02 5 p>! ':: 03

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

CHARLES E. AUSTIN, et aL, Plaintiffs,
v. REGINALD A. WILKINSON, et aL,
Defendants.

CASENO.4:01CV071 JUDGE GWIN

STIPULATION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF A. NATURE OF THIS STIPULATION
1. This Stipulation For Injunctive Relief (hereinafter "Stipulation") resolves all issues, except for the classification/due process issues, between the Plaintiff Class and the Defendants arising out of the claims for declaratory and mjunctive relief set forth in the First Amended Complaint filed with this Court on April 9,2001.
2. The terms of this Stipulation shall be applicable to and binding upon the Plaintiff Class and the Defendants in their official capacities and their officers, agents, employees, assigns and successors.
3. Upon signing of this Stipulation, the parties shall seek approval of this Stipulation from the Court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
Austin v. Wilkinson

PC-OH-001-001

4. Upon approval of this Stipulation, this Court shall retain jurisdiction of this action to enforce the terms of this Stipulation.
5. This Stipulation may not be used as evidence of liability in any legal proceedings.
B. NATURE OF THIS ACTION
6 This is a class action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
7. The Plaintiff Class challenges the constitutional adequacy of certain conditions of confinement and practices at the Ohio State Penitentiary ("OSP") located in Youngstown, Ohio.
8. This Court has jurisdiction over this class action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3).
C. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
9. On January 9, 2001, the proposed Plaintiff Class filed its Complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief in this action challenging the constitutional adequacy of certain conditions and practices at OSP.
10. On April 9,2001, the proposed Plaintiff Class filed its First Amended Complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.
11. On October 5, 2001, this Court certified this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, the Court defined the class as:
All persons who were confined at the Ohio State Penitentiary as of January 9, 2001, or who have come to be confined there since that date, or who may be confined there during the pendency of this litigation, membership in the class once thus established to continue during the pendency of the litigation.

D. PARTIES 12. The representative inmate plaintiffs named in the First Amended Complaint are: Charles E. Austin, Robert A. Baksi, Michael Benge, Alonzo L. Bonner, August Cassano, David Clark, James DeJarnette, Roy D. Donald, David Easley, Brian K. Eskridge, Keith Gardner, Roger L. Hall, Frederick Harris, Daryl Heard, Edward O. Hodge, Orsino Iacovone, Kunta Kenyatta, (aka Jerome Lennon), Stacy Lane, James D. Mitchell, Emanuel Newell, John W. Perotti, Lamar Preston, Jason H. Robb, Kevin Roe, Richard Siggers, Eric Swofford, Lahray Thompson, and Edward A. Tilley. 13. The Defendants named in the First Amended Complaint are: Patrick Biggs, Stephen Huffman, Todd Ishee, Cheryl Jorgenson-Martinez, Manish Joshi, Bruce Martin, Matthew Meyer, Audrey Nietzel (Sandor), Debra Nixon-Hughes, Bernie Ryzner, and Reginald Wilkinson.
E. REMEDIES 14. The Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections ("DRC") has undertaken a number of projects at OSP to continue improving that facility's conditions of confinement and practices. The Defendants acknowledge, however, that certain deficiencies exist in the areas noted below and agree to correct those deficiencies.
a. Medical Care 15. The Defendants agree to correct the various medical problems identified in Exhibit A, page 16, of Dr. Joe Goldenson's report, dated October 5, 2001, and in Exhibit B, pages 47 - 50, of Dr. Robert Cohen's report, dated December 3, 2001, with the Defendant's specific exceptions to such reports noted in Exhibit C attached with Exhibits A and B and fully incorporated in this Stipulation.

16. As described below, Joe Goldenson, M.D., and Robert Cohen, M.D., are designated as the Monitors to aid the parties in the implementation of the medical care provisions of this Stipulation.
b. Mental Health Care 17. DRC has a policy excluding inmates with serious mental illness from placement in "high maximum" security and calling for the expeditious removal of any inmate with serious mental illness inadvertently placed at OSP or of any inmate who has developed serious mental illness while at OSP. ODRC Policy 111-07 § C (August 31, 1998). In August, 2001, DRC expanded the exclusionary criteria. Standard Operating Procedure - SOP 2 (August 8, 2001). DRC agrees that any inmate who meets the exclusionary criteria set forth in those two documents should not be transferred to OSP, and that any inmate currently housed at OSP who, after evaluation, is deemed to meet the exclusionary criteria should be transferred to another institution. 18. DRC agrees to undertake a study to develop, in consultation with the Monitor, a policy addressing the issue of returning to SOP those inmates transferred from OSP for mental health reasons. In the interim, DRC agrees not to return those inmates to OSP. 19. The parties will select a Monitor to aid the parties in the implementation of the mental health care provisions of this Stipulation. 20. The Defendants agree to make arrangements for the Monitor to perform evaluations of the following categories of inmates currently at OSP: (a) inmates on the current mental health caseload at OSP; (b) inmates who were on DRC's mental health caseload within the last two years prior to their transfer to OSP; (c) any inmate currently prescribed psychotropic medications; (d) inmates who have been hospitalized in a psychiatric institution at any time in

their lives; (e) inmates who have spent more than one year on level 2 (or in the future, level 5B) at OSP and remain on that level; (f) inmates who have been on suicide watch at OSP or at any other DRC institution (including juvenile placements at Department of Youth Services (DYS)) during the past five years.
21. If the Monitor determines that any of those inmates described above meet the exclusionary criteria set forth in Policy 111-07 § C and Standard Operating Procedure - SOP 2, the Monitor shall decide what the appropriate placement for each of those inmates should be and shall also undertake a study to determine whether additional placement options may be desirable.
22. The Monitor shall conduct evaluations at least once every six months during the life of this Stipulation of those inmates within categories a-f, and shall determine whether any such inmates have developed a serious mental illness while confined at OSP, with the additional authority to randomly review any inmate's case at any time.
23. The Monitor shall evaluate the efficacy of OSP's various procedures (e.g. screening, evaluation, rounds, "kites" and staff referrals) designed to identify inmates who may meet the mental illness exclusionary criteria and shall make specific binding recommendations concerning any changes needed to enhance the efficacy of the process.
c. Outdoor Exercise Spaces 24. The Defendants agree to construct ground-level outdoor exercise spaces at OSP, as specified in paragraph 25 25. On July 9, 2001, DRC Director Reginald Wilkinson approved the State Architect's preliminary design for the construction of eight separate ground-level outdoor exercise spaces. The estimated cost of this project is Four Million Dollars. Funds have been released to DRC for the design phase of the project. A capital budget request for the

construction phase of the project has been submitted. The retained architectural firm has commenced the design phase of the project. The estimated timelines are: actual construction of the outdoor exercise spaces will begin December, 2002, and construction should be completed by August, 2003.
d. Security Restraints 26. Recently, OSP discontinued the utilization of the "black box" and belly chains as required security restraints during all inmate visitation sessions. The Defendants agree to continue that practice except where an inmate has demonstrated a history justifying the utilization of such restraints.
F. MONITORING FOR MEDICAL AND MENTAL HEALTH CARE
27. As mentioned above, Joe Goldenson, M.D., and Robert Cohen, M.D., are designated as the Monitors to aid the parties in the implementation of the medical care provisions of this Stipulation. All of their mutually agreed upon decisions relating to the implementation of those provisions are binding upon the parties. Their duties include determining whether the Defendants have achieved substantial compliance with the terms of the medical provisions of this Stipulation. In the event that either Dr. Joe Goldenson or Dr. Robert Cohen is unable or unwilling to serve, the parties agree to designate another Monitor.
28. As mentioned above, the parties will designate a Monitor to aid the parties in the implementation of the mental health care provisions of this Stipulation.
29. All of the Monitors' decisions relating to the implementation of the medical care and mental health care provisions of this Stipulation are binding upon the parties. The Monitors' duties include determining whether the Defendants have achieved substantial compliance with

the terms of the mental health provisions of this Stipulation. In the event that any Monitor is unable or unwilling to serve, the parties agree to designate another Monitor.
30. The Monitors may retain such appropriate staff, with the approval of the Defendants, as is necessary to conduct the requisite monitoring. The Defendants agree to pay for all reasonable costs associated with said monitoring. The Monitors will submit the curriculum vitae of any proposed staff to counsel for both parties and will seek their advice and consultation prior to retention of the experts.
31. The role of the Monitors includes review of records, the gathering of appropriate data and statistics and on-site inspections. A review of the aforementioned documents by the Monitors or their staff shall not constitute a waiver of any claim that the documents are subject to nondisclosure in this or any other proceeding. In addition, the Monitors and their staff agree to keep said documentation confidential and not to disclose, publish, or disseminate any of the records reviewed by the Monitors or their staff. However, all non-privileged institutional records, reports and material relevant to implementation of this Stipulation reviewed by the Monitors also shall be available for review by counsel for the Plaintiff Class. Review by counsel for the Plaintiff Class shall not constitute a waiver of any claim that the records are subject to nondisclosure.
G. INMATE COMPLAINTS REGARDING MEDICAL CARE 32. Except for instances where emergency medical care is required, all inmate medical complaints will continue to be processed through the existing grievance procedure in a timely manner. If the OSP staff fails to respond within twenty-five days from the date of the filing of an inmate's Informal Complaint Resolution ("ICR"), the inmate, in addition to

appealing to the Chief Inspector, may bring his medical care concern to the attention of counsel for the Plaintiff Class.
H. DISPUTE RESOLUTION 33. As mentioned above, all disputes concerning the implementation of the medical care and mental health care provisions of this Stipulation shall be submitted to the designated Monitors in those areas for final and binding decisions. If an agreement cannot be reached in the other areas (outdoor exercise spaces and security measures) covered in this Stipulation, either party may have recourse to this Court.
I. COMPLIANCE 34. Defendants shall be deemed to be in compliance with the terms of this Stipulation when they have substantially complied with those terms. As mentioned above, the designated Monitors in their designated areas of expertise will determine whether the Defendants have achieved substantial compliance with the terms of the medical care provisions and mental health provisions of this Stipulation. Their respective decisions are final and binding.
J. EMERGENCIES 35. It may be necessary to suspend temporarily any provision of this Stipulation in the event of an emergency. An emergency is an event which makes compliance with the terms of this Stipulation impracticable, impossible, or extraordinarily difficult, and is caused by unforeseeable events, beyond the control of the Defendants.

K. MODIFICATION 36. The parties recognize that some conditions or practices or the uses of particular buildings may change and thus affect the implementation of this Stipulation. Therefore, it may be appropriate to modify this Stipulation from time-to-time as the situation warrants. 37. Any such proposed modification shall become effective upon such terms as are agreed to by the parties. 38. If either party objects to a proposed modification regarding the medical care or mental health care provisions of this Stipulation, both parties shall confer promptly and attempt to reach an agreement. If an agreement cannot be reached, the proposed modification will be submitted to the designated Monitors in their designated areas for final and binding decisions. If an agreement cannot be reached in the other areas (outdoor exercise spaces and security measures) covered in this Stipulation, either party may have recourse to this Court.
L. EFFECTIVE DATES OF AGREEMENT 39. This Stipulation shall become effective upon approval of this Stipulation by this Court. 40. This Stipulation shall terminate within two years after this Stipulation becomes effective unless terminated sooner when the Defendants have achieved substantial compliance with the terms of this Stipulation.
M. ATTORNEY FEES 41. The Defendants agree to pay the costs and attorney fees of the undersigned counsel for the Plaintiff Class in the amount of $150,000. Except for the contingency noted

below, this payment includes any claim that the Plaintiff Class could make for all work done and costs expended in the litigation of this matter, through and including the effective date of this Stipulation. Should the Plaintiff Class prevail at trial with the classification issue. Defendants agree to pay counsel an additional amount commensurate with the time actually expended on that

issue. 42.

The Monitoring phase of this Stipulation is two years. The Defendants agree to

pay counsel for the Plaintiff Class $10,000 per year for lawyer monitoring. Should counsel have

to file motions to compel with the Court, they will be paid an additional amount commensurate

with the time actually expended.

IT IS SO STIPULATED AND AGREED

DATED: *"

RAYMOND VASVARJK0055538) Legal Director American Civil Liberties Union
of Ohio Foundation, Inc. 4506 Chester Avenue Cleveland, OH 44103 (216)472-2217 FAX: (216)472-2210

DATED:

O-
JILL GOODMAN Legal Director Center for Constitutional Rights 666 Broadway. 7th Floor Now York. NY 10012 (212)614-6427 FAX: (212)614-6499 hgoodma@ccr-nv.orp
Counsel for Plaintiff Class

10

DATED-

JOSfiPH MANCINI (0022419) Assistant Attorney General BETTY D. MONTGOMERY Attorney General Corrections Litigation Section 140 East Town Street, 14th Floor Columbus, OH 43215 (614) 644-7233 FAX: (614) 728-9327
JMincinliaag.satc.oh.us
Counsel for Defendants

THE COURT SO FINDS AND IT IS SO ORDERED

DATED:

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7

JUD0E JAMES S. GWIN United States District Court Judge

ti

that this is still in its beginning stages and needs more time to develop. Six months of minutes were provided to indicate meetings are being held to address health system areas needing improvement. This is a joint meeting with custody administration, in addition to these activities, a regular review of the quality of the physician's care and documentation, as well as an ongoing review of the quality of nursing assessments and care should be done.
SUMMARY
The major issues and concerns we identified during our review were: 1. The medical records were poorly organized. 2. The quality of the nursing documentation was not adequate. 3. The quality of nursing assessments was not adequate. 4. The physician is not consistently seeing patients in a timely manner. 5. There were problems related to the chronic care program. 6. All nursing vacancies, whether short or long-term, need to be filled. 7. Screening for hepatitis C is not occurring. 8. Follow-up of specialty and telemedicine clinics is not adequate. 9. Periodic health exams are not consistently being done. 10. There were problems related to confidentiality. 11. The quality of the dentist's documentation was not adequate. 12. Custody staff is not certified in CPR and is not required to be first responders.
We were assured during our site visit that areas we have identified as problems or deficiencies would be addressed. We are planning to return to the facility prior to trial for another inspection. If time permits we will produce a supplemental report and if not, will be prepared to report at trial.
Respectfully submitted on October 5, 2001

Joe Goldenson, MD

EXHIBIT A

1/

Jackie Clark, RN

Robert L. Cohen, MD December 3, 2001 Page 47

Report on Medical Services at Ohio State Penitentiary A High Maximum Security Prison

RECOMMENDATIONS:
Following are a set of recommendations which will provide an outline for improving the health care program at Ohio State Penitentiary. It is clear that there is no adequate on-site leadership to implement the following program. Changing the health care program at OSP will require substantial outside consultation and dedicated Central Office leadership.
1. Provide new clinical and administrative leadership for the medical program
2. Weekly physician rounds for all prisoners in the facility
3. Daily nursing rounds for all prisoners in the facility
4. Eliminate charges for any health care services at OSP
5. Forbid physical examination through food slots. Physical examination must take place in medically appropriate areas with adequate light, instruments, and preservation of aural and visual privacy and confidentiality. Do not perform physical examination when prisoners are rear cuffed to a wall.
6. Provide shoes to prisoners that are supportive and protective. • •-
7. Do not use chemical restraint agents (mace, pepper spray) on prisoners with known contraindications to these substances (e.g. respiratory compromise, asthma, etc.)

EXHIBIT

Robert L. Cohen, MD December 3, 2001 Page 48

Report on Medical Services at Ohio State Penitentiary A High Maximum Security Prison
•

8. If the ventilation system distributes these chemical restraint agents to other cells, do not use chemical restraint agents in these settings.

9. Revise clinical protocols for:

a. HIV infection

b. Diabetes

c. Hepatitis C

d. Hyperlipidemias (elevated cholesterol)

10. Revise formulary to provide appropriate analgesic agents, including narcotics when indicated, for management of painful conditions. Second line agents such as neurontin and amytriptilline are supplementary to the use of effective analgesic medication.

11. Develop and assure the utilization of humane, safe modes for transport of prisoners from OPC to other facilities. If this is too difficult, bring specialists to OSP instead.

12. Review and modify current x-ray capabilities to assure that they are adequate.

13. Provide quality continuing education to the medical and nursing staff in the following areas

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Robert L. Cohen, MD December 3, 2001 Page 49

Report on Medical Services at Ohio State Penitentiary A High Maximum Security Prison
•

a. AIDS b. Hepatitis C c. Tuberculosis: Control and Treatment

d. Palliative Care

e. Pain management

f. Treatment of insomnia

g. Recognition and treatment of medication side effects, particularly those secondary to HIV and Hepatitis treatments

h. Hypertension

i. Hyperlipidemia

j . Epilepsy

k. Management of Medical Emergencies in Prison

1. Quality Improvement

14. Establish and maintain an Emergency Kit which contains medications necessary for treatment of

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Robert L. Cohen, MD December 3,2001 Page 50

Report on Medical Services at Ohio State Penitentiary A High Maximum Security Prison
.

a. Acute Myocardial Infarction (nitroglycerin, parenteral morphine sulfate) b. Status Asthmaticus (epinephrine, albuterol, parenteral steroids) c. Status Epilepticus (parenteral diazepam) 15. Establish a quality assurance/continuous quality improvement program for the medical care program at OSP based upon: a. Sentinel events b. Adverse outcomes c. Infection control d. Medical Grievances e. Regular data collection and analysis regarding chronic disease process and
outcome

f. Existing models of quality improvement in prison health systems
16. Assure that prisoners whose health cannot be assured at OSP because of the restrictions on access to care are not housed at the facility. All patients health status should be reviewed with respect to this critical issue.

Robert L. Cohen, MD December 3, 2001 Page 47

Report on Medical Services at Ohio State Penitentiary A High Maximum Security Prison

RECOMMENDATIONS:
Following are a set of recommendations which will provide an outline for improving the health care program at Ohio State Penitentiary. It is clear that there is no adequate on-site leadership to implement the following program. Changing the health care program at OSP will require substantial outside consultation and dedicated Central Office leadership.
1. Provide new clinical and administrative leadership for the medical program
2. Weekly physician rounds for all prisoners in the facility
3. Daily nursing rounds for all prisoners in the facility
4. Eliminate charges for any health care services at OSP
5. Forbid physical examination through food slots. Physical examination must take place in medically appropriate areas with adequate light, instruments, and preservation of aural and visual privacy and confidentiality. Do not perform physical examination when prisoners are rear cuffed to a wall.
6. Provide shoes to prisoners that are supportive and protective. • ••
7. Do not use chemical restraint agents (mace, pepper spray) on prisoners with known contraindications to these substances (e.g. respiratory compromise, asthma, etc.)

EXHIBIT B

Robert L. Cohen, MD December 3, 2001 Page 48

Report on Medical Services at Ohio State Penitentiary A High Maximum Security Prison

8. If the ventilation system distributes these chemical restraint agents to other cells, do not use chemical restraint agents in these settings.
9. Revise clinical protocols for:
a. HIV infection
b. Diabetes
c Hepatitis C
d. Hyperlipidemias (elevated cholesterol)
10. Revise formulary to provide appropriate analgesic agents, including narcotics when indicated, for management of painful conditions. Second line agents such as neurontin and amytriptilline are supplementary to the use of effective analgesic medication.

11. Develop and assure the utilization of humane, safe modes for transport of prisoners from OPC to other facilities. If this is too difficult, bring specialists to OSP instead.
12. Review and modify current x-ray capabilities to assure that they are adequate.
13. Provide quality continuing education to the medical and nursing staff in the following areas

~nn 1—r

Robert L. Cohen, MD December 3, 2001 Page 49

Report on Medical Services at Ohio State Penitentiary A High Maximum Security Prison

a. AIDS b. Hepatitis C c. Tuberculosis: Control and Treatment

d. Palliative Care

e. Pain management

f. Treatment of insomnia

g. Recognition and treatment of medication side effects, particularly those secondary to HIV and Hepatitis treatments

h. Hypertension

i. Hyperlipidemia

j . Epilepsy

k. Management of Medical Emergencies in Prison

I. Quality Improvement
14. Establish and maintain an Emergency Kit which contains medications necessary for treatment of

"nn

Robert L. Cohen, MD December 3, 2001 Page 50

Report on Medical Services at Ohio State Penitentiary A High Maximum Security Prison
.

a. Acute Myocardial Infarction (nitroglycerin, parenteral morphine sulfate) b. Status Asthmaticus (epinephrine, albuterol, parenteral steroids) c. Status Epilepticus (parenteral diazepam)

15. Establish a quality assurance/continuous quality improvement program for the medical care program at OSP based upon:
a. Sentinel events

b. Adverse outcomes

• •

c. Infection control d. Medical Grievances

e. Regular data collection and analysis regarding chronic disease process and outcome

f. Existing models of quality improvement in prison health systems

16. Assure that prisoners whose health cannot be assured at OSP because of the restrictions on access to care are not housed at the facility. All patients health status should be reviewed with respect to this critical issue.

Defendants* Specific Exccptiou To The Various Medical Problems Identified In The Medical Report! of Dr. Joe Goldetuon and Dr. Robert Cohen
The Defendants agree to do the following: Custody staffvolunteers trained in CPR will promptly respond to acute and
emergent medical problems. Goldonson's Report (14) For a ibc-roonth period, the OSP doctor will make weekly rounds per block, thus
visiting allfourblocks each month. Shortly thereafter, OSP, after consultation withDrs. Goldcnson and Cohen, will decide whether the weekly doctor rounds will be continued. Cohen*! Report (2)
The co-paymentformedical services requirctnent will not be modified. Cohen's Report (4)
Inmates will be allowed to purchasefromthe commissary another brand of shoe that b also supportive and protective. Cohen's Report (6)
Once tho inmate is placed in a holding cell at the Central Medical Center (CMC) the black box used as a security measure during transport will be removed. Cohen's Report (11)
EXHIBIT C

 
 Austin v. Wilkinson
PC-OH-001-003
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

CHARLES E. AUSTIN, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. REGINALD WILKINSON, et al.,
Defendants.

CASENO.4:01-CV-71 ) Judge James S. Gwin ) ORDER

On April 24, 2002, Hie defendants filed their proposed Policy 111-07 in accordance with the Court's March 26, 2002, order [Doc. 272]. Having reviewed the defendants' proposed policy, the plaintiffs' response to the policy, and the defendants' reply, the Court adopts the defendants' April 24, 2002, proposed policy with the following changes:
1. The adopted policy will reflect the three phrasing changes described in the "Corrections" section ofthe defendants reply memorandum filed on May 13,2002 [Doc. 281]. 2. Both section VI(C)(III)(C)(8) [page 7 ofthe adopted policy] and section VI(J)(III)(H)

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CaseNo.4:01-CV-71 Gwin, J.
[page 14 ofthe adopted policy] should be changed from "within five (5) working days" to "within ten (10) working days." There are no other changes to these sections. 3. The newly adopted Policy 111 -07 should include the sentence: "No person who serves on a prisoner's classification committee should decide, or take part in deciding, the prisoner's appeal to the Warden or the Bureau of Classification." The Court leaves the placement of this language to the discretion of the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (the "Department"). In addition, the Court orders that all forms used by the defendants in conjunction with the newly adopted Policy 111-07 should conform to the language of the adopted policy. The Court will not delay the implementationofthe newly adopted Policy 111 -07 while the plaintiffs review the Department's forms. However, the defendants have until May 22,2002, to provide the plaintiffs' counsel copies of all the forms they will use under the newly adopted Policy 111-07. The plaintiffs have until May 30, 2002, to file any objections to the forms. Next, the Court clarifies its order with respect to the language in section VI(I)(nT) [page 12 ofthe adopted policy]. A prisoner's prior conduct that results in the death or extreme bodily harm to another may only be considered for retaining a prisoner in Level 5 classification if that conduct was used as one of the justifications for the prisoner's initialplacement to Level 5. In such a case, the prisoner's prior conduct that resulted in the death or extreme bodily harm of another may be considered but the conduct must be considered in conjunction with his conduct while at the OSP.
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Case No. 4:01-CV-71 Gwin, J.
Finally, the Court notes that under its March 26, 2002, order, all prisoners currently classified at
Level 5 should receive an additional classification review under the newly adopted Policy 111 -07. Those
reviews must be completed within eight weeks of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: May 15, 2002

s/James S. Gwin James S. Gwin United States District Judge

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 Austin v. Wilkinson
• m «• • • • • • m
PC-OH-001-004
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

CHARLES E. AUSTIN, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
REGINALD A. WILKINSON, et al., Defendants.

) CASENO.4:01-CV-71 )
) Judge James S. Gwin
) ORDER

This case comes before the Court upon the application of the parties that this Court approve a certain stipulation for injunctive relief ("Settlement Agreement") [Doc 181]. On October 5, 2001, this Court ordered that this action be maintained as a class action on behalf of:
All persons who were confined at the Ohio State Penitentiary as of January 9,2001, or who have come to be confined there since that date, or who maybe confined there during the pendency of this litigation, membership in the class once thus established to continue during the pendency of the litigation.
On February 19,2002, the parties jointly moved this Court to approve the proposed Settlement Agreement [Doc. 220]. The proposed Settlement Agreement would settle some of the claims the class
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Case No. 4:01 -CV-71 Gwin, J. plaintifls asserted. The Court ordered the class members be given notice of the hearing concerning acceptance of the Settlement Agreement and be given an opportunity to object.
The Court finds that the plaintiffs have adequately given notice to class members ofthe proposed Settlement Agreement. Furthermore, the Court finds that class members have been given an opportunity to object to the Settlement Agreement and some, in fact, have filed objections with the Court.
On April 5,2002, the Court held a hearing to determine whether the terms of the proposed partial settlement were fair, reasonable, and adequate. The Court now decides whether to approve the written Settlement Agreement partially settling the plaintiffs' claims entered into by and among the parties on January 8,2002, and enter judgment in accordance with its terms.
The Court has considered the effect onthe approval ofthis partial settlement on the class members. The Court has considered the pleadings and memorandums previously filed in this class action and heard argument ofcounsel. In addition, the Court has taken testimony from certain class members objecting to the settlement. In addition, the Court has reviewed each of the written objections to the Settlement Agreement filed with this Court.
Having reviewed each of these, the Court finds as follows: In this case, the plaintiffs are inmates at the Ohio State Penitentiary ("OSP"), the State of Ohio's first "supermax" prison. On January 9, 2001, the plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. In their amended complaint, they allege that conditions and practices at the OSP constitute cruel and unusual punishment. In major part, the plaintiffs complain that the housing of mentally ill patients at the OSP, the provision of mental health treatment at the OSP, the provision of medical treatment at the OSP, the provision of recreation at the OSP, and the use of security restraints at the OSP violate the
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Case No. 4:01-CV-71 Gwin, J. plaintiffs's right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The amended complaint also claimed that defendants' method and practice in classifying inmates for placement and retention at the OSP violates the inmates right to due process.
With their Settlement Agreement, the parties reach agreement on all claims save the plaintiffs' claims relating to the classification of inmates for placement or retention at OSP. With its orders filed on February 25, 2002 [Doc. 227], and March 26, 2002 [Doc. 259], the Court decided all issues related to the classification of inmates for placement or retention at the OSP. The Settlement Agreement proposes resolution of all other issues.
In the Settlement Agreement, the parties deal with the issues of housing and the treatment of inmates. Regarding the provision of medical treatment, the parties agree that the OSP will change certain practices identified by Drs. Goldenson and Cohen, the medical practice experts used in this litigatioa The parties agree to abide by the future decisions ofDrs. Goldenson and Cohen, who are to serve as Monitors to insure improved medical care.
Regarding mental health care, the Settlement Agreement stops the placement and retention of inmates at the OSP who are seriously mentally ilL To insure that seriously mentally inmates are not placed at the OSP, the Settlement Agreement provides for an agreed-upon Monitor to evaluate inmateplacements. As to such evaluations, the Monitor's decision is final.
With regard to its provisions dealing with recreation equipment, the Settlement Agreement says the defendants are to construct outdoor recreation. While some inmates complain about the time necessary to carry out the funding and construction of the outdoor space, the Court finds the agreed upon terms are reasonable.
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CaseNo.4:01-CV-71 Gwin, J.
After notice ofthe proposed Settlement Agreement, a number ofinmates objected. The objections mostfrequentlyraised by class members were related to their classification at the OSP, an issue unaffected by the Settlement Agreement does not affect. Members of the class also complained that the outdoor recreation modifications were not immediate. The Court finds that the Settlement Agreement reasonable in light of the fiscal and legislative realities the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction faces in constructing the outdoor recreation facility.
I. Discussion Under Rule 23 (e) ofthe Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure, "[a] class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval ofthe court." In reviewing whether to approve the parties settlement, the Court considers whether the proposed settlement is lawful, fair, reasonable, adequate and consistent with the public purpose. Bailey v. Great Lakes Canning, Inc., 908 F.2d 38, 42 (6th Cir. 1990); Williams v. Vukovich, 720 F.2d909,921 (6thCir. 1983); see also Isby v. Bayh, 75 F.3d 1191, 1196 (7th Cir. 1996). Inevaluating a proposed settlement agreement, the Court considers the nature ofthe litigation, what results could be obtained without settlement, and what risks exist ofan adverse ruling. See Vukovich, 720 F.2d at 921-23. A court may not withhold approval of a proposed consent decree simply because benefits accruedfromdecree are not what a successful plaintiff would have received in a fully litigated case. Id. at 922. The Settlement Agreement is reasonable, lawful, and fair. Under the agreement, specific procedures are put into place to improve medical and mental health treatment, including givingfinalauthority
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CaseNo.4:01-CV-71 Gwin, J. for mental health placement at the OSP to an agreed upon professor of psychiatry. None of the filed objections suggest a reasonable way to improve the Settlement Agreement.
With regard to medical treatment, the Settlement Agreement again significantly improves the currently provided treatment. Among other items, the Settlement Agreement requires weekly rounds by physicians and daily rounds by nurses. The agreement establishes a quality assurance program. The agreement also avoids housing inmates at the OSP with conditions that cannot be properly treated there and requires that its x-ray capability be improved. Perhaps most important, the Settlement Agreement appoints two Monitors to scrutinize ongoing medical treatment at the OSP and empowers them to require changes.
Finally, die Settlement Agreement makes provision for improved recreational facilities, even if not immediately. Given the large cost associated with renovations to the OSP, and the bureaucracy associated with state building projects, the proposed delay does not impact the reasonableness of the Settlement Agreement.
II. Conclusion The Settlement Agreement is hereby approved and confirmed as being fair, reasonable, and adequate. The parties thereto are hereby directed to perform the Settlement Agreement in accordance with its terms. All claims for equitable relief against the settling defendants by anyone who might fall within the Class are forever barred. The Court retains jurisdiction over the settlement of this case and may enter additional orders to
-5-

CaseNo.4:01-CV-71 Gwin, J.
effectuate the fair and orderly administration ofthe settlement and the Court's judgment as may from time
to time be appropriate.

Dated: April 5,2002

s/James S. Gwin JAMES S. GWIN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

-6-

Page 1 of 1

https://ecf.ohnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_case_doc?265,3482,0,,0,l

7/8/2003

 
 Austin v. Wilkinson

PC-OH-001-005
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO, EASTERN DIVISION

CHARLES E. AUSTIN, et al.,

)

Plaintiffs,

)

v.

)

REGINALD WILKINSON, et al., )

Defendants

)

CaseNo.4:01CV071
JUDGE GWIN
PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED INJUNCTIVE ORDER

PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED INJUNCTIVE ORDER Hearing Procedures
1. No person shall be placed or retained on Level 5 in violation of the hearing procedures set forth herein.
2. Before being placed or retained on Level 5, a prisoner must be given an opportunity to appear before a classification committee, to make an oral or written statement if he desires, to call witnesses, and to submit documents as evidence. He shall have forty-eight hour notice of the hearing. (See AR 51209-53(G), Joint Exhibit VII.)

3. The notice of hearing must inform the prisoner of: (a) the specific, detailed and individualized grounds for which he is being considered for placement or retention on Level 5, and (b) the evidence on which the Department proposes to rely. The notice must inform the prisoner of all grounds that could cause his placement or retention on Level 5. (Opinion and Order at 51.)
4. When a prisoner is given notice of a classification committee hearing, he shall have at least twenty-four hours within which to designate staff and/or inmate witnesses he wishes to call at the hearing. The Department shall permit a reasonable number of witnesses to testify, shall not unreasonably exclude witnesses and, if a witness is excluded, shall state the reason for exclusion on the record. (See AR 5120-9-07(T), Plaintiffs' Exhibit 14.) If a witness is not at the institution, the Department may arrange for his or her testimony by videoconference or speaker phone.
5. Whenever the Department proposes to rely on the statement of an informant whose identity it wishes to withhold, the notice of hearing shall "indicate this reliance and shall disclose to the inmate as much of the substance of the information as possible." (New Policy 111-07, as revised February 7, 2002, section VI(J), attached as Appendix A.) If, at a later stage in the process, the warden or the Chief of the Bureau of Classification wishes to rely on a statement that was not made known to the prisoner at the classification committee hearing, the same procedure shall be followed. (Opinion and Order at 53.)

6. No person who recommended placement of a prisoner on Level 5 shall participate in a later retention decision concerning that prisoner. No person who sat on a prisoner's classification committee shall review that decision as a designee of the warden. (See AR 5120-9-07, section (J)(3), Plaintiffs' Exhibit 14.) The Regional Director shall play no part in either placement or retention decisions.
7. As is the case with Rules Infraction Board hearings (AR 5120-9-07, section X, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 14), the proceedings of classification committee hearings and appeal hearings shall be electronically recorded and retained as long as the prisoner is on Level 5 plus one additional year. Upon request, the prisoner shall be given access to the recording to prepare his appeal.
8. At the conclusion of the hearing, the classification committee shall tell the prisoner its recommendation on the record and, if the committee recommends retention, the prisoner shall be offered an appeal form and told the procedure for appeal.
9. After the classification committee hearing, the committee shall within fortyeight hours provide the prisoner with a detailed written statement setting forth its recommendation and the evidence on which it relied.
10. In the event that either the classification committee or the warden recommends retention of a prisoner on Level 5, the prisoner shall be notified in writing of his right to appeal, given an appeal form, and instructed as to the procedure to be followed.

TTTl

T T

11. If the prisoner elects to appeal, or if the ultimate decision maker is considering rejection of a recommendation for reduction in security level, the prisoner must have an opportunity to speak face-to-face with the person who will ultimately make the decision before the decision is made. (Opinion and Order at 53-54, 56-57.) Should a prisoner indicate on his appeal form that he wishes to speak face-to-face with the ultimate decision maker, this could be done through videoconference (as suggested by New Policy 111-07, revised February 7, 2002, section VI(J), attached as Appendix A.)
12. After a final decision to place or retain a prisoner on Level 5, the Department must within five working days provide the prisoner with an explanation of the decision containing the facts relied upon and the reasoning used. (Opinion and Order at 53-54, 56.)
13. The procedures set forth above shall apply to members of the class who have been transferred to other correctional institutions but who remain on Level 5. Criteria for Level 5 Placement and Retention
14. Defendants shall specify the threshold quantity of drugs which, if conveyed, possessed, or introduced by a prisoner, would justify placement or retention on Level 5, e.g., the amount of cocaine required to support a third degree drug trafficking charge. (Opinion and Order at 52, 52 n.)
15. Before a prisoner is placed or retained on Level 5 because of gang-related activity, the Department must demonstrate that a prisoner currently functions as a leader, enforcer, or recruiter for a gang and is personally involved in violent or disruptive behavior. (Opinion and Order at 52-53.)

16. Prisoners shall not be "jumped" more than one security level so as to be placed on Level 5 unless (a) the prisoner is accused of an act of violence, (b) the prisoner has been found guilty of that act of violence by a Rules Infraction Board, and (c) the institutional committee and warden have recommended placement on Level 5. (See Opinion and Order at 15.) If the prisoner is later found Not Guilty by an outside court, the Department shall immediately conduct a new classification committee hearing in which the court's judgment is given substantial weight. (See Opinion and Order at 17, 17 n.)
17. No prisoner shall be placed on Level 5 for violent conduct unless he has been found guilty of violence within the "last 5 years" (Security Designation Long Form, DRC 2568, attached to Defendants' Exhibit C, mandated for use in Level 5 placements by New Policy 111-07, revised February 7, 2002, section VI(C), second sentence, attached as Appendix A).
18. If the prisoner has served more time than called for by the Parole Board Guidelines and is not eligible for parole because of his security classification, this factor should be given substantial weight in favor of his security reduction.
19. No prisoner shall be retained on Level 4 or Level 5 except on the basis of "behavior in the last five years, including prior to Level 4 or 5 classification" (Defendants' Exhibit C, section VI(I), repeated word for word in New Policy 111-07, revised February 7, 2002, section VI(I), attached as Appendix A.)
20. Each prisoner on Level 5 must be informed in writing at least annually of the specific conduct necessary for that prisoner to be reduced from Level 5 and

placed in general population at a lower-security prison, and the length of time within which that security reduction appears reasonably possible. (See Opinion and Order at 55, and New Policy 111-07, revised February 7, 2002, section VI(E), attached as Appendix A.) 21. During privilege reviews, the Behavior Management Team shall suggest programs that would enhance the prisoner's progress toward security reduction.
Additional Required Revisions of New Policy 111-07 22. Prisoners whose security classification is reduced from Level 5A to Level 4B
and who remain at OSP until being transferred to SOCF, shall be given credit for time spent on Level 4B at OSP toward the total amount of time they need to serve on Level 4 before being reduced to Level 3, and thereby becoming eligible for parole. 23. Whereas prisoners in Administrative Control were reviewed every 90 days or every 30 days, but under policies proposed by defendants prisoners on Level 4B will have privilege level reviews every six months, thereby inevitably lengthening the time they must spend on Level 4 to more than a year before they become eligible for parole, the Court directs that privilege level reviews for prisoners on Level 4B shall be conducted every three months. 24. Inasmuch as defendants utilize the experience of prisoners afforded congregate recreation as a means of assessing whether those prisoners are ready for security reduction, all prisoners on Level 5A shall be afforded the

opportunity for congregate recreation, unless the prisoner expressly waives that opportunity or forfeits it through abuse of this privilege.
New Classification Hearings 25. When defendants consider that the foregoing changes and revisions directed
by the Court have been completed in compliance with the Court's directives, and in any event no later than May 1, 2002, defendants shall report these changes and revisions together with the documents in which they are embodied to plaintiffs' counsel and to the Court. 26. Until the Court has approved the foregoing changes and revisions, no additional prisoners shall be placed on Level 5 unless approved by the Court. 27. After the Court has approved defendants' changes and revisions, defendants shall immediately begin new classification hearings, conducted according to the new procedures and criteria approved by the Court. These hearings shall be conducted in the order of date of arrival at OSP, so that the prisoners who were transferred to OSP in 1998 without due process of any kind, and who have been at OSP for more than three years (see Opinion and Order at 10-18, 46-49), will be reviewed first. 28. In these classification hearings, it shall be rebuttably presumed that prisoners who have been at OSP for three years or more, whose behavior has been good, shall have their security classification reduced. 29. The hearings shall include members of the class who are now at other institutions but are still on Level 5.

Monitoring and Document Production 30. Defendants shall provide to counsel for plaintiffs, prior to their effective date,
copies of any additional policies, forms, and other directives adopted by defendants in implementation of this Injunction. 31. Defendants shall provide to counsel for plaintiffs, beginning immediately and thereafter at regular intervals no longer than every three months, a list of all members of the class showing first and last name, number, date of arrival at OSP, current privilege and security level, and name of institution where housed. 32. Defendants shall provide to counsel for plaintiffs, beginning immediately and thereafter at monthly intervals, copies of all Level 5 placement and retention recommendations and final decisions for each and every member of the class whenever a placement or retention decision about that prisoner is made, including any and all forms utilized such as security designation forms, supervision review forms, notice of hearing forms, information presented by the inmate, information presented by staff, classification committee reports of Level 5 placement, and privilege/security level review forms. Upon request, the electronic recording of a hearing shall also be provided. 33. Defendants shall provide monthly to counsel for plaintiffs all documents embodying the program and behavior plans mandated by paragraphs 20 and 21, above.

34. Counsel for defendants shall meet monthly with counsel for plaintiffs to

facilitate the delivery of documents, and to discuss and, if possible, resolve

any problems related to the implementation of this Order.

Retention of Jurisdiction

35. The Court will retain jurisdiction over this matter for the purpose of

enforcement. This Injunction shall terminate in two years upon the motion of

either party unless the Court finds the prospective relief is needed to correct

an ongoing violation of the Federal right. (PLRA, 18 U.S.C. Section

3626(b)(l)(A)(i))

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date:

James S. Gwin United States District Judge

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO, EASTERN DIVISION

CHARLES E. AUSTIN, #A206-996 Ohio State Penitentiary 878 Coitsville-Hubbard Road Youngstown, OH 44505-4635
MICHAEL BENGE, #A276-821 Ohio State Penitentiary 878 Coitsville-Hubbard Road Youngstown, OH 44505-4635
ALONZO L. BONNER, #A223-264 Ohio State Penitentiary 878 Coitsville-Hubbard Road Youngstown, OH 44505-4635
AUGUST CASSANO, #A145-242 Mansfield Correctional Institution P. O. Box 788 Mansfield, OH 44901-0788
DAVID E. CLARK, #A254-389 Ohio State Penitentiary 878 Coitsville-Hubbard Road Youngstown, OH 44505-4635
ROY D. DONALD, #A150-710 Ohio State Penitentiary 878 Coitsville-Hubbard Road Youngstown, OH 44505-4635
DAVID EASLEY, #306-400 Ohio State Penitentiary 878 Coitsville-Hubbard Road Youngstown, OH 44505-4635

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF CASE NO. JUDGE
Austin v. Wilkinson

PC-OH-001-006

BRIAN K. ESKRIDGE, #A219-302

)

Ohio State Penitentiary

)

878 Coitsville-Hubbard Road

)

Youngstown, OH 44505-4635

)

)

ROGER LEE HALL, #A 161 -405

)

Ohio State Penitentiary

)

878 Coitsville-Hubbard Road

)

Youngstown, OH 44505-4635

)

)

EDWARD O. HODGE, #294-925

)

Ohio State Penitentiary

)

878 Coitsville-Hubbard Road

)

Youngstown, OH 44505-4635

)

)

STACY LANE, #A143-066

)

Ohio State Penitentiary

)

878 Coitsville-Hubbard Road

)

Youngstown, OH 44505-4635

)

)

KUNTA KENYATTA, #R140-858

)

a/k/a JEROME E. LENNON

)

878 Coitsville-Hubbard Road

)

Youngstown, OH 44505-4635

)

)

JAMES D. MITCHELL, #A238-630

)

Ohio State Penitentiary

)

878 Coitsville-Hubbard Road

)

Youngstown, OH 44505-4635

)

)

JOHN W. PEROTTI, #A 167-712

)

Ohio State Penitentiary

)

878 Coitsville-Hubbard Road

)

Youngstown, OH 44505-4635

)

)

LAMAR PRESTON, #A318-849

)

Ohio State Penitentiary

)

878 Coitsville-Hubbard Road

)

Youngstown, OH 44505-4635

)

)

JASON H. ROBB, #A308-919

)

Ohio State Penitentiary

)

878 Coitsville-Hubbard Road

)

Youngstown, OH 44505-4635

)

)

RICHARD SIGGERS, #A147-359

)

Ohio State Penitentiary

)

878 Coitsville-Hubbard Road

)

Youngstown, OH 44505-4635

)

)

ERIC SWOFFORD, #A 178-862

)

Ohio State Penitentiary

)

878 Coitsville-Hubbard Road

)

Youngstown, OH 44505-4635

)

)

LAHRAY THOMPSON, #337-139

)

Ohio State Penitentiary

)

878 Coitsville-Hubbard Road

)

Youngstown, OH 44505-4635

)

)

EDWARD A. TILLEY, #A257-737

)

Ohio State Penitentiary

)

878 Coitsville-Hubbard Road

)

Youngstown, OH 44505-4635

)

)

MARK TRAWICK, #A280-783

)

Ohio State Penitentiary

)

878 Coitsville-Hubbard Road

)

Youngstown, OH 44505-4635

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

vs.

REGINALD WILKINSON

)

Department of Rehabilitation and Correction

)

1050 Freeway Drive North

)

Columbus, OH 43229

)

)

STEPHEN J. HUFFMAN

)

Department of Rehabilitation and Correction

)

1050 Freeway Drive North

)

Columbus, OH 43229

)

)

BERNARD J. RYZNAR

)

Department of Rehabilitation and Correction

)

1050 Freeway Drive North

)

Columbus, OH 43229

)

)

TODD E. ISHEE

)

Ohio State Penitentiary

)

P. O. Box 1436

)

Youngstown, OH 44501-1436

)

)

BRUCE A. MARTIN, M.D.

)

Department of Rehabilitation and Correction

)

1050 Freeway Drive North

)

Columbus, OH 43229

)

)

DEBORAH NIXON HUGHES

)

Department of Rehabilitation and Correction

)

1050 Freeway Drive North

)

Columbus, OH 43229

)

)

CHERYL JORGENSEN-MARTINEZ

)

Department of Rehabilitation and Correction

)

1050 Freeway Drive North

)

Columbus, OH 43229

)

)

MANISH B. JOSHI, M.D.

)

Ohio State Penitentiary

)

P. O. Box 1436

)

Youngstown, OH 44501-1436

)

)

PATRICK F. BIGGS, PH.D.

)

Ohio State Penitentiary

)

P. O. Box 1436

)

Youngstown, OH 44501-1436

)

)

AUDREY SANDOR NIETZEL, R.N.

)

Ohio State Penitentiary

)

P. O. Box 1436

)

Youngstown, OH 445 01 -143 6

)

MATTHEW MEYER

)

Department of Rehabilitation and Correction

)

1050 Freeway Drive North

)

Columbus, OH 43229

)

)

Defendants

)

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF Now come Plaintiff Class and Subclass (inmates incarcerated at the Ohio State Penitentiary) by and through their attorneys, and allege as follows and for their complaint against REGINALD WILKINSON, STEPHEN J. HUFFMAN, BERNARD J. RYZNAR, TODD E. ISHEE, BRUCE A. MARTIN, M.D., DEBORAH NIXON HUGHES, CHERYL JORGENSEN-MARTINEZ, MANISH B. JOSHI, M.D., PATRICK F. BIGGS, PH.D., AUDREY SANDOR NIETZEL, R.N., and MATTHEW MEYER, individually and in their official capacity as follows:

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 1. This is a class action brought pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C.' 1983, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and customary international human rights law, which is incorporated into federal common law. The action seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, including an order enjoining the Defendants and their agents and those under their supervision from continuing to operate the Ohio State Penitentiary (OSP) as a high maximum security prison (Asupermax@) so as to deny the Plaintiffs and the class and

subclasses they represent the rights guaranteed to them under the Constitution and laws of the United States. Plaintiffs seek this relief on the ground that they are forced to undergo conditions of incarceration that, taken singly and in totality, constitute cruel and unusual punishment, in that those conditions inflict unnecessary and unreasonable punishment on the Plaintiffs. Defendants are wantonly, willfully and deliberately denying and refusing essential and needed medical care to many of the Plaintiffs, who form a subclass herein. Defendants are wantonly, willfully and deliberately denying and refusing essential and needed psychiatric and psychological care to Plaintiffs who form another subclass herein. Further, the decisions to assign and to maintain the Plaintiffs and the class represented by them at the OSP, are arbitrary and capricious, pursuant to vague and overbroad criteria, without meaningful due process, resulting in incarceration under conditions that, individually and in totality, constitute significant and atypical hardship as compared with the ordinary incidents of prison life, and in some cases extend the duration of incarceration. Defendants are aware of but are indifferent to the serious consequences of longterm solitary confinement. Conditions are so stark at this institution that a significant percentage of the prisoners have attempted or committed suicide.
2. Numerous attempts have been made to request and demand of the Defendants that the conditions set forth herein be eliminated. In the course of making these requests and demands, Plaintiffs have exhausted all available administrative remedies. Therefore, if the requested relief is not granted, the Defendants will continue to violate the rights of the Plaintiffs and the class they represent. These continued violations will adversely affect them and their families in many ways, including their physical and mental health, and potentially threaten their lives.

3. Plaintiffs and the class seek: (a) a declaratory judgment declaring that the conditions at the OSP violate the Constitution, and customary international human rights law; (b) a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining the Defendants, their employees, agents and those acting on their behalf from continuing to operate the OSP in a manner that violates the rights of the Plaintiffs and their class and threatens their basic well being, their mental and physical health, their lives and their essential humanity.
JURISDICTION 4. This Court has jurisdiction for claims seeking declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. '' 2201 and 2202, and Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 5. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.' 1331 in that this action arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1343(a) in that Plaintiff Class seeks redress for civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C.' 1983.
VENUE 6. Venue is proper in the Northern District of Ohio pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1391(b) and (c) in that a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiff Class= claims have occurred in this District, and the actions and contacts of Defendants WILKINSON, HUFFMAN, RYZNAR, ISHEE, MARTIN, HUGHES, JORGENSEN-MARTINEZ, JOSHI, BIGGS, N1ETZEL and MEYER subject them to jurisdiction in this District.

PARTIES Plaintiffs
7. The following individuals are class representatives of all prisoners held at OSP, challenging due process violations in their high maximum security classification and transfer to OSP, placement on Alevels@ at OSP, and/or retention at OSP:
(a) CHARLES E. AUSTIN, #A206-996, has been incarcerated at OSP since April 2, 1999. He has exhausted available administrative remedies by appealing to the North Regional Director the issue of his reclassification from close to high maximum security and transfer from Lebanon Correctional Institution to OSP for assaulting an inmate with a pair of scissors, despite the verdict of a court that he was not guilty. The disposition of his appeal is attached as Exhibit I-A.
(b) MICHAEL BENGE, #A276-821, has been incarcerated at OSP since May 15, 1998. He has exhausted available administrative remedies by appealing to the North Regional Director his retention at OSP in violation of Administrative Rule (AR) 5120-9-12 which requires prisoners sentenced to death to be housed on Death Row, and by appealing several issues to the Chief Inspector. The dispositions of these appeals are attached as Exhibit I-B.
(c) ALONZO L. BONNER, #A223-264, has been incarcerated at OSP since November 13, 1998. On January 13, 2000 he was recommended for reduction in security and transfer from OSP to the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility (SOCF). BONNER was notified by Defendant

RYZNAR on August 8, 2000 that he has been approved for placement at SOCF, but he remains at OSP in high maximum security with the consequence that he will not be eligible for release from prison on his Projected Release Date. He has already been in prison for years beyond the Parole Board=s guidelines. BONNER has exhausted available administrative remedies. Relevant documents are attached as Exhibit I-C.
(d) BRIAN K. ESKRIDGE, #A219-302, has been incarcerated at OSP since March 4, 1999. He has exhausted available administrative remedies by appealing to the North Regional Director the issue of his increase from medium or close to high maximum security and his initial transfer from Trumbull Correctional Institution to OSP; and the issue of reversal on April 12, 2000 of a March 15, 2000 recommendation that he be transferred out of OSP, with the result that his security level will not be reduced to close security in time to be considered for parole in May 2002. He also has exhausted available administrative remedies by appealing to the Chief Inspector on several issues including the issue of being placed on level I (with minimal privileges) for 53 days for no documented reason. The dispositions of these appeals are attached as Exhibit I-D.
(e) ROGER LEE HALL, #A161-405, has been incarcerated at OSP since February 10, 1999. He was recommended for release to maximum security, but that recommendation was denied by the North Regional Director. HALL has exhausted available administrative remedies by appealing his initial transfer to OSP and his retention at OSP, and by attempting to use the grievance procedure to challenge his high maximum security classification. Relevant documents are attached as Exhibit I-E.

(f) EDWARD O. HODGE, #294-925, has been incarcerated at OSP since November 2, 2000. He has exhausted available administrative remedies by appealing to the North Regional Director the issue of his reclassification from close to high maximum security and his transfer to OSP allegedly for leadership status affiliated with a gang. The disposition of this appeal is attached as Exhibit I-F.
(g) KUNTA KENYATTA, a/k/a JEROME E. LENNON, #R140-858, has been incarcerated at OSP since January 19, 1999. He has exhausted available administrative remedies by appealing to the North Regional Director the issue of his retention at OSP, and by appealing to the Chief Inspector the issue of his reclassification hearing. He was recommended for release to maximum security, but that recommendation was denied by the North Regional Director. Further delay in reducing his security level will result in his failing to be reduced to close security in time for consideration for parole in January 2002. Documents showing exhaustion are attached as Exhibit I-G.
(h) LAMAR PRESTON, #A318-849, has been incarcerated at OSP since November 13, 1998. He has exhausted available administrative remedies by appealing to the North Regional Director the issue of high maximum classification and transfer to OSP for reasons that include charges alleged in a conduct report for which he was found not guilty by the Rules Infraction Board, and denial of his appeal after a security review in which, upon information and belief, he scored two stability factors and no unfavorable behavior. Relevant documents are attached as Exhibit I-H.
(i) LAHRAY THOMPSON, #337-139, has been incarcerated at OSP since January 21,
10

1999. THOMPSON has exhausted available administrative remedies by appealing to the North Regional Director both his initial transfer to OSP and his retention at OSP, allegedly for the reason that he was captain of a gang, although he has not had any conduct reports for gang-related activity, fights or assaults, and he appears to have been confused with another inmate. Copies of relevant documents are attached as Exhibit I-I.
8. The following individuals are class representatives of all prisoners held at OSP, challenging conditions of confinement at OSP:
(a) DAVID E. CLARK, #A254-389, has been incarcerated at OSP since on or about November 27, 1998. He has exhausted available administrative remedies by appealing to the Chief Inspector the issue of unnecessary and degrading strip searches and excessive use of restraints during visits. The disposition of this appeal is attached as Exhibit II-A.
(b) ROY D. DONALD, #A 150-710, has been incarcerated at OSP since May 6, 1998. He has exhausted available administrative remedies by appealing to the Chief Inspector the issues of no outside recreation and the refusal of Defendants to provide a meaningful Behavioral Management Program to prepare him for release from prison. He is due to be released on July 26, 2001. The dispositions of these appeals are attached as Exhibit II-B.
(c) ERIC SWOFFORD, #A 178-862, has been incarcerated at OSP since May 26, 1998. He has exhausted available administrative remedies by appealing to the Chief Inspector the issue of inappropriate supervision. Relevant documents are attached as Exhibit II-C.
(d) EDWARD A. TILLEY, #A257-737, has been incarcerated at OSP since May 19, 1998. He has exhausted available administrative remedies by appealing to the Chief Inspector the
11

issues of restraints during visitation, behavioral management reviews, and the high level of tension due to nothing to do, lack of outdoor recreation and sunlight, and the creation of a stressful environment. Documents relevant to these appeals are attached as Exhibit II-D.
(e) MARK TRAWICK, #A280-783, has been incarcerated at OSP since October 23, 1998. He has exhausted available administrative remedies by appealing to the Chief Inspector issues of inappropriate supervision and harassment, and indigency for purposes of receiving a free legal kit, free postage to the courts, and free hygiene items. The dispositions of these appeals are attached as Exhibit II-E.
9. The following individuals are class representatives of a subclass of prisoners held at OSP, challenging denial of timely medical care at OSP:
(a) STACY LANE, #A143-066, has been incarcerated at OSP since May 19, 1998. He has Hepatitis C. He has exhausted available administrative remedies by appealing to the Chief Inspector the issue of lack of treatment for rectal bleeding and denial of referral to an HCV [Hepatitis C Virus] specialist. The disposition of this appeal is attached as Exhibit II1-A.
(b) JOHN W. PEROTTI, #A 167-712, was incarcerated at OSP for approximately one year between April 1999 and March 2000, and returned to OSP on October 5, 2000. He has exhausted available administrative remedies by appealing numerous issues to the Chief Inspector including his initial transfer to OSP and two appeals on the issue of inadequate medical care (no timely decision on the second appeal). He has also exhausted available administrative remedies by appealing to the North Regional Director his reassignment to OSP. Relevant documents are attached as Exhibit III-B.
12

(c) JASON H. ROBB, #A308-919, has been incarcerated at OSP since on or about May 7, 1998. He has exhausted available remedies by appealing to the Chief Inspector numerous issues including the housing of Death Row inmates at OSP, and lack of information and treatment for Hepatitis C. He has also exhausted available administrative remedies by appealing to the North Regional Director the issue of retention at OSP in spite of recommended release from highmaximum security and in violation of AR 5120-9-12 which requires prisoners sentenced to death to be housed on Death Row. The disposition of these appeals is attached as Exhibit III-C.
(d) RICHARD SIGGERS, #A147-359, has been incarcerated at OSP since May 1998. He has exhausted available administrative remedies by appealing to the Chief Inspector several issues relating to the non-treatment of inmates with Hepatitis C. The disposition of this appeal is attached at Exhibit III-D.
10. The following individuals are class representatives of a subclass of prisoners held at OSP, challenging transfer to and/or retention at OSP of prisoners who are seriously mentally ill and Defendants= failure and/or refusal to provide adequate mental health care at OSP:
(a) AUGUST CASSANO, #A 145-242, was incarcerated at OSP from December 15, 1998 until October 5, 2000. He has a long history of serious mental illness including numerous suicide attempts but he was not on the mental health caseload. Plaintiff CASSANO attempted suicide on or about September 29, 2000 by smashing his TV and cutting the artery in his arm with broken glass from the TV. He was returned to Death Row on October 5, 2000. To avoid being returned to OSP, he bit the artery and vein in his arm and bled profusely before being found on October 23, 2000. CASSANO has exhausted his administrative remedies by appealing two
13

II

I II I

grievances to the Chief Inspector to which there have been no responses in violation of AR 51209-31(H)(8). Plaintiff CASSANO seeks as relief, on behalf of himself and other prisoners who are transferred out of OSP for reasons of mental health, that no such prisoners be returned to OSP. Relevant documents are attached as Exhibit IV-A.
(b) DAVID EASLEY, #A306-400, is seriously mentally ill. He has been incarcerated at OSP since November 13, 1998. He has exhausted available administrative remedies by appealing his transfer to OSP to the North Regional Director, and by attempting to utilize the grievance procedure. EASLEY was briefly moved from OSP to a Residential Treatment Center at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility but was returned to OSP, and in the months since his return he has made at least two suicide attempts, once by hanging and once by fire for which he is being charged with arson. EASLEY also exhausted available administrative remedies by appealing the issue of outside recreation. Relevant documents are attached as Exhibit IV-B.
(c) JAMES D. MITCHELL, #A238-630, has been incarcerated at OSP since April 21, 1999. He is seriously mentally ill. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff MITCHELL made at least three suicide attempts before he was transferred to OSP, and at least three suicide attempts since he has been at OSP, once by electrocution, once by fire and, on October 10, 2000, by cutting his wrist with a razor. He was charged with Aggravated Arson in connection with suicide attempts after attempted hanging failed. MITCHELL has exhausted available administrative remedies by appealing to the Chief Inspector the issue of lack of response to his complaints that his life and safety were at risk. The disposition of this appeal is attached as Exhibit IV-C.
11. In addition to representing the subclass where presented above, some Plaintiffs also
14

represent another subclass or the class as a whole. For example, Plaintiff ROBB represents the class affected by due process violations as well as the medical subclass.
Defendants (Acting Individually and in Their Official Capacity) 12. Defendant REGINALD WILKINSON is Director of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC). As such he has caused, created, authorized, condoned, ratified, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the illegal, unconstitutional, and inhumane conditions, actions, policies, customs and practices that prevail at OSP, as described below. He has, therefore, directly and proximately caused, and will continue to cause in the future, the damages, injuries and violations of rights set forth below. 13. Defendant STEPHEN J. HUFFMAN was formerly the Warden of the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility, and was appointed North Regional Director on or about June 5, 2000. As such he has caused, created, authorized, condoned, ratified, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the illegal, unconstitutional, and inhumane conditions, actions, policies, customs and practices that prevail at OSP, including but not limited to initiating the high maximum classification and transfer to OSP of many prisoners, denying their appeals, and disapproving releases from OSP recommended by a Reclassification Committee and by the Warden. He has, therefore, directly and proximately caused, and will continue to cause in the future, the damages, injuries and violations of rights set forth below. 14. Defendant BERNARD J. RYZNAR is the Chief of the Bureau of Classification of the ODRC. As such he has caused, created, authorized, condoned, ratified, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the illegal, unconstitutional, and inhumane conditions, actions, policies,
15

customs and practices that prevail at OSP, including but not limited to issues of classification and transfer. He has, therefore, directly and proximately caused, and will continue to cause in the future, the damages, injuries and violations of rights set forth below.
15. Defendant TODD E. ISHEE became the Warden at OSP on or about July 24, 2000. As such he has caused, created, authorized, condoned, ratified, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the illegal, unconstitutional, and inhumane conditions, actions, policies, customs and practices that prevail at OSP. He has, therefore, directly and proximately caused, and will continue to cause in the future, many of the damages, injuries and violations of rights set forth below.
16. Defendant BRUCE A. MARTIN, M.D. is Medical Director of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. As such he has caused, created, authorized, condoned, ratified, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the illegal, unconstitutional, and inhumane conditions, actions, policies, customs and practices that prevail at OSP, as described below with regard to refusal to provide or implement timely diagnosis and treatment of serious physical disease and medical conditions. He has, therefore, directly and proximately caused, and will continue to cause in the future, the damages, injuries and violations of rights set forth below.
17. Defendant MANISH B. JOSHI, M.D. is the Medical Director of the OSP. As such he has caused, created, authorized, condoned, ratified, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the illegal, unconstitutional, and inhumane conditions, actions, policies, customs and practices that prevail at OSP, as described below with regard to failure or refusal to diagnose and treat serious physical disease and medical conditions of which he was fully aware and in a position to provide,
16

or to provide access to or implement the recommendations of specialists. He has, therefore, directly and proximately caused, and will continue to cause in the future, the damages, injuries and violations of rights set forth below.
18. Defendant DEBORAH NIXON HUGHES is the Chief of ODRC=s Bureau of Mental Health Services. As such she has caused, created, authorized, condoned, ratified, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the illegal, unconstitutional, and inhumane conditions, actions, policies, customs and practices that prevail at OSP, as described below with regard to Defendants= failure adequately to assess, diagnose, classify and treat, serious psychological and emotional disorders. She has, therefore, directly and proximately caused, and will continue to cause in the future, the damages, injuries and violations of rights set forth below.
19. Defendant PATRICK F. BIGGS, Ph.D. is the Mental Health Supervisor at OSP. As such he and persons working under his supervision have caused, created, authorized, condoned, ratified, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the illegal, unconstitutional, and inhumane conditions, actions, policies, customs and practices that prevail at OSP, as described below with regard to Defendants= failure adequately to assess, diagnose, classify and treat serious psychological and emotional disorders. He has, therefore, directly and proximately caused, and will continue to cause in the future, the damages, injuries and violations of rights set forth below.
20. Defendant AUDREY SANDOR NIETZEL, R.N. is the Health Care Administrator of the OSP. As such she and persons working under her supervision have caused, created, authorized, condoned, ratified, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the illegal, unconstitutional, and inhumane conditions, actions, policies, customs and practices that prevail at OSP, as
17

described below with regard to refusal to provide access to doctors, as well as failure to diagnose and treat serious physical disease and medical conditions. She has, therefore, directly and proximately caused, and will continue to cause in the future, the damages, injuries and violations of rights set forth below.
21. Defendant CHERYL JORGENSEN-MARTINEZ, Esq. is Chief Inspector of the ODRC. She and Assistant Inspectors under her supervision make the final decisions on grievance appeals. As such she has caused, created, authorized, condoned, ratified, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the illegal, unconstitutional, and inhumane conditions, actions, policies, customs and practices that prevail at the OSP, as described below. She has, therefore, directly and proximately caused, and will continue to cause in the future, the damages, injuries and violations of rights set forth below.
22. Defendant MATTHEW MEYER is Security Threat Group Investigation Coordinator for the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. As such he has caused, created, authorized, condoned, ratified, approved or knowingly acquiesced in some of the illegal, unconstitutional, and inhumane conditions, actions, policies, customs and practices that prevail at OSP, as described below with regard to issues of security classification and transfer based on alleged security threat group activity. He has, therefore, directly and proximately caused, and will continue to cause in the future, the damages, injuries and violations of rights set forth below.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 23. The above named Plaintiffs bring this action in their own behalf and, pursuant to
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) Rules 23 (a) and (b) (1) and (2), on behalf of a class similarly situated.
24. The class consists of all persons who are presently imprisoned at the OSP and who as a result of that imprisonment are subjected to the conditions set forth below which constitute cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment and customary international law. The class further consists of prisoners the conditions of whose confinement constitute a significant and atypical hardship as compared with the ordinary incidents of prison life, and in some cases extend the duration of incarceration; and who have been transferred to and retained at OSP without due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
25. The class further consists of subclasses: (a) those in serious need of medical care, who are deliberately and unreasonably denied timely access to care, said denial causing undue pain and anxiety and to whom, when care is given, it is below the minimal standards of care; (b) those in serious need of psychiatric and psychological care, who are transferred to and/or retained at OSP, who have a history of mental illness and/or, as a result of placement at OSP, suffer irreparable, unreasonable and unnecessary psychological, psychiatric and mental injury and damage, and/or who are deliberately denied adequate mental health care after placement at OSP. 26. The members of the class and subclasses are too numerous to be joined in one action. OSP has the capacity to house 502 high maximum security prisoners and, as of November 1999, was housing approximately 460 prisoners. Joinder of all class members is therefore
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impracticable. 27. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all class members and dominate those
questions that affect only the individual members. Those common questions include, but are not limited to:
(a) Whether Defendants= creation, supervision, and maintenance of a high maximum security prison subjecting Plaintiffs and class members to an extremely harsh system of confinement in long-term isolation at OSP amounts to cruel and unusual punishment.
(b) Whether Defendants= maintenance of a high maximum security prison as described herein without providing Plaintiffs and class members outdoor recreation constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and violates customary international law.
(c) Whether Defendants= routine use of unnecessary, degrading and humiliating restraints during visiting and confidential interviews constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
(d) Whether Defendants= deliberate indifference to the serious medical risks and conditions of the Plaintiffs and their class, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
(e) Whether the placement and retention at OSP of prisoners who are in serious need of psychiatric and psychological care, who have a history of serious mental illness and/or, as a result of placement at OSP, suffer irreparable, unreasonable and unnecessary psychological, psychiatric and mental injury and damage, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
(f) Whether the conditions which prevail at OSP, individually and in totality, constitute a significant and atypical hardship as compared with the ordinary incidents of prison life.
(g) Whether Defendants deprived Plaintiffs and class members of their liberty interests
20

without due process of law, inasmuch as Defendants arbitrarily and capriciously reclassified, transferred, and retained Plaintiffs in high maximum security at OSP based on vague and overbroad Assignment and Behavior Criteria, without adequate procedural safeguards, and often in derogation of existing Administrative Rules.
(h) Whether Defendants= creation, supervision and maintenance of a high maximum security prison subjecting Plaintiffs and class members to an extremely harsh form of prolonged solitary confinement violates international standards that constitute customary international law.
28. The claims of the Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the class. 29. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. The interests of the class representatives are consistent with those of the class members. In addition, Plaintiffs= counsel are experienced in class actions, civil rights and prison litigation. 30. Plaintiffs= counsel know of no conflicts of interest among class members that would affect this litigation or between the attorneys and class members. 31. Use of the class action mechanism here is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of claims and will prevent the imposition of undue financial, administrative and procedural burdens on the parties and Court that individual litigation of these claims would impose. 32. The Plaintiff class should be certified pursuant to Rule 23 (b)(2) for determination of liability because Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the respective classes, thereby making class-wide declaratory, injunctive and other equitable relief appropriate. 33. Common questions of law and fact clearly predominate within the meaning of Rule
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23 (b)(3). Class action treatment provides a fair and efficient method for the adjudication of the controversy herein described, affecting a large number of persons, joinder of whom is impracticable. This class action provides an effective method whereby the enforcement of the rights of Plaintiffs and the class members can be fairly managed without unnecessary expense or duplication.
STATEMENT OF FACTS Conditions of Confinement at OSP - Common Factual Claims 34. OSP is a high maximum security prison, commonly referred to as a Asupermax.@ The basic characteristics of supermax confinement are extreme social isolation, restricted movement, minimal property, reduced environmental stimuli, extremely limited recreational and cultural opportunities, no vocational opportunities, and extraordinary levels of surveillance and control for a duration of years. 35. Prisoners at OSP are confined to their cells except for an hour a day in another cell for recreation and a five-minute shower. OSP prisoners never go outside the building except under rare circumstances for medical purposes or a court appearance. Visiting is done under conditions that are so uncomfortable and humiliating that prisoners and families are deterred from visiting. The prison is designed and operated so as to exercise complete control over its residents, including the individual class representatives and class members, in every respect including the basic necessities of life, thereby making it easy for those in control to deprive prisoners of their dignity by negligent, or hostile or indifferent treatment.
22

36. Incarceration at OSP is generally distinguishable from other forms of segregation in a number of ways, the two most important of which are the duration of stay at OSP and the effect on the prisoner=s eligibility for parole. There is no time limitation, other than the prisoner=s maximum sentence, up to and including life, pursuant to which each prisoner may be confined at OSP. Moreover, a prisoner in high maximum security is not eligible for parole until he has first been reclasified to maximum security for a year and then reclassified to close security.
37. At OSP, each inmate is confined alone for at least 23 hours a day in a sparsely furnished cell, the floor area of which is 89.7 feet (7 feet wide by 14 feet from front to back, minus utility area). There is a window 4 inches wide and 36 inches high that allows for a small amount of natural light, and in cells where there is a wall outside the window, very little light and no view of the natural world. Heating and cooling and the amount and temperature of air blowing through the vent cannot be controlled by the inmate, nor can he open the window.
38. There is a small thick glass window in the steel door at the front of the cell. In the door there is a Afood slot@ or Acuff port@ which an officer may unlock to insert food or mail, and which is also used to put handcuffs on the prisoner before the door is opened. The cell has a sink and toilet, a small desk and a concrete immovable stool. Loud noise reverberates as the doors to the pods clang when opened and closed, and the doors and food slot doors are slammed by correctional officers.
39. There is a narrow concrete slab that stretches across the width of the cell. On that narrow slab lie a thin mattress, pillow, pillow case, blanket and two sheets unless bedding is confiscated for disciplinary reasons. A light remains on at all times inside the cell which makes it
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difficult for some inmates to sleep. Prisoners are punished if they attempt to use a piece of paper or any other object to shield themselves from the light or to protect themselves from the air blower.
40. The degree of isolation of prisoners at OSP is unique as compared with prisoners in any other Ohio prison. At the end of the year 2000, metal strips were being attached to the bottom and sides of cell doors, upon information and belief, effectively cutting off or severely reducing any kind of communication among prisoners, and so much reducing air circulation as to make it difficult for some prisoners to breathe.
41. Prisoners are allowed only a sparse amount of personal property. Prisoners are disciplined if any property is found in excess of the possession limits. Cells are routinely searched when an inmate is out of his cell for recreation. Because staples, binders, and fasteners of any kind are prohibited, legal and personal papers are often scattered during cell searches.
42. Prisoners have no privacy. Correctional officers can listen to what is going on in any cell at any time through an intercom. Fixed videocameras can record movement outside the cells. When medical and mental health personnel make rounds, they are accompanied by correctional officers; officers and other inmates can hear as conversations are held through the cuffport.
43. Prisoners are punished if they save a piece of bread or a packet of sugar or any other item from a food tray for a snack at a later time, or place any photographs or any other items on the cell wall, or for many other minor infractions.
44. It is difficult for prisoners to summon help. There is an emergency intercom button which the inmate can press, but the inmates are warned that they will be disciplined if they
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II

I II I

utilize it for other than emergency situations. If inmates kick or pound on the door to catch an officer=s attention, they may be disciplined.
45. Discipline even for minor offenses may result in an inmate being demoted to a lower Alevel@ for an indefinite period of time, which entails not only loss of privileges and programs, but may have the effect of extending the duration of his time at OSP by several years as he must once again work his way up to higher levels. Inmates are seldom exonerated through the very limited appeals available. Discipline may be imposed arbitrarily or in retaliation for the filing of a complaint or grievance.
46. Inmates never leave their cells for any reason, including showers and recreation, without their hands cuffed behind the back and a correctional officer holding each arm. Movement outside the cell block is in full restraints, with an escort of at least two or three correctional officers, one holding each arm, and sometimes one walking behind with a baton. Prisoners may remain for hours with their legs shackled, a belly chain tightly fastened around the waist, and their hands cuffed with a Ablack box@ that rigidly holds their hands separated from each other. See Exhibit II-D (TILLEY).
47. During confidential interviews with psychological and religious counselors as well as during Rules Infraction Board hearings and Reclassification Committee interviews, prisoners are placed inside a locked room with their legs shackled, hands cuffed behind the back, chained to a pole on the wall or attached to the floor behind the prisoner. See Exhibit II-C (SWOFFORD).
48. A thorough strip search is conducted every time an inmate leaves the block and every time he re-enters the block. The conditions in which prisoners are strip searched are often
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unreasonably and unnecessarily humiliating and demeaning. See Exhibit II-A (CLARK). 49. Each pod of cells has Arecreation@ components. One component is denoted the
Aoutside@ recreation area, the other Ainside.@ Both the Aoutside@ and Ainside@ components are cells within the building. The area of each component is 90 square feet (less than a parking space for a car in a parking lot), with a ceiling height of 7 feet 10 inches. There are no toilet facilities in the recreation cells. Some recreation cells have a chin-up bar mounted to the wall and a sit-up bench with no cushions. There is nothing movable: not even a ball. See Exhibits II-B (DONALD), II-E (TILLEY), and IV-B (EASLEY).
50. The Aoutside@ recreation facility is an indoor cell which has small grates or slots on one wall which allow fresh air in from the outside. This recreation facility is often unusable in the winter because it is unheated and prisoners are not provided with coats, hats, gloves or other protective clothing. The Aindoor@ recreation area is often unavailable. Recreation for high maximum security prisoners is always solitary.
51. Access to the outside world is very limited. Phone calls can be made only to approved persons; an unsuccessful attempt counts as one of two ten-minute phone calls per month for Level II or one call per week for Level III inmates. Visiting hours are during the morning and early afternoon on Wednesdays and Thursdays, thereby making it difficult for working adults or school children to visit. Prisoners have no opportunity for normal social interaction with other human beings.
52. Access to the courts is limited by difficulty in obtaining grievance forms, and long delays before Dispositions of Grievance are issued by the Inspector of Institutional Services and
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before Decisions of the Chief Inspector on a Grievance Appeal are rendered. For example, see Exhibits II-A (CLARK, March 1999 to August 2000), and II-E (TRAWICK, September 1999 to December 2000 before remand for further investigation).
53. Prisoners who are clearly indigent are being denied necessary items such as free soap, toothbrush or toothpaste, or free postage to courts. See Exhibit II-E (TRAWICK).
54. Virtually no programmed recreational activities are offered, and no work assignments are offered other than one porter in each pod. There are no educational programs beyond the GEiD level, and there are no vocational or job-readiness programs. There are no language courses, no arts or crafts activities or even any art supplies other than a few crayons. Instructional programs are provided on the institutional television channel with self-study workbooks. Mental health programs are likewise offered by television. There are long waiting lists for programs; waiting for programs may extend the duration of an inmate=s incarceration at OSP. Much .of a prisoner=s time is spent in idleness.
55. After four weeks of orientation and assessment, all OSP prisoners at all levels are in AGeneral Population® (not administrative control or any disciplinary status). Inmates are expected to progress from orientation and assessment, through Level II for one or two years, and Level III for an indefinite period of time with the possibility of demotion to Level II or level I.
56. Level I is for prisoners who are demoted for rule violations. Level I is the most restricted and may last for an indefinite period of time. Prisoners on level I are not permitted to have a television set, hence they cannot participate in educational, mental health, or recovery services programs. They may not have any visits except with their attorney of record. They are
27

permitted no phone calls other than to attorney of record, or if there is a death or serious illness in the family. When first placed on Level I, inmates are sometimes deprived of all property, including clothing, bedding, legal materials, and hygiene items.
57. Inmates on Levels II and III are permitted a small black and white television set, primarily for institutional programming. Inmates may have to wait for months to receive a television set or to have a non-functioning television replaced. The consequence is that they cannot complete programs that are required for promotion to a higher level, thereby extending the duration of their incarceration at high maximum security.
Placement, Transfer and Location at OSP (A) Initial Transfers
58. The first high maximum security prisoners arrived at the Ohio State Penitentiary during the first week of May 1998. There was no high maximum security policy in effect until August 31, 1998 when ODRC Policy 111-07, High Maximum Security, was first issued. See Exhibit V. Upon information and belief, over one hundred inmates, including numerous Plaintiffs and members of their class, were transferred to OSP prior to the promulgation of this policy. Most or all of the prisoners transferred to OSP during 1998 were accorded no procedural protections: they were not informed of the reasons for their transfers, nor were they told they had a right to appeal nor to whom to appeal, nor were they accorded a conference with prison officials, an opportunity to make an oral or written statement, or twenty-four hour notice prior to transfer, in derogation of AR 5120-9-21, -52, and -53.
(B) Arbitrary Criteria for Transfer
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59. The Assignment and Behavior Criteria adopted by the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction in ODRC Policy 111-07 are vague and overbroad, and are applied subjectively, arbitrarily and capriciously.
60. The Ohio Legislature=s Correctional Institution Inspection Committee (CIIC) inspected OSP in November 1999 and concluded that ASerious questions remain as to how adequate, proper, fair and objective are the decisions to identify, justify and assign selected inmates to supermax.@ The CIIC reported that less than half the inmates at OSP were clearly OSP material, that many inmates who remained in lesser security institutions had committed acts as deplorable as those of inmates who were sent to OSP, and that the temptation was strong to Ajustify@ the reclassification of some inmates to high maximum security in order to keep OSP full. It noted that between 1993 and 1998, the twenty Asupermax@ cells at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility did not remain full, and that what Ohio needs is another maximum security prison, not a supermax.
61. Many prisoners are placed at OSP or retained at OSP inappropriately. For example, Plaintiff AUSTIN and other members of the class were transferred to OSP based on a guilty finding by a Rules Infraction Board, notwithstanding a not guilty verdict by an outside court of law. Plaintiff DONALD and other members of the class were placed at OSP even though they had received no conduct reports for years prior to their transfer to OSP, in derogation of instructions contained in Supervision Review Forms which call for inmates to be placed in the least restrictive suitable environment. Plaintiff ESKRIDGE and other members of the class, were jumped from medium or close security to high maximum security for offenses involving no
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serious injuries, rather than moving them up one security classification at a time. Plaintiff THOMPSON was retained at OSP for gang-related activity even though his record indicates that he was confused with another inmate.
(C) Inadequate Procedural Protections 62. Even since the adoption of ODRC Policy 111-07 on August 31, 1998, a substantial number of prisoners transferred to OSP receive virtually no procedural protection to ensure that the criteria for assignment to high maximum security are not applied arbitrarily and capriciously. Numerous prisoners do not receive prior notice of their transfer, written reasons, a formal hearing or conference, or an opportunity to make a statement challenging their transfer before they are transferred to OSP. Prior to August 31, 1998, no prisoners transferred to OSP were accorded these protections. (a) Plaintiffs BENGE, BONNER, DONALD, HALL, LANE, PEROTTI, PRESTON, ROBB, and numerous other class members, were not given any notice prior to transfer to OSP, even though there was no emergency and they posed no immediate and probable danger to security, in violation of AR 5120-9-21(D)(2). (b) Plaintiffs BENGE, BONNER, CLARK, DONALD, EASLEY, HALL, HODGE, KENYATTA, LANE, PEROTTI, PRESTON, ROBB, TILLEY, and numerous other class members did not have a conference and an opportunity to submit a statement before they were transferred to OSP, in violation of AR 5120-9-53(G) and (H). (c) Plaintiffs BENGE, BONNER, CLARK, DONALD, EASLEY, HALL, KENYATTA, LANE, PRESTON, ROBB, TILLEY, and numerous other class members did not receive written
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reasons for their transfer to OSP indicating what behavior was deemed to meet the criteria for classification in high maximum security.
(d) Plaintiffs BENGE and ROBB are among more than a dozen death row inmates who are housed at OSP in violation of AR 5120-9-12.
(D) Classification Within and Transfer Out of OSP 63. OSP=s Inmate Program and Behavior policy sets forth criteria and procedures for progressing through the different levels of control at OSP and eventually out of OSP that are vague and overbroad and subject to arbitrary and capricious application. Furthermore, what may be required for promotion from level to level has been repeatedly changed and applied retroactively. 64. Behavioral Management plans and contracts are perfunctory and do not specify what a prisoner can do to move from one level to the next or eventually out of OSP. For example, Plaintiff DONALD=s plan called for him to reduce the number of conduct reports from his previous institution, but he had no conduct reports at his previous institution. See Exhibit II-B. Upon information and belief, some prisoners have been told they will never get out of OSP, regardless of whether or not they complete programs, remain free of rule violations, or otherwise comply with their behavioral management plans. 65. Level reviews are often perfunctory and fail to reward inmates for good behavior. Level reviews are often late and thereby prolong the duration of the inmate=s incarceration at OSP. Inmates have no opportunity to appear or be heard in connection with level reviews. See Exhibit II-D (TILLEY). Plaintiff ESKRIDGE was placed on Level I for 53 days without review
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j

i a i-

by either a Rules Infraction Board or a 30-day review by unit staff for continuation on Level I status. In response to his grievance appeal, the Chief Inspector eventually acknowledged that there was Ano justification as to why you were placed on level one status@ and Ano documentation was found to suggest a level change or a thirty-day placement review.@ See Exhibit I-D.
66. High maximum security inmates remain in that status for an indefinite period of time. The criterion for release from OSP is totally subjective: Athe inmate no longer represents the department=s highest level of threat to security or order in the professional judgment and discretion of the evaluating official.® ODRC Policy 11 l-07(VI)(5).
67. Plaintiffs DONALD, HALL, LANE, KENYATTA, ROBB, TILLEY, and numerous other class members, were seen by a Reclassification Review Committee that considered their behavior while at OSP as well as the reasons for placement at OSP, and recommended them for release from high maximum security and transfer out of OSP, but the Committee=s recommendation was denied by Defendants at Central Office, with the result that these prisoners are retained at OSP. In numerous instances, denials by the North Regional Director erroneously state that the Reclassification Committee recommended retention, when institutional records show that the Reclassification Committee recommended reduction in security level. See Exhibits I-E (HALL) and I-G (KENYATTA). Upon information and belief, even though security review scores merited a reduction in security level, some prisoners are still determined to pose Athe highest level of threat.® For example, see Exhibit I-H (PRESTON).
68. Numerous prisoners who have been approved for transfer out of OSP are nonetheless
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confined to the harsh and isolated conditions at OSP for months simply because there is no room to house them at a maximum security prison in Ohio. See Exhibit I-C (BONNER).
(E) Transfer of Mentally 111 Prisoners 69. Mentally disturbed, disruptive or retarded inmates, suffering from behavioral and psychological disorders, were and are placed at or transferred to OSP because they have the most difficulty in adjusting to prison routines, rules, and stress. Defendants frequently place disruptive, mentally ill inmates, including Plaintiffs EASLEY and MITCHELL and numerous other class members in supermax confinement because they lack other housing options, such as secure mental health treatment units or segregation units specifically designed for mentally ill offenders. The illness of these inmates is cruelly and significantly worsened, as evidenced by numerous rule violations which serve to harshen the conditions of their confinement, extend the time they are incarcerated in this anti-therapeutic environment, and increase the risk of suicide. 70. ODRC Policy 11 l-07(VI)(C) provides for the exclusion of inmates who are seriously mentally ill, and for expeditious transfer to another institution of any inmate who is seriously mentally ill. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs EASLEY and MITCHELL, and other members of the class who have attempted suicide at OSP, are either retained at OSP or, if transferred out, are returned to OSP after a brief stay in another institution, thereby further jeopardizing their mental health. 71. Defendants continue to maintain inadequate screening for mentally ill inmates so as to prevent these inmates from being transferred to or retained at OSP. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff EASLEY and other members of the class were transferred to OSP with no psychological
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evaluation prior to transfer; Plaintiff MITCHELL and other members of the class, were taken off psychotropic medications and removed from the mental health caseload just before or shortly after they were transferred to OSP.
Common Subclass Factual Claims Failure to Provide Timely Medical Care 72. Numerous inmates and class members, similarly situated to Plaintiff class representatives LANE, PEROTTI, ROBB, and SIGGERS, are at significant risk for serious physical injury and/or debilitation as a result of the Defendants= deliberate indifference to, failure and/or refusal to provide medical care. 73. Plaintiffs LANE, ROBB, and SIGGERS and an unknown number of additional members of the class, have Hepatitis C and have sought tests, treatment, and referral to a specialist, but have been denied information as to the criteria for treatment, have been given some blood tests but have not had a work-up or consultation with a specialist, nor have they been provided any early intervention in this potentially lethal and epidemic disease. Plaintiff LANE, who has suffered from an ulcerated colon and internal bleeding, was denied referral to a Hepatitis C specialist by Defendant JOSHI. Plaintiff ROBB was tested for Hepatitis C and found to have the disease but he was not informed by Defendants JOSHI or NIETZEL until ROBB inquired more than a year later. 74. Defendants JOSHI and NIETZEL have denied prisoner requests set forth in paragraph 73. Plaintiffs have no effective mechanism for appealing such denial of treatment inasmuch as Defendant JORGENSEN-MARTINEZ asserts that Athe final decision about any
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treatment protocol or subsequent management rests entirely with the Institutional Medical Director.® See Exhibits III-A, III-C, and III-D (LANE, ROBB and SIGGERS).
75. Tight leg irons and handcuffs sometimes cut the skin. Use of leg irons and handcuffs without disinfecting them after each use increases the risk that blood-borne viruses such as Hepatitis and HIV will be communicated from prisoner to prisoner, as does the use of the same clippers for multiple haircuts without disinfecting them. See Exhibit III-D (SIGGERS).
76. Numerous members of the class have experienced denial or delay in seriously needed medical care, causing them severe and unnecessary pain and anxiety. Some examples of Defendants= pervasive pattern and practice of denying or significantly delaying needed medical care are:
(a) On November 4, 1999, Plaintiff PEROTTI began to experience chest pains. He attempted to use the emergency button in his cell to call for medical assistance; later that day he was evaluated by a nurse. He was not seen by Defendant JOSHI until November 8, and did not have an EKG until November 9, 1999 which revealed that he was in cardiac distress. He was sent to a local hospital where a metal stent was placed in a collapsed artery; from there he was transferred to Columbus for surgery on his heart, using a vein from his leg. He was returned to OSP early in December 1999 but the incision in his leg did not heal, resulting in continued bleeding, bruising, pain and difficulty walking. Defendant JOSHI did not prescribe medications as specified by the cardio vascular surgeon. In February 2000 a vascular surgeon found an arterial fistula and recommended repair surgery. Once again, treatment was delayed causing prolonged and intense pain. It was not until March 21, 2000, after inquiries from a staff person at the
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Correctional Institution Inspection Committee, that he had the second surgery. See Exhibit III-B. (b) Antonio Carstaphen, #A221-782, was seen by Medical for a lump on his right
shoulder and was placed on a waiting list for surgery in September 1998. A Decision of the Chief Inspector on a Grievance Appeal dated June 3, 1999 said his medical needs would be addressed. Upon information and belief, by September 1999 the lump was the size of a pool ball and getting bigger; Carstaphen could not work out or sleep on his right side, and was scared that he had cancer. He wrote to the Bureau of Medical Services and received a letter dated November 16, 1999 saying he would be seen in a surgical clinic at OSP for removal of the lump and, if not done in a timely manner, to notify Defendant NIETZEL. By November 1999, Carstaphen was having pains and stiffness in his neck, was having dizzy spells, and feared he might be dying. Finally, on December 6, 1999 the lump was removed—sixteen months after he was put on a waiting list for surgery, and a half year after exhausting available administrative remedies. See Exhibit III-E (Carstaphen).
(c) Robert VanHook, #A 186-347, did not receive timely dental treatment and pulled an infected tooth after the pain became unbearable. VanHook had a history of gum disease and shortly after his arrival at OSP in the spring of 1998 he complained that he needed mouth wash and dental floss, both of which were not and are not available to prisoners at OSP. On May 27, 1999, VanHook sent a message to the Medical Department saying he had a very loose tooth that was hurting and causing pain. On May 31, he sent another notice saying his lower gum was swollen around the loose tooth and he squeezed pus out of the gum at the base of the tooth, still swollen and causing pain. He received a reply saying he would be scheduled to see the dentist on
36

