UNITED STATES DISTRlCT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVlSION

BRIAN MAST, MICHAEL WOODS, EUGENE

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WELLS, on their own behalfand on behalf ofa class

)

of those similarly situated,

)

)

Plainti ffs,

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)

v.

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No.

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J. DAVID DONAHUE, in his official capacity

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as Commissioner of the Indiana Department of

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Correction;

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CRAIG HANKS, in his official capacity as

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Superintendent of the Wabash Valley

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Complaint-Class Action

Correctional Facility,

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Defendants.

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COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Introduction

I. The Indiana Department of Correction ("DOC") maintains within the Wabash Valley

Correctional Facility the Secured Housing Unit ("SHU"), a super-maximum penal facility

which functions as a disciplinary segregation unit for DOC prisoners who have received at

least two years of disciplinary segregation time and are deemed to be inappropriate to house

elsewhere within the DOC. A significant number of prisoners in the SHU are mentally ill,

and confining these prisoners in the conditions of extreme social isolation and sensory

deprivation that exist in the SHU violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States

Constitution. Injunctive and declaratory reliefis sought for the prisoners bringing tlus action

as well as for a class of those similarly situated.

Jurisdiction, Venue, and Cause of Action 2. This Court has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to 28 U.S.c. § 1331 inasmuch as it arises
under the Constitution of the United States and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § I 343(a)(3) because this action seeks to redress the deprivation, under color of state law, of civil rights. 3. Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391. 4. Declaratory reliefis authorized pursuant to Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 , 2202. 5. Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to 42 U.S.c. § 1983 to redress the deprivation, under color of state law, of rights secured by the Constitution of the United States. Parties 6. Brian Mast is an adult resident oflndiana who is a DOC prisoner confined within the SHU. 7. Michael Woods is an adult resident of Indiana who is a DOC prisoner confined within the SHU. 8. Eugene Wells is an adult resident of Indiana who is a DOC prisoner confined within the SHU. 9. J. David Donahue is the duly appointed Commissioner of the Indiana Department of Correction. He is sued in his official capacity. 10. Craig Hanks is the duly appointed Superintendent ofthe Wabash Valley Correctional Facility within which is located the SHU. He is sued in his official capacity. Class Action Allegations 11. Brian Mast, Michael Woods and Eugene Wells bring this action on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of those similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(2) of the Federal
2

Rules of Civil Procedure.

12 . The class is defined as:

all prisoners currently, and in the future, confined within the Secured Housing Unit at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility who are mentally ill.

13. The requirements of Rule 23(a) are met with regard to the putative class. Specifically:

a.

The SHU has a maximum capacity of288 prisoners, many of whom are mentally ill.

The specific persons in the class will change as new prisoners are brought into the

SHU and other prisoners are discharged.

b. There are questions of law and fact common to the class, specifically whether confinement of mentally ill prisoners in the SHU violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

c. The claims of the representative parties are typical of those of the class.

d. The representative parties will fairly and adequately represent the class.

14. The further requirements of Rule 23(b)(2) are met in this cause in that at all times defendants

have acted, and have refused to act, on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby

making appropriate final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect

to the class as a whole.

Statement of Facts

15. The SHU opened in 1993. It is located within the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility in

Carlisle, Indiana.

16. The SHU functions primarily as a disciplinary segregation unit for the entire DOC. A small

part of the SHU functions as the disciplinary segregation unit for the Wabash Valley

Correctional Facility and there are a small number of Adminjstrative Segregation prisoners

from Wabash Valley Correctional Facility who are also housed there.

3

17. However, the large majority of the prisoners at the SHU are those who have accumulated at least two years of disciplinary segregation after being found guilty of infractions in other DOC penal facilities.
18. The SHU consists of four pods: A-East, A-West, B-East, B-West. 19. The SHU contains only male prisoners. 20. Each pod consists of 6 ranges which in tum contain 12 cells each. 21. B-East and B-West consist solely oflong tenn disciplinary segregation prisoners. Extreme Social Isolation and Sensory Deprivation 22. Prisoners in the SHU are subjected to levels of social isolation and sensory deprivation that
approach the limits ofhuman endurance. For prisoners with mental illness, these conditions lead to psychiatric deterioration, self-hann , and sometimes suicide. 23. Prisoners are locked in windowless single cells which are approximately seven feet by twelve feet. Each cell contains a concrete bed with a plastic mattress, a metal shelf, a fixed table and stool, and a combination sink and toilet. 24. Prisoners are generally confined to their cells 24 hours a day, except that they may be given the opportunity to go to a recreation area I hour a day where they may engage in solitary exercise. There is no group recreation. 25. The only recreation arca is a small walled area adjacent to each range on the SHU. It contains only a basketball net approximately 16 feet above the ground and a fixed exercise bike. It is partially covered by a roof. 26. The walls ofthe recreation area are approximately two stories high. Given that the recreation area is only approximately fifteen feet by twenty-four feet , and given the height of the walls
4

and the partial roof, the sun rarely is visible from the exercise area. 27. Because the recreation area is exposed to outside weather and temperatures, recreation is
frequently not provided because of cold or inclement weather. 28. Recently prisoners at the SHU have been provided coats and hats which they may wear
outside. However, neither gloves nor boots are provided to prisoners at the SHU. 29. In order to travel to the recreation area a prisoner is cuffed and led to the recreation area
where he is released to engage in solitary recreation. 30. The conditions of "recreation" are so harsh and unpleasant that many prisoners choose to
forego it, and simply remain locked in their cells 24 hours a day. 31. Prisoners are also offered a shower on a dai Iy basis. In order to obtain a shower the prisoner
is cuffed and led to the shower. The prisoner is then uncuffed and locked in the shower and may be left there alone for more than one hour. Many prisoners, either due to mental illness or because of these harsh conditions, choose to forego showers, and simply remain locked in their cells 24 hours a day. 32. In fact, whenever a SHU prisoner leaves his cell he is cuffed. 33. There are no windows or natural light in the cells in the SHU. 34. Each cell contains a flourescent light which may be turned off at night by the prisoner. However, the cell remains illuminated throughout the night, albeit at a lower level of brightness. This 24-hour illumination may interfere with sleep and further exacerbates mental illness. 35. Prisoners receive their meals in their cells. Three times a day a food tray is inserted through a slot in the locked door of the cells.
5

36. Prisoners in the SHU are severely restricted in their ability to have books, letters, family photographs, or other personal items in their cells.
37. While SHU policy theoretically allows prisoners to "earn" a television through good behavior, in practice many prisoners, particularly those who are mentally ill, are not allowed to possess a television , thus exacerbating their isolation and lack of environmental stimulation.
38. The cell doors in the SHU contain air holes and a screen running the length of part of the door. However, if the prisoner is deemed to be a risk of throwing waste or other items at guards outside the cells, a hard plastic covering is placed so that the door is completely covered. This covering is called lexan and serves to further isolate the prisoner by muffling sound.
39. Prisoners are not able to see each other while in the SHU. 40. Because of this lack of physical contact, the SHU is an extremely noisy place with prisoners
shouting at each other in an attempt to communicate. 41. All visitation takes place in cubicles through plexiglass. Many of the visitation booths do
not contain telephones with which prisoners and visitors may easily converse. Instead, they must shout back and forth. 42. Many prisoners receive no visitors. 43. There is no durationallimitation on how long a prisoner can be confined the SHU. And, if the prisoner receives additional disciplinary segregation time for offenses committed at the SHU, his period of confinement will be increased.
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Endemic Mental Illness and Inadequate Mental Health Care 44. Mental illness is prevalent in the SHU. Mentally ill prisoners are disproportionately likely
to be transferred to the SHU, because their inability to obey prison rules causes them to accumulate disciplinary infractions. For those prisoners who are already mentally ill upon their arrival, conditions in the SHU cause serious and sometimes catastrophic deterioration in their mental health. A large number of the prisoners at the SHU are severely mentally ill and many are taking anti-psychotic and similar medications. 45. The severe mental illnesses of the prisoners, exacerbated by the unbearable conditions in the SHU, cause them to engage in various behaviors including: having auditory and visual hallucinations; engaging in self-abusive behaviors, including ripping chunks of flesh from their bodies; rubbing feces on themselves; staring fixedly in their cells; and attempting suicide. 46. Indeed, despite the heightened security in the SHU at least four prisoners have committed suicide in the SHU since 2000. One prisoner hanged himself. Another set himsel f on fire. One cut his wrists and throat, and another swallowed a cloth and choked to death. 47. There is a psychiatrist who services the SHU as well as psychologists and other mental health staff. However, given the prevalence of mental illness in the SHU, mental health services are systemically inadequate. 48. Generally the psychiatrist and psychologists will have individual contact with prisoners by briefly conversing with them when they are in their cells within earshot of other prisoners and staff, or the prisoner is brought to a holding cell where he is spoken to through its door which is also within earshot of staff. These cell-front interviews are inadequate; because of
7

the complete lack of confidentiality, a prisoner may tell mental health staff that he is fine, when he is in fact paranoid, hallucinating, or contemplating suicide. 49. There are groups run by the psychology staff. These are not traditional groups; rather, the prisoners are taken to the visitation area and are placed in individual locked cubicles which are generally used for visitation. 50. Each cubicle door has a small slit in it where the prisoner presents his hands to be cuffed and uncuffed. 51. During group these slits are opened and by bending down the prisoner is able to shout and talk to the therapist who stands outside the doors, talking to up to six prisoners. 52. There are not sufficient groups to serve all the prisoners at the SHU. Punishment of the Mentally III 53. Prisoners in the SHU who report feeling suicidal or who are otherwise expenencmg symptoms of mental illness may be placed in four point leather restraints which are used to strap the prisoners to beds. Usually this may last for four hours, although at times it may be for longer periods of time. 54. Prisoners who are deemed to be dangerous to themselves may be stripped to their underwear and put back into their cells with nothing other than a blanket. All other items will be removed from the cell. This may last for up to 72 hours or longer. This harsh and punitive treatment exacerbates the prisoner's mental illness and actually increases the risk of suicide or self-harm. 55 . Excessive force is common in the SHU. Due to the oppressive conditions of confinement and inadequate mental health services in the SHU, prisoners become mentally ill, or their
8

mental illness worsens. When prisoners manifest their mental illness by self-haml or other behaviors, staff often misinterpret these symptoms of mental illness as willful misconduct, and respond with force rather than with appropriate mental health interventions. The SHU utilizes "cell extraction teams" to forcibly remove prisoners from their cells. The teams consist of at least five guards, wearing body armor and other protective material who rush into the cell and restrain the prisoner. 56. Frequently, the prisoners who are extracted are mentally ill and are not able to keep their behavior within acceptable boundaries as a result of their mental illness. The use of such force on mentally ill prisoners exacerbates their mental illness and makes them more prone to self-harm or suicide. 57. Mentally ill prisoners at the SHU may accumulate disciplinary infractions because of their inability to control their behavior due to the conditions at the SHU. This, in tum, leads to additional disciplinary time and more months, or even years, in the SHU. Thus, the more severe a prisoner's mental illness, the more likely he is to become "stuck" in the SHU, where the harsh conditions will exacerbate his mental illness still further. The Named Plaintiffs
Brian Mast 58. Brian Mast has been confined to the SHU for more than ten years continuously. His "out
date" from the SHU is currently 2023, although his out date from DOC is 2014. 59. Until October of2004 he was confined in a cell on B-East. Since then he has been confined
to a cell on B-West. 60. He is seriously mentally ill, and has been diagnosed as suffering from intermittent explosive
9

disorder, borderline personality disorder and anti-social personality disorder. 61. He has a long history ofself-abusive and self-mutilating behavior. On a number ofoccasions
he has cut himself so badly that he has required hospital care. 62. He has been placed in a cell behind lexan. 63. At times he suffers from auditory and visual hallucinations. 64. He is currently taking a number of anti-psychotic medications. 65. At the current time he is not receiving any psychotherapy except for occasional contact with
mental health staff through his cell door or the door of a holding cell. 66. He rarely goes to recreation because there is nothing available in the recreation area and it
is very cold in the wintertime. 67. He therefore spends his day in isolation. 68. On a number of occasions he has been unable to conform his behavior to acceptable norms
and he has been violently extracted from his cell by the cell extraction team. 69. On a number of occasions he has been strapped with four point leather restraints in a bed in
a cell. 70. On a number of occasions he has been placed into a strip cell. The last time was in August
of2003 when he was on a suicide watch. He was in the strip cell for a week. 71. The conditions at the SHU have caused his mental health to deteriorate. 72. On April 26, 2004, he filed the following grievance pursuant to the DOC ' s grievance
procedure, complaining of his placement in the SHU and pointing out that the conditions there are harmful to mentally ill prisoners. (See Attachment 1 [grievance] and 2 [DOC summary of grievance]). Mr. Mast noted that "the SHU is not designed to house mentally
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(sic) inmates" and requested that he be transferred to a mental health facility. (Attachment I). 73. The grievance was rejected because the DOC's grievance policies specify that prisoners "may NOT grieve the following ... Classification actions or decisions." (See Attachment I and 2). 74. Not only does the DOC grievance policy prohibit such a grievance but the policy further provides that if a complaint or grievance is rejected as non-grievable it may not be appealed. (See Attachment 3 [excerpts from DOC ' s grievance policy]). 75. Therefore, neither Brian Mast nor members of the putative class need to exhaust any grievance remedies to protest their placement in the SHU inasmuch as such protests concern classification decisions which are not grievable.
Michael Woods 76. Michael Woods is currently confined in B-East in the SHU. His "out date" from the SHU
is currently in 2025. 77. In 2004, he was sent to New Castle Correctional Facility. This is a medium security facility
which has a program for mentally iII prisoners. However, Mr. Woods was returned to the SHU from the New Castle program. 78. He has been diagnosed with a serious mcntal illness and receives psychotropic medications. 79. Medical records from New Castle discuss the fact that Mr. Woods is having auditory hallucinations. 80. Mr. Woods continues to suffer from hallucinations in the SHU. 81. His living area is filled with constant noise as prisoners yell and scream.
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82. Mr. Woods finds this to be very distressing. 83. Within this noisy environment he is isolated and has very little human contact. There is
lexan on his cell door. 84. He is not currently receiving any psychotherapy except for occasional contact with mental
health staff through his cell door or through the door of his holding cell. 85. He does not go to recreation. In the winter no gloves or boots are provided and in all
seasons there is nothing to do in the recreation area. 86. He generally takes a shower two times a week. 87. Other than this, he never leaves his cell. 88. He will occasionally talk to someone from the mental health staff when that person is on the
range and comes to the outside of his cell or when he is brought to a holding cell. 89. Mr. Woods is not receiving adequate and appropriate mental health care for his serious
illness. 90. The conditions at the SHU are causing him serious harm.
Eugene Wells 91. Eugene Wells is currently confined to B-East on the SHU. His out date from the SHU is
2019. 92. He is seriously mentally ill and is being prescribed anti-psychotic medications. 93. He is not receiving any psychotherapy except for occasional contact with mental health staff
through his cell door or through the door of the holding cell. 94. He was last placed in a strip cell less than two months ago when he had a problem with one
of the officers in the SHU. He was in the strip cell for five (5) days.
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95. He has also been restrained with four point restraints in the past. 96. He only infrequently goes to recreation because there is nothing to do in the recreation area. 97. He takes a shower every other day. 98. Other than this he does not leave his cell. 99. He is not receiving adequate treatment for his mental illness. 100. The conditions in the SHU are causing him serious harm. General Factual Allegations 101. The severe social isolation and lack of environmental stimulation in the SHU causes
exacerbation of pre-existing mental illnesses and contributes to the psychological deterioration of the prisoners at the SHU. 102. The conditions in the SHU create a substantial risk of serious haml to mentally ill prisoners and, indeed, cause actual harm to them. 103. The conditions in the SHU deprive mentally ill prisoners of the minimal civilized measure oflife's necessities. 104. At all times defendants were aware of this risk and harm and were deliberately indifferent to it. 105. At all times defendants were aware of this risk and failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the likely risk of haml caused by housing mentally ill prisoners in the SHU. In 1997, the human rights organization Human Rights Watch inspected the SHU with two psychiatrists who are experts in prison mental health issues. The Human Rights Watch report, of which defendants are aware, concluded that:
[wJarehousing severely ill and psychotic individuals under conditions
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that increase their suffering by exacerbating their symptoms, and in facilities that lack adequate mental health services, can only be characterized as cruel. In some cases the suffering that results is so great that the treatment must be condemned as torture.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COLD STORAGE: SUPER-MAXIM UM CONFINEMENT IN INDIANA II
( 1997). 106. Plaintiffs and the putative class are being caused irreparable hann for which there is no
adeq uate remedy at law. 107. At all times defendants have acted under color of state law.
Legal Claim 108. Confining mentally ill prIsoners 111 the SHU, under the conditions described in this
Complaint, violates the Eighth Amendment rights of plaintiffs and the members of the putative class. Request for Relief WHEREFORE, plaintiffs request that this Court: I. Accept jurisdiction of this case and set it for hearing at the earliest opportunity. 2. Certify this case as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of
Civi I Procedure with the class as specified above, and appoint the undersigned as class counsel pursuant to Rule 23(g). 3. Enter a declaratory judgment that the actions and inactions of the defendants described herein violate the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 4. Enjoin defendants fyom housing mentally ill prisoners in the SHU under the conditions described in this Complaint. 5. Grant plaintiffs their reasonable altomey fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.c. § 1988 and other applicable law.
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6. Award all other proper relief.

Kenneth J. Falk No. 6777-49 Indiana Civil Liberties Union 1031 E. Washington St. Indianapolis, IN 46202 317/635-4059 ext. 229 Fax: 317/635-4105 E-mail: ken.falk@ iclu.org
David C. Fathi National Prison Project of the ACLU Foundation, Inc. 733 151h St. N.W., #620 Washington, DC 20005 202/393-4930 Fax: 202/393-4931 Email: dfathi @npp-aclu.org Practice limited to f ederal courts Admission in this District pending
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

15

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

BRIAN MAST, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
J. DAVID DONAHUE, et al., Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

No. 2:05-CV-037 LJM/WGH

)

)

)

)

ORDER CERTIFYING CASE AS CLASS ACTION Come now plaintiffs, having filed their Motion for Class Certification, and the Court having read the Motion, and being duly advised, finds that all the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are met here and good cause exists to grant the Motion and to appoint counsel to represent the class, and, IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this case is certified as a class for injunctive and declaratory relief pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure concerning the legal issues of whether confinement of mentally ill prisoners in the Secured Housing Unit violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the class is defined as:
all prisoners currently, and in the future, confined within the Secured Housing Unit at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility who are mentally ill. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Kenneth J. Falk and David C. Fathi are appointed as counsel for the class pursuant to Rule 23(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

2:05-CV-0037 M/H MAST ET AL. V. DONAHUE ET AL.

_0_3_/1__0_/2_0_0__5____ Date

_______________________________________________ Judge, United States District Court

cc:

Kenneth J. Falk Indiana Civil Liberties Union ken.falk@iclu.org

Richard M. Bramer Deputy Attorney General rbramer@atg.state.in.us

David C. Fathi National Prison Project of the ACLU
Foundation, Inc. 915 15th St. N.W., 7th Floor Washington, D.C. 20005

2

 
 Case 2:05-cv-00037-LJM-WGH Document 104 Filed 11/26/07 Page 1 of 5 PageID #: 475

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

BRIAN MAST, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. J. DAVID DONAHUE, et al.,
Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

No. 2:05-cv-37

)

)

)

)

ORDER FINDING PRIVATE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT TO BE FAIR, REASONABLE AND ADEQUATE PURSUANT TO RULE 23(E) OF THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

This cause comes before the Court following the parties tendering of their Private

Settlement Agreement. On November 21, 2007, the Court held a fairness hearing,

pursuant to Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to determine whether the

Private Settlement Agreement is a fair, reasonable and adequate resolution of this matter.

