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Grand Lodge of the Fraternal Order or Police v. Janet Reno

202 514 0212

P.02/1S

PN-DC-002-001

FILED

1

IN TOE UNTIED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
2

3

THE GRAND LODGE OF THE 4 FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE,

5

309 Massachusetts Avenue, NE, Washington, 20002, National Police

6 Organizations,

7

Plaintiff

8

vs.

9
JANET RENO, UnitedStates Attorney 10 General, and the UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA,
11
Defendants.
12

Cause No.
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND PERMANENT rNJUNCTTVE
RELIEF CASE NUMBER l:01CV00090 JUDGEs Ricardo M. Urbina DECK TYPE: Civil General DATE STAMPs 01/18/2001

13

Plaintiff, the Grand Lodge of the Fraternal Order of Police, through counsel and

14
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, submits this complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive

15
relief. This complaint alleges a case of actual controversy with adversarial parties and
16
seeks this Court pass on the constitutional validity of Defendants' use of 42 U.S.C
17

18 §14141 (1996). Defendants have used and will continue to use this statute to interfere

19 with the protected interests of state and local law enforcement officers around the nation,

20 impermissibly assuming control over state governmental agencies and altering the

21 delicate balance between the states and the federal government. Defendants have or have

22 attempted to obtain federal judicial oversight of targeted state and local police
23 departments through consent decrees entered in the absence of a case or controversy^ 24 within the meaning of Article HI of the Constitution, and without the participation of
25
affected law enforcement officers or findings supporting the merits of the government's

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202 514 0212 P.03/18

1 underlying claims.

2

A declaration is sought that 42 U.S.C. § 14141 as interpreted and enforced by

3 defendants is unconstitutional. Additionally, Plaintiff seeks to permanently enjoin the

4 defendants from any and all reliance on those portions of the statute that are

5 unconstitutional on their face and all specified unconstitutional applications of 42 U.S.C. 6 §14141, and from undertaking enforcement actions pursuant to mat statute which 7 exclude participation by affected FOP member police officers and their representatives.

8

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

9 1. This Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this action under 28 U.S.C.

10

§§1331 and 1346(a).

11 2. Permanent injunctive relief is sought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 (d).

12 3. Venue in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S. 1391(b) in that the claim

13

arises from policies formulated and actions undertaken by Defendants in the District

14

of Columbia,

15 4. Defendants, the United States of America and Janet Reno, are located within this

16

district and are subject to the jurisdiction of this Court

17

PARTIES

18 5. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the matters set forth above and as additiona]

19

grounds for the relief requested hereinafter alleges as follows:

20 6. Plaintiff Grand Lodge of the Fraternal Order of Police (hereinafter 'TOP") is a non-

2!

profit organization formed under the laws of the State of Pennsylvania with its

22

national legislative office in Washington D.C. and affiliate lodges throughout the

23

24

Complaint for Declaratory and Permanent Injunctive Relief - 1

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202 514 0212 P.04/18

United States claiming a membership of more than 275,000 full time law

2

enforcement officers.

3 7. FOP affiliated lodges are organized by lawenforcement officers employed by the

4

United States, the several states and the political subdivisions of the respective

5

states.

6 8. Membership in FOP affiliated lodges is limited to persons who support and defend

7

the Constitution ofthe United States and promote and foster the enforcement oflaw

8

and order to more firmly establish the confidence of the public in the service

9

dedicated to the protection oflife and property.

10 9. FOP members arelawenforcement officers of the several states and their political

11

subdivisions.

12 10. Plaintiff and its affiliates do not discriminate or condone discriminatory law

13

enforcement practices and its members generally observe written policies

14

prohibiting such practices.

IS 11. FOP members include elected and appointed state and local law enforcemeni

16

officials who have theduty to enforce state and local laws and who are responsible

17

for formulation of department policies.

18 12. FOP members also include line officers and other state and local police officers who

19

have the duty to enforce state and local laws andto abide by duly promulgatec

20

department policies.

21 13. FOP members have Tenth Amendment rights in performing their duties to befree

22

from interference by the federal government except as permitted under the

23

Constitution.

24

Complaint for Declaratory and Permanent Injunctivc Relief- 3

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202 514 0212 P.05/18

1 20. Defendant Janet Reno is the United States Attorney General, a federal govenunenta

2

actor within whose jurisdiction the enforcement and implementation of 42 U.S.C

3

§14141 falls.

21. Defendant Janet Reno is sued in her official capacity only,

NATURE OF THE DISPUTE AND FACTS COMMON TO ALL COUNTS

22. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the matters set forth above and as additional

grounds for the relief requested hereinafter alleges as follows: 23. This is an action for declaratory and permanent injunctive relief.

24. Neither the claims asserted nor relief requested require the participation ol

10

individual members of Plaintiff or its affiliate Lodges because the members are

11

situated similarly with respect to the declaratory and injunctive relief requested.

12 25. Upon information and belief, Defendants have undertaken or are currently

13

undertaking investigations of law enforcement agencies in at least fourteen citiesL

14

various federal circuits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §14141.

15 26. Upon information and belief, the cities currently under investigation by Defendants

16

include Buffalo, New York; Charleston, West Virginia; Eastpointe, Michigan; Lo

17

Angeles, California; New Orleans, Louisiana; New York, New York; Orange

18

County, Florida; Prince George's County, Maryland; Riverside California; and

19

Washington, DC.

20 27. Upon information and belief, Defendants do not publicize their investigations, anc

21

do not always alert local law enforcement that they are investigating a particulai

22

police agency.

23

24

Complaint for Declaratory and Permanent Injunctive Relief- 5

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1 28. Defendants to date have filed suit in a) Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; b) Steubenville,

2

Ohio; and c) Columbus, Ohio,

3 29. Upon information and belief, Defendants' investigations and allegations have

4

improperly tarred FOP members and have hurt community relations, service

5

delivery, job performance and in some cases reputations and careers.

6 30. Upon information and belief, Defendants have resisted efforts by FOP affiliate

7

lodges to obtain details regarding the civil rights abuses alleged in their complaints

S

in both pre-litigation contexts and in response to routine and proper discovery

9

requests in the Columbus litigation.

