IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

HOUSTON DIVISION

§

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT

§

OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

§

Plaintiff,

§

§

v.

§

§

BROWN GROUP RETAIL, INC. d/b/a

§

FAMOUS FOOTWEAR

§ JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Defendant.

§

§

ORIGINAL COMPLAINT

1. This is an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e, et seq. and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, as amended, 42

U.S.C. §1981 et seq. to correct unlawful employment practices on the basis of race, and

to provide appropriate relief to Princess Uzor who was adversely affected by such

practices. As alleged herein, the Defendant, Brown Group Retail, Inc. d/b/a Famous Wear

("Famous Footwear") unlawfully refused to hire Princess Uzor ("Charging Party" or "Uzor")

because of her race, Black, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

2.

Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§451, 1331,

1337, 1343 and 1345. This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to Section 706

(f)(1) and (3) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e, et seq. ("Title Villi) and Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,42 U.S.C. §1981A.

3. Venue is proper in this Court because the unlawful employment practices alleged below were and are now being committed within the jurisdiction of the United

States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division.

PARTIES 4. Plaintiff, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("Commission") is an agency ofthe United States of America charged with the administration, interpretation and enforcement of Title VII, and is expressly authorized to bring this action by Section 706 (f)(1)(3), 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5 (f)(1) and (3). 5. Defendant Famous Footwear has continuously been and is now doing business in the State of Texas and the City of Houston and has continuously had more than 15 employees. Famous Footwear may be served with process by serving its registered agent in Texas, CT Corporation System, 350 N. St. Paul Street, Dallas, Texas 75201. 6. At all relevant times, Defendant Famous Footwear has continuously been and is now an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 701 (b), (g) and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e(b), (g) and (h).
STATEMENT OF CLAIMS 7. More than thirty days prior to the institution of this lawsuit, Princess Uzor filed a charge of discrimination with the Commission alleging violations of Title VII by Defendant Famous Footwear, her former employer. All conditions precedent to the institution of this lawsuit have been fulfilled. 8. Since at least 2006, Famous Footwear has engaged in unlawful employment
practices at its store # 2312 located on State Highway 249 in Houston, Texas, in violation
of Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 9. In February 2006, Charging Party, a Black female, went to Famous
Footwear's store located on State Highway 249 and asked for an application for 2

employment from one of the store's managers. She was treated rudely and told that the store was not hiring. She was also told they did not have any applications available and therefore she could not be given an application to complete. Suspecting that the manager was not being honest, Charging Party contacted one of her friends, a white female, and asked her if she would be willing to go to the store and request a job application. The friend agreed, went to the store and was immediately provided with an original application. Upon learning that the white female was given an employment application, Charging Party immediately returned to the store and was denied an application on the same grounds that had been asserted earlier. Both of the store managers who refused to give Charging Party an employment application were white females. Despite her best efforts, Charging Party was barred from applying for a position by company managers who knew she was Black.
10. The effect of the practices complained of herein has been to deprive Ms. Uzor of equal employment opportunities and otherwise adversely affect her status as an employee by refusing to hire her because of her race.
11. The conduct described in the paragraphs above was intentional and was committed with malice or with willful disregard for the federally protected civil rights of Ms. Uzor.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, the Commission respectfully requests that this Court: 12. Grant a permanent injunction enjoining Defendant, its officers, successors, assigns and all persons in active concert or participation with it, from engaging in an employment practice which discriminates on the basis of race; 13. Order Defendant to institute and carry out policies, practices and procedures
3

which provide equal employment opportunities for African-Americans and which eradicates the effects of its unlawful employment practices.
14. Order Defendant to make Ms. Uzorwhole by providing appropriate back pay, with prejudgment interest in amounts to be determined at trial, and other affirmative relief necessary to eradicate the effects of the unlawful employment practices to which she was subjected.
15. Order instatement of Ms. Uzor into the same or a comparable position, or award her front pay in the amounts to be proved at trial, if instatement is impractical;
16. Award compensatory damages to Ms. Uzor in amounts to be proved at trial; 17. Award punitive damages to Ms. Uzor in amounts to be proved at trial; 18. Award pre-judgment and post-judgment interest on all amounts recovered as allowed by law; 19. Order all affirmative relief necessary to eradicate the effects of Defendant's unlawful employment practices; 20. Award the Commission its costs in this action; and 21. Grant such other and further relief as the Court deems necessary and proper.
JURY TRIAL DEMAND 22. The Commission requests a jury trial on all questions of fact raised by its complaint.
4

