Case 3:07-cv-01436-RNC Document 1 Filed 09/26/2007 Page 1 of 66

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

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JUAN BARRERA, JOSE CABRERA, DANIEL CHAVEZ,

JOSE DUMA, JOSE LLiBISUPA, ISAAC MALDONADO,

EDGAR REDROVAN, NICHOLAS SEGUNDO SANCHEZ,

JUAN CARLOS SIMBANA, and DANILO BRITO VARGAS,

307CVQ1438 RNC

Plaintiffs,

-against-

C.A.No. __

MARK BOUGHTON, Mayor of Danbury, in his official and personal capacities, ALAN BAKER, Chief of Police, Danbury Police Department, in his official and personal capacities, Danbury Police Officers JOSE AGOSTO, in his official and personal capacities, RICHARD DEJUSUS, in his official and personal capacities, JAMES A. FISHER, in his official and personal capacities, JAMES LALLI, in his official and personal capacities, CRAIG MARTIN, in his official and personal capacities, JOSEPH NORKUS, in his official and personal capacities, JOHN DOES 1-15, in their official and personal capacities, CITY OF DANBURY,

ICE Agents RONALD PREBLE, in his official and personal capacities, RICHARD MCCAFFREY, in his official and personal capacities, JAMES BROWN, in his official and personal capacities, and JOHN DOES 15-20, in their official and personal capacities,

Defendants
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COMPLAINT

This is a civil rights suit to remedy the discriminatory and unauthorized enforcement of

federal immigration laws against Latino residents of the City of Danbury. Under the leadership

of Mayor Mark Boughton, Danbury and its police department have repeatedly and knowingly

made illegal civil immigration arrests, engaged in impermissibly discriminatory law

enforcement, and retaliated against residents for expressive activites secured by the First

Amendment. In their frustration with the arrival of new immigrants to Danbury, Mayor

Boughton and the police department have taken the law into their own hands. In some instances

the City has acted unilaterally, and at other times its officials have conspired with federal

immigration agents in the conduct of this unlawful campaign.