Both parties appeared by counsel at the hearing.

Having considered the Private Settlement Agreement, the arguments of counsel at

the fairness hearing, and the Court’s prior proceedings and record in this matter,

IT IS HEREBY FOUND that:

1. The Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this cause and over

all of the parties, including the members of the certified class.

2. The class has been given proper and adequate notice of the proposed

Private Settlement Agreement, such notice having been posted in some institutions and

hand delivered in others in compliance with the prior orders of this Court. Notice was

provided at least thirty (30) days prior to class counsel filing his reports to this Court.

Case 2:05-cv-00037-LJM-WGH Document 104 Filed 11/26/07 Page 2 of 5 PageID #: 476
3. The notice invited class members to notify class counsel of any objections or comments on the Private Settlement Agreement. The notice provided valid, due, and sufficient notice of these proceedings and the matters set forth herein and including information regarding the procedures for making any objections to the Private Settlement Agreement.
4. The notice fully satisfied the requirements of Rule 23, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the requirements of due process.
5. The proposed resolution of this case, the entering by the parties into the previously tendered Private Settlement Agreement, is fair, reasonable, and adequate for the following reasons:
A. The settlement in this case grants to the plaintiffs everything they requested in their Complaint, the removal of seriously mentally ill prisoners from the Secured Housing Unit (“SHU”) at Wabash Valley Correctional Facility. Plaintiffs assert that the strength of their case was high. Given that they have attained everything they requested the Court finds that the comparing the strength of the case to the settlement offered favors the settlement in this case. B. The complexity, length, and expense of continued litigation weigh in favor of finding the Private Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable and adequate. Continued litigation would require a lengthy trial and extensive trial preparation including multiple experts and extensive further discovery. Given that the Private Settlement Agreement grants plaintiffs the relief they have sought, albeit in the form of a private settlement
2

Case 2:05-cv-00037-LJM-WGH Document 104 Filed 11/26/07 Page 3 of 5 PageID #: 477
agreement, rather than a judgment, further cost and delay in litigating this claim would not be in the best interest of the parties, particularly the class members. C. It does not appear that any class member is opposed to the settlement insofar as it removes seriously mentally ill prisoners from the SHU and sets up standards and procedures to ensure that seriously mentally ill prisoners are not returned there. The objections that have been raised are to the fact the Private Settlement Agreement does not prohibit prisoners deemed to be seriously mentally ill by the Private Settlement Agreement from being housed in other segregation units throughout the DOC. Plaintiffs’ counsel expressed concern over this situation and indicated that it may lead to future litigation. However, plaintiffs’ counsel noted, and the Court agrees, that this case focused on the SHU and concerns over other segregation units are outside of the scope of this litigation. D. There is no evidence of any collusion between the parties in entering into this Private Settlement Agreement. The Court is satisfied that the Private Settlement Agreement is the result of an arms-length negotiation. E. The opinion of class counsel that the Private Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate weighs in favor of the Court so finding. Counsel is experienced in class action litigation.
3

Case 2:05-cv-00037-LJM-WGH Document 104 Filed 11/26/07 Page 4 of 5 PageID #: 478
F. The stage of the proceedings and amount of discovery weigh in favor of finding that the Private Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. The case has been ongoing since February of 2005. Extensive discovery has occurred and the parties have engaged in a number of conferences with two Magistrate Judges. Experts have made trips to Indiana to assist plaintiffs. The settlement arose after counsel had conducted thorough discovery in this case. 6. The Private Settlement Agreement provides that the defendants will agree to pay plaintiffs the sum of $150,109.60 in full satisfaction of any claim for attorneys’ fees and costs that could be claimed by plaintiffs for any work done in the case to the date of tendering of the Private Settlement Agreement. The notice to the class accurately and adequately described this fee agreement. There was very little objection to the fee agreement by the prisoners receiving notice of the settlement and no evidence that the fees were unreasonable was presented.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the Private Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable and adequate under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and is therefore deemed to be effective as of this date.
Pursuant to paragraph 29 of the Private Settlement Agreement, it is ORDERED that this matter is hereby STAYED for two years from this date, thereafter to be dismissed without prejudice to being reinstated by plaintiffs or class members pursuant to the terms of paragraph 28 of the Private Settlement Agreement.
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED on this ______ day of November, 2007.
4

Case 2:05-cv-00037-LJM-WGH Document 104 Filed 11/26/07 Page 5 of 5 PageID #: 479 2:05-cv-37 LJM-WGH MAST, et al. v. DONAHUE, et al.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 11/26/2007
_____________ Date
cc: Kenneth J. Falk ACLU of Indiana kfalk@aclu-in.org Elizabeth Alexander National Prison Project of the
ACLU Foundation, Inc. Ealexander@npp-aclu.org David A. Arthur Deputy Attorney General David.Arthur@atg.in.gov

___________________________________
LARRY J. McKINNEY, CHIEF JUDGE
United States District Court
_S_o_u_t_h_e_r_n_D__i_s_tr_i_c_t _o_f_I_n_d_i_a_n_a__________
LARRY J. McKINNEY, CHIEF JUDGE United States District Court Southern District of Indiana

5

 
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 Case 2:05-cv-00037-LJM-WGH Document 133 Filed 12/31/09 Page 1 of 1 PageID #: 580

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

BRIAN MAST, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
J. DAVID DONAHUE, et al., Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

No. 2:05-cv-37 LJM-WGH

)

)

)

)

ORDER DISMISSING CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Comes now the Court and pursuant to its Entry of November 26, 2007, hereby

DISMISSES this action WITHOUT PREJUDICE, subject to reinstatement by plaintiffs

or class members pursuant to the terms of paragraph 28 of the parties’ Private Settlement

Agreement.

_1_2_/3_1_/_2_0_09 Date
cc:
David Arthur Deputy Attorney General David.Arthur@atg.in.gov
Kenneth J. Falk ACLU of Indiana kfalk@aclu-in.org
Elizabeth Alexander National Prison Project of the
ACLU Foundation, Inc. Ealexander@npp-aclu.org

_________________________________________
Judge, United State_s_D__is_t_ri_c_t_C_o_u_r_t___________________
LARRY J. McKINNEY, JUDGE United States District Court Southern District of Indiana

 
 Case 2:05-cv-00037-JPH-DLP Document 152 Filed 06/10/19 Page 1 of 18 PageID #: 688

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

BRIAN MAST, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

COMMISSIONER, INDIANA

)

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, )

et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

No. 2:05-cv-00037-JPH-DLP

Report of Class Counsel

Plaintiffs, by class counsel Kenneth J. Falk, say that:

1. On March 18, 2019, counsel for the parties filed their Stipulation to Terminate

Private Settlement Agreement Following Notice to the Class and Approval by the Court

/ Joint Motion to Approve Manner of Notice. (Dkt. 138).

2. On that date undersigned counsel also filed Plaintiffs’ Motion to Approve Class

Notice. (Dkt. 139).

3. On March 20, 2019, this Court issued its Order Approving Form and Manner of

Notice, which approved the proposed class notice and ordered that it be given as set out

in the parties’ Stipulation and further ordered plaintiffs’ counsel to report back to the

Court as to the results of the notice no earlier than 30 days after the delivery or posting

of the notice as required by the Stipulation. (Dkt. 142).

[1]

Case 2:05-cv-00037-JPH-DLP Document 152 Filed 06/10/19 Page 2 of 18 PageID #: 689
4. On April 2, 2019, this Court approved an amended notice in place of the notice earlier presented to the Court. (Dkt. 146). 5. Undersigned counsel was informed on June 4, 2019, by David Arthur, counsel for defendants, that the class notice had been posted for at least 30 days and provided as required by the parties’ stipulation. 6. Undersigned counsel, as class counsel, therefore makes the following report concerning comments he has received about the proposed termination of the private settlement agreement in this case. 7. As indicated in the notice that was sent to prisoners, counsel agreed to summarize all comments that he received, although with the explicit consent of the prisoner counsel also agreed to also give the correspondence containing the prisoner’s comments directly to the Court. The comments are summarized below. Where the prisoner has not consented to the release of his or her comments to the Court, the prisoner’s name is not used and he or she is listed by a number. Although a number of prisoners gave their consent to disclose their correspondence to the Court, some of the correspondence discloses personal information concerning the prisoners’ mental health conditions and counsel is uncomfortable disclosing the correspondence publicly. Therefore, counsel has filed these letters under seal and designated the prisoners by letter. A number of prisoners have filed comments directly with the Court. Those comments are summarized
[2]

Case 2:05-cv-00037-JPH-DLP Document 152 Filed 06/10/19 Page 3 of 18 PageID #: 690
below, but counsel has not included copies of the comments, but has noted the numbers given to them by this Court’s electronic filing system. 8. As the Court knows, the proposed stipulation, if approved, would dismiss the private settlement agreement in this case that prohibits the housing of “seriously mentally ill” prisoners within what was formerly called the Secured Housing Unit (“SHU”) now Secure Confinement Unit (“SCU”), at Wabash Valley Correctional Facility. In return, as noted in the proposed stipulation, the prohibition on placing seriously mentally ill prisoners in secure confinement, as set out in the private settlement agreement in Indiana Protection and Advocacy Services Commission, et al. v. Commissioner, Indiana Department of Correction, No. 1:08-cv-01317-TWP-MJD (S.D. Ind.) (“IPAS”), would remain in place for at least one year from the dismissal of the private settlement agreement in this case. 9. Many of the comments received do not specifically concern the issue set out in the above paragraph. Nevertheless, all comments are summarized below. Where the letters have been quoted counsel has not corrected spelling or grammar. In a number of letters that are summarized below prisoners asked for copies of either the private settlement agreement in this case or in the IPAS case. These requests will be honored. 10. Here are the comments received as of this date: Prisoners who consented to disclosure of their letters to the Court and whose letters are attached:
[3]

Case 2:05-cv-00037-JPH-DLP Document 152 Filed 06/10/19 Page 4 of 18 PageID #: 691
1. Brandon Bates is currently in the IRT program at Pendleton Correctional Facility that was established by the IPAS agreement. He states that staff is not complying with the settlement and the program should be shut down.
2. Borislav Cuckovic states that the SCU, with windowless cells, is like a dungeon and mentally ill persons should not be put there, even if not seriously mentally ill. Terminating the settlement will not benefit anyone other than the DOC. “If you take away the Mast case agreement youll fail many inmates, fail our communities, youll only make the D.O.C. happier. Please I beg you DONT DON’T do it. PLEASE.”
3. David Dimmett – “I urge the court that the IPAS is better, and dismissal of the Mast agreement is not only fair, reasonable, and adequate but necessary.”
4. Donald Douglass asks for more information on the cases and does not take a position on the termination of the Mast agreement.
5. Thomas Hale cites an article in the International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology that discusses the adverse psychological effects of solitary confinement on prisoners in super-max units. He has no specific comments concerning the termination of the Mast agreement.
6. Charles Justise is against the termination as it appears that prisoners had more protections under Mast than under IPAS. He asks for further information on the agreements.
7. Phillip Grimsley indicates that the New Castle Annex is not following the settlement agreement. He says that offenders are allowed recreation for only 75 minutes a day, if they are allowed out of their cells at all: “some weeks were locked down for two to three days out of the week.” Because offenders are not currently being protected, “now is not the time to withdrawl from the settlement agreement.”
8. Phillip Littler states that he is seriously mentally ill. He filed a Petition for Leave to Intervene in this case (Dkt. 147). He objects to continued representation of the class by Kenneth Falk on several grounds, including Mr. Falk’s collusion with the DOC, his clear financial motivation, and his lack of “standing to arbitrarily and unilaterally, practically hijack” the Mast case. Lawsuits filed by Mr. Falk make conditions in the DOC worse (including litigation concerning kosher
[4]

Case 2:05-cv-00037-JPH-DLP Document 152 Filed 06/10/19 Page 5 of 18 PageID #: 692
diets), in part because the DOC now skirts the requirements of the IPAS agreement by refusing to give people mental health classifications. The IPAS agreement itself ignores the needs of people with social anxiety who truly need to be confined in solitude. Mr. Littler describes himself as being such a person. The only way to attain such solitude is on a Restricted Housing Unit, which is more abusive than segregation. There is reason to believe—based on Mr. Littler’s interviews with prisoner who were on those units—that the mental health units are even more abusive than the regular segregation units. Before making any decision on the Mast settlement agreement, Mr. Littler says, the court should investigate the psychiatric unit at Wabash Valley and the Treatment Unit at New Castle. Given the horrors that prisoners suffered at Wabash Valley prior to Mast, “No actual member of this class wants to reopen the S.C.U. to house us arbitrarily and abusively for years on end. And the one year extension of the I.P.A.S agreement offered in exchange is absolutely meaningless to us.”
9. Joshua McDaniel offers no opinion on the settlement agreement but is extremely concerned about the suicidal offenders housed in his dorm, who must cope with harassment, difficult living conditions, and untrained staff. McDaniel explains: “These guy’s are paraded in here in front of all of us, people talk s**t and yell at them.” They are not permitted mattresses, nor any reading materials. They are provided with powdered juice, but no means to drink it. He believes “mentally ill people should be in a highly controled environment for sure, around highly educated and trained professionals.”
10. John Miller states that the DOC is breaking the private settlement agreement from Mast. If a seriously mentally ill prisoner is creating problems for staff, Miller states that “staff will have the mental health at Westville take there mental health code off of them so they can put them in for a transfer to Wabash Valley,” where they will be placed in long-term segregation. Miller also believes the DOC is violating the IPAS agreement, and rather than terminating the agreement, “more needs to be done about this because if not another lawsuit could be filed.”
11. Clinton Riley objects to the incarceration and warehousing of the mentally ill within the DOC. Based on the injustices of the SOMMs program, he opposes any new structure by which the DOC can oppress and control those over whom the DOC should not have custody in the first place.
[5]

Case 2:05-cv-00037-JPH-DLP Document 152 Filed 06/10/19 Page 6 of 18 PageID #: 693
12. Jerome Robertson has “been on Department-wide Administration Segregation” since April of last year. He is seriously mentally ill and is housed at the Westville Control Unit. He is not permitted 10 hours of weekly treatment. He objects to the fact that there are no windows on the Secured Confinement Unit and he believes that the proposed settlement will result in mentally ill prisoners being confined there, despite what the DOC has said. The proposed agreement in this case demonstrates that undersigned counsel is “in cahoots with the DOC to justify the inadequate mental health treatment” provided by the DOC.
13. J.L. Spivey submitted a letter to the court (Dkt. 148), as well as a letter to the ACLU. (This latter letter is attached). In the letter to the court, he states that he has been held in the SHU for more than 24 months as an act of retaliation for mailing letters that reveal the true character of the DOC. He opposes the dismissal of the agreement, which he believes would run counter to the “ultimate goal of being able to lower our almost 80 percent reoffence levels.” Segregation provokes mental illness. The use of segregation must be greatly reduced. Even though mental health professionals are constrained by the DOC in terms of what good they can do, the presence of mental health staff has greatly improved the prison environment. Until the DOC radically reduces or reconfigures the use of segregation, agreements like Mast v. Donahue are vital because they facilitate positive change. His letter to the ACLU is identical in large part.
14. Gregory A. Taylor submitted a declaration (Dkt. 150). He is in the Special Needs Unit (“SNU”) at Wabash Valley Correctional Facility and states that there “is no m/H Treatment going on here only playing cards and coloring.” Mentally ill offenders see a psychiatrist every 90 days for only three minutes. He has been told by a correctional officer “that once this case is dismissed, ‘The state will be Free to do whatever.’” He complains of contacting undersigned counsel but receiving no response. He also complains that the class notice was only posted for two weeks rather than 30 days.
15. Joel Valle does not comment on the settlement agreement, but he would like the Court to know that he suffers from serious seizures, which his medication does nothing to alleviate. While seizing, he often injures himself. He woke from a recent seizure covered in blood from an injury to his chin that required stitches. Staff not only fail to assist him, but also spray him with mace.
[6]

Case 2:05-cv-00037-JPH-DLP Document 152 Filed 06/10/19 Page 7 of 18 PageID #: 694
16. Quentin Phipps says he is seriously mentally ill and is in secure confinement for something that he had no control of. He has no comments on the settlement.
Prisoners who consented to disclosure of their letters to the Court and whose letters have been submitted under seal:
17. Prisoner A. He describes himself as seriously mentally ill and describes a suicide attempt and suicidal thoughts. He reports that the DOC is not properly treating his mental illness and people are kicked out of mental health programming without treatment. He notes that “if they follow the agreement then yes it will work but ‘who’ is enforcing the agreement.”
18. Prisoner B. He states that he is severely disabled, both mentally and physically. He has no comments on the proposed termination of the private settlement agreement, but discusses his medical situation and his underlying criminal case.
19. Prisoner C. This prisoner writes an extremely lengthy letter. He is against the agreement being terminated. He believes that if the agreement is terminated prisoners with mental illness will be placed inside the SCU at Wabash Valley and this will injure them. He is concerned that the DOC will label these prisoners as not seriously mentally ill, but suffering from behavioral problems. He is concerned that if the Mast agreement is terminated he will be transferred to the SCU and be punished for having mental health issues. If he is transferred to the SCU “I have no doubt that I will end my life as a result.” He thinks the definition of “seriously mentally ill” in the Mast case should be applied to the IPAS agreement.
20. Prisoner D. He opposes termination of the agreement. He is particularly concerned because he believes the DOC is already circumventing the IPAS agreement by simply discontinuing meds and changing the mental health code for any offender the DOC wishes to place in segregation. He himself is now being refused medication, despite his history of anxiety, depression, self- harming, attempted suicide, and hearing voices. He believes that this is so he can be placed in segregation. “To dismiss the agreement in Mast v. Donahue,” he says, “will be a step in the wrong direction. I am currently attempting to prevent offenders from being housed on segregation for years under extremely harsh conditions which serve no penological interest other than to torture and torment us. Knowing that
[7]

Case 2:05-cv-00037-JPH-DLP Document 152 Filed 06/10/19 Page 8 of 18 PageID #: 695
segregation drives offenders mad it has to be limited.” “PLEASE DO NOT DISMISS MAST v. DONAHUE.”
21. Prisoner E. He notes concerns about the placement of mentally ill persons in segregation and believes that removing the Mast definition of seriously mentally ill “may be arbitrarily used to lower the level of the IDOC’s commitment to the settlement.” He is concerned that he was deemed to be seriously mentally ill in the past, was released, and came back to the DOC six months later on a suspected parole violation and was reclassified and told that he was no longer seriously mentally ill. He complains of conditions in the segregation unit at Indiana State Prison.
22. Prisoner F. He complains that he is seriously mentally ill but is confined to the Westville Control Unit, in administrative segregation He has no specific comments concerning the termination of the Mast agreement but believes that he should be in a mental health unit or a “open housed facility.”
23. Prisoner G. He believes that isolation of prisoners is a problem. He speaks highly of the IRT program at Pendleton. He has no specific comments concerning the termination of the Mast agreement.
24. Prison H. He is 100% against the termination. He reports that he is a mentally ill prisoner who is awaiting transfer to the Westville Control Unit. Mentally ill prisoners should only be housed in a unit with windows as this helps to dissipate depression and suicidal feelings. “So please do not dismiss the agreement.”
25. Prisoner I does not reference the settlement agreement in Mast. He says he is a serious mentally ill person and asks the court to preserve the rule limiting the number of days that seriously mentally ill patients can be held in segregation. He has benefited from the rule that limits this period to 30 days.
26. Prisoner J disagrees with the idea of “dropping this lawsuit.” He was sent to the mental health unit at New Castle Correctional Facility. After attempting suicide there many times and “because of issue there” he was sent to the Westville Control Unit. He was stripped of his mental health codes and sent to Pendleton – a fate he says has befallen numerous offenders. He is concerned that terminating the agreement will result in the DOC “keep[ing] us on lock up for years.”
[8]