OF COUNSEL
Jim Sacher Regional Attorney
. Rose Adewale-Mendes Supervisory Trial Attorney
Houston District Office 1919 Smith, 7th Floor Houston, Texas 77002

Respectfully submitted, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION RONALD S. COOPER GENERAL COUNSEL JAMES LEE Deputy General Counsel GWENDOLYN YOUNG REAMS Associate General Counsel
1801 L. Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20507
By: thy D. Boutchee
Attorney-in-Charge Houston District Office TBN:02717500 SDN:10145 1919 Smith Street, 7th Floor Houston, Texas 77002 (713) 209-3399 Fax: (713) 209-3402 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
5

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION

EEOC

§

§

§

versus

§

CIVIL ACTION NO. H-06-3074

§

§

BROWN & GROUP RETAIL, INC.

§

Memorandum and Order Regarding Discovery Motions, Motions for Summary Judgment and Analoeous Motions to Dismiss

This Memorandum and Order addresses motions for discovery, motions for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, and motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) that ask this Court to consider matters outside the pleadings.
In view of the substantial waste of resources, public and private, that results from plainly improper motions of these types, the Court asks your cooperation as follows: (a) adhere to this Court's Rule 4C relating to discovery disputes; (b) do not designate a motion as one to dismiss an action under Rule 12(b)(6) that is in essence a motion for summary judgment; and (c) do not file a summary judgment motion which must be denied after consideration because some essential factual assertion is in dispute.
1. Most discovery disputes, especially those dealing with (1) scheduling or calendaring issues; (2) the number, length, or form of oral or written questions; (3) the responsiveness of answers to oral or written questions; and (4) the mechanics of document production, including protective orders and the proper method of raising claims of privilege, should be resolved by counsel without

court intervention. Therefore, the Court will not permit the filing of any written discovery motions without prior approval (See Court's Procedures - Rule 4C).
II. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) authorizes the court to treat a motion to dismiss an action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 if matters outside the pleadings are presented. In order to assure fair procedure, however, this Court does not treat a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment unless the non-moving party has received reasonable notice that a response of the type required by Rule 56 must be filed. In the rare instances in which this Court treats a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment, it does so only to proceed promptly to an inevitable disposition and avoid needless further filings by counsel. The Court intends never to allow a party to gain any advantage by filing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion that refers to matters outside the pleadings (whether by attaching affidavits or through some other way) in the hope that it will be treated as a motion for summary judgment. For these reasons and as a practical matter, the Court may simply deny a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss which relies on facts asserted outside the pleadings. By referring to matters outside the pleadings, the moving party impliedly represents that the Court should consider such material. Accepting that representation as correct, the Court will deny the motion unless summary judgment is appropriate. Summary judgment is not appropriate before the opposing party has had a reasonable opportunity to file a response that demonstrates a dispute of material fact.
2

Of course, a denial of such a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss will not bar the moving party from later contending that neither the pleading of the claim nor the evidence on record asserts a claim upon which relief can be granted. Such a contention goes to the legal merit of the claim and can be asserted at any time before judgment is entered as a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) or as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56.
III. To the Court's concern, parties frequently file motions for summary judgment (or Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss which depend on factual assertions not contained in the pleadings) before they can effectively demonstrate that the essential facts are undisputed. Perhaps this is explained by some fear that either the Court or opposing party may assert that the moving party has waived its opportunity to present such a motion. This fear is unwarranted. Rule 56 clearly states that motions for summary judgment may be filed at a later time without danger of waiver. If counsel for the moving party knows that even one of the facts essential to a motion for summary judgment is in dispute, then the motion cannot properly be filed. As stated in Rule 11, counsel's signature on a motion is a certificate that, to the best of your "knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose .... " If counsel knows that some essential fact in the case is in dispute, the certificate is not proper even if counsel believes that the evidence is heavily weighted toward a favorable finding.
3

