Case 1:14-cv-01817-RM-KLM Document 45 Filed 07/23/14 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 12
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO Judge Raymond P. Moore
Civil Action No. 14-cv-01817-RM-KLM
CATHERINE BURNS; SHEILA SCHROEDER; MARK THRUN; GEOFFREY BATEMAN; RACHEL CATT; CASSIE RUBALD; BREANNA ALEXANDER; STACY PARRISH; ANGELA CRANMORE; JULIANNE DELOY; KAREN COLLIER; and DENISE LORD;
Plaintiffs,
v.
JOHN W. HICKENLOOPER, JR., in his official capacity as Governor of Colorado; JOHN SUTHERS, in his official capacity as Attorney General of Colorado; and PAM ANDERSON, in her official capacity as Clerk and Recorder for Jefferson County,
Defendants. ______________________________________________________________________________
ORDER ______________________________________________________________________________
Plaintiffs are six same-sex couples who have been legally married in another state but
whose marriage Colorado does not legally recognize or who have been refused a Colorado
marriage license, solely because they are same-sex couples. Two issues are before the Court: (1)
whether a preliminary injunction should be entered enjoining Defendants from enforcing Article
II, Section 31 of the Colorado Constitution and C.R.S. §§ 14-2-104(1)(b) and 14-2-104(2)
(collectively, “Challenged Laws”), laws which declare that only a union between one man and

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one woman may be recognized as a marriage in Colorado; and (2) if a preliminary injunction is ordered, whether such order and this entire proceeding should thereafter be stayed until such time as Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 13-4178, __ F.3d __, 2014 WL 2868044 (10th Cir. June 25, 2014) becomes final. In Kitchen, the Tenth Circuit found that Utah’s ban against same-sex marriage, which is similar to the Challenged Laws, violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution. The mandate in Kitchen has been stayed by the Tenth Circuit pending the disposition of any petition for writ of certiorari. Upon consideration of all relevant matters, including argument of counsel, and for the reasons stated herein, the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction is GRANTED; the Defendants’ Motion to Stay the preliminary injunction until resolution of Kitchen is DENIED, but instead only a temporary stay is GRANTED; and the Defendants’ Motion to Stay further proceedings in this matter, apart from the preliminary injunction, is GRANTED.
I. PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION Plaintiffs’ civil rights action for declaratory and injunctive relief seeks to declare the Challenged Laws banning same-sex marriage as unconstitutional under the United States Constitution, and to enjoin the Defendants from enforcing those laws. Plaintiffs’ two claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allege violations of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs have filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 8) supported by affidavits. Defendants have filed a “nonopposition” (ECF No. 16), revealing a far from unified front. Defendant Attorney General believes Kitchen is incorrect while Defendant Governor believes Kitchen was correctly decided. Defendant Anderson takes no position on this issue. Nevertheless, Defendants collectively do
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not oppose entry of a preliminary injunction, but also ask that the injunction, as well as further proceedings in this matter, be stayed. Relying primarily on the Kitchen decision, Plaintiffs argue they have established the requisite elements for the issuance of a preliminary injunction against Defendants. Based on its independent analysis, the Court agrees.
Before a preliminary injunction may be issued, the moving party must establish: “(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury will result if the injunction does not issue; (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs any damage the injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) issuance of the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.” Northern Natural Gas Co. v. L.D. Drilling, Inc., 697 F.3d 1259, 1266 (10th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Generally, where the three latter factors weigh in favor of the movant, the probability of success factor is relaxed.” Id. (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted). That is not the case, however, where the requested injunction is one of three disfavored types of preliminary injunctions, i.e., those that alter the status quo, “mandatory” preliminary injunctions, and those granting the moving party all the relief it could achieve at trial. See id.; Flood v. ClearOne Commc’ns, Inc., 618 F.3d 1110, 1117 n.1 (10th Cir. 2010). With disfavored injunctions, the movant must satisfy a heightened standard and make a “strong showing” as to the likelihood of success on the merits and that the balance of harm favors issuing the requested injunction. See Northern Natural Gas Co., 697 F.3d at 1266; ClearOne Commc’ns, Inc., 618 F.3d at 1117 n.1.
In this case, Plaintiffs rely on the traditional four requirements for granting injunctive relief. Although the Court finds Plaintiffs seek a disfavored injunction and, therefore, a heightened standard applies, it nonetheless concludes such standard is satisfied. First, Plaintiffs
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have made a strong showing of a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. In Kitchen, the Tenth Circuit held that Utah’s same-sex marriage bans do not withstand constitutional scrutiny as “under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution, those who wish to marry a person of the same sex are entitled to exercise the same fundamental right as is recognized for persons who wish to marry a person of the opposite sex.” Kitchen, 2014 WL 2868044, at *32. Subsequently, the Tenth Circuit decided Bishop v. Smith, Nos. 14-5003 & 14-5006, __ F.3d __, 2014 WL 3537847 (10th Cir. July 18, 2014), which reaffirmed that “[s]tate bans on the licensing of same-sex marriage significantly burden the fundamental right to marry.” Id. at *6. The Court agrees with the analysis in Kitchen and Bishop that marriage is a fundamental right and that the Challenged Laws impermissibly infringe upon that right. The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiffs will likely succeed in establishing that Colorado’s ban impermissibly violates Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Accordingly, this factor favors granting an injunction.
Next, Plaintiffs have also shown that substantial irreparable injury will result if the injunction does not issue. Where the harm is “great” or “substantial,” the deprivation of constitutional rights, for even minimal periods of time, constitutes irreparable harm. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1146 (10th Cir. 2013) (“establishing a likely [Religious Freedom Restoration Act] violation satisfies the irreparable harm factor”), aff’d on other grounds, 573 U.S. __, 2014 WL 2921709 (2014); Heideman v. South Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1190 (10th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)); 11A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 2948.1 (3d ed.
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2014) (where alleged deprivation of constitutional right is involved, “most courts hold that no further showing of irreparable injury is necessary”). Here, Plaintiffs’ establishment of a violation of their constitutional rights – their fundamental right to marry and to have their marriages recognized – satisfies the irreparable harm factor.1 See Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1146.
Third, the threatened injury to Plaintiffs by the enforcement of Colorado laws which are unconstitutional outweighs any damage the injunction may cause to Defendants. Due to Defendants’ non-opposition to the granting of an injunction, they did not address in that context how this or any other factor favored them. Nonetheless, in arguing for a stay of the injunction, Defendants contend that enjoining a state law as unconstitutional creates irreparable injury. But here, the Court is enjoining state laws without opposition from Defendants, which laws the Court has further found to be clearly unconstitutional. Thus, the equities tip strongly in favor of Plaintiffs.
Finally, the issuance of the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest as “‘it is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional rights.’” Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1147 (quoting Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1132 (10th Cir. 2012)). Accordingly, this factor also favors Plaintiffs.
In summary, even under the heightened standard, Plaintiffs have shown that all the preliminary injunction factors tip in their favor and that an injunction should be entered.
1 Plaintiffs also rely on financial injury, e.g., money to address estate planning issues that would not have been required if they were considered married, but such economic loss, without more, does not constitute irreparable harm. See Heideman, 348 F.3d at 1189.
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II. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STAY Defendants’ Motion to Stay raises the issue of whether this Court should stay not only this Order, but also this entire proceeding and await a determination of whether this case may be affected – not by an appeal of this Order in this case but by an appeal of another order in another case, i.e., the Kitchen case. This issue is far from simple. A stay is not a matter of right, but rather an exercise of judicial discretion, the propriety of which is dependent upon the circumstances of the particular case. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433 (2009). The party requesting the stay of an injunction bears the burden of showing that the circumstances justify the exercise of that discretion. Id. at 433-434. The Tenth Circuit, indeed the Supreme Court as well, has directed courts to apply certain accepted standards in deciding whether to issue a stay. See Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 134 S. Ct. 506, 506, 187 L.Ed.2d 465 (2013); FTC v. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc., 345 F.3d 850, 852 (10th Cir. 2003). Those factors are: (1) the likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the threat of irreparable harm if the stay is not granted; (3) the absence of harm to opposing parties if the stay is granted; and (4) the risk of harm to the public interest. See Planned Parenthood, 134 S. Ct. at 506; FTC, 345 F.3d at 852. “The first two factors are the most critical.” Planned Parenthood, 134 S. Ct. at 506 (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, in terms of a stay of the preliminary injunction, Defendants have not met their burden. As previously discussed, on the state of the record currently before the Court, it is Plaintiffs who have shown a likelihood of success on the merits; it is Plaintiffs who suffer irreparable harm if Colorado’s unconstitutional same-sex marriage ban is not enjoined; and it is Plaintiffs to whom the balance of harm and the public interest favor. Additionally, in light of
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Defendants’ express non-opposition to the entry of the injunction, Defendants cannot reasonably contend that this Court abused its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction and, concomitantly, no stay. See Aid for Women v. Foulston, 441 F.3d 1101, 1115 (10th Cir. 2006) (appellate court reviews grant of preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion).2
For these reasons, the posture of this case differs from many other cases being litigated in the federal court system where stays have issued. While the Court acknowledges that Defendants may file a protective appeal in this matter, Defendants cannot meet the burden required for a stay pending such appeal under the applicable standard. Defendants have elected to adopt a practical approach before this Court in recognizing the significance of Kitchen, but one consequence of that approach and the “non-opposition” to the requested injunction is that Defendants have not met their burden with respect to a stay pending appeal under the traditional rules. The factors used to assess whether an injunction should enter are largely the same as those used to determine whether a stay should enter. Having elected largely to stand silent with respect to such factors in the context of the injunction, Defendants have not put before this Court sufficient support for the factors determining entitlement to a stay of the injunction. Rather than take issue with this, Defendant Attorney General argues that:
with same sex-marriage litigation, federal courts have largely skipped a methodical assessment of those four factors in favor of entering a stay due to the “unsettled” nature of the constitutional questions regarding same-sex marriage and the “confusion, potential inequity, and high costs” that would likely result if the decision granting injunctive relief were reversed on appeal. (Attorney General’s Reply, ECF No. 41, pages 6-7.)
2 As to Defendants Governor and Anderson, it is unclear whether any argument by them that such factors are satisfied would withstand inquiry where Defendant Governor has affirmatively stated that Kitchen was correctly decided and Defendant Anderson took no position on the merits of the underlying legal issue in this case.
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The Court agrees that in same-sex marriage cases the federal courts appear to have often put aside the accepted standards they have been repeatedly directed to apply or, as the case may be, directed the lower federal courts to apply. The Court concludes, however, that the basis on which this is being done is much simpler than the nuanced considerations being proffered by Defendant Attorney General. It is being done largely because federal courts have interpreted Supreme Court actions as implied directives to issue stays in these matters. As the concurrence in the Ninth Circuit’s Order granting a stay stated:
On January 6, 2014, the Supreme Court granted the State’s application for a stay pending the disposition of the appeal in the Tenth Circuit. Herbert v. Kitchen, 134 S. Ct. 893 (2014). Although the Supreme Court’s terse two-sentence order did not offer a statement of reasons, I cannot identify any relevant differences between the situation before us today and Herbert. And, although the Supreme Court’s order in Herbert is not in the strictest sense precedential, it provides a clear message – the Court (without noted dissent) decided that district court injunctions against the application of laws forbidding same-sex unions should be stayed at the request of state authorities pending court of appeals review. Latta v. Otter, No. 14-35420, Order, at 3 (9th Cir. May 20, 2014) (Hurwitz, J., concurring). See also DeBoer v. Snyder, No. 14-1341, Order, at 1 (6th Cir. March 25, 2014) (“In light of the Supreme Court’s issuance of a stay in a similar case, Herbert v. Kitchen, 134 S. Ct. 893 (2014), a stay of the district court’s order is warranted.”); Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F.Supp.2d 456, 484 (E.D. Va. 2014) (same); DeLeon v. Perry, 975 F.Supp.2d 632, 666 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (same). Plaintiffs challenge the notion of any directive from the Supreme Court by noting instances in which requests to the Supreme Court for stays have been denied. In that regard, Plaintiffs rely on National Organization for Marriage v. Geiger, 134 S. Ct. 2722 (U.S. June 4, 2014) and Gaffney v. Whitewood, No. 14-3048 (U.S. July 7, 2014).
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Plaintiffs’ reliance, however, is misplaced because in each case, the applicant requesting the stay was a proposed intervenor who sought to appeal the district court’s order declaring the state’s same-sex marriage laws as unconstitutional. In short, they were outsiders to the litigation.
There is at least one aspect of this case which differs from other same-sex marriage cases being litigated elsewhere in the federal system which has not been emphasized by the parties. Here, the applicable appellate court has already spoken – more than once. Kitchen, supra; Bishop v. Smith, supra. Thus, it is conceivable that any perceived “directive” from the Supreme Court to let appellate courts consider this issue does not apply here.
The Court has given strong consideration to this difference. The proverbial wild card in the analysis is the recent stay entered by the Supreme Court in Herbert v. Evans, No. 14A65, 2014 WL 3557112 (U.S. July 18, 2014). Evans involved a preliminary injunction issued by the district court to require Utah to recognize same-sex marriages resulting from licenses issued in the “gap” between the time that an injunction issued in Kitchen and the Supreme Court issued a stay. The Evans defendants requested a stay which the Tenth Circuit denied after analyzing the request under the accepted standards and concluding that defendants failed to meet their burden of showing a stay should be issued. Evans v. State of Utah, No. 14-4060 (10th Cir. July 11, 2014). Notwithstanding this denial, and the fact that the Tenth Circuit has already spoken in Kitchen, on July 18, 2014, the Supreme Court still issued a stay “pending final disposition of the appeal by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.” Herbert v. Evans, No. 14A65,
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2014 WL 3557112 (July 18, 2014). But, making extraction of the meaning of the stay in Evans more difficult, Evans is a “companion” case to Kitchen, both addressing the application of Utah’s same-sex marriage laws.
Based on the most recent stay, it appears to the Court that it may well be that a message is being sent by the Supreme Court. But this Court is not some modern day haruspex skilled in the art of divination. This Court cannot – and, more importantly, it will not – tell the people of Colorado that the access to this or any other fundamental right will be delayed because it “thinks” or “perceives” the subtle – or not so subtle – content of a message not directed to this case. The rule of law demands more.
The rules which this Court is to apply in deciding this matter are set forth in Rule 62, Fed.R.Civ.P., and the standards described earlier. As already explained above, Defendants are not entitled to a stay order under the applicable rules. This is where this Court’s analysis must end.
The Court recognizes that the Tenth Circuit or the Supreme Court may choose to issue a stay in this matter. And this Court will not foreclose Defendants from having a fair opportunity to seek such stay. Accordingly, as it pertains to the preliminary injunction, this Court will temporarily stay the preliminary injunction order until 8:00 a.m. on August 25, 2014, to permit Defendants time to seek a stay of the injunction from a higher court.
As to a stay of further proceedings, apart from the preliminary injunction, the Court exercises its discretion to stay such proceedings in this matter. See Ryan v. Gonzales, 133 S. Ct. 696, 707-708, 183 L.Ed.2d 528 (2013); United Steelworkers of America v. Oregon Steel Mills,
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Inc., 322 F.3d 1222, 1227 (10th Cir. 2003). Kitchen will ultimately decide this matter – by the denial of certiorari and issuance of the mandate from the Tenth Circuit or by Supreme Court ruling. Indeed, Defendant Attorney General orally conceded at the July 22, 2014 hearing that if the Kitchen decision is upheld or becomes final, the Challenged Laws are unconstitutional. And a final merits determination here based on Kitchen will only trail Kitchen in the appellate courts. Little would thus be served by requiring the parties to incur the costs and expenses of litigating to final proceedings in this case while trailing Kitchen.3
III. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 8) is GRANTED and Defendants are hereby ENJOINED from enforcing or applying Article II, Section 31 of the Colorado Constitution and C.R.S. §§ 14-2-104(1)(b) and 14-2-104(2) as a basis to deny marriage to same-sex couples or to deny recognition of otherwise valid same-sex marriages entered in other states; and FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Stay Proceedings and NonOpposition to Proposed Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 16) is DENIED as to their request to stay the preliminary injunction but GRANTED as to a stay of all other proceedings in this case until three (3) days after the final mandate is issued in Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 13-4178, __ F.3d __, 2014 WL 2868044 (10th Cir. June 25, 2014), or further order of this Court; and
3 Defendant Attorney General has suggested that this Court defer to earlier state litigation under the Colorado River doctrine. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). This Court declines to abstain from deciding, and thus to defer to the state, matters of federal constitutional law.
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FURTHER ORDERED that the preliminary injunction is TEMPORARILY STAYED until 8:00 a.m. on Monday, August 25, 2014, to allow Defendants time to seek relief from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit or the Supreme Court.
DATED this 23rd day of July, 2014. BY THE COURT: ____________________________________ RAYMOND P. MOORE United States District Judge
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 Case 1:14-cv-01817-RM-KLM Document 1 Filed 07/01/14 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 40
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 14-cv-1817
CATHERINE BURNS; SHEILA SCHROEDER; MARK THRUN; GEOFFREY BATEMAN; RACHEL CATT; CASSIE RUBALD; BREANNA ALEXANDER; STACY PARRISH; ANGELA CRANMORE; JULIANNE DELOY; KAREN COLLIER; and DENISE LORD;
Plaintiffs, v.
JOHN W. HICKENLOOPER, JR., in his official capacity as Governor of Colorado; JOHN SUTHERS, in his official capacity as Attorney General of Colorado; PAM ANDERSON, in her official capacity as Clerk and Recorder for Jefferson County; DEBRA JOHNSON, in her official capacity as Clerk and Recorder for the City and County of Denver;
Defendants.
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys, Mari Newman, David A. Lane, Darren M.
Jankord, and Danielle C. Jefferis of KILLMER, LANE & NEWMAN, LLP, respectfully allege for
their Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief as follows:
I. INTRODUCTION
1. “[T]he Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right to marry, establish
a family, raise children, and enjoy the full protection of a state’s marital laws. A state may not

