2:09-cv-14596-NGE-RSW Doc # 1 Filed 11/23/09 Pg 1 of 10 Pg ID 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
WILLIAM C. DALLAS, individually, and on behalf of all similarly-situated persons,
Plaintiffs, v.
ALCATEL-LUCENT INC., a corporation,
Defendant. ______________________________________________________________________
COMPLAINT FOR EQUITABLE, DECLARATIVE AND MONETARY RELIEF JURY DEMAND

Plaintiff William C. Dallas (“Dallas”), i ndividually and on behalf of all similarly

situated persons, brings this age discrimi nation action against def endant Alcatel-Lucent

Inc. (“Lucent” or the “Company”) based on the following allegations:

I.

INTRODUCTION

1.

Dallas, on behalf of himself and other similarly-situated former Lucent

installers nationwide, with an average age of over 5 5, brings this age discrimination

collective action because the ter minations of older installers occurring in 2002 through

2004 were the result of a Co mpany-wide plan to eliminate its older Installers. The

Company’s plan used the threat of permanent tr ansfers or actual transfers to locations

hundreds of miles from the Inst allers’ homes and families in order to force thi s targeted

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groups’ resignations and retir ements which the Installers took in lieu of the

unreasonable permanent transfer option.

II. PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE

2.

Dallas is c itizen of the United St ates and resides in Livonia, Michigan

which is located within the Eastern District of Michigan judicial district. Dallas brings this

age discrimination c omplaint against Luc ent individually and on behalf of all similarly-

situated individuals nationwide.

3.

Alcatel-Lucent is a corporation with its headquarters in New Jersey and is

major installer of telecommunications ha rdware, software and other solutions to

commercial businesses worldwide. At the ti me of the implementation of the age bas ed

plan to force older installers to resign/re tire (2002 to 2004), Alcatel-Lucent employed

tens of thousands of installers and was known as Lucent Technologies, Inc.

4.

The jurisdiction of the court over this controversy is based on Section 7(b)

of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. 626(b) and 28 U.S. C. 1337 to enforce the provisions of the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S. C. §621.

5.

The unlawful employ ment practices alleged in this complaint were

committed in part within the State of Michigan in this judicial district. Accordingly, venue

lies in the United St ates District Court for the Easter n District of Michigan under 28

U.S.C. 1391(b).

III.

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

6.

Prior to filing this c ivil action, Dallas timely filed a written charge of age

discrimination with the Equa l Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). The

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EEOC failed to effect voluntary c ompliance with the requirements of the ADEA through

conciliation.

7.

Dallas brought his timely charge of age discrimination before the EEOC on

behalf of all similarly s ituated former Installers who are permitted by law to” piggyback”

on the timely charge brought by Dallas.

8.

The “piggyback doctrine” permits the more than 300 similarly situated

Installers to proceed in this action utiliz ing the timely charge file d by Dalla s where the

Installer has alleged age discrimination because his termination occurred in 2002

through 2004 and the termination was the result of the Company-wide plan to eliminate

its older in stallers. The Company’s plan at issue featured t he use of the t hreat of a

permanent transfer or an actual transfer to a location hundreds of miles from the

Installer’s home and family in order to force his resignation and retirement which he took

in lieu of the unreasonable permanent transfer option.

9.

This action was filed within 90 days of Dallas’ receipt of the EEOC’s right-

to-sue letter.

IV.
DESCRIPTION OF LUCENT’S PLAN TO DISCRIMINATE ON THE BASIS OF AGE AGAINST IT’S OLDER INSTALLERS

10.

During all relevant times, the Co mpany ranked its Installers on levels

known as Associate Communic ations Services Technician (ACST), Communication s

Service Leader (CSL), Com munications Services Technician (CST) or Senior

Communications Services Technician (SCST).

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11.

During all relevant times, in ad dition to above rankings, the Company

classified its Installers by “skill groupin gs” such as wireless, power, transmissions and

similar groupings.

12.

The Company routinely recorded that the type of work/skills performed by

each of it Installers on a docum ent known as the “Installer Record of Work (IRW).”

Work codes on the IRW reflected the level of skills and amount of time spent on each

skill annually and on a cumulative basis.

13.

The IRW’s show the amount and skill gr oup level of work that each

Installer performed during a given period of ti me. ACST work is designated at the 300

level, CSL work is designated at the 400 lev el and SCST work is design ated at the 500

level.

14.

In order to progress to a higher c lassification, each Installer was r equired

to work a set number of hours in a “specialized wor k operation” and those hours are

recorded on the IRW.

15.

Once the Installer obt ained the requisite number of hours, the Installer

was considered “qualified” in that category or “skill grouping.”

16.

The Installer was not subsequently r eassigned to a different skill grouping

regardless of whether the Inst aller continued to perform any work in a different skill

grouping.

17.

Installers were required by t he Company to perform all available

installation work without regard to their skill grouping. For exam ple, if an Installer’s skill

grouping was “Power”, he was n onetheless required to do “Wireless” work if that work

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was available and he was able to perform the wireless work. The wireless work was

recorded on the Installer’s IWR.

18.

Installers who obtained their qualif ying skill groups ye ars ago in areas of

expertise which bec ame practically extinct continued to per form available installation

work irrespective of their obsolete skill grouping.

19.

The Company, in order to effect uate a workforce adjustment, would

declare a “surplus” in a work area and dete rmine if permanent transfers or layoffs would

be necessary.’

20.

The skill grouping of each Installe r would be examined as part of the

workforce adjustment assessmen t. If the Installer’s skill grouping established years

before was then considered obs olete, the In staller would becom e a candidate for a

layoff or permanent transfer even if the In staller has extens ively performed work

associated with the current skill groupings.

21.

The Company knew t hat the obsolete skill groupings, on av erage, were

populated with a high perc entage of older Installers and t hat the current skill groupings,

on average, are populated with a high percentage of younger Installers.

22.

The Company, by selecting Installers for permanent transfers based on

their obsolete skill gr oupings knowing that there were a high percentage of older

Installers in that designation, deliberately targeted the older Installers as “surplus.”

23.

The selection of the older Installe rs in the obsolete skill grou pings as

“surplus” was unreasonable because the IW Rs established that the Installers in these

obsolete skill groupings performed work associ ated with the current non-obsolete skil l

groupings.

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24.

Company managers have confirmed in statements made to Instal lers that

the Company’s plan was to force resignat ions and retirements of older Installers by

offering them permanent transfers that the Company knew were unreasonable.

V.

STATEMENT OF FACTS REGARDING DALLAS

25.

Dallas, born in 1947, joined the predec essor of Lucent as an Installer in

April 1965 and worked in that capacity at the Detroit home base until his involuntary

retirement occurring on April 7, 2003.

26.

In March of 2003 Dallas received a notice from the Company dated March

8, 2003 stating that he was permanently transferred from his home base in Southeast

Michigan to San Antonio, Texas.

27.

At the time he received this notic e, the Company designated Dallas as a

CST and in skill gr ouping “No-Match Declin ing Systems – Non-El ectronic”. This

designation meant that Dallas’ sk ill grouping which was establish ed years before, did

not “Match” any of the current skill groupings.

28.

In the 3 m onths preceding March 8, 2003, Dallas wo rked 416 hours in

work codes 321 and 474.

29.

Dallas traveled to Texas to q uestion management regarding the nature

and amount available work. Dallas was in formed by Lucent management in Texas that

there was no work for Dallas to perform in Texas.

30.

Based on the information provi ded by Lucent managem ent located in

Texas, Dallas determined that there was no longer any employ ment opportunities for

him with Lucent and he retired.

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31.

After Dallas declined the transfer, the Company did not offer the transfer

to anyone else.

32.

In the three months a fter his fo rced retirement, the Installers in Dallas’s

home base in Detroit who had less years of service and were younger worked 4,763

hours in work codes 321 and 474.

33.

Prior to his termination, Dallas ’ IWR establish ed that he worked

extensively in non-obsolete ski ll level work codes including, cell site test 474 (4,361

hours) and wireless-overall 515 (1,808 hours).

34.

The reasons articulated by the Company for selecting Dallas for the

permanent transfer to Texas are not valid and constitute a pretext for age discrimination

primarily because his skills were still needed in Detroit, he could perform the availab le

work in Detroit, there was no work for him in Texas, the Company did not offer to

transfer anyone els e to Texas after he dec lined the transfer and the Company ha s

engaged in a nationwide pattern of targeti ng older Installers by offering them

unreasonable transfers under similar circumstances.

35.

As the dir ect and proximate result of this discrimin atory employment

practice, Dallas has and will cont inue to experience substantial economic losses arising

out termination of employment occurring on April 7, 2003.

VI. STATEMENT OF CLAIM – DISPARATE TREATMENT

36.

Dallas incorporates the above allegations as though stated in full herein

37.

The Company was under the statut ory obligation to refrain from

discriminating against Dallas in connection with all employ ment decisions because of

his age.

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38.

In violation of this duty, the Co mpany permanently transferred Dallas to

Texas knowing that there was no work available in Texas and at a time when there was

available work in Detroit that Dallas coul d perform and which was being performed by

younger employees with less service.

39.

Dallas has experienced all the damages as alleged in paragraph 35

above.

40.

The conduct of the Co mpany was willful and a de liberate violation of the

ADEA rights of Dallas and similarly situated Installers entitling Dallas and others to

liquidated damages as provided for in the ADEA.

VII.

STATEMENT OF CLAIM – DISPARATE IMPACT

41.

Plaintiffs incorporate by referenc e all the allegations contained above a s

though stated in full herein.

42.

The Company policy of selecting Installers for permanent transfer on the

basis of s kill groupings, al though neutral on its fac e, resulted in a dis proportionate

number of older Installers being selected for permanent transfer.

43.

This outcome violated the ADEA prohibition against employment

policies/practices which have a disparate impact on older employees.

44.

As a result of the above-unlawfu l disparate impact, Dallas and other

similarly-situated Installers suffered the damages described in paragraph 35 above.

VIII.

REQUEST FOR RELIEF

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Dallas requests the following relief from the Court for himself and all s imilarly

situated installers:

a. A declaratory judgment that t he Company has willfully violated the

ADEA rights of Dallas and all similarly situated Installers;

b. A mandatory injunction enjoining Lucent from continuing to violat e

the ADEA;

c. A court order that Dallas shou ld be reinstated to his former position

or a suitable comparabl e position with a full re instatement of rights

and benefits;

d. Compensatory and consequential damages for all of Dallas’

economic losses including fringe benefits;

e. Liquidated damages against the Company for its willful violation of

the ADEA;

f. An award of reasonable attorn ey fees and costs and expense s

related to the litigation of the ADEA claim; and

g. Such other relief the court deems appropriate.

Respectfully Submitted,

PITT, MCGEHEE, PALMER, RIVERS & GOLDEN

Dated: November 23, 2009

By:/s/ Beth M. Rivers (P33614) Michael L. Pitt (P22469) Beth M. Rivers (P33614) Attorneys for Plaintiff 117 W. Fourth Street, Suite 200 Royal Oak, MI 48067 248-398-9800 [Tel.]
brivers@pittlawpc.com
mpitt@pittlawpc.com

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
WILLIAM C. DALLAS, individually, and on behalf of all similarly-situated persons,
Plaintiffs,
v.
ALCATEL-LUCENT INC., a corporation,
Defendant. ______________________________________________________________________
JURY DEMAND
Plaintiff herein demand a trial by jury of all issues to the within cause of action.

Dated: November 23, 2009

Respectfully Submitted,
PITT, MCGEHEE, PALMER, RIVERS & GOLDEN
By:/s/ Beth M. Rivers (P33614) Michael L. Pitt (P22469) Beth M. Rivers (P33614) Attorneys for Plaintiff 117 W. Fourth Street, Suite 200 Royal Oak, MI 48067 248-398-9800 [Tel.]
brivers@pittlawpc.com
mpitt@pittlawpc.com

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 2:09-cv-14596-NGE-RSW Doc # 7 Filed 03/16/10 Pg 1 of 76 Pg ID 95

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
WILLIAM C. DALLAS, Ronald Battle, Johnny Beas ley, Frank Carigliano, Paul Ca rlson, Kim Clar k, Nicholas Congimi, Raymond Connoll y, Geoffrey Corbin, Lawrence Davis, Duane Dav ison, Calixto Fonseca, Frank Fox, Edward Haeussler, Rudolph Hopkins , Ronald Johnson, Gerald K ephart, John Koenig, J ohn Korz, Gordon Ludwig, James Mahaffey, Robert Mladenka, Gary Nash, James Nealis, Hugo Pemintel, Dale Peterson, Robert Po ltenovage, Michael Presby , James Riley, Rona ld Sadlik, Richard Schwartz, Lawrence Smith, Leo Stoney, Jr., W.T. Ruth, Francis Tedeschi, Richard Turner , E. Don Woodford, individually, and on behalf of all similarly-situated persons,

Plaintiffs, v.

Hon.

Bernard Friedman

ALCATEL-LUCENT USA INC., a corporation,

Case No. 09-14596

Defendant.

______________________________________________________________________

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR EQUITABLE, DECLARATIVE AND MONETARY RELIEF JURY DEMAND

Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of al l similarly situated persons, bring this

age discrimination action against defendant Alcatel-Lucent USA Inc. (“Lucent” or the

“Company”) based on the following allegations:

I.

INTRODUCTION

1.

Thirty-seven Plaintiffs bring this r epresentative age dis crimination action,

2:09-cv-14596-NGE-RSW Doc # 7 Filed 03/16/10 Pg 2 of 76 Pg ID 96

on behalf of themselves and other similarly -situated former Lucent installers nationwide,

with an average age of over 55, because the permanent transfers and/or terminations of

older Installers occurring in 2002 through 20 04 were the result of a Company-wide plan

to eliminate its older Inst allers. The Company’s plan used the threat of permanen t

transfers or actual transfers to locations hundreds of miles from the Installers’ hom es

and families in order to force this targeted groups’ resignations and retirements.

II. PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE

2.

William Dallas is a ci tizen of the United States and resides in Livon ia,

Michigan which is located within the Eastern District of Michigan judicial district.

3.

Ronald Battle is a citizen of the United States and resides in Dumont, New

Jersey. Battle’s Lucent base location was in New York, New York.

4.

Johnny Beasley is a citizen of the United States and resides in Red Oak,

Oklahoma. Beasley’s Lucent base location was in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.

5.

Frank Carigliano is a citizen of t he United States and resides in Bronx,

New York. Carigliano’s Lucent base location was in New York, New York.

6.

Paul Carlson is a citizen of the United States and resides in Lak e Grove,

New York. Carlson’s Lucent base location was in New York, New York.

7.

Kim Clark is a c itizen of the Un ited States and resi des in Bay City,

Michigan which is located within the Eastern District of Michi gan judicial district. Clark’s

Lucent base location was in Saginaw, Michigan.

8.

Nicholas Congimi is a ci tizen of the Unit ed States and re sides in Middle

Village, New York. Congimi's Lucent base location was in New York, New York.

9.

Raymond Connolly is a ci tizen of the United Stat es and resides in East

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Quogue, New York. Connolly’s Lucent base location was in New York, New York.

10.

Geoffrey Corbin is a citizen of the United States and resides in Beacon,

New York. Corbin’s Lucent base location was in Millbrook, New York.

11.

Lawrence Davis is a citizen of the United States and resides in Houston,

Texas. Davis’ Lucent base location was in Houston, Texas.

12.

Duane Davison is a citizen of the United States and resides in Davisburg,

Michigan which is located wit hin the Eastern District of Mi chigan judicial distric t.

Davison’s Lucent base location was Detroit, Michigan.

13.

Calixto Fonseca is a citizen of the United States and resides in Tucson,

Arizona. Fonseca’s Lucent base location was Tucson, Arizona.

14.

Frank Fox is a citizen of the United States and resides in Mahopac, New

York. Fox’s Lucent base location was in New York, New York.

15.

Edward Haeussler is a citizen of the United States and resides in Elmont,

New York. Haeussler’s Lucent base location was in New York, New York.

16.

Rudolph Hopkins is a citizen of the United States and resides in Highland

Park, Michigan whic h is located within the East ern District of Mi chigan judicial district.

Hopkins’ Lucent base location was Detroit, Michigan.

17.

Ronald Johnson is a citizen of the United States and resides in Detroit,

Michigan which is located wit hin the Eastern District of Mi chigan judicial distric t.

Johnson’s Lucent base location was Detroit, Michigan.

18.

Gerald Kephart is a citizen of the United States and resides in Fort Pierce,

Florida. Kephart’s Lucent base location was Fort Pierce/Ft. Lauderdale, Florida.

19.

John Koenig is a citizen of the United States and resides in Canton,

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Michigan, which is located wit hin the Easter n District of Michigan judic ial district.

Koenig’s Lucent base location was Detroit, Michigan.

20.

John Korz is a citizen of the United States and resides in Wappinger’s

Falls, New York. Korz’s Lucent base location was in New York, New York.

21.

Gordon Ludwig is a citizen of the United States and resides in Warren,

Michigan which is located wit hin the Easter n District of Mi chigan judicial distric t.

Ludwig’s Lucent base location was Detroit, Michigan.

22.

James Mahaffey is a citizen of the United States and resides in Chand ler,

Oklahoma, Mahaffey’s Lucent base location was Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.

23.

Robert Mladenka is a citizen of the United States and resides in Spring,

Texas. Mladenka’s Lucent base location was in Houston, Texas.

24.

Gary Nash is a c itizen of the Unit ed States and resides in Memphis, New

York. Nash’s Lucent base location was in Syracuse, New York.

25.

James Nealis is a citizen of th e United States and re sides in Katonah,

New York. Nealis’ Lucent base location was in New York, New York.

26.

Hugo Pemintel is a citizen of t he United States and resides in Novato,

California. Pemintel’s Lucent base location was Santa Rosa/San Francisco, California.

27.

Dale Peterson is a citizen of the United States and resides in Tucson,

Arizona. Peterson’s Lucent base location was Tucson, Arizona.

28.

Robert Poltenovage is a citizen of the United States and resides in

Wareick, New York. Poltenovage’s Lucent base location was in New York, New York.

29.

Michael Presby is a citizen of t he United States and resides in Ho lly,

Michigan which is located wit hin the Eastern District of Mi chigan judicial distric t.

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Presby’s Lucent base location was Detroit, Michigan.

30.

James Riley is a citiz en of the United Stat es and res ides in Opa Locka,

Florida. Riley’s Lucent base location was Ft. Lauderdale, Florida.

31.

Ronald Sadlik is a citizen of th e United States and resides in Mentor,

Ohio. Riley’s Lucent base location was Cleveland, Ohio.

32.

Richard Schwartz is a citizen of the United States and resides in Clinton

Township, Michigan which is located within the Ea stern District of Michigan judicia l

district. Schwartz’s Lucent base location was Detroit, Michigan.

33.

Lawrence Smith is a citizen of t he United States and resides in Jackson,

Tennessee. Smith’s Lucent base location was New York, New York.

34.

Leo Stoney, Jr. is a citizen of the United States and resides in Gainesville,

Florida. Stoney’s Lucent base location was in Gainesville, Florida.

35.

W.T. Ruth is a c itizen of the Unit ed States and resides in Humble, Texas.

Ruth’s Lucent base location was Houston, Texas.

36.

Francis Tedeschi, is a citizen of the United States and resides in Lak e

Grove, New York. Tedeschi’s Lucent base location was in New York, New York.

37.

Richard Turner is a c itizen of the United States and r esides in Atlanta,

Georgia. Turner’s most recent Lucent base location was in Atlanta, Georgia.

38.

E. Don Woodford is a citizen of t he United States and resides in Des Arc,

Arkansas. Woodford’s Lucent base location was in Little Rock, Arkansas.

39.

Alcatel-Lucent USA, Inc (“Lucent”) is a corporation with its headquarters

in New Jersey and is major installer of telecommunications hardware, software and

other solutions to com mercial businesses worldwide. At the time of the implementation

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of the age based plan to force older installers to resign/re tire (2002 to 2004), Alcatel-

Lucent USA, Inc employed tens of thousands of ins tallers and was known as Lucent

Technologies, Inc.

40.

The jurisdiction of the court over this controversy is based on Section 7(b)

of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. 626(b) and 28 U.S. C. 1337 to enforce the provisions of the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S. C. §621.

41.

The unlawful employ ment practices alleged in this complaint were

committed in part within the State of Michigan in this judicial district. Accordingly, venue

lies in the United St ates District Court for the Easter n District of Michigan under 28

U.S.C. 1391(b).

III.

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

42.

Prior to filing this civil action, Da llas, Battle, Carig liano, Carlson, Clark,

Cogmini, Connolly, Davison, Fox, Hopkins, Johnson, K ephart, Korz, Ludwig, Pemintel,

Poltenovage, Presby, Sadlik, Schwartz, Sm ith (Lawrence), Stoney, Tedeschi, and

Woodford timely filed a wri tten charge of age discriminati on with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). The EEOC failed to effect voluntary complianc e

with the requirements of the ADEA through conciliation.

43.

The specified Plaintiffs brought timely charges of age discrimination before

the EEOC on behalf of all similarly situated former Installers who are permitted by law to

“piggyback” on the timely charge brought by Plaintiffs.

44.

The “piggyback doctrine” permits t he remaining Plaint iffs and more than

300 similarly situated Installers to proceed in this action utilizing the timely charges filed

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by Plaintiffs identified in Paragraph 42 where the Installer has alleged age discrimination

because his termination, which occurred during the period from 2002 through 2004, was

the result of the Company-wid e plan to eliminate its older installers. The Company’s

plan at issue featured the use of the threat of a permanent trans fer or an actual transfer

to a location hundreds of miles from the older Installer’s’ home and family in order to

force their resignation and retirement whic h he took in lieu of the unreasonable

permanent transfer option.

45.

This action was filed within 90 days of receipt of the EEOC’s right-to-sue

letter.

IV.
DESCRIPTION OF LUCENT’S PLAN TO DISCRIMINATE ON THE BASIS OF AGE AGAINST IT’S OLDER INSTALLERS

46.

During all relevant times, the Co mpany ranked its Installers on levels

known as Associate Communic ations Services Technician (ACST), Communication s

Service Leader (CSL), Com munications Services Technician (CST) or Senior

Communications Services Technician (SCST).

47.

During all relevant times, in ad dition to above rankings, the Company

classified its Installers by “skill groupin gs” such as wireless, power, transmissions and

similar groupings.

48.

The Company routinely recorded that the type of work/skills performed by

each of it Installers on a docum ent known as the “Installer Record of Work (IRW).”

Work codes on the IRW reflected the level of skills and amount of time spent on each

skill annually and on a cumulative basis.

49.

The IRW’s show the amount and skill gr oup level of work that each

7

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Installer performed during a given period of ti me. ACST work is designated at the 300

level, CSL work is designated at the 400 lev el and SCST work is design ated at the 500

level.

50.

In order to progress to a higher c lassification, each Installer was r equired

to work a set number of hours in a “specialized wor k operation” and those hours are

recorded on the IRW.

51.

Once the Installer obt ained the requisite number of hours, the Installer

was considered “qualified” in that category or “skill grouping.”

52.

The Installer was not subsequently r eassigned to a different skill grouping

regardless of whether the Inst aller continued to perform any work in a different skill

grouping.

53.

Installers were required by t he Company to perform all available

installation work without regard to their skill grouping. For exam ple, if an Installer’s skill

grouping was “Power”, he was n onetheless required to do “Wireless” work if that work

was available and he was able to perform the wireless work. The wireless work was

recorded on the Installer’s IWR.

54.

Installers who obtained their qualif ying skill groups ye ars ago in a reas of

expertise which bec ame practically extinct continued to per form available installation

work irrespective of their obsolete skill grouping.

55.

The Company, in order to effect uate a workforce adjustment, would

declare a “surplus” in a work area and dete rmine if permanent transfers or layoffs would

be necessary.

56.

The skill grouping of each Installe r would be examined as part of the

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workforce adjustment assessment. If the Installer’s skill group ing established years

before was then considered obs olete, the In staller would becom e a candidate for a

layoff or permanent transfer even if the In staller has extens ively performed work

associated with the current skill groupings.

57.

The Company knew t hat the obsolete skill groupings, on av erage, were

populated with a high perc entage of older Installers and t hat the current skill groupings,

on average, are populated with a high percentage of younger Installers.

58.

The Company, from 2002 to 2004, se lected approximately 300 Installer s

for permanent transfers based on their obsolete skill groupings knowing that there were

a high percentage of older Installers in that designation deliber ately targeted the older

Installers as “surplus.”

59.

The selection of the older Installe rs in the obsolete skill grou pings as

“surplus” was unreasonable because the IW Rs established that the Installers in these

obsolete skill groupings performed work associ ated with the current non-obsolete skil l

groupings.

60.

Company managers have confirmed in statements made to Instal lers that

the Company’s plan was to force resignat ions and retirements of older Installers by

offering them permanent transfers that the Company knew were unreasonable.

V.

STATEMENTS OF FACTS REGARDING INDIVIDUAL PLAINTIFFS

A. STATEMENT OF FACTS REGARDING WILLIAM DALLAS

61.

Dallas (“Dallas”), born on January 9, 1947, joined the predec essor of

Lucent as an Installer in Ap ril 1965 and worked in th at capacity at the Detroit base

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location until his involuntary retirement occurring on April 7, 2003.

62.

In March of 2003 Dallas received a notice from the Company dated March

8, 2003 stating that he was pe rmanently transferred from his base location in Southeast

Michigan to San Antonio, Texas.

63.

At the time he received this notic e, the Company designated Dallas as a

CST and in skill gr ouping “No-Match Declin ing Systems – Non-El ectronic”. This

designation meant that Dallas ’ skill grouping, which was es tablished years before, did

not “Match” any of the current skill groupings.

64.

In the 3 m onths preceding March 8, 2003, Dallas wo rked 416 hours in

work codes 321 and 474.

65.

Dallas traveled to Texas to q uestion management regarding the nature

and amount available work. Dallas was in formed by Lucent management in Texas that

there was no work for Dallas to perform in Texas.

66.

Based on the information provi ded by Lucent managem ent located in

Texas, Dallas determined that there was no longer adequate employment opportunities

for him with Lucent and he retired.

67.

After Dallas declined the transfer, the Company did not offer the transfer

to anyone else.

68.

In the three months a fter his fo rced retirement, the Installers in Dallas ’

base location in Detroit who had less years of service and were y ounger worked 4,763

hours in work codes 321 and 474.

69.

In the years prior to his terminati on, Dallas’ IRW established that he

worked extensively in non-obsolete skill le vel work codes inclu ding, cell s ite test 474

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(4,361 hours) and wireless-overall 515 (1,808 hours).

70.

The reasons articulated by the Company for selecting Dallas for the

permanent transfer to Texas were not va lid and constitute a prete xt for age

discrimination primarily because his skills were still ne eded in Detroit, he could perfor m

the available work in Detroi t, there was no work for him in Texas, the Company did not

offer to transfer anyone else to Texas a fter he declined the transfer and the Company,

from 2002 to 2004, engaged in a nationwide pattern of target ing older Installers by

offering them unreasonable transfers under similar circumstances.

71.

As the dir ect and proximate result of this discrimin atory employment

practice, Dallas has and will cont inue to experience substantial economic losses arising

out termination of employment occurring on April 7, 2003.