Bear this in mind: In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court cannot properly make findings on disputed issues of fact. It cannot weigh evidence. Ifevidence must be weighed, then it must be weighed at trial, and the motion for summary judgment must be denied.
In addition, a motion for summary judgment cannot be granted when, given the state of discovery, it is not yet possible to ascertain whether essential assertions of fact made by the moving party will be in genuine dispute. In this circumstance, a motion requesting summary judgment is premature. It is a misuse of the time of both counsel and the Court for a party to file a motion for summary judgment before filing requests for admissions or other discovery devices designed to reveal whether the factual assertions on which the summary judgment motion is based are in dispute.
A motion under Rule 56 is timely filed when the pleadings clearly present no genuine issues of material fact. In cases pending before this Court, both parties are urged to defer filing motions for summary judgment before discovery is complete or where there is any doubt that some fact on which the motion is premised will be disputed.
These comments are not intended to discourage the filing of a motion for summary
judgment before expenses have been incurred in extended discovery if the motion is grounded on a legal theory under which the many factual controversies in the case are irrelevant. If counsel
files such a motion, however, it is improper under Rule 11 to add to the motion other grounds regarding facts which are in dispute. You may file a subsequent motion for summary judgment on such additional grounds if it becomes apparent after full discovery that the essential facts on which the additional motion is based are not in dispute.
4

The point is this: motions for summary judgment should present legal questions only. In
deciding such motions, the court rules on questions of law only and does not weigh evidence. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S.Ct. 1348 (1986).
IV. The Court further requests assistance in the resolution of motions for summary judgment in the following manner. Each motion for summary judgment shall include a statement of the material facts of record as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue for trial, complete with page references to affidavits, depositions and other documentation, if any are included or attached. Failure to include such a statement may constitute grounds for denial of the motion. The party opposing the motion for summary judgment shall include a concise statement of the material facts of record as to which it contends that there exists a genuine issue for trial, complete with page references to affidavits, depositions and other documentation. Copies of all referenced documentation shall be filed as exhibits to the motion or opposition. Material facts set forth in the statement served by the moving party will be deemed undisputed for purposes of the motion unless the statement served by the opposing parties asserts facts to the contrary. Counsel for a moving party should bear in mind that the required statement shall be a
"concise statement of the material facts." Fed R. Civ. P. 56 (emphasis added). It should be limited to facts that are undisputed and essential to judgment on each legal theory advanced. The
moving party should bear in mind that the longer a fact statement, the more likely an opponent is
to find some fact worthy of dispute. If an opponent disputes any part of a statement of facts, the moving party should establish that the opponent has no evidence (not merely less weighty
5

evidence) to support the assertion that the questioned fact is one in genuine dispute. A genuine

dispute on one essential fact defeats a motion for summary judgment.
v.

Finally, if counsel files a motion for summary judgment and at any time thereafter is not

prepared to certify that no genuine dispute exists as to any of the facts on which the relevant legal

theory is based, counsel has a professional obligation to this Court to notify the clerk aild

opposing counsel. The motion will be treated as withdrawn without prejudice to renewal if, at

a later time, counsel is able to certify that it appears that no genuine dispute exists.

Counsel shall serve a copy of this Order upon all parties.

Signed on this

10 day of O~ , 2006 at Houston, Texas.

VANESSA D. GILMORE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

6

 
 Case 4:06-cv-03074 Document 9 - Filed 07,/27-1-2001- - -Page -1- of 7 ..

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICf COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY §

COMMISSION,

§

§

Plaintiff,

§

§

v.

§

§

BROWN GROUP RETAIL, INC. d/b/a

§

FAMOUS FOOTWEAR,

§

§

Defendant.

§

CIVIL ACfION NO. H-06-3074 JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

CONSENT DECREE Plaintiff, the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("Commission") and Defendant Brown Group Retail, Inc, d/b/a Famous Footwear ("Defendant" or "Famous Footwear") agree to entry of this Consent Decree. I. Background and History of Proceedings A. Charging Party Princess Uzor ("Charging Party") filed a charge of discrimination with the Commission (Charge No. 460-2006-00705) alleging Defendant violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq. ("Title VII"). B. On September 29, 2006, after investigating the Charge and finding discrimination, the Commission commenced this action alleging that Defendant unlawfully refused to hire Charging Party because of her race in violation of Section 703 (a) ofTitle VII. C. Defendant denied the allegations in the complaint. D. The parties wish to avoid the risks, uncertainties and expenses of continued

Case 4:06-cv-03074 Document 9 Filed 07/27/2007 Page 2 of 7

litigation. Accordingly, the parties have agreed to settle this lawsuit. Neither Defendant's

consent to the entry of this Decree nor any of the terms set forth in it shall constitute or be

construed as an admission of any Title VII violation. Both parties agree that this Consent

Decree is being entered into for the purpose of compromising disputed claims without the

necessity for protracted litigation.

