By resolving the common issues described above in a single class proceeding, each member of the proposed Plaintiff Class will receive a determination of whether Chase’s policies and practices violated Title VII and various state anti-discrimination laws in the same uniform manner.
47. Members of the Class do not have a significant interest in individually controlling the prosecution of separate actions. The Class Members’ potential damages are modest compared to the expense and burden of prosecuting a complex action like this.
48. Other than this action, no litigation concerning sex discrimination in the provision of paid parental leave has been commenced by any member of the Plaintiff Class against Chase.
49. Prosecuting this case as a single class action will ensure that there are not inconsistent judgments and that a single injunction and rule will apply to all employees of Chase nationwide, no matter where they reside.
50. Concentration of the litigation in this forum is desirable, as this action challenges company-wide policies and practices, and it will benefit the Plaintiff Class Members to have all of their claims and defenses adjudicated in a single proceeding.
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COUNT I Violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. 51. Plaintiff hereby re-alleges and incorporates by reference, as if fully set forth herein, each and every allegation of this Complaint. 52. Title VII makes it “an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). This provision prohibits intentional discrimination based on sex, including sex-based classifications and sex-based stereotypes, in the provision of employee benefits such as paid parental leave. 53. Chase’s pre-2016 and 2016 Policies treated mothers as presumptively eligible for primary caregiver leave, while treating fathers as presumptively ineligible for primary caregiver leave. They therefore imposed a sex-based classification that treated birth fathers in a manner that, but for their sex, would be different had they been birth mothers. 54. The pre-2016 and 2016 Policies also rely upon and enforce a sex-based stereotype that women are or should be caretakers of children, and that women do or should remain at home to care for a child following the child’s birth, while men are not or should not be caretakers and instead men do or should return to work shortly after the birth of a child. 55. By instituting and operating these discriminatory policies and practices, Chase has intentionally treated male and female employees differently with respect to the compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges of employment, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 56. As a result of Defendant’s unlawful sex discrimination, Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class have suffered significant harm, including the loss of the paid time off, emotional pain and suffering, and other nonpecuniary losses.
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COUNT II (Violation of State Laws of OH, NY, CA, WA, AK, KY, ME, NJ, NC, SD, VT, WV, AR,
LA, MI, MN, OR, TN, and DC) 57. Plaintiff hereby re-alleges and incorporates by reference, as if fully set forth herein, each and every allegation of this Complaint. 58. Like Title VII, the laws of New York, Ohio, California, Alaska, Kentucky, Maine, New Jersey, North Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia, Arkansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Oregon, Tennessee, and the District of Columbia prohibit discriminating against employees on the basis of sex with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment and/or make actionable the violation of such state laws. See FEPL, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4112.02(A); the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. § 296 et seq.; the NYCHRL, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-101 et seq.; the FEHA, Cal. Gov. Code § 12940 et seq.; the California Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200; the WLAD, Rev. Code Wash. 49.60.010 et seq.; the AHRL, Alaska Stat. § 18.80.010 et seq.; the KCRA, Ky. Rev. Stat. § 334.010 et seq.; the MHRA, Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 5, § 4572; the NJLAD, N.J. Stat. Ann. 10:5-12; the NCEEPA, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-422.1, et. seq.; the SDHRA, S.D. Codified Laws § 20-13-1 et seq.; the VFEPA, 21 Vt. Stat. Ann. § 495; the WVHRA, W. Va. Code § 5-11-1 et seq.; the ACRA, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-123-107 et seq.; the LEDL, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23.301 et seq.; the MELCRA, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 37.2101 et seq.; the MNHRA, Minn. Stat. 363A et seq.; the OFEPA, Or. Rev. Stat. 659A et seq.; the THRA, Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-101 et seq.; and the DCHRA, 1. D.C. Code § 2-1401, et seq. Each of these state laws and the DCHRA provides a greater amount of time for employees to file a charge or a legal action than Title VII does, including in the context of the claims in this action.
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59. Chase’s pre-2016 and 2016 Policies treated mothers as presumptively eligible for primary caregiver leave, while treating fathers as presumptively ineligible for primary caregiver leave. They therefore imposed a sex-based classification that treated birth fathers in a manner that, but for their sex, would be different had they been birth mothers.
60. The pre-2016 and 2016 Policies also rely upon and enforce a sex-based stereotype that women are or should be caretakers of children, and that women do or should remain at home to care for a child following the child’s birth, while men are not or should not be caretakers and instead men do or should return to work shortly after the birth of a child.
61. By instituting and operating these discriminatory policies and practices, Chase has intentionally treated male and female employees differently with respect to the compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges of employment, in violation of the District of Columbia and state laws set forth above.
62. As a result of Defendant’s unlawful sex discrimination, Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class have suffered significant harm, including the loss of the paid time off, emotional pain and suffering, and other nonpecuniary losses.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant the following relief:
A. Declaratory relief, including but not limited to a declaration that Chase’s 2016 and pre-2016 Policies violated Title VII and other equivalent anti-discrimination laws of the numerous states identified above;
B. Injunctive relief, including but not limited to an order that Chase preserve a gender-neutral paid parental leave policy, with the 2017 Policy serving as a floor 15