Case 2:05-cv-00037-JPH-DLP Document 152 Filed 06/10/19 Page 9 of 18 PageID #: 696
27. Prisoner K has authorized the disclosure of his information. However, he is a juvenile who is incarcerated in one of the DOC’s juvenile facilities and therefore his name should not be publicly disclosed. He believes that segregating mentally ill prisoners is unfair and likely to cause them more damage. He states that “the Mast case should be dropped and dismissed.”
28. Prisoner L opposes terminating the agreement in Mast. He is mentally ill and is not receiving adequate treatment, and he is only ever told that the prison cannot do any better because they are understaffed. “The bottom line,” he says, is that the mental healthcare provided by the DOC “is very poor, so anything that’s for bettering and helping mental health patients needs to stay in place.”
Prisoners who did not consent to disclosure of their letters to the Court and whose comments are summarized:
29. Prisoner #1. This individual agrees that Mast can be terminated, “but only if the IPAS is continued definitely and permanently, not just one year.”
30. Prisoner #2. This offender makes no comment on the settlement but describes his own situation in some detail. His diagnoses include depression, schizophrenia, hallucinations, seizures, and a history of self-harm going back to childhood. He is also indigent. He objects to being housed with the general population, which intensifies his paranoia and predisposes him toward violence. He also objects to being located deep in the range, where guards cannot see and do not check. When he has seizures, they neither see him nor come to assist him, even when other offenders call out for help. He cannot report suicidal ideation out of fear of being placed in a strip cell. Other offenders prey on his loneliness and his mental illness, talking him out of his small monthly allotment of commissary items by promising to be his friend.
31. Prisoner #3. This individual expresses no opinion about the settlement, instead explaining what needs to be provided to help mentally ill people in the DOC, including counseling, air conditioning, proper staffing levels, proper medication, and either a television or windows. He has been through the IRT program.
32. Prisoner #4. This person identifies himself as a “C code mental patient” and states that he is heavily medicated. He does not comment on the Mast settlement but does note that he is currently in segregation after receiving 90 days for a write
[9]

Case 2:05-cv-00037-JPH-DLP Document 152 Filed 06/10/19 Page 10 of 18 PageID #: 697
up. “Please! get me out of segergation!” He feels he is in danger. He requests help in his criminal case.
33. Prisoner #5. This individual has lost the paperwork identifying him as mentally ill. He is presently in protective custody but seeks help to be properly classified and transferred. He offers no opinion on the fate of the settlement agreement.
34. Prisoner #6. This individual has been in segregation since February 28. He has not had his final hearing before the disciplinary hearing board. He has no comment on the settlement agreement.
35. Prisoner #7. This individual states that he has been diagnosed with an Axis I psychosis and an Axis II behavioral disorder. After being physically attacked, he was placed in protective custody, and he believes that the conditions for mentally ill prisoners in protective custody must be taken into account before terminating the agreement in Mast. At present, to gain protection, offenders must sacrifice treatment, and vice versa. He himself attempted suicide because he cannot get the treatment he needs in protective custody. The mentally ill prisoners in protective custody also reside in windowless cells where they can be seen – and ridiculed – by offenders in the general population, and they have no access to programs. “These agreements are important,” he says, “and we still need your concerns and the protection of the court.”
36. Prisoner #8. This individual makes no comment on the settlement agreement in Mast. He has a lengthy history of mental health problems preceding his formal diagnosis of schizophrenia in 2016. He is currently in disciplinary segregation for a period of six months because he fled from a correctional officer while overcome by paranoia. He contends that, according to the “Agreed Entry,” this violates his due process rights.
37. Prisoner #9. This individual is a graduate of the PLUS program who has served as a suicide watch companion in a mental health unit. In this capacity, he has observed delays in food, water, and other basic needs due to understaffing of the prison at large. Staff also provoke the people on suicide watch, mock them, and if they mouth off, may even beat them up. By way of commenting on the settlement agreement, he simply says, “I want you, to be aware of these things.”
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38. Prisoner #10. This individual states that he is blessed to be free from mental illness himself, but that after 20 years in the DOC’s custody, he has observed how the mentally ill are treated in virtually every facility in the state. “I believe any and every agreement with the DOC and these private prisons should require independent oversight,” he says. He asks that oversight be incorporated into any and all agreements as the DOC is not able to police itself.
39. Prisoner #11. This individual, who is incarcerated in a DOC facility, offers no specific opinion on the Mast settlement agreement but submits a paper written last year for a class. The paper, in turn, underscores the plight of mentally ill prisoners who are Black and LGBTQ, because they face racism, homophobia, and the stigma of mental illness, and they tend to fare the worst in the prison system.
40. Prisoner #12. This individual is held in a facility with a Secure Housing Unit, which this individual believes is like the one in the Mast agreement. Although mentally ill prisoners live in their own unit, they move freely within the general population as well, a situation that poses a danger to everyone. When a mentally ill person is upset, elderly inmates face particular danger, but anyone whom the mentally ill offender dislikes may also become a target. Allowing this situation to continue requires guards to be present 24/7.
41. Prisoner #13. This individual is a graduate of the PLUS program who has acquired more than 10 years of experience as a suicide companion, during which time, he witnessed firsthand the suffering of those placed in strip cells. “Medication,” he says, “is not the solution,” but the solution lies in an opportunity for talk therapy, meaningful treatment, recreation, education, and rehabilitation.
42. Prisoner #14. This individual objects to “segregation Housing for people with mental Health problem. That is like putting an animal in a cage that gets out for 1 hr.” He recounts his own history of being segregated and sometimes “forgotten about” while in a county jail.
43. Prisoner #15. This person has a mild intellectual disability, bipolar disorder, and intermittent explosive disorder. He is in a mental health unit and states that he has “been lock down for 1 year straight.” He makes no comment about the Mast agreement, only a request for help.
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44.. Prisoner #16. This individual seeks a more basic explanation of the issues presented in the ACLU’s memo to prisoners. “From what I gather,” he states, “they want to put the mentally ill in general population.” He disagrees with this idea and points out several problems likely to occur if this plan is implemented. He proposes his own idea, which is to train prisoners on their rights and on the proper use of the grievance process, so that offenders know when staff cross a line and what to do about it. He advocates for this as a non-violent approach to problem solving.
45. Prisoner #17. This individual spent five years in segregation, during which time, “I too as a sufferer of ‘serious mental illness’ found my symptoms greatly exacerbated by the thousands of hours and countless months in isolation.” During this time, his family told him that letters home were becoming upsetting to read. He would like to become involved in a class action lawsuit regarding his time in solitary and the permanent damage it did to him. He makes no comment on the settlement agreement in Mast.
46. Prisoner #18. This individual has seemingly understood the memo to prisoners to indicate that mentally ill prisoners will receive damages from the Mast v. Donahue suit. He declines his share of the damages on the grounds that “I will collect Disability” and receive food stamps upon his release from prison. In a postscript, he adds, “[i]ts realy Hard To tell the difference in being locked down for 21 hours a day at Walbash or more 23 Hours . . . in a controlled lockdown in a confined space.”
47. Prisoner #19. This individual was a member of the original class in Mast v. Donahue. He feels used, as though his opinion on the fate of the settlement agreement does not actually matter. He is upset that he has asked for help from the ACLU since Mast and has been turned down. He is upset that people released after Mast had good time restored to them for write-ups that occurred on the unit, while he was never offered that chance. Meanwhile, he is still not receiving appropriate mental health care, and no one is holding staff accountable. The media sensationalizes violence against an inmate when it is committed by another inmate but ignores violence against inmates when the DOC is to blame.
He adds that requesting a dismissal of the settlement is a tactic to go back to doing what was done before. He thinks a judgment should issue in the Mast case, not a
[12]

Case 2:05-cv-00037-JPH-DLP Document 152 Filed 06/10/19 Page 13 of 18 PageID #: 700
settlement agreement as the DOC is not complying. No prisoner with a mental health code or taking mental health medications should be sent to or allowed in the SHU. If this is not done, the DOC will find a way to send prisoners with mental health codes to the SHU.
48. Prisoner #20. The individual requests copies of the private settlement agreements in both the IPAS and Mast cases. 49. Prisoner #21. This prisoner states that the IPAS agreement changed his life, transforming him from a felon into a person who is now hoping to start college. He supports ending the settlement agreement in Mast “[a]s long as it betters a position for all psych in Indiana prisons.” 11. As can be seen, opposition to the proposed dismissal of the Mast private settlement agreement focuses on two points: 1) if the agreement is dismissed, seriously mentally ill prisoners will again be sent to the Secure Confinement Unit (formerly the SHU) at Wabash Valley Correctional Facility and 2) secure confinement/segregation is inappropriate for all prisoners, regardless of their mental health, and the unit at Wabash Valley Correctional Facility, which does not have windows, is particularly problematic. 12. Counsel does not disagree with the second point noted above concerning the fact that long-term segregation of any prisoner, even one without a preexisting mental health diagnosis, is debilitating to the prisoner’s mental health. However, the Mast decree did not concern the segregation of non-mentally ill prisoners. Therefore, undersigned counsel does not believe that general objections to segregation are relevant in this case. 13. As to the first point, it is certainly true that the definitions of “seriously mentally ill” in the Mast and IPAS stipulations are different.
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Mast definition:
10. The parties agree that for the purposes of this agreement, the term “seriously mentally ill” is defined as:
-prisoners who have a current diagnosis, or evidence, of any Diagnostic and Statistical Manual IV (DSM-IV) Axis I diagnosis or who are receiving treatment for such a diagnosis, or,
-prisoners who have been diagnosed with a mental disorder that is worsened by confinement in the SHU.
(Mast, Dkt. 75-1).
IPAS definition
18. The parties have agreed on the following definition of seriously mentally ill prisoners, which includes and expands upon the group of offenders covered by the Court’s definition:
a. Prisoners determined to have a current diagnosis or recent significant history of schizophrenia, delusional disorder, schizophreniform disorder, schizoaffective disorder, brief psychotic disorder, substance-induced psychotic disorder (excluding intoxication and withdrawal), undifferentiated psychotic disorder, bipolar I or II disorders;
b. Prisoners diagnosed with any other validated mental illness that is clinically severe, based on evidence-based standards, and that results in significant functional impairment; and
c. Prisoners diagnosed with an intellectual or developmental disability or other cognitive disorder that results in a significant functional impairment.
d. As used above:
(i) “Recent significant history” refers to a diagnosis made at any time in the last 12 months.
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(ii) “Significant functional impairment” includes one of the following as determined by qualified mental health staff:
 Within the previous 6 months, the prisoner has either made a suicide attempt that mental health staff considers serious, inflicted self-injury that mental health staff considers serious, or both;
 The prisoner has demonstrated difficulty in his/her ability to engage in activities of daily living including:
o Eating o Grooming and/or personal hygiene o Maintenance of housing area o Participation in recreation o Ambulation
 The prisoner has demonstrated a pervasive pattern of dysfunctional or disruptive social interactions, bizarre or disruptive behavior, etc., as a result of mental illness.
(iii) A misdiagnosis does not qualify as a diagnosis or determination of mental illness for purposes of this settlement, once the error has been determined by a qualified mental health professional.
(IPAS, Dkt. 496).
14. The Mast definition refers to “any Diagnostic and Statistical Manual IV (DSM-IV)
Axis I diagnosis.” This document can be viewed at https://1.cdn.edl.io/XRT6WhAdm7L7
xioV6lr2dVK1GoWWCeq614ySeGavmjPY2rV5.pdf (last visited June 10, 2019). Relevant
excerpts are attached to this document as Exhibit 27. It is true that the IPAS definition
does not include every Axis I DMS-IV diagnosis. However, in formulating the definition
used in the IPAS case, it was felt by the experts that plaintiffs’ counsel employed that the
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definition was sufficiently broad to include the class of seriously mentally ill persons who should not be in restrictive housing/segregation. 15. The IPAS agreement generally prohibits housing seriously mentally ill prisoners in restrictive housing for more than thirty days. There are two exceptions to this. One is if the prisoner desires to stay in restrictive housing and the DOC determines that the harm from staying in restricted housing does not outweigh the harm from moving to a placement where the prisoner can receive appropriate mental health treatment. (Mast Dkt. 496 ¶33). The second is if the DOC determines that there are exceptional circumstances such that “removing a seriously mentally ill prisoner from segregation/restrictive housing would pose an unacceptable risk to the safety and security of one or more prisoners and/or the staff. (Id. ¶32). In March there were only 14 such prisoners in the entire DOC. 16. Subject to the exceptions noted in the IPAS agreement for prisoners who are too dangerous to remove from restrictive housing or those who wish to stay in such housing, no one who is deemed to be seriously mentally ill under the IPAS definition will be able to be placed in the SCU if the Mast agreement is dismissed. Further, the DOC has agreed that dismissing the Mast agreement will not result in prisoners being placed into the SCU who are not already in restrictive housing in the DOC. (Dkt. 138 ¶ 17). The only question, therefore, is whether there are prisoners who are currently in restrictive housing units other than the SCU, or who may be eligible for such placement in the future, who will, if
[16]

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the Mast agreement is dismissed, now be allowed to go to the SCU even though they would not have been under the Mast agreement. Counsel is uncertain as to whether there are any such prisoners, other than the small number of prisoners who are excepted from the IPAS agreement as noted above. However, as also noted above, plaintiffs’ experts in IPAS were satisfied with the definition of seriously mentally ill in that case. Counsel receives frequent correspondence from prisoners and will continue to monitor whether prisoners are improperly placed in restrictive housing, including the SCU. 17. Counsel certainly understands and appreciates the concerns expressed that prisoners will be rediagnosed as not being seriously mentally ill so they can be placed into restricted housing. This was a concern in the IPAS case and the private agreement there requires undersigned counsel to be notified within 30 days after: 1) a prisoner who was reclassified from seriously mentally ill to not seriously mentally ill is placed in restrictive/segregated housing within 6 months of the reclassification, or 2) a prisoner who is in restrictive/segregated housing is reclassified from seriously mentally ill to not seriously mentally ill and is retained in restrictive segregated housing. (IPAS Dkt. 496 ¶ 39). The IPAS agreement allows undersigned counsel to review the medical records of these persons. (Id. ¶ 40). This concern can be monitored, provided the IPAS agreement remains in effect.
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18. Undersigned counsel believes that there is a real benefit to continuing the private settlement agreement in the IPAS case and it is necessary to allow for the dismissal of the Mast agreement to continue the IPAS agreement. 19. Undersigned counsel therefore continues to believe that the proposed dismissal of the private settlement agreement in this case is a fair, reasonable, and adequate resolution of this matter. 20. At the fairness hearing in this case undersigned counsel will address why he believes that the requirements of Rule 23(e)(2) are met in this case.
WHEREFORE, class counsel files his report to this Court.
Kenneth J. Falk No. 6777-49 ACLU of Indiana 1031 E. Washington St. Indianapolis, IN 46202 317/635-4059 fax: 317/635-4105 kfalk@aclu-in.org Attorney for Plaintiffs and the Certified Class
[18]

 
 Case 2:05-cv-00037-JPH-DLP Document 163 Filed 07/23/19 Page 1 of 12 PageID #: 833

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

BRIAN MAST,

)

MICHAEL WOODS,

)

EUGENE WELLS on their own behalf and )

on behalf of a class of those similarly

)

situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

J. DAVID DONAHUE in his official

)

capacity as Commissioner of the Indiana )

Department of Correction,

)

CRAIG HANKS in his official capacity as )

Superintendent of the Wabash Valley

)

Correctional Facility,

)

)

Defendants.

)

No. 2:05-cv-00037-JPH-DLP

ORDER

On March 18, 2019, the parties filed a Stipulation to Terminate the

Private Settlement Agreement Following Notice to the Class and Approval by

the Court (“the Stipulated Agreement”). On June 20, 2019, the Court

conducted a fairness hearing, as required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

23(e). For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that the Stipulated

Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate, and approves the termination of

the Private Settlement Agreement. Dkt. [138].

I. Facts and Background

Plaintiffs are a class of prisoners who were housed in the Secured

Housing Unit (“SHU”) at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility (“Wabash

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Valley”). Their complaint sought to “[e]njoin defendants from housing mentally ill prisoners in the SHU under the conditions described in this Complaint.” Dkt. 1 at 14.
A. The Mast Agreement On January 30, 2007, the parties filed their Private Settlement Agreement (“Mast Agreement”), dkt. 75-1, which the Court found to be fair, reasonable, and adequate under Rule 23, dkt. 104. The Mast Agreement prohibits, among other things, seriously mentally ill prisoners from being housed in the SHU (now called the Secured Confinement Unit “SCU”) at Wabash Valley. See dkt. 75-1 at 2–3 (¶¶ 7–9, 11). The Mast Agreement defines “seriously mentally ill” as: (1) prisoners who have a current diagnosis, or evidence, of any Diagnostic and Statistical Manual IV (DSM-IV) Axis I diagnosis or who are receiving treatment for such a diagnosis; or (2) prisoners who have been diagnosed with a mental disorder that is worsened by confinement in the SCU. Id. at ¶ 10. On December 31, 2009, the case was dismissed without prejudice, subject to reinstatement by Plaintiffs or class members pursuant to the Mast Agreement. Dkt. 133. Since being dismissed, the Mast Agreement has remained in full force and effect. B. The IPAS Agreement In 2008, the Indiana Protection and Advocacy Services Commission sued the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”) alleging that the continued confinement of mentally ill prisoners in segregation and segregation-like
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settings without appropriate mental health care and treatment violated prisoners’ constitutional rights. Ind. Prot. and Advocacy Servs. Comm’n, et al. v. Comm’r, Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 1:08-cv-1317 (S.D. Ind.) (hereinafter “IPAS”). Following a bench trial, the Court concluded that the “Plaintiffs have prevailed as to their Eighth Amendment Claim.” IPAS, dkt. 279 at 36.
The Court did not enter final judgment. Rather, in 2016, the parties in IPAS entered into a private settlement agreement (the “IPAS Agreement”), id., dkt. 496, which the Court found to be fair, reasonable, and adequate, id., dkt. 508.
The definition of “seriously mentally ill” in the IPAS Agreement is different from the definition used in the Mast Agreement as it does not include every Axis I DMS-IV diagnosis. Id., dkt. 496.
The IPAS Agreement prohibits housing seriously mentally ill prisoners from being housed in segregation/restrictive housing (including protective custody) if they are known to be seriously mentally ill for more than thirty days. Id., (¶¶ 29–30). Additionally, the IPAS Agreement requires the DOC to remove prisoners from segregation/restrictive housing (including protective custody) if they are found to be or become seriously mentally ill subsequent to such housing. Id. There are two exceptions to this for prisoners who: (1) are deemed too dangerous to move out of the segregation units, or (2) desire to stay in the segregation units. Id. (¶¶ 32–33). The plaintiffs can reinstate the case if they believe that the DOC is not complying with terms in the IPAS Agreement. Id.
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The IPAS Agreement was scheduled to expire on March 25, 2019. Id. On March 18, 2019, the parties stipulated to extend the IPAS Agreement to the later of: a) one year from the date of the Mast Agreement’s termination; or b) the date this Court prevents the Mast Agreement from terminating. IPAS, dkt. 649.
C. Class Notice On March 18, 2019, the parties filed the Stipulated Agreement. Dkt. 138. On March 20, 2019, the Court approved the parties’ proposed class notice. Dkt. 146. After the Court approved the proposed class notice, notice to the class was given as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e). Dkt. 152. The class originally certified does not appear to have any members because all seriously mentally ill prisoners have been removed from the SCU at Wabash Valley. The class notice therefore went to numerous prisoners who are not class members. On June 10, 2019, Class Counsel filed his report concerning comments and objections received about the proposed termination of the Mast Agreement1. Dkt. 152. D. Fairness Hearing On June 20, 2019, the Court held a fairness hearing to determine whether termination of the Mast Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. Dkt. 160. During the hearing, counsel described the steps that were taken to give notice to the class, including broadcasting the notice through the DOC’s
1 Following the hearing, the Court received and reviewed two additional submissions. Dkt. 161; dkt. 162.
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in-house television system to all offenders, posting notice in segregation units for at least thirty days, and handing copies of the notice to individuals currently in adult segregation units. The Court found that notice was given consistent with its prior Order, dkt. 142, and consistent with the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(1). Dkt. 160.
II. Legal Standard The termination of a settlement agreement in a class action must be approved by the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). “Before such a settlement may be approved, the district court must determine that a class action settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable, and not a product of collusion.” Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279 (7th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted); see also Synfuel Techs., Inc. v. DHL Express (USA), Inc., 463 F.3d 646, 652 (7th Cir. 2006). Courts must “exercise the highest degree of vigilance in scrutinizing proposed settlements of class actions,” a task that is “akin to the high duty of care that the law requires of fiduciaries.” Synfuel Techs., Inc., 463 F.3d at 652–53 (quoting Reynolds, 288 F.3d at 280).
III. Analysis To determine whether a stipulation to terminate a class settlement agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate, the Court must consider the factors set forth in Synfuel and in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Synfuel provides that the Court must consider:
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the strength of plaintiffs’ case compared to the amount of defendants’ settlement offer, an assessment of the likely complexity, length and expense of the litigation, an evaluation of the amount of opposition to settlement among affected parties, the opinion of competent counsel, and the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed at the time of settlement.
463 F.3d at 654. Rule 23 provides that the Court shall consider the following
factors:
(A) the class representatives and class counsel have adequately represented the class; (B) the proposal was negotiated at arm’s length; (C) the relief provided for the class is adequate, taking into account:
(i) the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal; (ii) the effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing relief to the class, including the method of processing classmember claims; (iii) the terms of any proposed award of attorney’s fees, including timing of payment; and (iv) any agreement required to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3); and (D) the proposal treats class members equitably relative to each other.
As discussed at the Fairness Hearing, not all of the Synfuel and Rule 23
factors are applicable because of the unique nature of this case. But those
that are applicable demonstrate that the parties’ Settlement Agreement is fair,
reasonable and adequate and thus weigh strongly in favor of approving it.
First, class counsel, Kenneth Falk of the ACLU of Indiana, is competent
and has adequately represented the class. Mr. Falk has represented the
classes in both Mast and IPAS since their inception and thus has command of
the facts and issues presented in both cases. He has demonstrated a deep
understanding of the concerns regarding termination of the Mast Agreement
expressed by individuals who submitted comments. See dkt. 152. Mr. Falk 6

