f

r. { Tr l 1` i 1 -1,K. 1. V 1 t V
l 1 iV 11 ILL wS1t11LE' S i.ii .~~Yi:'..1 l~i"iU~. n~ TTTT N~nnmuu~l.~ni I11\'1'K.II-, 'I^ ^ VP^ ^LTx`E~VnnnvTiAn
aTr .ANTA DIVISION

Fftc^ ~V ~;, ~S3K'C ~ft1vccritErF

ft-l~ _

rli

1

ueMY ilk

C. Alan Powell

)

388 Ashley Ave .

)

Atlanta, GA 30312

)

and

)

Tory Dunlap

)

957 North Ave, Apt B

)

Atlanta, GA 30318

)

and

Lee Antonio Smith 393 Landsey Drive Atlanta, GA, 30315

and

David Evans 3214 Harris Drive East Point, GA 30344
and
Individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated

Plaintiffs,

)

FIRST AMEMDED COMPLAINT-CLASS ACTION
Civil Case No. 04-1100 (JOF) 1 :0`f-'C.AI - I 1o o LJ0 r)

1

f

E

v
ei dCCiuiliu~. 7 .. . - ., .,
Sheriff, Fulton County,
~~~ _
S LQI.C 'vlr ucvi 6lu
Individually and in her Official Capacity
and
Fulton County, State of Georgia 141 Pryor Street, SW Atlanta GA, 30303
and
Karen Handel Chairperson, Fulton County Board of Commissioners 141 Pryor Street, SW, Suite 10044 Atlanta GA, 30303
and
Robb Pitts Member, Fulton County Board of Commissioners 141 Pryor Street, SW, Suite 10044 Atlanta GA, 30303
and
Tom Lowe Member, Fulton County Board of Commissioners
2

,  n....~., c*_.oo+, cW, ti ;ta 10044

i

30303 t1612t11bd Vr1, v vvaiv

and

)

1

Emma T . Darnell

)

Member,

)

Fulton County Board of

)

141 Pryor Street, SW, Suite 10044

)

Atlanta GA, 30303

)

and

)

Nancy A. Boxill

)

Member,

)

Fulton County Board of

)

Commissioners

)

141 Pryor Street, SW, Suite 10044

)

Atlanta GA, 30303

)

and

)

William "Bill" Edwards

)

Member,

)

Fulton County Board of

)

Commissioners

)

141 Pryor Street, SW, Suite 10044

)

Atlanta GA, 30303

)

and

)

City Of Atlanta,

)

State Of Georgia

)

Defendants

) CLASS ACTION

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR MONEY DAMAGES, INJUNCTIVE

3

Introduction
1 . This is an action brought by C . Alan Powell, Tory Dunlap, Lee Antonio Smith and David Evans (the "Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs") on their own behalf individually, and on oenalluf a class a. ~a.,.. . ... ... ("Arrestee Strip Search") who were injured by Defendants' conduct in causing them to be subjected to blanket strip searches upon their arrest and commitment to the Fulton County Jail. The term "blanket strip search" is more fully discussed later . 2 . This is also an action brought by each of C . Alan Powell, Tory Dunlap, Lee Antonio Smith, and David Evans (the "Overdetention Named Plaintiffs") on his own behalf and on behalf of the class defined below who were injured, or who are being injured, or who will be injured in the future by defendants' pattern and practice of overdetaining inmates. 3 . "Overdetain" means holding an inmate in Fulton County Jail custody past the inmate's "Release Date" . 4. "Premature Release" means releasing an inmate from Fulton County Jail custody before the inmate's "Release Date".
4

F e
h .Re,leaSe Da te- 1V1 eac 11 iPuu~iw
a ;;= ?;-~ , p,1e gsoi by court (1pljpY~ (1T tLhl e dlatCe V11 which ~,,Luc.^- Lv.uS : c. :.^.:~ hag or
her detention ha_~ nthPrwise expired, for example by posting bond, or by being detained pretrial on a cchhaarrg~e ~w~i~t~houu~t j' u u.7.~..u...a,~.,.. +. . Yno. . .c,+. . the naxim Um_Um period of any sentence on that charge . 6 . "Exit Date" for each inmate means the date on which he or she was actually released from the custody of the Fulton County Jail . 7. The Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs bring this action against Defendants under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U .S .C . §1983, to enforce their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments for injuries suffered by them and other members of the class at the Fulton County Jail. The Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs also base their claims on the Constitution of the State of Georgia and the common law of the State of Georgia . 8 . The Overdetention Named Plaintiffs bring this action against
Defendants under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §1983, to enforce their rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, for injuries suffered by them and other members of the class at the Fulton County Jail. The Overdetention Named Plaintiffs also base their
5

L
rlaimc nn Y.hP Constitution OI the State of Georgia aiiu iic i-^u.itl^. :: law ~'1 l .lit.' r r
Jurisdiction and Venue
9 . This Court has jurisdiction over the Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs' and the Overdetention Named Plaintiffs' §1983 claims pursuant to 28 U.S .C . §1331 and 28 U.S.C. §1343(a)(3) . This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over their state law claims under 28 U .S.C . §1367 . 10 . Venue is appropriate in this District and this division . Each of the claims for relief arose in this judicial district, and in this division .
Parties
11 . Plaintiff C . Alan Powell is an adult who was overdetained in the Fulton County Jail and subjected to illegal strip searches. 12. Plaintiff Tory Dunlap is an adult who was overdetained in the Fulton County Jail and subjected to illegal strip searches. 13 . Plaintiff Lee Antonio Smith is an adult who was overdetained in the Fulton County Jail and subjected to illegal strip searches. 14. Plaintiff David Evans is an adult who was overdetained in the Fulton County Jail and subjected to illegal strip searches .
6

T~,~,,ajinp Rnrrptt is 'ne sherit . o~fi4",Iuit- Cminty . sueC'k in [it-j- uEI-IcIiaIllI cap-,- --y PIU--1. F I - - I .- - i--niunctivp rplief. She Us sued in her offlicial capaulty, and in 'her individiml capacity, for money damages .
16 . At all times described herein, Defendant Jacqueline B .arrett -and each of
uoi_ ~  __a~; ; u~,, n~±±a, TnmT .owe . Emma I . Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill, William "Bill" Edwards was acting under color of state law . 17 . Defendant Fulton County is a body corporate, with power to sue or be sued in any court. O .C .G .A. §36-1-3 . 18. The Fulton County County Commissioners are Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I . Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill, William "Bill" Edwards . 19. The City of Atlanta is a municipal corporation with power to sue or be sued in any court.

i
Fulton County, The Fulton County Board Of Commissioners . And The Fujiton County Jail
20 . Defendant ruiLOn Coun4t"y- "~s nu~..m..i..ni_nfPT?f_~ F1V the Fulton County Board of Commissioners ("Board") which consists of seven Commissioners elected by the voters of Fulton County to four-year terms . 21 . The Board sets Fulton County governmental policy, and approves departmental budget requests . 22. Fuiton County and its "governing authority," that is, the Board, have authority to maintain and operate facilities for the detention, incarceration or confinement of all persons subject to confinement under the laws of the state, any county resolution, or any city ordinance . 23 . In 1991, Fulton County exercised its authority to build and operate an incarceration facility, and built the current Fulton County Jail on Rice Street to replace the old jail .
8

i

!;r1, ?+ F{ ;rP Street i"r'u:ton i;cuni

~U1i10~iuic^S L ::°

y :.°C~ ~~' N7tltOri !~'~~u_~_lii4~.v. Fvnv ~ . .~..~.7..C ., P.,

inmates in r'ulton County .

25 . The Fulton County Jail has a capacity of approximately 1,450 inmates . However, at its opening the County put double beds in the veils and se u:ton County Jail opened with about 2,250 inmates.

26 . Currently, the jail houses about 2,900 inmates, with 400 others in two annexes .

27 . Mast inmates at the Fulton County Jail are either pre-trial detainees, misdemeanants serving misdemeanor sentences, or probation violators .

28 . The old jail had been the subject of a 1982 class-action lawsuit Fambro v. Fulton, 82-ev2136, JOB challenging conditions at that facility including overcrowding and overdetentions.

29 . The Board has the power to designate the person(s) to control incarceration facilities, including the Fulton County Jail.

30. The Board has designated the Sheriff of Fulton County as the person to control the County's incarceration facilities .

9

J 811.

hac uit.imate cunUroI ov er ~ilc^.

p ;: ~~Guiei,

32 . Fulton County also sets the budget for the County's incarceration facilities .

33 . On December 14, 1992, defendant Jacquelyn Barrett took office as the Sheriff of Fulton County, Georgia .

34. The 1982 class-action lawsuit continued to cover the Rice Street Jail until the suit was settled by the Fulton County Commission in 1994, and dismissed by this Court.

Fulton County And The Board's Control Over Jail Staff

35 . The Sheriff appoints deputies and jailers subject to the supervision of the Board .

36. Classified employees are subject to the constitutionally mandated Fulton County Civil Service System .

10

i

^-

T'

-~- R- m .k~FF!  onnla that. work in the records room an,4

process w ~Ym7R`I_flflY dlili tcicu .ia~,vj ~+. ., .,'.-___S~~'~, ~~m . . . '. S~ .^ 3 tlpa nmr_ ll_ nVa_ PS .

These employees are itot deput:ea.

38. Many Records Room staff are county employees .

39. The Fulton County Personnel Department administers the Fulton County Civil Service Act through the Personnel Board .

40. The Personnel Board is appointed by the Board of Commissioners and is the major decision-making authority within the Personnel Department .

41 . The Fulton County Civil Service Act severely curtails the Fulton County Sheriff's power to hire, discipline, and fire Jail staff.

Jacqueline Barrett's Responsibilities For Inmates At The Fulton County Jail

42 . Jacqueline Barrett's duties include hiring, disciplining, and firing Jail staff subject to the supervision of the Board.

43 . Jacqueline Barrett's duties also include formulating, implementing, and executing policies concerning the operation of the Fulton County Jail facilities subject to the authority of the Board .

11

i

e

; .,rh,rip nrorilUlgaiAtiK policies controLung +.i,..-

gP~T_'CIICJ Vl liiiun~Co,

u. .~ ..

-

--' .7n4, `=o0--'----

;nnr~

-ensurin- g

the

TPIP}7SP

QI

1I11I1'tlLE3

Vll

aLLl.l,c.i' i..

Release LdLC .7 .

45 . Jacqueline Barrett has day-to-day training, supervisory, and disciplinary authority for all operations of the Fuiiu~i C;our~ty u82i 3'~luj~CL LC the supervision of the Board .

46 . Jacqueline Barrett is also responsible for ensuring that each employee of the Fulton County Jail discharges his or her duties in accordance with the law, court orders, and authority designated her by the Board.

Criminal Justice Cycle And The Fulton County Jail

47 . The steps in an inmate's trip through the criminal justice cycle in Fulton County are : (1) arrest ; (2) commitment to the Fulton County Jail as a new commitment; (3) hearing at the Fulton County Jail in the case of felony arrests, or hearing at the courthouse in the case of misdemeanor arrests ; (4) transport from the Fulton County Jail to court for subsequent court dates ; and (5) return to the Fulton County Jail.

12

f C

_

F'il lt.nn iouniv oV ` . e P, .~-U1t,Gii t,viAnmQ ' YO ::Ct', U

the

~h2P.t?,

CT

hy"

8

municipal ^y~ . . ::°

C,. .-rrF .

49 . The Fulton County Police Department transports all arrestees directly to the Fulton County Jail, and commits them to the Fulton County Jail .

50 . The Fulton County Police Department is controlled and operated by, and is subject to, the authority of the Board .

51 . At any one time, approximately forty percent (40%) of the Fulton County Jail inmate population was committed by the Fulton County Police Department .

52 . The City of Atlanta Police Department transports arrestees arrested on state charges directly to the Fulton County Jail, and commits them to the Fulton County Jail.

53. The Atlanta Police Department ("Atlanta PD") is a department of the City of Atlanta with an authorized strength of over 2,300 employees .

54 . Every year during the past five years, officers of the Atlanta PD arrested about 30,000 persons and committed them to the Fulton County Jail .

13

s

nP.i`CPilt '75") UL the cases in the ~L3LC

Court of rldi..(itt i:GuiiLy vi.6..^.~ L~ t__ ----

Atlanta .

56 . Many arrests made by the Atlanta PD charged as misdemeanors could also have been charged as municipal offenses .

57 . Prior to January 1, 2003, the Atlanta PD committed all persons it arrested and charged with state offenses to a City of Atlanta detention facility instead of the Fulton County Jail.

58 . Prior to January 1, 2003, the City of Atlanta detained, and assumed the responsibility for conducting the 48 hour "McLauehlin v . County of Riverside " probable cause hearings for all persons its officers arrested ; even persons its officers arrested and charged with state offenses .

59. Prior to January 1, 2003, the City of Atlanta detained all persons its officers arrested, even persons its officers arrested and charged with state offenses, and conducted whatever probable cause hearing was given to such persons .

14

Q

onn~z , norcnng for whom UYObFLUiC cause was tound

v ;i the state l1TTF!fitit' ~YC1C ivuiiu o~ . . .

wn~:l ?raT7CTPTPB (] LO

the bond r'ulton County '~ J411

1__ ., un less

t~ihi~e,

t.n ..% ..a. .x n..n_~aC

Y~?lPSJCPII

on

.

61 . Many such arrestees were held by the City of Atlanta for several days before being transferred to the Fulton County Jail.

62 . Prior to January 1, 2003, many persons arrested by the Atlanta PD and charged with state offenses had their charges reduced to a municipal offense as a result of their probable cause hearings, or after processing by City of Atlanta attorneys .

63 . First Appearances for persons arrested for felons committed to the Fulton County Jail are held in the Fulton County Jail .

64 . First Appearances for persons arrested for misdemeanors committed to the Fulton County Jail are held in the State or Superior Court during the week, and in the Fulton County Jail on Saturdays .

65. In-custody defendants are transported from the Fulton County Jail to the State or Superior Court for subsequent hearings such as bond hearings or status hearings .

15

f

t

P!,

All ~ _ ---l-

frnn,,nnrtect from the Fu-'

cou r thou s_ e tu C tt heari ng u i  ,.° . . . . ._

~_~~- 4_~. ? ~,'~ ;t,^"; U-~,~

1'\7 ~I?11_

i gif.OT th eir

court appearances, even ;, .w.^~^^ ^r..±,±lgr] fn PPlQASB by virtue of their court

appearances .

2003 Changes In City Of Atlanta Arrest And Commitment And Hearin Practices
67 . During 2002, Atlanta mayor Shirley Franklin conceived a plan to order Atlanta PD officers to exercise their discretion to charge all persons who could be charged with either municipal or state offenses with state offenses .
68 . During 2002, Atlanta mayor Shirley Franklin conceived a plan to order Atlanta PD officers to exercise their discretion to commit all persons it arrested and charged with state offenses to Fulton County Jail instead of an Atlanta detention facility .

69. Mayor Shirley Franklin expressly announced that the purpose of her plan was to save money for the City of Atlanta .
70 . Mayor Franklin advised the City of Atlanta City Council that her plan would save the City of Atlanta about $11 .4 million in fiscal year 2003 .

16

E

-'i .

._

budget .

_ . t _ . .__

i1/IaVC1Tl'Y'$IIK11Tla^yiaia, 3:1^.

72 . Fulton County officials had estimated it would cost anywhere from $8 million to $17 million to process and house the arrestees the City of Atlanta had previously processed and housed.
73 . As of January 1, 2003, the Atlanta PD began charging all persons who could be charged with either municipal offenses or state offenses with state offenses .

74. As of January 1, 2003, the City of Atlanta stopped detaining persons arrested by the Atlanta PD in Fulton County .

75 . As of January 1, 2003, the Atlanta PD began committing those arrestees it arrested in Fulton County and charged with state offenses directly to the Fulton County Jail .
Records Room And Operations Of The Records Room
76 . The Records Room is the unit of the Fulton County Jail that has responsibility for booking arrestees into the Fulton County Jail . Additionally, these employees create and administer institutional files for

17

r l
inm~tpe, anti kPPtl YT'ACk of inmates to BilSiiiiiis i. icii i^cic^cZB° uc^"^. ;'C'. :1e LO
77 . The Records Room uses a combined system of paper files and computer databases to keep track of inmates, prepare them to be transported to court for court hearings, and process the release and commillment. orders generated at the court hearings . 78. When inmates are "booked" into the Fulton County Jail, the Records Room creates, or in the case of a person who has previously been booked into the Fulton County Jail, updates a 4x6 card for each inmate showing his demographic information, his open charges, and his charge history. 79. As part of the booking process, the Records Room staff also checks criminal databases to determine if the new commitment is the subject of any other wants, holds or detainees from other jurisdictions . 80 . If there are such holds, the information is noted in the inmate's institutional files, and on the 4x6 card .
18

i

i

41 .

\hll. .,fl,o," +hp ;nm at.a iC t.hP RubiECt of 3RV other wants, hlolds or

;;- -oai t:m__=' nn_ tna
LV1d1111i'd1-1-1-c" ~ CviuYu 4~~.,...,. , u. . . ..., ;.lwblo to Record .- -Room staff and deputies .

82. The Jail and the courthouses have their own computer systems for keeping track of defendants and their court dates, and entering diqposIt10I_IS into the computer systems.

83. As a result, court data, release, and commitment orders issued by judges for in-custody defendants must be faxed from the courthouses to the Fulton County Jail. This information must be processed by hand for each inmate .

84. The large number of inmates in the Fulton County Jail, and the constant flow of inmates and releases, have overwhelmed the outmoded, paper-driven system for processing inmates.

85 . Lack of staff and lack of training exacerbates problems caused by the systemic deficiencies in the inmate management system.

19

t

v

RG; .

('h, " n  in aheantppiR7Y1 of ,Tail stall caused bY Unsanitary condit-ons in

iacu v l:

L`V _V th8 s:_ 'chom=r `1aY=ria71_!_`1_Pg i P the

inmate manasgcmcnt system

87 . Because of problems and backlogs in the Records Room, many newly committed inmates are not actually booked into the Jail for several days alter their commitment.

88. The Fulton County Jail also accepts for commitment to the Fulton County Jail arrestees brought by the Atlanta PD, and the Fulton County Police Department, to the Fulton County Jail without charging or arrest documents .

The Fulton County Jail Policy Of Strip Searching All Arrestees Booked Into The Fulton County Jail
89 . Every person booked into the Fulton County Jail is subjected to a strip search conducted without an individual determination of reasonable suspicion to justify the search, and regardless of the crime with which the
person is charged .

20

.', i

nn

TL.y Va ; .,  _ _n~ r,pnraCC involves having file arrested person go +=%t^

large,

7'UVlll

Wi~ia

a K,iv1j.~

~.

l1~' ; ''..,r. ;_1.1_`_-_.-v } ;

P;-4; - "" other inmatPR,

n r remove. dll Ul

h15 clothing, axiu7 place 4~1.,...,. clothing t_ o ~llIYPC

91 . The arrested person, along with the group, takes a shower and is then sprayed with delousing agent .

92. Each arrestee then either singly, or standing in a line with others, is visually inspected front and back by deputies .

93 . The Fulton County Jail does not keep any logs or other records of any individual strip searches performed in the booking areas.

The Fulton County Jail Policy For Court Returns

94. Every weekday, about 100 to 150 in-custody defendants are transported from the Fulton County Jail to the Superior Court and the State Court for court appearances.

95 . The Records Room does not run checks for wants and holds on incustody defendants before they are transported to the courthouses for hearings .

21

t
i

. ., MI-_ n ; ..~ .,a~ u  , floc null t.-hp. 4x6 earn of each 111111cl1.C who i5 gc .^.g ~o

S, courthouse, iti n

,~ t ~ a !;~a r. i . .~~ . andi r,~rs the ra_rri,c

aside in the necu~u5 ~oo:. ~ .

97 . The in-custody defendants are under the constant supervision of Fulton County Sheriffs deputies while in transit, and while at the courthouses .

98 . While at the courthouse, in-custody defendants are not allowed to have contact with anyone apart from Fulton County Sheriffs deputies, except for visits in the lockups with attorneys . These attorney visits are subject to supervision by Fulton County Sheriffs deputies during the visits .

99 . After an in-custody defendant appears before a judge, the judge issues an order directing release or further commitment. These orders are reduced to writing by the clerk.

100. The clerk does not enter the disposition into the court computer system in real time .

101 . Dispositions are entered into the court computer system later in the day, or the next day .

102. The release and commitment orders are faxed to the Records Room .

22

i

i

1VJ .

7.
In-( ;115LUlly

7 .1'
l1CLe11LLd11L5

N'11 1U,C

cases ihi~~ n~ v~ c

b ucecein a

i uii~o~~~.l it~a~.l~s~c~iu

are

riot

given

~liC

Of hojng rl~~~hwrncrl }rnm tFl_P (_`f117ThQ17$(? .

104 . Every in-custody defendant transported to the Superior Court or the State Court for a court event is sent back to the Fulton County Jail following his court appearance even ii the judge has issued a release order. Such persons are sometimes called "court returns" .

105 . The Fulton County Jail sends these court returns with release orders back to the Fulton County Jail so the Records Room can check for any other open cases with detention orders, warrants, detainees or holds before releasing them .

106 . The Records Room relies on its paper records as updated by the faxed court orders. Fulton County has not implemented a county-wide computer inmate management system as it was ordered to do by this Court .

107 . Court returns entitled to release are booked back into the Fulton County Jail general populations while the Records Room processes the day's commit and release orders . Even though they are entitled to release, these court returns are not actually released until a later date .

23

i

Tl,o 0. ,- ()f Tl,n Q~rprfla~antnn - Ilet.a tninPParanns Ordered Releasect TO

w'vi

i~v"t~fj inp=P U f ii r in-ii, n.

i'v'i n i~nrFiiicii~

i h0
ivv .

Ti_ V ., I+ ~n (`nwnf~r .T a i l h AC nn PffP(`Y.1VP in 7Y1`l ta managPmPn t SVSteIIl .

e Records Room is plague Th he

1

7 d

1. by

1 _~l_ UULll

~ L

4: .. . .

UVCLUC LC1161V11 .7

an d a U p ir le Gm ia 0 .tbu ur ice

w ac~i~c nomnw o .

Both overdetentions and premature releases are symptomatic of a non-

functioning inmate management system .

109 . The fact that the Fulton County Jail has no effective inmate management system has been documented by a series of reports and newspaper articles, as well as by court cases dating back many years .

110. The Fulton County Jail has recently aggravated the backlog of overdetained inmates by overreacting to a string of premature releases .

111 . The Fulton County Jail's policy of returning all in-custody defendants sent to the courthouses for hearings back to the Jail for processing after their hearings, even those whose cases have been dismissed, swells the backlog of unprocessed inmates .
112 . This policy and practice is a major contributing cause of the Records Room's inability to process and release individuals on their Release Dates .

24

i

e

l l :j'I'ha nnlirv nt cPnriinu emirt. returns entitled LO release back t0 the Jail .
,~ ..1, . . ..nl,lom
114 . If the court returns entitled to release by virtue of their court appearances were released at the courthouse, they would not be booked back in and strip searched in the first place.
115 . The policy of sending court returns entitled to release back to the Jail, instead of releasing them from the courthouses, exacerbates the overdetention and overcrowding problem . This policy adds persons who have already been ordered released by a judge into an already overloaded system . 116. The Fulton County Jail's policy of sending all court returns, even those whose cases have been dismissed, back to the jail for processing costs taxpayers money, swells the population of the facilities unnecessarily, and causes inmate unrest .

25

i

l

i'nP 0verv.rnwrii»g . Overdetentions And Premature Releases Are A

n vtiis~n~~~_i_ v_, -rSVn.p, v~ Ai~u"

aiic

--- :~ iiiciu TuiVrYia

ar"" ch. r""

117. The Fulton County Jail has a long and documented history of

overcrowding, overdetaining inmates past their release dates, and

prematurely releasing inmates .

118 . The old jail had been the subject of a 1982 class-action lawsuit Fambro v. Fulton, 82-cv2136, JOF) challenging conditions at that facility, including overcrowding and overdetentions .

119 . Among the many deficiencies the monitor found at the old jail in 1989, three broad areas were especially outrageous: 1) overcrowding, 2) medical services, and 3) sanitation .

120. The Court ultimately had to take the drastic step of ordered wholesale releases in an attempt to solve the problems of 1) overcrowding, 2) medical services, and 3) sanitation.

121 . In 1989, this Court published a decision that warned the Fulton County Commissioners that the new jail would not be sufficient to handle the present inmate population requirements of the county

26

t

i

her.anca nT a c hcr.ant ;aiiv nianer poquiaiion, and nirohiems with
4~Y.:iicll X112 :.^i^liiAI
122 . The 1982 class-action lawsuit continued to cover the current Rice Street Jail when that facility opened in 1991, until the suit was settled by the Fulton County Commission in 1994, and was dismissed by this Court .
123. The unconstitutional 1) overcrowding, 2) medical services, and 3) sanitation deficiencies persisted in the new facility.
124. Certain inmates of the Fulton County Jail again brought a class action against Fulton County, the Sheriff, and the Board in 1999. Foster v. Fulton County , 1 :99-cv-900-MHS challenging 1) overcrowding, 2) medical services, especially medical services for HIV positive inmates, 3) overdetentions, and 4) sanitation .
125. The Court found that systemic problems lead to unnecessary incarceration and chronic jail overcrowding, which in turn adversely affected living conditions at the jail, thus increasing the risk of exposure to dangerous diseases, and interfering with the provision of adequate medical care, and thus being a major contributing moving force of the overdetentions .
27

i t`
199 -Rarant. nnt.nrirnic axamnlES of OV0TQ0LEriL10I1 show the ovurdetuilt-on and
127 . At least eight jail inmates were released by error over the past year . 128 . Inmates routinely must obtain attorneys or inmate rights organizations on the outside to call the Records Room just to obtain release in accordance with their Release Dates. 129. On information and belief, at any one time up to 5-20% of the Fulton County Jail population is being held past their Release Dates . 130. The chart set forth below shows how pervasive and widespread the overdetention problem is. 131 . The chart shows the court date, Release Date, and Exit Date for virtually every inmate who appeared in magistrate court first appearance hearings (9 a.m . and 1 p .m . calendars) and State Court preliminary hearing calendars during the period March 18-31, 2004 who had a disposition resulting in release (dismissal, sentence of time served, defendant allowed to sign own bond (SOB)) .
28

i

t

?~ ~ rte.,., ,7 ~ e" F
El Aten

Book-led

i 7~ j Date$

3-18-04 13-18-04

i 7isuosiiion 1 Dismissed

Date

Days

Released

HvId
I
Over

3-LU-U4 I G

i

Marvin Davidson ~ 3-16-04 13-18; 3-19 I Time served I 3-20-04 , 2

Leroy Barrett

3-17-04 3-18-04 Dismissed

3-21-04 3

Corey

3-18-04 3-18-04 Dismissed

3-21-04 3

Boatwright

Michelle Collins 3-18-04 3-18-04 Dismissed

3-21-04 3

Bobbie Derest

3-18-04 3-18-04 Dismissed

3-21-04 3

Malcolm Dill

3-18-04 3-18-04 Dismissed

3-25-04 7

Roberto Duarte 3-18-04 3-18-04 SOB

3-25-04 7

Carl Feguson

3-18-04 3-18-04 SOB

3-20-04 2

Jimmie Gray

3-17-04 3-18-04 Dismissed

3-23-04 5

(hold)

Zhan Holsey

3-17-04 3-18-04 Dismissed

3-20-04 2

Jerald Lawson 3-17-04 3-18-04 Dismissed

3-22-04 4

Nadine Marshall 3-18-04 3-18-04 Dismissed

3-21-04 3

Angela Morrow 3-18-04 3-18-04 Dismissed

3-21-04 3

Terry Mozley

3-18-04 3-13-04 Dismissed

3-20-04 2

Donald Springer 3-18-04 3 .18-04 Dismissed

3-23-04 5

Randy Troy

3-18-04 3-18-04 SOB

3-23-04 5

Lorraine Wilkens 3-18-04 3-18-04 SOB

3-23-04 5

Harvey Boyd

3-17-04 3-18-04 Dismissed

3-21-04 3

29

i

liaranro

:~_1 7_(1d

tvinX ~ti cii
Reginald Morton Maury Ridley Roger Threats Chaka Zulu William Dodson Leo Harden Niles Johnson Arnold Levi

3-16-04 3-17-04 3-17-04 3-17-04 3-18-04 3-18-04 3-10-04 3-18-04

Charles Lyons Roger Thomas Ronnie Tyler

3-17-04 3-17-04 3-17-04

Larry Dean Jasiah Gillis Norman Gray Randy Harris Shirley McCullough Dwike Leonard Cassandra Mays Yolanda Smith

3-19-04 3-19-04 3-19-04 3-19-04 3-19-04
3-19-04 3-18-04 3-18-04

:;_lH_fld I Ili .cm .caari

14

3-18-04 3-18-04 3-18-04 3-18-04 3-19-04 3-19-04 3-19-04 3-19-04
3-19-04 3-19-04 3-19-04
3-19-04 3-19-04 3-19-04 3-19-04 3-19-04

Dismissed

3-21-04 3

Dismissed

3-21-04 3

Dismissed

3-20-04 2

Time served 3-22-04 4

SOB

3-20-04 1

Time served 3-24-04 5

SOB Reset for proof

3-23-04 4 3-21-04 2

Time served 3-23-04 4

SOB

3-25-04 6

Time served 3-29-04 10

(hold in

Bibb Co.)

SOB

3-25-04 6

Time served 3-24-04 5

Time served 3-23-04 4

SOB

3-23-04 4

SOB

3-23-04 4

3-19-04 3-19-04 3-19-04

SOB I SOB
SOB

3-23-04 4 3-22-04 3 3-22-04 1 3

30

f

Tarrnn 'I'vlPr

3-19-04

3-1`J-U4

I SOB

George Teasley Marco Thomas Timothy Williams

3-19-04 3-19-04 3-19-04

I 3-19-04 I SUIT 3-1y-U4 SOB 3-19-04, SOB
13-20 .04

Howard Arnold 2-18-04

Shanika Fambro I 3-12-04

Steven Berry

3-19-04

3-19-04 Time served
3-19.04 ~SOB i
3-20-04 SOB

Eric Brewster Ronald Brown Charles Carter Jane Doe Roberto Duarte Leo Harden Betty Ann Hicks Anthony Jefferson Mark King Bengie Martin

3-19-04 3-18-04 3-18-04 3-20-04 3-18-04 3-18-04 3-18-04 3-18-04
3-19-04 3-18-04

3-20-04 SOB 3-20-04 Time served 3-20.04 Time served 3-20.04 Time served
18,3-20 SOB 3-20-04 Time served 3-20-04 SOB 3-20 .04 SOB

3-20-04 3-18-04

SOB Bond, wouldn't let

J-LG-04

3

rvi a ri ar.i.a

hold)

-L$-U4 4

3-23-u4 4

3-24-04 5 (DeKalb

hold)

3-23-04 4

3-22-04 3

3-24-04 4

Gwinnett hold

3-22-04 2

3-25-04 5

3-25-04 5

3-22-04 2

3-25-04 5

3-24-04 4

3-23-04 3

3-23-04 3

3-22-04 2 3-25-04 7

31

E

him nn} cxr/n LUh1t1_31

I

I

Keair Mason

3-20-04 3-20-04 SOB

3-22-04 2

Deniera Owens 3-19-04 3-20-04 Time served 3-23-04 3

Charley Parks

3-19-04 3-20-04 SOB

3-23-04 3

Raymond

3-2Q-04 3-20-04 Time served 3-23-04 3

Quantez

Michael Riddlebarger

3-19-04 3-20-04 Time served 13-23-04 3

Waverly Spivey 3-19-04 3-20-04 Time served 3-23-04

3

Donald Springer 3-18-04 3-18-04, Dismissed

3-23-04 3

3-20-04

Quincy Tarver

3-20-04 3-20-04 SOB

3-23-04 3

Gary Thomas

3-19-04 3-20-04 Time served 3-23-04 3

Randy Troy

3-18-04 3-20-04 SOB

3-23-04 3

Lorraine Wilkens 3-18-04 3-18-04, SOB

3-23-04 3

3-20-04

Heidi Hendrix 13-20-04 3-20-04 SOB

3-24-04 4

(DeKalb

hold)

Bobby Adams Marvin Allen

3-21-04 3-21-04

3-22-Q4 3-22-04

SOB SOB

3-24-04 2 3-24-04 2

Petree Anderson 3-22-04 Keith Barnett ~3-21-04

3-22-04 3-22-04

SOB I Dismissed

3-26-04 4 3-24-04 2

Patrick Bryant 3-20-04 3.22-04 SOB

3-24-04 2

32

i

t

I l~'hriet.nnhp.r
I vvuu 1_-
Thomas Davis
Jose Alberto

I .2 -0. 1-114 12-22-04 1 IlismigSpd 1 2-24-114 1 2

I I

I I

1 I

I I

I I

I 3-20-04 I 3-21-04

3-22-04 ' Time served ' 3-24-04 ! 2

I

3-22-04 SOB

I 3-24-04 12

Duran

Arthur Favor

3-21-04 3-22-04 SOB

3-24-04

2

Pauline Favors

3-21-04 3-22-04

SOB

3-24-04

2

Torino Hawkins 3-22-04 3-22-04 SOB

3-23-04

1

Romaldo

3-21-04 3-22-04 SOB

3-23-04

1

Hernandez

Shane

3-22-04

3-22-04

SOB

3-24-04 2

Humphrey

(Alph. hold)

Ahmad Jamil

3-22-04 3-22-04 Dismissed

3-24-04 2

David Lucas Orlando Neal

3-19-04 3-20-04

3-22-04 3-22-04

SOB Dismissed

3-25-04 3 3-25-04 3

Herman Pittman 3-20-04 3-22-04 Time served 3-24-04 2

Arrgueta Reyes 3-21-04 3-22-04 SOB

3-24-04

2

William

3-20-04 3-22-04 Time served 3-24-04 2

Robinson

Dominique

3-21-04 3-22-04 Dismissed

3-24-04 2

Roscoe Gregory Shields 3-20-04 3-22-04 Time served 3-24-04 2

Wayne Teague

3-21-04 3-22-04 SOB

3-24-04 2

Thomas Toland 3-21-04 3-22-04 SOB

3-24-04

2

33

R

4

Q_,?n_nq i q_99_na i ti(lR

i s_2a_na i ~.

i

I

W1 11 7Q

n/,

.q

i On

A TV

I I

n 35-LL-V'!

13 - 22-04

IILD n'li_s m11i11s5"su'e0ld17

I

s

I 30 -2 4 - 04

In I G

I I

I

I

I

1

1

I

I

Derrick David

3-19-04 3-22-04 SOB

3-23-04 1

Norris Davis
Bernard Hill

3-20-04 I 3-20-04

3-22 .04 I 3-22-04

SOB ( Dismissed

3-24-04 I 2 I 3-24-04 I 2

Toddrick Merritt 3-19-04 ~ 3-22.04 Time served 3-24-04 2

Albert Williams 3-19-04 3-22-04 Time served 3-24-04 2

John E. Clarke 3-21-04 3-23-04 Dismissed

3-25-04 2

William Hiner

3-21-04 3-23-04 SOB

3-24-04 1

Emmanuel

3-21-04 3-23,3-26 Time served 3-29-04 3

Mitchell

Marcell Murrell 3-21-04 3-23-04 SOB

3-25-04 2

Brandon Starks 3-19-04 3-23-04 Time served 3-25-04 2

Roger Thomas

3-17-04 3-23-04 Dismissed

3-25-04 2

James Verlon

3-20-04 3-23-04 SOB

3-25-04 2

Arjuna

3-21-04 3-23-04 Time served 3-24-04 1

Westbrook

John Woody

3-20-04 3-23-04 Time served 3-25-04 2

Marvin Williams 3-15-04 3-16, 3-23 Time served 3-27-04 4

Trenton Williams 3-22-04 3-23-04 Time served 3-25-04 2

Phillip Buchanan 3-23-04 3-23-04 Time served 3-25-04 2

Ann Giorgianni 3-23-04 3-23-04 SOB

3-25-04 2

Michael Gladney 3-22-04 3-23-04 Time served 3-25-04 2

Vincent

3-23-04 3 .23-04 SOB

4-4-04

12

Manderson

34

t

I A  ,.;1 TrT .,., i i rnae1 ivtcieuu

I :~.'7.:i_(14 i v-2rJY

I R-I:3-U4 ~ v-~~-0_

I JOTS ~ B

I ~5-G4V! I 1 J

I .

~

4

John Bentley

3-22-04 T3-23-04 SOB

I 3-29-04 6

Warren Fletcher ~ 3-12-04

Uzziah

I 3.8-04

I 3-23-04 I 3-23-04

Dismisse3-25-04 ~ 2

I Time served

i-G5-U4 -~ G --{

Hammonds

~

I

I

Darrell James

3-15-04 3-23-04 Time served 3-25-04 2

Gary Jones

3-8-04

3-23-04 Dismissed

3-25-04 2

Anthony Cobb

3-23-04 3-24-04 Time served 3-26-04 2

Marcus

3-21-04 3-24-04 Time served 3-26-04 2

Richardson

Rachel Bailey

3-23-04 3-24-04 SOB

3-25-04 1

*Lavoid Blount 3-24-04 3-24-04 SOB

3-27-04 3

*Howard

3-24-04 3-24-04 SOB

3-28-04 4

Coleman

*Walter Gay

3-23-04 3-24-04 SOB

3-28-04 4

*William Hackett 3-24-04 3-24-04 SOB

3-28-04 4

Michael Moore

3-24-04 3-24-04 Time served 3-27-04

3

Ronnie Pharr

3-24-04 3-24-04 SOB

3-27-04 3

*Ledarius

3-24-04 3-24-04 SOB

3-28-04 4

Timmons

Duval Union

3-23-04 3-24-03 Time served 3-27-04 3

Travis Houston 3-25-04 3-25-04 Dismissed

3-27-04 2

Barry Johnson 3-25-04 3-25-04 SOB

3-26-04 1

Bryan Kitts

3-17-04 3-25-04 Dismissed

3-26-04 1

35

`s

I ri`.._` nT_77 ,.

I Q_9d_(14

-;-
IEtapni_rg Render i ;1-L7-V4

Curtis Thorton 3-25-04

I R_').,_I14

I

Q

~
'LJ'VY

i

3-25-04

I lltt
.
j uva~r ~-
I SOB

13-27-04 I G

I

-_

I 3-28-04 13

Larry Bostic

3-25-04 3-26-04 ( Dismissed I 3-28-04 I 2

I

Jeffrey Cain

3-25-04 3-26-04 I Time served I 3-29-04 I 3

i

rBenjamin Dykes 3-25-04 3-26-04 SOB

3-28-04 2

Keith Green

3-25-04 3-26-04 Time served 3-28-04 2

James Jones

3-25-04 3-26-04 SOB

3-29-04 3

Michael Netters 3-26-04 3-26-04 Time served 3-28-04 2

James Smith

3-26-04 3-26-04 Time served 3-31-04 5

Demiron Chester 3-25-04

Dwight Davis

3-25-04

3-26-04 3-26-04

SOB SOB

4-3-04

8

3-31-04 5

Dennis Fannin 3 .25-04 3-26-04 Time served 4-1-04

6

Kendrick

3-25-04 3-26-04 SOB

4-1-04

6

Freeman

Lee Gamble Mostafa

3-25-04 3-26-04 SOB

3-30-04 4

3.25-04 3-26-04 Time served 4-1-04

6

Ghorbani

Phillip Quinones 3-25-04 3-26-04 Time served 4-6-04

11

Michael Gladney 3 .26-04 3-27-04 Time served 3-29-04 2

Kevin Ball

3-26-04 3-27-04 SOB

3-29-04 2

Antonio Battle

3-26-04 3-27-04 SOB

3-29-04 2

John Bentley

3-22-04 3-27-04 Time served 3-29-04 2

Shakita Brew

3-26-04 3-27-04 SOB

3-29-04 2

Antonio Griffin 3-27-04 3-27-04 SOB

3-29-04 2

36

i

rr n,

I qnK r~A

I '7,O'7_fl~l

I -(l~nMlc .v'Rri

;-
I 3-L9~U4

~ L

I n1lArliR u.^. ::'?.:,~

I 3 _Y'(_I'04.

~ .}-21-V4 i I Time serveda

Joseph Hunt Shakita

I 3-26-04 3-26-04

' 3-27-04 3-27-04

I SOB l SOB

1 3-28-04 ~ 1

1 f

I 3-29-04 , 2

McLester

+

Richard Minor 13-25-04 ~ 3-27-04 SOB

13-29-04 `2

Travis Moore

3-26-04 3-27-04 Time served 3-29-04 , 2

Kyle Palmer

3-26-04 3-27-04 Time served 3-29-04 2

James Sidel

3-25-04 3-27-04 SOB

3-29-04 2

Steven Taylor

3-27-04 3-27-04 SOB

3-28-04 1

Rodney

3-25-04 3-27-04 SOB

3-31-04 4

Townsend

Bryan Turner

3-26-04 3-27-04 Time served 3-28-04 1

Shawn Williams 3-22-04 3-27-04 Time served 3-29-04 2

Dale Baldwin Lawrence

3-28-04 3-29-04 SOB

4-1-04

3

3-28-04 3-29-04 Time served 3-30-04 1

Caldwell Alfred Couch

3-27-04 3-29-04 SOB

3-30-04 1

Michelle Couch Harold Gooden Sandeep Gupta Curtis Harris

3-27-04 3-27-04 3-27-04 3-27-04

3-29-04 3-29-04 3-29-04 3-29-04

SOB SOB SOB SOB

3-30-04 1

4-1-04

3

3-30-04 1

3-30-04 1

Verner Harris

3-27-04 3-29-04 Time served 4-1-04

3

Michael Kingcaid 3-27-04

Nadir Quadir

3-27-04

3-29-04 3-29-04

SOB SOB

3-30-04 1 3-31-04 2

37

f

i
Lynn ~D_M_111

I ", nn n~
1 ~ .15_fI d

Thompson

I

N yroble White

3-27-04

Jeffrey Williams 3-27-04

P,:bravn _A_fla_m__s I 3-27-04

Ronald Boutte ' 3-28-04

Howard Brown 3-27-04

Lucia Davis

3-27-04

Sidy Diallo

3-26-04

Ann Gilbert

13-28-04

Darrell Glover

3-28-04

Dotruell Jordan Max Lipchonsky Eric Smith Amos Brown Avery Childs Rodrick Contrell Demarcus Ellis Kewonnus Harness Lamar Jefferson Mary Magnes

3-28-04 3-28-04 3-28-04 3-29-04 3-29-04 3-29-04 3-29-04 3-29-04
3-29-04 3-29-04

I qon !1 .A
i :i-I`i-ll4
I 3-29-04 3-29-04
~ 3-29-04 ' 3-29-04
3-29-04 3-29-04 3-29-04 3-29-04
3-29-04
3-29-04 3 .29-04 3-29-04 3-30-04 3-30-04 3-30-04 3-30-04 3-30-04
3-30-04 3-30-04

I 'Pimp .carver] I :i-3U-U4

I 1

j

I iJtaluia~Eu
I -

j v-~~-vz
i

i-

Ir Time served 14-1-04

SOB

3-31-04

~ 3 2

SOB

13-31-04 -I2

' SOB

3-31-04 2

SOB

3-31-04 2

SOB

3-31-04 2

SOB

4-1-04

3

Time served 3-31-04 2

(hold)

Time served 3-31-04 2

(hold)

SOB

3-30-04 1

SOB

4-1-04

3

Time served 4-1-04

3

Dismissed

4-1-04

2

SOB SOB SOB

4-1-04

2

4-1-04

2

4-1-04

2

Time served 4-1-04

2

Dismissed

4-1 .04

2

SOB

4-1-04

2

38

i T-,--!_ rR_--_n i ~_~1) _AA f ~_-gin-pn i Time served i 4-i-0v

j 2

j

Q ~;1Lu21i!1n_n72

I 3-L4-V4 i

~-~V- VYA i

~ jl1J11110J~.u
-

A-! -CIA

f .

Diane Thomas

3-29-04 3-30-04 I Time served I 4-1-04 ~2

Leroy Thompson 3-29-04 3-30-04 SOB

4-1-04 12

Patricia Brumley 3-29-04 3-30-04 Time served 4-1-04

L

Tarry Bailey

I 3-30-04 I 3-31-04 , SOB

~ 4-3-04 , 3

Wesley Cosby

3-30-04 3-31-04 Time served 4-2-04

2

Maurice

3-30-04 3-31-04 SOB

4-3-04

3

Edwards

Jason

3-30-04 3-31-04 SOB

4-3-04

3

Underwood

Henry Bell

3-30-04 3-31-04 SOB

4-1-04

1

Mikal Cartier

3-30-04 3-31-04 SOB

4-3-04

3

Marcene Cooper 3-30-04 3-31-04 SOB

4-1-04

1

John Daniell

3-30-04 3-31-04 SOB

4-1-03

1

Mark Hillegas

3-30-04 3-31-04 SOB

4-2-04

2

Illustrative Case

132. Overdetentions happen at practically every event in the criminal justice system from arrest to trial.

39

f

i

nn

Tl  ,  L,7 , a~or}c when inmates a12 COIIIII11'6L LL C~JU U 11IIIL6V 4M1 .e ~~ yL''~u~1i"w~+w+

. .. . "'; t_dll_IfILV eJdll wit-lout vi. : : p

- L.-. ..:~

t.in eu;

checked i^ur uut5~~a_-.~au=i~-.~ -.;~u;t.~., .~;c~.~~..Q, 1.v a_~,_~a.ntc and detainees, and entered

into the computerized inmate management system .

134. For example, Plaintiff Alan Powell was arrested anti committed intothe Fulton County Jail early on the morning of Saturday, March 20, 2004. He was not booked in until approximately 6 :00 p .m . the following day; Sunday, March 21, 2004.

135. As a result, Mr. Powell was not taken to the misdemeanor court in State Court for First Appearance, and so was not given a bond hearing.

136. Moreover, even though Mr. Powell was entitled to bail based on a schedule for minor offenses, Jail staff told him that he could not be released on bail until after he was booked .

137 . Finally, on the evening of Sunday, March 21, 2004, Mr. Powell was formerly booked into the jail .

138. Along with the booking procedure came a degrading, humiliating strip search .

40

E

pVPYV(1TlP else booked in t o Lis iiiitvii i..'^.uI: ;.ly e)uSi ion

?~~T1CLHy ctYeili. (vi any C~.: .. . __toL` "

::' .°.S taken in n large 1'VGili . ~Oia'4.~ to

take oii ai"i ~' ~-~'u--p- u,~. +?;~~ in a last;r hox. and take a shower with the

entire group in a single large room.

140 . Then each man took his clothes to a counter and exchanged :s a~:^. clothes for a jail jumpsuit .

141 . Before picking up his jumpsuit, Mr . Powell, along with every other inmate in the process, had to stand before a guard front and center, and show his front and back sides while naked.

142. Mr. Powell's family posted his bond on Sunday, March 21, 2004.

143 . However, Mr . Powell was not released. When he complained, guards threatened to "lose" his paperwork .

144. Mr. Powell was finally released on Tuesday morning, March 23, 2004 .

145 . The jail frequently sends recently arrested inmates to bond hearings at State Court before the inmates have been booked in.

41

i

r

. ..

-

'~-- ~-----7 Lc-- ~rP 1T1P`i]-n1]]ejQSS UF'I.AILSE the ilaTiait~°S

Cannot :i£ ° :tr°Y eng_rgeii Oi bvnuc~. C ..i b-___= ~~pV

n ot vet. hpPl_'1 booked .

147 . Without the paperwork generated by a booking, prosecutors lack the documentation necessary to show probable cause . Without probable cause, judges are forced to throw out cases within 48 hours.

148. On March 18, 2004, Judge Roy Roberts in State Court dismissed misdemeanor charges against 22 defendants because they were presented in his courtroom without paperwork . They had been sent to court without having been booked.

149. However, even when a judge orders inmates released at the first appearance, their release is no sure thing.

150. During the period March 18-31, 2004, approximately 135 persons presented before the magistrate for a probable cause hearing. .

151 . Almost every single person was overdetained for periods ranging from one day to twelve days. (see chart at x(131) .

42

i

__ --

~ nrmw  r it a. na- p .-O, f The I, nmate ivianaveroeiit oystem

nL t1L

~IY~l~ 11111

AX\uivU __

\-i111111LVQ11

152 . Defendants have known of the ineffective and chaotic condition of the

Records Room inmate management system for years .

M_ Moreover, ;ail_ officials have had personal knowledge of the problem for years .

154 . The Fulton County Commission has also been aware of the abovedescribed problems in the inmate management system for years .

155 . In the past few years, the Fulton County commissioners have had a federal judge, a grand jury, two separate private consultants, and a rash of escapes to tell them about problems at the Fulton County Jail . These problems are such as money for more guards, money for mental health treatment, money for new facilities to handle nonviolent inmates in workrelease programs, money to fix a crippled computer system, money to streamline the court system, money for public defenders, and money for more probation officers .

43

f

E

E

contirliAhig problems. at the crowUlmj` aln,I emergency ."

Ct a statemei-A ternung "%s-tL-a-f-f- M J1-"1 . -n "s-tate of-

Defendant Jacqueline Barrett's Failure To Take Meaningful. Sustained Corrective Action
157 . Defendant Jacqueline Barrett has acquiesced in the Records Room's chaotic procedures leading to the overdetention and strip search problems by failing to take any meaningful, sustained corrective action .

158. The Fulton County Jail is understaffed. Only about 650 guards watch over 2,900 inmates.

159. Fulton County has refused to provide adequate funding to the Fulton County Jail .

160 . Last year, the Fulton County Commission reduced the Jail's funding by $3,000,000 .

161 . Jacqueline Barrett never sent inmates to other county jails as she was authorized to do under Georgia law .

44

E
A .. - fo~, Cf,.  .Cno,~nhpc Pp rfnrmar{ RV Tha F'nltnn ('.nnnfv .la ;l
162 . On March 21, 2004, Plaintiff Alan Powell was booked into the Fulton County Jail's general population . He was subjected to a strip search without any individualized finding of reasonable suspicion, or probable cause that he was concealing contraband or weapons. 163 . On February 6, 2003, Plaintiff Tory Dunlap was booked into the Fulton County Jail's general population . He was subjected to a strip search without any individualized finding of reasonable suspicion, or probable cause that he was concealing contraband or weapons 164. On December 20, 2003, Plaintiff Lee Antonio Smith was booked into the Fulton County Jail's general population. He was subjected to a strip search without any individualized finding of reasonable suspicion, or probable cause that he was concealing contraband or weapons . 165. On August 22, 2003, Plaintiff David Evans was booked into the Fulton County Jail's general population . He was subjected to a strip search without any individualized finding of reasonable suspicion, or probable cause that he was concealing contraband or weapons.
45

i

f'lacc Art.inn illjvo'at.innc

"Arrestee Strip Search Class" -- Class Action Allegations

lbb.

i ii i5 ac un m 1 lhe

rAirre8iee

(~~ St

ri' p

~Ce.ai`C7U_

Name u.l

T rl i_ di._uPl~aiintuiff_s

g 1. . .' ._
brin

l. . _

i____ tion

1 . .. der

Rules 23(a), 23(b) (2), and 23(b) (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on

behalf of a class consisting of each person who, in the two years preceding the

filing of this action up until the date this case is terminated, was or will be, (i)

upon being arrested and committed into the Fulton County Jail; (ii) on a

charge other than a charge of drugs, weapon or felony violence; (iii) was

subjected to a blanket strip search without any individualized finding of

reasonable suspicion or probable cause that he or she was concealing drugs,

weapons or other contraband.

167. Certification of a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) is appropriate because the Fulton County Jail has a policy, and engages in a pattern and practice of conduct that has uniformly affected all members of the class . Injunctive relief against Defendant to enjoin the practice will benefit each and every Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiff and class member .

168. The class is entitled to injunctive relief of terminating the above-

46

i

rlnenr ;hprl nnlirv an(i nract.7f'.P alt Sllh10Ct1Ile $YY2SL20S LO blanketL strip Sedi~Ci105 i" i

L11AL lic vi oiic

~o~i ; R a= nac ixraanrnic or nthPr contraband.

169 . Certification of a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) is also appropriate in that common questions of law and tact predominate over any individual questions . A class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy as detailed below .

170 . Regarding the Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs and members of the class, there are no individual questions on the issue of liability . Every arrestee committed into the Fulton County Jail is subjected to the blanket strip searches . None of the staff of the Fulton County Jail keeps records of these searches. Therefore, Defendant cannot show that any of the searches were conducted based on an individual determination of reasonable suspicion . Should records exist demonstrating such individualized suspicion, such people would, by definition, not be members of the class .

171 . Among the questions of law and fact common to the class are:

a. whether Defendant Jacqueline Barrett instituted a policy, or acquiesced in a custom and practice of subjecting arrestees

47

i

i

-- _ .--- :++~a ~= 4-1,~ TP .,If-  ('n  nfv .laid nanrlina nYPRPTI t.meni to

f11i111Ke 6 JLllp sed11.11GJ vvuiavu~

u-

`' ... ..

.

~ . ..

.1' . ._ ._ ._~

..l_

1

~

. .F~

L11at the dl'i"Cj~CCS were iii posses O+vix v . .F avr~ ugro.a,-, c~r.o_oi,n.n._n_c.. !1_" l1fl'1P7'
contraband ;

b. whether such policy or practice, if found to exist, violates the Fourth Amendment;

c. whether Defendant Jacqueline Barrett was deliberately indifferent to the rights of such arrestees;

d . whether the Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs and the members of the class have sustained damages and, if so, the proper measure of such damages ;

e . whether the Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs and the members of the class and future members are entitled to equitable relief and, if so, what is the nature of that relief; and

f.

whether determination of damages suffered by a

statistically representative sample of the class provides the basis

for determination of all class members' damages except those who

48

g. Whether Defendant Jacqueline Barrett is entitled to qualified immunity on the §1983 claims ; and
h . Whether Defendant Jacaueline Barrett is entitled to governmental immunity on the state law claims.
172 . The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable . The exact number of class members is unknown to plaintiffs at this time . However, every week at least 100 persons meeting the Arrestee Strip Search Class class definition are committed into the Fulton County Jail pending presentment. All are subject to the illegal searches. Thus, this class well exceeds 10,000 members.
173 . Defendant Jacqueline Barrett and the Fulton County Jail have within their records the names and addresses of all current and past class members. This information is maintained in the Fulton County Jail computer systems (CJUS, JDL and Banner and Mainframe), logbooks, and other paper records maintained by the Fulton County Jail.
174 . The Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the
49

S

E

i

rl ., ;mg of fl-'a nthpr mamharc nt t.hP CIR9S because the Arrestee "'rip Search

..

... . . ..... .. .. ._ .._ -__-___L___.._ -. f fli p ,.1 ., .. , .~.~a . . .'foul 1,~_, ovartlv

..a ' v L11C same means ;~ that iu,

fl~o hl~nl;of c±rin caarr}ip .c

175 . The Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the class . They have retained counsel who are competent and experienced in complex federal civil rights class action litigation and/or complex federal prisoner rights litigation.

176. The Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs have no interests that are contrary to, or in conflict with, those of the class .

177 . The Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs know of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. The class action is superior to any other available means to resolve the issues raised on behalf of the Fourth Amendment Class. The class action will be manageable because so many different records systems exist from which to ascertain the members of the putative class . Damages can be determined on a class-wide basis using a damages matrix set by a jury, or by trying the damages of a statistically valid sample of the class to a jury and extrapolating those damages to the class as

50

f

i

178 . Class treatment will be superior because liability can be determined on a class-wide basis . Damages can also be determined on a class-wide basis through use of statistical sampling .
Plaintiff C. Alan Powell's Overdetention By The Fulton County Jail 179. On or about Saturday, March 20, 2004, Plaintiff C . Alan Powell was detained in the Fulton County Jail . 180. Plaintiff Alan Powell's Release Date was about March 21, 2004, when he made bond. 181 . Plaintiff Alan Powell's Exit Date was March 23, 2004 . 182 . Plaintiff Alan Powell was overdetained for three days at the Fulton County Jail . 183 . The moving force behind Plaintiff Alan Powell's overdetention was the collapse of the Fulton County Jail's inmate management system, and Defendants' deliberate indifference .
51

F
1H4 Plaintiff Alan Pnwaii Tuft"aracf insGot"emniovmentonnortuniiies .
Tory Dunlap's Overdetention By The Fulton County Jail 185 . On or about Friday, February 13, 2002, Plaintiff Tory Dunlap was committed to the Fulton County Jail. 186 . Plaintiff Tory Dunlap's Release Date was March 31, 2003 . 187. Plaintiff Tory Dunlap's Exit Date was April 4, 2003. 188 . Plaintiff Tory Dunlap was overdetained for four days at the Fulton County Jail. 189 . The moving force behind Plaintiff Tory Dunlap's overdetention was the collapse of the Fulton County Jail's inmate management system, and Defendants' deliberate indifference . 190. Plaintiff Tory Dunlap suffered loss of employment opportunities, anxiety, loss of freedom and other damages as a result of the overdetention.
52

l

I

C,  ;fh'o ()vo,"rlafantinn FS v'1'hP Fult.o71 COllritV JHll
191 . On or about Thursday night, May 9, 2002, Plaintiff Lee Antonio Smith was committed to the Fulton County Jail .
192 . Plaintiff Lee Antonio Smith's Release Date was December 22, 2003.
193 . Plaintiff Lee Antonio Smith's Exit Date was December 25, 2003 . 194. Plaintiff Lee Antonio Smith was overdetained for three days at the Fulton County Jail. 195. The moving force behind Plaintiff Lee Antonio Smith's overdetention was the collapse of the Fulton County Jail' inmate management system, and Defendants' deliberate indifference. 196 . Plaintiff Lee Antonio Smith suffered anxiety, loss of freedom and other damages as a result of the overdetention .
David Evans' Overdetention By The Fulton County Jail 197 . Plaintiff David Evans's Release Date from the Fulton County Jail was December 4, 2003. 198 . Plaintiff David Evans' Exit Date was December 14, 2003.
53

f F

l

iflll

Dl . ..,4 ;FFT1 .. . .; .7 Ti`., .,o ~xrue nvarflofaina`i fnr Y.P.n f1AV :q AT. the T'111L011

i;uulli,v uall .

200 . The moving force behind Plaintiff David Evans' overdetention was the collapse of the Fulton County Jail's inmate management system, and Defendants' deliberate indifference .

"Overdetention Class" - Class Action Allegations

201 . The Overdetention Named Plaintiffs bring this action under Rules 23(a), 23(b) (2), and 23(b) (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of a class consisting of: (a) each person who has been, is, or who will be incarcerated in any Fulton County Jail facility in the two years preceding the filing of this action up to and until the date this case is terminated ; and (b) who was not released or, in the future, will not be released by midnight on the date on which the person is entitled to be released by court order, posting bail, or the date on which the basis for his or her detention has otherwise expired .
202. Certification of a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) is appropriate because Defendant Jacqueline Barrett implemented a policy, or engages in a pattern and practice of conduct that has uniformly affected all

54

f

i

- -

.,_,_ r ,... ;  ,+ noto*,~Ia*,+ .iarnuPiine Barrett

Aa 4~ q --- 1, or W 111 UCilcii~ each a : :d every ~-~VE'rIiYI .viIL1Vii N, am cu i iu .. .un-.---

203 . The class is entitled to injunctive relief of terminating the above described policy and practice of overdetentions .

204. Certification of a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) is also appropriate in that common questions of law and fact predominate over any individual questions . A class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy as detailed below .

205. Regarding the Overdetention Named Plaintiffs and members of the class, there are no individual questions on the issue of liability other than whether an individual has been overdetained . The answer to that question can be determined by ministerial inspection of the Jail's records.

206 . Among the questions of law and fact common to the class are :

a) whether the Constitution provides a bright line, maximum length of time measured in hours beyond which Defendant cannot hold a person before releasing that person from jail after a judge has ordered his release or he has posted bail, or the basis

55

i

fnr hi .c riatant.inn hac nt.harwica axnirari~

b)

whether Defendants have exceeded that maximum for

each class member;

c) whether there is a pattern and practice of the Fulton County Jail of holding inmates past their Release Dates ;

d) whether Defendant Jacqueline Barrett has been deliberately indifferent to the pattern and practice of the Fulton County Jail of holding inmates past their Release Dates ;

e) whether Defendants' acts as alleged herein violate the Constitution of the United States by holding detainees and inmates past their release dates;

whether such policy, if found to exist, violates the Fourth and/or Fourteenth Amendments ;
g) whether Jacqueline Barrett was deliberately indifferent to the rights of inmates and detainees in the custody of the Fulton County Jail ;

56

f

1-1

-- .1 ..,.til. ..r fl.n (l . .o," apfnn+ ;nn Nnmpri Plaintiffs anti the

IIICI11U61'3 Vl b11 C V

uciciaia viuou

and, 11 JU, the iJ1ViJCiiaicaouicvaCoouuCclh, auaauu6C ;;

i) whether determination of damages suffered by a statistically representative sample of the class provides the basis for determination of all class members' damages except those who opt out;

j) whether Defendant Jacqueline Barrett is entitled to qualified immunity on the section 1983 claims ; and

k) whether Defendant Jacqueline Barrett is entitled to governmental immunity on the state law claims.

207 . The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable . The exact number of class members is unknown to plaintiffs at this time. However, every week at least 100 persons meeting the Overdetention Class definition are released from the Fulton County Jail . Thus, this class well exceeds 10,000 members .

208. Defendant Jacqueline Barrett and the Fulton County Jail have within

57

i
E

fl,o :r ,"o...-Ao +ho  n ,oc ?nri arirlroccoc of all rnrrant. and na .-,t. clad members.

/r 7770 \l~V VU~

V TIL -%L T

nllau

- Lniii~ci D uai!u7 T? . . ~ . . Fn n

~~ ~nn~re

nnr~ ~±}ior ronor i-ornr~a

maintained by the Fulton County jail .

209 . The Overdetention Named Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the class, because the Overdetention Named Plaintiffs and all other members of the class were injured by exactly the same means; that is, by the systemic collapse of the inmate management system, and the practice of returning in-custody defendants entitled to release by virtue of their court appearances from the courthouses to the Fulton County Jail to check for wants, holds and detainers.

210. The Overdetention Named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the class . They have retained counsel who are competent and experienced in complex federal civil rights class action litigation and/or complex federal prisoner rights litigation .

211 . The Overdetention Named Plaintiffs have no interests that are contrary to, or in conflict with, those of the class.

212. The Overdetention Named Plaintiffs know of no difficulty that will be

58

i

e

encountered in the manaeemeni or this nLiLyaiion That would Dreclude its

rg A

Al_t-

avn ;la},lA maa»s to racnlva th e 1C477PC 1'A1CPlI nn behalf nf tha Frnn" th

Amendment Class. ihe class action will de manageadie because so many

different records systems exist from which to ascertain the members of the

putative class, and damages can be determined on a class wide basis using a

damages matrix set by a jury or by trying the damages of a statistically valid

sample of the class to a jury, and extrapolating those damages to the class as

a whole .

213 . Class treatment will be superior because liability can be determined on a class-wide basis. Damages can also be determined on a class-wide basis through use of statistical sampling .

59

r

i

- "r=+m~?:mrsr~ AT TFrATinNC
CLAIMS OF ARRESTEE STRIP SEARCH NAMED PLAINTIFFS
Count 1
Section 1983 Claims Of Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs Against Defendant Jacqueline Barrett
214 . The Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations set forth above in this First Amended Complaint .
215 . Upon being booked into the Fulton County Jail, each of the Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs, and every other Arrestee Strip Search Class member, was subjected to a strip search without an individual determination that the search would reveal weapons, drugs or other contraband .
216. Subjecting an arrestee arrested on a non-drug, non-weapon non-violent felony offense to a strip search, without an individual determination that the search would reveal weapons, drugs or other contraband, violates his or her Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Rights.
217 . Defendant Jacqueline Barrett knew that the Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs and other class members would be subjected to these
60

i

-niPCrpr'I in t1hp. searches .

218. Defendant's actions, and failures to act as described above, directly and proximately and affirmatively were the moving forces behind the violations of the Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs, and the class members' Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights .

219 . Defendant caused the unreasonable strip searches of the Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs and all other class members by deliberate indifference to the risk of constitutional injury by maintaining and/or acquiescing in a policy and practice and custom of strip searching arrestees.

220. Defendant is therefore liable under 42 U .S.C . §1983 for constitutional injuries to the Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs and all other class members caused by their conduct .

Count 2

Negligent Training And Negligent Supervision And Failure To Implement Policies Claims Against Defendant Jacqueline Barrett
221 . The Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by
reference all allegations set forth above in this First Amended Complaint .

61

C

C

nnn TI,.C..~. .1 . . ..4 T .. .... .. .,1 : .... lZn,+,.off onf, .,ic}oA rcrto,n raiitioc inollirlinft hilt.

11V1. 1111111.CU ~V, searching ail aiicSicc~ uvviCiu laa~v ~ci~ i ui~vu

vu . Lj u- "

certain

dtai"it

eiuY l . . . 1V,YCC .`S .

223 . Therefore, Defendant Jacqueline Barrett had a duty to exercise reasonable care in training, supervising and disciplining such employees in exercising their duties .

224 . The need for such training was and is obvious from the nature of the responsibilities entrusted to such jail employees.

225 . Defendant Jacqueline Barrett deliberately failed to implement and enforce procedures employees needed to ensure the constitutional searches of inmates .

226. The problems at the jail described above, and the various reports in the media, should have made it obvious to Defendant Jacqueline Barrett that the training employees under her supervision and control were receiving was inadequate, that the policies in place were inadequate, and that, as a direct and proximate result of these inadequacies, the inmates under her supervision would suffer injury.

62

r
J'l.'] I lPtPnriant .larmiahna Harrntt navlivantlv frainari Mnrl c  norvicari nr
b'". . . 1~ . . .. . .~.~ . . . .i . . ... . . . . . . .,. ~ :1, ° . . . . .~ . .~~ . . . . . ...w~ :~~v~.~.~. .u iia~..ii uuvi .')~, iuii~u
4V lllllJltrlllVllb 1JWLV1\.J U11~4~ 4J U 1GJ414~ JllVll Glllk/1V,'GGJ YYG1G 1111 .V111PGLG11L UV
perform their duties .
228 . This negligent training ; negligent failure to train; failure to supervise, and failure to implement policies by Defendant Jacqueline Barrett resulted in the unconstitutional strip searches of the Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs and the other members of the putative class. 229. As a result of said negligence of Defendant Jacqueline Barrett, Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs suffered injuries described in the preceding paragraphs of this First Amended Complaint .
Count 3
Section 1983 Claims Of Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs Against Defendant Fulton County And Each Of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe .
Emma I . Darnell, Nancy A . Boxill and William "Bill" Edwards 230 . The Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations set forth above in this First Amended Complaint . 231 . Defendant Fulton County and each of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom
63

t

i

LUwe, LII1Rla 1 . Darneii. '1V3riCV H . FSnxill and William "Rill" H'.riizr~, "r1Q hart
232 . Defendant Fulton County and each of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I . Aarnell, Nancy A. Boxill and William "Bill" Edwards failed to adequately fund and staff the F'ulton County Jail. 233 . Defendant Fulton County and each of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill and William "Bill" Edwards failed to adequately fund and staff the Fulton County criminal justice network . 234 . Defendant Fulton County and each of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill and William "Bill" Edwards failed to adequately train the sheriff and her staff. 235 . Defendant Fulton County and each of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I . Darnell, Nancy A . Boxill and William "Bill" Edwards were deliberately indifferent to the rights of the Arrestee Strip Search Class members to be free from illegal strip searches . 236 . Defendant Fulton County and each of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill and William "Bill" Edwards'
64

f

f

rlPliharat.P inrliffarPnra t.n t.hP riaht.c n1 F.ha ,4rract.PP tit.rin tia.arrh l;laac

Count 4
Section 1983 Claims Of Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs Against Defendant City Of Atlanta
237 . The Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations set forth above in this First Amended Complaint .
238 . The City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, had control over the Atlanta PD's policy of charging persons arrested within the municipality for either municipal or state charges .
239. The City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, had control over the city's policy of holding persons arrested by the Atlanta PD within the municipality in an Atlanta detention facility.
240. The City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, had control over the city's policy of holding first appearance for persons arrested within the municipality in the Atlanta court system .
65

E

i

L

241 . The C1tV of E1L1811t8. 3Ct1riH through its mavnr and cnnn~.i I knew that

fI. V-if.,^,r !'^.;~n~.. 1 .. :t .,a;aA ~ . .,... .,....-"-a,.a a . . ..i .c fl-- `- ------ -

" -

First Amanrlarl f'.n,nrn_l.a_i_n_f .

242 . The City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, knew that the Fulton County Jail had a custom and policy of subjecting all new commitments to blanket strip searches without an individualized finding of reasonable suspicion as part of the booking process both before and during the class period.

243 . Still, the City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, discontinued its policy of committing persons arrested in the municipality to an Atlanta detention facility and holding their first presentment hearings there.

244. The City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, began directing its police officers to charge all persons they arrested with state charges, whenever possible, and commit them to the Fulton County Jail upon arrest .

245. The City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, knew that Defendant Fulton County and the Board and the Fulton County Sheriff were

66

f

Ctrin `PaT'!`Fl iJSllllea

Tl ' ~' ;1, . i"1d1116111o

aia,u.1

teaheV

pirpstnG

tri~p O~11_'Cll lil<lOJ l.1CaJJ iiti.+"'a+l.+~ :° .. .. ., __ _ _ __ .

blanket strip searches without an individualized nuirg iii re<^.S.^.^.^.ti`I°

suspicion as part of the booking process.

246. The City of Atlanta's deliberate indifference to the rights of the Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs and the Arrestee Strip Search Class class to be free from blanket strip searches without an individualized finding of reasonable suspicion as part of the booking process was the moving force behind their injuries .

247. Defendant City of Atlanta is therefore liable under 42 U.S.C . §1983 for constitutional injuries to the Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs and all other class members caused by its conduct described herein and is jointly and severally liable with all other defendants for injuries caused by their conduct described herein.

CLAIMS OF OVERDETENTION NAMED PLAINTIFFS

Count 5

Section 1983 Claims Of Overdetention Named Plaintiffs Against Defendant Jacqueline $arrett

67

040 m.l,- n, . .,_ . .l  ~  ~~ ;  AT .. .., ..~7 Ale ;  } ;fFc," nollnao on`i inrnrnnratP by

1_'Y~t'.1'CIICC dll d11CCAt1Vllo Jut lvliai auvvG in eiu3 i i.so V

.7 .; ^

l .inf

249 . Defendant Jacqueline Barrett was, at all times relevant herein, the supervisor of the Jail employees charged with ensuring the release on their Release Dates of all inmates in the custody of the Fulton County Jail .

250 . Defendant Jacqueline Barrett deliberately failed to train, monitor and discipline such employees.

251 . Defendant Jacqueline Barrett deliberately failed to implement and enforce procedures employees needed to ensure the timely release of inmates .

252 . Defendant Jacqueline Barrett had both actual and constructive knowledge that such employees were engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to The Overdetention Named Plaintiffs and other members of the class . 253. Defendant Jacqueline Barrett engaged in a pattern of continued inaction in the face of employees' documented widespread abuse of the Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the Overdetention Named Plaintiffs and the other members of the class by failing to ensure their release on their Release Dates.

68

i

')C,] Tlufnn~? +c' ?rfinnc an(1 failiiPaC Y.f1 A(`,t. 2.9 (1Pti(`.1'lbf?CI AhCIVA . CI17'ECt1V .

..1,.i :, .

,_Cfl,

dii u~ ~i' a..q_u._a.a~,c. .c.~u+~Lu. aAa uiyi .7uI`u~ . .t~ ...:b~l,~f.o. . . f±l~o flvcrrlafanf :n_n_ Namarl Pla_inf :f{'c'
and the other members of the class.
The deprivation-, to t_h_e Fourth; Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the Overdetention Named Plaintiffs and the other members of the
class were committed by Defendant Jacqueline Barrett while she was acting under color of state law, and was acting pursuant to the policy, custom and practice of Fulton County Jail .

256. Defendant Jacqueline Barrett's actions, and failures to act, as described above, directly and proximately caused injury described above to the Overdetention Named Plaintiffs' and the other members of the class .

Count 6

Negligent Training And Negligent Supervision And Failure To Implement Policies Claims Of Overdetention Named Plaintiffs Against Defendant Jacqueline Barrett
257 . The Overdetention Named Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by
reference all allegations set forth above in this First Amended Complaint.

258 . Defendant Jacqueline Barrett entrusted certain duties including, but

69

f
thu roloaca nxt their Release Dates of all inmates ill
259 . Therefore, Defendant Jacqueline Barrett had a duty to exercise reasonable care in training, supervising, and disciplining such employees in exercising their duties . 260. The need for such training was obvious from the nature of the responsibilities entrusted to Jail employees. 261 . Defendant Jacqueline Barrett deliberately failed to implement and enforce procedures employees needed to ensure the timely release of inmates . 262. The problems at the jail described above, and the various reports in the media, should have made it obvious to Defendant Jacqueline Barrett that the training employees under her supervision and control were receiving was inadequate, that the policies in place were inadequate, and that, as a direct and proximate result, the inmates under her supervision would suffer injury. 263 . Defendant Jacqueline Barrett negligently trained and supervised, or
negligently failed to train and supervise, such employees in their duties. She further failed to implement policies and, as a result, such employees were
70

F

!s

264 . This negligent training, and negligent failure to train and supervise, and failure to implement policies by Defendant Jacqueline Barrett resulted in the complete breakdown in the inmate management system of the Fulton County Jail. These failures have caused the overdetention of The Overdetention Named Plaintiffs and the other members of the putative class .
265 . As a result of said negligence of Defendant Jacqueline Barrett, The Overdetention Named Plaintiffs suffered injuries described in the preceding paragraphs of this First Amended Complaint .
Count 7
Section 1983 Claims Of Overdetention Named Plaintiffs Against Defendant Fulton County And Each of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I.
Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill and William "Bill" Edwards 266 . The Overdetention Named Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations set forth above in this First Amended Complaint .
267 . Defendant Fulton County and each of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill and William "Bill" Edwards had ultimate authority over the Fulton County Jail .
71

e

F

T

II

110~u . L' llllll4 1 . LU111C11 . 1\Qlll:v A . LUAlll clllll ~Y~T1111A111 Llll~U~Yi11UO 1c111GU VV

adequately tn unai andi. stalrlr~siue 1 r ui1~wii ~nuucii,y J1iil" l1 .

269 . Defendant Fulton County and each of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I . Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill and William "Bill" Edwards failed to adequately fund and staff the Fulton County criminal justice network.

270 . Defendant Fulton County and each of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill and William "Bill" Edwards failed to adequately train the sheriff and her staff.

271 . Defendant Fulton County and each of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I . Darnell, Nancy A . Boxill and William "Bill" Edwards were deliberately indifferent to the rights of the Overdetention Named Plaintiffs and the Overdetention Class class members to be released by midnight of their Release Dates .

272. Defendant Fulton County and each of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I . Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill and William "Bill" Edwards' deliberate indifference to the rights of the Overdetention Named Plaintiffs and the Overdetention Class class to be released by midnight of their Release

72

i

. .: : . .

. .° -1 . . . .

nn .anenr,}lnl7 al-,nvp

Count 8
Section 1983 Claims Of Overdetention Named Plaintiffs Against Defendant City Of Atlanta
273 . The Overdetention Named Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations set forth above in this First Amended Complaint.
274 . The City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, had control over the Atlanta PD's policy of charging persons arrested within the municipality for either municipal or state charges.
275 . The City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, had control over the city's policy of holding persons arrested by the Atlanta PD within the municipality in an Atlanta detention facility .
276 . The City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, had control over the city's policy of holding first appearance for persons arrested within the municipality in the Atlanta court system .
277 . The City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, knew that the Fulton County Jail was overcrowded during the ten years preceding this

73

-3 -A
278. The City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, knew that the Fulton County Jail had a custom of overdetaining inmates before and during the class period.
279 . Still, the City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, discontinued its policy of committing persons arrested in the municipality to an Atlanta detention facility and holding their first presentment hearings there .
280 . The City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, began directing its police officers to charge all persons they arrested with state charges, whenever possible, and commit them to the Fulton County Jail upon arrest .
281 . The City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, knew that the Fulton Defendant Fulton County and the Board were deliberately indifferent to the rights of the Overdetention Named Plaintiffs and the Overdetention Class class members to be released by midnight of their Release Dates .
74

r

i

nor) TL  ftia . . -CA }l . .  F~'~ .7 .,l ;l,ovofn ;nr~if+pronra to }h P rtaht.s nf t. -hp

\7VCIUCLC11L1V1i iVCi111GU i i<tiiuiiiu uiau`vuv

" ~ .v~a° . . . . ..~ .

n, . . . . .,. . .

-.--~---..-- ntnFa

reieasea u ~

i

7

i.

f ~l_ '

y ullullltjllL VI b11C11

D,.1,.f. 14G1C.QJG

T1 4

41.

LabGJ b11i.

it uon

frov aa~v ~ urarb c f~rnp

of }hp :p

injuries described above .

283 . Defendant City of Atlanta is therefore liable under 42 U.S.C . §1983 for constitutional injuries to the Overdetention Named Plaintiffs and the Overdetention Class class members caused by its conduct .

IRREPARABLE INJURY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

284 . Defendants are overdetaining, or contributing to the overdetention of members of the plaintiff class, and unreasonably subjecting, or causing the subjection of members of the Arrestee Strip Search Class to strip searches which irreparably harm them, even if they are later able to recover compensatory damages .

285 . Defendants' conduct and/or participation in overdetaining members of the plaintiff class, and performing illegal strip searches of the Arrestee Strip Search Class, has irreparably harmed them . This conduct will continue to irreparably harm members of the proposed plaintiff Overdetention Class and

75

f

--

Ovvnefoo .Cf, ;~ Rnovnh ('lone fhne ,no4 ;no flonlorotn,nr onrl ;n ;  nrt ;vo ra7iaf
ucicsoniy .
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court grant the following relief:
1) grant a jury trial on all claims so triable ; 2) declare that, with respect to the Arrestee Strip Search Class, this
action may be maintained as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(6)(2) and 23(6)(3) and certify the Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs as the proper representative of the class consisting of each person who, in the two years preceding the filing of this action up until the date this case is terminated, was or will be, (i) upon being arrested and committed into the Fulton County Jail; (ii) on a charge other than a charge of drugs, weapon or felony violence ; (iii) was subjected to a blanket strip search without any individualized finding of reasonable suspicion or probable cause that he or she was concealing drugs, weapons or other contraband . 3) declare that, with respect to the Overdetention Class, this action may
76

i

l

t- rn_Pr~iiTa % .i~ :~.j ; ~~ii~i %t~i , dim LJ1lV1\J1 dilU i.C16liV Uiic v%Tciuctci.nvi.
Named YlainLiiIS as the proper represeiAni,ive of the vvaueteiit.Gu
Class consisting of class consisting of: (a) each person who has been, is,
iii wii 'I r SSSnnf~=rTni.p.ii iii nil'y' i'ul~Cia vvuPat~' t1IJail facility in the two
years preceding the filing of this action up to and until the date this case is terminated; and (b) who was not released, or, in the future, will not be released by midnight on the date on which the person is entitled to be released by court order, posting bail, or the date on which the basis for his or her detention has otherwise expired. 4) Name William Claiborne, Dan DeWoskin, Charles Pekor, J .P. Claiborne, and Lynn Cunningham as class counsel for all classes . 5) preliminarily and permanently enjoin defendants from pursuing the course of conduct complained of herein ; 6) preliminarily and permanently enjoin defendants from pursuing settlement directly with any member of the putative Arrestee Strip Search Class or the Overdetention Class described herein unless that person is represented by counsel; 7) award all Plaintiffs and class members compensatory and consequential damages in an amount to be determined ;
77

i

e

 dress out area to ensure th a t a :i new CC uma.w:e .^.tS w :° : :0t Sri :^y
searched or subjected to a visual body cavity search without an individualized finding of reasonable suspicion ;
HI 'AY~71111Y11 ATI IIl11YllVII!\Yllr TT~l~T7T/lY TA C77T~MVlOO TY~~ K!~l~/l7~lIO K~~tv~ Fn
ensure that all inmates are released on or before their Release Dates;
10) award Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and costs incurred in bringing this action under 42 U .S .C . §1988; and
11) grant such other relief as this Court deems just and proper .
/////////

78

i

14. .01--1- 14 r miaw ~iaivuiiiy
Georgia Bar # 16360 Counsel lot the P.rrestee Strip search Class and the Overdetention Named Plaintiffs and Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiff 717 v Street. N. .W.' Suite 210 Washington, DC 20004 phone 202/824-0700 tax 202/824-0745
Respectfull submitted,

rl,a,lNC PNknr

Georgia Bar # S'jo (PC ~

i
Counse l

...
1V1

the

~ ~,., .
l1l

Scn._i'ip~.,I c.~e~. .._a ,N.~~~ . C~las. .s..

and the Overdetention Named Plaintiffs and

Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiff

'27U °eac::;:ee S;reet N . ::1 .

Suite 1060

Atlanta, GA 30303

Phone 404-221-8887

Phone 404-230-9171

Fax 404-221-8884

Dan DeWoskin Georgia Bar # 220-327 Counsel for the Arrestee Strip Search Class and the Ovzrdetention Named Plaintiffs and Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiff 270 Peachtree Street, N.W. Suite 1060 Atlanta, GA 30303 Phone 404-221-8887 Phone 404-230-9171 Fax 404-221-8884
Respectfully submitted,

1 .P. Claiborne
Georgia Bar # 126337 Counsel for the Arrestee Strip Search Class and the Overdetention Named Plaintiffs and Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiff' 699 Broad Street
Ste 1206 Augusta, GA 30901 Phone 706-722-8324
Fax 706-722-8236

ItE

1i1 ngch

LAydm tedC;7o a

Professor ofClinical Law

The George Washington University

Law School

2000 G Street, N. W.

Washineton, DC 20052

61

f

Phone~ 1(

I

JURY DENJAIND
Plaintiffs demand a jury of six as w all claims su u. nable ?
Lf~
Dan uewoskin Georgia Bar # 220-327 Counsel for the Arrestee Strip Search Class and the Overdetention Named Plaintiffs and Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiff 270 Peachtree Street, N. W. Suite 1060 Atlanta, GA 30303 Phone 404-221-8887 Phone 404-230-9171 Fax 404-221-8884

62

i

E

UNITED STATES- DISTRICIT COURT
u( :U .%i~u L" ~-1 C1i.R1 iNH'.i-ci~ iii ti'inii_ :'iir i~,FM ~iri .iiir~

C . Alan Powell, et al. a _a

Individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated

Plaintiffs,

v.

Jacqueline Barrett, et al.

)

Defendants

)

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I, Daniel DeWoskin, do hereby certify that the foregoing document has been prepared in 13-point Century Schoolbook font and complies with LR 5dB .

Dan DeWoskin Georgia Bar # 220-327 Counsel for the Arrestee Strip Search Class and the Overdetention Named Plaintiffs 270 Peachtree Street, N .W.
Suite 1060 Atlanta, GA 30303 Phone 404-221-8887
Phone 404-230-9171

E

E

UN1TED STATES DISTRICT COURT --- i~~S, :~~i, ;~i.~;vIK'~'F-1~'.F(IV IIIT11't .11_~1\_INlrf+,lIK.\il%1
4 ~ ~ 1y-.y~V'%_f~ Ill ~Y 1\7%\%1Y

C. Alan Powell, et al. and
Individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated
Plaintiffs,
v. Jacqueline Barrett, et al.
Defendants CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Charles B. Pekor, do hereby certify that Plaintiffs have caused service of this first amended complaint on Defendant Jacqueline Barrett by attaching a copy to the original complaint and summons and effecting service per FRCP 4 and Plaintiffs will cause service of this first amended complaint on all other Defendants per FRCP 4.

Charles B . Pekor Georgia Bar # 570601 Counsel for the Arrestee Strip Search Class and the Overdetention Named Plaintiffs 270 Peachtree Street, N.W.
Suite 1060 Atlanta, GA 30303 Phone 404-221-8887 Phone 404-230-9171 Fax 404-221-8884

 
 ORIGINAL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FILEDuI.Ns.o(.c). tAMt3"wIpE
dl ef'" APR 2 1 2004

wTt+ER

owr~

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

C . Alan Powell 388 Ashley Ave . Atlanta, GA 30312
and
Tory Dunlap 957 North Ave, Apt B Atlanta, GA 30318
and
Lee Antonio Smith 393 Landsey Drive Atlanta, GA, 30315
and
David Evans 3214 Harris Drive East Point, GA 30344
and

CO:VIPLAII`'T-CLASS ACTION
Civil Case No.
1 : o4-c v -11 oe

Individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated
Plaintiffs,
v.

FMS RECEII'EQ Consent To US Nom. pretrial Inuructmis lAA VIl NTC "bEi5
r1

JACQUELINE BARRETT

)

SHERIFF, FULTON COUNTY,

)

STATE OF GEORGIA

)

Defendant

)

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR MONEY DAMAGES AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND JURY DEMAND
Introduction 1 . This is an action brought by C . Alan Powell, Tory Dunlap, Lee Antonio Smith and David Evans (the "Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs") on his own behalf and on behalf of a class of individuals ("Arrestee Strip Search") who were injured by Defendant Jacqueline Barrett's conduct in causing them to be subjected to blanket strip searches (described below) upon their arrest and commitment to the Fulton County Jail ; by Defendant Jacqueline Barrett's deliberate indifference to the strip searches; by her failure to train, supervise and/or discipline her staff, and by her failure to promulgate and enforce policies .
2 . This is also an action brought by each of C . Alan Powell, Tory Dunlap, Lee Antonio Smith, and David Evans (the "Overdetention Named

2

Plaintiffs") on his own behalf and on behalf of the class defined below injured, or who are being injured, or who will be injured in the future by the Fulton County Jail's pattern and practice of overdetaining inmates . They will be further injured by Defendant Jacqueline Barrett's deliberate indifference to the overdetentions, and by her failure to train, supervise and/or discipline her staff, and by her failure to promulgate and enforce policies . To "overdetain" means to hold an inmate in the Fulton County Jail, including any of its annexes, past midnight of his or her release date, as defined below
3 . This is also an action brought by David Evans (the "Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiff') on his own behalf and on behalf of a class of individuals ("Court Return Strip Search Class") who were injured by Defendant Jacqueline Barrett's conduct in subjecting them to blanket strip searches (described below) after they were returned from Superior Court or State Court to the Fulton County Jail after a judge ordered their release, and after there was no longer a basis for their detention . They were further injured by Jacqueline Barrett's deliberate indifference to the practice of strip searches ; her failure to train, supervise and/or discipline her staff, and by her failure to promulgate and enforce policies .
3

4. The Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs bring this action against Defendant Jacqueline Barrett under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S .C . §1983, to enforce the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, for injuries suffered by them and other members of the class at the Fulton County Jail . The Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs also base their claims on the Constitution of the State of Georgia and the common law of the State of Georgia .
5 . The Overdetention Named Plaintiffs bring this action against Defendant Jacqueline Barrett under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S .C . §1983, to enforce the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, for injuries suffered by them and other members of the class at the Fulton County Jail. The Overdetention Named Plaintiffs also base their claims on the Constitution of the State of Georgia and the common law of the State of Georgia .
6 . The Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiff brings this action against Defendant Jacqueline Barrett under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S .C . §1983, to enforce the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, for injuries suffered by him and the class . The Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiff also bases his claims on
4

the Constitution of the State of Georgia and the common law of the State of Georgia .
Jurisdiction and Venue
7. This Court has jurisdiction over the Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs and the Overdetention Named Plaintiffs and the Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiffs §1983 claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C . § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) . This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over their state law claims under 28 U.S .C. § 1367 .
8 . Venue is appropriate in this District and this division . Each of the claims for relief arose in this judicial district and this division . Class Action Allegations
"Arrestee Strip Search Class" - Class Action Allevations
9 . The Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs bring this action under Rules 23(a), 23(b) (2), and 23(b) (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of a class consisting of each person who, in the two years preceding the filing of this action up until the date this case is terminated, was or will be, (i) upon being arrested and committed into the Fulton County Jail ; (ii) on a charge other than a charge of drugs,
5

weapon or felony violence; (iii) was subjected to a blanket strip search without any individualized finding of reasonable suspicion or probable cause that he or she was concealing drugs, weapons or other contraband .
10 . Certification of a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) is appropriate because the Fulton County Jail has a policy, and engages in a pattern and practice of conduct that has uniformly affected all members of the class . Injunctive relief against Defendant to enjoin the practice will benefit each and every Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs and class member .
11 . The class is entitled to injunctive relief of terminating the above described policy and practice of subjecting arrest.ees to blanket strip searches without any individualized finding of reasonable suspicion or probable cause that he or she was concealing drugs, weapons or other contraband .
12. Certification of a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(6)(3) is also appropriate in that common questions of law and fact predominate over any individual questions . A class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy as detailed
6

below .
13 . Regarding the Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs and members of the class, there are no individual questions on the issue of liability . Every arrestee committed into the Fulton County Jail is subjected to the blanket searches . None of the staff of the Fulton County Jail keeps records of the searches . Therefore . Defendant cannot show that any of the searches were conducted based on an individual determination of reasonable suspicion . Should records exist demonstrating such individualized suspicion, such people would, by definition, not be members of the class .
14. Among the questions of law and fact common to the class are : a . whether Defendant Jacqueline Barrett instituted a policy, or acquiesced in a custom and practice of subjecting arrestees committed to the Fulton County Jail pending presentment to blanket strip searches without an individualized determination that the arrestees were in possession of drugs, weapons or other contraband ;
b . whether such policy or practice, if found to exist, violates the
7

Fourth Amendment ; c. whether Defendant Jacqueline Barrett was deliberately
indifferent to the rights of such arrestees ; d . whether the Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs and the
members of the class have sustained damages and, if so, the proper measure of such damages; e . whether the Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs and the members of the class and future members are entitled to equitable relief and, if so, what is the nature of that relief; and f. whether determination of damages suffered by a statistically representative sample of the class provides the basis for determination of all class members' damages except those who opt out . g. whether Defendant Jacqueline Barrett is entitled to qualified immunity on the §1983 claims ; and h. whether Defendant Jacqueline Barrett is entitled to governmental immunity on the state law claims.
8

15 . The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable . The exact number of class members is unknown to plaintiffs at this time, but is likely to consist of at least many hundreds of people .
16 . Every week at least 100 persons meeting the Arrestee Strip Search Class class definition are committed into the Fulton County Jail pending presentment and subject to the illegal searches . Thus this class well exceeds 10,000 members .
17 . Defendant Jacqueline Barrett and the Fulton County Jail have within their records the names and addresses of all current and past class members in the Fulton County Jail computer systems (CJUS, JDL and Banner and Mainframe), logbooks and other paper records maintained by the Fulton County Jail.
18 . The Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the class, because the Arrestee Strip Search Framed Plaintiffs and all other members of the class were injured by exactly the same means ; that is, by the blanket strip searches .
19. The Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the class. They have retained counsel
9

who are competent and experienced in complex federal civil rights class action litigation and/or complex federal prisoner rights litigation .
20. The Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs have no interests that are contrary to, or in conflict with, those of the class . 21 . The Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs know of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. The class action is superior to any other available means to resolve the issues raised on behalf of the Arrestee Strip Search Class. The class action will be manageable because so many different records systems exist from which to ascertain the members of the putative class, and damages can be determined on a class-wide basis using a damages matrix set by a jury, or by trying the damages of a statistically valid sample of the class to a jury and extrapolating those damages to the class as a whole . 22 . Class treatment will be superior because liability can be determined on a class-wide basis . Damages can also be determined on a class-wide basis through use of statistical sampling .
"Overdetention Class" - Class Action Allegations 23. The Overdetention Named Plaintiffs bring this action under Rules 23(a),
10

23(b) (2), and 23(b) (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of a class consisting of: (a) each person who has been, is, or who will be incarcerated in any Fulton County Jail facility in the two years preceding the filing of this action up to and until the date this case is terminated ; and (b) who was not released or, in the future, will not be released by midnight on the date on which the person is entitled to be released by court order, posting bail, or the date on which the basis for his or her detention has otherwise expired .
24. Certification of a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) is appropriate because Defendant Jacqueline Barrett implemented a policy, or engages in a pattern and practice of conduct that has uniformly affected all members of the class ., Injunctive relief against Defendant Jacqueline Barrett will benefit each and every Overdetention Named Plaintiff and class member .
25 . The class is entitled to injunctive relief of terminating the above described policy and practice of overdetentions .
26 . Certification of a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) is also appropriate in that common questions of law and fact predominate over any individual questions . A class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy as detailed below .
11

27. Regarding the Overdetention Named Plaintiffs and members of the class, there are no individual questions on the issue of liability other than whether an individual has been overdetained . The answer to that question can be determined by ministerial inspection of the jail's records .
28. Among the questions of law and fact common to the class are :
a) whether the Constitution provides a bright line, maximum length of time measured in hours beyond which Defendant cannot hold a person before releasing that person from jail after a judge has ordered his release or he has posted bail, or the basis for his detention has otherwise expired;
b) whether Defendants leave exceeded that maximum for each class member ;
c) whether there is a pattern and practice of the Fulton County Jail of holding inmates past their Release Dates ;
d) whether Defendant Jacqueline Barrett has been deliberately indifferent to the pattern and practice of the Fulton County Jail of holding inmates past their Release Dates ;
e) whether Defendant Jacqueline Barrett's acts as alleged herein
12

violate the Constitution of the United States by holding detainees and inmates past their release dates : whether such policy, if found to exist, violates the Fourth and/or Fourteenth Amendments;
g) whether Jacqueline Barrett was deliberately indifferent to the rights of inmates and detainees in the custody of the Fulton County Jail ;
h) whether the Overdetention Named Plaintiffs and the members of the Overdetention Class have sustained damages and, if so, the proper measure of such damages;
i) whether determination of damages suffered by a statistically representative sample of the class provides the basis for determination of all class members' damages except those who opt out .
j) whether Defendant Jacqueline Barrett is entitled to qualified immunity on the section 1983 claims; and k) whether Defendant Jacqueline Barrett is entitled to governmental immunity on the state law claims .
13

29 . The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable . The exact number of class members is unknown to plaintiffs at this time, but is likely to consist of at least many hundreds of people . 30. Every week at least 100 persons meeting the Overdetention Class definition axe released from the Fulton County Jail . Thus, this class well exceeds 10,000 members .
31 . Defendant Jacqueline Barrett and the Fulton County Jail have within their records the names and addresses of all current and past class members in the Fulton County Jail computes- systems (CJUS, JDL and Banner and Mainframe), logbooks and other paper records maintained by the Fulton County Jail .
32. The Overdetention Named Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the class, because the Overdetention Named Plaintiffs and all other members of the class were injured by exactly the same means ; that is, by the systemic collapse of the inmate management system, and the practice of returning in-custody defendants entitled to release by virtue of their court appearances from the courthouses to the Fulton County Jail to check for wants, holds and detainers .
14

33 . The Overdetention Named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the class . They have retained counsel who are competent and experienced in complex federal civil rights class action litigation and/or complex federal prisoner rights litigation .
34. The Overdetention Named Plaintiffs have no interests that are contrary to, or in conflict with, those of the class.
35. The Overdetention Named Plaintiffs know of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its maintenance as a class action . The class action is superior to any other available means to resolve the issues raised on behalf of the Overdetention Class . The class action will be manageable because so many different records systems exist. from which to ascertain the members of the putative class, and damages can be determined on a class wide basis using a damages matrix set by a jury or by trying the damages of a statistically valid sample of the class to a jury and extrapolating those damages to the class as a whole.
36 . Class treatment. will be superior because liability can be determined on a class wide basis. Damages can also be determined on a class wide basis through use of statistical sampling .
15

"Court Return Strip Search Class" - Class Action Allegations
37 . The Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiff brings this action under Rules 23(a), 23(b) (2), and 23(U) (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of a class consisting of: each person who, in the two years preceding the filing of this action up until the date this case is terminated, has been, is or will be : (i) in the custody of the Fulton County Jail ; (ii) taken to court from the Fulton County Jail ; (iii) ordered released by the court or otherwise became entitled to release by virtue of the court appearance because the charge on which he had been held was no longer pending or was dismissed at the hearing, was ordered released on his own recognizance, or had posted bail, was sentenced to time served, was acquitted or was otherwise entitled to release ; (iv) was not the subject of any other pending case or cases which imposed any condition of release other than personal recognizance ; (v) was not the subject of any detainer or warrant ; (vi) was returned to the Fulton County Jail ; and (vii) was subjected to a strip search without any individualized finding of reasonable suspicion or probable cause that he was concealing contraband or weapons before being released, regardless of whether he was overdetained .
38. Certification of the Court Return Strip Search Class under Federal Rule
16

of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) is appropriate because Defendant Jacqueline Barrett implemented a policy, and/or acquiesces in a pattern and practice of conduct that has uniformly affected all members of the class. Injunctive relief against Defendant will benefit each and every Overdetention Named Plaintiff and class member.
39 . The Court Return Strip Search Class is entitled to injunctive relief of terminating the above-described policy of subjecting court returns entitled to release by virtue of their court appearances to strip searches without any individualized findings of reasonable suspicion or probable cause that the court returns were concealing contraband or weapons .
40. Certification of a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) is also appropriate in that common questions of law and fact predominate over any individual questions . A class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy as detailed below.
41 . Regarding the Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiff and members of the class, there are no individual questions on the issue of liability because every court return returned to the Fulton County Jail is subjected to the blanket searches . No records of the searches are kept . Defendant Jacqueline Barrett cannot show that any of the searches were conducted based on an
17

individual determination of reasonable suspicion . Should records exist demonstrating such individualized suspicion, such people would, by definition, not be members of the class .
42. Among the questions of law and fact common to the class are :
a. whether there is a policy, custom and practice of subjecting court returns entitled to release by virtue of their court appearances returned to the Fulton County Jail to blanket strip searches without an individualized determination that the person was in possession of drugs, weapons or other contraband ;
b . whether such policy, if found to exist, violates the Fourth Amendment;
c. whether Defendant Jacqueline Barrett was deliberately indifferent to the lights of such court returns by acquiescing in the strip searches; d . whether the Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiff and the members of the class have sustained damages and, if so, the proper measure of such damages ;
e . whether the Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiff, the members of the class, and future members are entitled to equitable
18

relief and, if so, the nature of that relief; and
f. whether determination of damages suffered by a statistically representative sample of the class provides the basis for determination of all class members' damages except those who opt out . g. whether Defendant Jacqueline Barrett is entitled to qualified immunity on the section 1983 claims ; and
h . whether Defendant Jacqueline Barrett is entitled to governmental immunity on the state law claims .
43 . The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable . The exact number of class members is unknown to plaintiffs at this time, but is likely to consist of at least many hundreds of people .
44 . Every week at least 100 persons meeting the Court Return Strip Search Class definition are committed into the Fulton County Jail pending presentment and subjected to the illegal searches. Thus this class well exceeds 10,000 members .
45 . Defendant Jacqueline Barrett and the Fulton County Jail have within their records the names and addresses of all current and past Court Return Strip Search Class members in the Fulton County Jail computer systems
19

(CJUS, JDL and Banner and Mainframe), logbooks and other paper records maintained by the Fulton County Jail .
46. The Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the class, because the Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiff and all other members of the class were injured by exactly the same means; that is, by the blanket searches .
47 . The Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the class . He has retained counsel who are competent and experienced in complex federal civil rights class action litigation and/or complex federal prisoner rights litigation . 48 . The Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiff has no interests that are contrary to, or in conflict with, those of the class . 49 . The Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiff knows of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its maintenance as a class action . The class action is superior to any other available means to resolve the issues raised on behalf of the Court Return Strip Search Class. The class action will be manageable because so many different records systems exist from which to ascertain the members of
20

the putative class . Damages can be determined on a class-wide basis using a damages matrix set by a jury, or by trying the damages of a statistically valid sample of the class to a jury and extrapolating those damages to the class as a whole . 50 . Class treatment will be superior because liability can be determined on a class-wide basis, and damages can also be determined on a class-wide basis through use of statistical sampling .
PARTIES 51 . Plaintiff C . Alan Powell is an adult who was overdetained in the Fulton County Jail and subjected to illegal strip searches. 52. Plaintiff Tory Dunlap is an adult who was overdetained in the Fulton County Jail and subjected to illegal strip searches . 53. Plaintiff Lee Antonio Smith is an adult who was overdetained in the Fulton County Jail and subjected to illegal strip searches . 54 . Plaintiff David Evans is an adult who was overdetained in the Fulton County Jail and subjected to illegal strip searches.
21

55 . Defendant Jacqueline Barrett is the Sheriff of Fulton County . She is sued in her official capacity for prospective injunctive relief. She is sued in her official and in her individual capacity for money damages . 56. At all times described herein Defendant Jacqueline Barrett was acting under color of state law .
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS Fulton County Jail's Pattern And Practice Of Overdetentions and Illegally
Strip Searching Arrestees and Court Returns Introduction and Description of the Overdetention Problem 57 . The Fulton County Jail has a long and documented history of overdetaining detainees and inmates past their release dates. 58 . "Overdetain" means holding an inmate in Fulton County Jail custody past the person's release date . 59. "Release Date" for each inmate is the day on which the person is entitled to be released by court order, or the date on which the basis for his or her detention has otherwise expired, for example by posting bond .
22

60 . 18 USCA §3624(a) requires that an inmate shall be released on the date of the expiration of the inmate's term of imprisonment, less any time credited toward the service of the inmate's sentence . 18 USCA § 3624(a) . 61 . "Exit Date" for each inmate means the date on which he or she was actually released from the custody of the Fulton County Jail . 62 . Overdetentions happen at practically every event in the criminal justice system from arrest to trial . 63 . The problem starts when inmates are committed into the Fulton County Jail without being "booked" in ; that is, fingerprinted, identified checked for outstanding wants, holds, warrants and detainees, and entered into the computerized inmate management system . 64. For example, Plaintiff Alan Powell was arrested and committed into the Fulton County Jail early on the morning of Saturday, March 20, 2004. He was not booked in until approximately 6 :00 p .m . the following day ; Sunday, March 21, 2004 . 65 . As a result, Mr. Powell was not taken to the misdemeanor court in State Court for First Appearance, and so was not given a bond hearing .
23

66. Moreover, even though Mr. Powell was entitled to bail based on a schedule for minor offenses, jail staff told him that he could not be released on bail until after he was booked . 67. Finally, on the evening of Sunday, March 21, 2004, Mr. Powell was formerly booked into the jail . 68. Along with the booking procedure came a degrading, humiliating strip search . 69 . Mr . Powell, and everyone else booked into the Fulton County Jail on Sunday night (or any other night or day), was taken to a large room, told to take off all clothes, put them in a plastic box, and take a shower with the whole group in a single large room . 70. Then, each man took his clothes to a counter and exchanged his own clothes for a jail jumpsuit . 71 . Before picking up his jumpsuit . Mr. Powell, along with every other inmate in the process, had to stand before a guard front and center, and show his front and back sides while naked. 72 . Mr . Powell's family posted his bond Sunday March 21, 2004 .
24

73. However, Mr. Powell was not released. When he complained, guards threatened to "lose" his paperwork . 74. Mr. Powell was finally released on Tuesday morning, March 23, 2004. 75. The jail frequently sends recently arrested inmates to bond hearings at State Court before the inmates have been booked in . 76 . As a result, the bond hearings are meaningless because the inmates cannot be either charged or bonded out . 77 . Without the paperwork generated by a booking, prosecutors lack the documentation necessary to show probable cause . Without probable cause, judges are forced to throw out cases within 48 hours. 78. On March 18, 2004, Judge Roy Roberts in State Court dismissed misdemeanor charges against 22 defendants because they were presented in his courtroom without paperwork . They had been sent to court without having been booked . 79 . However, even when a judge orders inmates released at the first appearance, their release is no sure thing .
25

80 . During the period March 18-31, 2004, of'the approximately 135 persons presented before the magistrate for a probable cause hearing, almost every single one was overdetained for periods ranging from one day to twelve days (see chart below) . 81 . Moreover, to add insult to injury, every single inmate returning from court, even those whose cases have been dismissed, was subjected to a strip search, after a judge had ordered his release . Jacqueline Barrett's Responsibilities For Inmates At The Fulton County Jail 82 . Jacqueline Barrett is the Sheriff of Fulton County. 83 . Jacqueline Barrett has been the Sheriff of Fulton County since 1992. 84 . Jacqueline Barrett's duties include formulating, implementing and executing policies concerning the operation of the Fulton County Jail facilities . This includes promulgating regulations ensuring the release of inmates on their Release Dates, and policies controlling the strip searches of inmates . 85 . Jacqueline Barrett has ultimate training, supervisory, and disciplinary authority for all operations of the Fulton County Jail.
26

86 . Jacqueline Barrett is also responsible for ensuring that each employee of the Fulton County Jail discharges his or her duties in accordance with the law and court orders . 87 . The American Correctional Association's Standards for Adult Local Detention Facilities require that a detention facility maintain an inmate population accounting system that includes records on the admission, processing, and release of inmates . American Correctional Association's Standards for Adult Local Detention Facilities, 3d, 3-ALDF-IF-O1 to -11 . The same standards require a detention facility to record for every person booked into the facility the date and duration of confinement, and a copy of the court order or other basis of confinement. 88. The standards also require a detention facility to make a determination at the time a new inmate is admitted to the facility that the inmate is legally committed to the facility . 89 . The Records Office is the unit of the Fulton County Jail that has responsibility for keeping track of inmates and ensuring their release according to their Release Dates .