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unless a more generous policy is adopted; and that Chase provide training on the 2017 Policy to all managers, human resources personnel, and any third-party contractors employed by Chase to implement Chase’s employee benefits policies to ensure that they are implemented in a gender-neutral manner. C. Monetary relief, including compensation for the value of any lost paid parental leave suffered by Plaintiff and the Class Members, and compensatory and consequential damages, including for emotional distress; D. Attorneys’ fees and costs to the extent allowable by law; E. Such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.

JURY DEMAND

Plaintiff demands a jury on all matters alleged herein.

Dated: May 30, 2019

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Freda Levenson Freda Levenson (0045916) Trial Attorney AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF OHIO FOUNDATION 4506 Chester Avenue Cleveland, OH 44103 Telephone: (614) 586-1958 flevenson@acluohio.org
Peter Romer-Friedman (pro hac vice forthcoming) Pooja Shethji (pro hac vice forthcoming)* OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP 601 Massachusetts Ave NW Suite 200W Washington, DC 20001 Telephone: (202) 770-7886 prf@outtengolden.com pshethji@outtengolden.com

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Deirdre Aaron (pro hac vice forthcoming) OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP 685 Third Avenue, 25th Floor New York, NY 10017 Telephone: (212) 245-1000 daaron@outtengolden.com Galen Sherwin (pro hac vice forthcoming) AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION WOMEN’S RIGHTS PROJECT 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, NY 10004 Telephone: (212) 549-2644 gsherwin@aclu.org * Admitted in New York; not yet a member of the D.C. Bar; supervised by a member of the D.C. Bar. Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Putative Class
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 Case: 2:19-cv-02328-GCS-CMV Doc #: 16 Filed: 06/21/19 Page: 1 of 10 PAGEID #: 196

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

DEREK ROTONDO, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. JPMORGAN CHASE Bank, N.A.,
Defendant.

Case No. 19-cv-2328 District Judge George C. Smith Magistrate Judge Vascura

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT, CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION OF THE
SETTLEMENT CLASS, APPOINTMENT OF PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL AS CLASS COUNSEL, AND APPROVAL OF THE PROPOSED NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT
AND CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT PROCEDURE
The matter came before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of
Class Action Settlement, Conditional Certification of the Settlement Class, Appointment of
Plaintiff’s Counsel as Class Counsel, and Approval of the Proposed Notice of Settlement and
Class Action Settlement Procedure (“Preliminary Approval Motion”). Defendant does not
oppose this Motion.
1. Based upon the Court’s review of Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support of
Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, Conditional
Certification of the Settlement Class, Appointment of Plaintiff’s Counsel as Class Counsel, and
Approval of the Proposed Notice of Settlement and Class Action Settlement Procedure, and all
other papers submitted in connection with Plaintiff’s Preliminary Approval Motion, the Court
grants preliminary approval of the $5,000,000.00 settlement memorialized in the Settlement

