Case 1:09-cv-01062-CRC Document 1 Filed 06/08/09 Page 1 of 9

UNITED STATES DISTICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ANTHONY HARDY,
803 E. Boot Road Westchester PA 19380
DONNELL MONTS,
20 Channing Street NW Washington, D.C. 20001
AND MEMBERS OF THE CLASS,
On behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
SERVE: Adrian M. Fenty, Mayor 1350 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Suite 316 Washington, D.C. 20004
Defendant.

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Civil Action No._______________

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CLASS ACTION

COMPLAINT FOR INDIVIDUAL MONEY DAMAGES AND CLASS INJUNCTIVE AND EQUITABLE RELIEF WITH JURY DEMAND

INTRODUCTION

1. Under the District of Columbia Forfeiture Statute, D.C. Code § 48-905.02, the

Government of the District of Columbia (“District”) may seize all cash or currency allegedly related to

a violation of the Controlled Substances Act.

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2. The D.C. Forfeiture Statute further permits the District to “forfeit” the currency if probable cause exists to believe the currency is subject to forfeiture, but requires that the Mayor cause notice to be made to the affected party of the seizure and intent to forfeit the property. The District must publish notice for 2 weeks, and must provide “written notice of the seizure together with information applicable to the procedures for claiming the property.” D.C. Code § 48-905.02 (d)(3)(A). Notice “shall be by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested.”
3. If the affected person files a claim and bond within 30 days, the District may return the property, or file a civil forfeiture action. D.C. Code § 48-905.02(d)(3)(C) & (D). A forfeiture action “shall be instituted promptly,” D.C. Code § 48-905.02(c), and at the latest must be brought within one year [of the disposition of the underlying charges], D.C. Code § 12-301(5).
4. The D.C. Forfeiture Statute implements and protects important due process rights available under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
5. The District has enacted forfeiture notice regulations that are consistent with the statute. 6A DCMR § 805 (requiring notice by publication and registered or certified mail).
6. During the relevant period covered by this Complaint, the District has had a policy and/or practice of forfeiting and keeping the currency of arrestees without providing the notice required by the D.C. Forfeiture Statute and related regulations.
7. This is an action brought by Anthony Hardy and Donnell Monts on behalf of themselves and on behalf of the class defined below injured (or presently subject to injury) by the Government of the District of Columbia's policy, pattern, and/or practice of seizing money from persons arrested by the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) and retaining money after disposition of charges stemming from the arrest without notice and/or the lack of opportunity to be heard, in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.
8. Plaintiffs bring this action against the Government of the District of Columbia under 2

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Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §1983, to enforce the Fifth Amendment for injuries suffered by them and putative class members.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 9. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1331 and 28 U.S.C. §1343(3)-(4). 10. Venue is proper in this jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C §1391(b) because the events or omissions underlying the claims occurred in this judicial district.
PARTIES 11. The named Plaintiffs, Anthony Hardy and Donnell Monts, are citizens of the United States and are or were residents of the State of Maryland. 12. The Defendant is a local municipal corporation and a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “person.”
EVENTS 13. Named Plaintiff Hardy was arrested on or about December 20, 2006, in the District of Columbia by MPD for alleged narcotics violations. Mr. Hardy was booked by the MPD and the information on the PD 251 and other data about him and the arrest was entered into CJUS, the MPD electronic booking system. On or about March 21, 2007, Mr. Hardy’s case was dismissed and the disposition was entered in the Superior Court’s electronic docketing system. 14. In connection with the arrest, the MPD seized $127 from Mr. Hardy. The arresting officers completed a PD 251 arrest report and a PD 81 memorializing the seizure of $127 in cash from Mr. Hardy. On or about February 15, 2007, Mr. Hardy demanded a return of his property by filing a Motion for Return of Property. 15. The District designated as “forfeited” and kept the seized money. However, the District never provided notice of forfeiture of the money seized, nor brought a forfeiture proceeding within one year. The District of Columbia continues to violate Mr. Hardy's Due Process Rights by failing to return said money.
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16. Named Plaintiff Monts was arrested by the District of Columbia MPD on or about July 26, 2006 for alleged narcotics violations. Mr. Monts was booked by the MPD and the information on the PD 251 and other data about him and the arrest was entered into CJUS, the MPD electronic booking system. On or about June 6, 2007, Mr. Monts pled guilty to one count of possession of heroin and was sentenced to a period of incarceration and the disposition was entered in the Superior Court's electronic docketing system.
17. In connection with the arrest, the MPD seized $823 in cash from Mr. Monts. The arresting officers completed a PD 251 arrest report and a PD 81 memorializing the seizure of the $823 from Mr. Monts.
18. The District designated as “forfeited” and kept the seized money. However, the District never provided notice of forfeiture of the money seized, nor brought a forfeiture proceeding within one year. The District of Columbia continues to violate Mr. Monts Due Process Rights by failing to return said money.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 19. The Named Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(2)-(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and on behalf of all persons similarly situated. 20. The class is comprised of each person (a) who was (or in the future prior to judgment will be) arrested by the MPD, (b) whose case was closed not more than 4 years before the filing of this Complaint and not less than 1 year before judgment is entered in this case, (c) who had money seized by the MPD (c) that was kept by the District (d) without notice to the person of the forfeiture and the right to contest the forfeiture, by certified or registered mail to the person’s last known or discoverable address. 21. Certification of this class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) is appropriate
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because the District of Columbia has a pattern and practice that has uniformly affected all members of the class, and injunctive relief against the District will benefit each and every plaintiff and class member.
22. The class is entitled to injunctive relief, for example, setting up an independent monitor to supervise the District's return of seized money and provision of adequate notice and opportunity to be heard, and other relief as specified below.
23. There are no individual questions on the issue of liability other than whether an individual’s money or property has been seized and held more than one year after the disposition of the case without notice and an opportunity to be heard, and the answer to that question can be determined by ministerial inspection of the District’s records.
24. Computer records are available for inspection on the question of when a person was arrested (CJUS) and when a person's case was disposed of (Superior Court System).
25. Paper records memorialize when and how much money was seized from a person (PD 81), whether notice was sent, and whether the money was returned (MPD records).
26. Computer records exist evidencing deposit of money into an account required by D.C. Code § 23-532, and any payments to the owners of the currency after disposition of cases.
27. Among the questions of law and fact common to the class are: a. whether the District has a policy, practice, and/or custom of seizing money from citizens and retaining it without notice and an opportunity to be heard; b. whether the Constitution prohibits the District from seizing money from citizens and retaining it without notice and an opportunity to be heard; c. whether the District has a pattern and practice of being deliberately indifferent to the rights of arrested persons from whom it seizes money by seizing money from them and retaining it without notice and an opportunity to be heard; and 5

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d. whether the plaintiffs and the members of the class and future members are entitled to relief, and, if so, what is the nature of that relief.
28. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The exact number of class members is presently unknown, but is likely to consist of at least several thousand people, and likely substantially more than that.
29. The Named Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the class, as Plaintiffs and all other members of the class were injured by exactly the same means, that is, by unconstitutional seizures and retentions.
30. The Named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class and have retained counsel who are competent and experienced in complex federal civil rights class action litigation.
31. The Named Plaintiffs have no interests that are contrary to or in conflict with those of the class.
32. Common issues predominate over individualized questions. 33. A class action would be superior to any other method available for resolving the claims of class members, and is likely the only realistic means of adjudicating claims given the relatively small amount of individual claims.
PLAINTIFF HARDY FACTS 34. On December 20, 2006, the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police stopped a vehicle driven by the Plaintiff, Anthony Hardy, on the 2500 Block of Benning Road, NE because it allegedly had illegal tinted windows. 35. The police officer approached the vehicle and allegedly saw a brown paper bag in the rear driver side of the floorboard. The brown bag allegedly contained alcohol. 36. The police placed Mr. Hardy under arrest for possession of an open container of
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alcohol. 37. After arresting Mr. Hardy, the officer allegedly discovered narcotics from the trunk of
the vehicle, and Mr. Hardy was charged with possession of narcotics. 38. In connection with the arrest of Mr. Hardy, the officer seized $127 cash from the
Plaintiff. 39. On or about March 21, 2007, the Plaintiff Hardy’s case was dismissed. 40. The District of Columbia never provided notice of the forfeiture of the money seized
within one year thereafter, failed to allow the Plaintiff an opportunity to be heard, and used or continues to hold Mr. Hardy’s money.
41. The time in which the District had to provide notice to Mr. Hardy and bring a forfeiture action has expired, such that the District has waived any forfeiture of the property.
PLAINTIFF MONTS FACTS 42. On or about July 26, 2006 the MPD arrested Mr. Monts for alleged narcotics violations on the 400th Block of 51st Street, NE. 43. On or about July 26, 2006, the MPD alleged that Mr. Monts distributed narcotics to an undercover police officer. 44. In connection with that arrest, the MPD seized $823 in cash from Mr. Monts. 45. The arresting officers completed a PD 251 arrest report and a PD 81 memorializing the seizure of $823 from Mr. Monts. 46. Mr. Monts was booked by the MPD and the information on the PD 251 and other data about him and the arrest was entered into CJUS, the MPD electronic booking system. 47. On or about, June 6, 2007, Mr. Monts pled guilty to one count of possession of heroin and was sentenced to a period of incarceration, and the disposition was entered in the Superior Court’s electronic docketing system.
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48. The District of Columbia never provided notice of the forfeiture of the money seized within the mandated time frame, failed to allow the Plaintiff Monts an opportunity to be heard, and used or continues to hold Mr. Monts’ money.
49. The time in which the District had to provide notice to Mr. Monts and bring a forfeiture action has expired, such that the District has waived any forfeiture of the property.
COUNT ONE FIFTH AMENDMENT PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS VIOLATION 50. All prior paragraphs are incorporated herein by reference as if fully set forth herein. 51. By keeping or using the Named Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ money without adhering to procedural due process safeguards, such as notice and the opportunity to be heard prior to a governmental taking, the District of Columbia violated the Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ Fifth Amendment Right to Due Process of Law. 52. The District’s policy and/or practice caused each Named Plaintiff and Class Member the loss of money to which each is entitled to have returned to him or her upon the expiration of one year after the disposition of the underlying criminal case.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs and the members of the class respectfully request: 1. That the Court certify this action to proceed as a class action under Rules 23(b)(2
and (b)(3); 2. That the Court declare the challenged policy, pattern, and/or practice of the
District of Columbia to be in violation of the Plaintiffs’ Constitutional Rights; 3. That the Court order the District of Columbia to cease its policy, pattern, and/or
practice of seizing money from persons arrested by the MPD and retaining money after disposition of the underlying charges, without notice and an opportunity to be heard;
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4. That the Court order the District of Columbia to return all money unlawfully retained, plus restitution for loss of use;
5. That the Named Plaintiffs and Class Members be awarded compensatory damages and judgment in an amount not less than the amount of money taken and kept from each person, plus damages for the loss of use of the money;
6. That the Plaintiffs be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.
Respectfully Submitted,
/s/Henry A. Escoto/s/ Henry A. Escoto, DC BAR # 448408 806 7th Street, NW, Suite 301 Washington, DC 20001 (202) 898-4700 hescoto@msn.com
/s/Sean R. Day/s/ Sean R. Day, DC Bar # 452420 8505 Baltimore Avenue, Suite 201 College Park, MD 20740 (301) 220-2270 sean@dayincourt.net Attorneys for Plaintiffs Hardy and Monts and the Proposed Class JURY DEMAND The Plaintiffs hereby demand a trial by jury.
/s/Henry A. Escoto/s/ Henry A. Escoto Attorney for Plaintiffs
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 Case 1:09-cv-01062-CRC Document 31 Filed 02/28/12 Page 1 of 9 SUMMARY MEMORANDUM AND OPINION; NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ANTHONY HARDY, et al. and Members of the Class, on behalf of all others similarly situated
Plaintiffs,
v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 09-cv-01062 (RLW)

MEMORANDUM OPINION1 Before the Court are two pending motions: Plaintiffs’ Motion to Certify Class #2 (Dkt. No. 22) and Defendant’s Motion for Suggestion of Mootness (Dkt. No. 27). For the following reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Certify Class is denied without prejudice. Defendant’s Suggestion of Mootness is also denied.
I. Procedural History Plaintiffs Anthony Hardy and Donnell Monts, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated (“Plaintiffs”), have filed a one-count Complaint against the District of Columbia. (Dkt. No. 1). Plaintiffs allege that the District violated their Fifth Amendment due process rights because the District seized cash from them without providing adequate notice under D.C. Code § 48-905.02 (“the D.C. Forfeiture Statute”) and the Fifth Amendment. (Dkt. 1 at 2).

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This is a summary opinion intended for the parties and those persons familiar with the

facts and arguments set forth in the pleadings; not intended for publication in the official

reporters.

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Plaintiffs filed their first motion for class certification on September 8, 2009, when this
case was before Judge Collyer. (Dkt. No. 6). Plaintiffs sought to certify the class under Rule
23(b)(3). After full briefing on that motion, including surreplies by both parties (Dkt. Nos. 16 &
17), the Court held a hearing on March 10, 2010.
After hearing argument from both parties, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion without
prejudice because the Plaintiffs had not met their burden on the Motion and the class was not
defined well enough. The Court allowed discovery so that the Plaintiffs could “better flesh out
who [their] class might include.” The Court ordered the parties to meet and confer and submit a
joint discovery plan on the issue of class certification.
At a hearing on July 21, 2010, the parties represented that discovery was complete, and
the District agreed that the class certification issues were “now teed up.” (Dkt. No. 21 at 7).
II. Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion for Class Certification Having now completed limited discovery to define the class, Plaintiffs have filed a
Renewed Motion for Class Certification. (Dkt. No. 22). The Court will turn to this motion first.
Plaintiffs seek to certify a class of all persons meeting the following criteria:
(1) The person was arrested by an officer of the District of Columbia.
(2) The District took cash from the person. (3) The person’s criminal case relating to the arrest was closed on
or after June 8, 2006, or if the person was released without charge, the person was arrested on or after June 8, 2005. (4) The District kept (or keeps) the person’s cash (whether by storing, using, or depositing). (5) The District mailed an administrative forfeiture notice to the person, and (a) the District did not receive back a signed mail receipt, or (b) the person was incarcerated but the District did not mail the notice to the place of incarceration. (6) The District did not (or does not prior to judgment in this case), within one year of the closing of the person’s criminal case (or
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release without charge), thereafter mail notice to a different address, or file a civil forfeiture action.
Dkt. No. 22 at 2.
In their renewed Motion, Plaintiffs seek certification under Rule 23(b)(3). In order for a
class to be properly certified under Rule 23, Plaintiffs must show that:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical
of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
In addition to the requirements of subsection (a), the following factors must be met to
certify a class under Rule 23(b)(3):
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. The matters pertinent to these findings include: (A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
Although there is no bright-line rule providing guidance on how to interpret Rule
23(b)(3), two prominent commentators have both noted that the proper standard is a “pragmatic”
one. See 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE: FEDERAL
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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1778, 121 (3d ed. 2005) (“hereinafter Wright & Miller”) (“[T]he proper standard under Rule 23(b)(3) is a pragmatic one, which is in keeping with the basic objectives of the Rule 23(b)(3) class action.”); 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 23.45 (3d ed. 2007) (“the Rule requires a pragmatic assessment of the entire action and all the issues involved.”). Moreover, as the Advisory Committee notes to Rule 23 explain, “[s]ubdivision (b)(3) encompasses those cases in which a class action would achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3), advisory committee’s note.
Plaintiffs have identified two subsets of individuals in Paragraph 5 of their proposed class definition, and the Court will discuss each subset separately.
First, Plaintiffs seek to certify those individuals described in Paragraph 5(a). These individuals were not necessarily incarcerated at the time the District attempted to send notice to them. They are included in the class merely because the District mailed an administrative forfeiture notice to them, and the District did not receive back a signed mail receipt. The Court finds that, for this subset of individuals, the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) are not met because common questions of fact do not predominate over individual questions. Under Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006), upon which Plaintiffs rely, the individual inquiry regarding the reasonableness of the District’s efforts to send notice will be fact intensive. See Jones, 547 U.S. at 234 (stating that when notice of tax sale came back came back undelivered, the state should have taken “additional reasonable steps to notify [the appellant], if practicable to do so” and also stating that if there were no “reasonable additional steps the government could have taken upon return of the unclaimed notice letter, it cannot be faulted for doing nothing.”) (emphasis added).
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The Court would, therefore, have to look into the facts of each case to determine whether it was “practicable” for the District to take any additional steps to provide notice to each plaintiff or whether such steps would have been unreasonable or futile. Consequently, Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to show that common questions of law and fact predominate over individual questions with respect to the “5(a) class.” See Wright & Miller § 1778, 119-20 (“What is clear . . . is that it is not sufficient that common questions merely exist, as is true for purposes of Rule 23(a)(2), and that the court is under a duty to evaluate the relationship between the common and individual issues in all actions under Rule 23(b)(3).”). Plaintiffs’ Motion to certify the 5(a) plaintiffs is therefore denied.2
The other subset that Plaintiffs seek to certify is the class of individuals described in Paragraph 5(b). These individuals were incarcerated but the District did not send notice to the plaintiff’s place of incarceration. Plaintiffs’ Motion as to this subset of individuals is also denied. The party seeking certification bears the burden of showing that the proposed class meets all of the prerequisites to certification that Rule 23 requires. See 7A Wright & Miller § 1759. Moreover, the class definition should be sufficiently definite so that members can be ascertained. One prominent treatise notes that courts examine whether the proposed class members be defined in a way as to make their membership ascertainable “at some stage during

