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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

,

DALLAS DIVISION

:',' ( t. 7 2000

------ --~

NANCY DOHERTY, CLERK

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY }

·f _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

COMMISSION,

}

}

Plaintiff,

}

CIVIL ACTION NO.

} }

3-00CV0666-T

v.

}

COMPLAINT

}

}

DALFORT AVIATION SERVICES,

}

DALFORT AEROSPACE, L.P.,

}

}

JURY TRIAL DEMAND

}

Defendants.

}

}

NATURE OF THE ACTION

This is an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, to correct

unlawful employment practices on the basis ofreligion and to make whole Eugene V. Krugh. The

Defendants violated Title VII by discriminating against Eugene V. Krugh on the basis of religion,

Seventh Day Adventist, by rescinding his offer of employment and failing or refusing to

accommodate his religious beliefs. Eugene V. Krugh was offered and accepted a position ofAirline

Mechanic Trainee with Defendants. Following the acceptance ofthe position, Defendants withdrew

the offer and refused to allow him to work an alternative schedule to resolve the conflict betweeh

a work requirement and Mr. Krugh's religious belief that he is not to work on the Sabbath. For

Seventh Day Adventists, Sabbath is from sundown Friday until sundown Saturday.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. Jurisdiction ofthis Court is invoked pursuantto 28 U.S.C. Sections 451,1331, 1337,

1343 and 1345. This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to Section 706(f)(1) and (3) ofTitle VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e5(f)(I) and (3), and Section 102 ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1991,42 U.S.c. Section 1981A.
2. The employment practices alleged to be unlawful were and are being committed within the jurisdiction ofthe United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.
PARTIES 3. The Plaintiff, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "Commission"), is an agency of the United States of America charged with the administration, interpretation and enforcement of Title VII and is expressly authorized to bring this action by Section 706(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.c. Section 2000e-5(a). 4. At all relevant times, the Defendants, have been and are now doing business in the State of Texas, and have continuously had at least fifteen employees. 5. At all relevant times, the Defendants have continuously been an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 701(b), (g) and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.c. §§ 2000e(b), (g) and (h).
STATEMENT OF CLAIMS 6. More than thirty days prior to the institution of this lawsuit, Eugene V. Krugh filed a charge with the Commission alleging violations of Title VII by the Defendants. All conditions precedent to the institution of this lawsuit have been fulfilled. 7. Since at least June 22,1999, the Defendants have engaged in unlawful employment practices in violation of Section 703(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(a). Specifically, Eugene V. Krugh responded to an advertisement for an Airplane Mechanic Trainee with the Defendants.
Page 2 of 6

8. Eugene V. Krugh completed the application and testing phase ofthe process and was interviewed for the position. During the interview, Eugene V. Krugh informed the Defendants that he could not work from sundown Friday until sundown Saturday, in accordance with his religious beliefs as a Seventh Day Adventist. The Defendants have engaged in unlawful employment practices by failing or refusing to reasonably accommodate Eugene V. Krugh's religious beliefs.
9. The effects of the practices complained of above have been to deprive Eugene V. Krugh of equal employment opportunities and to otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee because of his religious beliefs.
10. The unlawful employment practices complained of in paragraphs 7-8 above were intentional.
11. The unlawful employment practices complained of in paragraphs 7-8 above were done with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights ofEugene V. Krugh.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF Wherefore, the Commission respectfully requests that this Court: A. Grant a permanent injunction enjoining the Defendants, its officers, successors, assigns, and all persons in 'active concert or participation with them, from engaging in any employment practice which discriminates on the basis of religion and, specifically, from failing to accommodate employees' religious beliefs. B. Grant a permanent injunction enjoining the Defendants, its officers, successors, assigns, and all persons in active concert or participation with them, from subjecting their employees to retaliatory treatment in violation of Title VII. C. Order the Defendants to institute and carry out policies, practices and programs which
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-