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Agreement and Release (“Settlement Agreement”). Capitalized terms used in this Order shall have the same meanings as set forth in the Settlement Agreement, unless otherwise defined herein. I. CERTIFICATION OF THE SETTTLEMENT CLASS
2. For settlement purposes only, the Court conditionally certifies the Settlement Class defined in the Settlement Agreement pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) (“Settlement Class”).
3. The Settlement Class meets all of the requirements for class certification under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) for purposes of settlement only.
4. The Settlement Class Period for Settlement Class Members who worked in any state outside of those included in separately-defined State Settlement Class Periods is from August 19, 2016 (300 days before the charge was filed) through December 4, 2017 (when Chase revised the 2016 policy). The Settlement Class Member’s non-primary caregiver leave or request for non-primary or primary caregiver leave must have occurred during the Settlement Class Period or within sixteen (16) weeks before the Settlement Class Period (as the person still would have been eligible for paid parental leave benefits during the Settlement Class Period).
5. If a Settlement Class Member worked in a state included in the State Settlement Class Periods, the Settlement Class Member’s non-primary caregiver leave or request for nonprimary or primary caregiver leave must have occurred during the applicable State Settlement Class Period or within twelve (12) weeks before the State Settlement Class Period (as the person still would have been eligible for paid parental leave benefits during the State Settlement Class Period), except that for Arkansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee and District of Columbia the Settlement Class Member’s non-primary caregiver leave
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or request for non-primary or primary caregiver leave must have occurred during the applicable State Settlement Class Period or within sixteen (16) weeks before the State Settlement Class Period. The following State Settlement Class Periods apply for the following states:
a. Alaska, Maine, New Jersey, and West Virginia: June 15, 2015 through December 4, 2017
b. Michigan, New York, Washington, and Vermont: June 15, 2014 through December 4, 2017
c. California: June 15, 2013 through December 4, 2017 d. Kentucky: June 15, 2012 through December 4, 2017 e. Ohio: June 15, 2011 through December 4, 2017 f. Arkansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon, South Dakota,
Tennessee, and District of Columbia: June 15, 2016 through December 4, 2017 II. APPOINTMENT OF CLASS REPRESENTATIVE AND CLASS COUNSEL
6. The Court finds that Named Plaintiff Derek Rotondo has claims typical of the Settlement Class Members and is an adequate representative of the Settlement Class Members. The Court appoints him to serve as the class representative of the Settlement Class Members.
7. Outten & Golden LLP and the American Civil Liberties Union Women’s Rights Project (“ACLU”), have, separately and collectively, extensive experience and expertise in prosecuting employment discrimination class action cases. The Court appoints these firms as Class Counsel for the Settlement Classes under Rule 23(g). III. PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
8. Based upon the Court’s review of the Preliminary Approval Motion, the Court grants preliminary approval of the settlement and all terms set forth in the Settlement Agreement
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and finds that the settlement is, in all respects, fair, adequate, reasonable, and binding on all members of the Settlement Class who have not timely and properly opted out pursuant to Section 2.7 of the Settlement Agreement.
9. The Court concludes that the proposed Settlement Agreement is “within the range of possible [settlement] approval,” such that notice to the Settlement Class Members is appropriate. In re Inter-Op Hip Prosthesis Liability Litig., 204 F.R.D. 330, 350 (N.D. Ohio 2001) (“In re Inter-Op Litig.”) (quoting Manual for Complex Litigation (Third) § 30.41 (1995)).
10. Having conducted an initial evaluation of the fairness of the proposed settlement on the basis of the Preliminary Approval Motion, the supporting declarations, and its attached documents, the Court finds that because the settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate,” and is not a “product of fraud or collusion,” preliminary approval should be granted. Clark Equip. Co. v. Int’l Union, Allied Indus. Workers of Am., AFL-CIO, 803 F.2d 878, 880 (6th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, the Court finds it appropriate to “direct that notice under Rule 23(e) be given to the class members of a formal fairness hearing.” In re Inter-Op Litig., 204 F.R.D. at 350.
11. The Court finds that the Settlement Agreement is the result of extensive, arm’s length negotiations by counsel well-versed in the prosecution of complex employment class actions.
12. The assistance of an experienced mediator reinforces that the Settlement Agreement is non-collusive. See Bert v. AK Steel Corp., No. 02 Civ. 467, 2008 WL 4693747, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 23, 2008) (“[P]articipation of an independent mediator in settlement negotiations virtually insures that the negotiations were conducted at arm’s length and without collusion . . . .”).
