Case 2:16-cv-05028-MCA-SCM Document 1 Filed 08/17/16 Page 1 of 33 PageID: 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

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SUNY RODRIGUEZ ALVARADO and )

A.S.R., a minor,

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Plaintiffs,

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Civ. No. _____

v.

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

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Defendant.

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___________________________________ )

COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs Suny Rodriguez Alvarado and her minor child A.S.R., by and through their

counsel, allege the following:

INTRODUCTION

1. This is a civil rights lawsuit to redress the wrongful detention, unlawful conditions

of confinement, and other inhumane treatment suffered by Suny Rodriguez Alvarado and her

minor child A.S.R., refugees who fled violence and persecution in Honduras only to be

imprisoned and grossly mistreated for four months in southern Texas, pursuant to illegal policies

and practices of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

2. Beginning in summer 2014, DHS initiated an unprecedented program to detain,

subject to harsh conditions, and deport Central American refugee families seeking protection in

the United States. DHS unlawfully detained refugees like Plaintiffs, and held them in harsh,

degrading and inhumane conditions, for the improper purpose of deterring future migrant

families from fleeing to the United States, in violation of a binding court order.

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3. Indeed, Ms. Rodriguez and her son were detained in such conditions from January to May, 2015, for improper purposes, even though they posed no danger or flight risk and both were eligible for immediate release. DHS also illegally detained accompanied minors like A.S.R. in violation of a longstanding judicial consent decree governing the release of children.
4. Despite their mistreatment by DHS, Plaintiffs both managed to win their immigration cases and now reside lawfully in New Jersey. They bring this action for damages pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act for abuse of process, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent supervision, and negligence, and for the harm they suffered at the hands of DHS.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 5. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1346(b). 6. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1) because Plaintiffs reside in the District of New Jersey.
PARTIES Plaintiffs
7. Plaintiff Suny Rodriguez Alvarado is a forty-year-old Honduran woman. She is the mother of Plaintiff A.S.R. and partner to A.S.R.’s father, Jose Rafael Sanchez Villatoro. She resides in West New York, New Jersey.
8. Plaintiff A.S.R. is the nine-year-old son of Ms. Rodriguez and Mr. Sanchez. He resides with his mother and father in West New York, New Jersey. Defendant
9. Defendant United States of America is sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act for the tortious acts of its employees, including employees of the Department of Homeland Security
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and its constituent units, Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), as well as for the tortious actions of contractors that DHS directly supervised.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK Asylum Processing for Individuals in Expedited Removal
10. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), DHS may elect to place individuals apprehended shortly after crossing the United States border in “expedited removal” proceedings. In expedited removal proceedings, DHS may remove an individual without further process, provided that an individual who indicates a fear of persecution or an intention to apply for asylum may not be removed until a screening interview is completed. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(e).
11. An applicant who seeks to apply for this protection falls into one of two categories: (a) those eligible for asylum or withholding of removal; or (b) those eligible only for withholding of removal, usually due to returning after a prior removal order.
12. Defendant has a mandatory, non-discretionary duty to “immediately refer[] to an asylum officer” for a screening interview those applicants who express a fear of persecution or torture and who are eligible for withholding of removal only. 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(e).
13. In the screening interview, an asylum officer employed by USCIS makes a threshold determination regarding an applicant’s eligibility for relief due to a fear of persecution or torture.
14. The legal standard that asylum officers apply in these initial screening interviews differs depending on whether an applicant is eligible for asylum and withholding of removal, or only for withholding of removal. Those eligible only for withholding must demonstrate a
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“reasonable fear” of persecution. 8 C.F.R. §208.31. Those eligible for asylum must demonstrate a “credible fear” of persecution, a lower standard. 8 C.F.R. § 208.30.
15. If an applicant passes the initial interview, the asylum officer refers the applicant for conventional removal proceedings and a full merits hearing before an immigration judge. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.30(f), 208.31(e). Applicants in these conventional removal proceedings have a right to counsel at no expense to the government, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A), a right to judicial review, id. § 1252(a), and other statutory and constitutional procedural rights.
16. Applicants who have passed their threshold credible fear interviews may be detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) because they are in conventional removal proceedings and awaiting a full merits hearing on their cases.
17. Individuals in reasonable fear proceedings are also subject to detention under § 1226(a) because they do not have an administratively final order of removal. Ponce-Osorio v. Johnson, --- F.3d ---, No. 16-60085, 2016 WL 3063299 (5th Cir. May 27, 2016); Luna-Garcia v. Holder, 777 F.3d 1182 (10th Cir. 2015); Ortiz-Alfaro v. Holder, 694 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2012).
18. Although DHS has separate authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 to detain individuals previously ordered removed, this section does not apply to individuals in reasonable fear proceedings because they do not have a final order of removal. See Guerra v. Shanahan, --- F.3d ---, No. 15-504-cv, 2016 WL 4056035 (2d Cir. July 29, 2016); Guerrero v. Aviles, No. 14-4367, 2014 WL 5502931 (D.N.J. Oct. 30, 2014).
19. Once an individual is in § 1226(a) detention, the applicant is entitled to a custody determination based on whether she is a flight risk or danger. 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8). DHS makes the initial custody determination, but an applicant may appeal an adverse determination to an immigration judge for de novo review. 8 C.F.R 1003.19(a).
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The U.S. Government’s Non-Refoulement Obligations 20. Defendant also has a mandatory, non-discretionary obligation under the
international law principle of non-refoulement not to return a refugee to a country of origin where the person’s “life or freedom would be threatened on account of . . . race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 33, sec. 1, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
21. The United States is bound to the provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention as a signatory to the 1967 Protocol that amended the 1951 Convention. See 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967 19 U.S.T. 6261, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. Legal Obligations Governing DHS’s Immigration Detention
22. In addition, Defendant and its employees are subject to mandatory, nondiscretionary court orders governing the detention of immigrants to the United States.
23. Specifically, ICE and CBP have a long-standing legal obligation to ensure the prompt release of minors held in immigration custody. See Flores v. Reno, CV 85-4544-DMBAGR, No. 177 (C.D. Cal. July 24, 2015). The Flores class action litigation, brought on behalf of minor children held in immigration detention, began in 1985 and resulted in a 1997 consent decree that remains binding on a nationwide basis.
24. The decree sharply limits the circumstances, duration, and manner of immigration detention of minor children. Among other things, the decree requires ICE to expeditiously place minors in licensed facilities and prioritizes the prompt release of detained minors.
25. DHS violated the Flores consent decree when, in mid-2014, it launched its massive program of arresting and detaining Central American minors such as Plaintiff A.S.R. seeking
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asylum with their parents. See Flores v. Lynch, --- F.3d ---, No. 15-56434, 2016 WL 3670046 at *7 (9th Cir. July 6, 2016) (rejecting DHS argument that consent decree applies only to unaccompanied minors and holding decree “unambiguously applies to accompanied minors”); see also Bunikyte, ex rel. Bunikiene v. Chertoff, No. A-07-CA-164-SS, 2007 WL 1074070, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 2007) (“[T]he Flores Settlement, by its terms, applies to all ‘minors in the custody’ of ICE and DHS, not just unaccompanied minors.”).
26. The Flores decree also limits the time that ICE may hold accompanied minors in immigration detention to twenty days. Flores v. Reno, CV 85-4544-DMB-AGR, 2015 WL 9915880 at *5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2015).
STATEMENT OF FACTS ICE’s Policy of Using Deterrence to Justify the Detention of Refugee Families
27. In late 2014 and early 2015, ICE used deterrence of mass migration to justify the detention of refugee families detained at facilities in Texas and New Mexico through custody determinations that failed to consider an individual’s dangerousness or flight risk.
28. During that time, ICE denied release on bond or recognizance to 99 percent of applicants with a credible fear of persecution. Declaration of Allegra McLeod ¶ 11 from R.I.LR. v. Johnson, 1:15-cv-00011, ECF 5-7 (D.D.C Jan. 6, 2015) (copy attached as Ex. A).
29. Of those bond denials that were appealed, immigration judges granted bond or conditional parole in more than 99 percent of cases. Ex. A ¶ 16.
30. In these appeals, ICE opposed bond using an identical submission, in which ICE argued that the detainee should be held to deter other migrants from coming to the United States. See Declarations of Phillip Miller & Traci Lembke from R.I.LR., ECF 5-19 (copy attached as Ex. B).
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31. Specifically, ICE submitted statements from two senior DHS officials that a “‘no bond’ or ‘high bond’ policy would significantly reduce the unlawful mass migration of Guatemalans, Hondurans, and Salvadoran[s].” Ex. B, Miller Dec. ¶ 9; Lembke Dec. ¶ 20.
32. Attorneys representing families in ICE’s facilities also noted that ICE opposed bond by citing deterrence of mass migration as a rationale. Declaration of Barbara Hines from R.I.LR., ECF 5-4, ¶¶ 13-22 (copy attached as Ex. C); Declaration of Virginia Raymond from R.I.L.R., 1:15-cv-00011, ECF 24-4 (D.D.C. Jan. 28, 2015), ¶¶ 5-8 (copy attached as Ex. D).
33. This near-categorical refusal to release families on bond was a dramatic departure from previous ICE practice. Prior to the summer of 2014, ICE did not detain Central American families on this scale and released families on personal recognizance or bond. See Declaration of Valerie Burch from R.I.LR., ECF 24-1 (copy attached as Ex. E); Declaration of Matthew Archambeault from R.I.LR., ECF 24-2, ¶ 10 (copy attached as Ex. F).
34. High level DHS officials and members of Congress also identified deterrence of other migrants as a reason DHS was detaining Central American families seeking asylum. DHS Press Release, Statement by Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson Before the Senate Committee on Appropriations (July 10, 2014) (copy attached as Ex. G); Letter from Rep. Logren et. al. to President Obama (Oct 27, 2014) (copy attached as Ex. H); see also Chico Harlan, Inside the Administration’s $1 Billion Deal to Detain Central American Asylum Seekers, Wash. Post, Aug. 14, 2016 (discussing the role deterrence has played in justifying family detention).
35. Thus, ICE had a policy and practice of considering deterrence of potential migrants when it made family detention custody determinations in 2014 and early 2015. See R.I.L.R. v. Johnson, 80 F.Supp.3d 164, 176 (D.D.C. 2015) (finding an ICE policy of “taking deterrence of
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mass migration into account in making custody determinations,” and that the policy “played a significant role in the large number of Central American families detained since 2014”). Plaintiffs’ Past Persecution in Honduras
36. Ms. Rodriguez was born in Honduras in 1976 and emigrated to the United States in April 1998. She was placed in removal proceedings and ordered removed in absentia when she was sick and missed a court date.
37. Despite being subject to an in absentia removal order, Ms. Rodriguez received Temporary Protected Status after Hurricane Mitch struck Honduras in October 1998. She then resided lawfully in the United States for a number of years.
38. In 2004, Honduran police officers murdered Ms. Rodriguez’s mother, an outspoken police critic, as well as her stepfather. The police refused to investigate the murders – though they occurred near a police station – and blamed Ms. Rodriguez’s stepfather for a murdersuicide.
39. Ms. Rodriguez returned to Honduras in 2006 to investigate the circumstances of their deaths and to speak out against the corruption that had prevented a proper investigation.
40. When Ms. Rodriguez returned to Honduras, she had the bodies of her mother and stepfather exhumed and examined by the prosecutor’s office. The examination confirmed that her stepfather did not commit the murder and demonstrated that the police had covered up the true cause of death. The discovery led Ms. Rodriguez to speak out against police corruption.
41. In response, the Honduran police subjected Ms. Rodriguez’s family to intimidation, harassment, threats, and extortion at their business, at their home, and in the streets.
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42. After years of abuse, in September 2014, and when Ms. Rodriguez confronted the police officers and demanded that they leave her and her family in peace, the officers responded by physically attacking Ms. Rodriguez in front of her home.
43. Ms. Rodriguez reported the physical assault and harassment to the Chief of Police. Ms. Rodriguez also contacted the Commissioner for Human Rights in Honduras and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and encouraged others to do the same.
44. As a result of her activism, the Honduran police intensified their abuse, and Ms. Rodriguez became afraid to leave her house. Eventually, conditions became unbearable, and Ms. Rodriguez, her partner Mr. Sanchez, and their young son A.S.R. decided to flee in late 2014. Plaintiffs’ Arrival in the United States and Apprehension by CBP
45. Ms. Rodriguez, A.S.R., and Mr. Sanchez fled Honduras in November 2014. While they were en route to the United States, Mexican authorities arrested them and returned them to Honduras.
46. Still fearing for their lives, Ms. Rodriguez, Mr. Sanchez and A.S.R. attempted to flee Honduras a second time. This time they successfully reached the U.S.-Mexico border. On or about January 16, 2015, they crossed the Rio Grande River in an inflatable raft. The crossing soaked their clothing and the family arrived in Texas hungry, wet and thirsty.
47. CBP agents soon apprehended the family and placed them into a van, hungry and wet, without addressing their obvious need for basic provisions like clothes, food, and water.
48. CBP agents transported Plaintiffs and Mr. Sanchez to a holding facility, known as a “hielera,” or “icebox,” because of its cold temperatures, where they processed the family. When Plaintiffs requested food and dry clothes, CBP officials laughed at and taunted Plaintiffs for requesting these basic necessities.
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Ms. Rodriguez Expresses a Fear of Returning to Her Country of Origin 49. Ms. Rodriguez informed a Spanish-speaking CBP agent whom she knew as “Agent
Rodriguez” that she feared returning to Honduras. Despite her having expressed this fear, Agent Rodriguez and other agents pressured Ms. Rodriguez to sign papers accepting removal to Honduras.
50. Agent Rodriguez rebuked Ms. Rodriguez, telling her that she was not allowed in the United States and could not stay. Agent Rodriguez told Ms. Rodriguez that she would face the same violence she fled from in Honduras in the United States, and that her flight was pointless.
51. Although Ms. Rodriguez repeatedly expressed her fear of returning to Honduras during her time in CBP detention, CBP agents did not immediately refer her to an asylum officer for a reasonable fear interview or cease pressuring Ms. Rodriguez to sign deportation papers.
52. CBP agents have a mandatory, non-discretionary duty not to coerce individuals to withdraw their application for admission into the United States. See CBP Directive No. 3340-043 (Sept. 3, 2008) (copy attached as Ex. I).
53. Defendant’s employees violated a mandatory, non-discretionary duty by attempting to coerce Ms. Rodriguez and her family to agree to deportation. CBP agents also violated a mandatory, non-discretionary duty by failing to immediately refer Ms. Rodriguez for appropriate screening and by using CBP detention as a means to attempt to force Ms. Rodriguez to abandon her bona fide legal claims. 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(e). These coercive efforts also violate domestic law that provides protections for those fleeing persecution, as well as the principle of nonrefoulement.
54. CBP’s practice of coercing detained individuals to sign papers agreeing to removal is well-known. See, e.g., Lopez Venegas v. Napolitano, Complaint, No. 2:13-cv-03972 (C.D. Cal.
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Aug. 18, 2014); Doe v. Johnson, No. 4:15-cv-00250, ECF 1 (D. Ariz. June 8, 2015); Human Rights Watch, “You Don’t Have Rights Here”: US Border Screening and Returns of Central Americans to Risk of Serious Harm 20-29 (Oct. 2014).
55. The CBP officers’ threats of deportation and denial of food caused Ms. Rodriguez to develop intense headaches, feel nauseous, cry repeatedly, and tremble uncontrollably. Conditions in CBP Holding Facilities During Plaintiffs’ CBP Detention
56. During CBP’s initial processing, Ms. Rodriguez informed Agent Rodriguez that A.S.R. had asthma. Ms. Rodriguez was travelling with A.S.R.’s inhaler and pills for his asthma. CBP never provided any medical treatment to A.S.R. during his time in CBP detention.
57. After processing, CBP agents separated Plaintiffs from Mr. Sanchez and told Plaintiffs that Mr. Sanchez would be deported that night. CBP agents took Mr. Sanchez to another holding facility, and later, to the ICE South Texas Detention Facility in Pearsall, Texas. Ms. Rodriguez and their son did not see him for the next eight months while he was detained, pursuing his immigration case. Mr. Sanchez was unable to provide assistance to Ms. Rodriguez and their son, A.S.R., during their immigration proceedings in detention.
58. CBP agents refused to answer Ms. Rodriguez’s questions about Mr. Sanchez’s location or whether the family would be reunited.
