UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW a R S E Y

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ASSEMBI.,YOF GOD CHURCH RIVEKSLLIE,

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NEW JEKSEY, NATIONAL COALITION OF

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~&&L%YZ~:~ : LATINO CLERGY AND CHRISTIAN LEAl3RKS
~CONLAMIC")F,RANCO OR[)OMEL, INDIVIDUALLY )

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AND ON BEHALF OF ALL SIMILARLY SITUATED. )

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PLAINTIFFS

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'I'L)WNSf.IIPOF RIVERSIDE AND MAYOR CHARLES F. )

HILTON JR.,

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INJUNCTIVE AND FURTHER RELIEF

DEFENDANTS

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1. PKELlMINARY STATEMENT
1. This action is bmught on behalf of U.S. citizens, a U.S. non-profit corporation, legal U.S. residents and aliens seekingjudicial clarification ofthcjurisdiction, authority, and constitutional rightsof tho township oTRiverside, New Jersey ("Riverside") in adopting and enforcingan ordinance known as the "lllegal Immigration Rclicf'Act." If the ordinance is found to be unconstitutional or in any other way illegal, we respectfully request injunctive and mandamus relief ordering the Townshipof Riversideto cease and desist enforcement of the ordinance. The specific q u e s t is as filllows:
(A). The plaintiffs havc rcason to klicve thal the underlying ordinance, adopted and passed by the council on July 26,2006, raiscs significant preemption concerns.Initially, the ordinance clearly intendsto govern many types of conductalready covered by federal immigration law.

C a n p s s and the Executive branch have historically occupied the field of immigration law. Thc new Rivcrsidc ordinancc is crcating local immigrationregulationsindependent Smm lhe cxisting fcdcral systcm and clearly conllicts with federal immigration law. Thus,.iudicial clarification is required on thejurisdiction and constitutionalauthority ol'lhe township ol' Kiverside to adopt and enforce such an ordinance.
(B). Riverside's ordinance also raises significantconcerns regardingthe renting or leasing of property to "illegal" aliens. Such restrictions directly conflict with federal housing assistance reguluti~ns.
(C). Riverside's ordinance, as written, will lead to "national origin" discrimination, in violation of Titlc VI1 of thc Civil Rights Act and the Fair Housing Act (FHA).
(D). Riverside's ordinancc on it's face is vaguc and ambiguous as thcre is no definition for "illegal alien" in ihe Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") or in other fcderal law.
(E). The ordinancc as writtcn also givos rise lo 42 USC 5 1981violations as soction 1981
prohibits alicnage discrimination.
(F). The ordinancc makcs rcfcrcncc to applicationorthe law oulside ol' Riverside's township. Specifically, section 4(B) of the ordinance indicates "Any act that aids and abcts illcgal alicns within the Ilnited States, notjust within the 'Ibwnship limits, will constitutea violation."

(G). Due Lo the constitutional and statutory viola~ionset forth above, we require injunctive and mandamusreliefordering the township of Riverside to cease and desist enforcement of the "Illegal lmmigration Relief Act" until clarifioation is madc by this court.
(H). Furthermore, sincc plainLifi have suffered irreparable harm as a result r~f'Riverside's
unconstitutional actions, plaintiff* request damages in the amount of $10,000,000.00 in addition to attorney's fccs and rf!a~oIxdhlecosts.
2. The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that federal laws and trcaties are
"thc supreme Law of the Land." Whilc fcdcral and state power to regulate certain mattcrs is concomitant, the Supreme Court has long recognized that the regulation oTimnigration
?s mqwstionlblly exclusive$ a fcderal power," DeIums v. Bica, 424 US.351, 354 (1976). InHints v. Uavidmvirz,3I2 US.52 (1941),the SupremeCourt rulcd that cnforcemenlof'a Peunsylvaniastatutcrequiring the registration of' aliens was precluded by the Fcdcral Alien Regismlion Act of 1940,which cstablishcd a comprehensive federal scheme for the registration of alicns.
3. INA4274A gcncrally prohibits the h i g , referring, recruiting for a fee, or continued employmentol'illegal aliens. Violators may be subject LOcease and desist orders, civil monetary penalties, and {in thc casc of serial ofl'enders) crin~inaflines and/or
in~pristmenftor up to 6 months. Notably, INA 4 274A expressly preempts any state or
locd law imposing civil or miminal sanctionsupon those who employ, or recruit or rcfcr for a Tee for employment, unauthorizd aliens.

4. Under INA 5 274B,employers are prohibited fmm discriminatingagainst my individual
(olher than an unauthorized alien) on account of that alien's national origin or citizenship slatus. Riverside's ordinance is placing business owners and landlords in a pxedicarncnt
whcreby they will be afraid to hire or rcnt to a legal immigrant who is perceived to be a11
"illegd alien," thus giving rise to national origin discrimination.
5. Section 4(U) ol'the pposcd ordinancewould impose civil penaltics onan entity that "aids and abcts" (or has a p a n t or subsidiary that "aids and abets") illegal aliens anywhere in the UnifcdStutes,rsthcr than simply in the Township of Riverside. The scope 01'Section 4(8) of the proposed ordinancedoes not appear m w l y tailored to address particular, essentially local problems facing Ule ~e$identosf Riverside, and instead appears aimed ai deterring U.S. immigration violations nationwide.
6. Whiie a state or locality may regulatc the activities of a foreign corporation within the
state or locality, thc Uuc Process Clause of the Fourtemth Amendment prohibits it from regulating or interfering with what the corporation does wholly outside ol' iis territory. (e.g. St. Louis C:utton C,'ornt,ress CooK. State ofArhmcw',21% U.S. 346 (1922)) Riverside cannot rcgulatc the conduct of for-profit entities occurring outside its jurisdiction that mdy "aid and abct" illegal aliens.
7. Riverside's ordinance does not provide amechanism to determine whether an irmni@on violationhas:occumd indeed, the proposed ordinance does not dcfinc the meaning ofthe ienn "illegal alicn," and this term is not used or defined undcr the INA.

8. The TNA generally vests auihoriiy to the Attorney General and Sccrctary of Homcland Sccurity to administer and enforceall laws relating to immigration mdmturalizaliun, including deteminalions regarding ihe immigration status of alicns. As such, states and locnlitiesare preempted by federal itw tiom making their own independent assessment as
to whether an alien haq committed an immigration violation and imposing penalties against such aliens (along with persons who have provided t h w with assislance) on the hasis of that aqsessment. Such authority is confcrrcd cxclusively to designated federal autllorities by the INA.
U.JURISDICTION AN11 VNNUE
9. This Court hasjurisdiction under its general federal questionjurisdiction 28 U.S.C.
Section 1331, and spucificjurisdiction over claims arising under the Immigration and
Natiodity Act 8 U.S.C 1329. This wut is Ult! proper venue for the writ of Mandanlus pursuant to 28 1J.S.C. Seclion 1361. Jurisdiction is also conferred pursuant to Rules 57
and 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which permil:declaratory and injunctive actions.
10. The District of New Jersey is the pmpw venue ror this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1391 (e), as it is here whcrc the Dcfcndants' policies havc bccn implemented.

II1. STANDING
11. Plaintiffs have standing to commence this action as they are individuals and organizations which havc suffered irreparable hann as a result oChc Township's unconstitutional actions.
12. 'I'he Defendants' policy also prolongs the separation of family members. Plaintiffs have a particular interest in preservingtheir family units. (See Abowzekv. R e a m 785
F. 2d 1043.251 U.SApp. D.C. 355 (1985); Cllarkv.,Sccurities (1ndtr.q)Asss'n479 US.388,
393-915,107 S Cf. 750, 754,93 L.K.d. 2"75 757 (1987)). HR. Ren No. 1365.
R2d Cong.. 2dSess. (1952) reprinted in 1952 U5C. CAN 1653, 1680. Additionally, although thcrc is indirect precedent, there is no cnnwllingdccision regarding such an
ordinance.
13. Plaintiff Franco Ordofiez,a c i l b n of thc U.S., resides in Riverside, New .le:rsey, and is being advcrsdy affected by this ordinance.
14. Plaintiff A~scmhlyof God Charch, Rivcrsidc, is a non-profit church doing business in Riverside, New Jersey and countless ~nembersof said church are being adversely affected by this ordinance.

15. PlaintiffCON1,AMIC is a non-profit orgnnizntion doing business in New Jersey a d they have over 9,000 affiliate churches throughout the United States,
16. Dcfendant Riverside is atownship in Southern New Jersey.
17. Dcfcndant Charlcs F. Hilton Jr. is thc mayor of Rivcrsidc and is being sucd in his official capaciiy.
18. On or about July, 26,2006, the Lownshipof Riverside passed ordinance Number 16, known as ihc "Illcgal Immigration Rclicf Act." Atlachcd hercto and madc a part hcrcof as Exhibit
"A"is a copy ufrhe ordinnnce.
19. As a result of the passing of the ordinance, plaintif%have suffered. Specificnlly, many members ol'the class are alkaid to go LOwork. In July of 2006, fourteen individuals in ihe Townshipof Riversidewcrc incarcerated by Thc Department offomeland Sccurity. Plaintiffs have reason to believe thvt the incarceration and arrest of such persons was triggered by the proposed unconstitutional ordinance. The individualsare JuanPando, Mmta
Tenesela Yunga, Sandro Llivisupa, Maria lncs Arias, Josc 'l'cnesela, Maria lncs Yunga, Jose Y i l n e ~Wilmer Yungk Jose Tenesela, Patricio Tenesela, Osvaldo Chaves, Marselo

Chaves, Guillcrmo Nicves and Ecma Tenesela. They are all still being detained by (he Deparlment of Homeland Security.
COUNT I CLASS ACTION
Plaintiffs rnallege and indorpomte Paragraphs 1 through 19 inclusive and file this COllNT 1as a Class Action for 1)eclaratoryand Injunctive Kelief and allege:
20. Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant lo Rule 23 (a) and (b)(1)[2) on Waifofthemselves w d all othcrs similarly siluaid. The class consists of the following acerl;linable members: all pcrsons who cumntly reside in Riverside and find themselves to br.negntively affected by rho proposed unconstitutinnal ordinancs.
21. Defendants have acted, and will continue to act on grounds generally applicable to each member of the class, making appropriate tkal declaratoty, injunctive and mandamus relieI'to the class as a whole.
22. Plaintiffs in the class are entitled to rcprcscntation.
23. 'I'here exists a community of intcrcsi betwwn Plaintilrs and members uf their class in that there are questions of law and hct which are common lo all. The Plaintiffs seek a determination of whether or not the ordinance is unconstitutional and as such should not be enfircad,

24, Individual suirs by each member of the class would be imptacticdl because:
(A) 'l'here exist common and identical issucs of law and fact for all mcmbcrs of ihc class. (H) the nuniber of individual suits would impose an undue burden of thc Caurts as thsre appear to be a voluminousamount of members; (C) many mcmkrs ol'the clasa are unaware of their right and/or are intimidated due thcir slatus.
25. A class action is superior to othcr available methods tot the lair and ellicient adjutlication of this controversy.
26. Upon informationand belief no independentlitigation has been brought by any members of the respective class against Defendants as to the issucs raised in this complaint.
27. PlaintiKhTsc'ounsels are experienced in class aotions litigation and can adequately represent the interest of class mcmbem as well as ihe named Plaintiffs.
28. As a rcsult ofthe dcl'endanl's ordinance, plaintiffs and the rnembem of the class will conti~~ue to suffer.
29. Tliere exists no adequate remedy at law if thc ordinance is not ovcrlurnd.
COUNT I1 DECLARATORY ACTION

Plainlillk a l l e g e and incorporateparagraphs 1 through 29 inclusiveand file this COUNT 11 for declaratory Relief and allege:
30. Thcrc cxists confusion as lo Riverside's authority to pass and enforce such an ordinance.
31. WHEREFORE PlaintiKs seek judicial clarification of the ordinance's legality.
Plaintiffs reallcge and incotporatc paragraphs I through 31 inclusive and file [his COUNT 111 for declaratory Relief and allcgc:
32. The actions of the Township of Riverside deprive plaintiffs of their family and cause injury by prolonging fwlily separation. Countless plaintiffs have moved from Kiverside due to fear that local authoritieswill begin implementingthis unconstitutional ordinance. The plaintiff's are being denied their constitutional rights as the ordinance violates the preemption clause, conflicts with liederal I lousing Assistance regulations, will lead to national origin discrimination, and on its face is vague and ambiguous. As such, we rcspccifully rcqucn injunclive and mwdmus relief orderingthe Townshipof Kiverside to cease and desist enforcement of thc ordinance.
33. PlaintifIl request $10,000,000.00 in compensatoryand punitive damages as well as any olhcr damagcs this couri may deem just and reasonable. Plaintiffs also respectfully request attorney's fees and cosi in this action.