B. STATEMENT OF FACTS REGARDING RONALD BATTLE

72.

Ronald Battle (“Battle”), born on May 21, 1949, joined the predecessor of

Lucent as an Installer in Ju ly, 1973 and worked in that capacity until his premature

retirement occurring in January, 2005.

73.

In March, 2004 Battle received a notice from the Company stating that he

was permanently transferred from his base location in New York to Framingham,

Massachusetts.

74.

At the time he receiv ed this notic e, the Com pany designated Battle as a

SCST and in skill grouping “Power.”

75.

For years prior to his permanent transfer, Battle performed work analys is

and planning work in current sk ill groupings, including, but not limited to, “Power,” “Data

Networking,” and “Transmission.”

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76.

Battle travelled to Framingham and questioned management at the site

regarding the nature and amo unt available work. Battle was informed by Lucent

managers, Troy Martin and Mr. Rabidoux in Framingham, that they were unaware that

any transferees wer e coming to Framin gham and t hat there was not adequate work

available for those who accepted the transfer.

77.

Battle accepted the permanent transfer Framingham and worked from that

base location until his premature retirement in January, 2005.

78.

While Battle worked in Framingham, his wife remai ned in at t heir home in

New Jersey and he rented lodgings in Ma ssachusetts. Battle commuted home on

weekends.

79.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, after his forced permanent transfer, the Installers in Battle’s base location

in New York who had less years of serv ice and were younger worked a substantial

number of hours in the same work codes Battle worked in before the Company

requested that he permanently transfer to another base location.

80.

For years prior to his termination, Battle’s IRW established that he worked

extensively in non-obsolete skill level work codes including, but not limited t o 321, 424,

426, 435, 436, 454, 459, 460, 507, 448, 512, 516, 517, and 519.

81.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, the reasons articulated by the Company for selecting Battle for the

permanent transfer were not valid and cons titute a pretext for age dis crimination

primarily because his skills were still nee ded in h is base loca tion verify, he could

perform the available work at his base location, there was no or inadequate work for him

12

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in the location he was to be transferred to, the Company did not offer to transfer anyone

else to the same location after he declined the transfer and the Company, from 2002 to

2004, engaged in a nationwide pattern of target ing older Installers by offering them

unreasonable transfers under similar circumstances.

82.

As the dir ect and proximate result of this discrimin atory employment

practice, Battle has and will cont inue to experience substantial economic losses arising

out of his termination of employment incl uding consequential damages, lodging, travel,

meals and other expenses associated with his commuting.

83.

Battle also experienced economic losses because the unlawful permanent

transfer caused him to retire sooner than he wo uld have had he been allowed to finish

his career at his original home base.

C. STATEMENT OF FACTS REGARDING JOHNNY BEASLEY

84.

Johnny Beasley (“Beasley”), born on July 16, 1943, joined the

predecessor of Lucent as an Installer in September, 1965 and worked in that capacity at

the Oklahoma City, Oklahoma base location until his involuntary occurring in August,

2004.

85.

In July, 2004, Beasley received a notice from the Company stating that he

was permanently transferred from his base location in Oklahoma City to Aurora, Illinois.

86.

At the time he received this notice, the Company designated Beasley as a

SCST and in skill grouping “Transmission.”

87.

For years prior to 2004, Beasley performed work in other skill groupings,

including, but not limited to, “Wireless,” as required to complete his work assignments.

88.

In July and August, Beasley determined that there were no longer

13

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adequate employment opportunities for him with Lucent and he retired.

89.

Based on information supplied to the EEOC by the Company and relevant

other records, after his forced retirement, t he Installers in Beas ley’s base location in

Oklahoma City who had less years of servi ce and were younger worked a substantial

number of hours in the same work code s Beasley worked in before the Company

requested he permanently transfer to another base location.

90.

Based on information supplied to the EEOC by the Company and relevant

other records, the reasons articulated by the Company for selec ting Beasley for the

permanent transfer were not valid and cons titute a pretext for age dis crimination

primarily because his skills were still needed in his base location, he could perform the

available work at his base loc ation, there was no or inadequate work for him in the

location he was to be transferred to, the Com pany did not offer to transfer anyone els e

to the same location after he declined th e transfer and the Company, from 2002 to

2004, engaged in a nationwide pattern of target ing older Installers by offering them

unreasonable transfers under similar circumstances.

91.

As the direct and proximate result of this discriminatory employment

practice, Beasley has and will continue t o experience substantial economic losse s

arising out of his termination of employment.

D. STATEMENT OF FACTS REGARDING FRANK CARIGLIANO

92.

Frank Carigliano (“Carigliano”), bor n on December 3, 1942, joined the

predecessor of Lucent as an Installer in Apri l of 1962 and worked in that capacity at the

New York, New York base loca tion until h is involuntary retirement occurring in April,

2004.

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93.

In March, 2003 Carigliano received a notice from the Company stating that

he was permanently transferred from his base location in New York to Norfolk, Virginia.

94.

At the time he received this notice, the Company designated Carigliano as

a SCST and in skill grouping “Transmission.”

95.

For years prior to his permanent tr ansfer, Carigliano performed work in

current skill groupings, including, but not limited to, “Transmission,” “ESS,” and “5ESS.”

96.

Carigliano was unable to contac t management in Norfolk to question

management at the site regar ding the nature and amount ava ilable work. Carigliano

received information from other Installers that there was not adequate work in Norfolk.

97.

Based on his inability to discove r whether there was adequate work in

Norfolk, Carigliano determined that ther e was no longer adequate employment

opportunities for him with Lucent and he retired.

98.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, after his forced retirement, the Installers in Carigliano’s base location in

New York who had less years of servic e and wer e younger worked a substantial

number of hours in the same work codes Carigliano worked in before the Compan y

requested that he permanently transfer to another base location.

99.

For years prior to his termination, Carigliano’s IRW established that he

worked extensively in non-obsolete skill level work codes including, but not limited t o,

321, 435, 436, 459, 460, 461, 500, 501, 509, 505, 507, 473, 517 and 519.

100.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, the reasons articulated by the Company for selec ting Carigliano for the

permanent transfer were not valid and cons titute a pretext for age dis crimination

15

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primarily because his skills were still needed in his base location, he could perform the

available work at his base location, t here was no or inadequate adequate work for him

in the location he was to be transferred to, the Company did not offer to transfer anyone

else to the same location after he declined the transfer and the Company, from 2002 to

2004, engaged in a nationwide pattern of target ing older Installers by offering them

unreasonable transfers under similar circumstances.

101.

As the dir ect and proximate result of this discriminatory employment

practice, Carigliano has and will continue to experience substantial economic losses

arising out of his termination of employment.

E.

STATEMENT OF FACTS REGARDING PAUL CARLSON

102.

Paul Carlson (“Carlson”), born on May 1, 1946, joined the predecessor of

Lucent as an Installer in March, 1965 and worked in that capacity at the New York, New

York base location until his involuntary retirement occurring in January, 2004.

103.

In December, 2003 Carlson received a notice from the Company stating

that he was permanently transfe rred from his base location in New York to Jackson,

Tennessee.

104.

At the time he received this notice, the Company designated Carlson as a

SCST and in sk ill grouping “Declining Systems-Non Electr ic”. T his designation meant

that Carlson’s skill grouping which was established years bef ore, did not “Match” any of

the current skill groupings.

105.

For years prior to his permanent transfer, client performed work in current

skill groupings, inclu ding, but no t limited to, “T oll,” “Transmission,” “Data Networking,”

and “Power.”

16

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106.

Carlson travelled to Jackson and questioned management at the site

where he was to be transferred regarding the nature and amount available work.

Carlson was informed by Lucent manager Bo McKenzie in Jac kson that the was no

longer adequate work available at the site if Carlson accepted the transfer.

107.

Based on the information provi ded by Lucent managem ent located in

Jackson, Carlson determined t hat there were no longer any adequate employm ent

opportunities for him with Lucent and he retired.

108.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, after his forced retirement, t he Installers in Carlson’s bas e location in

New York who had less years of servic e and wer e younger worked a substantial

number of hours in the same work codes Carlson worked in before the Compan y

requested that he permanently transfer to another base location.

109.

For years prior to his termination, Carlson’s IRW established that he

worked extensively in non-obsolete skill level work codes including, but not limited t o,

321, 421, 425, 426, 427, 435, 436, 454, 459, 460, 505, 507, 472, 473, 482, 493, 494,

495, 516, 518, and 519.

110.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, the reasons articulated by the Company for selecting Carls on for the

permanent transfer were not valid and cons titute a pretext for age dis crimination

primarily because his skills were still needed in his base location, he could perform the

available work at his base loc ation, there was no or inadequate work for him in the

location he was to be transferred to, the Com pany did not offer to transfer anyone els e

to the same location after he declined th e transfer and the Company, from 2002 to

17

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2004, engaged in a nationwide pattern of target ing older Installers by offering them

unreasonable transfers under similar circumstances.

111.

As the dir ect and proximate result of this discrimin atory employment

practice, Carlson has and will continue t o experience substantial economic losses

arising out of his termination of employment.

F.

STATEMENT OF FACTS REGARDING KIM CLARK

112.

Kim Clark (“Clark”), born on Nov ember 21, 1949, joined the predecessor

of Lucent as an Installer in November, 1 998, and worked in that capacity at the

Saginaw, Michigan base location until his invo luntary retirement occurring on April 9,

2003.

113.

In March, 2003, Clark received a not ice from the Company stating that he

was permanently transferred from his base location in Saginaw to Louisville, Kentucky.

114.

At the time he receiv ed this noti ce, the Company des ignated Clark as a

SCST and in skill grouping “OSP.”

115.

Prior to 2003, Clark performed w ork in various current skill group ings as

needed to complete the projects assigned to him. Clark bu ilt units from the ground up,

performed testing, and turned locations over to the Company.

116.

Clark called the Loui sville base location and questioned management at

the site regarding the nature and amount of available work. Clark was informed by

Lucent manager Bill Priddy in Louisville that there was no wo rk available in Clark’s skill

category and that Clark would be sent out on Temporary Transfers if he d id come to

Louisville. Clark travelled to Louisville, Kentucky to explore the area.

117.

Based on the information provi ded by Lucent managem ent located in

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Louisville and his own observations and resear ch, Clark determined that there was no

longer adequate employment opportunities for him with Lucent and he retired.

118.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, after Clark’s forced retireme nt, no installers remained at Clark’s base

location in Saginaw, Michigan. However , work in the geographic area previously

covered by the Saginaw base location conti nued to be performed by Installers who had

less years of service and were younger work ed a substantial number of hours in the

same work codes Clark worked in before the Company requested that he permanently

transfer to another base location.

119.

For years prior to his termination, Clark’s IRW established that he worked

extensively in non-obsolete skill level work codes including, but not limited to, skill codes

321, 419, 421, 424, 426, 435, 454, 459, 460, 505, 507, 521, 4 67, 468, 471, 472, 473 ,

481, 482, 491, 492, 494, 495, 516, 517, 519, and 530.

120.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, the reasons articulated by the Company for selecting Clark for the

permanent transfer were not valid and cons titute a pretext for age dis crimination

primarily because his skills were still needed in area his base location s erviced, he

could perform the available work at his bas e location, there was no or inadequate work

for him in the location he was to be transferr ed to, the Company did not offer to transfe r

anyone else to the same location after he declined the transfer and the Company, from

2002 to 2004, engaged in a nat ionwide pattern of targeting older Inst allers by offering

them unreasonable transfers under similar circumstances.

121.

As the dir ect and proximate result of this discrimin atory employment

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practice, Clark has and will continue to ex perience substantial economic losses arising

out of his termination of employment.

G. STATEMENT OF FACTS REGARDING NICHOLAS CONGIMI

122.

Nicholas Congimi (“Congim i”), born in September 6,1943, joined the

predecessor of Lucent as an Installer in O ctober, 1962, and wor ked in that capacity at

the New York, New York base location until his involuntary retirement occurring on June

2003.

123.

In May, 2003, Congimi received a notice from the Company stating that he

was permanently transferred from his base location in New York, New York to

Washington, D.C.

124.

At the time he received this notice, the Company designated Congimi as a

SCST and in sk ill grouping “Declining Systems-Non-Electric”. T his designation meant

that Congimi’s skill g rouping, which was establish ed years before, was awarded in

technology that is no longer current.

125.

For years prior to his permanent tr ansfer notification, Cong imi performed

work in cu rrent skill groupings includ ing, but not limited to, “Wireless,” “Transport,”

“Cellular,” “DSL,” and “Wavestar” as required to complete his work assignments.

126.

Congimi was unable to contac t management at the Washington, D.C.

base location to inquire regarding the nature and amount available work.

127.

In May, 2003 Congimi, without input from the Washington, D.C.

management, initially accepted the permanent transfer to Washington, D.C., but

decided in June, 2003 to decline the permanent transfer and he retired.

128.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevant

20

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other records, after his forced retirement, the Installers in Congimi’s base location in

New York who had less years of servic e and wer e younger worked a substantial

number of hours in t he same work codes Congimi worked in before the Company

requested that he permanently transfer to another base location.

129.

For years prior to his termination, Congimi’s IRW, dated April 3, 2003

established that he worked exte nsively in non-obsolete skill level work codes including,

but not limited to, 421, 435, 454, 459, 460, 472, 473, 475, 482, and 519.

130.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, the reasons articulated by the Company for selec ting Congimi for the

permanent transfer were not valid and cons titute a pretext for age dis crimination

primarily because his skills were still needed in his base location, he could perform the

available work at his base loc ation, there was no or inadequate work for him in the

location he was to be transferred to, the Com pany did not offer to transfer anyone els e

to the same location after he declined th e transfer and the Company, from 2002 to

2004, engaged in a nationwide pattern of target ing older Installers by offering them

unreasonable transfers under similar circumstances.

131.

As the dir ect and proximate result of this discrimin atory employment

practice, Congimi has and will continue to experience substantial economic losses

arising out of his termination of employment.

H. STATEMENT OF FACTS REGARDING RAYMOND CONNOLLY

132.

Raymond Connolly (“Connolly”), born on March 29, 1945, joined the

predecessor of Lucent as an Installer in Ma y, 1965 and worked in that capacity at the

New York, New York base location until his in voluntary retirement occurring in May,

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2003.

133.

In April, 2003 Connolly received a notice from the Company stating that he

was permanently transferred from his base location in New York to Framingham,

Massachusetts.

134.

At the time he received this noti ce, the Company designated Connolly as

an SCST and in skill grouping “Transmission.”

135.

For years prior to his permanent tr ansfer, Connolly performed work in

current skill group ings, including, but not limited to, “Transmission,” “ESS,” and

“Wireless.”

136.

Connolly questioned management at the site where he was to be

transferred regarding the nature and amount available work. Connolly was informed by

Lucent management in Framing ham that there was only approximately six months

worth of work available in his skill grouping.

137.

Connolly travelled to Framingha m to investigate the area and housing

options.

138.

Based on the information provi ded by Lucent managem ent located in

Framingham and financial considerations related to housing costs, Connolly determined

that there were no longer adequate employment opportunities for him with Lucent and

he retired.

139.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, after hi s forced retirement, the Installers in Connolly’s base location in

New York who had less years of servic e and wer e younger worked a substantial

number of hours in the same work code s Connolly worked in before the Company

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requested that he permanently transfer to another base location.

140.

For years prior to his termination, Connolly IRW established that he

worked extensively in non-obsolete skill level work codes including, but not limited t o,

321, 421, 4224, 425, 427, 435, 436, 454, 459, 460, 467, 473, 475, 481, 493, 495, 505 ,

507, 516, 517, and 519.

141.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, the reasons articulated by t he Company for selecting Connolly for the

permanent transfer were not valid and cons titute a pretext for age dis crimination

primarily because his skills were still needed in his base location, he could perform the

available work at his base loc ation, there was no or inadequate work for him in the

location he was to be transferred to, the Com pany did not offer to transfer anyone els e

to the same location after he declined th e transfer and the Company, from 2002 to

2004, engaged in a nationwide pattern of target ing older Installers by offering them

unreasonable transfers under similar circumstances.

142.

As the dir ect and proximate result of this discrimin atory employment

practice, Connolly has and will continue t o experience substantial economic losses

arising out of his termination of employment.

I.

STATEMENT OF FACTS REGARDING GEOFFREY CORBIN

143.

Geoffrey Corbin (“Corbin”), born on November 1, 1942, joined the

predecessor of Lucent as an Installer in Ma rch, 1978 and worked in that capacity at the

Millbrook, New York base location until his involuntary retirement occurring on March,

2004.

144.

In March, 2004 Corbin received a notice from the Company stating that he

23

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was permanently transferred from his base lo cation in Millbr ook to Framingham,

Massachusetts.

145.

At the time he received this notic e, the Company des ignated Corbin as a

CST and in skill grouping “OSP-PBX.”

146.

For years prior to his permanent tr ansfer, Corbin performed work in

current skill groupings, including, but not limited to, “Transmission,” “Toll,” and “ESS.”

147.

Due to family obligations, Corbin was unable to accept the transfer and he

retired.

148.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, after his forced retirement, the Installers in Corbin’s base location in who

had less years of service and were younger worked a substantial number of hours in the

same work codes Corbin worked in before the Company requested that he permanently

transfer to another base location.

149.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevant

other records, the reasons ar ticulated by t he Company fo r selecting Corbin for the

permanent transfer were not valid and cons titute a pretext for age dis crimination

primarily because his skills were still needed in the area served by his base location, he

could perform the available work at his base location, ther e was no or inadequate work

for him in the location he was to be transferr ed to, the Company did not offer to transfe r

anyone else to the same location after he declined the transfer and the Company, from

2002 to 2004, engaged in a nationwide pattern of targeting older Installers by offering

them unreasonable transfers under similar circumstances.

150.

As the dir ect and proximate result of this discrimin atory employment

24

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practice, Corbin has and will continue to experience substantial economic losses arising

out of his termination of employment.

J.

STATEMENT OF FACTS REGARDING LAWRENCE DAVIS

151.

Lawrence Davis (“Davis”), born on Ju ly 20, 1950, joined the predecessor

of Lucent as an Installer in January of 1970 and worked in that capacity at the Houston,

Texas base location until his involuntary retirement occurring in August of 2004.

152.

In June of 2004 Davis received a notice from the Company stating that he

was permanently transferred from his base location in Houston to San Francisco,

California.

153.

For years prior to 2004, the Co mpany designated Davi s as a SCST in

current skill grouping “Power.”

154.

Davis worked primarily in the current “5ESS” skill gr ouping, performing

installation and testing of that technology, as well as other skill groupings as required by

the needs of the particular job.

155.

Davis called the San Francisco base location and questioned

Management at the site where he was to be transferred regarding the nature and

amount available work. Davis was informed by Lucent management in Sa n Francisco

that there was no work available and that he would be sent out on Temporary Transfers

if he accepted a Permanent Transfer to the base location.

156.

Based on the infor mation provided by Lucent management located in

San Francisco, California, Davis determined that there were no longer adequat e

employment opportunities for him with Lucent and he retired.

157. Based on information supplied to the EEOC by the Company and relevant

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other records, installers in Davis’ bas e location in H ouston who had less years of

service and were younger wor ked a substant ial number of hours in the same work

codes Davis worked in before the Company requested that he perm anently transfer to

another base location.

158.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, the reasons articulated by the Company for selecting Davis for the

permanent transfer were not valid and cons titute a pretext for age dis crimination

primarily because his skills were still needed in his base location, he could perform the

available work at his base location, t here was no per manent or inadequate permanent

work for him in the location he was to be transferred to, the Company did not offer to

transfer anyone else to the same location after he declined the transfer and the

Company, from 2002 to 2004, engaged in a nat ionwide pattern of targeting older

Installers by offering them unreasonable transfers under similar circumstances.

159.

As the dir ect and proximate result of this discrimin atory employment

practice, Davis has and will cont inue to experience substantial economic losses arising

out of his termination of employment.

K. STATEMENT OF FACTS REGARDING DUANE DAVISON

160.

Duane Davison (“Davison”), born on July 22,

1944, joined the

predecessor of Lucent as an Installer in February of 1966 and worked in that capacity at

the Detroit, Michigan base loca tion until his involuntary retire ment occurring in April,

2003.

161.

On March 6, 2003 Davison received a notice from the Company stating

that he was permanently transfe rred from his base location in Detroit to Memphis,

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Tennessee.

162.

At the time he received this notic e, the Company designated Davison as a

CST and in skill grou ping “No Match-Declining Systems.” This des ignation meant that

Davison’s skill grouping, which was established years before, did not “Match” any of the

current skill groupings.

163.

For years prior to 2003, Dav ison worked primarily in cu rrent skill grouping

“Wireless.”

164.

Davison travelled to Memphis and questioned management at the site

where he was to be transferred regarding the nature and amount available work.

Davison was informed by Lucent manager Bo Mc Daniels in Memphis that there was no

work available in “Wireless” in the area an d Davison should expect to be sent out on

Temporary Transfers. Davison also s poke to other Installers at the Memphis location

who also stated there was no “Wireless” work available.

165.

Based on the information provi ded by Lucent managem ent located in

Memphis Davison determined that there were no longer adequate employment

opportunities for him with Lucent and he retired.

166.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevant

other records, after his forc ed retirement, the Installers in Davison’s base location in

Detroit who had less years of service and were younger worked a substantial number of

hours in the same work codes Davison work ed in before the Company requested that

he permanently transfer to another base location.

167.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, the reasons articulated by the Company for selec ting Davison for the

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permanent transfer were not valid and cons titute a pretext for age dis crimination

primarily because his skills were still needed in his base location, he could perform the

available work at his base loc ation, there was no or inadequate work for him in the

location he was to be transferred to the Company did not offer to transfer anyone else to

the same location aft er he declined the transfer and the Company, from 2002 to 2004,

engaged in a nationwide pattern of targeti ng older Installers by offering them

unreasonable transfers under similar circumstances.

168.

As the dir ect and proximate result of this discrimin atory employment

practice, Davison has and will continue to experience substantial economic losses

arising out of his termination of employment.

L.

STATEMENT OF FACTS REGARDING CALIXTO FONSECA

169.

Calixto Fonseca (“Fonseca”), bor n in September 17, 1951, joined the

predecessor of Lucent as an Installer in January, 1980 and worked in that until his

premature retirement occurring in April, 2003.

170.

In March, 2003 F onseca received a notice from the Company stating that

he was permanently transferred from his base location in T ucson to Minneapolis,

Minnesota.

171.

At the time he received this notice, the Company designated Fonseca as a

CST and in skill grouping “Digital Systems/Transmission.”

172.

For years prior to his permanent transfer notification, Fonseca performed

work in va rious current skill gro upings including, but not limited to, “Digital Systems,”

and “Transmission” as required to perform his work assignments.

173.

During the 30 day transfer evaluati on period, Fonseca became ill and wa s

28

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unable to travel before the permanent transfer acceptance date.

174.

Fonseca declined the transfer and was involuntarily retired.

175.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, after hi s forced retirement, the Installer s in Fonseca’s base location in

location who had less years of service and were younger worked a substantial number

of hours in the same work codes Fonsec a worked in before the Company requested

that he permanently transfer to another base location.

176.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, the reasons articulated by the Company for selecting Fons eca for the

permanent transfer were not valid and cons titute a pretext for age dis crimination

primarily because his skills were still needed in his base location, he could perform the

available work at his base loc ation, there was no or inadequate work for him in the

location he was to be transferred to, the Com pany did not offer to transfer anyone els e

to the same location after he declined th e transfer and the Company, from 2002 to

2004, engaged in a nationwide pattern of target ing older Installers by offering them

unreasonable transfers under similar circumstances.

177.

As the dir ect and proximate result of this discrimin atory employment

practice, Fonseca has and will continue to experience substantial ec onomic losses

arising out of his termination of employment.

M. STATEMENT OF FACTS REGARDING FRANK FOX

178.

Frank Fox (“Fox”), born on September 13, 1946, joined the predecessor

of Lucent as an Installer in July, 1967 and worked in that capacity at the New York, New

York base location until his involuntary retirement occurring on May, 2003.

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179.

In April, 2003 Fox received a notice from the Company stating that he was

permanently transferred from his base location in New York to Baltimore, Maryland

180.

At the time he received this noti ce, the Company designated Fox as a

CST and in skill gro uping “Declining Systems-Non-Electric.” This design ation meant

that Fox’s skill grou ping which was estab lished years before, was asso ciated with

technology that was no longer widely used.

181.

For years prior to his permanent tr ansfer, Fox performed work in current

skill groupings, including work in 3G technology.

182.

Fox travelled to Baltimore and spoke with other Installers visiting Baltimore

to investigate the area and availability of work. Danny Koch, an Installer, informed Fox

that he had spoken wit h management at the Balt imore base location and was informed

my Lucent management that ther e was not adequate work at t he base for the Installer s

currently assigned to the Balt imore base and that the only work available was a limit ed

amount of “tear out” work.

183.

Based on the information provided by Koch regarding the work available in

the Baltimore base location and personal considerations, Fox determined that there was

no longer adequate employment opportunities for him with Lucent and he retired.

184.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, after hi s forced retirement, the Installer s in Fox’s base location in Ne w

York who had less years of service and we re younger worked a substantia l number of

hours in the same work codes Fox worked in before the Company request ed that he

permanently transfer to another base location.

185.

For years prior to his termination, Fox’s IRW established that he worked

30

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extensively in non-obsolete skill level work codes including, but not limited to 321, 421 ,

425, 427, 435, 454, 459, 460, 505, 472, 473, 482, and 519.

186.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, the reasons articulated by the Company for selecting Fox for the

permanent transfer were not valid and cons titute a pretext for age dis crimination

primarily because his skills were still needed in his base location, he could perform the

available work at his base location, there was inadequate work for him in the location he

was to be transferred to, the Co mpany did not offer to transfe r anyone else to the same

location after he declined the transfer and t he Company, from 2002 to 2004,engaged in

a nationwide pattern of tar geting older I nstallers by offering them unr easonable

transfers under similar circumstances.

187.

As the dir ect and proximate result of this discriminatory employment

practice, Fox has and will continue to experience s ubstantial economic losses arising

out of his termination of employment.

N. STATEMENT OF FACTS REGARDING EDWARD HAEUSSLER

188.

Edward Haeussler (“ Haeussler”), born in 1945, joined the predecessor of

Lucent as an Installer in April, 1969, and worked in that unt il his premature retirement

occurring on January 22, 2005.

189.

In March, 2004, Haeussler receiv ed a notice from the Co mpany (a stating

that he was permanently trans ferred from his base location in New York, New York to

Framingham, Massachusetts.

190.

At the time he received this notic e, the Company designated Haeussler as

a SCST and in skill grouping “Power.”

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191.

For years prior to his permanent tr ansfer, Haeussler primarily performed

work in current skill grouping “Power” as well as various other cur rent skill groupings as

required to complete his work assignments.

192.

Haeussler traveled to Fram ingham, Massachusetts and questioned

management at the site where he was to be transferred regarding the nature and

amount available work. Haeussler was informed by Lucent management in

Framingham, Massachusetts that there wa s no work available if he accepted the

permanent transfer.

193.

Haeussler accepted the transfer to Framingham, Massachusetts and

worked from that base location until his re tirement. In Framingham, Massachusetts,

Haeussler spent most of his time working b elow his skill grouping, performing “tear out”

work.