59. Plaintiffs experienced inhumane conditions that fell below CBP’s own minimum standards for operation of its facilities at the first holding facility known as the “icebox.” CBP agents detained Plaintiffs in a crowded room with a wet floor and cement blocks for seats. Other detainees had taken all the seats, so Ms. Rodriguez requested a blanket for her asthmatic son to sleep on so that he would not have to sleep directly on the wet floor. CBP agents told her that she could not have anything because she was not in her own country.
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60. CBP agents later gave her a Mylar blanket, but left Plaintiffs to sleep on the floor. 61. CBP agents gave Plaintiffs a cold ham sandwich and a juice box each after several hours. This was the first time Plaintiffs had eaten since crossing the border. CBP agents never gave Plaintiffs anything other than cold sandwiches for their meals while in CBP custody. 62. CBP agents kept the detention cell temperature very cold level throughout Plaintiffs’ time in the holding facility. Ms. Rodriguez requested that CBP agents raise the temperature to accommodate her son’s severe asthma, but the guards ignored her request. 63. Because of these inhumane conditions, Plaintiff A.S.R.’s asthma worsened. A.S.R. suffered serious asthma attacks in the first CBP holding facility because of the cold air. Ms. Rodriguez pleaded with CBP for help, especially with the room temperature, but CBP officials ignored her pleas, as well as this threat to A.S.R.’s deteriorating health. 64. Ms. Rodriguez became deeply anxious and concerned for her son because of the very cold temperatures and the wet floor her son was forced to sleep on. 65. On or about January 17, 2015, CBP agents transferred Plaintiffs to a second holding facility, known as a “perrera,” or “dog-house.” 66. CBP agents kept Plaintiffs in this second facility for two days and one night. 67. At this second facility, CBP agents again forced Plaintiffs to sleep in an extremely cold room on the floor, crowded with other people. The agents again gave Plaintiffs only a thin Mylar blanket to place between themselves and the floor. CBP agents also seized A.S.R.’s medicine from Ms. Rodriguez. 68. Ms. Rodriguez again asked CBP agents to raise the temperature because of A.S.R.’s poor health. CBP agents instead lowered the temperature.
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69. A.S.R. continued to suffer a decline in health at the second CBP facility, coughing repeatedly because of the holding facility’s cold, inhumane environment.
70. At this second facility, CBP agents again repeatedly pressured Ms. Rodriguez to sign deportation papers, despite her previous statement that she feared returning to Honduras. CBP agents harassed Ms. Rodriguez and the other detainees to sign the forms, as frequently as every twenty minutes.
71. CBP officials told Ms. Rodriguez that there were already too many immigrants in the holding center and too many immigrants trying to enter the United States. The CBP agents repeated Agent Rodriguez’s assertions, telling the Plaintiffs and other detainees that the United States was violent and not safe, just like their countries of origin.
72. Ms. Rodriguez continued to suffer from intense headaches, nausea, repeated crying, uncontrollable trembling, and fear during her time in the second CBP facility because of the pressure to agree to deportation.
73. In addition to his physical illness, A.S.R. also suffered emotionally, and became visibly sad and depressed. He cried multiple times during Plaintiffs’ time in CBP custody. CBP Obligations and Policy Violations Regarding Detention Conditions
74. CBP agents detained Plaintiffs, confined them in coercive, inhumane conditions and attempted to force Plaintiffs to abandon their legal rights to deter other migrants and refugees from seeking protection in the United States.
75. CBP’s “Hold Rooms and Short Term Custody” Policy (Hold Rooms Policy, or Policy) (copy attached as Ex. J) governed CBP activities at the “icebox” and “dog-house” during Plaintiffs’ detention. The Policy stated that “[w]herever possible, a detainee should not be held
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for more than 12 hours. Every effort will be made to promptly process, transfer, . . . or release those in custody as appropriate and as operationally feasible.” Ex. I ¶ 6.2.1.
76. CBP agents violated a mandatory, non-discretionary duty by detaining Plaintiffs for nearly three days, far in excess of the 12 hours mandated by agency policy.
77. The Hold Rooms Policy further mandated that detainees be held “in facilities that are safe, secure, and clean. Detainees will be provided food, water, properly equipped restrooms and hygiene supplies as set forth in this directive.” Id. ¶ 5.1. The Policy also stated that hold rooms for “unaccompanied alien children” must have an “adequate temperature.” Id. ¶ 6.24.7 The Flores consent decree also requires that facilities with children must provide shelter at an appropriate temperature.
78. CBP agents violated a mandatory, non-discretionary duty by ignoring Ms. Rodriguez’s complaints about the temperature in both CBP facilities. CBP agents disregarded their agency’s policy that temperatures in holding facilities be appropriate for children.
79. The Policy also required that “detention space capacity will not be exceeded.” Id. ¶ 7.1.2. CBP agents violated a mandatory, non-discretionary policy by overcrowding CBP’s facilities, forcing Plaintiffs to sit on a cold floor with wet clothes and without bedding.
80. The Hold Rooms Policy further stated that “Juveniles detained longer than 24 hours will be given access to basic hygiene articles, a blanket, and a mattress,” id. ¶ 6.24.6, and that every 2 of 3 meals that a Juvenile receives must be hot, id. ¶ 6.24.9. CBP agents violated mandatory, non-discretionary duties by failing to provide A.S.R. with hot food and bedding.
81. CBP’s neglect and deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs’ medical and subsistence needs, its coercive tactics, and the inhumane conditions of CBP holding facilities caused Plaintiffs severe emotional distress and significant physical injury.
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82. CBP detained Plaintiffs, subjected Plaintiffs to inhumane conditions, and coerced Plaintiffs to agree to deportation for the improper purpose of deterring other migrants and refugees from attempting to seek protection in the United States. Plaintiffs’ Detention in the South Texas Family Residential Center
83. On or about January 19, 2015, DHS officials transferred Plaintiffs to the South Texas Family Residential Center in Dilley, Texas (hereinafter “Dilley”). DHS officials intentionally misrepresented to Plaintiffs that DHS had plans to deport them to Honduras.
84. ICE administers and supervises Dilley and operates the facility in conjunction with the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA). ICE unlawfully detained Plaintiffs at this facility for the next four months, until May 14, 2015.
85. ICE’s detention of Plaintiffs, and the inhumane conditions of confinement to which CBP subjected Plaintiffs, violated the Flores consent decree in a number of respects, discussed infra ¶¶ 111-12, 117, 125-26, and was done for the improper purpose of forcing Plaintiffs to abandon their valid legal claims and deterring other migrants from coming to the United States, in violation of the INA and a federal court order. ICE’s Coercion and Intimidation
86. During Plaintiffs’ time in Dilley, ICE officials repeatedly subjected Ms. Rodriguez and A.S.R. to intimidation and threats of deportation.
87. After their arrival in detention in mid-January 2015 and until Plaintiffs’ credible and reasonable fear interviews on February 10, 2015, Ms. Rodriguez’s ICE deportation officer – whom she knew as Agent Johnston – frequently attempted to coerce her into signing deportation forms. When Ms. Rodriguez refused, Agent Johnston raised his voice in a threatening manner.
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88. Ms. Rodriguez repeatedly explained that she would not agree to deportation because she feared returning to her country of origin. Agent Johnston ignored her attempts to make known that she had a strong claim for legal refuge in the United States.
89. On approximately four occasions, CCA guards woke Ms. Rodriguez very late at night to attempt to coerce her into signing deportation papers. When Ms. Rodriguez pressed the guards to explain their actions, the guards informed her that they were acting under ICE’s orders.
90. On multiple occasions, the CCA guards took Ms. Rodriguez to see ICE Agent Johnston, who would pressure her to sign papers to agree to deportation.
91. Like CBP, ICE officials did not immediately refer Ms. Rodriguez for a reasonable fear interview, despite her insistence that she feared returning to Honduras.
92. A.S.R. was also present at the meetings with ICE Agent Johnston. On multiple occasions, A.S.R. also expressed to Johnston that he did not want to return to Honduras.
93. ICE Agent Johnston applied further pressure by putting Ms. Rodriguez on the phone with the Honduran consulate. Agent Johnston stated the call was necessary to prepare for her deportation. Ms. Rodriguez told the consulate, in the presence of Agent Johnston, that she would not sign any papers and that she feared return to Honduras.
94. Ms. Rodriguez experienced panic attacks, tremors, and nausea due to the ICE officials’ repeated threats of deportation, intimidation tactics, and refusal to afford her an immediate interview to begin the process of applying for withholding of removal. These symptoms began during Ms. Rodriguez’s time in CBP detention and subsided only after Ms. Rodriguez passed her reasonable fear interview in mid-February 2015.
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95. A.S.R. also experienced physical and emotional difficulties during this period. He was depressed, did not sleep well, and lost weight. He feared returning to Honduras during this time because he saw other families being deported.
96. DHS finally arranged for Ms. Rodriguez and A.S.R. to have a reasonable fear interview on February 10, 2015. However, in order to intimidate her, Agent Johnston continued to tell Ms. Rodriguez that she would fail her interview and be deported. ICE’s harassment caused Ms. Rodriguez great emotional distress as she worried about forced return to the danger she fled.
97. Defendant’s employees violated mandatory, non-discretionary statutory duties by failing to provide Ms. Rodriguez with an immediate reasonable fear interview and by continuing to threaten deportation. 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(e).
98. ICE’s repeated refusal to immediately arrange for Ms. Rodriguez’s reasonable fear interview, its attempts to coerce her into signing deportation papers, and its threats of deportation inflicted severe emotional distress and physical injury on Ms. Rodriguez and her son.
99. ICE’s coercive use of power to force Plaintiffs to sign removal papers also constituted an abuse of its legal authority. Plaintiffs’ Screening Interview and Continued Detention After the Interview
100. On February 10, 2015, an Asylum Officer interviewed Ms. Rodriguez and her son. 101. On February 11, 2015, Plaintiffs received notice of their positive interview results. The asylum officer determined that Ms. Rodriguez had demonstrated a reasonable fear of torture if returned to Honduras and that A.S.R. had passed his credible fear interview. 102. On February 16, 2015, ICE Agent Trevino executed a Form I-286, Notice of Custody Determination. There was no evidence that A.S.R., then an eight-year-old boy, posed any danger to the community or was a risk of flight. Nevertheless, Agent Trevino concluded that
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no amount of bond or conditions of supervised release could ensure his future appearance for removal proceedings.
103. Ms. Rodriguez requested review of this custody decision by an immigration judge. 104. A second ICE Agent, Gonzales, reaffirmed the custody decision on March 5, 2015. 105. ICE did not give Ms. Rodriguez a custody determination. ICE’s refusal to make a custody determination in Ms. Rodriguez’s case was unlawful. 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8). 106. At the time that ICE made A.S.R.’s custody determination, it had a policy in place of considering deterrence of other migrants. 107. On February 20, 2015, the district court in R.I.L.R. v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164 (D.D.C. 2015), granted a preliminary injunction preventing ICE from considering deterrence when making custody determinations for those in credible fear proceedings. 108. Nevertheless, ICE continued to detain Plaintiffs for many weeks for the improper purpose of deterring further immigration, even though Plaintiffs posed no security or flight risk. 109. A.S.R. was a member of the R.I.L.R. class. 80 F. Supp. 3d at 180. His detention for the improper purpose of general deterrence was unlawful. Id. at 189-91. 110. Because Ms. Rodriguez passed a reasonable fear interview, she was not subject to an administratively final order of removal. She was therefore also subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Her continued detention for the improper purpose of deterrence was unlawful. 111. In addition, ICE detained A.S.R. without cause in violation of the consent decree in Flores v. Reno. The Flores consent decree requires ICE to expeditiously place minors in licensed facilities and prioritizes the prompt release of minors held in immigration detention. 112. ICE also violated Flores by detaining A.S.R. in excess of twenty days.
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A.S.R.’s Custody Case 113. Throughout their time in detention, Ms. Rodriguez informed ICE officials that she
did not wish to be separated from A.S.R. unless he was released to his aunt in New Jersey. 114. After Plaintiffs passed their screening interviews in February 2015, Ms. Rodriguez
pursued release for A.S.R. by requesting review of his custody determination so that he could live with his aunt.
115. Ms. Rodriguez, through pro bono counsel, eventually succeeded in reversing ICE’s custody determination on March 12, 2015. On that date, Immigration Judge Eileen R. Trujillo ordered ICE to release A.S.R. and that the agency “comply with all the applicable rules and regulations pertaining to the release of a minor.”
116. ICE did not immediately release A.S.R. ICE Deputy Chief Counsel Paul Nishiie informed A.S.R.’s counsel that they did not intend to release A.S.R., despite the court order.
117. On April 4, 2015, ICE officials again violated the immigration judge’s order, as well as the agency’s other legal obligations, by attempting to place A.S.R. in a shelter for unaccompanied children. ICE’s attempt to separate Ms. Rodriguez and A.S.R. terrified Plaintiffs and violated the Flores consent decree and 8 C.F.R. § 1236.3 which impose a mandatory, nondiscretionary duty on ICE to prioritize release to family members, here to A.S.R.’s aunt.
118. ICE officials refused to provide assurances to Ms. Rodriguez that her son would be placed with his aunt and would not indicate how long they would house A.S.R. in the shelter.
119. ICE officials brought Plaintiffs to a bus at the detention facility. However, A.S.R. would not leave Ms. Rodriguez’s side. The two stayed together, refusing to be separated.
120. As a condition to stop ICE’s plan, an ICE official required Ms. Rodriguez to sign a document retracting her prior request that her son be released.
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121. ICE’s attempt to separate A.S.R. from his mother caused both Ms. Rodriguez and A.S.R. extreme distress, as they feared Defendant’s actions would cause them to lose contact with each other, as they had with Mr. Sanchez.
122. ICE took these actions without informing A.S.R.’s counsel at the time. 123. On April 7, 2015, A.S.R., through pro bono counsel, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court to enforce the immigration judge’s order. A.S.R. v. Lucero, No. EP-15-cv-0101 (W.D. Tex. filed Apr. 7, 2015). 124. ICE officials violated mandatory, non-discretionary agency policies by withholding information from Plaintiffs and by threatening to separate her from her son. 125. The Flores consent decree and 8 C.F.R. § 1236.3 impose a mandatory, nondiscretionary duty on ICE to prioritize release to family members over refugee shelters or foster care. By threatening to release A.S.R. to a shelter, ICE violated this mandatory duty and the immigration judge’s order, which incorporated these regulations and Flores by reference. 126. The Flores consent decree imposes a mandatory, non-discretionary duty on ICE to ensure that detained minors are allowed to have “contact with family members who were arrested with the minor.” ICE violated this mandatory duty by attempting to separate A.S.R. from Ms. Rodriguez without her consent and by withholding information about Mr. Sanchez. 127. ICE’s violations of its mandatory duties caused Plaintiffs severe emotional distress. Sleep Disruptions 128. During their time in Dilley, Plaintiffs experienced other instances of humiliation, threats, and intimidation by ICE and its CCA-employed guards. 129. Practices at Dilley required that Plaintiffs sleep with the lights on in their trailer. CCA guards informed Plaintiffs that the “lights on” mandate was an ICE policy.
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130. After Plaintiffs and other families in their cabin repeatedly complained about this policy, they were allowed to sleep with the lights off. CCA employees then began to enter the room with flashlights periodically throughout the night, sometimes as frequently as every ten minutes. CCA guards stated they were acting pursuant to ICE’s orders.
131. On multiple occasions, CCA guards required Plaintiffs to appear at the health clinic, without warning, during the late hours of the night and early hours of the morning. When Plaintiffs objected, CCA guards informed Plaintiffs that they were following ICE orders.
132. ICE practices regarding the use of lights and health clinic check-ins eliminated Plaintiffs’ sense of privacy and impeded Plaintiffs’ ability to sleep, exacerbating their stress and anxiety. ICE used these practices to further dissuade Plaintiffs from exercising their lawful rights.
133. ICE and CCA used these practices despite express provisions to the contrary in the Intergovernmental Service Agreement (“IGSA”) between CCA and ICE and in ICE policy.
134. The IGSA provides that CCA’s performance will be judged on the basis of the IGSA and the ICE Family Residential Standards. The Family Residential Standards are standards promulgated by ICE to govern conditions and practices in ICE’s family detention facilities.
135. The IGSA stipulates that CCA will not conduct “mandatory Head Counts”, but rather, will “allow residents to self-check in with designated staff three times per day.” IGSA Performance Work Statement at 13 (copy attached as Ex. K).
136. Similarly, the Family Residential Standards states that a detainee census “shall not be conducted during sleeping hours and staff shall not shine lights or otherwise disturb residents ….” ICE Family Residential Standard: Resident Census at 2 (copy attached as Ex. L).
137. ICE and CCA repeatedly ignored and violated these contract provisions.
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138. In sum, ICE and CCA officials violated non-discretionary policies by frequently disturbing Plaintiffs’ sleep. ICE used these conditions of detention to cause Plaintiffs to give up their legal rights and claims and to deter other migrants and refugees pursuant to DHS policy.
139. These ICE practices re-traumatized Ms. Rodriguez after her past persecution by the Honduran police, including that they led her to feel as if she were under constant police surveillance. Refusal to Share Information About Mr. Sanchez