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Paragraph 4 of the class definition includes a person merely if “[t]he District kept (or

keeps) the person’s cash (whether by storing, using, or depositing).” The due process violation

of which Plaintiffs complain, however, is based on improper notice prior to the final act of

administrative forfeiture. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306, 314

(1950) (“An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is

to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise

interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their

objections.”) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs do not address why a person should be a member of

the class based on improper notice when their property was never administratively forfeited or

how those putative plaintiffs could ever make out a due process claim. In addition to the

problems with Paragraph 5, this is yet another defect in the class definition.

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the proceeding,” and definable “by reference to…objective criteria,” and not upon subjective issues such as “state of mind” or other issues requiring an administratively burdensome inquiry into determining the identities of the class members. 1 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS §§ 3:1, 3:3 (internal quotation marks omitted). This treatise also states that some courts “address administrative feasibility from the [perspective] of potential class members, asking whether a prospective plaintiff could easily identify himself or herself as having a right to recovery based on the description in the class definition.” Id. at § 3:3 (citing Bynum v. District of Columbia, 214 F.R.D. 27 (D.D.C. 2003), for the proposition that a class could be sufficiently defined if “class members could identify themselves based on the dates of their incarceration included in the class definition.”). Here, Plaintiffs fail to address how an individual receiving a notice of the proposed class would have the knowledge to determine whether he or she falls inside or outside the class, because a key part of Plaintiffs’ class definition (when the administrative forfeiture notice was sent by the District) turns on knowledge outside the possession of the putative class member. Compare Bynum, 214 F.R.D. at 32 (plaintiffs had sufficiently outlined the boundaries of the class because ‘by looking at the class definition, counsel and putative class members can easily ascertain whether they are members of the class.’”) (citing Pigford v. Glickman, 182 F.R.D. 341, 346 (D.D.C. 1998)).
Relying heavily on this Circuit’s opinion in Small v. United States, 136 F.3d 1334, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1998), Plaintiffs argue that the class of individuals described in Paragraph 5(b) suffered a due process injury because the plaintiff was incarcerated at the time the District mailed out its notice of administrative forfeiture and the District failed to mail the notice to the place of incarceration or take any additional steps to provide notice. In Small, the D.C. Circuit held that, because the government knew Small was incarcerated, the government had an
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Case 1:09-cv-01062-CRC Document 31 Filed 02/28/12 Page 7 of 9 SUMMARY MEMORANDUM AND OPINION; NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION. “obligation to send adequate notice to him [at the prison].” Id. at 1337. Thus, if an individual was incarcerated at the time that the District sent him/her a notice of administrative forfeiture and the District knew or should have known of his/her incarceration, under Small, a plaintiff may be able to make out a due process claim against the District. However, the definition does not limit the proposed class to those who were incarcerated at the time that the District sent the notice of administrative forfeiture to them, nor does it limit the class to those incarcerated by the District of Columbia. Thus, evaluating the merits of the claims of the proposed class would require an individual assessment of whether the District knew or should have known that each class member was incarcerated at the time that the District sent the administrative forfeiture notice. Furthermore, with respect to the 5(b) plaintiffs, the plaintiffs have failed to adequately address the District’s argument that an adjudication of each plaintiffs’ claim would require this Court to determine whether the plaintiff received actual notice of forfeiture. If actual notice is indeed a defense available to the District, that would also require an individual factual assessment for each class member.
In sum, the definition in Paragraph 5(b) poses a number of problems that demonstrate that the class has not been narrowly drawn to result in a predominance of similarly-situated plaintiffs and of common issues of fact.
As noted previously, Plaintiffs have had two opportunities already to submit a class definition to the Court that can be certified under Rule 23(b)(3). The Court will allow Plaintiffs
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a third (and last) chance to renew their Motion for Class Certification within 30 days addressing the issues set forth in this ruling, if Plaintiffs so desire.3
III. District’s Suggestion of Mootness The District’s suggestion of mootness at Dkt. No. 27 is also denied. The District argues that this Court should deny Plaintiffs’ Motion to Certify Class under Rule 23(b)(2) because the District has implemented procedures which moot Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive or declaratory relief under Rule 23(b)(2). This Court will deny the District’s Motion for Suggestion of Mootness. Plaintiffs have moved for class certification only under Rule 23(b)(3), not (b)(2). There is no reason to consider whether the action would be a hybrid because the only injunctive relief Plaintiffs point to—the “return of money”—is actually part of the claim for money damages. Accordingly, this Court has construed Plaintiffs’ Motion as having been brought only under Rule 23(b)(3). The Plaintiffs’ claims for money damages under Rule 23(b)(3) are not moot due to the alleged newly-implemented procedures.

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Finally, Plaintiffs conceded at oral argument that, if this Court certified only those

individuals in Paragraph 5(b), Plaintiff Hardy would not be an adequate class representative

because there is no allegation that he was incarcerated at the time that the District attempted to

send him notice. If Plaintiffs file a renewed motion, they are directed to address how this Court

should handle the claims of Plaintiff Hardy or Monts if either falls outside of any class definition

that is subsequently approved by this Court.

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CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Certify Class is denied without prejudice. Defendant’s Suggestion of Mootness is also denied. An Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

SO ORDERED. Date: February 28, 2012

Digitally signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins DN: cn=Judge Robert L. Wilkins, o=U.S. District Court, ou=Chambers of Honorable Robert L. Wilkins, email=RW@dc.uscourt.gov, c=US Date: 2012.02.28 14:39:12 -05'00'
Robert L. Wilkins
United States District Judge

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 Case 1:09-cv-01062-CRC Document 67-1 Filed 11/04/13 Page 1 of 14

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Ex. 1

____________________________________

)

ANTHONY HARDY, et al.,

)

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Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

) Civil Action No. 09-cv-01062 (RLW)

)

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

)

)

Defendant.

)

____________________________________

STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT OF SETTLEMENT

1. This Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement (“Settlement”) is entered into on the date signed below, by and between Plaintiffs Anthony Hardy and Donnell Monts, individually and on behalf of the classes they represent (“Plaintiffs”), and Defendant Government of the District of Columbia (“Defendant” or “District”) (Plaintiffs and Defendants are collectively referred to herein as the “Parties”), through their respective undersigned attorneys, providing for a full and final settlement, subject to Court approval, of the above-captioned class action case on the following terms and conditions:
I. RECITALS 2. On June 8, 2009, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in the District Court for the District of Columbia against the Defendant on behalf of themselves and a putative class of individuals who were arrested by the Metropolitan Police Department, and had their money taken and administratively forfeited, which the Plaintiffs alleged was without adequate notice and due process. 3. The issues and claims have further developed in this case as reflected in the various court filings. 4. The Plaintiffs obtained discovery, including Rule 30(b)(6) depositions, answers to interrogatories, and production of documents, to obtain information relating to class certification issues. 5. On August 22, 2012, following a motion for class certification, the Court certified two classes for Rule 23(b)(3) class action status (Docket Nos. 44 and 45). 6. Thereafter, the parties engaged in a joint process to identify persons meeting the class definitions through scanning, coding, and analysis of tens of thousands of forfeiture documents, and through the use of the D.C. Department of Corrections database (“JACCS”). 7. The parties were able to identify the names of persons meeting the class definitions, their last known addresses, their incarceration status at the time of the forfeiture mailing, and the amount forfeited. 8. The parties then engaged in substantial arm’s length negotiations over a period of months, including two Court-ordered mediation sessions before Magistrate Judge Kay.