27

90 . Jacqueline Barrett is ultimately responsible for the functioning of the Fulton County Jail's Records Office, as defined below, and all other units of the Fulton County Jail .
91 . Jacqueline Barrett had, and continues to have the duty to establish procedures and policies, and to train and monitor Fulton County Jail employees in order to ensure the release on their Release Dates of all inmates in the custody of the Fulton County Jail .
92 . Jacqueline Barret.t. had, and continues to have the duty to establish procedures and policies, and to train and monitor Jail employees in order to prevent unreasonable strip searches of individuals who are in Jail custody .
The Fulton County Jail
93 . The Fulton County Jail is the primary facility used by Fulton County to house inmates in Fulton County.
94. Built to house about 1,450 inmates, the Fulton County Jail opened with many cells holding extra bunks to raise bed capacity to 2 .250 .
95 . Currently, the jail has about 2,900 inmates, with 400 others in two annexes. "That is more than double what should be in the jail," according to a knowledgeable person surnamed Rosser.
28

96 . Most of the inmates at the Fulton County Jail are either pre-trial detainees, misdemeanants serving sentences, or probation violators .
The Inmate Management Svstem
97 . The records office located at the Fulton County Jail ("Records Office") is responsible for administering and maintaining the records, including the judgment and commitment files, of all persons housed at the Fulton County Jail .
98 . The Records Office is responsible for ensuring that all persons housed at the Fulton County Jail are released according to their Release Dates .
99 . Release and commitment data entered into the court computer systems by courtroom clerks do not appear in the computer system used by the Records Office for several days.
100 . As a result, all release and commitment orders generated by judges in the Superior and State Courts on paper must be faxed to the Fulton County Jail or hand carried to the Records Office by deputies as inmates are bused from the courthouse to the Fulton County Jail .
101 . Some release orders are faxed from the courthouses to the Fulton County Jail .
29

102 . All processing of release and commitment orders must be done by hand at the Records Office located at the I?ulton County Jail .
The Fulton County Jail Policy and Procedure for Booking Inmates into the Fulton County Jail and Strip Searching Then
103 . Every person booked into the Fulton County Jail is subjected to a strip search conducted without an individual determination of reasonable suspicion to justify the search, and regardless of the crime with which the person is charged . 104. The strip search process involves having the arrested person go into a large room with a group of thirty to forty other inmates, remove all of his clothing, and place it in boxes . 105 . The arrested person, along with the group, takes a shower and is then sprayed with delousing agent . 106. Each arrestee then either singly, or standing in a line with others, is visually inspected front and back by deputies . 107. The Fulton County Jail does not keep any logs or other records of any individual strip searches performed in the booking areas .
30

108. When inmates are "booked" into the Fulton County Jail, the jail staff checks criminal databases to see whether the inmate is the subject of any other wants . holds or detainers from other jurisdictions . If there are such holds, the information is noted in the inmate's institutional files. 709 . Whether the inmate is the subject of any other wants, holds or detainees from other jurisdictions is also available in real time on the "Mainframe" computer, available to Records Office staff and deputies.
The Fulton County Jail Policy and Procedure for Processing Court Returns 110 . The Sheriff follows a policy and practice under which every in-custody defendant taken from the Fulton County Jail to the Superior Court or the State Court for a hearing, and ordered released by a judicial officer because the charge was no longer pending, or because of a change in conditions of release or some other reason, and is returned to the Fulton County Jail to check for wants and holds and detainees rather than being released from the courthouse .
31

111 . Every weekday about 100 to 150 in-custody defendants are transported to the Superior Court and State Court for court appearances, and then returned to the Fulton County Jail after their court appearances ("court returns") .
112 . The in-custody defendants are under the constant supervision of Fulton County Sheriff's deputies while in transit, and while at the courthouses .
113 . While at the courthouse, in-custody defendants are not allowed to have contact with anyone apart from Fulton County Sheriffs deputies, except for non-contact visits in the lockups with attorneys subject to supervision by Fulton County Sheriffs deputies .
114 . In-custody defendants whose cases have been discharged are not. given the option of being discharged from the courthouse .
115 . Every in-custody defendant transported to the Superior Court or the State Court for a court event is sent back to the Fulton County Jail following his court appearance, even if there is a judicial determination that there is no longer a basis for his detention .
116. The Fulton County Jail returns court returns with release orders back to the Fulton County Jail so the Records Office can check for any warrants,
32

detainers or holds on them before releasing them . 117 . Court returns entitled to release are booked back into the Fulton County Jail general populations and not released until a later date. 118 . The jail staff checks the Mainframe for wants, holds and detainers before releasing an inmate .
The Fulton County Jail's Policy and Procedure of Strip Searching all Court Returns
119 . Upon returning to the Fulton County Jail, inmates are separated by sex, males into one area and females into another area. 120 . Staff subjects every court return returned to the Fulton County Jail to a strip search without any individualized finding of reasonable suspicion or probable cause that the person is concealing contraband or weapons . 121 . Staff subjects every court return returned to the Fulton County Jail to a strip search without any individualized finding of reasonable suspicion or probable cause that the person is concealing contraband or weapons, even if the person has been ordered released by a judge and there is no other basis for his continued detention .
33

122. The standard strip search procedure of the Fulton County Jail for all inmates booked into the facility, whether new commitments or court returns who have been ordered released, is the complete removal of all clothing and a visual strip search .
123 . The Fulton County Jail does not keep any logs or other records of any individual strip searches performed on court returns .
The Cause of the Overdetention - Collapse of the Inmate Management System
124. The cause of the overdetention and illegal strip search problems is the deliberate indifference of Defendant Jacqueline Barrett to the rights of inmates to be released on their Release Dates, inasmuch as the Fulton County Jail has no effective inmate management system that can ensure release of inmates by their Release Dates.
125 . The fact that the Fulton County Jail has no effective inmate management system has been documented by a series of reports and newspaper articles, as well as by court cases dating back many years . 126 . The Fulton County Jail has recently aggravated the backlog of overdetained inmates by overreacting to a string of premature releases .
34

127 . The Fulton County Jail's policy of returning all court returns, even those whose cases have been dismissed, back to the jail for processing swells the backlog of unprocessed inmates . This policy and practice is a major contributing cause of the Records Office's inability to process and release individuals on their Release Dates . 128 . The Fulton County Jail's policy of returning all court returns, even those whose cases have been dismissed, back to the jail for processing costs taxpayers money, swells the population of the facilities unnecessarily, and causes inmate unrest . 129 . The policy of returning court returns entitled to release creates the court return strip search problem . If the court returns entitled to release by virtue of their court appearances were released at the courthouse, they would not be booked back in and strip searched in the first place . 130 . The inability of the Fulton County Jail to process and release individuals on their Release Dates leads to their being overdetained and illegally strip searched .
35

Defendant Jacqueline Barrett's Knowledge of the Collapse of the Inmate Management System at the Fulton County Jail
131 . Defendant Jacqueline Barrett has known of the ineffective and chaotic condition of the Records Office inmate management system for years . 132 . Moreover, jail officials have had personal knowledge of the problem for years . 133 . The Fulton County Commission has also been aware of the abovedescribed problems in the inmate management system for years .
Defendant Jacqueline Barrett's Failure to Take Meaningful, Sustained Corrective Action
134 . Defendant Jacqueline Barrett has acquiesced in the Records Office's chaotic procedures leading to the overdetention and strip search problems by failing to take any meaningful, sustained corrective action . 135 . The Fulton County Jail is understaffed . Only about 650 guards watch over 2,900 inmates. 136 . Fulton County has refused to provide adequate funding to the Fulton County Jail .
36

137 . Last year, the Fulton County Commission reduced the jail's funding by $3,000,000 .
The Collapse of the Inmate Management System - A Lonestanding, Pervasive and Continuing Problem Known to Defendant Jacqueline Barrett
and Jail Officials and County Officials 138 . Both overdetentions and premature releases are symptomatic of a nonfunctioning inmate management system . 139 . Recent notorious examples of overdetention show the overdetention and strip search problems persist . 140 . Eight jail inmates were released by error over the past year, including murder suspect James Cooper, 28, charged with the April slaying of John Atkins, a self-service-laundry operator. 141 . James Cooper was released in November on what jail spokepersons called a "clerical error." 142 . Some premature releases over the past 15 months involving Fulton County Jail inmates:
37

143 . May 14 : Terrence Tutman, a material witness in a 1999 killing, is picked up after hiding from subpoena servers for seven months. He is mistakenly released the next day after being misidentified .
144. June 19: Rape suspect Jesse Henry is mistakenly set free when a deputy assigns to Henry a bond actually paid for another prisoner. Henry is captured five days later. 145. Nov . 8: Murder and robbery suspect James Cooper is mistakenly released when an employee lets the wrong James Cooper go . He turns himself in Dec . 8 . 146 . March 4. 2004 : Shoplifting suspect Kenneth Dodd is freed after a computer operator overlooks an outstanding warrant . He is recaptured the same day.
147 . March 4: Burglary suspect Sterling Bruno is let go because jail supervisors do not follow "double check" release policies . He is recaptured the same day .
148. Kenneth Dodd, 44, awaiting trial for alleged shoplifting, was released when a computer operator overlooked an outstanding warrant that would have kept him in custody .
38

149. Sterling Bruno, 31, was let go because jail supervisors did not follow "double check" release policies, according to Defendant Jacqueline Barrett.
150 . Recently Defendant Jacqueline Barrett released a statement terming continuing problems at the crowded and understaffed jail a "state of emergency ."
151 . The chart set forth below shows how pervasive and widespread the overdetention problem is .
152 . The chart shows the court date, Release Date, and Exit Date for virtually every inmate who appeared in magistrate court first appearance hearings (9 a .m . and 1 p .m calendars) and State Court preliminary hearing calendars during the period March 18-31, 2004 who had a disposition resulting in release (dismissal, sentence of time served, defendant allowed to sign own bond (SOB)) .

rDefendant El Aten

Date Court ~ Dispositi 1 Date ~ Day

booke Date

on

~ Released ~ held

--~43-18-04 3-18-04 ~ D ismisse -~ 3-20-04

over 2

~

~J

Maivin Davidson 3-16-04 3-18,3-1 9 Time

3-20-04

2

I

served

39

Leroy Barrett Corey Boatwright

I, 3-17-04 3-18-04

I 3-18-04

~ I 3-18-04 -

I Dismisse I 3-21-04 d
ismisse 3-21-04

Michelle Collins 3-18-04i 3-18-04 I ddDismiss- e -3-~ 21-- 04

Bobbie Derest
Malcolm Dill
Roberto Duarte Carl Feguson Jimmie Gray
Zhan Holsey
Jerald Lawson Nadine- Marshall

I 3-18-04-I~3--18-04

ismisse 3-21-04

~.

d

3-18-04 ~I 3-18-04 Disinisse3-25-04

d

3-~18-04 3-18-04 SOB

3-25-04

I 3-18-04 ~ 3-18-04 , SOB

3-20-04

3-17-04 I 3-18-04 Tismisse 3-23-04

(hold)

3-17-04 I

8-04 Dismiss-20-04 d

3-17-048-04 Dismisse 3-22-04

d-- ~ 3-18-04 I3-18-04 I llismi7~t 3-21-04

Angela Morrow

- d

-

3-18-04 3-18-04 Dismisse 3-21-04

Terry Mozley

3-18-04 3-18-04

Donald Springer

3-18-04] 3-18-04

~ Randy Troy -3- 18-04 3-18-04

Lorraine Wilkens Harvey Boyd

3-18-0~43---18-04 3-17-04 3-18-04

Dismisse d Dismiss

3-20-04 3-23-04

SOB 'e I 3-23-04 SOB ~-3~ -23-04 Dismisse 3-21-04

Clarence Maxwell 3-17-04

llismisse ' 3-22-04

Reginald Morton M aury Ridley

3-16-04 ' 3-18-04 llismisse Id
' 3-17-043-18-04 -Dismisse ~d

' 3-21-04 ' 3-21-04

40

Roger Threats

~

-

T3-17-04 3-18-04 Dismisse 3-20-04

--- ~

~

i Chaka Zulu

3-17-04 'i 3-18-04

I-

I William Dodson

3-18-04 1 3-19-04

~d Time
I, served

T-3-22-04 ',

SOT-B 3-20-0I4

4

I

I

~1

Leo Harden

3-18-0.4 ~' 3-19-04

~-~-

Time

1 3-24-04

-I5 ~

- ~-

" - served

Niles Johnson

3j!-0471,3-19-04 SOB

3-23-04

I 4

Arnold Levi

3-18-04 1 3-19-04 Reset for 3-21-04

2

i

jCharles Lyons

I 3-17-04

I 3-19-04

roof Time

~3-23-04

4

served L --~--

~Roger Thomas Ronnie Tyler
Larry Dean

~-3~--17-0~-3-19- 04 ' 3-17-04 1 3-19-04 ~3-19-04 _L.3-19-04

SOB

3-25-04

I 6

' 3-29-04 (-ho ldl 10

-~ ~ - I

sSeOrBved-tIi3n-2B5i-b0b4 Co.)

~ 6

Jasiah Gillis

3-19-04 I 3-19-04 ~i me

3-24-04

Norman Gray

- 3-19-04 ~ 3- -19-04 ~ - sTeirmveed

3 -23-04

~1 4

-~--~ -- ~serve(

Randy Harris -~-3-19-04 ~ 3-19-04 SOB

-23-04

4

~Shirley

- i 3-19-04 3-19-04 I SO-B-1-23-04

McCullou h

~ 4

IDwike Leao nd Cassandra Mays
i Yolanda Smith

' 3-19-04 3-19-04 SOB

~ 3 23-04 - I 4

3-18-04 13-19-04 - ~ SO- B - 13-- 22-0- 4

3

3-18-0~4 _3-19-04 -SOB

3-22-04

3

~Tarron Tyler

3-19-04 I 3-19-04 I SOB

~ - 3-22-04

(Marietta

-~ho-ld)

George Teasley - 3-19-04 3-19-04 SOB

~ 3-23-04

4

Marco Thomas

3-19-n4 ~ 3-19-04 SOB

3-2034

~ 4

i Timothy Williams 3-19-U4 3-19-04, SOB

1 24-04 -~5

3-20-04

I (DeKalb

IrHoward Arnold ~ 2-18-04 1 3-19-04 Time

hold) 3-23-04

-~4

-' sei ved--

a1

Shanika Fambro I 3-12-04 1 3-19-04 SOB

~; 3-22-04

~ 3

Steven Berry

3-19-04 3-20-04 I SOB

3-24-04

i 4

Gwinnett

~

hold

Eric Brewster -~ 3-19-04 1 3-20-04~SOB ~ 3-22-04 --L2 --

Ronald Brown

i3-18-043-20-04 I Time T3-25-04

I 5

I

served ~

Charles Carter -r 3-18-0 3-20-04 4,,

I 3-25-04

5

-~-

-~served

Jane Doe

~ 3-20-04 i 3-20-04 i Time

~ 3-22-04

I 2

~~

served

Roberto Duarte

~ 3-18-04 1 3-18 ; 3 20SOB - T3-25-04 ~ -

Leo Harden

3-18-04 3-20-04 Time

3-24-04

I 4

-served

Betty Ann Hicks 3-18-04 3-20-04 SOB

3-23-043

Anthony Jefferson I 3-18-043-20-04SOB .~ 3-23- 04 -~-

Mark KindBengie Martin

3-19-04 3-20-04 3-18-04 1 3-18-04

ISOB ( Bond,

~i 33- --2225--0044

I wouldn't

let hiin

out w/o

Keair Mason Deniera Owens
Charley Parks Raymond Quantez
Michael Riddlebar ger Waverly Spivey
Donald Springe,
Quincy Tarver Gary Thomas

' 3-20- 04 i 3-20-04 SOB ~ 3-22-04

3-19-04 3-20Z44-1~

3-23-04

served~

3-19-04 3-20-0 4 SOB

3-23-04

3-20-04 3-20-04 Time ~3-23-04

served

3-19-043-20-04 Time -t3-23-04

served

3-19-04 r3-20-04 i Tiine ~3-23-04

-~-

served

3-18-04 I 3-18-04, Dismisse ~3-23-04

~_3-20-04 d

3-20-04 X 00-20-04 3-19-04~-3- .~.0-04

S-OBTime

3-23-04 I 3-23-04

served

42

2 3
3 3
~. ~ 3 ~-
3
~ 3 I 3

Randy Troy --3-18-0 4 3-20-04

Lorraine Wilkens 3-18-04 3-18-04,

3-20-04

Heidi Hencirix

' 3-20-04 ' 3-20-04

SOB SOB
SOB

3-23-04 - 3

3-23-04

3

I---

1I 3-24-04

~ 4

(DeKalb

I

Bobby Adams Marvin Allen

- ~ 3-21-~ 04 3-2- 2-04 SOB 3-21-04 3-22-04 SOB

3-24-04 I 3-24-04

2 I 2

Petre e Anderson ~ 3-22-0 4 ' 3-22-04-- S_ OB ~ 3-26-U4

14

Keith Barnett

3-21-04 1 3-22-04 I Dismisse 3-24-04

r2

Patrick Bryant -~3 -20-04 3-22-04

Christopher Cobb ' 3-21-04 i 3-22-04 -~~

Thomas Davis

3-20-04 1 3-22-04

-~

SOB

3-24-04

' llismisse i 3-24-04

d

( Time -~3-24-04

erved

T2 I 2

Jose Alberto Duran 'i-3--2- 1-0- 4 ~3 -22-04A~ OB

Arthur Favor

3 -21-04 3-22-04

SOB

Pauline Favors

3-21-04 3-22-04

SOB

Torino Hawkins

3-22-04 3-22-04

SOB

Romaldo

3-21-04 , 3-22-04

SOB

3-24-04 3-24-04 - 3-24-04 3-23-04 F3-23-04

+2 2
1

Hern andez Shane Humphreyj3-22-04 3-22-04
~

SOB

t3-24-04

2

~(Alph . hold)

Ahmad Jamil ~3-22-04 'I 3-22-04

Dismisse 3-24-04 d

2 ~

David Lucas

~3-19-04 3-2~2-04

SOB ~3-25-04

I 3

Orlando Neal

3-20-04 ' 3-22-04

Dismisse ' 3-25-04

Herman Pittman Arrgueta Reyes

3-20-04 1 3-22-04 3-21-04 3-2 ..-04

Time served I SOB

I 3-24-04 t3-24-U4

I .. ~_
i 2

William Robinson ~3-2n-04 I 3-22-04Time

3-24-04

served

I

43

Dominique Roscoe 3-21-04

Gregory Shields

3-20-04

-~

Wayne Teague

3 21 04

Thomas Toland

3-21-04

Michael Wallace

3 -20-0 4

Willie Zachary

3-21-04

Derr- ic- k D-av~id3~19-04

Norris Davis

3-20-04

Bernard Hill

3-20-04

~

Toddrick Vlerritt ' 3-19-04

Albert Williams ~3-19-04

3-22-04
3-22-04
3-22-04 3-22-04 3-22-04 3-22-04
3-2204 3-22-04 3-22-04
3-240 2
3-22-04

Dismisse 3-24-04

d

Time

3-24-04

served

SOB _~24-04

SOB

r3-2 4-04

SOB -~ Dismisse

4-04 -04

dd

'SOB

3-23-04

SOB -F3-24--04

Dismisse I 3-24-04

d

Time

234-04

served

Time

~ 3-24-04

served

]2
I 2
- ~2 2
~2 2
1 2 Z
~ 2
~2

John E. Clarke
William H iner Emmanuel Mitchell Marcell Murrell Brandon Starks
Roger Thomas

I 3-21-04
3-21-04 3-21-04
3-21-04 3-19-04
3 -17-04

3-23-04

Dismisse d

3-23-04 SOB-

3-23, 3-26 Time served

3-23-04 i SOB

3-23-04 Time

I served

I3-23-04 Dismisse

i 3-25-04

2

3-24-04 -~1

I3-29-04

3

~ 3-25-04

2

3-25-04

2

25-04

2

Jam es Verlon

~ 3-20-0 4 3-23-04

Arjuna Westbrook 3-21-04 3-23-04

SOB Time

3-25-04 3-24-04

served

John Woody

3-20-04 3-23-04 Time T-25-04 i served

Marvin Williams d-15-04 3-16,3-23 Time -~ 3-27-04

served

Trenton William~3-22-043-04 Time

3-25-04

7~- served

2 1 ~ 2 4 2

44

Phillip Buchanan 13-23-04 ~ 3-23-04 Time

13-25-04

12

I served ~

-~-

Ann Giorgianni ~-3-23--04t-3-23-0-4 SOI3

I 3-25-04

I 2

Michael Gladney ~ 3-22-04 I~ 3-23-04

Vincent Manderson

- 1 3-23-04 ! 3-23-04 ~

April May

3-23-04 ! 3-23-04

Michael Mcleod ~ 3-23-04 3-23-04

John Bentley~ Warren Fletcher

33--1222---0044'rI 33--2233--0- 044

Uzziah Hammonds 3-8-04 I 3-23-04

-

Darrell James

t3-15-04 3-23-04

i

-r~-

Gary Jones ~ 3-8-04 I 3-23-04

Anthony Cobb

3-23-04 3-24-04

~- '

-

Marcus Richardson 13-21-04 T3-24-04

Rachel Bailey ~ 3-23-04 3-24-04

*Lavoid Blount

3-24-04 3-24-04

*Howard Coleman 3-24-04 3-24-04

*Walter Gay

3-23-04 3-24-04

*William Hackett 3-24-04 3-24-04

Michael Moore

3-24-04 I 3-24-04

Ronnie Pharr *Ledarius Timm ons Duval Union

_~ 3-24-04~ - 3-24- -04 3-24-04 I3-24-04 3-23-04 3-24-n3

I Time

I 3-25-04

served

I S013 4- 4-4-04

12

SOB - I 3-24-04- ~ 1

SOB

-25 - 04

:[2

SOB ~-3-29-04

6

Dismisse I3-25-04

d

Time

3-25-04

2

served

Time

3-25-04

2

served

Dismisse-r325-04

~2

d

Time served Time served SOB SOB SOB SOB SOB Time served SOB SOB

3-26-04

2

~

~, 3-26-04

I 2

~_

2504- I 1

3-27-04 -

3-28-04

4

3-28-04

4

3-28-04-

3-27-04

3

-

3-27-04

3

~ 3-28-04

4

Time,

3-27-04

3

served I

I

45

Travis Houston

3-25-04 I 3-25-04

Dismisse 3-27-04 d

Barry Johnson Bryan Kitts

3-25-04 3-25-0 4 3-17-04 3-25-04

Gloria Miller Bernice Render Curtis Thorton
Larry Bostic

3-24-04 3-25-04 3-25-04 .13-25-04 3-25-04 ~ 3-25-04
3-25-04 I 3-26-04

Jeffrey Cain

3-25-04 I 3-26-04

Benjamin Dykes Keith Green

3-25-04 ~ 25-04

T~ 33---22-66---0044

Jame s Jones Michael Netters

3-25-04 -~3-26-04 3-26-04 I 3-26-04

James Smith

3-26-04 I 3-26-04

Demiron Chester - j 3-2 5-040

Dwight Davis

3-25-04 3-26-04

Dennis Fannin

3-25-04 ~ 3-26-04

Kendrick Freeman 3-25-04 3-26-04

Lee Gamble

3-25-04 3-26-04

Mostafa Ghorbani 3-25-04~ 3-26-04

I

I

Phillip Quinones 3-25-04 ~-3-26-04-

Michael Gladney Kevin Ball

3-26-04 13-27-04 3-26-04 i 3-27-04

SOB

I3-26-04

Dismisse I3-26-04

d

SOB --2704

SOB

I3-27-04

SOB

3-28-04

Dismisse I3-28-Q4

d Time

13-29-04

served --

SOB

3-28-04

Time

3-28-04

served

SOB

3-29-04

Time -r3-28-04 served

Time

3-31-04

served

SOB

4-3-04

SOB

3-31-04

Time

4-1-04

served

SOB

4-1-04

SOB

3-30-04

Time

4-1-04

served

Time

14-6-04

served

Time served SOB

I3-29-04 3-29-04

Antonio Battle

3-26-04 I 3-27-04 I SOB

3-29-04

46

2
1
2 3 2
13 -~2
2 ~3
2 5 8 5 6
-6 4 6 11
2 2 12

3 -22-0-4-F3-27-04

~ Shakita Brew Antonio Griffin Catrina Hollis

' 3-26-04 ~ 3-27-04 3-27-04 3-27-04
3-25-04 3-27-04

Charlie Howard ~~
Joseph Hunt Shakita McLester Richard Minor Travis Moore

3-27-04 3-27-04

3- 26-04 3-26-04 3-25-04 3-26-04

3-27-04 3-27-04 3-27-04 3-27-04

Kyle Palmer

3-26-04 3-27-04

James Sidel Steven Taylor Rodne Townsend Bryan Turner

, 3-25-04 3-27-04 3-25-04 3-26-04

3-27-04 3-27-04 3-27-04
-04

Shawn Williams

3-22-04 33--2727-04

Dale Baldwin

3-28-04 3-29-04

Lawrence Caldwell 3-28-04 3-29-04

Alfred Couch Michelle Couch Harold Gooden

3-27-04 3-27-04 3-27-04

3-29-04 3-29-04 3-29-04

Time served SOB SOB Dismisse d Time served SOB SOB SOB Time served Time served SOB SOB SOB Time served Time served
SOB Time served SOB SOB SOB

3-29-04

~-

3-29-04

I 2

3-29-04- 2

3-29-04

2

3-29-04

2

3-28-04 - 1

3-29-042

3-29-04

2

3-29-04

2

3-29-04

2

3-29-04

2

3-28-04

1

3-31-04

4

3-28-04

1

3-29-04

2

4-1-04

3

3-30-04

1

3-30-04- 1

3-30-04

1

4-1-04

3

Sandee Gupta

3-27-04 3-29-04 SOB

3-30-04

1

Curtis Harris

3-27-04 3-29-04 SOB

. 3-30-04

1

Verner Harris

3-27-04 3-29-04 Time

~ 4-1-04

3

served

MichiareOluKeingcaid 3-27-04 3-29-04 SOB

33-30-04

1

N adir uadir

3-27-04 3-29-04 SOB

3 31 04

2

Kelvin Robinson

3-28 04 3-2 -04 Time

I

~served

47

Lynn Ann Thompso n Nyroble White

I 3-27-04 ! 3-29-04 3-27-04 3-29-04

Jeffrey Williams 3-27-04 3-29-04

Arbram Adams

3-27-04 3-29-04

Ronald Boutte t3-28-04 3-229-04

Howard Brown

27-04 3-29-04

Lucia Davis -j 3_27-04 3-29-04

Si dy Dia l lo

3-29-04

Ann Gilbert

3-268-04 t3-29-04

~ Disinisse I 3-31-04

I 2

d

~-

Time

4-1-04

I 3

served

SOB

3-31-04

2

SUB

3-31-04

2

S OB

13-31-04

2

SOB

-31-04

2

SOB _j-31-04 -

SOB

14-1-04

3

Time

3-31-04 ~ 2

served - (hold)

Darrell Glover

3-28-04 3-29-04 ( Time

3-31-04

' 2

~

~ served - I (hold)

Dotruell Jordan

3-v8-04 3-29-04 SOB

3-30- 04

~ 1

Max Lip chonsky

3-28-04 3-29-04~ SOB

4-04

Eric Smith

3-28-04 3-29-04 i Time :[411-C4

I 3

I

I served i

i

Amos Brown

3-29-04 I, 3-30-04 Dismisse 4-1-04

2

d

Avery Childs

3-29-04 3-30-04 SOB

4-1-04

2

Rodrick Lontrell 3-29-04 ~ 3-30 -04 SOB

I 4--1-004

2

Demarcus Ellis

3-29-04 3-30-04 SOB

4-1-04

2

Kewonnus Harness 3-29-04 3-30-04 Time

4-1-04

2

serve d

Lamar Jefferson 3-29-04 3-30-04 Dismisse 4-1-04

2

~-T-~I u

M ary Ma1 . nes

3-29-04 3-30-04

rv

2

Frank N urrell

- 3-21 ~3-30-04

e

2

sT1eOrBveed

Brian Quinn

3-24-04 3-30-04 Dismisse 4-1-04

2

Diane Thomas

I 3-29-04 3 - 30-04

I

d Time

- ~4-1-04

2

serve d

~T.Prnv Thomnson 3-29-04 ~3-30-04OB

4-1-04

2

48

Patricia Brumley 3-29-04 ' 3-30-04 ' Time

4-1-04

2

served

Terry Bailer i 3-30-04 ' 3-31-04 SOB

4-3-04

3

Wesley Cosby

3-30-04 3-31-04 Ti me

4-2-04

~2

served -- ~-

Maurice Edwards 3-30-04 3-31-04 ~~SOB

~4-3-04

3

Jason Underwood 3-30-04 3-31-04 SOB

4-3-04

3

Henry Bell 3-30-04 3-31-04

OB ~ 4- 1-04 -

1

Mikal Cartier ~ 3-30-04 3-31-04 S OB

4-3-04

3

Marcene Cooper I 3-3n-04 3-37-04- I SOB

14-1-04

1

John Daniell

3-30-04 331-04 S~- BO

4-1-n3

1

Mark Hilleaas

~ 3-30-04 1 3-31-04 I SOB ~ 4-2-04

2

153 . Inmates routinely have to obtain attorneys or inmate rights organizations on the outside to call the Records Office just to obtain release in accordance with their Release Dates.
154. On information and belief, at any one time up to 5-20% of the Fulton County Jail population is being held past their Release Dates .
155 . The policies of the Fulton County Jail, and the overcrowding, cascade into larger problems .

49

156 . The Sheriff returns all in-custody defendants from the courtrooms to the jail to the cells they occupied before court, after they have been ordered released, in order to check for wants and holds in other cases .
157 . The court returns swell the backlog in an already overcrowded system .
158 . Because the system is plagued by erroneous releases of persons released before their release dates, the jail imposes extra release checks that would not be needed in a functioning Records Office, thereby further slowing an already overclogged, backlogged system .
159 . Many inmates are not processed and booked into the jail's computerized imnate management system for a day or more after commitment, in many cases after the first appearance .
160. Failing to book persons in upon commitment prohibits these inmates from being released before first appearance under a bond set by schedule; persons cannot be bonded out until they have been entered into the system .
161 . Persons who have not been booked in until after first appearance cannot be released promptly because they must be booked in before wants and holds checks can be run on them and they have been booked in .
50

162. Many inmates held at the Fulton County Jail are overdetained by 24 hours or more because the breakdown of the inmate management system has resulted in a backlog of inmates awaiting release. Therefore, inmates who have been ordered released by a judge are held one or more days past their Release Dates.
Arrestee Strip Searches Performed By the Fulton County Jail 163 . On March 21, 2004, Plaintiff Alan Powell was booked into the Fulton County Jail's general population . He was subjected to a strip search without any individualized finding of reasonable suspicion or probable cause that he was concealing contraband or weapons . 164 . On February 6, 2003, Plaintiff Tory Dunlap was booked into the Fulton County Jail's general population . He was subjected to a strip search without any individualized finding of reasonable suspicion or probable cause that he was concealing contraband or weapons 165. On December 20, 2003, Plaintiff Lee Antonio Smith was booked into the Fulton County Jail's general population . He was subjected to a strip search
51

without any individualized finding of reasonable suspicion or probable cause that he was concealing contraband or weapons . 166. On August 22, 2003, Plaintiff David Evans was booked into the Fulton County Jail's general population . He was subjected to a strip search without any individualized finding of reasonable suspicion or probable cause that he was concealing contraband or weapons .
Plaintiff C. Alan PowelPs Overdetention By the Fulton County Jail 167. On or about Saturday March 20, 2004, Plaintiff C . Alan Powell was detained in the Fulton County Jail . 168 . Plaintiff Alan Powell's Release Date was about March 21, 2004, when he made bond . 169 . Plaintiff Alan Powell's Exit Date was March 23, 2004 . 170 . Plaintiff Alan Powell was overdetained for three days at the Fulton County Jail .
52

171 . The moving force behind Plaintiff Alan Powell's overdetention was the collapse of the Fulton County Jail' inmate management system, and Defendant Jacqueline Barrett's deliberate indifference . 172. Plaintiff Alan Powell suffered loss of employment opportunities, anxiety, loss of freedom and other damages as a result of the over detention .
Tory Dunlap's Overdetention By the Fulton County Jail 173. On or about Friday, February 13, 2002, Plaintiff Tory Dunlap was committed to the Fulton County Jail . 174. Plaintiff Tory Dunlap's Release Date was March 31, 2003 . 175. Plaintiff Tory Dunlap's Exit Date was April 4, 2003 . 176. Plaintiff Tory Dunlap was overdetained for four days at the Fulton County Jail . 177. The moving force behind Plaintiff Tory Dunlap's overdetention teas the collapse of the Fulton County Jail' inmate management system, and Defendant Jacqueline Barrett's deliberate indifference .
53

178. Plaintiff Tory Dunlap suffered loss of employment opportunities, anxiety, loss of freedom and other damages as a result of the overdetention .
Plaintiff Lee Antonio Smith's Overdetention By the Fulton County Jail 179 . On or about Thursday night, May 9, 2002, Plaintiff Lee Antonio Smith was committed to the Fulton County Jail . 180 . Plaintiff Lee Antonio Smith's Release Date was December 22, 2003. 181 . Plaintiff Lee Antonio Smith's Exit Date was December 25, 2003 . 182 . Plaintiff Lee Antonio Smith was overdetained for three days at the Fulton County Jail . 183 . The moving force behind Plaintiff Lee Antonio Smith's overdetention was the collapse of the Fulton County Jail' inmate management system, and Defendant Jacqueline Barrett's deliberate indifference. 184 . Plaintiff Lee Antonio Smith suffered anxiety, loss of freedom and other damages as a result of the overdetention .
David Evans' Overdetention By the Fulton County Jail
54

185 . Plaintiff David Evans's Release Date from the Fulton County Jail was December 4, 2003 . 186 . Plaintiff David Evans' Exit Date was December 14, 2003 . 187 . Plaintiff David Evans was overdetained for ten days at the Fulton County Jail . 188 . The moving force behind Plaintiff David Evans' overdetention was the collapse of the Fulton County Jail's inmate management system, and Defendant Jacqueline Barrett's deliberate indifference .
PlaintiffDavid Evans' Court Return Strip Search 189 . On December 4, 2003, Plaintiff David Evans was booked back into the Fulton County Jail's general population . He was subjected to a strip search without any individualized finding of reasonable suspicion or probable cause that he was concealing contraband or weapons even though a court had ordered his release.
55

SUBSTANTIVE ALLEGATIONS CLAIMS OF ARRESTEE STRIP SEARCH NAMED PLAINTIFFS
Count 1 Section 1983 Claims of Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs 190 . The Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations set forth above in this Complaint . 191 . Upon being booked into the Fulton County Jail, each of the Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs and every other Arrestee Strip Search Class member were subjected to a strip search without an individual determination that the search would reveal weapons, drugs or other contraband . 192 . Subjecting an arrestee arrested on a non-drug, non-weapon non- violent felony offense to a strip search, without an individual determination that the search would reveal weapons, drugs or other contraband, violates his or her Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Rights . 193 . Defendant Jacqueline Barrett knew that the Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs and other class members would be subjected to the searches
56

in the Fulton County Jail, and acquiesced in the searches .
194. Defendant's actions, and failures to act as described above, directly and proximately and affirmatively were the moving forces behind the violations of the Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs, and the class members' Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights .
195 . Defendant caused the unreasonable strip searches of the Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs and all other class members by deliberate indifference to the risk of constitutional injury by maintaining and/or acquiescing in a policy and practice and custom of strip searching arrestees.
196 . Defendant is therefore liable under 42 U .S.C. §1983 for constitutional injuries to the Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs and all other class members caused by their conduct.
Count 2 Neeligent Trainine and Negligent Supervision and Failure to Implement
Policies
197 . The Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations set forth above in this Complaint .
57

198 . Defendant Jacqueline Barrett entrusted certain duties including, but not limited to, searching all arrestees booked into the Fulton County Jail to certain jail employees.
58

199 . Therefore, Defendant Jacqueline Barrett had a duty to exercise reasonable care in training, supervising and disciplining such employees in exercising their duties . 200 . The need for such training was and is obvious from the nature of the responsibilities entrusted to such jail employees . 201 . Defendant Jacqueline Barrett deliberately failed to implement and enforce procedures employees needed to ensure the constitutional searches of inmates . 202. The problems at the jail described above, and the various reports in the media, should have made it obvious to Defendant Jacqueline Barrett that the training employees under her supervision and control were receiving was inadequate, that the policies in place were inadequate, and that, as a direct and proximate result of these inadequacies, the inmates under her supervision would suffer injury .
59

203 . Defendant Jacqueline Barrett negligently trained and supervised, or negligently failed to train and supervise, such employees in their duties ;, failed to implement policies, and as a result, such employees were incompetent to perform their duties . 204. This negligent training; negligent failure to train ; failure to supervise, and failure to implement policies by Defendant Jacqueline Barrett resulted in the unconstitutional strip searches of the Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs and the other members of the putative class . 205 . As a result of said negligence of Defendant Jacqueline Barrett, Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs suffered injuries described in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint .
CLAIMS OF OVERDETENTION NAMED PLAINTIFFS Count 3
Section 1983 Claims of Overdetention Named Plaintiffs 206 . The Overdetention Named Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations set. forth above in this Complaint .
60

207. Defendant Jacqueline I3arrett was, at all times relevant herein, the supervisor- of the jail employees charged with ensuring the release nn their Release Dates of all inmates in the custody of the Fulton County Jail . 208 . Defendant Jacqueline I3arrett deliberately failed to train, monitor and discipline such employees . 209. Defendant Jacqueline Barrett deliberately failed to implement and enforce procedures employees needed to ensure the timely release of inmates. 210 . Defendant Jacqueline Barrett had both actual and constructive knowledge that such employees were engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to The Overdetention Named Plaintiffs and other members of the class . 211 . Defendant Jacqueline 13arrett engaged in a pattern of continued inaction in the face of employees' documented widespread abuse of the Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the Overdetention Named Plaintiffs' and the other members of the class by failing to ensure their release on their Release Dates .
61

212. Defendant Jacqueline Barrett's actions, and failures to act as described above, directly, proximately, and affirmatively caused the violations of the Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the Overdetention Named Plaintiffs' and the other members of the class .
213 . The deprivations to the Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the Overdetention Named Plaintiffs and the other members of the class were committed by Defendant Jacqueline I3arrett while she was acting under color of state law, and was acting pursuant to the policy, custom and practice of Fulton County Jail .
214 . Defendant Jacqueline Barrett' actions, and failures to act, as described above, directly and proximately caused injury described above to the Overdetention Named Plaintiffs' and the other members of the class .
Count 4 Negligent Training and Negligent Supervision and Failure to Implement
Policies Claims of Overdetention Named Plaintiffs 215 . The Overdetention Named Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations set forth above in this Complaint .
62

216 . Defendant. Jacqueline Barrett entrusted certain duties including but not limited to ensuring the release on their Release Dates of all inmates in Fulton County Jail custody to certain jail employees .
63

21'7 . Therefore, Defendant Jacqueline Barrett had a duty to exercise reasonable care in training, supervising, and disciplining such employees in exercising their duties . 218 . The need for such training was obvious from the nature of the responsibilities entrusted to jail employees . 219. Defendant Jacqueline Barrett deliberately failed to implement and enforce procedures employees needed to ensure the timely release of inmates . 220. The problems at the jail described above, and the various reports in the media, should have made it obvious to Defendant Jacqueline Barret.t. that the training employees under her supervision and control were receiving was inadequate, that the policies in place were inadequate, and that., as a direct and proximate result, the inmates under her supervision would suffer injury . 221 . Defendant Jacqueline Barrett negligently trained and supervised, or negligently failed to train and supervise, such employees in their duties . She further failed to implement policies and, as a result, such employees were incompetent to perform their duties .
64

222. This negligent training, and negligent failure to train and supervise, and failure to implement policies by Defendant Jacqueline Barrett resulted in the complete breakdown in the inmate management system of the Fulton County Jail . These failures have caused the overdetent.ion of The Overdetention Named Plaintiffs and the other members of the putative class .
223 . As a result of said negligence of Defendant Jacqueline Barrett, The Overdet.ent.ion Named Plaintiffs suffered injuries described in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint .
CLAIMS OF COURT RETURN STRIP SEARCH NAMED PLAINTIFF
Count 5 Section 1983 Claim of Court Return Strip Search Named Pla intiff
224. The Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations set forth above in this Complaint . 225 . Upon returning from the Superior Court or State Court to the Fulton County Jail after court hearings at which a judge ordered him released, the Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiff, and every other Court Return Strip Search Class member, was subjected to a strip search without an
65

individual determination that the search would reveal weapons, drugs or other contraband .
226 . Subjecting court returns entitled to release by virtue of their court appearances to strip searches without an individual determination that the search would reveal weapons, drugs or other contraband violates their Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Rights.
227 . Defendant Jacqueline Barrett knew that the Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiff and other class members would be subjected to searches in the Fulton County Jail, and acquiesced in such searches. 228 . Defendant's actions, and failure to act as described above, directly and proximately and affirmatively were and are the moving forces behind the violations of the Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiff and the class members' Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights . 229 . Defendant caused the unreasonable strip searches of the Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiff and all other class members by deliberate indifference to the risk of constitutional injury by maintaining and/or acquiescing in a policy and practice and custom of strip searching arrestees .
66

230 . Defendant is therefore liable under 42 U .S .C . §1983 for constitutional injuries to the Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiff and all other class members caused by their conduct .
Count 6 Negligent Training and Negligent Supervision and Failure to Implement Policies Regarding Searches of Court Return Strip Search Class Members 231 . The Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations set forth above in this Complaint. 232 . Defendant Jacqueline Barrett entrusted certain duties, including but not limited to, searching all court returns booked hack into the Fulton County Jail to certain jail employees .
67

233 . Therefore, Defendant Jacqueline Barrett had a duty to exercise reasonable care in training, supervising, and disciplining such employees in exercising their duties . 234 . The need for such training was obvious from the nature of the responsibilities entrusted to such jail employees . 235. Defendant Jacqueline Barrett deliberately failed to implement and enforce procedures employees under her supervision and control needed to ensure the constitutional searches of court returns entitled to release by virtue of their court appearances . 236 . The problems at the jail described above, and the various reports in the media should have made it obvious to Defendant Jacqueline Barrett that the training such employees were receiving was inadequate, the policies in place were inadequate, and that. as a direct and proximate result of these inadequacies, the inmates under her supervision would suffer injury.
68

237 . Defendant Jacqueline Barrett negligently trained and supervised, or negligently failed to train and supervise such employees in their duties, and failed to implement policies . As a direct result of these failures, such employees were incompetent to perform their duties . 238 . This negligent training, and negligent failure to train and supervise, and failure to implement policies by Defendant Jacqueline Barrett resulted in the unconstitutional strip searches of the Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiff and the other members of the putative class . 239 . As a result of said negligence of Defendant Jacqueline Barrett, Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiff suffered injuries described in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint .
IRREPARABLE INJURY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 240. Defendant is overdetaining members of the plaintiff class, and unreasonably subjecting members of the Arrestee Strip Search Class and the Court Return Strip Search Class to strip searches which irreparably harms them, even if they are later able to recover compensatory damages .
69

241 . Defendant's overdetaining members of the plaintiff class, and performing illegal strip searches of the Arrestee Strip Search Class and the Court Return Strip Search Class, has irreparably harmed them and will continue to irreparably harm members of the proposed plaintiff Overdetention Class and Arrestee Strip Search Class and the Court Return Strip Search Class, thus making declaratory and injunctive relief necessary.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court grant the following relief:
1 . grant a jury trial on all claims so triable ;
2 . declare that with respect to the Arrestee Strip Search Class this action may be maintained as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) and certifying the Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs as the proper representative of the class consisting of each person who, in the two years preceding the filing of this action up until the date this case is terminated, was or will be, (i) upon being arrested and committed into the Fulton County Jail ; (ii) on a charge other than a charge of drugs, weapon or felony violence ; (iii) was subjected to a blanket strip search
70

without any individualized finding of reasonable suspicion or probable cause that he or she was concealing drugs, weapons or other contraband .
3 . declare that, with respect to the Overdetention Class, this action may be maintained as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), 23(b) (2), and 23(b)(3) and certifying the Overdetention Named Plaintiffs as the proper representative of the Overdetention Class consisting of class consisting of: (a) each person who has been, is, or will be incarcerated in any Fulton County Jail facility in the two years preceding the filing of this action up to and until the date this case is terminated ; and (b) who was not released, or, in the future, will not be released by midnight on the date on which the person is entitled to be released by court order, posting bail, or the date on which the basis for his or her detention has otherwise expired.
4. declare that with respect to the Court Return Strip Search Class this action may be maintained as a class action pursuant to Rules 23(a), 23(b) (2), and 23(b) (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of a class consisting of: each person who, in the two years preceding the filing of this action up until the date this case is terminated, has been, is or will be : (i) in the custody of the Fulton County Jail ; (ii) taken to court form the Fulton
71

County Jail ; (iii) ordered released by the court or otherwise became entitled to release by virtue of the court appearance because the charge on which he had been held was no longer pending or was dismissed at the hearing, was ordered released on his own recognizance, or had posted bail, was sentenced to time served, was acquitted or was otherwise entitled to release ; (iv) was not the subject of any other pending case or cases which imposed any condition of release other than personal recognizance ; (v) was not the subject of any detainer or warrant ; (vi) was returned to the Fulton County Jail; and (vii) was subjected to a strip search without any individualized finding of reasonable suspicion or probable cause that he was concealing contraband or weapons before being released, regardless of whether he was overdetained .
5 . Name Dan DeWoskin, Charles Pekor, J .P. Claiborne,William Claiborne, and Lynn Cunningham as class counsel for all classes . William Claiborne is a member of the bar of the District of Columbia and is an active member in good standing of the Bar of the State of Georgia . He plans to move for admission to this Court and is an experienced class counsel. Charles Pekor is an active member in good standing of the Bar of the State of Georgia . He has moved for admission to this Court . Lynn Cunningham is a member of the bar
72

of the District of Columbia and is an experienced class counsel and plans to move this Court for admission pro haec vice .
6 . preliminarily and permanently enjoin defendant from pursuing the course of conduct complained of herein ;
7 . preliminarily and permanently enjoin defendant from pursuing settlement directly with any member of the putative Arrestee Strip Search Class or the Overdetention Class or the Court Return Strip Search Class described herein unless that person is represented by counsel;
8. award all Plaintiffs and class members compensatory and consequential damages in an amount to be determined ; 9 . appoint an independent monitor to supervise the receiving and discharge area to ensure that all new commitments are not strip searched or full body cavity searched without an individualized finding of reasonable suspicion ;
l0.appoint an independent monitor to supervise the Records Office to ensure that all inmates are released on or before their Release Dates; ll .appoint an independent monitor to supervise the receiving and discharge area to ensure that court returns entitled to release are not strip searched or
73

full body cavity searched without an individualized finding of reasonable suspicion ;
12 .award Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and costs incurred in bringing this action under 42 U.S .C . §1988; and
13 .grant such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
Respectfully,,$ubmitted,
Daniel E. DeWoskin Georgia Bar # 220327 Counsel for the Arrestee Strip Search Class and the Overdetention Named Plaintiffs and Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiff 270 Peachtree Street, N .W . Suite 1060 Atlanta, GA 30303 Phone 404-221-8887 Phone 404-230-9171 Fax 404-221-8884
74

Respectfully submitted,
J / C...cA(Boeyl ~f/ENf n ~.-K ~oNSaNr-1>~~
J .P. Claiborne Georgia Bar # 126337 Counsel for the Arrestee Strip Search Class and the Overdetention Named Plaintiffs and Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiff 699 Broad Street Ste 1206 Augusta, GA 30901
Phone 706-722-8224 Fax 706-722-8236
JURY DEMAND
Plaintiffs demand a jury of six as to all claims so triable .

DATED : April 21, 2004

Daniel E . DeWoskin Georgia Bar # 220327 Counsel for the Arrestee Strip Search Class and the Overdetention Named Plaintiffs and Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiff 270 Peachtree Street . N.W . Suite 1060 Atlanta, GA 30303 Phone 404-221-8887 Phone 404-230-9171 Fax 404-221-8884
75

ORIGINAL °''DA04JU (Rev . 10/9]) Summons in a Ci vil Action

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

No rthern

District of Georgia

C . ALAN POWELL, TORY and on behalf of all situated

DUNLAP, et al others similarly
SUMMONS IN A CIVIL CASE

V.

JACQUELINE BARRETT, SHERIFF OF FULTON COUNTY, STATE OF GEORGIA

CASE NUMBER :

1 :04-Cv-1100 96r

TO : (Name and address of Defendant)
JACQUELINE BARRETT, Sheriff of Fulton Fulton County Justice Center Tower 185 Central Avenue SW Atlanta, Georgia 30303

County

YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED and required to serve upon PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY (name and address)
Daniel E . DeWoskin, Pekor & DeWoskin LLC, Attorneys at Law Southern Company Building, 270 Peachtree Street, NW Suite 1060, Atlanta, Georgia 30303

an answer to the complaint which u herewith served upon you, within 20

days after service of this

summons upon you, exclusive of the day of service . [f you fail to do so, judgment by default will be taken against you for

the relief demanded in the complaint . You must also file your answer with the Clerk of this Court within a reasonable

period of time after service .

L(lTfM D. n

APR 21 2004
DATE

`+':.A0 440 (Rep . 10:'931 Sunwons m a Ci vil Acdun

RETURN OF SERVICE

Service of the Summons and complaint was made by me"' OF SERVER

TITLE

io indicate a11oronruue method D Served penonallv upon the third-purtydcfenJanL Place where ,card:

D Left copies thereof at tile defendant's dwelling house or usual place of abode wish a person of suiGable age and discretion then residing (herein . Name of person with whom the summons and complains wire left
G Returned unexccuted :

El Other (specify) :

TRAVEL

STATEMENT OF SERVICE FEES DECLARATION OF SERVER

1 declare under penaliyuf perjury under the laces of die United States of America that the foregoing information contained in the Return of Service and Statement of Service fees is true end correct .

Executed oil

Signature, of Server

Address u(Serva

111 As is mho msv sane a so moons see Rule 4 oft he Federal Rules of Ci vil Procedure .

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION

C. Alan Powell 388 Ashley Ave. Atlanta, GA 30312
and
Tory Dunlap 957 North Ave, Apt B Atlanta, GA 30318
and
Lee Antonio Smith 393 Landsey Drive Atlanta, GA, 30315
and
David Evans 3214 Harris Drive East Point, GA 30344
and
Stanley Clemons II Fulton County Jail 409 Pine Street, NE Atlanta, Ga. 30308
and
Allen Middleton

) ) ) ) FOURTH AMENDED ) COMPLAINT FOR MONEY ) DAMAGES, INJUNCTIVE ) RELIEF, PRELIMINARY ) INJUNCTION, AND JURY ) DEMAND ) CLASS ACTION ) ) ) ) ) Civil Case No. 1:04-cv-1100 (RWS) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
1

150 Peyton Place 107

)

East Atlanta 30331

)

)

and

)

)

Anthony Westbrook

)

2494 Baker Ave

)

Atlanta 30318

)

)

and

)

)

)

Benjamin Blake

)

413 St Cir Dr

)

Conyers, Georgia

)

)

and

)

)

Harry Witherspoon

)

2032 Campfire Dr

)

Riverdale, Georgia

)

)

and

)

)

Antionne Wolf

)

415 Fairburn Rd Apt 1001

)

Atlanta 30311

)

)

and

)

)

Kristopher Alan Matkin

)

3825 LaVista Rd apt 4

)

Tucker, GA 30084

)

)

Individually, and on behalf of all others )

similarly situated

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

2

)

Jacqueline Barrett

)

Former Sheriff, Fulton County,

)

State Of Georgia

)

Individually

)

)

and

)

)

Myron Freeman

)

Sheriff, Fulton County,

)

State Of Georgia

)

Individually and in his

)

Official Capacity

)

)

and

)

Fulton County

)

State of Georgia

)

141 Pryor Street, SW

)

Atlanta GA, 30303

)

)

and

)

)

Karen Handel

)

Chairperson,

)

Fulton County Board of

)

Commissioners

)

141 Pryor Street, SW, Suite 10044

)

Atlanta GA, 30303

)

)

and

)

)

Robb Pitts

)

Member,

)

Fulton County Board of

)

Commissioners

)

141 Pryor Street, SW, Suite 10044

)

Atlanta GA, 30303

)

)

and

)

)

3

Tom Lowe

)

Member,

)

Fulton County Board of

)

Commissioners

)

141 Pryor Street, SW, Suite 10044

)

Atlanta GA, 30303

)

)

and

)

)

Emma I. Darnell

)

Member,

)

Fulton County Board of

)

Commissioners

)

141 Pryor Street, SW, Suite 10044

)

Atlanta GA, 30303

)

)

and

)

)

Nancy A. Boxill

)

Member,

)

Fulton County Board of

)

Commissioners

)

141 Pryor Street, SW, Suite 10044

)

Atlanta GA, 30303

)

)

and

)

)

William "Bill" Edwards

)

Member,

)

Fulton County Board of

)

Commissioners

)

141 Pryor Street, SW, Suite 10044

)

Atlanta GA, 30303

)

)

and

)

)

City Of Atlanta,

)

State Of Georgia

)

)

Defendants

)

4

Introduction
1. This is an action brought by C. Alan Powell, David Evans, Stanley Clemons, Allan Middleton, Anthony Westbrook, Benjamin Blake, Harry Witherspoon, and Antionne Wolf (the "Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs") on their own behalf individually, and on behalf of a class of individuals ("Arrestee Strip Search“) who were injured by Defendants’ conduct in causing them to be subjected to blanket strip searches upon their arrest and commitment to the Fulton County Jail. The term “blanket strip search” is more fully discussed later. 2. This is also an action brought by C. Alan Powell and Kristopher Alan Matkin (the "Alpha-Strip Search Named Plaintiffs") on their own behalf individually, and on behalf of a class of individuals ("Alpha Strip Search Class“) who were injured by Defendants’ conduct in causing them to be subjected to blanket booking strip searches upon their arrest and commitment to the Fulton County Jail. The term “blanket strip search” is more fully discussed later. 3. This is also an action brought by David Evans, Benjamin Blake, and Antionne Wolf (the "Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiffs") on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of individuals (“Court Return Strip Search Class”) who were injured by Defendants’ conduct in subjecting them (or causing them to be subjected to) to blanket strip searches (described below) after they were returned from Superior Court or State Court to the Fulton County Jail after a judge
5

ordered their release, and after there was no longer a basis for their detention. They were further injured by Jacqueline Barrett’s and the other defendants’ deliberate indifference to the practice of strip searches; her failure to train, supervise and/or discipline her staff, and by her failure to promulgate and enforce policies. 4. This is also an action brought by each of C. Alan Powell, Tory Dunlap, Lee Antonio Smith, David Evans, Stanley Clemons, Allan Middleton, Anthony Westbrook, Benjamin Blake, Harry Witherspoon, Antionne Wolf and Kristopher Alan Matkin (the “Overdetention Named Plaintiffs”) on his or her own behalf and on behalf of the class defined below who were injured, or who are being injured, or who will be injured in the future by defendants’ pattern and practice of overdetaining inmates. 5. “Blanket strip search” means a strip search conducted without any determination of whether a basis to conduct the search exists. 6. "Overdetain" means holding an inmate in Fulton County Jail custody past the inmate’s “Release Date”. 7. “Premature Release” means releasing an inmate from Fulton County Jail custody before the inmate’s “Release Date”.
6

8. “Release Date” for each inmate is the day on which the person is entitled to be released by court order, or the date on which the basis for his or her detention has otherwise expired, for example by posting bond, or by being detained pretrial on a charge without judgment past the maximum period of any sentence on that charge. 9. “Exit Date” for each inmate means the date on which he or she was actually released from the custody of the Fulton County Jail. 10. Court return as used herein means an in custody defendant taken from the Fulton County Jail to one of the courthouses for a hearing, and returned to the Fulton County Jail. 11. The Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs bring this action against Defendants under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §1983, to enforce their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments for injuries suffered by them and other members of the class at the Fulton County Jail. The Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs also base their claims against Defendant Jacklyn Barrett and Myron Freeman on the Constitution of the State of Georgia and the common law of the State of Georgia. 12. The Alpha Strip Search Named Plaintiffs bring this action against Defendants under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §1983, to enforce their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments for injuries
7

suffered by them and other members of the class at the Fulton County Jail. The Alpha Strip Search Named Plaintiffs also base their claims against Defendant Jacklyn Barrett and Myron Freeman on the Constitution of the State of Georgia and the common law of the State of Georgia. 13. The Overdetention Named Plaintiffs bring this action against Defendants under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §1983, to enforce their rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, for injuries suffered by them and other members of the class at the Fulton County Jail. The Overdetention Named Plaintiffs also base their claims against Defendant Jacklyn Barrett and Myron Freeman on the Constitution of the State of Georgia and the common law of the State of Georgia. 14. The Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiffs brings this action against Defendant Jacqueline Barrett under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §1983, to enforce their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, for injuries suffered by them and the class. The Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiffs also bases their claims against Defendant Jacklyn Barrett and Myron Freeman on the Constitution of the State of Georgia and the common law of the State of Georgia.
8

Jurisdiction and Venue 15. This Court has jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331 and 28 U.S.C. §1343(a)(3). This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over their state law claims against Defendant Jaquelyn Barrett under 28 U.S.C. §1367. 16. Venue is appropriate in this District and this division. Each of the claims for relief arose in this judicial district, and in this division.
9

Parties-Plaintiffs
17. Plaintiff C. Alan Powell is an adult who was overdetained in the Fulton County Jail and subjected to illegal strip searches. 18. Plaintiff C. Alan Powell was arrested on March 20, 2004 on a charge of disorderly conduct and not paying a bar tab. 19. Plaintiff C. Alan Powell was committed to the Fulton County Jail on March 22, 2004. 20. Plaintiff C. Alan Powell’s Release Date was March 21, 2004. 21. Plaintiff C. Alan Powell’s Exit Date was March 23, 2004. 22. On 5/20/04 Plaintiff C. Alan Powell was re-arrested and re-committed to the Fulton County Jail a second time because the person who had posted his bind went off the bond. 23. Plaintiff C. Alan Powell’s Release Date was 6/26/04. 24. Plaintiff C. Alan Powell’s Exit Date was 5/27/04. 25. Plaintiff Tory Dunlap is an adult who was overdetained in the Fulton County Jail. 26. Tory Dunlap was arrested by the Atlanta Police Department on February 9, 2003 on a charge of armed robbery. 27. Plaintiff Tory Dunlap was committed to the Fulton County Jail on February 9, 2003.
10

28. Plaintiff Tory Dunlap’s Release Date was March 31, 2003. 29. Plaintiff Tory Dunlap’s Exit Date was April 3, 2003. 30. Plaintiff Lee Antonio Smith is an adult who was overdetained in the Fulton County Jail. 31. Plaintiff Lee Antonio Smith was arrested by the Atlanta Police Department on 12/20/04 on a charge of possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute. 32. Plaintiff Lee Antonio Smith was committed to the Fulton County Jail on 12/20/04. 33. Plaintiff Lee Antonio Smith’s Release Date was 12/22/04. 34. Plaintiff Lee Antonio Smith’s Exit Date was 12/25/04. 35. Plaintiff David Evans is an adult who was overdetained in the Fulton County Jail and subjected to illegal strip searches. 36. Plaintiff David Evans was arrested by the East Point Police on 8/9/03 on a charge of disorderly. 37. On 8/21/03 Plaintiff David Evans was transferred to the Fulton County Jail on a warrant for possession of a weapon. 38. A judge of the Superior Court ordered Plaintiff David Evans released on 8/21/03. 39. Instead of being released from the courthouse, Plaintiff David Evans was taken back to the Fulton County Jail and subjected to an illegal strip search even
11

though a judge had ordered his release, and there were no other charges, detainers, warrants or holds or other basis to detain him. 40. Plaintiff David Evans’ Release Date was 12/1/03. 41. Plaintiff David Evans’s Exit Date was 12/14/03. 42. Plaintiff Stanley Clemons is an adult who was overdetained in the Fulton County Jail and subjected to illegal strip searches. 43. Plaintiff Stanley Clemons was arrested on 8/2/03 by the Atlanta Police Department on a charge of burglary. 44. Plaintiff Stanley Clemons was committed to the Fulton County Jail on 8/2/03. 45. Plaintiff Stanley Clemons’s Release Date was 7/19/03. 46. Plaintiff Stanley Clemons was ordered released by a judge of the Superior Court on July 19, 2004 when he was sentenced to time served. 47. Plaintiff Stanley Clemons tried to obtain a grievance form from four separate guards so he could file a grievance about his overdetention beginning on July 20, 2004, but none of the guards ever gave him one. The Fulton County Jail has no administrative remedies procedure for grieving complaints in general or the strip searches and overdetentions.
12

48. Plaintiff Stanley Clemons requested a grievance form from Sgt Jones, a floor sergeant on Zone 5 North on July 20, 2004. Initially Sgt Jones advised Plaintiff Stanley Clemons that the Fulton County Jail did not have grievance forms. 49. Plaintiff Stanley Clemons tried to obtain a grievance form later in the evening of July 20, 2004from Deputy Williams. 50. On July 21, 2004 Plaintiff Stanley Clemons requested a grievance form from Deputy Ingram, and also requested a grievance form from Sergeant Fujobi. 51. None of the four guards gave Plaintiff Stanley Clemons a grievance form. 52. On July 20, 2004 Plaintiff Stanley Clemons obtained a grievance form from his civil attorney Charles Pekor, and on July 21, 2004 Plaintiff Stanley Clemons obtained a grievance form from another inmates. 53. On July 21, 2004 Plaintiff Stanley Clemons submitted the two grievance forms as instructed grieving his strip search and his overdetention to two separate guards, one form to Deputy Dunn, and one to Sergeant Jones. 54. On July 21, 2004 Plaintiff Stanley Clemons submitted the two grievance forms before his release. Plaintiff Stanley Clemons exhausted his administrative remedies available to him because he filed grievances and to this day has not received a response to his grievances. Any grievance system the Fulton County Jail has is a system in name only and there is no administrative remedies system available to inmates.
13

55. Plaintiff Stanley Clemons’s Exit Date was 7/23/04. 56. Plaintiff Allen Middleton is an adult who was overdetained in the Fulton County Jail and subjected to illegal strip searches. 57. Plaintiff Allen Middleton was arrested by the Fulton County Marshals on 3/8/04 on a warrant for an unpaid $27 traffic ticket from Richmond County. 58. Plaintiff Allen Middleton was committed to the Fulton County Jail on 3/8/04. 59. Plaintiff Allen Middleton’s Release Date was 3/8/04. 60. Plaintiff Allen Middleton’s Exit Date was 3/11/04. 61. Plaintiff Anthony Westbrook is an adult who was overdetained in the Fulton County Jail and subjected to illegal strip searches. 62. Plaintiff Anthony Westbrook was arrested by the Fulton County Marshals on 3/24/04 on a charge of simple battery, child abandonment (non-support) and a probation warrant for forgery. 63. Plaintiff Anthony Westbrook was committed to the Fulton County Jail on 3/24/04. 64. Plaintiff Anthony Westbrook’s Release Date was 4/2/04. 65. Plaintiff Anthony Westbrook’s Exit Date was 4/6/04. 66. Plaintiff Benjamin Blake is an adult who was overdetained in the Fulton County Jail and subjected to illegal strip searches.
14

67. Plaintiff Benjamin Blake was arrested by the Fulton County Police on charges of battery, trespass, and obstruction on 4/26/04. 68. Plaintiff Benjamin Blake was committed to the Fulton County Jail on 4/26/04. 69. Plaintiff Benjamin Blake’s Release Date was 5/13/04. 70. Plaintiff Benjamin Blake’s Exit Date was 5/15/04. 71. Plaintiff Harry Witherspoon is an adult who was overdetained in the Fulton County Jail and subjected to illegal strip searches. 72. Plaintiff Harry Witherspoon was arrested by the Fulton County Police on 2/11/04 on a charge of DUI (driving under the influence). 73. Plaintiff Harry Witherspoon was committed to the Fulton County Jail on 2/11/04. 74. Plaintiff Harry Witherspoon’s Release Date was 3/10/04. 75. Plaintiff Harry Witherspoon’s Exit Date was 3/17/04. 76. Plaintiff Antionne Wolf was arrested by the Fulton County Sheriff on 2/24/04 on a charge of contempt/non-payment of child support is an adult who was overdetained in the Fulton County Jail and subjected to illegal strip searches. 77. Plaintiff Antionne Wolf was committed to the Fulton County Jail on 2/24/04 and subjected to a booking strip search on the same day. 78. Plaintiff Antionne Wolf’ Release Date was 4/20/04.
15

79. Plaintiff Antionne Wolf’s Exit Date was 4/21/04. 80. Plaintiff Antionne Wolf was transported to Superior Court for a hearing on 4/20/04. 81. A judge of the Superior Court ordered Plaintiff Antionne Wolf released on 4/20/04. 82. Instead of being released from the courthouse, Plaintiff Antionne Wolf was taken back to the Fulton County Jail and subjected to an illegal strip search even though a judge had ordered her release, and there were no other charges, detainers, warrants or holds or other basis to detain her. 83. Plaintiff Kristopher Alan Matkin was arrested on 3/18/04 by the Atlanta Police Department on a charge of aggravated assault and committed to the Fulton County Jail on the same day. 84. Plaintiff Kristopher Alan Matkin appeared before a judicial officer in the Fulton County Jail on 3/19/04 and the judicial officer dismissed the charges and ordered him released. 85. Plaintiff Kristopher Alan Matkin had no other cases, detainers, warrants or holds preventing his release. 86. But, instead of being released, Plaintiff Kristopher Alan Matkin was booked into the jail, “dressed out” and strip searched, and held several days before being released.
16

87. Plaintiff Kristopher Alan Matkins' Release Date was 3/19/04. 88. Plaintiff Kristopher Alan Matkins’ Exit Date was 3/23/04. 89. The following chart shows the name, arresting jurisdiction, and arrest charge of each named plaintiff, and which class or classes each named plaintiff belongs to:

Name

Arresting charge jurisdiction

Arrestee Alpha Court Overdetention Strip Arrestee Return Class Search Strip Strip Class Search Search
Class Class

Powell 1 Sheriff

Disorderly/theft Yes

Yes

No Yes

Powell 2 Sheriff

Bail revocation Yes

No

No Yes

Tory Dunlap Atlanta Armed robbery No

No

No yes

Police

Department

Lee Antonio Atlanta

PWID cocaine No

No

No Yes

Smith

Police

Department

David Evans East Point Weapons warrant

Yes

No

Yes Yes

Stanley Clemons

Atlanta Police

Burglary warrant

Yes

No

No yes

17

Department

Allen

Fulton

Traffic ticket Yes

no

Middleton County warrant

Marshals

No yes

Anthony Fulton

Simple battery Yes

No

Westbrook County obstruction

Marshals

Benjamin Fulton

battery,

Yes No

Blake

County

trespass, and

Police

obstruction

No yes Yes yes

Harry

Fulton

DUI

Witherspoon County

Police

Yes No

No yes

Antionne Wolf

Sheriff

Kristopher Sheriff Alan Matkin

contempt/non- Yes

No

payment of

child support

Aggravated

Yes

Yes

assault

Parties-Defendants

Yes Yes No yes

90. Defendant Jacqueline Barrett was the Sheriff of Fulton County until December 31, 2004. She was previously sued in her official capacity for prospective injunctive relief. She is sued currently in in her individual capacity, for money damages. She was suspended for a period of 60days effective July 24,

18

2004. A receiver had authority over the Fulton County Jail from July 26, 2004 until December 31, 2004. 91. Defendant Myron Freeman is currently the Sheriff of Fulton County. He is sued in his official capacity for prospective injunctive relief, and in his official capacity, and individual capacity, for money damages. 92. Because there were different Sheriffs responsible for the operation of the Fulton County Jail at different times, certain allegations are made herein with reference to the “the Sheriff.” Such allegations refer to each Sheriff for the time period during which that person was Sheriff. 93. At all times described herein, Defendant Jacqueline Barrett, Myron Freeman and each of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill, William "Bill" Edwards was acting under color of state law. 94. Defendant Fulton County is a body corporate, with power to sue or be sued in any court. O.C.G.A. §36-1-3. 95. The Fulton County County Commissioners are Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill, William "Bill" Edwards. Plaintiffs sue Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill, William "Bill" Edwards in their individual as well as their individual capacities. 96. The City of Atlanta is a municipal corporation with power to sue or be sued in any court.
19

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS Fulton County, The Fulton County Board Of Commissioners, And The Fulton
County Jail 95. Defendant Fulton County is administered by the Fulton County Board of Commissioners ("Board") which consists of seven Commissioners elected by the voters of Fulton County to four-year terms. 96. The Board sets Fulton County governmental policy, and approves departmental budget requests. 97. Fulton County and its “governing authority,” that is, the Board, have authority to maintain and operate facilities for the detention, incarceration or confinement of all persons subject to confinement under the laws of the state, any county resolution, or any city ordinance. 98. Starting in 1989-1990, Fulton County exercised its authority to build and operate an incarceration facility, and built the current Fulton County Jail on Rice Street to replace the old jail. 99. The current Fulton County Jail on Rice Street came online in about 1990.
20

100. The Fulton County Jail at Rice Street (“Fulton County Jail” or sometimes the “Jail”) is the primary facility used by Fulton County to house inmates in Fulton County. 101. The Fulton County Jail has a capacity of approximately 1,450 inmates. However, at its opening the County put double beds in the cells and so Fulton County Jail opened with about 2,250 inmates. 102. Currently, the jail houses about 2,900 inmates, with 400 others in two annexes. 103. Most inmates at the Fulton County Jail are either pre-trial detainees, misdemeanants serving misdemeanor sentences, or probation violators. 104. The Board has the power to designate the person(s) to control incarceration facilities, including the Fulton County Jail. 105. The Board has designated the Sheriff of Fulton County as the person to control the County’s incarceration facilities. 106. The Board has designated the Sheriff of Fulton County as the person to operate and control the Fulton County Jail. 107. The Board, not the sheriff, has ultimate control over the Fulton County Jail. 108. Fulton County also sets the budget for the County’s incarceration facilities. 109. The Fulton County Board and its members, pursuant to requirements of Georgia state law, “shall pass an annual budget provide an annual budget sufficient
21

for the efficient and effective operation of the jail.” O.C.G.A. § 42-4-94(b). By definition, a budget sufficient for the “efficient and effective operation of the jail” must be one that permits constitutional requirements for the jail to be met. 110. On December 14, 1992, defendant Jacquelyn Barrett took office as the Sheriff of Fulton County, Georgia. 111. The old jail had been the subject of a 1982 class-action lawsuit (Fambro v. Fulton, 82-cv2136, JOF) challenging conditions at that facility including overcrowding and overdetentions. 112. In a published opinion in the Fambro case this Court stated that the Fulton County criminal justice system not capable of functioning at an attainable rate. The 1982 class-action lawsuit continued to cover the Rice Street Jail until the suit was settled by the Fulton County Commission in 1994, and dismissed by this Court. 113. In April 2002, The Honorable Marvin Shoob of this Court issued a published opinion in Foster v. Fulton County, which sought to address systemic problems that lead to unnecessary incarceration and chronic jail overcrowding, which in turn adversely affected living conditions at the jail, increased the risk of exposure to dangerous diseases, and interfered with the provision of adequate medical care. Foster v. Fulton County, 223 F. Supp. 2d 1292 (N.D. Ga. 2002).
22

114. The opinion detailed the unconstitutional condition of the Fulton County criminal Justice system and the overcrowding and overdetention problems at the Fulton County Jail. 115. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference herein the contents of the published opinions in Foster. 116. The Foster Court specifically ordered Fulton County and the Fulton County Jail and the sheriff to implement an integrated computer system that links all of the appropriate agencies in the Fulton County criminal justice system, expand the current discharge planning resources at the jail and evaluate obstacles to discharge planning and take steps to remove these obstacles. 117. The opinion detailed the fact that the Fulton County Jail allowed commitment of intakes to the Fulton County Jail without obtaining commitment documents needed to book intakes to the Fulton County Jail, and process their appearances in court in about twenty percent of intakes.
Fulton County and The Board’s Control Over Jail Staff
118. The Sheriff appoints deputies and jailers (civilian, administrative employees who do not have any police powers) to staff the Fulton County Jail subject to the supervision of the Board.
23

119. The Records Room staff (people that work in the records room and process admissions and releases) are classified, administrative employees. 120. Records Room staff employees are not deputies. 121. Records Room staff are county employees. 122. Both deputies and jailers are classified employees under the constitutionally mandated Fulton County Civil Service System. 123. Classified employees are subject to the constitutionally mandated Fulton County Civil Service System. 124. The Fulton County Board administers the Fulton County Civil Service System through the Personnel Board. 125. The Personnel Board is appointed by the Board of Commissioners and is the major decision-making authority within the Personnel Department. 126. The Fulton County Civil Service Act severely curtails the Fulton County Sheriff’s power to hire, discipline, and fire Jail staff. 127. The classified employees at the Fulton County Jail are employees of the county subject to the supervision of the Board. 128. All county employees, including deputies and Records Room staff and other Fulton County Jail staff, are part of a unified, constitutionally mandated civil service system subject to the Board.
24

129. County employees may freely transfer between various county departments (including the sheriff’s department) without losing seniority. 130. All county employees, including not only the sheriff’s staff, but the sheriff herself, are part of a unified, constitutionally mandated pension system. 131.
The Sheriff’s Responsibilities For Inmates At The Fulton County Jail
132. The Sheriff’s duties include hiring, disciplining, and firing Jail staff subject to the supervision of the Board. 133. The Sheriff’s duties also include formulating, implementing, and executing policies concerning the operation of the Fulton County Jail facilities subject to the authority of the Board. 134. These duties include promulgating policies controlling the strip searches of inmates, and regulations ensuring the release of inmates on their Release Dates. 135. The Sheriff has day-to-day training, supervisory, and disciplinary authority for all operations of the Fulton County Jail subject to the supervision of the Board. 136. The Sheriff is also responsible for ensuring that each employee of the Fulton County Jail discharges his or her duties in accordance with the law, court orders, and authority designated her by the Board.
25

Criminal Justice Cycle And The Fulton County Jail
137. The steps in an inmate’s trip through the criminal justice cycle in Fulton County are: (1) arrest; (2) commitment to the Fulton County Jail as a new commitment; (3) hearing at the Fulton County Jail in the case of felony arrests, or hearing at the courthouse in the case of misdemeanor arrests; (4) transport from the Fulton County Jail to court for subsequent court dates; and (5) return to the Fulton County Jail. 138. A suspect is arrested in Fulton County by the Fulton County Police or other county agent, by the Sheriff, or by a municipal police force. 139. The Fulton County Police Department transports all arrestees directly to the Fulton County Jail, and commits them to the Fulton County Jail. 140. The Fulton County Police Department is controlled and operated by, and is subject to, the authority of the Board. 141. At any one time, approximately forty percent (40%) of the Fulton County Jail inmate population was committed by the Fulton County Police Department. 142. The City of Atlanta Police Department transports arrestees arrested on state charges directly to the Fulton County Jail, and commits them to the Fulton County Jail. 143. The Atlanta Police Department (“Atlanta PD“) is a department of the City of Atlanta with an authorized strength of over 2,300 employees.
26

144. Every year during the past five years, officers of the Atlanta PD arrested about 30,000 persons and committed them to the Fulton County Jail. 145. Approximately seventy-five percent (75%) of the cases in the State Court of Fulton County originate in the City of Atlanta. 146. Many arrests made by the Atlanta Police Department charged as misdemeanors could also have been charged as municipal offenses. 147. Many arrests made by the Atlanta PD charged as state law misdemeanors could also have been taken before the City of Atlanta courts, given probable cause hearings there, and bound over to the Fulton County Jail upon a finding of probable cause. O.C.G.A. § 17-4-21; O.C.G.A. § 17-4-62; O.C.G.A. § § 15-74(a)(3)-(4); 15-10-2(1), (3), (9); 17-4-40(a); 17-6-1(b)(1); 17-6-1(f)(1); 17-7-20; and O.C.G.A. § 36-32-3 (granting municipal court judges the same power and authority as magistrate court judges in criminal cases). 148. Prior to January 1, 2003, the Atlanta PD committed all persons it arrested and charged with state offenses to a City of Atlanta detention facility instead of the Fulton County Jail. 149. Prior to January 1, 2003, the City of Atlanta detained, and assumed the responsibility for conducting the 48 hour “McLaughlin v. County of Riverside” probable cause hearings for all persons its officers arrested; even persons its officers arrested and charged with state offenses.
27

150. Prior to January 1, 2003, the City of Atlanta detained all persons its officers arrested, even persons its officers arrested and charged with state offenses, and conducted whatever probable cause hearing was given to such persons. 151. Prior to January 1, 2003, persons for whom probable cause was found on the state offense were bound over to Superior Court, and transferred to the Fulton County Jail unless the person was released on bond. 152. Many such arrestees were held by the City of Atlanta for several days before being transferred to the Fulton County Jail. 153. Prior to January 1, 2003, many persons arrested by the Atlanta PD and charged with state offenses had their charges reduced to a municipal offense as a result of their probable cause hearings, or after processing by City of Atlanta attorneys. 154. First Appearances for persons arrested for felons committed to the Fulton County Jail are held in the Fulton County Jail. 155. First Appearances for persons arrested for misdemeanors committed to the Fulton County Jail are held in the State or Superior Court during the week, and in the Fulton County Jail on Saturdays. 156. In-custody defendants are transported from the Fulton County Jail to the State or Superior Court for subsequent hearings such as bond hearings or status hearings.
28

157. All in-custody defendants transported from the Fulton County Jail to a courthouse for a hearing are returned to the Fulton County Jail after their court appearances (“court returns”), even those entitled to release by virtue of their court appearances.
2003 Changes In City Of Atlanta Arrest And Commitment And Hearing Practices
158. During 2002, Atlanta mayor Shirley Franklin conceived a plan to order Atlanta PD officers to exercise their discretion to charge all persons who could be charged with either municipal or state offenses with state offenses. 159. During 2002, Atlanta mayor Shirley Franklin conceived a plan to order Atlanta PD officers to exercise their discretion to commit all persons it arrested and charged with state offenses to Fulton County Jail instead of an Atlanta detention facility. 160. Mayor Shirley Franklin expressly announced that the purpose of her plan was to save money for the City of Atlanta. 161. Mayor Franklin advised the City of Atlanta City Council that her plan would save the City of Atlanta about $11.4 million in fiscal year 2003. 162. The City Council approved Mayor Franklin’s plan, and her proposed budget.
29

163. Fulton County officials had estimated it would cost anywhere from $8 million to $17 million to process and house the arrestees the City of Atlanta had previously processed and housed. 164. As of January 1, 2003, the Atlanta PD began charging all persons who could be charged with either municipal offenses or state offenses with state offenses. 165. As of January 1, 2003, the City of Atlanta stopped detaining persons arrested by the Atlanta PD in Fulton County. 166. As of January 1, 2003, the Atlanta PD began committing those arrestees it arrested in Fulton County and charged with state offenses directly to the Fulton County Jail.
Records Room And Operations Of The Records Room
167. The Records Room is the unit of the Fulton County Jail that has responsibility for booking arrestees into the Fulton County Jail. Additionally, these employees create and administer institutional files for inmates, and keep track of inmates to ensuring their release according to their court ordered Release Dates. 168. The Records Room uses a combined system of paper files and computer databases to keep track of inmates, prepare them to be transported to court for
30

court hearings, and process the release and commitment orders generated at the court hearings. 169. When inmates are “booked” into the Fulton County Jail, the Records Room creates, or in the case of a person who has previously been booked into the Fulton County Jail, updates a 4x6 card for each inmate showing his demographic information, his open charges, and his charge history. 170. As part of the booking process, the Records Room staff also checks criminal databases to determine if the new commitment is the subject of any other wants, holds or detainers from other jurisdictions. 171. If there are such holds, the information is noted in the inmate’s institutional files, and on the 4x6 card. 172. Whether the inmate is the subject of any other wants, holds or detainers from other jurisdictions is also available in real time on the “Mainframe” computer, available to Records Room staff and deputies. 173. The Jail and the courthouses have their own computer systems for keeping track of defendants and their court dates, and entering dispositions into the computer systems. 174. As a result, court data, release, and commitment orders issued by judges for in-custody defendants must be faxed from the courthouses to the Fulton County Jail. This information must be processed by hand for each inmate.
31

175. The large number of inmates in the Fulton County Jail, and the constant flow of inmates and releases, have overwhelmed the outmoded, paper-driven system for processing inmates. 176. Lack of staff and lack of training exacerbates problems caused by the systemic deficiencies in the inmate management system. 177. Chronic absenteeism of Jail staff caused by unsanitary conditions in the Jail exacerbates the problems caused by the systemic deficiencies in the inmate management system. 178. Because of problems and backlogs in the Records Room, many newly committed inmates are not actually booked into the Jail for several days after their commitment. 179. The Fulton County Jail also accepts for commitment to the Fulton County Jail arrestees brought by the Atlanta PD, and the Fulton County Police Department, to the Fulton County Jail without charging or arrest documents.
The Fulton County Jail Policy Of Strip Searching All Arrestees Booked Into The Fulton County Jail
180. Every person booked into the Fulton County Jail general population is subjected to a strip search conducted without an individual determination of reasonable suspicion to justify the search, and regardless of the crime with which the person is charged.
32

181. The booking strip search process involves having the arrested person go into a large room with a group of up to thirty to forty other inmates, remove all of his clothing, and place the clothing in boxes. 182. The arrested person, along with the group, takes a shower. 183. Each arrestee then either singly, or standing in a line with others, is visually inspected front and back by deputies. 184. Inmates and guards refer to the booking strip searches as “dressing out.” 185. The Fulton County Jail does not keep any logs or other records of any individual strip searches performed in the booking areas. 186. The City of Atlanta, through its agents, has had notice of the booking strip searches before the class period through communications with county agents, inmates and other methods.
The Fulton County Jail Practice Of Subjecting Certain Persons To Booking Strip Searches After They Have Already Been Ordered Released By A Judge Or Had
Their Bond Posted, Or Should Have Been Posted 187. The booking and presentment processes at the Fulton County Jail before and during the class period were so inefficient that many persons were committed to the Fulton County Jail, presented to a judicial officer in the Fulton County Jail or one of the court houses at First Appearance, ordered released by the judicial officer, and then subjected to the booking strip searches (the “dress out”
33

procedure), or, the persons were subjected to the illegal booking searches after they had posted bail or someone had posted it for them. 188. The only reasons Alpha Strip Search Class members were subjected to a booking strip search is because the Fulton County Jail made going through the booking process a condition of release, and it also made an illegal strip search a component of the booking process. 189. The Fulton County Jail’s booking process, as administered and acquiesced in, by defendants was so indifferent to the rights of these persons that it made a strip search an element of the booking process, and required the booking process as a condition of release, even after a person was entitled to release by court order or bond.
The Fulton County Jail Policy For Court Returns
190. Every weekday, about 100 to 150 in-custody defendants are transported from the Fulton County Jail to the Superior Court and the State Court for court appearances. 191. The Records Room does not run checks for wants and holds on in-custody defendants before they are transported to the courthouses for hearings. 192. The Records Room does pull the 4x6 card of each inmate who is going to a courthouse for a hearing the night before the hearing, and puts the cards aside in
34

the Records Room. 193. The in-custody defendants are under the constant supervision of Fulton County Sheriff’s deputies while in transit, and while at the courthouses. 194. While at the courthouse, in-custody defendants are not allowed to have contact with anyone apart from Fulton County Sheriff’s deputies, except for visits in the lockups with attorneys. These attorney visits are subject to supervision by Fulton County Sheriff’s deputies during the visits. 195. After an in-custody defendant appears before a judge, the judge issues an order directing release or further commitment. These orders are reduced to writing by the clerk. 196. The clerk does not enter the disposition into the court computer system in real time. 197. Dispositions are entered into the court computer system later in the day, or the next day. 198. The release and commitment orders are faxed to the Records Room. 199. In-custody defendants whose cases have been discharged are not given the option of being discharged from the courthouse. 200. Every in-custody defendant transported to the Superior Court or the State Court for a court event is sent back to the Fulton County Jail following his court appearance even if the judge has issued a release order. Such persons are
35

sometimes called “court returns”. 201. The Fulton County Jail sends these court returns with release orders back to the Fulton County Jail so the Records Room can check for any other open cases with detention orders, warrants, detainers or holds before releasing them. 202. The Records Room relies on its paper records as updated by the faxed court orders. Fulton County has not implemented a county-wide computer inmate management system as it was ordered to do by this Court. 203. Court returns entitled to release are booked back into the Fulton County Jail general populations while the Records Room processes the day’s commit and release orders. Even though they are entitled to release, these court returns are not actually released until a later date.
The Fulton County Jail Policy For Court Returns
204. The Fulton County Jail staff subject many court returns to strip searches, even after the court return has been ordered released by a judge, and has no other cases, detainers, warrants, holds or other basis to detain him. 205. These court return strip searches are different from the booking strip searches because they do not involve the “dressing out” process of turning in clothes and going through the showers.
36

The Cause Of The Overdetention – Detaining Persons Ordered Released To Check For Detainers And Warrants; Collapse Of The Inmate Management System
206. The Fulton County Jail has no effective inmate management system. 207. The Records Room is plagued by both overdetentions and premature releases. 208. Both overdetentions and premature releases are symptomatic of a nonfunctioning inmate management system. 209. The fact that the Fulton County Jail has no effective inmate management system has been documented by a series of reports and newspaper articles, as well as by court cases dating back many years. 210. The Fulton County Jail has recently aggravated the backlog of overdetained inmates by overreacting to a string of premature releases. 211. The Fulton County Jail's policy of returning all in-custody defendants sent to the courthouses for hearings back to the Jail for processing after their hearings, even those whose cases have been dismissed, swells the backlog of unprocessed inmates. 212. This policy and practice is a major contributing cause of the Records Room’s inability to process and release individuals on their Release Dates. 213. The policy of sending court returns entitled to release back to the Jail, instead of releasing them from the courthouses, creates the court return strip search problem.
37

214. If the court returns entitled to release by virtue of their court appearances were released at the courthouse, they would not be booked back in and strip searched in the first place. 215. The policy of sending court returns entitled to release back to the Jail, instead of releasing them from the courthouses, exacerbates the overdetention and overcrowding problem. This policy adds persons who have already been ordered released by a judge into an already overloaded system. 216. The Fulton County Jail's policy of sending all court returns, even those whose cases have been dismissed, back to the jail for processing costs taxpayers money, swells the population of the facilities unnecessarily, and causes inmate unrest.
The Overcrowding, Overdetentions And Premature Releases Are A Longstanding, Pervasive And Continuing Problem Known To Defendants
217. The Fulton County Jail has a long and documented history of overcrowding, overdetaining inmates past their release dates, and prematurely releasing inmates. 218. The old jail had been the subject of a 1982 class-action lawsuit (Fambro v. Fulton, 82-cv2136, JOF) challenging conditions at that facility, including overcrowding and overdetentions.
38

219. Among the many deficiencies the monitor found at the old jail in 1989, three broad areas were especially outrageous: 1) overcrowding, 2) medical services, and 3) sanitation. 220. The Court ultimately had to take the drastic step of ordered wholesale releases in an attempt to solve the problems of 1) overcrowding, 2) medical services, and 3) sanitation. 221. In 1989, this Court published a decision that warned the Fulton County Commissioners that the new jail would not be sufficient to handle the present inmate population requirements of the county because of a substantially higher population, and problems with moving persons expeditiously through the criminal justice system. 222. The 1982 class-action lawsuit continued to cover the current Rice Street Jail when that facility opened in 1991, until the suit was settled by the Fulton County Commission in 1994, and was dismissed by this Court. 223. The unconstitutional 1) overcrowding, 2) medical services, and 3) sanitation deficiencies persisted in the new facility. 224. Certain inmates of the Fulton County Jail again brought a class action against Fulton County, the Sheriff, and the Board in 1999. Foster v. Fulton County, 1:99-cv-900-MHS challenging 1) overcrowding, 2) medical services,
39

especially medical services for HIV positive inmates, 3) overdetentions, and 4) sanitation. 225. The Court found that systemic problems lead to unnecessary incarceration and chronic jail overcrowding, which in turn adversely affected living conditions at the jail, thus increasing the risk of exposure to dangerous diseases, and interfering with the provision of adequate medical care, and thus being a major contributing moving force of the overdetentions. 226. In Foster v. Fulton County, 1:99-cv-900-MHS, the defendants, including Fulton County and Fulton County Board of Commissioners, Mike Kenn, Karen Webster, Tom Lowe, Bob Fulton, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy Boxill, L. L. Briggs, and George Herron, filed monthly reports on the jail population containing (among other things) information documenting a persistent pattern of overdetentions, including certain inmates held past their Release Dates. 227. Recent notorious examples of overdetention show the overdetention and strip search problems persist. 228. At least eight jail inmates were prematurely released by error over the year 2004. 229. Inmates routinely must obtain attorneys or inmate rights organizations on the outside to call the Records Room just to obtain release in accordance with their Release Dates.
40

230. On information and belief, at any one time up to 5-20% of the Fulton County Jail population is being held past their Release Dates. 231. In addition to the court opinions referenced above, there were numerous newspaper articles and other media reports detailing the systemic problems of constitutional magnitude at the Fulton County Jail, including problems of Overdetentions. 232. On information and belief, Fulton County, the Fulton County Board and its members were fully aware of the court opinions, newspaper articles and other media reports and court filings detailing the systemic problems of constitutional magnitude at the Fulton County Jail, including problems of Overdetentions. 233. On information and belief, Sheriff Barrett directly informed Fulton County, the Fulton County Board and its members, on numerous occasions, that the insufficiency of the County’s allocation of funds “for the efficient and effective operation of the jail”, O.C.G.A. § 42-4-94(b), were directly responsible for serious deficiencies of constitutional magnitude in the jail’s operation, including the problem of Overdetentions. 234. On information and belief, Fulton County, the Fulton County Board and its members were fully aware that the problem of Overdetentions at the Fulton County Jail was significantly attributed to its lack of adequate funding “for the efficient and effective operation of the jail.” O.C.G.A. § 42-4-94(b).
41

235. On information and belief, Fulton County, the Fulton County Board and its members knowingly refused to provide adequate funding “for the efficient and effective operation of the jail.” O.C.G.A. § 42-4-94(b), and were fully aware that its inaction would result in the perpetuation of problems of the operation of the jail of constitutional magnitude, including Overdetentions. 236. The chart set forth below shows how pervasive and widespread the overdetention problem is. 237. The chart shows the court date, Release Date, and Exit Date for virtually every inmate who appeared in magistrate court first appearance hearings (9 a.m. and 1 p.m. calendars) and State Court preliminary hearing calendars during the period March 18-31, 2004 who had a disposition resulting in release (dismissal, sentence of time served, defendant allowed to sign own bond (SOB)).

Defendant El Aten

Date Booked
3-18-04

Court Date
3-18-04

Disposition Dismissed

Date Released
3-20-04

Days Held Over 2

Marvin Davidson 3-16-04 3-18; 3-19 Time served 3-20-04 2

Leroy Barrett

3-17-04 3-18-04 Dismissed 3-21-04 3

Corey Boatwright 3-18-04 3-18-04 Dismissed 3-21-04 3

Michelle Collins 3-18-04 3-18-04 Dismissed 3-21-04 3

42

Bobbie Derest

3-18-04 3-18-04 Dismissed 3-21-04 3

Malcolm Dill

3-18-04 3-18-04 Dismissed 3-25-04 7

Roberto Duarte 3-18-04 3-18-04 SOB

3-25-04 7

Carl Feguson

3-18-04 3-18-04 SOB

3-20-04 2

Jimmie Gray

3-17-04 3-18-04 Dismissed

3-23-04 5 (hold)

Zhan Holsey

3-17-04 3-18-04 Dismissed 3-20-04 2

Jerald Lawson 3-17-04 3-18-04 Dismissed 3-22-04 4

Nadine Marshall 3-18-04 3-18-04 Dismissed 3-21-04 3

Angela Morrow 3-18-04 3-18-04 Dismissed 3-21-04 3

Terry Mozley

3-18-04 3-18-04 Dismissed 3-20-04 2

Donald Springer 3-18-04 3-18-04 Dismissed 3-23-04 5

Randy Troy

3-18-04 3-18-04 SOB

3-23-04 5

Lorraine Wilkens 3-18-04 3-18-04 SOB

3-23-04 5

Harvey Boyd

3-17-04 3-18-04 Dismissed 3-21-04 3

Clarence Maxwell 3-17-04 3-18-04 Dismissed 3-22-04 4

Reginald Morton 3-16-04 3-18-04 Dismissed 3-21-04 3

Maury Ridley

3-17-04 3-18-04 Dismissed 3-21-04 3

Roger Threats

3-17-04 3-18-04 Dismissed 3-20-04 2

Chaka Zulu

3-17-04 3-18-04 Time served 3-22-04 4

William Dodson 3-18-04 3-19-04 SOB

3-20-04 1

Leo Harden

3-18-04 3-19-04 Time served 3-24-04 5

Niles Johnson

3-10-04 3-19-04 SOB

3-23-04 4

Arnold Levi

3-18-04

3-19-04

Reset for proof

3-21-04 2

43

Charles Lyons Roger Thomas Ronnie Tyler

3-17-04 3-17-04 3-17-04

Larry Dean Jasiah Gillis Norman Gray Randy Harris Shirley McCullough Dwike Leonard Cassandra Mays Yolanda Smith Tarron Tyler

3-19-04 3-19-04 3-19-04 3-19-04 3-19-04
3-19-04 3-18-04 3-18-04 3-19-04

George Teasley 3-19-04 Marco Thomas 3-19-04 Timothy Williams 3-19-04

Howard Arnold Shanika Fambro Steven Berry

2-18-04 3-12-04 3-19-04

3-19-04 3-19-04 3-19-04
3-19-04 3-19-04 3-19-04 3-19-04 3-19-04
3-19-04 3-19-04 3-19-04 3-19-04
3-19-04 3-19-04 3-19-04, 3-20-04
3-19-04 3-19-04 3-20-04

Time served SOB Time served
SOB Time served Time served SOB SOB

3-23-04 4 3-25-04 6 3-29-04 10 (hold in Bibb Co.) 3-25-04 6 3-24-04 5 3-23-04 4 3-23-04 4 3-23-04 4

SOB

3-23-04 4

SOB

3-22-04 3

SOB

3-22-04 3

SOB

3-22-04 3

(Marietta

hold)

SOB

3-23-04 4

SOB

3-23-04 4

SOB

3-24-04 5

(DeKalb

hold)

Time served 3-23-04 4

SOB

3-22-04 3

SOB

3-24-04 4

Gwinnett

44

hold

Eric Brewster

3-19-04 3-20-04 SOB

3-22-04 2

Ronald Brown 3-18-04 3-20-04 Time served 3-25-04 5

Charles Carter 3-18-04 3-20-04 Time served 3-25-04 5

Jane Doe

3-20-04 3-20-04 Time served 3-22-04 2

Roberto Duarte 3-18-04 3-18; 3-20 SOB

3-25-04 5

Leo Harden

3-18-04 3-20-04 Time served 3-24-04 4

Betty Ann Hicks 3-18-04 3-20-04 SOB

3-23-04 3

Anthony Jefferson 3-18-04 3-20-04 SOB

3-23-04 3

Mark King

3-19-04 3-20-04 SOB

3-22-04 2

Bengie Martin 3-18-04 3-18-04 Bond,

3-25-04 7

wouldn’t let

him out w/o

bk#

Keair Mason

3-20-04 3-20-04 SOB

3-22-04 2

Deniera Owens 3-19-04 3-20-04 Time served 3-23-04 3

Charley Parks

3-19-04 3-20-04 SOB

3-23-04 3

Raymond Quantez 3-20-04 3-20-04 Time served 3-23-04 3

Michael

3-19-04 3-20-04 Time served 3-23-04 3

Riddlebarger

Waverly Spivey 3-19-04 3-20-04 Time served 3-23-04 3

Donald Springer 3-18-04 3-18-04, Dismissed 3-23-04 3

3-20-04

Quincy Tarver 3-20-04 3-20-04 SOB

3-23-04 3

Gary Thomas

3-19-04 3-20-04 Time served 3-23-04 3

Randy Troy

3-18-04 3-20-04 SOB

3-23-04 3

45

Lorraine Wilkens 3-18-04 3-18-04, SOB

3-23-04 3

3-20-04

Heidi Hendrix 3-20-04 3-20-04 SOB

3-24-04 4

(DeKalb

hold)

Bobby Adams

3-21-04 3-22-04 SOB

3-24-04 2

Marvin Allen

3-21-04 3-22-04 SOB

3-24-04 2

Petree Anderson 3-22-04 3-22-04 SOB

3-26-04 4

Keith Barnett

3-21-04 3-22-04 Dismissed 3-24-04 2

Patrick Bryant 3-20-04 3-22-04 SOB

3-24-04 2

Christopher Cobb 3-21-04 3-22-04 Dismissed 3-24-04 2

Thomas Davis 3-20-04 3-22-04 Time served 3-24-04 2

Jose Alberto Duran

3-21-04 3-22-04 SOB

3-24-04 2

Arthur Favor

3-21-04 3-22-04 SOB

3-24-04 2

Pauline Favors 3-21-04 3-22-04 SOB

3-24-04 2

Torino Hawkins 3-22-04 3-22-04 SOB

3-23-04 1

Romaldo Hernandez

3-21-04 3-22-04 SOB

3-23-04 1

Shane Humphrey 3-22-04 3-22-04 SOB

3-24-04 2

(Alph.

hold)

Ahmad Jamil

3-22-04 3-22-04 Dismissed 3-24-04 2

David Lucas

3-19-04 3-22-04 SOB

3-25-04 3

Orlando Neal

3-20-04 3-22-04 Dismissed 3-25-04 3

Herman Pittman 3-20-04 3-22-04 Time served 3-24-04 2

46

Arrgueta Reyes 3-21-04 3-22-04 SOB

3-24-04 2

William Robinson 3-20-04 3-22-04 Time served 3-24-04 2

Dominique

3-21-04 3-22-04 Dismissed 3-24-04 2

Roscoe

Gregory Shields 3-20-04 3-22-04 Time served 3-24-04 2

Wayne Teague 3-21-04 3-22-04 SOB

3-24-04 2

Thomas Toland 3-21-04 3-22-04 SOB

3-24-04 2

Michael Wallace 3-20-04 3-22-04 SOB

3-24-04 2

Willie Zachary 3-21-04 3-22-04 Dismissed 3-24-04 2

Derrick David 3-19-04 3-22-04 SOB

3-23-04 1

Norris Davis

3-20-04 3-22-04 SOB

3-24-04 2

Bernard Hill

3-20-04 3-22-04 Dismissed 3-24-04 2

Toddrick Merritt 3-19-04 3-22-04 Time served 3-24-04 2

Albert Williams 3-19-04 3-22-04 Time served 3-24-04 2

John E. Clarke 3-21-04 3-23-04 Dismissed 3-25-04 2

William Hiner 3-21-04 3-23-04 SOB

3-24-04 1

Emmanuel

3-21-04 3-23, 3-26 Time served 3-29-04 3

Mitchell

Marcell Murrell 3-21-04 3-23-04 SOB

3-25-04 2

Brandon Starks 3-19-04 3-23-04 Time served 3-25-04 2

Roger Thomas 3-17-04 3-23-04 Dismissed 3-25-04 2

James Verlon

3-20-04 3-23-04 SOB

3-25-04 2

Arjuna Westbrook 3-21-04 3-23-04 Time served 3-24-04 1

John Woody

3-20-04 3-23-04 Time served 3-25-04 2

Marvin Williams 3-15-04 3-16, 3-23 Time served 3-27-04 4

47

Trenton Williams 3-22-04 3-23-04 Time served 3-25-04 2

Phillip Buchanan 3-23-04 3-23-04 Time served 3-25-04 2

Ann Giorgianni 3-23-04 3-23-04 SOB

3-25-04 2

Michael Gladney 3-22-04 3-23-04 Time served 3-25-04 2

Vincent Manderson

3-23-04 3-23-04 SOB

4-4-04 12

April May

3-23-04 3-23-04 SOB

3-24-04 1

Michael Mcleod 3-23-04 3-23-04 SOB

3-25-04 2

John Bentley

3-22-04 3-23-04 SOB

3-29-04 6

Warren Fletcher 3-12-04 3-23-04 Dismissed 3-25-04 2

Uzziah

3-8-04 3-23-04 Time served 3-25-04 2

Hammonds

Darrell James

3-15-04 3-23-04 Time served 3-25-04 2

Gary Jones

3-8-04 3-23-04 Dismissed 3-25-04 2

Anthony Cobb 3-23-04 3-24-04 Time served 3-26-04 2

Marcus

3-21-04 3-24-04 Time served 3-26-04 2

Richardson

Rachel Bailey

3-23-04 3-24-04 SOB

3-25-04 1

*Lavoid Blount 3-24-04 3-24-04 SOB

3-27-04 3

*Howard Coleman 3-24-04 3-24-04 SOB

3-28-04 4

*Walter Gay

3-23-04 3-24-04 SOB

3-28-04 4

*William Hackett 3-24-04 3-24-04 SOB

3-28-04 4

Michael Moore 3-24-04 3-24-04 Time served 3-27-04 3

Ronnie Pharr

3-24-04 3-24-04 SOB

3-27-04 3

*Ledarius

3-24-04 3-24-04 SOB

3-28-04 4

Timmons

48

Duval Union

3-23-04 3-24-03 Time served 3-27-04 3

Travis Houston 3-25-04 3-25-04 Dismissed 3-27-04 2

Barry Johnson 3-25-04 3-25-04 SOB

3-26-04 1

Bryan Kitts

3-17-04 3-25-04 Dismissed 3-26-04 1

Gloria Miller

3-24-04 3-25-04 SOB

3-27-04 2

Bernice Render 3-25-04 3-25-04 SOB

3-27-04 2

Curtis Thorton 3-25-04 3-25-04 SOB

3-28-04 3

Larry Bostic

3-25-04 3-26-04 Dismissed 3-28-04 2

Jeffrey Cain

3-25-04 3-26-04 Time served 3-29-04 3

Benjamin Dykes 3-25-04 3-26-04 SOB

3-28-04 2

Keith Green

3-25-04 3-26-04 Time served 3-28-04 2

James Jones

3-25-04 3-26-04 SOB

3-29-04 3

Michael Netters 3-26-04 3-26-04 Time served 3-28-04 2

James Smith

3-26-04 3-26-04 Time served 3-31-04 5

Demiron Chester 3-25-04 3-26-04 SOB

4-3-04 8

Dwight Davis

3-25-04 3-26-04 SOB

3-31-04 5

Dennis Fannin 3-25-04 3-26-04 Time served 4-1-04 6

Kendrick Freeman 3-25-04 3-26-04 SOB

4-1-04 6

Lee Gamble

3-25-04 3-26-04 SOB

3-30-04 4

Mostafa Ghorbani 3-25-04 3-26-04 Time served 4-1-04 6

Phillip Quinones 3-25-04 3-26-04 Time served 4-6-04 11

Michael Gladney 3-26-04 3-27-04 Time served 3-29-04 2

Kevin Ball

3-26-04 3-27-04 SOB

3-29-04 2

Antonio Battle 3-26-04 3-27-04 SOB

3-29-04 2

John Bentley

3-22-04 3-27-04 Time served 3-29-04 2

49

Shakita Brew

3-26-04 3-27-04 SOB

3-29-04 2

Antonio Griffin 3-27-04 3-27-04 SOB

3-29-04 2

Catrina Hollis

3-25-04 3-27-04 Dismissed 3-29-04 2

Charlie Howard 3-27-04 3-27-04 Time served 3-29-04 2

Joseph Hunt

3-26-04 3-27-04 SOB

3-28-04 1

Shakita McLester 3-26-04 3-27-04 SOB

3-29-04 2

Richard Minor 3-25-04 3-27-04 SOB

3-29-04 2

Travis Moore

3-26-04 3-27-04 Time served 3-29-04 2

Kyle Palmer

3-26-04 3-27-04 Time served 3-29-04 2

James Sidel

3-25-04 3-27-04 SOB

3-29-04 2

Steven Taylor

3-27-04 3-27-04 SOB

3-28-04 1

Rodney Townsend 3-25-04 3-27-04 SOB

3-31-04 4

Bryan Turner

3-26-04 3-27-04 Time served 3-28-04 1

Shawn Williams 3-22-04 3-27-04 Time served 3-29-04 2

Dale Baldwin

3-28-04 3-29-04 SOB

4-1-04 3

Lawrence Caldwell

3-28-04 3-29-04 Time served 3-30-04 1

Alfred Couch

3-27-04 3-29-04 SOB

3-30-04 1

Michelle Couch 3-27-04 3-29-04 SOB

3-30-04 1

Harold Gooden 3-27-04 3-29-04 SOB

4-1-04 3

Sandeep Gupta 3-27-04 3-29-04 SOB

3-30-04 1

Curtis Harris

3-27-04 3-29-04 SOB

3-30-04 1

Verner Harris

3-27-04 3-29-04 Time served 4-1-04 3

Michael Kingcaid 3-27-04 3-29-04 SOB

3-30-04 1

Nadir Quadir

3-27-04 3-29-04 SOB

3-31-04 2

50

Kelvin Robinson 3-28-04 3-29-04 Time served 3-30-04 1

Lynn Ann

3-27-04 3-29-04 Dismissed 3-31-04 2

Thompson

Nyroble White 3-27-04 3-29-04 Time served 4-1-04 3

Jeffrey Williams 3-27-04 3-29-04 SOB

3-31-04 2

Arbram Adams 3-27-04 3-29-04 SOB

3-31-04 2

Ronald Boutte 3-28-04 3-29-04 SOB

3-31-04 2

Howard Brown 3-27-04 3-29-04 SOB

3-31-04 2

Lucia Davis

3-27-04 3-29-04 SOB

3-31-04 2

Sidy Diallo

3-26-04 3-29-04 SOB

4-1-04 3

Ann Gilbert

3-28-04 3-29-04 Time served 3-31-04 2

(hold)

Darrell Glover

3-28-04 3-29-04 Time served 3-31-04 2 (hold)

Dotruell Jordan 3-28-04 3-29-04 SOB

3-30-04 1

Max Lipchonsky 3-28-04 3-29-04 SOB

4-1-04 3

Eric Smith

3-28-04 3-29-04 Time served 4-1-04 3

Amos Brown

3-29-04 3-30-04 Dismissed 4-1-04 2

Avery Childs

3-29-04 3-30-04 SOB

4-1-04 2

Rodrick Contrell 3-29-04 3-30-04 SOB

4-1-04 2

Demarcus Ellis 3-29-04 3-30-04 SOB

4-1-04 2

Kewonnus

3-29-04 3-30-04 Time served 4-1-04 2

Harness

Lamar Jefferson 3-29-04 3-30-04 Dismissed 4-1-04 2

Mary Magnes

3-29-04 3-30-04 SOB

4-1-04 2

Frank Murrell

3-22-04 3-30-04 Time served 4-1-04 2

51

Brian Quinn

3-24-04 3-30-04 Dismissed 4-1-04 2

Diane Thomas 3-29-04 3-30-04 Time served 4-1-04 2

Leroy Thompson 3-29-04 3-30-04 SOB

4-1-04 2

Patricia Brumley 3-29-04 3-30-04 Time served 4-1-04 2

Terry Bailey

3-30-04 3-31-04 SOB

4-3-04 3

Wesley Cosby 3-30-04 3-31-04 Time served 4-2-04 2

Maurice Edwards 3-30-04 3-31-04 SOB

4-3-04 3

Jason Underwood 3-30-04 3-31-04 SOB

4-3-04 3

Henry Bell

3-30-04 3-31-04 SOB

4-1-04 1

Mikal Cartier

3-30-04 3-31-04 SOB

4-3-04 3

Marcene Cooper 3-30-04 3-31-04 SOB

4-1-04 1

John Daniell

3-30-04 3-31-04 SOB

4-1-03 1

Mark Hillegas 3-30-04 3-31-04 SOB

4-2-04 2

Illustrative Case

231.

Overdetentions happen at practically every event in the criminal justice

system from arrest to trial.

232.

The problem starts when inmates are committed into the Fulton County

Jail without being “booked in”; that is, fingerprinted, identified, checked for

outstanding wants, holds, warrants and detainers, and entered into the

computerized inmate management system.

52

233.

For example, Plaintiff Alan Powell was arrested and committed into the

Fulton County Jail early on the morning of Saturday, March 20, 2004. He was not

booked in until approximately 6:00 p.m. the following day; Sunday, March 21,

2004.

234.

As a result, Mr. Powell was not taken to the misdemeanor court in State

Court for First Appearance, and so was not given a bond hearing.

235.

Moreover, even though Mr. Powell was entitled to bail based on a

schedule for minor offenses, Jail staff told him that he could not be released on bail

until after he was booked.

236.

Finally, on the evening of Sunday, March 21, 2004, Mr. Powell was

formerly booked into the jail.

237.

Along with the booking procedure came a degrading, humiliating strip

search.

238.

Mr. Powell, and everyone else booked into the Fulton County Jail on

Sunday night (or any other night or day), was taken to a large room, told to take off

all clothes, put them in a plastic box, and take a shower with the entire group in a

single large room.

239.

Then each man took his clothes to a counter and exchanged his own

clothes for a jail jumpsuit.

53

240.

Before picking up his jumpsuit, Mr. Powell, along with every other

inmate in the process, had to stand before a guard front and center, and show his

front and back sides while naked.

241.

Mr. Powell’s family posted his bond on Sunday, March 21, 2004.

242.

However, Mr. Powell was not released. When he complained, guards

threatened to “lose” his paperwork.

243.

Mr. Powell was finally released on Tuesday morning, March 23, 2004.

244.

The jail frequently sends recently arrested inmates to bond hearings at

State Court before the inmates have been booked in.

245.

As a result, the bond hearings are meaningless because the inmates

cannot be either charged or bonded out since they have not yet been booked.

246.

Without the paperwork generated by a booking, prosecutors lack the

documentation necessary to show probable cause. Without probable cause, judges

are forced to throw out cases within 48 hours.

247.

On March 18, 2004, Judge Roy Roberts in State Court dismissed

misdemeanor charges against 22 defendants because they were presented in his

courtroom without paperwork. They had been sent to court without having been

booked.

248.

However, even when a judge orders inmates released at the first

appearance, their release is no sure thing.

54

249.

During the period March 18-31, 2004, approximately 135 persons

presented before the magistrate for a probable cause hearing..

250.

Almost every single person was overdetained for periods ranging from

one day to twelve days. (see chart at ¶131).

Defendants’ Knowledge Of The Collapse Of The Inmate Management System At The Fulton County Jail

251.

Defendants have known of the ineffective and chaotic condition of the

Records Room inmate management system for years.

252.

The City of Atlanta, through its agents, has had notice of the

overdetention problem at the Fulton County Jail for years, through court opinions,