10 31. Upon information and belief, Defendants fail to allege any specific instance oi

11

improper conduct in their complaints.

12 32. Upon information and belief, Defendants allege state and local government agencies

13

are subject to a prophylactic injunction based on no more than failure to prevem

14

alleged abuses by unnamed individual officers.

15 33. Exemplary of the allegations describe above, the Defendants have alleged in theii

16

Complaint in. Columbus, Ohio:1

17

a. Columbus Department of Police ("GDP") officers have engaged and continue tc

engage in a pattern or practice of using excessive force against persons in

18

Columbus. This use of excessive force includes, but is not limited to:

19

i. use of excessive force in effecting arrests or detaining persons suspected oi

engaging in criminal activity; and
20

ii. use of excessive force against persons who are carrying out a routine

21

activity and either have not committed any crime or infraction or have

committed a minor infraction.

22

23 1 The language that follows is taken from the government's complaint. The numbering has been changed for clarity.
24

Complaint far Declaratory and Permanent Injuncrive Relief- €

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1

b. CPD officers have engaged and continue to engage in a pattern or practice oi

falsely arresting and charging persons in Columbus. These false arrests and

2

charges include, but arenot limited to:

3

i-. falsely arresting or charging persons who witness incidents of police

misconduct or who otherwise are observing police conduct;

4

ii. falsely arresting or charging persons who are believed likely to complain

5

of police misconduct; and

iii. falsely arresting or charging persons who behave or speak in a manner thai

is perceived by a CDP officer to be disrespectful but which does no1

7

constitute criminal behavior.

8

c. CDP officers have enggagged in and continue to engage in other misbehavior.

including, but not limited to:

9

i. falsifying official reports; and

ii. conducting searches without lawful authority or in an improper manner.

11

d. The City of Columbus has tolerated the misconduct of individual officers

12

through its acts or omissions. These acts or omissions include, but are noi

limited to:

13

i. failing to implement a policy on use of force that appropriately guidesth<

14

actions of individual officers;

15

ii. failing to train CDP officers adequately to prevent the occurrence o

misconduct;

16
iii. failing to supervise CDP officers adequately to prevent the occurrence o:

misconduct;

18

iv. failing to monitor CDP officers adequately who engage in or who may be

likely to engage in misconduct;

19

v.

failing to establish a procedure whereby citizen complaints are adequately

20

investigated;

vi. failing to investigate adequately incidents in which a police officer usei lethal or non-lethal force;

22

vii. failing to fairly and adequately adjudicate or review citizen complaints

23

and incidents in which a police officer uses lethal or non-lethal force; and

24

Complaint far Declaratory and Permanent lryunctive Relief-

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1

viii. failing to discipline adequately CDP officers who engage in misconduct.

2 33. Upon information and belief, Defendants have attempted to settle each ofthe three

3

suits filed todate through entry of a court-authorized consent decree.

4 34. Upon information and belief, the terms ofthe consent decrees described in the above

S

paragraph purport to authorize a Federal District Court to ascertain compliance with

6

the decree's terms for five (5) years and enforce those terms. The decrees provide

7

that no modification oramendment of their terms may occur absent Court order.

8 35. Upon information and belief, Defendants obtained consent decrees such a<

9

described in the.above paragraph in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania and Steubenville

10

Ohio. These decrees are enforceable bythe United States District Courts located m

il

those jurisdictions.

12 36. Defendants attempted to obtain a consent decree in Columbus, Ohio, andinitially

13

reached an agreement with that municipality on the terms of such a decree.

14 37. Defendants were prevented from entering the consent decree described inthe above

15

paragraph in the Columbus litigation by thelocal Fraternal Order of Police lodge,

16

which timely intervened in the litigation.

17 38. The opposing parties in each ofthe attempted or completed consent decrees are the

18

municipal governmental agencies subject toDefendants' enforcement action and the

19

United States Department of Justice through the Attorney General, Janet Reno.

20 39. Upon information and belief, in allthree locations, themunicipal law enforcemeni

21

officers hadcontracts in full force andeffect with the municipalities, the terms o

22

which had been collectively bargained through their Local Fraternal Order ofPolice

23

Lodges, acting as collective bargaining agents.

24

Complaint for Declaratory and Permanent Injunctive Relief - 8

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I

1 40. Upon information and belief in all three locations, the decrees altered or would have

2

altered existing standards, practices, policies, and operational procedures of the

3

municipalities targeted for enforcement action.

4 41. Upon information and belief, such existing standards, practices, policies, anc

5

operational procedures had previously been formulated by state and local

government officials and/or through the collective bargaining process.

7 42. The decrees interfered or would have interfered with the formulation of standards,

8

practices, policies, and operational procedures by the state and local govemmeni

officials whose duty under state law it is to make such decisions.

10 43. These officials include affiliate members of FOP who are the elected and appointee

H

state and local law enforcement officers with such policy responsibilities.

12 44. The decrees imposed or would have imposed federal supervision on state and loc

13 . law enforcement officers who have committed no wrongdoing and never have

14

accused of wrongdoing.

15 45. The decrees imposed or would have imposed federal supervision on state and k

16

police departments that have committed no wrongdoing and never have beer

17

accused of committing wrongdoing.

18 46. The decrees infringed or would have infringed upon the collective bargaining

19

process between affiliate lodges, members, and their governmental employers.

20 47. The infringement described in the above paragraph includes the contravention of

21

negotiated departmental standards, practices, policies, and procedures, and/oi

22

preventing such issues to be included in the collective bargaining process in state

23

and local law enforcement agencies targeted for enforcement action.

Complaint for Declaratory and Permanent Injunctive Relief- 9

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i 48. The decrees intruded or would have intruded upon the manner and means by which

2

local and state government agencies provide law enforcement services to the local

3

citizens.

4 49. The intrusion described in the above paragraph includes the imposition of federal

5

standards that require increased devotion of administrative and fiscal resources to

6

training, protocols, more burdensome record keeping, compliance monitoring

7

(including payment of an independent monitor) and dispute resolution to ensure

8

compliance.