Case 2:05-cv-00037-JPH-DLP Document 163 Filed 07/23/19 Page 7 of 12 PageID #: 839
has demonstrated a similarly thorough understanding of the benefits that inure to the classes under the IPAS Agreement and the Mast Agreement as well as the relative benefits of allowing the Mast Agreement to continue versus the immediate lapse of the IPAS Agreement. Second, Mr. Falk is not receiving any fees for his work on the dismissal of the Mast Agreement. Third, the negotiations between the parties were made in good faith and conducted at arm’s length.
The most important factor though is whether the relief provided for the class is adequate. In other words, does the class benefit if the Mast Agreement (which would otherwise continue indefinitely) is terminated in exchange for a one-year extension of the IPAS Agreement? The Court finds it does because termination of the Mast Agreement in exchange for a one-year extension of the IPAS Agreement is more beneficial to the intended class members than allowing the IPAS Agreement to immediately lapse so the Mast Agreement can continue indefinitely.
While there has been some opposition from prisoners to the proposal to terminate the Mast Agreement, the relative benefits of the parties’ agreement must be assessed in light of the reality that the class originally certified does not appear to currently have any members as all seriously mentally ill prisoners have been removed from the SCU at Wabash Valley. The Court thus considers the benefits that approving the parties’ agreement may bring to the broader class of intended beneficiaries of the Mast Agreement, that is, seriously
7

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mentally ill prisoners who may suffer harm as a result of being placed in any segregated housing for an extended period of time. Dkt. 1 at 4–9 (¶¶ 22–57).
The IPAS Agreement is broader in scope than the Mast Agreement because, unlike the Mast Agreement which is limited to the Wabash Valley, it applies to all DOC facilities. The IPAS Agreement thus prevents all seriously mentally ill prisoners in the DOC’s custody from being housed for extended periods of time in segregated/restrictive housing, subject to the limited exceptions based on dangerousness and voluntariness described elsewhere in this Order.
In addition to being broader in scope and benefitting more prisoners, the IPAS Agreement gives Mr. Falk the ability to monitor the DOC’s handling of seriously mentally ill prisoners. IPAS, dkt. 496 (¶ 61). Under the IPAS Agreement, Mr. Falk is notified of each seriously mentally ill prisoner that has a change in diagnosis or is reclassified and then moved into segregation within a six-month period. Id. (¶¶ 39–40). Mr. Falk would not have access to this information if the IPAS Agreement were immediately terminated as the Mast Agreement does not contain a comparable information-sharing/monitoring provision.
Many current and future DOC prisoners will benefit from the broader scope and monitoring provision of the IPAS Agreement so long as the IPAS Agreement is operative. In contrast, the continued operation of the Mast Agreement will most likely not benefit any current or future DOC prisoner. Similarly, termination of the Mast Agreement will most likely not cause harm to
8

Case 2:05-cv-00037-JPH-DLP Document 163 Filed 07/23/19 Page 9 of 12 PageID #: 841
those who this lawsuit was intended to benefit or result in seriously mentally ill prisoners being sent to the SCU at Wabash Valley. Moreover, the IPAS Agreement’s definition of “seriously mentally ill prisoners” is broad enough to include any mentally ill prisoners’ whose health is at risk in segregation.
Although the Mast Agreement does not include the same exceptions as the IPAS Agreement, the IPAS Agreement still requires “dangerous” segregated seriously mentally ill prisoners to be monitored by mental health professionals. IPAS, dkt. 496 (¶¶ 32–36). At the fairness hearing, Mr. Falk indicated that there are currently fifteen seriously mentally ill prisoners that the DOC has determined to be too dangerous to move out of segregation.2 Under the IPAS Agreement, Mr. Falk receives periodic reports on those prisoners. Id. (¶ 32).
The Court also considers that the objectives of the Mast litigation have been achieved through the combination of the Mast and IPAS cases. As noted above, it appears there are no current members of the class defined in this case. More broadly, the DOC has ended the practice of housing seriously mentally ill prisoners in restricted units for more than thirty days, except where the prisoners choose to stay in those units or are deemed too dangerous to be moved from the units. This applies throughout the DOC, not just at Wabash Valley.
2 Measures reasonably taken to protect inmates and staff from dangerous mentally ill prisoners may unavoidably aggravate their psychoses; in such a situation, the measures would not violate the Constitution. Scarver v. Litscher, 434 F.3d 972, 976 (7th Cir. 2006).
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Overall, the systemic resolution set in motion by the Mast litigation and Mast Agreement has been continued and enhanced by the IPAS Agreement. The IPAS Agreement requires seriously mentally ill prisoners to receive “minimum adequate treatment” while housed in DOC facilities. IPAS, dkt. 496 at 15–16 (¶ 47). This treatment includes individualized treatment plans that are subject to review every ninety days; at least ten hours of therapeutic programming each week; and recreation and showers consistent with DOC policy. Id. In addition, prisoners may be provided with additional out-of-cell time. Id.
The IPAS Agreement requires the development of new placements for seriously mentally ill prisoners formerly in segregated confinement. The treatment unit at Pendleton Correctional Facility (“Pendleton”) was started because of the IPAS litigation and has been an integral part of the IPAS Agreement. Although part of the unit at Pendleton Correctional Facility was destroyed in 2018, continuing the IPAS Agreement will allow Plaintiffs’ counsel to monitor the redevelopment programming and services.
The IPAS Agreement also guarantees that prisoners housed in DOC facilities receive credit for their time in the mental health units. IPAS, dkt. 496 at 18–19 (¶ 49). Each day in the mental health unit is treated as one less day of disciplinary confinement. Id. Similarly, under the IPAS Agreement, the DOC considers a prisoner’s mental health before disciplining the behavior. Id. at 20 (¶ 53).
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Last is the question of what happens to seriously mentally ill prisoners when the IPAS Agreement expires. While there will no longer be an agreement in place that is subject to monitoring and enforcement by the Court, the DOC has expressed commitment to maintaining the systemic changes already implemented that effect how it houses and treats seriously mentally ill prisoners. While only time will tell if that is the case, the Court has no reason to doubt these representations made by the DOC. Moreover, the Court’s written order following the IPAS trial identifies the circumstances that were found to violate the Eighth Amendment in the context of housing and treating mentally ill prisoners. IPAS, dkt. 279. That order thus provides clear guidance to the DOC and could be invoked as precedent, if necessary, should similar circumstances reemerge within the DOC.
IV. Conclusion Extending the operation of the IPAS Agreement will bring immediate, concrete benefits to many current and future DOC prisoners with serious mental illness. In contrast, the continued existence of the Mast Agreement would likely bring very little benefit to very few, if any, DOC prisoners. The agreement to terminate the Mast Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. The parties’ Stipulated Agreement is acknowledged and allowed to take effect. A separate order closing the case shall now issue. SO ORDERED. Date: 7/23/2019
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Distribution: Elizabeth Alexander NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT OF THE ACLU ealexander@npp-aclu.org David A. Arthur INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL David.Arthur@atg.in.gov Richard M. Bramer INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL Richard.Bramer@atg.in.gov Kenneth J. Falk ACLU OF INDIANA kfalk@aclu-in.org David C. Fathi NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT OF THE ACLU dfathi@npp-aclu.org Todd A. Weaver TAFT STETTINIUS & HOLLISTER LLP (Indianapolis) todd.weaver@dgslaw.com
12

 
 Case 2:05-cv-00037-JPH-DLP Document 138 Filed 03/18/19 Page 1 of 8 PageID #: 600

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

BRIAN MAST, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

COMMISSIONER, INDIANA

)

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, )

et al.,1

)

)

Defendants.

)

No. 2:05-cv-00037 LJM/WGH

Stipulation to Terminate Private Settlement Agreement Following Notice to the Class and Approval by the Court / Joint Motion to Approve Manner of Notice

Come now the parties, by their counsel, and say that:

Introduction

1. For the reasons set out below, undersigned counsel believe that the private

settlement agreement in this case (Dkt. 75-1) should now be terminated.

2. However, inasmuch as this case is a certified class action, with the class defined as

“all prisoners currently, and in the future confined within the Secured Housing Unit at

the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility who are mentally ill,” the parties agree that,

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), notice must be given to the class

1

At the time of the private settlement agreement in this case the lead defendant was J.

David Donahue in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Indiana Department of Correction.

Mr. Donahue is no longer the Commissioner and, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

17(d), the office is designated.

[1]

Case 2:05-cv-00037-JPH-DLP Document 138 Filed 03/18/19 Page 2 of 8 PageID #: 601

concerning this Stipulation and the Court must find that the termination of the private

settlement agreement is a fair, reasonable, and adequate resolution of this case.

Justification for the vacating and dismissal of the private settlement agreement

3. In the private settlement agreement the parties agreed that prisoners would not be

placed in the Secured Housing Unit (“SHU), which is now called the Secure Confinement

Unit (“SCU”), at Wabash Valley Correctional Facility if they were seriously mentally ill.

Paragraph 10 of the private settlement agreement defines “seriously mentally ill” as:

-prisoners who have a current diagnosis, or evidence, of any Diagnostic and Statistical Manual IV (DSM-IV) Axis 1 diagnosis or who are receiving treatment for such a diagnosis, or,

-prisoners who have been diagnosed with a mental disorder that is worsened by confinement in the SHU

4.

In 2008, new litigation was filed alleging that the Indiana Department of

Correction (“DOC”) was violating the constitutional rights of seriously mentally ill

prisoners throughout the DOC by placing them in segregation or segregation-like settings.

Indiana Protection and Advocacy Services Commission, et al. v. Commissioner, Indiana

Department of Correction, No. 1:08-cv-01317-TWP-MJD (S.D. Ind.) (“IPAS case”).

(Segregated housing is now referred to as “restrictive status housing” by the DOC).

Kenneth J. Falk is class counsel in both cases and David A. Arthur represents the

defendants in both cases.

5.

A class was certified in that case defined as:

[2]

Case 2:05-cv-00037-JPH-DLP Document 138 Filed 03/18/19 Page 3 of 8 PageID #: 602
all current and future mentally ill prisoners who are committed to the Indiana Department of Correction and who are housed in settings in Department of Correction Institutions or in the New Castle Correctional Facility that feature extended periods of time in cells, including, but not limited to, prisoners in disciplinary segregation, administrative segregation, or in the New Castle Psychiatric Unit 6. On December 31, 2012, the Court in the IPAS case issued its Entry Following Bench Trial concluding that the plaintiffs had demonstrated that the DOC was violating the Eighth Amendment rights of the class members by placing them in segregation or segregation-like settings. The Court did not enter final judgment. 7. Instead, on January 27, 2016, the parties filed a Stipulation to Enter Into Private Settlement Agreement Following Notice to the Class. That notice was given and on March 24, 2016, the Court found that the private settlement agreement was fair, reasonable, and adequate. 8. The private settlement agreement generally prohibits the placement of seriously mentally ill persons in segregation or segregation-like settings for more than 30 days and imposes requirements for the treatment of seriously mentally ill prisoners. 9. The private settlement agreement in the IPAS case defines seriously mentally ill prisoners as follows: a. Prisoners determined to have a current diagnosis or recent significant history of schizophrenia, delusional disorder, schizophreniform disorder, schizoaffective disorder, brief psychotic disorder, substance-induced psychotic disorder (excluding intoxication and withdrawal), undifferentiated psychotic disorder, bipolar I or II disorders;
[3]

Case 2:05-cv-00037-JPH-DLP Document 138 Filed 03/18/19 Page 4 of 8 PageID #: 603
b. Prisoners diagnosed with any other validated mental illness that is clinically severe, based on evidence-based standards, and that results in significant functional impairment; and
c. Prisoners diagnosed with an intellectual or developmental disability or other cognitive disorder that results in a significant functional impairment.
d. As used above:
(i) “Recent significant history” refers to a diagnosis made at any time in the last 12 months.
(ii) “Significant functional impairment” includes one of the following as determined by qualified mental health staff:
 Within the previous 6 months, the prisoner has either made a suicide attempt that mental health staff considers serious, inflicted self-injury that mental health staff considers serious, or both;
 The prisoner has demonstrated difficulty in his/her ability to engage in activities of daily living including:
o Eating o Grooming and/or personal hygiene o Maintenance of housing area o Participation in recreation o Ambulation
 The prisoner has demonstrated a pervasive pattern of dysfunctional or disruptive social interactions, bizarre or disruptive behavior, etc., as a result of mental illness.
(iii) A misdiagnosis does not qualify as a diagnosis or determination of mental illness for purposes of this settlement, once the error has been determined by a qualified mental health professional.
10. The DOC believes that the definition of seriously mentally ill prisoners in the IPAS
case is slightly narrower than that in this case. Consequently, there are prisoners today
[4]

Case 2:05-cv-00037-JPH-DLP Document 138 Filed 03/18/19 Page 5 of 8 PageID #: 604
who are not allowed to be housed in the SCU at Wabash Valley Correctional Facility, but may be housed, under the terms of the IPAS case, in other restrictive housing units throughout the DOC. 11. Unless the parties jointly consent to extend it, the private settlement agreement in the IPAS case will expire on March 25, 2019. 12. Plaintiffs’ counsel believes that it would be in the best interests of seriously mentally ill prisoners within the DOC to extend the private settlement agreement in the IPAS case as counsel believe that it has led to significant beneficial treatment for seriously mentally ill prisoners within the DOC and allowing the private settlement agreement to expire at this point could be detrimental to these prisoners. 13. The DOC does not agree with plaintiffs’ counsel’s assessment concerning the need or benefit to continuing the private settlement agreement in the IPAS case. 14. However, the DOC is willing to extend the private settlement agreement in the IPAS case for one year from the date this stipulation becomes operative after approval by the Court after notice, if the private settlement agreement in this case is terminated by that approval. 15. The DOC wishes to terminate the private settlement agreement here so that it can treat all secured housing units the same in terms of determining which prisoners with mental health diagnoses can be housed in the units.
[5]

Case 2:05-cv-00037-JPH-DLP Document 138 Filed 03/18/19 Page 6 of 8 PageID #: 605
16. At the current time the mentally ill prisoners who do not, in the estimation of the DOC, meet the definition of seriously mentally ill under the IPAS case, and who would otherwise be housed in the SCU at Wabash Valley Correctional Facility but for the private settlement agreement in this case, are housed in other secured housing units within the DOC. 17. Therefore, terminating the private settlement agreement in this case will not cause persons who would otherwise not be in secured housing to be placed in secured housing. It will only provide another unit where secured housing prisoners may be housed. 18. In light of this, and in light of the benefit to seriously mentally ill persons that plaintiffs’ counsel believe the extension of the IPAS private settlement agreement will bring, plaintiffs’ counsel believe it is appropriate to terminate the private settlement agreement in this case at this juncture. Notice to the class 19. Plaintiffs have separately filed their Motion to Approve Class Notice, that sets out the notice that their counsel wish to provide to the class. 20. As noted, the class in this case was defined in terms of mentally ill prisoners within the formerly named secured housing unit at Wabash Valley. However, given that “seriously mentally ill” prisoners as defined in the private settlement agreement in this case are no longer housed in this unit, it is appropriate to provide notice of this proposed termination not only to prisoners currently in the SCU at Wabash Valley, but also to
[6]

Case 2:05-cv-00037-JPH-DLP Document 138 Filed 03/18/19 Page 7 of 8 PageID #: 606
prisoners in other locations throughout the DOC and the parties agree that the notice, if approved by the Court, should be given as follows:
a. Notice posted in a prominent location in each secured housing unit in the DOC and the New Castle Psychiatric Unit for at least 30 days where prisoners will have an opportunity to review the notice when they are out of their cells for recreation and showers. b. Transmitting the notice to each DOC prisoner (with the exception of those in juvenile facilities) through the DOC’s GTL system. 21. The parties agree that this matter should be set for a fairness hearing pursuant to Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure no sooner than 60 days from this date and that plaintiffs’ counsel should be ordered to report back as to any comments from prisoners no sooner than 30 days after class notice is posted and distributed to the prisoners as noted above. WHEREFORE, the parties agree that the private settlement agreement in this case be terminated after notice to the class and a fairness hearing before this Court, and for all other proper relief.

For the plaintiffs:

Kenneth J. Falk No. 6777-49 ACLU of Indiana 1031 E. Washington St. Indianapolis, IN 46202 317/635-4059 fax: 317/635-4105 kfalk@aclu-in.org
[7]

Case 2:05-cv-00037-JPH-DLP Document 138 Filed 03/18/19 Page 8 of 8 PageID #: 607

For the defendants:

/s/ David A. Arthur (w/permission) David A. Arthur Senior Deputy Attorney General No. 2461-48 IGCS-5th Floor 302 W. Washington St. Indianapolis, IN 46204 317/232-6286 fax: 317/232-7979 David.Arthur@atg.in.gov

[8]

 
 Case 2:05-cv-00037-JPH-DLP Document 145 Filed 03/20/19 Page 1 of 2 PageID #: 622

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

BRIAN MAST, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

COMMISSIONER, INDIANA

)

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, )

et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

No. 2:05-cv-00037 JPH-DLP

Plaintiffs’ Motion to Approve Amended Class Notice

Plaintiffs, by their counsel, say that:

1. On this date this Court approved the class notice that plaintiffs proposed in this

case. (Dkt., 142).