Respectfully submitted.
Miami,Florida 33i86 TEL: (305)232-8889 FAX: (3051232-8819
EMAII.: IMICLAW@IOL.COM

EXHIBIT "A"

ILLEGAL IMMIGRAITON RELIBE ACT

& h c e 2006 1

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BEIT OI(DAlhEDBY THEGOvF&NING BODY OF
~ R S I D AES FOLLOWS:
.- SECTION 1 TITLE

TOW&'sHIp OF

Thisc h a w shall beknownandmaybe citedas4+T(iversi&TownshipJilcgall m & @ d o ~ ReliefM". .

A. 'Ihatillegal immigrationcontributesto negativeimpactsonour ShWtS

anb ~ou.&J, negatively imp- our neighborhoods, subjects our

classrooms toov;ercrowdiuga d puts ilistead d m ~ ~ o&nourschools

ed&&our schoolsto fisc&h&hips, leadsto highex aime mtcs, adds

OVA 'd&ands on all aswFts of~ b l i &cy j ~ & g thepublic safety of

legal rehdentsand dimini&cs o m

iualiiy oflife

Y

.

13. That the Towmhip of Rivnside is empowered and mandated by the

people of TheTownship of Rivemi& to ab& thenuis- ofillegal
immigrationby a ~ ~ v praohibyitingandpunishing thethR, policies. lxoplt widb w tbat ai~d and ab~etiliegdi m m i w .

When cverUSAin this chapter,the followingtermsshallhavethe f~llowingmcaning:

'Townshipm means the Township of Riverside. "Conbact employer"meansany personwho o b W theservices ofomOr individualsb u g haday labor agency. "Vehicle"mcans avehicle as definedin thx!New Ymsey Vehicle Code as the samenow
reads or mayh d e rbe amendeb

SECTION 4,- BUSINESS PERMTI'S, CONTRACTS OR GRANT'S

Any for-profitentity, includingacts committedby its p t companyorsubsidiaries, that

aids and aboutsegaIimmigrationshallbe deniedapproval ofabusinesspermit,tbe

d

renewal ofabusinesspermit,towr&ip conkactsotgrants for aperiodnot less thanfive

years from its last offense.

A. Aiding andabetting shall include, butnot be Limitedto, the Mng or atcemptedhiring ofillegal aliens,renting or leasing to illegal al'nas, or funding or aiding in the establishment of a day labom mtu tbat does not verify hgd work status.

B. Any actthat aidsand abetsillegalaliense t f i e UnitedStates, notjust within the Tomhip Limits, will constitute a violation.
SECTION 5. RBNTING TO KLEGAI. ALIENS
- A. Illegalaliens artprohibitedh m leasing orrenting property. Any ppW&owner
orrenterhtfl- incontto1of proeay-.- who kno-y allows an
illegal aliento use, rent orleasethe&propertyshallhein%&ion ofthissection.
B. Any personor entity that vi'olatesthis mtionshall be subjecttoafineofnot less than $1000.00.

If mypart ofpmvjsian ofasChapterisinuhtlictot incoasimwith applicable

p%\.isi& of fcded o: state statutes,or is itTany court orcompetentjurisdiction, su&

ot&bemo5fseprhoevldistioonbsehianUvableidsourspuennedoedfoa~nd~&le

surmiehdby suchapplicablelawsor@ations, andthe zimaimb ofthis.Chqter

MI not be affectedthemby.

 
 Case 1:06-cv-03842-RMB-AMD Document 6 Filed 10/03/2006 Page 1 of 7

File No. 13606-0005 Law Offices PARKER McCAY, P.A. Douglas L. Heinold Three Greentree Centre, Suite 401 7001 Lincoln Drive West P.O. Box 974 Marlton, NJ 08053 (856) 596-8900 Attorneys for Defendants, Township of Riverside and Mayor Charles F. Hilton, Jr.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY (Camden Vicinage)

ASSEMBLY OF GOD CHURCH RIVERSIDE, NEW JERSEY; NATIONAL COALITION OF LATINO CLERGY AND CHRISTIAN LEADERS (“CONLAMIC”); and FRANCO ORDONEZ, Individually and on behalf of all similarly situated,
Plaintiff(s),

Civil Case No.: 1:06-cv-03842-RMB-AMD
ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

vs.

TOWNSHIP OF RIVERSIDE and MAYOR CHARLES F. HILTON, JR.,

Defendant(s).

Defendants, Township of Riverside and Mayor Charles F. Hilton, Jr., hereby answer Plaintiffs’ allegations set forth in its Complaint as follows:

LAW OFFICE Parker,MMccCCaayy, P&.A. Criscuolo, P.A.

I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1.

Neither admitted nor denied. Defendant Township is without sufficient information as

to the individuals or groups making up the Plaintiff entities to respond to the description

provided by Plaintiff in this paragraph.

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Case 1:06-cv-03842-RMB-AMD Document 6 Filed 10/03/2006 Page 2 of 7

LAW OFFICE Parker McCay P.A.

(A). Denied. (B). Denied. (C). Denied. (D). Denied. (E). Denied. (F). Denied. (G). Denied. (H). Denied. Further, at the time of the drafting and filing of this Answer, Defendant has a pending motion to strike the claim for specified damages as such specification is prohibited by Civ. Rule 8.1. Plaintiffs have not responded to this aspect of the pending motion, which is returnable on the papers on October 6, 2006. 2. Denied. This paragraph contains legal argument and not factual allegation. Further, this paragraph makes no allegation or argument with regard to the Township ordinance at issue. 3. Denied. This paragraph contains legal argument and not factual allegation. Further, this paragraph makes no allegation or argument with regard to the Township ordinance at issue. 4. Denied. 5. Denied. The penalty under the Section indicated is only with regard to Township licenses, contracts and grants, and as such involves matters directly related to Township business. 6. Denied. The penalty under the Section indicated is only with regard to Township licenses, contracts and grants, and as such involves matters directly related to Township business. 7. Denied.

2

Case 1:06-cv-03842-RMB-AMD Document 6 Filed 10/03/2006 Page 3 of 7

8. Denied. This paragraph contains legal argument and not factual allegation. Further, this paragraph makes no allegation or argument with regard to the Township ordinance at issue. The Township Ordinance at issue does not directly regulate immigration or illegal immigrants.
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 9. Admitted. Defendant Township concurs that the content of Plaintiff’s Complaint raises federal questions and jurisdiction in this Court is proper. 10. Admitted. The District of New Jersey, Camden is the proper venue.
III. STANDING 11. Neither admitted nor denied. Defendant Township is without sufficient information with regard to Plaintiffs’ respective standing. 12. Denied.
IV. PARTIES

LAW OFFICE Parker McCay P.A.

13. Neither admitted nor denied. Plaintiff is left to its proofs. 14. Neither admitted nor denied. Plaintiff is left to its proofs. 15. Neither admitted nor denied. Plaintiff is left to its proofs. 16. Admitted. Riverside Township is a duly incorporated municipal entity of the State of New Jersey. 17. Admitted that Charles F. Hilton, Jr. is Mayor of Defendant Township of Riverside.
V. FACTS 18. Admitted. 19. Denied. With regard to Department of Homeland Security activity within the Township, such activity is outside of Township control and entirely independent of Ordinance 16-2006.

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Case 1:06-cv-03842-RMB-AMD Document 6 Filed 10/03/2006 Page 4 of 7

LAW OFFICE Parker McCay P.A.

COUNT 1 CLASS ACTION Defendants repeat the responses to the allegations numbered 1 through 19 as if set forth herein at length. 20. Denied. 21. Denied. 22. Admitted that any entity or individual is entitled to representation. Denied that Plaintiffs have established a class. 23. Denied. 24. Neither admitted nor denied. Defendant is without sufficient information with regard to Plaintiffs to respond to this allegation. 25. Denied. 26. Admitted. The Township is unaware of any actions independent of this matter. 27. Neither admitted nor denied. Defendant is without sufficient information with regard to Plaintiffs to respond to this allegation. 28. Denied. 29. Denied. WHEREFORE, Defendants hereby demand judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ Complaint with prejudice, together with such other relief as the Court deems just and equitable.
COUNT II DECLARATORY ACTION Defendants repeat the responses to the allegations numbered 1 through 29 as if set forth herein at length. 30. Denied. While there is no precedent directly on point, Defendant Township is within its authority in enacting the Ordinance at issue.

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Case 1:06-cv-03842-RMB-AMD Document 6 Filed 10/03/2006 Page 5 of 7

31. WHEREFORE, Defendants hereby demand judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ Complaint with prejudice, together with such other relief as the Court deems just and equitable.
COUNT III DECLARATORY ACTION Defendants repeat the responses to the allegations numbered 1 through 31 as if set forth herein at length. 32. Denied. 33. Denied. Further, at the time of the drafting and filing of this Answer, Defendant has a pending motion to strike the claim for specified damages as such specification is prohibited by Civ. Rule 8.1. Plaintiffs have not responded to this aspect of the pending motion, which is returnable on the papers on October 6, 2006. WHEREFORE, Defendants hereby demand judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ Complaint with prejudice, together with such other relief as the Court deems just and equitable.
PARKER McCAY, P.A. Attorneys for Defendants, Township of Riverside and Mayor Charles F. Hilton, Jr.

Dated October 3, 2006

By: s/ Douglas L. Heinold Douglas L. Heinold

LAW OFFICE Parker McCay P.A.

FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE Defendants acted reasonably and in good faith at all times, and are therefore entitled to qualified and absolute immunity.

5

Case 1:06-cv-03842-RMB-AMD Document 6 Filed 10/03/2006 Page 6 of 7

LAW OFFICE Parker McCay P.A.

THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE Defendants did not violate the civil rights of the plaintiffs.
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE Defendants are barred by the Doctrine of Unclean Hands.
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE Defendants committed no act that can be considered racial discrimination.
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE Plaintiffs’ claims are limited and/or precluded by the doctrine of estoppel.
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by their own contributory negligence.
EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the doctrine of waiver.
NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE The actions complained of are the result of Plaintiffs’ own illegal conduct and their recovery is therefore barred.
TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE The relief Plaintiffs request is contrary to public policy and their claim is barred.
ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE At all times relevant hereto Defendant Hilton was acting in his capacity as a legislator and is therefore entitled to absolute immunity.

6

Case 1:06-cv-03842-RMB-AMD Document 6 Filed 10/03/2006 Page 7 of 7

TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE Punitive damages are not available against Defendants.
PARKER McCAY P.A. Attorneys for Defendants Township of Riverside and Mayor Charles F. Hilton, Jr.
By: s/ Douglas L. Heinold DOUGLAS L. HEINOLD
Dated: October 3, 2006 I hereby certify that the matter in controversy is not the subject of any other Court,
Arbitration or administrative proceeding. s/ Douglas L. Heinold DOUGLAS L. HEINOLD
Date: October 3, 2006 CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE
I, Douglas L. Heinold, Esquire, a member of the bar of this Court, hereby certify that a copy of the within Answer was served this day via Federal Express overnight mail upon …

Date: October 3, 2006

s/ Douglas L. Heinold DOUGLAS L. HEINOLD

LAW OFFICE Parker McCay P.A.

