Case 1:12-cv-22282-XXXX Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/19/2012 Page 1 of 26 .

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA MIAMI DIVISION

KARLA VANESSA ARCIA, an individual, MELANDE ANTOINE, an individual, VEYEYO, a civic organization based in Miami-Dade County, FLORIDA IMMIGRANT COALITION, INC., a Florida non-profit corporation, NATIONAL CONGRESS FOR PUERTO RICAN RIGHTS, a Pennsylvania non-profit corporation, FLORIDA NEW MAJORITY, INC., a Florida non-profit corporation, and 1199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST, a Labor Union,
Plaintiffs,
v.
KEN DETZNER, in his official capacity as Florida Secretary of State,

CASE NO.

Defendant.

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF Plaintiffs KARLA VANESSA ARCIA, an individual, MELANDE ANTOINE, an individual, VEYEYO, a civic organization based in Miami-Dade County, FLORIDA IMMIGRANT COALITION, INC., a Florida non-profit corporation, NATIONAL CONGRESS FOR PUERTO RICAN RIGHTS, a Pennsylvania non-profit corporation, FLORIDA NEW MAJORITY, INC., a Florida not for profit corporation, and 1199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST, a labor union (collectively "Plaintiffs"), bring this action

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seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against Defendant KEN DETZNER, in his

official capacity as Florida Secretary of State ("Defendant"):

THE ACTION 1. In this action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, Plaintiffs are seeking

a judicial declaration that the program known as "Processing Ineligible Registered Voters-Non-

Immigrants" (the "Alleged Non-Citizen Voter Purge Program" or "Program") violates Section 2

of the Voting Rights Act ("VRA"), 42 U.S.c. § 1973, because it has resulted in United States

Black and Hispanic citizens having "less opportunity than other members of the electorate to

participate in the political process and to elect the representatives of their choice."

2.

Moreover, Plaintiffs are seeking a judicial declaration that the Alleged Non-

Citizen Voter Purge Program is in violation of Section 8(b)(1) of the National Voter Registration

Act of 1993 ("NVRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(b)(I) and Fla. Stat. § 98.075(1), both of which

provide that any State program or activity designed to ensure the maintenance of accurate and

currentvoter registration rolls "shall be uniform, nondiscriminatory, and in compliance with the

Voting Rights Act of 1965[.]"

3. Lastly, Plaintiffs are seeking a judicial declaration that the Alleged Non-Citizen

Voter Purge Program is in violation of Section 8(c)(2)(A) of the NVRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-

.

.

6(c)(2)(A), which prohibits the systematic purging of eligible voters from the official voter list

for the State of Florida, within 90 days before the date of a primary or general election for

Federal office.

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PARTIES 4. Plaintiff KARLA VANESSA ARCIA ("Ms. Arcia") is an individual and a resident of Miami-Dade County, Florida. Ms. Arcia is a citizen of the United States of America and a qualified and legally registered Florida voter. Ms. Arcia is Nicaraguan-American. As set forth more fully below, Ms. Arcia's rights have been, and will continue to be, affected by the Alleged Non-Citizen Voter Purge Program. 5. Plaintiff MELANDE ANTOINE ("Mrs. Antoine") is an individual and a resident of Miami-Dade County, Florida. Mrs. Antoine is a citizen of the United States of America and a qualified and legally registered Florida voter. Mrs. Antoine is Haitian~American. As set forth more fully below, Mrs. Antoine's rights have been, and will continue to be, affected by the Alleged Non-Citizen Voter Purge Program. 6. Plaintiff VEYEYO ("VEYEYO"), is a Miami-Dade County-based civic organization that is affiliated with the Haitian-American Grassroots Coalition. It has an office in Miami-Dade County, Florida and individual members throughout South Florida. VEYEYO's primary purposes are to empower Haitian-American citizens who are engaged in civic and democratic endeavors, and to assist members of the Haitian-American community in identifying and articulating issues of concern, including voting rights issues. VEYEYO is an organization dedicated to increasing the prominence and participation of Haitian-Americans in every aspect of the political prQcess. .To achieve this goal, VEYEYO facilitates naturalization classes, registers voters and engages in voter education and voter mobilization efforts. Defendant's unlawful practices have frustrated VEYEYO's mission as VEYEYO has been required to expend resources to locate members who have been unlawfully purged and/or to educate its members

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about Defendant's unlawful practices, to combat them, at the expense of its regularly-conducted programs/activities. In fact, VEYEYO has individual members who have been affected by the Alleged Non-Citizen Purge Program.
7. Plaintiff FLORIDA IMMIGRANT COALITION, INC. ("FLIC"), is a Florida non-profit corporation with its principal office in Miami-Dade County, Florida and member organizations located throughout the State of Florida. Central to FLIC's stated mission is the integration of immigrants into the civic and cultural life of America's communities. In conjunction with the National Partnership for New Americans, in early 2012, FLIC launched an initiative "Florida New Americans," aiming at providing opportunities of full integration for Florida's largest immigrant communities, through a citizenship program which includes citizenship clinics and naturalization classes, all with the goal of advancing immigrant rights and creating active citizenship among new Americans to achieve a vibrant, just, and welcoming democracy for all. Defendant's unlawful practices have frustrated FLIC's mission and have forced it to divert its scarce resources to combat Defe.ndant's unlawful practices at the expense of its regularly-conducted programs/activities.
8. Plaintiff the NATIONAL CONGRESS FOR PUERTO RICAN RIGHTS ("NCPRR") is a Pennsylvania non-profit corporation and membership organization founded in 1981 and dedicated to securing full equality for Puerto Ricans living in the United States through advocacy, education and participation in the political process. NCPRR has chapters across the United States, including Central and Southern Florida. These chapters are actively involved in safeguarding Puerto Rican and Hispanic voting rights and ensuring their political access in Florida. NCPRR's members are mainly comprjsed of Puerto Ricans and other Hispanics who

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are concerned about civic participation, including voting rights. NCPRR's Florida members stand to be disenfranchised by Defendant's unlawful practices, which include inaccurate name matching which has already resulted in native born United States citizens being targeted. NCPRR's mission is frustrated by Defendant's unlawful voter purge practices, and NCPRR has had to divert resources to combat Defendant's unlawful practices.
9. Plaintiff FLORIDA NEW MAJORITY, INC. ("FNM") is a Florida non-profit corporation and membership organization with its principal office in Miami-Dade County, Florida. Founded in 2009, FNM is dedicated to organizing, educating, and mobilizing disempowered communities in Florida to win equity and fairness throughout the State. FNM's central focus is to expand democracy and develop the leadership of underrepresented communities. To achieve its goal, FNM works with citizens who are engaged in civic and democratic endeavors and assists members of its target communities in identifying and articulating issues of concern, including voting rights issues. Defendant's unlawful practices have frustrated FNM's mission as FNM has been required to expend resources to locate members who have been unlawfully purged andlor to educate its members about Defendant's unlawful practices, to combat them, at the expense of its regularly-conductedprograms/activities. In fact, FNM has individual members who have been affected by the Alleged Non-Citizen Purge Program.
10. Plaintiff 1199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST ("1199SEIU") is a labor union that represents 25,000 healthcare workers, as well as an additional 7,400 retired members, in the State of Florida. 1199SEIU has members in 43 out of the 67 counties in Florida, including, but not limited to, the counties in this District, as well as Collier, Lee, Hillsborough,

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and Hendry Counties. Many of 1199SEIU's members are registered to vote or have sought to . register to vote. 1199SEIU has devoted significant time, energy and resources to making sure its
members and their families, co-workers and community members are registered to vote, and is committed to ensuring that every Floridian who is a United States citizen has the right to vote and the opportunity to exercise that right. Voter registration, education and engagement are central to 1199SEIU's mission, as reflected in its financial and personnel commitments and in the Service Employee International Union's mission statement: "We must build political power to ensure that workers' voices are heard at every level of government to create economic opportunity and foster social justice." Some of 1199SEIU's members, including Ms. Arcia and Mrs. Antoine, are United States citizens who were affected by the Alleged Non-Citizen Purge Program. Defendant's unlawful practices frustrate 1199SEIU's mission and require it to expend its limited resources investigating and taking measures to counteract the Alleged Non-Citizen Purge Program, thus diverting resources from planned voter registration and education activities.
11. Defendant KEN DETZNER is the Secretary of State of the State of Florida, and is being sued in his official capacity. Pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 92.012, the Secretary of State is the chief elections officer of the State and is therefore responsible for administration of state laws affecting voting, and for ensuring that elections in Florida are conducted according to law. Additionally, he is responsible for coordinating Florida's responsibilities under the NVRA.
JURISDICTION 12. This Court has jUrisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C; § 1331, as a case arising under the laws of the United States; under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) and (4), as a case seeking equitable and other relief pursuant to an act of Congress

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providing for the protection of the right to vote; and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as a case seeking to enforce rights and privileges secured by the laws of the United States.
13. In addition, this Court has jurisdiction over the pendent state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1367(a).
FACTS A. The State ofFlorida's Alleged Non-Citizen Voter Purge Program 14. In a press release dated May 9, 2012 (the "Press Release"), Defendant announced that the Florida Department of State ("DOS") was partnering with the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles ("DHSMV") Uto identify non-citizens who are currently on Florida's voter rolls." In the Press Release, Defendant asserted that the new initiative "is already proving to be successful. [DOS] recently sent the information of more than 2,600 potential non-citizens to Florida's 67 Supervisors of Elections for review and, if warranted, removal from Florida's voter rolls." Defendant pledged that it would continue identifying "more potential non-citizens in the next few months." 15. According to the Press Release, the Alleged Non-Citizen Voter Purge Program arose after the DOS and DHSMV began working together to develop a way to identify noncitizens in early 2011 following "a credentialing project led by DHSMV which informed DOS of the potential to identify non-citizens in DHSMV's database, which requires anyone getting a new driver's license or renewing a driver's license or state ID card to submit documentary proof of his or her legal status." 16. The Press Release further alleged that:
When DOS receives information from DHSMV indicating that a registered voter may not be a United States citizen, DOS conducts

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an initial investigation to determine whether the information identifying a voter as potentially ineligible is credible and reliable. This preliminary investigation includes a cross-reference of all files against the Comprehensive Case Information System, DHSMV, Department of Corrections, Florida Parole Commission and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) databases in order to assist supervisors of elections in the removal process by providing the most accurate documentation available. Additionally, DOS is actively seeking access to federal Department of Homeland Security databases such as SAVE (Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements) for further verification of immigration status.
(Emphasis added).
17. On or about April 2, 2012, Defendant had, in fact, sent two lists containing
approximately 2,700 names and identifying information of persons whom Defendant claimed
were potential non-citizens, to each of the Supervisors of Elections in Florida's 67 counties
(collectively the "Purge List"), including the Supervisors of Elections for Palm Beach, Broward,
Miami-Dade and Monroe Counties, all of whom had persons identified on the Purge List.
18. The Purge List included columns with the person's name, date of birth, voter
identification number and a column titled "LAST DHSMV TRANSACTION," purporting to set
forth each person's last DHSMV visit.
19. Thereafter, in mid-April of2012, Defendant published a webinar (the "Webinar")
directing the Supervisors of Elections to review the file information provided on the Purge List
and "conduct any additional research" (the "Additional Research"), described as follows:
Refer to whatever other sources you have to confirm identity and potential change in legal status. You should all have access to DHSMV's DAVE [the Driver and Vehicle Express System]. If you find information credible and reliable, proceed.
(Emphasis added).

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20. The Webinar states that persons had been placed on the Purge List as a result of positive identification that had been made by matching three out of five fields in the DHSMV database, including first name, last name, and birthday, for example "John" and "Smith" and a specific date of birth. Several media reports have indicated that these poor matching procedures resulted in citizens born in the United States ending up on the Purge List, including a World War II veteran, who was born in Brooklyn, New York and a woman of Puerto Rican descent who was born in New York City.
21. The Webinar indicates that the federal REAL ID law requiring proof of immigration status at the time of securing a driver's license or state identification has not yet been fully implemented in Florida, and illustrates that changes in legal immigration status, including naturalization, may not be included in the DHSMV database.
22. After completing the Additional Research, the Supervisors of Electio.ns were instructed by Defendant to carry out the procedures of Fla. Stat. § 98.075(7), for the removal of voters. This directive was consistent with information contained in the Press Release, ';Vherein Defendant stated as follows:
When a supervisor of elections receives information from DOS that a registered voter is a potential non-citizen, the supervisor must begin the statutory notice and removal process. (Emphasis added). 23. The Webinar contained a sample notice letter and sample voter eligibility form which Defendant "suggested" be sent to the potentially ineligible persons on the Purge List. The sample notice letter and sample voter eligibility form were only provided in English.

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24. As set forth more fully below, the processes and procedures used by the Supervisors of Elections to verify the eligibility of persons on the Purge List and to deal with the persons the Supervisors of Elections determined to be possibly ineligible, have varied widely including one county that has refused to implement the Alleged Non-Citizen Voter Purge Program, because of the inaccuracy of the Purge List, and at least two counties that not only implemented the Program, but have removed, and -have expressed the intent to continue removing, persons who did not respond to the notice andlor did not return the voter eligibility form.
B. The Alleged Non-Citizen Voter Purge Program Violates Section 2 ofthe VRA 25. Section 2 of the VRA prohibits Florida from applying or imposing any "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure" which results in denial or abridgement ofthe right to vote on account of race or color, or membership in a language minority group. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a). 26. Florida's voter registration form includes race identification, and the state's race identification data of the persons on the Purge List clearly demonstrates the disparate impact of the Program: the Purge List itself shows 61 % of the persons on Purge List are Hispanic, while 14% of registered Florida voters are Hispanic; 16% of the persons on the Purge List are Black, while 14% of registered Florida voters are Black; 16% of the persons on the Purge List are
of White, while 70% of registered Florida voters are White; and 5% the persons on the Purge
List are Asian, while 2% of registered Florida voters are Asian. Adding up the disparate impact, 82% of those on the Purge List are people of color. These numbers are glaringly disproportionate.

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27. Because Supervisors of Elections were instructed, in the Webinar, to review the immigration status of persons on the Purge List, as set forth in the DHSMV records, the Alleged Non-Citizen Voter Purge Program specifically targets naturalized citizens (as compared to persons born in the United States), the majority of whom are people of color whose rights are protected under Section 2 of the VRA.
28. Many Black and Hispanic persons in Florida have suffered and continue to suffer discrimination and bear the effects of that discrimination today, including a history of discrimination and neglect in voting-related activities.
29. In conducting the Alleged Non-Citizen Voter Purge Program, Defendant has failed to ensure that all Hispanics and Black voters, particularly Haitian-Americans, have an equal opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect the representatives of their choice.
30. Plaintiffs are concerned about the curtailment of their communities' voting rights as a result of the Alleged Non-Citizen Voter Purge Program.
C. The NVRA And Florida Law Both Require Uniformity and Non-Discrimination In Connection With List Maintenance Activities 31. Florida's procedures for registration list maintenance programs and activities are set forth in Chapter 98 of the Florida Statutes. Section 98.075(1), Florida Statutes imposes on DOS and Defendant the duty to "protect the integrity of the electoral process by ensuring the maintenance of accurate and current voter registration .records" and also provides that list maintenance activities undertaken by the DOS and, Defendant" must be "uniform,

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nondiscriminatory, and in compliance with the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the National Voter
Registration Act of 1993, and the Help America Vote Act of 2002." See Fla. Stat. § 98.075(1).1
32. Section 8(b)(1) of the NVRA, for its part, requires that any state program or activity designed to ensure the maintenance of an accurate and current voter registration roll must be "uniform, nondiscriminatory, and in compliance with the Voting Rights Act of ] 965." See 42 U.S.C. §1973gg-6(b)(1).
33. The House Report on the NVRA provides that the term "nondiscriminatory" is intended to mean that the procedure complies with the requirements of the VRA. House Report No. 103-9, H.R. REP. 103-9,15-16,1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 105,119-20.
34. The term "uniform" is intended to mean "that any purge program or activity must be applied to an entire jurisdiction." House Report No. 103-9, H.R. REP: 103-9,15-16, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 105, 119-20 (emphasis added).
35. Moreover, Section 98.075(1) states that the DOS "may adopt by rule uniform standards and procedures to interpret and administer this section." See Fla. Stat. § 98.075(1). (emphasis added).
36. The Alleged Non-Citizen Voter Purge Program is inaccurate and unreliable, and therefore violates Section 8(b)(1) of the NVRA as well as Section 98.075(1), Florida Statutes.

Section 98.065(1), Florida statutes, imposes the same requirement on the Supervisors of Elections. Moreover, Section 98.075(7) sets up procedures for removal to which the Supervisors of Elections must adhere "prior to the removal of a registered voter's name from the statewide voter registration system." See Fla. Stat. § 98.075(7).

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D. The Alleged Non-Citizen Voter Purge Program Violates the NonDiscrimination Provisions ofthe NVRA and Florida Law
"
37. The Alleged Non-Citizen Purge Program, which Florida failed to pre-clear as required by Section 5 of the VRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c, is discriminatory in violation of Section 2 of the VRA.
38. Also, the Alleged Non-Citizen Voter Purge Program is highly inaccurate, further discriminating against the minorities that are already disproportionately over-represented. In fact, while Defendant asserts that the Alleged Non-Citizen Voter Purge Program does not seek to purge eligible citizens, the statistics tell a vastly different story. Of the 2,700 persons targeted by Defendant, the overwhelming majority of those who responded are United States citizens.
39. Miami-Dade County's experience is illustrative. Of the 1,637 persons identified by Defendant as non-citizens residing in Miami-Dade County, 1,572 were notified by the MiamiDade County Supervisor of Elections that if they did not prove that they were United States citizens within 30 days of the date of the notice, they would be removed from the statewide voter registration system.2 Of the 1,572 persons who were sent the notice and voter eligibility form in Miami-Dade, a total of 562 responded. Of the 562 who responded, 514 voters have provided proof of citizenship and 35 voters responded denying ineligibility but did not provide proof. Only 14 voters responded admitting ineligibility. Thus, the overwhelming majority of those who responded, 549 out ofthe 562, or 98%, are United States citizens and lawful, eligible voters.
40. As demonstrated by the experiences of the individual Plaintiffs, there is a great likelihood that many of those who have not responded are United States citizens and lawful,
The Supervisor decided not to mail a notice to 65 persons "since they were duplicate names, citizens, deceased, or registered in another county," according to the Miami-Dade Supervisor of Elections' Office.

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eligible voters. For example, Plaintiff Ms. Arcia is a United States citizen whose name appears on the Purge List and who, based on the procedures created by Defendant, is required to be removed from the statewide voter registration system. This is because she did not timely respond to the notice or return the voter eligibility form because she never received them. Thus, if Defendant's instructions to the Supervisors of Elections as set forth in the Webinar, are carried out, Ms. Arcia will have to be removed from the statewide voter registration system.
41. Mrs. Antoine, on the other hand, did respond but should never have been on the Purge List in, the first place because she is a United States citizen who is eligible and duly registered to vote.
E. The Alleged Non-Citizen Voter Purge Program Violates the NVRA 's and Florida Law's Uniformity Provisions 42. The Alleged Non-Citizen Purge Program is not uniform in either design or implementation. First, as set forth above, of the approximately 2,700 persons on the Purge List, 1,637 were identified by Defendant as being from Miami-Dade County. This means that 61% of the persons on the Purge List are from one county -- Miami-:-Dade. 43. Moreover, the implementation of the Alleged Non-Citizen Voter Purge Program has varied widely by county. For example, the Palm Beach County Supervisor of Elections completely refused to implement the Program. The Supervisor of Elections of Miami-Dade County, for her part, informed the Defendant that she "has chosen to exercise her discretion under state law and will not remove any voters (other than those whose ineligibility has been demonstrated by the evidence) until the State has the opportunity to review the remaining voters against current, credible and reliable data sources." Other c~unties, including Broward and Monroe decided to conduct Additional Research and. to send out notices and voter eligibility

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forms but have indicated that they will likely not remove persons who did not respond. Collier and Lee Counties have fully implemented the Alleged Non-Citizen Voter Purge Program and have, in fact, removed from the statewide voter registration system voters who failed to respond to the notices and did not return the voter eligibility forms.
44. Further, the Alleged Non-Citizen Voter Purge Program is not uniform because the DHSMV database used is outdated, inaccurate and not reliable, as it does not even require the use of citizenship information to administer driver licenses.
45. The Alleged Non-Citizen Voter Purge Program disproportionately impacts newlynaturalized citizens as well as Hispanic, Black, Asian-American, and other minority voters.
F. The Alleged Non-Citizen Purge Program Violates the· NVRA's Bar On Systematic Purges Within 90 Days ofFederal Elections 46. Section 8(c)(2)(A) of the NVRA requires that the State of Florida "complete, not later than 90 days prior to the date of a primary or general election for Federal office, any program the purpose of which is to systematically remove the names of ineligible voters from the official list of eligible voters." 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(c)(2)(A). 47. The prohibition on systematic purges within 90 days of an election is central to the NVRA's goals of protecting against possible disenfranchisement of eligible voters while ensuring accurate and current voter registration rolls. Regarding programs that systematically remove ineligible voters from the official list of eligible voters, the House Report on the NVRA states that: "The Committee is concerned that such programs can be abused and may result in the elimination of names of voters from the rolls solely due to their failure to respon'd to a mailing. Abuses may be found in the design of a program as well as in its implementation." House Report No. 103-9, H.R. REP. 103-9, 15-16, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 105, 119-20 (emphasis

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added). Moreover, it is more difficult for concerned parties to identify and seek to correct inaccuracies resulting from systematic purges within 90 days of an election precisely because of the systematic nature and short time frame.
48. The next Federal election in Florida is the August 14, 2012 primary election. Therefore, the 90th day before the August 14 primary election is May 16, 2012.
49. Defendant is in breach of Section 8(c)(2)(A) of the NVRA. First, Plaintiffs are informed and believe that the majority of voters on the Purge List who were notified were instructed that their deadline to return the voter eligibility forms was after May 16, 2012. Moreover, Plaintiffs are informed and believe that under Section 48.075(7), Florida Statutes, no voter on the Purge List could possibly be removed until after May 16, 2012.
50. Defendant has not disputed the timeline set forth above. However, despite the NVRA's ban on systematic purges 90 days prior to an election, as set forth above, Defendant instructed the Supervisors of Elections to continue to carry out the Alleged Non-Citizen Voter Purge Program by reviewing the Purge List, conducting Additional Research, sending out notices and voter eligibility forms and removing voters under Fla. Stat. § 98.075(7). Defendant has sought to excuse its actions by asserting that the Alleged Non~Citizen Voter Purge Program falls within an exception to Section 8(c)(2)(A) of the NVRA. Defendant is wrong.
51. The NVRA establishes clear, enumerated exceptions to the 90 day prohibition. A state may only remove from the list registered persons who fall into four categories: those who request to be removed, those ineligible because of criminal conviction, those ineligible because of mental incapacity, and those who have died. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-(6)(c)(2)(B). The NVRA

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accomplishes this by placing outside the prohibition's ambit the categories of removals enumerated in42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-(6)(c)(3)(A) and (B) or (4)(A) and (B).
52. Importantly, the removal of alleged non-citizen voters is not one of the enumerated exceptions to the NVRA's 90 day prohibition. During the debates on the NVRA, Senator Mitch McConnell proposed an amendment that would have expanded the exceptions to the proscription against removal of voters from the rolls during the 90 day period. See 139 Congo Rec. 2960 (Mar. 16,1993) (Amendment No. 100); 139 Congo Rec. 2970 (Amendment No. 141), and 139 Congo Rec. 3066 (Mar. 17, 1993) (Amendment No. 169).' Cf 42 U.S.C. §1973gg6(a)(3) (2010).
53. Such legislative history supports the previously delineated expressio unius argument that "[w]here Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied." Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17 (1980).
G. Fulfillment of a Condition Precedent 54. By letter dated May 24,2012, Plaintiffs' counsel provided Defendant with written ante litem notice that the Alleged Non-Citizen Voter Purge Program was in violation of the NVRA. To date, the violation has not been corrected.
COUNT I DECLARATORY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2201
SECTION 2 OF THE VRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 55. Plaintiffs incorporate Paragraphs 1 through 30 and 54 above.

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56. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 authorizes suits for the deprivation of a right secured by the

Constitution or the laws of the United States caused by a person acting under the color of state

law. 57.

42 U.S.C. § 1973a of the VRA likewise c~eates a private right of action for

aggrieved persons whose voting rights have been denied or impaired.

58. This is an action for declaratory relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (the

"Declaratory Judgment Act"). Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the Alleged Non-Citizen Voter

Purge Program violates Section 2, of the VRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, which prohibits Defendant

from imposing any "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or

procedure" which results in a denial or abridgement of the rights of United States citizens,

namely Hispanics.and Blacks, to vote. 42 U.S.C. § 1973. c 59. There is a bona fide, actual, present practical need for the requested declaration.

The Alleged Non-Citizen Voter Purge Program has resuited in United States citizens, namely

Hispanics and Blacks having "less opportunity than other members of the electorate to

participate in the political process and to elect the representatives of their choice." 42 U.S.C. §

1973.

60. Plaintiffs are entitled to have resolved by judicial determination, all doubts raised

by Defendant's Alleged Non-Citizen Voter Purge Program and to have these declared and

confirmed by judicial determination.

61. The declaration requested deals with a present, ascertained or ascertainable state

of facts or present controversy as to a state of facts.

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62. Defendant has, or reasonably may have actual, present, adverse and antagonistic interests and has repeatedly advised of its intent to continue the Alleged Non-Citizen Purge Program.
63. The adverse interests are all before the Court. 64. The relief sought is not merely giving of legal advice by the courts or the answer to questions propounded from curiosity. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request that the Court enter a judgment declaring that: (a) the Alleged Non-Citizen Voter Purge Program violates Section 2, of the VRA, 42US.C. § 1973, because it has resulted in United States citizens, namely Hispanics and Blacks having "less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect the representatives of their choice"; (b) for reasonable attorneys' fees including litigation expenses and costs pursuant to 42 US.C. § 1988 and 42 US.C. § 19731(e); and (c) for all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.
COUNT II DECLARATORY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2201
SECTION 8(c)(2)(A) of the NVRA,42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(b)(1) AND Fla. Stat. § 98.075(1)
65. Plaintiffs incorporate Paragraphs 1 through 45 and 54 above. 66. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 authorizes suits for the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States caused by a person acting under the color of state law. 67. Section 11 (b) of the NVRA' 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-9(b), likewise creates a private right of action for parties who are aggrieved by a violation of the Act.

DM1\3282175.1

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Case 1:12-cv-22282-XXXX Document -1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/19/2012 Page 20 of 26
68. This is an action for declaratory relief pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the Alleged Non-Citizen Voter Purge Program violates Section 8(b)(1) of the NVRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(b)(1) and Section 98.075(1), Florida Statutes, both of which provide that any State program or activity designed to ensure the maintenance of accurate and current voter registration rolls "shall be uniform, nondiscriminatory, and in compliance with the Voting Rights Act of 1965[.]"
69. There is a bona fide, actual, present practical need for the requested declaratory relief. The Alleged Non-Citizen Voter Purge Program is not uniform, has been discriminatory against minority voters, namely Hispanics and Blacks, and has disproportionately impacted lawful, eligible minority voters, including Ms. Arcia. In fact, as set forth above, if Defendant's instructions to the Supervisors of Elections as set forth in the Webinar, are carried out, the Ms. Arcia will be removed from the statewide voter registration system. Moreover, the Program disenfranchises the minority communities that the institutional Plaintiffs serve and thus, frustrates the missions of the institutional Plaintiffs and forces them to divert their resources to combat the Program.
70. Defendant and his employees and agents lack adequate rules and procedures governing the conduct of programs and activities to maintain an accurate and current voter registration roll that are uniform, nondiscriminatory, and in compliance with the VRA.
71. Defendant and his employees and agents have failed to enforce substantive standards or provide adequate training to ensure that agents, employees and representatives of the DOS make a reasonable effort to conduct programs and activities to maintain an accurate and

DM1\32S2175.1

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Case 1:12-cv-222B2-XXXX Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/19/2012 Page 21 of 26

current voter registration roll that are uniform, nondiscriminatory, and in compliance with the VRA.
72. Plaintiffs are entitled to have resolved by judicial determination, all doubts raised by Defendant's Alleged Non-Citizen Voter Purge Program and to have these declared and confirmed by judicial determination.
73. The declaration requested deals with a present, ascertained or ascertainable state of facts or present controversy as to a state of facts.
74. Defendant has, or reasonably may have actmil, present, adverse and antagonistic interests and has repeatedly advised of its intent to continue the Alleged Non-Citizen Voter Purge Program.
75. The adverse interests are all before the Court. 76. The relief sought is not merely giving of legal advice by the courts or the answer to questions propounded from curiosity. 77. Unless and until ordered to cease doing so by this Court, Defendant and his employees or agents will continue to fail to conduct adequate programs and activities to maintain an accurate and current voter registration roll that are uniform and non-discriminatory in accordance with Section 8(b) of the NVRA, 42 U.S.C. 1973gg-6(b) and Section 98.075(1), Florida Statutes. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request that the Coun enter a judgment declaring that: (a) the Alleged Non-Citizen Voter Purge Program violates Section 8(b)(1) of the NVRA, 42 U.S.C. 1973gg-6(b) and Section 98.075(l).of Florida Statutes, both of which provide that any State program or activity designed to ensure the maintenance of accurate and current voter registration

DM1\328217S.1·

21

Case 1:12-cv-22282-XXXX Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/19/2012 Page 22 of 26
rolls "shall be uniform, nondiscriminatory, and in compliance with the Voting Rights Act of 1965[.]"; (b) for reasonable attorneys' fees including litigation expenses and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 42D.S.C. § 1973gg-9(c); and (c) for all other reliefthatthe Court deems just and proper.
COUNT III DECLARATORY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2201
Section 8(c)(2)(A) of the NVRA,42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(c)(2)(A) 78. Plaintiffs incorporate Paragraphs 1 through 24 and 46 through 54 above. 79. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 authorizes suits for the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States caused by a person acting under the color of state law. 80. Section l1(b) of the NVRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-9(b) likewise creates a private right of action for parties who are aggrieved by a violation of the Act. 81. This is an action for declaratory relief pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the Alleged Non-Citizen Voter Purge Program violates Section 8(c)(2)(A) of the NVRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(c)(2)(A) which bars systematic purges within 90 days of an election, except in limited and specific circumstances not found here. 82. There is a bona fide, actual, present practical need for the requested declaration. The Alleged Non-Citizen Voter Purge Program deprives eligible voters, including Ms. Arcia, of their rights under the NVRA. In fact, as set forth above, if Defendant's instructions to the Supervisors of Elections as set forth in the Webinar, are carried out, the individual Ms. Arciawill be removed from the statewide voter registration system. The Program also disenfranchises the

DM1\328217S.1

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Case 1:12-cv-22282-XXXX Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/19/2012 Page 23 of 26

communities that the institutional Plaintiffs serve and thus, frustrates the missions of the institutional Plaintiffs.
83. Plaintiffs are entitled to have resolved by judicial determination, all doubts raised by Defendant's Alleged Non-Citizen Voter Purge Program and to have these declared and confirmed by judicial determination.
84. The declaration requested deals with a present, ascertained or ascertainable state of facts or present controversy as to a state of facts.
85. Defendant has, or reasonably may have actual, present, adverse and antagonistic interests and has repeatedly advised of its intent to continue the Alleged Non-Citizen Voter Purge Program.
86. The adverse interests are all before the Court. 87. The relief sought is not merely giving oflegal advice by the courts or the answer to questions propounded from curiosity. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs'request that the Court enter a judgment declaring that: (a) the Alleged Non-Citizen Voter Purge Program violates Section 8(c)(2)(A) of the NVRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(c)(2)(A) which bars systematic purges within 90 days of an election, except in limited and specific circumstances not found here; (b) for reasonable attorneys' fees including litigation expenses and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C, § 1988 and 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-9(c); and (c) for all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.
COUNT IV
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 88. . Plaintiffs incorporate Paragraphs 1 through 87 above.

DM1 \3282175.1

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Case 1:12-cv-22282-XXXX Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/19/2012 Page 24 of 26

89. 42 U.S.c. § 1983 provides for equitable relief for the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States caused by a person acting under the color of state law. Additionally, Section 11(b)(2) of the NVRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-9(b)(2) provides for injunctive relief to redress a violation of the NVRA.
90. Plaintiffs have a great likelihood of suffering irreparable and substantial harm as a result of the Alleged Non-Citizen Voter Purge Program. Unless this Court enjoins the actions of Defendant and Defendant's use of the Alleged Non-Citizen Voter Purge Program, Ms. Arcia and other lawful, eligible voters will be removed from the voter registration roll and disenfranchised in future elections and members of the institutional Plaintiffs will be denied their fundamental right to vote.
91. The public interest weighs. strongly in favor of letting every lawful, eligible voter exercise the right to vote.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request that the Court enter a preliminary and a permanent injunction ordering Defendant: (a) to discontinue the Alleged Non-Citizen Voter Purge Program; (b) to instruct all Supervisors of Elections to restore the statewide voter registration system and all voters who have been removed as a result of the failure to respond to the notice or to return the voter eligibility form; (c) to instruct all Supervisors of Elections to send new notices to all persons on the Purge List explaining their rights as voters and assuring them that no lawful, eligible voter will be disenfranchised based on failure to provide documentary proof of United States citizenship; (d) to conduct adequate programs and activities to maintain an accurate and current voter registration roll that are uniform and non-discriminatory in accordance with Section 8(b)(1) of the NVRA, 42 U.S.C. 1973gg-6(b) and Section 98.075(1) of Florida Statutes,; (e) to

DM1\328217S.1

24

Case 1:12-cv-22282-XXXX Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/19/2012 Page 25 of 26

cease enforcing standards, practices, procedures and/or programs that deny Black and Hispanic

United States citizens an opportunity to participate effectively in the political process on an equal

basis with other members of the electorate; (f) for reasonable attorneys' fees including litigation

expenses and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-9(c); and (g) for all

other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

Dated: June 19th, 2012.

Respectfully submitted,

DUANE MORRIS LLP

By: /s/ Lida Rodriguez-Taseff Lida Rodriguez-Taseff, Esq. Florida Bar No. 039111 200 S. Biscayne Blvd. Suite 3400 Miami, FL 33 131 (305) 960-2242 (305) 960-2201 (Fax) LRTaseff@duanemorris.com

Attorneyfor Plaintiffs Karla Vanessa Arcia, Melande Antoine, VEYEYO, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, and Florida New Majority, Inc.

