IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA Civil No.02-CV-502 RHK/JMM

VENANTIUS NKAFOR

)

NGWANYIA, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v.

)

)

JOHN ASHCROFT, Attorney

)

General, et al.,

)

)

Defendants. )

____________________________________)

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED

MARY KENNEY NADINE K. WETTSTEIN J. TRACI HONG American Immigration Law Foundation 918 F Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20004 Telephone: (202) 742-5600 Fax: (202) 783-7857
JAMES K. LANGDON II Attorney Registration # 171931 Suite 1500, 50 South Sixth Street Minneapolis, MN 55402 Telephone: (612) 340-8759 Fax: (612) 340-2868
IRIS GOMEZ Massachusetts Law Reform Institute 99 Chauncy Street, Suite 500 Boston, MA 02111 Telephone: (617) 357-0700 Fax: (617) 357-0777
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS

INTRODUCTION Plaintiffs, by and through counsel, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 and D. Minn. LR 7.1(b)(2), hereby submit Pla intiffs’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Class Certification. Plaintiffs and the proposed class challenge the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s (INS) failure to allot, on a yearly basis, all 10,000 refugee admissions designated by Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) §209(b), 8 U.S.C. §1159(b), and by Presidential Decree specifically for individuals who have been granted asylum in the United States and who have applied to adjust their status to that of permanent resident.1 Plaintiffs also challenge Defendants’ failure to allocate the asylee adjustment numbers that it does issue “on a priority basis by the date the application was properly filed,” 8 C.F.R. §209.2(a)(1), and to immediately adjust the status of all eligible asylee adjustment applicants who are exempt, under various public laws, from the cap on asylee admissions found in 8 U.S.C. §1159(b). See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 105-277, Title I, §128; Pub. L. No.106-429, §586; and Pub. L. No.106-378. Finally, the suit challenges the INS’ failure to automatically provide employment authorization endorsement to asylees incident to their status as asylees, for the entire period that they await adjustment to permanent residency. See INA §208(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. §1158(c)(1)(B). Plaintiffs and the proposed class members are all asylees who have applied for adjustment to permanent residency and are currently on the waiting list for an asylee
1 Individuals granted asylum in the United States will hereinafter be referred to as “asylees.” The “refugee admissions” designated by statute for asylees will hereinafter be referred to as “asylee adjustments.”
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adjustment number. The majority of Plaintiffs and class members have also applied for or applied to renew their Employment Authorization Documents (EAD). As detailed in Plaintiffs’ Complaint and attached Exhibits 1-26, Plaintiffs have been harmed by the challenged policies and practices.
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, Plaintiffs seek to represent a class consisting of all asylees in the United States who have applied for adjustment of status to lawful permanent residence and whose applications for adjustment remain pending. The following subclasses fall within this class:
Subclass I: All asylees who filed their adjustment of status applications with the INS on or before January 16, 1998;
Subclass II: All asylees who filed their adjustment of status applications after January 16, 1998 and on or before June 9, 1998;
Subclass III: All asylees who filed their adjustment of status applications after June 9, 1998.
Subclass IV: All asylees who applied for or applied to renew an Employment Authorization Document (EAD); and
Subclass V: All asylees who are exempt from the annual statutory cap of 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers set by INA §209(b), 8 U.S.C. §1159(b).
For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiffs now move to certify the aforementioned class and subclasses I, II, III and IV. 2
2 At this time, Plaintiffs are not moving to certify subclass V – asylees exemp t from the statutory cap. Plaintiffs anticipate amending the complaint in the near future to add additional subclass V plaintiffs. At that point, Plaintiffs will move to certify this final subclass. Accord Sondel v. Northwest Airlines, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21252, *11 (D. Minn. 1993) citing FRCP 23(c)(1) and 23(c)(4) (Court may certify a class as to
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DISCUSSION I. Requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 To obtain class action certification, Plaintiffs must establish that all four requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and at least one part of Rule 23(b) are met. Sondel v. Northwest Airlines, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21252, *8, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 415 (D. Minn. 1993). Additionally, Plaintiffs must satisfy two “implicit requirements” for class certification: “(1) the existence of a precisely defined class; and (2) that the class representatives are members of the proposed class.” Id. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) provides that one or more members of a class may sue as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. A court may only certify a proposed class if it falls under one of the three categories of classes described in Rule 23(b). Plaintiffs request certification under Rule 23(b)(2), which provides: “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.” A principle purpose of class certification is “‘efficiency and economy of litigation.’” Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 139 F.R.D. 657, 664 (D. Minn. 1991) (quoting American
only some of the claims and may subsequently alter or amend the certification to reflect further developments in a case). In the interim, there is no reason to delay certification of the remainder of the class. See, e.g., Paxton v. Union National Bank, 688 F.2d 552, 558 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1083 (1983)
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Pipe and Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553, 38 L.Ed. 2d 713, 94 S.Ct. 756 (1974)). In determining whether to certify a class, the court “shall not conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of plaintiffs’ suit; rather, it must evaluate whether plaintiffs meet the requirements of Rule 23.” Sondel, 1993 D.Ct. LEXIS 21252 at *10 (citing Eisen v. Carlisle & Jaquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 2152-53, 40 L.Ed. 2d 732 (1974)). Moreover, “[w]hen there is a question as to whether certification is appropriate, the Court should give the benefit of the doubt to approving the class.” In re Workers Compensation, 130 F.R.D. 99, 104 (D. Minn. 1990) (citations omitted).
II. Implicit Requirements for Class Certification Plaintiffs are all members of the clearly defined proposed class and subclasses I, II, III and IV, and therefore satisfy the implicit requirements for class certification. To be a member of the class, an individual need only demonstrate that he or she has been granted asylum, has filed an application to adjust status to that of a permanent resident, and is waiting for the adjustment application to be adjudicated. The subclasses are equally clear: the first three entail only a determination of the date that the individual filed an adjustment of status application and the fourth requires only a showing that the asylee has applied for or applied to renew an EAD. Each of these facts is “easily determined,” and thus the class and subclasses are easily defined. In re Workers Compensation, 130 F.R.D. at 104 (class consisting of only those who purchased workers compensation insurance was clearly defined).
All Plaintiffs are asylees in the United States who have filed applications for adjustment of status, and who are currently awaiting an asylee adjustment number. See
quoting FRCP 23(c)(1) (class should be certified “[a]s soon as practicable after commencement of the action”).
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Exhibits 1-25. There are also individual class representatives who fall within each of the four subclasses.
A. Subclass I. Seventeen named Plaintiffs applied for adjustment of status prior to January 16, 1998 and their applications are still pending. These Plaintiffs are: Venantius Nkafor Ngwanyia; Wesene Ayele Gizaw; Merdekios Duressa; Salah Farah; Aloysius Tabue; Fakmi Hysenaj; Mat Dupuy; Solange Pierre; Dieuzeve Joseph; Akbar L. Ng; Zoila Margarita Castillo Ramirez; Luis Carballo-Manzanares; Maria Herrera; Marie Diogene; Graciela Martinez; Patrick Davies; and Fawzy Abdelsamad. The attached representative declarations demonstrate membership within subclass I: Exhibit 1 (Venantius Nkafor Ngwanyia); Exhibit 2 (Wesene Ayele Gizaw); Exhibit 3 (Merdekios Duressa); Exhibit 4 (Salah Farah); Exhibit 5 (Mat Dupuy); Exhibit 6 (Solange Pierre); Exhibit 7 (Zoila Margarita Castillo Ramirez); Exhibit 8 (Luis Carballo-Manzanares); Exhibit 9 (Maria Herrera); and Exhibit 10 (Fawzy Abdelsamad). B. Subclass II. Six named Plaintiffs applied for adjustment of status after January 16, 1998 but before June 9, 1998, and their applications remain pending. These Plaintiffs are: Stella Emuwahen Erhabor; Murad Fakhouri; Arslan Durrani; Faisal Usman; Sherman Brown; and Laura Tabue. The attached representative declarations demonstrate membership in this subclass: Exhibit 11 (Faisal Usman) and Exhibit 12 (Sherman Brown). C. Subclass III
Eighteen named Plaintiffs applied for adjustment of status after June 9, 1998, and their applications remain pending. These Plaintiffs are: Oleksander Zinkovsky;
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Unsheju Mbu Izampuye; Joseph Coleman; Adrienne Kazarwa; Amondieu Milfort; Dragon Cvetkovic; Aman Yakob; Nina Ionescu; Santiago Ruano Oliva; Abdiaziz Hassan; Patricia Muendo; Ali Murtaza; Pierre Boumtje; Martine Ernestine Boumtje; Rosemary Ekeada; Iltam S. Jean-Caidor; Bassem El-Khatib; and Bekana Huluka.
The attached representative declarations demonstrate membership in this subclass: Exhibit 13 (Aman Yakob); Exhibit 14 (Nina Ionescu); Exhibit 15 (Santiago Ruano Oliva); Exhibit 16 (Patricia Muendo); Exhibit 17 (Rosemary Ekeada); Exhibit 18 (Iltam S. Jean-Caidor); Exhibit 19 (Bassem El-Khatib); Exhibit 20 (Dragon Cvetkovic); Exhibit 21 (Pierre Boumtje); Exhibit 22 (Bekana Huluka); Exhibit 23 (Unsheju Mbu Izampuye); Exhibit 24 (Amondieu Milfort); and Exhibit 25 (Oleksander Zinkovsky). D. Subclass IV Forty Plaintiffs have applied for an EAD or a renewal of an EAD. These plaintiffs are: Ngwanyia; Gizaw; Duressa; Mohamad Farah; Mary Kariuki; S. Farah; A. Tabue; Hysenaj; Dupuy; Pierre; Joseph; Ng; Z. Castillo; Carballo-Manzanares; Herrera; Diogene; Martinez; Davies; Abdelsamad; Fakhouri; Durrani; Usman; L. Tabue; Oleksander Zinkovsky; Unsheju Mbu Izampuye; Joseph Coleman; Adrienne Kazarwa; Amondieu Milfort; Aman Yakob; Nina Ionescu; Santiago Ruano Oliva; Abdiaziz Hassan; Patricia Muendo; Ali Murtaza; Pierre Boumtje; Martine Ernestine Boumtje; Rosemary Ekeada; Iltam S. JeanCaidor; Bassem El-Khatib; and Bekana Hulaka.3 The attached representative declarations demonstrate membership in this subclass: Exhibit 1 (Ngwanyia); Exhibit 2 (Gizaw); Exhibit 3 (Duressa); Exhibit 4 (S. Farah); Exhibit 5 (Dupuy); Exhibit 6 (Pierre); Exhibit 7 (Z. Castillo); Exhibit 8 (Carballo-
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Manzanares); Exhibit 9 (Herrera); Exhibit 10 (Abdelsamad); Exhibit 11 (Usman); Exhibit 13 (Aman Yakob); Exhibit 14 (Nina Ionescu); Exhibit 15 (Santiago Ruano Oliva); Exhibit 16 (Patricia Muendo); Exhibit 17 (Rosemary Ekeada); Exhibit 18 (Iltam S. Jean-Caidor); and Exhibit 19 (Bassem El-Khatib).
III. Application of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) A. Numerosity Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1), a class must be “so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” Joinder need not be impossible; all that is required is that “joining all class members would be inconvenient or difficult.” Sondel, 1993 D.Ct. LEXIS 21252 at * 21. Rule 23(a)(1) “imposes no absolute limitations;” instead, a court must make “a practical judgment based on the specific facts of each case.” Id. at 20. Moreover, where a court may reasonably infer from the facts that numerosity is met, it is not necessary for plaintiffs to identify each member or the exact size of the class. Id. at * 21. In fact, “[t]he cases are legion suggesting that there is no absolute number which will satisfy the numerosity requirement.” Jenson, 139 F.R.D. at 664 (citing Paxton v. Union National Bank, 688 F.2d 552, 559-60 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1083 (1983)); Boyd v. Ozark Airlines, Inc., 568 F.2d 50, 54 (8th Cir. 1977). The Eighth Circuit has upheld certification of a class as small as 20 persons. Arkansas Ed. Ass'n v. Board of Education, 446 F.2d 763, 765-66 (8th Cir. 1971). The proposed class contains tens of thousands of asylees. INS has estimated that the waiting list for adjustment numbers for asylees who have applied for adjustment of status is well over 50,000. In November 2000, the Nebraska Service Center estimated the backlog at 44,000. Exhibit 26 (“American Immigration Lawyers’ Association – INS
3 A number of subclass IV plaintiffs also fall within subclass I, II or III.
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Nebraska Service Center Annual Liaison Questions”). By May, 2001, that number had increased to 51,000. Exhibit 27 (“INS Responses to Questions from Rep. Conyers,” Section 6). At that time INS also estimated that the backlog would continue to grow by 22,000 cases annually. Exhibit 28 (“AILA-NSC Teleconference,” Answer to Question 19). Further, in May 2001, there were an additional 12,000 to 21,000 cases pending at INS District Offices. Exhibit 27 (estimating 12,000); Exhibit 28 (estimating 21,000). By early 2002, approximately 9,000 of these cases remained at District Offices. Exhibit 29 (AILA DC Newsletter, Jan-Feb. 2002, p.29). The number of potential class members clearly makes joinder of all of their claims impracticable.
These large numbers are not the sole reason joinder is impracticable here. Other factors relevant to the joinder analysis include: the nature of the suit; the ease of identifying class members; their geographical dispersion; the inconvenience of conducting individual lawsuits; and whether the size of individual claims is so small as to inhibit individuals from separately pursuing claims. See, e.g., Paxton, 688 F.2d at 559-60; Beckman v. CBS, Inc., 192 F.R.D. 608, 613 (D. Minn. 2000).
Plaintiffs and proposed class members live throughout the United States. This geographical dispersion makes joinder impracticable. See, e.g., Sondel, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21252 at *22 (“Plaintiffs have also offered evidence that the members of the class are geographically dispersed, making joinder difficult”); Hewlitt v. Premier Salons, Inc., 185 F.R.D. 211, 215 (D. Md. 1997) (certifying class of African Americans refused services at salons in all 50 states). While five Plaintiffs live in Minnesota,4 others live in such disperse locales as, for example, California (Plaintiff El Khatib, Exh.19); Massachusetts
4 They are Ngwanyia, Gizaw, Duressa, Mohamad Farah and Mary Kariuki.
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(Jean-Caidor, Exh. 18); Nebraska (Ruano-Oliva, Exh. 15); New York (Ionescu, Exh. 14); Texas (Muendo, Exh. 16); and Virginia (Yakob, Exh. 13).
Additionally, as a direct result of the challenged practices – Defendants’ failure to properly maintain a waiting list of all non-exempt adjustment applicants based upon the date of their application – members of the class and subclasses are not all known or identified at this point in time. For instance, recent memorandum of Defendant INS to its District Offices indicates that there is not a complete list of all asylees who applied for adjustment prior to June 9, 1998, and also that the location of some of these files may not be known. See Exhibit 30 and 31.
A court may “reasonably infer that numerosity is satisfied from the facts of the case.” Sondel, 1993 D.Ct. LEXIS 21252 at * 21. A combination of factors demonstrate that joinder of all class members is impracticable in this case: the size of the classes and subclasses; the fact that, at this point, Defendants have not yet identified all members of the subclasses; the geographical spread of the class members, and the burden which individual suits would place on class members and the courts. Finally, joinder is impracticable “because none of [the class members], individually, could obtain the broadbased declaratory and injunctive relief the class representatives [seek].” Paxton, 688 F.2d at 561 (citations omitted).
B. Commonality Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) requires that “there [be] questions of law or fact common to the class.” Commonality is not required on every question raised in a class action. DeBoer v. Mellon Mortgage Company, 64 F.3d 1171, 1174 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1156 (1996). A common question of law exists when the legal question linking
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the class members is substantially related to the resolution of the litigation. Id. Thus, commonality is satisfied when, as here, “members of the class have allegedly been affected by a general policy of the defendant, and the policy is the focus of the litigation. Beckman, 192 F.R.D. at 614 (citation omitted).
A challenge to a program’s compliance with the mandates of its enabling legislation, even where the plaintiffs-beneficiaries are differently impacted by the violations, satisfies the commonality requirement. Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 56 (3d Cir. 1994). Courts consider “common” such challenges based on alleged violations of statutory standards. Id. at 56-57. See also Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1046 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied 526 U.S. 1003 (1999)(successful challenge to notice provided to individual non-citizens in civil document fraud proceedings); Campos v. INS, 188 F.R.D. 656, 660 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (citing Campos v. Nail, 940 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1991) (Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylum seekers permitted to challenge pattern and practice of immigration judge who consistently denied requests for change of venue)); Fernandez Roque v. Smith, 91 F.R.D. 117 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (Cuba nationals denied parole challenged INS system-wide parole procedures); Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1026 (11th Cir. 1982).
The threshold for commonality is not high. Forbush v. J.C. Penney Co., 994 F.2d 1101, 1106 (5th Cir. 1993). Moreover, the circumstances of each class member need not be identical; to the contrary, “[f]actual differences between plaintiffs are to be expected.” Jenson, 139 F.R.D. at 664 (citing Coley v. Clinton, 635 F.2d 1364 (8th Cir. 1980)).
In the instant case, an identical legal issue links all members of the class: whether Defendants have misadministered the asylee adjustment numbers. Additionally, common
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legal questions link the members of each subclass. Subclasses I, II and III are each concerned with the additional questions of whether Defendants have failed to annually issue all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers as required by 8 U.S.C. §1158(b) and, with regard to adjustment numbers that were is sued, whether Defendants issued them on a first in, first out basis as required by 8 C.F.R. §209.2(a)(1). Similarly, the legal question common to all members of subclass IV is whether Defendants’ requirement that asylees apply for an EAD and renew this EAD application every year, at the current cost of $120.00 per year, violates 8 U.S.C. §1158(c)(1)(B).
All plaintiffs and class members are further back on the waiting list than they otherwise would have been as a direct result of practices challenged in this lawsuit. In fact, had Defendants correctly administered the asylee adjustment numbers –in particular, had they issued the 18,000 unused asylee adjustment numbers authorized by the President – in all likelihood members of subclass I would have adjusted by now, and members of subclass II would be adjusted by the end of this fiscal year. Moreover, all members of subclass IV bear the additional burden of having to apply for and renew EADs.
All class members are interested in a “satisfactory common course of conduct” by Defendants in the future issuance of asylee adjustment numbers and EADs. DeBoer, 64 F.3d at 1174. Consequently, Plaintiffs are requesting declaratory and injunctive relief. “This declaratory and injunctive nexus is sufficient to establish the requisite commonality.” Paxton, 688 F.2d 561.
C. Typicality Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3) requires that “the claims or defenses of the representative parties [be] typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” Typicality is demonstrated
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where “the named plaintiffs’ claims arise out of the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the class members’ claims and is based on the same legal theory.” Sondel, 1993 D.Ct. LEXIS 21252 at *26 (citing Paxton, 688 F.2d at 561-62; Dirks v. Clayton Brokerage Co. of St. Louis, 105 F.R.D. 125, 132-33 (D. Minn. 1985)). “The pertinent legal inquiry is whether the named plaintiffs’ individual circumstances are markedly different or whether the legal theory upon which the claims are based differs from that upon which the other class members will be based.” Sondel, 1993 D.Ct. LEXIS 21252 at *26.
Plaintiffs’ burden of demonstrating typicality is “‘fairly easily met so long as other class members have claims similar to the named plaintiff[s].’” Select Comfort Corporation Securities Litigation, 202 F.R.D. 3d 598, 604 (D. Minn. 2001) (quoting Alpern v. UtiliCorp United, Inc., 84 F.3d 1525, 1540 (8th Cir. 1996)). As with commonality, it is not necessary that the factual circumstances of the named plaint iffs be identical to those of other class members. Id. at *27. Commonality and typicality are closely related; a “finding of one generally compels a finding of the other.” Select Comfort Corporation Securities Litigation, 202 F.R.D. 598, 602 (D. Minn. 2001) (citations omitted).
The applications of all Plaintiffs have been subjected to the same problems with the Defendants’ administration of the asylee adjustment numbers as have those of the class. As a result, both plaintiffs and proposed class members are all further back on the waiting list than they would be had Defendants followed the statute and regulations in its administration of asylee adjustments. Plaintiffs assert the same legal claims and seek the same relief for themselves as they do for the proposed class. Moreover, as discussed
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above, individual Plaintiffs share the same circumstances and claims as members of each subclass.
Finally, class certification in the instant case does not present the sorts of dangers the typicality requirement was intended to avoid. There is no danger that the named plaintiffs have unique interests that might motivate them to litigate against or settle with the defendants in a way that prejudices the class members. The named Plaintiffs are seeking only relief applicable to themselves and all class members alike. They assert only claims applicable to all plaintiffs. “[G]iven the nature of the injunctive relief sought,” plaintiffs’ claims are typical of those of the class. DeBoer, 64 F.3d at 1174.
D. Adequacy of Representation Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) requires that “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” There are two elements to this requirement. First, the representative for the class must be able to prosecute the action vigorously through qualified counsel. Second, the representative’s interests must be sufficiently similar to that of the class members that it is unlikely their goals will diverge. Sondel, 1993 Dist. LEXIS 21252 at *28; Beckman, 192 F.R.D. at 614. “Otherwise stated, adequate representation turns upon the qualifications and experience of the plaintiffs’ counsel to conduct the litigation and whether the plaintiffs have any interests antagonistic to the class.” Beckman, id. “[G]enerally speaking, consideration of the adequacy requirement tends to focus primarily on the competence and experience of class counsel … “ Sondel, 1993 Dist. LEXIS 21252 at *29-29. In the present action, as the attached declarations demonstrate, Plaintiffs’ counsel have extensive experience in immigration law, including serving as
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counsel for plaintiffs in immigration class action litigation. Additionally, Defendants have admitted that Plaintiffs’ counsel are competent. See Defendants’ Answer, ¶ 285.
Further, Plaint iffs’ interests are not antagonistic to those of the class. All Plaintiffs have a substantial stake in the outcome of the litigation. Cf. Sondel, 1993 Dist. LEXIS 21252 at *29. All Plaintiffs are currently waiting for an admission number, and thus share an interest in having future asylee admission numbers distributed in accordance with the law. Additionally, without an injunction, many of the Plaintiffs will have to renew their EADs while they continue to wait to be adjusted. There are also one or more Plaintiffs who fall within subclasses I, II, III and IV who will represent these subclasses. The injunctive relief sought in this suit will benefit the Plaintiffs and class members equally, and none of the named Plaintiffs seeks to pursue any interest that is antagonistic to any interest of the class members. All class representatives will fairly and vigorously litigate and protect the interests of the class members. II. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) Requirement
The class proposed by plaintiffs falls within Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have “acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.” Rule 23(b)(2) is intended to foster institutional reform by facilitating suits that challenge the widespread violation of the rights of those who are individually unable to vindicate their own rights. Baby Neal, supra, 43 F.3d at 64. Moreover, the Eighth Circuit has indicated that where, as here, Rule 23(a) prerequisites have been met and injunctive or declaratory relief is requested, the action
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usually should be allowed to proceed under 23(b)(2). DeBoer, 64 F.3d at 1175 (citing 7A

Charles A. Wright, et al., Fed. Prac. and Proc. §1775 at 470 (1986)).

In the present case, Plaintiffs seek relief for the entire class that is necessary and

appropriate to remedy Defendants’ violations of the immigration laws and regulations.

“These allegations fit squarely into the 23(b)(2) classification. Should plaintiffs' claims be

found to have merit, class-wide injunction relief would be appropriate.” Jenson, 139

F.R.D. at 666. Accord Beckman, 192 F.R.D. at 615 (“Civil rights cases against parties

charged with unlawful, class-based discrimination are prime examples” of 23(b)(2) cases)

(citing Anchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 2245, 138

L.Ed. 2d 689 (1997)).

CONCLUSION

For the above stated reasons, Plaintiffs satisfy the requirements for class

certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1), (2), (3), and (4) and 23(b)(2). Accordingly,

Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court enter an order certifying the following class

and subclasses:

Class:

All asylees in the United States who have applied for

adjustment of status to lawful permanent residence and

whose applications for adjustment remain pending.

Subclass I: All asylees who filed their adjustment of status applications

with the INS on or before January 16, 1998;

Subclass II: All asylees who filed their adjustment of status applications

after January 16, 1998 and on or before June, 9, 1998;

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Subclass III: All asylees who filed their adjustment of status applications
after June 9, 1998; and
Subclass IV: All asylees who applied for or applied to renew an
Employment Authorization Document (EAD).
Respectfully submitted,
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS
By__________________________
MARY KENNEY NADINE K. WETTSTEIN J. TRACI HONG American Immigration Law Foundation 918 F Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20004 Telephone: (202) 742-5600 Fax: (202) 783-7857
JAMES K. LANGDON II Attorney Registration # 171931 Suite 1500 50 South Sixth Street Minneapolis, MN 55402 Telephone: (612) 340-8759 Fax: (612) 340-2868
IRIS GOMEZ Massachusetts Law Reform Institute 99 Chauncy Street, Suite 500 Boston, MA 02111 Telephone: (617) 357-0700 Fax: (617) 357-0777
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS
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[INSERT CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE] 18

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA Civil No.02-CV-502 RHK/JMM

VENANTIUS NKAFOR NGWANYIA, et al.,)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

)

JOHN ASHCROFT, Attorney General, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

_____________________________________)

PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO TRANSFER
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED

I. INTRODUCTION The U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota should deny the Defendants’ motion
to transfer venue because venue is proper in Minnesota under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), and Defendants have failed to show that a transfer of venue is more convenient for the parties, more convenient for non-party witnesses, or in the interest of justice.
Both Plaintiffs and Defendants admit that venue is proper. Plaintiffs’ Complaint for Declaratory, Mandamus and Injunctive Relief at ¶ 8, (“Plaintiffs’ Complaint”); Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Transfer Venue at 5, (“Defendants’ Motion”). When venue is proper, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) allows a court to transfer a case to a court in which the case might have been brought. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1994). The Eighth Circuit and the Minnesota District Court evaluate three factors when deciding this motion: (1) the convenience of the parties, (2) the convenience of the witnesses, and (3) the interest of justice. See Terra Int’l, Inc. v. Mississippi Chemical Corp., 119 F.3d 688, 691 (8th Cir. 1997).

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The Court should deny Defendants’ motion to transfer venue to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Defendants have provided no evidence demonstrating the above contentions and have failed to meet their “heavy burden of proof.” See, e.g., United Mortg. Corp. v. Plaza Mortg. Corp., 853 F. Supp. 311, 315 (D. Minn. 1994) (finding that the party requesting the transfer “bears a heavy burden of establishing that the balance of the § 1404(a) factors strongly favors a transfer”) (citations omitted). This case involves federal law, which both courts are equally positioned to interpret and enforce. Because the case challenges the implementation of the asylee adjustment program rather than the policy itself, it is likely that more witnesses and documents will be located outside of the District of Columbia, including in Minnesota, than within that jurisdiction. Transferring the suit to the District of Columbia would not be more convenient for parties or witnesses and would not serve the interest of justice. Thus, Defendants have not demonstrated why Plaintiffs’ choice of venue should be disturbed. II. AN EVALUATION OF THE FACTORS USED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT AND THE MINNESOTA DISTRICT COURT SHOW THAT THIS ACTION SHOULD NOT BE TRANSFERRED TO THE D.C. DISTRICT COURT. The Minnesota District Court has found that evaluation of the factors must be done on a case-by-case basis and include all relevant circumstances. Terra, 119 F.3d at 691. An evaluation of the factors outlined above and circumstances shows that a transfer of venue to the D.C. District Court is not more convenient for both parties or in the interest of justice. The Eight Circuit has found that a 1404(a) transfer should not be freely granted. In re Nine Mile Ltd., 692 F.2d 56, 61 (8th Cir. 1982). The transfer must be to a more convenient forum and not an equally convenient one and cannot solely shift the convenience from one party to another. Graff v. Qwest Communications Corp., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1121 (D. Minn. 1999) (citing Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 646 (1964)). The Minnesota District Court denies a
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transfer when factors are evenly balanced or weigh “only slightly” in favor of the transfer. Graff, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 1121 (citing Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 962, 964 (D. Del. 1993)). “The party seeking transfer bears the burden of proof to show that the balance of factors 'strongly' favors the movant.” Graff, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 1121 (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947)) ("Unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed").
A. Defendants Have Not Shown that the District of Columbia is a More Convenient Forum.
Defendants' one page description of why the District of Columbia is a more convenient forum and attached exhibits are insufficient to meet the burden of proof necessary to justify a transfer of venue.1 See, e.g., Schmidt Printing, Inc. v. Impact Publ'g, Inc., Civil No. 02-48 (JRT/FLN), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10178 at *4 (D. Minn. June 5, 2002) (concluding defendant had not met burden of proof to warrant transfer of venue because it did not offer affidavit testimony or similar evidence to support assertion of financial difficulties); Plum Tree, Inc v. Stockment, 488 F.2d 754, 756-57 (3d Cir. 1973) (vacating a decision to transfer venue based only on the movant’s motion).
Defendants argue that the relevant papers concerning the administration and oversight of the asylee adjustment process are in the District of Columbia, and therefore, they would be able to more easily access the proof necessary to litigate this action in that district. Defendants’ Motion at 8. Defendants also allege that witnesses are located in the District of Columbia. Id. However, Defendants have not shown sufficient evidence that they will be unable to transport the necessary documents located in the District of Columbia to Minnesota or why their witnesses – their agents and employees – would be unable to travel to Minnesota to testify. Scheidt v.
1 Defendants' exhibits establish only that there are policy directives from INS personnel in Washington, D.C. that will be at issue in the case. However, these exhibits do not sufficiently support Defendants’ broader allegations.
3

Klein, 956 F.2d 963, 966 (10th Cir. 1992) (denying a transfer of venue because defendant failed to show why documents could not be shifted through and the relevant ones sent to the transferee forum at relatively minor cost).
Although the Eighth Circuit has not explicitly ruled on the necessity of supporting affidavits, other circuits and courts have found that conclusory evidence alone is insufficient proof of inconvenience. See, e.g., Plum Tree, 488 F.2d at 756-57 (vacating a decision to transfer venue because based only on movant’s motion); Scheidt, 956 F.2d at 966 (finding conclusory assertion of inconvenience insufficient).
The Minnesota District Court has followed these other circuit courts in finding that specification of key witnesses and what their testimony will include, specifically through the inclusion of affidavits, is important proof and has rejected the idea that documentation located in a movant’s headquarters is sufficient to justify a transfer. See, e.g., Brockman v. Sun Valley Resorts, 923 F. Supp. 1176, 1181 (D. Minn. 1996) (allowing a transfer because of the novelty of the issue, but finding that several circuit courts of appeals have found that a movant’s motion must specify the key witnesses to be called and to make a general statement of what their testimony would have included) (citations omitted); Imation Corp. v. Sterling Diagnostic Imaging, Civil File No. 97-2475 (PAM/JGL), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16859, at *11 (D. Minn. Apr. 21, 1998) (finding movant failed to meet its burden of proof by not including affidavits or declarations and rejecting the argument that the location of documents in movant’s headquarters justifies transfer because documentation was located in various places).
Defendants also allege that this case “has no more connection with Minnesota than it does with Florida, Texas, New York or Nebraska.” Defendants’ Motion at 7. However, the connection of the case with Florida, Texas, New York, or Nebraska is irrelevant. Defendants are
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not seeking to transfer the case to any of these states. Rather, the issue is whether the case is connected with Minnesota so as to make venue proper and whether the District of Columbia is sufficiently more convenient to overcome the presumption given by the court to the Plaintiffs’ choice of forum. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); Graff, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 1121 (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947)).
Defendants have admitted that venue is proper. Defendants’ Motion at 5. Five Plaintiffs resided in Minnesota while the harm occurred.2 Plaintiffs’ Complaint at ¶¶ 52-74. Three of these Plaintiffs filed their adjustment of status application in Minnesota, and the local Minnesota INS offices failed to properly process the Plaintiffs’ applications. Id.
B. The District of Columbia is Not a More Convenient Forum The Minnesota District Court has recognized a presumption in favor of the plaintiff’s choice of forum and found that it weighs heavily in support of denying a motion to transfer. See, e.g., K-Tel Int’l, Inc. v. Tristar Products, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 2d 1033 (D. Minn. 2001) (citing Christensen Hatch Farms, Inc. v. Peavey Co., 505 F. Supp. 903, 911 (D. Minn. 1981)). This presumption is particularly relevant when the plaintiff resides in the district in which the lawsuit was filed. Imation Corp., Civil File No. 97-2475 (PAM/JGL), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16859, at *10 (quoting Terra Int’l, Inc. v. Mississippi Chemical Corp., 119 F.3d 688 (8th Cir. 1997) (“In any determination of a motion to transfer under § 1404(a), the plaintiff's choice of a proper forum is entitled to great weight, and will not be lightly disturbed, especially where the plaintiff is a resident of the judicial district in which the suit is brought.”) Sec. Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Stewart, Civil No. 01-1677 (RHK/JMM), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19847, at * 8 (D. Minn. Nov. 28, 2001) (citing Sky Valley Ltd. Partnership v. ATX Sky Valley, Ltd., 776 F. Supp. 1271, 1276
2 There were five named Minnesota Plaintiffs as of the time of filing the complaint. Since that date, at least two more potential Plaintiffs located in Minnesota have asked to join the lawsuit.
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(N.D. Ill. 1991)). In this action, five Plaintiffs reside in the District of Minnesota. Plaintiffs’ Complaint at ¶¶ 52-74.
Defendants have not shown that a transfer of venue would be more convenient for nonparty witnesses or that their witnesses would be unwilling to appear. The relevant considerations concerning the convenience of the witnesses includes the number of non-party witnesses, their locations, and the preference of courts for live testimony over depositions. Graff at 33 F. Supp. 2d at 1121 (citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508).
The court has found that consideration of witness convenience is “more than the number of witnesses who might be inconvenienced by one forum or the other.” Imation Corp., Civil File No. 97-2475 (PAM/JGL), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16859, at *11 (citing Terra Int’l, Inc. v. Mississippi Chemical Corp., 119 F.3d 688 (8th Cir. 1997). The Court must also weigh considerations including the willingness of the witnesses to appear and whether compulsory process would be necessary or possible. Imation Corp., Civil File No. 97-2475 (PAM/JGL), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16859, at *11.
There likely will not be any non-party witnesses. See Defendants’ Motion at 8. Defendants state that they anticipate that their “officers, agents, and employees will be called upon to provide testimony about the implementation of Section 209 of the INA.” Id. As the witnesses are Defendants’ officers, agents, and employees, the Defendants should have no difficulty ensuring the appearance of these witnesses.
Because the case concerns problems with the implementation of the asylee adjustment program rather than simply the directions given by the Washington, D.C. INS, key witnesses and information will come from field offices around the country, including the field office located in Minnesota, and the Nebraska Service Center rather than only the national headquarters located in
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Washington, D.C. See Plaintiffs’ Complaint at ¶¶ 28-51; Defendants’ Exhibits in Support of the Motion to Transfer Venue at 5, (“Defendants’ Exhibits”). The documents located around the country are as easily transferred to Minnesota as to anywhere else and witnesses outside of both forums can just as easily travel to Minnesota as to the District of Columbia.
C. The D.C. District Court is Not More Apt to Handle this Case than the Minnesota District Court.
The Minnesota District Court is as familiar with the law to be applied as the D.C. District Court. This case involves federal law, which both courts are equally positioned to interpret and enforce. Defendants allege that the D.C. District Court “has a greater degree of interest in ensuring that government officials within its district are complying with the Constitution and the laws of the United States” than does the Minnesota District Court. Defendants’ Motion at 8. All federal courts have an equal interest in ensuring that government officials are complying with the Constitution and federal laws. See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
Additionally, the Minnesota District Court has more expertise adjudicating immigrationrelated cases than does the D.C. District Court. Both the Minnesota District Court and the Court of Appeals for the District of Minnesota frequently review decisions made in the immigration court in Minnesota. See, e.g., Badio v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1200 (D. Minn. 2001); Chan Jago John v. Aljets, 162 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (D. Minn. 2001); Gavilian-Cuate v. Yetter, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1039 (D. Minn. 2000). There is no immigration court within the District of Columbia, and therefore, litigants do not appeal cases in the D.C. District or Circuit Courts. Hence the D.C. District and Circuit Courts have no special expertise on immigration issues.
Granting a transfer of venue also is not in the interest of judicial economy because the the District of Columbia courts are not less busy than the Minnesota courts. For a twelve- month period that ended on March 31, 2001, 4,696 civil cases were commenced in the U.S. District
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Court for the District of Columbia and 4,448 civil cases were commenced in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota. U.S. District Courts – Civil Cases Commenced by Nature of Suit and District, During the 12-Month Period Ending March 31, 2001, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2001/tables/c03mar01.pdf.
The Minnesota District Court is just as capable as the D.C. District Court of enforcing a judgment against Defendants. Defendants allege that any relief granted to Plaintiffs should be administered and monitored by the judicial district in which the INS headquarters is situated. Courts around the country have monitored the implementation of nationwide class relief against the INS. See generally, Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 1998); Silva v. Bell, No. 76-C4268, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 11098, (7th Cir. Oct. 18, 1979).
D. The Courts Have Not Found the Existence of a “Political Issue” to Be a Dispositive Factor in Determining the Appropriate Venue.
Defendants allege that this case should be transferred to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia because it involves national policy issues developed by and promulgated from INS headquarters in the District of Columbia. Defendants’ Motion at 7 (citing Starnes v. McGuire, 512 F.2d 918, 929 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
The existence of a national policy issue does not require a case to be resolved by the D.C. District Court and the D.C. District Court has so ruled. See Starnes, 512 F.2d at 929 (finding only that the “existence of a national policy issue that may involve testimony by the policymakers is a factor to be considered by the district judge in determining whether transfer is appropriate under Section 1404(a)”); Adams v. Bell, No. 81-1715, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 16397 at *9 n9 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2982) (stating that the D.C. District Court has rejected the notion that it is alone suited to review issues of national importance) (citing Starnes, 512 F.2d. at 928). The Starnes court also noted that:
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Petitioner also suggests that, to the extent his case can be taken to be concerned with national policy, the policy is that of an agency headquartered in Washington, D.C., and that therefore, venue is most appropriate here. This argument is essentially based on the concept that somehow issues involving national policy are peculiarly appropriate for resolution by this forum. . . . An examination of those cases, however, reveals that far from creating a blanket rule that “national policy” cases should be brought here, the decisions require the case-by-case determination.
Starnes, 512 F.2d at 928.
Plaintiffs do not dispute that some directions outlining how to implement the asylee
adjustment program have come from the national headquarters of the INS. See Defendants’
Exhibits 1 and 2. However, some directions also have come from the Nebraska Service Center.
The Defendants’ exhibits demonstrate that the actual implementation, pursuant to these
directions, is carried out in field offices throughout the country, including the Minnesota office.
Id. The problems with the actual implementation, and not the directions given, largely motivated
this suit.
III. CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs respectfully urge the Court to deny the Defendants’ motion for a transfer of
venue.
Respectfully submitted: July 3, 2002.
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS
By__________________________
NADINE K. WETTSTEIN MARY KENNEY J. TRACI HONG American Immigration Law Foundation3 918 F Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20004 Telephone: (202) 742-5600
3 With assistance from Law Student Anne Seymour.
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Fax: (202) 783-7857 JAMES K. LANGDON II Dorsey and Whitfield Attorney Registration # 171931 Suite 1500 50 South Sixth Street Minneapolis, MN 55402 Telephone: (612) 340-8759 Fax: (612) 340-2868 IRIS GOMEZ Massachusetts Law Reform Institute 99 Chauncy Street, Suite 500 Boston, MA 02111 Telephone: (617) 357-0700 Fax: (617) 357-0777
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Venantius Nkafor Ngwanyia, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
John Ashcroft, Attorney General, et aI.,
Defendants.