7

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DlSTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ASSEMBLY OF GOD CIIURCII RIVERSIDE,
NF,W JERSEY, NA I'IONAL COALI'I ION 0 P LATINO CLERGY AND CHRISTIAN 1.EADERS
("C:ONLAMICV), FRANC0 O R ~ O ~ ~ E Z , 1NL)IVIDUALLYAND ON BCIIALI: OF ALL SlMlLAKLY S11 UA'l'EL).
TOWNSHIP 01:RIVERSIDE

)
j AMENDED ) COMPLAINT FOR
j DECLARATORY,
) INJUNCTIVEAND
1 FURTHER RELIEF 1 1
J
)

1. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
1. This action is brought on hehalfof 1J.S. citi~ensa, 1J.S.non-profit corporation, legal I1.S. residents and aliens seeking judicial clarification of the jurisdiction, authority, and constitutional rights ol' the township nl'Riverside, New Jersey ("Riverside") in adopting and enlbrcing an ordinance known as the "Illegd Immigra~ionReliel' Act." Il'the ordinance is found to be unconstitutional or in any other way illegal, we respectfully request injunctive and mandamus rclicf ordcring the 'l'ownship of Kivcrsidc to ccasc and desist enrorcement of the ordinunce. The specific request is as follows:

(A). 'l'hc plaintiffs havc rcason to bclicvc that thc atncndcd ordinance filed by the council and passed on November 22,2006, known as Ordinance 2006-26, raises significant preemption concerns as did the original ordinance filed on July 26,2006. Initially, the ordinance clearly intends to govern many types of conduct alrcady covcrcd by fcdcral immigration law. Congress and the Executive branch have historically occupied the tield of immigration law. 'The amcndcd Kivcrsidc ordinance is crcating local immigration reguliltions independent from the existing federal syslem m d clearly conflicls with federal immigration law. Thus, judicial clarification is required on the jurisdiction and
constitutional authority of the township of Riverside to d o p t and enforce such an
ordinance.
(B). Riverside's amended ordinance continues to raise significant concerns regarding the renting or leasing of property to "illegal" aliens. Such restrictions directly conflict with fedcral housing assistancc regulations.
(C). Kivcrsidc's amended ordinance, as written, continues to lead to "national origin" discrimination. in violation uf'Title VTI ofthe Civil Rights Act and the Fair Housing Act (FIIA).
(D). Riverside's amended ordinance on it's face continues to be vague and ambiguous as there
is no definition for "illegal alien" in the In~n~ijyatioend Nationality Act ("MA"o)r in
othcr fcdcral law.

(E). 'l'hc amended ordinance as written also gives risc to 42 lJSC 3 1981 violations as section
1981 prohibits alicnage discrimination.
(F). The original ordinancc makcs reference lo application o f the law outside of Rivcrsidc's township. Specifically, section 4(B) of the original ordinancc indicates "Any act lhat aids and abets illegal aliens within the United States, not just within the Township limits, will constitute a violation."
(G). In 8 166-2 (K) of the Amended Ordinance the Township claims to not he regulating
illegal aliens or their stntus. Howcvcr, the effect ofthe amended ordinance as wcll as the original ordinance, is that the Township is targeting immigrants and attempting to regulate immigration as a rcsult thereof.
(H). Due to the constitutional and statutory violations set Ibrth above, we requirc injunctive and mandamus relief ordcring the township of Riverside to ccasc and desist enforcement of the "Illegal Immigration Relief Act" until clarilicalion is n i d e by this court.
(1). Furthemiore, since plaintiffs have sunbred imepariible harm as a rcsult of Riverside's unconstitutional actions, plaintiffs request rcasonahlc damages in addition to attorney's fecs and reasonahle costs.
2. The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that federal laws and treaties are "the supreme Law of thc Land." While I'ederill and state powcr to regulate certain matters is concomitant, the Supreme Court has long rccogni~~ethdat the regulation of

immigration "is unqucstionably cxclusivcly a fcdcral powcr,"

42424 U.S.

351. 3S4 (1 9715). In Hine.s v. Duviduwilz, 312 lJ..S, j2 (1Y41), the Supreme Court ruled

that cnforccmcnt of a Pennsylvania statutc requiring thc registration of alicns was

precl~ldedhy the Federal Alien Regisiralion Acl of' 1940, which established a

comprehensive federal schcmc for the registration of aliens. 'The anended ordinance still

attemptsio impose civil and criminal sanctions Ihr the hiring a n h r harboring of illegal

aliens.

3. MAG 274A generally prohibits the hiring, referring, recruiting for a fee, or continued cmploymcnt of illcgal aliens. Violators may be subject to cease and desist ordcrs, civil rnonelary penalties, m d (in the case of serial offenders) criminal fines andJor imprisonment for up to h months. Notably, INA S; 274A expressly preempts any state or local law impusing civil or criminal sanctions upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for en~ploymentu, nauthorized alicns.

4. Undcr INA (i 274B, employers are prohibited liom discriminating against any individual (other than an unaulhurized alien) un account of that alien's national origin or citizenship status. Riverside's amended ordinance continues to place business owners and landlords in a prcdicamcnt whcrcby they will hc afraid to hirc or rent to a legal immigrant who is perceived to be an "illegal alien," thus giving rise to national origin discrimination.

5. Section 4(B) of the original ordinance would impose civil penalties on an entity that "aids aid abets" (or has a purent or subsidialy that "aids and abets") illegal aliens anywhere in

the Uniteu'S~ulesr,athcr than simply in the Township of Riverside. This section is not specilically eliminaled by the amended ordinance. The scope o f Section 4(R) ofthe original ordinance does not appear narrowly tailored to address particular, essentially local problems facing the residents of Riverside, and instead appears aimed a1 deterring U.S. immigration violations nationwide.

6. While a state or locality nlay regulate the activities of a foreign corporation within the

state or locality, thc Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits it rrom

regulating or interfering with what the corporation does wholly outside of its territoly.

S t . (e.g.

2CO C'o.lcrmrkansas,Z61). 34/j (1922)) Riverside

cannot regulate the conduct of for-profit entities occurring outside its jurisdiction that

may "aid and abct" illegal aliens.

7. Riverside's ordinance does not provide a mechanism to deterrninc whcthcr an immigration violation l ~ aosccurred. Indeed, the proposed ordinance does not define the meaning of the term "illegal alicn," and this tcrm is not uscd or defined under the INA.

8. The INA generally vests authority to the Attorney General and Secretary of Homcland Security to administcr and cnforcc all laws relating to immigration and naturali~alion, including dcterminations regarding the immigration status of aliens. As such, states and localities are preempted by federal law from making thcir own independent assessment as to whether an alien has committed an immigration violation and imposing penalties against such aliens (along with persons who have provided them with assistance) on thc

basis of that assessment. Such authority is conferred exclusively to designated federal authorities hy the INA.
11. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
9. This Court has jurisdic~ionunder its general kderal question jurisdictirm 28 U.S.C. Section 1331, and specific jurisdiction ovcr claims arising under the Immigration and Nalionality Act 8 U.S.C 1329. This court is the proper venuc for thc writ of Mandamus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Scction 1361. .lurisdiction is also conltrred pursuwl lo Rules 57 and 65 of thc Fcdcral Rules of Civil Procedure which permil declwiltory and injunctive aclions.
10. The District of New Jcrscy is thc proper venue Ibr this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1391 (e), as it is here where the Delbnrlimts' policies have been implen~ented.
- 111. STANDING

11. Plaintiffs havc standing lo commence this action as they are individuals and organizations which have sufrered irreparable harm as a rcsult o f the Township's unconstilulional actions.
12. The Defendants' policy also prolongs the separation crf family members. Plaintiffs havc a particular interest in preserving their fanlily units. (Scc Ahotlrzck v. Reuxun, 785 E 2d 1043. 251 U.S App. D.C.'. 355 (1985): (,'lurk v Securities (Indus)Ass'n. 479 US. 388, 395-96, 107 S C:r. 750, 754, 93 L.6d ld757 (1.9871).f1X. l k a No. 1365, XZd C ~ o n ~2d. .Sess. (1952) reprintt?din 1952 l/.S.(L (.:A.N. 1653, 1680. Additionally, although thcrc is indirect precedent, there is no controlling dccision regarding such an ordinance.
13. Plaintiff I'ranco Ordoflez, a citizen of the U.S., rcsidcs in Riverside, New Jersey, and is bcing adversely atyected by this ordinance.
14. Plaintiff Assemhly uf God Church, Riverside, i s a non-profit church doing busincss in Riverside, New Jersey and countless members of .;aid church are being advcrscly ai'fecled by this ordinance.

15. PlainliSl'CONLAMIC is a lion-profit organi/ation doing business in New Jersey md zhey have over 9,000 affiliate churches thoughoul the IJnited States.
16. Defendant Riverside is a township in Soulhem New Jersey
17. Defendant Charles F. Ililton Jr. is the mayor of Riverside and is being sued in his official capacity.
V. FACTS
18. On or about July, 26, 2006, the towlship o f Riverside passed ordinance Number Ih, known as the "Illegal Immigration Relief Act." Attachcd hcrcto and madc a part hereof as Exhihit "A" is a ctlpy of the ordinancc. On Novcmbcr 22,2006, thc l'ownship passed an amended ordinance, 2006-26, hereby known as "Riverside Township Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance."
19. As a result of the passing of the amended ordinance, plaintiffs continue to sufl'er. Specifically, many members of the class are still afraid to go to work. In July of 2006, fourtccn individuals in the l'ownship of Kivcrsidc wcrc incarcerated by 'l'he Department ol'Homeland Securily. Plaintill's have reason lo believe that the incarceration and arrest of such pcrsons was triggcrcd by thc proposcd unconstitutional ordinancc. The

@)individuals are Juan Fando, MartaTenerjelaYunga, SandroLlivisupa, Mwia Ines Arias,
lose Tenesela, Maria Ines Yunga, Jose Yancz, Wilmer Yunga, Jose 'l'enesela, Patricio 'I'cncscla, Osvaldo Chaves, Marselo Chaves, C;uillerrno Nieves, and Ecma Tenesela. They me all still being detained by the Deplzrt~nentof IIomeland Security. 20. Many mcmbsrs of the class have left the Township Tor I'ear ol'discrimination
COTJNT I CIIASS ACTION
Plaintiffs rcdlegc ,uld incorporate Paragraphs 1 through 20 inclusive and file this COIJNT I as a (:lass Action Ibr Declaraiory m d Injunctive Relief and allege:
21. Plaintiffs hring this action pursuanl lo Rule 23 ilnd(b)(1)(2)on behalf of thelnselves wd all uthers similarly situated. The class co~lsistsof the following asccrtainablc mcmbcrs: all pcrsons who currenlly reside in Riverside and find themselves to be negatively affected by the proposed unconstitutional ordinance, as wcll as thosc who have left Rivcrsidc as a rcsult of the Ordinance.
22. Deftndants have acted, and will continue to act on grounds gcncrally applicable to each member of thc class, making appropriate linal declaratory, injunctive and mandamus relief to the class as a whole.
23. Plaintiffs in thc class are entitled lo representation.

24. Therc cxists a community ol'inlerest belween Plaintiffs md members of their class in that there are questions of law and fact which arc common to all. 'l'hc Plaintitti scek a determination of whcthcr or not the amended ordinance is unconstitutional m d as such should no1 be enforced.
25. Individual silils by each member of the class would bc impractical hccause:
(A) There exist common and identical issues of law 'and fact for all mcmhers of Lhe class.
( R ) the number of individual suits would irnposc an unduc burden of the Courts as there appear to bc a voluminous amount ol'members; (C) many memhers ol'the class are unawtwe of their right and/or are intimidatcd due lheir status.
26. A class action is superior to other available methods for the lhir and erficient adjudication of this controversy.
27. Upon information and hclief no independent litigation hus been brought by any mcmhcrs of the rcspcctivc class against llet'endar~tsas to the issues raiscd in this complaini.
28. Plaintiffs' counscls are experienced in class actions litigation and can adequately represcnt thc interest of class members as well as the namcd Plaintiffs.

