case

~-CAN document 1-1 filed 08/i~2005 page 1 of 6

FILED

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIAN{~ ~[/1~ -~
SOUTH BEND DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

COMMISSION,

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

No

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3 :

FISERV INC. and FISERV SOLUTIONS )

COMPLA~T

/IS

INC. d/b/a MORTGAGESERV,

)

)

JURY T~AL DEMAND

Defendants.

)

.)

NATURE OF THE ACTION

This is an action under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and Title I

of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to correct unlawful employment practices on the basis of

disability and to provide appropriate relief to Jeffrey Stahl who was adversely affected by such

practices. As alleged with greater particularity in paragraph 11 below, the Commission alleges that Respondents failed to provide Jeffrey Stahl (who has cerebellar degeneration of unknown origin) with the same terms and conditions of employment, with or without reasonable accommodation, that it provided to other non-disabled employees.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 1. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § § 451, 1331, 1337, 1343 and 1345. This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to Section 107(a) of the

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a), which incorporates by reference Sections 706(f)(1) and (3) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-5(f)(1) and (3) and Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C.

case

~-CAN document 1-1 filed 08{1~2005 page 2 of 6

"§ 1981a. 2.

The employment practices alleged to be unlawful were and are now being

committed within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Northern District of

Indiana, South Bend Division.

PARTIES

3. Plaintiff, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "Commission"), is

the agency of the United States of America charged with the administration, interpretation and

enforcement of Title I of the ADA and is expressly authorized to bring this action by Section

107(a) of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a), which incorporates by reference Sections 706(t")(1)

and (3) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) and (3).

4. At all relevant times, Defendant, Fiserv Inc. ("Fiserv"), has continuously been a

Wisconsin Corporation doing business in the State of Wisconsin and the City of Brookfield, and

has continuously had at least 15 employees.

5. At all relevant times, Fiserv has continuously been an employer engaged in an

industry affecting commerce under Section 101(5) of the ADA, 42 U.S.C.§ 12111(5), and

Section 101(7) of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(7), which incorporates by reference Sections

701(g) and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(g) and (h).

6. At all relevant times, Fiserv has been a covered entity under Section 101 (2) of the

ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2). 7. At all relevant times, Defendant, Fiserv Solutions Inc. d/b/a MortgageServ

("MortgageServ"), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Fiserv, has continuously been a Wisconsin

Corporation doing business in the State of Indiana and the City of South Bend, and has

case 3:05-cv-0046~. ~-CAN document 1-1 filed 08{1~2005 page 3 of 6
"continuously had at least 15 employees. 8. At all relevant times, MortgageServ has continuously been an employer engaged
in an industry affecting commerce under Section 101 (5) of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (5), and Section 101 (7) of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (7), which incorporates by reference Sections 701(g) and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(g) and (h).
9. At all relevant times, MortgageServ has been a covered entity under Section 101(2) of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2).
STATEMENT OF CLAIMS 10. More than thirty days prior to the institution of this lawsuit, Jeffrey Stahl filed a charge with the Commission alleging violations of Title I of the ADA by Defendant MortgageServ. All conditions precedent to the institution of this lawsuit have been fulfilled. 11. Since approximately May 2003, Defendants have engaged in unlawful employment practices at MortgageServ’s South Bend Indiana facility, in violation of Section 102 (a) of Title I of the ADA, 42 U.S.C.§ 12112(a). These practices include Defendants’ refusal to afford Jeffrey Stahl the same terms and conditions of employment as non-disabled employees (remote work), with or without reasonable accommodation. 12. The effect of the practices complained of in paragraph 11 above has been to deprive Jeffrey Stahl of equal employment opportunities and otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of his disability. 13. The unlawful employment practices complained of in paragraph 11 above were and are intentional.

case 3:05-cv-0046~. ~-CAN document 1-1 filed 08{1~2005 page 4 of 6
14. The unlawful employment practices complained of in paragraph 11 above were and are being done with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of Jeffrey Stahl.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF Wherefore, the Commission respectfully requests that this Court: A. Grant a permanent injunction enjoining Defendants, their officers, successors, assigns, and all persons in active concert or participation with them, from engaging in disability discrimination and any other employment practice which discriminates on the basis of disability. B. Order Defendants to institute and carry out policies, practices, and programs which provide equal employment opportunities for qualified individuals with disabilities, and which eradicate the effects of their past and present unlawful employment practices. C. Order Defendants to make whole Jeffrey Stahl by providing appropriate backpay with prejudgment interest, in amounts to be determined at trial, and other affirmative relief necessary to eradicate the effects of their unlawful employment practices, including but not limited to reinstatement as a remote employee. D. Order Defendants to make whole Jeffrey Stahl by providing compensation for past and future nonpecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful practices complained of in paragraph 11 above, including emotional pain, suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, and humiliation, in amounts to be determined at trial. E. Order Defendants to pay Jeffrey Stahl punitive damages for their malicious and reckless conduct, as described in paragraph 11 above, in amounts to be determined at trial. F. Grant such further relief as the Court deems necessary and proper in the public

case 3:05-cv-0046<. ~-CAN document 1-1 filed 08{[~2005 page 5 of 6
interest. G. Award the Commission its costs of this action. JURY TRIAL DEMAND The Commission requests a jury trial on all questions of fact raised by its complaint.
Respectfully submitted,
ERIC S. DREIBAND General Counsel JAMES L. LEE Deputy General Counsel GWENDOLYN YOUNG REAMS Associate General Counsel EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 1801 L Street, N.W. WashinNton D.C. 20507//
k/Regional Attorne~¢/ ~
MIll;HELLE EISELE, # 12070-49 Supervisory Trial Attorney
NANCY DEAN EDMONDS Senior Trial Attorney
5

case 3: 05-cv-004691~-CAN document 1-1 filed 08{1~2005 page 6 of 6
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Indianapolis District Office 101 W. Ohio St., Suite 1900 Indianapolis, IN 46204-4203 Phone: (317) 226-7229 Fax: (317) 226-5571 E-mail: Nancy.Edmonds@eeoc.gov

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
v.
FISERV, INC., and FISERV SOLUTIONS, INC.,
Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

CAUSE NO. 3:05-cv-469 AS

)

)

)

)

)

ORDER AND OPINION

Plaintiff, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), filed this action on

August 4, 2005, alleging that Defendants, Fiserv, Inc, and Fiserv Solutions Inc. (collectively

“Fiserv”), engaged in discriminatory employment practices in violation of the Americans with

Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a). On February 9, 2006, in compliance

with N.D. L.R. 37.1, the EEOC filed a motion to compel answers to its interrogatories and

requests for production. On February 24, 2006, Fiserv served its discovery responses. On April

12, 2006, this Court conducted an in-court hearing on the EEOC’s motion. For the following

reasons, the EEOC’s motion to compel [Doc. No. 17] is GRANTED.

I.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND

On August 4, 2005, the EEOC filed this action against Fiserv alleging that since May

2003, Fiserv has refused to afford Jeffrey Stahl the same terms and conditions of employment as

non-disabled employees, with or without reasonable accommodations. On November 9, 2005,

the EEOC served its discovery requests on Fiserv. Upon request of defense counsel, the EEOC

granted Fiserv a two week extension to serve their responses. (Edmonds’ Affidavit ¶ 4).