Civil No. 02-502 (RHKJAJB) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

James K. Langdon II, Dorsey & Whitney, Minneapolis, Minnesota; Nadine Wettstein, J. Traci Hong, and Mary Kenney, American Immigration Law Foundation, Washington D.C.; and Iris Gomez, Massachusetts Law Refonn Institute, Boston, Massachusetts, for Plainti ffs.
Thomas B. Heffelfinger, United States Attorney, and Fred Siekert, Assistant United States Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota; Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, United States Department of Justice, Margaret J. Perry, Senior Litigation Counsel, United States Department of Justice, and Greg Mack, Trial Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Washington D.C., for Defendants.
Introduction
This matter comes before the Court on a motion for class certification. Forty-six
asylees' (collectively, "Plaintiffs") with applications for lawful permanent resident status
pending before the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") have sued the INS,
the Conunissioner of the INS, and the United States Attorney General (collectively,
---------------
, "Asylees" refers to individuals granted asylum in the United States.
H>.1:D JAN 1 4 2003
hiCHAFlD aSLET; ,.~',' ~._~".,~< JUDG.'"JENT ENTD.. r)E:PlJTY CLERK _

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"Defendants"), alleging the Defendants have improperly administered the system by which asylees become lawful, permanent residents of the United States. Plaintiffs have moved under Pederal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 for the Court to certify a class and several sub-classes consisting of all asylees who have applied for lawful permanent resident status and whose applications remain pending. (CompI.1I277.) Defendants assert that class certification is inappropriate because of the individualized, fact-specific nature of Plaintiffs' claims. Por the reasons set down below, the Court will grant Plaintiffs' motion.
Background I. Statutory and Reeulatory Framework
Under 8 U.S.c. § 1158(b), the INS may grant asylum to non-citizens in the United States who qualify as refugees and meet certain other requirements. After a year of physical presence in the United States, these asylees are permitted to apply for adjustment to lawful permanent resident status. 8 U.S.C. § lS59(b)(2). While asylee status does not expire at any particular time, 8 C.P.R. § 208.14(d), lawful permanent resident status confers advantages over asylee status. For instance, lawful permanent residents may apply for citizenship after five years, 8 U.S.c. § 1427(a), petition to immigrate close family members, id. §§ 1151,1153, and travel abroad freely, id. § 1101(a)(l3)(C). Because lawful permanent resident status is a prerequisite for naturalization, a delay in

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adjusting to lawful pennanent resident status also delays an asylee's opportunity to apply for citizenship. (Am. CampI. ~ 17.)
Over the course of each fiscal year, the Attorney General may confer lawful permanent resident status on up to 10,000 asylees. 8 U .S.C. § 1159(b). If applications from asylees who wish to adjust their status exceed the number of permanent resident spots available, the INS establishes a waiting list based on the date the applicant files an application. 8 C.F.R. § 209.2(a) (2001). Plaintiffs assert that, despite a backlog of more than 96,000 asylees awaiting adjustment, Defendants have failed to adjust the status of approximately 21,281 asylees who "could have and should have been adjusted." (Am. CampI. ~ 19.) Plaintiffs also assert that Defendants have administered the asylee waiting list in a manner that violates the INS's statutory and regulatory framework and the asylees' due process and equal protection rights. (Am. Compi. ~~ 329-46.)
LL Plaintiffs' Proposed Classes
Plaintiffs have moved the Court to certify a class consisting of all asylees in the United States who have applied for lawful pennanent resident status and whose applications remain pending. They have also moved to certify the following subclasses:
Subclass I: All asylees who filed their adjustment of status applications with the INS on or before January 16, 1998;2
--"-"--------
2 January 16, 1998, was the last day asylees could apply for one of the 10,000 asylee adjustments available for fiscal year 2001.
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Subclass II: All asylees who filed their adjustment of status applications after January 16, 1998, and on or before June 9, 1998/
Subclass III: All asylees who filed their adjustment of status applications after June 9, 1998;3
Subclass IV: All asylees who applied for or applied to renew an Employment Authorization Document.4
(PIs.' Mem. Supp. Class Cert. at 3.) Plaintiffs assert that there are seventeen named plaintiffs in Subclass I, six named plaintiffs in Subclass II, eighteen named plaintiffs in Subclass III, and forty named plaintiffs in Subclass IV. HI. Plaintiffs' Complaint
Plaintiffs allege Defendants violated: (1) 8 U.S.C. § 11S9(b) by violating Plaintiffs and class members' right to adjust their status and by delaying their adjustment pursuant to that statute; (2) 8 C.F.R. § 209(a)(1) by not maintaining a priority waiting list based on the date each plaintiff and class member's adjustment application was filed; (3) Pub. L. No. 105-277, Title I, § 128, Pub. L. No. 106-429, § 586, and Pub. L. No. 106-378 by failing to exempt qualifying Iraqi Kurds, Indo-Chinese parolees, and Syrian Jews from the 10,000 lawful permanent resident cap; (4) 8 U.S.C. § l158(c)(I)(B) by requiring Plaintiffs and Class IV members to apply for and renew Employment Authorization
J June 9, 1998, was the last day asylees could apply for one of the 10,000 asylee adjustments available for fiscal year 2002.
4 Asylees must apply for an Employment Authorization Document each year they wish to work in the United States until they become lawful permanent residents.
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Documents in order to be employed when the right to employment is incident to their
status as asylees; (5) the Administrative Procedures Act by unlawfully withholding or
unreasonably delaying agency action under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1); and (6) the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief requiring Defendants to comply with the statutory,
regulatory, and constitutional requirements outlined above, as well as attorneys' fees
under the Equal Access to Justice Act.
Analysis
L Standard of Decision
The Court may certify a class action "only when it is satisfied after rigorous
analysis that all of Rule 23's prerequisites are met." Lockwood Motors. Inc. v. General
Motors Corp., 162 F.R.D. 569, 573 (D. Minn. 1995) (Kyle, J.). Rule 23(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure sets out four threshold prerequisites that must be satisfied before a party can obtain the certification of a class:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions oflaw or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). In addition to the prerequisites of Rule 23(a), the plaintiff must demonstrate that a class action can be maintained under one of the three categories described in Rule 23(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
The party seeking class certification bears the burden ofshowing that the requirements of the rule are satisfied and that the class should be certified. See General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982); Coleman v. Watt, 40 F.3d 255, 258 (8th Cir. 1994). Although a court should not decide the merits of a case at the class certification stage, see Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156,177-78 (1974), a motion for class certification "generally involves considerations that are enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff's cause of action." Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 (1978) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
.l.h The Rule 23(8) Requirements
A. Numerosity "In order to maintain a class action, Plaintiffs must show that the class ofplaintiffs is so large that joinder of all members would be 'impracticable.... In re Potash Antitrust Litig., 159 F.R.D. 682, 689 (Kyle, 1.) (citing In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1178 (8th Cir. 1982)). Although the Plaintiffs need not show that joinder of all class members would be impossible, they must show that it would be difficult. See Lockwood Motors, 162 F.R.D. at 574 (citing Jenson v. Continental Fin. Corp., 404 F. Supp. 806,809 (D. Minn. 1975) (Lord, J.)). Here, "the proposed class contains tens of thousands of
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asylees" (PIs.' Mem. Supp. Class Cert. at 8) and Defendants do not challenge it on numerosity grounds.
B. Commonality The second provision of Rule 23(a) requires that the Plaintiffs show "that there are questions oflaw or fact common to the class." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). While not every question of law and fact must be common to the entire class, the Plaintiffs must show that the course of action giving rise to their cause of action affects all putative class members, and that at least one of the elements of that cause of action is shared by all ofthe putative class members. See Lockwood Motors, 162 F.R.D. at 575 (citing Forbush v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 994 F.2d 110 I, 1106 (5th Cir. 1993». As a general rule, the commonality requirement imposes a very light burden on plaintiff seeking to certify a class and is easily satisfied. See Newber~ on Class Actions, § 3.10 at 3-50 (collecting cases). Plaintiffs argue that certification is appropriate because whether Defendants have properly administered the asylee adjustment process presents a common legal question.
Moreover, Plaintiffs assert sub-classes I, II, and III are linked by the common issue of
whether Defendants have failed to annually issue all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers under 8 V.S.C. § 11S8(b). Finally, Plaintiffs argue that sub-class IV is joined by the question of whether the requirement that asylees apply for an Employment Authorization Document and renew that document every year at the cost of$120 violates 8 V.S.c. § 1158(c)(l)(B).
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Defendants respond that the individualized nature of Plaintiffs' claims precludes
class certification. For each alleged incident of mismanagement of the asylee adjustment
process, Defendants assert, the Court will have to engage in a fact specific analysis into
whether the applicant was actually eligible for lawful permanent resident status. In
addition, Defendants assert that the focus of this litigation is not the policies emanating
from INS headquarters in Washington D.C., but rather the implementation of those
policies in local INS offices throughout the country.s
Plaintiffs' proposed class and sub-classes share common questions of fact and law.
The issue of the alleged maladministration of the asylee adjustment process "pervades all
the class members' claims." Paxton v. Union Nat. Bank, 688 F.2d 522, 561 (8th CiI.
1982). The class and sub-classes alike allege specific failures by Defendants to
implement uniform asylum adjustment procedures in accord with constitutional and
administrative norms. Indeed, "it would be •a twisted result' to permit an administrative
agency to avoid nationwide litigation that challenges the constitutionality of its general ~ This appears to be part of Defendants' half-hearted attack on Plaintiffs' standing.
As Defendants argue, "there are no claims involving adjustment applications submitted to each of the INS's District Offices. Put another way, Plaintiffs do not have standing to bring a nationwide class action where the Complaint is devoid of claims involving each [NS District Office." (Defs.' Mem. Opposing Class Cert. at 14.) Of course, Plaintiffs have not sued "each INS District Office" and do not challenge their practices except as it provides evidence of Defendants' general maladministration of the asylee adjustment process. Each named plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient for the Court to conclude that "they personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong and which they purport to represent." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502 (1975). Plaintiffs therefore satisfy Article Ill's standing requirement.
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practices simply by pointing to minor variations in procedure among branch offices...."
Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1046 (9th Cir. 1998). Although Defendants suggest that
the proposed class would include applicants who would ultimately be unable to qualify
for pennanent legal residency status, successful and unsuccessful applicants alike have
the right to participate in a process that is legally and constitutionally sound. ~~,
Regents of the University of California v, Bakke, 438 U,S. 265, 281 n.14 (1978).
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have satisfied the commonality requirement./)
C. Typicality
The third requirement of Rule 23(a) calls for the party seeking certification to
show that "the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
--------------
6While the Court finds common legal issues, it questions whether many of the statutory and regulatory provisions listed by Plaintiffs as "causes of action" are amenable to private enforcement, see Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) ("Like substantive federal law itself, private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress. . .. Without it, a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute."); Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 145 n.13 {l985) (applying four-part test to detennine whether private right ofaction is implicit in statute that does not expressly so provide), whether the INS's adherence to its own directives and those of Congress is justiciable, compare Truijillo-Hemandez v. Farrell, 503 F.2d 954, 955 (5th Cif. 1974), with Federation for American Immigration Refonn. Inc. v. Reno, 897 F. Supp. 595,601 (D.D.C. 1995), and the appropriate level ofthe Court's own review, see Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (noting that "over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over the admission of aliens" and that judicial review should be "limited") (internal quotations omitted). Defendants, however, have not raised these issues and the Court does not consider them with regard to class certification.
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defenses of the class." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). "Typicality is satisfied when the claims of the named plaintiffs emanate from the same event or are based on the same legal theory as the claims of the class members." Lockwood Motors, 162 F.R.D. at 575 (quotation and citations omitted). To satisfy the typicality requirement, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the claims are sufficiently similar that (1) the representative parties will
adequately protect the interests of the class, and (2) there are no antagonistic interests
between the representatives and the c1ass. See In re Wirebound Boxes Antitrust Litig., 128 F.R.D. 268,270 (D. Minn. 1989) (Murphy, J.). Commonality and typicality are closely related and a "finding of one generally compels a finding of the other." Select Comfort Coworation Securities Litigation, 202 F.R.D. 598,602 (D. Minn. 2001) (Doty, J.) (citations omitted).
Plaintiffs assert that they have been "subjected to the same problems with the Defendants' administration of the asylee adjustment numbers ... [and] assert the same legal claims and seek the same relief for themselves as they do for the proposed class." (PIs.' Mem. Supp. Class Cert. at 13.) Because Defendants do not challenge Plaintiffs' proposed class and sub-classes on typicality grounds, and because the Court concludes that the named plaintiffs have similar interests to those of the class and will adequately protect their interests, Plaintiffs meet the typicality requirement.
D. Adequacy of Representation

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The fourth requirement of Rule 23(a) -- adequacy of representation -- is related to the typicality requirement. If the representative parties have interests or claims (or defenses to counterclaims) that are significantly different to that of the majority of class members, then neither typicality nor adequacy is present. .,Sg Potash, 159 F.R.D. at 692; Wirebound Boxes, 128 F.R.D. at 270. To satisfy the adequacy requirement, the Plaintiffs must show "that (1) the representatives and their attorneys are able and willing to prosecute the action competently and vigorously and (2) each representative's interests are sufficiently similar to those of the class that it is unlikely that their goals and viewpoints will diverge." Potash, 159 F.R.D. at 692 (citing Wirebound Boxes, 128 F.R.D. at 270).
Here, Defendants have admitted that Plaintiffs' counsel are competent (see Answer ~ 285) and do not argue that Plaintiffs' interests are antagonistic to those of the class. The Court therefore finds that Plaintiffs have satisfied the adequacy of representation requirement. Ill. The Rule 23(b)(2) Requirement
In addition to the Rule 23(a) prerequisites, Plaintiffs must also demonstrate that a class action can be maintained under one of the three categories described in Rule 23(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). Plaintiffs seek to proceed under Rule 23(b)(2).
The Court may certify a class under Rule 23(b)(2) if "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making
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appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Injunctive or declaratory relief is not "appropriate" when the "final relief relates exclusively or predominantly to money damages." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). "If the Rule 23(a) prerequisites have been met and injunctive or declaratory reliefhas been requested, the action usually should be allowed to proceed under subdivision (b)(2)." DeBoer y. Mellon Mort". Co., 64 F.3d 1171, 1175 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Charles A. Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1775, at 470 (1986).
In asserting that Plaintiffs' proposed class and sub-classes cannot be maintained under Rule 23(b)(2), Defendants generally rehash their commonality arguments. As discussed above, however, issues relating to Defendants' purported failure to properly administer the asylum adjustment program provide common questions of law and fact as well as a sufficient basis to maintain the suit as a class action under Rule 23(b)(2). The relief Plaintiffs seek is injunctive and on a class-wide basis. "Should plaintiffs' claims be found to have merit, class-wide injunctive relief would be appropriate." Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 139 F.R.D. 657, 666 (D. Minn. 1991). Because U[t]hese allegations fit squarely into the 23(b)(2) classification," the Court concludes that the class can be maintained under that Rule.7 Id. Accordingly, class certification is appropriate.
-: Under Rule 23(b)(2), notice to the class is not required and class members are not pennitted to opt-out. See Sperry Rand Corp. v. Larson, 554 F.2d 868, 875 (8th Cir. 1977); Robinson v. Sears. Roebuck and Co., III F. Supp. 2d 1101 (E.D. Ark. 2000). The parties have not suggested and the Court does not conclude that notice to absent class
12

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Conclusion Based on the foregoing, and all of the files, records and proceedings herein, IT IS

ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification is GRANTED. The Court

certifies the following class and sub-classes:

Class:

All asylees in the United States who have applied for adjustment of

status to lawful pennanent residence and whose applications for

adjustment remain pending;

Subclass I: All asylees who filed their adjustment of status applications with the

INS on or before January 16, 1998~

Subclass II: All asylees who filed their adjustment of status applications after

January 16, 1998, and on or before June 9,1998; Subclass III: All asylees who filed their adjustment of status applications after

June 9, 1998;

Subclass IV: All asylees who applied for or applied to renew an Employment

Authorization Document.

1- Dated: January 2002
members is warranted in this case.

I
l~ RICHARD H. KYLE United States District Judge
13

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Venantius Nkafor Ngwanyia, et aI., Plaintiffs,
v.
John Ashcroft, Attorney General, et aI.,

Civil No. 02-502 (RHK!AJB)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Defendants.
Mary A. Kenney and Nadine K. Wettstein, American Immigration Law Foundation, Washington D.C.; Iris Gomez, Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, Boston, Massachusetts; and James K. Langdon II, Dorsey & Whitney, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for Plaintiffs.
Greg D. Mack and Jennifer L. Lightbody, Office ofImmigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington D.C.; Fred Siekert, United States Attorney's Office, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for Defendants.

Introduction This matter comes before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs, on behalf of a class of asylees1 with pending applications for lawful permanent residence status in the United States, have sued Attorney General John Ashcroft, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security Tom Ridge, the Department of Homeland Security, Director of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services

1 "Asylees·· refers to individuals granted asylum in the United States. I

FEB 1 2 2004

Eduardo Aguirre. Jr., and the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (collectively, "Defendants"),2 alleging that Defendants have improperly administered the system by which asylees become lawful, permanent residents of the United States.
Plaintiffs have moved, and Defendants have filed a cross-motion, for partial summary judgment on two issues: (1) whether approximately 22,000 unused refugee
admission numbers, as a matter oflaw, remain available for use at this time, and (2) whether Defendants' policies and practices with regard to employment documents violate Plaintiffs' statutory authorization to work. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant Plaintiffs' motions and deny Defendants' motions.
Background I. Statutory and ReKulatory BackKround
Prior to 1980, the United States had no uniform system for admitting and resettling refugees and asylees. See generally Steel on Immigration Law, 2d § 8: I (2003). While Congress had enacted legislation with respect to various classes of refugees, federal refugee policy consisted largely of ad hoc programs developed in response to separate mass-refugee crises. Id. Refugees and asylees who did not fall into any of these
2 Effective March 1,2003, the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") was abolished and its immigration benefits and services functions were transferred to the newly created Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services division within the Department of Homeland Security. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), the Court will substitute Defendants Ridge, Aguirre, Department of Homeland Security, and the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services for former agency director Zigler and the now abolished INS.
2

categories were dependent upon the Attorney General's discretionary power to "parole"
aliens into the United States. Id. Thus, pre-1980 refugee and asylee law was a patchwork
of ad hoc legislation and executive grace.
Through the Refugee Act of 1980, Congress replaced this chaotic and arbitrary
system with one designed to
provide a pennanent and systematic procedure for the admission to this country of refugees of special humanitarian concern to the United States, and to provide comprehensive and uniform provisions for the effective resettlement and absorption of those refugees who are admitted.
Refugee Act of 1980, § 101(b), Pub. L. 96-212; accord Aliens and Nationality, Refugee
and Asylum Procedures, 46 F.R. 45116 (September 10, 1981) (INS application of this
stated purpose to the asylee adjustment provisions of the statute). Through the Refugee
Act, Congress codified the United Nation's definition of "refugee,,,3 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(42), curtailed the Attorney General's parole power, id. § 1182(d)(5), and
standardized the admissions process for refugees and asylees, id. §§ 1157-59.
3 "Refugee" is currently defined as "any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). The definition also allows for refugee status to be granted "in such special circumstances as the President ... may specify" after consulting with Congress. Id. The definition of "refugee" explicitly does not include "any person who ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular so(;ial group, or political opinion." Id.
3

II. Asylees and the Endorsement of Work Authorization Under the Refugee Act,"[a]ny alien who is physically present in the United States
. . . may apply for asylum." Id. § 1158. If the applicant can establish that he or she is a "refugee," within the meaning of8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A), and meets other criteria, sudl as a well-founded fear of persecution, sec 8 C.F.R. § 208. 13(b), the applicant may be granted asylum in the United States. Asylee status is indefinite; it does not automatically expire. 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(d). An asylee's status can change, however, if either (1) the government adjusts the asylee's status to that of a lawful permanent resident, see 8 U.S.c. § I I 59(b), or (2) the asylee's status is terminated, see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(2); 8 C.F.R. § 208.24.4
Aliens may be granted asylum by either the executive branch or the jUdiciary. In general, an alien who has not been placed in immigration proceedings may file an administrative application with the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services's Asylum Office. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(b). After receiving that application, an Asylum Officer will interview the alien to determine whether asylum is appropriate. Id. Should the Asylum Officer deny the application, the alien is referred to the Executive Office of Immigration Review for administrative proceedings.5 Id. §§ 208.14(c), 1208.2(b). If the
4An asylee's status can be revoked for several reasons, including (1) a showing of fraud in the application process, (2) a change in the circumstances in the sending country, or (3) discovery that the asylee no longer qualifies as a "refugee." See 8 C.F.R. § 208.24.
5Immigration proceedings within the Executive Office of Immigration Review include adjudication betore an Immigration Judge, id. § 1208.2(b) and, in the event
4

Executive Office also denies asylum, the alien may seek further review before the appropriate United States Court of Appeals. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1105a, 1252(a)(1).
Upon a grant of asylum, the Attorney General must authorize the asylee to work in the United States and provide appropriate endorsement of that authorization. Id. § 1158(e)(1)(B). Defendants provide two types of endorsement. The Employment Authorization Document, which includes a photograph and fingerprint of the asylee, must be renewed every year at a cost of$120. 8 C.F.R. § 103.7(b)(1). Renewal takes at least ninety days. (PIs.' Ex. 11 (Department of Justice, INS Office of Business Liaison, "Employment Authorization of Aliens," Employer Information Bulletin 108 (March 2002)).) Alternatively, since the onset oflitigation in this case, Defendants have allowed asylees to use their 1-94 "Arrival-Departure Record" card as an endorsement of their authorization to work. The 1-94 card, whieh is given to every alien upon entry into the United States, contains the asylee's name, address, and country of citizenship, and states: "Asylum status granted indefinitely pursuant to 208 of the INA." (PIs.' Ex. 11 (Affirmative Asylum Procedures Manual, Office ofInternational Affairs, Asylum Division (Feb. 2003)).) Because there is no national policy regarding the expiration of the 1-94 card, when-or whether-an 1-94 card expires depends upon the practices of the
asylum is not granted, review by the Board of Immigration Appeals, id. § 1003.1 (b)( 1)(3).
5

branch office issuing it. (Defs.' Resp. to PIs.' Mem. in Supp. of Second Mot. for Summ. J. at 4.)
While asylees are theoretically authorized to work whether they have an endorsement or not (see Defs. Ex. 7 (Dea Carpenter, Deputy General Counsel, Department of Justice, Employment Authorization of Aliens Granted Asylum (June 17, 2002)) [hereinafter "Carpenter Memorandum"]), an employer cannot hire an asylee without the appropriate documentation, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b). Therefore, a valid endorsement, of whatever kind, is of great practical import. III. Asylee Adjustment
Under the Refugee Act, as amended, the President may authorize the admission of fifty thousand refugees each fiscal year. 8 U.S.c. § 1157(a). Out of that number, the Attorney General may, at his discretion, use up to ten thousand refugee admission numbers to adjust asylees already in this country to the status of lawful permanent residents. Id. § 1159(b). For asylees, lawful-permanent-resident status confers many advantages. For instance, lawful permanent residents may apply for citizenship after five years, id. § 1427(a), petition to immigrate close family members, id. §§ 1151, 1153, and travel abroad freely, id. § 1101(a)(13)(C). Because lawful-permanent-resident status is a prerequisite for naturalization, any delay in adjustment inevitably postpones an asylee's ability to apply for citizenship.
6

In each fiscal year since 1992, the Attorney General has set aside the full ten-
thousand refugee admission numbers authorized by statute.6 The INS considers itself
"obligated to reach the 10,000 allotment for asylee adjustment set by Congress," and
acknowledges that "[t]his is an important benefit for asylees that we are required to
fulfill." (PIs. Ex. 3 (Update: 011 Asylee Adjustment Procedures (Jan. 29, 1997)) at 1.) Yet
despite having an excess number of applicants in each year except 1995 (see PIs.' Ex. 1
(INS Cap Proposal, May 18,2001) n.l),7 the immigration services have routinely failed to
provide the authorized adjustments (see PIs.' Ex. 2 (Asylee Workload and Immigrant
Statistics, Fiscal Years 1991-2002».8 INS processing errors "have hastened the growth in
the number of pending cases." (PIs.' Ex. 5 (Memorandum from William R. Yates, INS
Deputy Executive Associate Commissioner, to Kevin D. Rooney, INS Acting
Commissioner (May 21, 2001» at 1.) As one INS official stated in 2001, "[W]e have a
6See 67 F.R. 65469 (Oct. 25,2002); 66 F.R. 63487 (Dec. 10,2001); 65 F.R. 59697 (Oct. 6,2000); 64 F.R. 54505 (Oct. 7, 1999); 63 F.R. 54999 (Oct. 13, 1998); 62 F.R. 53219 (Oct. 10, 1997); 61 F.R. 56869 (Nov. 4, 1996); 60 F.R. 53091 (Oct. 11, 1995); 59 F.R. 52393 (Oct. 17, 1994); 58 F.R. 52213 (Oct. 7,1993); 57 F.R. 47253 (Oct. 15, 1992); 56 F.R. 51633 (Oct. 15, 1991).
7Between fiscal years 1993 and 2002, more than 10,000 asylee adjustment applications were filed in each fiscal year, save for 1995. The numbers demonstrate a dramatic escalation in the number of applications, as follows: FY 1993 10,018; FY 1994, 10,016; FY 1995,9,025; FY 1996, 11,838; FY 1997, 19,424; FY 1998, 15,329; FY 1999, 19,353; FY 2000,32,104; FY 2001 29,353; FY 2002, 45,547. (PIs.' Ex. 1 at n.!.)
8According to INS statistics, the agency used only a portion of the asylee adjustment set aside in at least the following years: FY 1994,5,983; FY 1995, 7837; FY 1998, 7546; FY 1999,2,532; FY 2000, 4,567; and FY 2002,9,713. (PIs.' Ex. 2 (Asyh::t: Workload and Immigrant Statistics, Fiscal Years 1991-2002).)
7

process that almost guarantees that we will not fully use the 10,000 numerical allocation provided by statute." (PIs.' Ex. 4 (Email from William R. Yates, INS Deputy Executive Associate Commissioner, to Fuji O. Ohata, INS Associate Commissioner (Jan. 24, 2001)).)
In total, between 1994 and 2002, at least 21,822 of the refugee admission numbers set aside by the Attorney General for asylee adjustment went unused. (PIs.' Ex. 2.) According to Defendants, these numbers may not be used to reduce the waiting list because
the adjustment figures available for any given fiscal year expire at the end of that fiscal year, and they are not available in a subsequent fiscal year because the prior years' adjustment figures have expired and there is no statutory authority or requirement to retroactively grant adjustment using a prior fiscal year's allotment of adjustment figures. (Defs.' Rule 26(f) Report at 6.)
Standard of Decision Summary judgment is proper if, drawing all reasonable inferences favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Anderson v. Libertv Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986). The moving party bears the burden of showing that the material facts in the case are undisputed. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; Mems v. City ofSt. Paul. Dep't of Fire & Safety Servs., 224 F.3d 735, 738 (8th Cir. 2000). The court must view the evidence, and the inferences that may be reasonably drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the
8

nonmoving party. See Graves v. Arkansas Dep't of Fin. & Admin., 229 F.3d 721,723

(8th Cir. 2000); Calvit v. Minneapolis Pub. Schs., 122 F.3d 1112, 1116 (8th Cir. 1997).

The nonmoving party may not rest on mere allegations or denials, but must show through

the presentation of admissible evidence that specific facts exist creating a genuine issue

for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256; Krenik v. County ofLe Sueur, 47 F.3d 953,

957 (8th Cir. 1995).

Analysis

Plaintiffs and Defendants have each moved for partial summary judgment on two

issues: (1) whether, under 8 U.S.c. § 1159(b), the approximately 22,000 unused refugee

admission numbers are available for use at this time; and (2) whether Defendants'

practices violate the statutory requirement that asylees be provided with "appropriate

endorsement" of their authorization to work. The Court will address each in tum.

I. Asylee Adjustment

Plaintiffs challenge Defendants' administration of the asylee adjustment process

under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). Under the APA, "A person suffering a

legal wrong ... or adversely affected or aggrieved by an agency action ... is entitled to

judicial review thereof." 5 U.S.C. § 702. The reviewing court is thus permitted to "hold

unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be ... arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." Id. §

706(2)(A). The reviewing court "shall ... compel agency action unlawfully withheld or

unreasonably delayed." Id. § 706(1).