E. The Commission and Defendant stipulate to the jurisdiction of the Court

and

the satisfaction of all administrative prerequisites. The parties further waive hearing and

entry of findings of fact and conclusions oflaw on all issues.

IT IS ORDERED that:

1.

This Consent Decree is entered in full and complete settlement of any and

all claims arising out of or asserted in Civil Action No. H-06-3074 and the above

referenced Charge on behalf of Princess Uzor. This Consent Decree remains in

effect until the last day of the month twenty-four months from the date of entry of

the Consent Decree by the Court. ("Consent Period")

2.

During the Consent Period, Defendant and all of its employees and

affiliated companies are enjoined from engaging in any employment practices

which discriminate against any individual with respect to hiring, compensation,

terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of such individual's race

and are enjoined from retaliating against any individual who has opposed any

practice made an unlawful employment practice under the Title VII or who has

made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding or hearing under Title VII.

3.

Within six months of the beginning of the Consent Period, on an annual

Case 4:06-cv-03074 Document 9 Filed 07/27/2007 Page 3 of 7

basis, Defendant will provide a web-based anti-discrimination and anti-harassment

training program, EEO Discrimination Laws and Discrimination Prevention,

which addresses the illegality of employment discrimination in recruitment, hiring,

compensation, tenns and conditions or privileges of employment to all of its

management and hiring officials who work in the Houston metropolitan area

(Harris and Montgomery Counties.) Defendant shall submit to the EEOC a

curriculum outline indicating the information to be addressed during the training.

Electronic confirmation of the completion of the training shall be obtained by

Defendant from all individuals participating in the training and retained among the

employment records of Defendant. Defendant shall provide electronic verification

of each individuals' completion of the training to the EEOC within one month of

the training.

4.

Defendant agrees that within ten (10) days after entry of this Decree, it will

conspicuously post the attached notice (Exhibit "A") in an area accessible to all

employees at each of its store locations in Harris and Montgomery Counties for the

duration of the Consent Period

5.

Defendant agrees to pay the total sum of EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE

HUNDRED AND NOllOO DOLLARS ($8,500.00) in full and final settlement of

the Commission's lawsuit to provide monetary relief to Princess Uzor. Said sum

shall be paid to Ms. Uzor within fourteen (14) days from the date of entry of the

Decree. Defendant shaU mail or deliver the settlement sum to Ms. Uzor at the

address provided by the Commission to Defendant. A copy of the check disbursed

to Ms. Uzor shall be mailed to the Commission's undersigned counsel of record on

the same day the check is mailed or delivered to the Charging Party.

Case 4:06-cv-03074 Document 9 Filed 07/27/2007 Page 4 of 7

6.

As a condition of payment of the monies described in paragraph S, Princess

Uzor will execute a full, final, complete and general release of all claims relating

to Defendant's failure to hire her or provide her an employment application.

7.

The sums payable to the Charging Party may be subject to federal income

tax. Defendant agrees to issue Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") Form 1099 or an

equivalent form to Charging Party for all sums paid pursuant to this Consent

Decree. The Charging Party will be responsible for paying any federal, state or

local taxes, including federal income tax that may be due on the aforementioned

monetary award. Defendant and the Commission agree that the sums paid pursuant

to this Decree are for personal damages and emotional distress. Defendant makes

no representation as to the tax status of the funds being paid herein.

8. Each party to this action shall bear their own costs and attorney's fees.

9.

This Consent Decree shall be binding on Defendant and all of Defendant's

successors-in-interest, and Defendant will notify all such successors-in-interest of

the existence and tenns of this Consent Decree.

10.

During the Consent Period, the Court shall retain jurisdiction to assure

compliance with this Decree and to pennit entry of such further orders or

modifications as may be appropriate. The Commission is specifically authorized to

seek Court-ordered enforcement of this Decree in the event of a breach of any of

the provisions herein.

11.