June 7. VanHook sent messages again to Medical on June 1 and June 2 and signed up for sick call. Tylenol provided by the nurse ran out on June 2. On June 3, he again spoke to the first shift nurse about his dental emergency. He was in so much pain that on June 3, he pulled the tooth himself under unsanitary conditions. He was finally seen by the dentist on June 13, 1999; the dentist gave him nothing for his gum disease. See Exhibit III-F (VanHook).
(d) Howard Hudson, #A143-510, had a collapsed lung and waited from January until July 1999 before part of one lobe was surgically removed. Hudson saw the dentist in March 2000 because he needed some teeth. The dentist told him he would be sent to Columbus for an oral surgeon to remove his remaining fourteen teeth. On June 5, 2000, Hudson was taken to the OSP infirmary where two dentists took turns pulling his teeth. They lacked a sink or suction equipment. When Hudson began to choke on the blood, a guard ran out in the hall and brought a waste paper basket for Hudson to spit into. The only medication he was given to relieve pain was Motrin.
(e) Plaintiff TILLEY has been trying for more than a year to get a medical evaluation of solid knots in the lymph nodes in his neck and groin, pressure in his neck/throat, problems in his urogenital area.
77. These incidents represent a pattern and practice in which Defendants departed from or failed to conform to minimal standards of care of similar practitioners under the same or similar circumstances.
Failure and/or Refusal to Provide Psychiatric and/or Psychological Care (A) Suicide
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78. Plaintiffs CASSANO, EASLEY, and MITCHELL are representative of dozens of members of the class who have attempted suicide and continue to be at risk for suicide. Attempted suicides have been dismissed as Amanipulation.@
79. During the first two years of operation, there were three suicides at OSP. (a) Mark DiMarco was transferred to OSP on January 20, 1999 and committed suicide by hanging on February 4, 1999. (b) On July 2, 1999, Anthony Williams cut both of his arms with broken glass. Later that same day he removed a part of the smoke detector and began to cut both arms. He was then placed in the medical unit under suicide watch. When he began to ram his head into the wall of the cell, he was sprayed with chemical agent and secured in four-way restraints. Williams was released from suicide watch on July 7, 1999. He hung himself in his cell on July 9, 1999, and died of his injuries at a local hospital on July 11, 1999. (c) Richard J. Pitts was transferred from Belmont Correctional Institution (medium security) to OSP on January 21, 2000. On April 13, 2000, he left a suicide note in the cuffport of his door and hung himself. 80. Those three suicides constituted over fifteen percent (15%) of all suicides in ODRC prisons from May 1998 through April 2000, although OSP houses only one percent (1%) of Ohio=s prison population. 81. As of November 5, 1999, Mental Health Supervisor Defendant BIGGS reported, forty-one (41) inmates had been placed on suicide watch. Upon information and belief, less than one year later, seventy-six (76) inmates, over fifteen percent (15%) of the population at OSP,
38

had been placed on suicide watch. (B) Failure to Treat Suicidal Prisoners
82. When placed on suicide watch, the inmate is strip searched, and placed in a bare cell with nothing but a suicide gown and suicide blanket. It is cold; air blows on the bed. Plaintiff CASSANO reported that while on suicide watch from September 29 to October 10, 2000, he was strapped down in five-way restraints where all he could move was his head for eight and a half hours, during which time he was wheezing and gasping for breath and his request that his head be elevated was denied. He also reports that he was being injected with drugs that made it harder for him to breathe. He was told if he cut himself again, he would be strapped down for eight (8) to sixteen (16) hours. Such measures do not encourage an inmate to want to live.
83. Michael McWilliams, #327-464, who appeared in a program entitled ALock Up, Lock Down@ on the Discovery Channel, was filmed with a mark on his neck shortly after a suicide attempt. McWilliams has a history of mental health hospitalizations and suicide attempts, had previously been incarcerated in Residential Treatment Units, had 31 conduct reports in two years at OSP, but is not on the mental health caseload at OSP. He did not appeal his high maximum security classification and transfer to OSP because he did not know that he could file an appeal or how to do the paperwork without inmates around him to tell him what to do.
84. Plaintiffs CASSANO and EASLEY repeatedly requested mental health assistance but, despite their suicide attempts or Asuicide gestures,® were not placed on the mental health caseload.
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85. Mental health care at OSP is limited to medication management through antipsychotic or psychotropic drugs and televised programs; psychiatric treatment through psychotherapy is not an option. Psychiatrists are rarely provided, and are therefore deliberately withheld from mentally ill patients who desperately need their help.
86. Mental health rounds for prisoners who are not on the mental health caseload are conducted in the presence of correctional officers and within hearing of other prisoners, depriving prisoners in need of psychological/psychiatric treatment of all privacy and dignity. It also constitutes a powerful disincentive for the inmate to seek treatment.
87. Defendants chain Plaintiffs and class members to a pole on the wall or to the floor during confidential psychological/psychiatric interviews. That practice constitutes further interference with the professional/patient relationship and is a powerful disincentive for the patient/inmate to seek treatment.
88. The totality of conditions at OSP is anti-therapeutic, stressful and debilitating, thus heightening the need for mental health services. For Plaintiffs and members of the class who anive at OSP with serious mental illness or who become seriously mentally ill while incarcerated there, the situation is worsened by:
(a) Lack of effective care and treatment; and (b) Humiliating and degrading conditions under which prisoners communicate with care providers.
COUNT I VIOLATION OF EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TOTALITY OF CONDITIONS AFFECTING PHYSICAL AND MENTAL HEALTH
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89. Plaintiffs and class members reallege paragraphs 1 through 88 as if fully set forth herein.
90. Plaintiffs allege a totality of circumstances at the Ohio State Penitentiary which puts at serious risk a single, identifiable human need, namely, mental health, in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Defendants have knowledge of and are deliberately indifferent to the effects of long term confinement of indefinite duration, in almost total social isolation, under harsh conditions that exceed what is penologically justified.
91. The harsh conditions of confinement at OSP are designed to deprive, and do indeed deprive, the Plaintiffs and their class of the minimum civilized measures of life=s necessities such as physical and mental activity, and impose harsh psychological pain and permanent injury.
92. Defendants prevent Plaintiffs and class members from receiving outdoor recreation in the open air and sun, thus jeopardizing their physical and mental health. Defendants= conduct violates the minimum constitutional standards for long term incarceration.
93. Defendants= routine use of restraints is excessive and goes beyond what is penologically justified. Prolonged use of restraints in routine non-emergency situations is unreasonably and unnecessarily degrading, humiliating and injurious, and runs afoul of minimum constitutional standards. Defendants= chaining of Plaintiffs to a pole on the wall or attaching their handcuffs to the floor during hearings, therapy sessions and other confidential interviews is unreasonably and unnecessarily degrading and humiliating. Defendants= restraining prisoners for hours with their legs shackled, a belly chain tightly fastened around their waists, handcuffs and a Ablack box@ holding their hands and arms in a fixed position, sitting on a stool, while they are
41

securely locked within a visiting booth is unnecessary, painful and degrading. 94. Defendants have been and continue to be deliberately indifferent to the serious
medical and psychological needs of the Plaintiffs and to those of the class they represent. 95. The aforementioned conditions, when combined, constitute an intolerable and
overwhelming burden which causes significant psychological injury to those who are otherwise emotionally healthy and significantly exacerbates pre-existing mental disorders.
96. The serious detrimental psychological effects of long term solitary confinement are well recognized. Plaintiffs and class members at OSP experience intense anger, bitterness, hostility, desire for revenge, depression, and hopelessness as the cumulative result of numerous deprivations deliberately inflicted by the Defendants.
97. The aforementioned violations of constitutional rights have been directly and proximately created, caused, authorized, condoned, ratified, approved or knowingly acquiesced in by the actions, policies and practices devised, promulgated, implemented and maintained by Defendants.
98. At all times herein, by those same acts and omissions, Defendants have acted under color of State law to deprive Plaintiffs and class members of their constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C.' 1983.
99. As a direct, proximate result of Defendants^ acts and omissions, Defendants have violated the basic human dignity of Plaintiffs and their class, and have abridged their right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
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100. Further, a real and immediate threat exists that Defendants will continue to violate the constitutional rights of the Plaintiffs and their class members in the future unless enjoined.
COUNT II VIOLATION OF EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
RECREATION 101. Plaintiffs and class members reallege paragraphs 1 through 100 as if fully set forth herein. 102. The recreational facilities at OSP do not meet the minimum standard for prisoners in segregation set forth by the American Correctional Association (ACA). An ACA committee recommended that OSP provide Aat least a >bull pen= type of recreation area with a ceiling height of at least 15 feet or more.@ 103. The Defendants= long term denial to Plaintiffs and class members of any recreational opportunities to run or walk (except in place), to engage in group sports, to exercise with other prisoners, to exercise in the open air and sunlight, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
COUNT III VIOLATION OF EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS
DENIAL OF TIMELY ACCESS TO MEDICAL CARE 104. Plaintiffs and class members reallege paragraphs 1 through 103 as if fully set forth herein. 105. Plaintiff subclass members are denied timely access to medical care, dental care, and
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II I

I III,

evaluation by specialists. Access to primary care is controlled by the Health Care Administrator and/or staff working under her supervision. Symptoms requiring emergency or urgent care are not promptly recognized and treated.
106. Defendants= deliberate indifference to the Plaintiff subclass of prisoners in serious need of medical or dental care, by denying medicines and other care by a doctor, or by providing care in such a way as to cause acute pain, anxiety, and potentially serious physical and medical injury, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Defendants= actions cause members of this subclass serious and unreasonable harm to their health.
COUNT IV VIOLATION OF EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS
MENTAL ILLNESS 107. Plaintiffs and class members reallege paragraphs 1 through 106 as if fully set forth herein. 108. Defendants= failure to develop an adequate screening process violates the prisoners= rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution inasmuch as prisoners who already suffer from serious psychiatric and psychological illness are placed at OSP, and OSP prisoners who develop mental disorders are retained at OSP. 109. Prisoners who are already mentally ill, or who develop mental or psychological disorders after transfer, suffer irreparable, unreasonable and unnecessary psychological,
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psychiatric and mental injury and damage as a result of their placement and retention at OSP. 110. Defendants= retention at OSP of prisoners who were assigned to OSP despite their
suffering from serious mental disorders or serious psychological illness constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
111. Defendants= deliberate indifference to Plaintiff subclass of persons in serious need of psychiatric and psychological care, who are denied care, or who receive care in a manner that causes further psychological and mental injury, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
COUNT V DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE TO SUICIDE AS CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT AND VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO LIFE PROTECTED BY THE FIFTH, EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS 112. Plaintiffs and class members reallege paragraphs 1 through 111 as if fully set forth herein. 113. Plaintiffs CASSANO, EASLEY and MITCHELL are representative of numerous members of the class who have attempted suicide and continue to be at serious risk for suicide. 114. Defendants created and maintain an environment designed to promote suicides and suicide attempts by Plaintiffs and their class. Despite tight controls on prisoners and high maximum security at OSP which make it difficult for prisoners to attempt suicide, there has been an inordinately high rate of suicides at OSP compared to the general Ohio prison population. See
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1 I

III-

above, paragraph 80. Defendants were and are aware of the severe conditions at OSP and the unreasonably and unnecessarily devastating impact the conditions have had and continue to have on Plaintiffs and their class. Defendants have acted and continue to act with deliberate indifference to the harsh treatment they inflict upon the Plaintiffs and their class, all in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
115. Defendants have been deliberately indifferent to the needs of prisoners who demonstrate suicidal tendencies. Defendants have refused to provide necessary mental health services to treat suicidal prisoners, have not permanently transferred such prisoners out of OSP, have treated such prisoners in a degrading and unnecessarily humiliating manner that encourages instead of discouraging suicides. Defendants= actions seriously threaten suicidal prisoners= right to life under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and their right to be free from cruel and inhuman treatment under the Eighth Amendment.
COUNT VI VIOLATIONS OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW STANDARDS 116. Plaintiffs and class members reallege paragraphs 1 through 115 as if fully set forth herein. 117. Defendants= practices and policies of maintaining prisoners in prolonged, indefinite solitary confinement under the harsh conditions described herein, including but not limited to denial of virtually all meaningful recreational opportunities, the harsh use of restraints and shackles, the denial of vocational opportunities, little or nothing by way of cultural and entertainment opportunities, highly restricted and humiliating conditions for visitation with
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family and loved ones, and denial of necessary medical and psychological services, violate customary international law.
118. The aforesaid harsh system of prolonged, indefinite solitary confinement violates Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which provides that no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, and Article 10 of that Covenant which requires that all persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person. The Covenant has been ratified by the United States, and both provisions of the Covenant reflect customary international law standards.
119. The United Nations Human Rights Committee has determined that prolonged solitary confinement in harsh conditions such as described herein violates the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The United States Department of State has repeatedly defined, in its human rights reports on other countries, torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment to include confinement of prisoners in prolonged periods of solitary confinement.
120. Defendants= denial of any outdoor recreation to prisoners violates customary international law. That customary international law is reflected in Article 21 of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, which requires that each prisoner shall have at least one hour of exercise in the open air daily, and, for young prisoners and others of suitable physique, physical and recreational training, ample space and equipment. The Geneva Convention for the treatment of prisoners of war requires that the detaining power
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ensure that all prisoners have adequate outdoor physical exercise. The United Nations Security Council requires that suspected war criminals held under UN authority shall receive at least one hour of outdoor exercise daily.
121. The unnecessarily harsh methods of restraint employed by Defendants such as chaining prisoners= hands to a pole or to the floor during confidential interviews, or use of the Ablack box@ during family visits violates Articles 33 and 34 of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners which say that chains or irons shall not be used as restraints, and that other instruments of restraint must not be applied for any longer time than is strictly necessary.
122. Defendants= aforesaid violations of customary international law are actionable in this court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. ' 1983 in that customary international law has been held, since the Constitution=s adoption, to be a part of the laws of the United States.
COUNT VII VIOLATION OF FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS
ATYPICAL AND SIGNIFICANT HARDSHIP DURATION/DUE PROCESS
123. Plaintiffs and class members reallege paragraphs 1 through 122 as if fully set forth herein.
124. Plaintiffs and class members have been deprived of a liberty interest without due process of law in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
125. The conditions of confinement at the hands of Defendants impose atypical and 48

significant hardship as compared with the ordinary incidents of prison life. Incarceration at OSP constitutes a major disruption in the life of the prisoner.
126. Confinement at OSP imposes an atypical and significant hardship as compared with the ordinary incidents of prison life for three basic reasons involving (a) conditions at OSP, (b) duration of confinement at OSP, and (c) effect on parole eligibility and overall length of imprisonment.
(A) Conditions at OSP 127. The conditions at OSP are so harsh as to be atypical not merely in relation to general population in the typical prison or maximum security prison in Ohio, but even when compared to Ohio prisoners in administrative or disciplinary segregation. Those atypical conditions include but are not limited to: complete isolation in cells that are sealed off from communication with other prisoners; lack of outdoor recreation or any recreation that allows a prisoner to run, walk more than a few steps, or play with a ball; atypically harsh and unnecessary use of restraints including having the hands chained to a pole or to the floor during confidential interviews; having a Ablack box@ restraining the hands during family visits; and total deprivation at level I of any outside visitors except legal counsel. Such conditions are not typically imposed on prisoners in disciplinary or administrative segregation.
(B) Duration of Confinement at OSP 128. The long-term and indefinite duration of confinement at OSP for most prisoners is atypical even in comparison with prisoners in other kinds of segregation in Ohio. 129. A prisoner can be released from Administrative Control into general population
49

L_J

• »I

without a reclassification review, merely upon a 90-day review. Release from OSP requires reclassification, subject to approval by the North Regional Director, and reclassification reviews only take place annually.
130. Numerous Plaintiffs and class members have been confined at OSP for more than two and a half years. The minimum time a prisoner would normally spend at OSP is over two years. Plaintiffs and other class members face the reasonable expectation that they will be imprisoned at OSP for years to come, or for the rest of their lives.
(O Overall Length of Imprisonment 131. Plaintiffs and class members have no possibility of being released on parole while they are at OSP and for more than a year after they are released from high maximum security. Projected Release Dates given by the Adult Parole Board are contingent on the prisoner being reduced to a security status below maximum. Thus, after release from high maximum to maximum security, a prisoner is expected to spend a year or more in maximum security before he is reclassified to Aclose@ security and eligibility for parole. 132. Plaintiff BONNER and a significant number of other class members have missed one or more Projected Release Dates by being retained at OSP, despite the Parole Board finding time served well over the guideline range and that the inmate appears ready for release. See Exhibit IC. Classification in high maximum security and retention at OSP is an absolute barrier to parole, for prisoners whose sentences permit parole, extending the period of ineligibility for parole by at least the number of years spent at OSP.
(D) Due Process
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133. Criteria employed by Defendants to reclassify Plaintiffs and class members to high maximum security, and to transfer them to OSP, violate their due process rights. The criteria are vague and overbroad, and are applied arbitrarily and capriciously. For example, Plaintiffs have been transferred to OSP despite:
(a) having not had any rules infractions or conduct reports for months or years prior to their high maximum reclassification and transfer; or,
(b) having been acquitted in a court of law for the offense for which they were reclassified to high maximum security and transferred to OSP; or,
(c) being transferred in violation of existing rules such as AR 5120-9-12 which prohibits housing of Death Row inmates with non-Death Row inmates, or ODRC Policy 111-07 which prohibits seriously mentally ill inmates from being imprisoned at OSP.
134. Defendants violated the procedural rights of Plaintiffs and class members, set forth in AR 5120-9-52, -53, and -21, in that many prisoners were not provided with notice of the reasons for their transfer, did not have a hearing or conference or an opportunity to make an oral or written statement challenging their transfer before they were transferred to OSP, were not given 24 hours notice prior to their transfer, nor provided with notification of their right to appeal their high maximum security classification and transfer to OSP.
135. The criteria and procedures for progressing within the levels at OSP are vague and overbroad, have been repeatedly changed and applied retroactively, and are applied arbitrarily and capriciously in violation of Plaintiffs= and class members= due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Prisoners can comply with their
51

Behavior Management plan or contract, have no incident reports, and still not be promoted from one level to another. They may be arbitrarily demoted without being given written reasons or an opportunity to defend themselves. Time periods for level review are not routinely met.
136. The criteria and procedures for being transferred out of OSP and being reclassified from high maximum security are vague and applied arbitrarily and capriciously in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
137. Numerous Plaintiffs and class members are recommended for release from OSP by the Reclassification Review Committee, yet that recommendation is denied by Defendants at Central Office for reasons that are arbitrary and capricious.
138. Appeal is to the same person(s) who disapproved the recommendation of the Reclassification Review Committee. Plaintiffs and the class they represent have no adequate procedures to challenge Defendants= decision not to transfer them out of high maximum security.
139. Numerous Plaintiffs and class members who have been approved for release from OSP continue to be held at OSP for months because of lack of bed space in a maximum security prison.
140. The atypical and significant hardship that a prisoner faces when placed in high maximum security at OSP requires that he be afforded a high level of procedural protection. Procedures now in place are inadequate given the indefinite and lengthy duration of incarceration under these extraordinary conditions.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs and class members respectfully request that the Court: 1. Certify this case as a class action; 2. Issue a declaratory judgment that the Defendants= actions, practices, customs and policies, and those of all persons acting on their behalf and/or their agents and/or employees, alleged herein are illegal and violate the constitutional rights of the class members under 42 U.S.C. ' 1983 as to each count; 3. Permanently enjoin the Defendants from operating the OSP as a high maximum security prison, or in the alternative, convert OSP from a high maximum security prison to a maximum security prison; 4. To remedy existing Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment and customary international law violations: (a) Permanently and preliminarily enjoin Defendants from operating OSP without providing for outdoor recreation with enough area to walk, run, and play at least some recreational sports with a ball; (b) Permanently and preliminarily enjoin Defendants from transferring prisoners with serious mental illness to OSP and/or keeping prisoners with serious mental illness at OSP and/or returning prisoners to OSP after they have been removed for reasons of mental health; and preliminarily ordering the appointment of an independent psychiatric expert to determine which prisoners currently housed at OSP are seriously mentally ill, whose continued confinement at OSP therefore violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and poses a serious risk of harm to themselves.
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(c) Permanently and preliminarily enjoin Defendants from using the unnecessarily harsh restraints used at OSP including chaining inmates to a pole, wall or floor, and restraining their hands with a Ablack box@ while locked inside the visiting booth.
(d) Permanently enjoin Defendants from refusing to provide or significantly delaying necessary medical care to prisoners who have serious and/or urgent and/or prolonged and painful medical conditions.
5. To remedy Fourteenth Amendment due process violations: (a) Permanently enjoin Defendants from transferring prisoners to OSP or retaining prisoners at OSP on the basis of vague and overbroad criteria. (b) Permanently enjoin Defendants from transferring to OSP prisoners who have had no rule infractions or conduct reports within one year prior to their transfer, or who are on Death Row, or from retaining at OSP any prisoner based upon an alleged infraction for which he has been found not guilty by a court of law, or for gang leadership or membership, absent actual dangerous or predatory behavior by that prisoner within one year of their transfer to OSP. (c) Permanently enjoin Defendants from transferring prisoners to OSP without first providing them with
(i) detailed, individualized, written reasons for their confinement at OSP; (ii) an opportunity to make an oral or written statement challenging their transfer; (iii) a formal hearing at which the prisoner can challenge his transfer and present reasons why he should not be transferred; and (iv) notice of the right to appeal and the procedures to be followed to appeal the
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reclassification to high maximum security and transfer to OSP. (d) Permanently enjoin Defendants from keeping prisoners indefinitely at OSP. Any
prisoner kept in high maximum security confinement for more than one year should be able to obtain review of the placement from an impartial, independent authority.
(e) Permanently enjoin Defendants from keeping prisoners in high maximum security at OSP without clear standards, timetable, and plan for their release from high maximum security to general population at a lower security level.
(f) Permanently enjoin Defendants from operating OSP without meaningful review every 90 days.
(g) Permanently enjoin Defendants from refusing to release a prisoner from OSP who has been recommended for transfer by the Reclassification Review Committee without first providing the prisoner with:
(i) detailed, individualized, written reasons for denying his transfer along with the Committee=s recommendation, and
(ii) a formal hearing before an impartial, independent authority to determine whether or not he should be released from high maximum security.
(h) Permanently enjoin Defendants from retaining at OSP for any significant period of time, under high maximum security conditions, prisoners who have been approved for transfer out of OSP.
6. Appoint a Special Master to assist in fashioning remedies and to monitor the implementation of those remedies.
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7. Order such further relief as necessary to ensure that Defendants operate OSP in compliance with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and customary international law.
8. Order such further relief as the Court considers just and proper. Respectfully submitted,

Bill Goodman, Legal Director Center for Constitutional Rights 666 Broadway, 7th Floor New York, NY 10012 Phone: (212)614-6427 Fax: (212)614-6499 E-mail: bgoodma@ccr-ny.org

Raymond Vasvari, Legal Director American Civil Liberties Union of
Ohio Foundation, Inc. 1266 West 6th Street Cleveland, OH 44113-1330 Phone:(216)781-8639 Fax: (216)781-6438 E-mail: ACLURV@en.com Ohio Bar Reg. No. 0055538

Jules Lobel, CCR Cooperating Atty. 3900 Forbes Avenue Pittsburgh, PA 15260 Phone:(412)648-1375 Fax: (412)648-2649 E-mail: lobel@law.pitt.edu

Michael Benza, Volunteer Atty. American Civil Liberties Union of
Ohio Foundation, Inc. Jeffry F. Kelleher & Associates 1540 Leader Building Cleveland, OH 44114 Phone:(216)241-0520 Fax: (216)696-6961 E-mail: attymjbenza@bwn.net Ohio Bar Reg. No. 0061454

Terry Gilbert, CCR Cooperating Atty. 1700Standard Building Cleveland, OH 44113 Phone:(216)241-1430 Fax: (216)621-0427

Jillian Davis, Staff Counsel American Civil Liberties Union of
Ohio Foundation, Inc. 1266 West 6th Street Cleveland, OH 44113-1330

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E-mail: tgilbert@f-glaw.com OhioBarReg. No. 0021948

Phone: (216)781-8479 Fax: (216)781-6438 E-mail: davis@acluohio.org Ohio Bar Reg. No. 0067272
Alice Lynd, Of Counsel to American Civil Liberties Union of
Ohio Foundation, Inc. 1694 Timbers Court Niles, OH 44446-3941 Phone:(330) 652-9635 Fax: (330)652-0171 E-mail: salynd@aol.com Ohio Bar Reg. No. 0029876
Staughton Lynd, Of Counsel to American Civil Liberties Union of
Ohio Foundation, Inc. 1694 Timbers Court Niles, OH 44446-3941 Phone: (330)652-9635 Fax: (330)652-0171 E-mail: salynd@aol.com Ohio Bar Reg. No. 0013512

57

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

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:

CHARLES E. AUSTIN et al.,

:

:

Plaintiffs,

:

:

vs.

:

:

REGINALD WILKINSON et al.,

:

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Defendants.

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:

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CASE NO. 4:01-cv-0071
ORDER AND OPINION [Resolving Doc. Nos. 655, 681, 696]

JAMES S. GWIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Before the Court are three motions: (1) the Defendants’ motion to Terminate the Stipulation for Injunctive Relief [Doc. 655]; (2) the Plaintiffs’ motion to extend the medical provisions of the Stipulation for Injunctive Relief until July 7, 2007 [Doc. 681]; and (3) the Defendants’ motion to terminate the medical provisions of the Stipulation for Injunctive Relief [Doc. 696] . For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS the Defendants’ motion to terminate the Stipulation for Injunctive Relief, DENIES the Plaintif fs’ motion to extend the medical provisions of the Stipulation for Injunctive Relief until July 7, 2007, and GRANTS theDefendants’ motion to terminate the medical provisions of the Stipulation for Injunctive Relief.
I. Background The Court has described this case’s underlyi ng facts several tim es previously. For a thorough iteration of those facts, the Court directs the reader specifically to the Court’s March 26, 2002 Order approving the Stipulation for Injunctive Relief [Doc. 259] and its March 21, 2006 Order

-1-

Case No. 4:01-cv-0071 Gwin, J. and Opinion [Doc. 659]. The Court briefly relates the relevant procedural history below.
On January 9, 2001, the Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendant Ohio, saying that their conditions of confinem ent at the Ohio State Pe nitentiary (“OSP”) presented an atypical and significant hardship when compared with the normal incidents of prison life. The Plaintiffs said that Ohio imposed these c onditions without Due Pr ocess of Law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. On February 25, 2002, this Court found that the Plaintiffs enjoyed a constitutionally protected liberty interest i n avoiding confinement at OSP [Doc. 227]. On March 26, 2002, this Court granted the Plaintiffs injunctive relief, which was to continue for two years [Doc. 259]. On April 5, 2002, the Court approved the parties’ Stipulation for Injunctive Relief [Doc. 265].1
Ohio appealed the Court’s March 26, 2002 Orderto the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and then to the Supreme Court. Both courts held, as this Court did, that the Plaintiffs enjoyed a protected liberty interest in avoiding confinement at OSP. 545 U.S. 209, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 2395 (2005); 372 F.3d 346, 355 (6th Cir. 2001). The Suprem e Court, however, reversed part of this Court’s procedural order and remanded the case. 545 U.S. 209.
On November 22, 2005, Judge Beckwithof the Southern Districtof Ohio issued an order in Fussell v. Wilkinson that approved the parties’ Stipulation for Injunctive Relief. 2005 WL 3132321 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 22, 2005). In that case, Ohio Deprtament of Rehabilitation and Corrections inmates with “serious medical and dental needs” petitioned for “unimpeded access” to appropriate health care, healthy food, and health education. Id. at *1. The court found the jointly proposed settlement

1

The stipulation provides, among other things, that “any inmate who meets the exclusionary criteria

[for mental illness as described in Department policies] should not be transferred to OSP, and that

any inmate currently housed at OSP who, after evaluation, is deemed to meet exclusionary criteria

should be transferred to another institution.” (Apr. 5, 2002 Inj. Rel. ¶ 17.) Notwithstanding this

Order’s other language, this prohibition on housing inmates with mental illness at OSP shall

remain in force.

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Case No. 4:01-cv-0071 Gwin, J. agreement to be fair, adequate, and reasonable, and approved it without a trial. Id. at *3-*4. The agreement called for, inter alia, a system-wide monitoring system to ensure compliance with the terms of the judgment.
On December 19, 2005, following the Fussell judgment, Ohio filed a motion to terminate the Stipulation for Injunctive Relief in this case [Doc. 655]. The Plaintiffsfiled a brief in opposition [Doc. 656]. On June 19, 2006, the Plaintiffs fileda motion to extend the medical provisions of the Stipulation for Injunctive Relief until July 7, 2007 [Doc. 681]. On July 28, 2006 the Defendants filed another motion to terminate the medical provisions of the Stipulation for Injunctive Relief [Doc. 696] and an opposition to the Plaintiffs’ motion [Doc. 681] to extend the medical provisions of the Stipulation for Injunctive Relief [Doc. 697].
The Court considers the several motions over the continuation or termination of the medical provisions of the April 5, 2002 stipulation for injunctive relief.
II. Legal Standard The Prison Litigation ReformAct (“PLRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3626et seq., governs the standard for continuing or term inating injunctive relief in prison litigation. Id. § 3626(b)(1). T he PLRA provides that prospective relief will generally remain in effect for two years and terminate on the defendant’s motion at the end of the prescribed period. Id. A court may continue the prospective relief if it finds that (1) such relief remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of a federal right and (2) that the prospective relief is narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation. Id. § 3626(b)(3). Because Ohio has moved for termination of the prospective relief, the Court determines whether that relief “remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of a Federal right.”Id. If such
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Case No. 4:01-cv-0071 Gwin, J. a violation is found and the Court determines that prospective relief is necessary to correct it, the Court must order relief that “is narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means necessary.” Id.
III. Analysis In support of its motion, Ohio argues that relief is no longer appropriate because there reamin no current and ongoing violations of OSP inmates’ right to medical care. Ohio further argues that the Fussell Stipulated Judgment ensures adequate system -wide medical and dental care, thus rendering this Court’s oversight redundant. (Defs.’ Mot. Term. Stip. Inj. Relief 6.) The Plaintiffs oppose the motion and move for a one-year continuation of the prospective relief. The Plaintiffs disagree with the Defendants’ position, arguing that Ohio is com mitting ongoing violations of the prisoners’ federal rights. Specifically, they say that Ohio is violating the inmates’ Eighth Amendment right to be free from Cruel and Unusual Punishment. The Plaintiffs concede, however, that the Fussell stipulation will generally provide oversight to m onitor and address potential future issues. (Pls.’ Mem. Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Terminate Stip. Inj. Relief 1.) The Court finds that termination of the stipulated injunctive reliefis appropriate at this point. This is so for two reasons. First, the Plaintiffs have failed to show that any continuing medical care delivery problems rise to Eighth Amendment violations. Second, the Court believes that theFussell stipulation will provide adequate oversight and protection against inadequate future medical care. The Court articulates the rationale for these findings. A. Eighth Amendment Violations The Plaintiffs say that Ohio continues to violate the Plaintif fs’ federal right to healthcare primarily by disrupting prisoners’ health care acce ss and treatment. Specifically, the Plaintiffs allege that prison officials have denied appropriate prisone rs referrals to the doctor’s sick call.
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Case No. 4:01-cv-0071 Gwin, J. Moreover, they say that prison officials have notadequately addressed the long delays of prisonerpatients’ waiting to see a doctor. Second, the Plaintiffs contend that prison guards and of ficials continue to breach prisoner confidentiality by beingpresent during doctor’s sick call. Additionally, the Plaintiffs allege that the medical staff interferes with treatment delivery by failing to timely fill prescriptions and dis continuing certain prescriptions without any m edical examination. The Plaintiffs finally allege that OSP’ s lack of a chief m edical officer further exacerbates these shortcomings. (Pls.’ Mem. Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Terminate Stip. Inj. Relief 2.)
The Plaintiffs’ allegations, if true, raise some genuine concerns about the inmates’ access to quality health care, but they do not rise to Eighth Amendment violations. Courts have made it clear that “[t]he Eighth Amendment is not a basis for broad prison reform.” Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 745 (9th Cir. 2002) (quotingHoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir.1982)). “[The Eighth Amendment] requires neitherthat prisons be comfortable nor that they provide every amenity that one might find desirable. Rather, the Eighth Amendment proscribes only the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). Further, punishment is only Cruel and Unusual where it is“so totally without penological justification that it results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering.” Id.
Where, as here, a plaintiff specifically alleges that lack of access to prison medical care constitutes Cruel and Unusual Punishment, the plaintiff faces a high standard: “Because society does not expect that prisoners will have unqualified access to health care, deliberate indifference to medical needs amounts to an Eighth Amendment violation only if those needs are serious.”Harris v. Kowalski, 2006 WL 1313863, at *6 (W.D. Mich. May 12, 2006) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992)).
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Case No. 4:01-cv-0071 Gwin, J.
To show a constitutional violation of a prisoner’s right to medical care, a plaintiff must satisfy both an objective and subjective test. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1991). To fulfill the objective portion, a plaintiff must first show “that the medical need at issue is ‘sufficiently serious.’” Comstock v. McCrary, 243 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)).
To satisfy the subjective com ponent, a plain tiff must further show tha t the defendant “subjectively perceived facts from which to infer substantial risk to the prisoner, that he did in fact draw the inference, and that he then disregarded that risk.” Id. at 703. To show deliberate indifference, a prisoner m ust show that prison officials “‘ den[ied], delay[ed], or intentionally interfere[d] with medical treatment’” in addressing a prisoner’s serious medical needs Hamilton v. Endell, 981 F.2d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir.1992) (quotingHunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. 1989)). Therefore, prison officials violatea prisoner’s Eighth Amendment right to medical care only when they “are deliberately indifferentto the prisoner’s serious medical needs” Comstock, 243 F.3d at 702.
The Plaintiffs have failed to m eet this high standard. The Plaintiffs offer evidence that inmates continue to experience breaches in doctor-patient conf identiality, alterations to their prescriptions without medical examination, and long delays before seeing the doctor or having prescriptions filled. (Pls.’ Mem. Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Terminate Stip. Inj. Relief 2.) Though these allegations should trouble the prison officials responsible for their care, the allegations do not meet the objective test standards. The allegations do not clearly show that these prisoners’emdical needs were sufficiently serious, nor do they demonstrate that Ohio’s failure to address those needs inflicted pain or caused unnecessary suffering. Moreover, thPe laintiffs have not presented facts showing that
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Case No. 4:01-cv-0071 Gwin, J. prison officials acted with deliberate indifference.
Therefore, the Plaintiffs have not shown an ongoing violation of their Eighth Amendment rights. Finding no current and ongoing federal rights violation, Ohio’s m otion to terminate the injunctive relief must be granted. B. The Fussell Stipulation
The Fussell stipulation provides additional grounds for granting Ohio’s motion. As noted above, Fussell is a class action lawsuit challenging the medial care deliv ery in Ohio’s prison system. Under the terms of the settlement agreement, Ohio must provide prisoners with systemwide medical and dental services at “a level within the framework of the Eighth Amendment and consistent with generally accepted m edical science and of a quality acceptable within prudent professional standards.” (Defs.’ Mot. Terminate Stip. Inj. Relief Ex. E 7.) TheFussell stipulation also creates a multi-disciplinary Medical OversightCommittee responsible for monitoring the prison system’s administration of medical and dental care and enforcing terms of this stipulation.
Ohio argues–and the Plaintiffs do not dispute–that this procedure adequately protects inamtes against potential future abuses. The Plaintiffs, however, state that the Fussell Stipulation’s protections are not currently in effect at OSP. (Pls.’ Mem. Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Terminate Stip. Inj. Relief 3.) However, as stated above, the Cour t finds no current and ongoing violat ions of t he inmates’ federal rights. Should such violations arise in the future, the Fussell stipulation provides the inmates with sufficient means to protect their federal rights. Like the stipulation at issue here, the Fussell stipulation will suffice to deter–and correct, if necessary–any future violations.
IV. Conclusion For these reasons the Court does not find that prospective relief “remains necessary to correct
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Case No. 4:01-cv-0071 Gwin, J.

a current and ongoing violation of the Federal right.” Therefore the Court

GRANTS the

Defendants’ motion to terminate the Stipulation for Injunctive Relief . The Court DENIES the

Plaintiffs’ motion to extend the medical provisions of the Stipulation for Injunctive Relief until July

7, 2007. Finally, the Court GRANTS the Defendants’ motion to terminate the medical provisions

of the Stipulation for Injunctive Relief.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 3, 2006

s/

James S. Gwin

JAMES S. GWIN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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 189 F.Supp.2d 719 (2002)
Charles E. AUSTIN, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Reginald WILKINSON, et al., Defendants.
No. 4:01-CV-71.
United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.
February 25, 2002.
7201 *720 *721 Alice Lynd, Law Office of Staughton & Alice Lynd, Niles, Bill Goodman, Center for Constitutional Rights, New York, NY, Jillian S. Davis, American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio, Cleveland, Jules L. Lobel, Pittsburgh, PA, Michael J. Benza, Law Office of Jeffry F. Kelleher, Raymond V. Vasvari, Jr., American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio, Cleveland, Staughton Lynd, Law Office of Staughton & Alice Lynd, Niles, Terry H. Gilbert, Friedman & Gilbert, Cleveland, for Michael Benge, Alonzo L. Bonner, Plaintiffs.
Carol H. O'Brien, Office of the Attorney General, State of Ohio, Corrections Litigation Section, Jeffrey A. Stankunas, Isaac, Brant, Ledman & Teetor, Joseph M. Mancini, Office of the Attorney General, State of Ohio, Corrections Litigation Section, Columbus, Marianne Pressman, Office of the Attorney General, State of Ohio, Corrections Litigation Section, Cincinnati, Mark Landes, Isaac, Brant, Ledman & Teetor, Columbus, for Stephen J Huffman, Bernard J. Ryznar, Todd E. Ishee, Bruce A. Martin, Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
GWIN, District Judge.
In this case, a class of current and former prisoners at the Ohio State Penitentiary ("OSP") says the defendants, all employees of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (the "Department"), violated their constitutional rights by denying them due process in their placement and retention at the OSP. The plaintiffs say conditions at the OSP give rise to a liberty interest because they impose an atypical and significant hardship on the prisoners in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995). Despite the existence of this liberty interest, the plaintiff prisoners claim the procedures used by the defendants in transferring them to the OSP and retaining them at the institution deny them due process.
722 *722 Responding, the defendants deny that conditions at the OSP are atypical or impose a significant hardship. In major part, the defendants argue that the Court should compare the plaintiffs' conditions to those of other inmates at the OSP or to inmates in similar facilities in other states when determining whether the conditions are atypical. The defendants alternatively argue that, if a liberty interest is found, they afford sufficient process to the inmates.
From January 2, 2002 through January 10, 2002, the Court conducted a bench trial on this matter at which it heard from twenty witnesses and accepted over one thousand pages of exhibits. After considering all of the evidence, and as hereinafter described, the Court finds that the nature and duration of restrictions at the OSP are conditions not expected by those serving similar incarcerations. The Court makes this determination despite finding that the current operation of the OSP, under the progressive stewardship of Warden Todd Ishee, has greatly improved inmates' treatment. Instead, the Court finds that inmates at the OSP face an atypical and significant hardship even under Warden Ishee's sensible leadership.
In laying out its decision, the Court first describes the conditions at the OSP. Next, the Court discusses its holding that confinement at the OSP is an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. After discussing the nature of the confinement at OSP, the Court considers the process afforded to inmates in

challenging their initial placement and subsequent retention at the OSP. Finally, the Court discusses the appropriate remedy for the constitutional violation that it finds.
I. Factual Background and Discussion
In this case, the plaintiffs represent a class of current and former inmates at the OSP. They sue certain state officials for violation of their constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.[1] The plaintiffs sue the named defendants in their official capacities only for purposes of injunctive relief. Originally, the plaintiffs' suit alleged that the defendants operation of the OSP was a violation of a number of the inmates' Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The parties have settled most of the claims. The only claim left at trial was the plaintiffs' claim that the defendants violated their right to due process in the selection and retention of inmates for the OSP.
A. Purpose of the Ohio State Penitentiary
The OSP is a high maximum security facility, also known as a "supermax" facility, located in Hubbard, Ohio, near 723 the city of Youngstown.[2] Constructed in reaction *723 to the April 1993 riot at the Southern Ohio Correctional
Facility at Lucasville, the OSP supermax prison first received inmates in May 1998. The OSP was designed to house 504 male inmates in single-inmate cells. The OSP was designed as "a more secure facility, to handle prisoners who were hellbent on disrupting the orderly operation of our correctional institutions." (Wilkinson Dep. at 8). Ohio intended the OSP be "a location in the state that we can separate the most predatory and dangerous prisoners from the rest of the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction's general population." (Wilkinson Dep. at 24-25).
The OSP carries out this goal primarily through solitary confinement 0907 extended periods of incarceration in which the inmate is kept alone in his cell and has minimal contact with the outside world. In other prisons, this type of confinement is commonly referred to as "segregation." The stark conditions and psychological consequences of solitary confinement at the OSP are noticeably different than at other Ohio prisons.
Before describing the conditions at the OSP, the Court notes that it was presented with evidence at trial suggesting that Ohio does not need a high maximum security prison or does not need one with the capacity of the OSP. Peter Davis, a member of the Ohio Parole Board and former executive director of the Correctional Institution Inspection Committee of the Ohio General Assembly, testified about the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction's use of the J-1 cellblock at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility. The Southern Ohio Correctional Facility is Ohio's only maximum security prison, the security level immediately below the OSP's high maximum security level.[3] The J-1 area is a self-contained cellblock of twenty cells that has tighter access requirements and allows less movement of inmates than a typical maximum security cell at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility. The J-1 cellblock is the most restrictive cellblock within the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility. Before the OSP opened, the J-1 cellblock was the most restrictive and isolated cellblock in the Ohio prison system. (Davis Test. at 117-19).
Suggestive that Ohio never needed the 504-inmate capacity of the OSP, before the OSP was built, Ohio did not fill the J-1 cells at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility. (Davis Test. at 119). Instead, Ohio faced a different problem. It did not have a sufficient number of maximum security cells, the level below the OSP's high maximum security cells. The deficit of maximum security cells and the surplus of high maximum cells causes an imbalance in assigning inmates to appropriate confinement.
In December 1998, a Department of Rehabilitation and Correction quality review team made up entirely of correctional officials reviewed the operations at the OSP.[4] The quality review report supports the plaintiffs' claim that no clear standard describes which inmates would be placed at the OSP:
When asked about the inmate population for which OSP is intended most all respondents cite "the worst of the worst." This concept has proven difficult to operationalize, particularly when we go beyond the 200 or so inmates who are clearly OSP material. Identifying those inmates who

724

represent the "lighter" end of high maximum has become clouded *724 by the overlap and

similarity in characteristics among high close, maximum, maximum A.C. and high maximum

inmates.

(Pls.' Ex. 10 at 2).

The Department of Rehabilitation and Correction assigns inmates to the OSP from a conflicted position. The opening of the OSP has created too much capacity for the highest level of security. At the same time, Ohio lacks sufficient capacity at maximum security, the level of confinement below the OSP's high maximum security level. After the huge investment in the OSP, Ohio risks having a "because we have built it, they will come" mind set. As a result, the defendants consider inmates for placement at the OSP who do not need its level of restrictions.

B. Conditions at the Ohio State Penitentiary

Conditions at the OSP are significantly more restrictive than at other correctional facilities of the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. First, inmates at the OSP are kept in their single cells for twenty-three hours a day. An inmate's cell measures approximately 89.7 square feet and is sealed with a solid metal door. The cell door has a small, thick glass window. The door also has a "food slot" or "cuff port" that an officer may unlock to insert food or mail, and that is also used to put handcuffs on the prisoner before the door is opened. Inmates eat all meals alone in their cells.
The Department has made the cells more isolated by installing metal strips to the bottom and sides of the cells doors at the end of 2000. Before installation of the metal strips, the doors had half-inch gaps along the sides and two- to three-inch gaps along the bottom. The Department installed the strips ostensibly to stop the throwing of urine or feces, although the defendants did not give specific testimony of the frequency of such incidents. The Department does not use these metal strips at any other institution.
The OSP cells have a narrow outside window that cannot be opened. These small windows do not comply with the square footage standard established by the American Correctional Association. An inmate has no control over the heating and cooling of his cell or the amount and temperature of air blowing through the cell. The cells are sparsely furnished, containing only a sink, a toilet, a small desk, and an immovable stool. Inmates sleep on a narrow concrete slab with a thin mattress, a pillow, a pillow case, a blanket, and a set of sheets. A light remains on at all times, although the light can be dimmed. The Department strictly limits the personal property an inmate may have at the OSP.
An inmate at the OSP may only leave his cell for one hour a day. During that hour, inmates have access to a recreation area with two rooms. In one of these rooms, the inmates can use minimal exercise equipment. In the other room, a slot with a grate that is approximately six inches wide by four feet high allows outside air to circulate through the room. The room gives the sensory impression of a closed room with a small screen opening to the outdoors. Both recreation rooms are cells within the building. Until recently, recreation for all inmates at the OSP was solitary. Now, however, a limited number of inmates at the OSP may have recreation with one other prisoner.
The ceiling height of the recreation rooms do not meet the American Correctional Association's established standard. After auditing the conditions at the OSP, the American Correctional Association also found that the OSP did not comply with its standards for outdoor recreation.
The OSP is significantly more restrictive than other Ohio correctional facilities, including those facilities housing 725 inmates under administrative control.[5] The other *725 Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction
facilities do not lack outdoor recreation.[6] In contrast to inmates at the OSP, inmates in administrative control on death row at the Mansfield Correctional Institution have outdoor recreation, more access to personal property, more access to telephone usage, and more access to counsel. (Jason Robb Test. at 153-54).
Administrative control prisoners at the Lebanon Correctional Institution, Orient Correctional Institution, and Lorain Correctional Institution live in open-faced cells. The Lebanon facility allows administrative control inmates access

to basketball courts and work-out areas. At the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility, administrative control inmates live in cells with bars, not solid doors, and have outside recreation available every day. Similarly, the Trumbull Correctional Facility has outdoor recreation. Most important to the quality of conditions, Ohio's other facilities all afford inmates a much greater ability to communicate with other persons. The conditions at the OSP do not allow any amelioration of the prolonged isolation designed into the OSP's structure.
The Department of Rehabilitation and Correction also restricts inmates at the OSP more intensely during the brief periods they are outside their cells. For example, until very recently, the defendants required inmates receiving visitors to be shackled into an uncomfortable "black box" that contorted their wrists. In addition, inmates having visitors are still required to be stripped searched when they leave their cellblock and when they reenter the cellblock. The OSP subjects inmates to these searches even though the visits are made through solid windows that do not allow any possible contact with the visitor.
The Department also limits contact between fellow OSP inmates. As described above, inmates always eat alone. They usually exercise alone, although now some inmates may occasionally exercise with one other inmate. Inmates are not permitted to share books, magazines, or other personal property. With the exception of some recently introduced group counseling sessions, inmates have almost no verbal communication with any other individual.[7] The defendants' expert, James Austin, described this:
Q: When you were there, did you observe inmates communicating with one another?
A: No. I observed there was some indications where they have two inmates who are recreating together, but I didn't0907I didn't notice much communication because the inmates were almost always being brought out in isolation with no I0907 didn't see any contact with other inmates except for those situations in the housing units where they could recreate together.
(Austin Test. at 1020).
The OSP's limitation upon communication contrasts with conditions at other correctional facilities, including 726 administrative *726 control units at Ohio's other prisons. For example, inmate James DeJarnette testified that
inmates in administrative control at the Orient Correctional Institution can easily communicate through their bar doors. Such communication is next to impossible in the OSP with metal strips around the edges of the solid metal cell doors.
Once at the OSP, an inmate faces different levels of restriction based on the classification level to which he is assigned. There are three classification levels, and the levels are assigned to discipline and to reward. After orientation, the OSP classifies most inmates at Level II. After approximately one or two years without problems, inmates can progress to Level III with attendant additional privileges. Similarly, the OSP assigns inmates who violate prison rules to Level I. Level I is the most restricted confinement possible and may last for an indefinite period of time. At Level I, prisoners receive no visitors except for their attorneys and receive no phone calls apart from calls with their attorneys or for family emergencies.
At the OSP, inmates are normally allowed to make one ten-minute phone call a week. Under the Department's new policy, effective March 1, 2002, inmates will only be allowed two ten-minute calls a month. Under the same policy change, the Department will reduce recreation outside the cell from seven one-hour periods per week to five one-hour periods a week.
At the OSP, inmates do not participate in any prison-based work. One inmate per cellblock is responsible for keeping the area tidy. Except for the rare visitor and one hour a day of recreation, inmates remain in their cells. The OSP has no educational programs beyond the GED level. Instructional programs come to inmates through closed-circuit television and self-study workbooks. Most mental health programs available to the inmates also come through the small black and white television sets inmates are allowed in their rooms.
In conclusion, inmates at the OSP live under significantly different conditions than prisoners at Ohio's other correctional facilities, including those prisoners with maximum security classifications and those prisoners with maximum security classifications who are currently in administrative control.

The Court now turns to a discussion of the defendants' current procedures for selecting which inmates are placed at the OSP.

C. Selection Procedures and Consequences of Placement at the Ohio State Penitentiary

The plaintiffs challenge the procedures the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction uses to select inmates for placement and retention at the OSP. Regarding placement at the OSP, the Department first transferred inmates to the OSP in early May 1998. At the time of this initial transfer, the Department had no policy in effect identifying which inmates could suitably be placed at the OSP. Without any transfer policy in place, the Department simply relied upon wardens to choose inmates for transfer. Without any set criteria, similarly situated inmates were often treated differently. Peter Davis, an Ohio Parole Board member and former director of the Ohio General Assembly's prison oversight committee, testified:

The only thing that's clear is, as I've said here, for every inmate that was cited to me and the reasons why that person was sent there, for this particular act, this assaultive behavior, if you will, we knew for a fact of plenty other inmates that were at other institutions, even close security institutions, that were not transferred there.

727

*727 My frustration was trying to understand how the criteria was being applied, whether or not it

was being applied consistently at all institutions on referral, whether or not it was being applied

consistently at central office level in those determinations.

Just simply was no way to understand how one assaultive inmate could get high max placement and other assaultive inmates could not.

(Davis Test. at 126).

On August 31, 1998, the defendants attempted to establish some predictability to placement at the OSP by issuing Department of Rehabilitation and Correction Policy 111-07 ("Policy 111-07"). The defendants issued this policy after a large number of inmates had already been transferred to the OSP. The policy described behavioral criteria that referral committees at Ohio's prisons should consider before recommending an inmate to the OSP. The policy was based on a April 15, 1998, memorandum by Regional Directors Norm Hills and Eric Dahlberg. The current version of Policy 111-07 used to transfer inmates to the OSP became effective on January 28, 1999.

The Department's review of an inmate's placement at the OSP differs from the review inmates receive when they are placed into administrative control at other Ohio prisons. At other prisons, the administrative control committee can release an administrative control prisoner without a classification review. In contrast, release from the OSP requires an inmate to be reclassified from high maximum security to maximum security.

An inmate at the OSP is considered for reclassification only once a year. This reclassification process includes several levels of review. Initially, an OSP inmate has a hearing before a three person reclassification committee. The reclassification committee is composed of an OSP deputy warden, a designee of the Department's North Regional Director, and a Department mental health professional. Under the Department's reclassification process, the OSP reclassification committee makes an initial recommendation of whether an inmate should stay at the OSP or be reclassified and transferred to a maximum security prison.

After the committee makes its recommendation, the OSP warden reviews the decision and reaches his own conclusion. He makes this review without notice to the inmate of any additional factors not considered by the reclassification committee. After review and decision by the OSP warden, the chief of the Bureau of Classification reviews both the committee's recommendation and warden's decision. Finally, after the chief of the Bureau of Classification has approved or disapproved of the committee's recommendation, the Department's North Regional Director makes the final decision.[8]

After reviewing the evidence presented at trial on the issue, the Court questions how much consideration is given to the review of each inmate's reclassification recommendation. Within the Bureau of Classification, Chief Bernard Ryznar reviews all reclassifications involving the OSP inmates. In addition to this task, he supervises a staff of nine and reviews each administrative control placement in Ohio's 44,000 inmate population. (Ryznar Test. at 638). Although his co-workers assist him, Chief Ryznar is also responsible for authorizing each of the 728 thousands of transfers *728 within the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction each year. (Ryznar Test. at 618, 638). He personally reviews each maximum security placement. He also reviews other placement issues that are brought to him, and he supervises the placement recommendations of his staff. Finally, he alone makes at least 400 high maximum security classification decisions each year. (Ryznar Test. at 638-39).
North Regional Director Stephen J. Huffman has even more responsibilities than Chief Ryznar that distract him from time needed to review high maximum security classifications. The Department's Regional Directors essentially manage all aspects of the correctional facilities within their geographic area. Classification decisions are a very small part of their responsibilities in running a huge organization.
Placement and retention at the OSP has immense consequences for some inmates. As described above, the OSP conditions are significantly more restrictive than the conditions at other prisons. In addition, initial placement at the OSP denies some inmates the chance to be considered for parole because of a Department policy. The Department has a policy, approved by Director Wilkinson, that prevents inmates in maximum security facilities from being paroled.
Any inmate with a maximum security classification or any other classification title utilized to denote the most serious security risk inmates, at the time of release eligibility, shall not be granted release ... Release at any such projected release date shall be conditioned upon the inmate receiving a security classification less than maximum, or any other security classification title utilized to denote the most serious security risk inmates.
(Pls.' Ex. 3 at 8). Therefore, no inmate in the OSP's high maximum security classification can be paroled.
1. James DeJarnette
Inmate James DeJarnette's case exemplifies the effect placement at the OSP has on parole eligibility. Convicted of armed robbery with a firearm specification, DeJarnette began serving an indeterminate sentence of three to fifteen years on April 22, 1993. While housed at the Orient Correctional Institution on a medium security classification, DeJarnette assaulted a correctional officer while intoxicated. The Orient Correctional Institution discipline committee unanimously agreed DeJarnette should be punished by being placed in administrative control at his current prison. The discipline committee also unanimously agreed against increasing his classification level and transferring him to the OSP. The Orient Correctional Institution's warden agreed with the discipline committee.
Despite these recommendations and the dismissal of the criminal indictment against DeJarnette arising from the assault, the chief of the Bureau of Classification increased DeJarnette's security classification three levels to high maximum and transferred him to the OSP in October 1998. DeJarnette was sent to the OSP without notice or explanation of why the Orient Correctional Institution's discipline committee and warden's recommendations were ignored.
While at the OSP, DeJarnette participated in programming and mainly complied with all prison rules. The only exceptions were attempting to share a newspaper with another inmate and being found with an altered radio because a screw had come out of the radio cover. After fourteen months at the OSP, DeJarnette received a classification review. In December 1999, the reclassification committee, made up of three Department employees 729 pursuant to Policy 111-07, examined DeJarnette's security classification. *729 The committee recommended that he remain at the OSP. Warden Ishee and the chief of the Bureau of Classification concurred with the recommendation.

As the result of DeJarnette's three-level increase to high maximum security, he was automatically denied parole when he appeared before the Ohio Parole Board in August 2000.[9] Parole board guidelines recommend that a first-time offender like DeJarnette receive parole after serving forty-eight to sixty months. Because of DeJarnette's high maximum security classification, he could not be paroled even though he had served over ninety months. The parole board's records explain its thinking:
"Inmate serving 1st adult commitment. He is currently high max security with next screening[,] next security screening 12/2000. He has served above the recommended range. However, his security status prevents a release recommendation. Time assessed to get inmate to earliest appointment for reduction to close [security] ... Requiring 19 additional months to serve until next [hearing] eligibility."[10]
(Pls.' Ex. DeJarnette-9 at 2)
After receiving this indication from the parole board that he would qualify for release if he could move to an appropriate security level, DeJarnette again appeared before the OSP reclassification committee in November 2000. This time the reclassification committee recommended that DeJarnette's security classification be reduced and he be removed from the OSP, saying DeJarnette had made a "good adjustment" and was "not a behavioral problem." (Pls.' Ex. DeJarnette-11). Despite this recommendation for a reduction in security level classification, the OSP warden, Chief of the Bureau of Classification, and the North Regional Director all decided against reducing DeJarnette's security classification. Importantly, the North Regional Director never heard from DeJarnette before deciding to keep him at the OSP, never fully explained his reasons behind the decision, and never told DeJarnette what issues prevented a reduction in his security level.
DeJarnette's case is especially troubling because increases or decreases in an inmate's security classification level usually occur one level at a time. Jumping multiple security levels is the exception and not the rule. (Ryznar Test. at 628). After the Department reviewed the OSP's operation in December 1998, the review team reported:
Some Wardens believe that an inmate must progress through close security and maximum security before being considered an appropriate high maximum placement. Although this requirement is not found in either the original Memorandum regarding high maximum (Appendix C) or the policy on maximum security (111-07, Appendix D), there appears to be a strong perception among institutional personnel that this procedure must be followed.
(Pls.' Ex. 10 at 4-5).
2. Daryl Heard
Inmate Daryl Heard's experiences also highlight the consequences of placement at the OSP. His case further 730 demonstrates the defendants' willingness to disregard a reclassification committee's recommendation *730
concerning an inmate's security level. After conviction in 1982 for aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and kidnaping, Heard worked his way down to a minimum security classification. In March 2000, the Orient Correctional Institution Rules Infraction Board brought rule violation charges against Heard for involvement with a scheme to bring marijuana into the prison. He was convicted of those charges and disciplined by being placed into local control for fifteen days. Additionally, his security classification was increased from minimal to medium. In June 2000, his case was submitted for possible high maximum placement. Because of his attempt to smuggle in marijuana seven months earlier, the chief of the Bureau of Classification ultimately recommended his security level be increased three levels to high maximum.[11] In October 2000, Heard was transferred to the OSP.
When deciding to increase Heard's security classification four levels, the Department noted that Heard had not been involved in violence in the last sixty months. He served over three years at the minimum security classification without any incident prior to the marijuana involvement.

On December 18, 2001, Heard had a parole hearing. At the time of the hearing, Heard had served 235 months of incarceration. The parole board guidelines suggested Heard should be paroled after serving between 156 and 192 months. (Heard Test. at 289). Heard was denied parole because of his high maximum security classification. Recognizing the impact of the Department's rule against paroling inmates classified as maximum or high maximum security, the parole board asked Heard to contact it immediately if he obtained a close security classification so another hearing could be scheduled. (Heard Test. at 293).
3. Keith Gardner
Inmate Keith Gardner's case gives a further example of the effect placement at the OSP has on parole eligibility. Now forty-four years old, Gardiner has been in prison since age nineteen for a murder conviction. Having served twenty-five years, he has served more time than the parole board guidelines suggest. The Department transferred Gardner to the OSP in November 1998 after an incident in which another prisoner was stabbed. The state prosecuted Gardner for the stabbing. At trial, Gardner argued self-defense, an affirmative defense to which Gardner had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence. See Ohio Rev.Code § 2901.05(C); see also State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 24, 759 N.E.2d 1240, 1244 (2002).[12] The jury acquitted Gardner, finding that he acted in self-defense.
731 *731 Despite the acquittal, the Department increased Gardner's security classification and transferred him to the OSP in April 1999. While at the OSP, Gardner had no rule violations and he participated in numerous programs. In both 2000 and 2001, the reclassification committee reviewed his security classification and recommended that the Department reduce Gardner's security classification. In 2000, Mansfield Correctional Institute Warden Baker, serving as a member of the reclassification committee, told Gardner he "shouldn't even be here." (Gardner Test. at 387). In addition, written on Gardner's 2000 form filled out by the reclassification committee is the comment: "Placement to OSP questionable. No recent disciplinary action after A/C release 1/98." (Pls.' Ex. Gardner-3). On both occasions, the committee's recommendation was rejected, and Gardner was kept at a high maximum security classification.[13] In rejecting the committee's recommendation to decrease Gardner's security classification, the Department principally based its decision upon the stabbing incident of which he was acquitted years earlier.
As with Heard and DeJarnette, the Department's decision to retain Gardner at the OSP rendered him ineligible for parole. Gardner has served more than twenty-five years of his original sentence of life with a possibility of parole after fifteen years. However, the Department's rule forbidding parole release from high maximum security denied the parole board an opportunity to exercise its discretion.
D. Review of Inmates Once at the Ohio State Penitentiary
As demonstrated by these accounts, the Department's procedures for reviewing an OSP inmate's classification do not provide the prisoner a hearing or even access to the individual deciding the inmate's security classification. The Department's procedures for initially moving someone to the OSP also suffer from the same lack of notice and opportunity for hearing.
For instance, the Department sent more than one hundred inmates to the OSP before adopting its Policy 111-07 concerning such transfers. While lacking a formal policy, the Department transferred inmates under the guidance of the April 15, 1998, memorandum from Regional Directors Hills and Dahlberg. The memorandum informs wardens that inmates will be assigned to high maximum security when:
The inmate is or is about to be classified as maximum security;
The inmate has demonstrated behavior which meets high maximum security criteria; and/or
The inmate presents the highest level of threat to the security and order of the department, in the professional judgment of the classifying official.

(Joint Ex. 19).[14]
732 *732 The memorandum's lack of specificity and guidance made it almost worthless in describing which inmates should be assigned to the OSP. In addition, the vast majority of inmates initially transferred to the OSP in 1998 neither received advance notice that they were being considered for transfer nor a hearing to contest their transfer. Only a few inmates received posttransfer hearings.
In support of their argument that some transfers and reclassification decisions are so irrational as to violate due process, the plaintiffs presented strong evidence showing that many of the Department's decisions to transfer and retain inmates at the OSP were made with little support. Perhaps there are no transfers to the OSP with less support than those of Kevin Roe and Lahray Thompson.
1. Kevin Roe
On January 26, 1989, the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas sentenced Roe on a rape conviction. During his twelve years in prison, Roe had only minor rule violations, principally involving the use of marijuana. He was not charged with any rule violations in the two years before his transfer to the OSP.
In January 1999, the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility dealt with increased tensions caused by a series of assaults among inmates identified as gang members of either the Aryan Brotherhood or the Crips. No evidence suggested Roe was directly involved in any of the incidents.
During this same time, Roe received his annual classification review. After a hearing on January 20, 1999, the reclassification committee recommended raising his security classification from maximum to high maximum even though the board's behavior worksheet indicated he should be considered for a security level decrease.[15] The committee's justification for its recommendation was that Roe was a longtime member of a gang and had participated in a racial disturbance over five years ago. (Pls.' Ex. Roe-2 at 2). Roe was not given notice that these issues would be used to increase his security classification. Furthermore, the committee does not explain why this evidence, without any proof of Roe's involvement in incidents at the prison, was sufficient to increase Roe's classification in January 1999, but that same evidence did not warrant an increase in his security classification in May 1998, when the OSP first began accepting prisoners.
Four days after his classification review, another inmate assaulted Roe by hitting him over the head with a spatula while Roe was standing in a food line. The control unit hearing board presiding over the disciplinary 733 charge brought against the other *733 inmate acknowledged that Roe did not fight back. (Pls.' Ex. Roe-1). The Department never charged Roe with a rule violation for having gotten hit in the head from behind. Furthermore, the Department's Security Threat Group Coordinator Matthew Meyer testified:
Q: Did he [Roe] get in any fights before that? Before he got hit in the head, was he involved with anything?
A: Not that we are aware of, sir.
(Meyer Test. at 1106).
Once Roe left the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility's medical area he was transferred to the OSP. He did not receive notice of his impending transfer or an opportunity to challenge his upgraded security status. In an attempt to quiet sentiments at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility, along with Roe, the warden sent approximately twenty other inmates to the OSP. Many of these inmates were transferred even though they had no current misconduct and the Department never made out or proved a rule violation associated with gang membership or other security threat group.[16]
At a closed hearing, Security Threat Group Coordinator Meyer testified regarding the evidence the Department relied on in its decision to assign Roe to high maximum security. Coordinator Meyer described violence and gang member gatherings in 1999 that did not involve Roe. Also, Coordinator Meyer never talked with Roe, and the

evidence did not show that Roe had any connection with the incidents surrounding the 1999 gang disputes. Even considering the evidence generously, at best it shows that Roe may have had some past connection to the Aryan Brotherhood. However, the Department's own rules require evidence of a leadership position in a security threat group before sending an inmate to the OSP. The defendants offered no credible evidence that Roe held a leadership position.
Nonetheless, Roe's high maximum security classification has continued for more than two years after the tension at the Southern Ohio Correction Facility has passed. Roe received a reclassification committee hearing in April 2000. Under the Department's formula, he scored a negative three on his supervision review form, the best score possible. The reclassification committee recommended his release from high maximum security, commenting:
[Roe w]as sent to OSP from general population 2 months after incidents. Was not involved in incident in library [word or words redacted] only involvement. He was hit with a spatula in chow hall. It appears he was assigned to OSP based on [word redacted] history in 97. Only 4 tickets during incarceration. No assaults or violence.
(Pls.' Ex. Roe-6).
The warden approved the committee's recommendation but Chief Ryznar denied it, stating that the "[inmate's security threat group] activity directly led to assaults, fights and disturbance at [Southern Ohio Correctional Facility]." (Pls.' Ex. 6).
In February 2001, Roe received another reclassification committee hearing. Once again, Roe scored a negative three on his supervision review form. Once again, the reclassification committee recommended reducing his security classification. The warden agreed. However, once again, Chief Ryznar disagreed with the recommendation to reduce Roe's security classification, stating "[r]ecommend continue high max. Involved in 734 conduct that resulted *734 in disturbance at SOCF." (Pls.' Ex. Roe-10).
The Court is perplexed by Chief Ryznar's decision keep Roe at the OSP. The Court is even more troubled by Roe's lack of notice and opportunity to contest the reasons for which he was transferred. Although nothing presented in the trial's closed session appeared confidential, the Court does not more fully describe the testimony out of an abundance of caution. It is sufficient to say that the Court has reviewed all of the Department's records on Roe and finds nothing to support Chief Ryznar's assertion he was involved in the 1999 incidents at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility. The evidence of Roe posing an ongoing threat is exceedingly weak.
Roe's behavior and threat do not even meet the standards of the defendants' own classification expert, James Austin. At trial, Austin describes these standards with regard to gang affiliation:
Q: Could you give us examples of the type of thing [conduct that warrants long-term placement at OSP] you are thinking of?
A: Inciting a riot, killing an officer, killing an inmate; you know, a history, a history of assaults on staff or inmates even though death may not occur, but every time this inmate comes out; a member of a Security Threat Group who is clearly the organizer of this group, and whenever this person is released a lot of bad things start happening wherever he or she may be.
Q: Not someone who is just identified as a leader, but there's got to be clearly some concrete evidence that this person in a particular prison leads to riots or leads to something bad happening?
A: Yeah, that type of person.
(Austin Test. at 1045). Nonetheless, Chief Ryznar decided to keep Roe at Ohio's most secure, and most expensive,[17] classification without much evidence and without giving Roe a hearing or informing him of the evidence leading to his retention at the OSP.

2. Lahray Thompson

The defendants offered even less evidence justifying the placement and retention of inmate Lahray Thompson at the OSP. In January 1999, Thompson was present at a fight at the Southern Ohio Correction Facility involving members of antagonistic gangs. The defendants never brought rule violations against Thompson to the Rule Infraction Board for a hearing. The Department's confidential security threat group file on Thompson makes no mention of what role, if any, Thompson played in the fight.

Nonetheless, Thompson was transferred to the OSP. In transferring Thompson to OSP, the Department never clearly defined Thompson's role in the incident but determined that he was affiliated with a gang. (Pls.' Ex. Thompson-2 at 3). Thompson was not given notice that he might be classified to high maximum or an opportunity to defend against the gang affiliation charge before his transfer.[18]

735 *735 Justifying the process used to send Thompson to the OSP, the defendants first say that Thompson indicated affiliation with the Crips while in his early teens living in California. Second, the defendants presented evidence Thompson once had a tattoo often associated with the Crips. Third, the defendants offered evidence that Thompson once wrote a letter using the letter "b" in a fashion sometimes used by Crips members to disrespect rival gangs. Finally, the defendants produced a summary report that said Thompson was present at the time of the January 1999 fight. The report did not further describe his role, if any, in the incident.

The defendants have not shown the Court that Thompson was involved in gang related conduct, save the uncertain evidence that he may have been involved in the January 1999 fight. Even if Thompson had participated in the January 1999 fight, under the Department's own guidelines, his placement to the OSP appears unjustified. The edition of Policy 111-07 relevant to Thompson's transfer says that an inmate can be recommended for placement at the OSP if his behavior shows he "functions as a leader or enforcer of a security threat group." (Pls.' Ex. 1). Chase Riveland, one of the defendants' experts, supports this standard, giving his opinion that mere gang membership does not justify placement in an overly restrictive prison like the OSP. (Riveland Test. at 924-26).

Despite the minimal evidence used to support Thompson's placement to the OSP, the defendants have continued to keep him at a high maximum security classification. Thompson has not had a rule infraction citation while at the OSP. In both 2000 and 2001, the OSP's reclassification committee recommended reducing Thompson's security classification. However, on both occasions, he was ultimately denied a classification reduction.[19]

The treatment of Thompson and Roe reflects a troublesome trend where the defendants deny reclassification based upon gang activity without giving the inmates notice and an opportunity to respond. Equally troublesome, reclassification is denied based on exceedingly weak evidence and alleged activity years in the past. In Thompson's case, he has been held in near solitary confinement for more than three years based on nothing more than the way he writes the letter "b," the fact that in 1999 he was with a group involved in a dispute, and his association with Crip members more than fifteen years ago while growing up in southern California.

Warden Ishee better described what the rule should be:

Q: [These particular words] require the Security Threat Group coordinator to determine that a particular prisoner is an active member of a Security Threat Group or a Security Threat Group behavior.

And just as a matter of clarification, do you understand the word "active" to mean current member of a Security Threat Group or currently engaging in Security Threat Group behavior?

736

*736 A: I think currently within a reasonable time frame. You know, if we, if we use the word

"Current" exactly, that would have had to have been an action that just occurred or occurred within

the last few days.

Q: Well, what would seem to you a reasonable time frame?

A: Within the-the period of review that applies to this instrument.
Q: That is, within the past year?
A: Generally, yes.
(Ishee Test. at 586-87).
Challenging the process afforded to inmates transferred to the OSP, the plaintiffs say the absence of process results in the OSP using a large amount of its expensive and restrictive capacity to house inmates involved with using or bringing drugs into a correctional facility. Currently, the OSP houses more than fifty inmates whose only rule violations are their involvement with drugs while in an Ohio prison.
In an unusually large percentage of cases, Chief Ryznar overrules the OSP reclassification committee's recommendations. Over a one-year period, the reclassification committee held 369 hearings on inmates at the OSP. Of those 369 hearings, the reclassification committee recommended reducing 157 inmates' (43%) security classifications. (Defs.' Ex. O at 9). But ultimately, the Regional Director only recommended seventy-one inmates (19%) for a security reduction. (Defs.' Ex. O at 9). In contrast, Riveland, the defendants' expert and former head of the State of Washington's prison system, testified that he did not often overturn a committee recommendation concerning a high maximum security classification.[20]
In defending his reviews, North Regional Director Huffman simply says that he is more conservative and might have security threat group information not available to the reclassification committee. (Huffman Test. at 1141). The Court was not overly persuaded by this testimony as the security threat group information involved in the cases of Roe and Thompson hardly shows an ongoing threat even if one were to stretch and find a gang association in the first place. While the Court agrees that reviewing individuals should be conservative, the issue here is not about releasing these inmates from prison. The inmates would simply be classified as maximum security, a level at which they remain subject to severe restrictions.
Against this factual backdrop, the Court now turns to a discussion of the law controlling its determination of the plaintiffs' procedural due process rights. In this discussion, the Court considers new policies that the defendants plan for the future. As discussed below, the Department's new rules improve upon its current procedures but still do not provide the plaintiffs with adequate due process.
II. Discussion of Procedural Due Process
Criminal incarceration does not end all constitutional protections. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321-23, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972) (right to freedom of religion); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969) (right of access to the courts).
737 *737 Although prisoners do not lose all constitutional rights, they are subject to additional restrictions upon those rights. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-97, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (holding that the fundamental right to marriage is subject to limitations as a result of incarceration); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827-28, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974) (restricting inmates' first amendment right to access to news media). Generally, prisoners retain those rights compatible with the objectives of incarceration. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493, 100 S.Ct. 1254, 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980) (noting that incarceration deprives inmate of right to freedom from confinement).
Despite prisoners' retention of certain constitutional rights, federal courts have been hesitant to interfere with the administration of prisons. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (noting that "federal courts ought to afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials trying to manage a volatile environment"); Turner, 482 U.S. at 85, 107 S.Ct. 2254 (stating that the separation of powers doctrine should caution judicial intervention in prison administration because it is an area traditionally governed by the

state legislative and executive branches); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 352, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981) (stating that courts should exercise judicial discretion rather than assume prison administrators are insensitive to prisoners' constitutional rights).
In this case, the plaintiffs say that the defendants violated their right to procedural due process. The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. As the plaintiffs were not deprived of life or property, they are only entitled to due process if they were deprived of "liberty" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The consideration of a due process claim goes through two steps. First, the Court asks whether a liberty or property interest exists with which the state has interfered. See Ky. Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 104 L.Ed.2d 506 (1989); Pusey v. City of Youngstown, 11 F.3d 652, 656 (6th Cir.1993). Second, the Court determines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient. See Thompson, 490 U.S. at 460, 109 S.Ct. 1904; Pusey, 11 F.3d at 656.
More specifically, the plaintiffs must plead and prove that state remedies for redressing the alleged violation are inadequate. See Hahn v. Star Bank, 190 F.3d 708, 716 (6th Cir.1999) (citing Vicory v. Walton, 721 F.2d 1062, 1066 (6th Cir. 1983)). The Sixth Circuit has elaborated on this requirement:
In other words, a party may maintain a procedural due process § 1983 case in federal court if he alleges and proves that there was a constitutional violation under color of law and: (1) The state did not have a remedy; or (2) the state had a remedy but it was deemed inadequate; or (3) the state had an adequate remedy in form, both procedurally and in damages, but the state did not apply it or misapplied its remedy.
Id. With these elements in mind, the Court now analyzes the plaintiffs' due process claim.
A. The Plaintiffs' Protected Liberty Interest
738 To succeed on their procedural due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the *738 plaintiffs must first demonstrate they possessed a protected liberty interest and were deprived of that interest without due process. See Thompson, 490 U.S. at 460, 109 S.Ct. 1904; Pusey, 11 F.3d at 656.[21]
In Sandin, the Court revisited its earlier decision in Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). In Hewitt, the Court found that an inmate confined to administrative segregation did not have a liberty interest "independently protected by the Due Process Clause" because "the transfer of an inmate to less amenable and more restrictive quarters for nonpunitive reasons is well within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence." Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 468, 103 S.Ct. 864. Nevertheless, the Court went on to hold that because Pennsylvania state law had established "specific substantive predicates" that must exist before restrictive confinement could be imposed, the inmate had a protected liberty interest in avoiding such confinement. Id. at 471-72, 103 S.Ct. 864.
Sandin rejected much of Hewitt's reasoning. Specifically, the Court rejected Hewitt's conclusion that a court had to ask whether "the State had gone beyond issuing mere procedural guidelines and had used `language of an unmistakably mandatory character' such that the incursion on liberty would not occur `absent specified substantive predicates.'" Sandin, 515 U.S. at 480, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (quoting Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 471-72, 103 S.Ct. 864). The Court found Hewitt had created disincentives for states to codify their prison management procedures and led to the involvement of federal courts in the day-to-day management of prisons. See id. at 482, 103 S.Ct. 864.
In order to correct these unwanted side effects, the Court held that liberty interests in the prisoner context "will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which ... imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Id. at 484, 103 S.Ct. 864. Although Sandin rejected Hewitt's methodology, the Court continued to "recognize that States may under certain circumstances create liberty

interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause." Id. at 483-84, 103 S.Ct. 864. In deciding whether the state had created a liberty interest, the Sandin Court emphasized that "the real concerns undergirding the liberty 739 protected by the *739 Due Process Clause," id. at 483, 115 S.Ct. 2293, were whether the state deprived the prisoner of "an interest of `real substance,'" id. at 480, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (quoting Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557, 94 S.Ct. 2963). Sandin "shift[ed] the focus of the liberty interest inquiry" away from "the language of a particular regulation" and back to "the nature of the deprivation." Id. at 481, 115 S.Ct. 2293.
Therefore, the Court must determine whether the nature of confinement at the OSP is an "atypical and significant hardship" giving rise to a protected liberty interest. This inquiry raises "many complex and fact-specific issues." Brown v. Plaut, 131 F.3d 163, 170 (D.C.Cir.1997).
In deciding whether placement at the OSP is atypical,[22] the Court must first choose an appropriate comparison. The plaintiffs argue the conditions at the OSP are atypical when compared to prisoners in administrative control. On the other hand, the defendants argue that the appropriate comparison is with the conditions at the OSP itself: "Ohio often transfers `high security risk' inmates to OSP, the conditions of which are more restrictive than the sending prisons. Subjecting inmates to those conditions, which are no different from those ordinarily experienced by other similarly situated inmates in OSP is not `atypical.'" (Defs.' Final Argument Br. at 12).
The Court rejects the defendants' suggested comparison. In Sandin, the Court said no claim could arise when the conditions of confinement were within the range that could reasonably be expected as a normal incident of incarceration. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293. However, the Court did not suggest that the existence of a condition somewhere within a state's prison system automatically made such a condition normal.
The courts of appeals have used varied comparisons. The Fourth and Ninth Circuit use the general prison population as the comparative baseline. See Beverati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 504 (4th Cir.1997); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir.1996). In contrast, the Second and Third Circuits use the typical conditions of administrative segregation when deciding whether conditions are atypical. See Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 708 (3d Cir. 1997); Brooks v. DiFasi, 112 F.3d 46, 49 (2d Cir.1997). Taking a different approach, the Seventh Circuit has defined the baseline as the conditions of nondisciplinary segregation in the state's most restrictive prison. See Wagner v. Hanks, 128 F.3d 1173, 1175 (7th Cir.1997). According to the Fifth Circuit, segregation never implicates a liberty interest unless it lengthens a prisoner's sentence. See Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 821 (5th Cir.1997). The remaining circuits have applied Sandin's "atypical and significant hardship" test without characterizing the comparative baseline. See Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312, 1318 (11th Cir.1999); Perkins v. Kan. Dep't of Corr., 165 F.3d 803, 809 (10th Cir.1999); Kennedy v. Blankenship, 100 F.3d 640, 642 (8th Cir.1996); Dominique v. Weld, 73 F.3d 1156, 1160 (1st Cir.1996). The Sixth Circuit has not clearly described the appropriate comparison that the Court should use. See Mackey v. Dyke, 111 F.3d 460, 463 (6th Cir. 1997).
The Court finds that the better approach is to compare the range of prison conditions experienced by the plaintiffs against the complete range of conditions experienced by a broad range of similarly situated inmates. Placement 740 in administrative *740 control for limited periods of time is not an atypical change that imposes a significant hardship. But to determine whether the plaintiffs' placement at the OSP is atypical in relation to ordinary prison life, the Court must consider the duration and extent of the deprivation because "especially harsh conditions endured for a brief interval and somewhat harsh conditions endured for a prolonged interval might both be atypical." Sealey v. Giltner, 197 F.3d 578, 586 (2d Cir.1999).
When viewed against this standard, the Court finds that the conditions at OSP are atypical and impose a significant hardship. In reviewing this issue, the Court begins with the time an inmate is held at the OSP. The vast majority of inmates placed at the OSP will remain for a minimum of two years, with only an annual review of their status. To date, two hundred OSP prisoners have been there for more than three years.
This lengthy stay is a function of the current OSP procedures. Upon arrival at the OSP, inmates complete a month long orientation program and are then assigned to Level II. At the inmate's reclassification hearing, conducted approximately a year after arrival, the inmate may progress from Level II to Level III. Only once an inmate is at Level III may he be reclassified to the less severe maximum security status. Because reclassification hearings are only held annually, even inmates with exemplary behavior rarely progress through OSP in less than two years.

In contrast, inmates in administrative control or disciplinary control at other Ohio institutions, including the maximum security Southern Ohio Correctional Facility, are reviewed every thirty days. Terry Collins, the Department's deputy director of institutions, testified that:
The most you can do in a disciplinary control cell at one time is 30 days. Typically the arrangements there are anywhere from one to 15 days. You could be placed there if 0907 there's a spree of offenses that you go before the Rules Infraction Board on, you could be placed there for 30 days. Typically that stay is one to 15 days.
(Collins Test. at 1176-77).
He also testified that high maximum security incarceration at the OSP is qualitatively different than any other placement in the Department's prisons:
Q: And those categories of incarceration, Mr. Collins, those will all be philosophically institutionally distinct from high max status, won't they?
A: There0907yes, most definitely different than high max facility.
Q: High max will be intended for a different sort of inmate?
A: Yes.
Q: Will have a different sort of restrictive environment?
A: Yes.
(Collins Test. 1175-76).[23]
Even with good behavior, inmates at the OSP serve indefinite terms at the institution. With the exception of the end of their sentences, there is no other indication of how long an individual inmate will be kept at the OSP.
In addition to inmates' indefinite retention at the OSP, the Department treats inmates at the OSP qualitatively differently than it treats inmates at other Ohio prisons. With regard to isolation, death row inmates have access to 741 true outdoor recreation and have direct access to attorneys. Most significantly, death row prisoners *741 can interact with other inmates during recreation or by conversations in their cells.
In contrast, inmates at the OSP have extremely limited contact with other individuals. The inmates remain alone in their solid-door cells for twenty-three hours a day. Metal strips along the cell doors do not allow conversation with adjacent inmates. Only a small, inoperable window allows the inmate to view the outside his cell. A correctional officer only opens the small "cuff-port" in the cell door to affix handcuffs or to drop off food. An OSP prisoner only goes outside the building in the rare case of a necessary medical procedure or a court appearance.
Without contradiction, inmate Jason Robb testified that he had not been outside the walls of the OSP for four years:
Q: I see. When is the last time you were outside the building at OSP?
A: Today was the first time in about four years.
Q: Since the day that you came?
A: Yeah, since the day that I arrived in May of '98, I've never been outside of the institution except for today.
(Robb Test. at 197).
Inmates at the OSP also are never allowed outdoor recreation. Their closest contact to the outdoors is exercise in a completely enclosed room with a grated opening approximately six inches wide and four feet long. The Court

finds it hard to believe anyone would seriously suggest such a space constitutes "outdoor" recreation. The lack of outdoor recreation is important to the Court as denial of outdoor recreation can impair a liberty interest:
Furthermore, deprivation of yard time imposes enough of a hardship to qualify as a constitutionally protected liberty interest. As noted previously, although the plaintiffs were deprived of only two hours of yard time per week, the marginal value of those two hours to a person in Close Management is substantial. Such a deprivation is therefore atypical and significant even in solitary confinement.
Bass, 170 F.3d at 1318.
In those instances when the OSP inmates are allowed out of their cells, they are escorted by two or three officers. In contrast, inmates on death row walk without a hands-on escort. At the OSP, when inmates leave their cellblock, they are strip-searched, shackled, and placed in full restraints, which include an uncomfortable rigid "black box" enclosing their hands. Inmates at the OSP are strip-searched before and after meeting visitors even though physical contact with visitors, who are behind solid glass, is impossible. In all, other correctional facilities have significantly less intrusive conditions than the OSP.
In addition, confinement at the OSP affects the duration of some inmates' incarceration. The plaintiffs do not argue that this impact on parole eligibility creates a liberty interest. Instead, they only argue that it is one factor, among many, showing that placement and retention at the OSP imposes an atypical and significant hardship. The Court agrees.
In Hewitt, the Court observed that "administrative segregation may not be used as a pretext for indefinite confinement of an inmate" and hence, the need to maintain the inmate in restricted housing must be subject to meaningful "periodic review" by prison officials. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 477 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 864; see also U.S. v. Johnson, 223 F.3d 665, 673 (7th Cir.2000).
Similarly, in Mackey v. Dyke, 29 F.3d 1086 (6th Cir.1994), a pre-Sandin decision, the Sixth Circuit stated that "[t]here is little difference between depriving a person of liberty without due process of law, on the one hand, and 742 failing to restore *742 someone's liberty after any legal justification for its deprivation has been eliminated, on the other hand." Mackey, 29 F.3d at 1090-91 (quoting Childs v. Pellegrin, 822 F.2d 1382, 1388 (6th Cir.1987)); see also Butts v. Dutton, No 87-6249, 1989 WL 73653, at *4 (6th Cir. July 6, 1989) (stating that Hewitt "clearly established" that a prisoner has a due process right not to be confined in administrative segregation as a pretext for indefinite confinement); Riley v. Johnson, 528 F.Supp. 333, 340 (E.D.Mich.1981).
The Department's formal policy stops consideration of parole for prisoners in the high maximum or maximum security classifications. (Pls.' Ex. 3 at 8). To receive parole, an OSP inmate must first be reclassified to maximum security. Once he spends approximately a year at maximum security he may be reclassified to close security and be eligible for parole.
The plaintiffs show convincing evidence of the significant consequences of this rule. Inmates DeJarnette and Heard were both at lower security classifications before being found guilty of misconduct. In both cases, the rules infraction board recommended that they not be sent to the OSP. Their wardens agreed. However, without offering DeJarnette any chance to appear or respond to the issues considered in denying the rule infraction board's recommendation, Chief Ryznar increased DeJarnette's security classification three levels from medium to high maximum.
Similarly, Heard was classified at minimum security facility before involving himself in a conspiracy to import marijuana. After a hearing, the Orient Correctional Institution Rules Infraction Committee recommended a onelevel increase to a medium security classification in conjunction with local control punishment. Without a hearing, the Chief Ryznar disregarded the committee's recommendation and increased Heard's security classification four levels to high maximum.
Once in the OSP, DeJarnette and Heard were both denied reductions in their security classification even though they had no significant rule violations. Both inmates were denied reductions even though the OSP's

reclassification committee recommended reductions after their reclassification hearings. Chief Ryznar's denial of reclassification has meant years of additional incarceration for DeJarnette and Heard.[24]
After considering the total context of confinement at the OSP, the Court finds conditions at the facility impose an atypical and significant hardship. First, the combination of conditions that the OSP inmates face, such as their isolation, the way they are controlled, and their inability to go outside, even for recreation, differs significantly from conditions in other Ohio prisons. Second, the length of confinement under these conditions makes confinement at the OSP atypical. Many inmates have continued in this extremely restrictive environment for four years without explanation.
Therefore, because the conditions at the OSP impose an atypical and significant hardship, the Court holds the inmates have a liberty interest.
743 *743 B. Minimal Due Process Requirements
Having determined that the plaintiffs have a liberty interest, the Court now turns to a discussion of what process the plaintiffs were due before the defendants sent them to the OSP.
The Supreme Court's decisions in Wolff and Hewitt describe the procedural safeguards afforded to prisoners who have demonstrated protected liberty interests. In Wolff, a prisoner alleged the procedures surrounding the disciplinary proceedings used to revoke his good time credits violated his due process rights. In fashioning the procedures needed to protect the prisoner's due process rights, the Court introduced a balancing test weighing "institutional needs and objectives" against "the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556, 94 S.Ct. 2963. The Court found that certain procedures were necessary if the "minimum requirements of procedural due process [were] to be satisfied." Id. at 563, 94 S.Ct. 2963.
Under Wolff, a prisoner must receive "advance written notice of the claimed violation and a written statement of the fact-finders as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action taken." Id. Regarding the timing of the notice, Wolff held that "a brief period of time after the notice, no less than 24 hours, should be allowed to the inmate to prepare for the appearance before the Adjustment Committee." Id. at 564, 94 S.Ct. 2963. The inmate must be allowed to appear at the hearing and be allowed adequate time to prepare a defense. See id. The inmate should also be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence as long as "permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals." Id. at 566, 94 S.Ct. 2963. However, the ability to present a defense does not extend to the right to cross-examination or confrontation. See id. at 567-68, 94 S.Ct. 2963. Nor is the inmate entitled to the right to counsel. See id. at 569-70, 94 S.Ct. 2963.
In Wolff, the Court also found that due process required the disciplinary body give some explanation for the action ultimately taken:
We also hold that there must be a "written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons" for the disciplinary action. Although Nebraska does not seem to provide administrative review of the action taken by the Adjustment Committee, the actions taken at such proceedings may involve review by other bodies. They might furnish the basis of a decision by the Director of Corrections to transfer an inmate to another institution because he is considered "to be incorrigible by reason of frequent intentional breaches of discipline," and the[y are] certainly likely to be considered by the state parole authorities in making parole decisions. Written records of proceedings will thus protect the inmate against collateral consequences based on a misunderstanding of the nature of the original proceeding. Further, as to the disciplinary action itself, the provision for a written record helps to insure that administrators, faced with possible scrutiny by state officials and the public, and perhaps even the courts, where fundamental constitutional rights may have been abridged, will act fairly. Without written records, the inmate will be at a severe disadvantage in propounding his own cause to or defending himself from others.
Id. at 564-65, 94 S.Ct. 2963 (internal citations omitted).