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Each of the ten Plaintiffs named in this action suffered illegal arrest and detention at the hands of Danbury Police Department ("DPD") officers for alleged civil immigration law violations. Yet federal immigration law preempts and prohibits local police from making civil immigration arrests unless explicitly authorized by prior written agreement with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"). Mayor Boughton very publicly, and unsuccessfully, sought such a written agreement in Connecticut in 2005.
Despite Mayor Boughton's failure to secure authority for the civil enforcement of immigration laws, on September 19, 2006, the DPD instigated an undercover sting operation in which DPD officers, with the knowing and willing assistance of ICE, used extraordinary deception to arrest a group of Latino day-laborers who had gathered at Kennedy Park, a park in the center of downtown Danbury. DPD targeted the men based on their race, ethnicity, and perceived national origin, having no other reason to believe that any of them had violated immigration law. Furthermore, the DPD arrested the day-laborers without probable cause, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The arrests were also calculated to silence the laborers' expression of their availability for work in a traditional public forum, in violation of the First Amendment, and to chill the speech of other day laborers who now avoid the park for fear of arrest. Nine of the day-laborers arrested on September 19,2006 are Plaintiffs in this action.
The enforcement of civil immigration laws, despite the absence of the necessary written authorization, has been a regular custom, policy and practice of the DPD. DPD officers routinely stage pretextual traffic stops in Danbury, in which they target drivers who are or appear Latino for the purpose of investigating their immigration status. DPD officers conducting these stops run searches for the names of drivers in the FBI's principal criminal database, the National Crime Information Center ("NCIC"), arrest drivers on any civil immigration violations they
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discover, and tum the arrestees over to ICE for deportation. One Plaintiff in this action was unlawfully arrested by DPD for a civil immigration violation after a pretextual and race-based traffic stop, transferred to ICE custody, and eventually deported.
The DPD's rogue actions have resulted in numerous constitutional violations, caused Plaintiffs suffering and ignominy, and endangered the civil rights of Danbury's Latino and immigrant communities at large. Plaintiffs bring this action to redress the Defendants' unlawful and discriminatory enforcement of federal immigration law. They ask this Court to issue a declaration stating that Plaintiffs' arrests violate the law and to award Plaintiffs damages for the harm they have suffered as a result of Defendants' illegal actions.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 1. This Court has jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs claims anslllg under the U.S. Constitution and federal statutes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 1361 and supplemental jurisdiction over claims arising under the laws and Constitution of the State of Connecticut pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Jurisdiction to grant declaratory judgment is conferred by 28 U.S.c. §§ 2201-02. 2. Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.c. § 1391(b) III that all events complained of and giving rise to Plaintiffs' claims arose in this district.
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PARTIES Plaintiffs
3. Plaintiff Juan Barrera. DPD officers arrested Plaintiff Barrera on September 19, 2006 and subsequently transferred him to ICE custody, where he remained until released on bond on or about October 3, 2006.
4. Plaintiff Jose Cabrera. DPD officers arrested Plaintiff Cabrera on September 19, 2006 and subsequently transferred him to ICE custody, where he remained until released on bond on or about October 23, 2006.
5. Plaintiff Daniel Chavez. DPD officers arrested Plaintiff Chavez on September 19, 2006 and subsequently transferred him to ICE custody, where he remained until released on bond on or about October 23, 2006.
6. Plaintiff Jose Edwardo Duma. DPD officers arrested Plaintiff Duma on September 19, 2006 and subsequently transferred him to ICE custody, where he remained until released on bond on or about October 3, 2006.
7. Plaintiff Jose Froilan Llibisupa. DPD officers arrested Plaintiff Llibisupa on September 19, 2006 and subsequently transferred him to ICE custody where he remained until released on bond on or about October 3, 2006.
8. P1aintiffIsaac Maldonado. DPD officers arrested Plaintiff Maldonado on September 19, 2006 and subsequently transferred him to ICE custody, where he remained until released on bond on or about October 3, 2006.
9. Plaintiff Edgar Eladio Redrovan. DPD officers arrested Plaintiff Redrovan on September 19, 2006 and subsequently transferred him to ICE custody, where he remained until released on bond on or about October 23,2006.
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10. Plaintiff Nicolas Segundo Sanchez. DPD officers arrested Plaintiff Sanchez on September 19. 2006 and subsequently transferred him to ICE custody, where he remained until released on bond on or about October 20, 2006.
II. Plaintiff Juan Carlos Simbafia. DPD officers arrested Plaintiff Simbafia on September 19, 2006 and subsequently transferred him to ICE custody, where he remained until released on bond on or about October 26, 2006.
12. Plaintiff Danilo Brito Vargas. On February 17, 2007, DPD officers detained Plaintiff Vargas in a pretextual, race-based traffic stop, unlawfully arrested him on the basis of an alleged civil immigration infraction, and transferred him to ICE custody. ICE eventually deported Mr. Vargas to Ecuador in April or May 2007. Danbury Defendants
13. Defendant Mark Boughton is the Mayor of the City of Danbury, Connecticut. He is the City Official charged with ultimate responsibility for implementing and administering the policies of the City of Danbury. He is sued in his official and personal capacities.
14. Defendant Alan Baker is the Chief of Police of the Danbury Police Department. He is charged with ultimate responsibility for the training and supervision of DPD officers and the administration and implementation of DPD policies. He is sued in his official and personal capacities.
IS. Defendant James Fisher is a Detective Lieutenant in the DPD's Special Investigations Division ("SID"). He is responsible for the training and supervision of SID officers and for carrying out the policies of the DPD; he was also the lead DPD officer for the undercover sting operation on September 19, 2006. He is sued in his official and personal capacities.
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16. Defendant James Lalli is a Danbury Police Officer. He is responsible for carrying out the policies of the DPD and participated in the undercover sting operation on September 19, 2006. He is sued in his official and personal capacities.
17. Defendant Jose Agosto is a Danbury Police Officer. He is responsible for carrying out the policies of the DPD and participated in the undercover sting operation on September 19, 2006. He is sued in his official and personal capacities.
18. Defendant Richard DeJesus is a Danbury Police Officer. He is responsible for carrying out the policies of the DPD and participated in the undercover sting operation on September 19, 2006. He is sued in his official and personal capacities.
19. Defendant Craig Martin is a Detective with the Danbury Police Department. He is responsible for carrying out the policies of the DPD and participated in the undercover sting operation on September 19,2006. He is sued in his official and personal capacities.
20. Defendant Joseph Norkus is a Danbury Police Officer. He is responsible for carrying out the policies of the DPD and participated in the undercover sting operation on September 19, 2006. He is sued in his official and personal capacities.
21. Defendants John Does 1-5 are Danbury Police Officers who took part in the arrests on September 19, 2006, but whose identities are as yet unknown. They are responsible for carrying out the policies of the DPD, and they are sued in their official and personal capacities.
22. Defendants John Does 6-8 are Danbury Police Officers who participated in the civil immigration arrest of Plaintiff Vargas on the pretext of an investigative stop for an alleged traffic violation on February 17,2007. John Does 6-8 unlawfully investigated, detained, and arrested Plaintiff Vargas on suspicion of a civil immigration infraction, on the basis of information obtained from the NCIC database.
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23. Plaintiffs are unaware of the true names and capacities, whether individual or otherwise, of Defendant Does I through 8, inclusive, and therefore sue those Defendants by fictitious names. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that each of these Doe Defendants are responsible and liable for the acts and/or damages alleged in this Complaint. Plaintiffs will amend this Complaint to allege the Doe Defendants' true names and capacities when they have been ascertained.
24. Defendant City of Danbury is a Connecticut municipal corporation. It is sued pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-557n, 7-465, and 7-101a, for the tortious acts of its employees. ICE Defendants
25. Defendant James E. Brown is an agent of rCE's Fugitive Operations Unit in Boston, Massachusetts. He is responsible for carrying out the immigration law enforcement operations of the Fugitives Operation Unit in Boston. He took part in the September 19, 2006 sting operation at Kennedy Park in Danbury. He is sued in his official and personal capacities.
26. Defendant Richard L. McCaffrey is an agent of the HARFOT. He is responsible for carrying out HARFOT immigration law enforcement operations. He took part in the September 19, 2006 sting operation at Kennedy Park in Danbury. He is sued in his official and personal capacities.
27. Defendant Ronald L. Preble is an agent of the Hartford Fugitive Operations Team ("HARFOT"). He is responsible for carrying out HARFOT immigration law enforcement operations. He took part in the September 19,2006 sting operation at Kennedy Park in Danbury. He is sued in his official and personal capacities.
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28. Defendants John Does 9-14 are agents of ICE who participated in Plaintiffs' arrests and detention on September 19, 2006. They are responsible for carrying out the policies ofICE, and they are sued in their official and personal capacities.
29. Plaintiffs are unaware of the true names and capacities, whether individual or otherwise, of Defendant Does 9 through 14, inclusive, and therefore sue those Defendants by fictitious names. Each of the Doe Defendants are responsible and liable for the acts and/or damages alleged in this Complaint. Plaintiffs will amend this Complaint to allege the Doe Defendants' true names and capacities when they have been ascertained.
30. During all times mentioned in this complaint, the Defendants were acting under color of law, that is, under color of the statutes, laws, charter, ordinances, rules, regulations, customs and usages of the United States, the State of Connecticut or the City of Danbury.
STATEMENT OF FACTS Immigration Law Enforcement in Danbury under Mayor Mark Boughton
31. Mayor Mark Boughton, first elected in 2001, has been a vocal advocate of strict immigration enforcement and of local government and police involvement in immigration enforcement.
32. Mayor Boughton has promoted the local enforcement of federal immigration laws in Danbury in direct response to an increase in the number of the city's immigrant and Latino residents and out of frustration over the federal government failure's to address the impact of sudden, large-scale immigration on local municipalities. Over the last few years, Danbury has seen a significant increase in immigrants from Brazil and other Latin American countries, especially Ecuador.
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33. The arrival of new Latino immigrants, and the failure of the federal government to address immigration's local effects, has sparked a backlash from Mayor Boughton's administration, which has targeted, harassed, and intimidated these new city residents through a number of discriminatory policies. These policies include discriminatory enforcement of city ordinances, such as building code and vehicle registration regulations, shutting down neighborhood volleyball games, encouraging police harassment of day laborers, encouraging direct police enforcement of civil immigration laws through traffic stops, and requests to U.S. Senators and Representatives and ICE for federal assistance in immigration law enforcement. Upon information and belief, these policies aim ultimately to drive unwanted immigrants from Danbury and to deter future immigrants from making Danbury their home.
34. Mayor Boughton's administration has especially directed these discriminatory policies against Danbury's Ecuadorian community. For example, in April 2005, Danbury drew national media attention when the Danbury Common Council, with Mayor Boughton's support, considered an ordinance banning "repetitive outdoor group activities." The purpose of this ordinance was to shut down the Ecuadorian community's neighborhood volleyball games, one of the primary venues for community gatherings in the spring and summer. Mayor Boughton also requested that the DPD aggressively police the volleyball games to achieve the same end.
35. Moreover, around the same time, with Mayor Boughton's support, city code inspectors discriminatorily enforced Danbury's fire and building codes and parking regulations against the Ecuadorian community as well. For example, in a nighttime sweep on July 23,2005, code enforcement officers shut down seven sites that serviced the Ecuadorian community'S neighborhood volleyball games.
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36. The centerpiece of Mayor Boughton's harassment campaign has been the City of Danbury's escalating involvement in the enforcement of federal immigration laws, especially through the Danbury Police Department.
37. Mayor Boughton and other Danbury city officials are fully aware and have been informed by their own Office of Corporation Counsel that local police lack the legal authority to enforce federal ci vii immigration laws.
38. In a letter to Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal, dated April 15, 2005, Mayor Boughton requested that Attorney General Blumenthal enter into a Memorandum of Understanding with ICE to train, supervise, and deputize state police officers to enforce federal immigration laws, pursuant to 8 U.S.c. § l257(g). State officials declined to pursue this course.
39. Despite this response from state officials, in a subsequent letter to Connecticut Governor Jodi Rell, Mayor Boughton stated that he had nevertheless instructed Danbury Police Chief Alan Baker to prioritize the resources of the DPD to assist with future federal and state immigration enforcement activities in Danbury.
40. In a letter to Paul Streitz of Connecticut Citizens for Immigration Reform, dated January 19, 2006, and based on legal advice from Danbury's Office of Corporation Counsel, Chief Baker acknowledged that DPD officers possess the authority to enforce only criminal-but not civil-immigration laws.
4l. Despite their knowledge that DPD officers are not authorized to enforce civil immigration laws, Mayor Boughton and Chief Baker have nevertheless encouraged and instructed the DPD to carry out independent civil immigration law enforcement actions against
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Danbury's unwanted immigrant and Latino residents without the requisite training, supervision, and written agreement with ICE as required by law.
42. Under Mayor Boughton and Chief Baker's leadership, the DPD's Special Investigations Division has become especially active in civil immigration law enforcement activities. SID is a special vice unit of the DPD that was established to investigate narcotics, gambling, prostitution, and organized crime. SID officers have received no formal training in immigration law enforcement and they are not supervised by ICE officers.