2. Undersigned counsel realized that he neglected to include in the notice that neither

he nor the ACLU of Indiana would be receiving attorneys’ fees from defendants in this

matter.

3. Counsel believes this is important information to transmit to the prisoners

receiving this notice.

4. The Indiana Department of Correction has not yet taken steps to distribute the

notice.

Case 2:05-cv-00037-JPH-DLP Document 145 Filed 03/20/19 Page 2 of 2 PageID #: 623
5. The amended notice is attached. Counsel also corrected a number of the paragraphs that were not indented.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs request that the attached amended notice be given as proposed in the parties Stipulation, and for all other proper relief.
Kenneth J. Falk No. 6777-49 ACLU of Indiana 1031 E. Washington St. Indianapolis, IN 46202 317/635-4059 fax: 317/635-4105 kfalk@aclu-in.org Attorney for Plaintiffs

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

BRIAN MAST, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. J. DAVID DONAHUE, et al.,
Defendants.

1 1
1
No. 2:05-cv-00037 LJMIWGH
1 1 1 1

Private Settlement Agreement Between Defendants and Plaintiffs Come now the parties, by their counsel, and enter into this Private Settlement Agreement
pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. 5 3626(c). The parties state as follows:
Introduction 1. This action has been brought by prisoners confined to the Secured Housing Unit ("SHU") at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility who claim that it violates the United States Constitution to confine certain mentally ill prisoners there. The Court has certified, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2), a plaintilf class comprising "all prisoners currently, and in the future, confined within the Secured Housing Unit at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility who are mentally ill." 2. The Prison Litigation Reform Act limits prospective relief that can be entered in any case
involving prison conditions. 18 U.S.C. 6 3626(a). However, the Prison Litigation Reform Act
also provides that the parties may enter into a private settlement agreement not subject to the limitations of the Act if the terms of the private settlement agreement are not subject to court enforcement othcr than the reinstatement of the civil proceeding that the agreement settled. 18

U.S.C. 8 3626(c)(2)(A). The Prison Litigation Reform Act further provides that nothing in the
Act shall preclude any party claiming that a private settlement agreement has been breached
from seeking in state court any remedy available under state law. 18 U.S.C. 5 3626(c)(Z)(B).
3. It is the parties' intention that this agreement be recognized as a private settlement agreement pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act.
4. The defendants deny any and all allegations made by the plaintiffs in this cause, but
believe it is in the best interests of the citizens of the State of Indiana to enter into this Private Settlement Agreement. Consideration 5. The parties recognize and acknowledge that this Private Settlement Agreement is intended to be a valid contract under the laws of ihe State of Indiana, enforceable in the courts of the State of Indiana. 6. The parties acknowledge that there is good and valuable consideration supporting this Agreement. Specific Terms of the Private Settlement Agreement
Introduction 7. The parties agree that it is inappropriate to place seriously mentally ill prisoners into the SHU or into any correctional setting that features isolation and solitary confinement. 8. The parlies agree that it is incumbent upon the Indiana Department of Correction ("DOC") to provide appropriate mental health treatment for seriously mentally ill prisoners and that this must take place in settings other than the SHU. 9. The defendants therefore agree that the following steps will be taken to insure that seriously mentally ill prisoners are not placed into the SHU and that those who are currently

there, who may inadvertently be placed there in the future, or who will become seriously mentally ill after placement in the SHU, are promptly removed.
Definition o f "seriouslynlenfally ill" 10. The parties agree that for purposes of this agreement, the term "seriously mentally ill" is defined as:
-prisoners who have a current diagnosis, or evidence, of any Diagnostic and Statistical Manual IV (DSM-IV) Axis I diagnosis or who are receiving treatment for such a diagnosis, or, -prisoners who have been diagnosed with a mental disorder that is worsened by confinement in the SHU.
Seriously mentally ill prisoners i ill no longer be placed into the SHU 11. The defendants agree that effective immediately, seriously mentally ill prisoners will not be housed in the SHU. 12. Instead, the DOC will maintain a continuum of services available for seriously mentally ill prisoners including, but not limited to, placement at the New Castle Psychiatric Facility for prisoners in. need of intensive psychiatric treatment, one or more step down units for those in need of less intensive psychiatric services, as well as placement in general population for those in need of even less intensive services. Prisoners identified by qualified mental health staff as needing acute care shall be placed at the New Castle Psychiatric Facility. Those needing other levels of mental health care shall not be placed in facilities that, in the estimation of qualified mental health staff, (1) will exacerbate their serious mental illness, or (2) where their mental health needs cannot be met. Determination of mental health needs shall be made by qualified mental health staff. However, there may be prisoners who, although not acutely mentally ill and therefore not appropriate for placement at the New Castle Psychiatric Facility, will have their serious mental illness exacerbated by any incarceration, regardless of the particular placement.

In such a situation the prisoner will be placed where his mental health needs may be most appropriately met as determined by qualified mental health staff. A written record will be made and maintained as to the decision of the mental health staff and the reasons for that decision. 13. If a prisoner receives sufficient discipline time that would otherwise qualify him to be sent to the SHU, he will not be sent to the SHU if he is seriously mentally ill. 14. All prisoners sent to the SHU will receive a face-to-face screening by a licensed mental health professional, who shall also review their mental health records, within two business days of arrival, and if it is determined that they are seriously mentally ill they will be removed from the SHU and sent to an appropriate placement where their mental health needs may be appropriately addressed, as set forth in paragraph 12 above, at the earliest opportunity, but no later than within seventy-two (72) hours of this determination, unless a psychiatrist determines after a face-to-face evaluation that the prisoner cannot safely be moved for mental health reasons, in which case the prisoner will be moved to the appropriate placement as soon as the psychiatrist determines that it is medically safe to do so. 15. Upon transfer of a seriously lnentally ill prisoner out of the SHU, the Commissioner or a designee, with input from qualified mental health staff, shall determiue if the prisoner's accumulated segregation time should be executed, suspended or modified because of the prisoner's serious mental illness. A written record shall be made and maintained as to the decision and the reasons for that decision. This paragraph shall apply to all seriously mentally ill prisoners removed from the SHU on, or after, Apiil 1,2006.
Continuing mental health evaluations in the SHU 16. All prisoners in the SHU will receive a mental health evaluation at least weekly by mental health professionals. These evaluations will take place in a setting where accurate

evaluation of the prisoner's mental health status can occur. At least every ninety (90) days, all prisoners in the SHU will receive an evaluation by a licensed doctoral-level mental health clinician in a setting that provides audio privacy from other prisoners and staff. 17. In the event that mental health staff determine that the prisoner is seriously mentally ill, he will be transported, in no more than seventy-two (72) hours, to an appropriate placement where he can receive appropriate mental health services, as set out in paragraph 12, above, unless a psychiatrist determines after a face-to-face evaluation that the prisoner cannot safely be moved for mental health reasons; in which case the prisoner will be moved to the appropriate placement as soon as the psychiatrist determines that it is medically safe to do so.
New Castle Psychiatric Facility 18. The term "New Castle Psychiatric Facility" refers to programming that is currently available at the New Castle Psychiatric Facility in New Castle, Indiana. This programming features various therapies as directed by a psychiatrist and other qualified mental health staff.
Determinations will be made by mental health slajjf 19. This Agreement requires that, at various opportunities, a determination be made whether a prisoner is seriously mentally ill and requires that such a prisoner be excluded from the SHU. This determination shall be made solely by qualified, doctoral-level, mental health professionals.
New policies and procedures 20. In order to implement the policy of exclusion of seriously mentally ill prisoners from the SHU, the Indiana Department of Correction has created and implemented the attached policies. These policies are part of this Agreement and for a period of one year from the effective date of this Agreement will not be altered without prior written notice to plaintiffs' counsel in this case, at least thirty (30) days prior to the planned effective date of the alteration. The effective date of

this Agreement shall be the date on which the Court finally deems the Agreement to be a fair and
appropriate settlement pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e).
Continued monitoring
21. For a period of two years following the effective date of this agreement the defendants
will provide to plaintiffs' counsel the following information on a ~nonthlybasis so that
co~npliancewith the agreement may be monitored:
a. The names of all prisoners at the ST-IU currently (speciljiing the date) prescribed psychotropic medications, and for each such prisoner, each medication's name and dosage.
b. The names of all current SHU prisoners with an Axis I diagnosis and the specific Axis I diagnosis or diagnoses.
c. The names of each prisoner since the last report (or, for the first report, since the effective date of this Agreement):
1. Who was admitted to the SHU after having been, at any time, confined at the New Castle Psychiatric Facility. For purposes of this paragraph only, the term "New Castle Psychiatric Facility" includes the HSBAR unit, which is no longer in existence. For each such prisoner, the followi~lginformation will be provided:
-the date of the prisoner's admission to the SHU. -the prisoner's mental health diagnosis as of the date of his admission to the SHU. -the dates of the prisoner's confinement(s) at the New Castle Psychiatric Facility. -the prisoner's mental health diagnosis as of the date(s) of his admission(s) to the New Castle Psychiatric Facility.
2. Who was renloved from the SHU because he was found to be seriously mentally ill. For each such prisoner, the following information will be provided:
-the date of the prisoner's admission to the SHU. -the date the prisoner was determined to be seriously mentally ill, and his mental health diagnosis as of that date. -the date the prisoner was removed from the SHU. -the facility to which the prisoner was transferred upon his relnoval from the SHU.

d. Upon request, defendants will provide to plaintiffs' counsel the underlying documentation containing the information noted above.
e. Upon request, defendants will provide to plaintiffs' counsel treatment plans or other similar documents that demonstrate that the decision as to where seriously inentally ill prisoners will be placed has been made in accordance with paragraph 12, above.
22. In addition to the provision of the above information, class members at the SHU and prisoners at other DOC facilities may be interviewed by plaintiffs' counsel and persons designated by plaintiffs, at all reasonable times. Plaintiffs' counsel and their experts may review the health and other records of class members at the SHU upon reasonable notice to defendants.
Attorneys' fees and costs 23. The defendants agree to pay to plaintiffs the suin of $150,109.60 in full satisfaction of any claim for attorneys' fees and costs that could be claimed by plaintiffs for any work done in this case to date. For purposes of this paragraph, "to date" means up to and including the date on which this Agreement is signed by counsel. 24. The parties further agree that the plaintiffs shall receive reasonable attorneys' fees and costs for the necessary monitoring of defendants' compliance with the terms of this Agreement. However, plaintiffs agree that they will not assess fees for the routine review of the periodic reports required by paragraph 21.
Notice ro the class 25. The parties acknowledge that Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that before this Agreement can be deemed to be approved by the plaintiffs notice to the class must be given. This notice will be accomplished by:

-delivering written notice to each prisoner in the SI-IU no later than ten (10) days following the Court's approval of the form and manner of notice, and delivering a copy to each prisoner newly admitted to the SHU for thirty (30) days thereafter. -posting written notice in a location where it will be seen by prisoners in the New Castle Psychiatric Facility, Indiana State Prison, Wabash Valley Correctional Facility, Pendleton Correctional Facility, Westville Correctional Facility, Westville Control Unit, Putnamville Correctional Facility, and Plainfield Correctional Facility. 26. The notice will be posted for at least thirty (30) days. Following this thirty (30) day period, counsel for plaintiffs will report to the Court and to the defendants as to the comments received by class members and will then indicate if, in counsel's estimation, this Court should find that this Agreement is a fair and equitable settlement pursuant to Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Further Proceedings 27. This Agreement may be modified only upon the written consent of counsel for all parties. 28. If at any time plaintiffs believe that defendants are in breach of this Agreement, they may seek (1) reinstatement of this action in this Couri, and/or (2) enforcement of this Agreement in the state courts of Indiana. However, absent an emergency, as defined below, plaintiffs will communicate in writing with defendants' counsel at least thirty (30) days prior to seeking any judicial enforcement oC this Agreement or prior to seeking that this case he placed back before the Court. An elnergency is defined as any condition in the SHU which, if proven, poses an immediate risk to life or which poses a serious health or safety risk. If the plaintiffs deem an emergency to exist, they will explicitly note this, and will specifically set out the emergency in their filing in court. 29. It is the parties' intention that if this Court determines that this Private Settlement Agreement is a fair compromise in this matter pursuant to Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this matter shall be stayed for a period of two years from the effective date of

this Agreement, and thereafter dismissed without prejudice to being reinstated by plaintiffs or class members pursuant to the terms of paragraph 28.

For the plaintiffs:

&
@n eth J. Falk
fro. 6777-49
ACLU of Indiana 1031 E. Washington St. Indianapolis, IN 46202 3171635-4059 ext. 229
National Prison Project of the ACLU Foundation, Inc. 915 1 5 S~t. N~.W., 7thFloor Washington, D.C. 20005 2021548-6609 Fax: 2021393-493 1 DfathiBnpp-aclu.org *Not admitted in D.C.; Practice limited to the federal courts
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

For the defendants:

issioner, Indiana Department :Action
Deputy Attorney General IGCS-5''' Floor 302 W. Washiilgton St. Indianapolis, IN 46204 31712324286 Fax: 3171232-7979 David.Arthur@atg.in.gov
Attorney for Defendants

Mitchcll E. Danicls, Jr.
Governor

STATE OF INDIAXA
1)epnrtnicnt of'Cor'rection liiiliana (iovcrnmciil Center - Soulh
. 302 W. Washinglo11Strect Indisnapolis, btdiimt~46204-2738 . Phutic: (317) 232-571 1 Pas: (317) 232-6798 Wcbsiic: www.in.~oviindcorrectionl

J. David D o n a h ~ ~ c
Commissioner

EXECUTIVE DIRECTIVE:

#06--

This Executive Directive presents new criteria and procedures to be followed when adult male offenders are found guilty of a disciplinary code violation and sanctioned with long-term disciplinary segregation or are determined to be appropriate for consideration for placement in a Department-wide administrative segregation unit. This Executive Directive is applicable to all Department facilities that house adult male offenders. This Executive Directive and the attached criteria and procedures are to be considered effective immediately.

The Department of Correction recognizes that some offenders commit inappropriate behavior due to being seriously mentally ill (i.e., having a current diagnosis, or evidence, of any Diagnostic and Statistical Manual IV [DSM-IV] AXIS I mental disorder or who is receiving treatment for such a diagnosis or who has been diagnosed with a mental disorder that is worsened by confinement in a Secure Confinement Unit [SCU]). In these cases, it is in the best interests of the Department to attempt to obtain mental health treatment for these offenders rather than simply placing them in a long-term disciplinary segregation or Department-wide administrative segregation unit, such as the Secure Confinement Unit at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility. In order to minimize the negative effects of long-term segregation on offenders, the attached criteria and procedures are to be implemented. These procedures include vrovisions for all facilities as well as vrovisions directed to the Secure Confinement Unit at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility.

Please ensure that all appropriate staff is made aware of this Executive Directive and the attached procedures. Also, please ensure that a copy of this Executive Directive is posted in all housing units in facilities housing adult male offenders.

If you have any questions regarding this Executive Directive or the attached procedures, please contact Dr. Elton Amos, Medical Director, at (317) 233-5735.

J. David Donahue Commissioner

APPENDIX XVI-B
(Revised 12-06)
CRITERIA/PROCEDURE FOR ASSIGNMENT TO THE WABASH VALLEY AND
WESTVILLE CONTROL - LONG TERM DISCIPLINARY SEGREGATION UNITS
CRITERIA
The following criteria are to be applied when considering an individual for, or continuing assignment to, the Wabash Valley and Westville Control Long Term Disciplinary Units. The offender shall:
1. Have six (6) months or more of accumulated disciplinary segregation time to serve; and 2. Have a Medical Code of A, F, G, H, I, or K, and a Disability Code of A or D.
Any exceptions to these criteria shall be made on a case-by-case basis. 3. Not have a current diagnosis or evidence of any Diagnostic and Statistical Manual IV
(DSM-IV) AXIS I mental disorder, be receiving treatment for such a diagnosis or have been diagnosed with a mental disorder that is worsened by confinement in a Secure Confinement Unit (SCU). Offenders who meet any of these criteria shall be referred to as "seriously meiltally ill." 4. Safekeepers may not be assigned to Long Term Disciplinary Segregation without the approval of the Deputy Commissioner of Operations.
PROCEDURE
The following procedure is to be used for referral of an offender for assignment to, or reassignmeilt from, the Wabash Valley and Westville Control Long Term Disciplinary Units.
1. Upon determining that an offender meets the criteria for consideration for assignment to the Long Term Disciplinary Units, a qualified mental health professional (i.e., licensed psychologist or psychiatrist) shall evaluate the offender prior to the offender being referred to the Superintendent.
a. During this evaluation, the qualified mental health professional shall determine whether the offender has a current AXIS I diagnosis or is otherwise seriously mentally ill as indicated in Criterion # 3.
b. The qualified mental health professional shall determine whether there are any other mental health conditions that may be negatively impacted by the offender's assignment to long-term disciplinary segregation.
c. The qualified mental health professional shall prepare a written evaluation of the offender and, if the offender is approved for transfer to a SCU, shall send a copy to the receiving segregation unit.
2. If the results of the evaluation indicate that the offender is seriously mentally ill, consideration shall be given to transferring the offender to the Psychiatric Unit at the New Castle Correctiollal Facility or another suitable facility where the offender can receive needed mental health treatment; the offender shall not be transferred to a SCU. If the results of the evaluation indicate that the offender is acutely mentally ill, the offender shall be transferred to the Psychiatric Unit at the New Castle Correctional Facility.

3. Offenders identified by qualified mental health professionals as needing other levels of mental health treatment shall not be placed in facilities that:
a. Will exacerbate their serious mental illness; or, b. Cannot meet their mental health needs.
Determination of mental health needs shall be made by qualified mental health staff. However, there may be offenders who, although not acutely mentally ill and therefore not appropriate for placement at the New Castle Psychiatric Facility, will have their serious mental illnesses exacerbated by any incarceration, regardless of the particular placement. In such a situation the offender will be placed where qualified mental health staff can meet his mental health needs appropriately. A written record will be made and maintained as to the decision of the mental health staff and the reasons for that decision.
4. If the qualified mental health professional determines that the offender is NOT seriously mentally ill,
a. The qualified mental health professioiial will submit a written evaluation to the Facility Head and advise that the offender may be considered for transfer to a
scu.
b. The Facility Head shall prepare a written request and submit it to the appropriate Regional Director. The written request will include the following:
(1) A new Classification Designation Inst~ument,State F o m ~7263 (R110-05). (A transfer to the Long Term Disciplinary Units does not require an offender to be classified Level Three [3].)
(2) An Inter-Facility Transfer Report, State Form 44355 (R16-94) to include a summary of the offender's behavior which initiated the transfer request.
(3) A Classification Hearing Report, State Form 3412 (R213-92) completed in accordance with the Adult Classification Policy.
(4) A copy of the cvaluation prepared by the qualified inental health professional indicating that the offender is not seriously mentally ill.
5. Upon receipt of the referral material, the Regional Director will review the material and either approve or deny the assignment on the submitted Inter-Facility Transfer Report. The Regional Director will then forward the decision and accompanying paperworlc to the Director of Classification.
a. If approved, the referring facility will be notified in writing. The Director of Classification shall cause the issuance of a Transfer Authority. The Classification Division and Offender Movement Section will coordinate a transfer date. The offender may appeal this decision to the Deputy Commissioner of Operations using the Classification Appeal Form, State Form (Rl3-92).
b. If denied, the referring facility will be notified in writing, the referring material will be returned to the facility and the offender will remain in his assigned facility.