newspaper articles, TV news reports, or communications with county agents.

253.

Moreover, jail officials have had personal knowledge of the problem for

years.

254.

The Fulton County Commission has also been aware of the above-

described problems in the inmate management system for years.

255.

In the past few years, the Fulton County commissioners have had a

federal judge, a grand jury, two separate private consultants, and a rash of escapes

to tell them about problems at the Fulton County Jail. These problems are such as

money for more guards, money for mental health treatment, money for new

55

facilities to handle nonviolent inmates in work-release programs, money to fix a

crippled computer system, money to streamline the court system, money for public

defenders, and money for more probation officers.

256.

Recently, Defendant Jacqueline Barrett released a statement terming

continuing problems at the crowded and understaffed jail a "state of emergency."

Defendant Jacqueline Barrett's Failure To Take Meaningful, Sustained Corrective Action

257.

Defendant Jacqueline Barrett has acquiesced in the Records Room's

chaotic procedures leading to the overdetention and strip search problems by

failing to take any meaningful, sustained corrective action.

258.

The Fulton County Jail is understaffed. Only about 650 guards watch

over 2,900 inmates.

259.

Fulton County has refused to provide adequate funding to the Fulton

County Jail.

260.

Last year, the Fulton County Commission reduced the Jail’s funding by

$3,000,000.

261.

Jacqueline Barrett never sent inmates to other county jails as she was

authorized to do under Georgia law.

262.

In an opinion published on April 16, 2002, just a couple of weeks

before the start of the class period, Judge Shoob held that it cost the county about

56

$45 per inmate per day to house an inmate in the Fulton County Jail. Foster v.

Fulton County, 223 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1295 n.3 (N.D. Ga. 2002).

263.

Since at least 2002 the Board and the sheriff have had the option of

sending inmates awaiting transfer to the state correctional system to other jails in

Georgia such as the facility in Pelham, Georgia.

264.

Since 2002, Gwinnett County has "housed out" surplus inmates to

Pelham, 240 miles from Lawrenceville, at the rate of $35 per day.

265.

"We don't have a choice," said Gwinnett County Sheriff Butch Conway

was quoted as saying. The population of Sheriff Conway’s 1,235-bed jail routinely

exceeds its capacity, forcing inmates to sleep on mattresses on the floor.

266.

The inmates housed out from Gwinnett County usually have been

convicted and are awaiting state cell space.

267.

The Fulton County Commission never exercised its constitutional

powers to build another jail or an addition to the Fulton County Jail.

57

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

ARRESTEE STRIP SEARCHES CLASS ALLEGATIONS

Arrestee Strip Searches Performed on Arrestee Strip Search Class Named Plaintiffs

268.

On May 20, 2004, Plaintiff Alan Powell was booked into the Fulton

County Jail’s general population a second time on the same charges after his bond

was revoked. He was subjected to a strip search without any individualized

finding of reasonable suspicion, or probable cause that he was concealing

contraband or weapons.

269.

On August 22, 2003, Plaintiff David Evans was booked into the Fulton

County Jail’s general population. He was subjected to a strip search without any

individualized finding of reasonable suspicion, or probable cause that he was

concealing contraband or weapons.

270.

On August 22, 2003, Plaintiff Stanley Clemons was booked into the

Fulton County Jail’s general population on a charge of felony burglary. He was

subjected to a strip search before presentment without any individualized finding

of reasonable suspicion, or probable cause that he was concealing contraband or

weapons. At First Appearance his charge was reduced to criminal trespass, but he

was indicted subsequently on burglary.

58

271.

On March 8, 2004, Plaintiff Allen Middleton was booked into the

Fulton County Jail’s general population. He was subjected to a strip search

without any individualized finding of reasonable suspicion, or probable cause that

he was concealing contraband or weapons.

272.

On March 24, 2004, Plaintiff Anthony Westbrook was booked into the

Fulton County Jail’s general population and subjected to a strip search without any

individualized finding of reasonable suspicion, or probable cause that he was

concealing contraband or weapons.

273.

On April 26, 2004 Plaintiff Benjamin Blake was booked into the Fulton

County Jail’s general population and subjected to a strip search without any

individualized finding of reasonable suspicion, or probable cause that he was

concealing contraband or weapons.

274.

On February 11, 2004 Plaintiff Harry Witherspoon was booked into the

Fulton County Jail’s general population and subjected to a strip search without any

individualized finding of reasonable suspicion, or probable cause that he was

concealing contraband or weapons.

“Arrestee Strip Search Class” -- Class Action Allegations

275.

The Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs bring this action under

Rules 23(a), 23(b) (2), and 23(b) (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on

59

behalf of a class consisting of each person who, in the two years preceding the

filing of this action up until the date this case is terminated, was or will be, (i) upon

being arrested and committed into the Fulton County Jail; (ii) on a charge other

than a charge of drugs, weapons or felony violence; (iii) was subjected to a blanket

strip search without any individualized finding of reasonable suspicion or probable

cause that he or she was concealing drugs, weapons or other contraband.

276.

Certification of a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2)

is appropriate because the Fulton County Jail has a policy, and engages in a pattern

and practice of conduct that has uniformly affected all members of the class.

Injunctive relief against Defendant to enjoin the practice will benefit each and

every Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiff and class member.

277.

The class is entitled to injunctive relief of terminating the above-

described policy and practice of subjecting arrestees to blanket strip searches

without any individualized finding of reasonable suspicion, or probable cause that

he or she was concealing drugs, weapons or other contraband.

278.

Certification of a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)

is also appropriate in that common questions of law and fact predominate over any

individual questions. A class action is superior for the fair and efficient

adjudication of this controversy as detailed below.

279.

Regarding the Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs and members of

60

the class, there are no individual questions on the issue of liability. Every arrestee committed into the Fulton County Jail is subjected to the blanket strip searches. None of the staff of the Fulton County Jail keeps records of these searches. Therefore, Defendant cannot show that any of the searches were conducted based on an individual determination of reasonable suspicion. Should records exist demonstrating such individualized suspicion, such people would, by definition, not be members of the class. 280. Among the questions of law and fact common to the class are:
a) whether Defendant Jacqueline Barrett instituted a policy, or acquiesced in a custom and practice of subjecting arrestees committed to the Fulton County Jail pending presentment to blanket strip searches without an individualized determination that the arrestees were in possession of drugs, weapons or other contraband;
b) whether such policy or practice, if found to exist, violates the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment;
c) whether Defendant Jacqueline Barrett was deliberately indifferent to the rights of such arrestees;
d) whether Defendant Jacqueline Barrett is entitled to qualified immunity on the §1983 claims;
61

e) whether Defendant Jacqueline Barrett is entitled to governmental immunity on the state law claims;
f) whether the County Defendants are liable for plaintiffs’ injuries; g) whether the City of Atlanta is liable for plaintiffs injuries; h) whether the Arrestee Strip Search Class Named Plaintiffs and the members
of the class have sustained damages and, if so, the proper measure of such damages; i) whether determination of damages suffered by a statistically representative sample of the class provides the basis for determination of all class members’ damages except those who opt out; and j) whether the Arrestee Strip Search Class Named Plaintiffs and the members of the class and future members are entitled to equitable relief and, if so, what is the nature of that relief. 287. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The exact number of class members is unknown to plaintiffs at this time. However, every week at least 100 persons meeting the Arrestee Strip Search Class class definition are committed into the Fulton County Jail pending presentment. All are subject to the illegal searches. Thus, this class well exceeds 10,000 members. 288. Defendant Jacqueline Barrett and the Fulton County Jail and the County Defendants have within their records the names and addresses of all current and
62

past class members. This information is maintained in the Fulton County Jail computer systems (CJUS, JDL and Banner and Mainframe), logbooks, and other paper records maintained by the Fulton County Jail and the Fulton County Defendants. 289. The Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the class because the Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs, and all other members of the class, were injured by exactly the same means; that is, by the blanket strip searches. 290. The Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the class. They have retained counsel who are competent and experienced in complex federal civil rights class action litigation and/or complex federal prisoner rights litigation. 291. The Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs have no interests that are contrary to, or in conflict with, those of the class. 292. The Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs know of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. The class action is superior to any other available means to resolve the issues raised on behalf of the Fourth Amendment Class. The class action will be manageable because so many different records systems exist from which to ascertain the members of the putative class. Damages can be
63

determined on a class-wide basis using a damages matrix set by a jury, or by trying the damages of a statistically valid sample of the class to a jury and extrapolating those damages to the class as a whole. 293. Class treatment will be superior because liability can be determined on a class-wide basis. Damages can also be determined on a class-wide basis through use of statistical sampling.
ALPHA STRIP SEARCHES CLASS ALLEGATIONS
Alpha Strip Searches Performed By The Fulton County Jail
294. On 3/21/04, someone posted bond for Plaintiff Alan Powell. 295. On 3/22/04, after someone had posted bond for him but before he was presented to a judicial officer for First Appearance, Plaintiff Alan Powell was subjected to a strip search without any individualized finding of reasonable suspicion, or probable cause that he was concealing contraband or weapons. 296. On 3/19/04, Plaintiff Kristopher Alan Matkin was ordered released by a judicial officer after his case was dismissed at First Appearance. 297. On 3/22/04, after a judicial officer had dismissed his case and ordered him released at First Appearance, Plaintiff Kristopher Alan Matkin was subjected to a strip search without any individualized finding of reasonable suspicion, or probable cause that he was concealing contraband or weapons.
64

“Alpha Strip Search Class” -- Class Action Allegations
298. The Alpha Strip Search Class Named Plaintiffs bring this action under Rules 23(a), 23(b) (2), and 23(b) (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of a class consisting of each person who, in the two years preceding the filing of this action up until the date this case is terminated, was or will be, (i) upon being arrested and committed into the Fulton County Jail; (ii) subjected to a booking strip search without any individualized finding of reasonable suspicion or probable cause that he or she was concealing drugs, weapons or other contraband; (iii) after a judicial officer had ordered his release at First Appearance, or, in the case of persons released without being taken before a judicial officer, after he had already posted bond (or someone had already posted it for him). 299. Certification of a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) is appropriate because the Fulton County Jail has a policy, and engages in a pattern and practice of conduct that has uniformly affected all members of the class. Injunctive relief against Defendants to enjoin the practice will benefit each and every Alpha Strip Search Class Named Plaintiff and class member. 300. The class is entitled to injunctive relief of terminating the above- described policy and practice. 301. Certification of a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) is also appropriate in that common questions of law and fact predominate over any
65

individual questions. A class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy as detailed below. 302. Regarding the Alpha Strip Search Class Named Plaintiffs and members of the class, there are no individual questions on the issue of liability. None of the staff of the Fulton County Jail keeps records of these searches. Therefore, Defendants cannot show that any of the searches were conducted based on an individual determination of reasonable suspicion. Should records exist demonstrating such individualized suspicion, such people would, by definition, not be members of the class. 303. Among the questions of law and fact common to the class are:
a) whether Defendants acquiesced in a practice or policy in which persons: (i) upon being arrested and committed into the Fulton County Jail; (ii) after a judicial officer at First Appearance had ordered their release, or, in the case of persons released without being taken before a judicial officer, after they had already posted bond (or someone had already posted it for them); (iii) were subjected to a blanket strip search without any individualized finding of reasonable suspicion or probable cause that they were concealing drugs, weapons or other contraband;
b) whether such policy or practice, if found to exist, violates the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment;
66

c) whether Defendant Jacqueline Barrett and Myron Freeman were deliberately indifferent to the rights of such arrestees;
d) whether Defendant Jacqueline Barrett and Myron Freeman are entitled to qualified immunity on the §1983 claims;
e) whether Defendant Jacqueline Barrett and Myron Freeman are entitled to governmental immunity on the state law claims;
f) whether the County Defendants are liable for plaintiffs’ injuries; g) whether the City of Atlanta is liable for plaintiffs injuries; h) whether the Alpha Strip Search Class Named Plaintiffs and the members of
the class have sustained damages and, if so, the proper measure of such damages; i) whether determination of damages suffered by a statistically representative sample of the class provides the basis for determination of all class members’ damages except those who opt out; and j) whether the Alpha Strip Search Class Named Plaintiffs and the members of the class and future members are entitled to equitable relief and, if so, what is the nature of that relief. 304. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The exact number of class members is unknown to plaintiffs at this time. However, upon information and belief every week at least 20 persons meeting the Alpha
67

Class class definition are committed into the Fulton County Jail. All are subject to the illegal searches. Thus, this class well exceeds 2,000 members. 305. Defendant Jacqueline Barrett and/or Myron Freeman and/or the Fulton County Jail and the Fulton County Defendants have within their records the names and addresses of all current and past class members. This information is maintained in the Fulton County Jail computer systems (CJUS, JDL and Banner and Mainframe), logbooks, and other paper records maintained by the Fulton County Jail and the Fulton County Defendants. 306. The Alpha Strip Search Class Named Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the class because the Alpha Strip Search Class Named Plaintiffs, and all other members of the class, were injured by exactly the same means; that is, by the blanket strip searches. 307. The Alpha Strip Search Class Named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the class. They have retained counsel who are competent and experienced in complex federal civil rights class action litigation and/or complex federal prisoner rights litigation. 308. The Alpha Strip Search Class Named Plaintiffs have no interests that are contrary to, or in conflict with, those of the class. 309. The Alpha Strip Search Class Named Plaintiffs know of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its
68

maintenance as a class action. The class action is superior to any other available means to resolve the issues raised on behalf of the Fourth Amendment Class. The class action will be manageable because so records systems exist from which to ascertain the members of the putative class. Damages can be determined on a class-wide basis using a damages matrix set by a jury, or by trying the damages of a statistically valid sample of the class to a jury and extrapolating those damages to the class as a whole. 310. Class treatment will be superior because liability can be determined on a class-wide basis. Damages can also be determined on a class-wide basis through use of statistical sampling.
COURT RETURN STRIP SEARCH CLASS ALLEGATIONS
“Court Return Strip Search Class” -- Class Action Allegations
311. The Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiffs were subjected to illegal strip searches after their court appearances as described above. 312. The Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiffs brings this action under Rules 23(a), 23(b) (2), and 23(b) (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of a class consisting of: each person who, in the two years preceding the filing of this action up until the date this case is terminated, has been, is or will be: (i) in the custody of the Fulton County Jail; (ii) taken to court from the Fulton
69

County Jail; (iii) ordered released by the court or otherwise became entitled to release by virtue of the court appearance because the charge on which he had been held was no longer pending or was dismissed at the hearing, was ordered released on his own recognizance, or had posted bail, was sentenced to time served, was acquitted or was otherwise entitled to release; (iv) was not the subject of any other pending case or cases which imposed any condition of release other than personal recognizance; (v) was not the subject of any detainer or warrant; (vi) was returned to the Fulton County Jail; and (vii) was subjected to a strip search without any individualized finding of reasonable suspicion or probable cause that he was concealing contraband or weapons before being released, regardless of whether he was overdetained. 313. Certification of the Court Return Strip Search Class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) is appropriate because Defendant Jacqueline Barrett implemented a policy, and/or acquiesces in a pattern and practice of conduct that has uniformly affected all members of the class, and on information and belief, that her successor, Myron Freeman has done so. Injunctive relief against Defendant will benefit each and every Overdetention Named Plaintiff and class member. 314. The Court Return Strip Search Class is entitled to injunctive relief of terminating the above-described policy of subjecting court returns entitled to release by virtue of their court appearances to strip searches without any
70

individualized findings of reasonable suspicion or probable cause that the court returns were concealing contraband or weapons. 315. Certification of a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) is also appropriate in that common questions of law and fact predominate over any individual questions. A class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy as detailed below. 316. Regarding the Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiffs and members of the class, there are no individual questions on the issue of liability because every court return returned to the Fulton County Jail is subjected to the blanket searches. No records of the searches are kept. Defendant Jacqueline Barrett cannot show that any of the searches were conducted based on an individual determination of reasonable suspicion. Should records exist demonstrating such individualized suspicion, such people would, by definition, not be members of the class. On information and belief, Defendant Myron Freeman has continued the aforementioned policies. 317. Among the questions of law and fact common to the class are:
a) whether there is a policy, custom and practice of subjecting court returns entitled to release by virtue of their court appearances returned to the Fulton County Jail to blanket strip searches without an individualized determination that the person was in possession of drugs, weapons or other contraband;
71

b) whether such policy or practice, if found to exist, violates the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment;
c) whether Defendant Jacqueline Barrett and/or Myron Freeman were deliberately indifferent to the rights of such arrestees;
d) whether Defendant Jacqueline Barrett and/or Myron Freeman are entitled to qualified immunity on the §1983 claims;
e) whether Defendant Jacqueline Barrett and/or Myron Freeman are entitled to governmental immunity on the state law claims;
f) whether the County Defendants are liable for the Court Return Strip Search Class Named Plaintiffs’ injuries;
g) whether the City of Atlanta is liable for the Court Return Strip Search Class Named Plaintiffs’ injuries;
h) whether the Court Return Strip Search Class Named Plaintiffs and the members of the class have sustained damages and, if so, the proper measure of such damages;
i) whether determination of damages suffered by a statistically representative sample of the class provides the basis for determination of all class members’ damages except those who opt out; and
72

j) whether the Court Return Strip Search Class Named Plaintiffs and the members of the class and future members are entitled to equitable relief and, if so, what is the nature of that relief.
317. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The exact number of class members is unknown to plaintiffs at this time, but is likely to consist of at least many hundreds of people. 318. Every week at least 100 persons meeting the Court Return Strip Search Class definition are committed into the Fulton County Jail pending presentment and subjected to the illegal searches. Thus this class well exceeds 10,000 members. 319. Defendant Jacqueline Barrett and/or Defendant Myron Freeman and the Fulton County Jail have within their records the names and addresses of all current and past Court Return Strip Search Class members in the Fulton County Jail computer systems (CJUS, JDL and Banner and Mainframe), logbooks and other paper records maintained by the Fulton County Jail and the Fulton County Defendants. 320. The Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the class, because the Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiffs and all other members of the class were injured by exactly the same means; that is, by the blanket searches.
73

321. The Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the class. They have retained counsel who are competent and experienced in complex federal civil rights class action litigation and/or complex federal prisoner rights litigation. 322. The Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiffs have no interests that are contrary to, or in conflict with, those of the class. 323. The Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiffs knows of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. The class action is superior to any other available means to resolve the issues raised on behalf of the Court Return Strip Search Class. The class action will be manageable because so many different records systems exist from which to ascertain the members of the putative class. Damages can be determined on a class-wide basis using a damages matrix set by a jury, or by trying the damages of a statistically valid sample of the class to a jury and extrapolating those damages to the class as a whole. 324. Class treatment will be superior because liability can be determined on a class-wide basis, and damages can also be determined on a class-wide basis through use of statistical sampling.
74

OVERDETENTION CLASS ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff C. Alan Powell’s Overdetention By The Fulton County Jail
325. On or about Saturday, March 20, 2004, Plaintiff C. Alan Powell was detained in the Fulton County Jail. 326. Plaintiff Alan Powell’s Release Date was about March 21, 2004, when he made bond. 327. Plaintiff Alan Powell's Exit Date was March 23, 2004. 328. Plaintiff Alan Powell was overdetained for three days at the Fulton County Jail. 329. The moving force behind Plaintiff Alan Powell's overdetention was the collapse of the Fulton County Jail's inmate management system, and Defendants’ deliberate indifference. 330. Plaintiff Alan Powell suffered damages as a result of the over detention.
Tory Dunlap’s Overdetention By The Fulton County Jail
331. On or about Friday, February 13, 2002, Plaintiff Tory Dunlap was committed to the Fulton County Jail. 332. Plaintiff Tory Dunlap’s Release Date was March 31, 2003. 333. Plaintiff Tory Dunlap's Exit Date was April 4, 2003.
75

334. Plaintiff Tory Dunlap was overdetained for four days at the Fulton County Jail. 335. The moving force behind Plaintiff Tory Dunlap's overdetention was the collapse of the Fulton County Jail's inmate management system, and Defendants’ deliberate indifference. 336. Plaintiff Tory Dunlap suffered damages as a result of the overdetention.
Plaintiff Lee Antonio Smith’s Overdetention By The Fulton County Jail
337. On or about Thursday night, May 9, 2002, Plaintiff Lee Antonio Smith was committed to the Fulton County Jail. 338. Plaintiff Lee Antonio Smith's Release Date was December 22, 2003. 339. Plaintiff Lee Antonio Smith's Exit Date was December 25, 2003. 340. Plaintiff Lee Antonio Smith was overdetained for three days at the Fulton County Jail. 341. The moving force behind Plaintiff Lee Antonio Smith's overdetention was the collapse of the Fulton County Jail' inmate management system, and Defendants’ deliberate indifference. 342. Plaintiff Lee Antonio Smith suffered damages as a result of the overdetention.
76

David Evans’ Overdetention By The Fulton County Jail
343. Plaintiff David Evans’s Release Date from the Fulton County Jail was December 4, 2003. 344. Plaintiff David Evans’ Exit Date was December 14, 2003. 345. Plaintiff David Evans was overdetained for ten days at the Fulton County Jail. 346. The moving force behind Plaintiff David Evans’ overdetention was the collapse of the Fulton County Jail's inmate management system, and Defendants’ deliberate indifference. 347. Plaintiff David Evans suffered damages as a result of the overdetention.
Plaintiff Stanley Clemons’ Overdetention By The Fulton County Jail
348. In August, 2003, Plaintiff Stanley Clemons was detained in the Fulton County Jail. 349. Plaintiff Stanley Clemons’ Release Date was July 19, 2004, when he was sentenced to time served. 350. Plaintiff Stanley Clemons has not yet been released from the Fulton County Jail as of the time the motion to amend was filed, July 21, 2004. 351. Plaintiff Stanley Clemons has already been overdetained for two days at the Fulton County Jail as of the time the motion to amend was filed, July 21, 2004.
77

352. The moving force behind Plaintiff Stanley Clemons’ overdetention was the collapse of the Fulton County Jail's inmate management system, and Defendants’ deliberate indifference. 353. Plaintiff Stanley Clemons suffered damages as a result of the over detention.
Plaintiff Allen Middleton’ Overdetention By The Fulton County Jail
354. On 3/8/04, Plaintiff Allen Middleton was detained in the Fulton County Jail. 355. Plaintiff Allen Middleton’s Release Date was 3/8/04, when he was sentenced to time served. 356. Plaintiff Allen Middleton’s Exit Date was 3/11/04. 357. Plaintiff Allen Middleton was overdetained for three days at the Fulton County Jail. 358. The moving force behind Plaintiff Allen Middleton’ overdetention was the collapse of the Fulton County Jail's inmate management system, and Defendants’ deliberate indifference. 359. Plaintiff Allen Middleton suffered damages as a result of the overdetention.
Plaintiff Anthony Westbrook’ Overdetention By The Fulton County Jail
360. On 3/24/04, Plaintiff Anthony Westbrook was detained in the Fulton County Jail.
78

361. Plaintiff Anthony Westbrook’s Release Date was 4/2/04. 362. Plaintiff Anthony Westbrook’s Exit Date was 4/6/04. 363. Plaintiff Anthony Westbrook was overdetained for four days at the Fulton County Jail. 364. The moving force behind Plaintiff Anthony Westbrook’ overdetention was the collapse of the Fulton County Jail's inmate management system, and Defendants’ deliberate indifference. 365. Plaintiff Anthony Westbrook suffered damages as a result of the overdetention.
Plaintiff Benjamin Blake’s Overdetention By The Fulton County Jail
366. On 4/26/04, Plaintiff Benjamin Blake was detained in the Fulton County Jail. 367. Plaintiff Benjamin Blake’s Release Date was 5/13/04. 368. Plaintiff Benjamin Blake’s Exit Date was 5/15/04. 369. Plaintiff Benjamin Blake was overdetained for two days at the Fulton County Jail. 370. The moving force behind Plaintiff Benjamin Blake’s overdetention was the collapse of the Fulton County Jail's inmate management system, and Defendants’ deliberate indifference.
79

371. Plaintiff Benjamin Blake suffered damages as a result of the overdetention.
Plaintiff Henry Witherspoon’ Overdetention By The Fulton County Jail
372. On 2/11/04, Plaintiff Henry Witherspoon was detained in the Fulton County Jail. 373. Plaintiff Henry Witherspoon’s Release Date was 3/10/04. 374. Plaintiff Henry Witherspoon’s Exit Date was 3/17/04. 375. Plaintiff Henry Witherspoon was overdetained for seven days at the Fulton County Jail. 376. The moving force behind Plaintiff Henry Witherspoon’ overdetention was the collapse of the Fulton County Jail's inmate management system, and Defendants’ deliberate indifference. 377. Plaintiff Harry Witherspoon suffered damages as a result of the overdetention.
Plaintiff Antionne Wolf’s Overdetention By The Fulton County Jail
378. On 2/24/04, Plaintiff Antionne Wolf was detained in the Fulton County Jail. 379. Plaintiff Antionne Wolf’s Release Date was 4/20/04. 380. Plaintiff Antionne Wolf’s Exit Date was 4/21/04.
80

381. Plaintiff Antionne Wolf was overdetained for one day at the Fulton County Jail. 382. The moving force behind Plaintiff Antionne Wolf’ overdetention was the collapse of the Fulton County Jail's inmate management system, and Defendants’ deliberate indifference. 383. Plaintiff Antionne Wolf suffered damages as a result of the overdetention.
Plaintiff Kristopher Matkins’ Overdetention By The Fulton County Jail
384. On 3/18/04, Plaintiff Kristopher Matkins was detained in the Fulton County Jail. 385. Plaintiff Kristopher Matkins’ Release Date was 3/19/04. 386. Plaintiff Kristopher Matkins’ Exit Date was 3/23/04. 387. Plaintiff Kristopher Matkins was overdetained for four days at the Fulton County Jail. 388. The moving force behind Plaintiff Kristopher Matkins’ overdetention was the collapse of the Fulton County Jail's inmate management system, and Defendants’ deliberate indifference. 389. Plaintiff Kristopher Matkins suffered damages as a result of the overdetention.
81

“Overdetention Class” -- Class Action Allegations
390. The Overdetention Named Plaintiffs bring this action under Rules 23(a), 23(b) (2), and 23(b) (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of a class consisting of: (a) each person who has been, is, or who will be incarcerated in any Fulton County Jail facility in the two years preceding the filing of this action up to and until the date this case is terminated; and (b) who was not released or, in the future, will not be released by midnight on the date on which the person is entitled to be released by court order, posting bail, or the date on which the basis for his or her detention has otherwise expired. 391. Certification of a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) is appropriate because Defendant Jacqueline Barrett implemented, and, on information and belief, Defendant Myron Freeman continued a policy, or or engaged or engages in a pattern and practice of conduct that has uniformly affected all members of the class, Injunctive relief against Defendant Myron Freeman, the current Sheriff will benefit each and every Overdetention Named Plaintiff and class member. 392. The class is entitled to injunctive relief of terminating the above described policy and practice of overdetentions. 393. Certification of a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) is also appropriate in that common questions of law and fact predominate over any
82

individual questions. A class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy as detailed below. 394. Regarding the Overdetention Named Plaintiffs and members of the class, there are no individual questions on the issue of liability other than whether an individual has been overdetained. The answer to that question can be determined by ministerial inspection of the Jail's records. 395. Among the questions of law and fact common to the class are:
a) whether the Constitution provides a bright line, maximum length of time measured in hours beyond which Defendant cannot hold a person before releasing that person from jail after a judge has ordered his release or he has posted bail, or the basis for his detention has otherwise expired;
b) whether Defendants have exceeded that maximum for each class member; c) whether there is a pattern and practice of the Fulton County Jail of holding
inmates past their Release Dates; d) whether Defendant Jacqueline Barrett and/or Myron Freeman have been
deliberately indifferent to the pattern and practice of the Fulton County Jail of holding inmates past their Release Dates; e) whether Defendants’ acts as alleged herein violate the Constitution of the United States by holding detainees and inmates past their release dates;
83

f) whether such policy, if found to exist, violates the Fourth and/or Fourteenth Amendments;
g) whether Jacqueline Barrett and/or Myron Freeman were deliberately indifferent to the rights of inmates and detainees in the custody of the Fulton County Jail;
h) whether Defendant Jacqueline Barrett and/or Myron Freeman are entitled to qualified immunity on the section 1983 claims;
i) whether Defendant Jacqueline Barrett and/or Myron Freeman are entitled to governmental immunity on the state law claims;
j) whether the County Defendants are liable for plaintiffs’ injuries; k) whether the City of Atlanta is liable for plaintiffs injuries; l) whether the Overdetention Named Plaintiffs and the members of the
Overdetention Class have sustained damages and, if so, the proper measure of such damages; m) whether determination of damages suffered by a statistically representative sample of the class provides the basis for determination of all class members’ damages except those who opt out; and n) whether the Overdetention Class Named Plaintiffs and the members of the class and future members are entitled to equitable relief and, if so, what is the nature of that relief.
84

397. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The exact number of class members is unknown to plaintiffs at this time. However, every week at least 100 persons meeting the Overdetention Class definition are released from the Fulton County Jail. Thus, this class well exceeds 10,000 members. 398. Defendant Jacqueline Barrett and/or Myron Freeman and the Fulton County Jail and the Fulton County Defendants have within their records the names and addresses of all current and past class members. This information is maintained in the Fulton County Jail computer systems (CJUS, JDL and Banner and Mainframe), logbooks, and other paper records maintained by the Fulton County Jail and the Fulton County Defendants. 399. The Overdetention Named Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the class, because the Overdetention Named Plaintiffs and all other members of the class were injured by exactly the same means; that is, by the systemic collapse of the inmate management system, and the practice of returning in-custody defendants entitled to release by virtue of their court appearances from the courthouses to the Fulton County Jail to check for wants, holds and detainers. 400. The Overdetention Named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the class. They have retained counsel who are competent and experienced in complex federal civil rights class action litigation
85

and/or complex federal prisoner rights litigation. 401. The Overdetention Named Plaintiffs have no interests that are contrary to, or in conflict with, those of the class. 402. The Overdetention Named Plaintiffs know of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. The class action is superior to any other available means to resolve the issues raised on behalf of the Fourth Amendment Class. The class action will be manageable because so many different records systems exist from which to ascertain the members of the putative class, and damages can be determined on a class wide basis using a damages matrix set by a jury or by trying the damages of a statistically valid sample of the class to a jury, and extrapolating those damages to the class as a whole. 403. Class treatment will be superior because liability can be determined on a class-wide basis. Damages can also be determined on a class-wide basis through use of statistical sampling.
86

SUBSTANTIVE ALLEGATIONS
CLAIMS OF ARRESTEE STRIP SEARCH NAMED PLAINTIFFS
Count 1
Section 1983 Claims Of Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs Against Defendants Jacqueline Barrett and Myron Freeman
404. The Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations set forth above in this Fourth Amended Complaint. 405. The phrase “Defendants” as used in Counts 1 and 2 herein refer to Defendants Barrett and Freeman. 406. Upon being booked into the Fulton County Jail, each of the Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs, and every other Arrestee Strip Search Class member, was subjected to a strip search without an individual determination that the search would reveal weapons, drugs or other contraband. 407. Subjecting an arrestee arrested on a non-drug, non-weapon non-violent felony offense to a strip search, without an individual determination that the search would reveal weapons, drugs or other contraband, violates his or her Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Rights. 408. Defendant Jacqueline Barrett knew that the Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs and other class members would be subjected to these searches in the
87

Fulton County Jail, and acquiesced in the searches. 409. On information and belief, Defendant Myron Freeman has continued the strip search policies of Defendant Barrett, and was aware, or should have been aware, that the strip search policies complained of herein were continuing. 410. Defendants’ actions, and failures to act as described above, directly and proximately and affirmatively were the moving forces behind the violations of the Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs, and the class members’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights. 411. Defendants caused the unreasonable strip searches of the Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs and all other class members by deliberate indifference to the risk of constitutional injury by maintaining and/or acquiescing in a policy and practice and custom of strip searching arrestees. 412. Defendants are therefore liable under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for constitutional injuries to the Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs and all other class members caused by their conduct.
Count 2
Negligent Training And Negligent Supervision And Failure To Implement Policies Claims Against Defendant Jacqueline Barrett and Myron Freeman
413. The Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations set forth above in this Fourth Amended Complaint.
88

414. Defendants entrusted certain duties including, but not limited to, searching all arrestees booked into the Fulton County Jail to certain Jail employees. 415. Therefore, Defendants had a duty to exercise reasonable care in training, supervising and disciplining such employees in exercising their duties. 416. The need for such training was and is obvious from the nature of the responsibilities entrusted to such jail employees. 417. Defendants deliberately failed to implement and enforce procedures employees needed to ensure the constitutional searches of inmates. 418. The problems at the jail described above, and the various reports in the media, should have made it obvious to Defendants that the training employees under her supervision and control were receiving was inadequate, that the policies in place were inadequate, and that, as a direct and proximate result of these inadequacies, the inmates under her supervision would suffer injury. 419. Defendants negligently trained and supervised, or negligently failed to train and supervise such employees in their duties; failed to implement policies and, as a result, such employees were incompetent to perform their duties. 420. This negligent training; negligent failure to train; failure to supervise, and failure to implement policies by Defendants resulted in the unconstitutional strip searches of the Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs and the other members of the putative class.
89

421. As a result of said negligence of Defendants, Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs suffered injuries described in the preceding paragraphs of this Fourth Amended Complaint.
Count 3
Section 1983 Claims Of Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs Against Defendant Fulton County And Each Of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill and William "Bill" Edwards
422. The Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations set forth above in this Fourth Amended Complaint. 423. Defendant Fulton County and each of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill and William "Bill" Edwards had ultimate authority over the Fulton County Jail. 424. Defendant Fulton County and each of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill and William "Bill" Edwards failed to adequately fund and staff the Fulton County Jail. 425. Defendant Fulton County and each of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill and William "Bill" Edwards failed to adequately fund and staff the Fulton County criminal justice network. 426. Defendant Fulton County and each of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill and William "Bill" Edwards failed to
90

adequately train the sheriff and her staff. 427. Defendant Fulton County and each of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill and William "Bill" Edwards knew or should have known of the illegal booking strip searches at the Fulton County Jail and were deliberately indifferent to the rights of the Arrestee Strip Search Class members to be free from illegal strip searches. 428. Defendant Fulton County and each of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill and William "Bill" Edwards’ deliberate indifference to the rights of the Arrestee Strip Search Class members to be free from illegal strip searches was the motivating factor of their injuries described above.
Count 4
Section 1983 Claims Of Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs Against Defendant City Of Atlanta
429. The Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations set forth above in this Fourth Amended Complaint. 430. The City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, had control over the Atlanta PD’s policy of charging persons arrested within the municipality for either municipal or state charges. 431. The City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, had control over
91

the city’s policy of holding persons arrested by the Atlanta PD within the municipality in an Atlanta detention facility. 432. The City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, had control over the city’s policy of holding first appearance for persons arrested within the municipality in the Atlanta court system. 433. The City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, knew that the Fulton County Jail was overcrowded during the ten years preceding this Fourth Amended Complaint. 434. The City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, knew that the Fulton County Jail had a custom and policy of subjecting all new commitments to blanket strip searches without an individualized finding of reasonable suspicion as part of the booking process both before and during the class period. 435. Still, the City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, discontinued its policy of committing persons arrested in the municipality to an Atlanta detention facility and holding their first presentment hearings there. 436. The City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, began directing its police officers to charge all persons they arrested with state charges, whenever possible, and commit them to the Fulton County Jail upon arrest. 437. The City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, knew that Defendant Fulton County and the Board and the Fulton County Sheriff were
92

deliberately indifferent to the rights of the Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs and the Arrestee Strip Search Class class members to be free from blanket strip searches without an individualized finding of reasonable suspicion as part of the booking process. 438. The City of Atlanta’s deliberate indifference to the rights of the Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs and the Arrestee Strip Search Class class to be free from blanket strip searches without an individualized finding of reasonable suspicion as part of the booking process was the moving force behind their injuries. 439. Defendant City of Atlanta is therefore liable under the Fourth and the Fourteenth Amendments through 42 U.S.C. §1983 for constitutional injuries to the Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs and all other class members caused by its conduct described herein and is jointly and severally liable with all other defendants for injuries caused by their conduct described herein.
93

CLAIMS OF ALPHA STRIP SEARCH NAMED PLAINTIFFS
Count 5
Section 1983 Claims Of Alpha Strip Search Named Plaintiffs Against Defendants Jacqueline Barrett and Myron Freeman
440. The Alpha Strip Search Named Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations set forth above in this Fourth Amended Complaint. 441. Each of the Alpha Strip Search Named Plaintiffs, and every other Alpha Strip Search Class member, was subjected to a strip search without an individual determination that the search would reveal weapons, drugs or other contraband, either after a judge ordered his release at First Appearance, or, in the case of persons released without appearing before a judge, after he had posted bail or someone had posted it for him. 442. Subjecting an Alpha Strip class member to such strip searches, without an individual determination that the search would reveal weapons, drugs or other contraband, violates his or her Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Rights. 443. The phrase “Defendants” as used in Counts 5 and 6 herein refers to Defendants Barrett and Freeman. 444. Defendants knew that the Alpha Strip Search Named Plaintiffs and other
94

class members would be subjected to these searches in the Fulton County Jail, and acquiesced in the searches. 445. Defendants’ actions, and failures to act as described above, directly and proximately and affirmatively were the moving forces behind the violations of the Alpha Strip Search Named Plaintiffs, and the class members’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights. 446. Defendants caused the unreasonable strip searches of the Alpha Strip Search Named Plaintiffs and all other class members by deliberate indifference to the risk of constitutional injury by maintaining and/or acquiescing in a policy and practice and custom of strip searching Alphas. 447. Defendants are therefore liable under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for constitutional injuries to the Alpha Strip Search Named Plaintiffs and all other class members caused by their conduct.
Count 6
Negligent Training And Negligent Supervision And Failure To Implement Policies Claims Against Defendant Jacqueline Barrett
448. The Alpha Strip Search Named Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations set forth above in this Fourth Amended Complaint. 449. Defendants entrusted certain duties including, but not limited to, searching all Alpha Strip Search class members to certain Jail employees.
95

450. Therefore, Defendants had a duty to exercise reasonable care in training, supervising and disciplining such employees in exercising their duties. 451. The need for such training was and is obvious from the nature of the responsibilities entrusted to such jail employees. 452. Defendants deliberately failed to implement and enforce procedures employees needed to ensure the constitutional searches of inmates. 453. The problems at the jail described above, and the various reports in the media, should have made it obvious to Defendant Jacqueline Barrett that the training employees under her supervision and control were receiving was inadequate, that the policies in place were inadequate, and that, as a direct and proximate result of these inadequacies, the inmates under her supervision would suffer injury. 454. Defendants negligently trained and supervised, or negligently failed to train and supervise such employees in their duties; failed to implement policies and, as a result, such employees were incompetent to perform their duties. 455. This negligent training; negligent failure to train; failure to supervise, and failure to implement policies by Defendants resulted in the unconstitutional strip searches of the Alpha Strip Search Named Plaintiffs and the other members of the putative class. 456. As a result of said negligence of Defendants, Alpha Strip Search Named
96

Plaintiffs suffered injuries described in the preceding paragraphs of this Fourth Amended Complaint.
Count 7
Section 1983 Claims Of Alpha Strip Search Named Plaintiffs Against Defendant Fulton County And Each Of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill and William "Bill" Edwards
457. The Alpha Strip Search Named Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations set forth above in this Fourth Amended Complaint. 458. Defendant Fulton County and each of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill and William "Bill" Edwards had ultimate authority over the Fulton County Jail and its staff. 459. Defendant Fulton County and each of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill and William "Bill" Edwards failed to adequately fund and staff the Fulton County Jail. 460. Defendant Fulton County and each of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill and William "Bill" Edwards failed to adequately fund and staff the Fulton County criminal justice network. 461. Defendant Fulton County and each of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill and William "Bill" Edwards failed to adequately train the sheriff and her staff.
97

462. Defendant Fulton County and each of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill and William "Bill" Edwards knew or should have known of the illegal strip searches of Alpha Strip Search Class members and were deliberately indifferent to the rights of the Alpha Strip Search Class members to be free from illegal strip searches. 463. Defendant Fulton County and each of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill and William "Bill" Edwards’ deliberate indifference to the rights of the Alpha Strip Search Class members to be free from illegal strip searches was the motivating factor of their injuries described above.
Count 8
Section 1983 Claims Of Alpha Strip Search Named Plaintiffs Against Defendant City Of Atlanta
464. The Alpha Strip Search Named Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations set forth above in this Fourth Amended Complaint. 465. The City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, had control over the Atlanta PD’s policy of charging persons arrested within the municipality for either municipal or state charges. 466. The City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, had control over the city’s policy of holding persons arrested by the Atlanta PD within the municipality in an Atlanta detention facility.
98

467. The City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, had control over the city’s policy of holding first appearance for persons arrested within the municipality in the Atlanta court system. 468. The City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, knew that the Fulton County Jail was overcrowded during the ten years preceding this Fourth Amended Complaint. 469. The City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, knew that the Fulton County Jail had a custom and policy of subjecting all new commitments to blanket strip searches without an individualized finding of reasonable suspicion as part of the booking process both before and during the class period. 470. The City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, knew or should have known that the Fulton County Jail had a custom and policy of subjecting persons who had been ordered released at First Presentment, and persons who had posted bail (or had it posted for them) before First Appearance to blanket strip searches without an individualized finding of reasonable suspicion as part of the booking process both before and during the class period. 471. Still, the City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, discontinued its policy of committing persons arrested in the municipality to an Atlanta detention facility and holding their first presentment hearings there. 472. The City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, began directing
99

its police officers to charge all persons they arrested with state charges, whenever possible, and commit them to the Fulton County Jail upon arrest. 473. The City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, knew that Defendant Fulton County and the Board and the Fulton County Sheriff were deliberately indifferent to the rights of the Alpha Strip Search Named Plaintiffs and the Alpha Strip Search Class class members to be free from blanket strip searches without an individualized finding of reasonable suspicion as part of the booking process, even after they had been ordered released at First Appearance or after posting bond (or having it posted for them). 474. The City of Atlanta’s deliberate indifference to the rights of the Alpha Strip Search Named Plaintiffs and the Alpha Strip Search Class class members to be free from blanket strip searches without an individualized finding of reasonable suspicion as part of the booking process was the moving force behind their injuries. 475. Defendant City of Atlanta is therefore liable under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for constitutional injuries to the Alpha Strip Search Named Plaintiffs and all other Alpha Strip Search class members caused by its conduct described herein and is jointly and severally liable with all other defendants for injuries caused by their conduct described herein.
100

CLAIMS OF COURT RETURN STRIP SEARCH NAMED PLAINTIFFSS
Count 9
Section 1983 Claim of Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiffs against Defendant Jaquelyn Barrett and Myron Freeman
476. The Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiffs reallege and incorporates by reference all allegations set forth above in this Complaint. 477. Upon returning from the Superior Court or State Court to the Fulton County Jail after court hearings at which a judge ordered him released, the Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiffs, and many other Court Return Strip Search Class member, was subjected to a strip search without an individual determination that the search would reveal weapons, drugs or other contraband. 478. Subjecting court returns entitled to release by virtue of their court appearances to strip searches without an individual determination that the search would reveal weapons, drugs or other contraband violates their Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Rights. 479. The phrase “Defendants” as used in Counts 9 and 10 herein refers to Defendants Barrett and Freeman. 480. Defendants knew that the Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiffs and other class members would be subjected to searches in the Fulton County Jail, and acquiesced in such searches.
101

481. Defendants’ actions, and failure to act as described above, directly and

proximately and affirmatively were and are the moving forces behind the

violations of the Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiffs’ and the class

members’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights.

482. Defendants caused the unreasonable strip searches of the Court Return Strip

Search Named Plaintiffs and all other class members by deliberate indifference to

the risk of constitutional injury by maintaining and/or acquiescing in a policy and

practice and custom of strip searching arrestees.

483.

Defendants are therefore liable under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for

constitutional injuries to the Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiffs and all

other class members caused by their conduct.

Count 10 Negligent Training and Negligent Supervision and Failure to Implement Policies
Regarding Searches of Court Return Strip Search Class Members against Defendant Jaquelyn Barrett
484. The Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiffs reallege and incorporates by
reference all allegations set forth above in this Complaint.
485. Defendants entrusted certain duties, including but not limited to, searching
all court returns booked back into the Fulton County Jail to certain jail employees.

102

486. Therefore, Defendants had a duty to exercise reasonable care in training, supervising, and disciplining such employees in exercising their duties. 487. The need for such training was obvious from the nature of the responsibilities entrusted to such jail employees. 488. Defendants deliberately failed to implement and enforce procedures employees under her supervision and control needed to ensure the constitutional searches of court returns entitled to release by virtue of their court appearances. 489. The problems at the jail described above, and the various reports in the media should have made it obvious to Defendants that the training such employees were receiving was inadequate, the policies in place were inadequate, and that as a direct and proximate result of these inadequacies, the inmates under her supervision would suffer injury. 490. Defendants negligently trained and supervised, or negligently failed to train and supervise such employees in their duties, and failed to implement policies. As a direct result of these failures, such employees were incompetent to perform their duties. 491. This negligent training, and negligent failure to train and supervise, and failure to implement policies by Defendants resulted in the unconstitutional strip searches of the Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiffs and the other members of the putative class.
103

492. As a result of said negligence of Defendants, Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiffs suffered injuries described in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.
Count 11
Section 1983 Claims Of Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiffs Against Defendant Fulton County And Each Of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe,
Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill and William "Bill" Edwards 493. The Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations set forth above in this Fourth Amended Complaint. 494. Defendant Fulton County and each of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill and William "Bill" Edwards had ultimate authority over the Fulton County Jail and its staff. 495. Defendant Fulton County and each of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill and William "Bill" Edwards failed to adequately fund and staff the Fulton County Jail. 496. Defendant Fulton County and each of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill and William "Bill" Edwards failed to adequately fund and staff the Fulton County criminal justice network. 497. Defendant Fulton County and each of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill and William "Bill" Edwards failed to
104

adequately train the sheriff and her staff. 498. Defendant Fulton County and each of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill and William "Bill" Edwards were deliberately indifferent to the rights of the Court Return Strip Search Class members to be free from illegal strip searches. 499. Each of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill and William "Bill" Edwards knew or should have known that the Fulton County Jail had a policy or practice of subjecting court returns to blanket strip searches after a judge had ordered their release and no further basis for their detention existed. 500. Defendant Fulton County and each of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill and William "Bill" Edwards’ deliberate indifference to the rights of the Court Return Strip Search Class members under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal constitution was the motivating factor of their injuries described above.
Count 12
Section 1983 Claims Of Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiffs Against Defendant City Of Atlanta
501. The Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations set forth above in this Fourth Amended Complaint.
105

502. The City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, had control over the Atlanta PD’s policy of charging persons arrested within the municipality for either municipal or state charges. 503. The City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, had control over the city’s policy of holding persons arrested by the Atlanta PD within the municipality in an Atlanta detention facility. 504. The City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, had control over the city’s policy of holding first appearance for persons arrested within the municipality in the Atlanta court system. 505. The City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, knew that the Fulton County Jail was overcrowded during the ten years preceding this Fourth Amended Complaint. 506. The City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, knew or should have known that the Fulton County Jail had a custom and policy of subjecting all court returns to blanket strip searches after a judge had ordered their release and their was no basis for their continued detention. 507. Still, the City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, discontinued its policy of committing persons arrested in the municipality to an Atlanta detention facility and holding their first presentment hearings there. 508. The City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, began directing
106

its police officers to charge all persons they arrested with state charges, whenever possible, and commit them to the Fulton County Jail upon arrest. 509. The City of Atlanta’s deliberate indifference to the rights of the Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiffs and the Court Return Strip Search Class class members to be free from blanket strip searches after a judge had ordered their release and their was no basis for their continued detention. 510. Defendant City of Atlanta is therefore liable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitutional pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 for constitutional injuries to the Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiffs and all other Court Return Strip Search class members caused by its conduct described herein and is jointly and severally liable with all other defendants for injuries caused by their conduct described herein.
107

CLAIMS OF OVERDETENTION NAMED PLAINTIFFS
Count 13
Section 1983 Claims Of Overdetention Named Plaintiffs Against Defendants Jacqueline Barrett and Myron Freeman
511. The Overdetention Named Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations set forth above in this Fourth Amended Complaint. 512. The phrase “Defendants” as used in Counts 13 and 14 herein refers to Defendants Barrett and Freeman. 513. Defendantswere, at all times relevant herein, the supervisor of the Jail employees charged with ensuring the release on their Release Dates of all inmates in the custody of the Fulton County Jail. 514. Defendants deliberately failed to train, monitor and discipline such employees. 515. Defendants deliberately failed to implement and enforce procedures employees needed to ensure the timely release of inmates. 516. Defendants had both actual and constructive knowledge that such employees were engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to The Overdetention Named Plaintiffs and other members of the class.
108

517. Defendants engaged in a pattern of continued inaction in the face of employees’ documented widespread abuse of the Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the Overdetention Named Plaintiffs and the other members of the class by failing to ensure their release on their Release Dates. 518. Defendants’ actions, and failures to act as described above, directly, proximately, and affirmatively caused the violations of the Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the Overdetention Named Plaintiffs' and the other members of the class. 519. The deprivations to the Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal constitution rights of the Overdetention Named Plaintiffs and the other members of the class were committed by Defendants while she was acting under color of state law, and was acting pursuant to the policy, custom and practice of Fulton County Jail. 520. Defendants’ actions, and failures to act, as described above, directly and proximately caused injury described above to the Overdetention Named Plaintiffs’ and the other members of the class.
109

Count 14
Negligent Training And Negligent Supervision And Failure To Implement Policies Claims Of Overdetention Named Plaintiffs Against Defendant Jacqueline Barrett
and Myron Freeman 521. The Overdetention Named Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations set forth above in this Fourth Amended Complaint. 522. Defendants entrusted certain duties including, but not limited to, ensuring the release on their Release Dates of all inmates in Fulton County Jail custody to certain Jail employees. 523. Therefore, Defendants had a duty to exercise reasonable care in training, supervising, and disciplining such employees in exercising their duties. 524. The need for such training was obvious from the nature of the responsibilities entrusted to Jail employees. 525. Defendants deliberately failed to implement and enforce procedures employees needed to ensure the timely release of inmates. 526. The problems at the jail described above, and the various reports in the media, should have made it obvious to Defendants that the training employees under her supervision and control were receiving was inadequate, that the policies in place were inadequate, and that, as a direct and proximate result, the inmates under her supervision would suffer injury. 527. Defendants negligently trained and supervised, or negligently failed to train
110

and supervise, such employees in their duties. She further failed to implement policies and, as a result, such employees were incompetent to perform their duties. 528. This negligent training, and negligent failure to train and supervise, and failure to implement policies by Defendants resulted in the complete breakdown in the inmate management system of the Fulton County Jail. These failures have caused the overdetention of The Overdetention Named Plaintiffs and the other members of the putative class. 529. As a result of said negligence of Defendants, The Overdetention Named Plaintiffs suffered injuries described in the preceding paragraphs of this Fourth Amended Complaint.
Count 15
Section 1983 Claims Of Overdetention Named Plaintiffs Against Defendant Fulton County And Each of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill and William "Bill" Edwards
530. The Overdetention Named Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations set forth above in this Fourth Amended Complaint. 531. Defendant Fulton County and each of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill and William "Bill" Edwards had ultimate authority over the Fulton County Jail. 532. Defendant Fulton County and each of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe,
111

Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill and William "Bill" Edwards failed to adequately fund and staff the Fulton County Jail. 533. Defendant Fulton County and each of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill and William "Bill" Edwards failed to adequately fund and staff the Fulton County criminal justice network. 534. Defendant Fulton County and each of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill and William "Bill" Edwards failed to adequately train the sheriff and her staff. 535. Defendant Fulton County and each of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill and William "Bill" Edwards knew or should have known of the overdetentions and were deliberately indifferent to the rights of the Overdetention Named Plaintiffs and the Overdetention Class class members under the Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal constitution to be released by midnight of their Release Dates. 536. Defendant Fulton County and each of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill and William "Bill" Edwards’ deliberate indifference to the rights of the Overdetention Named Plaintiffs and the Overdetention Class class to be released by midnight of their Release Dates the motivating factor of their injuries described above.
112

Count 16
Section 1983 Claims of Overdetention Named Plaintiffs Against Defendant Fulton County And Each of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emman I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill and William “Bill” Edwards – Deliberate Indifference For Knowing Failure to Provide Adequate Funds for the Constitutional Operation of the Fulton County Jail Despite the Express Legal Obligation To Do So
537. The Overdetention Named Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations set forth in this Fourth Amended Complaint. 538. The phrase “Defendants” as used in this Count 16 refers to Defendants Fulton County, Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emman I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill and William “Bill” Edwards. 539. Defendants were and are obligated under Georgia state law to provide sufficient funds “for the efficient and effective operation of the jail”, O.C.G.A. § 42-4-94(b), which as a matter of law necessitates adequate funding to allow the Sheriff to operate the jail in a constitutional manner. 540. Defendants were fully aware for many years, and knew or should have known, that serious deficiencies of constitutional magnitude in the Fulton County jail’s operation, including the problem of Overdetentions, were significantly attributable to their lack of adequate funding “for the efficient and effective operation of the jail.” O.C.G.A. § 42-4-94(b). 541. Despite this knowledge, Defendants made a knowing and conscious decision
113

not to provide adequate funding to allow the Sheriff to process inmates out in a timely fashion, in violation of those inmates’ constitutional rights. 542. In failing to provide adequate funding for the Fulton County Jail to operate without violating the constitutional rights of the inmates, and specifically without violating their right to be timely released from jail and not to be overdetained, Defendants displayed a conscious and knowing disregard for, and deliberate indifference towards, the constitutional rights of the Overdetention Named Plaintiffs and the class they represent. 543. Defendants’ deliberate indifference to the rights of the Overdetention Named Plaintiffs and the class they represent was a motivating factor for their injuries as described above.
Count 17
Section 1983 Claims Of Overdetention Named Plaintiffs Against Defendant City Of Atlanta
544. The Overdetention Named Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations set forth above in this Fourth Amended Complaint. 545. The City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, had control over the Atlanta PD’s policy of charging persons arrested within the municipality for either municipal or state charges. 546. The City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, had control over
114

the city’s policy of holding persons arrested by the Atlanta PD within the municipality in an Atlanta detention facility. 547. The City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, had control over the city’s policy of holding first appearance for persons arrested within the municipality in the Atlanta court system. 548. The City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, knew that the Fulton County Jail was overcrowded during the ten years preceding this Fourth Amended Complaint. 549. The City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, knew or should have known that the Fulton County Jail had a custom of overdetaining inmates before and during the class period. 550. Still, the City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, discontinued its policy of committing persons arrested in the municipality to an Atlanta detention facility and holding their first presentment hearings there. 551. The City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, began directing its police officers to charge all persons they arrested with state charges, whenever possible, and commit them to the Fulton County Jail upon arrest. 552. The City of Atlanta, acting through its mayor and council, knew that the Fulton Defendant Fulton County and the Board were deliberately indifferent to the rights of the Overdetention Named Plaintiffs and the Overdetention Class class
115

members under the Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal constitution to be released by midnight of their Release Dates. 553. The City of Atlanta’s deliberate indifference to the rights of the Overdetention Named Plaintiffs and the Overdetention Class class to be released by midnight of their Release Dates the was the moving force of their injuries described above. 554. Defendant City of Atlanta is therefore liable under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for injuries to the Overdetention Named Plaintiffs and the Overdetention Class class members’ rights under the Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal constitution caused by its conduct.
116

IRREPARABLE INJURY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
555. Defendants are overdetaining, or contributing to the overdetention of members of the plaintiff class, and unreasonably subjecting, or causing the subjection of members of the Arrestee Strip Search Class to strip searches which irreparably harm them, even if they are later able to recover compensatory damages. 556. Defendants’ conduct and/or participation in overdetaining members of the plaintiff class, and performing illegal strip searches of the Arrestee Strip Search Class, has irreparably harmed them. This conduct will continue to irreparably harm members of the proposed plaintiff Overdetention Class and Arrestee Strip Search Class, thus making declaratory and injunctive relief necessary.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court grant the following relief:
1) grant a jury trial on all claims so triable; 2) declare that, with respect to the Arrestee Strip Search Class, this action may
be maintained as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) and certify the Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs
117

as the proper representative of the class consisting of each person who, in the two years preceding the filing of this action up until the date this case is terminated, was or will be, (i) upon being arrested and committed into the Fulton County Jail; (ii) on a charge other than a charge of drugs, weapon or felony violence; (iii) was subjected to a blanket strip search without any individualized finding of reasonable suspicion or probable cause that he or she was concealing drugs, weapons or other contraband. 3) declare that, with respect to the Alpha Strip Search Class, this action may be maintained as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) and certify the Alpha Strip Search Named Plaintiffs as the proper representative of the class consisting of each person who, in the two years preceding the filing of this action up until the date this case is terminated, was or will be, (i) upon being arrested and committed into the Fulton County Jail; (ii) subjected to a booking strip search without any individualized finding of reasonable suspicion or probable cause that he or she was concealing drugs, weapons or other contraband; (iii) after a judicial officer had ordered his release because of a finding of no probable cause to support the arrest, or, in the case of persons released without being taken before a judicial officer, after he had already posted bond (or someone had already posted it for him).
118

4) declare that, with respect to the Court Return Strip Search Class, this action may be maintained as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) and certify the Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiffs as the proper representative of the class consisting of each person who: in the two years preceding the filing of this action up until the date this case is terminated, has been, is or will be: (i) in the custody of the Fulton County Jail; (ii) taken to court from the Fulton County Jail; (iii) ordered released by the court or otherwise became entitled to release by virtue of the court appearance because the charge on which he had been held was no longer pending or was dismissed at the hearing, was ordered released on his own recognizance, or had posted bail, was sentenced to time served, was acquitted or was otherwise entitled to release; (iv) was not the subject of any other pending case or cases which imposed any condition of release other than personal recognizance; (v) was not the subject of any detainer or warrant; (vi) was returned to the Fulton County Jail; and (vii) was subjected to a strip search without any individualized finding of reasonable suspicion or probable cause that he was concealing contraband or weapons before being released, regardless of whether he was overdetained.
5) declare that, with respect to the Overdetention Class, this action may be maintained as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
119

23(a), 23(b) (2), and 23(b)(3) and certify the Overdetention Named Plaintiffs as the proper representative of the Overdetention Class consisting of class consisting of: (a) each person who has been, is, or will be incarcerated in any Fulton County Jail facility in the two years preceding the filing of this action up to and until the date this case is terminated; and (b) who was not released, or, in the future, will not be released by midnight on the date on which the person is entitled to be released by court order, posting bail, or the date on which the basis for his or her detention has otherwise expired. 6) Name William Claiborne, Dan DeWoskin, Charles Pekor, J.P. Claiborne, Lynn Cunningham, Barrett Litt and Paul Estuar as class counsel for all classes. 7) preliminarily and permanently enjoin defendants from pursuing the course of conduct complained of herein; 8) preliminarily and permanently enjoin defendants from pursuing settlement directly with any member of the putative Arrestee Strip Search Class or the Alpha Strip Search Class or the Overdetention Class or Court Return Strip Search Class described herein unless that person is represented by counsel; 9) award all Plaintiffs and class members compensatory and consequential damages in an amount to be determined;
120

10) appoint an independent monitor to supervise the Fulton County Jail “dress out” area to ensure that all new commitments are not strip searched or subjected to a visual body cavity search without an individualized finding of reasonable suspicion;
11) appoint an independent monitor to supervise the Records Room to ensure that all inmates are released on or before their Release Dates;
10) award Plaintiffs’ attorneys' fees and costs incurred in bringing this action under 42 U.S.C. §1988; and
11) grant such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

Respectfully submitted,

____/s/William Claiborne___ William Claiborne Georgia Bar # 126360 Counsel for all named plaintiffs and all putative class members 717 D Street, NW Suite 210 Washington, DC 20004 Phone 202/824-0700 Fax 202/824-0745

___________ Charles Pekor Georgia Bar # 570601 Counsel for all named plaintiffs and all putative class members Pekor & DeWoskin 270 Peachtree Street, N.W. Suite 1060 Atlanta, GA 30303 Phone 404-221-8887 Fax 404-221-8884

Respectfully submitted,

Respectfully submitted,
121

__________________ Dan DeWoskin Georgia Bar # 220-327 Counsel for all named plaintiffs and all putative class members Pekor & DeWoskin 270 Peachtree Street, N.W. Suite 1060 Atlanta, GA 30303 Phone 404-221-8887 Phone 404-230-9171 Fax 404-221-8884

______________________ J.P. Claiborne Georgia Bar # 126337 Counsel for all named plaintiffs and all putative class members 699 Broad Street Ste 1206 Augusta, GA 30901 Phone 706-722-8224 Fax 706-722-8236

Respectfully submitted,

Respectfully submitted,

________________________ Lynn E. Cunningham Admitted pro hac vice Counsel for all named plaintiffs and all putative class members Professor of Clinical Law The George Washington University Law School 2000 G Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20052 Phone: 202/994-7659

___________________ Barrett S. Litt
Paul Estuar
Admitted pro hac vice
Counsel for all named plaintiffs and all putative class members Litt & Associates, Inc. 3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1100 Los Angeles, CA 90010-1912 Phone: 213-251-5400 Fax: 213.380-4585

122

JURY DEMAND Plaintiffs demand a jury of six as to all claims so triable.
/s/William Claiborne ________________________ William Claiborne Georgia Bar # 126360 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH LR 5dB I, William Claiborne, do hereby certify that the foregoing motion and other documents have been prepared in 14-point New Times Roman and comply with LR 5dB. /s/William Claiborne _________________________ William Claiborne Georgia Bar # 126360
123

 
 Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 1 of 151

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION

C. ALAN POWELL, et al

}

}

Plaintiffs,

}

}

VS.

}

}

JACQUELYN BARRETT; SHERIFF, }

in her individual capacity,

}

MYRON FREEMAN, SHERIFF

}

individually and in his official capacity, }

et aI,

}

}

Defendants.

}

CIVIL ACTION FILE No.l:04-CV-llOO(RWS}

ANSWER BY DEFENDANTS BARRETT AND FREEMAN TO FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT

COME NOW, Defendants Barrett and Freeman ("Defendants") to file this their Answer to the Fourth Amended Complaint as follows:
1. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 1 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 2 of 151
2. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 2 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
3, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 3 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
4. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 4 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
5.
Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 5 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
2

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 3 of 151
6. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 6 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
7.
Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 7 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
8. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 8 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
9. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 9 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
3

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 4 of 151
10. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 10 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
11. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 11 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
12. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 12 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
13. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 13 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
4

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 5 of 151
14. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 14 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
Jurisdiction and Venue 15.
Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 15 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
16. Admitted.
Parties-Plaintiffs 17.
Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 17 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
5

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 6 of 151
18. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 18 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
19. Admitted.
20. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 20 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
21. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 21 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
22. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 22 of the
6

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 7 of 151
Fourth Amended Complaint as to why Plaintiff Powell was re-committed to the Fulton County Jail.
23. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 23 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
24. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 24 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
25. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 25 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
7

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 8 of 151
26. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 26 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
27. Admitted.
28. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 28 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
29. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 29 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
8

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 9 of 151
30. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 30 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
31. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 31 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
32. Admitted.
33. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 33 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
9

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 10 of 151
34. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 34 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
35. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 35 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
36. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 36 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
37. Admitted.
38. Admitted.
10

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 11 of 151
39. Defendants admit that Plaintiff Evans was not released instanter but denies that any "illegal strip search" occurred or that Defendants knew at the time that there were no other charges, detainers, warrants or holds or other basis to detain him as alleged in paragraph 39 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
40. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 40 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
41. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 41 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
11

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 12 of 151
42. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 42 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
43. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 43 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
44. Admitted.
45. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 45 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
46. Admitted.
12

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 13 of 151
47. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 47 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
48. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 48 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
49. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 49 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
50. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 50 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
13

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 14 of 151
51.
Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 51 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
52. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 52 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
53. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 53 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
54. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the factual allegations contained in paragraph 54 of the Fourth Amended Complaint but deny the remaining allegations as to the existence of administrative remedies.
14

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 15 of 151
55. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 55 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
56. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 56 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
57. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 57 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
58. Admitted.
15

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 16 of 151
59. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 59 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
60. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 60 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
61. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 61 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
62. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 62 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
16

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 17 of 151
63. Admitted.
64. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 64 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
65. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 65 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
66. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 66 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
17

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 18 of 151
67. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 67 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
68. Admitted.
69. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 69 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
70. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 70 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
18

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 19 of 151
71. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 71 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
72.
Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 72 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
73. Admitted.
74. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 74 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
19

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 20 of 151
75. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 75 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
76. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 76 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
77. Defendants admit that Plaintiff Wolf was committed to the Fulton County Jail on 2/24/04, but deny the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 77 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
78. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allega,tions contained in paragraph 78 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
20

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 21 of 151
79. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 79 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
80. Admitted.
81. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 81 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
82. Defendants admit that Plaintiff Wolf was returned to the Fulton County Jail but denies the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 82 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
21

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 22 of 151
83. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 83 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
84. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 84 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
85. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 85 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
86. Defendants admit that Plaintiff Matkin was not released immediately but are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 86 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
22

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 23 of 151
87. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 87 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
88. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 88 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
89. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 89 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
Parties-Defendants 90.
Admitted. 91.
Admitted.
23

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 24 of 151
92. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 92 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
93. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny the acts attributed to them by Plaintiffs in paragraph 93 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
94. Allegation in paragraph 94 of the Fourth Amended Complaint appears to call for a legal conclusion that Defendants Barrett and Freeman are not competent to give.
95. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form . a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 95 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
24

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 25 of 151
96. Allegation in paragraph 96 of the Fourth Amended Complaint appears to call for a legal conclusion that Defendants Barrett and Freeman are not competent to give.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS Fulton County. The Fulton County Board of Commissioners, And The
Fulton County Iail 95.
Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 95 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
96. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 96 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
25

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 26 of 151
97. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 97 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
98. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 98 of the Fourth Amended Complaint as to the authority relied upon by Defendant Fulton County to build the Jail.
99. Fact asserted in paragraph 99 of the Fourth Amended Complaint is a matter of public record. Defendant Barrett and Freeman rely on that record to assert the fact alleged.
100. Admitted.
26

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 27 of 151
101. The term capacity is ambiguous and Defendant Barrett and Freeman decline the opportunity to speculate as to its meaning. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 101 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
102. Defendants deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 102 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
103. Admitted.
104. Defendants deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 104 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
27

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 28 of 151
105. Defendants deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 105 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
106. Defendants deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 106 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
107. Allegations contained in paragraph 107 of the Fourth Amended Complaint are ambiguous, Defendant Barrett and Freemen decline the opportunity to speculate as to their meaning.
108. Allegations contained in paragraph 108 of the Fourth Amended Complaint are ambiguous, Defendants Barrett and Freemen decline the opportunity to speculate as to their meaning.
28

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 29 of 151
109. Allegations contained in paragraph 109 of the Fourth Amended Complaint appear to be a statement of law, Defendants Barrett and Freemen decline the opportunity to speculate as to their accuracy.
110. Admitted.
111. The basis of that lawsuit in paragraph 111 of the Fourth Amended Complaint is a matter of public record; Defendant Barrett declines the opportunity to speculate as to the nature of that case.
112. The fads and circumstances of the termination of that lawsuit are a matter of public record; Defendants Barrett declines the opportunity to speculate as to the nature of that case.
113. The basis of that lawsuit is a matter of public record; Defendant Barrett declines the opportunity to speculate as to the nature of that case.
29

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 30 of 151
114. The allegation contained in that lawsuit is a matter of public record; Defendant Barrett declines the opportunity to speculate as to the nature of that case.
115. The facts asserted in that lawsuit were resolved, to the extent they are re-alleged herein that resolution is noted.
116. The orders of the Court in that lawsuit are a matter of public record; Defendants Barrett declines the opportunity to speculate as to the nature of that case.
117. The orders of the Court in that lawsuit are a matter of public record; Defendants Barrett declines the opportunity to speculate as to the nature of that case.
30

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 31 of 151
Fulton County and The Board's Control over Jail Staff 118.
Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny that the selection of deputies to serve at the Fulton County Jail is subject to approval by Board.
119. Admitted.
120. Admitted.
121. Admitted.
122. Defendants Barrett and Freeman admit that deputies and jailers are employees of Fulton County subject to the Fulton County Civil Service System. However, they are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 122 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
31

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 32 of 151
123. The phrase "constitutionally mandated" IS not defined and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline the opportunity to speculate as to its meaning. Therefore, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 123 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
124. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 124 of the Fourth Amended Complaint as to the role of the Fulton County Board in the administration of the Civil Service System.
125. Admitted.
126. The phrase "severely curtails" is not defined and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline the opportunity to speculate as to its meaning. Therefore, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to
32

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 33 of 151
form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 126 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
127. The phrase "subject to the supervision" is not defined and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline the opportunity to speculate as to its meaning. Therefore, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 127 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
128. The phrase "constitutionally mandated" IS not defined and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline the opportunity to speculate as to its meaning. Therefore, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 128 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
33

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 34 of 151
129. Statement contained in paragraph 129 of the Fourth Amended Complaint is overboard and inaccurate and is denied by Defendants Barrett and Freeman.
130. The phrase U constitutionally mandated" IS not defined and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline the opportunity to speculate as to its meaning. Therefore, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 130 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
131. The Sheriff's Responsibilities For Inmates At The Fulton County Jail
132. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny the allegations contained in paragraph 132 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
34

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 35 of 151
133. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny the allegations contained in paragraph 133 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
134. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny the allegations contained in paragraph 134 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
135. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny the allegations contained in paragraph 135 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
136. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny the allegations contained in paragraph 136 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
Criminal Justice Cycle And The Fulton County Jail 137.
Statement appears to be an incomplete articulation of the stages of an inmate's introduction into the Fulton County Jail and his/her stay. Without an understanding of the point attempted to be made by the
35

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 36 of 151
statement, Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 137 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
138. Statement appears to be an incomplete articulation of the numbers of authorities with arrest. Without an understanding of the point attempted to be made by the statement, Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 138 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
139. Statement appears to be an incomplete articulation of what a Fulton County Police Department does with each and every suspect that is arrested. Without an understanding of the point attempted to be made by the statement, Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 139 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
36

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 37 of 151
140. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without personal knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 140 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
141. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 141 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
142. Statement appears to be an incomplete articulation of all of the potential locations an Atlanta Police Officer may take a suspect arrested on state charges. Without an understanding of the point attempted to be made by the statement, Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 142 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
37

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 38 of 151
143. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 143 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
144. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 144 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
145. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 145 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
146. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 146 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
38

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 39 of 151
147. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 147 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
148. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 148 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
149. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 149 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
150. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 150 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
39

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 40 of 151
151. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 151 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
152. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 152 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
153. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 153 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
154. Admitted.
155. Admitted.
40

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 41 of 151
156. Admitted.
157. The term "entitled" is not defined and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline the opportunity to speculate as to its meaning. Therefore, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 157 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
2003 Changes to City Of Atlanta Arrest And Commitment And Hearing Practices 158.
Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 158 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
41

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 42 of 151
159. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 159 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
160 .. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 160 of the Fourth Amended Complaint as to "the purpose of [Mayor Franklin's]."
161. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 153 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
162. Admitted.
163. Without more specificity as to the identity of the "Fulton County," Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a
42

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 43 of 151
belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 163 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
164. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a bel~ef as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 164 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
165. Statement makes no sense. Therefore, and Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 166 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
166. Statement makes no sense. Therefore, and Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 166 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
43

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 44 of 151
Records Room And Operations Of The Records Room 167.
Admitted. 168.
The "Records Room" does not create documents; people do. Subject to that clarification, Defendants Barrett and Freeman admit the allegations.
169. The "Records Room" does not create documents; people do. Subject to that clarification, Defendants Barrett and Freeman admit the allegations.
170. Admitted.
171. Admitted.
172. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny that the statement made in paragraph 172 of the Fourth Amended Complaint is universally and always true.
44

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 45 of 151
173. Admitted.
174. Admitted.
175. The term "overwhelmed" is not defined and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline the opportunity to speculate as to its meaning. Therefore, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 175 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
176. Admitted.
177. The terms "chronic and systemic deficiencies" are not defined and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline the opportunity to speculate as to its meaning. Therefore, Defendants are without knowledge or information
45

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 46 of 151
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 177 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
178. Admitted.
179. Admitted. The Fulton County Jail Policy Of Strip Searching All Arrestee Booked
Into The Fulton County Jail 180.
Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 180 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
181. Admitted. The process described in paragraph 181 of the Fourth Amended Complaint occurs but it is not defined by Defendants Barrett and Freeman as a "strip search."
46

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 47 of 151
182. Paragraph 182 makes no sense; all of the persons in that situation are "arrested" persons. Subject to that caveat, the allegations contained in paragraph 182 of the Fourth Amended Complaint are admitted.
183. Admitted.
184. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 184 of the Fourth Amended Complaint as to the inmates' terminology.
185. Admitted.
186. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 186 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
47

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 48 of 151
The Fulton County Jail Practice Of Subjecting Certain Persons To Booking Strip Searches After They Have Already Been Ordered Released
By A Judge Or Had Their Bond Posted, Or Should Have Been Posted 187.
The term "illegal" is not defined and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline the opportunity to speculate as to its meaning. Therefore, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 187 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
188. The term "illegal" is not defined and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline the opportunity to speculate as to its meaning. Therefore, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 188 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
189. The term "indifferent to the rights" is not defined and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline the opportunity to speculate as to its meaning.
48

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 49 of 151
Therefore, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 189 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
The Fulton County Jail Policy For Court Returns 190.
Admitted. 191.
Admitted. 192.
Admitted. 193.
The facts articulated in paragraph 193 of the Fourth Amended Complaint are the goal, but Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to whether it was always the case.
194. Admitted.
49

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 50 of 151
195. Admitted.
196. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 196 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
197. Admitted.
198. Admitted.
199. Admitted.
200. Admitted.
201. Admitted.
50

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 51 of 151
202. Defendants Barrett and Freeman admit that there is no "county-wide computer inmate management system" but are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 202 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