According to Edmonds’ uncontested affidavit, during a January 26, 2006 telephone conversation, defense counsel promised to provide the discovery responses by February 6, 2006, at the latest. (Edmonds’ Affidavit ¶ 6). However, Fiserv failed to provide the responses on this date. As a result, on February 9, 2006, and in compliance with N.D. L.R. 37.1, the EEOC filed a motion to compel answers to its interrogatories and requests for production. On February 24, 2006, four days before their response to the motion to compel was due, Fiserv finally served their discovery responses on the EEOC. Fiserv argues that the EEOC’s motion was moot because they had complied with the discovery requests and that it would therefore, be inappropriate to award fees.
On March 8, 2006, the EEOC filed its reply, asserting that it was still seeking fees. Furthermore, the EEOC argues that the answers to the interrogatories are incomplete because Fiserv’s objections of relevancy, vagueness, attorney-client privilege, and work product doctrine have either been waived or are not justified. As a result of the ongoing discovery dispute, this Court conducted an in-court hearing on the EEOC’s motion on April 12, 2006. This Court may rule on the pending motion to compel pursuant to its referral order and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). II. LEGAL AUTHORITY
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (b)(1) permits discovery into "any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party." Relevant information need not be admissible at trial so long as the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (b)(1). For the purpose of discovery, relevancy will be construed broadly to encompass "any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter[s] that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case." Chavez v. Daimler Chrysler, 206
2

F.R.D. 615, 619 (S.D. Ind. 2002) (quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351(1978)).
This Court has broad discretion when deciding whether to compel discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c); Sattar v. Motorola, Inc., 138 F.3d 1164, 1171 (7th Cir. 1998) ("[D]istrict courts have broad discretion in matters related to discovery."); Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 95 F.3d 492, 495-96 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The district court exercises significant discretion in ruling on a motion to compel."). In ruling on a motion to compel, "a district court should independently determine the proper course of discovery based upon the arguments of the parties." Gile, 95 F.3d at 496.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4) states that if the motion to compel is granted, or if the disclosures or requested discovery is provided after the motion was filed, the court shall, after affording an opportunity to be heard, require the party whose conduct necessitated the motion to pay the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion (emphasis added). III. ANALYSIS
Although Fiserv has now provided discovery responses, the EEOC is still seeking its attorneys’ fees associated with bringing the motion to compel. In addition, the EEOC argues that Fiserv’s responses are insufficient because they contain numerous objections. The EEOC asserts that Fiserv has waived these objections by failing to timely raise them or that the objections are nonetheless meritless.
A. Attorneys’ Fees At the hearing, the EEOC argued that it was entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4) because Fiserv did not provide the discovery responses until after the motion to
3

compel was filed. Rule 37(a)(4) requires this Court to award the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion unless the opposing party’s non-disclosure was substantially justified. The record reveals that Fiserv was not substantially justified in its delay.
At the hearing, Fiserv’s counsel attempted to justify her delay because she was extremely busy with her other cases and that it was difficult to get the requested information from her client. Counsel also indicated that she thought there was an agreement with opposing counsel that would allow additional time to provide the discovery responses. The difficult task for the Court is to determine the facts when there are conflicts between counsel. Usually it becomes a test of dueling contentions, the proverbial “she said, she said” argument. However, in this case, the EEOC’s counsel submitted an affidavit in support of its motion. Fiserv’s counsel did not. As such, this Court will treat the facts contained in the Plaintiff’s counsel’s affidavit as unrebutted and will assume they are true.
As a result, the explanation offered by Fiserv’s counsel is insufficient to constitute substantial justification. Simply put, when served with interrogatories, Fiserv’s counsel had three options: 1) answer them within the required time period, 2) negotiate an agreement with opposing counsel for an enlargement of time to answer, and 3) if all else fails, file a motion for an enlargement of time. Fiserv’s counsel did none of these. Fiserv’s counsel’s conduct was dilatory, not diligent. And when the answers to the interrogatories were finally provided to the EEOC’s counsel, they were laced with objections which at the hearing Fiserv’s counsel admitted were baseless. As a result, there is no justification for Fiserv’s delay and the EEOC is entitled to its costs associated with bringing the motion.
4

At the hearing this Court tried to determine whether the delay was caused by Fiserv or Fiserv’s attorney. Fiserv’s counsel informed this Court that is was “a little of both.” Because it appears that both defense counsel and Fiserv are equally responsible for the delay in the discovery responses, defense counsel and Fiserv are jointly liable for the EEOC’s reasonable expenses incurred in making this motion. The EEOC has until April 28, 2006, to file a statement of its costs associated with bringing the motion to compel. Fiserv has until May 5, 2006, to file any objections to the statement.
B. Fiserv’s Responses are Insufficient The EEOC also argues that the responses that Fiserv has provided are deficient because Fiserv has waived the right to object and that the objections are meritless. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4) states that any grounds for an objection must be timely made or they are waived. Because Fiserv failed to timely respond to the discovery requests, any objections are now waived. In addition, Fiserv has objected to the discovery requests based on relevancy, vagueness, attorney-client privilege, and work product doctrine. Because Rule 26 requires liberal discovery, Fiserv’s objections of relevancy and vagueness are without merit. Furthermore, Fiserv admitted at the hearing that none of the requested documents are covered by the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine. Consequently, Fiserv should provide complete responses to the EEOC’s discovery requests. This Court notes that the EEOC specifically pointed to Fiserv’s deficient answers to the interrogatories. Fiserv contends that they have answered the questions to the best of their ability and it is not their fault if the EEOC does not understand the responses. This Court is deeply
5

troubled by this response, especially after reviewing the interrogatories. Fiserv merely states that they never employed Jeffrey Stahl and is therefore, not a proper party to this lawsuit. This answer is not responsive to the question. While Fiserv may feel that they are not proper parties to the lawsuit, this is an argument to be raised in a proper dispositive motion, but is not the basis for a discovery objection. Fiserv may assert the defense, but should still provide responsive information. As a result, the EEOC’s motion to compel is granted. Fiserv has until May 5, 2006, to serve the EEOC with supplemental discovery responses which conform with this Court’s order.
As stated in open court, this order resolves the issues that are currently pending before this Court. Upon receiving the supplemental responses, if discovery disputes remain, either party may file the appropriate motion after complying with N.D. L.R. 37.1. IV. CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, this Court GRANTS the EEOC’s motion to compel [Doc. No. 17]. The EEOC has until April 28, 2006, to file a statement of its costs associated with the motion to compel. Fiserv has until May 5, 2006, to file any objections to the statement. In addition, Fiserv has until May 5, 2006, to serve the EEOC with supplemental discovery responses which conform with this Court’s order.
SO ORDERED. Dated this 18th Day of April, 2006.
s/Christopher A. Nuechterlein Christopher A. Nuechterlein United States Magistrate Judge
6

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
v.
FISERV, INC. and FISERV SOLUTIONS, INC.,
Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

CAUSE NO. 3:05-CV-469 AS

)

)

)

)

)

ORDER

On April 28, 2006, Defendants filed a motion for a protective order. In their motion,

Defendants request a protective order in order to protect confidential employee records that

contain social security numbers, home addresses, and work related evaluations. Defendants do

not request that this protective order be entered to prevent disclosure of this information to

Plaintiff, but rather that the confidential information only be used for litigation purposes and

filed under seal when submitted to this Court.