9 50. In all three cases, Defendants opposed efforts by local FOP affiliate lodges to

10

intervene into title litigation.

11 51. Motions to Intervene by affiliate lodges in the Pittsburgh and Steubenville suits were

12

ultimately denied.

13 52. Upon information and belief Defendants failed to establish the basic legal requisites

14

for the courts to issue permanent equitable relief under Rules 52 or 65 of the Federal

15

Rules of Civil Procedure in either of the two above lawsuits.

16 53. Defendants failed either to allow participation by local affected police officers or to

17

prove the merits of their claims at trial prior to obtaining relief in either of the twc

18

above lawsuits.

19

CLAIM I:

20

42 U.S.C. §14141 is UNCONSTrrunoNAL BECAUSE IT EXCEEDS

CONGRESS' AUTHORITY UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE FOURTEENTH

21

AMENDMENT, OR IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL A S INTERPRETED AND

APPLIED BY DEFENDANTS

22

56. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the matters set forth above and as additional

23

24

Complaint for Declaratory and Permanent Injunctive Relief- 1

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1

grounds for the relief requested hereinafter alleges as follows:

2 57. Defendants, through officials at the Department of Justice, have stated both in a June

3

1, 2000 national policy statement and in the above-described litigation that 42

4

U.S.C. § 14141 allows them to obtain a federal injunction against a state or local law

5

enforcement agency without any showing that the law enforcement agency itseli

6

was actively involved with, was deliberately indifferent to, or had adopted a policy

7

that resulted in alleged instances of civil rights violations by unnamed individual

8

officers, and based on nothing more than Defendants' judgment that existinj

9

policies and procedures were inadequate.

10 58. 42 U.S.C. §14141 is invalid because it exceeds the scope of congressional powei

11

under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment

12 59. Alternatively, Defendants' interpretation and use of 42 U.S.C. §14141, as described

13

above, is incorrect and/or unconstitutional as applied.

14 60. Congress may not expose a state or local police agency to a structural injunction

15

based on sporadic allegations of alleged civil rights abuses by unnamed individual

16

officers.

17 61. Congress did not and could not expand the scope of a Federal Court's jurisdiction

18

under Article HI of the Constitution by conferring standing in 42 U.S.C. §14141 o:

19

the United States Attorney General to seek an injunction in place of a priva

20

enforcement action by individual citizens or a class of citizens.

21 62. The Congressional record does not support a radical retooling of the establi

22

balance between the federal government and the state law enforcement agencies.

23

24

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1 63. The Congressional record does not support a conclusion that 42 U.S.C. § 14141 as

2

•written is a congruent and proportional response to a national problem undei

3

Congress' specific grant of legislative power pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth.

4

Amendment ofthe United States Constitution.

5 64. Alternatively, the Congressional record does not support a conclusion that 42 U.S.C

6

§ 14141as it has been interpreted and applied by Defendants is a congruent and

7

proportional response to a national problem under Congress' specific grant oi

8

legislative power pursuant to Section 5 ofthe Fourteenth Amendment.

9 65. It exceeds the limits of federal power under Article III and the • Fourteenth

10

Amendment to impose a systemic, prophylactic injunction on a state or local police

11

department in the absence of a showing that the department did more than simply

12

fail toprevent alleged instances ofcivil rights violations by individual officers.

13 66. It improperly entangles the Federal Courts in matters of unique concern to local

14

government to impose judicial oversight on the day-to day affairs of state and local

15

police departments that arealleged to have done no more than fail to prevent allegec

16

instances of civil rights violations by individual officers.

17

CLAIM II:

18

DEFENDANTS SHOULD B E ENJOINED FROM COMTINUING TO SEEK

19

IMPOSITION OF A CONSENT DECREE WITHOUT THE PARTICIPATION OF AFFECTED STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS OR

20

A FINDING THAT THE POLICE AGENCY ENGAGED IN A PATTERN OR

PRACTICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS THROUGH ITS OFFICERS
21

67. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the matters set forth above and as additional
22

grounds forthe relief requested hereinafter alleges as follows:
23

24

Complaint forDeclaratory and Permanent Injunctive Relief- 12

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202 514 0212 P.13/18

1 68. FOP members include elected and appointed state and local law enforceraem

2

officials whose responsibility to formulate department polices is subject tc

3

interference by Defendants' consent decree strategy in implementing 42 U.S.C

4

§14141.

5 69. FOP members include line officers and others employed as police officers in state

6

and local law enforcement agencies whose duty to enforce state and local laws anc

7

to abide by duly promulgated department policies is subject to interference by

8

Defendants' consent decree strategy in implementing 42 U.S.C. §14141.

9 70. FOP members have standing to intervene to protect their legal interests in litigation

10

brought by Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §14141.

11 71. Plaintiff and FOP affiliate lodges have associational standing to intervene on behali

12

of affected FOPmembers in litigation brought by Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C

13

§14141.

14 72. A valid consent decree cannot be entered between Defendants and a local or state

15

law enforcement agency when the terms of that decree affect the legal interests o

16

police officers who have not been given the choice of agreeing to the decree oi

17

holding thegovernment to itsburden ofproof at trial.

18 73. Upon information and belief, Defendants' enforcement actions, including their

19

above-described consent decree strategy in implementation of 42 U.S.C. §14141

20

are based on their unconstitutional and/or incorrect interpretation of their lawful

21

authority.

22

23

24

Complaint for Declaratory and Permanent Injunctive Relief - 13

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202 514 0212 P.14/18

74. Defendants' enforcement actions, including their above-described consent decree

2

strategy in implementation of 42 U.S.C. §14141, exceed the limits of federal powei

3

over the internal workings of state andlocal government

75. Defendants' enforcement actions, including their above-described consent decree

5

strategy in implementation of 42 U.S.C. §14141, interfere with the Tenth

(5

Amendment interests of affected FOP members as state and local law enforcemeni

7

officers and/or elected or appointed policy makers.