9

Plaintiffs assert that Defendants have unlawfully withheld agency action by
allowing the unused refugee admission numbers set aside for asylee adjustment to lapse at
the end of each fiscal year.9 Plaintiffs argue that neither Congress nor the implementing
regulation imposes a limit on when refugee admission numbers, once set aside for
adjustment, may be used. Defendants, in contrast, contend that Congress has granted the
executive branch wide latitude to administer the asylee adjustment process and that its
decision as to the lapsing of refugee admission numbers should be accorded great
deference. 10
9 Plaintiffs also assert-and the undisputed evidence demonstrates-that Defendants have routinely failed to exempt a number of asylees, such as certain Iraqi Kurds, Syrian Jews, and Indochinese parolees, who are statutorily exempt from the 10,000 cap and should therefore be adjusted notwithstanding the asylee adjustment backlog. See Pub. L. No. 105-277, Title I, § 128; Pub. L. No. 106-378; Pub. L. No. 106429, § 586. Defendants' sole defense to this claim is that "INS initiated, and BCIS [Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services] continues, a program to purge these exempt individuals from its authorization list." (Ohata Decl. ~ 18.) Needless to say, the creation of such a program, while laudable, does not establish a defense to prior improper activity. Because Defendants offer no explanation for apparently ignoring Congress's command in this regard, and because each and every class member's place on the waiting list is higher as a result of Defendants' failure to cull exempt asylees from the adjustment rolls, the Court concludes that it constitutes "agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed," 5 U.S.C. § 706( 1), and will therefore enter summaryjudgment for Plaintiffs on this elaim.
10 Defendants also argue that the six-year statute of limitations provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) bars Plaintiffs' claims to the extent they rely on acts or omissions that took place prior to March 4, 1996. While § 2401(a) does indeed set forth a six-year limitations period, Plaintiffs' claims do not involve discrete acts, but rather, Defendants' continued refusal to use presently valid asylee adjustment numbers. As such, Defendants' activity falls squarely within the continuing violations doctrine, see Walsh v. National Computer Sys., Inc., 332 F.3d 1150, 1157 (8th Cir. 2003), and Plaintiffs' claims are not time-barred.
10

The ~tatute neither requires nor expressly forbids the expiration of asylee
adjustment numbers. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b), the Attorney General may "ma[k]e
available" a certain number of authorized refugee admission numbers for the purpose of
asylee adjustment:
Not more than 10,000 ofthe refugee admissions authorized under ~ection 1157(a) of this title in any fiscal year may be made available by the Attorney General, in the Attorney General's discretion and under such regulations as the Attorney General may prescribe, to adjust the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence the status of any alien granted asylum ....
While this language requires that the set aside be taken from the larger pool of refugee
admission numbers "authorized under section 1157(a) of this title in any fiscal year," 8
U.S.C. § 1159(b) (emphasis added), the statute does not require that a refugee admission
number, once "authorized" in a given fiscal year, be used for asylee adjustment in that
same year. Rather, the statute plainly imposes no temporal limit on the use of asylee
adjustment numbers. 11 Where, as here, "the language of the statute is plain, the [Court's]
II It is noteworthy that Congress used the phrase "in any fiscal year" with regard to the authorization of refugee admission numbers, but omitted it as it pertains to the use of the numbers for asylee adjustment. "[I]t is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely when it includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another." Chicago v. Environmental Def Fund, 511 U.S. 32R, 33R (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, the Immigration and Nationalization Act as a whole indicates that Congress knew how to limit an applicant's eligibility for an immigration benefit to a particular fiscal year. See. e.g., 8 U.S.C. § I I 54(a)(1)(I)(ii)(II) ("Aliens who qualify, through random selection, for a [diversity] visa under section 203(c) shall remain eligible to receive such visa only through the end ofthe specific fiscal year for which they were selected" (emphasis added).). Because the Court "must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says," Cunnecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992), the Court presumes that Congress acted intentionally when it omitted a temporal limit on the use of asylee
11

inquiry [begins and] ends with the language of the statute." United States Y_. Uniou_Elec. Co., 64 F.3d 1152, 1165 (8th Cir. 1995).
Likewise, the implementing regulation puts no time limit on the use of refugee admission numbers. Setting forth the "sole and exclusive procedure for adjustment of status by an a::;ylee," 8 C.P.R. § 209.2 merely requires that the asylee have "a refugee number available under [8 U.S.C. § 11S9(b)]" and meet certain other requirements. While the regulation also provides for a waiting list, such a list is only to be established if the applications for adjustment "exceed[] the refugee numbers available . .. for the fiscal year." 8 C.F.R. § 209.2(a) (emphasis added). The regulation makes no provision whatsoever for available. but unused, refugee numbers, and therefore presumes that each refugee admission number made available will be used to adjust an asylee. Thus, as with § 1159(b), 8 C.P.R. § 209.2 does not require that admission numbers unused for adjustment expire at the end of each fiscal year.
Because the statutory and regulatory authority neither supports nor expressly forbids the lapsing of asylee adjustment numbers, the question becomes whether Defendants nonetheless have the discretionary power to do so. Under § 1159(b), refugee admission numbers shall be made available "in the Attorney General's discretion and under such regulations as the Attorney General may prescribe." 8 U.S.c. § 11S9(b). Defendants therefore argue that their policy of requiring the expiration of these numbers
adjustment numbers.
12

should be accorded substantial deference under Chevron U.S.A.. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council. Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)Y The Court disagrees.
Defendants' policy qualifies as neither a regulation itself nor an interpretation of
an ambiguous regulation. Rather, it is the sort of sub-regulatory policy, such as
"interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement
guidelines," Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000), that is "beyond the
Chevron pale," United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001). As such, it is
"entitled to respect," Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944), "but only to the
extent that [it has] the 'power to persuade,'" Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587 (quoting
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140).
The Court is not persuaded. Defendants' policy does what neither this Court nor
the agency is permitted to do: "add[] additional requirements not contemplated by
Congress." Beltran v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Service. 332 F.3d
12 In their Reply, Defendants argue that the language used by the President to set aside the asylee adjustment numbers should be controlling. For example, in fiscal year 1995, the President ordered "[a]n additional 10,000 refugee admission numbers shall be made available during FY 1996 for the adjustment to permanent resident status under [8 U.S.c. § 1159(b)] of aliens who have been granted asylum in the United States." (Defs.' Ex 2.) Defendants contend that the language "shall be made available during [the applicable fiscal year]," which the President has used every year since 1995, indicates a presidential intent to allow the numbers to lapse at the end of the fiscal year. To the Court's way of thinking, however, this language mirrors the statute and speaks only to when the numbers are to be made available, not to when they are actually used. Even were Defendants' interpretation of the language the more plausible one, the President's function with regard to setting aside the numbers is strictly ministerial; section 1159(b) does not allow him to set extra-statutory conditions on the use of the numbers by fiat.
13

407.412 (6th Cir. 2003). Defendants' practice oflapsing the set aside "is not a mere interpretation of the statute, but an addendum," id., and Defendants have "no power to either ignore clear congressional intent or amend the legislation," Hernandez v. Reno, 91 F.3d 776, 780 (5th Cir. 1996), by adding significant temporal restrictions to a statute that is plainly not so limited. Just as "[c]ourts are obligated to refrain from embellishing statutes by inserting language that Congress has opted to omit," Root v. New Liberty Hospital Dist., 209 F.3d 1068, 1070 (8th Cir. 2000), so too must Defendants avoid taking away with their practices what Congress has granted by statute. Defendants have no more power to extinguish these numbers than they have to create them.
Defendants have, without statutory or regulatory authority, refused to use over twenty-thousand refugee admission numbers made available for the adjustment of asylees by the President and Congress. Because this constitutes "agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed," 5 U.S.c. § 706(1), the Court will grant Plaintiffs' motion with regard to their asylee adjustment claims under the APA. 13
13 With regard to the remedy, the parties dispute whether "recapture" of the asylee adjustment numbers is appropriate under Silva v. Bell, 605 F.2d 978 (7th Cir. 1979). This, to the Court, is a non-issue. Because the asylee adjustment numbers never lapsed or were never properly used, they have been-and continue to be-available for use. In other words, the asylee adjustment numbers are presently available and therefore need not be recaptured. Because the Court must "compel agency action unlawfully withheld," 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), the Court will order Defendants to utilize those numbers.
14

TT. Employment Endorsement
A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework
Plaintiffs and Defendants have also filed cross-motions for summary judgment on
Plaintiffs' claim that Defendants fail to provide asylees with "appropriate endorsement"
of their statutory right to work while in the United States. Under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(c)(1)(B),
In the case of an alien granted asylum ... , the Attorney General ... shall authorize the alien to engage in employment in the United States and provide the alien with appropriate endorsement of that authorization ....
Plaintiffs contend that Defendants' administration of the employment authorization
process violates the APA. 14 Defendants largely concede the legal issues, 15 but
argue-with only the thinnest of evidentiary support-that they should be immune from
summary judgment because they are changing their practices. 16 Defendants are wrong.
14 Plaintiffs also argue that Defendants' practices with regard to asylee endorsement violate both the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment and § 1158(c)(1)(B) itself. Because the Court finds that Defendants have violated the APA, it need not reach the question of whether that conduct also establishes concurrent due process and statutory violations.
15 In their papers, Defendants admit that (1) they have a statutory duty to provide asylees with endorsement of employment authorization (Defs.' Resp. Mem. at 8), (2) they have no discretion to deny such an endorsement (id. at 2-3, 8), (3) their duty to provide an endorsement attaches at the grant of asylum (id. at 2), and (4) they must accord all asylees, no matter how they are granted their status, rights and privileges under the same statute (id. at 7 n.13).
16 Defendants insist, and Plaintiffs furiously dispute, that they permit aliens granted asylum by the Executive Office ufImmigraliuIl Review Ul by a federal court to receive an 1-94 card endorsed with work status. Defendants can point to no written policies and
15

Section 1158(c)(1)(B) imposes two statutory requirements. First, Defendants must
authorize asylees to engage in employment. Second, they must provide asylees with
documents that appropriately reflect that authorization. Section 1158(c)( 1)(B) contains
no words of temporal limitation. In other words, under § 1158(c)(1)(B), asylees must be
authorized to work in the United States for as long as they remain asylees. Moreover,
under § 1158(c)(I)(B), Defendants must provide documents that reflect that authorization.
B. Endorsement Procedures
In the face of these simple statutory commands, Defendants have established
procedures that verge on the Kafkaesque. Defendants provide "no one particular form of
an endorsement of employment authorization." (Defs.' Resp. to PIs.' Mem. in Supp. of
Second Mot. for Summ. J. at 9.) Rather, the type of document an asylee receives-and
the length of time for which it is valid-depends upon the manner in which the asylee
was granted asylum and the district office handling the asylee's request.
procedures demonstrating that this is so, relying solely on the Declaration of Terrance O'Reilly, Director of the Office ofField Operations, which states: "The [alien granted asylum by the Executive Office of Immigration Review or by a federal court] may also appear at a location determined by the legacy INS District Director to obtain an 1-94 card endorsed with evidence of asylum status." (O'Reilly Decl. ~ 7.) Defendants limply contend that this statement, which was prepared for this litigation and never apparently communicated to anyone, constitutes the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services's "national policy." In rebuttal, Plaintiffs have provided the Court with affidavits indicating that many district offices are apparently unaware of this stealth policy. All of which raises the age-old question: If a national policy falls in the Office of the Director of the Office of Field Operations, and no one hears it, is it still a national policy? The obvious answer is "no." Nonetheless, even taking the O'Reilly Declaration as true, Defendants' practices violate the APA for the reasons stated below.
16

The primary form of endorsement is the Employment Authorization Document. Prior to the November 10,2002 effective date of the Border Security Act, asylees were required to apply for an Employment Authorization Document, either in person from the appropriate district office or by filing a form 1-765 with the Nebraska Service Center.
Under the Border Security Act, however, the Attorney General must now ensure that
immediately upon an alien being granted asylum under section 1158 of this title, the alien will be issued an employment authorization document. Such document shall, at a minimum, contain the fingerprint and photograph of such alien. Pub. L. 107-173, 116 Stat. 543 (May 14,2002) (emphasis added). According to this statutory mandate, Defendants now provide an Employment Authorization Document "at or near" the grant of asylum to all aliens granted asylum by an Asylum Officer within the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services. (O'Reilly Decl. ~ 5.) In contrast, the thousands of aliens granted asylum by the Department of Justice's Executive Office of Immigration Review or by a federal court must still apply for the document, which only issues after an extensive background check. The Employment Authorization Document, no matter how it was obtained, expires every year and must be renewed at the cost of $120. The process takes at least 90 days. Since litigation began in this matter, Defendants have also begun permitting use of the 1-94 card as an endorsement of an asylee's authorization to work. The 1-94 card is not, strictly speaking, an employment document. Rather, it is the "Arrival-Departure Record" provided to aliens upon arrival in the United States. Upon the grant of asylum by an Asylum Officer within the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, the
17

alien's status as an asylee is endorsed upon the card. Should an alien be granted asylum by the Executive Office of Immigration Review or a federal court, however, that alien can only receive an 1-94 card by "appear[ing] at a location determined by the legacy INS District Director ... [and] present[ing] evidence of a final grant of asylum." (O'Reilly Dec!. ~ 7.) An endorsed 1-94 card issues upon the completion of a background check and verification of status. The length of time for which an 1-94 card is valid "v[a]r[ies] from office to office." (Defs.' Resp. to PIs.' Mem. in SUpp. of Second Mot. for Summ. J. at 9). Asylees may use the 1-94 card as evidence of their authorization to work.
C. Appropriate Endorsement While the parties agree that certain allegations in Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint have been rendered moot by changes in Defendants' practices, Defendants continue to violate § 1158(c)( 1)(B) in at least two ways. First, Defendants improperly place the onus for obtaining work papers on the thousands of asylees granted asylum by the Executive Office of Immigration Review or by a federal court. Second, Defendants fail to provide all asylees with an endorsement of employment authorization coterminus with status.
1. Endorsement Through Application Defendants must provide each and every asylee with work papers. Moreover, Congress has placed the burden of providing those papers squarely on Defendants' shoulders. Under § 1158(c), the Attorney General "shall authorize the alien [granted asylum] to engage in employment in the United States and provide the alien [granted asylum} with appropriate endorsement." 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c) (emphasis added). This
18

language is mandatory, and does not permit Defendants to provide work papers only upon
request. As the Fifth Circuit noted with regard to the similar language of the Family
Unity Provision of the Immigration Act of 1990,
Congress has unequivocally mandated that eligible immigrants are entitled to ... authorization to be employed in the United States, and ... documentary evidence of that authorization. The INS regulation requiring an eligible immigrant to apply separately for employment authorization and documentation effectively reads [those] components . .. out of the statute. This the IN S may not do; it has no power to either ignore clear congressional intent or amend the legislation.
Hernandez, 91 F.3d at 780 (emphasis added).
Defendants ignore "clear congressional intent" by requiring an application from certain classes of asylees. 17 While Defendants properly provide an Employment
Authorization Document to asylees granted status by an Asylum Officer (see O'Reily
Decl. ,-r 6), those granted asylum by the Executive Office of Immigration Review or by a
federal court must still, on their own initiative, seek out appropriate endorsement (see id.
,-r 7). Not only is there no statutory justification for this differential treatment, but the
application requirement in and of itself "effectively reads [Defendants' obligation] ... out
of the statute." Hernandez, 91 F.3d at 780. Defendants are required to provide
appropriate endorsement to all asylees, regardless of how asylum was granted.
17Accordingly, 8 C.F.R. § 274a.13(a) and 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(a)(5), to the extent they require that asylees affirmatively apply for employment authorization documents, are entitled to no deference. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. ("If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.").
19

Defendants' practice, arbitrary in the extreme, is "not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.c.
§ 706(2)(A). The Court will therefore grant Plaintiffs' motion with regard to this issue. I8
2. Endorsement Expiration
Defendants also violate § 1158(c)( 1)(B) by not providing asylees with work papers
eotenninus with status. Under § IIS8(e)(1)(B), asylees are authorized to work for as long
as they are asylees, and Defendants must provide "appropriate endorsement of that
authorization." 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(1)(B) (emphasis added); see also 8 C.F.R. §
274a.12(a) (authorizing asylee employment "incident to status"). Defendants have no
discretion to deny an asylee either employment authorization or appropriate work papers.
18 Under the Border Security Act, Defendants' obligation with regard to work papers is even clearer. The Border Security Act now requires the Attorney General to issue an employment authorization document, complete with a photo and fingerprint, "immediately upon an alien being granted asylum." Pub. L. 107-173, 116 Stat. 543 (May 14,2002) (emphasis added). Despite this statutory guidance, however, Defendants continue to impose a delay on those asylees granted asylum by the Executive Office of Immigration Review or a federal court, requiring that they submit an application and undergo a rigorous background check before an endorsement will issue. This strikes the Court as particularly odd because, as Defendants admit. "the Attorney General has no discretion to withhold employment authorization [or presumably the endorsement] once an individual is granted asylum." (Carpenter Memorandum at 7.) To the extent, therefore, that D~f~mlants continue to delay providing an endorsement tu th~s~ asyl~~s aft~r the grant of asylum-even for background checks-they contravene the expressly stated will of Congress. Compare Pub. L. 107-173, 116 Stat. 543 (May 14,2002) (requiring the issuance of employment authorization documents "immediately"), with Decl. of Terrance O'Reilly, Director of the Office ofField Operations, Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, ,-r 5 (stating that the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services now provides an endorsement "at or near" the grant of asylum (emphasis added)). Of course, under both § 1158(c)(1)(B) and the Border Security Act, background checks could properly occur before the grant of asylum.
20

By imposing the arbitrary and varied validity periods of these documents, however,
Defendants do exactly that. Defendants offer no statutory or regulatory rationale for the expiration of these
documents, which Defendant Director Aguirre himself has called a "self-imposed and unnecessary" requirement. (PIs.' Ex. 4 (Prepared Remarks of Eduardo Aguirre, Director,
u.s. Citizenship and Immigration Services (Migration Policy Institute, Sept. 3,2003».)
Defendants concede that "there is no authority under regulations" for the limited validity period. (Prelim. Tr. of Oral Argument at 38.) Indeed, with regard to the Employment
Authorization Document, Defendants' sole justification is that "current machines do not
allow for manufacture of a card with a validity period oflonger than one year.,,19
(O'Reilly Dec!. ~ 5.) While the Court is tempted to pause and reflect upon the grim, futurist implications of this statement, it should suffice to say that our Constitution provides for government under the rule of law, not machines, and when the two conflict,
the machines must give way. Defendants fare little better with the 1-94 card. With
periods of validity that vary according to the whim of each local office, the 1-94 card
19 In Oral Argument, counsel from the Department of Justice stated that "the machines that produce some of the cards, the cards actually do disintegrate after a year. That's the type of paper that they used." (Prelim. Tr. Oral Arg. at 38.) When pressed for additional reasons that might support this practice, counsel advanced, in essence, the administrative corollary to Newton's First Law of Motion; namely, that a policy in place tends to stay in place, even if no one can remember the reason it was first established. As stated by counsel: "[T]he individuals who made the decision about them expiring in a yt:ar art: pt:rhaps nu lungt:r with the Department of Homeland Security, so it's unclear why they decided to make them expire after one year." (Id. at 38.)
21

provides another example of Defendants' one-Iaw-for-Tuesdays-and-another-Iaw-forWednesdays mismanagement of the asylee endorsement process, and paints the very picture of arbitrary and capricious agency action.
In short, and to put it mildly, Defendants have botched their obligation to provide appropriate endorsement of asylees' authorization to work. Not only have Plaintiff~ demonstrated clear APA violations, but Defendants' violations are so widespread, so egregious, and so plainly harmful to asylees as a class as to constitute nothing short of a national embarrassment. Under § 1158(c)(I)(B) and 8 C.P.R. § 274a.12(a), appropriate endorsement of an asylee's authorization to work should last for as long as that alien remains an asylee-not a minute shorter, and not a minute longer. By failing to provide such an endorsement, Defendants have "unlawfully withheld [and] unreasonably delayed" agency action in violation of the APA. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). Accordingly, the Court will grant Plaintiffs' motion with regard to their asylee endorsement claim.
Conclusion Based on the foregoing, and all of the files, records and proceedings herein, IT IS ORDERED: I. Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 57) is
GRANTED; a. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2201, the Court DECLARES, as a matter oflaw,
that all refugee admission numbers that have been made available for
22

asylee adjustments in prior years but remain unused are presently available to be used for asylee adjustment; b. Defendants shall make an accounting of the precise number of asylee adjustment numbers made available by the President but not used by Defendants in each fiscal year since 1992; c. Defendants shall make an accounting of the precise number of asylee adjustment numbers made available by the President that were erroneously used to adjust the status of asylees subject to statutory exemptions, including certain Iraqi Kurds, Syrian Jews, and asylees who applied for asylum prior to 1990. See. e.g., Pub. L. No. 105277, Title I, § 128; Pub. L. No. 106-378; Pub. 1. No. 106-429, § 586; and d. Defendants shall use all unused and misused asylee adjustment numbers made available in prior years to adjust the status of asylees, beginning at the start of the waiting list; 1. The parties shall attempt to negotiate a schedule for the timely
and expedient use of these numbers; 11. Should the parties fail to negotiate a schedule for the timely
and expedient use of these numbers within sixty (60) days from the effective date of this Order, the Court will establish a schedule; and
23

iii. Defendants' use of these numbers is to be in addition to the use of any numbers that have been or will be made available in fiscal year 2004 or in subsequent years;
2. Defendants' Cross-Motion to Dismiss, in Part, or, in the Alternative, for Partial Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 50) is DENIED;
3. Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 68) is GRANTED; a. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2201, the Court DECLARES that Defendants
have a statutory duty under both 8 U.S.c. &1158(c)(1) and Pub. L.
107-173, 116 Stat. 543 (May 14, 2002) to provide, on their own initiative, endorsement of employment authorization to all asylees immediately upon the grant of asylum. Defendants have no discretion to deny such an endorsement. Such endorsement 1. must contain, at a minimum, the fingerprint and photograph
of the asylee; and 11. be continuously valid for the duration of the alien's status as
an asylee. b. Defendants shall provide all asylees with an employment
authorization endorsement that is valid throughout the duration of the alien's status as an asylee;
24

1. The parties shall attempt to negotiate a deadline for the issuance of this endorsement; and
11. Should the parties prove unable to reach an agreement within sixty (60) days from the effective date of this Order, the Court will establish a deadline;
4. Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 75) is DENIED;
5. This Order is STAYED until the time for appealing therefrom has expired, and, if an appeal is taken, the stay is continued throughout the pendency of the appeal; and
6. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), the Court determines that there is no just reason for delaying the entry ofjudgment on these claims. The Clerk of Court is expressly directed to enter judgment pursuant to this Order.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: February 12,2004
25

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
District of Minnesota

700 Federal Ruilding 316 North Robert Street St. Paul, MN 55101
CIVIL NOTICE

202 US_ Courthouse 300 South Fourth Street Minneapolis, MN 55415

41 7 Federal Building 515 West First Street Duluth, MN 55802

The purpose of this notice is to summarize the time limits for filing with the District Court Clerk's Office a Notice of Appeal to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals from a final decision of the District Court in a civil case.
This is a summary only. For specific information on the time limits for filing a Notice ofAppeal, review the applicable federal civil and appellate procedure rules and statutes.
Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (Fed. R. App. P.) requires that a Notice of Appeal be filed within:

1. Thirty days (60 days if the United States is a party) after the date of "entry of the judgment or order appealed from;" or

2. Thirty days (60 days if the United States is a party) after the date of entry of an order denying a timely motion for a new trial under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59; or

3.

Thirty days (60 days if the United States is a party) after the date of entry

of an order granting or denying a timely motion for judgment under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 50(b), to amend or make additional findings oUact under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 52(b), and/or to alter or amend the judgment under Fed. R. Civ.

P. 59; or

4. Fourteen days after the date on which a previously timely Notice of Appeal was filed.

If a Notice of Appeal is not timely filed, a party in a civil case can move the District Court pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) to extend the time for filing a Notice of Appeal. This motion must be filed no later than 30 days after the period for filing a Notice of Appeal expires. If the motion is filed after the period for filing a Notice of Appeal expires, the party bringing the motion must give the opposing parties notice of it. The District Court may grant the motion, but only if excusable neglect or good cause is shown for failing to file a timely Notice of Appeal.

Modified 03/26/02

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
Prehearing Conference Program
The United States Com ofAppeals for the Eighth CiIcuit has established an early· intervention Prehearing Conference Program. The purposc of the program is twofold: (1) to facilitate settlement discussions in civil cases by providing an impartial atmosphere for an open discussion ofthe case and altemat.ive methods ofdisposition a:od(2) to promote the delineation .of issues~ early resolution ofprocedural problems. and effective. administration ofan appeal
throughout the appellate process. Sec, 81b eir. R 33A.
. The program is directed by Mr~ John Martin. Mr. Martin screens newly filed appeals based on information furnished by both appellants and appellees in the.comt's Appeal
Information Forms A and B. Contact with counsel is by telephone and in personal conferences held in several cities throughout the Circuit. All communications with Mr. Martin are confidcntial.CoWlSei can openly discuss and evaluate the issues and explore alternatives in a non-adversarial setting without fear that the subsequent processing of the appeal or ultimate disposition ofthe case will be adversely affected by participation in the program.
Participation in the program is voluntary. However, the Court strongly encourages your
participation and cooperation. Over the past twenty years, the program bas enabled many appellate litigants to achieve mutnally satisfactory resolution of certain issues or an overall settlement prior to progressing through all stages of the appellate process. Issue delineation
. enables counsel to focus only on those issues that need judicial resolution. The program bas helped relieve the ever-increasing caseload confronting the Court., and it has also saved litigants and attorneys substantial am.'?unts oftime and money.
In CIder for the program to function effectively certain information must be provided at the iUitiation of the appeal. Eighth Ci.rc;uit Rule 3B din;ctJ t:ach civil appt!:llant to; (1) file a completed Appeal Information Form. A with the Notice ofAppeal at the time the Notice is filed· with the District Court clerk and (2) forward a copy ofthe completed Form A and a copy of
Appeal Information. Form B to the appelleefor comphm01l. Appellee may complcte F<JIlIl B and send it to the clerk ofthe Court ofAppeals. Ifyou have any questions about the Prehearing
Conference Program or the Appeal InformationFo~ please contact Mr. Martin at (314)-5393669.
Forms A and B are available :from the District Court clerk and the Court of Appeals clerk and can be found at the Court ofAppeals' web site at: www.ca8.uscourts.gov
-'-1.2fJtItJ

 
 ASYLEE ADJUSTMENT (NGWANYIA) CLASS ACTION NOTICE OF PROPOSED SETTLEMENT AGREMENT
Ngwanyia v. Gonzales, No. 02-502 (RHK) (D. Minn).
May 2005
IF YOU ARE A PERSON WHO WAS GRANTED ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES AND YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR YOUR “GREEN CARD,” THAT IS, ADJUSTMENT OF YOUR IMMIGRATION STATUS TO LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENCE, THIS NOTICE HAS IMPORTANT INFORMATION FOR YOU.
Q. What are these questions and answers about?
A. These questions and answers explain the proposed settlement agreement of a national class action lawsuit. A federal court soon will be deciding whether to approve a settlement agreement and dismiss the lawsuit. This notice explains the terms of the settlement agreement so the individuals affected by the lawsuit can decide if they object to any part of the agreement. If they do object, this notice gives instructions for what they should do.
This is a general summary of the settlement agreement. You may also review the entire settlement agreement. See the question “What if I want more information?” below for information on how to see the entire settlement agreement.
Q: What was this lawsuit about?
A: This was a lawsuit against the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“the INS”) brought by a number of individuals (“named plaintiffs”) on their behalf and on behalf of others who are similarly situated (“class members”). The named plaintiffs and class members were non-US citizens in the United States who had been granted asylum by the INS (“asylees”), and who filed for “adjustment of status” to lawful permanent resident (“LPR”) status.
The immigration law in recent years has allowed only 10,000 asylees each year to become LPRs. Each year there are many more than 10,000 people who are granted asylum. For that reason, there are a lot of asylees waiting to adjust their status to LPR status.
In the lawsuit, the plaintiffs complained that the defendants had not used all 10,000 numbers they were allowed to use, and that this contributed to a very long wait for asylees waiting to “adjust” their immigration status. We explain all of these words below.
Q: What do the terms “plaintiff,” “defendant,” “class action” and “class member” mean?
A: A plaintiff is a person who files a lawsuit against someone else – the defendant. A
1

class action is a court case on behalf of a lot of plaintiffs, all of whom have at least one fact or legal issue in common. The court may certify the case as a class action. After the court certifies the case as a class action, each one of plaintiffs – whether named in the papers or not -- is a “class member.” Class members do not have to be and usually are not specifically named in the legal papers. They also may not know they are class members.
Q: What does the term “adjustment of status” mean?
A: “Adjustment of status” or “adjustment” is when a person who is in some other immigration status (usually asylee status or undocumented or non-immigrant status) becomes a lawful permanent resident of the United States without having to leave the United States to process their papers abroad.
Q: Who is a “class member” in the Ngwanyia case?
Ngwanyia class members are asylees in the United States whose application for adjustment of status is pending with the government.
Q. What happened to the INS?
A. When the Department of Homeland Security was created, the INS was abolished. The part of the INS mostly involved in this case is now called the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS). This summary just refers to “the government” but it is referring to all the defendants in the lawsuit, including what used to be the INS.
Q: What happened in the lawsuit?
A: The plaintiffs (the asylees) won at the trial court. The defendants (the government) appealed. While the appeal was pending, the lawyers for the plaintiffs and defendants negotiated a settlement agreement.
Q. What is the next step?
A. The settlement agreement resolves all of the issues in the lawsuit. If the trial court approves the settlement agreement, the settlement agreement will apply to and benefit all class members. The court then will dismiss the lawsuit.
Q. What are the main points of the settlement agreement?
A. The following is a summary of the major terms of the settlement agreement.
Asylee adjustment numbers: The parties agree that the government will make available 31,000 more asylee adjustment numbers during the next three years to adjust the status of asylees who have applied for permanent residence. As much as possible, asylees in the waiting list will be adjusted in chronological order by the date when they filed their
2

adjustment applications. The government will use at least 8,000 of these 31,000 asylee adjustment numbers in the current “fiscal year” (which ends on September 30, 2005). The government also will use at least 8,000 of these 31,000 asylee adjustment numbers next fiscal year (which runs from October 1, 2005 to September 30, 2006). The government will use the remainder of the 31,000 asylee adjustment numbers in fiscal year 2007 (which runs from October 1, 2006 to September 30, 2007).
Q: How many asylees will adjust their status in the next three years?
A: The use of these 31,000 additional asylee adjustment numbers over the next three years will be in addition to the government’s use of the 10,000 annually that are expected to be available over the next three years.
The government agrees that it will use all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers, or however many numbers may be available in the future, in addition to the 31,000 numbers from the Ngwanyia lawsuit.
This means that every year for the next three years, we expect that the government will adjust at least 18,000 asylees and as many as 25,000 in Fiscal Year 2007, in order to use all 31,000 additional numbers.
Q: Will asylees be able to tell when they will become LPRs?
A: Asylees will have more information than they did before. The government will post quarterly reports (that is, four times a year) on its Internet website (www.uscis.gov). These reports will include the filing date of the asylee adjustment applications currently being processed. They also will report the number of asylee adjustment applications approved during the prior quarter.
The government also will set up a way – probably by email -- for asylees whose adjustment applications were filed before the current processing date to inquire about the status of their particular applications.
Employment Authorization: The lawsuit also resolves complaints about the duration of asylees’ employment authorization documents (work permits). This is explained below:
Q: What does the settlement agreement say about employment authorization documents for asylees?
A: An asylee’s legal permission to work does not depend on the asylee having an employment authorization document (EAD) and does not end when the asylee’s EAD expires. The government does not charge for an asylee’s initial EAD, but asylees who want to renew their EADs must pay the appropriate fee.
Q. How will asylees renew their EADs? For how long will the renewal EAD be
3

valid?
A: Within 3 months of when the settlement agreement goes into effect, the government will give asylees who apply to renew EADs the option of applying for EADs that will be valid for multiple years, up to five years. In order to renew their EAD, asylees will be required to submit Form I-765 with the appropriate fee. Asylees will be told if they have to appear at a USCIS Application Support Center for the taking of a photograph and/or fingerprints.
To obtain a multiple year EAD, the asylee will have to prepay for the number of years requested. The government will subtract the estimated savings from its not having to produce the EAD every year. The cost of the multiple year EAD will be less than the cost of annual renewals by at least $20 per year.
Q. Must asylees renew their EADs?
A. No. Asylees do not have to renew their EADs.
Q. What about fee waivers for asylees applying to renew EADs?
Fee waivers will be available for multi-year EADs on the same basis as they are available for one year EADs.
A. What about attorneys’ fees?
Q. The plaintiffs and class members have not paid any attorneys fees and will not have to pay attorneys fees in connection with this case. The defendants and plaintiffs’ lawyers have reached an agreement for the government to pay the plaintiffs’ attorneys fees.
Q. What if I want more information?
A. This is just a summary of the agreement. If you would like to read the entire agreement, it should be attached to this document or available with this document. You also can obtain it from: 1) the USCIS’s internet website, http://uscis.gov/graphics/index.htm 2) the Community Relations Office located within each USCIS District Office; 3) the website of the American Immigration Law Foundation, www.ailf.org; and 4) immigration assistance providers listed on the Roster of Recognized Organizations and Accredited Representatives maintained by the Executive Office for Immigration Review pursuant to 8 C.F.R. Part 292 (2002). http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir
Q. What if I am a class member and I agree with or object to the terms of the settlement agreement?
If you are a class member and you agree with the proposed settlement, you do not need to
4

do anything. You may but do not have to appear at the public hearing on the proposed settlement on June 15, 2005 at 9:30 a.m. central time (see below).

If you are a class member and you disagree with the proposed settlement, you have a right to object to it. Your objections will be considered by the court as it reviews the settlement. Objections to the proposed settlement will be considered only if you follow these procedures:

1. Objections must be in writing and must be sent to:

Clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota 316 North Robert Street, Suite 700 St. Paul, MN, 55101.

2. All objections must include the following information:

* Name, address and telephone number of the person filing the objection. * The case name and number, Ngwanyia v. Gonzales, No. 02-502 (RHK).
* A statement of the reasons for the objection
* A statement that you have sent copies of your objection to the lawyers listed at the end
of the notice

3. The deadline for mailing your objections to the court and to the lawyers listed below is June 6, 2005. Objections must be postmarked on or before June 6, 2005 to be considered timely. Objections filed or mailed after that date will not be considered. Plaintiffs who fail to file objections on or before June 6, 2005 will not be permitted to testify at the settlement hearing.

4. A public hearing on the proposed settlement and any objections which have been filed will be held on June 15, 2005 at 9:30 a.m. at the following location. You may appear at that hearing.

United States District Court for the District of Minnesota 316 North Robert Street, Suite 700 St. Paul, MN, 55101.

5. You must send copies of your objections to each of the lawyers listed below before the deadline.

Nadine Wettstein American Immigration Law Foundation 918 F Street, NW Washington, DC 20004

Nancy E. Friedman Office of Immigration Litigation Department of Justice PO Box 878 Ben Franklin Station

5

Washington, D.C. 20044 6

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Venantius Ngwanyia et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs

)

)

v.