By: /s/ Katherine Roberson-Young Katherine Roberson-:Young, Esq. Florida Bar No. 038169 3000 Biscayne Blvd., Suite 212 Miami, Florida 33137 (305) 571-4082 (305) 571-1396 (Fax) katherine.roberson-young@seiu.org
Attorneys for Plaintiff1199SEIU .United Healthcare Workers East

DMl\328217S.1

25

Case 1:12-cv-22282-XXXX Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/19/2012 Page 26 of 26
CO-COUNSEL: Penda Hair, Esq. Katherine Culliton-Gonzalez, Esq. Uzoma Nkownta, Esq. Advancement Project 1220 L Street, N.W., Suite 850 Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 728-9557 (202) 728-9558 (fax) pendahair@advancementproject.org kcullitongonzalez@advancementproject.org UzomaNkownta@advancementproject.org
Ben Hovland, Esq. Fair Elections Legal Network 1825 K Street NW, Suite 450 Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) 248-5346 (202)331-1663 (fax) bhovland@fairelectionsnetwork.com
Juan Cartagena, Esq. Jose Perez, Esq. Diana S. Sen, Esq. LatinoJustice PRLDEF 99 Hudson Street, 14th Floor New York, NY 10013-2815 (212)219-3360 (212)431-4276(fax) jcartagena@latinojustice.org jperez@latinojustice.org dsen@latinojustice.org
Catherine M. Flanagan, Esq. Project Vote 1350 1St., N.W., Suite 1250 Washington, DC 20005 (202) 210-6903 (202)629-3754 (fax) cflanagan@projectvote.org
Attorneysfor Plaintiffs

OM113282175.1

26

 
 STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES
Plaintiffs Karla Vanessa Arcia, Melande Antoine, Veye Yo, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., National Congress For Puerto Rican Rights, Florida New Majority, Inc., and 1199SEIU United Healthcare Workers East ("Plaintiffs"); and Defendant Kenneth W. Detzner, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of the State of Florida (the "Secretary"), enter into this
Stipulation regarding certain claims at issue in Arcia et al. v. Detzner.
RECITALS WHEREAS, Plaintiffs initiated litigation against the Secretary in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of FJori.da in an action entitled Arcia et a/. v. Detzner,
Case No. 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ; and WHEREAS, on August 14, 2012, the Florida Department of State entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement with the United States Department ofHomeland Security governing access to the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) Program for the purpose of verifying citizenship and immigration status information of non-citizen and naturalized or derived U.S. citizen registrants on Florida's voter registration rolls; and
WHEREAS, in correspondence on August 29, 2012, and September 4, 2012, Plaintiffs sought information regarding the Secretary's plans with respect to individuals whose names appeared on lists of potentially-ineligible registered voters sent to Florida Supervisors of Elections in April 2012 (the "April Lists''), before the Florida Department of State obtained access to the SAVE Program; and
WHEREAS, in correspondence dated September 6, 2012, the Secretary responded to Plaintiffs' inquiries by identifying the actions that the Secretary states he has announced will be

taken with respect to these individuals and the dates by which these actions will be concluded; and
WHEREAS, the Secretary believes that Plaintiffs' claims in this action with respect to the April Lists are now moot because the process used to identify these potentially-ineligible registered voters was voluntarily discontinued before this action was fLied by Plaintiffs; and
WHEREAS, the Secretary is nonetheless willing to enter this Stipulation describing steps he states were previously announced with respect to individuals on the April Lists; and
WHEREAS, Plaintiffs disagree with the Secretary's position regarding whether their claims with respect to the April Lists are moot; and
WHEREAS, all Parties wish to resolve these matters without the time, expense, and uncertainty oflitigation
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants contained herein and other good and valuable consideration, the adequacy and sufficiency ofwhich are acknowledged by the Parties, and intending to be legally bound, the Parties hereby agree as follows:
I. DEFINITIONS
As used in this Stipulation, the following terms shall have the meanings set forth below: (a) "Effeetive Date" means the date this Stipulation shall become effective which shall occur as ofthe date when the last signature is placed on this Stipulation by the Parties. (b) "SAVE" refers to the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements Program administered by the United States Department of Homeland Security. (c) "Department" refers to the Florida Department ofState. (d) "Supervisor(s) ofElections" refers to the Supervisors ofElections in the State ofFlorida.
2

(e) "'Litigation" refers to the action entitled Arcia v. Detzner, Case No. 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ
(S.D. Fla.). (f) "April Lists" refers to lists of over 2,600 individuals identified as "potential non-U.S. citizens" that were sent to Florida's Supervisors ofElections in April2012.
II. UNDERTAKINGS BY DEFENDANT With respect to individuals on the April Lists, the Department will take the following steps: (a) The Department will advise the Supervisors of Elections that any individual on the April Lists who has been removed from the voter rolls for whom SAVE cannot verify non-citizenship, and who has not admitted to non-citizenship, should be restored to the voter rolls unless he or she was removed by a Supervisor of Elections on a basis unrelated to citizenship status (such as deceased, adjudicated mentally incompetent, or request by voter) and that this process should be concluded before October 15, 2012. Any individual who has been removed from the voter rolls may appeal the removal in accordance with Florida law. (b) When the Department's review of the April Lists is complete, all registered voters on the April Lists who received notice indicating that they may be ineligible to vote, and who have not been removed, will be sent notice advising them that they remain registered to vote. These notices will be sent no later than October 15, 2012. (c) The Department will reiterate to Supervisors of Elections that the presence of any individual on the prior lists ofpotential non-citizens should not be interpreted as a determination regarding that individual's eligibility to vote.
3

(d) The Department agrees that no registered voter should be required to cast a provisional ballot due solely to his or her inclusion on any prior list ofpotential non-citizens. (e) The Department agrees that nothing in this Stipulation affects its obligation to respond to
Plaintiffs' requests submitted under the Florida Public Records Law and will provide responsive documents to Plaintiffs on or before September 15, 2012.
III.
UNDERTAKINGS BY PLAINTIFFS In exchange for the Undertakings above, Plaintiffs agree as follows: (a) On the Effective Date, Plaintiffs will dismiss with prejudice all of their claims in the Litigation other than the claim under Section 8(c)(2)(A) of the National Voter Registration Act (the ''90-day claim") through the filing of a Joint Stipulation of Dismissal in the fonn attached as Exhibit 1. This dismissal does not preclude Plaintiffs from amending the 90-day claim in their Complaint in a manner consistent with the Court's Scheduling Orders entered in the Litigation. (b) On the Effective Date, Plaintiffs will withdraw all discovery subpoenas, document requests, and deposition notices and subpoenas issued in the Litigation. (c) Plaintiffs agree that none of the actions taken by the Department provide a basis for any determination that Plaintiffs are entitled to attorney's fees or costs in the Litigation.
IV. MISCELLANEOUS (a) Any Party may seek specific performance to enforce the tenns ofthis Stipulation. (b) This Stipulation constitutes a single integrated written document that expresses the entire agreement and understanding between the Parties. This Stipulation may not be amended, altered or modified except by a written agreement duly executed by each Party.
4

(c) By enteririg into this Stipulation, none of Parties has waived or shall be deemed to have waived any rights, obligations, or positions it or they have asserted or may in the future assert in connection with any matter or person outside the scope of this Stipulation other than as set forth herein. No part ofthis Stipulation, its negotiation, or perfonnance may be used in any manner in any action, suit or proceeding by any person as evidence of the rights, duties or obligations of any of the Parties with respect to matters or persons outside the scope of this Stipulation. All actions taken and statements made by the Parties or by their representatives, relating to this Stipulation or participation in this Stipulation, including but not limited to its development and implementation, shall be without prejudice or value as precedent, and shall not be used as a standard by which other matters may be judged. In entering this Stipulation, Plaintiffs make no admission about the accuracy or use ofthe SAVE database. (d) This Stipulation shall not be deemed an admission or concession by any Party of liability, culpability, or wrongdoing. Any evidence of the tenns of this Stipulation or negotiations or discussions associated with this Stipulation shall be inadmissible in any action or proceeding for purposes of establishing any rights, duties, or obligations of the Parties, except in an action or proceeding between the Parties to enforce the tenns ofthis Stipulation. (e) All notices, demands, or other communication to be provided pursuant to this Stipulation (including communications to Supervisors ofElections) shall be in writing and sent to the Parties at the addresses set forth below, or to such other Person or address as any ofthem may designate in writing from time to time:
Plaintiffs:
Lorelie S. Masters Marc Goldman Jenner & Block LLP 1099 New York Avenue, NW
5

Washington, DC 20001
Defendant:
Daniel Nordby Florida Department of State R.A. Gray Building, Suite 100 500 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399·0250

(f) This Stipulation may be executed in multiple counterparts, all of which together shall

constitute one and the same instrument. This Stipulation may be executed and delivered by facsimile, which facsimile counterparts shall be deemed to be originals. The Parties have authorized the signatories below to sign on their behalf.

[signatures on following page]

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have duly executed this Stipulation as ofthe Last

date indicated below.

k~/{ of'·Plaintiffs, Karla Vanessa Ar~ia, Melande
Antoine, Veye Yo, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., National Congress For Puerto Rican Rights, Florida New Majority, Ine., and l199SEIU
United Healtheare Workers East
By: '~ £et&tr

Name: __-(__._']ot--'---r-=c~fr._..,'----'----'(J~-"f-+=-;:::..L.,_

Title:

Jvf/ ·Ltt·: j ('.tJ.tJ<'/, ~ (4-t-1\

Date: q It Z/1 'L

., o... ~~..w~~:Defendant, Ken Detmer, in his Capacity as
Secretary ofState ofthe State ofFlorida
By: :])~~
No!f/
Name: 1>.-ut;--e(

6

Title: 6~( C,.~ Date: tf - IZ.- I 2-
7

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA MIAMI DIVISION
CASE NO. l:ll·cv-22282-WJZ
KARLA VANESSA ARCIA, an individual, MELANDE ANTOINE, an individual,
VEYEYO, a civic organization based in Miami-Dade County, FLORIDA IM..l\1IGRANT COALITION, INC., a Florida non-profit corporation, NATIONAL CONGRESS FOR PUERTO RICAN RIGHTS, a Pennsylvania non-profit corporation, FLORIDA NEW MAJORITY, INC., a Florida non-profit corporation, and 119SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST, a Labor Union,
Plaintiffs,
v.
KEN DETZNER, in his official capacity as Florida Secretary of State,
Defendant.
STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL AS TO COUNTS I, ll AND PART OF COUNT IV OF COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
The parties, pursuant to Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 4l(a), stipulate and have agreed
that Counts I, II and IV (except to the extent it seeks relief as to the claim in Count Til) of
Plaintiffs' Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief(ECF No. 1)1 are resolved and that
these cowtts are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
Date: September 12, 2012
Respectfully submitted,
1 Although leave has been granted to file an amended complaint, such a complaint has not yet been filed. See (ECF No. 46).
8

For the Plaintiffs:
Is/ Marc A. Goldman Lorelie S. Masters Marc A. Goldman Jenner & Block LLP 1099 New York Avenue, NW, Suite 900 Washington, DC 20001 lmasters@jenner.com mgoldman@jenenr.com (202) 639-6000 (202) 639-6066 (fax)

Is/ Katherine Roberson-Young Katherine Roberson-Young Service Employees International Union 4600 Sheridan Street, Suite 200 Hollywood, Florida 33021 Katherine.roberson-young@seiu.org (305) 571-4082 (305) 571-1396 (fax)
Counselfor Plaintiff1199SEIU United Healthcare Worlcers East

PendaHair Katherine Culliton..Oonzalez Uzoma Nkwonta Advancement Project 1220 L Street, N.W., Suite 850
W~n~n,D.C.20005
pendahair@advancementproject.org kcullitongon7.alez@advancementproject.org UzomaNkownta@advancementpmject.org (202) 728-9557 (202) 728-9558 (fax)
Catherine M. Flanagan Project Vote 1350 I Street, N.W., Suite 1250 Washington, DC 20005 cflanagan@proiectvote.org (202) 5464173 (202) 629-3754 (fax)
Ben Hovland Fair Elections Legal Network 1825 K Street NW, Suite 450 Washington, D.C. 20006 bhovland@iairelectionsnetwork.com (202) 248-5346 (202) 331-1663 (fax)

JohnDeLe6n Law Offices ofChavez & De Leon, P.A. 5975 Sunset Drive, Suite 605 South Miami, FL 33143 jdeleon@chavez-deleon.com (305) 740-5347 (305) 740-5348 (fax)
Counselfor Plaintiffs Arcia, Antoine, VEYEYO, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, and Florida New Majority, Inc.

9

Juan Cartegena Jose Perez DianaS. Sen LatinoJustice PRLDEF 99 Hudson Street. 14th Floor New York, NY 10013-2815 icartegena@latinojustice.org jperez@latinojustice.org dsen@latinojustice.org (212) 219-3360 (212) 431-4276 (fax)
Counselfor Plaintiffs
For the Defendants:
Is/ Daniel Nordbv Daniel E. Nordby General Counsel Florida Bar No. 14588 Ashley E. Davis Assistant General Counsel Florida Bar No. 48032 Florida Department ofState R. A. Gray Building 500 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 daniel.nordby@dos.myfl.oridacom ashley.davis@dos.myfloridacom
(850) 245-6536 (850) 245-6127 (fax)
Counsel for Defendant Kenneth W. Detzner Florida Secretary ofState
10

 
 Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 46 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/24/2012 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 12-22282-CIV-ZLOCH

KARLA VANESSA ARCIA et al.,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

O R D E R

KEN DETZNER, in his official capacity as Florida Secretary of State,

Defendant. /

THIS MATTER is before the Court upon Plaintiffs’ Expedited Motion To Modify Pre-Trial Scheduling Order (DE 39) and Plaintiffs’ Motion For Leave To Amend Their Complaint (DE 44). The Court has carefully reviewed said Motions, the entire court file and is otherwise fully advised in the premises.
Accordingly, after due consideration, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiffs’ Expedited Motion To

Modify Pre-Trial Scheduling Order (DE 39) and Plaintiffs’ Motion For Leave To Amend Their Complaint (DE 44) be and the same are hereby GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows:

1. To the extent Plaintiffs seek leave of the Court, by both Motions (DE Nos. 39 & 44) to file an Amendment Complaint, the aforementioned Motions be and the same are hereby GRANTED.

Plaintiffs be and the same are hereby directed to file a Second Amended Complaint by noon on Friday, September 7, 2012;
2. To the extent Plaintiffs request an extension of time for the Parties to conduct mediation, Plaintiffs’ Expedited Motion To Modify Pre-Trial Scheduling Order (DE 39) be and the same is hereby

Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 46 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/24/2012 Page 2 of 2

GRANTED. The mediation shall be completed no later than twenty

(20) days prior to the pretrial conference; and

3. In all other respects the instant Motions (DE Nos. 39 & 44)

be and the same are hereby DENIED.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Fort Lauderdale, Broward

County, Florida, this 24th

day of August, 2012.

Copies furnished: All Counsel of Record

WILLIAM J. ZLOCH United States District Judge

2

 
 Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 47 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/24/2012 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 12-22282-CIV-ZLOCH

KARLA VANESSA ARCIA et al.,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

AMENDED ORDER OF REFERRAL

TO MEDIATION

KEN DETZNER, in his official capacity as Florida Secretary of State,

Defendant. /

The pretrial conference having been set in this matter by separate order, and pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 and the Southern District Local Rule 16.2, it is hereby

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1) That all Parties are required to participate in mediation. The mediation shall be completed no later than twenty (20) days prior to the pretrial conference;
2) That Counsel for the Plaintiff, or another attorney agreed upon by all counsel of record and any unrepresented Parties, shall be responsible for scheduling the mediation conference. The parties are encouraged to avail themselves of the services of any mediator on the list of Certified Mediators, maintained in the office of the Clerk of this Court, but they may also select any other mediator of their choosing. The Parties shall agree upon a mediator within fifteen (15) days from the date hereof, and file a Notice of Selection with the Clerk reflecting the same, within (5) days of said selection. If there is no agreement, Counsel for the Plaintiff shall promptly notify the Clerk in writing and the Clerk shall designate a mediator from the list of Certified Mediators, which designation shall be made on a blind rotation basis;
3) That a place, date, and time for mediation convenient to the mediator, counsel of record, and unrepresented Parties shall be established no later than ten (10) days after a mediator is selected. Further, within five (5) days of said selection the Parties shall file a notice with the Court as to the date of said mediation;
4) That the personal appearance of counsel and each Party or representatives of each Party with full authority to enter into a full and complete compromise and settlement is mandatory. If insurance is involved, an adjuster with authority up to the policy limits or the most recent demand, whichever is lower, shall attend. The Court does not allow any appearance at mediation to be made by telephone;

Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 47 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/24/2012 Page 2 of 2

5) That all discussions, representations, and statements made at the mediation conference shall be confidential and privileged;
6) That at least ten (10) days prior to the mediation date, all Parties shall present to the mediator a brief written summary of the case identifying issues to be resolved. Copies of these summaries shall simultaneously be served on all other Parties;
7) That the Court may impose sanctions against Parties and/or counsel who do not comply with attendance or settlement authority requirements herein or who otherwise violate the terms of this Order. The mediator shall report non-attendance and may recommend imposition of sanctions by the Court for non-attendance;
8) That the mediator shall be compensated in accordance with the standing order of the Court entered pursuant to Rule 16.2.B.7, or on such basis as may be agreed to in writing by the Parties and the mediator selected by the Parties. The cost of mediation shall be shared equally by the Parties unless otherwise ordered by the Court. All payments shall be remitted to the mediator within thirty (30) days of the date of the bill. Notice to the mediator of cancellation or settlement prior to the scheduled mediation conference must be given at least two (2) full business days in advance. Failure to do so will result in imposition of a fee for one hour of the mediator’s time;
9) That if a total or partial settlement is reached in this case, counsel shall promptly notify the Court of the settlement in accordance with Local Rule 16.2.F, by the filing a notice of settlement signed by counsel of record within ten (10) days of the mediation conference. Within five (5) days of notifying the Court of any such settlement the Parties shall submit a stipulation of dismissal thereby concluding the case;
10) That within five (5) days following the mediation conference, the mediator shall file a Mediation Report indicating whether all Parties were present. The report shall also indicate whether the case settled (in full or in part), was continued with the consent of the Parties, or whether the mediator declared an impasse; and
11) That if mediation is not conducted, or the Parties otherwise fail to abide by the terms of this Order the Court may impose an appropriate sanction upon the Parties including but not limited to the dismissal of the above-styled cause without further notice or hearing.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Fort Lauderdale, Broward

County, Florida, this

24th

day of August, 2012.

Copies furnished: All Counsel of Record

WILLIAM J. ZLOCH United States District Judge
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI CIVIL DIVISION
Case No. 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Honorable Judge William J. Zloch
KARLA VANESSA ARCIA, an individual, MELANDE ANTOINE, an individual, VEYE YO, a civic organization based in MiamiDade County, FLORIDA IMMIGRANT COALITION, INC., a Florida non-profit corporation, NATIONAL CONGRESS FOR PUERTO RICAN RIGHTS, a Pennsylvania non-profit corporation, FLORIDA NEW MAJORITY, INC., a Florida non-profit corporation, and 1199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST, a Labor Union,
Plaintiffs,
v. KEN DETZNER, in his official capacity as Florida Secretary of State,
Defendant.
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiffs KARLA VANESSA ARCIA, an individual; MELANDE ANTOINE, an
individual; VEYE YO, a civic organization based in Miami-Dade County; FLORIDA
IMMIGRANT COALITION, INC., a Florida non-profit corporation; NATIONAL CONGRESS
FOR PUERTO RICAN RIGHTS, a Pennsylvania non-profit corporation; FLORIDA NEW
MAJORITY, INC., a Florida not for profit corporation; and 1199SEIU UNITED
HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST, a labor union (collectively “Plaintiffs”), bring this action
seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against Defendant KEN DETZNER, in his
official capacity as Florida Secretary of State (“Defendant”), and aver as follows:

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NATURE OF THE CASE 1. Plaintiffs are individuals and organizations whose rights and the rights of their members are affected by the program instituted by the Florida Department of State (“DOS”) to carry out a systematic purge of alleged non-citizens from the Florida voter rolls. 2. In April 2012, DOS initiated a program known as “Processing Ineligible Registered Voters – Non-Immigrants” (the “Program to Purge Alleged Non-Citizens”). DOS had, to date, collected a list containing more than 180,000 names of alleged ‘potential noncitizens’ (the “180,000-person list”). To initiate the Program to Purge Alleged Non-Citizens, DOS sent a sample of the 180,000-person list, containing approximately 2,625 names (the “Initial Purge List”), to Florida’s Supervisors of Elections. DOS further provided Florida Supervisors of Elections with direction as to how to review and use this list to determine the eligibility of currently-registered voters. In particular, DOS instructed Supervisors of Elections to review existing voter files and further conduct additional research using “whatever other sources [Supervisors of Elections] have to confirm identity and potential change in legal status.” DOS further instructed that, once a Supervisor of Elections found “information credible and reliable” to support the determination that a registered voter was a non-citizen, they should initiate notice of this conclusion, first via certified mail and second via publication, if necessary. Several Supervisors of Elections began implementing this program by sending notices containing allegations of non-citizenship, and some Supervisors of Elections actually purged voters from the registration rolls. 3. Following press reports exposing the shockingly low accuracy rate of the Initial Purge List and demands from the United States Department of Justice and private litigants that Florida cease its purge efforts, DOS temporarily suspended the Program to Purge Alleged NonCitizens, but also announced that it intended to continue the purge later using a different method.
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In particular, Defendant announced that DOS was awaiting a determination from the United States Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) regarding the State’s requested access to DHS’s Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (“SAVE”) database. DOS stated that, if granted access to the SAVE database, it would use the information contained in that database to continue its Program to Purge Alleged Non-Citizens. DOS admitted that its own information was outdated, and without the information provided by SAVE, individuals who are naturalized citizens but who were included on the Initial Purge List would be inconvenienced, and potentially even incorrectly purged from the voter rolls and unable to vote in Florida’s upcoming Federal elections.
4. On information and belief, Defendant received word from DHS on July 9, 2012, that Florida would have access to the SAVE database following the entry of a Memorandum of Agreement (“MOA”) between DOS and DHS. DOS and DHS executed an MOA on August 14, 2012, thus DOS’s resumption of the purge is imminent.
5. The Program to Purge Alleged Non-Citizens, both as initially established and as currently planned, violates Section 8(c)(2)(A) of the NVRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(c)(2)(A), which prohibits the systematic purging of eligible voters from the official voter list for the State of Florida within 90 days before the date of a primary or general election for Federal office. Plaintiffs additionally seek a preliminary and permanent injunction ordering Defendant to discontinue the Program to Purge Alleged Non-Citizens given this violation of the NVRA.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 6. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as a case arising under the laws of the United States; and under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(4), as a case seeking equitable and other relief pursuant to an act of Congress providing for the protection of the right to vote. In light of Florida’s history of engaging in
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actions that have compromised its citizens’ fundamental right to vote, and due to the likelihood that the State will continue to take steps to cause irreparable harm to valid and legitimate voters by illegally purging them, it is imperative that this Court hear and consider this action and grant injunctive relief.
7. Section 11(b) of the NVRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-9(b), creates a private right of action for parties who are aggrieved by a violation of the Act.
8. Venue is proper in this District because a substantial portion of the violations and harms complained of herein occurred, or will occur, in this District.
PARTIES
1
9. Plaintiff KARLA VANESSA ARCIA (“Ms. Arcia”) is an individual and a resident of Miami-Dade County, Florida. Ms. Arcia is a citizen of the United States of America and a qualified and legally registered Florida voter. Ms. Arcia is Nicaraguan-American. As set forth more fully below, Ms. Arcia’s rights have been, and will continue to be, adversely affected by the Program to Purge Alleged Non-Citizens.
10. Plaintiff MELANDE ANTOINE (“Mrs. Antoine”) is an individual and a resident of Miami-Dade County, Florida. Mrs. Antoine is a citizen of the United States of America and a qualified and legally registered Florida voter. Mrs. Antoine is Haitian-American. As set forth more fully below, Mrs. Antoine’s rights have been, and will continue to be, adversely affected by the Program to Purge Alleged Non-Citizens.
1
Plaintiffs Arcia and Antoine may at times be referred to collectively as the “Individual Plaintiffs.”
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2
11. Plaintiff VEYE YO (“VEYE YO”), is a Miami-Dade County-based civic organization that is affiliated with the Haitian-American Grassroots Coalition. It has an office in Miami-Dade County, Florida, and individual members throughout South Florida. VEYE YO’s primary purposes are to empower Haitian-American citizens who are engaged in civic and democratic endeavors, and to assist members of the Haitian-American community in identifying and articulating issues of concern, including voting rights issues. VEYE YO is an organization dedicated to increasing the prominence and participation of Haitian-Americans in every aspect of the political process. To achieve this goal, VEYE YO facilitates naturalization classes, registers voters and engages in voter education and voter mobilization efforts. Defendant’s unlawful practices have frustrated VEYE YO’s mission as VEYE YO has been required to expend resources to locate members who have been unlawfully purged or who received letters questioning their eligibility to vote, to educate its members about Defendant’s unlawful practices and to combat them at the expense of its regularly-conducted programs/activities. Moreover, VEYE YO has individual members who have been adversely affected by the Program to Purge Alleged Non-Citizens.
12. Plaintiff FLORIDA IMMIGRANT COALITION, INC. (“FLIC”), is a Florida non-profit corporation with its principal office in Miami-Dade County, Florida, and with member organizations located throughout the State of Florida. Central to FLIC’s stated mission is the integration of immigrants into the civic and cultural life of America’s communities. In conjunction with the National Partnership for New Americans, in early 2012, FLIC launched “Florida New Americans,” an initiative aimed at providing opportunities for the full integration
2
Plaintiffs Veye Yo; Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc.; National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights; Florida New Majority, Inc.; and 1199SEIU United Healthcare Workers East may at times be referred to collectively as the “Organizational Plaintiffs.”
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of Florida’s largest immigrant communities, through a citizenship program that includes citizenship clinics and naturalization classes, all with the goal of advancing immigrant rights and creating active citizenship among new Americans to achieve a vibrant, just, and welcoming democracy for all. Defendant’s unlawful practices have frustrated FLIC’s mission and have forced it to divert its scarce resources to combat Defendant’s unlawful practices at the expense of its regularly-conducted programs/activities.
13. Plaintiff the NATIONAL CONGRESS FOR PUERTO RICAN RIGHTS (“NCPRR”) is a Pennsylvania non-profit corporation and membership organization founded in 1981 and dedicated to securing full equality for Puerto Ricans living in the United States through advocacy, education and participation in the political process. NCPRR has chapters across the United States, including Central and Southern Florida. These chapters are actively involved in safeguarding Puerto Rican and Hispanic voting rights and ensuring the political access of Puerto Ricans and Haitian Americans in Florida. NCPRR’s members are mainly comprised of Puerto Ricans and other Hispanics who are concerned about civic participation, including voting rights. NCPRR’s Florida members stand to be disenfranchised by Defendant’s unlawful practices, which include inaccurate name matching that has already resulted in native-born United States citizens being targeted based on improper discriminatory factors. NCPRR’s mission is frustrated by Defendant’s unlawful voter-purge practices, and NCPRR has had to divert resources to combat Defendant’s unlawful practices.
14. Plaintiff FLORIDA NEW MAJORITY, INC. (“FNM”), is a Florida non-profit corporation and membership organization with its principal office in Miami-Dade County, Florida. Founded in 2009, FNM is dedicated to organizing, educating, and mobilizing disempowered communities in Florida to win equity and fairness throughout the State. FNM’s
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central focus is to expand democracy and develop the leadership of underrepresented communities. To achieve its goal, FNM works with citizens who are engaged in civic and democratic endeavors and assists members of its target communities in identifying and articulating issues of concern, including voting rights issues. Defendant’s unlawful practices have frustrated FNM’s mission. FNM has been required to expend resources (1) to locate members who have been unlawfully purged and/or (2) to educate its members about Defendant’s unlawful practices in order to combat them, at the expense of its regularly-conducted programs/activities. FNM has individual members who have been affected by the Program to Purge Alleged Non-Citizens.
15. Plaintiff 1199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST (“1199SEIU”) is a labor union that represents 25,000 healthcare workers, as well as an additional 7,400 retired members, in the State of Florida. 1199SEIU has members in 43 out of the 67 counties in Florida, including, but not limited to, the counties in this District, as well as Collier, Lee, Hillsborough, and Hendry Counties. Many of 1199SEIU’s members are registered to vote or have sought to register to vote. 1199SEIU has devoted significant time, energy and resources to making sure its members and their families, co-workers, and community members are registered to vote, and is committed to ensuring that every Floridian who is a United States citizen has the right to vote and the opportunity to exercise that right. Voter registration, education, and engagement are central to 1199SEIU’s mission, as reflected in its financial and personnel commitments and in the Service Employee International Union’s mission statement: “We must build political power to ensure that workers’ voices are heard at every level of government to create economic opportunity and foster social justice.” Some of 1199SEIU’s members, including Ms. Arcia and Mrs. Antoine, are United States citizens who were adversely affected by the Program to Purge
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Alleged Non-Citizens. Defendant’s unlawful practices frustrate 1199SEIU’s mission and require it to expend its limited resources investigating and taking measures to counteract the Program to Purge Alleged Non-Citizens, thus diverting resources from its planned voter registration and education activities.
16. Defendant KEN DETZNER is the Secretary of State for the State of Florida, and is being sued in his official capacity. Pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 92.012, Florida’s Secretary of State is the chief elections officer of the State and is therefore responsible for administration of state laws that affect voting, and for ensuring that elections in Florida are conducted according to law. Additionally, he is responsible for coordinating Florida’s duties and responsibilities under the NVRA.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND LAW I. The State of Florida’s Program to Purge Alleged Non-Citizens
17. In a press release dated May 9, 2012 (the “Press Release”), Defendant announced that the DOS was partnering with the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (“DHSMV”) “to identify non-citizens who are currently on Florida’s voter rolls.” In the Press Release, Defendant asserted that the new initiative “is already proving to be successful. DOS sent the information of more than 2,600 potential non-citizens to Florida’s 67 Supervisors of Elections for review and, if warranted, removal from Florida’s voter rolls.”
18. According to the Press Release, the Program to Purge Alleged Non-Citizens arose after the DOS and DHSMV began working together to develop a way to identify non-citizens in early 2011 following “a credentialing project led by DHSMV which informed DOS of the potential to identify non-citizens in DHSMV’s database, which requires anyone getting a new driver’s license or renewing a driver’s license or state ID card to submit documentary proof of his or her legal status.” The Press Release further alleged that:
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When DOS receives information from DHSMV indicating that a registered voter may not be a United States citizen, DOS conducts an initial investigation to determine whether the information identifying a voter as potentially ineligible is credible and reliable. This preliminary investigation includes a cross-reference of all files against the Comprehensive Case Information System, DHSMV, Department of Corrections, Florida Parole Commission and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) databases in order to assist supervisors of elections in the removal process by providing the most accurate documentation available. Additionally, DOS is actively seeking access to federal Department of Homeland Security databases such as SAVE (Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements) for further verification of immigration status.
A. The Initial Purge List
19. On or about April 2, 2012, Defendant sent approximately 2,625 names, with
accompanying identifying information for persons whom Defendant claimed were potential non-
citizens, to each of the Supervisors of Elections in Florida’s 67 counties including the
Supervisors of Elections for Palm Beach, Broward, Miami-Dade and Monroe Counties. The
Initial Purge List included columns with each person’s name, date of birth, voter identification
number and a column titled “LAST DHSMV TRANSACTION,” purporting to set forth each
person’s last DHSMV visit.
20. Thereafter, in mid-April of 2012, Defendant published a Webinar (the “Webinar”)
directing the Supervisors of Elections to review the file information provided on the Initial Purge
List and “conduct any additional research” (the “Additional Research”), described as follows:
Refer to whatever other sources you have to confirm identity and potential change in legal status. You should all have access to DHSMV’s DAVE [the Driver and Vehicle Express System]. If you find information credible and reliable, proceed.
(Emphasis added).
21. After completing the Additional Research, the Supervisors of Elections were
instructed by Defendant to carry out the procedures of Fla. Stat. § 98.075(7), for the removal of
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voters from the voter rolls. This directive was consistent with information contained in the Press Release, wherein Defendant stated as follows:
When a supervisor of elections receives information from DOS that a registered voter is a potential non-citizen, the supervisor must begin the statutory notice and removal process. (Emphasis added). The Webinar further advised Supervisors of Elections that they “have authority to investigate and refer fraudulent registrations or illegal voting to the state attorney’s office.” 22. The Webinar stated that persons had been placed on the Initial Purge List as a result of positive identification that had been made by matching three out of five fields in the DHSMV database, including first name, last name, and birth date (for example “John” and “Smith” and a specific date of birth). This matching system was severely flawed and, as several media reports have indicated, resulted in naturalized citizens and citizens born in the United States ending up on the Initial Purge List, including a World War II veteran, who was born in Brooklyn, New York, and a woman of Puerto Rican descent who was born in New York City. In fact, the Webinar as much as acknowledged the serious flaws in the system, indicating as it did that the Federal REAL ID law requiring proof of immigration status at the time of securing a driver’s license or state identification has not yet been fully implemented in Florida, illustrating that changes in legal immigration status, including naturalization, would not necessarily be included in the DHSMV database. 23. As set forth more fully below, the processes and procedures used by the Supervisors of Elections to verify the eligibility of persons on the Initial Purge List and to deal with the individuals the Supervisors of Elections determined to be possibly ineligible varied widely – including one county that refused to implement the Program to Purge Alleged NonCitizens because of the inaccuracy of the Initial Purge List and at least two counties that not only
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implemented the Program to Purge Alleged Non-Citizens, but removed persons who did not respond to the notice and/or did not return the voter eligibility form.
24. The content of the letter sent by individual Florida Supervisors of Elections varied as well. For example, the form letter sent by Jennifer J. Edwards, Supervisor of Elections for Collier County, dated May 11, 2012, stated that to avoid removal, the recipient must bring to Supervisor Edwards’ office the enclosed voter eligibility form, along with an original of any documentation demonstrating citizenship. The template notice letter provided in connection with the Webinar stated that a copy of any documentation could be mailed or faxed to the relevant Supervisor’s office.
25. The Initial Purge List proved to be inaccurate, obsolete, and an insufficient basis for challenging voters. On April 30, 2012, DOS suspended the Program to Purge Alleged NonCitizens due to its inaccuracies. DOS asserted it would resume the program once it received access to DHS’s SAVE database, claiming such access would allow the State to improve the accuracy of its Program to Purge Alleged Non-Citizens. But the program had already caused – and continues to cause – ongoing damage both to those who received letters informing them that they were suspected to be non-citizens and that such persons needed to come forward with evidence of citizenship to prevent them from being removed from the voter rolls, as well as to those who were actually removed from the rolls. Defendant’s planned resumption of the program will cause further injury to Plaintiffs and Florida voters and violates federal law as explained herein.
26. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-9(b), where, as here, a State is alleged to have committed acts in violation of the NVRA within 120 days of a Federal election, the statute requires that the State receive notice of that violation at least 20 days prior to the commencement
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of a civil lawsuit. By letter dated May 24, 2012, Plaintiffs’ counsel provided Defendant with written ante litem notice that the Program to Purge Alleged Non-Citizens was in violation of the NVRA.
B. Resumption of the Program to Purge Alleged Non-Citizens 27. On August 14, 2012, Defendant Secretary of State Ken Detzner stated that Florida would purge the state voter registry using its access to the SAVE database prior to the November 2012 general election. Since the general election day is November 6, 2012, Defendant’s planned purge of the state voter registry will occur within ninety (90) days of a Federal election. 28. DHS had communicated to the Department of State on or around July 9, 2012, that it would grant DOS access to SAVE, conditioned on the negotiation and execution of an MOA that would outline the appropriate uses of the database. In a letter dated July 14, 2012, Defendant Detzner indicated that, upon execution of the MOA, state staff would be trained on how to access the SAVE database in order to attempt to verify the legal status of individuals alleged to be non-citizens. Defendant Detzner asserted that the State would use the SAVE database to check the Initial Purge List, the results of which would be passed along to Florida’s Supervisors of Elections for “additional actions.” 29. The SAVE database is a compilation of databases that contains information on legal immigrants who are issued green cards or visas, as well as those who become naturalized citizens. The SAVE database was not designed for the purpose of verifying voter eligibility. 30. DOS and DHS executed the MOA on August 14, 2012, at which point Defendant announced his intention to resume the Program to Purge Alleged Non-Citizens. 31. In resuming the Program to Purge Alleged Non-Citizens, Defendant stated that he will rely upon the DHSMV registry to compile a potential list of non-citizens, apparently similar to the way the DOS initially compiled the flawed lists of 2,625 and 180,000 individuals, and
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from there, will run that list against the SAVE database. After checking the DHSMV list against the SAVE database, Defendant’s spokesman Chris Cates stated that Florida will “continue to seek out names of non-citizens….” Florida Moves Forward with Voter Purge After Feds Grant Access to Database, WFSU Aug. 16, 2012, http://news.wfsu.org/post/ florida-moves-forwardvoter-purge-after-feds-grant-access-database.
32. On information and belief, training for resumption of the Program to Purge Alleged Non-Citizens has already begun in at least one county (in September 2012). See Collier to Begin Reviewing Potential Illegal Voters, WZVN Sept. 6, 2012, http://www.abc7.com/story/19476766/collier-county-to-begin-reviewing-potential-illegalvoters#.UEpqdy_LY_Y.email.
33. By letter dated August 3, 2012, Plaintiffs’ counsel reiterated its written ante litem notice that the Program to Purge Alleged Non-Citizens was in violation of the NVRA. Additionally, Plaintiffs’ counsel explained this violation to Defendant’s counsel at both the July 23, 2012 status conference held by this Court and the parties’ Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 meet and confer. To date, the violation has not been corrected. Instead, Defendant has made clear that he intends to go ahead with the Program to Purge Alleged Non-Citizens. II. Implementation of the Program to Purge Alleged Non-Citizens Within 90 Days
Prior to 2012 Federal Election Dates Violates the NVRA. 34. Section 8(c)(2)(A) of the NVRA requires that the State of Florida “complete, not later than 90 days prior to the date of a primary or general election for Federal office, any program the purpose of which is to systematically remove the names of ineligible voters from the official list of eligible voters.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(c)(2)(A). 35. The prohibition on systematic purges within 90 days of a federal election is central to the NVRA’s goals of protecting against possible disenfranchisement of eligible voters
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while ensuring accurate and current voter registration rolls. The House Report on the NVRA articulated the concerns underlying the policy against programs that systematically remove ineligible voters from the official list of eligible voters, noting that “such programs can be abused and may result in the elimination of names of voters from the rolls solely due to their failure to respond to a mailing. Abuses may be found in the design of a program as well as in its implementation.” House Report No. 103-9, H.R. REP. 103-9, 15-16, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 105, 119-20 (emphasis added). As Congress acknowledged, it is difficult for voters to identify and correct the errors of a systematic purge in the short 90-day time frame, and it is difficult for election officials to execute and implement such a systematic program properly in such a short time frame. A system-wide purge generates system-wide confusion that renders it less likely that election officials will have the time necessary to correct erroneous removals. Section 8(c)(2)(B) protects voters and election officials alike from an inevitably error-riddled purge done too close to an election by prohibiting states from conducting “any program the purpose of which is to systematically remove the names of ineligible voters” within the 90-day period.
36. The unequivocal language of this provision bans any and every systematic program other than the removals specifically exempted. The NVRA establishes clear, enumerated exceptions to the 90-day prohibition. A state may only remove from the list registered persons who fall into one of four categories: those who request to be removed, those ineligible because of criminal conviction, those ineligible because of mental incapacity, and those who have died. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-(6)(c)(2)(B). The NVRA accomplishes this by placing outside the prohibition’s ambit the categories of removals enumerated in 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-(6)(c)(3)(A) and (B) or (4)(A) and (B).
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37. Importantly, the removal of alleged non-citizen voters is not one of the enumerated exceptions to the NVRA’s 90-day prohibition. During the debates on the NVRA, Senator Mitch McConnell proposed an amendment that would have expanded the exceptions to the proscription against removal of voters from the rolls during the 90-day period. See 139 Cong. Rec. 2960 (Mar. 16, 1993) (Amendment No. 100); 139 Cong. Rec. 2970 (Amendment No. 141), and 139 Cong. Rec. 3066 (Mar. 17, 1993) (Amendment No. 169). Cf. 42 U.S.C. §1973gg6(a)(3) (2010). That amendment was not adopted.
38. Such legislative history supports the previously delineated expressio unius argument that, “[w]here Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied.” Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17 (1980). Moreover, alternative measures are readily available to deal with any known instances of non-citizen voting.
39. The primary election in Florida was held on August 14, 2012 and included federal offices. Ninety (90) days before the August 14 primary election was May 16, 2012. The Federal general election in Florida, as elsewhere, is November 6, 2012. Ninety (90) days before the November 6 election was August 8, 2012.
40. On information and belief, the majority of voters who were purged based on the Initial Purge List were removed after May 16, 2012, and thus were purged within 90 days of the primary election. On information and belief, the majority of voters on the Initial Purge List who were notified of their purported need to prove they were citizens were instructed that their deadline to return the voter eligibility forms was after May 16, 2012. Moreover, assuming that Defendant followed the requirements of Section 48.075(7), Florida Statutes, no voter on the Initial Purge List could possibly have been removed in accordance with those procedures until
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after May 16, 2012. By that time, had these procedures been followed, such removal would have necessarily violated the NVRA because it would had to have taken place after May 16, 2012.
41. Defendant’s plan to continue the Program to Purge Alleged Non-Citizens will result in systematic removal of additional voters within 90 days of the general election. At this point, there are fewer than 90 days before the November 6, 2012 Federal election. Accordingly, any notification sent to voters after May 16, 2012, including future notices based on the SAVE databases, stating that the State has flagged them as potentially ineligible based on the SAVE database will, at this point, violate the NVRA.
42. Defendant has not disputed the timelines set forth above. However, despite the NVRA’s ban on systematic purges within the 90 days prior to an election, as set forth above, Defendant instructed the Supervisors of Elections to continue to carry out the Program to Purge Alleged Non-Citizens, as it was initially construed, by reviewing the Initial Purge List within 90 days of the primary, conducting Additional Research, sending out notices and voter eligibility forms, and removing voters under Fla. Stat. § 98.075(7). Similarly, Defendant has stated publicly that he plans a systematic purge targeting additional voters based on use of the SAVE database within 90 days of the general election.
43. Defendant has sought to excuse these actions by creating a new exception to Section 8(c)(2)(A) that allows removals of alleged noncitizens within the 90-day period. Defendant is wrong. As explained above, the provision prohibits “any program … to systematically remove” ineligible voters from the roll. Removal of alleged non-citizen voters is not an enumerated exception to the NVRA’s 90-day provision.
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COUNT I DECLARATORY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2201 AND SECTION 8(C)(2)(A) OF THE NVRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1973GG-6(C)(2)(A) 44. Plaintiffs incorporate Paragraphs 1 through 43 above. 45. This is an action for declaratory relief pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the Program to Purge Alleged Non-Citizens violates Section 8(c)(2)(A) of the NVRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(c)(2)(A), which bars systematic purges within 90 days of an election, except in limited and specific circumstances not found here. 46. There is a bona fide, actual, present and practical need for the requested declaration. The Program to Purge Alleged Non-Citizens deprives eligible voters, including Individual Plaintiffs, of their rights under the NVRA. The Program to Purge Alleged NonCitizens also disenfranchises voters within the communities that Organizational Plaintiffs serve and thus frustrates the missions of Organizational Plaintiffs. 47. Defendant has repeatedly confirmed his intent to continue the Program to Purge Alleged Non-Citizens.
COUNT II INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 48. Plaintiffs incorporate Paragraphs 1 through 43 above. 49. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-9(b)(2), provides for injunctive relief to redress a violation of the NVRA. 50. Plaintiffs have a strong likelihood of suffering irreparable and substantial harm as a result of the Program to Purge Alleged Non-Citizens. Unless this Court enjoins Defendant’s planned systematic removal of additional voters, more eligible voters will be removed from the rolls between now and the November election in violation of the NVRA.
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51. The public interest weighs strongly in favor of letting every lawful, eligible voter