6. Upon arrival, the following procedures shall be implemented:
a. Within two (2) working days of arrival at a SCU, the offender shall receive a faceto-face screening by a licensed mental health professional who shall also review the offender's mental health records and make a written record as to the results of the screening.
b. If it is determined by this screening that the offender is seriously mentally ill, the offender shall be transferred within 72 hours of this determination to an appropriate facility that can provide the needed mental health treatment unless a psychiatrist determines after a face-to-face evaluation that the offender cannot be moved safely for mental health reasons. The offender shall remain at the facility until the psychiatrist determines that it is medically safe to move the offender to a facility that can provided the needed mental health treatment.
7. All offenders assigned to the SCU at WVCF shall receive a mental health evaluation at least weelcly by a mental health professional (e.g., psychologist, behavioral clinician, etc.) which shall take place in a setting where an accurate evaluation of the offender's mental health status can occur.
8. At least every 90 days, each offender in the SCU at WVCF shall receive an evaluation by a licensed doctoral-level mental health professional in a setting that provides audio privacy from other offenders and staff.
9. If, as a result of the above evaluation, mental health staff determines that the offender is seriously mentally ill the offender shall be transferred within 72 hours of the determination to an appropriate facility where he can obtain needed mental health treatment, unless a psychiatrist determines after a face-to-face evaluation that the offender cannot be safely moved for mental health reasons. In such a case, the offender shall be moved to the appropriate facility as soon as the psychiatrist determines that it is medically safe to move the offender.
10. In addition to the weekly and every 90 days evaluations, if staff believes that the offender's mental health is deteriorating staff may request additional evaluations on an as needed basis and shall report all observations to the mental health staff.
11. Upon transfer of a seriously mentally ill offender out of a SCU, the appropriate Regional DirectorIOperations, with input from qualified mental health staff, shall determine whether the offender's accumulated segregation time should be executed, suspended or modified due to the offender's serious mental illness.
a. The Unit Management Team at the SCU at WVCF shall report the transfer to the Regional Director and provide documentation of the mental health diagnosis and status of the offender as of the time of transfer, together with any other information that the Team believes to be relevant to a determination under this part of this Executive Directive.
b. The Regional Director shall make a written record of the decision and the reason(s) for the decision and shall ensure that a copy of this written record is filed in the offender's facility and Central Office packets.

c. The Regional Director shall ensure that a copy of this decision is provided to the Superintendent of the facility housing the offender and that the Superintendent advises appropriate staff of the decision.
d. Unit staff shall ensure that the offender is notified of the decision and shall explain the consequences of the decision to the offender.
12. Upon completion of the offender's disciplinary segregation time, classification staff at the Long Term Disciplinary Segregation Units shall forward a request for reassignment to the appropriate Classification Analyst using materials outlined in Step 2 of this procedure. The Classification Analyst shall forward the request to the Director of Classification, who in consultation with the appropriate Regional Director shall determine the facility placement.
13. Any release from this unit other than a scheduled release or transfer due to the offender being diagnosed as seriously mentally ill requires the review of the Regional Director and approval of the Deputy Commissioner of Operations. The Superintendent shall support the request in writing noting the reasons for requesting an early release from the Secure Confinement Unit. The request along with a Transfer Report shall be forwarded to the Regional Director by facility classification. Upon approval of an unscheduled reassignment from the Long Term Disciplinary Units, the Regional Director shall consult with the Deputy Commissioncr of Operations and Director of Classification for the issuance of a Transfer Authority.

APPENDIX XVI-C
(Revised 12106)
CRJTERIARROCEDURE FOR PLACEMENT IN DEPARTMENT-WIDE ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION
CRITERIA
Offenders who present a special safety or security management concern may be recommended for placement in a department-wide administrative segregation unit. The Department-wide Administrative Segregation Units shall be at the SCUs at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility and the Westville Correctional Facility.
Offenders considered for such a placement must meet the following criteria:
1. The criteria for placement in a facility administrative segregation unit. a. History of assaultive behavior; b. Active member of a Security Threat Group who poses a threat to the safe and orderly operation of the facility; c. A high escape risk; d. The facility's need to contain, prevent or end a disturbance or other threat to the orderly operation of the facility; e. Pending an investigation, disciplinary hearing or criminal trial; f. A docume~~tehdistory of behavior that causes staff to believe that the offender's continued presence in the offender general population would be detrimental to the security of the facility or the offender; or, g. The offender is the subject of an on-going investigation and the segregation has been approved in accordance with the administrative procedures for Policy 02-04101, "The Disciplinary Code for Adult Offenders."
2. Offenders selected for a department-wide administrative segregation unit must have exhibited extraordinary security concerns, such as seriously injuring staff or offenders, participating in a hostage situation, identified security threat group leader, heavily involved in trafficking or having a lengthy history of serious (Class A andlor B) conduct violations.
3. Standards for the placement of offenders in an administrative segregation unit shall be in accordance with Policy 01-04-1-1, "Adult Offender Classification."
4. Have a Medical Code of A, F, G, H, I, or K and a Disability Code of A or D. Any exceptions to these criteria shall be made on a case-by-case basis.
5. Not have a current diagnosis or evidence of any Diagnostic and Statistical Manual IV (DSM-IV) AXIS I mental disorder, be receiving treatment for such a diagnosis or have been diagnosed with a mental disorder that is worsened by confinement in a Secure Confinement Unit (SCU). Offenders who meet any of these criteria shall be referred to as "seriously mentally ill."
PROCEDURE
The following procedure is to be used for referral of an offender for assignment to a departmentwide administrative segregation unit:

1. Offenders shall be provided a classification hearing to determine the apparent appropriateness of placement in a department-wide administrative segregation unit.
2. If the offender appears appropriate for transfer to a department-wide administrative segregation unit, a qualified mental health professional (i.e., licensed psychologist or psychiatrist) shall evaluate the offender prior to advising the Superintendent of the recommendation.
a. During this evaluation, the qualified mental health professional shall determine whether the offender has a current AXIS I diagnosis or is otherwise seriously mentally ill as indicated in Criterion # 5.
b. The qualified inental health professional shall determine whether there are any other mental health conditions that may be negatively impacted by the offender's assignment to department-wide administrative segregation.
c. The qualified mental health professional shall prepare a written evaluation of the offender and, if the offender is approved for transfer to a SCU, shall send a copy to the receiving segregation unit.
3. If the results of the evaluation indicate that the offender is seriously inentally ill, consideration shall be given to transferring the offender to the Psychiatric Unit at the New Castle Correctional Facility or another suitable facility where the offender can receive needed mental health treatment; the offender shall not be transferred to a SCU. If the results of the evaluation indicate that the offender is acutely mentally ill, the offender shall be transferred to the Psychiatric Unit at the New Castle Correctional Facility.
4. Offenders identified by qualified mental health professionals as needing other levels of mental health treatment shall not be placed in facilities that:
a. Will exacerbate their serious mental illness; or, b. Cannot meet their mental health needs.
Determination of mental health needs shall be made by qualified mental health staff. However, there may be offenders who, although not acutely mentally ill and therefore not appropriate for placement at the New Castle Psychiatric Facility, will have their serious mental illnesses exacerbated by any incarceration, regardless of the particular placement. In such a situation the offender will be placed where qualified mental health staff can meet his mental health needs appropriately. A written record will be made and maintained as to thc decision of the mental health staff and the reasons for that decision.
5. If the qualified mental health professional determines that the offender is NOT seriously mentally ill,
a. The qualified inental health professional will subinit a written evaluation to the Supervisor of Classification who shall present a recommendation, along with the evaluation report, to the Superintendent indicating that the offender may be considered for transfer to a SCU.
b. If the Facility Head approves the recommendation, the Superintendent shall prepare a written request and submit it to the appropriate Regional Director. The written request will include the following:

(1) A new Classification Designation Instrument, State Form 7263 (R110-05). (2) An Inter-Facility Transfer Report, State Form 44355 (W6-94) to include a
summary of the offender's behavior which initiated the transfer request. (3) A Classification Hearing Report, State Form 3412 (R213-92) completed in
accordance with the Adult Classification Policy. (4) A copy of the evaluation prepared by the qualified mental health
professional indicating that the offender is not seiiously mentally ill.
6. Following review of the information submitted by the Superintendent, the Regional Directors shall consult with the Deputy Commissioner of Operations and the Director of Classification in order to make a decision and to determine what department-wide unit would be most appropriate.
7 . The Regional Director shall advise the Superintendent ofthe decision. If the decision is to place the offender in a department-wide administrative segregation unit, the Regional Director shall work with the Director of Classification to ensure that the transfer is processed in a timely manner.
8. The offender may appeal the decision to assign himiher to a department-wide administrative segregation unit in accordance with Policy 01-04-101.
9. Upon transfer to a department-wide administrative segregation unit, the offender shall be provided the same reviews as indicated for offenders admitted to a facility administrative segregation unit. Copies of all reviews shall be forwarded to the Regional Director for review and approval.
10. In addition to the other reviews provided to the offenders, up011 arrival the following procedures shall be implemented:
a. Within two (2) working days of arrival at a SCU, the offender shall receive a faceto-face screening by a licensed mental health professional who shall review the offender's mental health records and make a written record as to the results of the screening.
b. If it is determined by this screening that the offender is seriously mentally ill, the offender shall be transferred within 72 hours of this detem~inationto an appropriate facility that can provide the needed mental health treatment unless a psychiatrist dctermines after a face-to-face evaluation that the offender cannot be moved safely for mental health reasons. The offender shall remain at the facility until the psychiatrist determines that it is medically safe to move the offender to a facility that can provided the needed mental health treatment.
11. All offenders assigned to the SCU at WVCF shall receive a mental health evaluation at least weekly by a mental health professional (e.g., psychologist, behavioral clinician, etc.) which shall take place in a setting where an accurate evaluation ofthe offender's mental health status can occur.
12. At least every 90 days, each offender in the SCU at WVCF shall receive an evaluation by a licensed doctoral-level mental health professional in a setting that provides audio privacy from other offenders and staff.

13. If, as a result of the above evaluation, mental health staff determines that the offender is seriously mentally ill the offender shall be transferred within 72 hours of the determination to an appropriate facility where he can obtain needed mental health treatment, unless a psychiatrist determines after a face-to-face evaluation that the offender cannot be safely moved for mental health reasons. In such a case, the offender shall be moved to the appropriate facility as soon as the psychiatrist determines that it is medically safe to move the offender.
14. In addition to the weekly and every 90 days evaluations, if staff believes that the offender's mental health is deteriorating staff may request additional evaluations on an as needed basis and shall report all observations to the mental health staff.
15. Upon transfer of a seriously mentally ill offender out of a SCU, the appropriate Regional DirectorIOperations, with input from qualified mental health staff, shall determine whether the offender's administrative segregation status should be suspended or modified due to the offender's serious mental illness.
a. The Unit Management Team at the SCU at WVCF shall report the transfer to the Regional Director and provide documentation of the mental health diagnosis and status of the offender as of the time of transfer, together with any other information that the Team believes to be relevant to a determination under this part of this Executive Directive.
b. The Regional Director shall make a written record of the decision and the reason(s) for the decision and shall ensure that a copy of this written record is filed in the offender's facility and Central Office packets.
c. The Regional Director shall ensure that a copy of this decision is provided to the Superintendent of the facility housing the offender and that the Superintendent advises appropriate staff of the decision.
d. Unit staff shall ensure that the offender is notified of the decision and shall explain the consequences of the decision to the offender.
16. An offender who has been assigned to a department-wide administrative segregation unit shall be released upon review of the respective Regional Director and the approval of the Deputy Commissioner of Operations or if the offender has been diagnosed as seriously mentally ill. If staff at the department-wide administrative segregation unit believes that an offendcr is ready for release other than due to the offender being diagnosed as seriously mentally ill, staff shall:
a. Prepare a written recommendation for the offender's release and forward it to the Superintendent for review.
b. If the Superintendent agrees with the recommendation, the Superintendent shall forward the recommendation, along with a Transfer Report, to the Regional Director for review. The Regional Director shall then forward the recommendation to the Deputy Commissioner for approval.
c. The Regional Directors shall consult with the Deputy Commissioner of Operations and the Director of Classification to determine to which facility administrative segregation unit the offender will be transferred.

 
 Case: 2:05-cv-37 As of: 03/15/2020 01:02 PM EDT 1 of 12
U.S. District Court Southern District of Indiana (Terre Haute) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:05−cv−00037−JPH−DLP

CLOSED

MAST et al v. DONAHUE et al Assigned to: Judge James Patrick Hanlon Referred to: Magistrate Judge Doris L. Pryor Cause: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights Plaintiff BRIAN MAST
Plaintiff MICHAEL WOODS
Plaintiff EUGENE WELLS on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of those similarly situated

Date Filed: 02/03/2005 Date Terminated: 07/23/2019 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 555 Prisoner Petitions − Prison Condition Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Elizabeth Alexander NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT OF THE ACLU 915 15th Street, NW 7th Floor Washington, DC 20005 (202) 393−4930 Fax: (202) 393−4931 Email: ealexander@npp−aclu.org PRO HAC VICE
Kenneth J. Falk ACLU OF INDIANA 1031 E. Washington Street Indianapolis, IN 46202 (317) 635−4059 x104 Fax: (317) 635−4105 Email: kfalk@aclu−in.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Elizabeth Alexander (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Kenneth J. Falk (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Elizabeth Alexander (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Kenneth J. Falk (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
J. DAVID DONAHUE in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Indiana Department of Correction

represented by David A. Arthur INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL Indiana Government Center South, 5th Floor 302 West Washington St. Indianapolis, IN 46204−2770 (317)232−6286

Case: 2:05-cv-37 As of: 03/15/2020 01:02 PM EDT 2 of 12

Defendant
CRAIG HANKS in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility

Fax: (317) 232−7979 Email: David.Arthur@atg.in.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David A. Arthur (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 02/03/2005
02/03/2005 02/03/2005 02/03/2005 02/03/2005 02/03/2005 02/03/2005 02/03/2005 02/14/2005 02/16/2005 02/16/2005 02/16/2005 02/28/2005
03/01/2005
03/07/2005 03/08/2005 03/09/2005 03/10/2005

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief against J. DAVID DONAHUE, CRAIG HANKS , filed by BRIAN MAST, MICHAEL WOODS, EUGENE WELLS. (Attachments: # 1 (2) (3) (NKD, ) (Entered: 02/03/2005)
2 CIVIL COVER SHEET by BRIAN MAST, MICHAEL WOODS, EUGENE WELLS. (NKD, ) (Entered: 02/03/2005)
3 Summons Issued as to J. DAVID DONAHUE, CRAIG HANKS, STEVE CARTER. (NKD, ) (Entered: 02/03/2005)
4 MAGISTRATE JUDGE's NOTICE of Availability to Exercise Jurisdiction (NKD, ) (Entered: 02/03/2005)
5 MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S Summary of CMP Notice (NKD, ) (Entered: 02/03/2005)
6 RECEIPT #201−1137 in the amount of $ 150.00 filing fee. (NKD, ) (Entered: 02/03/2005)
7 MOTION for Class Certification by BRIAN MAST, MICHAEL WOODS, EUGENE WELLS. (NKD, ) (Entered: 02/03/2005)
8 MEMORANDUM in Support re 7 MOTION for Class Certification filed by BRIAN MAST, MICHAEL WOODS, EUGENE WELLS. (NKD, ) (Entered: 02/03/2005)
9 NOTICE of Appearance by Richard M. Bramer on behalf of J. DAVID DONAHUE, CRAIG HANKS (Bramer, Richard) (Entered: 02/14/2005)
10 RETURN of Service by CMRRR J. DAVID DONAHUE served on 2/8/2005. (NKD, ) (Entered: 02/16/2005)
11 RETURN of Service by CMRRR CRAIG HANKS served on 2/7/2005. (NKD, ) (Entered: 02/16/2005)
12 RETURN of Service by CMRRR Steve Carter, Attorney General of State of Indiana. (NKD, ) (Entered: 02/16/2005)
13 MOTION for Extension of Time to March 28, 2005 in which to 1 Complaint to be answered by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Bramer, Richard) (Entered: 02/28/2005)
14 ORDER granting 13 Defendants' Motion for Extension of Time to File response to Plaintiff's Complaint to and including 3/28/2005 . Signed by Judge William G. Hussmann Jr. on 3/1/2005. (FBD) (Entered: 03/01/2005)
15 NOTICE of Change of Address of Co−Counsel by Kenneth J. Falk (Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 03/07/2005)
16 NOTICE of Filing Proposed Order by all plaintiffs (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 03/08/2005)
17 NOTICE of Filing of Substitute Proposed Order by all plaintiffs (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 03/09/2005)
18 ORDER granting plaintiffs' 7 Motion to Certify Class; it is ORDERED that this case is certified as a class for injunctive and declaratory relief; it is further ORDERED that class is defined as; all prisoners currently, and in the future, confined within the

Case: 2:05-cv-37 As of: 03/15/2020 01:02 PM EDT 3 of 12

03/28/2005 03/30/2005 03/31/2005 03/31/2005 04/08/2005 05/09/2005 05/17/2005 05/20/2005
05/20/2005 05/25/2005 05/25/2005 06/13/2005 06/23/2005 06/28/2005
06/28/2005
06/29/2005 07/01/2005

Secured Housing Unit at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility who are mentally ill; it is further ORDERED that Kenneth J. Falk and David C. Fathi are appointed as counsel for class pursuant to Rule 23(g) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Signed by Judge Larry J. McKinney on 03/10/05. cm (NKD, ) (Entered: 03/10/2005)
19 Second MOTION for Extension of Time to March 30, 2005 to answer Plaintiffs' Complaint by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Bramer, Richard) (Entered: 03/28/2005)
20 ANSWER to Complaint and affirmative defenses by J. DAVID DONAHUE, CRAIG HANKS.(Bramer, Richard) (Entered: 03/30/2005)
21 ORDER granting 19 Defendant, Deputy Attorney General's Motion for Extension of Time to File answer to Plaintiff's Complaint to and including 3/30/2005 . Signed by Judge William G. Hussmann Jr. on 3/31/2005. (FBD) (Entered: 03/31/2005)
22 NOTICE by BRIAN MAST, MICHAEL WOODS, EUGENE WELLS Following Rule 26(f) Conference Outlining Discovery Plan (Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 03/31/2005)
23 NOTICE of Service of Initial Disclosures by BRIAN MAST, MICHAEL WOODS, EUGENE WELLS (Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/08/2005)
24 NOTICE of Substitution of Appearance by David A. Arthur replacing Richard M. Bramer, Deputy Attorney General on behalf of J. DAVID DONAHUE, CRAIG HANKS (Arthur, David) (Entered: 05/09/2005)
25 NOTICE of Appearance by Todd A. Weaver on behalf of J. DAVID DONAHUE, CRAIG HANKS (Weaver, Todd) (Entered: 05/17/2005)
26 STIPULATION to Enter Qualified Protective Order Pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (Joint) by BRIAN MAST, MICHAEL WOODS, EUGENE WELLS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 05/20/2005)
27 Unopposed MOTION to Give Notice to Class by all plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order # 2 Exhibit A − Class Notice)(Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 05/20/2005)
28 ORDER GRANTING Joint Stipulation to Enter Qualified Protective Order. (SEE ENTRY). Signed by Judge William G. Hussmann Jr. on 5/25/2005. (FBD) (Entered: 05/25/2005)
29 ORDER DIRECTING NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF CLASS (SEE ENTRY). Signed by Judge William G. Hussmann Jr. on 5/25/2005. (FBD) (Entered: 05/25/2005)
30 SCHEDULING ORDER: TELEPHONIC Status Conference set for 8/24/2005 02:00 PM before Magistrate Judge William G. Hussmann Jr . Signed by Judge William G. Hussmann Jr. on 6/13/05. (TMD) (Entered: 06/13/2005)
31 MOTION reqeust for copy of court record by BRIAN MAST. (VS, ) (Entered: 06/23/2005)
32 STIPULATION −Joint Supplemental− to Enter Qualified Protective Order Pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act by BRIAN MAST, MICHAEL WOODS, EUGENE WELLS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 06/28/2005)
33 ENTRY directing furhter proceedings; counsel for plaintiff shall respond appropriately to request for putative class member Dominguez regarding action; request has been filed and scanned into the clerk's docket. Signed by Judge Larry J. McKinney on 06/28/05. (VS, ) (Entered: 06/28/2005)
34 Qualified PROTECTIVE ORDER Pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. Signed by Judge William G. Hussmann Jr. on 6/29/05. (TMD) (Entered: 06/29/2005)
35 NOTICE by BRIAN MAST, MICHAEL WOODS, EUGENE WELLS Concerning Matthew Dominguez (Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 07/01/2005)