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IV. APPROVAL OF THE FORM AND MANNER OF DISTRIBUTING CLASS NOTICE AND CLAIM FORM 13. The Court finds that the proposed Notice is the best notice practical under the
circumstances and allows Settlement Class Members a full and fair opportunity to consider the proposed settlement. The proposed plan for distributing the Notice and Claim Form likewise is a reasonable method calculated to reach all members of the Settlement Class who would be bound by the settlement. There is no additional method of distribution that would be reasonably likely to notify Settlement Class Members who may not receive notice pursuant to the proposed distribution plan.
14. The Notice fairly, plainly, accurately, and reasonably informs Settlement Class Members of: (1) appropriate information about the nature of this litigation, the Settlement Class, the identity of Class Counsel, and the essential terms of the Settlement Agreement, including class member relief; (2) appropriate information about Class Counsel’s forthcoming application for attorneys’ fees, the proposed Service Awards to the Named Plaintiff and other payments that will be deducted from the Gross Settlement Amount; (3) appropriate information about how to participate in the Settlement; (4) appropriate information about this Court’s procedures for final approval of the Settlement Agreement, and about Settlement Class Members’ right to appear through counsel if they desire; (5) appropriate information about how to challenge or opt-out of the settlement, if they wish to do so; and (6) appropriate instructions as to how to obtain additional information regarding this litigation or the Settlement Agreement. The Notice will also provide specific information regarding the date, time, and place of the final approval hearing. This information is adequate to put Class Members on notice of the proposed settlement and is well within the requirements of Rule 23(c)(2)(B).
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15. The Court finds and concludes that the proposed plan for distributing the Notice
and Claim Form will provide the best notice practicable, satisfies the notice requirements of Rule
23(e), and satisfies all other legal and due process requirements.
16. Accordingly, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows:
a. The form of the Notice and Claim Form is approved. Non-material changes may be made as the Parties deem appropriate.
b. The manner for distributing the Notice and Claim Form is approved.
c. Within ten (10) days following entry of this Order, Defendant will provide to the Settlement Administrator, in electronic form, for all Settlement Class Members, the following information: name, work state, Social Security Number, last known addresses, last known telephone number, and the number of times the Settlement Class Member took non-primary caregiver leave during the applicable Federal Settlement Class Period or State Settlement Class Period, as that information exists on file with Defendant. The Class List will be held in the strictest confidence by all Parties and their counsel to the extent the Parties and their counsel are entitled to the Class List under the Settlement Agreement, and by the Settlement Administrator.
d. By no later than twenty (20) days following the entry of this Order, Defendant shall deposit the Gross Settlement Amount into the Qualified Settlement Fund.
e. Within fifteen (15) days following the entry of this Order, the Settlement Administrator will mail to all Settlement Class Members, via First Class United States Mail, postage prepaid, the Court-approved Notice and Claim Form.
f. The Settlement Administrator will also maintain a static website with PDF versions of the Notice and Claim Form that Settlement Class Members may access, and establish and maintain a toll-free number to answer questions from Settlement Class Members. The website shall remain posted until the expiration of the Acceptance Period.
g. For any Settlement Class Members for whom a Notice is returned by the post office as undeliverable, the Settlement Administrator shall attempt to secure a correct address using “skip tracing” and/or similar method, and a subsequent notice will be sent to the Settlement Class Member at the new address. The Settlement Administrator will notify Class Counsel and Defendant’s Counsel of any Notice sent to a Settlement Class Member