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deny the issuance of a marriage license to two persons, or refuse to recognize their marriage, based solely upon the sex of the persons in the marriage union.” So held the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 13-4178, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 11935, at *34 (10th Cir. June 25, 2014).
2. In direct violation of the United States Constitution, Colorado law unlawfully denies the issuance of marriages licenses, and refuses to recognize the marriages of certain couples, based solely on the sex of the persons in the marriage union. See COLO. CONST. art. II, § 31; C.R.S. § 14-2-104(1)(b); C.R.S. § 14-2-104(2).
3. This action concerns the rights of loving and committed same-sex couples to enjoy our nation’s fundamental commitment “to the principles of liberty, due process of law, and equal protection of the laws [ ] made live by our adherence to the Constitution of the United States Constitution,” through the abolition of Colorado’s discriminatory denial of the fundamental right to marry the person of one’s choice. See Kitchen, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 11935, at *1-2.
4. Finding unconstitutional an analogous prohibition on the marriages of people of different races, the Supreme Court of the United States has long recognized that “[m]arriage is one of the ‘basic rights of man,’ [and women], fundamental to our very existence and survival.” Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). Yet 40 years later, the State of Colorado discriminates against and denies its gay and lesbian citizens access to “the fundamental right to marry, establish a family, raise children, and enjoy the full protection of [Colorado]’s martial laws,” in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Kitchen, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 11935, at *3-4.
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5. Civil unions, Colorado’s separate and unequal substitute to the full legal and societal recognition of marriage for one group of individuals based solely on their status as homosexual, are not a legally adequate substitute. Separate is inherently equal. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
6. Plaintiffs in this case seek the right to legally recognized marriage by the State of Colorado. Plaintiffs are same-sex, unmarried couples who have been denied the right to marry in the State of Colorado; same-sex married couples whose out-of-state marriages are relegated to civil union status by Colorado, and who desire to have their lawful marriages fully recognized by the State of Colorado; and same-sex couples whose relationships are only legally recognized by the separate, and unequal status of civil unions.
7. Plaintiffs seek a declaration from this Court that Amendment 43, C.R.S. § 14-2104(1)(b), and C.R.S. § 14-2-104(2), violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and a judgment to permanently enjoin the enforcement of Amendment 43 and any other Colorado statute that refuse to allow same-sex couples to marry within the state or to recognize the validity of out-of-state marriages of same-sex couples.
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 8. This action arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States, including Article III, Section 1 of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. Jurisdiction supporting Plaintiffs’ claims for attorneys’ fees is conferred by 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
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9. Venue is proper in the District of Colorado pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). All of the events alleged herein occurred within the State of Colorado, and all of the parties are and were residents of the State of Colorado at all relevant times.
III. PARTIES 10. Plaintiffs CATHERINE (“Kate”) BURNS and SHEILA SCHROEDER are citizens of the United States and residents of, and domiciled in, the State of Colorado. They currently reside in the City of Englewood, in Arapahoe County. Plaintiffs Burns and Schroeder have repeatedly sought to obtain a Colorado marriage license but have been denied each time by the Denver Clerk and Recorder. Their relationship has been relegated to the separate and unequal status of civil union. 11. Plaintiffs MARK THRUN and GEOFFREY (“Geoff”) BATEMAN are citizens of the United States and residents of, and domiciled in, the State of Colorado. They currently reside in the City and County of Denver. Plaintiffs Thrun and Bateman have been legally married in the State of Washington, but the State of Colorado refuses to legally recognize their marriage. Their relationship has been relegated to the separate and unequal status of civil union. 12. Plaintiffs RACHEL CATT and CASSIE RUBALD are citizens of the United States and residents of, and domiciled in, the State of Colorado. They currently reside in the City of Golden, in Jefferson County, Colorado. Plaintiffs Catt and Rubald have been legally married in the State of California, but the State of Colorado refuses to legally recognize their marriage. Their relationship has been relegated to the separate and unequal status of civil union. 13. Plaintiffs BREANNA (“Bre”) ALEXANDER and STACY PARRISH are citizens of the United States and residents of, and domiciled in, the State of Colorado. They currently
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reside in the City of Arvada, in Jefferson County, Colorado. Plaintiffs Alexander and Parrish have sought to obtain a Colorado marriage license which was denied by the Jefferson County Clerk and Recorder’s Office. Their relationship has been relegated to the separate and unequal status of civil union.
14. Plaintiffs ANGELA (“Angie”) CRANMORE and JULIANNE DELOY are citizens of the United States and residents of, and domiciled in, the State of Colorado. They currently reside in the City of Lakewood, in Jefferson County, Colorado. They desire the right to legally marry in the State of Colorado. Their relationship has been relegated to the separate and unequal status of civil union.
15. Plaintiffs KAREN COLLIER and DENISE LORD are citizens of the United States and residents of, and domiciled in, the State of Colorado. They currently reside in the City and County of Denver. Plaintiffs Collier and Lord have been legally married in the State of California, but the State of Colorado refuses to legally recognize their marriage. Their relationship has been relegated to the separate and unequal status of civil union.
16. Defendant John W. Hickenlooper, Jr. is the Governor of the State of Colorado. In his official capacity, the Governor Hickenlooper is the chief executive officer of the State of Colorado. It is his responsibility to ensure that the laws of the State are properly enforced. COLO. CONST. art. IV, § 2. Governor Hickenlooper is a person with the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and was acting under color of state law at all times relevant to this complaint. Governor Hickenlooper’s official residence is in the City and County of Denver, Colorado. He is being sued in his official capacity.
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17. Defendant John Suthers is the Attorney General of the State of Colorado. Attorney General Suthers is the chief legal officer of the State of Colorado. It is his duty to see that the laws of the State are uniformly and adequately enforced. Attorney General Suthers’ official residence is in the City and County of Denver, Colorado. Attorney General Suthers is a person with the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and was acting under color of state law at all times relevant to this complaint. He is being sued in his official capacity.
18. Defendant Pam Anderson is the Clerk and Record for Jefferson County. Under Colorado law, when a completed application has been submitted and the appropriate fees paid, “the county clerk shall issue a license to marry and a marriage certificate form upon being furnished” proof that the applicants meet the age requirement and proof that the marriage is not prohibited under C.R.S. section 14-2-110. See C.R.S. § 14-2-106(1)(a). Clerk and Recorder Anderson is a person with the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and was acting under color of state law at all times relevant to this complaint. Ms. Anderson’s official residence is in the City of Golden in Jefferson County, Colorado. She is being sued in her official capacity.
19. Defendant Debra Johnson is the Clerk and Recorder for the City and County of Denver. Under Colorado law, when a completed application has been submitted and the appropriate fees paid, “the county clerk shall issue a license to marry and a marriage certificate form upon being furnished” proof that the applicants meet the age requirement and proof that the marriage is not prohibited under C.R.S. section 14-2-110. See C.R.S. § 14-2-106(1)(a). Clerk and Recorder Johnson is a person with the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and was acting under color of state law at all times relevant to this complaint. Ms. Johnson’s official residence is in the City and County of Denver, Colorado. She is being sued in her official capacity.
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IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS A. Plaintiffs Have Been Injured By Colorado’s Laws Banning Same-Sex Marriage
And Refusing To Recognize Marriages Performed In Other States 20. The Plaintiffs in this case represent a broad cross-section of the Colorado community. They are diverse in ethnicity, race, age, and gender, and include an honorably discharged Army veteran, an enrolled member of the Klamath tribe, proud and loving parents, government employees, a physician, educators, administrators, attorneys, hiking and cycling enthusiasts, rugby players, a retiree, and homeowners in different Colorado Counties, among other things. 21. Each of the Plaintiffs in this case has suffered an injury in fact, fairly traceable to the acts of the Defendants, and that injury will be redressed by a judicial declaration of unconstitutionality and permanent injunction of Colorado’s laws banning same-sex marriage and recognition of same-sex marriages performed in other jurisdictions. 22. Marriage provides tangible and intangible legal, economic, cultural, historical, emotional, psychological, and social benefits to its participants and their families. 23. Colorado law would allow Plaintiffs to marry or have their out-of-state marriages recognized here, but for the fact that they are same-sex couples. They are not related to one another by blood or marriage. None is married to anyone else, and all are over the age of 18. Each Plaintiff has the capacity to consent to marry, and the members of each couple consent, or have consented, to marry one another.
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1. Plaintiffs Who Have Been Denied Colorado Marriage Licenses Plaintiffs Catherine Burns and Shelia Schroeder
24. Plaintiffs Catherine (“Kate”) Burns and Sheila Schroeder have been together since 2001 and have twice attempted – unsuccessfully – to obtain a marriage license from Defendants. They have a civil union but desire to be married in Colorado.
25. Plaintiff Kate Burns is a fourth generation Colorado native. She was born and raised in Colorado and has lived in Colorado for the vast majority of her adult life. Plaintiff Sheila Schroeder was born in Indiana, but has lived in Colorado for much of her adult life.
26. Sheila is an Associate Professor in the Media, Film & Journalism Studies Department at the University of Denver. Kate is the Student Services Coordinator at the University of Denver. Kate and Sheila own their home together in Englewood, Colorado. They love the outdoors, love to garden, and love having their home in the beautiful State of Colorado.
27. Kate Burns and Sheila Schroeder met in 2001 through mutual friends at Kate’s family’s cabin in Eldora, Colorado. They are the loves of one another’s lives and they intend to spend the rest of their lives together.
28. Because a legally recognized marriage ceremony was not available to them as a same-sex couple in Colorado, on June 21, 2003, Kate and Sheila celebrated their love with a commitment ceremony, officiated by their minister, at the cabin where they met. They have committed to growing old together and being together to the end. Both of their families attended the ceremony.
29. In 2007, Kate and Sheila sought a marriage license at the Clerk and Recorder’s office in Denver, Colorado. The Clerk and Recorder refused to grant them a marriage license,
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informing them that, as same-sex partners, they could not legally marry in Colorado. They were extremely disappointed, though not surprised.
30. On May 1, 2013, the first day that they were legally allowed to do so, Kate and Sheila entered into a civil union in Denver, Colorado.
31. While better than nothing, societal and legal benefits afforded by the civil union fall far short of those available associated with legal marriage.
32. Even with the civil union, Kate and Sheila do not enjoy many of the same rights that married couples take for granted. For example, Kate and Sheila cannot file joint federal tax returns, and they cannot leave each other Social Security survivor’s benefits.
33. Kate and Sheila have been required to spend additional money and time to engage legal assistance with estate planning issues that they would not have to address if they were a legally married couple.
34. Although they have been in a committed relationship for over ten years, Kate and Sheila have suffered consequences as a result of being denied the right to enter into a legal marriage.
35. In 2005, two years after their commitment ceremony, Sheila was in the hospital being treated for a possible heart attack. Kate rushed to the hospital to be at her side. When Kate arrived she was asked by the nurse if she was Sheila’s sister. When she told her Sheila was her partner, the nurse rushed out of the room in a manner that made it obvious to both Kate and Sheila that the nurse’s hostility was related to the fact that they were a same-sex couple. In that moment, instead of focusing on Sheila’s physical and mental health they were forced to wonder if the hospital was going to allow Kate to stay by her side and support her. Were they legally
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married, the hospital would have been obliged to do so; but as unwed members of a couple, the hospital was able to use its discretion to choose to allow Kate to remain with Sheila, or not, at the whim of a discriminatory nurse. Ultimately, the nurse returned to the room, subdued and less friendly, and Kate was able to stay, but the emotional impact Kate and Sheila suffered was real and lasting. Kate and Sheila have had to live with the insecurity of knowing that they may be denied access to one another during a medical emergency because they are not legally married.
36. Kate and Sheila are both members of the First Unitarian Society of Denver. Although their religion recognizes their marriage, their minister cannot perform a legal marriage ceremony for them like he can for the heterosexual couples of their congregation.
37. The fact that they cannot be legally married makes Kate and Sheila feel like second-class citizens, especially when they are surrounded by their friends who are married couples. Kate and Sheila are denied the privilege of referring to one another as legal spouses, instead having to hold themselves out in society as having a relationship status that is something different, and lesser, than the status of opposite-sex committed couples.
38. As Kate and Sheila grow older, the stress related to being denied the right to marry the person they love becomes more and more real. They live everyday with the fear that if something were to happen they will not be given the power to make decisions for the person they have vowed to spend their life with and care for.
39. Kate and Sheila have both been arrested for protesting Colorado’s unequal marriage laws that so deeply impact their lives.
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40. As a native of Colorado, the unjust nature of these laws hit particularly close to home for Kate. She has a strong desire to see these laws change, not just for Sheila and for her, but for the state in which she grew up is so proud to call her home.
41. Although they are not lawyers, Kate and Sheila actively follow the legal developments relating to important court decisions impacting same-sex marriage. They were thrilled when the United States Supreme Court issued its ruling in the Windsor case opening the door for legal recognition of same-sex marriage.
42. On June 25, 2014, Kate and Sheila were delighted when the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its ruling that Utah’s ban on same-sex marriage was not constitutional.
43. The very next day, June 26, 2014, Kate and Sheila went to the Denver Clerk and Recorder’s office and requested a Colorado marriage license. While expressing her disappointment at having to do so, the Denver Clerk and Recorder, Defendant Johnson, refused to issue Kate and Sheila a marriage license based on their status as a same-sex couple. Kate and Sheila were very disappointed again by this refusal, and left empty handed.
44. Although Kate and Sheila know it is possible to travel to another state to get married, they strongly desire to get married in Colorado. Colorado is their home; it is where their friends, family and faith community reside. They want the legal right to be perceived and recognized as a married couple by the community that is so important to them. Plaintiffs Breanna Alexander and Stacy Parrish
45. Plaintiffs Breanna (“Bre”) Alexander and Stacy Parrish have been together since 2010 and are the proud parents of a handsome baby boy. They have attempted – unsuccessfully
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– to obtain a marriage license from the office of the Jefferson County Clerk and Recorder. They have a civil union but desire to be married in Colorado.
46. Plaintiff Bre Alexander is a native of Denver, Colorado and has lived here her entire life. Plaintiff Stacy Parrish is an enrolled member of the Klamath tribe of Chiloqin, Oregon. She has called Colorado home since 2009, when she moved here to pursue her passion for urban education reform.
47. Bre is an attorney for a personal injury law firm in Aurora, Colorado. Stacy is an Assistant Principal in a local school district.
48. Bre and Stacy met in 2010 through their rugby team. They had many common interests and they instantly hit it off.
49. As their relationship progressed, Stacy and Bre knew they wanted to spend the rest of their lives with one another. They knew they wanted to have children and raise a family together.
50. Stacy and Bre own their home together in Arvada, Colorado. 51. On Mother’s Day, May 11, 2014, Stacy and Bre welcomed their first child. 52. Like most new parents, they are thrilled every day to watch their child grow and develop. 53. For several years they have known that they wanted to get married. However, as a same-sex couple in Colorado, that option was not legally available to them. 54. Bre and Stacy did not want to settle for a civil union, because the rights and legal recognition that it offers are not equal to those of marriage, and because a civil union does not enjoy the same societal meaning as a marriage.
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55. Out of necessity, Bre and Stacy ended up settling for this separate and unequal option, because they wanted to ensure as many legal protections for their family as they could, although those legal protections available as members of a civil union are less than those they would enjoy as members of a legally recognized marriage. On May 1, 2013, Stacy and Bre became the forty-second couple to enter into a civil union in Denver County.
56. While the civil union is preferable to no legal recognition whatsoever, it falls short of being married. Even with the civil union, Stacy and Bre do not enjoy many of the same rights that married couples take for granted. They continue to struggle to navigate the patchwork of state and federal legislation concerning their status as a couple united in a civil union. For example, although they entered in to a civil union, because they are not a married couple they cannot file joint federal tax returns.
57. Stacy and Bre follow the legal developments relating to important court decisions impacting same-sex marriage.
58. On June 25, 2014, Stacy and Bre were thrilled when the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its ruling that Utah’s ban on same-sex marriage was not constitutional.
59. On June 27, 2014, Stacy and Bre went to the Jefferson County Clerk and Recorder’s office requested a Colorado marriage license. The Jefferson County Clerk rebuffed their effort to become legally married in Colorado. The clerk turned Bre and Stacy away, telling them that Jefferson County was not issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples. They were crushed.
60. Bre and Stacy believe that marriage is the highest recognition for a family unit that one can enter into and is a union that is recognized and understood globally.
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61. Colorado’s refusal to allow Bre and Stacy to legally marry has made them feel like they belong in a separate, and lesser, class, and devalues their love and commitment to one another.
62. Although they know it is possible to travel to another state to get married, Bre and Stacy strongly desire to get married in Colorado. Colorado is where they grew up, where Bre’s parents live, and where they have made their home and their family. They want to be perceived and recognized as legally married by the community where they have built their life together.
63. It is their hope that they will not have to explain to their child that the State of Colorado, despite their committed partnership and desire to fully protect and assume responsibility for one another, will not allow his parents to marry. Instead, they hope to tell him of the progress Colorado made to equality, and the small role that they were able to play in history by participating in this lawsuit.
2. Plaintiffs Whose Out-of-State Marriages Are Not Recognized By the State of Colorado
Plaintiffs Mark Thrun and Geoffrey Bateman 64. Plaintiffs Mark Thrun and Geoffrey (Geoff) Bateman have been together for
nearly twelve years and are raising two smart and active children together. The state of Colorado does not recognize their marriage issued by the State of Washington. They have a civil union but desire to have their marriage legally recognized by the State of Colorado.
65. Plaintiff Mark Thrun has called Colorado home since moving here in 2000. Plaintiff Geoff Bateman has called Colorado home since moving here in 2001.
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66. Mark is a physician in the Public Health Department of Denver Health. Geoff is an Assistant Professor in the Peace and Justice Studies Department at a Regis University in Denver, Colorado.
67. Mark and Geoff met over Labor Day weekend 2001. They instantly connected and had so much to talk about. They knew they loved one another the night they met. They intend to spend the rest of their lives together.
68. Geoff and Mark own their home together in Denver, Colorado and they are the proud parents of two wonderful sons. Geoff is their biological father, and Mark is equally their parent in every respect.
69. Geoff and Mark love taking advantage of Colorado’s natural wonders. They make it to the mountains as often as they can. They love to hike and ski and their sons enjoy snowboarding.
70. As many parents do, Geoff and Mark spend much of their time enjoying watching their children grow and participate in the various activities in which their children have become interested.
71. Two years after they met, Mark proposed to Geoff in Paris. Mark told Geoff he wanted nothing more than to spend his life with him. Geoff happily accepted.
72. Geoff and Mark knew there was no legal process available to them in Colorado to solidify their commitment to one another. They decided they could wait no longer to forever commit themselves to one another, and in 2006, they returned to Paris and slipped rings onto each other’s fingers as they professed their love. Despite their unwavering commitment to one
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another, this exchange of rings was not legally recognized in any jurisdiction, but rather was only a symbolic statement of their commitment to one another.
73. Geoff and Mark have vowed to one another to keep each other safe and work hard to make each other, and their children, happy.
74. The legal recognition of their family is very important not just to Geoff and Mark, but also to their children.
75. On May 1, 2013, Geoff and Mark were one of the first couples in Denver to enter into a civil union.
76. Geoff and Mark have both observed that a civil union, and the rights that come with it, are better than nothing, but a civil union is certainly not a marriage. It is not recognized by the federal government and still denies them many rights married couples take for granted.
77. To Geoff and Mark, entering into a civil union felt like a consolation prize. They have never understood why their straight friends had the privilege of entering into a marriage and they did not. Their relationship was clearly no different in any significant way.
78. Colorado is their home. It is where they have built their life with their family and their friends. Geoff and Mark had always vowed that they would not get married until they could get married in Colorado.
79. However, after the Supreme Court issued the Windsor decision, they decided it would be in the best interest of their family unit to enjoy as many of the legal benefits associated with marriage that they could.
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80. On July 29, 2013, after a weekend of camping, they married on the beach in the State of Washington. Although this was a wonderful experience, it would have meant much more to them to have been able to wed in the state where they have made their home.
81. Although they have been in a committed relationship for well over ten years, due to their status as unmarried domestic partners, civil union partners, and now as a same-sex couple married out-of-state, they have consistently had concerns that married couples do not.
82. Geoff and their children are now covered under Mark’s health insurance. However, before they were married in the State of Washington, they had to pay that portion of the insurance premiums after-taxes. Geoff’s and the children’s portions of the premiums were not able to be taken out Mark’s paycheck before-taxes due to Mark and Geoff’s status as domestic partners.
83. Many times, Geoff and Mark have had to spend time and money seeking the advice of professionals in order to assure that their children could receive Mark’s benefits. If Colorado were to recognize their marriage, this would be unnecessary.
84. Geoff and Mark have had to spend additional time and money seeking counsel on how they should file their taxes. If Colorado were to recognize their marriage, this would be unnecessary.
85. Geoff and Mark have had to spend additional money and time to address estate planning issues they would not have to address if their marriage were recognized in Colorado.
86. Geoff and Mark fear for the security of their children, should something happen to them and the Colorado courts choose not to recognize their marriage.
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87. They have had to live with the insecurity of knowing that they may be denied access to one another during a medical emergency because their marriage is not recognized in Colorado.
88. Their family, their friends, and their children have no doubt about Mark and Geoff’s love and devotion to one another. However, semantics are powerful and actionable to many people. Being able to legally call one another “husband,” rather than “civil union partner,” is much more meaningful in this society. Plaintiffs Rachel Catt and Cassie Rubald
89. Plaintiffs Rachel Catt and Cassie Rubald have been together for nearly a decade and are raising two bright and inquisitive children together. The state of Colorado does not recognize their marriage issued by the State of California. Notwithstanding their California marriage, the State of Colorado recognizes their relationship as a civil union. They desire to have their marriage legally recognized by the State of Colorado.
90. Plaintiff Rachel Catt moved to Colorado with her family when she was five years old. She was raised in Colorado and completed her undergraduate degree at University of Colorado at Boulder. Plaintiff Cassie Rubald was born in Glenwood Springs, Colorado and lived in Colorado throughout much of her childhood. She attended college at Colorado State University.
91. After spending much of their adult lives in California, in June 2013, they returned to Colorado to raise their children and be near their families.
92. Rachel is an attorney in Denver, Colorado and Cassie is a California attorney.
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93. The two Coloradans met and fell in love in California in 2005. Rachel and Cassie have been in a committed relationship ever since. They intend to spend their lives together.
94. Cassie and Rachel live together in Golden, Colorado. They are the proud and loving parents of two children. Rachel is the biological mother of their children, and Cassie is equally their parent in every respect.
95. Although it does not have the same societal meaning, or the same legal rights, in order to protect Cassie’s interests as a parent of their children to the full extent available to them, they registered for a California domestic partnership (a lesser relationship status that predated legal marriage rights in California) while they lived in California.
96. The process was degrading. Instead of being given a marriage license at City Hall like married couples, Rachel and Cassie had to fill out forms and mail them to the Secretary of State, as though they were registering for a business partnership.
97. This legal registration enabled Cassie to proceed with a stepparent adoption. Similar to the process of registering for a domestic partnership, this too felt degrading. Cassie is not a stepparent to their children; she is their intended parent from the start.
98. In July 2008, although not legally recognized due to their status as a same-sex couple, they celebrated their love with a marriage ceremony in Colorado with their family and friends.
99. In June 2013, Rachel and Cassie moved back to Colorado. This has enabled them to spend more time with their close and supportive families and has given their families the opportunity to watch their children grow. Colorado has always felt like home to them. They have very deep and established connections and friendships in Colorado.
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100. After their move back home to Colorado, their California domestic partnership was recognized as a civil union.
101. After the Windsor decision, just to file joint tax returns, they had to bear the cost and burden of traveling back to California in December 2013 to enter into a legal marriage. At that point, California (unlike Colorado) allowed same-sex couples to wed.
102. This was Rachel and Cassie’s third marriage ceremony. Throughout their committed relationship, they have consistently had to deal with extra burdens that heterosexual couples do not, just to ensure that their family unit is protected and they are afforded at least some of the same rights that are presumptively available to their married heterosexual counterparts.
103. Throughout the course of their loving and committed relationship, they have had to bear the financial and emotional costs of two adoptions and three separate wedding ceremonies.
104. Upon their return back home to Colorado, their legal marriage in California has been demoted to a Colorado civil union.
105. A civil union, and the rights that come with it, are better than no legal recognition at all, but a civil union is certainly not a marriage. It is not recognized by the federal government and still denies them many rights married couples take for granted.
106. In our society where semantics are so important, the relegation of their California marriage to a civil union makes Rachel and Cassie feel like second-class citizens who are treated as separate and unequal from their married heterosexual counterparts. Although their
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relationships and families are very similar in every respect, Cassie and Rachel have to call their relationship something different and lesser.
107. Colorado’s refusal to recognize their California marriage, or to allow them to marry here, negatively impacts their parenting relationship with their children. When explaining to their children that the law does not treat them as though they are married here in Colorado, they send the negative message that some people do not believe that a child can have two mothers. This gives their children the message that somehow their family is less important and less legitimate than other families. They continue to try to teach their children otherwise; they tell their children to teach love.
108. Rachel and Cassie desire to be recognized as a married couple in Colorado where they have returned to make their home and raise their family. Plaintiffs Karen Collier and Denise Lord
109. Plaintiffs Karen Collier and Denise Lord have been together for nearly a decade. The state of Colorado does not recognize their marriage issued by the State of California. They have a civil union but desire to have their marriage legally recognized by the State of Colorado.
110. Plaintiff Karen Collier is a third generation Colorado native and she has lived in Colorado her entire life. Plaintiff Denise Lord has lived in Colorado since 2001 when she was transferred here through the military.
111. Karen worked as a court reporter in Colorado for thirty years and is now retired. Denise is a six year veteran of the Army National Guard and works as a college librarian.
112. In 2005, Denise and Karen met through Outspoken, a non-exclusive Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Questioning (“LGBTQ”) philanthropic road cycling club. They
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quickly connected and have been in a committed relationship ever since. They love each other and they intend to spend the rest of their lives together.
113. Denise and Karen own their home together in Denver, Colorado. They have lived together for eight years. They continue to enjoy having fun together, being active, and taking advantage of all Colorado has to offer including cycling, playing tennis, and skiing.
114. As their relationship progressed, they reached a point where they knew that if they had the legal right to do so, they would get married. They were in love and ready to commit to one another; marriage felt like the natural next step for their relationship. However, at that time they did not even have the option to enter into a civil union, let alone a marriage.
115. On January 10, 2014, Karen and Denise decided to enter into the only type of legally-recognized relationship status for same-sex couples in Colorado, and entered into a civil union.
116. They were advised that because their civil union is not recognized as a legal marriage they would be unable to file joint federal tax returns.
117. With this knowledge, although Colorado is their home and the place where they desire to get married, on May 22, 2014, Denise and Karen married in Martinez, California.
118. Throughout their relationship, Denise and Karen have been forced to jump through legal and financial hoops that they would not have if they had the right to marry in their home state of Colorado.
119. For example, Denise is a veteran of the United States Army, and Denise and Karen meet all of the qualifications for the Veteran’s Administration Refinance Loan Guaranty program—except that they cannot legally marry. They were told that because of Colorado’s ban
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on same-sex marriage they were unable to qualify for the program. Ultimately, they had to refinance their home in Denise’s name alone, compromising Karen’s legal ownership of the home she has lived in for decades.
120. Denise and Karen have had to spend additional money and time to address estate planning issues they would not have to address if their marriage were recognized in Colorado.
121. They have had to live with the insecurity of knowing that they may be denied access to one another during a medical emergency because their California marriage is not recognized in Colorado.
122. They desire to have their marriage recognized in Colorado, because it is the state where they have built their home and their life together. In addition to the legal benefits associate with marriage, marriage is a term that everyone understands and they feel it describes the love and commitment they have for one another.
3. Additional Plaintiffs Whose Colorado Civil Unions Provide Separate and Unequal Benefits to Those Afforded to Different-Sex Couples
Plaintiffs Angela Cranmore and Julianne Deloy 123. Plaintiffs Angela (“Angie”) Cranmore and Julianne Deloy are in a long-term
committed relationship and are the proud and loving parents of one young son, and have a second child on the way. They have entered into a civil union, but desire to have their marriage legally recognized by the State of Colorado.
124. Plaintiff Julianne Deloy was raised in Colorado and has lived here throughout her adult life. Plaintiff Angie Cranmore has called Colorado home since 2009.
125. Angie works for the Department of Veteran’s Affairs and Julianne works for a government contracting company.
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126. Julianne and Angie met in March 2010 through mutual friends. They have been in a loving and committed relationship ever since. They intend to spend the rest of their lives with one another.
127. Julianne and Angie own their home together in Lakewood, Colorado. They are the proud parents of a wonderful son and they are soon expecting their second child. Julianne is their biological mother, and Angie is equally their parent in every respect. They are very busy and very happy with attending to the needs of their growing family.
128. Angie and Julianne have committed to one another and they want to spend their lives together. However, because they are a same-sex couple in Colorado, marriage is not legally available to them.
129. They did not want to settle for a civil union, because the rights and legal recognition that it offers are not equal to those of marriage, and because a civil union does not have the same societal meaning as marriage.
130. Because it was the best way for them to ensure Angie’s legal rights to their children, on May 28, 2014, Angie and Julianne entered into a civil union.
131. While the civil union provides some of the benefits of legal marriage, it falls far short of being married. Notwithstanding their civil union, Angie and Julianne do not enjoy many of the same rights that married couples take for granted.
132. For example, because Julianne is Angie’s civil union partner, and not her legal spouse, Angie is not able to include Julianne on her federally-offered health insurance.
133. When their first child was born into their committed relationship, their inability to legally marry required Angie and Julianne to spend a great deal of time and money to establish
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Angie’s rights, as the non-biological parent, to their child. They had to pay for, and Angie had to undergo, Federal Bureau of Investigation and Colorado Bureau of Investigation background checks. Angie had to hire an attorney, appear in front of a judge, and prove why Angie should be allowed to adopt their child. They had to incur the cost of using an adoption agency to complete two different home studies. Angie could not be named on their son’s initial birth certificate. Angie and Julianne had to wait for the adoption to go through, the paperwork to be processed, and a new birth certificate to be issued before they could see both of their names listed on their son’s birth certificate, even though both had always been the intended parents. None of these steps would have been necessary if Angie and Julianne had the right to legally marry in Colorado.
134. As they prepare for the arrival of their second child their circumstances have changed somewhat, but Angie and Julianne are still not treated in the same manner as if they were legally married. Now, their civil union has enabled them to ensure Angie’s rights to their child through the stepparent adoption process. However, Angie is not their children’s stepparent; she is their intended parent from the start. The adoption cannot be finalized until after their child’s birth. Therefore, again Angie will not be able to be named on their child’s original birth certificate. Angie cannot claim their child under her health insurance until after the adoption is finalized. Again, all of these financial, legal, and emotional burdens would be unnecessary if Angie and Julianne were legally married.
135. In a time that should be filled with excitement and anticipation for Angie and Julianne, it has been very stressful and emotionally draining to go through all of these legal and
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financial steps just to ensure that Angie has the same rights to their children that heterosexual couples take for granted and receive automatically.
136. Angie and Julianne want to be able to teach their children that all people should be treated equal. They hope that they will not have to explain to them that although their parents love each other and have committed to spending their lives together; because of their sexual orientation they are unable to be married in Colorado.
137. Although they know it is possible to travel to another state to get married, Angie and Julianne strongly desire to get married in Colorado. Colorado is their home and it is where they plan to raise their family. They want to be perceived and recognized as married by the community where they have built their life together.
B. The United States Constitution Does Not Tolerate Discrimination of the Basis of Sexual Orientation
138. The United States Constitution does not tolerate discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation – in Colorado or anywhere else.
139. Striking down a 1992 amendment to the Colorado state Constitution (“Amendment 2”) that would have prevented any city, town, or county in the state from taking legislative, executive, or judicial action to recognize gay and lesbian individuals as a protected class, the Court made clear that the law may not treat people as second-class citizens on the basis of their sexual orientation:
We m ust c onclude t hat Amendment 2 classifies hom osexuals not t o f urther a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else. This Colorado cannot do. A State cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
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140. Same-sex couples have a constitutionally protected right to intimate personal relations. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
141. Last summer, the Supreme Court struck down a key provision in the Defense Against Marriage Act (“DOMA”), holding that the federal government defining marriage as between one man and one woman was unconstitutional animus. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
142. Colorado’s laws banning same-sex marriage share the same constitutional infirmity as the federal DOMA: “the avowed purpose and practical effect of the law here in question are to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States.” See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693.
C. Marriage Is A Fundament Right That Must Be Afforded To Same-Sex Couples 143. “There can be little doubt that the right to marry is a fundamental liberty. The marital relationship is older than the Bill of Rights—older than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. The Court has long recognized that marriage is ‘the most important relation in life.’ ‘Without doubt,’ the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment includes the freedom ‘to marry, establish a home[,] and bring up children.’” Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 13-4178, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 11935, at *34 (10th Cir. June 25, 2014) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)). See also, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“The freedom to marry has long
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been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness…”).
144. Even while our Courts have long acknowledged that “the right to marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals,” Kitchen, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 11935, at *36 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978)), Colorado law denies lesbians and gay men the freedom afforded to different-sex couples in this State to have their loving, committed relationships recognized through marriage.
D. Colorado Has Historically Discriminated Against Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Individuals and Same-Sex Couples, and Continues to Do So Today through its Discriminatory Marriage Laws
145. Colorado and the United States have historically subjected Lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (“LGBT”) individuals to painful societal and government-sponsored discrimination.
146. Colorado and the United States have singled out lesbians and gay men for discriminatory treatment even though sexual orientation bears no relation to an individual’s ability to contribute to society. LGBT individuals have faced unconstitutional criminal penalties for private sexual conduct between consenting adults, harassment, hate crimes, and discrimination in employment and public accommodations, and many other areas.
147. Colorado has led the nation when it comes to enacting government-sponsored discrimination against LGBT individuals. In 1992, Colorado passed Amendment II, which unconstitutionally prohibited “all legislative, executive or judicial action at any level of state of local government designed to protect…gays and lesbians.” Romer, 517 U.S. at 624. The purpose of Amendment II was “not to further a proper legislative end but to make [LGBT individuals]
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unequal to everyone else.” Id. at 635. The United States Supreme Court struck down this unconstitutional law.
148. In 2000, the Colorado legislature amended its marriage statute, C.R.S. § 14-2-104, to specifically ban marriage by same-sex couples and to deny recognition to same-sex marriages validly performed outside of Colorado. H.B. 00-1249 Colo. Legis. Serv. Ch. 233. Contravening Colorado’s longstanding practice of recognizing legally valid marriages from other states, Payne v. Payne, 214 P.2d 495, 497 (Colo. 1950); C.R.S. § 14-2-112, Colorado law now states:
(1). . . [ A] ma rriage is v alid in th is s tate if : ( a) It is lic ensed, s olemnized, a nd registered as provided in this part 1; and (b) It is only between one man and one woman. ( 2) N otwithstanding t he pr ovisions of s ection 14 -2-112, a ny m arriage contracted w ithin or out side t his s tate t hat doe s not s atisfy pa ragraph ( b) of subsection (1) of this section shall not be recognized as valid in this state. C.R.S. § 14-2-104. 149. In 2006, even though Colorado’s statutes already barred same-sex marriages and denied recognition to marriages of same-sex couples who legally married out of state, Colorado amended its Constitution to do so as well. 150. Amendment 43 was ostensibly passed to “persev[e] the commonly accepted definition of marriage” and that “[m]arriage as an institution has historically consisted of one man and one woman and, as such, provides the optimal environment for creating, nurturing, and protecting children and preserving families.” Colo. Leg. Council, Colo. Blue Book, Amendment 43: Marriage 13 (2006). 151. Colorado voters were told that Amendment 43 was “necessary to avoid court rulings that expand marriage beyond one man and one woman in Colorado.” Colo. Leg. Council, Colo. Blue Book, Amendment 43: Marriage 13 (2006).
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152. The express and stated purpose of Amendment 43 was to single out same-sex couples alone by stripping them of federal constitutional protections that apply to all other citizens, and state protections and rights that are granted to all different-sex married couples in Colorado by operation of law.
153. Colorado’s Constitutional Amendment singling out same-sex couples for the denial of marriage rights afforded to others was approved by a very thin margin of not more than 56 percent of voters in November 2006, an even smaller majority than the approximately 66% of voters that approved Utah’s substantially similar discriminatory ban against same-sex marriage. This is among those instances in which it is the duty of the judiciary to vigilantly protect the rights of the minority against the tyranny of the majority. Indeed, James Madison decried the potential for a tyranny of the majority, pointing out that it was as important in our system of government to guard the minority in our society against injustice by the majority, as it was to guard society from the oppression of its rulers. The Federalist, No. 51, at 351 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
E. Despite the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals Ruling in Kitchen v. Herbert, Defendants Continue to Enforce Amendment 43 and Colorado’s Related Discriminatory Marriage Laws
154. In light of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals’ June 25, 2014 decision, Kitchen v. Herbert, which overturned Utah’s substantially similar discriminatory restrictions on same-sex marriage based on the fundamental right to marry, Plaintiffs Burns and Schroeder, and Plaintiffs Alexander and Parrish, sought to enforce their same right in Colorado. Accordingly Plaintiffs Burns and Schroeder, and Plaintiffs Alexander and Parrish, applied for marriage licenses from
30