140. Ms. Rodriguez repeatedly requested that ICE agents inform her where her partner was located. ICE agents did not respond to her requests.
141. A couple weeks after her arrival in Dilley, a CCA employee finally informed Ms. Rodriguez that she could determine her partner’s location by using the ICE detainee locator website. Through the CCA employee, Ms. Rodriguez learned that her partner was detained in Pearsall, Texas.
142. Upon information and belief, ICE officials deliberately withheld information about Mr. Sanchez’s whereabouts to cause severe emotional distress, with the goal of coercing Plaintiffs into agreeing to deportation and to deter other migrants from coming to the United States. Plaintiffs suffered anxiety in part because CBP agents had previously told Ms. Rodriguez that Mr. Sanchez would be deported and Plaintiffs believed ICE withheld his location because he had been deported.
143. Mr. Sanchez was unable to assist with preparing the Plaintiffs’ immigration cases because he and Plaintiffs were in separate detention facilities, making communication very difficult. This caused Plaintiffs additional emotional distress as Ms. Rodriguez and A.S.R. sought to prepare their case without Mr. Sanchez.
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ICE and CCA’s Efforts to Prevent Access to Counsel 144. ICE and CCA officials also inhibited Ms. Rodriguez’s access to counsel. 145. On May 13, 2015, the day before Ms. Rodriguez’s merits hearing in her
immigration case, ICE and CCA officials required Ms. Rodriguez and her attorneys to wait several hours before allowing them to meet with one another. Ms. Rodriguez had out-of-state attorneys who were only at the remote Dilley facility for a brief period to prepare and present her case. The limited timeframe for preparing the case made the delay particularly stressful for Ms. Rodriguez, who knew that much rested on her appearance in immigration court the following day. ICE and CCA officials caused this delay even though both counsel and Ms. Rodriguez repeatedly requested to see one another.
146. ICE Family Residential Standards governing CCA’s and ICE’s employees allow Plaintiffs to meet with counsel during regular business hours and during meal times when necessary. ICE Family Residential Standards: Visitation at 7 (copy attached as Ex. M). ICE and CCA violated these mandatory, non-discretionary policies.
147. ICE officials deliberately attempted to inhibit Ms. Rodriguez’s success in her immigration case so they could deport her and A.S.R.
148. ICE and CCA’s delays caused Ms. Rodriguez severe anxiety and emotional distress as she worried whether she would be able to finish preparing her case. ICE’s Direct Supervision of CCA
149. At all times relevant to this complaint, ICE directly and daily supervised the operations of CCA in Dilley. ICE officials were present at Dilley on a daily basis and knew or should have known of all CCA practices relevant to this complaint.
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150. All policies and procedures that CCA implemented at Dilley and which were required by the IGSA between ICE and CCA were previously approved by ICE.
151. ICE Family Residential Standards also mandate direct supervision of family detention facilities by ICE. The standards provide that “ICE/DRO [Detention and Removal Operations] Field Office staff will frequently and directly observe facility operations and living and working conditions.” ICE Family Residential Standard: Staff-Resident Communication at 1 (copy attached as Ex. N).
152. In addition, USCIS officials conducting credible fear and reasonable fear screenings worked daily at Dilley, and therefore had extensive knowledge of conditions at Dilley.
153. Further, the San Antonio ICE Field Office exercised direct control and supervision over policies and practices at Dilley.
154. Finally, high-level DHS officials regularly visited the Dilley facility to supervise and observe operations at least every fifteen days. Plaintiffs’ Immigration Cases
155. On or about May 14, 2015, Ms. Rodriguez won her withholding of removal case before Immigration Judge Lourdes Rodriguez De Jongh, who found that Ms. Rodriguez more likely than not would be persecuted if returned to Honduras. Ms. Rodriguez prevailed while detained in Dilley and despite the threats, intimidation, and mistreatment she suffered.
156. On or about May 14, 2015, DHS officials released Plaintiffs from Dilley, approximately 128 days after first arresting them. Plaintiffs relocated to New Jersey, where Ms. Rodriguez and A.S.R. were reunited with relatives, including Ms. Rodriguez’s elder children.
157. A.S.R. did not have a merits hearing to establish his eligibility for protection while in ICE detention. After he and his mother were released, his case was transferred to New Jersey.
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158. On October 1, 2015, Mr. Sanchez was granted protection under the Convention Against Torture in Pearsall Immigration Court. On October 2, 2015, Mr. Sanchez was released from detention and was reunited with his family in New Jersey after eight months’ separation.
159. On January 19, 2016, Immigration Judge Leo Finston in Newark Immigration Court granted A.S.R. asylum, finding that he had a well-founded fear of persecution. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
160. The United States is liable pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act for the tortious acts of its employees in “circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
161. At all times relevant to this Complaint, ICE and CBP officials acted within the scope of their employment and/or their official duties as employees of DHS, a U.S. agency.
162. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a), the Plaintiffs filed FTCA administrative claims with DHS for all the tortious actions alleged here and committed by ICE, CBP, and CCA officials acting under the supervision of DHS.
163. DHS denied the Plaintiffs’ claims on February 26, 2016. 164. Plaintiffs have administratively exhausted their claims under the FTCA.
CLAIMS First Claim Federal Tort Claims Act - 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) Abuse of Process 165. Plaintiffs incorporate and re-allege all the allegations in paragraphs 1-164.
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166. Under Texas law, the elements of an abuse of process claim include (1) an illegal, improper, or perverted use of the process, neither warranted nor authorized by the process, (2) an ulterior motive or purpose in exercising such use, and (3) damage as a result of the illegal act.
167. Defendant’s employees abused legal process for the unlawful purpose of (1) deterring future migrants from seeking refuge in the United States in violation of the INA and a court order and (2) coercing Plaintiffs to abandon their legal claims when by detaining and subjecting Plaintiffs to inhumane conditions of confinement.
168. ICE and CBP abused their detention authority by detaining Plaintiffs in the “icebox,” the “dog house”, and Dilley, by failing to immediately provide a credible or reasonable fear interview as required by law, and by subjecting them to inhumane and coercive conditions. These abuses of authority were done for the improper purposes of coercing Plaintiffs to abandon their claims and deterring other migrants, in violation of the INA and federal court orders.
169. ICE officials also abused the legal process by threatening and attempting to separate Ms. Rodriguez from her son, despite Ms. Rodriguez’s repeated insistence that ICE could only release A.S.R. to his aunt in New Jersey.
170. ICE used its authority to separate Plaintiffs from Mr. Sanchez for the unlawful purpose of deterring future immigration in violation of the INA and a court order, to impede Plaintiffs’ case for protection in the United States, and to inflict emotional distress on Plaintiffs.
171. Plaintiffs suffered physical injury, mental anguish, and unlawful detention as a result of Defendant’s employees’ abuse of their legal authority.
172. The actions of Defendant’s employees constitute abuse of process under Texas law.
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Second Claim Federal Tort Claims Act - 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)
False Imprisonment 173. Plaintiffs incorporate and re-allege all the allegations in paragraphs 1-172. 174. Under Texas tort law, false imprisonment requires (1) willful detention, (2) without consent, and (3) without authority of law. 175. Defendant’s employees knowingly and intentionally detained and imprisoned Plaintiffs when they were picked up at the U.S.-Mexican border and placed in detention facilities for approximately 128 days. Plaintiffs at no point consented to or agreed to their detention. 176. Defendant’s employees unlawfully used their detention authority to detain Plaintiffs for the purpose of general deterrence in violation of the INA and a federal court order. 177. Defendant’s employees also abused their authority by detaining A.S.R. for an excessive period of time in violation of the Flores consent decree. 178. ICE unlawfully delayed its initial custody determination for three weeks after transferring Plaintiffs to Dilley, and then unlawfully held Plaintiffs for an additional three months despite having no evidence that either Plaintiff was dangerous or posed a flight risk. 179. The actions of Defendant’s employees constitute false imprisonment under Texas law.
Third Claim Federal Tort Claims Act - 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 180. Plaintiffs incorporate and re-allege all the allegations in paragraphs 1-179. 181. Under Texas law, intentional infliction of emotional distress exists where 1) the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly, 2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous, 3) the
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defendant’s action caused the plaintiff’s emotional distress, and 4) the emotional distress that plaintiff suffered was severe.
182. Defendant’s employees knowingly and intentionally caused Plaintiffs severe emotional stress by denying Plaintiffs proper food, clothing, and appropriate facilities during their time in CBP detention, maintaining CBP facilities at freezing temperatures, repeatedly threatening Plaintiffs with deportation, mocking Plaintiffs, intimidating Plaintiffs to try to secure their signatures on documents authorizing their removal from the United States, failing to immediately refer Plaintiffs for a reasonable or credible fear interview and delaying access to counsel the day before the merits hearing in Ms. Rodriguez’s withholding of removal case.
183. Defendant’s employees knowingly and intentionally caused Plaintiffs severe emotional distress by separating Ms. Rodriguez from her partner and A.S.R. from his father, and then by withholding information from Plaintiffs about his location.
184. Defendant’s employees also knowingly and intentionally caused Plaintiffs severe emotional distress by invading Plaintiffs’ privacy, harassing Plaintiffs in their sleep using disruptive “lights on” and “check in” policies, interrupting their sleep by forcing Plaintiffs to report to ICE agents and the health clinic, and attempting to forcibly separate Ms. Rodriguez from A.S.R. and place A.S.R. in a shelter with full knowledge that Ms. Rodriguez did not consent to this arrangement but instead was seeking a family placement, as the law allows and a federal court order requires.
185. Defendant’s employees’ behavior was extreme and outrageous under the circumstances, particularly in light of Plaintiffs’ recent flight from abuse and persecution.
186. Defendant’s employees ignored mandatory and non-discretionary duties when purposefully inflicting this emotional distress upon Plaintiffs.
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187. Plaintiffs’ emotional distress was caused by the conduct of Defendant’s employees, and the emotional distress Plaintiffs experienced was severe.
188. The actions of Defendant’s employees constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress under Texas law.
Fourth Claim Federal Tort Claims Act - 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)
Negligent Supervision 189. Plaintiffs incorporate and re-allege all the allegations in paragraphs 1-188. 190. To state a claim for negligent supervision under Texas law, a plaintiff must show that she suffered damages from the foreseeable misconduct of an employee supervised by the defendant. The elements required mirror those of a typical negligence claim: the plaintiff must show (1) a legal duty owed to the plaintiff, (2) a breach of that duty by the defendant, and (3) damages proximately caused by the breach. 191. Defendant’s employees in supervisory roles at DHS have a duty to properly supervise CBP and ICE agents and to oversee the Dilley detention facility. 192. CBP and ICE’s negligent supervision proximately caused the unlawful conduct and injury that Plaintiffs experienced to occur. 193. CBP and ICE’s failure to adequately supervise its own direct employees, as well as their failure to adequately supervise CCA contract employees, resulted in severe emotional stress to Plaintiffs, physical ailments, inhumane treatment, and unlawfully prolonged imprisonment. 194. The CBP and ICE agents involved in all alleged actions lacked proper supervision. 195. CBP agents violated non-discretionary, mandatory agency obligations by intimidating and harassing Plaintiffs, failing to provide appropriate food for A.S.R. during his detention, placing Plaintiffs in crowded facilities, failing to maintain the appropriate temperature
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in the facilities, intentionally provoking Plaintiffs’ physical discomfort, failing to provide A.S.R. with adequate sleeping accommodations, coercing Plaintiffs to agree to withdraw their applications or agree to deportation and failing to immediately refer Plaintiffs for a screening interview.
196. CBP supervisory officials were fully aware of the coercive tactics of the CBP officials they oversee, as well as the horrendous conditions in CBP holding facilities, which have been well-documented in the press, reports, and litigation. See, e.g., Notice of Motion to Enforce Settlement, Flores v. Lynch, 2:85-cv-04544, ECF No. 197-2 (C.D. Cal. May 17, 2016); Complaint, Doe v. Johnson, 4:15-cv-00250, ECF 1 (D. Ariz. June 8, 2015); Guillermo Cantor, Hieleras (Iceboxes) in the Rio Grande Valley Sector, American Immigration Council (Dec. 2015); John Burnett, Amid Wave Of Child Immigrants, Reports Of Abuse By Border Patrol, NPR, July 24, 2014; Cindy Carcamo & Richard Simon, Immigrant Groups Complain of 'Icebox' Detention Cells, L.A. Times, Dec. 5, 2013. CBP’s lack of adequate supervision or enforcement of its own policies resulted in the emotional distress and physical injuries that Plaintiffs suffered.
197. ICE officials responsible for Plaintiffs during the period of their detention and those directly supervising the Dilley facility also lacked adequate supervision.
198. ICE officials violated non-discretionary, mandatory policies with the knowledge of their supervisors by attempting to coerce Plaintiffs into agreeing to deportation without the legal process to which Plaintiffs were lawfully entitled, harassing Plaintiffs through interruptions of their sleep schedule, unlawfully detaining Plaintiffs for four months, inhibiting access to counsel, and allowing repeated violations of its Family Residential Standards at the Dilley facility.
199. Widespread misconduct by ICE officials in family detention facilities alerted, or should have alerted, supervisors at ICE to inadequate supervision practices by January 2015. See,
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e.g., Wil S. Hylton, The Shame of America’s Family Detention Camps, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 2015 (Magazine); Julia Preston, As U.S. Speeds the Path to Deportation, Distress Fills New Family Detention Centers, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 2014.
200. ICE directly supervised the operations of CCA at Dilley and permitted egregious violations of ICE detention policies and practices. ICE was negligent in failing to correct repeated abuses of its Family Residential Standards, which CCA was obligated to respect.
201. The actions of Defendant’s supervisory employees constituted negligent supervision under Texas law.
Fifth Claim 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) -Federal Tort Claims Act
Negligence 202. Plaintiffs incorporate and re-allege all the allegations in paragraphs 1-201. 203. Under Texas tort law, negligence requires that a (1) defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty, (2) defendant breached that duty, and (3) defendant’s breach proximately caused damages to the plaintiff. 204. Defendant owed a legal duty of care to Plaintiffs as individuals held in its custody. 205. While in the custody of CBP, Plaintiff A.S.R experienced a worsening of his asthma. CBP employees caused these injuries by holding A.S.R in extremely cold rooms, forcing him to sleep on the floor, and ignoring his mother’s pleas to raise the facilities’ temperature. 206. Ms. Rodriguez experienced nausea, developed severe headaches, cried repeatedly, and trembled uncontrollably because Defendant failed to properly care for her while in CBP and ICE detention. Because Defendant failed to properly care for her, Ms. Rodriguez also developed fear that she would be forced to return to life-threatening danger in Honduras or be separated from her son. This fear produced physical symptoms of extreme stress and re-traumatization.
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207. Plaintiff A.S.R. also suffered while in detention because Defendant failed to properly care for him. A.S.R. lost weight, became depressed, did not want to play, and was constantly fearful of being forced to return to the dangerous home he had just fled.
208. Plaintiffs’ injuries were proximately caused by the negligence of Defendant. 209. Defendant is liable for the negligent acts of CBP and ICE officials acting on its behalf. 210. The actions of Defendant constitute negligence under Texas law.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully requests that this Court:
(1) Award Plaintiffs compensatory damages in an amount to be proven at trial. (2) Grant such other relief as the Court deems just and equitable.
Respectfully submitted, August 17, 2016 Newark, New Jersey
s/ Lawrence Lustberg Lawrence Lustberg (0000000202370) Gibbons P.C. One Gateway Center Newark, New Jersey 07102 Phone: (973) 596-4731 LLustberg@gibbonslaw.com s/ Ruben Loyo Aaron Korthuis, Law Student Intern Ruben Loyo, Supervising Attorney (RL 3273) Muneer I. Ahmad, Supervising Attorney* Michael J. Wishnie, Supervising Attorney*
* Motion for admission pro hac vice forthcoming.
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Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization Yale Law School† P.O. Box 209090 New Haven, CT 06511 Phone: (203) 432-4800 michael.wishnie@yale.edu Elora Mukherjee (EM 018282005) Morningside Heights Legal Services, Inc. Columbia Law School 435 West 116th Street New York, NY 10027 Phone: (212) 854-4291 EMukherjee@law.columbia.edu s/ Doug Lasdon Conchita Cruz, Law School Graduate Swapna Reddy, Law School Graduate Doug Lasdon, Supervising Attorney* Asylum Seeker Advocacy Project (ASAP) Urban Justice Center 40 Rector Street, 9th Floor New York, New York 10006 Phone: (646) 602-5600 dlasdon@urbanjustice.org
† For identification purposes only. This complaint has been prepared by a clinic operated by Yale Law School, but does not purport to present the school’s institutional views, if any. * Motion for admission pro hac vice forthcoming.
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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