194.

Haeussler rented lodging in Massac husetts and maintained h is home in

New York and commuted home on weekends.

195.

Haeussler determined that ther e were no longer ade quate employment

opportunities for him with Lucent and he retired.

196.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, after his forced retirement, the Installers in Haeussler’s base location in

New York who had less years of servic e and wer e younger worked a substantial

number of hours in the same work codes Haeussler worked in before t he Company

requested that he permanently transfer to another base location.

197.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, the reasons ar ticulated by the Company fo r selecting Haeussler for the

32

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permanent transfer were not valid and cons titute a pretext for age dis crimination

primarily because his skills were still needed in his base location, he could perform the

available work at his base location, there wa s no work f or him in the location he was to

be transferred to, the Company did not offe r to transfer anyone else to the same

location after he declined the transfer and the Company, from 2002 to 2004, engaged in

a nationwide pattern of tar geting older I nstallers by offering them unr easonable

transfers under similar circumstances.

198.

As the dir ect and proximate result of this discriminatory employment

practice, Haeussler has and will continue t o experience substantial economic losses

arising out of his permanent transfer and

termination of employment including ,

consequential damages, lodging, travel, tol ls, meals and other ex penses associated

with his commuting.

199.

Haeussler also experienced ec onomic losses because the unlawful

permanent transfer caused him to retire sooner than he woul d have had he been

allowed to finish his career at his original base location.

O. STATEMENT OF FACTS REGARDING RUDOLPH HOPKINS

200.

Rudolph Hopkins (“Hopkins”), born on December 6, 1937, joined the

predecessor of Lucent as an Installer in Marc h, 1967, and worked in that capacity until

his premature retirement from the Company occurring in January, 2005.

201.

In March, 2003 Hopk ins received a no tice from the Company, stating that

he was permanently transferred from his base location in Detroit to Gary, Indiana.

202.

At the time he received this notic e, the Company designated Hopkins as a

CST, and in skill grouping “No- Match.” Th is designation meant that Hopkins’s skill

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grouping which was establishe d years before, did not “Match” any of the c urrent skill

groupings.

203.

For years prior to 2003, Hopkins performed work in the current skill

groupings of “Wireless,” “5 ESS,” and other current skill gr oupings as requir ed it the

performance of his duties as an installer.

204.

Hopkins accepted the transfer to Ga ry. While on per manent transfer in

Gary, Hopkins was on assignment in various cities in Indiana including Hammond,

Michigan City, and Crown Pointe.

205.

These assignments were not tempor ary transfers and were considered a

“local” assignment. Because these assignments were regarded as “local”, Hopkins was

not provided with financial assist ance related to his local assign ments from the Gary,

Indiana base location.

206.

Hopkins was later sent to Naper ville, Indiana, where he worked for

approximately one year.

207.

In 2004 after working approximately one year from the Gary, Indiana base

location, Hopkins was in formed that he was being permanently transferred t o

Elgin, Illinois.

208.

Hopkins accepted the second permanent transfer and worked from the

Elgin, Illinois base location.

209.

In early 2005, while on assignment in Indianapolis, Indiana, Hopkins

learned he was to be transferred to Terra Haute, Indiana.

210.

In January of 2005, Hopkins dete rmined that there we re no longer any

adequate employment opportunities for him with Lucent and he retired.

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211.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevant

other records, after his permanent transfer to Gary, the Installers in Hopkins’s original

base location in Detroit who had less year s of servi ce and were younger worked a

substantial number of hours in the same work codes Hopk ins worked in before the

Company requested that he permanently transfer to another base location.

212.

Prior to his transfer to Gary, Indi ana, Hopkins’s IWR established that he

worked extensively in non-obsolete skill level work codes including, but not limited t o,

321, 421, 424, 424, 435, 436, 454, 459, 460, 467, 468, 474, 475, 481, 482, 484, and

517.

213.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, the reasons articulated by the Company for selecting Hopkins for the

permanent transfer were not valid and cons titute a pretext for age dis crimination

primarily because his skills were still needed in his base location, he could perform the

available work at his base location, there was only work for Hopkins approximately sixty

miles from the location he was to be transfe rred to, and the Company, from 2002 to

2004, engaged in a nationwide pattern of target ing older Installers by offering them

unreasonable transfers under similar circumstances.

214.

As the dir ect and proximate result of this discriminatory employment

practice, Hopkins has and will continue to experience substantial economic losses

arising out of his permanent transfer a nd termination of employment, includin g

substantial out of pocket losses in the nature of travel, l odging, and meal expenses and

consequential damages related to the require ment that he work in multiple distan t

locations from March 2003 until his retirement.

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215.

Hopkins also experienced ec onomic losses because the unlawful

permanent transfer caused him to retire sooner than he wou ld have had he been

allowed to finish his career at his original base location.

P.

STATEMENT OF FACTS REGARDING RONALD JOHNSON

216.

Ronald Johnson (“Johnson”), bor n on January 8, 1946, joined the

predecessor of Lucent as an Installer in Marc h, 1965, and worked in that capacity at the

Detroit, Michigan base location until his involuntary retirement occurring in May, 2003.

217.

In March, 2003, Johnson received a notice from the Company, stating that

he was permanently transferred from his base location in Detroit to Pensacola, Florida

218.

At the time he received this notice, the Company designated Johnson as a

CST, and in skill grouping No- Match. This des ignation meant that Johnson’s sk ill

grouping which was establishe d years before, did not “Match” any of the c urrent skill

groupings.

219.

For years prior to his transfer, Johnson performed work in cu rrent skill

groupings including, but not limited to, “Electronic,” “Toll,” and “Wireless”.

220.

For personal reasons, Johnson was not able to accept the permanent

transfer and retired.

221.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevant

other records, after his forc ed retirement, the Installers in Johnson’s base location in

Detroit who had less years of service and were younger worked a substantial number of

hours in the same work codes J ohnson worked in before the Com pany requested that

he permanently transfer to another base location.

222.

For years prior to his terminati on, Johnson’s IRW established that he

36

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worked extensively in non-obsolete skill level work codes including, but not limited t o,

421, 427, 454, 459, 460, 468, 473, and 519.

223.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevant

other records, the reasons articulated by the Company for selecting Johnson for the

permanent transfer were not valid and cons titute a pretext for age dis crimination

primarily because his skills were still needed in his base location, he could perform the

available work at his base loc ation, there was no or inadequate work for him in the

location he was to be transferred to, the Com pany did not offer to transfer anyone els e

to the same location after he declined th e transfer and the Company, from 2002 to

2004, engaged in a nationwide pattern of target ing older Installers by offering them

unreasonable transfers under similar circumstances.

224.

As the dir ect and proximate result of this discriminatory employment

practice, Johnson has and will continue to experience substantial economic losses

arising out of his termination of employment.

Q. STATEMENT OF FACTS REGARDING GERALD KEPHART

225.

GERALD Kephart (“Kephart”), born on Se ptember 5,1945, joined the

predecessor of Lucent as an Installer in F ebruary, 1970 and worked in that capacity at

the Ft. Pierce, Florida base loc ation until his involuntary retirement occ urring in

October, 2004.

226.

In August, 2004 Kephart received a noti ce from the Company stating that

he was permanently transferred from his base location in Ft. Pierce to Nashville,

Tennessee.

227.

At the time he received this not ice, Kephart believes the Company

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designated him as an SCST and in skill grouping “Toll/Transmission.”

228.

For years before 200 4, Kephart performed work in cur rent skill groupings

including “5ESS,” “Toll,” and “ Transmission,” “Outside Plant,” “Ocean Cable,” and

“Power” as required to complete his work assignments.

229.

Kephart questioned management at t he site where he was to be

transferred and spoke to Mr. Lindsay regar ding the nature and amount of availab le

work. Kephart was informed by Lucent managem ent in Nashville that there was no

work available for him at the Nashville base location.

230.

Based on the information provi ded by Lucent managem ent located in

Nashville, Tennessee, Kephart determined t hat there were no longer adequate

employment opportunities for him with Lucent and he retired.

231.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, after his forced retirement, th e Installers in Kephart’s base location in Ft.

Pierce, Florida who had less years of se rvice and were younger worked a substantia l

number of hours in the same work code s Kephart worked in before the Compan y

requested that he permanently transfer to another base location.

232.

For years prior to his terminati on, Kephart’s IRW, established that he

worked extensively in non-obsolete skill lev el work codes including, but not limited to ,

321, 421, 424, 425, 426, 427, 435, 436, 454, 459, 460, 467, 472, 473, 488, 491, 492,

495, 505, 507, 515, 516, 517, and 519.

233.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevant

other records, the reasons articulated by the Company for selecting Kephart for the

permanent transfer were not valid and consti tute a pretext for age discrimination

38

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primarily because his skills were still needed in his base location, he could perform the

available work at his base lo cation, there was no or inad equate work for him in the

location he was to be transferred to, the Com pany did not offer to transfer anyone els e

to the same location after he declined t he transfer and the Company, from 2002 to

2004, engaged in a nationwide pattern of target ing older Installers by offering them

unreasonable transfers under similar circumstances.

234.

As the dir ect and proximate result of this discrimin atory employment

practice, Kephart has and will continue to experience substantial ec onomic losses

arising out of his termination of employment.

R. STATEMENT OF FACTS REGARDING JOHN KOENIG

235.

John Koenig (“Koenig”), born on Dece mber 10, 1941, joined the

predecessor of Lucent as an Installer in No vember, 1967, and worked in that capacity

at the Detroit, Michigan base loc ation until his involuntary retirement occurring on April

9, 2003.

236.

In March, 2003, Koenig received a notice from the Company st ating that

he was permanently transferre d from his base location in Detroit to Jackson,

Mississippi.

237.

At the time he receiv ed this notice, the Company des ignated Koenig as a

CST and in skill grouping “No- Match.” This designati on meant that Koenig’s skill

grouping which was established years before, did not “Match ” any of the current skill

groupings.

238.

For years prior to 20 03, Koenig performed work in c urrent skill groupings

as required to complete his work assignments.

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239.

Koenig determined that there were no longer any adequate em ployment

opportunities for him with Lucent and retired. Koenig believed he would be able to find

work in the Detroit area after he retired.

240.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, after his forc ed retirement, the Installers in Koenig’s base location in

Detroit who had less years of service and were younger worked a substantial number

of hours in the same work codes Koenig worked in before the Company requested that

he permanently transfer to another base location.

241.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevant

other records, the reasons articulated by the Company for selecting Koenig for the

permanent transfer were not valid and consti tute a pretext for age discrimination

primarily because his skills were still needed in his base location, he could perform the

available work at his base lo cation, there was no or inad equate work for him in the

location he was to be transferred to, the Com pany did not offer to transfer anyone els e

to the same location after he declined t he transfer and the Company, from 2002 to

2004, has engaged in a nationwi de pattern of targeting olde r Installers by offering

them unreasonable transfers under similar circumstances.

242.

As the dir ect and proximate result of this discrimin atory employment

practice, Koenig has and will continue t o experience substantial ec onomic losses

arising out of his termination of employment.

S. STATEMENT OF FACTS REGARDING JOHN KORZ

243.

John Korz (“Korz”), born on June 4, 1948, joined the predecessor of

Lucent as an Installer in January, 1973 and worked in that capacity at the New York,

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New York base location until his involuntary retirement occurring May, 2003.

244.

In April, 2003, Korz received a notice from the Company stating that he

was permanently transferred from his base location in New York to Framingham,

Massachusetts.

245.

At the time he receiv ed this notic e, the Company des ignated Korz as a

SCST and in skill grouping “Transport.”

246.

Prior to his transfer, Korz work ed primarily in the current “Transmission”

skill grouping, performing testing and installations.

247.

Due to family obligations and financi al considerations, Korz was unable t o

accept the permanent transfer and he retired.

248.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, after his forced retirement, th e Installers in Korz’s base loc ation in New

York who had less years of servi ce and were younger worked a s ubstantial number of

hours in the same work codes Korz worked in before the Company requested that he

permanently transfer to another base location.

249.

For years prior to his retirement, Korz’s IRW established that he worked

extensively in non-obsolete skill level work codes including, but not limited to, 424, 426,

427, 438, 454, 459, 460, 473, 512, 516, and 519.

250.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, the reasons articulated by the Company for selecting Korz for the

permanent transfer were not valid and consti tute a pretext for age discrimination

primarily because his skills were still needed in his base location, he could perform the

available work at his base lo cation, there was no or inad equate work for him in the

41

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location he was to be transferred to, the Com pany did not offer to transfer anyone els e

to the same location after he declined t he transfer and the Company, from 2002 to

2004, engaged in a nationwide pattern of target ing older Installers by offering them

unreasonable transfers under similar circumstances.

251.

As the dir ect and proximate result of this discriminatory employment

practice, Korz has and will continue to expe rience substantial economic losses arising

out of his termination of employment.

T. STATEMENT OF FACTS REGARDING GORDON LUDWIG

252.

Gordon Ludwig (“Ludwig”), born on November 26, 1946, joined the

predecessor of Lucent as an Installer in Febr uary, 1966, and worked in that capacity at

the Detroit base location until his involuntary retirement occurring in April, 2003.

253.

In March, 2003, Ludwig rec eived a notice from the Company, stating that

he was permanently transferred from his base location in Detroit to Tupelo, Mississippi.

254.

At the time he receiv ed this notice, the Company designated Ludwig as a

CST and in skill gro uping “No Match”. This designation meant that Ludwig ’s skill

grouping which was established years before, did not “Match ” any of the current skill

groupings.

255.

Ludwig was contacted by the union steward from Tupelo who informed

Ludwig that Ludwig would likely be working out of Memphis, Tennessee.

256.

Based on the information provided by the union steward located in Tupelo,

Mississippi, Ludwig determined that there were no long er adequate employmen t

opportunities for him with Lucent and he retired.

257.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

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other records, after his forced retirement, the Installers in Ludwig’s base location in

Detroit who had less years of service and were younger worked a substantial number

of hours in the same work codes Ludwig worked in before the Company requested that

he permanently transfer to another base location.

258.

Prior to his termination, Ludwig’s IRW established that he worked

extensively in non-obsolete skill level work codes including , but not limited to, 321,

410, 421, 423, 425, 435, 436, 454, 459, 460, 449, 468, 469, 471, 472, 473, 474, 481,

492, 493, 495, 505, 507, 514, 516, 517, 518, 519, 521, and 530.

259.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, the reasons articulated by the Company for selec ting Ludwig for the

permanent transfer were not valid and cons titute a pretext fo r age dis crimination

primarily because his skills were still needed in his base location, he could perform the

available work at his base lo cation, there was no or inad equate work for him in the

location he was to be transferred to, the Com pany did not offer to transfer anyone els e

to the same location after he declined t he transfer and the Company, from 2002 to

2004, engaged in a nationwide pattern of target ing older Installers by offering them

unreasonable transfers under similar circumstances.

260.

As the dir ect and proximate result of this discrimin atory employment

practice, Ludwig has and will continue t o experience substantial economic losses

arising out of his termination of employment.

U. STATEMENT OF FACTS REGARDING JAMES MAHAFFEY

261.

James Mahaffey (“Mahaffey”), bor n on September 25, 1944, joined the

predecessor of Lucent as an Installer in and worked in that capacity at the Oklahoma

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City, Oklahoma base location unt il his involunt ary retirement occurring on August 16,

2004.

262.

In May, 2004, Mahaffey received a notice from the Company stating tha t

he was permanently transferred from his base lo cation in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma to

Aurora, Illinois.

263.

At the time he received this notic e, the Company designated Mahaffey as

a SCST and in skill grouping “Cellular.”

264.

For years prior to his permanent tr ansfer notification, Mahaffey performed

work in current skill groups including, but not limited to, “Wireless” and “Cellular”.

265.

Mahaffey worked previously in Aurora, Illinois on a temporary transfer and

spent the bulk of his time working in Chicago, Illinois. Based on his prior experience in

the Aurora base location, Mahaffey determi ned that there were no longer adequate

employment opportunities for him with Lucent and he retired.

266.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, after his forced retirement, th e Installers in Mahaffey’s base location in

Oklahoma City who had less years of servic e and were younger worked a s ubstantial

number of hours in the same work codes Mahaffey worked in before the Compan y

requested that he permanently transfer to another base location.

267.

For years prior to his termination, Mahaffey’s IRW established that he

worked extensively in non-obsolete skill lev el work codes including, but not limited to ,

321, 421, 422, 435, 436, 454, 459, 460, 504, 505, 507, 474, 475, 462, 493, 495, 515,

516, 517, and 519.

268.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

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other records, the reasons articulated by the Company for selecting Mahaffey for the

permanent transfer were not valid and consti tute a pretext for age discrimination

primarily because his skills were still needed in his base location, he could perform the

available work at his base lo cation, there was no or inad equate work for him in the

location he was to be transferred to, the Com pany did not offer to transfer anyone els e

to the same location after he declined t he transfer and the Company, from 2002 to

2004, engaged in a nationwide pattern of target ing older Installers by offering them

unreasonable transfers under similar circumstances.

269.

As the dir ect and proximate result of this discrimin atory employment

practice, Mahaffey has and wil l continue to experienc e substantial economic losses

arising out of his termination of employment.

V. STATEMENT OF FACTS REGARDING ROBERT MLADENKA

270.

Robert Mladenka (“Mladenka”), born on February 17, 1947, joined the

predecessor of Lucent as an Installer in Oc tober, 1969, and worked in that capacity at

the Houston, Texas base location until his involuntary occurring on April 23, 2003.

271.

In March, 2003, Mladenka rec eived a notice from the Company stating

that he was permanently transfe rred from his base location in Houston to Louisv ille,

Kentucky.

272.

At the time he received this notic e, the Company designated Mladenka as

a CST and in skill gro uping “No Match”. This designation meant that Mladenka’s skill

grouping which was established years bef ore 2003 and did not “Match” any of the

current skill groupings.

273.

Prior to 2003, Mladenka performed work in the current skill groupings

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including, but not limited to, “Wireless” and “Power.”

274.

Mladenka travelled to Louisville and questioned management at the site

where he was to be transfe rred regarding the nat ure and amount of available work.

Mladenka was informed by Lucent management in Louisville that there w as no open

position for him.

275.

Based on the information provi ded by Lucent management located in

Louisville, Mladenka determined that there was no l onger adequate employment

opportunities for him with Lucent and he retired.

276.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, after his forced retirement, th e Installers in Mladenka’s bas e location in

Houston, Texas who had less y ears of service and were younger worked a substantial

number of hours in the same work codes Mladenka worked in before the Company

requested that he permanently transfer to another base location.

277.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, the reasons articulated by the Company for selecting Mladenka for the

permanent transfer were not valid and consti tute a pretext for age discrimination

primarily because his skills were still needed in his base location, he could perform the

available work at his base lo cation, there was no or inad equate work for him in the

location he was to be transferred to, the Com pany did not offer to transfer anyone els e

to the same location after he declined t he transfer and the Company, from 2002 to

2004, engaged in a nationwide pattern of target ing older Installers by offering them

unreasonable transfers under similar circumstances.

278.

As the dir ect and proximate result of this discriminatory employment

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practice, Mladenka has and will continue to experienc e substantial economic losses

arising out of his termination of employment.

W. STATEMENT OF FACTS REGARDING GARY NASH

279.

Gary Nash (“Nash”), born on September 17, 1942, joined the predecessor

of Lucent as an Installer in June, 1964 and work ed in that capacity at the Detroit base

location until his involuntary retirement occurring in July, 2002.

280.

In June, 2002 Nash received a notic e from the Company stating that he

was permanently transferred from his base loca tion in Syracuse, New York to Bronx,

New York.

281.

At the time he received this notic e, the Company designated Nas h as an

SCST and in skill grouping “Power.”

282.

For years prior to his permanent transfer, Nash performed work in current

skill groupings, including, but not limited to, “Power,” “ESS,” and “Transmission.”

283.

Nash could not accept the permanent transfer to the B ronx due to family

hardship and he retired.

284.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevant

other records, after his forced retirement, the Installers in Nash’s base location in

Syracuse who had less years of servic e and wer e younger worked a substantial

number of hours in the same work code s Nash worked in before the Company

requested that he permanently transfer to another base location.

285.

For years prior to his termination, Nash’s IRW established that he worked

extensively in non-obsolete skill level work codes including, but not limited to, 321, 426,

427, 436, 438, 454, 459, 460, 505, 507, 525, 449, 472, 473, 495, 505, 512, and 519.

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286.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, the reasons artic ulated by the Company for sele cting Nash for the

permanent transfer were not valid and cons titute a pretext fo r age dis crimination

primarily because his skills were still needed in his base location, he could perform the

available work at his base lo cation, there was no or inad equate work for him in the

location he was to be transferred to, the Com pany did not offer to transfer anyone els e

to the same location after he declined t he transfer and the Company, from 2002 to

2004, engaged in a nationwide pattern of target ing older Installers by offering them

unreasonable transfers under similar circumstances.

287.

As the dir ect and proximate result of this discrimin atory employment

practice, Nash has and will continue to exp erience substantial economic losses arising

out of his termination of employment.

X. STATEMENT OF FACTS REGARDING JAMES NEALIS

288.

James Nealis (“Nealis”), born on May 21, 1948, joined the predecessor of

Lucent as an Installer in April, 1969 and wo rked in that capacit y until his premature

retirement occurring in May, 2005.

289.

In March, 2004 Nealis received a not ice from the Company stating that he

was permanently transferred from his base location in New York to Framingham.

290.

At the time he received this notic e, the Company designated Nealis an

SCST and in current skill grouping “Power.”

291.

For years prior to his permanent transfer, Nealis performed work in current

skill groupings, including, but not limited to “Power.” Nealis performed work includ ing,

but not limited to, installation, analysis, pl anning and on site super vision of installation

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crews.

292.

Nealis accepted the permanent transfer to Framingham.

293.

In Framingham, much of the work being performed w as in the “Cellular”

skill grouping. While in Framing ham, Nealis was transferred to a “Cellu lar” group and

performed work as a “helper,” performing low skill level tasks.

294.

Nealis worked from the Framin gham base for approximately one year,

commuting between Framingham and New York on a week ly basis. In May 2005,

Nealis was offered a buyout and accepted. Nealis r etired, having determined that

there were no longer adequate employment opportunities for him with Lucent.

295.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, after his forced retirement, th e Installers in Nealis’ base location in Ne w

York who had less years of servi ce and were younger worked a s ubstantial number of

hours in the same work codes Nealis worked in before the Company requested that he

permanently transfer to another base location.

296.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, the reasons articulated by the Company for selecting Nea lis for the

permanent transfer were not valid and consti tute a pretext for age discrimination

primarily because his skills were still needed in his base location, he could perform the

available work at his base loc ation, there was inadequate work for him in the location

he was to be transferred to, t he Company did not offer to transfer anyone else to the

same location after he declined the trans fer and the Company, from 2002 to 2004,

engaged in a nationwide pattern of targeti ng older Installers by offering them

unreasonable transfers under similar circumstances.

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297.

As the dir ect and proximate result of this discrimin atory employment

practice, Nealis has and will c ontinue to experience substantial economic losses

arising out of his termination of empl oyment, including consequential damages,

lodging, travel, meals and other expenses associated with his commuting.

298.

Nealis also experienced econom ic losses because the unlawful

permanent transfer caused him to retire sooner than he would have ha d he been

allowed to finish his career at his original base location.

Y.

STATEMENT OF FACTS REGARDING HUGO PEMINTEL

299.

Hugo Pemintel (“Pemintel”), born on April 1, 1946, joined the predecessor

of Lucent as an Installer in March, 1970, and worked in that capacity at the San

Francisco/Santa Rosa, California base lo cation until his involuntary retirement

occurring on May 3, 2004.

300.

In May, 2004, Pemint el received a notice from the Company stating that

he was permanently transferred from his base location in Santa Rosa to Dallas, Texas.

301.

At the time he received this noti ce, the Company designated Pemintel as

a SCST and in skill grouping “Wireless/Data”.

302.

For years prior to 2003, Pemintel spent the majority of his time working in

the current skill groupings including, but not limited to, “Wireless”.

303.

Pemintel travelled to the Dall as base loc ation and questioned Lucent

manager Jim Ogle (“Ogle”) regarding the nature and amount available work. Pemintel

was informed by Ogle that t here was no work available at that site and Pemintel would

be sent on temporary transfers to Kansas and Oklahoma if he accepted the transfer.

304.

Based on the information provi ded by Lucent managem ent located in

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Dallas, Texas. Pemintel det ermined that there were no longer adequate employment

opportunities for him with Lucent and he retired.

305.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, after hi s forced retirement, the Installers in Pemintel’s base location in

San Francisco who had less y ears of serv ice and were younger worked a substantial

number of hours in the same work codes Pemintel worked in before the Company

requested that he permanently transfer to another base location.

306.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, the reasons articulated by the Company for selecting Pemintel for the

permanent transfer were not valid and cons titute a pretext for age dis crimination

primarily because his skills were still needed in his base location, he could perform the

available work at his base loc ation, there was no or inadequate work for him in the

location he was to be transferred to, the Com pany did not offer to transfer anyone els e

to the same location after he declined th e transfer and the Company, from 2002 to

2004, engaged in a nationwide pattern of target ing older Installers by offering them

unreasonable transfers under similar circumstances.

307.

As the dir ect and proximate result of this discrimin atory employment

practice, Pemintel has and will continue t o experience substantial economic losses

arising out of his termination of employment.

Z.

STATEMENT OF FACTS REGARDING DALE PETERSON

308.

Dale Peterson (“Peterson”), born on July 16, 1936, joined the

predecessor of Lucent as an Installer in November, 1998, and worked in that capacity at

the Tucson, Arizona base loca tion until his involuntary retirement occurring in April,

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2003.

309.

In March, 2003, Peterson received a notice from the Company stating that

he was permanently transferred from his base location in T ucson to Minneapolis,

Minnesota.

310.

At the time he received this noti ce, the Company designated Peterson as

a CST and in skill grouping “Declining Systems-Electronic”. This designation meant that

Peterson’s skill grou ping was establish ed years before and the technolo gy was no

longer widely installed.

311.

For years prior to 2003, Pet erson worked in current skill groupings,

including, but not limited to, “Transmission” performing DSL installation, data equipment

installation and testing, and some transcontinental testing.

312.

Peterson questioned management at the site where he was to be

transferred regarding the nature and amount available work. Peterson was informed by

Lucent management in Minneapolis that there was no work available at the base

location.

313.

Based on the information provi ded by Lucent managem ent located in

Minneapolis, Peterson determin ed that there was no lon ger adequate employment

opportunities for him with Lucent and he retired.

314.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, after his forced retirement, t he Installers in Peters on’s base location in

Tucson, Arizona who had less y ears of service and were younger worked a substantial

number of hours in t he same work code s Peterson worked in before the Company

requested that he permanently transfer to another base location.

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315.

For the years prior to his retirement, Peterson performed work in current

skill groupings, including, but not limited to, 321, 410, 421, 435, 459, 460, 494, and 507.

316.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, the reasons articulated by the Company for selecting Peterson for the

permanent transfer are not valid and constitute a pretext for age discr imination primarily

because his skills wer e still needed in his b ase location, he could perform the availa ble

work at his base locat ion, there was no or inadequate work for him in the location h e

was to be transferred to, the Co mpany did not offer to transfe r anyone else to the same

location after he declined the transfer and the Company, from 2002 to 2004, has

engaged in a nationwide pattern of targeti ng older Installers by offering them

unreasonable transfers under similar circumstances.