Furthermore, Wolff held that such procedural requirements were not limited to disciplinary proceedings dealing 744 with time credits, but extended to disciplinary proceedings *744 for segregation as well. See id. at 571 n. 19, 94
S.Ct. 2963. The Court held that "[a]lthough the complaint put at issue the procedures employed with respect to the deprivation of good time, ... the same procedures are employed where disciplinary confinement is imposed." Id.
In contrast, Hewitt considered the amount of process due a prisoner when prison officials transferred him to restrictive confinement for the "administrative," rather than the disciplinary, reason of investigating his role in a prison riot. Reviewing whether he was afforded due process in this administrative segregation, the Court gave prison authorities greater deference:
We think an informal, nonadversary evidentiary review is sufficient both for the decision that an inmate represents a security threat and the decision to confine an inmate to administrative segregation pending completion of an investigation into misconduct charges against him. An inmate must merely receive some notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to present his views to the prison official charged with deciding whether to transfer him to administrative segregation ... So long as this occurs, and the decisionmaker reviews the charges and thenavailable evidence against the prisoner, the Due Process Clause is satisfied.
Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 476, 103 S.Ct. 864. Although a hearing need not occur prior to confinement in administrative segregation, it "must occur within a reasonable time following an inmate's transfer." Id. at 476 n. 8, 103 S.Ct. 864.
Hewitt also requires periodic review of an inmate in administrative segregation.
[A]dministrative segregation may not be used as a pretext for indefinite confinement of an inmate. Prison officials must engage in some sort of periodic review of the confinement of such inmates. This review will not necessarily require that prison officials permit the submission of any additional evidence or statements. The decision whether a prisoner remains a security risk will be based on facts relating to a particular prisoner0907 which will have been ascertained when determining to confine the inmate to administrative segregation0907and on the officials' general knowledge of prison conditions and tensions, which are singularly unsuited for "proof" in any highly structured manner.
Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 477 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 864.
Under Wolff and Hewitt, the amount of process a prisoner requires depends on whether the prisoner's transfer is characterized as disciplinary or administrative. In deciding the nature of the transfer, nomenclature is less important than the substance of the transfer. Regardless of the defendants' characterization of the transfer and retention of inmates at the OSP, it is not clear that all transfers to the OSP were administrative.
Hewitt involved the administrative segregation of an inmate for a relatively short period of time during an investigation into the cause of a prison riot. Once the investigation was complete, the inmate was found guilty of two misconduct charges. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 464-65, 103 S.Ct. 864. Because the inmate in Hewitt was to face a rule infraction board and have the increased procedural protections associated with that disciplinary entity, he had less interest in procedural protections for the short time that prison authorities sent him to administrative control pending the investigation.
On the other hand, placement or retention at the OSP is for a significantly longer time than the temporary administrative segregation at issue in Hewitt. In addition, the inmate in Hewitt was eventually afforded a hearing 745 marked by the more rigorous due process protections that accompany *745 disciplinary segregation. In contrast, prisoners assigned to the OSP, especially those segregated for alleged gang affiliations, at best receive only one hearing before their transfer to the OSP. In light of the lengthy and indeterminate time inmates are held at the OSP, the minimal procedural requirements of Hewitt are insufficient.
An additional consideration for affording OSP inmates increased procedural protections is that inmates facing disciplinary control face less punishment than inmates facing placement at the OSP. In Wolff, the Court established heightened procedural protections for inmates facing disciplinary or punitive proceedings. Currently,

inmates appearing before rule infraction boards are entitled to these heightened protections even though the possible sanctions are less than the consequences of assignment to the OSP. A serious rule violation "may be penalized by disciplinary isolation and/or suspension of privileges and qualified rights for a period up to thirty days." Ohio Admin. Code § 5120:1-8-13(C)(2) (2001). "The maximum penalty for rule violations arising from one incident must be no more than sixty days." Ohio Admin. Code § 5120:18-13(D) (2001). Inmates transferred to the OSP face conditions more severe than a prisoner in disciplinary segregation and will face them for a much greater period of time. Therefore, at a minimum, inmates at the OSP should be afforded the same procedural protections as those described in Wolff.
Further support that the OSP inmates are entitled to the protections described in Wolff is found in the underlying factors that govern all decisions regarding what process an individual is due. In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), the Court set forth three factors to consider when deciding what procedural protections an individual requires. First, courts consider the private interest affected by the state action. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893. Second, courts consider how great the risk is that the procedures used will come to an erroneous decision, and whether additional procedural protections would sufficiently reduce a risk of mistake. Id. Finally, courts consider the government's interest, including whether additional procedural protections would place undue fiscal and administrative burdens upon the state. Id.; see also Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990) ("The procedural protections required by the Due Process Clause must be determined with reference to the rights and interests at stake in the particular case.").
As discussed above, the Court has found that confinement at the OSP imposes an atypical and significant hardship when compared to confinement in other Ohio prisons. Therefore, placement and retention at the OSP substantially affects one of the most basic private interests of the OSP inmates.
As it currently exists, the Department's procedure for selecting and retaining inmates at the OSP has great potential for error. Evidence at trial demonstrated a wide disparity between the recommendations of the reclassification committee, the OSP's warden, Chief Ryznar, and the North Regional Director. The potential for error is magnified by the fact that the North Regional Director, a single individual with responsibilities throughout the entire Department, is given the last decision on placement and retention at the OSP. The potential for error is little improved under the newly proposed system because it merely gives the final decision to the chief of the Bureau of Classification, an individual who also has a multitude of responsibilities and little time to consider each case carefully.
746 *746 Take the cases of inmates Roe and Thompson. For both, the decision to transfer them to the OSP arose from gang related incidents at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility in 1999. With essentially no evidence showing that Roe or Thompson were connected to the gang related tension, Chief Ryznar and North Regional Director Huffman nevertheless sent them to the OSP. Roe and Thompson remain at the OSP even with no evidence of current gang activity. Against this backdrop, additional procedural safeguards would, at little cost, reduce the potential of erroneous deprivation.
Next, additional procedural protections would not impair legitimate governmental interests and would place little additional administrative burden upon the state. The OSP aims to house only the most dangerous prisoners in Ohio's correctional system. Additional process advances the state's interest by consistently sending only those inmates who truly are "the worst of the worst" to the OSP. Parole Board Member Peter Davis best described the risk:
The only thing that's clear is, as I've said here, for every inmate that was cited to me and the reasons why that person was sent there, for this particular act, this assaultive behavior, if you will, we knew for a fact of plenty other inmates that were at other institutions, even close security institutions, that were not transferred [to the OSP].
(Davis Test. at 126).[25]
Requiring Department officials to give inmates specific notice of all the grounds for placing and retaining them at the OSP would cause minimal hardship. The officials would only need to expend the additional time to write out

their reasons for making a specific classification decision. Furthermore, this minimal amount of additional time would increase the Department's efficiency. Accurately summarizing all the grounds supporting an inmate's placement at the OSP would assist later reviewing entities and avoid unnecessary prisoner assignments to the OSP.
In addition to ensuring that only inmates presenting a serious risk to others or to the operation of the Department are housed at the OSP, increased procedural protections will ensure that inmates that can safely be housed elsewhere at cheaper cost will not be sent to the OSP. With the exception of the Corrections Medical Center (providing inpatient hospital treatment) and the Oakwood Correctional Facility (providing inpatient psychiatric treatment), the OSP has the highest annual cost per inmate in the Ohio prison system. See generally Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corr., The Institutions, at http://www.drc. state.oh.us/web/prisprog.htm (last modified Feb. 5, 2002). 747 [26] In all, any additional procedural protections at the selection and *747 retention stages add little in administrative costs and benefit everyone by avoiding mistaken, and costly, placement at the OSP.
Because of the liberty interest involved resulting from the length and the conditions of confinement at the OSP, and the Court's discussion of the Mathews factors, the Court holds that the plaintiffs are entitled to the minimal procedural requirements announced in Wolff. In summary, before an inmate attends a hearing to determine if he will be reclassified to high maximum (1) the inmate is entitled to twenty-four advance written notice of all the specific evidence relied upon to support the reasons for his reclassification; (2) the inmate must be allowed to appear at the reclassification hearing and present evidence, including witnesses and documents, in support of his position;[27] and (3) the reclassification committee must issue a written statement specifically describing the evidence relied on and the reasons for its recommendation.
In listing these requirements, the Court notes that notice given to an inmate must be more than a mere formality. See Benitez v. Wolff, 985 F.2d 662, 665 (2d Cir. 1993). Instead, the inmate should know what he is accused of so that he can prepare a defense to those charges and not be made to explain away vague allegations. See McKinnon v. Patterson, 568 F.2d 930, 940 n. 11 (2d Cir.1977).
The inmate should also have the right to offer evidence and argument to the person who, in fact, makes the decision on his reclassification. Even in Hewitt, the prisoner was to receive "an opportunity to present his views to the prison official charged with deciding whether to transfer him to administrative segregation." Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 476, 103 S.Ct. 864. The procedural requirements the Court lists "are not elaborate, but they are real, and must be strictly complied with." Brown, 131 F.3d at 171.
C. Due Process Afforded to the Plaintiffs
The Court now turns to the question of whether the plaintiffs were afforded the process they were due. "The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard `at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'" Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333, 96 S.Ct. 893 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965)). A hearing is not "meaningful" if a prisoner is given inadequate information about the basis of the charges against him. See Brown, 131 F.3d at 172 ("If [an inmate] was not provided an accurate picture of what was at stake in the hearing, then he was not given his due process.").
The defendants did not give notice to the majority of inmates transferred to the OSP between August 1998 and October 2000. Instead, inmates were awoken in the early morning hours and shipped off to the OSP. This denial of notice was intentional, apparently because Department officials believed the transfers would be easier to 748 make.[28] In addition, most of the *748 class members were never told of the grounds used to support their incarceration at the OSP. Similarly, after reviewing the reclassification committee's recommendations, Department officials frequently fail to tell inmates about the evidence used to support the denial of their reclassification to maximum security.
Inmate Roe again serves as an example. On January 20, 1999, Roe appeared for an annual review while incarcerated at the maximum security Southern Ohio Correctional Facility. While his behavior worksheet score indicated that a security level decrease was appropriate, that the reclassification committee recommended his

security classification be increased from maximum to high maximum. The reclassification committee also noted that Roe had no violent conviction or infraction within the previous twenty-four months. As justification for sending Roe to the OSP, the committee stated that he was a "[l]ong standing member of the [Aryan Brotherhood]. Participated in a racial disturbance over 5 years ago." (Pls'. Ex. Roe-2 at 2). Roe was sent to the OSP even though four days after his hearing he was assaulted but did not respond with violence. In fact, there was some testimony that Roe's assault was evidence he was a gang leader because higher level gang members were being targeted at that time.
The Department's justification does not approach the necessary process to which Roe was entitled. The Department chose to move Roe to a more secure and more expensive facility without articulating a single affirmative action he had undertaken. Instead, he was allegedly moved because of longtime gang membership and his involvement in a racial incident more than five years ago. These justifications ring hollow as the Department did not transfer Roe to the OSP when it opened in May 1998. If the Department's stated reasons made Roe an immediate threat, it seems reasonable to expect he would have been moved to the OSP shortly after it opened. Instead, the Department waited eight months. Thus, the defendants' failure to inform Roe of the reasons for his transfer or to afford Roe the opportunity to refute those reasons violated due process.
Roe faired no better in his reclassification hearings while at the OSP. Policy 111-07 recommends high maximum classification for an individual who "presents the highest level of threat to the security and order of the department and its institutions" or "functions as a leader or enforcer of a security threat group." (Pls.' Ex. 2 at 2). The defendants never gave notice to Roe of the evidence they relied on to meet Policy 111-07's requirements. After having heard evidence in a closed session, the Court finds the Department has failed to show that Roe functions as a leader or enforcer of the Aryan Brotherhood.
Inmate Thompson was similarly deprived of due process. On January 20, 1999, Thompson had a classification review. The hearing committee's worksheet indicated that Thompson had no rules violation findings, no administrative control placement, and no violence in the last five years. (Pls.' Ex. Thompson-2). At about the same time, Thompson was present at a fight in the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility involving members of rival gangs. Thompson was not brought before the rule infraction board for that incident, and the Department's confidential security threat group file on Thompson makes no mention of what role, if any, Thompson played in the fight. Nonetheless, without any notice of the evidence claimed against him, the Department sent Thompson to the OSP.
749 *749 The Department has also failed to give Thompson notice of the evidence used to keep him at the OSP. In subsequent reclassification committee hearings, the defendants did not give any notice of specific allegations that would prevent Thompson from being reclassified. While at the OSP, Thompson received no rule infraction citations. In both 2000 and 2001, the reclassification committee recommended that Thompson's security classification be reduced, indicating that his adjustment was good, he had received no tickets, and nothing at the OSP suggested gang affiliation. (Pls.' Exs. Thompson-4, -6). However, in both 2000 and 2001, the committee's recommendations were denied because of Thompson's alleged gang membership. (Pls.' Exs. Thompson-4, -5, -6).
Thompson never had an opportunity to respond to the evidence used to keep him at the OSP because he never received notice. Having reviewed the Department's evidence against Thompson in closed session, the Court does not see any evidence indicating that Thompson is a leader or enforcer of a security threat group. Thompson was denied due process by the Department's failure to provide any reasonable notice of the evidence supporting its decision to keep him in the OSP.
Many other inmates at the OSP have not received appropriate due process. In a twelve-month period reviewed by James Austin, the defendants' expert, 369 OSP inmates had reclassification hearings. Of the 369 reviewed, the reclassification committee recommended a security level reduction for 157 inmates (43%). (Defs.' Ex. O at 9). The OSP's warden recommended eighty-eight inmates (24%) for a reduction in classification, while Chief Ryznar recommended ninety inmates (24%) for reclassification. (Defs.' Ex. O at 9). The Regional Director ultimately reclassified only seventy-one inmates (19%). (Defs.' Ex. O at 9). While a representative of the OSP's warden sits on the reclassification committee, the vast majority of inmates never had an opportunity to present evidence or argument to Chief Ryznar or the North Regional Director. Therefore, eighty-six inmates never were able to

address the person responsible for making the final judgment on their retention at the OSP. Furthermore, in most cases, Chief Ryznar and the North Regional Director merely give a one- or two-sentence explanation for their decisions. Even if an inmate were able to see this explanation, such a cursory statement would not adequately inform him of evidence justifying the reviewer's decision.
In sum, the Court finds that the defendants have denied the plaintiffs due process in a number of ways. First, the defendants failed to afford a large number of inmates notice and an adequate opportunity to be heard before placing them at the OSP. Second, the defendants failed to give the plaintiffs sufficient notice of the grounds serving as the basis for their retention at the OSP. Third, the defendants have failed to give the plaintiffs sufficient opportunity to understand the reasoning and evidence used to retain them at the OSP. The Court now turns to what remedy is appropriate.

III. The Plaintiffs' Remedy

In April 1996, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), Pub.L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). The PLRA limits the ability of federal courts to affect the capacity and conditions of prisons beyond what is required by the Constitution and federal law. See Hadix v. Johnson, 228 F.3d 662, 665 (6th Cir. 2000).

Specifically, the PLRA restricts the entry of prospective relief in suits challenging the constitutionality of prison conditions, providing:

750

*750 Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions shall extend no further

than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The

court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is

narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and

is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. The court shall

give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice

system caused by the relief.

18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (1999) (emphasis added). The term "prospective relief" is defined as "all relief other than compensatory money damages." 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(7) (1999). Any prospective relief ordered by the Court would terminate in two years upon the motion of either party unless the Court finds the prospective relief is needed "to correct and [sic] ongoing violation of the Federal right." 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(1)(A)(i).

The defendants argue that prospective relief is unnecessary because they have adopted new policies that correct any earlier problems. On January 3, 2002, Director Wilkinson approved a new version of Policy 111-07 ("New Policy 111-07"), effective on March 1, 2002. While New Policy 111-07 improves upon the Department's placement and retention policies in major ways, the Court finds that it still fails to provide adequate due process in certain particulars.[29]

In contrast to how inmates were initially transferred to the OSP in the past, New Policy 111-07 requires an inmate be given forty-eight hour notice and an opportunity to appear before the classification committee before being sent to the OSP. (Defs.' Ex. C at 5). Inmates learn of their hearings by receipt of Form 2598, a formal Notice of Hearing. (Defs.' Ex. C at 5). However, Form 2598 does not ensure that inmates are given notice of the evidence relied upon and the specific grounds for which they are being considered for placement at the OSP. The form simply states, "[y]ou were referred to the Classification Committee for the following reason(s)" and has several blank lines to be filled in by the prison official. (Defs.' Ex. C). As currently written, nothing in New Policy 111-07 or Form 2598 requires the Department to inform an inmate of all the reasons the classification committee may recommend him for Level 5 placement.

Instead, the notice would be appropriate if the form said something like, "you are being considered for Level 5 placement at the Ohio State Penitentiary for the following reason(s)," and the classification committee then limited its consideration of Level 5 placement to the listed reasons and evidence. Such a system that ensures the inmate can adequately prepare for his hearing. He would be given notice of all grounds that could cause his reclassification.

New Policy 111-07 also fails because it is insufficiently specific regarding offenses that can lead to placement at 751 the OSP. Under section 6(c)(4) of New Policy 111- *751 07, an inmate meets a Level 5 placement criteria if the
"inmate has conspired or attempted to convey, introduce or possess major contraband which poses a serious threat or danger to the security of the institution. This includes but is not limited to ... [d]rugs for distribution." (Defs.' Ex. C at 4). By failing to specify a threshold quantity, this criteria gives insufficient notice of what conduct could lead to Level 5 placement.
This lack of specificity could easily have been corrected. For example, New Policy 111-07 could define the "drugs for distribution" criteria to coincide with the drug amount required to sentence an inmate to a third degree felony. [30] Regardless of the reasonable drug quantity the Department chooses, inmates should be given specific notice of the amount.
New Policy 111-07 is also unnecessarily vague regarding the type of gang involvement that may subject an inmate to incarceration at the OSP. The current Policy 111-07 stated that an inmate prisoner could be placed at the OSP if "[t]he inmate functions as a leader or enforcer of a security threat group." (Pls.' Ex. 2 at 2). The new policy actually lessens an inmate's ability to learn what conduct is forbidden and what conduct may cause them to be placed at the OSP. Section 6(C)(5) of New Policy 111-07 says that an inmate meets a Level 5 criteria if "[t]he inmate has been identified by the institution Security Threat Group Coordinator as a leader, enforcer, or recruiter of a security threat group, which is actively involved in violent or disruptive behavior." (Defs.' Ex. C at 4).
The problem with this criteria is that it merely requires a security threat group coordinator to believe that an inmate is a leader, enforcer, or recruiter. In essence, an inmate could never adequately respond to a charge that someone had "identified" him as a member of a security threat group without knowing on what specific evidence the identification was based.
The defendants can easily correct this criteria's deficiency by requiring that the person seeking an inmate's Level 5 placement present evidence to the classification committee that the inmate is a leader, enforcer, or recruiter of a security threat group actively involved in violent or disruptive behavior. Stated another way, the Department would need to establish to the reclassification committee's satisfaction that the inmate actually was a leader, enforcer, or recruiter of a gang involved in violent or disruptive behavior. While the defendants must give an inmate sufficient notice of any gang affiliated claims the Department is relying upon to send him to the OSP, the Court recognizes that prison officials have discretion regarding sensitive information "Prison officials must have the necessary discretion to keep the hearing within reasonable limits and to refuse to call witnesses that may create a risk of reprisal or undermine authority, as well as to limit access to other inmates to collect statements or to compile other documentary evidence." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566, 94 S.Ct. 2963.
There is one additional way New Policy 111-07 fails to provide adequate due process. Under the current policy, 752 Chief Ryznar and the North Regional Director often make an inmate's final classification *752 decision without
giving him any notice of the factors that they are considering. In general, but especially in cases regarding gang affiliation, the evidence at trial showed that Chief Ryznar frequently made decisions on an inmate's classification based on evidence and arguments never disclosed to the inmate.
While an improvement over the current policy, New Policy 111-07 also fails to require that the true decision maker identify the evidence he relied upon and explain the reasoning behind his decision. Section 6(C) of the new policy states that "[t]he Bureau of Classification will review the [warden's] recommendation and any objection filed by the inmate, and make a final decision." (Defs.' Ex. C at 5). By failing to require the Bureau of Classification to issue an explanation of its decision, the new policy ignores the procedural requirement "that there must be a `written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons' for the disciplinary action." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-65, 94 S.Ct. 2963 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972)).
Again, the new policy's failure to afford due process could be easily solved. Wolff requires the fact finder issue a written statement of the facts relied upon and the reasoning used. This written statement should address an inmate's specific case and not contain merely vague boilerplate language. If New Policy 111-07 required the

Bureau of Classification to describe the specific facts found and the reasoning used to support an inmate's placement at the OSP, it would afford sufficient due process.
Besides changing the procedures for initial placement at the OSP, New Policy 111-07 changes the procedures and standards used to review an inmate's retention at the OSP. The importance of affording inmates due process at their reclassification hearings cannot be overstated. The Department transferred almost two hundred prisoners to the OSP from 1998 through early 1999 who are still at the facility and have never received an adequate hearing concerning their placement at the OSP. Reclassification under the current policy suffers from the same problems as the initial placement hearings. The reclassification committee's recommendations are often cursorily denied by someone for reasons the inmate never knew were at issue.
Under the new policy, the Department changes the procedures for reclassification reviews. One improvement is that the final decision for reclassification rests with the Bureau of Classification rather than with the North Regional Director. While New Policy 111-07 represents an improvement over current policy, it still does not afford inmates adequate due process regarding their retention at the OSP.
First, New Policy 111-07 does not call for any information to be given to the inmate prior to the hearing. The policy simply requires that the inmate be given forty-eight hours notice of his hearing and be afforded an opportunity to appear and to give information to the reclassification committee. (Defs.' Ex. C at 9). While the committee appropriately considers a completed Form 2634[31] for each inmate, the inmates are not given the form before the reclassification committee hearing. The inmates receive no notice of the grounds claimed to support their retention at the OSP.
753 *753 Second, while New Policy 111-07 has only minor deficiencies when it comes to identifying sufficiently the type of conduct that could send an inmate in the OSP, it is much worse at describing the specific conduct necessary for an inmate to leave the OSP.
It is a fundamental precept of constitutional law, as well as "ordinary notions of fair play" that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law."
Rios v. Lane, 812 F.2d 1032, 1038 (7th Cir.1987) (quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926)). Adequate notice of conduct that could lead to sanctions is important if inmates are to "steer away from prohibited conduct, unentangled by the trappings of poorly delineated prison regulations." Id. at 1039.
The new policy provides a long list of information the reclassification committee will consider, but in the end the only standard governing the committee is "whether there has been a diminishing of the inmate's risk to the safety of persons or institutional security." (Defs.' Ex. C at 9-10). This lack of a defined standard is troubling because New Policy 111-07 also does not require the ultimate decision maker to explain why an inmate's reclassification is denied. New Policy 111-07 calls for a hearing before the reclassification committee and provides that:
The committee shall make a recommendation to reduce or continue the inmate's security level accordingly. The committee shall identify the basis for its decision and the factors relied upon. If the committee believes the inmate presents a threat to security of a general population institution, the committee shall document their conclusions as to the inmate's risk and their reasons.
The classification committee shall forward its recommendation to the Warden/Designee .... If the warden approves the recommendation, he or she shall submit the recommendation and the approval to the Bureau of Classification for final disposition .... The Bureau of Classification will review the recommendation and any objections filed by the inmate, and make a decision.
(Defs.' Ex. C at 10).
Just as with the initial placement hearings, New Policy 111-07 vests final authority with the Bureau of Classification. Under the current policy, Chief Ryznar denied the reclassification committee's recommendation for

a reduced classification in nearly half of the cases he saw. The evidence presented at trial, especially in Roe's and Thompson's cases, raises questions about the adequacy of the justifications Chief Ryznar used to make his decisions. Still, under the new policy, the Bureau of Classification would still not be required to give any explanation for denying an inmate reclassification. Once again, the new policy ignores the procedural requirement "that there must be a `written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons' for the disciplinary action." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-65, 94 S.Ct. 2963 (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489, 92 S.Ct. 2593).
As before, the new policy's due process deficiency is easily correctable. In reviewing both placement and reclassification decisions, the Bureau of Classification should set out the evidence it relied upon and the reasons for its decision. This information should be set out in sufficient detail to show the inmates the evidence that was actually considered and that a reasoned judgment was made. The use of boiler-plate language and form 754 decisions does not *754 show a reasoned consideration of the facts of the case necessary to afford an inmate due process.
IV. Conclusion
As described, the Court finds that the plaintiff inmates have a liberty interest entitled to constitutional protection. Because of the length of placement in its severely restrictive conditions, incarceration at the OSP imposes an atypical and a significant hardship upon inmates. The defendants have violated the plaintiff class's right to due process by denying the plaintiffs adequate notice, adequate hearing, and sufficiently detailed decisions.
Having found that the defendants violated, and will continue to violate, the plaintiffs' constitutionally protected liberty interest, the Court orders the parties to file, within fourteen days of the publication of this judgment, proposed injunctive orders, extending no further than necessary to correct the violation of the federal right set out in this opinion in a way that is the least intrusive means to correct the violation.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
[1] Plaintiffs sue Reginald Wilkinson, the director of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, Stephen J. Huffman, the former warden of the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility and the North Regional director of the Department, Bernard J. Ryznar, chief of the Department's Bureau of Classification, Todd E. Ishee, the warden at the OSP, Cheryl Jorgensen-Martinez, the Department's chief inspector, and Matthew Meyer, the Security Threat Group investigation coordinator for the Department.
[2] The National Institute of Corrections defines a supermax prison as:
[a] freestanding facility, or a distinct unit within a freestanding facility, that provides for the management and secure control of inmates who have been officially designated as exhibiting violent or seriously disruptive behavior while incarcerated. Such inmates have been determined to be a threat to safety and security in traditional high-security facilities and their behavior can be controlled only by separation, restricted movement, and limited access to staff and other inmates.
Chase Riveland, Supermax Prisons: Overview and General Considerations 3 (1999).
[3] At the time of trial, Ohio assigned prisoners to one of five security levels: minimum, medium, close, maximum, or high maximum.
[4] The team included a former warden of the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility and the Department's chief counsel, among others.
[5] Administrative control is highly restrictive solitary confinement. See Ohio Admin. Code § 5120-9-13 (2001). Inmates at various Ohio institutions are placed in administrative control for, among other reasons, prison rule infractions.

[6] The defendants presented evidence that the Department will seek funds to construct outdoor recreation spaces at the OSP. If approved by the Office of Budget and Management, the request will be submitted to the Ohio General Assembly. Whether the General Assembly approves funding for the outdoor recreation area in its 2002 capital budget will not be known until June 2002.
[7] Group counseling sessions are conducted by placing inmates in adjacent bar-fronted cells so that each inmate can see the counselor and hear the other inmates.
[8] The Court discusses below the Department's adoption of a new classification policy that goes into effect on March 1, 2002. When the policy becomes effective, the chief of the Bureau of Classification will make the final decision about whether an inmate at the OSP is reclassified.
[9] James DeJarnette was denied parole in June 1999 for the same reason.
[10] Under the Department rules, inmates can only be paroled from a close, medium, or minimum security level classification. Although DeJarnette met the parole board's guideline for release, he also needed to complete successfully a period, usually twelve months, at the maximum security classification before being moved to a close security classification.
[11] Under policies governing assignment to the OSP in effect at the time, it is not clear how the Department elevated Heard four levels to the high maximum security classification at the OSP. The Department's Policy 111-07 controlled placements to the OSP at that time. That policy states, in part:
VI. Procedures:
A. Assignment Criteria. Inmates will be recommended for and assigned to high maximum security when all of the following factors are present:
1. The inmate is or is about to be classified as maximum security;
....
3. The inmate presents the highest level of threat to the security and order of the department and its institutions, in the professional judgment of the classifying official.
(Pls.' Ex. 1) (emphasis added).
At the time the Department transferred Heard to the OSP, he was not at a maximum security classification. After his involvement with the drug offense, his classification level was only increased one level to medium security while he was in local control at the Orient Correctional Institution.
[12] The Barnes court stated:
To establish self-defense, a defendant must prove the following elements: (1) that the defendant was not at fault in creating the situation giving rise to the affray; (2) that the defendant had a bona fide belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that his only means of escape from such danger was in the use of such force; and (3) that the defendant did not violate any duty to retreat or avoid the danger.
Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d at 24, 759 N.E.2d at 1244.
[13] Interestingly, the warden of the OSP agreed with the reclassification committee's recommendation to reduce Kevin Gardner's security classification in 2000 but did not agree with the recommendation in 2001. The warden disagreed with the committee's recommendation because of Gardner's "[e]xtensive history of [assaults] and predatory acts." (Pls.' Ex. Gardner-5 at 2). However, this history must also have existed in 2000 as Gardner had no rules violations between his 2000 and 2001 reclassification hearings. (Pls.' Ex. Gardner-5 at 2).
[14] The memorandum lists the following behavior as criteria for classification to high maximum security status:

The inmate's conduct or continued presence at the sending institution poses a serious threat to the physical safety of any person, or to the security of the prison;
The nature of the inmate's criminal offense indicates that the inmate poses a serious threat to the physical safety of any person, or to the security of the prison;
The need to contain, prevent or quell a disturbance or riot;
A conspiracy to introduce contraband which may pose a serious threat to the security of the prison;
The inmate functions as a leader or enforcer of a security threat group;
The inmate poses a serious threat or escape; or
The inmate has demonstrated an ability to compromise the integrity of staff.
(Joint Ex. 19).
[15] The committee used a supervision review form containing a formula that assists in making security classification recommendations. The formula assigns an inmate up to ten positive points for "unfavorable behaviors" and up to three negative points for "stability factors." (Pls.' Ex. Roe-2). These subtotals are added and applied to a chart. The form directs that an inmate with an aggregate negative score should be considered for a supervision decrease. Roe scored a value of negative one on his review form. (Pls.' Ex. Roe-2).
[16] Security Threat Group Coordinator Matthew Meyer testified that his group has identified more than 900 different security threat groups in Ohio's prisons. (Meyer Test. at 1080). The groups range from very small, disorganized neighborhood groups to sophisticated and organized terrorist groups. (Meyer Test. at 1080).
[17] The annual cost per inmate at the OSP is $49,007.44, while the annual cost per inmate at the maximum security Southern Ohio Correctional Facility is $34,167.24. See Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corr., Ohio State Penitentiary, at http://www.drc.state.oh.us/public/osp.htm (last modified Feb. 5, 2002); Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corr., Southern Ohio Correctional Facility, at http://www.drc.state. oh.us/public/socf.htm (last modified Feb. 5, 2002).
[18] Further demonstrating the uncertainty regarding the evidence against Thompson, at a reclassification hearing held at the OSP in February 2000, the committee commented:
Ticket does not specify who he was fighting. Very generic. Inmate does not have any gang related tickets or any fighting or assault tickets in his record. It appears he has been mixed up with inmate Capone 293-878 who is ID'd as Crip leader.
(Pls.' Ex. Thompson-4).
[19] Interestingly enough, in 2000, the OSP's warden agreed with the reclassification committee's recommendation to reduce Thompson's security classification, but in 2001, the OSP's warden disagreed with the same recommendation even though nothing about Thompson's situation had changed. (Pls.' Exs. 3-6).
[20] Riveland testified:
Q: Can you comment on the frequency with which you overturned the committee?
A: The frequency of overturning the committee recommendation was not common, but it did occur.
(Riveland Test. at 934).
[21] The defendants first argue that the plaintiffs' claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), and Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997). In Heck, the Court ruled that a damage claim implicating the validity of a conviction or sentence is not valid under § 1983 until the conviction or sentence has been overturned. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87, 114

S.Ct. 2364. In Edwards, in the context of a prison disciplinary proceeding leading to segregated confinement, the Court held that "the respondent's claim for declaratory relief and money damages, based on allegations ... that necessarily imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed, is not cognizable under § 1983." Edwards, 520 U.S. at 648, 117 S.Ct. 1584. The defendants say that the plaintiffs' substantive and procedural due process claims call into question the validity of the administrative determinations affecting their continued confinement and should be barred.
The defendants' argument does not persuade. The plaintiffs are not seeking money damages or judicial invalidation of their initial transfers to the OSP. The plaintiffs seek prospective injunctive relief for adequate due process in the Department's transfer and retention decisions concerning the OSP. In fact, Edwards specifically states that seeking prospective injunctive relief under § 1983 is proper. See id. The Court does find that little or no evidence supports some of the Department's transfer and retention decisions. However, those findings are only used to support the plaintiffs' claim they should receive adequate process in the Department's future decisions, not to invalidate the Department's past decisions.
[22] Rather than repeat the phrasing an "atypical and a substantial hardship," the Court uses the word "atypical" as shorthand for both considerations unless specifically noted.
[23] Terry Collins testified that disciplinary control inmates, unlike OSP inmates, do not even have limited television privileges and programming. (Collins Test. at 1176).
[24] Discussed below, Chief Ryznar often denies an inmate's reclassification against the recommendation of the committee with minimal explanation. Such cursory treatment does not give the inmate any opportunity to challenge the basis for Chief Ryznar's decision or to know what he must do to win a reduction in classification. The defendants' expert on classification, James Austin, testified this is not appropriate: "I mean, you have to give reasonable explanation as to why the person is being kept there." (Austin Test. at 1034).
[25] Peter Davis was the executive director of the Ohio General Assembly's Correctional Institution Inspection Committee. Davis's comment is in the context of questions about his December 8, 1999, inspection report on the OSP, prepared for the Ohio General Assembly. (Pls.' Ex. 11). That report, after commenting on the subjectivity of the supermax placement process, concluded:
Serious questions remain as to how adequate, proper, fair and objective are the decisions to identify, justify and assign selected inmates to supermax. Still needed is a "clearer, more precise understanding of the working distinctions" among decisions to assign inmates to either high maximum, or to maximum [general population], or to maximum Administrative Control or to high close security.
(Pls.' Ex. 11 at 10).
[26] The OSP's higher cost is in part because it uses a higher staff-to-inmate ratio than used at other Ohio prisons. Also, unlike other prisons that have inmates prepare and serve food, inmates at the OSP do not perform any of the operational functions of the prison.
[27] Inmates are entitled to call witnesses and have them testify at their hearing as long as doing so does not "unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566, 94 S.Ct. 2963; King v. Wells, 760 F.2d 89, 93 (6th Cir.1985). Prison officials choosing to exclude a witness must have a reason based on a the specific facts of the case. See King, 760 F.2d at 93. This requirement is meant to strike the balance identified in Wolff between an inmate's due process rights and the Department's need for discretion in order to operate safely its correctional institutions.
[28] Defendant Huffman served as the warden of the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility during many of the transfers. He testified:
We were concerned about security of transporting the inmates, so at that time we did not tell them where they were going as far as the transport.
(Huffman Test. at 1138).

[29] Among other things, New Policy 111-07 changed the nomenclature describing the Department's security classifications. Instead of security classifications called maximum and high maximum, New Policy 111-07 has Level 4 and Level 5, respectively. (Defs.' Ex. C at 1). Also, instead of an inmate entering the OSP at Level II and having to progress to Level III before being able to transfer to a maximum security prison, under New Policy 111-07, an inmate enters the OSP at Privilege Level B and must progress to Privilege Level A before having the opportunity to transfer to a classification Level 4 facility. (Defs.' Ex. C at 1, 2, 6).
[30] The amount of cocaine required to support a third degree drug trafficking charge is as follows:
[I]f the amount of the drug involved equals or exceeds ten grams but is less than one hundred grams of cocaine that is not crack cocaine or equals or exceeds five grams but is less than ten grams of crack cocaine, trafficking in cocaine is a felony of the third degree ....
Ohio Rev.Code § 2925.03(C)(4)(d) (2001).
[31] Form 2634 contains administrative information about an inmate including his time to earliest possible release, his original crime, the basis for his admission to Level 5, a summary of his conduct since admitted to Level 5, and the number of conduct reports he received since arriving at the OSP.
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 204 F.Supp.2d 1024 (2002)
Charles E. AUSTIN, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Reginald A. WILKINSON, et al., Defendants.
No. 4:01-CV-071.
United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.
March 26, 2002.
10256 *1025 *1026 Alice Lynd, Law Office of Straughton & Alice Lynd, Niles, OH, Bill Goodman, Center for Constitutional Rights, New York City, Jillian S. Davis, American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio, Cleveland, OH, Jules L. Lobel Pittsburgh, PA, Michael J. Benza, Law Office of Jeffry F. Kelleher, Cleveland, OH, Raymond V. Vasvari, Jr., American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio, Terry H. Gilbert, Friedman & Gilbert, Cleveland, OH, Staughton Lynd, Law Office of Staughton & Alice Lynd, Niles, OH, for plaintiffs.
Carol H. O'Brien, Joseph M. Mancini, Office of the Attorney General, State of Ohio, Corrections Litigation Section, Columbus, OH, Jeffrey A. Stankunas, Isaac, Brant, Ledman & Teetor, Columbus, OH, Marianne Pressman, Office of the Attorney General, State of Ohio, Corrections Litigation Section, Cincinnati, OH, Mark Landes, Isaac, Brant, Ledman & Teetor, Columbus, OH, for defendants.
ORDER
GWIN, District Judge.
On February 25, 2002, the Court found that the plaintiff inmates have a liberty interest entitled to constitutional protection because the length of their placement at the Ohio State Penitentiary ("OSP"), and the severity of its restrictive conditions, imposes an atypical and a significant hardship upon the inmates. The Court held that the defendants violated the plaintiff class's right to due process by denying the plaintiffs adequate notice, adequate hearings, and sufficiently detailed decisions concerning their placement at the OSP. Because the defendants have violated the plaintiffs' constitutionally protected liberty interest, the Court orders the least intrusive means to correct the violation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A).
No person shall be placed or retained at a Level 5 security classification under Policy 111-07 except in compliance with the hearing procedures set forth herein.
I. Notice and Hearing
Before placing an inmate at Level 5, the defendants will provide the inmate written notice of the hearing at least forty-eight hours before the hearing. In addition to notice of the hearing, the defendants will provide the inmate with written notice of all the grounds believed to justify his placement at Level 5 and a summary of the evidence that the defendants will rely upon for the placement.[1] The written notice provided the inmate must be sufficient to "enable him to marshal the facts and prepare a defense." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974).
The defendants must give the inmates an opportunity to appear before a classification committee and make an oral or written statement if the inmate so desires. At the hearing on whether the inmate will be classified to Level 5, the defendants must allow the inmate an opportunity to call reasonable witnesses and present documentary evidence as long as permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous or burdensome to institutional safety or correctional goals. Id. at 566, 94 S.Ct. 2963. Upon request from an inmate being considered for Level 5 classification, the defendants will make reasonable efforts to secure the presence or participation by phone of

inmate-witnesses housed at other facilities. However, the ability to present a defense does not extend to the right 1027 to cross-examination or confrontation. See id. at 567-68, 94 S.Ct. 2963. Nor is the inmate entitled to the *1027
right to counsel. See id. at 569-70, 94 S.Ct. 2963.
If the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (the "Department") wants to use the statement of a witness whose identity it wishes to withhold, the Department shall "indicate this reliance and shall disclose to the inmate as much of the substance of the information as possible." (Pls.' Proposed Order Attach. 1 at 11). If the warden or the Chief of the Bureau of Classification wishes to rely on a statement that was not made known to the prisoner at the classification committee hearing, they shall follow the same procedure. Before using such information, the warden or the Chief of the Bureau of Classification will provide the inmate a reasonable opportunity to respond through a written statement and/or the submission of documentary evidence.
The classification committee shall make a record of hearings when an inmate is considered for placement to Level 5 security classification at the OSP., An audio recording is sufficient for this purpose. The defendants will retain this record while the inmate is at Level 5 classification at the OSP.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the classification committee shall inform the inmate of its recommendation. The classification committee will prepare a contemporaneous written statement of its recommendation, the justification for its recommendation, and a summary of the evidence supporting its recommendation. The classification committee will supply a copy of the recommendation to the inmate.
If the classification committee recommends placement to Level 5 security classification, the Department shall give the inmate notice of his right to appeal and the method for the appeal. The Department will give the inmate reasonable time[2] to prepare and submit a written response to the classification committee's recommendation.
After the warden or the warden's designee ("warden/designee") receives the classification committee's recommendation that he be reclassified to Level 5, the warden/designee will independently review the recommendation for consistency with the standards described in Policy 111-07. The warden/designee will recommend a placement. If the warden/designee recommends placement to Level 5, the warden/designee will provide a written justification of all reasons believed to support such a placement and will provide a copy of the recommendation to the inmate. If the inmate disagrees, the Department will allow the inmate to provide written argument and documentary evidence to the Bureau of Classification. The Bureau of Classification will make the final decision.
Regarding consideration of placement to a Level 5 security classification, the Bureau of Classification will consider the classification committee and the warden/designee's recommendations and, consistent with section VI(C) of Policy 111-07, will determine whether the inmate should be placed at Level 5. If the Bureau of Classification determines that the inmate should be placed at the Level 5 security classification, the responsible employee of the Bureau of Classification shall record a detailed and specific justification for the decision.
The justification shall set out all grounds justifying the inmates' placement at Level 5 classification and will not use conclusory or boilerplate language. The justification statement shall describe the facts relied upon and the 1028 reasoning used. This written statement shall address an inmate's *1028 specific case and not contain merely vague boilerplate language. The Department shall provide a copy of the Bureau of Classification's written decision to the inmate within five working days.
When the Department conducts its annual hearing on whether an inmate earlier assigned to the OSP because of his Level 5 security classification should be reclassified to a lower classification level, the Department must use the same procedure described for initial placement at the OSP.
II. Grounds for Level 5 Classification
With regard to the grounds justifying placement at the OSP, the defendants may rely upon the grounds set out in section VI(C) of Policy 111-07 with the following changes: First, defendants will revise section VI(C)(4) to set a reasonably specific description of the type and quantity of contraband that will make an inmate eligible for

placement at Level 5 classification. As to the quantity of illegal drugs that can subject an inmate to Level 5 classification, the quantity chosen should reflect a level that would subject an inmate to incarceration for at least a third degree felony. Alternatively, section VI(C)(4) could allow Level 5 classification placement for multiple violations involving lesser quantity of drugs.
Upon revising section VI(C)(4), defendants shall submit the proposed revisions to this Court for approval. Until the Court approves a revised section VI(C)(4), the defendants shall not place inmates at the Level 5 security classification for conspiracy or attempt to convey, introduce or possess major contraband.
Second, the defendants will revise Policy 111-07 to clearly set out the type of security group threat or gang involvement that justifies placement at Level 5 classification. Regarding this criteria for placement, Policy 111-07 would be acceptable if it used the criteria formerly employed: "[t]he inmate functions as a leader or enforcer of a security threat group." (Pls.' Ex. 2 at 2). The revision to Policy 111-07 should also require that the inmate was a leader, enforcer, or recruiter of a gang involved in violent or disruptive behavior.
The Court has found that Policy 111-07's criteria for decisions on retention are vague. While Policy 111-07 sets out appropriately considered factors at pages nine and ten, it fails to give sufficiently definite standards for the use of the factors.
To meet constitutional requirements of notice and justification, the defendants shall revise Policy 111-07 to clearly state the factors to be used for reclassification. Unless an inmate's prior conduct during incarceration resulted in death, or extremely serious bodily harm, the inmate should generally qualify for reclassification to a lower security classification if he has not committed any violence within the previous three years and has no major misconduct within the past two years while placed at the OSP. More generally, unless an inmate's prior conduct during incarceration resulted in death or extreme bodily harm, the Department should only consider "behavior in the last five years, including prior to Level 4 or 5 classification." (Defs.' Ex. C at 9).
At least twice a year, the Department will notify the inmate in writing and orally of the inmate's progress toward security level reduction. Such notice will advise the inmate what specific conduct is necessary for that prisoner to be reduced from Level 5 and the amount of time it will take before the defendants' reduce the inmate's security level classification.
III. Defendants' Changes to Policy 111-07 and Review Hearings
The defendants will submit proposed changes to Policy 111-07 within thirty days for approval. Until approved by 1029 this *1029 Court, no additional prisoners shall be placed on Level 5 unless approved by the Court. After the Court
approves the defendants' changes to Policy 111-07, the defendants will comply with all of the provisions of revised Policy 111-07.
To afford inmates currently classified at Level 5 the rights described in this Court's opinion, the defendants shall conduct an additional review of inmate security classifications in compliance with the revised Policy 111-07 approved by this Court. The defendants will complete this classification review within eight weeks of the approval of revisions to Policy 111-07.
IV. Monitoring and Document Production
The defendants shall provide to the plaintiffs' counsel copies of any additional policies, forms, and other directives adopted by defendants in implementation of this injunction.
The defendants shall provide to the plaintiffs' counsel a list of all members of the class showing the inmates first and last names, incarceration number, date of arrival at the OSP, current privilege and security level and the name of the institutions from which the inmates were transferred to the OSP.
The defendants shall provide to the plaintiffs' counsel copies of all Level 5 placement and retention recommendations and final decisions for class members whenever a placement or retention decision about that

prisoner is made, including any and all forms utilized such as security designation forms, supervision review forms, notice of hearing forms, information presented by the inmate, information presented by staff, classification committee reports of Level 5 placement, and privilege/security level review forms. The defendants' counsel shall meet monthly with the plaintiffs' counsel to facilitate the delivery of documents, and to discuss and, if possible, resolve problems related to the implementation of this order.
V. Retention of Jurisdiction
The Court will retain jurisdiction over this matter for the purpose of enforcement. This injunction shall terminate in two years upon the motion of either party unless the Court finds that prospective relief is needed to correct an ongoing violation of a federal right. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(1)(A)(i). IT IS SO ORDERED.
[1] If the defendants elect to use Form 2598 to give an inmate notice, they must limit the grounds stated on the form and the evidence generally described on the form, to support placement at the OSP. [2] This "reasonable time" shall not be less than twenty-four hours.
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 Case 4:01-cv-00071-JG Document 765 Filed 09/27/2007 Page 1 of 23

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

-------------------------------------------------------

:

CHARLES E. AUSTIN, et al.,

:

:

Plaintiffs,

:

:

vs.

:

:

REGINALD WILKINSON, et al.,

:

:

Defendants.

:

:

-------------------------------------------------------

CASE NO. 4:01-CV-71
OPINION & ORDER [Resolving Doc. No. 716]

JAMES S. GWIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

With this Opinion and Order, the Court decides whether to grant the motion of Plaintiffs

Charles E. Austin, et al. (“Plaintiffs” or “OSP Inmates”) that requests the Court order Defendants

Reginald Wilkinson, et al. (“Defendants” or “Ohoi ”) to modify their proposed prison administration

policies. Plaintif fs say m odification is needed to protect the constitutional rights of inmates

incarcerated at the Ohio State Penitentiary (“OSP”) because Defendants’ proposed policies fail to

give sufficient notice to inmates and, therefore, violate the due process rights of the OSP inmates.

[Doc. 716.] Defendants disagree and say tha t their proposed policies m eet the constitutional

requirements set forth by the Supreme Court in Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005), as well

as previous Or ders of t his Court. [Doc. 723.] As a result, Defendants request the Court deny

Plaintiffs’ motion. Id.

For the reasons presented below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Plaintiffs’

motion.

-1-

Case 4:01-cv-00071-JG Document 765 Filed 09/27/2007 Page 2 of 23

Case No. 4:01-CV-71 Gwin, J.

I. Background

At the outset, the C ourt notes that it has r ecorded this case’s extensive background in its

Opinions and Orders of, inter alia, March 21, 2006, August 2, 2006, and August 7, 2006. [Docs.

659, 699, 703.] The Court refers t he reader to th ese opinions and incorporates these previously

discussed findings.

The parties’ most recent disagreement comes from Defendants’ amendment to classification

procedures for male inmates entering the OSP. The amendments followed the Supreme Court’s

ruling in Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005). Prior to Wilkinson, this Court considered a

number of Defendants’ prison a dministration policies for the OSP and ruled on their

constitutionality. In January 2002, on the eve of theinitial trial in this action, Defendants approved

“Level 4 / Level 5 Classification for Male Inmates,” referred to as “New Policy 111-07” or “New

Policy.” Thus, this Court and the Sixth Circuit considered constitutional issues from Defendants’

adoption of New Policy 111-07. See, e.g., Austin v. Wilkinson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 719 (N.D. Ohio

2002); Austin v. Wilkinson, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1024 (N.D. Ohio 2002);Austin v. Wilkinson, 372 F.3d

346 (6th Cir. 2004). Like wise, the Supreme Court considered the New Policy in Wilkinson and

found its provisions constitutionally adequate. See, e.g., Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 220 (holding that

“the procedures set forth in the New Policy

are sufficient to satis fy the Constitu tion’s

requirements”).

After the Suprem e Court’s ruling in Wilkinson, Defendants again a mended their prison

administration policies for the OSP. See Doc. 710-2. Defendants did so, in part, to conform with

the Court’s post-Wilkinson Opinions and Orders of March 21, 2006, August 2, 2006, and August

7, 2006. [Doc. 753.] Defendants also appear to ha ve made the second am endment to enable

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Case 4:01-cv-00071-JG Document 765 Filed 09/27/2007 Page 3 of 23
Case No. 4:01-CV-71 Gwin, J. separate administration of Level 4 and Level 5 inmates at the OSP. The Court reefrs to Defendants’ second amended policy as the “Proposed Policy,” which appears on the docke t as Document Number 710-2. Defendants’ second amendment, i.e., the change fromthe New Policy 111-07 to the Proposed Policy, occasions Plaintiffs’ current complaint. Generally, the Plaintiffs say that the Court should require Defendants to adhere to the letter of New Policy 111-07, or a very-near facsimile of the prison administration policies found constitutional in Wilkinson. [Docs. 716, 752.] Plaintiffs also complain that Defendants’ Proposed Policy no longer encompasses the management of Level 4 inmates, which Ohio seeks to adm inister through new procedures entitled “Inm ate Security Classification Level 4 at the OSP.” [Doc. 738-2.]
Predictably, Ohio defends the Proposed Policy as constitutionall y sound. [Doc. 753.] Defendants say that the Proposed Policy provides thesame degree of constitutional protection as the Supreme Court-approved New Policy 111-07. Id. Ohio also asserts that the Court need show “substantial deference to [the] professional judgment” of the OSP’s prison admni istrators and refrain from taking any action regarding the State’s establishm ent of a standalone policy for Level 4 inmates. Id.
On February 16, 2007, the Court conducted a bench trial in this matter, during which the Court received the parties’ testimony, documentary evidence, stipulations, and physical exhibits. See, e.g., Doc. 735. Thereafter, the Court allowed the parties to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, which both sides did on May 21, 2007. [Docs. 752, 753.] The Court now considers Plaintiffs’ five issues relating to the classification, placement, and retention practices at the OSP that Plaintiffs say contravene the Constitution. [Doc. 752.]
With their motion, the Plaintiffs claim that:
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Defendants do not provide due process when determ ining a prisoner’s expected length of stay on Level 5 during the 30 day review after placement at OSP In annual security level assessments after a prisoner’s initial placement, Defendants do not provide meaningful review Defendants do not provide a reasoned decision for their security assessments Defendants do not provide due process when a r ecommendation to reduce a prisoner’s security level is reversed Defendants’ proposed policies do not providedue process protections “comparable” to New Policy 111-07 as described by the Supreme Court
Id. The Court discusses the m erits of the parties’ argum ents and presents its
conclusion on each of Plaintiffs’ five issues below.

II. Analysis

Plaintiffs’ Issue 1:

“Defendants do not provide due process when

determining a prisoner’s expected length of st ay

on Level 5 during the 30 day review

after

placement at OSP”

The parties’ first disagreement involves the OSP’s thirty-day review process, during which

prison administrators give some review to the Level 5 placement and give inmates some prediction

whether an incoming inmate will remain on Level 5 for more or less than three years. Plaintifs say

that, upon an inmate’s arrival at the OSP, Defendants determine how long the inmate will stay on

Level 5 without providing him adequate due process. See, e.g., Doc. 752 at 7. Specifically,

Plaintiffs claim that

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[d]uring the thirty (30) days after a prisoner is placed on Level 5 at OSP, Defendants determine whether the prisoner can expect toremain on Level 5 for more or less than three years due to the seriousness of his placement offense. This is done without written criteria, without notice and hearing prior to the st aff determination, and without a reasoned decision explaining the rationale for the projected duration. Id. Plaintiffs say that insufficient process dur ing the proposed thirty-day review r enders the procedure unconstitutional and represents “a current and ongoing violation of prisoners’ due process rights.” Id. at 10. Plaintiffs do not request a specific remedy, but, presumably, would ask the Court to impose substantive changes to Defendants’ proposed policy to correct this alleged violation. Defendants reply that the OSP’s proposed thir ty-day review process incorporates the procedures contained in the New Policy approved by the Supreme Court in Wilkinson and, therefore comports with due process requirements. See Doc. 753 at 15 (citing Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 229). Defendants particularly assert that the OSP’s thirty-day intake procedures compare to the “informal, non-adversary procedures” upheld by the Suprem e Court in Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 16 (1979) andHewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 473-76 (1983). Id. As a result, Defendants conclude that the Court need not impose additional safeguards on the OSP’s thirty-day review process. Id. As set forth in its August 7, 2006 Opinion andOrder, the Court cannot properly require that Ohio adhere to the letter of the New Policy. See Doc. 703 at 8. The Court recognizes that “Ohio has the authority to modify its procedure,”; however, “the modified procedure must still comport with the Due Process requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard.” Id. Thus, so long as the OSP’s thirty-day review process m eets the due proc ess requirements set forth in Wilkinson, including reflection of the non-adversarial measures found constitutional inGreenholtz and Hewitt, the Court will not compel Defendants to adopt other safeguards.
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In Wilkinson, the Supreme Court considered the OSP’sthirty-day review process as set of rth
in the New Policy and found its provisions sufficiently constitutional. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 217.
The Supreme Court characterized the OSP’s thirty-day review:
Inmates assigned to OSP receive [a] review within 30 days of their arrival. That review is conducted by a designated OSP staff member, who examines the inmate’s file. If the OSP staff member deems the inmate inappropriately placed, he prepares a written recommendation to the OSP warden that the inmate be transferred to a lower security institution. If the OSP ward en concurs, he forwards that transfer recommendation to the Bureau of Classification for appropriate action. If the inmate is deemed properly placed, he remains in OSP and his placement is reviewed on at least an annual basis according to the [OSP’s] initial three-tier classification review process . . .
Id. (citation omitted).
Thus, in Wilkinson, the Supreme Court sanctioned Defendants’ reliance on “informal, non-
adversary procedures” in completing its thirty-day review process of inmates coming into the OSP.
Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertions, Defendants’ proposed poilcy substantially mirrors the New
Policy for new prisoner intake. Specifically, the proposed policy provides:
E. Thirty (30) Day Review/Orientation Process
1. Placement at level 5 varies in length depending on the nature of the initiating incident, criteria for placement, and/or demonstrated behavior in assigned level. All inmates placed into this level m ust have a r eview of their classification level completed by an assigned unit staff member within thirty (30) days of placement to determine if they have been properly classified. This review must include a review of an inmate’s file to ensure that proper documentation has been included detailing how/why the inmate has been classified into level 5.
2. If the review finds that the inm ate meets the appropriate criteria, unit and/or programming staff will meet with the inmate to explain the classification and review processes and what the expectations are concerning his behavior, and appropriate program participation. This meeting will also afford the inmate the opportunity to request any needed assistance while assigned in the classification level. Staff will advise the inmate whether release to a general population institution in three (3) years or less appears reasonably possible.
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3. If the review finds that the inmate does not meet the level 5 criteria, the reviewing staff member must forward a written recommendation through the Deputy Warden of Operations, to the W arden recommending that the inm ate be transferred to an appropriate institution. The reasons for the recommendation must be listed to reflect why the inmate is not appr opriate for level 5 and is m ore appropriate for another level.
4. If the W arden concurs with the recom mendation, the packet will then be forwarded, along with a newly com pleted Supervision Review Form (male forms DRC2098, DRC2094, DRC2338 or female forms DRC2605, DRC2606, DRC2607) to the [Bureau of Classification and Receptoin] for appropriate action. If the Warden disagrees with the staff member’s recommendation, the inmate remains at his current status, and this decision is not appealable.
See Doc. 710-2 at 6.
The Court finds that the OSP’s thir ty-day review process outlined in the proposed policy
provides a similar degree of constitutional protections as the New Policy reviewed and approved by
the Supreme Court in Wilkinson. Thus, because the OSP’s thirty-day review process meets the due
process requirements set forth in Wilkinson, including reflection of the non-adversarial m easures
found constitutional in Greenholtz and Hewitt, the Court will not compel Defendants to adopt any
additional safeguards. Absent specific allegationsof due process violations, the Court does not find
Defendants’ thirty-day review process unconstituti onal and, therefore, will not grant Plaintiffs’
requested relief.
Plaintiffs’ Issue 2: “In annual security level assessments after a prisoner’s initial placement, Defendants do not provide meaningful review”
Plaintiffs next challenge Defendants’ methods for conducting annual security reviews after
an inmate’s placement at the OSP. See Doc. 752 at 31-32. Plaintiffscharacterize the annual security
reviews as “meaningless because [Ohio’s] decision [to retain some prisoners indefinitely] has been
predetermined and the prisoner’s positive conduc t while at the OSP is routinely held to be
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Case No. 4:01-CV-71 Gwin, J. outweighed by his placement offense.” Id. Plaintiffs assert that “Defendants retain some prisoners year after year regardless of good orexcellent conduct while on Level 5.” Id. Plaintiffs say that the predicted duration of stay operates as a predetermined decision to continue confinement on Level 5. Id. at 10-11. Plaintiffs pr ovide the facts surrounding Defendants’ annual security reviews of inmates Roy Slider, John Daniels, and Alvin Jones, a/k/a Mosi Paki as evidence of the outcom e determinative nature of the OSP’s annual security reviews. Id. at 11-14. As with the first issue, Plaintiffs do not request any specific relief from the Court. Id. at 18.
In part, Plaintiffs appear to again challengeDefendants’ anticipated length of stay policy or lack thereof. Defendants respond that Wilkinson does not require them to establish an anticipated length of stay policy. Defendantscontrast the District Court’s order imposing such a provision with the Supreme Court’s holding that the District Court’s interventionwas in error. On March 26, 2002, this Court ruled, “At least twice a year, the Department will notify the inmate in writing and orally of the inmate’s progress . . . Such notice will advise the inmate what specific conduct is necessary for that prisoner to be reduced from Level 5 and the amount of time it will take . . . ”. [Doc. 753, at 20.] The Supreme Court then overturned this Court: “[T]he procedures set forth in the New Policy [that do not contain an antici pated length of stay provision] are suf ficient to satisf y the Constitution’s requirements; it f ollows, then, that the procedural modif ications ordered by the District Court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals were in error.” [Id.]
Defendants further contend that their annual review procedures are adequate. Defendants assert that, because “inmates are provided with notice of the factual basis for the proposed placement and subsequent annual reviews,” this notice “demonstrates that inmates are provided with sufficient protection to comply with the Due Process Clause.” See Doc. 723 at 4-5, 15.
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Case No. 4:01-CV-71 Gwin, J.
Again, the Court turns to Wilkinson to assess the parties’ positions. In Wilkinson, the Supreme Court discusses not only the need for notice of authorities’ placement decisions to ensure inmates’ due process rights, but also underlines the requirem ent that the content of the communication be adequately detailed to “serve[] as a guide for future behavior.” See 545 U.S. at 226 (citing Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16). The Supreme Court also instructs that “[c]ourts must give substantial deference to prison m anagement decisions” before m andating substantive operating changes “when correctional officials conclude thata prisoner has engaged in disruptive behavior.” Id. at 228. Thus, prison officials and courts correctly consider an inm ate’s behavior in decisions they make that affect the terms of an inmate’s incarceration. Logically, this consideration should encompass the inmate’s positive and negative behavior, particularly in light of scarce resources available to administer most states’ penal systems, including that of Ohio.
Based on Wilkinson’s emphasis on the importance of an inmate’s behavior as a benchmark for the terms of his incarceration and after reviewing the “Annual supervision reviews for level 5 inmates” contained in the proposed policy, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ request to be reasonable in asking that Defendants communicate in sufficient detail their consideration of an inmate’s positive behavior at the OSP to the inmate at the time of the annual security review. To do otherwise would provide notice, but no content and, as such, run the risk of falling short of t he Constitution’s adequacy requirement.
Thus, the Court orders Defendants to considerand communicate in sufficient detail inmates’ positive behavior during the annual review process.
Plaintiffs’ Issue 3: “Defendants do not provide a reasoned decision for
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their security assessments”

Plaintiffs’ third issue raises two specific co mplaints about the Classification Committee’s

annual determination whether to retain an inmate on Level 5 or reduce his security classif ication.

Plaintiffs say that, unlike New Policy 111-07, the Proposed Policy “does not re

quire the

Classification Committee to identif y the f actors relied on in reaching their determ ination as to

whether or not a prisoner should remain on Level 5.” Doc. 752 at 19. Plaintiffs also say that the

OSP’s administrators often fail to record adequate reasons for their decision to retain a prisoner on

Level 5 and, as a result, the prisoner does not have “notice as to what he must do in the future to be

reduced to a lower security level.” Id. Once again, Plaintiffs characterize t hese deficiencies as

“current and ongoing constitutional violations.” Id. at 21.

In comparing the Proposed Policy and New Policy 111-07, the Court finds that both policies

require the Classification Committee identify the basis for its decision to retain a prisoner on Level

5. In fact, the Proposed Policy appears to provide an i nmate with more process during his annual

supervision review than New Policy 111-07. First, both policies contain eighteen factors that the

Classification Committee must take into consideration “at a m inimum” in coming to a Level 5

retention decision. See New Policy 111-07 at 9-10; Proposed Policy at 7-8. Further, both policies

instruct the Classification Committee to consider the eighteen factors, as well as the circumstances

underlying an inmate’s initial placement at the OSP, the inm ate’s subsequent adjustment to the

facility, and his “demonstrated attitude” in determining whether to continue an inmate on Level 5.

See New Policy 111-07 at 10; Proposed Policy at 8.

New Policy 111-07 then instructs the Classification Committee to “identify the basis for its

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Case No. 4:01-CV-71 Gwin, J. decision and the factors relied upon” in its recommendation to the warden. See New Policy 111-07 at 10. The Proposed Policy instructs the Classi fication Committee that it “must articulate the reason(s) for its recommendation in a written statement (form DRC2660).” See Proposed Policy at 8. “The statement need not be lengthy, but must include every basis for the recommendation, and may not be m erely conclusory.” Id. Finally, unlike New Policy 111-07, the Proposed Policy continues that “ [t]he inmate must be provide d promptly with a copy of the Classification Committee’s recommendation and reason(s), ensuring theinmate sufficient time to review it, prepare a defense, and file any objections (form DRC2596) before the next review.” Id. Thus, contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertion, the Proposed Policy appears toprovide as many, if not more, mechanisms than New Policy 111-07 for an inmate to understand and participate in his annual supervision review.
Moving to Plaintiffs’ second complaint against the OSP’s annual supervision review, they present compelling evidence that the prison adm inistrators often do not provide a “reasoned decision” sufficient for an inm ate to understand wh at steps he m ust take to reduce his Level 5 security assessment. Particularly noteworthy are the OSP inmates’ “Notices of Anticipated Length of Stay at Level Five Security Classification” that reflect the inmate’s apparent substantial positive progress, contain no negative comments, yet conclude that the Classification Committee is
of the opinion that [ the inmate’s] placement offense is so severe that [ he] should remain confined at the OSP for m any years regardless of [his] beha vior while confined at the OSP. W e do not believe you can be safely m anaged at a l ower security level. The type of offense you com mitted makes me believe that, if you commit another offense, the likelihood of the new offense being a serious offense is high. See, e.g., Doc. 752-7 (Inmate John Daniels), 752-14 (Inmate Alvin Jones). The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that these notices do not provide inmates with a reasoned decision that gives them notice as to what they must do to reduce their status fromLevel 5. Indeed,
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Case No. 4:01-CV-71 Gwin, J. these notices tell inmates that, regardless of their good behavior and self-im provement, they can expect to “remained confined at the OSP for many years.”
This message runs counter to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and this Court’s previous Orders. An inm ate’s “notice of the factual basis leading to [a deprivation of liberty] and a fair opportunity for rebuttal . . . are among the most important procedural mechanisms for purposes of avoiding erroneous deprivations.” Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 225-26 (citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 15 (1979);Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 543 (1985); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972)). “Requiring [the OSP] officials to provide a brief summary of the factual basis for the classification review and allowing the [OSP] inmate a rebuttal opportunity safeguards against the inmates being mistaken for another or singled out for insufficient reason.” Id. at 226. See also March 21, 2006 Order [Doc. 659 at 19], August 7, 2006 Order [Doc. 703 at 11]. Thus, the Proposed Policy and the OSP’s procedures in implementing them must provide for a reasoned decisions to an inmate as to what he m ust do to reduce his classification status from Level 5.
The reader will recall that any reduction from Level 5 to Level 4 results in a transfer to a maximum security placement. Given that placement at Level 5 costs the State of Ohio significant additional money than placement at maximum security placement at Level 4, the Defendants should provide more justification why they want to spend more money to keep an inmate at Level 5.
Plaintiffs’ Issue 4: “Defendants do not provide due process when a recommendation to reduce a prisoner’s security level is reversed”
Plaintiffs’ fourth issue raises three complaints: two regarding the procedural mechanisms in the Proposed Policy’s “reversal” provisions and oneregarding Ohio’s “narrowed scope” of its policy
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from Level 4 and Level 5 inmates in New Policy 111-07 to Level 5 inm ates only in the Proposed

Policy. See Doc. 752 at 21-27. The Court addresses the two “reversal” complaints here and takes

up the “narrowed scope” complaint in its discussion of Plaintiffs’ fifth issue.

In their fourth challenge, Plaintiffs say thathe Proposed Policy “does not require Defendants

to grant [an inm ate] a face-to-face opportunity to be heard” before a higher official reverses a

recommendation against an inm ate’s Level 5 placement or retention. Id. at 25. Plaintiffs also

complain that the Proposed Policy does not require an OSP adm inistrator who reverses a

recommendation against Level 5 placement to state the basis of his reversal. Id. According to

Plaintiffs, these two procedural deficiencies in the Proposed Policy’s reversal process create “current

and ongoing constitutional violations.” Id. at 26-27.

Defendants do not respond directly to Plainti ffs’ request. I nstead, several elem ents of

Defendants’ pleadings tangentially address Plaintiffs’ fourth issue. First, with regard to reversals

of recommendations to reduce an inmate’s classification from Level 5, Defendants claim that they

have already implemented the procedures required by this Court’s March 21, 2006 Order. Doc. 753

at 8-10. Defendants highlight that these proceduresinclude “notice [to the inmate], the reason(s) for

the contemplated reversal, an opportunity to respond, and a reasoned decision for any subsequent

reversal of the Classification Committee’s recommendation against placement into Level 5.” Id. at

9. To the extent that their current procedures “already” com ply with the Court’s March 21, 2006

Order, Defendants do not believe that they need to adopt additional or different practices.

Second, Defendants say that som e of Plaintiffs proposals “go beyond what Wilkinson

requires.” Id. at 9, 12. De fendants take special issue with Plaintiffs’ requests for “face-to-face

hearings” and “specification of what was inadequate or erroneous in the [classi

fication]

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Case No. 4:01-CV-71 Gwin, J. recommendation.” Id. Defendants view these proposed requirements as “attributes of an adversarial proceeding” and, as such, claim that they go beyond the scope of Wilkinson’s requirements. Id. at 12. According to Def endants, these “procedural proposals are at odds with the requirem ent in Wilkinson that the State’s interest in security and scarce resources be considered in deciding what procedures are required.” Id. at 9. Defendants charge that Planitiffs “ignor[e] those considerations” and seek to “mandate additional expenditures for unnecessary procedural safeguards which might jeopardize control of the prisoners.” Id. at 13.
Finally, Defendants say that, in the context of an informal, non-adversarial hearing of the type required by Wilkinson, “a brief description of the reasons supporting a [classification or reversal] decision is the standard for determining the constitutional sufficiency of a written decision.” Id. at 19. Providing an inmate with anything more than “a brief description of the reasons supporting the [classification or reversal] decision” would “go beyond what W ilkinson requires.” Id. at 21-22. Because Defendants already have a policy require ment “that the Classification Commi ttee, the Warden and the Bureau must make a recommendation [decision] that includes: ‘the reason(s) for the recommendation in a written statement,” Defendants say that they comply with this Court’s March 21, 2006 Order. Id. at 22.
Historically, Defendants allowed a higher revi ewing authority at OSP or t he Bureau of Classification at Ohio’s Departm ent of Correcti ons to r everse a decision of the Classification Committee or warden who had recom mended against an inma te’s placement at the OSP. Ohio allowed these reversals without providing the OSP inmates with notice or hearing rights. Plaintiffs sued, the Court found that Defendants’reversal procedures violated inmates’ due process rights, and the Supreme Court agreed. See Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 226-28. Thus, in its March 21, 2006 Opinion
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and Order, the Court instructed Defendants that

Ohio may use a three[-tiered] placem ent and retention review process whereby a

classification committee, a warden ( or representative), and the Bureau of

Classification can each review the cases of inm ates being considered for OSP

placement or retention. If a reviewer at nay [tier] of the process recommends against

OSP placement/retention, the process shall term inate, the decision against

placement/retention shall control, and no subsequent reviewer during that

investigation shall overturn the recommendation against placement/retention unless

Ohio affords [the effected inmate] notice, an opportunity to respond, and a reasoned

decision for any subsequent reversal of an earlier recom

mendation against

placement[/retention] at OSP.

Doc. 659 at 26-27.

In accordance with Wilkinson’s requirements and the Court’s March 21, 2006 Opinion and

Order, Defendants incorporated this m andate in their Proposed P olicy. Now, a higher of ficial’s

reversal of a recommendation against an inmate’s placement on Level 5 creates notice and hearing

rights in the OSP’s inmates. For example, within the context of a Level 5 placement decision, the

Proposed Policy provides as follows:

D. Procedure for placing an inmate into level 5

3. Warden or designee’s recommendation

a. If the Classification Committee recommends against placement [on Level 5], the process for level 5 placem ent will terminate and the recom mendation against placement must control; unless the Warden or designee overturns the recommendation against placement. In that event the inmate must receive notice, the reason(s) for the contemplated reversal, an opportunity to respond, and a reasoned decision for any subsequent r eversal of the Classification Committee’s recommendation against placement onto level 5.

b. The warden or designee m ust review the notice, the Classification Committee’s recommendation and reason(s), any objections filed by the inmate, and any other relevant information presented by staff or the inmate.

c. The Warden or designee must make a recommendation and must articulate the reason(s) f or the recom mendation in a written statem ent (forms DRC2653, DRC2657). The statement need not be lengthy, but must include

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every basis for the recommendation, and may not be merely conclusory.
d. The inmate must be provided with a copy of the Warden [sic] or designee’s recommendation and reason(s) promptly, ensuring the inmate sufficient time to review it, prepare a defense, and file any objections (form DRC2596) before the review of the Chief of the Bureau of Classification and Reception (BCR) or designee. The inm ate must be n otified upon receipt of the Warden’s recommendation that he or she may file formal objections with the Chief of the BCR or designee no later thanfifteen (15) days fromthe date the inmate is served with the Warden’s recommendation and reason(s).
4. Chief of the BCR or designee’s decision
a. If the Warden or designee recom mends against placement, the process for level 5 placement will terminate and the recommendation against placement must control; unless the Chief of the BCR or designee overtu rns the recommendation against placement. In that event the inmate must receive notice, the reason(s) for the contemplated reversal, an opportunity to respond, and a reasoned decision for any subsequent reversal of the W arden [sic] or designee’s recommendation against placement into level 5.
b. The Chief of the BCR or designee m ust review the notice, the recommendations and reason(s) of the Classification Com mittee and the Warden or designee, any obje ctions filed by the inm ate, and any other relevant information presented by staff or the inmate.
c. The Chief of the BCR or designee must decide whether to place the inmate into level 5 and m ust articulate the reason(s) for his or her decision in a written statement (forms DRC2654, DRC2655). The statement need not be lengthy, but must include every basis for the decision, and may not be merely conclusory.
d. The inmate must be provided promptly with a copy of the decis ion and the reason(s).
See Proposed Policy at 5-6.
The Proposed Policy contains similar procedures regarding the reversal of a recommendation
against retaining an inmate on Level 5 after his annual supervision review. Id. at 8-9.
In their most recent complaint, Plaintiffs would like the notice and hearing requirements to
include an inmate’s “face-to-face opportunity to beheard” before a higher administrator can reverse
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Case No. 4:01-CV-71 Gwin, J. a decision for placement at maximum security Level 4. However, contrary to Plaintiffs’ wishes, due process does not require Defendants toprovide an inmate with a face-to-face hearing prior to an OSP administrator’s reversal of a recommendation against his placement or retention on Level 5. Instead, “informal, nonadversary procedures” appropriately provide sufficient process due to an inmate when a higher official reverses recommendation against Level 5 placement or retention.
In Wilkinson, the Supreme Court held that Ohio’s New Policy [111-07] provdi es informal, nonadversary procedures comparable to those we upheld in Greenholtz and Hewitt [v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983)], and no further procedural m odifications are necessary in order to satisfy due process under the Mathews [v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)] test. Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals should have ordered the New Policy altered. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 229. The Supreme Court instructs that, where a prison administration decision “draws more on the experience of prison administrators, and where the State’s interest implicates the safety of other inmates and prison personnel, the informal, non-adversary procedures set forth in Greenholtz and Hewitt provide the appropriate model” to protect an inmate’s due process rights. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 228-29 (full citations omitted). In Greenholtz, a parole procedure case, the Supreme Court rejected the District Court ’s imposition of adm inistrative procedures equating to a “full form al hearing,” including an inm ate’s personal appearance before the parole board, during a parole eligibility determination. 442 U.S. at 5-6. Instead, the Supreme Court found that a “parole release decision is . . . essentially an e xperienced prediction based on a host of variables.” Id. at 16. Consequently, prison administrators need only provide an inmate “an opportunity to be heard, and when parole is denied [they] inform[ ] the inmate in what respects he falls short of qualifying for parole; this affords the process that is due under these circum stances. The Constitution does not
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require more.” Id.
Similarly, Hewitt approved “informal, nonadversary” proceedings in considering the process
due to inmates after their confinement to administrative segregation. The Supreme Court described
what was required:
We think an inform al, nonadversary evidentiary review is sufficient for both the decision that an inmate represents a securi ty threat and the decision to confine an inmate to administrative segregation pending com pletion of an investigation into misconduct charges against him. An inmate must merely receive some notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to present his views to the prison offi cial charged with deciding whether to transf er him to administrative segregation. Ordinarily a written statement by the inmate will accomplish this purpose, although prison administrators may find it more useful to permit oral presentations in cases where they believe a written statement would be ineffective. So long as this occurs, and the decisionmaker reviews the charges and then-available evidence against the prisoner, the Due Pr ocess Clause is satisfied. This inform al procedure permits a reasonably accurate assessm ent of pr obable cause to believe that m isconduct occurred, and the value of additional formalities and safeguards would be too slight to justify holding, as a matter of constitutional principle that they must be adopted.
Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 476 (footnote, internal quotations, and citation omitted).
Thus, Wilkinson, Greenholtz, and Hewitt instruct that “som e notice of charges and an
opportunity to be heard” constitute adequate due process in the context of prison adm inistration
decisions.
Thus, in this cas e, the Proposed Policy contains adequate “inform al nonadversary”
procedures that provide notice and hearing rights to the OSP’s inmates affected by a higher official’s
reversal of a recom mendation against the inm ate’s placement or retention on Level 5. These
procedures comport with the standards articulated in Greenholtz and Hewitt. As a result, the Court
will not require Defendants to grant inm ates a “face-to-face opportunity to be heard” following a
procedurally-proper reversal of an earlier recom mendation to reduce an inm ate’s Level 5
classification. Further, after reviewing the policy in detail, the Court does not agree with Plaintiffs
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Case No. 4:01-CV-71 Gwin, J. that the Proposed Policy does not require an OSP adm inistrator who reverses a recom mendation against Level 5 placement to state the basis of his reversal. Id. As a result, the Court will not find that the Proposed Policy’s recom mendation reversal procedure s infringe the OSP inm ates’ due process rights.
Plaintiffs’ Issue 5: “Defendants’ proposed policies do not provide due process protections comparable to NewPolicy 11107 as described by the Supreme Court”
Finally, with their fifth issue, Plaintiffs complain of the “narrowed scope” of the Proposed Policy and say that “[t]here should be one policy for Levels 5 and 4.”See Doc. 752 at 27. Plaintiffs stress that New Policy 111-07, consider ed by the Supreme Court in Wilkinson, included security classifications for Level 4 and Level 5 inmates, as well as privilege definitions as between Level A (i.e., less restrictive) and Level B (i.e., more restrictive). Id. Now, Defendants propose four separate policies: 1) A policy for security classification of Level 5 prisoners (Doc. 710, Exhibit A.); 2) A policy for security classifications of Level 4 priosners at the OSP (Doc. 738, Exhibit A.); 3) A policy for Level 4 prisoners not at the OSP; and 4) A policy for privilege level reviews of Levels 4 and 5 prisoners. Id. Tangential to their main argument, Plaintiffs also say that Defendants should use “an objective scoring instrument for security level review of all prisoners on Levels 5 and 4” similar to the “Supervision Review Form” that surfaced earlier in this litigation. Id. at 29-30. Finally, Plaintiffs specifically critique the proposed “Inmate Security Classification Level 4 at the OSP” with regard to voluntary placement at the OSP (Doc. 738, Exhibit A.):
the Level 4 classification policy should give the prisoner notice (i) that he shall not be placed or retained at OSP without his written c onsent, (ii) that he can withdraw his consent in writing at any tim e, and (iii) that the Bureau of Classification will transfer him to another institution with all due speed upon receipt of a valid request for transfer.
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Case 4:01-cv-00071-JG Document 765 Filed 09/27/2007 Page 20 of 23
Case No. 4:01-CV-71 Gwin, J. See Doc. 716, at 14. Plaintiffs claim that the Court’s previous orders require these three elements and that“[t]he revised policy should incorporate all of these elements so that Level 4 prisoners will know their rights, and staff implementing the revised policy will know what has been ordered by the Court.” Id.
In opposition, Defendants say that “Wilkinson does not require that the provisions forsecurity classification Levels 4 and 5 and the provisions for privilege Levels [A] and [B] must be included in one policy.” See Doc. 753 at 25. De fendants argue that Wilkinson “dealt solely with the procedures by which Ohio’s Policy classified inmates for placement at Level 5 at the OSP . . . [not] with the classification and placement of inmates at Level 4 at the OSP [or] with Level [A] and Level [B] privilege level reviews.” Id. Defendants then raise a deference argum ent and say that “[r]ecently, Ohio prison administrators have reachedan experience-based conclusion that developing and implementing separate policies for classification Levels 4 and 5 and a separate policy combining privilege Levels [ A] and [ B] will enable classif ication staff to m ore effectively carry out their assignments.” Id. Concluding, Defendants assert that the “ass essment made here by the prison administrators falls within the realm of professional judgment” and the Court must recognize that “[t]he need for substantial deference to their professional judgment is required.” Id. (citing Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572 (2006) (prisoner right s case involving free speech rights); Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003) (prisoner rights case involving visitation rights by minor children)).
With regard to Wilkinson’s reach, Plaintiffs have the better argument. Despite Defendants’ efforts to construe Wilkinson to Ohio’s advantage, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case “to consider what process an inm ate must be afforded under the Due Process Clause when he is
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Case 4:01-cv-00071-JG Document 765 Filed 09/27/2007 Page 21 of 23
Case No. 4:01-CV-71 Gwin, J. considered for placement at OSP.” 545 U.S. at 220.The Supreme Court did not distinguish between Level 5 and Level 4, or Level A and Level B. Rather, thWe ilkinson Court took pains to review New Policy 111-07, entitled “Level 4 / Level 5 Classification for Male Inm ates,” which outlined “the classification procedures for placing inmates in Level 4 and Level 5 security classifications.” See New Policy 111-07.
The Supreme Court m ade clear that it based its Wilkinson analysis and holding on the contents of New Policy 111-07: “Although the record is not altogether clear regarding the precise manner in which the New Policy operates, we construe it on the policy’s text, the accompanying forms, and the parties’ representations at oral agrument and in their briefs.” 545 U.S. at 216. Taking New Policy 111-07 as a whole, the Supre me Court held that OSP’s conditions – including the classifications and procedures contained in thepolicy – “impose an atypical and significant hardship within the correctional c ontext. It f ollows that [ Plaintiffs] have a liberty interest in avoiding assignment to OSP.” Id. at 224 (citation om itted). Having established a liber ty interest for any inmate subjected to “assignm ent to OSP,” the Suprem e Court went on to “find that Ohio’s New Policy provides a sufficient level of process” for the OSP’ s inmates. Id. at 223, 225. Thus, Defendants incorrectly construeWilkinson as somehow focused solely on Level 5 inmates. The mere fact that Defendants now incarcerate some Level 4 inmates at the OSP, whereas they did not do so in 2005, does not free Ohio fromits obligation toprovide all the OSP inmates with fundamental due process rights. As a result, Ohio m ust afford all OSP inm ates the full and equal constitutional protections set forth in Wilkinson and this Court’s Orders.
Having said that, in its May 15, 2003 Order, thiCs ourt recognized that Level 4 inmates “who voluntarily choose to rem ain at the OSP have validly waived their right not to be subjected to
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Case No. 4:01-CV-71 Gwin, J.
atypical conditions.” See Doc. 414, at 24. Specifically, the Court held “that the [Level 4] inmates
waived their right to challenge the procedureused to place or retain themat Level 4.” Id. at 22. The
central question then becomes: have the Level 4 inmates voluntarily and knowingly chosen to remain
at the OSP such that they havevalidly waived their rights to challenge the applicable placement and
retention procedures?
In its May 2003 Order, the Court found that Level 4 inmates met its “less formal knowing
and voluntary waiver” standard. Id. In part, the Court found that the inm ates met this standard
because they waived their rights “with a full aw areness of the consequences” and their right to
transfer. Id. The Court quoted the election form used by the inmates to remain at the OSP:
I have been notified that my privilege level status has been increased from privilege level 4B to privilege Level 4A and that I will be transferred to the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility. I request permission to remain at the Ohio State Penitentiary even though my privilege level has been increased to privilege Level 4A. I recognize that, if I remain at the Ohio State Penitentiary, I will be receiving level 4B privileges even though my status is privilege Level 4A. I also recognize that if I change m y mind, DR&C will honor m y request to be transf erred to the Southern O hio Correctional Facility. I also recognize thatDR&C has the right to change my status if I become involved in serious misconduct.
Id. at 23.
Here, the proposed “Inm ate Security Classification Level 4 at the OSP” states two rules
governing voluntary placement of Level 4 inmates:
a. No inmate shall be placed or retainedat Classification Level 4 at the OSP without his written consent.
b. The inmate can withdraw his consent inwriting at any time and request a transfer. Following receipt of the written request for tarnsfer, the Bureau of Classification and Reception (“the Bureau”) will transfer him to another institution with all due speed (14 days or less).
Doc. 738, Exhibit A. Thus, Defendants’ proposed policy incorporates the three elements Plaintiff
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Case No. 4:01-CV-71 Gwin, J. requests. However, t he policy does not specify what notice the prisoner receives of the three elements. Plaintiffs subm itted a recent version of the election form that m erely states, “Your selection [to remain at OSP or to transfer toSOCF] doesn’t guarantee thelocation of your choice but will be taken into consideration when the final placement is made.” See Doc. 725, Exhibit 1. The form contains nothing regarding the rights and consequences associated with remaining at the OSP.

In order for the inm ates to knowingly and vol untarily choose to rem ain at the OSP a nd thereby waive certain rights, they must “have full awareness of the consequences” of remaining at the OSP and the three elements Plaintiff lists above. The Court orders Defendants to so revise the election form.
Finally, Defendants need not incorporate a “scoring instrument for security level review of all prisoners on Levels 5 and 4” similar to the “Supervision Review Form” in its administration of the facility. As stated above, so long as Defendanst provide a sufficient description of their reasons for determining the individual placement and retention decisions for each of the OSP inmates, they comply with the Wilkinson standard.

III. Conclusion For these reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Plaintiffs’ motion. IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 27, 2007

s/

James S. Gwin

JAMES S. GWIN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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 Motion granted 7/16/08. s/ James S. Gwin JAMES S. GWIN UNITED STATES DISTRICTJUDGE

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

CHARLES E. AUSTIN, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. REGINALD WILKINSON, et al.,
Defendants.

:

:

:

Case No 4:01CV071

:

:

JUDGE GWIN

:

:

:

:

Joint Motion For Final Application of Attorney Fees and Joint Motion to Terminate and Close Case

Plaintiffs and Defendants, through counsel, have reached an agreement regarding all

remaining attorney fees and costs to be paid in this matter. Defendants have agreed to pay

Plaintiffs' attorney fees and costs as set forth in the attached Settlement Agreement and Release.

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h) and 54(d)(2), the Parties move for approval of that Agreement.

The Parties also ask the Court to terminate and close this case. The attached Memorandum

supports this Motion.

Respectfully submitted,

NANCY H. ROGERS Attorney General of Ohio

/s/ J. Eric Holloway J. ERIC HOLLOWAY(0063857) Assistant Attorney General Corrections Litigation Section 150 East Gay Street, 16th Floor Columbus, OH 43215 (614) 644-7233; FAX: (866) 459-6675 eholloway@ag.state.oh.us Counsel for Defendants

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG Doc #: 824-1 Filed: 07/16/08 1 of 5. PageID #: 7308

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG Doc #: 824-1 Filed: 07/16/08 2 of 5. PageID #: 7309

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG Doc #: 824-1 Filed: 07/16/08 3 of 5. PageID #: 7310

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG Doc #: 824-1 Filed: 07/16/08 4 of 5. PageID #: 7311

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG Doc #: 824-1 Filed: 07/16/08 5 of 5. PageID #: 7312

 
 Wilkinson v. Austin, 543 U.S. 1032 (2004) 125 S.Ct. 686
Supreme Court of the United States Reginald A. WILKINSON, Director, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, et al., petitioners,
v. Charles E. AUSTIN, et al. No. 04-495. | Dec. 10, 2004. Case below, 372 F.3d 346. Opinion Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted. Parallel Citations 125 S.Ct. 686 (Mem), 160 L.Ed.2d 518, 73 USLW 3248, 73 USLW 3350, 73 USLW 3348
1

 
 Austin v. Wilkinson, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2002)
2002 WL 32828651 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.
Charles E. AUSTIN, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Reginald WILKINSON, et al., Defendants.
No. 4:01–CV–71. | July 12, 2002.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Alice Lynd, Staughton Lynd, Niles, OH, Bill Goodman, New York, NY, Jules L. Lobel, Pittsburgh, PA, Terry H. Gilbert, Michael J. Benza, Raymond V. Vasvari, Jr., Cleveland, OH, for Plaintiff.
John W. Perotti, pro se.
Carol H. O’Brien, Charissa D. Payer, Jeffrey A. Stankunas, Joseph M. Mancini, Mark D. Landes, Robert C. Angell, Todd R. Marti, Columbus, OH, Marianne Pressman, Cincinnati, OH, for Defendants.
Opinion
ORDER
GWIN, J.
*1 On June 6, 2002, the defendants filed a motion seeking partial relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [Doc. 293]. The plaintiffs oppose the motion. Because the Court holds that the defendants were not surprised by the Court’s judgment, the Court had authority to order the injunctive relief at issue, and no other reason exists to upset the judgment, the Court denies the defendants’ motion.
I.
The defendants have motioned for relief from portions of the Court’s orders in this class action lawsuit brought by former and current inmates at the Ohio State Penitentiary (“OSP”) against employees of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (the “Department”). In the interest of brevity, the Court only describes the procedural aspects of the case relevant to the current order. The Court directs the reader to its earlier orders for a complete

factual description of the case.
On February 25, 2002, the Court, after a bench trial at which the Court heard from twenty witnesses and accepted over one thousand pages of exhibits, issued an opinion finding that the conditions at the OSP constituted an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. See Austin v. Wilkinson, 189 F.Supp.2d 719, 742 (N.D.Ohio 2002). Because of the conditions at the OSP, the Court held that the inmates had a protected liberty interest in not being assigned to the OSP and must receive adequate process before being sent to the facility or retained at the facility. See Austin, 189 F.Supp.2d at 742—47. On March 26, 2002, the Court ordered the Department to make certain changes to its Policy 111–07, the policy under which inmates were transferred to and retained at the OSP. See Austin v. Wilkinson, No. 4:01–CV–71, 2002 WL 519006, at *1 (N.D.Ohio Mar. 26, 2002). On May 15, 2002, the Court adopted a new Policy 111–07 as the procedure by which inmates were to be transferred to and retained at the OSP [Doc. 284].
The defendants now move for a relief from judgment of portions of the Court’s February 25, 2002, March 26, 2002, and May 15, 2002, orders. Specifically, the defendants ask the Court to vacate under Rule 60(b)(6)1 that part of its order that states unless an inmate’s prior conduct during incarceration resulted in death or extreme bodily harm, the Department should only consider behavior in the last five years, including behavior prior to level 4 or 5 classification. The defendants say the requirement directly interferes with their ability to prevent violence inside Ohio’s prisons because recent conduct is not necessarily the best predictor of future violence. In fact, the defendants say the restriction is so restrictive as to violate the separation of powers doctrine. In support of this argument the defendants point to several recent violent incidents involving inmates formerly housed at the OSP.
The defendants also ask the Court to vacate under Rule 60(b)(1) and Rule 60(b)(4)2 the provisions of its orders prohibiting placement of an inmate in security level 5 unless he possessed a quantity of drugs constituting a third degree felony. The defendants first say that this ordered relief came as a surprise because the plaintiffs did not ask for it or ever seek such relief through administrative means. Second, the defendants say the Court did not have the authority to order this relief because the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
*2 The plaintiffs say that the Court’s current orders should remain. Specifically, the plaintiffs say the Court
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Austin v. Wilkinson, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2002)
struck a careful balance between the Department’s safety concerns and the inmates’ due process rights by setting a time limit upon which the Department can consider past activity. In addition, the plaintiffs say that recent incidents involving former OSP inmates are not evidence of the Department’s inability to control the inmates they house.
With respect to the issue of the drug quantity, the plaintiffs say that one of the named class members did exhaust his remedies with respect to this issue. Furthermore, the plaintiffs say the defendants cannot be surprised by the issue because their own expert witnesses testified about the appropriateness of housing inmates at the OSP for drug offenses. In addition, the Court questioned the defendants’ counsel about placement at the OSP for drug offenses.
The Court considers the defendants’ motion below.
II.
A.
The defendants first say they should be relieved from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) because the Court’s order interferes with the Department’s ability to prevent violence in their prisons. In support of their argument, the defendants cite Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1986) and Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996).
In Turner, the Supreme Court held that “when a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” 482 U.S. at 89. The Court established this standard because it felt that prison administrators should make the difficult judgments concerning institutional operations. See id. Turner described four factors for courts to consider when determining the reasonableness of the regulation at issue. Those factors are: 1) that there must be a valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it; 2) whether an inmate has alternate means to exercise the right limited by the action; 3) what the impact accommodation of the of alleged constitutional right will have on prison staff, other inmates, and on the general allocation of prison resources; 4) whether there are an absence of effective alternatives without more than de minimis cost. See 482 U.S. at 89—90. A district court is not required to weigh evenly, or even consider explicitly, each Turner factor. See Spies v. Voinovich, 173 F.3d 398, 403—04 (6th Cir.1999); see also Flagner v. Wilkinson,

241 F.3d 475, 484 (6th Cir.2001).
In Lewis, the Supreme Court held that a district court’s injunction imposing changes on the Arizona Department of Corrections was invalid because it failed to accord adequate deference to the judgment of prison authorities. See 518 U.S. at 361. The Court held that the district court’s order ignored Turner’ s charge that a regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. See id.
*3 The District Court here failed to accord adequate deference to the judgment of the prison authorities in at least three significant respects. First, the court concluded that ADOC’s restrictions on lockdown prisoners’ access to law libraries were unjustified. Turner’ s principle of deference has special force with regard to that issue, since the inmates in lockdown include “the most dangerous and violent prisoners in the Arizona prison system,” and other inmates presenting special disciplinary and security concerns. The District Court made much of the fact that lockdown prisoners routinely experience delays in receiving legal materials or legal assistance, some as long as 16 days, but so long as they are the product of prison regulations reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, such delays are not of constitutional significance, even where they result in actual injury (which, of course, the District Court did not find here).
Second, the injunction imposed by the District Court was inordinately—indeed, wildly—intrusive. There is no need to belabor this point. One need only read the order to appreciate that it is the no plus ultra of what our opinions have lamented as a court’s “in the name of the Constitution, becom [ing] ... enmeshed in the minutiae of prison operations.”
Finally, the order was developed through a process that failed to give adequate consideration to the views of state prison authorities. We have said that “[t]he strong considerations of comity that require giving a state court system that has convicted a defendant the first opportunity to correct its own errors ... also require giving the States the first opportunity to correct the errors made in the internal administration of their prisons.” For an illustration of the proper procedure in a case such as this, we need look no further than Bounds [v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72(1977) ] itself. There, after granting summary judgment for the inmates, the District Court refrained from “ ‘dictat[ing] precisely what course the State should follow.” ’ Rather, recognizing that “determining the ‘appropriate relief to be ordered ... presents a difficult problem,” ’ the court “ ‘charge[d] the Department of Correction with the task of devising a Constitutionally sound program’ to assure inmate
2

Austin v. Wilkinson, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2002)
access to the courts.” The State responded with a proposal, which the District Court ultimately approved with minor changes, after considering objections raised by the inmates. We praised this procedure, observing that the court had “scrupulously respected the limits on [its] role,” by “not ... thrust[ing] itself into prison administration” and instead permitting “[p]rison administrators [to] exercis[e] wide discretion within the bounds of constitutional requirements.”
Id. at 361—63 (internal citations omitted).
The defendants say that the Court’s order prohibiting the Department from considering an inmate’s behavior beyond the last five years is invalid because it impedes the Department’s pursuit of the legitimate penological interests of preventing violence in prisons, decreasing gang activity in prisons, and protecting the public at large. The defendants also say the five year limitation runs afoul of Turner because inmates have alternative means of exercising the right infringed if the five year limitation is eliminated, the five year limitation unfairly impacts third parties, and the plaintiffs did not suggest any alternative.
*4 The Court acknowledges that the defendants are charged with the difficult, and often thankless, task of overseeing Ohio’s prison system. Nonetheless, their motion is not well taken. The defendants correctly state that the Turner standard applies to due process claims brought against prison regulations. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 223—24, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990) (“We made quite clear that the standard of review adopted in Turner applies to all circumstances in which the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights.”). The Supreme Court also makes clear that district courts must seek significant input from prison administration officials when crafting remedies for constitutional violations at prisons. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 361—63. However, the defendants’ motion for relief from judgment completely ignores the Court’s findings that placement at the OSP constitutes an atypical and significant hardship and that the Department’s former procedures for placing inmates at the OSP violated due process. Austin, 189 F.Supp.2d at 742, 749. In the context of these findings, the Court’s order is appropriate.
The Court’s finding that placement at the OSP constitutes an atypical and significant hardship entitles inmates to a liberty interest. Id. at 742. Because of this liberty interest, inmates must receive adequate notice of the Department’s intent to place or retain them at the OSP, an adequate hearing on the matter, and an adequate explanation for their placement or retention at the OSP once the Department finalizes its decision. See id. at 743—45 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974)). The Court made these findings in the context of concern over why inmates were being sent

to the OSP.
As it currently exists, the Department’s procedure for selecting and retaining inmates at the OSP has great potential for error. Evidence at trial demonstrated a wide disparity between the recommendations of the reclassification committee, the OSP’s warden, Chief Ryznar, and the North Regional Director.
....
The OSP aims to house only the most dangerous prisoners in Ohio’s correctional system. Additional process advances the state’s interest by consistently sending only those inmates who truly are “the worst of the worst” to the OSP. Parole Board Member Peter Davis best described the risk:
The only thing that’s clear is, as I’ve said here, for every inmate that was cited to me and the reasons why that person was sent there, for this particular act, this assaultive behavior, if you will, we knew for a fact of plenty other inmates that were at other institutions, even close security institutions, that were not transferred [to the OSP]. (Davis Test. at 126).3
Id. at 745, 746 (footnote in original).
The Court also found evidence that once some inmates were placed at the OSP, they were denied reclassification based on minimal evidence. See id. at 732—35 (discussing the Court’s findings with respect to inmates Kevin Roe and Lahray Thompson).
*5 The treatment of Thompson and Roe reflects a troublesome trend where the defendants deny reclassification based upon gang activity without giving the inmates notice and an opportunity to respond. Equally troublesome, reclassification is denied based on exceedingly weak evidence and alleged activity years in the past. In Thompson’s case, he has been held in near solitary confinement for more than three years based on nothing more than the way he writes the letter “b,” the fact that in 1999 he was with a group involved in a dispute, and his association with Crip members more than fifteen years ago while growing up in southern California.
Id. at 735. In light of these specific findings, the Court’s order is not invalid under Turner.
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Austin v. Wilkinson, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2002)
In reference to the first Turner factor, the defendants overstate matters by saying the Court’s five year limitation dangerously impedes the Department’s penological interests. The current edition of Policy 111–07 lists eighteen factors that must be considered when evaluating whether an inmate’s level 5 security classification should be lowered.4 These eighteen factors are the same factors contained in the former edition of Policy 111–07 that the Court explicitly found provided inadequate due process.
The [old] policy provides a long list of information the reclassification committee will consider, but in the end the only standard governing the committee is “whether there has been a diminishing of the inmate’s risk to the safety of persons or institutional security.” (Defs.’ Ex. C at 9—10). This lack of a defined standard is troubling because [old] Policy 111–07 also does not require the ultimate decision maker to explain why an inmate’s reclassification is denied. Austin, 189 F.Supp.2d at 753. To ensure that the Department’s policy satisfies the inmates’ minimal due process rights, the Court ordered the Department to only consider an inmate’s behavior in the last five years, including behavior prior to his level 4 or 5 classification. See Austin, 2002 WL 519006, at *5—6. There is no restriction on considering an inmate’s behavior if his prior conduct during incarceration resulted in death or extreme bodily harm. See id. The Court’s order is far from the “inordinately—indeed, wildly—intrusive” remedy decried by the Supreme Court in Lewis. 518 U.S. at 362. Much of the current edition of Policy 111–07 remains unchanged. The Court only modified Policy 111–07 as necessary to ensure that it fulfills the minimum due process requirements necessitated by the atypical and significant hardship imposed by placement at the OSP.
The Court also sought the defendants’ input when crafting its remedy. In Lewis, the Supreme Court also took issue with the district court’s injunctive order because it failed to give adequate consideration to the views of state prison authorities. Id. Specifically, the Supreme Court disliked the district court’s decision to make a special master responsible for a remedial plan while limiting the remedies the special master could choose from. Id. at 363. The Supreme Court felt “[t]he State was entitled to far more than an opportunity for rebuttal.” Id.
*6 In this case, the Court specifically asked both parties to submit proposed injunctive orders that would correct the federal due process rights violations by the least intrusive means. Austin, 189 F.Supp.2d at 754. The Department’s proposed injunctive order was one and a half pages in length. The only relevant language to the current motion is in the first paragraph of the proposed injunctive order:

Defendants are hereby required to comply with the procedural requirements set forth in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), regarding the placement and retention of members of the class in the Ohio State Penitentiary. Defendants are also required to comply with the requirements relating to Gang Affiliation (pp. [52—53] ), Drug Distribution (pp. 51—52), and New Evidence (pp. 53) set forth in this Court’s Opinion and Order entered on February 25, 2002.
(Defs.’ Proposed Inj. Order at 1). The Court gleaned as much information as possible from the defendants’ proposed injunctive order. However, the defendants’ lack of specific proposals required the Court to rely on the trial evidence and its own judgment when issuing a practical solution to the Department’s due process violations in its March 26, 2002, order.
Finally, the Court did not arbitrarily order the five year limitation. The old edition of Policy 111–07 specifically stated that “[b]ehavior in the last five years, including prior Level 4 or 5 classification” was a factor to consider for reclassification out of level 5 security. All the Court has done is place a reasonable time limit on what behavior the Department can consider when deciding whether to retain inmates at the OSP who were sent there for non-violent behavior.
In reference to the second Turner factor, the defendants incorrectly state that “[t]he right supposedly in need of protection by the Retention Limitations is a prisoner’s right to have the decision as to his proper security level decided based upon accurate information.” (Defs.’ Mot. for Partial Relief from J. at 11). The “right” at issue in this case is the inmates’ right to minimum due process. When the Supreme Court laid out the minimum due process rights to which prisoners are entitled, it took into account the appropriateness of restricting inmates constitutional rights because of their status. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556—58. The Department’s old edition of Policy 111–07 did not afford inmates the minimum due process they are entitled to under Wolff. See Austin, 189 F.Supp.2d at 750—53. The Court’s order merely ensures that the minimum due process requirements are met.
Importantly, the Court’s order does not prevent the Department form considering an inmate’s attempt to participate or direct gang activity while at the OSP. When evidence shows that security threat group leaders, enforcers, or recruiters housed at the OSP have reached
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Austin v. Wilkinson, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2002)
out to fellow gang members, the Department may consider that behavior in making its reclassification decision within the framework of the hearing procedure outlined in Policy 111–07. Likewise, the actions of inmates at the OSP who remain actively involved in terrorist activities may be considered by the Department when making reclassification decisions. However, the Court’s order does not allow the Department to keep an inmate at the OSP indefinitely once he has conformed to incarceration at the OSP by keeping free of major misconduct nor committing any violence for a period of years while at the OSP.
*7 For the reasons discussed above, the Court denies the defendants’ motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6).
B.
The defendants say they should be relieved from the judgment under Rule 60(b)(1) because they were surprised by the Court’s order prohibiting the Department from placing an inmate into security level 5 for a drug related offense unless he possessed a quantity of drugs constituting a third degree felony. The defendants say that they were harmed by the surprise because they were not able to present the defense that the plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). In addition, the defendants say they are entitled to relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(4) because the Court did not have authority to order this particular form of relief because, in fact, the plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies.
With respect to Rule 60(b)(1), the defendants say neither the plaintiffs’ original complaint, the amended complaint, or their other pretrial briefs suggested the relief ordered by the Court. The defendants say they did not know a change to the drug limitations was contemplated before or during the trial.
The Court disagrees. The defendants are correct that the plaintiffs never specifically requested the change in the drug limitations before trial. However, the plaintiffs’ complaint did charge that the defendants’ current policy of classifying inmates to the OSP was arbitrary and capricious. In addition, the Court questioned the defendants’ counsel about the wisdom of placing prisoners at the OSP for drug offenses. (Trial Tr. at 301—04). In fact, the defendants’ own experts testified at trial about their opinions on whether drug offenses should be a basis for transfer to the OSP or supermax prisons in general. (Trial Tr. at 948—50, 1014—15). The Court
Footnotes

holds that the defendants were not surprised within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(1) to be entitled to relief from judgment.
Next, the defendants say that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under § 1997(e) so that the Court did not have jurisdiction to order the relief it did.5 The defendant correctly states that § 1997(e) means a district court should not prematurely decide a cause of action if all available remedies have not been exhausted. See Brown v. Toombs, 139 F.3d 1102, 1104 (6th Cir.1998). However, the exhaustion provision is not jurisdictional and a showing that the requirement is substantially met is sufficient to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. See Wyatt v. Leonard, 193 F.3d 876, 879—80 (6th Cir.1999).
The plaintiffs attached to their amended complaint Plaintiff Daryl Heard’s letter appealing his placement at the OSP and North Regional Director Stephen J. Huffman’s letter denying his appeal. (Am.Compl.Ex. III–H). Defendant Huffman’s denial letter specifically states that Heard was sent to the OSP for smuggling marijuana into the Orient Correctional Facility. The Court holds that Plaintiff Heard’s attempt to appeal his placement at the OSP, and the plaintiffs’ inclusion of that paperwork with their complaint, satisfies § 1997e’s requirement for the exhaustion of remedies.
*8 Even more compelling is the undisputed fact that the defendants waived the exhaustion of remedies issue with respect to Heard in their answer. “Defendants admit that Daryl Heard is incarcerated at OSP and that he has exhausted his administrative remedies regarding his challenge to his placement at OSP.” (Defs.’ Answer ¶ 9(h)). There is no dispute that the defendants’ transferred Heard to the OSP for smuggling marijuana. Because the defendants admitted that Heard exhausted his administrative remedies, the Court had the authority to order the injunctive relief concerning the drug quantity sufficient fo placement into the OSP. The Court denies the defendants’ motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(4).
III.
For the reasons discussed above, the Court denies the defendants’ motion for relief from judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
	  
5

Austin v. Wilkinson, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2002)

1

In pertinent part, Rule 60(b)(6) says:

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party’s legal representative from a final

judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:

....