The Commission agrees that, in the event the Commission believes

Defendant is in violation of any provision of this Consent Decree, the Commission

shall notify Defendant, through their undersigned counsel, of such violation and

afford Defendant the opportunity to remedy as may be appropriate any such alleged

Case 4:06-cv-03074 Document 9 Filed 07/27/2007 Page 5 of 7

violation within thirty (30) days of such notice, before instituting any legal action

to enforce such provision(s).

12.

Nothing in this Consent Decree shall be construed to preclude the

Commission from filing a separate action under Title VII or any other statute

which the Commission enforces in the future for any alleged violations by

Defendant not resolved by this Decree.

13.

Each signatory certifies that he/she is authorized to execute this document

on behalf of the party whom he/she represents.

Signed this Texas.

w-- day Of_..::.0\?~_l....;;zs(,L---_ ,L- _' 2007 at Houston, v~,~
United States District Judge

CaseA:06:-cy-.Q3074 Document 9 File9. Q7/~Xf~Q9!, Page 6 of 7

AGREED AND CONSENTED TO:
ATIORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY CO MI SION

ATIORNEY FOR DEFENDANT BROWN GROUP RETAIL, INC. d/b/a FAMOUS FOOTWEAR

By:
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORU.JNIIY CoMMISSION
1919 Smith Street, 7th Floor Howrton, Texas 77002 (713) 209-3399

By: . Collins
TB : 00796025 S N:.20013 SEYFARlH SHAW LLP 700 Louisiana Street, Suite 3700 Houston, Texas 77002-2797 (713) 225-2300 Fax: (713) 225-2340

Case 4:06-cv-03074 Document 9 Filed 07/27/2007 Page 7 of 7

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Houston District Office

Mickey Leland Federal Building

1919 Smith Street, 7" Floor Houston, TX 77002·8049 (713) 209·3320 ITY (713) 209·3439 FAX (713) 209·3381

NOTICE TO THE EMPLOYEES OF BROWN GROUP RETAIL, INC.

TI-llS NOTICE IS POSTED PURSUANT TO A CONSENT DECREE ENTERED IN RESOLUTION OF ALAWSUIT BROUGHT BY THE EEOC HOUSTON DISTRICT OFFICE AGAINST BROWN GROUP RETAIL, INC., D/B/A FAMOUS FOOTWEAR REGARDING RACE DISCRIMINATION PURSUANT TO TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, AS AMENDED.

I. Federal law requires that there be no discrimination against any employee or applicant for employment because ofsuch person's sex, race, color, religion, national origin, age or disability with respect to compensation, hiring or other terms, conditions or privileges of employment.
2. BROWN GROUP RETAIL supports and will comply with such Federal law in all respects and will not take any action against employee or applicant because they have exercised their rights under the law by filing charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), providing information to the EEOC, and/or receiving compensation for the settlement of any race discrimination claim.
3. BROWN GROUP RETAIL prohibits race discrimination and will not engage in any practice which alters the terms and conditions ofemployment or potential employment on the basis ofrace.
4. Race discrimination is expressly prohibited and constitutes an unlawful discriminatory employment practice. Such discriminatory employment practices will not be tolerated at BROWN GROUP RETAIL.
5. Any employee or applicant who feels they have been the target of such discrimination is advised to report this action promptly to _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ (Name, address, telephone number and email address)
SIGNED this _ _ day of _ _ _ _ _, 2007.

Title: BROWN GROUP RETAIL., Inc.
This OFFICIAL NOTICE shall remain posted for two full years from date of signing.
"EXHIBIT A"

 
 DC CM/ECF LIVE- US District Court-Texas Southern

https://ecf.txsd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/framemenu.pl

Query •

Reports •

Utilities •

Logout

1 of 1

8/8/2007 3:04 PM

DC CM/ECF LIVE- US District Court-Texas Southern - Docket Report

https://ecf.txsd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?934289191582686-L_3...