203. Defendants Barrett and Freeman admit that "court returns" are placed in general population "while the Records Room processes the day's commit and release orders" but are without kriowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 203 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
The Fulton County Jail Policy For Court Returns 204.
Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining
51

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 52 of 151
allegations contained in paragraph 204 of the Fourth Amended Complaint, but such conduct is not sanctioned or authorized by them.
205. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 205 of the Fourth Amended Complaint, but such conduct is not sanctioned or authorized by them.
The Cause Of The Overdetention - Detaining Persons Ordered Released To Check For Detainers And Warrants; Collapse of The Inmate Management System 206. The term "effective" is not defined and Defendants Barrett and
Freeman decline the opportunity to speculate as to its meaning. Therefore, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 206 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
52

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 53 of 151
207. The term "plagued" is not defined and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline the opportunity to speculate as to its meaning. Therefore, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 207 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
208. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 208 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
209. The term "documented" is not defined and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline the opportunity to speculate as to its meaning. Therefore, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 209 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
53

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 54 of 151
210. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation made in paragraph 210 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
211. The term "swells" is not defined and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline the opportunity to speculate as to its meaning. Therefore, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 211 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
212. The terms "policy" and "practice" are not defined and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline the opportunity to speculate as to its meaning. Therefore, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 212 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
54

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 55 of 151
213. The phrase "court return strip search policy" is not defined and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline the opportunity to speculate as to its meaning. Therefore, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 213 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
214. The term "entitled to be released" is not defined and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline the opportunity to speculate as to its meaning. Therefore, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 214 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
215. The term "entitled to be released" is not defined and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline the opportunity to speculate as to its meaning. Therefore, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to
55

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 56 of 151
form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 215 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
216. The term "unnecessarily" is not defined and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline the opportunity to speculate as to its meaning. Therefore, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 216 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
The Overcrowding, Overdetention And Premature Release Are A Longstanding, Pervasive And Continuing Problem Known To Defendants 217. The terms "overcrowding, overdetaining, and premature" are not
clearly defined and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline the opportunity to speculate as to its meaning. Therefore, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth
56

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 57 of 151
of the allegations contained in paragraph 217 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
218. The Fambro case is a matter of public record and the issues contested therein are not within the personal knowledge or Defendants Barrett and Freeman. Therefore, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 218 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
219. The Fambro case is a matter of public record and the issues contested therein are not within the personal knowledge or Defendants Barrett and Freeman. Therefore, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 219 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
220. The Fambro case is a matter of public record and the issues contested therein are not within the personal knowledge or Defendants Barrett and
57

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 58 of 151
Freeman. Therefore, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 220 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
221. The Fambro case is a matter of public record and the issues contested therein are not within the personal knowledge or Defendants Barrett and Freeman. Therefore, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 221 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
222. The Fambro case is a matter of public record and the issues contested therein are not within the personal knowledge or Defendants Barrett and Freeman. Therefore, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 222 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
58

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 59 of 151
223. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 223 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
224. Defendant Freeman is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 224 of the Fourth Amended Complaint; Defendant Barrett admits to their truth.
225. Defendant Freeman is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 225 of the Fourth Amended Complaint; Defendant Barrett admits to their truth.
226. Defendant Freeman is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 226 of the Fourth Amended Complaint; Defendant Barrett admits to their truth.
59

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 60 of 151
227. The term "notorious" is not defined and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline the opportunity to speculate as to its meaning. Therefore, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 227 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
228. Defendant Freeman is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 228 of the Fourth Amended Complaint; Defendant Barrett admits to their truth.
229. The term "routinely" is not defined and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline the opportunity to speculate as to its meaning. Therefore, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 229 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
60

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 61 of 151
230. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 230 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
231. Admitted.
232. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 232 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
233. Defendant Freeman is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 233 of the Fourth Amended Complaint; Defendant Barrett admits to their truth.
61

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 62 of 151
234. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 234 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
235. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 235 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
236. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 236 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
237. The document speaks for itself; however, Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 237 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
62

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 63 of 151
231. Defendants Barrett and Freeman Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 231 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
232. The term "problem" is not defined and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline the opportunity to speculate as to its meaning. Therefore, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 232 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
233. Admitted.
234. Admitted.
235. Admitted.
63

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 64 of 151
236. Admitted.
237. The terms "degrading" and "humiliating" are not defined and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline the opportunity to speculate as to its meaning. Therefore, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 237 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
238. Paragraph 238 of the Fourth Amended Complaint is confusing. Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline the opportunity to speculate as to its meaning. Therefore, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 238 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
239. Admitted.
64

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 65 of 151
240. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 240 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
241. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 241 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
242. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 242 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
243. Admitted.
244. The terms "frequently" are not defined and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline the opportunity to speculate as to its meaning. Therefore,
65

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 66 of 151
Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 244f the Fourth Amended Complaint.
245. The allegations contained in paragraph 245 of the Fourth Amended Complaint are based on assumptions that have not been shown to be valid; therefore, Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 245 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
246. The allegations contained in paragraph 246 of the Fourth Amended Complaint are based on assumptions that have not been shown to be valid; therefore, Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 246 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
66

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 67 of 151
247. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 247 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
248. The allegations contained in paragraph 248 of the Fourth Amended Complaint are based on assumptions that have not been shown to be valid; therefore, Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 248 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
249. Admitted.
250. Paragraph is vague because the term U overdetained" is not sufficiently defined to include the many variables that may occur beyond the control of Defendants Barrett and Freeman that may affect an inmate's release; therefore, Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without knowledge
67

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 68 of 151
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 250 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
Defendant's Knowledge Of The Collapse Of The Inmate Management System At The Fulton County Jail 251.
The terms "ineffective" and"chaotic" are not defined and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline the opportunity to speculate as to its meaning in the context of this paragraph. Therefore, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 251 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
252. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 252 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
68

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 69 of 151
253. Defendant Barrett has been aware of problems at the Fulton County Jail but has not found them to cause "chaos" or to render the operations of the Records Room to be "ineffective." Defendant Freeman is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 253f the Fourth Amended Complaint.
254. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 254 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
255. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 255 of the Fourth Amended Complaint as to what Defendant County Commissioners have been "told."
256. Admitted.
69

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 70 of 151
Defendant Jacquelyn Barrett's Failure To Take Meaningful, Sustained Corrective Action 257.
Defendant Barrett denies each and every allegation contained in paragraph 257 of the Fourth Amended Complaint. Defendant Freeman is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of these allegations.
258. Admitted.
259. Admitted.
260. Admitted.
261. Facts and circumstances, such as a lack of funding to pay other county jails to accept Fulton County prisoners, made it impossible for Defendant Barrett to send inmates to other facilities. Defendant Freeman is
70

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 71 of 151
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 261 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
262. Admitted.
263. Admitted.
264. Admitted.
265. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 265 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
266. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 266 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
71

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 72 of 151
267. Admitted.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS ARRESTEE STRIP SEARCH CLASS ALLEGATIONS Arrestee Strip Search Performed on Arrestee Strip Search Class Named
Plaintiffs 268.
The phrase "strip search" is not defined and Defendants Barrett and· Freeman decline the opportunity to speculate as to its meaning in the context of this paragraph. Therefore, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 268 of the Fourth Amended Complaint as to a "strip search." The remaining allegations are admitted.
269. The phrase "strip search" is not defined and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline the opportunity to speculate as to its meaning in the context of this paragraph. Therefore, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations
72

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 73 of 151
contained in paragraph 269 of the Fourth Amended Complaint as to a "strip search." The remaining allegations are admitted.
270. The phrase "strip search" is not defined and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline the opportunity to speculate as to its meaning in the context of this paragraph. Therefore, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 270 of the Fourth Amended Complaint as to a "strip search." The remaining allegations are admitted.
271. Defendants Barrett and Freeman admit that Plaintiff Middleton was booked into the Fulton County Jail. The term "strip search" has not been specifically defined by Plaintiffs and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline to speculate as to its meaning and, therefore, are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 271 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
73

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 74 of 151
272. Defendants Barrett and Freeman admit that Plaintiff Westbrook was booked into the Fulton County Jail. The term "strip search" has not been specifically defined by Plaintiffs and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline to speculate as to its meaning and, therefore, are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 272 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
273. Defendants Barrett and Freeman admit that Plaintiff Blake was booked into the Fulton County Jail. The term "strip search" has not been specifically defined by Plaintiffs and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline to speculate as to its meaning and, therefore, are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 273 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
74

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 75 of 151
274. Defendants Barrett and Freeman admit that Plaintiff Witherspoon was booked into the Fulton County Jail. The term "strip search" has not been defined with sufficient specificity by Plaintiffs and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline to speculate as to its meaning and, therefore, are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 274 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
Arrestee Strip Search Class" - Class Action Allegations 275.
Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 275 of the Fourth Amended Complaint as to the statutory basis for their claim but denies knowledge of the remaining allegations.
75

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 76 of 151
276. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 276 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
277. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 277 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
278. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 278 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
280. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 280 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
287. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 287 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
76

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 77 of 151
288. Defendants Barrett and Freeman admit that the names of current and past inmates of the Fulton County Jail are available but deny the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 288 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
289. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 289 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
290. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 290 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
291. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 291 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
292. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 292 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
77

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 78 of 151
293. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 293 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
ALPHA STRIP SEARCHES CLASS ALLEGATIONS Alpha Strip Searches Performed By The Fulton County Jail
294. Admitted.
295. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 295 of the Fourth Amended Complaint
296. Admitted.
78

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 79 of 151
297. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 297 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
IIAlpha Strip Search Class" - Class Action Allegations 298.
Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 298 of the Fourth Amended Complaint as to the statutory basis for their claim but deny knowledge of the remaining allegations.
299. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 299 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
79

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 80 of 151
300. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 300 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
301. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 301 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
302. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 302 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
303. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny and every allegation contained in paragraph 303 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
304. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 304 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
80

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 81 of 151
305. Defendants Barrett and Freeman admit that the names of current and past inmates of the Fulton County Jail are available but deny the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 305 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
306. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 306 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
307. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 307 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
308. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 308 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
309. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 309 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
81

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 82 of 151
310. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 310 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
COURT RETURN STRIP SEARCH CLASS ALLEGATIONS "Court Return Strip Search Class" - Class Action Allegations
311. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 311 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
312. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 312 of the Fourth Amended Complaint as to the statutory basis for their claim but denies knowledge of the remaining allegations.
82

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 83 of 151
313. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 313 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
314. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 314 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
315. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 315 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
316. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 316 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
317. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 317 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
83

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 84 of 151
318. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 318 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
319. Defendants Barrett and Freeman admit that the names of current and past inmates of the Fulton County Jail are available but deny the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 319 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
320. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 320 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
321. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 321 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
322. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 322 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
84

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 85 of 151
323. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 323 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
324. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 324 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
OVERDETENTION CLASS ALLEGATIONS Plaintiff C. Alan Powell's Overdetention By The Fulton County Jail 325.
The term U detained" is not defined and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline the opportunity to speculate as to its meaning. Therefore, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 325 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
85

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 86 of 151
326. The term "release date" has not been defined with sufficient specificity by Plaintiffs and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline to speculate as to its meaning and, therefore, are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 326 of the Fourth Amended Complaint..
327. Admitted.
328. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 328 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
329. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 329 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
330. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 330 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
86

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 87 of 151
Tory Dunlap's Overdetention By The Fulton County Jail 331.
The term "committed" is not defined and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline the opportunity to speculate as to its meaning. Therefore, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 331 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
332. The term "release date" has not been defined with sufficient specificity by Plaintiffs and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline to speculate as to its meaning and, therefore, are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 332 of the Fourth Amended Complaint..
333. Admitted.
87

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 88 of 151
334. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 334 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
335. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 335 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
336. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 336 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
Plaintiff Lee Antonio Smith's Overdetention By the Fulton County Jail 337.
The term "committed" is not defined and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline the opportunity to speculate as to its meaning. Therefore, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a
88

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 89 of 151
belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 337 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
338. The term "release date" has not been defined with sufficient specificity by Plaintiffs and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline to speculate as to its meaning and, therefore, are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 338 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
339. The term "exit date" has not been defined with sufficient specificity by Plaintiffs and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline to speculate as to its meaning and, therefore, are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 339 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
340. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 340 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
89

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 90 of 151
341. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 341 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
342. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 342 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
David Evans's Overdetention By the Fulton County Jail 343.
The term "release date" is not defined and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline the opportunity to speculate as to its meaning. Therefore, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 343 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
90

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 91 of 151
344. The term "exit date" has not been defined with sufficient specificity by Plaintiffs and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline to speculate as to its meaning and, therefore, are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 344 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
345. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 345 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
346. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 346 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
347. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 347 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
91

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 92 of 151
Plaintiff Stanley Clemon's Overdetention By the Fulton County Jail 348.
The term "detained" is not defined and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline the opportunity to speculate as to its meaning. Therefore, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 348 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
349. The term "exit date" has not been defined with sufficient specificity by Plaintiffs and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline to speculate as to its meaning and, therefore, are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 349 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
350. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 350 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
92

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 93 of 151
351. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 351 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
352. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 352 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
353. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 353 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
Plaintiff Allen Middleton's Overdetention By the Fulton County Jail 354.
The term "detained" is not defined and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline the opportunity to speculate as to its meaning. Therefore, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a
93

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 94 of 151
belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 354 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
355. The term "release date" has not been defined with sufficient specificity by Plaintiffs and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline to speculate as to its meaning and, therefore, are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 355 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
356. The term "exit date" has not been defined with sufficient specificity by Plaintiffs and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline to speculate as to its meaning and, therefore, are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 356 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
357. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 357 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
94

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 95 of 151
358. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 358 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
359. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 359 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
Plaintiff Anthony Westbrook's Overdetention By the Fulton County Jail 360.
The term "detained" is not defined and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline the opportunity to speculate as to its meaning. Therefore, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 360 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
361. The term "release date" has not been defined with sufficient specificity by Plaintiffs and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline to
95

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 96 of 151
speculate as to its meaning and, therefore, are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 361 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
362. The term "exit date" has not been defined with sufficient specificity by Plaintiffs and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline to speculate as to its meaning and, therefore, are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 362 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
363. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 363 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
364. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 364 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
96

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 97 of 151
365. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 365 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
Plaintiff Benjamin Blake's Overdetention By the Fulton County Jail 366.
The term "detained" is not defined and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline the opportunity to speculate as to its meaning. Therefore, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 366 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
367. The term "release date" has not been defined with sufficient specificity by Plaintiffs and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline to speculate as to its meaning and, therefore, are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 367 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
97

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 98 of 151
368. The term Ifexit date" has not been defined with sufficient specificity by Plaintiffs and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline to speculate as to its meaning and, therefore, are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 368 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
369. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 369f the Fourth Amended Complaint.
370. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 370 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
371. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 371 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
98

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 99 of 151
Plaintiff Henry Witherspoon's Overdetention By the Fulton County Jail 372.
The term "detained" is not defined and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline the opportunity to speculate as to its meaning. Therefore, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 372 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
373. The term "release date" has not been defined with sufficient specificity by Plaintiffs and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline to speculate as to its meaning and, therefore, are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 373 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
374. The term "exit date" has not been defined with sufficient specificity by Plaintiffs and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline to speculate as to
99

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 100 of 151
its meaning and, therefore, are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 374 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
375. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 375 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
376. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 376 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
377. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 377 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
100

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 101 of 151
Plaintiff Antionne Wolf's Overdetention By the Fulton County Jail 378.
The term "detained" is not defined and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline the opportunity to speculate as to its meaning. Therefore, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 378 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
379. The term "release date" has not been defined with sufficient specificity by Plaintiffs and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline to
speculate as to its meaning and, therefore, are without the knowledge Or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 379 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
380. The term "exit date" has not been defined with sufficient specificity by Plaintiffs and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline to speculate as to
101

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 102 of 151
its meanmg and, therefore, are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 380 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
381. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 381 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
382. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 382 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
383. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 383 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
102

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 103 of 151
Plaintiff Kristopher Matkin's Overdetention By the Fulton County Jail 384.
The term "detained" is not defined and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline the opportunity to speculate as to its meaning. Therefore, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 384 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
385. The term "release date" has not been defined with sufficient specificity by Plaintiffs and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline to speculate as to its meaning and, therefore, are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 385 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
386. The term "exit date" has not been defined with sufficient specificity by Plaintiffs and Defendants Barrett and Freeman decline to speculate as to
103

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 104 of 151
its meaning and, therefore, are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 386 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
387. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 387 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
388. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 388 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
389. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 389 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
"Overdetention Class" - Class Action Allegations 390.
Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations
104

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 105 of 151
contained in paragraph 390 of the Fourth Amended Complaint as to the statutory basis for their claim but denies knowledge of the remaining allegations.
391. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 391 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
392. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 392 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
393. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 393 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
394. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 394 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
105

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 106 of 151
395. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 395 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
397. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 397 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
398. Admitted.
399. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 399 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
400. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 400 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
401. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 401 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
106

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 107 of 151
402. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 402 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
403. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 403 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
SUBSTANTIVE ALLEGATIONS CLAIMS OF ARRESTEE STRIP SEARCH NAMED PLAINTIFF
Countl 404.
Defendants Barrett and Freeman reaver and reallege the information contained in the previous paragraphs of the Answers to Fourth Amended Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
405. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 405 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
107

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 108 of 151
406. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 406 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
407. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 407 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
408. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 408 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
409. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 409 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
410. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 410 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
108

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 109 of 151
411. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 411 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
412. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 412 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
Count 2 Negligent Training And Negligent Supervision
and Failure to Implement Policies Claims Against Defendant Jacquelyn Barrett
413. Defendants Barrett and Freeman reaver and reallege the information contained in the previous paragraphs of the Answers to Fourth Amended Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
414. Admitted.
109

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 110 of 151
415. Admitted.
416. Admitted.
417. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 417 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
418. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 418 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
419. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 419 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
420. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 420 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
110

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 111 of 151
421. Defendant Barrett denies each and every allegation contained in paragraph 421 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
Count 3 Section 1983 Claims Of Arrestee Strip Search Named Plaintiffs Against Defendant Fulton County and Each of Karen Handel,
Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma L. Darnell, Nancy Boxill and William "Bill" Edwards 422.
Defendants Barrett and Freeman reavers and realleges the information contained in the previous paragraphs of the Answers to Fourth Amended Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
423. The term "ultimate" is not defined. Therefore, Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 423 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
111

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 112 of 151
424. Admitted.
425. Admitted.
426. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny that the named Defendants had a duty or obligation to train the Sheriff or her deputies.
427. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny the existence of any "illegal booking strip searches" and are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 427 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
428. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny the existence of any "illegal strip searches" and are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 428 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
112

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 113 of 151
Count 4 Section 1983 Claims of Arrestee Strip
Search Named Plaintiffs Against Defendant City of Atlanta 429.
Defendants Barrett and Freeman reavers and realleges the information contained in the previous paragraphs of the Answers to Fourth Amended Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
430. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 430 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
431. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 4310£ the Fourth Amended Complaint.
113

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 114 of 151
432. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 432 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
433. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 433 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
434. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny the existence of any "blanket strip searches" and are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 434 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
435. Defendants Barrett and Freeman admit the fact asserted but are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
114

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 115 of 151
truth of the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 435 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
436. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 436 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
437. Defendant Barrett denies being"deliberately indifferent" or knowing of the existence of any "blanket strip searches," and is without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 437 of the Fourth Amended Complaint. Defendant Freeman is without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 437 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
438. Defendant Barrett denies the existence of any "blanket strip searches" and is without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as
115

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 116 of 151
to the truth of the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 438 of the Fourth Amended Complaint. Defendant Freeman is without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 438 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
439. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 439 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
CLAIMS OF ALPHA STRIP SEARCH NAMED PLAINTIFFS CountS
Section 1983 Claims of Alpha Strip Search Named Plaintiffs Against Defendant Jacquelyn Barrett 440.
Defendants Barrett and Freeman reaver and reallege the information contained in the previous paragraphs of the Answers to Fourth Amended Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
116

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 117 of 151
441. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 441 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
442. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny the allegation that underlies the assertions made in paragraph 442 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
443. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 443 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
444. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 444 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
445. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 445 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
117

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 118 of 151
446. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 446 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
447. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 447 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
Count 6 Negligent Training and Negligent Supervision
and Failure to Implement Policies Claims Against Defendant Jacquelyn Barrett
448. Defendants Barrett and Freeman reaver and reallege the information contained in the previous paragraphs of the Answers to Fourth Amended Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
449. Admitted.
118

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 119 of 151
450. Admitted.
451. Admitted.
452. Defendant Barrett denies each and every allegation contained in paragraph 452 of the Fourth Amended Complaint. Defendant Freeman is without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 452 of the Fourth Amended Complaint
453. Defendant Barrett denies each and every allegation contained in paragraph 453 of the Fourth Amended Complaint. Defendant Freeman is without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 453 of the Fourth Amended Complaint
119

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 120 of 151
454. Defendant Barrett denies each and every allegation contained in paragraph 454 of the Fourth Amended Complaint. Defendant Freeman is without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 454 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
455. Defendant Barrett denies each and every allegation contained in paragraph 455 of the Fourth Amended Complaint. Defendant Freeman is without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 455 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
456. Defendant Barrett denies each and every allegation contained in paragraph 456 of the Fourth Amended Complaint. Defendant Freeman is without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
120

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 121 of 151
truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 456 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
Count 7 Section 1983 Oaims of Alpha Strip Search Named Plaintiffs Against Defendant Fulton County and Each of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma L. Darnell,
Nancy Boxill and William "Bill" Edwards 457.
Defendants Barrett and Freeman reaver and reallege the information contained in the previous paragraphs of the Answers to Fourth Amended Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
458. The term "ultimate" is not defined. Therefore, Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 458 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
121

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 122 of 151
459. Admitted.
460. Admitted.
461. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny the allegations in paragraph 461 of the Fourth Amended Complaint that the named Defendant Fulton County had a duty or obligation to train the Sheriffs or their deputies.
462. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny that any systematic illegal strip searches took place at the Jail and are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 462 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
463. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny that any systematic illegal strip searches took place at the Jail and are without knowledge or
122

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 123 of 151
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 463 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
Count 8 Section 1983 Claims of Alpha Strip Search Named
Plaintiffs Against Defendant City of Atlanta 464.
Defendants Barrett and Freeman reaver and reallege the information contained in the previous paragraphs of the Answers to Fourth Amended Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
465. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 465 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
123

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 124 of 151
466. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 466 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
467. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 467 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
468. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 468 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
469. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny the existence of a blanket strip search custom and policy and are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 469 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
124

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 125 of 151
470. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny the existence of a blanket strip search custom and policy and are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 470 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
471. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 471 of the Fourth Amended Complaint as to the state of the City of Atlanta's knowledge.
472. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 472 of the Fourth Amended Complaint as to the state of the City of Atlanta's knowledge.
125

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 126 of 151
473. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 473 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
474. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 474 of the Fourth Amended Complaint as to the state of the City of Atlanta's knowledge.
475. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny the existence of a blanket strip search custom and policy and are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 475 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
126

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 127 of 151
CLAIMS OF COURT RETURN STRIP SEARCH NAMED PLAINTIFFS Count 9
Section 1983 Claims of Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiffs Against Defendants Jacquelyn Barrett and Myron Freeman 476.
Defendants Barrett and Freeman reaver and reallege the information contained in the previous paragraphs of the Answers to Fourth Amended Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
477. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny the existence of a blanket strip search custom and policy and are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 477 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
478. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 478 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
127

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 128 of 151
479. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 479 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
480. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 480 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
481. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 481 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
482. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 482 of the Fourth Amended Complaint
483. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 483 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
128

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 129 of 151
Count 10 Negligent Training and Negligent Supervision and Failure to Implement Policies Regarding Searches of Court Return Strip Search Class Members Against
Defendant Jacquelyn Barrett 484.
Defendants Barrett and Freeman reaver and reallege the information contained in the previous paragraphs of the Answers to Fourth Amended Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
485. Admitted.
486. Admitted.
487. Admitted.
488. Defendant Barrett denies each and every allegation contained in paragraph 488 of the Fourth Amended Complaint. Defendant Freeman is
129

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 130 of 151
without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 488 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
489. Defendant Barrett denies each and every allegation contained in paragraph 489 of the Fourth Amended Complaint. Defendant Freeman is without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 489 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
490. Defendant Barrett denies each and every allegation contained in paragraph 490 of the Fourth Amended Complaint. Defendant Freeman is without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 490 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
130

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 131 of 151
491. Defendant Barrett denies each and every allegation contained in paragraph 491 of the Fourth Amended Complaint. Defendant Freeman is without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 491 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
492. Defendant Barrett denies each and every allegation contained in paragraph 492 of the Fourth Amended Complaint. Defendant Freeman is without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 492 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
131

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 132 of 151
Count 11 Section 1983 Claim of Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiffs Against Defendant Fulton County and Each of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma L. Darnell,
Nancy Boxill and William "Bill" Edwards 493.
Defendants Barrett and Freeman reaver and reallege the information contained in the previous paragraphs of the Answers to Fourth Amended Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
494. The term "ultimate" is not defined. Therefore, Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 494 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
495. Admitted.
496. Admitted.
132

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 133 of 151
497. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny that the named Defendants had a duty or obligation to train the Sheriff or the deputies.
498. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny the existence of any "illegal strip searches" and are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 498 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
499. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny the existence of any "blanket strip searches" and are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 499 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
500. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 500 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
133

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 134 of 151
Count 12 Section 1983 Claim of Court Return Strip Search Named Plaintiffs Against Defendant City of Atlanta
501. Defendants Barrett and Freeman reaver and reallege the information contained in the previous paragraphs of the Answers to Fourth Amended Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
502. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 502 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
503. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 503 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
134

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 135 of 151
504. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 504 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
505. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 505 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
506. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny the existence of a "blanket strip search" policy at the Fulton County Jail and are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 506 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
507. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 507 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
135

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 136 of 151
508. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 508 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
509. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 509 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
510. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny the existence of a "blanket strip search" policy at the Fulton County Jail and are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 510 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
136

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 137 of 151
CLAIMS OF OVERDETENTION NAMED PLAINTIFFS Count 13
Section 1983 Claims of Overdetention Named Plaintiffs Against Defendant Jacquelyn Barrett
511. Defendants Barrett and Freeman reaver and reallege the information contained in the previous paragraphs of the Answers to Fourth Amended Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
512. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 512 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
513. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 513 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
514. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 514 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
137

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 138 of 151
515. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 515 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
516. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 516 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
517. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 517 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
518. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 518 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
519. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 519 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
138

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 139 of 151
520. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 520 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
Count 14 Negligent Training and Negligent Supervision and Failure to Implement Policies Claims of Overdetention Named Plaintiffs Against Defendant Jacquelyn Barrett and Myron Freeman
521. Defendants Barrett and Freeman reaver and reallege the information contained in the previous paragraphs of the Answers to Fourth Amended Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
522. Admitted.
523. Admitted.
139

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 140 of 151
524. Admitted.
525. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 525 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
526. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 526 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
527. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 527 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
528. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 528 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
529. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 529 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
140

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 141 of 151
Count 15 Section 1983 Claims of Overdetention Named Plaintiffs Against Defendant Fulton County and Each of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma L. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill and William "Bill" Edwards
530. Defendants Barrett and Freeman reaver and reallege the information contained in the previous paragraphs of the Answers to Fourth Amended Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
531. The term "ultimate" is not defined. Therefore, Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 531 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
532. Admitted.
533. Admitted.
141

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 142 of 151
534. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny that the named Defendants had a duty or obligation to train the Sheriff or the deputies.
535. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 535 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
536. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 536 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
142

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 143 of 151
Count 16 Section 1983 Claims of Overdetention Named Plaintiffs Against Defendant Fulton County And Each of Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell. Nancy Boxill and William "Bill" Edwards - Deliberate Indifference For Knowing Failure to Provide Adequate Funds for the Constitutional Operation of the Fulton County Jail Despite the Express Legal Obligation To Do So
537. Defendants Barrett and Freeman reaver and reallege the information contained in the previous paragraphs of the Answers to Fourth Amended Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
538. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 538 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
539. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 539 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
143

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 144 of 151
540. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 540 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
541. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 541 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
542. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 542 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
543. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 543 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
144

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 145 of 151
Count 17 Section 1983 Claims Of Overdetention Named Plaintiffs Against
Defendant City of Atlanta 544.
Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 544 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
545. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 545 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
546. Defendants Barrett and Freeman without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 546 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
145

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 146 of 151
547. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 547 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
548. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 548 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
549. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 549 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
550. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 550 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
146

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 147 of 151
551. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 551 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
552. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 552 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
553. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 553 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
554. Defendants Barrett and Freeman are without the knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 554 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
147

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 148 of 151
IRREPARABLE INJURY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 555.
Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 555 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
556. Defendants Barrett and Freeman deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 556 of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
DEFENSES 545.
This Complaint fails to state a cause of action against Defendants Barrett and Freeman upon which relief may be granted.
546. Plaintiffs lack standing to assert allegations on behalf of any class.
547. Plaintiffs are not entitled to injunctive relief.
148

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 149 of 151

548. This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction only Defendants Barrett and Freeman in their official capacity.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Defendants Barrett and Freeman pray that this Fourth Amended Complaint be dismissed as to them in their official and individual capacities with all costs to Plaintiffs.
Respectfully submitted by, AND & ASSOCIATES, LLC

230 Peachtree Street, NW Suite 1150 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Telephone: (404) 522-8155 Facsimile (404) 522-7355 Email: tlackland@e-Iacklaw.com

Theodore H. Lackland Georgia Bar No. 431055 Counsel for Defendant Barrett and Freeman

149

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 150 of 151

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I, Theodore H. Lackland, do hereby certify that the foregoing document has been prepared in 14-point Book Antiqua font and complies with LR 5.1B.
Respectfully submitted by,

230 Peachtree Street, NW Suite 1150 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Telephone: (404) 522-8155 Facsimile (404) 522-7355 Email: tlackland@e-lacklaw.com

AND & ASSOCIATES, LLC
~
Theodore H. Lackland Georgia Bar No. 431055 Counsel for Defendants Barrett and Freeman

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 133 Filed 08/10/2005 Page 151 of 151

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that on August 10, 2005, I electronically filed

Defendants Barrett and Freeman's Answer to the Fourth Amended

Complaint with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which

will automatically send email notification of such filing to the following

attorneys of record:

Teresa Roseborough, Esq.
Paul J. Estuar, Esq.
William Clairbome, Esq.
Dennis Young, Esq.

230 Peachtree Street, NW Suite 1150 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Telephone: (404) 522-8155 Email: tlackland@e-lacklaw.com

-A'/LJu Theodore H. Lackland Georgia Bar No. 431055 Counsel for Defendants Barrett and Freeman

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION

C. ALAN POWELL, TORY DUNLAP, LEE ANTONIO SMITH, and DAVID EVANS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
JACQUELINE BARRETT, individually and in her Official Capacity, FULTON COUNTY, KAREN HANDEL, Chairperson, Fulton County Board of Commissioners, ROB PITTS, Member, Fulton County Board of Commissioners, EMMA I. DARNELL, Member, Fulton County Board of Commissioners, NANCY A. BOXILL, Member, Fulton County Board of Commissioners, WILLIAM “BILL” EDWARDS, Member, Fulton County Board of Commissioners, and CITY OF ATLANTA,
Defendants.

: : : : : CIVIL ACTION NO. : 1:04-CV-1100-RWS : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :

AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

ORDER In a decision dated August 15, 2005, this Court certified several previously entered orders in this case for interlocutory appeal, and stayed this action pending resolution of the parties’ appeal and cross-appeal. (See Aug. 15, 2005 Order [142] at 2-3.) The same day, Defendants Barrett and Freeman filed a motion to dismiss, complaining that they had not been timely served with certain amendments to Plaintiffs’ Complaint. (See Def.s’ Mot. to Dismiss [141].) Although this Court arguably has jurisdiction to resolve Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, see Green Leaf Nursery v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 341 F.3d 1292, 1309 (11th Cir. 2003) (“ ‘The district court has authority to proceed forward with portions of the case not related to the claims on appeal . . . .’ ”) (quoting May v. Sheahan, 226 F.3d 876, 880 n. 2 (7th Cir. 2000)); Taylor v. Sterrett, 640 F.2d 663, 667-68 (5th Cir. Unit A Mar. 1981) (“where an appeal is allowed from an interlocutory order, the district court may still proceed with matters not involved in the appeal”);1 it is not inclined to lift the previously
1 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent the decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit handed down prior to September 30, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981).
2
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

entered stay to address Defendants’ Motion, nor to require Plaintiffs to respond to the motion while they continue to pursue this litigation before the Eleventh Circuit. Consequently, Defendants Barrett and Freeman’s Motion to Dismiss [141] is DENIED with the right to re-file. To the extent they wish to raise the issues asserted therein following the Eleventh Circuit’s resolution of the pending appeal and cross-appeal, they may do so at a later date.
SO ORDERED this 7th day of March, 2006.
/s/ Richard W. Story RICHARD W. STORY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
3
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION

C. ALAN POWELL, TORY DUNLAP, LEE ANTONIO SMITH, and DAVID EVANS, individually and behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
JACQUELINE BARRETT, individually and in her Official Capacity, FULTON COUNTY, KAREN HANDEL, Chairperson, Fulton County Board of Commissioners, ROB PITTS, Member, Fulton County Board of Commissioners, EMMA I. DARNELL, Member, Fulton County Board of Commissioners, NANCY A. BOXILL, Member, Fulton County Board of Commissioners, WILLIAM “BILL” EDWARDS, Member, Fulton County Board of Commissioners and CITY OF ATLANTA,
Defendants.

: : : : : CIVIL ACTION NO. : 1:04-CV-1100-RWS : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :

AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

ORDER This case comes before the Court for consideration of Defendant Jacqueline Barrett’s Motion for Leave to File Answer [12-1], Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification [15-1], Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend the First Amended Complaint [16-1], Defendant Fulton County, Karen Handel, Rob Pitts, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill, William Edwards’ (collectively, the “Fulton County Defendants’”) Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint [17-1], Defendant City of Atlanta’s Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint [21-1], the Fulton County Defendants’ Motion for Extension of Time to File a Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification [22-1], the Fulton County Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery [27-1], Plaintiffs’ Motion to Supplement their Opposition to the Fulton County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [32-1], Plaintiffs’ Motion for Entry of a Scheduling Order Including Setting Deadlines and Extending Certain Dates [34-1], Plaintiffs’ Motion to Late File their Reply to the Fulton County Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Amend their First Amended Complaint [41-1], Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Amend their Second Amended Complaint [42-1], the Fulton County Defendants’ Request for Scheduling Conference [44-1], the Fulton County Defendants’ Motion for
2
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

Protective Order [46-1], and the Fulton County Defendants’ Motion to Quash Subpoenas [61-1].
As preliminary matters, Defendant Jacqueline Barrett’s Motion for Leave to File Answer [12-1], Plaintiffs’ Motion to Supplement their Opposition to the Fulton County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [32-1],1 and Plaintiffs’ Motion to Late File their Reply to the Fulton County Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Amend their First Amended Complaint [41-1] are GRANTED nunc pro tunc. The Court addresses the remaining motions
before it following its review of the record and the parties’ briefs. Background
Plaintiffs, certain former detainees at the Fulton County Jail (the “Jail”), initiated this putative class action on April 21, 2004. In their Complaint, as presently amended, Plaintiffs assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Georgia
1Plaintiffs are cautioned to fully respond to Defendants’ arguments in all future filings with the Court. Although the Court in this instance will consider the arguments
asserted in the submitted surreply, it is not required to do so. See L.R. N.D. Ga. 7.1 (providing for filing a motion and brief, response brief, and reply brief); Garrison v. Northeast Ga. Med. Ctr., Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1340 (N.D. Ga. 1999) (it is not the function or obligation of the district court to engage in “refereeing an endless volley of briefs”).
3
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

common law respecting the conditions of their confinement at the Jail. They complain about being subject to “blanket strip searches” upon entering and/or returning to the Jail, as well as their continued detention past scheduled or necessary release dates (a condition they refer to as “over-detention”).
In particular, Plaintiffs allege that they and others similarly situated were held at the Fulton County Jail for periods of time, in some instances, almost two weeks, after they had served misdemeanor sentences, posted bond or had been ordered released by a Fulton County Court. Moreover, they assert that the Jail maintained a policy of strip searching inmates without any individualized determination that such searches would reveal weapons, drugs or other contraband, and that they and others were subjected to these invasive searches at the hands of Jail staff. Moreover, Plaintiffs allege that at least some of these searches were conducted with respect to persons who were returning from court hearings pursuant to which they were entitled to be released from the facility.
Plaintiffs allege that these conditions at the Fulton County Jail were ubiquitous and had persisted for many years. Moreover, they assert that through media coverage and several published judicial decisions relating such
4
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

conditions to the public, the unconstitutional treatment of inmates at the Jail had grown notorious, such that the government actors who placed arrestees into the Jail’s custody were aware of these alleged practices.
Plaintiffs assert that the foregoing treatment violates rights guaranteed them under the Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and predict that the persons falling within the proposed classes denominated in their pleadings will number 10,000 or more. As a result of exposure to such conditions, Plaintiffs seek monetary and injunctive relief against Fulton County Sheriff Jacqueline Barrett, Fulton County, the members of the Fulton County Board of Commissioners, and the City of Atlanta.
Discussion The motions before the Court fall into four distinct categories–motions to amend, motion to certify class, motions to dismiss, and several filings concerning discovery. The Court addresses these submissions in that order. I. Motions to Amend The Court first considers Plaintiffs’ Rule 15 motions to amend. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), after a responsive pleading has been filed, a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or written consent
5
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

of the adverse party. The rule goes on to provide, “leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Even so, granting leave to amend is not automatic. Faser v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 674 F.2d 856, 860 (11th Cir. 1982); see also Underwriters at Interest on Cover Note JHB92M10582079 v. Nautronix, Ltd., 79 F. 3d 480, 484 (5th Cir. 1996) (“approval of motion to amend is not automatic”); Ashe v. Corley, 992 F. 2d 540, 542 (5th Cir. 1993) (same). Rather, district courts have “extensive discretion” in deciding whether to grant leave to amend and may choose not to allow a party to do so “when the amendment would prejudice the defendant, follows undue delays or is futile.” Campbell v. Emory Clinic, 166 F.3d 1157, 1162 (11th Cir. 1999).
Plaintiffs submitted their first motion to amend in July 2004, requesting the addition of one Stanley Clemens II as a named plaintiff in this action.2 According to Plaintiffs, the amendment was sought because, at the time the motion was filed, Mr. Clemens was still housed at the Jail (despite a decision
2Although the second motion to amend (requesting leave to file a pleading captioned, “Third Amendment Complaint”) likewise identifies Mr. Clemens as a named plaintiff, Plaintiffs elected not to withdraw their earlier motion because they assert the Second Amended Complaint “relates back” to a time when Mr. Clemens was still housed at the Jail. (See Pls.’ Br. in Supp. of their Mot. for Leave to Amend their Second Am. Compl. at 2 n.1.)
6
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

from Judge Bedford of the Superior Court of Fulton County ordering his immediate release). Consequently, Plaintiffs submit, his standing to pursue injunctive relief is free from doubt.
The Fulton County Defendants oppose this motion, contending that the requested amendment would be futile for two reasons. First, the Fulton County Defendants assert that the proposed amended pleading does not state claims for relief against them for all the reasons set forth in their Motion to Dismiss. Second, they urge that Mr. Clemens had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking leave to be joined in this action, thereby foreclosing the relief sought under habeas corpus jurisprudence and the mandates of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e) (hereinafter, “PLRA”).
As it relates to the first ground for opposition, the Court declines to deny leave to amend based on a pleading’s alleged failure to assert meritorious claims against some named Defendants.3 The viability of claims against a subset of litigants can be tested more effectively through a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, and the Court will not exercise its discretion in favor of a wholesale
3The Court addresses the merits of the Fulton County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss infra, Part III.
7
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

denial of sought after amendments when the allegations against other parties appear to state cognizable claims for relief.
Likewise, Defendants’ “failure to exhaust” futility argument fails to
persuade the Court that Plaintiffs should be denied the right to file their Second Amended Complaint. Pretermitting whether Plaintiffs’ request for an injunction can appropriately be considered as a petition for habeas corpus relief,4 Plaintiffs
have come forward with evidence tending to show that Mr. Clemens had exhausted available remedies at the time he sought to become a named Plaintiff. They have additionally included an allegation to that effect in their Third Amended Complaint. While deficiencies in the allegations contained in a proposed amended pleading may permit a court to exercise its discretion in favor of refusing the amendment on grounds of futility, see Bellanger v. Health Plan of Nevada, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 914, 916 (D. Nev. 1992), the Court is
guided here by the principle that “[a] denial of leave to amend is justified ‘only if
4Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Clemens does not seek release from his individual confinement, but rather, joins with the remaining Plaintiffs in asking for an injunction proscribing the continued over-detention of inmates at the Jail. This, Plaintiffs argue, takes their request for relief outside the umbrella of habeas corpus jurisprudence. The Court need not address the merits of Plaintiffs’ contention at this juncture, however, because irrespective of whether the exhaustion requirement applies to the instant controversy, Defendants have not persuaded the Court that Mr. Clemens’ claims are not viable.
8
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

it appears to a certainty that plaintiff cannot state a claim.’” Grupke v. Linda Lori Sportswear, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 987, 993 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (quoting Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bur., Inc., 760 F.2d 1347, 1366 (2d Cir. 1985)). Here, in light of the proffered evidence and Plaintiffs’ subsequent representations, no such certainty exists. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend the First Amended Complaint [16-1] is GRANTED.
The Plaintiffs have also requested leave to file a Third Amended Complaint, in which they add additional parties, numerous allegations concerning the facts underlying this dispute, as well as two new putative plaintiff classes.5 Defendants have not opposed this requested amendment, and after a review of the proposed pleading, and in light of the Rule 15(a) mandate that leave to amend should be freely given, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs are entitled to the requested amendment. Consequently, Plaintiffs’ Motion for
5Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint introduces, for the first time, a class denominated as the “Alpha Strip Search Class”–persons who are subjected to the Jail’s purported “blanket strip search” policy despite having had the cases against them dismissed, or having posted bond. In addition, the Third Amended Complaint restores a class of Plaintiffs found in the original Complaint, but omitted from the First and Second Amended Complaints, designated as the “Court Return Strip Search Class.”
9
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

Leave to Amend their Second Amended Complaint [42-1] is hereby GRANTED. II. Motion for Class Certification
In mid-August 2004, Plaintiffs submitted their Motion for Class Certification. There is some question regarding whether this Motion was properly served on Defendants, and no Defendant has yet filed a response.6 The Fulton County Defendants, however, have requested that they be permitted an extension of time to submit a brief in opposition to the Motion, asking that their response deadline be set at sixty days following this Court’s resolution of their Motion to Dismiss.
In view of the fact that Plaintiffs submitted their Motion for Class Certification while their First Amended Complaint remained the operative pleading in this case, and in light of Plaintiffs’ subsequent addition of new named plaintiffs and of two new proposed classes, the Court concludes that considerations of judicial efficiency militate against the development and consideration of this important issue based on the incomplete arguments
6The Fulton County Defendants state that they were not served with a copy of this Motion.
10
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

currently before it. Rather, the Court finds that its resources, and those of the parties, would be efficiently and best conserved if the Plaintiffs were to submit an amended, complete brief to the Court (addressing all classes and named plaintiffs) after the Defendants have tendered responsive pleadings to the Third Amended Complaint. See LR 23.1B, NDGa (“[I]n any class action . . . in which one or more defendants have filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 in lieu of an answer to the complaint . . . the plaintiff shall move for a determination under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1) within thirty (30) days after all defendants have filed an answer to the complaint. The court may extend the time upon a showing of good cause”).
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification [15-1] is DENIED with the right to re-file. The Fulton County Defendants’ Motion for Extension of Time to File a Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification [22-1] is DENIED as moot. III. Motions to Dismiss
Both the Fulton County Defendants and the City of Atlanta have moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ causes of action against them. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) empowers the Court to grant a defendant’s motion to
11
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

dismiss when a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.7 In considering whether to grant or deny such a motion, the Court may look only to the pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). The pleadings are construed broadly so that all facts pleaded therein are accepted as true, and all inferences are viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 546, 84 S. Ct. 1733, 12 L. Ed. 2d 1030 (1964); Conner v. Tate, 130 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1373 (N.D. Ga. 2001). Thus, a motion to dismiss should be granted when “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957); see Linder v. Portocarrero, 963 F.2d 332 (11th Cir. 1992).
Even so, a court may not accept conclusory allegations or unwarranted factual deductions as true. Purvis v. City of Orlando, 273 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1324 (M.D. Fla. 2003). Nor may a court presume that a plaintiff can prove facts it has not alleged or “accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
7Although the motions are directed at Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, the Court evaluates the parties’ arguments with reference to the current, operative pleading, i.e., the Third Amended Complaint.
12
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

allegation.” Papasan v.Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S. Ct. 2932, 92 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1983); see also Purvis, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 1324.
Here, the Fulton County Defendants and the City of Atlanta contend that
Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against them. In particular, pointing to the Eleventh Circuit’s decisions in Grech v. Clayton County, 335 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2003), and Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2003), these
Defendants assert that they lacked control over the management of the Fulton County Jail and, specifically, the over-detention and strip search policies at issue in this litigation, and that this lack of control forecloses their liability under § 1983.8
A. Requisites of Municipal Liability under § 1983
Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
8Defendants also argue that certain Georgia statutes shield them from liability under § 1983. See O.C.G.A. §§ 36-1-4, 36-33-1. The Court finds this argument to lack merit. See Howlett v. Howlett, 496 U.S. 356, 376, 110 S. Ct. 2430, 110 L. Ed. 2d 332 (1990) (“Conduct by persons acting under color of state law which is wrongful under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . cannot be immunized by state law. A construction of the federal statute which permitted a state immunity defense to have controlling effect would transmute a basic guarantee into an illusory promise; and the supremacy clause of the Constitution insures that the proper construction may be enforced.”) (quoting Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284, 100 S. Ct. 553, 62 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1980)).
13
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although municipal bodies are undoubtedly “persons”
subject to liability under the statute, Monell v. Department of Social Services,
436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978), the Supreme Court
has placed “strict limitations” on the circumstances in which § 1983 municipal
liability may arise. Grech, 335 F.3d at 1329 (11th Cir. 2003) (plurality opinion).9
Specifically, municipalities can be found liable under § 1983 only when their “
‘official policy’ causes a constitutional violation[,]” and only for acts or
omissions for which they are “actually responsible[.]” Id. Liability may not be
9Herein, citations to Grech direct the reader to the plurality opinion authored by Judge Hull in that case. The Court observes that the concurring Judges in Grech appeared to take issue only with those parts of the plurality’s opinion related to the scope of the plurality’s determination, the plurality’s conception of sheriffs as subservient constitutional officers, and the plurality’s reading of Georgia law. For the most part, this Court’s reliance on Grech is for propositions dealing more generally with municipal liability under § 1983–an issue over which the en banc panel in Grech did not seem to evince the same disagreement.
14
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

based on the acts of the municipality’s agents or employees under the theory of respondeat superior. Id.
In order for a plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of a municipal “policy,” he must identify either (i) an officially promulgated municipal mandate, or (ii) an unofficial custom or practice of the municipality shown through the repeated acts of one of its final policymakers, and that such custom or practice constitutes “the moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Id. at 132930. In either case, to prevail on a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the relevant local governmental entity has authority and control over the governmental function in question, and identify those officials who speak with final policymaking authority for that body concerning the act alleged to have caused the particular constitutional injury. Id. at 1330.
In the instant litigation, the parties dispute whether Plaintiffs’ allegations suffice to demonstrate that either the City of Atlanta or the Fulton County Defendants possess the requisite degree of control over the policies that allegedly gave rise to Plaintiffs’ constitutional injuries. Plaintiffs respond to Defendants’ attacks on their pleading by arguing, in the first instance, that these Defendants did control the over-detention and strip search practices in place
15
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

within the Jail. Alternatively, Plaintiffs contend that regardless of whether the Defendants controlled the offensive Jail practices, their knowledge of the “notoriously” unconstitutional conditions at the Jail render them liable by virtue of their election to nevertheless subject arrestees to detainment there.10
Following its consideration of Plaintiffs’ allegations and the authorities raised in the parties’ papers, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ first argument to lack merit. Conversely, the Court concludes that if Plaintiffs prove the allegations contained in their Complaint, including, critically, that the City and County controlled the placement of arrestees in the Fulton County Jail with knowledge of the pervasive constitutional violations alleged to exist at the facility, they may be entitled to § 1983 relief.
10In their Response to the Fulton County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs also argue that the Fulton County Defendants are in violation of orders entered by Judge Shoob in Foster v. Fulton County, 1:99-cv-900-MHS. Defendants contend that these orders have been vacated or terminated. Irrespective of whether Judge Schoob’s orders are still in force, Plaintiffs have not filed any motion for contempt with this Court, and have not explained how the alleged violation of Judge Schoob’s orders is germane to the question of whether the Fulton County Defendants had “control” over the Jail policies at issue in this litigation.
16
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

B. The County and City’s Lack of Requisite Control Over the Over-Detention and Strip Search Policies
Confined to the most narrow perspective, the constitutional injuries asserted in this litigation can be seen as the direct product of two purported practices in the Fulton County Jail. First, Plaintiffs allege that they and other inmates were subjected to blanket strip searches while detained at the Jail, and that these searches were administered without an individual determination that the search would reveal weapons, drugs or other contraband. (Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 404-506.) According to Plaintiffs, exposure to such searches violates rights afforded them under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment. Second, Plaintiffs contend that they and others similarly situated were subject to detention beyond their scheduled release dates, and that being so detained violated their Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Id. ¶¶ 507544.)
As Plaintiffs concede, at all times relevant to this action, it was the duty of Defendant Jacqueline Barrett, Sheriff of Fulton County, to formulate, implement, and execute policies concerning the operation of the Fulton County Jail. (See Third Am. Compl. ¶ 132 (acknowledging such duties on the part of Defendant
17
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

Barrett “subject to the authority of the [Fulton County] Board”)). Moreover, Plaintiffs acknowledge that the aforementioned duties “include promulgating policies controlling the strip searches of inmates, and regulations ensuring the release of inmates on their Release Dates.” (Id. ¶ 133.)
As discussed supra, in order to prevail on a § 1983 claim against a municipal body, a plaintiff must prove that “the local government entity . . . has authority and responsibility over the governmental function at issue.” Grech, 335 F.3d at 1330. Stated differently, a plaintiff is required to show that the relevant municipality had “control” over the governmental act or acts that are the source of the alleged constitutional wrong. Id. at 1330-31 (emphasizing importance of municipal control in § 1983 analysis). With respect to the policies of alleged over-detention and blanket strip searches, therefore, Plaintiffs must plead and prove that the City and County had authority over the such practices, rendering them “actually responsible” for the acts giving rise to the constitutional violations. Id. 1329-31. As Defendants correctly observe in their papers, Plaintiffs have not alleged facts that would demonstrate the requisite degree of control on the part of the County or the City over these functions, and under binding precedent, cannot make the required showing.
18
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

Initially, with respect to the City, Plaintiffs do not advance any allegation that the City controlled or is “actually responsible” for the practices in place at the Fulton County Jail. (See generally Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 427-437, 461-472, 497-506, 532-542.) Indeed, aside from their contention, discussed infra, that the City placed its arrestees in the custody of a facility where it knew that unconstitutional treatment was likely to occur, Plaintiffs identify no germane nexus between the acts or omissions of the City and the cited violations of their constitutional rights. Consequently, the Court has little difficulty concluding that Defendant City of Atlanta did not exercise the requisite “control” over the overdetention and strip search policies identified in Plaintiffs’ pleading to support its liability for that conduct under § 1983. See Grech, 335 F.3d at 1330.
Likewise, clearly established law forecloses the liability of the Fulton County Defendants based upon any theory that they “controlled” the unconstitutional treatment of detainees within the Fulton County Jail. In two recent decisions, Grech v. Clayton County, 335 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2003), and Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2003), the Eleventh Circuit thoroughly elucidated the relationship of Georgia county sheriffs vis-a-vis their respective municipalities and the State. It is clear from those decisions, as well this
19
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

Court’s own review of Georgia law, that the Sheriff in her corrections and detainee oversight role is acting as an arm of the State, and that the County lacks any meaningful authority to direct the Sheriff’s actions in that regard. See Manders, 338 F.3d at 1312-1318 (recognizing “counties . . . do not assign or control any of the sheriffs’ duties[,]” including duties related to corrections, and that “counties have no authority over what corrections duties sheriffs perform, or which state offenders serve time in county jails, or who is in charge of the inmates in the county jails”); see also Grech, 335 F.3d at 1333-44 (refusing to find county liable in § 1983 case relating to sheriff’s law enforcement functions, observing, “In contrast to the control it gives the State, Georgia’s Constitution does not grant counties legislative power or authority over sheriffs and expressly prevents counties from controlling or affecting the sheriff’s elective county office.”) (plurality opinion). Without such control, the County similarly cannot be held liable for the cited occurrences taking place within the Fulton County Jail in the event those occurrences were ultimately to prove unconstitutional.
Plaintiffs cite three “local” constitutional amendments in an attempt to alter this result, at least with respect to the County. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that what they denominate as the Jail Local Constitutional Amendment, the Civil
20
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

Service Local Constitutional Amendment and the Pension Local Constitutional
Amendment, in conjunction with acts taken by Fulton County pursuant thereto,
place Fulton County on unique footing in the Georgia municipal landscape.
According to Plaintiffs, by virtue of this unique position, the County does
exercise the requisite degree of control over the Jail and its personnel to sustain
municipal liability under § 1983. Upon review of the cited constitutional
provisions, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ argument unavailing.
The “Jail Local Constitutional Amendment” cited by Plaintiffs provides as
follows:
The governing authority of Fulton County is hereby authorized to maintain and operate facilities within or without the boundaries of said County for the detention, incarceration or confinement of all persons (including juveniles) subject to detention, incarceration or confinement under the laws of this State, under any County resolution or under any City ordinance. Such facilities, whether designated as a jail, public works camp, or detention center, shall be under the control of such persons or official as may be designated by the governing authority of Fulton County, and need not be used exclusively for any one class of prisoner or person.
H.R. 687-1585, 1972 Sess., at 1439 § 1 (Ga. 1972), continued in effect in S.
503, 1986 Sess., at 4428 (Ga. 1986); see also Fulton County, Ga., Code § 1-
21
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

122 (codifying same provision as part of Fulton County Code relating to powers of the Board of Commissioners). According to Plaintiffs, this provision of the Georgia constitution and the Fulton County Code give the Fulton County Board power over the operation of the County Jail, and thus, bring them within the ambit of municipal liability under § 1983. The Court rejects this reading of the amendment.
Initially, the amendment, by its express terms, is simply an enabling mandate. It merely authorizes the Fulton County Board to determine whether it wishes to operate an independent detention facility. See H.R. 211, 1972 Sess., at 1439 § 1 (Ga. 1972) (“The governing authority of Fulton County is hereby authorized to maintain and operate facilities within or without the boundaries of said County for the detention, incarceration or confinement of all persons (including juveniles) subject to detention, incarceration or confinement under the laws of this State . . . .”) (emphasis supplied). Even as subsequently adopted in the Fulton County Code, it does not reflect the election of the Fulton County Board to pursue its power under the constitutional amendment, and Plaintiffs have directed the Court to no authority that Fulton County has actually seized upon this power and decided to undertake the maintenance of an incarceration
22
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

center. Thus, the cited amendment establishes only the Fulton County Defendants’ potential ability to exert some level of control over a county detention facility, not the exercise of that power in such a way as to render them “actually responsible” for the policies of any facility bearing the Fulton County name.
Moreover, while Plaintiffs characterize Fulton County as having “designated” Sheriff Barrett as the person in charge of the county’s detention facility (presumably, by virtue of their failure to designate someone else under the enabling amendment), that allegation does not cure the defect in their claims. Even if Plaintiffs’ contention was sustainable, the amendment does not give the County the ability to direct the policies of any designee, nor does it purport to alter (or even mention) the established allocation of power between the Sheriff and the County in the corrections arena. Such amorphous, unexercised “control” conferred upon Fulton County by the Jail Local Constitutional Amendment is insufficient to sustain § 1983 municipal liability.
Similarly, the Civil Service Local Constitutional Amendment, H.R. 1501, 1982 Sess., at 4896 (Ga. 1982), see also Fulton County, Ga., Code § 34-31 et seq., does not establish the requisite “control” on the part of the Fulton County
23
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

Defendants over the Jail practices at issue to render them liable under § 1983. Plaintiffs’ argument as it relates to the amendment is that, by virtue of Fulton County’s election to participate in the Civil Service System, the Sheriff’s ability to hire, discipline and terminate Jail employees is constrained by the acts of the Fulton County Personnel Board, a political subdivision subject to the authority of the Fulton County Board. Such attenuated constraint over personnel matters, however, is far from the sort of “control” over offending policies that would be sufficient to sustain § 1983 municipal liability. See Grech, 335 F.3d at 1330-32. Indeed, were the ability to exercise employer-like authority over staff deemed sufficient to render a municipality liable under § 1983, the proscription against imposition of municipal liability based on principles of respondeat superior would cease to have any meaningful force. See id. at 1329 (“A county’s liability under § 1983 may not be based on the doctrine of respondeat superior.”).
Finally, the Court is not persuaded that the so-called Pension Local Constitutional Amendment, No. 247, 1939 Sess., at 39 (Ga. 1939), provides a foundation for the Fulton County Defendants’ liability under § 1983. While Plaintiffs emphasize that this amendment places the Sheriff and her employees’ within a “unified county pension system[,]” they have provided no argument or
24
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

authority suggesting that such placement in any way affects the § 1983 municipal liability inquiry. Moreover, the Court observes that the Eleventh Circuit has already rejected the argument that a county’s authority over a sheriff’s budget (including, by necessity, authority over salary and pensions) can impute liability to the county as a consequence of policies adopted by the sheriff. See Manders, 338 F.3d at 1323-24; see also Grech, 335 F.3d at 1339-40.
In sum, Plaintiffs have directed the Court to no allegation or authority that would take this case outside of the Eleventh Circuit’s pronouncements in Grech and Manders. Because the City of Atlanta and the Fulton County Defendants lack control over the offending Jail policies of over-detention and blanket strip searches, these municipalities cannot be held liable for such practices under § 1983.
C. Entrustment-Based Liability Plaintiffs additionally contend that, regardless of whether the City or County could be said to control the over-detention and strip search policies in place at the Fulton County Jail, these municipalities are subject to § 1983 liability because they entrusted their arrestees to the Jail with full knowledge of the “notoriously” unconstitutional conditions present at that facility. The City and
25
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

County counter by arguing that there was nothing inherently unlawful in their placement of arrestees in the Fulton County Jail, and that in any event, any purported knowledge on their part of the Jail’s unconstitutional policies is not tantamount to the control necessary to sustain § 1983 municipal liability.
After careful consideration of the issue, the Court agrees with Defendants to the extent they insist that a municipality’s knowledge of unconstitutional treatment by another government actor, without more, is insufficient to render such a municipality liable under § 1983. Likewise, the Court agrees with Defendants that a municipality’s mere entrustment of arrestees to another government actor, who in turn engages in unconstitutional conduct, cannot support such liability. These two conclusions are compelled by the Eleventh Circuit’s mandate that “a local government . . . is liable under section 1983 only for acts for which the local government is actually responsible.” Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1027 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc); see Turquitt v. Jefferson County, 137 F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir. 1998) (“local governments can never be liable under § 1983 for the acts of those whom the local government has no authority to control”) (en banc); see also Grech, 335 F.3d at 1331.
26
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

Nevertheless, those principles, in isolation, do not end the inquiry. This is because the Complaint, read in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, does not predicate claims against the County and City on either bare knowledge of unconstitutional conditions at the Fulton County Jail, or the mere entrustment of arrestees to a constitutional misfeasor. Rather, Plaintiffs contend that these municipal bodies are liable under § 1983 for maintaining the policy and practice of actively entrusting their arrestees to the Jail with knowledge of the unconstitutional treatment such arrestees would face upon their confinement there. The Court finds that such an allegation, if substantiated, could lay the foundation for § 1983 liability.
Precedent addressing this precise theory of § 1983 liability is not voluminous. Nonetheless, other federal courts to have considered the issue have either held or implicitly recognized that a municipality that places its arrestees in the detention facility of another government subdivision can be liable for the latter’s unconstitutional conduct if it knew that such conduct was taking place at the facility. See Young v. City of Little Rock, 249 F.3d 730, 735 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that city that entrusted its arrestees to county with knowledge of unconstitutional practice at issue could be held liable under § 1983
27
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

for injury arising out of arrestee’s exposure to the practice); Deaton v.
Montgomery County, 989 F.2d 885, 889-90 (6th Cir. 1993) (in declining to hold
county liable under § 1983 for city’s unconstitutional practices in treatment of
arrestees, emphasized that “[t]here are no facts presented indicating that the
sheriff knew or should have known that strip searches were conducted in
violation of state law”).11 The Court finds the reasoning expressed in such
precedent persuasive.
11Plaintiffs additionally cite Ford v. City of Boston, 154 F. Supp. 2d 131 (D. Mass. 2001), in support of their assertion that the City and County can be liable in this case as a consequence of the Fulton County Jail’s allegedly unconstitutional policies. While the Ford decision would lend additional support to the outcome reached above, the Court reads Ford as extending § 1983 liability beyond the limited basis provided for in its holding today. In particular, the Court observes that the Ford court appeared to subject a city to liability under § 1983 based solely on the city’s decision to entrust arrestees to a county jail where unconstitutional treatment occurred. There was no requirement articulated in Ford that the city knew that unconstitutional treatment was taking place; rather, the court imposed upon the city an affirmative obligation to determine whether such unconstitutional conditions were prevalent at the jail. See 154 F. Supp. 2d at 148-49. The Court’s decision in this case should not be read as imposing such an obligation.
Moreover, the Court does not concur in the Ford court’s reading of Ancata v. Prison Health Services, Inc., 769 F.2d 700 (11th Cir. 1984), to impose such an affirmative investigatory burden in cases where one municipality is sought to be held liable for the acts of another government entity. Ancata involved an instance in which a defendant municipality farmed out a non-delegable duty to a private actor. The reasons underlying the imposition of an affirmative duty to investigate in that circumstance, if Ancata can be read as imposing such a burden, simply do not exist where, as here, the misfeasor is a public body with its own independent obligation to ensure compliance with constitutional mandates.
28
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

Moreover, the Court rejects the City and County’s assertion that these authorities are in any way inconsistent with the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that a municipal body can only be liable under § 1983 for policies which it actually controls. The flaw in such an argument is the unduly myopic scope with which Defendants’ attempt to define the “policies” at issue in this litigation.
Plainly, the most direct cause of the Plaintiffs’ asserted constitutional injuries in this case was the Fulton County Jail’s alleged policies of overdetention and blanket strip searches–policies which, as discussed supra, neither the County nor the City can be said to control in the manner necessary to sustain § 1983 liability. But those policies are not the only ones which Plaintiffs contend were the proximate cause of the suffered constitutional wrongs. Instead, Plaintiffs identify a third, proximate “moving force” behind their constitutional injuries; namely, the City and County’s policy of placing arrestees in the custody of a facility in which they knew constitutional violations were rampant.
In contrast with the over-detention and strip search policies discussed supra, Georgia law suggests that these Defendants did possess control over where their police departments placed arrestees. See Ga. Const. of 1983, art.