317.

As the dir ect and proximate result of this discriminatory employment

practice, Peterson has and will continue t o experience substantial econo mic losses

arising out of his termination of employment.

AA. STATEMENT OF FACTS REGARDING ROBERT POLTENOVAGE

318.

Robert Poltenovage, born on June 6, 1945, joined the predecessor of

Lucent as an Installer in July, 1963 and wor ked in that c apacity at the New York, New

York base location until his involuntary retirement occurring in April, 2004.

319.

In December 2003, Poltenov age received a notice f rom the Company

stating that he was permanently transferred to Jackson, Mississippi.

320.

Poltenovage questioned management at the site in Jackson where he was

to be transferred regarding the nature and amount available wor k. Poltenovage was

informed by Lucent manager, Mike Harrington, that there was not adequate work in

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Jackson and that Poltenovage s hould expect to be on working in a different location

every day.

321.

Based on the information provi ded by Lucent managem ent located in

Jackson, Poltenovage determined he would not have adequate work in Jackson.

322.

Poltenovage was contacted by Un ion C.W.A.Local 1190 President Sal

Sanserverino, who wished to retire and wa s allowed to trade this transfer with

Sanservervino. Poltenovage remained at his base location in New York.

323.

In March, 2004 Poltenovage rec eived another notice from the Company

stating that he was permanently transferred from his base loc ation in New York to

Framingham, Massachusetts.

324.

At the time he received this not ice, the Company designated Poltenovage

as an SCST and in s kill grouping “Declining Systems-Non Eelectric.” This design ation

meant that Poltenovage’s ski ll grouping which was established years before, was

associated with technology that was no longer widely utilized.

325.

For years prior to his permanent tr ansfer, Poltenovage performed work in

current skill groupings, including, but not limited to, “Transmission,” “ESS,” and “Power.”

326.

Poltenovage travelled to Fr amingham and questioned management and

Installers from New York who had recently transferred to the site where he was to be

transferred regarding the nature and amount available work. Poltenovage was informed

that he would be working throughout Massachusetts, Vermont and New Hampshire if he

accepted the permanent transfer to Framingham. From these discussions, Poltenovage

determined that there was not adequate work available in Framingham.

327.

During his trip to Framingham, Poltenovage also investigated the cost of

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lodging in t he area. Poltenov age determined that the cost of lodging in th e area was

beyond what he could afford.

328.

Based on the information provided by Lucent management and Installers

located in Framingham and finan cial considerations, Poltenovage determined that there

were no longer adequate employment opportunities for him with Lucent and he retired.

329.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, after his forced retirement, the Installers in Poltenovage’s base location in

New York who had less years of servic e and wer e younger worked a substantial

number of hours in the same work codes Poltenovage worked in before the Company

requested that he permanently transfer to another base location.

330.

For years prior to his termination, Poltenovage’s IRW established that he

worked extensively in non-obsolete skill level work codes including, but not limited t o,

321, 421, 424, 435, 454, 459, 460, 505, 467, 468, 473, 475, 484, 517, and 519.

331.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, the reasons articulated by the Company for selecting Poltenovage for

the permanent transfer were not valid and c onstitute a pretext fo r age discrimination

primarily because his skills were still needed in his base location, he could perform the

available work at his base location, there was inadequate work for him in the location he

was to be transferred to, the Co mpany did not offer to transfe r anyone else to the same

location after he declined the transfer and the Company, from 2002 to 2004, engaged in

a nationwide pattern of tar geting older I nstallers by offering them unr easonable

transfers under similar circumstances.

332.

As the dir ect and proximate result of this discrimin atory employment

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practice, Poltenovage has and will co ntinue to experience substantial economic losses

arising out of his termination of employment.

BB. STATEMENT OF FACTS REGARDING MICHAEL PRESBY

333.

Michael Presby (“Presby”), born on April 22, 1945, joined the predecessor

of Lucent as an Installer in December, 1964, and worked in that capacity at the Detroit,

Michigan base location until his involuntary retirement occurring on April, 2003.

334.

In March, 2003, Pres by received a notice from the Company, stating tha t

he was p ermanently transferred from his bas e location in Detroit to Milwauk ee,

Wisconsin.

335.

At the time he receiv ed this notice, the Company designated Presby as a

CST and in skill gro uping “No-Match.” This designation meant that Presby’s skill

grouping which was establishe d years before, did not “Match” any of the c urrent skill

groupings.

336.

For years prior to 2003, Presby worked in various current skill grouping s

including, but not limited to, “Transmission” and “All Operations” as needed to complete

his work assignments.

337.

Presby learned a coworker, who was recently transferred to Detroit from

Milwaukee wished to return to Wisconsin. Presby requested a trade, but his request

was denied by Lucent management.

338.

Presby declined the transfer due to family obligations.

339.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, after hi s forced retirement, t he Installers in Pres by’s base location in

Detroit, Michigan who had less years of service and were younger worked a substantial

56

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number of hours in the same work code s Presby worked in before the Company

requested that he permanently transfer to another base location.

340.

For years prior to his termination, Presby’s IRW established that he

worked extensively in non-obsolete skill level work codes including, but not limited t o,

321, 421, 427, 454, 459, 460, 505, 507, 439, 457, 468, 469, 472, 473, and 517.

341.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, the reasons articulated by the Company for selecting Presby for the

permanent transfer are not valid and constitute a pretext for age discr imination primarily

because his skills wer e still needed in his b ase location, he could perform the availa ble

work at his base locat ion, there was no or inadequate work for him in the location h e

was to be transferred to, the Co mpany did not offer to transfe r anyone else to the same

location after he declined the transfer and the Company, from 2002 to 2004, engaged in

a nationwide pattern of tar geting older I nstallers by offering them unr easonable

transfers under similar circumstances.

342.

As the dir ect and proximate result of this discriminatory employment

practice, Presby has and will continue to experience substantial economic losses arising

out of his termination of employment.

CC. STATEMENT OF FACTS REGARDING JAMES RILEY

343.

James Riley (“Riley ”), born on No vember 19, 1946, joined th e

predecessor of Lucent as an Installer in July, 1972 and worked in that capacity at the Ft.

Lauderdale, Florida base location until his in voluntary retirement occurring in August,

2004.

344.

In July, 2004 Riley received a notice from the Compan y stating that he

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was permanently transferred from his base lo cation in Ft. Lauderdale to Greenwood,

Mississippi.

345.

At the time he receiv ed this notic e, the Company des ignated Riley as a

CST and in skill groupi ng “Declining Systems-Electronic.” This designation meant that

Riley’s skill grouping which was established years before was associated with aging

systems.

346.

For the years prior to 2004, Riley per formed work including, but not limited

to, installations, testing, turn over and computer work related to switching systems.

347.

Riley heard from other Installers at Lucent that there was no work

available in Greenwood.

348.

Based on the information provided by Lucent Installers, his own research

into the Greenwood area, and family obligat ions Riley determined that there were no

longer adequate employment opportunities for him with Lucent and he retired.

349.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, after his forced retirement, the Installers in Riley ’s base loca tion in Ft.

Lauderdale who had less years of service and were younger worked a substantial

number of hours in the same work code s Riley worked in before the Company

requested that he permanently transfer to another base location.

350.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, the reasons articulated by the Company for selecting Riley for the

permanent transfer were not valid and cons titute a pretext for age dis crimination

primarily because his skills were still needed in his base location, he could perform the

available work at his base loc ation, there was no or inadequate work for him in the

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location he was to be transferred to, the Com pany did not offer to transfer anyone els e

to the same location after he declined th e transfer and the Company, from 2002 to

2004, engaged in a nationwide pa ttern of targeting older Inst allers by off ering them

unreasonable transfers under similar circumstances.

351.

As the dir ect and proximate result of this discrimin atory employment

practice, Riley has and will continue to ex perience substantial economic losses arising

out of his termination of employment.

DD. STATEMENT OF FACTS REGARDING RONALD SADLIK

352.

Ronald Sadlik (“Sadlik”), born on July 6, 1950, joined the predec essor of

Lucent as an Installer in June, 1970, and worked in that capacity at the Cleveland, Ohio

base location until his involuntary retirement occurring on December 4, 2003.

353.

In December, 2003, Sadlik receiv ed a notice from the Company stating

that he was permanently transfe rred from his base location in Cleveland to Jackson,

Mississippi.

354.

At the time he received this notic e, the Company designated Sadlik as a

SCST in skill grouping “Transmission”.

355.

For years prior to 2003, Sadlik performed work installing, testing and

transitioning to the phone company, newer fiber-optic equipment.

356.

Sadlik could not acc ept the per manent transfer to Jackson due to family

considerations.

357.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevant

other records, after his forced r etirement, the Installers in Sadlik’s base location in

Cleveland who had less years of service and were younger worked a substantial

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number of hours in the same work code s Sadlik worked in before the Company

requested that he permanently transfer to another base location.

358.

Prior to his termination, Sadlik ’s IRW established that he worked

extensively in non-obsolete skill level work codes including, but not limited to, 321, 410,

424, 426, 426, 427, 435, 436, 459, 460, 468, 471, 481, 482, 484, 505, 519, and 521.

359.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, the reasons artic ulated by the Company for selecting Sadlik for the

permanent transfer were not valid and cons titute a pretext for age dis crimination

primarily because his skills were still needed in his base location, he could perform the

available work at his base loc ation, there was no or inadequate work for him in the

location he was to be transferred to, the Com pany did not offer to transfer anyone els e

to the same location after he declined th e transfer and the Company, from 2002 to

2004, engaged in a nationwide pattern of target ing older Installers by offering them

unreasonable transfers under similar circumstances.

360.

As the dir ect and proximate result of this discrimin atory employment

practice, Sadlik has and will continue to experience substantial ec onomic losses arising

out of his termination of employment.

EE. STATEMENT OF FACTS REGARDING RICHARD SCHWARTZ

361.

Richard Schwartz, (“Schwartz”), born on August 16, 1944, joined the

predecessor of Lucent as an Installer in Detr oit, Michigan and worked in that capacity at

the Detroit, Michigan base loca tion until his involuntary retire ment occurring in April,

2003.

362.

In March, 2003, Schwartz received a notice from the Company, stating

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that he was permanently transferred from hi s base location in Detroit to Jackson,

Mississippi.

363.

At the time he received this noti ce, the Company designated Schwartz as

a CST and in skill groupi ng “No-Match.” This des ignation meant that Schwartz’s skil l

grouping which was establishe d years before, did not “Match” any of the c urrent skill

groupings.

364.

For years prior to 2003, Sch wartz performed work in current skill

groupings including, but not limited to, “Wireless.”

365.

Schwartz travelled to Mississippi, and questioned management at the sit e

where he was to be transferred by telephone regarding the nature and amount available

work. Schwartz was informed by Lucent management in Jackson that there was no

work for him at the base location.

366.

Based on the information provi ded by Lucent managem ent located in

Jackson, Schwartz determined that t here was no longer any adequate employment

opportunities for him with Lucent and he retired.

367.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, after his forced retirement, t he Installers in Sc hwartz’s base location in

Detroit who had less years of service and were younger worked a substantial number of

hours in the same work codes Schwartz work ed in before the Company requested that

he permanently transfer to another base location.

368.

Prior to his termination, Schwartz ’s IRW established that he worked

extensively in non-obsolete skill level work c odes including, but not limited to, 321, 435,

436, 454, 459, 460, 473, 474, 475, 495, 508, 515, and 519.

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369.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, the reasons articulated by the Company for selecting Sc hwartz for the

permanent transfer were not valid and cons titute a pretext for age dis crimination

primarily because his skills were still needed in his base location, he could perform the

available work at his base loc ation, there was no or inadequate work for him in the

location he was to be transferred to, the Com pany did not offer to transfer anyone els e

to the same location after he declined th e transfer and the Company, from 2002 to

2004, engaged in a nationwide pattern of target ing older Installers by offering them

unreasonable transfers under similar circumstances.

370.

As the dir ect and proximate result of this discrimin atory employment

practice, Schwartz has and will continue to experience substantial economic losses

arising out of his termination of employment.

FF. STATEMENT OF FACTS REGARDING LAWRENCE SMITH

371.

Lawrence Smith (“Smith”), born on June 21,1944, joined the predecessor

of Lucent as an Installer in June, 1968, and worked in that capacit y until his premature

retirement occurring on March 6, 2004.

372.

In December, 2003, Smith received a notice from the Compan y stating

that he was permanently transfe rred from his base location in New York to Jackson,

Tennessee.

373.

At the time he receiv ed this notic e, the Com pany designated Smit h as a

CST and in skill grouping “Declining Systems.” This designation meant that Smith’s skill

grouping, which was established years before, was awarded in technology that is no

longer current.

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374.

For years prior to his retiremen t, Smith worked ins talling frames and

cabling in current skill grouping “5ESS.”

375.

Smith travelled to Jackson, Tennessee to investigate the area.

376.

Smith accepted the transfer to Jackson, Tennessee.

377.

When Smith reporte d for work at the Ja ckson base location, Lucent

supervisor Bo McDaniels immediately informed Smith that a buyout was available.

378.

Smith worked from the Jackson base location for approximately one

month, but ultimately determined that t here were no longer adequate em ployment

opportunities for him with Lucent and he retired.

379.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevant

other records, after his forced retirement, t he Installers in Smith base location in New

York, New York who had less years of service and were younger worked a substantial

number of hours in the same work codes Smith worked in before the Company

requested that he permanently transfer to another base location.

380.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, the reasons articulated by the Company for selecting Sm ith for the

permanent transfer are not valid and constitute a pretext for age discr imination primarily

because his skills wer e still needed in his b ase location, he could perform the availa ble

work at his base locat ion, there was no or inadequate work for him in the location h e

was to be transferred to, the Co mpany did not offer to transfe r anyone else to the same

location after he declined the transfer and the Company, from 2002 to 2004, engaged

in a nationwide pattern of targeting older Installers by offeri ng them unreasonable

transfers under similar circumstances.

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381.

As the dir ect and proximate result of this discrimin atory employment

practice, Smith has and will cont inue to experience substantial economic losses arising

out of his permanent transfer and termination of employment, including substantial out

of pocket losses in the nature of travel, lo dging, and meal expe nses and consequential

damages related to t he requirement that he work in multip le distant locat ions from

December 2003 until his retirement.

382.

Smith also experienced economic losses because the unlawful permanent

transfer caused him to retire sooner than he wo uld have had he been allowed to finish

his career at his original base location.

GG. STATEMENT OF FACTS REGARDING LEO STONEY, JR.

383.

Leo Stoney, Jr. (“Stoney”), born on Oct ober 21,1942, joined the

predecessor of Lucent as an Installer in Ma rch, 1969 and worked in that capacity at the

Gainesville, Florida base location until his involuntary retirement occurring in May, 2004.

384.

In April, 2004 Stoney received a notice from the Company stating that he

was permanently transferred from his base location in Gainesville to Toledo, Ohio.

385.

At the time he receiv ed this notice, the Company des ignated Stoney as a

SCST and in skill grouping “Transmission”.

386.

For years prior to his permanent tr ansfer notification, Stoney performed

work in current skill groupin gs including, but not limited to, “5ESS,” “Transmission,” and

“Power.”

387.

Stoney travelled to T oledo to inve stigate the location. Stoney called the

Toledo base location and questioned management at the site where he was to be

transferred regarding the nat ure and amount avai lable work. St oney was informed by

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Lucent management in Toledo t hat there was either no or inadequate work for him a t

the new base location. The supervisor Stoney spoke with was unaware he was bei ng

transferred new Installers.

388.

Based on the information provi ded by Lucent managem ent located in

Toledo, Ohio Stoney determined that t here was no longer adequate employment

opportunities for him with Lucent and he retired.

389.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, after hi s forced retirement, the Installers in St oney’s base location in

Gainesville who had less years of serv ice and were younger worked a substantial

number of hours in the same work code s Stoney worked in before the Company

requested that he permanently transfer to another base location.

390.

For years prior to his termination, Stoney’s IRW established that he

worked extensively in non-obsolete skill level work codes including, but not limited t o,

321, 422, 424, 425, 426, 427, 436, 460, 448, 449, 454, 459, 4 67, 471, 472, 473, 474 ,

492, 493, 494, 505, 512, 517, and 519.

391.

Based on information supplied to the EEOC by the Company and relevant

other records, the reasons articulated by the Company for selecting Stoney for the

permanent transfer were not valid and cons titute a pretext for age dis crimination

primarily because his skills were still needed in his base location, he could perform the

available work at his base loc ation, there was no or inadequate work for him in the

location he was to be transferred to, the Com pany did not offer to transfer anyone els e

to the same location after he declined th e transfer and the Company, from 2002 to

2004, engaged in a nationwide pattern of target ing older Installers by offering them

65

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unreasonable transfers under similar circumstances.

392.

As the dir ect and proximate result of this discrimin atory employment

practice, Stoney has and will continue to experience substantial economic losses arising

out of his termination of employment.

HH. STATEMENT OF FACTS REGARDING W.T. RUTH

393.

W.T. Ruth (“Ruth”), born on May 4, 1947, joined the predec essor of

Lucent as an Installer in Oct ober, 1969 and worked in that capacity at the Houston,

Texas base location until his involuntary retirement occurring in April, 2003.

394.

In March, 2003, Ruth received a notic e from the Company stating that he

was permanently transferred from his base location in Houston to Louisville, Kentucky.

395.

At the time he receiv ed this notic e, the Company des ignated Ruth as a

CST and in skill grouping “Power.”

396.

For years prior to 2003, Ruth per formed work in cu rrent skill grouping

“Power,” and various current skill groupings as required to complete his work

assignments.

397.

Ruth contacted the Louisville base and questioned an Installer stationed at

the site where he was to be transferred r egarding the nature an d amount available

work. Ru th was informed by this Installer in Louisville that ther e was no work at the

base location and Ruth would be sent on Temporary Transfers if he ac cepted the

permanent transfer.

398.

Based on the information provi ded by Lucent personnel located in

Louisville, Ruth determined that t here was no longer adequate employment

opportunities for him with Lucent and he retired.

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399.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, after his forced retirement, the Insta llers in Ruth’s base location in

Houston who had less years of service and were younger worked a substantial number

of hours in the same work codes Ruth worked in before the Company requested that he

permanently transfer to another base location.

400.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, the reasons artic ulated by the Company for selecting Rut h for the

permanent transfer were not valid and cons titute a pretext for age dis crimination

primarily because his skills were still needed in his base location, he could perform the

available work at his base loc ation, there was no or inadequate work for him in the

location he was to be transferred to, the Com pany did not offer to transfer anyone els e

to the same location after he declined th e transfer and the Company, from 2002 to

2004, engaged in a nationwide pa ttern of targeting older In stallers by off ering them

unreasonable transfers under similar circumstances.

401.

As the dir ect and proximate result of this discrimin atory employment

practice, Ruth has and will continue to ex perience substantial economic losses arising

out of his termination of employment.

II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS REGARDING FRANCIS TEDESCHI

402.

Francis Tedeschi (“Tedeschi”), born on March 20, 1946, joined the

predecessor of Lucent as an Installer in June, 1967 and worked in that until his

premature retirement occurring in January, 2005.

403.

In June, 2003 T edeschi received a notice from the Com pany stating tha t

he was permanently transferred fr om his base location in New York to Framingham,

67

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Massachusetts.

404.

At the time he received this noti ce, the Company designated Tedeschi as

an SCST and in skill grouping “Transport.”

405.

For years prior to his permanent transfer, client performed work in current

skill groupings, including, but not limited to “Transmission, ” “Power,’ “Wireless,” and

“ESS.”

406.

Tedeschi was not yet eligible to retire at the time of his permanent transfer

and accepted the permanent transfer to Framingham and worked from the base location

from approximately August, 2003 to January, 2005.

407.

While in F ramingham, Tedeschi per formed “tear out, “Power” and other

work below his skill level.

408.

Tedeschi accepted a buyout from Lucent in January, 2005.

409.

Tedeschi rented an apartment near Framingham and maintained his home

in Lake Grove, New York.

410.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, after his separation of empl oyment, the Installers in Tedeschi’s bas e

location in New Yor k who had less year s of service and wer e younger worked a

substantial number of hours in the same work codes Tedes chi worked in before the

Company requested that he permanently transfer to another base location.

411.

For years prior to his termination, Tedeschi’s IRW establish ed that he

worked extensively in non-obsolete skill level work codes including, but not limited t o,

321, 421, 422, 424, 427, 435, 438, 454, 459, 460, 505, 507, 473, 514, and 519.

412.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

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other records, the reasons articulated by the Company for selecting Tedes chi for the

permanent transfer were not valid and cons titute a pretext for age dis crimination

primarily because his skills were still needed in his base location, he could perform the

available work at his base location, there inadequate work for him at his skill level in the

location he was to be transferred to, the Com pany did not offer to transfer anyone els e

to the same location after he declined th e transfer and the Company, from 2002 to

2004, has engaged in a nationwide pa ttern of targeting older Inst allers by offering them

unreasonable transfers under similar circumstances.

413.

As the dir ect and proximate result of this discrimin atory employment

practice, Tedeschi has and will continue t o experience substantial economic losses

arising out of his termination of employment including, consequential damages, lodging,

travel, tolls, meals and other expenses associated with his commuting.

414.

Tedeschi also experienced econom ic losses bec ause the unlawful

permanent transfer caused him to retire sooner than he woul d have had he been

allowed to finish his career at his original base location.

JJ. STATEMENT OF FACTS REGARDING RICHARD TURNER

415.

Richard Turner (“Turner”), born on July 14, 1941, joined the predecessor

of Lucent as an Installer in February, 1965, and worked in that capacity until his

involuntary retirement occurring on January 22, 2005.

416.

In October of 2003, Tu rner received a no tice from the Company stating

that he was permanently transferred from his base location in Los Angeles, California to

Atlanta, Georgia.

417.

Turner accepted the permanent transfer to Atlanta.

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2:09-cv-14596-NGE-RSW Doc # 7 Filed 03/16/10 Pg 70 of 76 Pg ID 164

418.

In October of 2004, Tu rner received a notice from the Company stating

that he was permanently transfe rred from his base loc ation in Atlanta to Newark, New

Jersey.

419.

At the time he received this notic e, the Company des ignated Turner as a

SCST and in skill grouping “Power.”

420.

For years prior to his permanent transfer, Turner worked primarily in

current skill groupings, “Wireless,” “Transmission,” and “Power.”

421.

Work was available for Turner in Atlanta. Turner’s OAM (Operations Area

Manager) requested that Turner s ubmit a request to remain in Atlanta. Turner did so,

but never received a response.

422.

Turner was recovering from a medical procedure and was unable to travel

to Newark immediately. Bec ause of his medical situation, Turner was given additional

time to decide whether he would accept the transfer.

423.

Turner was unable t o accept t he permanent transfer to Newark and

accepted a buyout offered in January, 2005, retiring due to family obligations and

financial considerations relating to his re cent purchase of a home in Atlanta and the

increased cost of living in Newark.

424.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, after his forced retirement, t he Installers in Turner’s base location in

Atlanta, Georgia who had less years of service and were younger worked a substantial

number of hours in the same work codes Turner work ed in before the Company

requested that he permanently transfer to another base location.

425.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

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other records, the reasons ar ticulated by the Company fo r selecting Turner for the

permanent transfer are not valid and constitute a pretext for age discr imination primarily

because his skills wer e still needed in his b ase location, he could perform the availa ble

work at his base locat ion, there was no or inadequate work for him in the location h e

was to be transferred to, the Co mpany did not offer to transfe r anyone else to the same

location after he declined the transfer and the Company, from 2002 to 2004, engaged

in a nationwide pattern of targeting older Installers by offeri ng them unreasonable

transfers under similar circumstances.

426.

As the dir ect and proximate result of this discrimin atory employment

practice, Turner has and will continue to experience substantial economic losses arising

out of his termination of employment.

KK. STATEMENT OF FACTS REGARDING E. DON WOODFORD

427.

E. Don Woodford (“Woodf ord”), born on December 24, 1942, joined the

predecessor of Lucent as an Installer in June, 1968 until Augus t, 1984 and again from

1997 to August, 2004, and working in that capac ity at the Little Rock, Arkansas bas e

location until approximately March, 2003. Woodford work ed from the Topeka, Kansa s

base location from approximately March 2003 unt il his involuntary retirement occurring

in August, 2004.

428.

In March, 2003 Woodford received a notice from the Company stating that

he was permanently transferred from his base loc ation in Little Rock, Arkansas to

Topeka, Kansas.

429.

Woodford accepted the permanent transfer to Topeka.

430.

There was not adequate work in T opeka and Woodford s pent most of his

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2:09-cv-14596-NGE-RSW Doc # 7 Filed 03/16/10 Pg 72 of 76 Pg ID 166

time on Temporary Transfers in other states, including, but not limited to, Arkansas and

Oklahoma.

431.

At the time he received this notice, the Com pany designated Woodford as

a CST, and in skill grouping “Wireless.”

432.

For years prior to 2003, Woodfor d performed work in current skill

groupings including, but not limit ed to, “P ower” and Wireless” and other current skill

groupings as needed to complete his work assignments.

433.

For years prior to 2003 Woodford wo rked extensively in non-obsolete skill

level work codes including, but not limited to, 321, 459, 515, and 519

434.

In July or August, 2004, Woodfor d received a notice from the C ompanY

stating that he was pe rmanently transferred from his base location in Topeka to Aurora,

Illinois.

435.

Woodford questioned Installers at t he Aurora site where he was to be

transferred regarding the nat ure and amount available wo rk. Woodward was informed

by the Installers in Aurora that there was not adequate work at the base location.

436.

Based on the information provided by Lucent Installers located in Aurora,

Woodford determined that there were no longer adequate employment opportunities for

him with Lucent, he accepted a buyout and he retired.

437.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevan t

other records, after his forced retirement, th e Installers in Woodford’s base location in

Little Rock, Arkansas who had less years of service and wer e younger worked a

substantial number of hours in t he same work codes worked in before the Company

requested that he permanently transfer to another base location.

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438.

Based on information supplied to t he EEOC by the Company and relevant

other records, the reasons articulated by the Company for selecting Woodford for the

permanent transfer were not valid and cons titute a pretext for age dis crimination

primarily because his skills were still needed in the Little Rock base location and in the

area serviced by the Topeka base location, he could perform the available work at those

base locations, there was inadequate work for him in the both the Topek a and Aurora

locations he was to be transferred to, the Co mpany did not offer to transfer anyone else

to the same locations after he declined th e transfer and the Company, from 2002 to

2004, engaged in a nationwide pattern of target ing older Installers by offering them

unreasonable transfers under similar circumstances.

439.

As the dir ect and proximate result of this discrimin atory employment

practice, Woodford has and will continue to experience substantial ec onomic losses

arising out of his termination of employment.

VI. STATEMENT OF CLAIM – DISPARATE TREATMENT

440.

Plaintiffs incorporate the above allegations as though stated in full herein.

441.

The Company was under the statut ory obligation to refrain from

discriminating against Plaintiffs in connection with all em ployment decisions because of

their age.

442.