Plaintiff objects to Defendants’ motion asserting that Defendants have not complied with

the local rules regarding discovery disputes, that any objections have already been waived, and

that Defendants have not articulated good cause. Plaintiff is correct in asserting that Defendants

have not met the meet and confer obligation of N.D. L.R. 37.1. Such a failure would typically

result in a denial of Defendants’ motion. However, in order to avoid further delay, Plaintiff

states in its response that it does not object to this Court addressing the merits of Defendants’

motion. Therefore, because this case is quickly developing a rather detailed history of discovery

disputes, this Court will address the merits of the motion so that discovery in this case may proceed.
Plaintiff’s second objection is that this Court has already determined that Defendants waived their objections when they failed to timely provide answers to the discovery requests. In its April 18, 2006 order granting Plaintiff’s motion to compel, this Court did state that “because Fiserv failed to timely respond to the discovery requests, any objections are now waived.” However, there is a significant problem with using this Court’s language from its April 18, 2006 order to object to Defendants’ current motion for a protective order.
There are two types of protective orders. The first type of protective order does not prevent the disclosure of relevant information to the opposing party, but rather limits who can see the documents once produced and the method by which they are filed with the court. This type of protective order is routinely entered to protect proprietary business information, as well as personal and confidential information. When a party applies for this type of protective order, this Court must examine the protective order in light of the standard set forth in Citizens First National Bank of Princeton v. Cincinnati Insurance Co., 178 F.3d 943, 944 (7th Cir.1999) and Pierson v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 205 F.R.D. 646, 647 (S.D. Ind. 2002).
The second type of protective order completely prevents disclosure to the opposing party. Typically, these protective orders are issued when the moving party has established a privilege such as attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine. In objecting to Plaintiff’s discovery requests, it appeared from the motion to compel filings and the hearing that Defendants were attempting to assert a privilege. If successful, Defendants would have been allowed to completely withhold the information that the Plaintiff was seeking in its discovery requests. In
2

its April 18, 2006 order, this Court found that Defendants had withdrawn their attorney-client privilege and work product objections and had waived any other objections to Plaintiff’s discovery requests because they had failed to timely raise those objections. Thus, this Court ordered Defendants to provide Plaintiff with the responsive information.
Defendants’ current motion, however, is entirely different. Defendants, having read this Court’s April 18, 2006 order granting the motion to compel, acknowledge that they must produce the requested information to Plaintiff. However, Defendants wish to protect confidential personal identifying factors such as social security numbers, home addresses, and personnel file work evaluations from public disclosure. Defendants are willing to produce these documents to Plaintiff as long as access to the documents is restricted to Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s counsel, and those individuals engaged by Plaintiff’s counsel. In addition, Defendants request that the information be used solely for the purpose of this litigation. Consequently, Plaintiff’s second objection is not relevant to Defendants’ current motion because Defendants do not wish to completely prevent the disclosure of the discovery information.
Plaintiff’s last argument is that the Defendants have not established good cause for the entry of a protective order. This Court does not agree. It is important that the personal identifying factors contained in the personnel files do not fall into the wrong hands. Employers routinely seek to protect their employees’ or former employees’ personnel files which contain social security numbers, home addresses, and other personal identifying features. As a result, Defendants have established good cause for seeking the protective order.
Merely establishing good cause for a protective order is not sufficient. This Court must independently examine Defendants’ proposed protective order to ensure that it complies with the
3

requirements found in Citizens First National Bank of Princeton v. Cincinnati Insurance Co., 178 F.3d 943, 944 (7th Cir.1999). This Court must not grant parties carte blanche to seal or protect whatever they desire. Id. at 944.
When reviewing an agreed protective order seeking to seal documents produced in discovery, this Court must ensure that “(1) the information sought to be protected falls within a legitimate category of confidential information, (2) the information or category sought to be protected is properly described or demarcated, (3) the parties know the defining elements of the applicable category of confidentiality and will act in good faith in deciding which information qualifies thereunder, and (4) the protective order explicitly allows any party and any interested member of the public to challenge the sealing of particular documents.” Pierson, 205 F.R.D. at 647 (citing Citizens, 178 F.3d at 946).
Defendants’ proposed protective order fails two prongs of the above test. First, while Defendants have articulated that the information sought to be protected falls within a legitimate category of confidential information, i.e. personal identifying factors, Defendants then state that “the Defendants anticipate that future discovery in this action may lead to requests for, and production of, other documents containing Confidential Materials.” (Def. Motion pg. 2). The additional language makes the protective order overly broad. Although the personnel files may be properly protected, allowing the Defendants to classify any future materials they deem confidential without specifying what those documents are or what type of information they contain runs afoul of Citizens.
In addition, Defendants’ proposed protective order does not satisfy the fourth prong. “The right to intervene to challenge a closure order is rooted in the public's well-established right
4

of access to public proceedings.” Jessup v. Luther, 227 F.3d 993, 997 (7th Cir. 2000). In granting protective orders, judges are thus “the primary representative[s] of the public interest in the judicial process" and must require that a “protective order explicitly allows any party and any interested member of the public to challenge the sealing of particular documents.” Pierson, 205 F.R.D. at 647 (citing Citizens, 178 F.3d at 945-46). In paragraph nine, Defendants outline the process for filing sealed documents with the court. However, Defendants have failed to include in this paragraph any provision which would explicitly allow any party and any interested member of the public to challenge the sealing of particular documents. As a result, Defendants’ proposed protective order does not comply with the requirements set forth in Citizens.
This Court is not opposed to granting Defendants’ motion for a protective order in order to protect the personal identifying factors if the proposed protective order is narrowly drawn and complies with Seventh Circuit authority. However, Defendants’ current protective order does not meet that standard. Therefore, Defendants’ motion for a protective order [Doc. No. 34] is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Defendants may refile their motion for a protective order in accordance with Seventh Circuit precedent.
SO ORDERED. Dated this 11th Day of May, 2006.
S/Christopher A. Nuechterlein Christopher A. Nuechterlein United States Magistrate Judge
5

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
v.
FISERV, INC., and FISERV SOLUTIONS, INC.,
Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

CAUSE NO. 3:05-CV-469 AS

)

)

)

)

)

ORDER

On April 28, 2006, Defendants filed a motion for a protective order in this case, seeking

to protect confidential employee records that contain social security numbers, home addresses,

and work related evaluations. Plaintiff objected to Defendants’ motion. As a result, this Court

analyzed the merits of Defendants’ motion and found that Defendants had demonstrated good

cause for the issuance of a protective order covering confidential materials. However, upon

reviewing the proposed protective order, this Court found that the order did not comply with the

requirements set forth in Citizens First National Bank of Princeton v. Cincinnati Insurance Co.,

178 F.3d 943, 944 (7th Cir.1999) and Pierson v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 205 F.R.D.

646, 647 (S.D. Ind. 2002). As a result, on May 11, 2006, this Court denied without prejudice

Defendants’ motion for a protective order, but gave Defendants leave to re-file their proposed

protective order in accordance with Seventh Circuit precedent.