76. Defendants' enforcement actions, including their above-described consent decree

'9

strategy in implementation of 42 U.S.C. §14141, interfere with the collective

10

bargaining process by which members of FOP affiliate lodges reach agreements

11

with their respective state or local governmental employers.

12 77. Upon information and belief, unless enjoined from doing so, Defendants will

13

continue to bring enforcement actions based on their current interpretation of theii

14

lawful authority.

15 78. Upon information and belief, unless enjoined from doing so, Defendants will

16

continue to exclude affected police officers, police policy makers, and theii

17

representatives from consent decree negotiations.

18 79. Upon information and belief, unless enjoined from doing so, Defendants will

19

continue to obstruct efforts to determine the underlying factual basis for theii

20

enforcement actions and complaints.

21 80. Upon information and belief, unless enjoined from doing so, Defendants wil

22

continue to oppose participation by affected officers and their representatives in

23

24

Complaint for Declaratory and Permanent lnjunctive Relief- 1

JAN-24-2001 10:36

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202 514 0212 P.15/18

1

litigation, despite the impact of such litigation on the legal interests of the excluded

2

officers.

3

CLAIM HI:

4

DEFENDANTS SHOULD B EENJOINED FROM CONTINUING TOSEEK

IMPOSITION OF A CONSENT DECREE INTHE ABSENCE OF A RECORD

5

AFFIRMATIVELY DEMONSTRATING COMPLIANCE WITH FED.R.QV.P.

52 AND65(D) 6

81. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the matters set forth above and as additional
7
grounds for the relief requested hereinafter alleges as follows:
8
82. Defendants have failed to request or obtain findings by the Federal Courts sufficien1

9
to support the grant of an injunction to enforce 42 U.S.C. §14141 through consen1
10

n

decrees entered without theparticipation of affected local police officers.

83. Upon information and belief, unless enjoined from doing so, Defendants will
12

continue to engage inthe above practice.
13

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED
14

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that:
15

1. This Court enter an Order declaring 42 U.S.C. §14141 invalid under Section 5 of the
16

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States' Constitution and thus in derogation o
17

the Tenth Amendment rights of Plaintiff's members.
18

2. This Court enter an Order declaring unconstitutional Defendants' past interpretation
19

and use of 42 U.S.C. §14141 to enjoin state and local police departments that did no
20

engage in, were not actively involved with, were not deliberately indifferent to:
21

and/or had not adopted a policy that resulted in alleged instances of civil rights
22

violations by individual officers.
23

24

Complaint for Declaratory and Permanent injunctive Relief- 13

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3. This Court enter an Order declaring invalid the use of consent decrees in the absence

2

of either full participation by affected police ofiBcers or complete compliance with

3

FedJLCiv.P. 52 and 65 regarding the merits of the allegations of the underlying

4

complaint

5 4. This Court enter an Order enjoining Defendants from issuing any Order, command

6

or action based on 42 U.S.C. § 14141 or their past unconstitutional interpretation

7

and application of the 42 U.S.C. § 14141, or from entering into consent decrees oi

8

other settlements of suits in the absence of either full participation by affected police

9

ofiBcers or complete compliance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 52 and 65.

10 5. Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court order such further relief as it deems

11

necessary, proper and appropriate under the circumstances.

12

13

ly submitted,

[AL ORDER OF POLICE
14

15

56

C.D&dd Henderson

17

Bar # TX0W9

Counsel of Record

18

2074 Galisteo, Suite B-5

Post Office Box 4111

19

Santa Fe, New Mexico 87502

(505) 988-1848 Telephone

20

(505) 820-1433 Facsimile

21

22

23

24

Complaint for Declaratory and Permanent Iqjunctive Relief- It

JAN-24-2001 10=36

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202 514 0212 P.17/18

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICTCOURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OFAMERICA
Plaintiff, vs.
CITY OF COLUMBUS OHIO,
etal., Defendants.
Civil No. C2-99-1097
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE GRAND LODGE OF THE FRATERNAL ORDER OFPOLICE
IN SUPPORT OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT ANDRECOMMENDATIONS

Before the Honorable District Judge Holshuh and the Honorable Magistrate Judge King

C. David Henderson 2074 Galisteo, Suite B-5 Post Office Box 4111 Santa Fe, New Mexico 87502 (505) 988-1848 telephone (505) 820-1433 Facsimile Attorney for Amicus Curiae
Grand Lodge of the Fraternal Order of Police
Tom Rutherford, General Counsel

JAN-24-2001 10=37

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law.

P.18/18

[ (a) PLAINTIFFS THE GRAND LODGE OF THE FRATERNAL ORDER OP POLICE

~b) COUNTY OP MS1DEWCE Of FUST LISTED HABttttt

D. C

,

7

IEXCPT iw UA njurtntr exams'" • / / < j c y

DEFENDANTS J A N E T RENOand theUNITED

STATES OF AMERICA

COUNTY OF RESIDENCEOF RUST USTOJStttMDANT

NOTE: W t A M ) M N D e $ N A f » N c J r LAND INVOLVED

IFF CASES ONt VI

D -

X USETHE LOCATION OF THE TRACT OF

c ) ATTORNEYS (FIRM NAME. ADDRESS, AND TELEPHONE NUMBER)
C. David Henderson, Esquire

A1 CASE NUMBER l:01CV00090

Post Office Box 4111 Santa Pe, NM 87502

JUDGE: Ricardo M. Urbina

(505) 988-1848

DECK TYPE! Civil General

I . BASIS OF JURISDICTION

ULcrnzE DATE STAMP: 01/18/2001

itucxroc strDi

I VS. Government PlalatUT

D 3 FH«r»l Question ( U i . Government Not a Party)

Dl Q |

PTF DCF 04 04

• 4 Dl»mity (indicate Cituemhip ofpanies inttcmtll)

Cltlzca of Anoib.tr State
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02 O2 0 3 O3

iMMwictd u d rriadwir •r k a t e u ia AaMfer S 4 M Far*i(a Naiton

• 5 0«

V. ORIGIN

irtACS AN I 04 ONC BOX OMLV)