27. As a result of the defendant's ordinance, plaintiffs and the ~nelnhersof the class will
continue to suffcr,
30. 'l'here exists no adequate remedy at law if the ordinance is not overturned.
COUNT 11 DECLARATORY ACTION
Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate paragraphs 1 ihro~~g3h0 inclusivc and filc this COUN'T I1 for declaratory Rclicf and allege:
31. 'I'hcrc cxists confusion as to Kivcrsidc's authority to pass and enforce such an ordinance.
32. WHEREFORE Plaintiffs seek judicial clarification of the ordinance's legality.
COUNT 111 IIECLAHATOKY ACTION
Plaintillj; reallege and incorporate pilragraphs 1 through 32 inclusive and lile this COUN'I 111for declaratory Kelicf and allege:
33. The actions of the Township of Riverside deprive plaintiffs of their family and cause injury by prolonging family separation. Countless plaintiffs have moved from Riverside due to fear that local auillorities will begin implementing this unctmstitutional ordinance. The plaintiffs are being denied their constitutional rights as the amended ordinance

violates the preemption clause, contlicts with Federal Housing Assistance regularions, will lead to national origin disc*imimion, and on rts face is vague and ambiguous. As such, we respectfully request injunctive and mandamus relief ordering thc Towship of Riverside to cease and desist enforcement of the ordinance.
34. Plaintiffs request compensatory and punitive damages as well as my other damages this court may deem just and waso~mbleP. laintiffs also respectfully request attorney's fees md costs in this action.
Respectfully submitted, Attorney fbr Plaintiffs
Assembly of God Church, et d.
By: Jesus Pefia

violatcs the preemption clause. conflicts with Federal IIousing Assistance regulations, will lead to national origin discrimination, and on its face is vague and ambiguous. As such, wc rcspcctfi~llyrequest injunclive and lnandamus reliel'ordering the Towilship of Riverside to cease and desist cnforccmcnt of thc ordinancc.
34. Plaintiffs request compensatory and punitivc damages as well as any other damages this court may dccm just and reasonable. PlaintiITs also respectfully request attorney's fees and costs in this action.
Respectfully submitted, Attorney for Plaintiffs
Florida Bar ~ a 9 0 6 0
12915 SW 132"~S'1'.lJnit 5
Miami, Florida 33 186 TEL: (305)232-8889 FAX: (305)232-8819 EMAIL: IMIC;LAW(@AOL.~OM

 
 Case 1:06-cv-03842-RMB-AMD Document 27 Filed 09/25/2007 Page 1 of 8

JESUS PENA & ASSOCIATES 4430 BERGERLINE, AVE.
UNION CITY, NJ 07087 (201) 617-0801 JESUSPENA,ESQUIRE Attorney for Plaintiff(s), Assembly of God Church, et al,

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
(Camden Vicinage)

ASSEMBLY OF GOD CHURCH RIVERSIDE,

) TilE HONORABLE

NEW JERSEY, NATIONAL COALITION OF

) ANN MARIE DONIO

LATINO CLERGY AND CHRISTIAN LEADERS

)

("CONLAMIC"), FRANCO ORDONEZ, INDIVIDUALLY ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 06-CV

AND ON BEHALF OF ALL SIMILARLY SITUATED. ) -3842-RMB-AMD

)

PLAINTIFF(S)

) MOTIONFOR

) SUMMARY JUDGMENT

TOWNSHIP OF RIVERSIDE, ET AL.

) AND MEMORANDUM

) OFLAW.

DEFENDANT(S)

)

_______________________________________/

Pursuant to Ru1e 56 (c), Plaintiffs, Assembly of God Church Riverside, New Jersey, National Coalition of Clergy and Christian Leaders ("CONLAMIC"), Franco Ordofiez, individually and on behalfof all similarly situated ("Plaintiffs") move for summaryjudgment on their declaratory judgment actions count ll, count Ill and of their class action count I, and state that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw.
The facts are plain and not in dispute. On July 26, 2006 the Township of Riverside passed Ordinance 16, known as the "lllegal Immigration Relief Act", a copy of Ordinance 16 is attached as exhibit "A" and is incorporated herein. Minor amendments were then made by Ordinance 2006-18 on August 23,2006. Finally, on November 26,2006 the

Case 1:06-cv-03842-RMB-AMD Document 27 Filed 09/25/2007 Page 2 of 8
final amendments to date were made to the Ordinance now referred to as Ordinance 2006.26, the "lllegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance", attached hereto as Exhibit "B".
According to recent newspaper reports, the Township is rescinding the Ordinance. However, our office had not received any oral or written communication confmning this from the Township or their counsel until September 20, 2007, yet the newspaper articles date back as far as August 24,2007. The newspaper article with the aforementioned date as well as other articles are attached as Exhibit "C."
The Plaintiffs, Assembly of God Church Riverside, a non-profit church doing business in Riverside, New Jersey and members ofsaid church; CONLAMIC, a non-profit corporation doing business in New Jersey with over 9,000 affiliate churches throughout the United States and Franco Ordonez, a citizen of the United States, are being affected by this Ordinance.
Plaintiffs are suffering in various ways by the effect of the Ordinance. Specifically, many members of the class are afraid to go to work. Countless others have fled the town in fear ofdiscrimination. In July of2006, fourteen individuals in the Township of Riverside were incarcerated by the Department of Homeland Security. Plaintiffs have reason to believe that the incarceration and arrest ofthese people were triggered by the unconstitutional Ordinance. The individuals arrested were Juan Pando, Marta Tenesela Yunga, Sandra Ulivisupa, Maria lnes Frias, Jose Tenesela, Maria lnes Yunga, Jose Yenez, Wilma Yunga, Jose Tenesela, Patricio Tenesela, Ovaldo Chaves, Marselo Chaves, Guillermo Nieves, and Elma Tenesela. After detention for approximately 30-60 days, the individuals have been released on bond.
The defendant is Riverside Township in Southern New Jersey. These plaintiffs are a mixture of United States Citizens, and United States non-profit corporations who are seeking, among other matters, judicial clarification of the jurisdiction, authority and constitutional

Case 1:06-cv-03842-RMB-AMD Document 27 Filed 09/25/2007 Page 3 of 8
rights ofthe Township ofRiverside New Jersey (Riverside) in adopting and enforcing the
Illegal Immigration ReliefAct Ordinance. Ifthe court should fmd the Ordinance to be
unconstitutional or in any other way illegal, Plaintiffs request injunctive and mandamus relief
ordering Riverside to cease and desist enforcement ofthe Ordinance.
I. PLAINTIFFS' SPECIFIC CONCERNS WITH THE NOVEMBER 22, 2006 ORDINANCE 2006-26 KNOWN AS "RIVERSIDE TOWNSHIP ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION RELIEF ACT ORDINANCE."
The amended Ordinance 2006-26, passed on November 22,2006, raises
"preemption" concerns. The Ordinance intends to govern many types ofconduct already
covered by federal immigration law. For instance, in§ 166-2, Findings and Declaration of
Purpose, the Ordinance states: A. State and Federal law requires that certain conditions be met before a person may be authorized to work or reside in this country; B. Unlawful workers are illegal aliens as defined by this Ordinance and State and Federal law, do not normally meet such conditions as a matter of law when present in the "Township." C. Unlawful employment and harboring of illegal aliens in dwelling units in the Township harm the health, safety and welfare of authorized workers and legal residents in the Township. D. ...While the Federal Government has passed laws and regulations on these issues, it has woefully forsaken enforcement.
Based on the foregoing reasoning, the Township found it in the frrst interests
ofthe public to adopt policies and procedures to prevent unauthorized employment and
harboring ofillegal aliens. The Township adopted provisions to make it illegal to rent to
aliens or house them.
The Township has created its own definitions for "illegal alien" and
''unlawful worker." Persons seeking business permits, contracts, and grants shall sign an
affidavit in a form prepared by the Township, basically affirming they hire no illegal aliens.

Case 1:06-cv-03842-RMB-AMD Document 27 Filed 09/25/2007 Page 4 of 8
To enforce the ordinance's provisions, the Township created a complaint and violations systems with deadlines, which may result in suspension of business licenses, grants or contracts.
There is also a "Harboring illegal immigrants" section which makes it unlawful for anyone that owns a dwelling unit in the Township to harbor an illegal alien in the dwelling unit. To let, lease, or rent a dwelling unit to an illegal alien shall constitute harboring. Any dwelling owner found guilty ofviolating this section shall be subject to $1,000.00 fine and up to 90 day imprisonment.
Riverside's amended Ordinance continues to raise significant concerns regarding the renting and leasing ofproperty to illegal aliens. Such restrictions directly conflict with Federal Housing Association regulations. Moreover, Riverside's amended Ordinance as written continues to lead to national origin discrimination in violations of title VII ofthe Civil Rights Act and the Fair Housing Act.
Riverside's amended Ordinance in fact continues to be vague and ambiguous and is in direct conflict with immigration laws in the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") and other federal law. In§ 166-2(k) ofthe amended Ordinance of the Township, it is alleged that it does not regulate illegal alien(s) or their status. However, the effect ofthe amended Ordinance as well as the original Ordinance is that Riverside establishes new local guidelines affecting immigrants and attempts to regulate immigration as a result thereof. In a very similar matter, a federal court in Hazelton, Pennsylvania, recently ruled against the constitutionality of that city's ordinance, Lozano v. City ofHazleton, PICS Case No. 071143(July, 2007).The Riverside Township has admitted to practically copying Hazelton's ordinance also known as the "Illegal Immigration Act Ordinance." For the same reasons so eloquently set forth by Judge James Munley in the Hazelton matter, the court should grant summer judgment in this matter.

Case 1:06-cv-03842-RMB-AMD Document 27 Filed 09/25/2007 Page 5 of 8
THE POWER TO REGULATE IMMIGRATION IS UNQUESTIONABLY A FEDERAL POWER.
Federal power in the general field of foreign affairs, including power over Immigration, naturalization, and deportation, is supreme. When the federal government by statute or treaty has established rules and regulations touching the rights, privileges, obligations or burdens ofaliens, the treaty or statute is the supreme law ofthe hand.
No state or municipality can add to or take from the force and effect ofthe Constitution, as set forth in Article VI.
THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE "The Constitution and the laws ofthe United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made or which shall be made under the authority of the United States shall be the [Supreme Law ofThe Land] and the judges in every state shall be bound thereof, anything in the Constitution oflaws ofany state to the contrary not withstanding." U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl.2.
PREEMPTIVE DOCTRINE The Riverside Ordinance raises significant preemption concerns. The Preemptive Doctrine states that a federal law can supersede or supplement any inconsistent state law or regulation. The principle doctrine is derived from the Supremacy Clause and is also called the Federal Preemptive Doctrine. Even the name ofthe Ordinance "Riverside Township Illegal Immigration ReliefAct Ordinance" alerts the reader ofthe content. The Ordinance is clearly intended to govern many types of conduct covered by immigration law. The ordinance creates local immigration regulations and goes as far as defining terms at the center ofimmigration law like "illegal alien."