29
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

IX, § 2, ¶ 3(a)(1) (“any county, municipality, or any combination thereof may exercise the following powers and provide the following services . . . [p]olice . . . protection”); O.C.G.A. § 36-8-5 (placing county police within the control of the county governing authority); Fulton County, Ga., Code § 146-31 (creating Fulton County Police Department, and providing Fulton County Board with control over police rules and regulations); Atlanta, Ga., Code § 98-26 (creating Atlanta Police Department).12 In light of such control, the Court finds nothing in binding precedent that would insulate these Defendants from liability in the event Plaintiffs prove that they exercised such control by electing to place their arrestees in the custody of a facility which they knew engaged in the unconstitutional treatment of detainees. To provide such insulation would be to effectively encourage a municipality, whether motivated by fiscal considerations or more sinister intentions, to “wash its hands,” so to speak, of unconstitutional
12The City cites Manders, 338 F.3d at 1315, for the proposition that a municipality lacks control over where its arrestees are housed. The Court finds that Defendants’ reliance on Manders to support such a “rule” is misplaced. Rather, the Court construes the language cited by the City as simply acknowledging that the sheriff lacks the authority to refuse to take custody of an individual arrested by the police for a state offense. It does not address the ability of a municipality to detain arrestees at a separate facility.
30
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

evils by simply passing off its inmates to another government actor. Cf. Young, 249 F.3d at 735.
That being said, however, the liability of the City and County can extend no further than their control over the placement of arrestees in the Fulton County Jail. Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1027; Turquitt, 137 F.3d at 1292; see also Grech, 335 F.3d at 1331. Stated differently, even assuming Plaintiffs can demonstrate that these actors had the requisite knowledge regarding the prevalence of constitutional infractions at the Jail, neither the City nor the County may be liable for constitutional injuries suffered by a detainee unless it had the authority to choose whether to entrust such a person to the facility. Critically, therefore, while Fulton County may be liable for the arrestees placed in the Jail by its police department (over which it exerted control), it may not be subject to § 1983 liability for arrestees placed in the Jail by the Sheriff or her deputies. See Manders, 338 F.3d at 1312-1318 (county does not control sheriff’s correction functions); see also Grech, 335 F.3d at 1333-44 (county does not control sheriff’s law enforcement functions).
Accordingly, the Fulton County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint [17-1], and Defendant City of Atlanta’s Motion to Dismiss
31
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

Amended Complaint [21-1] are hereby DENIED. The City and County may be liable under § 1983 in the event Plaintiffs prove their allegations that these municipal bodies, through their respective police departments, entrusted arrestees to the Fulton County Jail with knowledge of the unconstitutional conditions cited in the Complaint. IV. Discovery Motions; Motions for Scheduling Order, Conference
Although pending for less than one year, this case, due to a series of recusals, has been before four different Judges in this District. It was assigned to the undersigned on December 6, 2004. As a consequence of its movement through the Court, and notwithstanding its procedural infancy, it has accumulated a substantial volume of outstanding motions relating to discovery. Many of these motions are now of questionable relevance given the passage of time and the procedural posture of this case, and the Court concludes that the most efficient and effective way to address the questions asserted therein would be to meet and confer with counsel. Consequently, the Court will take up these matters at a status and scheduling conference to be held on 2nd day of February, 2005 at 10:30 a.m. at Courtroom 2105, Richard B. Russell Federal Building, 2121 United States Courthouse, 75 Spring Street, SW, Atlanta,
32
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

Georgia 30303. In addition, given that many matters raised in the outstanding motions are now moot, and that other scheduling issues may have since arisen, the parties are permitted, and encouraged, to submit concise statements in advance of the conference regarding matters they wish the Court to address during the course of the scheduling conference.
Conclusion Defendant Jacqueline Barrett’s Motion for Leave to File Answer [12-1], Plaintiffs’ Motion to Supplement their Opposition to the Fulton County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [32-1], and Plaintiffs’ Motion to Late File their Reply to the Fulton County Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Amend their First Amended Complaint [41-1] are GRANTED nunc pro tunc. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend the First Amended Complaint [16-1], and Motion for Leave to Amend their Second Amended Complaint [42-1] are hereby GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification [15-1] is DENIED with the right to re-file. The Fulton County Defendants’ Motion for Extension of Time
33
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

to File a Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification [22-1] is DENIED as moot.
The Fulton County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint [17-1], and Defendant City of Atlanta’s Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint [21-1] are hereby DENIED.
As it relates to the Fulton County Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery [27-1], Plaintiffs’ Motion for Entry of a Scheduling Order Including Setting Deadlines and Extending Certain Dates [34-1], the Fulton County Defendants’ Request for Scheduling Conference [44-1], the Fulton County Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order [46-1], and the Fulton County Defendants’ Motion to Quash Subpoenas [61-1], the Court will take up these matters at a status and scheduling conference to be held on 2nd day of February, 2005 at 10:30 a.m. at Courtroom 2105, Richard B. Russell Federal Building, 2121 United States Courthouse, 75 Spring Street, SW, Atlanta, Georgia 30303. In addition, given that many matters raised in the outstanding motions are now moot, and other scheduling issues may have since arisen, the parties are permitted, and encouraged, to submit concise statements in advance of the conference
34
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

regarding matters they wish the Court to address during the course of the scheduling conference.
Finally, with respect to the stay entered by the Court in its December 7, 2004 Order [66-1], that stay shall remain in effect pending the resolution of discovery issues at the status and scheduling conference.
SO ORDERED this 13th day of January, 2005. /s/ Richard W. Story RICHARD W. STORY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
35
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

 
 Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 290 Filed 03/03/11 Page 1 of 20

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION

ALAN POWELL, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. JACQUELINE BARRETT,
Defendant.

: : : : : CIVIL ACTION NO. : 1:04-CV-1100-RWS : : : : :

ORDER

This case comes before the Court on Defendant Jacqueline Barrett’s

Motion for Summary Judgment [269], Plaintiffs Alan Powell, et al.’s Rule 56(d)

Motion [282] and Defendant Jacqueline Barrett’s Motion to Exclude Testimony

of Expert Witness [259], and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File a Revised

Opposition to Defendant’s Statement of Facts [284]. After a review of the

record, the Court issues the following Order.

As an initial matter, Plaintiffs did not file any opposition to Defendant’s

Statement of Material Facts [269-2], therefore their Motion for Leave to File a

Revised Opposition [284] is DENIED.

AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 290 Filed 03/03/11 Page 2 of 20
Background Plaintiffs assert claims against Defendant Jacqueline Barrett in her individual capacity for alleged strip searches and over-detentions that occurred at the Fulton County Jail between December 2003 and May 2004, during the period when Defendant was sheriff of the Jail. According to the Fourth Amended Complaint, the Jail had no effective inmate management system which caused inmates to be detained after they had been ordered release. (Fourth Am. Comp., Dkt. [78] at ¶¶ 206, 208). Plaintiffs assert that this policy of over-detention was a violation of their constitutional rights. (Id. at ¶ 395). The named Plaintiffs in this case also claim that they were subjected to illegal strip searches upon entering or re-entering the general population at the Fulton County Jail. (Id. at ¶¶ 12, 14). The eleven named plaintiffs can be divided into three groups with regard to their strip search claims. The first group, the Arrestee Strip Search Class (AR), consists of inmates who were strip searched as part of the point-of-entry booking process before they were placed into the general jail population for the first time. (Id. at ¶ 180). The second group, the Alpha Strip Search Class (AL), were subjected to the booking process, including the booking strip searches, after posting bond or having been
2
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 290 Filed 03/03/11 Page 3 of 20
ordered released at their first appearances. (Id. at ¶¶ 187, 188). The third group, the Court Return Strip Search Class (CR), includes inmates who were ordered released by a judge in state court and returned to the Jail where they were subjected to blanket strip searches. (Id. at ¶¶ 204, 205).
In an en banc decision, the Eleventh Circuit held that the strip searches of the AR class did not violate Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights. Powell v. Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298, 1302 (11th Cir. 2008). The court then remanded the case back to this court to apply the principles discussed in the opinion to the AL and CR classes. Powell v. Barrett, 307 Fed. Appx. 434, 436 (11th Cir. 2009).
Discussion I. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [269] and Plaintiffs’
Rule 56(d) Motion [282] A. Background Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment as to Qualified Immunity [269]. In response, Plaintiffs have made a Rule 56(d) Motion alleging that they are unable to present facts essential to justify their opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Plaintiffs’ Rule 56(d) Motion to Deny Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. [282] at p. 2). Plaintiffs filed their Rule 56(d) Motion on December 8, 2010 styled as a Rule 56(f)
3
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 290 Filed 03/03/11 Page 4 of 20
Motion. Under the amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which became effective on December 1, 2010, the grounds Plaintiffs assert for opposing Defendant’s Summary Judgment Motion are now contained in Rule 56(d), not Rule 56(f). Therefore, this Court will consider the Plaintiffs’ Motion as a Rule 56(d) Motion.
B. Rule 56(d) Standard District Courts have the discretion to postpone ruling on a party’s motion for summary judgment if the nonmovant needs additional discovery to explore “facts essential to justify its opposition.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(d). Rule 56(d) provides that a court may allow time for additional discovery “if a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition” to the moving party’s motion for summary judgment. Id. Plaintiffs assert that they are unable to respond to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. In his affidavit, William Claiborne, Plaintiffs’ counsel, contends that Plaintiffs “cannot justify their opposition to defendant’s summary judgment motion . . . because plaintiffs have not had discovery on the claims from defendant and the summary judgment motion exceeds the scope of the
4
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 290 Filed 03/03/11 Page 5 of 20
Court of Appeals remand motion.” (Aff. of William Claiborne, Dkt. [282-2] at p. 2).
In its July 14, 2009 Order, the Court ruled that “discovery should be narrowly limited until the threshold constitutional issues can be decided.” (Dkt. [199] at 2). As a result, discovery was restricted to information regarding only the length of the named plaintiffs’ detentions and the circumstances of each plaintiff’s release from the Fulton County Jail. (Id. at pp. 2, 4). Plaintiffs contend that in order to properly respond to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of qualified immunity, information regarding the releases of a broader class of inmates is necessary.
C. Standard for Qualified Immunity Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, government officials performing discretionary functions may not be held individually liable for civil damages unless their conduct violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Lassiter v. Alabama, 28 F.3d 1146, 1149 (11th Cir.1994)(en banc) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)) The court may ascertain whether this standard has been met by making two
5
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 290 Filed 03/03/11 Page 6 of 20
determinations: (1) whether the defendant committed a violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and (2) whether the violation was governed by clearly established law. See West v. Tillman, 496 F.3d 1321, 1327 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001))1. In addition, where the plaintiff seeks to hold the defendant liable for acts not taken by the defendant personally but by staff under the defendant’s supervision, the plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Id.
D. Over-Detention Claims The Eleventh Circuit in West v. Tillman explained that the deliberate indifference standard is “a difficult burden for the plaintiff to meet.” Id. In order to prove deliberate indifference, plaintiffs in over-detention cases must establish a history of widespread abuse sufficient to put the supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation. Id. at 1328-29. Although the Court initially limited discovery to information regarding only the named plaintiffs’ over-detentions, under the requirements of West,
1After the decision in West v. Tillman, the Supreme Court held that while the two -step sequence for resolving government officials’ qualified immunity claims established in Saucier is appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory in all cases. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S.Ct. 808, 818, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009).
6
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 290 Filed 03/03/11 Page 7 of 20
Plaintiffs do not have sufficient information to respond to the deliberate indifference prong of Defendant’s argument for qualified immunity. Additional discovery is necessary to enable Plaintiffs to demonstrate “a history of widespread abuse” that was sufficient to put Sheriff Barrett on notice of the problem with over-detentions at the Fulton County Jail and the need to correct that problem.
Defendant objects to the Rule 56(d) motion on the grounds that Plaintiffs failed to explain how additional discovery would preclude the entry of summary judgment. (Def.’s Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Rule 56(d) Motion, Dkt. [285] at pp. 12-15). However, Plaintiffs have explained that additional discovery will enable them to demonstrate a history of widespread abuse at the Fulton County Jail. (Aff. of William Claiborne, Dkt. [282-2] at pp. 6-7). This showing is necessary for Plaintiffs to rebut Defendant’s qualified immunity defense and therefore necessary to respond to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Id. Defendant also contends that Plaintiffs failed to make use of the available discovery because they only served three interrogatories. (Def.’s Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Rule 56(d) Motion, Dkt. [285] at pp. 1516). However, based on the limited discovery allowed by the Court, Plaintiffs
7
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 290 Filed 03/03/11 Page 8 of 20
did not have access to the information necessary to rebut the defense of qualified immunity.
The Court will allow Plaintiffs additional discovery on any computerized inmate population accounting system used to track inmates in the Fulton County Jail and a manual examination of a statistically valid sample of institutional folders to obtain information on the extent of the over-detention problem during the relevant period. Defendants will have seven days from the date of this Order to file any objections to this expanded scope of discovery. Plaintiffs will then have seven days from the date of Defendant’s objections to reply. After considering the objections and the reply and determining the proper scope of additional discovery, the Court will seek a proposed Scheduling Order from the parties pertaining to any additional discovery. Plaintiffs’ Rule 56(d) Motion is GRANTED.
Given that the Court granted the Rule 56(d) Motion, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Qualified Immunity [269] as to the over-detention class is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and with the right to re-file after the completion of the additional discovery.
8
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 290 Filed 03/03/11 Page 9 of 20
D. Alpha Class The AL class is comprised of inmates held in the intake area prior to their first appearances in the Fulton County Jail, ordered released or granted bond at the first appearance, and then placed into the general population and subjected to group, blanket strip searches prior to actual release. (Pl.’s Memo, Dkt. [282-1] at pp. 23-24). The AL class was placed in the general jail population while staff in the Records Room, as part of the release process, searched for other detention orders, warrants, and holds. Powell v. Barrett, 496 F.3d 1288, 1313 (11th Cir. 2007), rev’d en banc, 541 F.3d 1298 (2008). Because the AL class was subjected to strip searches prior to entering the general population, the inmates’ Fourth Amendment rights were not violated under the standard established in the Eleventh Circuit’s en banc decision in this case. Powell, 541 F.3d at 1302 (holding that strip searches of all arrestees as part of the booking process prior to entering the general population, even without reasonable suspicion, is constitutionally permissible). Therefore Sheriff Barrett is entitled to qualified immunity as to the strip search claims of the Alpha Class.
9
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 290 Filed 03/03/11 Page 10 of 20
The Eleventh Circuit in this case held that the Fulton County Jail’s policy of strip searching inmates entering the general population was justifiable and did not violate the inmates’ constitutional rights. Powell, 541 F.3d at 1302. The court stated that the reasonableness of a search “requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.” Id. at 1305 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 1884, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1979)). In balancing those interests, courts must consider four factors: (1) the scope of the particular intrusion; (2) the manner in which it was conducted; (3) the justification for initiating it; and (4) the place in which it is conducted. Id.
The Eleventh Circuit, in considering the Bell factors, noted that “the combined weight of the third and fourth factors” supported the finding that the strip search policy as applied to the AR class did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1306. The Eleventh Circuit held that these two factors merged into one “heavy consideration because the searches took place in a detention facility and the justification for them was the critically important security needs of the facility.” Id. According to the Court, “a detention facility is a unique place fraught with serious security concerns.” Id. (quoting Bell, 441
10
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 290 Filed 03/03/11 Page 11 of 20
U.S. at 559). “Employees . . . and . . . the detained inmates themselves face a real threat of violence, and administrators must be concerned on a daily basis with the smuggling of contraband by inmates accused of misdemeanors as well as those accused of felonies.” Id. at 1310. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that these safety concerns justified the strip searches of the AR class before entering the general population of the Fulton County Jail. Id. at 1302.
These same safety concerns support the finding that the strip searches of the AL class did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The late booking process was the first time the AL class was subject to strip searches because the class was not strip searched prior to attending their first appearances. As such, the AL class, like the AR class, was strip searched prior to entering the general population after having contact with individuals outside of the Fulton County Jail.
The Jail has significant and legitimate security interests supporting the requirement that all inmates entering and re-entering the general population be strip searched. The searches of the AL class occurred after the inmates had been outside the jail and presented an increased security hazard. Therefore, a search
11
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 290 Filed 03/03/11 Page 12 of 20
of the body was necessary to ensure that no contraband was introduced into the general population.
Plaintiffs assert that if the AL class presented a security risk, the Fulton County Jail should have released them instead of placing them into the general population. (Pl.’s Memo, Dkt. [282-1] at p. 29). While Plaintiffs’ claim that the AL class had a constitutional right to be released instead of placed into the general population has merit, this contention goes to the over-detention claims and has no bearing on the constitutional validity of strip searching the AL class. Under the reasoning of Powell, the Fulton County Jail has strong security interests justifying searches of inmates prior to entering the general population. In the case of the AL class, the strip searches were performed before the inmates entered the jail population and after they had contact with individuals outside of the jail facility. As a result, the Jail’s policy did not violate a clearly established constitutional right of the AL class. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Qualified Immunity [269] as to the AL Class is GRANTED.
Unlike the over-detention class, Plaintiffs do not need additional information to respond to Defendant’s claim of qualified immunity. The
12
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 290 Filed 03/03/11 Page 13 of 20
Eleventh Circuit’s decision in this case demonstrates that the strip searches of the AL class did not violate any clearly established constitutional rights. There is no need for additional discovery as to this claim. As a result, Plaintiff’s Rule 56(d) Motion [282] is DENIED as to the AL class.
E. Court Return Class The CR class is comprised of in-custody defendants who went to court for court hearings, became entitled to release at the hearings, and were subjected to blanket strip searches upon their return to the Fulton County Jail. (Pl.’s Memo, Dkt. [282-1] at p. 31). The CR class was under constant supervision while in transit to and from the Jail and while at the courthouse. (Fourth Am. Comp., Dkt. [78] at ¶ 193). Unlike the AL class, the CR class had already been subjected to strip searches upon their initial entry into the Fulton County Jail. After returning from court, they were subjected to another strip search before being placed back into the general population. The same security concerns that justified the searches of the AR and the AL classes support the strip searches of the CR class. The inmates were subjected to the searches after having contact with individuals outside the Jail population. There was a risk that the CR class could acquire contraband during
13
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 290 Filed 03/03/11 Page 14 of 20
their transfers between the Jail and the courthouse, and introduce it into the general population. As a result, the strip searches before re-entering the general population are justified under the Eleventh Circuit’s en banc decision. Powell, 541 F.3d at 1302.
The Jail’s security interests were not eliminated simply because the CR class was under constant supervision during the transfers to and from the courthouse. In Bell, the Supreme Court upheld the searches of inmates reentering the general population after having contact visits with individuals from outside the facility, even defense attorneys. Bell, 441 U.S. at 560. These contact visits occurred in glass-enclosed rooms and were continuously monitored by corrections officers. Id. at 577 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Despite the constant monitoring of the inmates, the Supreme Court held that the security risks associated with the smuggling of contraband justified searching the inmates after these visits. Id. at 559. The CR class, like the plaintiffs in Bell, were subject to constant monitoring during their time outside of the jail. Despite this monitoring, the same risk of acquiring contraband that supported the search in Bell exists in this case.
14
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 290 Filed 03/03/11 Page 15 of 20
Plaintiffs assert that “every court that has addressed strip searching court returns after a judge has ordered them released has condemned the practice, and ruled returning court returns to a county jail to process them out or to check for detainers is an administrative interest that does not justify strip searching them.” (Pl.’s Memo, Dkt. [282-1] at p. 36). Therefore, according to Plaintiffs, the strip searches are not justified under the four factors identified by Bell because they serve the administrative convenience interests of the Sheriff, and not the legitimate security interests of the Fulton County Jail. Id. While Plaintiffs’ claim that the CR class had a constitutional right to be kept out of the general population after posting bond or having charges dismissed may have merit, it does not impact the constitutionality of the strip searches. Moreover, despite Plaintiffs’ contention, the strip searches were not searches to process inmates out of the Jail. Id. Instead, they were searches conducted before the CR class reentered the general population. The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged the numerous security risks posed by inmates re-entering the general population. Powell, 514 F.3d at 1310-12. As a result, the strip searches served more than “administrative interests,”and instead served the security interests of the Jail. Because the policy of strip searching the CR class did not violate a clearly
15
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 290 Filed 03/03/11 Page 16 of 20
established constitutional right, Sheriff Barrett is entitled to qualified immunity. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Qualified Immunity [269] as to the CR Class is GRANTED.
Moreover, Plaintiffs’ do not need additional discovery to rebut Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to the CR class. Thus, Plaintiff’s Rule 56(d) Motion [282] is DENIED as to the CR class. II. Motion to Exclude Testimony [259]
Defendant seeks to preclude Plaintiffs from offering any and all opinion testimony of Plaintiffs’ expert witness, David Goldstein, relating to the interpretation of inmate records on the grounds that Plaintiffs failed to satisfy the requirements of Local Rule 26.2 (c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). (Def.’s Br., Dkt. [259-1] at pp. 1,5,6).
Despite Plaintiffs’ contention that Mr. Goldstein is a fact witness, the Court concludes that the testimony of Mr. Goldstein proffered by Plaintiffs is appropriately considered expert testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 702. Because Mr. Goldstein will offer expert testimony, Plaintiffs are subject to the disclosure requirements of Local Rule 26.2(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 26.
16
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 290 Filed 03/03/11 Page 17 of 20
A witness with specialized knowledge can testify as a fact witness if the testimony is “rationally based on the witnesses own perceptions.” United States v. Rivera, 22 F.3d 430, 434 (2d. Cir. 1994)(quoting FED. R. EVID. 701(a)). Witnesses with specialized knowledge and training may be pure fact witnesses when they directly participate in the events at issue in a particular case. Morgan v. U.S. Xpress, Inc., 2006 WL 278398, at *2 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 3, 2006) (citing Gomez v. Rivera Rodriguez, 344 F.3d 103,113 (1st Cir. 2003)). Moreover, owners and employees of a particular business may testify as fact witnesses because of their particularized knowledge gained by virtue of their position in the business. See Tampa Bay Shipbuilding & Repair Co. v. Cedar Shipping Co., 320 F.3d 1213, 1222 (11th Cir. 2003). On the other hand, if the testimony consists of “opinions based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge,” the witness is not a fact witness, but instead an expert witness under Fed. R. Evid. 702. Morgan, 2006 WL 278398, at *3 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702).
Mr. Goldstein’s testimony will be expert testimony as opposed to lay opinion testimony. Mr. Goldstein has no affiliation with the Fulton County Sheriff’s Office. Moreover, he has never worked in the Fulton County Jail, was
17
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 290 Filed 03/03/11 Page 18 of 20
not a sheriff’s deputy or employee, and did not represent any of the Plaintiffs in connection with the charges leading to the subject incarcerations. As a result, Mr. Goldstein’s testimony is not based on his own perceptions of the events at the Fulton County Jail nor is his testimony based on specialized knowledge acquired by virtue of his position at the Jail. Instead, Mr. Goldstein’s interpretation of inmate records is appropriately considered expert testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 702 because it is based on the specialized general knowledge he acquired working as a public defender.
Because the Court finds that Mr. Goldstein is an expert, Plaintiffs failed to make the appropriate disclosures required by Local Rule 26.2 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. Under Local Rule 26.2, a party “who desires to use the testimony of an expert witness shall designate the expert sufficiently early in the discovery period to permit the opposing party the opportunity to depose the expert.” Local Rule 26.2(c), N.D. Ga. Plaintiffs failed to disclose Mr. Goldstein as an expert during the discovery period. The discovery period for the current post-remand phase of the litigation expired on December 18, 2009, and the deadline for supplemental discovery was June 14, 2010. Plaintiffs did not advise Defendant that they had retained an expert until August 2, 2010, well after the close of the
18
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 290 Filed 03/03/11 Page 19 of 20
supplemental discovery period. Additionally, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B), the disclosure of an expert witness must be accompanied by an expert report. Here, Plaintiffs failed to include an expert report when they disclosed Mr. Goldstein on August 2, 2010.
Although the Court finds that Mr. Goldstein is an expert and that Plaintiffs failed to make the required disclosures, the Court will not exclude his testimony at this juncture. Instead, given the extension of the discovery period to enable Plaintiffs to gather evidence of deliberate indifference, the Court will allow Plaintiffs the opportunity to make the required disclosures under Local Rules 26.2 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). The expert report should be served upon Defendant within seven days from the date of this Order. Plaintiffs should make Mr. Goldstein available to Defendant for deposition. Defendant will have fourteen days from the filing of the expert report to depose Mr. Goldstein and seven days from the date of the deposition to offer any counter-experts. Plaintiffs will then have fourteen days from that time to depose the Defendant’s counter-experts. The parties will then have an opportunity to file any motions to exclude the testimony of either expert in accordance with the Local Rules of
19
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 290 Filed 03/03/11 Page 20 of 20
this Court. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Exclude Testimony [259] is DENIED.
Conclusion For the aforementioned reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [269] is GRANTED as to the AL and CR Classes, and DENIED without prejudice as to the Over-Detention Class. Plaintiffs’ Rule 56(d) Motion [282] is GRANTED as to the Over-Detention Class, and DENIED as to the AL and CR Classes. Defendant’s Motion to Exclude Testimony [259] is DENIED, and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File a Revised Opposition [284] is DENIED. SO ORDERED this 3rd day of March, 2011.
________________________________ RICHARD W. STORY United States District Judge
20
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

 
 Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 319 Filed 02/17/12 Page 1 of 15

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION

C. ALAN POWELL, ET AL., Plaintiffs,
v. JACQUELINE H. BARRETT,
Defendant.

: : : : : CIVIL ACTION NO. : 1:04-CV-1100-RWS : : : :

ORDER

This case comes before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment [269], Plaintiffs’ Motion to Motion to [sic] Exclude Purported Expert

Opinion Evidence of Mr. Lane [314], and Defendant’s Motion for Oral

Argument [316]. After reviewing the Record, the Court enters the following

Order.

As a preliminary matter, the Court finds that oral argument will not aid

the Court in resolving Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

Accordingly, the Court hereby DENIES Defendant’s Motion for Oral

Argument [316].

AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 319 Filed 02/17/12 Page 2 of 15
Background Plaintiffs, certain former detainees at the Fulton County Jail (the “Jail”), initiated this putative class action on April 21, 2004, raising claims against Defendant Jacqueline Barrett in her individual capacity arising out of alleged strip searches and over-detentions to which Plaintiffs were subjected between December of 2003 and May of 2004, during which time Defendant was Sheriff of the Jail. With respect to the strip search claims, the named Plaintiffs could be classified into three separate groups: first, the Arrestee Strip Search Class (“AR Class”), which consisted of inmates who were strip searched as part of the point-of-entry booking process before being placed, for the first time, into the general Jail population; second the Alpha Strip Search Class (“AL Class”), which consisted of inmates who were granted bond or ordered to be released at their first appearances, but subjected to another strip search and placed back into the general population prior to actual release; and, finally, the Court Return Class (“CR Class”), which consisted of inmates who went to court for hearings and were ordered to be released, but who were subjected to another strip search and placed back into the general population prior to being released. (Order, Dkt. No. [290] at 2, 9, 13.)
2
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 319 Filed 02/17/12 Page 3 of 15

AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

In an en banc decision, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the strip searches of the AR Class did not violate those Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Powell v. Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298, 1302 (11th Cir. 2008). The court then remanded the case back to this Court to apply the principles discussed in the opinion to the claims of the AL and CR classes. Powell v. Barrett, 307 F. App’x 434, 436 (11th Cir. 2009). On remand, the Court held, by Order dated March 3, 2011, that under the principles articulated by the Eleventh Circuit, the strip searches of the AL and CR classes did not violate those Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights; accordingly, the Court granted Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [269] on grounds of qualified immunity as to the remaining strip search claims. (Order, Dkt. No. [290] at 13, 16.)
In the same Order, however, the Court denied without prejudice Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [269] on grounds of qualified immunity as to Plaintiffs’ over-detention claims, granting instead Plaintiffs’ Rule 56(d) Motion [282] for further discovery. (Id. at 8-9.) Specifically, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ request for additional discovery to demonstrate a “history of widespread abuse” of inmates’ constitutional rights at the Jail (i.e., a history of over-detentions), which the Court found was necessary to enable Plaintiffs to rebut the defense of qualified immunity. (Id. at 7-8.)
3

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 319 Filed 02/17/12 Page 4 of 15

AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

By Order dated August 8, 2011, however, the Court vacated its March 3, 2011 Order [290] to the extent it granted Plaintiffs’ Rule 56(d) Motion. (Dkt. No. [300] at 6.) The Court found that contrary to the findings of its initial Order, additional discovery was not needed to demonstrate a problem with over-detentions at the Jail given that Defendant admitted that such a problem existed. (Id. at 2-3.) In light of this admission, Defendant argued that her qualified immunity defense would revolve around the issue of whether she was deliberately indifferent to the problem. (Id. at 5-6.) Finding that Plaintiffs had had a sufficient opportunity to discover information related to this issue, the Court reconsidered and denied Plaintiffs’ Rule 56(d) Motion for further discovery. (Id.)
In light of this ruling, the Court ordered Plaintiffs to respond to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [269] on the over-detention claims–the only claims that currently remain in this case. (Id. at 6.) This motion has now been fully briefed and is ripe for decision.
Discussion I. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [269]
A. Legal Standard Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 requires that summary judgment be
4

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 319 Filed 02/17/12 Page 5 of 15

AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “The moving party bears ‘the initial responsibility of informing the . . . court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.’” Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal quotations omitted)). Where the moving party makes such a showing, the burden shifts to the non-movant, who must go beyond the pleadings and present affirmative evidence to show that a genuine issue of material fact does exist. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986).
The applicable substantive law identifies which facts are material. Id. at 248. A fact is not material if a dispute over that fact will not affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id. An issue is genuine when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. at 249-50.
In resolving a motion for summary judgment, the court must view all evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
5

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 319 Filed 02/17/12 Page 6 of 15

AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

non-moving party. Patton v. Triad Guar. Ins. Corp., 277 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2002). But, the court is bound only to draw those inferences which are reasonable. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (internal citations omitted); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (once the moving party has met its burden under Rule 56(a), the nonmoving party “must do more than simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts”).
B. Qualified Immunity As stated above, Defendant moves for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ over-detention claims on grounds of qualified immunity. The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from being sued in their individual capacities. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999). Officials are shielded “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
6

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 319 Filed 02/17/12 Page 7 of 15

AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

818 (1982). The qualified immunity analysis thus is governed by a two-step framework. One inquiry in the analysis is “whether the plaintiff’s allegations, if true, establish a constitutional violation.” Barnett v. City of Florence, 409 F. App’x 266, 270 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736 (2002)). “If the facts, construed . . . in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that a constitutional right has been violated, another inquiry is whether the right violated was ‘clearly established.’” Id. (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). “Both elements of this test must be present for an official to lose qualified immunity, and this two-pronged analysis may be done in whatever order is deemed most appropriate for the case.” Id. (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 241 (2009)). Finally, the qualified immunity analysis “is a pure question of law” at the summary judgment stage once the court has “drawn all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party to the extent supportable by the record.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 n.8 (2007).
The Court first undertakes the inquiry of whether Plaintiffs have shown a constitutional violation on the part of Defendant. If the Court finds a sufficient showing of a constitutional violation, it then must consider whether the violation was of a clearly established right. If, however, no violation has been established, the inquiry ends and the Court must find Defendant entitled to
7

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 319 Filed 02/17/12 Page 8 of 15

AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

qualified immunity. Under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, a detainee has a “constitutional right to be free from continued detention after it was or should have been known that [he] was entitled to release.” Cannon v. Macon Cnty., 1 F.3d 1558, 1563 (11th Cir. 1993). To establish a violation of this right, “Plaintiffs must show that Defendant[ ] acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs’ due process rights.” West v. Tillman, 496 F.3d 1321, 1327 (11th Cir. 2007).
In this case, Plaintiffs seek to hold Defendant liable in her supervisory capacity for the alleged over-detentions that occurred at the Jail. In this regard, “‘[i]t is well established in this Circuit that supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.’” Id. at 1328 (citing Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003)). On the contrary, “supervisory liability occurs either when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged unconstitutional conduct or when there is a causal connection between the actions of a supervising official and the alleged constitutional violation.” Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360. The requisite causal connection can be established by showing, among other things, “a history of widespread abuse [which] puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged
8

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 319 Filed 02/17/12 Page 9 of 15

AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

deprivation, and he fails to do so.” Id. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the standard for supervisory liability is “extremely rigorous.” Id. at 1360.
Plaintiffs seek to establish deliberate indifference on the part of Defendant to Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights by showing that Defendant was on notice of the over-detentions and yet failed to take action to stop them. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant “engaged in a pattern of continued inaction in the face of employees’ documented widespread abuse of [Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights] by failing to ensure their release on their Release Dates.” (Am. Compl., Dkt. No. [78] ¶ 517.) In support of her Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant does not deny the problem of over-detentions; on the contrary, she admits that such a problem existed but argues that she “vigorously addressed [it] with a wide variety of actions” and thus was “anything but deliberately indifferent” to it. (Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., Dkt. No [269] at 1920.)
The parties agree that one of the causes of the over-detentions was a shortage of Jail staff during the relevant time period combined with a sharp increase in the average daily population at the Jail. (Def.’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“Def.’s SOF”), Dkt. No. [269-2] ¶ 37.) In 2003,
9

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 319 Filed 02/17/12 Page 10 of 15

AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

the City of Atlanta decided to send all Atlanta Police Department arrestees charged with state offenses to the Jail rather than city detention facilities, which resulted in a twenty-nine percent increase in the average daily Jail population. (Id. ¶¶ 32-33.) Approximately fifty to sixty new inmates were received at the Jail each day, with even higher numbers on Friday and Saturday. (Id. ¶ 35.) Despite this influx of inmates, the number of Jail staff did not increase, causing the Jail to experience significant staff shortages. (Id. ¶¶ 34. 36.)
In addition to staff shortages and an increasing Jail population, Defendant cites other reasons for the over-detentions. Defendant contends that unavoidable delays in obtaining paperwork from the courts further delayed the release of inmates, as did the fact that court documents were not in a standard format and were often difficult for Jail staff to read and understand. (Id. ¶¶ 38, 41-44.) Finally, Defendant contends that Jail staff had to consult different computer systems for the sheriff, courts, and district attorney before an inmate could be cleared for release, which further contributed to the delays. (Id. ¶ 39.) While Plaintiffs generally “deny” that these additional factors contributed to delay, they put forward no evidence to refute them. (Pls.’ Combined Opp. to Def.’s SOF and Pls.’ Statement of Facts (“Pls.’ SOF”), Dkt. No. [307-1] ¶¶ 38, 39, 41-44.)
10

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 319 Filed 02/17/12 Page 11 of 15

AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

In support of her argument that she was not deliberately indifferent to the problem of over-detentions, Defendant alleges that she took the following actions: “(1) request[ed] funding for additional staff; (2) [took] steps to increase the efficiency of existing staff; (3) work[ed] to improve the transfer of information from the courts to the Jail, so that releases could be processed more efficiently; and (4) hir[ed] a new Chief Jailor to study and improve Jail processes, particularly including the release process.” (Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., Dkt. No. [269-1] at 20.) With specific regard to staff shortages and staff efficiency, Defendant did the following: First, she attempted to reduce staff shortages by suggesting to the County that certain Jail staff positions be made civilian rather than sworn, so that Defendant could hire more employees for less money. (Barrett Dep., Dkt. No. [269-6] at 99-100.) Additionally, Defendant reassigned staff from other parts of the Jail or from outside the building to help with the book-out process. (See id. at 99, lines 11-19 (“[During] peak periods I reassigned staff from inside of the building or even outside the building to come in and to help with the book-out process. There was a point at which I required all of the senior staff, I don’t care what bureau they worked in, courts, warrant, all of us worked at the jail for at least a shift so that we could give some relief to others inside the building so that we could redirect staff perhaps down to the
11

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 319 Filed 02/17/12 Page 12 of 15

AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

book-out process.”).) At one point, Defendant also required Jail staff to log on a board the names of inmates who were waiting to be released with the goal of clearing those names off the board. (Id. at 100, lines 9-13.)
Defendant also obtained a new filing system for the Jail records room in an effort to speed up the book-out process. (Id. at 111-12, lines 25-3.) (The Court notes, however, that this “new filing system” appears to refer only to filing cabinets, which Defendant provided to take the place of milk crates.) With regard to communicating with the courts, Defendant met with the Chief Judge of the Superior Court and members of the District Attorney’s office to make sure that the Jail received records from the courts as expeditiously as possible. (Id. at 104, lines 15-18.) She also sent a memo to the Fulton County judges asking them to send orders regarding case dispositions to one central fax number. (Id. at 134, lines 19-25.) In addition, when the funds were available to pay employees overtime, Defendant authorized a staff member to be a liaison with the Court to ensure that Court documents issued late in the day were sent to the Jail. (Id. at 139-140, lines 13-5.)
Finally, in September of 2003, Defendant hired Roland Lane, Jr. to serve as Chief Jailor. (Decl. of Roland Lane, Dkt. No. [269-7] ¶ 2.) Defendant tasked him with improving jail processes in Fulton County, generally, and
12

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 319 Filed 02/17/12 Page 13 of 15

AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

charged him with “making the intake and release processes more efficient and effective using available staff.” (Id. ¶ 6.) Lane made it a priority as Chief Jailor to speed up the release process through an initiative he termed “Operation Bum’s Rush.” (Id. ¶ 7.)
To refute a claim of deliberate indifference, a supervisory official must show that she “did not fail to act correctively to address the problem.” West, 496 F.3d at 1330. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit has held that a sheriff was not deliberately indifferent to the problem of under-staffing at the jail, which led to significant over-detentions, where the sheriff took the following actions: “asked existing staff to work overtime,” “temporarily brought in employees from other departments,” and “hired new employees . . . .” Id. In this case, Plaintiffs argue that the aforementioned measures Defendant took were insufficient to address the problem of over-detentions and at times led to perverse results (i.e., longer delays). (See generally Pls.’ Opp’n, Dkt. No. [307].) However, the question the Court must answer is not whether Defendant approached the problem in the best way or achieved the best results, but whether she was “deliberately indifferent”–that is, whether she failed to take corrective action. As stated above, this is an “extremely rigorous” standard to meet. “Human error does not equal deliberate indifference.” West, 496 F.3d at 1327. Deliberate indifference
13

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 319 Filed 02/17/12 Page 14 of 15
clearly contemplate culpable conduct greater than negligence. Id. In spite of the evidence of negligence on the part of Defendant, under the rationale of West, the Court cannot conclude, based on the conduct set forth above, that Defendant acted with deliberate indifference to the problem of over-detentions at the Jail. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the standard for supervisory liability.
Having found no constitutional violation on the part of Defendant, the Court need not undertake the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis. (See, e.g., Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1362 (“Because [Plaintiffs have not established] a constitutional violation committed by the supervisory defendant[], we need not reach the ‘clearly established law’ prong of the qualified immunity inquiry with respect to supervisory liability. . . .).) The Court concludes that Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ over-detention claims and hereby GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [269].
II. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude [314] In light of the Court’s ruling in Part I, supra, granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [269] as to the only claims remaining in this
14
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 319 Filed 02/17/12 Page 15 of 15
action, Plaintiff’s Motion to Exclude Purported Expert Opinion of Mr. Lane [314] is hereby DENIED as moot.1
Conclusion In accordance with the foregoing, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [269] as to Plaintiff’s overdetention claims, DENIES as moot Plaintiff’s Motion to Exclude Purported Expert Opinion of Mr. Lane [314], and DENIES Defendant’s Motion for Oral Argument [316]. As no claims remain, the Court DIRECTS the Clerk to enter final judgment in favor of Defendant. SO ORDERED, this 17th day of February, 2012.
_______________________________ RICHARD W. STORY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

1 The Court notes that in reaching its decision to grant Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, it did not rely on the statements made in the Lane Declaration or Deposition that Plaintiffs challenge in this Motion.
15

 
 376 F.Supp.2d 1340 (2005)
C. Alan POWELL, Individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated; Tory Dunlap, Individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated; Lee Antonio Smith, Individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated; David Evans, Individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated; Plaintiff, v.
Sheriff Jacqueline BARRETT, Fulton County, State of Georgia; Sheriff Myron Freeman, Fulton County, State of Georgia; Chairperson Karen Hanel, Fulton County Board of
Commissioners; Member Robb Pitts, Fulton County Board of Commissioner; Member Tom Lowe, Fulton County Board of Commissioners; Member Emma I. Darnell, Fulton County Board of Commissioners; Member Nancy A. Boxill, Fulton County Board of Commissioners; Member William Edwards, Fulton County Board of Commissioners, a/k/a
Bill Edwards; City of Atlanta, State of Georgia, Defendants.
No. 1:04-CV-1100-RWS.
United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.
July 5, 2005.
13412 *1341 *1342 Barrett S. Litt, Paul J. Estuar, Litt, Estuar, Harrison, Miller & Kitson, LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Charles B. Pekor, Jr., Daniel Eliot DeWoskin, Pekor & DeWoskin, Atlanta, GA, James Patrick Claiborne, Augusta, GA, Lynn E. Cunningham, George Washington University, Washington, D.C., William Charles Claiborne, III, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.
Theodore Howard Lackland, Lackland & Associates, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants 0907 Sheriff Jacqueline Barrett and Sheriff Myron Freeman.
Julianne N. Belaga, Kimberly Williams D'Haene, Richard Lance Robbins, Sidney Leighton Moore, Teresa Wynn Roseborough, Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants 0907 Fulton County, State of Georgia and Fulton Co. Board of Commissioners.
Dennis McRay Young, Office of Atlanta City Attorney, Law Department, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant 0907 City of Atlanta, State of Georgia.
ORDER
STORY, District Judge.
This case comes before the Court for consideration of County Defendants' Motion for Certification of Order for Interlocutory Appeal [77-1],[1] Defendants Barrett and Freeman's Motion to Dismiss Counts in the Fourth Amended Complaint [85-1], Defendant City of Atlanta's Motion to Dismiss the Fourth Amended Complaint [87-1], County Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Fourth Amended Complaint [88-1], Plaintiffs' Consent Motion for an Extension of Time to Respond to Defendants Barrett and Freeman's Motion to Dismiss [89-1], County 1343 Defendants' Motion to Stay *1343 Discovery [92-1], Defendants Barrett and Freeman's Motion to Stay Discovery [93-1], Plaintiffs' Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to City of Atlanta's Motion to Dismiss [95-1]; Plaintiffs' Second Consent Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to County Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [101-1], and Plaintiffs' Motion for Judicial Notice [113-1].
As a preliminary matter, Plaintiffs' Consent Motion for an Extension of Time to Respond to Defendants Barrett and Freeman's Motion to Dismiss [89-1], Plaintiffs' Consent Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to City of Atlanta's Motion to Dismiss [95-1], and Plaintiffs' Second Consent Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to

County Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [101-1] are GRANTED nunc pro tunc.[2] Likewise, Plaintiffs' Motion for Judicial Notice [113-1], being unopposed, is GRANTED. See LR 7.1B, NDGa ("Failure to file a response shall indicate that there is no opposition to the motion."). In accordance with its March 25, 2005 Order, moreover, the Court continues to RESERVE RULING on County Defendants' Motion for Certification of Order for Interlocutory Appeal [77-1]. The Court addresses the remaining motions before it through the following Order.
Background
Plaintiffs, certain former detainees at the Fulton County Jail (the "Jail"), initiated this putative class action on April 21, 2004. In their Complaint, as presently amended, Plaintiffs assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 respecting the conditions of their confinement at the Jail. They complain about being subject to "blanket strip searches" upon entering and/or returning to the Jail, as well as their continued detention past scheduled release dates (a condition they refer to as "over-detention").
Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that they and others similarly situated were held at the Fulton County Jail for a number of days after they had served misdemeanor sentences, posted bond, or had been ordered released by a Fulton County Court. In some instances, the periods of over-detention allegedly suffered by members of the putative class lasted almost two weeks.
In addition, Plaintiffs assert that the Jail maintained a policy of "strip searching" all inmates without an individualized determination that such searches would reveal weapons, drugs, or other contraband. According to Plaintiffs, such searches were part of the process in which arrestees were "booked" into the Jail's general population. It involved an arrested individual being placed in a room with up to thirty or forty other arrestees, asked to remove his clothing, and instructed to place the clothing in a box. As a group, the arrestees were required to shower, and then, standing in a line with others, were visually inspected front and back by deputies. Further, due to the Jail's practice of incorporating booking procedures into the release process, at least some of these searches were allegedly conducted on persons who were returning from court proceedings and who were entitled to be released from the facility.
1344 *1344 Plaintiffs allege that these practices at the Fulton County Jail were pervasive and had persisted for many years. Moreover, they assert that through media coverage and published judicial decisions, the unconstitutional treatment of inmates at the Jail had grown notorious, such that the government actors who placed arrestees into the Jail's custody were aware of these alleged practices.
Plaintiffs assert that the foregoing practices violate rights guaranteed them under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and predict that the persons falling within the proposed classes denominated in their pleadings will number 10,000 or more. As a result of exposure to such conditions, Plaintiffs seek monetary and injunctive relief against former Fulton County Sheriff Jacqueline Barrett, Fulton County Sheriff Myron Freeman, Fulton County, the members of the Fulton County Board of Commissioners, and the City of Atlanta.
On January 13, 2005, this Court entered an Order that, inter alia, denied two motions to dismiss that had been filed by the County Defendants and the City of Atlanta. In doing so, the Court recognized that in order to be held liable under § 1983, a municipal body must have had control over the policy that is alleged to have violated the plaintiff's rights. Moreover, it rejected Plaintiffs' assertion that either the City of Atlanta or the County Defendants exercised sufficient control over the over-detention and strip search practices in question to be held liable under applicable precedent. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that Plaintiffs had stated a claim against these Defendants insofar as they alleged that Fulton County and the City of Atlanta, through their respective police forces, maintained a policy of entrusting arrestees to the Fulton County Jail with knowledge of the unconstitutional treatment these persons would face at the facility 0907 a theory that will be referred to herein as that of "entrustment liability."
Thereafter, the Court permitted Plaintiffs to file a Fourth Amended Complaint. Defendants, including former Sheriff Jacqueline Barrett and Sheriff Myron Freeman, have now filed a second round of motions to dismiss. In addition, they request a stay of discovery. For their part, Plaintiffs, in their opposition papers, appear to request

reconsideration of the Court's Order insofar as it declined to read a so-called "Jail Local Constitutional Amendment" as making the Fulton County Sheriff an officer of Fulton County in his capacity as administrator of the Jail.
Discussion
I. Defendants' Motions to Dismiss
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) empowers the Court to grant a defendant's motion to dismiss when a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In considering whether to grant or deny such a motion, the Court looks only to the pleadings, accepting all facts pleaded therein as true, and drawing all inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 546, 84 S.Ct. 1733, 12 L.Ed.2d 1030 (1964); Conner v. Tate, 130 F.Supp.2d 1370, 1373 (N.D.Ga.2001). The motion may be granted only where "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); see Linder v. 1345 Portocarrero, 963 F.2d 332 (11th Cir.1992). Motions to dismiss are disfavored and are *1345 rarely granted. Gasper v. La. Stadium & Exposition Dist., 577 F.2d 897, 900 (5th Cir.1978); Woodham v. Fed. Transit Admin., 125 F.Supp.2d 1106, 1108 (N.D.Ga.2000).
Here, Defendants' motions to dismiss present four broad issues. First, the Sheriffs' motion requires resolution of whether the claims against them are viable under the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of qualified immunity. Next, both the City of Atlanta and the County Defendants request that the Court reconsider and/or clarify the entrustment liability theory it articulated in its January 13, 2005 Order. Third, the County Defendants ask the Court to dismiss Plaintiffs' revised "funding-based" theory of liability. Finally, the County Defendants insist that Plaintiffs lack Article III standing to bring claims for prospective injunctive relief.
A. Liability of Sheriffs Barrett and Freeman
Sheriff Myron Freeman argues that the Eleventh Amendment bars suit against him in his official capacity because, in the administration of the Fulton County Jail, he is acting as an "arm of the State." Both he and former Sheriff Jacqueline Barrett, moreover, claim that they cannot be held liable in their individual capacities for the challenged Jail practices under the doctrine of qualified immunity. For the reasons set forth below, the Sheriffs' motion is granted in part and denied in part.
1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
It is well-settled that the Eleventh Amendment precludes a prisoner from seeking monetary damages against an officer of the state in his or her official capacity. See Miller v. King, 384 F.3d 1248, 1259-60 (11th Cir.2004); see also Edwards v. Wallace Cmty. Coll., 49 F.3d 1517, 1524 (11th Cir.1995) ("A state, a state agency, and a state official sued in his official capacity are not `persons' within the meaning of § 1983, thus damages are unavailable [.]"). At the same time, § 1983 contemplates, and the Eleventh Amendment does not foreclose, an action against a state official in his official capacity where the plaintiff seeks only prospective, injunctive relief. Miller, 384 F.3d at 1260.
The parties debate the impact of these principles on the instant litigation. Plaintiffs contend that Sheriff Freeman, in applying the challenged Jail policies, acts as the instrument of the County, not the State, and that the Eleventh Amendment bar is consequently inapplicable. The Count finds this attempt to avoid the preclusive effect of the Eleventh Amendment unavailing in light of Grech v. Clayton County, 335 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir.2003), and Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir.2003), as well as the Eleventh Circuit's more recent decision in Purcell ex rel. Estate of Morgan v. Toombs County, 400 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir.2005), where it held:
[In Manders,] we decided that a sheriff's "authority and duty to administer the jail in his jurisdiction flows from the State, not [the] County." [Cit.] Thus Manders controls our determination here; [the sheriff] functions as an arm of the State 0907 not [the] County 0907 when promulgating policies and procedures governing conditions of confinement at the [] County Jail. Accordingly, even if [the plaintiff] had established a constitutional violation, [the sheriff] would be entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in his official capacity.

400 F.3d at 1325.
1346 Accordingly, insofar as Defendants seek a determination that the Eleventh Amendment *1346 bars suit for money damages against the Sheriff in his official capacity, their motion is granted. This conclusion does not, however, foreclose Plaintiffs from seeking prospective, injunctive relief against the Sheriff.
2. Qualified Immunity
A considerably more difficult question is presented, however, by the Sheriffs' attempted invocation of qualified immunity. As the Eleventh Circuit explained in Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir.2002), "[q]ualified immunity offers complete protection for government officials sued in their individual capacities if their conduct `does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" 311 F.3d at 1346 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). "The purpose of this immunity is to allow government officials to carry out their discretionary duties without the fear of personal liability or harassing litigation, protecting from suit all but the plainly incompetent or one who is knowingly violating the federal law." Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir.2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Here, the parties dispute whether the rights Defendants are alleged to have violated were "clearly established" at the time the purported violations took place.[3] A constitutional right is clearly established "only if its contours are `sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand what he is doing violates that right.'" Vaughan v. Cox, 316 F.3d 1210, 1212 (11th Cir.2003) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). The salient question is whether the state of the law at the time of the alleged violation gave officials "fair warning" that their acts were unconstitutional. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 740, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002); Holmes v. Kucynda, 321 F.3d 1069, 1078 (11th Cir.2003); see also Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1350-53 (articulating a tripartite analytical framework for ascertaining whether right at issue was "clearly established").
In answering this question, the Eleventh Circuit has instructed district courts to look to its decisions, those of the United States Supreme Court, and those of the highest court in the relevant state. Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1033 n. 10 (11th Cir.2001); but cf. Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1251 n. 4 (11th Cir.2003) (recognizing that decisions by the United States Supreme Court have suggested that looking to decisions of other Circuits is appropriate in qualified immunity analysis) (Birch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Qualified immunity is a question of law for the court. Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 7 F.3d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir.1993).
1347 *1347 a. Strip Search Policy
Plaintiffs contend that, at all times relevant to this litigation, their right to be free from a blanket strip search policy was clearly established. In support of this position, they rely principally on the Supreme Court's decision in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), and the decision of the Eleventh Circuit in Wilson v. Jones, 251 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir.2001). Given the importance of precedent in determining whether a right is sufficiently "clear" to warrant the denial of qualified immunity, and in light of the dynamic nature of the law as it relates to inmate strip searches, the Court examines these and other pertinent decisions in some detail below.
In Bell, the Supreme Court was called upon to examine the constitutionality of certain jail policies affecting pretrial detainees, including a policy requiring such persons "to expose their body cavities for visual inspection as a part of a strip search conducted after every contact visit with a person from outside the institution." 441 U.S. at 558, 99 S.Ct. 1861. The defendants argued that such searches were justified, without probable cause, both to discover and to deter attempts to smuggle contraband into the general population. Id. Upholding the practice under constitutional attack, the Court explained that the Fourth Amendment requires courts to balance the need for a given search against the invasion of personal rights the search entails, considering "the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted." Id. at 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861. Addressing the case before it, it concluded:

We do not underestimate the degree to which these searches may invade the personal privacy of inmates. Nor do we doubt, as the District Court noted, that on occasion a security guard may conduct the search in an abusive fashion. [Cit.] Such an abuse cannot be condoned. The searches must be conducted in a reasonable manner. [Cit.] But we deal here with the question whether visual body-cavity inspections as contemplated by the MCC rules can ever be conducted on less than probable cause. Balancing the significant and legitimate security interests of the institution against the privacy interests of the inmates, we conclude that they can.
Id. at 560, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (emphasis in original).
More than twenty years later, in Wilson v. Jones, 251 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir.2001), the Eleventh Circuit applied the Bell analysis to a case involving a strip search of a woman arrested for driving under the influence. The plaintiff in Wilson, before being taken to her cell, was escorted to a restroom in the jail by a female corrections officer and "instructed ... to disrobe completely, face the wall, squat, spread her buttocks, and cough three times." 251 F.3d at 1341. In addition, while no body cavity search was performed below the Wilson plaintiff's waist, the corrections officer examined the woman's "ears, mouth, nose and breasts during the search." Id.
Relying on Bell, the Circuit, employing a fact-specific balancing test, determined that the Jail's policy was unconstitutional because it had been conducted in the absence of a "reasonable suspicion that [the plaintiff] was concealing weapons or any other type of contraband." Id. at 1343. Nevertheless, it declined to deny the defendants qualified immunity, recognizing material dissimilarities between the facts before it and those reflected 1348 in binding *1348 precedent. Id. at 1344-46.[4]
Two years after Wilson, the Eleventh Circuit once again had the opportunity to review the constitutionality of a strip search performed on pretrial arrestees. In Evans v. City of Zebulon, 351 F.3d 485 (11th Cir.2003) (hereinafter, "Evans I"), two young men were arrested while driving through the city of Zebulon, Georgia; one for speeding and refusing to submit to a breathalyzer test, the other based on mistaken identity and the resultant belief he had violated parole. 351 F.3d at 487-88. Upon arriving at the county jail, the two men were subjected to strip searches which involved an examination and prodding of their anus and genitals with a slender black object. Id. at 488-89.
Addressing the constitutionality of the search, the Eleventh Circuit explained, "Arrestees who are to be detained in the general jail population can constitutionality be subjected to a strip search only if the search is supported by reasonable suspicion that such a search will reveal weapons or contraband." Id. at 490. Because the Court found such a reasonable suspicion lacking, it held that the plaintiffs' constitutional rights had been violated. Id. at 490-92. Nevertheless, it granted the officer involved in the search qualified immunity. Id. at 495-96.
Shortly after the Evans I panel issued its decision, the Circuit voted to vacate the opinion and rehear the appeal en banc. Evans v. City of Zebulon, 364 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir.2004). On rehearing, the Court of Appeals likewise found certain characteristics of the search unconstitutional, but concluded that the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the allegedly abusive manner in which the search was conducted. See Evans v. Stephens, 407 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir.2005) (en banc) (hereinafter, "Evans II"). The most important aspect of the Evans II decision for purposes here, however, was not this result, but rather the following language in which the Circuit questioned the "standard" initially articulated by the panel in Evans I:
The panel opinion in this case included these words: "Arrestees who are to be detained in the general jail population can constitutionally be subjected to a strip search only if the search is supported by reasonable suspicion that such a search will reveal weapons or contraband." [Cit.] And these words doubtlessly contributed to causing some judges to vote for en banc rehearing.
Most of us are uncertain that jailers are required to have a reasonable suspicion of weapons or contraband before strip searching 0907 for security and safety purposes 0907 arrestees bound for the general jail population.
407 F.3d at 1278. The Circuit went on to observe that the Supreme Court had never imposed such a "reasonable suspicion" prerequisite on inmate strip searches, but stopped short of resolving the accuracy of the panel's earlier statement. Rather, it explained that the case before it "involve[d] a different kind of search altogether: a postarrest investigatory strip search by the police looking for evidence (and not weapons)." Id. at 1279.
1349

*1349 In a concurring opinion, Judge Carnes, joined by Judge Dubina and Judge Hull, went further and expressed his "view is that reasonable suspicion is not necessary for a strip search of an arrestee who is to be detained in the general jail population, if that search is conducted pursuant to a generally applicable, reasonable jail policy designed to promote safety and security by guarding against the smuggling of weapons and other contraband into a detention facility." Id. at 1284 (Carnes, J., concurring; emphasis supplied). These Judges recognized that "a strong argument can be made" that decisions holding to the contrary, including that authored by the panel in Wilson v. Jones, were "wrong," and were predicated on a misinterpretation of Bell. Id. at 1285.
In light of the foregoing, the Court's task here is to determine whether the "strip search" policy allegedly in place at the Fulton County Jail violated clearly established rights of detainees at the time the searches were purportedly performed (i.e., in 2003 and 2004). Needless to say, the broad pronouncements in Wilson and Evans I, contrasted with the en banc Court's election to vacate Evans I and subsequent reluctance in Evans II to impose a "reasonable suspicion" precondition on strip searches of arrestees bound for the general population, introduces a novel and awkward wrinkle into this determination. After carefully considering the issue, however, the Court is inclined to agree with Sheriffs Barrett and Freeman that they are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the challenged searches.
As the en banc Court of Appeals emphasized in Evans II, the Supreme Court has never expressly held that, before conducting a strip search of detainees bound for the general jail population, a jailer must possess a reasonable suspicion of the concealment of weapons or other contraband. See Evans II, 407 F.3d at 1279. Moreover, in Evans II, a majority of the Court of Appeals indicated its uncertainty regarding whether such a suspicion must precede any constitutional strip search. Id. at 1278. Admittedly, that opinion was issued after the challenged strip searches involved in this litigation allegedly took place. But if the majority of the Eleventh Circuit continues to perceive room to debate the contours of this constitutional right, it seems to this Court that no state official could justifiably be charged with having "fair warning" that conducting a strip search absent a reasonable suspicion of contraband violates the law. See Hope, 536 U.S. at 740, 122 S.Ct. 2508. Put another way, this Court cannot characterize a state official's doubt in the existence of a constitutional rule "unreasonable" if his uncertainty is shared by a majority of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Vaughan, 316 F.3d at 1212 (11th Cir.2003) (a right is clearly established "only if its contours are `sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand what he is doing violates that right.'") (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)).
In making this determination, the Court is aware that certain language in Wilson could be read as supporting a different result. See 251 F.3d at 1343 ("Because Wilson was strip searched absent reasonable suspicion, we hold that the search of Wilson, as well as the jail's policy authorizing her search, violated the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.") (emphasis supplied). Nevertheless, a thorough reading of the Wilson opinion underscores that the constitutionality of any challenged strip search hinges on a 1350 fact-intensive inquiry *1350 0907 one in which a court is required to "consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted." Id. at 1342 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979).). That being the case, any "lesson" to be taken from Wilson cannot be divorced from the facts of that case, including the invasiveness of the search at issue there.
Thus, this Court finds it relevant that, in Wilson, the plaintiff had her breasts examined, and was required to "squat, spread her buttocks, and cough...." See 251 F.3d at 1341. Here, by contrast, Plaintiffs' pleading describes a markedly less invasive examination. Plaintiffs were simply required to submit to a visual "front and back" inspection upon leaving a shower. It is the view of this Court that such a pronounced dissimilarity between the intrusiveness of the searches at issue here in and Wilson could lead a reasonable official to believe one search is constitutional, while the other is not.[5]
Insofar as Sheriffs Barrett and Freeman seek qualified immunity on Plaintiffs'"strip search" claims, their motion to dismiss is granted.[6]
b. Over-Detention

Sheriffs Barrett and Freeman likewise seek to invoke qualified immunity on Plaintiffs' "over-detention" claims. 1351 They argue that case law within this Circuit does not establish a concrete deadline by which an *1351 arrestee
who is entitled to be released (e.g., because he has posted bond, served his misdemeanor sentence, or been ordered released by a court) must be permitted to leave the jail. In the absence of such an indelible, "bright line" standard, the Sheriffs argue their obligation to release inmates in a timely fashion cannot be described as "clearly established." The Court disagrees.
As the Supreme Court explained in Hope v. Pelzer, the fundamental question in the qualified immunity analysis is whether the state of the law provided an official with "fair warning" that his treatment of the plaintiff ran afoul of the Constitution. See Hope, 536 U.S. at 740, 122 S.Ct. 2508. While materially similar precedent or "broad statements of principle" can unquestionably establish a right with sufficient clarity to deny an officer qualified immunity, they are not in all instances required to provide officials with the requisite notice. See Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1350-52. Rather, in some cases, "the words of a federal statute or federal constitutional provision may be so clear and the conduct so bad that case law is not needed to establish that the conduct cannot be lawful." Id. at 1350. To borrow language from a slightly different context, there are some instances where the conduct in question goes so far beyond the "hazy border" of constitutionally permissible behavior that an official should be denied qualified immunity even absent materially similar precedent. See id at 1350 n. 18.
As it relates to the instant case, there can be no doubt that a detainee has a "constitutional right to be free from continued detention after it was or should have been known that [he] was entitled to release...." See Cannon v. Macon County, 1 F.3d 1558, 1563 (11th Cir.1993), modified, 15 F.3d 1022 (1994); see also Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781, 791 (5th Cir.1968) ("There is no privilege in a jailer to keep a prisoner in jail beyond the period of his lawful sentence.").[7] While the Constitution does not mandate instantaneous release, it does require that a detainee be released within a reasonable time after the basis for his lawful detainment has ended. See Whirl, 407 F.2d at 792 ("The sheriff, of course, must have some protection too. His duty to his prisoner is not breached until the expiration of a reasonable time for the proper ascertainment of the authority upon which his prisoner is detained."); Lewis v. O'Grady, 853 F.2d 1366, 1370 (7th Cir.1988) ("We recognize that the administrative tasks incident to a release of a prisoner from custody may require some time to accomplish 0907 in this case perhaps a number of hours."); see also County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 55, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 114 L.Ed.2d 49 (1991) (Fourth Amendment required that persons arrested without warrant be given prompt judicial determinations of probable cause; establishing forty-eight hour standard to assess reasonableness of delay in light of inevitable administrative hurdles).[8]
1352 Plainly, within a given range, what is "reasonable" as it relates to a particular *1352 individual's release presents a fact-specific question. See, e.g., Berry v. Baca, 379 F.3d 764, 770-72 (9th Cir.2004) (rejecting county sheriff's argument that release delays lasting up to forty-eight hours are presumptively reasonable; held twenty-nine hour delay presented question for jury); Lewis, 853 F.2d at 1370 (recognizing that "[i]t is virtually impossible to establish an absolute minimum time to meet all potential circumstances which might exist" in the context of inmate release; holding eleven-hour delay presented question for the jury); Arline v. City of Jacksonville, 359 F.Supp.2d 1300, 1310 (M.D.Fla.2005) (two and a half hour detention following acquittal presented jury question under Fourth Amendment). Equally as plain is that there are circumstances in which a lengthy delay is per se unreasonable, and necessarily runs afoul of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 527, 532 (5th Cir.1980) ("Detention of a prisoner thirty days beyond the expiration of his sentence in the absence of a facially valid court order or warrant constitutes a deprivation of due process.").
Here, Plaintiffs claim to have been over-detained for durations ranging from one to ten days, with a mean overdetention period of 3.90 days.[9] (See Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 328, 334, 340, 345, 351, 357, 363, 369, 375, 381 & 387.) In describing an "illustrative case," moreover, Plaintiffs allege that Plaintiff Alan Powell was told by guards that if he continued to complain about his over-detention, they might "lose" his paperwork 0907 presumably intimating that a problem arrestee could be detained for longer periods of time for reasons totally unrelated to the administrative process incident to effectuating releases. (Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 242.) It is the view of this Court that such allegations, if proven, might preclude the Sheriff's invocation of qualified immunity on Plaintiffs' "overdetention" claims.

In what has been recognized as a "clearly analogous" line of authority, the Supreme Court has established a presumptive deadline of forty-eight hours for persons arrested without a warrant to be taken before a judge for a probable cause hearing. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 55, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 114 L.Ed.2d 49 (1991); see also Lewis, 853 F.2d at 1370 (recognizing that circumstances presented in case involving "overdetention" of inmate and McLaughlin were "clearly analogous"). An arrestee who is provided a hearing within that time period can prevail on a constitutional challenge only if he demonstrates the hearing was nonetheless 1353 "delayed unreasonably." McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56, *1353 111 S.Ct. 1661. Among the delays that may be considered unreasonable are those "motivated by ill will against the arrested individual, or delay for delay's sake." Id. Conversely, "[w]here an arrested individual does not receive a probable cause determination within 48 hours..., the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate the existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance." Id. at 57, 111 S.Ct. 1661. In cases arising after McLaughlin, moreover, courts have recognized that an official may be denied qualified immunity where arrestees under his supervision was not given a probable cause determinations within forty-eight hours of arrest and no emergency or extraordinary circumstances justified the delay. See, e.g., Cherrington v. Skeeter, 344 F.3d 631, 643-44 (6th Cir.2003) (reversing summary judgment in favor of defendants on grounds of qualified immunity where arrestee held for seventy-two hours without probable cause determination and no emergency or extraordinary circumstances justified delay); Lingenfelter v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Reno County, 359 F.Supp.2d 1163, 1173 (D.Kan.2005) (denying sheriff's motion to dismiss on grounds of qualified immunity where inmate was held eight days without judicial probable cause determination).
Of course, the issue presented in McLaughlin is not in all respects identical to that presented here. See Berry, 379 F.3d at 771 (observing that, "while the two contexts share the same concerns about the need for flexibility in the face of inevitable administrative and logistical delays," issues of over-detention and detainment pending probable cause determination "may not share the same precise calculus"). Nevertheless, in circumstances where a detainee is unquestionably entitled to be free from further governmental restraint, it cannot be doubted that the public interest in his prompt release is even greater, and the constitutional tolerance for "administrative delay" substantially less, than in the context of arrestees awaiting probable cause determinations. See Berry, 379 F.3d at 771-72 (declining to adopt McLaughlin's presumption that forty-eight hour detention is constitutional in context of over-detentions, explaining that, in over-detention context, "the societal interest in the process that result in delay, while significant, may not be as weighty as in the probable cause context [,]" and that, "the administrative burden of accelerating the release process 0907 in particular, running a computer check on wants and holds within less than forty-eight hours 0907 does not seem as weighty as the burden of establishing probable cause under a tight timeline"); Brass v. County of Los Angeles, 328 F.3d 1192, 1202 (9th Cir.2003) ("It is unclear, however, whether the 48-hour period applied to probable cause determinations is appropriate for effectuating the release of prisoners whose basis for confinement has ended. One might conclude that when a court orders a prisoner released 0907 or when, for example, a prisoner's sentence has been completed 0907 the outer bounds for releasing the prisoner should be less than 48 hours.") (emphasis supplied).[10] It follows that an official who continues to hold 1354 a detainee without legal *1354 justification for a period of time that would fail to pass muster even under McLaughlin cannot be said to have lacked "fair warning" that his conduct violates the Constitution.
Here, the allegations of the Complaint describe a lethargy in the Jail's release policies that could be said to exist well beyond the "hazy border" of constitutionally acceptable delay. The Court has been unable to find any case, whether within or outside of the Eleventh Circuit, in which the detainment of a properly identified individual for days beyond his scheduled release date was held constitutionally permissible. And, read most favorably to Plaintiffs, the allegations of the Complaint suggest that the delays at issue here may have in some instances been the product of more than a mere lack of organization, but rather, indicative of a custom of purposeful indifference to the rights of detainees 0907 "motivated by ill will against the arrested individual, or delay for delay's sake." McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56, 111 S.Ct. 1661. Accordingly, based on the arguments and record currently before the Court, dismissal of Plaintiffs' over-detention claims on qualified immunity grounds would be improper.
B. Entrustment Liability

The County Defendants and the City of Atlanta also move the Court to reconsider, or, in the alternative, to clarify its January 13, 2005 holding regarding "entrustment liability."[11] The Court addresses the requests for reconsideration and clarification separately.
1. Reconsideration
Under the Local Rules of this Court, "[m]otions for reconsideration shall not be filed as a matter of routine practice." LR 7.2(E), NDGa. Consequently, motions for reconsideration are not to be submitted as a matter of course, but only when "absolutely necessary." Id. Such absolute necessity arises where there is "(1) newly discovered evidence; (2) an intervening development or change in controlling law; or (3) a need to correct a clear error of law or fact." Bryan v. Murphy, 246 F.Supp.2d 1256, 1258-59 (N.D.Ga.2003).
Conversely, motions for reconsideration may not be used as a vehicle to present the court with arguments which have already been raised and rejected, or to "repackage familiar arguments to test whether the court will change its mind." Bryan, 246 F.Supp.2d at 1259. Likewise, such motions "may not be used to offer new legal theories or evidence that could have been presented in conjunction with the previously filed motion or response, unless a reason is given for failing to raise the issue at an earlier stage in the litigation." Adler v. Wallace Computer Servs., Inc., 202 F.R.D. 666, 675 (N.D.Ga.2001).
1355 Here, Defendants' arguments in support of reconsideration do not fall within *1355 the limited range of objections that may appropriately be raised in such a motion. Further, the Court remains of the view that a municipal body that maintains a policy of entrusting its arrestees to a jail with knowledge of the unconstitutional treatment those persons will face upon their confinement there can be liable under § 1983. See Young v. City of Little Rock, 249 F.3d 730, 735 (8th Cir.2001) (holding that city that entrusted its arrestees to county with knowledge of unconstitutional practice at issue could be held liable under § 1983 for injury arising out of arrestee's exposure to the practice); Deaton v. Montgomery County, 989 F.2d 885, 889-90 (6th Cir.1993) (in declining to hold county liable under § 1983 for city's unconstitutional practices in treatment of arrestees, emphasized that "[t]here are no facts presented indicating that the sheriff knew or should have known that strip searches were conducted in violation of state law"); cf. also Warren v. D.C., 353 F.3d 36, 39 (D.C.Cir.2004) (holding that District of Columbia could be liable § 1983 for entrusting inmate to private prison with "actual or constructive knowledge that its agents will probably violate constitutional rights"); Baker v. D.C., 326 F.3d 1302, 1306-07 (D.C.Cir.2003) (holding likewise). The motions for reconsideration are denied.
2. Clarification
The County Defendants additionally request that this Court clarify its January 13, 2005 holding as it relates to the showing necessary to prevail on a theory of entrustment liability. In particular, they ask whether the "knowledge" a municipality must have to be liable under § 1983 is limited to the facts giving rise to the constitutional violation, or whether it additionally must be chargeable with knowledge of the unconstitutionality of the challenged practice. They assert that if the latter is required, then the legal landscape at the time the events in question took place here did not provide them with the requisite notice (a concept they insist must be construed akin to the "clearly established" test for qualified immunity) to sustain their liability under an entrustment-based theory.
This Court is inclined to agree with the County Defendants that knowledge 0907 either actual or constructive-of the unconstitutionality of a challenged practice employed by a recipient government actor must exist before § 1983 liability may attach. See Bd. of County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997) ("Where a plaintiff claims that the municipality has not directly inflicted an injury, but nonetheless has caused [another] to do so, rigorous standards of culpability and causation must be applied to ensure that the municipality is not held liable solely for the actions of [others]."); cf. also id. at 411, 117 S.Ct. 1382 ("A plaintiff must demonstrate that a municipal decision reflects deliberate indifference to the risk that a violation of a particular constitutional or statutory right will follow the decision."); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) ("Where a § 1983 plaintiff can establish that the facts available to city policymakers put them on actual or constructive notice that the particular omission is substantially certain to result in the violation of the constitutional rights of their citizens, the dictates of Monell are satisfied.") (O'Connor,

J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Warren, 353 F.3d at 39 ("[F]aced with actual or construction knowledge that its agents will probably violate constitutional rights, the city may not adopt a policy of inaction.").
1356 *1356 At the same time, however, the Court cannot agree with the County Defendants that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for relief when this "legal knowledge" requirement is incorporated into the entrustment liability test. Read in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Fourth Amended Complaint contains allegations that the County Defendants had actual knowledge that the challenged practices at the Fulton County Jail were unconstitutional. (See, e.g., Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 232.) Were these allegations proven, then the County Defendants have directed the Court to no authority that would permit them to avoid § 1983 liability.[12]
C. Plaintiffs' Revised Funding-Based Theory of Liability
In their Fourth Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs renew their attempt to impose § 1983 liability on Fulton County based on the County's control over the Fulton County Sheriff's budget, this time infusing their allegations with accusations of deliberate indifference. The Court finds this theory foreclosed by Eleventh Circuit precedent.
As explained in this Court January 2005 Order, the Eleventh Circuit, after a thorough examination of the relationship between the State of Georgia, its counties, and its sheriffs, flatly rejected the argument that a county's authority over a sheriff's budget can justify imposing liability on the county as a consequence of policies adopted by the sheriff. See Manders, 338 F.3d at 1323-24; see also Grech, 335 F.3d at 1339-40. Although it recognized a different result might be appropriate where a county's own duty to provide medical care to inmates was at issue, the provision of such care is not implicated by Plaintiffs' claims in this case. See Manders, 338 F.3d at 1323 n. 43 ("We stress that this case does not involve medical care, which counties have a statutory obligation to provide to inmates in county jails.") (citing O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2); compare McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir.2004) (considering deliberate indifference challenge to Georgia county's alleged under-funding of jail that was asserted to have resulted in its health services subcontractor's failure to treat inmate's medical condition). Consequently, the Court finds Plaintiffs' revised funding-based theory of liability unavailing. Count 16 of Plaintiffs' Fourth Amended Complaint is dismissed.
D. Plaintiffs' Standing to Pursue Injunctive Relief
Finally, the County Defendants challenge Plaintiffs' standing to pursue equitable relief in this case.
It goes without saying that those who seek to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts must satisfy the threshold requirement imposed by Article III of the Constitution by alleging an actual case or controversy. [Cits.] Plaintiffs must demonstrate a "personal stake in the outcome" in order to "assure that concrete adverseness 1357 which sharpens the presentation of issues" necessary for *1357 the proper resolution of constitutional questions. [Cit.] Abstract injury is not enough. The plaintiff must show that he "has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury" as the result of the challenged official conduct and the injury or threat of injury must be both "real and immediate," not "conjectural" or "hypothetical."
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-102, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 1665, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). Where injunctive relief is at issue, moreover, "to have standing ... a plaintiff must show a sufficient likelihood that he will be affected by the allegedly unlawful conduct in the future." Wooden v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 247 F.3d 1262, 1283 (11th Cir.2001). "Although past wrongs are evidence bearing on whether there is a real and immediate threat of repeated injury ..., past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects." Id. at 1284 (internal punctuation omitted).
These principles often prove problematic for former detainees seeking to enjoin conditions attendant to their arrest and confinement. See, e.g., O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 497, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974) (equitable standing lacking where "the prospect of future injury rests on the likelihood that respondents will again be arrested for and charged with violations of the criminal law and will again be subjected to bond proceedings, trial, or sentencing before petitioners"); cf. also Lyons, 461 U.S. at 109, 103 S.Ct. 1660 (explaining that it was "no more than speculation" that plaintiff would once again be arrested and subjected to allegedly unlawful chokehold); Dudley v. Stewart, 724 F.2d 1493, 1494 (11th Cir.1984) ("Since Dudley is no longer in the custody of

county jail officials, the most that can be said for his standing is that if he is released from prison, is convicted of another crime and is incarcerated in the Daugherty County Jail, he might again be subject to disciplinary confinement without due process."). Indeed, the Supreme Court has appeared singularly unwilling, "for purposes of assessing the likelihood that state authorities will reinflict a given injury ... to assume that the party seeking relief will repeat the type of misconduct that would once again place him or her at risk of that injury." Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 320, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988) (collecting cases).
While acknowledging that most of their ranks had been released at the time the complaint in this case was filed, Plaintiffs attempt to avoid this standing obstacle here by focusing on three of the eleven named Plaintiffs. First, they concentrate on the claims of Mr. Powell and Mr. Blake, explaining that both men have been arrested by Fulton County Police since the original complaint was filed in April 2004: Mr. Blake once, and Mr. Powell three times. They urge that these arrests (as well as the fact that Mr. Powell remains out on bond, and that Mr. Blake is on probation) show a substantial likelihood that these men will again be detained at the Fulton County Jail and will again face allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement.
Admittedly, there exists some language in Supreme Court precedent intimating that a plaintiff who, prior to filing his complaint, has multiple "run-ins" with police might be able to show a sufficient likelihood of future police 1358 encounters to be able to pursue injunctive relief against an unconstitutional law enforcement practice. *1358 See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 108, 103 S.Ct. 1660 ("We cannot agree that the `odds[]' ... that Lyons would not only again be stopped for a traffic violation but would also be subjected to a chokehold without any provocation whatsoever are sufficient to make out a federal case for equitable relief. We note that five months elapsed between October 6, 1976, and the filing of the complaint, yet there was no allegation of further unfortunate encounters between Lyons and the police.") (emphasis supplied). That said, Plaintiffs have directed the Court to no authority actually holding that a civilian claimant's potential for recidivism was so high that it took his future arrest and detainment out of the realm of the hypothetical, laying the foundation for equitable standing. Compare 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1266 (11th Cir.2003) (in suit by foster children challenging conditions of foster care system, held children who were in custody of system had standing, explaining, plaintiffs "are in the custody of the defendants involuntarily ... [and t]hey cannot avoid exposure to the defendants' challenged conduct"); Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1337-38 (11th Cir.1994) (explaining presumption that person will not engage in misconduct placing him at risk of injury does not preclude standing "when, for reasons beyond the plaintiff's control, he or she is unable to avoid repeating the conduct that led to the original injury at the hands of the defendant"; citing as examples mental illness and homelessness) (emphasis supplied); Cruz v. Hauck, 627 F.2d 710, 717 (5th Cir.1980) (prisoners' claim attacking unconstitutional jail policies was not moot for purposes of class certification, even though they were not in jail at time of class certification decision, where they could easily be transferred from prison back to jail). This Court declines to extend precedent to find such a foundation here. Next, Plaintiffs emphasize that Mr. Clemons was still in Fulton County Jail at the time the Second Amended Complaint 0907 which added him as a Plaintiff 0907 was filed. Clearly, his case places him in a much stronger position to pursue injunctive relief in this litigation. See McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 51, 111 S.Ct. 1661 (holding former inmates had standing to pursue injunctive claims against county where "at the time the second amended complaint was filed, plaintiffs James, Simon, and Hyde had been arrested without warrants and were being held in custody without having received a probable cause determination"); see also Wooden, 247 F.3d at 1285 n. 21 (distinguishing McLaughlin from those cases in which unconstitutional treatment had ended by the time the pleading was filed, explaining "McLaughlin... concerned a situation where the plaintiffs were exposed to a continuing unconstitutional act 0907 a protracted delay in affording them probable cause hearings 0907 which was ongoing at the time of the complaint") (emphasis supplied). Mr. Clemons, however, was arrested by the City of Atlanta, not the Fulton County Police, and his standing to pursue injunctive relief against the County is therefore lacking. (See Jan. 13, 2005 Order at 31 ("while Fulton County may be liable for the arrestees placed in the Jail by its police department (over which it exerted control), it may not be subject to § 1983 liability for arrestees placed in the Jail by" other municipal or state actors) (emphasis in original).)
In sum, Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue injunctive relief against the County Defendants. Insofar as the County Defendants seek to dismiss such requests for relief, their motion is granted.
II. Plaintiffs' Request for Reconsideration

1359 Plaintiffs, in their opposition to Defendants' motions to dismiss, attempt to rely *1359 on Abusaid v. Hillsborough County Board of County Commissioners, 405 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir.2005), as "intervening case law" establishing that a so-called Jail Local Constitutional Amendment renders the Fulton County Sheriff an officer of Fulton County in his capacity as administrator of the Jail. (See Jan. 13, 2005 Order at 20-23 (discussing, and rejecting, Plaintiffs' argument).) In Abusaid, the Eleventh Circuit held a Florida sheriff was acting as a county official in his enforcement of a county ordinance. 405 F.3d at 1304. Plaintiffs argue that, because the Sheriff was "designated" to control the Fulton County Jail pursuant to the amendment, a similar result is compelled here. The Court finds this argument to lack merit.
The "Jail Local Constitutional Amendment," as this Court's prior Order explained, provides as follows:
The governing authority of Fulton County is hereby authorized to maintain and operate facilities within or without the boundaries of said County for the detention, incarceration or confinement of all persons (including juveniles) subject to detention, incarceration or confinement under the laws of this State, under any County resolution or under any City ordinance. Such facilities, whether designated as a jail, public works camp, or detention center, shall be under the control of such persons or official as may be designated by the governing authority of Fulton County, and need not be used exclusively for any one class of prisoner or person.
H.R. 687-1585, 1972 Sess., at 1439 § 1 (Ga.1972), continued in effect in S. 503, 1986 Sess., at 4428 (Ga.1986); see also Fulton County, Ga., Code § 1-122 (codifying same provision as part of Fulton County Code relating to powers of the Board of Commissioners). Plaintiffs argued that this provision of the Georgia Constitution and the Fulton County Code gave the Fulton County Board power over the operation of the County Jail, bringing them within the ambit of municipal liability under § 1983.
The Court declined to accept this argument in its January 13, 2005 Order, observing that it reflected a misconstruction of the cited amendment. Specifically, it pointed out that nothing in the amendment or the Fulton County Code reflected the Board's exercise of any power to erect a separate detention facility, or to affirmatively "designate" any person to operate such a facility. It rejected, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs' argument that mere inaction by the Fulton County Board of Commissioners had implicitly resulted in its adoption of the Fulton County Jail as its "own," and that the Board's failure to designate someone other than the Sheriff to operate the facility tacitly resulted in its "designation" of the person holding that office to so control the institution. The Court struggles to see how Abusaid in any way cures this basic legal flaw in Plaintiffs' argument. Their request for reconsideration is denied.
III. Defendants' Motions to Stay Discovery
In their motions to stay discovery, Defendants request a stay during the pendency of their motions to dismiss. Those motions now having been resolved, County Defendants' Motion to Stay Discovery [92-1] and Defendants Barrett and Freeman's Motion to Stay Discovery [93-1] are DENIED as moot.
Conclusion
1360 Plaintiffs' Consent Motion for an Extension of Time to Respond to Defendants *1360 Barrett and Freeman's Motion to Dismiss [89-1], Plaintiffs' Consent Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to City of Atlanta's Motion to Dismiss [95-1], and Plaintiffs' Second Consent Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to County Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [101-1] are GRANTED nunc pro tunc. Likewise, Plaintiffs' Motion for Judicial Notice [113-1], being unopposed, is GRANTED. See LR 7.1B, NDGa ("Failure to file a response shall indicate that there is no opposition to the motion.").
Defendants Barrett and Freeman's Motion to Dismiss Counts in the Fourth Amended Complaint [85-1], and the County Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Fourth Amended Complaint [88-1] are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Defendant City of Atlanta's Motion to Dismiss the Fourth Amended Complaint [87-1] is DENIED.
County Defendants' Motion to Stay Discovery [92-1] and Defendants Barrett and Freeman's Motion to Stay Discovery [93-1] are DENIED as moot.

In accordance with its March 25, 2005 Order, the Court continues to RESERVE RULING on County Defendants' Motion for Certification of Order for Interlocutory Appeal [77-1]. The County Defendants will have 30 days from the date appearing on this Order within which to either amend their pending Motion for Certification or to inform the Court that they will not be filing an amendment. Plaintiffs will have 30 days after Defendants file their amended motion or notice within which to file a response to the motion. Defendants' reply brief will be due 15 days after Plaintiffs file their response.
[1] The term "County Defendants," as used herein, refers to Fulton County and the seven members of the Fulton County Board of Commissioners.
[2] Plaintiffs have additionally requested leave to exceed the page limits imposed by the local rules. Because the filings already before the Court exceed those limitations, the Court will permit Plaintiffs the requested leave, and consider their papers. As it relates to future submissions, however, Plaintiffs are strongly encouraged to focus their arguments in such a way as to bring their filings into compliance with LR 7.1D, NDGa.
[3] The Court acknowledges that, ideally, the first inquiry to be undertaken in the qualified immunity analysis is whether the facts as alleged, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, establish a constitutional violation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). Here, however, Defendants have neglected to fully brief this "threshold" question, and the Court is reluctant to rule on the precise contours of the rights at issue in this litigation without the benefit of hearing complete argument from both sides. As a consequence, it will assume for purposes of the instant motion that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a constitutional violation, and addresses only the question whether the rights purportedly violated were "clearly established" within the meaning of pertinent authority.