) Proceeding

O2R«novtd from SUte Court

O i Remanded from Appellate Court

O 4 or Reopened

O STnnstened from another district

U<ii«aoa

O 7Appeal lo District Ju4|c Cram i

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PERSONAL INJURY PEftSO^AL INJURY

Q4SI0 A|riculture

O 422 Appeal 2S USC ISt

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 185 F.Supp.2d 9 (2001)
GRAND LODGE OF THE FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, Plaintiff, v.
John ASHCROFT, United States Attorney General, and the United States of America, Defendants.
Civil Action No. 01-90(RMU).
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
August 14, 2001.
101 *10 *11 C. David Henderson, Santa Fe, NM, for plaintiff.
Steven H. Rosenbaum, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
URBINA, District Judge.
Granting the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the court on the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or, alternatively, for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. The plaintiff, the Grand Lodge of the Fraternal Order of Police ("Grand Lodge"), seeks a declaratory judgment stating that Section 14141 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141, is unconstitutional as enforced because it interferes with the rights of local and state law-enforcement agents, thereby disturbing the balance of power 12 between federal and state governments. Grand Lodge also *12 asks the court to enjoin the defendant from undertaking certain enforcement actions pursuant to Section 14141 to the extent that those actions affect members of the plaintiff's organization. The defendants argue that Grand Lodge lacks standing and that its claims are not ripe. For the reasons stated below, the court will grant the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
II. BACKGROUND
Grand Lodge is a non-profit fraternal organization that represents the interests of law-enforcement officers throughout the United States. See Compl. ¶ 6. Membership in Grand Lodge's affiliated lodges "is limited to persons who support and defend the Constitution of the United States and promote and foster the enforcement of law and order." Id. ¶ 8. In conjunction with its state and local affiliates, Grand Lodge provides legal representation to its members in matters concerning collective-bargaining agreements and internal police affairs and procedures. See id. ¶ 16. Grand Lodge also advocates on behalf of its members before Congress and state legislatures and courts. See id.
According to the defendants, Congress enacted the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 in response to the beating of Rodney King by members of the Los Angeles Police Department. See Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 3. Section 14141 of the Act provides the United States with a remedy in the form of injunctive and declaratory relief, but not damages, against systemic police misconduct. See 42 U.S.C. § 14141. Subsection (a) of the Act provides that it is unlawful for any government official "to engage in a pattern or practice of conduct ... that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or the laws of

the United States." 42 U.S.C. § 14141(a). Subsection (b) authorizes the U.S. Attorney General to file a civil action seeking "appropriate equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate the pattern or practice" referenced in subsection (a). See id. § 14141(b).
Pursuant to its powers under Section 14141, the United States, through the Department of Justice ("DOJ"), has undertaken investigations of law-enforcement agencies in at least fourteen cities.[1]See Compl. ¶ 25. Based on these investigations, DOJ has initiated lawsuits against five state and local governments. In Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and in Steubenville and Columbus, Ohio, for example, DOJ has filed suits alleging a pattern or practice of excessive force, false arrests, and improper searches. See DOJ Police Misconduct Pattern or Practice Program, Defs.' Reply in Support of Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. A, at 7. DOJ has also filed suit against the New Jersey State Police, alleging a pattern of racially discriminatory traffic stops and searches. See id.
In the Pittsburgh, Steubenville, and New Jersey lawsuits, the parties have negotiated settlements through the imposition of court-authorized consent decrees. See Compl. ¶¶ 33, 35. A consent decree resolving DOJ's claims against the city of Los Angeles is awaiting entry by the court. See Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 5. In Columbus, DOJ 13 has been unable to negotiate a consent decree. See id. at 6. Grand *13 Lodge claims that by intervening in the Columbus litigation,[2] it was able to prevent DOJ and the city from entering into a consent decree. See Compl. ¶¶ 37, 51.
Grand Lodge sets forth three causes of action in its complaint: (1) "Section 14141 is invalid because it exceeds the scope of congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment" or, in the alternative, the defendants' application of the statute is erroneous and/or unconstitutional, see id. ¶¶ 58-59; (2) the defendants should be enjoined from applying Section 14141 in the form of consent decrees, because the terms of such agreements generally impinge on the legal interests of police officers, see id. ¶¶ 72, 76; and (3) the defendants should be enjoined from applying Section 14141 through the use of consent decrees, because there is no evidence on the record that demonstrates the defendants' past compliance with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 52 and 65(d),[3]see id. ¶¶ 82-83.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
The defendants move to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) or, in the alternative, Rule 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(1) deals with the court's subject-matter jurisdiction, while Rule 12(b)(6) "presents a ruling on the merits with a res judicata effect." See Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C.Cir.1987). In the present case, the defendants argue that Grand Lodge has not fulfilled the constitutional requirement of standing. See Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 2. "The defect of standing is a defect in subject matter jurisdiction." Haase, 835 F.2d at 906. Therefore, the court will confine its consideration to the 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss.
Under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the court has jurisdiction. See District of Columbia Retirement Bd. v. United States, 657 F.Supp. 428, 431 (D.D.C.1987). Because subject-matter jurisdiction focuses on the court's power to hear the plaintiff's claim, a Rule 12(b)(1) motion imposes on the court an affirmative obligation to ensure that it is acting within the scope of its jurisdictional authority. See 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, FED.PRAC. & PROC.CIV.2D, § 1350. For this reason, "the [p]laintiff's factual 14 allegations in the complaint ... will bear closer scrutiny in resolving *14 a 12(b)(1) motion" than in resolving a 12 (b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim. See id.
In deciding a 12(b)(1) motion, the court need not limit itself to the allegations of the complaint. See Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 241 (D.C.Cir.1986), vacated on other grounds, 482 U.S. 64, 107 S.Ct. 2246, 96 L.Ed.2d 51 (1987). Rather, "[t]he court may consider such materials outside the pleadings as it deems appropriate to resolve the question whether it has jurisdiction in the case." Scolaro v. D.C. Board of Elections and Ethics, 104 F.Supp.2d 18, 22 (D.D.C.2000) (citing Herbert v. Nat'l Academy of Sciences, 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C.Cir.1992)); see also Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C.Cir.1987).