)

United States Attorney General;

)

Department of Homeland Security;

)

Secretary of the Department of

)

Homeland Security;

)

U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services; and )

Director,

)

U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services,

)

)

Defendants

)

)

__________________________________________)

No. 02-502 (RHK) SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

WHEREAS, Plaintiffs and Defendants consider it in their best interests to resolve all the issues raised in this action through a stipulated settlement agreement;
NOW THEREFORE, plaintiffs and defendants (hereinafter “the parties”) enter into and do hereby stipulate to a Settlement Agreement (hereinafter “Agreement”) that imposes binding obligations upon the parties and their successors to the extent stated below. Plaintiffs acknowledge that this Agreement is fully dispositive of all claims in the Second Amended Complaint both as they relate to themselves and to all members of the class, except as specified in Sections C and I herein, against defendants in their official and individual capacities. The parties acknowledge that this Agreement is fully binding upon the parties, and on each of their successors and successor agencies, as defined below.
SECTION A. DEFINITIONS
As used throughout this Agreement, the following definitions shall apply:
1. The term “party” or “parties” shall apply to plaintiff class members and defendants. All named plaintiffs are listed in the Addendum, attached. The defendants are the Attorney General; the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security; the Department of Homeland Security; Director of the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS); and USCIS. As the term applies to defendants, it shall include all of their departments, agencies, successor agencies, agents, employees, contractors, and/or successors in office, that or who have a role in asylee
1

adjustment and employment authorization issues.
2. The term "adjust" or “adjustment of status” is defined as the adjustment of an asylee’s status to that of a lawful permanent resident alien of the United States under section 209(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b), as amended.
3. The terms “adjustment cap,” “asylum cap” or “cap” refer only to the subset of refugee admission numbers that may be made available annually for the adjustment of asylees in any fiscal year, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b).
4. The term “asylee” means any alien who has received a grant of asylum under section 208 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1158, from either United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), or its predecessor Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”), or the Executive Office of Immigration Review (“EOIR”) from either an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) or the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).
5. The term "Employment Authorization Document” or “EAD” is defined as a Form I-766, I-688B or successor versions.
6. The term “District Court” refers to the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, Judge Richard Kyle presiding.
7. The term “Court of Appeals” refers to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
8. As certified by the District Court, the class and subclasses are defined as:
All asylees in the United States who have applied for adjustment of status to lawful permanent residence and whose applications for adjustment remain pending;
Subclass I All asylees who filed their adjustment of status applications with the INS on or before January 16, 1998;
Subclass II All asylees who filed their adjustment of status applications after January 16, 1998, and on or before June 9, 1998;
Subclass III All asylees who filed their adjustment of status applications after June 9, 1998;
Subclass IV All asylees who applied for or applied to renew an Employment Authorization Document.
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9. The term “effective date” refers to the date on which the District Court approves this Agreement or such later date as the District Court may designate as the effective date.
10. The term “notice to plaintiffs’ counsel” refers to actual delivery of notice to plaintiffs’ counsel of record by registered mail or to posting of such information on the USCIS website, unless the terms of this Agreement require notice to counsel prior to implementation, in which case actual delivery is required.
SECTION B. BACKGROUND
11. The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota issued a memorandum decision and order on February 12, 2004. The decision is reported at 302 F.Supp.2d 1076 (D. Minn 2004).
12. The District Court stayed enforcement of its order for 60 days after February 12, 2004, and directed the parties to negotiate a timely and expedient schedule for the enforcement of the District Court’s order.
13. Defendants appealed the District Court’s order to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, and this appeal triggered the District Court’s stay of enforcement of its order pending appeal.
SECTION C. DISPOSITION AND RETAINED JURISDICTION
14. The parties agree to jointly move the Court of Appeals for an order:
a) effecting a limited remand of the case to the District Court with instructions that the District Court review the parties’ stipulated settlement Agreement, hold a fairness hearing pursuant to FRCP 23(e), and determine whether to approve the stipulated settlement Agreement;
b) holding defendants/appellants’ appeal in abeyance pending the District Court’s decision whether to approve the stipulated settlement Agreement.
A copy of this joint motion and proposed order are attached as Exhibits 1 and 2. This settlement Agreement will be appended to the proposed remand order.
15. If, upon the limited remand and following the fairness hearing, the District Court:
a) approves the parties’ stipulated settlement Agreement, the parties will jointly move the District Court to dismiss the case with prejudice, (except as to those matters that will remain the subject of the District Court’s retained jurisdiction under paragraphs 16 and 17 of this Agreement, but only for the life of this Agreement pursuant to Section H), and to enter an order vacating its decision and Order filed on February 12, 2004. Neither party shall seek to remove the February 12, 2004 District Court decision from publication, but any party may seek to ensure that record of the vacatur of the decision is published. Following the District Court’s entry of the
3

latest of an order or orders approving the settlement Agreement, dismissing the case with prejudice (except as to those matters that will remain the subject of the District Court’s retained jurisdiction under paragraphs 16 and 17 of this Agreement, but only for the life of this Agreement pursuant to Section H), and vacating its decision and Order filed on February 12, 2004, defendants will withdraw the appeal in the Court of Appeals within 30 days.
b) does not approve the stipulated settlement Agreement, does not dismiss the case with prejudice (except as to those matters that will remain the subject of the District Court’s retained jurisdiction under paragraphs 16 and 17 of this Agreement, but only for the life of this Agreement pursuant to Section H), or does not vacate its decision and Order filed on February 12, 2004, the settlement Agreement will be null and void and the defendants will have the right to make an appropriate motion with the Court of Appeals within 30 days of the District Court’s decision not to approve the settlement Agreement, not to dismiss the case with prejudice (except as to those matters that will remain the subject of the District Court’s retained jurisdiction under paragraphs 16 and 17 of this Agreement), or not to vacate its decision and Order filed on February 12, 2004, whichever comes last.
16. Retention of Jurisdiction by the District Court. Following final approval of this Agreement and dismissal by the District Court and until this Agreement is no longer in effect, the District Court will retain jurisdiction through this action over only the following matters:
a) claims by any party hereto that any other party has committed a significant violation of this Agreement;
b) the express repudiation of any of the terms of this Agreement by any party;
c) any applications for attorneys fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act related to enforcement of this Agreement, including monitoring that results in an enforcement action, filed by or on behalf of a class member.
17. Exercise of retained jurisdiction by the District Court. The parties agree that, except as to paragraph 16(c), no party will seek to invoke the District Court's jurisdiction under this Section with respect to any violation unless and until the party has complied with the provisions of section D with respect to that violation.
SECTION D. DISPUTE RESOLUTION
18. A significant purpose of this Agreement is to eliminate or reduce the need for further complex litigation in court. In order to effectuate this purpose the parties agree to the following dispute resolution mechanism:
(a) Upon learning of any fact or facts that constitute the basis for asserting that a party has expressly repudiated or committed a significant violation of this
4

Agreement, the aggrieved party shall notify the other party hereto of that fact or facts and request a report on what remedial action has been taken with respect to such alleged facts prior to invoking the enforcement provisions of this Agreement.
(b) Within thirty (30) days after receipt of such notice, the other party shall notify the first party of the results of its investigation of the facts and any remedial action it has taken or intends to take in connection therewith.
(c) Thereafter the parties shall initiate negotiations in good faith within 30 days in an effort to resolve any disputes remaining after the undertaking set forth in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above have been completed.
SECTION E. PROCESSING OF APPLICATIONS FOR ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS
19. Unused Asylee Adjustment Numbers - Defendants agree that asylee adjustment cap numbers made available in a given fiscal year remain available to adjust an asylee's status beyond the end of the fiscal year. Defendants will make use of all past unused or misapplied numbers, as described in this section, within the time frame set out in this Agreement. Defendants further agree that, in the event any numbers made available for Fiscal Year 2005 and subsequent fiscal years are not utilized for asylee adjustments subject to the adjustment cap, they will continue to treat those numbers as available for use in subsequent fiscal years. This Agreement affects only the adjustment of status for asylees pursuant to section 209(b) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1159(b) and in no way affects the use or allocation of refugee admission numbers pursuant to section 207(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1157(a).
20. The parties agree that an accounting of unused asylee adjustment numbers is no longer necessary and will divert critical resources needed for the adjudication of applications. Instead, based upon a careful review of the evidence and findings of the District Court, the government statistics relating to the administration of asylee adjustment numbers since 1994, and the limited specific evidence relating to the use of asylee adjustment numbers from 1991 to 1994, the parties agree that a reasonable estimate of the asylee adjustment numbers made available in prior years that remain available for use at this time is 31,000. Thus, in lieu of specific accounting, the parties estimate and agree that defendants’ policies and practices have resulted in approximately 31,000 unused or misapplied asylee adjustment numbers. The parties agree to be bound by this estimate as if a full accounting had been made. These numbers are now available to adjust the status of asylees, in addition to any numbers made available for asylee adjustment by the President in this or any subsequent fiscal year.
21. Tracking of Asylee Adjustment Applications--Defendants shall maintain a database that identifies all pending asylee adjustment applications organized in chronological order by date of filing of the adjustment application. Defendants shall process asylee adjustments in the order of filing to the maximum degree possible. Defendants will treat all available asylee adjustment
5

numbers, including those additional numbers agreed to in this section, as one pool of numbers from which eligible applicants may be adjusted.
22. Distribution of Unused Asylee Adjustment Numbers - Defendants will increase the number of asylee adjustments processed in this and subsequent fiscal years in order to adjust the status of an additional 31,000 asylees within the next three fiscal years beginning with the fiscal year of the effective date of the Agreement. Defendants agree to implement this process as soon as possible following the signing of this Agreement by the parties. Any additional adjustments made during the time period between signature of the Agreement and approval by the District Court will be counted toward the 31,000 total. At a minimum, defendants will process and adjust at least 8,000 additional applications in the first fiscal year beginning with the fiscal year of the effective date of the Agreement; 8,000 additional adjustments during the second fiscal year following the effective date of the Agreement; and the remainder of the additional adjustments during the third fiscal year following the effective date of the Agreement. The processing of these additional 31,000 cases shall be in addition to the processing of the annual authorization of numbers under the asylum cap, as defined in Section A.
23. Quarterly and Annual Reports - Defendants agree to produce quarterly reports, and post them on the Internet website of defendant USCIS. The content of the quarterly reports shall reflect the filing date of asylee adjustment applications currently being processed and shall report on the number of asylee adjustment applications that were approved during the prior quarter. Defendants also shall produce annual reports and post them on the internet website of defendant USCIS. The annual reports shall set forth USCIS’ reasonable estimates of the dates by which groups of asylees are expected to be able to complete adjustment processing, based on date of filing of the application for adjustment in light of the effect of the annual cap. Such annual reports shall be provided only as a general planning tool and shall not bind any of the defendants in any way. The quarterly and annual reports shall not include information about any specific application for adjustment of status, other than that enumerated in this paragraph.
24. Adjustment Processing Contact Person - Defendants will identify a method of contact by which class members may direct inquiries concerning the adjudication of asylee adjustment applications filed before the processing date reflected in the most recent quarterly report. Defendants will determine the status of the application, and the cause for any delay in processing the application, including any delays due to security issues, and will take immediate steps to resolve any problems. Defendants will notify plaintiffs’ counsel of the method of contact and provide written contact information, upon approval of the settlement Agreement.
25. Continued Use of Numbers Made Available in Current and Future Fiscal Years Defendants’ use of the unused and misapplied numbers described in paragraphs 20 and 22 above is to be in addition to the use of the ten thousand asylee adjustment numbers that have been made available in fiscal year 2005 and all asylee adjustment numbers that will be made available in subsequent fiscal years. Defendants will continue to use all asylee adjustment numbers made available in any fiscal year to the maximum extent.
SECTION F. ENDORSEMENT AND DURATION OF AUTHORIZATION TO WORK
6

26. Persons granted asylum in the United States are authorized to work incident to status. An asylee’s right to engage in employment does not terminate at the expiration of the asylee’s employment authorization document. Defendants agree to provide asylees with EADs as set forth in this section for so long as their asylee status has not been terminated. Defendants agree to provide plaintiffs’ counsel with copies of instructions to defendants’ staff regarding implementation of this Agreement.
27. Defendants have an interest in an EAD that has integrity and reliability, and withstands fraud by its holder or persons who are not authorized to hold the EAD. Plaintiffs have an interest in an EAD that is effective for immediate and continuous employment while they are in asylee status.
28. The parties agree that defendants will provide notice to plaintiffs’ counsel prior to the initial implementation of this Agreement and make reasonable efforts to provide notice to plaintiffs’ counsel of changes in the EAD process affecting the class members. Such changes may include, for example, the replacement of Form I-688B with Form I-766 for initial cards, the reduction or elimination of need for some or all asylum grantees or EAD renewal applicants to present themselves for further biometric processing, the availability of multi-year cards for initial grantees, or the reduction of fees for certain multi-year cards.
29. Within 3 months of the effective date of this Agreement, and at a minimum, throughout the duration of this Agreement, defendants will provide asylees seeking renewal of their EADs the option to obtain EADs valid for multiple year periods, up to 5 years. To exercise such option, asylees will prepay for the number of years requested. The fee for multiple years will be adjusted to reflect estimated costs of producing the EAD and savings to defendants resulting from not producing additional EADs, which will not be less than $20 per year.
30. Although regulations may apply future increases or decreases in fees for EADs to asylees, no change in fees for EADs will be applied to the detriment of class members within two years of the effective date of this Agreement. A request for an EAD of longer duration will not adversely affect the adjudication of fee waivers pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 103.7(c).
31. The parties agree that class members wishing to renew their EADs shall submit a Form I-765, or other form required by defendants by regulation for EAD processing with any lawfully required fee. Upon receipt of a properly signed Form I-765 and appropriate fee, defendant USCIS will generate a notice that will be mailed to the class member’s address indicated on the Form I-765. The notice will be generated within 5 business days of receipt and will acknowledge receipt of the application and fee as of a specific date. The notice will provide further instructions, as necessary. If biometrics are necessary, such instructions will include an appointment time and place or how to schedule an appointment at a convenient time and place at a USCIS Application Support Center for the taking of the class member’s biometrics for the generation of a new card and/or the initiation of an FBI fingerprint check. Within 100 days of receipt of a completed application, CIS will issue an EAD to the class member, except in those
7

cases described in paragraph 34 and in cases where an applicant fails to comply with or delays complying with instructions for necessary biometric processing. This procedure is in addition to and does not eliminate, replace or restrict an asylee’s rights under 8 C.F.R. § 274a.13(d), including the right to an interim EAD if defendants fail to adjudicate an EAD application within 90 days.
32. Defendants will provide asylees who follow the steps described in paragraph 31 above with a renewal EAD by mailing the new EAD to the address the asylee provided on the renewal form or to such other address as the asylee provides defendants for such purpose.
33. Defendants agree to provide a dedicated e-mail address by which class members may bring to the attention of the defendants cases in which an asylee who applied for a renewal of an EAD which has been pending for 80 days or longer has not received a new EAD in the mail within 80 days of application. In establishing such procedure, defendants shall establish a point of contact and will notify plaintiffs’ counsel of the name of the point of contact, and provide contact information, upon approval of this Agreement. Once such cases are brought to the attention of the point of contact, the point of contact will determine the cause for the delay in issuing the renewal EAD and take immediate steps to expedite and resolve any problems. If the problem cannot be resolved within ten days, the point of contact will so notify the complainant as soon as necessary to avoid any gap between the expiration of the old EAD and receipt of the renewal or an interim EAD.
34. The parties agree that the provisions of this section shall not apply to EAD renewal requests properly governed by 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(18), including but not limited to situations in which USCIS is investigating an alien's inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3) or deportability under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(4) and has invoked 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(18).
35. Where an asylee applies for an EAD that is of longer duration than one year, and where 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(18) is not properly invoked by defendants, defendants shall issue the EAD for the multiple year period for which the asylee applied. Where an asylee applies for an EAD of one-year duration, and the defendants issue an EAD for a shorter duration, defendants will not charge for renewals of the card that are occasioned by the shorter duration.
36. Defendants agree to use reasonable and good faith efforts to implement the procedures described in this Agreement in a manner that avoids interruption of asylees’ employment authorization endorsement throughout the duration of their asylum status, and that facilitates all asylees’ ability to comply with the requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b) and 8 C.F.R. §274a.2.
SECTION G. NOTICE TO THE CLASS
37. This Agreement shall be binding upon the class certified by the District Court on October 17, 2003.
38. The parties will jointly seek approval from the District Court of a notice sufficient to satisfy Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(e). Upon the District Court’s approval of the notice,
8

Defendants shall:
a. place the notice and the Agreement on the USCIS website and on the EOIR website;
b. distribute the notice and Agreement to the Community Relations Office located within each USCIS District Office; and
c. distribute the notice and Agreement to all immigration assistance providers listed on the Roster of Recognized Organizations and Accredited Representatives maintained by the Executive Office for Immigration Review pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §292.
SECTION H. DURATION AND SCOPE OF THIS AGREEMENT
39. This settlement Agreement shall remain in full force and effect for three years from its effective date or until the defendants complete the following, whichever period is longer:
a. Completion of the processing of the 31,000 adjustment applications as described in paragraph 21 above; and
b. Implementation of procedures to issue EADs valid for multiple years to all asylees, consistent with this Agreement.
40. No later than 30 days prior to the three-year anniversary of the effective date of this Agreement, defendants will report to the plaintiffs’ counsel and to the District Court in writing that the defendants have or have not met the obligations described in this Section. If defendants have not met the obligations, defendants will appear before the District Court to discuss the status of compliance and appropriate action.
41. The termination of this Agreement shall not extinguish or diminish the District Court’s authority to resolve claims pending during the effective period of the Agreement pursuant to the District Court’s retained jurisdiction under Section C regarding the violation of the terms of the Agreement; nor shall the termination of the Agreement extinguish or diminish the rights of any party with such pending claims to obtain relief based on the terms of the Agreement.
SECTION I. RESERVATION OF RIGHTS AND INTERESTS
42. By entering into this Agreement, the defendants do not waive, reduce or otherwise diminish their authority to enforce the laws of the United States against class members notwithstanding the terms of this Agreement, consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.
43. Nothing in this Agreement shall limit the right of a class member to preserve issues for judicial review in the appeal of an individual case pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252; or to exercise any independent statutory or regulatory rights they may have, outside the scope of this Agreement,
9

under the Immigration and Nationality Act, including rights under 8 C.F.R. §274a.13(d).
44. By entering into this Agreement, defendants do not admit to any violations of, or failure to comply with, the Constitution, laws or regulations.
45. Defendants represent and warrant that they are fully authorized and empowered to enter into this Agreement on behalf of the named defendants and all defendants and successors as defined in Section A of this Agreement. The undersigned who sign on behalf of other defendants warrant and declare that they have all the required authorization to execute this Agreement and that upon execution of the Agreement in their representative capacities, their principals and the successors of such principals shall be bound hereunder to the full extent authorized by law.

THE PLAINTIFFS
BY: _____________________________ original signed by Nadine Wettstein Dated: on January 31, 2005

THE DEFENDANTS

BY: ___________________

[

[ original signed by Nancy Friedman

Dated: on January 31, 2005

10

 
 376 F.Supp.2d 923 (2005)
Venantius Nkafor NGWANYIA, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Alberto GONZALES, U.S. Attorney General, et al., Defendants.
No. Civ.02502(RHK/AJB).
United States District Court, D. Minnesota.
July 12, 2005.
924 *924 Nadine K. Wettstein and Mary A. Kenney, American Immigration Law Foundation, Washington, DC; Iris Gomez, Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, Boston, Massachusetts; and James K. Langdon II, Dorsey & Whitney, Minneapolis, MN, for Plaintiffs.
Nancy E. Friedman, U.S. Department of Justice Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, and Friedrich A.P. Siekert, Assistant United States Attorney, Minneapolis, MN, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
KYLE, District Judge.
Introduction
Counsel for the plaintiff class and the defendant federal government officials and agencies seek final approval of their proposed Settlement Agreement, pursuant to Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court preliminarily approved the parties' proposed Settlement Agreement and directed notice to be distributed to the class members. After notice was distributed, class members filed a number of objections. The Court conducted a fairness hearing on June 15, 2005. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds the Settlement Agreement fair, reasonable, and adequate, and will grant it final approval.
Background
A. The Allegations[1]
In March 2002, forty-six asylees[2] with pending applications for lawful permanent resident status in the United States, on behalf of a class of individuals (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), sued the United States Attorney General, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Homeland Security, Director of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, and the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (collectively, 925 "Defendants").[3] Plaintiffs asserted that Defendants improperly administered the system *925 by which asylees become lawful, permanent residents of the United States. (See Doc. No. 91 (Order dated 2/12/04).)
Plaintiffs alleged Defendants violated: (1) 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) by violating Plaintiffs' right to adjust their status and by delaying their adjustment pursuant to that statute; (2) 8 C.F.R. § 209(a)(1) by not maintaining a priority waiting list based on the date each Plaintiff's adjustment application was filed; (3) Pub.L. No. 105-277, Title I, § 128, Pub.L. No. 106-429, § 586, and Pub.L. No. 106-378 by failing to exempt qualifying Iraqi Kurds, Indo-Chinese parolees, and Syrian Jews from the 10,000 lawful permanent resident cap; (4) 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(1)(B) by requiring Plaintiffs to apply for and renew Employment Authorization Documents in order to be employed when the right to employment is incident to their status as asylees; (5) the Administrative Procedures Act by unlawfully withholding or unreasonably delaying agency action under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1); and (6) the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief

requiring Defendants to comply with the statutory, regulatory, and constitutional requirements outlined above, as well as attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act. (See Doc. No. 37 (Order dated 1/14/03).)
B. Class Certification Granted
In January 2003, the Court certified the matter as a class action on behalf of tens of thousands of asylees pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (See Doc. No. 37 (Order dated 1/14/03).) The Court found that Plaintiffs' claims satisfied the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements of Rule 23(a). The Court further found that Plaintiffs' claims satisfied Rule 23(b)(2), which permits class certification if "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole."
The Court certified the following class and sub-classes:
Class: All asylees in the United States who have applied for adjustment of status to lawful permanent residence and whose applications for adjustment remain pending;
Subclass I: All asylees who filed their adjustment of status applications with the INS on or before January 16, 1998;
Subclass II: All asylees who filed their adjustment of status applications after January 16, 1998, and on or before June 9, 1998;
Subclass III: All asylees who filed their adjustment of status applications after June 9, 1998;
Subclass IV: All asylees who applied for or applied to renew an Employment Authorization Document.
(See Doc. No. 37 (Order dated 1/14/03).)
C. Plaintiffs' Motions for Summary Judgment Granted
In February 2004, the Court granted Plaintiffs' cross-motions for summary judgment and denied Defendants' 926 cross-motion *926 for summary judgment. (See Doc. No. 91 (Order dated 2/12/04).) The two main issues raised
in the cross-motions concerned asylee adjustment and employment endorsement.
With regard to asylee adjustment, the Court:
0905 Declared, as a matter of law, that all refugee admission numbers that have been made available for asylee adjustments in prior years but remain unused are presently available to be used for asylee adjustment;
0905 Ordered that Defendants make an accounting of the precise number of asylee adjustment numbers made available by the President but not used by Defendants in each fiscal year since 1992;
0905 Ordered that Defendants make an accounting of the precise number of asylee adjustment numbers made available by the President that were erroneously used to adjust the status of asylees subject to statutory exemptions, including certain Iraqi Kurds, Syrian Jews, and asylees who applied for asylum prior to 1990; and
0905 Ordered that Defendants use all unused and misused asylee adjustment numbers made available in prior years to adjust the status of asylees, beginning at the start of the waiting list.
With regard to employment endorsement, the Court:
0905 Declared that Defendants have a statutory duty to provide, on their own initiative, endorsement of employment authorization to all asylees immediately upon grant of asylum; that Defendants have no discretion to deny such an endorsement; and that the endorsement must contain, at a minimum, the fingerprint and photograph of the asylee and be continuously valid for the duration of the alien's status as an asylee; and
0905 Ordered that Defendants provide all asylees with an employment authorization endorsement that is valid throughout the duration of the alien's status as an asylee.

(See Doc. No. 91 (Order dated 2/12/04).)
The Court stayed its Order until the time for appealing had expired, and, if appealed, continued the stay throughout the pendency of the appeal. (See id.) Finding no just reason for delaying the entry of judgment, the Court directed the Clerk to enter judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and judgment was entered. (See Doc. Nos. 91, 92.)
D. Other Claims Dismissed
In March 2004, based on the representations of Plaintiffs' counsel, the Court dismissed with prejudice any and all claims not addressed in the February 12, 2004 Memorandum Opinion and Order. (See Doc. No. 95.)
E. The Appeal, Execution of Settlement Agreement, and Limited Remand
In April 2004, Defendants filed a Notice of Appeal to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals as to the February 12, 2004 Memorandum Opinion and Order. (See Doc. No. 99.) In January 2005, the parties executed the proposed Settlement Agreement. In February 2005, the Eighth Circuit granted the Parties' Joint Motion For Limited Remand and To Hold Appeal in Abeyance. (See Doc. No. 105.) The Eighth Circuit remanded the case to this Court "for the purpose of holding a fairness hearing to determine whether to approve the stipulated settlement agreement." (Id.)
F. The Terms of the Proposed Settlement Agreement
927 In May 2005, this Court granted preliminary approval of the proposed Settlement *927 Agreement, and approved the proposed notice for distribution. (See Doc. No. 109.) The proposed Settlement Agreement "is fully dispositive" of all Plaintiffs' claims and is fully binding upon the parties, and on each of their successors and successor agencies.
The Settlement Agreement sets forth the parties' agreement on the two main issues of asylee adjustment and employment endorsement. With regard to asylee adjustment, Section E, which is entitled "Processing of Applications For Adjustment of Status," provides for: the use of unused or misplaced asylee adjustment numbers; the distribution of unused asylee adjustment numbers (paragraph 22 specifies a minimum distribution of 61,000 over the next three fiscal years);[4] quarterly and annual reports; an adjustment processing contact person; and the continued use of numbers made available in current and future fiscal years. With regard to employment endorsement, Section F, which is entitled "Endorsement and Duration of Authorization To Work," details how Defendants will provide asylees with employment authorization documents.
In addition, Section H provides that the Settlement Agreement remains in effect for three years or until Defendants complete the following, whichever is longer: (1) completion of the processing of 31,000 adjustment applications as described; and (2) implementation of procedures to issue employment adjustment documents. No later than thirty days prior to the three-year anniversary of the effective date of the Settlement Agreement, Defendants will report to Plaintiffs and to this Court that Defendants have or have not met its obligations. If the obligations are not met, Defendants will appear before the Court to discuss compliance and appropriate action.
Furthermore, Section C provides that upon approval of the Settlement Agreement by the Court, the parties agree to move this Court to dismiss the case with prejudice and to vacate its February 12, 2004 Memorandum Opinion and Order. Upon the Court issuing orders approving the proposed Settlement Agreement, dismissing the case with prejudice, and vacating the February 12, 2004 Memorandum Opinion and Order, Defendants will withdraw its appeal to the Eighth Circuit within thirty days.
Also under Section C, the Court retains jurisdiction over the following matters: (a) claims by any party that any other party has committed a significant violation of the Settlement Agreement; (b) the express repudiation of any of the terms of the Settlement Agreement by any party; and (c) any applications for attorneys' fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act related to enforcement of the Settlement Agreement, including monitoring that results in an enforcement action, filed by or on behalf of a class member. The parties agreed not to seek to

invoke the Court's jurisdiction, except as to attorneys' fees, unless and until the party has complied with the dispute resolution provisions outlined in Section D.[5]
928 *928 G. The REAL ID Act
On May 11, 2005, Congress enacted the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub.L. No. 109-13. The Act includes Section 101 (g) which lifted a 10,000 cap on asylee adjustments per fiscal year. See REAL ID Act, Pub.L. 109-13, Division B, Title I (2005). The parties subsequently filed Parties' Joint Notice of REAL ID ACT stating that should the Settlement Agreement be approved by the Court, the parties will abide by its terms, including paragraph 22, which provides for the processing and adjusting of a minimum of 61,000 asylees within the next three fiscal years. (See Doc. No. 110.)
H. Responses to the Proposed Settlement Agreement
In response to the notice of the Settlement Agreement, fourteen individuals filed objections with the Court. It is not apparent, however, that every objector is a class member. Assuming that all fourteen are class members, and further assuming that the class size is ten thousand individuals,[6] the Court received objections from less than one percent (1%) of the class.
The greatest number of objectors addressed the effect of the REAL ID Act. Others asserted that asylee adjustment for legal permanent residence should be treated like refugee adjustments. A few others suggested that Defendants backdate the approval date for a green card to the date the application was received. One person objected to the lack of a definition for class membership in the Settlement Agreement. Finally, various objectors sought additional relief, such as reducing the wait for citizenship after legal permanent resident status; creating an expedited process like that apparently used for H-1B visas; considerations of expedited reunion with family; and priority adjustment for those who applied for asylum prior to 1998.
I. Fairness Hearing and Joint Motion
On June 15, 2005, the Court held a fairness hearing on the proposed Settlement Agreement. Counsel for all parties appeared and four class members raised objections during the hearing. After listening to the parties' arguments and to the objectors' concerns, the Court gave final approval to the Settlement Agreement on the record, and counsel were directed to submit a proposed order. On June 24, 2005, counsel submitted a proposed order and filed a Joint Motion For Court Approval of Settlement Agreement and to Dismiss. (Doc. No. 129.)
Analysis
Under Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court must approve any settlement of the claims, issues, and defenses of a certified class. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e)(1)(A). The Court may approve a settlement that binds class members "only after a hearing and on finding that the settlement ... is fair, reasonable and adequate." Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e)(1)(C); see Van Horn v. Trickey, 840 F.2d 604, 606 (8th Cir.1988). To determine whether a settlement satisfies these standards, the Court must consider: "[1] the merits of the plaintiff's case, weighed against the terms of the settlement; [2] the defendant's financial condition; [3] the complexity and expense of further litigation; and [4] the amount of opposition to the settlement." Van Horn, 840 F.2d at 607 (citations omitted). While "the district court need not undertake the type of detailed investigation that trying the case would 929 involve," the Court "must nevertheless provide the appellate court with a *929 basis for determining that its decision rests on well-reasoned conclusions and not mere boilerplate." Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted). The Court will consider each of the above-mentioned factors in turn.
A. Merits of Plaintiffs' Case, Weighed Against Terms of the Settlement
This factor is "[t]he single most important factor in determining whether a settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate." Van Horn, 840 F.2d at 607. In this case, Plaintiffs' primary concerns were with asylee adjustments and employment endorsements. They prevailed on both claims at summary judgment. (See Doc. No. 91 (Order dated 2/12/04).) Obviously, in the Court's assessment, Plaintiffs' case was meritorious. Weighing the merits of the case against the settlement terms, the Court finds that a comparison of the relief sought by Plaintiffs and the relief

proposed in the Settlement Agreement demonstrates that Plaintiffs were highly successful. Having carefully reviewed both the merits of the case and the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the Court finds that the settlement provides "substantial benefits to the class." Van Horn, 840 F.2d at 608 (citation omitted). Accordingly, the Court concludes that this factor weighs heavily in favor of approval of the Settlement Agreement.
B. Defendants' Financial Condition
This factor is not significant in this case because the action is not for monetary damages. See Cody v. Hillard, 88 F.Supp.2d 1049, 1059 (D.S.D.2000).
C. Complexity and Expense of Further Litigation
This case, which presents moderately complex issues of agency administration of immigration law, was initiated more than three years ago and has already consumed a considerable amount of time and resources of both parties and the Court. If the litigation continues, which initially will be in front of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, more time and resources will be expended. The delay in resolving the issues raised in this case will only further delay the relief that the asylees seek and that Defendants have agreed to provide. Accordingly, the Court finds that this factor weighs in favor of approval of the Settlement Agreement.
D. Amount of Opposition to the Settlement
The amount of opposition to the settlement is relatively small. The Court received objections from fourteen people, each raising a number of concerns. Assuming that each objector is a class member, and assuming that the class size is ten thousand people, less than one percent (1%) of the class objected to the settlement. It is the opinion of class counsel that the objections presented do not warrant rejection of the proposed Settlement Agreement. (See Doc. Nos. 119, 124, 127.) The Court will address the objections in turn.
1. Effect of the REAL ID Act
The greatest number of objectors addressed the effect of the REAL ID Act. Prior to the REAL ID Act, the President could authorize the admission of fifty thousand refugees each fiscal year, and the Attorney General could, at his discretion, use up to ten thousand refugee admission numbers to adjust the status of asylees already in this country to the status of lawful permanent residents. (See Doc. No. 91 at 6 (Order dated 2/12/04).) Section 101(g) of the REAL ID Act lifted the ten thousand number cap on asylee adjustments. See REAL ID Act 930 of 2005, Pub.L. 103-13, Division A, Title I (2005). The objectors apparently view the Settlement *930 Agreement as placing a cap on asylee adjustments in violation of their rights.
The Court finds that the objectors' concerns regarding the effect of the REAL ID Act are unfounded. The Settlement Agreement does not implement a cap; rather, it requires Defendants to adjust the status of a minimum number of asylees within the next three years. After the passage of the REAL ID Act, counsel from both parties filed Parties' Joint Notice of Real ID Act wherein Defendants agreed to abide by the terms of the Settlement Agreement which "provides for the processing and adjusting of a minimum of 61,000 asylees within the next three fiscal years." (Doc. No. 110 (emphasis added).) Accordingly, the Court will overrule the objection.
2. Treating Asylee Adjustment For Legal Permanent Residency Like Refugee Adjustment
A significant number of objectors asserted that adjusting the status of asylees to legal permanent resident status should be treated like refugee adjustments. This objection is unfounded because Congress has set the manner in which asylee and refugee adjustment applications are handled by statute. This lawsuit did not challenge the validity of those laws; rather, it challenged the ways in which the laws were being carried out. Accordingly, the Court will overrule this objection.
3. Backdating Green Cards
Some objectors suggested that Defendants backdate the approval date for a green card to the date the application was received. This objection is unfounded because Congress has set the manner in which applications are backdated by statute. See 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) (providing one-year backdating of alien's admission for lawful permanent residence). As noted above, this lawsuit concerned not the validity of the laws

passed by Congress, but rather the ways in which the administrative agencies were carrying out the laws. Accordingly, the Court will overrule this objection.
4. Definition of Class Membership
One person objected to the lack of a definition for class membership in the Settlement Agreement. This objection will be overruled because Section A, subsection 8, of the Settlement Agreement provides the class and sub-class definitions as ordered by this Court.
5. Miscellaneous Objections
Finally, some objectors asked for various other types of relief, such as reducing the wait for citizenship after legal permanent resident status; creating an expedited process like that apparently used for H-1B visas; considerations of expedited reunion with family; and priority adjustment for those who applied for asylum prior to 1998. Again, Congress has set forth the manner in which these matters are handled and this lawsuit did not challenge those statutes as invalid; rather, it challenged how the statutes were administered. Accordingly, these objections will be overruled.
E. Conclusion
Having considered the relevant factors, the Court concludes that the Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate, and will grant it final approval.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, and all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS ORDERED:
1. The proposed Settlement Agreement dated January 31, 2005 is APPROVED as fair, reasonable, and adequate 931 pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e). The parties are ordered to *931 carry out the terms of the Settlement Agreement;
2. The objections to the Settlement Agreement are OVERRULED;
3. The Joint Motion For Court Approval of Settlement and to Dismiss (Doc. No. 129) is GRANTED;
4. This case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, pursuant to paragraph 15(a) of the Settlement Agreement (except as to those matters that will remain the subject of the Court's retained jurisdiction under paragraphs 16 and 17 of the Settlement Agreement, but only for the life of the Settlement Agreement pursuant to Section H of the Settlement Agreement); and
5. The Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order of February 12, 2004 is VACATED. The Court notes, however, that the Memorandum Opinion and Order is vacated only because vacation was made a condition of the settlement, and because the Court finds that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and should be approved and put into effect. The Court reaffirms its views expressed in that Memorandum Opinion and Order, which is published at Venantius Nkafor Ngwanyia v. John Ashcroft, 302 F.Supp.2d 1076 (D.Minn.2004).
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
[1] For further detail on the statutory and regulatory framework at issue in this case, as well as details on the proceedings in this matter, see 302 F.Supp.2d 1076 (D.Minn.2004).
[2] "Asylees" refers to individuals granted asylum in the United States.
[3] Plaintiffs originally sued the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") and its commissioner. Effective March 1, 2003, the INS was abolished and its immigration benefits and services functions were transferred to the newly created Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services division within the Department of Homeland Security. Thus, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(d), the Court substituted Defendants Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Homeland Security, Director of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration

Services, and Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, for the now abolished INS and its commissioner. ( See Doc. No. 91 (Order dated 2/12/04).)
[4] (See Doc. No. 110 (Parties' Joint Notice of REAL ID ACT).)
[5] In Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Approval of Settlement Agreement, Approval of Notice to the Class and Statement Identifying Agreement, Plaintiffs' counsel informed the Court that the parties have reached a separate attorneys' fees and costs agreement. The fee agreement provides that Defendants will pay to Plaintiffs' counsel a specified sum of fees and costs (an amount not disclosed to the Court). Counsel also informed the Court that, as was explained in the notice to the class, the individual plaintiffs and class members have not paid attorneys' fees or costs, will not be asked to pay attorneys' fees or costs, and will not have to pay attorneys' fees or costs in connection with this case. (See Doc. No. 106.)
[6] This is probably a gross underestimate.
Save trees - read court opinions online on Google Scholar.

 
 Ngwanyia v. Ashcroft, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2002)

2002 WL 31371947 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, D. Minnesota.
Venantius Nkafor NGWANYIA, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
John ASHCROFT, Attorney General, et al., Defendants.
No. Civ. 02–502 RHK/AJB. | Oct. 10, 2002.
Attorneys and Law Firms
James K. Langdon II, Dorsey & Whitney, Minneapolis, Minnesota; Nadine Wettstein, J. Traci Hong, and Mary Kenney, American Immigration Law Foundation, Washington D.C.; and Iris Gomez, Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, Boston, Massachusetts; for Plaintiffs.
Thomas B. Heffelfinger, United States Attorney, and Fred Siekert, Assistant United States Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota; Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, United States Department of Justice, Margaret J. Perry, Senior Litigation Counsel, United States Department of Justice, and Greg Mack, Trial Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Washington D.C.; for Defendants.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
KYLE, J.
Introduction
*1 This matter is a putative class action involving asylees1 with applications for lawful permanent residence pending before the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”). Defendants John Ashcroft, the United States Attorney General, James Ziglar, the Commissioner of the INS, and the INS (collectively, “Defendants”) move the Court to transfer venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Because the Court finds that Defendants have failed to demonstrate that the balance of factors is strongly in their favor, see Graff v. Qwest Communication Corp., 33 F.Supp.2d 1117, 1121 (D.Minn.1999) (Doty, J.), the motion will be denied.