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provide equal employment opportunities for Eugene V. Krugh which eradicate the effects of their past and present unlawful employment practices.
D. Order the Defendants to make whole Eugene V. Krugh by providing appropriate back pay with prejudgment interest, in amounts to be proved at trial, and other affirmative reliefnecessary to eradicate the effects of its unlawful practices, including but not limited to, rightful-place reinstatement and/or promotion.
E. Order the Defendants to make whole Eugene V. Krugh by providing compensation for past and future pecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful practices described in paragraphs 7-8 above, including but not limited to lost wages, relocation expenses,job search expenses, medical expenses not covered by the Defendants' employee benefit plan and other benefits in amounts to be determined at trial.
F. Order the Defendants to make whole Eugene V. Krugh by providing compensation for past and future nonpecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful practices described in paragraphs 7-8 above, including emotional pain, suffering, humiliation and inconvenience in amounts to be determined at trial.
G. Order the Defendants to pay Eugene V. Krugh punitive damages for their malice or reckless indifference described in paragraphs 7-8 above in an amount to be determined at trial.
H. Grant such further relief as the Court deems necessary and proper. 1. Award the Commission its costs in this action.
JURY TRIAL DEMAND The Commission requests a jury trial on all questions of fact raised by its complaint.

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-
Respectfully submitted,
C. Gregory Stewart
~~~.CA-NIN-O -Regional Attorney Oklahoma Bar No. 011782
SUZANNE M. ANDERSON Supervisory Trial Attorney Texas Bar No. 14009470
Senior Trial Atto ey Texas Bar No. 01493850
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Dallas District Office 207 S. Houston, Third Floor Dallas, Texas 75202 (214) 655-3328 (FAX) 655-3331
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 E.E.O.C. v. Dalfort Aerospace, L.P., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2002)

2002 WL 255486 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas
Division.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v.
DALFORT AEROSPACE, L.P., Defendant.
No. 3:00–CV–0666–P. | Feb. 19, 2002.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
SOLIS, District J.
*1 Now before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, filed August 16, 2001, and Defendant’s Response, and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, filed August 16, 2001, Plaintiff’s Response, and Defendant’s Reply. After considering the parties’ briefing and arguments, and the applicable law, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
I. Background and Procedural History Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) brought this action on behalf of Eugene Krugh, alleging that Defendant discriminated against Krugh based upon his religious beliefs. Plaintiff filed the instant action on March 27, 2000. Both Plaintiff and Defendant have moved the Court to grant summary judgment in their favor.
Krugh applied for a job with the Aviation Maintenance Technician Training Program (“Program”) with DalFort on May 27, 1999. Pl.’s App., Ex. 2.1 The Program was a 16–month training program designed to prepare candidates for certification as FAA Certificated Airframe and Powerplant Mechanics. Pl.’s App., Ex. 3, at 2. According to the Training Agreement between Defendant and the training provider, Aviation Maintenance Training, Inc. d/b/a Aeronautical Institute of Technologies (“AIT”), the costs of the Program included student tuition ($14,500.00), tools and tool box costs ($1,600.00), book costs (not to exceed $250.00), and Final Exam and Test Fees ($600.00). Pl.’s App., Ex. 3, at 2. Krugh and Defendant signed a separate Training Agreement which

stipulated that Defendant would pay 1/16 of the total tuition cost and any fees due that month upon each completion of each month of training. Pl.’s App ., Ex. 4, ¶ 2.4. This Training Agreement set up the cost of training as a loan paid to Krugh on behalf of Defendant. Id.

1

Plaintiff has filed two appendices concerning these

motions. Plaintiff’s Appendix filed with its Brief in

Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment will be

referred to as “Pl.’s App.”, while Plaintiff’s Appendix