On May 19, 2006, Defendants filed a second motion for a protective order. After

reviewing their revised order, this Court is satisfied that it conforms with Seventh Circuit

precedent. Because this Court has already determined that good cause exists for a protective

order, this Court now GRANTS Defendants’ motion [Doc. No. 42] and enters the following protective order.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) and regarding the matter between Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the “EEOC “) and Fiserv, Inc. and Fiserv Solutions Inc. d/b/a Mortgageserv (the “Defendants”), the Court hereby finds:
Discovery Has Requested Material Considered Confidential. The Plaintiff has served upon the Defendants certain discovery requests. The Defendants deem the information and documents sought by the Plaintiff’s discovery requests to be confidential; specifically, information and documents regarding employees and former employees of Fiserv Solutions, Inc. other than Jeffrey Stahl, including, but not limited to, Social Security numbers, addresses and information (evaluations, counselings, warnings or any other performance related documents) from the personnel files of those employees or former employees of Fiserv Solutions, Inc. that are considered confidential (“the “Confidential Information”).
The Court finding good cause for entry of the protective order, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 1. Confidential Information. “Confidential Information” shall be as defined above. 2. Copies of Confidential Information, Documents that Contain Information and
Materials Derived from Confidential Information. All copies, duplicates, extracts, summaries or descriptions of Confidential Information, and all documents containing information or materials derived from Confidential Information, including all documents produced pursuant to Plaintiff’s Document Requests, shall be treated as confidential and shall be subject to the terms of this Protective Order regarding Confidential Information. The parties shall be allowed to designate as Confidential Information documents previously produced
2

during discovery. If a party inadvertently fails to designate Confidential Information as such, the designation may be corrected or made belatedly, so long as it is done promptly after learning of the oversight. If either party corrects an improper designation or belatedly designates information or material as Confidential Information, counsel for the other party shall take reasonably necessary steps to ensure the appropriate treatment of such information or material according to the confidentiality designation, including securing return of the information or materials from individuals to whom disclosure was made, but would not be permitted, under the correct designation.
3. Prohibition of Use of Confidential Information and Documents Produced by the Defendants and Information and Materials Derived from Said Documents.
Documents produced by the Defendants that are marked “Confidential” in the abovecaptioned action, and all information and materials derived from said documents marked
“Confidential”, shall not be disclosed or used by the Plaintiff, counsel for the Plaintiff and the persons or entities listed in paragraph five (5) of this Protective Order (except for those persons and entities listed in sub-paragraphs (g) & (h) of paragraph five (5) of this Protective Order), for any purposes whatsoever other than preparing for, and conducting, the litigation in the above-captioned action, including appeals.
4. Redaction of Social Security Numbers from Documents Produced by the Defendants. The Defendants may redact Social Security Numbers from any document prior to producing it to the Plaintiff’s counsel in the above-captioned action. In the event that the Defendants produce documents for inspection by the Plaintiff’s counsel, the Defendants have the option of producing the documents for inspection without redacting the Social Security Numbers, and redacting the Social
3

Security Numbers after the Plaintiff’s counsel designates which documents she wants copied and prior to producing copies of said documents to her.
5. Permissible Disclosure of Confidential Information and Documents Produced by the Defendants and Information and Materials Derived from Said Documents.
The Plaintiff, the Plaintiff’s counsel, and the persons and entities listed in this paragraph five (5) of this Protective Order (except those persons and entities listed in sub-paragraphs (g) & (h) of this paragraph five (5) of this Protective Order), shall not disclose or permit the disclosure of any document produced by the Defendants marked Confidential, and all information and materials derived from said documents, to any person or entity except for the following:
a. The Plaintiff. b. The Plaintiff’s counsel. c. Consultants, investigators or experts employed by the Plaintiff’s
counsel to assist in the preparation and trial of the above-captioned action, including appeals. d. Secretaries, administrative assistants, paralegals, legal assistants and clerical personnel who are actively engaged in assisting the persons or entities listed in sub-paragraphs (a) - (c) of this paragraph five (5) of this Protective Order with the preparation and trial of the abovecaptioned action, including appeals. e. Court reporters and persons operating video recording equipment at depositions.
4

f. Those persons and entities specifically engaged for the limited purpose of copying documents produced by the Defendants in the above-captioned action.
g. Persons or entities who possessed documents produced by the Defendants, or knowledge of the information and materials contained in them, prior to their production in the above-captioned action.
h. The Court. 6. Service of this Protective Order on Non-Parties to Whom the Defendants’
Documents, and Information and Materials Obtained from Said Documents, Are Disclosed. The Plaintiff, the Plaintiff’s counsel and any person or entity listed in paragraph (5) of this Protective Order that provides documents produced by the Defendants, or information or materials derived from said documents, to a person or entity listed in paragraph five (5) of this Protective Order (except for those persons or entities listed in sub-paragraphs (g) & (h) of paragraph five (5) of this Protective Order), shall provide a copy of this Protective Order to the person or entity before providing said documents marked Confidential, or information or materials derived from said documents, to said person or entity, and shall obtain agreement to be bound by the terms thereof not to disclose or otherwise use any of the documents or information produced other than in connection with the above-captioned action as provided for in this Protective Order. 7. Maintenance of Confidential Information. The parties, counsel for the parties and the persons and entities listed in paragraph five (5) of this Protective Order (except those persons and entities listed in sub-paragraphs (g) and (h) of the
5

paragraph five (5) of this Protective Order) shall employ reasonable measures to control, consistent with this Protective Order, the duplication of, access to, and distribution of copies of Confidential Information.
8. Use of the Defendants’ Documents, and Information and Materials Derived from the Defendants’ Documents at Deposition.
Nothing in this Protective Order prevents the Plaintiff’s counsel from using a document produced by the Defendants and marked Confidential as an exhibit at a deposition or from questioning a party or witness about the contents of said documents, and information and materials derived from said documents, during a deposition in the above-captioned action provided that the Plaintiff’s counsel provides the deponent (except for those persons or entities listed in subparagraphs (g) & (h) of paragraph five (5) of this Protective Order), prior to questioning the deponent about the documents and/or information and materials derived from said documents, with a copy of this Protective Order, and obtains the agreement of the deponent to be bound by the terms thereof not to disclose or otherwise use any of the documents or information produced other than in connection with the above-captioned action as provided for in this Protective Order.
9. Filing of Confidential Information with the Court. Except by agreement of the parties or order of the Court, if any party submits part of any said document to the Court that is marked “Confidential,” those documents shall be filed and maintained under seal by the Court. Except by agreement of the parties, no party shall file with the Court any motion, brief or other paper containing or otherwise exhibiting these documents or any portion thereof unless the confidential documents are sealed in envelopes or other appropriate sealed containers on which shall be endorsed the caption in this action, an indication of the nature of the
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contents of such sealed container, the words “CONFIDENTIAL – SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER” and a statement in substantially the following form:
“This envelope contains documents which are filed in this case by [name of party]. It is not to be opened nor the contents thereof to be displayed or revealed except by order of the Court or by stipulation of the parties.”
10. Use of the Defendants’ Documents, and Information and Materials Derived from the Defendants’ Documents, at a Hearing or Trial.
Subject to the rules of evidence, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and/or the Local Rules for the Northern District of Indiana, documents produced by the Defendants marked Confidential, and information or materials derived from said documents, may be marked as exhibits and offered and/or entered into evidence, at trial or at any Court hearing in the above-captioned action.
11. Non-Termination and the Disposition of Documents Produced by the Defendants at the Conclusion of the Above-Captioned Action.
The provisions of this Protective Order shall not terminate at the conclusion of the abovecaptioned action. Within one hundred and twenty (120) days of the conclusion of the abovecaptioned matter, including all appeals and/or the time for all appeals, and upon Defendants’ demand, counsel for the Plaintiff shall: (a) return all documents produced by the Defendants marked Confidential to counsel for the Defendants; and (b) ensure that copies of documents produced by the Defendants marked Confidential and all extracts, summaries or descriptions of said documents, and all documents containing information or materials derived from said documents, are destroyed, and shall certify in writing to counsel for the Defendants that said destruction has occurred. The requirements of this paragraph eleven (11) of this Protective Order do not apply to the Defendants’
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documents that were filed with the Court or used as exhibits at a deposition, hearing or trial in the above-captioned action.
12. The Defendants May Seek Further Protective Orders. Nothing in this Protective Order prevents the Defendants from seeking a protective order from the Court for any document that the Defendants contend should be entitled to greater protection than that provided by this Protective Order or for other protective orders. 13. Release From This Protective Order. By this Protective Order, the discovering party or an interested member of the public does not waive its right to make application to the Court, with at least seven days notice to the producing party and other parties to the litigation, that any Confidential Information produced by a responding party does not contain sensitive and confidential information, or that in the circumstances the information should be released from the provisions of this Protective Order. If disputes arise concerning the propriety of designating particular documents as Confidential Information, whether certain documents or information should be released from the provisions of this Protective Order, or concerning any other matter relating to the application of this Protective Order, counsel shall attempt to resolve these disputes by agreement before asking the court to resolve these disputes. Pending resolution of a dispute over whether information or material shall be considered confidential, all parties and other persons bound by this Protective Order shall continue to treat the information or material as confidential until the issue is resolved by the Court. SO ORDERED. Dated this 26th Day of May, 2006.
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s/Christopher A. Nuechterlein Christopher A. Nuechterlein United States Magistrate Judge
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 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY )

COMMISSION,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

vs.

)

)

FISERV INC. and FISERV SOLUTIONS

)

INC. d/b/a MORTGAGESERV,

)

)

Defendants.

)

__________________________________________)

Case No. 3:05-cv-0469 AS

CONSENT DECREE

THE LITIGATION

1. Plaintiff Equal Employment OpportunityCommission (the "EEOC") filed this action

alleging that Defendants, Fiserv, Inc. (“Fiserv”) and Fiserv Solutions, Inc. (“Fiserv Solutions”)

(collectively "Defendants"), engaged in unlawful employment practices pursuant to Section 107 of

the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (“ADA”)

against Charging Party Jeffrey A. Stahl (“EEOC Claimant” or “Mr. Stahl”). Defendants deny the

allegations.

2. In the interest of resolving this matter, and as a result of having engaged in

comprehensive settlement negotiations, the parties have agreed that this action should be finally

resolved by entry of this Consent Decree (hereafter "Decree"). This Decree fully and finally resolves

any and all issues and claims arising out of the Complaint filed by the EEOC in Case No. 3:05-cv-

469 AS. Nothing in this Decree shall constitute or shall be deemed to constitute an admission by

any party regarding either liability or non-liability.

FINDINGS 3. Having carefully examined the terms and provisions of this Decree, and based on the pleadings, record, and stipulations of the parties, the Court finds the following:
a. This Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this action and of the parties.
b. The terms of this Decree are adequate, fair, reasonable, equitable, and just. The rights of the parties, the EEOC Claimant, and the public interest are adequately protected by this Decree.
c. This Decree conforms with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the ADA and is not in derogation of the rights or privileges of any person. The entry of this Decree will further the objectives of the ADA and will be in the best interests of the parties, the EEOC Claimant, and the public.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT: NON-DISCRIMINATION
4. Defendants agree that they will not discriminate against employees or applicants for employment on the basis of disability.
MONETARY RELIEF 5. Defendants agree to pay Mr. Stahl, or his heirs and assigns in the event of his death, the total sum of One Hundred-Seventy- Five Thousand Seven Hundred and Twenty Five Dollars ($175,725) in settlement of Mr. Stahl’s claims arising out of the Complaint filed by the EEOC in Case No. 3:05-cv-469 AS. The checks will be issued by Fiserv Solutions as follows: (1) a check (and W-2) to Mr. Stahl in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000), less applicable
2

federal, state, and local withholding taxes, in full settlement of Mr. Stahl’s claim for back wages (Fiserv Solutions shall not deduct from this amount the employer’s share of any costs, taxes or social security required by law to be paid by Fiserv Solutions); (2) a check (and form 1099) in the amount of Seventy Five Thousand Dollars ($75,000) to Mr. Stahl, in full settlement of Mr. Stahl’s claims for compensatory and punitive damages; and (3) a check (and form 1099) in the amount of Seven Hundred Twenty Five Dollars ($725) to Mr. Stahl, in full settlement of Mr. Stahl’s claim for attorneys’ fees. Upon entry of this Decree, the EEOC will forward the Release (Exhibit A) to Mr. Stahl for his execution. The EEOC will also forward to Mr. Stahl an Internal Revenue Service Form W-9 (“Form W-9"), Internal Revenue Service Form W-4 (“Form W-4) and a Michigan State Form MI-W4 (“Form MI-W4") for his completion. When the executed Release, Form W-9, Form W-4 and Form MI-W4 are received, the EEOC will transmit to defense counsel, the executed Release, Form W-9, Form W-4 and Form MI-W4. Defense counsel will retain the original executed Release until after payment has been made to Mr. Stahl and proof of delivery has been forwarded to defense counsel. Fiserv Solutions agrees to issue the above referenced checks to Mr. Stahl within ten business days of the entry of the Decree and receipt of the executed Release, completed Form W-9, Form W-4 and Form MI-W4 by defense counsel. The checks shall be mailed by certified mail to Mr. Stahl at 7160 Spring Lake Trail, Saginaw MI 46603. Proof of delivery shall be sent to the EEOC within 15 days of mailing said checks. Defense counsel will forward the original executed Release to Defendants after payment has been made to Mr. Stahl.
POSTING OF NOTICE 6. Fiserv Solutions agrees to post the Notice of Non-Discrimination Policy attached as Exhibit B (to be printed on EEOC letterhead) to this Decree in a conspicuous place at its South
3

Bend, Indiana, Florence, South Carolina and Dallas, Texas locations. Said notice shall remain posted throughout the term of this Decree.
DISCRIMINATION POLICY 7. Within thirty (30) days of the date of entry of this Decree, Fiserv Solutions agrees to implement or to have implemented an anti-discrimination policy which includes disability discrimination. Fiserv Solutions agrees that the policy will or has been included in an employees’ manual or other printed memorandum which will have been distributed to each employee.
RECORD KEEPING 8. The Defendants agree that the EEOC may review compliance with this Decree. As part of such review, the EEOC upon ten (10) business days notice and for the purpose of verifying compliance with this Decree may enter the premises of Fiserv Solutions South Bend, Indiana location, interview employees of Fiserv Solutions, South Bend, Indiana location whom the EEOC reasonably requests, and examine and copy any non-privileged documents relating to any complaints of disability discrimination of Fiserv Solutions, South Bend Indiana location.
TRAINING 9. Within ninety (90) days of the entry of this Decree, Fiserv Solutions agrees to train all supervisory personnel located at its South Bend, Indiana, Florence, South Carolina and Dallas, Texas locations on the anti-discrimination policy.
REPORTING 10. Fiserv Solutions agrees to submit a report to the EEOC detailing its compliance with this Decree. Within one-hundred-twenty (120) days of the date of entry this Decree, Fiserv Solutions will report to the EEOC Regional Attorney that the distribution and explanation of the anti-
4