Case: 2:05-cv-37 As of: 03/15/2020 01:02 PM EDT 4 of 12

08/01/2005 08/09/2005 08/18/2005 09/01/2005 09/07/2005 09/12/2005
10/11/2005 11/10/2005 12/29/2005 12/29/2005 01/04/2006 01/04/2006 01/12/2006
03/23/2006 03/23/2006
03/28/2006
04/04/2006 04/27/2006

36 ENTRY directing further proceedings denying 31 Motion for copy of entire record; clerk shall supply Mr. Dominguez with copy of docket sheet and copy of his request; Signed by Judge Larry J. McKinney on 08/01/05. (VS, ) (Entered: 08/01/2005)
37 MOTION for transfer to another facility by BRIAN MAST. (NKD, ) (Entered: 08/09/2005)
38 ENTRY directing further proceedings; denying 37 Motion to transfer to another prison. Signed by Judge Larry J. McKinney on 08/18/05. (VS, ) (Entered: 08/18/2005)
39 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge William G. Hussmann Jr.: Telephonic Status Conference held on 8/24/2005. Parties are directed to file joint CMP by 9/09/05. (TMD) (Entered: 09/01/2005)
40 CASE MANAGEMENT PLAN TENDERED by all plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Mag. Judge's Summary of Case Mgt. Plan)(Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/07/2005)
41 ORDER: CASE MANAGEMENT PLAN APPROVED. SCHEDULING ORDER:The Conference set 8/24/05 WAS HELD. Settlement Conference set for 3/16/2006 10:00 AM in room #210 before Magistrate Judge William G. Hussmann Jr. Signed by Judge William G. Hussmann Jr. on 9/12/05. (TMD) (Entered: 09/13/2005)
42 Witness List and Exhibit List −Preliminary− by all plaintiffs. (Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/11/2005)
43 Exhibit List and Witness List by J. DAVID DONAHUE, CRAIG HANKS.. (Arthur, David) (Entered: 11/10/2005)
44 Joint MOTION to Extend Case Management Deadlines by all plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 12/29/2005)
45 MOTION to Establish Trial Date by all plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 12/29/2005)
46 ORDER granting 45 Motion for order to establish trial date. Court Trial set for 7/10/2006 09:30 AM in room #215 before Judge Larry J. McKinney. Signed by Judge William G. Hussmann Jr. on 1/04/06. (TMD) (Entered: 01/04/2006)
47 ORDER granting 44 Motion to Extend Case Management Deadlines . Signed by Judge William G. Hussmann Jr. on 1/04/06. (TMD) (Entered: 01/04/2006)
48 Minute Entry on unscheduled conference call held 1/06/06:Court Trial set for 7/10/06 is VACATED AND RESET to 8/28/2006 (7 days) at 09:00 AM in room #215 before Judge Larry J. McKinney. The settlement conference set 3/16/06 is confirmed. Signed by Judge William G. Hussmann Jr. on 1/12/06. (TMD) (Entered: 01/12/2006)
49 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to April 4, 2006 to Serve Expert Reports by all plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 03/23/2006)
50 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge William G. Hussmann Jr.: Settlement Conference held on 3/16/2006. Current trial setting of 8/28/06 is CONFIRMED. Defendants counsel is directed to make arrangements to have the first day of the trial conducted at the Wabash Valley CorrectionalFacility in Carlisle, Indiana, commencing at 9:00 a.m. (EDT), and to have thesecond day of the trial (August 29, 2006) conducted at the New CastleCorrectional Facility in New Castle, Indiana, commencing at 9:00 a.m. (EDT). Allsubsequent days of the trial will be conducted in Courtroom 202 of the U.S.Courthouse in Indianapolis, Indiana. (TMD) (Entered: 03/24/2006)
51 ORDER granting plaintiffs' 49 Motion for Extension of Time; plaintiffs are to serve their expert reports no later than 04/04/06, with defendant to file their reports 30 days thereafter . Signed by Judge Larry J. McKinney on 03/28/06. (NKD, ) (Entered: 03/28/2006)
52 NOTICE by all plaintiffs of Service of Experts' Reports on Defendants (Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/04/2006)
53 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to 05/05/2006 to file witness and exhibit lists by J. DAVID DONAHUE, CRAIG HANKS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Arthur, David) (Entered: 04/27/2006)

Case: 2:05-cv-37 As of: 03/15/2020 01:02 PM EDT 5 of 12

04/28/2006 05/02/2006 05/05/2006 05/10/2006
05/10/2006 06/05/2006 06/05/2006
06/09/2006 07/20/2006 07/21/2006 07/25/2006 07/25/2006 07/25/2006
07/26/2006 09/25/2006
10/05/2006 10/05/2006

54 Witness List and Exhibit List − Final by all plaintiffs. (Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/28/2006)
55 ORDER granting 53 Motion for Extension of Time to File witness and exhibit lists to 05/05/06 . Signed by Judge Larry J. McKinney on 05/02/06. (VS, ) (Entered: 05/02/2006)
56 Joint MOTION to Extend Case Management Deadlines So That Parties May Pursue Settlement by all plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 05/05/2006)
57 ORDER granting 56 Motion to Extend Case Management Deadline. Final witness and exhibit list and expert disclosure due 6/09/06. Dispositive Motions due by 7/7/2006. Motions to preclude or limit expert testimony shall be filed no later than 8/11/06. Parties shall file a status report concerning settlement no later than 6/05/06. Signed by Judge William G. Hussmann Jr. on 5/10/06. (TMD) (Entered: 05/10/2006)
58 SCHEDULING ORDER: Final Pretrial Conference set for 8/11/06 at 11:00 AM in room #204 before Judge Larry J. McKinney. Signed by Judge Larry J. McKinney on 05/10/06. (GJQ) (Entered: 05/10/2006)
59 STATUS REPORT (Joint) by all plaintiffs. (Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 06/05/2006)
60 Order on Attorney Conference call held 5/31/06. Settlement Conference set for 7/6/2006 09:30 AM in room #210 before Magistrate Judge William G. Hussmann Jr. Current trial setting of 8/28/06 remains on calendar. Other internal litigation deadlines are STAYED until a settlement conference can be held. Signed by Judge William G. Hussmann Jr. on 6/05/06. (TMD) (Entered: 06/05/2006)
61 ORDER APPROVING 59 Status Report filed by BRIAN MAST,, MICHAEL WOODS,, EUGENE WELLS. Settlement conference set 7/6/06 at 9:30 am. Signed by Judge William G. Hussmann Jr. on 6/09/06. (TMD) (Entered: 06/09/2006)
62 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge William G. Hussmann Jr.: Settlement Conference held on 7/6/2006. (SMD) (Entered: 07/21/2006)
SCHEDULING ORDER: Status Conference set for 7/24/2006 01:30 PM Telephonic before Magistrate Judge William G. Hussmann Jr. Signed by Judge William G. Hussmann Jr. on 7/20/06. (SMD) (Entered: 07/21/2006)
63 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by J. DAVID DONAHUE, CRAIG HANKS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Weaver, Todd) (Entered: 07/25/2006)
64 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge William G. Hussmann Jr.: Telephonic Status Conference held on 7/24/2006. (TMD) (Entered: 07/25/2006)
SCHEDULING ORDER: Final pre−trial conference set 8/11/06 and trial date of 8/28/06 are VACATED. Bench Trial set (7 days) for 11/13/2006 09:00 AM in room #215 before Judge Larry J. McKinney. Final Pretrial Conference set for 10/19/2006 11:00 AM in room #204 before Judge Larry J. McKinney. Settlement Conference set for 8/28/2006 01:30 PM in room #328 before Magistrate Judge William G. Hussmann Jr. Discovery due by 9/22/2006. Signed by Judge William G. Hussmann Jr. on 7/25/06. (TMD) (Entered: 07/25/2006)
65 ORDER granting 63 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Apppearance of Todd A. Weaver for defendants is withdrawn. Signed by Judge William G. Hussmann Jr. on 7/26/06. (TMD) (Entered: 07/26/2006)
66 MOTION for Defendants to Bring a Representative of the New Castle Correctional Facility to October 11, 2006 Settlement Conference, filed by Plaintiffs BRIAN MAST, MICHAEL WOODS, EUGENE WELLS., (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/25/2006)
67 ORDER granting 66 Motion for Defendants to Bring a Representative of the New Castle Correctional Facility to the 10/11/06 Settlement Conference. Signed by Judge William G. Hussmann Jr. on 10/5/06. (SMD) (Entered: 10/05/2006)
68 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge William G. Hussmann Jr.: Status Conference held on 9/13/2006. (SMD) (Entered: 10/05/2006)

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10/05/2006 10/11/2006 10/11/2006
10/12/2006 12/07/2006
01/04/2007 01/19/2007 01/30/2007 01/30/2007 02/05/2007 02/08/2007 03/20/2007 03/22/2007 04/10/2007 04/16/2007

SCHEDULING ORDER:Settlement Conference set for 10/11/2006 10:00 AM in room #355 (IP) before Magistrate Judge John Paul Godich. Defendants are directed to have present a representative from the Indiana Department of Correction. Signed by Judge William G. Hussmann Jr. on 10/5/06. (SMD) (Entered: 10/05/2006)
69 Joint MOTION for Continuance of Trial and Final Pre−Trial Conference, filed by Plaintiffs BRIAN MAST, MICHAEL WOODS, EUGENE WELLS., (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/11/2006)
70 ENTRY for 10/11/06: The parties appeared in person and by counsel for Settlement Conference. Conference held and concluded w/o resolution., SCHEDULING ORDER:Settlement Conference set for 11/6/2006 01:30 PM in room #355 before Magistrate Judge John Paul Godich. The parties were ordered to appear in person and by counsel and Defts were ordered to produce CMA representatives. Signed by Judge John Paul Godich on 10/11/06. (SWM) (Entered: 10/13/2006)
71 ORDER granting 69 Motion for Continuance. Trial set 11/13/06 and final pretrial conference set 10/19/06 are VACATED. TElephonic Status Conference set for 1/3/2007 05:00 PM (bridge) before Magistrate Judge William G. Hussmann Jr. Signed by Judge William G. Hussmann Jr. on 10/12/06. (TMD) (Entered: 10/13/2006)
72 ORDER: The parties appeared by counsel for Telephone Status Conference on 12/6/06. SCHEDULING ORDER: Status Conference set for 12/22/2006 11:00 AM in room #355 before Magistrate Judge John Paul Godich. Pltfs are ordered to appear by counsel. Defts are ordered to appear by counsel and with appropriate representatives of the IDOC. Signed by Judge John Paul Godich on 12/7/06. (SWM) (Entered: 12/08/2006)
73 SCHEDULING ORDER: Status Conference set for 1/23/2007 01:30 PM in room #355 before Magistrate Judge John Paul Godich. Defts are ordered to produce CMA representatives in person. Signed by Judge John Paul Godich on 1/4/07. (SWM) (Entered: 01/05/2007)
74 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge William G. Hussmann Jr.: Telephonic Status Conference held on 1/3/2007. By separate order, a settlement conference has been set before Magistrate John Paul Godich on 1/23/07. (NRN) (Entered: 01/19/2007)
75 NOTICE, filed by Plaintiffs BRIAN MAST, MICHAEL WOODS, EUGENE WELLS of Tendering of Private Settlement Agreement. (Attachments: # 1 Private Settlement Agreement) (Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 01/30/2007)
76 MOTION to Approve Form and Manner of Class Notice and Request to Set Fairness Hearing, filed by Plaintiffs BRIAN MAST, MICHAEL WOODS, EUGENE WELLS., (Attachments: # 1 Class Notice# 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 01/30/2007)
77 ORDER granting 76 Motion APPROVED and shall be given as specified in paragraphs 25 and 26 of private settlement agreenent Hearing set for 3/30/2007 10:00 AM in room #215 before Judge Larry J. McKinney.. Signed by Judge Larry J. McKinney on 02/05/07. (VS) (Entered: 02/05/2007)
78 Letter from Nathan Gaustad regarding case status. (PG) (Entered: 02/09/2007)
79 MOTION for Continuance of Fairness Hearing/Report of Class Counsel, filed by Plaintiffs BRIAN MAST, MICHAEL WOODS, EUGENE WELLS., (Attachments: # 1 Summary of Prisoner Comments# 2 Prisoner Comments Pt 1# 3 Prisoner Comments Pt. 2# 4 Text of Proposed Order)(Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 03/20/2007)
80 ORDER granting 79 Motion for ContinuanceSCHEDULING ORDER: Hearing set for 6/6/2007 10:00 AM in room #202 before Judge Larry J. McKinney.. Signed by Judge Larry J. McKinney on 03/22/07. (VS) (Entered: 03/22/2007)
81 MOTION for Conference, filed by Plaintiffs BRIAN MAST, MICHAEL WOODS, EUGENE WELLS., (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/10/2007)
82 Letter Regarding case − Oscar Smith # 861084 (VS) (Entered: 04/16/2007)

Case: 2:05-cv-37 As of: 03/15/2020 01:02 PM EDT 7 of 12

04/30/2007
05/25/2007 05/25/2007 07/12/2007 08/13/2007 08/15/2007
08/31/2007 08/31/2007 09/05/2007 09/18/2007 09/18/2007 09/20/2007 09/21/2007 09/24/2007
10/18/2007
10/18/2007 10/19/2007
10/25/2007

83 ORDER granting 81 Motion for conference.SCHEDULING ORDER: Status Conference set for 5/18/2007 10:00 AM in room #353 (Indianapolis) before Magistrate Judge William G. Hussmann Jr. Signed by Judge William G. Hussmann Jr. on 4/30/07. (TMD) (Entered: 04/30/2007)
SCHEDULING ORDER: Fairness Hearing set for 6/06/07 is VACATED AND RESET to 9/7/2007 10:00 AM in room #202 before Judge Larry J. McKinney. Signed by Judge William G. Hussmann Jr. on 5/25/07. (TMD) (Entered: 05/25/2007)
84 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge William G. Hussmann Jr.: Pretrial Conference held on 5/18/2007. (TMD) (Entered: 06/01/2007)
85 Letter received from Steven o'Bryant concerning settlement of case (VS) (Entered: 07/12/2007)
86 MOTION for Attorneys' Conference, filed by Plaintiffs BRIAN MAST, MICHAEL WOODS, EUGENE WELLS., (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Order No. 1# 2 Text of Proposed Order Order No. 2)(Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 08/13/2007)
87 ORDER granting 86 Motion for Attorneys' Conference. Telephonic conference of attorneys is set for 8/28/2007 09:30 AM (bridge) before Magistrate Judge William G. Hussmann Jr. Signed by Judge William G. Hussmann Jr. on 8/15/07. (TMD) (Entered: 08/15/2007)
88 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge William G. Hussmann Jr.: Status Conference held on 8/28/2007. (SMD) (Entered: 08/31/2007)
SCHEDULING ORDER:Fairness Hearing set for 9/7/07 VACATED and RESET for 9/21/2007 10:00 AM in room #202 in Indianapolis before Judge Larry J. McKinney. Signed by Judge William G. Hussmann Jr. on 8/31/07. (SMD) (Entered: 08/31/2007)
89 CORRECTING ORDER: Fairness Hearing set for 9/07/07 is RESET to 11/21/2007 10:00 AM in room #202 before Judge Larry J. McKinney. Signed by Judge William G. Hussmann Jr. on 9/05/07. (TMD) (Entered: 09/05/2007)
90 MOTION to Appear pro hac vice by Elizabeth Alexander, filed by Plaintiffs BRIAN MAST, MICHAEL WOODS, EUGENE WELLS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(PG) (Entered: 09/18/2007)
91 *VOIDED* RECEIPT #IP 3275 in the amount of $ 30.00 for phv fee, Alexander (PG) Modified on 9/19/2007 (WJC). Modified on 9/19/2007 (WJC). (Entered: 09/18/2007)
92 RECEIPT #TH 000178 in the amount of $ 30.00 FOR (Elizabeth Alexader) PHV (VS) (Entered: 09/20/2007)
93 NOTICE of Substitution of Appearance by Kenneth J. Falk replacing David Fathi on behalf of all plaintiffs (Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/21/2007)
94 ORDER granting 90 Motion to Appear pro hac vice. Attorney Elizabeth Alexander for BRIAN MAST, EUGENE WELLS and MICHAEL WOODS added. Signed by Judge William G. Hussmann Jr. on 9/24/07. (TMD) Modified on 9/24/2007 (TMD). (Entered: 09/24/2007)
95 NOTICE (JOINT) of Substitution of Attachment to Private Settlement Agreement and Plaintiffs' Motion to Approve Form and Manner of Notice to the Class, filed by Plaintiffs BRIAN MAST, MICHAEL WOODS, EUGENE WELLS (Attachments: # 1 class notice# 2 Executive Directive# 3 Text of Proposed Order) (Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/18/2007)
96 Letter Regarding medications − James Snodgrass (VS) (Entered: 10/19/2007)
97 ORDER granting plaintiff's Motion to Approve Form and Manner of Supplemental Notice to the Class; supplemental notice to the class is approved; notice shall be given and class counsel shall file their report as provided in Motion. Signed by Judge Larry J. McKinney on 10/19/07. (NKD) (Entered: 10/22/2007)
98 Submission of Entry concerning case, filed by Plaintiff BRIAN MAST. (NKD) (Entered: 10/25/2007)

Case: 2:05-cv-37 As of: 03/15/2020 01:02 PM EDT 8 of 12

11/05/2007 11/19/2007 11/20/2007 11/21/2007
11/26/2007 11/26/2007
12/05/2007 12/06/2007 01/16/2008 01/30/2008 01/31/2008 02/06/2008 02/15/2008 02/25/2008 02/27/2008 03/03/2008