filed with its Response to Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment will be cited to as “Pl.’s

Resp.App.” Defendant has filed a single Appendix,

referred to as “Def.’s App.”

In addition to loaning Krugh the cost of the Training Program over the 16–month period, Krugh was also to participate in the DalFort Structured Field Training Program (SFT). This program required Krugh to have three hours of on-the-job training at DalFort five days per week. Pl.’s App., Ex. 4, ¶ 3.2. This contract stated that “[t]he schedule for SFT will be set by DalFort,” and that “[f]ailure of the Trainee to comply with the SFT schedule will be grounds for dismissal from the program.” Pl.’s App., Ex. 4, ¶¶ 3.5, 3.7. Trainees were paid an hourly wage for their work pursuant to the SFT. Pl.’s App., Ex. 4 ¶ 3.4. During this time, Trainees were considered part-time temporary employees. Pl.’s App., Ex. 4 ¶ 3.6.
Krugh and Defendant agreed that the Training Agreement was a loan. The ultimate purpose of the Program was stated in the contract: “DalFort is desirous of assisting students to become licensed Aviation Maintenance Technicians with the intent that those so assisted would become employees of DalFort.” Pl.’s App., Ex. 4, ¶ 1.3. Upon 30 months of active full-time employment with DalFort, “the debt will be considered to be totally repaid.” Pl.’s App., Ex. 4, ¶ 4.4.2. The Agreement also provided that “the debt will also be considered to be fully repaid if the Trainee completes the AIT program and the DalFort SFT program and DalFort does not offer the Trainee employment within 90 days of the completion date.” Pl.’s App., Ex. 4, ¶ 4.4.4. Upon completing the Training Program and accepting full-time employment at DalFort, a Trainee’s debt to Defendant would be credited at the rate of $500.00 per month. Pl.’s App., Ex. 4, ¶ 4.4.1.
*2 The Agreement between Defendant and AIT provided that all classes would be conducted from 7:00 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. Pl.’s Ex. 3, ¶ 6. The hours available for on-the-job training pursuant to the SFT program were 2:30 until 6:30 Monday through Friday. Def.’s App. at 93 (Clark Dep.). While these were the hours set at the time of Krugh’s application to Defendant, the hours of the classroom training and the availability of on-the-job training through the SFT changed somewhat in June or July of 2000.
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E.E.O.C. v. Dalfort Aerospace, L.P., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2002)

Def.’s App. at 98–99 (Clark Dep.).
Krugh applied to DalFort to join the first training class in June of 1999. Krugh was interviewed and hired as a Trainee. During his interview, Krugh explained to the interview board that he was a Seventh–Day Adventist and his religious beliefs prohibited him from working on his Sabbath, from sundown Friday until sundown Saturday. Def.’s App. at 63 (Krugh Dep.). Krugh agreed to work any shift other than a shift that conflicted with his Sabbath. Def.’s App. at 63.
Krugh received an answering machine message offering him the job as a DalFort Trainee. Def.’s App. at 64. He also received a letter, dated June 2, 1999, confirming the job offer. Pl.’s App., Ex. 6. The letter instructed him to meet with the Training Coordinator to finalize the student agreement. Pl.’s App., Ex. 6.
Before signing the Training Agreement, Krugh met with Charles Bohannon and asked again whether his religious beliefs would pose a problem. Def.’s App. at 67 (Krugh Dep.). Krugh testified that “I point-blank asked Mr. Bohannon, ‘Would there be a problem with me being a Seventh Day Adventist?” ’ and that Mr. Bohannon replied “no .” Def.’s App. at 67. (Krugh Dep. 25:22–25). Thereafter, on June 17, 1999, Krugh signed the Training Agreement. Pl.’s App., Ex. 4.
The next day, Krugh claims he received a phone call from a DalFort representative telling him that DalFort had decided to withdraw the contract because Krugh was a Seventh Day Adventist. Pl.’s App., Ex. 14 (Krugh Dep. 28:8–15). Charles Bohannon, Defendant’s Director of Human Resources and General Counsel, testified that the reason Krugh’s contract was withdrawn was because Defendant could not accommodate Krugh’s religious beliefs because of the standard bidding provisions of the union collective bargaining agreement. Pl.’s App., Ex. 16 (Bohannon Dep.).