1

Both parties use the term “asylees” to refer to

individuals granted asylum in the United States.

Background
Under § 209(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Attorney General may, at his discretion, adjust the status of an alien granted asylum. 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b). At or near the beginning of each fiscal year, the Attorney General may confer lawful permanent resident status upon no more that 10,000 asylees who apply for adjustment. (Id.) If applications from asylees who wish to adjust their status exceed the number of permanent resident spots available for the fiscal year, a waiting list is established on a priority determined by the date the application was filed. 8 C.F.R. § 209.2(a) (2001). Plaintiffs assert there is a backlog of more than 60,000 asylees awaiting adjustment of status, and yet the INS has not been distributing all 10,000 available adjustment allotments. (See Complaint ¶ 20.) Plaintiffs are seeking to represent a class consisting of all asylees in the United States who have applied for adjustment of status to lawful permanent residence and whose applications remain pending. (Id. ¶ 277.) Five named plaintiffs reside in the District of Minnesota. (Id. ¶ 8.) In the present motion, Defendants have moved for a transfer of venue to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (“D.C. District Court”).
Analysis
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), a civil action against an officer or employee may be brought in any judicial district in which (1) the defendant in the action resides, (2) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or (3) the plaintiff resides. In the present matter, Plaintiffs assert that venue is proper in the District of Minnesota because several of them are Minnesota residents and events and omissions giving rise to their claim occurred in this judicial district. Because Plaintiffs only need satisfy one of these conditions, Defendants concede that venue is proper in this district. (Defs.’ Supp. Mem. at 5.)
Where, as here, venue is proper, § 1404(a) permits a party to move the district court to transfer a case to another judicial district. Transfer under § 1404(a) “should not be freely granted.” In re Nine Mile Ltd., 692 F.2d 56, 61 (8th Cir.1982). Instead, transfer is only appropriate if certain conditions are met: “For the convenience of the parties
1

Ngwanyia v. Ashcroft, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2002)

and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). This statutory language encompasses three general factors: (1) the convenience of the parties, (2) the convenience of the witnesses, and (3) the interests of justice.2 Terra Int’l, Inc. v. Mississippi Chemical Corp., 119 F.3d 688, 691 (8th Cir.1997). The Court’s consideration, however, is not limited to these factors and may be based upon a case-by-case evaluation of the particular circumstances at hand. Id. The party seeking transfer bears the burden showing that the balance of factors “strongly” favors the movant. United Mortgage Corp. v. Plaza Mortgage Corp., 853 F.Supp. 311, 315 (D.Minn.1994) (Doty, J.). Here, Defendants move to transfer venue to the D.C. District Court on the grounds that this action has a tenuous connection with Minnesota and involves issues that are national in scope.

2

While Defendants analyze this action under the

framework laid out by the D.C. Circuit and provide

ample citations to D.C. District Court, the Court notes

that it is bound by caselaw of the circuit in which it is

situated, to wit, the Eighth Circuit.

*2 Defendants have not demonstrated that the convenience of the parties requires a transfer. Section 1404(a) provides for transfer to a more convenient forum, “not to a forum likely to prove equally convenient or inconvenient, and a transfer should not be granted if the effect is simply to shift the inconvenience to the party resisting the transfer.” Graff, 33 F.Supp.2d at 1121 (citing Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 646 (1964)). While Defendants argue that the relevant papers concerning the administration and oversight of the asylees adjustment process are located in the D.C. District Court, Defendants also concede that “the consolidation of the dispensation of adjustment numbers” is done at the Nebraska Service Center. (Defs.’ Supp. Mot. at 6.) These documents, at the heart of the present matter, would have to be transferred to the D.C. District Court even if Defendants’ motion were granted. Defendants have come forward with no evidence explaining why they could easily transfer these and other documents to the D.C. District Court but not to the District of Minnesota. Without affidavits or similar evidence to support the contention that the D.C. District Court would be more convenient for the parties, the Court is left with the impression that who a transfer of venue would really be convenient for is Defendants’ counsel. Needless to say, that reason is insufficient to overcome the strong “presumption in favor of a plaintiff’s choice of forums.” See K–Tel Int’l, Inc. v. Tristar Products, Inc., 169 F.Supp.2d 1033, 1045 (D.Minn.2001) (Frank, J.) (citing Christensensen Hatch Farms, Inc. v. Peavy Co., 505 F.Supp. 903, 911 (D.Minn.1981) (Renner, J.)).

Likewise, Defendants have not demonstrated that a transfer to the D.C. District Court would enhance the convenience of witnesses. The party seeking the transfer must clearly specify the essential witnesses to be called and must make a general statement of what their testimony will cover. Nelson v. Master Lease Corp., 759 F.Supp. 1397, 1402 (D.Minn.1991) (MacLaughlin, J.) (citing Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3851 at 425). In determining the convenience of the witnesses, the Court must examine the materiality and importance of the anticipated witnesses’ testimony and then determine their accessibility and convenience to the forum. Reid–Walen v. Hansen, 933 F.2d 1390, 1396 (8th Cir.1991). Here, Defendants have not produced any evidence by which the Court could conduct this analysis. Defendants neither identify their prospective witnesses nor describe what their testimony might be.3 Instead, Defendants assert that their witnesses will be “officers and employees of the government.” (Defs.’ Rep. Mem. at 4.) This appears to represent a fairly large pool of potential witnesses–including government employees already located in the District of Minnesota–and does not provide anything close to the level of specificity required for the Court to balance the hardships on non-party witnesses. Accordingly, Defendants have failed to carry their burden as to this factor.

3

Plaintiffs have indicated they are unlikely to call

non-party witnesses (see Pls.’ Opp’n Mem. at 6.)

*3 Finally, Defendants argue that a transfer to the D.C. District Court serves the interests of justice. The interest of justice factor is weighted very heavily. Radisson Hotels Int’l, Inc. v. Westin Hotel Co., 931 F.Supp. 638, 641 (D.Minn.1996) (Kyle, J.). Among the considerations that may be relevant in analyzing this factor are the relative familiarity of the two courts with the law to be applied, the relative abilities of the parties to bear the expenses of litigating in a distant forum, judicial economy, the plaintiff’s choice of forum, obstacles to a fair trial, and each party’s ability to enforce a judgment. See Terra, 199 F.3d at 696. Defendants do not argue that any of these factors require a transfer; rather, they assert that the D.C. District Court is best positioned to handle issues that are “national in scope.” (Defs. Supp. Mem. at 2.) As Defendants’ Memorandum states, “the District of Columbia has a greater degree of interest in ensuring that government officials within its district are complying with the Constitution and laws of the United States.” (Defs.’ Supp. Mem. at 8.)4

4

Defendants’ argument, in pertinent part, is as follows:

If a court were to grant relief to Plaintiffs, which it

should not, the relief should be administered, and

therefore monitored by a judicial district in which

2

Ngwanyia v. Ashcroft, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2002)
the INS headquarters is situated, to wit, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Finally, pre-trial matters concerning Defendants’ witnesses and papers may be readily addressed with access to a local forum, to wit, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Accordingly, the District of Columbia has a greater degree of interest in ensuring that government officials within its district are complying with the Constitution and laws of the United States. (Defs.’ Supp. Mem. at 8.)

located, and to outline their expected testimony, such a bare showing cannot upset the traditional presumption granted Plaintiffs’ choice of forum. Because Defendants have failed to demonstrate that a transfer would do anything other than “shift the inconvenience to the party resisting the transfer,” Graff, 33 F.Supp.2d at 1121, they have not demonstrated that the balance of factors strongly supports a transfer.

5

That “degree of interest” is not affected by the

residence of the affected government officials.

Defendants’ argument here is devoid of citation and common sense. This Court has precisely the same “degree of interest” as the D.C. District Court in ensuring the government and its officials “are complying with the Constitution and laws of the United States.”5 Whether this is a responsible argument for the Department of Justice to make is a matter for others to consider. It is sufficient here to state that while the existence of a national policy issue that may involve testimony by policymakers is a factor that may be considered by the district judge in determining whether transfer is appropriate under § 1404(a), it must be weighed against other factors such as the preference given the plaintiff’s choice of forum. See Starnes v. McGuire, 512 F.2d 918, 929 (D.C.Cir.1974). Where, as here, Defendants fail to list the policymakers who might be called to testify, to indicate where they are

Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, and all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS ORDERED that Defendants John Ashcroft, United States Attorney General, James Ziglar, Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and Immigration and Naturalization Service’s Motion for Transfer (Doc. 13) is DENIED.
	  

3

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA No. 02-CV-502 RHK/AJB

VENANTIUS NKAFOR NGWANYIA, WESENE

)

AYELE GIZAW, MERDEKIOS DURESSA, MOHAMAD )

FARAH, VLADIMIR KASHIRSKY, SUSAN Y. PAFE, )

KUEVI RAFOU EKUE-HETTAH, OLEG AVERIANOV, )

SOKHAVUDDH MOEUN, MARY W. KARIUKI,

)

MIGUEL CANDIDO SILVESTRE MONTEJO,

)

ALOYSIUS TABUE, MAT DUPUY, SOLANGE PIERRE, )

DIDACE NZEYIMANA, ZOILA MARGARITA

)

CASTILLO RAMIREZ, LUIS CARBALLO-

)

MANZANARES, MARIA HERRERA, MARIE DIOGENE, )

GRACIELA MARTINEZ, FAWZY A. ABDELSAMAD, )

DIEULILA VIL, MURAD FAKHOURI, BASSAM

)

HANTOULI, FAISAL USMAN, SHERMAN BROWN, )

LAURA TABUE, OLEKSANDER ZINKOVSKY,

)

UNSHEJU MBU IZAMPUYE, PAVEL E. GUBANIKHIN, )

JOSEPH COLEMAN, ADRIENNE KAZARWA,

)

AMONDIEU MILFORT, BINEYAM KASSAHUN,

)

ISSETTE KASSAHUN, DRAGON CVETKOVIC, AMAN )

YAKOB, ALEXANDER MARFO, NINA IONESCU,

)

SANTIAGO RUANO OLIVA, ABDIAZIZ HASSAN, )

TAREQ M. DREIZA, PATRICIA MUENDO, ALI

)

MURTAZA, PIERRE BOUMTJE, MARTINE ERNESTINE)

BOUMTJE, ROSEMARY EKEADA, TOKO MAURICE )

MBUNGU, ILTAM S. JEAN-CAIDOR, ARTURO JAVIER )

REYNOSO MADRIGAL, BASSEM EL-KHATIB,

)

DJAVANSHIR GRADJIEV, SONIA S. SANTISTEBAN )

GRIJALVA, GERARDO R. VIDAL SIC, SAMON SOM, )

and BEKANA HULUKA,

)

on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, )

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JOHN ASHCROFT, Attorney General, JAMES W.

)

ZIGLAR, Commissioner of the Immigration

)

and Naturalization Service, and

)

THE IMMIGRATION AND

)

NATURALIZATION SERVICE,

)

)

Defendants.

)

_________________________________________________)

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY, MANDAMUS AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF CLASS ACTION

1

INTRODUCTION Plaintiffs, by and through their undersigned counsel, sue the defendants and allege as follows: 1. This is a class action on behalf of people from many countries who were eligible for, sought, and received asylum in the United States. As more specifically explained herein, plaintiffs and class members they seek to represent were harmed by defendants’ violations of federal statutes and their own regulations. Defendants have misadministered the system and waiting list that determine when asylees can become lawful permanent residents of the United States. Specifically, since Fiscal Year 1994, defendants’ errors have prevented approximately 21,281 waiting asylees -- named plaintiffs and class members -- from becoming lawful permanent residents of the United States. 2. Plaintiffs and class members all fled to the United States as refugees from persecution in their home countries. All plaintiffs and class members were given asylum in this country by the United States government and are, therefore, “asylees.” All plaintiffs and class members are in valid asylee status and as such are eligible to become lawful permanent residents and, then, citizens of the United States. 3. Defendants’ failures have prevented plaintiffs and class members from adjusting their immigration status to lawful permanent resident status and thereby stabilizing their lives. These failures also delayed plaintiffs’ and class members’ becoming United States citizens. Defendants’ other actions and misinterpretations of law have cost many plaintiffs and class members hundreds of dollars in unnecessary fees and untold lost opportunities for employment and advancement.
2

4. Plaintiffs, class members, and where they have been represented, their lawyers on their behalf have inquired and complained repeatedly to the defendants about the delays without any resolution.
5. Plaintiffs seek declaratory, mandamus, and injunctive relief against the defendants for the defendants’ policies, practices, interpretations of law, and failures to properly administer the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. and applicable regulations.
JURISDICTION 6. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction of this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction) because plaintiffs’ claims arise under the laws of the United States, specifically § 209(b) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b), and applicable regulations arising thereunder. This Court may grant relief in this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (Mandamus Act); 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (All Writs Act); 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (Declaratory Judgment Act); and under 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (Administrative Procedures Act). 7. There are no administrative remedies available to plaintiffs or class members to redress the grievances described herein. This action challenges only the defendants’ procedural policies, practices, and interpretations of law, not the granting or denial of individual applications. Therefore, the jurisdictional limitations of INA § 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 are not applicable.
VENUE 8. Venue is proper in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because this is a civil action in which the defendants John Ashcroft and James W. Ziglar are officers of the United States acting in their official capacities and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
3

is an agency of the United States; because plaintiffs Venantius Nkafor Ngwanyia, Wesene Ayele Gizaw, Merdekios Duressa, Mohamed Farah, Vladimir Kashirsky, Susan Y. Pafe, Kuevi Rafou Ekue-Hettah, Oleg Averianov, Sokhavuddh Moeun, and Mary W. Kariuki, and many class members reside in this judicial district; and because many of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in this judicial district.
DEFENDANTS 9. John Ashcroft is the Attorney General of the United States. He is charged with the administration and enforcement of the immigration laws. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a). He is sued in his official capacity. 10. James W. Ziglar is the Commissioner of the INS. He is charged with any and all responsibilities and authority in the administration of the INS as have been delegated or prescribed by the Attorney General. He is sued in his official capacity. 11. The INS is an agency of the United States government. It has primary responsibility for implementation of the immigration laws, including the INA and applicable regulations.
RELEVANT STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND Asylum and Asylee Adjustment
12. Under INA §208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158, noncitizens in the United States may apply for asylum. If they establish they are refugees as that term is defined in INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A), and meet the other conditions and requirements, they are granted asylum and become asylees. The government may not return asylees to their home country. Asylees are authorized to work within the United States and to travel outside the United States and be readmitted upon their return. INA § 208(c)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. §
4

1158(c)(1)(C). Asylee status is indefinite; that is, it does not automatically terminate but continues indefinitely. 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(d).
13. However, asylee status can be revoked, and the asylee may be deported, if the conditions in the home or “sending” country change substantially. INA § 208(c)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(2)(A). Asylees also are required to obtain a “refugee travel document” to reenter after travel outside the United States. INA § 208(c)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(1)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 223.2. Defendants charge a fee for a refugee travel document. Defendants have increased the fee over the years and increased it again on February 19, 2002 to $110. Adjustment of Certain Fees of the Immigration Examinations Fee Account, 66 Fed. Reg. 65811, 65814 (Dec. 21, 2001) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 103.7).
14. After one year of physical presence in the United States as an asylee, asylees may apply to “adjust” their status to lawful permanent residence (LPR). INA § 209(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b)(2). LPRs are known colloquially as people who hold “green cards.” When asylees adjust their status, technically they are granted the immigration status of LPR. INA § 209(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b).
15. Lawful permanent resident status confers many advantages over asylee status. As the name implies, LPRs have the privilege of residing and working permanently in the United States. INA § 101(a)(20), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20). They may travel outside the United States freely and generally are readmitted to the United States automatically. INA § 101(a)(13)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C). They may petition to immigrate close family members. INA § 201, 8 U.S.C. § 1151; INA § 203, 8 U.S.C. § 1153.
16. LPRs may retain their LPR status (or their “green card”) for the rest of their lives or, after five years of LPR status, they may apply to “naturalize,” that is, to become a
5

United States citizen. INA § 316(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a). Citizenship conveys many benefits over LPR status. Citizens may vote; they may apply for and receive a United States passport; they cannot be deported from the United States; and they may travel freely into and out of the United States. They may petition to immigrate family members, including elderly parents, as “immediate relatives,” thus eliminating many long waiting periods. INA § 201(b)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i). They may hold many jobs that are restricted to United States citizens. They may run for public office.
17. LPR status is a prerequisite for naturalization. Thus, any delay in adjusting to LPR status also delays eventual naturalization.
18. There is no limit on the number of people who can be granted asylum. However, a refugee admission number must be “available” for an asylee to adjust his or her status. On October 1, the beginning of each fiscal year, there are 10,000 new refugee admission numbers available for asylee adjustments. INA § 209(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b). Once a number has become “available” for asylee adjustments, there is no statutory or regulatory deadline for use of that number. Every fiscal year since 1992, the President has authorized 10,000 refugee admission numbers to be made available for asylees applying for permanent residence.
19. In recent years, there have been more asylees applying for adjustment than there have been available asylee numbers. Compounding the backlog, the defendants have not been distributing all 10,000 available numbers to waiting asylees each year. In fact, the defendants have failed to adjust approximately 21,281 waiting asylees who could have and should have been adjusted. Therefore, there is currently a backlog of more than 96,000 asylees awaiting adjustment of status. Under defendants’ current practices for distributing
6

these available numbers, this translates into more than a nine year wait for adjustment, even though Congress anticipated asylees would become LPRs one year after being granted asylum.
20. The applicable regulation says: “If the application for adjustment filed under this part exceeds the refugee numbers available under section 207(a) of the Act for the fiscal year, a waiting list will be established on a priority basis by the date the application was properly filed.” 8 C.F.R. § 209.2(a)(1). That is, no applicant can be put on a waiting list until all of the available numbers for each fiscal year have been used. Further, asylees on the waiting list must be adjusted according to the date that each asylee’s adjustment application was properly filed.
Exempt Asylees 21. Congress periodically has designated specific groups of asylees who may adjust to LPR status without being subject to the numerical cap of INA § 209(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b). These exempt groups do not have to wait in the queue for an available asylee adjustment number. 22. One such exempt group is Kurdish Iraqi nationals who worked for the United States government during 1996 or 1997 and were evacuated as part of “Operation Pacific Safe Haven.” Pub. L. No. 105-277, Title I, § 128. Estimates of the number of people who fit this exemption range from 5,000 to 10,000. Another exempt group is Indochinese parolees from Cambodia, Vietnam or Laos who were paroled into the United States before October 1, 1997. Pub. L. No. 106-429, § 586. A maximum of 5,000 asylees may qualify under this exemption. A third exempt group is certain nationals of Syria. Pub. L. No. 106-378. A maximum of 2,000 asylees can qualify for the Syrian exemption.
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Employment Authorization

23. It is unlawful for an employer to hire a noncitizen who is not authorized to

work in the United States. INA § 274A, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a. Asylees are authorized to work

in the United States, incident to their status as asylees. INA § 208(c)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. §

1158(c)(1)(B). The same statutory section also requires the Attorney General to “provide the

[asylee] with appropriate endorsement of that authorization.”

24. A separate regulation recognizes that asylees are employment-authorized

incident to status, but nevertheless goes on to require that the asylee apply for an employment

authorization document (EAD) evidencing employment authorization. 8 C.F.R. §§ 274.12(a)

and 274a.12(a)(5). The regulations do not provide that EADs expire.

DEFENDANTS’ ACTIONS AND FAILURES TO ACT

THAT HAVE HARMED THE PLAINTIFFS AND CLASS MEMBERS

Failure to Adjust All Possible Asylees

25. In violation of the applicable regulation, the defendants have maintained an

ever-growing waiting list of asylees while failing to adjust approximately 21,281 asylees for

whom there were available adjustment numbers. Specifically, according to defendants’

Annual Reports, defendants adjusted only the following number of asylees in the specified

fiscal years:

Fiscal Year #

% OF 10,000

FY 2001 FY 2000 FY 1999 FY 1998

10,111 4,567 2,532 7,546

100% 46% 25% 75%

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FY 1997 10,106

101%

FY 1996 10,037

100%

FY 1995 7,837

78%

FY 1994 5,983

60%

26. In sum, in the fiscal years since 1994, the defendants allocated only 58,719

rather than 80,000 asylee adjustment numbers. That is, between Fiscal Years 1994 and 2001,

the defendants failed to adjust 21,281 asylees who could have and should have become

lawful permanent residents.

Misadministration of the Asylee Adjustment Queue

Misadministration of the Cut-Off Date

27. Defendants have failed to allocate the asylee adjustment numbers available

and adjust plaintiffs’ and class members’ status under a first-in, first-out system as required

by 8 C.F.R. § 209.2(a)(1). Defendants announced a national “cut-off date” for asylee

adjustments for the fiscal year that concluded on September 30, 2001, Fiscal Year 2001.

That date was January 16, 1998. That is, defendants claimed that there were sufficient

available asylee adjustment numbers for all asylees who filed for adjustment before January

16, 1998 to adjust their status. Asylees who filed for adjustment before January 16, 1998 had

arrived at the top of the waiting list and should have had their status adjusted. However,

defendants still have not adjusted the status of the plaintiffs and class members who filed for

adjustment of status before January 16, 1998. Other asylees who filed their adjustment

applications later than these plaintiffs and class members already have been adjusted.

28. Defendants announced a national cut off date for asylee adjustment for Fiscal

Year 2002, which began on October 1, 2001. That cut-off date was June 9, 1998. However,

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defendants still have not adjusted the status of the plaintiffs or class members who filed their adjustment applications before June 9, 1998.
29. Defendants have adjusted the status of some asylees out of chronological order. For example, shortly before plaintiffs filed their complaint in this case, defendants adjusted the status of three asylees who were planning to be named plaintiffs in this lawsuit. Each asylee applied for adjustment after other named plaintiffs. Specifically, Nancy Casajuana applied for adjustment on July 7, 1997. Wafaa Kariakos applied for adjustment in late 1997 or early January 1998. John Mbaku applied for adjustment on April 8, 1998.
INS District Office Inconsistencies 30. Prior to July 6, 1998, asylees filed their adjustment applications in one of the INS’s local district offices, sometimes known as adjudicating offices. From July 1998 until the present, asylees in all parts of the United States have been directed to file their adjustment applications at the INS’s Nebraska Service Center (NSC). 31. Many of the plaintiffs and class members filed for adjustment in the INS local district offices before July 6, 1998. Their place in the adjustment queue is determined by the local offices’ practices, which were not and are not uniform. 32. For example, some local offices reported their “approvable” adjustment cases promptly after the asylee filed for adjustment. Others waited -- and still wait -- until after they have interviewed the asylee to report to NSC that the case is approvable. Because some asylees have been interviewed years after filing their adjustment applications, an asylee applying in one such district office is placed on the queue years later than someone who applied in another district office. An asylee who applied for adjustment in one city may still
10

be waiting while an asylee who applied in another city at a later date may already have been adjusted.
33. The defendants have acknowledged that processing of asylee adjustment applications was inconsistent and that local offices’ practices varied. On June 3, 1998, the INS published an interim rule, effective July 3, 1998, that sought to consolidate asylee adjustment filings in one national location, the NSC.
34. Notwithstanding the new rule, district office practices still vary. Some district offices do not distribute all the asylee adjustment numbers they are allocated on an annual basis, leaving some numbers unused, further lengthening the waiting period for asylees.
35. Even though the filing of all asylee adjustment applications was “consolidated” at the NSC almost four years ago, the NSC still distributes asylee adjustment numbers -- at least for pre-July 1998 cases -- based on individual requests from the local offices. In turn, these requests are based on the local office determining that it has a pending approvable asylee adjustment case. Consequently, many of plaintiffs’ and class members’ adjustment dates still are dependent upon the varying practices and inefficiencies of local offices.
Failure to Keep Track of and Announce Adjustment Numbers 36. Defendants do not maintain accurate records of the queue. The NSC distributes asylee adjustment numbers based on unreliable reports from the INS district offices regarding which applications are ready to be approved or have been approved. Defendants do not have a system for correcting improper allocations of asylee adjustment numbers (i.e. adjustments granted out of filing date order).
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37. Defendants are unable or unwilling to tell asylees where they are in the queue or how long they will have to wait to adjust status, except very generally and inaccurately. Plaintiffs and class members have no way to determine if they even are on a waiting list or if so, when they can expect to be adjusted.
38. Plaintiffs have no way to verify whether defendants are adjusting asylees in the order in which their adjustment applications were filed.
39. In addition, defendants reportedly have improperly mixed refugee adjustments in with asylee adjustments, further lengthening the waiting period for asylees. Refugee admissions are governed by a separate section of the statute and are not subtracted from the numbers which are made available each year for asylee adjustments. INA §§ 207, 209(a); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157(a), 1159(a).
Failure to Exclude Exempt Asylees From the Waiting List 40. Defendants have failed to implement a system to identify and exclude from the asylee adjustment queue the exempt individuals, such as the designated Iraqi Kurds. These exempt asylees have been waiting years longer than they should have had to wait to adjust their status. Their presence in the queue also has harmed all other asylees because exempt asylees have been and still are occupying space on the waiting list. On information and belief, the INS gave exempt asylees asylee adjustment numbers that should have gone to nonexempt asylees. 41. A comparison of the defendants’ recent Annual Reports illustrates that before the 2001 Annual Report, the defendants included exempt asylees as part of the total number of asylees adjusted. Each annual report lists asylee adjustments from that year and some prior years. The FY 2001 Annual Report lists asylee adjustments in two categories: those
12

“Subject to annual limit” and those “Not subject to limit.” Prior reports collapsed both numbers into one total.
42. That is, the FY 2000 Annual report reported 6,858 asylee adjustments in FY 2000. The FY 2001 Annual Report now shows that 4,567 of those 6,858 asylees were “Subject to the annual limit” and 2,291 were “Not subject to limit.” The FY 2000 and 1999 Annual Reports reported 3,357 asylee adjustments in 1999, but the 2001 Annual Report shows that of those 3,357 asylees, 2,532 were “Subject to limit” and 825 were “Not subject to limit.” The FY 2000, 1999, and 1998 Annual Reports listed 7,548 asylees adjusted in 1998, but the FY 2001 Annual Report shows that of those 7,548 asylees, 7,546 were “Subject to annual limit” and 2 asylees were “Not subject to limit.”
Requiring Application for and Renewal of Employment Authorization Documents
43. The INA says that asylees’ employment authorization is incident to their status, that asylee status continues indefinitely, and that the defendants must provide the asylee with appropriate endorsement of that authorization. INA § 208(c)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(1)(B). Defendants nevertheless require that asylees file a separate application for an EAD, INS Form I-765, and to wait for its approval as evidence of their eligibility to work.
44. Specifically, applicable regulations require that asylees apply for an EAD evidencing their employment authorization. 8 C.F.R. §§ 274.12(a) and 274a.12(a)(5). Further, the letter defendants routinely sent to asylum applicants notifying them that asylum has been granted says, in pertinent part: “[Y]ou must apply for and obtain an Employment Authorization Document (EAD) as evidence of your eligibility to work in the United States.”
45. Defendants also limit the duration of asylees’ EAD to one year. Defendants also require asylees to renew their EADs every year.
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46. Before October 1998, the renewal filing fee for the I-765 was $70 per renewal. From October 1998 until February 18, 2002, the fee had been $100 per renewal per year. On February 19, 2002, the renewal fee increased to $120 per year.
47. Because of defendants’ delays in processing EAD applications, asylees must apply to renew their EADs months before they expire and, then, must hope that the defendants process the renewal application before their current EAD expires. Some plaintiffs and class members have lost jobs or employment opportunities because of the defendants’ delays in approving the EAD renewals.
48. As asylees now wait three, four, or five years to adjust their status, the cost and inconvenience of filing for initial and renewal EADs is considerable. In addition, the durational limit of the EAD prevents some asylees from obtaining jobs or promotions for which long-term or permanent employment authorization is required.
Requiring Repeated Fingerprinting 49. The defendants require asylees to be fingerprinted before their adjustment applications are granted. Asylee adjustment applicants who are 14 years old or older must pay a fingerprint processing fee and must appear at an INS “Application Support Center” (ASC) to be fingerprinted. The fingerprint processing fee was $25; on February 1, 2002, the INS increased the fee to $50. 50. After 15 months, the defendants consider the fingerprints to have “expired” and destroy the fingerprint records supplied by asylees. The defendants have obligated the plaintiffs and class members to be re-fingerprinted before their adjustment applications have been approved, at additional expense and inconvenience, even though, of course, their fingerprints have not changed.
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51. Defendants do not coordinate the fingerprinting to ensure that all approvable cases have valid fingerprints at the time the asylee adjustment numbers are assigned.
Requiring Repeated Medical Examinations 52. Defendants require asylees to have a medical examination and submit the results with their applications. The fee for such an examination typically is approximately $200-$250. The defendants have obligated many of the plaintiffs and class members to have duplicate medical examinations: once at the time they submit their applications and, again, because their applications have been pending for so long, before their adjustment applications are approved, at considerable expense and inconvenience.
PLAINTIFFS Minnesota Residents 53. Plaintiff Venantius Nkafor Ngwanyia is a resident of St. Paul, Minnesota. He was granted asylum on October 8, 1996 from Cameroon. He applied for adjustment of status in October 1997 at the INS’s Bloomington, Minnesota District Office. He was interviewed in conjunction with his adjustment application in 1998 at the Bloomington Office. 54. Mr. Ngwanyia has applied for an EAD every year since 1996. In 1996 through 1998, he paid $70 each year for the EAD. Since 1999, he has he paid $100 each year. It often has taken the INS two months to process the EAD after Mr. Ngwanyia has applied for it. Mr. Ngwanyia has been refused two jobs and believes it may be because he is not a permanent resident. 55. Mr. Ngwanyia was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. He is still waiting to adjust his status even though he filed his adjustment application before
15

January 16, 1998, the cut-off date for the fiscal year that ended on September 30, 2001. Mr. Ngwanyia is not accruing time toward naturalization.
56. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year and distributed the numbers in the mandated order, they already would have adjusted Mr. Ngwanyia’s status. The defendants have not adjusted his status in the mandated order, that is, by date of filing. Mr. Ngwanyia has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust his status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
57. Plaintiff Wesene Ayele Gizaw is a resident of Minneapolis, Minnesota. She was granted asylum on April 4, 1996 from Ethiopia. She applied for adjustment of status at the Bloomington, Minnesota District Office on May 28, 1997. She received a written receipt notice from the INS acknowledging that her adjustment application had been received on May 28, 1997.
58. Ms. Gizaw was first interviewed regarding her adjustment application in May 1997. In approximately July 1997 she was interviewed again and was told her adjustment application had been approved but was pending because the INS was waiting for an asylee adjustment number.
59. Ms. Gizaw applied for an EAD in 1996 at the INS’s Bloomington District Office. She renewed her EAD in 1997 and 1998 paying $70 each time and again in 1999, 2000 and 2001 paying the increased renewal fee of $100.
60. Ms. Gizaw was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. She is still waiting to adjust her status even though she filed her adjustment application before January 16, 1998, the cut-off date for the fiscal year that ended on September 30, 2001. She is not accruing time towards naturalization.
16

61. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year and distributed the numbers in the mandated order, they already would have adjusted Ms. Gizaw’s status. The defendants have not adjusted her status in the mandated order, that is, by date of filing. Ms. Gizaw has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust her status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
62. Plaintiff Merdekios Duressa is a resident of Minneapolis, Minnesota. He is Wesene Ayele Gizaw’s husband. He was granted asylum on April 4, 1996, from Ethiopia. He applied for adjustment of status at the INS’s Bloomington, Minnesota District Office on or around May 28, 1997. He received a written receipt notice from the INS acknowledging that his adjustment application had been received on May 28, 1997.
63. In approximately May 1997, Mr. Duressa’s fingerprints were taken. He was interviewed for adjustment by the Bloomington, Minnesota District Office in approximately July 1997.
64. Mr. Duressa applied for an EAD in 1996 at the Bloomington INS office. He renewed his EAD in 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000. In 1996 through 1998, he paid $70 each year for the EAD. In 1999 and 2000, he paid $100 each year.
65. Mr. Duressa was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. He is still waiting to adjust his status even though he filed his adjustment application before January 16, 1998, the cut-off date for the fiscal year that ended on September 30, 2001. He is not accruing time towards naturalization.
66. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year and distributed the numbers in the mandated order, they already would have adjusted Mr. Duressa’s status. The defendants have not adjusted his status in the mandated
17

order, that is, by date of filing. Mr. Duressa has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust his status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
67. Plaintiff Mohamed Farah is a resident of St. Paul, Minnesota. He was granted asylum from Somalia on August 25, 1997. He applied for adjustment of status on or about July 2, 1998 and received an acknowledgment from the INS that his application had been received on that date.
68. Mr. Farah was fingerprinted at the INS District Office in Bloomington, Minnesota on July 7, 1998. He was interviewed for his adjustment application in August 1998 at the same office.
69. Mr. Farah applied for an EAD. He has applied for renewal EADs in 1999, 2000 and 2001, at a cost of $100 each. He has been denied jobs because his EAD is limited to a one-year period. Mr. Farah also applied for a refugee travel document for a fee of $70. He was unable to travel out of the country for a family emergency because of the delay in receiving the travel document.
70. Mr. Farah was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. He is not accruing time towards naturalization.
71. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year, distributed the numbers in the mandated order, and excluded exempt asylees from the list, on information and belief they already would have adjusted Mr. Farah’s status or he would be eligible to adjust his status in the current fiscal year. Mr. Farah has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust his status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
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72. Plaintiff Vladimir Kashirsky is a resident of Maple Grove, Minnesota. He was granted asylum on June 24, 1997 from Uzbekistan. He applied for adjustment of status at the NSC on August 17, 1998.
73. Mr. Kashirsky was interviewed at the San Francisco INS office on December 20, 1999. At that time, he received a letter stating that his application for permanent resident status was being retained for processing and that he would be notified when further action has taken place.
74. Mr. Kashirsky applied for an EAD in August 2001. 75. Mr. Kashirsky was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. He is still waiting to adjust his status and is not accruing time towards naturalization. 76. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year and distributed the numbers in the mandated order, on information and belief, they already would have adjusted Mr. Kashirsky’s status or he would be eligible to adjust his status in the current fiscal year. The defendants have not adjusted his status in the mandated order, that is, by date of filing. Mr. Kashirsky has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust his status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit. 77. Plaintiff Susan Y. Pafe is a resident of Minneapolis, MN. She was granted asylum on July 23, 1997 from Cameroon. She applied for adjustment of status at the Nebraska Service Center August 17, 1998. She received a written receipt notice from the INS acknowledging that her adjustment application had been received on August 17, 1998. 78. Ms. Pafe applied for an EAD on August 20, 1998 at a cost of $100. She renewed the EAD on February 2, 2001 at a cost of $100 and on March 12, 2002 at a cost of $120. Ms. Pafe applied for a refugee travel document on March 28, 1998. Ms. Pafe has been
19

found ineligible for certain jobs, scholarships, and a loan because she is not a permanent resident.
79. Ms. Pafe was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. She is still waiting to adjust her status and is not accruing time towards naturalization.
80. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year and distributed the numbers in the mandated order, on information and belief, they already would have adjusted Ms. Pafe’s status or she would be eligible to adjust her status in the current fiscal year. The defendants have not adjusted her status in the mandated order, that is, by date of filing. Ms. Pafe has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust her status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
81. Plaintiff Kuevi Rafou Ekue-Hettah is a resident of Minneapolis, Minnesota. He was granted asylum on October 8, 1997 from Togo. He applied for adjustment of status at the NSC on January 6, 1999. He received a written receipt notice from the INS acknowledging that his adjustment application had been received on January 6, 1999.
82. Mr. Ekue-Hettah applied for an EAD as an Asylee in April 1997 and renewed it every year since that date. He applied for a refugee travel document in September 1999 and November 2001.
83. Mr. Ekue-Hettah was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. He is still waiting to adjust his status and is not accruing time towards naturalization.
84. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year and distributed the numbers in the mandated order, on information and belief, they already would have adjusted Mr. Ekue-Hettah’s status or he would be eligible to adjust his status in the current fiscal year. The defendants have not adjusted his status in the mandated
20

order, that is, by date of filing. Mr. Ekue-Hettah has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust his status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
85. Plaintiff Oleg Averianov is a resident of Maple Grove, Minnesota. He was granted asylum on October 15, 1997 from Uzbekistan. He applied for adjustment of status at the NSC on March 16, 1999. He received a written receipt notice from the INS acknowledging that his adjustment application had been received on March 16, 1999.
86. Mr. Averianov applied for an EAD in January 2002 at a cost of $100. 87. Mr. Averianov was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. He is still waiting to adjust his status and is not accruing time towards naturalization. 88. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year and distributed the numbers in the mandated order, on information and belief, they already would have adjusted Mr. Averianov’s status or he would be eligible to adjust his status in the current fiscal year. The defendants have not adjusted his status in the mandated order, that is, by date of filing. Mr. Averianov has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust his status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit. 89. Plaintiff Sokhavuddh Moeun is a resident of St. Paul, MN. She was granted asylum on August 20, 1998 from Cambodia. She applied for adjustment of status at the NSC on or about October 20, 1999. She has not received a written receipt notice from the INS acknowledging that her adjustment application had been received, but has requested it many times with no response. 90. Ms. Moeun applied for an EAD in October 1999 at a cost of $100. She applied for a renewal EAD once at a cost of $100 and once at a cost of $120. Ms. Moeun applied for a refugee travel document on February 13, 2001 at a cost of $95.
21