Case 1:06-cv-03842-RMB-AMD Document 27 Filed 09/25/2007 Page 6 of 8
The federal government's power over immigration and deportation as well as the general field of foreign affairs is supreme. To have it otherwise, would be chaos. In fact, there have been a number of attempts by other municipalities across the country to adopt similar ordinances, but no federal court has yet ruled on the constitutionality of such ordinances.
ANALYSES Through the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), the federal government has instituted a framework or system to regulate the admission and removal ofaliens. There are various federal laws already in place through the INA that preempt provisions ofthe Riverside Ordinance.
IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT§ 274A, THE IDRING OF UNAUTHORIZED ALIENS. INA § 274A prohibits the hiring, referring, recruiting for a fee or employment of illegal aliens. The penalties that violators may be subject to include cease and desist orders, civil penalties, and in the case of repeat violators, criminal fmes. INA specifically preempts any state or local law from imposing civil or criminal sanctions upon those who employ, recruit, or refer an alien for a fee for employment. INA § 274A (h)(2); & U.S.C. § 1324a. The provision in INA§ 274A (h)(2) conflicts with those parts ofthe "Ordinance" that deal with employment of aliens. Riverside Ordinance 2006-26 § 166-2, Findings and Declaration of Purpose sections A, B, parts of C, and parts ofD, E, and K are therefore preempted. INA§ 274B prohibits employers from discriminating against any individual other than an unauthorized alien, on account of that alien's or citizen's status. Riverside's amended Ordinance continues to place business owners and landlords in a predicament whereby they

Case 1:06-cv-03842-RMB-AMD Document 27 Filed 09/25/2007 Page 7 of 8
will be afraid to hire or rent to a legal immigrant who is perceived to be an "illegal alien," thus giving rise to ''National Origin" discrimination.
INA 274B would eliminate the ordinance for preemption purposes. Also eliminated by both INA§274A and INA§ 274B are the ordinance's sections that deal with Definitions, Illegal Alien, Unlawful Worker as well as those dealing with business permits, contracts, and grants. These sections refer to harboring, employing, and renting to an illegal alien. Ifthe findings, declaration, and defmitions portions of the Amended ordinance are pre-empted, then the ordinance as a whole should be pre-empted.
The United States Supreme Court ruled that enforcement ofa Pennsylvania statute requiring the registration ofaliens was precluded by the Federal Alien Regulation Act of 1940 which had established a comprehensive Federal scheme for the regulation of aliens. Hines vs. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941.)
The Federal Alien Regulation Act of 1940 did not expressly preempt the state law. However, the Hines court found that the "basic subject ofthe state and federal laws was identical." As applied to the case "sub judice", the basic subject ofthe Riverside Ordinance and those provisions of the INA are so identical to make preemption necessary. The Hines court held that " the regulation ofaliens is as intimately blended and intertwined with responsibilities of the national government that where it acts, and the state also acts on the same subject, the act of congress, or treaty, is supreme; and the law of the state, though enacted in the exercise ofpowers not controverted, must yield to it, and where the federal government in the exercise of its superior authority in this field, has enacted a complete scheme of regulation [like under the INA], states cannot, inconsistently with the purpose of Congress conflict or interfere with, curtail or compliment, the federal law, or enforce additional or auxiliary regulations". Hines at 66-67 (internal citations omitted).

Case 1:06-cv-03842-RMB-AMD Document 27 Filed 09/25/2007 Page 8 of 8
Although the arguments heretofore adequately preempt the Riverside Ordinance by the INA, there is also the conflict concerning the renting and leasing ofproperty to illegal alien's and the conflict with the regulations of certain Federal Housing Assistance programs designed specifically to aid citizens, aliens and their families. These programs permit the renting and leasing of housing to "mixed families" defined as those with eligible immigration status and those without citizenship or eligible immigration status, See 24 C.F.R. §§5.504, 5.520; William 0. Russell III, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public housing and voucher programs, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Memorandum ofEligibility of Mixed Families for Public and Assisted Housing, March 11, 2004.

CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, plaintiffs respectfully request injunctive and mandamus relief ordering the Township ofRiverside to permanently cease and desist enforcement of Ordinance 2006-26 (26)"The Illegal Immigration Relief Act", and to award fees and costs in accordance with such ruling.

Respectfully Submitted, Attorney for Plaintiffs
sf William Sanchez William J. Sanchez Law LLC 12915 SW 132 St Ste#5 Miami, Fl33186 Phone:(305)232-8889 Fax: (305)232-8819

Jesus Petla & Associates, Attorney for Plaintiffs
sJ Jesus Pena Jesus Pefta 4430 Bergerline, Ave. Union City, NJ 07087 (201)617-0801

 
 Case 1:06-cv-03842-RMB-AMD Document 34 Filed 11/02/2007 Page 1 of 12

GCORGe R. SAPONARO' WILLIAM EMMETT SITZtER "Memnt::r NJ and MJ) RaT'S

~1!Jl~

0/
8~anddl~ :,.,J

The Newbold lIouse 27 Cedar Street
Mount Holly, New Jersey 08060
609·518·1256 609-267 -8080 FAX609-lIS-12S7

'001 I,..

""I' ') \"',:1,1" i ,.• ,._.'

i'.'
CRISTIAN M. TOWER~ Mt::mbt:t NJ lild PA Bars

November 2, 2007

RECEIVED

Honorable Renee M, Bumb, J. US, District Court Mitchell H. Cohen US. Courthouse
I John F. Ch:rry Plaza
P.O. Box 886 Camden, NJ 08101

NOV - 2 2007

AT 0;$0

_ _.M

WILLIAM T. WALSH

CLERK

Re: A,~,\'emhly o(God v. Townshil1 o.l'Riverside Docket No: 06·CV·3842·RMB·AMB

Dear Judge Bumb:

Enclosed herein please find an original and one copy of the Defendant's Brief in Opposition for Plaintiff's Application for Fees. Kindly file same and provide me with a stamped filed copy.

Thank you for Your Honor's attention to this matter.