Full-time DalFort employees are covered by a collective bargaining agreement which sets out bidding provisions for shift assignment. The bidding provisions are based upon an employee’s seniority under the CBA. Def.’s App. at 40–43 (Bohannon Dep.). Typically, the most senior employees are able to use the bidding process to ensure that their scheduled days off correspond with the weekends. Def.’s App. at 149–50, 165–66 (Teague Dep.). Krugh would have been covered by the CBA upon becoming a full-time employee of DalFort, although he was not covered by the CBA during the 16–month training period. Pl.’s App., Ex. 5 (Clark Dep.).
*3 Now both parties have moved this Court for summary judgment. Plaintiff argues that Defendant made no attempt to accommodate Krugh’s religious beliefs. Defendant argues that no accommodation was possible,

and thus it is no liable under Title VII.
II. Summary Judgment Standard Summary judgment shall be rendered when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). All evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). The moving party bears the burden of informing the district court of the basis for its belief that there is an absence of a genuine issue for trial, and of identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate such an absence. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
Once the moving party has made an initial showing, the party opposing the motion must come forward with competent summary judgment evidence of the existence of a genuine fact issue. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The party defending against the motion for summary judgment cannot defeat the motion unless he provides specific facts that show the case presents a genuine issue of material fact, such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict in his favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Mere assertions of a factual dispute unsupported by probative evidence will not prevent summary judgment. Id. at 248–50; Abbot v. Equity Group, Inc., 2 F.3d 613, 619 (5th Cir.1993). In other words, conclusory statements, speculation and unsubstantiated assertions will not suffice to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1429 (5th Cir.1996) (en banc). If the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to is case, and on which he bears the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23.
Finally, the Court has no duty to search the record for triable issues. Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir.1998). “The party opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate the precise manner in which the evidence supports his or her claim.” Id. A party may not rely upon “unsubstantiated assertions” as competent summary judgment evidence. Id.
IV. Title VII Claim Title VII prohibits religious discrimination in employment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a).2 An employer engages in an unfair employment practice if he discriminates against an
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E.E.O.C. v. Dalfort Aerospace, L.P., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2002)

employee because of any aspect of his religious practices or beliefs, unless the employer shows that it cannot “reasonably accommodate” the employee’s religious needs without “undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).3

2

Title 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2(a)(1) provides: “It shall be

an unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1)

to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,

or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with

respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment, because of such individual’s

race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”

3

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(j) provides: (j) The term “religion”

includes all aspects of religious observance and

practice, as well as belief, unless an employer

demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably

accommodate to an employee’s or prospective

employee’s religious observance or practice without

undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s

business.