91. Ms. Moeun was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. She is still waiting to adjust her status and is not accruing time towards naturalization.
92. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year and distributed the numbers in the mandated order, on information and belief, they already would have adjusted Ms. Moeun’s status or she would be eligible to adjust her status in the current fiscal year. The defendants have not adjusted her status in the mandated order, that is, by date of filing. Ms. Moeun has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust her status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
93. Plaintiff Mary W. Kariuki is a resident of St. Paul, Minnesota. She was granted asylum on December 7, 1998 from Kenya. She applied for adjustment of status at the NSC on January 3, 2000. She received a written receipt notice from the INS acknowledging that her adjustment application had been received on January 3, 2000.
94. Ms. Kariuki applied for an EAD at the NSC in 1998. She renewed her EAD three times, paying a total of $300 in renewal fees.
95. Ms. Kariuki was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. She is not accruing time towards naturalization.
96. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year, distributed the numbers in the mandated order, and excluded exempt asylees from the list, on information and belief they already would have adjusted Ms. Kariuki’s status or she would be eligible to adjust her status in the current fiscal year. Ms. Kariuki has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust her status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
Plaintiffs Who Applied For Adjustment Before January 16, 1998 (The Cut-Off Date for FY 2001)
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97. Plaintiff Miguel Candido Silvestre Montejo was granted asylum on May 10, 1993 from Guatemala. He applied for adjustment of status at the INS’s Los Angeles District Office on or about May 11, 1994. He received a written receipt notice from the INS acknowledging that his adjustment application had been received on May 11, 1994.
98. Mr. Silvestre was fingerprinted at the INS District Office in Los Angeles, California on October 13, 1994. He was interviewed for his adjustment application on the same date at the same office.
99. Mr. Silvestre applied for an EAD on May 10, 1994 at a cost of $60. At that time he was told that he would not have to renew his EAD and that he would be receiving a resident card. Between May 1995 and February 2002, Mr. Silvestre did not renew his EAD. He was waiting to receive his resident card in the mail. His employers underpaid him because he was considered an “undocumented alien.” He was afraid of quitting a job he disliked because he knew that he would be asked for his EAD when dealing with any potential employer. He applied for a renewal EAD in January 2002 at a cost of $100. Mr. Silvestre has not applied for a refugee travel document because he is afraid to leave the country until he receives his residency card.
100. Mr. Silvestre was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. He is still waiting to adjust his status even though he filed his adjustment application long before January 16, 1998, the cut-off date for the fiscal year that ended on September 30, 2001. He is not accruing time towards naturalization. If the defendants had distributed the asylee adjustment numbers in the mandated order, they already would have adjusted Mr. Silvestre’s status. The defendants have not adjusted his status in the mandated order, that is, by date of filing.
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101 Further, on information and belief, in May 1994, there was no asylee adjustment backlog and Mr. Silvestre’s status should have been adjusted immediately when he applied. Instead, he has waited eight years to adjust his status.
102. If the defendants had adjusted Mr. Silvestre’s status when they should have, in 1994, he would have been eligible to apply for U.S. citizenship in 1999, and likely already would be a U.S. citizen. Mr. Silvestre has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust his status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
103. Plaintiff Aloysius Tabue was granted asylum on December 13, 1994 from Liberia. He applied for adjustment of status at the INS’s Chicago District Office on July 29, 1996. He received a written receipt notice from the Chicago office, dated July 29, 1996, acknowledging that his adjustment application had been received.
104. On September 23, 1996, Mr. Tabue was interviewed at the INS’s Chicago District Office. Mr. Tabue’s fingerprints were taken most recently at the Chicago District Office in May 2001.
105. Mr. Tabue applied for an EAD in 1997. He has renewed his EAD each year since 1998, paying the $100 renewal fee each time. Because he is not yet a permanent resident, Mr. Tabue has been unable to file petitions to immigrate his adult children and has had to apply and pay for refugee travel documents to leave the United States.
106. Mr. Tabue was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. He is still waiting to adjust his status even though he filed his adjustment application before January 16, 1998, the cut-off date for the fiscal year that ended on September 30, 2001. He is not accruing time towards naturalization.
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107. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year and distributed the numbers in the mandated order, they already would have adjusted Mr. Tabue’s status. The defendants have not adjusted his status in the mandated order, that is, by date of filing. Mr. Tabue has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust his status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
108. Plaintiff Mat Dupuy was granted asylum on March 21, 1996 from Haiti. She applied for adjustment of status at the INS’s West Palm Beach, Florida District Office on March 26, 1997. She received a written receipt notice from the INS acknowledging that her adjustment application had been received.
109. Ms. Dupuy’s fingerprints were taken at the Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center on March 26, 1997. In 1998, she was interviewed at the INS’s West Palm Beach Office. Ms. Dupuy applied for an EAD at the INS’s West Palm Beach District Office and has renewed it twice, paying the $100 fee each time.
110. Ms. Dupuy was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. She is still waiting to adjust her status even though she filed her application before January 16, 1998, the cut-off date for the fiscal year that ended on September 30, 2001. She is not accruing time toward naturalization.
111. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year and distributed the numbers in the mandated order, they already would have adjusted Ms. Dupuy’s status. The defendants have not adjusted her status in the mandated order, that is, by date of filing. Ms. Dupuy has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust her status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
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112. Plaintiff Solange Pierre was granted asylum on January 16, 1996 from Haiti. She applied for adjustment of status at the INS’s West Palm Beach District Office on or about May 1, 1997. Ms. Pierre’s fingerprints were taken on May 1, 1997. In 1998, she was interviewed at the INS’s West Palm Beach Office.
113. Ms. Pierre applied for an EAD in 1997. She renewed her EAD in 1998 and 1999, paying the $100 renewal fee each time. Ms. Pierre was unable to work for an extended period of time because the INS would not renew her EAD in 2000 due to an INS error that said Ms. Pierre’s adjustment application had been denied. Her EAD was finally renewed in 2001; however, she lost significant income because of the INS error and the requirement that she obtain an EAD.
114. Ms. Pierre was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. She is still waiting to adjust her status even though she filed her adjustment application before January 16, 1998, the cut-off date for the fiscal year that ended on September 30, 2001. She is not accruing time towards naturalization.
115. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year and distributed the numbers in the mandated order, they already would have adjusted Ms. Pierre’s status. The defendants have not adjusted her status in the mandated order, that is, by date of filing. Ms. Pierre has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust her status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
116. Plaintiff Didace Nzeyimana was granted asylum on June 13, 1994 from Burundi. He applied for adjustment of status at the INS’s Dallas Office on May 28, 1997. He received a written receipt notice from the INS acknowledging that his adjustment application had been received on May 28, 1997.
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117. Mr. Nzeyimana was fingerprinted in New York in 1994 and Dallas in 1996 and 1997. Mr. Nzeyimana was interviewed for adjustment in Dallas in 1998.
118. Mr. Nzeyimana has applied for an EAD every year from 1995 - 2000. The INS’s delays in processing his application for an EAD have caused him work interruptions and inability to obtain promotions. Mr. Nzeyimana has applied for a refugee travel document four times.
119. Mr. Nzeyimana was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. He is still waiting to adjust his status even though he filed his application before January 16, 1998, the cut-off date for the fiscal year that ended on September 30, 2001. He is not accruing time towards naturalization.
120. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year and distributed the numbers in the mandated order, they already would have adjusted Mr. Nzeyimana’s status. The defendants have not adjusted his status in the mandated order, that is, by date of filing. Mr. Nzeyimana has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust his status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
121. Plaintiff Zoila Margarita Castillo Ramirez was granted asylum on April 22, 1996 from Guatemala. She applied for adjustment of status at the INS’s Los Angeles District Office on July 28, 1997. She received a written receipt notice from the INS, showing a date of October 6, 1997.
122. Ms. Castillo’s fingerprints were taken on three separate occasions. The first time was at an ASC in Santa Monica, California and the second and third times were in Los Angeles. On February 16, 2000, Ms. Castillo was interviewed at the Los Angeles District Office.
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123. Ms. Castillo received a letter from the INS office in May of 2001 requesting that she reapply for asylum because she turned 21 while the adjustment was pending. Ms. Castillo submitted the asylum application, INS Form I-589, on June 19, 2001.
124. Although Ms. Castillo has lived in California for many years, because she is not yet a lawful permanent resident, she is not considered a California resident and, therefore, has to pay expensive out-of-state tuition for her education.
125. Ms. Castillo applied for an EAD in 1996 at the LA District Office and renewed her EAD in 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001, paying the applicable fee for each renewal. She missed some days of school and work to travel to the INS office to renew her EAD.
126. Ms. Castillo was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. She is still waiting to adjust her status even though she filed her adjustment application before January 16, 1998, the cut-off date for the fiscal year that ended on September 30, 2001. She is not accruing time towards naturalization.
127. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year and distributed the numbers in the mandated order, they already would have adjusted Ms. Castillo’s status. The defendants have not adjusted her status in the mandated order, that is, by date of filing. Ms. Castillo has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust her status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
128. Luis Carballo-Manzanares was granted asylum in August 1996 from El Salvador. He applied for adjustment of status on or around September 8, 1997, at the INS District Office in New York (Federal Plaza). He was interviewed in conjunction with his adjustment application on or around July 21, 1998, also at Federal Plaza.
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129. Mr. Carballo-Manzanares applied for an EAD and applied for renewal EADs in 1999 and 2000. He paid $100 to the INS each time he applied for a renewal application, and the INS took about two months to process the renewal application.
130. Mr. Carballo-Manzanares was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. He is still waiting to adjust his status even though he filed his adjustment application before January 16, 1998, the cut-off date for the fiscal year that ended on September 30, 2001. He is not accruing time towards naturalization.
131. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year and distributed the numbers in the mandated order, they already would have adjusted Mr. Carballo-Manzanares’ status. The defendants have not adjusted his status in the mandated order, that is, by date of filing. Mr. Carballo-Manzanares has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust his status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
132. Plaintiff Maria Herrera was granted asylum on July 3, 1996 from Nicaragua. She applied for adjustment of status on or about October 8, 1997 in Texas. Ms. Herrera was interviewed on September 22, 1998 at the Miami District Office. Her fingerprints were taken in 1998.
133. Ms. Herrera applied for an EAD and has been renewing her EAD every year, paying $70 in 1997 and 1998 and $100 every year after 1998.
134. Ms. Herrera has not pursued many employment opportunities to advance her career because they involved travel abroad. She hesitates to travel outside the United States even with a refugee travel document for fear that her EAD will expire when she is outside the United States or she will have difficulty reentering the United States.
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135. Maria Herrera was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. She is still waiting to adjust her status even though she filed her adjustment application before January 16, 1998, the cut-off date for the fiscal year that ended on September 30, 2001. She is not accruing time towards naturalization.
136. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year and distributed the numbers in the mandated order, they already would have adjusted Ms. Herrera’s status. The defendants have not adjusted her status in the mandated order, that is, by date of filing. Ms. Herrera has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust her status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
137. Marie Diogene was granted asylum in October 1996 from Haiti. She applied for adjustment of status on or around October 20, 1997 in the INS’s District Office in West Palm Beach, Florida. Ms. Diogene has never been interviewed in conjunction with her adjustment application.
138. Ms. Diogene applied for an EAD in October 1998 and for a renewal in October 1999, paying $100 with the renewal application. She did not apply to renew her EAD after 1999 because of the filing fee.
139. Because defendants have not adjusted Ms. Diogene’s status, she has had difficulty finding employment. She has had difficulty registering for school and cannot qualify for student loans. She is afraid to leave the United States until defendants adjust her status.
140. Ms. Diogene was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. She is still waiting to adjust her status even though she filed her adjustment application before
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January 16, 1998, the cut-off date for the fiscal year that ended on September 30, 2001. She is not accruing time towards naturalization.
141. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year and distributed the numbers in the mandated order, they already would have adjusted Ms. Diogene’s status. The defendants have not adjusted her status in the mandated order, that is, by date of filing. Ms. Diogene has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust her status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
142. Plaintiff Graciela Martinez was granted asylum on September 24, 1996 from El Salvador. She applied for adjustment of status on or about October 23, 1997 at the INS’s Boston District Office. Ms. Martinez received a written receipt notice from the INS acknowledging that her adjustment application had been received.
143. Ms. Martinez applied for an EAD on September 25, 2000. She applied to renew her EAD on September 24, 2001 and paid a $100 renewal fee.
144. Ms. Martinez was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. She is still waiting to adjust her status even though she filed her application before January 16, 1998, the cut-off date for the fiscal year that ended on September 30, 2001. She is not accruing time towards naturalization.
145. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year and distributed them in the mandated order, they already would have adjusted Ms. Martinez’s status. The defendants have not adjusted her status in the mandated order, that is, by date of filing. Ms. Martinez has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust her status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
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146. Plaintiff Fawzy A. Abdelsamad was granted asylum in 1996 from Egypt. He applied for adjustment of status in the INS’s Kansas City, Missouri District Office on January 14, 1998. He received a written receipt notice from the INS acknowledging that his adjustment application had been received on January 14, 1998.
147. Mr. Abdelsamad was interviewed on February 24, 1999 at the Kansas City District Office. He has also been fingerprinted.
148. Mr. Abdelsamad applied for an EAD in 1998 at the Kansas City District Office. He renewed his EAD in 1999, 2000, and 2001, paying the $100 renewal fee each time.
149. Mr. Abdelsamad was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. He is still waiting to adjust his status even though he filed his adjustment application before January 16, 1998, the cut-off date for the fiscal year that ended on September 30, 2001. He is not accruing time towards naturalization.
150. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year and distributed the numbers in the mandated order, they already would have adjusted Mr. Abdelsamad’s status. Mr. Abdelsamad has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust his status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
Plaintiffs Who Filed for Adjustment After January 16, 1998 (The FY 2001 Cut-Off Date)
But Before June 9, 1998 (The FY 2002 Cut-Off Date) 151. Plaintiff Dieulila Vil was granted asylum on September 23, 1996 from Haiti. She applied for adjustment of status at the INS's West Palm Beach, Florida District Office on or about January 22, 1998. She did not receive a written notice from the INS indicating that they received her application for permanent residency.
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152. Ms. Vil was fingerprinted at the Stuart County Sheriff’s Department. She was interviewed for her adjustment application on October 14, 1998 at the West Palm Beach office. Ms. Vil applied to renew her EAD in May 2001 at a cost of $100.
153. Ms. Vil was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. She is still waiting to adjust her status even though she filed her adjustment application before June 9, 1998, the cut-off date for FY 2002. She is not accruing time towards naturalization.
154. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year, distributed the numbers in the mandated order, and excluded exempt asylees from the list, on information and belief they already would have adjusted Ms. Vil's status. Ms. Vil has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust her status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
155. Plaintiff Murad Fakhouri was granted asylum on January 6, 1997 from Kuwait. He applied for adjustment of status at the INS’s Richmond, Virginia District Office on March 5, 1998. He received a written receipt notice from the INS in May or June 1998 acknowledging that his adjustment application had been received.
156. In May or June of 1998, Mr. Fakhouri was interviewed and fingerprinted at the INS’s Charlotte, North Carolina District Office.
157. Mr. Fakhouri applied for and received an EAD in 1997. He renewed his EAD in 1999 and 2000, paying the $100 renewal fee each time. Each time there was several months of delay before the INS renewed the EAD. Mr. Fakhouri was denied employment at one point, while his EAD was pending.
158. Mr. Fakhouri has applied for a refugee travel document three times, paying $95 each time. On one occasion, his application was denied and he lost the filing fee. When
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he reapplied, the application was approved, but his trip had to be cancelled because of the delay.
159. Mr. Fakhouri was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. He is still waiting to adjust his status even though he filed his adjustment application before June 9, 1998, the cut-off date for FY 2002. He is not accruing time towards naturalization.
160. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year, distributed the numbers in the mandated order, and excluded exempt asylees from the list, on information and belief they already would have adjusted Mr. Fakhouri’s status. Mr. Fakhouri has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust his status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
161. Plaintiff Bassam Hantouli was granted asylum on September 4, 1996 from Israel. He applied for adjustment of status at the Dallas District Office on March 23, 1998. He received a written receipt notice from the INS acknowledging that his adjustment application had been received on March 23, 1998.
162. Mr. Hantouli was fingerprinted at the INS ASC in Ft. Worth, Texas on March 26, 2002. On May 14, 2000, Mr. Hantouli was interviewed for his adjustment at the Dallas District Office on October 17, 2000.
163. Mr. Hantouli applied for a refugee travel document in 2001 at a cost of $95. He currently is attempting to renew the document.
164. Mr. Hantouli was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. He is still waiting to adjust his status even though he filed his adjustment of status application before June 9, 1998. He is not accruing time towards naturalization.
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165. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year, distributed the numbers in the mandated order, and excluded exempt asylees from the list, on information and belief, they already would have adjusted Mr. Hantouli’s status. Mr. Hantouli has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust his status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
166. Plaintiff Faisal Usman was granted asylum on January 28, 1997 from India. He applied for adjustment of status in Seattle, Washington, on or about April 16, 1998.
167. Mr. Usman applied for an EAD in or around 1998. He has renewed the EAD and paid the $100 renewal fee each year since 1998.
168. Mr. Usman was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. He is still waiting to adjust his status even though he filed his adjustment application before June 9, 1998, the cut-off date for FY 2002. He is not accruing time towards naturalization.
169. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year, distributed the numbers in the mandated order, and excluded exempt asylees from the list, on information and belief they already would have adjusted Mr. Usman’s status. Mr. Usman has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust his status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
170. Plaintiff Sherman Brown was granted asylum on January 29, 1997 from Liberia. He applied for adjustment of status at the INS’s Arlington, Virginia District Office in or around April 1998. He received a written receipt notice from the INS acknowledging that his adjustment application had been received. He was interviewed in the Arlington District Office on August 27, 1998.
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171. Mr. Brown was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. He is still waiting to adjust his status even though he filed his adjustment application before June 9, 1998, the cut-off date for FY 2002. He is not accruing time towards naturalization.
172. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year, distributed the numbers in the mandated order, and excluded exempt asylees from the list, on information and belief they already would have adjusted Mr. Brown’s status. Mr. Brown has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust his status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
173. Plaintiff Laura Tabue was granted asylum on March 23, 1997 from Liberia. She applied for adjustment of status at the Chicago District office on May 1, 1998. She received a written receipt notice from the INS acknowledging that her adjustment application had been received on May 1, 1998.
174. Ms. Tabue’s fingerprints were taken at the Chicago District office. On January 31, 2000, Ms. Tabue was interviewed at the Chicago Office.
175. Ms. Tabue applied for an EAD on May 6, 1997 and renewed her EAD in 1998, 1999, and 2000, paying $100 each time. The INS took eight months to approve her 2000 EAD renewal application, from August 2000 to April 2001. Before it was approved, Ms. Tabue was laid off her job because she did not have a current EAD.
176. Ms. Tabue was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. She is still waiting to adjust her status even though she filed her adjustment application before June 9, 1998, the cut-off date for FY 2002. She is not accruing time towards naturalization.
177. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year, distributed the numbers in the mandated order, and excluded exempt asylees from
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the list, on information and belief, they already would have adjusted Ms. Tabue’s status. Ms. Tabue has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust her status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
Plaintiffs Who Filed For Adjustment After June 9, 1998 178. Plaintiff Oleksander Zinkovsky was granted asylum on October 10, 1996 from the Ukraine. His wife Galina and son Igor were granted asylum as derivative asylees. The Zinkovskys filed for adjustment of status at the INS’s Philadelphia, Pennsylvania District Office on June 12, 1998. Mr. Zinkovsky received a filing receipt issued by the Philadelphia District Office on June 12, 1998, acknowledging that his adjustment application had been received. 179. Mr. Zinkovsky’s fingerprints were taken on or about June 16, 1998 at the Philadelphia District Office. He was interviewed on October 23, 1998 also at the Philadelphia District Office. 180. Mr. Zinkovsky, his wife, and son all applied for EADs. Each renewed their EAD four times. The Zinkovskys paid the $70 renewal fee for each EAD the first year, and $100 for the other three years. The total of their EAD renewal fees, through 2001, comes to $1,110. 181. Mr. Zinkovsky has had difficulty securing a job because most companies prefer employees who are LPRs or citizens. Their son was chosen for a study abroad opportunity in Europe last summer but had to relinquish his seat because the INS did not process his refugee travel document in time. 182. The Zinkovskys were eligible and remain eligible for adjustment of status. They are still waiting to adjust status and are not accruing time towards naturalization.
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183. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year, distributed the numbers in the mandated order, and excluded exempt asylees from the list, on information and belief, they already would have adjusted the Zinkovskys’ status or they would be eligible to adjust status in the current fiscal year. The Zinkovskys have no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust their status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
184. Plaintiff Unsheju Mbu Izampuye was granted asylum in April 1997 from the Congo. He applied for adjustment of status at the NSC in July 1998. He received a written receipt notice from the INS, dated July 13, 1998, acknowledging that his adjustment application had been received.
185. Mr. Mbu Izampuye’s fingerprints were taken and sent to the INS with his application for residency. Mr. Mbu Izampuye applied twice for a refugee travel document, paying $95 each time. He applied for a renewal EAD at the NSC and paid the $100 renewal fee.
186. Mr. Mbu Izampuye was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. He is still waiting to adjust his status and is not accruing time toward naturalization.
187. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year, distributed the numbers in the mandated order, and excluded exempt asylees from the list, on information and belief, they already would have adjusted Mr. Izampuye’s status or he would be eligible to adjust his status in the current fiscal year. Mr. Mbu Izampuye has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust his status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
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188. Plaintiff Pavel E. Gubanikhin was granted asylum on August 4, 1997 from Russia. He applied for adjustment of status at the NSC on August 11, 1998. He received a written receipt notice from the INS acknowledging that his adjustment application had been received on August 11, 1998.
189. Mr. Gubanikhin was fingerprinted at the INS ASC in Ft. Lauderdale, FL on October 6, 1998.
190. Mr. Gubanikhin has renewed his EAD five times. In the spring of 1999, he had to take time off work because the INS failed to issue a renewal EAD prior to expiration of the previously issued EAD. Mr. Gubanikhin applied for a refugee travel document on November 24, 1997 at a cost of $70. He renewed the document in 1999, 2000, and 2001 at a cost of $95.00 and in 2002 at a cost of $110. In the summer of 1999, he had to cancel a trip to France because of INS delays in processing the renewal application.
191. Mr. Gubanikhin was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. He is still waiting to adjust his status and is not accruing time towards naturalization.
192. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year, distributed the numbers in the mandated order, and excluded exempt asylees from the list, on information and belief, they already would have adjusted Mr. Gubanikhin’s status or he would be eligible to adjust his status in the current fiscal year. The defendants have not adjusted his status in the mandated order, that is, by date of filing. Mr. Gubanikhin has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust his status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
193. Plaintiff Joseph Coleman was granted asylum on November 21, 1996 from Liberia. He applied for adjustment of status at the NSC on August 24, 1998. He received a
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written receipt notice from the INS, dated September 29, 1998, acknowledging that his adjustment application had been received.
194. Mr. Coleman applied for an EAD in 1996 at the NSC. He renewed his EAD three time, incurring $270 in filing fees.
195. Mr. Coleman has had difficulty establishing residency for state college tuition and in obtaining student loans.
196. Mr. Coleman was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. He is still waiting to adjust his status and is not accruing time toward naturalization.
197. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year, distributed the numbers in the mandated order, and excluded exempt asylees from the list, on information and belief, they already would have adjusted Mr. Coleman’s status or he would be eligible to have his status adjusted in the current fiscal year. Mr. Coleman has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust his status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
198. Plaintiff Adrienne Kazarwa was granted asylum on November 15, 1996 from Rwanda. She applied for adjustment of status at the NSC in August 1998. She received a written receipt notice from the INS in September 1998 acknowledging that her adjustment application had been received.
199. Ms. Kazarwa applied for an EAD at the NSC. She renewed her EAD in 1997 1998, and 1999, paying $70 in both 1997 and 1998 and $100 in 1999.
200. Ms. Kazarwa applied for a refugee travel document in April 2001, paying the $95 fee. She was unable to take a planned trip because of INS’s delay in processing the travel document.
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201. Adrienne Kazarwa was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. She is still waiting to adjust her status and is not accruing time toward naturalization.
202. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year, distributed the numbers in the mandated order, and excluded exempt asylees from the list, on information and belief, they already would have adjusted Ms. Kazarwa’s status or she would be eligible to adjust her status in the current fiscal year. Ms. Kazarwa has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust her status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
203. Plaintiff Amondieu Milfort was granted asylum from Haiti on August 28, 1997. He applied for adjustment of status on or about September 9, 1998, and received an acknowledgement from the INS that it had received his application.
204. Mr. Milfort applied for an EAD and has renewed his application each year for a total of three times at a cost of $300. He also paid a $50 fee each year for his attorney’s office to prepare the renewal applications.
205. Mr. Milfort was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. He is not accruing time towards naturalization.
206. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year, distributed the numbers in the mandated order, and excluded exempt asylees from the list, on information and belief, they already would have adjusted Mr. Milfort’s status or he would be eligible to adjust his status in the current fiscal year. Mr. Milfort has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust his status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
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207. Plaintiff Bineyam Kassahun was granted asylum on July 17, 1992 from Ethiopia. He applied for adjustment of status at the NSC on September 24, 1998. He received a written receipt notice from the INS acknowledging that his adjustment application had been received on September 24, 1998.
208 Mr. Kassahun applied for and received an EAD in 1998 at a cost of $100. He renewed his EAD in 2000 and 2001 at a cost of $100 each time and in 2002 at a cost of $120.
209. Mr. Kassahun was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. He is still waiting to adjust his status even though he filed his adjustment application before June 9, 1998, the cut-off date for FY 2002. He is not accruing time towards naturalization.
210. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year, distributed the numbers in the mandated order, and excluded exempt asylees from the list, on information and belief, they already would have adjusted Mr. Kassahun’s status. Mr. Kassahun has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust his status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
211. Plaintiff Issette Kassahun was granted asylum on March 30, 1990 from Ethiopia. She applied for adjustment of status at the NSC on September 24, 1998. She received a written receipt notice from the INS acknowledging that her adjustment application had been received on September 24, 1998.
212. Ms. Kassahun applied for and received an EAD in 1998 at a cost of $100. She renewed her EAD in 2000 and 2001 at a cost of $100 each time and in 2002 at a cost of $120. In 2001, there was a several month delay before the INS renewed the EAD. Ms. Kassahun was unable to work during that period.
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213. Ms. Kassahun was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. She is still waiting to adjust her status even though she filed her adjustment application before June 9, 1998, the cut-off date for FY 2002. She is not accruing time towards naturalization.
214 If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year, distributed the numbers in the mandated order, and excluded exempt asylees from the list, on information and belief, they already would have adjusted Ms. Kassahun’s status. Ms. Kassahun has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust her status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
215. Plaintiff Dragon Cvetkovic was granted asylum from Yugoslavia on August 29, 1997. Mr. Cvetkovic’s wife, Lilana Cvetkovic, and his two children, Danijel Cvetkovic and Marijan Cvetkovic, also received asylum as derivatives of Mr. Cvetkovic. Mr. Cvetkovic applied for adjustment of status on October 8, 1998 and received a notice from the INS indicating that it had received their applications on that date. His wife and two children applied for adjustment on October 9, 1998. Mr. Cvetkovic was fingerprinted in October 1998.
216. Mr. Cvetkovic was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. He is not accruing time towards naturalization.
217. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year, distributed the numbers in the mandated order, and excluded exempt asylees from the list, on information and belief, they already would have adjusted the Cvetkovics’ status or they would be eligible to adjust their status in the current fiscal year. The Cvetkovics have no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust their status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
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218. Plaintiff Aman Yakob was granted asylum on September 16, 1997 from Afghanistan. His wife, Yasamin Yakob, and his daughter, Farangeees Yakob, were granted asylum as derivative asylees. They applied for adjustment of status in October 1998 at the NSC. Mr. Yakob received an acknowledgement that the NSC had received his adjustment application.
219. The Yakobs have applied for EADs and have renewed the EADs every year, paying $70 for each of them for a total of $210 each year until 1998, and then $100 for each, for a total of $300 per year every year since then. Each time, the EAD renewal takes approximately 60 to 90 days to process.
220. The Yakobs have not left the United States since they came here. They are afraid to leave until their status is adjusted because they fear they would not be permitted to reenter.
221. Mr. Yakob tried to go to school to get a better job and better support his family, but he was not eligible for financial aid as he is not yet a permanent resident. The Yakob family worries a lot about not having their green cards and do not believe they will be truly free until they are adjusted to permanent residents.
222. The Yakobs were eligible and remain eligible for adjustment of status. They are still waiting to adjust their status and are not accruing time towards naturalization.
223. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year, distributed the numbers in the mandated order, and excluded exempt asylees from the list, on information and belief, they already would have adjusted all three of the Yakobs’ status or they would be eligible to adjust their status in the current fiscal year. The Yakobs
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have no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust their status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
224. Plaintiff Alexander Marfo was granted asylum on February 29, 1996 from Rwanda. He applied for adjustment of status at the NSC on November 2, 1998. He received a written receipt notice from the INS acknowledging that his adjustment application had been received on November 2, 1998.
225. Mr. Marfo was fingerprinted at the Greensboro Police Department on November 2, 1998.
226. Mr. Marfo applied for an EAD in 1997. He applied for a renewal EAD three times at a cost of $100 each. Mr. Marfo applied for a refugee travel document at a cost of $70.
227. Mr. Marfo was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. He is still waiting to adjust his status and is not accruing time towards naturalization.
228. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year, distributed the numbers in the mandated order, and excluded exempt asylees from the list, on information and belief, they already would have adjusted Mr. Marfo’s status. The defendants have not adjusted his status in the mandated order, that is, by date of filing. Mr. Marfo has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust his status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
229. Plaintiff Nina Ionescu was granted asylum on July 10, 1997 from Romania. She applied for adjustment of status at the NSC on November 16, 1998. She received a written receipt notice from the INS, dated November 19, 1998, acknowledging that her adjustment application had been received.
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230. Ms. Ionescu applied for an EAD at the INS’s New York District Office in 1998. She never received her EAD and the INS never made a determination on her EAD application. She paid a filing fee, even though filing fees on asylee’s initial EAD is not required, and attorney fees.
231. Ms. Ionescu was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. She is still waiting to adjust her status and is not accruing time toward naturalization.
232. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year, distributed the numbers in the mandated order, and excluded exempt asylees from the list, on information and belief, they already would have adjusted Ms. Ionescu’s status or she would be eligible to have her status adjusted in the current fiscal year. Ms. Ionescu has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust her status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
233. Plaintiff Santiago Ruano Oliva was granted asylum in December 1996 from Guatemala. He applied for adjustment of status at the NSC on December 14, 1998. He received a written receipt notice from the INS, acknowledging that his adjustment application had been received on December 14, 1998.
234. Mr. Ruano Oliva applied for an EAD at the NSC. He has renewed his EAD three times, paying $100 each time.
235. Mr. Ruano Oliva was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. He is still waiting to adjust his status and is not accruing time towards naturalization
236. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year, distributed the numbers in the mandated order, and excluded exempt asylees from the list, on information and belief, they already would have adjusted Mr. Ruano Oliva’s
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status or he would be eligible to adjust his status in the current fiscal year. Mr. Ruano Oliva has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust his status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
237. Plaintiff Abdiaziz Hassan was granted asylum on January 22, 1997 from Somalia. He applied for adjustment of status at the NSC on December 18, 1998. Mr. Hassan received a written receipt notice from the INS acknowledging that his adjustment application had been received on December 18, 1998.
238. Mr. Hassan applied for an EAD at the NSC. He paid the $100 renewal fee at least twice, in 1999 and 2000.
239. Mr. Hassan applied for a refugee travel document at a cost of $70. The INS spelled his name incorrectly on the document and did not issue a corrected document despite two requests that it do so. Consequently, he was unable to travel outside the United States.
240. Mr. Hassan was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. He is still waiting to adjust his status and is not accruing time towards naturalization.
241. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year, distributed the numbers in the mandated order, and excluded exempt asylees from the list, on information and belief, they already would have adjusted Mr. Hassan’s status or he would be eligible to adjust his status in the current fiscal year. Mr. Hassan has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust his status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
242. Plaintiff Tareq M. Dreiza was granted asylum on January 5, 1998 from Libya. He applied for adjustment of status at the NSC on January 19, 1999. He received a written
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receipt notice from the INS acknowledging that his adjustment application had been received on January 19, 1999.
243. Mr. Dreiza had his fingerprints taken as part of the asylum application in approximately November 1994. When he applied for adjustment of status, he was told that it would take between 215 and 245 days. Instead, it has now been over three and a half years, and he still is not a permanent resident.
244. Mr. Dreiza applied for an EAD as an asylee on May 7, 1998. He applied for renewal EADs in 1999, 2000, and 2001 at a cost of $100 each and in 2002 at a cost of $120.
245. Mr. Dreiza applied for a refugee travel document in 1999, 2000, and 2001 at a cost of $95 each. His job requires overseas travel, and in order to apply for travel documents, he has had to travel to Los Angeles in order to personally apply. This travel was an added cost. He has had difficulties and delays entering other countries because he was unable to show proof of U.S. residency. He was not permitted to board a flight because the airline was uncertain as to whether a travel document would be sufficient for him to reenter the United States. Secondary inspection has caused him significant delays and missed connecting flights. He was unable to travel on numerous occasions because he did not have a travel document or because it was valid for less than 6 months. This inability to travel has affected his work.
246. Mr. Dreiza is afraid that, after a business trip, he will not be permitted to reenter the United States. After September 11, he also fears being targeted by INS officials at the airport because of his Middle Eastern origin.
247. Mr. Dreiza was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. He is still waiting to adjust his status and is not accruing time towards naturalization.
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248. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year, distributed the numbers in the mandated order, and excluded exempt asylees from the list, on information and belief, they already would have adjusted Mr. Dreiza’s status or he would be eligible to adjust his status in the current fiscal year. The defendants have not adjusted his status in the mandated order, that is, by date of filing. Mr. Dreiza has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust his status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
249. Plaintiff Patricia Muendo was granted asylum on December 11, 1997 from the Democratic Republic of Congo. She applied for adjustment of status at the NSC on February 8, 1999. She received a written receipt notice from the INS acknowledging that her adjustment application had been received.
250. Ms. Muendo applied for an EAD in 1997 at the INS’s Dallas District Office. She renewed her EAD in 1998, 1999 and 2000, paying a $100 renewal fee each time. Ms. Muendo also has applied for and paid $95 in fees for a refugee travel document, but she never received the document.
251. Ms. Muendo was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. She is not accruing time towards naturalization.
252. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year, distributed the numbers in the mandated order, and excluded exempt asylees from the list, on information and belief, they already would have adjusted Ms. Muendo’s status or she would be eligible to adjust her status in the current fiscal year. Ms. Muendo has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust his status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
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253. Plaintiff Ali Murtaza was granted asylum on February 28, 1998 from Pakistan. He applied for adjustment of status at the NSC on March 8, 1999. He received a written receipt notice from the INS, dated September 15, 2000, acknowledging that his adjustment application had been received and was filed on March 8, 1999.
254. Mr. Murtaza’s fingerprints were taken in Oklahoma when he first applied for his EAD on August 16, 1997. Mr. Murtaza renewed his EAD at the NSC in 1998, 1999, and 2000 and is currently waiting for his 2001 EAD. He has spent more than $300 on renewal fees in addition to attorney’s fees for his EAD renewal. Mr. Murtaza has had to wait many months for the EAD renewal to be processed. He has had to obtain legal assistance and pay legal fees when his employer threatened to fire him due to the delay in the arrival of his EAD.
255. Mr. Murtaza was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. He is still waiting to adjust his status and is not accruing time towards naturalization.
256. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year, distributed the numbers in the mandated order, and excluded exempt asylees from the list, on information and belief, they already would have adjusted Mr. Murtaza’s status or he would be eligible to adjust his status in the current fiscal year. Mr. Murtaza has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust his status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
257. Plaintiff Pierre Boumtje was granted asylum on December 19, 1996 from Cameroon. He applied for adjustment of status at the NSC in April 1999. He received a written receipt notice from the INS, in June 1999, acknowledging that his adjustment application had been received.
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258. Mr. Boumtje applied for an EAD at the NSC. He has renewed his EAD four times, paying $100 each time. Mr. Boumtje was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. He is still waiting to adjust his status and is not accruing time towards naturalization.
259. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year, distributed the numbers in the mandated order, and excluded exempt asylees from the list, on information and belief, they already would have adjusted Mr. Boumtje’s status or he would be eligible to adjust his status in the current fiscal year. Mr. Boumtje has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust his status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
260. Plaintiff Martine Ernestine Boumtje was granted asylum on December 19, 1996 from Cameroon. She applied for adjustment of status at the NSC in April 1999. She received a written receipt notice from the INS, in June 1999, acknowledging that her adjustment application had been received.
261. Ms. Boumtje applied for an EAD at the NSC. She has renewed her EAD four times, paying $100 each time. Ms. Boumtje was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. She is still waiting to adjust her status and is not accruing time towards naturalization.
262. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year, distributed the numbers in the mandated order, and excluded exempt asylees from the list, on information and belief, they already would have adjusted Ms. Boumtje’s status or she would be eligible to adjust her status in the current fiscal year. Ms. Boumtje has no
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remedy to compel the defendants to adjust her status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
263. Plaintiff Rosemary Ekeada was granted asylum in February 1998 from Nigeria. She applied for adjustment of status at the Vermont Service Center in April 1999. She received a written receipt notice from the INS, dated May 19, 1999, acknowledging that her adjustment application had been received.
264. Ms. Ekeada applied for an EAD in 1998 at the Vermont Service Center. She has renewed her EAD four times, paying $100 each time. Ms. Ekeada was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. She is still waiting to adjust her status and is not accruing time towards naturalization.
265. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year, distributed the numbers in the mandated order, and excluded exempt asylees from the list, on information and belief, they already would have adjusted Ms. Ekeada’s status or she would be eligible to adjust her status in the current fiscal year. Ms. Ekeada has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust her status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
266. Plaintiff Toko Maurice Mbungu was granted asylum on January 13, 1998 from the Democratic Republic of Congo. He applied for adjustment of status at the NSC on July 12, 1999. He received a written receipt notice from the INS acknowledging that his adjustment application had been received on July 12, 1999.
267. Mr. Mbungu renewed his EAD once at a cost of $100. Mr. Mbungu applied for a refugee travel document in September 1998 at a cost of $95.00.
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268. Mr. Mbungu was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. He is still waiting to adjust his status and is not accruing time towards naturalization.
269. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year, distributed the numbers in the mandated order, and excluded exempt asylees from the list, on information and belief, they already would have adjusted Mr. Mbungu’s status or he would be eligible to adjust his status in the current fiscal year. The defendants have not adjusted his status in the mandated order, that is, by date of filing. Mr. Mbungu has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust his status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
270. Plaintiff Iltam S. Jean-Caidor was granted asylum on July 10, 1998 from Haiti. He applied for adjustment of status at the NSC on July 23, 1999. He received a written receipt notice from the INS acknowledging that his adjustment application had been received on July 23, 1999.
271. Between 1997 and 1998, Mr. Jean-Caidor’s fingerprints were taken four times. Mr. Jean-Caidor applied for an EAD in 1998 and renewed his EAD three times, paying the $100 renewal fee each time. He suffered many lapses in his EAD because of defendants’ delays in processing them.
272. Mr. Jean-Caidor was separated from his wife and two young children, who were outside the United States, from April 1992 to December 2000 due to defendants’ mishandling of his file.
273. Mr. Jean-Caidor was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. He is not accruing time towards naturalization.
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274. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year, distributed the numbers in the mandated order, and excluded exempt asylees from the list, on information and belief, they already would have adjusted Mr. Jean-Caidor’s status or he would be eligible to adjust his status in the current fiscal year. Mr. Jean-Caidor has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust his status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
275. Plaintiff Arturo Javier Reynoso Madrigal was granted asylum on June 22, 1998 from Mexico. He applied for adjustment of status at the NSC on July 29, 1999. He has received a notice from the INS indicating that they have received his application for permanent residency.
276. Mr. Reynoso has had difficulty obtaining a mortgage at least partially due to not being a permanent resident.
277. Mr. Reynoso applied for an EAD on July 27, 1998. He applied for renewal EADs three times at a cost of $100 each.
278. Mr. Reynoso was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. He is not accruing time towards naturalization.
279. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year, distributed the numbers in the mandated order, and excluded exempt asylees from the list, on information and belief, they already would have adjusted Mr. Reynoso’s status or he would be eligible to adjust his status in the current fiscal year. The defendants have not adjusted his status in the mandated order, that is, by date of filing. Mr. Reynoso has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust his status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
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280. Plaintiff Bassem El-Khatib was granted asylum from Kuwait. He applied for adjustment of status at the NSC on January 10, 2000. Mr. El-Khatib received a written receipt notice from the INS acknowledging that his adjustment application had been received on January 10, 2000. Mr. El-Khatib applied for an EAD at the NSC, paying a $100 renewal fee in 2001.
281. Mr. El-Khatib was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. He is not accruing time towards naturalization.
282. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year, distributed the numbers in the mandated order, and excluded exempt asylees from the list, on information and belief, they already would have adjusted Mr. El-Khatib’s status or he would be eligible to adjust his status in the current fiscal year. Mr. El-Khatib has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust his status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
283. Plaintiff Djavanshir Gadjiev was granted asylum on January 12, 1999 from Azerbaijan. He applied for adjustment of status at the NSC on February 8, 2000. He received a written receipt notice from the INS acknowledging that his adjustment application had been received on February 8, 2000.
284. Mr. Gadjiev’ fingerprints were taken when he was granted asylum at the Charlotte, North Carolina INS office.
285. Mr. Gadjiev applied for and received an EAD in 1999 at a cost of $100. He renewed his EAD in 2000 and 2001 at a cost of $100 each time and in 2002 at a cost of $120. Mr. Gadjiev almost lost his job due to an INS delay in processing his EAD application between September 22, 2000 and February 8, 2001.
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286. Mr. Gadjiev was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. He is still waiting to adjust his status and is not accruing time towards naturalization.
287. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year, distributed the numbers in the mandated order, and excluded exempt asylees from the list, on information and belief, they already would have adjusted Mr. Gadjiev’s status or he would be eligible to adjust his status in the current fiscal year. Mr. Gadjiev has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust his status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
288. Plaintiff Sonia S. Santisteban Grijalva was granted asylum on September 28, 1998 from Guatemala. She applied for adjustment of status at the NSC on March 23, 2000. She received a written receipt notice from the INS acknowledging that her adjustment application had been received on March 23, 2000.
289. Ms. Santisteban applied for an EAD on March 23, 2000. She renewed the EAD in 2001 at a cost of $100 and in 2002 at a cost of $120. INS delays in processing her application for an EAD caused her to lose a job because she did not receive her EAD on time.
290. Ms. Santisteban was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. She is still waiting to adjust her status and is not accruing time towards naturalization.
291. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year, distributed the numbers in the mandated order, and excluded exempt asylees from the waiting list, on information and belief, they already would have adjusted Ms. Santisteban’s status or she would be eligible to adjust her status in the current fiscal year. The defendants have not adjusted her status in the mandated order, that is, by date of filing.
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Ms. Santisteban has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust her status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
292. Plaintiff Gerardo R. Vidal Sic was granted asylum on September 28, 1998 from Guatemala. He applied for adjustment of status at the NSC on March 23, 2000. He received a written receipt notice from the INS acknowledging that his adjustment application had been received on March 23, 2000.
293. Mr. Vidal was fingerprinted in Las Vegas in December 1999. 294. Mr. Vidal has applied for an EAD every year since 1998. INS delays in processing his application for an EAD have caused him to lose a job because he did not receive his EAD on time. Mr. Vidal applied for a refugee travel document on March 20, 2000 at a cost of 95.00. 295. Mr. Vidal was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. He is still waiting to adjust his status and is not accruing time towards naturalization. 296. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year, distributed the numbers in the mandated order, and excluded exempt asylees from the list, on information and belief, they already would have adjusted Mr. Vidal’s status or he would be eligible to adjust his status in the current fiscal year. The defendants have not adjusted his status in the mandated order, that is, by date of filing. Mr. Vidal has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust his status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit. 297. Plaintiff Samon Som was granted asylum on November 2, 1998 from Cambodia. She applied for adjustment of status at the NSC on April 12, 2000. She received
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a written receipt notice from the INS acknowledging that her adjustment application had been received on April 12, 2000.
298. Ms. Som was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. She is not accruing time towards naturalization.
299. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year, distributed the numbers in the mandated order, excluded exempt asylees from the list, on information and belief, they already would have adjusted Ms. Som’s status or she would be eligible to adjust her status in the current fiscal year. The defendants have not adjusted her status in the mandated order, that is, by date of filing. Ms. Som has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust her status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
300. Plaintiff Bekana Huluka was granted asylum on January 11, 1999 from Ethiopia. He applied for adjustment of status at the NSC on May 16, 2000. He received a written receipt notice from the INS acknowledging that his adjustment application had been received on May 16, 2000.
301. Mr. Huluka applied for an EAD in 1998 at the Vermont Service Center. He renewed his EAD in 1999 and 2000, paying a $100 renewal fee each time.
302. Mr. Huluka was eligible and remains eligible for adjustment of status. He is still waiting to adjust his status and is not accruing time towards naturalization.
303. If the defendants had distributed all 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers every fiscal year, distributed the numbers in the mandated order, and excluded exempt asylees from the list, on information and belief they already would have adjusted Mr. Huluka’s status or he
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would be eligible to adjust his status in the current fiscal year. Mr. Huluka has no remedy to compel the defendants to adjust his status in the proper order, other than through this lawsuit.
HARMS THE PLAINTIFFS AND CLASS MEMBERS ARE SUFFERING 304. Plaintiffs and class members have suffered, are suffering, and will continue to suffer significant and irreparable harm because of defendants’ policies, procedures, acts and failures to act as described herein. This harm includes the harms alleged throughout this complaint, and the following: 305. Because defendants have, in many fiscal years, distributed far fewer than the 10,000 available asylee adjustment numbers, and because defendants have not complied with the requirement to allocate these numbers in the order in which plaintiffs filed for adjustment, all plaintiffs and class members are farther back on the waiting list than they otherwise would be. As a direct result of their placement on the waiting list, all plaintiffs and class members have had to and/or will have to wait a significantly longer period to adjust their status. As long as defendants continue to improperly fail to allocate available asylee adjustment numbers, to distribute these numbers out of order, and to include exempt asylees in the queue, all plaintiffs and class members will continue to suffer delays. 306. Because plaintiffs and class members have waited and will continue to wait significantly longer to become LPRs, they have been and are unable to stabilize their lives. Their status here has been and will continue to be indefinite. Some plaintiffs and class members have been and will continue to be afraid to accumulate assets in the United States because they fear they may ultimately be denied permanent residence status and may be deported. They have not been able to and cannot plan because they have not known and do not know when they will become permanent residents.
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307. Some plaintiffs and class members have been and will continue to be unable to petition for family members to join them in the United States. For example, if an asylee marries a noncitizen who is a resident of some other country, the asylee cannot petition for his or her spouse nor bring them to this country. Single asylees cannot marry and sponsor his or her spouse until the asylee’s status is adjusted.
308. Some plaintiffs and class members have been and will be refused jobs or passed over for promotions because they are not LPRs or not United States citizens. Many plaintiffs have lost significant work time and will lose significant work time while pursuing their adjustment applications, making inquiries at INS offices, meeting with lawyers, applying for renewals and refugee travel documents, and otherwise pursuing their delayed permanent residency.
309. Some colleges and universities have considered and will continue to consider plaintiffs and class members to be out-of-state residents and hence charged them out-of-state tuition. The plaintiffs and class members have had and will continue to have other hardships when applying for financial aid for higher education.
310. Because they have not become LPRs, plaintiffs and class members have been and are unable to travel freely outside the United States. Many plaintiffs and class members have been and will be afraid to travel outside the United States for fear there will be a bar to their reentry or they will not be permitted to reenter, even if they obtain a refugee travel document before they depart. Some plaintiffs and class members have declined and will decline employment opportunities that involved travel abroad. Those plaintiffs and class members who have been willing to travel outside the United States have had to apply for, wait for, and pay for refugee travel documents to assure their reentry. Many have paid
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attorneys’ fees for their attorneys' assistance in obtaining refugee travel documents and advice.
311. Because they have had to wait and will continue to have to wait many years to adjust their status, and because of defendants’ policies and practices as described herein, plaintiffs and class members have had to and will continue to have to submit to repeated fingerprinting and medical exams, at considerable cost and inconvenience.
312. Plaintiffs and class members who are exempt from the 10,000 cap on asylee adjustment numbers have had to and will continue to have to wait years longer than required by law to adjust their status. They also have had to and will continue to have to obtain EADs and refugee travel documents and renew those documents repeatedly, at considerable expense and inconvenience, when they should not have had to obtain or renew EADs or refugee travel documents at all.
313. Nonexempt plaintiffs and class members have not adjusted as quickly as they should have, and have had to wait longer than they should have, because defendants did not exclude exempt asylees from the queue. Nonexempt plaintiffs and class members will continue to have to wait years longer than they should have if defendants do not exclude exempt asylees from the queue.
314. Because plaintiffs and class members have not and will continue to not become LPRs when or as quickly as they should have, their naturalization has been delayed. They have been and will continue to be unable to vote and participate fully in our democracy. They have lost job opportunities that are open only to United States citizens and will continue to lose such opportunities. They have been and will continue to be unable to petition for their family members to immigrate to the United States as immediate relatives.
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315. Because defendants have misinterpreted the INA and applicable regulations,