Respectfully SU~
~~~---

GRS:amc cc: Ann Marie Donio, U.S. Magistrate
William Sanchez, Esquire

Case 1:06-cv-03842-RMB-AMD Document 34 Filed 11/02/2007 Page 2 of 12

UNITED STATES DISTlUCT COURT' '.' . , '" ',', ," l'OR THE DISTRICT OF NEW .JERS~Y

ASSEMBLY OF GOD CHURCH RIVERSIDE, NEW JERSEY, et al PlaintifTs,
v. TOWNSHIP OF RIVERSIDE, Defendant.

l.inl .. ', I., .

WI",

I.

THE HONORABl.E ANN MARIE DONIO

CIVIL AcnON NO: 06-CV-3842-RMS-AMD

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR FEES

STATEMENT OF FACTS I. The Township orRiverside enacted an Ordinance in an effort to address a growing prohlem with undocumented and illegal aliens. 2. One of the goals sought by the enac!ment oflhe subject Ordinance was to curb increasing housing and parking violations that wcre largely being committed by such persons. 3. The Ordinance was b~lsed on a sim.ilar one enacted in Hazelton, Pennsylvania, 4. Due to the challenge oftlIe Constitutionality of the Hazelton Ordinance, the Township of" Riverside decided not to entorce its Ordinanee pending the outcome of the litigation in Hazelton. 5, In July of2007, the Federal Judge presiding Over the Hazelton matter ruled the Ordinance was unconstitutional. 6. Shortly after the ruling in the Hazelton matter, the Riverside Township Committee convened in a special session to discuss repealing the ~ubject Ordinance. 7. On September 17,2007, the Ordinance was repealed, never having been enforced.

Case 1:06-cv-03842-RMB-AMD Document 34 Filed 11/02/2007 Page 3 of 12
LEGAL ARGUMENT l. PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT MET THEIR BURDEN WITH
REGARD TO THE APPLICATION FOR ATTORNEYS'
l<'EES. In order for a Comtto grant an application for attomeys' fees. the Plaintiffs must establish that they ar~ a prevailing party. "A 'prevailing party' is one who has been awarded ~ome relief by a court." Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 758 (1980). This Honor,lhle C'.ll!li has directed the parties to speclticaliy address the "catalys( theory" in our respective briefs. The "catalyst theory" stands f(lr (he prenlise thai "a plaintifI is a 'prevailing party' if it achieves the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant's condLtcL" Buchanon Bd. & Care IIome. Inc. v,.WcstVirginia Dept. of Hca1(h and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 601 (2001). Buchanon is th.., seluinal case on the "catalyst t]leory" and it is provides an in-depth alialysis of (he reasoning and rationale behind the
Court's decision. The lactthat the Plaintiffs have neglectcd to address it in any capacity in their BrieCis liJretelJing that they realize its import. Buchanon represents a death knell for the Plaintiffs' application. There can be J1() other explanation for its absence, or for that matter, the absence of any case law spccilically addressing the "catalyst theory."
The answer is clear. The law is weJl settled that the "catalyst theory" is not supported in
conferring "prevailing party" status ror the purpose of fee applications. In Buchanon, the
Sllpremtl Court ruled that merely being a "catalyst" (0 a defendant's voluntaty change is insuilIcient to be considered a "prevailing party" fbr the purposes of recovering fees. "Al!hough the Buchanon Court recognized that the plaintiff s suit might have heen a catalyst of the
2

Case 1:06-cv-03842-RMB-AMD Document 34 Filed 11/02/2007 Page 4 of 12
del~ndClnl's voluntary. legislative change, it held lhal the sO-~Cllled "catkllyst theory" was an insufficient basis on which to confer "prevailing party" status." Id., at 602; See A/so, John T. v. Delawan: County Intennegj(l!.9J.Jnit, 318 F.3d 545, 556 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 2003). In denying the fees sought. the Buch!UlOn court reasoned that the "catalyst theory" penl1its "an award where there is no judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties" and that such a resulL would be contrary to existing precedent. Buchanon, at 604. The judicial imprimatur on the change is fundamentally necessary. Id., at 605.
In A.P. Doyg,jl.l.c. and the Mechanical Contractors Assn. of New JC{~cy, Inc., v. Newark !,ublic Schools, 44 Fed. Appx. 569 (U.S. Court of Appeals for (he Third Circuil2002), the Court ruled in an unpublished opinion that the "~atalysl theory" is "moribund" in this judicial circuit. !.~L at 573 (Citing Tru<:~ddl v. Phila. HO,HS~.f\uth., 290 F.3d 159, 163 nJ (3d Cir.2002).
In the present case, the Township of Riverside enacted an Ordinance in an effort to address a legitimate concern surTounding illegal immigrants and the increased unlawful conduct allegedly perpetrated by such individuals. This Ordinance was fashioned after one recently enacted in Hazelton, Pennsylvania to address similar concerns in that (own. After the Ordinance in Hazelton came under lire questioning its constitutionality, the Township of Riverside v{)lunl(lri~y refrained from enforcing its own Ordinance. Then, in or about August of2007, shortly after a Fcderal Judge struck dovm the Hazelton Ordinance as unconstitutional, the Township Committee convened a special session aimed at TI:pealing the subject Ordinance.
These actions were taken by the Township of Riverside voluntarily, without any Court Order,
Settlement Agreement, or Judgment. The Plaintiffs argue in their Briefthat changes were made to the Ordinance and that the act of its repeal waR brought about as a result of the within lawsuit.
,.'

Case 1:06-cv-03842-RMB-AMD Document 34 Filed 11/02/2007 Page 5 of 12
This i~ not true, The Tovillship of Riverside considered all of the social and economic rmnifications of maintaining the Ordinance as well as other reasoning in its decision-making process, The Township also went through a shift in the political make-up of the governing COnlmi(t<:<: which may have impacted the process. All of these things, in conjunction with the Federal ruling on the constitutionality or the Ha;;celton Ordinance. were considered and played a mle in modi (ying and ultimately repealing the subject Ordinance,
In light of the fact that there has heen no legal change to the parties' respective positions and that the issues presented to this court for determination conecming the Ordinance are mlW moot due to its being repealed, the Plainti ITs cannot be considered a "prevailing party" for the purpose of fi:e shifting. It is clear that there has been no alteration to thtl legal relationship of the parties as no Orders. Judgments or Sdtlement Agreements have been entercd. The Ordinance
was voluntarily repealed and even, assuming arguendo, that Plaintift'S' actions were (he
"catalyst" of that change. the well-settled law in thb jurisdiction does not permit fcc-shifting in such instances.
[1. PLAINTIFFS FEE REQUEST IS DE.FlCIENT AND THEREFORE SHOULD BE DENIED.
In the even! the court determines that the Plaintiffs somehow satisly the "prevailing party" burden, the application must either be denied and/or modified due to its unreasonableness in its present f0l111. "JTJhe court must examine the record to determine that the hours billed are not 'unreasonable [or the work performed.'" A.V. and M.V. v, Rurlingtol1 Towl1shill.Bd. of Education. 20070.S. Dist. LEXIS 47309 (3d Cir. 2007) (Gring WaSW!lgton v. Philadelphia
4

Case 1:06-cv-03842-RMB-AMD Document 34 Filed 11/02/2007 Page 6 of 12
County Court of Common Plea~, 89 F,3d 1031, 1037 (3d Cir. 1996). In the present application, the Plaintiffs submit invoices thattota1 $87,750.00. The
invoices, although divided into categories ~ucb a~ "Senior attorney and paralegal time spent in New Jer~ey," the entries are not made with sufficient specitlcity as to identify a particular issue
or measure of relief sought ror the entry. FurthernlOre, for all the entries for time spent in New
.Jer~ey, it appears that billing was entered for 100% of the waking day for each person fbI' eadl day. This is clearly inappropriate over-hilling. In fact, 1110st of the subsequent entries appear to he hlanket hilling i(lT an entire oftlce-day. From August 4,2006, until Septemher 27,2006, there was not 11 single entry for the Senior Attomey of less than 6.5 hours on any given day. As the court said in Washington, "where the documentation of hours is inadequate, the district eOllrt m"y n:duce the award accordingly." Washington v. Philadelphia County Court ol'Common PI!'-!!.!!, 89 F.3d 1031, 1037 (3d eir. 1996). In this case, if the court deems the Plaintiffs arc a prevailing party, the fees sought must he adjusted significantly downward.
CONCLUSION While this country may have been fo,mded by immigrants, times have changed over the past 121 years. Immigration laws and the need to control our horders have replaced the "open border" lhat seemingly existed back when the country was {()unded. Riverside attempted to address this growing problem hy enacting the subject Ordinance. However, the Township never cnforced thc Ordinance in the wake of the diffictlltics experienced in Hazelton, Pennsylvania, and while they reconsidered its social and economic impact. The Township ultimately n:pealed the Ordinance voluntarily.
5

Case 1:06-cv-03842-RMB-AMD Document 34 Filed 11/02/2007 Page 7 of 12
Th~ Plaintiff'S canl10t be construed as a "prevailing party" f;)r the purpose of being awarded fees. It is respectfully submitted that the Plaintitl'S have fhiled to meet their burden to justifY fcc shifting and the within application should be denied. In the alternative, it is argued that the fee application submitted by the Plaintiffs is unreasonabk, in the rate and number of hours charged as well as specificity and accordingly it should either be disregarded or substantially adjusted downward.
Respectfully Submitted,
'APONARO, ESQ. lship of Riverside
k:.-.~~~_ _
CRISTIAN M. TOWERS, ESQ. On the Brier
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71 of 499 DOCUM8NTS
A.P. BOYD, INC. AND THE MECHANICAL CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION OF NI!:W JJ<:RSEY, INC. v. NEWARK PUBLIC SCHOOLS (District COllrt No. OO-cv-
00100); NORTHERN NEW ,TRRSEY CHAPTER, INC. NATIONAL ELECTRICAl, CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION v. THE NEWARK PUBLIC SCHOOLS (District Court No. OO-cv-OOlO!); AP-BClyd, inc.; The Mechanical Contractors Association of
New Jersey, Inc., Apl'ell~nts
No,01-4250
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPFALS FOR THF THIRD CIRCUIT
44 Fed. App>. 569; 2002 U.s. App. LBXIS 16019
.July 19,2002 Submitted uuder Thil'd Circuit LAR 34,I(a) Augnst 7, 2002, Decided August 7, 2002, Filed
NOTICE: ['Wl1 RULES OF THE TIIIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS MAY LIMIT CITATION TO UNPUllLISHED OPINIONS. PLEASE REFER TO THE RULES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THIS CIRCUIT.
PRIOR HISTORY: On Appeal from the United State, District Court for the District "fNew Jersey. (O.c. Nos. OO-cv-OO 100 & OO-CY-00101). Di,trict Judge: Honorable Joseph A. Greenaway.

OISPOSITION: Aftil1ned. CAST': SUMMARY;

PROCEDURAL POSTURE; Appellants, contractors and a contractors' ",sociation, sued appellee public school district ror maintaining a f!set-aside " program for constmction contracts. The contractors soughl declaratory relieC hut the work was completed before the case was heard. 111e contracto" reguested aLtorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1988, but the United SLates Oistrict C()L1rt tOl' the District of New jersey denied the request and the enntr.c!o!"s appealed.
OVERVIEW: The district courL consolidated the case with a similar case brought by electricians. 111e electricians entered into a consent order that ptovided that the school district would conduct a study to determine whether a set-aside program was warranted. Althnugh the contractors refused to jnin the COllscnL ortier, they argued they were cnLitled to attorney's fees uncier the "catalyst theory" --even though they did not prevail On the merits, the suit brought about a voluntary change in the school district's conduct, However, this theory was no longer viable hcc~use the United States Supreme Comi had rejected it. The c·ontractors Lhen tried to amend their complaint to seek nominal damages so that they could claim to be the "prevailing pan),," The district court rejected this request, and the appellate court_greed. 111e contractors' complainL sought injunctive and declaraLnry relief, not compensatory damages, nominal or otherwise. This relief became moot becanse Lhe work had been completed. The contractors could have been a pl'evailiTlg paliy had they joined the consent order. 'l'here was no judicially sancLioned change in the legnlrelationship between the contractors and the school district.
OliTCOMl£: 'j'he appellate court af'tinned the decision of tile district COU1i.
CORE Tt,;RMS: moot, set-aside, nominal damagcs, contractors, catnlyst, prevailing party, injuncLivc relief, teachings, lawsuit, declaratory reliei, consent decree, is also 010, injunctive, electrical, mootness, entitled to attorneys' fees, attorneys' fees. compensatory damages, judicial estoppel, irreLrievably, instiLutcd, plumbing, CI1joined .• inferred, rlominal, enjoin, phas., join, equitable
LcxlsNexis(R) Headnote.

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Case 1:06-cv-03842-RMB-AMD Document 34 Filed 11/02/2007 Page 9 of 12 Page 38 of41
Civil Procedure :-,:. Jluticiability :.-". .Nlootllcss > General Overview [HN IJ A claim for nominal damage" ex.u'acted late in (he day from a plaintiff's general pr.yer tor relief and a"erted solely to i::I.void otherwisl.; certain mootncss1 bems close inspE;lction. r:ivil Procedur." Judgmefm,. Preclusion & Effect ~f Judgments:> Estoppel> .ludicial Estoppel [HN2] Where a party assumcs a celiain position in a legal proceeding, and sllcceeds in maintaining that position, be may not thereafter, simply becallse his interests have changed, ass lime a contrary position, especially if it be to the prejudice of the party who has acquiesced in the position formerly taken by him, This rule, known as judicial estoppel, generally prevents a party fi'om prevailing in one phase ora case on an argument and then rdying on a contradictory argument to prevail in an()tiler phase.