[4] In affording the defendants qualified immunity in Wilson, the Eleventh Circuit engaged in a "materially similar" comparison of relevant precedent to the record before it. This rigorous precedential comparison for determining whether a defendant acted in violation of a claimant's "clearly established" rights has since been criticized by the Supreme Court. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 740, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002).
[5] Plaintiffs cite Marriott v. County of Montgomery, 227 F.R.D. 159 (N.D.N.Y.2005), to support a contrary view. There, the District Court for the Northern District of New York considered, and ultimately rejected, an argument that no "strip search" had been performed on inmates where they were made to disrobe in front of guards. 227 F.R.D. at 168-69. The court read Second Circuit precedent as foreclosing a definition of a "strip search" as limited to those which targeted singularly private parts of the body. Id. at 169 ("Defendants contend that the Second Circuit has determined that in order to be constitutionally problematic, a strip search must target the breast, genitals, and anus.... This misstates the law of this Circuit."). This Court, however, does not find that Marriott advances Plaintiffs' qualified immunity argument. That decision, issued after the searches at issue here took place, could not have apprised Sheriffs Barrett and Freeman of the outer limits embodied in the concept of a "strip search," and the Eleventh Circuit has squarely rejected the proposition that judicial decisions outside this Circuit can "clearly establish" principles of law for those officials who operate within its boundaries. See Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1033 n. 10.
[6] To be clear, this holding applies with equal force to the Plaintiffs and putative class members who fall or would fall into the so-called Alpha Arrestee Strip Search Class and Court Return Strip Search Class. These persons, according to the Fourth Amended Complaint, had obtained the status of "releasees" at the time the challenged search was performed 0907 whether by court order or the posting of bond. It is Plaintiffs' position that there is no reason why these individuals should have to be put back into the Jail's general population prior to their release, and thus, that subjecting them to the strip search procedure that precedes reentry into that population is uniquely offensive.
In fairness to Plaintiffs, the Court appreciates that any need to conduct the challenged searches may be significantly diminished in these instances, and acknowledges that the status of the inspected persons may prove germane to the ultimate constitutional inquiry. Plaintiffs have not, however, directed the Court to any United States Supreme Court, Eleventh Circuit, or Georgia Supreme Court authority compelling a finding of unconstitutionality on these facts, and absent such authority, this Court cannot deem the rights Plaintiffs seek to

vindicate vis-a-vis these subclasses any more "clearly established" than those of the remaining putative class. See Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1033 n. 10.
[7] The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent the decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit handed down prior to September 30, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir.1981).
[8] As explained supra, note 3, the Court declines at this juncture to resolve the outer boundaries of the constitutional right to be free from over-detention without the benefit of hearing full argument from the parties in this litigation. That is, it declines to resolve whether the standard announced by the Supreme Court in McLaughlin, or some more stringent analysis, should apply when an individual challenges his continued detention beyond the expiration of the government's right to hold him. Nevertheless, the Court does not believe the case law leaves any room to doubt the existence of an individual's constitutional right to be released from detention within a reasonable time after it is or reasonably should be known that he is entitled to such release.
[9] Plaintiff Alan Powell claims to have been over-detained for three days; Plaintiff Tory Dunlap for four days; Plaintiff Lee Antonio Smith for three days; Plaintiff David Evans for ten days; Plaintiff Stanley Clemons for two days (as of the filing of the Second Amended Complaint); Plaintiff Allen Middleton for three days; Plaintiff Anthony Westbrook for four days; Plaintiff Benjamin Blake for two days; Plaintiff Henry Witherspoon for seven days; Plaintiff Antionne Wolf for one day; and Plaintiff Kristopher Matkins for four days.
[10] Ironically, this Court's review of applicable precedent reveals that Brass held constitutional one of the longest "over-detention" delays in reported authority (outside the realm of "mistaken identity" cases) 0907 a delay which lasted 39 hours after a court had ordered the detainee's release. See 328 F.3d at 1202. As the Ninth Circuit has observed in subsequent decisions, however, Brass was unique in that the detainee there did not challenge the overall length of his delay, but rather, isolated administrative practices he found objectionable. See Berry, at 768-69. Because the Brass court considered only the reasonableness of the challenged procedures, rather than whether the aggregate resultant delay evinced deliberate indifference to the detainee's rights, it stands on a different footing than this and most other "over-detention" controversies.
[11] The City of Atlanta apparently requests reconsideration on other aspects of the Court's January 13, 2005 Order as well, having incorporated in their current motion to dismiss many arguments that were already considered, and rejected, by the Court. For all the reasons stated in subsection 1, infra, that request is denied.
[12] Of course, the Court's holding that the rights of the "strip search" plaintiffs were not established with sufficient clarity to deny the defendant actors qualified immunity presents an arduous hurdle for Plaintiffs to overcome in succeeding on a theory of entrustment liability. This Court is not presently prepared, however, to entirely conflate the standard for constructive notice in the entrustment liability context with that employed in deciding whether a right is "clearly established" for purposes of qualified immunity. Given the procedural posture of this case, moreover, that issue is not before the Court.
Save trees - read court opinions online on Google Scholar.

 
 Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 331 Filed 04/08/13 Page 1 of 3 Case: 12-15721 Date Filed: 04/05/2013 Page: 1 of 2

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 331 Filed 04/08/13 Page 2 of 3 Case: 12-15721 Date Filed: 04/05/2013 Page: 2 of 2

Case 1:04-cv-01100-RWS Document 331 Filed 04/08/13 Page 3 of 3 Case: 12-15721 Date Filed: 04/05/2013 Page: 1 of 1

John Ley Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
ELBERT PARR TUTTLE COURT OF APPEALS BUILDING 56 Forsyth Street, N.W. Atlanta, Georgia 30303
April 05, 2013

For rules and forms visit www.ca11.uscourts.gov

Edward Barber Valdosta SP - Inmate Legal Mail PO BOX 310 VALDOSTA, GA 31063-0310
Appeal Number: 12-15721-C Case Style: Edward Barber v. GA Dept. of Law, et al District Court Docket No: 1:12-cv-01011-WSD

On April 1, 2013, this Court began MANDATORY electronic filing. All counsel are required to file documents electronically in appeals pending on April 1, 2013, and in appeals docketed in this Court on or after that date, unless exempted for good cause.
The following action has been taken in the referenced case:
The enclosed order has been ENTERED.
Pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 42-1(b) you are hereby notified that upon expiration of fourteen (14) days from this date, this appeal will be dismissed by the clerk without further notice unless you pay to the DISTRICT COURT clerk the $450 docket and $5 filing fees (total of $455), with notice to this office.
Sincerely,
JOHN LEY, Clerk of Court
Reply to: Walter Pollard, C Phone #: (404) 335-6186

MOT-2 Notice of Court Action

 
 Case: 1:04-cv-1100 As of: 03/18/2016 03:02 PM EDT 1 of 41
4months,CLASS,CLOSED
U.S. District Court Northern District of Georgia (Atlanta) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:04−cv−01100−RWS

Powell, et al v. Barrett, et al Assigned to: Judge Richard W. Story Demand: $0 Case in other court: 11th USCA, 05−16734
USCA − 11th Circuit., 05−16734−EE
USCA − 11th Circuit., 12−11422−CC Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 04/21/2004 Date Terminated: 02/17/2012 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

C. Alan Powell Individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated TERMINATED: 02/04/2010

represented by Barrett S. Litt Litt, Estuar &Kitson, LLP Suite 1880 1055 Wilshire Boulevard Los Angeles, CA 90017 213−251−5400 Fax: 213−380−4585 Email: blitt@kmbllaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charles B. Pekor , Jr. Pekor Law Office, LLC Suite 255 47 Perimeter Center East Atlanta, GA 30346 404−848−8086 Fax: 404−848−8089. Email: chuckpekor@yahoo.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Eliot DeWoskin The High House 309 Sycamore Street Decatur, GA 30030 404−869−3565 Fax: 404−869−3558 Email: dan@dedlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Patrick Claiborne Office of James Patrick Claiborne, PC Suite 403 3527 Wheeler Road Augusta, GA 30909 706−722−8224 Email: jpcfirm@aol.com TERMINATED: 04/09/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY

Lynn E. Cunningham P O Box 1547 Dubois, WY 82513 3074553374 Fax: 3074553374

Case: 1:04-cv-1100 As of: 03/18/2016 03:02 PM EDT 2 of 41

Email: lcunningham@law.gwu.edu TERMINATED: 08/03/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

Paul J. Estuar Litt, Estuar, Harrison, Miller &Kitson, LLP Suite 1880 1055 Wilshire Boulevard Los Angeles, CA 90017 213−386−3115 Fax: 213−380−4585 Email: pestuar@littlaw.com TERMINATED: 09/10/2013

William Charles Claiborne , III Law Office of William Claiborne 151 Uluniu Avenue Honolulu, HI 96815 202−824−0700 Email: claibornelaw@gmail.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Tory Dunlap Individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated

represented by Barrett S. Litt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charles B. Pekor , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Eliot DeWoskin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Patrick Claiborne (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/09/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY

Lynn E. Cunningham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/03/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

Paul J. Estuar (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2013

William Charles Claiborne , III (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Lee Antonio Smith Individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated

represented by Barrett S. Litt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:04-cv-1100 As of: 03/18/2016 03:02 PM EDT 3 of 41

Charles B. Pekor , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Eliot DeWoskin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Patrick Claiborne (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/09/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY

Lynn E. Cunningham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/03/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

Paul J. Estuar (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2013

William Charles Claiborne , III (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
David Evans Individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated

represented by Barrett S. Litt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charles B. Pekor , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Eliot DeWoskin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Patrick Claiborne (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/09/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY

Lynn E. Cunningham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/03/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

Paul J. Estuar (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2013

William Charles Claiborne , III (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

Case: 1:04-cv-1100 As of: 03/18/2016 03:02 PM EDT 4 of 41

Stanley Clemons, II

represented by Barrett S. Litt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charles B. Pekor , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Eliot DeWoskin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Patrick Claiborne (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/09/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY

Lynn E. Cunningham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/03/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

Paul J. Estuar (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2013

William Charles Claiborne , III (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Allen Middleton

represented by Barrett S. Litt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charles B. Pekor , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Eliot DeWoskin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Patrick Claiborne (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/09/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY

Lynn E. Cunningham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/03/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

Paul J. Estuar (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2013

Case: 1:04-cv-1100 As of: 03/18/2016 03:02 PM EDT 5 of 41

Plaintiff Anthony Westbrook
Plaintiff Benjamin Blake

William Charles Claiborne , III (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barrett S. Litt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Charles B. Pekor , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Eliot DeWoskin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Claiborne (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/09/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY
Lynn E. Cunningham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/03/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY
Paul J. Estuar (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2013
William Charles Claiborne , III (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barrett S. Litt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Charles B. Pekor , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Eliot DeWoskin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Claiborne (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/09/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY
Lynn E. Cunningham (See above for address)

Case: 1:04-cv-1100 As of: 03/18/2016 03:02 PM EDT 6 of 41

TERMINATED: 08/03/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

Paul J. Estuar (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2013

William Charles Claiborne , III (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Harry Witherspoon

represented by Barrett S. Litt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charles B. Pekor , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Eliot DeWoskin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Patrick Claiborne (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/09/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY

Lynn E. Cunningham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/03/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

Paul J. Estuar (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2013

William Charles Claiborne , III (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Antionne Wolf

represented by Barrett S. Litt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charles B. Pekor , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Eliot DeWoskin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Patrick Claiborne

Case: 1:04-cv-1100 As of: 03/18/2016 03:02 PM EDT 7 of 41

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/09/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY

Lynn E. Cunningham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/03/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

Paul J. Estuar (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2013

William Charles Claiborne , III (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Kristopher Alan Matkin Individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated

represented by Barrett S. Litt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charles B. Pekor , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Eliot DeWoskin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Patrick Claiborne (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/09/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY

Lynn E. Cunningham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/03/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

Paul J. Estuar (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2013

William Charles Claiborne , III (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
Sheriff Jacqueline Barrett Fulton County, State of Georgia

represented by Theodore Howard Lackland Lackland &Associates, LLC Suite C, Building 15 630 Village Trace, NE Marietta, GA 30067 404−522−8155 Fax: 404−522−7355 Email: tlackland@e−lacklaw.com

Case: 1:04-cv-1100 As of: 03/18/2016 03:02 PM EDT 8 of 41

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karen Eleice Woodward Cruser &Mitchell, LLP Suite 2000, Meridian II 275 Scientific Drive Norcross, GA 30092 404−881−2622 Fax: 404−881−2630 Email: kwoodward@cmlawfirm.com

Robert N. Godfrey City of Atlanta, Department of Law Suite 5000 55 Trinity Avenue SW Atlanta, GA 30303 404−546−4137 Fax: 404−494−1685 Email: rgodfrey@atlantaga.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shakara Monique Barnes Troutman Sanders, LLP−ATL Bank of America Plaza, Suite 5200 600 Peachtree Street, N.E. Atlanta, GA 30308−2216 404−885−3000 Email: shakara.barnes@troutmansanders.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sidney Leighton Moore The Summerville Firm, LLC 1201 Peachtree Street, NE Suite 2000 Atlanta, GA 30361 678−237−0330 Email: leighton@moorefirmpc.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William T. Mitchell Cruser &Mitchell, LLP Suite 2000, Meridian II 275 Scientific Drive Norcross, GA 30092 404−881−2622 Fax: 404−881−2630 Email: bmitchell@cmlawfirm.com

Willie Jake Lovett , Jr. Office of the Child Attorney Suite 4098 395 Pryor Street Atlanta, GA 30312 404−612−4407 Email: willie.lovett@fultoncountyga.gov

Defendant Sheriff Myron Freeman

represented by Theodore Howard Lackland (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karen Eleice Woodward

Case: 1:04-cv-1100 As of: 03/18/2016 03:02 PM EDT 9 of 41

(See above for address)

Overtis Hicks Brantley Office of Fulton County Attorney 141 Pryor Street, S.W. Suite 4038 Atlanta, GA 30303 404−730−7750 Email: ov.brantley@co.fulton.ga.us TERMINATED: 01/31/2008

William T. Mitchell (See above for address)

Willie Jake Lovett , Jr. (See above for address)

Defendant
Fulton County, State of Georgia TERMINATED: 03/27/2009

represented by John Howard Fleming Sutherland Asbill &Brennan, LLP−GA 999 Peachtree Street, N.E. Suite 2300 Atlanta, GA 30309−3996 404−853−8000 Email: john.fleming@sutherland.com TERMINATED: 03/31/2008 LEAD ATTORNEY

Julianne N. Belaga Sutherland Asbill &Brennan 999 Peachtree Street, N.E. Suite 2300 Atlanta, GA 30309−3996 404−853−8000 Email: julianne.belaga@sablaw.com TERMINATED: 03/15/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

Kimberly Williams D'Haene Sutherland Asbill &Brennan 999 Peachtree Street, N.E. Suite 2300 Atlanta, GA 30309−3996 404−853−8000 Email: kimberly.dhaene@sablaw.com TERMINATED: 11/30/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY

Richard Lance Robbins Robbins Ross Alloy Belinfante Littlefield, LLC −Atl Suite 1120 999 Peachtree Street, N.E. Atlanta, GA 30309 678−701−9381 Fax: 404−856−3250 Email: rrobbins@robbinsfirm.com TERMINATED: 11/30/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY

Sidney Leighton Moore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:04-cv-1100 As of: 03/18/2016 03:02 PM EDT 10 of 41

Defendant
Chairperson Karen Handel Fulton County Board of Commissioners TERMINATED: 03/27/2009

Teresa Wynn Roseborough Sutherland Asbill &Brennan, LLP−GA 999 Peachtree Street, N.E. Suite 2300 Atlanta, GA 30309−3996 404−853−8100 Email: teresa.roseborough@sablaw.com TERMINATED: 11/30/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY
Coy J. Johnson , Jr. Fulton County Office of the Child Attorney 395 Pryor Street, SW Suite 4068 Atlanta, GA 30312 404−612−4756 Email: coy.johnson@fultoncountyga.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jamala S. McFadden McFadden Davis, LLC Suite 200 1100 Peachtree Street NE Atlanta, GA 30309 678−424−1381 Email: jmcfadden@theemploymentlawsolution.com TERMINATED: 03/31/2008
Karen Eleice Woodward (See above for address)
William T. Mitchell (See above for address)
Willie Jake Lovett , Jr. (See above for address)
represented by John Howard Fleming (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/31/2008 LEAD ATTORNEY
Julianne N. Belaga (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/15/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY
Kimberly Williams D'Haene (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/30/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY
Richard Lance Robbins (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/30/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY
Sidney Leighton Moore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:04-cv-1100 As of: 03/18/2016 03:02 PM EDT 11 of 41

Teresa Wynn Roseborough (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/30/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY

Coy J. Johnson , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jamala S. McFadden (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/31/2008

Karen Eleice Woodward (See above for address)

William T. Mitchell (See above for address)

Willie Jake Lovett , Jr. (See above for address)

Defendant
Member Robb Pitts Fulton County Board of Commissioners TERMINATED: 03/27/2009

represented by John Howard Fleming (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/31/2008 LEAD ATTORNEY

Julianne N. Belaga (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/15/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

Kimberly Williams D'Haene (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/30/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY

Richard Lance Robbins (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/30/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY

Sidney Leighton Moore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Teresa Wynn Roseborough (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/30/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY

Coy J. Johnson , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jamala S. McFadden (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/31/2008

Karen Eleice Woodward (See above for address)

Case: 1:04-cv-1100 As of: 03/18/2016 03:02 PM EDT 12 of 41

William T. Mitchell (See above for address)

Willie Jake Lovett , Jr. (See above for address)

Defendant
Member Tom Lowe Fulton County Board of Commissioners TERMINATED: 03/27/2009

represented by John Howard Fleming (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/31/2008 LEAD ATTORNEY

Julianne N. Belaga (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/15/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

Kimberly Williams D'Haene (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/30/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY

Richard Lance Robbins (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/30/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY

Sidney Leighton Moore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Teresa Wynn Roseborough (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/30/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY

Coy J. Johnson , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jamala S. McFadden (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/31/2008

Karen Eleice Woodward (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William T. Mitchell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Willie Jake Lovett , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Member Emma I. Darnell Fulton County Board of Commissioners TERMINATED: 03/27/2009

represented by John Howard Fleming (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/31/2008 LEAD ATTORNEY

Julianne N. Belaga

Case: 1:04-cv-1100 As of: 03/18/2016 03:02 PM EDT 13 of 41

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/15/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

Kimberly Williams D'Haene (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/30/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY

Richard Lance Robbins (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/30/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY

Sidney Leighton Moore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Teresa Wynn Roseborough (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/30/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY

Coy J. Johnson , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jamala S. McFadden (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/31/2008

Karen Eleice Woodward (See above for address)

William T. Mitchell (See above for address)

Willie Jake Lovett , Jr. (See above for address)

Defendant
Member Nancy A. Boxill Fulton County Board of Commissioners TERMINATED: 03/27/2009

represented by John Howard Fleming (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/31/2008 LEAD ATTORNEY

Julianne N. Belaga (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/15/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

Kimberly Williams D'Haene (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/30/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY

Richard Lance Robbins (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/30/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY

Sidney Leighton Moore (See above for address)

Case: 1:04-cv-1100 As of: 03/18/2016 03:02 PM EDT 14 of 41

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Teresa Wynn Roseborough (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/30/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY

Coy J. Johnson , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jamala S. McFadden (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/31/2008

Karen Eleice Woodward (See above for address)

William T. Mitchell (See above for address)

Willie Jake Lovett , Jr. (See above for address)

Defendant
Member William Edwards Fulton County Board of Commissioners TERMINATED: 03/27/2009 also known as Bill Edwards TERMINATED: 03/27/2009

represented by John Howard Fleming (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/31/2008 LEAD ATTORNEY
Julianne N. Belaga (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/15/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

Kimberly Williams D'Haene (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/30/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY

Richard Lance Robbins (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/30/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY

Sidney Leighton Moore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Teresa Wynn Roseborough (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/30/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY

Coy J. Johnson , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jamala S. McFadden (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/31/2008

Case: 1:04-cv-1100 As of: 03/18/2016 03:02 PM EDT 15 of 41

Karen Eleice Woodward (See above for address)

William T. Mitchell (See above for address)

Willie Jake Lovett , Jr. (See above for address)

Defendant
City of Atlanta, State of Georgia TERMINATED: 03/27/2009

represented by Dennis McRay Young Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation−DC 550 17th Street, NW Room F−2026 Washington, DC 20429 404−330−6400 Email: deyoung@fdic.gov TERMINATED: 07/23/2010

Robert N. Godfrey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Tamara Nikki Baines City of Atlanta, Department of Law Suite 5000 55 Trinity Avenue SW Atlanta, GA 30303 404−546−4115 Fax: 404−546−8366 Email: tbaines@atlantaga.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 04/21/2004
04/23/2004 04/26/2004 05/20/2004 06/03/2004 07/01/2004 07/01/2004 07/01/2004
07/02/2004

# Docket Text
1 CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT filed and summons(es) issued. Consent form to proceed before U.S. magistrate and pretrial instructions given to attorney; jury demand FILING FEE $ 150.00 RECEIPT # 520815 (epm) (Entered: 04/21/2004)
3 Attorney appearance for plaintiffs by Charles B. Pekor Jr. (bsm) (Entered: 04/28/2004)
2 ORDER by Judge G. E. Tidwell, recusing Judge. Case reassigned to Judge J. O. Forrester (cc w/notice) (bsm) (Entered: 04/27/2004)
4 Application for admission of Lynn E. Cunningham pro hac vice for plaintiffs (to JOF) (adg) (Entered: 05/28/2004)
5 ORDER APRVD BY CRD GRANTING [4−1] pro hac vice application of Lynn E. Cunningham. (cc) (adg) (Entered: 06/03/2004)
6 Return of service executed 6/28/94 as to Jacqueline Barrett on original complaint (adg) (Entered: 07/02/2004)
7 Return of service executed 6/30/04 as to Jacqueline Barrett (adg) (Entered: 07/02/2004)
8 FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT by plaintiffs adding Fulton County, State of Georgia, Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill, William Edwards, and City of Atlanta, State of Georgia; jury demand. (adg) (Entered: 07/06/2004)
9 Summons issued for Fulton County, Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill, William Edwards, City of Atlanta, (adg) (Entered: 07/06/2004)

Case: 1:04-cv-1100 As of: 03/18/2016 03:02 PM EDT 16 of 41

07/06/2004 07/09/2004 07/13/2004 07/13/2004 07/19/2004 07/19/2004 07/20/2004 07/20/2004
07/21/2004 07/22/2004 08/09/2004 08/09/2004

10 Return of service executed 7/2/04 as to Fulton County, State, Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill, William Edwards, City of Atlanta, St on amended complaint (adg) (Entered: 07/08/2004)
11 NOTICE of Appearance by Kimberly Williams D'Haene, Julianne N. Belaga, Richard Lance Robbins, Teresa Wynn Roseborough and S. Leighton Moore on behalf of Nancy A. Boxill, Emma I. Darnell, William Edwards, Fulton County, State of Georgia, Karen Handel, Tom Lowe, Robb Pitts (adg) (Entered: 07/16/2004)
12 MOTION for Leave to File Answerby Jacqueline Barrett. (Attachments: # 1 Brief # 2 Certification of Theodore Lackland)(adg) (Entered: 07/17/2004)
13 ANSWER to Complaint and Amended Complaint, with Jury Demand by Jacqueline Barrett. Discovery ends on 12/10/2004.(adg) (Entered: 07/17/2004)
18 APPLICATION for Admission of Barrett S. Litt Pro Hac Vicefor Tory Dunlap, David Evans, C. Alan Powell, Lee Antonio Smith.Filing Fee received $150.00, Receipt #524760. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed order)(to JOF)(adg) (Entered: 08/04/2004)
19 APPLICATION for Admission of Paul J. Estuar Pro Hac Vicefor Tory Dunlap, David Evans, C. Alan Powell, Lee Antonio Smith.Filing Fee received $150.00, Receipt #524759. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed order) (to JOF)(adg) (Entered: 08/04/2004)
14 NOTICE of Appearance by William Charles Claiborne III on behalf of all plaintiffs (Claiborne, William) (Entered: 07/20/2004)
15 MOTION to Certify Class by C. Alan Powell. (Attachments: # 1 Brief # 2 certificates# 3 Exhibit List# 4 Exhibit # 5 Exhibit Ex 11# 6 Exhibit Ex 12# 7 Exhibit Ex 13# 8 Exhibit Ex 14# 9 Exhibit Ex 15# 10 Exhibit Ex 16# 11 Exhibit Ex 17# 12 Exhibit Ex 18# 13 Exhibit # 14 Exhibit # 15 Exhibit # 16 Exhibit Affidavit# 17 Exhibit Affidavit# 18 Exhibit Affidavit# 19 Exhibit Affidavit# 20 Exhibit Affidavit# 21 Exhibit Affidavit# 22 Exhibit Affidavit# 23 Exhibit Affidavit# 24 Exhibit Affidavit# 25 Exhibit Affidavit# 26 Exhibit Affidavit# 27 Exhibit Affidavit# 28 Exhibit Affidavit# 29 Exhibit Affidavit# 30 Exhibit Affidavit# 31 Exhibit Affidavit# 32 Exhibit Affidavit# 33 Exhibit Affidavit# 34 Exhibit Affidavit# 35 Exhibit Affidavit# 36 Exhibit Affidavit# 37 Exhibit Affidavit# 38 Exhibit Affidavit# 39 Exhibit Affidavit# 40 Exhibit Affidavit# 41 Exhibit Affidavit# 42 Exhibit Affidavit# 43 Exhibit Affidavit# 44 Exhibit Affidavit# 45 Exhibit Affidavit# 46 Exhibit Affidavit# 47 Exhibit Affidavit# 48 Exhibit Affidavit# 49 Exhibit Affidavit# 50 Exhibit Affidavit# 51 Exhibit Affidavit# 52 Exhibit Affidavit# 53 Exhibit Affidavit# 54 Exhibit Affidavit# 55 Exhibit Affidavit# 56 Exhibit Affidavit# 57 Exhibit Affidavit# 58 Exhibit Affidavit# 59 Exhibit Affidavit# 60 Exhibit Affidavit# 61 Exhibit Affidavit# 62 Exhibit Affidavit# 63 Exhibit Affidavit# 64 Exhibit Affidavit# 65 Exhibit # 66 Exhibit # 67 Exhibit # 68 Exhibit # 69 Exhibit # 70 Exhibit # 71 Exhibit # 72 Exhibit # 73 Exhibit # 74 Exhibit # 75 Exhibit # 76 Exhibit # 77 Exhibit # 78 Exhibit # 79 Exhibit # 80 Exhibit # 81 Exhibit # 82 Text of Proposed Order)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 07/20/2004)
16 MOTION to Amend First Amended Complaint by C. Alan Powell. (Attachments: # 1 # 2 Exhibit second amended complaint# 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 07/21/2004)
17 MOTION to Dismiss by Nancy A. Boxill, Emma I. Darnell, William Edwards, Fulton County, Karen Handel, Tom Lowe, Robb Pitts. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum of law in support)(adg) (Entered: 07/23/2004)
20 RESPONSE in Opposition filed by C. Alan Powell re 17 MOTION to Dismiss First Amended Complaint. (Attachments: # 1 Supplement certificates service &compliance# 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Claiborne, William) Modified on 9/7/2004 to correct text (mmc). (Entered: 08/09/2004)
22 MOTION for Extension of Time to file response to 15 MOTION to Certify Class, by Nancy A. Boxill, Emma I. Darnell, William Edwards, Fulton County, State of Georgia, Karen Handel, Tom Lowe, Robb Pitts. (adg) (Entered: 08/13/2004)

Case: 1:04-cv-1100 As of: 03/18/2016 03:02 PM EDT 17 of 41

08/11/2004 08/12/2004 08/12/2004 08/12/2004
08/12/2004
08/13/2004
08/18/2004 08/20/2004 08/20/2004 08/23/2004
08/23/2004 08/25/2004 08/26/2004 08/27/2004 08/30/2004 08/30/2004 09/03/2004 09/06/2004

21 MOTION to Dismiss with Brief In Support by City of Atlanta, State of Georgia. (Attachments: # 1)(Young, Dennis) (Entered: 08/11/2004)
MINUTE ORDER by CRD approving 18 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice of Barrett S. Litt on 8/12/04. (cc by CRD) (tcc) (Entered: 08/12/2004)
MINUTE ORDER by CRD approving 19 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice of Paul J. Estuar on 8/12/04. (cc by CRD) (tcc) (Entered: 08/12/2004)
23 CONSENT MOTION for Extension of Time thru 8/26/04 to respond to 16 motion to amend first Amended Complaint by Nancy A. Boxill, Emma I. Darnell, William Edwards, Fulton County, State of Georgia, Karen Handel, Tom Lowe, Robb Pitts. (Attachments: # 1 proposed consent order (incorrect case number))(adg) Modified on 8/23/2004 (adg). (Entered: 08/23/2004)
Notification of Docket Correction re 23 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 8 Amended Complaint. Entry was corrected to indicate that it was a motion to extend time to respond to 16 motion to amend 8 first amended complaint. (adg) (Entered: 08/23/2004)
24 CORRECTED CONSENT MOTION for Extension of Time thru 8/26/04 to respond to 16 motion to amend 8 first amended complaint, by Nancy A. Boxill, Emma I. Darnell, William Edwards, Fulton County, State of Georgia, Karen Handel, Tom Lowe, Robb Pitts. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed consent order)(adg) (Entered: 08/23/2004)
Submission of 12 MOTION for Leave to File Answer, 15 MOTION to Certify Class, 17 MOTION to Dismiss,submitted to District Judge J. Owen Forrester. (adg) (Entered: 08/18/2004)
26 Certificate of Interested Persons by Nancy A. Boxill, Emma I. Darnell, William Edwards, Karen Handel, Tom Lowe, Robb Pitts, Fulton County, State of Georgia. (adg) Modified on 8/26/2004 to add a filer (adg). (Entered: 08/26/2004)
27 MOTION to Stay Discoveryby Nancy A. Boxill, Emma I. Darnell, William Edwards, Fulton County, State of Georgia, Karen Handel, Tom Lowe, Robb Pitts. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum of Law in Support)(adg) (Entered: 08/26/2004)
Submission of 23 CONSENT MOTION for Extension of Time to respond to 16 motion to Amend and 24 CORRECTED CONSENT MOTION for Extension of Time to respond to 16 motion to amend 8 first amended complaint; submitted to District Judge J. Owen Forrester. (adg) (Entered: 08/23/2004)
25 REVISED CASE INSTRUCTIONS. (adg) (Entered: 08/24/2004)
29 REPLY BRIEF filed by Nancy A. Boxill, Emma I. Darnell, William Edwards, Fulton County, State of Georgia, Karen Handel, Tom Lowe, Robb Pitts re 17 MOTION to Dismiss. (adg) (Entered: 08/30/2004)
30 RESPONSE in Opposition filed by Nancy A. Boxill, Emma I. Darnell, William Edwards, Fulton County, State of Georgia, Karen Handel, Tom Lowe, Robb Pitts re 16 MOTION to Amend First Amended Complaint. (adg) (Entered: 08/30/2004)
28 NOTICE by Jacqueline Barrett Certificate of Interested Persons (Lackland, Theodore) (Entered: 08/27/2004)
Submission of 16 MOTION to Amend First Amended Complaint, 22 MOTION for Extension of Time to file response re: 15 MOTION to Certify Class, submitted to District Judge J. Owen Forrester. (adg) (Entered: 08/30/2004)
31 RESPONSE in Opposition filed by C. Alan Powell re 21 MOTION to Dismiss. (Attachments: # 1 Certificates Service−Compliance# 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 08/30/2004)
Submission of 21 MOTION to Dismiss, submitted to District Judge J. Owen Forrester. (adg) (Entered: 09/03/2004)
32 MOTION to Supplement Plaintiffs' opposition to counrty defendants' motion to dismiss with Brief In Support by C. Alan Powell. (Attachments: # 1 Brief supplemts plaintiffs opposition to the County defendants motion to dismiss# 2

Case: 1:04-cv-1100 As of: 03/18/2016 03:02 PM EDT 18 of 41

09/06/2004
09/06/2004 09/08/2004 09/08/2004 09/14/2004 09/16/2004 09/16/2004 09/16/2004 09/16/2004 09/20/2004
09/20/2004
09/20/2004 09/20/2004 09/20/2004 09/20/2004 09/21/2004
10/01/2004

certificates# 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 09/06/2004)
33 RESPONSE in Opposition filed by C. Alan Powell re 27 MOTION to Stay discovery by county defendants. (Attachments: # 1 certificates compliance−service# 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 09/06/2004)
34 MOTION for Discovery for entry of scheduling order with Brief In Support by C. Alan Powell. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Plaintiffs' Rule 16.2 Report# 2 certificates# 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 09/06/2004)
35 NOTICE by C. Alan Powell of interested persons (Attachments: # 1 certificates)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 09/08/2004)
36 CERTIFICATE of Counsel change in firm name by William Charles Claiborne III on behalf of C. Alan Powell (Attachments: # 1)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 09/08/2004)
37 Response to Initial Disclosures by Jacqueline Barrett.(Lackland, Theodore) (Entered: 09/14/2004)
38 Response to Initial Disclosures by C. Alan Powell. (Attachments: # 1 certificatesd)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 09/16/2004)
39 NOTICE by C. Alan Powell Certificate of Discovery (Attachments: # 1 certificates)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 09/16/2004)
40 REPLY BRIEF filed by C. Alan Powell re 16 MOTION to Amend First Amended Complaint. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Clemons Affidavit# 2 certificates)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 09/16/2004)
41 MOTION for Extension of Time File a reply re: 16 MOTION to Amend First Amended Complaint by C. Alan Powell. (Attachments: # 1 # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 09/16/2004)
42 AMENDED COMPLAINT Third amended complaint against all plaintiffs, filed by C. Alan Powell. (Attachments: # 1 Brief in support of motion# 2 Exhibit third amended complaint# 3 certificates# 4 Text of Proposed Order)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 09/21/2004)
43 RESPONSE to Motion filed by Nancy A. Boxill, Emma I. Darnell, William Edwards, Fulton County, State of Georgia, Karen Handel, Tom Lowe, Robb Pitts re 32 MOTION to Supplement Plaintiffs' opposition to county defendants' motion to dismiss. (adg) (Entered: 09/21/2004)
44 MOTION for Scheduling Conferenceby Nancy A. Boxill, Emma I. Darnell, William Edwards, Fulton County, State of Georgia, Karen Handel, Tom Lowe, Robb Pitts. (adg) (Entered: 09/21/2004)
RESPONSE filed by Nancy A. Boxill, Emma I. Darnell, William Edwards, Fulton County, State of Georgia, Karen Handel, Tom Lowe, Robb Pitts to 34 MOTION for Discovery. (filed in 44 motion) (adg) (Entered: 09/21/2004)
45 REPLY to Response to 27 MOTION to Stay filed by Nancy A. Boxill, Emma I. Darnell, William Edwards, Fulton County, State of Georgia, Karen Handel, Tom Lowe, Robb Pitts. (adg) (Entered: 09/21/2004)
75 MOTION to Amend Second Amended Complaintby plaintiffs. (see document 42 ) (adg) Additional attachment(s) added on 2/4/2005 (epm). (Entered: 10/08/2004)
Submission of 27 MOTION to Stay, 32 MOTION to Supplement Plaintiffs' opposition to counrty defendants' motion to dismiss, 34 MOTION for entry of scheduling order, submitted to District Judge J. Owen Forrester. (adg) (Entered: 09/21/2004)
46 MOTION for Protective Order with Memorandum of Law In Support by Nancy A. Boxill, Emma I. Darnell, William Edwards, Fulton County, State of Georgia, Karen Handel, Tom Lowe, Robb Pitts. (adg) (Entered: 10/05/2004)

Case: 1:04-cv-1100 As of: 03/18/2016 03:02 PM EDT 19 of 41

10/01/2004 10/01/2004 10/06/2004 10/08/2004 10/25/2004 10/29/2004 10/29/2004 11/12/2004 11/23/2004
11/23/2004 11/30/2004 11/30/2004 11/30/2004
12/02/2004 12/03/2004 12/03/2004

47 Petition for Leave of Absence from 11/5/2004 to 11/23/2004 by Charles B. Pekor Jr. (to JOF) (adg) (Entered: 10/05/2004)
48 Petition for Leave of Absence from 11/4/2004 to 11/9/2004 by Daniel Eliot DeWoskin. (to JOF) (adg) (Entered: 10/05/2004)
49 RESPONSE in Support re 42 MOTION to Amend Second Amended Complaint, filed by Nancy A. Boxill, Emma I. Darnell, William Edwards, Fulton County, State of Georgia, Karen Handel, Tom Lowe, Robb Pitts. (adg) . (Entered: 10/08/2004)
Submission of 41 MOTION for Extension of Time File a reply re: 16 MOTION to Amend First Amended Complaint, and 42 MOTION to Amend Second Amended Complaint, submitted to District Judge J. Owen Forrester. (adg) (Entered: 10/08/2004)
Submission of 46 MOTION for Protective Order, submitted to District Judge J. Owen Forrester. (adg) (Entered: 10/25/2004)
50 CERTIFICATE of Counsel Certificate of Service by Theodore Howard Lackland on behalf of Jacqueline Barrett (Lackland, Theodore) (Entered: 10/29/2004)
51 CERTIFICATE of Counsel Certificate of Service by Theodore Howard Lackland on behalf of Jacqueline Barrett (Lackland, Theodore) (Entered: 10/29/2004)
52 RESPONSE to Motion re MOTION to Amend Defendant Barrett's Response to Motion to Amend Second Amended Complaint filed by Jacqueline Barrett. (Lackland, Theodore) (Entered: 11/12/2004)
MINUTE ORDER by Judge J. Owen Forrester on 11/22/04 GRANTING 23 Extension of Time thru 8/26/04 to respond to 16 motion to amend 8 first amended complaint, by Nancy A. Boxill, Emma I. Darnell, William Edwards, Fulton County, State of Georgia, Karen Handel, Tom Lowe, Robb Pitts.,and GRANTING 24 CORRECTED CONSENT MOTION for Extension of Time thru 8/26/04 to respond to 16 motion to amend 8 first amended complaint, by Nancy A. Boxill, Emma I. Darnell, William Edwards, Fulton County, State of Georgia, Karen Handel, Tom Lowe, Robb Pitts. (tcc) (Entered: 11/23/2004)
53 REPLY to Response to Motion re MOTION to Amend Second Amended Complaint filed by Tory Dunlap. (Attachments: # 1 certificates)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 11/23/2004)
54 ORDER OF RECUSAL. Judge J. Owen Forrester recused. Case reassigned to Judge Horace T. Ward for all further proceedings. Signed by Judge J. Owen Forrester on 11/30/2004. (adg) (Entered: 11/30/2004)
55 NOTICE TO PARTIES re 54 Order of Recusal (adg) (Entered: 11/30/2004)
Submission of 12 MOTION for Leave to File Answer, 15 MOTION to Certify Class, 16 MOTION to Amend First Amended Complaint, 17 MOTION to Dismiss, 21 MOTION to Dismiss, 22 MOTION for Extension of Time to file response re: 15 MOTION to Certify Class, 27 MOTION to Stay, 32 MOTION to Supplement Plaintiffs' opposition to county defendants' motion to dismiss, 34 MOTION for Discovery for entry of scheduling order, 41 MOTION for Extension of Time File a reply re: 16 MOTION to Amend First Amended Complaint, MOTION to Amend, 44 MOTION for Hearing, 46 MOTION for Protective Order, submitted to District Judge Horace T. Ward. (adg) (Entered: 11/30/2004)
56 ORDER OF RECUSAL. Judge Horace T. Ward recused. Case reassigned to Judge Beverly B. Martin for all further proceedings Signed by Judge Horace T. Ward on 12/2/04. (bh) (Entered: 12/03/2004)
57 NOTICE to all counsel of disctrict judge reassignment re 56 Order (er) (Entered: 12/03/2004)
Submission of 12 MOTION for Leave to File Answer, 15 MOTION to Certify Class, 16 MOTION to Amend First Amended Complaint, 17 MOTION to Dismiss, 21 MOTION to Dismiss, 22 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response re: 15 MOTION to Certify Class, 27 MOTION to Stay, 32 MOTION to Supplement Plaintiffs' opposition to county defendants' motion to dismiss, 34 MOTION for

Case: 1:04-cv-1100 As of: 03/18/2016 03:02 PM EDT 20 of 41

12/03/2004 12/03/2004 12/05/2004 12/06/2004 12/06/2004 12/06/2004
12/06/2004 12/06/2004 12/06/2004 12/06/2004 12/07/2004 12/15/2004 01/13/2005
01/13/2005

discovery for entry of scheduling order, 41 MOTION for Extension of Time to File a Reply re: 16 MOTION to Amend First Amended Complaint, MOTION to Amend, 44 MOTION for Hearing 46 MOTION for Protective Order, submitted to District Judge Beverly B. Martin. (er) (Entered: 12/03/2004)
61 FULTON COUNTY DEFENDANTS'MOTION to Quash Subpoenas and Incorporated Memorandum of Law. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D)(epm) (Entered: 12/08/2004)
67 Motion for Leave of Absence from 12/23/2004 to 1/1/2005 by Charles B. Pekor Jr. with Proposed Order. (epm) (Entered: 12/09/2004)
58 RESPONSE in Opposition re 46 MOTION for Protective Order filed by C. Alan Powell. (Attachments: # 1 certificates# 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 12/05/2004)
59 ORDER OF RECUSAL. Judge Beverly B. Martin recused. Case reassigned to Judge Richard W. Story for all further proceedings Signed by Judge Beverly B. Martin on 12/03/2004. (pdw) (Entered: 12/06/2004)
60 NOTICE of case reassignment by courtroom deputy clerk to counsel, pursuant to 59 Order of Recusal (cc Honorable Richard W. Story) (pdw) (Entered: 12/06/2004)
Submission of 16 MOTION to Amend First Amended Complaint, 17 MOTION to Dismiss, 44 MOTION for Hearing, 32 MOTION to Supplement Plaintiffs' opposition to counrty defendants' motion to dismiss, 34 MOTION for Discovery for entry of scheduling order, 46 MOTION for Protective Order, 12 MOTION for Leave to File Answer, 21 MOTION to Dismiss, 22 MOTION for Extension of Time to file response re: 15 MOTION to Certify Class, 27 MOTION to Stay, 41 MOTION for Extension of Time File a reply re: 16 MOTION to Amend First Amended Complaint, 15 MOTION to Certify Class, submitted to District Judge Richard W. Story. (pdw) (Entered: 12/06/2004)
62 NOTICE Of Filing Subpoena to Sgt. Adrian Grooms filed by Tory Dunlap, David Evans, C. Alan Powell and Lee Antonio Smith. (epm) (Entered: 12/08/2004)
63 NOTICE Of Filing Subpoena for Sgt. Gates by Tory Dunlap, David Evans, C. Alan Powell and Lee Antonio Smith. (epm) (Entered: 12/08/2004)
64 NOTICE Of Filing Subpoena for Don Rock by Tory Dunlap, David Evans, C. Alan Powell and Lee Antonio Smith. (epm) (Entered: 12/08/2004)
65 NOTICE Of Filing Subpoena for Richard Hochendoner by Tory Dunlap, David Evans, C. Alan Powell and Lee Antonio Smith. (epm) (Entered: 12/08/2004)
66 ORDER STAYING all proceedings in this case, including performance in accordance with the subject subpoenas, until such time as the Court may consider the outstanding motions affecting discovery in this case. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 12/6/04. (epm) (Entered: 12/08/2004)
68 ORDER GRANTING 67 Leave of Absence for Charles B. Pekor, Jr., from 12/23/04 through 1/1/05. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 12/13/04. (epm) (Entered: 12/15/2004)
69 ORDER granting nunc pro tunc 12 Motion for Leave to File Answer, denying with the right to re−file 15 Motion to Certify Class, granting 16 Motion to Amend First Amended Complaint, denying 17 Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, denying 21 Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, denying as moot 22 Motion for Extension of Time to File a Response, granting nunc pro tunc 32 Motion to Supplement, granting nunc pro tunc 41 Motion for Extension of Time, and granting 42 Motion for Leave to Amend their Second Amended Complaint. With respect to the stay entered by the Court in its Dec. 7, 2004 Order 66 , that stay shall remain in effect pending the resolution of discovery issues at the status and scheduling conference. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 1/13/05. (epm) Modified to correct text on 1/19/2005 (epm). (Entered: 01/19/2005)
STATUS AND SCHEDULING CONFERENCE as to 34 MOTION for Entry of a Scheduling Order, 46 MOTION for Protective Order, 27 MOTION to Stay

Case: 1:04-cv-1100 As of: 03/18/2016 03:02 PM EDT 21 of 41

01/19/2005 01/27/2005 02/02/2005 02/02/2005 02/02/2005 02/04/2005 02/11/2005 02/11/2005
02/18/2005
02/25/2005 03/04/2005 03/07/2005
03/07/2005
03/14/2005 03/14/2005 03/14/2005

Discovery, 44 Request for Scheduling COnference and 61 MOTION to Quash Subpoenas. Status and Scheduling Conference set for 2/2/2005 10:30 AM in Courtroom 2105 before Judge Richard W. Story. (epm) (Entered: 01/19/2005)
Submission of 61 MOTION to Quash Subpoenas, submitted to District Judge Richard W. Story. (dfb) (Entered: 01/19/2005)
70 Consent MOTION to Continue Status and Scheduling Conference by C. Alan Powell. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order # 2 Certificates)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 01/27/2005)
71 ORDER granting 70 Consent Motion to Continue Status and Scheduling Conference from 2/2/05 to 2/10/05 . Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 2/1/05. (rag) (Entered: 02/02/2005)
72 AMENDED COMPLAINT Second Amended Complaint against all defendants, filed by C. Alan Powell.(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 02/02/2005)
73 AMENDED COMPLAINT Third Amended Complaint against all defendants, filed by C. Alan Powell.(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 02/02/2005)
74 STATUS REPORT Plaintiffs' statement of issues for status and scheduling conference by C. Alan Powell. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Plaintiffs' discovery plan# 2 Certificates)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 02/04/2005)
76 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Richard W. Story : Scheduling/Status Conference held on 2/10/2005. (Court Reporter Sharon Upchurch.)(rag) (Entered: 02/11/2005)
Steno Notes of proceedings held on 2/10/05 as to Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill, William Edwards, City of Atlanta, State of Georgia, Jacqueline Barrett, Fulton County, State of Georgia, Karen Handel, Robb Pitts and Tom Lowe before Judge Richard W. Story; by Court Reporter, Sharon D. Upchurch (epm) (Entered: 02/14/2005)
77 MOTION for Order Certifying Interlocutory Appeal with Brief In Support by Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill, William Edwards, Fulton County, State of Georgia, Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe. (Attachments: # 1 Order of January 13, 2005.)(Moore, Sidney) (Entered: 02/18/2005)
78 AMENDED COMPLAINT Fourth against all defendants, filed by C. Alan Powell. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Fourth Amended Complaint redlined to show changes from Third Amended Complaint)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 02/25/2005)
79 PROPOSED ORDER re: 76 Scheduling Conference. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order # 2 Certificates)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 03/04/2005)
80 SCHEDULING ORDER: Defendant shall answer 4th Amended Complaint by 3/30/05; Discovery shall commence on 3/30/05; Discovery ends on 7/28/2005; Defendant shall file any new Motions to stay discovery by 4/6/05; Discovery Status Conference shall be conducted on or about 6/24/05. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 3/7/05. (epm) (Entered: 03/08/2005)
81 TRANSCRIPT of Status Conference held on 2/10/05 before Judge Richard W. Story. Court Reporter: Sharon D. Upchurch. (epm) (Additional attachment(s) added on 4/20/2012: # 1 Status Conference Hearing Proceedings) (kac). (Entered: 03/09/2005)
82 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by Myron Freeman. Myron Freeman waiver mailed on 3/11/2005, answer due 5/10/2005. (Lackland, Theodore) (Entered: 03/14/2005)
Submission of 77 MOTION for Order Certifying Interlocutory Appeal, submitted to District Judge Richard W. Story. (epm) (Entered: 03/14/2005)
83 Consent MOTION to Defer Ruling re: 77 MOTION for Order Certifying Interlocutory Appealby Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill, William Edwards, Fulton County, State of Georgia, Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe. (Moore, Sidney) (Entered: 03/14/2005)

Case: 1:04-cv-1100 As of: 03/18/2016 03:02 PM EDT 22 of 41

03/15/2005
03/18/2005 03/25/2005 03/30/2005 03/30/2005
04/01/2005 04/04/2005 04/05/2005 04/06/2005 04/06/2005 04/08/2005 04/08/2005 04/11/2005 04/11/2005 04/12/2005 04/13/2005

84 Notice of Withdrawal of Julianne N. Belaga as Co−Counsel. Teresa Wynn Roseborough for Fulton County, State of Georgia; Richard Lance Robbins for Fulton County, State of Georgia; Sidney Leighton Moore for Fulton County, State of Georgia; and Kimberly Williams D'Haene for Fulton County, State of Georgia replacing attorney Julianne N. Belaga. (epm) (Entered: 03/17/2005)
85 MOTION to Dismiss by Defendants Barrett and Freeman with Brief In Support by Jacqueline Barrett. (Attachments: # 1 Brief Defendants' Memorandum of Law)(Lackland, Theodore) (Entered: 03/18/2005)
86 ORDER granting 83 Motion to Defer Ruling on 77 Motion for Certification of Order for Interlocutory Appeal. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 3/25/2005. (sjk) (Entered: 03/25/2005)
87 Second MOTION to Dismiss with Brief In Support by City of Atlanta, State of Georgia. (Attachments: # 1 # 2 Brief)(Young, Dennis) (Entered: 03/30/2005)
88 MOTION to Dismiss Fourth Amended Complaint with Brief In Support by Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill, William Edwards, Fulton County, State of Georgia, Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe. (Attachments: # 1 Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss Fourth Amended Complaint)(Moore, Sidney) (Entered: 03/30/2005)
89 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time File Response re: 85 MOTION to Dismiss by Defendants Barrett and Freeman by C. Alan Powell. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit certificates# 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 04/01/2005)
90 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by C. Alan Powell. (Attachments: # 1 certificates# 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 04/04/2005)
91 RESPONSE in Opposition re 85 MOTION to Dismiss by Defendants Barrett and Freeman filed by C. Alan Powell. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix chart# 2 certificates# 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 04/05/2005)
92 MOTION to Stay Discovery with Brief In Support by Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill, William Edwards, Fulton County, State of Georgia, Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe. (Attachments: # 1 Brief in Support of Motion)(Moore, Sidney) (Entered: 04/06/2005)
93 MOTION to Stay by Defendants Barrett and Freeman with Brief In Support by Jacqueline Barrett. (Attachments: # 1 Brief Memorandum of Law)(Lackland, Theodore) (Entered: 04/06/2005)
94 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time re: 88 MOTION to Dismiss Fourth Amended Complaint by C. Alan Powell. (Attachments: # 1 certificates# 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 04/08/2005)
95 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time by C. Alan Powell. (Attachments: # 1 certificates# 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 04/08/2005)
97 ORDER GRANTING 90 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Plaintiffs may file 10 excess pages. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 4/11/2005. (sjk) (Entered: 04/12/2005)
98 NOTICE of Change of Address for Paul J. Estuar and Barrett S. Litt, counsel for C. Alan Powell, Tory Dunlap, Lee Antonio Smith and David Evans. (sjk) (Entered: 04/14/2005)
96 REPLY BRIEF re 94 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time re: 88 MOTION to Dismiss Fourth Amended Complaint Reply to Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants Barrett and Freeman's Motion to Dismiss Fourth Amended Complaint filed by Myron Freeman, Jacqueline Barrett. (Lackland, Theodore) (Entered: 04/12/2005)
99 ORDER GRANTING 94 Consent Motion for Extension of Time, through and including 4/29/2005, and Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. The Plaintiffs may file 10 excess pages in their opposition. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 4/13/2005. (sjk) (Entered: 04/14/2005)

Case: 1:04-cv-1100 As of: 03/18/2016 03:02 PM EDT 23 of 41

04/27/2005
04/27/2005
04/27/2005 04/28/2005 04/28/2005
04/28/2005 04/28/2005 04/29/2005 04/29/2005 04/29/2005 05/04/2005
05/05/2005 05/06/2005 05/06/2005 05/10/2005
05/10/2005

Submission of 95 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time, 85 MOTION to Dismiss by Defendants Barrett and Freeman, 92 MOTION to Stay Discovery and 93 MOTION to Stay by Defendants Barrett and Freeman to District Judge Richard W. Story. (sjk) (Entered: 04/27/2005)
100 Second MOTION for Extension of Time File Response to City of Atlanta's Motion to Dismiss Fourth Amended Complaint with Brief In Support by C. Alan Powell. (Attachments: # 1 # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 04/27/2005)
101 Second MOTION for Extension of Time n to file opposition to County Defendants motion to dismiss Fourth Amended Complaint by C. Alan Powell. (Attachments: # 1 # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 04/27/2005)
102 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time File Response to sheriffs' motion to stay discovery by C. Alan Powell. (Attachments: # 1 # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 04/28/2005)
103 RESPONSE in Opposition re 93 MOTION to Stay by Defendants Barrett and Freeman filed by C. Alan Powell. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Queener detention documents# 2 Affidavit Powell affidavit Ex 97# 3 certificates# 4 Text of Proposed Order)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 04/28/2005)
104 RESPONSE in Opposition re 92 MOTION to Stay Discovery filed by C. Alan Powell. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Powell affidavit# 2 certificates compliance# 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 04/28/2005)
105 MOTION for Extension of Time File Response to county defendants' motion to stay discovery by C. Alan Powell. (Attachments: # 1 certificates compliance# 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 04/28/2005)
106 ORDER GRANTING 102 Consent Motion for Extension of Time nunc pro tunc to 4/28/2005. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 4/29/2005. (sjk) (Entered: 05/02/2005)
107 ORDER GRANTING 105 Second Consent Motion for Extension of Time to 5/6/2005. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 4/29/2005. (sjk) (Entered: 05/02/2005)
108 ORDER GRANTING 100 Motion for Extension of Time to 5/6/2005. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 4/29/2005. (sjk) (Entered: 05/02/2005)
Submission of 87 Second MOTION to Dismiss and 89 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time File Response re: 85 MOTION to Dismiss by Defendants Barrett and Freeman to District Judge Richard W. Story. (sjk) (Entered: 05/04/2005)
Submission of 88 MOTION to Dismiss Fourth Amended Complaint to District Judge Richard W. Story. (sjk) (Entered: 05/05/2005)
109 RESPONSE in Opposition re 88 MOTION to Dismiss Fourth Amended Complaint filed by C. Alan Powell. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Blake's booking report# 2 certificates# 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 05/06/2005)
110 RESPONSE in Opposition re 87 Second MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Fourth Amended Complaint filed by C. Alan Powell. (Attachments: # 1 certificates# 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 05/06/2005)
111 REPLY to Response to Motion re 102 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time File Response to sheriffs' motion to stay discovery Sheriffs' Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant Sheriffs' MOtion to Stay Discovery filed by Myron Freeman. (Attachments: # 1 # 2)(Lackland, Theodore) (Entered: 05/10/2005)
112 Consent MOTION to Supplement plaintiffs' opposition to sheriffs' motion to dismiss Fourth Amended Complaint with Brief In Support by C. Alan Powell. (Attachments: # 1 Supplement # 2 certificates# 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 05/10/2005)

Case: 1:04-cv-1100 As of: 03/18/2016 03:02 PM EDT 24 of 41

05/11/2005 05/16/2005 05/17/2005 05/18/2005 05/25/2005 05/26/2005 06/01/2005 06/01/2005 06/01/2005 07/05/2005
07/20/2005 07/25/2005

113 MOTION judicial notice of facts by C. Alan Powell. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Blake booking sheet# 2 Exhibit City of Atlanta website# 3 certicates# 4 Text of Proposed Order)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 05/11/2005)
114 ORDER GRANTING 112 Consent Motion for Plaintiffs to File Supplement to Opposition to Motion to Dismiss filed by Sheriffs. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 5/16/2005. (sjk) (Entered: 05/17/2005)
115 REPLY to Response to Motion re 92 MOTION to Stay Discovery filed by Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill, William Edwards, Fulton County, State of Georgia, Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe. (Moore, Sidney) (Entered: 05/17/2005)
116 REPLY to Response to Motion re 93 MOTION to Stay by Defendants Barrett and Freeman filed by Jacquelyn Barrett and Myron Freeman filed by Jacqueline Barrett. (Lackland, Theodore) (Entered: 05/18/2005)
117 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time File Reply re: 109 Response in Opposition to Motion by Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill, William Edwards, Fulton County, State of Georgia, Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe. (Moore, Sidney) (Entered: 05/25/2005)
118 ORDER GRANTING 117 Consent Motion for Extension of Time up to and including 6/1/2005. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 5/26/2005. (sjk) (Entered: 05/27/2005)
Submission of 113 MOTION judicial notice of facts, 92 MOTION to Stay Discovery, and 93 MOTION to Stay by Defendants Barrett and Freeman to District Judge Richard W. Story. (sjk) (Entered: 06/01/2005)
119 REPLY BRIEF re 88 MOTION to Dismiss Fourth Amended Complaint filed by Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill, William Edwards, Fulton County, State of Georgia, Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe. (Moore, Sidney) Modified on 6/1/2005 to correct filer information (adg). (Entered: 06/01/2005)
Notification of Docket Correction re 119 Reply Brief. Modified to correct filer information, David Evans removed as a filing party for document. (adg) (Entered: 06/01/2005)
120 ORDER GRANTING, nunc pro tunc, 89 Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to 77 MOTION for Order Certifying Interlocutory Appeal, 95 Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to City of Atlanta's Motion to Dismiss, and 101 Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to County Defendants' Motion to Dismiss; GRANTING 113 Motion for Judicial Notice as unopposed; GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART Defendants Barrett and Freeman's 85 Motion to Dismiss Counts in the Fourth Amended Complaint and the County Defendants' 88 Motion to Dismiss; DENYING Defendant City of Atlanta's 87 Motion to Dismiss the Fourth Amended Complaint; and DENYING AS MOOT the County Defendants' 92 Motion to Stay Discovery and Defendants Barrett and Freeman's 93 Motion to Stay Discovery. The Court reserves ruling on the County Defendants' 77 Motion for Certification of Order for Interlocutory Appeal. The County Defendants will have 30 days from the date appearing on this Order within which to either amend their pending Motion for Certification or to inform the Court that they will not be filing an amendment. Plaintiffs will have 30 days thereafter within which to file a response to the Motion. Defendants' reply brief will be due 15 days after Plaintiffs file their response. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 7/5/2005. (sjk) (Entered: 07/06/2005)
121 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE First Interrogatories and First Request for Documents to Plaintiffs by Myron Freeman.(Lackland, Theodore) Modified on 7/21/2005 to add filer and to correct docket text accordingly (sjk). (Entered: 07/20/2005)
122 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE re 121 Certificate of Service of Withdrawal of Interrogatories by Myron Freeman, Jacqueline Barrett. Related document: 121 Certificate of Service filed by Myron Freeman,, Jacqueline Barrett,.(Lackland, Theodore) (Entered: 07/25/2005)

Case: 1:04-cv-1100 As of: 03/18/2016 03:02 PM EDT 25 of 41

07/25/2005 07/25/2005 07/25/2005 07/28/2005
08/01/2005 08/01/2005 08/03/2005 08/04/2005
08/08/2005 08/09/2005 08/10/2005 08/10/2005 08/10/2005 08/10/2005 08/10/2005 08/10/2005

123 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE re 122 Certificate of Service of Withdrawal of Request to Produce Documents by Myron Freeman, Jacqueline Barrett. Related document: 122 Certificate of Service filed by Myron Freeman,, Jacqueline Barrett,.(Lackland, Theodore) (Entered: 07/25/2005)
124 MOTION for Extension of Time Answer Fourth Amended Complaint by Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill, William Edwards, Fulton County, State of Georgia, Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe. (Moore, Sidney) (Entered: 07/25/2005)
125 MOTION for Stay by Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill, William Edwards, Fulton County, State of Georgia, Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe. (Attachments: # 1 Brief in Support of Motion)(Moore, Sidney) Modified on 7/26/2005 to correct docket text (sjk). (Entered: 07/25/2005)
126 ORDER GRANTING 124 Motion for Extension of Time. The Fulton County Defendants shall have until 30 days after this Court's ruling on their Motion for Interlocutory Review or until 30 days after the Court of Appeals rules on an appeal, whichever comes latest, to answer Plaintiffs' Fourth Amended Complaint. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 7/27/2005. (sjk) (Entered: 07/29/2005)
127 MOTION to Withdraw Lynn E. Cunningham as Attorneyby C. Alan Powell. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Certificate of Service# 2 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order)(Cunningham, Lynn) (Entered: 08/01/2005)
128 RESPONSE in Opposition re 125 MOTION for Stay filed by C. Alan Powell. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit transcript pages# 2 # 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 08/01/2005)
129 ORDER GRANTING 127 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Lynn E. Cunningham terminated. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 8/3/2005. (sjk) (Entered: 08/04/2005)
130 Amended MOTION for Leave to Appeal re: 120 Order on Motion to Dismiss, Order on Motion for Extension of Time, Order on Motion to Stay, Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief, 69 Order on Motion for Leave to File, Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion to Amend, Order on Motion to Dismiss, Order on Motion for Extension of Time, Order on Motion to Supplement, by Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill, William Edwards, City of Atlanta, State of Georgia, Fulton County, State of Georgia, Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe. (Attachments: # 1 Brief in Support of Motion)(Moore, Sidney) Modified on 8/5/2005 to correct docket text (sjk). (Entered: 08/04/2005)
131 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE of Amended Responses to Plaintiffs' First Set of Document Requests by Myron Freeman, Jacqueline Barrett.(Lackland, Theodore) (Entered: 08/08/2005)
132 MOTION to Quash Subpoenas with Brief In Support by Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill, William Edwards, Fulton County, State of Georgia, Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe. (Moore, Sidney) (Entered: 08/09/2005)
133 ANSWER to Amended Complaint by Myron Freeman, Jacqueline Barrett.(Lackland, Theodore) Please visit our website at http://www.gand.uscourts.gov to obtain Pretrial Instructions. (Entered: 08/10/2005)
134 RESPONSE in Opposition re 132 MOTION to Quash Subpoenas filed by C. Alan Powell. (Attachments: # 1 certificates# 2 Exhibit relevant transcript pages# 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 08/10/2005)
135 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE of Objection of Richard Hochendoner to Plaintiffs' Subpoena by Richard Hochendoner.(Moore, Sidney) (Entered: 08/10/2005)
136 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE of Objection of Sergeant Adrienne Grooms to Plaintiffs' Subpoena by Adrienne Grooms.(Moore, Sidney) (Entered: 08/10/2005)
137 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE of Objection of Sergeant James Gates to Plaintiffs' Subpoena by James Gates, James Gates.(Moore, Sidney) (Entered: 08/10/2005)
138 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE of Objections of Donald Roch to Plaintiffs' Subpoena by Donald Roch.(Moore, Sidney) (Entered: 08/10/2005)

Case: 1:04-cv-1100 As of: 03/18/2016 03:02 PM EDT 26 of 41

08/11/2005 08/11/2005 08/15/2005 08/15/2005
09/06/2005 10/27/2005 10/27/2005 10/27/2005 12/09/2005 12/14/2005 12/15/2005 12/19/2005
12/19/2005
12/19/2005 12/20/2005

139 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE filed by C. Alan Powell deposition and duces tecum subpoenas (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit executed returns of service)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 08/11/2005)
140 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Richard W. Story : Telephone Conference held on 8/11/2005. (Court Reporter Sharon Upchurch.)(rag) (Entered: 08/11/2005)
141 MOTION to Dismiss 72 Second Amended Complaint by Myron Freeman, Jacqueline Barrett. (Attachments: # 1 Brief # 2 Affidavit Roland Lane, Jr.)(Lackland, Theodore) Modified on 8/17/2005 to create link to second amended complaint and to correct docket text (sjk). (Entered: 08/15/2005)
142 ORDER GRANTING 77 Motion for Certification of Order for Interlocutory Appeal, GRANTING 125 Motion to Stay Discovery, GRANTING 130 Amended Consent Motion to Certify Orders for Interlocutory Appeal, and GRANTING 132 Motion to Quash Subpoenas. Further, the Court STAYS this action pending resolution of the appeal. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 8/15/2005. (sjk) (Entered: 08/17/2005)
Submission of 141 MOTION to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint to District Judge Richard W. Story. (sjk) (Entered: 09/06/2005)
143 Document Filed in Error Leave of Absence for the following date(s): 11/16, 11/17, 11/18, 11/19, 11/20, 11/21, by Charles B. Pekor, Jr. (Pekor, Charles) Modified on 10/28/2005. Counsel notified to file document in correct case (djh). (Entered: 10/27/2005)
144 MOTION for Leave to File Motion to Strike Previous Motion for Leave of Absenceby C. Alan Powell. (Pekor, Charles) (Entered: 10/27/2005)
145 for Leave of Absence for the following date(s): 11/16, 11/17, 11/18, 11/19, 11/20, 11/21, by Charles B. Pekor, Jr. (Pekor, Charles) (Entered: 10/27/2005)
146 ORDER of USCA − 11th Circuit GRANTING Petitioner's Petition for Permission to Appeal. USCA Case No. 05−90031−E. (kac) (Entered: 12/14/2005)
Appeal filing fees $255.00 received; Receipt Number 545275. USCA Case No. 05−90031−E (kac) (Entered: 12/15/2005)
147 Forwarded certified copy of docket sheets reflecting payment of appeal filing and docketing fees to USCA regarding Appeal Case Number 05−90031−E. (kac) (Entered: 12/15/2005)
148 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 120 Order on Motion to Dismiss, Order on Motion for Extension of Time, Order on Motion to Stay, Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief and 69 Order on Motion for Leave to File, Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion to Amend, Order on Motion to Dismiss, Order on Motion for Extension of Time, Order on Motion to Supplement by Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill, William Edwards, Fulton County, State of Georgia, Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe. Transcript Order Form due on 1/4/2006 (kac) (Entered: 12/29/2005)
149 NOTICE OF CROSS APPEAL as to 120 Order on Motion to Dismiss, Order on Motion for Extension of Time, Order on Motion to Stay, Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief and 69 Order on Motion for Leave to File, Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion to Amend, Order on Motion to Dismiss, Order on Motion for Extension of Time, Order on Motion to Supplement by C. Alan Powell, Tory Dunlap, Lee Antonio Smith, David Evans. Transcript Order Form due on 1/4/2006 (kac) (Entered: 12/29/2005)
150 TRANSCRIPT ORDER FORM re: 149 Notice of Cross Appeal. USCA Appeal Number 05−16734−I Certificate of Readiness due on 1/4/2006 (No transcript is required for appeal purposes.)(kac) (Entered: 12/29/2005)
151 USCA Acknowledgment of certified docket sheets reflecting payment of appeal filing and docketing fees re: 149 Notice of Cross Appeal filed by C. Alan Powell, Tory Dunlap, Lee Antonio Smith and David Evans. Case Appealed to USCA − 11th Circuit. Case Number 05−16734−I. (kac) (Entered: 12/29/2005)

Case: 1:04-cv-1100 As of: 03/18/2016 03:02 PM EDT 27 of 41

12/23/2005 12/28/2005 12/28/2005 12/29/2005 01/03/2006 01/05/2006 01/06/2006
01/10/2006 01/17/2006
01/17/2006 01/18/2006 01/19/2006
03/07/2006 03/30/2006

154 Appeal Notice sent to Daniel Eliot DeWoskin regarding Civil Appeal Statement received on December 21, 2005 by USCA re: 149 Notice of Cross Appeal. Case Appealed to USCA − 11th Circuit. Case Number 05−16734−I. (kac) (Entered: 12/29/2005)
152 TRANSCRIPT ORDER FORM re: 148 Notice of Appeal. USCA Appeal Number 05−16734−I Certificate of Readiness due on 1/12/2006 (No transcript is required for appeal purposes.)(kac) (Entered: 12/29/2005)
153 USCA Appeal Fees received $255.00; Receipt number 545686 re: 148 Notice of Appeal filed by Karen Handel, Fulton County, State of Georgia, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill and William Edwards. Case Appealed to USCA − 11th Circuit. Case Number 05−16734−I. (kac) (Entered: 12/29/2005)
155 Forwarded certified docket sheets reflecting payment of appeal filing and docketing fees to USCA re: 148 Notice of Appeal filed by Karen Handel, Fulton County, State of Georgia, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill and William Edwards. Case Appealed to USCA − 11th Circuit. Case Number 05−16734−I. (kac) (Entered: 12/29/2005)
156 Transmission of certified copies of Notice of Appeal, Notice of Cross Appeal and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals re: 148 Notice of Appeal and 149 Notice of Cross Appeal. (kac) (Entered: 01/03/2006)
157 USCA Acknowledgment of certified docket sheets reflecting payment of appeal filing and docketing fees re: 148 Notice of Appeal filed by Karen Handel, Fulton County, State of Georgia, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill and William Edwards. Case Appealed to USCA − 11th Circuit. Case Number 05−16734−I. (kac) (Entered: 01/06/2006)
158 USCA Acknowledgment of certified docket sheets reflecting payment of appeal filing and docketing fees re: 148 Notice of Appeal, filed by Karen Handel, Fulton County, State of Georgia, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill, William Edwards and 149 Notice of Cross Appeal filed by C. Alan Powell, Tory Dunlap, Lee Antonio Smith, David Evans. Case Appealed to USCA − 11th Circuit. Case Number 05−16734−I. (kac) (Entered: 01/09/2006)
159 for Leave of Absence for the following date(s): 02/02/2005 02/07/2005, by Charles B. Pekor, Jr. (Pekor, Charles) (Entered: 01/10/2006)
CERTIFICATE OF READINESS of Appeal Record re: 148 Notice of Appeal filed by Karen Handel, Fulton County, State of Georgia, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill, William Edwards and 149 Notice of Cross Appeal filed by C. Alan Powell, Tory Dunlap, Lee Antonio Smith, David Evans. USCA Case Number 05−16734−II. (9 Vols. of Pldgs and 1 Transcript) (kac) (Entered: 01/17/2006)
160 Certified copy of CERTIFICATE OF READINESS transmitted to USCA re: 148 Notice of Appeal and 149 Notice of Cross Appeal. Case Appealed to USCA − 11th Circuit. Case Number 05−16734−II (9 Vols. of Pldgs and 1 Transcript) (kac) (Entered: 01/17/2006)
161 for Leave of Absence for the following date(s): 02/15/2006, 02/20/2006, by Charles B. Pekor, Jr. (Pekor, Charles) (Entered: 01/18/2006)
162 USCA Acknowledgment of COR re: 148 Notice of Appeal filed by Karen Handel, Fulton County, State of Georgia, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill, William Edwards and 149 Notice of Cross Appeal filed by C. Alan Powell, Tory Dunlap, Lee Antonio Smith, David Evans. Case Appealed to USCA − 11th Circuit. Case Number 05−16734−II. (9 Vols. of Pldgs and 1 Transcript) (kac) (Entered: 01/20/2006)
163 ORDER DENYING, with the right to re−file, 141 Motion to Dismiss by Myron Freeman and Jacqueline Barrett. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 3/7/2006. (sjk) (Entered: 03/07/2006)
164 FORTHWITH LETTER from USCA re: 148 Notice of Appeal filed by Karen Handel, Fulton County, State of Georgia, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell,

Case: 1:04-cv-1100 As of: 03/18/2016 03:02 PM EDT 28 of 41

03/31/2006 04/05/2006
04/24/2006 05/30/2006 11/27/2006 11/28/2006 11/28/2006 11/30/2006 12/14/2006 12/15/2006 12/19/2006 04/03/2007 04/09/2007 01/30/2008

Nancy A. Boxill, William Edwards and 149 Notice of Cross Appeal filed by C. Alan Powell, Tory Dunlap, Lee Antonio Smith, David Evans. Case Appealed to USCA − 11th Circuit. Case Number 05−16734−II. Appeal Record due by 4/10/2006. (kac) (Entered: 03/30/2006)
165 Certified and Transmitted Record on Appeal to US Court of Appeals re: 148 Notice of Appeal and 149 Notice of Cross Appeal. Case Appealed to USCA − 11th Circuit. USCA Case Number 05−16734−II. (9 Vols. of Pldgs and 1 Transcript) (kac) (Entered: 03/31/2006)
166 NOTICE of Docketing Record on Appeal from USCA re: 148 Notice of Appeal filed by Karen Handel, Fulton County, State of Georgia, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe, Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill and William Edwards and 149 Notice of Cross Appeal filed by C. Alan Powell, Tory Dunlap, Lee Antonio Smith and David Evans. Case Appealed to USCA − 11th Circuit. Case Number 05−16737−II. (9 Vols. of Pldgs and 1 Transcript) (kac) (Entered: 04/06/2006)
167 TRANSCRIPT of Telephone Conference held on 8/11/2005 before Judge Richard W. Story. Court Reporter: Sharon D. Upchurch. (sjk) (Additional attachment(s) added on 4/20/2012: # 1 Telephone Conference Hearing Proceedings) (kac). (Entered: 04/25/2006)
168 Notice for Leave of Absence for the following date(s): 07/21/06−08/02/06,08/21/06−08/29/06, by Charles B. Pekor, Jr. (Pekor, Charles) (Entered: 05/30/2006)
169 NOTICE of Appearance by Coy J. Johnson, Jr on behalf of Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill, William Edwards, Fulton County, State of Georgia, Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe (Johnson, Coy) (Entered: 11/27/2006)
NOTICE of Undeliverable Electronic Mail re: 169 Notice of Appearance. Mail returned for Kimberly Williams D'Haene due to no longer being employed with the firm. (aar) (Entered: 11/28/2006)
NOTICE of Undeliverable Electronic Mail re: 169 Notice of Appearance. Mail returned for Teresa Wynn Roseborough due to no longer being employed with the firm. (aar) (Entered: 11/28/2006)
170 Certification of Consent to Substitution of Counsel. Jamala S. McFadden replacing attorney Teresa Wynn Roseborough; Kimberly Williams D'Haene and Richard Lance Robbins. (McFadden, Jamala) (Entered: 11/30/2006)
171 NOTICE of Appearance by John Howard Fleming on behalf of Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill, William Edwards, Jacqueline Barrett, Fulton County, State of Georgia, Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe (Fleming, John) (Entered: 12/14/2006)
172 NOTICE by C. Alan Powell of Name Change (Claiborne, William) Modified on 12/18/2006 to correct useage of all capitals in docket text (sjk). (Entered: 12/15/2006)
Notification of Docket Correction re 170 Notice of Substitution of Counsel. Jamala McFadden has been terminated as counsel of record for Jacqueline Barrett. Attorney John Fleming was never added as counsel for this defendant. (sjk) (Entered: 12/19/2006)
173 MOTION to Withdraw James Patrick Claiborne as Attorneyby C. Alan Powell. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Notification/Certificate# 2 Exhibit Certification Under L.R.7.1D# 3 Exhibit Order)(Claiborne, James) (Entered: 04/03/2007)
174 ORDER GRANTING 173 Motion of Attorney J. Patrick Claiborne to Withdraw as Counsel for Plaintiffs. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 4/9/07. (dfb) (Entered: 04/09/2007)
175 MOTION to Withdraw Overtis Hicks Brantley as Attorneyby Myron Freeman. (Brantley, Overtis) (Entered: 01/30/2008)

Case: 1:04-cv-1100 As of: 03/18/2016 03:02 PM EDT 29 of 41

01/31/2008 02/04/2008
03/28/2008
03/28/2008
03/31/2008 03/31/2008 02/19/2009 02/19/2009 02/20/2009 02/24/2009 02/24/2009 03/11/2009 03/23/2009 03/23/2009 03/26/2009

176 ORDER GRANTING 175 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Overtis Hicks Brantley terminated. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 1/31/2008. (sjk) (Entered: 01/31/2008)
177 Certified copy of ORDER of USCA re: 148 , 149 Notices of Appeal. This case shall be reheard by the Court en banc. The previous panel's opinion is hereby VACATED. Case Appealed to U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Case Number 05−16734. (Attachment: # 1 Transmittal Letter)(dfb) (Entered: 02/05/2008)
178 MOTION to Withdraw Jamala S. McFadden as Attorneyby Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill, William Edwards, Fulton County, State of Georgia, Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit − Notification/Certificate, # 2 Exhibit − Certification, # 3 Exhibit − Withdrawal Order)(McFadden, Jamala) (Entered: 03/28/2008)
179 MOTION to Withdraw John Howard Fleming as Attorneyby Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill, William Edwards, Fulton County, State of Georgia, Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit − Notification/Certificate, # 2 Exhibit − Certification, # 3 Exhibit − Withdrawal Order)(Fleming, John) (Entered: 03/28/2008)
180 ORDER GRANTING 179 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney John Howard Fleming terminated. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 3/31/2008. (sjk) (Entered: 03/31/2008)
181 ORDER GRANTING 178 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Jamala S. McFadden terminated. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 3/31/2008. (sjk) (Entered: 03/31/2008)
Appeal Record Returned re: 149 Notice of Cross Appeal and 148 Notice of Appeal. Case Appealed to USCA − 11th Circuit. USCA Case Number 05−16734−EE. (kac) (Entered: 02/20/2009)
182 Certified copy of JUDGMENT of USCA REMANDING to the District Court re: 148 Notice of Appeal and 149 Notice of Cross Appeal. Case Appealed to 11th USCA Case Number 05−16734. (Attachments: # 1 Letter from USCA)(ekb) (Entered: 02/20/2009)
Submission of 182 USCA Judgment with Proposed Mandate Order, submitted to District Judge Richard W. Story. (ekb) (Entered: 02/20/2009)
183 ORDER making the USCA mandate the judgment of this Court re 148 Notice of Appeal, 149 Notice of Cross Appeal. Case Appealed to 11th USCA Case Number 05−16734. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 2/24/09. (ekb) (Entered: 02/24/2009)
184 CLERK'S REMITTITUR NOTICE re 183 USCA Mandate to parties. (ekb) (Entered: 02/24/2009)
185 NOTICE of Hearing: Status Conference set for 3/26/2009 at 10:30 AM in ATLA Courtroom 2105 before Judge Richard W. Story. (rag) (Entered: 03/11/2009)
186 NOTICE of Appearance by Karen Eleice Woodward on behalf of Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill, William Edwards, Myron Freeman, Jacqueline Barrett, Fulton County, State of Georgia, Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe (Woodward, Karen) (Entered: 03/23/2009)
187 NOTICE of Appearance by William T. Mitchell on behalf of Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill, William Edwards, Myron Freeman, Jacqueline Barrett, Fulton County, State of Georgia, Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe (Mitchell, William) (Entered: 03/23/2009)
188 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Richard W. Story: In Chambers Conference held on 3/26/2009. Order to follow. The county and city are no longer a party in the case. Plaintiffs to submit a discovery plan within 10 days and defendant shall have 5 days to respond. (Court Reporter Lois Phillips)(gar) (Entered: 03/26/2009)

Case: 1:04-cv-1100 As of: 03/18/2016 03:02 PM EDT 30 of 41

03/27/2009
03/27/2009
04/01/2009 04/09/2009 04/23/2009 04/24/2009 06/02/2009
06/17/2009 06/17/2009 06/23/2009 06/24/2009 07/09/2009 07/14/2009

189 ORDER dismissing the City of Atlanta, State of Georgia and Fulton County, State of Georgia from this case. The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Fulton County, State of Georgia; Chairperson Karen Handel; Member Rob Pitts; Member Tom Lowe; Member Emma I. Darnell; Member Nancy A. Boxill; Member William Edwards; and City of Atlanta, State of Georgia. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 3/27/2009. (gar) (Entered: 03/27/2009)
190 CLERK'S JUDGMENT entered dismissing Fulton County and the City of Atlanta and in favor of Fulton County, State of Georgia; Chairperson Karen Handel; Member Rob Pitts; Member Tom Lowe; Member Emma I. Darnell; Member Nancy A. Boxill; Member William Edwards; and City of Atlanta, State of Georgia. (ekb)−−Please refer to http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov to obtain an appeals jurisdiction checklist−− (Entered: 03/30/2009)
191 NOTICE of Appearance by Willie Jake Lovett, Jr on behalf of Emma I. Darnell, Nancy A. Boxill, William Edwards, Myron Freeman, Jacqueline Barrett, Fulton County, State of Georgia, Karen Handel, Robb Pitts, Tom Lowe (Lovett, Willie) (Entered: 04/01/2009)
192 Proposed PRELIMINARY REPORT AND DISCOVERY PLAN filed by C. Alan Powell, Tory Dunlap, Lee Antonio Smith, David Evans. (Claiborne, William) (Entered: 04/09/2009)
193 Response in opposition re 192 Proposed PRELIMINARY REPORT AND DISCOVERY PLAN by Jacqueline Barrett. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Defendant's Proposed Discovery Plan)(Moore, S.) Modified on 4/24/2009 to correct docket text to accurately reflect e−file pleading (rvb). (Entered: 04/23/2009)
Notification of Docket Correction re 193 Response in opposition re 192 Proposed PRELIMINARY REPORT AND DISCOVERY PLAN. Docket text corrected to accurately reflect e−file pleading. (rvb) (Entered: 04/24/2009)
194 ORDER directing the parties to report to the Court within ten (10) days of the entry of this Order, any areas of agreement that the parties have reached regarding the schedule and each party's competing positions for any unresolved issues. The Court will then issue a scheduling order. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 6/2/09. (ekb) (Entered: 06/03/2009)
195 PRELIMINARY REPORT AND DISCOVERY PLAN filed by Jacqueline Barrett. (Moore, S.) (Entered: 06/17/2009)
196 PRELIMINARY REPORT AND DISCOVERY PLAN filed by C. Alan Powell. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit discovery plan, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 06/17/2009)
197 RESPONSE re 196 Preliminary Report and Discovery Plan Defendant's Response In Opposition to Plaintiffs' Submission on Discovery Plan filed by Jacqueline Barrett. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Moore, S.) (Entered: 06/23/2009)
198 REPLY to Response re 196 Preliminary Report and Discovery Plan by C. Alan Powell. (Claiborne, William) Modified on 6/25/2009 to correct document link (ekb). (Entered: 06/24/2009)
Submission of 196 Preliminary Report and Discovery Plan, submitted to District Judge Richard W. Story. (ekb) (Entered: 07/09/2009)
199 ORDER re 195 Preliminary Report and Discovery Plan, 196 Preliminary Report and Discovery Plan. Discovery is authorized only on the subjects expressly stated in the Remand Order and on closely related ancillary subjects to the extent necessary to determine whether any of the named plaintiffs have been deprived of a clearly established constitutional right by being strip searched or overdetained while in the Defendant's custody. In addition, pursuant to the Court's oral ruling at the March 26, 2009, scheduling conference, the parties may proceed with discovery regarding the named plaintiffs' overdetention claims. During the preliminary phase of factual development, initial disclosures shall be limited to an initial exchange of documents, as outlined. In addition to the described exchange of documents, there shall be a period of forty−five (45) days from the execution of the Scheduling

Case: 1:04-cv-1100 As of: 03/18/2016 03:02 PM EDT 31 of 41

08/31/2009 08/31/2009 09/04/2009
09/08/2009
10/08/2009 10/16/2009 10/16/2009 10/16/2009 10/16/2009 10/16/2009 10/16/2009 10/19/2009 10/19/2009 10/19/2009 10/19/2009 10/19/2009 10/29/2009

Order within which the parties may serve written discovery, including interrogatories and requests for production of documents, limited to the scope of discovery as ordered. The parties shall have an additional sixty (60) days after the conclusion of written discovery to conduct depositions. At the conclusion of this initial phase of discovery, the parties shall submit to the Court proposed stipulations of fact with citations to documents or deposition transcripts. Proposed stipulations shall be due twenty (20) days after conclusion of the deposition phase of discovery. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 7/14/09. (See order for specific details) (ekb) (Entered: 07/14/2009)
200 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE for First Interrogatories by Jacqueline Barrett.(Moore, S.) (Entered: 08/31/2009)
201 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE for First Request for Production of Documents by Jacqueline Barrett.(Moore, S.) (Entered: 08/31/2009)
202 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery by C. Alan Powell. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Claiborne, William) Modified on 9/8/2009 to correct docket text to accurately reflect e−filed pleading (gar). (Entered: 09/04/2009)
203 ORDER granting 202 Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery. The period within which the parties may serve interrogatories and requests for production of documents shall end on October 20, 2009. The sixty−day period within which the parties may take depositions shall begin on October 21, 2009 and end on December 18, 2009. The remaining provisions of the 199 Scheduling Order regarding written discovery and depositions shall remain as stated therein. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 9/8/2009. (gar) (Entered: 09/08/2009)
204 STIPULATION Stipulation to Extend Discovery by Jacqueline Barrett. (Moore, S.) (Entered: 10/08/2009)
205 NOTICE to Take Deposition of C. Alan Powell filed by Jacqueline Barrett (Woodward, Karen) (Entered: 10/16/2009)
206 NOTICE to Take Deposition of Tory Dunlap filed by Jacqueline Barrett (Woodward, Karen) (Entered: 10/16/2009)
207 NOTICE to Take Deposition of Lee Antonio Smith filed by Jacqueline Barrett (Woodward, Karen) (Entered: 10/16/2009)
208 NOTICE to Take Deposition of David Evans filed by Jacqueline Barrett (Woodward, Karen) (Entered: 10/16/2009)
209 NOTICE to Take Deposition of Stanley Clemons filed by Jacqueline Barrett (Woodward, Karen) (Entered: 10/16/2009)
210 NOTICE to Take Deposition of Benjamin Blake filed by Jacqueline Barrett (Woodward, Karen) (Entered: 10/16/2009)
211 NOTICE to Take Deposition of Anthony Westbrook filed by Jacqueline Barrett (Woodward, Karen) (Entered: 10/19/2009)
212 NOTICE to Take Deposition of Henry Witherspoon filed by Jacqueline Barrett (Woodward, Karen) (Entered: 10/19/2009)
213 NOTICE to Take Deposition of Allen Middleton filed by Jacqueline Barrett (Woodward, Karen) (Entered: 10/19/2009)
214 NOTICE to Take Deposition of Antionne Ronaldo Wolfe filed by Jacqueline Barrett (Woodward, Karen) (Entered: 10/19/2009)
215 NOTICE to Take Deposition of Kristopher Matkin filed by Jacqueline Barrett (Woodward, Karen) (Entered: 10/19/2009)
216 MOTION to Compel and for Expedited Consideration with Brief In Support by Jacqueline Barrett. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Leighton Moore)(Moore, S.) (Entered: 10/29/2009)

Case: 1:04-cv-1100 As of: 03/18/2016 03:02 PM EDT 32 of 41

11/12/2009 11/20/2009 11/25/2009 11/25/2009
11/25/2009 12/01/2009 12/02/2009 12/02/2009
12/03/2009 01/06/2010 01/06/2010 01/13/2010 01/13/2010 01/20/2010 01/29/2010

217 NOTICE of Appearance by Shakara Monique Barnes on behalf of Jacqueline Barrett (Barnes, Shakara) (Entered: 11/12/2009)
Submission of 216 MOTION to Compel and for Expedited Consideration, submitted to District Judge Richard W. Story. (gar) (Entered: 11/20/2009)
218 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Richard W. Story: Telephone Conference held on 11/25/2009. Parties discussed deposition scheduling. Scheduling order to follow. (Court Reporter David Ritchie)(gar) (Entered: 11/25/2009)
219 ORDER directing all Plaintiffs to serve complete responses to written discovery requests no later than 11/25/2009. The parties agree that the depositions will take place at the offices of Troutman Sanders, 600 Peachtree Street, NE, Suite 5200, Atlanta, GA 30308, on December 2−4, 9−11 and are scheduled as outlined in the order. The parties will endeavor to comply this schedule. In the event counsel are unable to reach an agreement, counsel may request a telephone conference with the Court to resolve the issue. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 11/25/2009. (gar) (Entered: 11/25/2009)
220 STATUS REPORT Re Location of Plaintiff Blake by C. Alan Powell, Tory Dunlap, Lee Antonio Smith, David Evans. (Claiborne, William) (Entered: 11/25/2009)
221 MOTION to Take Deposition from Inmate Benjamin Blake (plaintiff) with Brief In Support by Jacqueline Barrett. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Woodward, Karen) (Entered: 12/01/2009)
222 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Richard W. Story: Telephone Conference held on 12/2/2009. Parties discussed discovery issues. Court Grants Defendants' Oral Motion to Dismiss Stanley Clemons as a class representative. (Court Reporter Sharon Upchurch)(gar) (Entered: 12/02/2009)
223 ORDER granting 221 Motion to Take Deposition from Benjamin Blake. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff has permission of this Court to depose BENJAMIN BLAKE, a plaintiff in this case who currently is incarcerated in the Fulton County Jail. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 12/2/2009. (gar) (Entered: 12/02/2009)
224 ORDER granting Defendants' Oral Motion for Dismissal of Plaintiff Stanley Clemons as a Class Representative and Plaintiffs' Oral Motion to Extend the Deposition of Lieutenant Beasley is GRANTED. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 12/3/2009. (gar) (Entered: 12/04/2009)
225 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE of Defendant Jacqueline Barrett's Response and Objections to Plaintiffs' Revised First Set of Interrogatories by Jacqueline Barrett.(Moore, S.) (Entered: 01/06/2010)
226 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE of Defendant Jacqueline Barrett's Response and Objections to Plaintiffs' Request for the Production of Documents by Jacqueline Barrett.(Moore, S.) (Entered: 01/06/2010)
227 NOTICE to Take Deposition of Anthony Westbrook filed by Jacqueline Barrett (Barnes, Shakara) (Entered: 01/13/2010)
228 MOTION for Protective Order by Tory Dunlap. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex 1 affidavit, # 2 Exhibit 1 no extradite print out, # 3 Exhibit 3 no hold telex, # 4 Exhibit 140 class representative declaration, # 5 Exhibit depo excerpts, # 6 Text of Proposed Order)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 01/13/2010)
229 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff Alan Powell for Failure to Prosecute with Brief In Support by Jacqueline Barrett. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A (Affidavit of Non−Appearance by Powell at deposition), # 2 Brief, # 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Woodward, Karen) (Entered: 01/20/2010)
230 (STRICKEN AS PER 241 ORDER) AFFIDAVIT of Leighton Moore by Jacqueline Barrett. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E)(Moore, S.) Modified on 3/2/2010 to modify document security (rvb). (Entered: 01/29/2010)

Case: 1:04-cv-1100 As of: 03/18/2016 03:02 PM EDT 33 of 41

01/29/2010 01/29/2010 02/01/2010 02/04/2010
02/16/2010 02/17/2010 02/19/2010 02/19/2010 02/19/2010 02/26/2010 02/26/2010 02/27/2010 02/27/2010 03/02/2010 03/23/2010 03/23/2010

231 MOTION to Strike 230 Affidavit of Leighton Moore by Jacqueline Barrett. (Barnes, Shakara) (Entered: 01/29/2010)
232 RESPONSE in Opposition re 228 MOTION for Protective Order filed by Jacqueline Barrett. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Leighton Moore, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E)(Barnes, Shakara) Modified on 2/1/2010 to correct docket text (gar). (Entered: 01/29/2010)
233 REPLY to Response to Motion re 228 MOTION for Protective Order filed by Tory Dunlap. (Claiborne, William) (Entered: 02/01/2010)
234 ORDER denying Plaintiffs' 228 Motion for Protective Order on Deposition of Allen Middleton. The Court has determined that Defendant is entitled to sanctions for Plaintiff's Motion and is directed to submit a statement of costs to the Court. Defendant's 216 Motion to Compel Discovery is DENIED AS MOOT and Defendant's 229 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Alan Powell for Failure to Prosecute is GRANTED. The remaining discovery disputes addressed in the February 2 telephone conference are resolved as outline in Section III of this Order. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 2/4/2010. (gar) (Entered: 02/05/2010)
Submission of the 231 MOTION to Strike 230 Affidavit of Leighton Moore to District Judge Richard W. Story. (aaq) (Entered: 02/16/2010)
235 MOTION to Compel responses to interrogatories and document production requests by Tory Dunlap. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit email traffic on responses, # 2 Exhibit email traffic on responses)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 02/17/2010)
236 RESPONSE in Opposition re 235 MOTION to Compel responses to interrogatories and document production requests and Defendant's Motion for Sanctions filed by Jacqueline Barrett. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Barnes, Shakara) (Entered: 02/19/2010)
237 MOTION for Sanctions by Jacqueline Barrett. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(contained within 236 Response in Opposition) (gar) (Entered: 02/19/2010)
Notification of Docket Correction re 236 Response in Opposition to Motion. Multi−pleading entered as one pleading. Document refiled as 237 Motion for Sanctions. (gar) (Entered: 02/19/2010)
238 (STRICKEN AS PER 241 ORDER) REPLY BRIEF re 235 MOTION to Compel responses to interrogatories and document production requests filed by Tory Dunlap. (Claiborne, William) Modified on 3/2/2010 to modify document security (rvb). (Entered: 02/26/2010)
Submission of 235 MOTION to Compel responses to interrogatories and document production requests, submitted to District Judge Richard W. Story. (gar) (Entered: 02/26/2010)
239 MOTION to Strike 238 Reply Brief by Tory Dunlap. (Claiborne, William) (Entered: 02/27/2010)
240 REPLY to Response to Motion re 235 MOTION to Compel responses to interrogatories and document production requests filed by Tory Dunlap. (Claiborne, William) (Entered: 02/27/2010)
241 ORDER GRANTING 231 Motion to Strike the 230 Affidavit of Leighton Moore and GRANTING 239 Motion to Strike the 238 Reply Brief. Plaintiff's 235 Motion to Compel is DENIED. Defendant's 237 Motion for Sanctions is DENIED. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 03/01/2010. (rvb) (Entered: 03/02/2010)
242 Proposed Schedule for Post−Limited Discovery Proceedings filed by Tory Dunlap. (Claiborne, William) Modified on 3/24/2010 to correct docket text to accurately reflect e−filed pleading (gar). (Entered: 03/23/2010)
243 Proposed Procedural Schedule filed by Jacqueline Barrett. (Moore, S.) Modified on 3/24/2010 to correct docket text to accurately reflect e−filed pleading (gar). (Entered: 03/23/2010)

Case: 1:04-cv-1100 As of: 03/18/2016 03:02 PM EDT 34 of 41

03/24/2010 03/25/2010
04/02/2010 04/02/2010 05/24/2010 05/26/2010 05/26/2010 05/26/2010
06/29/2010 07/23/2010
07/23/2010 07/23/2010 07/27/2010 07/30/2010
08/03/2010 08/06/2010 08/09/2010 08/25/2010

Notification of Docket Correction re 242 Proposed Schedule for Post−Limited Discovery Proceeding, 243 Proposed Procedural Schedule. Docket text corrected to accurately reflect e−filed pleading (gar) (Entered: 03/24/2010)
244 SCHEDULING ORDER: The parties shall submit to the Court a stipulation of all relevant facts to which they can agree by June 24, 2010. The parties may file potentially dispositive motions by August 12, 2010. Any party who desires to request oral argument on a dispositive motion shall do so by August 19, 2010. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 3/25/2010. (gar) (Entered: 03/25/2010)
245 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE of Supplemental Interrogatory Responses by Jacqueline Barrett.(Barnes, Shakara) (Entered: 04/02/2010)
246 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE of Supplemental Response to Document Production Requests by Jacqueline Barrett.(Barnes, Shakara) (Entered: 04/02/2010)
247 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery by Tory Dunlap. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 05/24/2010)
248 Withdrawal of Motion 247 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery filed by Tory Dunlap filed by Tory Dunlap. (Claiborne, William) (Entered: 05/26/2010)
249 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery by Tory Dunlap. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 05/26/2010)
250 ORDER granting 249 Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery. The time limits set forth in the 244 Order are hereby extended as outlined herein. Dispositive motions are due by 9/12/2010. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 5/26/2010. (gar) (Entered: 05/27/2010)
251 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE for Defendant Barrett's Responses and Objections to Plaintiffs' May 23rd Interrogatories and Requests for Production by Jacqueline Barrett.(Moore, S.) (Entered: 06/29/2010)
252 DOCUMENT FILING ERROR MOTION to Withdraw Dennis McRay Young as Attorneyby City of Atlanta, State of Georgia. (Young, Dennis) Modified on 7/27/2010 (pdw). Modified on 8/4/2010 to correct red text (pdw). (Entered: 07/23/2010)
253 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to Extend Deadlines Relating to Dispositive Motions by Jacqueline Barrett. (Moore, S.) (Entered: 07/23/2010)
254 MOTION AT DOC #252 REDOCKETED AS Certification of Consent to Substitution of Counsel. Robert N. Godfrey for Jacqueline Barrett and City of Atlanta replacing attorney Dennis McRay Young. (pdw) (Entered: 07/27/2010)
Notification of Docket Correction re 252 MOTION to Withdraw Dennis McRay Young as Attorney redocketed as 254 Notice of Substitution of Counsel to correctly reflect nature of filing. (pdw) (Entered: 07/27/2010)
255 ORDER granting 253 Motion to Extend Deadlines as set forth in 244 Scheduling Order: stipulation of facts due 8/10/10; statements of undisputed facts due 8/17/10; dispositive motions due 9/28/10 and requests for oral argument due 10/05/2010. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 7/29/2010. (pdw) (Entered: 07/30/2010)
256 NOTICE of Appearance by Tamara Nikki Baines on behalf of City of Atlanta, State of Georgia (Baines, Tamara) (Entered: 08/03/2010)
257 Joint MOTION to Amend Scheduling Order by Jacqueline Barrett. (Moore, S.) (Entered: 08/06/2010)
258 ORDER granting 257 Motion to Amend Scheduling Order. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 8/09/2010. (pdw) (Entered: 08/09/2010)
259 MOTION to Exclude Testimony of Expert Witness with Brief In Support by Jacqueline Barrett. (Attachments: # 1 Brief)(Moore, S.) (Entered: 08/25/2010)

Case: 1:04-cv-1100 As of: 03/18/2016 03:02 PM EDT 35 of 41

08/27/2010 09/13/2010 09/13/2010 09/13/2010 09/14/2010 09/29/2010 09/29/2010 09/30/2010 10/21/2010 10/22/2010 11/02/2010
11/02/2010
11/08/2010 11/08/2010 11/08/2010

260 NOTICE by Tory Dunlap, David Evans, C. Alan Powell, Lee Antonio Smith NOTICE OF CHANGE IN FIRM NAME (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 08/27/2010)
Submission of 259 MOTION to Exclude Testimony of Expert Witness, submitted to District Judge Richard W. Story. (pdw) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
261 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time For Plaintiffs to Respond to Defendant's Motion to Exclude Testimony re: 259 MOTION to Exclude Testimony of Expert Witness Filed August 25, 2010 by Tory Dunlap. (Pekor, Charles) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
262 RESPONSE in Opposition re 259 MOTION to Exclude Testimony of Expert Witness filed by C. Alan Powell. (Claiborne, William) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
263 ORDER granting Plaintiff's 261 Consent Motion for an Extension of Time until September 16, 2010 to file their Response to Defendant's Motion to Exclude Testimony 259 . Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 9/14/2010. (tcc) (Entered: 09/15/2010)
264 STATUS REPORT Regarding Joint Stipulations of Fact by Jacqueline Barrett. (Moore, S.) (Entered: 09/29/2010)
265 NOTICE by David Evans on Stipulations by plaintiffs (Claiborne, William) Modified on 9/30/2010 to correct duplicate text. (cem) (Entered: 09/29/2010)
266 REPLY BRIEF re 259 MOTION to Exclude Testimony of Expert Witness David Goldstein filed by Jacqueline Barrett. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4)(Woodward, Karen) (Entered: 09/30/2010)
267 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time of Dispositive Motion Deadlines with Brief In Support by Jacqueline Barrett. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Woodward, Karen) (Entered: 10/21/2010)
268 ORDER granting 267 Motion for Extension of Time. Parties to file dispositive motions by 11/2/2010; requests for oral argument by 11/9/10; briefs in response to motions for summary judgment by 12/01/2010. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 10/22/2010. (pdw) (Entered: 10/22/2010)
269 MOTION for Summary Judgment Based on Qualified Immunity with Brief In Support by Jacqueline Barrett. (Attachments: # 1 Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, # 2 Statement of Material Facts in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, # 3 Exhibit (Deposition Excerpts Part 1), # 4 Exhibit (Deposition Excerpts Part 2), # 5 Exhibit (Deposition Excerpts Part 3), # 6 Exhibit (Deposition Excerpts Part 4), # 7 Affidavit of Roland Lane, # 8 Exhibit (Defendant's Interrogatory Responses), # 9 Exhibit Defendant's Supplemental Interrogatory Responses), # 10 Exhibit (Verification))(Moore, S.) −−Please refer to http://www.gand.uscourts.gov to obtain the Notice to Respond to Summary Judgment Motion form contained on the Court's website.−− (Entered: 11/02/2010)
270 NOTICE by David Evans PLAINTIFFS RESPONSES TO THE QUESTIONS ASKED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS IN THE REMAND OPINION/ SUBMISSION FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit exhibit list, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit, # 8 Exhibit, # 9 Exhibit, # 10 Exhibit, # 11 Exhibit, # 12 Exhibit, # 13 Exhibit, # 14 Exhibit, # 15 Exhibit, # 16 Exhibit, # 17 Exhibit, # 18 Exhibit, # 19 Exhibit, # 20 Exhibit, # 21 Exhibit, # 22 Exhibit, # 23 Exhibit, # 24 Exhibit, # 25 Errata)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 11/02/2010)
271 Request to File Original Discovery by Jacqueline Barrett.(Woodward, Karen) (Entered: 11/08/2010)
272 NOTICE Of Filing Original Discovery by Jacqueline Barrett (Moore, S.) (Entered: 11/08/2010)
273 DEPOSITION of Benjamin Blake taken on 12/08/2009 by Jacqueline Barrett.(pdw) (Additional attachment(s) added on 4/20/2012: # 1 Benjamin Blake Deposition) (kac). (Entered: 11/10/2010)

Case: 1:04-cv-1100 As of: 03/18/2016 03:02 PM EDT 36 of 41

11/08/2010 11/08/2010 11/08/2010 11/08/2010 11/29/2010 12/01/2010 12/08/2010
12/08/2010 12/08/2010 12/17/2010 12/24/2010

274 DEPOSITION of David Evans taken on 12/03/2009 by Jacqueline Barrett.(pdw) (Additional attachment(s) added on 4/20/2012: # 1 David Evans Deposition Part 1, # 2 David Evans Deposition part 2, # 3 David Evans Deposition Part 3) (kac). (Entered: 11/10/2010)
275 DEPOSITION of David Evans, Vol. II taken on 12/10/2009 by Jacqueline Barrett.(pdw) (Additional attachment(s) added on 4/20/2012: # 1 David Evans Deposition Volume 2 Part 1, # 2 David Evans Deposition Volume 2 Part 2, # 3 David Evans Deposition Volume 2 Part 3, # 4 David Evans Deposition Volume 2 Part 4) (kac). (Entered: 11/10/2010)
276 DEPOSITION of Kristopher Alan Matkin taken on 12/10/2009 by Jacqueline Barrett.(pdw) (Additional attachment(s) added on 4/20/2012: # 1 Kristopher Alan Deposition) (kac). (Entered: 11/10/2010)
277 DEPOSITION of Antionne Wolfe taken on 12/03/2009 by Jacqueline Barrett.(pdw) (Additional attachment(s) added on 4/20/2012: # 1 Antionne Wolfe Deposition) (kac). (Entered: 11/10/2010)
278 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment by Tory Dunlap. (Pekor, Charles) (Entered: 11/29/2010)
279 ORDER granting 278 Motion for Extension of Time to and through 12/08/2010 for plaintiffs to respond to defendants' 269 MOTION for Summary Judgment Based on Qualified Immunity. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 12/01/2010. (pdw) (Entered: 12/01/2010)
280 NOTICE by Tory Dunlap, David Evans, C. Alan Powell, Lee Antonio Smith on Records Office Manual (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 200, # 2 Exhibit 201, # 3 Exhibit 202, # 4 Exhibit 203, # 5 Exhibit 204, # 6 Exhibit 205, # 7 Exhibit 206, # 8 Exhibit 207, # 9 Exhibit 208, # 10 Exhibit 209, # 11 Exhibit 210, # 12 Exhibit 211, # 13 Exhibit 212, # 14 Exhibit 213, # 15 Exhibit 214, # 16 Exhibit 215, # 17 Exhibit 216, # 18 Exhibit 217, # 19 Exhibit 218, # 20 Exhibit 219, # 21 Exhibit 220, # 22 Exhibit 221, # 23 Exhibit 222, # 24 Exhibit 223, # 25 Exhibit 224, # 26 Exhibit 225, # 27 Exhibit 226, # 28 Exhibit 227, # 29 Exhibit 228, # 30 Exhibit 229, # 31 Exhibit 230, # 32 Exhibit 231, # 33 Exhibit 232, # 34 Exhibit 233, # 35 Exhibit 234, # 36 Exhibit 235, # 37 Exhibit 236, # 38 Exhibit 237, # 39 Exhibit 238, # 40 Exhibit 239, # 41 Exhibit 240, # 42 Exhibit 241, # 43 Exhibit 242, # 44 Exhibit 243, # 45 Exhibit 244, # 46 Exhibit 245, # 47 Exhibit 246, # 48 Exhibit 247, # 49 Exhibit 248, # 50 Exhibit 249, # 51 Exhibit 250, # 52 Exhibit 251, # 53 Exhibit 252, # 54 Exhibit 253, # 55 Exhibit 254)(Claiborne, William) Modified on 12/9/2010 to correct duplicate text. (cem) (Entered: 12/08/2010)
281 OBJECTIONS re 270 to Plaintiffs' "Responses to the Questions Asked By The Court Of Appeal In The Remand Opinions/Submissions For Evidentiary Hearing" filed by Jacqueline Barrett. (Woodward, Karen) Modified on 12/9/2010 to correct docket entry to reflect efiled pleading. (cem) (Entered: 12/08/2010)
282 MOTION to deny 269 Defendant's MOTION for Summary Judgment Based on Qualified Immunity Plaintiffs' Rule 56(f) motion with Brief In Support by David Evans. (Attachments: # 1 Brief, # 2 Affidavit, # 3 Exhibit)(Claiborne, William) Modified on 12/9/2010 to correct docket entry to reflect efiled pleading. (cem) (Entered: 12/08/2010)