In violation of this duty, the Co mpany engaged in a pl an to discriminate

against its older Installers by permanently tr ansferring them or threatening to do s o

knowing that there was insufficient work ava ilable at the locations or that for personal

reasons the older Installers would decline the transfers and retire.

443.

Plaintiffs have experienced all the damages as alleged above.

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444.

The conduct of the Co mpany was willful and a de liberate violation of the

ADEA rights of Plaintif fs and similarly situated Installers entitling Plaintiffs and others to

liquidated damages as provided for in the ADEA.

VII.

STATEMENT OF CLAIM – DISPARATE IMPACT

445.

Plaintiffs incorporate by referenc e all the allegations contained above a s

though stated in full herein.

446.

The Company policy of selecting Installers for permanent transfer on the

basis of s kill groupings, al though neutral on its fac e, resulted in a dis proportionate

number of older Installers being selected for permanent transfer.

447.

This outcome violated the ADEA prohibition against employment

policies/practices which have a disparate impact on older employees.

448.

As a result of the above-unlawfu l disparate impact, Plaintiffs and other

similarly-situated Installers suffered the damages described above.

VIII.

REQUEST FOR RELIEF

Plaintiffs request the following relief fr om the Court for themselves and all

similarly situated installers:

a. A declaratory judgment that t he Company has willfully violated the

ADEA rights of Plaintiffs and all similarly situated Installers;

b. A mandatory injunction enjoining Lucent from continuing to violat e

the ADEA;

c. A court order that Plaintiffs shou ld be reinstated to their former

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2:09-cv-14596-NGE-RSW Doc # 7 Filed 03/16/10 Pg 75 of 76 Pg ID 169

positions or suitable c omparable positions with a full reinstatement

of rights and benefits;

d. Compensatory and consequential damages for all of Plaintiffs’

economic losses including fringe benefits;

e. Liquidated damages against the Company for its willful violation of

the ADEA;

f. An award of reasonable attorn ey fees and costs and expense s

related to the litigation of the ADEA claim; and

g. Such other relief the court deems appropriate.

Respectfully Submitted,

PITT, MCGEHEE, PALMER, RIVERS & GOLDEN

Dated: March 16, 2010

By:/s/ Beth M. Rivers (P33614) Michael L. Pitt (P22469) Beth M. Rivers (P33614) Attorneys for Plaintiff 117 W. Fourth Street, Suite 200 Royal Oak, MI 48067 248-398-9800 [Tel.]
brivers@pittlawpc.com
mpitt@pittlawpc.com

75

2:09-cv-14596-NGE-RSW Doc # 7 Filed 03/16/10 Pg 76 of 76 Pg ID 170

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
WILLIAM C. DALLAS, Ronald Battle, Johnny Beas ley, Frank Carigliano, Paul Ca rlson, Kim Clar k, Nicholas Congimi, Raymond Connoll y, Geoffrey Corbin, Lawrence Davis, Duane Dav ison, Calixto Fonseca, Frank Fox, Edward Haeussler, Rudolph Hopkins , Ronald Johnson, Gerald K ephart, John Koenig, J ohn Korz, Gordon Ludwig, James Mahaffey, Robert Mladenka, Gary Nash, James Nealis, Hugo Pemintel, Dale Peterson, Robert Po ltenovage, Michael Presby , James Riley, Rona ld Sadlik, Richard Schwartz, Lawrence Smith, Leo Stoney, Jr., W.T. Ruth, Francis Tedeschi, Richard Turner , E. Don Woodford, individually, and on behalf of all similarly-situated persons,

Plaintiffs,

Hon.

Bernard Friedman

v.

ALCATEL-LUCENT USA INC., a corporation,

Case No. 09-14596

Defendant.

______________________________________________________________________

JURY DEMAND

Plaintiff herein demand a trial by jury of all issues to the within cause of action. Respectfully Submitted,

PITT, MCGEHEE, PALMER, RIVERS & GOLDEN

Dated: March 16, 2010

By:/s/ Beth M. Rivers (P33614) Michael L. Pitt (P22469) Beth M. Rivers (P33614) Attorneys for Plaintiff 117 W. Fourth Street, Suite 200 Royal Oak, MI 48067 248-398-9800 [Tel.]
brivers@pittlawpc.com
mpitt@pittlawpc.com

76

 
 2:09-cv-14596-NGE-RSW Doc # 22 Filed 07/16/10 Pg 1 of 1 Pg ID 273

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

WILLIAM C. DALLAS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

Civil Action No. 09-CV-14596

vs.

HON. BERNARD A. FRIEDMAN

ALCATEL-LUCENT USA, INC.,

Defendant. ____________________________/

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTIONS TO DISMISS OR TRANSFER

On July 14, 2010, this matter came before the court on (1) defendant’s motion to dismiss for

improper venue or, alternatively, to transfer [docket entry 11] and (2) defendant’s motion dismiss for failure

to state a claim [docket entry 14]. A hearing was held and oral argument heard. For the reasons stated on

the record,

IT IS ORDERED that defendant’s motion to dismiss for improper venue or, alternatively, to transfer is denied.

denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant’s motion dismiss for failure to state a claim is

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant’s answer is due by September 1, 2010. Once defendant answers, the court shall conduct a scheduling conference by telephone.

Dated: July 16, 2010 Detroit, Michigan

S/Bernard A. Friedman________________ BERNARD A. FRIEDMAN SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

WILLIAM C. DALLAS, ET AL., Plaintiffs,
v. ALCATEL-LUCENT USA, INC.,
Defendant. /

Case No. 09-14596 Honorable Nancy G. Edmunds

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION AND DISCOVERY REQUEST [28] AND DIRECTING COUNSEL TO
FILE A JOINT PROPOSED NOTICE AND OPT-IN CONSENT FORM WITHIN 10 DAYS

The 37 named Plaintiffs, all former employees of Defendant, bring this employment action, on behalf of themselvesand all others similarly-siut ated, against Defendant AlcatelLucent USA, Inc. alleging violations of t he Age Discrimination in Employment Act , 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq., arising out of their employment wiht Defendant. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant engaged in a pattern and practice of age discrimination in the selection of employees who were age 40 or over for permanent transfers between 2002 and 2004. Plaintiffs also allege thatthe permanent transfers had a disparate impact on older workers.
This matter i s presently before the C ourt on P laintiffs’ motion seeking conditional certification of this lawsuit as a collect ive action for purposes of notice and discovery. Plaintiffs also request that the Court approve their proposed notice to prospective opt-ins and require Defendant to “produce a list of the names, last known addresses, and telephone numbers of all former employees who meet the criteria of the proposed class.”

(Pls.’ Mot. at 12.) As set forth in detail bel ow, Plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED as to their requests for conditional certification and discovery from Defendant. I. Facts
The following facts are based on detailed allegations in Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and supporting deposition testimony or documents.
This case arises from the former employment relationship between DefendantLucent, a worldwide installer of telecommunications hardware, software, and other solutions, and the 37 named Plaintiffs who were employed as isntallers by Lucent in locations nationwide. (Pls.' 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2-39.) Plaintiffsallege that Defendant used its permanent transfer process to weed out older employees -- t hey were forced to choose between accepting unreasonable permanent transfers to locations farfrom their homes where, in many cases, there was no work for them, or retirement. Palintiffs submit evidence supporting their claim that Defendant intentionally chose locations for permanent transfers for Plaintiffs and similarly situated older installers that were "further from home" so as to dis courage acceptance and encourage these older installers to end their employment and thus leave spots available for younger workers. (Pls.' Reply, Ex. 1, 6/23/02 internal Lucent email with attached charts.)
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant was able to discriminate against older installers, not by directly using seniority, but rather by using its skill grouping methods to accomplish this purpose. Broadly described, installers per form tasks involved in installing a wide range of sophisticated telecommunications equipment, from central office switching systems to transmission systems that connect centr al offices to wireless systems for cellular telephones. (Def.'s Resp., Ex. A, Muscat Dep. at 33-35.)
2

Defendant ranked its installers in sk ill groupings -- like wireless, power, and transmission -- according to levels of achievement as measured byexperience and testing. (2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 47, 50-51.) As the installer worked longer, he or she achieved levels known as Associat e Communications Serv ices Technician (ACST), Communications Service Leader (CSL), Communications Services T echnician (CST), or Senior Communications Services Technician (SCST). Installers were required to work a specified number of hours in a skill in order to be designated as qualified in a skill grouping. (Id. at ¶¶ 46, 51.) Once qualified in a particular skill grouping, the installer was not subsequently reassigned to a different skill grouping regardl ess of whether he or she continued to perform any work in a different skill grouping. Thus, regardless of the type of work completed by a particular installer, he or she retained his or her original skill group designation. Moreover, despite the installer's designated skill grouping, Defendantrequired him or her to perform whatever work was available at his or her home base. For example, if an installer's skill grouping was "power," the installer was nonetheless required to do "wireless" work if that work was availableat his home base and he was able to perform the work. (Id. at ¶¶ 52-53.) As a result,an installer often spent mostof his or her time working in a skill group different than ht e one in which he or she initially qualified. Stated otherwise, installers who obtained their qualifying skill group years ago in areas of expertis e that subsequently became obsolete continued ot perform installation work in other non-obsolete skill groupings because it was available at their home bases and they had the ability to perform the work. ( Id. at ¶¶ 53-54.) This is evidenced by the Instal ler Record of Work (IRW) document Defendant maintained at an installer's home base. That IRW recorded the amount and skill level of work actually performed by an installer during a given period
3

of time. For example, ACST work is designated at the 300 level, CSL work is designated at the 400 level, and SCST work is designated at the 500 level. (Id. at ¶¶ 48-49.)
Plaintiffs allege that, dur ing the years 2002 through 2004, Defendant Lucent used permanent transfers to reduce the number of installers in its workforce. Based solely on an outdated skill grouping designation and regardless of the actual work an installer was performing at that time, Defendant would declarean installer as "surplus." If the installer's skill grouping established years earlier was then considered obsolete, the installer would become a candidate for a layoff or permanent transfer. Defendant Lucent knew that the obsolete skill groupings, on average, were popul ated with a higher percentage of older installers and that the current skill groupi ngs, on average, were populated with a higher percentage of younger installers. Thus, using this skill grouping method, Defendant was able to target older workers for termination. From 2002 to2004, it selected approximately 300 installers for permanent transfers based ontheir obsolete skill groupings knowing that there were a high percentage of older installers in that designation and thus deliberately targeted older installers as "surplus." Oncedesignated as "surplus," an installer was then told that he or she would bepermanently transferred to another base location. Most times, the location was in another staet and region of the country that required relocation of home and family to remain employed. (Id. at ¶¶ 53-58; Pls.' Reply, Ex. 1, 6/23/02 internal Lucent email and attachments.)
When "surplus" installers contacted the new base location, they were often told that there was no work available for them. (See, e.g., 2d Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 65, 106, 116, 155, 164, 182, 229, 255, 274.) This was because the destination locations of permanently transferred installers were determined without regard to the skills needed or the volume of
4

work at the destination locations. (Pls.' Mo t., Ex. 1, Muscat Dep. at 115, 157-158; Pls.' Reply, Ex. 1, 6/23/02 internal Lucent email and attachments.)
Faced with the prospec t of relocating to an entirely new location with limited work opportunities while work remained available toindividuals with less seniority at their home base, many installers were compelled to retireor resign. Thirty-one of the named Plaintiffs rejected the permanent transfer. (2d Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 61, 84, 92,102, 112, 122, 132, 143, 151, 160, 169, 178, 216, 225,235, 243, 252, 261, 270, 279,299, 308, 318, 333, 343, 352, 361, 383, 393, 415, 427.) Of the remaining six named Plaintiffs who initially accepted the permanent transfer, they subsequently found a lack of work. Asa result, those individuals also were forced to retire shortly after being transferred from their original base location. (Id. at ¶¶ 77, 195, 210, 294, 378, 406, 408.) This permanent transfer process was implemented by Defendant company-wide and affected installers in 40 states. As a result, hundreds of other similarly-si tuated older installers nati on-wide rejected the permanent transfer and chose to retire or resign. (Id. at ¶¶ 1, 39, 60, 442, 444, 446, 448; Pls.' Mot., Ex. 2, T. Bevilaqua Decl. at ¶ 14.)
By using outdated skill grouping designations todeclare installers "surplus," Defendant Lucent selected hundreds of older installers forpermanent transfers. At the same time that Defendant Lucent was declaring its older inst allers as "surplus" in base loc ations throughout the country, younger installers with less seniority continued todo the work these older installers had performed, using the same skills that Plaintiffs and others who were declared "surplus" had used when they were targeted for permanent transfer. That work continued unabated after the older installers wereremoved from their base locations. (2d Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 68, 79, 89, 98, 108, 118, 128, 139, 148, 157, 166, 175, 184, 196, 211,
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221, 231, 240, 248, 257, 266,276, 284, 295, 305, 314, 329,339, 349, 357, 367, 379, 389, 399, 410, 424, 437.) There was nobasis to remove the older installers using designations that Defendant Lucent knew wereoutdated and failed to reflect the work actually performed by the older installers. Rather, as Defendant's managers haveconfirmed, this process was intended to force resignations and retirements of older installers. (Id. at ¶ 60; Pls.' Reply, Ex. 1, 6/23/02 internal Lucent email and attachments.)
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Lucent violated the ADEA by engaging in a plan designed to dis criminate against its older installers, like the named Plaintiffs, by permanently transferring or threatening to transfer them to locations hundreds of miles from their homes and fam ilies knowing that there was insufficient work available at the new location or knowing that the older installers would likely decline the transfers and retire. Although neutral on its face, Defendant Lucent k new that, by selecting installers f or permanent transfer on the basis of outdated sk ill groupings, this policy would result in a disproportionate number of older installers being selected for permanent transfer. In other words, Defendant knew that its policy and parctices would have a disparate impact on older employees. (2d Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 1, 442, 446-447.) II. Analysis
Plaintiffs move for conditional certification of the following class: All former employees of Alcatel-Lucent USA, Inc. (Lucent) who were age 40 or older at the time of the t ermination of their employment or other adverse employment action, who were selectedfor permanent transfer in 2002, 2003, or 2004 and who, as a result, retired or resigned or experienced another adverse employment action.
6

(Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 3, Proposed Notice). The Court begins its anayl sis with a discussion of the general principles that apply to conditional class certification for collective actions alleging violations of the ADEA. It then addresses Plaintiffs' proposed Notice.
A. Conditional Class Certification 1. General Principles It is well-established that“[c]lass actions under the ADEA are authorized by 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), which expressly borrows the opt-in class action mechanism of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1994).” Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 222 F.R.D. 483, 484 (D. Kan. 2004). See also Rodolico v. Unisys Corp., 199 F.R.D. 468, 480 (E.D. N.Y. 2001). Section 216(b) provides that: An action . . . may be maintained against any employer . . . in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themse lves and other employees similarly situated. No employee shall be a party plaintiff to anysuch action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and suchconsent is filed in the court in which such action is brought. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (emphasis a dded). As the Sixth Circuit re cently observed, "[u]nlike class actions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, collective actions under FLSA require putative class members to opt into the class," and "[t]hese opt-in employees are party plaintiffs, unlike absent class members in a Rule 23 class action." O'Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enter., Inc., 575 F.3d 567, 583 (6th Cir. 2009). Suits brought under § 216(b) of the FLSA are thus called "collective actions;" not class actions. See Comer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 454 F.3d 544, 546 (6th Cir. 2006). Section 216(b) "establishes two requirements for a representative action" brought by employees "in their own behalf and for'similarly situated' persons." Id. First, "the plaintiffs
7

must actually be 'similarly situated,'" and second, "all plaintiffs must signal in writing their affirmative consent to par ticipate in t he action." Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling , 493 U.S. 165, 167-68 (1989) ). Ac cordingly, the district court's task is to "first consider whether plaintiffs have shown that the employees to be notified" of the collective action "are, in fact, 'similarly situated.'" Id. If the plaintiffs meet this burden, then "[t]he district court may use its discretion to authorize notification of similarly situated employees to allow them to opt into the lawsuit." Id.
Although the phrase "similarly situated" is undeinf ed, "the Sixth Circuit has recognized that district courts typically 'follow[ ] a two-stage certification process . . . to determine whether the opt-in plaintiffs and lead planitiffs [are] similarly situated.'" Noble v. Serco, Inc., No. 3:08-76-DCR, 2009 WL 3154252, *1 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 28, 2009) (quoting O'Brien, 575 F.3d at 583 and citing Comer, 454 F.3d at 546). The first stage of § 216(b) certification, also known as the "notice stage," takes place early in the litigation. Comer, 454 F.3d at 546. It is here where "the court determines whether t he suit should be 'conditionally certified' as a collective action so that potential opt-in plaintiffs can be notified of the suit's existence and of their right to participate." Noble, 2009 WL 3154252 at *1. The second stage occurs much later; "after all of the opt-in forms have been received and discovery has been concluded." Comer, 454 F.3d at 546 (internal quotatoi n marks and citation omitted).
2. Plaintiffs' Burden at "Notice" Stage Plaintiffs' motion here involves this first or "notice" stage and seeks only conditional, not final certification. "The lead plainti ffs bear the burden of showing that the opt-in plaintiffs are similarly situated to the lead plaintiffs." O'Brien, 575 F.3d at 584. Plaintiffs'
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burden under the FLSA is less strni gent than that required for cal ss certification under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. (observing that the district court erred when it "applied a Rule 23-type analysis" and found "that the plaintiffswere not similarly situated because individualized questions predominated."). To be considered "similarly situated," it is sufficient if the plaintiffs' "claims [are] unified by common theories of defendants' statutory violations, even if the proofs of those theories ar e inevitably individualized and distinct." Id. at 585. This is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for a finding that a group of employees is similarly situated. Id. Moreover, as the Sixth Circuit observed in Comer, "[t]he plaintiff must show only that his position is similar, not identical, to the positions held by the putative class members." Comer, 454 F.3d at 546-47 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted and emphasis added). Accordingly, district courts generally allow the lead plaintiffsto "show that the potential cal imants are similarly situated by making a modest factual showing sufficient to demonstrate that they and potential plaintiffs together were victims of a common policy or plan that violated the law." Olivo v. GMAC Mortgage Corp., 374 F. Supp.2d 545, 548 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). See also Brasfield v. Source Broadband Servs., LLC , 257 F.R.D. 641, 642 (W.D. Tenn. 2009) (same). This Court applies that standard here.
Defendant’s argument for a more rigorous standard is rejected. Although some discovery has been completed -- six depositions of high leve l employees and some document production -- it is undisputed that there is much morediscovery to be done. For example, in their Rule 26(f) discovery planilfed in late 2010, Defendant estimated that each side would initially require at least 75 depositions [Doc. #25]. So far, no Plaintiff or his or her supervisor or manager hasbeen deposed. Thus, unlike ht e decisions Defendant relies
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upon for a more rigorous standard, substantiadl iscovery has not been completed here; and this Court will apply the lenient standard typicallyapplied at the notice stage of a collective action under the FSLA or ADEA.
3. Plaintiffs Have Met Their Lenient Burden for Conditional Certification This "first stage" or notice standard is "fairly lenient," r equiring only that Plaintiffs "submit evidence establishing at least a colo rable basis f or their claim that a class of 'similarly situated' plaintiffs exists." Olivo, 374 F. Supp.2d at 548 (ni ternal quotation marks and citation omitted). "[T]he Court does not resolve factual disputes, decide substantive issues going to the ultimate merits, or make credibility determinations." Brasfield, 257 F.R.D. at 642. It is at the second stage, after discovery is concluded, that the Court uses a stricter standard and "examine[s] more cl osely the question of whether particular members of the class are, in fact, similarly situated." Comer, 454 F.3d at 547. Despite Defendant's arguments to the contrary, Plaintiffs have met theri lenient burden for conditional certific ation by showing that they and potentia l plaintiffs were "similarly situated" victims of a common policy of Defendant's that violated the ADEA -- its policy to use permanent transfers to eliminate older installers from its workforce. "Generally, at the notice stage, courts require nothing more than substantial allegations that the putative class members were together the victims of a single decision, policy or plan." Rodolico, 199 F.R.D. at 480 (inter nal quotation marks and citation omitted) (citing cases). See, e.g., Williams v. Sprint/United Managem ent Co., 222 F.R.D. 483, 487, 488 (D. Kan. 2004 ) (rejecting Sprint's focus on dissimilarities between named plaintiffs and potential opt-ins because "such differences are simply not rele vant at the notice stage when plaintiff, as here, has set forth substantial allegations that all plaintiffs were subjected to a pattern and
10

practice of age discrimination"and granting the plaintiffs' motionto conditionally certify their ADEA action as a collective action under 29 U.SC. . § 216(b) because plaintiffs showed that they and "the potential plaintiffs were terminated during the reduction in force as a result of Sprint's pattern and practiceof discriminating against older workers in implementing the reduction in force" ); Jackson v. New York Telephone Co., 163 F.R.D. 429, 432-33 (S.D. N.Y. 1995) (rejecting the defendant employer's argument for a more rigorous standard for determining "whether potential plaintiffs are similarly situated" as being "at odds with the well-reasoned conclusions of other courts, theremedial purposes ofADEA, and the prompt and efficient resolution of similar claims" and granting the plaintiffs' motion for conditional class certification because "at this preliminary notice stage, plaintiffs are only required to demonstrate a factual nexus that supports a finding that potential plaintiffs were subjected to a common discriminatory scheme" and the plaintiffs here had satisfied that burden with allegations that they and ot her employees over age 40 "w ere discharged or otherwise allegedly discriminated against" by the defendantemployer's when it implemented its force management plan in1993).
Similar to the plaintiffs inother ADEA collective actions, Pal intiffs here allege that they and other potential plaintiffs were similarly situated victims of a common policy or plan of discrimination carried out by Defendant when it implemented its permanent transfer plan in 2002 through 2004. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that they were all installers employed by Defendant Lucent during the relevant time period; were classified into skill groupings that remained the same over the years despite the fact that some skill groupings had become obsolete; and despite ou-tdated skill grouping cal ssifications, they were performing work in other, non-obsolete or more up-dated skill groupings. Plaintiffs further allege that
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Defendant knew that the obsolete skill groupings were populated with a high percentage
of older installers and used those obsolete sk ill groupings to target older in stallers for
permanent transfers in an attempt to force resignations or retirements. (2d Am. Compl.,
¶¶ 1, 46-60, 442, 446; Muscat Dep. at 13-14, 78; Bevilacqua Decl .) This is sufficient to
satisfy the lenient burden for conditional certif ication at the not ice stage of this ADEA
litigation. Defendant's arguments to the contrary are rejected.
This Court rejects Defendant's attempts toemphasize factual dissimilarities between
Plaintiffs and between Plaintiffs and potential opt-ins. Individual differences are not
relevant at this stage. As the Sixth Circuit observed in Comer, "[t]he plaintiff must show
only that his position is similar , not identical, to the positions held by the putative class
members." Comer, 445 F.3d at 546-47 (internal quotatoi n marks and citations omitted and
emphasis added). As t his Court previously observed in Wlotkowski v. Michigan Bell
Telephone Co., 267 F.R.D. 213, 219 (E.D. Mich. 2010), these types of arguments are properly raised at the second stage when discovery has been completed.1
The Court also rejects Defendant's attemptsto address the merits of Plaintiffs' ADEA
claims. At this initial, notice stage, "the Court does not resolve factual disputes, decide
substantive issues going to the ultimate me rits, or make credibility determinations."
Brasfield, 257 F.R.D. at 642.
1For all the reasons stated above, the Cour t also rejects Defendant's arguments that subclasses are required to reflect the significandt ifferences among Plaintiffs. (Def.'s Resp. at 18.) Based on Plaintiffs' detailed allegaitons, proffered deposition testimony and exhibit, the same challenged permanent transfer policy was used by Defendant nationwide. Named Plaintiffs' position and circumstances ar e similar to those to whom they seek to send notice. Each held the position of inst aller, was over forty, and was offered a permanent transfer by Defendant in an attempt toget him or her to leave the company and leave a position available for a younger installer.
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Furthermore, similar to the court in Lyons v. Ameriprise Financial, Inc., No. 10-503 (RHK/JJK), 2010 WL 3733565, at *4 (D. Minn. Sept. 20, 2010), this Court rejects Defendant's argument that Plaintiffs "failed to show suffici ent interest" of opt-ins in their lawsuit. As the Lyons court observed, "[t]he existence of more than one or two plaintiffs . . . at the time of the conditional-certifica tion inquiry has been found sufficient to warrant collective action treatment, even without a showi ng that other individuals wish to opt in." Id. at *5. Moreover, as the district court observed in Heckler v. DK Funding, LLC, 502 F. Supp. 2d 777, 780 (N.D. Ill. 2007), this argumen"tputs the cart before the horse" and "does not make sense." Here, Defendant's appendices and exhibits to its response reveal that many more than the 37 named Plaintiffs were targeted for permanent transfers during the years 2002 through 2004 and subsequently terminated their em ployment as a result. Indeed, Plaintiffs' counsel informs the Court that it has received inquiries from ten individuals who fit this description.
Having determined that Plaintiffs have sati sfied the lenient standard for conditional certification, this Court turns its attent ion to Plaintiffs' proposed notice and Defendant's objections to the scope of the proposed class and proposed notice.
B. Plaintiffs' Proposed Class/Notice Plaintiffs' proposed Notice defines the proposed class as consisting of: All former employees of Alcatel-Lucent USA, Inc. (Lucent) who were age 40 or older at the time of the t ermination of their employment or other adverse employment action, who were selected forpermanent transfer in 2002, 2003, or 2004 and who, as a result, retired or resigned or experienced another adverse employment action.
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(Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 3, Proposed Notice (emphasisadded).) Defendant Lucent raises a number of objections to Plaintiffs' proposed Notice andoffers a counter-proposal for the Notice that defines the class as consisting of:
All former employees of Alcatel-Lucent USA, Inc. (Lucent) who were age 40 or older at the time they were offered permanent transfer in [ ] 2003 or 2004, and who, as a result of selection for permanent transfer, retired or resigned [ ]. (Def.'s Resp., App. C, Proposed Notice (emphasis added).) Defendant's counter-proposal reflects its objections that (1) because t he first EEOC charge was filed on October 17, 2003, the earliest trigger date that can be piggybacked onto this charge is December 21, 2002 and thus the class definition and notice shoudl reflect this; and (2) Plaintiffs' proposed language "or other adverse employment action"is vague, overly broad and unmanageable and thus should be eliminated. In light of Defendant's challenges, Plaintiffs suggest that the parties meet and confer regarding the language in the Notice and definition of the class. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs' suggestion. Using Plaintiffs' draft as a starting point, the Court ORDERS counsel to confer and attempt to reach agreement on appropriate l anguage for the class, the Notice, and the Consent to Join form. WithinTen Days from entry of this Opinion and Order, counsel shall file a Joint Draft Notice and Consent to Jo in form for the Court' s final approval. If any specific language remains in dispute, that language shall be identified, along with each party's proposed language, and the Court will immediately resolve any dispute. Counsel should take note of the following during their discussions. First, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs t hat the Notice should not include contact information for defense counsel. Rather, it hsall include the name of counsel for Defendant
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and no more. See Gambo v. Lucent Tech., Inc., No. 05 C 3701, 2005 WL 3542485, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 22, 2005) (rejecting the defendant's request that the notice "include defense counsel's name and contact information" because "there is no basis in law or logic for this request.")
Second, because the detailed allegations in Plaintiffs' complaint address only two adverse employment actions -- resignation or retirement --, this Court finds merit in Defendant's argument that thechallenged "or other adverse employment action" should be omitted.
Third, considering the decisions highlightedby Defendant in support of its time-frame challenge, the "single-file" or "piggyback" rule would not allow putative plaintiffs "whose time limit for filing [an EEOC charge] had already run at the time of the filing they wish to join" to take advantage of this "piggyback" rule.Morton v. ICI Acrylics, Inc., 69 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1044 (W.D. Tenn. 1999). Accordingly, the relevant time period in the class definition should be from December 21, 2002 through 2004.
C. Plaintiffs' Discovery Request Finally, to facilitate notice to the class, Plaintiffs request that this Court order Defendant to produce a list of the names, last known addresses, and telephone numbers of all former employees who meet the criteria of the proposed clas s. The Court rejects Defendant's claim that this request would impose upon it an unreasonable burden. This type of discovery request is routni ely granted in collective actions.See, e.g., Lacy v. Reddy Electric Co., No. 3: 11-cv-52, 2011 WL 6149842, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 9, 2011); Wlotkowski, 267 F.R.D. at 220. Accordingly, within Ten Days of this Court's entry of its
15

Order granting final approval of the Not ice and Consent to Join form, Defendant shall provide Plaintiffs with the requested discovery. III. Conclusion
For the above-stated reasons, Plaintiffs' motion is GRANTED as to their requests for conditional certification and discovery from Defendant. As to Plaintiffs' request for judicial approval of their proposed noticeand consent to join form, this Court ORDERS counsel to confer and attempt to reach agreement on appropriate language for the class, the Notice, and the Consent to Join for m. Within Ten Days from entry of this Opinion and Order, counsel shall file a Joint Draft Notice and Consent to Join form for the Court's final approval. If any specific language remains in dispute, that language shall be identified, along with each party's proposed language, and the Court will immedia tely resolve any dispute.
s/Nancy G. Edmunds Nancy G. Edmunds United States District Judge Dated: February 9, 2012 I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record on February 9, 2012, by electronic and/or ordinary mail. s/Carol A. Hemeyer Case Manager
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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

WILLIAM C. DALLAS, ET AL., Plaintiffs,
v. ALCATEL-LUCENT USA, INC.,
Defendant. /

Case No. 09-14596 Honorable Nancy G. Edmunds

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTIONS FOR COURT’S PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF (1) SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND PLAN OF
ALLOCATION [63]; AND (2) ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS [64] On February 9, 2012, this Court entered an Order granting Plaintiffs’ motion seeking conditional certification of this employment lawsuit as a collective action for purposes of notice and discovery [ECF No. 39]. The named Plaintiffs, all former employees of Defendant and its predecessor companies, brought this employment action on behalf of themselves and all others similarly-situated, against Defendant Alcatel-Lucent, USA, Inc. alleging violations of the Age Discriminationin Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. This matter is now before the Cour t on Plaintiffs’ unopposed motions seeking preliminary approval of (1) the settlement agr eement resolving this nationwide collective action against Defendant for $1.4 million and theproposed plan of allocation [ECF No. 63]; and (2) $452,100 in attorney fees and $30,000 in costs as fair and reasonable [ECF No. 64]. The proposed settlement agreementresolves all of the claimsof the original Plaintiffs and the Opt-in Plaintiffs, including attorney fees and costs.