Civil Procedure" JlIs/iciahlllty :> Mootness,. Real Controver"y Reqlliremelll lHN31 A case i~ moot when it has lost its character as a prosent, live controversy of the kind that must exist to avoid advisory opinion~ on abstract opinions of law. The. mootness doctrine i'5 centrally concen1ed with a court1s ability to grant effective telief: Ifdevclopments occur during the course llfadjudication that eJjminate a plaintiff's personal ,take in the outcome "fa suit 01' prevent a COUl1 from being able to grant the requested relief, the case must he dismissed as moot. ('lvi/Procedure" ,/llsticiahili(r ,. Mootness > Voluntary Ces,~ati(J11 Exception lHN41 Although ordinarily the voluntary, cessation ofalJegcdly illegal conduct does not deprive a federal court of jlll'isdktion, such action does bear on \-vhcther the court should in the exercise of its discretion, dismiss the case as moot.
1
However, some deference must be accorded to a state'. representation, that certain conduct has been discontinued,
Civil Procedure" .lusticiability > MQolness > General Overview Criminal Law & Proc"dufe" Sentencing:> Corrections, M(){/ijicaliolts & ReductiOlls :> Eligibility, CirCllntllimces & FaCTors [IIN5] Dcclaratory reliefi. moot when the challenged acts have already "irretrievably OCCUlTed,"
Civill'rocedll.re ,. Settlem!!nt.' ,. Settlement ,1greemelll.l > (ieneral Oven'iew eM! Procedure> .llldt-:ments ". Elltry ofJudgments :> Colt,~el!t Decrees eMI Procedure" .ludgmenls > Enlry of.llldgmeflts ". .t.'njilrcenumt & Exceulim/ ,. Genertll Overview [HN6J To be a prevailing party and thus entitled to attorneys' fcc, under 42 UXC,S, § 1988(b), the party must have either obtained a judgment on the merits or be a party to a settlement agreement that is expre~sly enforced by a COUlt thl'Ough a consent decree,
Civil Procedure:> Remedies:> Ow" & Attomer Fees,. General Overview rHN7J In the 'f'hird Circuit, for purposes of awa;'ding attorney'> fees, the "catalyst theory" is moribund,
COUNSEL: for AP flOYD INC., MECH CONTR ASSOC N.J, Appellant,: Edward], Frisch, Lindabury, McCormick & Bstabrook, We'tfleld, NJ.
For NEWARK PUB SCH, Appellee: Vito A, Uagliardi, Jr" POTzio, Bromberg & Newman, Monistown, NJ.
JUDGES: Flefore: McKEE., PUENTES and ALDISBRT, Circllit .Jlldges,
OPINION BY: Ruggero J. Aldiselt
OPINION
1*5701 OPINION OP THE COURT
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge.
We decide today that Appellants A.P. Floyd, Inc. and the Mechanical ContraetoTs Association of New Jersey, Inc, are not entitled to attorneys' rees for seeking declaraL<>ry and it~unclive relief against the Newark rublic School District. We will affirm the judgment ofthc district COllrL
Appellant, filed suit against the Newark Public School District for maintaining a "set-aside" program for electrical .md plumbing umtracts fat' the rVlalcolm X. Shabazz High School (the "Shabazz Project"), as welll**21 as t(>r Appellee's Pl)1iCY
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Case 1:06-cv-03842-RMB-AMD Document 34 Filed 11/02/2007 Page 10 of 12 Page 39 of 41
of race-based contracting. Appellants arglled that the Court's decision in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 102 L. Ed. 2d 854, 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989), rendered Appellee's actions unconstitutional because the ,et-aside program, purpOrtedly institllted according to Article 15 of the Public School Contn.cts Law ("PSCI."), N.J. Stat. Ann. 18A: 18A-S 1 through 59, impennissibly discriminated according to race, in violation of Article 1 section 5 oftllc New Jersey Cottstitution, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983. 19X8(b) and (0) and section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. TIle setaside program reters to the practice of excluding non-minority contractor, ttom bidding on particular projects, in which they otherwise would be eligible, in order to assist minority contractors in getting work. Appellants sought both declaratory and injunctive relief, attempting to have thc contract award, enjoined 01' Ilullifled, and the set-aside program declared unconstitutional.
The district court consolidated Appellants' case at trial with a 8imilar action brought hy the National Electrical Contractors Association ("NECA"). [**31 The School District ancl NECA entered into a Consent Order which provided that the District would conduct a stuily to determine whether a set-aside program was wammted. The Order j'1l1her provided that the District would not reinstate a set-aside program until such time as the study had been eotnpleted and found to wa11'ant such a program. Appellants rerused to join in the Consent Order.
Meanwhile, the electrical and plumbing work on the Shabhan Project had heen awarded and, for all intents and purposes, had heen substantially completed. Because Appellants sought only to vacate the contracts and enjoin the work, the court determined that tlleir action was now moot. Appellants then sought attnrneys' under the "catalyst theory" as articulated by this COlllt in Baumgartner v. HaTTisburg Hous. Auth., 21 F.3d 541 (Jd Cir. 1994). Appellants relied ostensibly on the theory that, al!hough they did not receive a judgment in their Ii.var, the Consent Order was germinated by Appellants' lawsuit, and that their lawsuit was the catalyst that brought about tbe rC]'OT1l1s. This contention is argued vigorously even though Appellants refllsed to join in the Consent Order. That aside, the ["41 Court has rejected the catalyst theory in Buckhannon Bd, & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va, Dept. of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 149 L. Hd. 2<1 855,121 S. Ct. 1835 (2001). Appellants then sought to amend their i'omplaint to [*5711 reque,t nomioal damages. Their goal was to thereby gualify as a prevailing party under the prevailing party theory, and thus he entitled to fees. n)e district Court denied the request and this appeal followed.
Appellants preselH three issues. Thoy argue that the di.strict court was inconsistent in it.s application of the teachings of Buckhannon with respect to nominal dam"ges, while dctcnllining that their equitable arg:uments were In()Ot: that they were prevailing parties by virtue oftlte Consent Order and alternatively, tbat the district court erred in applying the teachings of Buckhannon. Because we arc writing for parties who are familiar with the facts and procedural history in the di,trict coun, we will di,cus, only the legal issues presented before us and the· material facts relating thereto.
(,
Reducing Appellants' first argumem to a logical syllogi,m, their major premise is that when a case is moot, the court is
pl'obibilcd from c·onsiuering any l**51 otheT motion; this case is moot; therefore the COLIrt may not consider the nominal
damage!» issue. So Slated, it becomes obviolls that this contenriOr'llakes the form of the classic mat!:;:nal fallacy ofn(Jn sequitur. It was Appellants who "rgued that hecause their equitable contentions were determined as moot, the court should have considered an implied demalld for compensatory damages in the foml of nominal damages, Their request having been
denied, they now argue hefore ns that tlw court's action was inconsistent.
A.
Appellants are not entitled to nomitlal damages because.) to revert to a common law analysis that still persisls on the quesllon of whether one i, entitled to a jury trial, their complaint sounds in equity and not law. It sought injunctive and declaratory rc1ie( not COmpensatory damages, nominal or otherwise. We apply the teachings of Fox v. Od, oCTru,tees of the State Univ. ofN.Y,,42 FJd 135 (2d Cil', 1994), where students hrQught an action against SUNY seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on First Amendment grounds, Because the plaintiffs were no longer students dlll'ing the litigation, they argued, as do Appellants here, that they implicitly plcd nominal 1**61 damages when reque,ting "such other relief as the court deemed just a.nd proper.!] The court responded by stating: "then: i~ absolutely no specific tlllmt.ion in [the Complaint] ornominal damages, No/' can a request for such damages be inferred Irom the language of [the Complaint]." Fox, 42 1'.3d at 141; see also Ari£cmans for Omci,,1 English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 71,137 L, Ed. 2d 170,117 S. Ct. 1055 (1997) ([lml] "a claim for nomInal damages, extracted late in the day frortl lplaintiffs] general prayer lilT relief and asserted solely to avoid otherwise certain 11100tne8" [hearsl close inspection").
It. would have been preferable if Appella.nts' Brief contained a Summary of Argument., as re4uired by Rule 28(a)(8), Federal Rules of J\ppellat~ Procedure; to make more clear how this argument relates to their attack on mootncss on the theory that a claim for nominal damages could be inferred Itom the avemlent "such (lthe·r relier a, the court may award." Their contention 11ere flies in the face or their argument in support of a preliminary injunction wilere their counsel argued: "Iftbe project i.s
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Case 1:06-cv-03842-RMB-AMD Document 34 Filed 11/02/2007 Page 11 of 12 Page 40 of 41
awarded I.(J .~Qmebody cise, my client In,", (Ilat project, he has no right 1**71 (,f action to collect any monetary damages." Appellants' App. at 90. At the very least, the nominal damages ~rgLlmenl is foreclosed by dictates of Judicial Estoppel. See New lIampshirc v. Maine, 532 liS. 742, 749,149 L. Rd. 2d 968. ['5721 121 S. Ct. 1808 (200 I) ([HN2] "Where a party assumes a certain position in a legal pro(;·eeding t:md sllcceeds in maintaining that position, he may not thcreafter~ simply
l
becaw~e his interests have changed; a~.sume a contrary position, especially if it be to the prejudicl) ot'the party who has acquiesced in the po,itiQn formerly taken by him ... Thi, rule, known as judicial estoppel, generally prevents" party fi'om prevailing in one phase of" case on an argulTlcnt and then relyirlg (In a contradictory argument to prevail in another phase") (internal citations omitted).
n.
SuhSllmed in this "inconsistency" argument is Appellants' contention that the matter wa~ not moot. We now tum to this contention. [HN3] A case i, moot when it ha, lost its character as a present, live controversy of the kind that must exisl to avoid advisory opinions 011 abstract opinions of law. UilTcndcrfer v. Cent. Baptist Church of Miami, Florida, Irlc., 404 U.S.
412,414,30 L. Ed. 2<1 567, 92 S. Cl. 574 (1972) "'SI (per curiam).
The 1T1(1)lMllll rloGtrine is ct:oLraJly concerned with the. C(lllr(s ability to grant effective rdii':f. 'If devdopments Ot;cur during the course of ad,judil..:lltioTi that !1:1jjllinal~ a plaintitl'S pltf.liunul stake in the Ollt(;()mt: of II. ~\I\t or pr~\'tmL a (;nurt th:lUl being ubIi': to grllnt the l'et1L1illsltd rdiet~ the cast) must be dismisse.d as mont'
Coonty of Mon'is v. Nationalist Movement, 273 F.3d 527, 533 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Blanciak v.Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698-699 (3d Cir. 1996). Appellanls' lawsuil is moot. because they sought only injunctive or declaratory relief by voiding the contraCls. The work is substantially Jln;,hed, a new sludy of minority participation is being conducted, aod no MBE set-aside contracts will be awarded in the meantime.
In N.J. 'l'pk. Auth. v. Jersey Cent. Power and Ught, 772 F.2d 25 Od Cir. 1985), we held thalthe plaintiffs action to enjoin the shipping ofhazarJous materials on the New Jersey Turnpike Was moot because lhere was no reasonahle expectation that the wrong would be repeated.
Similarly, in Harri")l1 & Burrowe, Bridge Constructnrs, Inc. v. Cuomo, 981 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1992), ,"91 plaintiff contractors broLLgllt a 1983 claim against the Slate QfNew York alleging COllstitLltion,,1 violations slemming from the state's minority set-",ide program. The COlll't held that because Ncw York State had instituted emergency regulations for suspending enforcement oCthe set-aside pmgram pending a post Croson study, plaintiff's claims were moot. It re.soned that [HN4J although "ordinarily the voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct docs not deprive a federal court ofjurisdiction, such actiotl does beal' on whether the C.OUrt Sllouldl in the c.xerc;·ise of it!} dif'tc.retiol1\ dlsrnbs lhf.:: case as moot!! [d. at 59. It noted that "some deference must be accorded to a state's representation, that certain conduct has been discontinued." rd.
Finally, In Maryland Highways Contractor, iI.ssn., Inc. v. Stat.e of Md., 933 F.2d 1246 (4th Cir. (991), a en,c with facts almost identical m Ihl..lse present here, the contractors had alleged lhat the state's rninority 5et-aside pmbrram violated their equal protection rights. Becau,e Maryland commissioned a post Croson study during the pendency Qfthe appeal, the court held that plaintiffs c.iaim' became moot. We are persllatlcd by 1** IOJ the reasoning orthc," C"5es.
Moreover, we believe that [HN51 declaratory relief is also moot when the challenged acts have already "irretrievably
occurred." 1"5731 Acc(lrdingly, we apply the teachings QfN.J. lpk. Auth., that the claim lor injunctive relief had become
"academic by reason Qfthese changed circulllslances ...." [d. at27. H~re, as in N.J. Tpk. Auth., the challenged acli(lll awarding the contracts h., already occurred, aJld the work required by thclll h,1'S already bcen performed. There is no longer a "'slIbjeet matter upon which the judgment of the C(Jurt can operare' to mllke a substanLive determinali<ln on the meril'." Id. at
30 (quoting Ex Parte Baez, 177 U.S. 378, 390, 44 t. Ed. 813,20 S. Ct. 673 (1900)); see also Jersey Cent. Power and Light.
CO. V. Slat.e of N.J., 772 F.2d 35, 36 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that injunctive claim wa~ rendered "meaningless since the State acti,.Jn sought to be enjoined has irretrievably occurred").
II,
for Appellants [HN6J to be prevailing parties and thus entitled to attorneys' fces (lllder 42 U.S.C. 1988(b), they must have eilher obtained a judgmelll ott the meri18 or he a party to a ,el.l.lement agreement that is exprossly enforced hy the court through a consent decree. 1**IIJ Neilher has OCCUlTed here. First, as previously di,eussed, they have not prevailed on the mcrits because their claims were dismissed as moot. Tirey were not a pany to a court enforced consent deere·e because thcy deliberalely refused to ne a pat1y lo the Consent Order. TIlere ha, heen no "judicially sanctioned change in the legal
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relationship" between Appellants and th~ District. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605. Appellants' application for attorney,' tee, therefore rests entirely 011 the catalyst theoty.