283 NOTICE by Tory Dunlap re 270 Notice Exhibits # 2 And #4 To Plaintiffs Responses To The Questions Asked By The Court Of Appeals In The Remand Opinion/ Submission For Evidentiary Hearing (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex # 2, # 2 Exhibit Ex # 4)(Claiborne, William) Modified on 12/20/2010 to take out duplicate text. (cem) (Entered: 12/17/2010)
284 MOTION for leave to file a revised opposition to defendant's statement of facts in support of her summary judgment motion 282 MOTION 269 MOTION for Summary Judgment Based on Qualified Immunity Plaintiffs' Rule 56(f) motion MOTION 269 MOTION for Summary Judgment Based on Qualified Immunity Plaintiffs' Rule 56(f) motion by Tory Dunlap. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit revised statement facts redlined to show changes, # 2 Exhibit clean revised statement facts)(Claiborne, William) Modified on 12/27/2010 to correct text in all caps. (cem) (Entered: 12/24/2010)

Case: 1:04-cv-1100 As of: 03/18/2016 03:02 PM EDT 37 of 41

12/28/2010 12/28/2010 01/03/2011
01/10/2011 01/14/2011 01/19/2011 01/20/2011 02/01/2011 03/03/2011
03/10/2011 03/17/2011 03/25/2011
03/28/2011

285 RESPONSE in Opposition re 282 MOTION 269 MOTION for Summary Judgment Based on Qualified Immunity Plaintiffs' Rule 56(f) motion MOTION 269 MOTION for Summary Judgment Based on Qualified Immunity Plaintiffs' Rule 56(f) motion filed by Jacqueline Barrett. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Leighton Moore, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C)(Moore, S.) (Entered: 12/28/2010)
286 MOTION for Extension of Time File Response re: 285 Response in Opposition to Motion, by Jacqueline Barrett. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Moore, S.) (Entered: 12/28/2010)
287 ORDER granting 286 Defendant's Motion for for leave to file 285 Defendant's Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Rule 56(f) Motion to Deny Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Objections to Rule 56(f) Affidavit of Plaintiffs' Counsel William Claiborne" out of time, and finding excusable neglect for filing 26 minutes after the deadline, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant's Response (Doc. 285) shall be considered as if timely filed. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 1/3/11. (cem) (Entered: 01/03/2011)
288 RESPONSE in Opposition re 284 MOTION for Leave to File filed by Jacqueline Barrett. (Moore, S.) (Entered: 01/10/2011)
289 REPLY to Response to Motion re 282 MOTION 269 MOTION for Summary Judgment Based on Qualified Immunity Plaintiffs' Rule 56(f) motion MOTION 269 MOTION for Summary Judgment Based on Qualified Immunity Plaintiffs' Rule 56(f) motion filed by David Evans. (Claiborne, William) (Entered: 01/14/2011)
Submission of 282 MOTION to Deny 269 MOTION for Summary Judgment, submitted to District Judge Richard W. Story. (cem) (Entered: 01/19/2011)
Submission of 269 MOTION for Summary Judgment Based on Qualified Immunity, submitted to District Judge Richard W. Story. (cem) (Entered: 01/20/2011)
Submission of 284 MOTION for Leave to File a revised opposition to defendant's statement of facts of her summary judgment motion, submitted to District Judge Richard W. Story. (cem) (Entered: 02/01/2011)
290 ORDER that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 269 is GRANTED as to the AL and CR Classes, and DENIED without prejudice as to the Over−Detention Class. Per Order 300 − Vacating Ruling on 282 Motion and DENYING said 282 Motion, − Plaintiffs' Rule 56(d) Motion 282 is GRANTED as to the Over−Detention Class, and DENIED as to the AL and CR Classes. Defendant's Motion to Exclude Testimony 259 is DENIED, and Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File a Revised Opposition 284 is DENIED. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 3/3/2011. (tcc) Modified on 8/9/2011 (cem). (Entered: 03/04/2011)
291 OBJECTIONS to Additional Discovery re 290 Order on Motion to Exclude, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment, Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief, Order on Motion for Leave to File,,,, Defendant's Objections to Additional Discovery filed by Jacqueline Barrett. (Moore, S.) Modified on 3/11/2011 to correct docket entry to refled e−filed pleading. (cem) (Entered: 03/10/2011)
292 RESPONSE re 291 Response (Non−Motion), Response (Non−Motion), 290 Order on Motion to Exclude, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment, Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief, Order on Motion for Leave to File,,,, filed by C. Alan Powell. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Defendant's supplemental interrogatory responses)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 03/17/2011)
293 MOTION for Leave to File Defendant's Motion For Leave To File Reply To Correct Inaccurate Statements with Brief in Support with Brief In Support by Jacqueline Barrett. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order Granting Motion for Leave, # 2 Brief Defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's Objections to Additional Discovery, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit A to Reply, Declaration of Leighton Moore, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit 1 to Exhibit A)(Woodward, Karen) (Entered: 03/25/2011)
294 ORDER granting 293 Motion for Leave to File Defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's Objections to Additional Discovery, and for good cause

Case: 1:04-cv-1100 As of: 03/18/2016 03:02 PM EDT 38 of 41

03/28/2011 03/28/2011
04/07/2011 04/19/2011 06/09/2011 07/12/2011 08/08/2011
08/22/2011 08/22/2011 09/07/2011 09/12/2011
09/19/2011 09/19/2011

shown, it is hereby ORDERED that the filing of Defendant's Reply shall be permitted and the Reply shall be considered. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 3/28/11. (cem) (Entered: 03/28/2011)
295 REPLY to Plaintiffs' 291 Response to Defendant's Objections to Additional Discovery filed by Jacqueline Barrett. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit 1 to A) (cem) (Entered: 03/28/2011)
296 MOTION for Leave to File Plaintiffs' Reply To Correct Inaccurate Statements 295 Response (Non−Motion), 290 Order on Motion to Exclude, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment, Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief, Order on Motion for Leave to File,,,, 294 Order on Motion for Leave to File, by Lee Antonio Smith. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit proposed reply)(Claiborne, William) Modified on 3/29/2011 to correct duplicate text. (cem) (Entered: 03/28/2011)
297 Notice for Leave of Absence for the following date(s): April 25−29, 2011, by Robert N. Godfrey. (Godfrey, Robert) (Entered: 04/07/2011)
Submission of 296 MOTION for Leave to File Plaintiffs' Reply To Correct Inaccurate Statements, submitted to District Judge Richard W. Story. (cem) (Entered: 04/19/2011)
298 NOTICE of Change of Address for Theodore Howard Lackland, counsel for Jacqueline Barrett (Lackland, Theodore) (Entered: 06/09/2011)
299 NOTICE of Change of Address for Charles B. Pekor, Jr, counsel for Tory Dunlap (Pekor, Charles) (Entered: 07/12/2011)
300 ORDER granting 296 Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Reply, and the Court has considered Plaintiffs' Reply [269−1]. The Court VACATES its March 3, 2011 Order 290 to the extent it granted Plaintiffs Rule 56(d) Motion. Upon reconsideration, Plaintiffs Rule 56(d) Motion 282 is DENIED. Plaintiffs are ORDERED to respond to Section II.A of Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 269 no later than 21 days from the date of this Order. Plaintiff shall also file a response to Defendants Statement of Undisputed Material Facts [269−2] as set forth by Local Rule 56(b)(2)(a)(2). Defendant shall have 14 days from the date of Plaintiffs response to file a reply. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 8/8/11. (cem) (Entered: 08/09/2011)
301 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time file response to Section II.A of Motion Summary Judgment re: 300 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief,, by Lee Antonio Smith. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 08/22/2011)
302 ORDER granting 301 Motion for Extension of Time to respond to Section II.A of defendant's 269 Motion for Summary Judgment. Response due on or before September 13, 2011. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 8/22/2011. (rej) (Entered: 08/23/2011)
303 Second MOTION for Extension of Time in which to file an Opposition to Section II.A of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment re: 300 Order by Lee Antonio Smith. (Claiborne, William) Modified on 9/8/2011 to correct docket entry to reflect efiled pleading. (cem) (Entered: 09/07/2011)
304 ORDER granting 303 Motion for Extension of Time in which to file an Opposition to Section II.A of Defendant's 269 Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs shall file their response to Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment not later than September 20, 2011. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 9/12/2011. (rej) (Entered: 09/12/2011)
305 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time re: 304 Order on Motion for Extension of Time, by Lee Antonio Smith. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit affidavit of computer specialist)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 09/19/2011)
306 ORDER granting 305 Plaintiffs' Motion for Third Extension of Time not later than 9/23/11, to file their response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 9/19/11. (cem) (Entered: 09/20/2011)

Case: 1:04-cv-1100 As of: 03/18/2016 03:02 PM EDT 39 of 41

09/23/2011
09/24/2011
09/26/2011
10/07/2011 10/13/2011
11/01/2011 11/01/2011 11/04/2011 11/21/2011 12/07/2011 12/07/2011 12/08/2011 12/22/2011 01/18/2012

307 MEMORANDUM of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Opposition to Section II.A of Defendant's 269 MOTION for Summary Judgment Based on Qualified Immunity filed by Tory Dunlap. (Attachments: # 1 Statement of Material Facts in Century Schoolbook, # 2 Statement of Material Facts copy this versionhas defendants statements in Bold Arial 14 and plaintiffs responses/ statements in Bookman Old Style 14 for ease of reading, # 3 Exhibit jail policies, # 4 Exhibit redacted Matkin jail file, # 5 Exhibit McKie depo transcript excerpt, # 6 Exhibit certain orders, # 7 Exhibit list of affiants, # 8 Exhibit Barrett depo excerpt from Green v Barrett, # 9 Exhibit sample release verification forms, # 10 Exhibit Beasley depo excerpt, # 11 Exhibit Lane depo transcript)(Claiborne, William) Modified on 9/26/2011 to correct docket entry to reflect efiled pleading. (cem) (Entered: 09/23/2011)
308 MOTION to Supplement 307 Response in Opposition to Motion,, by Lee Antonio Smith. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ps. Ex. # 27 as Fulton County Board Of Commissioners' Memorandum Of Law In Response To Court's Show Cause Order, in the case of Harper v. Barrett, NO.04−CV−1416−MHS (docket # 27), # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 09/24/2011)
309 ORDER granting 308 Plaintiffs' Motion for leave to Supplement their opposition to Section II.A of defendant's motion for summary judgment by filing Ps. Ex. # 27 ["Fulton County Board Of Commissioners' Memorandum Of Law In Response To Court's Show Cause Order," in the case of Harper v. Barrett, NO.04−CV−1416−MHS (docket # 27)]. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 9/26/11. (cem) (Entered: 09/26/2011)
310 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Reply in Support for Motion for Summary Judgment with Brief In Support by Jacqueline Barrett. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Woodward, Karen) (Entered: 10/07/2011)
311 ORDER granting 310 Motion for Extension of Time to File a Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. It is hereby ORDERED that the time for filing Defendant's Reply shall be extended for a period of twenty−one days, up to and including November 1, 2011. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 10/13/2011. (rej) (Entered: 10/13/2011)
312 Response to Statement of Material Facts re 269 MOTION for Summary Judgment Based on Qualified Immunity Response to Respondent's Facts filed by Jacqueline Barrett. (Woodward, Karen) (Entered: 11/01/2011)
313 REPLY BRIEF re 269 MOTION for Summary Judgment Based on Qualified Immunity filed by Jacqueline Barrett. (Moore, S.) (Entered: 11/02/2011)
314 MOTION to Exclude Purported Expert Opinion Evidence Of Mr. Lane by Lee Antonio Smith. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Dr. Krieglers Declaration, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 11/04/2011)
315 RESPONSE re 314 MOTION to Exclude Purported Expert Opinion Evidence Of Mr. Lane filed by Jacqueline Barrett. (Woodward, Karen) (Entered: 11/21/2011)
316 MOTION for Oral Argument with Brief In Support by Jacqueline Barrett. (Attachments: # 1 Brief, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Woodward, Karen) (Entered: 12/07/2011)
317 REPLY to Response to Motion re 314 MOTION to Exclude Purported Expert Opinion Evidence Of Mr. Lane filed by Tory Dunlap. (Claiborne, William) (Entered: 12/07/2011)
Submission of 314 MOTION to Exclude Purported Expert Opinion Evidence Of Mr. Lane, submitted to District Judge Richard W. Story. (cem) (Entered: 12/08/2011)
318 RESPONSE in Opposition re 316 MOTION for Oral Argument filed by Tory Dunlap. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 12/22/2011)
Submission of 316 MOTION for Oral Argument, submitted to District Judge Richard W. Story. (cem) (Entered: 01/18/2012)

Case: 1:04-cv-1100 As of: 03/18/2016 03:02 PM EDT 40 of 41

02/17/2012
02/17/2012 02/21/2012 03/13/2012
03/14/2012 03/14/2012 03/16/2012
03/19/2012
03/22/2012 03/27/2012
04/05/2012 04/05/2012 04/10/2012 04/20/2012 03/07/2013

319 ORDER granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 269 as to Plaintiff's over−detention claims, DENIES as moot Plaintiff's 314 Motion to Exclude Purported Expert Opinion of Mr. Lane 314 , and DENIES Defendant's 316 Motion for Oral Argument. As no claims remain, the Court DIRECTS the Clerk to enter final judgment in favor of Defendant. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 2/17/12. (cem) (Entered: 02/21/2012)
Civil Case Terminated. (cem) (Entered: 02/21/2012)
320 CLERK'S JUDGMENT entered in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiffs for costs of action. (cem)−−Please refer to http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov to obtain an appeals jurisdiction checklist−− (Entered: 02/21/2012)
321 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 320 Clerk's Judgment, 199 , 234 , 241 , 244 , 287 , 290 , 294 , 300 and 319 Orders by Tory Dunlap, C. Alan Powell, Lee Antonio Smith, David Evans, Stanley Clemons, Allen Middleton, Anthony Westbrook, Benjamin Blake, Harry Witherspoon, Antionne Wolf, Kristopher Alan Matkin. Transcript Order Form due on 3/27/2012 (Claiborne, William) Modified on 3/14/2012 to include document relationship and filers (kac). (Entered: 03/13/2012)
322 NOTICE of Change of Address for William Charles Claiborne, III, counsel for Lee Antonio Smith (Claiborne, William) (Entered: 03/14/2012)
323 Transmission of Certified Copy of Notice of Appeal, Judgment, Orders and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals re: 321 Notice of Appeal. (kac) (Entered: 03/14/2012)
324 USCA Appeal Fees received $455.00; Receipt Number GAN100044301 re: 321 Notice of Appeal filed by Benjamin Blake, Anthony Westbrook, C. Alan Powell, Tory Dunlap, Kristopher Alan Matkin, Stanley Clemons, II, Harry Witherspoon, David Evans, Allen Middleton, Lee Antonio Smith, Antionne Wolf. (kac) (Entered: 03/19/2012)
325 Forwarded certified copy of docket sheets reflecting payment of appeal filing and docketing fees to USCA re: 321 Notice of Appeal filed by Benjamin Blake, Anthony Westbrook, C. Alan Powell, Tory Dunlap, Kristopher Alan Matkin, Stanley Clemons, II, Harry Witherspoon, David Evans, Allen Middleton, Lee Antonio Smith, Antionne Wolf. Case Appealed to USCA − 11th Circuit. USCA Case Number 00−00000−00. (kac) (Entered: 03/19/2012)
326 BILL OF COSTS with attachments by Jacqueline Barrett. (Woodward, Karen) (Entered: 03/22/2012)
327 USCA Acknowledgment of 321 Notice of Appeal filed by Benjamin Blake, Anthony Westbrook, C. Alan Powell, Tory Dunlap, Kristopher Alan Matkin, Stanley Clemons, II, Harry Witherspoon, David Evans, Allen Middleton, Lee Antonio Smith, Antionne Wolf. Case Appealed to USCA − 11th Circuit. USCA Case Number 12−11422−C. (kac) (Entered: 03/28/2012)
328 TRANSCRIPT ORDER FORM re 321 Notice of Appeal,. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 04/05/2012)
Set Certificate of Readiness deadline re: 328 Transcript Order Form. Certificate of Readiness due on 4/16/2012. (No hearing)(kac) (Entered: 04/06/2012)
329 Costs Taxed in amount of $ 11,553.20 against Plaintiffs. (cem) (Entered: 04/10/2012)
Pursuant to F.R.A.P.11(c), the Clerk certifies that the record is complete for purposes of this appeal re: 321 Notice of Appeal. Case Appealed to USCA − 11th Circuit. USCA Case Number 12−11422−CC. The entire record on appeal is available electronically. (kac) (Entered: 04/20/2012)
330 USCA Opinion received re: 321 Notice of Appeal filed by Benjamin Blake, Anthony Westbrook, C. Alan Powell, Tory Dunlap, Kristopher Alan Matkin, Stanley Clemons, II, Harry Witherspoon, David Evans, Allen Middleton, Lee Antonio Smith, Antionne Wolf. In accordance with FRAP 41(b), the USCA mandate will issue at a later date. Case Appealed to USCA − 11th Circuit. USCA Case Number 12−11422−CC. (kac) (Entered: 03/07/2013)

Case: 1:04-cv-1100 As of: 03/18/2016 03:02 PM EDT 41 of 41

04/08/2013
04/10/2013 09/09/2013 09/10/2013 11/04/2013

331 Certified copy of JUDGMENT of USCA AFFIRMING the decision of the District Court re: 321 Notice of Appeal filed by Benjamin Blake, Anthony Westbrook, C. Alan Powell, Tory Dunlap, Kristopher Alan Matkin, Stanley Clemons, II, Harry Witherspoon, David Evans, Allen Middleton, Lee Antonio Smith, Antionne Wolf. Case Appealed to USCA − 11th Circuit. USCA Case Number 12−11422−CC. (kac) (Additional attachment(s) added on 4/10/2013: # 1 USCA Judgment) (kac). (Entered: 04/08/2013)
Notification of Docket Correction re: 331 USCA Judgment. Incorrect PDF attached. (kac) (Entered: 04/10/2013)
332 MOTION to Withdraw Paul J. Estuar as Attorneyby Benjamin Blake, Stanley Clemons, II, Tory Dunlap, David Evans, Kristopher Alan Matkin, Allen Middleton, Lee Antonio Smith, Anthony Westbrook, Harry Witherspoon, Antionne Wolf. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 09/09/2013)
333 ORDER granting 332 Motion to Withdraw as Counsel. Effectively immediately, Paul J. Estuar shall be terminated as attorney of record from case no. 1:04−cv−1100 (RWS). Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 9/10/2013. (cem) (Entered: 09/11/2013)
334 Appeal notice from USCA notifying the U.S.D.C., Clerk of Court, that the United States Supreme Court has DENIED the Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Certiorari re: 321 Notice of Appeal. Case Appealed to USCA − 11th Circuit. USCA Case Number 12−11422−CC. (kac) (Entered: 11/05/2013)

 
 US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

http://pacer.ca11.uscourts.gov/CHMSDKTP.FWX
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
56 Forsyth Street, N.W. Atlanta, GA 30303-2289
(404) 335-6100

1 of 12

05-16734-II C. Alan Powell v. Sheriff Jacqueline Barrett

Docket #: 05-16734-II Short Style: C. Alan Powell v. Sheriff Jacqueline Barrett Docket Date: 12/08/2005 Lead Case:
Agency: Nature of Suit: Civil Rights: Other
Misc. Type: Clerk: Richardson, Tonya
Clerk Phone: (404) 335-6178

District Information

Docket #: 04-01100-CV-RWS-1 Judge: Richard W. Story

Dkt Date: 04/21/2004

District: Georgia-Northern

NOA Date: 12/08/2005

Office: NGA-Atlanta

Secondary Case Information

Docket #: Judge: Dkt Date: / /
Case Relationships

Docket #

Short Style

Relation Status

05-16735-II C. Alan Powell v. Sheriff Jacqueline Barrett Cross

Open

05-90031-E C. Alan Powell v. Sheriff Jacqueline Barrett Related Closed

Pending Motions
No Pending Motions

8/24/2007 1:18 PM

US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

http://pacer.ca11.uscourts.gov/CHMSDKTP.FWX
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
56 Forsyth Street, N.W. Atlanta, GA 30303-2289
(404) 335-6100

2 of 12

05-16734-II C. Alan Powell v. Sheriff Jacqueline Barrett
C. ALAN POWELL, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
TORY DUNLAP, individually, and on behalf of all other similarly situated,
LEE ANTONIO SMITH, individually, and on behalf of all other similarly situated,
DAVID EVANS, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs Appellees Cross-Appellants,
versus
SHERIFF JACQUELINE BARRETT, Fulton County, State of Georgia, SHERIFF MYRON FREEMAN,
FULTON COUNTY, STATE OF GEORGIA, CHAIRPERSON KAREN HANDEL,

8/24/2007 1:18 PM

US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

http://pacer.ca11.uscourts.gov/CHMSDKTP.FWX

Fulton County Board of Commissioners, MEMBER ROBB PITTS,
Fulton County Board of Commissioners, MEMBER TOM LOWE,
Fulton County Board of Commissioners, MEMBER EMMA I. DARNELL,
Fulton County Board of Commissioners, MEMBER NANCY A. BOXILL,
Fulton County Board of Commissioners, MEMBER WILLIAM EDWARDS, a.k.a. BILL EDWARDS,
Fulton County Board of Commissioners, CITY OF ATLANTA, State of Georgia,

Defendants-Appellants
Cross-Appellees.
United States Court OF Appeals FOR the Eleventh Circuit
56 Forsyth Street, N.W. Atlanta, GA 30303-2289
(404) 335-6100

05-16734-II C. Alan Powell v. Sheriff Jacqueline Barrett

Appellant
Jacqueline Barrett Address Not On File Appellant Brief Filed filed on 01.17.2006 Record Excerpts filed on 01.17.2006

Appellant Attorney
Sidney Leighton Moore, III Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan LLP 999 PEACHTREE ST NE ATLANTA, GA 30309-3915

3 of 12

8/24/2007 1:18 PM

US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

http://pacer.ca11.uscourts.gov/CHMSDKTP.FWX

E-Brief Tendered: Appellant filed on 01.17.2006 Reply/Cross-Appellee Brief filed on 03.17.2006 Fees: Paid on 12.28.2005 Myron E. Freeman Address Not On File No Briefing Information Found.
Fulton County, GA Address Not On File Corrected Cross-Appellee Brief Filed filed on 03.29.2006
Karen Handel Address Not On File No Briefing Information Found.
Robb Pitts Address Not On File No Briefing Information Found.
Tom Lowe Address Not On File No Briefing Information Found.
Emma I. Darnell Address Not On File No Briefing Information Found.

(404) 853-8332 Fax: (404) 853-8806 leighton.moore@sablaw.com No Briefing Information Found.
Theodore H. Lackland Lackland & Heyward 233 PEACHTREE ST NE STE 2300 ATLANTA, GA 30303-1509 (404) 522-8155 Fax: (404) 522-7355 tlackland@e-lacklaw.com No Briefing Information Found.
Teresa Wynn Roseborough Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan 999 PEACHTREE ST NE ATLANTA, GA 30309-3915 (404) 853-8100 twroseborough@sablaw.com No Briefing Information Found.
John H. Fleming SUTHERLAND ASBILL & BRENNAN 999 PEACHTREE ST NE ATLANTA, GA 30309-3915 (404) 853-8065 john.fleming@sablaw.com No Briefing Information Found.
John H. Fleming SUTHERLAND ASBILL & BRENNAN 999 PEACHTREE ST NE ATLANTA, GA 30309-3915 (404) 853-8065 john.fleming@sablaw.com No Briefing Information Found.
John H. Fleming SUTHERLAND ASBILL & BRENNAN 999 PEACHTREE ST NE ATLANTA, GA 30309-3915 (404) 853-8065 john.fleming@sablaw.com No Briefing Information Found.
John H. Fleming SUTHERLAND ASBILL & BRENNAN 999 PEACHTREE ST NE ATLANTA, GA 30309-3915 (404) 853-8065 john.fleming@sablaw.com No Briefing Information Found.

4 of 12

8/24/2007 1:18 PM

US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

http://pacer.ca11.uscourts.gov/CHMSDKTP.FWX

Nancy A. Boxill Address Not On File No Briefing Information Found.
William Edwards Address Not On File No Briefing Information Found.
City of Atlanta, GA Address Not On File Reply/Cross-Appellee Brief filed on 03.29.2006
Appellee C. Alan Powell Address Not On File
Tory Dunlap Address Not On File
Lee Antonio Smith Address Not On File
David Evans Address Not On File

John H. Fleming SUTHERLAND ASBILL & BRENNAN 999 PEACHTREE ST NE ATLANTA, GA 30309-3915 (404) 853-8065 john.fleming@sablaw.com No Briefing Information Found.
John H. Fleming SUTHERLAND ASBILL & BRENNAN 999 PEACHTREE ST NE ATLANTA, GA 30309-3915 (404) 853-8065 john.fleming@sablaw.com No Briefing Information Found.
Appellee Attorney
William Charles Claiborne, III Attorney at Law 717 D ST NW STE 210 WASHINGTON, DC 20004-2813 (202) 824-0700 Fax: (202) 824-0745 law@claiborne.net Reply Brief Filed filed on 04.25.2006 Supplemental Authority for Appellee filed on 05.25.2007
George Brian Spears Law Office of Brian Spears 1126 PONCE DE LEON AVE NE Atlanta, GA 30306-4517 (404) 872-7086 BSpears@mindspring.com Appellee/Cross Appellant Brief Filed filed on 02.21.2006
George Brian Spears Law Office of Brian Spears 1126 PONCE DE LEON AVE NE Atlanta, GA 30306-4517 (404) 872-7086 BSpears@mindspring.com No Briefing Information Found.
George Brian Spears Law Office of Brian Spears 1126 PONCE DE LEON AVE NE Atlanta, GA 30306-4517

5 of 12

8/24/2007 1:18 PM

US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 6 of 12

http://pacer.ca11.uscourts.gov/CHMSDKTP.FWX
(404) 872-7086 BSpears@mindspring.com No Briefing Information Found.
Barrett S. Litt 1055 WILSHIRE BLVD STE 1880 LOS ANGELES, CA 90017-5601 (213) 386-3115 No Briefing Information Found.
Charles B. Pekor, Jr. Pekor & Dewoskin, LLC 270 PEACHTREE ST NW STE 1060 ATLANTA, GA 30303-1263 (404) 221-8887 Fax: (404) 221-8884 chuckpekor@yahoo.com No Briefing Information Found.
Daniel Eliot DeWoskin Pekor & DeWoskin, LLC 270 PEACHTREE ST NW STE 1060 ATLANTA, GA 30303-1263 (404) 221-8887 Fax: (404) 221-8884 dan@dedlaw.com No Briefing Information Found.
Coy J. Johnson, Jr. The Office of the Fulton County Attorney 141 PRYOR ST SW STE 4038 ATLANTA, GA 30303-3468 (404) 612-0267 Fax: (404) 730-6324 coy.johnson@fultoncountyga.gov No Briefing Information Found.
Rolesia Butler Dancy Office of the Fulton County Attorney 141 PRYOR ST SW STE 4038 ATLANTA, GA 30303-3468 (404) 612-0246 Fax: (404) 730-6324 rolesia.dancy@fultoncountyga.gov No Briefing Information Found.
Willie Jake Lovett, Jr. Office of the Fulton County Attorney 141 PRYOR ST SW STE 4038 ATLANTA, GA 30303-3468 (404) 612-0246 Fax: (404) 730-6324 willie.lovett@fultoncountyga.gov No Briefing Information Found.
8/24/2007 1:18 PM

US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Initial Service Dennis M. Young City of Atlanta Law Department 68 MITCHELL ST SW STE 4100 ATLANTA, GA 30303-3520 (404) 330-6400 Fax: (404) 658-6894 dmyoung@atlantaga.gov J. Patrick Claiborne Office of James Patrick Claiborne 699 BROAD ST STE 1110 AUGUSTA, GA 30901-1400 (404) 738-4086 jpcfirm@aol.com Lynn E. Cunningham PO BOX 1547 DUBOIS, WY 82513-1547 (307) 455-3374 Fax: (307) 455-3374

http://pacer.ca11.uscourts.gov/CHMSDKTP.FWX
Overtis Hicks Brantley City of Atlanta Law Department 141 PRYOR ST SW STE 4038 ATLANTA, GA 30303-3468 (404) 612-0246 Fax: (404) 730-6324 ov.brantley@fultoncountyga.gov No Briefing Information Found.
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
56 Forsyth Street, N.W. Atlanta, GA 30303-2289
(404) 335-6100

7 of 12

05-16734-II C. Alan Powell v. Sheriff Jacqueline Barrett

File Date

Entry

12/08/2005 Probable Jurisdiction Noted:

12/08/2005 Order Transferring From Misc. # 05-90031-E 12/08/2005 Probable Jurisdiction Noted:

Party Jacqueline Barrett
C. Alan Powell

Pending No No No

8/24/2007 1:18 PM

US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

http://pacer.ca11.uscourts.gov/CHMSDKTP.FWX

12/16/2005 Appearance Form Submitted.

Theodore H. Lackland

No

12/21/2005 Civil Appeal Statement Form:

C. Alan Powell No

12/21/2005

Transcript purposes)

Order

Form

(No

transcripts

required

for

appeal

C. Alan Powell

No

CAS1 (Civil Appeal Statement deficiency letter) issued.

12/22/2005 To:DeWoskin, Daniel Eliot; c:Lackland, Theodore H.;

No

c:Luther D. Thomas

12/28/2005 Transcript Order Form - No Transcript Requested:

Jacqueline Barrett

No

12/28/2005 Civil Appeal Statement Form:

Jacqueline Barrett

No

12/29/2005 Appearance Form Submitted.

Sidney Leighton Moore, III

No

12/29/2005 Appearance Form Submitted.

Teresa Wynn Roseborough

No

12/30/2005 Briefing Notice Issued

No

BR1CIV (Letter confirming brief due date) issued.

c:Claiborne, J. Patrick; c:Claiborne, William Charles, III;

12/30/2005 c:Cunningham, Lynn E.; c:DeWoskin, Daniel Eliot;

No

c:Lackland, Theodore H.; c:Litt, Barrett S.; c:Pekor,

Charles B., Jr.; c:Roseborough, Teresa W+

01/05/2006

ATTY1 (Appearance To:Moore, Leighton

form/bar

admission

letter)

issued.

No

01/09/2006 Appearance Form Submitted.

Daniel Eliot DeWoskin

No

01/09/2006 Appearance Form Submitted.

Charles Jr.

B.

Pekor,

No

Appellants (Barrett, Freeman, Fulton Co, etc) Brief Filed: 01/17/2006 M: 2/01 Summary of Argument, Stmt Regarding Oral
Argument (Atty: Teresa Wynn Roseborough)

Jacqueline Barrett

No

01/17/2006 Record Excerpts: (Atty: Teresa Wynn Roseborough)

Jacqueline Barrett

No

30pages

01/17/2006

E-Brief Tendered: Appellant for Jacqueline Barrett

by

Teresa

Wynn

Roseborough

Jacqueline Barrett

No

BR8CIV (Brief deficiency letter) issued. To:Roseborough,

01/18/2006

Teresa Wynn; c:DeWoskin, Daniel Eliot; Theodore H.; c:Moore, Sidney Leighton,

c:Lackland, III; c:Pekor,

No

Charles B., Jr.

01/18/2006 Certificate of Readiness

No

02/07/2006 Appearance Form Submitted.

George Brian Spears

No

02/13/2006

Statement of Non-Opposition to Motion for leave page limit: (Atty: Teresa Wynn Roseborough)

to

exceed

Jacqueline Barrett

No

8 of 12

8/24/2007 1:18 PM

US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

http://pacer.ca11.uscourts.gov/CHMSDKTP.FWX

Letter issued-Per Appellee's counsel request, the motion for

02/16/2006

leave to file excess pages is being returned unfiled. Additionally, Appellant's response to the motion to

file

No

excess pages is being returned .

MOT2 (Notice of court action) issued. To:George Brian

Spears; c:Barrett S. Litt; c:Charles B. Pekor, Jr.; c:Daniel

02/17/2006 Eliot DeWoskin; c:Dennis M. Young; c:J. Patrick

No

Claiborne; c:Lynn E. Cunningham; c:Sidney Leighton

Moore, III; c:Teresa Wynn Roseborough; +

30pages

02/21/2006

E-Brief Tendered: Appellee

Appellee

by

George

Brian

Spears

for

No

02/21/2006

Appellee/Cross Appellant Brief Filed: (also for: Powell, Smith, Evans, et al.) (Atty: George Brian Spears)

Tory Dunlap

No

02/22/2006 Appearance Form Submitted.

George Brian Spears

No

02/23/2006

Motion to File PT'D AOC

Amicus

Brief:

(Atty:

George

Brian

Spears)

National Police Accountability Project

No

02/24/2006

ATTY1 (Appearance form/bar To:George Brian Spears

admission

letter)

issued.

No

MOT1 (Motion filed letter) issued. c:Barrett S. Litt;

c:Charles B. Pekor, Jr.; c:Daniel Eliot DeWoskin; c:Dennis

02/24/2006 M. Young; c:George Brian Spears; c:George Brian Spears;

No

c:J. Patrick Claiborne; c:Lynn E. Cunningham; c:Sidney

Leighton Moore, III; c:Teresa+

03/06/2006 Application to Appear Pro Hac Vice:

Barrett S. Litt No

03/17/2006

Barrett Vice is

S Litt, Esquire motion GRANTED. CRW

for

leave

to

Appear

Pro

Hac

No

MOT2 (Notice of court action) issued. c:Barrett S. Litt;

03/17/2006

c:Charles B. Pekor, Jr.; c:Daniel Brian Spears; c:Sidney Leighton

Eliot DeWoskin; c:George Moore, III; c:Teresa Wynn

No

Roseborough; c:Theodore H. Lackland

03/17/2006

Reply/Cross-Appellee (Barrett & Freeman) Brief: PT'D Cover Color (Atty: Theodore H. Lackland)

M:

03/24

Jacqueline Barrett

No

BR8CIV (Brief deficiency letter) issued. To:Theodore H.

03/21/2006

Lackland; c:Charles B. Pekor, Jr.; c:Daniel Eliot DeWoskin; c:George Brian Spears; c:Sidney Leighton Moore, III;

No

c:Teresa Wynn Roseborough

03/22/2006 Appearance Form Submitted.

William Charles Claiborne, III

No

Over the Phone Extension to File Cross-Appellee Fulton 03/22/2006 County Brief Granted by EMDixon Until 3/29/06: (Atty:
Teresa Wynn Roseborough)

Fulton County, GA

No

03/23/2006 Appearance Form Submitted.

Barrett S. Litt No

9 of 12

8/24/2007 1:18 PM

US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

http://pacer.ca11.uscourts.gov/CHMSDKTP.FWX

03/23/2006

7-Day Confirmation Letter Wynn Roseborough)

for

Appellant:

(Atty:

Teresa

Jacqueline Barrett

No

03/28/2006

Attorney Changed for: Fulton Roseborough, Teresa Wynn.

County,

GA

From:

To:

Fulton County, GA

No

Attorney Changed for: Jacqueline Barrett From: Teresa 03/28/2006 Wynn Roseborough (404) 853-8100
twroseborough@sablaw.com To: Lackland, Theodore H..

Jacqueline Barrett

No

03/29/2006 Reply/Cross-Appellee Brief: (Atty: Leighton Moore)

City of Atlanta, GA

No

03/29/2006

Corrected Cross-Appellee Roseborough)

Brief

Filed:

(Atty:

Teresa

Wynn

Fulton County, GA

No

The motion for leave to file an amicus curiae brief in

03/31/2006 support of Appellees, filed by the National Police

No

Accountability Project, is DENIED. SM.

MOT2 (Notice of court action) issued. c:Barrett S. Litt;

c:Charles B. Pekor, Jr.; c:Daniel Eliot DeWoskin; c:George

03/31/2006 Brian Spears; c:George Brian Spears; c:Sidney Leighton

No

Moore, III; c:Teresa Wynn Roseborough; c:Theodore H.

Lackland; c:William Charles C+

04/03/2006 Record on Appeal

No

04/05/2006

MOT-11 (Letter re moot motion) issued. To:George Spears; c:Barrett S. Litt; c:Charles B. Pekor, Jr.

Brian

No

Letter issued 1 cc of your amicus brief is rtnd unfiled in

04/05/2006

light of this court's order of 3/31/06. ... forward a SASE the rtn of the remaining briefs or they will be discarded

for

No

w/21 days.

Over the Phone Extension to File Plaintiff/Appellee Cross 04/12/2006 Appellants Reply Brief Granted by DM Until 04/24/06: C. Alan Powell No
(Atty: Barrett S. Litt)

04/13/2006

7-Day Confirmation (Atty: George Brian

Letter for Spears)

Cross

Appellant

Reply

brief:

Tory Dunlap

No

04/17/2006

Defendants' motion to substitute Theodore H. Lackland)

corrected

pages:

(Atty:

Jacqueline Barrett

No

04/19/2006

Defendants' motion to GRANTED by AW.

substitute

corrected

pages

was

No

MOT2 (Notice of court action) issued. c:Barrett S. Litt;

c:Charles B. Pekor, Jr.; c:Daniel Eliot DeWoskin; c:George

04/20/2006 Brian Spears; c:Sidney Leighton Moore, III; c:Teresa Wynn

No

Roseborough; c:Theodore H. Lackland; c:William Charles

Claiborne, III

30pages

04/24/2006

E-Brief Tendered: Appellee

Appellee

by

George

Brian

Spears

for

No

04/25/2006

Reply Litt)

Brief

Filed:

M:

04/24

PT'D

E-Brief

(Atty:

Barrett

S.

C. Alan Powell

No

10 of 12

8/24/2007 1:18 PM

US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

http://pacer.ca11.uscourts.gov/CHMSDKTP.FWX

04/25/2006 Motion to Strike: (Atty: Barrett S. Litt)

C. Alan Powell No

BR8CIV (Brief deficiency letter) issued. To:Barrett S. Litt;

c:Charles B. Pekor, Jr.; c:Daniel Eliot DeWoskin; c:George

04/26/2006 Brian Spears; c:Sidney Leighton Moore, III; c:Teresa Wynn

No

Roseborough; c:Theodore H. Lackland; c:William Charles

Claiborne, III

Over the Phone Extension to File Response to motion to 05/08/2006 Strike Brief Granted by TD Until May 15,2 006: (Atty:
Sidney Leighton Moore, III)

Jacqueline Barrett

No

Attorney Changed for: Jacqueline Barrett From: Theodore 05/10/2006 H. Lackland (404) 522-8155 tlackland@e-lacklaw.com To:
Moore, Sidney Leighton III.

Jacqueline Barrett

No

05/10/2006

Response to Moore, III)

Motion

to

Strike:

(Atty:

Sidney

Leighton

Jacqueline Barrett

No

05/10/2006

Motion for Substitution of Counsel: (Atty: Sidney Leighton Moore, III)

Jacqueline Barrett

No

05/17/2006 Motion for Substitution of Counsel is GRANTED by BMc.

No

MOT2 (Notice of court action) issued. c:Barrett S. Litt;

c:Charles B. Pekor, Jr.; c:Daniel Eliot DeWoskin; c:Dennis

05/17/2006 M. Young; c:George Brian Spears; c:J. Patrick Claiborne;

No

c:John H. Fleming; c:Lynn E. Cunningham; c:Sidney

Leighton Moore, III; c:Theodor+

05/18/2006 Appearance Form Submitted.

John H. Fleming No

05/23/2006

DELETED: E-Brief Tendered: Reply by Spears eBrief was an invalid brief type.

George

Brian

No

05/23/2006

Reply to Opposition Response George Brian Spears)

to

Motion

to

Strike:

(Atty:

C. Alan Powell

No

05/25/2006

Attorney Changed for: C. Alan Powell From: Barrett (213) 386-3115 To: Spears, George Brian.

S. Litt

C. Alan Powell

No

06/07/2006 Appellees' "Motion to Strike" is DENIED. (GBT)

No

MOT2 (Notice of court action) issued. c:Barrett S. Litt;

c:Charles B. Pekor, Jr.; c:Daniel Eliot DeWoskin; c:Dennis

06/07/2006 M. Young; c:George Brian Spears; c:J. Patrick Claiborne;

No

c:John H. Fleming; c:Lynn E. Cunningham; c:Sidney

Leighton Moore, III; c:Theodor+

10/06/2006 Oral Argument Scheduled: 10/06/06

No

10/11/2006

Sidney Leighton Moore, III S. Litt argued for Appellee

argued

for

Appellant;

Barrett

No

11/29/2006 Appearance Form Submitted.

Overtis Hicks Brantley

No

11/29/2006 Appearance Form Submitted.

Rolesia Butler Dancy

No

11/29/2006 Appearance Form Submitted.

Coy J. Johnson, Jr.

No

11 of 12

8/24/2007 1:18 PM

US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

http://pacer.ca11.uscourts.gov/CHMSDKTP.FWX

11/29/2006 Appearance Form Submitted.

Willie Jake Lovett, Jr.

No

05/25/2007

Supplemental Authority Charles Claiborne, III)

for

Appellee:

(Atty:

William

C. Alan Powell No

Attorney Changed for: C. Alan Powell From: George Brian 05/30/2007 Spears (404) 872-7086 BSpears@mindspring.com To: C. Alan Powell No
Claiborne, William Charles III.

08/23/2007 Judgment Entered

No

OPIN1A (Notice of issuance of opinion) issued. Each party

to bear own costs. c:Barrett S. Litt; c:Charles B. Pekor, Jr.;

08/23/2007 c:Coy J. Johnson, Jr.; c:Daniel Eliot DeWoskin; c:George

No

Brian Spears; c:John H. Fleming; c:Kenneth L. Ryskamp;

c:Overtis Hicks Bran+

08/23/2007 Opinion Issued-05-16735X

No

08/23/2007 Opinion Issued

No

Send Comment

PACER Service Center

Transaction Receipt

PACER Login: Description: Billable Pages:

08/24/2007 14:18:49

hs0328

Client Code:

docket sheet Case Number:

8

Cost:

05-16734-II 0.64

Change Client Code View Billing History

Search

12 of 12

8/24/2007 1:18 PM

 
 [PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

FILED

________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-16734 ________________________

September 4, 2008 THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK

D. C. Docket No. 04-01100-CV-RWS-1

C. ALAN POWELL, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, TORY DUNLAP, individually, and on behalf of all other similarly situated, LEE ANTONIO SMITH, individually, and on behalf of all other similarly situated, DAVID EVANS, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
versus
SHERIFF JACQUELINE BARRETT, Fulton County, State of Georgia, SHERIFF MYRON FREEMAN, FULTON COUNTY, STATE OF GEORGIA, CHAIRPERSON KAREN HANDEL, Fulton County Board of Commissioners, MEMBER ROBB PITTS, Fulton County Board of Commissioners, MEMBER TOM LOWE, Fulton County Board of Commissioners, MEMBER EMMA I. DARNELL, Fulton County Board of Commissioners,

Plaintiffs Appellees Cross-Appellants,

MEMBER NANCY A. BOXILL, Fulton County Board of Commissioners, MEMBER WILLIAM EDWARDS, a.k.a. BILL EDWARDS, Fulton County Board of Commissioners, CITY OF ATLANTA, State of Georgia,
Defendants-Appellants Cross-Appellees.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia _________________________
(September 4, 2008)
Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, and TJOFLAT, ANDERSON, BIRCH, DUBINA, BLACK, CARNES, BARKETT, HULL, MARCUS, WILSON and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
CARNES, Circuit Judge:
We granted rehearing en banc to decide whether a policy or practice of strip
searching all arrestees as part of the process of booking them into the general
population of a detention facility, even without reasonable suspicion to believe that
they may be concealing contraband, is constitutionally permissible. We answer
that question in the affirmative, at least where the strip search is no more intrusive
than the one the Supreme Court upheld in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S. Ct.
1861 (1979).
2

I. The facts and procedural history of this entire case are set out in accurate detail in the panel opinion. Powell v. Barrett, 496 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2007), vacated, No. 05-16734 (11th Cir. Feb. 1, 2008). As it explains, the named plaintiffs in this class action lawsuit are eleven former detainees at the Fulton County Jail in Georgia, all of whom were strip searched upon entering or reentering the general population at that detention facility. Id. at 1296, 1298. The eleven named plaintiffs can be divided into three groups, which overlap to some extent. Id. at 1297. One of those three groups is “the Arrestee Strip Search Class (AR Group),” which consists of the eight plaintiffs who were strip searched as part of the point-of-entry booking process before they were placed into the general jail population for the first time. Id. at 1297–98. Three of the eight members of that group were arrested on charges that supplied reasonable suspicion to believe that they might be concealing contraband at the time they were booked into the jail. Id. at 1312. Our en banc interest, as reflected in our briefing instructions, is in the strip searches conducted on the other five members of the arrestee group (plaintiffs Powell, Clemons, Middleton, Witherspoon and Wolf). Id. As to each of those five, neither the charge itself nor any other circumstance supplied reasonable
3

suspicion to believe that the arrestee might be concealing contraband. See id. at 1312–13. The five were strip searched solely because they were entering the general population of inmates at the detention facility.
Because this is an appeal from the denial of a motion to dismiss, we take the facts from the allegations of the complaint. Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008); Locke v. SunTrust Bank, 484 F.3d 1343, 1345 n.1 (11th Cir. 2007); Spain v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 363 F.3d 1183, 1186 (11th Cir. 2004). The allegations are that four of these five plaintiffs were taken to the Fulton County Jail for detention after being arrested on relatively minor charges: a bail revocation on a disorderly conduct charge, a traffic ticket warrant, a DUI charge, and a contempt charge for failure to pay child support. Powell, 496 F.3d at 1312; (R6:78:¶89.) The fifth plaintiff in this group was arrested on a burglary charge, which we (like the panel) assume did not involve an element of violence. Powell, 496 F.3d at 1312 & n.32.
“Every person booked into the Fulton County Jail general population is subjected to a strip search conducted without an individual determination of reasonable suspicion to justify the search, and regardless of the crime with which the person is charged.” (R6:78:¶180.) The booking process includes “having the arrested person go into a large room with a group of up to thirty to forty other
4

inmates, remove all of his clothing, and place the clothing in boxes.” (Id. ¶181.) The entire group of arrestees then takes a shower in a single large room. (Id. ¶¶182, 238.) After the group shower each arrestee “either singly, or standing in a line with others, is visually inspected front and back by deputies.” (Id. ¶183.) “Then each man [takes] his clothes to a counter and exchange[s] his own clothes for a jail jumpsuit.” (Id. ¶ 239.) Identifying an illustrative case, the complaint alleges that one of these five plaintiffs “along with every other inmate in the process, had to stand before a guard front and center, and show his front and back sides while naked.” (Id. ¶240.) There is no allegation that any members of the opposite sex either conducted the visual searches or were present while they were being conducted. Nor is there any allegation that the searches were conducted in an abusive manner. See Powell, 496 F.3d at 1310 n.28 (“We note that, in the instant case, Plaintiffs do not challenge the manner of the strip searches.”).
The five plaintiffs contend that the strip searches violated the Fourth Amendment because there was no reasonable suspicion to believe that any of them had hidden contraband. The panel felt forced to agree, citing our prior decision in Wilson v. Jones, 251 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2001), as well as an earlier opinion that had reached the same conclusion, albeit in dicta, Skurstenis v. Jones, 236 F.3d 678, 682 (11th Cir. 2000) (stating that a strip search without reasonable suspicion does
5

not comport with the Fourth Amendment but that reasonable suspicion existed in that case). Powell, 496 F.3d at 1310, 1312; see also Cuesta v. Sch. Bd., 285 F.3d 962, 969 (11th Cir. 2002) (noting that “[i]n Wilson, we made the dicta of Skurstenis binding law” but concluding that reasonable suspicion existed in that case). The panel did point out that our decisions imposing a reasonable suspicion requirement for point-of-entry strip searches at detention facilities had “relied on, but misconstrued, the Supreme Court’s decision in Bell,” and that “[w]e have since recognized our misinterpretation” of that decision. Powell, 496 F.3d at 1312 (citing Evans v. Stephens, 407 F.3d 1272, 1279 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (dicta)).
Despite its misgivings, the panel acted properly in following Wilson because it was bound by the prior panel precedent rule to do so. Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1301–02 (11th Cir. 2001); Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069, 1076 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1317–18 (11th Cir. 1998) (en banc); Cargill v. Turpin, 120 F.3d 1366, 1386 (11th Cir. 1997); Gwin v. Snow, 870 F.2d 616, 623–24 (11th Cir. 1989). We are not. Sitting en banc, we are free to revisit the Wilson decision and its interpretation of Bell and to decide for ourselves what Bell means.
II. The reasoning that leads us to uphold the searches of these five plaintiffs is
6

simple. After balancing the privacy interests of detention facility inmates against the important security interests involved, the Supreme Court upheld the visual body cavity strip searches at issue in the Bell case against a Fourth Amendment attack. The security needs that the Court in Bell found to justify strip searching an inmate re-entering the jail population after a contact visit are no greater than those that justify searching an arrestee when he is being booked into the general population for the first time. And the searches conducted in the Bell case were more intrusive, and thereby impinged more on privacy interests, than those conducted in this case. It follows from the Bell decision that the less intrusive searches in this case do not violate the Fourth Amendment. That is the gist of our reasoning, the details of which follow.
A. Before getting into those details, we pause briefly to address the defendants’ contention that the test we should apply is the one for prison regulations in general that was announced in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987), instead of the more strip search-specific Fourth Amendment analysis that the Supreme Court used in Bell. In their brief, the plaintiffs oppose the defendants’ position, arguing instead that we should apply the specific Fourth Amendment approach.
7

The plaintiffs’ position is consistent with the Supreme Court’s repeated admonitions that we should not assume that it has, by implication, overruled a prior decision specifically on point with later, more general language in a different decision. Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 252–53, 118 S. Ct. 1969, 1978 (1998) (“Our decisions remain binding precedent until we see fit to reconsider them, regardless of whether subsequent cases have raised doubts about their continuing vitality.”); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2017 (1997) (“We do not acknowledge, and we do not hold, that other courts should conclude our more recent cases have, by implication, overruled an earlier precedent.”); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484, 109 S. Ct. 1917, 1921–22 (1989) (“If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”). We take those admonitions seriously. See United States v. Greer, 440 F.3d 1267, 1275–76 (11th Cir. 2006); Eng’g Contractors Ass’n of S. Fla. Inc. v. Metro. Dade County, 122 F.3d 895, 908 (11th Cir. 1997); Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Eng’g Corp., 117 F.3d 519, 525–26 (11th Cir. 1997); Scala v. City of Winter Park, 116 F.3d 1396, 1399 n.2 (11th Cir. 1997). Until the Supreme Court tells us that the Bell
8

approach no longer applies where that Court applied it, we are inclined to continue using it.
We also concur in the agreement that is implicit in the parties’ opposing positions—that to the extent of any difference, the Bell Fourth Amendment test is more detainee friendly in this context than the test in Turner. Because we conclude that the plaintiffs lose even under the straight Fourth Amendment approach of Bell, we need not decide if that approach has been superseded by the more deferential Turner one.
B. The Bell case involved a class action lawsuit brought by pretrial detainees being held at the federal Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York City. Bell, 441 U.S. at 523, 99 S. Ct. at 1866. The MCC had a general strip search policy that applied to all inmates, id. at 530, 99 S. Ct. at 1869, including pretrial detainees, “convicted inmates who [were] awaiting sentencing or transportation to federal prison,” “convicted prisoners who [had] been lodged at the facility under writs of habeas corpus . . . issued to ensure their presence at upcoming trials, witnesses in protective custody, and persons incarcerated for contempt,” id. at 524, 99 S. Ct. at 1866. Under the MCC’s policy all inmates, regardless of the reason for their
9

detention, were required “to expose their body cavities for visual inspection as a part of a strip search conducted after every contact visit with a person from outside the institution.” Id. at 558, 99 S. Ct. at 1884. More specifically: “If the inmate is a male, he must lift his genitals and bend over to spread his buttocks for visual inspection. The vaginal and anal cavities of female inmates also are visually inspected.” Id. at 558 n.39, 99 S. Ct. at 1884 n.39.
The pretrial detainees alleged in their complaint in Bell that the MCC’s strip search policy violated their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches. Id. at 526–27 & n.7, 99 S. Ct. at 1868 & n.7. The district court emphatically agreed. United States ex rel. Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114, 146–48 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). In an overwrought passage crackling with indignation, the court described the postures that the inmates were forced to assume during the visual body cavity searches as “calculated to trigger, in the officer and inmate respectively, feelings of sadism, terror, and incipient masochism that no one alive could have failed to predict.” Id. at 147. The court found that on some occasions “male correction officers have been incited by the temptation to indulge the sense of a cheap machismo” and had made “insultingly suggestive remarks and banal but terrifying expressions of aggression” to those being searched. Id. It was, the court insisted, a “grisly procedure” and a “loathesome practice.” Id. The court credited
10

the testimony of some inmates who said that they had found the visual body cavity searches “so high a price as to forego [contact] visits or to feel after a visit that it was not worthwhile.” Id.
Not only that, but the district court in Bell also found that visually inspecting the body cavities of inmates after each contact visit had turned up barely any contraband. Id. That was not surprising, the court reasoned, given that “inmates and their visitors are in full view during the visits and fully clad,” so that “[t]he secreting of objects in rectal or genital areas becomes in this situation an imposing challenge to nerves and agility.” Id. In all of the time that the searches had been conducted there had been only one occasion when any object—it was a red balloon containing heroin—had been spotted in an inmate’s vagina. Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 131 (2d Cir. 1978) (“[I]n this case appellants proved only one instance in the MCC’s several years of existence when contraband was found during a body cavity inspection.”); Wolfish, 439 F. Supp. at 147. The visual inspections of anuses had never turned up any contraband, a fact that did not surprise the court for physiological reasons it felt compelled to explain. Wolfish, 439 F. Supp. at 147.
Even though it recognized that “the prospect of the strip search may serve as a deterrent to people planning to secrete and import forbidden things,” the district court believed that deterrence “cannot justify the more extreme and offensive
11

aspects of the strip search.” Id. It advised the warden of MCC and the Director of the Bureau of Prisons that they should be most concerned about weapons, which “are discoverable by metal detecting devices and, if necessary, other equipment employed for airline security and other purposes.” Id. As for “other things, mainly narcotics, that might still be secreted and evade detection,” the court could not say “with confidence” how serious that problem may be. Id. It could say with confidence, though, that “the goal of absolute security is unattainable, and we must assume that some contraband will continue to make its way into jails and prisons, as it always has—whether through visitors, guards, lawyers, clergymen, or otherwise.” Id. at 148.
That said, the district court in Bell insisted that it was not treating the security needs of the detention facility lightly and would let the officials who ran it “go as far as may be permitted by the demands of reasonableness in the Fourth Amendment and the claims of decency in the Fifth.” Id. The court ordered the detention officials to “cease the routine requirements of anal and genital inspections after visits.” Id. They could perform those inspections only “upon a specific and particular demonstration of probable cause for doing so.” Id.
However, the district court in Bell did not curtail all routine strip searches. To the contrary, the court justified its restriction on anal and genital inspections by
12

stating that: “[T]he demands of security are amply satisfied if inmates are required to disrobe, to have their clothing subjected to inspection, and to present open hands and arms to demonstrate the absence of concealed objects.” Id. The court allowed those full body visual strip searches, which did not require the inmates to take any action to more fully expose their anal or genital areas to inspection, to continue without any showing of cause. Id.; see also Bell, 441 U.S. at 558, 99 S. Ct. at 1884 (“The District Court upheld the strip-search procedure but prohibited the bodycavity searches, absent probable cause to believe that the inmate is concealing contraband.”); Wolfish, 573 F.2d at 131 (stating that the district court judge “left the basic strip-search procedures undisturbed, but . . . [h]e prohibited inspection of the genitals and anus unless there is probable cause to believe that the inmate is concealing contraband”). The district court left the basic strip search procedure in place only “with grave reluctance, inviting reconsideration by wiser judges or [the detention officials] themselves in the more mature wisdom of future times.” Wolfish, 439 F. Supp. at 148.
Three decades have passed but the Bureau of Prisons, which administers MCC, still has not reached the state of “more mature wisdom” that the district court in Bell hoped that it would. A materially identical strip search policy is still in effect at all federal detention facilities. See infra at 23–24. There was
13

“reconsideration by wiser judges” of the district court’s decision, but ultimately it did not come out the way that court had hoped.
On appeal, the Second Circuit agreed with the district court’s conclusions about the strip searches. Wolfish, 573 F.2d at 131. Its reasoning about the body cavity inspection part of the strip searches is summed up in these two sentences from its opinion: “The gross violation of personal privacy inherent in such a search cannot be outweighed by the government’s security interest in maintaining a practice of so little actual utility. To speak plainly, in the circumstances presented by this record, the procedure shocks one’s conscience.” Id. The Second Circuit’s decision nonetheless left the detention officials free to require, even without any individualized cause, full body visual strip searches. Id. What the decision prohibited, absent probable cause, was forcing inmates to assume postures or take other actions that would more fully expose their anal and genital areas to visual inspection. Id. In other words, the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s order on strip searches. Id.
The Supreme Court did not. In facing the issue the high court did not attempt to airbrush the facts but instead described in unblinking terms how the visual body cavity searches were conducted. Bell, 441 U.S. at 558 & n.39, 99 S. Ct. at 1884 & n.39. Because the district court had upheld the strip search policy
14

except for the body cavity inspections, it was that most intrusive part of the searches that defined the question before the Supreme Court. See id. at 558, 99 S. Ct. at 1884. The Court acknowledged that of the five MCC practices before it, the blanket policy of requiring body cavity inspections after each contact visit with anyone from the outside “instinctively gives us the most pause.” Id. But the Court did not pause long. It quickly demolished, in just three paragraphs and an equal number of footnotes, the arguments that the policy violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 558–60, 99 S. Ct. at 1884–85.
The Supreme Court did not hold that inmates at a detention facility had any Fourth Amendment rights to begin with. It only assumed that they did. Id. at 558, 99 S. Ct. at 1884 (“However, assuming for present purposes that inmates, both convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees, retain some Fourth Amendment rights upon commitment to a corrections facility . . . .”). Even with that assumption, however, the Court concluded that the body cavity inspection searches after every contact visit were constitutionally permissible because the Fourth Amendment “prohibits only unreasonable searches, and under the circumstances, we do not believe that these searches are unreasonable.” Id. (citation omitted).
The Court explained that the reasonableness of a search cannot be determined by “precise definition or mechanical application,” but instead “requires
15

a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.” Id. at 559, 99 S. Ct. at 1884. In balancing those interests there are four factors courts must consider: “the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.” Id.
As for the first factor, the Supreme Court did not “underestimate the degree to which these searches may invade the personal privacy of inmates.” Id. at 560, 99 S. Ct. at 1885. It described how intrusive the searches were when it described how they were performed. Id. at 558 n.39, 99 S. Ct. at 1884 n.39. And it quoted the Second Circuit’s view that the searches were a “‘gross violation of personal privacy.’” Id. at 558, 99 S. Ct. at 1884 (quoting Wolfish, 573 F.2d at 131). As for the second factor, the Court did not “doubt, as the District Court noted, that on occasion a security guard may conduct the search in an abusive fashion.” Id. at 560, 99 S. Ct. at 1885. Such abuses are not to be condoned. Id. The searches must be conducted in a reasonable manner, but the Court recognized that “we deal here with the question whether visual body-cavity inspections . . . can ever be conducted on less than probable cause.” Id. (The emphasized “ever” served to underscore the assumption that the searches will be conducted in a non-abusive, reasonable manner.)
16

The Supreme Court answered that question in the affirmative, and the reason it did so was the combined weight of the third and fourth factors—the justification for the searches and the place they were conducted. Those two factors merged into one heavy consideration because the searches took place in a detention facility, and the justification for them was the critically important security needs of the facility. As the Court explained: “A detention facility is a unique place fraught with serious security dangers. Smuggling of money, drugs, weapons, and other contraband is all too common an occurrence.” Id. at 559, 99 S. Ct. at 1884. The Court viewed that factor as a critical one even though the record indicated only one instance in three years “where an MCC inmate was discovered attempting to smuggle contraband into the institution on [her] person.” Id. at 559, 99 S. Ct. at 1885; see also Wolfish, 439 F. Supp. at 147. That fact, the Court believed, “may be more a testament to the effectiveness of this search technique as a deterrent than to any lack of interest on the part of the inmates to secrete and import such items when the opportunity arises.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 559, 99 S. Ct. at 1885. The Court noted that officials had testified “that visual cavity searches were necessary not only to discover but also to deter the smuggling of weapons, drugs, and other contraband into the institution.” Id. at 558, 99 S. Ct. at 1884.
The district court’s position that less intrusive alternatives, such as metal
17

detectors, should be used instead of the body cavity inspections was rejected. For one thing the Supreme Court was not ready to concede that lesser alternative analysis has any place in the Fourth Amendment area. Id. at 559 n.40, 99 S. Ct. at 1885 n.40 (“‘[T]he logic of such elaborate less-restrictive-alternative arguments could raise insuperable barriers to the exercise of virtually all search-and-seizure powers.’” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556–57 n.12, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 3082 n.12 (1976)). For another thing the Court decided that, even assuming lesser alternatives may be considered, the metal detectors suggested by the district court would not be as effective as visual body cavity inspections because metal detectors cannot detect currency, drugs, and other nonmetallic contraband. Id.
The bottom line of the Bell decision is that, after “[b]alancing the significant and legitimate security interests of the institution against the privacy interests of the inmates,” the Supreme Court concluded that the visual body cavity inspections—the most intrusive part of the strip searches in that case—were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 559–60, 99 S. Ct. at 1884–85. The policy the Court upheld required that searches be conducted on every inmate after each contact visit, even without the slightest cause to suspect that the inmate was concealing contraband. Id. at 558, 99 S. Ct. at 1884.
18

C. We are aware that some courts have interpreted the Bell decision as requiring, or at least permitting lower courts to require, reasonable suspicion as a condition for detention facility strip searches, especially those that involve visual body cavity inspections. See, e.g., Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1997) (“Balancing these interests, courts have concluded that, to be reasonable under Wolfish, strip and visual body cavity searches must be justified by at least a reasonable suspicion that the arrestee is concealing contraband or weapons. . . . Accordingly, it is clear that at least the reasonable suspicion standard governs strip and visual body cavity searches in the arrestee context as well.” (citation omitted)); Chapman v. Nichols, 989 F.2d 393, 395 (10th Cir. 1993) (“In this case, it is undisputed that plaintiffs were arrested for minor traffic violations and were awaiting bail, that jail officials had no reasonable suspicion that these particular arrestees were likely to be carrying or concealing weapons or drugs, and that plaintiffs were searched solely because the blanket policy required all detainees to be subjected to a strip search. Every circuit court, including our own, which has considered the above circumstances under the Wolfish balancing test has concluded that a search under these circumstances is unconstitutional.”). We ourselves have done that. Wilson, 251 F.3d at 1343 (“Because Wilson was strip
19

searched absent reasonable suspicion, we hold that the search of Wilson, as well as the jail’s policy authorizing her search, violated the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.”). Those decisions misread Bell as requiring reasonable suspicion.
The Bell decision, correctly read, is inconsistent with the conclusion that the Fourth Amendment requires reasonable suspicion before an inmate entering or reentering a detention facility may be subjected to a strip search that includes a body cavity inspection. And the decision certainly is inconsistent with the conclusion that reasonable suspicion is required for detention facility strip searches that do not involve body cavity inspections.
First, and most fundamentally, the Court in Bell addressed a strip search policy, not any individual searches conducted under it. The Court spoke categorically about the policy, not specifically about a particular search or an individual inmate. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 560, 99 S. Ct. at 1885; see also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 538, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3206 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Bell for the proposition that “[i]n some contexts, . . . the Court has rejected the case-by-case approach to the ‘reasonableness’ inquiry in favor of an approach that determines the reasonableness of contested practices in a categorical fashion”). The policy that the Court categorically upheld in Bell
20

applied to all inmates, including those charged with lesser offenses and even those charged with no wrongdoing at all who were being held as witnesses in protective custody. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 524, 99 S. Ct. at 1866. The policy did not require individualized suspicion. Just the opposite. It called for a search of every inmate returning from a contact visit regardless of whether there was any reasonable suspicion to believe that the inmate was concealing contraband. See id. at 558, 99 S. Ct. at 1884.
The Supreme Court said: “[A]ssuming for present purposes that inmates, both convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees, retain some Fourth Amendment rights upon commitment to a corrections facility, we nonetheless conclude that these searches do not violate that Amendment.” Id. (citations omitted, emphasis added). When the Court stated that “these searches” do not violate the Fourth Amendment, it obviously meant the searches that were before it, and those searches were conducted under a blanket policy without reasonable suspicion. It really is that simple.
If more is needed, it can be found in Justice Powell’s dissenting opinion in Bell, the significance of which has been underappreciated.1 Justice Powell
1 Some, but by no means most, of the discussion in this part of the opinion is borrowed, occasionally verbatim, from Evans, 407 F.3d at 1283–92 (Carnes, J., concurring specially), with the gracious consent of the author of that opinion.
21

dissented for one and only one reason, which was that the Court did not require reasonable suspicion for conducting the strip searches in that case. His opinion, a model of brevity, states in its entirety:
I join the opinion of the Court except the discussion and holding with respect to body-cavity searches. In view of the serious intrusion on one’s privacy occasioned by such a search, I think at least some level of cause, such as a reasonable suspicion, should be required to justify the anal and genital searches described in this case. I therefore dissent on this issue. Bell, 441 U.S. at 563, 99 S. Ct. at 1886 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Obviously, Justice Powell would not have dissented from a holding that the Court had not made. Granted, it can be risky to place too much reliance on dissenting opinions because they sometimes take a Chicken Little or doomsday approach, exaggerating aspects of the majority opinion in order to have a bigger target to attack. Justice Powell’s dissent in Bell is not of that type. It does not attack the majority opinion. Instead, it states in three sentences that it disagrees with only one aspect of the decision and that is the failure to require “some level of cause, such as a reasonable suspicion” before the “anal and genital searches described in this case” can be performed. Id. If the majority had required reasonable suspicion for body cavity inspection strip searches of pretrial detainees, Justice Powell would not have dissented at all. And Justice Marshall would have had one less thing to complain
22

about in his separate dissenting opinion. Id. at 578, 99 S. Ct. at 1894 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Here, the searches are employed absent any suspicion of wrongdoing.”).
From his perspective inside the Court, Justice Powell (like Justice Marshall) had a far better sense of the majority’s decision in Bell than any of us lower court judges could, and he understood that the decision permitted the body cavity inspection strip searches without reasonable suspicion. Confronted with the dissenting statements, the majority, if it had not intended to permit those searches of pretrial detainees without reasonable suspicion, would have noted as much in its opinion. It would have been a simple matter to do that. The majority, however, did not change its opinion to state that reasonable suspicion was required because Justice Powell’s (and Justice Marshall’s) reading of its opinion was accurate. The Bell decision means that the Fourth Amendment does not require reasonable suspicion for this type of strip search in detention facilities.
The decisions that conclude to the contrary not only disregard the existence of the dissenting opinions, but they also ignore one momentous fact of Franciscan simplicity: The Bureau of Prisons’ policy has not changed in any material respect. Under that policy body cavity strip searches without reasonable suspicion are conducted today just as they were when the Bell lawsuit was brought. Indeed, the
23

year after the Bell decision the Bureau enshrined the policy in a regulation, where it remains to this day. The policy still subjects inmates to strip searches involving “a visual inspection of all body surfaces and body cavities” whenever there is either a “reasonable belief” or “a good opportunity for concealment has occurred.” Fed. Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Program Statement No. 5521.05, Searches of Housing Units, Inmates, and Inmate Work Areas 6(b)(1) (1997) (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 552.11(c)(1)). And the policy specifies that “a good opportunity for concealment has occurred,” and the searches are to be performed, when an inmate is processed into the facility for the first time, when an inmate returns from having any contact with the public, such as during a contact visit, and so on. Id. That policy applies to federal facilities nationwide. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 558, 99 S. Ct. at 1884. Yet, so far as we can tell, in the nearly thirty years since the Bell decision was issued no court has attempted to enjoin the Bureau of Prisons from performing body cavity inspection strip searches without reasonable suspicion. The reason should be obvious.
If the Supreme Court’s decision in Bell had required, or permitted lower courts to require, reasonable suspicion before body cavity strip searches could be conducted at detention facilities, the district court in that case would have done so on remand. However, the court must have recognized that the Supreme Court’s
24

decision did not permit it to require reasonable suspicion before the searches could be performed. All other courts should recognize as much.
Some courts fail to recognize that because they misread one sentence from the Bell opinion. See, e.g., Swain, 117 F.3d at 6; Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796, 800 (2d Cir. 1986). In that sentence the Supreme Court said: “But we deal here with the question whether visual body-cavity inspections as contemplated by the [facility’s] rules can ever be conducted on less than probable cause.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 560, 99 S. Ct. at 1885. The Court answered “yes,” but neither the question nor the answer compels the conclusion that “less than probable cause” means “reasonable suspicion.” The absence of reasonable suspicion is also “less than probable cause.” The context of that sentence, which we have already discussed, see supra at 16, is also important. In the sentences that came before that one the Court had acknowledged that some guards may conduct the visual body cavity searches in an abusive fashion. Bell, 441 U.S. at 560, 99 S. Ct. at 1885; see also Wolfish, 439 F. Supp. at 147. The “ever” referred to searches that did not involve abuse. Bell, 441 U.S. at 560, 99 S. Ct. at 1885.
Interpreting the quoted sentence from Bell to require reasonable suspicion puts more weight on it than the words will bear. Doing so also ignores the rest of the majority opinion as well as the dissenters’ interpretation of it, see id. at 563, 99
25

S. Ct. at 1886 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 578, 99 S. Ct. at 1894 (Marshall, J., dissenting), an interpretation that the majority implicitly accepted by not modifying its opinion to require reasonable suspicion. And it ignores the fact that the same searches that were being conducted without reasonable suspicion at MCC when Bell was decided are still being conducted without reasonable suspicion there and at every other federal detention facility in the country.2
One other point is worth discussing. In judging the constitutionality of strip searches for detainees, some other circuits draw a distinction between whether the person has been arrested on a felony charge or just for a misdemeanor or some other lesser violation. See, e.g., Masters v. Crouch, 872 F.2d 1248, 1255 (6th Cir. 1989); Stewart v. Lubbock County, Tex., 767 F.2d 153, 156–57 (5th Cir. 1985); Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1041 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc); Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1272 (7th Cir. 1983).
While those decisions vary in detail around the edges, the picture they paint is essentially the same. The arrestee is charged with committing a misdemeanor or some other lesser violation and, while being booked into the detention facility, she
2 The parties have not cited and we have been unable to find any post-Bell decision enjoining any type of strip search at any federal detention facility.
26

is subjected to a strip search pursuant to the facility’s policy. She later sues the officials asserting that the search was unconstitutional because the guards did not have any reasonable basis for believing that she was hiding contraband on her person. See, e.g., Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1266. In each cited case, the court of appeals concludes that because the plaintiffs were “minor offenders who were not inherently dangerous,” id. at 1272, detention officials could conduct a strip search only where there was “a reasonable suspicion that the individual arrestee is carrying or concealing contraband,” Giles, 746 F.2d at 617. In each of the cases where reasonable suspicion was lacking, the search is held to violate the Fourth Amendment.
Those decisions are wrong. The difference between felonies and misdemeanors or other lesser offenses is without constitutional significance when it comes to detention facility strip searches. It finds no basis in the Bell decision, in the reasoning of that decision, or in the real world of detention facilities. The Supreme Court made no distinction in Bell between detainees based on whether they had been charged with misdemeanors or felonies or even with no crime at all. Instead, the policy that the Court treated categorically, and upheld categorically, was one under which all “[i]nmates at all Bureau of Prison facilities, including the MCC, are required to expose their body cavities for visual inspection as a part of a
27

strip search conducted after every contact visit with a person from outside the
institution.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 558, 99 S. Ct. at 1884. It was a blanket policy
applicable to all.
Among the “[i]nmates at all Bureau of Prison facilities, including the MCC,”
were detainees facing only lesser charges, people incarcerated for contempt of
court, and witnesses in protective custody who had not been accused of doing
anything wrong. See id. at 524 & n.3, 558, 99 S. Ct. at 1866 & n. 3, 1884. The
MCC was hardly a facility where all of the detainees were “awaiting trial on serious federal charges,” as some of the opinions incorrectly state.3 See, e.g., Mary
Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1272. It is on that basis that some of the decisions involving
county jails erroneously distinguish what they describe as the exaggerated need for
strip searches at that type of facility from the real need for them at federal facilities.4 Id.
3 Nor was the MCC facility some special sort of seething cauldron of criminality. The Supreme Court described it this way: “The MCC differs markedly from the familiar image of a jail; there are no barred cells, dank, colorless corridors, or clanging steel gates. It was intended to include the most advanced and innovative features of modern design of detention facilities.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 525, 99 S. Ct. at 1866. Yet, the Supreme Court found that “serious security dangers” warranted the strip search policy at MCC and all federal detention facilities. Id. at 559, 99 S. Ct. at 1884.
4 Even if we were to buy into that distinction, which we do not, it would not make any difference in this case. The Fulton County Jail is a large detention facility, housing about 2,900 inmates, some of whom are charged with or have been convicted of felonies. (See R6:78:¶102); see also Foster v. Fulton County, Ga., 223 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1294 (N.D. Ga. 2002); Foster v. Fulton County, Ga., 223 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1308 (N.D. Ga. 2002).
28

The need for strip searches at all detention facilities, including county jails, is not exaggerated. Employees, visitors, and (not least of all) the detained inmates themselves face a real threat of violence, and administrators must be concerned on a daily basis with the smuggling of contraband by inmates accused of misdemeanors as well as those accused of felonies. See Clements v. Logan, 454 U.S. 1304, 1305, 102 S. Ct. 284, 286 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice) (noting that the jail’s strip search policy had been “adopted after the shooting of a deputy by a misdemeanant who had not been strip-searched”), vacated, 454 U.S. 1117, 102 S. Ct. 961 (1981); Johannes v. Alameda County Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. C 04-458MHP, 2006 WL 2504400, at *4–6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2006) (discussing in statistical detail as well as practical terms the contraband problem at a large county jail and the usefulness of strip searches in combating it); Dodge v. County of Orange, 282 F. Supp. 2d 41, 46–49 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (discussing testimony that strip searches were essential to prevent gangs from smuggling in contraband to the county jail), appeal dismissed, 103 F. App’x 688 (2d Cir. 2004). Even some of the circuits that have required reasonable suspicion for searches of those arrested for misdemeanors concede that there have been instances where contraband was smuggled into a jail by detainees facing only misdemeanor or other lesser charges. See, e.g., Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1272–73.
29

Then there is the fact that gang members commit misdemeanors as well as felonies. In one county jail, for example, fifty percent of those being held on “misdemeanor or lesser charges” were gang members. Dodge, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 48 & n.9 (citing figures from 2002). “Gang members are often more violent, dangerous, and manipulative than other inmates, regardless of the nature of the charges against them.” Id. at 48. Moreover, some gang members “attempt to coerce family members or to coerce, cajole, or intimidate lesser violators into smuggling contraband into the facility.” Id. To make matters worse, “officials at a county jail . . . usually know very little about the new inmates they receive or the security risks they present at the time of their arrival.” Id. The officials usually have no way of knowing whether someone coming into the detention facility after an arrest on a misdemeanor or other minor offense is only a minor offender or is also a gang member who got himself arrested so that he could serve as a mule smuggling contraband in to other members.
These reasons support the expert opinion of jail administrators that all of those who are to be detained in the general population of a detention facility should be strip searched when they enter or re-enter it. Id. at 49 (“All jail personnel who testified at this trial, including plaintiffs’ expert, Robert Joseph DeRosa, testified that, if they could, they would strip search every newly arrived inmate, regardless
30

of what brought him or her to their facility, in order to minimize the risk of introduction of contraband.”).
The Supreme Court has instructed us that jailers and corrections officials “should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 547, 99 S. Ct. at 1878. It has also explained that “judicial deference is accorded not merely because the administrator ordinarily will, as a matter of fact in a particular case, have a better grasp of his domain than the reviewing judge, but also because the operation of our correctional facilities is peculiarly the province of the Legislative and Executive Branches of our Government, not the Judicial.” Id. at 548, 99 S. Ct. at 1879 (citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405, 94 S. Ct. 1800, 1807 (1974)). Decisions that carve out misdemeanor arrestees at county facilities for special treatment do not afford those who run detention facilities the “wide-ranging deference” the Supreme Court has mandated. The courts issuing those decisions have also failed to explain why misdemeanor arrestees in a county detention facility are entitled to more favorable Fourth Amendment treatment than those being detained for contempt of court or as witnesses in protective custody at a federal detention facility were afforded by the Supreme Court in Bell.
31

The decisions acknowledging Bell but reaching a contrary result are clothed in the language of distinction and difference, but at least one of them appeared to the author of the Bell decision himself to be thinly disguised defiance. In Clements, then Justice Rehnquist issued a stay of the decision in Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007 (4th Cir. 1981). Clements, 454 U.S. at 1310, 102 S. Ct. at 288 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice). The court of appeals had decided that the strip search of a woman who was booked into the county jail on a charge of driving while intoxicated violated the Fourth Amendment. As Justice Rehnquist saw it, the Fourth Circuit had “recited from Bell v. Wolfish the general standard by which searches are judged under the Fourth Amendment, but it chose to ignore the Court’s application of that standard to the practice of conducting strip-searches of persons detained after being charged with a crime.” Id. at 1309, 102 S. Ct. at 288. In lambasting what the court of appeals had done, he complained: “In short, the Court of Appeals decision reads as if Bell v.Wolfish had never been decided. Much as that may have been the desire of the lower court, the decision is authoritative precedent and I believe it clearly dictates a contrary result in this case.” Id. at 1310, 102 S. Ct. at 288.5 We recognize the Bell decision as
5 The Supreme Court vacated the stay that Justice Rehnquist had issued to permit the Court to consider the certiorari petition, Clements, 454 U.S. 1117, 1117, 102 S.Ct. 961, 961 (1981), and then denied the petition, Clements, 455 U.S. 942, 942, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 1435 (1982). Our dissenting colleague finds this fact “highly salient” because of her mistaken belief that the
32

authoritative precedent and reach the result it dictates in this case.
denial of certiorari and vacation of the stay means that “Justice Rehnquist’s reading of Bell was rejected by the Supreme Court.” Dissenting op. at 4. The implicit premise of the syllogism that informs her misunderstanding about this point is that the denial of certiorari or vacation of a stay is an indication of the Court’s view on the merits. It is not.
For at least eight decades the Supreme Court has instructed us, time and again, over and over, that the denial of certiorari does not in any way or to any extent reflect or imply any view on the merits. See, e.g., United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490, 43 S.Ct. 181, 182 (1923) (“The denial of a writ of certiorari imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of the case, as the bar has been told many times.”); House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 48, 65 S.Ct. 517, 521 (1945) (“[A]s we have often said, a denial of certiorari by this Court imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of a case.”), overruled on other grounds by Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 118 S.Ct. 1969 (1998); Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 919, 70 S.Ct. 252, 255 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., opinion respecting the denial of certiorari) (“Inasmuch, therefore, as all that a denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari means is that fewer than four members of the Court thought it should be granted, this Court has rigorously insisted that such a denial carries with it no implication whatever regarding the Court’s views on the merits of a case which it has declined to review. The Court has said this again and again; again and again the admonition has to be repeated.”); Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363, 365 n.1, 93 S.Ct. 647, 650 n.1 (1973) (reiterating “the well-settled view that denial of certiorari imparts no implication or inference concerning the Court’s view of the merits.”); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 296, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1067–68 (1989) (“As we have often stated, the denial of a writ of certiorari imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of the case. The variety of considerations that underlie denials of the writ counsels against according denials of certiorari any precedential value.”) (citations, marks, and brackets omitted); Evans v. Stephens, 544 U.S. 942, 942, 125 S.Ct. 2244, 2244 (2005) (Stevens, J., opinion respecting the denial of certiorari) (“On several occasions in the past, I have found it appropriate to emphasize the fact that a denial of certiorari is not a ruling on the merits of any issue raised by the petition.”).
Because the denial of certiorari implies no view of the merits, the denial or vacation of a stay that was entered to permit consideration of a certiorari petition logically cannot imply any view of the merits either. We have previously held exactly that at least twice. Ford v. Strickland, 734 F.2d 538, 542 (11th Cir. 1984) (reiterating that the Supreme Court’s “denial of a stay pending filing and disposition of a writ of certiorari imports no more than a decision to deny certiorari, which does not express any views on the merits of the claims presented.”) (citation and internal marks omitted); Ritter v. Smith, 726 F.2d 1505, 1511 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that the Supreme Court’s vacation of a stay, like its denial of a stay, pending certiorari “imports no more than a decision to deny certiorari, which does not express any views on the merits of the claims presented,” and that is true even when it was done in a co-defendant’s case).
33

D.
The strip searches of the five plaintiffs before us did not include body cavity
inspections. Indeed, the full body visual searches performed on them are exactly what even the district court in Bell grudgingly recognized would be reasonable.6
See Bell, 441 U.S. at 558, 99 S. Ct. at 1884; Wolfish, 573 F.2d at 131; Wolfish,
439 F. Supp. at 148. If these plaintiffs had been strip searched after contact visits
at the Fulton County Jail, instead of as part of the booking process, their claims
would not have a prayer of surviving even the most cursory reading of Bell. Their
best hope for distinguishing Bell lies in the fact that they were strip searched as
part of the booking process instead of after contact visits.
Of course, an inmate’s initial entry into a detention facility might be viewed
as coming after one big and prolonged contact visit with the outside world. There
is no denying that arrestees entering a detention facility usually have had plenty of
contact with outsiders, most having been outsiders themselves until they were
6 Indeed, the searches of these plaintiffs came immediately after each one had taken a group shower with the other incoming detainees of the same sex and before they put on their jail jumpsuit. (R6:78:¶¶181–83, 238–40.) The strip searches consisted of one or more guards viewing the front and back sides of the plaintiffs’ naked bodies. (Id. ¶¶183, 240.) The exposure of flesh was no greater than occurred in the shower itself. We do not think it is open to serious dispute that inmates of the same sex may be required to shower together and that guards of that sex may watch them while they are showering to prevent any misconduct. See generally, Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 746 (5th Cir. 2002); Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 145–46 (7th Cir. 1995); Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093, 1101–02 (8th Cir. 1990). It necessarily follows that this type of visual strip search is not unconstitutional.
34

arrested. What the plaintiffs argue is that with contact visits detainees have enough notice and time to arrange for contraband to be brought to them, while that is not the case with newly arriving arrestees. Arrests, they insist, are not anticipated and as a result provide no chance for one to obtain and conceal contraband.
The factual premise of this argument is unsupportable. Not everyone who is arrested is surprised, seized, and slapped into handcuffs without a moment’s notice. Some people surrender when they are notified that a warrant for them is outstanding. Those who do not turn themselves in often have notice that officers are coming to arrest them. Even those in a vehicle who are pulled over and arrested may have time to hide items on their person before the officer reaches the car door. Then there are those who deliberately get themselves arrested. Demonstrators or protestors engaged in civil disobedience are one example. Another example, as we mentioned earlier, is gang members who get themselves arrested just so they can smuggle in contraband. They have all the time they need to plan their arrests and conceal items on their persons.
The point is that there are plenty of situations where arrestees would have had at least as much opportunity to conceal contraband as would inmates on a contact visit, which is the situation Bell involved. See Wolfish, 439 F. Supp. at 147 (“[I]nmates and their visitors are in full view during the [contact] visits and
35

fully clad. The secreting of objects in rectal or genital areas becomes in this
situation an imposing challenge to nerves and agility.”).
In conclusion, assuming that arrestees being booked into a jail or detention
facility retain some Fourth Amendment rights, see Bell, 441 U.S. at 558, 99 S. Ct. at 1884,7 those rights are not violated by a policy or practice of strip searching each
one of them as part of the booking process, provided that the searches are no more
intrusive on privacy interests than those upheld in the Bell case. We also assume,
of course, that the searches are not conducted in an abusive manner. Because the
part of our Wilson decision finding a constitutional violation under the facts of that
case, Wilson, 251 F.3d at 1343, is inconsistent with our reasoning here, we
overrule it. We also disavow any dicta to the same effect as the Wilson decision.
See, e.g., Skurstenis, 236 F.2d at 682.
III.
Insofar as the district court dismissed the Fourth Amendment point-of-entry
strip search claims of the “the Arrestee Strip Search Class (AR Group),” we
AFFIRM its decision. We REMAND the case back to the panel to apply the
7 This assumption and our reasoning make it unnecessary to decide whether, as the defendants insist, Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984), means that inmates have no right to privacy. We do note, without endorsement or criticism, that one of our decisions concludes that jail inmates retain a right to bodily privacy that implicates the Fourth Amendment. See Fortner v. Thomas, 983 F.2d 1024, 1026 (11th Cir. 1993) (“As a matter of first impression in this circuit, we hold that a prisoner retains a constitutional right to bodily privacy.”).
36

principles we have discussed in this opinion to the other two groups of plaintiffs in this case, which it denominated the “Alpha Strip Search Class (AL Group)” and the “Court Return Strip Search Class (CR Group).”
37

EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge, Concurring: I do not write in a complaining spirit. I unhesitatingly concur in the Court's
judgment and in almost all of today's Court opinion. I write separately because I think it is jurisprudentially unsound to look at a Justice's dissenting opinion to determine what the Supreme Court has decided in a case.
To the degree that our Court today seems to make some verifying use--I think unnecessarily--of this approach, I cannot join it.
38

BARKETT, Circuit Judge, Dissenting: I believe the majority misreads Bell as justifying a balancing test that is
satisfied by the mere fact that the strip searches take place in jails. The complaint alleges the automatic strip-searching, in a group, of arrestees charged with petty misdemeanors when there is no cause whatsoever to suspect the individuals of concealing contraband. No justification for these invasive searches is alleged and there are no other facts before us at this juncture to permit upholding these searches under the Bell balancing test. Under the longstanding, widely-held reading of Bell, with which I agree, the plaintiffs have stated a valid constitutional claim for a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
A. Applying the Bell Balancing Test to the Complaint Like the majority, I recognize and appreciate the deference due to jail administrators as they fulfill their charge of ensuring security in jails, not only for the jail officials but also for the inmates. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547–48 (1979). At the same time, “convicted prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional protections by reason of their conviction and confinement in prison.” Id. at 545. This principle applies with at least as much force to individuals detained prior to their trial on petty misdemeanor charges such as failing to pay child support, driving without a license, or trespassing. See id. These protections,
39

such as the right to be free from degrading, humiliating, and dehumanizing
treatment and the right to bodily integrity, include protection against forced
nakedness during strip searches in front of others. See Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d
1107, 1111 (11th Cir. 2006) (“We have reaffirmed the privacy rights of prisoners
emphasizing the harm of compelled nudity.” (citing Padgett v. Donald, 401 F.3d
1273, 1281 (11th Cir. 2005))).1
I recognize that even these rights can be circumscribed given adequate
cause. The question is whether there is adequate cause to permit the intrusive
searches of these arrestees. The Supreme Court in Bell instructed the lower courts
to answer that question by considering the following four factors: (1) the
1 Additionally, in Justice v. City of Peachtree City, 961 F.2d 188, 192 (11th Cir. 1992), we stated:
It is axiomatic that a strip search represents a serious intrusion upon personal rights. In Mary Beth G., the court referred to strip searches as “demeaning, dehumanizing, undignified, humiliating, terrifying, unpleasant, embarrassing, repulsive, signifying degradation and submission.” Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1272. Another court described the indignity individuals arrested for minor offenses experience in the following manner:
The experience of disrobing and exposing one’s self for visual inspection by a stranger clothed with the uniform and authority of the state, in an enclosed room inside a jail, can only be seen as thoroughly degrading and frightening. Moreover, the imposition of such a search upon an individual detained for a lesser offense is quite likely to take that person by surprise, thereby exacerbating the terrifying quality of the event. John Does 1-100 v. Boyd, 613 F. Supp. 1514, 1522 (D. Minn. 1985). One commentator has gone so far as to describe strip searches as “visual rape.” See Shuldiner, Visual Rape: A Look at the Dubious Legality of Strip Searches, 13 J. Marshall L. Rev. 278 (1980).
40

justification for initiating the search; (2) the scope of the particular intrusion; (3) the manner in which the search is conducted; and (4) the place in which it is conducted. 441 U.S. at 559. It did so based on a fully developed trial record, which detailed the procedure in place, the asserted justifications for the procedure, and the alleged violations of the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Id. at 528, 559.
For almost thirty years, circuit courts have followed the Bell Court’s instructions and, until today, universally held that reasonable suspicion is necessary to constitutionally justify the types of searches before us. See Wilson v. Jones, 251 F.3d 1340, 1343 (11th Cir. 2001); Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1997); Masters v. Crouch, 872 F.2d 1248, 1255 (6th Cir. 1989); Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796, 804 (2d Cir. 1986); Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 739, 741–42 (8th Cir. 1985); Stewart v. Lubbock County, 767 F.2d 153, 156–57 (5th Cir. 1985); Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1040 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc); Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391, 394–95 (10th Cir. 1984); Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1273 (7th Cir. 1983); Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007, 1013 (4th Cir. 1981).
The Supreme Court has never found it necessary to contradict the unanimous view of the circuit courts that required reasonable suspicion for strip searches over
41

the past three decades. Quite the opposite. When the Court had the opportunity, it refused to do so. In Logan v. Shealy, after a trial, the Fourth Circuit enjoined a detention center from applying its blanket policy of strip-searching all booked individuals. 660 F.2d at 1013. The Fourth Circuit determined that the strip search of Logan—who was arrested for a DWI offense—had no “discernible relationship to security needs at the Detention Center that, when balanced against the ultimate invasion of personal rights involved, it could reasonably be thought justified.” Id. As the majority notes, in an order staying the injunction issued by the Fourth Circuit, Justice Rehnquist, in an individual opinion as Circuit Justice, strongly expressed his belief that the Fourth Circuit misapplied Bell by failing to give proper weight to the security concerns identified by the law enforcement officials as justification for the search. Clements v. Logan, 454 U.S. 1304, 1309–10 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice), vacated, 454 U.S. 1117 (1981). However, Justice Rehnquist’s reading of Bell was rejected by the Supreme Court, as evidenced by the vacation of the stay and the denial of certiorari. This is highly salient because, in essence, the majority’s argument merely repackages the interpretation of Bell that Justice Rehnquist futilely advanced in Clements.
Today, the majority reads the balancing test out of Bell and effectively establishes a per se rule permitting automatic strip searches of all detainees,
42

regardless of their status, in the name of security and administrative convenience. But Bell did not validate strip searches in detention settings per se. 441 U.S. at 559; Roberts v. Rhode Island, 239 F.3d 107, 113 (1st Cir. 2001) (“Bell has not been read as holding that the security interests of a detention facility will always outweigh the privacy interests of the detainees.” (quoting Dobrowolskyj v. Jefferson County, 823 F.2d 955, 957 (6th Cir. 1987))); Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1272. Instead, the Supreme Court explained, “[t]he test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application. In each case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 559 (emphasis added). As this language makes clear, the Bell balancing test is case-specific and there is no general rule rendering the allegations before us inadequate to state a claim.
Nor does the fact that Bell upheld a blanket policy, after a trial, mean that the Supreme Court implicitly rejected a finding that reasonable suspicion is ever necessary to justify strip searches or strip search policies. This is too broad a constitutional principle to derive from an allegedly implicit holding of the Supreme Court. A more reasonable interpretation would be that the Supreme Court did not need to address the issue because reasonable suspicion was present in the
43

evidentiary record based on the detainees’ planned contact with outsiders knowing
they would be returning to the general population of the detention center after the
visit. Id. at 558; Shain v. Ellison, 273 F.3d 56, 64 (2nd Cir. 2001) (“Second, and
more important, Bell authorized strip searches after contact visits, where contraband often is passed.”).2 Such a reading would be consistent with the
Supreme Court’s description of the issue as dealing only with the need for probable
cause. Bell, 441 U.S. at 560.
The majority also reads too much into the dissents of Justice Powell and
Justice Marshall to support its argument that the Supreme Court implicitly
sanctioned strip searches without reasonable suspicion. The reading more
consistent with judicial rules of construction is that Justice Powell wanted the
Supreme Court to decide more than it was willing to decide, namely, to explicitly
articulate a level of cause necessary to justify the searches. See Kennedy v. Los
Angeles Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 702, 715 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at
2 Reading a finding of reasonable suspicion into Bell is consistent with the precedent in a number of circuit courts—including our own—that have found reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify strip searches of individuals based on the nature of the charged offense that led to their arrest or other behavioral indicators. See, e.g., Hicks v. Moore, 422 F.3d 1246, 1252 (11th Cir. 2005) (“We accept that a person’s being charged with a crime of violence is sufficient to evoke reasonable suspicion that the person may be concealing weapons or contraband.”); see also Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1447 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that reasonable suspicion existed to strip-search an inmate upon introduction to the general jail population based on nature of the charges); Arruda v. Fair, 710 F.2d 886, 887 (1st Cir. 1983) (upholding strip searches of inmates upon their return from the infirmary).
44

563 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)). The Bell majority was willing to say that probable cause was not necessary but was unwilling to state any more than that. This silence cannot be construed to mean that the Supreme Court rejected the notion that the Fourth Amendment requires reasonable suspicion to justify strip searches of misdemeanor detainees. If the Bell Court had intended to restrict lower courts from making that determination, it would have just said so.
In the case before us, the majority purports to apply the Bell balancing test to the complaint. However, the allegations of the complaint do not include any facts that support the majority’s conclusion that justification exists for the strip searches of these appellants. Facts regarding the jail administration’s justification for the policy are simply absent because there is no evidentiary record at this stage. Given this absence, it is no surprise that neither the Supreme Court nor any circuit court has found constitutional this type of strip-search policy on a motion to dismiss.3
The majority says that the policy is justified on the basis of generalized security concerns, citing the records of cases that describe contraband problems of specific detention facilities other than the Fulton County Jail. Although generalized security concerns might be relevant in a Bell analysis, simply saying
3 Several courts have noted the general problem of applying the Bell balancing test to affirm a dismissal of a complaint. See, e.g., Beaulieu v. Ludeman, No. 07-CV-1535, 2008 WL 2498241, at *12 (D. Minn. June 18, 2008) (“[T]his Court does not have before it any facts to assist it in evaluating the factors necessary to determine if the alleged blanket strip search policy in this case is appropriate.”).
45

jails typically are dangerous places is not a sufficient “justification for initiating” the strip searches under Bell. Generalized security concerns cannot be enough to justify an infringement of such magnitude—an infringement that involves an intrusion of the most intimate sort. I believe the majority’s reliance on factual findings unrelated to the specific situation at the Fulton County Jail is an abdication of our responsibility to weigh the significant competing interests—particularly the justification for the search—on the basis of specific facts.
To adequately weigh the justification for a search against the privacy concerns that Bell recognized, there has be an institution-specific justification for the policy. Should such justification be offered, deference might be due. There is a difference, however, between deference and abdication of our duty to perform the weighing function with which we have been charged. See Kennedy, 901 F.2d at 712 (“When litigants petition the federal courts to review the application of an institutional policy, the courts must proceed cautiously; the Supreme Court has sounded this warning emphatically and with considerable wisdom. Yet, at the same time, we must be equally careful not to abdicate our function as the guardians of the Constitution.”).
46

Indeed, the Supreme Court in Bell specifically noted that deference is not due when there is “substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations.” 441 U.S. at 548 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974)). Automatically strip-searching all pretrial misdemeanor detainees absent any suspicion that such detainees pose a security threat and anything indicating they were aware that they were going to be arrested is the exaggerated response which Bell cautioned against.4 “[A]rrest and confinement in the [county jail] are unplanned events, so the policy could not possibly deter arrestees from carrying contraband.” Giles, 746 F.2d at 617.
These appellees differ significantly from those in Bell, where the stripsearched plaintiffs had advance knowledge of their return to the general jail population after their planned interactions with outsiders. Again, as other circuit courts have recognized, the reasonable need for inspection in the Bell scenario is simply not present after the unplanned arrest of individuals for petty misdemeanors unrelated to contraband. See, e.g., Shain, 273 F.3d at 64; Roberts, 239 F.3d at 111 (“[T]he deterrent rationale for the Bell search is simply less relevant given the essentially unplanned nature of an arrest and subsequent incarceration.”); Giles,
4 And if, for example, Powell was such a threat, he would not have been committed to the Fulton County Jail for over twenty-four hours without being strip-searched. See Logan, 660 F.2d at 1013 (finding relevant that “when strip-searched, [the plaintiff] had been at the Detention Center for one and one-half hours without even a pat-down search”).
47

746 F.2d at 617. The majority’s assertion that pretrial detainees booked on petty misdemeanor charges might anticipate their arrests or that gang members might deliberately get arrested in order to smuggle weapons and drugs into jail is unwarranted speculation in this case. See generally Shain, 273 F.3d at 64 (“Unlike persons already in jail who receive contact visits, arrestees do not ordinarily have notice that they are about to be arrested and thus an opportunity to hide something. For the exceptions—for example, a person who is allowed to visit the bathroom unescorted before an arrest—reasonable suspicion may well exist.”).
It is simply unreasonable to assume that individuals arrested on misdemeanor charges not giving rise to reasonable suspicion are going about their daily lives carrying contraband in such a way as to be discoverable only by a strip search. More to the point, it is an exaggerated response to strip-search all pretrial misdemeanor detainees on the basis of this speculative concern. Although easier and more convenient to simply subject all detainees to a blanket policy, the indiscriminate strip searches before us “cannot be justified simply on the basis of administrative ease in attending to security considerations.” Roberts, 239 F.3d at 113 (quoting Logan, 660 F.2d at 1013); see also Chapman v. Nichols, 989 F.2d 393, 396 (10th Cir. 1993); see generally Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 346 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting “the clear holding of our cases that ‘administrative
48

convenience’ is a thoroughly inadequate basis for the deprivation of core constitutional rights”). As the Ninth Circuit noted, intermingling alone is an insufficient justification because the practice is inherently “limited and avoidable.” Giles, 746 F.2d at 619. And, to echo the concern voiced by the First Circuit, “[t]o place so much weight on one (potentially alterable) characteristic of the state prison system would gut the balancing approach endorsed by the Supreme Court in Bell . . . .” Roberts, 239 F.3d at 113.
Moreover, the current existence of less-intrusive alternatives to stripsearching is instructive in an assessment of the strength of the justification for the strip search policy. Metal detectors would be effective in discovering metallic weapons, discounting—at least, to some degree—the safety rationale. And, in this case, Powell points to the availability of new technology that could detect nonmetallic contraband as well. Thus, assuming all else being equal, the search in the instant case is less reasonable than the one in Bell because of the present availability of less intrusive but equally effective means of achieving the important goal of jail safety.
The Bell test also requires courts to examine “the scope of the particular intrusion.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 559. In its balancing, the Bell Court noted the highly intrusive nature of the strip and visual body-cavity searches. Id. at 560 (“We do
49

not underestimate the degree to which these searches may invade the personal privacy of inmates.”). Even the least invasive strip search is highly intrusive. See, e.g., Kirkpatrick v. City of Los Angeles, 803 F.2d 485, 489–90 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he fact that a strip search is conducted reasonably, without touching and outside the view of all persons other than the party performing the search, does not negate the fact that a strip search is a significant intrusion on the person searched.”) (citation omitted); Thompson, 885 F.2d at 1446 (“The feelings of humiliation and degradation associated with forcibly exposing one’s nude body to strangers for visual inspection is beyond dispute.”). Furthermore, as our own precedent recognizes, the general harm of forced nudity is often even greater when imposed upon a misdemeanor detainee given that such treatment “is quite likely to take that person by surprise, thereby exacerbating the terrifying quality of the event.” Justice, 961 F.2d at 192 (quoting John Does 1-100, 613 F. Supp. at 1522).