discrimination policy to employees has been completed and provide the EEOC with a copy of the manual or memorandum containing the policy prohibiting discrimination. Fiserv Solutions will also report to the EEOC that the Notice has been posted in accordance with paragraph 6 above and on the training identified in paragraph 9 above. The report shall be sent to the attention of Laurie A. Young, Regional Attorney, or her successor, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 101 W. Ohio Street, Suite 1900, Indianapolis, Indiana, 46204.
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 11. In the event that either party to this Decree believes that the other party has failed to comply with any provision(s) of the Decree, the complaining party shall notify the other party of the alleged non-compliance within sixty (60) days of the alleged non-compliance and shall afford the alleged non-complying party thirty (30) business days to remedy the non-compliance or to satisfy the complaining party that the alleged non-complying party has complied. If the alleged noncomplying party has not remedied the alleged non-compliance or satisfied the complaining party that it has complied within thirty (30) business days, the complaining party may apply to the Court for appropriate relief.
DURATION OF THE DECREE 12. All provisions of this Decree shall be in effect for a period of two (2) years immediately following entry of the Decree.
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 13. Defendants agree that Fiserv Solutions will provide Mr. Stahl with the attached letter of reference (Exhibit C to be printed on Fiserv Solutions letterhead) within 30 days of the date of entry of the Decree and receipt of the executed Release (Exhibit A).
5

14. Each party to this Decree shall bear its own expenses, costs and attorneys' fees, except as provided in paragraph 5.
15. If any provision(s) of the Decree are found to be unlawful, only such provision(s) shall be severed, and the remainder of the Decree shall remain in full force and effect.
RETENTION OF JURISDICTION BY COURT 16. The court shall retain jurisdiction of this matter throughout the duration of this Decree for purposes of monitoring compliance with this Decree and entry of such further orders as may be necessary or appropriate.
DATE: October 24, 2006
_____S_/ _A_LL_E_N__S_H_A_R_P___________ United States District Court Judge
6

EXHIBIT A RELEASE AGREEMENT

I, Jeffrey A. Stahl, for and in consideration of the sum of One Hundred Seventy Five

Thousand Seven Hundred Twenty Five Dollars ($175,725), payable to me pursuant to the terms of

the Consent Decree entered by the Court in EEOC v. Fiserv, Inc. and Fiserv Solutions, Inc., Case No.

3:05-cv-469AS, on behalf of myself, my heirs, assigns, executors, and agents, do hereby forever

release, waive, remise, acquit, and discharge Fiserv, Inc. and Fiserv Solutions, Inc., and all past and

present shareholders, officers, agents, trustees, directors, employees, and representatives of Fiserv,

Inc. and Fiserv Solutions, Inc., as well as all successors and assigns of Fiserv, Inc. and Fiserv

Solutions, Inc., from any and all claims and causes of action of any kind which I now have or ever

have had under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.,

as a result of or arising from the subject matter and claims which were or which could have been

asserted in EEOC v. Fiserv, Inc. and Fiserv Solutions, Inc., Case No. 3:05-cv-469 AS. I represent

and warrant that I am the sole owner of the actual or alleged claims, damages, rights, causes of

actions and other matters which are released herein; that the same have not been transferred or

assigned or caused to be transferred or assigned to any other person, firm, corporation or other legal

entity; that I have obtained all approvals necessary to enter into this Release and that I have the full

right and power to grant, execute and deliver the releases, undertakings and agreements contained

herein.

I have read this Release and I execute it voluntarily, without coercion or threat of reprisal.

_____________________ Date

______________________________ Jeffrey A. Stahl

Subscribed and sworn to before me this ______ day of October, 2006. ____________________________ Notary Public, State of _________ My Commission Expires:_______

7

[FISERV SOLUTIONS LETTERHEAD] EXHIBIT C
Mr. Jeffrey Stahl was employed by Fiserv Solutions, Inc. from December 1, 1998 to September 3, 2003 as a Software Development Engineer. Mr. Stahl’s ending salary was $61,293.00. Pursuant to Fiserv Solutions’ corporate policy it cannot provide any additional information. Sincerely, _________________ Fiserv Solutions, Inc.
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CASREF, PROTO, TERMED
U.S. District Court Northern District of Indiana [LIVE] USDC Northern Indiana (South Bend)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:05-cv-00469-AS-CAN

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Fiserv Inc et Date Filed: 08/04/2005

al

Date Terminated: 10/24/2006

Assigned to: Judge Allen Sharp

Jury Demand: Plaintiff

Referred to: Magistrate Judge Christopher A Nuechterlein Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs

Cause: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilites Act

Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Plaintiff

Mediator Joseph V Simeri

represented by Joseph V Simeri 520 E Colfax Avenue South Bend, IN 46617-1438 574-233-3303 Fax: 574-284-2397 PRO SE

Plaintiff
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

represented by Laurie A Young Equal Employment Opportunity Commission - Ind/IN 101 W Ohio Street Suite 1900 Indianapolis, IN 46204-4203 317-226-7947 Fax: 317-226-7203 Email: legal.station@eeoc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michelle F Eisele Equal Employment Opportunity Commission - Ind/IN 101 W Ohio Street Suite 1900 Indianapolis, IN 46204-4203 317-226-7059 Fax: 317-226-5571 Email: michelle.eisele@eeoc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nancy Dean Edmonds Equal Employment Opportunity Commission - Ind/IN 101 W Ohio Street Suite 1900 Indianapolis, IN 46204-4203

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V. Defendant Fiserv Inc
Defendant Fiserv Solutions Inc doing business as Mortgageserv

317-226-7229 Fax: 317-226-5571 Email: Nancy.Edmonds@eeoc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Elizabeth A McDuffie Gonzalez Saggio and Harlan LLP Chi/IL 208 S LaSalle Street Suite 1460 Chicago, IL 60604 312-236-0475 Fax: 312-236-1750 Email: liz_mcduffie@gshllp.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James L Hough Spangler Jennings & Dougherty PC Mer/IN 8396 Mississippi Street Merrillville, IN 46410-6398 219-769-2323 Fax: 219-769-5007 Email: jhough@sjdlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kathleen M Maicher Spangler Jennings & Dougherty PC Mer/IN 8396 Mississippi Street Merrillville, IN 46410-6398 219-769-2323 Fax: 219-769-5007 Email: kmaicher@sjdlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Elizabeth A McDuffie (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James L Hough (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Date Filed 08/04/2005 08/04/2005 08/23/2005 08/30/2005 08/30/2005 08/30/2005 08/30/2005 09/01/2005
09/01/2005 09/19/2005 09/22/2005
09/26/2005
10/14/2005

Kathleen M Maicher (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

#

Docket Text

1 COMPLAINT with JURY DEMAND against Fiserv Inc, Fiserv Solutions Inc, filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: (1) Civil Cover Sheet)(rmn ) (Entered: 08/05/2005)

2 Summons Issued as to Fiserv Inc, Fiserv Solutions Inc. (rmn ) (Entered: 08/05/2005)

3 NOTICE of Appearance by Nancy Dean Edmonds on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Edmonds, Nancy) (Entered: 08/23/2005)