43. In a December 2004 letter to Eduargo Aguirre, Jr., Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, which is an agency within the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), Mayor Boughton described the recent arrival of allegedly undocumented immigrants in Danbury and requested the assistance of the agency in enforcing immigration laws in Danbury. Mayor Boughton also sent a copy of this letter to Tom Ridge, then Secretary of DHS.
44. Mayor Boughton also sent copies of correspondence with state and other federal officials to the Secretary of DHS. This correspondence described the perceived problems Danbury faced as a result of illegal immigration and requested the assistance of state and federal authorities in enforcing immigration laws.
45. The repeated communications from Mayor Boughton and the DPD to DHS, whether made directly or indirectly to the agency, together with the widespread media accounts of the Mayor's initiative to rid Danbury of certain immigrant populations, rendered the ICE defendants fully aware of the Mayor's unlawful immigration enforcement campaign.
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Harassment of the Kennedy Park Day Laborers Under Mayor Mark Bonghton 46. As part of their local immigration enforcement campaign, Mayor Boughton and the
DPD have singled out the day laborer community in Danbury's Kennedy Park for special harassment.
47. Upon infonnation and belief, almost all of the day laborers who gather at Kennedy Park each day are Latino men, and many of them are of Ecuadorian descent.
48. Kennedy Park is a small park, open to the public, located at the intersection of Main Street and Kennedy Avenue. Kennedy Park is at the center of Danbury's downtown district and within walking distance of City Hall.
49. In recent years, Kennedy Park has become a gathering site for day laborers. Contractors in the construction, landscaping, and other industries drive by Kennedy Park in the early morning to solicit workers on a job-by-job basis. Nonnally, wages and work arrangements are negotiated at the park, and contractors then drive workers to worksites.
50. There is no ordinance in the Danbury Municipal Code prohibiting the expression of one's availability to solicit work in a public forum.
51. Prior to September 2006, the daily and visible gathering of the day laborers in Kennedy Park had become a source of political controversy in Danbury and subject of increasing political debate among city residents. Mayor Boughton believed the congregation of day laborers at Kennedy Park to be hannful to the city's image.
52. Upon infonnation and belief, Mayor Boughton expressly directed the Danbury Police to harass and intimidate the day laborers who gathered peaceably in Kennedy Park, to silence their solicitation speech and prevent them from communicating with potential employers.
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53. In accordance with Mayor Boughton's directives, DPD officers, from at least as early as August 2006, repeatedly harassed day laborers gathering peaceably in Kennedy Park by threatening to cite or arrest them on the grounds that they were interfering with the flow of traffic.
54. Even day laborers who were not crossing or about to cross the street in front of Kennedy Park were approached by police and warned not to congregate near the edge of the park. The DPD's campaign of threats and harassment were intended to deter and effectively prohibit day laborers from assembling peaceably in the park and to encourage them to leave Danbury. The Arrest of Eleven Men on September 19, 2006
Planning the Sting Operation 55. On September 19, 2006, DPD's harassment of the day laborers culminated in an undercover immigration sting operation at Kennedy Park that resulted in the unlawful arrest of eleven men, nine of whom are Plaintiffs in this action. 56. Defendants Agosto, Dejesus, Fisher, Lalli, Martin, Norkus, and John Does 1-5 (collectively, "DPD Officers") planned and/or executed the operation. Defendants Brown, McCaffrey, Preble, and John Does 9-14 (collectively, the "HARFOT Officers") were present during the execution of the operation. 57. On an unknown date prior to September 19, 2006, some of the DPD Officers determined to arrest day-laborers at Kennedy Park as part of the broader effort by Mayor Boughton and the DPD to drive new Latino immigrants, and partiCUlarly those of Ecuadorian descent, from the city.
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58. The DPD Officers knew of no particular "fugitive" or other alleged immigration violators in Kennedy Park and had no specific targets in mind in planning the undercover sting operation with ICE.
59. Nevertheless, upon information and belief, Detective Fisher communicated with one or more of the HARFOT Officers regarding the potential presence of immigration violators, including immigrants with outstanding orders of deportation or removal, among the day-laborers at Kennedy Park.
60. HARFOT Officers willfully and knowingly agreed to assist the DPD in an operation to arrest day-laborers at Kennedy Park in full awareness of Mayor Boughton and the DPD's goal of ridding Danbury of its new Latino immigrants.
61. The DPD communication to ICE was non-specific and based on group stereotypes. The communication targeted the day laborers on the basis of their race, ethnicity, and perceived national origin, while providing no identifying information about any individuals who might have been in violation of federal law.
62. Furthermore, upon information and belief, Detective Fisher submitted the tip to retaliate against the day laborers for gathering in public to express their availability to work and to communicate with potential employers.
63. Similarly, although Mayor Boughton and the DPD have repeatedly alleged, in letters to state officials and to the media, that immigration law violators are present at Kennedy Park, they have no basis for these allegations other than racial and ethnic stereotype and perceived national origin. Mayor Boughton and the DPD have made these allegations to further their campaign to drive the day laborers from Kennedy Park and to instill fear in the rest of Danbury's immigrant population.
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64. Accordingly, in participating in the sting operation, the HARFOT Officers also proceeded on the basis of racial and ethnic stereotype and perceived national origin, and without any identifying infonnation about any individuals who might have been in violation of federal law.
65. On or about September 18, 2006, Detective Fisher and one or more HARFOT Officers agreed that the operation would take place on September 19, 2006.
66. On or about September 18, 2006, Detective Fisher infonned others, including but not limited to DPD Officers Dejesus, Martin, and Norkus of the planned operation. Detective Fisher requested the assistance of DPD Officers Dejesus, Martin, and Norkus, who agreed to work extended shifts of duty on September 19, 2006.
67. Defendants DeJesus, Martin, and Norkus were fully aware of the purpose of the. operation, knowingly and willingly agreed to assist, intentionally targeted the day-laborers for arrest based on their race, ethnicity, and/or perceived national origin, and intended to retaliate against the day-laborers for their use of Kennedy Park.
68. Before September 19, 2006, the HARFOT Officers did not identify any particular suspected immigration violators among the Kennedy Park day-laborers. The HARFOT Officers did not obtain any administrative or criminal arrest warrants in advance of the September 19th operation.
69. Detective Fisher or another of the DPD Officers arranged for the use of an undercover vehicle on September 19, 2006.
70. One of the Defendant DPD Officers dressed in clothing so as to resemble the sort of contractor or employer who typically hired day-laborers at Kennedy Park.
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71. The DPD Officers and the HARFOT Officers met in the early morning of September 19,2006 to review final plans for the sting operation.
72. Upon information and belief, Police Chief Baker failed to inform himself about, approve, and otherwise adequately supervise the sting operation as required by DPD internal policies and procedures. Chief Baker failed to do so despite the importance of such procedures to protecting the rights of arrestees, his awareness of the DPD Officers' goals of suppressing the protected speech of the day laborers, singling out the day laborers for harassment on the basis of race, ethnicity, and perceived national origin, and ultimately driving the Kennedy Park day laborers from Danbury, and his knowledge that local immigration enforcement is preempted under federal law.
The Arrests 73. On the morning of September 19, 2006, each of the Plaintiffs Barrera, Cabrera, Chavez, Duma, Llibisupa, Maldonado, Redrovan, Sanchez, and Simbafia (collectively, "DayLaborer Plaintiffs") went to Kennedy Park to find work for the day. 74. Some time early that morning, each of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs saw a vehicle drive up to the park. Each of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs approached the vehicle, and the driver offered each of them work for the day demolishing a fence. The driver did not appear to be looking for any specific individuals. 75. In fact, the vehicle approached by each Day-Laborer Plaintiff was driven by one of the DPD Officers, and the offer of work demolishing a fence was a ruse. 76. Each Day-Laborer Plaintiff reasonably relied on the misrepresentation of the offer of work and entered the vehicle.
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77. The vehicle made three trips to Kennedy Park that morning, picking up three to five workers each time.
78. On each of the three trips from Kennedy Park, the vehicle drove several blocks to a fenced-in lot behind an office building on Main Street in Danbury. The vehicle stopped in the comer of the parking lot behind the building, which is surrounded by a tall chain link fence and closed off on the fourth side by the building.
79. The undercover officer driving the vehicle did not ask any questions of any of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs during the drive from Kennedy Park to the parking lot.
80. When each Day-Laborer Plaintiff exited the vehicle, the DPD Officers, who were waiting in the lot, immediately surrounded each man, some officers with weapons drawn, and roughly seized each Day-Laborer Plaintiff. Some of the arresting officers had apparently been hiding in or around several vehicles that were parked in the comer of the parking lot.
81. The HARFOT Officers were also present in the parking lot. 82. In the alternative, Plaintiffs allege that the HARFOT Officers were waiting in the lot and surrounded and seized each Day-Laborer Plaintiff when they exited the vehicle, and that the DPD Officers also present in the parking lot to assist. 83. Upon seizing each Day-Laborer Plaintiff, DPD Officers, or, in the alternative, HARFOT officers, then physically detained each Day-Laborer Plaintiff and told him that he was under arrest. DPD Officers, or, in the alternative, HARFOT officers, handcuffed each DayLaborer Plaintiff, placed him in a white van that was parked in the lot, and closed the door to the van.
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84. Those Day-Laborer Plaintiffs who arrived first were instructed to watch while the same thing happened to subsequent day laborers. A total of eleven day laborers were arrested and placed in the van.
85. As confirmed by DPD arrest and booking records, DPD officers arrested the DayLaborer Plaintiffs at approximately 7:00 am on September 19, 2006.
86. In the alternative, Plaintiffs allege that HARFOT Officers arrested the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs at some point on the morning of September 19, 2006.
87. After being arrested in the parking lot, some of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs wanted to call a family member or a lawyer and asked to make a phone call. The arresting officers refused to let any of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs make such a call and confiscated the cell phones of those Day-Laborer Plaintiffs who had them.
88. Only after the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs had been physically restrained, put under arrest by the DPD Officers, or in the alternative, by the HARFOT Officers, and told that they could not can anyone, did law enforcement agents question the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs about their identity, nationality, the place and manner of their entry into the United States, and their immigration status.
89. While the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs were detained in the parking lot, a DPD officer of Hispanic appearance, and who spoke Spanish well, told Plaintiff Barrera in Spanish that he had been arrested because he was standing in Kennedy Park, after the DPD had previously warned laborers not to stand there. Upon information and belief, this individual was Officer Jose Agosto.
90. None of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs had been previously warned, cited, or ticketed for standing in Kennedy Park or interfering with traffic in the area of Kennedy Park, and none had
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any record of causing any "safety issues" in Kennedy Park, whether related to traffic or otherwise. Indeed, Plaintiffs Chavez and Sanchez had never even solicited work at Kennedy Park before the morning of September 19, 2006.
91. None of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs had an outstanding deportation or removal order, and no immigration warrants had been issued for any of them before their arrests on September 19,2006.
92. Either the DPD Officers or the HARFOT Officers, or both, then transported the DayLaborer Plaintiffs from the parking lot to the Danbury Police Station, where DPD officers fingerprinted and questioned them, and entered their booking records into the DPD's files.
93. While at the Danbury Police Station, Plaintiff Chavez saw a DPD officer that he recognized to be Jose Agosto. Officer Agosto told Plaintiff Chavez in Spanish that he had been arrested because they had been standing at Kennedy Park, even though the DPD had previously warned the day laborers not to stand there.
94. Plaintiff Chavez had never been told by any police officer not to stand at or near Kennedy Park, nor had Plaintiff Chavez previously been warned, cited, or ticketed for interfering with traffic in the area of Kennedy Park.
95. At the Danbury Police Station, Plaintiff Barrera was also mockingly told by a Danbury police officer of Hispanic appearance, and who spoke Spanish well, that when he could, Plaintiff Barrera should call his family in Ecuador and tell them to meet him at the airport in Quito, because that was the first place that Plaintiff Barrera would be released from custody. Upon information and belief, this individual was Defendant DPD Officer Jose Agosto.
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96. According to the DPD booking records for the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs, Danbury police made the arrests in the Danbury Executive Tower parking lot at 7:06 am on the charge of "Illegal Entry Into U.S."
97. The booking reports list the arresting officer to be Defendant Danbury Police Officer James Lalli.