For the reasons stated below, Plaintif fs’ motions for preliminary approval of (1) the proposed Settlement Agreement andPlan of Allocation, and (2)for attorney fees and costs are GRANTED. This Court (1) unconditionally certifies this lawsuit as a collective action with a Plaintiff Class comprised of 36 original Pl aintiffs and the 158 Opt-in Plaintiffs; (2) approves Plaintiffs’ counsel’s request for establishment of a qualified Settlement Fund in the amount of $1.4million; (3) preliminarily approvesthe proposed Settlement Agreement, including its exhibit s; (4) preliminarily approves the proposed Plan of Allocation for determining individual awards from the Settl ement Fund; (5) prelim inarily approves that Plaintiffs’ counsel’s fees and costs are to be paid for m the Settlement Fund; (6) preliminarily approves Plaintiffs’ counsel’s request for $452,100 in attorney fees and $30,000 in costs; and (7) overrules the objections of Ronald Battle, Harvey Echols, Kenneth Forbes, Edward Haeussler, Rudolph Hopkins, and Gary Nash. I. Background
A. Plaintiffs’ ADEA Claim This collective action was brought under the ADEA.1 Plaintiffs allege that Defendant engaged in a pattern and practice of age discrimination when it implemented permanent transfers and a selection process that caused a disparate impact on older workers. More specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant violated the ADEA by forcing the resignation and retirement of older installers in 2002, 2003, and 2004 when it required older installers to choose between accepting permanent transfe rs to locations hundr eds of miles away from their home bases or terminating their employment by resigning or retiring. Plaintiffs
1The original complaint was brought by Plaintiff William Dallas in November 2009, and an amended complaint adding 36 additional Plaintiffs was filed in January 2010.
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assert that the transfer destination location was selected without regard to need or work volume at the destination base,and that work performed by theolder installers before their selection for a permanent transfer remained available at home bases for younger installers with less seniority.
Plaintiffs contend that Defendant was able to eliminate older installers from its workforce by declaring installers “surpul s” based on an outdated skill grouping designation, rather than by examining the work installersactually performed or were qualified to perform. Using this outdated skill designation, which was obtained in obsolete skill groupings from early in the installer’s career, Defendant was able to selec t the oldest installers in the workforce for permanent transfer. Once designaet d as “surplus,” the installer was told that he or she would be permanently transferred, of ten to bases hundreds of miles from the home base. Accepting the transfer would require relocation of home and family simply to remain employed. Faced with the prospect of relocation with limited work opportunities, many installers opted to resign or retire. This nationwide policy affected installers in forty states.
Defendant vehemently denies Plaintiffs’ claims. B. Procedural Background Before discovery, Defendant moved for a change of venue to New Jersey and for dismissal. Plaintiffs successfully opposedboth motions, and discovery began. Thousands of documents were exc hanged and depositions we re taken of many Plaintiffs and Defendant’s managers. Based on the informationobtained, Plaintiffs sought an Order from this Court granting their motion for conditional certification of this case as a collective action consisting of following class of individuals:
3

All former employees of Alcatel-Lucent USA, Inc. (Lucent) who were age 40 or older at the time of the termination of ht eir employment or other adverse action, who were selected for permanent transfer in 2002, 2003, or 2004 and who, as a result, retired or resigned or expereinced another adverse employment action.

This Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion and, on February 9, 2012, entered an order

conditionally certifying this single count age di scrimination lawsuit as a collective action

against Defendant. This allowed t he original Plaintiffs and other former installers, who

timely elected to join the lawsuit and agreed to be bound by its resolution (

“Opt-in

Plaintiffs”), to collectively seek enforcement of their rights under the ADEA. The Court

subsequently approved the parties’joint proposed notice and consent to join form [ECF No.

43]. At the conclusion of theopt-in period, there were 36 original Plaintiffs and 158 Opt-in

Plaintiffs who make up the class of claimants (hereinafter “Plaintiffs,” “Class Members,” or

“Plaintiff Class”).

Following the opt-in period, the parties conducted additional dis covery. Plaintiffs

sought evidence in support of ht eir theory that Defendant’s use of permanent transfers was

part of a plan to target the removal of older installers. Defendant strongly denied this

allegation, arguing that its use of permanent transfers was approved by the installer’s labor

representatives and was designed to benefit older workers by giving them a last chanc e

to maintain employment during a time

of significant workforce reductions and

reorganization driven by the rapid change in technology and diminishment of customer

demand.

From January 2010 through the Fall of 2012, Plaintiffs’ counsel obtained thousands

of documents in discoveryfrom Defendant and conducted more than a dozen management

and union depositions and interviews in various par ts of the country. Plaintiffs’ counsel,

4

after securing from Defendant thousands of historical employment data points regarding the impact of its use of permanenttransfers on older installers,retained the services of Dr. David Macpherson, expert statistician and economist. Dr. Macpherson analyzed the data to determine whether it revealed a potentia l pattern of unlawful age discrimination and concluded that the permanent transfers did adversely affect older installers like Plaintiffs. Defendant disagrees with Dr. Macpherson’s methodology.
This collective action was referred to voluntary mediation in Novem ber 2012. On December 6, 2012, the parties engaged in voluntary mediation with United States District Court Judge Rosen to pursue settlement discussions, fully recognizing the litigation risks attendant to all parties. Plain tiffs recognized that their ability to recover was subject to numerous risks, including the possibility that (1) the Court might enter summary judgment in Defendant’s favor on some or all of Plaintiffs’ claims; (2) a jury might decide that some or all Plaintiffs were not enittled to damages or were entitel d to less damages than Plaintiffs sought; and (3) the Cour t of Appeals might determine that Plaintiffs were not entitled to recover on their claim. Defendant also rec ognized the risks of litigating through trial because a jury could find in the Plaintiffs ’ favor and award them full r elief, including liquidated damages. Thus, to avoid the uncertainty, as well as the burdens and expenses of further discovery and litigation, the parties agreed to resolve the claim asserted in this litigation.
Serving as the neut ral mediator, Judge Rosen recommended a total settlement of $1.4 million to satisfy all claims of the originaland Opt-in Plaintiffs, as well as attorney fees and costs of litigation. In February 2013, Plaintiffs’ counsel, wiht the approval of designated
5

class representatives, determined that it would be in the best interests of the Plaintiff Class to accept Judge Rosen’s recommendation, subject to satisfactory terms and conditions.
On April 3, 2013, the par ties negotiated a proposed Settl ement Agreement that, in Plaintiffs’ counsel opinion, establishes satisfactory terms and conditions for resolving this collective action. Plaintiffs’ counsel thus asks this Court to pr eliminarily approve the proposed Settlement Agreement (Pls.’ Mot., Ex. A, 4/3/13 Settle. Agree.).
C. Summary of Settlement Terms The proposed Settlement Agreement is intended to resolve Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant resulting from its use of the pe rmanent transfer process from December 21, 2002 until December 31, 2004 and covers 36 origi nal Plaintiffs and 158 Opt-in Plaintiffs who filed Consents to Join this collective action. Excluded from this gr oup are (1) one original Plaintiff whose claim was untimely; and (2) several Opt-in Plaintiffs who either withdrew or do not fit the conditions for participation in this collective action. After describing Plaintiffs’ ADEA claim, the Agreement states that it is not to be construed as an adjudication or finding on themerits, as an admission or acknowledgment of any wrongdoing or liability by Defendan t, and no party may be deem ed a “prevailing party” for any purpose. (Pls.’ Mot, Ex. A, Settl. Agree., ¶¶ 1-2.) The proposed Settlement Agreement prov ides that Defendant will pay a gross settlement of $1.4 million to a qualified settlement fund created, maintained, and administered by Plaintiffs’ counsel for the benefit of Plaintiffs. Defendant’s payment of the $1.4 million is “in full and final satisfaction of any and all claims that Plaintiffs have, could have, or could allege t o have, including, but not limited to liquidated damages, lost
6

economic damages, compensatory damages, atto rneys’ fees, costs, administrative expenses, interest, and reinstatement of employment, among other things.” (Id. at ¶ 5.)
The Agreement further provides that Defendant will pay the $1.4 million settlement amount to Plaintiffs’ counsel’s settlement fund no later than 45 days after Defendant receives (1) an original, executed copy of this Settlement Agreement; (2) the Court’s order granting final approval of the Settlement Agreement and dismissing Plaintiffs’ lawsuit with prejudice and without costs; (3) original copies of Plaintiffs’ signed Individual Agreements and Releases; (4) the qualified settlement fund’s completed IRS Form W-9; and (5) Plaintiffs’ counsel’s certification that all Alcatel-Lucent confidential material produced by it in this lawsuit was destroyed,except the limited materials thatPlaintiffs’ counsel may retain in accordance with, and subjectto the Protective Order. (Id.) Moreover, Plaintiffs’ counsel must provide these items to Defendant no later than 180 days after the Court grants final approval of the Settlement Agreement and enters an appropriate order of dismissal. (Id.)
At the preliminary hearing scheduled for May 152, 013, Plaintiffs’ counsel is to ask the Court to (1) unconditionally certify this matter as a collectiveaction and confirm the Plaintiff Class; (2) preliminarily approve the establis hment of a qualified settlement fund in the amount of $1.4 million; (3) preliminarily appr ove Plaintiffs’ counsel’s proposed plan of allocation for determining indi vidual awards from the settl ement fund; (4) preliminarily approve that Plaintiffs’ counsel’s fees and costs are to be paid from the settlement fund; and (5) rule on the named Plaintiff’s or Opt-in Palintiff’s objections, if any, to the settlement. (Id. at ¶ 3.)
After obtaining the Court’s preliminary appr oval of the proposed plan o f allocation, Plaintiffs’ counsel will determine each Plaint iff’s individual award and will provide each
7

Plaintiff with notice of his or her proposed award by June 13, 2013. Any Plaintiff may request Plaintiffs’ counsel t o reconsider his or her individual award by filing a written request by June 24, 2013. Plaintiffs’ c ounsel will notify any Pla intiff who seeks reconsideration of his or her individual award of Plaintiffs’ counsel’s decision by July 1, 2013. (Pls.’s Br. at 5.) Plaintiffs’ counsel will file papers with the Court by July 1, 2013 requesting a final fairness hearing. (Pls.’ Mot., Ex. A, Settl. Agree. at ¶ 3.)
Plaintiff’s counsel will mail a notice of the final fairness hearing to each Plaintiff at least 30 days prior to that hearing that notifies Plaintiff of the date, time, and place of the hearing and of the Plaintiff’s opportunity to object either in person or by mail at least 15 days prior to the hearing. Plaintiffs may object only to the amount of their proposed individual awards, i.e., that the Plan of Allocation’s terms were not applied correctly to the Plaintiff’s individual circumstances thus arriving at an improper individual award. (Id. at ¶ 4.)
Notice of the final fairness hearing will also apprise each Plaintiff (1) of the terms of the Settlement; (2) that if the Court approves the Settlement, this lawsuit will be fully and finally dismissed, and in that event, unlessthey sign an Individual Agreement and Release, they will not receive their individual awardsin connection with this lawsuit and will have no other recourse; and (3) that any Plain tiff who fails to object will be deemed to have accepted the Settlement and the terms of the Settlement Agreement, will be bound by the judgment dismissing this case pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, and will have his or her claim dismissed. (Id.)
At the final fairness hearing, Plaintiffs ’ counsel will ask the Cou rt to grant final approval of the proposed Settlement Agreement, Pal n of Allocation, its request for attorney
8

fees and costs and for an order dismissing this lawsuit with prejudice as to all Plaintiffs. I(d. at ¶ 3.) At that hearing, t he Court will co nsider Plaintiffs’ objections, if any, to their proposed individual awards and will exerci se its discretion and mak e appropriate adjustments. Each Plaintiff’s objections shall set forth thereasons why he or she believes that he or she is entitled t o be placed in a higher Tier or why he or she is entitled to additional Special Circumstances point allocatoi n. The Court will not consider any untimely objections for an award adjustment, and its decisoi n as to all individual awards will be final and binding and constitute the final award. (Pls.’ Mot. at ¶¶ 22, 23.)
Under the terms of the proposed Settlement Agreement, no Plaintiff is entitled to the right to return to employment with Defendant either as a reinstated employee or as a new hire. (Pls.’ Mot., Ex. A, Settl. Agree. at ¶ 9.) But, it does provide that each Plaintiff will be paid a portion of the $1.4 million settlement amount from the settlement fund in an amount to be determined by Plaintiffs’ counsel in accordance with a Court-approved Plan of Allocation as long as each Plaintiff first signsand returns a valid Individual Agreement and Release. (Id. at ¶ 5.) A copy of the Individual Agreement and Release is attached as Exhibit B to the Settlement Agreement.
If a Plaintiff fails to sign,date and return an IndividualAgreement and Release within the time required to do so, no mo nies will be paid to that Plaintiff under the terms of the Settlement Agreement. The signed and dated nI dividual Agreement and Release must be postmarked, or electronically transmitted to Pal intiffs’ counsel within 120 days from the date this Court issues an order of dismissal. Any Individual Agreement and Release that is modified or altered will not be valid. Failure to timely submit a valid Individual Agreement and Release will forfeit their portion of the Settlement Amount, which shall instead be paid
9

by Plaintiffs’ counsel to the American Red Cross as a donaiton on behalf of Alcatel-Lucent. (Id. at ¶ 6.)
Each Plaintiff’s settlement award will al so be taxable, and eac h Plaintiff will be required to determine his or her own obligati ons to the federal, state, and local taxing authorities. No amounts will be deducted or withheld from De fendant’s $1.4 million settlement payment, but an IRS Form 1099 Msi cellaneous will be issued to the settlement fund in the settlement amount. Plaintiffs acknowledge that it is their responsibility to make the necessary tax payments, ifany may be required, on any amounts paid to each Plaintiff. Plaintiffs’ counsel acknowledges its responsibility to make the necessary tax payment on the amount paid to t hem. Plaintiffs’ couns el shall report the value of the settlement received by each Plaintiff from the settlem ent fund to the IRS on an appropriate taxing form. Plaintiffs also agree to promptly indemnify and hold Defendant (and its affiliat es, successors and assigns) harmless with respect to any amounts which were not properly reported or paid by Plaintiffs, the settlement fund, or Plaintiffs’ counsel. (Id. at ¶ 7.)
Finally, the proposed SettlementAgreement provides that itis to be governed by and construed in accordance with Michigan law, without giving effect to any choice or conflict of law provision, or rule that would caus e the application of the laws of any other jurisdiction. (Id. at ¶ 13.)
D. Proposed Plan of Allocation To fulfill their obligation to determine each Plaintiff’s individual award on a fair and equitable basis, Plaintiffs’ counsel has constructed a proposed Plan of Allocation (“Plan”). All Plaintiffs were asked to complete a comprehensive questionnaire and participate in an extensive interview with representatives from Plaintiffs’ counsel’s office. Defendant
10

also produced dem ographic data about Plaintiffs from which relevant information was obtained. Based on that information, Plaintiffs’ counsel determined that some Plaintiffs are entitled to a greater award t han others. Plaintiffs’ counsel analyzed factors that would affect the merits and/or damages of each Plaint iff, i.e., whether a Plaintiff accepted or rejected the permanent transfer, and then r anked and assigned award points to certain common characteristics. For example, more points were awarded to a Plaintiff that rejected a permanent transfer.
Plaintiffs’ counsel also evaluated the reasons given for rejecting a permanent transfer. Those Plaintiffs that made an affirmative effort to determine the availability of work at the destination base were awarded the most points. Less points were given to those whose contacts were just telephonic rather than personal visits. For those who made no inquiry before rejecting the permanenttransfer, fewer points wereawarded. But, additional points were allocated to a Plaintiff who rejectedthe permanent transfer due to a hardship caused by serving as a primary caregiver to a spouse or other family member.
Those Plaintiffs who accepted the permanent ransfer received less points than those who rejected. Some differentiation was made based on how long the Plaintiff remained employed after accepting the permanent transfer. Finally, those Plaintiffs who remained employed and then retired/resigned only whenoffered a severance package of $75,000.00 were not allocated any points.
In addition to awarding points based on an eavluation of the merits/damages incurred by Plaintiffs, points were assigned for those Plaintiffs who provided service to Plaintiffs in this collective action. These points were intended to recognize time and effort on behalf of the entire Plaintiff Class. First, Plaintiffs were asked to complete a questionnaire and
11

participate in a telephone interview with Plaintfifs’ counsel. Using information gleaned from those efforts, Plaintiffs’ counsel was abl e to develop important demographic data about Plaintiffs who were subjected to permanent transfers. Thus, two points were allocated to those Plaintiffs who completed this process. Second, thirty points were allocated to the original Plaintiffs for accepting the responsibility and risk in bringing this litigation. Third, and finally, twenty points were allocated to the original named Plaintiff, William Dallas, for spearheading this litigation from its earliest stages and for partic ipating closely with Plaintiffs’ counsel during the mediation process.
After all claims are assigned points, Plaintiffs’ counsel will divide the total number of points into the amount of the Settlement Fund remaining after its attorney fees and costs are deducted – $917,900.00 – to determine the v alue of each award point. Plaintiffs’ counsel’s preliminary analysis of each claimindicates that about 4,600 award points will be allocated to Plaintiffs, making each award point worth approximately $200.00.
E. Notice to Plaintiffs Notice of the terms of the proposed Setetlment Agreement wasapproved by the Court on April 20, 2013 [ECF No. 62], and mailed to Plaintiffs on or before April 11, 2013. That notice advised that (1) Plaintiffs who int ended to object to the proposed Settlement Agreement or Plan of Allocation must file their objections with the Court and counsel by May 8, 2013; and (2) a hearing would be held on May 15, 2013 on Plaintiffs’ motions for preliminary approval of the proposed Settlement Agreement, preliminary approval of the proposed Plan of Allocation, and preliminary approval of their requested attorney fees and costs. II. Analysis
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A. The Settlement Agreement is Fair, Reasonable, and Adequate
Although this is not a class action filed under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, this Court will, as Plaintiffs urge, use the Rule 23 standard for its preliminary
approval of the proposed Settlement Agreement.2 The Court’s role in reviewing class
action settlements “must be limited to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment
that the agreement is notthe product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the
negotiating parties and t hat the settlement, ta ken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and
adequate to all concerned.” Clark Equip. Co. v. Intl’ Union, Allied Indus. Workers, 803 F.2d
878, 880 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To
assess the fairness, adequacy and reasonableness ofa class action settlement, the Court
considers the following factors:
(a) the likelihood of success on the merits weighed against the amount and form of the relief offered in the settlement; (b) the risks, expense,and delay of further litigation; (c) the judgment of ex perienced counsel who have competently evaluated the strength of their proofs; (d) the amount of discovery completed and the character of the evidence uncovered; (e) whether the settlement is fair to the unnamed c lass members; (f) objec tions raised by class members; (g) whether the settlement is the product of arm’s length negotiations as opposed to collusive bargaining; and (h) whether t he settlement is consistent with the public interest.
In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig ., 218 F .R.D. 508, 522 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (citations
omitted). See also 4 Newberg § 11.41 (observing that "[t]he initial presumption of fairness
of a [plaintiff's] settlement may be established by showing 1) that the settlement has been
2Because this is a collective action, not a cal ss action filed under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, thenotice requirements of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1715, do not apply. See 28 U.S.C. § 1711 (defining “class action” as “any civil action filed in a district court of the United States under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure[.]”).
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arrived at by arm's length bargaining; 2) that sufficient discovery has been taken or investigation completed to enable counsel and the court to act intelligently; 3) that the proponents of the settlement are counsel experienced in similar litigation; and 4) that the number of objectors or interests they represent is not large when compared to the class as a whole.").
Review and approval of class settlements involves a two-step process: (1) preliminary approval of the settlement and the content and method of class notice; and (2) final approval after notice and a fairness hearing. See Gautreaux v. Pierce, 690 F.2d 616, 621 n.3 (7th Cir. 1982). At the first step inthe process, the Settlement Agreement should be preliminarily approved if it (1) “does not disclose grounds to doubt its fairness or other obvious deficiencies, such as unduly preferential treatment to class representatives or of segments of the class, or excessive compensation for attorneys,” and (2) “appears to fall within the range of possible approval.”In re Inter-Op Hip Prosthesis Liab. Litig,.204 F.R.D. 330, 350 (N.D. Ohio 2001).
Because the Settlement Agreement provides Plaintiffs a benefit within the range of possible approval, was negotiated at arm’ s length, and does not evidence unduly preferential treatment or other obvious deficiencies, it sa tisfies the requirements for preliminary approval.
Here, the parties negotiated the proposedsettlement agreement in good faith and at arm's length. They used the services of a federal judge as a neutral mediator, and the settlement amount is that recommended by that judge. Prior to settlement, the parties engaged in extensive investigation and discovery so that counsel -- who are experienced employment attorneys -- could assess the st rengths and weaknesses of the claims and
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defenses, and to weigh the benefits and costs ofsettlement as opposed to those inherent in continued litigation, a trial, and possible appeal. The proposed Settlement Agreement advances Plaintiffs' interests, is the produc t of substantial, informed, and non-collus ive negotiations between the parties' counsel thatwere facilitated by Judge Rosen who served as a neut ral mediator. For all these r easons, and those detailed below, the proposed Settlement Agreement is preliminarily approved.
1. Sufficient Investigation/Discovery to Inform Arm's-L ength Settlement Negotiations Between Competent, Experienced Counsel
Substantial discovery and arm's-length negotiations informed counsels' decision to enter into the proposed SettlementAgreement. Counsel servedmultiple sets of discovery and obtained thousands of documents regarding the permanent transfer process and the individual Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' counsel ot ok and defended scores of depositions of Plaintiffs and Defendant's management officials throughoutthe country. Counsel also responded to interrogatories and produced documents in res ponse to discovery requests proffered to each named Plaintiff. Demographic data regarding the base locations was obtained from Defendant. Plaintiffs also obtained computer ized personnel data. This data required extensive review by counsel and Plaintiffs' expert. Using all of this information, as well as the extensive files obtained fromthe EEOC, Plaintiffs' counsel was well-informed about the strengths and weaknesses involved in this collective ADEA action.
Here, settlement negotiations were conducted at arm's-length by adversarial parties and experienced counsel, which itself is i ndicative of fair ness, reasonableness, and adequacy. Plaintiffs' counsel's informed andreasoned judgment and their weighing of the relative risks and benefits of protracted litigation are entitled to deference. See UAW v.
15