B. Standing Analysis
1. Legal Standard
Article III of the United States Constitution limits the role of federal courts to the resolution of "cases" or "controversies." See U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2, cl. 1. "A showing of standing `is [therefore] an essential and unchanging' predicate to any exercise of [federal court] jurisdiction." Florida Audubon Soc. v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 663 (D.C.Cir.1996) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)). The standing requirement serves important goals: separation of powers, judicial efficiency, the improvement of judicial decision-making and fairness. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975) (discussing the limited role of courts in a democratic society); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192, 94 S.Ct. 2940, 41 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) (standing requirement prevents a flood of lawsuits); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962) (standing requirement ensures that a litigant has "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends...."); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-114, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976) ("courts should not adjudicate ... rights unnecessarily").
The Supreme Court has framed the law of standing as a narrow, three-part test:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact" an 0907 invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) "actual and imminent, not `conjectural or hypothetical.'" Second, there must be a "causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of0907the injury has to be fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant...." Third, it must be "likely," as opposed to merely "speculative," that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable decision."
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (citations omitted). Courts consider the injury-in-fact prong the "principal limitation imposed by Article III." See, e.g., McKinney v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 799 F.2d 1544 (Fed.Cir.1986). Under this prong, a future injury is imminent only if the injury is "certainly impending," Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565 n. 2, 112 S.Ct. 2130; speculative allegations of future injury will not suffice. See Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983); Tenacre Found. v. INS, 892 F.Supp. 289, 294 (D.D.C.1995), aff'd, 78 F.3d 693 (D.C.Cir.1996).
Even if a party satisfies the constitutional requirements of standing, the courts may still deny standing on 15 prudential grounds. See, e.g., Gladstone, Realtors *15 v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100, 99 S.Ct.
1601, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979). The prudential rules of standing serve to limit the role of courts in resolving public disputes. See, e.g., Warth, 422 U.S. at 499, 95 S.Ct. 2197. For example, courts may deny standing to litigants who present the court with generalized grievances shared by many persons, which can be better addressed by the political process. See id. In addition, courts may decline to hear cases in which litigants "seek to assert the rights of third parties or to proffer grievances not relevant to the `zone of interests' intended to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." Navegar, Inc. v. United States, 103 F.3d 994, 998 (D.C.Cir.1997).
There are additional rules of standing when the plaintiff is an association. An association may sue on its own behalf or, as in the present case, on behalf of its members. See, e.g., United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 552, 116 S.Ct. 1529, 134 L.Ed.2d 758 (1996). An association has standing to sue on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests the organization seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977); see also National Lime Ass'n. v. E.P.A., 233 F.3d 625, 637 (D.C.Cir.2000).

2. The Injuries that the Plaintiff Fears Are Not Imminent, but Merely Conjectural and Hypothetical
In the present case, Grand Lodge claims to have standing to bring a pre-enforcement suit on behalf of its members.[4] Thus, under the test outlined in Hunt, the court must first determine whether Grand Lodge's "members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right." Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434. This brings the court to the test outlined in Lujan.
The gravamen of the plaintiff's standing argument is that, given the defendants' past use of consent decrees to enforce Section 141410907and given the alleged illegalities surrounding those decrees 0907any future enforcement of Section 14141 will involve more consent decrees and repeated illegalities. See Pl.'s Resp. at 27-28. The court does not deny that "past wrongs are evidence bearing on whether there is a real and immediate threat of 16 repeated injury." O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 496, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974). But even assuming *16 arguendo that the defendants have committed past wrongs in their use of consent decrees to enforce Section 14141, the chain of events that would need to occur for the defendants to commit these alleged wrongs again is simply too attenuated to be a real and immediate threat. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 n. 2, 112 S.Ct. 2130 ("Although `imminence' is concededly a somewhat elastic concept, it cannot be stretched beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III purposes 0907that the injury is `certainly impending.' It has been stretched beyond the breaking point when ... the plaintiff alleges only an injury at some indefinite future time, and the acts necessary to make the injury happen are at least partly within the plaintiff's own control.").
In O'Shea, the Supreme Court rejected a chain-of-events theory of standing similar to that advanced by Grand Lodge. See O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 497-99, 94 S.Ct. 669. The plaintiffs in O'Shea, residents of Cairo, Illinois, alleged that county officials were engaging in discriminatory bail-setting, jury selection and sentencing. See id. at 492, 94 S.Ct. 669. A lower court granted the plaintiffs' request for an injunction and ordered the county to prevent the defendants from "depriving others of their constitutional rights in the ... future." Id. at 493, 94 S.Ct. 669. The Supreme Court reversed, stating that:
here the prospect of future injury rests on the likelihood that respondents will again be arrested for and charged with violations of the criminal law and will again be subjected to bond proceedings, trial, or sentencing before petitioners. ... Apparently, the proposition is that if respondents proceed to violate an unchallenged law and if they are charged, held to answer, and tried in any proceedings before petitioners, they will be subjected to the discriminatory practices that petitioners are alleged to have followed.
Id. at 496-97, 94 S.Ct. 669 (emphasis added). Finding that this chain of events "takes [the Court] into the area of speculation and conjecture," the Court held that the plaintiffs failed to show standing.[5]See id.
As in O'Shea, the danger that the defendants' enforcement of Section 14141 will injure a member of Grand Lodge depends on a hypothetical chain of events which is neither actual nor imminent. Section 14141 merely asks that law enforcement officers and other governmental authorities abstain from behavior that "deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States." See 42 U.S.C. § 14141(a). If the Attorney General "has reasonable cause to believe" that such deprivations are occurring, he "may in a civil action obtain appropriate equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate the pattern or practice." 42 U.S.C. 14141(b) (emphasis added). Thus, in the chain of events that would need to occur for the plaintiff to meet the first element of the Lujan test, the government first would have to believe that a law enforcement agency was engaging in an unconstitutional or illegal pattern of behavior. The government would then have to decide to pursue the matter under Section 14141, and would need to resolve the matter with a consent decree rather some other form of relief. And, of course, in this scenario, a member of the agency would have to be a member of the plaintiff's organization0907 and would have to make out a good-faith claim that the 17 government's enforcement *17 of Section 14141 was violating his own rights.