SUNY RODRIGUEZ ALVARADO, and A.S.R., a minor,
Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 16-5028 OPINION

This matter comes before the Court by way of the United States’ (the “Government”) motion to transfer the matter to either the Southern or Western District of Texas. Dkt. No. 17. Plaintiffs Suny Yaneth Rodriguez Alvarado (“Ms. Rodriguez Alvarado”) and her child, A.S.R. (together, “Plaintiffs”), oppose the motion. Dkt. No. 21. For the reasons set forth below, the Government’s motion is DENIED. I. BACKGROUND
In this Federal Tort Claims Act case, Plaintiffs seek damages for injuries sustained at the hands of federal Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) officers when they entered the United States to seek asylum.
Plaintiff Suny Rodriguez Alvarado and her son, A.S.R., are citizens of Honduras. Compl. ¶ 7. Ms. Rodriguez Alvarado was born in Honduras in 1976, and resided in the United States lawfully for a number of years from 1998 to 2006. Id. ¶¶ 36-39. In 2004, Honduran police officers killed Ms. Rodriguez Alvarado’s mother, an outspoken police critic, along with her stepfather. Id. ¶ 38. Ms. Rodriguez Alvarado returned to Honduras in 2006 to investigate their deaths. Id. ¶ 39.

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She was met with intimidation, harassment, and extortion by the Honduras police, which culminated in a physical attack outside her home in September 2014. Id. ¶¶ 41-42.
In November 2014, Ms. Rodriguez Alvarado, A.S.R., and A.S.R.’s father, Jose Rafael Sanchez Villatoro (“Mr. Sanchez”) fled Honduras for the United States. Id. ¶ 45. While en route, Mexican authorities arrested them and returned them to Honduras. Id. Ms. Rodriguez Alvarado, Mr. Sanchez, and A.S.R. made a second attempt to flee Honduras, arriving in Texas after crossing the U.S.-Mexico border on January 16, 2015. Id. ¶ 46. CBP apprehended the Rodriguez AlvaradoSanchez family, and detained them at the South Texas Family Residential Center in Dilley, Texas (“Dilley”) from January 19, 2015 until May 14, 2015. Id. ¶¶ 83-84.
Plaintiffs allege that they were mistreated by CBP and ICE officers through the duration of their time in custody in violation of federal regulations. Specifically, they allege that Government officials: (1) placed Plaintiffs in inhumane, cold, and crowded conditions in violation of CBP’s own minimum standards for operation, id. ¶¶ 59-64; (2) attempted to coerce Plaintiffs to agree to removal by making constant threats of deportation, id. ¶¶ 70, 74, 87-90; (3) attempted to place A.S.R. in a shelter for unaccompanied minors, id. ¶¶ 113-27; (4) regularly disrupted Plaintiffs’ sleep by keeping the lights on, id. ¶¶ 128-32; (5) refused to share information about Mr. Sanchez with Plaintiffs, id. ¶¶ 140-43; and (6) inhibited Ms. Rodriguez Alvarado’s access to counsel, id. ¶¶ 144-48.
Ms. Rodriguez Alvarado sought withholding of removal, which was granted on May 14, 2015, by Immigration Judge Lourdes Rodriguez De Jongh. Id. ¶ 155. Plaintiffs were released from Dilley that day, and joined their relatives in New Jersey. Id. ¶ 156. On October 1, 2015, Mr. Sanchez was granted protection from removal under the Convention Against Torture in
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Pearsall Immigration Court. Id. ¶ 158. Three months after that, on January 19, 2016, A.S.R. was granted asylum in Newark Immigration Court by Immigration Judge Leo Fink. Id. ¶ 159.
Plaintiffs filed administrative claims pursuant to the FTCA for their alleged mistreatment at the hands of CBP and ICE officers acting under the supervision of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). Id. ¶ 162. DHS denied the claims on February 25, 2016. Id. ¶ 163. Plaintiffs subsequently initiated the instant action on August 17, 2016. Plaintiffs assert the following five causes of action pursuant to the FTCA: (1) abuse of process; (2) false imprisonment; (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (4) negligent supervision; and (5) negligence. Id. ¶¶ 165-210. Defendants now seek dismissal for improper venue, or—in the alternative—transfer of venue. II. Discussion
A. Whether Venue is Proper in New Jersey The Government first contends that venue is improperly laid in New Jersey as to Plaintiff Ms. Rodriguez Alvarado because, as an alien, she cannot establish residency in the forum.1 The Court disagrees. 1. Residence In a Rule 12(b)(3) motion, the moving party bears the burden of proving that venue is improper. See Myers v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 695 F.2d 716, 724-25 (3d Cir. 1982). FTCA actions against the United States “may be prosecuted only in the judicial district where the plaintiff resides or wherein the act or omission complained of occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b) (emphasis added).
1 While arguing that A.S.R. does not yet have LPR status, and is therefore not a resident under the venue statute, the Government does not challenge venue on this basis because having been granted asylum, A.S.R. “will become eligible to apply for LPR status in January 2017.” Def.’s Br. at 4 n.1. The Government maintains that because Ms. Rodriguez Alvarado’s case is not properly venued in this district, the entire case should be transferred to Texas pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404. Id.
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The parties dispute the meaning of “resides.” As Section 1402 does not define residence, the Court looks to the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, which does. Section 1391’s provision on residency states that for venue purposes, “a natural person, including an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States, shall be deemed to reside in the judicial district in which that person is domiciled.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1).2
Plaintiffs contend that the plain reading of this provision allows any non-citizen to establish venue in a forum where he or she is domiciled. Pls.’ Opp’n at 5-6. Defendants contend that Section 1391(c)(1) should be narrowly read only to permit non-citizens who are Legal Permanent Residents (“LPR”) to establish residency where he or she is domiciled. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs.
The plain text of 1391(c)(1) authorizes all non-citizens—regardless of LPR status—to establish residency where they are domiciled. The clause provides “a natural person . . . shall be deemed to reside in the judicial district in which that person is domiciled.” The ordinary meaning of “natural person” is an individual. See FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397, 403 (2011) (“When a statute does not define a term, we typically give the phrase its ordinary meaning.”) (citations omitted); Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 566 U.S. 449, 454 (2012) (recognizing that “this Court routinely uses ‘individual’ to denote a natural person”). The statute here does not limit the term “natural persons” in any way, and thus includes all natural persons. “When Congress intend[s] to exclude . . . it [says] so.” Flores v. United States, 108 F. Supp. 3d 126, 130 (E.D.N.Y.
2 As both Section 1391 and Section 1402 contain the phrase “where plaintiff resides,” and are part of the same Title, they must be read consistently. See Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 479 (1992) (applying the “basic canon of statutory construction that identical terms within an Act bear the same meaning.”).
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2015) (holding that the plain meaning of Section 1391(c)(1) indicates that “[a]lienage is not a reason stated in the statute as a basis for finding persons outside its reach”).
The Government argues that the clause “including an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States,” limits the scope of Section 1391(c)(1) to LPRs alone. The Government contends that this clause would be superfluous had Congress meant the term “natural persons” to include all individuals regardless of LPR status. But a more plausible reading—the one that is plain on its face—is that LPRs are merely an illustrative example of “natural persons.” “[T]he term ‘including is not one of all-embracing definition, but connotes simply an illustrative application of the general principle.” Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 100 (1941) (citing Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 313 U.S. 177, 189 (1941)). Here, the general principle is that “natural persons” can establish residency where they are domiciled, and individuals with LPR status are merely an illustrative example of natural persons.
Where a statute is unambiguous on its face, no further inquiry is necessary. Nwozuzu v. Holder, 726 F.3d 323, 327 (2d Cir. 2013). But even if Section 1391(c)(1) was ambiguous, Plaintiffs’ reading of the text is supported by its legislative history. Congress adopted the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011 (the “Act”) to resolve a circuit split over whether “residence” has the same meaning as “domicile” as used in Section 1391. H.R. Rep. 11210, at 20-21 (Feb. 11, 2011) (citing 15 WRIGHT & MILLER, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction and Related Matters at 33–37 (2d. ed. 1986)). Before 2011, a minority of circuits permitted individuals to establish residence in multiple locations, while others limited residence to where an individual is domiciled. Id. Under either rule, individuals who were not domiciled in the United States were unable to mount a venue defense in actions brought against them. As such,
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all non-citizens were considered non-domiciliaries, and so were unable to establish venue under 1391. See Arevelo-Franco v. I.N.S., 889 F.2d 589, 590 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting “federal courts have interpreted [Section 1391] to deny venue to aliens, holding that for purposes of venue, aliens are not residents of any district despite where they live”); Williams v. United States, 704 F.2d 1222, 1225 (11th Cir. 1983) (“An alien, for purposes of establishing venue, is presumed by law not to reside in any judicial district of the United States . . . .”); Blacher v. Ridge, 436 F. Supp. 2d 602, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Although [plaintiff] resides in this District, she is an alien and has no residence for venue purposes.”).
The Act clarified the venue statute by explicitly adopting the majority rule in its new provisions on residency. The House Judiciary Committee Report (the “Report”) states, “1391(c)(1) would provide that, for venue purposes, a natural person would be deemed to reside in the judicial district in which that person is domiciled, thereby resolving the division of authority regarding the residence of parties by adopting the majority rule.” Id. at 21. While Congress acknowledged that the modification would “permit permanent resident aliens domiciled in the United States to raise a venue defense,” Id. at 23, it does not distinguish between the application of the statute to LPRs and to non-citizens without LPR status. Id. Notably, the only mention of non-LPR aliens in the Report suggests that Congress was aware that non-LPRs could establish domicile in the United States. In a footnote, the Judiciary Committee acknowledges “[a]n alien can obtain a ‘lawful domicile’ in the United States only if he or she has the ability under the immigration laws to form the intent to remain this country indefinitely.’” Id. at 23 n. 16 (quoting Castellon-Contreras v. I.N.S., 45 F.3d 149 (7th Cir. 1995)). In sum, the legislative history confirms that Congress intended that domicile, regardless of LPR status, governs an individual’s ability to establish residence, and therefore venue.
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2. Domicile The Government next disputes whether Plaintiff Ms. Rodriguez Alvarado is properly “domiciled” in New Jersey. The Government argues that Ms. Rodriguez Alvarado is not domiciled in this district because her non-LPR status means that “she cannot show that she has an intent to remain the United States indefinitely.” Def.’s Reply at 3. The Court again disagrees. “An alien can obtain a ‘lawful domicile’ in the United States only if he or she has the ability under the immigration laws to form the intent to remain in this country indefinitely.” H.R. Rep. 112–10, at 33 n.16 (citing Castello-Contreras v. I.N.S., 45 F.3d 149 (7th Cir. 1995)). Ms. Rodriguez Alvarado became lawfully present in the United States when she was granted a withholding of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B); see also USCIS Adjudicator’s Field Manual § 40.9(b)(3)(K) (“Accrual of unlawful presence stops on the date that withholding or deferral is granted and continuous through the period of the grant.”). Individuals who have received withholding of removal enjoy some privileges of others who are lawfully present. These privileges include the authority to work, 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(a)(10), and the ability to register for health insurance on the federal marketplace, 45 C.F.R. § 600.5. Ms. Rodriguez Alvarado is “settled in the community of West New York, New Jersey” and “intend[s] to continue living” there with her family. Rodriguez Alvarado Aff. ¶¶ 5-7. Although a withholding of removal is a right not be removed to a specific country rather than an unqualified right to remain in the United States, Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 545 (3d Cir. 2001), it does not lapse after a set amount of time.3
3 Withholding of removal status may only be terminated if there is a showing of fraud in the alien’s application, if there is a “fundamental chance in circumstances relating to the original claim” such that “the alien’s life or freedom no longer would be threatened,” or if the alien commits any other act that would have been grounds for denying her original application. 8 C.F.R. § 208.24(b)(1)(2).
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Accordingly, Ms. Rodriguez Alvarado is lawfully present in New Jersey, and has exhibited an intent to stay here indefinitely.
Plaintiffs’ position is also consistent with the long established principle that physical presence is the hallmark of domicile for venue purposes. See Midwest Transit, Inc. v. Hicks, 79 Fed. Appx. 205, 207 (7th Cir.2003) (“[d]omicile has two elements: (1) physical presence or residence in a state and (2) an intent to remain in the state”); Lew v. Moss, 797 F.3d 747, 750 (9th Cir.1986) (same). Furthermore, the Government’s position would render the distinction that courts have made between LPRs and non-LPRs unnecessary. Courts have recognized that non-LPR aliens can establish domicile so long as they show a lawful intent to remain in the United States. See Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647, 666 (1978) (“Congress . . . was willing to allow nonrestricted nonimmigrant aliens to adopt the United State as their domicile.”); Lok v. I.N.S., 681 F.2d 107, 109 (holding that “the Supreme Court ruled that an alien did not have to be a permanent resident to harbor a lawful intent to remain. Thousands of aliens could become lawful domiciliaries without becoming permanent residents under Elkins.”). In other words, non-LPRs may also establish domicile. There would be no need for this distinction if only LPRs can establish domicile.
The Government argues that Ms. Rodriguez Alvarado’s immigration status is insufficient because she is legally ineligible to become an LPR. But this position conflates unlawful status with unlawful presence. The Government does not present any cases suggesting that only those with lawful status may establish an intent to remain in the United States indefinitely. The Court is instead persuaded by cases set forth by Plaintiff finding that lawful presence is all that is required. For example, in Flores v. United States, a United States District Court held that a citizen of El Salvador with a pending application for asylum is lawfully present in the United States, and was thus able to establish domicile in the Eastern District of New York in an FTCA action. 108
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F. Supp. 3d at 130. Like Flores, Ms. Rodriguez Alvarado’s status is one that is deemed not to be
unlawfully present. Id. at 129. Ms. Rodriguez Alvarado, like the petitioner in Flores, has also
decided to make the forum her permanent residence.4 Because Ms. Rodriguez Alvarado is
domiciled in the District of New Jersey, she may sue in this Court.5
B. Whether the Court Should Transfer the Action to the Southern or Eastern District of Texas.
The Government argues that even if venue is proper in the District of New Jersey as to Ms.
Rodriguez Alvarado’s claims, it is in the public interest for the claims to be transferred to Texas.
The Court again disagrees.
Defendants filed the instant motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), which applies where
the current forum is proper but an alternative forum is arguably more convenient. Section 1404
provides: “For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court
may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.”
Courts have “broad discretion in making determinations under Section 1404(a), and convenience
4 The Government relies on two decisions to support its argument that Ms. Rodriguez Alvardo is not domiciled in the District of New Jersey: Aguilar v. United States, No. 15-986 (E.D. Va. Feb. 26, 2016) and Najera v. United States, No. 16-459, 2016 WL 6877069 (E.D. Va. Nov. 22, 2016). In both cases, courts in the Eastern District of Virginia granted the Government’s motion for transfer on the basis that the plaintiffs could not establish domicile in Virginia. The Court is not persuaded. The Aguilar court granted the Government’s motion to transfer in a brief, on-therecord hearing without providing any analysis. The Najera court held that Section 1391(c) only authorizes LPRs to establish residence where they are domiciled. 2016 WL 6877069, at *6-7. However, the court’s analysis did not consider the plain meaning of Section 1391(c). Id. This Court declines to follow the Najera court’s analysis because “[w]here statutory language is unambiguous, the court should not consider statutory purpose or legislative history.” In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 304 (3d Cir. 2010). 5 Plaintiffs contend that, regardless of whether Ms. Rodriguez Alvarado is deemed to be domiciled in New Jersey, venue is proper in this forum because Co-Plaintiff A.S.R. is domiciled here, and the venue statute “imposes only a minimal residence requirement in multi-plaintiff cases.” Pls.’ Opp’n at 13. Because the Court finds that Ms. Rodriguez Alvarado may establish domicile in New Jersey, it does not reach the issue of whether proper venue as to one plaintiff satisfies venue as to all plaintiffs in a multi-plaintiff litigation.
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and fairness are considered on a case-by-case basis.” Linwood Trading Ltd., No. 14-5782, 2015 WL 5098117, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 28, 2015). The burden of establishing the need for a venue change lies with the party seeking the transfer. Shutte v. Armco Steel Corp., 431 F.2d 22 (3d Cir. 1970).
As a threshold matter, the Court must determine “whether the transferee district has proper jurisdiction and venue, such that the case could have been brought in the transferee district in the first instance.” Telebrands Corp. v. Mopnado, No. 14-7969, 2016 WL 368166, at *10 (D.N.J. Jan. 12, 2016). Next, courts conduct a balancing test, which takes a number of private and public interest factors into consideration. Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 879 (3d Cir. 1995). The private interest factors include: (1) plaintiff’s choice of forum; (2) defendant’s choice of forum; (3) whether the claim arose elsewhere (4) convenience of the parties as indicated by their relative physical and financial condition; (5) availability of compulsory process over unwilling witnesses; and (6) the location of books and records. Id.; Seghers v. Executive Risk Indemnification, Inc., No. 06-628, 2006 WL 2865494, at *6 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 2006). The public interest factors include: (1) enforceability of the judgment; (2) practical considerations that could make the trial easy, expeditious, or inexpensive; (3) local interest in deciding local controversies at home; (4) public policies of the fora; and (4) familiarity of the trial judge with the applicable state law. Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879.
Here, the parties do not dispute that either the Western or Southern District of Texas is a viable forum. Accordingly, the Court will discuss the remaining Jumara factor below.
1. Private Interest Factors a. Parties’ Choice of Forum
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“[I]n ruling on defendants’ motion the plaintiff’s choices of venue should not be lightly disturbed.” Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879 (citing 1A Pt. 2 MOORE’S ¶ 0.345[5] at 4360). The Plaintiff’s choice is “entitled to greater deference when a plaintiff chooses its home forum.” Wm. H. McGee Co., Inc. v. United Arab Shipping Co., 6 F. Supp. 2d 283, 289 (D.N.J. 1997) (internal citations omitted). Here, Plaintiffs chose to commence this action in their home district. Rodriguez Alvarado Aff. ¶¶ 4-7.
The Government favors Texas. As it correctly contends, “when the central dispute in a lawsuit arose from events that occurred almost exclusively in another forum . . . courts give substantially less weight to the plaintiff’s forum choice. Janosko v. United of Omaha Life Insurance Company, 16-1137, 2016 WL 4009818, at *3 (D.N.J. July 25, 2016). Here, the alleged tortious conduct took place while Plaintiffs were in CPB and ICE custody in Texas.
Because there are only limited material connections between the events underlying this action and the District of New Jersey, Plaintiffs’ choice of forum is accorded diminished weight, and will be considered in light of the other Jumara factors.
b. Whether the Claim Arose Elsewhere Nearly all the facts at issue in this matter arose in Texas. Plaintiffs were apprehended and detained there after entering the United States through a section of the U.S.-Mexican border located in the Southern District of Texas. At the same time, a few facts occurred in New Jersey. For example, A.S.R.’s aunt made efforts from New Jersey to take custody of A.S.R. while he was in Texas. Compl. ¶ 113. On balance, because the alleged tortious conduct occurred outside New Jersey, this factor favors transfer.
c. Convenience of the Parties
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A transfer is disfavored where it “merely shifts the burden of litigating in a disfavored forum to the plaintiff.” NCR Credit Corp. v. Ye Seekers Horizon, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 317, 322 (D.N.J. 1998). The Government’s sole contention that litigation in New Jersey would be inconvenient for it is that requiring its employee witnesses to travel to New Jersey “is burdensome” and “would detract from their public duties.” Def.’s Br. at 20. Plaintiffs contend that they would face far greater burdens by litigation in Texas. They explain how transferring this action to a Texas district would cause both financial hardship and medical harm. Pls.’ Opp’n at 21-23.
First, a transfer would impose such a financial burden on Plaintiffs that it would indeed shift the burden of the case from the Government to Plaintiffs. A transfer would take Ms. Rodriguez Alvarado away from her job at a clothing warehouse in Secaucus, New Jersey, where she is paid an hourly wage of $9.50. Rodriguez Alvarado Decl. ¶ 10.
Second, a transfer could cause Plaintiffs to suffer psychological and medical harm. Returning to Texas, the site of the alleged mistreatment would force Plaintiffs to relive their trauma. Id. ¶ 13. Plaintiffs support their contentions with statements from doctors. After evaluating Ms. Rodriguez Alvarado, Dr. Favio Casoy concluded that her return to Texas would cause her to relive her traumatic experiences. Casoy Decl. ¶ 24, Dkt. No. 21-3. Furthermore, a change in venue would exacerbate A.S.R.’s separation anxiety disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder. Posner Decl. ¶ 19, Dkt. No. 21-2.
Lastly, a transfer would also limit Ms. Rodriguez Alvarado’s ability to care for other family members in New Jersey. She has two teenaged children besides A.S.R. to care for. Rodriguez Alvarado Decl. ¶ 1. All three are in school. Id. ¶ 9.
Because Plaintiffs reside in New Jersey, and would experience significant hardship if they were to litigate this case in Texas, this factor weighs strongly in favor of the District of New Jersey.
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d. Convenience of the Witnesses The Government contends that all of its witness are based in Texas, and are thus outside the reach of courts in New Jersey. This is not the case. The Government only points to witnesses who are employed by a private government contractor, the Corrections Corporations of America (“CCA”). Although the Complaint alleges wrongdoing by CCA, see Compl. ¶ 84, it also alleges wrongdoing by ICE and CPB officials, id. ¶¶ 74-82, 86-99. As federal employees, these witnesses may be compelled to testify by the Government. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 144717, 2015 WL 1182764, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2015). Moreover, to the extent that it is inconvenient for federal employees to travel to New Jersey, the Court may permit them to participate by video deposition. In contrast, Plaintiffs have identified specific individual witnesses who will be inconvenienced by a transfer to Texas. These witnesses include A.S.R.’s aunt Lourdes Sanchez, a New Jersey resident who will testify about her efforts to secure A.S.R.’s release, and Plaintiffs’ expert witness, Dr. Flavio Casoy, a New York resident. See Robinson v. Air Liquid Sys. Corp., No. 11-4078, 2014 WL 3735338, at *2, n.4 (D.N.J. July 28, 2014) (“The convenience of the witnesses (including expert witnesses) is only relevant to the extent the witness is unavailable in the relevant forums.”). Accordingly, witness convenience does not favor a chance of venue.
e. Location of Books and Records The Government contends that this factor slightly favors transfer as the custodial facilities of the records needed in this matter are located in Texas. However the location of books and records is not decisive in this matter, as the Government concedes that any documentary evidence related to the matter can be reproduced and transmitted electronically to this Court.
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2. Public Interest Factors a. Practical Considerations
The Government contends that practical considerations favor a transfer to Texas because allowing the case to remain in New Jersey would impose a substantial burden on the Government witnesses and affect their ability to perform their duties. This Court has already addressed some of these arguments above. This argument also fails to take into account that litigation of this case affects public employees’ time regardless of location.
The Government also argues that the matter warrants transfer under this prong because similar cases are already pending in District Courts in Texas. But the fact finding required to adjudicate FTCA claims against ICE and CPB officers is unique to each case. There is little overlap between the allegations in this matter regarding the mistreatment of Ms. Rodriguez Alvarado and A.S.R. in early 2015 and the mistreatment of plaintiffs in the other cases. See Complaint, Amador v. United States, No. 16-595 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2016), Dkt. No. 1 (alleging mistreatment while plaintiff was in CBP’s Rio Grande Valley Sector in August and September 2013); Complaint, Villafuerte v. United States, No. 16-619 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2016), Dkt. No. 1 (alleging mistreatment against CBP officers in May 2013). Thus, a transfer would not advance practical considerations.
b. Local Interests and Public Policies The Government argues that Texas has a strong interest in “deciding controversies involving its border patrol and detention facilities where . . . the events at issue have occurred.” Def.’s Br. at 14. This argument again relies on the fact that the events giving rise to this suit occurred in Texas, which has already been addressed above.
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Plaintiffs argue that this matter is not of local concern, but instead involves issues of national importance. The Court finds Plaintiffs’ arguments to be persuasive. Plaintiffs were held in federal detention centers and allege mistreatment by federal officers in violation of federal policies. Immigration, and the treatment of those who have entered the United States without inspection is a matter of national concern. No Texas laws or policies are implicated by this matter. Courts have found that public interests do not warrant a transfer of venue where issues are national in scope. See Joao Control & Monitoring Systems, LLC v. Ford Motor Co., No. 12-1479, 2013 WL 4496644, at *3 (D. Del. Aug. 21, 2013) (finding that this factor is typically neutral in patent matters involving national corporations). Accordingly, this factor does not favor a transfer.
c. Courts’ Familiarity with Controlling Case Law Finally, the Government argues that Texas judges are “more likely to have a better knowledge of tort law.” Def.’s Br. at 15. But Plaintiffs correctly note that tort law is the only state law involved in this case. Courts have found this factor to be neutral where the only matters of state law involve common law torts or negligence. See Yocham v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp., 565 F. Supp. 2d 554, 560 (D.N.J. 2008) (“Disturbing Plaintiff’s choice of forum in order to spare this Court the trouble of interpreting Texas law is simply not called for here.”); Flores, 142 F. Supp. 3d at 290 (“Plaintiff’s state law tort claims, which sound in common law negligence, are not complex. The court can ascertain Texas law with help from counsel.”). In addition, this matter involves many questions of federal law, including sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act, along with the regulations promulgated under it. Accordingly, this factor does not warrant transfer. On balance, the Court finds that the Jumara factors related to private interests favor Plaintiffs as their limited means and medical issues would impose an extreme hardship if this case
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were transferred to Texas. In addition, the Court finds that the public interest Jumara factors are neutral as the case implicates matters of national concern. Accordingly, the Government has failed to satisfy its burden of demonstrating that a transfer would promote the convenience of the parties and witnesses, or that it would be in the interests of justice. III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Government’s motion to dismiss or transfer venue, Dkt. No. 17, is DENIED. An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.