many plaintiffs and class members have had to and will continue to have to obtain EADs and

pay for repeated renewals of those EADs, resulting in significant out-of-pocket expense,

including attorneys’ fees, inconvenience, loss of wages, and loss of employment

opportunities. Some plaintiffs and class members have suffered and will continue to suffer

lapses between receiving EADs because of INS delays in processing their renewals. These

lapses have resulted in and will continue to result in loss of income and risk of lost of jobs.

316. Plaintiffs and class members do not know when they will be adjusted and

believe that defendants will not adjust them in the proper, chronological order. Plaintiffs and

class members have no way, other than through this lawsuit, to compel the defendants to

adjust them in the proper order.

317. Plaintiffs’ and class members’ rights to due process of law and equal

protection under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution have been and are

being violated and will continue to be violated by defendants’ failures and policies and

practices as described herein.

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

318. The named plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of themselves and all other persons similarly situated in

the following classes. The named plaintiffs seek to represent the following class and

subclasses:

Class:

All asylees in the United States who have applied for

adjustment of status to lawful permanent residence and whose

applications for adjustment remain pending.

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Subclass I: All asylees who filed their adjustment of status applications with the INS on or before January 16, 1998;
Subclass II: All asylees who filed their adjustment of status applications after January 16, 1998 and on or before June 9, 1998;
Subclass III: All asylees who filed their adjustment of status applications after June 9, 1998;
Subclass IV: All asylees who applied for or applied to renew an Employment Authorization Document (EAD); and
Subclass V: All asylees who are exempt from the annual statutory cap of 10,000 asylee adjustment numbers set by INA §209(b), 8 U.S.C. §1159(b).
319. Class members may, and often will, belong to more than one class. 320. The members of the plaintiff classes warrant class action treatment because they fulfill the certifying requirements under Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 321. The proposed classes meet the commonality requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) because there are questions of law and fact common to the class. Common questions of law include whether the INS and defendants’ regulations require defendants to maintain a single, national asylee adjustment queue and whether the statute and regulations permit asylees to work indefinitely incident to status. Common questions of fact include whether defendants have failed to allocate all 10,000 available asylee adjustment numbers per fiscal year and whether exempt asylees have been excluded from the waiting list.
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322. The individual differences in the class members’ and plaintiffs’ life stories and asylum applications are irrelevant to their complaints against defendants for their misadministration of the adjustment process.
323. The proposed classes meet the numerosity requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) because the members of each of the five classes are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. According to defendants, there currently are approximately 96,000 asylees whose adjustment applications are pending either at district offices or at the NSC. Most of these asylees have had to apply for an EAD and most of those have applied to renew the EAD at least once.
324. The proposed classes meet the typicality requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3) because the claims of the named plaintiffs are typical of the claims of each of the class members. The named plaintiffs complain of the defendants’ systemic failures to properly administer the asylee waiting list and of agency-wide misinterpretation of law. The claims of each class representative are typical of the claims of each member of that class.
325. The named plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the classes as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) because their interests are identical to those of the other members of the classes. Both the named plaintiffs and the class members will benefit from the relief requested in this complaint. The named plaintiffs will therefore zealously protect the interests of the classes. Plaintiffs know of no conflicts between their interests and those of the class they seek to represent.
326. In addition, the fair and adequate protection of the interests of the classes will be further ensured because the named plaintiffs are represented by competent legal counsel.
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Plaintiffs’ counsel are experienced in class action litigation and federal litigation and have adequate resources and commitment to represent the class as a whole.
327. The instant action should be maintained as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because the defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to each member of the classes by failing to carry out the duties owed to each member of the classes.
328. Furthermore, as contemplated by Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1), if the individual members of the classes were to bring separate suits to address the defendants’ policies, practices, actions and inactions, the defendants may address the cases of the named plaintiffs but ignore the applications and concerns of the remaining class members, thereby exacerbating the defendants’ violations of the law. Resolving this matter as a class action would also serve judicial economy since the courts would not be burdened with lawsuits by many individual adjustment applicants.
CAUSES OF ACTION I.
Violation of INA §209(b), 8 U.S.C. §1159(b) (Adjustment of Status, Number of Asylee Adjustment Slots Available) 329. Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 328 as if fully set forth herein. 330. Defendants’ practices, policies, conduct, and failures to act as alleged herein deprive plaintiffs and class members of their rights to adjust status pursuant to INA §209(b), 8 U.S.C. §1159(b) and unlawfully delay their adjustment of status pursuant to that statute. 331. As a result, plaintiffs and class members have suffered irreparable harm and damages entitling them to injunctive and other relief.
II. Violation of 8 C.F.R. §209.2(a)(1) (Waiting List)
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332. Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 331 as if set forth in full herein. 333. Defendants’ practices, policies, conduct, and failures to act as alleged herein violate 8 C.F.R. §209.2(a)(1) because defendants have not maintained a priority waiting list based on the date each plaintiff’s and class member’s adjustment application was filed, and do not adjust plaintiffs or class members in the order in which they filed their applications. 334. As a result, plaintiffs and class members have suffered irreparable harm and damages entitling them to injunctive and other relief.
III. Violation of Pub. L. No. 105-277, Title I, §128 (Iraqi Kurds); Pub. L. No. 106-429, §586
(Indochinese parolees); Pub. L. No. 106-378 (Syrian Jews) (Exempt Plaintiffs)
335. Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 334 as if set forth in full herein. 336. Defendants’ practices, policies, conduct, and failures to act as alleged herein violate Pub. L. No. 105-277, Title I, §128; Pub.L. No. 106-429, §586; Pub.L.No. 106-378 in that defendants are not exempting those asylees, including Class V members, who are exempt from the 10,000 cap and should be adjusted notwithstanding the asylee adjustment backlog. 337. As a result, plaintiffs and class members have suffered irreparable harm and damages entitling them to injunctive and other relief.
IV. Violation of INA §208(c)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1158(c)(1)(B)
(Employment Authorization Documents) 338. Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 337 as if set forth in full herein. 339. Defendants’ practices, policies, conduct, and failures to act as alleged herein violate INA §208(c)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. §1158(c)(1)(B) in that defendants require many
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plaintiffs and Class IV members to apply for and renew EADs in order to be employed when their right to employment is incident to their status as asylees.
340. As a result, plaintiffs and class members have suffered irreparable harm and money damages entitling them to injunctive and other relief.
V. Violation of Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §§702 and 706 341. Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 340 as if set forth in full herein. 342. Defendants’ practices, policies, conduct, and failures to act as alleged herein violate, inter alia, the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 702 and 706, because agency action is unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed under §706(1). 343. As a result, plaintiffs and class members have suffered irreparable harm and money damages entitling them to injunctive and other relief.
VI. Violation of the Fifth Amendment, Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
344. Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 343 as if set forth in full herein. 345. Defendants’ practices, policies, conduct, and failures to act as alleged herein violate plaintiffs’ and class members’ rights to due process and equal protection of law protected by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 346. As a result, plaintiffs and class members have suffered irreparable harm and damages entitling them to injunctive and other relief.
RELIEF REQUESTED Wherefore, plaintiffs respectfully ask that the Court:
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a) Permit this case to proceed as a class action and certify the classes as and when requested by plaintiffs;
b) Declare that defendants’ acts and omissions complained of herein violate the INA, defendants’ regulations, the Administrative Procedures Act, and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth Amendment;
c) Preliminarily and permanently enjoin defendants as and when requested by plaintiffs;
d) Order defendants to make an accounting of the precise number of asylee adjustment numbers not allocated or used in each of the preceding 10 fiscal years and to publish the accounting in the Federal Register, and elsewhere;
e) Order defendants to arrange all pending adjustment applications filed by plaintiffs and class members in the chronological order in which the applications were properly filed;
f) Order defendants to determine the number of asylee adjustment numbers currently available for plaintiffs and class members, including all those the defendants did not allocate or that were unused in prior fiscal years, and then to immediately distribute all of those asylee adjustment numbers and adjust the status of waiting plaintiffs and class members, in the proper first in-first out order;
g) Order defendants to put and keep in place measures to assure that all available asylee adjustment numbers are allocated in the current and each future fiscal year and that those numbers are allocated in chronological order based on date of filing;
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h) Order defendants to segregate out from the asylee adjustment waiting list any and all exempt plaintiffs and class members, adjust their status immediately, and deduct those numbers from the waiting list;
i) Order defendants to put and keep measures in place to identify and exclude from the asylee adjustment waiting list any and all exempt asylees;
j) Order defendants to publish quarterly, in the Federal Register and elsewhere, particulars regarding the asylee adjustment waiting list, including, but not limited to, the number of asylee adjustment numbers remaining to be distributed in this fiscal year, an accurate cut-off date, and the expected wait for adjustment for asylees who filed by particular dates;
k) Order defendants to refrain from requiring plaintiffs and class members to apply for and/or renew an EAD;
l) Order defendants to refrain from requiring multiple sets of fingerprints and multiple medical examinations of plaintiffs and class members who are waiting to adjust, by, for example, requiring the submission of a set of fingerprints and a medical examination report only when there is an asylee adjustment number available and the asylee is almost ready to adjust status;
m) Order the defendants to properly record plaintiffs’ and class members’ adjustment dates to credit plaintiffs and class members for time they improperly spent waiting to adjust status, toward the five-year waiting period for naturalization.
n) Award the plaintiffs their attorneys’ fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act, and;
o) Grant such other relief as the Court deems just, equitable and proper.
69

Respectfull submitted this _____ day of October, 2002. By_____________________________ NADINE K. WETTSTEIN J. TRACI HONG MARY KENNEY ANNE SEYMOUR (law clerk) American Immigration Law Foundation 918 F Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20004 Telephone: (202) 742-5600 Fax: (202) 783-7857 IRIS GOMEZ Massachusetts Law Reform Institute 99 Chauncy Street, Suite 500 Boston, MA 02111 Telephone: (617) 357-0700 Fax: (617) 357-0777 JAMES K. LANGDON II Attorney Registration # 171931 DORSEY 7 WHITNEY, LLP Suite 1500 50 South Sixth Street Minneapolis, MN 55402 Telephone: (612) 340-8759 Fax: (612) 340-2868 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS
70

 
 CaSe: 0:02-cv-502 As Of: 06/21/2013 02:55 PM CDT 1 of 37
ATYADM,CLOSED,PHV
U.S. District Court U.S. District of Minnesota (DMN) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 0:02−cv−00502−RHK−AJB

Ngwanyia, et al v. Ashcroft, et al Assigned to: Judge Richard H. Kyle Referred to: Chief Mag. Judge Arthur J. Boylan Demand: $0 Cause: 05:702 Administrative Procedure Act
Plaintiff
Venantius Nkafor Ngwanyia

Date Filed: 03/04/2002 Date Terminated: 07/12/2005 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 360 P.I.: Other Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Defendant
represented by Iris Gomez Massachusetts Law Reform Institute 99 Chauncy St Ste 500 Boston, MA 02111−1722 617−357−0700 Fax: 16173570777 Email: igomez@mlri.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J Traci Hong Law Firm Unknown LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James K Langdon Dorsey &Whitney LLP 50 S 6th St Ste 1500 Mpls, MN 55402−1498 612−340−2600 Fax: 612−340−8800 Email: langdon.jim@dorsey.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary A Kenney American Immigration Law Foundation 918 F St NW Washington, DC 20004 202−742−5611 Fax: 202−783−7857 Email: mkenney@ailf.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine K Wettstein American Immigration Law Foundation 918 F St NW Washington, DC 20004 202−742−5611 Fax: 202−783−7857 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Wesene Ayele Gizaw

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J Traci Hong

CaSe: 0:02-cv-502 As Of: 06/21/2013 02:55 PM CDT 2 of 37

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Merdekios Duressa

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Mohamad Farah

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

CaSe: 0:02-cv-502 As Of: 06/21/2013 02:55 PM CDT 3 of 37

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Mary W Kariuki

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Salah Farah TERMINATED: 11/26/2002

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Aloysius Tabue

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

CaSe: 0:02-cv-502 As Of: 06/21/2013 02:55 PM CDT 4 of 37

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Fakmi Hysenaj TERMINATED: 11/26/2002

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Mat Dupuy

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

CaSe: 0:02-cv-502 As Of: 06/21/2013 02:55 PM CDT 5 of 37

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Solange Pierre

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Dieuzeve Joseph TERMINATED: 11/26/2002

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/26/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY

J Traci Hong (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/26/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY

James K Langdon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/26/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/26/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/26/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY

Plaintiff

CaSe: 0:02-cv-502 As Of: 06/21/2013 02:55 PM CDT 6 of 37

Akbar L Ng TERMINATED: 11/26/2002

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/26/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY

J Traci Hong (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/26/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY

James K Langdon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/26/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/26/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/26/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY

Plaintiff
Vera Catalina Castillo Ramirez TERMINATED: 11/26/2002

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/26/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY

J Traci Hong (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/26/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY

James K Langdon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/26/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/26/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/26/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY

Plaintiff Zoila Margarita Castillo Ramirez

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James K Langdon (See above for address)

CaSe: 0:02-cv-502 As Of: 06/21/2013 02:55 PM CDT 7 of 37

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Luis Carballo−Manzanares

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Maria Herrera

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

CaSe: 0:02-cv-502 As Of: 06/21/2013 02:55 PM CDT 8 of 37

Plaintiff Marie Diogene
Plaintiff Graciela Martinez
Plaintiff Patrick Davies TERMINATED: 11/26/2002

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/26/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY
J Traci Hong (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/26/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY

CaSe: 0:02-cv-502 As Of: 06/21/2013 02:55 PM CDT 9 of 37

Plaintiff Dawzy A Abdelsamad
Plaintiff Stella Emuwahen Erhabor TERMINATED: 11/26/2002

James K Langdon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/26/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY
Mary A Kenney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/26/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY
Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/26/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/26/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY
J Traci Hong (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/26/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY
James K Langdon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/26/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY
Mary A Kenney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/26/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY
Nadine K Wettstein

CaSe: 0:02-cv-502 As Of: 06/21/2013 02:55 PM CDT 10 of 37

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/26/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY

Plaintiff Murad Fakhouri

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Jaci Caetano Pereira TERMINATED: 11/26/2002

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/26/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY

J Traci Hong (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/26/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY

James K Langdon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/26/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/26/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/26/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY

Plaintiff
Arslan Durrani TERMINATED: 11/26/2002

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/26/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY

J Traci Hong

CaSe: 0:02-cv-502 As Of: 06/21/2013 02:55 PM CDT 11 of 37

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/26/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY

James K Langdon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/26/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/26/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/26/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY

Plaintiff Faisal Usman

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Sherman Brown

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

CaSe: 0:02-cv-502 As Of: 06/21/2013 02:55 PM CDT 12 of 37

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Laura Tabue

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Oleksander Zinkovsky

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Unsheju Mbu Izampuye

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

CaSe: 0:02-cv-502 As Of: 06/21/2013 02:55 PM CDT 13 of 37

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Joseph Coleman

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Adrienne Kazarwa

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

CaSe: 0:02-cv-502 As Of: 06/21/2013 02:55 PM CDT 14 of 37

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Amondieu Milfort

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Dragon Cvetkovic

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

CaSe: 0:02-cv-502 As Of: 06/21/2013 02:55 PM CDT 15 of 37

Aman Yakob

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Nina Ionescu

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Abdiaziz Hassan

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James K Langdon (See above for address)

CaSe: 0:02-cv-502 As Of: 06/21/2013 02:55 PM CDT 16 of 37

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Patricia Muendo

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Ali Murtaza

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

CaSe: 0:02-cv-502 As Of: 06/21/2013 02:55 PM CDT 17 of 37

Plaintiff Pierre Boumtje
Plaintiff Martine Ernestine Boumtje
Plaintiff Rosemary Ekeada

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

CaSe: 0:02-cv-502 As Of: 06/21/2013 02:55 PM CDT 18 of 37

Plaintiff Iltam S Jean−Caidor
Plaintiff Bassem El−Khatib

James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nadine K Wettstein

CaSe: 0:02-cv-502 As Of: 06/21/2013 02:55 PM CDT 19 of 37

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Bekana Huluka on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Fuad Sumo on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated TERMINATED: 11/26/2002

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/26/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY

J Traci Hong (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/26/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY

James K Langdon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/26/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/26/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/26/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY

Plaintiff Santiago Ruano Oliva

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J Traci Hong

CaSe: 0:02-cv-502 As Of: 06/21/2013 02:55 PM CDT 20 of 37

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Vladimir Kashirsky

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Susan Y Pafe

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

CaSe: 0:02-cv-502 As Of: 06/21/2013 02:55 PM CDT 21 of 37

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Kuevir Rafou Ekue−Hettah TERMINATED: 11/19/2003

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/19/2003 LEAD ATTORNEY

J Traci Hong (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/19/2003 LEAD ATTORNEY

James K Langdon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/19/2003 LEAD ATTORNEY

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/19/2003 LEAD ATTORNEY

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/19/2003 LEAD ATTORNEY

Plaintiff Oleg Averianov

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Sokhavuddh Moeun

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

CaSe: 0:02-cv-502 As Of: 06/21/2013 02:55 PM CDT 22 of 37

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Miguel Candido Silvestre Montejo

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Didace Nzeyimana

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

CaSe: 0:02-cv-502 As Of: 06/21/2013 02:55 PM CDT 23 of 37

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Dieulila Vil

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Bassam Hantouli

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

CaSe: 0:02-cv-502 As Of: 06/21/2013 02:55 PM CDT 24 of 37

Pavel E Gubanikhin

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Bineyam Kassahun

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Issette Kassahun

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James K Langdon (See above for address)

CaSe: 0:02-cv-502 As Of: 06/21/2013 02:55 PM CDT 25 of 37

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Alexander Marfo

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Tareq M Dreiza

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

CaSe: 0:02-cv-502 As Of: 06/21/2013 02:55 PM CDT 26 of 37

Plaintiff Toko Maurice Mbungu
Plaintiff Arturo Javier Reynoso Madrigal
Plaintiff Djavanshir Gradjiev

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

CaSe: 0:02-cv-502 As Of: 06/21/2013 02:55 PM CDT 27 of 37

Plaintiff Sonia S Santisteban
Plaintiff Gerardo R. Vidal Sic

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

CaSe: 0:02-cv-502 As Of: 06/21/2013 02:55 PM CDT 28 of 37

Plaintiff Samon Som

represented by Iris Gomez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J Traci Hong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James K Langdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary A Kenney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine K Wettstein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
John Ashcroft Attorney General

represented by Friedrich A. P. Siekert United States Attorney's Office 300 S 4th St Ste 600 Minneapolis, MN 55415 (612) 664−5600 Fax: (612) 664−5788 Email: fred.siekert@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Greg D Mack US Dept of Justice PO Box 878 Ben Franklin Station INACTIVE Washington, DC 20044 202−616−4858 Fax: 202−616−9366 Email: greg.mack@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jennifer L Lightbody US Dept of Justice 1331 Pennsylvania Ave NW Ste 700 INACTIVE Washington, DC 20530 202−616−9352 Fax: 202−616−9366 Email: jennifer.lightbody@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nancy E Friedman