99 Submission of Entry, filed by Plaintiff BRIAN MAST. (NKD) (Entered: 11/05/2007)
100 Submission Report of Class Counsel Following Notice to the Class, filed by Plaintiffs BRIAN MAST, MICHAEL WOODS, EUGENE WELLS. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment − Prisoner letters)(Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 11/19/2007)
101 Submission Supplemental Report to the Court Following Notice to the Class, filed by Plaintiffs BRIAN MAST, MICHAEL WOODS, EUGENE WELLS. (Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 11/20/2007)
102 ENTRY: Parties appear by counsel for Class Action Settlement Fairness Hearing on 11/21/07. On the record the Court made findings pursuant to Rule 23(e) and to the factors for making a finding that a settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate pursuant to the Seventh Circuit's directives. Parties shall provide the necessary Order for the Court's signature. Signed by Judge Larry J. McKinney on 11/21/07. (GJQ) (Entered: 11/21/2007)
103 NOTICE of Submission of Proposed Order, filed by Plaintiffs BRIAN MAST, MICHAEL WOODS, EUGENE WELLS (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order) (Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 11/26/2007)
104 ORDER finding private settlement agreement to be fair, reasonable and adequate pursuant to rule 23(e) of the federal rules of civil procedure; ORDERED this matter is herby STAYED for two years from this date, thereafter to be dismissed without prejudice to being reinstated by plaintiffs or class members pursuant to terms of paragraph 28 of the private settlement agreement. Signed by Judge Larry J. McKinney on 11/26/07. (VS) (Entered: 11/27/2007)
105 MOTION to Establish Schedule to File For Attorneys' Fees Pursuant to Paragraph 23 of the Private Settlement Agreement, filed by Plaintiffs BRIAN MAST, MICHAEL WOODS, EUGENE WELLS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 12/05/2007)
106 ORDER granting plaintiff's 105 Motion to establish schedule to file for attorney fees; plaintiff's shall have to and including 02/03/08n to file initial request for attorneys' fees and costs for monitoring. Signed by Judge Larry J. McKinney on 12/06/07. (VS) (Entered: 12/06/2007)
107 Submission of a document filed by JOHN ERIC THOMAS(CBU) (Entered: 01/17/2008)
109 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order, filed by Plaintiff BRIAN MAST. (PG) (Entered: 02/01/2008)
108 MOTION for Extension of Time to March 4, 2008 for Plaintiffs to File for Attorneys' Fees and Costs (Agreed), filed by Plaintiffs BRIAN MAST, MICHAEL WOODS, EUGENE WELLS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 01/31/2008)
110 ORDER granting Plaintiffs' 108 Motion for Extension of Time to File initial request for attorneys' fees and costs for monitoring to 3/4/08. Signed by Magistrate Judge William G. Hussmann, Jr on 2/6/08. (SMD) (Entered: 02/06/2008)
111 MOTION for Pretrial Conference, filed by Plaintiff BRIAN MAST. (VS) (Entered: 02/19/2008)
112 ENTRY Directing Further Proceedings; ORDER denying 109 Motion for temporary restraining order filed by Brian Mast. Signed by Judge Larry J. McKinney on 02/25/08. (NKD) (Entered: 02/26/2008)
113 Second MOTION for Extension of Time to April 3, 2008 for Plaintiffs to File for Attorneys' Fees and Costs, filed by Plaintiffs BRIAN MAST, MICHAEL WOODS, EUGENE WELLS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 02/27/2008)
114 ORDER granting plaintiff's 113 Motion for Extension of Time; plaintiffs shall have to and including 04/03/08 to file their initial request for attorneys' fees and costs for monitoring in this matter. Signed by Judge Larry J. McKinney on 03/03/08. (NKD) (Entered: 03/04/2008)

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03/07/2008 04/01/2008
04/03/2008 05/02/2008
05/07/2008 06/03/2008 08/07/2008 10/06/2008 10/07/2008
10/21/2008 03/25/2009 03/25/2009 03/26/2009
05/29/2009
06/04/2009 06/04/2009 09/16/2009

115 MOTION for pre−trial conference, filed by Plaintiff BRIAN MAST. (NKD) (Entered: 03/07/2008)
116 Third MOTION for Extension of Time to May 5, 2008 for Plaintiffs to File for Attorneys' Fees and Costs (Agreed), filed by Plaintiffs BRIAN MAST, MICHAEL WOODS, EUGENE WELLS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/01/2008)
117 ORDER granting 116 Motion for Extension of Time to 5/05/08 to file initial request for attorneys' fees and costs. Signed by Magistrate Judge William G. Hussmann, Jr on 4/03/08. (TMD) (Entered: 04/03/2008)
118 Fourth MOTION for Extension of Time to June 4, 2008 for Plaintiffs to File for Attorneys' Fees and Costs, filed by Plaintiffs BRIAN MAST, MICHAEL WOODS, EUGENE WELLS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 05/02/2008)
119 ORDER granting 118 Motion for Extension of Time to 6/04/08 for filing of initial request for attorneys' fees and costs. Signed by Magistrate Judge William G. Hussmann, Jr on 5/07/08. (TMD) (Entered: 05/07/2008)
120 NOTICE Concerning Attorneys' Fees and Costs, filed by Plaintiffs BRIAN MAST, MICHAEL WOODS, EUGENE WELLS (Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 06/03/2008)
121 ORDER denying 111 Motion for Pretrial Conference; denying 115 Motion. Signed by Judge Larry J. McKinney on 08/07/08. (VS) (Entered: 08/07/2008)
122 Submission APPEARANCE of Class Action Plaintiff, filed by Eric D. Smith(TRG) (Entered: 10/07/2008)
123 MOTION for Order Holding Defendants in Contempt of Court for Violating the Settlement Agreement and for Award of Punitive Damages, filed by Eric D. Smith. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment No. 1, # 2 Attachment No. 2)(TRG) (Entered: 10/07/2008)
124 ENTRY concerning selected matters; denying 123 Motion for order holding defendants in contempt of court. Signed by Judge Larry J. McKinney on 10/21/08. (VS) (Entered: 10/21/2008)
125 SCHEDULING ORDER: Telephonic Status Conference set for 4/28/2009 03:00 PM (bridge) before Magistrate Judge William G. Hussmann Jr. Signed by Magistrate Judge William G. Hussmann, Jr on 3/25/2009.(TMD) (Entered: 03/25/2009)
126 Unopposed MOTION for Continuance of telephonic status conference, filed by Defendants J. DAVID DONAHUE, CRAIG HANKS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Arthur, David) (Entered: 03/25/2009)
127 ORDER granting 126 Motion for Continuance of telephonic status conference. Telephonic Status Conference set for 4/28/09 is VACATED AND RESET TO 6/1/2009 11:00 AM (bridge) before Magistrate Judge William G. Hussmann Jr. Signed by Magistrate Judge William G. Hussmann, Jr on 3/26/2009. (TMD) (Entered: 03/26/2009)
128 SCHEDULING ORDER: Telephonic Status Conference set for 6/01/09 is RESET TO 6/2/2009 11:00 AM (bridge)before Magistrate Judge William G. Hussmann Jr. Signed by Magistrate Judge William G. Hussmann, Jr on 5/29/2009.(TMD) (Entered: 05/29/2009)
129 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge William G. Hussmann, Jr: Status Conference held on 6/2/2009. (TMD) (Entered: 06/05/2009)
SCHEDULING ORDER: Telephonic Status Conference set for 12/7/2009 09:15 AM (bridge) before Magistrate Judge William G. Hussmann Jr. Signed by Magistrate Judge William G. Hussmann, Jr on 6/4/2009.(TMD) (Entered: 06/05/2009)
130 Clerk's Notice of Change of Terre Haute Division Mailing Address. (JD) (Entered: 09/16/2009)

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11/30/2009 12/04/2009
12/31/2009 06/15/2010 06/03/2013 06/10/2013
10/06/2014 03/18/2019 03/18/2019 03/19/2019
03/19/2019
03/20/2019
03/20/2019

131 NOTICE to the Court Concerning Case Status (JOINT), filed by Plaintiffs BRIAN MAST, EUGENE WELLS, MICHAEL WOODS (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order) (Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 11/30/2009)
132 ORDER re 131 Notice to Court Concerning Case Status filed by EUGENE WELLS, BRIAN MAST and MICHAEL WOODS − Based on the information set out herein, the telephone status conference set for 12/7/09 @ 9:15 am is VACATED. Signed by Magistrate Judge William G. Hussmann, Jr on 12/4/2009.(SMD) (Entered: 12/04/2009)
133 CLOSED DISMISSED without prejudice; pursuant to Court's Entry of 11/26/07, subject to reinstatement by plaintiffs or class members pursuant to terms of paragraph 28 of parties' Private Settlement Agreement. Signed by Judge Larry J. McKinney on 12/31/2009.(NKD) (Entered: 12/31/2009)
134 DECLARATION of John Eric Thomas by BRIAN MAST. (NKD) (Entered: 06/16/2010)
135 MOTION Requesting Copies of the complt and any amended complts − Request made by Kyle Payment. (Attachments: # 1 Envelope)(CBU) (Entered: 06/04/2013)
136 ENTRY − The non−party request for a copy of the complaint [Dkt. No. 135] is granted to the extent that Kyle L. Payment is notified that the cost of obtaining a copy of the 21−page complaint with attachments is Ten Dollars and Fifty Cents ($10.50). (See Entry.) Copy mailed pursuant to distribution list. Signed by Judge Larry J. McKinney on 6/10/2013. (RSF) (Entered: 06/10/2013)
137 NOTICE of Claim for Tort filed by JOE HOWARD MCCLAIN. No c/s. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment 1, # 2 Envelope) (AH) (Entered: 10/07/2014)
138 STIPULATION to Terminate Private Settlement Agreement Following Notice to the Class and Approval by the Court / Joint Motion to Approve Manner of Notice, filed by Plaintiffs BRIAN MAST, EUGENE WELLS, MICHAEL WOODS. (Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 03/18/2019)
139 MOTION to Approve Class Notice, filed by Plaintiffs BRIAN MAST, EUGENE WELLS, MICHAEL WOODS. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed class notice, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 03/18/2019)
140 ORDER REASSIGNING CASE. Pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. Section 137 and Local Rule 401(f) of the Southern District of Indiana, the Clerk is directed to randomly reassign this case to a District Judge and Magistrate Judge. Upon completion of the reassignment the Clerk will notify the parties in the case of the newly assigned Judges. Signed by Judge Jane Magnus−Stinson on 3/19/2019.(NLR) (Entered: 03/19/2019)
141 NOTICE of Reassignment of Case to Judge James Patrick Hanlon and Magistrate Judge Doris L. Pryor. Judge Larry J. McKinney, Magistrate Judge William G. Hussmann, Jr is no longer assigned to this case. Please include the new case number, 2:05−cv−00037−JPH−DLP, on all future filings in this matter. (NLR) (Entered: 03/19/2019)
142 ORDER APPROVING FORM AND MANNER OF CLASS NOTICE − The plaintiffs' Motion to Approve Class Notice, dkt 139 , is granted. IT IS ORDERED that the proposed class notice is approved, and it shall be given as set out in the parties' Stipulation. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no earlier than 30 days after the notice is first posted or delivered as set out in the Stipulation, plaintiffs' counsel shall report back to the Court as to the results of the notice. The requested fairness hearing shall be set by separate Order. (See Order.) Signed by Judge James Patrick Hanlon on 3/20/2019. (DMW) (Entered: 03/20/2019)
143 ENTRY REOPENING CASE − This action was closed on December 31, 2009, subject to reinstatement by plaintiffs or class members pursuant to the terms of the parties' Private Settlement Agreement. See dkt 75−1. The parties have now stipulated to terminate the Private Settlement Agreement following notice to the class and approval by the Court. Accordingly, this civil case is now reinstated, consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 3626(c). The clerk is directed to reopen this action on the docket. (See Entry.) Signed by Judge James Patrick Hanlon on 3/20/2019. (DMW) (Entered: 03/20/2019)

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03/20/2019 03/20/2019 04/02/2019 04/17/2019 05/01/2019 05/03/2019 05/15/2019 06/06/2019
06/10/2019
06/10/2019
06/10/2019 06/10/2019 06/17/2019

144 ORDER SETTING FAIRNESS HEARING − The Court now SCHEDULES this matter for a fairness hearing on June 20, 2019, at 10:00 a.m. in Room 131, United States Courthouse, 921 Ohio Street, Terre Haute, Indiana. Signed by Judge James Patrick Hanlon on 3/20/2019. (DMW) (Entered: 03/20/2019)
145 MOTION to Approve Amended Class Notice, filed by Plaintiffs BRIAN MAST, EUGENE WELLS, MICHAEL WOODS. (Attachments: # 1 Amended class notice, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 03/20/2019)
146 ORDER − Granting 145 Motion to Approve Amended Class Notice. The amended class notice shall be given in the manner provided in this Court's Order of March 20, 2019 (Dkt. 142 ), in place of the notice previously approved in that Order. Signed by Judge James Patrick Hanlon on 4/2/2019. (DMW) (Entered: 04/02/2019)
147 MOTION for Leave to Intervene, filed by non−party PHILLIP LITTLER. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibits)(MAT) (Entered: 04/17/2019)
148 Letter from Non−party, Mitakuye Oyasin. (Attachments: # 1 Envelope) (MAT) (Entered: 05/02/2019)
149 MOTION for Acknowledgement, filed by Non−Party PHILLIP LITTLER. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(LBT) (Entered: 05/03/2019)
150 DECLARATION of Non−Party, Gregory A. Taylor. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(DMW) (Entered: 05/15/2019)
151 ENTRY DISCUSSING PHILLIP LITTLER'S MOTION TO INTERVENE − Phillip Littler, an Indiana State prisoner, seeks leave to intervene in this class action. The request to intervene, dkt 147 , is denied as unnecessary because Rule 23(e) (5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifically provides that "[a]ny class member may object to the proposal if it requires court approval." Mr. Littler's motion to acknowledge the fact that he filed a motion for leave to intervene, dkt 149 , is granted. The motion was received and filed. (See Entry.) Copy via U.S. Mail pursuant to distribution list. Signed by Judge James Patrick Hanlon on 6/6/2019. (DMW) (Entered: 06/07/2019)
152 REPORT of Class Counsel by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Bates, # 2 Exhibit Cuckovic, # 3 Exhibit Dimmett, # 4 Exhibit Douglass, # 5 Exhibit Hale, # 6 Exhibit Justise, # 7 Exhibit Grimsley, # 8 Exhibit McDaniel, # 9 Exhibit Miller, # 10 Exhibit Riley, # 11 Exhibit Robertson, # 12 Exhibit Spivey, # 13 Exhibit Valle, # 14 Exhibit Phipps, # 15 Exhibit Prisoner A− Seal Notice, # 16 Exhibit Prisoner B− Seal Notice, # 17 Exhibit Prisoner C− Seal Notice, # 18 Exhibit Prisoner D− Seal Notice, # 19 Exhibit Prisoner E− Seal Notice, # 20 Exhibit Prisoner F− Seal Notice, # 21 Exhibit Prisoner G− Seal Notice, # 22 Exhibit Prisoner H− Seal Notice, # 23 Exhibit Prisoner I− Seal Notice, # 24 Exhibit Prisoner J− Seal Notice, # 25 Exhibit Prisoner K− Seal Notice, # 26 Exhibit Prisoner L− Seal Notice, # 27 Exhibit DSM−IV Excerpt)(Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 06/10/2019)
153 Unopposed SEALED MOTION to Maintain Certain Documents Under Seal, filed by Plaintiffs BRIAN MAST, EUGENE WELLS, MICHAEL WOODS. (Attachments: # 1 Letter−Prisoner A, # 2 Letter −Prisoner B, # 3 Letter−Prisoner C, # 4 Letter−Prisoner D, # 5 Letter−Prisoner E, # 6 Letter−Prisoner F, # 7 Letter−Prisoner G, # 8 Letter−Prisoner H, # 9 Letter−Prisoner I, # 10 Letter−Prisoner J, # 11 Letter−Prisoner K, # 12 Letter−Prisoner L)(Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 06/10/2019)
154 MOTION to Maintain Document Under Seal 153 Unopposed SEALED MOTION to Maintain Certain Documents Under Seal , filed by Plaintiffs BRIAN MAST, EUGENE WELLS, MICHAEL WOODS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 06/10/2019)
155 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support re 153 Unopposed SEALED MOTION to Maintain Certain Documents Under Seal , filed by Plaintiffs BRIAN MAST, EUGENE WELLS, MICHAEL WOODS. (Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 06/10/2019)
156 The Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion to Maintain Certain Documents Under Seal and Motion to Maintain the Motion Under Seal, dkts 153 and 154 , are granted. Docket number 153 discloses individual mental health histories and shall remain restricted to court users and case participants. Docket number 154 remains unrestricted. (See

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06/18/2019 06/20/2019 06/24/2019 06/24/2019
06/27/2019 07/02/2019 07/23/2019
07/23/2019 01/08/2020

Order.) Signed by Judge James Patrick Hanlon on 6/17/2019. (DMW) (Entered: 06/17/2019)
157 NOTICE of Submission of Proposed Order, filed by Plaintiffs BRIAN MAST, EUGENE WELLS, MICHAEL WOODS (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order) (Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 06/18/2019)
158 NOTICE of Citation to Supplemental Authority, filed by Plaintiffs BRIAN MAST, EUGENE WELLS, MICHAEL WOODS (Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 06/20/2019)
159 NOTICE of Submission of Proposed Order, filed by Plaintiffs BRIAN MAST, EUGENE WELLS, MICHAEL WOODS (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order) (Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 06/24/2019)
160 MINUTE ORDER for proceedings held before Judge James Patrick Hanlon: On June 20, 2019, the Court held a hearing on the parties' Stipulation to Terminate Private Settlement Agreement Following Notice to the Class and Approval by the Court, dkt. 138, to determine if the proposed stipulation is fair, reasonable and adequate as required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). Plaintiffs appeared by counsel, Kenneth Faulk, and Defendants appeared by counsel, senior Deputy Attorney General David Arthur. The hearing was recorded by Court Reporter, David Moxley. The Court found that proper and adequate notice was given, consistent with the Court's Order, dkt. 142, and the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(1). Prior to the hearing, counsel filed a proposed order, dkt. 157. Within seven (7) days, counsel shall prepare and submit a supplemental proposed final judgment.The Stipulation to Terminate the Private Settlement Agreement is taken under advisement. (*See Entry for further details.) Signed by Judge James Patrick Hanlon. (PKP) (Entered: 06/25/2019)
161 NOTICE of Submission of Additional Letter from Prisoner, filed by Plaintiffs BRIAN MAST, EUGENE WELLS, MICHAEL WOODS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Letter from Mr. Sims) (Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 06/27/2019)
162 NOTICE of Submission of Additional Information from Prisoner (SECOND), filed by Plaintiffs BRIAN MAST, EUGENE WELLS, MICHAEL WOODS (Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 07/02/2019)
163 ORDER − On March 18, 2019, the parties filed a Stipulation to Terminate the Private Settlement Agreement Following Notice to the Class and Approval by the Court ("the Stipulated Agreement"). On June 20, 2019, the Court conducted a fairness hearing, as required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e). For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that the Stipulated Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate, and approves the termination of the Private Settlement Agreement. Dkt. 138 . Extending the operation of the IPAS Agreement will bring immediate, concrete benefits to many current and future DOC prisoners with serious mental illness. In contrast, the continued existence of the Mast Agreement would likely bring very little benefit to very few, if any, DOC prisoners. The agreement to terminate the Mast Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. The parties' Stipulated Agreement is acknowledged and allowed to take effect. A separate order closing the case shall now issue. (See Order.) Signed by Judge James Patrick Hanlon on 7/23/2019. (DMW) (Entered: 07/23/2019)
164 ORDER CLOSING CASE − The parties having filed their Stipulation to Terminate Private Settlement Agreement Following Notice to the Class and Approval by the Court, dkt. 138 , and the Court having concluded that the Stipulation to Terminate is fair, reasonable, and adequate, the Stipulation to Terminate is now deemed effective. The Private Settlement Agreement, dkt. 75−1, is TERMINATED, and, this matter is CLOSED. Signed by Judge James Patrick Hanlon on 7/23/2019. (DMW) (Entered: 07/23/2019)
165 Submission of previously filed court order, filed by Plaintiff BRIAN MAST. (TMC) (Entered: 01/09/2020)

Case #: 2:05−cv−00037−JPH−DLP