Dated: May 25, 2017

/s Madeline Cox Arleo__________ MADELINE COX ARLEO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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 Case 2:16-cv-05028-SCM Document 85 Filed 12/17/18 Page 1 of 13 PageID: 1016

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

Chambers of
STEVEN C. MANNION
United States Magistrate Judge

Martin Luther King Jr, Federal Bldg. & U.S. Courthouse 50 Walnut Street Newark, NJ 07102 (973) 645-3827
December 17, 2018

LETTER ORDER-OPINION Re: Rodriguez Alvarado v. United States
Civil Action No. 16-cv-5028 (SCM) Dear Counsel:
Before the Court is an unopposed motion by Plaintiff Suny Rodriguez Alvarado, individually and on behalf of her minor age son A.S.R., for the Court’s approval of a settlement and voluntary dismissal of this Federal Tort Claims Act case against Defendant United States of America. The parties consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction and the Court conducted a “friendly” hearing on October 24, 2018.1 For the reasons stated on the record and supplemented herein, the Court approved the settlement as reasonable as to its amount and terms, but reserved decision on whether A.S.R.’s settlement proceeds could be deposited into a private trust instead of the Surrogate’s Court for the County of Hudson County, New Jersey.
Upon review of the parties’ submissions and oral argument heard during the friendly hearing, the Court denies the motion to deposit A.S.R.’s settlement funds into a private trust. The

(ECF Docket Entry No. (“D.E.”) 82). Unless indicated otherwise, the Court will refer to documents by their docket entry number and the page numbers assigned by the Electronic Case Filing System.

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settlement proceeds for A.S.R. shall be deposited with the Surrogate of Hudson County pending further application to that Court as appropriate.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2 The facts set forth in the Opinion on the United States Government’s motion to transfer are
incorporated herein by reference.3 The Court supplements those facts to the extent necessary to resolve the pending motion.
A.S.R. entered the United States with his father, Jose Rafael Sanchez Villatoro (“Mr. Sanchez”) and his mother, Suny Rodriguez Alvarado (“Ms. Rodriguez Alvarado”) in 2015. They are each citizens of Honduras. Ms. Rodriguez Alvarado filed this action on behalf of herself and A.S.R. against the United States of America claiming deprivations of their respective civil rights.4 The United States Government denies those claims.5
The Court held a settlement conference and counsel subsequently filed a notice of settlement on August 3, 2018.6 Thereafter, the Court scheduled a “friendly hearing” for September 12, 2018, at the parties’ request.7 Counsel for plaintiffs requested to postpone the date of the hearing to “resolve a number of complexities related to the establishment of the trust, including
2 The allegations set forth within the pleadings and motion record are relied upon for purposes of this motion only. The Court has made no findings as to the veracity of the parties’ allegations.
(D.E. 34, Op.). (D.E. 1, Compl.). (D.E. 39, Answer). 6 (D.E. 71, Notice of Settlement). ‘ (D.E. 72, Order).
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the role of A.S.R.’s father, who is not a party to the suit.”8 The Court rescheduled the hearing to October 24, 2018.
On October 22, 2018, counsel filed the proposed settlement.’° The parties’ agreement stated that “Plaintiffs must obtain Court approval of the settlement at their expense. Plaintiffs agree to obtain such approval in a timely manner: time being of the essence. Plaintiffs further agree that the United States may void this settlement at its option in the event such approval is not obtained in a timely manner.”11
A.S.R. is presently 11 years old and resides with his mother in Hudson County, New Jersey.12 His father, Mr. Sanchez, did not appear at the hearing, but provided a declaration indicating that he supports the settlement. II. AUTHORITY & JURISDICTION
“It is elementary that the validity of an order of a federal court depends upon that court’s having jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and the parties.”3 “Jurisdiction” refers to
$ (D.E. 77, Letter). (D.E. 78, Order).
10 (D.E. 79, Letter).
1 (D.E. 79-4, Settlement, at ¶ 7).
12 (D.E. 34, Opinion, at 7; D.E. 79-1, Decl. of Suny Rodriguez Alvarado, atJ 1). 13 Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle, 955 f.2d 1268, 1287 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Gttinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701 (1982); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 171—72 (1938)).
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“a court’s adjudicatory authority.”4 Courts have an independent and continuing obligation to assess their junsdiction.
This Court has original jurisdiction over the underlying civil action because the United States is a defendant on a claim pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act.’6 Considering that the parties have a proposed settlement, I question whether this Court has the authority to approve the parties’ agreement.
The A.S. v. Harrison Twp. Court similarly questioned “whether a friendly hearing is required” in a federal question case but elected not to answer that question because the plaintiff requested the hearing and the defendant did not object.’7 The parties here also requested a friendly hearing and like AS., this case is “not one of the special situations in which” a district court “is required by statute or rule to approve a settlement.”8
federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(e), 23.1(c), 23.2, and 66 each respectively require court approval for settlement or dismissal of class actions, derivative actions, actions involving members of an unincorporated association, and actions in which a receiver has been appointed. 19
‘‘ Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004). Zambelti fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 f.3d 412, 420 (3d Cir. 2010).
‘628U.S.C. 1346. ‘7A.S. v. Harrison Tp. 3d. ofEdttc. & E. Greenwich Sc/i. Dist., No. 14-147, 2017 WL 1362025, at *1 n.2 (D.N.J. Apr. 12, 2017). IS Gardiner v. A.H. Robins Co., 747 F.2d 1180, 1189 (8th Cir. 1984) (citing United States v. City ofMiami, florida, 614 f.2d 1322, 1330 & n.16 (5th Cir. 1980) (“four examples of such ‘special situations’ are proposed class action settlements, proposed shareholder derivative suit settlements, proposed compromises of claims in bankruptcy court, and consent decrees in antitrust suits brought by the United States”), modfied on rehearing, 664 f.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1981)). “ fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (settlement of class actions); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1(c) (settlement of derivative actions); fed. R. Civ. P. 23.2 (settlement involving members of an unincorporated
4

Case 2:16-cv-05028-SCM Document 85 Filed 12/17/18 Page 5 of 13 PageID: 1020
This case is not governed by any of those rules, and absent such a requirement, settlement is ordinarily a matter between the parties.2° Parties may settle and dismiss their suit at any time without judicial approval,2’ “and the court need not and should not get involved.”22
federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(ç) Stilt, the Ninth Circuit has held that federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c) imposes a “special duty” that requires a court to “conduct its own inquiry to determine whether a settlement involving a minor serves the best interests of the minor.”23 The Rule provides in relevant part that a district court “must appoint a guardian ad litem—or issue another appropriate order—to protect a minor or incompetent person who is unrepresented in an action.”24 Unlike Federal Rules 23(e), 23.1(c), 23.2, and 66, Rule 17(c) does not require court approval for a settlement or dismissal. District courts are no doubt required by the Rule to safeguard the interests of litigants who are minors,2 but, the Eleventh Circuit has held that “Rule 17(c) does not address the conditions under which a minor’s claims may be contractually settled or released” and “simply deals with the court’s obligation to protect the interests of a minor party through the appointment of a guardian
association); Fed. R. Civ. P. 66 (dismissal of action in which a receiver has been appointed). 20 Gardiner, 747 F.2d at 1189. 2! first Nat’l Bankv. Marine City, Inc., 411 f.2d 674, 677 (3d Cir.1969). 22 United States v. City ofMiami, fla., 614 f.2d 1322, 1330 (5th Cir. 1980). 23Robicloiitv Rosengren, 638 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9thCir. 2011) (quoting Dacanay v. Mendoza, 573 F.2d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir. 1978)); see also Salmeron v. United States, 724 F.2d 1357, 1363 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that “a court must independently investigate and evaluate any compromise or settlement of a minor’s claims to assure itself that the minor’s interests are protected, even if the settlement has been recommended or negotiated by the minor’s parent or guardian ad litem”). 24 Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c). 25 Id.
5