U.S. District Court SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (Houston) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:06-cv-03074

CLOSED

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Brown Group Retail Inc Assigned to: Judge Vanessa D Gilmore Cause: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Race)

Date Filed: 09/29/2006 Date Terminated: 07/30/2007 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Plaintiff

Plaintiff
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

represented by Kathy D Boutchee EEOC 1919 Smith St 7th Floor Houston, TX 77002 713-209-3399 Fax: 713-209-3402 fax Email: kathy.boutchee@eeoc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
Brown Group Retail Inc doing business as Famous Footwear

represented by John L Collins Seyfarth Shaw LLP 700 Louisiana Ste 3700 Houston, TX 77002-2797 713-225-2300 Fax: 713-225-2340 fax Email: jcollins@seyfarth.com LEAD ATTORNEY
Marjorie A Murphy Seyfarth Shaw LLP 700 Louisiana, Ste 3700 Houston, Tx 77002 713-860-0053 Fax: 713-225-2340 Email: mmurphy@seyfarth.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

1 of 3

8/8/2007 3:04 PM

DC CM/ECF LIVE- US District Court-Texas Southern - Docket Report

https://ecf.txsd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?934289191582686-L_3...

Date Filed 09/29/2006
09/29/2006 09/29/2006
10/10/2006 10/23/2006 10/31/2006 11/02/2006 01/22/2007 02/02/2007
02/06/2007
07/27/2007 07/30/2007

#

Docket Text

1 COMPLAINT against Brown Group Retail Inc (Filing fee $ 0.) filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.(lfilmore, ) Additional attachment(s) added on 10/2/2006 (hler, ). Modified on 10/16/2006 (psmith, ). (Entered: 09/29/2006)
Summons Issued as to Brown Group Retail Inc , filed.(lfilmore, ) Modified on 10/16/2006 (psmith, ). (Entered: 09/29/2006)
2 ORDER for Initial Pretrial and Scheduling Conference and Order to Disclose Interested Persons. Initial Conference set for 2/2/2007 at 01:30 PM in Courtroom 9A before Judge Vanessa D Gilmore.( Signed by Judge Vanessa D Gilmore ) Parties notified.(hler, ) (Entered: 10/02/2006)
3 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER Regarding Discovery Motions, Motions for Summary Judgment and Analogous Motions to Dismiss .( Signed by Judge Vanessa D Gilmore ) Parties notified.(bthomas, ) (Entered: 10/11/2006)
4 CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PARTIES by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, filed.(Boutchee, Kathy) (Entered: 10/23/2006)
5 ANSWER to Complaint by Brown Group Retail Inc, filed.(Collins, John) (Entered: 10/31/2006)
6 CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PARTIES by Brown Group Retail Inc, filed.(Murphy, Marjorie) (Entered: 11/02/2006)
7 JOINT DISCOVERY/CASE MANAGEMENT PLAN by all parties, filed.(Murphy, Marjorie) (Entered: 01/22/2007)
SCHEDULING CONFERENCE Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Vanessa D Gilmore. held on 2/2/2007. Scheduling dates entered, order to follow. Appearances: Kathy D Boutchee, Marjorie A Murphy.(Court Reporter: Johnny Sanchez), filed.(emares, ) (Entered: 02/05/2007)
8 SCHEDULING ORDER: Trial Term: April, 2008. ETT: 3 days. Jury. Amended Pleadings due by 3/1/2007 Pltf Expert Report due by 8/13/2007 Deft Expert Report due by 9/17/2007 Discovery due by 12/30/2007 Dispositive Motion Filing due by 12/30/2007 Joint Pretrial Order due by 3/21/2008 Docket Call set for 3/28/2008 at 01:30 PM in Courtroom 9A before Judge Vanessa D Gilmore.( Signed by Judge Vanessa D Gilmore ) Parties notified.(emares, ) (Entered: 02/06/2007)
9 Agreed PROPOSED ORDER Consent Decree, filed.(Boutchee, Kathy) (Entered: 07/27/2007)
10 CONSENT DECREE, Case terminated on 7/30/07.( Signed by Judge Vanessa D Gilmore ) Parties notified.(emares, ) (Entered: 07/30/2007)

PACER Service Center

2 of 3

8/8/2007 3:04 PM

DC CM/ECF LIVE- US District Court-Texas Southern - Docket Report

https://ecf.txsd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?934289191582686-L_3...

Transaction Receipt

08/08/2007 15:05:27

PACER Login: hs0328

Client Code: clearinghouse

Description: Docket Report Search Criteria: 4:06-cv-03074

Billable Pages: 2

Cost:

0.16

3 of 3

8/8/2007 3:04 PM

about:blank

1 of 1

8/8/2007 3:04 PM