*4 A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of religious discrimination when he demonstrates: (1) that he has a bona fide religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement; (2) that he informed his or her employer of this belief; and (3) that he suffered an adverse employment decision because of failure to comply with the conflicting employment requirement. See, e.g., Turpen v. MissouriKan.-Tex.R.R. Co., 736 F.2d 1022, 1026 (5th Cir.1984); Brener v. Diagnostic Center Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 144 (5th Cir.1982); Glovinsky v. Cohen, 983 F.Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C.1997). The Fifth Circuit has held that the adverse employment decision must be an “ultimate employment decision.” Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781–82 (5th Cir.1995). If, and when, the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden then shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that it is unable to reasonably accommodate the plaintiff’s needs without suffering undue hardship. Turpen, 736 F.2d at 1026; Brener, 671 F.2d at 144.

Title VII does not require that the accommodation process infringe on the rights of the plaintiff’s fellow employees, for, as the Supreme Court explained in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison:

The repeated, unequivocal

emphasis of both the language and

the legislative history of Title VII is

on eliminating discrimination in

employment,

and

such

discrimination is proscribed when it

is directed against majorities as

well as minorities.... It would be

anomalous to conclude that by

“reasonable

accommodation”

Congress meant that an employer

must deny the shift and job

preference of some employees, as

well as deprive them of their

contractual rights, in order to

accommodate or prefer the

religious needs of others, and we

conclude that Title VII does not

require an employer to go that far.

432 U.S. 63, 81 (1977). An accommodation that would force other employees, against their wishes, to modify their work schedules to accommodate the religious beliefs of the complaining employee would be unreasonable and an undue hardship. See Eversley v. MBank Dallas, 843 F.2d 172, 176 (5th Cir.1988). Nor is the employer required to bear more than a de minimis cost in order to accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84. Title VII does not require the employer to choose any particular form of reasonable accommodation, or demonstrate that the plaintiff’s alternative forms of accommodation would result in undue hardship. See Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68–69 (1986). Title VII dictates that “any reasonable accommodation by the employer is sufficient to meet its accommodation obligation.” Id. at 68. While the statutory burden to accommodate rests with the employer, “the employee has a correlative duty to make a good faith attempt to satisfy his needs through means offered by the employer.” Brener, 671 F.2d at 146.

The controversy in this case is whether Defendant was required to attempt any accommodation, or if it was permissible for Defendant to conclude that no accommodation was possible and dismiss Krugh without offering any accommodation. Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff has set out a prima facie case of discrimination. Rather, the outcome of this case hinges on whether any accommodation was possible. The EEOC argues that because Defendant fired Krugh without attempting to accommodate his religious beliefs, the Court should hold that Defendant, as a matter of law, discriminated against Krugh because of his religious beliefs. Defendant maintains that because there was no possible accommodation, Defendant is not subject to liability.

*5 As noted above, the Supreme Court has emphasized that what is required by an employer is reasonable accommodation. See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 81. In some circumstances, courts have allowed defendant employees to be absolved of liability where no possible accommodation is available. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently affirmed this proposition. In Weber v. Roadway Express, Inc., the court noted that the defendant “was entitled to summary judgment even
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E.E.O.C. v. Dalfort Aerospace, L.P., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2002)

though it failed to make an effort to accommodate” and that the employer is not required to show a good faith effort to accommodate where “the employer can show that any accommodation would impose an undue burden.” 199 F.3d 270, 275 (5th Cir.2000) (emphasis added). See also Toledo v. Nobel–Sysco, Inc., 892 F.2d 1481, 1489 (10th Cir.1989) (“[I]t is certainly conceivable that particular jobs may be completely incompatible with particular religious practices. It would be unfair to require employers faced with such irreconcilable conflicts to attempt futilely to resolve them. Employers faced with such conflicts should be able to meet their burden by showing that no accommodation is possible.”); Heller v. Ebb Auto Co. 8 F.3d 1433, 1440 (9th Cir.1993).