Case 2:16-cv-05028-SCM Document 85 Filed 12/17/18 Page 6 of 13 PageID: 1021
ad litem or other representative.”26 The Fifth Circuit has noted even more strictly that the Rule “is confined to those cases where the minor or incompetent is not otherwise represented.”27
Here, A.S.R.’s mother has appeared in the case on his behalf, and I agree with the Eleventh Circuit that Rule 17(c) does not address approval of settlements involving minors.28 This Court also need not rely upon its “inherent authority” to protect the interest of the minor in this case.29
federal Rule of Civil Frocedttre 41(a)(2) Parties may voluntarily dismiss any action without court approval.30 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2), however, provides that “an action may be dismissed at the plaintiffs request only by court order, on terms that the court considers proper.”3’ This Rule provides clearer authority and has been relied upon by district courts that have reviewed dismissals or settlements involving minors.32 When read in the light of federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1, which requires
26 Burke v. Smith, 252 f.3d 1260, 1266 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Eagan v. Jackson, $55 F. Supp. 765, 775 (ED. Pa. 1994) (“[TJhe thrust of Rule 17 [is] the acquisition of a proper representative for an incompetent.... Rule 17(c) deals only with the protection of incompetents in their status as parties, and gives no general powers over their persons or property.”)). 27 Hoffert v. Gen. Motors Coip., 656 F.2d 161, 164 (5th Cir. 1981). 28 See Burke, 252 F.3d at 1266. 29 Eagan, 855 F. Supp. at 775 (disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Rule 17(c), and instead relying on “the Court’s inherent duty to protect the interests of minors ... that come before it”). 30 Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). ‘ fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). 32 See e.g., G.C. v. S. Wash. Cty. ScIi. Dist. 833, No. 17-3680, 201$ WL 2694503, at *2 (D. Minn. June 5, 2018) (dismissal of minor’s claims approved); Adkins v. TfIFamilv Servs., Inc., No. 132579, 2017 WL 4338269, at *4 (D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2017) (approved settlement involving a minor); Higgins v. Koch Dcv. Corp., No. 3:11-cv-81, 2013 WL 12290826, at *1 (S.D. md. Nov. 25, 2013) (denied dismissal of minors’ claims); Farber v. Cly. of Suffolk, No. 09-3255, 2009 WL 4730204, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2009) (granted dismissal of minor’s claims); D.C.G. ex rel. E.MG. v.
6

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all rules be construed to secure “the just ... determination of every action and proceeding,”33 Rule 41(a)(2) requires that any judicially approved settlement be ‘just” and “proper.”
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A plaintiff may request dismissal of an action “by court order, on terms that the court considers proper.”34 The plaintiff bears the burden to show that the relief requested is warranted. Though decisions on requests for voluntary dismissal are within the sound discretion of the court,36 such motions are generally granted unless another party would suffer some plain legal prejudice.37 “The court is responsible for ensuring that such prejudice will not occur.”38
Wilson Arect Sch. Dist., No. 07-cv-1357, 2009 WL 838548, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2009) (dismissal of minor’s claims denied); KS. ex rel. T.S. v. Harvey, No. l:0$-cv-199, 200$ WL 4682486, at *1 (D. Me. Oct. 22, 2008) (approved settlement of minor’s claims); hi re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 603 F. Supp. 239, 247—48 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (granted dismissal without prejudice of minors’ claims), aff’d in part, appeal dismissed in part, 818 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1987).
fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2); Carroll v. F One Inc., 893 F.3d 139, 144—45 (3d Cir. 201$); Cason v. Ptterto Rico Flee. Power Auth., 770 F.3d 971, 976 (1st Cir. 2014). The case law pertaining to the earlier version of this Rule are instructive because the amendments have been non-substantive. Carroll, 893 f.3d at 145 n.5.
Higgins v. Koch Dev. Corp., No. 3:1 1-cv-81, 2013 WL 5274281, at *2 (S.D. md. Sept. 18,2013) (citing Tolle v. Carroll Touch, Inc., 23 F.3d 174, 177 (7th Cir.1994)). 36 ferguson v. Eakle, 492 F.2d 26, 28 (3d Cir. 1974) (citing Ockert v. Union Barge Line Corp., 190 F.2d 303, 304 (3d Cir. 1951); Stern v. Barnett, 452 F.2d 211, 213 (7th Cir. 1971)).
See Quad/Graphics, Inc. v. Fass, 724 F.2d 1230, 1233 (7th Cir. 1983); Saviour v. Revco Disc. Drug Ctrs., Inc., 126 F.R.D. 569, 570 (D. Kan. 1989) (citation omitted) (“manifestly prejudicial to the defendant”); Trautmann V. Cogema Mining, Inc., No. 5:04-cv-117, 2007 WL 869501, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 21,2007) (citation omitted) (“absent some plain legal prejudice to the non-moving party”). 38 Cason, 770 F.3d at 976 (citing Colön—Cabrera v. Esso Standard Oil Co. (Puerto Rico,), Inc., 723 F.3d 82, 87 (1st Cir.2013); Doe v. Urohealth Sys., Inc., 216 F.3d 157, 160 (1st Cir. 2000)).
7

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“In exercising its ‘broad equitable discretion under Rule 41(a)(2),’ the district court must ‘weigh the relevant equities and do justice between the parties in each case, imposing such costs and attaching such conditions to the dismissal as are deemed appropriate.”39 Conducting a hearing on a motion for voluntary dismissal is not necessary where the defendant has adequate notice and opportunity to be heard and the judge is familiar with the relevant issues.40
If, however, the plaintiffs dismissal request concerns the claims of another, such as in the case of a minor, the trial court should conduct an independent review to ensure the dismissal is on terms that the court considers proper.41 Here, Ms. Rodriguez Alvarado, individually and on behalf of A.S.R., moved for approval of the proposed settlement and dismissal. The Government has not opposed, but in fact agrees with the proposed settlement, and insisted upon having a “friendly” hearing to protect its rights and the rights of A.S.R. Accordingly, the Court conducted a “friendly” hearing to determine whether the proposed settlement payment to A.S.R. was proper and just.
The Third Circuit has not yet provided guidance for district courts to make such determinations in these circumstances. However, in analogous situations involving settlements for the benefit of others, courts are guided by the Federal Rules to conduct a fairness hearing prior to determining whether the proposed settlement “is fair, reasonable, and adequate” after considering whether counsel provided adequate representation and negotiated at arm’s length, the costs and risks of continued litigation, and the proposed agreement itself.42
Pontenberg v. Boston Sci. Corp., 252 f.3d 1253, 1256 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting McCants v. ford Motor Co., 781 F.2d $55, 857 (11th Cir. 1986)). ° Puerto Rico Mar. Shipping Auth. v. Leith. 66$ F.2d 46, 51(1st Cir. 1981). ‘‘ Island Tile & Marble, LLC v. Bertrand, No. 20 12-0050, 2012 WL 5499863, at *10 (V.1. Nov. 7, 2012). 42 See e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2) (requirements for approval of a class settlement).
8

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New Jersey Law Though not bound by New Jersey law in this instance, it offers persuasive authority and guidance for the protection of minors. Court approval is required for settlement on behalf of a minor.43 “A ‘friendly’ hearing is a proceeding ... wherein the court reviews a settlement of a minor’s claims.”44 Once a court approves the amount and allocation of the settlement, a fully represented minor is bound by the agreement just as if he was an adult.45 Consequently, courts in New Jersey review the settlement to “determine whether [it] is fair and reasonable as to its amount and terms.”46
The judge’s role at such a hearing is to assess “whether the proffered settlement is commensurate with the settling defendant’s liability and, if so, whether it adequately compensates the infant for his past, present and future losses attributable to that defendant.” The trial court, after assessing these factors, then must make a determination whether the proposed settlement, as advanced by the parties, is fair and reasonable.47 “After review, the Court may accept the settlement, reject the settlement, or suggest different terms.”48 A court cannot re-write the settlement by ordering different terms. Courts retain discretion to approve settlements involving minors.49
N.J. Ct. R. 4:44-3. 44A.S. v. Harrison Twp. 3d. ofEduc. &E. Greenwich Sc/i. Dist., No. 14-147, 2017 WL 1362025, at *1 n.2 (D.N.J. Apr. 12, 2017) (citing Impink ex rel. Baldi v. Reynes, 396 N.J. Super. 553 (App. Div. 2007)).
Riemer v. St. Clare Riverside Med. Ctr., 300 N.J. Super. 101, 111 (App. Div. 1997). 46 N.J. Ct. R. 4:44-3. ‘ Impink, 396 N.J. Super. at 562 (quoting Riemer, 300 N.J. Super. at 111). 48A.S., 2017 WL 1362025, at *1 (citing Impink, 396 N.J. Super. at 562). ‘ N.J. Ct. R. 4:48A(a).
9

Case 2:16-cv-05028-SCM Document 85 Filed 12/17/18 Page 10 of 13 PageID: 1025
IV. DISCUSSION The settlement proposal includes payment of $125,000.00 by the United States in full
satisfaction of all claims to avoid the “expenses and risks of further litigation.”30 The agreement provides that seventy-five (75) percent of the proceeds ($93,750.00) would be allocated to A.S.R. and twenty-five (25) percent be allocated to Ms. Rodriguez Alvarado.51
Their counsel represented them pro bono and will not be paid for their time or reimbursed for their expenses.52 Thus, A.S.R.’s gross and net award will be $93,750.00. The Court finds that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate for the claims asserted by A.S.R. in the light of the risks of continued litigation.
For the reasons set forth on the record at the conclusion of the hearing on October 24th, and as supplemented herein, the Court makes the following findings: a) The Stipulation of Compromise, Settlement and Release is just and proper for all parties to the suit; b) A.S .R. received adequate representation by counsel in the settlement; c) the proposed agreement was negotiated at arm’s length; and d) the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate in light of the costs and risks of continued litigation.
Disposition offunds Disposition of the proceeds due to A.S.R. is the only remaining issue. Once a settlement involving a minor is approved, the court must address the disposition of the proceeds. There is no federal guidance here, so the Court will again rely on New Jersey authority.
° (D.E. 79-4, Settlement, at ¶ 4).
5’ Ia.
52 (D.E. 79-3, Dccl. of Muneer I. Ahmad, at ¶ 6).
10

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New Jersey law requires that if a court approves a settlement involving a minor “it shall enter an order reciting the action taken and directing the appropriate judgment in accordance with R. 4:48A.”3 New Jersey’s Legislature has determined that proceeds for a minor’s settlement will be deposited either with the minor’s parents or guardians if the funds do not exceed $5,000, NJ.S.A. 3B:12—6, or in court if the funds exceed $5,000, N.J.S.A. 3B:15—16.54
According to Ms. Rodriguez Alvarado’s counsel, funds deposited with the Surrogate are invested in an account earning 2.13% interest.55 Withdrawals from funds held by the court for a minor must be made on motion supported by “an affidavit explaining the necessity for the requested withdrawal.”56 New Jersey has a body of law explaining what charges against the estate of a minor are appropriate and what charges are not.57
Ms. Rodriguez Alvarado bears the burden to show both that her proposal is in A.S.R.’s interest and there is good cause to deviate from the legislatively prescribed disposition of the settlement funds.58 She proposes to establish a private irrevocable trust to “be used for the health, education, maintenance and support of A.S.R. while he is a minor.”59 Her proposal further includes the following: 1) She would “serve as trustee” and would “not receive any compensation for”’ her
N.J. Ct. R. 4:44-3. ‘4fssex Cty. Div. of Welfare v. O.J., 128 N.J. 632, 640 (1992).
(D.E. 83-5, Decl. of Andrea Tavema, at ¶ 6).
56 N.J. Ct. R. 4:48A(c). See In re Conda, 104 N.J. 163, 170—72 (1986).
58 Comment to N.J. Ct. R. 4:48A. (D.E. 79-6, Proposed Trust). 11

Case 2:16-cv-05028-SCM Document 85 Filed 12/17/18 Page 12 of 13 PageID: 1027
role as trustee;6° 2) She would retain a financial advisor and professional trustee to assist with the trust;6’ 3) She would consult with Mr. Sanchez “regarding uses of the trust funds” but would “retain final decision-making authority”; 4) “At age 18, A.S.R. will gain independent access to and authority over one-half of the funds in the trust”; and 5) “At age 21, A.S.R. would gain independent access to and authority over the remaining funds in the trust.”62
The United States Government raised several concerns with Ms. Rodriguez Alvarado’s proposal: 1) The “professional trustee” has not been identified; 2) “the amount of fees that the professional trustee will charge” have not been identified; 3) the mechanism to resolve conflicts between Ms. Rodriguez Alvarado and the professional trustee is unclear; 4) the professional trustee may change and can appoint a successor at any time; 5) neither the contemplated financial advisor nor his or her fees have been identified; and 6) several proposals discussed in the brief conflict with the proposed trust language.63 Ms. Rodriguez Alvarado has not responded to the Government’s concerns.
The Court shares the Government’s concerns that Ms. Rodriguez Alvarado’s proposal is incomplete and lacks key information needed to determine whether the private trust would be in A.S.R.’s interest. Ms. Rodriguez Alvarado’s brief criticizes the 2.13% interest rate earned by accounts held by the Surrogate, but does not disclose the rate of return expected with the private
60 (D.E. 80, Updated Proposed Trust, at 1). 6! (D.E. 83, Br., at 10—11). 62 (D.E. 80, Updated Proposed Trust, at 2). 63 (D.E. 84, Letter Br.).
12

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trust. Ms. Rodriguez Alvarado also does not disclose the fees and expenses, if any, that would be charged by the financial advisor or professional trustee.
The Court finds that Ms. Rodriguez Alvarado has not shown that the private trust is in A.S.R’s interest. The Court further finds good cause has not been shown to deviate from the plan prescribed by New Jersey’s Legislature for deposit with the Surrogate. Therefore, Ms. Rodriguez Alvarado’s request to have A.S.R.’s settlement proceeds deposited into a private trust is denied.
An appropriate order will be issued.

*
%:
‘1CTC0

-iZ_. C. L_—
* Honorable Steve Mannion, U.S.MJ, United States District Court. for the District of New Jersey phone: 973-645-3827

12/17/2018 6:59:29 PM

Original: Clerk of the Court cc: All parties
file

13

 
 Case 2:16-cv-05028-SCM Document 97 Filed 02/22/19 Page 1 of 2 PageID: 1114

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT Of NEW JERSEY

SIJNY YANETII R()DRIGUE.Z
ALVARADO, and A.S.R., a minor,
Plaintiffs,

Civil Action 2:16-cv-502$ —SCM

UNITED STATES of AMERICA. Defetidant.

CONSENT ORDER APPROVING SETTLEMENT AND DISMISSAL OF ACTION

IT IS onthis

tt

1. ORDERED that the Court’s orders of December 17, 2018, ECf No. 85 and 86, are hereby vacated; and it is further

2. ORDERED that the Settlement by and between Plaintiffs and Defendants as set forth in the Stipulation olComprornise, Settlement, and Release, ECF No. 79-4, is hereby approved; and it is further
3. ORDERED that the gross settlement of $1 25,000 shall be mailed by Defendant United States of America to Gibbons, P.C., local counsel for plaintiffs no later than 10 days from the receipt of the funds by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of New Jersey from the U.S. Treasury; and it is further
4. ORDERED that the net recovery of $93,750.00 for A.S.R., shall be deposited by Gibbons, P.C. into an irrevocable tmst in the name of A.S.R, with ‘Orange Bank & Trust Company,” pursuant to the terms outlined in ‘A.S.R. Trust of20l8.’ ECF No.

Case 2:16-cv-05028-SCM Document 97 Filed 02/22/19 Page 2 of 2 PageID: 1115
90-2, within 30 days of receipt of funds tiom Defendant: and it is further 5. ORDERED that the management of the funds will be in accordance with the terms set
forth in A.S.R. Trust of 20! 8.” ECF No. 90-2. and that prior to making any request to withdraw any monies from said Trust. Ms. Rodriguez Alvarado shall consult with Jose Rafael Sanchez Villatoro. A.S.R.’s father. and notify him by written instrument, as to the purposes for which any such payment is to be made: and it us ftirthcr 6. ORDERED that this action is hereby dismissed with prejudice, with all parties bearing their own costs and fees, including attorneys fees.
HON. STEVEN C. MANNION

 
 U.S. District Court District of New Jersey [LIVE] (Newark) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:16-cv-05028-SCM

RODRIGUEZ ALVARADO et al v. UNITED STATES Date Filed: 08/17/2016

OF AMERICA

Date Terminated: 12/17/2018

Assigned to: Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion

Jury Demand: None

Cause: 28:1346 Tort Claim

Nature of Suit: 360 P.I.: Other

Jurisdiction: U.S. Government

Defendant

Plaintiff
SUNY YANETH RODRIGUEZ ALVARADO

represented by ELORA MUKHERJEE MORNINGSIDE HEIGHTS LEGAL SERVICES, INC. COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL 435 W. 116TH STREET NEW YORK, NY 10027 212-854-4291 Email: emukherjee@law.columbia.edu LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

LAWRENCE S. LUSTBERG GIBBONS, PC ONE GATEWAY CENTER NEWARK, NJ 07102-5310 (973) 596-4731 Email: llustberg@gibbonslaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

RUBEN LOYO National Immigrant Justice Center 208 South LaSalle Street Suite 1300 Chicago, Il 60604 312-660-1312 Fax: 312-660-1505 Email: rloyo@heartlandalliance.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff A. S.R.