There is no way for this court to predict with any certainty whether such events will unfold. Furthermore, the plaintiffs have failed to offer any decision holding that circumstances similar to those in the plaintiff's case can satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement. Indeed, the cases on which the plaintiff relies have involved injuries far less speculative than those presently alleged. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 73-74, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (environmental group challenging proposed nuclear facility meets injury-in-fact requirement because of "the environmental and aesthetic consequences of the thermal pollution of the two lakes in the vicinity" and "the emission of non-natural radiation into [the plaintiff's] environment ") (emphasis added); Louisiana Envtl. Action Network v. E.P.A., 172 F.3d 65, 67-68 (D.C.Cir.1999) (environmentally concerned citizens challenging EPA regulation governing the treatment of hazardous waste in landfills meets injury-in-fact requirement because several of the group's members lived near a landfill site where, under the challenged EPA regulation, waste companies had a significant financial incentive to dump "low quality" waste); Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 981 F.Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C.1997) (Fraternal Order of Police meets injury-in-fact requirement to challenge on behalf of its members a law that prohibits the possession of firearms by persons convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors because the law forced certain members of the Order to be assigned to lesser positions in their departments or put on leave, prevented them from working in off-duty security jobs, and generally impeded their ability to act as police officers), reversed on other grounds, 152 F.3d 998 (D.C.Cir. 1998). In contrast to the above cases, any possible future injury to Grand Lodge members is conjectural and hypothetical at best. Accordingly, the court dismisses the plaintiff's complaint for lack of standing.
3. Ripeness
The defendants also assert that the plaintiff's claims are not ripe for review. But "[b]ecause issues of standing, ripeness, and other such `elements' of justiciability are each predicate to any review on the merits, a court need not identify all such elements that a complainant may have failed to show in a particular case." Louisiana Envtl. Action Network v. Browner, 87 F.3d 1379, 1385 (D.C.Cir. 1996); see also Ohio Forestry Ass'n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 732, 118 S.Ct. 1665, 140 L.Ed.2d 921 (1998) (deciding case on ripeness grounds even though petitioner argued the case was nonjusticiable on both standing and ripeness grounds); Association of American Railroads v. Surface Transp. Bd., 146 F.3d 942 (D.C.Cir. 1998) (same).
Were the court to address the ripeness of the plaintiff's claim, however, the claim would succumb to problems similar to those discussed above. The test for ripeness0907which requires a court to "evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration," Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967) 0907 makes this clear. With respect to the "fitness for judicial decision" prong, a claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon "contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all." Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580-81, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985). Similarly, with respect to the "hardship to the parties" prong, 18 an abstract harm is not sufficient; there must be an immediate *18 harm with a "direct effect on the day-to-day business of the plaintiffs." Texas, 523 U.S. at 301, 118 S.Ct. 1257 (quoting Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 152, 87 S.Ct. 1507) (internal citations omitted). Thus, in light of the conjectural nature of the plaintiff's future injuries, the plaintiff would be unable to demonstrate ripeness.
IV. CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, the court grants the defendants' motion to dismiss. An order directing the parties in a fashion consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued this 14 day of August 2001.
ORDER

Granting the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Upon consideration of the defendants' Motion to Dismiss, and for the reasons stated in the court's Memorandum Opinion,
it is this 14th day of August 2001,
ORDERED that the defendants' motion be GRANTED; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff's motion to allow discovery be DENIED as moot.
SO ORDERED.
[1] The cities currently under investigation include: Buffalo, New York; Charleston, West Virginia; Eastpointe, Michigan; Los Angeles, California; New Orleans, Louisiana; New York, New York; Orange County, Florida; Prince George's County, Maryland; Riverside, California; and Washington, D.C. See Compl. ¶ 26. DOJ does not make the findings of the investigations public. See id ¶ 27.
[2] Columbus was the only case in which Grand Lodge was permitted to intervene. In Pittsburgh, the court determined that the consent decree did not violate the union's collective bargaining agreements and denied Grand Lodge's motion to intervene. See Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 4 (citing Tr. of Hr'g, Ex. A at 76-77). In Steubenville, the court denied Grand Lodge's motion to intervene, holding that Grand Lodge "did not have a `significantly protectable' interest in the lawsuit to merit intervention." See Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 5 (citing United States v. Steubenville, No. 2:97-CV-966, slip op. at 1 (S.D.Ohio July 23, 1998) (attached as Ex. B)). "Similarly, in Los Angeles, the court denied the Los Angeles Police Protective League's motion to intervene on the grounds that the union did not have a legally protectable interest in the litigation." See Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 6 (citing United States v. Los Angeles, No. CV 00-11769, slip op. at 1 (C.D.Cal. Jan 5, 2001) (attached as Ex. D)). Grand Lodge did not attempt to intervene in DOJ's section 14141 suit against the New Jersey State Police. See Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 5.
[3] Rule 52 relates to "Findings by the Court" and "Judgment on Partial Findings" while Rule 65 deals with Preliminary Injunctions and Temporary Restraining Orders. The plaintiff does not say precisely how the defendants failed to comply with these Rules, just that "Defendants failed to establish the basic legal requisites for the courts to issue permanent equitable relief under Rule 52 or 65." See Compl. ¶ 52.
[4] The fact that Grand Lodge seeks a declaratory judgment does not obviate its need to show standing. The Declaratory Judgment Act permits federal courts to "declare the rights and other legal relations" of parties to "a case or actual controversy." See 28 U.S.C. § 2201. The Act does not enlarge the jurisdiction of federal courts beyond what is constitutionally permissible, but merely widens the range of remedies that federal courts have at their disposal. See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671-72, 70 S.Ct. 876, 94 L.Ed. 1194 (1950). The sole requirement for jurisdiction under the Act is that the conflict be "real and immediate, i.e., that there be a true, actual `controversy.'" See Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 735 (Fed.Cir.1988). The "actual controversy" requirement, in turn, mirrors the "case or controversy" requirement of Article III of the United States Constitution. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239-41, 57 S.Ct. 461, 81 L.Ed. 617 (1937). Thus, the Declaratory Judgment Act requires no more or less rigorous a showing of justiciability than the Constitution does.
[5] The Court also noted that it expected the plaintiffs to follow the law and thus avoid prosecution in the first place. See O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 496-97, 94 S.Ct. 669.
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CLOSED, TYPE-E
U.S. District Court District of Columbia (Washington, DC) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:01-cv-00090-RMU