98. No criminal charges have been filed against any of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs. 99. Upon information and belief, Mayor Boughton was informed of the undercover operation and arrests no later than while they were occurring on the morning of September 19, 2006. 100. At no point that morning, or any point afterwards, did Mayor Boughton attempt to prevent the arrests of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs in spite of his knowledge that the sting operation was illegal and violated the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' civil rights. 101. Upon information and belief, Mayor Boughton allowed the arrests to take place pursuant to his administration's policy of promoting local civil immigration enforcement against Danbury's new Latino immigrants and out of total disregard for the constitutional interests of the arrestees. 102. Upon information and belief, Mayor Boughton took no disciplinary actions against the DPD Officers upon learning of the sting operation and the arrests of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs. The Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' Transfer to and Detention in ICE Custody 103. After detaining each Day-Laborer Plaintiff in a holding cell or otherwise for approximately two hours at Danbury Police Headquarters, DPD officers transferred custody of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs to ICE at approximately 9:00 am.
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104. The HARFOT Officers transported the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs, handcuffed and shackled, to Hartford, Connecticut.
105. The ICE Agents responsible for accepting custody of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs were the HARFOT Officers, Defendants Brown, McCaffrey, and Preble.
106. Defendant McCaffrey also served as examining officer for the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs, though he knew or should have known that doing so violated federal immigration regulations.
107. After two nights in Hartford, ICE agents transferred Plaintiffs Barrera, Duma, Llibisupa, and Maldonado to Suffolk County House of Corrections in Boston, Massachusetts. ICE agents transferred Plaintiffs Cabrera, Chavez, Redrovan, Sanchez, and Simbafia to Plymouth County Detention Center in Plymouth, Massachusetts.
108. At both the Suffolk and Plymouth facilities, prison officials denied each of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs access to a telephone for periods ranging from several days to several weeks, despite the Plaintiffs' repeated requests to call family members or a lawyer.
109. Plaintiff Barrera did not receive access to a phone for at least four days. 110. Plaintiff Cabrera was allowed to use a phone on his first day in Hartford, but the phone did not work, and he was denied access to a phone for the next three weeks of detention. Ill. Plaintiff Chavez was allowed to use a phone on his first day in Hartford, but the phone did not work. 112. Plaintiff Duma asked repeatedly to make a phone call, but was denied access to a phone for the entire period of his detention. 113. Plaintiff Llibisupa was denied access to a phone for the entire period of his detention.
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114. Plaintiff Maldonado was denied access to a phone and was unable to contact his family until they ultimately called him at the detention facility after he had been detained for several days.
115. Plaintiff Redrovan was denied access to a phone for several days, until he was transferred to ICE custody in Massachusetts.
116. Plaintiff Simbafia was allowed to use a phone once, on the first day of his detention in Hartford, but not subsequently.
117. While in custody in Hartford, ICE officers instructed the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs to sign a document written in English, which had not been translated or explained to them, and which they could not read. ICE officers took the men out of the room one at a time and individually intimidated them and pressured them into signing the document. ICE officers gave the men a number of different and wholly inadequate explanations for what the paper was.
ll8. Plaintiff Barrera did not understand what the document said. An officer who spoke some Spanish stated simply that he needed to sign it to be transferred.
119. Another officer told Plaintiff Chavez that he needed to sign the document in order to see a judge.
120. Plaintiff Maldonado similarly could not read the document, but the officers who addressed him angrily told him that he had to sign it anyway.
121. Officers informed Plaintiff Simbafia that, practically speaking, he already "signed" the document and terrorized him into actually doing so, leading him to believe that he needed to sign the document in order to see an Immigration Judge.
122. While the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs were in custody in Massachusetts, an unknown law enforcement agent or agents questioned them as potential suspects or witnesses in a murder
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investigation. The agent told them that the victim had been murdered in Danbury by an Ecuadorian. During the interrogation, the agent did not offer Plaintiffs access to counsel, nor did he inform them of their Miranda rights, including their right to remain silent and to have counsel present during the interrogation. Instead, the agent promised them immigration benefits if they told him about the murder.
123. Also while in custody in Massachusetts, prison officials subjected each of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs to a medical examination and full-body search.
124. Prison officials forced at least Plaintiffs Barrera, Llibisupa, Maldonado, Redrovan, and Simbaiia to give blood samples without their consent as part of the medical examination.
125. Prison officials forced at least Plaintiffs Barrera, Maldonado, Redrovan, and Simbaiia to give urine samples without their consent as part of the medical examination.
126. Suffolk County correctional guards held Plaintiff Barrera in isolation for five days-in a cell with neither a toilet nor a sink-as a result of his blood test. At no point did officers explain the reason for his confinement.
127. On October 2, 2006, Immigration Judge ("U") Matthew J. D'Angelo of the Immigration Court in Boston, Massachusetts held bond redetermination hearings for Plaintiffs Barrera, Duma, Llibisupa, and Maldonado. IJ D'Angelo found that Plaintiffs Barrera, Duma, Llibisupa, and Maldonado were neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community and set the statutory minimum bond of $1500 for each man.
128. Plaintiffs Barrera, Duma, Llibisupa, and Maldonado were released on $1500 bond on October 3, 2006. In total, they each spent approximately 15 days in ICE custody.
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The Remaining Day-Laborers' Transfer to and Detention in Texas 129. The Boston Immigration Court calendared bond redetermination hearings for
Plaintiffs Chavez, Sanchez, and Simbaiia for 1:00 pm on October 3, 2006. 130. After the conclusion of the bond proceedings for other Plaintiffs on the afternoon
of October 2, a DRO officer in Boston personally assured undersigned counsel that ICE would not transfer Chavez, Sanchez, and Simbaiia before 3:00 pm on October 3, 2006.
131. On the morning of October 3, however, before their 1:00 pm bond hearings, ICE began the process of transferring Plaintiffs Chavez, Sanchez, and Simbaiia, along with Plaintiffs Cabrera, and Redrovan, to detention facilities in Texas. When the Immigration Judge in Boston attempted to call the bond cases for these Plaintiffs as scheduled at the 1:00 pm video-conference calendar on October 3, jail officials informed the Court that the Plaintiffs were not available for court because they were in transit to Texas.
132. On October 3, 2006, ICE flew Plaintiffs Cabrera, Chavez, Redrovan, Sanchez, and Simbaiia, handcuffed and shackled, to Texas. ICE kept Plaintiffs in shackles for the entire journey to Texas-a period of nearly sixteen hours.
133. After being briefly held at the Port Isabel Processing Center in Los Fresnos, Texas, Plaintiffs Cabrera, Chavez, Sanchez, and Simbaiia were detained at the Willacy Detention Center in Raymondville, Texas. Plaintiff Redrovan continued to be held at the Port Isabel Processing Center.
134. While at the Willacy Detention Center, Plaintiffs Cabrera, Chavez, Sanchez, and Simbaiia were subjected to horrendous detention conditions. The men endured extremely overcrowded and unsanitary conditions, and prison officials denied them adequate medical care and adequate amounts of food at regular intervals. At times, the detainees were forced to eat
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with their bare hands. Prison guards also frequently verbally insulted, taunted, and ridiculed the detainees.
135. Immigration Judge ("Ir') Eleazar Tovar of the Immigration Court in Harlingen, Texas held telephonic bond redetermination hearings on October 16, 2006 for Plaintiffs Cabrera, Chavez, Sanchez, and Simbafta. IJ Tovar found that the detainees were neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community and set bond.
136. IJ Peterson of the Immigration Court in Harlingen, Texas held a telephonic bond redetermination hearing for Plaintiff Redrovan. IJ Peterson found that Plaintiff Redrovan was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community and set bond.
137. Plaintiff Cabrera was released on $8,000 bond on or around October 23, 2006. In total, Mr. Cabrera was detained in ICE custody for approximately 35 days.
138. Plaintiff Chavez was released on $10,000 bond on or around October 23, 2006. In total, Mr. Chavez was detained in ICE custody for approximately 35 days.
139. Plaintiff Redrovan was released on $15,000 bond on or around October 23,2006. In total, Mr. Redrovan was detained in ICE custody for approximately 35 days.
140. Plaintiff Sanchez was released on $10,000 bond on or around October 20, 2006. In total, Mr. Sanchez was detained in ICE custody for approximately 32 days.
141. Plaintiff Simbafta was released on $10,000 bond on or around October 26,2006. In total, Mr. Simbafta was detained in ICE custody for approximately 38 days. Effect on Plaintiffs and Day Laborer Community at Large
142. Defendants' unlawful and retaliatory arrest and detention of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs caused the Plaintiffs to suffer humiliation, damage to their reputations and professional
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prospects, emotional distress, physical pain, and monetary damages from their arrest, detention, and restrictions on liberty.
I
143. They continue to fear that they, their families, or their acquaintances will be arbitrarily and unlawfully arrested by ICE, DPD, or both. Several of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs no longer gather in Kennedy Park for fear of harassment by ICE and DPD officers.
144. While sparking a great deal of political engagement and advocacy by the immigrant and Ecuadorian community in Danbury and across the State of Connecticut, the DayLaborer Plaintiffs' very visible unlawful arrests have also created and sustained a climate of fear among day laborers at Kennedy Park and among Latino and immigrant residents in Danbury more generally. This climate persists to this day.
145. Fewer day laborers in general now assemble at Kennedy Park to seek work, fearing that they too will be arrested by ICE, DPD, or both, and those who do continue to gather there do so in part as a statement of their disagreement with the anti-immigrant tactics of Mayor Boughton and the DPD.
146. Latino and immigrant residents in Danbury also remain fearful of harassment, detention, and arrest by ICE, DPD, or both. The Pretextual Traffic Stop and Unlawful Civil Immigration Arrest of Danilo Brito Vargas
147. As part of Mayor Boughton's campaign against immigrant and Latino communities, the DPD has also exploited the FBI's principal criminal database, the National Crime Information Center ("NCIC"), to target Latinos for make unlawful and discriminatory immigration arrests. DPD officers have engaged in a series of pretextual traffic stops for the purpose of investigating the immigration status of Latino drivers. During these traffic stops,
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DPD officers conduct a search for drivers' names on the NCIC database and arrest drivers on any civil immigration violations they discover.
149. The DPD's use of the NCIC database to effect immigration arrests against Latino and immigrant drivers constitutes a form ofracial and ethnic profiling.
150. Moreover, the DPD's NCIC immigration arrests violate Congress's broad preemption of state and local police from making federal immigration arrests outside of specific statutory procedures. Background on the NCIC Database
151. The National Crime Information Center ("NCIC") provides direct on-line access to its computerized database of criminal justice information. The NCIC is the FBI's principal criminal records database and is accessed millions of times each day by state and local police nationwide.
152. Since its creation, the NCIC database has principally contained criminal justice records, such as rap sheets, criminal warrants, and stolen property records. Congress has not authorized the entry of civil immigration records, including administrative immigration warrants for arrest or removal, into the NCIC database.
153. In 2002, disregarding Congress's careful statutory limitations on the entry and dissemination of non-criminal records via the NCIC, the Attorney General and other senior Justice Department officials announced a plan to enter hundreds of thousands of administrative immigration warrants into the NCIC.
154. Since 2002, the Law Enforcement Support Center ("LESC"), a division of ICE, has entered administrative immigration warrants for tens of thousands of persons with outstanding orders of deportation, exclusion, or removal (collectively, "removal orders") whom
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it believes have remained in the United States. DRS estimates that there are more than 632,000 such persons resident in the United States, and has announced its intention to enter administrative immigration warrants for every such person into the NCIC.
ISS. The administrative immigration warrants entered by DRS into the NCIC differ significantly from criminal warrants. DRS administrative warrants are issued by an agency clerk, not by an independent judge, and there is no requirement that a warrant be issued only on probable cause, based on evidence sworn under oath. There is no review by anyone other than the DRS official. They are administrative warrants, alleging only a civil violation of immigration law.
156. When a police officer runs an NCIC check on an individual who has an administrative immigration warrant listed in the NCIC, a "hit" appears with instructions to contact the Law Enforcement Support Center, a unit ofICE, for confirmation.
157. According to ICE's data, in 2002-04, LESC failed to confirm 42% of the NCIC immigration hits that prompted the requested communication from a local police officer to LESC.
158. Of those occasIOns when LESC does confirm the immigration "hit," DRS instructs the police officer to arrest the individual until the DRS officials can arrive to take custody of the individual. DPD's Unlawful Immigration Arrests Made Through the NCIC Database
159. Congress has enacted a complex and comprehensive statutory scheme regulating immigration in the United States that includes numerous and detailed provisions relating to enforcement of federal immigration laws. In adopting this statutory scheme, Congress has
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broadly preempted immigration enforcement by state and local officials, except as specifically authorized by Congress.
160. No authority exists for DPD to make a civil immigration arrest. 161. An arrest pursuant to an administrative immigration warrant in the NCIC is a civil immigration arrest. 162. Nevertheless, the DPD has developed a policy or practice of arresting persons on the basis of administrative immigration warrants in the NCIC. 163. DPD officers conducting such arrests do not typically inform NCIC immigration arrestees of their Miranda rights, nor are such persons subject to state or federal prosecution. DPD typically arrests and detains such persons until they are transferred to the custody ofICE. 164. Defendants Boughton and Baker knowingly promulgated, implemented, enforced, sanctioned, and/or acquiesced in this arrest policy as part of the city's ongoing immigration enforcement campaign against its new Latino and immigrant residents, despite knowledge on the part of Boughton and Baker that DPD officers are preempted by federal law from making civil immigration arrests. 165. Moreover, upon information and belief, Defendant Baker does not supervise the execution and processing of these arrests as required by internal DPD police procedure despite his knowledge that DPD civil immigration arrests are preempted by federal law and the importance of such procedures to protecting the rights of arrestees. Arrest of Danilo Brito Vargas 166. On February 17, 2007, Plaintiff Danilo Brito Vargas and his wife were driving near their home in Danbury. A DPD cruiser pulled up behind them and signaled for Plaintiff Vargas to pull over, which he did.