(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6).

2

In pertinent part, Rule 60(b)(1) and Rule 60(b)(4) say:

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party’s legal representative from a final

judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect

....

(4) the judgment is void

Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1), (4).

3

Peter Davis was the executive director of the Ohio General Assembly’s Correctional Institution Inspection Committee. Davis’s

comment is in the context of questions about his December 8, 1999, inspection report on the OSP, prepared for the Ohio General

Assembly. (Pls.’ Trial Ex. 11). That report, after commenting on the subjectivity of the supermax placement process, concluded:

Serious questions remain as to how adequate, proper, fair and objective are the decisions to identify, justify and assign

selected inmates to supermax. Still needed is a “clearer, more precise understanding of the working distinctions” among

decisions to assign inmates to either high maximum, or to maximum [general population], or to maximum Administrative

Control or to high close security.

(Pls.’ Trial Ex. 11 at 10).

4

The current edition of Policy 111–07 lists the relevant factors as follows:

A. Reason for placement in Level 4 or 5 and relevant circumstances;

B. Conduct Reports;

C. Current Privilege Level;

D. Time Served in current privilege level;

E. Total time spent in level 5 and/or level 4;

F. Time left to spend on current sentence;

G. Time since last incident that resulted in inmate being designated level 5 or 4;

H. Program Involvement;

I. Behavior in the last five years, including prior Level 4 or 5 classification;

J. Security level prior to placement;

K. Adjustment/behavior after placement;

L. Factors which indicate a risk of future violence;

M. Interaction with others (staff and/or inmates);

N. Recognition and acknowledgment of the factors contributing to the commission of the placement offense and nature;

O. The findings and recommendations of the previous assessment committees;

P. Previous review committees;

Q. The findings and recommendations of all assessment committees subsequent to the placement in level 4 or level 5; and

R. The findings and recommendations of all supervision and privilege review committees subsequent to placement in level

4 or level 5.

5

Section 1997e(a) says in its entirety: “No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title,

or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies

as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

	  

6

 
 Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG Doc #: 134 Filed: 11/21/01 1 of 27. PageID #: 1492

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

CHARLES AUSTIN, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. REGINALD WILKINSON, et al.,
Defendants.

) CASE NO. 4:01-CV-71 ) ) ) ) Judge James S. Gwin ) ) ) ORDER ) )

On August 1, 2001, the plaintiffs filed a motionfor a preliminaryinjunctionin this action challenging the conditions of confinement at the Ohio State Penitentiary [Doc. 58]. The plaintiffs represent a class of the prisoners who “who were confined at the Ohio State Penitentiary as of January 9, 2001, or who have come to be confined there since that date, or who may be confined there during the pendency of this litigation.”1/ Included among those represented by the class plaintiffs are “those inmates who were at Ohio State Penitentiary on January 9, 2001, but have since been transferred to other facilities.” In their underlying action, the plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of a broad range of conditions and practices.

1/ On October 5, 2001, the Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification.
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Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG Doc #: 134 Filed: 11/21/01 2 of 27. PageID #: 1493
Case No. 4:01-CV-71 Gwin, J. They seek injunctive and declaratory relief. After considering testimony and evidence, 2/ the Court grants in part and denies in part the plaintiffs’ motion for relief.
I. Background
With their motion for a preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs try to stop defendants from placing seriously mentally ill inmates into administrative control when transferred from Ohio State Penitentiary to another Ohio prison. In addition, the plaintiffs ask the Court to order certain mental health care for the plaintiffs.3/ Finally, the plaintiffs seek to stop defendants from transferring seriously mentally ill inmates back to Ohio State Penitentiary. 4/
The plaintiffs’ motion makes several arguments. First, the plaintiffs argue that the Ohio State Penitentiary denies inmates with serious mental condition their right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment because of its design and staffing. Next, the plaintiffs say the defendants violated their constitutional rights after transferring them to the Southern Ohio Correction Facility. As to this, the plaintiffs say the defendants violated their rights when it placed the plaintiffs into administrative control, or solitary
2/ The Court conducted evidentiary hearings on August 27, September 11, September 24, and September 25, 2001. The September 11, 2001, hearing was interrupted by news of the tragic events in New York, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania.
3/ In response to the Court’s question at the hearing upon the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs indicated that they sought: “some intensive group programming” and an end to “the whole administrative segregation.” August 27, 2001, hearing at 8.
4/ At the hearing on the plaintiffs’ application for preliminary injunction, the counsel for the defendants stated that the defendants intended to exclude the seriously mentally ill from the Ohio State Penitentiary, although some may have mistakenly slipped through: “. . . We took the lead there right off the bat when [Ohio State Penitentiary] was opened, . . ., we excluded the seriously mentally ill, and if some slipped by, and that's noticed, they are sent out. They are immediately transferred out to the Ohio -- to the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility.” August 27, 2001, hearing at 11.
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Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG Doc #: 134 Filed: 11/21/01 3 of 27. PageID #: 1494
Case No. 4:01-CV-71 Gwin, J. confinement, because of their mental illness and failed to provide mental health care. With this argument, the plaintiffs seem to say they have a right to mainstream into the general prison population. Finally, the plaintiffs challenge the defendants’ right to return them to the Ohio State Penitentiary.
Responding, the defendants deny they have violated any constitutional right. Regarding placement into mental health programs, the defendants say that all “decisions are made by the treating doctors.”5/ As to inmates transferred to the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility, the defendants say they house and treat the inmates consistent with their diagnosis and their security risk. Defendants contend they only place inmates in administrative segregation when they present a risk. While in administrative segregation, known as J-4, the defendants say the inmates continue to receive intensified mental-health services.
In April 1998, Ohio opened the Ohio State Penitentiary, Ohio’s first “supermax” prison in Youngstown. The Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction designed the Ohio State Penitentiary to house the “worst of the worst.”6/
Generally, the crime causing incarceration does not control placement into the Ohio State Penitentiary supermax facility. Instead, the inmate’s conduct within the prison system most affects whether he is placed to the Ohio State Penitentiary. Often placement to the Ohio State Penitentiary results from assaults upon other inmates, riots, or assaults upon correctional officers. Sometimes, the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction places inmates at Ohio State Penitentiary as a form of protective custody. Restating, a placement at Ohio State Penitentiary “it’s not what you came in for. It’s what you’ve done
5/ August 27, 2001, hearing at 14. 6/ August 27, 2001, hearing, Testimony of Monitor Fred Cohen, at 104.
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Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG Doc #: 134 Filed: 11/21/01 4 of 27. PageID #: 1495
Case No. 4:01-CV-71 Gwin, J. while in prison.”7/
Although many inmates suffer from mental illness, 8/ the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and
Correction did not design or staff the Ohio State Penitentiary to house mentally ill inmates, especially seriously mentally ill inmates. The defendants’ expert, Monitor Fred Cohen 9/ described this:
Well, it’s a fairly punitive environment, not a lot of cell time, not a lot of time out of cell, and the primary motivating factor was that if you were going to -- if you were going to allow the seriously mentally ill to be housed there, you were going to have to staff up in ways that were not currently in the plans. So I put -- you could have it either way. I mean, if you were going to go with seriously mentally ill, I will monitor for it, but I will tell you right now you can’t do it with one psychiatrist one day a week or so on. 10/
Because it inadequately staffs the Ohio State Penitentiary to treat seriously mentally ill inmates, the
Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction adopted policy 111-07, effective August 31, 1998.
That policy says, in part:
Inmates who are seriously mentally ill or seriously physically ill will not be placed at Ohio State Penitentiary. . . . Any inmate who is seriously mentally ill and has been inadvertently transferred to Ohio State Penitentiary shall be transferred to another institution in an expeditious manner
Instead of staffing the Ohio State Penitentiary to adequately treat seriously mentally ill inmates, the
Ohio Department of Corrections decided to house such inmates at the Southern Ohio Correction Facility.
This decision is consistent with the concentration of mental health resources at the Southern Ohio
7/ Id. 8/Nationally, about sixteen percent of the prison and jail population suffers from mental illness. See Paula M. Ditton, Mental Health and Treatment of Inmates and Probationers, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report, July 1999, at 1, <http://www.umaryland.edu/behavioraljustice/issues/inmatetreatment.html> (visited November 16, 2001). 9/ Professor Cohen is a former law professor who specializes in, and is highly regarded with regard to, prison litigation. 10/ September 24, 2001, hearing, testimony of Fred Cohen, at 64.
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Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG Doc #: 134 Filed: 11/21/01 5 of 27. PageID #: 1496
Case No. 4:01-CV-71 Gwin, J. Correction Facility.11/
After the plaintiffs filed this action, defendants reviewed the mental health status of inmates at the Ohio State Penitentiary on February 20-22, 2001. After Drs. Sarah McIntyre, Tim Callahan and Robin Hoffman reviewed inmate files and interviewed inmates, the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction transferred several inmates to the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility. The doctors transferred the inmates for mental health reasons. Inmate James Mitchell transferred to the Southern Ohio Correction Facility around March 15, 2001, inmate Fred Harris transferred in May 2001, inmate David Easley transferred in February or March 2001, and inmate James Newell transferred in late April 2001.
After being transferred to the Southern Ohio Correction Facility, the defendants assigned inmates Mitchell, Harris, Easley and Newell to the residential treatment unit, also known as K-5. The K-5 residential treatment unit is a general population cell block area that is a designated unit for the treatment of mentally ill inmates. The residential treatment unit structures its program around group counseling sessions. Inmates participate in these group programs with members of the mental health team.
Within the residential treatment unit, prison officials restrain inmates at varying levels. Prison officials assign inmates to the residential treatment unit based upon mental health, not security considerations. After assignment to the residential treatment unit, inmates can progress through various levels of restraint. Level 1 provides a highly restrictive, almost 23-hour lock-down. Inmates can then progress to “level 2, level 3, and then level 4 with increasing out of cell time, with increasing freedoms, you
11/ Gary Beven, the principle Southern Ohio Correction Facility psychiatrist testified: SOCF has very rich mental health resources. I'd be very surprised if many other institutions have the capabilities that we do. September 24, 2001, hearing, testimony of Dr. Gary Beven, at 222.
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Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG Doc #: 134 Filed: 11/21/01 6 of 27. PageID #: 1497
Case No. 4:01-CV-71 Gwin, J. might say. Level 4 eat outside the unit and program outside the unit.” 12/
Residential treatment unit level 3 inmates spend eight to nine hours a day outside their cells. “They program; they mingle. . . . It's very relaxed, very relaxed environment.”13/ The residential treatment unit uses a high degree of treatment and a high degree of programming.
Inmates Mitchell, Harris, and Newell responded well to placement in the residential treatment unit. Moreover, inmates Harris, Easley and Newell had no disciplinary infractions while placed into the residential treatment unit. Inmate Mitchell broke prison rules by creating a disturbance. He says a panic attack caused him to kick his cell door, resulting in disciplinary isolation in the J-2 administrative control block. Apart from this incident, Inmates Mitchell, Harris, and Newell had no other disciplinary infractions when housed in the relatively unrestricted J-5 administrative control block.
Inmate Easley had problems in the residential treatment unit. While in the residential treatment unit, Easley harassed other patients. When admonished by a sergeant to stop, inmate Easley punched the officer. After being taken to disciplinary confinement pending disciplinary action, he assaulted other officers.14/
On July 2, 2001, Deputy Director of Institutions Terry Collins established a policy directing that high maximum security classified inmates released from the residential treatment unit were to be placed in the J-4 administrative control unit. In a letter directed to all those concerned, Collins stated, “[a]t the time when mental health clinicians determine that the inmate no longer requires residential treatment unit
12/ September 24, 2001, hearing, testimony of Monitor Fred Cohen, at 28-29. 13/ Id. at 30. 14/ September 24, 2001, hearing, testimony of Stephen Dillon, at 137.
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Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG Doc #: 134 Filed: 11/21/01 7 of 27. PageID #: 1498
Case No. 4:01-CV-71 Gwin, J. placement, he will be placed in J4 on the mental health range.”
Consistent with Collins’ directive, the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction assigned inmates Mitchell, Harris, Easley and Newell to administrative control after they released them from the residential treatment unit.15/ In reassigning inmates Mitchell, Harris, Easley and Newell to the J-4 administrative control unit, the defendants relied upon their classifications at the Ohio State Penitentiary. Deputy Director Collins explained his reasons:
It was my intention that when those people are out of residential treatment unit, that they be placed in the J-4 simply for this reason: The individuals that are being returned from OSP are still considered a risk. They have not been released from OSP because their behavior has been good. They have been released because of some mental health issue1.6/
On July 11, 2001, the defendants transferred nine former Ohio State Penitentiary inmates from the residential treatment unit to the J-4 administrative control unit. In recommending that inmates Mitchell, Harris, Easley and Newell be placed in the J-4 administrative control unit, prison psychiatrist Dr. Abul Hasan testified:
Q. When you discharge an inmate from the residential treatment unit, what do you base that decision on?
A. Well, how they’re doing, not whether they’re mentally ill or not, because most of the inmates admitted to the residential treatment unit would be mentally ill and would still have the same diagnosis at the time of discharge. So the main thing is whether they’re stable and whether they’re able to deal with maximum security prison . . . 17/
In recommending placement in the J-4 administrative control unit, Hasan did not consider the
15/ Inmate Newell was subsequently reassigned to the Warren Correctional Facility. 16/ August 27, 2001, hearing testimony of Terry Collins, at 84. 17/ September 25, 2001, hearing, testimony of Abul Hasan, M.D., at 311.
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Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG Doc #: 134 Filed: 11/21/01 8 of 27. PageID #: 1499
Case No. 4:01-CV-71 Gwin, J. inmates cured:
Q. With respect to these nine inmates, when you say that they no longer needed the services of the residential treatment unit, did you believe they no longer needed the psychiatric services?
A. No, sir. I think almost all of them I resolved that they need psychiatric treatment all along.18/
Dr. Hasan recommended that each inmate coming to the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility residential treatment unit from Ohio State Penitentiary be moved to the J-4 administrative control block after stabilizing in the residential treatment unit. He made these findings on the same day, on the same form, and using the same standard language for each of them. He gave little justification for his opinion that they should transfer inmates Mitchell, Harris, Easley and Newell to the J-4 administrative control block.
The Ohio Department of Rehabilitationand Correction opened the J-4administrative controlblock at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility in February 1998. It developed the J-4 unit because of the inability of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction to treat seriously mentally ill inmates at the Ohio State Penitentiary.
The J-4 unit looks the same as the other cell blocks. It has 80 cells back to back. The cells have open fronts with bars instead of a solid door. They have a bed and a unitized stainless steel toilet in them. Without contradiction, Stephen Dillon, the deputy warden of special services, described the J-4 administrative control unit as “fairly bright, tiled, airy confinement facility.” 19/
Of the 80 cells in the J-4 range, 60 cells have been designated for use by inmates identified as
18/ Id. 19/ September 24, 2001, hearing, testimony of Stephen Dillon, at 115.
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Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG Doc #: 134 Filed: 11/21/01 9 of 27. PageID #: 1500
Case No. 4:01-CV-71 Gwin, J. having a severe mental illness. With the development of the J-4 administrative control unit, the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction consolidated inmates with serious mental illness. Previously, the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction scattered these inmates in seven different cell blocks at Southern Ohio Correction Facility. Dispersion of the serious mentally ill inmates made it difficult to keep track of them. Consolidating inmates in the J-4 range helped the delivery of mental health services. Because the staff would be more accustomed to working witha seriously mentally illpopulation, theycould provide better custody care and treatment.
Within the J-4 administrative control unit, the defendants provide mental health services through psychiatrists, psychologist, mentalhealthnurses, and, to a lesser degree, correctionalofficers. Psychologist Richard Shellenberger, PhD., sees each inmate weekly. Dr. Shellenberger sees patients at their cell block or in a private setting in his office. In addition, Dr. Shellenberger “walk[s] the ranges and discuss different aspects with the different inmate patients . . . usually three or more times during a week.” 20/
Beyond seeing psychologist Shellenberger, inmates in the J-4 administrative control unit see psychiatrist Dr. Gary Beven at least monthly. Dr. Beven additionally participates in a monthly group meeting with an inmate that usually includes Dr. Shellenberger, the nurse and the inmate. At these treatment meetings, Dr. Beven designs or adjusts the inmate’s treatment program, a written guide of how the treatment team plans to help that person. Dr. Beven updates the treatment plan at least every 90 days.
Besides being seen bypsychiatristBevenand psychologistShellenberger,nursesmakedaily rounds distributing medication and checking on the inmates. The correctional officers, who have received some training, also check on inmates.
20/ September 24, 2001, hearing, testimony of Richard Shellenberger, PhD., at 248.
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Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG Doc #: 134 Filed: 11/21/01 10 of 27. PageID #: 1501
Case No. 4:01-CV-71 Gwin, J.
Finally, inmates in the J-4 administrative control unit sometimes participate in group programs, including programs to help inmates better control their anger.
The Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction provides greater mental health treatment to inmates assigned to the J-4 administrative control unit than inmates in other units. Among inmates receiving mental health care, about 80% live in the general population. Inmates with a mental illness in the general population receive medication, including anti-psychotic drugs, and receive a psychiatric review at least every 90 days. Inmates in the general population do have weekly psychological sessions or monthly sessions with a psychiatrist.
The Court now considers the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction.
II. Discussion A. Legal Standard The factors a district court uses in deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction are well-established: “(1) the likelihood that the party seeking the preliminary injunction will succeed on the merits ofthe claim; (2) whether the party seeking the injunctionwill suffer irreparable harmwithout the grant of the extraordinary relief; (3) the probability that granting the injunction will cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest is advanced by the issuance of the injunction.” Washington v. Reno, 35 F.3d 1093, 1098–99 (6thCir. 1994); see also Connection Distributing Co. v. Reno, 154 F.3d 281, 288 (6th Cir. 1998); Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. of DeLorean Co. v. DeLorean (In re DeLorean Motor Co.), 755 F.2d 1223, 1228 (6th Cir. 1985). “None of these factors, standing alone, is a prerequisite to relief; rather, the court should balance them.” Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 73 F.3d
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Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG Doc #: 134 Filed: 11/21/01 11 of 27. PageID #: 1502
Case No. 4:01-CV-71 Gwin, J. 648, 653 (6th Cir. 1996).
B. Assigning Inmates to J-4 Administrative Control With their motion for a preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs ask this Court to restrain defendants from assigning inmates returned from Ohio State Penitentiary for mental health reasons to administrative control solitary confinement. The plaintiffs give some complaint that their assignment to administrative control was done without procedural due process. More persuasively, the plaintiffs argue that assignment of seriously mentally ill inmates to administrative control solitary confinement denies them their right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment.
1. Procedural due process In reviewing the plaintiffs’ claim that the defendants denied themproceduraldue process, the Court first examines whether they had a liberty or property interest that the defendants impaired. If they have suchaninterest,the Court thenexamines whether the procedures giventhemwere constitutionallysufficient. Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454 (1989). In general, inmates do not have a liberty interest in a particular security classification or in freedom from segregation. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983); Newell v. Brown, 981 F.2d 880, 883 (6th Cir. 1992); Beard v. Livesay, 798 F.2d 874, 876 (6th Cir. 1986). Inmates have a liberty interest sufficient to support a procedural due process claim with regard to their classification only when that classification “imposes atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483–84 (1995). The inquiry into the severity of confinement
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Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG Doc #: 134 Filed: 11/21/01 12 of 27. PageID #: 1503
Case No. 4:01-CV-71 Gwin, J. considers whether differences in conditions between a restrictive housing status and the general population or other restrictive statuses are a significant hardship.
In Jones v. Baker, 155 F.3d 810 (6th Cir. 1998), the SixthCircuit found that an inmate’s two and one-half years confinement in administrative segregation was not an “atypical and significant” hardship for due process purposes. 155 F.3d at 812–13. In Jones, the prison authorities transferred the plaintiff and other inmates to Mansfield Correctional Institute after the 1993 Lucasville prison riot. At Mansfield, the prison officials put the plaintiff in segregation while the authorities investigated the circumstances of the riot at the Southern Ohio Correction Facility. In June 1993, the prison officials put Jones in administrative control, a more restrictive classification than segregation. Later, the prison returned him to segregation. But after a prosecutor said there was insufficient evidence to implicate the plaintiff in the murder of a prison official in the 1993 riot, officials brought administrative charges against Jones. Jones challenged the prison officials holding him in administrative segregation for two and one-half years.
In rejecting the claim, the Sixth Circuit described the general rule:
Plaintiff contends that the extraordinarily long time during which he has been held in segregation establishes the “atypical and significant” hardship necessary under Sandin [v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995),] to create a liberty interest. First, administrative segregations have repeatedly been held not to involve an“atypicaland significant”hardship implicating a protected liberty interest without regard to duration. Second, we note that under Ohio law, administrative segregation may continue for an “indefinite time period.” Admittedly, few cases of segregation extend to the length of plaintiff's stay here. However, we agree with the district court that under Sandin a liberty interest determination is to be made based on whether it will affect the overall duration of the inmate’s sentence and there is no evidence here that the segregation will impact plaintiff’s sentence.
Jones, 155 F.3d at 812 (internal citations omitted).
The plaintiffs are unlikely to prevail on the merits of their procedural due process claim because the
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Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG Doc #: 134 Filed: 11/21/01 13 of 27. PageID #: 1504
Case No. 4:01-CV-71 Gwin, J. plaintiffs do not show that the defendants subjected them to conditions different from those found constitutional in Jones. Even if the plaintiffs had a liberty interest in staying out of administrative control, which the Sixth Circuit has found they do not, the plaintiffs fail to show that the defendants denied them a sufficient hearing. This Court considers the private interests at stake in a governmental decision, the governmental interests involved, and the value of procedural requirements in determining what process is due under the Fourteenth Amendment. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
Each plaintiff received an Administrative Control hearing to decide whether they should be placed or remain in administrative control. The Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction conducts administrative control hearings before three individuals. As described by Deputy Director of Institutions Terry Collins, the individuals see an inmate and look at a multitude of factors including “past behavior, current behavior, how serious the past behavior has been, assaultive, predatory, drugs, whatever it may be, that would place somebody in administrative control placement, which is typically defined who, are a threat to security in prison or assaultory/predatory-type individuals.” 21/
The defendants show that Ohio has a significant interest in maintaining discipline within its correctional facilities. In the circumstances presented by inmates Mitchell, Harris, Easley and Newell, the classification committee hearing, with a right to appeal, and with significant input from mental health professionals, supplies a procedural structure suited for the purpose of the determination. As subsequently described, each of inmates Mitchell, Harris, Easleyand Newell have a significant mentalhealthillness. Each has a history of disciplinary rule violations. Therefore, a correctional official, with the input of mental health professionals, appropriately decides an inmate’s administrative classification. Importantly, the defendants
21/ September 25, 2001, hearing, testimony of Terry Collins, at 350.
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Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG Doc #: 134 Filed: 11/21/01 14 of 27. PageID #: 1505
Case No. 4:01-CV-71 Gwin, J. review an inmate’s administrative classification every 90 days.
2. Eighth Amendment claim In their more persuasive argument, the plaintiffs contend that the placement of mentally ill prisoners in segregation environments violates their Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. With this claim, the plaintiffs suggest two tracks. First they say that having successfully completed the residential treatment unit, there is no grounds for placing plaintiffs in the more restrictive J-4 administrative control unit. Second, they argue that placing seriously mentally ill inmates in administrative control is cruel and unusual punishment. The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, i.e., punishment that runs afoul of evolving societal standards or involves the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. See U.S. Const. amend. VIII; see also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978) (“Confinement in a prison or in an isolationcell is a form of punishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendment standards.”); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102–03 (1976). A “punishment” for Eighth Amendment purposes need not come in the form of a criminal penalty. Conditions of incarceration may also constitute punishment actionable under the Eighth Amendment. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (“The Constitutiondoes not mandate comfortable prisons . . . but neither does it permit inhumane ones, and it is now settled that the treatment a prisoner receives in prisonand the conditions under whichhe is confined are subject to scrutiny under the EighthAmendment.”) (internal quotations omitted). In the prison context, an Eighth Amendment claim includes both objective and subjective
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Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG Doc #: 134 Filed: 11/21/01 15 of 27. PageID #: 1506
Case No. 4:01-CV-71 Gwin, J. components. See, e.g., Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 401 (6th Cir. 1999).
[T]he deliberate indifference standard embodies both an objective and a subjective prong. Objectively, the alleged deprivation must be “sufficiently serious,” in the sense that “a condition of urgency, one that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain” exists. Subjectively, the charged official must act with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.
Hathaway v. Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550, 553 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal citations omitted). The objective component requires a prisoner to show the conditions of his incarceration posed “a
substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. To make out an Eighth Amendment claim resulting from prison conditions, a party must also show
culpable conduct of the prison official. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298–303 (1991) (Eighth Amendment prohibits only “cruel and unusual punishment,” and “[t]he infliction of punishment is ‘a deliberate act intended to chastise or deter.’”) (quoting Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985)). The Wilson Court held that “if the pain inflicted is not formally meted out as punishment by the statute or the sentencing judge, some mental element must be attributed to the inflicting officer before it can qualify” as punishment. Id. at 300.
To satisfy the subjective component, a prisoner must establish that the prison official responsible for these conditions acted with “deliberate indifference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. An official acts with deliberate indifference when the official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837.
“Deliberate indifference,” as used in the Eighth Amendment context, comprehends more than mere negligence but less than the purposeful or knowing infliction of harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S.
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Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG Doc #: 134 Filed: 11/21/01 16 of 27. PageID #: 1507
Case No. 4:01-CV-71 Gwin, J. at 836; Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Deliberate indifference requires that a prison official know of and disregard a substantial risk of serious harm to inmate health or safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. The deliberate indifference standard is a subjective one. It is not enough that there was a danger of which a prison official objectively should have been aware. “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id.
The plaintiffs do not succeed with their Eighth Amendment claim. As a matter of policy, Collins directed that inmates leaving the residential treatment unit were to return to the classification they enjoyed before coming to the residential treatment unit, subject to later reclassification. Therefore, when inmates Mitchell, Harris, Easley and Newell completed the residential treatment unit program, the defendants assigned them to administrative control.
The defendants had good reason to be cautious about returning inmates Mitchell, Harris, Easley and Newell to the general prison population. Each had a combination of mental illness and past misconduct.
Inmate James Mitchell is incarcerated for involuntary manslaughter that involved the beating death of a young woman before she was thrown off a balcony. He is also incarcerated for the April 1999 aggravated arson at the Marion Correctional Facility. While incarcerated, Mitchell has violated prison rules often. At the Marion Correctional Facility, he twice set fires that caused evacuations. In April 2000, he broke windows and mirrors. He fought with other inmates in November 1997, and November 1998. He disobeyed correctional officer orders on many occasions.
Mitchell suffers from dysthymia, a form of depression. He also reports auditory hallucinations,
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Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG Doc #: 134 Filed: 11/21/01 17 of 27. PageID #: 1508
Case No. 4:01-CV-71 Gwin, J. typical for a schizophrenic disorder. Mitchell also has an intermittent explosive disorder when he becomes angry and enraged. He receives mood stabilizing and anti-psychotic medications.
Fred Harris, Jr. is incarcerated for having weapons under disability arising from his killing a man during a fight in 1994. He also is serving a sentence for harassment by an inmate. While incarcerated, Harris has often violated prison rules. He fought with other inmates at least twice. He has refused orders or made disrespectful remarks, often of a sexual nature when speaking to female officers, on at least twenty-four occasions. On other occasions he has broken prison property.
Regarding Harris’s mental condition, he suffers from a dysthymic disorder, which is a form of depression. He is chronically depressed and discouraged. He has an antisocial personality disorder. He has very low self-esteem and, at the same time, has a tendency to call attention to himself by unseemly acts.
David Easley is serving a sentence for aggravated robbery and felonious assault, among other crimes. The aggravated robbery charges come from the hold-up of food and convenience stores with the use of a weapon. The felonious assault charge arises from Easley shooting at police officers while commandeering a stolen vehicle. While incarcerated, prison officials have disciplined Easley for fighting with other inmates at least seven times. He threatened or assaulted correction officers at least nine times. He has started fires on a number of occasions.
Easley suffers from major depressive disorder with psychotic features. Dr. Beven describes him as “a disgruntled, discouraged, angry, potentially violent man and he admits this.”22/ Beven relates that
22/ September 24, 2001, hearing, testimony of Gary Beven, M.D., at 201.
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Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG Doc #: 134 Filed: 11/21/01 18 of 27. PageID #: 1509
Case No. 4:01-CV-71 Gwin, J. Easley has expressed intentions to hurt “some of the officers that he had had run-ins with in the past.” 23/
Inmate Emanuel Newell is serving sentences for felonious assault and weapon offenses. At an earlier time he served time for voluntary manslaughter. In the felonious assault offense, Newell shot a gun at police officers after a traffic stop. In the earlier offense, Newell shot and killed an individual after a traffic accident. While incarcerated, he has threatened other inmates and correction officers. In October 1998, Newell struck another inmate in the head with an iron and then stabbed the inmate.
Inmate Newell was assaulted in the 1993 Lucasville riot at the SouthernOhio Correctional Facility, apparently upon the belief that he cooperated with prison officials. Because of the belief that he had cooperated during and after the riot, the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction placed Newell in protective custody at an institution other than the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility.
Newell suffered from posttraumatic stress syndrome and major depressive disorder. While able to function generally, he has a strong potential to decompensate under certain circumstances.
Each of inmates Mitchell, Harris, Easley and Newell have various levels of mental dysfunction. Each is a discipline risk. As to their mentalcondition, the plaintiffs fail to clearly show that placement in J-4 administrative control block risks serious damage to them. First, the J-4 block provides the inmates more access to mental health treatment then the general population. Second, the J-4 block lay out reduces isolation. As described by Deputy Director Terry Collins, inmates in the J-4 block can converse or interact with other inmates, 24-hours a day, seven days a week. With all cells having open fronts, inmates in the J-4 block can talk to the persons above, below, or next to them at will: “So there’s constant

23/ Id.

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Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG Doc #: 134 Filed: 11/21/01 19 of 27. PageID #: 1510
Case No. 4:01-CV-71 Gwin, J. conversation and talking in that cell block.” 24/
As described above, an Eighth Amendment claim requires a two-part showing of both objective and subjective components. As to the objective test, the deprivation must pose a substantial risk of serious harm. Regarding the subjective component, the plaintiffs must also show culpable conduct of the prison officials. To show such culpable conduct, the plaintiffs must show a deliberate act or “deliberate indifference.”
The Constitution “does not mandate comfortable prisons,” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981), but neither does it permit inhumane ones, Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832. See also, Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). The Eighth Amendment imposes on prison officials the duty to provide humane conditions of confinement, including adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832. Prison officials must take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates. Id.; Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984).
A party who shows that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners sufficient to inflict unnecessary pain or suffering, make out a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104; Horn v. Madison County Fiscal Court, 22 F.3d 653, 660 (6th Cir. 1994).
Deliberate indifference to mental health or physical needs, can make out an Eighth Amendment claim. Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 834 (11th Cir. 1990) (claim stated for failure to provide psychotropic medication); Young v. City of Augusta, 59 F.3d 1160, 1171–72 (11th Cir. 1995) (claim stated because inmate alleged that city’s failure to adequately train guards to accommodate mentally ill
24/ August 27, 2001, hearing, testimony of Terry Collins, at 81.
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Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG Doc #: 134 Filed: 11/21/01 20 of 27. PageID #: 1511
Case No. 4:01-CV-71 Gwin, J. prisoners represented deliberate indifference to inmate’s mental health).
Serious psychological conditions that show themselves in suicidal tendencies are serious medical needs for purposes of the due process analysis. Horn, 22 F.3d at 660; Barber v. City of Salem, Ohio, 953 F.2d 232, 239–40 (6th Cir. 1992) (identifying the proper inquiry in suicide cases as “whether the decedent showed a strong likelihood that he would attempt to take his own life in such a manner that failure to take adequate precautions amounted to deliberate indifference to the decedent's serious medical needs”); Molton v. City of Cleveland, 839 F.2d 240, 243 (6th Cir. 1988).
Regarding the plaintiffs’ burden of showing that the defendants acted objectively unreasonable, the Supreme Court observed in Farmer that “prison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.” 511 U.S. at 844.
Here, the defendants must place inmates Mitchell, Harris, Easley, Newell and others who have both a mental illness and long-standing discipline problem in an environment that reasonably reduces risk to them, to corrections officers, and to other inmates. Under the Eighth Amendment, prison officials must “ensure reasonable safety.” Accordingly, “prison officials who act reasonably cannot be found liable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.” Id. at 845.
Seeking to show the defendants acted unreasonably in assigning inmates Mitchell, Harris, Easley and Newell to the J-4 administrative control unit, the plaintiffs offered the testimony of Dr. James Gilligan, M.D., a psychiatrist who once served as the Director of Mental Health Services for the State of Massachusetts. Broadly summarized, Dr. Gilligan believes that inmates should never be subjected to administrative control except when an inmate is “absurd or acutely violent who may have to be placed
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Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG Doc #: 134 Filed: 11/21/01 21 of 27. PageID #: 1512
Case No. 4:01-CV-71 Gwin, J. behind a locked door for perhaps a few hours at a time until he can calm down enough and talk about what happened.”25/ Dr. Gilligan believes that administrative control exacerbates bad conduct by demeaning inmates, especially when restraints are used.
While he acknowledges that past conduct, including past bad conduct, is the best predictor of futureconduct, Dr. Gilliganbelievesthat inmates should have the least restraint because he believes this best socializes inmates:
. . . What creates security is effective treatment. And that means not just in the technical sense of psychotherapy, but in the way people are treated by other people. In the more ordinary sense of the word, the way they are related to by other people.
When an individual’s dignity is respected, when he is treated as a human being and not an animal, when he is given a chance to talk and is not limited to having to act in order to have people pay attention to him or understand what he’s trying to get at, under those conditions people are much more likely to drop violence as a way of coping and to relate to other people in non-violent ways. 26/
While believing that a policy of least restraint is best, Dr. Gilligan acknowledges that such policy is not used in any prison and is “at the leading edge of progress in this area”27/ More important, Dr. Gilligan does not show any conduct by the defendants inconsistent with mental health other than security measures. While disagreeing with the level of restraint, he does not say that defendants acted unreasonably in subjecting inmates Mitchell, Harris, Easley and Newell to the conditions in the J-4 administrative control unit. He does not criticize the nature or amount of mental heath treatment given J-4 administrative control unit inmates. He simply believes that the defendants should not restrain even the most dangerous inmates. The Court is not persuaded by Dr. Gilligan’s testimony.
25/ September 11, 2001, hearing, testimony of James Gilligan, M.D., at 37. 26/ Id. at 36. 27/ Id. at 43.
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Case No. 4:01-CV-71 Gwin, J.
The plaintiffs fail to show the defendants acted unreasonably by assigning the inmates to the J-4 administrative control unit. As described, inmates Mitchell, Harris, Easley and Newell had stabilized after placement in the residential treatment unit. Because of the high cost associated with running the residential treatment unit and the greater potential for injury to other inmates from misconduct, the defendants reasonably decided inmates Mitchell, Harris, Easley and Newell should be placed elsewhere.
Once taken from the residential treatment unit, placement in the J-4 administrative control block was reasonable. First, the J-4 administrative control block had the highest concentration of mental health treatment at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility outside the residential treatment unit. With ongoing treatment from psychiatrists, psychologists, mental health nurses, with some programming, the J-4 unit provides reasonable care.
As important, because of their history of past rule violations, many of which were serious, the defendants could reasonably believe that inmates Mitchell, Harris, Easley and Newell should be kept in administrative control. While inmates Mitchell, Harris, and Newell mostly avoided problems while in the residential treatment unit, Easley had the problems described above, including assaults upon correction officers and harassment of other inmates. The plaintiffs are unlikely to prevail on the objective component of their Eighth Amendment claim because they fail to show that defendants subjected plaintiffs to an unreasonable risk of serious harm by assigning them to the J-4 block.
As for the subjective component of their Eighth Amendment claim, the plaintiffs do not show that the defendants acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). To judge whether the defendants have such a culpable state of mind, the Court decides if the defendants were “deliberately indifferent.”
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Case No. 4:01-CV-71 Gwin, J.
The plaintiffs do not present evidence establishing that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to an unreasonable risk of serious harm. While not agreeing with plaintiffs that inmates should not suffer administrative control, the defendants have afforded significant effort to treat mental illness in the J-4 administrative control unit. The centralization of inmates subject to administrative control simplifies their treatment
As discussed above, the plaintiffs are unlikely to prevail on the legal merits of this claim. Without a likelihood of success on the legal merits of their claim, the Court need not address the other factors concerning this aspect of the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs fail to show entitlement to an order stopping defendants from placing inmates Mitchell, Harris, Easley, Newell or other seriously ill inmates into the J-4 administrative control unit.
C. Housing of Seriously Mentally Ill Inmates at Ohio State Penitentiary In addition to their motion regarding administrative control, the plaintiffs ask the Court enjoin the defendants from returning seriously mentally ill inmates to the Ohio State Penitentiary. The plaintiffs seek to stop defendants from transferring patients to the Ohio State Penitentiary who are seriously mentally ill.
The defendants neither designed nor, more important, staffed Ohio State Penitentiary to house seriously mentally ill inmates. With only one psychiatrist and very limited mental health staffing, the plaintiffs say that housing seriously mentally ill inmates at Ohio State Penitentiary violates their right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
The defendants give little opposition. As noted above, the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and
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Case No. 4:01-CV-71 Gwin, J. Correction policy 111-07 stated that seriously mentally ill or seriously physically ill inmates were not to be placed at the Ohio State Penitentiary. Any such inmate inadvertently transferred to the Ohio State Penitentiary was to be transferred to another institution. The defendants own experts believe that the Ohio State Penitentiary poses a serious threat to the health of seriously mentally ill inmates housed there. Dr. Gary Beven, the psychiatrist at the Southern Ohio Correction Facility testified:
Q. With regard to [Ohio State Penitentiary], at the present time, Dr. Beven, it's my observation of your treatment notes, for example, on Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Easley and Mr. Newell, that you have consistently recommended against the return of such prisoners to Ohio State Penitentiary because of the likelihood of decompensation and deterioration. Would you agree?
A. Absolutely.28/
See also Plaintiffs’ Exhibit H-22, June 6, 2001, Treatment Team Progress Notes (“At OSP, [Harris] resorted to harming himself by cutting and he actually began, at one point, to consume his own fecal material”); Plaintiffs’ Exhibit M-14, May 30, 2001, Psychiatrist’s Clinic Progress Note (“At OSP [Mitchell’s] behavior deteriorated precipitously. . . . The isolation at OSP provoked quite serious decompensationwithboth self-destructive and aggressive behaviors”); Plaintiffs’ Exhibit M-21, August16, 2001, Treatment Team Mental Health Evaluation (“[Mitchell] is not to return to OSP . . . Apparently at OSP, the confinement at that institution intensified his propensity to become violent, aggressive, and selfdestructive . . . His mental health problems contradindicate the transfer back to OSP in the future”); Plaintiffs’ Exhibit N-6, June 7, 2001, Treatment Team Progress Note (“Regarding transfer back to OSP, although stable at the present time, it is perhaps to be anticipated that further deterioration and decompensation would occur if [Newell] were to be transferred back to that super maximum security
28/ September 24, 2001, hearing, testimony of Gary Beven, M.D., at 216.
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Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG Doc #: 134 Filed: 11/21/01 25 of 27. PageID #: 1516
Case No. 4:01-CV-71 Gwin, J. prison.”).
Monitor Cohen testified to like effect: “I thought the better way to go was to have a policy that specifically excluded the seriously mentally ill from Ohio State Penitentiary, from being sent there or if sent there by some accident, retained there.”29/
In Estelle, the Supreme Court held thatthe EighthAmendment prohibitsthe government frombeing deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs, and that the government has an obligation to provide medical care for people being punished by incarceration. 429 U.S. at 102–05. To make a claim under Estelle because of inadequate medical care in prison requires that there be deliberate indifference by prison officials and that the prisoner's medical needs be serious. See id. at 106.
As described by the Third Circuit in Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1979):
Thus, where the size of the medical staff at a prison in relation to the number of inmates having serious health problems constitutes an effective denial of access to diagnosis and treatment by qualified health care professionals, the “deliberate indifference” standard of Estelle v. Gamble has been violated. In such circumstances, the exercise of informed professionaljudgment as to the serious medicalproblems ofindividualinmates is precluded by the patently inadequate size of the staff.
612 F.2d at 763.
The plaintiffs’ and defendants’ evidence makes it clear that returning inmates Newell, Mitchell, Harris, Easley, or other seriously mentally ill inmates to the Ohio State Penitentiary would likely constitute a constitutional violation. Therefore, the plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of this claim. The Court quickly turns to the other factors it must weigh when deciding to issue an injunction.
29/ September 24, 2001, hearing, Fred Cohen, at 46–47.
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Case No. 4:01-CV-71 Gwin, J.
There is also little dispute that the transfer of a seriously ill inmate to the Ohio State Penitentiary would cause irreparable harm. Dr. Beven testified that such a transfer could cause decompensation and deterioration to such an inmate’s mental health. Regardless if treatment is available, the destruction of an individual’s mental health constitutes an irreparable harm.
At the same time, issuing an injunction preventing the return of seriously mentally ill inmates to the Ohio State Penitentiary does not cause substantial harm to others. As previously discussed, the design of the J-4 block keeps the inmates away fromthe generalpopulationand allowscorrectionalofficers sufficient opportunities to observe and control the inmates. No evidence was presented of inmate overcrowding in the J-4 block or that the inmates represented a specific danger to the correctional officers or other inmates in the J-4 block.
Finally, an injunction prohibiting the inmates return to the Ohio State Penitentiary serves the public interest. The injunction ensures the inmates’ right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by housing them at facility that provides them adequate mental health care.
Therefore, for the reasons discussed above the Court grants the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction preventing the return of seriously mentally ill inmates to the Ohio State Penitentiary.
III. Conclusion The Court denies the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction preventing seriously mentally ill inmates from being housed in the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility’s J-4 administrative control block. The Court grants the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction preventing the defendants from returning seriously mentally ill inmates to the Ohio State Penitentiary.
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Case No. 4:01-CV-71 Gwin, J.
Therefore,the defendantsare enjoinedfromreturning any of the seriously mentally illclassmembers to the Ohio State Penitentiary. This preliminary injunction will remain in effect until February 19, 2002, approximately a month and a half after the trial on the merits begins on January 7, 200 2, or until a permanent injunction order replaces the current injunction. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). After reviewing all of the testimony and evidence, the Court holds that the plaintiffs need not post a security bond. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c); UASCO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 100 (6th Cir. 1982).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: November 21, 2001

__s/ James S. Gwin__ James S. Gwin United States District Court

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 Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 1 of 86
Cat03,ClassAction,Complex,LC1,Limbert,Protect,Termed
U.S. District Court Northern District of Ohio (Youngstown) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:01−cv−00071−JG

Austin et al v. Wilkinson et al Assigned to: Judge James S. Gwin Case in other court: 6th Circuit, 07−04371 Cause: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights
Plaintiff
Charles E. Austin

Date Filed: 01/09/2001 Date Terminated: 03/26/2002 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Alice Lynd Law Office of Staughton & Alice Lynd 1694 Timbers Court Niles, OH 44446−3941 330−652−9635 Fax: 330−652−0171 Email: SALYND@aol.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bill Goodman Center for Constitutional Rights 666 Broadway 7th Floor New York, NY 10012 212−614−6427 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeffrey M. Gamso Ste. 200 310 Lakeside Avenue Cleveland, OH 44113 216−443−3669 Fax: 216−443−3632 Email: jeff.gamso@gmail.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jillian S. Davis Office of the Federal Public Defender − Cleveland Northern District of Ohio 750 Skylight Office Tower 1660 West Second Street Cleveland, OH 44113 216−522−1950 Fax: 216−522−1951 Email: jillian_davis@fd.org TERMINATED: 04/23/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jules L. Lobel 3900 Forbes Avenue Pittsburgh, PA 15260 412−648−1375 Fax: 412−648−2649 Email: lobel@law.pitt.edu ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Benza 17850 Geauga Lake Road Chagrin Falls, OH 44023 216−319−1247

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 2 of 86

Fax: 440−708−2626 Email: michael_benza@route61.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Raymond V. Vasvari , Jr. Berkman, Gordon, Murray & DeVan 2200 Illuminating Bldg. 55 Public Square Cleveland, OH 44113 216−781−5245 Fax: 216−781−8207 Email: rvasvari@bgmdlaw.com TERMINATED: 11/20/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Staughton Lynd Law Office of Staughton & Alice Lynd 1694 Timbers Court Niles, OH 44446−3941 330−652−9635 Fax: 330−652−0171 Email: SALYND@aol.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terry H. Gilbert Friedman & Gilbert Ste. 1055 55 Public Square Cleveland, OH 44113 216−241−1430 Fax: 216−621−0427 Email: tgilbert@f−glaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Michael Benge

represented by Alice Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bill Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey M. Gamso (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jillian S. Davis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jules L. Lobel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Benza (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Raymond V. Vasvari , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/20/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 3 of 86

Plaintiff Alonzo L. Bonner
Plaintiff August Cassano

Staughton Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Terry H. Gilbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alice Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bill Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeffrey M. Gamso (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jillian S. Davis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jules L. Lobel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Benza (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Raymond V. Vasvari , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/20/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Staughton Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Terry H. Gilbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alice Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bill Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeffrey M. Gamso (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jillian S. Davis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2003

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 4 of 86

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jules L. Lobel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Benza (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Raymond V. Vasvari , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/20/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Staughton Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terry H. Gilbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff David Clark

represented by Alice Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bill Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey M. Gamso (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jillian S. Davis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jules L. Lobel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Benza (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Raymond V. Vasvari , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/20/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Staughton Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terry H. Gilbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Roy D. Donald

represented by

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 5 of 86

Alice Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bill Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey M. Gamso (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jillian S. Davis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jules L. Lobel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Benza (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Raymond V. Vasvari , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/20/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Staughton Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terry H. Gilbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff David Easley

represented by Alice Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bill Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey M. Gamso (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jillian S. Davis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jules L. Lobel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Benza (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 6 of 86

Raymond V. Vasvari , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/20/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Staughton Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terry H. Gilbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Brian K. Eskridge

represented by Alice Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bill Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey M. Gamso (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jillian S. Davis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jules L. Lobel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Benza (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Raymond V. Vasvari , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/20/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Staughton Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terry H. Gilbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Roger Lee Hall

represented by Alice Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bill Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey M. Gamso (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 7 of 86

Plaintiff Edward O. Hodge

Jillian S. Davis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jules L. Lobel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Benza (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Raymond V. Vasvari , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/20/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Staughton Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Terry H. Gilbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alice Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bill Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeffrey M. Gamso (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jillian S. Davis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jules L. Lobel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Benza (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Raymond V. Vasvari , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/20/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Staughton Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Terry H. Gilbert (See above for address)

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 8 of 86

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Stacy Lane

represented by Alice Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bill Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey M. Gamso (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jillian S. Davis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jules L. Lobel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Benza (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Raymond V. Vasvari , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/20/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Staughton Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terry H. Gilbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Kunta Kenyatta also known as Jerome E. Lennon

represented by Alice Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bill Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey M. Gamso (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jillian S. Davis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jules L. Lobel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Benza

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 9 of 86

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Raymond V. Vasvari , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/20/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Staughton Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terry H. Gilbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff James D. Mitchell

represented by Alice Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bill Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey M. Gamso (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jillian S. Davis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jules L. Lobel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Benza (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Raymond V. Vasvari , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/20/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Staughton Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terry H. Gilbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff John W. Perotti

represented by Alice Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bill Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 10 of 86

Jeffrey M. Gamso (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jillian S. Davis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jules L. Lobel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Benza (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Raymond V. Vasvari , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/20/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Staughton Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terry H. Gilbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Lamar Preston

represented by Alice Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bill Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey M. Gamso (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jillian S. Davis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jules L. Lobel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Benza (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Raymond V. Vasvari , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/20/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Staughton Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 11 of 86

Plaintiff Jason H. Robb
Plaintiff Richard Siggers

Terry H. Gilbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alice Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bill Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeffrey M. Gamso (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jillian S. Davis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jules L. Lobel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Benza (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Raymond V. Vasvari , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/20/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Staughton Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Terry H. Gilbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alice Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bill Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeffrey M. Gamso (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jillian S. Davis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jules L. Lobel (See above for address)

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 12 of 86

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Benza (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Raymond V. Vasvari , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/20/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Staughton Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terry H. Gilbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Eric Swofford

represented by Alice Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bill Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey M. Gamso (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jillian S. Davis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jules L. Lobel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Benza (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Raymond V. Vasvari , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/20/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Staughton Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terry H. Gilbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Lahray Thompson

represented by Alice Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bill Goodman

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 13 of 86

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey M. Gamso (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jillian S. Davis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jules L. Lobel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Benza (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Raymond V. Vasvari , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/20/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Staughton Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terry H. Gilbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Edward A. Tilley

represented by Alice Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bill Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey M. Gamso (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jillian S. Davis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jules L. Lobel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Benza (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Raymond V. Vasvari , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/20/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 14 of 86

Staughton Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terry H. Gilbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Mark Trawick

represented by Alice Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bill Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey M. Gamso (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jillian S. Davis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jules L. Lobel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Benza (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Raymond V. Vasvari , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/20/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Staughton Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terry H. Gilbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff #A208−653 Kevin B. Roe

represented by Alice Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bill Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey M. Gamso (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jillian S. Davis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 15 of 86

Plaintiff #A206−453 Emanuel B. Newell
Plaintiff #A304−050 Orsino Iacovone

Jules L. Lobel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Benza (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Raymond V. Vasvari , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/20/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Staughton Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Terry H. Gilbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alice Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bill Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeffrey M. Gamso (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jillian S. Davis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jules L. Lobel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Benza (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Raymond V. Vasvari , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/20/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Staughton Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Terry H. Gilbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alice Lynd (See above for address)

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 16 of 86

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bill Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey M. Gamso (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jillian S. Davis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jules L. Lobel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Benza (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Raymond V. Vasvari , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/20/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Staughton Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terry H. Gilbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff #A170−799 Daryl Heard

represented by Alice Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bill Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey M. Gamso (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jillian S. Davis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jules L. Lobel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Benza (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Raymond V. Vasvari , Jr. (See above for address)

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 17 of 86

TERMINATED: 11/20/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Staughton Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terry H. Gilbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff #A316−641 Frederick O. Harris, Jr.

represented by Alice Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bill Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey M. Gamso (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jillian S. Davis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jules L. Lobel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Benza (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Raymond V. Vasvari , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/20/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Staughton Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terry H. Gilbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff #A149−278 Keith Gardner

represented by Alice Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bill Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey M. Gamso (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jillian S. Davis

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 18 of 86

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jules L. Lobel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Benza (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Raymond V. Vasvari , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/20/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Staughton Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terry H. Gilbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff #A275−295 James DeJarnette

represented by Alice Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bill Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey M. Gamso (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jillian S. Davis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jules L. Lobel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Benza (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Raymond V. Vasvari , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/20/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Staughton Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terry H. Gilbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 19 of 86

Plaintiff #A310−983 Robert Baksi

represented by Alice Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bill Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey M. Gamso (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jillian S. Davis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jules L. Lobel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Benza (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Raymond V. Vasvari , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/20/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Staughton Lynd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terry H. Gilbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Reginald Wilkinson

represented by Jeffrey A. Stankunas Isaac, Brant, Ledman & Teetor Ste. 900 250 East Broad Street Columbus, OH 43215−3742 614−221−2121 Fax: 614−365−9516 Email: jstankunas@isaacwiles.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Janet Hill Arbogast City of Columbus Department of Law Ste. 200 90 West Broad Street Columbus, OH 43215 614−645−7385 Fax: 614−645−6949 Email: jrhillarbogast@columbus.gov TERMINATED: 01/31/2008

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 20 of 86
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Anne Reese Office of the Attorney General − Cincinnati State of Ohio 1600 Carew Tower 441 Vine Street Cincinnati, OH 45202 513−852−3497 Fax: 513−852−3484 Email: mary.anne.reese@ohioattorneygeneral.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carol H. O'Brien INVALID − Office of the Attorney General State of Ohio Corrections Litigation Section 140 East Town Street, 14th Floor Columbus, OH 43215 614−644−7233 Fax: 614−728−9327 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Charissa D. Payer Office of the Attorney General − Health & Human Services State of Ohio 26th Floor 30 East Broad Street Columbus, OH 43215 614−466−8162 Fax: 614−466−6090 Email: charissa.payer@ohioattorneygeneral.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Eric Holloway INVALID ADDRESS − Office of the Attorney General State of Ohio 16th Floor 150 East Gay Street Columbus, OH 43215 614−644−7233 Fax: 866−459−6675 Email: Eric@EricHollowayLaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph M. Mancini Office of the Attorney General State of Ohio Corrections Litigation Section 150 East Gay Street, 16th Floor Columbus, OH 43215 614−644−7233 Fax: 614−728−9327 Email: jmancini@ag.state.oh.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marianne Pressman INVALID ADDRESS − Office of the Attorney General State of Ohio Corrections Litigation Section 441 Vine Street, Ste. 1600 Cincinnati, OH 45202−2809

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 21 of 86

513−852−3497 Fax: 513−852−3484 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark D. Landes Isaac Wiles Burkholder & Teetor − Columbus Ste. 700 Two Miranova Place Columbus, OH 43215 614−221−2121 Fax: 614−365−9516 Email: mlandes@isaacwiles.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert C. Angell Ste. 190 167 South State Street Westerville, OH 43081 614−890−0400 Fax: 614−890−0401 Email: rangell@columbus.rr.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Todd R. Marti Office of the Attorney General − Education Section State of Ohio 16th Floor 30 East Broad Street Columbus, OH 43215 614−466−9577 Fax: 866−524−1226 Email: todd.marti@ohioattorneygeneral.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Stephen J Huffman

represented by Jeffrey A. Stankunas (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Janet Hill Arbogast (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/31/2008 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Anne Reese (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carol H. O'Brien (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charissa D. Payer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Eric Holloway (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph M. Mancini

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 22 of 86

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marianne Pressman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark D. Landes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert C. Angell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Todd R. Marti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Bernard J. Ryznar

represented by Jeffrey A. Stankunas (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Janet Hill Arbogast (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/31/2008 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Anne Reese (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carol H. O'Brien (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charissa D. Payer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Eric Holloway (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph M. Mancini (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marianne Pressman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark D. Landes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert C. Angell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Todd R. Marti (See above for address)

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 23 of 86

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Todd E. Ishee

represented by Jeffrey A. Stankunas (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Janet Hill Arbogast (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/31/2008 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Anne Reese (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carol H. O'Brien (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charissa D. Payer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Eric Holloway (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph M. Mancini (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marianne Pressman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark D. Landes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert C. Angell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Todd R. Marti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant M.D. Bruce A. Martin

represented by Jeffrey A. Stankunas (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Janet Hill Arbogast (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/31/2008 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Anne Reese (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 24 of 86

Carol H. O'Brien (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charissa D. Payer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Eric Holloway (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph M. Mancini (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marianne Pressman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark D. Landes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert C. Angell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Todd R. Marti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Deborah Nixon Hughes

represented by Jeffrey A. Stankunas (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Janet Hill Arbogast (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/31/2008 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Anne Reese (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carol H. O'Brien (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charissa D. Payer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Eric Holloway (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph M. Mancini (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marianne Pressman

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 25 of 86

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark D. Landes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert C. Angell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Todd R. Marti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Cheryl Jorgensen−Martinez

represented by Jeffrey A. Stankunas (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Janet Hill Arbogast (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/31/2008 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Anne Reese (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carol H. O'Brien (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charissa D. Payer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Eric Holloway (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph M. Mancini (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marianne Pressman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark D. Landes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert C. Angell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Todd R. Marti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant M.D. Manish B. Joshi

represented by

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 26 of 86

Jeffrey A. Stankunas (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Janet Hill Arbogast (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/31/2008 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Anne Reese (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carol H. O'Brien (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charissa D. Payer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Eric Holloway (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph M. Mancini (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marianne Pressman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark D. Landes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert C. Angell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Todd R. Marti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant PH.D. Patrick F. Biggs

represented by Jeffrey A. Stankunas (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Janet Hill Arbogast (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/31/2008 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Anne Reese (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carol H. O'Brien (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 27 of 86

Defendant R.N. Audrey Sandor Nietzel

Charissa D. Payer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Eric Holloway (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph M. Mancini (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marianne Pressman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mark D. Landes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert C. Angell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Todd R. Marti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jeffrey A. Stankunas (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Janet Hill Arbogast (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/31/2008 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Anne Reese (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carol H. O'Brien (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Charissa D. Payer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Eric Holloway (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph M. Mancini (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marianne Pressman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 28 of 86

Mark D. Landes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert C. Angell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Todd R. Marti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Matthew Meyer

represented by Jeffrey A. Stankunas (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Janet Hill Arbogast (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/31/2008 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Anne Reese (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carol H. O'Brien (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charissa D. Payer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Eric Holloway (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph M. Mancini (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marianne Pressman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark D. Landes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert C. Angell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Todd R. Marti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant Dave Easley

represented by Dave Easley #306−400 Box 45699 Lucasville, OH 45699

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 29 of 86

PRO SE

Movant Eugene Groves

represented by Eugene Groves A144−869 Unknown PRO SE

Movant James T. Thomas

represented by James T. Thomas #249−731 P. O. Box 45699 Lucasville, OH 45699 PRO SE

Movant Daniel Wilson

represented by Daniel Wilson #A260−074 OSP 878 Coitsville Hubbard Road Youngstown, OH 44505 PRO SE

Movant Anthony C Apanovitch

represented by Anthony C Apanovitch 182−824 OSP Ohio State Penitentiary 878 Coitsville−Hubbard Road Youngstown, OH 44505 (419) 525 4455 PRO SE

Interested Party Anthony M. Hoepf

represented by Anthony M. Hoepf 259−692 Southern Ohio Correctional Facility Unit J4 Cell 1 P.O. Box 85699 Lucasville, OH 45699 PRO SE

Interested Party Raymond Mefford

Interested Party Derrick Scott Newmann

represented by Derrick Scott Newmann #308−502 #308−502 PRO SE

Interested Party Alphonse Gerhardstein

represented by Alphonse A. Gerhardstein Gerhardstein & Branch Ste. 400 432 Walnut Street Cincinnati, OH 45202 513−621−9100 Fax: 513−345−5543 Email: agerhardstein@gbfirm.com

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 30 of 86

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Interested Party David Singleton

represented by David A. Singleton Ohio Justice & Policy Center Ste. 601 215 East Ninth Street Cincinnati, OH 45202 513−421−1108 Fax: 513−562−3200 Email: dsingleton@ohiojpc.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 01/09/2001
01/09/2001 01/09/2001 01/09/2001 01/16/2001 01/26/2001 01/30/2001 01/30/2001
02/26/2001

# Docket Text
1 Complaint for declatory judgment and injunctive relief. Complete document on file in the Clerk's Office (54 pages + 114 pages of Exhibits). against Patrick F. Biggs, Stephen J Huffman, Deborah Nixon Hughes, Todd E. Ishee, Manish B. Joshi, Cheryl Jprgensen−Martinez, Bruce A. Martin, Matthew Meyer, Audrey Sandor Nietzel, Bernard J. Ryznar, Reginald Wilkinson filed by Raymond V. Vasvari Jr. on behalf of Charles E. Austin, Michael Benge, Alonzo L. Bonner, August Cassano, David Clark, Roy D. Donald, David Easley, Brian K. Eskridge, Roger Lee Hall, Edward O. Hodge, Kunta Kenyatta, Stacy Lane, James D. Mitchell, John W. Perotti, Lamar Preston, Jason H. Robb, Richard Siggers, Eric Swofford, Lahray Thompson, Edward A. Tilley, Mark Trawick. Filing fee collected, receipt #622480. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet)(B, B) Modified on 1/11/2001 (B, B). Modified on 1/12/2001 (B, B). Modified on 1/25/2005 (S, T). (Entered: 01/11/2001)
2 Random Assignment of Magistrate Judge Limbert .(B, B) (Entered: 01/11/2001)
3 Case Information Statement with Complex Track recommendation filed by Raymond V. Vasvari Jr. of American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio on behalf of all plaintiffs.(B, B) (Entered: 01/11/2001)
4 Notice of Placement of case in the CM/ECF Docketing System .(B, B) (Entered: 01/11/2001)
5 Motion for order permitting access to prisoners (oral hearing requested) filed by Terry H. Gilbert of Friedman & Gilbert on behalf of all plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support# 2 Declaration by Alice Lynd# 3 Re: Stuart Grassian, M.D.)(M, EJ) Modified text correcting typographical error on 1/18/2001 (R, J A). (Entered: 01/17/2001)
6 Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Order Permitting Access to Prisoners filed by Joseph M. Mancini of Office Of The Ohio Attorney General on behalf of all defendants. (Related motion(s) 5 ) (Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 01/26/2001)
7 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 1/30/01 that this case is to be entered into the Court's electronic filing system. All further documents, notices and orders in this matter are to be filed electronically rather than on paper (attachment). (A, V) (Entered: 01/30/2001)
8 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 1/30/01 that the parties are to confer to see if they can agree upon a proposed order setting out the plaintiffs' visitation privileges during the pendency of this action. If able to reach such an agreement, the parties shall submit the proposed order to the Court. If unable to agree, the parties shall each file a proposed order incorporating its requested visitation schedule, along with any supporting memorandum. (Related Doc # 5 ) (A, V) (Entered: 01/30/2001)
9 Motion to consolidate cases 4:01cv71 and 4:99cv2658; with memorandum in support, filed by Raymond V. Vasvari Jr. of American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio on behalf of all plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Cases)(M, EJ) (Entered: 02/27/2001)

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03/07/2001 03/08/2001 03/09/2001 03/09/2001 03/15/2001 03/27/2001 03/29/2001
03/30/2001
04/05/2001
04/09/2001

10 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 3/7/01 regarding visitation guidelines during the pendency of this lawsuit (related document(s) 8 ) .(A, V) (Entered: 03/07/2001)
11 Motion for extension of time to answer complaint (related document(s) 1 ) filed by Joseph M. Mancini of Office Of The Ohio Attorney General on behalf of all defendants.(Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 03/08/2001)
12 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 3/9/01 granting defendants' motion for extension of time until 4/2/01 to answer complaint(Related Doc # 11 ) (A, V) (Entered: 03/09/2001)
13 Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Consolidate filed by Joseph M. Mancini of Office Of The Ohio Attorney General on behalf of all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A) (Related motion(s) 9 ) (Mancini, Joseph) Modified text adding description for attachment on 3/12/2001 (R, J A). (Entered: 03/09/2001)
14 Reply Brief in Support of Their Motion to Consolidate Cases filed by Jules Lobel, Raymond V. Vasvari Jr. on behalf of all plaintiffs. (Related motion(s) 9 ) (Other related filing(s) 9 ) (M, P) Modified text removing party type on 3/19/2001 (R, J A). (Entered: 03/16/2001)
15 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 3/27/01 denying plaintiffs' motion to consolidate this case with case 4:99cv2658 (Related Doc # 9 ) (A, V) (Entered: 03/27/2001)
16 Waiver of Summons Returned as to defendants Stephen J. Huffman, Bernard J. Ryznar, Todd E. Ishee, Bruce A. Martin, Deborah Nixon Hughes, Cheryl Jorgensen−Martinez, Manish B. Joshi, Patrick F. Biggs, Audrey Sandor Nietzel, Matthew Meyer & Reginald Wilkinson. Waivers were issued on 1/9/2001 and received on 3/8/2001. (B.B.) Modified text on 3/30/2001 (B, B). (Entered: 03/30/2001)
17 Answer to Complaint (Related Doc # 1 ) filed by Joseph M. Mancini of Office Of The Ohio Attorney General on behalf of Patrick F. Biggs, Stephen J Huffman, Deborah Nixon Hughes, Todd E. Ishee, Cheryl Jorgensen−Martinez, Manish B. Joshi, Bruce A. Martin, Matthew Meyer, Audrey Sandor Nietzel, Bernard J. Ryznar, Reginald Wilkinson.(Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 03/30/2001)
18 Proposed Stipulation Consenting to the Filing of a First Amended Complaint & Class Certification Motion filed by Joseph M. Mancini, Raymond V. Vasvari Jr. of Office Of The Ohio Attorney General on behalf of all parties.(Vasvari, Raymond) Modified text on 4/6/2001 (R, J A). Modified text adding proposed on 4/10/2001 (R, J A). (Entered: 04/05/2001)
19 First Amended complaint Adding New Parties Plaintiff against Patrick F. Biggs, Stephen J Huffman, Deborah Nixon Hughes, Todd E. Ishee, Cheryl Jorgensen−Martinez, Manish B. Joshi, Bruce A. Martin, Matthew Meyer, Audrey Sandor Nietzel, Bernard J. Ryznar, Reginald Wilkinson. filed by Raymond V. Vasvari Jr. of American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio on behalf of Kevin B. Roe, Emanuel B. Newell, Orsino Iacovone, Daryl Heard, Frederick O. Harris Jr., Keith Gardner, James DeJarnette, Robert Baksi, Charles E. Austin, Michael Benge, Alonzo L. Bonner, August Cassano, David Clark, Roy D. Donald, David Easley, Brian K. Eskridge, Roger Lee Hall, Edward O. Hodge, Kunta Kenyatta, Stacy Lane, James D. Mitchell, John W. Perotti, Lamar Preston, Jason H. Robb, Richard Siggers, Eric Swofford, Lahray Thompson, Edward A. Tilley, Mark Trawick. (Attachments: # 1 Index List of Exhibits# 2 Index Index of Exhibits# 3 Exhibit Exhibit I−A# 4 Exhibit Exhibit I−B# 5 Exhibit Exhibit I−C# 6 Exhibit Exhibit I−D# 7 Exhibit Exhibit I−E# 8 Exhibit Exhibit I−F# 9 Exhibit Exhibit I−G# 10 Exhibit Exhibit I−H# 11 Exhibit Exhibit I−I# 12 Exhibit Exhibit I−J# 13 Exhibit Exhibit I−K# 14 Exhibit Exhibit I−L# 15 Exhibit Exhibit II−A# 16 Exhibit Exhibit II−B# 17 Exhibit Exhibit II−C# 18 Exhibit Exhibit II−D# 19 Exhibit Exhibit II−E# 20 Exhibit Exhibit III−A# 21 Exhibit Exhibit III−B# 22 Exhibit Exhibit III−C# 23 Exhibit Exhibit III−D# 24 Exhibit Exhibit III−E# 25 Exhibit Exhibit III−F# 26 Exhibit Exhibit III−G# 27 Exhibit Exhibit III−H# 28 Exhibit Exhibit IV−A# 29 Exhibit Exhibit IV−B# 30 Exhibit Exhibit IV−C# 31 Exhibit Exhibit IV−D# 32 Exhibit Exhibit IV−E# 33 Exhibit Exhibit IV−F# 34 Exhibit Exhibit V)(Vasvari, Raymond) (DOCUMENT FILED IN ERROR−−SEE DOCUMENT 20 ) Modified text regarding filing error on 4/9/2001 (R, J A). (Entered: 04/09/2001)

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04/09/2001
04/12/2001 04/18/2001 04/20/2001 05/08/2001 05/08/2001 05/08/2001 05/10/2001 05/16/2001 05/17/2001

20 First Amended complaint Adding New Party Plaintiffs Kevin B. Roe, Emanuel B. Newell, Orsino Iacovone, Daryl Heard, Frederick O. Harris, Jr., Keith Gardner, James DeJarnette & Robert Baski against Patrick F. Biggs, Stephen J Huffman, Deborah Nixon Hughes, Todd E. Ishee, Cheryl Jorgensen−Martinez, Manish B. Joshi, Bruce A. Martin, Matthew Meyer, Audrey Sandor Nietzel, Bernard J. Ryznar, Reginald Wilkinson filed by Raymond V. Vasvari Jr. of American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio on behalf of Kevin B. Roe, Emanuel B. Newell, Orsino Iacovone, Daryl Heard, Frederick O. Harris Jr., Keith Gardner, James DeJarnette, Robert Baksi, Charles E. Austin, Michael Benge, Alonzo L. Bonner, August Cassano, David Clark, Roy D. Donald, David Easley, Brian K. Eskridge, Roger Lee Hall, Edward O. Hodge, Kunta Kenyatta, Stacy Lane, James D. Mitchell, John W. Perotti, Lamar Preston, Jason H. Robb, Richard Siggers, Eric Swofford, Lahray Thompson, Edward A. Tilley, Mark Trawick. (Attachments: # 1 Index List of Exhibits# 2 Index of Exhibits# 3 Exhibit I−A# 4 Exhibit I−B# 5 Exhibit I−C# 6 Exhibit I−D# 7 Exhibit I−E# 8 Exhibit I−F# 9 Exhibit I−G# 10 Exhibit I−H# 11 Exhibit I−I# 12 Exhibit I−J# 13 Exhibit I−K# 14 Exhibit I−L# 15Exhibit II−A# 16 Exhibit II−B# 17 Exhibit II−C# 18 Exhibit II−D# 19 Exhibit II−E# 20 Exhibit III−A# 21 Exhibit III−B# 22 Exhibit III−C# 23 Exhibit III−D# 24 Exhibit III−E# 25 Exhibit III−F# 26 Exhibit III−G# (TO BE SUBMITTED TO COURT BECAUSE OF SIZE) (27) Exhibit III−H# 28 Exhibit IV−A# 29 Exhibit IV−B# 30 Exhibit IV−C# (PAGE 7 IS NOTHING) (31) Exhibit IV−D# 32 Exhibit IV−E# 33 Exhibit IV−F# 34 Exhibit V)(Vasvari, Raymond) Modified text regarding attachments on 4/9/2001 (R, J A). (Entered: 04/09/2001)
21 Exhibit III−G to Amended Complaint (related document(s) 20 ) filed by Raymond V. Vasvari Jr. of American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio on behalf of all plaintiffs.(M, J) (Entered: 04/12/2001)
22 Motion for extension of time to answer amended complaint until 5/14/01 with Memorandum in Support (related document(s) 20 ) filed by Carol H. O'Brien of Ohio Attorney General's Office on behalf of all defendants.(O'Brien, Carol) Modified text adding date and memorandum on 4/19/2001 (R, J A). (Entered: 04/18/2001)
23 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 4/20/01 granting defendants' motion for extension of time until 5/14/01 to answer amended complaint (Related Doc # 22 ) (A, V) (Entered: 04/20/2001)
24 Case Management Conference Scheduling Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin. Case management conference to be held on 5/24/01 at 10:30 a.m. (attachments) (A, V) (Entered: 05/08/2001)
25 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 5/8/01 that the plaintiffs are to select one plaintiff to participate in the case management conference. Said plaintiff will serve as the spokesperson for all the plaintiffs and must possess full settlement authority. The Court will then have the warden at the Ohio State Penitentiary make that plaintiff available to participate in the case management conference by way of video conferencing. (A, V) (Entered: 05/08/2001)
26 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 5/8/01 that this Court contacted the Secretary to the Warden to make arrangements to have one of the plaintiffs participate in the case management conference by way of video−conference. A representative at said institution shall place the video−conference thirty minutes prior to the time of said conference. (A, V) (Entered: 05/08/2001)
27 Answer to Amended Complaint (Related Doc # 20 ) (related document(s) 20 ) filed by Patrick F. Biggs, Stephen J Huffman, Deborah Nixon Hughes, Todd E. Ishee, Cheryl Jorgensen−Martinez, Manish B. Joshi, Bruce A. Martin, Matthew Meyer, Audrey Sandor Nietzel, Bernard J. Ryznar, Reginald Wilkinson.(Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 05/10/2001)
28 Motion for reconsideration of 5/8/01 Court Order (related document(s) 25 ) filed by all plaintiffs.(Gilbert, Terry) Modified adding text on 5/16/2001 (R, J A). (Entered: 05/16/2001)
29 Position Statement re: CMC Agenda filed by all defendants.(O'Brien, Carol) (Entered: 05/17/2001)

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05/21/2001 05/21/2001 05/21/2001 05/21/2001 05/22/2001 05/23/2001
05/24/2001 05/24/2001 05/24/2001
05/24/2001 05/24/2001
06/06/2001
06/07/2001 06/08/2001 06/12/2001 06/15/2001

30 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 5/21/01 denying plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of this Court's order wherein counsel were to select one plaintiff to participate in the case management conference (Related Doc # 28 ) (A, V) (Entered: 05/21/2001)
31 Report of Parties Planning Meeting filed by all defendants.(O'Brien, Carol) (Entered: 05/21/2001)
32 Report of Parties Planning Meeting filed by all plaintiffs.(Vasvari, Raymond) Modified text on 5/22/2001 (R, J A). (Entered: 05/21/2001)
33 Notice of Designation of Plaintiff Spokesman and Motion to Allow Presense of Counsel filed by all plaintiffs.(Vasvari, Raymond) (Motion filed separately−−see document #34) Modified text regarding motion on 5/22/2001 (R, J A). (Entered: 05/21/2001)
34 Motion for order Allowing Presence of Counsel with Inmate Spokesman During Case Management Conference filed by all plaintiffs.(Vasvari, Raymond) (Entered: 05/22/2001)
35 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 5/23/01 denying plaintiff's motion for an order allowing presence of counsel with inmate spokesman during case management conference. Counsel to participate via video−conference from U.S. District Court, 575 Federal Building, 2 South Main Street, Akron, Ohio. (Related Doc # 34 ) (A, V) (Entered: 05/23/2001)
36 Minutes of Proceedings. Case Management Conference held before Judge James S. Gwin on 5/24/01. Court Reporter: none. (A, V) (Entered: 05/24/2001)
37 Estimate of Fees and Costs to be Incurred by Plaintiff's counsel filed by plaintiffs. (L, T) (Entered: 05/24/2001)
38 Case Management Conference Plan/Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin. Case assigned to the Complex Track. Preliminary discovery due by 10/1/01 with all discovery due by 12/24/01, Parties to be Joined and Pleading Amendments due by 5/24/01, Dispositive Motions due by 10/15/01, with responses by 10/29/01 and replies by 11/5/01. Final Pre−Trial Conference set for 1/2/02 at 4:00 p.m. Jury Trial set on a two−week standby basis beginning 1/7/02 at 8:00 a.m. (A, V) (Entered: 05/24/2001)
39 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 5/24/01 scheduling status conferences on 8/3/01 at 10:00 a.m. and 11/2/01 at 12:00 noon. The plaintiff is to identify their experts by 7/2/01 and defendants by 7/31/01. (A, V) (Entered: 05/24/2001)
40 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 5/24/01 that discovery with regard to the class certification issue is to be completed on or before 7/23/01. Plaintiffs' motion for class certification is to be filed on or before 7/30/01, with a response to said motion to be filed on or before 8/13/01, and reply brief to be filed on or before 8/21/01. (A, V) (Entered: 05/24/2001)
41 Motion for reconsideration of Order entered 5/24/01 assigning case to the Complex Track and motion requesting this case be assigned to the inactive track with Memorandum in Support and Exhibit A (related document(s) 38 ) filed by all defendants.(O'Brien, Carol) Modified text adding text on 6/7/2001 (R, J A). (Entered: 06/06/2001)
42 Motion for order assigning case to the inactive case track filed by all defendants.(O'Brien, Carol) (Entered: 06/07/2001)
43 Opposition to Defendants' motion for reconsideration filed by all plaintiffs. (Related motion(s) 41 ) (M, P) Modified text removing filer name on 6/11/2001 (R, J A). (Entered: 06/08/2001)
44 Attorney Appearance by Marianne Pressman filed by all defendants.(Pressman, Marianne) (Entered: 06/12/2001)
45 Reply to Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration filed by all defendants. (Related motion(s) 41 , 42 ) (Other related filing(s) 41 , 42 ) (Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 06/15/2001)

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 34 of 86

06/15/2001
07/11/2001 07/18/2001 07/19/2001 07/24/2001 07/24/2001 07/27/2001 07/27/2001 07/27/2001 07/27/2001 07/31/2001
07/31/2001 08/01/2001 08/01/2001 08/01/2001

46 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 6/15/01 that defendants' motion for reconsideration is denied. Defendants made the same argument in their "Proposed Agenda of Matters to be Discussed at the Case Management Conference" [Doc. 29]. The Court considered and rejected Defendants' argument, as reflected in the Court's 5/24/01 Case Management Order. The Court finds no justification for altering this order. (Related Doc # 41 & 42 ) (A, V) (Entered: 06/15/2001)
47 Motion for preliminary injunction, Motion for temporary restraining order with memorandum in support filed by John W. Perotti. (P, G) (Entered: 07/11/2001)
48 Address Change Notice by Jillian S. Davis and by Raymond V. Vasvari Jr. filed by Raymond V. Vasvari Jr. on behalf of all plaintiffs. (M, EJ) (Entered: 07/19/2001)
49 Opposition (Related Motion(s) 47 ) to Inmate Perotti's motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction filed by Carol H. O'Brien on behalf of all defendants. (O'Brien, Carol) (Entered: 07/19/2001)
50 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 7/24/01 denying, without prejudice, plaintiff John Perotti's motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction (Related Doc # 47 ); plaintiff is free to re−file his request for a temporary restraining order as a separate law suit. (S, S) (Entered: 07/24/2001)
51 Exhibits (Related Doc. 47 )in support of temporary restraining order/permanent injunction filed by John W. Perotti. (Attachments: # 1 Attachments)(R, J A) Modified to add document link on 7/25/2001 (R, J A). (Entered: 07/25/2001)
52 Motion for appearance pro hac vice of Jules Lobel filed by all plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Curriculum Vitae of Jules Lobel)(Vasvari, Raymond) (Entered: 07/27/2001)
53 Motion for order to Designate Jason Robb as Plaintiff Representative by Video Conference at the Case Status Conference to be held August 3, 2001 filed by all plaintiffs. (Vasvari, Raymond) (Entered: 07/27/2001)
54 Motion to compel discovery (the Production of Documents) filed by all plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Defendants' Amended Response to Plaintiffs' First Request for Production of Documents# 2 Exhibit B, Letter dated 7/26/01# 3 Exhibit C, Copy of Opinion)(A, J) Modified text on 10/10/01 (A, V). (Entered: 07/27/2001)
55 Motion for class certification filed by all plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification with Exhibits)(A, J) Modified text adding exhibits on 7/30/2001 (R, J A). (Entered: 07/27/2001)
56 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 7/31/01 granting plaintiffs' motion for Professor Jules Lobel to appear pro hac vice; Professor Jules L. Lobel for Michael Benge; Alonzo L. Bonner; August Cassano; David Clark; James DeJarnette; Roy D. Donald; David Easley; Brian K. Eskridge; Keith Gardner; Roger Lee Hall; Frederick O. Harris; Daryl Heard; Edward O. Hodge; Orsino Iacovone; Kunta Kenyatta; Stacy Lane; James D. Mitchell; Emanuel B. Newell; John W. Perotti; Lamar Preston; Jason H. Robb; Kevin B. Roe; Richard Siggers; Eric Swofford; Lahray Thompson; Edward A. Tilley; Mark Trawick; Charles E. Austin and Robert Baksi added to case. (Related Doc # 52 ) (S, S) (Entered: 07/31/2001)
57 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 7/31/01 granting plaintiffs' motion to designate Jason Robb as the plaintiff representative to attend the 8/3/01 case management conference via video conference (Related Doc # 53 ). (S, S) (Entered: 07/31/2001)
58 Motion for preliminary injunction and Temporary Restraining Order filed by all plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Brief in Support)(Gilbert, Terry) (Entered: 08/01/2001)
59 Notice of Manual Filing of Exhibits 1−7 filed by all plaintiffs. (Gilbert, Terry) Modified adding text on 8/2/2001 (R, J A). (Entered: 08/01/2001)
60 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 8/1/01 referring this matter to Magistrate Judge George J. Limbert to conduct a telephone conference with regard to a discovery dispute that has arisen between the parties. (Related document(s) 54 ) (S, S) (Entered: 08/01/2001)

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 35 of 86

08/02/2001 08/02/2001 08/02/2001 08/02/2001 08/03/2001 08/06/2001 08/07/2001 08/07/2001
08/09/2001
08/10/2001 08/13/2001 08/15/2001
08/22/2001 08/23/2001 08/24/2001
08/24/2001

61 Exhibits filed by all plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2# 3 Exhibit 3# 4 Exhibit 4# 5 Exhibit 5# 6 Exhibit 6# 7 Exhibit 7)(Related document(s) 59 ) (R, J A) (Entered: 08/02/2001)
62 Notice of rescheduling status conference. The status conference scheduled for 8/3/01 at 10:00 a.m is rescheduled for 8/3/01 at 12:30 p.m. (S, S) (Entered: 08/02/2001)
63 Motion for appearance pro hac vice of William Goodman filed by all plaintiffs. (Vasvari, Raymond) (Entered: 08/02/2001)
64 Opposition (Related Motion(s) 55 ) to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(O'Brien, Carol) (Entered: 08/02/2001)
65 Minutes of Proceedings. Status conference held before Judge James S. Gwin on 8/3/01. Court Reporter: none. (S, S) (Entered: 08/03/2001)
66 Reply (Related Motion(s) 55 ) in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Class Certification filed by all plaintiffs. (Vasvari, Raymond) (Entered: 08/06/2001)
67 Notice of evidentiary hearing to be held before Judge James S. Gwin on 8/27/01 at 9:00 a.m. (A, V) (Entered: 08/07/2001)
68 Order: A telephonic conference call is scheduled on plaintiffs' motion to compel production of documents on 8/16/01 at 1:30 p.m. (Related document(s) 54 ); plaintiffs' counsel is responsible for placing this call. Magistrate Judge George J. Limbert.(S, A) (Entered: 08/07/2001)
69 Order: Attorney Lobel's oral request to continue the telephone conference on plaintiffs' motion to compel production is granted; the telephone conference is rescheduled for 8/21/01 at 2:30 p.m.; plaintiffs' counsel is responsible for placing the call. Magistrate Judge George J. Limbert.(S, A) (Entered: 08/09/2001)
70 Opposition (Related Motion(s) 54 ) to Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Affidavit w/ attachment)(O'Brien, Carol) (Entered: 08/10/2001)
71 Order entered on 8/13/01 by Judge James S. Gwin granting motion of William Goodman to appear pro hac vice (Related Doc # 63 ) (A, V) (Entered: 08/13/2001)
72 Opposition (Related Motion(s) 58 ) to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order filed by all defendants. (Mancini, Joseph) Replaced scanned main document with document directly converted to pdf on 11/13/2001 (P, S). (Entered: 08/15/2001)
73 Motion for order Regarding the Conduct of the Preliminary Injunction Hearing to be Held August 27, 2001 filed by all plaintiffs. (Vasvari, Raymond) (Entered: 08/22/2001)
74 Opposition (Related Motion(s) 58 ) Memorandum (Supplemental) to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Fred Cohen, LL.B., LL.M# 2 Attachment 1)(R, J A) (Entered: 08/23/2001)
75 Order entered on 8/24/01 by Judge James S. Gwin. granting Plaintiffs' motion concerning the conduct of the preliminary injunction hearing. Defendants are to arrange for plaintiffs David Easley #306−400, Frederick Harris #316−641, James Mitchell #238−630, Emanuel Newell #206−453, and Jason Robb #308−919 to testify at the hearing via video conference. A representative at said institution shall place the video−conference fifteen minutes prior to the time of said hearing. Plaintiffs' request that the hearing be allowed to resume for a second day of testimony is granted. Said hearing is scheduled and will take place on 9/11/01 at 9:00 a.m. (Related Doc # 73 ) (A, V) (Entered: 08/24/2001)
76 Order: A telephone conference was held on 8/21/01 regarding plaintiffs' motion to compel producction of documents (Related document(s) 54 ); defts are ordered to comply with the requests as sest forth in this Order; FURTHER, an in−camera inspection of documents responsive to request 2(e) shall take place on 9/14/01 at 9:00 a.m.; the parties are ordered to file brief summaries of their claims, defenses, positions, & theories relating to the case & the relevance of the materials requested no later than 9/7/01. Magistrate Judge George J. Limbert.(S, A) (Entered: 08/24/2001)

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08/27/2001 08/31/2001 09/05/2001 09/06/2001 09/06/2001 09/06/2001 09/06/2001 09/07/2001 09/07/2001 09/07/2001 09/07/2001 09/07/2001
09/07/2001
09/12/2001 09/12/2001 09/12/2001