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the Denver Clerk and Recorder, and from the office of the Jefferson County Clerk and Recorder, respectively.
155. Both the Denver Clerk and Recorder and the Jefferson County Clerk and Recorder denied these Plaintiffs’ applications for licenses because of the Colorado laws prohibiting same sex marriage, which are substantially similar to the Utah laws that were ruled unconstitutional and are still being enforced by Defendants.
156. In response to the Tenth Circuit’s ruling in Kitchen v. Herbert, Boulder Clerk and Recorder Hillary Hill determined that Boulder County would issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples.
157. Thereafter, in response to the Tenth Circuit ruling and Boulder County’s issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples, Defendant Colorado Attorney General John Suthers issued the following public statement:
Colorado’s constitutional prohibition on same-sex marriages remains in effect. ... Any marriage licenses issued to same-sex couples in Colorado before a final court resolution of the issue are invalid. As Colorado Attorney General J.D. MacFarlane opined in 1975 when the Boulder County Clerk and Recorder issued same-sex marriage licenses, “the issuance of a license under such circumstances is useless and an official act of no validity and may mislead the recipients of the license and the general public.” http://www.coloradoattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/press_releases/2014/06/25/062 514_reactive_statement_10th_circuit_court_same_sex_marriage_ruling.pdf. 158. Defendant Suthers thus nullified Boulder’s attempt to equalize same-sex marriages, confirming that, absent Court action, same-sex couples will remain unequal under Colorado law.
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159. Following Defendant Suthers’ lead and in response to requests for marriage licenses from same-sex couples, Defendant Anderson and Jefferson County issued this statement reiterating their refusal to issues marriage licenses to same-sex couples:
We ar e cu rrently n ot i ssuing s ame-sex m arriage licenses i n J efferson C ounty i n accordance w ith t he s tate co nstitution. W e ar e watching t he l egal p roceedings regarding ma rriage e quality c losely a s it is c ompletely a djudicated f or C olorado citizens. http://jeffco.us/recording/news/2014/statement-on-same-sex-marriage-ruling/. 160. Arapahoe County also issued a similar statement: Arapahoe County will continue to uphold Colorado’s constitutional provision on same-sex m arriage, and w ill f ollow C olorado statute b y i ssuing c ivil uni on certificates to same-sex couples. http://arapahoegov.com/DocumentCenter/View/2093. F. Colorado’s Civil Union Law is Not an Adequate Substitute for Legal Marriage 161. Colorado is currently the only state that offers civil unions to same-sex couples.1 162. Plaintiffs Thrun and Bateman, Catt and Rubald, and Collier and Lord are legally married in other states, but Colorado refuses to recognize those legal marriages. Plaintiffs Cranmore and Deloy wish to marry in Colorado, but are prohibited from doing so. This, the only legal status afforded to these Plaintiffs’ relationships is the separate and unequal status of civil union. 163. Colorado and Defendants do not recognize Plaintiffs’ legal out-of-state marriages and denigrate the status and significance of their relationship to a civil union.
1 Nevada currently offers domestic partnerships. Other states had civil unions or domestic partnerships, but those states now have full marriage equality or a court’s granting of marriage equality is pending appeal.
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164. While same-sex couples are eligible to enter into civil unions under Colorado law, those civil unions are not identical to marriage, and do not offer the full protections of marriage. For example (though not exhaustive):
a. Plaintiffs a re i neligible for v irtually a ll th e federal p rotections otherwise available to validly married couples. Windsor, 133 S . Ct. at 2683 (There are “over 1,000 federal laws in which marital or spousal status is addressed as a matter of federal law.”)
b. Plaintiffs face uncertainty when they travel as to whether other states will recognize or respect their relationship status.
c. Plaintiffs c annot file j oint s tate an d f ederal t ax returns as a m arried couple.
d. Plaintiffs are taxed for health benefits provided by employers to their same-sex partner, thus significantly raising the cost of health care for the families. 26 U.S.C. § 106.
165. In addition to the tangible harms listed above, Plaintiffs are denied the unique social recognition that marriage conveys. Without access to the familiar language and legal label of marriage, Plaintiffs are unable instantly or adequately to communicate to others the depth and permanence of their commitment, or to obtain respect for that commitment as others do simply by invoking their married status.
166. When the Colorado Legislature passed the Colorado Civil Union Act, it expressly emphasized the separate and unequal status of civil unions, stating that civil unions do “not alter the public policy of the State, which recognizes only the union of one man and one woman as a marriage.” Colorado Civil Union Act., C.R.S. §14-15-101, et seq. Additionally, the Colorado Legislature specifically defined “spouses” as “two persons who are married pursuant to the provisions of the Uniform Marriage Act,” meaning the term “spouse” is exclusive to different-
33