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167. A DPD officer approached the car, told Plaintiff Vargas that he was being pulled over because his muffler was too loud, and asked to see identification. Plaintiff Vargas tendered his Ecuadorian passport, whereupon the officer took the passport, returned to the cruiser, and consulted a computer there.
168. On information and belief, the officer used the cruiser computer to run Plaintiff Vargas's name through the NCIC and other databases, and the NCIC returned a response indicating the existence of an administrative immigration warrant for Plaintiff Vargas. The NCIC response further instructed the DPD officer to contact LESC for confirmation.
169. Acting solely on the basis of this information, the DPD officer radioed for assistance. Two more officers arrived on the scene. The three officers told Plaintiff Vargas to step out of the car. After patting him down and searching his pockets, they handcuffed him and placed him in the cruiser. They did not explain why he was being detained.
170. The DPD officers then transported Plaintiff Vargas to the Danbury Police Station, where he was detained in a holding cell for approximately two days. DPD officers told Plaintiff Vargas that he was being detained solely because he had "immigration problems."
171. He was then transferred to an immigration detention facility in Hartford, and shuttled between that facility and another correctional facility in Rhode Island.
172. Plaintiff Vargas was deported to Ecuador in April or May 2007. 173. As a result of this arrest, Plaintiff Vargas has suffered humiliation, damage to his reputation and professional prospects, emotional distress, physical pain, and monetary damages from his arrest, detention, and restrictions on liberty.
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CLAIMS RELATING TO ARREST OF DAY-LABORERS FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF:
(Fourth Amendment and Article First, §§ 7, 9 of the Connecticut Constitution (42 U.S.c. § 1983: Danbury Defendants)
174. The Day-Laborer Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
175. Defendant DPD Officers Jose Agosto, Richard Dejesus, James Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, and John Does 1-5 violated the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and §§ 7 and 9 of Article First of the Connecticut Constitution by arresting them for alleged civil immigration violations without valid warrants and in the absence of exigent circumstances, any probable cause, or reason to believe that the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs were engaged in any unlawful activity, and by stopping, detaining, investigating, searching and effecting seizures and/or arrests of the DayLaborer Plaintiffs in the absence of a reasonable, articulable suspicion of unlawful activity or probable cause.
176. Defendants Boughton, Baker, and Fisher were personally involved in and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights by knowingly and intentionally creating, implementing, enforcing, encouraging, sanctioning, and/or acquiescing in a policy, practice and/or custom of (a) arresting Latino, immigrant, and day laborer residents in Danbury for alleged civil immigration violations without valid warrants and in the absence of exigent circumstances, any probable cause, or reason to believe that the arrestees are engaged in any unlawful activity, in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, §§ 7 and 9 of Article First of the Connecticut Constitution; and (b) stopping, detaining, investigating, searching, and effecting seizures of Latino, immigrant, and
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day laborer residents in Danbury in the absence of a reasonable, articulable suspicion of unlawful activity or probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, §§ 7 and 9 of Article First of the Connecticut Constitution.
177. Defendant Boughton, the Mayor of Danbury, is responsible for promulgating, implementing and administering the policies, practices and/or customs of the City of Danbury and for supervising and administering all City Departments. He was directly involved in the promulgation, implementation, and administration of the policy that proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights.
178. Defendant Boughton was personally involved III and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights because he failed to remedy these violations. Specifically, Defendant Boughton failed to act on information provided to him no later than on the morning of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' arrests that alerted him to these violations before they occurred or while they were occurring. Upon learning of the violations, Defendant Boughton made no attempt to stop the violations from occurring, to minimize the harm that resulted from any violations that had already occurred, or to punish, sanction, or discipline the DPD Officers who committed the violations.
179. Defendant Boughton was personally involved III and proximately caused the violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights through his deliberate indifference to the rights of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs and his grossly negligent supervision of his subordinates, including but not limited to Defendant Baker and Defendant Fisher, who proximately caused the aforementioned violations. Defendant Boughton's gross negligence in supervising Defendants Baker and Fisher permitted them to promulgate, implement, and administer the aforementioned
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policies, practices, and customs which proximately caused the violations of the Plaintiff DayLaborers' rights, and to plan and carry out the sting operation which resulted in those violations.
180. Defendant Baker, the Chief of Police for Danbury, is responsible for promulgating, impl,:menting, and administering the policies, practices, and/or customs of the DPD, and for super,ising all DPD officers in the commission of their duties. He was directly involved in the promulgation, implementation, and administration of the policy that proximately caused the violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights.
181. Defendant Baker was personally involved III and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights through his deliberate indifference to the rights of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs and his grossly negligent supervision of his subordinates, induding but not limited to Defendant Fisher, who proximately caused the aforementioned violations. Defendant Baker's gross negligence in supervising Defendant Fisher permitted Defendant Fisher to promulgate, implement, and administer the aforementioned policies, practices, cmd customs which proximately caused the violations of the Plaintiff DayLaborers' rights, and to plan and carry out the sting operation which resulted in those violations.
182. Defendant Fisher was directly involved in and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights by participating in the violations, or by ordering or instructing the other DPD Officers to commit the unlawful arrests. Defendant Fisher knew of all relevant facts that made the actions of the DPD Officers unlawful.
183. Defendant Fisher, the head of the DPD's SID, is responsible for promulgating, implementing, and administering the policies, practices, and/or customs of the SID, and for supervising all other SID officers in the commission of their duties. He was directly involved in
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the promulgation, implementation, and administration of the policy proximately caused the aforementioned violations ofthe Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights.
184. Defendant Fisher was personally involved in and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights through his deliberate indifference to the rights of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs and his grossly negligent supervision of his subordinate DPD Officers who committed the violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Defendant Fisher knew or should have known of the DPD's policy, practice, or custom of making civil immigration arrests without probable cause, and failed to act to prevent the violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights from occurring.
185. The City of Danbury is liable pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-557n, 7-465, and/or 7-101a, for the tortious acts of its employees.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF: Fourth Amendment and Article First, §§ 7, 9 of the Connecticut Constitution: Preemption
(42 U.S.c. § 1983: Danbury Defendants) 186. The Day-Laborer Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 187. Defendant DPD Officers Jose Agosto, Richard Dejesus, James Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, and John Does 1-5 violated the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, §§ 7 and 9 of Article First of the Connecticut Constitution by intentionally and knowingly detaining and/or arresting the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs on suspicion of civil immigration violations. The arrest and detention of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs was unlawful, wholly without authority, and in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, §§ 7 and 9 of Article First of the Connecticut Constitution, because Federal law preempts state or local police from civil immigration
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enforcement activity, and expressly and implicitly deprives local law enforcement officials of the authority to make civil immigration arrests. The Danbury Defendants lacked any authority cognizable under 8 U.S.C. § 1357 or other relevant federal laws to make civil immigration arrests.
188. Defendants Boughton, Baker, and Fisher were personally involved in and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights by knowingly and intentionally creating, implementing, enforcing, encouraging, sanctioning, and/or acquiescing in a policy, practice, and/or custom of using local police to engage in unauthorized, unlawful and preempted civil immigration law enforcement against Danbury's day laborer, Latino and immigrant residents, in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, §§ 7 and 9 of Article First of the Connecticut Constitution.
189. Defendant Boughton, the Mayor of Danbury, is responsible for promulgating, implementing, and administering the policies, practices and/or customs of the City of Danbury and for supervising and administering all City Departments. He was directly involved in the promulgation, implementation, and administration of the policy that proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights.
190. Defendant Boughton was personally involved III and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights because he failed to remedy these violations. Specifically, Defendant Boughton failed to act on information provided to him no later than on the morning of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' arrests that alerted him to these violations before they occurred or while they were occurring. Upon learning of the violations, Defendant Boughton made no attempt to stop the violations from occurring, to minimize the
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harm that resulted from any violations that had already occurred, or to punish, sanction, or discipline the DPD Officers who committed the violations.
191. Defendant Boughton was personally involved III and proximately caused the violations ofthe Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights through his deliberate indifference to the rights of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs and his grossly negligent supervision of his subordinates, including but not limited to Defendant Baker and Defendant Fisher, who proximately caused the aforementioned violations. Defendant Boughton's gross negligence in supervising Defendants Baker and Fisher permitted them to promulgate, implement, and administer the aforementioned policies, practices, and customs which proximately caused the violations of the Plaintiff DayLaborers' rights, and to plan and carry out the sting operation which resulted in those violations.
192. Defendant Baker, the Chief of Police for Danbury, is responsible for promulgating, implementing, and administering the policies, practices, and/or customs of the DPD, and for supervising all DPD officers in the commission of their duties. He was directly involved in the promulgation, implementation, and administration of the policy that proximately caused the violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights.
193. Defendant Baker was personally involved III and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights through his deliberate indifference to the rights of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs and his grossly negligent supervision of his subordinates, including but not limited to Defendant Fisher, who proximately caused the aforementioned violations. Defendant Baker's gross negligence in supervising Defendant Fisher permitted Defendant Fisher to promulgate, implement, and administer the aforementioned policies, practices, and customs which proximately caused the violations of the Plaintiff DayLaborers' rights, and to plan and carry out the sting operation which resulted in those violations.
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194. Defendant Fisher was directly involved in and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights by participating in the violations, or by ordering or instructing the other DPD Officers to commit the unlawful arrests. Defendant Fisher knew of all relevant facts that made the actions of the DPD Officers unlawful.
195. Defendant Fisher, the head of the DPD's SID, is responsible for promulgating, implementing, and administering the policies, practices, and/or customs of the SID, and for supervising all other SID officers in the commission of their duties. He was directly involved in the promulgation, implementation, and administration of the policy proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights.
196. Defendant Fisher was personally involved in and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights through his deliberate indifference to the rights of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs and his grossly negligent supervision of his subordinate DPD Officers who committed the violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Defendant Fisher knew or should have known of the DPD's policy, practice, or custom of making civil immigration arrests without probable cause, and failed to act to prevent the violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights from occurring.
197. The City of Danbury is liable pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-557n, 7-465, and/or 7-101a, for the tortious acts of its employees.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF: Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and Article First, § 20 of the Connecticut
Constitution (42 U.S.c. § 1983: Danbury Defendants) 198. The Day-Laborer Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
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199. Defendant DPD Officers Jose Agosto, Richard Dejesus, James Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, and John Does 1-5 intentionally targeted the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs for an immigration sting operation and arrested and detained them on the basis of their race, ethnicity, and perceived national origin in violation of in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, § 20 of Article First of the Connecticut Constitution.