77 Minutes of Proceedings. Evidentiary Hearing held before Judge James S. Gwin on 8/27/01. Court Reporter: Sue Trischan Time: 3 hrs (A, V) (Entered: 08/27/2001)
78 Motion to compel discovery (production of documents) filed by all plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit (Declaration of Jules Lobe unsigned))(R, N) Modified text regarding declaration on 9/4/2001 (R, J A). Modified termed date on 10/10/2001 (A, V). (Entered: 08/31/2001)
79 Order: A telephonic conference is scheduled on 9/6/01 at 1:30 p.m. regarding plantiffs' motion to compel production of documents (Related document(s) 78 ); plainitffs' counsel to initiate call. Magistrate Judge George J. Limbert.(S, A) (Entered: 09/05/2001)
80 Response to Order of Magistrate Limbert re Production of Documents filed by all plaintiffs. (Related document(s) 76 ) (A, J) (Entered: 09/06/2001)
81 Minute Sheet of telephonic hearing on plaintiffs' motion to compel held by Magistrate Judge Limbert (M, P) Related Motion # 78 Modified adding document link on 9/7/2001 (P, S). (Entered: 09/06/2001)
82 Order that pursuant to the agreement of the parties the affidavit of Matthew Meyer shall be sealed. George J. Limbert, Magistrate Judge (M, P) (Entered: 09/06/2001)
83 Transcript of proceedings of Preliminary Injunction Hearing of 8/27/01 before Judge James S. Gwin. Complete document on file in the Clerk's Office. (R, J A) (Entered: 09/07/2001)
84 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 9/7/01 referring this matter to Magistrate Judge George J. Limbert to conduct a telephone conference with regard to a discovery dispute that has arisen between the parties.(Related Doc # 78 ) (A, V) (Entered: 09/07/2001)
85 Supplemental Opposition (Related Motion(s) 58 ) Memorandum to Injunctive Relief filed by all defendants. (O'Brien, Carol) Modified text on 9/10/2001 (R, J A). Replaced scanned main document with document directly converted to pdf on 11/13/2001 (P, S). (Entered: 09/07/2001)
86 Memorandum In Support (Related Motion(s) 54 ) Of Objections to production request filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Affidavit of Matthew Meyer, under seal pursuant to court order)(O'Brien, Carol) (Entered: 09/07/2001)
87 Notice of manual filing of affidavit of Matthew Meyer filed by all defendants. (Related document(s) 86 ) (O'Brien, Carol) Modified text adding description of manual filing on 9/10/2001 (R, J A). (Entered: 09/07/2001)
88 Order; supplemental request 1: defendants shall comply with this request by providing a chart showing the transfer and placement history for each of the 14 inmates. Defendants shall comply with this request no later than 9/10/01; Supplemental Request 3: Defendants shall comply with this request in full no later than 9/10/01; Supplemental Request 4: Defendants shall comply with this request in full no later than 9/10/01; Magistrate Judge George J. Limbert (R, N) (Entered: 09/07/2001)
89 Exhibit (affidavit of Matthew Meyer) to memorandum in support of objections to production request filed under seal pursuant to order dated 9/6/01 filed by all defendants. (Related document(s) 82 , 86 , 87 ) (R, N)(FILED UNDER SEAL #3057) Modified text on 9/10/2001 (P, S). Modified on 9/11/2001 (R, J A). Modified text adding seal number on 9/17/2001 (R, J A). (Entered: 09/10/2001)
90 Minutes of Proceedings. Evidentiary hearing held before Judge James S. Gwin on 9/11/01. Time: 4 hours. Court Reporter: Richard DelMonico (A, V) (Entered: 09/12/2001)
91 Notice of evidentiary hearing to be held on 9/24/01 at 8:00 a.m. before Judge James S. Gwin. (A, V) (Entered: 09/12/2001)
92 Exhibit list of plaintiffs' exhibits admitted at evidentiary hearing with regard to motion for preliminary injunction held before Judge James S. Gwin on 9/11/01. (A, V) (Entered: 09/12/2001)

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09/14/2001 09/18/2001 09/21/2001 09/24/2001 09/25/2001 09/26/2001 09/26/2001 09/26/2001 09/28/2001 10/02/2001 10/03/2001
10/04/2001 10/04/2001 10/04/2001 10/04/2001 10/05/2001

93 Response to Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Objection filed by all plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Case Law)(Related document(s) 54 ) (A, J) Modified document link on 9/17/2001 (R, J A). (Entered: 09/14/2001)
94 Order: In−camera inspection scheduled to be held on 9/14/01; in lieu of proceeding with the in−camera inspection, the parties agreed to, & the Court approved, an alternative to releasing the documents in the Security Threat Group files, as outlined in this Order. Magistrate Judge George J. Limbert. (S, A) (Entered: 09/18/2001)
95 Transcript of proceedings of Evidentiary Hearing before the Hon. James S. Gwin taken 9/11/01 at 8:15 a.m. (Complete document on file in the Clerk's Office.) Court reporter: Richard DelMonico (R, J A) (Entered: 09/21/2001)
96 Minutes of Proceedings. Evidentiary hearing held regarding preliminary injunction before Judge James S. Gwin on 9/24/01. Court Reporter: Lori Klinger (A, V) (Entered: 09/25/2001)
97 Minutes of Proceedings. Evidentiary hearing held regarding preliminary injunction before Judge James S. Gwin on 9/25/01. Court Reporter: Lori Klinger (A, V) (Entered: 09/25/2001)
98 Exhibit list of defendants' exhibits admitted at evidentiary hearing with regard to motion for preliminary injunction held before Judge James S. Gwin on 9/24/01 and 9/25/01. (A, V) (Entered: 09/26/2001)
99 Exhibit list of plaintiffs' exhibits admitted at evidentiary hearing with regard to motion for preliminary injunction held before Judge James S. Gwin on 9/24/01 and 9/25/01. (A, V) (Entered: 09/26/2001)
100 Exhibits DRC−25 filed by all plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Dunn Consent Decree)(R, N) (Entered: 09/26/2001)
101 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 9/28/01 that the previously assigned date for submission of post−hearing briefs with regard to the preliminary injunction is extended. Briefs shall be filed by all parties on or before 10/9/01. (A, V) (Entered: 09/28/2001)
102 Motion for order to Prohibit the Experts for the Proposed Plaintiff Class from Testifying at the Trial with Memorandum in Support filed by all defendants. (Mancini, Joseph) Modified text adding memorandum on 10/3/2001 (R, J A). (Entered: 10/02/2001)
103 Notice of Defendants' Suggestion to the Court that the Issues Raised in the Motion of the Proposed Plaintiff Class for Preliminary Injunction are Moot filed by all defendants. (Related document(s) 58 ) (Mancini, Joseph) Replaced scanned main document with document directly converted to pdf on 11/13/2001 (P, S). (Entered: 10/03/2001)
104 Motion for extension of time to permit both parties to file the reports of their respective expert witnesses 60 days before trial, on November 8, 2001 filed by all plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support)(M, P) (Entered: 10/04/2001)
107 Transcript of proceedings on 9/24/01 commencing at 8:00 AM before Judge James S. Gwin of preliminary injunction hearing. Court Reporter: Lori Ann Callahan. Complete document on file in the Clerk's Office. (Related documents(s) 96 ) (M, EJ) Modified adding text on 10/9/2001 (R, J A). (Entered: 10/05/2001)
108 Transcript of proceedings on 9/24/01 commencing at 12:20 PM before Judge James S. Gwin of preliminary injunction hearing. Court Reporter: Lori Ann Callahan. Complete document on file in the Clerk's Office. (Related documents(s) 96 ) (M, EJ) Modified adding text on 10/9/2001 (R, J A). (Entered: 10/05/2001)
109 Transcript of proceedings on 9/25/01 commencing at 8:00 a.m. before Judge James S. Gwin of preliminary injunction hearing. Court Reporter: Lori Ann Callahan. Complete document on file in the Clerk's Office. (Related documents(s) 97 ) (M, EJ) Modified adding text on 10/9/2001 (R, J A). (Entered: 10/05/2001)
105 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 10/5/01 granting plaintiffs' motion for class certification and denying defendants' motion to strike plaintiffs' exhibits filed in

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10/05/2001 10/05/2001 10/05/2001
10/05/2001 10/05/2001 10/05/2001 10/09/2001
10/09/2001 10/12/2001 10/12/2001 10/12/2001 10/12/2001 10/12/2001

support of their motion (Related Doc # 55 ). The Court certifies the following class: All persons who were confined at the Ohio State Penitentiary as of January 9, 2001, or who have come to be confined there since that date, or who may be confined there during the pendency of this litigation, membership in the class once thus established to continue during the pendency of the litigation. The named plaintiffs at the OSP on January 9, 2001, but who have since been transferred to other facilities, may continue to serve as class representatives. (Related documents(s) 64 ) (S, S) (Entered: 10/05/2001)
106 Reply (Related Motion(s) 104 ) to Plaintiffs' Motion Pursuant to FRCP 26(2)(c) to Permit Both Parties to File the Reports of their Respective Expert Witnesses 60 Days Before Trial on November 8, 2001 filed by all defendants. (Mancini, Joseph) Modified text on 10/9/2001 (R, J A). (Entered: 10/05/2001)
110 Reply (Related Motion(s) 58 ) to Defendants' Suggestion of Mootness in motion of proposed plaintiff class for preliminary injunction filed by all plaintiffs. (M, P) Modified adding text on 10/9/2001 (R, J A). (Entered: 10/05/2001)
111 Amended Motion for order pursuant to FRCP 26(2)(C) filed by all plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Email from O'Brien to Lynd dated 10/4/01# 2 Exhibit B, Letter from Mancini to Vasvari dated 8/10/01# 3 Exhibit C, Email from Lynd to Mancini dated 10/5/01)(Related document(s) 104 ) (M, P) Modified text regarding Exhibit B on 10/9/2001 (R, J A). (Entered: 10/05/2001)
112 Stipulated Protective Order (5 branch) signed on 10/3/01 by George J. Limbert, Magistrate Judge (M, P) Modified adding date on 10/9/2001 (R, J A). (Entered: 10/05/2001)
113 Notice of Manual Filing of Security Threat Group Document Summaries Filed Under Seal filed by all defendants. (O'Brien, Carol) (Entered: 10/05/2001)
114 Notice of Security Threat Group File Summaries of STG Coordinator Matt Meyer FILED UNDER SEAL #3059 filed by all defendants. (Related document(s) 113 ) (R, J A) Modified text on 10/9/2001 (R, J A). Modified text adding seal number on 10/10/2001 (R, J A). (Entered: 10/09/2001)
115 Response (Related Motion(s) 58 ) (Post−Evidentiary Hearing Memorandum) to Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G# 8 Exhibit H# 9 Exhibit I# 10 Exhibit J# 11 Exhibit K# 12 Exhibit L)(Mancini, Joseph) Modified on 10/10/2001 (R, J A). Replaced scanned main document with document directly converted to pdf on 11/13/2001 (P, S). (Entered: 10/09/2001)
116 Post Hearing Brief filed by all plaintiffs.(R, N) (Entered: 10/10/2001)
117 Marginal Order entered on 10/12/01 denying defendants'motion for order to prohibit the experts for the proposed plaintiff class from testifying at the trial (Related Doc # 102 ) (A, V) (Entered: 10/12/2001)
118 Marginal Order entered on 10/12/01 by Judge James S. Gwin denying as moot plaintiffs' motion for extension of time to permit both parties to file the reports of their respective expert witnesses 60 days before trial (Related Doc # 104 ) (A, V) (Entered: 10/12/2001)
119 Marginal Order entered on 10/12/01 by Judge James S. Gwin denying as moot plaintiffs' amended motion for order pursuant to FRCP 26(2)(C) (Related Doc # 111 ) (A, V) (Entered: 10/12/2001)
120 Brief (Post Hearing) Reply filed by all plaintiffs. (Related Document(s) 58 )(Gilbert, Terry) Modified text on 10/12/2001 (R, J A). Modified text adding document link on 10/15/2001 (R, J A). (Entered: 10/12/2001)
121 Response (Related Motion(s) 58 ) (Second Post−Evidentiary Hearing Memorandum) to Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by all defendants. (Mancini, Joseph) Replaced scanned main document with document directly converted to pdf on 11/13/2001 (P, S). (Entered: 10/12/2001)

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10/22/2001 10/29/2001 10/30/2001 11/05/2001 11/05/2001 11/05/2001
11/06/2001
11/07/2001
11/13/2001 11/16/2001 11/16/2001 11/20/2001 11/21/2001

122 Motion to alter/amend judgment and to dismiss the claims of all class members that are not presently incarcerated at OSP for want of subject matter jurisdiction with Memorandum in Support filed by all defendants. (Related document(s) 105 ) (O'Brien, Carol) Modified adding text on 10/23/2001 (R, J A). (Entered: 10/22/2001)
123 Response to Defendants' Motion to Alter or Amend and for Partial Dismissal (Related Motion(s) 122 ) filed by all plaintiffs. (Lynd, Staughton) Modified adding text on 10/30/2001 (R, J A). (Entered: 10/29/2001)
124 Notice of rescheduling the time for the status conference. The status conference will be held on 11/2/01 at 9:00 a.m. (Related documents(s) 39 ) (A, V) (Entered: 10/30/2001)
125 Minutes of proceedings before Judge James S. Gwin. Status conference held on 11/2/01. Court Reporter: none. (A, V) (Entered: 11/05/2001)
126 Reply (Related Motion(s) 122 ) to Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion to Alter or Amend filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Stephen Dillon)(O'Brien, Carol) (Entered: 11/05/2001)
127 Order: Upon review of the summaries drafted by the Security Threat Group Coordinator for the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation & Corrections, it is found that the summaries represent accurate descriptions of the materials presented in the actual Security Threat Group file documents; FURTHER, it is found that, based upon the materials presented, credible evidence exists to support defendants' conclusions of gang affiliations of the named plaintiffs (Related document(s) 94 ). Magistrate Judge George J. Limbert. (S, A) (Entered: 11/06/2001)
128 Certificate of Service to Motion for leave 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16360 (W.D.Wis., Oct. 10, 2001 filed by all plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Jones et al. v. Berge et al.# 2)(Related document(s) 120 , 58 ) (Lynd, Staughton) (FILING ERROR. Per co−counsel, Alice Lynd, motion refiled − see document #129; attachment #2 inadvertently filed) Modified text regarding refiling on 11/7/2001 (R, J A). Modified text on 11/9/2001 (P, S). (Entered: 11/06/2001)
129 Motion for leave to file new case law; Jones et al. v. Berge et al. in support of plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction filed by all plaintiffs. (Related document(s) 120 , 58 ) (Lynd, Staughton) (New Case Law is Attachment #1 in document #128) Modified text regarding Jones v Berge on 11/7/2001 (R, J A). Modified text on 11/9/2001 (L, T). (Entered: 11/07/2001)
130 Response (Related Motion(s) 129 , 58 ) to Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File New Case Law filed by all defendants. (Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 11/13/2001)
131 Reply (Related Motion(s) 129 ) In Support of Motion to File New Case Law filed by all plaintiffs. (Vasvari, Raymond) Modified text on 11/16/2001 (R, J). (Entered: 11/16/2001)
132 Motion for order to Bar Dr. Stuart Grassian's Testimony at the Trial in this Action filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Anticipated Testimony of Stuart Grassian, M.D.)(Mancini, Joseph) Modified text describing attachment on 11/16/2001 (R, J). (Entered: 11/16/2001)
133 Marginal Order entered on 11/20/01 by Judge James S. Gwin granting plaintiffs' motion for leave to file new case law; Jones et al. v. Berge et al. in support of plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction (Related Doc # 129 ) (A, V) (Entered: 11/20/2001)
134 Order entered on 11/21/01 by Judge James S. Gwin that the Court denies plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction preventing seriously mentally ill inmates from being housed in the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility's J−4 administrative control block and grants the preventing defendants from returning seriously mentally ill inmates to the Ohio State Penitentiary. Defendants are enjoined from returning any of the seriously mentally ill class members to the Ohio State Penitentiary. This preliminary injunction will remain in effect until 2/19/02, approximately a month and a half after the trial on the merits begins on 1/7/02 or until a permanent injunction order replaces the current injunction. After reviewing all of the testimony and evidence, the Court holds that the plaintiffs need not post a security bond. (Related Doc # 58 ) (A, V) (A, V) (Entered: 11/21/2001)

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11/28/2001 11/28/2001 11/29/2001
12/10/2001 12/10/2001 12/18/2001 12/19/2001 12/19/2001 12/24/2001 12/26/2001 12/28/2001 12/28/2001 12/28/2001 12/31/2001 12/31/2001 12/31/2001
12/31/2001

135 Response (Related Motion(s) 132 ) to Defendants' Motion to Bar Dr. Stuart Grassian's Testimony at the Trial in This Action filed by all plaintiffs. (Lynd, Staughton) Modified text deleting duplicate wording on 11/28/2001 (R, J). (Entered: 11/28/2001)
136 Notice of Service of Supplemental Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents upon Defendants' counsel filed by all plaintiffs. (Gilbert, Terry) Modified text adding description on 11/28/2001 (R, J). (Entered: 11/28/2001)
137 Reply (Related Motion(s) 132 ) in Support of Motion to Bar Dr. Stuart Grassian's Testimony at Trial filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Report of Dr. Grassian Submitted in Austin# 2 Exhibit B − Portion of Madrid v. Gomez# 3 Exhibit C − Declaration of Dr. Grassian Submitted in Coleman)(Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 11/29/2001)
138 Motion for extension of time to 12/24/01 to File Pretrial Statement filed by all plaintiffs. (Lynd, Staughton) Modified text adding date on 12/10/2001 (R, J). (Entered: 12/10/2001)
139 Marginal Order entered on 12/10/01 by Judge James S. Gwin granting plaintiff's motion for extension of time until 12/24/01 to file Pretrial Statement (Related Doc # 138 ) (A, V) (Entered: 12/10/2001)
140 Attorney Appearance of Mark Landes and Jeffrey A. Stankunas by Mark Landes filed by on behalf of all defendants. (Document to be re−filed per Attorney Landes) (Landes, Mark) Modified text on 12/19/2001 (R, J). (Entered: 12/18/2001)
141 Amended Attorney Appearance Mark Landes and Jeffrey A. Stankunas by Mark Landes filed by on behalf of all defendants. (Landes, Mark) (Entered: 12/19/2001)
142 Address Change Notice for Jeffrey A. Stankunas by Mark Landes filed by on behalf of all defendants. (Landes, Mark) (Entered: 12/19/2001)
143 Motion for order concerning public trial filed by all plaintiffs. (Lynd, Staughton) (Entered: 12/24/2001)
144 Notice of rescheduling the time of the final pretrial conference. The final pretrial conference is rescheduled to 1/2/02 at 10:00 a.m. (A, V) (Entered: 12/26/2001)
145 Proposed Final Pretrial Order filed by all plaintiffs. (Lynd, Staughton) Modified text on 12/28/2001 (L, T). (Entered: 12/28/2001)
146 Notice of the Filing of Proposed Final Pretrial Order filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Defendants' Final Pretrial Order)(O'Brien, Carol) Modified text on 12/28/2001 (L, T). (Entered: 12/28/2001)
147 Motion to excuse appearance of Defendants at Final Pretrial with Memorandum in Support filed by all defendants. (O'Brien, Carol) Modified text adding memorandum on 12/28/2001 (R, J). (Entered: 12/28/2001)
148 Notice Of Filing Amendments To Exhibit List filed by all defendants. (Related Doc. 146 ) (Landes, Mark) Modified adding document link on 1/4/2002 (R, J). (Entered: 12/31/2001)
149 Trial Brief and Motions in Limine filed by all defendants. (Landes, Mark) (Document inadvertently filed without attachments−−see Doc. #150) Modified text on 1/2/2002 (R, J). (Entered: 12/31/2001)
150 Amended Trial Brief and Motions in Limine regarding past transfers, legitimacy of defendants' prior disciplinary findings and testimony of attorney Jamie Fellner with Proposed Order filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment 1 # 2 Attachment 2 # 3 Attachment 3 # 4 Attachment 4 # 5 Memorandum and Opinion of Judge Nugent # 6 Attachment 6 # 7 Attachment 7)(Landes, Mark) Modified text and describing attachments on 1/2/2002 (R, J). Modified attachment links on 1/4/2002 (P, S). (Entered: 12/31/2001)
151 Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed by all defendants. (Landes, Mark) (Entered: 12/31/2001)

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01/01/2002 01/02/2002 01/02/2002
01/02/2002 01/02/2002 01/02/2002 01/02/2002 01/02/2002 01/02/2002 01/02/2002
01/02/2002
01/02/2002
01/02/2002
01/02/2002

152 Amendment to Proposed Final Pretrial Order filed by all plaintiffs. (Related document(s) 145 ) (Lynd, Alice) Modified text on 1/2/2002 (R, J). (Entered: 01/01/2002)
153 Marginal Entry Order entered on 1/2/02 by Judge James S. Gwin denying defendants' motion to excuse appearance at the final pretrial conference (Related Doc # 147 ) (A, V) (Entered: 01/02/2002)
154 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin The parties are to file by 1/4/02 proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law. The defendant, if they wish, are granted leave until 1/4//02 to supplement their previously filed proposed finding of facts and conclusions of law. The parties are to file amended proposed finding of facts and conclusions of law one week after the close of testimony (A, V) (Entered: 01/02/2002)
155 Response (Related Motion(s) 143 ) Memo Concerning Plaintiffs' Motion for a Public Trial and Motion to Prohibit Plaintiffs' Physical Presence at Trial filed by all defendants. (Landes, Mark) Modified text on 1/3/2002 (R, J). (Entered: 01/02/2002)
156 Marginal Order entered on 1/2/02 by Judge James S. Gwin denying defendants' motion for order to bar Dr. Stuart Grassian's testimony at trial. The plaintiffs are to supplement Dr. Grassian's report by 1/4/02. (Related Doc # 132 ) (A, V) (Entered: 01/02/2002)
157 Marginal Order entered on 1/2/02 by Judge James S. Gwin denying defendants' motion to alter/amend judgment and to dismiss the claims of all class members that are not presently incarcerated at OSP (Related Doc # 122 ) (A, V) (Entered: 01/02/2002)
158 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin that this case is set for trial on 1/7/02 at 8:00 a.m. The Court allocates to plaintiffs and defendants 800 minutes each for the presentation of their respective cases. (A, V) (Entered: 01/02/2002)
159 Minutes of proceedings before Judge James S. Gwin. A final pretrial conference was held on 1/2/02. Court Reporter: none. (A, V) (Entered: 01/02/2002)
160 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 1/2/02 that the ruling on defendants' motion in limine to stop testimony of Jamie Fellner is deferred until the time of trial.(Related document(s) 150 ) (A, V) (Entered: 01/02/2002)
161 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 1/2/02 that the court commands the Warden, of the Ohio State Penitentiary to produce the body of Charles E. Austin, 206−996, to testify as a witness in a bench trial on 1/2/02 at 8:00 a.m. This writ will remain in full force and effect, and shall serve as the document to return the plaintiff to appear before this court on subsequent dates. The original writ was issued by regular mail to the Warden. (Attachments: # 1 Writ)(A, V) (Entered: 01/02/2002)
162 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 1/2/02 that the court commands the Warden, of the Ohio State Penitentiary to produce the body of Stacy Lane, 143−066, to testify as a witness in a bench trial on 1/2/02 at 8:00 a.m. This writ will remain in full force and effect, and shall serve as the document to return the plaintiff to appear before this court on subsequent dates. The original writ was issued by regular mail to the Warden. (Attachments: # 1 Writ of Habeas Corpus)(A, V) (Entered: 01/02/2002)
163 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 1/2/02 that the court commands the Warden, of the Ohio State Penitentiary to produce the body of Kevin Tolliver, 370−500, to testify as a witness in a bench trial on 1/2/02 at 8:00 a.m. This writ will remain in full force and effect, and shall serve as the document to return the plaintiff to appear before this court on subsequent dates. The original writ was issued by regular mail to the Warden. (Attachments: # 1 Writ of Habeas Corpus)(A, V) (Entered: 01/02/2002)
164 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 1/2/02 that the court commands the Warden, of the Ohio State Penitentiary to produce the body of Daryl Heard to testify as a witness in a bench trial on 1/2/02 at 8:00 a.m. This writ will remain in full force and effect, and shall serve as the document to return the plaintiff to appear before this court on subsequent dates. The original writ was issued by regular mail to the Warden. (Attachments: # 1 Writ of Habeas Corpus)(A, V) (Entered: 01/02/2002)
165 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 1/2/02 that the court commands the Warden, of the Ohio State Penitentiary to produce the body of Michael Benge to testify as a witness in a bench trial on 1/2/02 at 8:00 a.m. This writ will remain in full force and

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01/02/2002 01/02/2002 01/02/2002 01/02/2002 01/02/2002 01/02/2002 01/02/2002 01/02/2002 01/02/2002 01/03/2002

effect, and shall serve as the document to return the plaintiff to appear before this court on subsequent dates. The original writ was issued by regular mail to the Warden. (Attachments: # 1 Writ of Habeas Corpus)(A, V) (Entered: 01/02/2002)
166 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 1/2/02 that the court commands the Warden, of the Ohio State Penitentiary to produce the body of James DeJarnette to testify as a witness in a bench trial on 1/2/02 at 8:00 a.m. This writ will remain in full force and effect, and shall serve as the document to return the plaintiff to appear before this court on subsequent dates. The original writ was issued by regular mail to the Warden. (Attachments: # 1 Writ of Habeas Corpus)(A, V) (Entered: 01/02/2002)
167 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 1/2/02 that the court commands the Warden, of the Ohio State Penitentiary to produce the body of Keith Gardner to testify as a witness in a bench trial on 1/2/02 at 8:00 a.m. This writ will remain in full force and effect, and shall serve as the document to return the plaintiff to appear before this court on subsequent dates. The original writ was issued by regular mail to the Warden. (Attachments: # 1 Writ of Habeas Corpus)(A, V) (Entered: 01/02/2002)
168 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 1/2/02 that the court commands the Warden, of the Ohio State Penitentiary to produce the body of Edward Tilley to testify as a witness in a bench trial on 1/2/02 at 8:00 a.m. This writ will remain in full force and effect, and shall serve as the document to return the plaintiff to appear before this court on subsequent dates. The original writ was issued by regular mail to the Warden. (Attachments: # 1 Writ of Habeas Corpus)(A, V) (Entered: 01/02/2002)
169 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 1/2/02 that the court commands the Warden, of the Ohio State Penitentiary to produce the body of David Clark to testify as a witness in a bench trial on 1/2/02 at 8:00 a.m. This writ will remain in full force and effect, and shall serve as the document to return the plaintiff to appear before this court on subsequent dates. The original writ was issued by regular mail to the Warden. (Attachments: # 1 Writ of Habeas Corpus)(A, V) (Entered: 01/02/2002)
170 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 1/2/02 that the court commands the Warden, of the Ohio State Penitentiary to produce the body of Lahray Thompson to testify as a witness in a bench trial on 1/2/02 at 8:00 a.m. This writ will remain in full force and effect, and shall serve as the document to return the plaintiff to appear before this court on subsequent dates. The original writ was issued by regular mail to the Warden. (Attachments: # 1 Writ of Habeas Corpus)(A, V) (Entered: 01/02/2002)
171 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 1/2/02 that the court commands the Warden, of the Ohio State Penitentiary to produce the body of Kevin Roe to testify as a witness in a bench trial on 1/2/02 at 8:00 a.m. This writ will remain in full force and effect, and shall serve as the document to return the plaintiff to appear before this court on subsequent dates. The original writ was issued by regular mail to the Warden. (Attachments: # 1 Writ of Habeas Corpus)(A, V) (Entered: 01/02/2002)
172 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 1/2/02 that the court commands the Warden, of the Ohio State Penitentiary to produce the body of Jason Robb to attend as a party plaintiff in a bench trial on 1/2/02 at 8:00 a.m. This writ will remain in full force and effect, and shall serve as the document to return the plaintiff to appear before this court on subsequent dates. The original writ was issued by regular mail to the Warden. (Attachments: # 1 Writ of Habeas Corpus)(A, V) (Entered: 01/02/2002)
173 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 1/2/02 that the court commands the Warden, of the Ohio State Penitentiary to produce the body of Brian Eskridge to attend as a party plaintiff in a bench trial on 1/2/02 at 8:00 a.m. This writ will remain in full force and effect, and shall serve as the document to return the plaintiff to appear before this court on subsequent dates. The original writ was issued by regular mail to the Warden. (Attachments: # 1 Writ of Habeas Corpus)(A, V) (Entered: 01/02/2002)
174 Objection to proposed settlement and voluntary dismissal per Rule 41(B) on the medical, mental health and outside recreation due to lack of representation for Mr. Perotti with attached memorandum in support filed by John W. Perotti. (R, N) (Entered: 01/03/2002)
175 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 1/3/02 amending Orders entered on 1/2/02 (Document Nos. 161 through 173) to reflect the correct trial date of January 7, 2002.

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01/04/2002 01/07/2002 01/07/2002
01/07/2002 01/07/2002
01/08/2002
01/08/2002
01/09/2002 01/09/2002
01/10/2002
01/10/2002 01/10/2002 01/10/2002 01/10/2002 01/10/2002 01/11/2002 01/14/2002 01/14/2002 01/14/2002

(Related document(s) 165 , 166 , 167 , 168 , 169 , 170 , 161 , 171 , 162 , 172 , 163 , 173 , 164 ) (S, S) (Entered: 01/03/2002)
176 Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed by all plaintiffs. (Lynd, Staughton) (Entered: 01/04/2002)
177 Proposed Stipulation /Protective Order filed by all parties. (R, J) (Entered: 01/07/2002)
178 Deposition of Reginald Wilkinson taken 10/22/01 at 10:05 a.m. with Exhibits (COMPLETE DOCUMENT ON FILE IN CLERK'S OFFICE) (111 pages deposition, 416 pages exhibits) filed by all plaintiffs. (R, J) Modified (typo) on 1/7/2002 (P, S). (Entered: 01/07/2002)
179 Motion for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum to attend the trial in this action filed by John W. Perotti. (R, J) Modified text on 1/7/2002 (R, J). (Entered: 01/07/2002)
180 Minutes of trial proceedings before Judge James S. Gwin on 01/07/02. Plaintiff's case begun and not concluded; testimony taken; trial adjourned until 01/08/02 at 8:00 a.m. Susan Trischan, court reporter. (S, S) Modified text adding court reporter on 1/9/2002 (R, J). (Entered: 01/07/2002)
181 Stipulation & Order for Injunctive Relief resolving all issues, except for the classification/due process issues, between the Plaintiff Class and the Defendants arising out of the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief set forth in the First Amended Complaint, signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 1/8/02. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # (2) Exhibit B, # (3) Exhibit C)(S, S) (Entered: 01/08/2002)
182 Minutes of trial proceedings before Judge James S. Gwin on 1/8/02. Plaintiff's case continued and not concluded; testimony taken; trial adjourned until 01/09/02 at 8:00 a.m. Susan Trischan, court reporter. (S, S) Modified text adding court reporter on 1/9/2002 (R, J). (Entered: 01/08/2002)
183 Objection to any medical, mental health & recreation settlement due to lack of specifics and plaintiffs who still have problems filed by John W. Perotti. (R, J) Modified text to correct filers on 1/10/2002 (L, T). (Entered: 01/09/2002)
184 Minutes of trial proceedings before Judge James S. Gwin on 01/09/02. Plaintiffs' case concluded. Defendants' case begun and not concluded. Testimony taken. Trial adjourned until 01/10/02. Court Reporter: Susan Trischan. (S, S) (Entered: 01/09/2002)
185 Minutes of trial proceedings before Judge James S. Gwin on 1/10/02; Defendants' case continued and concluded. Bench Trial concluded on 1/10/02. Final arguments to be briefed; briefs due 1/25/02, replies due 2/1/01. Court Reporter: Susan Trischan. (S, S) Modified filed date on 1/11/02 (S, S). (Entered: 01/11/2002)
186 Joint Exhibit List filed by all parties. (S, S) (Entered: 01/11/2002)
187 Exhibit List filed by all plaintiffs. (S, S) (Entered: 01/11/2002)
188 Exhibit List of Individual Plaintiffs filed by all plaintiffs. (S, S) (Entered: 01/11/2002)
189 Exhibit List filed by all defendants. (S, S) (Entered: 01/11/2002)
190 List of witnesses that testified during bench trial held before Judge James S. Gwin. (S, S) (Entered: 01/11/2002)
191 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 1/11/02. Final argument briefs due 1/25/02, with replies due 2/1/02. (S, S) (Entered: 01/11/2002)
192 Objection to proposed settlement and voluntary dismissal per Rule 41(b) on the medical, mental health and outside recreation due to lack of representation filed by John W. Perotti. (R, J) (Entered: 01/14/2002)
193 Motion for order to Admit Plaintiffs' Exhibit 3 filed by all plaintiffs. (Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 01/14/2002)
194 Objection by class plaintffs to any medical, mental health and recreation settlement due to lack of specifics and plaintiffs who still have problems filed by John W. Perotti.

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01/14/2002 01/16/2002 01/16/2002 01/16/2002 01/16/2002 01/16/2002 01/16/2002 01/17/2002
01/17/2002 01/17/2002 01/23/2002 01/24/2002 01/24/2002 01/25/2002 01/25/2002

(M, EJ) (Entered: 01/15/2002)
195 Transcript of proceedings had before Honorable James S. Gwin on 1/7/02 (Volume 1); (234 pages). Susan K. Trischan, Court Reporter. Complete document on file in the Clerk's Office. (R, J) (Entered: 01/15/2002)
196 Objection to any medical, mental health and recreation settlement due to lack of specifics and plaintiffs who still have problems. filed by John W. Perotti. (Related document(s) 194 ) (R, J) Modified correcting document link on 1/16/2002 (R, J). (Entered: 01/16/2002)
197 Marginal Order entered on 1/16/02 by Judge James S. Gwin denying as moot plaintiffs' motion for order concerning public trial (Related Doc # 143 ) (A, V) (Entered: 01/16/2002)
198 Marginal Order entered on 1/16/02 by Judge James S. Gwin denying as moot plaintiff John W. Perotti's motion for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum to attend the trial in this action. (Related Doc # 179 ) (A, V) (Entered: 01/16/2002)
201 Transcript of proceedings before Hon. James S. Gwin taken 1/8/02 (Volume 2)(321 pages). Susan Trischan, Court Reporter. Complete document on file in the Clerk's Office. (R, J) (Entered: 01/17/2002)
202 Transcript of proceedings before Hon. James S. Gwin taken 1/9/02 (Volume 3)(308 pages). Susan Trischan, Court Reporter. Complete document on file in the Clerk's Office. (R, J) (Entered: 01/17/2002)
203 Transcript of proceedings before Hon. James S. Gwin taken 1/10/02 (Volume 4) with pages 1074−1134 FILED UNDER SEAL #3095)(269 pages). Susan Trischan, Court Reporter. Complete document, except sealed pages, on file in the Clerk's Office. (R, J) (Entered: 01/17/2002)
199 Marginal Order entered on 1/17/02 by Judge James S. Gwin granting plaintiffs' motion for an order to admit Plaintiffs' exhibit 3, ODRC Policy 501.36, Parole Board Hearing Policy, effective December 22, 2000. An obsolete copy was inadvertantly placed among the exhibits at trial. (Related Doc # 193 ) (Related documents(s) 187 ) (A, V) (Entered: 01/17/2002)
200 Response to Motion by John W. Perotti filed by all plaintiffs. (Related document(s) 192 ) (Lynd, Alice) Modified text deleting duplicate wording on 1/17/2002 (R, J). (Entered: 01/17/2002)
204 Objection to any medical, mental health and recreation settlement due to lack of specifics and class plaintiffs who still have medical problems filed by John W. Perotti. (Related document(s) 194 , 196 ) (R, J) (Entered: 01/17/2002)
205 Objection to any medical, mental health & recreation settlement due to lack of specifics and class plaintiffs who still have medical problems filed by John W. Perotti. (Related document(s) 194 , 196 , 204 ) (R, J) (Entered: 01/23/2002)
206 Objection to any medical, mental health & recreation settlement due to lack of specifics and class members who still have problems filed by John W. Perotti. (Related document(s) 205 , 192 , 194 , 196 , 204 ) (R, J) (Entered: 01/24/2002)
207 Objection to any medical, mental health & recreation settlement due to lack of specifics and plaintiffs who have problems filed by John W. Perotti. (Related Doc. 192 , 194 , 196 , 204 , 205 , 206 ) (R, J) Modified adding document link on 1/25/2002 (R, J). (Entered: 01/24/2002)
208 Final Argument Brief filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Index C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G# 8 Exhibit H# 9 Exhibit I# 10 Exhibit J)(O'Brien, Carol) Modified text on 1/28/2002 (R, J). (Entered: 01/25/2002)
209 Post Trial Brief filed by all plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Castro# 2 Chappell# 3 Giano# 4 Herron# 5 Mapson# 6 Rodgers# 7 Wildberger# 8 Workman)(Lynd, Staughton) Replaced scanned main document with electronically converted document on 1/28/2002 (P, S). (Entered: 01/25/2002)

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01/25/2002 01/31/2002 02/01/2002 02/01/2002 02/07/2002 02/11/2002 02/12/2002
02/13/2002 02/15/2002 02/15/2002 02/19/2002
02/19/2002
02/19/2002
02/25/2002 02/25/2002 02/25/2002 02/25/2002

210 Amended Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed by all plaintiffs. (Related document(s) 176 ) (Lynd, Staughton) Replaced scanned main document with electronically converted document on 1/28/2002 (P, S). (Entered: 01/25/2002)
211 Motion for contempt holding defendants for failure to inform non−named class as to stipulations filed by John W. Perotti. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support# 2 Unnotorized Affidavit of John Perotti# 3 Exhibits)(R, J) (Entered: 01/31/2002)
212 Reply Trial Brief filed by all plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Rodgers)(Related document(s) 208 , 209 , 210 ) (Lynd, Staughton) (Entered: 02/01/2002)
213 Reply Trial Brief filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit K# 2 Exhibit L) (Related Doc. 208 )(Mancini, Joseph) Modified text adding document link on 2/4/2002 (R, J). (Entered: 02/01/2002)
214 Motion for leave to File this Citation of Supplemental Authorities filed by all defendants. (Related document(s) 213 ) (Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 02/07/2002)
215 Supplement to Motion to Hold Defendants in Contempt of Court...filed on 1/31/02 filed by John W. Perotti. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit (unnotorized) of John W. Periotti)(Related document(s) 211 ) (R, J) (Entered: 02/11/2002)
216 Marginal Order entered on 2/12/02 by Judge James S. Gwin granting defendants' motion for leave to note that the case styled Hatch v. District of Columbia,was inadvertently omitted in the Jones v. Baker string of citationson pages 4 and 5 of Defendants Second Post−Trial Brief (Related Doc # 214 ) 213 ) (A, V) (Entered: 02/12/2002)
217 Supplement to Motion to Hold Defendants in Contempt of Court filed 1/31/02 filed by John W. Perotti. (Related document(s) 211 ) (R, J) (Entered: 02/13/2002)
218 Motion for order to remove plaintiff John Perrotti in pending class suit filed by pro se plaintiff Anthony M. Hoepf. (R, J) Modified text on 2/19/02 (A, V). (Entered: 02/15/2002)
219 Motion for order to remove him from SOCF and back to OSP filed by pro se Anthony M. Hoepf. (R, J) (Entered: 02/15/2002)
220 Joint Motion for order to approve the proposed notice to the plaintiff class and the proposed stipulation for injunctive relief filed by Reginald Wilkinson. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum In Support of Motion# 2 Proposed Notice)(A, V) (Entered: 02/19/2002)
221 Marginal Order entered on 2/19/02 by Judge James S. Gwin granting joint motion for order to approve the proposed notice to the plaintiff class and the proposed stipulation for injunctive relief. The notice was approved and filed by the Court on 2/19/02. A fairness hearing is set for 4/5/02 at 8:30 a.m. (Related Doc # 220 ) (A, V) Modified text on 2/20/2002 (R, J). (Entered: 02/19/2002)
222 Legal Notice from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio to all inmates of the plaintiff class of proposed settlement claims. Persons wishing to comment upon the proposed settlement must file a written objection with the Clerk's Office by 3/25/02. A fairness hearing is scheduled for 4/5/02 at 8:30 a.m. The defendants are to provide each member of the plaintiff class with a copy of the proposed Notice and stipulation for injunctive relief. (Related documents(s) 220 ) (A, V) (Entered: 02/19/2002)
223 Objection by Thomas J. Blackmon, inmate, to Settlement of Class Action (Related documents(s) 222 ). (R, J) (Entered: 02/25/2002)
224 Objection by Derrick S. Newmann, inmate, to Settlement of Class Action (Related documents(s) 222 ). (R, J) (Entered: 02/25/2002)
225 Objection by August Cassano, inmate, to Settlement of Class Action (Related documents(s) 222 ). (R, J) (Entered: 02/25/2002)
226 Objection by inmate (no name indicated) to Settlement of Class Action (Related documents(s) 222 ). (R, J) (Entered: 02/25/2002)

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02/25/2002
02/26/2002 02/26/2002 02/26/2002 02/27/2002 02/27/2002 03/01/2002 03/01/2002 03/01/2002 03/04/2002 03/05/2002 03/07/2002 03/07/2002 03/08/2002
03/11/2002 03/11/2002 03/11/2002

227 Opinion and Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 2/25/02 that the Court finds the plaintiff inmates have a liberty interest entitled to constitutional protection. Because of the length of placement in its severely restrictive conditions, incarceration at the OSP imposes an atypical and a significant hardship upon inmates. The defendants have violated the plaintiff class's right to due process by denying the plaintiffs adequate notice, adequate hearing, and sufficiently detailed decisions. Having found that the defendants violated, and will continue to violate, the plaintiffs' constitutionally protected liberty interest, the Court orders the parties to file, within fourteen days of the publication of this judgment, proposed injunctive orders, extending no further than necessary to correct the violation of the federal right set out in this opinion in a way that is the least intrusive means to correct the violation. (A, V) (Entered: 02/25/2002)
228 Objection by Francisco R. Gonzalez, inmate, to Settlement of Class Action (Related documents(s) 222 ). (R, J) (Entered: 02/26/2002)
229 Objection by inmates Ford, William, Feathers and Howell to Settlement of Class Action (Related documents(s) 222 ). (R, J) (Entered: 02/26/2002)
230 Objection by Richard Troy Warren, inmate, to Settlement of Class Action (Related documents(s) 222 ). (R, J) (Entered: 02/26/2002)
231 Objection by Don Saffell, inmate, to the Proposed Stipulation for Injunctive Relief (Related documents(s) 222 ). (R, J) (Entered: 02/27/2002)
232 Objection by August Cassano, inmate, to the Proposed Stipulation for Injunctive Relief (Related documents(s) 222 ). (R, J) (Entered: 02/27/2002)
233 Objection by David Easley, inmate, to Proposed Stipulation for Injunctive Relief (Related documents(s) 222 ). (R, J) (Entered: 03/01/2002)
234 Motion for preliminary injunction restraining order filed by pro se Dave Easley. (R, J) (Entered: 03/01/2002)
235 Motion for leave to File a Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs on or Before April 1, 2002 filed by all plaintiffs. (Vasvari, Raymond) (Entered: 03/01/2002)
236 Objection by Derrick Newmann, inmate, to Proposed Stipulation for Injunctive Relief (Attachments: # 1 Attachment 1) (Related documents(s) 222 ). (R, J) (Entered: 03/04/2002)
237 Objections by Mr. Hatcher, inmate, to the Proposed Stipulation for Injunctive Relief (Related documents(s) 222 ). (R, J) (Entered: 03/05/2002)
238 Objection by Herr Dennis P. Tuck, inmate, to the proposed stipulation for injunctive relief (Related documents(s) 222 ). (R, J) (Entered: 03/07/2002)
239 Marginal Order signed on 3/7/02 by Judge James S. Gwin granting plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a motion for attorney fees and costs on or before4/1/02 (Related Doc # 235 ) (A, V) (Entered: 03/07/2002)
240 Proposed Injunctive Order filed by all plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment 1)(Related document(s) 227 ) (Lynd, Staughton) (Judge Gwin's signature removed from document and document added as main document on 3/11/02) Modified text describing attachment on 3/11/2002 (R, J). Modified text removing words Notice of Filing on 3/11/2002 (P, S). (Entered: 03/08/2002)
241 Objections by Derrick Newmann, inmate, to the Proposed Stipulation for Injunctive Relief (Related documents(s) 222 ). (R, J) (Entered: 03/11/2002)
242 Notice of Filing of Defendants' Proposed Injunctive Order filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Related document(s) 227 ) (Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 03/11/2002)
243 Plaintiff Siggers proposed injunctive order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Letter to Congressman Stokes dated 9/25/98# (2) Exhibit B, Decision of the Chief Inspector on a Grievance Appeal 3/22/99# (3) Exhibit C, Disposition of the Rules Infraction Board 9/9/98) (M, P) (Entered: 03/11/2002)

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03/12/2002 03/13/2002 03/14/2002 03/14/2002 03/14/2002 03/15/2002 03/18/2002
03/20/2002
03/20/2002 03/21/2002 03/21/2002 03/21/2002 03/22/2002 03/25/2002 03/25/2002 03/25/2002 03/26/2002
03/26/2002

244 Objections by inmate Hosea Strickland to the Proprosed Stipulations for Injunctive Relief. (S, T) (Entered: 03/12/2002)
245 Notice of Proposed Injunctive Order filed by David Easley. (Related document(s) 222 ) (R, J) (Entered: 03/13/2002)
246 Objection by Eric Richardson, inmate, to Settlement of Class Action (Related documents(s) 222 ). (R, J) (Entered: 03/14/2002)
247 Objection by Dalton M. Bordeaux, to the Proposed Stipulation for Injunctive Relief (Related documents(s) 222 ). (R, J) (Entered: 03/14/2002)
248 Objection by Michael Smith, inmate, for injunctive relief (Related documents(s) 222 ). (R, J) (Entered: 03/14/2002)
249 Objection by Brian Vidrine, inmate, to the Proposed Stipulation for Injunctive Relief (Related documents(s) 222 ). (R, J) (Entered: 03/15/2002)
250 Memorandum In Support (Related Motion(s) 234 , 47 ) of Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order & Preliminary Injunction filed by Raymond Mefford. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration# 2 Proposed Order)(R, J) Modified adding document link on 3/18/2002 (R, J). (Entered: 03/18/2002)
251 Objection by Richard Siggers, inmate, to the Proposed Stipulation for Injunctive Relief. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Case Law Cites) (Related documents(s) 222 ) (R, J) Modified text to correct misspelling on 3/20/2002 (L, T). (Entered: 03/20/2002)
252 Objection by George Edward Redmond, inmate, to the Proposed Stipulation for Injunctive Relief. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibits) (Related documents(s) 222 ) (R, J) (Entered: 03/21/2002)
253 Objection by Darryl R. Caldwell, inmate, to the Proposed Stipulation for Injunctive Relief (Related documents(s) 222 ). (R, J) Modified on 3/22/2002 changing document link from 122 to 222 (P, S). (Entered: 03/21/2002)
254 Objection by Michael Smith, inmate, to the Proposed Stipulation for Injunctive Relief (Related documents(s) 222 ) (P, S) (Entered: 03/22/2002)
255 Objection by Orlando Powell, inmate, to the Proposed Stipulation for Injunctive Relief (Related documents(s) 222 ) (P, S) (Entered: 03/22/2002)
256 Objection by Dewey Dickey, inmate, to the Proposed Stipulation for Injunctive Relief. (Related documents(s) 222 ) (L, T) (Entered: 03/22/2002)
257 Objection by Starlin Hargrove, inmate, to the Proposed Stipulation for Injunctive Relief. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibits) (Related documents(s) 222 ) (R, J) (Entered: 03/25/2002)
258 Objection by Anthony M. Hoepf, inmate to the Proposed Stipulation for Injunctive Relief/Motion in part to return this inmate to Ohio State Penitentiary. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibits) (Related documents(s) 219 , 222 ) (R, J) (Entered: 03/25/2002)
261 Objection by Kevin D. Tolliver, inmate, to Settlement of Class Action/request for opinion of evidence. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibits) (Related documents(s) 222 ) (R, J) (Entered: 03/26/2002)
259 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 3/26/02 previously the Court held that the defendants violated the plaintiff class's right to due process by denying the plaintiffs adequate notice, adequate hearings, and sufficiently detailed decisions concerning their placement at the OSP. Because the defendants have violated the plaintiffs' constitutionally protected liberty interest, the Court orders the least intrusive means to correct the violation. The Court will retain jurisdiction over this matter for the purpose of enforcement. This injunction shall terminate in two years upon the motion of either party unless the Court finds that prospective relief is needed to correct an ongoing violation of a federal right. (A, V) (Entered: 03/26/2002)
260 Judgment signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 3/26/02 that the Court has issued its injunctive order in the case. The defendants will submit proposed changes to Policy 111−07 in accordance with that order within thirty days for approval by the Court.

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04/01/2002
04/05/2002 04/05/2002
04/05/2002 04/12/2002 04/15/2002 04/17/2002 04/18/2002 04/23/2002 04/23/2002 04/24/2002 04/26/2002 04/29/2002

This action is terminated under Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.(A, V) (Entered: 03/26/2002)
262 Motion for attorney fees and costs by Raymond V. Vasvari Jr. filed by on behalf of all plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Brief in Support Memorandum of Law# 2 Exhibit AL−0 A Lynd Declaration# 3 Exhibit AL−1 A Lynd Time Record# 4 Exhibit AL−2 Cullen Affidavit# 5 Exhibit AL−3 Phone Bills# 6 Exhibit JL−0 Lobel Declaration# 7 Exhibit JL−1 Lobel CV# 8 Exhibit JL−2 Lobel Hotel Receipts# 9 Exhibit JL−3 Lobel Time# 10 Exhibit RV−0 Vasvari Declaration# 11 Exhibit RV−1 Vasvari Hours# 12 Exhibit RV−2 ACLU and Vasvari Costs# 13 Exhibit RV−3 Carlin Declaration# 14 Exhibit SL−0 Staugton Lynd Declaration# 15 Exhibit SL−1 Tims Affidavit# 16 Exhibit SL−2 Staughton Lynd Time# 17 Exhibit TG−0 Gilbert Affidavit# 18 Exhibit TG−1 Gilbert Time)(Vasvari, Raymond) Modified adding text and deleting party type on 4/2/2002 (R, J). (Entered: 04/01/2002)
263 Minutes of proceedings before Judge James S. Gwin. Fairness hearing held on 4/5/02. Court Reporter: Sue Trischan. (A, V) (Entered: 04/05/2002)
264 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 4/5/02 that the settlement agreement is approved and confirmed as being fair, reasonable, and adequate. The parties are directed to perform the settlement agreement in accordance with its terms.All claims for equitable relief against the settling defendants by anyone who might fall within the Class are forever barred. The Court retains jurisdiction over the settlement of this case and may enter additional orders to effectuate the fair and orderly administration of the settlement and the Court's judgment as may from time to time be appropriate. (A, V) Modified text correcting typographical error on 4/8/2002 (R, J). (Entered: 04/05/2002)
265 Stipulation & Order for Injunctive Relief signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 4/5/02. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# (2) Exhibit B# (3) Exhibit C)(Related document(s) 181 ) (A, V) (Entered: 04/05/2002)
266 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin referring plaintiff's motion for attorney fees and costs to Magistrate Judge George J. Limbert for a report and recommended decision. Related Doc. 262 (A, V) Modified document link on 4/12/2002 (R, J). (Entered: 04/12/2002)
267 Response (Related Motion(s) 262 ) Memorandum Contra Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs filed by Reginald Wilkinson. (Landes, Mark) Modified text deleting duplicate party type on 4/16/2002 (R, J). (Entered: 04/15/2002)
268 Notice of Appeal to the USCA for the 6th Circuit from opinion and judgment dated March 26, 2002 filed by all defendants. (Marti, Todd) (Related Doc. 259 & 260 )Fee paid, receipt #512282. Modified text removing "interlocutory" and adding document link on 4/17/2002 (R, J). Modified text on 4/18/2002 (K, Chr). (Entered: 04/17/2002)
269 Joint Motion to stay Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs filed by all plaintiffs and Reginald Wilkinson. (Related document(s) 262 ) (Landes, Mark) Modified text adding all plaintiffs on 4/19/2002 (R, J). (Entered: 04/18/2002)
270 Marginal Order signed on 4/23/02 by Judge James S. Gwin granting joint motion for stay of plaintiffs' motion for attorney fees and costs until this case has been resolved on appeal. Order referring motion for attorney fees to Magistrate Judge Limbert is vacated. (Related Doc # 269 , 266 ) (A, V) (Entered: 04/23/2002)
271 Marginal Order signed on 4/23/02 by Judge James S. Gwin denying as moot plaintiffs' motion for attorney fees and costs. Plaintiffs are to refile motions for attorney fees and costs after this case has been resolved on appeal. (Related Doc # 262 ) (A, V) Modified text on 4/23/2002 (R, J). (Entered: 04/23/2002)
272 Notice of Filing of Defendants' Proposed Changes to Policy 111−07 filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Defendants' Proposed Changes to Policy 111−07)(Related document(s) 260 ) (O'Brien, Carol) (Entered: 04/24/2002)
273 Motion for reconsideration filed by pro se Derrick Scott Newmann. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibits)(R, J) (Entered: 04/26/2002)
274 Acknowledgment from the USCA for Sixth Circuit of receipt of notice of appeal. USCA #02−3429. Filed 4/19/02. (Related documents(s) 268 ) (K, Chr) Modified text

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05/01/2002 05/03/2002 05/06/2002 05/06/2002
05/08/2002
05/13/2002 05/13/2002 05/13/2002 05/13/2002 05/15/2002 05/21/2002 05/21/2002 05/24/2002 05/28/2002

adding filing date of USCA on 4/29/2002 (R, J). (Entered: 04/29/2002)
275 Cross Notice of Appeal to the USCA for the 6th Circuit of memorandum, opinion and judgment filed 3/26/02. Fee not paid filed by John W. Perotti. (Related document(s) 259 , 260 ) (K, Chr) (Entered: 05/02/2002)
276 Response to Defendants' Proposed Changes to Policy 111−07 filed by all plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A through P)(Related document(s) 272 ) (Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 05/03/2002)
277 Motion to strike Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Proposed Changes to Policy 111−07 filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support)(Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 05/06/2002)
278 Motion for leave to File Motion for an Expedited Ruling on Defendants' Proposed Changes to Policy 111−07 filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support# 2 Defendants' Motion for an Expedited Ruling on Their Proposed Changes to Policy 111−07# 3 Affidavit of Bernard Ryznar)(Related document(s) 272 ) (Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 05/06/2002)
279 Order signed on 5/8/02 by Judge James S. Gwin that the Court denies defendants' motion to strike. The defendants have until 5/13/02 to file a reply to the plaintiffs' response. The Court denies the defendants' motion for leave to file a motion for an expedited ruling, the Court is aware of the defendants' position that a quick decision is desired. The Court will consider the defendants' reply as soon as it is filed. (Related Doc # 277 , 278 ) (A, V) (Entered: 05/08/2002)
280 Marginal Order signed on 5/13/02 by Judge James S. Gwin denying motion of Derrick Newmann for reconsideration (Related Doc # 273 ) (A, V) (Entered: 05/13/2002)
281 Reply to Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Proposed Changes to Policy 111−07 filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Affidavit of Bernard Ryznar)(Related document(s) 272 ) (Mancini, Joseph) Modified text and correcting document link on 5/14/2002 (R, J). (Entered: 05/13/2002)
282 Acknowledgment from the USCA for Sixth Circuit of receipt of notice of cross appeal. Filed 5/10/02; USCA #02−3524. (Related documents(s) 275 ) (K, Chr) (Entered: 05/14/2002)
283 Order from the USCA for the Sixth Circuit placing the appeal in abeyance until the District Court issues the proper McGore notice. USCA #02−3524; Filed 5/10/02. (Related documents(s) 275 ) (K, Chr) (Entered: 05/14/2002)
284 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 5/15/02 that having reviewed the defendants' proposed policy 111−07, the plaintiffs' response to the policy, and the defendants' reply, the Court adopts the defendants' 4/24/02 proposed policy with the changes contained within this order. (Related document(s) 272 ) (A, V) (Entered: 05/15/2002)
285 Motion for appointment of counsel filed by pro se John W. Perotti. (R, J) (Entered: 05/21/2002)
286 Marginal Order signed on 5/21/02 by Judge James S. Gwin denying plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel. (Related Doc # 285 ) (A, V) (Entered: 05/21/2002)
287 Motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal filed by pro se John W. Perotti. (Attachments: # 1 Cashiers statement# 2 Application# 3 Prison Statement)(Related document(s) 275 ) (K, Chr) Modified text on 5/30/02. Motion moot per order filed on 5/28/02 (A, V). (Entered: 05/28/2002)
288 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 5/28/02. Plaintiff notified to pay full filing fee or file attached Financial Application within 30 days. Failure to do so may result in dismissal of the appeal for want of prosecution by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and assessment of the filing fee by this Court. If the appeal is dismissed for want of prosecution, it will not be reinstated despite payment of the full filing fee or subsequent correction of the deficiency. (Related Doc. 287 ). (Attachments: # 1 Financial application for appeal)(M, G) Modified on 5/30/2002 to note related document. (M, G). (Entered: 05/28/2002)

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05/29/2002
05/30/2002 06/03/2002 06/05/2002 06/06/2002 06/06/2002 06/06/2002 06/10/2002 06/11/2002 06/11/2002 06/13/2002 06/17/2002
06/21/2002
06/24/2002

289 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin that while plaintiff has furnished a trust account statement, this information is not sufficient. The plaintiff is still required to submit a signed Affidavit of Prisoner and Request for Certified Account Statement and Acknowledgment of Understanding. If the plaintiff does not pay the full filing fee or file a complete Financial Application within 30 days, the Court of Appeals may dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution and this court will assess the filing fee. (A, V) (Entered: 05/29/2002)
290 Objection to Forms Pertaining to Policy 111−07 filed by all plaintiffs. (Related document(s) 284 ) (Lynd, Alice) Modified text on 6/4/2002 (R, J). (Entered: 05/30/2002)
291 Response to Plaintiffs' Objections to Forms Pertaining to Policy 111−07 filed by all defendants. (Related Doc. 284 , 290 ) (Mancini, Joseph) Modified adding document links on 6/4/2002 (R, J). (Entered: 06/03/2002)
292 Letter to the Court dated 5/31/02 regarding status of case filed by pro se John W. Perotti. (K, Chr) (Entered: 06/06/2002)
293 Motion for partial relief from judgments filed 2/25/02, 3/26/02 & 5/15/02 with Memorandum in Support filed by all defendants. (Related document(s) 259 , 227 , 260 , 284 ) (Marti, Todd) Modified text adding further description and memorandum on 6/7/2002 (R, J). (Entered: 06/06/2002)
294 Notice of Manual Filing of Exhibit to Motion for Partial Relief from Judgments filed by all defendants. (Related document(s) 293 ) (See Document #294) (Marti, Todd) Modified text adding further description on 6/7/2002 (R, J). Modified text to reference filing of exhibit on 6/10/2002 (R, J). (Entered: 06/06/2002)
295 Motion for extension of time until 7/15/02 to file notice of appeal with Memorandum in Support filed by all defendants. (Related document(s) 284 ) (Marti, Todd) Modified text adding date and memorandum on 6/7/2002 (R, J). (Entered: 06/06/2002)
296 Exhibits to the Motion for Partial Relief from Judgments filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Affidavit of Matthew Meyer# 2 Investigation Summary dated 10/31/00)(Related document(s) 294 , 293 ) (R, J) (Entered: 06/10/2002)
297 Marginal order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 6/11/02 granting defendants' motion for extension of time. Notice of appeal to be filed by 7/15/02. (Related Doc # 295 ) (M, G) Modified text on 6/12/2002 (R, J). (Entered: 06/11/2002)
300 Amended Notice of Appeal to the USCA for the 6th Circuit of order filed 3/26/02 and order filed 4/5/02. Fee not paid filed by pro se John W. Perotti. (Related document(s) 264 , 259 ) (K, Chr) (Entered: 06/17/2002)
299 Motion for order to file amended notice of appeal filed by pro se John W. Perotti. (K, Chr) (Entered: 06/17/2002)
298 Response (Related Motion(s) 293 ) to Defendants' Motion for Partial Relief from Judgments filed by all plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Barefield Affidavit# 2 Roe Declaration# 3 Favors Offender Data# 4 Olander Hudson Offender Data# 5 Were Offender Data# 6 Roper Offender Data# 7 Vaughn Offender Data# 8 Robb Declaration# 9 Snow Offender Data)(Lynd, Staughton) (Entered: 06/17/2002)
301 Motion for extension of time to 6/28/02 to reply to Plaintiffs' memorandum in opposition to motion for partial relief from judgment with Memorandum in Support filed by all defendants. (Related document(s) 293 , 298 ) (Marti, Todd) Modified text adding date and memorandum on 6/24/2002 (R, J). Added document link on 6/24/2002 (M, J). (Entered: 06/21/2002)
302 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 6/24/02. Plaintiff John Perotti's request for permission to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal is granted. The total fee due for this appeal is $105.00. Initial partial fee in the amount of $22.73 is due and should be deducted from plaintiff's prisoner account, when funds are available therein, until the initial partial fee is paid in full. Thereafter the prison cashier's office shall deduct and forward to the Court 20% of the preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's account each time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00. Said funds shall be forwarded to the Court until the full fee has been paid. Copy of Order mailed to Ohio

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 51 of 86

06/24/2002 06/28/2002 06/28/2002 07/01/2002 07/01/2002 07/01/2002 07/01/2002 07/08/2002 07/11/2002 07/12/2002 07/12/2002
07/12/2002 07/15/2002 07/16/2002 07/16/2002

State Penitentiary, Prison Cashier's Office. (Related document(s) 287 , 288 , 289 ) (M, G) (Entered: 06/24/2002)
303 Marginal Order signed by Judge Jame S. Gwin on 6/24/02 granting defendants' motion for extension of time to file reply supporting motion for partial relief from judgment. Defendants' reply due 6/28/02.(Related Doc # 301 ) (M, G) (Entered: 06/24/2002)
304 Reply (Related Motion(s) 293 ) to Plaintiffs' Memorandum in opposition to Defendants' motion for partial releif from judgment filed by all defendants. (Marti, Todd) Modified text on 7/1/2002 (P, S). (Entered: 06/28/2002)
305 Notice of manual filing of Exhibits to Reply to Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Partial Relief from Judgment filed by all defendants. (Related document(s) 304 ) (Marti, Todd) Modified text on 7/1/2002 (P, S). (Entered: 06/28/2002)
306 Exhibits to the reply to plaintiff's response to defendant's motion for partial relief from judgment, filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit B# 2 Exhibit C)(Related document(s) 293 , 304 , 305 , 298 ) (M, J) (Entered: 07/01/2002)
307 Motion for extension of time to Complete Court Ordered Classfication Review Proceedings filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support)(Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 07/01/2002)
308 Acknowledgment from the USCA for Sixth Circuit of receipt of Notice of Appeal (Related documents(s) 300 ). Case No. 02−3713. Filed 6/26/02. (R, J) (Entered: 07/02/2002)
309 Letter regarding appeal fee filed by pro se John W. Perotti. (H, S P) (Entered: 07/09/2002)
Appeal fee paid on 7/8/02. Receipt #512589. (Related documents(s) 275 ) (K, Chr) (Entered: 07/16/2002)
310 Response (Related Motion(s) 307 ) to Defendants' Motion to Extend the Time within which to Complete the Court Ordered Classification Review Proceedings filed by all plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Plaintiff Keith Gardner)(Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 07/11/2002)
311 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 7/12/02 denying defendants' motion seeking partial relief from judgment. (Related Doc # 293 ) (M, G) (Entered: 07/12/2002)
312 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 7/12/02. The Court partially grants the defendants' motion for an extension of time. The defendants have until September 11, 2002, to complete the ordered classification reviews. In addition, all reductions to level 4B within the time extension shall be considered to have occurred on July 10, 2002, the original deadline set by the Court. All parties are still required to observe the procedural time limits for notice, appeals, and reviews set forth in the policy adopted by the Court on May 15, 2002. (Related document(s) 290 , 291 , 307 ) (M, G) Modified adding document link on 7/15/02. (M, G). (Entered: 07/12/2002)
313 Notice of Appeal to the USCA for the 6th Circuit from orders of May 15, 2002 (Doc. No. 284 ) and July 12, 2002 ( Doc. No. 311 ) filed by all defendants. Fee not paid. (Related document(s) 311 ) (Marti, Todd) Modified text on 7/18/2002 (K, Chr). (Entered: 07/12/2002)
Appeal fee paid on 7/15/02. Receipt #512636. (Related documents(s) 313 ) (K, Chr) (Entered: 07/18/2002)
314 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 7/16/02 denying motion by John W. Perotti for order to file amended notice of appeal. (Related Doc # 299 ) (M, G) (Entered: 07/16/2002)
315 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 7/16/02 denying plaintiff's request to vacate the Court's 6/24/02 assessment order. The Clerk of Court is directed to refund to plaintiff the $105.00 lump sum payment of his appeals fee if that lump sum has been or is received by the Court. Refund to be sent to Attn: John W. Perotti, #167−712, Ohio State Prison (OSP), P. O. Box 1430, Youngstown, Ohio 44501. (Related document(s) 309 ) (M, G) (Entered: 07/16/2002)

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 52 of 86

07/22/2002 07/22/2002 07/22/2002 07/22/2002 07/24/2002
07/24/2002 07/26/2002 07/30/2002 08/05/2002 08/05/2002 08/07/2002 08/21/2002 09/09/2002 09/11/2002 09/11/2002 09/11/2002

Financial Transaction Partial Payment of $22.73 was made by John Perotti on 7/22/02. Receipt NO. 635586. (B, R) (Entered: 07/22/2002)
316 Motion for order to be reimbursed $22.73 withdrawn from prison account and applied to appeal fee filed by pro se John W. Perotti. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment)(K, Chr) (Entered: 07/22/2002)
317 Returned Mail addressed to Anthony M. Hoepf marked "refused" (Related documents(s) 314 , 315 ). (R, J) (Entered: 07/23/2002)
320 Notice of Appeal to the USCA for the 6th Circuit of order filed 6/24/02 (Document # 302 ). Fee not paid filed by pro se John W. Perotti. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment)(K, Chr) (Entered: 07/25/2002)
318 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 7/24/02. Plaintiff is to pay the full fee of $105 if funds to pay same exist in his prisoner account. If plaintiff does not have funds in the account to pay the entire fee at once, he is to complete and submit the accompanying Financial Application for Appeal within 30 days of the date of this Order. Plaintiff is notified that if he does not pay the full filing fee or file the Financial Application within 30 days, the Court of Appeals may dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution. (Attachment: #1 Financial Application) (M, G) (Entered: 07/24/2002)
319 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 7/24/02 denying motion for request for reimbursement by plaintiff, John Perotti. (Attachment: #1 Instructions for Payment of Prisoner Filing Fee and Subsequent Installments) (Related Doc # 316 ) (M, G) (Entered: 07/24/2002)
Financial Transaction Partial Payment of $82.27 was made on 7/26/02. Receipt No. 635716. (B, R) (Entered: 07/29/2002)
321 Motion to enforce order filed 7/16/02 regarding reimbursement of $105.00 appeal fee filed by pro se John W. Perotti. (Related document(s) 315 ) (K, Chr) (Entered: 08/01/2002)
322 Motion to enforce the July 16, 2002 order of reimbursement filed by pro se John W. Perotti. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B)(Related document(s) 315 ) (M, EJ) (Entered: 08/05/2002)
323 Acknowledgment from the USCA for Sixth Circuit of receipt of notice of appeal. USCA #02−3816; Filed 7/25/02. (Related documents(s) 313 ) (K, Chr) (Entered: 08/05/2002)
324 Address Change Notice for Dave Easley (address change noted) filed by pro se Dave Easley. (R, J) (Entered: 08/07/2002)
325 True copy of order from the USCA for the Sixth Circuit that upon consideration of appellant's motion to voluntarily dismiss the appeal, motion granted and appeal dismissed. Filed 8/19/02; Clerk: Green; USCA #02−3713. (Related documents(s) 300 ) (K, Chr) (Entered: 08/21/2002)
326 Second Motion to vacate Court's Order of 6/24/2002 regarding filing fee, filed by pro se John W. Perotti. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit B# 2 Exhibit C# 3 Exhibit D)(Related document(s) 302 , 318 , 321 ) (M, J) (Entered: 09/09/2002)
327 Second Motion for extension of time to 9/30/02 to Complete the Court Ordered Classification Review Proceedings filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support)(Related document(s) 312 ) (Mancini, Joseph) Modified text adding date on 9/12/2002 (R, J). (Entered: 09/11/2002)
328 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 9/11/02 denying plaintiff's second motion to vacate Court's order of 6/24/02 assessing costs and to refund money assessed. Copy of instant order mailed to plaintiff, prison cashier's office, court financial office and U.S. Court of Appeals for Sixth Circuit. (Related Doc # 326 ) (M, G) (Entered: 09/11/2002)
329 Marginal Order signed by Judge Jams S. Gwin on 9/11/02 denying as moot plaintiff's motion to enforce Court's order of 7/16/02. (Related Doc # 321 ) (M, G) (Entered: 09/11/2002)

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 53 of 86

09/11/2002 09/16/2002 09/30/2002 10/03/2002 10/07/2002
10/16/2002 10/16/2002 10/17/2002 10/17/2002 10/17/2002
10/18/2002
10/18/2002

330 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 9/11/02 denying as moot plaintiff's motion to enforce the Court's order of 7/16/02.(Related Doc # 322 ) (M, G) (Entered: 09/11/2002)
Partial payment of $82.27 by John Perotti. Receipt #636813. (W, Jo) (Entered: 09/18/2002)
331 Cashier's Statement and Affidavit of Indigency filed by pro se Anthony M. Hoepf. (M, P) Modified on 9/30/2002 to correct text (M, P). (Entered: 09/30/2002)
332 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 10/3/02 granting defendants' second motion for extension of time to 9/30/02 to complete court ordered classification review proceedings. (Related Doc # 327 ) (M, G) (Entered: 10/03/2002)
333 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 10/7/02. The filing fee of $105.00 is assessed against plaintiff. The prison cashier's office shall deduct, and forward to to the Court, 20% of the preceding month's income credited to the prisioner's account each time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00 until the full fee has been paid. Further, the Clerk's Office is advised that no partial payments of the filing fee for this appeal will be accepted from any party other than the correctional facility in which plaintiff is incarcerated. Therefore, any partial payments received to date from sources other than the prison cashier as payment of the filing fee for either appeal in this case, shall be reimbursed to: Attn: John W. Perotti, #167−712, Ohio State Penitentiary, P. O. Box 1430, Youngstown, Ohio 44501. A copy of this Order has been issued to the plaintiff, the prison cashier's office and the Court's financial office. (Related document(s) 318 ) (M, G) (Entered: 10/07/2002)
334 Notice of Appeal to the USCA for the 6th Circuit of order filed 10/7/02. Fee not paid filed by pro se John W. Perotti. (Related document(s) 333 ) (K, Chr) (Entered: 10/17/2002)
335 Letter to the Court regarding filing fees for appeal of 10/9/02 filed by pro se John W. Perotti. (K, Chr) (Entered: 10/17/2002)
336 Motion for reconsideration of Court's order filed by pro se Eugene Groves. (Attachments: # 1 Miscellaneous documents)(Related document(s) 264 ) (L, T) (Entered: 10/17/2002)
337 Supplement to motion for reconsideration of Court's order filed by pro se Eugene Groves. (Related document(s) 264 , 336 ) (L, T) (Entered: 10/17/2002)
338 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 10/17/02. The Court will treat the motion for reconsideration and supplement thereto of Eugene Groves as a motion to enforce the settlement entered in this case on 4/5/02. The response of the Classification Committee and/or Warden and/or Chief of Classification at the Ohio State Penitentiary shall be filed within fourteen days of the entry of this Order. A copy of this Order has been sent by regular U.S. mail to the Office of the Warden, Ohio State Penitentiary, 878 Coitsville−Hubbard Road, Youngstown, Ohio 44505. (Related document(s) 264 , 336 , 337 ) (M, G) (Entered: 10/17/2002)
339 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 10/18/02. Plaintiff is to pay the full fee of $105 if funds to pay it exist in his prisoner account. If plaintiff does not have funds in the account to pay the entire fee at once, he is to complete and submit the accompanying Financial Application for Appeal within 30 days of the date of this Order. Plaintiff is notified that if he does not pay the full filing fee or file the Financial Application within 30 days, the Court of Appeals may dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution. (Attachments: # 1 Financial Application)(M, G) (Entered: 10/18/2002)
340 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 10/18/02. The Court will treat the motion for reconsideration and supplement thereto of Eugene Groves as a motion to enforce the Court's Order of 5/15/02. The response of the Classification Committee and/or Warden an/or Chief of Classification at the Ohio State Penitentiary shall be filed within fourteen days of the entry of this Order. A copy of this Order has been sent by regular U.S. mail to the Office of the Warden, Ohio State Penitentiary, 878 Coitsville−Hubbard Road, Youngstown, Ohio 44505. (Related document(s) 337 , 338 , 284 , 336 ) (M, G) (Entered: 10/18/2002)

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 54 of 86

10/24/2002 10/25/2002 10/31/2002 11/01/2002
11/01/2002 11/04/2002 11/05/2002 11/12/2002 11/15/2002
11/18/2002 11/21/2002 11/21/2002 11/27/2002
12/09/2002 12/09/2002

341 Returned Mail addressed to Derrick Scott Newmann marked "Not Deliverable As Addressed − Unable To Forward (Related documents(s) 340 ). (M, J) (Entered: 10/24/2002)
342 Motion to alter/amend judgment ordering a third appeal fee filed 10/18/02 filed by pro se John W. Perotti. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in support)(Related document(s) 339 ) (K, Chr) (Entered: 10/28/2002)
343 Response to Inmate Eugene Groves' Filing of Classification Appeal filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Report on Inmate Eugene Groves)(Related document(s) 340 ) (Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 10/31/2002)
344 Motion for order for time to reply until 11/15/02 to inmate Eugene Groves' classification appeal with Memorandum in Support filed by all plaintiffs. (Related document(s) 337 , 338 , 343 , 340 , 284 , 336 ) (Lynd, Alice) Modified text deleting all capital letters, adding date and further description on 11/4/2002 (R, J). (Entered: 11/01/2002)
345 Returned Mail addressed to Derrick Scott Newmann marked "Return to Sender" (Related documents(s) 336 ). (R, J) (Entered: 11/04/2002)
346 Acknowledgment from the USCA for Sixth Circuit of receipt of notice of appeal. USCA #02−4222; Filed 10/29/02. (Related documents(s) 334 ) (K, Chr) (Entered: 11/05/2002)
347 Order signed on 11/5/02 by Judge James S. Gwin denying motion by John W. Perotti to alter/amend judgment. (Related Doc # 342 ) (M, G) (Entered: 11/05/2002)
348 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 11/12/02 granting plaintiffs' motion for time to reply. Reply re: filing of classification appeal by Eugene Groves, Inmate, to be filed by 11/15/02. (Related Doc # 344 ) (M, G) (Entered: 11/12/2002)
349 Reply (Related Motion(s) 336 ) to Defendants' Response to Prisoner Eugene Groves' Filing of Classification Appeal filed by all plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 # 2 Exhibit 1−SupervisionReviewForm# 3 Exhibit 2−HighMaxClassnReview# 4 Exhibit 3−SecurityLevelReview# 5 Exhibit 4−NoticeOfHearing# 6 Exhibit 5−SummaryOfInmate'sInfo# 7 Exhibit 6−NoticeOfAppeal&Kite# 8 Exhibit 7−Kite−6−16−02# 9 Exhibit Receipt# 10 Exhibit 9−Fax−7−26−02# 11 Exhibit 10−Decision−7−26−02# 12 Exhibit 11−LetterFromChief−8−6−02# 13 Exhibit 12−Fax−8−20−02)(Lynd, Staughton) (Entered: 11/15/2002)
350 Motion for leave to File a Response to Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Response to Prisoner Eugene Groves' Filing of Classification Appeal filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support)(Related document(s) 349 ) (Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 11/18/2002)
351 Marginal Order signed on 11/21/02 by Judge James S. Gwin granting defendants' motion for leave to file sur−reply. Defendants' sur−reply shall be filed by 12/9/02. (Related Doc # 350 ) (M, G) (Entered: 11/21/2002)
352 Financial application by John Perotti (Attachments: # 1 Account Statement) (Related documents(s) 339 ) (H, S P) (Entered: 11/22/2002)
353 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 11/27/02 assessing plaintiff the amount of $105.00 for the filing fee of his third appeal(# 334 ) in this case. The prison cashier's office shall deduct and forward to the court 20% of the preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's account each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 until the full fee has been paid. The prison cashier's office shall not send payments aggregating more than the amount of the full fee. Copy of this order issued to plaintiff, prison cashier's office, and court financial office. (Related document(s) 339 ) (M, G) Added related on 12/2/2002 (K, Chr). (Entered: 11/27/2002)
354 Sur−Reply (Related Motion(s) 336 ) to Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant's Response to Prisioner Eugene Groves' filing of Classification Appeal filed by all defendants. (Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 12/09/2002)
355 Exhibit A to Defendant's Sur−Reply filed by all defendants. (Related document(s) 354 ) (Mancini, Joseph) Modified on 12/10/2002 (H, D). (Entered: 12/09/2002)

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12/10/2002 12/12/2002 12/23/2002 12/23/2002
12/30/2002 01/03/2003 01/13/2003 01/14/2003 01/21/2003 01/21/2003 01/21/2003 01/21/2003 01/22/2003 01/27/2003 01/28/2003

356 Motion for order Requesting the Setting of a Deadline for Filing the First Post−Judgment Report with Memorandum and Exhibit A attached filed by all defendants. (Mancini, Joseph) Modified on 12/11/2002 (H, D). (Entered: 12/10/2002)
357 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 12/12/02 referring motion for reconsideration filed by Eugene Groves to Magistrate Judge George Limbert. (Related document(s) 336 ) (M, G) (Entered: 12/12/2002)
358 Motion for order to enforce Court's Orders of February 25, 2002, March 26, 2002, May 15, 2002, and July 12, 2002, filed by all plaintiffs. (Related document(s) 259 , 227 , 284 , 311 ) (Lynd, Staughton) Modified text on 12/23/2002 (M, J). (Entered: 12/23/2002)
359 Memorandum In Support (Related Motion(s) 358 ) of Motion to Enforce Court's Orders, filed by all plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 List of Exhibits # 2 Exhibit 1 Executive Order # 3 Exhibit 2 List OSP # 4 Exhibit 3 Ishee 4B # 5 Exhibit 4 Collins AC # 6 Exhibit 5 Security Level Review # 7 Exhibit 6 Declaration Lynd # 8 Exhibit Declaration−1 # 9 Exhibit Declaration−2 # 10 Exhibit Declaration−3 # 11 Exhibit Declaration−4 # 12 Exhibit Declaration−5 # 13 Exhibit Declaration−6 # 14 Exhibit Declaration−7 # 15 Exhibit 7 Beyond 3 Years # 16 Exhibit 8 Length Stay Form # 17 Exhibit 9 Congregate Active Policy # 18 Exhibit 10 No Contact Congreg Rec # 19 Exhibit 11 Notice of Hearing)(Lynd, Staughton) Modified text on 12/23/2002 (M, J). (Entered: 12/23/2002)
360 Motion for extension of time to Respond to Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce this Court's Orders filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support)(Related document(s) 358 ) (Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 12/30/2002)
361 Marginal Order signed on 1/3/03 by Judge James S. Gwin granting defendants' motion for extension of time. Defendants' response to motion to enforce Court's orders to be filed by 1/21/03. (Related Doc # 360 ) (M, G) (Entered: 01/03/2003)
362 Returned Mail addressed to Anthony M. Hoepf marked "Inmate Refused Mail on 1/6/2003, (Related documents(s) 361 ). (M, J) Modified spelling on 1/14/2003 (P, G). (Entered: 01/13/2003)
363 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 1/14/03. Plaintiffs shall file within seven days of the entry of this Order a response to defendants' motion requesting the setting of a deadline for filing the first post−judgment report. (Related document(s) 356 ) (M, G) (Entered: 01/14/2003)
364 Motion to enforce the Stipulation for Injunctive Relief, filed by all plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support# 2 Fax 1−8−03# 3 Fax 1−13−03# 4 Fax 1−14−03)(Related document(s) 265 ) (Lynd, Staughton) Modified text on 1/22/2003 (M, J). (Entered: 01/21/2003)
365 Response (Related Motion(s) 356 ) to Defendants' Motion Requesting the Setting of a Deadline for Filing the First Post−Judgment Report filed by all plaintiffs. (Lynd, Staughton) (Entered: 01/21/2003)
366 Motion to strike Declaration of Alice Lynd which is attached as Exhibit 6 to Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce this Court's Orders, with memorandum in support incorporated, (Related Document(s) 358 , 359 ), filed by all defendants. (Landes, Mark) Modified text and document link on 1/22/2003 (M, J). (Entered: 01/21/2003)
367 Opposition (Related Motion(s) 358 ) to Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce this Court's Orders filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Williams v. Wilkinson, et al.# 2 Exhibit B, Ishee Affidavit# 3 Exhibit C, Mancini Affidavit)(Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 01/21/2003)
368 Attorney Appearance by Charissa D. Payer filed by on behalf of all defendants. (Payer, Charissa) (Entered: 01/22/2003)
369 Returned Mail addressed to Derrick Scott Newman marked "CMC other" (Related documents(s) 363 ) (M, J) (Entered: 01/27/2003)
370 Reply (unsigned) (Related Motion(s) 358 ) to Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce This Court's Orders, filed by all plaintiffs. (Lynd, Alice) Modified text on 1/29/2003 (M, J). (Entered: 01/28/2003)

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 56 of 86

01/28/2003 01/28/2003 01/29/2003 02/03/2003 02/03/2003 02/06/2003 02/06/2003 02/13/2003 02/17/2003
02/19/2003 02/20/2003 02/20/2003 02/20/2003 02/20/2003 02/20/2003

371 Response (Related Motion(s) 366 ) to Defendants' Motion to Strike Declaration of Attorney Lynd filed by all plaintiffs. (Lynd, Staughton) (Entered: 01/28/2003)
372 Notice that the Court will conduct a hearing in this case on 3/3/03 at 8:00 a.m., in Courtroom 575. Motions challenging the jurisdiction of this Court are to be filed by 2/6/03 and responses are to be filed by 2/20/03. (Related documents(s) 356 , 358 , 366 ) (M, G) (Entered: 01/28/2003)
373 Supplemental Memorandum in Support to Defendant's Motion for Requesting the Setting of a Deadline for Filing the First Post−Judgment Report, filed by all defendants. (Related document(s) 356 ) (Payer, Charissa) Modified text on 1/30/2003 (M, J). (Entered: 01/29/2003)
374 Opposition (Related Motion(s) 364 ) to Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce the Stipulation for Injunctive Relief filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Todd Ishee)(Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 02/03/2003)
375 Notice that plaintiffs' motion to enforce the stipulation for injunctive relief will be heard on 3/3/03 at 8:00 a.m., in Courtroom 575. (Related documents(s) 265 , 364 ) (M, G) (Entered: 02/03/2003)
376 Motion to dismiss Certain Claims Raised in Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce This Court's Orders filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support# 2 Exhibit A)(Related document(s) 358 ) (Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 02/06/2003)
377 Reply (Related Motion(s) 366 )in support of Motion to Strike Affidavit of Attorney Lynd filed by all defendants. (Stankunas, Jeffrey) Modified text on 2/7/2003 (P, G). (Entered: 02/06/2003)
378 Returned Mail addressed to Anthony M. Hoepf regarding Notice that plaintiffs' motion to enforce the stipulation for injunctive relief will be heard on 3/3/03 at 8:00 a.m., in Courtroom 575. Mail marked "Refused to sign paper, 2/10/03" (Related documents(s) 375 ) (M, J) (Entered: 02/13/2003)
379 Motion for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum requiring Warden Todd Ishee, Ohio State Penitentiary, to produce inmates Jason Robb #308−919, Lyle Heyward #252−187, Charles Austin #206−996, Michael Benge #276−821, Eugene Groves #144−869, Keith Gardner #149−278, Edward Hodge #294−925 and Edward Swiger #220−709, filed by all plaintiffs. (Related document(s) 375 , 372 ) (Lynd, Alice) Modified text on 2/18/2003 (M, J). (Entered: 02/17/2003)
380 Response (Related Motion(s) 376 ) to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Certain Claims Raised in Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce This Court's Orders filed by all plaintiffs. (Lynd, Staughton) (Entered: 02/19/2003)
381 Attorney Appearance by Robert C. Angell filed by on behalf of all defendants. (Angell, Robert) (Entered: 02/20/2003)
382 Marginal Order signed on 2/20/03 by Judge James S. Gwin granting in part and denying in part plaintiffs' motion for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum. Jason Robb and Lyle Heyward will attend in person. Remaining six prisoners will attend via video conferencing.(Related Doc # 379 ) (M, G) (Entered: 02/20/2003)
383 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 2/20/03 commanding the Warden of Ohio State Penitentiary to produce the body of Jason Robb to appear before this Court on 3/3/03 at 8:00 a.m. (Attachments: # 1 Writ of Habeas Corpus re: Jason Robb)(Related document(s) 372 , 379 , 382 ) (M, G) (Entered: 02/20/2003)
384 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 2/20/03 commanding the Warden of Ohio State Penitentiary to produce the body of Lyle Heyward to appear before this Court on 3/3/03 at 8:00 a.m. (Attachments: # 1 Writ of Habeas Corpus re: Lyle Heyward)(Related document(s) 372 , 379 , 382 ) (M, G) (Entered: 02/20/2003)
385 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 2/20/03 that Plaintiffs Charles Austin, Michael Benge, Eugene Groves, Keith Gardner, Edward Hodge and Edward Swiger, all prisoners at Ohio State Penitentiary in Youngstown, Ohio, are to attend the 8:00 a.m., court hearing on 3/3/03 via video conference. A representative at the institution shall place the video conference call thirty minutes prior to the time of said court hearing. A copy of this Order was faxed to Diana Carter, Administrative Assistant,

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02/20/2003 02/27/2003 02/28/2003 03/03/2003 03/03/2003 03/03/2003 03/03/2003 03/03/2003 03/03/2003 03/04/2003 03/06/2003 03/06/2003 03/06/2003 03/10/2003

Ohio State Penitentiary (330−743−0841). (Related document(s) 372 , 379 , 382 ) (M, G) (Entered: 02/20/2003)
386 Report and Recommendation: It is recommended that plaintiff Eugene Groves' motion for reconsideration of his classification status be granted in part, and denied in part (Related document(s) 337 , 336 ). Magistrage Judge George J. Limbert.(S, A) (Entered: 02/20/2003)
387 Objection to Report and Recommendation regarding plaintiff Eugene Groves' Motion for Reconsideration of Classification Status, filed by all defendants. (Related document(s) 336 , 337 , 386 ) (Mancini, Joseph) Modified text and document link on 2/27/2003 (M, J). (Entered: 02/27/2003)
388 Reply (Related Motion(s) 376 ) to Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Certain Claims filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C)(Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 02/28/2003)
389 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 3/3/03 commanding the Warden of Ohio State Penitentiary to produce the body of Charles Austin to appear before this Court on 3/4/03 at 8:00 a.m. (Attachments: # 1 Writ of Habeas Corpus re: Charles Austin)(Related document(s) 372 ) (M, G) (Entered: 03/03/2003)
390 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 3/3/03 commanding the Warden of Ohio State Penitentiary to produce the body of Michael Benge to appear before this Court on 3/4/03 at 8:00 a.m. (Attachments: # 1 Writ of Habeas Corpus re: Michael Benge)(Related document(s) 372 ) (M, G) (Entered: 03/03/2003)
391 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 3/3/03 commanding the Warden of Ohio State Penitentiary to produce the body of Keith Gardner to appear before this Court on 3/4/03 at 8:00 a.m. (Attachments: # 1 Writ of Habeas Corpus re: Keith Gardner)(Related document(s) 372 ) (M, G) (Entered: 03/03/2003)
392 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 3/3/03 commanding the Warden of Ohio State Penitentiary to produce the body of Eugene Groves to appear before this Court on 3/4/03 at 8:00 a.m. (Attachments: # 1 Writ of Habeas Corpus re: Eugene Groves)(Related document(s) 372 ) (M, G) (Entered: 03/03/2003)
393 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 3/3/03 commanding the Warden of Ohio State Penitentiary to produce the body of Edward Hodge to appear before this Court on 3/4/03 at 8:00 a.m. (Attachments: # 1 Writ of Habeas Corpus re: Edward Hodge)(Related document(s) 372 ) (M, G) (Entered: 03/03/2003)
394 Minutes of proceedings. Hearing on pending motions held on 3/3/03 before Judge James S. Gwin. Hearing to resume 3/4/03. Court Reporter: S. Trischan. (Related documents(s) 372 , 375 ) (M, G) Modified text on 3/5/03. (M, G). (Entered: 03/03/2003)
395 Minutes of proceedings. Hearing on pending motions held on 3/4/03 before Judge James S. Gwin. Hearing to resume 3/5/03. Court Reporter: S. Trischan. (Related documents(s) 372 , 375 ) (M, G) Modified text on 3/5/03. (M, G). (Entered: 03/04/2003)
396 Minutes of proceedings. Hearing on pending motions held on 3/5/03 before Judge James S. Gwin. Hearing concluded. Court Reporter: S. Trischan. (Related documents(s) 372 , 375 ) (M, G) (Entered: 03/06/2003)
397 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 3/6/03. Parties to file their briefs (Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) by 3/26/03. Response briefs shall be filed by 4/2/03. (M, G) (Entered: 03/06/2003)
398 Returned Mail addressed to Eugene Groves marked "Undeliverable as addressed − unable to forward" RTS AWL/OSU. (Related documents(s) 390 , 391 , 392 , 393 , 389 ) (M, J) (Entered: 03/06/2003)
399 Transcript of proceedings of hearing on pending motions held on 3/3/2003 before Judge James S. Gwin. (Complete document on file in the Clerk's Office) (124 pages) (Related documents(s) 394 ) (M, J) (Entered: 03/11/2003)

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03/12/2003 03/13/2003 03/14/2003 03/18/2003 03/26/2003 03/26/2003 04/02/2003 04/02/2003 04/10/2003 04/11/2003 04/16/2003 04/16/2003 04/18/2003 04/23/2003 05/15/2003
05/15/2003

400 Transcript of proceedings of hearing on pending motions held on 3/4/2003 before Judge James S. Gwin. (366 pages)(Volume 2) Complete document on file in the Clerk's Office. (Related documents(s) 399 ) (S, T) (Entered: 03/12/2003)
401 Returned Mail, addressed to Anthony M. Hoepf; "inmate refused to sign for this letter" (Related documents(s) 397 ) (R, N) (Entered: 03/13/2003)
402 Transcript of proceedings. Volume 3 held 3/5/03 Complete document on file in the Clerk's Office. (265 pgs) (Related documents(s) 400 , 396 , 394 ) (M, P) (Entered: 03/14/2003)
403 Order signed on 3/18/03 by Judge James S. Gwin. The motion of Defendant Groves for reconsideration of his classification status is denied as moot as his security level was reduced from 5A to 4B on January 26, 2003. (Related Doc # 336 ) (M, G) (Entered: 03/18/2003)
404 Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Proposed Remedies filed by all plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Giano# 2 Rodgers# 3 WorldWide Communication# 4 State v Brown)(Related document(s) 397 ) (Lynd, Alice) Modified text on 3/27/2003 (P, G). (Entered: 03/26/2003)
405 Initial Post−Hearing Brief, filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Bedel# 2 Exhibit B, Chipman# 3 Exhibit C, Merchant# 4 Exhibit D, McMann# 5 Exhibit E, Nash)(Mancini, Joseph) Modified text on 3/27/2003 (P, G). (Entered: 03/26/2003)
406 Response to Defendants' Initial Post−Hearing Brief filed by all plaintiffs. (Related document(s) 397 , 405 ) (Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 04/02/2003)
407 Second Post−Hearing Brief, (Related Document(s) 405 ), filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit G, Heyward)(Mancini, Joseph) Modified text and document link on 4/3/2003 (M, J). (Entered: 04/02/2003)
408 Marginal Order signed on 4/10/03 by Judge James S. Gwin denying as moot defendants' motion requesting a date be set for the filing of the first post−judgment report. (Related Doc # 356 , 373 ) (M, G) (Entered: 04/10/2003)
409 Motion for leave to File this Citation of Supplemental Authorities filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit H Rodgers)(Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 04/11/2003)
410 Marginal Order signed on 4/16/03 by Judge James S. Gwin granting defendants' motion for leave to file citation of supplemental authority. (Related Doc # 409 ) (M, G) (Entered: 04/16/2003)
411 Marginal Order signed on 4/16/03 by Judge James S. Gwin denying as moot defendants' motion to strike the declaration of Alice Lynd. (Related documents(s) 366 , 371 , 377 ) (M, G) (Entered: 04/16/2003)
412 Motion to withdraw as attorney as to attorney Jillian Davis, filed by all plaintiffs. (Vasvari, Jr., Raymond) Modified text on 4/21/2003 (M, J). (Entered: 04/18/2003)
413 Marginal Order signed on 4/23/03 by Judge James S. Gwin granting motion of Jillian S. Davis to withdraw as counsel in this case. Attorney Jillian S. Davis removed from case. (Related Doc # 412 ) (M, G) (Entered: 04/23/2003)
414 Order signed on 5/15/03 by Judge James S. Gwin. The Court grants the plaintiffs' motion to enforce in part and denies it in part. The Court finds that the defendants have violated parts of the Court's prior orders but it denies the plaintiffs' request for further injunctive relief. Instead, it instructs the defendants to more rigorously observe the Court's Orders in all future reviews. Finally, because the Court modifies the Orders only to the extent necessary to maintain a status quo and because the Court denies the plaintiffs' request for further injunctive relief, the Court denies the defendants' contemporaneous motion to dismiss. (Related documents(s) 358 , 370 , 376 , 380 , 359 , 388 , 366 , 367 ) (M, G) Modified text on 5/16/2003 (M, G). (Entered: 05/15/2003)
415 Marginal Order signed on 5/15/03 by Judge James S. Gwin denying plaintiffs' motion to enforce the stipulation for injunctive relief. The outdoor recreation issue is addressed in the Court's enforcement order [Doc. 414]. Upon representation by the

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05/27/2003 06/10/2003
06/10/2003 06/10/2003 06/13/2003 06/16/2003 06/20/2003 06/23/2003 07/01/2003 07/18/2003 07/23/2003 08/01/2003 11/14/2003 11/20/2003 11/20/2003 12/12/2003 02/02/2004 02/02/2004

parties that they have settled the medical monitoring dispute, this issue is moot. (Related Doc # 364 , 374 ) (M, G) (Entered: 05/15/2003)
416 Motion for order to Stay Litigation Regarding Application for Certain Attorney Fees & Costs filed by all plaintiffs. (Related document(s) 414 ) (Vasvari, Jr., Raymond) (Entered: 05/27/2003)
417 Response (Related Motion(s) 416 ) and Stipulation to Plaintiffs' Motion to Stay Proceedings on Application For Certain Attorney Fees and Costs Pending Appeal filed by all defendants. (Stankunas, Jeffrey) DOCUMENT FILED IN ERROR − TO BE REFILED. (M, G). (Entered: 06/10/2003)
418 Response (Related Motion(s) 416 ) and Stipulation to Plaintiffs' Motion to Stay Proceedings on Application For Certain Attorney Fees and Costs Pending Appeal filed by all defendants. (Landes, Mark) (Entered: 06/10/2003)
419 Notice of Appeal (Filing Fee Not Paid) from order of May 15, 2003, filed by all defendants. (Related document(s) 414 ) (Marti, Todd) Modified text on 6/11/2003 (M, J). (Entered: 06/10/2003)
420 Financial Transaction; filing fee paid in the amount of $105.00 for the Appeal filed on 6/10/03; Receipt #405531 (Related documents(s) 419 ) (R, N) (Entered: 06/13/2003)
421 Acknowledgment from the USCA for Sixth Circuit of receipt of Notice of Appeal; USCA case# 03−3840 (Related documents(s) 419 ) (M, J) (Entered: 06/16/2003)
422 True copy of order from the USCA for the Sixth Circuit filed on 6/17/2003, dismissing cause, USCA #02−4222, for want of prosecution. Leonard Green, Clerk (Related documents(s) 346 , 334 ) (M, J) (Entered: 06/20/2003)
423 Appeal Transcript Order Form requesting testimony of all witnesses, and proceedings held on 3/3/2003−3/5/2003, filed by all defendants. (Related document(s) 419 , 400 , 402 , 399 ) (P, G) (Entered: 06/24/2003)
424 Marginal Order signed on 7/1/03 by Judge James S. Gwin. Plaintiffs' motion to stay proceedings on fees and costs is granted. (Related documents(s) 416 , 418 ) (M, G) (Entered: 07/01/2003)
425 Returned Mail addressed to John Perotti marked "Other; TOCI" (Related documents(s) 424 ) (M, J) (Entered: 07/21/2003)
Remark: Returned mail re−issued to John W. Perotti at TOCI. (Related documents(s) 424 , 425 ) (M, G) (Entered: 07/23/2003)
426 Returned Mail addressed to John Perotti marked "No Longer at TOCI" (Related documents(s) 424 , 425 ,) (M, J) (Entered: 08/01/2003)
427 Motion to withdraw as attorney Instanter, as to Counsel Raymond Vasvari, filed by all plaintiffs. (Vasvari, Jr., Raymond) Modified text on 11/17/2003 (M, J). (Entered: 11/14/2003)
428 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 11/20/03 granting motion of Attorney Raymond V. Vasvari, Jr. to withdraw as counsel for plaintiffs. Attorney Raymond V. Vasvari, Jr. removed from case. (Related Doc # 427 )(M, G) (Entered: 11/20/2003)
429 Information copy of opinion from the USCA for the Sixth Circuit, affirming the judgment of the district court, Moore and Rogers, Circuit Judges and Forester, District Judge, USCA # 02−3524. This is not a mandate. (M, J) (Entered: 11/20/2003)
430 True copy of mandate from the USCA for the Sixth Circuit affirming the judgment of the district court, Moore and Rogers, Circuit Judges and Forester, District Judge, USCA # 02−3524. (M, J) (Entered: 12/12/2003)
431 Motion for order Extending the Jurisdiction of the Court for One Year filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 265 , 259 . (Lynd, Staughton) (Entered: 02/02/2004)
432 Memorandum In Support of Motion for order Extending the Jurisdiction of the Court for One Year filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 431 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit List of Exhibits# 2 Exhibit Extend−1, Fifth Report Medical# 3 Exhibit

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02/02/2004 02/02/2004 02/04/2004
02/04/2004 02/04/2004 02/04/2004
02/06/2004 02/12/2004 02/17/2004 02/23/2004 02/27/2004 03/08/2004

Extend−2, Recreation# 4 Exhibit Extend−3, Flannigan, Decision# 5 Exhibit Extend−4, Jones, Committee# 6 Exhibit Extend−5, Jones, Decision# 7 Exhibit Extend−6, Slider, Appeal# 8 Exhibit Extend−7, Slider, Decision# 9 Exhibit Extend−8, Saffell, Summary# 10 Exhibit Extend−9, Saffell, Appeal 5/18# 11 Exhibit Extend−10, Saffell, Warden# 12 Exhibit Extend−11, Saffell, Appeal 5/22# 13 Exhibit Extend−12, Saffell, Decision# 14 Exhibit Extend−13, Jones, Long Term# 15 Exhibit 11−07 pp. 12−15# 16 Exhibit Extend−15, Austin, Response)(Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 02/02/2004)
433 Motion for order Permitting 90−Day Period of Discovery filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 431 , 432 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Lynd, Staughton) Modified text on 2/3/2004 (M, J). (Entered: 02/02/2004)
434 Motion for leave to File Instanter Correct List of Exhibits to Memorandum in Support filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 432 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit List)(Lynd, Alice) Modified text on 2/3/2004 (M, J). (Entered: 02/02/2004)
435 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 2/4/04 granting plaintiffs' motion for leave to file correct list of exhibits with instruction to plaintiffs to REFILE Docs. 431 and 432 attaching the correct exhibit list. The Court will term Doc. 431 as moot pursuant to this marginal entry. (Related Doc # 434 , 432 , 431 ).(M, G) Modified on 2/4/2004 (M, G). (Entered: 02/04/2004)
436 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 2/4/04 denying as moot plaintiffs' motion for order exending the jurisdiction of the Court for one year. (Related Doc # 431 , 432 , 434 , 435 ).(M, G) (Entered: 02/04/2004)
437 Motion for Order Extending the Jurisdiction of the Court for One Year filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 265 , 259 , 435 . (Lynd, Staughton) (Entered: 02/04/2004)
438 Memorandum In Support of Motion for Order Extending the Jurisdiction of the Court for One Year filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 437 . (Attachments: # 1 List of Exhibits# 2 Exhibit Extend−1, Fifth Report Medical# 3 Exhibit Extend−2, Recreation# 4 Exhibit Extend−3, Flannigan, Decision# 5 Exhibit Extend−4, Jones, Committee# 6 Exhibit Extend−5, Jones, Decision# 7 Exhibit Extend−6, Slider, Appeal# 8 Exhibit Extend−7, Slider, Decision# 9 Exhibit Extend−8, Saffell, Summary# 10 Exhibit Extend−9, Saffell, Appeal 5/18# 11 Exhibit Extend−10, Saffell, Warden# 12 Exhibit Extend−11, Saffell, Appeal 5/22# 13 Exhibit Extend−12, Saffell, Decision# 14 Exhibit Extend−13, Jones, Long Term# 15 Exhibit Extend−14, lll−07 pp. 12−15# 16 Exhibit Extend−15, Austin, Response)(Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 02/04/2004)
439 Notice that a conference with the Court will take place on Wednesday, 2/11/04 at 4:00 p.m., Chamber 9A, Carl B. Stokes U.S. Courthouse, 801 W. Superior Ave., Cleveland, Ohio. (M, G) (Entered: 02/06/2004)
440 Minutes of proceedings. Status conference before Judge James S. Gwin on 2/11/04. Court Reporter: none. (M, G) (Entered: 02/12/2004)
441 Response to Motion for order Permitting 90−Day Period of Discovery, and to Motion for Order Extending the Jurisdiction of the Court for One Year, filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 433 , 437 . (Mancini, Joseph) Modified text on 2/18/2004 (M, J). (Entered: 02/17/2004)
442 Returned Mail addressed to Anthony M. Hoepf marked "Inmate Refused Legal Mail" Related document(s) 439 . (M, J) (Entered: 02/23/2004)
443 Notice of Filing Proposed Agreed Order, filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Agreed Order) Related document(s) 259 , 265 , 437 , 441 , 433 . (Mancini, Joseph) Modified text and document link on 2/27/2004 (M, J). (Entered: 02/27/2004)
444 Agreed Order approved by Judge James S. Gwin on 3/8/04. The defendants shall file a response to plaintiffs' motions for order permitting discovery and extending the jurisdiction of the Court as they relate to this Court's 3/26/02 Order within thirty (30) days following a ruling by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals on defendants' pending appeal of that Order. The defendants shall file a response to plaintiffs' extension motion as it relates to the Stipulated Judgment within thirty (30) days following receipt of additional reports from the medical monitors and the mental health monitor. (Related Docs. 259 , 265 , 433 , 437 ). (M, G) Modified text on 3/8/2004 (M, J).