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that is returned as undeliverable after the first mailing, as well as any such Notice returned as undeliverable after any subsequent mailing(s). In addition, for any Settlement Class Members for whom a Notice is returned by the post office as undeliverable, the Settlement Administrator will request and Defendant shall provide to the Settlement Administrator within seven (7) days the personal e-mail address(es) for such individuals (if such e-mail address(es) are reasonably available to Defendant), and the Settlement Administrator will then e-mail such Settlement Class Members the Notice. h. Thirty (30) days after the initial mailing of the Notice and Claim Form to Settlement Class Members, the Settlement Administrator will send, to the extent the information is available, by First Class United States Mail to Settlement Class Members who have not returned a valid Claim Form, a reminder postcard. i. The Settlement Administrator shall take all other actions in furtherance of claims administration as are specified in the Settlement Agreement. V. PROCEDURES FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF THE SETTLEMENT A. Final Approval Hearing 17. The Court hereby schedules a hearing to determine whether to grant final certification of the Settlement Class, and final approval of the Settlement Agreement (including the proposed plan of class member relief, payment of attorneys’ fees and costs, and Service Award to the Named Plaintiff) (the “Fairness Hearing”) for October 30, 2019 at 2:00 p.m. B. Deadline to Request Exclusion from the Settlement 18. Settlement Class Members may exclude themselves, or opt-out, of the Settlement. Any Opt-out Statement must be in the form of a written, signed statement that states, “I opt out of the JPMorgan Chase parental leave settlement.” To be effective, an Opt-out Statement must be postmarked within sixty (60) days from the initial mailing of the Notice to the Settlement Class Member.
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19. Within twenty-four (24) hours of the end of the Opt-out Period, the Settlement Administrator will send a final list of all Opt-out Statements to Class Counsel and Defendant’s Counsel by both email and overnight delivery.
20. Any Settlement Class Member who does not properly submit an Opt-out Statement pursuant to this Agreement will be deemed to have accepted the Settlement and the terms of the Settlement Agreement, including the Release contained therein.
C. Deadline for Filing Objections to the Settlement 21. Any Settlement Class Member who wishes to object to the proposed Settlement must do so in writing. To be considered, a written objection must be mailed to the Settlement Administrator via First-Class United States Mail, postage prepaid, and be received by the Settlement Administrator by a date certain sixty (60) days from the mailing of the Notice to the Settlement Class Member. The written objection must include the words, “I object to the settlement in the JPMorgan Chase parental leave case” as well as all reasons for the objection. Any reasons not included in the written objection will not be considered by the Court. The written objection must also include the name, job title, address, and telephone numbers for the Settlement Class Member making the objection. The Settlement Administrator will stamp the date received on the original and send copies of each objection to Class Counsel and Defendant’s Counsel by email and overnight delivery no later than three days after receipt thereof. 22. Any Settlement Class Member who is an Objector has the right to appear at the Fairness Hearing either in person or through counsel hired by the Objector. An Objector who wishes to appear at the Fairness Hearing must state his intention to do so in writing at the time he submits his written objection by including the words, “I intend to appear at the Fairness Hearing” in his written objection. An Objector may withdraw his objection(s) at any time. No Settlement
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Class Member may appear at the Fairness Hearing unless he has filed a timely objection that complies with all procedures provided in the Settlement Agreement. No Settlement Class Member may present an objection at the Fairness Hearing based on a reason not stated in his written objection(s). A Settlement Class Member who has submitted an Opt-out Statement may not submit objections to the Settlement.
D. Deadline for Submitting Claims Forms 23. In order to receive a Settlement Award, Settlement Class Members must submit a valid Claim Form by the Claim Form Deadline. 24. To submit a valid Claim Form, Settlement Class Members must affirm that they meet the requirements set forth in Part A of the Claim Form and one of the requirements contained in Part B of the Claim Form, and that these representations are made in accordance with Part C of the Claim Form. Under the Claim Form, each Settlement Class Member may submit a separate claim for each time the person took non-primary leave for the birth of a child during the relevant Settlement Class Period for that Settlement Class Member. F. Deadline for Submitting Motion Seeking Final Approval 25. No later than fifteen (15) days before the Fairness Hearing, Plaintiff will submit a Motion for Judgment and Final Approval of the Settlement. In conjunction with the Motion for Judgment and Final Approval of the Settlement, Plaintiff shall also petition for approval of Class Counsel’s attorneys’ fees and costs and the requested Service Award to the Named Plaintiff, consistent with terms of the Settlement Agreement. 26. The Parties shall abide by all terms of the Settlement Agreement.
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Case: 2:19-cv-02328-GCS-CMV Doc #: 16 Filed: 06/21/19 Page: 10 of 10 PAGEID #: 205 It is so ORDERED this __20TH day of June , 2019. s/ George C. Smith__________________ GEORGE C. SMITH, JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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