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sex married couples. C.R.S. § 14-15-103(6). The Colorado legislature determined that persons in a civil union would be labeled “partner in a civil union” or “party to a civil union.” C.R.S. § 14-15-103(5). This designation is expressly unequal.
167. A marriage is the pinnacle relationship in our society. When married people communicate their marital status to others, that status is readily recognized and understood. Conversely, a civil union is not a readily recognized or understood relationship either in Colorado, throughout the United States, or anywhere else.
168. Different-sex couples who chose to make a public commitment to each other get married. Although different-sex couples are permitted to obtain a civil union in Colorado, almost without exception, different-sex couples chose to get married instead of “unionize.” Indeed given the legal uncertainty and the social implications of civil unions, it would be illogical for a different-sex couple to obtain a civil union instead of marriage. Accordingly, in Colorado, different-sex couples get married; same-sex couples obtain a civil union. This separate status is inherently unequal.
169. Because of the way in which their relationships are labeled differently by Colorado, the Plaintiff couples and other same-sex couples must disclose their sexual orientation in their civic dealings, in a manner that is discriminatory, unfair and violates their privacy.
170. The Plaintiff couples and other same-sex couples have experienced confusion about and disregard for their civil union status when seeking government and private-sector services that require them to accurately fill out required forms, as the forms fail to acknowledge “civil union” as a family or legal structure.
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Case 1:14-cv-01817-RM-KLM Document 1 Filed 07/01/14 USDC Colorado Page 35 of 40
171. Colorado’s civil union law is not an adequate substitute for marriage. Denying two people in a loving, committed relationship the freedom to marry denies them the opportunity to express and legally embody their commitment in the most serious way that society provides. It refuses them the opportunity to enter into a relationship that is universally respected and recognized as a symbol of their love and commitment. The civil union designation withholds from same-sex couples the reverence and recognition associated only with marriage. It offers no more than a mundane entryway to an extremely limited subset of benefits. The essence of marriage is a private and public celebration of love and commitment; civil unions fail to achieve that goal. Marriage is something many people hope for from a young age, an ideal they aspire to; a civil union is not.
STATEMENT OF CLAIMS FOR RELIEF FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Fourteenth Amendment – Due Process Violation 172. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 173. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that no “State [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process or law.” U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV § 1. The Due Process Clause protects individuals from arbitrary government intrusion into life, liberty, and property. 174. Amendment 43 of the Colorado Constitution, C.R.S § 14-2-104(1)(b) and 14-2104(2), et seq., and all other sources of state law that preclude marriage or marital recognition for
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same-sex couples, violate fundamental liberties that are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, both on their face and as applied to Plaintiffs.
175. The freedom to marry is one of the fundamental liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Kitchen, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 11935, at *34 (“There can be little doubt that the right to marry is a fundamental liberty.”).
176. The fundamental right to marry includes the right to remain married, and the legal recognition of a marriage performed in a different state.
177. Colorado’s Amendment 43 and the Colorado statutes that define and limit marriage to one man and one woman violate this fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause because they prevent each Plaintiffs from marrying the person of his or her choice, and from enjoying the legal recognition of a legal marriage performed in another state.
178. The right to marry is intertwined with the rights to privacy, family integrity and intimate association, and an individual’s choices related to marriage are protected by the Due Process Clause because they are integral to a person’s dignity and autonomy. Defendants’ actions to enforce the marriage ban directly and impermissibly infringe upon Plaintiffs’ deeply intimate, personal, and private decisions regarding family life, and preclude them from obtaining full liberty, dignity, privacy, and security for themselves, their families, and their parent-child bonds, including the right to have those parent-child bonds recognized in the first instance.
179. Colorado’s ban on same-sex marriages and its provision of unequal civil unions impair Plaintiffs’ fundamental right to travel as civil unions are not recognized as valid in the vast majority of states or internationally.
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180. Colorado’s refusal to recognize otherwise lawful, out-of-state same-sex marriages “undermines both public and private significance of state-sanctioned same-sex marriages; for it tells those couples, and all the world, that their otherwise valid marriages are unworthy of [Colorado’s] recognition.” Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694.
181. Nothing logically or physically precludes same-sex couples from marrying. 182. Defendants’ enforcement of the Colorado laws prohibiting same-sex marriages and refusing to recognize out-of-state same-sex marriages has harmed, and continues to harm, Plaintiffs. 183. Defendants’ actions in enforcing Amendment 43 and other Colorado laws restricting marriage to one man and one woman have no compelling, important, rational, or otherwise sufficient justification. 184. Injunctive and declaratory relief are necessary, as there is no adequate remedy at law to redress these constitutional wrongs.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Fourteenth Amendment – Violation of Equal Protection 185. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 186. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV § 1. 187. Amendment 43 of the Colorado Constitution, C.R.S § 14-2-104(1)(b) and 14-2104(2), et seq., and all other sources of state law that preclude marriage for same-sex couples and
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refuse to recognize legal marriages preformed in other states, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, both on their face and as applied to Plaintiffs.
188. Amendment 43 and other Colorado laws that restrict marriage to one man and one woman violate Plaintiffs’ right to equal protection of the laws by impermissibly discriminating on the basis of sex and sexual orientation.
189. Plaintiffs are similarly situated to different-sex spouses in every relevant respect. Plaintiffs and their children are as worthy of respect, dignity, social acceptance, and legitimacy as different-sex spouse and their children. The emotion, romantic, and dignitary reasons Plaintiffs seek to marry are similar or identical to those of different-sex couples who choose to marry.
190. Defendants’ actions enforcing Amendment 43 and other Colorado laws restricting marriage to one man and one woman have harmed, and continue to harm, each of the Plaintiffs and their families.
191. Defendants’ actions have no compelling, important, rational, or otherwise sufficient justification for their actions enforcing Amendment 43 and Colorado laws restricting marriage to one man and one woman.
192. Injunctive and declaratory relief are necessary, as there is no adequate remedy at law to redress these constitutional wrongs.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court enter judgment in their favor and against Defendants, vindicate the Plaintiffs’ basic constitutional rights to essential human dignity and to be treated like every other citizen of this country, and:
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(a) Declare that the provisions of and enforcement by defendants of Colorado’s laws excluding same-sex couples from marriage, including Article II, section 31 of Colorado’s Constitution, Colorado Revised Statutes sections 14-2-104(1)(b) and 142-104(2), et seq., and all other sources of state law that exclude same-sex couples from marrying, violate the Unmarried Plaintiffs’ rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United State Constitution;
(b) Declare that the provisions of and enforcement by defendants of Colorado’s laws barring recognition of the valid out-of-state marriages of same-sex couples, including Article II, section 31 of Colorado’s Constitution, Colorado Revised Statutes sections 14-2-104(1)(b) and 14-2-104(2), et seq., and all other sources of state law that bar recognition of valid out-of-state marriages entered into by same-sex couples, violate the Married Plaintiffs’ rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution;
(c) Permanently enjoin enforcement by Defendants of Article II, section 31 of Colorado’s Constitution, Colorado Revised Statutes sections 14-2-104(1)(b) and 14-2-104(2), et seq., and all other sources of state law that exclude Unmarried Plaintiffs from marriage or refuse to recognize the marriages of the Married Plaintiffs;
(d) Enter an Order requiring defendants Hickenlooper, Suthers, Anderson and Johnson in their official capacities to permit issuance of marriage licenses to the Unmarried Plaintiffs, pursuant to the same restrictions and limitations applicable to opposite-sex couples, and to recognize the out-of-state marriages validly entered into by the Married Plaintiffs;
(e) Award plaintiffs their costs, expenses, and reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and other applicable laws,
(f) Award Pre- and post-judgment interest at the lawful rate as allowed by law; and
(g) Grant such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper and any other relief as allowed by law.
DATED this 1st day of July, 2014.
KILLMER, LANE & NEWMAN, LLP
s/ Mari Newman ___________________________ Mari Newman David A. Lane Darren M. Jankord
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Case 1:14-cv-01817-RM-KLM Document 1 Filed 07/01/14 USDC Colorado Page 40 of 40 Danielle C. Jefferis KILLMER, LANE & NEWMAN, LLP 1543 Champa Street, Suite 400 Denver, Colorado 80202 (303) 571-1000 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
40