exercise the right to vote.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request that the Court enter a judgment declaring that:

(a)

the Program to Purge Alleged Non-Citizens violates Section 8(c)(2)(A) of the

NVRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(c)(2)(A), which bars systematic purges within

90 days of an election, except in limited and specific circumstances not found

here;

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request that the Court enter a preliminary and a permanent

injunction:

A. declaring that the Program to Purge Alleged Non-Citizens, specifically including plans to remove additional voters based on use of the SAVE database, is a systematic purge within ninety (90) days of a Federal election and is therefore unlawful under the NVRA;
B. enjoining the Defendant from implementing the Program to Purge Alleged NonCitizens, specifically including plans to remove additional voters based on use of the SAVE database;
C. prohibiting Defendant from enforcing standards, practices, procedures and/or programs that deny persons of color and members of language minority groups who are United States citizens an opportunity to participate effectively in the political process on an equal basis with other members of the electorate;
D. filing with the Court, within five days of the issuance of an injunction, a list of voters removed pursuant to the Purge, and a report stating which voters have been reinstated and providing confirmation of the steps that Defendant is taking to comply with the injunction;
E. granting such further relief as the needs and interests of justice require, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, including litigation expenses and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-9(c).

Dated: September 12, 2012

Respectfully submitted, By: /s/ John De Leon

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Of Counsel:
Catherine M. Flanagan Michelle Kanter Cohen PROJECT VOTE 1350 I St., N.W., Suite 1250 Washington, DC 20005 (202) 546-4173 (202) 629-3754 (fax) cflanagan@projectvote.org mkantercohen@projectvote.org
Ben Hovland FAIR ELECTIONS LEGAL NETWORK 1825 K Street NW, Suite 450 Washington, DC 20006 (202) 248-5346 (202) 331-1663 (fax) bhovland@fairelectionsnetwork.com
Juan Cartagena Jose Perez, Esq. Diana Sen, Esq. LATINOJUSTICE PRLDEF 99 Hudson Street, 14th Floor New York, NY 10013-2815 (212) 219-3360 (212) 431-4276 (fax) jcartagena@latinojustice.org jperez@latinojustice.org dsen@latinojustice.org

John De Leon Florida Bar No. 650390 LAW OFFICES OF CHAVEZ & DE LEON 5975 Sunset Drive, Suite 605 South Miami, FL 33143 (305) 740-5347 (305) 740-5348 (fax) jdeleon@chavez-deleon.com
Lorelie S. Masters Marc A. Goldman JENNER & BLOCK, LLP 1099 New York Ave., N.W. Suite 900 Washington, DC 20001-4412 (202) 639-6000 (202) 639-6066 (fax) lmasters@jenner.com mgoldman@jenner.com
J. Gerald Hebert Campaign Legal Center 215 E Street NE Washington, DC 20002 (202) 736-2200 ghebert@campaignlegalcenter.org
Katherine Roberson-Young, Esq. Florida Bar No. 038169 3000 Biscayne Blvd., Suite 212 Miami, Florida 33137 (305) 571-4082 (305) 571-1396 (fax) katherine.roberson-young@seiu.org
Penda Hair Katherine Culliton-Gonzalez, Esq. Uzoma Nkwonta, Esq. ADVANCEMENT PROJECT 1220 L Street, N.W., Suite 850 Washington, D.C. 20005
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Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 57 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/12/2012 Page 20 of 21 (202) 728-9557 (202) 728-9558 (fax) pendahair@advancementproject.org kcullitongonzalez@advancementproject.org unkwonta@advancementproject.org Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that, on September 12, 2012, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served on all counsel of record via CM/ECF.

Dated: September 12, 2012

By: /s/ John De Leon_____ John De Leon

21

 
 Part Description 1 14 pages 2 Exhibit 1 3 Exhibit 2

Multiple Documents

© 2012 Bloomberg Finance L.P. All rights reserved. For terms of service see bloomberglaw.com // PAGE 1 Document Link: http://www.bloomberglaw.com/ms/document/X1Q6M8H68N82?documentName=67.xml

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI DIVISION
Case No. 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Honorable Judge William J. Zloch
KARLA VANESSA ARCIA, an individual, MELANDE ANTOINE, an individual, VEYEYO, a civic organization based in Miami-Dade County, FLORIDA IMMIGRANT COALITION, INC., a Florida non-profit corporation, NATIONAL CONGRESS FOR PUERTO RICAN RIGHTS, a Pennsylvania nonprofit corporation, and 1199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST, a Labor Union,
Plaintiffs,
v.
KEN DETZNER, in his official capacity as Florida Secretary of State,
Defendant.

MOTION OF BIPARTISAN GROUP OF VOTERS LUIS I. GARCIA, DIANA K. WHITEHURST, HAL DAVID RUSH, AND BARBARA A. DEREUIL FOR INTERVENTION UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 24
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24, Luis I. Garcia, Diana K. Whitehurst, Hal David Rush, and Barbara A. Dereuil (collectively, “Intervenors”) move for intervention in this action. In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(c), Intervenors attach their proposed Answer as Exhibit 1 to this Motion.
Intervenors are a bipartisan group of properly registered and duly qualified voters of the State of Florida who intend to vote in the November 6, 2012 general election (the “General

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Election”). Intervenors are entitled to intervene in this action because the outcome of the action may impair their constitutional right to vote by allowing their votes to be diluted, cancelled out, or effectively nullified by votes from non-citizens who are otherwise ineligible to vote but remain on the voter rolls.
THE UNDERLYING LITIGATION
In February 2012, an investigative report by NBC2 news in Florida revealed that approximately 100 non-citizens were registered to vote in two counties in Southwest Florida. See Andy Pierotti, NBC2 Investigates: Voter Fraud – Part 2, NBC-2.Com (Feb. 2, 2012, 8:58 PM) available online at: http://www.nbc-2.com/ story/16666098/2012/02/02/nbc2-investigatesvoter-fraud-part-2 (last visited Sept. 18, 2012). The reporter uncovered the non-citizen registered voters by comparing jury excusal forms, on which the putative voters sought to be excused from jury duty on the grounds that they were not U.S. citizens, with the voter registration rolls, which both state law and state constitution require to be limited to U.S. citizens. FLA. CONST., art. VI, § 2; Fla. Stat. § 97.041(1)(a)(2) (2011). Several of the non-citizen registered voters reportedly have a history of voting in federal elections. See Andy Pierotti, NBC2 Investigates: Voter Fraud, NBC-2.Com (Feb. 2, 2012, 2:34 PM), available online at: http://www.nbc-2.com/story/16666098/2012/02/02/nbc2-investigates-voter-fraud (last visited Sept. 18, 2012).
Consistent with this revelation, the Florida Secretary of State (“the SOS”) subsequently identified thousands of registered voters who had submitted official documents declaring they are not U.S. citizens.1 The self-identified non-citizen registered voters submitted these

1 Under Fla. Stat. § 92.012, the SOS is the chief elections officer of the State of Florida and is therefore responsible for administration of state laws that affect voting, and for ensuring that elections in Florida are conducted in accordance with federal law. Additionally, the SOS is

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documents, including driver’s license applications, under oath or under the penalty of perjury. In April 2012, the SOS forwarded a sample of roughly 2,600 such records to Florida county election supervisors for their additional review (“the April List”). In accordance with Florida law, the county election supervisors provided notice to the registered voters identified on the April List. See Fla. Stat. § 98.075(7). In part, the notice informed each of the registered voters on the April List of his or her potential ineligibility to vote, and also that failure to respond to the notice may result in the otherwise registered voter’s removal from the voter rolls.
Although the April List indicated that a substantial amount of voting by non-citizens had occurred in Florida, it also demonstrated that a number of eligible voters became naturalized citizens after submitting the official documents from which the April List was created. See First Amended Compl., D.E. #57, ¶ 25. Accordingly, the SOS requested access to more recent citizenship information contained in the Department of Homeland Security’s Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (“SAVE”) database. Id. The Department of Homeland Security initially denied the SOS’s request, and eventually litigation ensued. See Florida Dept. of State v. United States Dept. of Homeland Security et al., Case No. 1:12-CV-00960 (D.D.C.).
On June 6, 2012, Plaintiffs filed this action against the SOS, alleging the SOS’s actions in identifying ineligible voters through the April List violated § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, and §§ 8(b)(1) and 8(c)(2)(A) of the National Voting Registration Act (“NVRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1873gg. See Complaint, D.E. #1, ¶ 1-3. After Plaintiffs filed their Complaint, the SOS received access to the SAVE database, and subsequently agreed to use the SAVE database to verify the accuracy of the April List. First Amended Compl., D.E. #57, ¶ 28-

responsible for coordinating Florida’s duties and responsibilities under the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (“NVRA”). 42 U.S.C. § 1873gg.

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30. As a result, Plaintiffs dismissed the bulk of their claims in this suit and amended their Complaint. See Stipulation of Dismissal, D.E. #56; First Amended Compl., D.E. #57.
Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint alleges that the SOS resumed efforts to identify noncitizens on the voter rolls after receiving access to the SAVE database. See First Amended Compl., D.E. #57, ¶ 28-33. Plaintiffs now claim that the SOS’s actions violate § 8(c)(2)(A) of the NVRA, which requires the State of Florida to “complete, not later than 90 days prior to the date of a primary or general election for Federal office, any program the purpose of which is to systematically remove the names of ineligible voters from the official list of eligible voters.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(c)(2)(A).
ARGUMENT
Rule 24 provides for a third party’s intervention into an existing action. There are two distinct types of intervention: intervention as of right, governed by Rule 24(a); and intervention with permission from the Court (permissive intervention), governed by Rule 24(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24.
I. Intervenors Have a Right to Intervene in This Action
Rule 24(a)(2) provides for intervention as of right when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). The Rule thus creates a four-part test for non-statutory intervention as of right. A proposed intervenor must show (1) timeliness of their motion; (2) a sufficient protectable legal interest; (3) impairment of that interest absent intervention; and (4) inadequate

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representation by the existing parties. See Athens Lumber Co., Inc. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 690 F.2d 1364, 1366 (11th Cir. 1982).
Once these prerequisites to intervention are established, no discretion exists to deny Intervenors’ motion. United States v. Georgia, 19 F.3d 1388, 1393 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). Any doubts about satisfaction of Rule 24(a)(2)’s prerequisites should be “resolved in favor of the proposed intervenor.” Tweedle v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 527 F.3d 664, 671 (8th Cir. 2008).
Here, Intervenors satisfy the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2).

A. Intervenors Have a Legally Protectable Interest in this Case —The Constitutional Right to Prevent Vote Dilution
“[A] legally protectable interest is something more than an economic interest.” Mt.

Hawley Ins. Co. v. Sandy Lake Props., Inc., 425 F.3d 1308, 1311 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal

quotation marks omitted). “[A] legally protectable interest is an interest that derives from a legal

right,” i.e., an interest “which the substantive law recognizes.” Id.

Here, Intevenors’ legally protectable interest derives from their constitutional right to

vote. The “right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a

citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.”

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964); see Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 226

(1974) (“The right to an honest [count] is a right possessed by each voting elector, and to the

extent that the importance of his vote is nullified, wholly or in part, he has been injured in the

free exercise of a right or privilege secured to him by the laws and Constitution of the United

States.”); accord Touchston v. McDermott, 234 F.3d 1133, 1145 (11th Cir. 2000). Indeed,

claims of vote dilution present sufficiently concrete and personalized injuries as to impart

Intervenors with personal standing. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 207-08 (1962).

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The question whether personalized injury sufficient to satisfy Article III standing is also sufficient to satisfy Rule 24(a)(2)’s legally protectable interest has split the Circuits. Compare United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855, 859 (7th Cir. 1985) (“The interest of a proposed intervenor . . . must be greater than the interest sufficient to satisfy the standing requirement.”) with Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Kelly, 747 F.2d 777, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating that an interest necessary to intervene is equivalent to interest necessary to confer standing).
The Eleventh Circuit has noted this split of authority, but has not weighed in on the issue. Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1212-13 (11th Cir. 1989). Even so, the Eleventh Circuit has used standing cases to help define the legally protectable interest an intervenor must assert. See Dillard v. Chilton, 495 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2007); Howard v. McLucas, 782 F.2d 956, 959 (11th Cir.1986) (finding that a movant who shows standing has a sufficiently substantial interest to intervene). In so doing, the Eleventh Circuit has acknowledged that vote dilution is a sufficiently particular interest to support intervention as of right. Dillard, 495 F.3d at 1333 (“The distinction referenced in Lance refers to the difference between plaintiffs such as those in Baker and Whitcomb v. Chavis, who alleged concrete and personalized injuries in the form of denials of equal treatment or of vote dilution, and plaintiffs like those in the instant case, Baldwin III, or Lance itself, who merely seek to protect an asserted interest in being free of an allegedly illegal electoral system”) (internal citation omitted); Clark v. Putnam Cty., 168 F.3d 458, 461 (11th Cir. 1999) (allowing African-American voters to intervene in support of county commissioners to defend a single-member district voting system). Other courts agree. See League of United Latin American Citizens, Dist. 19 v. City of Boerne, 659 F.3d 421, 434-35 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that right to vote is sufficient to satisfy Article III standing, as well as Rule

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24(a)(2)’s legally protectable interest requirement); Johnson v. Mortham, 915 F. Supp. 1529, 1536 (N.D. Fla. 1995) (“Registered voters have standing, and a sufficiently substantial interest to intervene, in an action challenging the voting district in which the voters are registered.”).

B. Denial of Intervenors’ Motion Would Impair Intervenors’ Right to Vote Intervenors are “so situated that the disposition of the lawsuit will, as a practical matter, impair their ability to protect their interests.” Chiles, 865 F.2d at 1214. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the SOS’s actions violate § 8(c)(2)(A) of the NVRA, and an injunction compelling the SOS to halt “plans to remove additional voters based on use of the SAVE database.” First Amended Compl., D.E. #57, Prayer for Relief. If granted, such relief may preclude the SOS from identifying non-citizens on the voting rolls before the General Election. This will dilute the effect of Intervenors’ votes by allowing otherwise ineligible voters to participate in the General Election. It is of no moment that any declaration or injunction granted in this case will be directed only at the SOS, as opposed to Intervenors. Federal statutory cases frequently pit private, state, and federal interests against each other. In such circumstances, private parties may ensure their position is heard by intervening. To this end, Kleisser v. United States Forest Service is instructive. 157 F.3d 964, 971 (3d Cir. 1998). There, the Third Circuit permitted timber companies to intervene as a matter of right, on the side of the U.S. Forest Service, even though the Forest Service was the only party able to comply with the federal statute at issue. Kleissler¸ 157 F.3d at 971. The Third Circuit allowed intervention because the Government might have been tempted to agree to a settlement that excluded the would-be intervenors from competing for future logging contracts. In so doing, the Third Circuit noted as follows: “We are reluctant to endorse a narrow approach that makes the onus of compliance [with a federal statute] the litmus

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test for intervention. . . . Rigid rules in such cases contravene a major premise of intervention— the protection of third parties affected by pending litigation. Evenhandedness is of paramount importance.” Id.
Nor is it a bar to intervention that Intervenors could litigate in a separate action, or in the future. See Natural Res. Defense Council v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904, 909 (D.C. Cir. 1977). “The central purpose of the 1966 amendment [to Rule 24] was to allow intervention by those who might be practically disadvantaged by the disposition of the action and to repudiate the view, [under the former rule], that intervention must be limited to those who would be legally bound as a matter of res judicata.” 7C Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 1908.2, at 301 (3d ed.). Indeed, the need for resolution of this suit—and Intervenors’ interests in this suit—before the General Election counsels in favor of intervention. It is more efficient to resolve this dispute in one lawsuit rather than two.

C. Intervenors’ Interest is Not Adequately Represented by the Existing Parties Intervenors’ interest in this case is not adequately represented by the existing parties. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 462 (2003) (considering and affirming, over the United States’ objections, the District Court’s grant of a motion to intervene because the “intervenors’ analysis. . . identifies interests that are not adequately represented by the existing parties.”) First, Intervenors obviously disagree with the premises and claims in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint. Second, Intervenors’ incentives and interests do not necessarily align with those of the SOS. On August 24, 2012, this Court ordered “all Parties . . . to participate in mediation.” Amended Order of Referral to Mediation, D.E. #47, ¶ 1. At mediation, each party must appear “with full authority to enter into a full and complete compromise and settlement,” otherwise “the

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Court may impose sanctions.” Id. at ¶¶ 4, 7. In order to reach such a compromise and settlement, the SOS may cease or halt any existing efforts he is making to identify non-citizens on the voter rolls. Alternatively, the SOS may agree to postpone existing efforts to identify noncitizens on the voter rolls in order to moot this case. Under either scenario, Intervenors’ rights will be impaired as explained above. Indeed, the SOS’s past actions demonstrate an openness to ceasing activities related to identifying non-citizens on the voter rolls and settling similar voter litigation. See League of Women Voters of Florida v. Detzner, Case No. 4:11-cv-628-RH/CAS, D.E. #84, (N.D. Fla. Aug. 31, 2012) (third-party voter registration litigation); Florida v. United States, Case No. 1:11-cv-01428-CKK-MG-ESH, D.E. #158, (D.D.C. Sept. 5, 2012) (preclearance litigation).

D. Intervenors’ Motion is Timely Finally, Intervenors’ motion is timely. In determining whether a motion to intervene is timely, the Court considers the following four factors: (1) the length of time during which Intervenors knew, or should have known, of their interest in the case before moving to intervene, (2) the extent of the prejudice to existing parties as a result of Intervenors’ failure to move for intervention as soon as they knew, or reasonably should have known, of their interests, (3) the extent of prejudice to Intervenors, and (4) the existence of unusual mitigating circumstances militating either for or against a determination that Intervenors’ motion was timely. See Chiles, 865 F.2d at 1213. “Timeliness is not a word of exactitude or of precisely measurable dimensions.” Id. (quoting McDonald v. E. J. Lavino Co., 430 F.2d 1065, 1074 (5th Cir. 1970)). Here, there is not an extended length of time in which Intervenors knew, or should have known, of their interest in this case. This case is but three months old. Moreover, Plaintiffs’ initial claims related to the April List and were seemingly moot after the SOS received access to

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the SAVE database. Plaintiffs’ current claim—challenging the validity of the SOS’s actions involving the SAVE database—did not materialize until September 12, 2012. Nor will Plaintiffs suffer prejudice from any purported delay in Intervenors’ filing of this motion four business days after Plaintiffs amended their Complaint.

II. In the Alternative, the Court Should Exercise Its Discretion Under Rule 24(b) and
Permit Intervenors to Intervene in this Action
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b) provides, “On timely motion, the court may permit

anyone to intervene who . . . has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common

question of law or fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B).

“[I]t is wholly discretionary with the court whether to allow intervention under Rule

24(b).” Worlds v. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 929 F.2d 591, 595 (11th Cir. 1991). “Rule

24(b) is just about economy in litigation. Because less is at stake for a party seeking intervention

under Rule 24(b) than under Rule 24(a), . . . the standard of appellate review is more deferential

(“abuse of discretion”) under Rule 24(b).” City of Chicago v. FEMA, 660 F.3d 980, 987 (7th

Cir. 2011) (Posner, J.); see also Medical Liab. Mutual Ins. Co. v. Alan Curtis LLC, 485 F.3d

1006, 1008 (8th Cir. 2007) (employing abuse of discretion standard).

As described above, Intervenors have “an interest that is relating to the action pending

before the court.” United States v. Lee Cty., No. 2:12-CV-67-FtM-29SPC, 2012 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 66887, at *9 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 19, 2012). Intervenors are a bipartisan group of properly

registered and duly qualified voters who intend to vote in the November 6, 2012 general election.

Plaintiffs are attempting to stop the SOS both from confirming the citizenship status of self-

identified non-citizens, and from removing confirmed non-citizens from the voter rolls. If

Plaintiffs are successful, Intervenors’ properly cast votes will be diluted by votes from ineligible

electors in derogation of Intervenors’ constitutional right to vote. Intervenors wish to participate

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in this lawsuit to assist in interpreting § 8(c)(2)(A) of the NVRA in accordance with its plain text, structure and legislative history. See Johnson v. Gov. of Florida, 405 F.3d 1214, 1229 (11th Cir. 2005) (applying the cannon of constitutional avoidance to the Voting Rights Act).
The interests of Intervenors and the SOS are not coextensive; neither are the arguments each may potentially make before the Court. Previously, Intervenors moved to intervene in a similar case in the Northern District of Florida. There, the Department of Justice sued the SOS, arguing for the same interpretation of § 8(c)(2)(A) of the NVRA as Plaintiffs put forward here. Even though the SOS and Intervenors took the same side in the action, their arguments in defense of the SOS’s actions were, in part, different. The Northern District court allowed Intervernors to intervene and then considered all arguments, before adopting an interpretation of the NVRA consistent with the positions advocated by the SOS and Intervenors. See United States v. Florida, Case No. 4:12-CV-285-RH/CAS, D.E. #34 (N.D. Fla. June 28, 2012) (attached hereto as Exhibit 2).
For example, Intervenors argued that the NVRA distinguishes between “programs” and “activities,” with the statute’s 90-day exclusion applying to the former and the SOS’s activities falling under the latter. Intervenors also argued that the NVRA’s 90-day exclusion contains an exception for “correction of registration records,” 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-(6)(c)(2)(B)(ii), applicable to the SOS’s actions. The SOS did not make either statutory argument.
Intervenors also advanced constitutional arguments in the Northern District of Florida that the SOS did not pursue. Intervenors argued that a proper reading of the NVRA avoids vote dilution, which is an inevitable consequence of the statutory interpretation put forward by Plaintiffs in this action. Intervenors further argued that Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the NVRA would exclude maintenance of voter registration rolls for 180 days in every election year (when

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people are most inclined to register to vote), thus endangering Florida’s obligation to determine electors to Congress under Article I, § 2 and the Seventh Amendment. Moreover, such a protracted exclusionary period would jeopardize Florida’s obligation under state law to “protect the integrity of the electoral process by ensuring the maintenance of accurate and current voter registration records,” Fla. Stat. § 98.075(1), and obligation under federal law to “ensure that voter registration records in the State are accurate and are updated regularly” in order to “remove registrants who are ineligible to vote,” 42 U.S.C. § 15483(a).

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO LOCAL RULE 7.1(a)(3) The undersigned counsel certifies that she has conferred with counsel for Defendant Ken Detzner, who indicated that Defendant Detzner does not oppose the relief sought herein; and that her office has made reasonable efforts to confer with counsel for Plaintiffs, which efforts included leaving multiple messages for Plaintiffs’ local counsel and counsel at the Fair Elections Legal Network, the latter of whom indicated that he would consult with his co-counsel and inform the undersigned counsel’s office of Plaintiffs’ position but has yet to do so.
CONCLUSION This action against the SOS threatens to substantially burden Intervenors’ constitutional right to vote by allowing their votes to be diluted, cancelled out, or effectively nullified by votes from non-citizens who are ineligible to vote. Intervenors’ right to vote is a significant protectable interest that could be detrimentally impaired by the resolution of this suit, either in settlement or by the Court. As a result, Intervenors request that this Court grant their Motion to Intervene as of Right under Rule 24(a)(2), or permissively under Rule 24(b)(2). Intervenors also

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McDonald Hopkins LLC, Attorneys at Law 200 South Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 3130, Miami, Florida 33131  1.305.704.3990

Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 67 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/20/2012 Page 13 of 14

respectfully request that the Court set an expedited briefing schedule that will allow them to fully participate in this action, given the compressed nature of the proceedings.

DATED: September 20, 2012
Joseph C. Smith, Jr., Esquire joseph.smith@bartlit-beck.com Bartlit Beck Herman Palenchar & Scott LLP 1899 Wynkoop Street, 8th Floor Denver, CO 80202 Telephone: (303) 592-3100 Facsimile: (303) 592-3140
Pro Hac Vice Pending
Nevin M. Gewertz, Esquire nevin.gewertz@bartlit-beck.com Bartlit Beck Herman Palenchar & Scott LLP 54 W. Hubbard, Suite 300 Chicago, IL 60654 Telephone: (312) 494-4400 Facsimile: (312) 494-4440
Pro Hac Vice Pending

Respectfully submitted,
/s Raquel A. Rodriguez Raquel A. Rodriguez (Fla. Bar No. 511439) rrodriguez@mcdonaldhopkins.com David Axelman (Fla. Bar No. 90872) daxelman@mcdonaldhopkins.com McDonald Hopkins LLC 200 South Biscayne Blvd., Suite 3130 Miami, FL 33131 Telephone: (305) 704-3994 Facsimile: (305) 704-3999 Attorneys for Putative Defendant-Intervenors

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McDonald Hopkins LLC, Attorneys at Law 200 South Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 3130, Miami, Florida 33131  1.305.704.3990

Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 67 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/20/2012 Page 14 of 14
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that on September 20, 2012, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was filed with the Clerk of Court via the CM/ECF system, causing a Notice of Electronic Filing to be sent to all counsel of record.
s/ Raquel A. Rodriguez Raquel A. Rodriguez

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McDonald Hopkins LLC, Attorneys at Law 200 South Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 3130, Miami, Florida 33131  1.305.704.3990

Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 67-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/20/2012 Page 1 of 8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI DIVISION
Case No. 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Honorable Judge William J. Zloch
KARLA VANESSA ARCIA, an individual, MELANDE ANTOINE, an individual, VEYEYO, a civic organization based in Miami-Dade County, FLORIDA IMMIGRANT COALITION, INC., a Florida non-profit corporation, NATIONAL CONGRESS FOR PUERTO RICAN RIGHTS, a Pennsylvania nonprofit corporation, and 1199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST, a Labor Union,
Plaintiffs,
v.
KEN DETZNER, in his official capacity as Florida Secretary of State,
Defendant,
LUIS I. GARCIA, DIANA K. WHITEHURST, HAL DAVID RUSH, and BARBARA A. DEREUIL,
Defendant-Intervenors.
DEFENDANT-INTERVENORS’ ANSWER
Defendant-Intervenors Luis I. Garcia, Diana K. Whitehurst, Hal David Rush, and Barbara
A. Dereuil, a bipartisan group of eligible Florida voters (hereafter, “Intervenors”), by and
through undersigned counsel, hereby Answer the Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (D.E.
#57) as follows:

{3980037:}

1

Exhibit 1

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1. To the extent this paragraph contains legal conclusions, it does not require a responsive pleading. To the extent this paragraph contains factual allegations, Intervenors are otherwise without knowledge and therefore the allegations are denied.
2. To the extent this paragraph contains factual allegations, Intervenors are otherwise without knowledge and therefore the allegations are denied.
3. To the extent this paragraph contains factual allegations, Intervenors are otherwise without knowledge and therefore the allegations are denied.
4. To the extent this paragraph contains factual allegations, Intervenors are otherwise without knowledge and therefore the allegations are denied.
5. To the extent this paragraph purports to cite the NVRA, the NVRA speaks for itself and this paragraph does not require a responsive pleading. To the extent this paragraph contains legal conclusions, it does not require a responsive pleading. To the extent this paragraph contains factual allegations, Intervenors are otherwise without knowledge and therefore the allegations are denied.
6. To the extent this paragraph purports to cite federal statutes, the statutes speak for themselves and this paragraph does not require a responsive pleading. To the extent this paragraph contains legal conclusions, no responsive pleading is required.
7. To the extent this paragraph purports to cite the NVRA, the NVRA speaks for itself and this paragraph does not require a responsive pleading.
8. Admitted. 9. To the extent this paragraph contains factual allegations, Intervenors are otherwise without knowledge and therefore the allegations are denied.