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9. The parties have engaged in significant factual and legal analysis of the issues implicated by the Litigation. 10. Plaintiffs have claimed, and continue to claim, that each and all of the claims asserted by them have merit. 11. Defendant denies all liability for both Classes and all allegations, and it does not concede any infirmity in the defenses that it has asserted or intended to assert in the Litigation. 12. After considering the risks and difficulties involved in attempting to establish a right of recovery on behalf of the Classes, the expense necessary to continue the Litigation through trial and the appeals which might follow, the uncertainty inherent in any complex litigation, and the substantial benefits of the Settlement for the Settlement Class Members, including the fact that even if Plaintiffs and the class they represent ultimately prevailed on their claims, there is no assurance that the Settlement Class Members would receive any greater recovery than they will receive from the Settlement, Plaintiffs and Settlement Class Counsel have concluded that the proposed Settlement on the terms and conditions of this Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate, and is in the best interests of the Settlement Class. 13. The Settlement contemplated by this Settlement is the product of extensive, good faith, and arm’s-length negotiation between Class Counsel and Defendant’s Counsel. 14. WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing Recitals and the agreements, covenants, representations and warranties set forth herein, IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and among the Parties, by and through their counsel, that, subject to the approval of the Court pursuant to Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Released Claims shall be finally and fully compromised, settled, released and forever discharged as to the Released Party, subject to the following terms and conditions:
II. SETTLEMENT CLASS DEFINITIONS 15. Failed Notice Class. All individuals meeting the following criteria:
(1) The person was arrested by an officer of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department (MPD). (2) The MPD took cash from the person. (3) The District kept (or keeps) the person’s cash (whether by storing, using, or depositing). (4) On or after June 8, 2006, and on or before May 24, 2012, the District mailed an administrative forfeiture notice to the person, but the District did not receive back a signed mail receipt. (5) The District did not re-send a notice regarding the cash upon failure to receive a signed mail receipt. (6) The District did not within one year of the conclusion of the person’s criminal case (or release without charge) file a civil forfeiture action. 16. Jailed Notice Class. All individuals meeting the following criteria: (1) The person was arrested by an officer of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department. (2) The MPD took cash from the person. (3) The District kept (or keeps) the person’s cash (whether by storing, using, or depositing). (4) The District mailed an administrative forfeiture notice to the person on or after June 8, 2006 (or on or after June 8, 2005, but the person was in the custody of the District
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at the time and released from custody on or after June 8, 2006), and on or before May 24, 2012. (5) At the time of mailing, the person was held by or in the custody of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections. (6) The District did not mail or deliver an administrative forfeiture notice to the person at the place of incarceration, and did not re-send notice to the person after their release from custody. (7) The District did not within one year of the conclusion of the person’s criminal case (or release without charge) file a civil forfeiture action.
III. CONDITIONAL SETTLEMENT AND DISCLAIMER OF LIABILITY 17. Conditional Settlement. Except where otherwise indicated, this Settlement is expressly conditioned upon the Preliminary Approval, Final Approval, and Final Judgment of the terms of this Settlement. The class periods set forth above are an essential condition of this Settlement. 18. Disclaimer of Liability. This Settlement Agreement is for settlement purposes only, and neither the fact of, nor any provision contained in, this Settlement Agreement or its exhibits, nor any action taken hereunder, shall constitute, be construed as, or be admissible in evidence as, any admission of the validity of any claim or any fact alleged by any Plaintiff or Class Member in either this action or in any other pending or future action or of any wrongdoing, fault, violation of law, or liability of any kind on the part of the District or admission by the District of any claim or allegation made in this action or in any other action. Defendant denies all allegations of wrongdoing and denies any liability to Plaintiffs or to any Class Member. The Parties have agreed that, in order to avoid long and costly litigation, this dispute should be settled pursuant to the terms of this Settlement Agreement, subject to the approval of the Court.
IV. DEFINITIONS 19. Administrative Expenses. All expenses arising out of the administration of the Settlement, including but not limited to, the cost of preparing a list of Class Members, and the cost of the Claims Administrator, including, but not limited to, the cost of preparing and mailing Notice, the cost of publication of Summary Notice, the cost of creating and maintaining a website to post relevant information regarding the Settlement, the cost of reviewing and processing claims, the cost of handling phone calls, emails, and other correspondence from Class Members, the costs of issuing payment, and any other costs attendant to the administration of the Settlement as may be necessary to provide notice, process Claims, and handle Opt-Outs and other communications. 20. Approved Claim. A Claim qualified for payment under this Settlement. 21. Attorneys’ Fees. The attorneys’ fees awarded to Class Counsel in connection with the Litigation. 22. Attorneys’ Expenses. Filing fees, deposition costs, investigative fees, expert fees, and other expenses incurred by Class Counsel in connection with this Litigation. 23. Claim. A Claim Form submitted. 24. Claim Form. The Claim Form in substantially the form attached to this Settlement Agreement as Exhibit C. 25. Claimant. Any person who submits a Claim Form. 26. Claims Period. The period of time ending 134 days subsequent to preliminary approval.
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27. Class Administrator. Class Action Administration Inc. (“CAA”) of Westminster, Colorado (“Class Action”), who will be retained by Class Counsel. 28. Class Counsel. Henry Escoto and Sean Day. 29. Class List. The list of persons mutually created by the parties listing the persons meeting the definition of one or both Classes, together with the amount of the Forfeited Money. 30. Class Members. All persons meeting the definitions of the Failed Notice Class, the Jailed Notice Class, or both. 31. Class Notice. The Notice of Class Action, Proposed Class Settlement, and Hearing, in substantially the form attached to this Settlement Agreement as Exhibit A. 32. Class Representatives. Anthony Hardy and Donnell Monts. 33. Court. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 34. District/Defendant. The Government of the District of Columbia. 35. Forfeited Money/Amount. The monies of the Settlement Class as inventoried by Class Counsel and the District in the creation of the Class List.
a. Large Claims. The largest one-third of Forfeited Amounts appearing on the Class List (calculated to be $225 or more as of the date of the Agreement, subject to change with final calculations).
36. Final Approval. The Court's issuance of a final order approving this Settlement pursuant to Rule 23(e) in a form to be agreed to by Settlement Class Counsel and Defendants’ Counsel consistent with the provisions hereof, providing final approval of the Settlement. 37. Final Judgment. Final Approval not appealed, or finally upheld on appeal. 38. Litigation. The above-captioned civil action. 39. “MPD.” The Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia. 40. Opt-Out. A request by any person not to participate in the Settlement as provided for herein or otherwise agreed to by the Parties or allowed by the Court. 41. Preliminary Approval. The Court's determination that the Settlement is within the range of fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy, and therefore a notice should be sent to the Classes and a hearing should be held with respect to fairness and Final Approval. 42. Preliminary Approval Order. An order substantially in the form of Exhibit E attached herein and described below that memorializes the Court’s Preliminary Approval. 43. Proof of Claim. A completed Claim Form together with any supporting information and/or documents sufficient to allow the Claims Administrator and Class Counsel to determine whether a Person is a Settlement Class Member entitled to participate in this Settlement. 44. Released Party. The Government of the District of Columbia and all its agencies, employees, agents, attorneys, insurers, representatives, administrators, predecessors, successors and assigns. 45. Releasing Parties. The Plaintiffs and all Settlement Class Members on behalf of themselves and each of their predecessors, successors, custodians, agents, assigns, representatives, heirs, executors, trustees, administrators, and any other Person or entity having any legal or beneficial interest in the Forfeited Money. 46. Settled Claims. All claims, demands, rights, liabilities and causes of action of every nature and description whatsoever, in law or equity, known or unknown, asserted or that might have been asserted, either directly or indirectly, in a representative or in any other capacity, by any Releasing Party against the Released Party for any matter, arising out of, relating to, or in connection with the forfeiture of the Forfeited Money. 47. Settlement/Stipulation. The settlement set forth in this document.
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48. Settlement Class Members. All Class Members who do not Opt-Out. 49. Summary Notice. The notice approved by the Court for publication disclosing the Settlement and Final Approval Hearing as provided for herein, in substantially the form attached to this Settlement Agreement as Exhibit B.
V. SETTLEMENT FUND 50. Subject to Court approval and pursuant to the terms and conditions of this Settlement, and except as otherwise provided expressly conditioned on the Final Approval by the Court of the Settlement Class Definitions, and in full and final disposition, settlement, discharge, release and satisfaction of the Settled Claims, the following fund shall be created by the Defendant: 51. Settlement Fund. The total sum of $855,000.00 U.S. Dollars. The Settlement Fund shall be held by the City subject to the transfers as provided in Article VII. 52. Extent of Defendant’s Monetary Obligations. Defendant’s monetary obligations under this Settlement are limited to the Settlement Fund. Defendants shall not be called upon or required to contribute additional monies under any circumstance. 53. Settlement Fund Allocation. The Parties estimate that the Settlement Fund will be allocated as follows, and the Defendant will not in any way contest such allocation and awards by the Court:
a. $5,000 ($2,500 each) to the Class Representatives as an incentive payment in consideration of their services as Class Representatives. b. $21,667 for Attorneys’ Expenses. c. $283,333 for Attorneys’ Fees. d. $45,000 for Administrative Expenses. e. $500,000 Residuary for payments of Approved Claims. 54. Payment of Settlement Fund. The Settlement Fund shall be paid as follows: a. Administrative Expenses. Within 45 days after Preliminary Approval, the District shall transfer $45,000 to the Class Administrator for Administrative Expenses. This sum, to the extent used and accounted for (including refunds to Class Counsel for any advances made toward Administrative Expenses), will be non-refundable and not conditioned upon Final Approval. The District’s deadline to pay the Class Administrator is expressly conditioned upon the Class Administrator’s timely and satisfactory completion and submission of all necessary paperwork for the District’s procurement process. This paperwork includes but may not be limited to an original W-9 form and registration in the District’s “PASS” system. b. Attorney’s Fees, Attorney’s Expenses, and Incentive Payments. Within 45 days of Final Judgment, the District shall transfer to Class Counsel the sums awarded for Attorney’s Fees and Expenses, and for incentive payments for the Class Representatives. c. Residuary. Within 45 days of Final Judgment, the District will pay the remaining amount (Settlement Fund minus Payment for Administrative Expenses, Attorney’s Fees, Attorney’s Expenses, and Incentive Payments) to the Class Administrator. The Residuary may exceed $500,000 if additional funds are available from the $855,000; however, under no circumstances whatsoever shall the total Settlement Fund exceed $855,000.
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VI. REVERSION OF SETTLEMENT FUND, CLASS COUNSEL FEES 55. Reversion to the District. Within 4 months of the payment of the Residuary to the Class Administrator, the Class Administrator will refund to the District any funds not used, together with a statement accounting for the use of all funds. 56. Class Counsel Fees. Class Counsel agrees and acknowledges that they are personally and solely responsible for any taxes owed on the fees received pursuant to this Settlement. Plaintiffs and Class Counsel agree to defend, indemnify, and hold harmless the District with respect to any liability to any taxing authority, whether federal, state or local, arising from payments contemplated by this Settlement. Class Counsel and Plaintiffs acknowledge and understand that the District will report payments set forth in this Settlement to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service.
VII. NOTICE AND ADMINISTRATION OF SETTLEMENT 57. Adequacy of Notice. The Parties agree that compliance with the procedures described in this Article constitutes due and sufficient notice to Class Members of this Settlement and Final Approval Hearing, and that it satisfies the requirements of due process. Nothing else shall be required of the Parties, Class Counsel, or Defendants’ Counsel to provide notice of the Settlement and the Final Approval Hearing. 58. Proofs of Claim. Subject to the approval and further Orders of the Court, Claimants who submit Proofs of Claims shall be entitled to the return of their respective Forfeited Money in accordance with the terms of this Settlement. Persons who are Class Members of both classes will be entitled to only one recovery, the same as if they were a member of one Class or the other. 59. Submissions Required. Each Person claiming to be a member of the Settlement Class will be required to submit a Proof of Claim which shall include sufficient information and documentation to establish that the person submitting the Claim is a member of the Settlement Class, signed under penalty of perjury. 60. Proof on Large Claims. For Large Claims where a Claimant is not incarcerated, the Proof of Claim shall include proof of identity, such as a legible photocopy of an official state, D.C., or federal-issued identification, or the providing of information satisfactorily establishing that the Claimant is a Class Member. Any copy of identity documentation may be reviewed by the District. 61. Class List. Claimants appearing on the Class List will be entitled to participate in the Settlement by submitting a completed and timely Claim Form and, where required, proof of identification, without further proof. Any other Claimant will be required to submit documentation satisfactorily establishing Class Membership. 62. Timely Proof of Claim Required. To be processed for payment, a Proof of Claim must be received by the Class Administrator within the Claims Period. 63. Review of Proof of Claim. The Class Administrator shall review the Proofs of Claim and any supporting documentation timely received. The Class Administrator shall determine whether a person submitting a Proof of Claim is entitled to share in the distribution from the Settlement Fund. The Class Administrator, in consultation with Class Counsel, may approve, in whole or part, any or all untimely or deficient Proofs of Claims submitted by Class Members before final judgment. During the Claims Period, on a rolling weekly basis, the Class Administrator shall e-mail the designated MPD contact(s) the name, property control numbers, and any other identifying information from received Claims Forms so that MPD can cross-check
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said information against its internal database to verify that the cash property associated with the Claim Form was not already returned. The Class Administrator shall wait 10 business days from its e-mail to MPD to approve any Claim to provide MPD sufficient time to conduct the crosscheck. 64. Class Administrator’s Records. The Class Administrator shall maintain accurate records, for inspection by Class Counsel and the District with reasonable notice, of all Claims records and financial records related to the Settlement. 65. Denied Claims. If the Claims Administrator denies a claim in whole or part, the Class Administrator shall notify the Claimant in writing of its determination with a brief description of the deficiency. 66. Failure to Correct Deficiency. If, as determined by the Class Administrator, the Claimant fails to correct or argue against such deficiency by information and/or documents within 14 days of the date of the deficiency letter, or by the end of the Claims Period, whichever is later, the Claims Administrator will deny the claim via a letter of final determination. 67. Request for Review. Any Claimant who wishes to contest the final determination by the Class Administrator may, within 14 days after the date of letter of final determination, file with the Court a Request for Review of the Class Administrator’s determination. Unless the request is filed through ECF, the Claimant must mail a copy of the request to counsel for all parties. If the Court does not receive a Request for Review within said 14 days, the final determination of the Class Administrator will stand. Any response(s) to the Request for Review will be due within 14 days of the filing of the Request for Review. 68. Defendant’s Cooperation and Review of Claims. Defendant shall cooperate and participate in the review and processing of Claims as is necessary and reasonable, including providing information as may be in its possession and readily obtained and necessary to verify a Claim. 69. Amount to Be Paid on Approved Claims. Approved Claims will be paid in an amount equal to the Forfeited Money unless the aggregate total of Approved Claims exceeds the Residuary of the Settlement Fund, in which case payment will be a pro-rated amount (reduced in the same percentage for all Approved Claims). 70. Time Period to Cash or Deposit Checks. Checks issued on claims will be good for 90 days from the date of issue. 71. Effect of Failure to File Proof of Claim. Any Settlement Class Member who does not file a valid Proof of Claim with the Class Administrator will not be entitled to receive any of the proceeds from the Settlement, but will otherwise be bound by all terms of the Settlement, including the terms of the Final Judgment and Order to be entered and the releases provided for herein, and will be barred from bringing any action against any Released Party concerning the Settled Claims. 72. JACCS Update. At such reasonable time as requested by Class Counsel, the District will provide Class Counsel with an updated JACCS production and any additional information that will enable Class Counsel to identify Class Members who are jailed at the time of the mailing of Class Notice, together with the location of incarceration, and an inmate identifier such as DCDC number that can be reasonably provided, so that Class Notice can be mailed to any incarcerated Class Members at the place of incarceration. 73. Mailing. Within 67 days after entry of the Preliminary Approval Order, the Class Administrator shall send on behalf of the Court, copies of the Notice and Claim Form, by United States Mail, postage prepaid, to Class Members appearing on the Class List. If the Class
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Member is incarcerated as indicated in the District’s JACCS database, Notice will be mailed to the Class Member at his or her place of incarceration. 74. Addresses-Checking. For all Claims, the Class Administrator will use the U.S. Postal Service’s address verification and mail forwarding databases for pre-checking the validity of all Class Members’ last known addresses before mailing the Notice. 75. Posting at DC Jail. From the time of Preliminary Approval until Final Judgment, the District shall allow the Class Notice and blank Claim Forms to be posted and maintained at a conspicuous location at the D.C. Jail. 76. Undelivered Notices. The Class Administrator shall use a skip-tracing service to attempt to locate an alternate address for any Notice returned as “undeliverable” and will re-send the Notice to the Class Members at an alternate address if located. 77. Reminder Notices. For Large Claims, where the Class Member has not responded by 30 days before the end of the Claims Period, the Class Administrator shall promptly mail a reminder postcard (Exhibit D). 78. Additional Efforts. Class Counsel may, at no additional cost or effort by the District, conduct any additional effort to locate any number of Class Members, provide notice, and assist in submitting Claims (and at no fee or cost to any such Claimant). 79. Envelopes. Class Administrator will conspicuously mark envelopes as follows: “NOTICE OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT REGARDING CASH SEIZURE/ YOU MAY BE ENTITLED TO CASH PAYMENT” or comparable statement. 80. Publication. Within 67 days of Preliminary Approval, the Class Administrator shall publish the Summary Notice, in a form to be agreed to by counsel for the Parties consistent with the provisions hereof, in a local newspaper of general circulation. 81. Email List-Serve. Within 60 days of Preliminary Approval, Class Counsel will send a copy of the Notice and a blank Claim Form to the email list serve of the Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association of D.C. 82. Website. The Class Administrator will launch and maintain a website that provides information about the settlement; a copy of the Class Notice; printable and downloadable Claim Forms; a copy of this Settlement; Court orders relating to Preliminary and Final Approval; Court dates; and a list of Class Members with dates of administrative forfeitures, notices, amounts, dates of letters, and any other identifying information upon agreement of the parties that Class Counsel determines is necessary or desirable for Class Members to be able to determine that they are on the Class List. The website shall be at a minimum bookmarked at the time of Preliminary Approval or as soon as reasonably possible thereafter, and substantially operational within 5 calendar days thereafter, and maintained until Final Judgment. However, the District shall not be obligated to make payments to the Class Administrator sooner than set forth previously; Class Counsel will advance such costs as necessary and receive reimbursement from the Class Administrator when the Class Administrator receives payment from the District. 83. Costs of Notice. Costs of printing and mailing the Notice, the Summary Notice, the publication of the Summary Notice, and creation and maintenance of a website will be considered Administrative Expenses as defined herein. 84. Affidavit of Compliance. Prior to the Final Approval and Fairness Hearing, Class Counsel shall file an affidavit of mailing and publications with the Court stating that the Notice was duly provided to the Class Members and Summary Notice published in accordance with the Preliminary Approval Order.
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85. Notice under Class Action Fairness Act. The District shall serve the appropriate state official of each state in which a class member resides and comply with their other obligations under 28 U.S.C. § 1715(b) not later than 10 days after Agreement is filed in the Court. The motion seeking Final Approval shall inform the Court of the date of the District’s notifications under 28 U.S.C. § 1715(b) and request Final Approval no fewer than ninety (90) days following the last such notification.
VIII. KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY DISCHARGE OF ALL CLAIMS 86. Release by Plaintiffs and Settlement Class Members. The Settlement, as of Final Approval, resolves in full all claims against the District by all of the Settlement Class Members, (including named Plaintiffs), involving violations of law or constitutional rights, including, without limitation, their Fifth Amendment rights, or any other federal or District of Columbia law, regulation, duty, or obligation, or any other legal theory, action or cause of action, which are based upon or could be based upon or arise from the facts alleged in the Litigation, i.e., claiming damages for allegedly deficient notice of administrative forfeiture proceedings and/or the District’s failure to adequately follow up on forfeiture notices returned undelivered to MPD. When the Settlement is final, as of Final Approval, all Settlement Class Members, including the named Plaintiffs, waive all rights to any and all claims relating to allegedly deficient notice of administrative forfeiture proceedings and/or the District’s failure to adequately follow up on forfeiture notices returned undelivered to MPD under any theory or cause of action whatsoever under District of Columbia law and federal law. This waiver and release shall include a full release and waiver of unknown rights that may exist as of Final Approval. This release is binding on Class Members, even if they never received actual notice of the Litigation or this Settlement. 87. Future Claims Barred. It is the Parties’ intent that this Settlement bars all Settlement Class Members (including named Plaintiffs) and their privies from bringing a subsequent suit or enforcement action in this Court, or another, alleging the same or similar claims for relief as contained in the complaint or in any amended complaints in this Litigation, with respect to any administrative forfeiture of cash by the District that occurred or may have occurred during the Settlement Class Periods specified herein. Notwithstanding the foregoing, and for the avoidance of doubt, the preceding sentence shall not bar or limit any action to enforce the terms of this Settlement. Upon entry of the Final Judgment, the Releasing Parties, whether or not each submits a Proof of Claim or otherwise participates in the Settlement, will be deemed by this Settlement and Final Judgment to have released and forever discharged the Released Party from any and all claims, whether such claims are direct or derivative, arising under federal or state law, known or unknown, accrued or unaccrued, which concern Plaintiffs’ and the Settlement Class Members’ claims related to or concerning the Settled Claims. 88. Assertion of Claims Barred. The Releases outlined in the preceding paragraphs shall bar the assertion of any and all claims related to the Settled Claims by the Releasing Parties, the Settlement Class Members, and Class Counsel against the Released Party.. 89. Limitation of Liability. No Class Member will have any claim against Class Counsel, the Class Administrator, Defendant, or Defendants’ Counsel, for actions taken in good faith or distributions made substantially in accordance with the Settlement or further Orders of the Court. 90. Knowledge of Claims. The Parties waive and assume the risk of any and all claims that exist as of the date of this Settlement, which that Party does not know of or suspect to exist,
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whether through ignorance, oversight, error, negligence, or otherwise, with respect to either facts or law, and which, if known, would materially affect its decision to enter this Settlement.
IX. OPT-OUTS AND OBJECTIONS TO SETTLEMENT 91. Opt-Outs. All persons who satisfy either Settlement Class definition shall have the option to be excluded from the Settlement Class, and thereby elect not to participate in the Settlement, by mailing a timely and valid Opt-Out pursuant to the instructions set forth in the Notice which must be received by the Class Administrator within 134 days from preliminary approval. All Persons who submit timely and valid Opt-Outs shall not be Settlement Class Members and shall have no rights or interests with respect to the Settlement. Class Representative shall not file Opt-Outs, nor shall Class Counsel encourage any Class Members to file Opt-Outs. 92. Notice of Opt-Outs. The Class Administrator shall notify Class Counsel and Defendant’s Counsel of all Opt-Outs within 7 days of receiving same. 93. Objection to Settlement. A person who is a Settlement Class Member may object to the proposed Settlement if that person complies with the requirements and procedures set forth in the Preliminary Approval Order and the Notice, with respect to the time within which objections must be served and filed, and with respect to the requirements for written notices of objection. Unless otherwise permitted by the Court, any Settlement Class Member who fails to comply with the requirements of the Preliminary Approval Order for asserting objections shall be foreclosed from making any objection to this Settlement.
X. IMPLEMENTATION OF SETTLEMENT 94. Mailing Documents and Cataloguing Provided and To Be Provided to Enable Identification of Class Members. The District warrants that it has provided all documents in its possession that could be located with reasonable diligence and that are mailings of the Administrative Forfeitures from June 8, 2005 through October 29, 2009 (copies of outgoing notices of administrative forfeiture, returned notices, returned envelopes, signed receipts), and that it has provided Class Counsel with a complete and accurate catalogue of information from such documents (Property Control Number, Name, Address, Amount of Forfeited Money, Date, Type of Document (outgoing letter, letter returned undelivered, signed mail receipt)). Furthermore, the District will do the same for the remainder of the Class Period in a timing and manner that allows for the timely identification of Class Members consistent with this Settlement and the administration thereof. Nothing in this provision, however, creates any liability against the District for unintentional errors or mistakes that may have occurred and/or may occur in the ordinary course of the document retrieval, scanning and data entry process to which the parties agreed for the purposes of class identification discovery. Unintentional errors or mistakes by the District pursuant to its obligations hereunder shall not be grounds for claiming a breach of the Agreement. 95. Jail Status Information Provided and To Be Provided to Enable Identification of Class Members. The District warrants that it has provided JACCS (the District’s jail database) information showing the jail status of persons mailed administrative forfeiture notices from June 8, 2005 through October 29, 2009, and that it will do the same for the remainder of the Class Period in a timing and manner that allows for the timely identification of Class Members consistent with this Settlement and the administration thereof. Prior to the mailing of Notice and Claim Forms, the District shall research (using the MPD “File on Q” system or other records or
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database having the information) and provide to Class Counsel and CAA the forfeiture amounts at issue for the approximately 300-400 potential Class Members where the information is not available from the data produced by the District. Unintentional errors or mistakes by the District pursuant to its obligations hereunder shall not be grounds for claiming a breach of the Agreement. 96. Reasonable Efforts and Duty to Defend. The Parties and their respective Counsel agree to cooperate, assist, and undertake all reasonable actions to have approved and to effectuate the terms and conditions of this Settlement (including any written modification thereto made with the consent of the Parties). The Parties and their counsel agree to defend the Settlement. Class Counsel may not undertake representation of individuals opting out of the Settlement or of persons who wish to object to the Settlement. The Parties and their counsel shall take no positions contrary to, or inconsistent with, the terms of the Settlement. This paragraph will be effective regardless of and not conditioned upon Preliminary or Final Approval. 97. Preliminary Approval of Settlement. Before this Settlement becomes final and binding on the Parties, Class Counsel shall submit this Settlement to the Court for its consideration and shall request entry of an order substantially in the form of the Preliminary Approval Order attached hereto as Exhibit E. 98. Final Approval Hearing. Before this Settlement becomes final and binding on the Parties, the Court shall hold a Final Approval and Fairness Hearing. At said hearing, the Parties will request the Court to approve the fairness of the Settlement, including the reasonableness of Class Counsel’s request for Attorney’s Fees and Expenses. 99. Entry of Final Judgment and Order. Prior to the Final Approval Hearing, counsel for the Parties shall jointly submit to the Court a proposed Final Judgment and Order, in a form to be agreed to by counsel for the Parties, that:
(a) Certifies the Settlement Classes pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), as may be necessary. (b) Approves the Settlement as fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the best interests of the Class Members, and directing consummation of the Settlement in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Settlement. (c) Dismisses the Complaint on the merits and with prejudice as to the Settlement Class. (d) Bars and permanently enjoins Settlement Class Members, either directly, representatively, or in any other capacity, from instituting or prosecuting the Settled Claims against the Released Party; (e) Orders that all Class Members who have not filed timely and valid Opt-Outs, whether or not they filed a Claim, and whether or not they have an Approved Claim, be barred from asserting any Settled Claims and all Settlement Class Members shall be conclusively deemed to have released the Released Party from the Settled Claims. (f) Orders the payments agreed to be made herein. (g) Finds that Class Counsel and the Class Representatives adequately represented the Classes for the purpose of entering into and implementing the Agreement; (h) Maintains jurisdiction over the Parties and this case as to all matters relating to the administration, consummation, enforcement, and interpretation of the terms of the Settlement and the Final Approval and Judgment.
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XI. EFFECT AND CONSTRUCTION OF SETTLEMENT 100. Settlement not admission of wrongdoing. Regardless of whether consummated, the fact of entering into or carrying out this Settlement, any exhibits attached to this Settlement, and any negotiations, proceedings, communications or agreements related hereto, shall not be construed as, offered into evidence as, or deemed to be evidence of, an admission or concession of liability by or an estoppel against any of the Parties, a waiver of any applicable statute of limitations or repose, and shall not be offered or received into evidence, or considered, in any action or proceeding against any Party in any judicial, quasi-judicial, administrative agency, regulatory or self-regulatory organization, or other tribunal, or proceeding for any purpose whatsoever. However this provision does not limit, restrict, or in any way hinder a Party that requires evidence of this Settlement to enforce the provisions of this Settlement or the provisions of any related agreement agreed to by the parties and approved by the Court, release, or exhibit thereto, or in the case of any subsequent action against any of the Released Party, Plaintiffs or Class Counsel on any or all of the Settled Claims, in order to support a claim or defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, accord and satisfaction, release or other theory of claim or issue preclusion or similar defense. 101. Contract. This Agreement is a contract binding upon the Parties. The Court shall retain jurisdiction over this matter and the Parties for the purpose of enforcing the terms of this Agreement. Plaintiffs’ acceptance of this Agreement is reflected by Class Counsel’s signature(s) upon this Agreement and is binding on the Class. The Parties agree that failure to comply with the provisions of this Settlement shall not be a basis for entry of contempt or sanctions against the District. 102. Captions. The captions contained in this Settlement are inserted only as a matter of convenience and in no way define, limit, extend, or describe the scope of this Settlement or the intent of any of its provisions. 103. Definitions and Recitals. The definitions and recitals set forth above are essential elements of this Settlement. 104. Entire Agreement. This Settlement and any exhibits attached hereto set forth the entire agreement of the Parties with respect to the Settlement and supersedes all prior oral or written agreements, arrangements, understandings, inducements, promises, and warranties, not embodied or incorporated herein, relating to the subject matter of the Settlement. 105. No Representations. Plaintiffs acknowledge, for themselves and for the Settlement Class, that they have not relied upon any representations, warranties, guarantees, promises, statements or estimates, whether written or oral, express or implied, by the Released Party, or anyone representing or purporting to represent the Released Party. Plaintiffs acknowledge that they or Class Counsel have undertaken such investigation as they have deemed necessary in connection with entering into the Settlement. 106. Modifications. The terms and provisions of this Settlement may not be changed, waived, modified, or varied in any manner unless in writing signed by Defendant’s Counsel and Class Counsel, and with consent of the Court. 107. Waiver. The failure of any Party to enforce at any time any provision of this Settlement shall not be construed as a waiver of such provisions, nor be construed in any way to effect the validity of this Settlement or any part hereof or the right of any Party thereafter to insist upon strict performance of each and every provision of this Settlement. No waiver of any breach of this Settlement shall be held to constitute a waiver of any other breach.
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108. Successors, Assignment and Delegation. This Settlement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the Parties and their successors. No Party may assign or delegate its rights or obligations under the Settlement without the prior written consent of all of the other Parties. Plaintiffs and Settlement Class Counsel represent and warrant that none of Plaintiffs’ alleged claims or causes of action against Defendants have been assigned, encumbered or in any manner transferred in whole or in part. 109. Third Parties. Nothing in this Settlement, whether express or implied, is intended to confer any rights or remedies under or by reason of this Settlement on any person other than the Parties and their respective successors and assigns, nor is anything in this Settlement intended to relieve or discharge the obligations or liabilities or any third parties to any Party, or shall any provision give any third parties any right of subrogation or action over or against any Party. 110. Governing Law. This Settlement shall be governed by and construed and enforced in accordance with the laws of the District of Columbia. 111. Collaborative Effort. This Settlement, and any exhibits, was executed after arm’s length negotiations among the Parties and reflects the conclusions of counsel for the Parties that the contemplated Settlement is fair, equitable and in the best interests of their respective clients. This Settlement shall not be construed more strictly against one Party than another merely by virtue of the fact that it may have been prepared by counsel for one of the Parties, it being recognized that, because of the arm’s length negotiations described above, Parties and their Counsel have contributed substantially and materially to the preparation of this Settlement. 112. Terminology and Construction. All personal pronouns used in this Settlement, whether used in the masculine, feminine or neutral gender, shall include all other genders, and the singular shall include the plural and vice versa. All dates referenced herein shall be calendar days unless otherwise indicated. Should any of the provisions of this Settlement conflict with the terms of any exhibits hereto, the terms of the Settlement shall control unless otherwise ordered by the Court. 113. No Severability. Invalidation of any material portion of this Settlement or any exhibit hereto shall invalidate the Settlement in its entirety unless the Parties shall subsequently agree in writing that the remaining provisions shall remain in full force and effect. 114. Counterparts. This Settlement may be executed in one or more counterparts. All executed counterparts and each of them shall be deemed to be one and the same instrument. Provided that all Parties hereto execute a copy of this Settlement, the Settlement shall be deemed fully executed and entered into on the date of execution by the last required signatory.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have caused this Settlement to be executed, by their duly authorized attorneys, as of the date set forth below.
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 283 F.R.D. 20 United States District Court,
District of Columbia.
Anthony HARDY, et al. and Members of the Class, on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.
Civil Action No. 09–cv–01062 (RLW). Aug. 22, 2012.
Synopsis
Background: Named plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, filed onecount complaint against District of Columbia, alleging that it seized and forfeited cash from incarcerated persons without providing adequate notice under D.C. forfeiture statute and Fifth Amendment to U.S. Constitution. Plaintiffs moved to certify class. Holdings: The District Court, Robert L. Wilkins, J., held that: 1 numerosity prerequisite for certification was met; 2 commonality prerequisite for certification was met; 3 typicality prerequisite for certification was met; 4 adequacy prerequisite for certification was met; 5 as for ascertainability requirement, “Incarcerated Persons Class” was clearly defined; 6 as for maintainability, common issues predominated over individual issues with regard to “Failed Notice Class”; and 7 class action was superior method of adjudication.
Motion granted.
MEMORANDUM OPINION ROBERT L. WILKINS, District Judge.
Before the Court is Plaintiffs' Second Renewed Motion for Class Certification (Dkt. No. 33). Upon consideration of the briefs and oral argument, the entire record, and for the following reasons, Plaintiffs' Motion is hereby GRANTED. For purposes of this ruling, the Court will assume that the reader is familiar with the Court's previous Memorandum Opinion in this case and the factual assertions and arguments made by the parties.
BACKGROUND Plaintiffs Anthony Hardy and Donnell Monts, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated (“Plaintiffs”), have filed a one-count Complaint against the District of Columbia. (Dkt. No. 1). Plaintiffs allege that the District seized and forfeited cash from them without providing adequate notice under D.C.Code § 48–905.02 (“the D.C. Forfeiture Statute”) and the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. (Dkt. 1 at 2).