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO Judge Raymond P. Moore
Civil Action No. 14-cv-01817-RM-KLM
CATHERINE BURNS; SHEILA SCHROEDER; MARK THRUN; GEOFFREY BATEMAN; RACHEL CATT; CASSIE RUBALD; BREANNA ALEXANDER; STACY PARRISH; ANGELA CRANMORE; JULIANNE DELOY; KAREN COLLIER; and DENISE LORD;
Plaintiffs,
v.
JOHN W. HICKENLOOPER, JR., in his official capacity as Governor of Colorado; JOHN SUTHERS, in his official capacity as Attorney General of Colorado; and PAM ANDERSON, in her official capacity as Clerk and Recorder for Jefferson County,
Defendants. ______________________________________________________________________________
ORDER ______________________________________________________________________________
THIS MATTER is before the Court on “Defendants’ Joint, Unopposed Motion to Make
Preliminary Injunction Permanent” (“Joint Motion”) (ECF No. 62), requesting that the
preliminary injunction issued on July 23, 2014, be made permanent and a final judgment be
entered under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54. Upon consideration of the Joint Motion, and being otherwise
fully advised, Defendants’ Joint Motion is GRANTED for the reasons stated herein.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On July 1, 2014, Plaintiffs, same-sex couples, filed a Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief seeking to declare certain laws banning same-sex marriage as unconstitutional under the United States Constitution, and to enjoin Defendants from enforcing those laws. Plaintiffs also filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction (“Motion”) that same day. By Order (“Order”) dated July 23, 2014, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ Motion and enjoined Defendants from enforcing or applying Article II, Section 31 of the Colorado Constitution and C.R.S. §§ 142-104(1)(b) and 14-2-104(2) (collectively, the “Challenged Laws”) as a basis to deny marriage to same-sex couples or to deny recognition of otherwise valid same-sex marriages entered in other states. Defendant Attorney General appealed the Order and obtained from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit a stay (“Stay”) of the Order pending final resolution of Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014) and Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014), cases which held that same-sex marriage bans do not withstand constitutional scrutiny. On October 6, 2014, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review of Kitchen and Bishop. Thereafter, upon motion filed by the parties, the Tenth Circuit dissolved the Stay, dismissed the appeal of the Order, and issued the mandate. Defendants’ Joint Motion is now before the Court, which represents that the issuance of a permanent injunction will resolve all of Plaintiffs’ claims for relief in this case.
II. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW “To obtain a permanent injunction, a plaintiff must show: ‘(1) actual success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm unless the injunction is issued; (3) the threatened injury outweighs
2