200. In addition, Defendant DPD Officers subjected the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs to selective law enforcement out of a malicious and bad faith intent to drive them out of the City of Danbury.
201. Defendants Boughton, Baker, and Fisher were personally involved in and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights by knowingly and intentionally creating, implementing, enforcing, encouraging, sanctioning, and/or acquiescing in a policy, practice, and/or custom of targeting, harassing, and arresting Danbury's day laborer, Latino and immigrant communities on the basis of their race, ethnicity and/or perceived national origin.
202. Defendant Boughton, the Mayor of Danbury, is responsible for promulgating, implementing, and administering the policies, practices and/or customs of the City of Danbury and for supervising and administering all City Departments. He was directly involved in the promulgation, implementation, and administration of the policy that proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights.
203. Defendant Boughton was personally involved III and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights because he failed to remedy these violations. Specifically, Defendant Boughton failed to act on information provided to him no
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later than on the mornmg of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' arrests that alerted him to these violations before they occurred or while they were occurring. Upon learning of the violations, Defendant Boughton made no attempt to stop the violations from occurring, to minimize the harm that resulted from any violations that had already occurred, or to punish, sanction, or discipline the DPD Officers who committed the violations.
204. Defendant Boughton was personally involved m and proximately caused the violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights through his deliberate indifference to the rights of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs and his grossly negligent supervision of his subordinates, including but not limited to Defendant Baker and Defendant Fisher, who proximately caused the aforementioned violations. Defendant Boughton's gross negligence in supervising Defendants Baker and Fisher permitted them to promulgate, implement, and administer the aforementioned policies, practices, and customs which proximately caused the violations of the Plaintiff DayLaborers' rights, and to plan and carry out the sting operation which resulted in those violations.
205. Defendant Baker, the Chief of Police for Danbury, is responsible for promUlgating, implementing, and administering the policies, practices, and/or customs of the DPD, and for supervising all DPD officers in the commission of their duties. He was directly involved in the promulgation, implementation, and administration of the policy that proximately caused the violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights.
206. Defendant Baker was personally involved m and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights through his deliberate indifference to the rights of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs and his grossly negligent supervision of his subordinates, including but not limited to Defendant Fisher, who proximately caused the aforementioned violations. Defendant Baker's gross negligence in supervising Defendant Fisher
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permitted Defendant Fisher to promulgate, implement, and administer the aforementioned policies, practices, and customs which proximately caused the violations of the Plaintiff DayLaborers' rights, and to plan and carry out the sting operation which resulted in those violations.
207. Defendant Fisher was directly involved in and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights by participating in the violations or by ordering or instructing the other DPD Officers to commit the unlawful arrests. Defendant Fisher knew of all relevant facts that made the actions of the DPD Officers unlawful.
208. Defendant Fisher, the head of the DPD's SID, is responsible for promulgating, implementing and administering the policies, practices, and/or customs of the SID, and for supervising all other SID officers in the commission of their duties. He was directly involved in the promulgation, implementation, and administration of the policy proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights.
209. Defendant Fisher was personally involved in and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights through his deliberate indifference to the rights of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs and his grossly negligent supervision of his subordinate DPD Officers who committed the violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Defendant Fisher knew or should have known ofthe DPD's policy, practice or custom of making civil immigration arrests without probable cause, and failed to act to prevent the violations ofthe Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights from occurring.
210. The City of Danbury is liable pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-557n, 7-465, and/or 7-1 Ola, for the tortious acts of its employees.
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FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF First Amendment and Article First, §§ 4, 14 ofthe Connecticut Constitution
(Suppression of and Retaliation for Protected Speech) (42 U.S.c. § 1983: Danbury Defendants)
211. The Day-Laborer Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as iffully set forth herein.
212. Defendant DPD Officers Jose Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, and John Does 1-5 knowingly and intentionally stopped, detained, investigated, and arrested the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs in retaliation for their exercise of protected speech and association in a public forum, in violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article First, §§ 4 and 14 of the Connecticut Constitution.
213. Defendant DPD Officers had no probable cause to stop, detain, investigate, or arrest the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs, and had no reason to believe that they were in violation of any immigration laws. The DPD does not have the legal authority to make arrests solely for violations of federal civil immigration law.
214. Defendants Boughton, Baker, and Fisher were personally involved in and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights by knowingly and intentionally creating, implementing, enforcing, encouraging, sanctioning, and/or acquiescing in a policy, practice and/or custom of (a) threatening and acting to prevent Latino and immigrant day laborers from exercising their rights to protected speech and association in Kennedy Park, a public forum, and (b) of using the arrests of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs, in concert with the broader campaign of threats and harassment, to silence other Latino day laborers who wish to gather in Kennedy Park to solicit work in the future.
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215. Defendant Boughton, the Mayor of Danbury, is responsible for promulgating, implementing, and administering the policies, practices and/or customs of the City of Danbury and for supervising and administering all City Departments. He was directly involved in the promulgation, implementation, and administration of the policy that proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights.
216. Defendant Boughton was personally involved III and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights because he failed to remedy these violations. Specifically, Defendant Boughton failed to act on information provided to him no later than on the morning of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' arrests that alerted him to these violations before they occurred or while they were occurring. Upon learning of the violations, Defendant Boughton made no attempt to stop the violations from occurring, to minimize the harm that resulted from any violations that had already occurred, or to punish, sanction, or discipline the DPD Officers who committed the violations.
217. Defendant Boughton was personally involved III and proximately caused the violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights through his deliberate indifference to the rights of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs and his grossly negligent supervision of his subordinates, including but not limited to Defendant Baker and Defendant Fisher, who proximately caused the aforementioned violations. Defendant Boughton's gross negligence in supervising Defendants Baker and Fisher permitted them to promulgate, implement, and administer the aforementioned policies, practices, and customs which proximately caused the violations of the Plaintiff DayLaborers' rights, and to plan and carry out the sting operation which resulted in those violations.
218. Defendant Baker, the Chief of Police for Danbury, is responsible for promulgating, implementing, and administering the policies, practices, and/or customs of the
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DPD, and for supervising all DPD officers in the commission of their duties. He was directly involved in the promulgation, implementation, and administration of the policy that proximately caused the violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights.
219. Defendant Baker was personally involved III and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights through his deliberate indifference to the rights of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs and his grossly negligent supervision of his subordinates, including but not limited to Defendant Fisher, who proximately caused the aforementioned violations. Defendant Baker's gross negligence in supervising Defendant Fisher permitted Defendant Fisher to promulgate, implement, and administer the aforementioned policies, practices, and customs which proximately caused the violations of the Plaintiff DayLaborers' rights, and to plan and carry out the sting operation which resulted in those violations.
220. Defendant Fisher was directly involved in and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights by participating in the violations or by ordering or instructing the other DPD Officers to commit the unlawful arrests. Defendant Fisher knew of all relevant facts that made the actions of the DPD Officers unlawful.
221. Defendant Fisher, the head of the DPD's SID, is responsible for promulgating, implementing, and administering the policies, practices, and/or customs of the SID, and for supervising all other SID officers in the commission of their duties. He was directly involved in the promulgation, implementation, and administration of the policy proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights.
222. Defendant Fisher was personally involved in and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights through his deliberate indifference to the rights of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs and his grossly negligent supervision of
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his subordinate DPD Officers who committed the violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Defendant Fisher knew or should have known of the DPD's policy, practice, or custom of making civil immigration arrests without probable cause, and failed to act to prevent the violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights from occurring.
223. The City of Danbury is liable pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-557n, 7-465, and/or 7- 10 Ia, for the tortious acts of its employees.
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: Due Process Rights Under the Fourteenth Amendment and Article First, § 8 of the
Connecticut Constitution (42 U.S.C. § 1983: Danbury Defendants) 224. The Day-Laborer Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 225. Defendant DPD Officers Jose Agosto, Richard Dejesus, James Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, and John Does 1-5 civilly arrested the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs and deprived them of their of their liberty the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs in a manner that was without due process of law and fundamentally unfair in the totality of its circumstances, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and § 8 of Article First of the Connecticut Constitution. 226. Defendants Boughton, Baker, and Fisher were personally involved in and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights by knowingly and intentionally creating, implementing, enforcing, encouraging, sanctioning, and/or acquiescing in a policy, practice and/or custom of civilly arresting and depriving individuals of their liberty without due process of law and in a manner that is fundamentally unfair in the totality of its circumstances, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and § 8 of Article First of the Connecticut Constitution.
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227. Defendant Boughton, the Mayor of Danbury, is responsible for promulgating, implementing, and administering the policies, practices and/or customs of the City of Danbury and for supervising and administering all City Departments. He was directly involved in the promulgation, implementation, and administration of the policy that proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights.
228. Defendant Boughton was personally involved III and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights because he failed to remedy these violations. Specifically, Defendant Boughton failed to act on information provided to him no later than on the morning of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' arrests that alerted him to these violations before they occurred or while they were occurring. Upon learning of the violations, Defendant Boughton made no attempt to stop the violations from occurring, to minimize the harm that resulted from any violations that had already occurred, or to punish, sanction, or discipline the DPD Officers who committed the violations.
229. Defendant Boughton was personally involved III and proximately caused the violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights through his deliberate indifference to the rights of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs and his grossly negligent supervision of his subordinates, including but not limited to Defendant Baker and Defendant Fisher, who proximately caused the aforementioned violations. Defendant Boughton's gross negligence in supervising Defendants Baker and Fisher permitted them to promulgate, implement, and administer the aforementioned policies, practices, and customs which proximately caused the violations of the Plaintiff DayLaborers' rights, and to plan and carry out the sting operation which resulted in those violations.
230. Defendant Baker, the Chief of Police for Danbury, is responsible for promulgating, implementing, and administering the policies, practices, and/or customs of the
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DPD, and for supervising all DPD officers in the commission of their duties. He was directly involved in the promulgation, implementation, and administration of the policy that proximately caused the violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights.
231. Defendant Baker was personally involved III and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights through his deliberate indifference to the rights of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs and his grossly negligent supervision of his subordinates, including but not limited to Defendant Fisher, who proximately caused the aforementioned violations. Defendant Baker's gross negligence in supervising Defendant Fisher permitted Defendant Fisher to promulgate, implement, and administer the aforementioned policies, practices, and customs which proximately caused the violations of the Plaintiff DayLaborers' rights, and to plan and carry out the sting operation which resulted in those violations.