GRAND LODGE/FOP v. ASHCROFT, et al Assigned to: Judge Ricardo M. Urbina Demand: $0 Cause: 28:2201 Declaratory Judgement

Date Filed: 01/18/2001 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 890 Other Statutory Actions Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Defendant

Plaintiff
THE GRAND LODGE OF THE FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE

represented by C. David Henderson P.O. Box 4111 Santa Fe, NM 87502 (505) 988-1848 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant JANET RENO United States Attorney General TERMINATED: 04/24/2001 Defendant UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Defendant JOHN ASHCROFT

represented by Steven H. Rosenbaum U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE P.O. Box 66400 Washington, DC 20035-6400 (202) 514-6255 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 01/18/2001
01/18/2001

#

Docket Text

1 COMPLAINT filed by plaintiff GRAND LODGE/FOP (bm) (Entered: 01/19/2001)

SUMMONS (2) issued to federal party(s) federal defendants JANET RENO, and USA (U.S. and U.S. Attorney General). (bm) (Entered:

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02/12/2001 02/12/2001 03/30/2001 04/10/2001 04/18/2001 04/19/2001
04/24/2001 05/01/2001 05/14/2001
05/21/2001 08/14/2001 08/14/2001
10/11/2001

01/19/2001)
2 RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of summons and complaint executed upon U.S. Attorney General on 1/31/01 (td) (Entered: 02/15/2001)
3 RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of summons and complaint executed upon U.S. Attorney on 1/26/01 (td) (Entered: 02/15/2001)
4 MOTION filed by federal defendant USA to dismiss complaint [1-1] ; exhibits (7) (aet) (Entered: 04/02/2001)
5 RESPONSE by plaintiff GRAND LODGE/FOP in opposition to motion to dismiss complaint [1-1] [4-1] by USA .; exhibits (5) (aet) (Entered: 04/11/2001)
6 MOTION (UNOPPOSED) filed by federal defendant USA to extend time to 4/24/01 to file its reply in further support of its motion to dismiss (aet) (Entered: 04/19/2001)
7 ORDER by Judge Ricardo M. Urbina : granting motion to extend time to 4/24/01 to file its reply in further support of its motion to dismiss [6-1] by USA; U.S. reply to brief in further support of its motion to dismiss due by 4/24/01 (N) (jwd) (Entered: 04/19/2001)
8 REPLY by federal defendant USA, federal defendant JOHN ASHCROFT in support of motion to dismiss complaint [1-1] [4-1] by USA; exhibits (1) (aet) (Entered: 04/25/2001)
9 MOTION filed by plaintiff GRAND LODGE/FOP to allow discovery , and to hold decision in abeyance on defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of standing (cdw) (Entered: 05/04/2001)
10 RESPONSE by federal defendant USA to motion to allow discovery [91] by GRAND LODGE/FOP, motion to hold decision in abeyance on defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of standing [9-2] by GRAND LODGE/FOP (aet) (Entered: 05/15/2001)
11 REPLY by plaintiff GRAND LODGE/FOP in support of motion to hold decision in abeyance on defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of standing [9-2] by GRAND LODGE/FOP (aet) (Entered: 05/23/2001)
12 MEMORANDUM OPINION by Judge Ricardo M. Urbina granting the defendants' motion to dismiss (N) (jwd) (Entered: 08/14/2001)
13 ORDER by Judge Ricardo M. Urbina : denying motion to allow discovery [9-1] by GRAND LODGE/FOP, denying motion to hold decision in abeyance on defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of standing [9-2] by GRAND LODGE/FOP, granting motion to dismiss complaint [1-1] [4-1] by USA (N) (jwd) (Entered: 08/14/2001)
14 NOTICE OF APPEAL by plaintiff GRAND LODGE/FOP from order [13-1] , entered on: 8/14/01. $105.00 fee paid; copy mailed to parties. (td) (Entered: 10/16/2001)

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10/16/2001
10/16/2001 10/23/2001
10/30/2001 10/31/2001 11/21/2001

TRANSMITTED PRELIMINARY RECORD on appeal [14-1] by GRAND LODGE/FOP to U.S. Court of Appeals (td) (Entered: 10/16/2001)
USCA # 01-5368 assigned for appeal [14-1] by GRAND LODGE/FOP (tb) (Entered: 10/17/2001)
USDC appeal fee of $5.00 received, for appeal [14-1] by GRAND LODGE/FOP , by plaintiff GRAND LODGE/FOP . USCA notified. (td) (Entered: 10/30/2001)
TRANSMITTED supplemental record on appeal [14-1] by GRAND LODGE/FOP USCA No.: 01-5368. (td) (Entered: 10/30/2001)
USCA # 01-5368 assigned for appeal [14-1] by GRAND LODGE/FOP (td) (Entered: 11/01/2001)
15 CERTIFIED COPY of order filed in USCA dated 11/20/01, on appeal [14-1] , dismissing appeal . USCA # 01-5368 (bcs) (Entered: 11/21/2001)

PACER Service Center
Transaction Receipt

10/19/2005 18:12:56

PACER Login: hs0328

Client Code:

Description: Docket Report Search Criteria: 1:01-cv-00090-RMU

Billable Pages: 2

Cost:

0.16

https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?787894924304363-L_923_0-1

10/19/2005