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10. To the extent this paragraph contains factual allegations, Intervenors are otherwise without knowledge and therefore the allegations are denied.
11. To the extent this paragraph contains factual allegations, Intervenors are otherwise without knowledge and therefore the allegations are denied.
12. To the extent this paragraph contains factual allegations, Intervenors are otherwise without knowledge and therefore the allegations are denied.
13. To the extent this paragraph contains factual allegations, Intervenors are otherwise without knowledge and therefore the allegations are denied.
14. To the extent this paragraph contains factual allegations, Intervenors are otherwise without knowledge and therefore the allegations are denied.
15. To the extent this paragraph contains factual allegations, Intervenors are otherwise without knowledge and therefore the allegations are denied.
16. Admitted. 17. Admitted that the there is a press release dated May 9, 2012, issued by the Florida Secretary of State, which speaks for itself. To the extent this paragraph contains other factual allegations, Intervenors are otherwise without knowledge and therefore the allegations are denied. 18. Admitted that the there is a press release dated May 9, 2012, issued by the Florida Secretary of State, which speaks for itself. To the extent this paragraph contains other factual allegations, Intervenors are otherwise without knowledge and therefore the allegations are denied. 19. Intervenors admit that in early April 2012, the Florida Division of Elections (“DOE”) sent to the 67 Florida county Supervisors of Elections a list of voters identified as potentially

{3980037:}

3

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ineligible due to lack of citizenship and that the document speaks for itself. To the extent this paragraph contains other factual allegations, Intervenors are otherwise without knowledge and therefore the allegations are denied.
20. Admitted that in late April of 2012, the Florida Secretary of State conducted a Webinar with the County Supervisors of Elections, which included a PowerPoint document entitled “Processing Ineligible Registered Voter-Non-Immigrants,” and that the Webinar and PowerPoint documents speak for themselves. To the extent the paragraph contains other factual allegations, Intervenors are otherwise without knowledge and the allegations are therefore denied.
21. The May 9 Press Release and Webinar speak for themselves, and therefore do not require a responsive pleading. To the extent the paragraph contains other factual allegations, Intervenors are otherwise without knowledge and the allegations are therefore denied.
22. As to the first and third sentences, the Webinar speaks for itself. To the extent the first and third sentences contain other factual allegations, Intervenors are otherwise without knowledge and the allegations are denied. As to the second sentence, Intervenors admit that there were media reports of citizens on the sample list created by the Florida Secretary of State; those reports speak for themselves. To the extent the second sentence contains other factual allegations, Intervenors are otherwise without knowledge and the allegations are therefore denied.
23. To the extent this paragraph contains factual allegations, Intervenors are otherwise without knowledge and the allegations are therefore denied.
24. To the extent this paragraph purports to characterize the contents of letters sent by individual Florida Supervisors of Elections, the letters speak for themselves and do not require a

{3980037:}

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Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 67-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/20/2012 Page 5 of 8
responsive pleading. To the extent this paragraph contains other factual allegations, Intervenors are otherwise without knowledge and the allegations are therefore denied.
25. To the extent this paragraph contains factual allegations, Intervenors are otherwise without knowledge and the allegations are denied.
26. The NVRA speaks for itself and does not require a responsive pleading. To the extent this paragraph contains other factual allegations, Intervenors are otherwise without knowledge and the allegations are denied.
27. Admitted as to the timing of the November 6, 2012 election. To the extent this paragraph contains other factual allegations, Intervenors are otherwise without knowledge and the allegations are denied.
28. To the extent this paragraph purports to characterize certain letters, the letters speak for themselves and do not require a responsive pleading. To the extent this paragraph contains factual allegations, Intervenors are otherwise without knowledge and the allegations are denied.
29. Admitted that the SAVE database is a compilation of databases containing information on legal immigrants. To the extent this paragraph contains allegations about the purpose for which the SAVE database was designed, Intervenors are otherwise without knowledge and therefore the allegations are denied.
30. To the extent this paragraph purports to characterize a MOA, the MOA speaks for itself and does not require a responsive pleading. To the extent this paragraph contains factual allegations, Intervenors are otherwise without knowledge and the allegations are denied.
31. To the extent this paragraph purports to characterize the contents of a website, the website speaks for itself and the paragraph does not require a responsive pleading. To the extent

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5

Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 67-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/20/2012 Page 6 of 8
this paragraph contains factual allegations, Intervenors are otherwise without knowledge and therefore the allegations are denied.
32. To the extent this paragraph purports to characterize the contents of a website, the website speaks for itself and the paragraph does not require a responsive pleading. To the extent this paragraph contains factual allegations, Intervenors are otherwise without knowledge and therefore the allegations are denied.
33. To the extent this paragraph contains legal conclusions, it does not require a responsive pleading. To the extent this paragraph contains factual allegations, Intervenors are otherwise without knowledge and therefore the allegations are denied.
34. The NVRA speaks for itself and does not require a responsive pleading. 35. The NVRA and the House Report on the NVRA speak for themselves and do not require responsive pleadings. To the extent this paragraph contains legal conclusions, it does not require a responsive pleading. 36. The NVRA speaks for itself and does not require a responsive pleading. To the extent this paragraph contains legal conclusions, it does not require a responsive pleading. 37. The NVRA speaks for itself. To the extent this paragraph contains factual allegations, Intervenors are otherwise without knowledge and therefore the allegations are denied. 38. The cited case, Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 46 U.S. 608 (1980), speaks for itself and does not require a responsive pleading. To the extent this paragraph contains legal conclusions, it does not require a responsive pleading. To the extent this paragraph contains factual allegations, Intervenors are otherwise without knowledge and therefore the allegations are denied. 39. Admitted.

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40. To the extent this paragraph contains legal conclusions, it does not require a responsive pleading. To the extent this paragraph contains factual allegations, Intervenors are otherwise without knowledge and therefore the allegations are denied.
41. Admitted as to the timing of the November 6, 2012 election. To the extent this paragraph contains legal conclusions, it does not require a responsive pleading. To the extent this paragraph contains factual allegations, Intervenors are otherwise without knowledge and therefore the allegations are denied.
42. The NVRA speaks for itself and does not require a responsive pleading. To the extent this paragraph contains legal conclusions, it does not require a responsive pleading. To the extent this paragraph contains factual allegations, Intervenors are otherwise without knowledge and therefore the allegations are denied.
43. The NVRA speaks for itself and does not require a responsive pleading. To the extent this paragraph contains legal conclusions, it does not require a responsive pleading. To the extent this paragraph contains factual allegations, they are denied.
COUNT ONE 44. Intervenors incorporate by reference their answers to paragraphs 1 through 43 as if fully set forth herein. 45. Admitted that Plaintiffs have filed an action for declaratory relief. To the extent this paragraph purports to cite the NVRA, the NVRA speaks for itself and does not require a responsive pleading. To the extent this paragraph contains factual allegations, they are denied. 46. Denied. 47. Denied.

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COUNT TWO 48. Intervenors incorporate by reference their answers to paragraphs 1 through 43 as if fully set forth herein. 49. The NVRA speaks for itself and therefore does not require a responsive pleading. 50. Denied. 51. Denied.

Joseph C. Smith, Jr., Esquire joseph.smith@bartlit-beck.com Bartlit Beck Herman Palenchar & Scott LLP 1899 Wynkoop Street, 8th Floor Denver, CO 80202 Telephone: (303) 592-3100 Facsimile: (303) 592-3140
Pro Hac Vice Pending
Nevin M. Gewertz, Esquire nevin.gewertz@bartlit-beck.com Bartlit Beck Herman Palenchar & Scott LLP 54 W. Hubbard, Suite 300 Chicago, IL 60654 Telephone: (312) 494-4400 Facsimile: (312) 494-4440
Pro Hac Vice Pending

Respectfully submitted,
/s Raquel A. Rodriguez Raquel A. Rodriguez (Fla. Bar No. 511439) rrodriguez@mcdonaldhopkins.com David Axelman (Fla. Bar No. 90872) daxelman@mcdonaldhopkins.com McDonald Hopkins LLC 200 South Biscayne Blvd., Suite 3130 Miami, FL 33131 Telephone: (305) 704-3994 Facsimile: (305) 704-3999 Attorneys for Defendant-Intervenors

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on September 20, 2012, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was filed with the Clerk of Court via the CM/ECF system, causing a Notice of Electronic Filing to be sent to all counsel of record.
s/ Raquel A. Rodriguez Raquel A. Rodriguez

{3980037:}

8

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Page 1 of 11
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

CASE NO. 4:12cv285-RH/CAS

STATE OF FLORIDA and KEN DETZNER, Secretary of State, in his official capacity,

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

ORDER DENYING A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

This case arises from a program that the Florida Secretary of State began and then voluntarily abandoned to identify and remove noncitizens from the Florida voter-registration rolls. The United States has sued the Secretary and the State of Florida, asserting violations of the National Voter Registration Act. The United States has moved for a temporary restraining order. In substance, the motion may seek a preliminary injunction, but the nomenclature makes no difference. This order confirms the ruling announced at greater length on the record at the conclusion of a hearing on the motion. The order denies the motion primarily because the Secretary has abandoned the program.

Case No. 4:12cv285-RH/CAS

Exhibit 2

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Page 2 of 11
I The Secretary is Florida’s chief elections officer, but each county has its own Supervisor of Elections. A Supervisor of Elections is a constitutional officer who operates not entirely within the Secretary’s control. The Secretary compiled a list of roughly 180,000 registered voters who he said might be noncitizens. The Secretary sent a sample of names drawn from the list to the Supervisors with a detailed set of instructions—or at least suggestions— on how to use the list. The instructions included sending a letter to each person on the list directing the person to send back a form swearing, under penalty of perjury, that the person was or was not a citizen, and, if a citizen, either requesting a hearing or attaching documents showing citizenship. The proposed letter included a statement that if the person failed to respond within 30 days, the person might be removed from the voter roll. There were major flaws in the program. The Secretary compiled the list in a manner certain to include a large number of citizens. At least insofar as shown by this record, the list included any person who (1) as a noncitizen, obtained a driver’s license and accurately disclosed to the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles that the person was not a citizen, (2) became a naturalized citizen, (3) registered to vote, accurately disclosing to the Supervisor of Elections that the
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Page 3 of 11
person was a citizen, and (4) had not yet renewed the driver’s license and so had
not updated DHSMV’s records to reflect the new citizenship status.
Florida driver’s licenses are renewed every six years. One thus would
expect the average lag between naturalization and driver’s-license renewal to be
three years. Tens of thousands of Florida residents become naturalized citizens
each year. Homeland Security records put the number at nearly 240,000 for the last three years.1 If just over three-fourths of those were already licensed drivers
and, upon becoming citizens, registered to vote, one would expect the Secretary’s
list to include 180,000 properly registered new citizens. And the Secretary’s
methodology had other possible flaws as well, including, for example, the
possibility that the clerk issuing a driver’s license improperly listed a citizen as a
noncitizen; the record does not indicate whether a driver has an opportunity to
review or correct such an entry. The suggestion that there was a list of 180,000
improperly registered noncitizens was plainly wrong.
1 The numbers are 82,788 for 2009, and 67,484 for 2010, and 87,309 for 2011, for a total of 237,581. James Lee, Annual Flow Report: U.S. Naturalizations: 2011, Dep’t of Homeland Security 3 (April 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/publications/us-naturalizations-2011.shtm. This appears to be information that can be judicially noticed. Taking notice would be proper only if the parties have an opportunity to be heard. See Fed. R. Evid. 201. But it makes no difference whether this information is judicially noticed or even considered at all. It is common knowledge than many thousands of Floridians are naturalized each year. At argument, the Secretary did not deny it, and nobody could reasonably do so. The numbers are set out here just to illustrate the point.
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Still, the Supervisors who received the Secretary’s sample list identified a small number of noncitizens who were on the list and were registered to vote. The record is less than conclusive but suggests that some actually voted in past elections.
II In order to obtain a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, that it will suffer irreparable injury unless the injunction issues, that the threatened injury outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause a defendant, and that the injunction will not be adverse to the public interest. See, e.g., Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Charles H. Wesley Educ. Found., Inc. v. Cox, 408 F.3d 1349, 1354 (11th Cir. 2005).
III In support of its motion, the United States asserts it is likely to prevail on the merits of two claims, both arising under the National Voter Registration Act. First, the United States says the NVRA prohibits a state from pursuing a program to systematically remove noncitizens from the voting rolls within 90 days before a federal election. And second, the United States says the Secretary’s program violates the NVRA’s requirement that any such program be uniform and nondiscriminatory.
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A The United States bases its 90-day argument on NVRA section 8(c)(2)(A):
A State shall complete, not later than 90 days prior to the date of a primary or general election for Federal office, any program the purpose of which is to systematically remove the names of ineligible voters from the official lists of eligible voters. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(c)(2)(A). Section 8(c)(2)(B) sets out exceptions:
Subparagraph (A) shall not be construed to preclude— (i) the removal of names from official lists of voters on a basis described in paragraph (3)(A) or (B) or (4)(A) of subsection (a) of this section; or
(ii) correction of registration records pursuant to this subchapter. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(c)(2)(B). It is unclear why the exception in clause (ii) does not apply to the Secretary’s program, but neither side says it does. The exceptions
in clause (i) do not apply here; they deal with removal of an individual who requests removal, or has a felony conviction or mental incapacity, or has died. Thus paragraph (a)(3) deals with removal of names from the voter list:
(A) at the request of the registrant; (B) as provided by State law, by reason of criminal conviction or
mental incapacity; or (C) as provided under paragraph (4) . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(a)(3). Paragraph (a)(4)(A) in turn deals with removal on one additional ground:
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(A) the death of the registrant . . . . 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(a)(4). The Secretary says subparagraph (a)(3)(B) allows removal on any ground “provided by State law,” but that plainly is incorrect, first because that reading would render the rest of paragraph (a)(3)—and also section 8(c)(2)(A)—virtually superfluous, and second because in the vertical list with separate entries separately numbered and separated by semicolons, each separately numbered entry must be read as an integrated whole. The reference to removal “as provided by State law, by reason of criminal conviction or mental incapacity” thus means removal based on a criminal conviction or mental incapacity—but only to the extent state law provides for removal on those grounds. The suggestion that two wholly unrelated grounds for removal—“as provided by state law” and “by reason of criminal conviction or mental incapacity”—were set out in subparagraph (B), separated by a comma instead of a semicolon, is wrong.
The United States says the Secretary’s program is a “program the purpose of which is to systematically remove the names of ineligible voters from the official lists of eligible voters,” that none of the listed exceptions applies to the removal of noncitizens, and that section 8(c)(2)(A) thus prohibits the Secretary from continuing his program into the 90-day quiet period. The quiet period began on May16, 2012, which was 90 days before the scheduled August 14, 2012 primary.
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On first reading, section 8(c)(2)(A) seems to say precisely what the United States claims. But a parallel NVRA provision indicates that this first reading is incorrect. Section 8(a)(3) requires a state to provide that “the name of a registrant may not be removed from the official list of eligible voters” with the specific exceptions quoted in part above—exceptions for the registrant’s own request, criminal conviction or mental incapacity, death, or change of residence. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(a)(3). On first reading, this section—which applies at all times, not just in the 90 days before an election—seems to prohibit a state from ever removing from its voting list a noncitizen, even though the noncitizen should never have been registered in the first place.
But this is not what this section means. Both sides agree that a state can remove an improperly registered noncitizen; the United States challenges only a state’s ability to do so as part of a systematic program during the 90-day quiet period. This conclusion is inescapable: section 8(a)(3)’s prohibition on removing a registrant except on specific grounds simply does not apply to an improperly registered noncitizen.
So section 8(a)(3)’s list of the grounds on which a “registrant” may be “removed” does not apply to removing an improperly registered noncitizen. Section 8(c)(2) provides a quiet period—90 days—during which a state cannot pursue a program to systematically “remove . . . ineligible voters.” Surely
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“removed” in 8(a)(3) and “remove” in 8(c)(2) mean the same thing. And there is no reason to believe the reference to removing a “registrant” in 8(a)(3) means something different than removing “ineligible voters” in 8(c)(2); by definition, someone who is being “removed” has already registered, so an “ineligible voter” is a “registrant.” In short, if, as both sides concede, section 8(a)(3) does not prohibit a state from removing an improperly registered noncitizen, then 8(c)(2) does not prohibit a state from systematically removing improperly registered noncitizens during the quiet period.
This indicates that what Congress had in mind when it drafted these sections was removing a person on grounds that typically arise after an initial proper registration. Congress was not addressing the revocation of an improperly granted registration of a noncitizen. A person who was once properly registered can be removed from the voting list under section 8(a)(3) only for specific reasons: the person asks to be taken off the list, becomes ineligible under state law because of a criminal conviction or mental incapacity, dies, or changes residence. During the 90-day quiet period, a state may pursue a program to systematically remove registrants on request or based on a criminal conviction, mental incapacity, or death, but not based on a change of residence. What matters here is this: none of this applies to removing noncitizens who were not properly registered in the first place.
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For noncitizens, the state’s duty is to maintain an accurate voting list. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(b). A state can and should do that on the front end, blocking a noncitizen from registering in the first place. And if a state finds it has made an error—or a number of errors—and wishes to correct the problem, it should do so well in advance. But the NVRA does not require a state to allow a noncitizen to vote just because the state did not catch the error more than 90 days in advance.
B The United States bases its second challenge on NVRA section 8(b), which requires a state program that is intended “to protect the integrity of the electoral process”—by providing an “accurate” voter roll—to be “uniform” and “nondiscriminatory.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(b). The Secretary’s program, while he was pursuing it, probably ran afoul of this provision. The record indicates that the Secretary’s program identified many properly registered citizens as potential noncitizens. Given the methodology, that is hardly surprising. The Secretary’s proposal was to send letters to the listed individuals requiring a response and ultimately to require them to provide documentation of their citizenship. The Secretary’s methodology made it likely that the properly registered citizens who would be required to respond and provide documentation would be primarily newly naturalized citizens. The program was
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Page 10 of 11
likely to have a discriminatory impact on these new citizens. And while the Secretary suggests that having to respond to this kind of inquiry is of little import, that is not so. A state cannot properly impose burdensome demands in a discriminatory manner.
III The Secretary says, though, that he has suspended the program and will not resume it. He says he is seeking better information, specifically access to a database maintained by the United States Department of Homeland Security that, if used properly, should exclude from the Secretary’s list the newly naturalized citizens, and perhaps others included on the Secretary’s list in error. A program that accurately identifies noncitizens who are registered to vote without unnecessarily challenging citizens could meet the requirement of uniformity and nondiscrimination. And because, as set out above, such a program could be pursued even within 90 days of an election, there is no reason to believe, at this point, that the Secretary will engage in any future violation of the NVRA. There is no need for an injunction prohibiting the Secretary from continuing with a program he has unequivocally said he will not continue. Support for this conclusion comes from the four-part test governing preliminary injunctive relief, as set out above, including the requirement that any such injunction be necessary to avoid irreparable harm. And support also comes from the voluntary-cessation
Case No. 4:12cv285-RH/CAS

Case 1:12-Ccavs-2e242:8122--WcvJ-Z002D8o5c-RumH-eCnAt 6S7-2DocEunmteerendt 3o4n FFLilSeDd 0D6o/c2k8e/1t 209/P2a0g/2e0112 ofP1a1ge 11 of 11
Page 11 of 11
doctrine as applied to public defendants. In this circuit a government entity that has discontinued challenged conduct enjoys a rebuttable presumption that the conduct will not recur. See, e.g., Bankshot Billiards, Inc. v. City of Ocala, 634 F.3d 1340, 1351-52 (11th Cir. 2011) (collecting earlier cases). If the Secretary or the supervisors of elections go forward with the program the Secretary says he has abandoned, the issue can be revisited.
IV For these reasons, IT IS ORDERED: The motion for a temporary restraining order, ECF No. 7, is DENIED. SO ORDERED on June 28, 2012.
s/Robert L. Hinkle United States District Judge
Case No. 4:12cv285-RH/CAS

Arcia v. Florida Secretary of State, Docket No. 1:12-cv-22282 (S.D. Fla. Jun 19, 2012), Court Docket
General Information

Case Name Docket Number Court Nature of Suit

Arcia v. Florida Secretary of State 1:12-cv-22282 United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida Civil Rights: Voting

© 2012 Bloomberg Finance L.P. All rights reserved. For terms of service see bloomberglaw.com // PAGE 1 Document Link: http://www.bloomberglaw.com/ms/document/X1Q6M8H68N82?documentName=67.xml

 
 Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 73 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/21/2012 Page 1 of 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 12-22282-CIV-ZLOCH

KARLA VANESSA ARCIA, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

O R D E R

vs.

KEN DETZNER, in his official capacity as Florida Secretary of State,

Defendant. /

THIS MATTER is before the Court upon Plaintiffs’ Unopposed

Motion To Vacate Amended Order Of Referral To Mediation (DE 59).

The Court has carefully reviewed said Motion, the entire court file

and is otherwise fully advised in the premises.

Accordingly, after due consideration, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiffs’ Unopposed Motion To

Vacate Amended Order Of Referral To Mediation (DE 59) be and the

same is hereby GRANTED as follows:

1. The Amended Order Of Referral To Mediation (DE 47) be and

the same is hereby VACATED; and

2. The Parties be and the same are hereby excused from

conducting mediation in the above-styled cause.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Fort Lauderdale, Broward

County, Florida, this 21st

day of September, 2012.

Copies furnished: All Counsel of Record

WILLIAM J. ZLOCH United States District Judge

 
 Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 111 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/04/2012 Page 1 of 24

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 12-22282-CIV-ZLOCH

KARLA VANESSA ARCIA, et al.

Plaintiffs,
vs.
KEN DETZNER, in his official capacity as Florida Secretary of State,

O R D E R

Defendant. /

THIS MATTER is before the Court upon Plaintiffs’ Motion For

Preliminary Injunction And Summary Judgment (DE 65) and Defendant’s

Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiffs’ Motion For Preliminary

Injunction And Summary Judgment (DE 79), which the Court construes

as a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing. The Court has carefully reviewed said Motions, the entire court file and is

otherwise fully advised in the premises.

I. Background

The above-styled cause concerns the implementation of the

program known as “Processing Registered Voters - Non-Immigrants” (hereinafter “the Program”) by Defendant Florida Secretary of State

Ken Detzner (hereinafter “the Secretary”). Plaintiffs are comprised

of two individual Plaintiffs and five organizational Plaintiffs who

claim that their rights, and those of their members, “are affected

by the program instituted by the Florida Department of State . . . to carry out a systematic purge of alleged non-citizens from the

Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 111 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/04/2012 Page 2 of 24
Florida voter rolls.” DE 57, p. 2. The individual Plaintiffs, Karla Vanessa Arcia (hereinafter “Arcia”) and Melande Antoine (hereinafter “Antoine”), are United States citizens who are registered to vote in the State of Florida and were included on the Secretary’s initial list of potential non-citizens. DE 71, p. 4. The five organizational Plaintiffs include a labor union and various Florida-based civic organizations. These organizational Plaintiffs allege that their members are at risk of being removed from the voting rolls or that based on the Program, the organizations themselves have had to divert their resources away from their regular business activities and toward addressing the implementation of the Program. DE 57, pp. 5-8.
On June 19, 2012, Plaintiffs initiated this case with the filing of their Complaint For Declaratory And Injunctive Relief (DE 1), alleging that the Program violated certain provisions of the Voting Rights Act (hereinafter “the VRA”) and the National Voter Registration Act (hereinafter “the NVRA”). By this initial Complaint (DE 1), Plaintiffs alleged that in April of 2012, the Secretary began the process of identifying, with the intent of later purging, potential non-citizens from the rolls of registered voters in the State of Florida. To identify such potential non-citizens, the Secretary gained information from the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (hereinafter “DHSMV”) indicating that a registered voter may not be a United States citizen, which
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was then cross-checked against various other databases. At that time, the Secretary issued a press release which stated that the Department of State was “actively seeking access to federal Department of Homeland Security databases such as SAVE (Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements) for further verification of immigration status.” DE 1, pp. 7-8 (hereinafter “the SAVE database”). The Secretary initially identified 180,000 names of alleged “potential non-citizens,” and sent a sample of that list, containing 2,625 names, to the Supervisors of Elections in Florida’s 67 counties. DE 57, p. 1. The Secretary then directed these Supervisors to confirm whether any identified registered voter on the list was indeed a potential non-citizen, and if so, to begin the statutorily required notice and removal process to remove the individual from the voting rolls.
According to Plaintiffs, the Program——especially in its initial implementation——proved to be inaccurate, and the list of 2,625 “potential non-citizens” included at least some United States citizens, including the two individually named Plaintiffs: Arcia and Antoine. On April 30, 2012, implementation of the Program was temporarily suspended. Since that time, the Secretary has received access to the federal SAVE database from the Department of Homeland Security (hereinafter “DHS”), which the Secretary alleges “is a rapidly updated federal database that allows state and local governments to check the most recent immigration status of non-
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citizens who lawfully entered the United States.” DE 79, p. 6. By checking an individual’s Alien Registration Number (hereinafter “Anumber”), “a unique 9-digit identifier given only to non-citizens,” against information in the SAVE database, Defendant maintains that it can accurately ascertain whether a registered voter has been naturalized as a United States citizen. Id., p. 7. The Secretary asserts that since its August 14, 2012, declaration to use the SAVE database in the implementation of the Program, “the Secretary’s data matching program has identified at least scores of registered voters who have either personally attested to their lack of citizenship or who, after the data matching process, . . . appear to be ineligible registered voters based on non-citizenship.” Id.
On September 12, 2012, the Parties filed a Stipulation Of Dismissal As To Counts I, II, And Part Of Count IV Of Complaint For Declaratory And Injunctive Relief (DE 56), dismissing the claims under the VRA, and the claim under paragraph (6)(b)(a) of section 8 of the NVRA, that the Program is not uniform, nondiscriminatory, and in compliance with the VRA. Thus, the sole claim that remains by Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (DE 57) is that the Program violates the NVRA’s prohibition on completing “not later than 90 days prior to the date of a primary or general election for Federal office, any program the purpose of which is to systematically remove the names of ineligible voters from the official list of eligible voters.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(c)(2)(A) (2002).
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The Court held an evidentiary Hearing on the instant Motion (DE 65) on October 1, 2012. At the Hearing, the Court heard from two witnesses on behalf of Plaintiffs: Mr. Dale Ewart, the Assistant Regional Director of the Florida Region for 1199SEIU United Healthcare Workers East, and Mr. Wilfredo Seda, the Chair of the National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights. The Court then heard argument from Plaintiffs and the Secretary.
By this Motion (DE 65), Plaintiffs ask that the Court do essentially four things: (1) declare that the State’s implementation of the Program, specifically in its recent use of the SAVE database, violates the NVRA; (2) enjoin the Secretary from conducting any systematic purge aimed at excluding ineligible voters prior to the November 6, 2012, election; (3) direct the Secretary to ensure that any individual who was removed after August 8, 2012, be restored to the voting rolls prior to October 15, 2012; (4) and instruct the Secretary to file with the Court a list of voters who have been so removed from the voting rolls and/or have been reinstated. DE 65, pp. 1-2.
II. Standing By Defendant’s Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiffs’ Motion For Preliminary Injunction And Summary Judgment (DE 79), which the Court construes as a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing, the Secretary argues that both the individual Plaintiffs and the organizational Plaintiffs lack standing to proceed in the above-
5

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styled cause. Based on the testimony and evidence presented at the evidentiary Hearing held on October 1, 2012, and the facts set forth in Plaintiffs’ Statement Of Undisputed Material Facts In Support Of Their Motion For Summary Judgment (DE 65-2), the Court finds that only some of the Plaintiffs have established standing. The instant Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing will therefore be granted in part and denied in part as detailed below.
At the October 1, 2012 Hearing, the Court heard testimony from Mr. Dale Ewart, the Assistant Regional Director of the Florida Region for 1199SEIU United Healthcare Workers East (hereinafter “1199SEIU”) and Mr. Wilfredo Seda, the Chair of the National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, regarding the standing of 1199SEIU, the National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, as well as that of individual Plaintiffs Arcia and Antoine. No testimony or evidence was presented at the Hearing regarding the standing of organizational Plaintiffs Veye Yo, the Florida Immigration Coalition, Inc., or Florida New Majority, Inc.
Plaintiffs also set forth facts supporting their standing to proceed in the above-styled cause in their Statement Of Undisputed Material Facts In Support Of Their Motion For Summary Judgment (DE 65-2). In the context of a Motion For Summary Judgment, failure to controvert a fact alleged by the movant and supported by the record results in the same being deemed admitted. S.D. Fla. L.R. 7.5(d). Plaintiffs allege facts regarding all individual and organizational
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Plaintiffs in paragraphs 11 through and including 16 of their Statement Of Undisputed Material Facts (DE 65-2). In response to each the facts alleged in paragraphs 11 through and including 16, Defendant responds in an identical fashion: that he is “without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the statements . . . and therefore denies them.” DE 79-4. These bare and conclusory denials can hardly be understood to substantively challenge the facts alleged by Plaintiffs, supported by the record, and certainly do nothing to controvert1 the same. The Court notes that this case was filed June 19, 2012. See DE 1. Defendant has had more than adequate time to engage in discovery regarding standing, and for whatever reason has chosen not to do so. The Court therefore finds it insincere for the Secretary to now complain that he has not been allowed sufficient time to address the standing issue.
Therefore, based in large part on the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in NAACP v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153 (11th Cir. 2008), the Court finds that the testimony presented at the October 1, 2012 evidentiary Hearing, in conjunction with the Declarations of Maria
1 Mere denial of an opposing party’s statement does not specifically controvert anything. Pursuant to the Local Rules of this District, an opposing party’s statement needs to be supported “by specific references to pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits on file with the Court.” S.D. Fla. L.R. 7.5(c). Thus, to the extent Plaintiffs’ facts are supported by record evidence and not specifically controverted by Defendant, they are deemed admitted.
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Del Rosario Rodriguez of Florida Immigration Coalition, Inc. (DE 655), Mr. Ewart of 1199SEIU (DE 65-6), and Mr. Seda of the National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights (DE 65-7), are sufficient——albeit minimally so——to establish the standing in the above-styled cause of individual Plaintiffs Arcia and Antoine, as well as organizational Plaintiffs the National Congress For Puerto Rican Rights, 1199SEIU United Healthcare Workers East, and Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc. Accordingly, in so far as it challenges the standing of these Plaintiffs, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing (DE 79) will be denied.
However, the Court recognizes that, even where not successfully controverted, only those facts supported by specific record evidence shall deemed admitted. See S.D. Fla. L.R. 7.5(c) and 7.5(d). As to organizational Plaintiffs Veye Yo and Florida New Majority, Inc., the Court reiterates that no testimony or evidence regarding the standing of these two Plaintiffs was presented to the Court at the evidentiary Hearing on October 1, 2012. While Plaintiffs do make statements of fact regarding these two organizational Plaintiffs in their Statement Of Undisputed Material Facts (DE 65-2), in support of those statements Plaintiffs cite only to the allegations made in various paragraphs of their First Amended Complaint. See DE 65-2, ¶¶ 12, 15. While Defendant’s failure to controvert the statements remains, the Court cannot and will not deem facts admitted where there is not sufficient evidence in the record to support them.
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Beyond the bald allegations made in the First Amended Complaint (DE 57), the Court finds no record evidence supporting the standing of organizational Plaintiffs Veye Yo and Florida New Majority, Inc. to proceed in the above-styled cause. Accordingly, in so far as it challenges the standing of Plaintiffs Veye Yo and Florida New Majority, Inc., Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing (DE 79) will be granted.
III. Preliminary Injunction The Court next considers Plaintiffs’ request for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. A district court may grant a preliminary injunction if the movant demonstrates (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that irreparable injury will be suffered unless the injunction is issued; (3) the threatened injury to the moving party outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction might cause the non-moving party; and (4) if issued, the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 868 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. MCIMetro Access Transmission Services, LLC, 425 F.3d 964, 968 (11th Cir. 2005)). “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be granted unless the movant clearly establishes the burden of persuasion as to the four requisites.” ACLU of Florida v. Miami-Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 557 F.3d 1177, 1198 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Further, a “[f]ailure to show any of the four factors is fatal, and the most common failure is not showing
9

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a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.” Id. The Court will thus first consider whether Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of the sole remaining claim in their First Amended Complaint——that the Program “violates Section 8(c)(2)(A) of the NVRA, [codified at] 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(c)(2)(A).” DE 57, p. 17.
Subparagraph (c)(2)(A) of section 8 of the NVRA (hereinafter “the 90-day Provision”) reads as follows: “A state shall complete, not later than 90 days prior to the date of a primary or general election for Federal office, any program the purpose of which is to systematically remove the names of ineligible voters from the official list of eligible voters.” § 1973gg-6(c)(2)(A). Plaintiffs argue that the Program “violates the plain language” of the 90-day Provision and that no part of section 8 excepts the removal of noncitizens by a “systematic program” such as that which the Secretary is implementing here. See DE 65-1, p. 9 & p. 14 n.9. The Secretary posits several competing interpretations of section 8 of the NVRA. The Secretary first argues that section 8 of the NVRA simply does not concern the removal of individuals who were never properly registered in the first instance, or if it does, subsection (b) addresses, generally, the removal of those individuals. DE 79, p. 17. He then argues, in the alternative, that subparagraph (a)(3)(B) excepts from the 90-day provision the removal of registrants “as provided by State law,” which would necessarily include the State’s statutory proscription against a non-citizen registering to vote.
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DE 79, p. 20. The Court considers each of these arguments in turn. A. The General Removal Provision: Subsection (a)(3) In order to understand the meaning of the 90-day provision, the
Court must first look to paragraph (a)(3) (hereinafter “the General Removal Provision”). Paragraph (a)(3) deals with the types of “registrants” that may be removed from “the official list of eligible voters.” § 1973gg-6(a)(3). This provision provides:
(a) In general. In the administration of voter registration for elections for Federal office, each State shall– ... (3) provide that the name of a registrant may not be removed from the official list of eligible voters except–
(A) at the request of the registrant; (B) as provided by State law, by reason of criminal conviction or mental incapacity; or (C) as provided under paragraph (4). Id. Paragraph (4) then addresses the removal of names of “ineligible voters” by reason of: “(A) the death of the registrant; or (B) a change in the residence of the registrant, in accordance with subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this section.” § 1973gg6(a)(4)(A)-(B). This General Removal Provision found in (a)(3) is later referenced in paragraph (c)(2), which also contains the 90-day Provision. Paragraph (c)(2) explicitly exempts from the 90-day period certain “removals” that are enumerated in subparagraphs (a)(3)(A)-(C). Subparagraph (c)(2)(B) provides: (B) Subparagraph (A) shall not be construed to preclude (i) the removal of names from official lists of voters on a basis described in paragraph (3)(A) or
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(B) or 4(A) of subsection (a) of this section; or (ii) correction of registration records pursuant to this subchapter. Thus, the Secretary’s Program is not subject to the 90-day provision if it “remov[es] [] names from official lists of voters on a basis described in paragraph (3)(A) or (B) or 4(A) of subsection (a) of this section” or corrects “registration records pursuant to this subchapter.” § 1973gg-6(c)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). Taking these two provisions together, then, four classifications of “removals” are explicitly excepted from the 90day provision, meaning that a removal on these grounds may be effected at any time. These grounds include: (1) removals at the request of the registrant; (2) those “provided by State law, by reason of criminal conviction or mental incapacity”; (3) removals based on the death of the registrant; and (4) “correction of registration records pursuant to this subchapter.” § 1973gg6(a)(3)(A)-(B), (4)(A); (c)(2)(B)(ii). The Secretary states in a footnote that clause (ii), “correction of registration records,” may pertain to the Program and allow it to be implemented at any time; yet, because the Parties have not thoroughly explored an interpretation of this clause, and because it was not raised at the Hearing, the Court will not address it now. See DE 79, p. 20 n.6. At first blush, it would appear that implementation of the Program would be excepted from the 90-day provision, because it is “provided by State law.” By Florida Statute, individuals who are
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“not [] United States citizen[s]” yet are registered to vote may be removed from “the statewide voter registration system.” Fla. Stat. § 98.075(6) (2011). This statute then provides for the “procedures for removal” that must be followed in order to remove such an individual. § 98.075(7).
Yet, subparagraph (a)(3)(B) cannot reasonably be read to create three independent categories for removals——those based on State law, criminal conviction, and mental incapacity. Indeed, the wording of this subparagraph is puzzling, and if Congress wanted to clearly indicate that this subparagraph dealt exclusively with criminal convictions or mental incapacity based on State law, it could have stated as much. However, if this subparagraph were intended to set forth three distinct categories for removal, then indeed any removals “based on State law” would render the 90-day provision at best superfluous, and at worst, directly inconsistent with subparagraph (a)(3)(B). In other words, removals under state law based on a change in residence cannot be allowed during the 90-day period under a reading of subparagraph (a)(3)(B), yet also prohibited in the 90-day period based on subparagraph (c)(2)(A). Thus, the Court does not find that the Program’s implementation is permitted based on this understanding of subparagraph (a)(3)(B).
B. The Program Is Not Subject to the General Removal Provision or the 90-day Provision As set forth above, paragraph (a)(3) provides the exclusive grounds upon which a “registrant” may be removed from the “official
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list of eligible voters.” § 1973gg-6(a)(3) (“[T]he name of a registrant may not be removed from the official list of eligible voters except” under three enumerated grounds.”) Therefore, if one were to read this provision literally and without reference to any other portion of section 8 of the NVRA, the only grounds by which a State could remove a “registrant,” would be: (1) if the registrant requests to be removed; (2) the registrant becomes ineligible to vote under State law by reason of criminal conviction or mental incapacity; (3) the registrant dies; or (4) the registrant changes his residence.
It would necessarily follow, then, that a state would be prohibited from removing from its voting rolls a registrant who was improperly registered for other valid reasons. So a state could therefore not remove from its voting rolls minors, fictitious individuals, individuals who in fact reside in a different state, and non-citizens. Not only would this interpretation stand in direct contravention of Florida law, see Fla. Stat. § 98.075(6), but it would produce an absurd result. See United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218, 1237 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[N]othing is better settled than that statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will effectuate the legislative intention, and, if possible, so as to avoid an unjust or absurd conclusion.”) Therefore, paragraph (a)(3) cannot apply to the removal of non-citizens. See also United States v. Florida, 2012 WL 2457506, at *3 (N.D. Fla. June 28, 2012)
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(“This conclusion is inescapable: section 8(a)(3)'s prohibition on removing a registrant except on specific grounds simply does not apply to an improperly registered non-citizen.”).
As stated above, subparagraph (c)(2)(A) lists the removals that are excepted from the 90-day provision: (1) removals at the request of the registrant; (2) those “provided by State law, by reason of criminal conviction or mental incapacity”; (3) removals based on the death of the registrant; and (4) “correction of registration records pursuant to this subchapter.” § 1973gg-6(a)(3)(A)-(B), (4)(A); (c)(2)(B)(ii). Therefore, the only removal under paragraph (a)(3) that is subject to the 90-day Provision is a removal based on “a change in the residence of the registrant, in accordance with subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this section.” § 1973gg-6(a)(4)(B).
The Court finds no reason to conclude that the 90-day Provision applies to anything other than removals of registrants based on a change in residence. The 90-day Provision is found in subsection (c), which is entitled “Voter removal programs.” Paragraph (1) of subsection (c) then details how a state is to implement the requirements of subsection (a)(4) [“a change in residence of the registrant”], such as by “establishing a program” to address the change-of-address of a registrant who moves inside, or outside, the state. Paragraph (2) of course includes the 90-day Provision, which, when read in conjunction with paragraph (a)(3) reveals that registrants who become ineligible because of a change in residence
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may not be removed in the 90-day period. Finally, not only does subparagraph (2)(A) incorporate by reference paragraph (a)(3) in setting forth those removals excepted from the 90-day period, but the language of the two provisions track one another. Thus, these two provisions are indeed “inextricably linked.” DE 105, p. 70. See also United States v. Florida, 2012 WL 2457506, at *3 (“‘[R]emoved” in 8(a)(3) and ‘remove’ in 8(c)(2) mean the same thing. And there is no reason to believe the reference to removing a ‘registrant’ in 8(a)(3) means something different than removing ‘ineligible voters’ in 8(c)(2) . . .).
Another way to understand these two sets of provisions is that they only address the removal of once-eligible voters——those who were at one time bona fide registrants, yet because of personal request, criminal conviction, mental incapacity, or change in residence, became ineligible. It is indeed notable these provisions are silent as to the removal of those registered voters who were never bona fide registrants, and whose registration was void ab initio by virtue of their status as minors, non-citizens, or any other factor that would nullify their registration.
Put simply, these two provisions are meant to be read in conjunction with one another and when read together, the 90-day provision is meant only to proscribe the removal within 90 days of a federal election of registrants who become ineligible to vote based on a change in residence. Plaintiffs seem to argue that the
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90-day Provision’s use of the word “systematically” distinguishes some voter removal programs from others. See DE 65-1, p. 14 n.9 (“the Plaintiffs believe non-citizens may be removed from the voting rolls within 90 days of a federal election - as long as the removal is not party of a systematic program.”) To be sure, subsection (c) sets forth mere “voter removal programs,” as opposed to systematic ones. Yet, this does not change the fact that Plaintiffs cannot direct the Court to any provision of section 8 that differentiates a systematic program from a non-systematic one; nor can Plaintiffs direct the Court to a provision of section 8 that provides guidance on how to properly remove an individual from the voting rolls who was never eligible to vote.
At the Hearing, Plaintiffs explored several measures that they aver should deter non-citizens from registering to vote, or at least from voting, despite their lack of citizenship. Because it is a federal offense for a non-citizen to both register to vote and cast a vote in a federal election, such individuals should be deterred from breaking the law. And if those individuals do succeed in casting a vote despite their non-citizenship, they can be criminally prosecuted. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-3(C)(2)(B)(ii); § 1973gg3(C)(2)(C); 18 U.S.C. § 1015(f). These suggestions give the Court little assurance. Certainly, the NVRA does not require the State to idle on the sidelines until a non-citizen violates the law before the State can act. And surely the NVRA does not require the State
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to wait until after that critical juncture——when the vote has been cast and the harm has been fully realized——to address what it views as nothing short of “voter fraud.” DE 79, p. 2.
C. Subsection (b): Confirmation of Voter Registration This only leaves one statutory proscription under section 8 that relates to the removal of non-citizens from the voting rolls. Subsection (b), “[c]onfirmation of voter registration,” provides that “[a]ny State program or activity to protect the integrity of the electoral process by ensuring the maintenance of an accurate and current voter registration roll for elections for Federal office——(1) shall be uniform, nondiscriminatory, and in compliance with the Voting Rights Act of 1965 . . .” § 1973gg-6(b)(1). The only consistent reading of section 8 of the NVRA is that subsection (b) alone applies to programs such as the Secretary’s. Further, it is hard to understand why Congress would create a distinct subsection, markedly set apart from subsection (c)’s “[v]oter removal programs,” which provides direction regarding the “confirmation” of voter registration. By creating two distinct subsections, Congress meant to differentiate the removal of onceeligible voters from those who were never eligible in the first instance. Finally, subsection (b) is consistent with Congress’ finding that “the right of citizens of the United States to vote is a fundamental right” and one of the purposes of the NVRA is “to ensure that accurate and current voter registration rolls are
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maintained.” § 1973gg(a)(1), (b)(4) (emphasis added). It must follow that subsection (b) was meant to apply to
programs aimed at removing those voters whose status as registered voters was void ab initio. See also United States v. Florida, 2012 WL 2457506, at *4 (holding that pursuant to subsection (b), and in regard to “non-citizens, the state's duty is to maintain an accurate voting list. . . . But the NVRA does not require a state to allow a non-citizen to vote just because the state did not catch the error more than 90 days in advance.”)
D. The Other Preliminary Injunction Factors The Court thus finds that Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate “a substantial likelihood of success on the merits” on both Counts I and II of the First Amended Complaint (DE 57). This failure to satisfy one of the four-factors requisite to obtaining a preliminary injunction is fatal to Plaintiffs’ Motion (DE 65), and therefore, the Court need not consider the other three factors. However, because they are similarly of no help to Plaintiffs, the Court will briefly address them. The Court seriously questions whether Plaintiffs can establish that “irreparable injury . . . will be suffered unless the injunction is issued,” based on their own 3-month delay in filing the instant Motion (DE 65). Keeton, 664 F.3d at 868. Such “a pattern of delay is fundamentally inconsistent with . . . allegations of irreparable injury.” Burger v. Hartley, 2011 WL
19

Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 111 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/04/2012 Page 20 of 24
6826645, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 28, 2011). This is because “the failure to act sooner undercuts the sense of urgency that ordinarily accompanies a motion for preliminary injunction and suggests that there is, in fact, no irreparable injury.” Tough Traveler, Ltd. v. Outbound Prods., 60 F.3d 964, 968 (2d Cir. 1995). Here, Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion (DE 65) three months after the June 19, 2012, filing of their initial Complaint (DE 1), and 36 days after Plaintiffs allege the Secretary stated he would “purge the state voter registry using its access to the SAVE database.” DE 57, p. 12. Thus, if the Court were to reach a substantive consideration of this factor, the Court would find that Plaintiffs’ delay in filing the instant Motion (DE 65) establishes that their purported injury is, in fact, not so serious as to warrant preliminary injunctive relief.
The Court next considers the third and fourth factors——that “the threatened injury to the moving party outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction might cause the non-moving party” and that “if issued, the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.” Keeton, 664 F.3d at 868. By both state and federal law, the Secretary is charged with “protect[ing] the integrity of the electoral process” and promoting “the right of citizens of the United States to vote . . .” See § 1973gg(a), 1973gg-6(b); Fla. Stat. § 98.075(1)-(8). Even the Department of Justice has recently recognized that “federal and state governments have a compelling
20

Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 111 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/04/2012 Page 21 of 24
interest in excluding foreign citizens from activities intimately related to the process of democratic self-government.” Brief of the United States Bluman v. Fed. Election Comm., 130 S. Ct. 1087 (2012) (No. 11-275), 2011 WL 5548718, at *11 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The Court finds that the Secretary has a compelling interest in ensuring that the voting rights of citizens are not diluted by the casting of votes by non-citizens. Alternatively, and at the very least, Plaintiffs have failed to convince the Court that the purported harms——that voters’ exercise of their rights will be chilled based on the Program, or that the organizational Plaintiffs will be forced to divert their resources toward addressing the effects of the Program——outweigh the Secretary’s interest in protecting the integrity of the electoral process.
Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of the two-Count First Amended Complaint (DE 57). Further, even if Plaintiffs were able to establish this factor, the Court finds that Plaintiffs cannot establish any of the other three factors requisite to the Court’s issuance of a preliminary injunction. Thus, to the extent the instant Motion (DE 65) seeks the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the Motion is denied.
IV. Summary Judgment The Court next turns to Plaintiffs’ request that the Court
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grant summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on all Counts in the First Amended Complaint (DE 57).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Eberhardt v. Waters, 901 F.2d 1578, 1580 (11th Cir. 1990). The party seeking summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)(quotation omitted). Indeed,
[t]he moving party bears the initial burden to show the district court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at trial. Only when that burden has been met does the burden shift to the non-moving party to demonstrate that there is indeed a material issue of fact that precludes summary judgment. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991); Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572, 1577 (11th Cir. 1991). The moving party is entitled to “judgment as a matter of law” when the non-moving party fails to make a sufficient showing of an essential element of the case to which the non-moving party has the burden of proof. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322; Everett v. Napper,
22

Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 111 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/04/2012 Page 23 of 24
833 F.2d 1507, 1510 (11th Cir. 1987). Further, the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
The Parties stipulated, prior to the October 1, 2012, Hearing, that “this action involves a pure question of law under Section 8(c)(2)(A) of the NVRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(c)(2)(A).” See DE 71, p. 5. Therefore, there are no disputed issues of material fact for the Court to consider at this time. Applying the same reasoning justifying the Court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to establish that the Program violates the 90-day Provision of section 8 of the NVRA. Consequently, to the extent the Motion (DE 65) seeks entry of summary judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor, it will be denied.
Accordingly, after due consideration, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows: 1. Plaintiffs’ Motion For Preliminary Injunction And Summary Judgment (DE 65) be and the same is hereby DENIED; 2. Defendant’s Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiffs’ Motion For Preliminary Injunction And Summary Judgment (DE 79), which the Court construes as a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing be and the same is hereby GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, consistent with the terms of this Order. To the extent the Motion (DE 79)
23

Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 111 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/04/2012 Page 24 of 24

seeks dismissal of the First Amended Complaint (DE 57) as it relates

to Plaintiffs Veye Yo and Florida New Majority, Inc., the Motion be

and the same is hereby GRANTED. To the extent the Motion seeks

dismissal as it relates to any other Plaintiff, the Motion (DE 79)

be and the same is hereby DENIED; and

3. The First Amended Complaint (DE 57) be and the same is

hereby DISMISSED as it relates to Plaintiffs Veye Yo and Florida New

Majority, Inc.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Fort Lauderdale, Broward

County, Florida, this 4th

day of October, 2012.

Copies Furnished: All Counsel of Record

WILLIAM J. ZLOCH United States District Judge

24

 
 Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 94 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/28/2012 Page 1 of 7

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 12-22282-CIV-ZLOCH

KARLA VANESSA ARCIA, et al.,

Plaintiffs, vs.

O R D E R

KEN DETZNER,

Defendant. /

THIS MATTER is before the Court upon the Motion Of Bipartisan

Group Of Voters Luis I. Garcia, Diana K. Whitehurst, Hal David

Rush, And Barbara A. Dereuil For Intervention Under Federal Rule Of

Civil Procedure 24 (DE 67). The Court has carefully reviewed said

Motion, the entire court file and is otherwise fully advised in the

premises.

The above-styled cause concerns the State of Florida’s

implementation of the program entitled “Processing Ineligible

Registered Voters-Non-Immigrants” (hereinafter “the Program”). By

the instant Motion (DE 67), Luis I. Garcia, Diana K. Whitehurst,

Hal David Rush, And Barbara A. Dereuil (hereinafter “the

Prospective Intervenors”) assert that they should be allowed to

intervene as of right, or in the alternative, be granted a

permissive intervention, in the above-styled cause.

The

Prospective Intervenors are “a bipartisan group of properly

registered and duly qualified voters of the State of Florida who

intend to vote in the November 6, 2012 general election” who wish

Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 94 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/28/2012 Page 2 of 7
to intervene lest their votes be allegedly “diluted, cancelled out, or effectively nullified by votes from non-citizens who are otherwise ineligible to vote but remain on the voter rolls.” DE 67, pp. 1-2. By this Motion (DE 67), the Intervenors also state that Defendant Ken Detzner does not oppose the proposed intervention. DE 67, p. 12. Plaintiffs contest the proposed intervention and have filed an Opposition To The Motion To Intervene (DE 83).
To intervene as of right under Rule 24(a)(2), a party must establish that “(1) [its] application to intervene is timely; (2) [it] has an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action; (3) [it] is so situated that disposition of the action, as a practical matter, may impede or impair [its] ability to protect that interest; and (4) [its] interest is represented inadequately by the existing parties to the suit.” Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1213 (11th Cir. 1989) (citing Athens Lumber Co. v. FEC, 690 F.2d 1364, 1366 (11th Cir. 1982)). Intervention as of right is proper only where all four requirements have been established.
The Court’s first concern is one of timeliness. The Prospective Intervenors state that “[t]his case is but three months old” and that Plaintiffs’ current claim “did not materialize until September 12, 2012.” DE 67, pp. 9-10. These remarks altogether miss the point. First, the above-styled cause was filed June 19,
2

Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 94 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/28/2012 Page 3 of 7
2012, three months prior to the Intervenors’ filing of the instant Motion (DE 67). That initial Complaint (DE 1) also included a claim that the “Alleged Non-Citizen Purge Program” violates Section 8(c)(2)(A) of the National Voter Registration Act, the sole claim which remains by Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (DE 57). While Plaintiffs’ initial Complaint (DE 1) may have contained claims other than the sole claim which remains in the First Amended Complaint (DE 57), that does not affect the time in which Intervenors’ interest, if any, vested. If the Prospective Intervenors find it necessary to intervene at this point in the litigation, they would have presumably found it necessary to intervene on June 19, 2012. And the Court is aware that on June 20, 2012, the same four Prospective Intervenors in the above-styled cause filed a Motion to Intervene in a case pending in the Northern District of Florida involving the same underlying facts and the same allegations under Section 8(c)(2)(A) of the National Voter Registration Act. See Docket Entry 2 in Case No. 12-CIV-00285HINKLE, The United States of America v. State of Florida and Ken Detzner.1
1While the Court is aware of the Prospective Intervenors’ September 26, 2012, Notice Of Correction (DE 85), the Court is indeed concerned with their initial representation to the Court that “[t]he Northern District court allowed Intervenors to intervene” in Case No. 12-CIV-00285-HINKLE. DE 67, p. 11. Of course, the Prospective Intervenors’ Motion For Permissive Intervention in the Northern District of Florida has not been ruled upon.
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Finally, the Court is acutely mindful of the fact that the Preliminary Injunction hearing has been set for Monday, October 1, 2012. See DE 74. Allowing the Prospective Intervenors to intervene at this late hour would surely prejudice Plaintiffs in this case, as discovery has closed, the date of the November 6, 2012, election is approaching, and the Preliminary Injunction hearing is just days away.
The Court next considers whether the Prospective Intervenors have a legally protectable interest in the present litigation. While the Prospective Intervenors state they are concerned with the possibility of voter dilution, the Court finds that this asserted interest is no different from that of any other Floridian who is duly registered to vote. See League of Women Voters of Florida v. Detzner, 2012 WL 3194950, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 6, 2012) (denying a motion to intervene because, among other reasons, any interest of the prospective intervenors was “precisely the same interest as every registered voter in the state.”)
This purported interest brings the Court to a consideration of the related third and fourth factors under Rule 24(a)(2)——whether disposition of this action may impede or impair the Prospective Intervenors’ ability to protect their interest, and whether Defendant Detzner is inadequately representing that interest. Chiles, 865 F.2d at 1213. The Court has been given no indication that Defendant Detzner might cease implementation of the Program,
4

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or attempt to moot any litigation over the State’s implementation of the Program, as the Prospective Intervenors claim. See DE 67, pp. 8-9. In fact, Defendant Detzner’s interest seem to align with that of the Prospective Intervenors. See Defendant Detzner’s Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiffs’ Motion For Preliminary Injunction And Summary Judgment, DE 79, p. 2 (“Under both state and federal law, Secretary of State Detzner . . . has a clear responsibility to protect the votes of citizens by preventing voter fraud.”) Defendant Detzner has also alleged to the Court that since entering into the August 14, 2012, Memorandum of Agreement with the Department of Homeland Security in regard to the State of Florida’s access to the Department’s “SAVE” database, the State has used the SAVE database to “identif[y] at least scores of registered voters who have either personally attested to their lack of citizenship or who, after the data-matching process described above, appear to be ineligible registered voters based on noncitizenship.” DE 79, p. 6. The Court further echoes the sentiments of the Northern District of Florida in League of Women Voters: “The defendants are, after all, officials of the State of Florida. Whatever might be said of the litigation stance of public officials generally, the State of Florida has recently——repeatedly——shown little reluctance to pursue litigation on matters of this kind; the state is no shrinking violet.” 2012 WL 3194950, at *1.
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Therefore, the Court finds that the Prospective Intervenors have failed to satisfy each element of the four factors set forth in Rule 24(a)(2), and the Court will deny their request to intervene as of right.
The Court now turns to the alternative relief sought by the instant Motion (DE 67): permissive intervention under Rule 24(b)(1)(B). Permissive intervention may be granted if the applicant is able to demonstrate that (1) the application to intervene is timely and (2) the claim asserted and the main action have a question of law or fact in common. Chiles, 865 F.2d at 1213. Further, “[i]f there is no right to intervene as of right under Rule 24(a), it is wholly discretionary with the court whether to allow intervention under Rule 24(b) and even though there is a common question of law or fact, or the requirements of Rule 24(b) are otherwise satisfied, the court may refuse to allow intervention.” Worlds v. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 929 F.2d 591, 595 (11th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted).
As articulated above, the instant Motion (DE 67) is woefully late. Timeliness is, as stated, of paramount concern to the Court. See also NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 365 (“Thus, the court where the action is pending must first be satisfied as to timeliness.”) The Court further finds that the interest set forth by the Prospective Intervenors will be adequately represented by Defendant Detzner, and therefore the presence of the Prospective
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Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 94 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/28/2012 Page 7 of 7

Intervenors will only serve to raise a further risk of delay. See

Wollschlaeger v. Scott, 2011 WL 2672250, at * 3 (S.D. Fla. July 8,

2011) (holding that “[t]he duplicative nature of the [prospective

intervenor’s] claims or interests will unduly delay the

adjudication of the rights of the parties to this lawsuit and

unlikely shed any new light on the constitutional issues in this

case.”). Therefore, insofar as it alternatively seeks permissive

intervention, the instant Motion (DE 67) will be denied.

Accordingly, after due consideration, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motion Of Bipartisan Group Of

Voters Luis I. Garcia, Diana K. Whitehurst, Hal David Rush, And

Barbara A. Dereuil For Intervention Under Federal Rule Of Civil

Procedure 24 (DE 67) be and the same is hereby DENIED.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Fort Lauderdale, Broward

County, Florida, this 28th

day of September, 2012.

Copies furnished: All Counsel of Record

WILLIAM J. ZLOCH United States District Judge

7

 
 Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 124 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/29/2012 Page 1 of 20

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 12-22282-CIV-ZLOCH

KARLA VANESSA ARCIA, et al.

Plaintiffs,
vs.
KEN DETZNER, in his official capacity as Florida Secretary of State,

O R D E R

Defendant. /

THIS MATTER is before the Court upon Plaintiffs’ Motion For

Entry Of Judgment (DE 113) and pursuant to the Parties’ Stipulation

made in Court at the Status Conference held on October 22, 2012.

The Court has carefully reviewed said Motion and Stipulation, the

entire court file and is otherwise fully advised in the premises. The Court notes that as to the interpretation of section 8(c)(2)(A)

of the National Voter Registration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-

6(c)(2)(A), this Order supersedes any previous Order entered by the

Court. In all other respects, and specifically regarding

Plaintiffs’ Motion For Preliminary Injunction And Summary Judgment (DE 65) and the issue of the standing of all Plaintiffs, the Court’s

October 4, 2012, Order (DE 111) remains in full force and effect.

I. Background The above-styled cause concerns the implementation of the program known as “Processing Registered Voters - Non-Immigrants”

Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 124 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/29/2012 Page 2 of 20
(hereinafter “the Program”) by Defendant Florida Secretary of State Ken Detzner (hereinafter “the Secretary”). Plaintiffs were initially comprised of two individuals and five organizations who claim that their rights, and those of their members, “are affected by the program instituted by the Florida Department of State . . . to carry out a systematic purge of alleged non-citizens from the Florida voter rolls.” DE 57, p. 2. The individual Plaintiffs, Karla Vanessa Arcia (hereinafter “Arcia”) and Melande Antoine (hereinafter “Antoine”), are United States citizens who are registered to vote in the State of Florida and were included on the Secretary’s initial list of potential non-citizens. DE 71, p. 4. The five organizational Plaintiffs included a labor union and various Florida-based civic organizations. These organizational Plaintiffs alleged that their members are at risk of being removed from the voting rolls or, that based on the Program, the organizations themselves have had to divert their resources away from their regular business activities and toward addressing the implementation of the Program. DE 57, pp. 5-8.
On June 19, 2012, Plaintiffs initiated this case with the filing of their Complaint For Declaratory And Injunctive Relief (DE 1), alleging that the Program violated certain provisions of the Voting Rights Act (hereinafter “the VRA”) and the National Voter Registration Act (hereinafter “the NVRA”). By this initial Complaint (DE 1), Plaintiffs alleged that in April of 2012, the
2

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Secretary began the process of identifying, with the intent of later purging, potential non-citizens from the rolls of registered voters in the State of Florida. To identify such potential non-citizens, the Secretary obtained information from the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (hereinafter “DHSMV”) indicating that a registered voter may not in fact be a United States citizen, which was then cross-checked against various other databases. At that time, the Secretary issued a press release which stated that the Department of State was “actively seeking access to federal Department of Homeland Security databases such as SAVE (Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements) for further verification of immigration status.” DE 1, pp. 7-8 (hereinafter “the SAVE database”). The Secretary initially identified 180,000 names of alleged “potential non-citizens” and sent a sample of that list, containing 2,625 names, to the Supervisors of Elections in Florida’s 67 counties. DE 57, p. 1. The Secretary then directed these Supervisors to confirm whether any identified registered voter on the list was indeed a non-citizen, and if so, to begin the statutorily required notice and removal process to remove the individual from the voting rolls.
According to Plaintiffs, the Program——especially in its initial implementation——proved to be inaccurate, and the list of 2,625 “potential non-citizens” included at least some United States citizens, including the two individually named Plaintiffs: Arcia
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and Antoine. On April 30, 2012, the implementation of the Program was temporarily suspended. Since that time, the Secretary has received access to the federal SAVE database from the Department of Homeland Security (hereinafter “DHS”), which the Secretary alleges “is a rapidly updated federal database that allows state and local governments to check the most recent immigration status of noncitizens who lawfully entered the United States.” DE 79, p. 6. By checking an individual’s Alien Registration Number (hereinafter “Anumber”), “a unique 9-digit identifier given only to non-citizens,” against information in the SAVE database, Defendant maintains that it can accurately ascertain whether a registered voter has been naturalized as a United States citizen. Id., p. 7. The Secretary asserts that since its August 14, 2012, declaration to use the SAVE database in the implementation of the Program, “the Secretary’s data matching program has identified at least scores of registered voters who have either personally attested to their lack of citizenship or who, after the data matching process, . . . appear to be ineligible registered voters based on non-citizenship.” Id.
On September 12, 2012, the Parties filed a Stipulation Of Dismissal As To Counts I, II, And Part Of Count IV Of Complaint For Declaratory And Injunctive Relief (DE 56), dismissing the claims under the VRA, and the claim under paragraph (6)(b)(1) of section 8 of the NVRA, that the Program is not uniform, nondiscriminatory, and in compliance with the VRA. Thus, the sole claim that remains
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by Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (DE 57) is that the Program violates the NVRA’s prohibition on completing “not later than 90 days prior to the date of a primary or general election for Federal office, any program the purpose of which is to systematically remove the names of ineligible voters from the official list of eligible voters.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(c)(2)(A) (2002). On September 19, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a Motion For Preliminary Injunction And Summary Judgment (DE 65).
The Court held an evidentiary hearing on Plaintiffs’ Motion For Preliminary Injunction And Summary Judgment (DE 65) on October 1, 2012. At the hearing, the Court heard from two witnesses on behalf of Plaintiffs: Mr. Dale Ewart, the Assistant Regional Director of the Florida Region for 1199SEIU United Healthcare Workers East, and Mr. Wilfredo Seda, the Chair of the National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights. The Court then heard argument from Plaintiffs and the Secretary.
By that Motion (DE 65), Plaintiffs asked that the Court do essentially four things: (1) declare that the State’s implementation of the Program, specifically in its recent use of the SAVE database, violates the NVRA; (2) enjoin the Secretary from conducting any systematic purge aimed at excluding ineligible voters prior to the November 6, 2012, election; (3) direct the Secretary to ensure that any individual who was removed after August 8, 2012, be restored to the voting rolls prior to October 15, 2012; (4) and instruct the
5

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Secretary to file with the Court a list of voters who have been so removed from the voting rolls and/or have been reinstated. DE 65, pp. 1-2.
On October 4, 2012, the Court issued its Order (DE 111) in response to Plaintiffs’ Motion For Preliminary Injunction And Summary Judgment (DE 65). First, construing Defendant’s Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiffs’ Motion For Preliminary Injunction And Summary Judgment (DE 79) as a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing, the Court found that Plaintiffs failed to establish the organizational standing of Plaintiffs Veye Yo and Florida New Majority, Inc. and therefore dismissed the First Amended Complaint (DE 57) solely as it relates to those two Plaintiffs. See DE 111, p. 24. The Court further found that the record evidence regarding Plaintiffs Arcia, Antoine, as well as organizational Plaintiffs the National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, 1199SEIU United Healthcare Workers East, and Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc. was sufficient to establish their standing in the above-styled cause. The Court then denied Plaintiffs’ Motion (DE 65) to the extent it sought entry of a preliminary injunction in its favor, based on a finding that Plaintiffs failed to establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their two-Count First Amended Complaint (DE 57). See DE 111. The Court also found that even if Plaintiffs could establish the first factor requisite to the issuance of a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs would be unable to establish any
6

Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 124 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/29/2012 Page 7 of 20
of the other three preliminary injunction factors. Id., pp. 19-21. The Court also denied Plaintiffs’ Motion (DE 65) to the extent it sought entry of summary judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor. Id., pp. 2123. The Court found that there were no issues of material fact in dispute, and for the same reasons underlying the denial of the request for a preliminary injunction, the Court denied entry of summary judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor. Id.
On October 5, 2012, Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion For Entry Of Judgment (DE 113) requesting that “the Court promptly enter final judgment in favor of Defendant.” Id., p. 2. The Court held a hearing on October 22, 2012, at which time both Parties stipulated that they did not object to the Court’s entry of final judgment in the above-styled cause, consistent with their September 21, 2012, stipulation that “this action involves a pure question of law under Section 8(c)(2)(A) of the NVRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(c)(2)(A).” See DE 71, p. 5. Therefore, because the Court now finds that the Program does not violate section 8(c)(2)(A) of the NVRA, the Court will enter judgment in favor of the Secretary.
II. Plaintiffs’ Claim Under Section 8 of the NVRA The Court now considers the sole remaining claim by Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint——that the Program “violates Section 8(c)(2)(A) of the NVRA, [codified at] 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg6(c)(2)(A).” DE 57, p. 17.
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Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 124 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/29/2012 Page 8 of 20
Subparagraph (c)(2)(A) of section 8 of the NVRA (hereinafter “the 90-day Provision”) reads as follows: “A state shall complete, not later than 90 days prior to the date of a primary or general election for Federal office, any program the purpose of which is to systematically remove the names of ineligible voters from the official list of eligible voters.” § 1973gg-6(c)(2)(A). Plaintiffs argue that the Program “violates the plain language” of the 90-day Provision and that no part of section 8 excepts the removal of noncitizens by a “systematic program” such as that which the Secretary is implementing here. See DE 65-1, p. 9 & p. 14 n.9. The Secretary posits several competing interpretations of section 8 of the NVRA. The Secretary first argues that section 8 of the NVRA simply does not concern the removal of individuals who were never properly registered in the first instance1, or if it does, subsection (b)2 of section 8 addresses, generally, the removal of those individuals. DE 79, p. 17. He then argues, in the alternative, that subparagraph
1 As will be explained, the Secretary argues, and the Court agrees, that paragraphs (a)(3) and (a)(4), which set forth the types of registrants a state may remove from an official list of eligible voters, does not apply to the removal of those individuals who are registered to vote yet were never eligible for such registration in the first instance.
2 As will be explained, the Secretary argues, and the Court agrees, that subsection (b), by which a state is to “confirm[] [] voter registration,” is the only provision of section 8 of the NVRA which applies to the Secretary’s Program.
8

Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 124 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/29/2012 Page 9 of 20
(a)(3)(B)3 excepts from the 90-day Provision the removal of
registrants “as provided by State law,” which would necessarily
include the State’s statutory proscription against a non-citizen
registering to vote. DE 79, p. 20. The Court considers each of
these arguments in turn.
A. The General Removal Provision: Paragraph (a)(3)
In order to understand the meaning of the 90-day Provision, the
Court must first look to paragraph (a)(3) (hereinafter “the General
Removal Provision”). Paragraph (a)(3) deals with the types of
“registrants” who may be removed from “the official list of eligible
voters.” § 1973gg-6(a)(3). This provision provides:
(a) In general. In the administration of voter registration for elections for Federal office, each State shall– ... (3) provide that the name of a registrant may not be removed from the official list of eligible voters except–
(A) at the request of the registrant; (B) as provided by State law, by reason of criminal conviction or mental incapacity; or (C) as provided under paragraph (4).
Id. Paragraph (a)(4) then permits the removal of names of
“ineligible voters” by reason of: “(A) the death of the registrant;
or (B) a change in the residence of the registrant, in accordance
3 Subparagraph (a)(3)(B) provides that a state may remove registrants from the list of eligible voters “as provided by State law, by reason of criminal conviction or mental incapacity.” The Secretary argues that the State may remove registrants based on State law, inside the 90-day period, based on the fact that subparagraph (c)(2)(B) exempts such a removal from the 90-day period. As explained, the Court does not accept this interpretation of subparagraph (a)(3)(B).
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Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 124 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/29/2012 Page 10 of 20
with subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this section.” § 1973gg6(a)(4)(A)-(B).
This General Removal Provision found in paragraph (a)(3) is later referenced in paragraph (c)(2), which also contains the 90-day Provision. Paragraph (c)(2) explicitly exempts from the 90-day period certain “removals” that are enumerated in subparagraphs (a)(3)(A), (B), and (a)(4)(A). Subparagraph (c)(2)(B) provides:
(B) Subparagraph (A) shall not be construed to preclude (i) the removal of names from official lists of voters on a basis described in paragraph (3)(A) or (B) or (4)(A) of subsection (a) of this section; or (ii) correction of registration records pursuant to this subchapter.
Thus, the Secretary’s Program is not subject to the 90-day Provision if it “remov[es] [] names from official lists of voters on a basis described in paragraph (3)(A) or (B) or (4)(A) of subsection (a) of this section” or corrects “registration records pursuant to this subchapter.” § 1973gg-6(c)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).
Taking these two provisions together, then, four classifications of “removals” are explicitly excepted from the 90day Provision, meaning that a removal on these grounds may be effected at any time. These grounds, which do not include removal for change of residence, are: (1) removals at the request of the registrant under subparagraph (a)(3)(A); (2) those “provided by State law, by reason of criminal conviction or mental incapacity” under subparagraph (a)(3)(B); (3) removals based on the death of the registrant under subparagraph (a)(4)(A); and (4) “correction of
10

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registration records pursuant to this subchapter” under clause (c)(2)(B)(ii). § 1973gg-6(a)(3)(A)-(B), (4)(A); (c)(2)(B)(ii). The Secretary states in a footnote of his Motion For Preliminary Inunction And Summary Judgment (DE 65) that clause (c)(2)(B)(ii), “correction of registration records,” may pertain to the Program and allow it to be implemented at any time; yet, because the Parties have not thoroughly explored an interpretation of this clause, and because it was not raised at the October 1, 2012, hearing, the Court will not address it now. See DE 79, p. 20 n.6.
At first blush, it would appear that implementation of the Program would be excepted from the 90-day Provision, because it is “provided by State law” under subparagraph (a)(3)(B). By Florida Statute, individuals who are “not [] United States citizen[s]” yet are registered to vote may be removed from “the statewide voter registration system.” Fla. Stat. § 98.075(6) (2011). This statute provides the “procedures for removal” that must be followed in order to remove such an individual. Fla. Stat. § 98.075(7) (2011).
Yet, subparagraph (a)(3)(B) cannot reasonably be read to create three independent categories for removals——those based on State law, criminal conviction, and mental incapacity. If this subparagraph were intended to set forth three distinct categories for removal, then indeed any removals “provided by State law” at any time would render the 90-day Provision at best superfluous, and at worst, directly inconsistent with subparagraph (a)(3)(B). This is because
11

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removals “provided by State law” based on a change in residence cannot be consistently allowed during the 90-day period under such a reading of subparagraph (a)(3)(B), yet also prohibited during the 90-day period by subparagraph (c)(2)(A). Thus, the Court does not find that the Program’s implementation is permitted as “provided by State law” pursuant to such a reading of subparagraph (a)(3)(B).
B. The Program Is Not Subject to the General Removal Provision or the 90-day Provision As set forth above, paragraphs (a)(3) and (a)(4) provide the exclusive grounds upon which a “registrant” may be removed from the “official list of eligible voters.” § 1973gg-6(a)(3)-(4) (“[T]he name of a registrant may not be removed from the official list of eligible voters except” under four enumerated grounds.). Therefore, if one were to read this provision literally and without reference to any other portion of section 8 of the NVRA, the only grounds by which a state could remove a “registrant,” would be: (1) if the registrant requests to be removed under subparagraph (a)(3)(A); (2) the registrant becomes ineligible to vote under state law by reason of criminal conviction or mental incapacity under subparagraph (a)(3)(B); (3) the registrant dies under subparagraph (a)(4)(A)4; or
4 Subparagraph (a)(3)(C) states that “a registrant may not be removed from the official list of eligible voters except . . . as provided under paragraph (4),” which then provides that “each State shall . . . conduct a general program that makes a reasonable effort to remove the names of ineligible voters from the official list of eligible voters by reason of (a) the death of the registrant; or (B) a change in residence of the registrant, in accordance with subsections (b), (c), and (d) of
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(4) the registrant changes his residence under subparagraph (a)(4)(B).
It would necessarily follow, then, that a state would be prohibited from removing from its voting rolls for other valid reasons a registrant who was improperly registered. So a state could therefore not remove from its voting rolls minors, fictitious individuals, individuals who misrepresent their residence in the state, and non-citizens. Not only would this interpretation stand in direct contravention of Florida law, see Fla. Stat. § 98.075(6), but it would produce an absurd result. See In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 667 (1897) (“[N]othing is better settled than that statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will effectuate the legislative intention, and, if possible, so as to avoid an unjust or absurd conclusion.”). Therefore, paragraph (a)(3) cannot apply to the removal of non-citizens. See also United States v. Florida, 2012 WL 2457506, at *3 (N.D. Fla. June 28, 2012) (“This conclusion is inescapable: section 8(a)(3)'s prohibition on removing a registrant except on specific grounds simply does not apply to an improperly registered non-citizen.”).
As stated above, subparagraph (c)(2)(B) lists the removals that are excepted from the 90-day Provision5: (1) removals at the request
this section.” § 1973gg-6(a)(3)(C), (a)(4)(A)-(B). 5 Subparagraph (c)(2)(B) states that subparagraph (c)(2)(A),
the 90-day Provision, “shall not be construed to preclude– (i) the removal of names from official lists of voters on a basis
13