232. Defendant Fisher was directly involved in and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights by participating in the violations or by ordering or instructing the other DPD Officers to commit the unlawful arrests. Defendant Fisher knew of all relevant facts that made the actions of the DPD Officers unlawful.
233. Defendant Fisher, the head of the DPD's SID, is responsible for promulgating, implementing, and administering the policies, practices, and/or customs of the SID, and for supervising all other SID officers in the commission of their duties. He was directly involved in the promulgation, implementation, and administration of the policy proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights.
234. Defendant Fisher was personally involved in and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights through his deliberate indifference to the rights of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs and his grossly negligent supervision of
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his subordinate DPD Officers who committed the violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Defendant Fisher knew or should have known of the DPD's policy, practice or custom of making civil immigration arrests without probable cause, and failed to act to prevent the violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights from occurring.
235. The City of Danbury is liable pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-557n, 7-465, and/or 7-10Ia, for the tortious acts of its employees.
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF False Arrest and False Imprisonment
(Defendant DPD Officers) 236. The Day-Laborer Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 237. Defendant DPD Officers Jose Agosto, Richard Dejesus, James Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, and John Does 1-5 knowingly and intentionally arrested, detained, and imprisoned the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs for alleged civil violations of federal immigration law without a warrant and without probable cause, in retaliation for protected speech, based on impermissible racial, ethnic, and national origin discrimination, and in a manner preempted by federal law. 238. The Day-Laborer Plaintiffs were forcibly restrained and subsequently imprisoned by the Danbury Defendants and suffered damages as a result of Danbury Defendants' actions. 239. The Defendant DPD Officers' actions constitute false arrest and false imprisonment under Connecticut common law. 240. The City of Danbury is liable pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-557n, 7-465, and/or 7-lOla, for the tortious acts of its employees.
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SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Negligence
(Defendant DPD Officers and Defendant Baker) 24l. The Day-Laborer Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 242. Defendant DPD Officers Jose Agosto, Richard Dejesus, James Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, and John Does 1-5 negligently arrested, detained, and imprisoned the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs without a warrant and without probable cause, in retaliation for protected speech, based on impermissible racial and ethnic discrimination, and in a manner preempted by federal law, for alleged civil violations of federal immigration law. 243. Defendant DPD Officers and Defendant Baker owe to the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs a duty of care in the performance of their jobs. Defendant DPD Officers and Defendant Baker breached that duty of care by arresting the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs without a warrant and without probable cause, in retaliation for protected speech, based on impermissible racial and ethnic discrimination, and in a manner preempted by federal law. 244. Defendant DPD Officers and Defendant Baker knew that their acts or omissions would likely subject a group of identifiable persons to imminent harm, namely, the Latino and immigrant day-laborers gathered in Kennedy Park. 245. Defendant Baker negligently failed to supervise Defendant DPD Officers as they executed the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' unlawful arrest and detention. 246. The Day-Laborer Plaintiffs were forcibly restrained and subsequently imprisoned by the Danbury Defendants and suffered damages as a result of Danbury Defendants' actions. 247. The Defendant DPD Officers' actions constitute negligent false arrest and negligent false imprisonment under Connecticut common law.
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248. The City of Danbury is liable pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-557n, 7-465, and/or 7-101a, for the tortious acts of its employees.
EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
(Defendant DPD Officers) 249. The Day-Laborer Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 250. Defendant DPD Officers Jose Agosto, Richard Dejesus, James Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, and John Does 1-5 intended to inflict emotional distress upon the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs by deceiving, arresting, detaining, and imprisoning them, or should have known that their conduct was likely to cause Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' emotional distress. The Danbury Defendants' conduct was clearly extreme and outrageous, given the circumstances surrounding the arrests. 251. The emotional distress of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs was caused by the Danbury Defendants' conduct, and was severe. 252. The Defendant DPD Officers' actions constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress under Connecticut common law. 253. The City of Danbury is liable pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-557n, 7-465, and/or 7-10 la, for the tortious acts of its employees.
NINTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (Defendant DPD Officers and Defendant Baker) 254. The Day-Laborer Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as iffully set forth herein.
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255. Defendant DPD Officers Jose Agosto, Richard Dejesus, James Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, and John Does 1-5 created an unreasonable risk of causing the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs emotional distress. It was clearly foreseeable that the Defendant DPD Officers' conduct would cause the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs emotional distress.
256. Defendant DPD Officers knew that their failure to act would likely subject a group of identifiable persons to imminent harm, namely, the Latino and immigrant day-laborers gathered in Kennedy Park.
257. Moreover, Defendant Baker negligently failed to supervise Defendant DPD Officers as they executed the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' unlawful arrest and detention.
258. The emotional distress of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs was caused by the Defendant DPD Officers' conduct and was severe enough that it might result in illness or bodily harm.
259. The Defendant DPD Officers' actions constitute negligent infliction of emotional distress under Connecticut common law.
260. The City of Danbury is liable pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-557n, 7-465, and/or 7-l0la, for the tortious acts of its employees.
TENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Abuse of Process
(Defendant DPD Officers) 261. The Day-Laborer Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 262. Defendant DPD Officers Jose Agosto, Richard Dejesus, James Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, and John Does 1-5 abused legal process for a purpose for which it was not intended when they deceived, arrested, detained, and imprisoned the Day-
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Laborer Plaintiffs and subsequently transferred them to ICE custody for the purposes of placing them in immigration proceedings.
263. The Day-Laborer Plaintiffs suffered damages as a result of Defendants' actions. 264. The Defendant DPD Officers' actions constitute an abuse of process under Connecticut common law. 265. The City of Danbury is liable pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-557n, 7-465, and/or 7-lOla, for the tortious acts of its employees.
ELEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Fourth Amendment
(Bivens: ICE Defendants) 266. The Day-Laborer Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 267. In the event that this Court finds that the Defendant HARFOT Officers James Brown, Richard McCaffrey, Ronald Preble, and John Does 9-14, in conjunction with or rather than DPD officers, stopped, detained, investigated, searched, seized and/or arrested the DayLaborer Plaintiffs, the HARFOT Officers did so intentionally and knowingly and without probable cause and/or reasonable suspicion, in violation of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' right to be free from umeasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
TWELFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: Fifth Amendment Equal Protection
(Bivens: ICE Defendants) 268. The Day-Laborer Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
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269. In the event that the Court finds that Defendant HARFOT Officers James Brown, Richard McCaffrey, Ronald Preble, and John Does 9-14, in conjunction with or instead of the Defendant DPD Officers, stopped, detained, investigated, searched, seized and/or arrested the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs, Defendant HARFOT Officers knowingly and intentionally did so on the basis of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' race, ethnicity, and perceived national origin, in violation of their right to Equal Protection under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
270. In addition, Defendant HARFOT Officers subjected the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs to selective law enforcement out ofa malicious and bad faith intent to drive them out of the City of Danbury.
THIRTEENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Fifth Amendment Due Process (Bivens: ICE Defendants)
271. The Day-Laborer Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
272. In the event that the Court finds that Defendant HARFOT Officers James Brown, Richard McCaffrey, Ronald Preble, and John Does 9-14, in conjunction with or instead of DPD officers, arrested the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs, Defendant HARFOT Officers civilly arrested and deprived Day-Laborer Plaintiffs of their liberty in a manner that was without due process of law and was fundamentally unfair in the totality of the circumstances, in violation of the DayLaborer Plaintiffs' rights under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
FOURTEENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Conspiracy
(42 U.S.c. § 1983 and Bivens; Danbury and ICE Defendants)
273. The Day-Laborer Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
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274. Defendant DPD Officers and HARFOT Officers entered into an agreement, amongst and between themselves, to act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury on the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs. Moreover, Defendant DPD Officers and HARFOT Officers performed numerous overt acts in furtherance of the goal of causing damages.
275. Defendants Boughton, Baker, and Fisher were personally involved in and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights by knowingly and intentionally creating, implementing, enforcing, encouraging, sanctioning, and/or acquiescing in a policy, practice, and/or custom of acting in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury on the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs.
276. Defendant Boughton, the Mayor of Danbury, is responsible for promulgating, implementing, and administering the policies, practices and/or customs of the City of Danbury and for supervising and administering all City Departments. He was directly involved in the promulgation, implementation, and administration of the policy that proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights.
277. Defendant Boughton was personally involved III and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights because he failed to remedy these violations. Specifically, Defendant Boughton failed to act on information provided to him no later than on the morning of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' arrests that alerted him to these violations before they occurred or while they were occurring. Upon learning of the violations, Defendant Boughton made no attempt to stop the violations from occurring, to minimize the harm that resulted from any violations that had already occurred, or to punish, sanction, or discipline the DPD Officers who committed the violations.
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278. Defendant Boughton was personally involved in and proximately caused the violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights through his deliberate indifference to the rights of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs and his grossly negligent supervision of his subordinates, including but not limited to Defendant Baker and Defendant Fisher, who proximately caused the aforementioned violations. Defendant Boughton's gross negligence in supervising Defendants Baker and Fisher permitted them to promulgate, implement, and administer the aforementioned policies, practices, and customs which proximately caused the violations of the Plaintiff DayLaborers' rights, and to plan and carry out the sting operation which resulted in those violations.
279. Defendant Baker, the Chief of Police for Danbury, is responsible for promulgating, implementing, and administering the policies, practices, and/or customs of the DPD, and for supervising all DPD officers in the commission of their duties. He was directly involved in the promulgation, implementation, and administration of the policy that proximately caused the violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights.
280. Defendant Baker was personally involved m and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights through his deliberate indifference to the rights of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs and his grossly negligent supervision of his subordinates, including but not limited to Defendant Fisher, who proximately caused the aforementioned violations. Defendant Baker's gross negligence in supervising Defendant Fisher permitted Defendant Fisher to promulgate, implement, and administer the aforementioned policies, practices, and customs which proximately caused the violations of the Plaintiff DayLaborers' rights, and to plan and carry out the sting operation which resulted in those violations.
281. Defendant Fisher was directly involved in and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights by participating in the violations
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or by ordering or instructing the other DPD Officers to commit the unlawful arrests. Defendant Fisher knew of all relevant facts that made the actions of the DPD Officers unlawful.
282. Defendant Fisher, the head of the DPD's SID, is responsible for promulgating, implementing and administering the policies, practices, and/or customs of the SID, and for supervising all other SID officers in the commission of their duties. He was directly involved in the promulgation, implementation, and administration of the policy proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights.
283. Defendant Fisher was personally involved in and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights through his deliberate indifference to the rights of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs and his grossly negligent supervision of his subordinate DPD Officers who committed the violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Defendant Fisher knew or should have known of the DPD's policy, practice or custom of making civil immigration arrests without probable cause, and failed to act to prevent the violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights from occurring.