the harm that the injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) the injunction, if issued, will not adversely affect the public interest.’” Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1208 (quoting Sw. Stainless, LP v. Sappington, 582 F.3d 1176, 1191 (10th Cir. 2009)). By Defendants’ unopposed Joint Motion, all parties agree that these four factors are met. In light of Kitchen and Bishop, and for the reasons stated in the Order, the Court agrees. The Court finds and concludes: (1) Colorado’s Challenged Laws impermissibly violate Plaintiffs’ fundamental right to marry under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution; (2) Plaintiffs suffered – and will continue to suffer – irreparable harm in the form of violations of their constitutional right unless the injunction is issued1; (3) the balance of equities tip strongly in favor of Plaintiffs as their actual and threatened injury outweigh any harm2 that the injunction may cause Defendants; and (4) the public interest will not be adversely affected by the injunction because the preservation of constitutional rights serves everyone’s interest.
III. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, all claims in this case have been resolved. It is therefore ORDERED that Defendants’ Joint, Unopposed Motion to Make Preliminary Injunction Permanent (ECF No. 62) is GRANTED. In accordance therewith, Defendants, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and all other persons who are in active concert or participation with them, are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from enforcing or applying Article II, Section 31 of the Colorado Constitution and C.R.S. §§ 14-2-104(1)(b) and 14-2-104(2) as a
1 Notwithstanding the Defendant Attorney General’s dismissal of the appeal of the Order and of pending appeals in similar proceedings, this injunction is necessary in order to permanently secure the protection of the constitutional right at issue. 2 In light of Defendants’ position, it appears they will suffer no harm.
3

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 Case: 1:14-cv-01817-RM-KLM As of: 03/29/2015 01:46 PM MDT 1 of 13
MJ CIV PP,TERMED
U.S. District Court District of Colorado (Denver) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:14−cv−01817−RM−KLM

Burns et al v. Hickenlooper et al Assigned to: Judge Raymond P. Moore Referred to: Magistrate Judge Kristen L. Mix Case in other court: USCA, 14−01283 Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act Plaintiff Catherine Burns
Plaintiff Sheila Schroeder

Date Filed: 07/01/2014 Date Terminated: 10/20/2014 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Mari Anne Newman Killmer, Lane &Newman, LLP 1543 Champa Street Suite 400 Denver, CO 80202 303−571−1000 Fax: 303−571−1001 Email: mnewman@kln−law.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Danielle C. Jefferis Killmer, Lane &Newman, LLP 1543 Champa Street Suite 400 Denver, CO 80202 303−571−1000 Fax: 303−571−1001 Email: djefferis@kln−law.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Darren M. Jankord Killmer, Lane &Newman, LLP 1543 Champa Street Suite 400 Denver, CO 80202 303−571−1000 Fax: 303−571−1001 Email: djankord@kln−law.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Arthur Lane Killmer, Lane &Newman, LLP 1543 Champa Street Suite 400 Denver, CO 80202 303−571−1000 Fax: 303−571−1001 Email: dlane@kln−law.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mari Anne Newman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Danielle C. Jefferis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:14-cv-01817-RM-KLM As of: 03/29/2015 01:46 PM MDT 2 of 13

Plaintiff Mark Thrun
Plaintiff Geoffrey Bateman
Plaintiff Rachel Catt

Darren M. Jankord (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Arthur Lane (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mari Anne Newman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Danielle C. Jefferis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Darren M. Jankord (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Arthur Lane (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mari Anne Newman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Danielle C. Jefferis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Darren M. Jankord (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Arthur Lane (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mari Anne Newman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Danielle C. Jefferis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Darren M. Jankord (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Arthur Lane (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:14-cv-01817-RM-KLM As of: 03/29/2015 01:46 PM MDT 3 of 13

Plaintiff Cassie Rubald
Plaintiff Breanna Alexander
Plaintiff Stacy Parrish
Plaintiff Angela Cranmore

represented by Mari Anne Newman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Danielle C. Jefferis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Darren M. Jankord (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Arthur Lane (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mari Anne Newman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Danielle C. Jefferis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Darren M. Jankord (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Arthur Lane (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mari Anne Newman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Danielle C. Jefferis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Darren M. Jankord (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Arthur Lane (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mari Anne Newman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Danielle C. Jefferis (See above for address)

Case: 1:14-cv-01817-RM-KLM As of: 03/29/2015 01:46 PM MDT 4 of 13

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Darren M. Jankord (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David Arthur Lane (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Julianne Deloy

represented by Mari Anne Newman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Danielle C. Jefferis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Darren M. Jankord (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David Arthur Lane (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Karen Collier

represented by Mari Anne Newman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Danielle C. Jefferis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Darren M. Jankord (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David Arthur Lane (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Denise Lord

represented by Mari Anne Newman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Danielle C. Jefferis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Darren M. Jankord (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David Arthur Lane (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:14-cv-01817-RM-KLM As of: 03/29/2015 01:46 PM MDT 5 of 13

V. Defendant John W. Hickenlooper, Jr. in his official capacity as Governor of Colorado
Defendant John Suthers in his official capacity as Attorney General of Colorado
Defendant Pam Anderson in her official capacity as Clerk and Recorder for Jefferson County

represented by Benjamin Todd Figa Colorado Governor's Office of Legal Counsel 136 State Capitol Room 121 Denver, CO 80203 303−866−2760 Email: ben.figa@state.co.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack D. Finlaw , Jr. Office of the Governor 136 State Capitol Denver, CO 80203 303−866−6375 Email: jack.finlaw@state.co.us TERMINATED: 11/14/2014
Kathleen L. Spalding Colorado Attorney General's Office Ralph L. Carr Colorado Judicial Center 1300 Broadway Denver, CO 80203 720−508−6000 Fax: 720−508−6032 Email: kit.spalding@state.co.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Michael L. Francisco Colorado Attorney General's Office Ralph L. Carr Colorado Judicial Center 1300 Broadway Denver, CO 80203 720−508−6551 Email: michael.francisco@state.co.us LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kathleen L. Spalding (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kathryn Anne Teresa Starnella Colorado Attorney General's Office Ralph L. Carr Colorado Judicial Center 1300 Broadway Denver, CO 80203 720−508−6613 Fax: 720−508−6032 Email: kathryn.starnella@state.co.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Ellen G. Wakeman Jefferson County Attorney's Office 100 Jefferson County Parkway Suite 5500 Golden, CO 80419

Case: 1:14-cv-01817-RM-KLM As of: 03/29/2015 01:46 PM MDT 6 of 13

303−271−8900 Fax: 303−271−8901 Email: ewakeman@jeffco.us LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David Ryan Wunderlich Jefferson County Attorney's Office 100 Jefferson County Parkway Suite 5500 Golden, CO 80419 303−271−8900 Fax: 303−271−8901 Email: dwunderl@jeffco.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Writer Mott Jefferson County Attorney's Office 100 Jefferson County Parkway Suite 5500 Golden, CO 80419 303−271−8900 Fax: 303−271−8901 Email: wmott@jeffco.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Debra Johnson in her official capacity as Clerk and Recorder for the City and County of Denver TERMINATED: 07/15/2014

represented by Evan P. Lee Denver City Attorney's Office 201 West Colfax Avenue Denver, CO 80202−5332 720−913−3120 Email: evan.lee@denvergov.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Wendy J. Shea Denver City Attorney's Office 201 West Colfax Avenue Denver, CO 80202−5332 720−913−3112 Fax: 720−913−3182 Email: wendy.shea@denvergov.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 07/01/2014

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief against All Defendants (Filing fee $ 400,Receipt Number 1082−3937535)Attorney Mari Anne Newman added to party Breanna Alexander(pty:pla), Attorney Mari Anne Newman added to party Geoffrey Bateman(pty:pla), Attorney Mari Anne Newman added to party Catherine Burns(pty:pla), Attorney Mari Anne Newman added to party Rachel Catt(pty:pla), Attorney Mari Anne Newman added to party Karen Collier(pty:pla), Attorney Mari Anne Newman added to party Angela Cranmore(pty:pla), Attorney Mari Anne Newman added to party Julianne Deloy(pty:pla), Attorney Mari Anne Newman added to party Denise Lord(pty:pla), Attorney Mari Anne Newman added to party Stacy Parrish(pty:pla), Attorney Mari Anne Newman added to party Cassie Rubald(pty:pla), Attorney Mari Anne Newman added to party Sheila Schroeder(pty:pla), Attorney Mari Anne Newman added to party Mark Thrun(pty:pla), filed by Karen Collier, Breanna Alexander, Sheila Schroeder, Catherine Burns, Cassie Rubald, Mark Thrun, Angela Cranmore, Denise Lord, Stacy Parrish, Geoffrey Bateman, Julianne Deloy, Rachel Catt.(Newman, Mari) (Entered: 07/01/2014)

Case: 1:14-cv-01817-RM-KLM As of: 03/29/2015 01:46 PM MDT 7 of 13

07/01/2014 07/01/2014
07/01/2014
07/01/2014
07/01/2014 07/01/2014 07/01/2014 07/02/2014