Turning to the remaining “manner” and “place” prongs of the Bell balancing test, I note that the strip searches in this case took place in rooms of 30 to 40 people as a matter of course.5 The presence of others likewise militates against the reasonableness of the searches. See, e.g., Masters, 872 F.2d at 1250, 1254;
5 In Bell, the policy subjected detainees to individual searches, although in practice, prisoners were sometimes searched in the presence of other inmates. See 441 U.S. at 577 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
50

Edwards, 770 F.2d at 742; Hill, 735 F.2d at 394. The majority discounts this factor by noting that detainees in the Fulton County Jail are observed during a required group shower. While the amount of exposed flesh might remain constant, the level of scrutiny surely differs when a jail official monitors the detainees during a group shower for physical altercations as opposed to when a jail official closely scrutinizes an individual for contraband during a strip search. Moreover, the observation of group showers was not at issue in this case and had never been addressed by this circuit before the majority’s cursory treatment of the issue in a footnote.
B. The Detainees in the Other Groups Were Entitled to Immediate Release Finally, the majority remands the case back to the panel to apply the
principles discussed in the opinion to the Alpha Strip Search Class (AL Group) and the Court Return Strip Search Class (CR Group). Members of these groups were entitled to release and could not be legally detained any longer. Powell v. Barrett, 496 F.3d 1288, 1314 (11th Cir. 2007), vacated, No. 05-16734 (11th Cir. Feb. 1, 2008) (recognizing “the privacy interests of the AL and CR Group Plaintiffs are the same, or arguably greater than, those of arrestees because they are entitled to release and the basis for their detention at the Jail no longer exists”); see also Cannon v. Macon County, 1 F.3d 1558, 1563 (11th Cir. 1993). These individuals
51

should not have been subjected to any strip search, since their detention was no longer authorized under any possible legal principle. I also would note that today’s decision should not be read as foreclosing future Fourth Amendment challenges in cases where a jail’s search policy is more intrusive without a concomitant increase in the justification for the intrusion.
52

 
 496 F.3d 1288 (2007)
C. Alan POWELL, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Tory Dunlap, individually, and on behalf of all other similarly situated, et al., Plaintiffs Appellees Cross-
Appellants, v.
Sheriff Jacqueline BARRETT, Fulton County, State of Georgia, Sheriff Myron Freeman, Fulton County, State of Georgia, et al., Defendants-Appellants Cross-Appellees.
No. 05-16734. United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
August 23, 2007. 12899012345 *1289 *1290 *1291 *1292 *1293 *1294 *1295 Sidney Leighton Moore, III, Teresa Wynn Roseborough, John H.
Fleming, Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, LLP, Theodore H. Lackland, Lackland & Heyward, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants. William Charles Claiborne, III, Washington, DC, George Brian Spears, Law Office of Brian Spears, Charles B. Pekor, Daniel Eliot DeWoskin, Pekor & DeWoskin, LLC, Coy J. Johnson, Jr., Rolesia Butler Dancy, Willie Jake 1296 Lovett, Jr., Fulton *1296 Cty. Attorney's Office, Overtis Hicks Brantley, City Law Dept., Atlanta, GA, Barrett S. Litt, Litt, Estuar, Harrison, Miller & Kitson, LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiffs. Before BLACK and HULL, Circuit Judges, and RYSKAMP,[*] District Judge. BLACK, Circuit Judge:
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Allegations in the Complaint Concerning the Jail's Strip Search Policy 1. Strip Searches as part of Point-of Entry Booking into the Jail (AR Group) 2. Strip Searches after Becoming Entitled to Release at the Jail (AL Group) 3. Strip Searches upon Returning from Court Appearance (CR Group)
B. Section 1983 Claims based on the Jail's Strip Search Policy 1. Claims against the Sheriffs 2. Claims against the County and the Board 3. Claims against the City
C. District Court's Order
II. DISCUSSION
A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity from Suit in Official Capacity 1. Eleventh Amendment Factors a. How state law defines the sheriff's office

b. Where state law vests control
c. Where the entity derives its funds
d. Liability for and payment of adverse judgments
2. Local Constitutional Amendments
B. Qualified Immunity from Suit in Individual Capacity
1. Constitutional Violation
a. Strip searches of AR Group Plaintiffs
b. Strip searches of AL and CR Group Plaintiffs
2. Clearly Established Law
a. Strip Searches of AR Group Plaintiffs
b. Strip Searches of AL and CR Group Plaintiffs
C. Municipal Liability of the County and the City under § 1983
1. Liability of the City
2. Liability of the County
III. CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs, 11 male former detainees at the Fulton County Jail (the Jail), filed a putative class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the former and current sheriffs of the Jail (the Sheriffs), Fulton County (the County), the members of the Fulton County Board of Commissioners (the Board), and the City of Atlanta (the City) (collectively, Defendants).[1] In their Fourth Amended Complaint (the Complaint), Plaintiffs claim their constitutional rights were violated when they were subjected at the Jail to "blanket strip searches," or strip searches without an individualized finding of reasonable suspicion that each Plaintiff was concealing weapons, drugs, or other contraband. Defendants filed motions to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim, arguing, inter alia, the Sheriffs were entitled to both Eleventh Amendment immunity and qualified immunity and the County 1297 and City lacked the requisite control over the policies at the Jail to be liable as municipalities *1297 under § 1983. In an order dated July 5, 2005 (the Order), the district court granted in part and denied in part Defendants' motions to dismiss.[2] In this appeal and cross-appeal, the parties challenge the district court's Order. After hearing oral argument, considering the parties' briefs, and reviewing the pertinent record, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand in part.[3]
I. BACKGROUND
In the Complaint, Plaintiffs sue former Sheriff Jacqueline Barrett in her individual capacity, current Sheriff Myron Freeman in his official and individual capacities, the County, the Board,[4] and the City. Plaintiffs seek both monetary damages and injunctive relief against Defendants.[5] Plaintiffs challenge the blanket strip searches at the Jail on behalf of three putative classes: the Arrestee Strip Search Class (AR Group), Alpha Strip Search Class (AL Group), and Court Return Strip Search Class (CR Group).[6] Although the Complaint contains a chart showing the Plaintiffs included in each strip search group, there are some discrepancies between the chart and the allegations in the Complaint. The chart that appears in the appendix to this opinion is consistent with the allegations in the Complaint, and we rely on the appended chart for purposes of our opinion. As shown in the chart, the Plaintiffs and their respective strip search groups are as follows: C. Alan Powell (AR and AL Groups),[7]

David Evans (AR and CR Groups), Stanley Clemons (AR Group), Allen Middleton (AR Group), Anthony Westbrook (AR Group), Benjamin Blake (AR Group), Harry Witherspoon (AR Group), Antionne Wolf (AR and CR 1298 Groups), and Kristopher Alan Matkin (AL Group).[8] Plaintiffs identify *1298 three types of blanket strip searches [9] they contend violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights: (1) blanket strip searches of arrestees as part of their point-of-entry booking into the Jail (AR Group); (2) blanket strip searches of detainees who posted bond or were ordered released at the Jail before their point-of-entry booking into the Jail was started or completed (AL Group); and (3) blanket strip searches of detainees who return from a court appearance after having been ordered released in state court (CR Group).[10]
We first summarize the factual allegations in the Complaint as they pertain to each group. We then explain the claims against the various Defendants and summarize the district court's rulings on those claims.
A. Factual Allegations in the Complaint Concerning the Jail's Strip Search Policy
1. Strip Searches as part of Point-of-Entry Booking into the Jail (AR Group)
According to the Complaint, there is a policy at the Jail whereby every male arrestee "booked"[11] into the Jail's general population upon entering the Jail, regardless of the crime for which he is arrested, is subjected to a strip search without an individualized finding of reasonable suspicion that the arrestee is concealing weapons, drugs, or other contraband. Each male arrestee is placed in a room with a group of 30 or 40 other persons, removes all of his clothing and places it in boxes, and, along with the group, takes a shower.[12] Each arrestee then either by himself or standing in line with others is visually inspected front and back by deputies. The booking strip search process is referred to as "dressing out." The AR Group Plaintiffs allege they were subjected to blanket strip searches as part of their point-of-entry booking into the Jail.
2. Strip Searches after Becoming Entitled to Release at the Jail (AL Group)
According to the Complaint, the Jail's inmate management system is so inefficient that many persons committed to the Jail either post bond (or have someone post it for them) or are ordered released at First Appearance 1299 hearings at the Jail before *1299 their point-of-entry booking into the Jail has been started or completed.[13] Because these detainees were not booked immediately upon entering the Jail, they are subjected to the booking process 0907 including the booking strip searches 0907 after posting bond or having been ordered released at the Jail. Plaintiffs allege that, as a result, there is a practice of subjecting detainees who are to be released to booking strip searches before they are released from the Jail.[14] The AL Group Plaintiffs allege they were subjected to booking strip searches after having posted bond, in the case of Powell, or having been ordered released at a First Appearance hearing at the Jail, in the case of Matkin. It is not clear why Jail officials included the strip searches as part of the late booking process for the AL Group Plaintiffs given that they were to be released. However, we assume the AL Group Plaintiffs were strip searched because they were placed into the Jail's general population, where they were held while the staff in the Records Room checked for other detention orders, warrants, or holds and processed their release.
3. Strip Searches upon Returning from Court Appearance (CR Group)
Further, Plaintiffs allege the Jail has a policy whereby detainees who have been ordered released by a judge in state court are returned to the Jail following their court appearance instead of being released from the courthouse. Upon their return to the Jail, these detainees are subjected to blanket strip searches and booked back into the Jail's general population while the Record Rooms staff checked for other warrants or holds and processed their release.[15] The CR Group Plaintiffs, Evans and Wolf, allege they were subjected to blanket strip searches upon returning to the Jail after their court appearances. Unlike the AL Group Plaintiffs, the CR Group Plaintiffs were immediately booked upon entering the Jail and thus were already strip searched once before.[16] The CR Group Plaintiffs allege that, while in transit to and from the Jail and while at the courthouse, they were under constant supervision and were not permitted to have contact with anyone other than the Sheriff's deputies and their attorneys. According to the Complaint, the detainees' visits with their attorneys while at the courthouse were "subject to supervision by the Fulton County Sheriff's deputies."

B. Section 1983 Claims based on the Jail's Strip Search Policy
1300 Plaintiffs assert § 1983 claims against Defendants based on the Jail's policies of *1300 conducting: (1) blanket strip searches of arrestees as part of their point-of-entry booking into the Jail (AR Group); (2) blanket strip searches of detainees who posted bond or were ordered released at the Jail before their point-of-entry booking into the Jail was started or completed (AL Group); and (3) blanket strip searches of detainees who return from a court appearance after having been ordered released in state court (CR Group).[17]
1. Claims against the Sheriffs
The AR, AL, and CR Groups assert § 1983 claims against the Sheriffs in Counts 1, 5, and 9 of the Complaint, respectively. Plaintiffs allege the Sheriffs knew of the strip search policies at the Jail and acquiesced in the strip searches. According to Plaintiffs, the Sheriffs' failure to act was the "moving force" behind the constitutional violations and, by maintaining or acquiescing in the strip search policies, the Sheriffs were deliberately indifferent to the risk of constitutional injury.
2. Claims against the County and the Board
The AR, AL, and CR Groups assert § 1983 claims against the County and the Board in Counts 3, 7, and 11 of the Complaint, respectively. Plaintiffs allege the County and the Board had "ultimate authority" over the Jail, failed to adequately fund and staff the Jail and the County's criminal justice network, and failed to train the Sheriffs and their staff.
According to Plaintiffs, the County and the Board have authority to "maintain and operate facilities for the detention, incarceration or confinement of all persons subject to confinement under the laws of the state, any county resolution, or any city ordinance." They claim the County exercised its authority when it built the current Jail. According to Plaintiffs, the Board has the power to designate the person who controls the County's incarceration facilities, and the Board has designated the sheriff as the person who operates and controls the Jail. Plaintiffs allege, therefore, that "the Board, not the sheriff, has ultimate control" over the Jail.
Plaintiffs also allege the County, through the Board, sets the budget for the Jail; administers the Fulton County Civil Service System, which governs all county employees, including deputies, Records Room staff, and other Jail staff; maintains a unified pension system for all county employees, including the sheriff and the sheriff's staff; and supervises the sheriff's duties to hire, discipline, and fire Jail employees, as well as the sheriff's duties to formulate, implement, and execute "policies concerning the operation of the Fulton County Jail facilities subject to the authority of the Board." Lastly, Plaintiffs allege the Board controls and operates the Fulton County Police Department, which transports the individuals it arrests to the Jail for confinement.
Plaintiffs allege the County and the Board "knew or should have known" of the illegal strip searches at the Jail 1301 and were "deliberately indifferent" to the rights of Plaintiffs to be free from such strip *1301 searches. Plaintiffs
claim the County's and the Board's "deliberate indifference" was the "motivating factor" of Plaintiffs' injuries.
3. Claims against the City
The AR, AL, and CR Groups assert § 1983 claims against the City in Counts 4, 8, and 12 of the Complaint, respectively. Plaintiffs allege the City has control over the Atlanta Police Department's policy of charging persons arrested within the municipality with either municipal or state offenses and over where to incarcerate those persons, even those charged with state offenses.
Specifically, Plaintiffs state that, prior to January 1, 2003, the Atlanta Police Department committed all persons it arrested, even those it charged with state offenses, to a City of Atlanta detention facility instead of the County Jail. The City detained and assumed responsibility for conducting probable cause hearings for all persons its officers arrested, whether the persons were arrested on state or municipal charges. Persons arrested for state offenses for whom probable cause was found were then transferred to the Jail. However, many of the persons arrested for state offenses had their charges reduced to municipal offenses at their probable cause hearings, and thus many arrestees were never transferred to the County Jail.

Plaintiffs allege that during 2002, the mayor developed-and the city council approved-a new policy to "save money for the City." As of January 1, 2003, the City ceased its policy of committing persons arrested within the municipality to an Atlanta detention facility and holding their First Appearance hearings there. Instead, under the new policy, the Atlanta Police Department began charging all arrestees with state offenses, whenever possible, and committing those persons directly to the Jail, instead of detaining them in the City detention facility as they had previously done.
According to Plaintiffs, the City knew or should have known the Jail had a custom and policy of subjecting the AR, AL, and CR Group Plaintiffs to illegal blanket strip searches and still chose to change its policy. Plaintiffs allege the City was "deliberately indifferent" to the rights of Plaintiffs, and its deliberate indifference was the "moving force" behind Plaintiffs' injuries.
C. District Court's Order
In its Order, the district court addressed Defendants' motions to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Powell v. Barrett, 376 F.Supp.2d 1340 (N.D.Ga.2005).
In response to the Sheriffs' motion to dismiss, the district court first determined Sheriff Freeman functions as an arm of the State and, therefore, is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from claims against him in his official capacity seeking monetary damages. Id. at 1345-46. The district court relied on this Court's decisions in Grech v. Clayton County, 335 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir.2003) (en banc), Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir.2003) (en banc), and Purcell ex rel. Estate of Morgan v. Toombs County, 400 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir.2005), where we stated that a sheriff "functions as an arm of the State 0907not [the] County 0907when promulgating polices and procedures governing conditions of confinement at the [ ] County Jail." Powell, 376 F.Supp.2d at 1345 (alterations in original). The district court clarified, however, that the Eleventh Amendment did not foreclose Plaintiffs from seeking prospective, injunctive relief against Sheriff Freeman in his official capacity.
1302 *1302 The district court also determined the Sheriffs were entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiffs' strip search claims for monetary damages against the Sheriffs in their individual capacities. Id. at 1346-50. After assuming Plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged constitutional violations, the district court determined that Plaintiffs' right to be free from blanket strip searches was not clearly established. Id. at 1346 n. 3, 1349. The district court analyzed this Court's decisions in Wilson v. Jones, 251 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir.2001), and this Court's panel and en banc decisions in Evans v. City of Zebulon, 351 F.3d 485 (11th Cir. 2003), vacated by 364 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2004), and Evans v. Stephens, 407 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir.2005) (en banc) (Evans I and Evans II, respectively). Id. at 1347-50. It found that because this Circuit had "perceive[d] room to debate the contours of this constitutional right," the Sheriffs could not justifiably be charged with having fair warning that conducting strip searches absent reasonable suspicion violated the law. Id. at 1349. Accordingly, the district court dismissed the strip search claims against the Sheriffs in their individual capacities. Id. at 1350.
In response to the County's and City's motions to dismiss, the district court agreed the County and the City lacked the requisite control over the strip search policies at the Jail to be liable under § 1983 for such policies.[18] The district court explained that, with respect to the City, Plaintiffs failed to advance any allegation that the City "controlled" or was "actually responsible for" the strip search practices at the Jail. With respect to the County, the district court found the County could not be held liable for the strip search practices at the Jail under Grech and Manders, explaining that a Georgia sheriff acts as an arm of the state in his or her corrections and detaineeoversight roles and the County lacks any meaningful authority to direct the sheriff's actions in those regards. Further, the district court rejected Plaintiffs' argument that three "local constitutional amendments" applicable only to Fulton County gave the County control over the operation of the Jail and treatment of detainees at the Jail. The district court explained that it found nothing in the amendments or the Fulton County Code reflecting the Board's exercise of any potential authority granted by the amendments. Additionally, it found the amendments did not give the County the authority to direct the policies of the Sheriffs, nor did they alter the established allocation of power between the Sheriffs and County with respect to corrections.
The district court nonetheless concluded Plaintiffs had stated a claim against the County and the City insofar as Plaintiffs alleged the County and the City, through their respective police forces, maintained a policy of placing

their respective arrestees in the Jail with knowledge of the Jail's unconstitutional practices. According to the district court, in addition to the policies at the Jail, Plaintiffs had identified another "proximate `moving force'" behind their alleged constitutional violations, namely, the County's and City's policies of placing their arrestees at the Jail. The district court found that, because Georgia law suggests the County and the City do control where their respective police departments place arrestees, the County and the City could face § 1983 liability for these 1303 policies. Accordingly, the district court denied *1303 the County's and City's motions to dismiss. Id. at 1356, 1360.
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, the County and the City maintain they cannot be held liable under § 1983 for their policies of placing arrestees at the Jail. They argue that because they do not control the policies at the Jail, Plaintiffs' claims against them must be dismissed.
On cross-appeal, Plaintiffs contend the district court erred in determining Sheriff Freeman is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity because, under three local constitutional amendments applicable to Fulton County, the County operates the Jail and thus the Sheriff acts for the County rather than the State of Georgia.[19] Plaintiffs also cross-appeal the district court's determination that the Sheriffs are entitled to qualified immunity from the strip search claims against them in their individual capacities. Plaintiffs argue their constitutional rights to be free from blanket strip searches was clearly established at the time they were strip searched at the Jail.
We must determine, therefore, whether (1) Sheriff Freeman is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from Plaintiffs' strip search claims for monetary damages against him in his official capacity; (2) Sheriff Barrett is entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiffs' strip search claims for monetary damages against her in her individual capacity;[20] and (3) the County and City are subject to municipal liability under § 1983 for Plaintiffs' strip search claims.
We note at the outset that we have jurisdiction to consider the issues raised on both appeal and cross-appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Section § 1292(b) permits this Court to review a district court order not otherwise appealable as an interlocutory decision if the district court certifies that its order "involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The district court certified the issues addressed in its Order for immediate appeal in an order dated August 1, 2005. Defendants timely petitioned and Plaintiffs timely cross-petitioned this Court for permission to appeal the Order, and we granted the petitions on December 8, 2005.[21]
1304 *1304 We review the district court's rulings on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim de novo, accepting all factual allegations as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hill v. White, 321 F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir.2003); see also Ass'n for Disabled Americans, Inc. v. Fla. Int'l Univ., 405 F.3d 954, 956 (11th Cir.2005) (applying de novo standard to district court's grant of a motion to dismiss based upon Eleventh Amendment immunity); Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d 991, 994 (11th Cir.2003) (applying de novo standard to district court's decision to grant or deny the defense of qualified immunity on a motion to dismiss). "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (citations and internal quotations omitted). A complaint is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) when the allegations in the complaint, on their face, show that an affirmative defense bars recovery on the claim. Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1022 (11th Cir.2003) (en banc).
A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity from Suit in Official Capacity
We first address whether Sheriff Freeman is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from Plaintiffs' strip search claims for monetary damages against him in his official capacity. "The Eleventh Amendment protects a State from being sued in federal court without the State's consent." Manders, 338 F.3d at 1308. The Eleventh Amendment also bars suits brought in federal court against a defendant acting as an "arm of the State." Id. To determine

whether a defendant is an "arm of the State," this Court examines the four factors enumerated in Manders: "(1) how state law defines the entity; (2) what degree of control the State maintains over the entity; (3) where the entity derives its funds; and (4) who is responsible for judgments against the entity." Id. at 1309. The factors must be considered "in light of the particular function in which the defendant was engaged when taking the actions out of which liability is asserted to arise." Id. at 1308. Further, our determination is dependent on the law of the state in which the sheriff operates, since "states have extremely wide latitude in determining their forms of government and how state functions are performed." Id. at 1309 n. 10. Accordingly, at issue in the instant case is whether, under Georgia law, Sheriff Freeman acted as an arm of the State in promulgating policies and procedures to maintain security at the Jail for the safety of detainees, visitors, and jail personnel, through the Jail's strip search policy.

In Manders, this Court addressed whether the sheriff of Clinch County, Georgia, was an arm of the State with respect to his "force policy at the jail and the training and disciplining of his deputies in that regard." Id. at 1308-09. Recognizing that resolution of the issue depended in part on state law, we discussed the relationship among the sheriff, the State, and Clinch County under Georgia law. Id. at 1309-18. Because the instant case also involves the relationship of a Georgia sheriff with the county in which he operates and the State, we rely on the pertinent discussion of Georgia law in Manders.

In Manders, we noted:

1305

Georgia's Constitution grants the State legislature the exclusive authority to establish and to control a sheriff's powers and duties. Interpreting this constitutional provision, the Georgia Supreme *1305 Court has explained that sheriffs are subject to the control of the Georgia legislature and are not county employees. . . .

In contrast to the State's authority and control over sheriffs, Georgia's Constitution grants counties no legislative power or authority over sheriffs and expressly prevents counties from controlling or affecting the sheriff's office or the personnel thereof. In this regard, the Georgia Supreme Court has concluded that this constitutional restriction on the legislative power granted to counties0907home rule0907prevents counties from taking action affecting the sheriff's office. . . . Further, in Georgia, counties also do not delegate any of their governmental or police powers to sheriffs. Instead, the sheriffs' authority and duties are derived directly from the State. . . .

Georgia law likewise makes the county entity itself, here Clinch County, a separate entity independent of the sheriff's office. . . . As a separate entity, Clinch County is headed by its Board of Commissioners, which is given "exclusive jurisdiction over and control of county affairs." In contrast, under Georgia's Constitution, the State has exclusive authority and control over the duties and affairs of the sheriff's office. Although the State requires the county to fund the sheriff's budget, Georgia's Constitution precludes the county from exercising any authority over the sheriff, including how the sheriff spends that budget.

Id. at 1310-11 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted); see also Bd. of Comm'rs of Dougherty County v. Saba, 278 Ga. 176, 598 S.E.2d 437, 439 (2004) ("The sheriff is an elected constitutional officer and not an employee of the county commission."); Bd. Of Comm'rs of Randolph County v. Wilson, 260 Ga. 482, 396 S.E.2d 903, 903 (1990) (same).

With this brief summary of the relationship between the State, the sheriff, and the County, we turn to the four factors in Manders. Although Manders analyzed the four factors in light of a sheriff's use-of-force policy, see Manders, 338 F.3d at 1305, we determine that the analysis in Manders is applicable to Sheriff Freeman's function of maintaining security at the Jail. And, guided by Manders, we conclude the factors weigh in favor of finding that Sheriff Freeman is an arm of the State in performing this function. See Purcell, 400 F.3d at 1325 (11th Cir.2005) (finding, in a suit against the sheriff of Toombs County, Georgia for failure to prevent inmate-on-inmate violence, the sheriff acts as an arm of the State "when promulgating policies and procedures governing conditions of confinement at the Toombs County Jail").[22] We briefly analyze the four factors below.

1. Eleventh Amendment Factors
a. How state law defines the sheriff's office
The sheriff's office is a "separate and independent office" from the county and its governing body, notwithstanding that the sheriff is elected by county voters. Manders, 338 F.3d at 1319; Brown v. Dorsey, 276 Ga.App. 851, 625 S.E.2d 16, 21 (2005) ("[T]he Constitution has made the sheriff independent from the County, notwithstanding the 1306 designation of the sheriff *1306 as a `county officer.'"). The essential governmental nature of the sheriff's office is to (1) enforce the law and preserve the peace on behalf of the State and (2) perform specific statutory duties, directly assigned by the State, in law enforcement, state courts, and corrections. Manders, 338 F.3d at 1319. With respect to corrections, in particular, the State requires the sheriff to take custody of pre-trial detainees charged with state felony and misdemeanor offenses.[23]Id. at 1315. The State also charges the sheriff with providing for the protection and well-being of the detainees in his custodial care. Mayo v. Fulton County, 220 Ga.App. 825, 470 S.E.2d 258, 259 (1996).[24] Thus, in performing his State-assigned function of maintaining security at the Jail, Sheriff Freeman acted for the State. Based on Manders, therefore, we conclude the first factor weighs in favor of immunity.
b. Where state law vests control
The State requires, and funds, annual specialized training of sheriffs in law enforcement, investigation, judicial process, and corrections practices. Manders, 338 F.3d at 1320. It is reasonable to assume that the Statemandated training in corrections includes instruction on maintaining security at the Jail and protecting the safety of detainees and others at the Jail. If a sheriff fails to comply with the annual training requirements, the Governor0907on behalf of the State0907may sanction the sheriff for noncompliance. Id. at 1320. In fact, as we recognized in Manders, the Governor retains significant control over sheriffs:
[T]he Governor has broad investigation and suspension powers regarding any misconduct by a sheriff in the performance of any of his duties. If a sheriff's policy permits excessive force in the county jail, plainly the Governor may discipline the sheriff. If a sheriff fails to take custody of state offenders in the county jail, plainly the Governor may discipline the sheriff.
The State legislature expressly has made [the Sheriffs] answerable to the Governor for [their] conduct. . . .
Specifically, the Governor may initiate an investigation of any suspected misconduct by any sheriff and may suspend the sheriff. . . . The State funds the investigation.
Id. at 1321 (citations omitted).
In contrast to the State's and Governor's authority over the sheriff's office, the counties have no authority or control over the sheriff's corrections duties. See id. at 1322. While Georgia counties have obligations regarding the jail structure and inmates' food, clothing, and medical necessities, those matters are "wholly separate and distinct" from the sheriff's policies governing strip searches and release of detainees at the Jail. See id. Given "the State's direct and substantial control over the sheriff's duties, training, and discipline and the county's total lack thereof," id., we determine that the second factor also weighs in favor of immunity in this case.
1307 *1307 c. Where the entity derives its funds
State funds are involved, to some extent, in the functions at issue here, including the annual training of sheriffs in corrections matters and in the Governor's disciplinary procedure over sheriffs for misconduct. See id. at 1323. While counties bear the major burden of funding the sheriff's office and county jail, they are required to do so by State law. Id. The State requires the County to pay for pre-trial state offenders, maintain the jail structure, provide

necessities to inmates, and pay the salaries of the Sheriffs and their deputies. Id. at 1323 & n. 42. Although the County sets and funds the sheriff's total budget, however, it cannot dictate how the sheriff spends that budget in the exercise of the Sheriffs' duties, including their duties to maintain security at the Jail. See id. at 1323; see also McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 791, 117 S.Ct. 1734, 1740, 138 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997) ("The county's payment of the sheriff's salary does not translate into control over [the sheriff], since the county neither has the authority to change [the sheriff's] salary nor the discretion to refuse payment completely."); Chaffin v. Calhoun, 262 Ga. 202, 415 S.E.2d 906, 907-08 (1992). Because both state and county funds are involved in the function at issue here, and because county funds are involved only by virtue of state law, we conclude the third factor weighs in favor of immunity. See Manders, 338 F.3d at 1324.
d. Liability for and payment of adverse judgments
Under Georgia law, "counties are not liable for, and not required to give sheriffs money to pay, judgments against sheriffs in civil rights actions." Id. at 1326. We noted in Manders, however, that while the counties would not be liable for judgments against the sheriffs, the State might not be liable either. Id. at 1327. We could not find a Georgia law that expressly required the State to pay an adverse judgment against the Sheriff in his official capacity. Id. We suggested, therefore, that the sheriff may have to pay a judgment against him out of his own budget. Id. This could, in turn, affect both state and county funds indirectly. Id. The situation in Manders with respect to the county's or state's liability for adverse judgments is the same as that in the instant case. Thus, we conclude, as did the Manders court, that the fourth factor, "at a minimum, . . . does not defeat Sheriff [Freeman's] immunity claim." Id. at 1328.
2. Local Constitutional Amendments
Plaintiffs maintain on appeal that three local constitutional amendments applicable only to Fulton County alter the "default" allocation of authority between a Georgia sheriff and the county established in Manders. In particular, Plaintiffs rely on the amendment they refer to as the "Jail Local Constitutional Amendment" (JLCA).[25] Plaintiffs 1308 contend that because the JLCA authorizes the County to "maintain and *1308 operate" detention facilities and designate a person to "control" those facilities, the Sheriff acts for the County rather than as an arm of the State in operating the County's Jail.
We disagree. The three local amendments to which Plaintiffs draw our attention do not affect our reliance on Manders. We recognize that, in Manders, we stated in a footnote that a local act of the State legislature could give a Georgia county control over the county jail, such as a local act granting Chatham County control over its jail.[26]Manders, 338 F.3d at 1318 n. 34. The Chatham County act explicitly gives the commissioners of Chatham County the power to make "rules and regulations" for the "government and control" of the Chatham County jail and inmates. Further, the Chatham County act affirmatively vests the commissioners with the "management and care" of the jail. By contrast, the JLCA does not give the County power to make rules and regulations for the administration of the Jail. Therefore, the JLCA does not alter the relationship among the State, the County, and the Sheriff, as the County continues to have no say in how the Sheriff implements his policies at the Jail. However, even if the JLCA altered the analysis in Manders, the County has not exercised any potential authority granted to it under the JLCA because the Sheriff, an office established by the State legislature, continues to control the Jail.
Under Georgia law, the office of sheriff carries with it all of its common-law duties and powers, except as modified by statute. Elder v. Camp, 193 Ga. 320, 18 S.E.2d 622, 625 (1942). Where a statute limits the common-law duties and powers of a sheriff, it must be strictly construed, particularly where the limitation or restriction applies to only one sheriff in the State. Warren v. Walton, 231 Ga. 495, 202 S.E.2d 405, 409 (1973). We cannot conclude the JLCA definitely and positively grants to the County the traditional powers allocated to the sheriff of a Georgia county, thereby altering the established allocation of power between the State, the County, and Sheriff Freeman. We therefore affirm the district court's determination that Sheriff Freeman is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, and we dismiss Plaintiffs' claims against Sheriff Freeman in his official capacity to the extent Plaintiffs seek monetary damages.[27]
1309

*1309 B. Qualified Immunity from Suit in Individual Capacity
We turn next to whether Sheriff Barrett is entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiffs' strip search claims for monetary damages against her in her individual capacity. "Qualified immunity offers complete protection for government officials sued in their individual capacities if their conduct `does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir.2002) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). To receive qualified immunity, the government official first must prove he was acting within his discretionary authority when the alleged wrongful acts occurred. Id. Once the government official establishes he was acting within his discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity. Id. The Supreme Court has established a two-part test to determine whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. "The threshold inquiry a court must undertake . . . is whether [the] plaintiff's allegations, if true, establish a constitutional violation." Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 2513, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 2156, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) ). If, under the plaintiff's version of the facts, the defendant violated a constitutional right, "the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. at 2156.
Sheriff Barrett is undisputedly a government official. Further, Plaintiffs do not dispute that Sheriff Barrett was acting within the scope of her discretionary authority in having Plaintiffs strip searched to maintain security at the Jail. Therefore, we consider only whether, with respect to the AR, AL, and CR Group Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged violations of constitutional rights and, if so, whether such rights were clearly established at the time of the alleged violations.
1310 *1310 1. Constitutional Violation
a. Strip searches of AR Group Plaintiffs
We first address the constitutionality of the blanket strip searches conducted on the AR Group Plaintiffs as part of their point-of-entry booking into the Jail.[28] Plaintiffs allege each arrestee booked into the Jail's general population, regardless of the crime for which the person is arrested, is subjected to a blanket strip search without an individualized finding of reasonable suspicion that the person is concealing drugs, weapons, or other contraband. Under the law of this Circuit, an arrestee to be detained in the general jail population has a constitutional right under the Fourth Amendment to be free from strip searches conducted without reasonable suspicion that the detainee is concealing weapons, drugs, or other contraband. Wilson, 251 F.3d at 1341, 1343 (plaintiff arrested for driving under the influence); Skurstenis v. Jones, 236 F.3d 678, 680, 682 (11th Cir. 2000) (plaintiff arrested for driving under the influence). Thus, under our binding precedent, the Jail's alleged policy of conducting blanket strip searches on all arrestees at booking, on the single ground they are to be placed in the Jail's general population, must be deemed unconstitutional. See Wilson, 251 F.3d at 1343; Skurstenis, 236 F.3d at 682.
Our holding with respect to the Jail's policy does not mean, however, that the particular strip search conducted on each AR Group Plaintiff actually violated that Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. Hicks v. Moore, 422 F.3d 1246, 1251 (11th Cir.2005); Skurstenis, 236 F.3d at 682 . Reasonable suspicion may have existed to justify the searches of some Plaintiffs. Id. "`Whether an officer has reasonable suspicion is an objective question viewed from the standpoint of a reasonable [ ] officer at the scene. It is based on the totality of the circumstances, and is a question of law to be reviewed de novo.'" Id. at 1252 (quoting Evans II, 407 F.3d at 1280). In determining whether reasonable suspicion existed for the strip search, it is immaterial whether the specific arresting officer or jailer actually and subjectively had reasonable suspicion, or whether anyone at the time actually conducted a reasonable suspicion analysis. Hicks, 422 F.3d at 1252. Instead, our inquiry is whether, given the circumstances, reasonable suspicion objectively existed to justify the search. Id.
Our precedent demonstrates that reasonable suspicion to justify the strip search of an arrestee may be based on, among other things, the circumstances of the person's arrest and/or the nature of the offense for which the

person was arrested. First, we have recognized that the circumstances surrounding a person's arrest may support reasonable suspicion to justify a strip search upon booking into the jail. 236 F.3d at 682. For example, in Skurstenis, we held that "possession of a weapon by a detainee [at the time of arrest] provides the `reasonable suspicion' necessary to authorize a strip search." Id. Although we noted the jail's policy of conducting blanket strip searches on arrestees before being placed in a cell or detention room was unconstitutional, we upheld the particular strip search conducted on the plaintiff because, at time of her arrest for driving under the influence, she had a handgun in her possession. Id.[29]
1311 *1311 Second, we have recognized that "a person's being charged with a crime of violence is sufficient to evoke reasonable suspicion that the person may be concealing weapons or contraband." Hicks, 422 F.3d at 1252; see also Masters v. Crouch, 872 F.2d 1248, 1255 (6th Cir. 1989). Similarly, where a person is arrested for an offense involving weapons or drugs0907such as possession or use of a firearm and possession, use, or distribution of an illegal substance it 0907 is objectively reasonable to conduct a strip search of that person before he comes into contact with other detainees. In such cases, the nature of the arrest charge itself, independent of the facts surrounding the arrest, gives rise to reasonable suspicion. On the other hand, where a person is arrested for an offense not generally associated with violence and not involving weapons or drugs, the single fact the arrestee will be placed in the general jail population is not sufficient justification for the search under our binding precedent. See Hicks, 422 F.3d at 1251-52. In such a case, there must be additional facts giving rise to reasonable suspicion that the person is concealing weapons, drugs, or other contraband, such as the circumstances surrounding the person's arrest, as in Skurstenis.
We have declined to draw a distinction between felonies and misdemeanors, recognizing there exist both felonies and misdemeanors that are crimes of violence or that involve weapons or drugs and whose nature, therefore, give rise to reasonable suspicion that the arrestee is concealing weapons, drugs, or other contraband. In Hicks, for example, a panel of this Court found that the misdemeanor offense of "family violence battery," for which the detainee was arrested and charged, justified the strip search conducted on the plaintiff. 422 F.3d at 1252. Because it was the first time the plaintiff had been arrested for and charged with family violence battery, he was charged with a misdemeanor. See id. at 1249 n. 2. Finding the offense was "obviously one of violence," the panel explained that Georgia law defined family violence battery as "`intentionally caus[ing] substantial physical harm or visible bodily harm' to a `past or present spouse.'" Id. at 1252 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1(a)). The panel reached its conclusion not by considering whether the arrest charge was a felony or misdemeanor, but by looking to the elements of the offense. See id. The panel determined that, although the arresting officers and jailers did not subjectively suspect the detainee of concealing weapons or drugs, the nature of the arrest charge (of which the jailers were notified) was sufficient to justify the strip search. Id. at 1249, 1252.
We stress that under Hicks, the question of whether an offense is a crime of violence depends not on the offense's classification as a felony or misdemeanor, but instead on the elements of the offense for which the arrestee was arrested and charged. Where the elements of the offense demonstrate that it is a crime of violence or a crime that involves weapons or drugs, the offense itself gives rise to reasonable suspicion to justify a strip search. Of course, even where the offense is not a crime of violence and does not involve weapons or drugs, the circumstances surrounding the arrest may nonetheless support reasonable suspicion that the arrestee is concealing weapons, drugs, or other contraband. See Skurstenis, 236 F.3d at 682.
In the instant case, there are no allegations about the circumstances surrounding the arrest of each AR Group Plaintiff. Accordingly, we can look only to the nature of the particular offenses for which the AR Group Plaintiffs were arrested to determine if their strip searches were supported by reasonable suspicion.
1312 *1312 Based on the allegations in the Complaint, we conclude the following AR Group Plaintiffs were arrested for crimes of violence or crimes involving weapons or drugs: David Evans, arrested on a charge of disorderly conduct but transferred to the Jail on a warrant for possession of a weapon; Anthony Westbrook, arrested on a charge of simple battery;[30] and Benjamin Blake, arrested for battery.[31] Because the strip searches of these AR Group Plaintiffs were supported by reasonable suspicion based on the nature of the arrest offenses, the allegations do not establish a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. We therefore affirm the dismissal of the strip search claims asserted by Plaintiffs Evans, Westbrook, and Blake.

We also conclude the following AR Group Plaintiffs were arrested for offenses that are not crimes of violence and do not involve weapons or drugs: C. Alan Powell, arrested after revocation of bond for "disorderly conduct" and failure to pay a "bar tab"; Stanley Clemons, arrested on a charge of burglary;[32] Allen Middleton, arrested on a warrant for an "unpaid $27 traffic ticket"; Harry Witherspoon, arrested for "driving under the influence"; and Antionne Wolf, arrested for "contempt/nonpayment of child support." The strip searches of this latter group of AR Group Plaintiffs, as alleged in the Complaint, were not supported by reasonable suspicion based on the nature of the arrest offenses alone. Therefore, the allegations in the Complaint, at least at this Rule 12(b)(6) stage, establish a violation of the Fourth Amendment rights of Plaintiffs Powell, Clemons, Middleton, Witherspoon, and Wolf.[33] We must proceed to consider whether the rights of these AR Group Plaintiffs were clearly established.
Before doing so, however, we point out that a majority of our Court has expressed uncertainty about our precedent holding that strip searches of arrestees to be placed in the jail's general population, absent reasonable suspicion, violate the Fourth Amendment. See Evans II, 407 F.3d at 1278. In imposing a requirement of reasonable suspicion, our prior decisions relied on, but misconstrued, the Supreme Court's decision in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). See Wilson, 251 F.3d at 1342-43; Skurstenis, 236 F.3d at 681-82; Justice v. City of Peachtree City, 961 F.2d 188, 193 (11th Cir.1992). We have since recognized our misinterpretation of Bell, stating: "Most of us are uncertain that jailers are required to have a reasonable suspicion of weapons or contraband before strip searching0907for security and safety purposes 0907arrestees bound for the general jail population. Never has the Supreme Court imposed such a requirement." Evans II, 407 F.3d at 1279 (citations omitted). Nonetheless, we recognize we are bound by our Circuit's prior panel decisions that a jail's general practice of conducting blanket strip searches on arrestees on the single ground that they will be 1313 placed in the *1313 jail's general population is unconstitutional under Wilson and Skurstenis.
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district court's dismissal of the strip search claims asserted by Plaintiffs Evans, Westbrook, and Blake, concluding the allegations do not establish a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. With respect to Plaintiffs Powell, Clemons, Middleton, Witherspoon, and Wolf, we conclude the allegations in the Complaint do establish a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights, and we consider in section II.B.2.a. whether the rights of these AR Group Plaintiffs were clearly established.
b. Strip searches of AL and CR Group Plaintiffs
We turn next to the constitutionality of blanket strip searches conducted on the AL and CR Group Plaintiffs after becoming entitled to release. Plaintiffs allege, with respect to the AL Group, the Jail has a practice of conducting blanket strip searches on detainees who have posted bond or who have been ordered released at a First Appearance hearing at the Jail. The AL Group Plaintiffs were subjected to the booking process, including the booking strip searches, after becoming entitled to release because their point-of-entry booking into the Jail was not started or completed upon their arrival at the Jail. We assume the AL Group Plaintiffs were subjected to strip searches as part of this late booking process because they were placed in the general jail population while the staff in the Records Room, as part of the release process, searched for other detention orders, warrants, and holds.[34]
Plaintiffs also allege, with respect to the CR Group, the Jail has a policy of conducting blanket strip searches on persons who are returned to Jail following a court appearance at which they were ordered released, despite the fact that these "in-custody defendants" were under the constant supervision of the Sheriff's deputies, were not permitted to have contact with anyone while in transit or at the courthouse, and were already strip searched upon entering the Jail. The CR Group Plaintiffs were strip searched upon their return from the courthouse before being booked back into the general jail population, where they were held while the Records Room searched for outstanding detention orders, warrants, and other holds before releasing them. The CR Group Plaintiffs had already been strip searched once as part of their point-of-entry booking into the Jail and thus were subjected to blanket strip searches twice.
As with arrestee strip searches, the Supreme Court's reasonableness test articulated in Bell is the applicable standard to evaluate the strip searches of the AL and CR Group Plaintiffs. In each case, the test requires "a

balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it was conducted." Bell, 441 U.S. at 559, 99 S.Ct. at 1884.[35] This Court 1314 conducted such a balancing in Wilson and Skurstenis, explaining the "justification" prong of the *1314 Bell test and finding that strip searches of arrestees as they enter the Jail cannot be justified on the single ground that the arrestees will be placed in the Jail's general population. Wilson, 251 F.3d at 1342-43; Skurstenis, 236 F.3d at 682. Rather, under the law of this Circuit, an arrestee to be detained in the general jail population has a constitutional right under the Fourth Amendment to be free from strip searches conducted without reasonable suspicion that the detainee is concealing weapons, drugs, or other contraband. Wilson, 251 F.3d at 1341-43; Skurstenis, 236 F.3d at 678, 680, 682. Here, the justification is the same as in Wilson and Skurstenis, that is, continued detention in the general jail population. Additionally, the privacy interests of the AL and CR Group Plaintiffs are the same, or arguably greater than, those of arrestees because they are entitled to release and the basis for their detention at the Jail no longer exists.[36] Accordingly, if our precedent requires reasonable suspicion to justify point-of-entry strip searches of arrestees bound for the general jail population, then at a minimum, reasonable suspicion must exist to justify strip searches of persons entitled to release from the Jail who are to be placed in the general jail population while their records are checked for other detention orders, warrants, or holds. Therefore, we must deem unconstitutional the Jail's policies of conducting blanket strip searches on detainees who are entitled to release from the Jail under the factual circumstances presented here.
Although we conclude the Jail's policy is unconstitutional, we must determine whether reasonable suspicion existed to justify the particular strip searches of the AL and CR Group Plaintiffs. We first discuss the two Plaintiffs in the AL Group, Powell and Matkin. Because Powell posted bond, rather than having been ordered released, his arrest charge remained pending against him at the time he was strip searched. Therefore, the nature of the offense for which he was arrested may give rise to reasonable suspicion to justify his strip search. Powell was arrested on charges of "disorderly conduct" and failure to pay a "bar tab," neither of which are crimes of violence or involve weapons or drugs. Thus, we conclude that Powell's strip search after having posted bond was not supported by reasonable suspicion based on the nature of the arrest charge alone. Matkin, however, was ordered released by a judicial officer at the Jail. According to the Complaint, Matkin was arrested on March 18, 2004 on a charge of "aggravated assault"; on March 19, 2004, a judicial officer at the Jail dismissed the aggravated assault charge and ordered Matkin released; instead of being released, Matkin was booked into the Jail, strip searched, and held for four days; Matkin was permitted to leave the Jail only on March 23, 2004. Based on the allegations, we cannot say at this 12(b)(6) stage that Matkin's strip search was supported by reasonable suspicion.[37]
The two Plaintiffs in the CR Group, Evans and Wolf, had already been strip searched upon entering the Jail and were ordered released in state court. Thus, there were no pending charges against them at the time they were strip searched again, and we cannot look to the nature of their arrest charges to find reasonable suspicion. Further, according to the Complaint, the CR Group Plaintiffs were under constant supervision while in transit to 1315 and from the Jail and while at *1315 the courthouse, and they were not permitted to have contact with anyone other than the Sheriff's deputies and their attorneys. Plaintiffs make no allegations indicating they had an opportunity to acquire contraband during their transfers within the Jail or between the Jail and the courthouse.[38]
We therefore conclude that all Plaintiffs of the AL Group 0907Powell[39] and Matkin0907and all Plaintiffs of the CR Group0907Evans[40] and Wolf0907have sufficiently alleged violations of their Fourth Amendment rights. We proceed to determine whether their rights were clearly established in section II.B.2.b. below.
2. Clearly Established Law
In determining whether a constitutional right is clearly established, "[t]he relevant, dispositive inquiry . . . is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, 121 S.Ct. at 2156. This inquiry "must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition." Id. at 201, 121 S.Ct. at 2156. The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear such that a reasonable official would understand that his conduct violates that right. Hope, 536 U.S. at 739, 122 S.Ct. at 2515. "This is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful; but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law

the unlawfulness must be apparent." Id. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (citation omitted)). The salient question, therefore, is whether the state of the law gave the government official "fair warning" that his treatment of the plaintiff was unconstitutional. Id. at 741, 122 S.Ct. at 2516; see also Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1031 (11th Cir.2001) (en banc) (stating "fair and clear notice to government officials is the cornerstone of qualified immunity").
In most instances, "fair warning" will be given by case law existing at the time of the alleged violation. See Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1351. In finding applicable case law, we look to decisions of the United States Supreme Court, decisions of this Court, and decisions of the highest court of the pertinent state. Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1032-33 n. 10; Hamilton v. Cannon, 80 F.3d 1525, 1532 n. 7 (11th Cir. 1996). In many instances, case law will announce a holding that is tied to a particular set of facts. Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1351-52. When such fact-specific precedents are said to clearly establish the law, the circumstances in the instant case facing the government 1316 official must be "materially similar" to those in the preexisting case law for us to conclude the government *1316 official had fair warning of the unconstitutionality of his conduct. See id. at 1352. However, although cases with materially similar facts can provide especially strong support for a conclusion that the law is clearly established, they are not always necessary. Hope, 536 U.S. at 741, 122 S.Ct. at 2516. A governmental official can be on notice that his conduct violates the law even in novel factual circumstances. Id.; see Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1351-52 . Where case law announces broad principles of law that are not tied to particularized facts, such case law can clearly establish the law applicable in a variety of different factual circumstances. Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1351. We have cautioned, however, that if a broad principle is to clearly establish the law applicable to a specific set of facts, "it must do so `with obvious clarity' to the point that every objectively reasonable government official facing the circumstances would know that the official's conduct did violate federal law when the official acted." Id. (emphasis added).
a. Strip Searches of AR Group Plaintiffs
We first consider whether the Fourth Amendment rights of Plaintiffs Powell, Clemons, Middleton, Witherspoon, and Wolf of the AR Group were clearly established. This Court's panel decisions in both Skurstenis and Wilson, issued before the strip searches in the instant case occurred, make clear that jailers are required to have reasonable suspicion of weapons, drugs, or other contraband before strip-searching arrestees bound for the general jail population. Wilson, 251 F.3d at 1343 (holding the strip search of the plaintiff absent reasonable suspicion, as well as Shelby County Jail's policy authorizing the strip search, were unconstitutional); Skurstenis, 236 F.3d at 682 (holding Shelby County Jail's policy of strip-searching inmates without reasonable suspicion was unconstitutional); see also Cuesta v. School Bd. of Miami-Dade County, 285 F.3d 962, 969 (11th Cir.2002) ("This Court has explained the `justification' prong of the Bell decision in two recent cases: Skurstenis v. Jones and Wilson v. Jones. Both cases make clear that the Fourth Amendment requires jail officials to have `reasonable suspicion' that an arrestee is concealing weapons or contraband before they can perform a strip search." (citations omitted)).
Further, on at least two occasions, this Court has emphasized the holding of Wilson. In Hicks, for example, a panel of this Court addressed the constitutionality of a county jail's practice of strip searching every arrestee to be placed in the general jail population. Citing Wilson, we stated: "[G]iven the Circuit's precedent, we must conclude the search of Plaintiff cannot be justified under the Constitution on the single ground that Plaintiff was about to be placed in the Jail's general population," and "we accept that reasonable suspicion is required by the law of this Circuit." Hicks, 422 F.3d at 1251. In Evans I, we again recited the holding of Wilson: "Arrestees who are to be detained in the general jail population can constitutionally be subjected to a strip search only if the search is supported by reasonable suspicion that such a search will reveal weapons or contraband." Evans I, 351 F.3d at 490. Accordingly, we conclude Sheriff Barrett had fair warning that the blanket strip searches conducted on the AR Group Plaintiffs were unconstitutional.
It is true, as the district court pointed out, that we have questioned our requirement of reasonable suspicion. See Evans II, 407 F.3d at 1278 ("Most of us are uncertain that jailers are required to have a reasonable suspicion of 1317 weapons or contraband before strip searching0907for security and safety purposes 0907arrestees *1317 bound for the general jail population"); Hicks, 422 F.3d at 1251 n. 5 ("We personally question that such a practice violates the

Fourth Amendment."). However, our questioning has been merely dicta, and we have previously recognized that dicta plays no role in the clearly established analysis: "The law cannot be established by dicta. Dicta is particularly unhelpful in qualified immunity cases where we seek to identify clearly established law." Hamilton, 80 F.3d at 1530. However, even if our dicta in Evans II and Hicks could be said to "muddle" the law of this Circuit, the opinions in both cases were issued after the alleged strip searches in the instant case occurred and thus could not have affected Sheriff Barrett.
We also disagree with the district court's conclusion that there is a "pronounced dissimilarity" between the strip searches in Wilson and those in the instant case such thatWilson could not have given Sheriff Barrett fair warning of our requirement of reasonable suspicion. Specifically, the district court found the strip searches alleged in the instant case were "markedly less invasive" than those in Wilson. This ignores the allegations in the instant case that Plaintiffs were required not only to remove their clothing but also to shower together with a group of thirty or forty other persons. Each arrestee then either singly or standing in line with others was visually inspected front and back. In Wilson, the plaintiff was required to remove her clothing, "squat, spread her buttocks, and cough three times." Wilson, 251 F.3d at 1341. The female officer in Wilson checked the plaintiff's ears, mouth, nose, and breasts during the search. Id. at 1341-42. While the strip search in Wilson and those in the instant case were conducted in different manners, each was invasive and we cannot conclude that any difference in the degree of invasiveness is material. Like the instant case, Wilson addressed strip searches of arrestees to be placed in the general jail population without an individualized finding of reasonable suspicion. See id. at 1341. Thus, while Wilson's holding is to a certain extent tied to the particular facts at issue, the pertinent facts of both cases are materially similar.[41] Accordingly, we conclude Sheriff Barrett had fair warning that strip-searching the AR Group Plaintiffs absent reasonable suspicion violated their Fourth Amendment rights.
Because Plaintiffs Powell, Clemons, Middleton, Witherspoon, and Wolf sufficiently alleged violations of their Fourth Amendment rights, and because such rights were clearly established, we reverse the district court's dismissal of the strip search claims for monetary damages against Sheriff Barrett in her individual capacity.
b. Strip Searches of AL and CR Group Plaintiffs
We next consider whether the Fourth Amendment rights of Plaintiffs Powell and Matkin, of the AL Group, and Plaintiffs Evans and Wolf, of the CR Group, were clearly established. The conduct challenged in the instant caseroutine, indiscriminate strip searches-is the same as the conduct we addressed in Wilson. Further, in both Wilson 1318 and the instant case, the purported justification for the routine, indiscriminate strip searches was that the *1318 arrestees would be placed in the general jail population. Wilson, 251 F.3d at 1341; see also Hicks, 422 F.3d at 1251. We concluded in Wilson that such a justification, alone, was not sufficient to justify the challenged conduct. See Wilson, 251 F.3d at 1341, 1343. To the extent the rule announced in Wilson was tied to particularized facts, we determine the facts of the instant case with respect to the AL and CR Groups are materially similar to the pertinent facts in Wilson.
The fact that the AL and CR Group Plaintiffs were not newly-admitted arrestees makes it even more obvious under Wilson that their strip searches were unconstitutional. They, unlike newly-admitted arrestees, were entitled to release from the Jail and, in case of those Plaintiffs ordered released either at the Jail or in state court, no longer had pending charges against them. Accordingly, we conclude Sheriff Barrett had fair warning, under this Circuit's precedent, that strip-searching the AL and CR Group Plaintiffs absent reasonable suspicion violated their Fourth Amendment rights.
Because the AL and CR Group Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged violations of their Fourth Amendment rights, and because such rights were clearly established, we reverse the district court's dismissal of their strip search claims against Sheriff Barrett in her individual capacity.
C. Municipal Liability of the County and the City under § 1983
The question of municipal liability under § 1983 is relevant only when a constitutional violation has occurred. Rooney v. Watson, 101 F.3d 1378, 1381 (11th Cir. 1996). Thus, we address the County's and City's liability under

§ 1983 only with respect to those Plaintiffs who have sufficiently alleged violations of their Fourth Amendment rights, namely Plaintiffs Powell, Middleton, Witherspoon, Matkin, Wolf, and Evans.
"The Supreme Court has placed strict limitations on municipal liability under § 1983." Grech, 335 F.3d at 1329. A municipality can be found liable under § 1983 only where the municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at issue. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 1203, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989). Thus, a plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a municipality under § 1983 must identify a municipal policy or custom that caused the plaintiff's injury. Grech, 335 F.3d at 1329. Because a municipality will rarely have an officially-adopted policy of permitting a particular constitutional violation, most plaintiffs must show the local government has a custom or practice that evidences a "deliberate indifference" to the plaintiff's right. See id.; McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir.2004). Only where the municipality's custom or practice reflects a "deliberate" or "conscious" choice from among various alternatives can the municipality be liable for its conduct. Harris, 489 U.S. at 388, 109 S.Ct. at 1205. However, it is not enough to identify conduct properly attributable to the municipality. Id. A plaintiff must also demonstrate that the municipality's custom is the "direct causal link" between the municipality and the constitutional injury such that the municipality's action was the "moving force" behind the violation. Id. at 385, 389, 109 S.Ct. 1197.
Our decision today that Sheriff Freeman acts as an arm of the State forecloses Plaintiffs' argument that the County can be held liable under § 1983 based on its control of the strip search policies at the Jail. As we previously explained, the Sheriffs do not act as policymakers for the County when performing their function of 1319 maintaining security at the Jail. See Manders, *1319 338 F.3d at 1328; Grech, 335 F.3d at 1332.
However, plaintiffs identify another set of "policies" which they claim the City and County do control, namely the County's and the City's policies of committing arrestees to the Jail through their respective police departments. We agree with the district court that, when read in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Complaint can be read to allege these other "policies." Nonetheless, as we explain below, we conclude that Plaintiffs' claims of municipal liability against the County and City for the violation of Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights, even when based on these other "policies," fail.
1. Liability of the City
With respect to the City, not one of the Plaintiffs who sufficiently alleged a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights was arrested by the City of Atlanta Police Department. There are no constitutional injuries attributable the City, therefore, because the City did not place at the Jail any of the Plaintiffs who sufficiently alleged constitutional injuries. Because the City did not violate the constitutional rights of these Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs' strip search claims against the City under § 1983 must be dismissed. See Rooney, 101 F.3d at 1381 (explaining that inquiry into a governmental entity's custom or policy is relevant only when a constitutional deprivation has occurred).
2. Liability of the County
With respect to the County, Plaintiffs claim the County "knew or should have known" of the unconstitutional strip searches and were "deliberately indifferent" to Plaintiffs' rights "to be free from illegal strip searches." Plaintiffs allege the County's deliberate indifference was the "moving force" or "motivating factor" behind Plaintiffs' constitutional injuries. Although Plaintiffs allege that the County was "deliberately indifferent," we question whether the County's commitment of arrestees at the Jail was in fact a "deliberate choice from among various alternatives." In fact, unlike their allegations about the City, Plaintiffs do not specifically allege that the County has a choice over where to commit its arrestees.
Even assuming, however, the County's placement of arrestees at the Jail constitutes a policy that reflects a deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights, this case presents additional problems of causation. The link between the County's policy of placing arrestees at the Jail and the strip searches conducted at the Jail by the Sheriff and his deputies-over which the County has no control-is too attenuated to impose liability on the County. See Turquitt v. Jefferson County, 137 F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir.1998) ("[L]ocal governments can never be liable under § 1983 for the acts of those whom the local government has no authority to control."). We recognize that had the County not placed its arrestees at the Jail, those persons would not be subjected to the strip searches at the Jail; but we cannot say, based on Plaintiffs' allegations, that the County's

placement of arrestees at the Jail was the direct causal link or the moving force that animated the behavior of the Sheriffs and their deputies that resulted in the constitutional violations alleged. "Obviously if one retreats far enough from a constitutional violation some municipal `policy' can be identified behind almost any . . . harm inflicted by a municipal official." Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 2436, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985) (plurality opinion). For example, Plaintiffs would never have been committed to the Jail if the County did not have a "policy" of arresting state offenders, and Plaintiffs would never have been arrested, if the County 1320 did not have "policy" of establishing a police force. See id. But the Supreme Court's rigorous standards of *1320 culpability and causation that apply where a municipality's actions are facially valid require more, which Plaintiffs have failed to show. See Harris, 489 U.S. at 388, 109 S.Ct. at 1205. Plaintiffs' conclusory statement that the County was the "moving force" behind Plaintiffs' injuries does not cure this defect. See Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1964-65 (requiring more than a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action to survive a motion to dismiss). We therefore reverse the district court's denial of the County's and City's motions to dismiss.[42]
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court's dismissal of the strip search claims for monetary damages against Sheriff Freeman in his official capacity; we affirm in part and reverse in part the district court's dismissal of the strip search claims for monetary damages against Sheriff Barrett in her individual capacity; we reverse the district court's denial of the County's and the City's motions to dismiss Plaintiffs' strip search claims; and we remand for the district court to dismiss Plaintiffs' strip search claims for monetary damages against Sheriff Freeman in his individual capacity and Plaintiffs' strip search claims for injunctive relief against Sheriff Freeman in his official capacity.
After remand consistent with our instructions, only the strip search claims for monetary damages asserted by Plaintiffs Powell (both his AR and AL Group claims), Clemons, Middleton, Witherspoon, Wolf, Matkin, and Evans (only his CR Group claim) against Sheriff Barrett in her individual capacity will remain.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED IN PART.
Appendix:

AR GROUP

Blanket strip searches as part of point-of entry booking into the Jail

Name

Charge

C. Alan Powell

Bond revocation on charges of disorderly conduct and failure to pay a bar tab

David Evans

Disorderly conduct, weapons warrant

Stanley Clemons

Burglary

Alan Middleton

Traffic ticket warrant

Anthony Westbrook

Simple battery, child abandonment (non-support), forgery probation warrant

Benjamin Blake

Battery, trespass, obstruction

Harry Witherspoon

DUI

Antionne Wolf

Contempt/non-payment of child support

AL GROUP

Blanket strip searches of detainees who posted bond or were ordered released at the Jail before their point-of-entry booking into the Jail was started or completed

Name

Charge

Reason for Release

C. Alan Powell

Disorderly conduct, failure to pay a bar tab

Posted bond at the Jail

Kristopher Alan Matkin

Aggravated assault

Charges dismissed by judicial officer at the Jail

1321 *1321

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------CR GROUP

Blanket strip searches of detainees upon returning from a court appearance after having

been ordered released in state court

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Name

Charge

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

David Evans

Disorderly conduct, weapons warrant

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Antionne Wolf

Contempt/non-payment of child support

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[*] Honorable Kenneth L. Ryskamp, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Florida, sitting by designation.
[1] Plaintiffs also brought state law negligence claims against the Sheriffs. Those claims are not before us on appeal.
[2] The district court's July 5, 2005 order relies, in part, on a previous order dated January 13, 2005, in which the district court addressed the County's and City's motions to dismiss the First Amended Complaint. We include in this opinion the pertinent analysis from the January 13, 2005 order.
[3] In their Complaint, Plaintiffs also claim their constitutional rights were violated when they were detained past midnight on their scheduled release dates, or "overdetained." The district court granted in part and denied in part Defendants' motions to dismiss the overdetention claims. We address the district court's orders on the overdetention claims in a separate, unpublished opinion.
[4] Plaintiffs name the members of the Board as defendants in their Complaint. Although Plaintiffs have expressed their intent to dismiss their suit against the Board, it appears Plaintiffs have not yet done so. Nonetheless, because the parties do not treat the County and the Board separately in their briefs, we, like the district court, treat the County and the Board as one in our discussion of municipal liability.
[5] Although the Complaint is not entirely clear, it appears Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief specifically against the County, the City, and Sheriff Freeman in his official capacity.

[6] Because these classes have not yet been certified by the district court, we refer to them as "groups" throughout the opinion, and we use the names assigned to each putative class in the Complaint.
[7] C. Alan Powell is a Plaintiff for both the AR Group and AL Group. According to the Complaint, Powell was arrested on March 20, 2004 on charges of "disorderly conduct" and "not paying a bar tab." On March 21, 2004, someone posted bond for Powell. Before being released, Powell was strip searched. This strip search is the basis of Powell's involvement in the AL Group. At some point after Powell was released, his bond was revoked. On May 20, 2004, he was re-arrested and booked back into the Jail on the same charges following revocation of his bond. Upon booking, he was strip searched. This second strip search is the basis of Powell's involvement in the AR Group.
[8] Two of the eleven plaintiffs in this case, Tory Dunlap and Lee Antonio Smith, are not included in any of the strip search groups. Plaintiffs Dunlap and Smith only assert overdetention claims against Defendants.
[9] The Complaint states that "[b]lanket strip search means a strip search conducted without any determination of whether a basis to conduct the search exists." Thus, as used in this opinion, "blanket strip search" is a strip search without an individualized finding of reasonable suspicion that each Plaintiff was concealing weapons, drugs, or other contraband.
[10] Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of the strip searches only under the Fourth Amendment, as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. See United States v. Davis, 313 F.3d 1300, 1302 (11th Cir.2002). Plaintiffs do not contend in their briefs that the strip searches violated rights arising independently under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, under the law of this Circuit, we analyze the constitutionality of a strip search conducted without reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment. See Cuesta v. School Bd. of Miami-Dade County, 285 F.3d 962, 969 n. 6 (11th Cir.2002). We therefore apply Fourth Amendment standards in addressing the constitutionality of the strip searches at issue here.
[11] Plaintiffs use the term "booked" to refer to the process during which a person committed to the Jail is fingerprinted, identified, and entered into the Jail's computerized inmate management system. Plaintiffs explain that blanket strip searches are also a part of the booking process.
[12] Because there are no factual allegations in the Complaint regarding female arrestees, we refer to Plaintiffs hereinafter as "arrestees" without reference to gender.
[13] Although Plaintiffs' allegations state that the AL Group Plaintiffs are released either at the Jail or at one of the courthouses, the two AL Group Plaintiffs never left the Jail. C. Alan Powell was released after his family posted bond for him, and Kristopher Alan Matkin was ordered released by a judicial officer at the Jail.
[14] While Plaintiffs allege that "many" 0907 as opposed to "all" 0907 detainees who have posted bond or have been ordered released by a judicial officer at the Jail are subjected to booking strip searches, we nonetheless construe the Complaint as alleging a policy or practice with respect to the AL Group strip searches. Plaintiffs refer to it as a "practice" in other parts of the Complaint.
[15] Again, while Plaintiffs allege that "many" 0907 as opposed to "all" 0907 detainees who are returned to the Jail following a court appearance are subjected to strip searches, we nonetheless construe the Complaint as alleging a policy or practice with respect to the CR Group strip searches. Plaintiffs refer to it as a "policy" in other parts of the Complaint.
[16] Based on Plaintiffs' allegations that every person booked into the Jail is strip searched, we must assume that because the CR Group Plaintiffs have been "booked" into the Jail, they have already been strip searched once.
[17] Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of the strip searches only under the Fourth Amendment, as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. See United States v. Davis, 313 F.3d 1300, 1302 (11th Cir.2002). Plaintiffs do not contend in their briefs that the strip searches violated rights arising independently under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, under the law of this Circuit, we analyze the constitutionality of a strip search conducted without reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment. See

Cuesta v. School Bd. of Miami-Dade County, 285 F.3d 962, 969 n. 6 (11th Cir.2002). We therefore apply Fourth Amendment standards in addressing the constitutionality of the strip searches at issue here.
[18] The district court first addressed the County's and City's liability in its January 13, 2005 order. In their motions to dismiss the Complaint, the County and City requested the district court reconsider, or, alternatively, clarify its January 13, 2005 holding regarding their potential liability under § 1983. The district court denied the request for reconsideration, but granted the request for clarification.
[19] Alternatively, Plaintiffs contend that Sheriff Freeman is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity because suing him in his official capacity amounts to suing the Sheriff's office, which is neither an arm of the County nor an arm of the State but is instead an independent entity. Plaintiffs did not raise this argument before the district court, however, arguing only that Sheriff Freeman acts for Fulton County and not as an arm of the State. We therefore decline to consider whether the sheriff's office is independent from both the County and the State. Madu v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 470 F.3d 1362, 1366 n. 2 (11th Cir.2006) ("[A]n argument made for the first time in the court of appeals is generally waived."); see also Manders, 338 F.3d at 1328 n. 54.
[20] Defendants claim Plaintiffs lack standing to sue Sheriff Freeman in his individual capacity because the allegations in the Complaint show that all Plaintiffs were released from the Jail before Sheriff Freeman took office. We agree and remand to the district court to dismiss Plaintiffs' strip search claims for monetary damages against Sheriff Freeman in his individual capacity. Thus, we address qualified immunity only with respect to the strip search claims for monetary damages against Sheriff Barrett in her individual capacity.
[21] The district court's certification and this Court's grant of permission to appeal also included the issues addressed in the district court's January 13, 2005 order.
[22] Compare Brown v. Dorsey, 276 Ga.App. 851, 625 S.E.2d 16, 21 (2005) (finding that, for purposes of municipal liability under § 1983, the sheriff of Dekalb County, Georgia, did not act as final policymaker for the county when using departmental personnel and resources to commit a murder and thus the county could not be liable for the sheriff's actions under § 1983), with Freeman v. Barnes, 282 Ga.App. 895, 640 S.E.2d 611, 615-16 (2006) (finding that the sheriff is a county official for workers' compensation purposes).
[23] Under O.C.G.A. 42-4-12, the sheriff has a duty to accept persons charged with an indictable offense, and by implication, a right to refuse to receive any municipal prisoner who is not charged with an offense against the State. Tate v. Nat'l Sur. Corp., 58 Ga.App. 874, 200 S.E. 314, 315 (1938). In the instant case, although some of the Plaintiffs were arrested by the Atlanta Police Department, we assume based on Plaintiffs' allegations that they were all charged with state offenses.
[24] We note, as we did in Manders, that this is not a case of feeding, clothing, or providing medical care to inmates, which are matters over which Fulton County does have obligations and which are therefore county functions. Manders, 338 F.3d at 1319, 1322.
[25] The full text of the JLCA is as follows:
The governing authority of Fulton County is hereby authorized to maintain and operate facilities within or without the boundaries of said County for the detention, incarceration or confinement of all persons (including juveniles) subject to detention, incarceration or confinement under the laws of this State, under any County resolution or under any City ordinance. Such facilities, whether designated as a jail, public works camp or detention center, shall be under the control of such person or official as may be designated by the governing authority of Fulton County, and need not be used exclusively for any one class of prisoner or person.
H.R. 687-1585, 1972 Sess., at 1439 § 1 (Ga. 1972), continued in effect in S. 503, 1986 Sess., at 4428 (Ga.1986); see also Fulton County, Ga., Code § 1-122.
Plaintiffs also rely on two other constitutional amendments, which they refer to as the "Civil Service Local Constitutional Amendment" and the "Pension Local Constitutional Amendment." We agree with the district court that these amendments do not establish the requisite control on the part of the County to render the Sheriff a county actor.

[26] The text of the local act giving Chatham County control over its jail is as follows:
"Said Commissioners (of Chatham County) shall have power to make proper rules and regulations for the government and control of said jail of Chatham County, and the prisoners and inmates therein, and, except as hereinbefore provided, are hereby invested with the management and care of said jail." Griffin v. Chatham County, 244 Ga. 628, 261 S.E.2d 570, 572 (1979) (emphasis added).
[27] The Eleventh Amendment does not prevent Plaintiffs from seeking prospective, injunctive relief against Sheriff Freeman in his official capacity. See Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437, 124 S.Ct. 899, 903, 157 L.Ed.2d 855 (2004). Defendants maintain, however, that Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue prospective injunctive relief on their strip search claims against both Sheriff Freeman in his official capacity and against the City. We need only address Plaintiffs' standing to seek injunctive relief against Sheriff Freeman in his official capacity because we dismiss the strip search claims against the County and the City in section II.C. below. In order to meet the constitutional minimum for standing to seek injunctive relief, Plaintiffs must show they "[have] sustained or [are] immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of the challenged official conduct and the injury or threat of injury must be both real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical." City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 1665, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (internal quotations omitted). "[P]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects." Id. (internal quotations omitted). All Plaintiffs (other than Stanley Clemons) had been released from the Jail before they were added as parties to this suit. We agree with the district court that the threat they face of future unconstitutional strip searches is too speculative or conjectural and not real and immediate. See, e.g., Shain v. Ellison, 356 F.3d 211, 216 (2d Cir.2004) (finding the likelihood of plaintiff being subjected to unconstitutional strip search policy at correctional center after release is "too speculative and conjectural"). Further, although Clemons was still at the Jail at the time he was added as a plaintiff to this suit, he has since been released from the Jail, which moots his claim for relief. See Spears v. Thigpen, 846 F.2d 1327, 1328 (11th Cir.1988) (holding that claims regarding treatment at a facility at which prisoner was no longer incarcerated were moot); see also Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1173 (11th Cir.1985) (explaining that absent class certification, an inmate's claim for injunctive relief under § 1983 action is moot once the inmate has been transferred). Clemons does not meet the two conditions for the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception to apply: (1) the challenged action must be of too short a duration to be fully litigated prior to its cessation, and (2) a reasonable expectation must exist that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action again. Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149, 96 S.Ct. 347, 348, 46 L.Ed.2d 350 (1975). While the first condition may be satisfied, the second is not because Clemons has not demonstrated a reasonable expectation that he will again be arrested, committed to the Jail, and unconstitutionally strip searched. Thus, we conclude Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief against Sheriff Freeman in his official capacity should be dismissed.
[28] We note that, in the instant case, Plaintiffs do not challenge the manner of the strip searches.
[29] At the time of her arrest for driving under the influence, "Skurstenis had a .38 special handgun, for which she had an expired permit, in the floorboard of her car." Skurstenis, 236 F.3d at 680. Skurstenis was arrested only for driving under the influence, however, and was not charged with any weapons offense. See id.
[30] According to the Complaint, Anthony Westbrook also was arrested for "child abandonment (non-support)" and on a probation warrant for "forgery."
[31] According to the Complaint, Benjamin Blake also was arrested for "trespass" and "obstruction."
[32] We note that, in some circumstances, burglary may be a crime of violence. However, the allegations in the instant case are insufficient for us to make that determination.
[33] At the summary judgment stage, Defendants may show facts regarding the circumstances of each Plaintiff's arrest, the nature of the arrest offenses, or some other conduct that support reasonable suspicion. At this 12(b)(6) stage, however, we look only to the allegations in the Complaint.

[34] Plaintiffs do not challenge the late booking process as a whole. For example, Plaintiffs do not challenge the process during which a person committed to the Jail is fingerprinted, identified, and entered into the Jail's computerized inmate management system. Rather, Plaintiffs challenge the policy of conducting booking strip searches, as part of the late booking process, after they have posted bond or have been ordered released by a judicial officer at the Jail.
[35] Because the AL and CR Group Plaintiffs do not challenge the scope, place, or manner of their strip searches, we address only the "justification" prong.
[36] We recognize that the AL Group Plaintiffs who posted bond still have charges pending against them.
[37] See supra note 33.
[38] Because the allegations do not give rise to reasonable suspicion as required under our precedent, we need not determine what particular level of cause is necessary to justify the strip searches of the AL and CR Group Plaintiffs. Further, at this 12(b)(6) stage, Defendants have had no opportunity to present evidence on, or respond about, whether there was constant supervision and no contact or, even so, whether there were opportunities to obtain weapons, other contraband, or items from which weapons could be made.
[39] As we concluded above, Powell's strip search upon being booked into the Jail, which was based on his second commitment to the Jail after his bond was revoked, also violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
[40] Although the strip search conducted on Evans upon being booked into the Jail did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights, see supra, his strip search after returning from a court appearance at which he was ordered released lacked reasonable suspicion and, under our precedent, violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
[41] We note that Wilson's holding imposing a requirement of reasonable suspicion was in no way qualified by the manner in which the strip search was conducted. However, because judicial opinions "cannot make law beyond the facts of the cases in which those decision are announced," we recognize that the holding is limited to a certain extent by the material facts presented to the Court. Watts v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 316 F.3d 1203, 1207 (11th Cir.2003).
[42] We note that Plaintiffs do not argue on appeal the County was deliberately indifferent based on its failure to train the Sheriffs and their staff.
Save trees - read court opinions online on Google Scholar.

 
 Powell v. Barrett, 246 Fed.Appx. 615 (2007)

246 Fed.Appx. 615 This case was not selected for publication in the
Federal Reporter. Not for Publication in West’s Federal Reporter See
Fed. Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 generally governing citation of judicial decisions issued on or after Jan. 1, 2007. See also Eleventh Circuit Rules 36-2, 36-3. (Find CTA11 Rule 36-2 and Find CTA11
Rule 36-3) United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
C. Alan POWELL, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Tory Dunlap,
individually, and on behalf of all other similarly situated, et al., Plaintiffs–Appellees Cross– Appellants, v.
Sheriff Jacqueline BARRETT, Fulton County, State of Georgia, Sheriff Myron Freeman, Fulton
County, State of Georgia, et al., Defendants– Appellants Cross–Appellees.
No. 05–16734. | Aug. 23, 2007.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded in part.
For additional opinion, see 496 F.3d 1288.

Attorneys and Law Firms

*616 William Charles Claiborne, III, Washington, DC, George Brian Spears, Law Office of Brian Spears, Charles B. Pekor, Jr., Daniel Eliot Dewoskin, Pekor & Dewoskin, LLC, Coy J. Johnson, Jr., Rolesia Butler Dancy, Willie Jake Lovett, Jr., The Office of the Fulton County Attorney, Overtis Hicks Brantley, City of Atlanta Law Department, Atlanta, GA, Barrett S. Litt, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiffs–Appellees Cross–Appellants.

Sidney Leighton Moore, III, Teresa Wynn Roseborough, John H. Fleming, Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan LLP, Theodore H. Lackland, Lackland & Heyward, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants–Appellants Cross–Appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. D.C. Docket No. 04– 01100–CV–RWS–1. *617 Before BLACK and HULL, Circuit Judges, and RYSKAMP,* District Judge.

*

Honorable Kenneth L. Ryskamp, United States District

Judge for the Southern District of Florida, sitting by

designation.

Opinion PER CURIAM:

Plaintiffs, eleven male former detainees at the Fulton County Jail (the Jail), filed a putative class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Sheriffs Myron Freeman and Jacqueline Barrett, the current and former sheriffs of the Jail (the Sheriffs), Fulton County (the County), the members of the Fulton County Board of Commissioners (the Board), and the City of Atlanta (the City) (collectively, Defendants).
Plaintiffs sue Sheriff Freeman in his official capacity for both monetary damages and injunctive relief and in his individual capacity for monetary damages. Plaintiffs sue Sheriff Barrett only in her individual capacity for monetary damages. Plaintiffs also seek both monetary damages and injunctive relief against the County and the City.
In their Fourth Amended Complaint (the Complaint), Plaintiffs claim their constitutional rights were violated when they were detained past midnight on their scheduled release dates, or “overdetained,” pursuant to a policy or practice at the Jail.1 Defendants filed motions to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim, arguing, inter alia, Sheriff Freeman was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, both Sheriffs were entitled to qualified immunity, and the County and the City lacked the requisite control over the policy at the Jail to be liable as municipalities under § 1983. In an order dated July 5, 2005, 376 F.Supp.2d 1340 (the Order), the district court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motions to dismiss.2 Specifically, the district court granted Eleventh Amendment immunity to Sheriff Freeman for Plaintiffs’ overdetention claims against him in his official capacity seeking monetary damages; however, the district court denied the Sheriffs qualified immunity for Plaintiffs’ overdetention claims against them in their individual capacities. The district court also denied the County’s and City’s motion to dismiss the overdetention claims, finding that Plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged claims of municipal liability under § 1983 against the County and City.

1

In their Complaint, Plaintiffs also claim their

constitutional rights were violated when they were

subjected at the Jail to “blanket strip searches,” or strip

searches without an individualized finding of

reasonable suspicion that each Plaintiff was concealing

weapons, drugs, or other contraband. We discuss

Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against Defendants based on

1

Powell v. Barrett, 246 Fed.Appx. 615 (2007)

the blanket strip searches in a separate, published opinion.

2

The district court’s July 5, 2005 order relies, in part, on

a previous order dated January 13, 2005, in which the

district court addressed the County’s and City’s

motions to dismiss the First Amended Complaint.

In this appeal and cross-appeal, the parties challenge the district court’s order. After reviewing the parties’ briefs and hearing oral argument, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand in part.

I. DISCUSSION
A. Suit Against Sheriff Freeman in his Official Capacity for Monetary Damages [1] We first address whether Sheriff Freeman is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in his official capacity seeking monetary damages. Under the Eleventh Amendment, a State is immune from suit in federal court without its consent. *618 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 908, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984). This immunity extends to an “arm of the State,” which includes agents and instrumentalities of the State. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429–30, 117 S.Ct. 900, 903–04, 137 L.Ed.2d 55 (1997). “Whether a defendant is an ‘arm of the State’ must be assessed in light of the particular function in which the defendant was engaged.” Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir.2003) (en banc). We look at four factors to determine whether an entity is an “arm of the State”: “(1) how state law defines the entity; (2) what degree of control the State maintains over the entity; (3) where the entity derives its funds; and (4) who is responsible for judgments against the entity.” Id. at 1309. In Manders, we examined Georgia law and held that the sheriff of Clinch County was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity as an “arm of the State” when he established and executed a use-of-force policy at the jail. Id. at 1328.
Although the policy in the instant case is different, our analysis in Manders applies to Sheriff Freeman’s policy for processing the release of detainees. See id. at 1318– 1328. We conclude that Sheriff Freeman, in his official capacity, is an “arm of the State” entitled to immunity in executing his function of processing the release of detainees from the Jail. We therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ overdetention claims for

monetary damages against Sheriff Freeman in his official capacity.

B. Suit Against Sheriff Freeman in his Official Capacity for Injunctive Relief [2] The Eleventh Amendment does not prevent Plaintiffs from seeking prospective, injunctive relief against Sheriff Freeman in his official capacity. See Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437, 124 S.Ct. 899, 903, 157 L.Ed.2d 855 (2004). Defendants maintain, however, that Plaintiffs lack standing to seek injunctive relief against Sheriff Freeman in his official capacity.3 For purposes of this issue, we assume Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged a constitutional violation based on the alleged overdetentions at the Jail. All Plaintiffs, other than Stanley Clemons, had been released from the Jail before they were added as parties to this suit. We agree with the district court that the threat they face of future overdetentions is too speculative or conjectural and not real and immediate. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–102, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 1665, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). Clemons, however, was still at the Jail at the time he was added as a plaintiff to the suit and therefore has standing to seek injunctive relief against Sheriff Freeman in his official capacity.4

3

The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims for

injunctive relief against the County, but it did not

address Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief against

Sheriff Freeman in his official capacity or against the

City. On appeal, Defendants challenge Plaintiffs’

standing to seek injunctive relief against Sheriff

Freeman in his official capacity and against the City.

However, because we dismiss Plaintiffs’ overdetention

claims against the County and the City infra, we need

only address Plaintiffs’ standing to seek injunctive

relief against Sheriff Freeman in his official capacity.

4

Although Clemons was still at the Jail when he was

added as a party, all Plaintiffs—including Clemons—

were released from the Jail before Sheriff Freeman took

office. The suit against Sheriff Freeman in his official

capacity is tantamount to a suit against the

governmental entity involved, here the Sheriff’s Office.

See Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1293 n. 15 (11th

Cir.1999). Thus, Plaintiffs’ release from the Jail before

Sheriff Freeman took office is relevant only to their suit

against Sheriff Freeman in his individual capacity, as

discussed infra in Section C.

*619 Nonetheless, as Defendants point out, Clemons has since been released from the Jail, which moots his claim for injunctive relief. See Spears v. Thigpen, 846 F.2d
2

Powell v. Barrett, 246 Fed.Appx. 615 (2007)
1327, 1328 (11th Cir.1988) (holding that claims regarding treatment at a facility at which prisoner was no longer incarcerated were moot); see also Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1173 (11th Cir.1985) (explaining that absent class certification, an inmate’s claim for injunctive relief under § 1983 action is moot once the inmate has been transferred). Clemons does not meet the two conditions for the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to apply: (1) the challenged action must be of too short a duration to be fully litigated prior to its cessation, and (2) a reasonable expectation must exist that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action again. Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149, 96 S.Ct. 347, 348, 46 L.Ed.2d 350 (1975). While the first condition may be satisfied, the second is not because Clemons has not demonstrated a reasonable expectation that he will again be arrested, committed to the Jail, and unconstitutionally detained. Therefore, we conclude Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief against Sheriff Freeman in his official capacity should be dismissed, and we remand to the district court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ overdetention claims for injunctive relief against Sheriff Freeman in his official capacity.
C. Suit Against the Sheriffs in their Individual Capacities for Monetary Damages [3] Qualified immunity offers complete protection for government officials sued in their individual capacities if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights. Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir.2002). Defendants challenge the district court’s order denying Sheriffs Freeman and Barrett qualified immunity from Plaintiffs’ claims against them for monetary damages in their individual capacities. We first note that, based on the allegations in the Complaint, all Plaintiffs were released from the Jail before Sheriff Freeman took office. Because Sheriff Freeman was not yet a sheriff at the Jail at the time the alleged overdetentions occurred, he cannot be responsible for the alleged overdetentions in his individual capacity. We therefore remand to the district court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ overdetention claims against Sheriff Freeman for monetary damages in his individual capacity.
[4] With respect to Sheriff Barrett, Defendants have not adequately preserved for appeal the district court’s denial of qualified immunity from Plaintiffs’ overdetention claims against her in her individual capacity. Defendants failed to properly raise this as an issue in their consolidated, initial brief, making only a passing reference to it in a footnote. Although Defendants discuss the issue in greater detail in their consolidated reply brief, the single footnote in the initial brief did not sufficiently preserve the issue. A party may not argue an issue in its

reply brief that was not preserved in its initial brief. See Tallahassee Mem’l Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 1435, 1446 n. 16 (11th Cir.1987) (stating that single footnote in initial brief did not sufficiently preserve issue that was argued in reply brief); see also United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1284 n. 8 (11th Cir.2003) (holding issue abandoned where, although the defendant made passing references to issue in brief, the references were undertaken as background to claims that he expressly advanced). Our determination that Defendants failed to adequately raise this issue on appeal now is without prejudice to raise the issue before us at a later stage.

*620 D. Municipal Liability of the County and the City under § 1983 To impose § 1983 liability on a municipality, a plaintiff must show: (1) that his constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the municipality had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom caused the violation, or was the “moving force” behind the violation. McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir.2004); see also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388–89, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989). We need not address whether Plaintiffs’ allegations establish constitutional violations based on the overdetentions at the Jail because, even if they do, Plaintiffs have failed to otherwise establish claims of municipal liability against the County and City for any constitutional injuries based on those overdetentions.5

5

We note that although Defendants adequately raise the

issue of municipal liability on appeal, they did not fully

brief the first prong of the municipal liability analysis.

Defendants did not specifically address whether the

alleged overdetentions violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional

rights, but instead assumed constitutional violations and

addressed only whether those rights were clearly

established. Without having full briefing on the first

prong, and because we conclude infra that Plaintiffs fail

to satisfy the causation prong of the municipal liability

analysis, we decline to address the constitutional issue.

[5] The County and City cannot be held liable under § 1983 based on their alleged “control” of the Sheriffs’ overdetention policies at the Jail. With respect to the City, the district court correctly noted that Plaintiffs do not advance any allegations that the City controls the overdetention policies at the Jail. Although Plaintiffs do allege that the County controls such polices, our precedent makes clear the Sheriffs do not act as policymakers for the County when performing their function of processing the release of inmates. See Grech
3

Powell v. Barrett, 246 Fed.Appx. 615 (2007)
v. Clayton County, 335 F.3d 1326, 1332 (11th Cir.2003) (en banc); Manders, 338 F.3d at 1328. Thus, the overdetention polices at the Jail cannot be attributed to the County or the City.
[6] Plaintiffs identify another set of “policies” which they claim the City and County do control, namely the County’s and the City’s policies of committing arrestees to the Jail through their respective police departments. Nonetheless, even if such policies evidenced a “deliberate indifference” to Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, Plaintiffs have not alleged the requisite causation between such policies and the alleged constitutional violations that resulted from the Sheriffs’ conduct in managing the release process at the Jail, over which the County and City have no control. Based on the conclusory allegations in the Complaint, we cannot conclude that placement of arrestees at the Jail was the “moving force” that animated the behavior of the Sheriffs resulting in the constitutional injuries. We reverse the district court’s denial of the County’s and City’s motions to dismiss the overdetention claims.

II. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the overdetention claims for monetary damages against Sheriff Freeman in his official capacity; we remand for the district court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ overdetention claims for injunctive relief against Sheriff Freeman in his official capacity; we remand for the district court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ overdetention claims for monetary damages against Sheriff Freeman in his individual capacity; and we reverse the denial of the County’s and the City’s motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ overdetention claims against them.
*621 We do not address Plaintiffs’ overdetention claims for monetary damages against Sheriff Barrett in her individual capacity. Thus, only Plaintiffs’ overdetention claims for monetary damages against Sheriff Barrett in her individual capacity will remain after remand consistent with our instructions. Nothing herein rules on the merits of those claims or on whether Plaintiffs’ allegations state a constitutional violation.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED IN PART.
	  

4