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04/16/2004 05/05/2004 05/07/2004 05/19/2004 05/19/2004 05/20/2004 06/07/2004 06/07/2004 06/14/2004
06/22/2004 06/28/2004
06/29/2004
07/01/2004 07/06/2004 07/06/2004
07/12/2004

(Entered: 03/08/2004)
445 First Interim Report Relating to the Agreed Order of 3/8/2004, filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 444 . (Mancini, Joseph) Modified text on 4/20/2004 (M, J). (Entered: 04/16/2004)
446 Motion for better or safer housing at 878 Coitsville−Hubbard Road, Youngstown, Ohio 44505, filed by James T. Thomas. (M, J) (Entered: 05/05/2004)
447 Supplement to his Motion for better or safer housing at 878 Coitsville−Hubbard Road, Youngstown, Ohio 44505, filed by James T. Thomas. Related document(s) 446 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(M, J) (Entered: 05/07/2004)
448 Opposition to Motion for Better or Safer Housing filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 446 . (Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 05/19/2004)
449 Notice of Second Interim Report Relating to the Agreed Order, filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 444 . (Mancini, Joseph) Modified text on 5/20/2004 (M, J). (Entered: 05/19/2004)
450 Motion for the issuance of a television and to be release from isolation, filed by James T. Thomas. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(M, J) (Entered: 05/20/2004)
451 Motion for order extending time until 7/21/04 to respond to motion for order to extend jurisdiction filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 437 , 444 . (Mancini, Joseph) Modified text 6/8/2004 (C, K A). (Entered: 06/07/2004)
452 Supplement to opposition to motion for safer and better housing filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 448 . (Mancini, Joseph) Modified text 6/8/2004 (C, K A). (Entered: 06/07/2004)
453 Information copy of opinion from the USCA for the Sixth Circuit: The judgment of the District Court is partially affirmed and partially reversed, and the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion as to 268 Notice of Appeal (USCA# 02−3429) and 313 Notice of Appeal (USCA# 02−3816). This is not a mandate order. Circuit Judges: Moore and Rogers, District Judge: Forester. Date issued by USCA 6/10/04 (Attachments: #(1) Judgment) (H, S P) (Entered: 06/15/2004)
454 Joint Proposed Stipulation for Stay of Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs filed by all parties. Related document(s) 453 . (Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 06/22/2004)
455 Marginal Order 454 approving stipulation for stay on motion for attorney fees by Judge James S. Gwin on 6/28/04. The parties' motions for attorney fees and costs may be filed after this case has been resolved after further appellate review. (M, G) Modified text 6/30/2004 (C, K A). (Entered: 06/28/2004)
456 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 6/29/04 granting defendants' motion for an extension of time until 7/21/04 to respond to plaintiffs' motion to extend this Court's jurisdiction for one year as it relates to the stipulated judgment. (Related Doc # 451 , 437 ). (M, G) (Entered: 06/29/2004)
457 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 7/1/04 denying motions of James Thomas for transfer to better and safer housing, for the issuance of a television and to be released from isolation. (Related Doc # 446 , 450 ). (M, G) (Entered: 07/01/2004)
458 Letter to Judge Gwin from Howard J. Watson (filed only for purpose of providing counsel with copy). (M, G) (Entered: 07/06/2004)
459 True copy of mandate from the USCA for the Sixth Circuit: Affirming in part, reversing in part the judgment of the District Court and remanding as to 268 Notice of Appeal (USCA# 02−3429) and 313 Notice of Appeal (USCA# 02−3816). Date issued as mandate 7/2/04, Costs: None (Related document 453 ). (H, S P) (Entered: 07/07/2004)
460 Motion for Order Extending the Time In Which to Respond to Plaintiffs' Motion for Order to Extend this Court's Jurisdiction for One Year and Motion for Order Permitting Discovery as They Relate to This Court's March 26, 2002 Order filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 433 , 437 , 444 . (Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 07/12/2004)

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07/20/2004 07/20/2004 07/20/2004
07/21/2004 07/21/2004
07/26/2004
07/26/2004 07/27/2004 07/30/2004 07/30/2004
07/30/2004 07/30/2004 08/02/2004 08/05/2004

461 Attorney Appearance by James Eric Holloway filed by on behalf of all defendants. (Holloway, James) (Entered: 07/20/2004)
462 Opposition to Motion for Order Extending the Jurisdiction of the Court for One Year filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 437 . (Holloway, James) (Entered: 07/20/2004)
463 Motion for Order to Terminate the Prospective Relief Provided by the Stipulation for Injunctive Relief Entered on April 5, 2002 filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Seventh Report of the Medical Monitoring Panel# 2 Final Report of Mental Health Monitor# 3 March 29, 2004 Report of Fred Cohen# 4 Affidavit of Deputy Warden Betty McDonough (unsigned))(Holloway, James) Modified text on 7/21/2004 (P, G). (Entered: 07/20/2004)
464 Address Change Notice by Michael J. Benza filed by on behalf of all plaintiffs. (Benza, Michael) (Entered: 07/21/2004)
465 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 7/21/04. Pursuant to the 7/6/04 mandate from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the date of 7/30/04 is set as the deadline for the parties to file any request for a hearing and/or any proposed modifications to the Court's prior remedial order. Any party requesting a hearing should explain why a hearing is necessary to effectuate the mandate. (Related Doc. 459 ). (M, G) (Entered: 07/21/2004)
466 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 7/26/04 granting defendants' motion extending the response date to plaintiffs' motions to extend the court's jurisdiction and for order permitting discovery as they relate to the 3/26/02 order. Defendants shall have until 8/9/04 to file their response to the respective motions. (Related Doc # 460 , 433 , 437 , 259 )(M, G) (Entered: 07/26/2004)
467 Motion for extension of time until July 30, 2004 to reply to defendants' memorandum in opposition to plaintiffs' motion to extend the court's jurisdiction regarding the parties' stipulation of injunctive relief filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 462 , 437 . (Lynd, Staughton) Modified text on 7/27/2004 (P, S). (Entered: 07/26/2004)
468 Motion for order to Substitute the Affidavit of Betty McDonough filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit)(Holloway, James) Modified on 7/28/2004 to label attachment(P, G). (Entered: 07/27/2004)
469 Request for Hearing and Proposed Modifications to the Court's Prior Remedial Order filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 259 , 465 , 459 , 437 , 466 , 284 , 227 , 433 , 311 . (Attachments: # 1 Settlement hearing in case C−94−2847) (Lynd, Staughton) Modified text & attachments on 8/2/2004 (P, G). (Entered: 07/30/2004)
470 Response to Motion for Order to Terminate the Prospective Relief Provided by the Stipulation for Injunctive Relief Entered on April 5, 2002 , and Request for Evidentiary Hearing filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 463 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 Robb informal complaint# 2 Exhibit 2 Eighth Report of the Medical Monitoring Panel)(Lynd, Alice) Modified text on 8/2/2004 (P, G). (Entered: 07/30/2004)
471 Response to order regarding proposed modification of remedial orders filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 465 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A) (Marti, Todd) s/by Joseph Mancini. (P, G). (Entered: 07/30/2004)
472 Motion to enforce Court's orders filed by James T. Thomas. Related document(s)(Related Documents 259 , 457 , 227 , 414 ) (L, T) (Entered: 08/02/2004)
473 Motion for leave to file a reply memorandum to request for hearing and proposed modifications to the courts prior remedial order filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 471 , 469 . (Mancini, Joseph) Modified text on 8/3/2004 (P, G). (Entered: 08/02/2004)
474 Response to Motion for Order Extending the Jurisdiction of the Court for One Year,and the Motion for order Permitting 90−Day Period of Discovery As They Relate to This Court's March 26, 2002 Order filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 437 , 433 . (Mancini, Joseph) Modified text on 8/6/2004 (P, G). (Entered: 08/05/2004)

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08/10/2004 08/10/2004 08/10/2004 08/10/2004 08/11/2004 08/12/2004
08/12/2004 08/13/2004 08/16/2004 08/16/2004
08/17/2004 08/19/2004 08/23/2004 08/24/2004 08/24/2004 08/24/2004

475 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 8/10/04 granting plaintiff's motion 467 for an extension of time to reply to defendants' opposition to extend the court's jurisdiction regarding stipulation of injunctive relief. (M, G) (Entered: 08/10/2004)
476 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 8/10/04 granting defendants' motion to substitute the affidavit of Betty McDonough. Affidavit to be substituted upon receipt of this marginal order. (Related Doc # 468 )(M, G) (Entered: 08/10/2004)
477 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 8/10/04 granting defendants' motion for leave to file reply to plaintiffs' request for hearing and proposed modifications to prior remedial order. (Related Doc # 473 )(M, G) (Entered: 08/10/2004)
478 Reply to response to Motion for Order to Terminate the Prospective Relief Provided by the Stipulation for Injunctive Relief Entered on April 5, 2002 filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 437 , 463 . (Mancini, Joseph) Modified links on 8/11/2004 (P, G). (Entered: 08/10/2004)
479 Response to Plaintiffs Request for Hearing and Proposed Modifications to the Courts Prior Remedial Order filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 469 , 433 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Defendants Proposed Revisions to Classification Policy) (Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 08/11/2004)
480 Notice of hearing before Judge James S. Gwin on 8/20/04 at 8:30 a.m., in Courtroom 575 (Akron) on motions for orders permitting 90 day period of discovery and extending the Court's jurisdiction for one year. Additionally the parties shall address modifications to the Court's prior remedial orders in light of the recent Sixth Circuit's decision. (M, G) (Entered: 08/12/2004)
481 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 8/12/04 denying motion 472 to enforce filed by Inmate James Thomas. (M, G) (Entered: 08/12/2004)
482 Attorney Appearance by Jeffrey M. Gamso filed by on behalf of all plaintiffs. (Gamso, Jeffrey) (Entered: 08/13/2004)
483 Notice rescheduling the hearing on pending motions to 9/1/04 at 8:15 a.m., in Courtroom 575 (Akron) before Judge James S. Gwin. There will be no further continuances. (M, G) (Entered: 08/16/2004)
484 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 4/16/04. Plaintiffs' motion for an order extending the Court's jurisdiction is granted as to the Court's 3/26/02 order and held in abeyance as to the parties' stipulation for injunctive relief. Plaintiffs' motion for an order permitting a 90−day period of discovery is denied. Said denial is without prejudice to plaintiffs' ability to seek discovery to support any subsequently filed motion for an order to show cause. (Related Docs. 433 , 437 , 438 , 441 , 462 , 474 ). (M, G) Modified spelling on 8/17/2004 (P, G). (Entered: 08/16/2004)
485 Returned Mail addressed to Eugene Groves, James T. Thomas and Derrick Scott Newmann marked "Not Here, Return to Sender". Related document(s) 483 , 484 (M, J) (Entered: 08/17/2004)
486 Motion for leave to file Reply Brief filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 465 , 469 , 479 , 471 . (Attachments: # 1 Reply)(Lynd, Alice) Modified attachment on 8/20/2004 (P, G). (Entered: 08/19/2004)
487 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 8/23/04 granting plaintiffs' motion 486 for leave to file reply brief. Counsel to file reply upon receipt of this marginal order and no later than 8/27/04. (Related Docs. 465 , 469 , 471 , 479 ). (M, G) (Entered: 08/23/2004)
488 Reply Brief to Defendants' Response re Remedial Order filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 465 , 486 , 479 , 471 , 469 , 487 . (Lynd, Staughton) (Entered: 08/24/2004)
489 Motion for writ of habeas corpus ad testifcandum filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 483 . (Lynd, Staughton) (Entered: 08/24/2004)
490 Motion for leave To File A Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiffs Reply To Defendants Response Re Remedial Order filed by all defendants. Related document(s)

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08/26/2004 08/26/2004
08/27/2004
08/30/2004
08/31/2004 09/01/2004 09/01/2004 09/01/2004 09/01/2004 09/09/2004 09/13/2004 09/15/2004 09/15/2004
09/16/2004

488 . (Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 08/24/2004)
491 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 8/26/04 granting defendants' motion for leave to file a reply memorandum by 8/27/04. (Related Doc # 490 , 488 ). (M, G) (Entered: 08/26/2004)
492 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 8/26/04 granting plaintiffs' motion for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum and commanding the Warden of Ohio State Penitentiary to produce the bodies of Jason Robb and Alvin Jones aka Mosi Paki to appear before this Court on 9/1/04 at 8:15 a.m. (Related Doc # 489 , 483 ). (Attachments: # 1 Writ of Habeas Corpus re: Jason Robb and Alvin Jones aka Mosi Paki)(M, G) Modified on 8/26/2004 (M, G). (Entered: 08/26/2004)
493 Response In Opposition To Plaintiffs Reply To Defendants Response Re Remedial Order filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 488 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Doc. 227, February 25, 2002 Opinion and Order, pp. 1, 51−53# 2 Exhibit B, Doc. 259, March 26, 2002 Order, pp. 1, 4−6# 3 Exhibit C, Doc. 284, May 15, 2002 Order, pp. 1−2# 4 Exhibit D, Doc. 414, May 15, 2003 Order, pp. 1, 10−13, 17−18, 29−30) (Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 08/27/2004)
494 Motion for leave to Substitute Exhibits filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 493 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Doc. 227, February 25, 2002 Opinion and Order, pp. 1, 51−53# 2 Exhibit B, Doc. 259, March 26, 2002 Order, pp. 1, 4−6# 3 Exhibit C, Doc. 284, May 15, 2002 Order, pp. 1−2# 4 Exhibit D, Doc. 414, May 15, 2003 Order, pp. 1, 10−13, 17−18, 29−30)(Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 08/30/2004)
495 Motion to quash subpoenas with memorandum in support, filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Copies of subpoenas served# 2 Exhibit B, copy of e−mail letter to Plaintiffs' counsel)(Holloway, James) Modified text on 9/1/2004 (P, G). (Entered: 08/31/2004)
496 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 9/1/04 granting defendants' motion for leave to substitute exhibits. (Related Docs. # 494 , 493 ). (M, G) (Entered: 09/01/2004)
497 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 9/1/04 denying as moot defendants' motion to quash subpoenas. (Related Doc # 495 ). (M, G) (Entered: 09/01/2004)
498 Minutes of proceedings. Settlement conference held on 9/1/04 before Judge James S. Gwin. (Court Reporter: R. DelMonico.) Related document(s) 463 . (M, G) Modified text on 9/2/2004 (P, G). (Entered: 09/01/2004)
499 Stipulated Agreement and Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 9/1/04 regarding the Stipulation for Injunctive Relief filed 1/8/02. (Related Doc # 181 , 463 , 470 , 478 ). (M, G) Modified link on 9/2/2004 (P, G). (Entered: 09/01/2004)
500 Motion for extension of Time to Move for Attorneys' Fees regarding the Stipulation for Injunctive Relief until October 1, 2004 filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 499 . (Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 09/09/2004)
501 Letter filed by Eugene Groves dated 9/5/04 requesting to be removed from any mailings in this case. (P, G) (Entered: 09/13/2004)
502 Amended supplemental motion for order received on 9/1/04 from Movant James T. Thomas. (M, G) Modified text on 9/15/2004 (M, G). (Entered: 09/15/2004)
503 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 9/15/04 denying amended supplemental motion on behalf of class received from Movant James T. Thomas on 9/1/04. Additionally the Court will not entertain any further post−judgment motions by movant on behalf of the certified class in the instant case. Any such motions should be returned by the clerk to the movant. (Related Doc # 502 ) (M, G) (Entered: 09/15/2004)
504 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 9/16/04 granting plaintiffs' motion for an extension of time until 10/1/04 to move for attorney fees regarding the stipulation for injunctive relief. (Related Doc. 500 ). (M, G) (Entered: 09/16/2004)

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09/27/2004 09/29/2004 10/01/2004 10/01/2004 10/21/2004 10/28/2004 10/28/2004 10/29/2004 11/03/2004 11/04/2004 11/11/2004 11/15/2004 11/30/2004 12/01/2004 12/10/2004 12/15/2004

505 Letter from the Supreme Court of the United States regarding an extension of time within which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari. It has been presented to Justice Stevens, who on 8/27/04 extended the time to and including 10/8/04. [USCA # 02−3429, 02−3816] (P, G) (Entered: 09/27/2004)
506 Motion for extension of time until October 22, 2004 to submit attorney fee request filed by all defendants. (Holloway, James) Modified text on 9/30/2004 (P, G). (Entered: 09/29/2004)
507 Transcript of Proceedings of Status Conference held before Judge James S. Gwin on 9/1/04. Complete 6 page document on file in the Clerk's Office. To obtain a bound copy of this transcript please contact Richard DelMonico at 330−472−1830. (P, G) (Entered: 10/01/2004)
508 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 10/1/04 granting defendants' motion for an extension of time until 10/22/04 for plaintiffs to file their attorney fee application. (Related Doc. 506 ). (M, G) (Entered: 10/01/2004)
509 Motion for extension of time to submit attorney fee request until 10/29/2004 filed by all parties. (Holloway, James) Modified text on 10/22/2004 (P, S). (Entered: 10/21/2004)
510 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 10/28/04 granting the joint motion for an extension of time until 10/29/04 for plaintiffs to file their motion for attorney fees. (Related Doc. 509 , 508 ) (M, G) (Entered: 10/28/2004)
511 Information copy (Letter) from the Supreme Court of the United States indicating a writ of certiorari was filed on 10/8/04 and placed on the docket 10/13/04. (USSC #04−495; Filed 10/8/04) (USCA #02−3429, 023816; Filed 10/21/04) (L, T) (Entered: 10/28/2004)
512 Second Joint Motion for extension of time until 11/12/2004 to submit attorney fee request, filed by all parties. (Holloway, James) Modified text on 11/2/2004 (P, G). (Entered: 10/29/2004)
513 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 11/3/04 granting parties' second joint motion for an extension of time until 11/12/04 for plaintiffs to submit their request for attorney fees. (Related Doc. 512 , 510 ) (M, G) (Entered: 11/03/2004)
514 Motion to dismiss party Ayham Y. Haddad, M.D. as a Defendant filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 19 , 1 . (Lynd, Alice) Modified text on 11/5/2004 (S, T). (Entered: 11/04/2004)
515 Motion for attorney fees by Alice Lynd filed by on behalf of all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 504 , 437 , 508 , 510 , 499 , 264 , 513 , 265 . (Attachments: # 1 Settlement agreement and release)(Lynd, Alice) Modified attachments on 11/12/2004 (P, G). (Entered: 11/11/2004)
516 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 11/15/04 granting plaintiffs' motion to dismiss Ayham Y. Haddad, M.D., as a defendant. (Related Doc # 514 ) (M, G) (Entered: 11/15/2004)
517 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 11/30/04 granting plaintiffs' motion for attorney fees in the amount of $20,000.00 pursuant to Costs, Fees and Attorney Fees Settlement Agreement and Release. (Related Doc # 515 , 499 ) (Attachments: # 1 Settlement Agreement and Release) (M, G) (Entered: 11/30/2004)
518 Motion for relief from Order Entered November 15, 2004, (Related document # 516 ) filed by all defendants. (Holloway, James) Modified on 12/2/2004 to create link (P, G). (Entered: 12/01/2004)
519 Response to Motion for relief from Order Entered November 15, 2004 filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 518 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − 68−MED−02# 2 Exhibit 2 − Third Report of Medical Monitoring Panel# 3 Exhibit 3 − Eighth Report of Medical Monitoring Panel)(Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 12/10/2004)
520 Letter from the Supreme Court of the United States dated 12/10/04 giving notice the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted. [USSC # 04−495], [USCA # 02−3429,02−3816). (Related document # 511 ) (P, G) (Entered: 12/15/2004)

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12/16/2004 12/17/2004 01/13/2005 01/26/2005 01/28/2005 02/03/2005 02/11/2005
02/11/2005 02/14/2005 02/14/2005 02/24/2005 02/24/2005 02/28/2005
03/01/2005 03/02/2005

521 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 12/16/04 denying defendants' motion for relief from Order dated 11/15/04. (Related Doc. 514 , 516 , 518 , 519 ) (M, G) (Entered: 12/16/2004)
522 Supplement filed by Anthony M. Hoepf. (Page 3 was not included) (P, G) (Entered: 12/17/2004)
523 Motion and Memorandum in Support filed by interested party Anthony M. Hoepf. (P, S) Modified on 2/16/05 to term motion. (M, G). (Entered: 01/13/2005)
524 Joint Motion for extension of time until February 14, 2005 to Propose a Course of Action Concerning the Medical and Outdoor Exercise Provisions of the January 8, 2002 Stipulated Judgment filed by all parties. Related document(s) 181 , 499 . (Mancini, Joseph) Modified filers on 1/27/2005 (P, G). (Entered: 01/26/2005)
525 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 1/28/05 granting the parties' joint motion to extend until 2/14/05 for submitting their proposed course of action as to medical and outdoor exercise provisions of the 1/8/02 stipulated judgment. (Related Docs. 524 , 181 ) (M, G) Modified text on 1/31/2005 (P, G). (Entered: 01/28/2005)
526 Motion for Briefing Schedule to Address This Court's March 26, 2002 Injunctive Order filed by all defendants. (Holloway, James) Modified date on 2/4/2005 (P, G). (Entered: 02/03/2005)
527 Motion to enforce and Extend Medical and Outdoor Recreation Provisions of Stipulation filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 499 , 265 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 Ninth Medical Report# 2 Exhibit 2 ACA Standards# 3 Exhibit 3 Ishee Memo# 4 Exhibit 4 Handbook 3−5−04# 5 Exhibit 5A IOC 8−13−04# 6 Exhibit 5B IOC 8−23−04# 7 Exhibit 5C IOC 8−26−04# 8 Exhibit 6 ACA Accreditation 9−22−01# 9 Exhibit 7A Handbook 1998# 10 Exhibit 7B Handbook 8−7−98# 11 Exhibit 7C Handbook 2−8−99# 12 Exhibit 7D Handbook 6−00# 13 Exhibit 7E Handbook 3−02# 14 Exhibit 7F Handbook 10−8−02# 15 Exhibit 8 UN Minimum Rules)(Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 02/11/2005)
528 Response to Motion for Briefing Schedule to Address This Court's March 22, 2002 Injunctive Order filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 526 . (Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 02/11/2005)
529 Emergency Motion for order filed by James T. Thomas. (Document submitted contains 5 pages, not 8) (P, G) Modified on 2/28/05 to term motion (see Doc. 503 as to pro se filngs by James T. Thomas) (M, G). (Entered: 02/14/2005)
530 Second Motion for Order to Terminate the Prospective Relief Provided by the Stipulation for Injunctive Relief Entered on April 5, 2002 filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A, 9th Medical Monitors' Report# 2 Affidavit Exhibit B, Affidavit of Warden Marc Houk)(Holloway, James) (Entered: 02/14/2005)
531 Reply to response to Motion for Briefing Schedule to Address This Court's March 22, 2002 Injunctive Order filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 526 , 528 . (Holloway, James) Modified to add link on 2/25/2005 (P, G). (Entered: 02/24/2005)
532 Notice that the motions to enforce/extend medical/outdoor recreation provisions of and to terminate the prospective relief provided by the Stipulation will be held before Judge James S. Gwin on 3/7/05 at 12:15 p.m., in Courtroom 575 (Akron). Related Docs. 530 , 527 , 499 , 265 , 181 ) (M, G) (Entered: 02/24/2005)
533 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 2/28/05. The parties shall have 30 days from the date the U.S. Supreme Court rules as to the procedural requirements of the 3/26/02 Order of this Court to file their proposed schedules to address the continuation/termination of said Order. (Related Docs. 526 , 259 ) (M, G) (Entered: 02/28/2005)
534 Motion for writ of habeas corpus ad testifcandum filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 532 . (Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 03/01/2005)
535 Response to Motion for writ of habeas corpus ad testifcandum filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 534 . (Holloway, James) (Entered: 03/02/2005)

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03/04/2005 03/04/2005 03/04/2005 03/04/2005
03/07/2005 03/07/2005 03/11/2005 03/16/2005 03/21/2005 03/22/2005 03/22/2005 03/23/2005
03/23/2005
04/04/2005

536 Opposition to Motion to enforce and Extend Medical and Outdoor Recreation Provisions of Stipulation filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 527 . (Holloway, James) (Entered: 03/04/2005)
537 Motion for extension of Time to File Memorandum in Opposition until March 23, 2005 filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 530 . (Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 03/04/2005)
538 Motion for Order to Enforce Court's Orders and Prevent Transfer from Death Row filed by all plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 Trout Letter# 2 Exhibit 2 Benge Level 4 Grievance)(Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 03/04/2005)
539 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 3/4/05 granting plaintiff's motion for Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum as to Jason Robb and Keith Lamar. The Warden of Ohio State Penitentiary shall produce said inmates to appear before this Court on 3/7/05 at 12:15 p.m., in Courtroom 575 (Akron). (Related Docs. 532 , 534 , 535 ) (Attachments: # 1 Writ of Habeas Corpus as to Robb and Lamar) (M, G) (Entered: 03/04/2005)
540 Acknowledgement by U.S. Supreme Court of receipt of docket, complaint and transcripts received on 2/23/05.(P, S) (Entered: 03/07/2005)
541 Minutes of proceedings before Judge James S. Gwin on 3/7/05. Chambers conference and hearing on pending motions. (Related Docs. 527 , 530 ) (Court Reporter: S. Trischan) (M, G) (Entered: 03/08/2005)
542 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 3/11/05 granting plaintiffs' motion for an extension of time until 3/23/05 to file a response to defendants' second motion to terminate injunctive relief. (Related Docs. 537 , 530 , 265 ) (M, G) (Entered: 03/11/2005)
543 Joint Motion for extension of time to file post−hearing briefs and response to motion regarding Death Row until March 23, 2005 and April 4, 2005 respectively filed by all parties. Related document(s) 537 , 538 , 527 , 541 , 530 , 542 , 532 , 265 . (Lynd, Alice) Modified text on 3/17/2005 (P, G). (Entered: 03/16/2005)
544 Transcript of motion hearing held on 3/7/2005 before Judge Gwin filed manually. To obtain a bound copy of this transcript please contact Court Reporter Sue Trischan at 440−570−6950. Complete document on file, 77 pages. (S, T) (Entered: 03/22/2005)
545 Second Joint Motion for extension of time for Plaintiff's to submit attorney fee request filed by all parties. (Holloway, James) Modified text on 3/23/2005 (P, G). (Entered: 03/22/2005)
546 Memorandum In Support of Motion for extension of March 21, 2005 until To be determined filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 545 . (Holloway, James) (Entered: 03/22/2005)
547 Opposition to Second Motion for Order to Terminate the Prospective Relief Provided by the Stipulation for Injunctive Relief Entered on April 5, 2002 and Joint Motion for extension of time to file post−hearing briefs and response to motion regarding Death Row until March 23, 2005 and April 4, 2005, and Motion to enforce and Extend Medical and Outdoor Recreation Provisions of Stipulation and Post−Hearing Brief filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 530 , 543 , 527 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 Hadix v. Johnson (1995)# 2 Exhibit 2 Stone v. Prince George's...# 3 Exhibit 3 Grievance Dispositions# 4 Exhibit 4 Heyward Order# 5 Exhibit European Prison Rules# 6 Exhibit 6 Rules of Detention)(Lynd, Alice) Modified text on 3/24/2005 (P, G). (Entered: 03/23/2005)
548 Memorandum In Support of Second Motion for Order to Terminate the Prospective Relief Provided by the Stipulation for Injunctive Relief Entered on April 5, 2002 and Defendants' Post−Hearing Brief for Hearing Held March 7, 2005 filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 530 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Copy of Order in Fussell v. Wilkinson# 2 Exhibit Copy of Unreported Case)(Holloway, James) (Entered: 03/23/2005)
549 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 4/4/05 granting the joint motion for an extension of time to file post−hearing briefs and response to motion regarding death

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04/04/2005 04/06/2005
04/11/2005
04/11/2005 04/22/2005 05/02/2005 05/11/2005 05/19/2005 05/27/2005 05/31/2005 05/31/2005 06/03/2005 06/09/2005
06/14/2005

row transfers by 3/23/05 and 4/4/05 respectively. (Related Doc. 543 ) (M, G) Modified text on 4/4/2005 (M, G). Modified text on 4/5/2005 (P, G). (Entered: 04/04/2005)
550 Opposition to Motion for Order to Enforce Court's Orders and Prevent Transfer from Death Row filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 538 . (Holloway, James) (Entered: 04/04/2005)
551 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 4/6/05 granting the parties' joint motion for an extension of time for plaintiffs to file their motion for attorney fees. Said motion shall be filed within two weeks of this Court's ruling on the motions concerning jurisdiction. (Related Doc. 545 ) (M, G) Modified text on 4/7/2005 (P, G). (Entered: 04/06/2005)
552 Motion for Order Requiring Defendants to Show Cause Why They Should Not Be Held in Contempt filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 538 , 259 , 550 , 311 , 414 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 Trout 3−2−05# 2 Exhibit 2 Bradshaw 3−9−05# 3 Exhibit 3 Mancini 3−22−05# 4 Exhibit 4 News 3−23−05# 5 Exhibit 5 Bradshaw & Houk 3−25−05)(Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 04/11/2005)
553 Motion for Order Permitting Discovery filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 552 . (Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 04/11/2005)
554 Opposition to Motion for Order Requiring Defendants to Show Cause Why They Should Not Be Held in Contempt, and Motion for Order Permitting Discovery filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 552 , 553 . (Stankunas, Jeffrey) Modified text on 4/25/2005 (P, G). (Entered: 04/22/2005)
555 Reply to response to Motion for Order Requiring Defendants to Show Cause Why They Should Not Be Held in Contempt, and Motion for Order Permitting Discovery filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 552 , 553 , 554 ). (Lynd, Alice) Modified on 5/3/2005 to create link (P, G). (Entered: 05/02/2005)
556 Notice Of Filing Of Documents Pertaining To The Transfer Of Death Row Inmates To The Ohio State Penitentiary filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Executive Order# 2 Exhibit B, Death Row Privileges# 3 Exhibit C, Notice of Transfer) (Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 05/11/2005)
557 Motion for leave to file Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Their Motions to Show Cause and for Discovery filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 552 , 553 , 556 . (Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 05/19/2005)
558 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 5/27/05 granting plaintiffs' motion for leave to supplement their motions to show cause and for discovery. The supplements shall not exceed 10 pages. (Related Doc. 557 , m 553 , 552 ) (M, G) (Entered: 05/27/2005)
559 Motion for temporary restraining order and Preliminary and Permanent Injunction filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 556 . (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order TRO# 2 Proposed Order Preliminary and Permanent Injunction)(Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 05/31/2005)
560 Memorandum In Support of Motion for temporary restraining order and Preliminary and Permanent Injunction filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 559 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 Wilson# 2 Exhibit 2 Benner# 3 Exhibit 3 VanHook)(Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 05/31/2005)
561 Proposed Agreed Entry filed by all parties. (Holloway, James) Modified text on 6/6/2005 (P, G). (Entered: 06/03/2005)
562 Agreed Entry approved by Judge James S. Gwin on 6/9/05. Defendants voluntarily agree not to move death row inmates to Ohio State Penitentiary until the Court conducts a hearing on defendants' motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary/permanent injunction. (Related Docs. 559 , 560 , 561 ) (M, G) (Entered: 06/09/2005)
563 Opposition to Motion for temporary restraining order and Preliminary and Permanent Injunction filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 559 . (Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 06/14/2005)

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 69 of 86

06/15/2005 06/16/2005 06/20/2005
06/22/2005 06/23/2005 06/24/2005 06/27/2005 06/29/2005 07/05/2005 07/06/2005 07/07/2005 07/13/2005 07/20/2005
07/26/2005
07/27/2005 07/27/2005

564 Motion for temporary restraining order preventing the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections from conducting mental health assessments filed by Daniel Wilson. (P, G) (Entered: 06/16/2005)
565 Response to Motion for temporary restraining order and Preliminary and Permanent Injunction and Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition thereto filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 559 . (Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 06/16/2005)
566 Information copy of Opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States: The Judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with Opinion. (Supreme Court # 04−495) This is not a mandate order. Date issued 6/13/05. (Attachments: # 1 Opinion)(P, G) (Entered: 06/22/2005)
567 Notice that plaintiffs' motion for temporary restraining order/preliminary injunction will be on 8/18/05 at 9:00 a.m., in Courtroom 575 (Akron) before Judge James S. Gwin. (Related Doc. 559 , 560 , 563 , 565 ) (M, G) (Entered: 06/22/2005)
568 Joint Motion for extension of time to submit attorney fee request until 08/15/2005 filed by all parties. (Holloway, James) Modified text on 6/24/2005 (P, G). (Entered: 06/23/2005)
569 Motion for Order Permitting Discovery filed by Daniel Wilson. (Hearing requested) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(W, He) (Entered: 06/24/2005)
570 Opposition to Motion for temporary restraining order filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 564 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, ODRC, BMHS SOP 2# 2 Exhibit B, Taifa v. Bayh# 3 Exhibit C, Reed v. Richards# 4 Exhibit D, Martin v. Johnson)(Holloway, James) (Entered: 06/27/2005)
571 Memorandum In Support of Daniel Wilson's Motion for temporary restraining order I> filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 564 . (Lynd, Alice) Modified text on 7/1/2005 (L, T). (Entered: 06/29/2005)
572 Reply to Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for temporary restraining order filed by Daniel Wilson. Related document(s) 564 . (P, G) (Entered: 07/06/2005)
573 Motion for extension of time until July 2006 to Extend the Jurisdiction of the Court over the Stipulation for Injunctive Relief filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 527 , 547 , 265 , 544 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 Tenth Report of Medical Monitors)(Lynd, Alice) Modified text on 7/7/2005 (P, G). (Entered: 07/06/2005)
574 Opposition to Motion for Discovery filed by Inmate Daniel Wilson filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 569 . (Holloway, James) (Entered: 07/07/2005)
575 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 7/13/05 granting the parties' joint motion for an extension until 8/15/05 for plaintiffs to submit their attorney fee request. (Related Doc. 568 ) (M, G) (Entered: 07/13/2005)
576 Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to extend the jurisdiction of the Court over the stipulation for injunctive relief filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 573 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Cohen Letter# 2 Exhibit B, Houk)(Holloway, James) Modified docket text on 7/28/2005 (R, N). (Entered: 07/20/2005)
577 Motion for extension of Time to File Reply to Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Extend Jurisdiction of the Court over the Stipulation for Injunctive Relief until seven days after receipt of Fussell Medical Investigation Team Report filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 573 , 576 . (Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 07/26/2005)
578 Reply to defendants' memorandum in opposition to pro se motion for order permitting discovery filed by Daniel Wilson. Related document(s) 569 . (W, He) (Entered: 07/27/2005)
579 Notice to take Deposition of Jason Robb, Keith Lamar, Brian Nemeth, Shannon Troche, and Cornell Lee on August 5, 2005 filed by all defendants. (Holloway, James) (Entered: 07/27/2005)

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 70 of 86

07/28/2005
07/29/2005 08/03/2005 08/10/2005 08/12/2005
08/15/2005 08/15/2005 08/15/2005 08/18/2005 08/18/2005
08/19/2005
08/21/2005 08/21/2005 08/21/2005 08/24/2005

580 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 7/28/05 denying plaintiffs' motion to extend the Court's jurisdiction over the terms of the stipulated relief related to outdoor activities and grants defendants' motion to terminate the outdoor recreation provisions of the Stipulation for Injunctive Relief. (Related Doc. 527 , 530 , 547 , 548 ) (M, G) Modified docket text on 7/28/2005 (R, N). (Entered: 07/28/2005)
581 Amended Notice to take Deposition of Jason Robb, Keith Lamar, Brian Nemeth, Shannon Troche, Cornell Lee and Thomas Blackmon on August 5, 2005 filed by all defendants. (Holloway, James) (Entered: 07/29/2005)
582 Notice of Service of Subpoenas upon inmate witnesses served on 7/29/05 filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Completed Service of Subpoenas) (Holloway, James) Modified text on 8/10/2005 (M, V). (Entered: 08/03/2005)
583 Motion for appointment of counsel to represent the class members in the above matter filed by movant Anthony C. Apanovitch. (S, T) (Entered: 08/11/2005)
584 Supplemental memorandum in opposition to plaintiffs' motion to extend the jurisdiction of the court over the stipulation for injunctive relief until July 2006 filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 573 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit B, CIIC Report# 2 Exhibit C, MIT Report)(Holloway, James) Modified text on 8/17/2005 (M, V). (Entered: 08/12/2005)
585 Joint Motion for extension of time until August 29, 2005 to Submit Attorney Fee Application filed by all parties. (Holloway, James) (Entered: 08/15/2005)
586 Joint Motion for protective order filed by all parties. (Holloway, James) (Entered: 08/15/2005)
587 Notice that plaintiffs' motion for temporary restraining order/preliminary injunction has been reset for 8/31/05 and 9/1/05 at 9:00 a.m., in Courtroom 575 (Akron) and on 9/2/05 at 1:00 p.m., in Courtroom 19A (Cleveland) before Judge James S. Gwin. (Related Doc. 567 ) (M, G) Modified text on 8/15/2005 (M, G). (Entered: 08/15/2005)
588 Opposition to inmate Apanovitch's motion for appointment of counsel filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 583 . (Mancini, Joseph) Modified text on 8/25/2005 (M, V). (Entered: 08/18/2005)
606 True copy of order from the USCA for the Sixth Circuit: Remanding the case to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's decision 566 re 313 Notice of Appeal (USCA# 02−3816), 268 Notice of Appeal (USCA# 02−3429) and 419 Notice of Appeal (USCA# 03−3840). Circuit Judges: Moore and Rogers, District Judge: Forester. Date issued by USCA 8/16/05 (H, S P) (Entered: 08/30/2005)
589 Reply to response to Motion for extension of time until July 2006: Extend the Jurisdiction of the Court over the Stipulation for Injunctive Relief, Motion for extension of Time to File Reply to Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Extend Jurisdiction of the Court over the Stipulation for Injunctive Relief until seven days after receipt of Fussell Medical Investig ation Team Report filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 573 , 577 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 Daniels, Informal Complaint)(Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 08/19/2005)
590 Motion for writ of habeas corpus ad testifcandum (Plaintiffs' Representatives) filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 587 . (Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 08/21/2005)
591 Motion for writ of habeas corpus ad testifcandum for Plaintiffs' witnesses being held at the Ohio State Penitentiary filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 587 . (Lynd, Alice) Modified text on 8/25/2005 (M, V). (Entered: 08/21/2005)
592 Motion for writ of habeas corpus ad testifcandum for Plaintiffs' witnesses being held at the Mansfield Correctional Institution filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 587 . (Lynd, Alice) Modified text on 8/25/2005 (M, V). (Entered: 08/21/2005)
593 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 8/24/05 commanding the Warden of Ohio State Penitentiary to produce the bodies of Jason Robb, Keith Lamar, Brian Nemeth and Thomas Blackmon on 8/31/05−9/2/05 at 9:00 a.m., Courtroom 19A (Cleveland) for a matter pending before this Court. (Attachments: # 1 Writ of Habeas Corpus) (Related Doc. 590 , 591 ) (M, G) (Entered: 08/24/2005)

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 71 of 86

08/24/2005 08/24/2005
08/24/2005 08/24/2005 08/26/2005
08/26/2005 08/26/2005 08/26/2005 08/27/2005 08/29/2005 08/29/2005 08/29/2005 08/29/2005 08/30/2005 08/30/2005

Writ issued. Original Writ sent via ordinary mail to Warden, Ohio State Penitentiary; certified copies of Order and Writ issued to Warden via fax and U.S. Marshal via interoffice mail on 8/24/05. (M, G) (Entered: 08/24/2005)
594 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 8/24/05 commanding the Warden of Mansfield Correctional Institution to produce the bodies of Michael Benge, William T. Montgomery and Daniel Wilson on 8/31/05 − 9/2/05 at 9:00 a.m., Courtroom 19A (Cleveland) for a matter pending before this Court. (Attachments: # 1 Writ) (Related Doc. 592 ) (M, G) (Entered: 08/24/2005)
Writ issued. Original Writ sent via ordinary mail to Warden, Mansfield Correctional Institution; certified copies of Order and Writ issued to Warden via fax and U.S. Marshal via interoffice mail on 8/24/05. (Related Doc. 594 ) (M, G) (Entered: 08/24/2005)
595 Notice that the hearing in this case as to plaintiffs' motion for temporary restraining order/preliminary injunction has been relocated in its entirety to Courtroom 19A (Cleveland) for 8/31/05 − 9/2/05 beginning at 9:00 a.m., daily. (Related document(s) 587 (M, G) (Entered: 08/24/2005)
596 Motion for Order to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce Court's Prior Orders and Prevent Transfer from Death Row (Doc 538) and Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary and Permanent Injunction (Doc 559) filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 538 , 559 . (Mancini, Joseph) Modified text on 8/30/2005 (R, Li). (Entered: 08/26/2005)
597 Notice of Filing the Declaration and Report of Vincent M. Nathan filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Declaration and Report of Vince Nathan) (Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 08/26/2005)
598 Notice of Filing the Declaration and Report of Jeffrey L. Metzner, M.D. filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Declaration and Report of Jeffrey L. Metzner, M.D.) (Mancini, Joseph) Modified text on 8/30/2005 (R, Li). (Entered: 08/26/2005)
600 Response to defendants' opposition to Motion requesting appointment of counsel to represent petitoner and all class members filed by Anthony C Apanovitch. Related document(s) 588 . (S, T) Modified text and docket relationships on 8/30/2005 (R, Li). (Entered: 08/29/2005)
599 Report of Terry A. Kupers, M.D filed by all plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Kupers' Report) Related document(s) 595 . (Lynd, Alice) Modified on 9/7/2005. Report contains personal identifiers and is sealed. (M, V). (Entered: 08/27/2005)
601 Report of Jeanne Woodford filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Woodford Resume# 2 Woodford Report# 3 Items Reviewed by Woodford) (Landes, Mark) Modified text on 9/7/2005 (M, V). (Entered: 08/29/2005)
602 Motion for Order to Exclude Testimony of Jeanne Woodford filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 601 , 595 . (Lynd, Alice) Modified text on 8/30/2005 (R, Li). (Entered: 08/29/2005)
603 Second Motion for extension of time until 09/12/2005 to submit Plaintiffs' attorney fee application filed by all parties. (Holloway, James) Modified text on 8/30/2005 (R, Li). (Entered: 08/29/2005)
605 Deposition of Terry Collins taken on 7/21/05. Complete document on file, 78 pages & 10 pages of exhibits filed by all plaintiffs. (H, D) (Entered: 08/30/2005)
604 Depostion Transcript of Jospeh Wilhelm filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Deposition Transcript of Jospeh Wilhelm) (Holloway, James) Modified text on 9/7/2005 (M, V). (Entered: 08/30/2005)
607 Opposition to Motion for Order to Dismiss Plaintiffs Motion to Enforce Court's Orders and Prevent Transfer from Death Row 538 and Plaintiffs Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary and Permanent Injunction 559 filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 596 . (Lynd, Alice) Modified creating link on 9/7/2005 (M, V). (Entered: 08/30/2005)

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08/30/2005 08/31/2005 09/01/2005 09/02/2005 09/02/2005 09/08/2005
09/08/2005
09/08/2005
09/09/2005 09/09/2005 09/13/2005
09/16/2005 09/16/2005 09/16/2005 09/22/2005 09/28/2005 10/03/2005

608 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 8/30/05 concerning the live and video conference testimony of inmates in custody of Ohio State Penitentiary and Mansfield Correctional Institution. (Related Docs. 593 , 594 ) (M, G) (Entered: 08/30/2005)
609 Minutes of hearing as to plaintiffs' motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction held on 8/31/05. (Related Doc. 559 ) (Court Reporter: Judy Gage) (M, G) Modified text on 9/6/2005 (M, V). (Entered: 09/02/2005)
610 Minutes of hearing on plaintiffs' motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction held on 9/1/05. (Related Doc. 559 ) (Court Reporter: Judy Gage) (M, G) Modified text on 9/6/2005 (M, V). (Entered: 09/02/2005)
611 Minutes of hearing before Judge James S. Gwin on 9/2/05 concerning plaintiffs' motion for temporary restraining order/preliminary injunction. (Related Doc. 559 ) (Court Reporter: Judy Gage) (M, G) (Entered: 09/06/2005)
612 Original record returned from the Supreme Court of the United States on 9/2/05 Related document(s) 540 . (P, G) (Entered: 09/06/2005)
615 Transcript of Motions Hearing Proceedings held on 8/31/05 before Judge James S. Gwin filed manually. To obtain a bound copy of this transcript please contact Court Reporter Judith A. Gage at 216−357−7238. Complete document on file, Volume 1, pages 1 − 219. (H, D) (Entered: 09/12/2005)
616 Transcript of Motions Hearing Proceedings held on 9/1/05 before Judge James S. Gwin filed manually. To obtain a bound copy of this transcript please contact Court Reporter Judith A. Gage at 216−357−7238. Complete document on file, Volume 2, pages 220 − 455. (H, D) (Entered: 09/12/2005)
617 Transcript of Motions Hearing Proceedings held on 9/2/05 before Judge James S. Gwin filed manually. To obtain a bound copy of this transcript please contact Court Reporter Judith A. Gage at 216−357−7238. Complete document on file, Volume 3, pages 457 − 600. (H, D) (Entered: 09/12/2005)
613 Proposed Findings of Fact , Conclusions of Law, and Remedies filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 595 . (Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 09/09/2005)
614 Post Trial Brief for Hearing held Aug. 31, 2005 to Sept. 2, 2005 filed by all defendants. (Holloway, James) (Entered: 09/09/2005)
618 Joint Motion for extension of time until 10/20/05 within which to file motions addressing the continuation or termination of the 3/26/02 Injunctive Order filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 533 . (Mancini, Joseph) Modified text on 9/20/2005 (M, V). (Entered: 09/13/2005)
619 Brief in response to Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 613 filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Unreported Case)(Holloway, James) Modified creating link on 9/20/2005 (M, V). (Entered: 09/16/2005)
620 Joint Motion for attorney fees by Jules L. Lobel, James Eric Holloway filed by on behalf of all parties. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Settlement and Release Agreement)(Holloway, James) (Entered: 09/16/2005)
621 Response to Defendants' Initial Post−Hearing Brief (Death Row) filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 613 , 614 . (Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 09/16/2005)
622 Contempt of Court Order Motion filed by Dave Easley. (R, N) (Entered: 09/22/2005)
623 Notice of Termination of Contracts filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 573 , 589 . (Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 09/28/2005)
624 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 9/30/05. Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction is denied. However, plaintiffs' motion for a permanent injunction is deferred until such time as the Court may better evaluate the actual restrictions placed on and privileges afforded death row inmates at Ohio State Penitentiary. (Related Docs. 538 , 550 , 559 , 560 , 563 , 565 , 596 , 607 , 613 , 614 , 619 , 621 ) (M, G) (Entered: 10/03/2005)

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 73 of 86

10/05/2005 10/05/2005 10/07/2005 10/07/2005 10/07/2005 10/07/2005 10/20/2005
10/20/2005 10/31/2005
11/03/2005 11/03/2005 11/07/2005 11/09/2005

625 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 10/5/05 denying as moot the joint motion for extension of time to submit attorney fee application. (Related Doc. 585 ) (M, G) (Entered: 10/05/2005)
626 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 10/5/05 granting the second joint motion for an extension of time for plaintiffs to submit their attorney fee application. Said application shall be filed by 9/16/05. (Related Doc. 603 ) (M, G) (Entered: 10/05/2005)
627 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 10/7/05 denying motion seeking temporary restraining order filed by Daniel Wilson. (Related Doc. 564 ) (M, G) (Entered: 10/07/2005)
628 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 10/7/05 denying the motion for order permitting discovery filed by Daniel Wilson. (Related Doc # 569 ) (M, G) (Entered: 10/07/2005)
629 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 10/7/05 denying the motion of Anthony C. Apanovitch for appointment of counsel. (Related Doc. 583 ) (M, G) (Entered: 10/07/2005)
630 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 10/7/05 granting the joint motion for application of attorney fees. Attachments: # 1 Settlement and Release) (Related doc. 620 ) (M, G) (Entered: 10/07/2005)
631 Motion for Order Extending the Jurisdiction of This Court Over Due Process Issues for One Year with Memorandum in Support filed by all Plaintiffs. Related document(s) 606 , 618 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 New Policy 111−07# 2 Exhibit 2 Security Designation Long Form# 3 Exhibit 3 Supervision Review Form# 4 Exhibit 4 Saffell Appeal, etc.# 5 Exhibit 5A Slider, Administrative Control Review, 4/97# 6 Exhibit 5B Slider, Exhibit 31C (2003)# 7 Exhibit 5C Anticipated Length of Stay, 8/4/03# 8 Exhibit 5D Decision of Bureau of Classification, 7/30/04# 9 Exhibit Privilege Level Review, 8/18/04# 10 Exhibit 5F Anticipated Length of Stay, 11/1/04# 11 Exhibit 5G Ohio Parole Board Decision, Amended 6/24/05# 12 Exhibit Notice of Hearing, 5/20/05# 13 Exhibit 5I Reasons for Placement# 14 Exhibit 5J Security Level Review, 5/20/05# 15 Exhibit 5K Recommendation of Classification Committee, 5/25/05# 16 Exhibit 5L Recommendation of Warden, 6/15/05# 17 Exhibit 5M Decision of Bureau of Classification, 7/5/05# 18 Exhibit 5N Anticipated Length of Stay, 7/22/05# 19 Exhibit 6 Giano v. Kelly (2000)# 20 Exhibit 7 Ankrom v. Hageman (Ohio App. 2005))(Lynd, Alice) Modified text on 10/24/2005 (R, Li). (Entered: 10/20/2005)
632 Motion for Order to Terminate the Prospective Relief Provided by this Courts Orders Entered on February 25, 2002 and March 26, 2002, with Memorandum in Support, filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 227 , 259 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Declaration of Warden Houk)(Mancini, Joseph) Modified text on 10/24/2005 (R, Li). (Entered: 10/20/2005)
633 Notice of Filing Objection to Stipulation for Injunctive Relief in Fussell v. Wilkinson filed by all plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Fussell Objection# 2 Austin Stipulation 2002# 3 Stipulated Agreement 9/04# 4 Transcript 9/04# 5 Ninth Medical Report# 6 Tenth Medical Report# 7 Motion/Extend/Jurisdiction/Stipulation for Injunctive Relief# 8 Notice of Termination of Contracts# 9 Robert Cohen and Joe Goldenson 10/05)Related document(s) 584 , 573 , 623 . (Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 10/31/2005)
634 Opposition to Motion for Order to Terminate the Prospective Relief Provided by this Courts Orders Entered on February 25, 2002 and March 26, 2002 filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 632 . (Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 11/03/2005)
635 Notice Of Intent To File Their Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiffs Motion For Order Extending The Jurisdiction Of This Court Over Due Process Issues For One Year filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 631 . (Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 11/03/2005)
636 Letter to Judge Gwin dated 10/13/05 from Joseph Wilhelm, Chief Counsel, Death Penalty Division, Office of the Ohio Public Defender. (M, G) (Entered: 11/07/2005)
637 Notice of telephone conference call scheduled for 11/15/05 at 12:00 noon before Judge James S. Gwin and Chief Judge Sandra Beckwith. Counsel are instructed to call

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 74 of 86

11/10/2005
11/15/2005 11/17/2005
11/17/2005
11/18/2005 11/22/2005 11/22/2005
11/22/2005 11/22/2005
11/29/2005 11/29/2005 12/05/2005
12/05/2005 12/06/2005 12/06/2005 12/06/2005

800−473−8795 and provide the name of Sandra Beckwith as the Chairperson. (M, G) (Entered: 11/09/2005)
638 Motion for extension of Time to File Reply to Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Order Extending the Jurisdiction of This Court over Due Process Issues for One Year until December 6, 2005 filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 635 , 631 . (Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 11/10/2005)
639 Minutes of telephone conference call held on 11/15/05 before Judge James S. Gwin. (Court Reporter: none) (M, G) (Entered: 11/16/2005)
640 Unopposed Motion for For An Order To Enlarge The Time Within Which To File Their Reply To Plaintiffs Memorandum In Opposition To Defendants Motion To Terminate filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 634 . (Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 11/17/2005)
641 Unopposed Motion for For An Order To Enlarge The Time Within Which To File Their Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiffs Motion For An Order To Extend Jurisdiction filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 631 . (Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 11/17/2005)
642 Status Report on Inmate David Easley filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 622 . (Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 11/18/2005)
643 Motion to withdraw document #640 filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 640 . (Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 11/22/2005)
644 Unopposed Motion for An Order To Enlarge The Time Within Which To File Their Reply To Plaintiffs Memorandum In Opposition To Defendants Motion To Terminate filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 634 . (Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 11/22/2005)
645 Motion to withdraw document #641 filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 641 . (Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 11/22/2005)
646 Unopposed Motion for An Order To Enlarge The Time Within Which To File Their Memorandum in Opposition To Plaintiffs Motion For An Order To Extend Jurisdiction filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 631 . (Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 11/22/2005)
647 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 11/29/05 granting defendants' motion to withdraw Doc. 640. (Related Doc. 643 ) (M, G) (Entered: 11/29/2005)
648 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 11/29/05 granting defendants' motion to withdraw Doc. 641. (Related Doc. 645 ) (M, G) (Entered: 11/29/2005)
649 Opposition to Motion for Order Extending the Jurisdiction of This Court Over Due Process Issues for One Year filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 631 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, 5−23−02 Letter# 2 Exhibit B, 5−28−02 Letter# 3 Exhibit C, 10−3−03 Austin Letter# 4 Exhibit C1, Mancini Declaration)(Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 12/05/2005)
650 Reply to response to Motion for Order to Terminate the Prospective Relief Provided by this Courts Orders Entered on February 25, 2002 and March 26, 2002 filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 632 . (Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 12/05/2005)
651 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 12/6/05 granting defendants' motion for an extension of time to file their reply supporting motion to terminate prospective relief. (Related Doc # 644 , 634 , 632 ) (M, G) (Entered: 12/06/2005)
652 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 12/6/05 granting defendants' motion for extension of time to file their opposition to motion to extend jurisdiction. (Related Doc # 646 , 631 ) (M, G) (Entered: 12/06/2005)
653 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 12/6/05 granting plaintiffs an extension of time to file their rely supporting motion to extend jurisdiction of the Court. (Related Doc. 638 , 631 ) (M, G) (Entered: 12/06/2005)

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12/15/2005 12/19/2005 01/09/2006 01/24/2006 02/07/2006 03/21/2006
03/28/2006
03/29/2006 03/29/2006 04/04/2006 04/10/2006 04/11/2006 04/26/2006 05/01/2006 05/03/2006

654 Reply to response to Motion for Order Extending the Jurisdiction of This Court Over Due Process Issues for One Year filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 631 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 Mancini letter, 6/21/02# 2 Exhibit 2 Hearing Notice DRC 2652)(Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 12/15/2005)
655 Motion for Order To Terminate The Stipulation For Injunctive Relief Entered On April 5, 2002 filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 265 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit D, Fussell Order# 2 Exhibit E, Fussell Stipulation# 3 Exhibit F, Fussell Notice of Addition)(Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 12/19/2005)
656 Opposition to defendants' Motion for Order To Terminate The Stipulation For Injunctive Relief Entered On April 5, 2002 filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 655 . (Lynd, Alice) Modified text on 1/10/2006 (S, T). (Entered: 01/09/2006)
657 Reply to plaintiffs' response to defendants' Motion for Order To Terminate The Stipulation For Injunctive Relief Entered On April 5, 2002 filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 655 . (Mancini, Joseph) Modified text on 1/25/2006 (S, T). (Entered: 01/24/2006)
658 Agreed Protective Order approved by Judge James S. Gwin on 2/7/06. (Related Doc. 586 ) (M, G) (Entered: 02/07/2006)
659 Order and Opinion granting the Plaintiffs' motion for an Order extending jurisdiction of this Court over Due Process issues for one year and denying the Defendants' motion to terminate the prospective relief provided by this Court's February and March 2002 Orders. The Court further orders Ohio to modify its existing policy to include the procedural modifications described within this order for the placement and retention of inmates at OSP. Ohio shall fully implement these procedures within six months of this Order, or a final disposition of this matter. The Court declines to order the Defendants to release all level 4 security classification inmates involuntarily assigned to OSP. Further, the Court declines to order the Defendants to take any additional action, except for those procedures described within this order, with regard to classification consideration of level 5 "longtermers". Signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 3/21/2006. (Related Documents # 631 # 632 )(S, T) (Entered: 03/21/2006)
660 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 3/28/06 denying as moot plaintiffs' motions to show and permit discovery; granting plaintiffs' motion to extend until 7/2006 the jurisdiction of the Court over the stipulation for injunctive relief; granting plaintiffs' motion for extension of time to file reply in support of motion for extension of jurisdiction over stipulation for injunctive relief; denying as moot defendants' motion to dismiss the motion to enforce prior orders and prevent transfer from death row and for temporary restraining order and preliminary and permanent injunctions; denying as moot plaintiffs' motion to exclude testimony of Jeanne Woodford. (Related Docs. 552 , 553 , 573 , 577 , 596 , 602 ) (M, G) (Entered: 03/28/2006)
661 Address Change Notice filed by Anthony C Apanovitch. (S, T) (Entered: 03/30/2006)
662 Returned Mail addressed to Daniel Wilson & Anthony Apanovitch marked "Return to Sender". Related document(s) 659 (S, T) Addresses updated & document remailed 3/30/2006. (Entered: 03/30/2006)
663 Address Change Notice filed by Daniel Wilson. (S, T) (Entered: 04/04/2006)
664 Joint Motion for extension of To File Attorney Fee Application until May 1, 2006 filed by all parties. (Holloway, James) (Entered: 04/10/2006)
665 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 4/11/06 granting the parties' joint motion for an extension of time until 5/1/06 to submit the application for attorney fees. (Related Doc. 664 ) (M, G) (Entered: 04/11/2006)
666 Motion for Order to Compel (re Tate) filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 659 . (Attachments: # 1 # 2)(Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 04/26/2006)
667 Motion for Order to Enlarge Time to Submit Application for Attorney Fees filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 665 , 664 . (Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 05/01/2006)
668 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 5/3/06 granting plaintiffs' motion for an extension of time until 5/15/05 to submit their application for attorney fees. (Related Doc # 667 , 665 ) (M, G) (Entered: 05/03/2006)

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 76 of 86

05/11/2006 05/15/2006 05/18/2006 05/18/2006 05/18/2006 05/26/2006 05/30/2006 05/31/2006 06/01/2006 06/08/2006 06/12/2006 06/12/2006 06/19/2006
06/19/2006
06/21/2006

669 Opposition to Motion for Order to Compel (re Tate) filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 666 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Inmate Tate's Appeal to B.O.C.# 2 Exhibit Classification Policy# 3 Exhibit April 2006 Letter to Plaintiffs' Counsel)(Holloway, James) (Entered: 05/11/2006)
670 Joint Motion for extension of May 15, 2006 until May 30, 2006 filed by all parties. (Holloway, James) (Entered: 05/15/2006)
671 Reply to response to Motion for Order to Compel (re Tate) filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 666 . (Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 05/18/2006)
672 Motion for leave to File Second Amended Complaint filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 19 . (Attachments: # 1 Pleading Second Amended Complaint)(Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 05/18/2006)
673 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 5/18/06 granting the joint motion for an extension of time until 5/30/06 for plaintiffs to file their attorney fee request. (Related Doc. 670 ) (M, G) (Entered: 05/18/2006)
674 Motion for Order re Level 4 (Durkin) filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 659 , 631 . (Attachments: # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4 # 5)(Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 05/26/2006)
675 Joint Motion for attorney fees by Jules L. Lobel, James Eric Holloway filed by on behalf of all parties. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Attorney Fees and Cost Agreement)(Holloway, James) (Entered: 05/30/2006)
676 Unopposed Motion for extension of June 5, 2006 until June 19, 2006 filed by all defendants. (Holloway, James) (Entered: 05/31/2006)
677 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 6/1/06 granting defendants' motion for an extension of time until 6/19/06 to respond to plaintiffs' motion to file an amended complaint. (Related Doc. 676 ) (M, G) (Entered: 06/01/2006)
678 Unopposed Motion for For An Order To Enlarge The Time Within Which To File Defendants Response To Plaintiffs Motion For An Order Re Level 4 (Durkin) filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 674 . (Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 06/08/2006)
679 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 6/12/06 approving the joint Settlement Agreement and Release. (Related Doc. 675 ) (M, G) (Entered: 06/12/2006)
680 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 6/12/06 granting defendants' motion for an extension of time until 6/26/06 to respond to plaintiffs' motion for an order re: Level 4 (Durkin). (Related Doc. 678 ) (M, G) (Entered: 06/12/2006)
681 Motion for Order Extending the Medical Provisions of the Stipulation for Injunctive Relief until July 7, 2007 and Memorandum in Support filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 660 , 265 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Fred Cohen 3−20−06# 2 Exhibit 2 − Goldenson 3−5−06# 3 Exhibit 3 − Peterson 3−9−06# 4 Exhibit 4 − LaMarre 3−14−06# 5 Exhibit 5 − Peterson 4−30−06# 6 Exhibit 6 − Bowling# 7 Exhibit 7 − McLemore# 8 Exhibit 8 − Nathan 2−13−01# 9 Exhibit 9 − Hines v. Wilkinson)(Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 06/19/2006)
682 Opposition to Motion for leave to File Second Amended Complaint filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 672 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Jeffers v Doe# 2 Exhibit B, Robb Wardens Recommendation# 3 Exhibit B1, Robb BOC Decision# 4 Exhibit C, Slider Wardens Recommendation# 5 Exhibit C1, Slider BOC Decision# 6 Exhibit D, Lamar Wardens Recommendation# 7 Exhibit D1, Lamar BOC Decision# 8 Exhibit E, Sanders Wardens Recommendation# 9 Exhibit E1, Sanders BOC Decision# 10 Exhibit F, Were Wardens Recommendation# 11 Exhibit F1, Were BOC Decision# 12 Exhibit G, Hairston Wardens Recommendation# 13 Exhibit G1, Hairston BOC Decision# 14 Exhibit H, Jones Wardens Recommendation# 15 Exhibit H1, Jones BOC Decision# 16 Exhibit I, Daniels Wardens Recommendation# 17 Exhibit I1, Daniels BOC)(Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 06/19/2006)
683 Joint Motion for extension of Time to File Response/Reply until July 14, 2006 filed by all parties. Related document(s) 674 , 680 , 672 , 682 . (Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 06/21/2006)

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06/22/2006 06/29/2006 07/10/2006 07/11/2006 07/13/2006 07/14/2006 07/14/2006
07/19/2006
07/24/2006 07/25/2006
07/28/2006 07/28/2006 07/28/2006
07/28/2006

684 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 6/22/096 granting the joint motion for defendants to file their response to the motion for order concerning Level 4 (Durkin) and for plaintiffs' to file their reply concerning the motion to file an amended complaint, both by 7/14/06. (M, G) (Entered: 06/22/2006)
685 Notice Of Intent To File A Motion To Terminate The Medical Provisions Of The Stipulated Judgment filed by all defendants. (Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 06/29/2006)
686 Motion of Fussell plaintiffs to file Amicus Brief in opposition to extension of medical provisions of the stipulation for injunctive relief filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 681 . (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Amicus Brief (Gerhardstein, Alphonse) Modified text on 7/11/2006 (S, T). (Entered: 07/10/2006)
687 Notice of filing Amicus Brief in Fussell filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 686 . (Gerhardstein, Alphonse) (Entered: 07/11/2006)
688 Opposition to Motion for Order re Level 4 (Durkin) filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 674 . (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Ex. A, Warden Marc Houk Affidavit)(Holloway, James) (Entered: 07/13/2006)
689 Reply to response to Motion for leave to File Second Amended Complaint filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 672 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Rauso v. Sutton)(Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 07/14/2006)
690 Unopposed Motion for For An Order To Enlarge The Time Within Which To File Defendants Motion To Terminate The Medical Provisions Of The Stipulated Judgment And To File Defendants Response To Plaintiffs Motion For An Order Extending The Medical Provisions Of The Stipulation For Injunctive Relief filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 681 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Cohen Email)(Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 07/14/2006)
691 Notice DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF FILING OF MEDICAL REPORTS IN RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION REQUESTING AN EXTENSION OF THE MEDICAL PROVISIONS OF THE STIPULATION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Defendants' Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit Defendants' Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit Defendants' Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit Defendants' Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit Defendants' Exhibit E)Related document(s) 681 . (Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 07/19/2006)
692 Reply to response to Motion for Order re Level 4 (Durkin) filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 674 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 Saffell# 2 Exhibit 2 Dennison)(Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 07/24/2006)
693 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 7/25/06 granting defendants' motion for an extension of time until 7/28/06 to file motion to terminate medical provisions of the Stipulated Judgment and response to motion to extend medical provisions of Stipulation for Injunctive Relief. (Related Doc. 690 ) (M, G) (Entered: 07/25/2006)
694 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 7/28/06 denying the joint motion for enlargement of time to file motions concerning continuation/termination of 3/26/02 injunctive order. (Related Doc. 618 ) (M, G) (Entered: 07/28/2006)
695 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 7/28/06 denying as moot the motion for contempt of Dave Easley. (Related Doc. 622 ) (M, G) (Entered: 07/28/2006)
696 Motion for Order To Terminate The Medical Provisions Of The Stipulation For Injunctive Relief Entered On April 5, 2002 filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit F, Fred Cohen Declaration# 2 Exhibit G, Shansky Declaration# 3 Exhibit H, Shansky Report# 4 Exhibit I, LaMarre Report# 5 Exhibit J, Peterson Report)(Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 07/28/2006)
697 Opposition to Motion for Order Extending the Medical Provisions of the Stipulation for Injunctive Relief until July 7, 2007 and Memorandum in Support filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 681 . (Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 07/28/2006)

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08/02/2006 08/02/2006
08/02/2006 08/03/2006 08/03/2006
08/07/2006
08/11/2006 08/14/2006 08/31/2006 08/31/2006
09/05/2006 09/06/2006 09/21/2006 09/29/2006
10/02/2006 10/02/2006 10/09/2006

698 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 8/2/06 granting the motion of Fussell Plaintiffs to file amicus brief. The amicus brief shall be filed upon receipt of this marginal entry. (Related Doc. 681 , 686 ). (M, G) (Entered: 08/02/2006)
699 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 8/2/06 granting plaintiffs' motion as to security level 4 inmates. Defendants shall transfer inmates at security levels 4 or below with all due speed upon receipt of a valid transfer request. (Related Doc. 674 , 688 , 692 ) (M, G) (Entered: 08/02/2006)
700 Amicus Brief in opposition to extension of medical provisions of the stipulation for injunctive relief filed by Alphonse Gerhardstein, David Singleton. (Gerhardstein, Alphonse) (Entered: 08/02/2006)
701 Amicus Brief of Fussell plaintiffs in opposition to extension of medical provisions of the stipulation for injunctive relief filed by Alphonse Gerhardstein, David Singleton. Related document(s) 700 , 698 . (Gerhardstein, Alphonse) (Entered: 08/03/2006)
702 Order and Opinion signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 8/3/06 granting defendants' motion to terminate the stipulation for injunctive relief, denying plaintiffs' motion to extend the medical provisions of the stipulation for injunctive relief until 7/707, and granting defendants' motion to terminate the medical provisions of the stipulation for injunctive relief. (Related Doc. 655 , 656 , 657 , 696 , 681 , 686 , 697 (M, G) (Entered: 08/03/2006)
703 Order granting plaintiffs' motion to compel (Related Doc # 666 ) and further orders the State of Ohio to return Frederick Tate to TCI for the pendency of a complete rehearing of his security placement using a process consistent with this opinion. Signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 8/7/06.(S, T) (Entered: 08/07/2006)
704 Motion for extension of time to file Motion for Attorneys' Fees until 30 days after decisions become final, filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 703 , 699 . (Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 08/11/2006)
705 Motion for leave to file Supplemental Authority filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 672 , 689 . (Attachments: # 1)(Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 08/14/2006)
706 Attorney Appearance by Janet Hill Arbogast filed by on behalf of all defendants. (Arbogast, Janet) (Entered: 08/31/2006)
707 Opposition to plaintiff's motion for leave to file supplemental authority in support of plaintiff's motion to file second amended complaint filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 705 , 672 . (Arbogast, Janet) Modified on 9/1/2006 (P, S). (Entered: 08/31/2006)
708 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 9/5/06 granting plaintiffs' unopposed motion for an extension of time to file motion for attorney fees. (Related Doc. 704 ) (M, G) Modified text on 9/6/2006 (M, G). (Entered: 09/05/2006)
709 Reply to response to Motion for leave to file Supplemental Authority filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 705 . (Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 09/06/2006)
710 Notice of Filing Revised Classification Policy filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Revised Policy) (Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 09/21/2006)
711 Motion for extension of time to Respond to Defendants' Proposed Level 5 Classification Policy and Forms until 30 days after filing of forms filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 710 . (Attachments: # 1Exhibit 1)(Lynd, Alice) Modified text on 10/2/2006 (S, T). (Entered: 09/29/2006)
712 Motion for extension of October 2, 2006 until October 13, 2006 filed by all defendants. (Holloway, James) (Entered: 10/02/2006)
713 Notice of Filing Forms Associated With Revised Level 5 Classification Policy filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit B, Placement Forms# 2 Exhibit C, Review Forms)Related document(s) 710 . (Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 10/02/2006)
714 Joint Motion for attorney fees by Jules L. Lobel, James Eric Holloway filed by on behalf of all parties. (Holloway, James) (Entered: 10/09/2006)

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10/11/2006 10/31/2006
11/13/2006
11/19/2006 11/19/2006 11/19/2006 11/19/2006 12/05/2006 12/11/2006 12/12/2006 12/22/2006
01/29/2007 01/30/2007 01/31/2007 02/09/2007

715 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 10/11/06 granting defendants' motion for an extension of time until 10/13/06 for plaintiffs to file their motion for attorney fees. (Related Doc. 712 ) (M, G) (Entered: 10/11/2006)
716 Motion for Order Directing Defendants to Propose Further Modifications of Their Level 5 and Level 4 Placement and Retention Policies and Forms filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 713 , 711 , 710 , 703 , 659 , 699 . (Attachments: # 1 Brief in Support # 2 Exhibit 1 Detailed Changes Recommended by Plaintiffs)(Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 10/31/2006)
717 Motion for Order To Enlarge The Time Within Which To File Their Response To Plaintiffs Motion For An Order Directing Defendants To Propose Further Modifications Of Their Level 5 And Level 4 Placement And Retention Policies And Forms filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 716 . (Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 11/13/2006)
718 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 11/19/06 granting defendant's motion for an extension of time until 12/11/06 to respond to plaintiffs' motion concerning further modifications to Levels 4 and 5 placement and retention policies and forms. (Related Docs. 717 , 716 ) (M, G) (Entered: 11/19/2006)
719 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 11/19/06 granting plaintiffs' motion for leave to file supplemental authority which shall be filed upon receipt of this marginal entry. (Related Doc. 705 , 672 ) (M, G) (Entered: 11/19/2006)
720 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 11/19/06 granting plaintiffs' motion for extension of time to respond to proposed Level 5 classification policy and forms until 30 days after filing of forms. (Related Doc. 711 ) (M, G) (Entered: 11/19/2006)
721 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 11/19/06 granting the joint motion for attorney fees. (Related Doc. 714 ) (M, G) (Entered: 11/19/2006)
722 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 12/5/06 denying plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. (Related Doc. 672 , 682 , 689 ) (M, G) (Entered: 12/05/2006)
723 Opposition to Motion for Order Directing Defendants to Propose Further Modifications of Their Level 5 and Level 4 Placement and Retention Policies and Forms filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 716 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit # 2 Exhibit)(Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 12/11/2006)
724 Notice of Filing An Unreported Case To Supplement The Record filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Johnson v. O'Donnell)Related document(s) 723 . (Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 12/12/2006)
725 Reply to response to Motion for Order Directing Defendants to Propose Further Modifications of Their Level 5 and Level 4 Placement and Retention Policies and Forms filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 716 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 Election Form# 2 Exhibit 2−A Jordan Anticipated Length of Stay# 3 Exhibit 2−B Jordan Kite UMA and Offender Data# 4 Exhibit 2−C Jordan Hoagland Comment# 5 Exhibit 3 Carpenter Anticipated Length of Stay# 6 Exhibit 4 Charts)(Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 12/22/2006)
726 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 1/29/07 that the parties advise the Court by 12:00 noon on 2/2/07 if anyone requests a hearing prior to the Court ruling on whether defendants should be permitted to put the proposed Level 4 and Level 5 classification schemes into effect. (M,G) (Entered: 01/29/2007)
727 Response to Court's Order re Hearing filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 726 . (Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 01/30/2007)
728 Notice that a hearing as to defendants' Level 4 and 5 classification scheme has been set for 2/16/07 at 9:00 a.m., in Courtroom 18A (Cleveland) before Judge James S. Gwin. (Related Doc. 726 ) (M,G) (Entered: 01/31/2007)
729 Motion for writ of habeas corpus ad testifcandum filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 728 . (Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 02/09/2007)

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02/12/2007 02/12/2007 02/13/2007 02/15/2007
02/15/2007 02/16/2007 02/20/2007
02/23/2007
02/27/2007 02/27/2007
03/02/2007 03/07/2007 03/08/2007 03/13/2007
03/16/2007 03/19/2007 03/21/2007

730 Opposition to 729 Motion for writ of habeas corpus ad testifcandum filed by all defendants. (Arbogast, Janet) (Entered: 02/12/2007)
731 Reply to 729 Motion for writ of habeas corpus ad testifcandum filed by all plaintiffs. (Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 02/12/2007)
732 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 2/13/07 granting plaintiffs' motion for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum. (Related Doc. 729 ) (M,G) (Entered: 02/13/2007)
Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum issued via fax (330−742−5135) to Warden, Ohio State Penitentiary, as to Keith Lamar and Roy Slider for hearing on 2/16/07 at 9:00 a.m., Courtroom 18A (Cleveland) before Judge James S. Gwin. (Related Doc. 732 ) (M,G) (Entered: 02/15/2007)
734 Notice Concerning Level 4 Policy filed by all defendants. (Landes, Mark) (Entered: 02/15/2007)
735 Minutes of hearing before Judge James S. Gwin on 2/16/07 as to Level 4 and 5 classification scheme. (Court Reporter: B. Matthews) (Related Doc. 716 ) (M,G) (Entered: 02/16/2007)
736 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 2/20/07. Defendants shall provide plaintiffs and the Court with Level 4 proposed policy by 2/28/07; plaintiffs to file response by 3/7/07; parties to submit proposed facts by 3/14/07 and proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by 3/21/07. The Court will then consider this matter at issue. (M,G) (Entered: 02/20/2007)
737 Amended Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 2/23/06 that defendants provide plaintiffs and the Court with Level 4 proposed policy by 2/28/07; plaintiffs to file response by 3/7/07; stipulated facts to be filed by 3/14/07 and proposed Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law by 3/21/07. The Court will then consider this matter at issue. (Related Doc. 736 ) (M,G) (Entered: 02/23/2007)
738 Notice of Filing Policy for Classification Level 4 Inmates at the OSP filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Proposed Level 4 Policy for OSP)(Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 02/27/2007)
739 Transcript of motion hearing Proceedings held on 2/16/07 before Judge James S. Gwin filed manually. To obtain a bound copy of this transcript please contact Court Reporter Bruce A. Matthews at 216/357−7207. Complete document on file, 92 pages. (C,B) Modified to change date filed on 2/28/2007 (C, Br). (Entered: 02/28/2007)
740 Motion for conference/hearing on Defendants' Proposed OSP Level 4 Classification Policy filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 738 . (Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 03/02/2007)
741 Response to Defendants' Proposed Level 4 Classification Policy filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 738 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 Re−Entry Accountability Plan) (Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 03/07/2007)
742 Notice that a conference with counsel has been scheduled before Judge James S. Gwin on on 3/13/07 at 10:00 a.m., in Chambers 18A (Cleveland). (M,G) (Entered: 03/08/2007)
743 Minutes of status conference before Judge James S. Gwin on 3/13/07. Defendants to provide plaintiffs and Court with Level 4 proposed policy by 3/28/07; plaintiffs to file response by 4/7/07; Level 5 proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to be filed by 4/21/07; parties excused from filing stipulated facts. (Court Reporter: none) (M,G) (Entered: 03/13/2007)
744 Joint Motion for Order To Extend This Courts Jurisdiction Over Due Process Issues filed by all defendants. (Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 03/16/2007)
745 Joint Motion for Order To Extend The Time Within Which To File Briefs Concerning The Proposed Classification Level 4 Policy filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 743 . (Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 03/19/2007)
746 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 3/21/07 granting the parties' joint motion for an extension of this Court's jurisdiction over due process issues to 9/21/07.

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03/21/2007 04/13/2007 04/13/2007 04/20/2007 05/17/2007 05/21/2007
05/21/2007 05/29/2007 07/11/2007
07/13/2007 07/18/2007 08/10/2007

(Related Doc. 744 ) (M,G) (Entered: 03/21/2007)
747 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 3/21/07 granting the parties' joint motion for an extension of time to 4/13/07 to file briefs concerning proposed classification Level 4 policy. (Related Doc. 745 ) (M,G) (Entered: 03/21/2007)
748 Joint Motion for Order Granting An Extension of Time Within Which To File Proposed Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law And Additional Agreements, If Any filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 743 . (Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 04/13/2007)
749 Joint Notice of Filing the Status Report of the Parties filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Status Report of Parties)Related document(s) 747 .(Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 04/13/2007)
750 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 4/20/07 granting the joint motion for an extension of time until 5/21/07 to file proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and any additional agreements. (Related Doc. 748 ) (M,G) (Entered: 04/20/2007)
751 Notice of Change to Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction's Parole Board Hearing Policy filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Memo re Parole Board Hearing Policy)(Arbogast, Janet) (Entered: 05/17/2007)
752 Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Levels 5 and 4) filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 738 , 710 , 750 , 716 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1A Watley Anticipated Length of Stay 3/07# 2 Exhibit 1B Watley Orientation Checklist 3/07# 3 Exhibit 2 Chart Anticipated Length of Stay 2004−06# 4 Exhibit 3A Daniels security classification review 5−6/06# 5 Exhibit 3B Daniels privilege level review 11/06# 6 Exhibit 3C Daniels Anticipated Length of Stay 11/06# 7 Exhibit 4A Alvin Jones, RIB, Hudson, 1/96# 8 Exhibit 4B Alvin Jones Privilege Level Review 1/07# 9 Exhibit 4C Alvin Jones, Lynd letter, 9/03# 10 Exhibit 4D Alvin Jones Classification Committee 2/03# 11 Exhibit 4E Alvin Jones, Warden 3/03# 12 Exhibit 4F Alvin Jones, Bureau 4/03# 13 Exhibit 4G Alvin Jones Anticipated Length of Stay 11/06# 14 Exhibit 5A Batcho Informal Complaint 3/21/07# 15 Exhibit 5B Batcho Informal Complaint 3/29/07# 16 Exhibit 5C Batcho Disposition of Grievance 4/07# 17 Exhibit 6 Giano v. Kelly (W.D.N.Y. 2000)# 18 Exhibit 7 DRC Policy 53−CLS−01 3/04)(Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 05/21/2007)
753 Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion Seeking to Modify Defendants Proposed Classification Policy and Forms filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 737 , 716 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit D1−2, Robb# 2 Exhibit E1−6, Stojetz)(Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 05/21/2007)
754 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 5/29/07 denying as moot plaintiffs' motion for conference/hearing on proposed OSP Level 4 Classification Policy. (Related Docs. 740 , 742 , 743 ) (M,G) (Entered: 05/29/2007)
755 Motion for Order to Re−Open Mental Health Claims Pursuant to FRCP 60(b)(6) filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 499 , 265 , 20 . (Attachments: # 1 Brief in Support Memorandum in Support# 2 Proposed Order # 3 Exhibit 1 McCauley essay# 4 Exhibit 2 Privilege Level Review, 12/06/05# 5 Exhibit 3 Anticipated Length of Stay, 11/30/06# 6 Exhibit 4 Declaration of Bradley Vinton, 6/10/07# 7 Exhibit 5 Affidavit of Namir Abdul Mateen, a/k/a James Were, 6/1/07# 8 Exhibit 6 Blackmon, Informal Complaint, 6/5/06# 9 Exhibit 7 Level 5B Chart)(Lynd, Alice) Modified text on 7/30/2007 (R, Sh). (Entered: 07/11/2007)
756 Motion for For Order Granting Defendants Leave To File Their Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiffs Motion To Reopen (Doc. 755) By August 10, 2007 filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 755 . (Mancini, Joseph) (Entered: 07/13/2007)
757 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 7/18/07 granting defendants' motion for an extension of time until 8/10/07 to file their response to plaintiffs' motion to reopen. (Related Doc. 756 ) (M,G) (Entered: 07/18/2007)
758 Opposition to 755 Motion for Order to Re−Open Mental Health Claims Pursuant to FRCP 60(b)(6) filed by all defendants. (Mancini, Joseph) Modified text for duplicate wording on 8/13/2007 (R, Sh). (Entered: 08/10/2007)

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 82 of 86

08/14/2007 08/16/2007 08/20/2007 08/27/2007
09/04/2007
09/21/2007 09/27/2007 10/03/2007 10/03/2007 10/09/2007 10/09/2007 10/10/2007 10/12/2007

759 Reply in support of 755 Motion for Order to Re−Open Mental Health Claims Pursuant to FRCP 60(b)(6) filed by all plaintiffs. (Lynd, Alice) Modified text on 8/15/2007 (R, Sh). (Entered: 08/14/2007)
760 Notice Defendants'response to Plaintiffs' Motion for extension of time to file Reply to Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Order to reopen mental health claims filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 759 .(Mancini, Joseph) Modified text on 8/20/2007 (R, Sh). (Entered: 08/16/2007)
761 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 8/20/07 granting leave to plaintiffs until 8/27/07 to file their reply in support of motion to reopen mental health claims. (Related Doc. 759 ) (M,G) (Entered: 08/20/2007)
762 Reply in support of 755 Motion for Order to Re−Open Mental Health Claims Pursuant to FRCP 60(b)(6) filed by all plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 6 DRC Policy 67−MNH−02# 2 Exhibit 7 Declaration of Michael A. Jones# 3 Exhibit 8 Declaration of Walter Raglin# 4 Exhibit 9 Declaration of Joseph Riley# 5 Exhibit 10 Affidavit of Jason Goudlock# 6 Exhibit 11 Seymour L. Halleck, M.D., Second Interim Report, Feb. 11, 2004)(Lynd, Alice) Modified text on 8/29/2007 (R, Sh). (Entered: 08/27/2007)
763 Motion for Order Extending the Jurisdiction of the Court filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 752 , 624 , 746 , 755 , 716 , 538 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 Declaration of Frederick Tate and letter from Eleby to Tate, 1/19/07# 2 Exhibit 2 Tate, Privilege Level Review, 7/17/07# 3 Exhibit 3 Saffell Declaration, 8/22/07# 4 Exhibit 4 Newell, Classification Review and Supervision Review Form, Nov.−Dec. 2006# 5 Exhibit 5 Newell, E−mail from S. Wilson to G. Siegfried re Bureau's Decision, 5/2/07# 6 Exhibit 6 Newell, Letter from Eleby, 12/28/06# 7 Exhibit 7 Newell, Request for Reconsideration# 8 Exhibit 8 Newell, Letter from Eleby, 5/22/07, and Notice of Mental Health Hearing, 1/25/06# 9 Exhibit 9 Apanovitch, Visiting Grievance, #CI−06−064# 10 Exhibit 10 Inmate Handbook Death Row Unit, Feb. 2007, cover, pp. 11−12, 34, 37# 11 Exhibit 11 Inmate Handbook [Levels 5 & 4], 2/26/07, cover, pp. 39−41, 52, 56# 12 Exhibit 12 OSP Policy 15−08−01, Use of Restraints, 12/12/05, pp. 1, 11, 12# 13 Exhibit 13 Benge, Clemency Grievance, #03−06−029# 14 Exhibit 14 Robb, Appeal to Warden, 6/4/07# 15 Exhibit 15 Robb, Notice of Anticipated Length of Stay, 8/3/07)(Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 09/04/2007)
764 Motion for Order to Terminate Prospective Relief filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 659 , 259 , 227 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Warden Marc Houk Declaration)(Holloway, James) (Entered: 09/21/2007)
765 Opinion and Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 9/27/07 granting in part and denying in part plaintiffs' motion for order directing defendants to modify their proposed prison administration policies. (Related Doc. 716 ) (M,G) (Entered: 09/27/2007)
766 Motion for extension of time to move for attorneys' fees until November 23, 2007 filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 716 , 765 . (Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 10/03/2007)
767 Unopposed Motion for extension of time until 10/12/2007 to File Opposition to Motion to Extend Jurisdiction filed by all defendants. (Holloway, James) (Entered: 10/03/2007)
768 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 10/9/07 granting moving defendants' motion for an extension of time until 10/12/07 to respond to motion to extend jurisdiction. (Related Doc. 767 ) (M,G) (Entered: 10/09/2007)
769 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 10/9/07 granting plaintiffs' motion for an extension of time until 11/23/07 to file motion for attorneys' fees. (Related Doc. 766 ) (M,G) (Entered: 10/09/2007)
770 Joint Motion for extension of Responses to Doc. 763 until 10/19/2007 and 11/05/2007 filed by all parties. Related document(s) 763 . (Holloway, James) (Entered: 10/10/2007)
771 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 10/12/07 granting the joint motion for the parties to respond/reply to the motion for order extending jurisdiction.