2 SUMMONS REQUEST as to John W. Hickenlooper, Jr., John Suthers, Pam Anderson, Debra Johnson re 1 Complaint,,,, by Plaintiffs Breanna Alexander, Geoffrey Bateman, Catherine Burns, Rachel Catt, Karen Collier, Angela Cranmore, Julianne Deloy, Denise Lord, Stacy Parrish, Cassie Rubald, Sheila Schroeder, Mark Thrun. (Attachments: # 1 Summons John Suthers, # 2 Summons Pam Anderson, # 3 Summons Debra Johnson, # 4 Civil Cover Sheet)(Newman, Mari) (Entered: 07/01/2014)
3 NOTICE of Entry of Appearance by David Arthur Lane on behalf of All Plaintiffs Attorney David Arthur Lane added to party Breanna Alexander(pty:pla), Attorney David Arthur Lane added to party Geoffrey Bateman(pty:pla), Attorney David Arthur Lane added to party Catherine Burns(pty:pla), Attorney David Arthur Lane added to party Rachel Catt(pty:pla), Attorney David Arthur Lane added to party Karen Collier(pty:pla), Attorney David Arthur Lane added to party Angela Cranmore(pty:pla), Attorney David Arthur Lane added to party Julianne Deloy(pty:pla), Attorney David Arthur Lane added to party Denise Lord(pty:pla), Attorney David Arthur Lane added to party Stacy Parrish(pty:pla), Attorney David Arthur Lane added to party Cassie Rubald(pty:pla), Attorney David Arthur Lane added to party Sheila Schroeder(pty:pla), Attorney David Arthur Lane added to party Mark Thrun(pty:pla) (Lane, David) (Entered: 07/01/2014)
4 NOTICE of Entry of Appearance by Darren M. Jankord on behalf of All Plaintiffs Attorney Darren M. Jankord added to party Breanna Alexander(pty:pla), Attorney Darren M. Jankord added to party Geoffrey Bateman(pty:pla), Attorney Darren M. Jankord added to party Catherine Burns(pty:pla), Attorney Darren M. Jankord added to party Rachel Catt(pty:pla), Attorney Darren M. Jankord added to party Karen Collier(pty:pla), Attorney Darren M. Jankord added to party Angela Cranmore(pty:pla), Attorney Darren M. Jankord added to party Julianne Deloy(pty:pla), Attorney Darren M. Jankord added to party Denise Lord(pty:pla), Attorney Darren M. Jankord added to party Stacy Parrish(pty:pla), Attorney Darren M. Jankord added to party Cassie Rubald(pty:pla), Attorney Darren M. Jankord added to party Sheila Schroeder(pty:pla), Attorney Darren M. Jankord added to party Mark Thrun(pty:pla) (Jankord, Darren) (Entered: 07/01/2014)
5 NOTICE of Entry of Appearance by Danielle C. Jefferis on behalf of All Plaintiffs Attorney Danielle C. Jefferis added to party Breanna Alexander(pty:pla), Attorney Danielle C. Jefferis added to party Geoffrey Bateman(pty:pla), Attorney Danielle C. Jefferis added to party Catherine Burns(pty:pla), Attorney Danielle C. Jefferis added to party Rachel Catt(pty:pla), Attorney Danielle C. Jefferis added to party Karen Collier(pty:pla), Attorney Danielle C. Jefferis added to party Angela Cranmore(pty:pla), Attorney Danielle C. Jefferis added to party Julianne Deloy(pty:pla), Attorney Danielle C. Jefferis added to party Denise Lord(pty:pla), Attorney Danielle C. Jefferis added to party Stacy Parrish(pty:pla), Attorney Danielle C. Jefferis added to party Cassie Rubald(pty:pla), Attorney Danielle C. Jefferis added to party Sheila Schroeder(pty:pla), Attorney Danielle C. Jefferis added to party Mark Thrun(pty:pla) (Jefferis, Danielle) (Entered: 07/01/2014)
6 Case assigned to Magistrate Judge Kristen L. Mix. Text Only Entry. (jofox, ) (Entered: 07/01/2014)
7 Magistrate Judge Consent Form issued pursuant to Magistrate Judge Pilot Project to Assign Civil Cases to Full Time Magistrate Judges. The summons submitted has incorrect caption and not issued. Please file completed summons for issuance using the event Summons Request. (jofox, ) (Entered: 07/01/2014)
8 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Plaintiffs Breanna Alexander, Geoffrey Bateman, Catherine Burns, Rachel Catt, Karen Collier, Angela Cranmore, Julianne Deloy, Denise Lord, Stacy Parrish, Cassie Rubald, Sheila Schroeder, Mark Thrun. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit, # 2 Affidavit, # 3 Affidavit, # 4 Affidavit, # 5 Affidavit, # 6 Affidavit, # 7 Affidavit, # 8 Affidavit, # 9 Affidavit, # 10 Affidavit, # 11 Affidavit, # 12 Affidavit)(Lane, David) (Entered: 07/01/2014)
9 CASE REASSIGNED. Pursuant to the Pilot Program to Implement Direct Assignment of Civil Cases to Full Time Magistrate Judges, the case is reassigned due to the 8 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction. This case is assigned to Judge Robert E. Blackburn. All future pleadings should be designated as 14−cv−01817−REB−KLM. (Text Only Entry) (agarc, ) (Entered: 07/02/2014)

Case: 1:14-cv-01817-RM-KLM As of: 03/29/2015 01:46 PM MDT 8 of 13

07/02/2014 07/02/2014
07/02/2014 07/02/2014
07/02/2014 07/02/2014
07/02/2014
07/02/2014 07/02/2014 07/02/2014 07/03/2014 07/03/2014 07/03/2014
07/03/2014 07/07/2014

10 Magistrate Judge Consent Form issued pursuant to Local Rule. (agarc, ) (Entered: 07/02/2014)
11 SUMMONS REQUEST as to John W. Hickenlooper, Jr., John Suthers, Pam Anderson, Debra Johnson re 1 Complaint,,,, by Plaintiffs Breanna Alexander, Geoffrey Bateman, Catherine Burns, Rachel Catt, Karen Collier, Angela Cranmore, Julianne Deloy, Denise Lord, Stacy Parrish, Cassie Rubald, Sheila Schroeder, Mark Thrun. (Attachments: # 1 Summons, # 2 Summons, # 3 Summons)(Newman, Mari) (Entered: 07/02/2014)
12 SUMMONSES issued by Clerk. (klyon, ) (Entered: 07/02/2014)
13 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by Karen Collier, Breanna Alexander, Sheila Schroeder, Catherine Burns, Cassie Rubald, Mark Thrun, Angela Cranmore, Denise Lord, Stacy Parrish, Geoffrey Bateman, Julianne Deloy, Rachel Catt. John Suthers waiver sent on 7/2/2014, answer due 9/2/2014. (Newman, Mari) (Entered: 07/02/2014)
14 NOTICE of Entry of Appearance by Michael L. Francisco on behalf of John SuthersAttorney Michael L. Francisco added to party John Suthers(pty:dft) (Francisco, Michael) (Entered: 07/02/2014)
15 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by Karen Collier, Breanna Alexander, Sheila Schroeder, Catherine Burns, Cassie Rubald, Mark Thrun, Angela Cranmore, Denise Lord, Stacy Parrish, Geoffrey Bateman, Julianne Deloy, Rachel Catt. Pam Anderson waiver sent on 7/2/2014, answer due 9/2/2014. (Newman, Mari) (Entered: 07/02/2014)
16 MOTION to Stay re 8 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Defendant John Suthers. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order (PDF Only) Proposed Stay and Preliminary Injunction, # 2 Exhibit Latta v. Otter, # 3 Exhibit DeBoer v. Snyder, # 4 Exhibit Tanco v. Haslam, # 5 Exhibit Baskin v. Bogan)(Francisco, Michael) (Entered: 07/02/2014)
17 NOTICE of Entry of Appearance by Wendy J. Shea on behalf of Debra JohnsonAttorney Wendy J. Shea added to party Debra Johnson(pty:dft) (Shea, Wendy) (Entered: 07/02/2014)
18 NOTICE of Entry of Appearance by Evan P. Lee on behalf of Debra JohnsonAttorney Evan P. Lee added to party Debra Johnson(pty:dft) (Lee, Evan) (Entered: 07/02/2014)
19 JOINDER re 16 MOTION to Stay re 8 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Defendant Debra Johnson. (Shea, Wendy) (Entered: 07/02/2014)
20 Unopposed MOTION for Order to Set Expedited Status Conference by Plaintiffs Breanna Alexander, Geoffrey Bateman, Catherine Burns, Rachel Catt, Karen Collier, Angela Cranmore, Julianne Deloy, Denise Lord, Stacy Parrish, Cassie Rubald, Sheila Schroeder, Mark Thrun. (Lane, David) (Entered: 07/03/2014)
21 NOTICE of Entry of Appearance by Writer Mott on behalf of Pam AndersonAttorney Writer Mott added to party Pam Anderson(pty:dft) (Mott, Writer) (Entered: 07/03/2014)
22 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by Karen Collier, Breanna Alexander, Sheila Schroeder, Catherine Burns, Cassie Rubald, Mark Thrun, Angela Cranmore, Denise Lord, Stacy Parrish, Geoffrey Bateman, Julianne Deloy, Rachel Catt. John W. Hickenlooper, Jr waiver sent on 7/2/2014, answer due 9/2/2014. (Newman, Mari) (Entered: 07/03/2014)
23 NOTICE of Entry of Appearance by Kathryn Anne Teresa Starnella on behalf of John SuthersAttorney Kathryn Anne Teresa Starnella added to party John Suthers(pty:dft) (Starnella, Kathryn) (Entered: 07/03/2014)
24 ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Kristen L. Mix, for non−dispositive motions.That pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) and (b), this matter is referred to the assigned United States Magistrate Judge:(1) To convene a scheduling conference under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b), enter a Scheduling Order that satisfies the requirements of

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07/07/2014
07/08/2014 07/08/2014 07/08/2014 07/09/2014
07/10/2014 07/11/2014 07/11/2014
07/11/2014
07/11/2014 07/11/2014 07/11/2014

D.C.COLO.LCivR 16.2, and enter such orders as appropriate to enforce the Scheduling order and resolve discovery matters; provided, further that the scheduling conference, the Magistrate Judge shall advise the parties of Judge Blackburns practice standards found at www.cod.uscourts.gov.;(2) To hear and finally determine non−dispositive matters that have been referred, subject to the exceptions found in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); and(3) To hear and make recommendations on dispositive matters that have been referred as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).Court sponsored alternative dispute resolution is governed by D.C.COLOLCivR 16.6. On the recommendation or informal request of the magistrate judge or on the request of the parties by motion, this court may direct the parties to engage in an early neutral evaluation, a settlement conference, or another alternative dispute resolution proceeding. By Judge Robert E. Blackburn on 7/7/14. Text Only Entry (rebsec) (Entered: 07/07/2014)
25 MEMORANDUM regarding 20 Unopposed MOTION for Order to Set Expedited Status Conference filed by Sheila Schroeder, Denise Lord, Angela Cranmore, Catherine Burns, Cassie Rubald, Julianne Deloy, Breanna Alexander, Mark Thrun, Geoffrey Bateman, Stacy Parrish, Karen Collier, Rachel Catt. Motions referred to Magistrate Judge Kristen L. Mix, by Judge Robert E. Blackburn on 7/7/14. Text Only Entry (rebsec) (Entered: 07/07/2014)
26 NOTICE of Entry of Appearance of Jack Finlaw by Benjamin Todd Figa on behalf of John W. Hickenlooper, JrAttorney Benjamin Todd Figa added to party John W. Hickenlooper, Jr(pty:dft) (Figa, Benjamin) (Entered: 07/08/2014)
27 NOTICE of Entry of Appearance of Benjamin Figa by Benjamin Todd Figa on behalf of John W. Hickenlooper, Jr (Figa, Benjamin) (Entered: 07/08/2014)
28 NOTICE OF CASE ASSOCIATION by Defendant John W. Hickenlooper, Jr (Figa, Benjamin) (Entered: 07/08/2014)
29 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by Karen Collier, Breanna Alexander, Sheila Schroeder, Catherine Burns, Cassie Rubald, Mark Thrun, Angela Cranmore, Denise Lord, Stacy Parrish, Geoffrey Bateman, Julianne Deloy, Rachel Catt. Debra Johnson waiver sent on 7/2/2014, answer due 9/2/2014. (Newman, Mari) (Entered: 07/09/2014)
30 NOTICE of Entry of Appearance by David Ryan Wunderlich on behalf of Pam AndersonAttorney David Ryan Wunderlich added to party Pam Anderson(pty:dft) (Wunderlich, David) (Entered: 07/10/2014)
31 ORDER OF RECUSAL. Judge Robert E. Blackburn recused. Entered on 7/11/14. (kweck) (Entered: 07/11/2014)
32 RESPONSE to 16 MOTION to Stay re 8 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Plaintiffs Breanna Alexander, Geoffrey Bateman, Catherine Burns, Rachel Catt, Karen Collier, Angela Cranmore, Julianne Deloy, Denise Lord, Stacy Parrish, Cassie Rubald, Sheila Schroeder, Mark Thrun. (Newman, Mari) (Entered: 07/11/2014)
33 MOTION to Dismiss Party Defendant Debra Johnson (Partially Unopposed) by Plaintiffs Breanna Alexander, Geoffrey Bateman, Catherine Burns, Rachel Catt, Karen Collier, Angela Cranmore, Julianne Deloy, Denise Lord, Stacy Parrish, Cassie Rubald, Sheila Schroeder, Mark Thrun. (Newman, Mari) (Entered: 07/11/2014)
34 CASE REASSIGNED pursuant to 31 Order of Recusal.This case is reassigned to Judge Raymond P. Moore. All future pleadings should be designated as 14−cv−01817−RM−KLM. (Text Only Entry) (kweck) (Entered: 07/11/2014)
35 MINUTE ORDER Status Conference set for 7/15/2014 at 02:00 PM in Courtroom A 601 before Judge Raymond P. Moore. SO ORDERED by Judge Raymond P. Moore on July 11, 2014. Text Only Entry (rmlc1). (Entered: 07/11/2014)
36 Exhibits in Support of 32 Response to Motion, by Plaintiffs Breanna Alexander, Geoffrey Bateman, Catherine Burns, Rachel Catt, Karen Collier, Angela Cranmore, Julianne Deloy, Denise Lord, Stacy Parrish, Cassie Rubald, Sheila Schroeder, Mark Thrun. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3)(Newman,

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07/14/2014 07/15/2014
07/18/2014 07/18/2014 07/18/2014
07/21/2014 07/22/2014 07/23/2014 07/23/2014