*23 Plaintiffs filed their first motion for class certification on September 8, 2009. (Dkt. No. 6). The Court denied Plaintiffs' motion without prejudice because the class was not sufficiently defined and Plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden. The Court allowed discovery so that the Plaintiffs could “better flesh out who [their] class might include.” At a hearing on July 21, 2010, the parties represented that class discovery was complete. The District represented that the class certification issues were “now teed up.” (Dkt. No. 21 at 7). Plaintiffs filed a second motion for class certification on August 30, 2010. In its Memorandum Opinion denying the second motion, the Court cited numerous concerns with the proposed class definition. (Dkt. Nos. 31–32). The Court allowed Plaintiffs a third and final opportunity to address and potentially cure those concerns. (Id. at 7–8). Plaintiffs have altered their class definition a third time and now seek to certify two classes: the “Failed Notice Class” and the “Incarcerated Persons Class.” Plaintiff Anthony Hardy seeks to represent the “Failed Notice Class,” which includes individuals meeting the following criteria: (1) The person was arrested by an officer of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department. (2) The MPD took cash from the person. (3) The person's criminal case relating to the arrest was concluded on or after June 8, 2006, or if the person was released by the MPD without charge, the person was arrested on or after June 8, 2005. (4) The District kept (or keeps) the person's cash (whether by storing, using, or depositing). (5) On or before October 28, 2009, the District mailed an administrative forfeiture notice to the person, but the District did not receive back a signed mail receipt. (6) The District did not re-send a notice regarding the cash. (7) The District did not within one year of the conclusion of the person's criminal case (or release without charge) file a civil forfeiture action. (Dkt. No. 33 at 1–2). Plaintiff Darnell Monts seeks to represent the “Incarcerated Persons Class,” which includes individuals meeting the following criteria: (1) The person was arrested by an officer of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department. (2) The MPD took cash from the person. (3) The person's criminal case relating to the arrest was concluded on or after June 8, 2006, or if the person was released by the MPD without charge, the person was arrested on or after June 8, 2005. (4) The District kept (or keeps) the person's cash (whether by storing, using, or depositing). (5) On or before October 28, 2009, the District mailed an administrative forfeiture notice to the person. (6) At the time of mailing, the person was held by or in the custody of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections. (7) The District did not mail or deliver an administrative forfeiture notice to the person at the place of incarceration. (8) The District did not within one year of the conclusion of the person's criminal case (or release without charge) file a civil forfeiture action. (Dkt. No. 33 at 2). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs have met their burden under Rule 23 as to both proposed classes.