CaSe: 0:02-cv-502 As Of: 06/21/2013 02:55 PM CDT 29 of 37

US Department of Justice PO Box 878 INACTIVE Washington, DC 20044−0878 202−353−0813 Fax: 202−616−4950 Email: nancy.friedman@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
James W Ziglar Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service

represented by Greg D Mack (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nancy E Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Immigration and Naturalization Service

represented by Greg D Mack (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nancy E Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus Nadine K Wettstein

Movant Musadag Sinada

represented by Musadag Sinada 3317 Hobble Court Ellicott City, MD 21043 914−645−2459 PRO SE

Objector Mohammed Saud

Objector Hisham Izzadin Ibrahim

Date Filed 03/04/2002
03/04/2002 03/07/2002

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT − Summons issued. Assigned to Judge Richard H. Kyle per Master list and referred to Magistrate Judge John M. Mason, rcpt no 421940 63pg(s) (DFL) (Entered: 03/06/2002)
PRO HAC VICES SENT to out of state attorneys: Nadine K. Wettstein, J Traci Hong, Mary Kenney and Iris Gomez (DFL) (Entered: 03/06/2002)
2 COPIES OF SUMMONSES AND RETURNS OF SERVICE mailed by certified mail upon defendant John Ashcroft, defendant James W Ziglar, defendant INS and U.S. Attorney on 3/5/02 6pg(s) (DFL) (Entered: 03/11/2002)

CaSe: 0:02-cv-502 As Of: 06/21/2013 02:55 PM CDT 30 of 37

04/10/2002 04/12/2002 04/12/2002 04/12/2002 05/01/2002 05/02/2002 05/03/2002
05/28/2002 06/14/2002 06/19/2002
07/15/2002 07/15/2002 07/15/2002 07/15/2002 07/25/2002 07/25/2002 07/25/2002 07/29/2002
07/29/2002 08/06/2002 08/07/2002 08/12/2002

3 PETITION AND ORDER for admission pro hac vice ( Clerk Richard D. Sletten ) on behalf of plaintiffs by Iris Gomez 1pg(s) (DFL) (Entered: 04/12/2002)
4 PETITION AND ORDER for admission pro hac vice ( Clerk Richard D. Sletten ) on behalf of plaintiffs by NadineK. Wettstein 1pg(s) (DFL) (Entered: 04/16/2002)
5 PETITION AND ORDER for admission pro hac vice ( Clerk Richard D. Sletten ) on behalf of plaintiffs by J. Traci Hong 1pg(s) (DFL) (Entered: 04/16/2002)
6 PETITION AND ORDER for admission pro hac vice ( Clerk Richard D. Sletten ) on behalf of plaintiffs by Mary A. Kenney 1pg(s) (DFL) (Entered: 04/16/2002)
8 JOINT MOTION to extend time to answer or otherwise respond to Pltfs' complaint (to Magistrate Judge John M. Mason) 3pg(s) (GJS) (Entered: 05/02/2002)
7 PETITION AND ORDER for admission pro hac vice ( Clerk Richard D. Sletten ) on behalf of John Ashcroft by Greg D Mack. 1 pg(s) (VEM) (Entered: 05/02/2002)
9 ORDER (Magistrate Judge John M. Mason / 5/3/02) granting motion to extend time to answer or otherwise respond to Pltfs' complaint [8−1] 1pg(s) (cc: all counsel) (GJS) (Entered: 05/07/2002)
10 ANSWER by defendants 26pg(s) (GJS) (Entered: 05/29/2002)
11 LETTER RE: SVC OF DISPOSITIVE MOTION PAPERS by defendants to transfer case (to Judge Richard H. Kyle) 2pg(s) (GJS) (Entered: 06/17/2002)
12 NOTICE OF REASSIGNMENT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE ( Clerk Richard D. Sletten /) Case referred to Magistrate Judge Arthur J. Boylan 1 pg(s) (cc: all counsel) (VEM) (Entered: 06/19/2002)
13 MOTION by defendants to transfer case (to Judge Richard H. Kyle) 3pg(s) (GJS) (Entered: 07/16/2002)
14 MEMORANDUM in support of motion to transfer case [13−1] 10pg(s) (GJS) (Entered: 07/16/2002)
15 EXHIBITS IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO TRANSFER [13−1] 2+pg(s) (GJS) (Entered: 07/16/2002)
16 MEMORANDUM by plaintiffs in opposition to motion to transfer case [13−1] 11pg(s) (GJS) (Entered: 07/16/2002)
17 MOTION by plaintiffs to certify class action ( to Judge Richard H. Kyle ). 5 pg(s) (JVN) Modified on 07/25/2002 (Entered: 07/25/2002)
18 MEMORANDUM by plaintiffs in support of motion to certify class action. [17−1] 17 pg(s) (JVN) (Entered: 07/25/2002)
19 EXHIBITS by plaintiffs in support of motion for class certification. [17−1] 70+ pg(s) (JVN) Modified on 07/25/2002 (Entered: 07/25/2002)
20 ORDER (Judge Richard H. Kyle / 7/29/02) The Court will hear oral argument on the pending motion to transfer and resolve that motion before scheduling the motion for class certification. If the mtn to transfer is granted the class certification motion will also be transferred. The Defendants ahll serve a reply memorandum with respect to the motion to transfer. Counsel are directed to contact Ms. Siebrecht to secure a date for the Reply Mrmorandum and a hearing date for the motion to transfer 1pg(s) (cc: all counsel) (GJS) (Entered: 07/30/2002)
21 MEMORANDUM by defendants in opposition to motion to certify class action [17−1] 16pg(s) (SEA) (Entered: 08/06/2002)
22 REPLY by plaintiffs to defts' opposition to pltf's motion to certify class action. [17−1] 7 pg(s) (VEM) (Entered: 08/08/2002)
23 REPLY by defendant to Plaintiff's Oppositon to Defendant's motion to transfer case [13−1] 6pg(s) (GJS) (Entered: 08/10/2002)
24 CORRECTION TO MEMORANDUM by plaintiff in opposition to motion to transfer case. [13−1] 2+ pg(s) (VEM) (Entered: 08/14/2002)

CaSe: 0:02-cv-502 As Of: 06/21/2013 02:55 PM CDT 31 of 37

08/26/2002 08/30/2002 10/10/2002 10/10/2002 10/18/2002 10/21/2002 10/28/2002 10/29/2002
11/12/2002 11/13/2002 11/26/2002 11/26/2002
01/14/2003 01/28/2003 02/24/2003 02/24/2003 02/24/2003

26 NOTICE of hearing, setting hearing for motion to transfer case [13−1] at 8:00am on 9/13/02 1pg(s) (GJS) (Entered: 08/31/2002)
25 ORDER ( Judge Richard H. Kyle ) the 9/13/02 hearing is canceled and the motion to transfer is deemed submitted upon the writeen record. [13−1] 1 pg(s) (cc: all counsel) (VEM) (Entered: 08/30/2002)
27 MOTION by plaintiff to amend complaint.( to Magistrate Judge Arthur J. Boylan ) 3+ pg(s) (VEM) (Entered: 10/17/2002)
28 MEMORANDUM, OPINION, AND ORDER: ( Judge Richard H. Kyle /) Defts' motion to transfer case is denied. [13−1] 7 pg(s) (cc: all counsel) (VEM) (Entered: 10/17/2002)
29 NOTICE of setting hearing of Pltf's motion to certify class action to Judge Richard H. Kyle [17−1] at 9:00 am on 11/26/02. 1 pg(s) (VEM) (Entered: 10/23/2002)
30 ORDER ( Magistrate Judge Arthur J. Boylan)Pltfs' motion to amend complaint granted and directs that the first amended complaint be filed. [27−1] 1 pg(s) (cc: all counsel) (VEM) (Entered: 10/24/2002)
31 UNOPPOSED MOTION by defendants for an extension of time to file an amended answer or other response to Pltfs' first amended complaint. ( to Magistrate Judge Arthur J. Boylan ) 3 pg(s) (VEM) (Entered: 11/04/2002)
32 ORDER ( Magistrate Judge Arthur J. Boylan ) Defts shall be granted an extension of time until 11/13/02 to file an amended answer or otherwise response to Pltfs' first amended complaint. [31−1] 1pg(s) (cc: all counsel) (VEM) (Entered: 11/04/2002)
33 ADDENDUM by plaintiffs to First Amended Complaint for Declaratory, Mandamus and Injunctive Relief Class Action 8pg(s) (GJS) (Entered: 11/16/2002)
34 ANSWER by defendant John Ashcroft, defendant James W Ziglar, defendant INS 32pg(s) (GJS) (Entered: 11/16/2002)
35 MINUTES:( Judge Richard H. Kyle / R. Riley) taking under advisement Pltf's motion to certify class action. [17−1] 1 pg(s) (VEM) (Entered: 12/04/2002)
36 AMENDED COMPLAINT [1−1] by plaintiff; terminating Fuad Sumo, Salah Farah, Fakmi Hysenaj, Jaci Caetano Pereira, Arslan Durrani, Stella Emuwahen Erhabor, Patrick Davies, Vera Catalina Castillo Ramirez, Akbar L Ng, Dieuzeve Joseph; adding Vladimir Kashirsky, Susan Y Pafe, Kuevir Rafou Ekue−Hettah, Oleg Averianov, Sokhavuddh Moeun, Miguel Candido Silvestre Montejo, Didace Nzeyimana, Dieulila Vil, Bassam Hantouli, Pavel E Gubanikhin, Bineyam Kassahun, Issette Kassahun, Alexander Marfo, Tareq M Dreiza, Toko Maurice Mbungu, Arturo Javier Reynoso Madrigal, Djavanshir Gradjiev, Sonia S Santisteban, Gerardo R. Vidal Sic, Samon Som. 70 pg(s) (VEM) Modified on 8/11/2004 (vem). (Entered: 12/05/2002)
37 MEMORANDUM, OPINION, AND ORDER: ( Judge Richard H. Kyle / 1/14/03) granting Plaintiff's motion to certify class action [17−1] 13pg(s) (cc: all counsel) (GJS) (Entered: 01/17/2003)
38 NOTICE OF PRETRIAL CONFERENCE( Magistrate Judge Arthur J. Boylan / 1/28/03) ; pretrial status conference set for 10:00am on 3/4/03 ; Rule report ddl set for 2/24/03 1pg(s) (cc: all counsel) (GJS) (Entered: 01/30/2003)
39 REPORT OF RULE 26(f) MEETING 8pg(s) (GJS) (Entered: 02/26/2003)
40 MOTION by defendant John Ashcroft to extend time to file a response to the notice of pretrial conference (to Magistrate Judge Arthur J. Boylan 5pg(s) (GJS) (Entered: 02/26/2003)
41 ORDER ( Magistrate Judge Arthur J. Boylan ) that Defts shallhave until 2/26/03 to file a memorandum or other response to the notice of pretrial conference. [40−1] 1 pg(s) (cc: all counsel) (VEM) (Entered: 02/28/2003)

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03/03/2003 03/04/2003
08/04/2003 08/04/2003 08/05/2003 08/25/2003 08/25/2003 09/03/2003 09/04/2003
09/10/2003
09/10/2003
09/10/2003
09/10/2003 09/11/2003 09/12/2003 09/12/2003 09/15/2003 09/15/2003 09/22/2003

42 REPORT OF RULE 26(f) MEETING 10pg(s) (GJS) (Entered: 03/05/2003)
43 PRETRIAL SCHEDULING ORDER (Magistrate Judge Arthur J. Boylan / 3/4/03) ; amd pleadings set for 9/1/03 ; discovery set for 10/1/03 ; non−dispositive motions set for 10/1/03 ; dispositive motions set for 12/1/03 ; ready for trial set for 3/1/04 2pg(s) (cc: all counsel) (GJS) (Entered: 03/06/2003)
44 LETTER RE: SVC OF DISPOSITIVE MOTION PAPERS by plaintiff for partial summary judgment. SVRLTE. ( to Judge Richard H. Kyle ) 2 pg(s) (VEM) (Entered: 08/07/2003)
57 MOTION by plaintiffs for partial summary judgment.( to Judge Richard H. Kyle ) 5 pg(s) (VEM) Modified on 10/29/2003 (Entered: 09/19/2003)
45 PETITION AND ORDER for admission pro hac vice (Clerk Richard D. Sletten) on behalf of defendant The Department of Homeland Security by Jennifer L Lightbody 1pg(s) (cc: all counsel) (BLW (Entered: 08/07/2003)
46 UNOPPOSED MOTION by defendants' for extension of time to file a response to pltfs' motion for partial summary judgment until 9/10/03 (to Judge Richard H. Kyle) no date/time noticed 3pg(s) (BLW (Entered: 08/26/2003)
47 ORDER (Magistrate Judge Arthur J. Boylan / 8/25/03) granting defts' unopposed motion for extension of time to file a response to pltfs' motion for partial summary judgment until 9/10/03 [46−1] pg(s) (cc: all counsel) (BLW (Entered: 09/02/2003)
48 JOINT MOTION of the parties to amend the pretrial scheduling order (to Magistrate Judge Arthur J. Boylan) 5pg(s) (BLW (Entered: 09/04/2003)
49 AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER (Magistrate Judge Arthur J. Boylan / 9/3/04) ; amd pleadings &parties by 9/15/03 ; discovery completed by 10/15/03 ; dispositive motions served, filed and heard by 1/1/04 ; ready for trial set on 4/1/04 2pg(s) (cc: counsel) (BLW (Entered: 09/09/2003)
50 CROSS MOTION by defendant to dismiss in part ) , or in the alternative for partial summary judgment and opposition to plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment ( to Judge Richard H. Kyle ). 4 pg(s) (HLL) Modified on 09/11/2003 (Entered: 09/11/2003)
51 MEMORANDUM by defendants in support of cross motion to dismiss in part ) [50−1], or in the alternative to motion for partial summary judgment and opposition to plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. [50−2] 45 pg(s) (HLL) (Entered: 09/11/2003)
52 EXHIBITS by defendant [50−1], [50−2] in support of defendants' motion to dismiss in part or, in the alternative, for partial summary judgment and opposition to plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. 64 pg(s) (HLL) (Entered: 09/11/2003)
53 MOTION by defendant for order to exceed page limitations( to Judge Richard H. Kyle ). 4 pg(s) (HLL) (Entered: 09/11/2003)
54 MOTION by defendants for leave to file correct exhibits ( to Judge Richard H. Kyle ). 4 pg(s) (HLL) (Entered: 09/15/2003)
58 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff in support of motion for partial summary judgment. [57−1] 31 pg(s) (VEM) (Entered: 09/19/2003)
59 EXHIBITS by plaintiff in connection with Petitioner's mtoion for summary judgment. [57−1] 60 pg(s) (VEM) (Entered: 09/19/2003)
55 NOTICE REGARDING SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES by defendants 4pg(s) (GJS) (Entered: 09/18/2003)
56 ORDER ( Judge Richard H. Kyle / 9/15/03) granting motion for order to exceed page limitations by Defendants. [53−1] 1pg(s) (cc: all counsel) (GJS) (Entered: 09/18/2003)
60 CORRECTED EXHIBITS by defendant in support of motion to dismiss [50−1]. 57pg(s) (GJS) (Entered: 09/29/2003)

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10/03/2003 10/03/2003
10/10/2003 10/20/2003 10/21/2003 10/23/2003 10/23/2003 10/24/2003 10/24/2003 10/29/2003 11/13/2003 11/19/2003 11/19/2003
11/19/2003
12/05/2003 12/05/2003

61 UNOPPOSED MOTION by plaintiffs to extend briefing schedule, Re: plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment and defendants' cross motion to dismiss or for summary judgment ( to Magistrate Judge Arthur J. Boylan). 3pg(s) (DFL) Modified on 10/07/2003 (Entered: 10/06/2003)
62 ORDER (Magistrate Judge Arthur J. Boylan / 10/3/03) granting pltfs' unopposed motion to extend briefing schedule, Re: plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment and defendants' cross motion to dismiss or for summary judgment and pltfs' shall have until 10/10/03, to file their response [61−1] 1pg(s) (cc: all counsel) (BLW (Entered: 10/06/2003)
63 RESPONSE/REPLY BRIEF by plaintiff to deft's opposition to pltf's motion for partial summary judgment [57−1] and deft's cross−motion for dismissal or summary judgment. [50−1] 16 pg(s) (HLL) (Entered: 10/14/2003)
64 REPLY by defendants to Plaintiff's response to Defendants Oppositon to Plaintiffs' motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Defendants Cross Motion for Dismissal in part or partial summary judgment [63−1]. 13pg(s) (GJS) (Entered: 10/22/2003)
65 REPLY by defendants to Plaintiffs' Response/Reply to motion for partial summary judgment and opposition to plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment [50−2], to motion to dismiss in part)[50−1]. 12 pg(s) (GJS) (Entered: 10/24/2003)
66 MEMORANDUM by plaintiffs in support of motion for partial summary judgment. [57−1] 31pg(s) (DFL) (Entered: 10/29/2003)
67 EXHIBITS by plaintiffs in support of motion for partial summary judgment. [57−1] (DFL) (Entered: 10/29/2003)
68 SECOND MOTION by plaintiffs for partial summary judgment on Claims IV, V, and VI of their Complaint. ( to Judge Richard H. Kyle ). 5 pg(s) (HLL) (Entered: 10/29/2003)
69 CORRECTED MEMORANDUM by plaintiff in support of second motion for partial summary judgment on Claims IV, V, and VI of their [68−1] 30 pg(s) (HLL) (Entered: 10/29/2003)
70 NOTICE OF MOTION HEARING. The Motions are re−scheduled to 12/10/03 at 8:00 a.m. before Judge Richard H. Kyle. Motions were previously scheduled for hearing on 12/9/03. 1 pg(s) (cc:all counsel) (HLL) Additional attachment(s) added on 10/22/2004 (akl). (Entered: 11/04/2003)
71 NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT OF CASES FOR TRIAL BEFORE JUDGE KYLE (Calendar Clerk for Judge Richard H. Kyle / 11/12/03) ; deemed ready for court trial 4/1/04 6pg(s) (cc: all counsel) (BLW Additional attachment(s) added on 10/22/2004 (akl). (Entered: 11/15/2003)
72 NOTICE OF VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL by plaintiff Kuevir Rafou Ekue−Hettah. 1pg(s) (GJS) (Entered: 11/24/2003)
73 NOTICE of hearing setting hearing for motion for partial summary judgment and opposition to plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment ( to Judge Richard H. Kyle ). [50−2] at <date not set>, setting hearing for motion for partial summary judgment on Claims IV, V, and VI of their Complaint. ( to Judge Richard H. Kyle ). [68−1] at <date not set> pg(s) (GJS) (Entered: 11/24/2003)
74 NOTICE of hearing setting hearing for motion for partial summary judgment on Claims IV, V, and VI of their Complaint. [68−1] and setting hearing for motion for partial summary judgment and opposition to plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment [50−2] at 8:00am on 1/12/04 1pg(s) (GJS) Additional attachment(s) added on 10/22/2004 (akl). (Entered: 11/24/2003)
75 MOTION by defendants John Ashcroft, James W Ziglar, and INS for partial summary judgment ( to Judge Richard H. Kyle ) 3pg(s) (GJS) Modified on 12/12/2003 (Entered: 12/09/2003)
76 RESPONSE by defendant John Ashcroft, defendant James W Ziglar, defendant INS to motion for partial summary judgment on Claims IV, V, and VI of their Complaint.[68−1] 25pg(s) (GJS) Modified on 12/12/2003 (Entered: 12/09/2003)

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12/05/2003 12/22/2003 12/22/2003 01/08/2004 01/20/2004
01/26/2004 01/26/2004 01/26/2004 01/26/2004 01/26/2004 01/27/2004
01/27/2004 01/30/2004 01/30/2004
02/12/2004

77 EXHIBITS by defendant John Ashcroft, defendant James W Ziglar, defendant INS IN SUPPORT OF Response [76−1],and motion for partial summary judgment. [75−1] 1pg(s) plus exhibits. (GJS) Modified on 12/12/2003 (Entered: 12/09/2003)
78 REPLY TO DEFENDANTS'S RESPONSE to plaintiff to motion for partial summary judgment on Claims IV, V, and VI of their Complaint. ([68−1], to Defendant's cross− motion for partial summary judgment [75−1]. 22pg(s) (GJS) (Entered: 12/26/2003)
79 EXHIBITS IN SUPPORT of Reply ReL Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [68−1], and cross−motion for partial summary judgment [75−1]. 38pg(s) (GJS) (Entered: 12/26/2003)
80 NOTICE by plaintiffs of setting hearing for motion for summary judgment to Judge Richard H. Kyle [68−1] at 9:00 am on 1/27/04. 2 pg(s) (VEM) (Entered: 01/11/2004)
81 ORDER ( Judge Richard H. Kyle / 1/20/04) Defendants shall submit a short reply/respons brief t Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants Response to Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and to Defendants' Cross−Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by 12:00pm, January 26, 2003. 2pg(s) (cc: all counsel) ( Additional attachment(s) added on 10/22/2004 (akl). (Entered: 01/21/2004)
82 REPLY by defendants to plaintiff's response to defendants' cross−motion for partial summary judgment [50−2], and for partial summary judgment. [75−1] 11 pg(s) (HLL) (Entered: 01/28/2004)
83 DEFENDANTS' STATUS REPORT CONCERNING PROCESSING OF ASYLUM ADJUSTMENT APPLICATIONS. 5 pg(s) (HLL) (Entered: 01/28/2004)
84 EXHIBITS by defendants in support of reply to plaintiffs' response to defendants' cross−motion for partial summary judgment. [82−1] 31 pg(s) (HLL) (Entered: 01/28/2004)
85 NOTICE OF ADDITIONAL EXHIBITS by plaintiffs in support of plaintiffs' second motion for partial summary judgment. [68−1] 11 pg(s) (HLL) (Entered: 01/28/2004)
86 AFFIDAVIT of Mark N. Yeager regarding motion for partial summary judgment on Claims IV, V, and VI of their Complaint. [68−1] 2 pg(s) (HLL) (Entered: 01/28/2004)
87 MINUTES:( Judge Richard H. Kyle / R. Riley) re: Motion for partial summary judgment [75−1], Motion to dismiss in part [50−1], and Motion for partial summary judgment and opposition to plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment are all taken under advisement. [50−2] 1 pg(s) (JMM) (Entered: 01/28/2004)
88 ADDITIONAL EXHIBITS by plaintiffs in support of plaintiffs' second motion for partial summary judgment. [68−1] 5 pg(s) (JMM) (Entered: 01/28/2004)
89 EXHIBITS by defendants in support of the Reply to Defendants Cross−Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 6pg(s) (GJS) (Entered: 02/02/2004)
90 ORDER ( Judge Richard H. Kyle / 1/30/04) Re: schedule for submissions materials for April, 2004; certain materials are to be exchanged and filed by 3/16/04; responsive briefs to motions in limine, written objections and replies to trial briefs by 3/23/04 and responses to written objections by 3/30/04. 1pg(s) (cc: all counsel) (DFL) Additional attachment(s) added on 10/22/2004 (akl). (Entered: 02/03/2004)
91 MEMORANDUM, OPINION, AND ORDER: ( Judge Richard H. Kyle / 2/12/04) granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment {57} denying motion for partial summary judgment [75−1] granting motion for partial summary judgment on Claims IV, V, and VI [68−1], denying motion to dismiss in part ) [50−1] denying motion for partial summary judgment and opposition to plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. [50−2]. this Order is STAYED until time for appealing therefrom has expired, and, if an appeal is taken, the stay is continued throughut the pendency of the appeal. 25 pg(s) (cc: all counsel) (GJS) Additional

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02/12/2004 02/19/2004 03/08/2004 03/09/2004
03/09/2004 04/09/2004 04/09/2004 04/09/2004 04/19/2004 04/21/2004 04/30/2004 05/25/2004 06/07/2004 06/25/2004 08/05/2004
08/09/2004

attachment(s) added on 10/22/2004 (akl). (Entered: 02/12/2004)
92 JUDGMENT entered. 1pg(s) (GJS) Additional attachment(s) added on 10/22/2004 (akl). (Entered: 02/12/2004)
93 NOTICE OF FINAL Settlement Conference set for 3/17/2004 at 02:00 PM before Magistrate Judge Arthur J Boylan. Signed by Judge Arthur J Boylan on 2/19/04. 1pg(s)(GJS) Modified on 4/5/2004 (Schneider, Gloria). (Entered: 02/19/2004)
94 NOTICE OF CANCELLATION − Settlement Conference set for 3/17/04 at 2:00pm is CANCELED.. Signed by Judge Arthur J Boylan on 3/8/04. 1pg(s)(GJS) (Entered: 03/09/2004)
95 ORDER that any and all claims not addressed in the Court's Order of February 12, 2004 are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Court expressly retains jurisdiction over the remedy set forth in its Order of February12, 2004. Signed by Judge Richard H Kyle on 03/09/2004. Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A.(kll) (Entered: 03/09/2004)
96 Letter to Judge Kyle from Mary Kenney − Counsel for Plaintiffs, requesting that the current trial date of 4/1/04 be postponed indefinitely. 1pg(s) (GJS) (Entered: 03/09/2004)
97 MOTION for Post−Judgment Relief re 91 Memorandum Opinion and Order, and 92 Judgment by John Ashcroft, Immigration and Naturalization Service, James W Ziglar. 6pg(s) (GJS) (Entered: 04/19/2004)
98 MEMORANDUM in Support re 97 MOTION Post−Judgment Relief re 91 Memorandum Opinion and Order, and 92 Judgment . 7pg(s) (GJS) (Entered: 04/19/2004)
99 NOTICE OF APPEAL to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals as to 91 Memorandum Opinion and Order 92 and Judgment, both dated 2/12/04, filed by John Ashcroft, Immigration and Naturalization Service, James W Ziglar. 3pg(s) (GJS) (Entered: 04/19/2004)
Transmission of Notice of Appeal and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals re 99 Notice of Appeal. Delivered/mailed two certified and one uncertified copy of each of the following to the Court of Appeals: St. Paul Office: Notice of Appeal, Order, Judgment and District Court's Docket Sheet. (GJS) (Entered: 04/19/2004)
100 Plaintiffs' MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 97 MOTION Post−Judgment Relief re 91 Order and 92 Order. 7pgs (CK) (Entered: 04/23/2004)
101 REPLY to Response to Motion re 97 MOTION Post−Judgment Relief re 91 filed by Defendants John Ashcroft, Immigration and Naturalization Service, James W Ziglar.6pg(s) (GJS) (Entered: 05/05/2004)
USCA Case Number 04−2170 for 99 Notice of Appeal filed by Immigration and Naturalization Service, John Ashcroft, James W Ziglar. (GJS) (Entered: 05/27/2004)
102 ORDER − denying post judgment relief (Doc. 97) is denied. Signed by Judge Richard H Kyle on 6/7/04. (ds) (Entered: 06/07/2004)
103 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary and Defendants Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment held on January 27, 2004 before Judge Richard H. Kyle. Court Reporter: Robert Riley. (SEPARATE) (GJS) (Entered: 06/29/2004)
104 NOTICE OF APPEAL TO 8TH CIRCUIT as to 102 Order denying Motion for Post−Judgment Relief entered on June 7, 2004 by John Ashcroft,Attorney General of the United States, Eduardo Aguirre Jr. Director of Immigration and Naturalization Service. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(GJS) (Entered: 08/09/2004)
Transmission of Notice of Appeal and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals re 99 Notice of Appeal to 8th Circuit. Delivered/mailed two certified and one uncertified copy of each of the following to the Court of Appeals: St. Paul Office: Notice of

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08/17/2004 02/15/2005
05/06/2005 05/06/2005 05/06/2005 05/10/2005 05/20/2005 05/23/2005 05/26/2005 05/26/2005 05/26/2005 05/26/2005 05/27/2005 05/27/2005 06/03/2005 06/03/2005
06/06/2005 06/07/2005 06/07/2005

Appeal, Order, Judgment and District Court's Docket Sheet. (GJS) (Entered: 08/09/2004)
USCA Case Number 04−2946 for 99 Notice of Appeal to 8th Circuit filed by Immigration and Naturalization Service, John Ashcroft, James W Ziglar. (GJS) (Entered: 08/25/2004)
105 ORDER of USCA; the parties' joint motion for limited remand and to hold the appeal in abeyance is granted, and the case is remanded to the district court for the purpose of holding a fairness hearing to determine whether to approve the stipulated settlement agreement. The parties shall notify the clerk when the district court enters its order after the hearing.(SEA) Modified on 2/22/2005 (MKC). (Entered: 02/15/2005)
106 MOTION Preliminary Court Approval of Settlement Agreement by all Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service).(LJD) (Entered: 05/06/2005)
107 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT by all Parties. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2).(LJD) (Entered: 05/06/2005)
108 Asylee Adjustment (NGWANYIA) Class Action NOTICE re Propsed 107 Settlement Agreement. (LJD) (Entered: 05/06/2005)
109 ORDER preliminarily approved 106 Motion Preliminary Court Approval of Settlement Agreement. Signed by Judge Richard H Kyle on 5/10/05. (LJD) (Entered: 05/10/2005)
110 Parties' Joint NOTICE of Real ID Act by all parties. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(LJD) (Entered: 05/20/2005)
111 OBJECTION re 107 Settlement Agreement filed by Zhiyi Ohzeng. (LJD) (Entered: 05/23/2005)
112 OBJECTION re 107 Settlement Agreement filed by Ashok Vaghjimal. (LJD) (Entered: 05/26/2005)
113 OBJECTION re 107 Settlement Agreement filed by Erchi Zhang. (LJD) (Entered: 05/26/2005)
114 OBJECTION re 107 Settlement Agreement filed by Ming Hui Li. (LJD) (Entered: 05/26/2005)
115 OBJECTION re 107 Settlement Agreement filed by Qing Xia Meng. (LJD) (Entered: 05/26/2005)
116 LETTER from Essam Abdalla re: Settlement. (MKC) (Entered: 05/27/2005)
117 OBJECTION re 107 Settlement Agreement filed by Tudor Bleotu. (MKC) (Entered: 05/27/2005)
118 OBJECTION re 107 Settlement Agreement by Manohar Lal Bamrel. (JMH) (Entered: 06/03/2005)
119 NOTICE by Nadine K Wettstein re 111 Objection, 112 Objection, 113 Objection, 114 Objection, 115 Objection, 116 Letter, 117 Objection (Attachments: # 1 Response to Cheng objection− document #111# 2 Response to Vaghjimal objection− document #112# 3 Response to Zhang objection− document #113# 4 Response to Li objection− document #114# 5 Response to Meng objection− document #115# 6 Response to Abdalla objection− document #116# 7 Response to Bleotu objection− document #117)(Wettstein, Nadine) (Entered: 06/03/2005)
123 OBJECTION from Hisham Izzadin Ibrahim re: Objection to the proposed settlement plan. (JMH) (Entered: 06/08/2005)
120 OBJECTION re 107 Settlement Agreement filed by Musadag Sinada. (JLB) (Entered: 06/07/2005)
121 OBJECTION re 107 Settlement Agreement filed by Xin Xian Ni, Jian Zhou and Wen Zhi Ni. (akl) (Entered: 06/07/2005)

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06/08/2005 06/10/2005 06/10/2005 06/10/2005 06/14/2005 06/15/2005 06/24/2005 07/12/2005
07/12/2005 08/15/2005
09/20/2005 06/11/2008 06/11/2008 06/11/2008 07/25/2008 09/02/2008

122 OBJECTION from Mohammed Saud re: Objection to Case Ngwanyla v. Gonzales. (JMH) (Entered: 06/08/2005)
124 NOTICE by Nadine K Wettstein of Filing Responses to Letters (Attachments: # 1 Response to Bamrel Letter #118# 2 Response to Sinada Letter #120# 3 Response to Ni Letter #121# 4 Response to Saud Letter #122# 5 Response to Ibrahim Letter #123)(Wettstein, Nadine) (Entered: 06/10/2005)
125 OBJECTION re 107 Settlement Agreement filed by Jose J Lombo. (LJD) (Entered: 06/13/2005)
126 LETTER in response to a letter sent from Attorney Wettstein from Essam Abdalla. (LJD) (Entered: 06/13/2005)
127 NOTICE by Nadine K Wettstein re 125 Objection of Filing Response to Letters (Attachments: # 1 Response to Lombo Letter, document #125)(Wettstein, Nadine) (Entered: 06/14/2005)
128 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Richard H Kyle : held on 6/15/2005 re 106 MOTION Preliminary Court Approval of Settlement Agreement − court approves settlement, counsel to submit proposed order within two weeks. (Court Reporter Robert Riley) (ds) (Entered: 06/16/2005)
129 Joint MOTION to Dismiss Joint Motion for Court Approval of Settlement Agreement and to Dismiss by Plaintiffs and Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Langdon, James) Modified filers on 6/27/2005 (LJD). (Entered: 06/24/2005)
130 ORDER GRANTING 129 Motion to Dismiss, APPROVING Settlement Agreement dated January 31, 2005, OVERRULING Objections to Settlement Agreement, DISMISSING WITH PREJUDICE case pursuant to paragraph 15(a) of Settlement Agreement (with exceptions), VACATING Court's February 12, 2004 Memorandum Opinion and Order. (Written Opinion). Signed by Judge Richard H. Kyle on 07/12/05. (rhks) (Entered: 07/12/2005)
131 JUDGMENT. (Attachments: # 1 Civil−8th Circuit Pre−Hearing Conference Notice # 2 Civil Notice − appeal)(LJD) (Entered: 07/12/2005)
132 USCA JUDGMENT as to 99 Notice of Appeal to 8th Circuit filed by Immigration and Naturalization Service,, John Ashcroft,, James W Ziglar,, 104 Notice of Appeal to 8th Circuit, filed by Immigration and Naturalization Service,, John Ashcroft. Appellants motion to dismiss these appeals is granted. The appeals are hereby dismissed in accordance with the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 42(b). (RJL) (Entered: 08/15/2005)
133 Appeal Record Returned: 104 Notice of Appeal to 8th Circuit. Returned one volume of transcript. (RJL) (Entered: 09/22/2005)
134 MOTION for Admission Pro Hac Vice for Nancy E. Friedman by John Ashcroft, James W Ziglar, Immigration and Naturalization Service. (MMC) (Entered: 06/11/2008)
TEXT ONLY ENTRY − ORDER granting 134 Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice of Attorney Nancy E Friedman for John Ashcroft, James W Ziglar and Immigration and Naturalization Service. Fee waived for U.S. government attorney. Approved by Clerk Richard D Sletten on 6/11/08. (MMC) (Entered: 06/11/2008)
135 NOTICE by John Ashcroft DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE WITH SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (Friedman, Nancy) (Entered: 06/11/2008)
136 LETTER TO DISTRICT JUDGE regarding the delay in his immigration processing by Sayed Birgees Qadir. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s))(VEM) QC'd jam (Entered: 07/25/2008)
137 LETTER TO CLERK'S OFFICE from Sayed Birjees Qadir. (Attachments: # 1 Envelope)(RLR) (Entered: 09/02/2008)