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of the registrant; (2) those “provided by State law, by reason of criminal conviction or mental incapacity”; (3) removals based on the death of the registrant; and (4) “correction of registration records pursuant to this subchapter.” § 1973gg-6(a)(3)(A)-(B), (4)(A); (c)(2)(B)(ii). Therefore, the only removal allowed under paragraphs (a)(3) and (a)(4) that remains subject to the 90-day Provision is a removal based on “a change in the residence of the registrant, in accordance with subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this section.” § 1973gg-6(a)(4)(B).
The Court finds no reason to conclude that the 90-day Provision applies to anything other than removals of registrants based on a change in residence. The 90-day Provision is found in subsection (c) of section 8 of the NVRA, which is entitled “Voter removal programs.” Paragraph (1) of subsection (c) then details how a state is to implement the requirements of subsection (a)(4) [“a change in residence of the registrant”], such as by “establishing a program” to confirm the change-of-address of a registrant who moves inside or outside the state. Paragraph (c)(2) of course includes the 90day Provision, which, when read in conjunction with paragraphs (a)(3) and (a)(4) reveals that registrants who become ineligible because of a change in residence may not be removed during the 90day period. Finally, not only does paragraph (c)(2) incorporate by
described in paragraph (3)(A) or (B) or (4)(A) of subsection (a) of this section; or (ii) correction of registration records pursuant to this subchapter.” § 1973gg-6(c)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).
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reference paragraphs (a)(3) and (a)(4) in setting forth those removals excepted from the 90-day period, but the language of each of the two provisions tracks the other. Thus, these two provisions are indeed “inextricably linked.” DE 105, p. 70. See also United States v. Florida, 2012 WL 2457506, at *3 (“‘[R]emoved’ in 8(a)(3) and ‘remove’ in 8(c)(2) mean the same thing. And there is no reason to believe the reference to removing a ‘registrant’ in 8(a)(3) means something different than removing ‘ineligible voters’ in 8(c)(2) . . .”).
Another way to understand these two sets of provisions is that they only address the removal of once-eligible voters——those who were at one time bona fide registrants, yet because of personal request, criminal conviction, mental incapacity, death, or change in residence, became thereafter ineligible. It is indeed notable that these provisions are silent as to the removal of those registered voters who were never bona fide registrants, and whose registration was void ab initio by virtue of their status as minors, non-citizens, fictitious persons, or any other factor nullifying their registration.
Put simply, these two provisions are meant to be read in conjunction with one another. When read together, the 90-day Provision is meant only to proscribe the removal within 90 days of a federal election of registrants who become ineligible to vote based on a change in residence. Plaintiffs seem to argue that the
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90-day Provision’s use of the word “systematically”6 distinguishes some voter removal programs from others. See DE 65-1, p. 14 n.9 (“[T]he Plaintiffs believe non-citizens may be removed from the voting rolls within 90 days of a federal election - as long as the removal is not part of a systematic program.”). To be sure, subsection (c) sets forth mere “voter removal programs,” as opposed to systematic ones. Yet, this does not change the fact that Plaintiffs cannot direct the Court to any provision of section 8 that differentiates a systematic program from a non-systematic one; nor can Plaintiffs direct the Court to a provision of section 8 that provides guidance on how to properly remove an individual from the voting rolls who was never eligible to vote in the first instance.
At the October 1, 2012, hearing, Plaintiffs explored several measures that they aver should deter non-citizens from registering to vote, or at least from voting, despite their lack of citizenship. Because it is a federal offense for a non-citizen to both register to vote and cast a vote in a federal election, such individuals should be deterred by the consequences of breaking the law. And if those individuals do succeed in casting a vote despite their noncitizenship, they can be criminally prosecuted. See 42 U.S.C. §
6 The 90-day Provision states that “[a] State shall complete, not later than 90 days prior to the date of a primary or general election for Federal office, any program the purpose of which is to systematically remove the names of ineligible voters from the official list of eligible voters.” § 1973gg6(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
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1973gg-3(C)(2)(B)(ii); § 1973gg-3(C)(2)(C); 18 U.S.C. § 1015(f). These suggestions give the Court little assurance. Certainly, the NVRA does not require the State to sit idle on the sidelines until a non-citizen violates the law before it can act. And surely the NVRA does not require the State to wait until after that critical juncture——when the illicit vote has been cast and its harm fully realized——to address what it views as nothing short of “voter fraud.” DE 79, p. 2.
C. Subsection (b) of Section 8 of the NVRA: Confirmation of Voter Registration This only leaves one statutory proscription under section 8 that relates to the removal of non-citizens from the voting rolls. Subsection (b), “[c]onfirmation of voter registration,” provides that “[a]ny State program or activity to protect the integrity of the electoral process by ensuring the maintenance of an accurate and current voter registration roll for elections for Federal office——(1) shall be uniform, nondiscriminatory, and in compliance with the Voting Rights Act of 1965 . . .” § 1973gg-6(b)(1). The only consistent reading of section 8 of the NVRA is that subsection (b) alone applies to programs such as the Secretary’s. Further, it is hard to understand why Congress would create a distinct subsection, markedly set apart from subsection (c)’s “[v]oter removal programs,” which provides direction regarding the “confirmation of voter registration.” By creating two distinct subsections, Congress meant to differentiate the removal of once-
17

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eligible voters from those who were never eligible in the first instance.
Finally, subsection (b) is consistent with Congress’s finding that “the right of citizens of the United States to vote is a fundamental right” and one of the purposes of the NVRA is “to ensure that accurate and current voter registration rolls are maintained.” § 1973gg(a)(1), (b)(4) (emphasis added). Even the Department of Justice has recently recognized that “federal and state governments have a compelling interest in excluding foreign citizens from activities intimately related to the process of democratic selfgovernment.” Brief of the United States Bluman v. Fed. Election Comm., 130 S. Ct. 1087 (2012) (No. 11-275), 2011 WL 5548718, at *11 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
It must follow that subsection (b) was meant to apply to programs aimed at removing those voters whose status as registered voters was void ab initio. See also United States v. Florida, 2012 WL 2457506, at *4 (holding that pursuant to subsection (b), and in regard to “non-citizens, the state's duty is to maintain an accurate voting list. . . . But the NVRA does not require a state to allow a non-citizen to vote just because the state did not catch the error more than 90 days in advance.”).
Therefore, the Court finds that the Secretary’s implementation of the Program is not subject to the 90-day Provision. If the Program is subject to any provision of section 8 of the NVRA, it
18

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would be subsection (b); yet, Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (DE 57) does not include any claims based on an interpretation of subsection (b). Therefore, both of Plaintiffs’ two Counts by their First Amended Complaint (DE 57) fail as a matter of law, and the Court will therefore enter judgment in the Secretary’s favor.
III. Conclusion In reaching its conclusion today, the Court is mindful of the Supreme Court’s “guiding principle” that “where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter.” Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 857 (2000). Here, interpreting the 90day Provision in the manner above avoids reaching the constitutional question of whether Congress has the right so to deprive the states of their authority, pursuant to Article I, Section 2 of the Federal Constitution, to determine the qualifications of eligible voters in Federal elections. On the other hand, interpreting the 90-day Provision in the manner Plaintiffs posit would certainly raise such “grave and doubtful constitutional questions”——however, the Court need not undertake that inquiry today. Accordingly, after due consideration, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows: 1. Plaintiffs’ Motion For Entry Of Judgment (DE 113) be and the
19

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same is hereby GRANTED; and

2. Final Judgment will be entered by separate Order.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Fort Lauderdale, Broward

County, Florida, this 29th

day of October, 2012.

Copies Furnished: All Counsel of Record

WILLIAM J. ZLOCH United States District Judge

20

 
 Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 125 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/29/2012 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 12-22282-CIV-ZLOCH

KARLA VANESSA ARCIA, et al.

Plaintiffs,
vs.
KEN DETZNER, in his official capacity as Florida Secretary of State,

FINAL JUDGMENT

Defendant. /

THIS MATTER is before the Court sua sponte. The Court has

carefully reviewed the entire court file and is otherwise fully

advised in the premises.

Accordingly after due consideration, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. Final Judgment be and the same is hereby ENTERED in favor

of Defendant Ken Detzner, in his official capacity as Florida

Secretary of State, and against Plaintiffs Karla Vanessa Arcia,

Melande Antoine, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., National

Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, and 199SEIU United Healthcare

Workers East, upon the First Amended Complaint (DE 57) filed

herein; and

2. To the extent not otherwise disposed of herein, all pending

Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 125 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/29/2012 Page 2 of 2

motions are hereby DENIED as moot.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Fort Lauderdale, Broward

County, Florida this 29th

day of October, 2012.

Copies furnished: All Counsel of Record

WILLIAM J. ZLOCH United States District Judge

2

 
 Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 131 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/04/2012 Page 1 of 2

Case: 12-15220 Date Filed: 12/03/2012 Page: 1 of 1
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

DEC 3, 2012

ELBERT PARR TUTTLE COURT OF APPEALS BUILDING 56 Forsyth Street, N.W. Atlanta, Georgia 30303

John Ley Clerk of Court

December 03, 2012

For rules and forms visit www.ca11.uscourts.gov

Steven M. Larimore United States District Court 400 N MIAMI AVE MIAMI, FL 33128-1807
Appeal Number: 12-15220-EE Case Style: Karla Arcia, et al v. Secretary of State District Court Docket No: 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ

The enclosed copy of this Court's Order of Dismissal is issued as the mandate of this court. See 11th Cir. R. 41-4. Counsel and pro se parties are advised that pursuant to 11th Cir. R. 27-2, "a motion to reconsider, vacate, or modify an order must be filed within 21 days of the entry of such order. No additional time shall be allowed for mailing."
Sincerely,
JOHN LEY, Clerk of Court
Reply to: Lois Tunstall, EE/jsc Phone #: (404) 335-6224
Enclosure(s)

DIS-4 Multi-purpose dismissal letter

1 of 2

Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 131 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/04/2012 Page 2 of 2 Case: 12-15220 Date Filed: 12/03/2012 Page: 1 of 1
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-15220-EE
KARLA VANESSA ARCIA, Individually, MELANDE ANTOINE, Individually, FLORIDA IMMIGRANT COALITION, INC., Non-Profit Corporation, NATIONAL CONGRESS FOR PUERTO RICAN RIGHTS, Non-Profit Corporation, 199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, a labor union, FLORIDA NEW MAJORITY, INC., Non-Profit Corporation, VEYEYO, a Civic Organization based in Miami Dade County,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
versus
FLORIDA SECRETARY OF STATE, Ken Detzner, in his official capacity,
Defendant - Appellee, ------------------------On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida --------------------------
BEFORE: CARNES and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
BY THE COURT:
Appellants’ “Amended Unopposed Motion to Dismiss Appeal with Prejudice” is
GRANTED.
2 of 2

 
 Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 141 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/04/2014 Page 1 of 34 Case: 12-15738 Date Filed: 12/04/2014 Page: 1 of 1

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

John Ley Clerk of Court

ELBERT PARR TUTTLE COURT OF APPEALS BUILDING 56 Forsyth Street, N.W. Atlanta, Georgia 30303
December 04, 2014

Steven M. Larimore U.S. District Court 400 N MIAMI AVE MIAMI, FL 33128-1810

Appeal Number: 12-15738-EE Case Style: Karla Arcia, et al v. Florida Secretary of State District Court Docket No: 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ

ABM
Dec 4, 2014
MIA For rules and forms visit www.ca11.uscourts.gov

A copy of this letter, and the judgment form if noted above, but not a copy of the court's decision, is also being forwarded to counsel and pro se parties. A copy of the court's decision was previously forwarded to counsel and pro se parties on the date it was issued.

The enclosed copy of the judgment is hereby issued as mandate of the court. The court's opinion was previously provided on the date of issuance.

Sincerely,

JOHN LEY, Clerk of Court

Reply to: Brenda H. McConnell Phone #: (404) 335-6209

Enclosure(s)

MDT-1 Letter Issuing Mandate

Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 141 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/04/2014 Page 2 of 34 Case: 12-15738 Date Filed: 12/04/2014 Page: 1 of 1
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS For the Eleventh Circuit ______________
No. 12-15738 ______________
District Court Docket No. 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ
KARLA VANESSA ARCIA, Individually, MELANDE ANTOINE, Individually, FLORIDA IMMIGRANT COALITION, INC., Non-Profit Corporation, NATIONAL CONGRESS FOR PUERTO RICAN RIGHTS, Non-Profit Corporation, FLORIDA NEW MAJORITY, INC., Non-Profit Corporation, 199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, a labor union, VEYEYO, a Civic Organization based in Miami Dade County,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
versus
FLORIDA SECRETARY OF STATE,
Defendant - Appellee,
LUIS I. GARCIA, et al.,
Intervenor Defendants. __________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
__________________________________________
JUDGMENT
It is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the opinion issued on this date in this appeal is entered as the judgment of this Court.
Entered: November 17, 2014 For the Court: John Ley, Clerk of Court
By: Djuanna Clark
ISSUED AS MANDATE: 12/4/2014

Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 141 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/04/2014 Page 3 of 34 Case: 12-15738 Date Filed: 04/01/2014 Page: 1 of 31
[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 12-15738 ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ KARLA VANESSA ARCIA, MELANDE ANTOINE, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
FLORIDA SECRETARY OF STATE,
Defendant-Appellee,
LUIS I. GARCIA, et al.,
Intervenor Defendants. ________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida ________________________ (April 1, 2014)
Before MARTIN, JORDAN and SUHRHEINRICH,* Circuit Judges.
MARTIN, Circuit Judge:
* Honorable Richard F. Suhrheinrich, United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.

Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 141 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/04/2014 Page 4 of 34 Case: 12-15738 Date Filed: 04/01/2014 Page: 2 of 31
Section 8(c)(2)(A) of the National Voter Registration Act (the 90 Day Provision) requires states to “complete, not later than 90 days prior to the date of a primary or general election for Federal office, any program the purpose of which is to systematically remove the names of ineligible voters from the official lists of eligible voters.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(c)(2)(A). This provision became the center of a legal dispute in 2012, when a group of individual voters and organizations sued Florida Secretary of State Kenneth W. Detzner. These plaintiffs argued that Florida was violating the 90 Day Provision by conducting a program to systematically remove suspected non-citizens from the voter rolls within 90 days of a federal election. The District Court denied the plaintiffs’ motions for a preliminary injunction and summary judgment, and entered judgment in favor of Secretary Detzner. The plaintiffs now appeal.
Because we conclude that Florida’s program was an attempt to systematically remove names from the voter rolls in violation of the 90 Day Provision, we reverse and remand.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY This case concerns Florida’s efforts to remove the names of ineligible voters from the State’s voter rolls prior to the 2012 primary and general elections. Concerned about people who are not citizens casting ballots in Florida elections,
2

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Secretary of State Detzner engaged in two separate programs to identify and remove non-citizens from the Florida voter rolls.
Secretary Detzner’s first program began in advance of the primary election and used records from the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV). The Secretary started by compiling a list of registered voters who had previously presented the DHSMV with identification—such as green cards or foreign passports—suggesting that they may be non-citizens. After putting together this list, he sent a portion of it to the State Supervisor of Elections in each county, instructing them to (1) review the names on the list, (2) conduct additional research using “whatever other sources you have,” and (3) initiate a notice and removal process. Secretary Detzner suspended the program at the end of April 2012. Records indicate, however, that suspected non-citizens continued to be removed from the voter rolls during May and June, which was less than 90 days before the Florida primary election.
This first effort by Secretary Detzner to identify non-citizens was far from perfect. For example, Plaintiffs Karla V. Arcia and Melande Antoine were identified as non-citizen voters to be removed from the voter rolls. This, despite the fact that they were both United States citizens eligible to vote in the 2012 elections. Also, organizations like the Florida Immigration Coalition, Inc., the National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, and 1199SEIU United Healthcare
3

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Workers East (1199SEIU) diverted resources from their regularly-conducted programs and activities to counteract the effects of the Secretary’s program. These efforts included locating and assisting members who had been wrongly identified as non-citizens to ensure that they were able to vote.
Despite these shortcomings in his initial program, Secretary Detzner renewed his efforts to remove non-citizens from the voter rolls in advance of the 2012 general election. Rather than use the DHSMV records, this second program relied on the Department of Homeland Security’s Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) database. Secretary Detzner also announced that he would not wait until after the general election to implement his program. Even though there were less than 90 days before the general election, Secretary Detzner stated publicly that he planned to forward the names of registered voters identified as non-citizens in the SAVE database to State Supervisors.
This case began on June 19, 2012, when the plaintiffs first challenged Secretary Detzner’s efforts to remove non-citizens prior to the Florida primary election. Among other things, the plaintiffs alleged that they were entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief because the Secretary’s actions were barred by the 90 Day Provision. After Secretary Detzner announced that he would resume the removal of purported non-citizens from the voter rolls using the SAVE database, the plaintiffs amended their complaint, arguing that the Secretary’s program still
4

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violated the NVRA’s 90 Day Provision because of the proximity to the general election. The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction and summary judgment.
The District Court found that the 90 Day Provision did not apply to the Secretary’s efforts to remove non-citizens from the voter rolls and denied the plaintiffs’ motions for an injunction and summary judgment. At the plaintiffs’ request, the District Court also entered judgment as a matter of law in favor of Secretary Detzner. Plaintiffs now appeal this final judgment.1
II. JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES Before reaching the merits, we must first determine whether we have Article III jurisdiction over the parties and issues presented here. In particular, we must decide (1) whether the plaintiffs have standing and (2) whether this case is moot because the 2012 elections have passed.
A. STANDING Secretary Detzner claims that neither the individual nor the organizational plaintiffs have standing because they did not suffer an “injury-in-fact.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992). “We review issues of standing de novo.” Hollywood Mobile Estates Ltd. v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 641 F.3d 1259, 1264 (11th Cir. 2011). Standing is determined at the
1 The plaintiffs filed a motion to expedite this appeal, arguing that the Secretary’s program risked disfranchising eligible voters incorrectly identified as non-citizens on the eve of the general election. Based on Secretary Detzner’s assurances that no citizens would be mistakenly removed from the voter rolls before Election Day, this Court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to expedite their appeal.
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time the plaintiff’s complaint is filed. Focus on the Family v. Pinellas Suncoast Transit Auth., 344 F.3d 1263, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003).
“‘Injury in fact’ reflects the statutory requirement that a person be ‘adversely affected’ or ‘aggrieved,’ and it serves to distinguish a person with a direct stake in the outcome of a litigation—even though small—from a person with a mere interest in the problem.” United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14, 93 S. Ct. 2405, 2417 n.14 (1973) (noting that “an identifiable trifle is enough”). An injury-in-fact involves “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S. Ct. at 2136 (quotation marks and internal citations omitted). 1. Individual Plaintiffs
The individual plaintiffs, Ms. Arcia and Ms. Antoine, have standing because (1) they were directly injured by Secretary Detzner’s first program before the 2012 primary election and (2) at the time they filed their complaint, they had established a probable future injury allowing them to prospectively challenge Secretary Detzner’s second program before the 2012 general election.
Ms. Arcia and Ms. Antoine had standing to challenge Secretary Detzner’s first program before the 2012 primary election because they were directly injured by it when they were wrongly identified as non-citizens. Even though they were
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ultimately not prevented from voting, an injury like theirs is sufficient to confer standing. See Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340, 1351–52 (11th Cir. 2009) (finding that requirement to produce photo identification to vote was an injury sufficient to confer standing even though the right to vote was not “wholly denied”); Charles H. Wesley Educ. Found., Inc. v. Cox, 408 F.3d 1349, 1352 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding sufficient the injury of being unable to vote in home precinct because state government rejected voter’s use of the federal registration form to change her address).
Ms. Arcia and Ms. Antoine also have standing to prospectively challenge the Secretary’s second attempt to remove non-citizens from the voter rolls using the SAVE database. When the harm alleged is prospective, as it was here, a plaintiff can satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement by showing imminent harm. Fla. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153, 1160–61 (11th Cir. 2008). While the threatened future injury cannot be merely hypothetical or conjectural, probabilistic harm is enough. Id. at 1162–63. Because Ms. Arcia and Ms. Antoine were naturalized U.S. citizens from Nicaragua and Haiti respectively, there was a realistic probability that they would be misidentified due to unintentional mistakes in the Secretary’s data-matching process. See id. at 1163–64 (distinguishing foreseeable injuries from those based on assumptions and conjecture). This being the case, Ms. Arcia and Ms. Antoine sufficiently established standing based on the
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potential errors that could occur when the Secretary attempted to confirm their immigration status in various state and federal databases in the hurried 90-day window before the election. 2. Organizational Plaintiffs
The organizational plaintiffs also have standing to challenge Secretary Detzner’s program based on both a diversion-of-resources theory and an associational standing theory.
Under the diversion-of-resources theory, an organization has standing to sue when a defendant’s illegal acts impair the organization’s ability to engage in its own projects by forcing the organization to divert resources in response. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379, 102 S. Ct. 1114, 1124 (1982) (“[C]oncrete and demonstrable injury to the organization’s activities—with the consequent drain on the organization’s resources—constitutes far more than simply a setback to the organization’s abstract social interests.”). For example, our precedent provides that organizations can establish standing to challenge election laws by showing that they will have to divert personnel and time to educating potential voters on compliance with the laws and assisting voters who might be left off the registration rolls on Election Day. See Browning, 522 F.3d at 1165–66.
Here, all three of the organizational plaintiffs—the Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., the National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, and 1199SEIU—
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submitted affidavits showing they have missions that include voter registration and education, or encouraging and safeguarding voter rights, and that they had diverted resources to address the Secretary’s programs. A representative from 1199SEIU also testified that after some of its members were identified as potential noncitizens before the primary election, the organization expended resources to locate and assist the members to ensure that they were able to vote.2 This redirection of resources to counteract the Secretary’s removal program is a concrete and demonstrable injury, not an “abstract social interest[].” Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. at 379, 102 S. Ct. at 1124.
The organizational plaintiffs also have standing to challenge Secretary Detzner’s programs under an associational standing theory. An organizational plaintiff has standing to enforce the rights of its members “when its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right, the interests at stake are germane to the organization’s purpose, and neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Friends of the Earth, Inc., v. Laidlaw Envt’l Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181, 120 S. Ct. 693, 704 (2000). Based on our review of the affidavits provided on behalf of the organizational plaintiffs, we have concluded that the interests at stake in this
2 This fact, together with Mr. Arcia and Ms. Antoine being included on the Secretary’s list of purported non-citizens, distinguish this case from Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013), in which the Court found the plaintiffs’ theory of standing “relie[d] on a highly attenuated chain of possibilities.” Id. at 1148.
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case are germane to the purposes and goals of the organizations. Further, the declaratory and injunctive relief sought by the organizations does not require the individual participation of the organizations’ members. Browning, 522 F.3d at 1160. The only remaining issue is whether the members of the organizations themselves would have standing. We conclude that they do.
In order to sue on behalf of its members, organizational plaintiffs need not establish that all of their members are in danger of suffering an injury. Rather, the rule in this Circuit is that organizational plaintiffs need only establish that “at least one member faces a realistic danger” of suffering an injury. Id. at 1163. As in Browning, the organizational plaintiffs here argue that the process of matching voters across various databases creates a foreseeable risk of false positives and mismatches based on user errors, problems with the data-matching process, flaws in the underlying databases, and similarities in names and birthdates. See id. at 1163 (finding that “the injuries are foreseeable and the expected results of unconscious and largely unavoidable human errors in transcription”). The three organizational plaintiffs also represent a large number of people, like Ms. Arcia and Ms. Antoine, who face a realistic danger of being identified in the Secretary’s removal programs because of their names or status as naturalized citizens. See id. (finding that large organizations like the NAACP had standing because there was a high probability that at least one of the members would be mistakenly
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mismatched). On this record, the organizational plaintiffs have sufficiently established their standing to bring this action on behalf of their members.
B. MOOTNESS Secretary Detzner next argues that the plaintiffs’ claims are moot because the 2012 elections have passed. We retain jurisdiction to decide this case, however, because the exception to mootness for disputes “capable of repetition yet evading review” applies here. The “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine applies where (1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action again. Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 735, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2769–70 (2008) (quotation marks omitted) (rejecting mootness argument despite fact that election had passed). Both of these requirements are met here. First, the plaintiffs are correct that Secretary Detzner’s actions were too short in duration to be fully litigated prior to their cessation. In election cases, we have stated that there is often “not sufficient time between the filing of the complaint and the election to obtain judicial resolution of the controversy before the election.” Teper v. Miller, 82 F.3d 989, 992 n.1 (11th Cir. 1996). Election cases also frequently present issues that will persist in future elections, and
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resolving these disputes can simplify future challenges. See id. Here, the plaintiffs could not challenge Secretary Detzner’s program until it became clear that it would continue past the 90th day before an election, giving the plaintiffs just three months before the case became moot. Based on this record, we conclude that the Secretary’s actions here were in their duration too short to be fully litigated prior to their cessation or expiration. See Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1309 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e conclude that one year is an insufficient amount of time for a district court, circuit court of appeals, and Supreme Court to adjudicate the typical case.”).
Second, there is a reasonable expectation that these plaintiffs will be subjected to Secretary Detzner’s program again. The District Court’s ruling was not limited to the 2012 elections or the specific program employed by the Secretary in 2012. Rather, it interpreted the 90 Day Provision generally to allow systematic removal programs based on citizenship during the last 90 days before an election. The Secretary has also not offered to refrain from similar programs within the 90day window in the future. Thus, there is a reasonable expectation that the plaintiffs will be subject to the same action again.
For these reasons, we have jurisdiction over this case, even though the 2012 elections have passed.
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III. DISCUSSION We now turn to the merits of this dispute. The primary issue here involves the statutory interpretation of the 90 Day Provision, which is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(c)(2)(A). The 90 Day Provision requires that: A State shall complete, not later than 90 days prior to the date of a primary or general election for Federal office, any program the purpose of which is to systematically remove the names of ineligible voters from the official lists of eligible voters. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(c)(2)(A). The issue presented is whether “any program . . . to systematically remove the names of ineligible voters” includes a program like the one initiated by Secretary Detzner to remove non-citizens from the voter rolls less than 90 days before the 2012 elections.
A. PLAIN MEANING “As in all cases involving statutory construction, our starting point must be the language employed by Congress, and we assume that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used.” Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68, 102 S. Ct. 1534, 1537 (1982) (quotation marks and internal citations omitted). “Courts must assume that Congress intended the ordinary meaning of the words used, and absent a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, that language is generally dispositive.” Gonzalez v. McNary, 980 F.2d 1418, 1420 (11th Cir. 1993) (quotation marks omitted). Because this is a case involving statutory construction, our first task is to determine
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whether Secretary Detzner’s program is barred under the plain meaning of the 90 Day Provision. We believe that it is.
First, the purpose of Secretary Detzner’s program was clearly to remove the names of “ineligible voters” from the Florida voter rolls. The National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) is premised on the assumption that citizenship is one of the requirements for eligibility to vote. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg3(c)(2)(C)(i), 1973gg-5(a)(6)(A)(i)(I), 1973gg-7(b)(2)(A) (requiring certain voter registration forms to state or specify “each eligibility requirement (including citizenship)” (emphasis added)). Thus, Secretary Detzner’s program to remove non-citizens was a program to remove “ineligible voters.”
Second, Secretary Detzner does not deny that his program was an attempt to “systematically” remove ineligible voters from the voter rolls. Although the statute provides no definition for the word “systematically” or “systematic,” we agree that Secretary Detzner’s program was a “systematic” program under any meaning of the word. Secretary Detzner’s program did not rely upon individualized information or investigation to determine which names from the voter registry to remove. Rather, the Secretary used a mass computerized datamatching process to compare the voter rolls with other state and federal databases, followed by the mailing of notices. Certainly, it is telling that the database that
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Secretary Detzner used before the general election—SAVE—stands for Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements.
Finally, the phrase “any program” suggests that the 90 Day Provision has a broad meaning. Both the Supreme Court and this Court have had occasion to consider the meaning of the word “any.” In United States v. Gonzalez, the Supreme Court noted that “[r]ead naturally, the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning, that is ‘one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.’” 520 U.S. 1, 5, 117 S. Ct. 1032, 1035 (1997) (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 97 (1976)). In the same way, this Court has held that when Congress does not add any language limiting the breadth of that word, “any” means all. Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 1997); Lyes v. City of Riviera Beach, 166 F.3d 1332, 1337 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Castro, 837 F.2d 441, 445 (11th Cir. 1988) (concluding that “any” meant “every” and “all”). “This long history of established meaning is important, because we readily presume that Congress knows the settled legal definition of the words it uses, and uses them in the settled sense.” Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 974 (11th Cir. 2000). The fact that the provision now before us applies to “any program” strongly suggests that Congress intended the 90 Day Provision to encompass programs of any kind, including a program like Secretary Detzner’s to remove non-citizens.
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B. STATUTORY CONTEXT AND PURPOSE Thus, the plain meaning of the 90 Day Provision indicates that Secretary Detzner’s actions fall under the category of “any program . . . to systematically remove the names of ineligible voters.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(c)(2)(A). The language of the 90 Day Provision, however, is not the end of our inquiry. “In expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its policy.” In re Colortex, 19 F.3d 1371, 1375 (11th Cir. 1994) (quotation marks omitted). Here, the statutory context and policy of the NVRA further buttresses our conclusion that the plain meaning of “any program . . . to systematically remove the names of ineligible voters” was intended by Congress to include programs like Secretary Detzner’s. First, Congress expressly allowed for a number of exceptions to the 90 Day Provision, and an exception for removals of non-citizens is not one of them. Directly after the 90 Day Provision, the statute includes a limiting provision, which states: [The 90 Day Provision] shall not be construed to preclude—(i) the removal of names from official lists of voters on a basis described in paragraph (3)(A) or (B) or (4)(A) of subsection (a) of this section; or (ii) correction of registration records pursuant to this subchapter
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42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(c)(2)(B). Thus the limiting provision creates an exception in the 90 Day Provision for “correction of registration records”3 and also directs us to several of the exceptions in § 1973gg-6(a) (the General Removal Provision). The General Removal Provision, which governs the removal of voters at any time, states that the names of registrants may not be removed from the voter rolls except:
(3)(A) at the request of the registrant; (B) as provided by State law, by reason of criminal conviction or mental incapacity . . . (4)(A) the death of the registrant; or (B) a change in the residence of the registrant . . . Id. § 1973gg-6(a)(3)–(4). Reading these two provisions together, the NVRA expressly allows states to conduct three types of removals during the final 90 days before a federal election. They are removals (1) at the request of the registrant; (2) as provided by State law, by reason of criminal conviction or mental incapacity; and (3) upon death of the registrant. See id. § 1973gg-6(c)(2)(B) (citing id. § 1973gg-6(a)(3)–(4)). Noticeably absent from the list of exceptions to the 90 Day Provision is any exception for removal of non-citizens. “Where Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.” Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616–617, 100 S. Ct. 1905, 1910 (1980); see
3 The Secretary has not argued that his program constitutes a “correction” of registration records. 17

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also United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 352, 117 S. Ct. 849, 852 (1997)
(observing that an “explicit listing of exceptions” indicates that “Congress did not
intend courts to read other unmentioned, open-ended, ‘equitable’ exceptions into
the statute”). The fact that Congress did not expressly include removals based on
citizenship in its exhaustive list of exceptions to the 90 Day Provision is good evidence that such removals are prohibited.4
Finally, the stated purposes of the National Voter Registration Act further
support our reading of the 90 Day Provision. The NVRA states that its purposes
are:
(1) to establish procedures that will increase the number of eligible citizens who register to vote in elections for Federal office;
(2) to make it possible for Federal, State, and local governments to implement this Act in a manner that enhances the participation of eligible citizens as voters in elections for Federal office;
(3) to protect the integrity of the electoral process; and
(4) to ensure that accurate and current voter registration rolls are maintained.
42 U.S.C. § 1973gg(b).
4 Secretary Detzner suggests that the exception for removals “as provided by State law, by reason of criminal conviction or mental incapacity” could be read to authorize the removal of noncitizens from the voter rolls. Like the District Court, we reject this interpretation. An exception for any removal “as provided by State law” would render the 90 Day Provision completely superfluous. See In re Griffith, 206 F.3d 1389, 1393 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[C]ourts should disfavor interpretations of statutes that render language superfluous . . . .”) (quotation marks omitted).
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As amici points out, the 90 Day Provision is designed to carefully balance these four competing purposes in the NVRA. Brief of Current and Former Election Officials as Amici Curiae, 14–15. For example, by limiting its reach to programs that “systematically” remove voters from the voter rolls, the 90 Day Provision permits removals based on individualized information at any time. According to amici, individualized removals are safe to conduct at any time because this type of removal is usually based on individual correspondence or rigorous individualized inquiry, leading to a smaller chance for mistakes.
For programs that systematically remove voters, however, Congress decided to be more cautious. At most times during the election cycle, the benefits of systematic programs outweigh the costs because eligible voters who are incorrectly removed have enough time to rectify any errors. In the final days before an election, however, the calculus changes. Eligible voters removed days or weeks before Election Day will likely not be able to correct the State’s errors in time to vote. This is why the 90 Day Provision strikes a careful balance: It permits systematic removal programs at any time except for the 90 days before an election because that is when the risk of disfranchising eligible voters is the greatest.
C. SECRETARY DETZNER’S INTERPRETATION Secretary Detzner responds that interpreting the 90 Day Provision to prohibit systematic removals of non-citizens would create grave constitutional concerns.
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Because the 90 Day Provision and the General Removal Provision share many of the same exceptions, see 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(c)(2)(B), Secretary Detzner believes that the statutory text of the NVRA provides us with only two options: either non-citizens may be excluded at any time, or not at all. The latter option, according to Secretary Detzner, would dilute the votes of citizens and trample on the rights of states to regulate the qualifications and functions of voters. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 34, 89 S. Ct. 5, 12 (1968) (“[T]he State is left with broad powers to regulate voting, which may include laws relating to the qualifications and functions of electors.”).
We reject Secretary Detzner’s attempts to have us decide today whether both the General Removal Provision and the 90 Day Provision allow for removals of non-citizens. Certainly an interpretation of the General Removal Provision that prevents Florida from removing non-citizens would raise constitutional concerns regarding Congress’s power to determine the qualifications of eligible voters in federal elections. Cf. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2257 (2013) (“Arizona is correct that the Elections Clause empowers Congress to regulate how federal elections are held, but not who may vote in them.”). We are not convinced, however, that the Secretary’s perceived need for an equitable exception in the General Removal Provision also requires us to find the same exception in the 90 Day Provision. None of the parties before us
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have argued that we would reach an unconstitutional result in this case if we found that the 90 Day Provision prohibits systematic removals of non-citizens. Constitutional concerns would only arise in a later case which squarely presents the question of whether the General Removal Provision bars removal of noncitizens altogether. And before we ever get that case, Congress could change the language of the General Removal Provision to assuage any constitutional concerns. With this in mind, we will confine our ruling to apply to the plain meaning of the 90 Day Provision and decline Secretary Detzner’s invitation to go further.
Secretary Detzner next argues that in drafting the NVRA, Congress only contemplated the removal of people who were once entitled to vote, not the removal of people who never had eligibility (like non-citizens). In support of this distinction, Secretary Detzner argues that non-citizens are not technically “registrants,” and removing them from the voter rolls is not really a “removal” because the non-citizens on the voter rolls were never supposed to be there from the start. He also observes that all the exceptions to the General Removal Provision relate to voters who become ineligible (like those who become felons or mentally incapacitated) rather than those voters who are ineligible at the time of their registration (like non-citizens).
At the outset, we are skeptical of Secretary Detzner’s arguments about what Congress may or may not have contemplated when drafting the NVRA. Our job is
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to honor the broad statutory language in the 90 Day Provision, which unambiguously covers programs like Secretary Detzner’s. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79, 118 S. Ct. 998, 1002 (1998) (“But statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.”); Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212, 118 S. Ct. 1952, 1956 (1998) (“[T]he fact that a statute can be applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth.” (quotation marks omitted)). We are not allowed to engage in “purpose-driven statutory interpretation at the expense of specific provisions.” Myers v. TooJay’s Mgmt. Corp., 640 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted); see id. (“When presented with the plain text of a statute, we do not gaze at it blurry-eyed, attempting to see some hidden image formed by the broad purpose that lies behind the legislation.”).
We also reject Secretary Detzner’s suggestion that there is a categorical difference between (1) registrants who are ineligible to vote on account of their citizenship and (2) registrants who are ineligible to vote because of their criminal history or mental capacity. Registrants in any of those categories could be ineligible to vote at the time of their registration or they could lose their eligibility later. For example, while some voters lose their eligibility to vote after they
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register because of a criminal conviction or mental incapacity, other voters may have been ineligible for the same reasons at the time of their registration. In the same way, while Secretary Detzner is correct that a non-citizen registrant may have been ineligible to vote at the time that he registered, a citizen could also lose his citizenship after registering, thereby losing his eligibility to vote. See 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(5) (describing the procedure for a United States citizen to renounce his or her U.S. citizenship). Thus, we do not accept Secretary Detzner’s argument that the NVRA distinguishes between the removals of registered voters who become ineligible to vote and registrants who were never eligible in the first place.
Finally, Secretary Detzner’s limited interpretation of the 90 Day Provision would also require us to conclude—as the District Court did—that the 90 Day Provision only prohibits the removal of registrants who become ineligible to vote after moving to a different state. This is because the 90 Day Provision adopts all of the exceptions from the General Removal Provision except for the one allowing for removals based on a change in residence. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(c)(2)(B). Such an interpretation, however, would functionally eviscerate the meaning of the phrase “any program” in the 90 Day Provision. See United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218, 1236 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting that it is “a cardinal principle of statutory construction” that “a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or
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insignificant”) (quoting TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31, 122 S. Ct. 441, 449 (2001)). Surely when Congress wrote that the 90 Day Provision applied to “any program,” it intended for the provision to apply to more than just programs aimed at voters who have moved. If Congress wanted such a limited result, it could have said so. See CBS Inc. v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 245 F.3d 1217, 1226 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[W]here Congress knows how to say something but chooses not to, its silence is controlling.” (quotation marks omitted)). As a result, we cannot accept Secretary Detzner’s interpretation.
In closing, we emphasize that our interpretation of the 90 Day Provision does not in any way handcuff a state from using its resources to ensure that noncitizens are not listed in the voter rolls. The 90 Day Provision by its terms only applies to programs which “systematically” remove the names of ineligible voters. As a result, the 90 Day Provision would not bar a state from investigating potential non-citizens and removing them on the basis of individualized information, even within the 90-day window. All that the 90 Day Provision prohibits is a program whose purpose is to “systematically remove the names of ineligible voters” from the voter rolls within the last 90 days before a federal election. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(c)(2)(A).
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IV. CONCLUSION For these reasons, we reverse the District Court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law to Secretary Detzner and remand with instructions to enter an order (1) declaring that Secretary Detzner’s actions here were in violation of the 90 Day Provision of the NVRA; and (2) granting such further relief as the needs and interests of justice require. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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JORDAN, Circuit Judge, concurring: As Judge Martin correctly explains, the plain language of the so-called 90-
Day Provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(c)(2)(A), prohibits states from using programs, like Florida’s, to systematically remove suspected non-citizens from the voter rolls within 90 days of a federal election. There is little room for textual debate given the use of broad statutory language directed at “any program” to systematically remove ineligible voters from the rolls, and the failure to include lack of citizenship as one of the express exceptions to the bar against systematic removals during the 90-day quiet period. See Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (“[W]hen the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, if the 90-Day Provision spelled out the exceptions to the bar on systematic removals, instead of cross-referencing them from the General Removal Provision (§ 1973gg6(a)(3)(A)-(B) & (4)(A)), the outcome in this case would be the statutory equivalent of a slam dunk, because the text would read like so:
(2)(A) A State shall complete, not later than 90 days prior to the date of a primary or general election for Federal office, any program the purpose of which is to systematically remove the names of ineligible voters from the official lists of eligible voters. (B) Subparagraph (A) shall not be construed to preclude—
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(i) the removal of names from official lists of voters [at the request of a registrant; as provided by State law, by reason of criminal conviction or mental incapacity; or the death of the registrant]; or (ii) correction of registration records pursuant to this subchapter. This case is difficult because the exceptions to the 90-Day Provision also constitute (with slight changes in language) the permissible bases for the removal of persons from the voter rolls at any time under the General Removal Provision, and an “established canon of construction [is] that similar language contained within the same section of statute must be accorded a consistent meaning.” Nat’l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 501 (1998). If the limited exceptions to the 90-Day Provision mean that states cannot use systematic programs to remove non-citizens from the voter rolls within 90 days of a federal election, then—because of the symmetry of the 90-Day Provision and the General Removal Provision—it would appear to follow that states also cannot remove non-citizens from the voter rolls at any time. See United States v. Florida, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1349 (N.D. Fla. 2012). Such a result is instinctively difficult to accept, and may require courts to decide to what extent Congress can constitutionally limit the states’ authority to determine the qualifications of eligible voters in federal elections. See U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 2, 4; Arcia v. Detzner, 908 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1284 (S.D. Fla. 2012). Cf. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of
27

Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 141 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/04/2014 Page 30 of 34 Case: 12-15738 Date Filed: 04/01/2014 Page: 28 of 31
Arizona, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2258-59 (2013) (“Since the power to establish voting requirements is of little value without the power to enforce those requirements, . . . it would raise serious constitutional doubts if a federal statute precluded a State from obtaining the information necessary to enforce its voter qualifications.”).
To avoid the problems created by this interaction between the 90-Day and General Removal Provisions, we would welcome the venerable doctrine of constitutional avoidance if it were “fairly possible” to read the statutory language in any other way. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932). “But even so important a canon of statutory construction as that favoring the avoidance of serious constitutional questions does not always carry the day,” Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 437 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (emphasis in original), and it does not do so here because it would require us to give the NVRA a plainly atextual reading. See Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 60-61 (1997) (“[Although] [s]tatutes should be construed to avoid constitutional questions, . . . this interpretive canon is not a license for the judiciary to rewrite language enacted by the legislature. . . . Any other conclusion, while purporting to be an exercise in judicial restraint, would trench upon the powers vested in Congress[.]”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
28

Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 141 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/04/2014 Page 31 of 34 Case: 12-15738 Date Filed: 04/01/2014 Page: 29 of 31
Like the district court in Florida, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 1350, I am not persuaded by the Secretary’s argument that the word “registrant” in the General Removal Provision should be read to mean only a person who could properly register to vote in the first place. The NVRA does not define “registrant,” and we must therefore give the word its “ordinary meaning.” See Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2002-03 (2012). In 1993, when Congress enacted the NVRA, “registrant” meant “one who registers; [especially] one who by virtue of securing an official registration obtains a specific right or title of possession and use.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1912 (1993). See also 2 THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2528 (1993) (a registrant is “[a] person who registers, [especially] a person who by so doing gains a particular entitlement”). Given this ordinary meaning of the word, it is linguistically incorrect to say that a person is a “registrant” only if he or she is legally eligible to receive the benefits that come with registration. Indeed, a person can register for something even if he is not entitled to the ensuing benefits. That is the reason why the General Removal Provision lists several circumstances where registrants may be “removed from the official list of eligible voters.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(a)(3).
As made clear by the parties’ briefs, each possible reading of the NVRA’s 90-Day and General Removal Provisions does some present or future violence to the statutory scheme. Given the choice, and under the circumstances here, I opt for
29

Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 141 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/04/2014 Page 32 of 34 Case: 12-15738 Date Filed: 04/01/2014 Page: 30 of 31
the reading that applies the statutory text as written and surrender the interpretation that comes from a purpose-driven view of the Act and concomitant desire to avoid future constitutional questions. I do this because this case calls on us to interpret only one provision of the NVRA, the 90-Day Provision, and it is certainly reasonable (and constitutional) for Congress to limit systematic removals of noncitizens from the voter rolls within the 90-day quiet period. Stated differently, the result in this case is not an absurd one. See Durr v. Shineski, 638 F.3d 1342, 1349 (11th Cir. 2011) (explaining that the absurdity canon applies only in the “rare situations where the plain language of a statute, at least where read in isolation, yields a result that is both absurd and completely at odds with the entire statutory context in which the language is found” ).
Any constitutional problems would arise only in a future case squarely presenting the application of the General Removal Provision. Before any such case arises, Congress has the ability to change the language of the General Removal Provision (as well as the ability to modify the exceptions to the 90-Day Provision if it so desires). Should it not do so, the court addressing such a future case may have to confront the argument that Congress drafted a portion of the NVRA in an unconstitutional manner.
With these observations, I join Judge Martin’s opinion for the court in full.
30

Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 141 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/04/2014 Page 33 of 34 Case: 12-15738 Date Filed: 04/01/2014 Page: 31 of 31
SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judge, dissenting: I would affirm the judgment of the district court for the reasons set forth in
the district court’s opinion, see Arcia v. Detzner, 908 F. Supp. 2d 1276 (S.D. Fla. 2012), as well as the reasoning of United States v. Florida, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1346 (N.D. Fla. 2012). I therefore respectfully dissent.
31

Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 141 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/04/2014 Page 34 of 34 Case: 12-15738 Date Filed: 04/01/2014 Page: 1 of 1

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

ELBERT PARR TUTTLE COURT OF APPEALS BUILDING 56 Forsyth Street, N.W. Atlanta, Georgia 30303

John Ley Clerk of Court

April 01, 2014

MEMORANDUM TO COUNSEL OR PARTIES
Appeal Number: 12-15738-EE Case Style: Karla Arcia, et al v. Florida Secretary of State District Court Docket No: 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ

For rules and forms visit www.ca11.uscourts.gov

This Court requires all counsel to file documents electronically using the Electronic Case Files ("ECF") system, unless exempted for good cause. Enclosed is a copy of the court's decision filed today in this appeal. Judgment has this day been entered pursuant to FRAP 36. The court's mandate will issue at a later date in accordance with FRAP 41(b).

The time for filing a petition for rehearing is governed by 11th Cir. R. 40-3, and the time for filing a petition for rehearing en banc is governed by 11th Cir. R. 35-2. Except as otherwise provided by FRAP 25(a) for inmate filings, a petition for rehearing or for rehearing en banc is timely only if received in the clerk's office within the time specified in the rules. Costs are governed by FRAP 39 and 11th Cir.R. 39-1. The timing, format, and content of a motion for attorney's fees and an objection thereto is governed by 11th Cir. R. 39-2 and 39-3.

Please note that a petition for rehearing en banc must include in the Certificate of Interested Persons a complete list of all persons and entities listed on all certificates previously filed by any party in the appeal. See 11th Cir. R. 26.11. In addition, a copy of the opinion sought to be reheard must be included in any petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. See 11th Cir. R. 35-5(k) and 40-1 .

Counsel appointed under the CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT must file a CJA voucher claiming compensation for time spent on the appeal no later than 60 days after either issuance of mandate or filing with the U.S. Supreme Court of a petition for a writ of certiorari (whichever is later).
Pursuant to Fed.R.App.P. 39, costs taxed against the appellee.

The Bill of Costs form is available on the internet at www.ca11.uscourts.gov

For questions concerning the issuance of the decision of this court, please call the number referenced in the signature block below. For all other questions, please call Lois Tunstall, EE at (404) 335-6224.
Sincerely,
JOHN LEY, Clerk of Court
Reply to: Djuanna Clark Phone #: 404-335-6161

OPIN-1A Issuance of Opinion With Costs

 
 Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 150 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/12/2015 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 12-22282-CIV-ZLOCH

KARLA VANESSA ARCIA, et al.

Plaintiffs, vs.

FINAL JUDGMENT

KEN DETZNER, in his official capacity as Florida Secretary of State,

Defendant. /

THIS MATTER is before the Court upon Mandate of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (DE 141). The

Court has carefully reviewed the entire court file and is otherwise

fully advised in the premises.

Accordingly after due consideration, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. Final Judgment be and the same is hereby ENTERED in favor

of Plaintiffs Karla Vanessa Arcia, Melande Antoine, Florida

Immigrant Coalition, Inc., National Congress for Puerto Rican

Rights, and 199SEIU United Healthcare Workers East and against

Defendant Ken Detzner, in his official capacity as Florida

Secretary of State, upon the First Amended Complaint (DE 57) filed

herein; and

Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 150 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/12/2015 Page 2 of 2

2. To the extent not otherwise disposed of herein, all pending

motions are hereby DENIED as moot.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Fort Lauderdale, Broward

County, Florida this 12th

day of February, 2015.

Copies furnished: All Counsel of Record

WILLIAM J. ZLOCH United States District Judge

2

 
 Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 153 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/15/2015 Page 1 of 2 Case: 12-15738 Date F(i1eodf: 20)4/15/2015 Page: 1 of 1
HH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

Apr 15, 2015

ELBERT PARR TUTTLE COURT OF APPEALS BUILDING 56 Forsyth Street, N.W. Atlanta, Georgia 30303

MIAMI

Douglas J. Mincher Clerk of Court

April 15, 2015

For rules and forms visit www.ca11.uscourts.gov

Steven M. Larimore U.S. District Court 400 N MIAMI AVE MIAMI, FL 33128-1810
Appeal Number: 12-15738-EE Case Style: Karla Arcia, et al v. Florida Secretary of State District Court Docket No: 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ

This Court requires all counsel to file documents electronically using the Electronic Case Files ("ECF") system, unless exempted for good cause.
The enclosed order has been ENTERED.
Sincerely,
DOUGLAS J. MINCHER, Clerk of Court
Reply to: Team 2 Vacant/emd, EE Phone #: 404-335-6135

MOT-2 Notice of Court Action

Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 153 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/15/2015 Page 2 of 2 Case: 12-15738 Date F(i2leodf: 20)4/15/2015 Page: 1 of 1
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________ No. 12-15738-EE ________________________
KARLA VANESSA ARCIA, MELANDE ANTOINE, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, versus FLORIDA SECRETARY OF STATE,
Defendant-Appellee, ________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida ________________________
Before: MARTIN, JORDAN, and SUHRHEINRICH,* Circuit Judges. BY THE COURT:
Appellee’s motion to transfer the issue of attorney’s fees is GRANTED IN PART to the extent set forth below.1
Appellants’ motion for attorney’s fees is GRANTED IN PART as to entitlement and REMANDED for a determination of the reasonable amounts of appellate attorneys’ fees to be awarded.
* Honorable Richard F. Suhrheinrich, United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
1 Appellee’s alternative request for an extension of time to file a response to the motion for attorney’s fees is denied.

 
 Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 158 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2015 Page 1 of 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI CIVIL DIVISION

KARLA VANESSA ARCIA, an individual, MELANDE ANTOINE, an individual, VEYE YO, a civic organization based in MiamiDade County, FLORIDA IMMIGRANT COALITION, INC., a Florida non-profit corporation, NATIONAL CONGRESS FOR PUERTO RICAN RIGHTS, a Pennsylvania non-profit corporation, FLORIDA NEW MAJORITY, INC., a Florida non-profit corporation, and 1199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST, a Labor Union,

Case No. 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Honorable Judge William J. Zloch

Plaintiffs,

v.

KEN DETZNER, in his official capacity as Florida Secretary of State,

Defendant.

NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF PENDING MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES ON REMAND AND SETTLEMENT OF CLAIM FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
Plaintiffs respectfully advise the Court that the parties have entered into a settlement agreement with respect to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees remanded to this Court by the Eleventh Circuit on April 15, 2015, and have likewise settled Plaintiffs’ claim for attorneys’ fees for their litigation of the proceedings before this Court. See Local Rule 7.3. Accordingly, Plaintiffs withdraw the pending Motion for Attorneys’ fees remanded by the Eleventh Circuit, and likewise notify the Court that they will not file any further motion for attorneys’ fees in this action. Plaintiffs respectfully request that the matter be removed from the Court’s docket and the case be closed.

1

Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 158 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2015 Page 2 of 3

Dated: May 26, 2015
Catherine M. Flanagan Michelle Kanter Cohen PROJECT VOTE 805 15th Street, N.W., Suite 250 Washington, DC 20005 (202) 546-4173 (202) 733-4762 (fax) cflanagan@projectvote.org mkantercohen@projectvote.org
Juan Cartagena Jose Perez, Esq. LATINOJUSTICE PRLDEF 99 Hudson Street, 14th Floor New York, NY 10013-2815 (212) 219-3360 (212) 431-4276 (fax) jcartagena@latinojustice.org jperez@latinojustice.org
Penda Hair Katherine Culliton-Gonzalez, Esq. ADVANCEMENT PROJECT 1220 L Street, N.W., Suite 850 Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 728-9557 (202) 728-9558 (fax) pendahair@advancementproject.org kcullitongonzalez@advancementproject.org
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Katherine Roberson-Young Katherine Roberson-Young, Esq. Florida Bar No. 038169 3000 Biscayne Blvd., Suite 212 Miami, Florida 33137 (305) 571-4082 (305) 571-1396 (fax) katherine.roberson-young@seiu.org
Jessica Ring Amunson Marina K. Jenkins JENNER & BLOCK, LLP 1099 New York Ave., N.W., Suite 900 Washington, DC 20001-4412 (202) 639-6000 (202) 639-6066 (fax) mjenkins@jenner.com
John De Leon Florida Bar No. 650390 LAW OFFICES OF CHAVEZ & DE LEON 5975 Sunset Drive, Suite 605 South Miami, FL 33143 (305) 740-5347 (305) 740-5348 (fax) jdeleon@chavez-deleon.com

2

Case 1:12-cv-22282-WJZ Document 158 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2015 Page 3 of 3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that, on this 26th day of May 2015, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served on all counsel of record via CM/ECF.

May 26, 2015

By:

/s/ Katherine Roberson-Young

Katherine Roberson-Young, Esq.

Florida Bar No. 038169

3000 Biscayne Blvd., Suite 212

Miami, Florida 33137

(305) 571-4082

(305) 571-1396 (fax)

katherine.roberson-young@seiu.org

Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants

3

 
 Case: 1:12-cv-22282 As of: 10/29/2016 09:51 PM EDT 1 of 29
BSS,CLOSED,RECOUT
U.S. District Court Southern District of Florida (Miami) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:12−cv−22282−WJZ

Arcia v. Florida Secretary of State Assigned to: Judge William J. Zloch Case in other court: USCA, 12−15220−EE
USCA, 12−15738−EE Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act Plaintiff
Karla Vanessa Arcia Individually

Date Filed: 06/19/2012 Date Terminated: 02/12/2015 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 441 Civil Rights: Voting Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Ben Hovland Fair Elections Legal Network 1825 K Street, NW Suite 450 Washington, DC 20006 202−331−0114 Email: bhovland@fairelectionsnetwork.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Catherine M. Flanagan Project Vote 1350 I Street, N.W. Suite 1250 Washington, DC 20005 202−210−6903 Email: cflanagan@projectvote.org LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Diana Sen LatinoJustice PRLDEF 99 Hudson Street 14th Floor New York, NY 10013 212−219−3360 Email: dsen@latinojustice.org TERMINATED: 12/08/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
J. Gerald Hebert 191 Somervelle Street #415 Alexandria, VA 22304 703−628−4673 Fax: 567−5876 Email: hebert@voterlaw.com TERMINATED: 10/15/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jose Perez LatinoJustice PRLDEF 99 Hudson Street, 14th Floor New York, NY 10013 212−219−3360

Case: 1:12-cv-22282 As of: 10/29/2016 09:51 PM EDT 2 of 29
Email: jperez@latinojustice.org LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua N. Friedman Jenner & Block 1099 New York Avenue, NW Suite 900 Wasington, DC 202−639−6898 Email: joshuafriedman@jenner.com TERMINATED: 02/25/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Juan Cartagena LatinoJustice PRLDEF 99 Hudson STreet 14th Floor New York, NY 10013 212−219−3360 Email: jcartagena@latinojustice.org LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Culliton−Gonzalez Advancement Project 1220 L. Street, N.W. Suite 850 Washington, DC 20005 202−728−9557 Email: kcullitongonzalez@advancementproject.org LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Roberson−Young 3000 Biscayne Blvd Suite 212 Miami, FL 33137 954−804−2710 Fax: 305−571−1396 Email: katherine.roberson−young@seiu.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristen M. Rogers Jenner & Block 1099 New York Avenue, N.W. Suite 900 Washington, DC 202−639−6083 Email: krogers@jenner.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lindsay Eyler Kaplan Jenner & Blo9ck 1099 New York Avenue, N.W. Suite 900 Washington, DC

Case: 1:12-cv-22282 As of: 10/29/2016 09:51 PM EDT 3 of 29
202−639−6086 Email: lkaplan@jenner.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lorelie S. Masters Jenner & Block 1099 New York Avenue, N.W. Suite 900 Washington, DC 202−639−6087 Email: lmasters@jenner.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marc A. Goldman Jenner & Block 1099 New York Avenue, N.W. Suite 900 Washington, DC 202−639−6087 Email: mgoldman@jenner.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marina K. Jenkins Jenner & Block 1099 New York Avenue, NW Suite 900 Washington, DC 202−639−6053 Email: mjenkins@jenner.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle Kanter Cohen Project Vote 1350 I Street, NW Suite 1250 Washington, DC 20005 202−546−4173 Email: mkantercohen@projectvote.org LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Penda Hair Advancement Project 1220 L Street, NW Suite 850 Washington, DC 20005 202−728−9557 Fax: 728−9558 Email: pendahair@advancementproject.org LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Uzoma Nkwonta Advancement Project 1220 L. Street, N.W.

Case: 1:12-cv-22282 As of: 10/29/2016 09:51 PM EDT 4 of 29

Suite 850 Washington, DC 2005 202−728−9557 Email: uzomankwonta@advancementproject.org TERMINATED: 12/08/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John De Leon Chavez & De Leon, P.A. 1399 SW 1st Avenue Suite 202 Miami, FL 33130 305−740−5347 Fax: 740−5348 Email: jdeleon@chavez−deleon.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lida Rodriguez−Taseff Duane Morris 200 S Biscayne Boulevard Suite 3400 Miami, FL 33131 305−960−2242 Fax: 960−2201 Email: lrtaseff@duanemorris.com TERMINATED: 06/29/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Melande Antoine Individually

represented by Ben Hovland (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Catherine M. Flanagan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Diana Sen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/08/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J. Gerald Hebert (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/15/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jose Perez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joshua N. Friedman

Case: 1:12-cv-22282 As of: 10/29/2016 09:51 PM EDT 5 of 29
(See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/25/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Juan Cartagena (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Culliton−Gonzalez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Roberson−Young (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristen M. Rogers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lindsay Eyler Kaplan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lorelie S. Masters (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marc A. Goldman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marina K. Jenkins (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle Kanter Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Penda Hair (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:12-cv-22282 As of: 10/29/2016 09:51 PM EDT 6 of 29

Uzoma Nkwonta (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/08/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John De Leon (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lida Rodriguez−Taseff (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/29/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc. Non−Profit Corporation

represented by Ben Hovland (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Catherine M. Flanagan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Diana Sen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/08/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J. Gerald Hebert (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/15/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jose Perez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joshua N. Friedman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/25/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Juan Cartagena (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine Culliton−Gonzalez (See above for address)

Case: 1:12-cv-22282 As of: 10/29/2016 09:51 PM EDT 7 of 29
LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Roberson−Young (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristen M. Rogers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lindsay Eyler Kaplan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lorelie S. Masters (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marc A. Goldman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marina K. Jenkins (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle Kanter Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Penda Hair (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Uzoma Nkwonta (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/08/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John De Leon (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lida Rodriguez−Taseff (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/29/2012

Case: 1:12-cv-22282 As of: 10/29/2016 09:51 PM EDT 8 of 29

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights Non Profit Corporation

represented by Ben Hovland (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Catherine M. Flanagan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Diana Sen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/08/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J. Gerald Hebert (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/15/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jose Perez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joshua N. Friedman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/25/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Juan Cartagena (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine Culliton−Gonzalez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine Roberson−Young (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kristen M. Rogers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:12-cv-22282 As of: 10/29/2016 09:51 PM EDT 9 of 29

Plaintiff
Florida New Majority, Inc. Non Profit Corporation TERMINATED: 10/04/2012

Lindsay Eyler Kaplan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lorelie S. Masters (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marc A. Goldman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marina K. Jenkins (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle Kanter Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Penda Hair (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Uzoma Nkwonta (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/08/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John De Leon (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lida Rodriguez−Taseff (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/29/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Ben Hovland (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Catherine M. Flanagan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE

Case: 1:12-cv-22282 As of: 10/29/2016 09:51 PM EDT 10 of 29
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Diana Sen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/08/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
J. Gerald Hebert (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/15/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jose Perez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua N. Friedman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/25/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Juan Cartagena (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Culliton−Gonzalez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Roberson−Young (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristen M. Rogers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lindsay Eyler Kaplan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lorelie S. Masters (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marc A. Goldman

Case: 1:12-cv-22282 As of: 10/29/2016 09:51 PM EDT 11 of 29

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marina K. Jenkins (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michelle Kanter Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Penda Hair (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Uzoma Nkwonta (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/08/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John De Leon (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lida Rodriguez−Taseff (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/29/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA a labor union

represented by Ben Hovland (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Catherine M. Flanagan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Diana Sen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/08/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J. Gerald Hebert (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/15/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE

Case: 1:12-cv-22282 As of: 10/29/2016 09:51 PM EDT 12 of 29
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jose Perez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua N. Friedman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/25/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Juan Cartagena (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Culliton−Gonzalez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Roberson−Young (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristen M. Rogers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lindsay Eyler Kaplan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lorelie S. Masters (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marc A. Goldman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marina K. Jenkins (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle Kanter Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 1:12-cv-22282 As of: 10/29/2016 09:51 PM EDT 13 of 29

PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Penda Hair (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Uzoma Nkwonta (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/08/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John De Leon (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Veyeyo a Civic Organization based in Miami Dade County TERMINATED: 10/04/2012

represented by Ben Hovland (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Catherine M. Flanagan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Diana Sen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/08/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J. Gerald Hebert (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/15/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jose Perez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joshua N. Friedman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/25/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Juan Cartagena (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE

Case: 1:12-cv-22282 As of: 10/29/2016 09:51 PM EDT 14 of 29
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Culliton−Gonzalez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Roberson−Young (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristen M. Rogers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lindsay Eyler Kaplan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lorelie S. Masters (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marc A. Goldman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marina K. Jenkins (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle Kanter Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Penda Hair (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Uzoma Nkwonta (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/08/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John De Leon (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:12-cv-22282 As of: 10/29/2016 09:51 PM EDT 15 of 29

Lida Rodriguez−Taseff (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/29/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
Florida Secretary of State Ken Detzner, in his official capacity

represented by Ashley Davis Florida Office of the Attorney General Complex Litigation PL−01 The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399 850−414−3887 Email: Ashley.Davis@myfloridalegal.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Elden Nordby Florida Department of State 500 South Bronough Street Suite 100 Tallahassee, FL 32399 850−245−6536 Email: Daniel.Nordby@dos.myflorida.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John M. Gore Jones Day 51 Louisiana Avenue NW Washington, DC 20001 202 879−3939 Email: jmgore@jonesday.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Carvin Jones Day 51 Louisiana Avenue NW Washington, DC 20001−2113 202−879−3939 Fax: 626−1700 Email: macarvin@jonesday.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Warren D. Postman Jones Day 51 Louisiana Avenue NW Washington, DC 20001 202−879−3939 Email: wpostman@jonesday.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam Scott Tanenbaum Florida Department of State Office of the General Counsel 500 South Bronough Street, Suite 100

Case: 1:12-cv-22282 As of: 10/29/2016 09:51 PM EDT 16 of 29
Tallahassee, FL 32399−0250 850−245−6536 Fax: 850−245−6127 Email: adam.tanenbaum@dos.myflorida.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Intervenor Defendant Luis I Garcia TERMINATED: 09/28/2012
Intervenor Defendant Diana K Whitehurst TERMINATED: 09/28/2012
Intervenor Defendant

represented by Joseph C. Smith , Jr. Bartlit Beck Herman Palenchar & Scott 1899 Wynkoop Street Suite 800 Denver, CO 80202 303−592−3188 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nevin M. Gewertz Bartlit Beck Herman Palenchar & Scott, LLP Courthouse Place 54 West Hubbard Street Suite 300 Chicago, IL 60654 312−494−4476 Email: nevin.gewertz@bartlit−beck.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Raquel A. Rodriguez McDonald Hopkins, LLC Southeast Financial Center 200 South Biscayne Boulevard Suite 3130 Miami, FL 33131 305−704−3994 Fax: 305−704−3999 Email: rrodriguez@mcdonaldhopkins.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Joseph C. Smith , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nevin M. Gewertz (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Raquel A. Rodriguez (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by

Case: 1:12-cv-22282 As of: 10/29/2016 09:51 PM EDT 17 of 29

Hal David Rush TERMINATED: 09/28/2012

Joseph C. Smith , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nevin M. Gewertz (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Raquel A. Rodriguez (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Defendant
Barbara A Dereuil TERMINATED: 09/28/2012

represented by Joseph C. Smith , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nevin M. Gewertz (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Raquel A. Rodriguez (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 06/19/2012
06/19/2012 06/19/2012
06/19/2012 06/21/2012 06/21/2012 06/28/2012

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against All Defendants. Filing fee $ 350.00 receipt number 113C−4827175, filed by Karla Vanessa Arcia, Melanie Antoine, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., National Congress For Puerto Rican Rights, Florida New Majority Inc., 1199SEIU United Healthcare Workers East. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Summon(s))(Rodriguez−Taseff, Lida) Text Modified on 6/19/2012 (cbr). (Entered: 06/19/2012)
2 Judge Assignment to Judge William J. Zloch and Magistrate Judge Robin S. Rosenbaum (cbr) (Entered: 06/19/2012)
3 Clerks Notice to Filer re: Electronic Case. Parties Not Added. The Filer failed to add all parties associated with the case.Filer is instructed to add the additional parties by filing a Notice of Entry of Parties. It is not necessary to re−file this document. (cbr) (Entered: 06/19/2012)
4 Summons Issued as to Florida Secretary of State. (cbr) (Entered: 06/19/2012)
5 NOTICE OF RECUSAL. Magistrate Judge Robin S. Rosenbaum recused. Case reassigned to Ch. Magistrate Judge Barry S. Seltzer. Signed by Magistrate Judge Robin S. Rosenbaum on 6/21/2012. (mb) (Entered: 06/21/2012)
6 Notice of Entry of Parties Listed NOTE: New Filer(s) will appear twice, since they are also a new party in the case. New Filer(s)/Party(s): Veyeyo and Veyeyo. (Rodriguez−Taseff, Lida) (Entered: 06/21/2012)
7 UNSTIPULATED MOTION for Substitution of Counsel by Melande Antoine, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., Florida New Majority, Inc., National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Veyeyo. Responses due by 7/16/2012 (Attachments: # 1 Order)(Rodriguez−Taseff, Lida) (Entered: 06/28/2012)

Case: 1:12-cv-22282 As of: 10/29/2016 09:51 PM EDT 18 of 29

06/29/2012
07/12/2012 07/12/2012 07/12/2012 07/12/2012 07/12/2012 07/12/2012 07/12/2012 07/12/2012 07/12/2012 07/12/2012 07/12/2012 07/12/2012 07/13/2012
07/16/2012 07/16/2012
07/16/2012

8 ORDER granting 7 Unstipulated Motion for Substitution of Counsel. Added attorney Katherine Roberson−Young for Melande Antoine, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., Florida New Majority, Inc., National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, and Veyeyo. Attorney Lida Rodriguez−Taseff terminated. Signed by Judge William J. Zloch on 6/29/2012. (bc) (Entered: 06/29/2012)
9 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Ashley Davis on behalf of Florida Secretary of State (Davis, Ashley) (Entered: 07/12/2012)
10 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Ashley Davis on behalf of Florida Secretary of State (Davis, Ashley) (Entered: 07/12/2012)
11 ANSWER and Affirmative Defenses to Complaint by Florida Secretary of State.(Davis, Ashley) (Entered: 07/12/2012)
12 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice, Consent to Designation and Request to Electronically Receive Notices of Electronic Filings for Juan Cartagena. Filing Fee $ 75.00. Receipt # 41866. (ksa) (Entered: 07/13/2012)
13 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice, Consent to Designation and Request to Electronically Receive Notices of Electronic Filings for Jose Perez. Filing Fee $ 75.00. Receipt # 41866. (ksa) (Entered: 07/13/2012)
14 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice, Consent to Designation and Request to Electronically Receive Notices of Electronic Filings for Diana Sen. Filing Fee $ 75.00. Receipt # 41866. (ksa) (Entered: 07/13/2012)
15 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice, Consent to Designation and Request to Electronically Receive Notices of Electronic Filings for Uzoma Nkwonta. Filing Fee $ 75.00. Receipt # 41866. (ksa) (Entered: 07/13/2012)
16 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice, Consent to Designation and Request to Electronically Receive Notices of Electronic Filings for Penda Hair. Filing Fee $ 75.00. Receipt # 41866. (ksa) (Entered: 07/13/2012)
17 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice, Consent to Designation and Request to Electronically Receive Notices of Electronic Filings for Katherine Culliton−Gonzalez. Filing Fee $ 75.00. Receipt # 41866. (ksa) (Entered: 07/13/2012)
18 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice, Consent to Designation and Request to Electronically Receive Notices of Electronic Filings for Ben Hovland. Filing Fee $ 75.00. Receipt # 41866. (ksa) (Entered: 07/13/2012)
19 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice, Consent to Designation and Request to Electronically Receive Notices of Electronic Filings for Catherine M. Flanagan. Filing Fee $ 75.00. Receipt # 41866. (ksa) (Entered: 07/13/2012)
20 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice, Consent to Designation and Request to Electronically Receive Notices of Electronic Filings for Michelle Kanter Cohen. Filing Fee $ 75.00. Receipt # 41866. (ksa) (Entered: 07/13/2012)
21 Clerks Notice to Filer re 10 Notice of Attorney Appearance. Attorney Did Not Associate Themselves; ERROR − Filing attorney neglected to associate themselves to the case. The Clerk has added the attorney to the case. It is not necessary to refile this document future filings must comply with the CM/ECF Administrative Procedures and Local Rules by filing a Notice of Attorney Appearance and linking themselves to the case. (yha) (Entered: 07/13/2012)
22 ORDER of Instructions. Signed by Judge William J. Zloch on 7/13/2012. (bc) (Entered: 07/16/2012)
23 PAPERLESS ORDER granting 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 16 , 17 , 18 , 19 and 20 Motions to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Attorneys Juan Cartagena, Jose Perez, Diana Sen, Uzoma Nkwonta, Penda Hair, Katherine Culliton−Gonzalez, Ben Hovland, Catherine M. Flanagan and Michelle Kanter Cohen are permitted to appear on behalf of Plaintiffs.Signed by Judge William J. Zloch on 7/16/2012. (bc) (Entered: 07/16/2012)
24 ORDER Setting Status Conference for 7/23/2012 at 12:00 PM in Fort Lauderdale Division before Judge William J. Zloch. Signed by Judge William J. Zloch on

Case: 1:12-cv-22282 As of: 10/29/2016 09:51 PM EDT 19 of 29

07/20/2012 07/20/2012
07/20/2012 07/22/2012 07/22/2012
07/23/2012 07/23/2012 07/26/2012
08/09/2012 08/09/2012 08/09/2012 08/13/2012 08/13/2012 08/13/2012 08/15/2012

7/16/2012. (bc) (Entered: 07/16/2012)
25 MOTION for Leave to Appear via telephone . Attorney: Katherine Roberson−Young by Karla Vanessa Arcia. Responses due by 8/6/2012 (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Roberson−Young, Katherine) (Entered: 07/20/2012)
26 Paperless ORDER denying 25 Motion for Leave to Appear Telephonically. Attorneys Michelle Kanter Cohen, Catherine Flanagan, Katherine Culliton Gonzalez, Ben Hovland, Uzoma Nkwonta, Diana Sen, Marc Goldman, and Gerry Herbert may not appear telephonically. Attorneys Katherine Roberson−Young and John DeLeon may appear at the July 23, 2012, Status Conference and speak on behalf of Plaintiffs. Signed by Judge William J. Zloch on 7/20/2012. (wjz2) (Entered: 07/20/2012)
29 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice, Consent to Designation, and Request to Electronically Receive Notices of Electronic Filings for Marc A. Goldman. Filing Fee $ 75.00. Receipt # 42482. (ksa) (Entered: 07/23/2012)
27 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by John De Leon on behalf of Karla Vanessa Arcia (De Leon, John) (Entered: 07/22/2012)
28 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by John De Leon on behalf of 199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, Melande Antoine, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., Florida New Majority, Inc., Florida Secretary of State, National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Veyeyo (De Leon, John) (Entered: 07/22/2012)
30 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge William J. Zloch: Status Conference held on 7/23/2012. Court Reporter: Carl Schanzleh, 954−769−5488 / Carl_Schanzleh@flsd.uscourts.gov (dby) (Entered: 07/24/2012)
31 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice, Consent to Designation, and Request to Electronically Receive Notices of Electronic Filings for J. Gerald Hebert. Filing Fee $ 75.00. Receipt # 2826. (ksa) (Entered: 07/24/2012)
32 PAPERLESS ORDER granting 29 and 31 Motions to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Attorneys Marc A. Goldman and J. Gerald Hebert are permitted to appear on behalf of Plaintiffs Karla Vanessa Arcia, Melande Antoine, Veyeyo, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Florida New Majority, Inc., and 199SEIU United Healthcare Workers East Florida. Signed by Judge William J. Zloch on 7/26/2012. (bc) (Entered: 07/26/2012)
33 SCHEDULING REPORT − Rule 26(f) by 199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, Melande Antoine, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., Florida New Majority, Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Supplement)(De Leon, John) (Entered: 08/09/2012)
34 SCHEDULING REPORT − Rule 26(f) by National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Veyeyo (Attachments: # 1 Supplement)(De Leon, John) (Entered: 08/09/2012)
35 SCHEDULING REPORT − Rule 26(f) by Florida Secretary of State (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Davis, Ashley) (Entered: 08/09/2012)
36 ORDER for Pre−Trial Conference. Pretrial Conference set for 10/5/2012 at 9:30 AM in Fort Lauderdale Division before Judge William J. Zloch. Pretrial Stipulation due by Noon, 9/21/2012. Signed by Judge William J. Zloch on 8/13/2012. (bc) (Entered: 08/13/2012)
37 ORDER REFERRING CASE to Mediation. Signed by Judge William J. Zloch on 8/13/2012. (bc) (Entered: 08/13/2012)
38 Order on Trial Instructions. Signed by Judge William J. Zloch on 8/13/2012. (bc) (Entered: 08/13/2012)
39 Plaintiff's Expedited MOTION to Amend/Correct 36 Scheduling Order, 38 Order on Trial Instructions, 37 Order Referring Case to Mediation by 199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, Melande Antoine, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., Florida New Majority, Inc., National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Veyeyo. Responses due by 9/4/2012 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum In Support of Motion to Amend Scheduling Order)(De Leon, John)