ANALYSIS A. Rule 23(a) factors
1. Numerosity 1Rule 23(a)(1) requires Plaintiffs to establish that “the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.”FED.R.CIV.P. 23(a)(1). The District does not meaningfully refute the fact that Plaintiffs have established numerosity. During discovery, Plaintiffs deposed Lt. Derek Gray, manager *24 of the evidence control division of the Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”). Gray, who the District designated as its Rule 30(b)(6) witness,1 testified that the evidence control division is the division that sends out “notices relating to forfeiture proceedings of cash and other property.” (Dkt. No. 22–5 at 8; 30–31). According to Gray, the division received approximately 2,000 returned unsigned mail receipts from the 3,000 asset forfeiture notices that it sent out in 2009 alone. (Id. at 59–60). Gray testified that, during the relevant time period, the division did not first check whether a person to whom notice was being sent was incarcerated. (Id. at 54–55). Gray also testified that, for the same time period, the division generally did not follow up on undelivered returned mail by looking for other addresses. (Id. at 56–57). Plaintiffs have established that, in 2009 alone, the class could include up to approximately 2,000 individuals. Given that both class definitions cover the years from 2005 to 2009, Plaintiffs have clearly met their burden under Rule 23 to show that joinder is impracticable. See Cohen v. Chilcott, 522 F.Supp.2d 105, 114 (D.D.C.2007) (“Courts in this District have generally found that the numerosity requirement is satisfied and that joinder is impracticable where a proposed class has at least forty members.”);Pigford v. Glickman, 182 F.R.D. 341, 347 (D.D.C.1998) (“Mere conjecture, without more, is insufficient to establish numerosity, but plaintiffs do not have to provide an exact number of putative class members in order to satisfy the numerosity requirement.”).
2. Commonality 2Rule 23(a)(2) requires that there are questions of law or fact common to the class. FED.R.CIV.P. 23(a)(2). “To establish commonality under Rule 23(a)(2), a plaintiff must identify at least one question common to all members of the class.” Garcia v. Johanns, 444 F.3d 625, 632 (D.C.Cir.2006) (citing In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 528 (3d Cir.2004)). “Significantly, ‘factual variations among the class members will not defeat the commonality requirement, so long as a single aspect or feature of the claim is common to all proposed class members.’ ” Cohen, 522 F.Supp.2d at 114 (quoting Bynum v. District of Columbia, 214 F.R.D. 27, 33 (D.D.C.2003)). 3As Plaintiffs have demonstrated through class discovery, their claims raise a number of common issues of fact and law. Indeed, as discussed in more detail below, those common issues predominate over any individual issues. All putative plaintiffs are advancing the same legal theory based on the same set of facts and the same course of conduct by the District. They also claim to have been injured in the same way—by the deprivation of their property without due process. The questions common to the proposed classes include: 1) whether the District had a custom, practice or policy of failing to check the incarceration status of any individual to whom a notice was being sent; 2) whether the District's practice of failing to send notices to incarcerated persons at their place of incarceration violated plaintiffs' due process rights; 3) whether the District had a custom, practice or

policy of failing to conduct any follow up on returned undelivered notices; 4) whether the District's practice of failing to conduct any follow up on undelivered mail receipts violated plaintiffs' due process rights; and 5) whether the District's failure to either return property or begin a forfeiture proceeding violated plaintiffs' rights. The Court is satisfied that Plaintiffs have met their burden to establish that these common questions of law and fact exist in this case.
3. Typicality 4Rule 23(a)(3) requires a finding that “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” FED.R.CIV.P. 23(a)(3). “The *25 typicality requirement aims at ensuring that the class representatives have suffered injuries in the same general fashion as absent class members.” Cohen, 522 F.Supp.2d at 115 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff's claim is “typical if it arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to a claim of another class member's where his or her claims are based on the same legal theory.” Stewart v. Rubin,948 F.Supp. 1077, 1088 (D.D.C.1996), aff'd, 124 F.3d 1309 (D.C.Cir.1997). 5There is no genuine dispute regarding the typicality of the claims and defenses of Hardy and Monts vis-à-vis the two proposed classes. Plaintiffs have shown through record evidence that they suffered injuries in the same general fashion as the putative class members—i.e., deprivation of their property without adequate notice. Moreover, Hardy's claims are typical of the “Failed Notice Class,”2 and Monts is typical of the “Incarcerated Persons Class.” Although the District argues in conclusory fashion that the “variety and uniqueness of each purported class member's claims” defeats the typicality requirement, the District offers no specific reasons why any of the absent class member's claims may diverge from those of Hardy or Monts. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have met their burden to establish typicality.
4. Adequacy 6The final requirement of Rule 23(a) is that the “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” FED.R.CIV.P. 23(a)(4). “Two criteria for determining the adequacy of representation are generally recognized: (1) the named representative must not have antagonistic or conflicting interests with the unnamed members of the class, and (2) the representative must appear able to vigorously prosecute the interests of the class through qualified counsel.” Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 117 F.3d 571, 575 (D.C.Cir.1997) (quoting Nat'l Assoc. of Regional Medical Programs, Inc. v. Mathews, 551 F.2d 340, 345 (D.C.Cir.1976)). 7There is no evidence that Plaintiffs' interests are antagonistic or in some way conflict with the interests of the unnamed class members. The Court has closely reviewed the record, and discerns no reason why named Plaintiffs would not fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Moreover, the District concedes the adequacy of plaintiffs' counsel to represent the putative class, and this Court has no reason to question that assertion either. (Dkt. No. 37 at 18). Class counsel has vigorously pursued this motion for class certification, addressing and curing the Court's concerns and moving for certification on three different occasions. The Court is satisfied that Plaintiffs and counsel have met the adequacy requirement.
5. Ascertainability

8Finally, with respect to the “Incarcerated Persons Class,” the Court previously expressed some concern that it may not be administratively feasible for a prospective plaintiff to identify himself or herself as a member of the class. Plaintiffs, however, have adequately addressed that concern in *26 their renewed motion. First, Plaintiffs have revised the definition to limit the class to those who were incarcerated at the time the notices were sent, and those who were only incarcerated by the District.See “Incarcerated Persons Class,” ¶ 6 (“At the time of mailing, the person was held by or in the custody of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections.”). Second, Plaintiffs have introduced evidence—which the District has not rebutted—reflecting that the date of a person's incarceration with the District is available on current databases. (Dkt. No. 33 at 12–13 and cited exhibits). As Plaintiffs point out, a potential class member will be able to determine, with assistance from counsel and the court, whether he/she falls within the “Incarcerated Persons Class.” The District does not contest Plaintiffs' argument that it is possible to determine administratively through the JACCS database whether a person was incarcerated by the District on a particular date. See Affidavit of Deborah Golden at Dkt. No. 33 at Ex. 27. Finally, the District does not contest Plaintiffs' contention that it is administratively feasible to cross reference that information with the signed and unsigned mail receipts that the District retained. (Dkt. No. 33 at 16). As the District conceded at oral argument on this Motion, it is possible to ascertain putative class members for the “Incarcerated Persons Class” by checking the JACCS database in conjunction with the undelivered mail receipts. This is certainly objective data on which counsel can rely in determining the members of the class. The class is, therefore, now clearly defined. B. Rule 23(b)(3) factors In addition to the requirements of subsection (a), the following factors must be met to certify a class under Rule 23(b)(3):3 (3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. The matters pertinent to these findings include: (A) the class members' interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action. FED.R.CIV.P. 23(b)(3). Although there is no bright-line rule providing guidance on how to interpret Rule 23(b)(3), two prominent commentators have both noted that the proper standard is a “pragmatic” one. See 7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, MARY KAY KANE & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1778 at 121 (3d ed. 2005) (“hereinafter Wright & Miller”) (“[T]he proper standard under Rule 23(b)(3) is a pragmatic one, which is in keeping with the basic objectives of the Rule 23(b)(3) class action.”); 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL.,

MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 23.45 (3d ed. 2007) (“[T]he Rule requires a pragmatic assessment of the entire action and all the issues involved.”). Moreover, as the Advisory Committee notes to Rule 23 explain, “[s]ubdivision (b)(3) encompasses those cases in which a class action would achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing*27 procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results.” FED.R.CIV.P. 23(b)(3), advisory committee's note.
1. Predominance 9The first requirement is that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. This requirement “tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.” Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997). After close examination of the two proposed classes, the Court is satisfied that both classes meet this requirement. Through class discovery, Plaintiffs have established by a preponderance of the evidence that, at least until approximately October 2009, the District had a custom or practice of: 1) failing to investigate whether the individual to whom an administrative forfeiture notice was being sent was incarcerated at the time the notice was mailed; and 2) failing to perform any follow up on undelivered notices. The District had ample opportunity to engage in class discovery and present evidence of its own to undermine or rebut evidence of this practice. It failed to do so. Indeed, the District does not even meaningfully contest Plaintiffs' argument that this constituted a custom or practice. 10The District argues that this Court should not certify the “Failed Notice Class” under Rule 23(b)(3) because individual questions predominate over common questions. The District relies heavily on this Court's February 28, 2012 Memorandum Opinion, in which the Court held that Plaintiffs' previous class definition (which failed to account for the change in the District's policy as of October 2009) was insufficient to meet the Rule 23(b)(3) requirements. The Court previously held that: Under Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 [126 S.Ct. 1708, 164 L.Ed.2d 415] (2006), upon which Plaintiffs rely, the individual inquiry regarding the reasonableness of the District's efforts to send notice will be fact intensive. See Jones, 547 U.S. at 234 [126 S.Ct. 1708] (stating that when notice of tax sale came back came back undelivered, the state should have taken “additional reasonable steps to notify [the appellant], if practicable to do so ” and also stating that if there were no “reasonable additional steps the government could have taken upon return of the unclaimed notice letter, it cannot be faulted for doing nothing.”) (emphasis added). The Court would, therefore, have to look into the facts of each case to determine whether it was “practicable” for the District to take any additional steps to provide notice to each plaintiff or whether such steps would have been unreasonable or futile. Dkt. No. 31 at 4–5. As Plaintiffs point out, the new “Failed Notice Class” definition addresses the Court's previous concerns about predominance. By limiting the class definition to those plaintiffs whose claims would arise prior to October 29, 2009, when the District generally neither checked to see if a notice recipient was incarcerated nor took any steps to follow up on undelivered notices, the new definitions “ensure[ ] (substantial if not complete) uniformity, and little or no individual factual inquiries.” (Dkt. No. 33 at 4).

The District's argument—that the Court will be required to make individualized inquiries into each case to determine whether it was “practicable” for the District to take any further steps with respect to any particular returned, undelivered notice—is without merit. The District has presented no evidence that, for any particular notice that was mailed and returned unsigned during the relevant period, the District actually followed up at the time and determined that it was impracticable to send any further notices. Although it is clear under Jones v. Flowers that the government cannot be faulted for doing nothing if there were no “reasonable additional steps the government could have taken,” this does not excuse the District from doing nothing at all. SeeJones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 229–30, 126 S.Ct. 1708, 164 L.Ed.2d 415 (2006) (stating that, when notice of tax sale was returned undelivered, “[d]eciding to take no further action is not what someone desirous of actually informing Jones would do ....”) (internal quotation marks omitted). As the Supreme Court held in *28 Jones, there were “several reasonable steps,” including resending the notice via regular mail, that the state could have taken when it learned that its notice went undelivered.See id. at 234–39, 126 S.Ct. 1708 (“It suffices for present purposes that we are confident that additional reasonable steps were available for Arkansas to employ before taking Jones' property.”). Plaintiffs here have presented testimony from the District's own witness that, prior to October 2009, the District took no steps to follow up on returned undelivered notices of forfeiture. The District has not presented any evidence that, for any particular claimant, it followed up and determined that there were no additional reasonable steps it could have taken. Accordingly, despite ample opportunity to present such evidence, there is no indication that this Court would be required to undergo individualized inquiries. Even assuming the District has evidence that it did follow up on any particular undelivered notice, the District can come forward with that evidence without disrupting the class action. See 7AA Wright & Miller § 1778 (“.... when one or more of the central issues in the action are common to the class and can be said to predominate, the action may be considered proper under Rule 23(b)(3) even though other important matters will have to be tried separately....”). Relying on cases distinguishable from this one, the District also argues that certification is inappropriate for the “Failed Notice Class” because of the individualized nature of any damages awards. See Dkt. No. 37 at 18–20. Those cases, however, were instances in which the damages would have required fact-intensive inquiries into each plaintiff's circumstances. See Daskalea v. Washington Humane Society, 275 F.R.D. 346, 379–81 (D.D.C.2011) (finding that nature of individualized damages inquiry counseled against certification under Rule 23(b)(3) where putative plaintiffs alleged that in several different instances, plaintiffs' pets had been seized, detained and damaged under District law without due process); Jane Does I through III v. District of Columbia, 2006 WL 2864483, at *3–4, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72681, at *9–12 (finding that damages inquiry would require mini-trials where plaintiffs were patients with mental retardation that had been forced to undergo elective surgeries for which consent was unconstitutionally given on his or her behalf). The District argues that this Court would be required to hold separate “ ‘mini-trials' since damages would depend on the amount of cash each class member had when arrested and the amount forfeited.” (Dkt. No. 37 at 19). The District's argument is without merit. As the court recognized in Jane Does I through III, “[i]f the calculation of the damage claims were a mechanical task, the presence of individualized claims would not be a barrier to class certification.”

Does, 2006 WL 2864483, at *3, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72681, at *10. Here, the damages are fixed in that the District's own records (the undelivered notices) reflect the monetary amount that each plaintiff lost. Even assuming interest were to apply to those sums, the calculation of damages claims in this case would clearly be a mechanical task. In sum, having considered the relationship between the common and individual questions for the “Failed Notice Class,” the Court is satisfied that the common questions predominate. Common questions also predominate with respect to the “Incarcerated Persons Class.” In Small v. United States, 136 F.3d 1334, 1337 (D.C.Cir.1998), this Circuit held that where the government knows or can easily ascertain that a person is incarcerated, the government has an “obligation to send adequate notice” of forfeiture to him at the jail or prison. Id. at 1337.Thus, if an individual was incarcerated at the time that the District sent him/her a notice of administrative forfeiture and the District knew or should have known of his/her incarceration, a plaintiff may be able to make out a due process claim against the District. This Court rejected Plaintiffs' previous class definition because it failed to limit the proposed class to those who were incarcerated at the time that the District sent the notice of administrative forfeiture and also failed to limit the class to those incarcerated by the District of Columbia. The Court denied Plaintiffs' motion to grant class certification because it would be required to conduct an individual assessment of whether the *29 District knew or should have known that each class member was incarcerated at the time that the District sent a forfeiture notice. Plaintiffs have cured those concerns with their most recent proposed class definition because they have limited the class to those individuals who were “held by” or “in the custody of” the District of Columbia Department of Corrections. Plaintiffs have also presented undisputed evidence that, during the relevant time period, the District was able to access an individual's incarceration status through a database system known as JACCS. (Dkt. No. 33 at Ex. 27). Beyond repeating its previous Memorandum Opinion back to this Court, the District wholly fails to specify with any particularity which individual “fact intensive” inquiries would predominate as to the newly-defined “Incarcerated Persons Class.” (Dkt. No. 37 at 11). Nor can this Court discern any. Having considered the relationship between the common and individual questions as to the “Incarcerated Persons Class,” this Court is satisfied that the common questions predominate.
2. Superiority 11In addition to finding predominance, this Court must also consider whether the class action is “superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy,” considering the factors set forth in Rule 23(b)(3)(A)–(D). Having considered and weighed those factors, the Court finds that class action is a superior form of adjudicating this controversy. This is a case with a large number of potential plaintiffs with relatively small individual dollar amounts at stake.4 A class action would certainly be more desirable than thousands of smaller suits against the District based on essentially the same operative facts and legal theories. Such actions would require the expenditure of unnecessary litigation costs and duplication of effort. Moreover, it is unlikely that putative plaintiffs with small claims could or would sue to recover those amounts individually. SeePhillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809, 105 S.Ct. 2965, 86 L.Ed.2d 628 (1985) (“Class actions also may permit the plaintiffs to pool claims which would be

uneconomical to litigate individually ... this lawsuit involves claims averaging about $100 per plaintiff; most of the plaintiffs would have no realistic day in court if a class action were not available.”). As one prominent treatise has noted, “[w]hen the claims of class members are small, denial of a class action would effectively exclude them from judicial redress .... [t]he need to provide a forum for small claimants has, therefore, assumed an important role in resolving the superiority issue.” 2 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:27 (4th ed.); see also Amchem, 521 U.S. at 616–17, 117 S.Ct. 2231(noting that Advisory Committee “had dominantly in mind vindication of the rights of groups of people who individually would be without effective strength to bring their opponents into court at all.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The District fails to make any meaningful argument why class action would not be a superior method of adjudicating this case. The District only argues in a conclusory manner that “the number of individual issues here appears to have risen to be coextensive with the number of members of the putative classes.” (Dkt. No. 37 at 20). Given the high number of claims, the relatively small amounts of damages per plaintiff, and the predominant common issues of law and fact, this Court finds that class action with respect to the two classes would be a superior method of adjudicating this controversy. A class action would, in short, achieve “economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results.”FED.R.CIV.P. 23(b)(3), advisory committee's note.
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class is granted. An Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. SO ORDERED.