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 83 of 86

10/18/2007 10/19/2007 10/22/2007 10/26/2007
10/29/2007 11/05/2007 11/05/2007 11/09/2007 11/16/2007 11/19/2007
11/19/2007
12/04/2007 12/04/2007

Responses to be filed by 10/19/07 and replies to be filed by 11/5/07. (Related Doc. 770 ) (M,G) (Entered: 10/12/2007)
772 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 10/18/07 denying plaintiffs' motion for order to vacate previous judgment and reopen mental health claims. (Related Docs. 755 , 758 , 762 ) (M,G) (Entered: 10/18/2007)
773 Opposition to 763 Motion for Order Extending the Jurisdiction of the Court filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Haney Declaration# 2 Exhibit B, Houk Declaration)(Holloway, James) (Entered: 10/19/2007)
774 Opposition to 764 Motion for Order to Terminate Prospective Relief filed by all plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Level 5 Chart# 2 Exhibit Level 4B Chart)(Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 10/22/2007)
775 NOTICE OF APPEAL to the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals from the 765 Opinion and Order of 9/27/07, filed by defendants Reginald Wilkinson, Stephen J Huffman, Bernard J. Ryznar, Todd E. Ishee, Bruce A. Martin, Deborah Nixon Hughes, Cheryl Jorgensen−Martinez, Manish B. Joshi, Patrick F. Biggs, Audrey Sandor Nietzel and Matthew Meyer. (Filing fee of $455 received, receipt number 14660013471) (Arbogast, Janet). Modified text on 10/29/2007 (H, SP). (Entered: 10/26/2007)
776 Motion to stay Order Pending Appeal filed by all defendants. Related document(s) 765 . (Arbogast, Janet) (Entered: 10/29/2007)
777 Reply in support of 763 Motion for Order Extending the Jurisdiction of the Court filed by all plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 Saffell Declaration, 10/25/07# 2 Exhibit 2 Apanovitch Statement, 10/28/07# 3 Exhibit 3 Benge Declaration, 10/24/07, and ICRs# 4 Exhibit 4 Velasquez v. Tanner et al.)(Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 11/05/2007)
778 Reply in support of 764 Motion for Order to Terminate Prospective Relief filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Declaration of Warden Marc Houk with attachments)(Holloway, James) (Entered: 11/05/2007)
779 Opposition to 776 Motion to stay Order Pending Appeal filed by all plaintiffs. (Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 11/09/2007)
780 Acknowledgment from the USCA for Sixth Circuit of receipt of 775 Notice of Appeal (USCA# 07−4371). Date filed in USCA 11/14/07. (H, SP) (Entered: 11/16/2007)
781 Joint Motion for extension of time until Sixty Days after Appeal is Final to File Attorney Fee and Costs Application filed by Michael Benge, Alonzo L. Bonner, Kevin B. Roe, Emanuel B. Newell, Orsino Iacovone, Daryl Heard, Frederick O. Harris, Jr, Keith Gardner, James DeJarnette, Robert Baksi, August Cassano, David Clark, Charles E. Austin, Roy D. Donald, David Easley, Brian K. Eskridge, Roger Lee Hall, Edward O. Hodge, Stacy Lane, Kunta Kenyatta, James D. Mitchell, John W. Perotti, Lamar Preston, Jason H. Robb, Richard Siggers, Eric Swofford, Lahray Thompson, Edward A. Tilley, Mark Trawick, Reginald Wilkinson, Stephen J Huffman, Bernard J. Ryznar, Todd E. Ishee, Bruce A. Martin, Deborah Nixon Hughes, Cheryl Jorgensen−Martinez, Manish B. Joshi, Patrick F. Biggs, Audrey Sandor Nietzel, Matthew Meyer. Related document(s) 775 , 765 . (Holloway, James) (Entered: 11/19/2007)
782 Unopposed Motion for extension of time until December 7, 2007 to File Reply in Support of Defendants' Motion to Stay filed by Reginald Wilkinson, Stephen J Huffman, Bernard J. Ryznar, Todd E. Ishee, Bruce A. Martin, Deborah Nixon Hughes, Cheryl Jorgensen−Martinez, Manish B. Joshi, Patrick F. Biggs, Audrey Sandor Nietzel, Matthew Meyer. Related document(s) 779 , 775 , 776 . (Holloway, James) (Entered: 11/19/2007)
783 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 12/4/07 granting extension to plaintiffs for leave to file their request for attorney fees 60 days after appeal is final. (Related Doc. 781 ) (M,G) (Entered: 12/04/2007)
784 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 12/4/07 granting defendants leave to file reply in support of motion to stay by 12/7/07. (Related Doc. 782 ) (M,G) (Entered: 12/04/2007)

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 84 of 86

12/05/2007
12/06/2007 12/06/2007 12/11/2007 12/11/2007 12/21/2007 01/02/2008 01/04/2008
01/06/2008 01/07/2008 01/07/2008
01/07/2008 01/08/2008 01/10/2008 01/11/2008 01/11/2008

785 Unopposed Motion for extension of time until 12/28/07 to File Reply in Support of Motion to Stay Order Pending Appeal filed by Reginald Wilkinson, Stephen J Huffman, Bernard J. Ryznar, Todd E. Ishee, Bruce A. Martin, Deborah Nixon Hughes, Cheryl Jorgensen−Martinez, Manish B. Joshi, Patrick F. Biggs, Audrey Sandor Nietzel, Matthew Meyer. (Holloway, James) (Entered: 12/05/2007)
786 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 12/6/07 granting, in part, defendants' motion for extension of time to file reply supporting motion to stay pending appeal. Reply to be filed by 12/21/07. (Related Doc. 785 ) (M,G) (Entered: 12/06/2007)
787 Joint Notice regarding Stipulation of the Parties Regarding Discovery Issues filed by Charles E. Austin, Stephen J Huffman. (Holloway, James) (Entered: 12/06/2007)
788 Stipulation regarding discovery issues approved by Judge James S. Gwin on 12/11/07. (Related Doc. 787 ) (M,G) (Entered: 12/11/2007)
789 Notice of oral argument before Judge James S. Gwin on 1/11/08 at 8:30 a.m., Courtroom 18A (Cleveland) on the motions to extend jurisdiction and to terminate prospective relief. (Related Docs. 763 , 764 ) (M,G) (Entered: 12/11/2007)
790 Reply to response to 776 Motion to stay Order Pending Appeal filed by Reginald Wilkinson, Stephen J Huffman, Bernard J. Ryznar, Todd E. Ishee, Deborah Nixon Hughes, Cheryl Jorgensen−Martinez, Manish B. Joshi, Patrick F. Biggs, Audrey Sandor Nietzel, Matthew Meyer. (Holloway, James) (Entered: 12/21/2007)
791 Motion for writ of habeas corpus ad testifcandum filed by Plaintiff Jason H. Robb. Related document(s) 789 , 763 , 764 . (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Proposed Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum)(Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 01/02/2008)
792 Opposition to 791 Motion for writ of habeas corpus ad testifcandum filed by Reginald Wilkinson, Stephen J Huffman, Bernard J. Ryznar, Todd E. Ishee, Bruce A. Martin, Deborah Nixon Hughes, Cheryl Jorgensen−Martinez, Manish B. Joshi, Patrick F. Biggs, Audrey Sandor Nietzel, Matthew Meyer. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Jackson v. Foti, # 2 Exhibit B, Riggins v. Carter, # 3 Exhibit C, Declaration of Warden Marc Houk)(Holloway, James) (Entered: 01/04/2008)
793 Reply to response to 791 Motion for writ of habeas corpus ad testifcandum filed by Jason H. Robb. (Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 01/06/2008)
794 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 1/7/08 granting the plaintiffs' motion for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum as to Jason Robb and Keith Lamar for hearing set 1/11/08 at 8:30 a.m., in Courtroom 18A (Cleveland). (Attachments: # 1 Writ of Habeas Corpus) (Related Doc. 791 ) (M,G) (Entered: 01/07/2008)
795 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 1/7/08. Counsel for plaintiffs shall select and notify the Court via electronic filing of 1 representative to attend the hearing set for 1/11/08. Upon receipt of same the courtroom deputy shall notify Ohio State Penitentiary of said selection for transport purposes. (Related Docs. 791 , 792 , 793 , 794 ) (M,G) (Entered: 01/07/2008)
796 Notice of Selection of Representative filed by Jason H. Robb. Related document(s) 793 , 791 , 792 , 795 , 794 .(Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 01/07/2008)
797 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 1/8/08 approving the selection of Jason Robb as plaintiffs' representative for the hearing on 1/11/08. (Related Doc. 794 , 795 ) (M,G) Modified text on 1/11/2008 (M,G). (Entered: 01/08/2008)
798 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 1/10/08 denying defendants' motion to stay pending appeal of the Court's entry of 9/27/07. (Related Docs. 776 , 779 , 790 ) (M,G) Modified text on 1/11/2008 (M,G). (Entered: 01/10/2008)
799 Minutes of motions hearing before Judge James S. Gwin on 1/11/08. (Related Docs. 763 , 764 ) (Court Reporter: J. Gage) (M,G) (Entered: 01/11/2008)
800 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 1/11/08 that, pending resolution of the parties opposing motions to extend or terminate jurisdiction over this case, the Court maintains jurisdiction in this matter. (Related Docs. 763 , 764 ) (M,G) (Entered: 01/11/2008)

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 85 of 86

01/14/2008 01/16/2008 01/17/2008 01/17/2008 01/22/2008 01/29/2008 01/30/2008
02/07/2008 02/09/2008 02/11/2008
02/12/2008 02/12/2008

801 Notice of Filing Non−Appeal Transcript Order filed by Jason H. Robb. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Non−Appeal Transcript Order)Related document(s) 789 .(Lynd, Alice) Modified on 1/16/2008, transcript order form attached as exhibit, attorney notified and document filed (R,N). (Entered: 01/14/2008)
802 Non−Appeal Transcript Order Form for proceedings held on 1/11/08 before Judge Gwin 801 . Court Reporter: Judge Gage. Requested completion date: 30 days filed by all plaintiffs. (R,N) (Entered: 01/16/2008)
803 Transcript of hearing on motion held on January 11, 2008 before Judge James S. Gwin. To obtain a bound copy of this transcript please contact Court Reporter Judith Gage at 216−357−7238. Complete document on file, 46 pages. Related document(s) 802 . (G,Ju) (Entered: 01/17/2008)
804 Joint Motion for Order filed by Reginald Wilkinson, Stephen J Huffman, Bernard J. Ryznar, Todd E. Ishee, Bruce A. Martin, Deborah Nixon Hughes, Cheryl Jorgensen−Martinez, Manish B. Joshi, Patrick F. Biggs, Audrey Sandor Nietzel, Matthew Meyer. (Landes, Mark) (Entered: 01/17/2008)
805 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 1/22/08 granting the parties' joint motion for the filing of any application for attorney fees within 14 days after Court's ruling on motions to terminate or extend jurisdiction. (Related Doc. 804 ) (M,G) (Entered: 01/22/2008)
806 Notice of Substitution of Counsel removing attorney Janet Hill Arbogast and adding attorney Mary Anne Reese filed by on behalf of Reginald Wilkinson, Stephen J Huffman, Bernard J. Ryznar, Todd E. Ishee, Bruce A. Martin, Deborah Nixon Hughes, Cheryl Jorgensen−Martinez, Manish B. Joshi, Patrick F. Biggs, Audrey Sandor Nietzel, Matthew Meyer. (Reese, Mary) (Entered: 01/29/2008)
807 Supplemental Memorandum In Support of 764 Motion for Order to Terminate Prospective Relief filed by Reginald Wilkinson, Stephen J Huffman, Bernard J. Ryznar, Todd E. Ishee, Bruce A. Martin, Deborah Nixon Hughes, Cheryl Jorgensen−Martinez, Manish B. Joshi, Patrick F. Biggs, Audrey Sandor Nietzel, Matthew Meyer. (Attachments: # 1 Transcript of hearing 1/11/08, # 2 Unreported case)(Landes, Mark) (Entered: 01/30/2008)
808 Notice of Supplemental Authority filed by Reginald Wilkinson, Stephen J Huffman, Bernard J. Ryznar, Todd E. Ishee, Bruce A. Martin, Deborah Nixon Hughes, Cheryl Jorgensen−Martinez, Manish B. Joshi, Patrick F. Biggs, Audrey Sandor Nietzel, Matthew Meyer. Related document(s) 764 .(Landes, Mark) (Entered: 02/07/2008)
809 Motion for leave to file Reply to Defendants' Supplemental Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Terminate Prospective Relief and Supplemental Authority filed by Plaintiff Jason H. Robb. Related document(s) 763 , 764 , 807 , 808 . (Attachments: # 1 Brief in Support Proposed Reply, # 2 Exhibit 1 Lancaster v. Tilton)(Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 02/09/2008)
810 Response to 809 Motion for leave to file Reply to Defendants' Supplemental Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Terminate Prospective Relief and Supplemental Authority filed by Reginald Wilkinson, Stephen J Huffman, Bernard J. Ryznar, Todd E. Ishee, Bruce A. Martin, Deborah Nixon Hughes, Cheryl Jorgensen−Martinez, Manish B. Joshi, Patrick F. Biggs, Audrey Sandor Nietzel, Matthew Meyer. (Landes, Mark) (Entered: 02/11/2008)
811 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 2/12/08 granting plaintiffs' motion for leave to respond to defendants' supplemental memo; response to be filed upon receipt of this marginal entry. (Related Doc. 809 ) (M,G) (Entered: 02/12/2008)
812 FILING ERROR−attorney to re−file Reply to response to 763 Motion for Order Extending the Jurisdiction of the Court, 809 Motion for leave to file Reply to Defendants' Supplemental Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Terminate Prospective Relief and Supplemental Authority, 764 Motion for Order to Terminate Prospective Relief filed by Jason H. Robb. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 Lancanster v. Tilton)(Lynd, Alice) Modified to denote filing error on 2/12/2008 (B,IE). (Entered: 02/12/2008)

Case: 4:01-cv-00071-JG As of: 07/28/2014 09:11 AM EDT 86 of 86

02/12/2008
02/16/2008
03/12/2008 03/24/2008 03/26/2008 05/30/2008 05/30/2008 06/05/2008 06/13/2008 06/16/2008 07/11/2008 07/16/2008 08/04/2008

813 Reply to response to 764 Motion for Order to Terminate Prospective Relief by leave of Court 811 filed by Michael Benge, Alonzo L. Bonner, Kevin B. Roe, Emanuel B. Newell, Orsino Iacovone, Daryl Heard, Frederick O. Harris, Jr, Keith Gardner, James DeJarnette, Robert Baksi, August Cassano, David Clark, Charles E. Austin, Roy D. Donald, David Easley, Brian K. Eskridge, Roger Lee Hall, Edward O. Hodge, Stacy Lane, Kunta Kenyatta, James D. Mitchell, John W. Perotti, Lamar Preston, Jason H. Robb, Richard Siggers, Eric Swofford, Lahray Thompson, Edward A. Tilley, Mark Trawick. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 Lancaster v. Tilton)(Lynd, Alice) (Entered: 02/12/2008)
814 Attorney Appearance by James Eric Holloway filed by on behalf of Reginald Wilkinson, Stephen J Huffman, Bernard J. Ryznar, Todd E. Ishee, Bruce A. Martin, Deborah Nixon Hughes, Cheryl Jorgensen−Martinez, Manish B. Joshi, Patrick F. Biggs, Audrey Sandor Nietzel, Matthew Meyer. (Holloway, James) (Entered: 02/16/2008)
815 Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 3/12/08 denying plaintiffs' motion to extend the jurisdiction of the Court and granting defendants' motion to terminate the prospective relief provided in previous Court orders. (Related Docs. 763 , 764 , 773 , 774 , 777 , 778 , 807 and 813 ) (M,G) (Entered: 03/12/2008)
816 Joint Motion for extension of time until 06/01/2008 to Apply for Attorney Fees filed by Plaintiff Charles E. Austin, Defendant Reginald Wilkinson. (Holloway, James) (Entered: 03/24/2008)
817 Marginal Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 3/26/08 granting the parties' joint motion for an extension until 6/1/08 to petition the Court for attorney fees. (Related Doc. 816 ) (M,G) (Entered: 03/26/2008)
818 Unopposed Motion for extension of time to file Application for Attorney Fees until 06/13/2008 filed by Defendant Reginald Wilkinson. (Holloway, James) (Entered: 05/30/2008)
819 Amended Motion for extension of time to file Application for Attorney Fees until 06/13/2008 filed by Defendant Reginald Wilkinson. (Holloway, James) Modified note amended motion on 6/2/2008 (S,HR). (Entered: 05/30/2008)
820 Marginal Entry Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 6/5/08 granting defendants' unopposed motion for an extension of time for the parties to submit anticipated joint application for attorney fees. (Related Doc. 819 ) (M,G) (Entered: 06/05/2008)
821 Second Unopposed Motion for extension of Attorney Fee Application until 07/11/2008 filed by Defendant Reginald Wilkinson. (Holloway, James) (Entered: 06/13/2008)
822 Marginal Entry Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 6/16/08 granting defendants' unopposed motion for an extension of time until 7/11/08 to submit the anticipated joint application for attorney fees. (Related Doc. 821 ) (M,G) (Entered: 06/16/2008)
823 Joint Motion for application of attorney fees and joint Motion to Terminate Case by James Eric Holloway and Jules Lobel filed by Plaintiff Charles E. Austin, Defendant Reginald Wilkinson. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Settlement Agreement)(Holloway, James) Modified on 7/14/2008 (S,HR). (Entered: 07/11/2008)
824 Marginal Entry Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 7/16/08 approving the parties' joint motion for application of attorneys and termination of case. (Attachments: # 1 Settlement Agreement) (Related Doc. 823 ) (M,G) (Entered: 07/16/2008)
825 True copy of order from the USCA for the Sixth Circuit: Granting the motion to voluntarily dismiss the Notice of Appeal 775 (USCA# 07−4371). Date issued by USCA 8/1/08 (H, SP) (Entered: 08/06/2008)

 
 Fib-12-2002 ll.-SSa FromMKrn-ui m.iatw . ,.„, »^. . . . . .

M I 2 P. 002/015 F-03S

STATE OP OHIO

SUBJECT:
LEVEL 4 / LEVEL 5 CLASSIFICATION FOR INMATES

RULE/CODE REFERENCE:

DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION ANO CORRECTION

RELATED ACA STANDARDS:
3-4282:4263:4264; 4aS6-.A287.4289: 4349:4367: snd 4369
RELATED AUDIT STANDARDS:

PAGE J

OF 14 ,

SECTION: 111NUMBER: 07
SUPERCEOES: 111-07 rfat«dni/3Il/tt) EFFECTIVE DATE: March 1,2002
APPROVED: February 7.2002

I.

AUTHORITY:

This policy is issued in compliance with Ohio Revised Code Section 5120.01 which delegates to the Director of th» Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction the authority to manage and direct the total operations of the Department and to establish such rules and regulations as the director prescribes.
U. PURPOSE:

The purpose of this policy is to define the classification procedures for placing inmates in Level 4 and Level 5 security classifications.
III. APPLICABILITY:

This policy applies to all staff and inmates involved in the classification process, except inmates who are classified as death row status and held at Mansfield Correctional Institution.

IV. DEFINITIONS:

Classification Level 4 - A security level for inmates who are involved In, but not leading others to commit violent, disruptive, predatory or riotous actions, and/or a threat to the security of the institution as set forth in the established Levei 4 criteria. This classification replaces the classification previously known as "maximum security." References to maximum security in the Administrative Code and other policies shall be construed as the equivalent of level 4.

Classification Level 5 - A security level for inmates who commit or lead others to commit violent, disruptive, predatory, riotous actions, or who otherwise pose a serious threat to the security of the institution as set forth in the established Level 5 criteria. This classification replaces the classification previously known as "high maximum security." References to "high maximum security* In the Administrative Code and other policies shaH be construed as the equivalent of "level 5."

Privilege Level B The initial privilege level assigned to an inmate classified into Levels 4 or S.

{r»v4/01>

Fib-12-2002 11:57am Froin-
r«crn-ui i
in Levels 4 or 5
standard operating V. POLICY:

T-II2 P.003/015 F-056 OSP.

to d s p t m standard VI. PROCEDURES:
A. Placement in Level 4 or 5 from Reception

uU th. SKunt,

end cf this directive. B Placement in Level 4 after Initial Placement:

The Warden. ^ W a r d e n . Major Unit Manager. Rules mfracbon IBoard (WB)

^ ; r t m f t n t h a s ^ e a d y made an

F«b-12-2002 11:58am F r w

......

.

T.|,2 p.004/015 F-050

SUBJECT: LEVEL 4 / LEVEL 5 CLASSIFICATION FOR INMATES

PAGE 3 OF 14

DRC1M2

1. The inmate has demonstrated physically assaultive and/or predatory bohavlor resulting in physical harm/Injury to any person.
2. The nature of the inmate's behavior presents a current threat to the security and orderly operation of the institution and safety of others.
3. The inmate has planned or participated in a serious disturbance or riot. 4. The inmate has possessed major contraband which poses a threat or
danger to the institution. This includes but is not limited to: weapons, drugs, escape contraband, large amounts of currency. 5. The inmate has been identified by the institution Security Threat Group Coordinator as an active member Involved in disruptive security threat group behavior. 6. The inmate escaped, attempted to escape or committed acts to facilitate an escape from a level 1 or 2 (or their equivalent, minimum or medium) security facility or while under .supervision outside of the facility, resulting in physical harm or threatened serious physical harm to others or caused serious destruction to the physical plant. 7. The inmate has established an inappropriate relationship with a staff member. 8. The inmate through repetitive and/or seriously disruptive behavior has demonstrated an inability to adjust to Level 3 as evidenced by repeated class II rule violations.
The classification committee shall review the completed Supervision Review Form and any relevant information. The inmate is to be served with a Notice of Hearing Form (Form DRC2598) 48 hours prior to the hearing, and afforded the opportunity to appear before the entire committee, unless waived in writing, to offer any pertinent information, explanation and/or objections to Level 4 placement The inmate will also be afforded the opportunity to submit a written statement to the committee. The classification committee shall determine whether the inmate has met one of the criteria above and whether the inmate should be placed in level 4. The classification committee shall make a recommendation accordingly.
The Classification committee shall forward its recommendation to the WardfirVDesignee. The Warden/Oesignee shall review the Supervision Review Form and all other information presented, and approve or disapprove the recommendation. If the warderoapproves the recommendation for level 4. he or she shall submit the recommendation to the Bureau of Classification for final disposition. The inmate may file a formal objection to the recommendation of the classification committee and warden with the Bureau of Classification within fifteen days. The Bureau Of Classification will review the recommendation and any objections filed by the inmate, and make a final decision.
C. Placement in Level S after Initial Placement:
Placement into the Level 5 classification may be Initiated by the Warden, Deputy Warden, Major, LIMA. Unit Manager, RIB or the Reception Coordinator. The person initiating the placement shall use the Security Designation Long Form, referenced at the end of this directive. Once initiated, the Warden/Designee shall

F»b-12-2002 11:59am Froin-

<-.«-., « .»...«. ,..,„

..

M I 2 p.005/015 F-056

SUBJECT: LEVEL 4 / LEVEL 5 CLASSIFICATION FOR INMATES

PAGE 4 OF 14

OftC 1352

establish a classification committee to review the inmate's behavior and determine if the inmate meets one or more of the following Level 5 criteria:
1. The inmate has demonstrated physically or sexually assaultive and/or predatory behavior resulting in either serious physical Injury or death to any person? or In an attempt to sexually assault any person, or to cause serious physical injury or death to any person. An inmate has demonstrated such behavior when the inmate has: • Physically assaulted another resulting in serious physical harm; • Assaulted or attempted to assault another with a deadly weapon • Compelled or attempted to compel another to perform sexual acts; engage in sexual conduct or sexual contact; or to submit to sexual contact, all by force or threat of force; • Compelled or coerced another, by force or the threat of sen'ous physical harm or death, to provide anything of value, to perform any act, or to violate any rule.
2. The nature of the criminal offense committed prior to incarceration constitutes a current threat to the security and orderly operation of the institution and to the safety of others, for example, serious assaults against law enforcement, participation in organized criminal activity or actions indicating a serious escape risk.
3. The inmate has lead, organized, or incited a serious disturbance or riot that resulted in the talcing of a hostage, significant property damage, physical harm, or loss of life.
4. The inmate has conspired or attempted to convey, introduce or possess major contraband which poses a serious threat or danger to the security of the institution. This includes but is not limited to: • Deadly weapons
• Ammunition • Escape instruments • Drugs for distribution 5. The inmate has been identified by the institution Security Threat Group Coordinator as a leader, enforcer, or recruiter of a security threat group, which is actively involved in violent or disruptive behavior.
6. The inmate escaped, attempted to escape or committed acts to facilitate an escape from a level three or four (or their equivalent, close or maximum) security facility or while under supervision outside of the facility, resulting in physical harm or threatened serious physical harm to others or caused serious destruction to the physical plant.
7. The inmate has demonstrated an ability to compromise the integrity of staff, which resulted in a threat to the security of the institution.
8. The inmate knowingly exposed others to the risk of contracting a dangerous disease, such as HIV or hepatitis.
9. Tha inmate through repetitive and/or seriously disruptive behavior, has demonstrated a«chronic inability to adjust to level 4B as evidenced by repeated class II rule violations.

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DRC1362

The classification committee shall review the completed Supervision Review Form and any other relevant information. The inmate is to be served with a Notice of Hearing (Form ORC2598) 4 8 hours prior to the hearing, and afforded the opportunity to appear before the entire committee, unless waived in writing, to offer any pertinent information, explanation and/or objections to Level 5 placement. The inmate will also be afforded the opportunity to submit a written statement to the committee. The classification committee shall document information presented by staff and the inmate (Forms DRC2627 and ORC2628). The classification committee shall determine whether the inmate has met one of the criteria above and whether the inmate should be placed in level 5. The classification committee shall make a recommendation accordingly, which shall be documented on the Classification Committee Report (Forms DRC2637. DRC2638, DRC2639).
The classification committee shall forward Its recommendation to the Warden/Designee. The Warden/Designee shall.review the Supervision Review Form and all other information presented, and approve or disapprove the recommendation. If the Warden approves a recommendation for an increase in security level, he or she shall submit the recommendation and the approval to the Bureau of Classification for final disposition. The inmate shall be notified of the warden's approval of the recommendation and may file a formal objection to the recommendations of the classification committee and warden with the Bureau of Classification within fifteen days of The date he is served with the committee's recommendation and warden's action. The Bureau of Classification will review the recommendation and any objections filed by the inmate, and make a final decision. The Bureau shall send a written copy of the decision to the institution, to be given to the inmate.
No level 5 inmate will be housed at the Ohio State Penitentiary who is determined to be seriously mentally ill, pursuant to the procedures of the department's bureau of mental health; or whose medical needs are inconsistent with that assignment, pursuant to Policy Directive 320-15, 'Medical Classification."
D. Placement in Level 5 from Level 4
A classification Committee snail r*view the inmate's behavior and determine if the inmate meets at least one of the criteria for Level-5.
* If the inmate's repetitive and/or seriously disruptive behavior has demonstrated a chronic inability to adjust to level 4B. the documentation must dearly reflect this. The classification committee must ensure that the documentation includes any repeated class II rule violations, information and/or descriptions of the inmate's behavior and how the behavior disrupted the operation of the housing unit, facility or its operation. For example: * List any rule violations with dispositions and the dates of any violations within
the previous twelve months. • Detail the number of times it was necessary to us« force to restrain or control
the inmate.

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PAGE 6 OF 14

ORC1382

• List the instances of disruptions to meal, recreation, shower or scheduled activities, etc.
• Detail the impact on other inmates, threats, disruptions, etc.
The dasstfication committee shall complete the pracass as described in subsection C , above.
E. 30 Day Review/Orientatloft Process
Placement into Level 4 or Level 5 varies in length depending on the nature of the initiating inddenL criteria for plaoement, and/or demonstrated behavior in assigned level. Ail inmates placed into these levels shall have a review of their dassification level completed by an assigned Unit staff member within 30 days of placement to r determine if they have been properly dassified. This review shad indude a review of' the inmate's file to ensure that proper documentation has been included detailing now/why the inmate has been classified into Level 4 or Level 5.
If the review finds that the inmate meets the appropriate criteria, Unit and/or programming staff will meet with the inmate to explain the dasstfication and review processes and what the expectations are concerning his behavior, and appropriate program participation. This meeting will also afford the inmate the opportunity to request any needed assistance while assigned in the classification level. Staff will advise the inmate whether release to a general population institution in three years or less appears reasonably possible.
K the review finds that the inmate does not meet the Level 4 or Level 5 criteria, the reviewing staff member shall forward a written recommendation through the Deputy Warden of Operations, to the Warden recommending that the inmate be transferred to an appropriate institution. The Reasons for the recommendation must be listed to reflect why the inmate is not appropriate for Level 4 or Level 5 and is more appropriate for another level.
If the Warden concurs with the recommendation, the packet will then be forwarded, along with a newly completed Supervision Review Form, to the Bureau of Classification for appropriate action. If the Warden disagrees with the committee's recommendation, the Inmate remains at his current status and this decision is not appeallable.
F. Privilege Level Review Process
Inmates placed into Level 4 or 5 will initially be assigned to privilege level 6 (5B or 4B). They will remain In this level until racommendftd for reduction by the Privilege Level Review Committee, and approved by the Warden/Designee. Reductions from Privilege Level B to A do not require the Bureau of Classification's approval. However, a Privilege / Security Level Review, Level 5B, 5A & 4B Form (Form DRC2634, DRC2636) must be completed, approved at the institution and entered into the DOTS system when a privilege level changes.

Fib-I2-2002 12:02p« Fron-

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SUBJECT: LEVEL 4 / LEVEL 5 CLASSIFICATION FOR INMATES .

PAOE 7

The privilege level review process - not to be confused with a Supervision Review weighs both Known behavior and future risk levels. The Information reviewed during trie assessment will include, but is not limited to:
Program Involvement Current privilege level Time served in currant privilege level Total time spent in level 5 and/or level 4 Time left to spend on current sentence Timti since last incident that resulted in inmate being designated level 5 or 4 Conduct Reports Reason for placement Behavior in the last five years - Prior to Level 4 or 5 classification Security level when placed Adjustment/behavior after placement Interaction with others (staff and/or inmates) The offender recognizes and acknowledges factors contributing to the commission of the placement offense and nature • Other Factors which indicate a*risk of future violence
The committee will use professional correctional judgment to evaluate the inmate's likelihood to repeat prohibited actions. The privilege level review will be in a narrative form to record the factors considered by the evaluating employee. The inmate will appear before the Privilege Level Review Committee to ensure that he or she has the opportunity to have input into the process and respond to questions the committee may have during the review. The Privilege Level Review Committee will consist of a Unit staff member, a Custody staff member, and a Warden's designee. They may consult with any other staff person (Mental Health, Medical, Executive Staff, etc.) during the course of the review process.

G. Privilege Level Review for Level 4

inmates placed in level 4 shall receive privilege level reviews during the time

between annual supervision reviews and at the time of the annual review. The

annual supervision review procedures are more fully described below. The

provisions of this section pertain only to privilege' levels within the assigned security

level.

*

Privilege level 4B is an entry level privilege status. Placement in 4B is for an indeterminate period. Inmates classified into Level 4B shall have an assessment completed every six months. Inmates who are in privilege level 4B and have been reviewed pursuant to this subsection may be placed in privilege level 4A.

DRC1362

F«b-I2-2002 12:03M FronZ \ 0 : * Q M FrcwUKK I t n i u r v i u i

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PAGE 8 OF 14

ORC13B2

The inmate will appear before the committee to discuss and review the placement issues. The inmate shall have the opportunity to present information, express objections and explain the current classification. The committee will advise the inmate of their expectations and any steps the inmate can take to improve his or her eligibility for reduction. The first assessment will take place six months after the initial placement, and will continue every six months thereafter.
The Privilege Level Review Committee will make a recommendation to the Warden/Oesignee to either continue the inmate in 4B reduce the inmate to 4A, or increase the inmate from 4A to 4B\ which must be supported by a written rationale. The Wfirden/Designee shall then render a decision based on the Committee's recommendation. This decision is not appeallable. The Privilege Level Review Committee may also recommend a special supervision level review if that is warranted, in their judgment Such special reviews must be approved by an individual who could initiate such a placement and shall follow the procedures described for an annual supervision review, described below.
H. Privilege Level Review for Level 5
inmate* placed in level 5 shall receive privilege level reviews during the time between annual supervision reviews and at the time of the annual review. The annual supervision procedures are more fully described below. The provisions of this sciction pertain only to privilege levels within the assigned security level, inmates classified into Level 5B shall have an assessment completed every three month:;; inmates classified as Level 5A shall have an assessment completed every six months.
Placement in Level 5 is for an indeterminate period. Privilege level SB is an entry level privilege status. Inmates who are in privilege level SB and have been reviewed pursuant to this subsection may be placed in privilege level 5A.
The Privilege Level Review Committee will consist of three members, designated by the Warden/Designee. such as the inmate's Unit Manager, Case Manager (to comment on educational programming, and other programming), Mental Health staff, and/or a custody staff person.
The inmate will appear before the committee to discuss and review the placement issues. The inmate shall have the opportunity to present information, express objections and explain the current classification. The committee will advise the inmaie of their expectations and any steps the inmate can take to improve his or her eligibility for reduction. The first review for 5A inmates will take place six months after the initial placement, and will continue every six months thereafter. The first review for SB inmates will take place three months after the initial placement, and will continue every three months thereafter.
At the annual (one-year) review a Privilege / Security Level Review, Level 5B, SA & 48 Porm (Form ORC2634, ORC2636) win be completed - regardless of the

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SUBJECT: LEVEL 4 / LEVEL 5 CLASSIFICATION FOR INMATES

PAGE 9 OF 14

DftCi3S2

recommendation - affording the inmate the normal classification review and appeals process.

The Review Committee will make a recommendation to the Warden/Designee to either continue the inmate in SB, reduce him to 5A or increase the inmate from 5A to SB. which must be supported by a written rationale. The Warden/Designee shall then render a final decision based on the Committee's recommendation. This decision is not appeallable. The Privilege Level Review Committee may also recommend a special supervision level review if that is warranted, in their judgment. Such special reviews must be approved by an individual who could initiate such a placement and shall follow the procedures described for an annual supervision review, described below.

I.

Annual Supervision Level Review

All Level 4 and Level S inmates will have supervision level reviews completed at

least annually. The classification Committee shall consist of three members, which

may include the Deputy Warden of Operations/Designee, the Unit Management

Administrator, a Unit Manager, a Case Manager and/or other Unit Staff member

and may include a Mental Health staff. All annual reviews of Level 5 inmates must

include* a Director's designee to review all pertinent information and make a

recommendation.

*

The Inmate is to be served with a Notice of Hearing 4 8 hours prior to the hearing, and afforded the opportunity to appear before the entire committee, unless waived in writing, to offer any pertinent information, explanation and/or objections to Level 4 or 5 placement. The inmate will be afforded the opportunity to submit a written statement to the committee. The committee shall make a comprehensive review of the inmate's institutional adjustment and behavior, including his behavior since placement in level S in order to make an assessment of the risk to safety and security posed by such an inmate.

This cjommittee shall review the completed Privilege / Security Level Review, Level 5B. 5A & 4B Form (DRC2634, DRC2636). and shall take into consideration at a minimum the following information:
Reason for placement in Level 4 or 5 and relevant circumstances; Conduct Reports;
Current privilege level;
Time served in current privilege level; Total time spent in level 5 and/or level 4: Time left to spend on current sentence; Time since last incident mat resulted in inmate being designated level 5 or 4; Program Involvement; Behavior in The last five years, including prior to Level 4 or 5 classification: Security level prior to placement; Adjustment/behavior after placement; Factors which indicate a risk of future violence;

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PAGE 10 OF 14

• Interaction with others (staff and/or inmates);

« Recognition and acknowledgment of the factors contributing to the commission of the placement offense and nature;

•

Tne findings and recommendations of the previous assessment committees;

• Previous review committees;

•

The findings and recommendations of all assessment committees

subsequent to the placement in level 4 or level 5;

• The findings and recommendations of alt supervision review committees

subsequent to placement in level 4 or level 5;

The committee will use professional correctional judgment to evaluate the inmate's likelihood to repeat prohibited acti8ns. The classification committee shall review the completed Privilege / Security Level Review, Level SB. 5A & 4B Form and any other relevant information. The committee shall review and evaluate the factors listed above, the circumstances underlying the placement in Level 4 or 5, the reasons for initial placement, the inmate's subsequent actions and his demonstrated attitude. The committee shall determine whether there has been a diminishing of the inmate's risk to the safety of persons or institutional security, within their professional correctional judgment. The committee shall make a recommendation to reduce or continue the inmate's security level accordingly. The committee shall identify the basis for its decision and the factors relied upon, if the committee believes the inmate presents a threat to security of a general* population institution, the committee shall document their conclusions as to the inmate's risk, and their reasons.

The classification committee shall forward its recommendation to the Wardan/Designee ("Warden"). The Warden shall review the Privilege / Security Level Review, Level 5B, 5A & 4 8 Form and all other information presented. Following the review, the Warden may approve or disapprove the recommendation. The Warden may request a transfer regardless of the committee's recommendation. If the Warden recommends a transfer, he or she shall submit the recommendation and the transfer request to the Bureau of Classification for final disposition. The inmate shall be'notified of the Warden's action. The inmate shall be told that he may file a formal objection to the recommendations of the classification committee and warden with the Bureau of Classification within fifteen days of the date he is served with the committee's recommendation and warden's action. The Bureau of Classification wilt review the recommendation and any objections filed by the inmate, and make a decision.

J. Optional Procedure for Placement and Retention in Level 5
The Department, Its employees and its administrators may utilize an optional procedure when placing an inmate in level 5 or considering whether an inmate should be retained in level 5. This procedure shall be optional at the discretion of the ;;taff and officials of the department This procedure may be utilized to replace any step or alt steps in the processes described above for placement and retention at level 5.

Ftb-12-2002 72:05pm FrtwFrt-U-W M-.3QW rroruKi. c«t«<

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PAGE 11 OF 14

The staff and officials may conduct any hearing, consideration or proceeding using videoconference communications. The inmate; the case manager, unit management administrator (" U.M.A.") or othe^institution representative: and the chief of the bureau of classification or designee, at a minimum, shall participate in the videoconference hearing. T h e case manager. U . M A or other institution representative shall provide information about the inmate's adjustment, program participation and other information rel«vani to the decision. The warden or a designee may also participate to present information or opinions, as may any other person who may offer Information that is relevant, to the issue being considered.
The institution representatives Shall present information concerning the items for consideration by a classification committee conducting an annual supervision level review, as identified in the subsection above. The chief of the bureau of classification may obtain any additional information as win likely be reasonably relevant to the decision, and is encouraged to obtain it in advance of the proceeding to assist in the efficient consideration of the matter. The chief of the bureau may continue the hearing at any time to allow the collection of additional information or to assist with the deliberative process.
The inmate shall be permitted a reasonable opportunity to present information and statements regarding the issue at hand. The department may videotape the proceeding for its subsequent use. but taping is not mandatory. Confidential information may be presented to the chief of the bureau without disclosure to the inmate.
The chief of the bureau shall evaluate the inmate for retention at level five or transfer to a lower security level as described in the subsection of this policy that addresses the annual supervision level review. The chief shall determine whether there has been a diminishing of the inmate's risk to the safety of persons or Institutional security, within his or her professional correctional judgment. If the chief of the bureau relies upon confidential information, he or she shall indicate this reliance and shall disclose to the inmate as much of the substance of the information as possible. The chief is not required to disclose the substance of confidential information relied upon if doing so would jeopardize security.
The chief shall notify the inmate of the decision. The chief may choose to verbally notify the inmate of the decision at the conclusion of the videoconference, though it is not required. In every case, the decision of the chief and supporting reasons shall be reduced to writing, and a copy shall be given to the inmate. The inmate shall be permitted to request that the chief of the bureau reconsider the decision. Such request shall be in writing, directed to the chief of the bureau and must state reasons in support of th& request.

OAC13G2

Forms: Security Designation Long Form:«Form Nos. DRC256B, DRC2630, DRC2569 Initial Designation Forms, females: Form Nos. DRC2605, DRC2606 & ORC2607

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Supervision Review Forms: DRC2O98. DRC2094, DRC2629, DRC2338 Notice of Hearing Form: DRC2598 information Presented by the Inmate: DRC2627 Information Presented by Staff: DRC2628. Classification Committee Report Level 6 Placement, DRC2637, DRC2638, DRC2639 Privilege / Security Level Review, Level SB. SA & 4B Form: DRC2634, DRC2636

O*C 1362

Fib-12-2002 12:07pm From-

SUBJECT:: LEVEL 4 / LEVEL 5 CLASSIFICATION FOR INMATES

Clothing Privilege Level Review Classification Status Review Phone cans
Recreation
Shaving Shower TV
Walkman
Visits
ORC1382

RECOMMENDED PRIVILEGE LEVELS FOR LEVELS 5 AND 4:

Level SB
3 state issue Uniforms
3 Months

Level SA
3 State Usue Uniforms 6 Months

Laval 4B 3 State Issue Uniforms
6 Month*

Annuany

Annually

Annually

One tan minute call
per month. AH others only by request of Attorney of Record or confirmed serious illness or death in ihe family ^Warden's Discretion)

Two ten minute calls per month. All other* only by Request of Attorney of Record Of confirmed serious illness or death in the family. (Warden's Discration)

One ten minute call par week. All others only by request of Attorney of Record or confirmed serious illness or death In the family (Warden's Discretion)

5 one-hour periods per week, inside, or outside recreation areas.

5 one-hour periods per week; inside or outside recreation areas. Congregate recreation opportunity

5 one-hour periods perweek; inside or outside recreation pods. Congregate recreation with at least one other

with at least one other inmate.

inmate.'

3 times per week

3 times per week

5 times per week

Stimesoerweek
State Issued or purchase from commissary, programming only.
Nona
Non-Contact. 2 visits per month, per visitor for up to 2.5 hours: Attorney of Record. Clergy of

5 times per week

5 times per week

State issued or purchase from commissary. Programming and Network.

Network and Institutional programming provided on range TV. Movie rentals on weekends and holidays.

Walkman w/ AM/FMw/cassene player. No cassettes permitted. Battery operated.
Non-Contact, 2 visits per month, per visitor for UP to 3.S hours; Attorney of Record, Clergy of

Walkman/Cassette AM/FM w/cassette player. Battary operated. Five (5) cassettes permitted.
Non-Contact. 2 visits per month, par visitor for up to 4 hours: Attorney of Record. Cleruv of Record.

Level 4A 3 State Issue Uniform* NfA
Annually 2 times per day
Seven 1 % hour periods per week
Anytime during the day. Twice per day. May have personal TV
Commissary Purchase or Approved Vendor
Contact 2 visits per month for up to T hours.

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Ubrary/Leget Service
Programming
Commissary Spending Limit Twice Par Month

Ritcord.

Record.

Library. 3 paperback books Legal: Per kite to Paralegal.
Broadcast over TVs piovkJed in «ach cell SmaH group programming in program booths

Library. 4 paperback books Ugal: Par kite to Paralegal.
Broadcast o w TVs provided in each ceH Sm«fl group programming in program booths

Library: S paperback books Legal: Per kite to paraiagat.
Broadcast over "TVs provided on range. Small group counseling, no more than four Inmates.

S 30.00

$50.00

$70.00

Minimum 414 hours par week.
Broadcast over TVs; Small group counsslIng.
5100.00

 
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P a : 773-235-6699 .

Attorney JbrAmici 'Cukiae

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BLANK PAGE

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Authorities ............................................................ i Statement of Interest of Amici ............................................ 1
Summary of Argument ....................................................... 4
ARGUMENT
I. Protracted Supermax Confinement Represents a Serious Psychological Stressor and Imposed
Significant Psychological Pain .................................. 6
11. There Is a Serious Risk of Psychological Harm for Some Persons Created by Prolonged Exposure to the
Stress of Extreme Isolation .................................... 14
CONCLUSION ................................................................30

BLANK PAGE

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Austin v. Wilkinson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 719 (N.D. Ohlo 2002)
...................................................................................... 6, 23
In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160 (1890) ..................................... 9
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) .............................. 4
Spain v. Procunier, 408 F. Supp. 534 (1976), a f d in part,
rev'd in part, 600 F. 2d 189 (9th Cir. 1979) ...................... 18
Books:
Harry Elmer Barnes, The Evolution of Penology in
Pennsylvania Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill (1927) ................ 7
Torsten Eriksson, The Reformers, An Historical Survey of Pioneer Experiments in the Treatment of Criminals. New
Y ork: Elsevier (1976) ......................................................... 7
D. Foster, Detention & Torture in South Africa: Psychological, Legal & Historical Studies. Cape Town:
David Philip (1987) .......................................................... 12
Michael Jackson, Prisoners of Isolation: Solitary Confinement in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto
Press (1983) ..................................................................... 17
W. Davis Lewis, From Newgate to Dannemora: The Rise of the Penitentiary in New York, 1796-1848. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press (1965) .......................................... 7

Louis P. Masur, Rites of Execution: Capital Punishment and the Transformation of American Culture, 1776-1865. New
York: Oxford University Press (1989) ................................ 7
Peter Scharff Smith, The EfSects of Solitary Confinement on Prison Inmates. A Report to the European Court of Human
Rights (May, 2004) ........................................................... 22
Hans Toch, Men in Crisis: Human Breakdowns in Prisons.
Aldine Publishing Co.: Chicago (1975) .................. 17, 24, 25
Articles:
Henrik Andersen, Dorte Sestoft, Tommy Ldlebaek, Gorm Babrielsen, & Ralf Hernrningsen, A Longitudmal Study of Prisoners on Remand: Repeated Measures of Psychopathology in the Initial Phase of Solitary Versus Nonsolitary Confinement, 26 International Journal of Law &
Psychiatry 165-177 (2003) ......................................... 23, 25
Harry Elmer Barnes, The Historical Origin of the Prison System in America, 12 Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology 35-60 (1921) .................................................. 8
Henri N. Barte, L'Isolement Carceral, 28 Perspectives
Psychiatriques 252 (1989) ................................................ 19
Michael Bauer, Stefan Priebe, Bettina Haring & Kerstin Adamczak, Long-Term Mental Sequelae of Political Imprisonment in East Germany, 181 Journal of Nervous &
Mental Disease 257-262 (1993) ................................. 23, 24
Thomas B. Benjamin and Kenneth Lux, Constitutional and Psychological Implications of the Use of Solitary

Confinement: Experience at the Maine Prison, 9
Clearinghouse Review 83-90 (1975) ................................. 16
Thomas B. Benjamin and Kenneth Lux, Solitary Confinement as Psychological Punishment, 13 California
Western Law Review 265-296 (1977) .......................... 16, 25
Leonard Berkowitz, Situational Influences on Aggression, in J. Groebel & R. Hinde, (Eds.), Aggression and War: Their Biological and Social Bases (pp. 91-100). Cambridge,
England: Cambridge University Press (1989) .................... 27
James Bonta and Paul Gendreau, Reexamining the Cruel and Unusual Punishment of Prison Life, 14 Law and Human
Behavior 347-372 (1990) .................................................30
Chad Briggs, Jody Sundt, and Thomas Castellano, The Effect of Supermaximum Security Prisons on Aggregate Levels of
Institutional Violence, 41 Criminology 301 (2003) ........... 28
Stanley Brodsky and Forrest R. Scogin, Inmates in Protective Custody: First Data on Emotional Effects, 1 Forensic Reports
267-280 (1988) ............................................... 21, 23, 24, 25
Neena Chappell & Mark Badger, Social Isolation and Well-
Being, 44 Journal of Gerontology 169-176 (1989) ........... 11
Margaret K. Cooke & Jeffrey H. Goldstein, Social Isolation and Violent Behavior, 2 Forensic Reports 287-294, 288
(1989) ............................................................................ 11
Bruno M. Connier & Paul J. Williams, Excessive Deprivation of Liberty, 11 Canadian Psychiatric Association
Journal 470-484 (1966) .................................. 15, 24, 25, 27

John Darley, Sol Fulero, Craig Haney, & Tom Tyler, Psychological Jurisprudence: Talung Psychology and Law into the Twenty-First Century, in James Ogloff (Ed.), Taking Psychology and Law into the Twenty-First Century (pp. 3559). New York: Kluwer Acadernic/Plenum Publishing (2002)
Paul Gendreau, N. Freedman, G. Wilde, and G. Scott, Changes in EEG Alpha Frequency and Evoked Response Latency During Solitary Confinement, 79 Journal of
Abnormal Psychology 54-59 (1972) ................................. 11
Leo Goldberger, Experimental Isolation: An Overview, 122
American Journal of Psychiatry 774-783 (1966) ................ 9
Stuart Grassian, Psychopathological Effects of Solitary Confinement, 140 American Journal of Psychiatry 1450-
1454 (1983) ......................................... 18, 19, 21, 23, 24, 25
Stuart Grassian and N. Friedman, Effects of Sensory Deprivation in Psychiatric Seclusion and Solitary Confinement, 8 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 49-65 (1986)
Craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and "Supermax" Confinement, 49 Crime & Delinquency 124
(2003) ......................................................... 6, 21, 23, 24, 25
Craig Haney et al., Interpersonal Dynamics of a Simulated
Prison, 1 Int'l. J. Criminology & Penology 69 (1973) ......... 3
Craig Haney and Mona Lynch, Regulating Prisons of the Future: A Psychological Analysis of Supermax and Solitary

Confinement, 23 New York Review of Law & Social Change
477 (1997) ................................................................... 6, 24
Rodney Henningsen, Wesley Johnson, and Terry Wells, Superrnax Prisons: Panacea or Desperation, 3 Corrections
Management Quarterly 53-59 (1999) ............................... 28
Thomas Hilliard, The Black Psychologist in Action: A Psychological Evaluation of the Adjustment Center Environment at San Quentin Prison, 2 Journal of Black
Psychology 75-82 (1976) ................................. 18, 23, 24, 25
Lawrence E. Hinkle & Harold E. Wolff, Communist Interrogation and Indoctrination of "Enemies of the States," 76 Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry 115-174 (1956)
Adam J. Hirsch, From Pillory to Penitentiary: The Rise of Criminal Incarceration in Early Massachusetts, 80 Michigan
Law Review 1178 (1982) .................................................... 7
Frederick Hocking, Extreme Environmental Stress and its Significance for Psychopathology, 24 American Journal of
Psychotherapy 4-26 (1970) .............................................. 10
Ida Koch, Mental and Social Sequelae of Isolation: The Evidence of Deprivation Experiments and of Pretrial Detention in Denmark, in The Expansion of European Prison Systems, Working Papers in European Criminology No. 7 119 (Bill Rolston & Mke Tomlinson eds. 1986)20, 23, 24,25
Richard Kom, The Effects of Confinement in the High Security Unit at Lexington, 15 Social Justice 8-19 (1988)
...............................................................................23, 24, 25

Richard Kom, Follow-up Report on the Effects of Confinement in the High Security Unit at Lexington, 15
Social Justice 20-29 (1988) .............................................. 23
Herbert P. Leiderman, Man Alone: Sensory Deprivation and Behavioral Change, 8 Corrective Psychiatry and Joumal of
Social Therapy 64-74 (1962) ........................................ 11
Matthew Lippman, The Development and Drafting of the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 27 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review 275
(1994) .............................................................................. 14
W.E. Lucas, Solitary Confinement: Isolation as Coercion to Conform, 9 Australian & New Zealand Journal of
Criminology 153-167 (1976) ........................................... 12
Holly Miller & Glenn Young, Prison Segregation: Administrative Detention Remedy or Mental Health Problem? 7 Criminal Behaviour and Mental Health 85-94
(1997) ............................................................. 23, 24, 25, 28
Jesenia Pizarro and Vanja Stenius, Supemax Prisons: Their
k s e , Current Practices, and Effect on Inmates, 84 Prison Journal 248 (2004) ........................................................... 28
J.G. Riekert, The DDD Syndrome: Solitary Confinement and a South African Security Law Trial. In A.N. Bell & R. D.A. Mackie (Eds.) Detention and Security Legislation in South
Africa (pp. 121-147). Durban: University of Natal (1985) . 12
Frank Rundle, The Roots of Violence at Soledad. In Erik Olin Wright, (Ed.), The Politics of Punishment: A Critical Analysis of Prisons in America. (pp. 163-172) New York:
Harper (1973) ................................................................... 15

G. Scott & M. Gendreau, Psychiatric Implications of Sensory Deprivation in a Maximum Security Prison, 14 Canadian
Psychiatric Association Journal 337-341 (1969) .............. 25
Tim Shallice, Solitary Confinement-A Torture Revived?
New Scientist, November 28, 1974 ................................... 12
Robert Slater, Psychiatric Intervention in an Atmosphere of Terror, 7(1) American Journal of Forensic Psychiatry 5-12
(1986) .............................................................................. 16
P. Solomon, Quantitative Aspects of Sensory Deprivation. In Leo Madow & Laurence H. Snow (Eds.), The Psychodynamic Implications of Physiological Studies on Sensory Deprivation
(pp. 28-54). Springfield,IL: Charles Thomas (1970) ......... 10
F.E. Somnier & I.K. Genefke, Psychotherapy for Victims of
Torture, 149 British Journal of Psychiatry 323 (1986) ..... 13
Peter Suedfeld, Carmenza Rarnirez, John Deaton, & Gloria Baker-Brown, Reactions and Attributes of Prisoners in Solitary Confinement, 9 Criminal Justice & Behavior 303-
340 (1982) .................................................................23, 25
Peter Suedfeld & Chunilal Roy, Using Social Isolation to Change the Behavior of Disruptive Inmates, 19 International Journal of Oflender Therapy & Comparative Criminology
90-99 (1975) .............................................................. 24, 25
Raymone H. Thoenig, Comment: Solitary Confinement-Punishment Within the Letter of Law or Psychological Torture? 1972 Wisconsin Law Review 223-237
(1972) .............................................................................. 12

Graham Thomicroft, Social Deprivation and Rates of Treated Mental Disorder: Developing Statistical Models to Predict Psychiatric Service Utilisation, 158 British Journal of
Psychiatry 475-484 (1991) ............................................... 11
Gary L. Tischler, Jerzy E. Henisz, Jerome K. Myers & Philip C. Boswell, Utilisation of Mental Health Services, 32
Archives of General Psychiatry 411-415 (1975) ............... 11
Tom Tyler, Public Trust and Confidence in Legal Authorities: What Do Majority and Minority Group Members Want From the Law and Legal Institutions? 19 Behavioral
Science & the Law 215-235 (2001) ................................... 29
Tom Tyler & Men Lind, Procedural Justice, in Joseph Sanders & Lee Hamilton (Eds.), Handbook of Justice Research in Law (pp. 65-92). Dordrecht, Netherlands:
Kluwer Academic Publishers (2001) ................................. 29
Reto Volkart, Einzelhaft: Eine Literaturubersicht (Solitary confinement: A literature survey), 42 Psychologie Schweizerische Zeitschrift fur Psychologie und ihre
Anwendungen 1-24 (1983) ................................................ 19
Reto Volkart, Adolf Dittrich, Thomas Rothenfluh, & Paul Werner, Eine Kontrollierte Untersuchung uber Psychopathologische Effekte der Einzelhaft (A controlled investigation on psychopathological effects of solitary
confinement), 42 Psychologie - Schweizerische Zeitschrift fur
Psychologie und ihre Anwendungen 25-46 (1983) 20,24, 25
Reto Volkart, et al., Einzelhaft als Risikofaktor fur Psychiatrische Hospitalisierung (Solitary confinement as a risk for psychiatric hospitalization), 16 Psychiatna Clinica,
365-377 (1983) ................................................................ 20

Boguslaw Waligora, Funkcjonowanie Czlowieka W Warunkach Izolacji Wieziennej (How men function in conditions of penitentiary isolation), Seria Psychologia I
Pedagogika NR 34, Poland (1974) ................................... 20
Richard Walters, John Callagan & Albert Newman, Effect of Solitary Confinement on Prisoners, 119 American Journal of
Psychiatry 771-773 (1963) ............................................... 24
Louis J. West, Effects of Isolation on the Evidence of Detainees. In A.N. Bell & R.D.A. Mackie (Eds.) Detention and Security Legislation in South Africa (pp. 69-80). Durban:
University of Natal (1985) ................................................ 12
Shaun R. Whittaker, Counseling Torture Victims, 16 The
Counseling Psychologist 272-278 (1988) ................... 13, 22
Ivan Zinger, Cherami Wichmann, and D. Andrews, Segregation: The Psychological ~ f f e c t sof 60 Days in Administrative Segregation, 41 Canadian Journal of
Criminology 47-83 (2001) ................................................ 22
Ivan Zinger & Cherami Wichrnann, The Psychological Effects of 60 Days in Administrative Segregation. Research
Branch. Correctional Services of Canada (1999) ............... 23
Marvin Zuckerman, Variables Affecting Deprivation Results. In J. Zubek (Ed.), Sensory Deprivation: Fifreen Years of
Research, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts (1969) ...... 9

BLANK PAGE

STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICF
We are professors and practitioners of psychiatry and psychology. Each of us has extensive experience studying the psychology of imprisonment and/or treating prisoners who are in penal confinement. We are professionally knowledgeable about the psychological effects of a range of different prison conditions in the United States and many foreign countries. More specifically, we have background, experience, and expertise in analyzing the special psychiatric and psychological problems that arise in the course of isolated confinement in what has come to be called "supermaximum" security prisons.
Stanley L. Brodsky, Ph.D., is Professor of Psychology at The University of Alabama where he coordinates the doctoral concentration in Psychology-Law. He is editor or author of eleven books and hundreds of articles and scholarly presentations. He has worked as Chief of Psychology at the United States Disciplinary Barracks in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, inspected solitary confinement facilities in eight states as part of his clinical-forensic work, and conducted research and clinical assessment interviews for prisoners in a variety of isolation conditions.
Professor Carl Clements, Ph.D., has taught and published in the field of correctional psychology for 30
The parties have consented to the filing of this brief. Their consent letters are on file with the Clerk of the Court. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, counsel for amici curiae certifies that this brief was not written in whole or in part by counsel for any party, and that the only person or entity other than counsel for amici who has made a monetary contribution to the preparation and submission of the brief is John Boston

years and has inspected dozens of US prisons in regard to the effects of overcrowding, offender classification procedures, and the mental health needs of prisoners. He has testified in numerous conditions of confinement cases (e.g., Alabama, New Mexico, Rhode Island) especially regarding the negative impact of lock-down, severely restrictive protective custody, and overreaching and invalid offender classification systems.
Keith R. Curry, Ph.D., is a clinical psychologist in Washington, DC, with extensive expertise in conditions of confinement. Fornearly twenty years he hasevaluated jail and prison conditions and their effects on mentally ill inmates, including the cyclical interaction of mental illness and segregation for inmates with severe psychopathology.
Karen Froming, Ph.D., is a clinical psychologist, board certified neuropsychologist and Assistant Clinical Professor of Psychiatry at the University of California, San Francisco and the Pacific Graduate School of Psychology. She has extensive experience evaluating individuals who have been subjected to severe prison conditions producing behavioral problems, psychiatric, and neuropsychiatric conditions. Her specialties include the study of emotion processing by the brain in conditions of extreme stress.
Carl Fulwiler, M.D., Ph.D., is a board-certified psychiatrist and neuroscientist and is Assistant Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Massachusetts Medical School and Tufts University School of Medicine. His clinical specialty is the diagnosis and treatment of mental illness among inmates and former inmates and his research focuses on

the causes of violent behavior by the mentally ill. He has extensive experience with the mental health effects of isolated confinement, having interviewed over two hundred inmates in over a dozen segregation units.
Craig Haney, Ph.D., J.D., is Professor of Psychology at the University of California, Santa Cruz and the principal author of this Brief. One of the researchers in the "Stanford Prison Experiment,"Z he has been studying actual prison conditions for the more than thirty years since then. He has toured and inspected numerous prisons, including many supermax facilities, in the United States, and has written extensively about the psychological effects of this form of confinement.
Pablo Stewart, M.D., is a psychiatrist with over 20 years experience working within the criminal justice system, including ten years as the federal court appointed psychiatric expert in two cases focusing on the effects of supermax confinement on the mental health of inmates, and as a consultant to the New Mexico Department of Corrections concerning the mental health needs of prisoners in supermax confinement. He currently is a psychiatric and medical consultant with the Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, for whom he inspects prison facilities around the country.
Hans Toch, Ph.D., is Distinguished Professor of Criminal Justice at the State University of New York at Albany, and has written numerous texts considered "classics" in the psychology of imprisonment, as well as hundreds of articles about prison-related topics. He has
Craig Haney et al., Interpersonal Dynamics of a Simulated Prison,
1Int'l. J. Criminology6 Penology 69 (1973).

served as a consultant to a number of correctional systems in the United States and elsewhere, and has received many awards for distinguished contributions to criminology and penology.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Because of the extraordinary nature of extremely isolating "supermax" confinement-including the type that has been described as being practiced at Ohio State Penitentiary (0SP)-and the significant risk of psychological harm it creates for some prisoners, we conclude that these conditions impose an "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin v. Cunner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Indeed, long-term solitary confinement, in widespread use over a century ago, was abandoned largely because of its harmful psychological effects. Especially in its more modern supermax form, there is nothing "typical" about it. In addition, the literature that we review clearly documents that supermax confinement imposes a significant "hardship" in the form of grave psychiatric and psychological risks to prisoners. No study of the effects of solitary or supermax-like confinement that lasted longer than 60 days failed to find evidence of negative psychological effects. Moreover, research raises significant doubts about the ability of supermax prisons to achieve their goal of reducing violence in prison systems. Prisoners have a clear liberty interest, as this Court has defined it, in insuring that they are not exposed to such risks on the basis of mere conjecture, or absent a meaningful opportunity to contest the basis for their supermax confinement.

Since Sandin shifted the focus of the due process inquiry to the nature and severity of the conditions to which prisoners are subjected, we address those conditions and their effects in psychiatric and psychological terms. As one analysis of the nature of the supermax environment noted:
To summarize: prisoners in these units live almost entirely within the confines of a 60 to 80 square foot cell, can exist for many years separated from the natural world around them and removed from the natural rhythms of social life, are denied access to vocational or educational training programs or other meaningful activities in which to engage, get out of their cells no more than a few hours a week, are under virtually constant surveillance and monitoring, are rarely if ever in the presence of another person without being heavily chained and restrained, have no opportunities for normal conversation or social interaction, and are denied the opportunity to ever touch another human being with affection or caring or to receive such affection or caring themselves. Because supermax units typically meld sophisticated modern technology with the age-old practice of solitary confinement, prisoners experience levels of isolation and behavioral control that are more total and complete and literally "dehumanized" than has been possible in the past. The combination of these factors is what makes this

extraordinary and extreme form of imprisonment unique in the modern history of corrections.3
In all but a few respects-some that appear to improve conditions and some that appear to make them worsethe OSP environment conforms to this general description.4
ARGUMENT
I. PROTRACTED SUPERMAX CONFINEMENT REPRESENTS A SERIOUS PSYCHOLOGICAL STRESSOR AND IMPOSES SIGNIFICANT PSYCHOLOGICAL PAIN.
Prolonged or long-term involuntary solitary confinement constitutes a significant, painful, and potentially damaging psychological stressor. Strong empirical support for this proposition comes from a variety of sources.
Some direct evidence on the effects of this kind of punishment is part of the historical record of long-term solitary confinement used a century or more ago. Its effects were drastic enough to lead nineteenth-century officials to abandon the pra~ticeT.~hus, the first block of
Craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Tern Solitary and "Supermax" Confinement, 49 Crime 8 Delinquency 124,127 (2003).
Amici rely on the District Court's description of these conditions. Austin v. Wilkinson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 719,724 (N.D. Ohio 2002).
This historical record is summarized in Craig Haney and Mona Lynch, Regulating Prisons of the Future: A Psychological Analysis

solitary confinement cells in the Walnut Street jail was authorized by the Pennsylvania legislature in 1790, to house "the more hardened and atrocious offendersv6 Some jurists soon recognized that solitary confinement was "a greater evil than certain death" and it was reported that prisoners in solitary "beg, with the greatest earnestness, that they may be hanged out of their misery."7
When a similar form of solitary confinement was tried in New York,g Gustav Beaumont and Alexis de Tocqueville recorded the outcome: "This experiment, of which such favourable results had been anticipated, proved fatal for the majority of prisoners. It devours the victim incessantly and unmercifully; it does not reform, it kills. The unfortunate creatures submitted to this experiment wasted away..."9 Another historian also
of Supermax and Solitary Confinement, 23 Nezu York Rmiew of Law 6 Social Change 477,481-496 (1997).
Harry Elmer Barnes, The Evolution of Penology in Pennsylvania Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill(1927), at 118-120.
Enoch Edwards, president of the Philadelphia Court of QuarterSessions, charging a grand jury in 1791. Quoted in Louis P. Masur, Rites of Execution: Capital Punishment and the Transformation of American Culture, 1776-1865. New York: Oxford University Press (1989), at 83.
See Adam J. Hirsch, From Pillory to Penitentiary: The Rise of Criminal Incarceration in Early Massachusetts, 80 Michigan LAW Rmiew 1178-1269 (1982)) for a discussion of the forms of imprisonment in use during this period.
Quoted in Torsten Eriksson, The Reformers, An Historical Survey of Pioneer Experiments in the Treatment of Criminals. New York: Elsevier (1976), at 49. See, also, W. Davis Lewis, From Naugate to

termed the Auburn experiment a "hopeless failure" and noted that it had "led to a marked prevalence of sickness and insanity on the part of the convicts in solitary confinement."1°
Numerous states experimented with the Pennsylvania system during the nineteenth century, only to abandon the practice in light of its adverse effects." United States Supreme Court Justice Miller summarized a hundred years of experience with solitary confinement:
A considerable number of the prisoners fell, after even a short confinement, into a semi-fatuous condition, from which it was next to impossible to arouse them, and

Dannemora: The Rise of the Penitentiny in New York, 1796-1848.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press (1965))at 17-21.

lo Harry Elmer Barnes, The Historical Origin of the Prison System
in America, 12Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 35-60 (1921),
at 53.
" Barnes recounted the following history of adoption and
abandonment of the so-called "Pennsylvania system" of complete solitary confinement in the United States:

Introduced

Abandoned

Maryland

Massachusetts

Maine

New Jersey

N

II

Virginia Rhode kland

1809 1811 1824 1820 1833 1824 1838

Supra note 10, at 56, n. 54.

others became violently insane; others still, committed suicide; while those who stood the ordeal better were not generally reformed, and in most cases did not recover sufficient mental activity to be of any subsequent service to the community.l2
In addition to this historical record, empirical research on settings and situations in some ways analogous to solitary confinement has reached consistent conclusions about the painful and stressful nature of the experience. According to the definition of "sensory deprivation" offered by medical researcher Leo Goldberger-as an "experimental condition aimed at reducing, altering, or by some means or other, interfering with a person's normal stimulation from, and commerce with, his environment"l3-then virtually all forms of solitary and supermax confinement would quallfy. Although most research on sensory deprivation per se has been done in artificial environments intended for only short-term exposure, we do know that participants characteristically have experienced a variety of negative psychological reactions, including high levels of anxiety. These studies also suggest that failing to inform participants of the upper time limit of the study aggravates the negative effects of the isolation. 14 In any
l2In re Medley, 134U.S. 160,168 (1890).
l3 Leo Goldberger,Experimental Isolation: An Overview, 122 American Journal of Psychiatry 774-783 (1966), at 774.
l4 Marvin Zuckerrnan, Variables Affecting Deprivation Results. In J. Zubek (Ed.), Sensory Deprivation: Fifteen Years of Research, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts (1969).

event, this research emphasizes the importance of sensory stimulation in human experience and the dramatic effects that can occur when such stimulation is completely curtailed.15In addition:
One of the most important results of sensory deprivation experiments has been the finding that the resultant psychologic disturbances are virtually universal. Similar symptoms occurring in the deaf, and in explorers and prisoners had, in the past, been thought to be due to personal predisposition.16
l5 AS one psychiatrist who conducted sensory deprivation experiments put it: "[Tlhe conscious mind is dependent on constant contact with the outside world for alerting, for orientation, for programming, and for gaiting of responses. Unless there is the constant incoming flood of sensation, behavior is highly disturbed and can even be so badly disturbed as to bring on what amounts to transient psychotic states," Solomon, P., Quantitative Aspects of Sensory Deprivation In Leo Madow & Laurence H. Snow (Eds.), The Psychodynamic Implications of Physiological Studies on Sensory Deprivation (pp. 28-54). Springheld, IL: Charles Thomas (1970), at 47. See also, Frederick Hocking, Extreme Environmental Stress and its Significance for Psychopathology, 24 American Journalof Psychotherapy 4-26 (1970).
l6 Hocking, supra note 15, at 7. Herbert Leiderman's review of much the same literature led him to similar conclusions:
These disparate findings converge on one major point. Man is dependent on adequate and changing amounts of sensory and social stimulation in order to maintain his psychic and physiological functioning. When he lacks adequate supplies of stimuli, he may develop mental aberrations involving imagery similar to that of hallucinations, a loss of sense of time, a loss of motor coordination, become unable to

In a separate but related line of research, social isolation has been related to a number of other dysfunctional states and outcomes, including psychiatric illness.17 The importance of social contact in grounding human identity and mental health is underscored by the frequent use of isolation to render people more malleable. Thus, coercive interrogation practices (including procedures once termed "brainwashing") virtually always include extreme forms of social isolation. As two students of these techniques wrote, a
person "[elxposed for the first time to total isolation ...
develops a predictable group of symptoms, which
think or reason clearly, become less able to initiate new tasks, perform less well on certain memory and visual tests, and perhaps become more susceptible to suggestion.
Herbert P. Leiderman, Man Alone: Sensory Deprivation and Behavioral Change, 8 Correcfive Psychiafry and Joumal of Social Therapy 6474 (1962), at 73. See also, Paul Gendreau, N. Freedman, G. Wilde, and G. Scott, Changes in EEG Alpha Frequency and Evoked Response Latency During Solitary Confinement, 79 Joumal of Abnormal Psychology 54-59 (1972),who concluded that sigruficant changes in EEG frequency and visual evoked potentials (VEP) in prisoners after one week of solitary confinement paralleled those reported in laboratory studies of sensory deprivation.
l7 For example, see: Neena Chappell & Mark Badger, Social Isolation and Well-Being, 44 Journal of Gerontology 169-176 (1989); Gary L. Tischler, Jerzy E. Henisz, Jerome K. Myers & Philip C. Boswell, Utilisation of Mental Health Services, 32 Archives of General Psychiatry 411-415 (1975); Graham Thornicroft, Social Deprivation and Rates of Treated Mental Disorder: Developing Statistical Models to Predict Psychiatric Service Utilisation, 158
British Joumal of Psychiatry 475-484 (1991). See also, Margaret K.
Cooke & Jeffrey H. Goldstein, Social Isolation and Violent Behavior, 2 Forensic Reports 287-294,288 (1989).

might almost be called a 'disease syndrome."'l8 Among the symptoms are bewilderment, anxiety, frustration, dejection, boredom, obsessive thoughts or ruminations, and depression. In addition, the authors observed that "[s]ome prisoners may become delirious and have visual hallucinations."19
In fact, other legal and mental health commentators have noted the frequency with which solitary confinement has been used as a form of torture,Z0 underscoring its aversive nature and destructive potential.21 Methods of psychological torture include
Lawrence E. Hinkle & Harold E. Wolff, Communist Interrogation and Indoctrination of "Enemies of the States," 76 Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry 115-174 (1956).
l9 Id. at 128.
20 See, for example: W.E. Lucas, Solitary Confinement: Isolation as Coercion to Conform 9 Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology 153-167 (1976); Tim Shallice, Solitary Confinement-A Torture Revived? New Scientist, November 28, 1974; Raymone H. Thoenig, Comment: Solitary Confinement-Punishment Within the Letter of Law or Psychological Torture? 1972 Wisconsin Law R e v i m 223-237 (1972).
21 South African psychological researcher D. Foster, lists solitary confinement among the most common "psychological procedures" used to torture South African detainees. D. Foster, Detention & Torture i n South Africa: Psychological, Legal & Historical Studies. Cape Town: David Philip (1987), at 69. He noted that "there can be little doubt that solitary confinement under these circumstances [in South Africa] should in itself be regarded as a form of torture" (at p. 136). For additional discussions of the use and effect of solitary confinement in South Africa, see J.G. Riekert, The DDD Syndrome: Solitary Confinement and a South African Security Law Trial. In A.N. Bell & R. D.A. Mackie (Eds.) Detention and Security Legislation i n South Africa (pp. 121-147). Durban: University of Natal (1985); and Louis J. West, Effects of Isolation on the Evidence of Detainees.

stimulus deprivation, of which solitary confinement is an example, as well as so-called "constraint" techniques in which "[vlictims are submitted to a detailed set of regulations and rules, resulting in close supervision where everything (including completely insignificant details) is controlled."22 When used in this way as a method of torture, solitary confinement has been recognized as contributing to cognitive impairment, including the inability to think coherently and logically, as well as producing anxiety, anger and depression in its victims.23
In A.N. Bell & R.D.A. Mackie (Eds.) Detention and Security Legislation i n South Africa (pp. 69-80). Durban: University of Natal (1985). See, also, H i d e & Wolff, supra note 18 (describing effects of isolation cells used by the "Communist State Police" in the Soviet Union and China).
22 F.E. Sornnier & I.K. Genefke, Psychotherapy for Victims of Torture, 149 British Journal of-Psychiatry 323,324 (1986).The authors systematically examined 230 torture victims in order to develop effective psychotherapeutic techniques with which to treat such patients. We note some obvious psychological similarities between the constraint techniques used to break the "will" of a subject in the course of interrogation and the regimens imposed in solitary or supermax confinement. Prisoners placed in solitary or supermax confinement have little control over their day to day existencetheir diet, hygiene, daily schedule, reading materials and other possessions are carefully regulated and greatly restricted by prison personnel. Further, a defining characteristic of the use of this form of isolated segregation in correctional facilities is the loss of control over one's physical self. Prisoners housed in supermax units are subjected to greater amounts and degrees of physical restraint than those housed elsewhere and, of course, have no direct control over whether and when they can leave these physically oppressive conditions.
23 For example: Sornnier & Genefke, supra note 22; Shaun R. Whittaker, Counseling Torture Victims, 16 The Counseling Psychologist 272-278 (1988). As one commentator summarized:

11. PROLONGED EXPOSURE TO THE STRESS OF EXTREME ISOLATION CREATES A SERIOUS RISK OF PSYCHOLOGICAL HARM.
Human beings cannot endure significant levels of uncontrollable stress for long periods of time without psychological harm. Although the magnitude of the harm will vary as a function of the nature of the stressor, the particular strengths and vulnerabilities of the person who endures it, and the length of time during which he or she is exposed, severe stress creates the substantial risk of some form of psychological harm. All other things being equal, the more prolonged and complete the isolation, the greater the risk of harm. Direct studies of solitary and solitary-like confinement . reach consistent conclusions about the psychological stress that it creates for those persons subjected to it.
The harm that has been measured in many published studies is serious-in some instances, serious enough to exacerbate pre-existing psychological disorders, in others contributing to the emergence of previously unrecognized or undiagnosed symptoms. Here, too, the documentation is consistent from different sources. Some of the data are merely descriptive and observational. For example, in one early study Canadian researchers collected observational data on
"Even the most unintrusive [torture] techniques were found to leave lasting psychological scars. For instance, sensory deprivation frequently led to anxiety, hypochondria, and hysteria." Matthew Lippman, The Development and Drafting of the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Tnhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 27 Boston College Intmational 6 Comparative Law R a i e w 275 (1994),at 310 (footnotesomitted).

the effects of solitary from 21 isolated pri~oners.2T~he authors observed three response patterns that they described as typical of prisoners placed in isolation: verbal aggression, physical destruction of surroundings, and the development of an inner fantasy world, including paranoid psychosis. In addition, they observed an overall reaction to solitary confinement that they described as uncontrolled rage, including an increase in homicidal and suicidal impulses.
Accounts by psychiatrists working in several isolation units in California prisons raised similar concerns. They analyzed the extreme psychological adaptations that prisoners made to the extreme conditions of confinement. Psychiatrist Frank Rundle detailed conditions at Soledad's "adjustment center" (one precursor of the modem supermax) and concluded that the "madness" he witnessed in some of the prisoners who were confined there was a "partially functional and adaptive" response to the extreme conditions.25 Specifically, Rundle watched some prisoners who had been isolated for days "become so desperate for relief that they would set their mattresses afire so as to force the staff to open the door and remove them from the
torture chamber... "26 Other prisoners "would burst out
in a frenzied rage of aimless destruction, tearing their sinks and toilets from the walls, ripping their clothing
24 B m o M. Cormier & Paul J. Williams, Excessive Deprivation of Liberty, 11Canadian Psychiatric Association Journal 470-484 (1966).
25 Frank Rundle, The Roots of Violence at Soledad. In Erik Olin Wright, (Ed.), The Politics of Punishment: A Critical Analysis of Prisons in America. (pp. 163-172)New York: Harper (1973).
26 Id. at 167

and bedding, and destroying their few personal possessions in order to alleviate the numbing sense of deadness or non-being and to escape the torture of their own thoughts and despair."*7
Another descriptive small-scale study analyzed Maine prisoners held indefinitely in solitary confinement, most of whom had been given no reason for their isolation. It found that almost every isolated prisoner had attempted suicide, and that the prisoners often acted out in seemingly irrational ways-smashing their heads against the concrete walls, destroying their beds and light fixtures.2sSimilarly, attorney Michael Jackson
27 Ibid. Similarly, psychiatrist Robert Slater observed the psychiatric consequences for "large numbers" of prisoners in their attempts "to cope with the psychological effects of terror as well as the debilitating effects of long-term lockup, excessive noise, poor
sanitary conditions, sensory overload or deprivation... lack of
privacy, brutality, isolation, and pests." Robert Slater, Psychiatric Intervention in an Atmosphere of Terror, 7(1) American Journal of Forensic Psychiatry 5-12 (1986), at p. 10. Slater's description of the symptoms suffered by these prisoners in reaction to their severely restrictive environment included:
...tension, irritability, sleeplessness, nightmares,
inability to think clearly or to concentrate, and fear of impending loss of impulse control. Sometimes the anxiety is severe enough to be crippling. It interferes with sleep, concentration, work, and study and predisposes to brief psychotic reactions, suicidal behavior and psychophysiological reactions. It causes rnisperceptions and overreactions. It fuels the cycle of violence, leading to more violence and terror. Ibid.
28 Thomas B. Benjamin and Kenneth Lux, Constitutional and Psychological Implications of the Use of Solitary Confinement: Experience at the Maine Prison, 9 Clearinghouse Reuiew 83-90 (1975);

inspected segregation units in Canada and found that prisoners reported difficulties concentrating on even simple tasks, experienced headaches, mental and physical deterioration, emotional flatness, lability, breakdowns, hallucinations, paranoia, hostility and rage, and some were beset with thoughts of selfmutilation and suicide (which some acted upon).29
In more systematic research involving hundreds of indepth interviews with isolated prisoners, psychologist Hans Toch. concl.uded that "isolation panic" was a serious problem among prisoners in solitary confinement. Symptoms reported included rage, panic, loss of control and breakdowns, psychological regression, a build-up of physiological and psychic tension that led to incidents of self-m~tilation.3T~och noted that this kind of confinement marked an important dichotomy for prisoners: the "distinction between imprisonment, which is tolerable, and isolation, which is not." 31
Thomas B. Benjamin and Kenneth Lux, Solitary Confinement as Psychological Punishment, 13 California Western Law Review 265296 (1977). For example, one nearly died from loss of blood after cutting himself up with his broken light bulb, another swallowed glass, and a number of prisoners attempted hanging (several successfully).
29 Michael Jackson, Prisoners of Isolation: Solitary Confinement i n Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press (1983).
30 Hans Toch, Men i n Crisis: Human Breakdowns i n Prisons. Aldine
Publishing Co.: Chicago (1975).
31 Id. at 54.

Similarly, psychologist Thomas Hilliard wrote that the "caging" and chaining of prisoners in the San Quentin Adjustment Center, the absence of meaningful exercise, activity, or other outlets through which to release their frustration, combined with the indeterminacy of the terms, the absence of any program leading to their release, and the sense that they might never be freed from such confinement was creating overwhelming tension and anxiety. The prisoners experienced a "pervasive sense of frustration and hopelessness," "deep feelings of despair," and the possibility that the psychological pain of their confinement might drive them "to extreme actions, and desperate solution^."^^ Hilliard concluded finally that conditions of confinement in the Adjustment Center were "overwhelmingly negative and antagonistic to effective rehabilitation," and that they were "0th hostile and provocative" because they "provok[ed] hostility, resentment and re~istance."3~
In a particularly thorough psychiatric assessment of prisoners in solitary confinement, psychiatrist Stuart Grassian reported on 15 prisoners kept in isolation for varying amounts of time at a Massachusetts prison.34
32 Thomas Hilliard, The Black Psychologist in Action: A PsychologicalEvaluation of the Adjustment Center Environment at San Quentin Prison, 2 Journal of Black Psychology 75-82 (1976), at 80. Conditions in the Adjustment Center were described in Spain v. Procunier, 408 F. Supp. 534 (1976),affd in part, rev'd in part, 600 F. 2d 189 (9th Cir. 1979).
33 Id. at 81.
34 Stuart Grassian, Psychopathological Effects of Solitary Confinement, 140 American Journal of Psychiatry 1450-1454 (1983). See also, Stuart Grassian and Friedman, N., Effects of Sensory

The prisoners, initially reluctant to speak candidly about their experiences in solitary, described a series of psychiatric symptoms that were "strikingly consistent among the inmates."35 Two-thirds of them had become hypersensitive to external stimuli (noises, smells, etc.) and about the same number experienced "massive free floating anxiety." About half of the prisoners suffered from perceptual disturbances that for some included hallucinations and perceptual illusions, and another half complained of cognitive difficulties like confusional states, difficulty concentrating, and memory lapses. About a third also described thought disturbances such as paranoia, aggressive fantasies, and impulse control problems. Three out of the fifteen had cut themselves in suicide attempts while in isolation. In almost all instances the prisoners had not previously experienced any of these psychiatric reactions, and all reported that their symptoms subsided shortly after being given a brief respite from isolation (which took place, by law, every 15 days). Grassian concluded that "rigidly imposed solitary confinement may have substantial psychopathological effects and that these effects may form a clinically distinguishable syndrome."36 He also noted that: "[Slolitary

-

--

-

p -

-

--

--

Deprivation in Psychiatric Seclusion and Solitary Confinement, 8

International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 49-65 (1986).

35 Grassian, supra note 34, at 1452.

36 Id. at 1453. Compare Barte's analysis of the "psychopathogenic"
effects of solitary confinement in French prisons and his conclusion
that prisoners placed there for extended periods of time could become schizophrenic instead of receptive to social rehabilitation. Henri N. Barte, L'Isolement Carceral, 28 Perspectives Psychiatriques 252 (1989). Other social scientific and clinical literature published in international journals has reached many of the same conclusions. For example, see Reto Volkart, Einzelhaft: Eine

Literaturubersicht (Solitary confinement: A literature survey), 42 Psychologie - Schweizerische Zeitschrift fur Psychologie und ihre Anwendungen 1-24 (1983) (reviewing the empirical and theoretical literature on the negative effects of solitary confinement); Reto Volkart, Adolf Dittrich, Thomas Rothenfluh, & Paul Werner, Eine Kontrollierte Untersuchung uber Psychopathologische Effekte der Einzelhaft (A controlled investigation on psychopathological effects of solitary confinement), 42 Psychologie - Schweizerische Zeitschrifi fur Psychologie und ihre Anwendungen 25-46 (1983) (when prisoners in "normal" conditions of confinement were compared to those in solitary confinement the latter were found to display considerably more psychopathological symptoms that included heightened feelings of anxiety, emotional hypersensitivity, ideas of persecution, and thought disorders); Reto Volkart, et al., Einzelhaft als Risikofaktor fur Psychiatrische Hospitalisierung (Solitary confinement as a risk for psychiatric hospitalization), 16 Psychiatria Clinica, 365-377 (1983) (finding that prisoners who had been kept in solitary confinement were overrprepresented among prisoners who were hospitalized in a psychiatric clinic); Boguslaw Waligora, Funkcjonowanie Czlowieka W Warunkach Izolaji Wieziennej (How men function in conditions of penitentiary isolation), Seria Psychologia I Pedagogika NR 34, Poland (1974) (so-called "pejorative isolation" of the sort that occurs in prison strengthens "the asocial features in the criminal's personality thus becoming an essential cause of difficulties and failures in the process of his resocialization"). See also, Ida Koch, Mental and Social Sequelae of Isolation: The Evidence of Deprivation Experiments and of Pretrial Detention in Denmark, in The Expansion of European Prison Systems, Working Papers i n European Criminology No. 7 119 (Bill Rolston & Mike Tomlinson eds. 1986)who found evidence of "acute isolation syndrome" among detainees that occurred after only a few days in isolation and included "problems of concentration, restlessness, failure of memory, sleeping problems and impaired sense of time an ability to follow the rhythm of day and night" (at 124). If the isolated confinement persisted-"a few weeks" or more, some detainees developed "chronic isolation syndrome," including intensified difficulties with memory and concentration, "inexplicable fatigue," a "distinct emotional lability" that can include "fits of rage," hallucinations, and the "extremely common" belief among isolated inmates that "they have gone or are going mad" (at 125).

confinement cannot be viewed as a single entity. The effects of solitary confinement situations vary substantially with the rigidity of the sensory and social isolation imposed."37
Finally, psychologist Craig Haney studied prisoners in a "state-of-the-art" supermax prison that housed prisoners who had committed serious disciplinary infractions or were suspected of prison gang activity.38 Haney's use of a random (and therefore representative) sample of prisoners in supermax confinement allowed him to establish prevalence rates (i.e., an estimate of how widespread the psychological reactions were among the group of persons confined in ~upermax).3~ This study found extraordinarily high rates of symptoms of psychological trauma. More than four out of five of those evaluated suffered from feelings of anxiety and nervousness, headaches, troubled sleep, and lethargy or chronic tiredness, and over half complained of nightmares, heart palpitations, and fear of impending nervous breakdowns. Equally high numbers reported specific psychopathological effects of
37 Grassian, supra note 34, at 1454.
38 Haney, supra note 3.
39 Another study of a random sample of prisoners in a supermaxlike setting found symptom prevalence rates nearly as high, suggesting that these levels were not unique to the facility at issue in the Haney study. See Stanley Brodsky and Forrest R. Scogin, Inmates in Protective Custody: First Data on Emotional Effects, 1 Forensic Reports 267-280 (1988). Although they studied isolation in the context of protective custody rather than supermax housing, Brodsky and Scogin described conditions of isolation and restricted movement that paralleled many of those that exist in most supermaxes.

social isolation--obsessive ruminations, confused thought processes, an oversensitivity to stimuli, irrational anger, and social withdrawal. Well over half reported violent fantasies, emotional flatness, mood swings, chronic depression, and feelings of overall deterioration, while nearly half suffered from hallucinations and perceptual distortions, and a quarter experienced suicidal ideation.40

The overall consistency of these findings-the same or

similar conclusions reached by different researchers

examining different facilities, in different parts of the

world, in different decades, using different research

methods-is

striking. The well-documented

psychological risks created by long-term prison

isolation are matters of grave concern to Arnici.41 To

40 See, also, Whittaker, supra note 23 to the effect that solitary confinement "leads the person to fantasize and daydream. Logical and coherent thinking becomes impossible. The person becomes anxious, angry, and depressed" (at 273). These results are consistent with studies of other populations exposed to long-term solitary confinement.

41 As a recent report presented to the European Court of Human

Rights summarized: "The serious physiological, psychological and

psychiatric effects of solitary confinement on prison inmates are by

now very well documented by a long history and by extensive

research-by

psychologists, psychiatrists, sociologists,

criminologists, historians, etc. from many different countries in

different parts of the world." Peter Scharff Smith, The Eflects of

Solitary Confinement on Prison Inmates. A Report to the European Court

of Human Rights, May, 2004, p., 37. The single study that failed to

find serious negative effects was limited to 60-days of superrnax-

type confinement. See Ivan Zinger, Cherami Wichmann, and D.