Here, Defendant DalFort argues that there was no possible accommodation of Krugh’s religious beliefs. There would not have been a problem accommodating Krugh during the 16–month training period because the classes were scheduled in the mornings and because the on-the-job training allowed for flexible scheduling. However, upon completing the 16–month training period, Krugh would have become a full-time employee covered by the collective bargaining agreement. Defendant maintains that to accommodate Krugh’s requests for leave on his Sabbath would have violated the collective bargaining agreement. Upon completion of the training period, Krugh would need to begin to repay DalFort for the costs of his training. The religious conflict, Defendant argues, would have made it impossible for Krugh to work as a full-time employee for DalFort and would have prevented DalFort from recouping the training costs it expended on Krugh’s behalf.
The Fifth Circuit and other courts have held repeatedly that where seniority bidding provisions in collective bargaining agreements conflict with the religious beliefs of an employee so that no accommodation is possible, an employer will not be liable for its failure to accommodate. The Supreme Court held that the operation of a seniority system that prevented an employee’s religious beliefs from being accommodated was acceptable. The Court found that while “neither a collective-bargaining contract nor a seniority system may be employed to violate [Title VII] ... the duty to accommodate [does] not require [an employer] to take steps inconsistent with the otherwise valid agreement.” Hardison, 432 U.S. at 79. See also Brener, 671 F.2d at 146.
Defendant posits that the conflict here is identical to that faced by the Supreme Court in Hardison; that is, Defendant cannot accommodate Krugh’s religious beliefs within the context of the seniority bidding provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. To make this determination, the Court examines Plaintiffs proffered alternatives to see if any accommodation was possible in light of the union agreement and the shift-allocating measures.

*6 Plaintiff tries to show that Defendant could have accommodated Krugh in several ways. Specifically, Plaintiff points to several potential solutions to the conflict between Krugh’s religious beliefs and the collective bargaining agreement. Such a showing would demonstrate that Defendant failed to reasonably accommodate Krugh’s Sabbath observation. However, considering the Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court precedent affirming existing agreements in the face of potential religious discrimination, Plaintiff’s showing here fails.
Plaintiff argues that there is an issue of fact as to whether or not it was possible for Defendant to accommodate Krugh’s religious beliefs. Plaintiff argues that although the collective bargaining agreement governs the shift bidding provisions, alternatives exist which would have been acceptable accommodations that did not violate the terms of the union agreement. Plaintiff argues that Krugh could have worked a variety of shifts, including longer shifts, and the EEOC points to Article 9, Section A1–2 of the CBA. Pl.’s Resp.App., Ex. B. Plaintiff argues that Krugh could have traded shifts with different employees, pursuant to Article 9, Section A4 of the CBA. Id. Further, Plaintiff points to a 30 minute rest period and argues that Krugh could have left early or arrived late. Id. (Article 9, Section B3). Plaintiffs point to the possibility of allowing Krugh to take temporary assignments or vacancies. Pl.’s Resp.App., Ex. A (Bohannon Dep.). Plaintiff points to Krugh’s willingness to work any shift but the Friday evening or Saturday afternoon shift and conclude that any hardship upon Defendant would be de minimis.
However, Defendant refutes all of these possibilities, and argues that affording Krugh special treatment because of his Sabbath observation would have lead to repeated union grievance proceedings and conflict with the union based on real or perceived violations of the collective bargaining agreement. Plaintiff never contends with Defendant’s basic argument: providing Krugh with special treatment would conflict with the seniority bidding provision of the collective bargaining agreement. Defendant provides evidence that the union would object to the possibilities raised by Plaintiff. Def .’s App. at 129–30 (Branch Dep.).