 
 49 F.Supp.3d 48 United States District Court,
District of Columbia.
Anthony Hardy, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
District of Columbia, Defendant.
Case No. 1:09–cv–01062 (CRC) Signed June 20, 2014
Synopsis
Background: In class action against District of Columbia, alleging that it seized and forfeited cash from incarcerated persons without providing adequate notice under Fifth Amendment and District's forfeiture statute, parties sought final approval of proposed settlement. Holdings: The District Court, Christopher R. Cooper, J., held that: 1 reaction of class to proposed settlement was favorable, as factor supporting approval of settlement, and 2 requested award of attorney fees to class counsel, in amount of $283,333, was reasonable.
Final judgment.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT
CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER, United States District Judge
1Plaintiffs brought this class action in 2009 alleging that the District of Columbia seized and forfeited cash from them without providing adequate notice under the D.C. forfeiture statute and the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. After some five years, the parties have reached a proposed settlement and now seek its final approval by the Court. Plaintiffs have also moved for final approval of a fee award to class counsel. In December 2013, Judge Wilkins, who was previously assigned to this case, conditionally certified the class, approved the class notice procedures, and preliminarily approved both the settlement and fee award. In so doing, the Court considered the five factors to be applied in reviewing a proposed class action settlement: “(1) whether the settlement is the result of arm's-length negotiations; (2) the terms of the settlement in relation to the strength of plaintiffs' case; (3) the status of the litigation at the time of the settlement; (4) the *50 reaction of the class; and (5) the opinion of experienced counsel.” Radosti v. Envision EMI, LLC, 717 F.Supp.2d 37, 54 (D.D.C.2010). The Court found that four of the factors favored approval, but could not determine the reaction of the class to the proposed settlement because notice to the class had not yet been provided and no claims had been submitted or processed. This Court held a fairness hearing on the proposed settlement on June 19, 2014 at which the parties addressed this final factor and other issues.

2Since preliminary approval, the claims administrator and plaintiffs' counsel provided notice to and adjudicated claims submitted by class members. Notice was provided by publication in the Washington City Paper; mailing notices to all class members' last known addresses; mailing follow up notices to class members in the top third of forfeited amounts; posting notices at the D.C. jail; and maintaining a website and call number for claimants. Declaration of Matthew J. McDermott, Class Administrator, ¶¶ 4–8. Of the approximately 9,759 class members, the claims administrators processed 14.1% or 1,377 claims.Id. ¶ 11. The total approved claims represented $694,689 in forfeitures out of the $2,968,634 in forfeitures estimated for the total class. Id. Based on the proposed payment pool of $500,000, the claimants will receive approximately 72% of their forfeited monies. The claims administrators denied 126 claims as duplicative, outside the class, or deficient; six individuals opted out of the class, and no class member objected to the settlement. Id. ¶¶ 9–11. Considering these factors, the Court finds that the reaction of the class has been favorable and supports approval. The settlement payment pool to class members was fully exhausted, while claimants will receive a substantial portion of their forfeited funds. The ratio of claimants who responded to notices relative to the total class pool is comparable to that in similar cases. See, e.g., Stoner v. CBA Info. Servs., 352 F.Supp.2d 549, 552 (E.D.Pa.2005) (16% claim rate out of approximately 11,000 class members collecting claims in the several-hundred dollar range). And there have been no objections and minimal opt-outs. 3Moving to the plaintiffs' request for final approval of their attorney's fees, “[t]o evaluate whether a fee request is reasonable, a court can consider (1) the size of the fund created and the number of persons benefitted, (2) the presence or absence of substantial objections by class members to the settlement terms or fees requested by counsel, (3) the skill and efficiency of the attorneys involved, (4) the complexity and duration of litigation, (5) the risk of non-payment, (6) the time devoted to the case by plaintiffs' counsel, and (7) awards in similar cases.” Trombley v. Nat'l City Bank, 826 F.Supp.2d 179, 204 (D.D.C.2011). 4Plaintiffs request approval of their attorney's fees of $283,333, which is approximately 33% of the $855,000 total settlement payment by the District, excluding $5,000 in incentive payments to the two class representatives. Plaintiffs suggest that a one-third fee is appropriate and common in similar cases. Mot for Approval at 4. They provide a list of class actions where courts in this district approved settlement fees between 45% and 23%. Id. at 4. They also point out that if the Court considers the District's contribution of roughly $150,000 worth of contract labor to help administer the settlement, then counsel's fees decrease to 28% of the District's total contribution. Id. at 2. Counsel for the District represented at the final fairness hearing that the District would not *51 have incurred at least some of this labor expense but for the settlement. As noted above, the size of the payment pool and the percentage of class members who responded are on par with typical class action settlement awards. No class members have objected and there were few opt-outs. Nothing in the course of this ligation indicates a lack of general skill or efficiency on the part of plaintiffs' attorneys. To the contrary, counsel appears to have handled the case quite effectively. In addition, the case was reasonably complex in that it involved questions of constitutional due process and presented significant administrative burdens due to the transient nature of the class members. Class counsel also risked non-payment prior to settlement. An award

of 33% appears to be at the high end of the acceptable range, while 28% is within the mid-range of most cases. Trombley, 826 F.Supp.2d at 205–206 (“fee awards nationally appear to fall in a range of 20% to 30% of the common fund, and that the fees in this Circuit mirror those nationwide numbers .... In some cases, the percentage has been even greater.” (citing among others Radosti v. Envision EMI, LLC, 760 F.Supp.2d 73, 78 (D.D.C.2011) (awarding 33% of payment pool)). Plaintiffs' counsel calculate their totals hours at 1123.4, resulting in an approximate hourly rate of $252.21. This hourly rate is not unusual; in fact, it is rather low compared with similar cases. See Trombley, 826 F.Supp.2d at 205–206 (approving award of $3 million for approximately 1000 hours of work). Moreover, plaintiffs' counsel indicate that they expect to incur at least $6,000 in administrative expenses above the amount earmarked for such expenses in the settlement agreement, which will be paid out of their fees. Because the fee percentage relative to the award, while somewhat high in relation to similar cases, is within the range of acceptable fees, because plaintiffs' counsel have contributed considerable time to this case and appear to have handled it effectively, and because the additional costs incurred by the District and plaintiffs' counsel mitigate the fee ratio, the Court concludes that the fee is reasonable. Therefore, upon review and consideration of the Consent Motion for Final Approval of Settlement of Class Action (“Motion for Final Approval”) and the Unopposed Motion for Final Approval of Attorney's Fees, and following a final approval and fairness hearing held before the Court on June 19, 2014, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: I. FINAL APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT 1. The Court incorporates herein by reference and ratifies its prior order preliminarily approving the settlement [ECF 71] (“Preliminary Approval Order”). 2. The Court finds that the parties satisfied the notice provisions set forth in the Preliminary Approval Order. 3. The settlement received a favorable reaction from the class. The approved claim rate was 14%, which is within the expected range for this type of settlement, and included fraud protection to protect the class fund from fraudulent claims. Out of 9,759 forfeitures found to have met one of the class definitions, only 6 persons (covering 8 forfeitures) opted opt. There were no objections. 4. The Court finds that an award of fees as negotiated and set forth in the Settlement Agreement is fair and reasonable, considering the seven factors set forth in Trombley v. Nat'l City Bank, 826 F.Supp.2d 179 (D.D.C.2011). *52 5. The Court finally approves the Settlement Class Definitions: Failed Notice Class. All individuals meeting the following criteria: (1) The person was arrested by an officer of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”). (2) The MPD took cash from the person. (3) The District kept (or keeps) the person's cash (whether by storing, using, or depositing). (4) On or after June 8, 2006, and on or before May 24, 2012, the District mailed an administrative forfeiture notice to the person, but the District did not receive back a signed mail receipt. (5) The District did not re-send a notice regarding the cash upon failure to receive a signed mail receipt.

(6) The District did not within one year of the conclusion of the person's criminal case (or release without charge) file a civil forfeiture action. Jailed Notice Class. All individuals meeting the following criteria: (1) The person was arrested by an officer of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department. (2) The MPD took cash from the person. (3) The District kept (or keeps) the person's cash (whether by storing, using, or depositing). (4) The District mailed an administrative forfeiture notice to the person on or after June 8, 2006 (or before that date, but the person was in the custody of the District at the time and released from custody on or after June 8, 2006), and on or before May 24, 2012. (5) At the time of mailing, the person was held by or in the custody of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections. (6) The District did not mail or deliver an administrative forfeiture notice to the person at the place of incarceration, and did not re-send notice to the person after their release from custody. (7) The District did not within one year of the conclusion of the person's criminal case (or release without charge) file a civil forfeiture action. II. PAYMENTS 6. The Court approves payments to be disbursed as follows, in the timing and manner set forth in the Settlement Agreement ($855,000 total): a. $2,500.00 to each of the class representatives; b. $14,001.85 for attorney's expenses c. $52,665.15 to Class Action Administration, Inc. (“CAA”); d. $283,333.00 for attorney's fees; and e. $500,000.00 on approved claims. IV. FINAL JUDGMENT 7. This Order shall constitute final judgment and have res judicata and collateral effect against all class members meeting the definition(s) above, except for those persons who have opted out (listed in Exhibit 3 to the Motion for Final Approval). SO ORDERED.

 
 Case: 1:09-cv-1062 As of: 07/14/2016 01:06 PM EDT 1 of 11
CLOSED,JURY,TYPE−L
U.S. District Court District of Columbia (Washington, DC) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:09−cv−01062−CRC

HARDY et al v. GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Assigned to: Judge Christopher R. Cooper Cases: 1:13−cv−00569−CRC
1:13−cv−00686−ESH Cause: 28:1343 Violation of Civil Rights
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 06/08/2009 Date Terminated: 06/20/2014 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

ANTHONY HARDY and Members of the Class, on behalf of all others similarly situated

represented by Henry A. Escoto LAW OFFICES OF HENRY A. ESCOTO 503 D Street, NW Suite 300 Washington, DC 20001 (202) 898−4700 Fax: (202) 898−1112 Email: henry@escotolaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sean Robert Day LAW OFFICES OF SEAN ROBERT DAY 7500 Greenway Center Drive Suite 110 Greenbelt, MD 20770 (301) 220−2270 Fax: (301) 220−2441 Email: sean@dayincourt.net LEAD ATTORNEY

Plaintiff
DONNELL MONTS and Members of the Class, on behalf of all others similarly situated

represented by Henry A. Escoto (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sean Robert Day (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

represented by Douglas Stuart Rosenbloom OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Civil Litigation Division 441 4th Street, NW One Judiciary Square− 6th Floor South Washington, DC 20001 (202) 724−1342 Fax: (202) 730−0623 Email: douglas.rosenbloom@dc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 1:09-cv-1062 As of: 07/14/2016 01:06 PM EDT 2 of 11
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert C. Utiger DC OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 441 Fourth Street, NW Washington, DC 20001 (202) 442−5168 Email: robert.utiger@dc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Chad Alan Naso OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Public Interest Division, Equity Section 441 Fourth Street, NW 600 South Washington, DC 20001 (202) 724−7854 Email: chad.naso@dc.gov TERMINATED: 01/17/2013
Daniel Albert Rezneck OFFICE OF THE D.C. ATTORNEY GENERAL Commercial Division 441 4th Street NW 10th Floor South Washington, DC 20001 (202) 724−7751 Fax: (202) 727−3625 Email: daniel.rezneck@dc.gov TERMINATED: 06/29/2012
Grace Graham OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 441 Fourth Street, NW Suite 600S Washington, DC 20001 (202) 442−9784 Fax: (202) 741−8892 Email: grace.graham@dc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 06/08/2009
06/08/2009 06/08/2009 08/16/2009
08/19/2009

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ( Filing fee $ 350, receipt number 4616021303) filed by ANTHONY HARDY, DONNELL MONTS. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet)(rdj) (Entered: 06/09/2009)
Summons (2) Issued as to GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Adrian M. Fenty, Mayor). (rdj) (Entered: 06/09/2009)
2 NOTICE of Appearance by Henry A. Escoto on behalf of ANTHONY HARDY, DONNELL MONTS (rdj) (Entered: 06/09/2009)
3 RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed. GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA served on 8/5/2009, answer due 8/25/2009 (Escoto, Henry) (Entered: 08/16/2009)
4 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer or Otherwise Respond to the Complaint by GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Utiger, Robert) (Entered: 08/19/2009)

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08/19/2009
08/19/2009 09/04/2009 09/08/2009
09/21/2009 09/22/2009 09/22/2009 09/25/2009 09/28/2009 09/28/2009 09/28/2009 10/01/2009 10/01/2009 10/02/2009 10/08/2009 10/09/2009
10/09/2009