Mari) (Entered: 07/11/2014)
37 NOTICE of Supplemental Authorities re: 32 Response to Motion, by Plaintiffs Breanna Alexander, Geoffrey Bateman, Catherine Burns, Rachel Catt, Karen Collier, Angela Cranmore, Julianne Deloy, Denise Lord, Stacy Parrish, Cassie Rubald, Sheila Schroeder, Mark Thrun (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2)(Newman, Mari) (Entered: 07/14/2014)
38 COURTROOM MINUTES for proceedings held before Judge Raymond P. Moore: Status Conference held on 7/15/2014, granting 20 Unopposed Motion for Expedited Status Conference, and granting 33 Plaintiffs' Partially Unopposed Motion to Dismiss. Defendant Debra Johnson (in her official capacity as Clerk and Recorder for the City and County of Denver) is terminated. 19 Defendant Debra Johnson's Joinder in Motion to Stay Proceedings and Non−opposition to Stipulated Preliminary Injunction is deemed moot. Motion Hearing set for 7/22/2014 at 1:30 PM in Courtroom A 601 before Judge Raymond P. Moore on 16 Defendants' Motion to Stay Proceedings. Court Reporter: Tammy Hofffschildt. (cpear) (Entered: 07/15/2014)
39 BRIEF in Support of 16 MOTION to Stay re 8 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Defendant John W. Hickenlooper, Jr. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Bishop v. Smith Slip Opinion)(Figa, Benjamin) (Entered: 07/18/2014)
40 REPLY to Response to 16 MOTION to Stay re 8 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Defendant Pam Anderson. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−1, # 2 Exhibit A−2, # 3 Exhibit A−3)(Mott, Writer) (Entered: 07/18/2014)
41 REPLY to Response to 16 MOTION to Stay re 8 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Defendant John Suthers. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex. F − Colo. Sup. Ct. Order staying Adams and Denver County Clerks' issuance of licenses, # 2 Exhibit Ex G − Adams County Dist Ct Order Grant MSJ to Ps, # 3 Exhibit Ex. H − Notice of Appeal to Colo. Sup. Ct., # 4 Exhibit Ex I − ACA−related stays and Preliminary Injunctions)(Starnella, Kathryn) (Entered: 07/18/2014)
42 NOTICE re 16 MOTION to Stay re 8 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Supplemental Authority by Defendant John Suthers (Francisco, Michael) (Entered: 07/21/2014)
43 COURTROOM MINUTES for proceedings held before Judge Raymond P. Moore: Motion Hearing held on 7/22/2014, taking under advisement 16 Defendants' Motion to Stay and Non−Opposition to Proposed Preliminary Injunction. Court Reporter: Tammy Hoffschildt. (cpear) (Entered: 07/22/2014)
44 NOTICE of Supplemental Authorities re: 32 Response to Motion, by Plaintiffs Breanna Alexander, Geoffrey Bateman, Catherine Burns, Rachel Catt, Karen Collier, Angela Cranmore, Julianne Deloy, Denise Lord, Stacy Parrish, Cassie Rubald, Sheila Schroeder, Mark Thrun (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Jankord, Darren) (Entered: 07/23/2014)
45 ORDER that Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction ECF No. 8 is GRANTED and Defendants are hereby ENJOINED from enforcing or applying Article II, Section 31 of the Colorado Constitution and C.R.S. §§ 14−2−104(1)(b) and 14−2−104(2) as a basis to deny marriage to same−sex couples or to deny recognition of otherwise valid same−sex marriages entered in other states; and FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Motion to Stay Proceedings and Non− Opposition to Proposed Preliminary Injunction ECF No. 16 is DENIED as to their request to stay the preliminary injunction but GRANTED as to a stay of all other proceedings in this case until three (3) days after the final mandate is issued in Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 13−4178, __ F.3d __, 2014 WL 2868044 (10th Cir. June 25, 2014), or further order of this Court; and FURTHER ORDERED that the preliminary injunction is TEMPORARILY STAYED until 8:00 a.m. on Monday, August 25, 2014, to allow Defendants time to seek relief from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit or the Supreme Court. by Judge Raymond P. Moore on 7/23/2014.(evana, ) (Entered: 07/23/2014)

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07/23/2014 07/24/2014 07/24/2014 07/24/2014 07/24/2014 08/01/2014 08/04/2014 08/12/2014
08/13/2014 08/21/2014 09/18/2014
10/07/2014 10/07/2014

46 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 45 Order on Motion to Stay,,,,, Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction,,,, by Defendant John Suthers (Francisco, Michael) (Entered: 07/23/2014)
47 USCA Case Number 14−1283 for 46 Notice of Appeal filed by John Suthers. (dbrow, ) (Entered: 07/24/2014)
48 NOTICE OF NONCOMPLIANCE WITH COURT RULES/PROCEDURES: Ellen G. Wakeman has failed to register for electronic case filing (CM/ECF) in violation of local rules and procedures of the court. Counsel is advised that the failure to register for CM/ECF within 10 days of the date of this docket entry may lead to action by the court. (mfred) (Entered: 07/24/2014)
49 LETTER Transmitting Notice of Appeal to all counsel advising of the transmittal of the 46 Notice of Appeal filed by John Suthers to the U.S. Court of Appeals. ( Retained Counsel, Fee not paid,) (Attachments: # 1 docket sheet, # 2 preliminary record)(trlee, ) (Entered: 07/24/2014)
50 USCA Appeal Fees received $ 505, receipt number COX063789; Full Payment (USCA Case No. 14−1283) (dbrow, ) (Entered: 07/24/2014)
51 TRANSCRIPT ORDER FORM re 46 Notice of Appeal by Defendant John Suthers (Starnella, Kathryn) (Entered: 08/01/2014)
52 REPORTER TRANSCRIPT ORDER FORM filed by Tammy Hoffschildt re: 46 Notice of Appeal. Transcript due by 9/4/2014. (nrich) (Entered: 08/04/2014)
53 TRANSCRIPT of hearing held on July 22, 2014 before Judge Moore. Pages: 1−64. <br> NOTICE − REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: Within seven calendar days of this filing, each party shall inform the Court, by filing a Notice of Intent to Redact, of the party's intent to redact personal identifiers from the electronic transcript of the court proceeding. If a Notice of Intent to Redact is not filed within the allotted time, this transcript will be made electronically available after 90 days. Please see the Notice of Electronic Availability of Transcripts document at www.cod.uscourts.gov.<br> Transcript may only be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber prior to the 90 day deadline for electronic posting on PACER. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/13/2014. (thoff, ) (Entered: 08/12/2014)
54 LETTER TO USCA and all counsel certifying the record is complete as to 46 Notice of Appeal filed by John Suthers. All transcripts ordered are now on file as of 8/12/2014. (Appeal No. 14−1283) Text Only Entry (dbrow, ) (Entered: 08/13/2014)
55 ORDER of USCA as to 46 Notice of Appeal filed by John Suthers. We grant Mr. Suthers motion for a stay pending appeal.(USCA Case No. 14−1283) (trlee, ) (Entered: 08/21/2014)
56 ORDER of USCA as to 46 Notice of Appeal filed by John Suthers. This appeal is abated pending further order of this court. The deadline for the appellants opening brief will be established when the abatement of this appeal is lifted. The parties shall notify this court within 10 days of a decision on the petitions for writ of certiorari pending before the Supreme Court of the United States in Kitchen v. Herbert, Supreme Court No. 14−124, and Bishop v. Smith, Supreme Court No. 14−136. It is further ordered that the parties shall file status reports 30 days from the date of this order if no decision on the pending writs has been issued by that time. (USCA Case No. 14−1283) (agarc, ) (Entered: 09/18/2014)
57 ORDER of USCA as to 46 Notice of Appeal filed by John Suthers. (USCA Case No. 14−1283). The parties have filed a joint motion to dissolve the stay entered in this case. We grant the motion and dissolve the stay. (trlee, ) (Entered: 10/07/2014)
58 LETTER re 46 Notice of Appeal filed by John Suthers. (USCA Case No. 14−1283). Please be advised that the court issued an order today dismissing this case. In addition, please be advised that the mandate for this case has issued today. The clerk of the originating court shall file accordingly. (trlee, ) (Entered: 10/07/2014)

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10/07/2014 10/08/2014
10/08/2014 10/14/2014 10/17/2014
10/20/2014 10/28/2014 11/03/2014 11/03/2014 11/10/2014 11/10/2014 11/14/2014

59 ORDER of USCA as to 46 Notice of Appeal filed by John Suthers. (USCA Case No. 14−1283). This matter comes on for consideration of the appellant's Unopposed Motion to Dismiss Appeal. Upon consideration thereof, the motion is granted and this appeal is dismissed. See Fed. R. App. P. 42(b). The mandate shall issue forthwith. (trlee, ) (Entered: 10/07/2014)
60 MINUTE ORDER. THIS MATTER is before the Court sua sponte. Upon consideration of the issuance of the mandate in Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014), and the voluntary dismissal of the appeal of this Court's Order (ECF Nos. 45, 59), the parties shall file a status report by Tuesday, October 14, 2014, addressing the anticipated future course of proceedings in this matter. SO ORDERED by Judge Raymond P. Moore on 10/8/2014. (Text Only Entry) (rmsec ) (Entered: 10/08/2014)
61 Utility Setting Deadline per 60 Minute Order: Status Report due by 10/14/2014. Text Only Entry. (alowe) (Entered: 10/09/2014)
62 Joint MOTION for Permanent Injunction and Status Update by Defendant John Suthers. (Francisco, Michael) (Entered: 10/14/2014)
63 ORDER granting 62 Defendants Joint, Unopposed Motion to Make Preliminary Injunction Permanent; and it is FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendant John W. Hickenlooper, Jr., in his official capacity as Governor of Colorado; John Suthers, in his official capacity as Attorney General of Colorado; and Pam Anderson, in her official capacity as Clerk and Recorder for Jefferson County; and it is FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs are awarded costs and shall within 14 days of the date of this Order file a bill of costs, in accordance with the procedures under Fed.R.Civ.P.54(d)(1) and D.C.COLO.LCivR 54.1, which shall be taxed by the Clerk of Court. By Judge Raymond P. Moore on 10/17/2014.(evana, ) (Entered: 10/17/2014)
64 JUDGMENT in favor of Angela Cranmore, Breanna Alexander, Cassie Rubald, Catherine Burns, Denise Lord, Geoffrey Bateman, Julianne Deloy, Karen Collier, Mark Thrun, Rachel Catt, Sheila Schroeder, Stacy Parrish and against John Suthers, John W. Hickenlooper, Jr, and Pam Anderson. By Judge Raymond P. Moore on 10/20/2014. (cpear) (Entered: 10/20/2014)
65 NOTICE of Entry of Appearance by Kathleen L. Spalding on behalf of John W. Hickenlooper, Jr, John SuthersAttorney Kathleen L. Spalding added to party John W. Hickenlooper, Jr(pty:dft), Attorney Kathleen L. Spalding added to party John Suthers(pty:dft) (Spalding, Kathleen) (Entered: 10/28/2014)
66 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Bill of Costs by Plaintiffs Breanna Alexander, Geoffrey Bateman, Catherine Burns, Rachel Catt, Karen Collier, Angela Cranmore, Julianne Deloy, Denise Lord, Stacy Parrish, Cassie Rubald, Sheila Schroeder, Mark Thrun. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order (PDF Only))(Newman, Mari) (Entered: 11/03/2014)
67 ORDER granting 66 Motion for Extension of Time to File. SO ORDERED by Judge Raymond P. Moore on 11/3/2014. (Text Only Entry)(rmsec ) (Entered: 11/03/2014)
68 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Expenses by Plaintiffs Breanna Alexander, Geoffrey Bateman, Catherine Burns, Rachel Catt, Karen Collier, Angela Cranmore, Julianne Deloy, Denise Lord, Stacy Parrish, Cassie Rubald, Sheila Schroeder, Mark Thrun. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10, # 11 Exhibit 11)(Newman, Mari) (Entered: 11/10/2014)
69 Proposed Bill of Costs by Plaintiffs Breanna Alexander, Geoffrey Bateman, Catherine Burns, Rachel Catt, Karen Collier, Angela Cranmore, Julianne Deloy, Denise Lord, Stacy Parrish, Cassie Rubald, Sheila Schroeder, Mark Thrun. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Invoices)(Newman, Mari) (Entered: 11/10/2014)
70 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney for Jack Finlaw by Defendant John W. Hickenlooper, Jr. (Figa, Benjamin) (Entered: 11/14/2014)

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71 ORDER granting 70 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Jack D. Finlaw, Jr terminated. SO ORDERED by Judge Raymond P. Moore on 11/14/2014. (Text Only Entry)(rmsec ) (Entered: 11/14/2014)
72 NOTICE of Settlement by Defendants John W. Hickenlooper, Jr, John Suthers (Spalding, Kathleen) (Entered: 12/01/2014)
73 MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of the parties' Notice of Settlement (ECF No. 72), the parties are directed to file their documents resolving their fee dispute on or before January 30, 2015. SO ORDERED by Judge Raymond P. Moore on 12/2/2014. (Text Only Entry) (rmsec ) (Entered: 12/02/2014)
74 STIPULATION of Dismissal of Case With Prejudice by Plaintiffs Breanna Alexander, Geoffrey Bateman, Catherine Burns, Rachel Catt, Karen Collier, Angela Cranmore, Julianne Deloy, Denise Lord, Stacy Parrish, Cassie Rubald, Sheila Schroeder, Mark Thrun. (Newman, Mari) (Entered: 01/27/2015)
75 ORDER denying as moot 68 Motion for Attorney Fees. That the parties' Stipulation for Dismissal 74 is GRANTED. The above−captioned matter is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. By Judge Raymond P. Moore on 1/28/2015.(tscha, ) (Entered: 01/28/2015)