REENA PARIKH JEROME N. FRANK LEGAL SERVICES ORGANIZATION YALE LAW SCHOOL 127 WALL STREET NEW HAVEN, CT 06511 203-436-8971 Email: reena.parikh@ylsclinics.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by ELORA MUKHERJEE (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
LAWRENCE S. LUSTBERG (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
RUBEN LOYO (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
REENA PARIKH (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

represented by DANIEL WILLIAM MEYLER U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 970 BROAD STREET, SUITE 700 NEWARK, NJ 07102 973-645-2700 Email: daniel.meyler@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
KRUTI D. DHARIA OFFICE OF THE U.S.

ATTORNEY DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 970 BROAD STREET SUITE 700 NEWARK, NJ 07102 973-645-2891 Email: kruti.dharia@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 08/17/2016
08/17/2016 08/17/2016 08/17/2016

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ( Filing and Admin fee $ 400 receipt number 0312-7296382), filed by SUNY YANETH RODRIGUEZ ALVARADO, A. S.R.. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Exhibit Ex. A, McLeod Declaration, # 3 Exhibit Ex. B, Miller and Lembke Declarations, # 4 Exhibit Ex. C, Hines Declaration, # 5 Exhibit Ex. D, Raymond Declaration, # 6 Exhibit Ex. E, Burch Declaration, # 7 Exhibit Ex. F, Archambeault Declaration, # 8 Exhibit Ex. G, Statement of Sec. Jeh Johnson, # 9 Exhibit Ex. H, Letter from Rep. Zoe Lofgren et al., # 10 Exhibit Ex. I, CBP Directive No. 3340-043, # 11 Exhibit Ex. J, US Border Patrol Policy 08-11267, # 12 Exhibit Ex. K, South Texas Family Residential Center Performance Work Statement, # 13 Exhibit Ex. L, ICE/DRO Residential Standard, Resident Census, # 14 Exhibit Ex. M, ICE/DRO Residential Standard, Visitation, # 15 Exhibit Ex. N, ICE/DRO Residential Standard, StaffResident Communication)(LOYO, RUBEN) (Entered: 08/17/2016)
Case Assigned to Judge Madeline C. Arleo and Magistrate Judge Michael A. Hammer. (mfr) (Entered: 08/17/2016)
2 SUMMONS ISSUED as to UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Attached is the official court Summons, please fill out Defendant and Plaintiffs attorney information and serve. Issued By *Donato Marucci* (dam) (Entered: 08/17/2016)
CLERK'S QUALITY CONTROL MESSAGE - The case you electronically filed has been processed, however, the following deficiencies were found: Nature of Suit, changed to 360 P.I. . The Clerk's Office has made the appropriate changes. Please refer to the Attorney Case Opening Guide for processing electronically filed cases. (dam) (Entered: 08/17/2016)

08/30/2016 08/30/2016
08/31/2016
08/31/2016 09/02/2016 09/28/2016 09/28/2016
10/05/2016 10/13/2016

3 NOTICE of Appearance by LAWRENCE S. LUSTBERG on behalf of SUNY YANETH RODRIGUEZ ALVARADO, A. S.R. (LUSTBERG, LAWRENCE) (Entered: 08/30/2016)
4 First MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice by SUNY YANETH RODRIGUEZ ALVARADO, A. S.R.. (Attachments: # 1 Certification Lawrence S. Lustberg, Esq., # 2 Certification Applicant Michael J. Wishnie, Esq., # 3 Certification Applicant Muneer I. Ahmad, Esq., # 4 Text of Proposed Order, # 5 Certificate of Service)(LUSTBERG, LAWRENCE) (Entered: 08/30/2016)
Set/Reset Deadlines as to 4 First MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Motion set for 10/3/2016 before Judge Madeline C. Arleo. Unless otherwise directed by the Court, this motion will be decided on the papers and no appearances are required. Note that this is an automatically generated message from the Clerk`s Office and does not supersede any previous or subsequent orders from the Court. (DD, ) (Entered: 08/31/2016)
5 NOTICE of Appearance by ELORA MUKHERJEE on behalf of All Plaintiffs (MUKHERJEE, ELORA) (Entered: 08/31/2016)
6 SUMMONS Returned Executed by SUNY YANETH RODRIGUEZ ALVARADO, A. S.R.. All Defendants. (LOYO, RUBEN) (Entered: 09/02/2016)
7 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice by SUNY YANETH RODRIGUEZ ALVARADO, A. S.R.. (Attachments: # 1 Certification Ruben Loyo, Esq., # 2 Certification Applicant Douglas H. Lasdon, Esq., # 3 Text of Proposed Order, # 4 Certificate of Service)(LOYO, RUBEN) (Entered: 09/28/2016)
Set/Reset Deadlines as to 7 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Motion set for 11/7/2016 before Judge Madeline C. Arleo. Unless otherwise directed by the Court, this motion will be decided on the papers and no appearances are required. Note that this is an automatically generated message from the Clerk`s Office and does not supersede any previous or subsequent orders from the Court. (ld, ) (Entered: 09/28/2016)
8 ORDER granting 4 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice of Muneer I. Ahmad and Michael J. Wishnie on behalf of Plaintiffs Suny Rodriguez Alvarado and A.S.R., etc. Signed by Magistrate Judge Michael A. Hammer on 10/04/2016. (ek) (Entered: 10/05/2016)
Pro Hac Vice fee: $ 150, receipt number NEW031179 as to Michael Wishnie. (cm ) (Entered: 10/14/2016)

10/13/2016

Pro Hac Vice fee: $ 150, receipt number NEW031178 as to Muneer Ahmad. (cm ) (Entered: 10/14/2016)

10/19/2016

9 Application and Proposed Order for Clerk's Order to extend time to answer as to the United States of America. Attorney KRUTI D. DHARIA for UNITED STATES OF AMERICA added. (DHARIA, KRUTI) (Entered: 10/19/2016)

10/20/2016

Clerk`s Text Order - The document 9 Application for Clerk's Order to Ext Answer/Proposed Order submitted by UNITED STATES OF AMERICA has been GRANTED. The answer due date has been set for 11/4/2016. (ld, ) (Entered: 10/20/2016)

10/24/2016 10 Notice of Request by Pro Hac Vice Muneer Ahmad to receive Notices of Electronic Filings. (LUSTBERG, LAWRENCE) (Entered: 10/24/2016)

10/24/2016

11 Notice of Request by Pro Hac Vice Michael Wishnie to receive Notices of Electronic Filings. (LUSTBERG, LAWRENCE) (Entered: 10/24/2016)

10/25/2016

Pro Hac Vice counsel, MUNEER AHMAD and MICHAEL WISHNIE, has been added to receive Notices of Electronic Filing. Pursuant to L.Civ.R. 101.1, only local counsel are entitled to sign and file papers, enter appearances and receive payments on judgments, decrees or orders. (sr, ) (Entered: 10/25/2016)

10/25/2016

12 ORDER granting 7 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice as to Douglas H. Lasdon, Esq. Signed by Magistrate Judge Michael A. Hammer on 10/25/16. (cm ) (Entered: 10/25/2016)

10/27/2016 13 Notice of Request by Pro Hac Vice Doug Lasdon to receive Notices of Electronic Filings. (LOYO, RUBEN) (Entered: 10/27/2016)

10/28/2016

14 Letter from Defendant requesting additional time to respond to the complaint with plaintiffs' consent. (DHARIA, KRUTI) (Entered: 10/28/2016)

11/01/2016

15 ORDER granting the United States an extension of time to respond to the complaint from 11/4/16 to 11/18/16 re 14 Letter. Signed by Magistrate Judge Michael A. Hammer on 10/31/16. (cm ) (Entered: 11/01/2016)

11/01/2016

Answer Due Deadline Update - The document 15 Order submitted by UNITED STATES OF AMERICA has been GRANTED. The answer due date has been set for 11/18/16. (cm ) (Entered: 11/01/2016)

11/07/2016

16 Consent MOTION to Permit Appearances of Supervised Law Students by SUNY YANETH RODRIGUEZ ALVARADO, A. S.R.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibits, # 2 Certificate of Service)(LOYO, RUBEN) (Entered: 11/07/2016)

11/18/2016

17 MOTION to Dismiss , MOTION to Transfer Case to either the Western or Southern District of Texas by UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. (Attachments: # 1 Brief, # 2 Declaration of Homer Salinas, # 3 Declaration of Manuel Padilla, Jr., # 4 Text of Proposed Order)(DHARIA, KRUTI) (Entered: 11/18/2016)

11/21/2016

Set Deadlines as to 17 MOTION to Dismiss MOTION to Transfer Case to either the Western or Southern District of Texas . Motion set for 12/19/2016 before Judge Madeline C. Arleo. Unless otherwise directed by the Court, this motion will be decided on the papers and no appearances are required. Note that this is an automatically generated message from the Clerk`s Office and does not supersede any previous or subsequent orders from the Court. (cm ) (Entered: 11/21/2016)

11/29/2016

18 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 17 MOTION to Dismiss MOTION to Transfer Case to either the Western or Southern District of Texas by SUNY YANETH RODRIGUEZ ALVARADO, A. S.R.. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order Granting Joint Motion for Extension of Briefing Schedule)(LUSTBERG, LAWRENCE) (Entered: 11/29/2016)

12/02/2016

19 CONSENT ORDER extending time for Plaintiff to file and serve its opposition to the Government's Motion to Dismiss or toTransfer on or before, December 23, 2016. Defendant shall file and serve its reply to said opposition on or before January 13, 2017. The Court shall set the return date on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or to Transfer at its convenience after January 13, 2017. Signed by Magistrate Judge Michael A. Hammer on 12/2/16. (cm ) (Entered: 12/02/2016)

12/02/2016

Reset Deadlines as to 17 MOTION to Dismiss MOTION to Transfer Case to either the Western or Southern District of Texas . Motion set for 1/17/2017 before Judge Madeline C. Arleo. Unless otherwise directed by the Court, this motion will be decided on the papers and no appearances are required. Note that this is an automatically generated message from the Clerk`s Office and does not supersede any previous or subsequent orders from the Court. (cm ) (Entered: 12/02/2016)

12/16/2016

20 TEXT ORDER REASSIGNING CASE. Case reassigned to Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion for all further proceedings. Magistrate Judge Michael A. Hammer no longer assigned to case. So Ordered by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 12/16/16. (th, ) (Entered: 12/16/2016)

12/23/2016

21 RESPONSE in Opposition filed by SUNY YANETH RODRIGUEZ ALVARADO, A. S.R. re 17 MOTION to Dismiss MOTION to Transfer Case to either the Western or Southern District of Texas (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Rodriguez Alvarado Decl., # 2 Exhibit Dr. Posner Decl., # 3 Exhibit Dr. Casoy Decl., # 4 Exhibit Kurzban Aff.)(LOYO, RUBEN) (Entered: 12/23/2016)

12/27/2016

Pro Hac Vice fee: $ 150, receipt number NEW031832 RE: Douglas H. Lasdon. (sr, ) (Entered: 12/29/2016)

01/09/2017 22 Letter from the Government requesting an extension of time to submit the reply brief. (DHARIA, KRUTI) (Entered: 01/09/2017)

01/10/2017

23 Letter from the Plaintiffs regarding Proposed Order to permit appearances of supervised law students. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Certificate of Service)(LOYO, RUBEN) (Entered: 01/10/2017)

01/13/2017

24 ORDER granting the United States of America an extension of time from January 13, 2017 until January 20, 2017 to file their reply brief in support of the Government's motion to dismiss/and or transfer to Texas. Signed by Judge Madeline C. Arleo on 1/13/17. (cm ) (Entered: 01/13/2017)

01/13/2017 25 Letter from the Government requesting an additional 5 pages for its reply brief. (DHARIA, KRUTI) (Entered: 01/13/2017)

01/20/2017

26 Letter from the Plaintiffs and Defendant regarding Proposed Order to permit appearances of supervised law students. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Certificate of Service)(LOYO, RUBEN) (Entered: 01/20/2017)

01/20/2017

27 ORDER granting 25 Letter request for an additional 5 pages for the reply brief. Signed by Judge Madeline C. Arleo on 1/20/17. (jr) (Entered: 01/20/2017)

01/20/2017

28 REPLY to Response to Motion filed by UNITED STATES OF AMERICA re 17 MOTION to Dismiss MOTION to Transfer Case to either the Western or Southern District of Texas (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(DHARIA, KRUTI) (Entered: 01/20/2017)

01/26/2017

29 ORDER GRANTING CONSENT MOTION TO PERMIT APPEARANCES OF SUPERVISED LAW STUDENTS: It is ORDERED that Plaintiffs' application for an Order granting Katherine Haas, Aaron Korthuis, Melissa Marichal, and Rachel Wilf leave to appear as supervised law students in this matter shall be and hereby is granted, subject to the supervising attorneys obligations set forth in

Local Rule l0l.1(h)(1). Signed by Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion on 1/25/2017. (seb) (Entered: 01/26/2017)

01/30/2017 30 Letter re 21 Response in Opposition to Motion, 28 Reply to Response to Motion,. (LOYO, RUBEN) (Entered: 01/30/2017)

02/06/2017

31 REPLY to Response to Motion filed by UNITED STATES OF AMERICA re 17 MOTION to Dismiss MOTION to Transfer Case to either the Western or Southern District of Texas (DHARIA, KRUTI) (Entered: 02/06/2017)

03/03/2017

32 Consent MOTION to Permit Law Student Appearances by SUNY YANETH RODRIGUEZ ALVARADO, A. S.R.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Text of Proposed Order, # 3 Certificate of Service)(LOYO, RUBEN) (Entered: 03/03/2017)

03/03/2017

Set Deadlines as to 32 Consent MOTION to Permit Law Student Appearances. Motion set for 4/3/2017 before Judge Madeline Cox Arleo. Unless otherwise directed by the Court, this motion will be decided on the papers and no appearances are required. Note that this is an automatically generated message from the Clerk`s Office and does not supersede any previous or subsequent orders from the Court. (cm ) (Entered: 03/06/2017)

03/08/2017

33 ORDER granting Plaintiff's 32 Motion to Leave to appear as supervised Law Students of Adam Bradlow, Allison Morte, and Natalia Nazarewicz, etc Signed by Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion on 03/08/2017. (ek) (Entered: 03/08/2017)

05/25/2017 34 OPINION. Signed by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 5/25/17. (cm, ) (Entered: 05/26/2017)

05/25/2017

35 ORDER denying 17 Motion to Transfer Case to Western District of Texas. Signed by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 5/25/17. (cm, ) (Entered: 05/26/2017)

06/06/2017

36 Letter from the Government requesting, with Plaintiffs' consent, an extension until June 30 to file the Answer. (DHARIA, KRUTI) (Entered: 06/06/2017)

06/07/2017

37 ORDER granting the Government an extension of time to answer from 6/9/17 until 6/3017 re 36 Letter. Signed by Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion on 6/7/17. (cm, ) (Entered: 06/07/2017)

06/13/2017 38 ORDER scheduling Initial R16 Conference for 7/26/2017 11:00 AM in Newark - Courtroom 2B before Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion.