MINUTE ORDER granting 4 Defendant's Motion for Extension of Time. Defendant shall file its Answer or otherwise respond to the Complaint no later than September 25, 2009. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 8/19/09. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 08/19/2009)
Set/Reset Deadlines/Hearings: Answer to complaint due by 9/25/2009. (cdw) (Entered: 08/20/2009)
5 NOTICE of Appearance by Sean Robert Day on behalf of all plaintiffs (Day, Sean) (Entered: 09/04/2009)
6 MOTION to Certify Class by ANTHONY HARDY (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit Exhibit 6A, # 8 Exhibit Exhibit 6B, # 9 Errata Exhibit 7, # 10 Exhibit Exhibit 7A, # 11 Exhibit, # 12 Exhibit, # 13 Exhibit, # 14 Exhibit, # 15 Exhibit, # 16 Exhibit, # 17 Exhibit, # 18 Exhibit, # 19 Exhibit, # 20 Exhibit, # 21 Exhibit, # 22 Exhibit, # 23 Exhibit, # 24 Exhibit, # 25 Exhibit, # 26 Exhibit, # 27 Exhibit, # 28 Exhibit, # 29 Exhibit, # 30 Exhibit, # 31 Exhibit, # 32 Exhibit, # 33 Exhibit, # 34 Exhibit, # 35 Exhibit, # 36 Exhibit, # 37 Exhibit, # 38 Exhibit, # 39 Exhibit, # 40 Exhibit, # 41 Exhibit, # 42 Exhibit, # 43 Exhibit, # 44 Exhibit, # 45 Exhibit, # 46 Exhibit, # 47 Exhibit, # 48 Exhibit, # 49 Exhibit, # 50 Text of Proposed Order)(Escoto, Henry) (Entered: 09/08/2009)
7 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 6 MOTION to Certify Class by GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Utiger, Robert) (Entered: 09/21/2009)
MINUTE ORDER granting 7 Defendant's Motion for Extension of Time. DC shall file its opposition to Plaintiffs' motion to certify class no later than September 30, 2009. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 9/22/09. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 09/22/2009)
Set/Reset Deadlines: DC's response due by 9/30/2009. (cdw) (Entered: 09/22/2009)
8 ANSWER to 1 Complaint with Jury Demand by GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. Related document: 1 Complaint filed by ANTHONY HARDY, DONNELL MONTS.(Utiger, Robert) (Entered: 09/25/2009)
9 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify the Class by GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Utiger, Robert) (Entered: 09/28/2009)
MINUTE ORDER granting 9 DC's Consent Motion for Extension of Time. DC shall file its response to Plaintiffs' motion to certify class no later than October 2, 2009. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 9/28/09. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 09/28/2009)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Response to 6 due by 10/2/2009. (cdw) (Entered: 09/29/2009)
10 ORDER FOR INITIAL SCHEDULING CONFERENCE. The Initial Scheduling Conference is set for November 20, 2009 at 10:45 a.m. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 10/1/09. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 10/01/2009)
Set/Reset Hearings: Initial Scheduling Conference set for 11/20/2009 10:45 AM in Courtroom 2 before Judge Rosemary M. Collyer. (cdw) (Entered: 10/02/2009)
11 Memorandum in opposition to re 6 MOTION to Certify Class filed by GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1−9)(Utiger, Robert) (Entered: 10/02/2009)
12 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 6 MOTION to Certify Class by ANTHONY HARDY, DONNELL MONTS (Day, Sean) (Entered: 10/08/2009)
MINUTE ORDER granting 12 Plaintiffs' Consent Motion for Extension of Time. Plaintiffs shall file their reply to Defendant's opposition to motion for class certification no later than November 9, 2009. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 10/9/09. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 10/09/2009)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Plaintiff's Reply due by 11/9/2009. (cdw) (Entered: 10/15/2009)

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11/09/2009 11/10/2009 11/20/2009 11/20/2009
12/18/2009 12/22/2009 12/23/2009 01/11/2010 02/26/2010 03/10/2010
03/10/2010 03/10/2010 03/24/2010 04/07/2010 04/08/2010
04/14/2010

13 REPLY to opposition to motion re 6 MOTION to Certify Class filed by ANTHONY HARDY. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Eugene Brown Docket Sheet)(Escoto, Henry) Modified on 11/10/2009 to correct linkage (rdj). (Entered: 11/09/2009)
14 MEET AND CONFER STATEMENT. (Day, Sean) (Entered: 11/10/2009)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Rosemary M. Collyer: Scheduling Conference held on 11/20/2009. (Court Reporter: Crystal Pilgrim) (cdw) (Entered: 11/20/2009)
MINUTE ORDER. Pursuant to the status conference held in open Court on November 20, 2009, Defendant's oral motion to file a surreply to Plaintiffs' motion for class certification is GRANTED. Defendant shall file its surreply no later than December 21, 2009. Plaintiffs may file a response to the surreply no later than January 11, 2010. Oral argument on Plaintiffs' motion for class certification is scheduled for February 26, 2010 at 10:30 a.m. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 11/19/09. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 11/20/2009)
15 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply Sur−reply to Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification by GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Utiger, Robert) (Entered: 12/18/2009)
MINUTE ORDER granting nunc pro tunc to December 21, 2009 15 Defendant's Motion for Extension of Time. Defendant shall file its surreply no later than December 23, 2009. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 12/22/09. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 12/22/2009)
16 SURREPLY to Plaintiff's' Motion for Class Certification filed by GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Utiger, Robert) (Entered: 12/23/2009)
17 SURREPLY to re 6 MOTION to Certify Class filed by ANTHONY HARDY. (Escoto, Henry) (Entered: 01/11/2010)
NOTICE of Hearing: Oral Argument is reset for 3/10/2010 at 11:30 AM in Courtroom 2 before Judge Rosemary M. Collyer. (cdw) (Entered: 02/26/2010)
MINUTE ORDER denying without prejudice 6 Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class for the reasons stated in open Court at a hearing on March 10, 2010. No later than March 24, 2010, the parties shall file a joint proposed class discovery plan, or if the parties cannot agree on a joint proposed plan, Plaintiffs shall file their proposed class discovery plan, and Defendant shall file its response no later than April 7, 2010. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 3/10/10. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 03/10/2010)
Set/Reset Deadlines/Hearings: Class Discovery Plan due by 3/24/2010. Response due by 4/7/2010. (cdw) (Entered: 03/11/2010)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Rosemary M. Collyer: Motion Hearing held on 3/10/2010 re 6 Motion to Certify Class. (Court Reporter: Crystal Pilgrim) (cdw) (Entered: 03/11/2010)
18 MEMORANDUM re Order on Motion to Certify Class, by ANTHONY HARDY, DONNELL MONTS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit (Proposed) Notice of Deposition)(Day, Sean) (Entered: 03/24/2010)
19 RESPONSE re 18 Memorandum Regarding Plaintiff's' Proposed Discovery Plan filed by GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Utiger, Robert) (Entered: 04/07/2010)
MINUTE ORDER. Having carefully reviewed the transcript of the hearing held in open Court on March 10, 2010, the Court approves 18 Plaintiffs' Notice of Deposition Duces Tecum. If the scope of the Notice presents further issues, the parties are directed to call Chambers to schedule a telephone conference and not to file further discovery papers. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 4/8/10. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 04/08/2010)
MINUTE ORDER. Class discovery shall be completed no later than July 14, 2010. The Courtroom Deputy is directed to schedule a status conference for a date after July 14, 2010. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 4/14/10. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 04/14/2010)

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04/14/2010 04/21/2010 07/21/2010
07/21/2010 07/21/2010 08/23/2010 08/23/2010

Set/Reset Deadlines/Hearings: Class Discovery closes 7/14/2010. (cdw) (Entered: 04/15/2010)
NOTICE of Hearing: A Status Conference is set for 7/21/2010 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 2 before Judge Rosemary M. Collyer. (cdw) (Entered: 04/21/2010)
MINUTE ORDER. Pursuant to the status conference held in open court on July 21, 2010, Plaintiffs shall file a motion to certify class by no later than August 23, 2010. Defendant shall file an opposition by no later than September 27, 2010. Plaintiffs may file a reply by no later than October 12, 2010. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 7/21/2010. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 07/21/2010)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Rosemary M. Collyer: Status Conference held on 7/21/2010. (Court Reporter: Lisa Hand) (cdw) (Entered: 07/21/2010)
Set/Reset Deadlines/Hearings: Plaintiff's Motion due by 8/23/2010. Defendant's Response due by 9/27/2010. Plaintiff's Reply due by 10/12/2010. (cdw) (Entered: 07/22/2010)
20 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Motion for Class Certification by ANTHONY HARDY, DONNELL MONTS (Day, Sean) (Entered: 08/23/2010)
21 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Rosemary M. Collyer held on 7−21−10; Page Numbers: 1−12. Date of Issuance:8−23−10. Court Reporter/Transcriber Lisa Hand, Telephone number 202−354−3269, Court Reporter Email Address : lisa_hand@dcd.uscourts.gov.

For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.

NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at ww.dcd.uscourts.gov.

08/24/2010
08/24/2010 08/30/2010 09/24/2010 09/24/2010 09/24/2010

Redaction Request due 9/13/2010. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/23/2010. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/22/2010.(Hand, Lisa) (Entered: 08/23/2010)
MINUTE ORDER granting 20 Plaintiffs' consent motion for extension of time nunc pro tunc to August 23, 2010. Plaintiffs shall file a motion for class certification by no later than August 30, 2010. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 8/24/2010. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 08/24/2010)
Set/Reset Deadlines/Hearings: Plaintiff's Motion due by 8/30/2010. (cdw) (Entered: 08/25/2010)
22 MOTION to Certify Class # 2 by ANTHONY HARDY, DONNELL MONTS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Amended 1, # 2 Exhibit 3, # 3 Exhibit 7B, # 4 Exhibit 7C, # 5 Exhibit 26, # 6 Text of Proposed Order)(Day, Sean) (Entered: 08/30/2010)
23 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification by GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Utiger, Robert) (Entered: 09/24/2010)
24 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification by GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Utiger, Robert) (Entered: 09/24/2010)
MINUTE ORDER granting Defendant's consent motion for an extension of time 24 . Defendant shall file an opposition to the Plaintiffs' renewed motion to certify a class 22 by no later than October 4, 2010. Plaintiffs may file a reply by no later than October 19, 2010. Accordingly, Defendant's motion for an extension of time 23 is denied as

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09/24/2010 10/04/2010 10/19/2010 01/19/2011 02/24/2011 03/10/2011 04/19/2011
04/21/2011 01/04/2012 02/01/2012 02/15/2012
02/28/2012 02/28/2012
03/29/2012 04/03/2012 04/03/2012
04/04/2012

moot. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 9/24/2010. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 09/24/2010)
Set/Reset Deadlines/Hearings: Response to 22 due by 10/4/2010. Reply due by 10/19/2010. (cdw) (Entered: 09/27/2010)
25 Memorandum in opposition to re 22 MOTION to Certify Class # 2 filed by GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Utiger, Robert) (Entered: 10/04/2010)
26 REPLY to opposition to motion re 22 MOTION to Certify Class # 2 filed by ANTHONY HARDY, DONNELL MONTS. (Day, Sean) (Entered: 10/19/2010)
Case reassigned to U.S. District Judge Robert L. Wilkins. Judge Rosemary M. Collyer no longer assigned to the case. (ds) (Entered: 01/19/2011)
27 MOTION for Suggestion of Mootness re 22 by GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Judge Leon Opinion)(Rezneck, Daniel) Modified on 2/25/2011 modify event and add linkage(rdj). (Entered: 02/24/2011)
28 Memorandum in opposition to re 27 MOTION filed by ANTHONY HARDY, DONNELL MONTS. (Day, Sean) (Entered: 03/10/2011)
MINUTE ORDER directing Defendant to file by April 26, 2011 any Reply in support of its Motion for Suggestion of Mootness (Docket 27) or a notice indicating that Defendant does not intend to file a Reply. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 4/19/2011. (tcb) (Entered: 04/19/2011)
29 REPLY to opposition to motion re 27 MOTION filed by GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Rezneck, Daniel) (Entered: 04/21/2011)
30 NOTICE of Filing by ANTHONY HARDY, DONNELL MONTS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Letter)(Escoto, Henry) (Entered: 01/04/2012)
MINUTE ORDER: A Motion Hearing is hereby set for 2/15/2012 at 02:30 PM in Courtroom 17 before Judge Robert L. Wilkins. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 2/1/12. (lcrlw1, ) (Entered: 02/01/2012)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Robert L. Wilkins: Motion Hearing held on 2/15/2012 re Plaintiff's 22 MOTION to Certify Class and Defendant's 27 MOTION for Suggestion of Mootness re 22 MOTION to Certify Class. Motions heard and taken under advisement. (Court Reporter Annie Shaw) (tcb) (Entered: 02/15/2012)
31 MEMORANDUM OPINION re: Defendant's 27 MOTION for Suggestion of Mootness and 22 MOTION to Certify Class. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 2/28/2012. (tcb). (Entered: 02/28/2012)
32 ORDER: it is hereby: ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion to Certify Class #2 is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. If they so wish, Plaintiffs may re−file their motion within 30 days of this Order in accordance with the Courts Memorandum Opinion; and it is, FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Motion for Suggestion of Mootness is hereby DENIED. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 2/28/2012. (tcb) (Entered: 02/28/2012)
33 MOTION to Certify Class [Second Renewed] by ANTHONY HARDY, DONNELL MONTS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 26−A, # 2 Exhibit 27, # 3 Exhibit 28, # 4 Exhibit 29, # 5 Exhibit 30, # 6 Text of Proposed Order)(Day, Sean) (Entered: 03/29/2012)
NOTICE of Hearing on Motion 33 MOTION to Certify Class Second Renewed: Motion Hearing set for 6/18/2012 at 2:30 PM in Courtroom 17 before Judge Robert L. Wilkins. (tcb) (Entered: 04/03/2012)
34 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 33 MOTION to Certify Class [Second Renewed] by GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Rezneck, Daniel) (Entered: 04/03/2012)
MINUTE ORDER: Granting 34 Defendant's Motion for Extension of Time to File Response. Defendants time in which to respond to Plaintiffs' renewed motion for class

Case: 1:09-cv-1062 As of: 07/14/2016 01:06 PM EDT 7 of 11

04/26/2012 04/27/2012
05/02/2012 05/09/2012 05/10/2012 06/08/2012 06/18/2012 06/29/2012 06/29/2012 07/05/2012 08/22/2012 08/22/2012
08/29/2012 08/30/2012

certification 33 is extended to and including April 27, 2012. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 4/4/12. (lcrlw1) (Entered: 04/04/2012)
35 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 33 MOTION to Certify Class [Second Renewed] by GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Graham, Grace) (Entered: 04/26/2012)
36 ORDER granting 35 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 33 MOTION to Certify Class [Second Renewed]; and it is further ORDERED that Defendants deadline to file its opposition to Plaintiffs Third Motion for Class Certification is May 2, 2012. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 4/27/2012. (tcb) (Entered: 04/27/2012)
37 Memorandum in opposition to re 33 MOTION to Certify Class [Second Renewed] filed by GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Rezneck, Daniel) (Entered: 05/02/2012)
38 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 33 MOTION to Certify Class [Second Renewed] by ANTHONY HARDY, DONNELL MONTS (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Day, Sean) (Entered: 05/09/2012)
39 ORDER granting 38 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 33 MOTION to Certify Class [Second Renewed]; and it further ORDERED that Plaintiffs' deadline to file its reply to Defendant's Opposition is extended to June 8, 2012. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 5/10/2012. (tcb) (Entered: 05/10/2012)
40 REPLY to opposition to motion re 33 MOTION to Certify Class [Second Renewed] filed by ANTHONY HARDY, DONNELL MONTS. (Day, Sean) (Entered: 06/08/2012)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Robert L. Wilkins: Motion Hearing held and concluded on 6/18/2012 re Plaintiff's 33 MOTION to Certify Class Second Renewed; Argument Heard and this matter is taken under advisement. (Court Reporter Pat Kaneshiro−Miller) (tcb) (Entered: 06/19/2012)
41 NOTICE of Appearance by Chad Alan Naso on behalf of GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Naso, Chad) (Entered: 06/29/2012)
42 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. Attorney Grace Graham terminated. (Rezneck, Daniel) Modified on 6/29/2012 to withdraw Daniel Rezneck(rdj). (Entered: 06/29/2012)
43 NOTICE of Filing by GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA re 33 MOTION to Certify Class [Second Renewed] (Naso, Chad) (Entered: 07/05/2012)
44 MEMORANDUM AND OPINION re 33 MOTION to Certify Class [Second Renewed]. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 8/22/2012. (tcb) (Entered: 08/22/2012)
45 ORDER granting 33 MOTION to Certify Class [Second Renewed] ; and it is,FURTHER ORDERED that the parties meet and confer and submit a joint proposedorder consistent with this Courts Memorandum Opinion and FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(B) no later than Wednesday, August 29, 2012; and it is, FURTHER ORDERED that, no later than September 12, 2012, the parties shall meet and confer and file a joint proposed schedule for further proceedings. As this is a case that has been pending since 2009, the Court expects the parties to propose a schedule that will move this matter apace. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 8/22/2012. (tcb) (Entered: 08/22/2012)
46 NOTICE of Proposed Order by ANTHONY HARDY, DONNELL MONTS re 45 Order on Motion to Certify Class,, (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Day, Sean) (Entered: 08/29/2012)
MINUTE ORDER: The parties are hereby ORDERED to meet and confer and revise their Joint Proposed Order [Dkt. No. 46] to "define... the class claims, issues, or defenses" in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(B). The parties are FURTHER ORDERED to file the revised Joint Proposed Order no later than 5:00 p.m. on August 31, 2012. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 8/30/12. (lcrlw2) (Entered:

Case: 1:09-cv-1062 As of: 07/14/2016 01:06 PM EDT 8 of 11

08/31/2012
09/04/2012 09/12/2012 09/19/2012
11/15/2012 12/18/2012 12/20/2012 12/20/2012 01/17/2013 03/04/2013 03/08/2013 03/11/2013 03/13/2013
04/05/2013 04/10/2013
04/12/2013

08/30/2012)
47 NOTICE of Proposed Order by GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ANTHONY HARDY, DONNELL MONTS re 45 Order on Motion to Certify Class,, (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Day, Sean) (Entered: 08/31/2012)
48 ORDER ON CLASS CERTIFICATION. (SEE ORDER FOR FULL DETAILS). Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 9/4/2012. (tcb) (Entered: 09/04/2012)
49 MEET AND CONFER STATEMENT. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order PLAINTIFFS, # 2 Text of Proposed Order DEFENDANT)(Day, Sean) (Entered: 09/12/2012)
50 SCHEDULING ORDER: Amended Pleadings due by 7/1/2013. Discovery due by 3/12/2013. Mediation to begin March 13, 2013 and conclude by 5/4/2013. Plaintiff Rule 26a2 due by 6/7/2013. Defendant Rule 26a2 due by 7/17/2013. Summary Judgment motions due by 9/12/2013. (SEE ORDER FOR FULL DETAILS). Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 9/19/2012. (tcb) (Entered: 09/19/2012)
51 NOTICE of Appearance by Douglas Stuart Rosenbloom on behalf of GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Rosenbloom, Douglas) (Entered: 11/15/2012)
52 Consent MOTION for Protective Order by GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Rosenbloom, Douglas) (Entered: 12/18/2012)
MINUTE ORDER granting 52 Consent MOTION for Protective Order. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 12/20/2012. (tcb) (Entered: 12/20/2012)
53 PROTECTIVE ORDER setting forth procedures for handling confidential material; allowing designated material to be filed under seal. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 12/20/2012. (tcb) (Entered: 12/20/2012)
54 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. Attorney Chad Alan Naso terminated. (Naso, Chad) (Entered: 01/17/2013)
55 CASE RANDOMLY REFERRED to Magistrate Judge Alan Kay for Mediation from 3/13/2013 − 5/4/2013. (ls, ) (Entered: 03/04/2013)
56 ORDER setting a Settlement Conference for 4/19/2013, at 10:00 AM in Chambers [room 2333] before Magistrate Judge Alan Kay. Signed by Magistrate Judge Alan Kay on 03/08/13. (DM) (Entered: 03/08/2013)
57 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery on Class Identification by GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Rosenbloom, Douglas) (Entered: 03/11/2013)
58 ORDER granting 57 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery on Class Identification; and The Scheduling Order is AMENDED to EXTEND class identification discovery through Friday, April 5, 2013. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 3/13/2013. (tcb) (Entered: 03/13/2013)
59 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery (re Class Identification) by ANTHONY HARDY, DONNELL MONTS (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Day, Sean) (Entered: 04/05/2013)
60 ORDER granting 59 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery (re Class Identification); Class identification discovery deadline is extended from April 5, 2013, to April 12, 2013; and Class identification discovery will be subject to (a) supplementation if additional relevant documents or information is discovered, and/or (b) re−opening for good cause shown. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 4/10/2013. (tcb) (Entered: 04/10/2013)
MINUTE ORDER canceling the mediation set for 04/19/13, at the request of counsel, and rescheduling the mediation for 5/3/2013, at 03:00 PM in Chambers [room 2333] before Magistrate Judge Alan Kay. Signed by Magistrate Judge Alan Kay on 04/12/13. (DM) (Entered: 04/12/2013)

Case: 1:09-cv-1062 As of: 07/14/2016 01:06 PM EDT 9 of 11

05/03/2013
07/01/2013 07/02/2013 07/03/2013 07/10/2013
08/02/2013 08/14/2013 08/15/2013
08/30/2013 09/27/2013 10/01/2013
10/31/2013 11/01/2013
11/04/2013

MINUTE ORDER: Based on the advice of Magistrate Judge Kay that the parties want more time to gather data and engage in mediation, the Court hereby stays the deadlines in the Scheduling Order (Dkt. No. 50) and extends the settlement negotiation period to July 2, 2013. The parties shall file a joint status report and proposed order to govern proceedings before the end of that period. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 5/3/2013. (lcrlw4) (Entered: 05/03/2013)
61 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Mediation by ANTHONY HARDY, DONNELL MONTS (Day, Sean) (Entered: 07/01/2013)
MINUTE ORDER rescheduling Settlement Conference for 7/19/2013, at 02:00 PM in Chambers [room 2333] before Magistrate Judge Alan Kay. Please note that this new date is contingent upon the trial court's approval of an extension of mediation. Signed by Magistrate Judge Alan Kay on 07/02/13. (DM) (Entered: 07/02/2013)
MINUTE ORDER granting 61 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Mediation. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 7/3/2013. (tcb) (Entered: 07/03/2013)
MINUTE ORDER rescheduling the Settlement Conference which was previously set for 7/19/2013. The Settlement Conference is reset (at counsel's request) for 8/02/13, at 10:00 a.m. in chambers [room 2333] before Magistrate Judge Alan Kay. The parties are reminded that the mediation referral in this case was recently extended by the trial court up to and including August 2, 2013. Signed by Magistrate Judge Alan Kay on 07/10/13. (DM) (Entered: 07/10/2013)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Alan Kay: Settlement Conference held on 8/2/2013. (DM) (Entered: 08/05/2013)
62 STATUS REPORT (JOINT) by ANTHONY HARDY, DONNELL MONTS. (Day, Sean) (Entered: 08/14/2013)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon review of the parties' recent status report and their representation that they have reached a resolution of this matter in principle, the parties are directed to file a motion for preliminary settlement approval or a further joint status report by no later than September 30, 2013. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 8/15/2013. (lcrlw3) (Entered: 08/15/2013)
63 NOTICE OF RELATED CASE by GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. Case related to Case No. 13−569. (Graham, Grace) (Entered: 08/30/2013)
64 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to Submit Settlement Documents by ANTHONY HARDY, DONNELL MONTS (Day, Sean) (Entered: 09/27/2013)
MINUTE ORDER: Plaintiffs' 64 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to Submit Settlement Documents is hereby GRANTED. The parties are admonished to comply with the local rules in the future and submit a proposed order with ALL motions pursuant to Local Rule 7(c). Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 10/1/2013. (tcb) (Entered: 10/01/2013)
65 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Consent Motion For Preliminary Approval of Settlement by GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Rosenbloom, Douglas) (Entered: 10/31/2013)
66 ORDER granting 65 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Consent Motion For Preliminary Approval of Settlement; and The parties deadline to submit their motion for preliminary approval of the settlement agreement (and all supporting documents) in the above−captioned matter is extended to Monday, November 4, 2013. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 11/1/2013. (tcb) (Entered: 11/01/2013)
67 Consent MOTION for Settlement (for Preliminary Approval of Settlement of Class Action) by ANTHONY HARDY, DONNELL MONTS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 Settlement Agreement, # 2 Exhibit 1−A Mail Notice, # 3 Exhibit 1−B Publication Notice, # 4 Exhibit 1−C Claim Form, # 5 Exhibit 1−D Reminder Postcard, # 6 Exhibit 1−E Agreed Proposed Order, # 7 Exhibit 2 MPD SOP 12−06, # 8 Exhibit 3 Kriegler CV, # 9 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order)(Day, Sean) (Entered: 11/04/2013)

Case: 1:09-cv-1062 As of: 07/14/2016 01:06 PM EDT 10 of 11

11/04/2013 11/21/2013 12/09/2013
12/19/2013
12/20/2013
12/20/2013 12/20/2013 12/20/2013 12/20/2013 01/24/2014
02/07/2014 02/11/2014 04/07/2014 05/01/2014

68 Unopposed MOTION for Attorney Fees (Preliminary Approval) by ANTHONY HARDY, DONNELL MONTS (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order)(Day, Sean) (Entered: 11/04/2013)
MINUTE ORDER: The parties shall appear on December 9, 2013 in Courtroom 27A for a hearing on the pending motion for settlement at DKT # 67 . Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 11/21/2013. (tcb) (Entered: 11/21/2013)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Robert L. Wilkins: Motion Hearing held on 12/9/2013 re 67 Consent MOTION for Settlement (for Preliminary Approval of Settlement of Class Action); Parties directed to further meet and confer and submit a notice that states the parties agreement on the proposed order discussed on the record. Parties additionally to submit proposed order to the Court. (Court Reporter Chantal Geneus) (tcb) (Entered: 12/11/2013)
69 NOTICE Amending and Supplementing Documents per 12/9/13 hearing and 12/11/13 minute entry by ANTHONY HARDY, DONNELL MONTS re 67 Consent MOTION for Settlement (for Preliminary Approval of Settlement of Class Action), 68 Unopposed MOTION for Attorney Fees (Preliminary Approval) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Amended Personalized Claim Form, # 2 Exhibit Generic Claim Form, # 3 Text of Proposed Order Amended Proposed Order for Preliminary Approval of Settlement, # 4 Text of Proposed Order Amended Proposed Order for Preliminary Approval of Attorneys' Fees)(Day, Sean) (Entered: 12/19/2013)
70 NOTICE re Amended Class Notice per 12/9/13 hearing and 12/11/13 minute entry by ANTHONY HARDY, DONNELL MONTS re 67 Consent MOTION for Settlement (for Preliminary Approval of Settlement of Class Action), 69 Notice (Other),, 68 Unopposed MOTION for Attorney Fees (Preliminary Approval) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Amended Class Notice)(Day, Sean) (Entered: 12/20/2013)
71 ORDER PRELIMINARILY APPROVING PROPOSED SETTLEMENT,CONDITIONALLY CERTIFYING SETTLEMENT CLASS,AND APPROVING CLASS NOTICE.(SEE ORDER FOR FULL DETAILS). Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 12/20/2013. (tcb) (Entered: 12/20/2013)
72 ORDER PRELIMINARILY APPROVING FEE AWARD IN SETTLEMENT.(SEE ORDER FOR FULL DETAILS). Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 12/20/2013. (tcb) (Entered: 12/20/2013)
MINUTE ORDER granting 67 Consent MOTION for Settlement (for Preliminary Approval of Settlement of Class Action). Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 12/20/2013. (tcb) (Entered: 12/20/2013)
MINUTE ORDER granting 68 Unopposed MOTION for Attorney Fees (Preliminary Approval). Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 12/20/2013. (tcb) (Entered: 12/20/2013)
Case reassigned to the Calendar Committee who will oversee it until it is reassigned to another judge. Judge Robert L. Wilkins has been elevated to the U.S. Court of Appeals for DC and is no longer assigned to the case. Any questions should be directed to Terri Barrett, formerly Judge Wilkins deputy clerk, at 202−354−3179 or terri_barrett@dcd.uscourts.gov. (ztnr, ) (Entered: 01/24/2014)
73 Consent MOTION for Final Approval and Fairness Hearing Date re 71 Order by ANTHONY HARDY, DONNELL MONTS (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Day, Sean) (Entered: 02/07/2014)
74 ORDER granting 73 Consent MOTION for Final Approval and Fairness Hearing Date re 71 Order ; The Final Approval and Fairness Hearing is hereby scheduled for June 19, 2014 at 11:30 AM in Courtroom 23A. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on behalf of the Calendar Committee on 2/11/2014. (tcb) (Entered: 02/12/2014)
Case directly reassigned to Judge Christopher R. Cooper. Calendar Committee no longer assigned to the case. (gt, ) (Entered: 04/07/2014)
MINUTE ORDER: the Fairness Hearing scheduled for June 19, 2014, is VACATED and RESET for June 19, 2014 at 11:30 AM in Courtroom 27A before Judge Christopher R. Cooper. Signed by Judge Christopher R. Cooper on 5/1/2014. (lccrc1, )

Case: 1:09-cv-1062 As of: 07/14/2016 01:06 PM EDT 11 of 11

05/01/2014 06/16/2014 06/16/2014 06/17/2014 06/19/2014
06/20/2014
09/18/2014 09/22/2014

(Entered: 05/01/2014)
Set/Reset Hearings: Fairness Hearing set for 6/19/2014 at 11:30 AM in Courtroom 27A before Judge Christopher R. Cooper. (tcb) (Entered: 05/01/2014)
75 Consent MOTION for Settlement (for Final Approval of Settlement of Class Action) by ANTHONY HARDY, DONNELL MONTS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 (Class. Admin. Decl. and Exhibits), # 2 Exhibit 2 (CAFA Notice Letter), # 3 Exhibit 3 (Opt Out List), # 4 Text of Proposed Order)(Day, Sean) (Entered: 06/16/2014)
76 Unopposed MOTION for Attorney Fees (Final Approval) by ANTHONY HARDY, DONNELL MONTS (Day, Sean) (Entered: 06/16/2014)
77 ERRATA by DONNELL MONTS 75 Consent MOTION for Settlement (for Final Approval of Settlement of Class Action) filed by ANTHONY HARDY, DONNELL MONTS. (Attachments: # 1 Errata ECF 75−1 p. 6 add'l pages)(Day, Sean) (Entered: 06/17/2014)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Christopher R. Cooper: Fairness Hearing held and concluded on 6/19/2014 re Parties 75 Consent MOTION for Settlement (for Final Approval of Settlement of Class Action) and Parties 76 Unopposed MOTION for Attorney Fees (Final Approval); Arguments heard and this matter is taken under advisement. (Court Reporter Cathryn Jones) (tcb) (Entered: 06/19/2014)
78 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT re: Parties 75 Consent MOTION for Settlement (for Final Approval of Settlement of Class Action) and Parties 76 Unopposed MOTION for Attorney Fees (Final Approval);This Order shall constitute final judgment and have res judicata and collateral effect against all class members meeting the definition(s) above, except for those persons who have opted out (listed in Exhibit 3 to the Motion for Final Approval).(SEE ORDER FOR FULL DETAILS). Signed by Judge Christopher R. Cooper on 6/20/2014. (tcb) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
79 NOTICE of Letter by ANTHONY HARDY, DONNELL MONTS (tcr) (Entered: 09/18/2014)
80 NOTICE of Letter Re: Sydney Gross by ANTHONY HARDY, DONNELL MONTS (tcr) (Entered: 09/22/2014)