4 NOTICE of Appearance by James L Hough on behalf of all defendants (Hough, James) (Entered: 08/30/2005)

5 NOTICE of Appearance by Kathleen M Maicher on behalf of all defendants (Maicher, Kathleen) (Entered: 08/30/2005)

6 NOTICE of Appearance by Elizabeth A McDuffie on behalf of all defendants (McDuffie, Elizabeth) (Entered: 08/30/2005)

7 DEFENDANTS' ANSWER to Complaint by Fiserv Inc, Fiserv Solutions Inc.(McDuffie, Elizabeth) (Entered: 08/30/2005)

8 ORDER: Joint Proposed Discovery due by 10/14/2005. Rule 16 Preliminary Pretrial Conference set for 10/25/2005 10:30 AM (South Bend time) in South Bend before Magistrate Judge Christopher A Nuechterlein. Signed by Judge Christopher A Nuechterlein on 9/1/2005. (rmn ) (Entered: 09/01/2005)

9 MAGISTRATE CONSENT FORMS sent to all parties (Standard Track). (rmn ) (Entered: 09/01/2005)

10 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Fiserv Solutions c/o Prentice Hall Corp (Registered Agent) served on 8/10/2005, answer due 8/30/2005. (rmn) (Entered: 09/21/2005)

11 MOTION for Leave to Appear Telephonic, at Preliminary Pretrial Conference by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # (1) Proposed Order removed per chambers)(Edmonds, Nancy) Modified on 9/23/2005 (rmn). (Entered: 09/22/2005)

12 ORDER granting 11 Motion for Leave of ALL COUNSEL to Appear Telephonically at the 10/25/2005 Preliminary Pretrial Conference. Signed by Judge Christopher A Nuechterlein on 09/26/2005. (rmn ) (Entered: 09/26/2005)

13 REPORT of Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting. (McDuffie, Elizabeth)

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10/25/2005
11/23/2005 11/30/2005 02/09/2006
02/24/2006 02/27/2006 02/28/2006 03/08/2006
03/09/2006

(Entered: 10/14/2005)
14 RULE 16 PRELIMINARY PRETRIAL CONFERENCE held on 10/25/2005. before Judge Christopher A Nuechterlein. Plaintiffs appeared by attorneys Nancy Dean Edmonds. Defendants appeared by attorneys Elizabeth A McDuffie. Initial Disclosures to be exchanged by 11/22/2005. Any amendments to the pleadings to be filed by 12/30/2005. Plaintiff expert witness disclosures and reports to be delivered to the defendant by 5/31/2006. Defendant expert witness disclosures and reports to be delivered to the plainitff by 7/30/2006. Discovery deadline is 9/30/2006. Mediator Selection Deadline is 11/25/2006. (slm, ) (Entered: 10/26/2005)
15 REPORT by Fiserv Inc, Fiserv Solutions Inc REGARDING MEDIATION. (McDuffie, Elizabeth) (Entered: 11/23/2005)
16 ORDER appointing Joseph V Simeri to serve as a mediator. Signed by Judge Christopher A Nuechterlein on 11/30/2005. Atty Simeri added. (rmn) (Entered: 11/30/2005)
17 MOTION to Compel Responses to First Interrogatories and First Request for Production by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Declaration of Nancy Dean Edmonds# 2 Exhibit #1 to Declaration of Nancy Dean Edmonds# 3 Exhibit #2 to Declaration of Nancy Dean Edmonds# 4 Exhibit #3 to Declaration of Nancy Dean Edmonds# 5 Exhibit # 4 to Declaration of Nancy Dean Edmonds# (6) Proposed Order)(Edmonds, Nancy) (Entered: 02/09/2006)
18 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 17 MOTION to Compel Responses to First Interrogatories and First Request for Production by Fiserv Inc, Fiserv Solutions Inc. (McDuffie, Elizabeth) (Entered: 02/24/2006)
19 ORDER granting 18 Motion for Extension of Time to respond to Plaintiff's 17 Motion to Compel. Response is due 2/28/2006. Signed by Judge Christopher A Nuechterlein on 2/27/06. (khr) (Entered: 02/28/2006)
20 RESPONSE to Motion re 17 MOTION to Compel Responses to First Interrogatories and First Request for Production filed by Fiserv Inc, Fiserv Solutions Inc. (McDuffie, Elizabeth) (Entered: 02/28/2006)
21 REPLY to Response to Motion re 17 MOTION to Compel Responses to First Interrogatories and First Request for Production filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Supplemental Declaration of Nancy Dean Edmonds# 2 Exhibit 1 to Suppl. Decl.# 3 Exhibit 2 to Suppl. Decl.# 4 Exhibit 3 to Suppl. Decl.# 5 Exhibit 4 to Supp. Decl.# 6 Exhibit 5 to Supp. Decl.# 7 Exhibit 6 to Supp. Decl.)(Edmonds, Nancy) (Entered: 03/08/2006)
22 MOTION for Hearing request on Plaintiff's Motion to Compel or In The Alternative to Allow Defendants an Opportunity to Submit a Response to Plaintiff's "Reply" by Fiserv Inc, Fiserv Solutions Inc. (McDuffie,

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03/10/2006 03/13/2006 03/13/2006 03/15/2006 03/17/2006 03/20/2006 03/23/2006 04/12/2006
04/17/2006 04/18/2006
04/20/2006

Elizabeth) (Entered: 03/09/2006)
23 ORDER granting 22 Motion for Hearing. Telephonic Conference set for 3/29/2006 at 3:30 PM with Judge Neuchterlein. Signed by Judge Christopher A Nuechterlein on 3/10/06. (khr) (Entered: 03/10/2006)
24 MOTION to reset Telephonic Conference by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Edmonds, Nancy) (Entered: 03/13/2006)
25 MOTION for Leave to File Motion for Hearing or in the alternative, to Allow Defendants an Opportunity to Respond to Plaintiffs' Reply by Fiserv Inc, Fiserv Solutions Inc. (McDuffie, Elizabeth) (Entered: 03/13/2006)
26 ORDER GRANTING 24 Motion to Reset Telephonic Conference and DENYING As Moot 25 Motion for Leave to File Motion for Hearing. Telephone Conference set for 3/22/2006 03:30 PM in South Bend before Magistrate Judge Christopher A Nuechterlein. Signed by Judge Christopher A Nuechterlein on 3/15/06. (khr) (Entered: 03/15/2006)
27 MOTION to Continue Hearing Date by Fiserv Inc, Fiserv Solutions Inc. (McDuffie, Elizabeth) (Entered: 03/17/2006)
28 ORDER GRANTING 27 Motion to Continue with telephonic conference to be held on 3/23/2006 at 03:30 PM at South Bend. Signed by Judge Christopher A Nuechterlein on 3/20/06. (khr) Modified on 3/21/2006 (smp). (Entered: 03/20/2006)
29 ORDER continuing telephonic conference on the Plaintiff's motion to compel and the Defendants objection. Hearing rescheduled on 4/12/06 at 11:00 a.m. (E.D.T.) in court in South Bend, Indiana with counsel required to attend. Signed by Judge Christopher A Nuechterlein on 3/23/06. (khr) Modified on 3/24/2006 (smp). (Entered: 03/23/2006)
30 MOTION HEARING held on 4/12/2006 re 17 MOTION to Compel Responses to First Interrogatories and First Request for Production filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, before Judge Christopher A Nuechterlein. Plaintiffs appeared by attorneys Nancy Dean Edmonds. Defendants appeared by attorneys Elizabeth A McDuffie; James L Hough. Order to be entered. (Tape #FTR 4/12/2006.) (slm, ) (Entered: 04/12/2006)
31 SUPPLEMENT RESPONSE TO MOTION TO COMPEL HEARING HELD APRIL 12, 2006 filed by Fiserv Inc, Fiserv Solutions Inc. (McDuffie, Elizabeth) (Entered: 04/17/2006)
32 ORDER AND OPINION granting 17 Plaintiff's Motion to Compel. Plaintiff has until 4/28/06 to file a statement of its costs associated with the motion. Fiserv has until 5/5/06 to file objections to the statement and to serve Plaintiff with supplemental discovery responses conforming with this Court's order. Signed by Judge Christopher A Nuechterlein on 4/18/06. (khr) Modified on 4/18/2006 (khr). (Entered: 04/18/2006)
33 MOTION for Attorney Fees per 4/18/06 Order by Equal Employment