Gen. Mtrs. Corp., No. 05-CV-73911-DT, 2006 WL 891151, *18 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2006) (observing that "[t]he endorsement of the parties' counsel is entitled to significant weight and supports the fairness of the class settlement."). Moreover, settlement occurred after mediation with a respected federal judge, Judge Gerald Rosen. After careful reflection by experienced counsel on both sides, the parties accepted the Judge's recommendation for settlement of this case. Finally, counsel for both parties are very experienced. Plaintiffs' counsel has handled many group, collective, and class actions for decades. Defendant's counsel is also very experienced and has r epresented Defendant in nationwide litigation for many years.
2. The Settlement Is Reasonable In Light of the Risks of Proceeding Through Trial and Possible Appeal
The determination of a reasonable settlement is not susceptible to mathematical precision. Rather, there is a range of reasonableness f or a settlement, and it should be preliminarily approved if it falls within the range of possible approval. See In re Inter-Op Hip Prosthesis Liab. Litig., 204 F.R.D. at 350.
Here, the settlement is reasonable in par t due to the numerous legal and f actual arguments available to Defendant. Defendant vehemently denies that it treated older workers unlawfully. Rather than being an adverse employment action, Defendant argues, the permanent transfer was an opportunity toremain employed. Defendant also contends that some individual Plaintiffs cannot p oint to a younger individual with a similar skill set who received preferential tr eatment and/or continued work ing at a base location. Defendant highlights evidence of a huge reducti on in the workforce from over 10,000 installers to 1,700, with lessthan 500 installers leaving due tothe rejection of a permanent
16

transfer. Using this evidence,Defendant argues that Plaintiffscannot show that they were injured by the permanent transfer process because, but for that permanent transfer offer, Plaintiffs would have been laid off. Defendant has also argued that it could not have unlawfully discriminated based on age when it was simply acting in accordance with the union contract that provided f or permanent transfers. Based on the relative strength of these arguments, Defendant's commitment to pay $1.4 million to settle this collective action is meaningful. In light of the risks involved in establishing liability and damages, as well as the costs and delays inherent in continued litigation, it is Plaintiffs' counsel's opinion that the settlement is well within the range of reasonableness. This Court agrees.
Here, the factual and legal issues are complex. Settlement now avoids the risks of increased costs and delay inherent in continued litigation, the uncertainty of successfully defending any substantive defense motions, winning at trial, or on appeal if needed. Prior to any trial, the parties would need to ta ke hundreds more depositions, including expert depositions. A trial would requrie substantial preparation andexpense. Thus, weighing the risks and benefits of continuing tolitigate and of settling now, settlement now is in the best interests of the Plaintiff Class.
B. The Proposed Plan of Allocation is Fair and Reasonable The proposed Plan of Allocation is described above. Plaintiffs’ counsel advises the Court that the Plan is t he result of its effort to determine how best to distribute the $1.4 million settlement amount on a fair and equitablebasis. Plaintiffs’ counsel devised the Plan based on information compiled from numerous s ources, including individual Plaintiff interviews and questionnaires and t he examination of demographic data supplied by Defendant.
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If approved by this Court, after Court-approved attorney fees and costs are deducted from the $1.4 million gross settlement amount, the remaining balance in the Settlement Fund will be $917,900. Plaintiffs’ claims will be paid from that $917,900 remaining in the Settlement Fund. Thus, each Plaintiff’s settlement award will be net of attorney fees and costs.
The proposed Plan of Allocation is prelim inarily approved. It fairly and reasonably evaluates Plaintiffs, treats those with like qualiites in the same fashion, and allocates more points to those Plaintiffs with the strongest cases and those who participated and facilitated in the prosecution of this collective action the most. The Plan recognizes three levels of participation or service on behalf of the Plaintiff Class: (1) two points will be allocated to those Plaintiffs who completed a questionnaire and participated in a telephonic interview with Plaintiffs’ counsel; (2) thirty points will be allocated to the original Plaintiffs for accepting the responsibility and risk in bringing this litigation; and (3) twenty points will be allocated to the original named Plaintiff, William Dallas, for spearheading this litigation from its earliest stage and participatingclosely with counsel in the mediation process. The Court finds that the allocation of additional points in tihs manner is similar to incentive awards that have been approved in numerous class actions, and approves the allocation of additional points as proposed.
“The Sixth Circuit has held that incentive awards to class representatives may be appropriate in some cas es, but has not def ined the circumstances justifying incentive awards.” Lonardo v. Travelers Indem . Co., 706 F. Supp.2d 766, 787 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (citing Hadix v. Johnson , 322 F.3d 895, 898 (6th Cir. 2003)). “Cour ts within the Sixth Circuit, however, recognize that, in co mmon fund cases and where the settlement
18

agreement provides for incentive awards, class representatives who have had extensive involvement in a class action litigationdeserve compensation above and beyond amounts to which they are entitled to byvirtue of class membership alone.” Id. (citing Liberte Capital Group v. Capwill, No. 5:99 cv 818, 2007 WL 2492461, *1-2 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 29, 2007)).
Here, the allocation of incentive points is reasonable and fair. The original Plaintiffs all responded to discovery requests, includni g document productions; participated in many conferences with Plaintiffs’ counsel; and took t he risk of joining this litigation at an early stage. As the initial lead Plaintiff, William Dallas took the greatest risk and had the most extensive involvement in this litigation.
As further support for preliminary approval, the proposed Plan of Allocation provides Plaintiffs with sufficient notice of his or her Individual Award and opportunity to object and have that I ndividual Award reconsidered and adjusted. As described in the proposed Settlement Agreement, after obtaining the C ourt’s preliminary approval of the proposed plan of allocation, Plaintiffs’ counsel will deet rmine each Plaintiff’s individual award and will provide each Plaintiff with notice of his or her proposed award by June 13, 2013. Any Plaintiff may request Plaintiffs’ counsel to reconsider his or her individual award by filing a written request by June 24, 2013. Plaintiffs ’ counsel will notify any Plaintiff who seeks reconsideration of his or her individual award of Plaintiffs’ counsel’s decision by July 1, 2013. (Pls.’s Br. at 5.)
Plaintiffs’ counsel will also file papers withthe Court by July 1, 2013 requesting a final fairness hearing. (Pls.’ Mot., Ex . A, Settl. Agree. at ¶ 3.) Plaintiff’s counsel will mail a notice of the final fairness hearni g to each Plaintiff at least 30days prior to that hearing that notifies Plaintiff of the date, time, and place ofthe hearing and of the Plaintiff’s opportunity
19

to object either in person or by mail at least 15 days prior to the hearing. Plaintiffs may object only to the amount of their proposed individual awards, i. e., that the Plan of Allocation’s terms were not applied correctly tothe Plaintiff’s individual circumstances thus arriving at an improper individual award. (Id. at ¶ 4.)
For all these reasons, Plaintiffs’ proposed Plan of Allocatoi n is preliminarily approved. C. Objections to the Settlement Agreement and/or Plan of Allocation On April 11, 2013, this Court authorized the notice that was sent to all original and opt-in Plaintiffs advising that a proposed settlement had been reached with Defendant. In the notice and attached documents, Plaintiffs explained the details of the settlement, described the proposed Plan of Allocation, set forth the amount and basis for the award of attorney fees and costs, and notified all paretis that a preliminary approval/fairness hearing was to be held on May 15, 2013. In addition, the notice explained the process and time requirements for objecting to the proposed settlement and Plan of Allocation. Notice was sent to 194 class members. By the deadline of May 8, 2013, only six class members filed objections. This C ourt now OVERRULES the objections raised by Gary Nash, Ron Battle, Rudolph Hopkins, Harvey Echols, Edward Haeussler, and Kenneth Forbes. As stated at the May 15, 2013 hearing on Plaintiffs’ motions, no allocation is perfect for everyone. After careful consideration of each of the six objections and Plaintiffs’ Response [73], this Court finds that the proposed Plan of Alloca tion is reasonable and makes a good faith effort to fairly alloca te the proposed settlement in a manner that considers that the individual Plaintiff inst allers had vastly different exper iences and responses to the permanent transfer offer and are thus entitled to different awards that
20

consider those varying circumstances. For the reasons stated on the record at the May 15th hearing and in Plaintiffs’ Response to the Objcetions [73], there is no reason to sustain the objections raised by Gary Nash, Ron Battel , Rudolph Hopkins, Harvey Echols, Edward Haeussler, and Kenneth Forbes.
C. Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s Request for Attorney Fees and Co sts is Preliminarily Approved as Reasonable
From the $1.4 million settlement amount, Pl aintiffs’ counsel seeks this Court’s preliminary approval of re imbursement of $30,000 in past and anticipated future litigation/administration costs and attorney fees in the amount of $452,100, which is onethird (or 33%) of the net recovery to the Plaintiffs. The requested one-third attorney fee is consistent with the contingent fee retainer agreements executed by original Plaintiffs, agreeing to pay Plaintiffs’ counsel one- third of the net recovery, and is less than the attorney fees that would be paid if there had not been any contingent fee agreements. As reflected in Plaintiffs’ counsel’s motion, attached billings, and a ffidavits, 2,125 attorney hours were expended on this litigation, including that of Michael Pitt, Megan Bonanni, Beth Rivers, Cary McGehee and Andrea Johnson from the law firm of Pitt M cGehee Palmer Rivers & Golden, P.C., as well asthat of two contract employeeshired by the firm: Christy Drucker and Carrie Harp. The attorney fees based on the attor ney hours expended is $668,342; considerably more than the $452,100 one-third contingent fee net of expenses that Plaintiffs’ counsel requests be paid from the Settlement Fund.
Here, the original 36 Plaintiffs entered into one-third contingent fee agreements with Plaintiffs’ counsel. And, each Opt-in Plaintiff signed a Consent Form which complied with the statutory prerequisites to participating in the case and informed that Opt-in Plaintiff that
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he or she could retain alternate counsel. Moreover, the notice that Plaintiffs’ counsel sent to all Plaintiffs concerning these motions describes their requested attorney fees and costs. Plaintiffs were informed that their objections to the attorney fees and costs should be submitted to the Court in writing on or before May 8, 2013, and this Court has received and considered those filed objections.
This Court preliminarily approves Plaintiffs’ counsel’s request that it be paid $452,100 in attorney fees and $30,000 in costs from ht e $1.4 million settlement fund. Various courts have expressed approval of attorney fees in common fund cases at sim ilar or higher percentages than that requested by Plaintiffs’ counsel. See 4 Conte & Newberg on Class Actions, § 14:6 at 551 (4th Ed. 2002) (citing cases in footnote and observing that “fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery.”).
The Sixth Circuit “require[s] only that awards of attorney’s fees by federal courts in common fund cases be reasonable under the circumstances.” Rawlings v. PrudentialBache Properties, Inc., 9 F.3d 513, 516 (6th Cir. 1993). “When awarding attorney’s fees in a class action, a court must make surehtat counsel is fairly compensated for the amount of work done as well as for the results achieved. The lodestar method better accounts for the amount of work done, whilethe percentage of the fund method more accurately reflects the results achieved.” Id. (internal citation omitted). Thus, for these reasons, the Sixth Circuit has determined that “it is necessary that district courts be permitted to select the more appropriate method for calculating attorney’sfees in light of ht e unique characteristics of class actions in general, and the unique circumstances of the actual cases before them.” Id.
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As it must, this Court explains its reasoning and the factors considered in arriving at
its decision to preliminarily approve Plaintiffs’ counsel’s request for an attorney fee based
on a one-third contingent fee net of expenses. Similar to the district court whose decision
was affirmed in Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 102 F.3d 777 (6th Cir. 1996), this Court considers
the following factors in determining whether Plaintiffs’ counsel’s requested attorney fees
are reasonable:
(1) the value of the benefit rendered to the plaintiff class . . .; (2) the value of the services on an hourly basis; (3) whether the services were undertaken on a contingent fee basis; (4) society’s stake in rewarding attorneys who produce such benefits
in order to maintain an incentive to others; (5) the complexity of the litigation; and (6) the professional skill and standing of counsel involved on both sides.
Id. at 780 (quoting Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 1261, 1280 (S.D. Ohio 1999)).
As to the first factor, theentire Plaintiff Class, consisting of 194 Plaintiffs, will receive
a financial recovery as a result of Plaintiffs’ c ounsel’s efforts. After attorney fees in the
requested amount of $452,100 are deducted from the net settlement f und, the financial
recovery rendered to the Plaintiff Class is $917,900.
When the second and third f actors are contrasted, i.e., the value of services on an
hourly basis compared with the value of services on a contingent fee net expenses basis,
it is evident that Plaintiffs obtain a greater benefit under the contingent fee net expenses
method that Plaintiffs’ counsel urges this Court to approve. Plaintiffs’ counsel supplied the
Court with their accumulated hours since 2009. (Pls.’ Mot., Ex. B, billing statements.) As
reflected in the affidavit of lead counsel Michael L. Pitt, the firm attorneys have expended
over 2,125 hours on this case since December 2009. Rates were assigned to attorneys
based on their skill and expertise. Plaintiffs ’ counsel were assigned the following rates: 23

Michael Pitt/Cary S. McGehee – $400; Beth Rivers – $375; Megan Bonanni – $350; and Andrea Johnson – $275. Two contract attorne ys, Carrie Harp and Christy Drucker, also provided legal services in this litigation and both were assigned the hourly rate of $250. The per hour rates are fair and reasonable fotrhe skill and experience of each attorney and for the quality of services er ndered by that attorney and these hourly rates conform with the prevailing rates. (Pls.’ Mot., Ex. C, Affidavits of Michael Pitt and Kathleen Bogas.) A review of Plaintiffs’ counsel’s billing statements reveals that theamount of hours expended for the legal services rendered is reasonable. Thus,using the lodestar method, the total value of the legal services provided by Plaintiffs’ counsel exceeds $668,342. This is considerably larger than the $452,100 attorney fee under the one-third contingent fee net recovery that Plaintiffs’ counsel seeks approval of here. Moreover, that each of the original 36 Plaintiffs entered into a one-third contingent fee agreem ent, also weighs in favor of approving Plaintiffs’ counsel’s requested attorney fee.
As to the fourth factor – society’s stak e in maintaining an incentive to others by rewarding attorneys who produce benefits like Plaintiffs’ counsel did here – also weighs in favor of approving the attorney fees Plaintiffs’ request. Approving attorney fee awards in the manner and amount Plaintiffs’ counsel requests is needed to encourage competent employment counsel to undertake the time-consuming, expensive, and often-risky business of representing groups of individuals who claim they have been illegally discriminated against in t heir employment. Cases of th is sort are often protracted and complex. Consider this case for example. It is nearly ten years since the EEOC filed the charge in November 2003 that gives rise to this litigation.
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As to the fifth factor, the complexity of this litigation is reflected in the 2,125 attorney hours expended to develop Plaintiffs’ claims through discovery and to ultimately reach a $1.4 million settlement after intense, arm’s-length negotiations before a neutral mediator, Judge Rosen. Before this matter was conditionallycertified as a collecitve action, Plaintiffs’ counsel developed this case by the ex change of written discovery; by their receipt and review of thousands of documents from Defendant, including demographic and layoff data related to over 7,000 installers; by pr eparing interrogatory responses for the original 36 Plaintiffs; and by taking of numerous depositions of Defendant’s managers and defending Plaintiffs’ depositions. After this matter was conditionally certified as a collective action, Plaintiffs’ counsel sent judicially-approved notices to approximately 400 potential Opt-in Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs’ counsel then evaluated the claims of potentia l Opt-in Plaintiffs, expending considerable time in interviewing and assessing facts submitted by these individuals. To facilitate settlement, Plaintiffs’ counsel prepared an extensive facilitation summary and a comprehensive statistical analysisas well as an individual case evaluation. Plaintiffs’ counsel also fielded hundreds of calls from the original Plaintiffs and putative members of the Plaintiff Clas s. Unlike cl ass actions that are settled early on before discovery is undertaken, this collective actoi n settled only after exet nsive discovery, motion practice, facilitation, and settlement discussions were completed.
Finally, as to the sixth factor, the professional skill and standing of counsel on both sides, also weighs heavily in favor of approving Plaintiffs’ counsel’s requested attorney fees. Considering the legal complexity of this case, as well as the vigor and intensity with which it was defended by experienced and able counsel for Defendant, Plaintiffs’ counsel exhibited a high degree of skill in achievinghte $1.4 million settlement. Plaintiffs’ counsel’s
25

conduct in this matter substantiates thei r outstanding reputation and high professional standing in the legal community.
All of these factors weigh in favor of this Court’s preliminary approval of Plaintiffs’ counsel’s request for attorney fees in the amount of $452,100.
This Court also preliminarily approves Plai ntiffs’ counsel’s request that $30,000 in costs be paid to it from the settlement fund. This amount reflects $27,602.53 in actual costs already incurred by Plaintiffs’ couns el and is supported by the billing records submitted to the Court. (Pls.’ Mot., Ex. B, Billing Stmts.) The additional amount requested to cover the cost of future notices to and co mmunications with Plaintiffs as well as other anticipated administrative costs in allocating each Plaintiff’s individual award from the settlement fund is reasonable. III. Conclusion
For the above-stated reasons, Plaintiffs’ motions for preliminary approval of (1) the proposed Settlement Agreement andPlan of Allocation, and (2)for attorney fees and costs are GRANTED. This Court (1) unconditionally certifies this lawsuit as a collective action with a Plaintiff Class comprised of 36 original Plaintiffs and the 158 Opt-in Plaintiffs; (2) approves Plaintiffs’ counsel’s request for establishment of a qualified Settlement Fund in the amount of $1.4 million; (3) preliminarily approves theproposed Settlement Agreement, including its ex hibits; (4) preliminarily appr oves the proposed Plan of Allocation for determining individual awards from the Settlement Fund; (5) preliminarily approves that Plaintiffs’ counsel’s fees and costs are to be paid for m the Settlement Fund; (6) preliminarily approves Plaintiffs’ counsel’s request for $452,100 in attorney fees and $30,000 in costs;
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and (7) overrules the objections of Ronald Battle, Harvey Echols, Kenneth Forbes, Edward Haeussler, Rudolph Hopkins, and Gary Nash.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that: 1. Plaintiffs’ counsel will determine each Plaintiff’s individual award in accordance with the Plan of Allocation, and provide Plaintiffs with notice of the proposed award on or before June 3, 2013; and Plaintiffs may request re consideration of that award by filing a written request on or before June 24, 2013; and 2. A final fairness hearing will be held on August 7, 2013 at 2:00 p.m., and that on or before June 17, 2013 , Plaintiffs’ c ounsel shall provi de notice of that hearing to all Plaintiffs that includes the date, time, and place of the hearing, and notice that any Plaintiff who wishes to do so shall have the opportunity tofile an objection by mail at least 15 days before the August 7, 2013 hearing date and/or to appear in person at that hearing. SO ORDERED.
s/Nancy G. Edmunds Nancy G. Edmunds United States District Judge Dated: May 20, 2013 I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record on May 20, 2013, by electronic and/or ordinary mail. s/Johnetta M. Curry-Williams Case Manager Acting in the Absence of Carol Hemeyer
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 2:09-cv-14596-NGE-RSW Doc # 92 Filed 08/13/13 Pg 1 of 4 Pg ID 1069

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

WILLIAM C. DALLAS, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v.
ALCATEL-LUCENT USA INC., a corporation,
Defendant.

Hon. Nancy G. Edmunds Case No. 09-14596

ORDER GRANTING FINAL APPROVAL TO SETTLEMENT OF CLASS ACTION AND
DISMISSING ACTION WITH PREJUDICE On May 20, 2013, this Court entered an Opinion and Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motions for Court’s Preliminary Approval of (1) Settlement Agreement and Plan of Allocation; and (2) Attorney Fees And Costs [ECF No. 79]. In that Order this Court preliminarily approved settlement of this collective action brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 620 et seq. for a total, aggregate sum of $1,400,000, inclusive of attorney fees and costs; preliminarily approved the terms of the Settlement Agreement into which the parties entered to achieve that settlement; preliminarily approved the plan of allocation among the 194 Plaintiffs (the complete list of whom has been determined through separate orders [ECF Nos. 80, 81], which add and drop Plaintiffs and Plaintiff representatives); preliminarily approved payment to be made to Plaintiffs’ counsel of fees and costs totaling $482,100 out of the Qualified Settlement Fund; and directed additional steps to be taken in providing each Plaintiff with his or her estimated award and an opportunity to seek reconsideration of that award. Those steps have been taken. This matter is now before

2:09-cv-14596-NGE-RSW Doc # 92 Filed 08/13/13 Pg 2 of 4 Pg ID 1070
the Court on the parties’ Joint Motion to Finalize Settlement And Dismiss Action With Prejudice.
The Court held a hearing on August 7, 2013. All requests for reconsideration of awards have been resolved or overruled. The amount of each Plaintiff’s award has been determined and appears on a Final Distribution List that has been submitted to the Court . No impediments to finalizing the settlement or dismissing this Action exist. Accordingly, the Court grants the Joint Motion.
IT IS ORDERED: 1. All approvals preliminarily conferred in the prior Order are hereby confirmed and made final. In particular, the Settlement Agreement, including its attachments, and Plaintiff’s proposed plan of allocation are unconditionally and finally approved. 2. The class is unconditionally certified and confirmed. 3. The Court determines and holds that the form and terms of the Release, and the procedure for its return, comply fully with the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626(f). 4. Each Plaintiff on the Final Distribution List shall be eligible to collect an award in the amount set forth on the List, provided that he or she first executes and timely returns, without alteration, the Release set forth as Exhibit B to the Settlement Agreement. Any person who is not identified on the List is not eligible to collect an award. 5. Plaintiffs’ counsel shall promptly distribute an individualized copy of the Release to each Plaintiff, together with a notice informing the Plaintiff of the deadline by which the executed Release must be returned, as set forth in paragraph 6 of the
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2:09-cv-14596-NGE-RSW Doc # 92 Filed 08/13/13 Pg 3 of 4 Pg ID 1071
Settlement Agreement. Each and every Plaintiff who returns an executed, unaltered Release on or before the deadline shall be paid his or her award from the Qualified Settlement Fund, in accordance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement.
6. Any Plaintiff who fails to return an executed, unaltered Release on or before the deadline set forth in the Settlement Agreement shall forever forfeit his or her award, but shall still have his or her claim in this Action extinguished, and he or she may not refile this action against Defendant. Forfeited awards shall be dealt with in accordance with the terms of paragraph 6 of the Settlement Agreement.
7. Defendant shall pay the settlement amount to the Qualified Settlement Fund on the terms and within the timetable set forth in paragraph 5 of the Settlement Agreement.
8. After receipt of the settlement amount, the administrator of the Qualified Settlement Fund shall promptly and properly pay the Plaintiffs who have timely returned their unaltered Release the amounts which they have been awarded, less such withholding for tax purposes as provided in the Settlement Agreement and Order of the Court Preliminarily approving the Settlement, shall promptly remit to Plaintiffs’ counsel the sum of $482,100, as attorney fees and expenses, and shall thereafter remit to the cy pres designee under the Settlement Agreement any forfeited or remaining monies. When the administrator has completed the distribution of all of the monies in the Qualified Settlement Fund, she shall file with the Court a brief report of that fact.
9. This Action is hereby dismissed with prejudice, without costs to either party, as to all plaintiffs, including all of the named plaintiffs and opt-in plaintiffs.
10. The Court shall retain jurisdiction through and until the administrator’s report for the limited purpose of entertaining requests for the entry of any orders that
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2:09-cv-14596-NGE-RSW Doc # 92 Filed 08/13/13 Pg 4 of 4 Pg ID 1072 may facilitate the orderly and timely completion of the settlement, consistent with its terms.
SO ORDERED. s/Nancy G. Edmunds Nancy G. Edmunds United States District Judge
Dated: August 13, 2013 I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record on August 13, 2013, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Johnetta M. Curry-Williams Case Manager Acting in the Absence of Carol Hemeyer
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 Case: 2:09-cv-14596-NGE-RSW As of: 09/27/2013 12:47 PM EDT 1 of 22
CLOSED,reassigned
U.S. District Court Eastern District of Michigan (Detroit) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:09−cv−14596−NGE−RSW

Dallas v. Alcatel−Lucent Inc Assigned to: District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds Referred to: Magistrate Judge R. Steven Whalen Cause: 28:451 Employment Discrimination
Plaintiff
William C Dallas

Date Filed: 11/23/2009 Date Terminated: 08/13/2013 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Andrea J. Johnson Pitt McGehee 117 W. Fourth Street Suite 200 Royal Oak, MI 48067 248−398−9800 Fax: 248−398−9804 Email: ajohnson@pittlawpc.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Beth M. Rivers Pitt, Dowty, 117 W. Fourth Street Suite 200 Royal Oak, MI 48067−3804 248−398−9800 Email: brivers@pittlawpc.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cary S. McGehee Pitt, McGehee, 117 W. Fourth Street Suite 200 Royal Oak, MI 48067−3804 248−398−9800 Email: cmcgehee@pittlawpc.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Megan Bonanni Pitt, McGehee, 117 W. Fourth Street Suite 200 Royal Oak, MI 48067−3804 248−398−9800 Email: mbonanni@pittlawpc.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt Pitt, McGehee, 117 W. Fourth Street Suite 200 Royal Oak, MI 48067−3804 248−398−9800 Email: mpitt@pittlawpc.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Ronald Battle

represented by Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Plaintiff Johnny Beasley
Plaintiff Frank Carigliano TERMINATED: 05/22/2013
Plaintiff

Andrea J. Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cary S. McGehee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Megan Bonanni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrea J. Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cary S. McGehee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Megan Bonanni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrea J. Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cary S. McGehee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Megan Bonanni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:09-cv-14596-NGE-RSW As of: 09/27/2013 12:47 PM EDT 3 of 22

Paul Carlson

represented by Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrea J. Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cary S. McGehee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Megan Bonanni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Kim Clark

represented by Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrea J. Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cary S. McGehee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Megan Bonanni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Nicholas Congimi

represented by Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrea J. Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cary S. McGehee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:09-cv-14596-NGE-RSW As of: 09/27/2013 12:47 PM EDT 4 of 22

Megan Bonanni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Raymond Connolly

represented by Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrea J. Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cary S. McGehee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Megan Bonanni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Geoffrey Corbin

represented by Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrea J. Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cary S. McGehee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Megan Bonanni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Lawrence Davis

represented by Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrea J. Johnson (See above for address)

Case: 2:09-cv-14596-NGE-RSW As of: 09/27/2013 12:47 PM EDT 5 of 22

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cary S. McGehee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Megan Bonanni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Duane Davison

represented by Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrea J. Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cary S. McGehee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Megan Bonanni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Calixto Fonseca

represented by Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrea J. Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cary S. McGehee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Megan Bonanni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Frank Fox

represented by Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt

Case: 2:09-cv-14596-NGE-RSW As of: 09/27/2013 12:47 PM EDT 6 of 22

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrea J. Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cary S. McGehee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Megan Bonanni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Edward Haeussler

represented by Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrea J. Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cary S. McGehee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Megan Bonanni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Rudolph Hopkins

represented by Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrea J. Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cary S. McGehee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Megan Bonanni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

Case: 2:09-cv-14596-NGE-RSW As of: 09/27/2013 12:47 PM EDT 7 of 22

Ronald Johnson

represented by Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrea J. Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cary S. McGehee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Megan Bonanni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Gerald Kephart

represented by Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrea J. Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cary S. McGehee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Megan Bonanni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff John Koenig

represented by Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrea J. Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cary S. McGehee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:09-cv-14596-NGE-RSW As of: 09/27/2013 12:47 PM EDT 8 of 22

Megan Bonanni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff John Korz

represented by Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrea J. Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cary S. McGehee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Megan Bonanni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Gordon Ludwig

represented by Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrea J. Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cary S. McGehee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Megan Bonanni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff James Mahaffey

represented by Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrea J. Johnson (See above for address)

Case: 2:09-cv-14596-NGE-RSW As of: 09/27/2013 12:47 PM EDT 9 of 22

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cary S. McGehee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Megan Bonanni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Robert Mladenka

represented by Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrea J. Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cary S. McGehee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Megan Bonanni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Gary Nash

represented by Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrea J. Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cary S. McGehee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Megan Bonanni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff James Nealis

represented by Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt

Case: 2:09-cv-14596-NGE-RSW As of: 09/27/2013 12:47 PM EDT 10 of 22

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrea J. Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cary S. McGehee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Megan Bonanni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Hugo Pemintel

represented by Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrea J. Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cary S. McGehee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Megan Bonanni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Dale Petersen

represented by Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrea J. Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cary S. McGehee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Megan Bonanni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