The Court finds that Defendant did not have to offer potential accommodations to Krugh. “The mere possibility of an adverse impact on co-workers ... is sufficient to constitute an undue hardship.” Weber, 199 F.3d at 274. Plaintiff has not shown any accommodation that would not potentially conflict with the collective bargaining agreement, and Defendant has demonstrated that any accommodation would be likely to conflict with the seniority provisions of the agreement. Therefore, the Court finds that as a matter of law, Defendant did not have a duty to attempt to accommodate Krugh’s religious
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E.E.O.C. v. Dalfort Aerospace, L.P., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2002)

beliefs. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
V. DalFort’s Request for Attorney’s Fees *7 Finally, Defendant requests that the Court award attorney’s fees to Defendant because the EEOC’s claim is frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. Although the

Court grants Defendant’s motion, the Court does not find that Plaintiff’s position is so lacking in merit as to justify an award of attorney’s fees. Therefore, Defendant’s request is DENIED.
It is so ordered.
	  

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ADR, CLOSED, JURY, SANDERSON
U.S. District Court Northern District of Texas (Dallas) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:00-cv-00666

EEOC v. Dalfort Aerospace LP, et al Assigned to: Judge Jorge A Solis Demand: $0 Cause: 42:2003 Job Discrimination Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
V.

Date Filed: 03/27/2000 Date Terminated: 02/19/2002 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Plaintiff
represented by Robert A Canino, Jr Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Dallas District Office 207 S Houston 3rd Floor Dallas, TX 75202 214/253-2750 Email: robert.canino@eeoc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Suzanne M Anderson Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Dallas District Office 207 S Houston 3rd Floor Dallas, TX 75202 214/253-2740 Fax: 214/253-2749 FAX Email: suzanne.anderson@eeoc.gov
William C Backhaus Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Dallas District Office 207 S Houston 3rd Floor Dallas, TX 75202 214/253-2742 Fax: 214/253-2749 FAX Email: william.backhaus@eeoc.gov

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Defendant Dalfort Aviation Services TERMINATED: 01/30/2002
Defendant Dalfort Aerospace LP

represented by Durwood D Crawford Goins Underkofler Crawford & Langdon Renaissance Tower 1201 Elm St Suite 4800 Dallas, TX 75270 214/969-5454 Fax: 214/969-5902 FAX Email: durwoodc@gucl.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 03/27/2000 03/27/2000 03/27/2000 04/03/2000 04/19/2000 05/04/2000
05/19/2000 05/23/2000
05/23/2000

#

Docket Text

1 COMPLAINT filed; (5) (alh) (Entered: 03/28/2000)
1 DEMAND for jury trial by plaintiff EEOC (5) (alh) (Entered: 03/28/2000)
PRELIMINARY ASSIGNMENT TO Magistrate Judge Wm F Sanderson Jr (alh) (Entered: 03/28/2000)
2 SUMMONS(ES) issued for defendant Dalfort Aviation Svc (ISS-1) (alh) (Entered: 04/04/2000)
3 ANSWER to Complaint by defendant Dalfort Aerospace LP (Attorney Durwood D Crawford), (5) (alh) (Entered: 04/19/2000)
4 ORDER DIRECTING THE CONVENING OF A LITIGATION PLANNING MEETNG AND REQUIRING PROPOSAL for Contents of Scheduling Order. See Order for specifics signed by RBM) Copies to counsel: 5/4/00 Page(s): 3 (jas) (Entered: 05/04/2000)
5 Joint STATUS REPORT by defendant Dalfort Aviation Svc, defendant Dalfort Aerospace LP (5) (jas) (Entered: 05/22/2000)
6 SCHEDULING ORDER setting Joining of Parties on 10/20/00 ; Amending of Pleadings on 10/20/00 ; Discovery cutoff 6/18/01 ; Deadline for filing of dispositive motions 8/16/01 ; Proposed pretrial order due 1/2/02 ; Pretrial conference for 11:00 2/1/02 ; Jury trial set for 10:00 3/4/02;...see order for specifics ( signed by Judge Maloney) Copies to counsel: 5/24/00 Page(s): 3 (lch) (Entered: 05/24/2000)
6 ORDER that mediation is required and shall be completed no later than January 18, 2001. Requested by: court ( Signed by Judge Maloney) Copies to counsel: 5/24/00 Page(s): 3 (lch) (Entered: 05/24/2000)