Case: 1:12-cv-22282 As of: 10/29/2016 09:51 PM EDT 20 of 29

08/15/2012 08/17/2012 08/20/2012
08/22/2012 08/22/2012 08/23/2012 08/24/2012 08/24/2012 08/24/2012 09/06/2012 09/06/2012 09/06/2012 09/06/2012 09/07/2012

Modified text on 8/16/2012 (asl). (Entered: 08/15/2012)
40 NOTICE by 199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, Melande Antoine, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., Florida New Majority, Inc., National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Veyeyo of Service of Plaintiffs' First Requests for Production (De Leon, John) (Entered: 08/15/2012)
41 RESPONSE to Motion re 39 Plaintiff's MOTION to Amend/Correct 36 Scheduling Order, 38 Order on Trial Instructions, 37 Order Referring Case to Mediation filed by Florida Secretary of State. Replies due by 8/27/2012. (Davis, Ashley) (Entered: 08/17/2012)
42 REPLY to Response to Motion re 39 Plaintiff's MOTION to Amend/Correct 36 Scheduling Order, 38 Order on Trial Instructions, 37 Order Referring Case to Mediation filed by 199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, Melande Antoine, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., Florida New Majority, Inc., National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Veyeyo. (De Leon, John) (Entered: 08/20/2012)
43 MOTION to Amend/Correct 1 Complaint, by 199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, Melande Antoine, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., Florida New Majority, Inc.. Responses due by 9/10/2012 (Attachments: # 1 Appendix)(De Leon, John) (Entered: 08/22/2012)
44 MOTION to Amend/Correct 1 Complaint, by National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Veyeyo. Responses due by 9/10/2012 (Attachments: # 1 Appendix)(De Leon, John) (Entered: 08/22/2012)
45 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice, Consent to Designation, and Request to Electronically Receive Notices of Electronic Filings for Lorelie S. Masters. Filing Fee $ 75.00. Receipt # 44144. (ksa) (Entered: 08/23/2012)
46 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 39 Motion to Modify Pre−Trial Scheduling Order and granting in part and denying in part 44 Motion to Amend Complaint. Signed by Judge William J. Zloch on 8/24/2012. (bc) (Entered: 08/24/2012)
47 VACATED AMENDED ORDER REFERRING CASE to Mediation. Signed by Judge William J. Zloch on 8/24/2012. (bc) Modified on 9/21/2012 (bc). (Entered: 08/24/2012)
48 PAPERLESS ORDER granting 45 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Attorney Lorelie S. Masters is permitted to appear on behalf of Plaintiffs. Signed by Judge William J. Zloch on 8/24/2012. (bc) (Entered: 08/24/2012)
49 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice, Consent to Designation, and Request to Electronically Receive Notices of Electronic Filings for Lindsay Eyler Kaplan. Filing Fee $ 75.00. Receipt # 44812. (ksa) (Entered: 09/07/2012)
50 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice, Consent to Designation, and Request to Electronically Receive Notices of Electronic Filings for Joshua N. Friedman. Filing Fee $ 75.00. Receipt # 44811. (ksa) (Entered: 09/07/2012)
51 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice, Consent to Designation, and Request to Electronically Receive Notices of Electronic Filings for Marina K. Jenkins. Filing Fee $ 75.00. Receipt # 44810. (ksa) (Entered: 09/07/2012)
52 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice, Consent to Designation, and Request to Electronically Receive Notices of Electronic Filings for Kristen M. Rogers. Filing Fee $ 75.00. Receipt # 44809. (ksa) (Entered: 09/07/2012)
53 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time of certain deadlines by 199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, Melande Antoine, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., Florida New Majority, Inc., Florida Secretary of State, National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Veyeyo. Responses due by 9/24/2012 (Davis, Ashley) (Entered: 09/07/2012)

Case: 1:12-cv-22282 As of: 10/29/2016 09:51 PM EDT 21 of 29

09/10/2012
09/10/2012
09/12/2012 09/12/2012 09/13/2012 09/17/2012
09/18/2012 09/18/2012 09/18/2012 09/18/2012 09/19/2012 09/19/2012
09/19/2012

54 PAPERLESS ORDER granting 53 Motion for Extension of Time. Plaintiffs may file an Amended Complaint by Noon, 9/12/2012. All Motions for Summary Judgment and Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings must be filed no later than Wednesday, 9/19/2012. Resumes of experts and their reports must be exchanged no later than 9/19/2012. All discovery must be completed no later than 9/20/2012. Signed by Judge William J. Zloch on 9/10/2012. (bc) (Entered: 09/10/2012)
55 PAPERLESS ORDER granting 49 , 50 , 51 and 52 Motions to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Attorneys Lindsay Eyler Kaplan, Joshua N. Friedman, Marina K. Jenkins and Kristen M. Rogers are permitted to appear on behalf of Plaintiffs, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Melande Antoine, Veye Yo, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Florida New Majority, Inc. and 1199SEIU United Healthcare Workers East. Signed by Judge William J. Zloch on 9/10/2012. (bc) (Entered: 09/10/2012)
56 STIPULATION of Dismissal by 199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, Melande Antoine, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., Florida New Majority, Inc., Florida Secretary of State, National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Veyeyo (Davis, Ashley) (Entered: 09/12/2012)
57 First AMENDED COMPLAINT against All Defendants, filed by Karla Vanessa Arcia.(De Leon, John) (Entered: 09/12/2012)
58 Clerks Notice to Filer re 57 Amended Complaint. Parties Not Added; ERROR − The Filer failed to add all parties− re 1199SEIU United Healthcare Workers East. Filer is instructed to add the additional parties by filing a Notice of Entry of Parties. (asl) (Entered: 09/13/2012)
59 Agreed Unopposed MOTION to Vacate 47 Order Referring Case to Mediation by 199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, Melande Antoine, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., Florida New Majority, Inc., Florida Secretary of State, National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Veyeyo. Responses due by 10/4/2012 (De Leon, John) Modified text on 9/18/2012 (asl). (Entered: 09/17/2012)
60 NOTICE by Florida Secretary of State Pretrial Disclosures (Davis, Ashley) Modified to re−docket, see 62 on 9/19/2012 (asl). (Entered: 09/18/2012)
61 NOTICE by 199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, Melande Antoine, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., Florida New Majority, Inc., National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Veyeyo of Pre−Trial Disclosures (De Leon, John) Modified to re−docket, see 63 on 9/19/2012 (asl). (Entered: 09/18/2012)
62 Pretrial Disclosure(s) re 36 Scheduling Order by Florida Secretary of State. See 60 for image (asl) (Entered: 09/19/2012)
63 Pretrial Disclosure(s) re 36 Scheduling Order by 199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, Melande Antoine, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., Florida New Majority, Inc., National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Veyeyo. See 61 for image (asl) (Entered: 09/19/2012)
64 Clerks Notice to Filer re 60 Notice (Other), 61 Notice (Other). Wrong Event Selected; ERROR − The Filer selected the wrong event. The document was re−docketed by the Clerk, see 62 and 63 . It is not necessary to refile this document. (asl) (Entered: 09/19/2012)
65 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction , MOTION for Summary Judgment ( Responses due by 10/9/2012) by 199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, Melande Antoine, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., Florida New Majority, Inc., National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Veyeyo. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Summary Judgment, # 2 Exhibit Statement of Undisputed Facts, # 3 Exhibit A, # 4 Exhibit B, # 5 Exhibit C, # 6 Exhibit D, # 7 Exhibit E)(Roberson−Young, Katherine) (Entered: 09/19/2012)
66 MOTION to Expedite Preliminary Injunction Proceedings, MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order ( Responses due by 10/9/2012) by 199SEIU UNITED

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09/20/2012 09/20/2012 09/20/2012 09/20/2012 09/21/2012 09/21/2012 09/21/2012 09/21/2012
09/24/2012 09/24/2012 09/25/2012 09/26/2012
09/26/2012

HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, Melande Antoine, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., Florida New Majority, Inc., National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Veyeyo. (Roberson−Young, Katherine) (Entered: 09/19/2012)
67 MOTION to Intervene by Luis I Garcia, Diana K Whitehurst, Hal David Rush, Barbara A Dereuil. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2)(Rodriguez, Raquel) (Entered: 09/20/2012)
68 RESPONSE in Opposition re 66 MOTION to Expedite Preliminary Injunction Proceedings MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order filed by Florida Secretary of State. (Davis, Ashley) (Entered: 09/20/2012)
69 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice, Consent to Designation, and Request to Electronically Receive Notices of Electronic Filing for Nevin M. Gewertz. Filing Fee $ 75.00. Receipt # 45694. (ksa) (Entered: 09/21/2012)
70 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice, Consent to Designation, and Request to Electronically Receive Notices of Electronic Filing for Joseph C. Smith, Jr. Filing Fee $ 75.00. Receipt # 45693. (ksa) (Entered: 09/21/2012)
71 PRETRIAL STIPULATION by 199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, Melande Antoine, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., Florida New Majority, Inc., Florida Secretary of State, National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Veyeyo (Davis, Ashley) (Entered: 09/21/2012)
72 MOTION to Expedite Consideration of Motion for Intervention Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 (D.E. #67) by Barbara A Dereuil, Luis I Garcia, Hal David Rush, Diana K Whitehurst. (Rodriguez, Raquel) (Entered: 09/21/2012)
73 ORDER granting 59 Motion to Vacate 47 Amended Order Referring Case to Mediation. Signed by Judge William J. Zloch on 9/21/2012. (bc) (Entered: 09/21/2012)
74 ORDER Setting Evidentiary Hearing on Motion 65 for Preliminary Injunction and Summary Judgment: Motion Hearing set for 10/1/2012 at 9:30 AM in Fort Lauderdale Division before Judge William J. Zloch. Plaintiffs shall respond to 67 Motion of Bipartisan Group by Noon, 9/26/2012; Defendant shall respond to Plaintiffs' Motion 65 for Preliminary Injunction and Summary Judgment by Noon, 9/26/2012; Plaintiffs shall file their Reply in support of their Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Summary Judgment by Noon, 9/28/2012. Signed by Judge William J. Zloch on 9/21/2012. (bc) (Entered: 09/21/2012)
75 PAPERLESS ORDER denying as moot 72 Motion to Expedite per DE 74 . Signed by Judge William J. Zloch on 9/24/2012. (bc) (Entered: 09/24/2012)
76 NOTICE by Karla Vanessa Arcia re 65 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction MOTION for Summary Judgment Corrected Declaration and Expert Report of Dan Smith (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Declaration and Expert Report of Dan Smith)(De Leon, John) (Entered: 09/24/2012)
77 NOTICE of Change of Address by Raquel A. Rodriguez (Rodriguez, Raquel) (Entered: 09/25/2012)
78 NOTICE by Barbara A Dereuil, Luis I Garcia, Hal David Rush, Diana K Whitehurst OF FILING PROPOSED RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit RESPONSE BY BIPARTISAN GROUP OF VOTERS LUIS I GARCIA, DIANA K WHITEHURST, HAL DAVID RUSH AND BARBARA A. DEREUIL IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT (D.E. #65))(Rodriguez, Raquel) (Entered: 09/26/2012)
79 RESPONSE in Opposition re 65 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Florida Secretary of State. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 (Matthews Declaration), # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit Statement of Facts)(Davis, Ashley) (Entered: 09/26/2012)

Case: 1:12-cv-22282 As of: 10/29/2016 09:51 PM EDT 23 of 29

09/26/2012 09/26/2012 09/26/2012
09/26/2012
09/26/2012
09/26/2012 09/26/2012
09/26/2012 09/26/2012 09/26/2012 09/27/2012

80 RESPONSE/REPLY to 67 MOTION to Intervene by Karla Vanessa Arcia. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion for Intervention, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit B in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion for Intervention, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit C in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion for Intervention)(De Leon, John) (Entered: 09/26/2012)
81 NOTICE of Striking 80 Response/Reply (Other), filed by Karla Vanessa Arcia by Karla Vanessa Arcia (De Leon, John) (Entered: 09/26/2012)
82 RESPONSE/REPLY to 67 MOTION to Intervene by 199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, Melande Antoine, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., Florida New Majority, Inc., Luis I Garcia, National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Veyeyo. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion for Intervention, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit B in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion for Intervention, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit C in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion for Intervention)(De Leon, John) (Entered: 09/26/2012)
83 RESPONSE/REPLY to 67 MOTION to Intervene by 199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, Melande Antoine, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., Florida New Majority, Inc., National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Veyeyo. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion for Intervention, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit B in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion for Intervention, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit C in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion for Intervention)(De Leon, John) (Entered: 09/26/2012)
84 NOTICE of Striking 82 Response/Reply (Other),, filed by 199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., Luis I Garcia, Veyeyo, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Melande Antoine, Florida New Majority, Inc. by 199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, Melande Antoine, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., Florida New Majority, Inc., National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Veyeyo (De Leon, John) (Entered: 09/26/2012)
85 NOTICE by Barbara A Dereuil, Luis I Garcia, Hal David Rush, Diana K Whitehurst re 67 MOTION to Intervene Notice of Correction (Rodriguez, Raquel) (Entered: 09/26/2012)
86 Plaintiff's MOTION to Strike or, in the Alternative, to Expand the Page Limit for Plaintiff's Reply in Support of Motion for Preliminarty Injunction and Summary Judgment 78 Notice (Other), Intervenor's Proposed Response (DE 78−1) by 199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, Melande Antoine, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., Florida New Majority, Inc., National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Veyeyo. Responses due by 10/15/2012 (De Leon, John). Added MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages on 9/27/2012 (yha). (Entered: 09/26/2012)
89 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice, Consent to Designation, and Request to Receive Notices of Electronic Filings on Behalf of Michael A. Carvin. Filing Fee $ 75.00. Receipt # 46065. (ksa) (Entered: 09/28/2012)
90 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice, Consent to Designation, and Request to Receive Notices of Electronic Filings on Behalf of Warren D. Postman. Filing Fee $ 75.00. Receipt # 46064. (ksa) (Entered: 09/28/2012)
91 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice, Consent to Designation, and Request to Receive Notices of Electronic Filings on Behalf of John M. Gore. Filing Fee $ 75.00. Receipt # 46063. (ksa) (Entered: 09/28/2012)
87 Clerks Notice to Filer re 86 Plaintiff's MOTION to Strike 78 Notice (Other), Intervenor's Proposed Response (DE 78−1). Motion with Multiple Reliefs Filed as One Relief; ERROR − The Filer selected only one relief event and failed to select the additional corresponding events for each relief requested in the motion. The docket entry was corrected by the Clerk. It is not necessary to refile this document but future filings must comply with the instructions in the CM/ECF Attorney User's Manual. (yha) (Entered: 09/27/2012)

Case: 1:12-cv-22282 As of: 10/29/2016 09:51 PM EDT 24 of 29

09/28/2012
09/28/2012
09/28/2012 09/28/2012 09/28/2012 09/28/2012 09/28/2012
09/28/2012
10/01/2012
10/01/2012
10/01/2012 10/01/2012 10/01/2012 10/01/2012

88 RESPONSE in Support re 65 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by 199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, Melande Antoine, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., Florida New Majority, Inc., National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Veyeyo. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A in Support of Plaintiffs Reply in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Summary Judgment)(De Leon, John) (Entered: 09/28/2012)
92 First MOTION Motion to Appear Telephonically re 36 Scheduling Order by 199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, Melande Antoine, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., Florida New Majority, Inc., National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Veyeyo. (De Leon, John) Modified relief on 10/1/2012 (yha). (Entered: 09/28/2012)
93 PAPERLESS ORDER granting 89 , 90 and 91 Motions to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Attorneys Michael A. Carvin, Warren D. Postman and John M. Gore are permitted to appear on behalf of Defendant Florida Secretary of State. Signed by Judge William J. Zloch on 9/28/2012. (bc) (Entered: 09/28/2012)
94 ORDER denying 67 Motion to Intervene. Signed by Judge William J. Zloch on 9/28/2012. (bc) (Entered: 09/28/2012)
95 PAPERLESS ORDER denying as moot 86 Motion to Strike or Leave to File Excess Pages per DE 94 . Signed by Judge William J. Zloch on 9/28/2012. (bc) (Entered: 09/28/2012)
96 PAPERLESS ORDER denying as moot 69 and 70 Motions to Appear Pro Hac Vice per DE 94 . Signed by Judge William J. Zloch on 9/28/2012. (bc) (Entered: 09/28/2012)
97 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages with Respect to Plaintiffs Reply in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Summary Judgment by 199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, Melande Antoine, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., Florida New Majority, Inc., National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Veyeyo. (De Leon, John) (Entered: 09/28/2012)
98 Paperless ORDER granting 97 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Plaintiffs' Reply in Support of Their Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Summary Judgment (DE 88) that exceeds the applicable page limit is acceptable. The Court notes that any argument by Plaintiffs in said Reply (DE 88) that deals with the Prospective Intervenors' Proposed Response to Plaintiffs' Motion For Preliminary Injunction, see DE 78−1, shall not be considered by the Court, as per DE 94. Signed by Judge William J. Zloch on 9/28/2012. (wjz2) (Entered: 09/28/2012)
99 Clerks Notice to Filer re 92 First MOTION Motion to Appear Telephonically re 36 Scheduling Order . Wrong Motion Relief(s) Selected; ERROR − The Filer selected the wrong motion relief(s) when docketing the motion. The correction was made by the Clerk. It is not necessary to refile this document but future motions filed must include applicable reliefs. (yha) (Entered: 10/01/2012)
100 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge William J. Zloch: Motion Hearing held on 10/1/2012 re 65 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Witness Dale Ewart and Wifredo Seda testified. Court Reporter: Carl Schanzleh, 954−769−5488 / Carl_Schanzleh@flsd.uscourts.gov (Attachments: # 1 Plaintiff's Exhibit List, # 2 Defendant's Exhibit List) (bc) (Entered: 10/01/2012)
101 ORDER Cancelling Pre−Trial Conference. Signed by Judge William J. Zloch on 10/1/2012. (bc) (Entered: 10/01/2012)
102 ORDER. Signed by Judge William J. Zloch on 10/1/2012. (bc) (Entered: 10/01/2012)
103 PAPERLESS ORDER denying as moot 66 Motion to Expedite Preliminary Injunction Proceedings and for Temporary Restraining Order per DE 74 . Signed by Judge William J. Zloch on 10/1/2012. (bc) (Entered: 10/01/2012)
104 PAPERLESS ORDER denying as moot 92 Motion for Leave to Appear Telephonically per DE 101 . Signed by Judge William J. Zloch on 10/1/2012. (bc) (Entered: 10/01/2012)

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10/02/2012
10/02/2012 10/03/2012 10/03/2012 10/03/2012 10/04/2012 10/04/2012 10/04/2012 10/05/2012 10/05/2012
10/05/2012 10/09/2012 10/15/2012

105 TRANSCRIPT of Motion Hearing held on 10−01−12 before Judge William J. Zloch, 1−87 pages, Court Reporter: Carl Schanzleh, 954−769−5488 / Carl_Schanzleh@flsd.uscourts.gov. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased by contacting the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 10/26/2012. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/5/2012. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/3/2013. (cs) (Entered: 10/02/2012)
106 ANSWER and Affirmative Defenses to Amended Complaint by Florida Secretary of State.(Davis, Ashley) (Entered: 10/02/2012)
107 MOTION for Reconsideration re 102 Order stating that Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is not yet ripe for consideration' by 199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, Melande Antoine, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., Florida New Majority, Inc., National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Veyeyo. (De Leon, John) (Entered: 10/03/2012)
108 ORDER re 107 Motion for Reconsideration. Defendant shall file his response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration by 3:00 PM, 10/3/2012. Signed by Judge William J. Zloch on 10/3/2012. (bc) (Entered: 10/03/2012)
109 RESPONSE in Opposition re 107 MOTION for Reconsideration re 102 Order stating that Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is not yet ripe for consideration' filed by Florida Secretary of State. (Davis, Ashley) (Entered: 10/03/2012)
110 ORDER granting 107 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge William J. Zloch on 10/4/2012. (bc) (Entered: 10/04/2012)
111 ORDER denying 65 Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge William J. Zloch on 10/4/2012. (bc) (Entered: 10/04/2012)
112 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by J. GERALD HEBERT. by 199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, Melande Antoine, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., Florida New Majority, Inc., National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Veyeyo. Responses due by 10/22/2012 (De Leon, John) (Entered: 10/04/2012)
113 MOTION for Judgment as a Matter of Law by 199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, Melande Antoine, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., Florida New Majority, Inc., National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Veyeyo. (De Leon, John) (Entered: 10/05/2012)
114 Notice of Appeal by 199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, Melande Antoine, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., Florida New Majority, Inc., National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Veyeyo re 111 Order denying Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Motion for Summary Judgment. Filing fee $ 455.00 receipt number 113C−5127008. Within fourteen days of the filing date of a Notice of Appeal, the appellant must complete the Eleventh Circuit Transcript Order Form regardless of whether transcripts are being ordered [Pursuant to FRAP 10(b)]. For information go to our FLSD website under Transcript Information. (De Leon, John) Text Modified on 10/9/2012 (amb). (Entered: 10/05/2012)
115 Clerks Notice to Filer re 114 Notice of Appeal,,. Document Not Linked; ERROR − The filed document was not linked to the related docket entry. The correction was made by the Clerk. It is not necessary to refile this document. (amb) (Entered: 10/09/2012)
Transmission of Notice of Appeal, Order Under Appeal and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals re 114 Notice of Appeal,, (amb) (Entered: 10/09/2012)
116 Acknowledgment of Receipt of NOA from USCA re 114 Notice of Appeal,, filed by 199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., Veyeyo, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Melande Antoine, Florida New Majority, Inc.. Date received by USCA: 10/12/2012. USCA Case Number: 12−15220−EE. (amb) (Entered: 10/15/2012)

Case: 1:12-cv-22282 As of: 10/29/2016 09:51 PM EDT 26 of 29

10/15/2012 10/16/2012 10/16/2012 10/18/2012 10/18/2012 10/22/2012 10/29/2012
10/29/2012 10/29/2012 11/01/2012
11/02/2012 11/13/2012 11/14/2012

117 ORDER granting 112 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney J. Gerald Hebert terminated as to Plaintiffs. Signed by Judge William J. Zloch on 10/15/2012. (bc) (Entered: 10/15/2012)
118 ORDER of USCA DENYING Appellants' motion to expedite this appeal re 114 Notice of Appeal,, filed by 199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., Veyeyo, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Melande Antoine, Florida New Majority, Inc. USCA #12−15220−E (amb) (Entered: 10/16/2012)
119 ORDER requiring Defendant to file response to 113 Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law by Noon, 10/18/2012. Signed by Judge William J. Zloch on 10/16/2012. (bc) (Entered: 10/16/2012)
120 RESPONSE to Motion re 113 MOTION for Judgment as a Matter of Law filed by Florida Secretary of State. Replies due by 10/29/2012. (Davis, Ashley) (Entered: 10/18/2012)
121 ORDER Setting Status Conference: Status Conference set for 10/22/2012 at 10:00 AM in Fort Lauderdale Division before Judge William J. Zloch. Signed by Judge William J. Zloch on 10/18/2012. (bc) (Entered: 10/18/2012)
122 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge William J. Zloch: Status Conference held on 10/22/2012. Court Reporter: Carl Schanzleh, 954−769−5488 / Carl_Schanzleh@flsd.uscourts.gov (bc) (Entered: 10/22/2012)
123 TRANSCRIPT of Status Conference held on 10−22−12 before Judge William J. Zloch, 1−14 pages, Court Reporter: Carl Schanzleh, 954−769−5488 / Carl_Schanzleh@flsd.uscourts.gov. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased by contacting the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 11/23/2012. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/3/2012. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/30/2013. (cs) (Entered: 10/29/2012)
124 VACATEDORDER granting 113 Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law. Signed by Judge William J. Zloch on 10/29/2012. (bc) Modified on 2/12/2015 (bc). (Entered: 10/29/2012)
125 VACATED FINAL JUDGMENT in favor of the Defendant and against the Plaintiffs. Signed by Judge William J. Zloch on 10/29/2012. (bc) Modified on 2/12/2015 (bc). (Entered: 10/29/2012)
126 Notice of Appeal by Plaintiffs as to 125 Judgment, 124 Order on Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law by 199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, Melande Antoine, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., Florida New Majority, Inc., National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Veyeyo. Filing fee $ 455.00 receipt number 113C−5201389. Within fourteen days of the filing date of a Notice of Appeal, the appellant must complete the Eleventh Circuit Transcript Order Form regardless of whether transcripts are being ordered [Pursuant to FRAP 10(b)]. For information go to our FLSD website under Transcript Information. (De Leon, John) (Entered: 11/01/2012)
Transmission of Notice of Appeal, Judgment, Order Under Appeal and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals re 126 Notice of Appeal,, (amb) (Entered: 11/02/2012)
127 Acknowledgment of Receipt of NOA from USCA re 126 Notice of Appeal,, filed by 199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., Veyeyo, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Melande Antoine, Florida New Majority, Inc.. Date received by USCA: 11/7/2012. USCA Case Number: 12−15738−E. (amb) (Entered: 11/13/2012)
128 TRANSCRIPT INFORMATION FORM by 199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, Melande Antoine, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., Florida New Majority, Inc., National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Veyeyo re 126 Notice of Appeal,,. All necessary transcripts on file transcript(s) ordered. Order placed by John de Leon. Email sent to Court Reporter Coordinator. (De Leon, John) (Entered: 11/14/2012)

Case: 1:12-cv-22282 As of: 10/29/2016 09:51 PM EDT 27 of 29

11/15/2012 11/28/2012 12/03/2012
12/04/2012 12/14/2012 01/18/2013 01/18/2013
01/18/2013 02/01/2013 02/01/2013 02/22/2013 02/25/2013 03/04/2013

129 TRANSCRIPT NOTIFICATION − Transcript(s) ordered on: 11/14/2012 by John DeLeon, Esq. has/have been filed by Court Reporter: Carl Schanzleh, 954−769−5488 / Carl_Schanzleh@flsd.uscourts.gov re 128 Transcript Information Form,. (amb) (Entered: 11/15/2012)
130 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE. Show Cause Response due by 12/5/2012. Signed by Judge William J. Zloch on 11/28/2012. (bc) (Entered: 11/28/2012)
131 ORDER of DISMISSAL from USCA. Appellants Amended Unopposed Motion to Dismiss Appeal with Prejudice is GRANTED re 114 Notice of Appeal,, filed by 199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., Veyeyo, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Melande Antoine, Florida New Majority, Inc. USCA #12−15220−EE (amb) (Entered: 12/04/2012)
132 RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE re 130 Order to Show Cause by Florida Secretary of State. (Davis, Ashley) (Entered: 12/04/2012)
133 NOTICE by Melande Antoine, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., Florida New Majority, Inc., National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Veyeyo NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL AS COUNSEL BY DIANA S. SEN (De Leon, John) (Entered: 12/14/2012)
134 First MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney for Plaintiffs by Uzoma Nkwonta. by 199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, Melande Antoine, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., Florida New Majority, Inc., National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Veyeyo. Responses due by 2/4/2013 (De Leon, John) (Entered: 01/18/2013)
135 NOTICE of Striking 134 First MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney for Plaintiffs by Uzoma Nkwonta. filed by 199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., Veyeyo, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Melande Antoine, Florida New Majority, Inc. by 199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, Melande Antoine, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., Florida New Majority, Inc., National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Veyeyo (De Leon, John) (Entered: 01/18/2013)
136 NOTICE by 199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, Melande Antoine, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., Florida New Majority, Inc., National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Veyeyo Notice of Withdrawal as Counsel by Uzoma Nkwonta (De Leon, John) (Entered: 01/18/2013)
137 CERTIFICATE of Readiness transmitted to USCA (Atlanta Office) re 126 Notice of Appeal,, filed by 199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., Veyeyo, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Melande Antoine, Florida New Majority, Inc. USCA #12−15738−EE (amb) (Entered: 02/01/2013)
138 Certified and Transmitted Record on Appeal to US Court of Appeals (Atlanta Office) Consisting of (3) Volumes of Pleadings, (2) Volumes of Transcripts, (1) Accordion folder w/DE's 65,76,79,80 & 127 re 126 Notice of Appeal. USCA #12−15738−EE (amb) (Entered: 02/01/2013)
139 NOTICE by 199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, Melande Antoine, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., Florida New Majority, Inc., National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Veyeyo (De Leon, John) (Entered: 02/22/2013)
Attorney Joshua N. Friedman terminated. Notice of Termination delivered by US Mail to Joshua Friedman per 139 Notice of Withdrawal as Counsel (yha) (Entered: 02/25/2013)
140 Acknowledgment of Receipt of COR/ROA from USCA re 126 Notice of Appeal,, filed by 199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., Veyeyo, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Melande Antoine, Florida New Majority, Inc.. Date received by USCA: 2/5/2013. USCA Case Number: 12−15738−EE. (amb) (Entered: 03/04/2013)

Case: 1:12-cv-22282 As of: 10/29/2016 09:51 PM EDT 28 of 29

12/04/2014
12/04/2014 12/04/2014 12/08/2014 12/09/2014 12/09/2014 12/10/2014 12/10/2014 12/15/2014 02/12/2015 02/12/2015

141 MANDATE of USCA (certified copy) REVERSED AND REMANDED. We REVERSE the District Courts grant of judgment as a matter of law to Secretary Detzner and REMAND with instructions to enter an order (1) declaring that Secretary Detzners actions here were in violation of the 90 Day Provision of the NVRA; and (2) granting such further relief as the needs and interests of justice require re 126 Notice of Appeal,, filed by 199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., Veyeyo, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Melande Antoine, Florida New Majority, Inc. ; Date Issued: 12/4/2014 ; USCA Case Number: 12−15738−EE (amb) (Main Document 141 replaced on 12/5/2014 to attach correct document) (amb). Text Modified on 12/5/2014 (amb). (Entered: 12/04/2014)
142 ORDER Setting Status Conference. Status Conference set for 12/15/2014 at 11:00 AM in Fort Lauderdale Division before Judge William J. Zloch. Signed by Judge William J. Zloch on 12/4/2014. (bc) (Entered: 12/04/2014)
Case Reopened (bc) (Entered: 12/10/2014)
143 ORDER granting Notices of Withdrawal of Diana S. Sen 133 and Uzoma Nkwonta 136 . Attorneys Uzoma Nkwonta and Diana Sen terminated. Signed by Judge William J. Zloch on 12/8/2014. (bc) (Entered: 12/08/2014)
144 UNOPPOSED MOTION to Appear Telephonically at December 15, 2014, Status Conference by Florida Secretary of State. (Davis, Ashley) Modified text to correct spelling error on 12/9/2014 (bb). Modified relief on 12/10/2014 (jua). (Entered: 12/09/2014)
145 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to Appear Telephonically at December 15, 2014, Status Conference. Attorney: John De Leon by Karla Vanessa Arcia. Responses due by 12/26/2014 (De Leon, John) (Entered: 12/09/2014)
146 ORDER granting 144 Motion to Appear Telephonically at December 15, 2014 Status Conference. Signed by Judge William J. Zloch on 12/10/2014. (bc) (Entered: 12/10/2014)
147 ORDER granting 145 Motion to Appear Telephonically at December 15, 2014 Status Conference. Signed by Judge William J. Zloch on 12/10/2014. (bc) (Entered: 12/10/2014)
148 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge William J. Zloch: Status Conference held on 12/15/2014. Court Reporter: Francine Salopek, 954−769−5657 / Francine_Salopek@flsd.uscourts.gov (bc) (Entered: 12/15/2014)
149 Order Vacating 124 Order on Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and 125 Final Judgment. Signed by Judge William J. Zloch on 2/12/2015. (bc) (Entered: 02/12/2015)
150 FINAL JUDGMENT in favor of 199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Melande Antoine and against Florida Secretary of State. Closing Case. Signed by Judge William J. Zloch on 2/12/2015. (bc)

04/10/2015 04/14/2015

NOTICE: If there are sealed documents in this case, they may be unsealed after 1 year or as directed by Court Order, unless they have been designated to be permanently sealed. See Local Rule 5.4 and Administrative Order 2014−69. (Entered: 02/12/2015)
151 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to file motion for attorneys' fees and expenses by 199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, Melande Antoine, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights. Responses due by 4/27/2015 (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Roberson−Young, Katherine) (Entered: 04/10/2015)
152 PAPERLESS ORDER granting 151 Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Expenses. Plaintiffs shall have until on or before Noon on 5/13/2015 to file a Motion for Attorneys' Fees. Signed by Judge William J. Zloch on 4/14/2015. (bc) (Entered: 04/14/2015)

Case: 1:12-cv-22282 As of: 10/29/2016 09:51 PM EDT 29 of 29

04/15/2015
04/20/2015 04/22/2015 05/12/2015
05/12/2015 05/26/2015

153 ORDER of USCA, Appellee's motion to transfer the issue of attorney's fees is GRANTED IN PART to the extent set forth below. Appellants' motion for attorney's fees is GRANTED IN PART as to entitlement and REMANDED for a determination of the reasonable amounts of appellate attorneys' fees to be awarded as to 126 Notice of Appeal,, filed by 199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., Veyeyo, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Melande Antoine, Florida New Majority, Inc., USCA # 12−15738−EE (see order de# 152 ) (hh) (Entered: 04/15/2015)
154 UNSTIPULATED Unopposed MOTION for Substitution of Counsel A Tanenbaum for J A Atkinson by Florida Secretary of State. Attorney Adam Scott Tanenbaum added to party Florida Secretary of State(pty:dft). Responses due by 5/7/2015 (Tanenbaum, Adam) (Entered: 04/20/2015)
155 ORDER granting 154 Unstipulated Motion for Substitution of Counsel.. Signed by Judge William J. Zloch on 4/22/2015. (bc) (Entered: 04/22/2015)
156 Second MOTION for Extension of Time to file motion for attorneys' fees and expenses with consent by 199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, Melande Antoine, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights. Responses due by 5/29/2015 (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Roberson−Young, Katherine) (Entered: 05/12/2015)
157 PAPERLESS ORDER granting 156 Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion. Plaintiffs shall have until on or before Noon, 6/12/2015, to file their Motion for Attorney's Fees and Expenses. Signed by Judge William J. Zloch on 5/12/2015. (bc) (Entered: 05/12/2015)
158 NOTICE of Settlement of Claim for Attorneys' Fees and Withdrawal of Pending Motion for Attorneys' Fees by 199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST FLORIDA, Melande Antoine, Karla Vanessa Arcia, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights (Roberson−Young, Katherine) (Entered: 05/26/2015)