Case: 2:09-cv-14596-NGE-RSW As of: 09/27/2013 12:47 PM EDT 11 of 22

Robert Poltenovage

represented by Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrea J. Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cary S. McGehee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Megan Bonanni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Michael Presby

represented by Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrea J. Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cary S. McGehee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Megan Bonanni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff James Riley

represented by Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrea J. Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cary S. McGehee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:09-cv-14596-NGE-RSW As of: 09/27/2013 12:47 PM EDT 12 of 22

Megan Bonanni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Ronald Sadlik

represented by Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrea J. Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cary S. McGehee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Megan Bonanni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Richard Schwartz

represented by Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrea J. Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cary S. McGehee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Megan Bonanni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Lawrence Smith

represented by Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrea J. Johnson (See above for address)

Case: 2:09-cv-14596-NGE-RSW As of: 09/27/2013 12:47 PM EDT 13 of 22

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cary S. McGehee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Megan Bonanni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Leo Stoney, Jr.

represented by Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrea J. Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cary S. McGehee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Megan Bonanni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff W.T. Ruth

represented by Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrea J. Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cary S. McGehee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Megan Bonanni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Francis Tedeschi

represented by Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt

Case: 2:09-cv-14596-NGE-RSW As of: 09/27/2013 12:47 PM EDT 14 of 22

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrea J. Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cary S. McGehee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Megan Bonanni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Richard Turner

represented by Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrea J. Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cary S. McGehee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Megan Bonanni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff E. Don Woodford

represented by Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrea J. Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cary S. McGehee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Megan Bonanni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

Case: 2:09-cv-14596-NGE-RSW As of: 09/27/2013 12:47 PM EDT 15 of 22

Nancy Cox Personal Representative of the Estate of Timothy Cox

Plaintiff
Christine Janowski Personal Representative of the Estate of Charles Janowski

Plaintiff
Carolyn Nichols Personal Representative of the Estate of James Nichols

Plaintiff
Patricia Carigliano Personal Representative of the Estate of Frank Carigliano

represented by Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrea J. Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cary S. McGehee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Megan Bonanni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Debra Reuskins Personal Representative of the Estate of Donald Reuskins

represented by Debra Reuskins PRO SE

V. Defendant Alcatel−Lucent Inc TERMINATED: 03/16/2010
Defendant Alcatel−Lucent USA, Inc.

represented by Matthew T. Miklave Epstein Becker &Greene P.C. 250 Park Avenue New York, NY 10177−1211 212−351−4500 Fax: 212−661−0989 Email: mmiklave@ebglaw.com TERMINATED: 03/16/2010 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Matthew T. Miklave (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John H. Pope

Case: 2:09-cv-14596-NGE-RSW As of: 09/27/2013 12:47 PM EDT 16 of 22
Epstein Becker and Green, P C 250 Park Avenue New York, NY 10177−1211 212−351−4500 Fax: 212−878−8741 Email: JHpope@ebglaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 11/23/2009 11/24/2009 11/24/2009 11/25/2009 01/12/2010
03/03/2010
03/16/2010 03/16/2010
03/16/2010

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT filed by William C Dallas against Alcatel−Lucent Inc with Jury Demand. Plaintiff requests summons issued. Receipt No: 06450000000002245970 − Fee: $ 350. County of 1st Plaintiff: oakland − County Where Action Arose: wayne − County of 1st Defendant: wayne. [Previously dismissed case: No] [Possible companion case(s): None] (Rivers, Beth) (Entered: 11/23/2009)
A United States Magistrate Judge of this Court is available to conduct all proceedings in this civil action in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 636c and FRCP 73. The Notice, Consent, and Reference of a Civil Action to a Magistrate Judge form is available for download at http://www.mied.uscourts.gov (DEld) (Entered: 11/24/2009)
2 SUMMONS Issued for *Alcatel−Lucent Inc* (DEld) (Entered: 11/24/2009)
3 NOTICE of Appearance by Michael L. Pitt on behalf of William C Dallas. (Pitt, Michael) (Entered: 11/25/2009)
4 AMENDED COMPLAINT with Jury Demand filed by Ronald Battle, Johnny Beasley, Frank Carigliano, Paul Carlson, Kim Clark, Nicholas Congimi, Raymond Connolly, Geoffrey Corbin, Lawrence Davis, Duane Davison, Calixto Fonseca, Frank Fox, Edward Haeussler, Rudolph Hopkins, Ronald Johnson, Gerald Kephart, John Koenig, John Korz, Gordon Ludwig, James Mahaffey, Robert Mladenka, Gary Nash, James Nealis, Hugo Pemintel, Dale Petersen, Robert Poltenovage, Michael Presby, James Riley, Ronald Sadlik, Richard Schwartz, Lawrence Smith, Leo Stoney, W.T. Ruth, Francis Tedeschi, Richard Turner, E. Don Woodford against Alcatel−Lucent Inc. (Rivers, Beth) Modified on 1/13/2010 (CGre). [CLEANED UP TEXT] (Entered: 01/12/2010)
5 ERRATA Sheet re: 4 Amended Complaint,, filed by Johnny Beasley, Ronald Battle. by Ronald Battle, William C Dallas, Johnny Beasley, Frank Carigliano, Paul Carlson, Kim Clark, Nicholas Congimi, Raymond Connolly, Geoffrey Corbin, Lawrence Davis, Duane Davison, Calixto Fonseca, Frank Fox, Edward Haeussler, Rudolph Hopkins, Ronald Johnson, Gerald Kephart, John Koenig, John Korz, Gordon Ludwig, James Mahaffey, Robert Mladenka, Gary Nash, James Nealis, Hugo Pemintel, Dale Petersen, Robert Poltenovage, Michael Presby, James Riley, Ronald Sadlik, Richard Schwartz, Lawrence Smith, Leo Stoney, Jr, W.T. Ruth, Francis Tedeschi, Richard Turner, E. Don Woodford (Rivers, Beth) (Entered: 03/03/2010)
6 NOTICE of Appearance by Matthew T. Miklave on behalf of Alcatel−Lucent Inc. (Miklave, Matthew) (Entered: 03/16/2010)
7 AMENDED COMPLAINT with Jury Demand (Second) filed by Ronald Battle, William C Dallas, Johnny Beasley, Frank Carigliano, Paul Carlson, Kim Clark, Nicholas Congimi, Raymond Connolly, Geoffrey Corbin, Lawrence Davis, Duane Davison, Calixto Fonseca, Frank Fox, Edward Haeussler, Rudolph Hopkins, Ronald Johnson, Gerald Kephart, John Koenig, John Korz, Gordon Ludwig, James Mahaffey, Robert Mladenka, Gary Nash, James Nealis, Hugo Pemintel, Dale Petersen, Robert Poltenovage, Michael Presby, James Riley, Ronald Sadlik, Richard Schwartz, Lawrence Smith, Leo Stoney, Jr, W.T. Ruth, Francis Tedeschi, Richard Turner, E. Don Woodford against Alcatel−Lucent USA, Inc.. (Rivers, Beth) (Entered: 03/16/2010)
REQUEST for SUMMONS for Alcatel−Lucent USA, Inc.. (Rivers, Beth) (Entered: 03/16/2010)

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03/17/2010 03/17/2010 04/19/2010
05/17/2010 05/17/2010
05/17/2010 05/17/2010 06/10/2010
06/11/2010 06/15/2010 06/15/2010 06/30/2010
07/05/2010
07/07/2010

8 STIPULATION AND ORDER to amend complaint and extend answer deadline Signed by District Judge Bernard A Friedman. (CMul) (Entered: 03/17/2010)
9 SUMMONS Issued for *Alcatel−Lucent USA, Inc.* (DEld) (Entered: 03/17/2010)
10 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed. Alcatel−Lucent USA, Inc. waiver sent on 3/19/2010, answer due 5/18/2010. (Rivers, Beth) [WRONG EVENT USED − THIS IS A CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE/SUMMONS RETURNED EXECUTED, ANSWER DUE 4/8/10] Modified on 4/19/2010 (CGre). (Entered: 04/19/2010)
11 MOTION to Dismiss for Improper Venue or, in the alternative, to Transfer to the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey by Alcatel−Lucent USA, Inc.. (Miklave, Matthew) (Entered: 05/17/2010)
12 AFFIDAVIT of Thomas Bevilacqua re 11 MOTION to Dismiss for Improper Venue or, in the alternative, to Transfer to the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey filed by Alcatel−Lucent USA, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − chart of permanent transfers, 2002−2004) (Miklave, Matthew) (Entered: 05/17/2010)
13 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF re 11 MOTION to Dismiss for Improper Venue or, in the alternative, to Transfer to the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey −− Memorandum in Support of Motion filed by Alcatel−Lucent USA, Inc.. (Miklave, Matthew) (Entered: 05/17/2010)
14 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State A Calim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted, with Attached Brief in Support by Alcatel−Lucent USA, Inc.. (Miklave, Matthew) (Entered: 05/17/2010)
15 NOTICE of hearing on 11 MOTION to Dismiss for Improper Venue or, in the alternative, to Transfer to the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, 14 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State A Calim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted. Motion Hearing set for 6/30/2010 02:00 PM before District Judge Bernard A Friedman. (CMul) (Entered: 06/10/2010)
16 STIPULATION AND ORDER extending response time to 6/15/2010 re 11 MOTION to Dismiss for Improper Venue or, in the alternative, to Transfer to the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey Signed by District Judge Bernard A Friedman. (CMul) (Entered: 06/11/2010)
17 RESPONSE to 11 MOTION to Dismiss for Improper Venue or, in the alternative, to Transfer to the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits List of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit 1 − Affidavit of Michael Klein) (Rivers, Beth) (Entered: 06/15/2010)
18 RESPONSE to 14 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State A Calim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted, with Attached Brief in Support filed by All Plaintiffs. (Rivers, Beth) (Entered: 06/15/2010)
Set/Reset Deadlines as to 14 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State A Calim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted, with Attached Brief in Support, 11 MOTION to Dismiss for Improper Venue or, in the alternative, to Transfer to the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. Reply due by 7/7/2010. Motion Hearing reset for 7/14/2010 02:00 PM before District Judge Bernard A Friedman (DOpa) (Entered: 06/30/2010)
19 STIPULATION AND ORDER re 11 MOTION to Dismiss for Improper Venue or, in the alternative, to Transfer to the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, and 14 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State A Calim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted, with Attached Brief in Support :( Motion Hearing set for 7/14/2010 02:00 PM before District Judge Bernard A Friedman) Signed by District Judge Bernard A Friedman. (CMul) (Entered: 07/05/2010)
20 REPLY to Response re 11 MOTION to Dismiss for Improper Venue or, in the alternative, to Transfer to the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey filed by Alcatel−Lucent USA, Inc.. (Miklave, Matthew) (Entered: 07/07/2010)

Case: 2:09-cv-14596-NGE-RSW As of: 09/27/2013 12:47 PM EDT 18 of 22

07/07/2010 07/16/2010
07/16/2010 09/01/2010 09/02/2010 10/06/2010 10/07/2010
10/13/2010 10/05/2011
10/13/2011 10/13/2011 10/17/2011 10/20/2011 11/08/2011 11/10/2011 11/16/2011 11/21/2011

21 REPLY to Response re 14 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State A Calim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted, with Attached Brief in Support filed by Alcatel−Lucent USA, Inc.. (Miklave, Matthew) (Entered: 07/07/2010)
Minute Entry − Motion Hearing held on 7/16/2010 re 11 MOTION to Dismiss for Improper Venue or, in the alternative, to Transfer to the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey and 14 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State A Calim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted, with Attached Brief in Support filed by Alcatel−Lucent USA, Inc. before District Judge Bernard A Friedman. Disposition: denied(Court Reporter Joan Morgan) (CMul) (Entered: 07/16/2010)
22 ORDER denying 11 Motion to Dismiss; denying 14 Motion to Dismiss; and setting deadline for defendant's answer. Signed by District Judge Bernard A Friedman. (CMul) (Entered: 07/16/2010)
23 ANSWER to Amended Complaint with Affirmative Defenses by Alcatel−Lucent USA, Inc.. (Pope, John) (Entered: 09/01/2010)
24 NOTICE TO APPEAR: Scheduling Conference set for 10/13/2010 at 9:30 AM before District Judge Bernard A Friedman (FMos) (Entered: 09/02/2010)
25 DISCOVERY plan jointly filed pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(f) (Rivers, Beth) (Entered: 10/06/2010)
26 SCHEDULING ORDER: Discovery due by 10/13/2011 Final Pretrial Conference set for 5/7/2012 01:00 PM and Jury Trial set for 5/15/2012 09:00 AM before District Judge Bernard A Friedman Signed by District Judge Bernard A Friedman. (Refer to image for additional dates) (CMul) (Entered: 10/07/2010)
27 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE: Cary S. McGehee appearing on behalf of All Plaintiffs (McGehee, Cary) (Entered: 10/13/2010)
28 MOTION to Certify Class (Conditional Certification, Judicial Notice, and Motion to Compel by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit 1−excerpts from Muscat dep, # 3 Exhibit 2−Bevilaqua Declaration, # 4 Exhibit 3−Proposed Notice and Consent Form) (Rivers, Beth) (Entered: 10/05/2011)
29 NOTICE OF TELE−CONFERENCE: Status/Scheduling Conference set for 10/17/2011 01:00 PM before District Judge Bernard A. Friedman Plaintiff to initiate call. (CMul) (Entered: 10/13/2011)
30 NOTICE of Appearance by Megan Bonanni on behalf of All Plaintiffs. (Bonanni, Megan) (Entered: 10/13/2011)
Minute Entry − Telephone Conference held on 10/17/2011 before District Judge Bernard A. Friedman. (Court Reporter Joan Morgan) (CMul) (Entered: 10/18/2011)
Minute Entry − Telephone Conference held on 10/20/2011 before District Judge Bernard A. Friedman. Disposition: discovery issue resolved (CMul) (Entered: 10/20/2011)
31 ORDER of DISQUALIFICATION and REASSIGNING CASE from District Judge Bernard A. Friedman to District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (SSch) (Entered: 11/08/2011)
32 NOTICE TO APPEAR: Status Conference set for 11/28/2011 10:30 AM before District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds (CHem) (Entered: 11/10/2011)
33 STIPULATED ORDER Extending Response Time as to Motion for Conditional Class Certification ( Response due by 11/21/2011) Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (CHem) (Entered: 11/16/2011)
34 RESPONSE to Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional Class Certification, etc. filed by Alcatel−Lucent USA, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Document Continuation Index to Appendicies, # 2 Document Continuation Appendix A − List of Personnel Actions Involving Installers, 2001−04, # 3 Document Continuation Appendix B − EEOC Charges By Installers, # 4 Document Continuation Appendix C − Defendant's

Case: 2:09-cv-14596-NGE-RSW As of: 09/27/2013 12:47 PM EDT 19 of 22

11/28/2011 11/28/2011
12/15/2011 12/16/2011 02/01/2012
02/08/2012
02/09/2012
02/22/2012 02/22/2012
02/24/2012
02/27/2012 03/28/2012
04/20/2012 04/27/2012 04/27/2012 05/04/2012 05/04/2012 05/11/2012 05/11/2012

Proposed Notice &Conent Form, # 5 Index of Exhibits Appendix D, # 6 Exhibit A − Muscat dep excerpts, # 7 Exhibit B − Davis dep excerpts, # 8 Exhibit C − Bevliqua dep excerpts, # 9 Exhibit D − Email reflecting union support for EEOC charge campaign by installers) (Pope, John) (Entered: 11/21/2011)
Minute Entry − Status Conference held on 11/28/2011 before District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (CHem) (Entered: 11/28/2011)
35 NOTICE of hearing. Replies due by 12/13/2011 Motion Hearing set for 2/8/2012 02:00 PM before District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds (CHem) (Entered: 11/28/2011)
36 REPLY to Response filed by All Plaintiffs. (Rivers, Beth) (Entered: 12/15/2011)
37 REPLY to Response EXHIBIT 1 to Reply (Doc #36) filed by All Plaintiffs. (Rivers, Beth) (Entered: 12/16/2011)
38 NOTICE by Alcatel−Lucent USA, Inc. re 34 Response to Motion,, of Filing Supplement to Appendix D (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Index to Exhibits in Supplemental Appendix, # 2 Document Continuation Supplemental Appendix) (Pope, John) (Entered: 02/01/2012)
Minute Entry − Motion Hearing held on 2/8/2012 before District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. Disposition: granted(Court Reporter Suzanne Jacques) (CHem) (Entered: 02/08/2012)
39 ORDER granting 28 Motion For Conditional Certification and Discovery Request and Directing Counsel to File a Joint Proposed Notice and Opt−In Consent Form Within 10 Days. Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (CHem) (Entered: 02/09/2012)
40 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE: Andrea J. Johnson appearing on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Johnson, Andrea) (Entered: 02/22/2012)
41 STIPULATED ORDER Extending Time to File Joint Draft Notice and Consent to Join ( Due by 2/24/2012) Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (CHem) (Entered: 02/22/2012)
42 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 39 Order on Motion to Certify Class, 41 Stipulation and Order, Set Deadlines/Hearings (Notice of Filing Joint Draft Notice and Consent and Join) (Johnson, Andrea) (Entered: 02/24/2012)
43 ORDER Approving Parties' Joint Proposed Notice and Consent to Join Form {42]. Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (CHem) (Entered: 02/27/2012)
Minute Entry − Status Conference regarding Notice of Pendency of Age Discrimination Lawsuit and Consent to Join form held on 3/28/2012 before District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (CHem) (Entered: 03/29/2012)
44 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE re 43 Order by All Plaintiffs (Notice and Consent to Join) (Johnson, Andrea) (Entered: 04/20/2012)
45 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 43 Order (Notice of Filing of Consent Forms) (Johnson, Andrea) (Entered: 04/27/2012)
46 SEALED EXHIBIT #1 to Notice of Filing of Consent Forms re 45 Notice (Other) by All Plaintiffs. (Johnson, Andrea) (Entered: 04/27/2012)
47 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 43 Order (Notice of Filing of Additional Consent Forms) (Johnson, Andrea) (Entered: 05/04/2012)
48 SEALED EXHIBIT #1 to Notice of Filing of Additional Consent Forms re 47 Notice (Other) by All Plaintiffs. (Johnson, Andrea) (Entered: 05/04/2012)
49 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 43 Order (Notice of Filing of Additional Consent Forms) (Johnson, Andrea) (Entered: 05/11/2012)
50 SEALED EXHIBIT #1 to Notice of Filing of Consent Forms re 49 Notice (Other) by All Plaintiffs. (Johnson, Andrea) (Entered: 05/11/2012)

Case: 2:09-cv-14596-NGE-RSW As of: 09/27/2013 12:47 PM EDT 20 of 22

05/18/2012 05/18/2012 05/24/2012 05/24/2012 06/01/2012 06/01/2012 07/27/2012 07/27/2012 09/26/2012 09/26/2012 11/15/2012 12/07/2012 01/09/2013 03/04/2013 04/10/2013 04/11/2013
04/11/2013
04/16/2013
04/18/2013 04/29/2013
05/03/2013 05/06/2013 05/07/2013

51 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 43 Order (Notice of Filing of Additional Consent Forms) (Johnson, Andrea) (Entered: 05/18/2012)
52 SEALED EXHIBIT #1 to Notice of Filing of Additional Consent Forms re 51 Notice (Other) by All Plaintiffs. (Johnson, Andrea) (Entered: 05/18/2012)
53 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 43 Order (Notice of Filing of Additional Consent Forms) (Johnson, Andrea) (Entered: 05/24/2012)
54 SEALED EXHIBIT #1 to Notice of Filing of Additional Consent Forms re 53 Notice (Other) by All Plaintiffs. (Johnson, Andrea) (Entered: 05/24/2012)
55 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 43 Order (Notice of Filing of Additional Consent Forms) (Johnson, Andrea) (Entered: 06/01/2012)
56 SEALED EXHIBIT #1 to Notice of Filing of Additional Consent Forms re 55 Notice (Other) by All Plaintiffs. (Johnson, Andrea) (Entered: 06/01/2012)
57 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 43 Order (Notice of Filing of Additional Consent Forms) (Johnson, Andrea) (Entered: 07/27/2012)
58 SEALED EXHIBIT #1 to Notice of Filing of Additional Consent Forms re 57 Notice (Other) by All Plaintiffs. (Johnson, Andrea) (Entered: 07/27/2012)
59 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 43 Order (Notice of Filing of Additional Consent Forms) (Johnson, Andrea) (Entered: 09/26/2012)
60 SEALED EXHIBIT #1 to Notice of Filing of Additional Consent Forms re 59 Notice (Other) by All Plaintiffs. (Johnson, Andrea) (Entered: 09/26/2012)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Settlement Conference set for 12/7/2012 09:00 AM before District Judge Gerald E. Rosen (JOwe) (Entered: 11/15/2012)
Minute Entry − Settlement Conference held on 12/7/2012 before District Judge Gerald E. Rosen. Disposition: Case Did Not Settle (JOwe) (Entered: 12/10/2012)
61 NOTICE TO APPEAR: Fairness Hearing set for 3/26/2013 02:00 PM before District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds (CHem) (Entered: 01/09/2013)
Re−Set Deadlines/Hearings: Fairness Hearing re−set for 5/15/2013 02:00 PM before District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds (CHem) (Entered: 03/04/2013)
62 ORDER Approving Notice of Proposed Settlement of Class Action. Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (CHem) (Entered: 04/10/2013)
63 MOTION for Court Approval of Settlement Agreement and Plan of Allocation by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit −A− proposed Settlement Agreement) (Bonanni, Megan) (Entered: 04/11/2013)
64 MOTION for Approval of Attorney Fees and Costs by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit −A− retainer agreement, # 2 Exhibit −B− attorney hours, # 3 Exhibit −C− Affidavits of Bogas and Pitt) (Bonanni, Megan) (Entered: 04/11/2013)
65 NOTICE OF HEARING on 63 MOTION for Court Approval of Settlement Agreement and Plan of Allocation , 64 MOTION for Approval of Attorney Fees and Costs . Motion Hearing set for 5/15/2013 02:00 PM before District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds (CHem) (Entered: 04/16/2013)
66 NOTICE TO APPEAR : Final Fairness Hearing set for 7/17/2013 02:00 PM before District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds (CHem) (Entered: 04/18/2013)
67 RESPONSE to 64 MOTION for Approval of Attorney Fees and Costs , 63 MOTION for Court Approval of Settlement Agreement and Plan of Allocation filed by Alcatel−Lucent USA, Inc.. (Pope, John) (Entered: 04/29/2013)
68 OBJECTION to Settlement by Edward Haeussler. (KKra) (Entered: 05/06/2013)
69 OBJECTION by Rudolph Hopkins. (KKra) (Entered: 05/07/2013)
70 OBJECTION to Settlement by Ronald Battle. (KKra) (Entered: 05/07/2013)

Case: 2:09-cv-14596-NGE-RSW As of: 09/27/2013 12:47 PM EDT 21 of 22

05/08/2013 05/08/2013 05/14/2013 05/14/2013 05/14/2013
05/15/2013 05/15/2013 05/15/2013
05/15/2013 05/17/2013 05/20/2013
05/21/2013 05/21/2013 05/22/2013 06/24/2013 07/10/2013 07/23/2013 07/23/2013 07/23/2013 08/02/2013

71 OBJECTION to Dallas Plan of Allocation by Kenneth Forbes. (KKra) (Entered: 05/09/2013)
72 OBJECTION to Dallas Plan Allocation by Harvey Echols. (KKra) (Entered: 05/09/2013)
73 RESPONSE to Objections to the Settlement Filed by Class Members filed by All Plaintiffs. (Rivers, Beth) (Entered: 05/14/2013)
74 EXHIBIT #1 re 73 Response to Petition/Request/Application by All Plaintiffs (Rivers, Beth) (Entered: 05/14/2013)
75 MOTION Uncontest Motion for Approval of Adding in Opt−In Plaintiffs and Substituting PR of the Estates of Deceased Class Members by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Cox Consent Form, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Janowski Consent Form, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Nichols Consent Documents) (Bonanni, Megan) (Entered: 05/14/2013)
76 PETITION for Appointment of Kathleen L. Bogas as Adminstrator of Dallas Qualified Settlement Fund by All Plaintiffs. (Rivers, Beth) (Entered: 05/15/2013)
77 OBJECTION to Dallas Plan of Allocation by Gary Nash. (JCur) (Entered: 05/15/2013)
Minute Entry − Motion Hearing held on 5/15/2013 re 64 MOTION for Approval of Attorney Fees and Costs filed All Plaintiffs; 63 MOTION for Court Approval of Settlement Agreement and Plan of Allocation filed by All Plaintiffs before District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. Disposition: TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT. (Court Reporter Suzanne Jacques) (JCur) (Entered: 05/15/2013)
RESET Hearing: FINAL Fairness Hearing reset for 8/7/2013 02:00 PM before District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (JCur) (Entered: 05/15/2013)
78 EXHIBIT − Acceptance of Nomination as Administrator of Dallas Qualified Settlement Fund re 76 Petition by All Plaintiffs (Rivers, Beth) (Entered: 05/17/2013)
79 OPINION AND ORDER Granting Plaintiffs' Motions for Court's Preliminary Approval of (1) Settlement Agreement and Plan of Allocation 63 ; and (2) Attorney Fees and Costs 64 . Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (See Order for Specifics) (JCur) (Entered: 05/20/2013)
80 ORDER granting 75 Motion and Approving the Addition of Opt−In Plaintiffs and Substituting Personal Representatives of the Estates of Deceased Class Members.. Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (KKra) (Entered: 05/22/2013)
82 ORDER Granting 76 Petition and Approving Qualified Settlement Fund. Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (KKra) (Entered: 05/22/2013)
81 STIPULATED ORDER Substituting and Removing Parties. Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (KKra) (Entered: 05/22/2013)
83 REQUEST from Harvey Echols Asking to be Part of the Original Plaintiffs' List. (JCur) (Entered: 06/24/2013)
84 OBJECTION to Dallas Plan of Allocation by Rudolph Hopkins. (JCur) (Entered: 07/10/2013)
85 OBJECTION to Dallas Plan of Allocation as to Donald J. Murnane. (JCur) (Entered: 07/23/2013)
86 OBJECTION to Dallas Plan of Allocation as to Ronald F. Johnson. (JCur) (Entered: 07/23/2013)
87 REQUEST from Harvey Echols Asking to be Part of the Original Plaintiffs' List. (JCur) (Entered: 07/23/2013)
88 MEMORANDUM Regarding Requests for Reconsideration By Plaintiffs and Certificate of Service by All Plaintiffs (Rivers, Beth) (Entered: 08/02/2013)

Case: 2:09-cv-14596-NGE-RSW As of: 09/27/2013 12:47 PM EDT 22 of 22

08/06/2013 08/06/2013 08/07/2013
08/13/2013

89 Ltr from Atty. Michael Pitt re. Recommendation Reconsideration REPORT by All Plaintiffs (Pitt, Michael) (Entered: 08/06/2013)
90 Corrected Report re. Harvey Echols REPORT by All Plaintiffs (Pitt, Michael) (Entered: 08/06/2013)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds: Final Fairness Hearing held on 8/7/2013. Disposition: GRANTED FINAL APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT. (Court Reporter Suzanne Jacques) (JCur) (Entered: 08/07/2013)
92 ORDER GRANTING Final Approval to Settlement of Class Action and Dismissing Action With Prejudice. Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (JCur) (Entered: 08/13/2013)