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04/28/2006 05/03/2006 05/08/2006 05/08/2006
05/09/2006
05/11/2006 05/16/2006 05/16/2006 05/19/2006 05/26/2006 07/05/2006

Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Nancy Dean Edmonds# 2 Affidavit Denise K. LaRue# 3 Affidavit Stephanie Longo# 4 Exhibit A to Longo Declaration)(Edmonds, Nancy) (Entered: 04/20/2006)
34 MOTION for Protective Order by Fiserv Inc, Fiserv Solutions Inc. (Attachments: # 1)(McDuffie, Elizabeth) (Entered: 04/28/2006)
35 MOTION for Extension of Time to File SUPPLMENTAL DISCOVERY RESPONSES by Fiserv Inc, Fiserv Solutions Inc. (McDuffie, Elizabeth) (Entered: 05/03/2006)
37 ORDER granting 35 Motion for Extension of Time to 5/11/06 to comply with 32 Court's order and serve the supplemental discovery responses . Signed by Judge Christopher A Nuechterlein on 5/8/06. (smp) Modified on 5/12/2006 (smp). (Entered: 05/11/2006)
38 ORDER granting 33 Motion for Attorney Fees. Defendants shall pay plaintiff $3,125.00 in attorney's fees and $110.36 in costs incurred in bringing the motion to compel by 6/8/06. Signed by Judge Christopher A Nuechterlein on 5/8/06. (smp) Modified on 5/12/2006 (smp). (Entered: 05/11/2006)
36 RESPONSE to Motion re 34 MOTION for Protective Order filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Nancy Dean Edmonds# 2 Exhibit 1 to Declaration# 3 Exhibit 2 to Declaration# 4 Exhibit 3 to Declaration# 5 Exhibit 4 to Declaration# 6 Exhibit 5 to Declaration# 7 Exhibit 6 to Declaration# 8 Exhibit 7 to Declaration)(Edmonds, Nancy) (Entered: 05/09/2006)
39 ORDER denying without prejudice 34 Motion for Protective Order . Defendants may refile their motion for a protective order in accordance with Seventh Circuit precedent. Signed by Judge Christopher A Nuechterlein on 5/11/06. (smp) (Entered: 05/12/2006)
40 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Expert Report by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Edmonds, Nancy) (Entered: 05/16/2006)
41 ORDER granting 40 Motion for Extension of Time to File. Plaintiff expert reports to be delivered to the defendant by 7/31/2006. Defendants serve any responsive expert report by 8/30/2006. Signed by Judge Christopher A Nuechterlein on 5/16/06. (kds) (Entered: 05/17/2006)
42 Second MOTION for Protective Order by Fiserv Inc, Fiserv Solutions Inc. (Attachments: # 1)(McDuffie, Elizabeth) (Entered: 05/19/2006)
43 ORDER granting 42 Motion for Protective Order . Signed by Judge Christopher A Nuechterlein on 5/26/06. (kds) (Entered: 05/26/2006)
44 AGREED NOTICE to extend time to file discovery filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; EEOC's Responses to Defendants' First Interrogatories and First REquest for Production to be filed by August 13, 2006. (Edmonds, Nancy) (Entered: 07/05/2006)

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07/07/2006 07/17/2006
08/16/2006
10/03/2006 10/06/2006 10/10/2006
10/10/2006 10/18/2006 10/24/2006 10/27/2006 11/01/2006 11/13/2006

45 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery and Expert Reports by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Edmonds, Nancy) (Entered: 07/07/2006)
46 ORDER granting 45 Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery. Discovery deadline is 11/30/2006. Defendant expert witness disclosures and reports to be delivered to the plainitff by 10/30/2006. Plaintiff expert witness disclosures and reports to be delivered to the defendant by 9/30/2006. Signed by Judge Christopher A Nuechterlein on 7/17/06. (kds) (Entered: 07/18/2006)
47 AGREED NOTICE to extend time to file discovery filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Fiserv Inc, Fiserv Solutions Inc; EEOC REsponses to dEfendants First Interrogatories and REquest for Production; Defendants' Responses to EEOC's Second Request for Production to be filed by 9/12/2006 and 9/16/2006. (Edmonds, Nancy) (Entered: 08/16/2006)
48 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery Extend Discovery Deadlines by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Edmonds, Nancy) (Entered: 10/03/2006)
49 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Dispositive Motion Deadline by Fiserv Inc, Fiserv Solutions Inc. (McDuffie, Elizabeth) (Entered: 10/06/2006)
50 AGREED NOTICE to extend time to file discovery filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; EEOC's Responses to First Interrogatories/REquest for Production and Defendants' Responses to EEOC's Second REquest for Production to be filed by EEOC: 10/17/06; Defs. 10/23/06. (Edmonds, Nancy) (Entered: 10/10/2006)
51 ORDER granting 49 Motion for Extension of Time to File. Defendants dispositive motions to be filed by 12/14/2006. Signed by Judge Christopher A Nuechterlein on 10/10/06. (kds) (Entered: 10/12/2006)
52 Joint MOTION for Settlement and Entry of a Consent Decree by Fiserv Inc, Fiserv Solutions Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Consent Decree)(McDuffie, Elizabeth) (Entered: 10/18/2006)
53 CONSENT JUDGMENT in favor of plaintiff and against defendant in the amount of $175,725.00 with interest at the rate of 5.05%. Signed by Judge Allen Sharp on 10/24/06. (kds) (Entered: 10/25/2006)
54 MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION AND OTHER RELIEF by Fiserv Inc, Fiserv Solutions Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B) (McDuffie, Elizabeth) (Entered: 10/27/2006)
55 RESPONSE to Motion re 54 MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION AND OTHER RELIEF filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Edmonds, Nancy) (Entered: 11/01/2006)
56 Supplemental MOTION to Amend/Correct 54 MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION AND OTHER RELIEF by Fiserv Inc, Fiserv Solutions

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Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B)(McDuffie, Elizabeth) (Entered: 11/13/2006)
57 ORDER granting 54 Motion for clarification and other relief in its entirety. Defendants' payment obligation under the Consent Decree has been stayed pending the entry of this order. The court retains jurisdiction to enforce the Consent Decree for a period of two years from 10/24/06. Signed by Judge Allen Sharp on 11/20/06. (jld) (Entered: 11/21/2006)

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