Andrews, Segregation: The Psychological Effects of 60 Days in

Administrative Segregation, 41 Canadian Journal of Criminology 47-

83 (2001).The authors themselves conceded that the results of this

study were "somewhat irrelevant to current segregation practices

summarize, these effects include increases in the following potentially damaging symptoms and problematic behaviors: negative attitudes and affect>* insomnia,43 anxie9 4 panic,45 withdrawal>6
in the United States..." Ivan Zinger & Cherami Wichrnann, The
Psychological Efects of 60 Days in Administrative Segregation. Research Branch. Correctional Services of Canada (1999), at p. 64. Indeed, in Ohio, prisoners are kept in OSP for a minimum of a fuLl year, and many prisoners spend several years or more there. Austin v. Wilkinson, 189 F.Supp. 719,726 (2002).
42 For example, see: Michael Bauer, Stefan Priebe, Bettina Haring & Kerstin Adamczak, Long-Term Mental Sequelae of Political Imprisonment in East Germany, 181 Journal of Nervous 6 Mental Disease 257-262 (1993) (a study of persons who had spent at least six weeks in political imprisonment that included solitary confinement); Hilliard, supra note 32; Richard Korn, The Effects of Confinement in the High Security Unit at Lexington, 15 Social Justice 8-19, (1988); Richard Korn, Follow-up Report on the Effects of Confinement in the High Security Unit at Lexington, 15 Social Justice 20-29 (1988) (studies of women federal prisoners subjected to "small group isolation"); Koch, supra note 36; Holly Miller & Glenn Young, Prison Segregation: Administrative Detention Remedy or Mental Health Problem? 7 Criminal Behaviour and Mental Health 85-94 (1997); Peter Suedfeld, Carmenza Ramirez, John Deaton, & Gloria Baker-Brown, Reactions and Attributes of Prisoners in SolitaryConfinement, 9 Criminal Justice 6 Behavior 303340 (1982).
43 For example, see: Bauer et al., supra note 42; Brodsky & Scogin, supra note 39; Haney, supra note 3; Koch, supra note 36; Korn, supra note 42.
For example, see: Henrik Andersen, Dorte Sestoft, Tommy Lillebaek, Gorm Babrielsen, & Ralf Hemrningsen, A Longitudinal Study of Prisoners on Remand: Repeated Measures of Psychopathology in the Initial Phase of Solitary Versus Nonsolitary
Confinement, 26 International Journal of Law 6 Psychiatry 165-177 (2003); Brodsky & Scogin, supra note 39; Grassian, supra note 34; Haney, supra note 3; Hilliard, supra note 32; Koch, supra note 36;

hypersensitivity to stimuli,47 rurninations,48 cognitive d y s f ~ n c t i o n , ~h~allucinations,50 loss of control,51 irritability, aggression, and rage,52 paran0ia,5~
Korn, supra note 42; Toch, supra note 30; Volkart, Dittrich, Rothentluh & Werner, supra note 36; Richard Walters, John Callagan & Albert Newman, Effect of Solitary Confinement on Prisoners, 119 American Journal of Psychiat y 771-773 (1963).
45 For example, see: Toch, supra note 30.
46 For example, see: Cormier & Williams, supra note 24; Haney, supra note 3; Miller & Young, supra note 42; G. Scott & M. Gendreau, Psychiatric Implications of Sensory Deprivation in a Maximum Security Prison, 14 Canadian Psychiatric Association Journal 337-341 (1969);Toch, supra note 30; Waligora, supra note 36.
47 For example, see: Grassian, supra note 34; Haney, supra note 3; Volkart, Dittrich, Rothenfluh & Wemer, supra note 36.
48 For example, see: Brodsky & Scogin, supra note 39; Haney, supra note 3; Kom, supra note 42; Miller & Young, supra note 42.
49 For example, see: Brodsky & Scogin, supra note 39; Grassian, supra note 34; Haney, supra note 3; Koch, supra note 36; Kom, supra note 42; Miller & Young, supra note 42; Peter Suedfeld & Chunilal Roy, Using Social Isolation to Change the Behavior of Disruptive Inmates, 19 International Journal of Ofmder Therapy & Comparative Criminology 90-99 (1975); Volkart, Dittrich, Rothentluh & Wemer, supra note 36.
50 For example, see: Brodsky & Scogin, supra note 39; Grassian, supra note 34; Haney, supra note 3; Koch, supra note 36; Kom, supra note 42; Suedfeld & Roy, supra note 49.
51 For example, see: Grassian, supra note 34; Haney, supra note 3; Suedfeld & Roy, supra note 49; Toch, supra note 30.
52 For example, see: Bauer et al., supra note 42; Brodsky & Scogin, supra note 39; Cormier & Williams, supra note 24; Grassian, supra note 34; Haney, supra note 3; Hilliard, supra note 32; Koch, supra

hopelessness,54 lethargy75 depres~ion7~a sense of impending emotional breakdown77 self-rn~tilation,5~ and suicidal ideation and behavior.59 The damaging effects ranged in severity and included such clinically significant symptoms as hypertension, uncontrollable anger, hallucinations, emotional breakdowns, chronic depression, and suicidal thoughts and behavior.
These studies of the psychiatric and psychological effects of isolated confinement focused on discrete and measurable consequences. However, there are other
note 36; Miller & Young, supra note 42; Suedfeld, Ramirez, Deaton, & Baker-Brown, supra note 42; Toch, supra note 30.
53 For example, see: Cormier & Williams, supra note 24; Grassian, supra note 34; Volkart, Dittrich, Rothenfluh & Werner, supra note 36.
54 For example, see: Haney, supra note 3; Hilliard, supra note 32.
55 For example, see: Brodsky & Scogin, supra note 39; Haney, supra note 3; Koch, supra note 36; Scott & Gendreau, supra note 46; Suedfeld and Roy, supra note 49.
56 For example, see: Andersen, et al., supra note 44; Brodsky & Scogin, supra note 39; Haney, supra note 3; Hilliard, supra note 32; Korn, supra note 42.
57 For example, see: Brodsky & Scogin, supra note 39; Grassian, supra note 34; Haney, supra note 3; Koch, supra note 36; Korn, supra note 42; Toch, supra note 30.
5sFor example, see: Benjamin & Lux,supra note 28; Grassian, supra note 34; Toch, supra note 30.
59 For example, see: Benjamin & L w , supra note 28; Cormier & Williams, supra note 24; Grassian, supra note 34; Haney, supra note 3.

psychiatric and psychological changes that are common in such confinement that do not lend themselves to quantification but are extremely familiar to mental health professionals. These may be equally if not more problematic for the future health and well-being of prisoners and those around them. Many prisoners gradually change their patterns of thinking, acting, and feeling in order to survive the rigors of supermax and, for some, these changes may persist or even become permanent. Although they do not represent clinical syndromes per se, these patterns of behavior are dysfunctional in more normal social settings.
Thus, the unique totality of the control in supermax units requires prisoners to become highly dependent upon the institution to organize their daily existence. Some supermax prisoners gradually lose the ability to initiate or to control their own behavior, or to organize their personal lives. The two separate components of this reaction-problems with the self control and self initiation of behavior-are both adaptations to an institutional regime that limits virtually all aspects of their behavior. Some prisoners become uncomfortable with even small amounts of freedom because they lose confidence in their own ability to behave without the constant and rigid restrictions to which they have become accustomed.
In addition, because so much of a person's individual identity depends on interaction with others, the virtually complete absence of normal human contact undermines their sense of self and the sense of being connected to a larger social world. For some the experience of total social isolation leads, paradoxically,

to social withdrawal, which may persist even after their release from supermax confinement.

We have also seen how the prolonged deprivations, severe restrictions, and the totality of control in supermax can create high levels of frustration in that may turn to anger or sudden outbursts of rage, with some prisoners becoming consumed by the fantasy of revenge against people they perceive as having unfairly provoked, thwarted, or oppressed them.

These observations suggest skepticism about the value

of supermax prisons in achieving their main purpose of

reducing violence in prison systems. Given the well-

documented destructive effects of extreme or prolonged

isolation discussed earlier in this brief, the intense

frustrations of supermax confinement (including

increases in negative affect; loss of control, irritability,

aggression, and rage; and paranoia),6O and the tendency

of frustration to lead to aggression,61 we would expect

supermax confinement to increase or at best to have no

effect on an individual's violence potential rather than

decreasing it. Moreover, prison violence that comes

about for structural reasons-for

example,

overcrowded conditions or the lack of meaningful or

effective programming-would not be abated by the

As cited supra in notes 42,51,52, and 53.
61 For example, see Leonard Berkowitz, Situational Influences on Aggression, in J. Groebel & R. Hinde, (Eds.),Aggression and War: Their Biological and Social Bases (pp. 91-100). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, (1989). One of the early studies on prolonged isolation concluded that one of its effects was to mobilize the potential for aggression. See Connier & Williams, supra note 24.

supermax prison. Some researchers have concluded that more severe levels of restriction imposed on inmates in segregated housing may increase problems within prison systems rather than relieving them.62
Thus, it is not surprising that as one review of the nature and status of the supermax put it: "All the evidence points to the opposite being true. The creation of control units and increased use of administrative segregation have not reduced the level of violence within general prison populations."63 A more recent, systemic study of the effects of supermax in three different states concluded that "[tlhe findings presented here reveal that the opening of a supermax had no effect on eight of the measures of institutional violence examined across three states."64 The authors found "no support" for the proposition that supermaxes reduced aggregate levels of inmate-on-inmate assaults, and that
62 For example, see: Miller & Young, supra note 42.
63 Rodney Henningsen, Wesley Johnson, and Teny Wells, Supermax Prisons: Panacea or Desperation, 3 Corrections Management Quarterly 53-59 (1999),at p. 55. Another recent review of the Literature on supermax prisons concluded much the same thing: "[tlhe extant empirical research on supermax facilities suggests that these institutions have the potential to damage inmates' mental health while failing to meet their purported goals (e.g., deterring inmates in the general prison population from committing criminal acts inside prison)." Jesenia Pizarro and Vanja Stenius, Supermax Prisons: Their Rise, Current Practices, and Effect on Inmates, 84 Prison Journal 248 (2004).
64 Chad Briggs, Jody Sundt, and Thomas Castellano, The Effect of Supermaximum Security Prisons on Aggregate Levels of Institutional Violence, 41 Criminology 301 (2003), at p. 325.

it produced stable reductions in inmate-on-staff assaults in only one of the three states in which it was studied.
Finally, we note the important role that the perception of fair treatment plays in a context such as this. Much psychological research has addressed the importance of the perception of fair process in the evaluation of the quality of justice dispensed in any legal setting.65 Supermax prisons are no exception. In fact, because of the severity of the restrictions, the level of the deprivation, and the potential psychological harm imposed, the need for fair process may be greater here (and the failure to provide such fairness may exacerbate the psychological stress experienced). We note that Michael Jackson's study of isolated Canadian prisoners revealed that "the single most important factor in [the segregated inmates'] descriptions of the effects that segregation had upon them" was "the prisoner's experience of the justice or injustice of his ~egregation."M~o~reover, as one comprehensive review of the psychological effects of imprisonment observed,
65 For example, see: John Darley, Sol Fulero, Craig Haney, & Tom Tyler, Psychological Jurisprudence: Taking Psychology and Law into the Twenty-First Century, in James Ogloff (Ed.), Taking Psychology and Law into the Twenty-First C e n t u y (pp. 35-59). New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishing (2002). Psychologist Tom Tyler has produced much of this research. For example, see: Tom Tyler, Public Trust and Confidence in Legal Authorities: What Do Majority and Minority Group Members Want From the Law and Legal Institutions? 19 Behavioral Science 6 the Law 215-235 (2001); and Tom Tyler & Allen Lind, Procedural Justice, in Joseph Sanders & Lee Hamilton (Eds.), Handbook of Justice Research i n Law (pp. 65-92). Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers (2001).
66 Jackson, supra note 29, at p. 114.

"when inmates are dealt with capriciously by
management... psychological stress can be created even
in the most humane prison environments."67
CONCLUSION
Severe conditions of isolated confinement such as those found in supermax prisons inflict psychological pain and distress and, if prolonged, create a serious risk of harm for prisoners. These facts strongly support requiring carefully designed and fair procedures that avoid unnecessary-erroneous, overreaching, or premature-placement in supermax prisons. Insofar as the lower court imposed procedures designed to ensure greater care, reliability, and fairness in supermax placement and retention decisions, its decision should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
Michael E. Deutsch People's Law Office 1180 N. Milwaukee Ave. Chicago, Illinois 60622 Telephone: 773-235-0070 Fax: 773-235-6699 Attorney for Amici Curiae
67 James Bonta and Paul Gendreau, Reexamining the Cruel and Unusual Punishment of Prison Life, 14 Law and Human Behavior 347-372 (1990),at p. 361.

 
 372 F.3d 346 (2004)
Charles E. AUSTIN et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.
Reginald WILKINSON et al., Defendants-Appellants.
Nos. 02-3429, 02-3816.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Argued: October 30, 2003. Decided and Filed: June 10, 2004.
3478 *347 *348 Jules Lobel, Center for Constitutional Rights (argued and briefed), Pittsburgh, PA, Raymond Vasvari (briefed), American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation, Cleveland, OH, Alice Lynd (briefed), Nile, OH, for Appellees.
Todd R. Marti (argued and briefed), Office of the Attorney General, Corrections Litigation Section, Columbus, OH, for Appellants.
Before MOORE and ROGERS, Circuit Judges; FORESTER, Chief District Judge.[*]
MOORE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which FORESTER, D.J., joined. ROGERS, J. (pp. 360-365), delivered a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
OPINION
MOORE, Circuit Judge.
349 Plaintiffs-Appellees Charles E. Austin et al.,[1] ("Inmates") all inmates at the Ohio *349 State Penitentiary ("OSP") in Youngstown, Ohio, filed this § 1983 suit as a class action against Defendants-Appellants Reginald Wilkinson et al.,[2] Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction officials ("ODRC Officials"), alleging Eighth Amendment violations as well as procedural due process claims relating to their placement at the OSP facility, which is a supermaximum, or supermax, facility. A class was certified pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), and the Eighth Amendment claims, related primarily to medical care and the provision of outdoor recreation, were settled. The due process claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were then tried to the district court, which rendered a judgment for the Inmates and entered the injunctive orders at issue.
On appeal, the ODRC Officials raise two claims of error: that the district court applied the wrong legal standards in finding a constitutional violation, and that even if a violation was correctly found, the remedial orders entered violate 18 U.S.C. § 3626, requiring particularized fact-finding by federal district courts interfering with state prison practices. Because we conclude that the district court did not err in determining that a liberty interest existed in the prison placement at issue and in modifying the procedures that govern that placement, we AFFIRM that portion of the district court's judgments; because the district court erred, however, in modifying substantive Ohio prison regulations, we REVERSE AND REMAND that portion of the judgments.
I. BACKGROUND
In May 1998, the OSP, Ohio's supermax prison facility, opened for business. Supermax facilities, in operation in most of the states and in the federal prison system, represent an attempt to concentrate the "worst of the worst" in one facility, thereby making the rest of the general prison population more safe and easier to control. Ohio's supermax, which is designated a high- maximum-security prison, was built in response to an April 1993 riot at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility ("SOCF"). Prior to the construction of the 504-bed OSP, Ohio's most secure

prison was the SOCF, a maximum-security prison. Within the SOCF is an even more secure cellblock, the J-1 cellblock, which houses twenty cells. Before the OSP opened, Ohio did not fill the J-1 cells; instead, it did not have enough maximum-security cells to house inmates at that security designation. From these facts, the district court concluded that the surplus of high-maximum-security cells led to a "because we have built it, they will come" mentality, with the surplus of maximum-security inmates leading to placement of inmates at OSP who did not meet the high-maximum-security requirements, contrary to both corrections policy and constitutional norms. See Austin v. Wilkinson (Austin I), 189 F.Supp.2d 719, 724 (N.D.Ohio 2002).
When the OSP first received inmates in May 1998, it did so in a concededly problematic and confused manner. Appellants' Br. at 11. On August 31, 1998, the department "attempted to establish some predictability to 350 placement at the OSP by *350 issuing Department of Rehabilitation and Correction Policy 111-07"; the version of this policy in effect when the Inmates filed their complaint ("old 111-07") became effective January 28, 1999. Austin I, 189 F.Supp.2d at 727. Placement at the OSP was synonymous with inmate classification at a highmaximum-security level. Old 111-07 provided for a classification committee (made up of a deputy warden and a mental health professional from the inmate's current institution, and a third official designated by the warden), which would receive a written statement from the prisoner as well as information provided by staff, and make a recommendation to the warden. The warden then approved or disapproved the recommendation, and sent the information along to the Bureau of Classification ("Bureau"). Even if both the classification committee and the warden agreed that high-maximum-security classification was inappropriate for an inmate, the Chief of the Bureau could still assign the inmate to OSP. Placement at OSP renders an inmate ineligible for parole during his time there. Austin I, 189 F.Supp.2d at 728.
Under this policy, though, problems continued. Some of the more troubling instances of this haphazard system occurred when the Bureau would, without stating its reasons, overrule the recommendation of both the classification committee and the warden and either place or maintain the placement of an inmate at OSP; when inmates who would otherwise be recommended for parole were ineligible because of a suspect OSP placement; when multiple jumps in security levels happened as a result of a single incident; when decisions were made with little factual support; and when decisions were based solely on the use or smuggling in of small amounts of drugs. Id. at 734-36.
The goal of the OSP, to separate the most dangerous prisoners from the rest of the prison population, is achieved primarily through solitary confinement, of a type noticeably different than segregation at other Ohio prisons. Inmates at OSP spend twenty-three hours a day in their single cells, measuring approximately 89.7 square feet. Id. at 724. These cells are further isolated from the outside world by the installation of metal strips on the bottom and sides of the cell doors that prevent inmates from communicating with one another. Id. During the one hour per day that inmates can leave their cells, they have access to two indoor recreation rooms; most inmates have recreation alone, although a limited number may have recreation with one other prisoner. Id. Inmates having visitors are required to be strip-searched when they leave and reenter the cellblock, even though they are isolated from their visitors by solid windows. Id. at 725. Additional factual findings by the district court differentiate life at OSP from segregation conditions at other Ohio prisons, including extra limitations on personal property rights, access to telephones and counsel, outside recreation, and communication with other persons. Id.
On January 1, 2001, the Inmates filed their complaint, stating both procedural due process claims regarding placement at OSP, the claims at issue on appeal, and Eighth Amendment claims regarding inadequate medical and psychiatric care, inadequate outdoor recreation facilities, and harsh restraints used at OSP. The Eighth Amendment claims were settled below. See Austin v. Wilkinson, No. 4:01-CV-71 (N.D.Ohio Apr. 5, 2002) (order approving settlement agreement). A Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2) class was certified, and the case was scheduled for 351 trial in January 2002. On the eve of trial, the ODRC released a new version of 111-07 ("new 111-07"), and *351 it is the district court's ordered modifications to new 111-07, made after a bench trial, that are at issue on this appeal. In old 111-07, prisoners were classified as high-maximum-security and maximum-security; in new 111-07, the security levels are instead level five and level four. When the district court issued its decision, only level five prisoners were housed at OSP, but the appellees urge this court to take judicial notice of the decision by Defendant Wilkinson to house inmates classified at both levels four and five at OSP. Appellees' Br. at 5 n. 1. New 111-07 details both the substantive reasons for reclassification and the procedures followed to reclassify, as well as the conditions imposed on inmates in those classification levels.[3] Various prison officials are empowered to

initiate placement into classification level five,[4] using the "Security Designation Long Form," which provides a score sheet for inmates based on their age, the severity of the offense triggering the initiation of reclassification hearings, prior prison experience, prior violent behavior, pre-prison gang activity, and escape attempts; the prison official is also empowered to override the numerical score for any of the reasons identified by 111-07 as grounds for level five classification. These include assaultive and/or predatory behavior; the nature of the inmate's conviction; leadership roles in riots or disturbances; the possession of contraband; the identification of the inmate as a leader of a "security threat group" (prison gang); escape attempts; "an ability to compromise the integrity of [prison] staff"; knowing exposure of others to HIV or hepatitis; or a chronic inability to adjust to a lower security level. On initiation of the reclassification, the warden establishes a classification committee to review the inmate's behavior and determine whether in fact the inmate meets one of the level five criteria. That committee is to hold a hearing to review the form and any other relevant information; 111-07 entitles inmates to forty-eight hours' prior notice of that hearing and the opportunity to appear and make both oral and written presentations. The classification committee is to "document information" presented by staff and the inmate, and determine whether the inmate should be placed in level five. That recommendation is then forwarded to the warden. If the warden approves the recommendation, both the recommendation and the approval are forwarded to the Bureau of Classification for final decision. (If the warden does not approve the recommendation, the process ends and the inmate is not classified as level five). The inmate shall be notified of the warden's approval, and may file a formal objection with the Bureau within fifteen days of notice. The Bureau will then review the recommendation and any objection and make a final decision. Additionally, within thirty days of placement at OSP, the OSP staff reviews a reclassified inmate's placement, and if they recommend a security reduction with which the OSP warden agrees, 352 that recommendation is sent to the Bureau. Review of OSP *352 inmates' security levels is made at least annually and follows essentially the same process as the initial classification hearing.
In its opinion, issued on February 25, 2002, the district court found the process specified in new 111-07 lacking. See Austin I, 189 F.Supp.2d at 750-52. The district court identified the following deficiencies: that inmates are not given notice of all the evidence that may be relied upon in their classification hearings; that inmates are not allowed to call witnesses; that the placement criteria give insufficient notice of the amount of drugs in possession that would trigger level five placement; that the placement criteria are unnecessarily vague with regard to the gang activity that would trigger a placement; that the final decisionmaker, the Bureau of Classification, was not required to describe the facts found and reasoning used in making its placement and reclassification decisions; that the inmate is not given adequate notice of the information to be considered at his reclassification hearing; and that adequate notice of the conduct necessary for the inmate to leave the OSP is not given. The district court then ordered the parties to file proposed injunctive orders; the ODRC Officials' proposed injunctive order was one and a half pages in length. On March 26, 2002, the district court issued an injunction directing the ODRC Officials to correct each of the deficiencies it had found and issued an accompanying judgment terminating the action under Rule 58. See Austin v. Wilkinson (Austin II), 204 F.Supp.2d 1024 (N.D.Ohio 2002). The ODRC Officials filed a timely notice of appeal on April 17, which was docketed as Sixth Circuit Appeal Number 02-3429. On April 24, they filed with the district court a revised version of 111-07 ("revised 111-07"). On May 15, the district court ordered that policy adopted with slight changes. On June 6, 2002, the ODRC Officials filed a Rule 60(b) motion, [5] which the district court denied on July 12, ruling that the defendants were not surprised by its judgment, and that it had the authority to order the injunctive relief at issue. On July 12, the ODRC Officials filed a notice of appeal from both the district court's denial of their Rule 60(b) motion and its May 15 order adopting revised 111-07,[6] docketed as Appeal No. 02-3816.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Jurisdiction
The underlying civil rights action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court had original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

B. Standard of Review
The ODRC Officials appeal from the grant of a permanent injunction and the denial of a motion for relief from the judgment, both of which are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazzetti Imp. & Exp., Inc., 270 F.3d 298, 317 (6th Cir.2001); Mallory v. Eyrich, 922 F.2d 1273, 1279 (6th Cir.1991). In determining whether the district court abused its discretion, we give great deference to the district court, reviewing its legal determinations de novo, but only disturbing its factual findings if they are clearly erroneous. Elec. Workers 353 Pension Trust Fund of Local Union # 58 v. Gary's *353 Elec. Serv. Co., 340 F.3d 373, 378 (6th Cir.2003).
C. Due Process Rights
1. Liberty Interest under Sandin v. Conner
Inmates challenge the procedures for classification at level five under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, claiming that classification at that level and concomitant placement at OSP implicates a statecreated liberty interest, and that the procedures in place before trial were inadequate to protect this interest. Therefore, our threshold inquiry is whether a state-created liberty interest exists with regard to placement in Ohio's supermax prison. This inquiry is controlled by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995), which mandates that a state creates a liberty interest in avoiding certain prison conditions only where those conditions are an "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Id. at 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293. Prior to Sandin, a state created a liberty interest through using "`language of an unmistakably mandatory character' such that the incursion on liberty would not occur `absent specified substantive predicates.'" Id. at 480, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471-72, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983)). Sandin shifted the focus from parsing the language of state statutes and regulations to examining the severity of the conditions to which an inmate would be subject.
The district court thus properly made factual findings as to the conditions in OSP compared to the conditions in other Ohio prisons, specifically in the segregated units of maximum-security prisons, the most severe non-OSP conditions in the Ohio system. The court found that the extreme isolation visited upon the inmates at OSP, the lack of any outdoor recreation, the limitations upon personal property rights and access to telephones and counsel, and, finally, the ineligibility of OSP inmates for parole, all combined to create a significant and atypical hardship. The ODRC Officials' sole challenge on appeal to these careful findings is that the district court erred by comparing conditions at OSP to conditions at other Ohio prisons. They argue instead that the proper baseline in determining atypicality is the conditions at other supermax facilities around the country. Other circuits that have decided the question have split over whether the proper control group is the general prison population or inmates in typical segregation conditions. Compare Beverati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 504 (4th Cir.1997) (finding "the conditions [at issue] were more burdensome than those imposed on the general prison population" although not sufficiently atypical), and Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir.1996) ("a major difference between the conditions for the general prison population and the segregated population triggers a right to a hearing"), with Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 708 (3d Cir.1997) (administrative custody is not "extraordinary" and "stays of many months are not uncommon"), and Brooks v. DiFasi, 112 F.3d 46, 49 (2d Cir.1997) (explicit factual comparison between administrative segregation and disciplinary segregation is necessary). See also Hatch v. District of Columbia, 184 F.3d 846, 847 (D.C.Cir.1999) (appropriate comparison is "the most restrictive conditions ... routinely impose[d] on inmates serving similar sentences"); Wagner v. Hanks, 128 F.3d 1173, 1177 (7th 354 Cir.1997) (appropriate comparison is to the conditions of nondisciplinary segregation in the *354 state's most restrictive prison).[7] None of the courts of appeals, however, have adopted the novel and restrictive control group urged by the ODRC Officials, which would as a matter of law make it impossible for any inmates but those in the most harsh prison in the country to make out a case for protection under Sandin.
The ODRC Officials point only to the Supreme Court's decision in Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 103 S.Ct. 1741, 75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983), and dicta in Wagner, 128 F.3d at 1173, to support their argument. Olim involved a

challenge to an interstate prison transfer; the Court held that no liberty interest was created by Hawaii state prison regulations, and that the Due Process Clause of its own force did not protect any liberty interest deprived by an interstate prison transfer. Olim, 461 U.S. at 245-49, 103 S.Ct. 1741. But Olim's holding has limited applicability when dealing with a state-created liberty interest; that the Due Process Clause does not of its own force protect against interstate transfers has little to do with whether Ohio regulations create a liberty interest in remaining outside of a supermax prison. Sandin requires a situationally-based factual analysis; if it is typical that an Ohio prisoner experiences conditions similar to those of OSP, then state lines might truly be irrelevant. That, however, is not the case; of 44,000 prisoners in the Ohio system, only twenty to thirty have been transferred out of state 0907 a number that itself might give rise to a typicality, if not hardship, if substantive state law limiting officials' discretion in transfer existed 0907 and not a single one has been shown to have been transferred to a supermax. See Hatch, 184 F.3d at 857 ("What matters, therefore, is not simply the possibility of transfer but also its likelihood."). Olim, to the contrary, relied heavily on the fact of interstate transfer as a common occurrence, suggesting that no reasonable expectation existed that any particular inmate would serve his sentence within his state of conviction. Olim, 461 U.S. at 245-47, 103 S.Ct. 1741. Even if the proper comparison in this case were nationwide rather than statewide, the appropriate question would be whether the OSP represented an atypical hardship as compared to, at most, the typical conditions in administrative or disciplinary segregation to which transferred Ohio prisoners are subject, not those in supermaxes.
Finally, Wagner is not to the contrary. First, as the Inmates point out, the language relied upon by the ODRC Officials in support of their claim is dicta. See Wagner, 128 F.3d at 1176. Second, and more important, the Wagner court itself in its analysis misses the important distinction between cases narrowly defining the contours of the protection of the Due Process Clause of its own force and those deciding when state laws create a liberty interest. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that transfers in and of themselves do not implicate due process interests (although it has not to date dealt with transfer to a supermax prison), see Olim, 461 U.S. at 238, 355 103 S.Ct. 1741; *355 Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 229, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976), but the Court has never held that state laws cannot create a liberty interest in avoiding a transfer to a particularly harsh facility. This key distinction goes wholly unaddressed by the ODRC Officials.[8]
Ultimately, whether OSP is compared to the general prison population of Ohio, or instead to inmates in typical segregation conditions, which was the baseline used by the district court, OSP constitutes an atypical and significant hardship under Sandin, such that inmates enjoy a liberty interest in not being placed at OSP absent the state-mandated substantive predicates set out in new Policy 111-07. It is therefore unnecessary to determine which is the proper baseline for Sandin comparisons in order to decide this case, but we reject emphatically the ODRC Officials' argument that the baseline should be out-of-state supermax prisons. Whatever the "ordinary incidents of prison life" may encompass, they must be decided with reference to the particular prison system at issue, and can only be truly "ordinary" when experienced by a significant proportion of the prison population.
2. The Process That Is Due
Once a liberty interest has been established under Sandin, we must turn to the question of what process is due to protect that interest. At issue on appeal is the propriety of a set of modifications made by the district court to the ODRC's policy governing classification at level five. Most of these modifications concern the procedures used to classify inmates, but three modifications are substantive predicates to OSP placement and retention. We will analyze the procedural modifications in greater depth below under the familiar due process analysis of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), but the substantive modifications can be dealt with more simply.
a. Modifications to Ohio's Substantive Prison Regulations
Prior to the district court's modifications, inmates could be placed at OSP for any contraband activity, no matter how minimal. As its first substantive modification, the district court directed that the policy be rewritten to specify a 356 quantity of contraband activity, and for drug activity, the district court stipulated that the *356 threshold amount should "reflect a level that would subject an inmate to incarceration for at least a third degree felony," or

alternately the court allowed "placement for multiple violations involving lesser quantit[ies] of drugs." Austin II, 204 F.Supp.2d at 1028. The district court's second substantive modification was to the "security group threat" predicate for classification, directing the ODRC Officials to modify the criteria to require a greater showing of involvement in such groups. Third, the district court required that only behavior in the five years prior to a retention decision should be considered, and that an inmate with three years free of violent behavior and two years free of major misconduct "should generally qualify for reclassification" to a lower level and transfer out of OSP, with an exception to both of these rules if an inmate's "prior conduct during incarceration resulted in death or extreme bodily harm." Id.
The power of the federal courts to order modifications in state prison policies extends only as far as is necessary to protect federal rights. The Inmates do not argue and we do not decide whether placement at OSP implicates either the Eighth Amendment or the substantive portion of the Due Process Clause.[9] The federal right at issue in this case, then, is defined solely in relation to the substantive limits placed on the discretion of the ODRC officials by state law itself. Therefore, the district court only had the power to order federally mandated process in a substantive inquiry otherwise governed by the state. The district court was thus without power to order the state officials to modify the substantive predicates which governed placement and retention at OSP. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 219-222, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990) (reviewing a state court's substantive as well as procedural modifications to state correctional regulations). Therefore, regardless of their inherent soundness, these three modifications must fail, as they order the ODRC to alter its substantive rules governing OSP placement and retention.
While the district court correctly identified adequate notice as a requirement of due process when making these changes, see Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1104-05 (6th Cir.1995), we conclude that each of the regulations provides sufficient notice and that the modifications made by the district court are in fact substantive modifications. For instance, new 111-07 states that any amount of drugs can trigger a reclassification hearing; altering the policy to require a specified amount does not improve upon that notice but instead limits the substantive discretion of the ODRC Officials. Similarly, the security group modification alters the substantive grounds for placement at OSP, rather than the process used in determining that placement. And the modification to the retention criteria also limits the substantive discretion of the Officials. While the due process requirement of notice applies in the prison context as well as outside of it, albeit slightly differently, see United States v. Chatman, 538 F.2d 567, 569 (4th Cir.1976), any deficiencies in the notice provided by these provisions are properly corrected through case by case "as applied" challenges to the regulations, rather than striking the 357 regulations *357 down on their face. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 755-56, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974); Adams v. Gunnell, 729 F.2d 362, 369-70 (5th Cir.1984). We therefore reverse those portions of the district court's judgments that altered the contents of these three substantive regulations.
b. Procedural Modifications
That a liberty interest exists in avoiding classification at level five and concurrent placement in OSP is in many ways the easy half of the Sandin analysis. What is much less clear after Sandin is how to determine what process is due to protect that interest. Before Sandin, state-created liberty interests of prisoners were either protected by an adversary hearing on the record following Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-73, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), or a more free-form hearing following Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 477, 103 S.Ct. 864. Wolff dealt with the process due in finding a disciplinary infraction punished by the rescission of good-time credits; Hewitt involved a challenged placement in administrative segregation, pending the outcome of an investigation into misconduct. Cases following the Hewitt/Wolff split have classified various factual situations depending upon the category into which the challenged process fell: disciplinary or administrative, historical or prospective, objective or subjective, Wolff or Hewitt. On appeal, the ODRC Officials assert that this mechanical dichotomy still has force after Sandin, that classification at level five and placement at OSP is a forward-looking, Hewitt-type procedure, and that our inquiry should end there, with a decision that only "Hewitt process" is due. We are convinced, however, that Sandin called into question not only the mechanistic way in which the circuit courts previously found liberty interests in prison regulations, but also the mechanistic fashion in which they applied the Hewitt/Wolff dichotomy.[10] After Sandin, both steps of the analysis 0907 the creation of a liberty interest and the

determination of the process due to protect that interest 0907 must carefully reference the severity of the deprivation at stake. It is not enough to say that a particular decision is "forward-looking"; instead, reference must be made to the interests at stake, for the inmate and for the state. It is not the nature of the decision which strikes the due process balance; it is the nature of the interests on both sides of that balance.[11] With that in mind, we approve of the district court's grounding of its decision in the due process balancing test outlined in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, and consider the procedural modifications in light of that test. Mathews

358

requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that *358 will be affected

by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the

procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;

and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and

administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.

Id.

The district court made fifteen specific modifications to new 111-07, including the improper substantive modifications dealt with above. A first set deals with the classification hearing itself, and closely tracks Wolff. First, when classification proceedings are initiated, the notice already stipulated by new 111-07 shall include an exhaustive list of the reasons to be considered for placement and a summary of the evidence to be presented. Second, the inmate shall be allowed to present witnesses and documentary evidence at classification hearings, where "permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous or burdensome to institutional safety or correctional goals." J.A. at 530 (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566, 94 S.Ct. 2963). Finally, a record is to be made of the proceeding itself, and if the ODRC wishes to rely on confidential witnesses, it must indicate that reliance and disclose as much of the confidential testimony as possible.

A second group of modifications required by the district court centers on the administrative appellate procedure laid out in new 111-07. Because no comparable appellate procedure was at issue in Wolff, see 418 U.S. at 565, 94 S.Ct. 2963, these requirements do not track that case as closely. The district court found that the previous system of administrative review, in which each intervening appellate decisionmaker had plenary power to reverse the prior decisionmaker without any statement of reasons for the decision given to the inmate, had led to suspect inmate classifications. The specific changes ordered by the district court were: that the inmate is to receive the classification committee's recommendation and notice of his right to and method of appeal; that the warden is to engage in "independent review" of the committee's recommendation, and if in doing so, relies upon a confidential witness statement not already made known to the prisoner, shall follow the procedure outlined above, including allowing the inmate to respond in writing; that the warden shall, if she approves the recommendation, send a copy of that recommendation to the inmate; and that the Bureau of Classification shall follow the same procedure in relying on new confidential witness statements, shall allow the inmate to submit documentary evidence, and will, if the inmate is recommended for level five placement, record a detailed and specific justification for the decision. Finally, the district court, in its May 15, 2002, order, required that none of the members of the original classification committee shall take part in the decision of the prisoner's appeal to the warden or to the Bureau.

The first factor of the Mathews balancing test, the private interest at stake, is significant; placement at OSP is indefinite and reviewed only annually, unlike placement in disciplinary segregation in the Ohio prison system, which lasts only thirty days, or administrative segregation, which is reviewed every thirty days. Prisoners placed at OSP are deprived of all significant human contact and have other restrictions placed upon their movement and their personal privileges; they are also ineligible for parole during their stay at OSP. In this first factor, Sandin 359 affects *359 the due process balance: because only those conditions that constitute "atypical and significant hardships" give rise to liberty interests, those interests will necessarily be of a weight requiring greater due process protection.[12] As to the second factor, the risk of error, the district court made specific findings concerning past erroneous and haphazard placements at OSP, which go unchallenged on appeal. We will consider the probative value of particular procedures in the next paragraph. As to the third factor, the ODRC clearly has an interest in guaranteeing the safety of its staff and inmates through the swift isolation of dangerous inmates. However, the ODRC has a mechanism to assure safety, one which does not require extensive process, and which, unlike OSP placement, is easily and swiftly reversible in the case of error: administrative segregation.

Looking at each of the modifications ordered by the district court individually, we remain unconvinced that the district court abused its discretion in finding that each procedural modification it made was mandated by the weighty private interest at stake and the risk of error and was unmitigated by the governmental interests at stake. We examine first the requirement identified by the ODRC Officials both in their brief and at oral argument as the most burdensome: requiring officials to limit their placement decision to only those matters detailed in the notice given to the inmate. They argue that this requirement will constrict "substantive discretion" by disallowing reliance on "rumor, reputation, and even more imponderable factors." Appellants' Reply Br. at 8 (quoting Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 474, 103 S.Ct. 864). This argument is unavailing. Placement at OSP implicates a liberty interest because of the ODRC's own regulations limiting the substantive discretion of prison officials; they can place inmates at OSP only in the presence of certain factual predicates, all of which are historical in nature. Having set out a detailed and restricted list of reasons why inmates can be put at OSP, the ODRC cannot turn around and argue that the district court's order decreases their ability to rely on "rumor, reputation, and even more imponderable factors," for those factors are illegitimate under their own placement scheme.[13] The district court required that the "defendants will provide the inmate with written notice of all the grounds believed to justify his placement at level five and a summary of the evidence that the defendants will rely upon for the placement." Austin II, 204 360 F.Supp.2d at 1026. We do not find that this requirement's burdens on the *360 ODRC outweigh its probative and protective value.
Having found that the additional procedural requirement identified by the ODRC Officials as the most burdensome passes muster under Mathews v. Eldridge, we conclude that those which pose a lesser burden on the ODRC are also appropriate. The ODRC Officials, both in their brief and at oral argument, did not in fact point to any other single procedural requirement as being particularly burdensome. We note, moreover, that many of the procedures ordered by the district court are an attempt to reconcile an elaborate administrative appeals scheme created by the ODRC Officials with the requirement that the inmate know the reason for any decision made about his fate; where a higher-up decisionmaker reverses the decision of the original factfinder, a brief description of the grounds for that reversal is constitutionally necessary.
D. Prison Litigation Reform Act
The ODRC Officials make a final argument that the district court failed to follow 18 U.S.C. § 3626, part of the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), governing prospective relief. Their complaints center around the substantive modifications made to new 111-07, which modifications are indeed invalid for the reasons discussed above. They also make a third, more general argument that the district court erred in failing to make findings that the remedial orders are necessary to correct "`current and ongoing' federal violations." Appellants' Br. at 60. But the "current and ongoing" language comes from § 3626(b)(3), governing the termination of relief, not from § 3626 (a), governing requirements for initial relief. This argument therefore has no merit.
III. CONCLUSION
Because the Inmates have a liberty interest in avoiding placement at OSP, and because the procedural modifications ordered by the district court are necessary to protect that interest, we affirm those portions of the district court's judgments that address procedural requirements and modifications. Because the district court was without power to reach the substantive prison regulations which were also modified, we reverse the district court's judgments insofar as they rely on the following: Part II of the district court's March 26, 2002 order, excepting the final paragraph;[14] the penultimate paragraph of the district court's May 15, 2002 order; and the underlying portions of the district court's February 25, 2002 opinion.[15] We therefore partially AFFIRM and partially REVERSE the district court's judgments, and we REMAND to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ROGERS, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting.

While I agree with much of the majority's careful opinion, there are two areas where my analysis differs sufficiently to warrant a separate opinion, and one point upon which I respectfully dissent.
361 *361 A.
I agree that the Inmates have shown a protected liberty interest under Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995), and that in applying Sandin we are not required to make an interstate, as opposed to intrastate, comparison. The record shows that inmates assigned to OSP not only are subjected to far more severe conditions of confinement, but they are also disqualified for parole while assigned to OSP. These two factors together permit the conclusion that a liberty interest is implicated under Sandin.
Because assignment to the OSP involves disqualification from parole, it is unnecessary for us to decide whether a prison classification that subjects an inmate to more restrictive conditions of confinement, without more, constitutes a deprivation of a liberty interest. Recent unpublished opinions of the Seventh Circuit hold that it does not, even where assignment to a supermax prison was involved. See Moore v. Litscher, 52 Fed.Appx. 861 (7th Cir.2002) (prisoners do not have a federally protected liberty interest in being housed in a particular facility, and therefore, as a matter of federal constitutional law, prisoner was not entitled to any due process protection before he was moved to supermax facility); Nash v. Litscher, 50 Fed.Appx. 317 (7th Cir.2002) (same). If movement from one level of restrictive confinement to a significantly higher one triggers due process protections, then prison administration could be unduly burdened by the necessity of due process hearings. Courts would then have to struggle with just how much of a change in the severity of confinement triggers due process protection. Fortunately, we do not need to decide the issue. In this case, the decision to assign an inmate to OSP not only imposes extraordinarily strict conditions, but also suspends parole eligibility. While Ohio law does not create a liberty interest in parole, see Ohio Rev.Code § 2967.03; Wagner v. Gilligan, 609 F.2d 866, 867 (6th Cir.1979), a parole eligibility determination can indirectly affect the length of a prisoner's incarceration, and is patently based on factors beyond the consideration of prisoner safety and prison management. See Ohio Admin. Code § 5120:1-1-07 (2004); Layne v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 97 Ohio St.3d 456, 780 N.E.2d 548, 555 (2002) (emphasizing that parole board may "consider any circumstances relating to the offense or offenses of conviction, including crimes that did not result in conviction, as well as any other factors [it] deems relevant").
Even though assignment to a very restrictive prison might not by itself amount to a deprivation of a liberty interest, and even though a suspension of parole eligibility by itself may not amount to the deprivation of a property or liberty interest in Ohio, the combination of the two deprivations, in the context of the facts shown in the record of this case, amounts to a deprivation of a protected interest for procedural due process purposes. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (finding no protected liberty interest in remaining free from disciplinary segregation, but noting that disciplinary record did not preclude parole); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 830 (9th Cir.1997) (finding that stigmatizing consequences of labeling inmate as "sex offender," combined with parole ineligibility for non-completion of mandatory treatment program, triggered due process protections under Sandin). By way of analogy, the Supreme Court found a protected interest in Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 633 n. 13, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980), from the combination of a loss of at-will employment (alone not a property interest under Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 362 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972)) and defamatory statements (alone not a deprivation of a *362 liberty interest under Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976)).
B.
I also agree that the proper framework for evaluating whether the state procedures meet the requirements of procedural due process is the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-45, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). Such an analysis requires that each procedural protection sought for each category of administrative decisionmaking be evaluated independently under the Eldridge factors. We are not required to adopt for any prison-related decision the bundle of procedures required by one or another Supreme Court case dealing with different types of prison decisions. Thus discussion of the Hewitt/Wolff "dichotomy" is problematic. Many deprivations of liberty interests in prison, and certainly the ones in this case, are different in important

respects both from the disciplinary rescission of good-time credits in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), and from the administrative segregation in Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). The sought procedures may also vary. In short, the balance has to be contextspecific. Thus whether or not a particular procedure imposed by the district court "tracks Wolff" by itself does not tell us whether it is required by Eldridge. On the other hand, of course, the Supreme Court's analysis with respect to what procedures are required to protect a particular liberty interest do provide guidance where the procedures or the interests are in relevant respects analogous. Thus to the extent, for instance, that Hewitt instructs that additional procedures with respect to "forward-looking" determinations are less likely to increase the accuracy of such decisions (the second Eldridge factor), 459 U.S. at 473-74, 103 S.Ct. 864, that guidance may appropriately be applied 0907 not categorically but as part of the weighing 0907 in other cases involving different procedures and different liberty interests.
I would also qualify the majority's statement that "[i]t is not the nature of the decision which strikes the due process balance; it is the nature of the interests on both sides of that balance." The Eldridge balance involves three factors, two of which can be characterized as "the nature of the interests on both sides." The other, often dispositive factor, however, is the degree to which the desired procedures will increase the accuracy of agency decisionmaking. That determination often does depend on "the nature of the decision" in the sense that some types of decisions will be greatly benefited by certain procedures, while others may not.
C.
Applying the Eldridge analysis, I would uphold all of the procedural requirements imposed by the district court except the requirement that officials limit their placement decision to those matters detailed in the notice to the inmate.[1]
At the outset, I note that our scope of review is de novo for legal issues such as whether procedural due process requires certain procedures, even though the issue is presented on appeal from the entry of an injunction. See 363 Chao v. Hosp. Staffing Servs., Inc., 270 F.3d 374, 381 (6th Cir.2001) ("A court abuses its discretion when *363 it relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact, applies an inappropriate legal standard, or improperly applies the law, with such legal questions receiving de novo review in the Court of Appeals."), South Cent. Power Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 186 F.3d 733, 737 (6th Cir.1999) ("A district court's decision to grant or deny a permanent injunction is reviewed under several distinct standards. Factual findings are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, and the scope of injunctive relief is reviewed for an abuse of discretion."). The scope of equitable relief may be discretionary in some sense, such that review of injunctive orders may sometimes be for abuse of discretion, but precisely speaking a district court does not have discretion to determine whether due process requires a hearing in a particular context. We properly review such a legal issue de novo.
The comprehensive notice requirement imposed by the district court essentially provides inmates with notice of all of the evidence that may be relied on in determining his placement. Significantly, this requirement provides inmates appearing before classification committees with more notice than that received by criminal defendants at trial, where the liberty interests at stake are obviously more substantial. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 16; Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559, 97 S.Ct. 837, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977) ("There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case ... [and] the Due Process Clause has little to say regarding the amount of discovery which the parties must be afforded ..."). As the Supreme Court has recognized, "[p]rison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556, 94 S.Ct. 2963. In my view, the comprehensive notice requirement extends beyond what due process requires.
In upholding the district court's requirement, the majority relies on Sandin to conclude that the liberty interest in this case is particularly weighty. If anything, however, the opposite inference is warranted. That is, under Sandin, a liberty interest arises from "atypical and significant hardships" not implicit in the original sentence. Typical or less significant hardships thus do not even rise to the level of a protected liberty interest. It is only the atypicality or the extraordinary significance of the hardship that is even enough to raise due process concerns. It follows that

a hardship that is only marginally atypical and marginally significant should only be given marginal weight in an Eldridge analysis. It is illogical to say that any interest that meets the Sandin test must be of a weight requiring greater due process protection. On the contrary, a prisoner gains due process protection under Sandin only when the hardship exceeds typical hardship. Because in a sense it is the excess over typical hardship that warrants due process protection, it is logical that it be that excess that is weighed as the private interest in the Eldridge analysis. Since that excess may be very small, the fact that the interest was determined under Sandin may instead imply that the private interest be given a lesser weight than in the case of another type of protected property or liberty interest. In any event, the fact that the liberty interest is determined under a Sandin analysis cannot, without more, lead to the conclusion that the interests will be deemed to weigh particularly heavily.
Secondly, we must evaluate the increase in accuracy that will result from the procedural requirement that the 364 decisionmakers limit their placement decision to the grounds and evidence detailed in the notice *364 given to
the inmate. A general finding that erroneous and haphazard placements have occurred in the past is insufficient. Instead, under the second factor of Eldridge, we must evaluate the extent that the particular procedural requirement increases the accuracy of the decisionmaking.
Under the ORDC Officials' new policy 111-07, inmates received written notice explaining the reasons they were referred for a classification hearing. See J.A. at 716, 731. The district court ordered that, not only must ORDC officials provide advance written notice of the reasons for the referral to a hearing, but that they must also provide "written notice of all the grounds believed to justify [placement] and a summary of the evidence that the [officials] will rely upon for the placement." Austin v. Wilkinson, 204 F.Supp.2d 1024, 1026 (N.D.Ohio 2002). The district court added a footnote that appears to preclude consideration of evidence not described in the notice: "If [ORDC Officials] elect to use [a proposed form] to give an inmate notice, they must limit the grounds stated on the form and the evidence generally described on the form, to support placement at OSP." Id. The majority fails to explain, however, how requiring ORDC officials to provide an inmate with such comprehensive notice increases the accuracy of the placement decision for a given inmate. The district court reasoned that
[r]equiring Department officials to give inmates specific notice of all of the grounds for placing and retaining them at OSP would cause minimal hardship. The officials would only need to expend the additional time to write out their reasons for making a specific classification decision. Furthermore, this minimal amount of additional time would increase the Department's efficiency. Accurately summarizing all the grounds supporting an inmate's placement at the OSP would later assist reviewing entities and avoid unnecessary prisoner assignments to the OSP.
Austin v. Wilkinson, 189 F.Supp.2d 719, 746 (N.D.Ohio 2002). The district court's analysis misapprehends the burden that a comprehensive notice requirement imposes on the government. In making such decisions, ORDC Officials rely on a wide range of information. The hardship in expending additional time to write out reasons for making a specific classification decision may indeed be minimal. However, requiring that, prior to even conducting a hearing, ORDC Officials cull through often voluminous records and note every potentially relevant fact 0907 on pain of barring them from considering any information, no matter how relevant, that was inadvertently omitted 0907 is significantly more onerous. Such burdens have not been shown to be outweighed by the improvement in accuracy 0907 assuming there is any 0907 asserted to arise from the comprehensive notice requirement.
Nor is the comprehensive notice requirement necessary to vindicate the interests cited by the district court. Under the procedural process required by the district court, the classification committee is responsible only for making the initial recommendation concerning whether an inmate should be assigned to OSP; both the warden (or the warden's designee) and the Bureau of Classification must agree with the committee's recommendation before an inmate can be placed at OSP. Austin v. Wilkinson, 204 F.Supp.2d 1024, 1026-28 (N.D.Ohio 2002). At each stage in the process, an inmate must be given a written statement explaining the justification for the placement recommendation and the evidence supporting it, as well as an opportunity to respond to the recommendation in 365 writing. This process provides both a written record for review and ample opportunity *365 for inmates to challenge their placement. Accordingly, I would find that the notice required under the new 111-07 is sufficient to satisfy due process in this context.

As to the remaining procedures imposed by the district court, the Government has failed to articulate in any significant manner how they burden the government. On their face the additional procedural requirements appear to increase the accuracy and reliability of the decisionmaking process, and they were arrived at by careful consideration by the district court. The private interest is substantial. I therefore agree that the procedural requirements imposed by the district court, apart from the one discussed above, were properly imposed by the district court.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the judgment except to the extent that it upholds the requirement that ORDC Officials provide comprehensive notice to inmates appearing before classification committees.
[*] The Honorable Karl S. Forester, Chief United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Kentucky, sitting by designation.
[1] The additional named plaintiffs are Robert Baksi, Michael Benge, Alonzo L. Bonner, August Cassano, David E. Clark, James DeJarnette, Roy D. Donald, David Easley, Brian K. Eskridge, Keith Gardner, Roger Lee Hall, Frederick O. Harris, Jr., Daryl Heard, Edward O. Hodge, Orsino Iacovone, Kunta Kenyatta, Stacy Lane, James D. Mitchell, Emanuel B. Newell, John W. Perotti, Lamar Preston, Jason H. Robb, Kevin B. Roe, Richard Siggers, Eric Swofford, Lahray Thompson, Edward A. Tilley, and Mark Trawick.
[2] Named additionally as defendants are Stephen J. Huffman, Bernard J. Ryznar, Todd E. Ishee, Bruce A. Martin, Deborah Nixon Hughes, Cheryl Jorgensen-Martinez, Manish B. Joshi, Patrick F. Biggs, Audrey Sandor Nietzel, and Matthew Meyer.
[3] The procedural information and quoted language are taken from new 111-07.
[4] When the district court made its findings and decision, only prisoners classified as level five were placed at OSP. As noted above, this is no longer the case, as the ODRC is now placing level four prisoners at OSP. The procedure for placement at level four is essentially the same as that set out in new 111-07 and found constitutionally inadequate by the district court. Therefore, inmates are being placed at OSP without the procedural protections ordered by the district court. Because the complained-of deprivation of liberty is not reclassification by itself, but placement at OSP which results from a level five classification, this seems a particularly disingenuous way to evade the district court's order in advance of appellate review.
[5] The ODRC Officials asked for relief under Rule 60(b)(6), (b)(1), and (b)(4).
[6] The ODRC Officials had moved on June 6, 2002, simultaneous with their Rule 60(b) motion, for additional time to file a notice of appeal from the district court's May 15 order. An extension was granted to July 15, 2002, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5).
[7] The Fifth Circuit has also remanded at least one case to a district court with instructions to determine the proper baseline if Sandin is triggered. See Wilkerson v. Stalder, 329 F.3d 431, 436 (5th Cir.2003). But see Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 31-32 (5th Cir.1995) ("it is difficult to see that any other deprivations in the prison context, short of those that clearly impinge on the duration of confinement, will henceforth qualify for constitutional `liberty' status"). Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 821 (5th Cir.1997), cited by the district court, does not in fact analyze state-created liberty interests under Sandin, but instead evaluates fundamental liberty rights under the three-strikes provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA").
[8] This distinction also partially explains why Moore v. Litscher, 52 Fed.Appx. 861 (7th Cir.2002), and Nash v. Litscher, 50 Fed.Appx. 317 (7th Cir.2002), cited by the concurrence for the proposition that avoidance of placement at a supermax is not in and of itself a liberty interest under Sandin, are inapposite. Moore cited to Olim in holding, "Prisoners do not have a federally protected liberty interest in being housed in a particular facility." 52 Fed.Appx. at 861-62. With respect to a state liberty interest, the court held that "a failure to comply with state procedural rules does not violate the federal constitution." Id. The Moore court failed to partake in any analysis

under Sandin, and the case cannot stand for the proposition that placement at a supermax could not implicate a liberty interest created by the state. Nash noted simply that "Nash does not have a liberty interest in his prison placement," and cited to an earlier case, Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d 527, 532 (7th Cir.1995). 50 Fed.Appx. at 319-20. Whitford held that no federal interest existed in prison placement, and that Illinois state regulations, so far as the court "understood," did not create such a liberty interest. Whitford also dealt with transfer to a maximum security prison, rather than a supermax. All three of these cases, Whitford, Moore, and Nash, were argued pro se in the Seventh Circuit. We do not think they can stand for the proposition that careful factual findings in the district court demonstrating severe hardship in prison conditions, atypical in a prison system, can never rise to the level of a protected liberty interest without a parole deprivation.
[9] While the Inmates challenged certain conditions at OSP under the Eighth Amendment, claims that were settled below, they do not argue that either the Eighth Amendment or the substantive protections of the Due Process Clause create liberty interests in freedom from transfer to OSP that require due process protection. We express no opinion as to the viability of such a claim.
[10] Like Judge Rogers, we are convinced that the "Hewitt/ Wolff dichotomy" is not a viable form of analysis; we note later that the district court's procedural modifications track Wolff only because the ODRC officials had argued that the district court went beyond Wolff in ordering certain modifications, most of which were directed at the "appellate" process created by the ODRC.
[11] We do not think that we differ so much from Judge Rogers in describing this balance; we agree that the type of decision being made will affect the private interest, the government interest, and the value of certain procedural safeguards. We only emphasize that the type of decision is not, as the ODRC Officials would have us hold, the only factor necessary to determine what procedure is due. We believe, however, that in the face of the substantial factual findings of the district court as to haphazard ODRC placements, the procedural requirement of notice is particularly important, and give great weight to its value in increasing accuracy.
[12] We mean by this statement only to compare those liberty interests found to exist post-Sandin with those found to exist pre-Sandin. Because the Court has made clear that many of the liberty interests found by courts which would have in the past required certain pre-deprivation processes are no longer viable liberty interests, in looking over what courts have required of prison officials in the past, it is important to remember that many liberty interests which required less process in the past would require no process now. Any liberty interest which passes Sandin's threshold comes with a higher presumption of process due than those which may have been found preSandin.
[13] It is here we part ways with Judge Rogers 0907 in determining what process is due, we believe reference to what the state substantively requires is the first step. In order to be placed at OSP, an inmate must fulfill one of those discrete, substantive historical predicates; the district court correctly required that ODRC Officials place an inmate on notice of what historical events will be used to demonstrate his fulfillment of one of those predicates. The state itself has limited its ability to place inmates at OSP; the combing through files predicted by Judge Rogers is unlikely in the face of the specific substantive predicates identified in the state scheme.
[14] That paragraph concerns the procedural modification of departmental notice to the inmate of the inmate's progress towards reclassification, and is a proper procedural modification.
[15] The ODRC Officials appeal from the district court's July 12 denial of their Rule 60(b) motion; the only claims of error in that denial which they make on appeal concern the substantive modifications to 111-07 that we reverse in any case. There is therefore no need to evaluate the propriety of the district court's denial of the Rule 60(b) motion on its own merits.
[1] I agree that the substantive requirements must be reversed, for the reasons stated in Part II(C)(2)(a) of the majority opinion.
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 Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005)

125 S.Ct. 2384 Supreme Court of the United States
Reginald A. WILKINSON, Director, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, et
al., Petitioners, v.
Charles E. AUSTIN et al.
No. 04-495. | Argued March 30, 2005. | Decided June 13, 2005.

Synopsis Background: Current and former inmates housed at state supermax prison brought class action against prison officials under § 1983, alleging that state’s policy governing placement in the supermax prison did not afford procedural due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, 189 F.Supp.2d 719, ruled that the policy denied due process, and ordered modifications, 204 F.Supp.2d 1024. Prison officials appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 372 F.3d 346, affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. Prison officials applied for certiorari which was granted.

Holdings: The Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy, held that:
[1] inmates had a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause in avoiding assignment to state’s supermax prison, and
[2] state’s informal, nonadversary procedures for placement of inmate in supermax prison were adequate to safeguard inmate’s liberty interest in not being assigned to supermax facility.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.

**2385 *209 Syllabus*

*

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the

Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of

Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United

States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321,

337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 50 L.Ed. 499.

“Supermax” prisons are maximum-security facilities with highly restrictive conditions, designed to segregate the most dangerous prisoners from the general prison

population. Their use has increased in recent years, in part as a response to the rise in prison gangs and prison violence. Ohio opened its only Supermax facility, the Ohio State Penitentiary (OSP), after a riot in one of its maximum-security prisons. **2386 In the OSP almost every aspect of an inmate’s life is controlled and monitored. Incarceration there is synonymous with extreme isolation. Opportunities for visitation are rare and are always conducted through glass walls. Inmates are deprived of almost any environmental or sensory stimuli and of almost all human contact. Placement at OSP is for an indefinite period, limited only by an inmate’s sentence. Inmates otherwise eligible for parole lose their eligibility while incarcerated at OSP.
When OSP first became operational, no official policy governing placement there was in effect, and the procedures used to assign inmates to the facility were inconsistent and undefined, resulting in haphazard and erroneous placements. In an effort to establish guidelines for the selection and classification of OSP inmates, Ohio issued its Policy 111-07. Relevant here are two versions of the policy: the “Old Policy” and the “New Policy.” Because assignment problems persisted after the Old Policy took effect, Ohio promulgated the New Policy to provide more guidance regarding the factors to be considered in placement decisions and to afford inmates more procedural protection against erroneous placement. Under the New Policy, a prison official conducts a classification review either (1) upon entry into the prison system if the inmate was convicted of certain offenses, e.g., organized crime, or (2) during the incarceration if the inmate engages in specified conduct, e.g., leads a prison gang. The New Policy also provides for a three-tier review process after a recommendation that an inmate be placed in OSP. Among other things, the inmate must receive notice of the factual basis leading to consideration for OSP placement and a fair opportunity for rebuttal at a hearing, although he may not call witnesses. In addition, the inmate is invited to submit objections prior to the final level of review. *210 Although a subsequent reviewer may overturn an affirmative recommendation for OSP placement at any level, the reverse is not true; if one reviewer declines to recommend OSP placement, the process terminates. Ohio also provides for a placement review within 30 days of an inmate’s initial assignment to OSP, and annual review thereafter.
A class of current and former OSP inmates filed this suit for equitable relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging, inter alia, that the Old Policy, which was then in effect, violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. On the eve of trial, Ohio promulgated its New Policy and represented that it contained the procedures to be followed in the future. After extensive evidence was presented, the District Court made findings and
1

Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005)
conclusions and issued a detailed remedial order. First, relying on Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418, the court found that inmates have a liberty interest in avoiding assignment to OSP. Second, it found Ohio had denied the inmates due process by failing to afford many of them notice and an adequate opportunity to be heard before transfer; failing to give them sufficient notice of the grounds for their retention at OSP; and failing to give them sufficient opportunity to understand the reasoning and evidence used to retain them at OSP. Third, it held that, although the New Policy provided more procedural safeguards than the Old Policy, it was nonetheless inadequate to meet procedural due process requirements. The court therefore ordered modifications to the New Policy, including substantive modifications narrowing the grounds that Ohio could consider in recommending assignment to OSP, and various specific procedural modifications. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s conclusion that the inmates had a liberty interest in avoiding OSP placement and **2387 upheld the lower court’s procedural modifications in their entirety, but set aside the far-reaching substantive modifications on the ground they exceeded the District Court’s authority.
Held: The procedures by which Ohio’s New Policy classifies prisoners for placement at its Supermax facility provide prisoners with sufficient protection to comply with the Due Process Clause. Pp. 2393-2398.
(a) Inmates have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in avoiding assignment at OSP. Such an interest may arise from state policies or regulations, subject to the important limitations set forth in Sandin, which requires a determination whether OSP assignment “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” 515 U.S., at 483, 115 S.Ct. 2293. The Court is satisfied that assignment to OSP imposes such a hardship compared to any plausible baseline from which to measure the Ohio prison system. For an inmate placed in OSP, almost all human contact is prohibited, *211 even to the point that conversation is not permitted from cell to cell; his cell’s light may be dimmed, but is on for 24 hours; and he may exercise only one hour per day in a small indoor room. Save perhaps for the especially severe limitations on all human contact, these conditions likely would apply to most solitary confinement facilities, but here there are two added components. First is the duration. Unlike the 30-day placement in segregated confinement at issue in Sandin, placement at OSP is indefinite and, after an initial 30-day review, is reviewed just annually. Second is that placement disqualifies an otherwise eligible inmate for parole consideration. Taken together these conditions impose an atypical and significant hardship within the correctional context. Pp. 2393-2395.
(b) The New Policy’s procedures are sufficient to satisfy

due process. Evaluating the sufficiency of particular prison procedures requires consideration of three distinct factors: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18. Applying those factors demonstrates that Ohio’s New Policy provides a sufficient level of process. First, the inmate’s interest in avoiding erroneous placement at OSP, while more than minimal, must nonetheless be evaluated within the context of the prison system and its attendant curtailment of liberties. The liberty of prisoners in lawful confinement is curtailed by definition, so their procedural protections are more limited than in cases where the right at stake is the right to be free from all confinement. Second, the risk of an erroneous placement is minimized by the New Policy’s requirements. Ohio provides multiple levels of review for any decision recommending OSP placement, with power to overturn the recommendation at each level. In addition, Ohio reduces the risk of erroneous placement by providing for a placement review within 30 days of an inmate’s initial assignment to OSP. Notice of the factual basis for a decision and a fair opportunity for rebuttal are among the most important procedural mechanisms for purposes of avoiding erroneous deprivations. See, e.g., Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 15, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668. Third, in the context of prison management and the specific circumstances of this **2388 case, Ohio’s interest is a dominant consideration. Ohio’s first obligation must be to ensure the safety of guards and prison personnel, the public, and the prisoners themselves. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 473, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675. Prison security, imperiled by the brutal reality of prison gangs, provides the *212 backdrop of the State’s interest. Another component of Ohio’s interest is the problem of scarce resources. The high cost of maintaining an inmate at OSP would make it difficult to fund more effective education and vocational assistance programs to improve prisoners’ lives. Courts must give substantial deference to prison management decisions before mandating additional expenditures for elaborate procedural safeguards when correctional officials conclude that a prisoner has engaged in disruptive behavior. Were Ohio required to provide other attributes of an adversary hearing before ordering transfer to OSP, both the State’s immediate objective of controlling the prisoner and its greater objective of controlling the prison could be defeated. Where, as here, the inquiry draws more on the experience of prison administrators, and where the State’s interest implicates the safety of other inmates and prison personnel, the informal, nonadversary procedures set forth in Greenholtz
2

Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005)
and Hewitt provide the appropriate model. If an inmate were to demonstrate that the New Policy did not in practice operate in the fashion described, any cognizable injury could be the subject of an appropriate future challenge. In light of the foregoing, the procedural modifications ordered by the District Court and affirmed by the Sixth Circuit were in error. Pp. 2395-2398.
372 F.3d 346, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Attorneys and Law Firms
James M. Petro, Columbus, OH, for petitioners.
Deanne E. Maynard, Washington, DC, for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the petitioners.
Jules Lobel, Pittsburgh, PA, for respondents.
Jim Petro, Counsel of Record, Attorney General of Ohio, Douglas R. Cole, State Solicitor, Stephen P. Carney, Senior Deputy Solicitor, Todd R. Marti, Franklin E. Crawford, Assistant Solicitors, Columbus, Ohio, for Petitioners.
Jules Lobel, Pittsburgh, PA, Staughton Lynd, of Counsel, Niles, OH, Counsel for Respondents, Counsel in the Courts Below, Michael Benza, Cleveland, Ohio, Terry H. Gilbert, Cleveland, Ohio, Alice Lynd, Niles, Ohio, of Counsel, Elizabeth Alexander, Washington, DC, Jeffrey Fogel, New York City, Jeffrey M. Gamso, Cleveland, Ohio, Raymond Vasvari, Cleveland, Ohio.
Opinion
Justice KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.
*213 This case involves the process by which Ohio classifies prisoners for placement at its highest security prison, known as a “Supermax” facility. Supermax facilities are maximum-security prisons with highly restrictive conditions, designed to segregate the most dangerous prisoners from the general prison population. We must consider what process the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires Ohio to afford to inmates before assigning them to Supermax. We hold that the procedures Ohio has **2389 adopted provide sufficient procedural protection to comply with due process requirements.

I
The use of Supermax prisons has increased over the last 20 years, in part as a response to the rise in prison gangs and prison violence. See generally U.S. Dept. of Justice, National Institute of Corrections, C. Riveland, Supermax Prisons: Overview and General Considerations 1 (1999), http://www.nicic. org/pubs/1999/014937.pdf (as visited June 29, 2005, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file). About 30 States now operate Supermax prisons, in addition to the two somewhat comparable facilities operated by the Federal Government. *214 See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 2. In 1998, Ohio opened its only Supermax facility, the Ohio State Penitentiary (OSP), after a riot in one of its maximum-security prisons. OSP has the capacity to house up to 504 inmates in single-inmate cells and is designed to “ ‘separate the most predatory and dangerous prisoners from the rest of the ... general [prison] population.’ ” See 189 F.Supp.2d 719, 723 (N.D.Ohio 2002) (Austin I) (quoting deposition of R. Wilkinson, pp. 24-25).
Conditions at OSP are more restrictive than any other form of incarceration in Ohio, including conditions on its death row or in its administrative control units. The latter are themselves a highly restrictive form of solitary confinement. See Austin I, supra, at 724-725, and n. 5 (citing Ohio Admin. Code § 5120-9-13 (2001) (rescinded 2004)). In OSP almost every aspect of an inmate’s life is controlled and monitored. Inmates must remain in their cells, which measure 7 by 14 feet, for 23 hours per day. A light remains on in the cell at all times, though it is sometimes dimmed, and an inmate who attempts to shield the light to sleep is subject to further discipline. During the one hour per day that an inmate may leave his cell, access is limited to one of two indoor recreation cells.
Incarceration at OSP is synonymous with extreme isolation. In contrast to any other Ohio prison, including any segregation unit, OSP cells have solid metal doors with metal strips along their sides and bottoms which prevent conversation or communication with other inmates. All meals are taken alone in the inmate’s cell instead of in a common eating area. Opportunities for visitation are rare and in all events are conducted through glass walls. It is fair to say OSP inmates are deprived of almost any environmental or sensory stimuli and of almost all human contact.
Aside from the severity of the conditions, placement at OSP is for an indefinite period of time, limited only by an *215 inmate’s sentence. For an inmate serving a life sentence, there is no indication how long he may be incarcerated at OSP once assigned there. Austin I, supra, at 740. Inmates otherwise eligible for parole lose their eligibility while incarcerated at OSP. 189 F.Supp.2d, at 728.
3

Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005)
Placement at OSP is determined in the following manner: Upon entering the prison system, all Ohio inmates are assigned a numerical security classification from level 1 through level 5, with 1 the lowest security risk and 5 the highest. See Brief for Petitioners 7. The initial security classification is based on numerous factors (e.g., the nature of the underlying offense, criminal history, or gang affiliation) but is subject to modification at any time during the inmate’s prison term if, for instance, he engages in misconduct or is deemed a security risk. Ibid. Level 5 inmates are placed in OSP, and levels 1 through 4 inmates are placed at lower security facilities throughout the State. Ibid.
**2390 Ohio concedes that when OSP first became operational, the procedures used to assign inmates to the facility were inconsistent and undefined. For a time, no official policy governing placement was in effect. See Austin I, supra, at 726-727. Haphazard placements were not uncommon, and some individuals who did not pose high-security risks were designated, nonetheless, for OSP. In an effort to establish guidelines for the selection and classification of inmates suitable for OSP, Ohio issued Department of Rehabilitation and Correction Policy 111-07 (Aug. 31, 1998). This policy has been revised at various points but relevant here are two versions: the “Old Policy” and the “New Policy.” The Old Policy took effect on January 28, 1999, but problems with assignment appear to have persisted even under this written set of standards. 189 F.Supp.2d, at 727-736. After forming a committee to study the matter and retaining a national expert in prison security, Ohio promulgated the New Policy in early 2002. The New Policy provided more guidance regarding *216 the factors to be considered in placement decisions and afforded inmates more procedural protection against erroneous placement at OSP.
Although the record is not altogether clear regarding the precise manner in which the New Policy operates, we construe it based on the policy’s text, the accompanying forms, and the parties’ representations at oral argument and in their briefs. The New Policy appears to operate as follows: A classification review for OSP placement can occur either (1) upon entry into the prison system if the inmate was convicted of certain offenses, e.g., organized crime, or (2) during the term of incarceration if an inmate engages in specified conduct, e.g., leads a prison gang. App. 42-43. The review process begins when a prison official prepares a “Security Designation Long Form” (Long Form). Id., at 20. This three-page form details matters such as the inmate’s recent violence, escape attempts, gang affiliation, underlying offense, and other pertinent details. Id., at 20, 38-45.
A three-member Classification Committee (Committee) convenes to review the proposed classification and to hold a hearing. At least 48 hours before the hearing, the inmate

is provided with written notice summarizing the conduct or offense triggering the review. Id., at 22, 58. At the time of notice, the inmate also has access to the Long Form, which details why the review was initiated. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 13-17. The inmate may attend the hearing, may “offer any pertinent information, explanation and/or objections to [OSP] placement,” and may submit a written statement. App. 22. He may not call witnesses.
If the Committee does not recommend OSP placement, the process terminates. Id., at 62, 65. See also Brief for Petitioners 9. If the Committee does recommend OSP placement, it documents the decision on a “Classification Committee Report” (CCR), setting forth “the nature of the threat the inmate presents and the committee’s reasons for the recommendation,” App. 64, as well as a summary of any information *217 presented at the hearing, id., at 59-65. The Committee sends the completed CCR to the warden of the prison where the inmate is housed or, in the case of an inmate just entering the prison system, to another designated official. Id., at 23.
If, after reviewing the CCR, the warden (or the designated official) disagrees and concludes that OSP is inappropriate, the process terminates and the inmate is not placed in OSP. If the warden agrees, he indicates his approval on the CCR, provides his reasons, and forwards the annotated **2391 CCR to the Bureau of Classification (Bureau) for a final decision. Id., at 64. (The Bureau is a body of Ohio prison officials vested with final decisionmaking authority over all Ohio inmate assignments.) The annotated CCR is served upon the inmate, notifying him of the Committee’s and warden’s recommendations and reasons. Id., at 65. The inmate has 15 days to file any objections with the Bureau. Ibid.
After the 15-day period, the Bureau reviews the CCR and makes a final determination. If it concludes OSP placement is inappropriate, the process terminates. If the Bureau approves the warden’s recommendation, the inmate is transferred to OSP. The Bureau’s chief notes the reasons for the decision on the CCR, and the CCR is again provided to the inmate. Ibid.
Inmates assigned to OSP receive another review within 30 days of their arrival. That review is conducted by a designated OSP staff member, who examines the inmate’s file. Id., at 25. If the OSP staff member deems the inmate inappropriately placed, he prepares a written recommendation to the OSP warden that the inmate be transferred to a lower security institution. Brief for Petitioners 9; App. 25. If the OSP warden concurs, he forwards that transfer recommendation to the Bureau for appropriate action. If the inmate is deemed properly placed, he remains in OSP and his placement is reviewed on at least an annual basis according to the initial three-tier classification review process outlined above. Brief for Petitioners 9-10.
4

Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005)
*218 II
This action began when a class of current and former OSP inmates brought suit under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio against various Ohio prison officials. We refer to the class of plaintiff inmates, respondents here, collectively as “the inmates.” We refer to the prison officials, petitioners here, as “Ohio.”
The inmates’ complaint alleged that Ohio’s Old Policy, which was in effect at the time the suit was brought, violated due process. In addition the inmates brought a claim that certain conditions at OSP violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments, but that claim was settled in the District Court. The extent to which the settlement resolved the practices that were the subject of the inmates’ Eighth Amendment claim is unclear but, in any event, that issue is not before us. The inmates’ suit sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On the eve of trial Ohio promulgated its New Policy and represented that it contained the procedures to be followed in the future. The District Court and Court of Appeals evaluated the adequacy of the New Policy, and it therefore forms the basis for our determination here.
After an 8-day trial with extensive evidence, including testimony from expert witnesses, the District Court made findings and conclusions and issued a detailed remedial order. First, relying on this Court’s decision in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995), the District Court found that the inmates have a liberty interest in avoiding assignment to OSP. Austin I, 189 F.Supp.2d, at 738-740. Second, the District Court found Ohio had denied the inmates due process by failing to afford a large number of them notice and an adequate opportunity to be heard before transfer; failing to give inmates sufficient notice of the grounds serving as the basis for their retention at OSP; and failing to give the inmates sufficient opportunity to **2392 understand the reasoning and evidence *219 used to retain them at OSP. Id., at 749. Third, the District Court held that, although Ohio’s New Policy provided more procedural safeguards than its Old Policy, it was nonetheless inadequate to meet procedural due process requirements. Id., at 736, 750-754. In a separate order it directed extensive modifications to that policy. 204 F.Supp.2d 1024 (N.D.Ohio 2002).
The modifications the District Court ordered to Ohio’s New Policy included both substantive and procedural reforms. The former narrowed the grounds that Ohio could consider in recommending assignment to OSP. For instance, possession of drugs in small amounts, according to the District Court, could not serve as the basis for an

OSP assignment. Id., at 1028. The following are some of the procedural modifications the District Court ordered:
(1) Finding that the notice provisions of Ohio’s New Policy were inadequate, the District Court ordered Ohio to provide the inmates with an exhaustive list of grounds believed to justify placement at OSP and a summary of all evidence upon which the Committee would rely. Matters not so identified, the District Court ordered, could not be considered by the Committee. Id., at 1026.
(2) The District Court supplemented the inmate’s opportunity to appear before the Committee and to make an oral or written statement by ordering Ohio to allow inmates to present documentary evidence and call witnesses before the Committee, provided that doing so would not be unduly hazardous or burdensome. The District Court further ordered that Ohio must attempt to secure the participation of any witness housed within the prison system. Id., at 1026-1027.
(3) Finding the New Policy’s provision of a brief statement of reasons for a recommendation of OSP placement inadequate, the District Court ordered the Committee to summarize all evidence supporting its recommendation. Id., at 1027. Likewise, the District Court ordered the Bureau to prepare a “detailed and specific” statement “set[ting] *220 out all grounds” justifying OSP placement including “facts relied upon and reasoning used.” Ibid. The statement shall “not use conclusory,” “vague,” or “boilerplate language,” and must be delivered to the inmate within five days. Id., at 1027-1028.
(4) The District Court supplemented the New Policy’s 30-day and annual review processes, ordering Ohio to notify the inmate twice per year both in writing and orally of his progress toward a security level reduction. Specifically, that notice must “advise the inmate what specific conduct is necessary for that prisoner to be reduced from Level 5 and the amount of time it will take before [Ohio] reduce[s] the inmate’s security level classification.” Id., at 1028.
Ohio appealed. First, it maintained that the inmates lacked a constitutionally protected liberty interest in avoiding placement at OSP. Second, it argued that, even assuming a liberty interest, its New Policy provides constitutionally adequate procedures and thus the District Court’s modifications were unnecessary. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s conclusion that the inmates had a liberty interest in avoiding placement at OSP. 372 F.3d 346, 356 (2004). The Court of Appeals also affirmed the District Court’s procedural modifications in their entirety. Id., at 359-360. Finally, it set aside the District Court’s far-reaching substantive modifications, concluding they exceeded the scope of the District Court’s authority. This last **2393
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aspect of the Court of Appeals’ ruling is not the subject of review in this Court.
We granted certiorari to consider what process an inmate must be afforded under the Due Process Clause when he is considered for placement at OSP. 543 U.S. 1032, 125 S.Ct. 686, 160 L.Ed.2d 518 (2004). For reasons discussed below, we conclude that the inmates have a protected liberty interest in avoiding assignment at OSP. We further hold that the procedures set forth in the New Policy are sufficient to satisfy the Constitution’s requirements; it follows, then, that the procedural modifications *221 ordered by the District Court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals were in error.
III
Withdrawing from the position taken in the Court of Appeals, Ohio in its briefs to this Court conceded that the inmates have a liberty interest in avoiding assignment at OSP. See Pet. for Cert. i; Brief for Petitioners i. The United States, supporting Ohio as amicus curiae, disagrees with Ohio’s concession and argues that the inmates have no liberty interest in avoiding assignment to a prison facility with more restrictive conditions of confinement. See Brief for United States 10. At oral argument Ohio initially adhered to its earlier concession, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 5, but when pressed, the State backtracked. See id., at 6-7. We need reach the question of what process is due only if the inmates establish a constitutionally protected liberty interest, so it is appropriate to address this threshold question at the outset.
[1] [2] The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects persons against deprivations of life, liberty, or property; and those who seek to invoke its procedural protection must establish that one of these interests is at stake. A liberty interest may arise from the Constitution itself, by reason of guarantees implicit in the word “liberty,” see, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493-494, 100 S.Ct. 1254, 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980) (liberty interest in avoiding involuntary psychiatric treatment and transfer to mental institution), or it may arise from an expectation or interest created by state laws or policies, see, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-558, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (liberty interest in avoiding withdrawal of state-created system of good-time credits).
We have held that the Constitution itself does not give rise to a liberty interest in avoiding transfer to more adverse conditions of confinement. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976) (no liberty interest arising from Due Process Clause itself in transfer from low-to maximum-security *222 prison

because “[c]onfinement in any of the State’s institutions is within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to impose”). We have also held, however, that a liberty interest in avoiding particular conditions of confinement may arise from state policies or regulations, subject to the important limitations set forth in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995).
[3] Sandin involved prisoners’ claims to procedural due process protection before placement in segregated confinement for 30 days, imposed as discipline for disruptive behavior. Sandin observed that some of our earlier cases, Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983), in particular, had employed a methodology for identifying state-created liberty interests that emphasized “the language of a particular [prison] regulation” instead of “the nature of the deprivation.” Sandin, 515 U.S., at 481, 115 S.Ct. 2293. In Sandin, we criticized this methodology as creating a disincentive for States to promulgate **2394 procedures for prison management, and as involving the federal courts in the day-to-day management of prisons. Id., at 482-483, 115 S.Ct. 2293. For these reasons, we abrogated the methodology of parsing the language of particular regulations.
“[T]he search for a negative implication from mandatory language in prisoner regulations has strayed from the real concerns undergirding the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. The time has come to return to the due process principles we believe were correctly established in and applied in Wolff and Meachum. Following Wolff, we recognize that States may under certain circumstances create liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause. But these interests will generally be limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation *223 to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id., at 483-484, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (citations and footnote omitted).
After Sandin, it is clear that the touchstone of the inquiry into the existence of a protected, state-created liberty interest in avoiding restrictive conditions of confinement is not the language of regulations regarding those conditions but the nature of those conditions themselves “in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id., at 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293.
[4] Applying this refined inquiry, Sandin found no liberty interest protecting against a 30-day assignment to segregated confinement because it did not “present a dramatic departure from the basic conditions of [the inmate’s] sentence.” Id., at 485, 115 S.Ct. 2293. We
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noted, for example, that inmates in the general population experienced “significant amounts of ‘lockdown time’ ” and that the degree of confinement in disciplinary segregation was not excessive. Id., at 486, 115 S.Ct. 2293. We did not find, moreover, the short duration of segregation to work a major disruption in the inmate’s environment. Ibid.
The Sandin standard requires us to determine if assignment to OSP “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id., at 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293. In Sandin’s wake the Courts of Appeals have not reached consistent conclusions for identifying the baseline from which to measure what is atypical and significant in any particular prison system. Compare, e.g., Beverati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 504 (C.A.4 1997), and Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1089 (C.A.9 1996), with Hatch v. District of Columbia, 184 F.3d 846, 847 (C.A.D.C.1999). See also Wagner v. Hanks, 128 F.3d 1173, 1177 (C.A.7 1997). This divergence indicates the difficulty of locating the appropriate baseline, an issue that was not explored at length in the briefs. We need not resolve the issue here, however, for we are satisfied that assignment to OSP imposes an atypical and significant hardship under any plausible baseline.
For an inmate placed in OSP, almost all human contact is prohibited, even to the point that conversation is not permitted *224 from cell to cell; the light, though it may be dimmed, is on for 24 hours; exercise is for 1 hour per day, but only in a small indoor room. Save perhaps for the especially severe limitations on all human contact, these conditions likely would apply to most solitary confinement facilities, but here there are two added components. First is the duration. Unlike the 30-day placement in Sandin, placement at OSP is indefinite and, after an initial 30-day review, **2395 is reviewed just annually. Second is that placement disqualifies an otherwise eligible inmate for parole consideration. Austin I, 189 F.Supp.2d, at 728. While any of these conditions standing alone might not be sufficient to create a liberty interest, taken together they impose an atypical and significant hardship within the correctional context. It follows that respondents have a liberty interest in avoiding assignment to OSP. Sandin, supra, at 483, 115 S.Ct. 2293.
OSP’s harsh conditions may well be necessary and appropriate in light of the danger that high-risk inmates pose both to prison officials and to other prisoners. See infra, at 2396-2397. That necessity, however, does not diminish our conclusion that the conditions give rise to a liberty interest in their avoidance.

IV
[5] A liberty interest having been established, we turn to the question of what process is due an inmate whom Ohio seeks to place in OSP. Because the requirements of due process are “flexible and cal[l] for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands,” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972), we generally have declined to establish rigid rules and instead have embraced a framework to evaluate the sufficiency of particular procedures. The framework, established in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), requires consideration of three distinct factors:
“First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation *225 of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Id., at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893.
[6] The Court of Appeals upheld the District Court’s procedural modifications under the assumption that Sandin altered the first Mathews factor. It reasoned that, “[i]n this first factor, Sandin affects the due process balance: because only those conditions that constitute ‘atypical and significant hardships’ give rise to liberty interests, those interests will necessarily be of a weight requiring greater due process protection.” 372 F.3d, at 358-359. This proposition does not follow from Sandin. Sandin concerned only whether a state-created liberty interest existed so as to trigger Mathews balancing at all. Having found no liberty interest to be at stake, Sandin had no occasion to consider whether the private interest was weighty vis-à-vis the remaining Mathews factors.
Applying the three factors set forth in Mathews, we find Ohio’s New Policy provides a sufficient level of process. We first consider the significance of the inmate’s interest in avoiding erroneous placement at OSP. Prisoners held in lawful confinement have their liberty curtailed by definition, so the procedural protections to which they are entitled are more limited than in cases where the right at stake is the right to be free from confinement at all. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975); Wolff, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935. The private interest at stake here, while more than minimal, must be evaluated, nonetheless, within the context of the prison system and its attendant curtailment of liberties.
The second factor addresses the risk of an erroneous placement under the procedures in place, and the probable value, if any, of additional or alternative procedural **2396 safeguards. The New Policy provides that an
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inmate must receive notice *226 of the factual basis leading to consideration for OSP placement and a fair opportunity for rebuttal. Our procedural due process cases have consistently observed that these are among the most important procedural mechanisms for purposes of avoiding erroneous deprivations. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 15, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979); Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 543, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972) (“For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear: ‘Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified’ ” (quoting Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223, 233, 17 L.Ed. 531 (1864))). Requiring officials to provide a brief summary of the factual basis for the classification review and allowing the inmate a rebuttal opportunity safeguards against the inmate’s being mistaken for another or singled out for insufficient reason. In addition to having the opportunity to be heard at the Committee stage, Ohio also invites the inmate to submit objections prior to the final level of review. This second opportunity further reduces the possibility of an erroneous deprivation.
Although a subsequent reviewer may overturn an affirmative recommendation for OSP placement, the reverse is not true; if one reviewer declines to recommend OSP placement, the process terminates. This avoids one of the problems apparently present under the Old Policy, where, even if two levels of reviewers recommended against placement, a later reviewer could overturn their recommendation without explanation.
If the recommendation is OSP placement, Ohio requires that the decisionmaker provide a short statement of reasons. This requirement guards against arbitrary decisionmaking while also providing the inmate a basis for objection before the next decisionmaker or in a subsequent classification review. The statement also serves as a guide for future behavior. See Greenholtz, supra, at 16, 99 S.Ct. 2100.
*227 As we have noted, Ohio provides multiple levels of review for any decision recommending OSP placement, with power to overturn the recommendation at each level. In addition to these safeguards, Ohio further reduces the risk of erroneous placement by providing for a placement review within 30 days of an inmate’s initial assignment to OSP.
The third Mathews factor addresses the State’s interest. In the context of prison management, and in the specific circumstances of this case, this interest is a dominant consideration. Ohio has responsibility for imprisoning nearly 44,000 inmates. Austin I, 189 F.Supp.2d, at 727. The State’s first obligation must be to ensure the safety of

guards and prison personnel, the public, and the prisoners themselves. See Hewitt, 459 U.S., at 473, 103 S.Ct. 864.
Prison security, imperiled by the brutal reality of prison gangs, provides the backdrop of the State’s interest. Clandestine, organized, fueled by race-based hostility, and committed to fear and violence as a means of disciplining their own members and their rivals, gangs seek nothing less than to control prison life and to extend their power outside prison walls. See Brief for State of California et al. as Amici Curiae 6. Murder of an inmate, a guard, or one of their family members on the outside is a common form of gang discipline and control, as well as a condition for membership in some gangs. See, e.g., **2397 United States v. Santiago, 46 F.3d 885, 888 (C.A.9 1995); United States v. Silverstein, 732 F.2d 1338, 1341 (C.A.7 1984). Testifying against, or otherwise informing on, gang activities can invite one’s own death sentence. It is worth noting in this regard that for prison gang members serving life sentences, some without the possibility of parole, the deterrent effects of ordinary criminal punishment may be substantially diminished. See id., at 1343 (“[T]o many inmates of Marion’s Control Unit the price of murder must not be high and to some it must be close to zero”).
*228 The problem of scarce resources is another component of the State’s interest. The cost of keeping a single prisoner in one of Ohio’s ordinary maximum-security prisons is $34,167 per year, and the cost to maintain each inmate at OSP is $49,007 per year. See Austin I, supra, at 734, n. 17. We can assume that Ohio, or any other penal system, faced with costs like these will find it difficult to fund more effective education and vocational assistance programs to improve the lives of the prisoners. It follows that courts must give substantial deference to prison management decisions before mandating additional expenditures for elaborate procedural safeguards when correctional officials conclude that a prisoner has engaged in disruptive behavior.
The State’s interest must be understood against this background. Were Ohio to allow an inmate to call witnesses or provide other attributes of an adversary hearing before ordering transfer to OSP, both the State’s immediate objective of controlling the prisoner and its greater objective of controlling the prison could be defeated. This problem, moreover, is not alleviated by providing an exemption for witnesses who pose a hazard, for nothing in the record indicates simple mechanisms exist to determine when witnesses may be called without fear of reprisal. The danger to witnesses, and the difficulty in obtaining their cooperation, make the probable value of an adversary-type hearing doubtful in comparison to its obvious costs.
A balance of the Mathews factors yields the conclusion
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Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005)
that Ohio’s New Policy is adequate to safeguard an inmate’s liberty interest in not being assigned to OSP. Ohio is not, for example, attempting to remove an inmate from free society for a specific parole violation, see, e.g., Morrissey, 408 U.S., at 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, or to revoke good-time credits for specific, serious misbehavior, see, e.g., Wolff, 418 U.S., at 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, where more formal, adversary-type procedures might be useful. Where the inquiry draws more on the experience of prison administrators, and where the State’s interest implicates the *229 safety of other inmates and prison personnel, the informal, nonadversary procedures set forth in Greenholtz, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668, and Hewitt v. Helms, supra, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675, provide the appropriate model. Greenholtz, supra, at 16, 99 S.Ct. 2100 (level of process due for inmates being considered for release on parole includes opportunity to be heard and notice of any adverse decision); Hewitt, supra, at 473-476, 103 S.Ct. 864 (level of process due for inmates being considered for transfer to administrative segregation includes some notice of charges and an opportunity to be heard). Although Sandin abrogated Greenholtz’s and Hewitt ‘s methodology for establishing the liberty interest, these cases remain instructive for their discussion of the appropriate level of procedural safeguards. Ohio’s New Policy provides informal, nonadversary procedures comparable to those we upheld in Greenholtz and Hewitt, and no further procedural modifications are necessary in order to satisfy due process under the Mathews test. Neither **2398 the District Court nor the Court of Appeals should have ordered the New Policy altered.
The effect of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, in particular 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A), in this case has not been discussed at any length in the briefs. In view of our disposition it is unnecessary to address its application here.
Prolonged confinement in Supermax may be the State’s only option for the control of some inmates, and claims alleging violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments were resolved, or withdrawn, by settlement in an early phase of this case. Here, any claim of excessive punishment in individual circumstances is not before us.
The complaint challenged OSP assignments under the Old Policy, and the unwritten policies that preceded it, and

alleged injuries resulting from those systems. Ohio conceded that assignments made under the Old Policy were, to say the least, imprecise. The District Court found constitutional violations had arisen under those earlier versions, and held *230 that the New Policy would produce many of the same constitutional problems. Austin I, 189 F.Supp.2d, at 749-754. We now hold that the New Policy as described in this opinion strikes a constitutionally permissible balance between the factors of the Mathews framework. If an inmate were to demonstrate that the New Policy did not in practice operate in this fashion, resulting in a cognizable injury, that could be the subject of an appropriate future challenge. On remand, the Court of Appeals, or the District Court, may consider in the first instance what, if any, prospective relief is still a necessary and appropriate remedy for due process violations under Ohio’s previous policies. Any such relief must, of course, satisfy the conditions set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A).
* * *
The Court of Appeals was correct to find the inmates possess a liberty interest in avoiding assignment at OSP. The Court of Appeals was incorrect, however, to sustain the procedural modifications ordered by the District Court. The portion of the Court of Appeals’ opinion reversing the District Court’s substantive modifications was not the subject of review upon certiorari and is unaltered by our decision.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Parallel Citations
125 S.Ct. 2384, 162 L.Ed.2d 174, 73 USLW 4473, 05 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5044, 2005 Daily Journal D.A.R. 6866, 18 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 371
	  

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