III.
We reject the alternative argument that [HN7] the catalyst theory is alive and wei I in this judicial circuit. Indeed, it is mQl'ibund. Truesdell v. Phila. HOlls. Amh., 290 FJd 159, 1M n.3 (3d Cir. 2002) ("In Ill1ekhannon, the Supreme Court rejected the i!catalyst theOlYI II holding th\1t when:: H party has failed to ogecure ajudgml:::nt on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree. but has nonethcbs achieved the desired result hecause the law,uit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct, the plaintitfis not a "prevailing party.").
* * '" * ;.fI
We have considered all contentions presented hy the parties and conclude th.lno further discussion is Ilece,"ary.
1"'121 TI,e· judgment oftl,e district comt will be atfjnned.
Is/ Ruggero J. Aldiserl
Circuit Judge
DATED; August 7, 2002

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 CM/ECF LIVE - U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey - Docket Report

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RULE16, SCHEDO
U.S. District Court District of New Jersey [LIVE] (Camden) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:06-cv-03842-RMB-AMD

ASSEMBLY OF GOD CHURCH RIVERSIDE, NEW JERSEY et al v. TOWNSHIP OF RIVERSIDE et al Assigned to: Judge Renee Marie Bumb Referred to: Magistrate Judge Ann Marie Donio Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

Date Filed: 08/15/2006 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Plaintiff
ASSEMBLY OF GOD CHURCH RIVERSIDE, NEW JERSEY

represented by JESUS J. PENA JESUS J. PENA, ESQ. & ASSOCIATES 88-19 ROOSEVELT AVENUE JACKSON HEIGHTS, NY 11372 (718) 779-6961 Email: imiglaw@aol.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
NATIONAL COALITION OF LATINO CLERGY AND CHRISTIAN LEADERS ("CONLAMIC")

represented by JESUS J. PENA (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
FRANCO ORDONEZ individually and on behalf of all similaryl situated

represented by JESUS J. PENA (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant TOWNSHIP OF RIVERSIDE

represented by DOUGLAS L. HEINOLD PARKER MCCAY THREE GREENTREE CENTRE 7001 LINCOLN DRIVE WEST MARLTON, NJ 08053 856-596-8900 Email: dheinold@parkermccay.com TERMINATED: 01/09/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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11/6/2007

CM/ECF LIVE - U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey - Docket Report

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Defendant
MAYOR CHARLES F. HILTON, JR. TERMINATED: 01/04/2007

GEORGE R. SAPONARO THE NEWBOLD HOUSE 27 CEDAR ST. MOUNT HOLLY, NJ 08060 (609) 518-1256 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by DOUGLAS L. HEINOLD (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/10/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 08/15/2006
08/22/2006 08/31/2006 08/31/2006 09/26/2006 09/28/2006
10/03/2006 10/03/2006

#

Docket Text

1 COMPLAINT against TOWNSHIP OF RIVERSIDE, CHARLES F. HILTON, JR ( Filing fee $ 350 receipt number 2-340481.) , filed by ASSEMBLY OF GOD CHURCH RIVERSIDE, NEW JERSEY, NATIONAL COALITION OF LATINO CLERGY AND CHRISTIAN LEADERS, FRANCO ORDONEZ. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet)(gn ) (Entered: 08/22/2006)

2 Summons Issued as to TOWNSHIP OF RIVERSIDE, CHARLES F. HILTON, JR.Days Due - 20. (gn, )(MAILED) (Entered: 08/22/2006)

3 First MOTION to Dismiss Complaint by TOWNSHIP OF RIVERSIDE, CHARLES F. HILTON, JR. (Attachments: # 1 Order to Dismiss# 2 Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss)(HEINOLD, DOUGLAS) (Entered: 08/31/2006)

Setting Deadlines as to 3 First MOTION to Dismiss Complaint. Motion Hearing set for 10/6/2006 before Judge Renee Marie Bumb. PLEASE BE ADVISED THIS MOTION WILL BE DECIDED ON THE PAPERS UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTIFIED BY THE COURT. (js) (Entered: 09/01/2006)

4 NOTICE of Appearance by JESUS J. PENA on behalf of ASSEMBLY OF GOD CHURCH RIVERSIDE, NEW JERSEY, NATIONAL COALITION OF LATINO CLERGY AND CHRISTIAN LEADERS, FRANCO ORDONEZ (sb) (Entered: 09/26/2006)

5 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss by ASSEMBLY OF GOD CHURCH RIVERSIDE, NEW JERSEY, NATIONAL COALITION OF LATINO CLERGY AND CHRISTIAN LEADERS, FRANCO ORDONEZ. (Attachments: # 1 Brief)(sb) (Entered: 09/28/2006)

6 Defendants ANSWER to Complaint and Affirmative Defenses by TOWNSHIP OF RIVERSIDE, CHARLES F. HILTON, JR.(HEINOLD, DOUGLAS) (Entered: 10/03/2006)

7 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by TOWNSHIP OF RIVERSIDE, CHARLES F. HILTON, JR re 6 Answer to Complaint and Affirmative Defenses (HEINOLD,

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10/03/2006 10/05/2006 11/13/2006 12/20/2006 12/21/2006 12/22/2006 12/27/2006
12/27/2006
01/04/2007 01/04/2007 01/04/2007 01/05/2007

DOUGLAS) (Entered: 10/03/2006)
8 ORDERED that plaintiffs shall file and serve an amended complaint within 20 days and denying without prejudice 3 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 10/3/06. (sb) (Entered: 10/04/2006)
9 ORDER setting Initial Scheduling Conference for 11/14/2006 02:30 PM before Magistrate Judge Ann Marie Donio. Signed by Judge Ann Marie Donio on 10/5/06. (sb) (Entered: 10/05/2006)
10 SCHEDULING ORDER:The Initial Scheduling Conference is rescheduled for 12/20/2006 10:30 AM before Magistrate Judge Ann Marie Donio.Signed by Judge Ann Marie Donio on 11/13/06. (sb) (Entered: 11/14/2006)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ann Marie Donio : Initial Pretrial Conference held on 12/20/2006. (jm1, ) (Entered: 12/21/2006)
11 SCHEDULING ORDER:Telephone Status Conference set for 1/22/2007 12:00 PM before Magistrate Judge Ann Marie Donio. Discovery due by 3/30/2007. Motions due by 4/30/2007. Signed by Judge Ann Marie Donio on 12/21/06. (sb) (Entered: 12/21/2006)
12 STIPULATION of Dismissal by TOWNSHIP OF RIVERSIDE, CHARLES F. HILTON, JR. (HEINOLD, DOUGLAS) (Entered: 12/22/2006)
13 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice (to admit Michael M. Hethmon, Esq. to appear) by TOWNSHIP OF RIVERSIDE. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Michael Hethmon, Esquire# 2 Certification of Douglas L. Heinold, Esquire# 3 Text of Proposed Order granting Michael M. Hethmon, Esq. be admitted to practice pro hac vice)(HEINOLD, DOUGLAS) (Entered: 12/27/2006)
Setting Deadlines as to 13 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice (to admit Michael M. Hethmon, Esq. to appear). Motion Hearing set for 2/2/2007 before Magistrate Judge Ann Marie Donio. PLEASE BE ADVISED THIS MOTION WILL BE DECIDED ON THE PAPERS UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTIFIED BY THE COURT. (js) (Entered: 12/29/2006)
14 STIPULATION AND ORDER of Dismissal of Mayor Charles F. Hilton, Jr. as defendant with prejudice. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 1/7/07. (sb) (Entered: 01/04/2007)
15 MOTION for William J. Sanchez, Esq. Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice by ASSEMBLY OF GOD CHURCH RIVERSIDE, NEW JERSEY, NATIONAL COALITION OF LATINO CLERGY AND CHRISTIAN LEADERS, FRANCO ORDONEZ. (sb) (Entered: 01/04/2007)
Setting return date as to 15 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice for 2/2/2007 before Magistrate Judge Ann Marie Donio. PLEASE BE ADVISED THAT THIS MOTION WILL BE DECIDED ON THE PAPERS UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTIFIED BY THE COURT. (sb) (Entered: 01/04/2007)
16 AMENDED COMPLAINT against TOWNSHIP OF RIVERSIDE , filed by ASSEMBLY OF GOD CHURCH RIVERSIDE, NEW JERSEY, NATIONAL COALITION OF LATINO CLERGY AND CHRISTIAN LEADERS, FRANCO

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01/08/2007 01/09/2007 01/23/2007 01/24/2007 02/02/2007 02/05/2007 02/06/2007 04/16/2007 04/17/2007 05/30/2007 05/30/2007
09/21/2007
09/21/2007

ORDONEZ.(sb) (Entered: 01/08/2007)
17 SCHEDULING ORDER: Telephone Status Conference set for 1/22/2007 12:00 PM before Magistrate Judge Ann Marie Donio. Signed by Judge Ann Marie Donio on 1/8/07. (sb) (Entered: 01/09/2007)
18 Substitution of Attorney - Attorney DOUGLAS L. HEINOLD and DOUGLAS L. HEINOLD for TOWNSHIP OF RIVERSIDE added. Attorney DOUGLAS L. HEINOLD terminated.. (HEINOLD, DOUGLAS) (Entered: 01/09/2007)
19 SCHEDULING ORDER: Telephone Status Conference set for 2/1/2007 09:30 AM before Magistrate Judge Ann Marie Donio. Signed by Judge Ann Marie Donio on 1/23/07. (sb) (Entered: 01/23/2007)
20 ORDER denying without prejudice 13 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Judge Ann Marie Donio on 1/24/07. (sb) (Entered: 01/24/2007)
21 ORDER granting 15 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Ordered that the attorney admitted pro hac vice is directed to make payment of $150 made payable to Clerk, U.S. District Court. Signed by Judge Ann Marie Donio on 2/2/07. (sb) (Entered: 02/02/2007)
Set/Reset Hearings: Telephone/Status Conference reset for 2/6/2007 09:30 AM before Magistrate Judge Ann Marie Donio. Plaintiff's counsel to advise all parties and set up call. (jm1, ) (Entered: 02/05/2007)
22 SCHEDULING ORDER: Telephone Status Conference set for 4/16/2007 03:00 PM before Magistrate Judge Ann Marie Donio. Discovery due by 5/30/2007. Motions due by 6/29/2007.Signed by Judge Ann Marie Donio on 2/6/07. (sb) (Entered: 02/07/2007)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ann Marie Donio : Status Conference held on 4/16/2007. (jm1, ) (Entered: 04/16/2007)
23 SCHEDULING ORDER:Telephone Status Conference set for 5/30/2007 10:30 AM before Magistrate Judge Ann Marie Donio.Signed by Judge Ann Marie Donio on 4/17/07. (sb) (Entered: 04/18/2007)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ann Marie Donio : Status Conference held on 5/30/2007. (jm1, ) (Entered: 05/30/2007)
24 AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER: Final Pretrial Conference set for 12/19/2007 at 11:30 AM before Magistrate Judge Ann Marie Donio,Amended Pleadings due by 6/29/2007,Discovery due by 9/28/2007, Disp. Motions due by 10/30/2007. Signed by Judge Ann Marie Donio on 5/30/07. (js) (Entered: 05/31/2007)
25 MOTION for Summary Judgment and memorandum of law by ASSEMBLY OF GOD CHURCH RIVERSIDE, NEW JERSEY, NATIONAL COALITION OF LATINO CLERGY AND CHRISTIAN LEADERS, FRANCO ORDONEZ. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ordinance 16# 2 Exhibit Ordinance 2006-26# 3 Exhibit Newspaper Articles)(PENA, JESUS) (Entered: 09/21/2007)
26 MOTION for Attorney Fees by ASSEMBLY OF GOD CHURCH RIVERSIDE,

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09/24/2007
09/25/2007 09/25/2007 09/25/2007 10/15/2007 10/15/2007 10/16/2007 10/16/2007 10/17/2007

NEW JERSEY, NATIONAL COALITION OF LATINO CLERGY AND CHRISTIAN LEADERS, FRANCO ORDONEZ. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Newspaper Articles# 2 Exhibit Detailed Hourly Report)(PENA, JESUS) (Entered: 09/21/2007)
CLERKS OFFICE QUALITY CONTROL MESSAGE - The MOTION for Summary Judgment, Doc.25 and MOTION Attorney Fees, Doc.26 submitted by J. PENA, ESQ. on 9/21/07 did not contain a proper electronic signature (s/). PLEASE RESUBMIT THE DOCUMENT WITH THE PROPER ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE BY 9/27/07. This submission will remain on the docket unless otherwise ordered by the court. This message is for informational purposes only. (gn ) (Entered: 09/24/2007)
27 MOTION for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law by ASSEMBLY OF GOD CHURCH RIVERSIDE, NEW JERSEY, NATIONAL COALITION OF LATINO CLERGY AND CHRISTIAN LEADERS, FRANCO ORDONEZ. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ordinance 16# 2 Exhibit Ordinance 2006-26# 3 Exhibit Newspaper Articles)(PENA, JESUS) (Entered: 09/25/2007)
28 MOTION for Attorney Fees by ASSEMBLY OF GOD CHURCH RIVERSIDE, NEW JERSEY, NATIONAL COALITION OF LATINO CLERGY AND CHRISTIAN LEADERS, FRANCO ORDONEZ. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Newspaper Articles# 2 Exhibit Hourly Fees)(PENA, JESUS) (Entered: 09/25/2007)
Setting Deadlines as to 28 MOTION for Attorney Fees, 27 MOTION for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law. Motion returnable for 10/19/2007 before Judge Renee Marie Bumb. (Please be advised the motion will be decided on the papers unless otherwise notified by the court) (gn ) (Entered: 09/26/2007)
29 MOTION Waive appearance of Local Counsel for Oral Arguments by ASSEMBLY OF GOD CHURCH RIVERSIDE, NEW JERSEY, NATIONAL COALITION OF LATINO CLERGY AND CHRISTIAN LEADERS, FRANCO ORDONEZ. (PENA, JESUS) (Entered: 10/15/2007)
Setting Deadlines as to 29 MOTION Waive appearance of Local Counsel for Oral Arguments. Motion returnable for 11/16/2007 before Judge Renee Marie Bumb. (gn, ) (Entered: 10/16/2007)
30 Amended MOTION for Attorney Fees by ASSEMBLY OF GOD CHURCH RIVERSIDE, NEW JERSEY, NATIONAL COALITION OF LATINO CLERGY AND CHRISTIAN LEADERS, FRANCO ORDONEZ. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit "A"# 2 Exhibit Exhibit "B"# 3 Exhibit Exhibit "C")(PENA, JESUS) (Entered: 10/16/2007)
Setting Deadlines as to 30 Amended MOTION for Attorney Fees. Motion returnable for 11/16/2007 before Judge Renee Marie Bumb. (gn) (Entered: 10/17/2007)
31 AFFIDAVIT in Support re 30 Amended MOTION for Attorney Fees filed by ASSEMBLY OF GOD CHURCH RIVERSIDE, NEW JERSEY, NATIONAL COALITION OF LATINO CLERGY AND CHRISTIAN LEADERS, FRANCO

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10/17/2007 10/18/2007
10/22/2007 11/02/2007

ORDONEZ. (PENA, JESUS) (Entered: 10/17/2007)
CLERK'S QUALITY CONTROL MESSAGE: Only the attorney electronically submitting a document is permitted to s/ their signature all other signatures must be scanned. Please resubmit the Affidavit with a signature of local counsel by 10/22/07 (gn) (Entered: 10/18/2007)
32 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Renee Marie Bumb : Telephone Conference held on 10/18/2007. Ordered defendant to reply to plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment and for attorney fees by 11/2/07. Ordered plaintiffs' response due by 11/9/07. Ordered oral argument set for 11/30/07 at 2:00p.m. (Court Reporter Ted Formaroli.) (ar1, ) (Entered: 10/18/2007)
33 ORDER DENIED 29 Motion waive appearance at oral argument on October 19, 2007. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 10/22/07. (gn) (Entered: 10/22/2007)
34 RESPONSE to Motion re 28 MOTION for Attorney Fees filed by TOWNSHIP OF RIVERSIDE. (gn ) (Entered: 11/05/2007)

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