Signed by Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion on 6/13/2017. (spc, ) (Entered: 06/13/2017)

06/28/2017

39 ANSWER to Complaint by UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(DHARIA, KRUTI) (Entered: 06/28/2017)

06/29/2017 40 Letter re 38 Order, Set Hearings, Set/Clear Flags. (LUSTBERG, LAWRENCE) (Entered: 06/29/2017)

07/05/2017

41 ORDER adjourning the Initial Conference already set for 7/26/17 to 8/14/2017 at 11:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion, etc. Signed by Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion on 7/5/17. (cm, ) (Entered: 07/05/2017)

08/04/2017 42 Joint Discovery Plan by SUNY YANETH RODRIGUEZ ALVARADO, A. S.R..(LOYO, RUBEN) (Entered: 08/04/2017)

08/04/2017

43 AFFIDAVIT/Certification in support of discovery confidentiality order of Kruti D. Dharia and Ruben Loyo re 42 Joint Discovery Plan by SUNY YANETH RODRIGUEZ ALVARADO, A. S.R.. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Discovery Confidentiality Order)(LOYO, RUBEN) (Entered: 08/04/2017)

08/07/2017 44 Discovery Confidentiality Order. Signed by Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion on 8/7/17. (cm, ) (Entered: 08/08/2017)

08/14/2017

45 PRETRIAL SCHEDULING ORDER: Telephone Status Conference set for 10/18/2017 09:30 AM before Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion. Amended Pleadings due by 11/30/2017. Fact Discovery due by 4/27/2018. Joinder of Parties due by 11/30/2017.;etc. Signed by Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion on 8/14/2017. (ld, ) (Entered: 08/15/2017)

08/14/2017

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion: Scheduling Conference held on 8/14/2017. Initial Scheduling Order filed. (spc, ) (Entered: 08/21/2017)

10/11/2017

46 Letter from the Government requesting, with Plaintiffs' consent, to reschedule the October 18th conference to a later time. (DHARIA, KRUTI) (Entered: 10/11/2017)

10/16/2017

47 Letter from the Government requesting, with plaintiffs' consent, an adjournment of the 10/18/17 teleconference. (DHARIA, KRUTI) (Entered: 10/16/2017)

10/16/2017

48 ORDER adjourning the telephone conference already set for 10/18/17 to 10/23/2017 at 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion. Signed by Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion on 10/16/17. (cm, ) (Entered: 10/17/2017)

10/18/2017

49 Consent MOTION Consent Motion to Permit Appearances of Supervised Law Students by SUNY YANETH RODRIGUEZ ALVARADO, A. S.R.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Supporting Documents, # 2 Text of Proposed Order, # 3 Certificate of Service)(LOYO, RUBEN) (Entered: 10/18/2017)

10/19/2017

50 ORDER granting 49 Consent Motion to Permit Appearances of Supervised Law Students Patrick Baker and Victoria Roeck. Signed by Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion on 10/19/17. (cm, ) (Entered: 10/19/2017)

10/20/2017 51 STATUS REPORT Joint Agenda for Status Conference by All Plaintiffs. (LOYO, RUBEN) (Entered: 10/20/2017)

10/23/2017

52 TEXT ORDER: A telephone conference is scheduled with Magistrate Judge Mannion on 12/22/2017 at 10:00 a.m. Defendant(s)' counsel is to initiate the call. Three or more business days before that date, counsel are to submit agenda letter(s) (up to 3 pages) itemizing the issues, if any, to be discussed at the upcoming conference. So Ordered by Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion on 10/23/17. (SCM) (Entered: 10/23/2017)

10/23/2017

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion: Telephone Conference held on 10/23/2017. Text order entered scheduling next conference for 12/22/2017 at 10 am (spc, ) (Entered: 10/24/2017)

12/15/2017 53 Letter from Plaintiffs requesting an adjournment of the 12/22/17 teleconference. (LUSTBERG, LAWRENCE) (Entered: 12/15/2017)

12/19/2017

54 NOTICE of Appearance by DANIEL WILLIAM MEYLER on behalf of UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(MEYLER, DANIEL) (Entered: 12/19/2017)

12/19/2017

55 STATUS REPORT in advance of the December 22, 2017 status conference by UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. (DHARIA, KRUTI) (Entered: 12/19/2017)

12/20/2017

56 ORDER DENYING the Parties request to adjourn the Status Conference currently set for 12/22/17, etc. Signed by Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion on 12/20/17. (cm, ) (Entered: 12/20/2017)

12/22/2017

57 TEXT ORDER: A telephone conference is scheduled with Magistrate Judge Mannion on 2/27/2018 at 4:15 p.m. Plaintiff(s)' counsel is to initiate the call. Three or more business days before that date, counsel are to submit agenda letter(s) (up to 3 pages) itemizing the issues, if any, to be discussed at the upcoming conference. So Ordered by Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion on 12/22/2017. (SCM) (Entered: 12/22/2017)

12/22/2017

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion: Telephone Conference held on 12/22/2017. text order entered scheduling next conf. for 2/27/2018 at 4:15 pm (spc, ) (Entered: 01/05/2018)

02/22/2018 58 STATUS REPORT Joint Agenda for Status Conference by All Plaintiffs. (LOYO, RUBEN) (Entered: 02/22/2018)

02/27/2018

59 TEXT ORDER: Fact discovery is extended to May 31, 2018. Counsel shall continue todays settlement discussion. Defendant shall provide an offer in response to Plaintiffs demand by 3/13/2018. A settlement conference to be held on 3/21/2018 at 11:15 a.m. before Judge Steve Mannion in courtroom 2B. Trial counsel and clients who have settlement authority must appear. Confidential settlement positions no longer than five pages should be faxed to Judge Mannion 4 days before the conference and not filed via ECF. So Ordered by Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion on 2/27/2018. (Mannion, Steven) (Entered: 02/27/2018)

02/27/2018

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion: Telephone Conference held on 2/27/2018. text order entered scheduling next conference for 3/21/2018 at 11:15 a.m. (spc, ) (Entered: 02/28/2018)

03/21/2018

60 TEXT ORDER: Due to the Courts closing for snow, todays conference is adjourned to 3/23/18 at 9:30 a.m. So Ordered by Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion on 3/21/18. (Mannion, Steven) (Entered: 03/21/2018)

03/23/2018

61 TEXT ORDER: A telephone conference is scheduled with Magistrate Judge Mannion on 5/22/2018 at 4:15 p.m. Plaintiff(s)' counsel is to initiate the call. Three or more business days before that date, counsel are to submit an agenda letter(s) (up to 3 pages) itemizing the issues, if any, to be discussed at the upcoming conference. So Ordered by Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion on 3/23/18. (Mannion, Steven) (Entered: 03/23/2018)

03/23/2018

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion: Settlement Conference held on 3/23/2018. Text order entered

scheduling next conference for 5/22/2018 at 4:15 pm (spc, ) (Entered: 03/23/2018)

03/28/2018

62 Consent MOTION Consent Motion to Permit Appearances of Supervised Law Students by SUNY YANETH RODRIGUEZ ALVARADO, A. S.R.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Supporting Documents, # 2 Text of Proposed Order, # 3 Certificate of Service)(LOYO, RUBEN) (Entered: 03/28/2018)

03/29/2018

Set Deadlines as to 62 Consent MOTION Consent Motion to Permit Appearances of Supervised Law Students . Motion set for 5/7/2018 before Judge Madeline Cox Arleo. Unless otherwise directed by the Court, this motion will be decided on the papers and no appearances are required. Note that this is an automatically generated message from the Clerk`s Office and does not supersede any previous or subsequent orders from the Court. (cm, ) (Entered: 03/29/2018)

04/24/2018

63 ORDER denying without prejudice 62 Consent Motion to Permit Appearances of Supervised Law Students, etc. Signed by Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion on 4/24/18. (cm, ) (Entered: 04/25/2018)

05/17/2018

64 STATUS REPORT Joint Agenda for May 22, 2018 Status Conference by All Plaintiffs. (LUSTBERG, LAWRENCE) (Entered: 05/17/2018)

05/22/2018

65 TEXT ORDER: Fact disc extended to 8/31/18. Parties shall use this extension to its fullest or not seek additional time. A telephone conference is scheduled with Magistrate Judge Mannion on 8/24/2018 at 10:45 a.m. Defendant(s)' counsel is to initiate the call. Three or more business days before that date, counsel are to submit an agenda letter(s) (up to 3 pages) itemizing the issues, if any, to be discussed at the upcoming conference. So Ordered by Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion on 5/22/18. (Mannion, Steven) (Entered: 05/22/2018)

05/22/2018

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion: Telephone Conference held on 5/22/2018. text order entered scheduling next conference for 8/24/2018 at 10:45 am (spc, ) (Entered: 05/22/2018)

06/08/2018

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion: Telephone Conference held on 6/8/2018. (spc, ) (Entered: 06/12/2018)

06/15/2018

66 Consent MOTION to Permit Appearances of Supervised Law Student by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Text of Proposed Order, # 5 Certificate of Service)(LOYO, RUBEN) (Entered: 06/15/2018)

06/21/2018

67 ORDER Granting 66 Consent MOTION to Permit Appearances of Supervised Law Student by All Plaintiffs.. Signed by Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion on 6/16/2018. (JB, ) (Entered: 06/21/2018)

07/30/2018 68 NOTICE of Appearance by REENA PARIKH on behalf of All Plaintiffs (PARIKH, REENA) (Entered: 07/30/2018)

07/30/2018

69 Consent MOTION to Permit Appearances of Supervised Law Students by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Text of Proposed Order proposed order, # 12 Certificate of Service cert. of service)(PARIKH, REENA) (Entered: 07/30/2018)

07/31/2018

Set/Reset Deadlines as to 69 Consent MOTION to Permit Appearances of Supervised Law Students . Motion set for 9/4/2018 before Judge Madeline Cox Arleo. Unless otherwise directed by the Court, this motion will be decided on the papers and no appearances are required. Note that this is an automatically generated message from the Clerk`s Office and does not supersede any previous or subsequent orders from the Court. (ld, ) (Entered: 07/31/2018)

08/01/2018

70 Letter from parties joint discovery dispute letter. (Attachments: # 1 Brief in support of plaintiffs position, # 2 Exhibit to plaintiffs brief, # 3 Brief in support of government position)(PARIKH, REENA) (Entered: 08/01/2018)

08/03/2018 71 NOTICE of Settlement Joint Notice of Settlement by SUNY YANETH RODRIGUEZ ALVARADO (PARIKH, REENA) (Entered: 08/03/2018)

08/14/2018

72 ORDER: The 8/24/2018 teleconference is adjourned. A friendly hearing is scheduled for 9/12/2018 at 10:45AM. Etc. Signed by Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion on 8/14/2018. (fp) (Entered: 08/14/2018)

08/20/2018

73 ORDER, that Plaintiff's application for an Order Granting Aseem Mehta, Peter Menz, and Andrea Taverna leave to appear as supervised law student in this matter shall be and hereby administratively terminated pending the 9/12/2018 friendly hearing. Signed by Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion on 8/20/2018. (JB, ) (Entered: 08/21/2018)

09/01/2018 74 Letter from Plaintiffs regarding Law Student Appearances at Friendly Hearing. (PARIKH, REENA) (Entered: 09/01/2018)

09/07/2018 75 Letter from Plaintiffs regarding agenda for friendly hearing. (PARIKH, REENA) (Entered: 09/07/2018)

09/10/2018

76 ORDER Granting 69 Consent MOTION to Permit Appearances of Supervised Law Students, Aseem Mehta, Peter Menz, and Andrea Taverna, subject to the supervising attorney's obligation set forth in local Rule 101.1(h)(1). Signed by Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion on 9/10/2018. (JB, ) (Entered: 09/11/2018)

09/11/2018 77 Letter from Plaintiffs seeking continuance to friendly hearing. (PARIKH, REENA) (Entered: 09/11/2018)

09/11/2018

78 ORDER Granting 77 Letter from Plaintiffs seeking continuance to friendly hearing. Friendly hearing adjourned to 10/24/2018 03:00 PM before Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion.. Signed by Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion on 9/11/2018. (JB, ) (Entered: 09/12/2018)

10/22/2018

79 Letter from Plaintiffs regarding friendly hearing. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Declaration of Suny Rodriguez Alvarado, # 2 Exhibit Declaration of Jose Rafael Sanchez Villatoro, # 3 Exhibit Declaration of Muneer Ahmad, # 4 Exhibit Stipulation of Compromise Settlement and Release, # 5 Exhibit Proposed Order of Dismissal, # 6 Exhibit Trust Parameters Description)(PARIKH, REENA) (Entered: 10/22/2018)

10/24/2018 80 Letter from Plaintiffs regarding update to trust parameters. (PARIKH, REENA) (Entered: 10/24/2018)

10/24/2018 81 DECLARATION of Jose Rafael Sanchez Villatoro (Corrected) by All Plaintiffs. (PARIKH, REENA) (Entered: 10/24/2018)

10/24/2018

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion: Friendly settlement Hearing held on 10/24/2018. court reserved decision, parties executed the consent to Mag. Jurisdiction form. (Court Reporter/Recorder ECR.) (spc, ) (Entered: 10/25/2018)

10/24/2018

82 CONSENT to Jurisdiction by US Magistrate Judge by SUNY YANETH RODRIGUEZ ALVARADO, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. Case reassigned to Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion. (dam, ) (Entered: 10/26/2018)

11/14/2018

83 BRIEF in Support of Plaintiffs' Request for Approval of Friendly Settlement (Attachments: # 1 Order, Chacon v. United States, # 2 Order, Lee v. United States, # 3 Order, Castillo v. United States, # 4 Redacted Trust Agreement, # 5 Declaration of Andrea Taverna)(PARIKH, REENA) (Entered: 11/14/2018)

11/28/2018 84 Letter from the Government re 83 Brief,. (DHARIA, KRUTI) (Entered: 11/28/2018)

12/17/2018

85 ***VACATED*** LETTER ORDER-OPINION, etc. Signed by Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion on 12/17/2018. (JB, ) Modified on 2/26/2019 (JB, ). (Entered: 12/18/2018)

12/17/2018

86 ***VACATED*** JUDGMENT in favor of A.S.R., a minor by his mother and guardian, SUNY YANETH RODRIGUEZ ALVARADO in the gross amount of $93,750.00 against UNITED STATES OF AMERICA without attorneys' fees, costs and/or interest. This amount shall be the sole and exclusive remedy of A.S.R. against the United States of America related to the underlying claims in this matter, etc ***CIVIL CASE TERMINATED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion on 12/17/2018. (JB, ) Modified on 2/26/2019 (JB, ). (Entered: 12/18/2018)

12/21/2018 87 Letter from the Government re 86 Judgment,. (DHARIA, KRUTI) (Entered: 12/21/2018)

12/21/2018

88 MOTION to Amend/Correct 86 Judgment, by UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. (Attachments: # 1 Brief, # 2 Exhibit 1 (Proposed Order), # 3 Exhibit 2 (Redline of Proposed Order), # 4 Certificate of Service)(MEYLER, DANIEL) (Entered: 12/21/2018)

12/21/2018 89 Letter from Plaintiffs re 86 Judgment, 85 Opinion. (PARIKH, REENA) (Entered: 12/21/2018)

12/22/2018

90 MOTION for Reconsideration (Partial Reconsideration) of Order and Judgment and in the Alternative Partial Relief from Judgment by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Brief in Support of Motion, # 2 Exhibit 1 Redacted Trust, # 3 Exhibit 2 - Redacted Declaration)(PARIKH, REENA) (Entered: 12/22/2018)

12/22/2018

91 MOTION to Stay re 86 Judgment, Motion for Partial Stay of Judgment Pending Resolution of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Reconsideration of Order and Judgment by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Brief in Support of Motion)(PARIKH, REENA) (Entered: 12/22/2018)

12/22/2018

Set Deadlines as to 88 MOTION to Amend/Correct 86 Judgment, , 91 MOTION to Stay re 86 Judgment, Motion for Partial Stay of Judgment Pending Resolution of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Reconsideration of Order and Judgment, 90 MOTION for Reconsideration (Partial Reconsideration) of Order and Judgment and in the Alternative Partial Relief from Judgment. Motion set for 1/22/2019 before Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion. Unless otherwise directed by the Court, this motion will be decided on the papers and no appearances are required. Note that this is an automatically generated message from the Clerk`s Office and does not

supersede any previous or subsequent orders from the Court. (JB, ) (Entered: 12/22/2018)

02/01/2019

92 ORDER in support of Plaintiff's motion for partial stay of judgment and ORDER, Plaintiff's motion for partial stay 91 Motion to Stay is GRANTED. Regarding DE 88 and 90, the Court invites counsel to file oppositions by 2/15/2019, if counsel deems necessary. A telephone conference is scheduled for 4/3/2019 at 3:30pm. Defendant's counsel to initiate the call. Signed by Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion on 1/31/2019. (JB, ) Modified on 2/1/2019 (JB, ). (Entered: 02/01/2019)

02/04/2019 93 Letter from the Government regarding D.E. 90. (DHARIA, KRUTI) (Entered: 02/04/2019)

02/07/2019 94 Letter from Plaintiffs regarding ECF No. 88. (PARIKH, REENA) (Entered: 02/07/2019)

02/11/2019

95 LETTER ORDER re: 94 Letter from Plaintiffs regarding ECF No. 88. Counsel shall jointly submit a consent memorializing the modifications sought in D.E. 88 and 90 within 10 days. Signed by Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion on 2/11/2019. (JB, ) (Entered: 02/13/2019)

02/21/2019 96 Letter from All Parties - Joint Consent Order. (PARIKH, REENA) (Entered: 02/21/2019)

02/22/2019

97 CONSENT ORDER APPROVING SETTLEMENT AND DISMISSAL OF ACTION, that the Courts orders of December 17, 2018, ECf No. 85 and 86, are hereby vacated; and it is further ORDERED that the Settlement by and between Plaintiffs and Defendants as set forth in the Stipulation of Compromise, Settlement, and Release, ECF No. 79-4, is hereby approved, etc. Signed by Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion on 2/22/2019. (JB, ) (Entered: 02/26/2019)

02/27/2019

98 TEXT ORDER -- With the filing of DE 97 the telephone conference scheduled for 4/3/2019 is cancelled. So Ordered by Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion on 2/27/2019. (spc, ) (Entered: 02/27/2019)

12/04/2019

99 Letter from the defendant enclosing a proposed confidentiality order. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(DHARIA, KRUTI) (Entered: 12/04/2019)

12/05/2019

CLERK'S QUALITY CONTROL MESSAGE - The Letter with a Text of Proposed Confidentiality Order filed by KRUTI DHARIA on 12/04/2019 was filed in the incorrect case. This submission will remain on the docket unless otherwise ordered by the court. (qa, ) (Entered: 12/05/2019)