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08/15/2001 08/15/2001 08/16/2001 08/16/2001 08/16/2001 08/16/2001 09/04/2001 09/04/2001 09/05/2001 09/05/2001 09/05/2001 09/21/2001 01/30/2002 01/30/2002

7 ORDER REASSIGNING CASE to Judge Jorge A. Solis per Special Order No. 3-191. Case shall henceforth carry suffix letter "P". (signed by JB) Copies to counsel: 08.30.00 Page(s): 7 (alh) (Entered: 08/30/2000)
8 REVISED SCHEDULING ORDER setting Jury trial set for 9:00 3/4/02 ; Pretrial conference for 9:00 2/15/02 ; Joining of Parties on 10/20/00 ; Amending of Pleadings on 10/20/00 ; Discovery cutoff 6/18/01 ; Deadline for filing of dispositive motions 8/16/01 ; Proposed pretrial order due 2/8/02 ; ( signed by jas) Copies to counsel: 9.15.00 Page(s): 2 (mlh) (Entered: 09/15/2000)
9 JOINT STATUS REPORT SETTING FORTH STATUS OF SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS by plaintiff EEOC, defendant Dalfort Aviation Svc, defendant Dalfort Aerospace LP. (3) (lmr) (Entered: 07/03/2001)
11 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM by plaintiff EEOC in support of [10-1] motion for summary judgment. (15+) (jaw) (Entered: 08/16/2001)
12 APPENDIX by plaintiff EEOC in support of [10-1] motion for summary judgment. (15+)(USC/Not imaged.) (jaw) (Entered: 08/16/2001)
10 MOTION by plaintiff EEOC for summary judgment . (3) (jaw) (Entered: 08/16/2001)
13 MOTION by defendant Dalfort Aerospace LP for summary judgment . (2) (jaw) (Entered: 08/17/2001)
14 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM by defendant Dalfort Aerospace LP in support of [13-1] motion for summary judgment. (15+) (jaw) (Entered: 08/17/2001)
15 APPENDIX by defendant Dalfort Aerospace LP in support of [13-1] motion for summary judgment. (15+)(USC/Not imaged.) (jaw) (Entered: 08/17/2001)
16 RESPONSE by defendant Dalfort Aerospace LP to [10-1] motion for summary judgment. (2) (lmr) (Entered: 09/05/2001)
17 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM by defendant Dalfort Aerospace LP in support of [16-1] motion response.(9) (attachments not imaged) (lmr) (Entered: 09/05/2001)
18 RESPONSE by plaintiff EEOC to [13-1] motion for summary judgment. (3) (lmr) (Entered: 09/06/2001)
19 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM by plaintiff EEOC in support of [18-1] motion response. (15+) (lmr) (Entered: 09/06/2001)
20 APPENDIX by plaintiff EEOC in support of [18-1] motion response. (15+)(not imaged)(usc) (lmr) (Entered: 09/06/2001)
21 REPLY BRIEF by defendant Dalfort Aviation Svc to response to [13-1] motion for summary judgment.(7) (lmr) (Entered: 09/24/2001)
22 UNOPPOSED MOTION by plaintiff EEOC to amend caption .(4) (lmr) Modified on 01/31/2002 (Entered: 01/31/2002)
23 ORDER granting [22-1] motion to amend caption. For all future purposed the caption should reflect as amended so to name only Dalfort Aerospace LP as the Defendant.(see order for specifics) ( Signed by Judge Jorge A. Solis ) Copies to

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District Version 3.0.3 - Docket Report

https://ecf.txnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?186011671311948-L_3...

02/19/2002
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counsel: 01/31/02 Page(s) 1 (lmr) (Entered: 01/31/2002)
24 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying [10-1] motion for summary judgment, granting [13-1] motion for summary judgment. The Court grants Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and denies Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. Finally, Defendant requests that the Court award attorney's fees to Defendant because the EEOC's claim is frivolous, unreasonalbe, or groundless. Although the Court grants Defendant's motion, the Court does not find that Plaintiff's position is so lacking in merit as to justify an award of attorney's fees. Therefore, defendants request is DENIED.(see order for specifics) ( Signed by Judge Jorge A. Solis ) Copies to counsel: 02/21/02 Page(s): 12 (lmr) (Entered: 02/21/2002)
25 FINAL JUDGMENT..It is ordered that Plaintiff takes nothing from its claims against Defendants Dalfort Aerospace LP. Accordingly, costs incurred by Defendants shall be assessed against Plaintiff.(see order for specifics) ( Signed by Judge Jorge A. Solis ) Copies to counsel: 02/21/02 Page(s): 1 (lmr) (Entered: 02/21/2002)
Case closed (lmr) (Entered: 02/21/2002)

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