284. The City of Danbury is liable pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-557n, 7-465, and/or 7-IOJa, for the tortious acts of its employees.
FIFTEENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Conspiracy
.(42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and Bivens; Danbury and ICE Defendants) 285. The Day-Laborer Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 286. Defendant DPD Officers and Defendant HARFOT Officers entered into an agreement to act in concert for the purpose of depriving the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs of the equal
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protection of the laws, perfonned numerous overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, and committed injuries to the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' person or property.
287. Defendant DPD Officers and HARFOT Officers actions were motivated by racist and discriminatory animus.
288. Defendants Boughton, Baker, and Fisher were personally involved in and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights by knowingly and intentionally creating, implementing, enforcing, encouraging, sanctioning, and/or acquiescing in a policy, practice, and/or custom of acting in concert for the purpose of depriving the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws, based on the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' race or ethnicity.
289. Defendant Boughton, the Mayor of Danbury, is responsible for promulgating, implementing and administering the policies, practices, and/or customs of the City of Danbury and for supervising and administering all City Departments. He was directly involved in the promulgation, implementation, and administration of the policy that proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights.
290. Defendant Boughton was personally involved III and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights because he failed to remedy these violations. Specifically, Defendant Boughton failed to act on infonnation provided to him no later than on the morning of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' arrests that alerted him to these violations before they occurred or while they were occurring. Upon learning of the violations, Defendant Boughton made no attempt to stop the violations from occurring, to minimize the hann that resulted from any violations that had already occurred, or to punish, sanction, or discipline the DPD Officers who committed the violations.
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291. Defendant Boughton was personally involved in and proximately caused the violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights through his deliberate indifference to the rights of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs and his grossly negligent supervision of his subordinates, including but not limited to Defendant Baker and Defendant Fisher, who proximately caused the aforementioned violations. Defendant Boughton's gross negligence in supervising Defendants Baker and Fisher permitted them to promulgate, implement, and administer the aforementioned policies, practices, and customs which proximately caused the violations of the Plaintiff DayLaborers' rights, and to plan and carry out the sting operation which resulted in those violations.
292. Defendant Baker, the Chief of Police for Danbury, is responsible for promUlgating, implementing, and administering the policies, practices, and/or customs of the DPD, and for supervising all DPD officers in the commission of their duties. He was directly involved in the promulgation, implementation, and administration of the policy that proximately caused the violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights.
293. Defendant Baker was personally involved III and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights through his deliberate indifference to the rights of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs and his grossly negligent supervision of his subordinates, including but not limited to Defendant Fisher, who proximately caused the aforementioned violations. Defendant Baker's gross negligence in supervising Defendant Fisher permitted Defendant Fisher to promUlgate, implement, and administer the aforementioned policies, practices, and customs which proximately caused the violations of the Plaintiff DayLaborers' rights, and to plan and carry out the sting operation which resulted in those violations.
294. Defendant Fisher was directly involved in and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights by ordering or instructing the
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other DPD Officers to commit the unlawful arrests. Defendant Fisher knew of all relevant facts that made the actions ofthe DPD Officers unlawful.
295. Defendant Fisher, the head of the DPD's SID, is responsible for promulgating, implementing, and administering the policies, practices, and/or customs of the SID, and for supervising all other SID officers in the commission of their duties. He was directly involved in the promulgation, implementation, and administration of the policy proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights.
296. Defendant Fisher was personally involved in and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights through his deliberate indifference to the rights of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs and his grossly negligent supervision of his subordinate DPD Officers who committed the violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Defendant Fisher knew or should have known of the DPD's policy, practice or custom of making civil immigration arrests without probable cause, and failed to act to prevent the violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' rights from occurring.
297. The City of Danbury is liable pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-557n, 7-465, and/or 7-101a, for the tortious acts of its employees.
CLAIMS RELATING TO NCIC-PROMPTED ARREST SIXTEENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Fourth Amendment and Article First, § 7, 9 Conn. Constitution (42 U.S.c. § 1983: Danbury NCIC Defendants)
298. Plaintiff Danilo Brito Vargas repeats and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
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299. Defendants Mayor Mark Boughton, Police Chief Alan Baker, and DPD John Doe Officers 6-8 violated Plaintiff Vargas' rights when the DPD John Doe Officers 6-8 knowingly and intentionally conducted a pretextual investigatory stop of Plaintiff Vargas and unlawfully and without authority arrested him, in a manner preempted by federal law, based on information regarding an alleged civil immigration violation obtained from the NCIC database, in violation of Plaintiff Vargas' rights under the Fourth Amendment and Article First, §§ 7 and 9 of the Connecticut Constitution to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
300. Defendants Boughton and Baker were personally involved in and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of Plaintiff Vargas' rights by knowingly and intentionally creating, implementing, enforcing, encouraging, sanctioning, and/or acquiescing in a policy, practice andlor custom of making arrests based on civil immigration warrants, through use of the NCIC database.
301. Defendant Boughton, the Mayor of Danbury, is responsible for promUlgating, implementing, and administering the policies,practices and/or customs of the City of Danbury and for supervising and administering all City Departments. He was directly involved in the promulgation, implementation, and administration of the policy that proximately caused the aforementioned violations of Plaintiff Vargas' rights.
302. Defendant Boughton was personally involved in and proximately caused the violations of Plaintiff Vargas' rights through his deliberate indifference to Plaintiff Vargas' and his grossly negligent supervision of his subordinates, including but not limited to Defendant Baker, who proximately caused the aforementioned violations. Defendant Boughton's gross negligence in supervising Defendant Baker permitted them to promulgate, implement, and administer the aforementioned policies, practices, and customs which proximately caused the
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violations of Plaintiff Vargas' rights, and to plan and carry out the sting operation which resulted in those violations.
303. Defendant Baker, the Chief of Police for Danbury, is responsible for promulgating, implementing, and administering the policies, practices, and/or customs of the DPD, and for supervising all DPD officers in the commission of their duties. He was directly involved in the promulgation, implementation, and administration of the policy that proximately caused the violations of Plaintiff Vargas' rights.
304. Defendant Baker was personally involved in and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of Plaintiff Vargas' rights through his deliberate indifference to Plaintiff Vargas' rights and his grossly negligent supervision of his subordinates, including but not limited to Defendant DPD John Doe Officers 6-8, who proximately caused the aforementioned violations.
305. The City of Danbury is liable pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-557n, 7-465, and/or 7-101 a, for the tortious acts of its employees.
SEVENTEENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and Article First, § 20 of the Connecticut
Constitution (42 U.S.c. § 1983: Danbury NCIC Defendants) 306. Plaintiff Danilo Brito Vargas repeats and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as iffully set forth herein. 307. Defendants Mayor Mark Boughton, Police Chief Alan Baker, and DPD John Doe Officers 6-8 violated Plaintiff Vargas' rights when DPD John Doe Officers 6-8 targeted and arrested Plaintiff in a pretextual traffic-stop on the basis of his race, ethnicity, and national origin and for the purpose of investigating his immigration status through the NCIC database, in
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violation of Plaintiff Vargas' right to Equal Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article First, § 20 ofthe Connecticut Constitution.
308. Defendants John Does 6-8 subjected Plaintiff Vargas to selective law enforcement out of a malicious and bad faith intent to drive him and other drivers of Latino and/or foreignborn appearance from the City of Danbury.
309. In targeting Plaintiff Vargas for arrest, Defendants John Does 6-8 intentionally treated him differently from other similarly situated drivers without any rational basis for doing so.
310. Defendants Boughton and Baker were personally involved in and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of Plaintiff Vargas' rights by knowingly and intentionally creating, implementing, enforcing, encouraging, sanctioning, and/or acquiescing in a policy, practice and/or custom of making arrests based on civil immigration warrants, through use of the NCIC database.
311. Defendant Boughton, the Mayor of Danbury, is responsible for promulgating, implementing, and administering the policies, practices, and/or customs of the City of Danbury and for supervising and administering all City Departments. He was directly involved in the promulgation, implementation, and administration of the policy that proximately caused the aforementioned violations of Plaintiff Vargas' rights.
312. Defendant Boughton was personally involved in and proximately caused the violations of Plaintiff Vargas' rights through his deliberate indifference to Plaintiff Vargas' and his grossly negligent supervision of his subordinates, including but not limited to Defendant Baker, who proximately caused the aforementioned violations. Defendant Boughton's gross negligence in supervising Defendant Baker permitted them to promulgate, implement, and
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administer the aforementioned policies, practices, and customs which proximately caused the violations of Plaintiff Vargas' rights, and to plan and carry out the sting operation which resulted in those violations.
3l3. Defendant Baker, the Chief of Police for Danbury, is responsible for promulgating, implementing, and administering the policies, practices, and/or customs of the DPD, and for supervising all DPD officers in the commission of their duties. He was directly involved in the promulgation, implementation, and administration of the policy proximately caused the violations ofPlairitiffVargas' rights.
314. Defendant Baker was personally involved in and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of Plaintiff Vargas' rights through his deliberate indifference to Plaintiff Vargas' rights and his grossly negligent supervision of his subordinates, including but not limited to Defendant DPD John Doe Officers, who proximately caused the aforementioned violations.
315. The City of Danbury is liable pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-557n, 7-465, and/or 7-lOla, for the tortious acts of its employees.
EIGHTEENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF False Arrest and False Imprisonment (Defendants John Does 6-8 and the City of Danbury) 316. Plaintiff Danilo Brito Vargas repeats and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 317. Defendant DPD John Doe Officers 6-8 arrested Plaintiff Vargas without a warrant and without probable cause, and in a manner preempted by federal law, for alleged civil violations of federal immigration law as listed in the NCIC Database.
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318. Plaintiff Vargas was forcibly restrained and subsequently imprisoned by Defendants and suffered damages as a result of Defendant DPD John Doe Officers 6-8's actions.
319. Defendant DPD John Doe Officers 6-8's actions constitute false arrest and false imprisonment under Connecticut common law.
320. The City of Danbury is liable pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-557n, 7-465, and/or 7-101a, for the tortious acts of its employees.
NINETEENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Negligence
(Defendants Baker, John Does 6-8, and the City of Danbury) 321. Plaintiff Danilo Brito Vargas repeats and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 322. Defendants DPD John Doe Officers 6-8 negligently caused the arrest without a warrant and without probable cause, and in a manner preempted by federal law, of Plaintiff for alleged civil violations of federal immigration law. Plaintiff was forcibly restrained and subsequently imprisoned by Defendants and suffered damages as a result of Defendants' actions. 323. Defendants DPD John Doe Officers 6-8 owe a duty of care in the performance of their jobs to Plaintiff Vargas. Defendants breached that duty of care by arresting Plaintiff Vargas without a warrant and without probable cause, in a manner preempted by federal law, and on the basis of untrustworthy information retrieved from the NCIC database. 324. Defendant DPD John Doe Officers 6-8 knew that their failure to act would likely subject a group of identifiable persons to imminent harm, namely, individuals who appear to be of Latino racial ethnic background and national origin driving in the City of Danbury.
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325. Moreover, though fully aware that civil immigration arrests are preempted by federal law, Defendant Baker negligently failed to supervise Defendant DPD John Doe Officers 6-8 as they executed Plaintiff Vargas' arrest and detention.
326. Defendants' actions constitute negligent false arrest and negligent false imprisonment under Connecticut common law.
327. The City of Danbury is liable pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-557n, 7-465, and/or 7-10Ia, for the tortious acts of its employees.
TWENTIETH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Defendants John Does 6-8 and the City of Danbury) 328. Plaintiff Danilo Brito Vargas repeats and re-alleges the allegations in paragraphs X through Y as if fully set forth herein. 329. Defendant DPD John Doe Officers 6-8, through the arrest of Plaintiff Vargas, intended to inflict emotional distress upon him, or should have known that Plaintiffs emotional distress was a likely consequence of their conduct. Defendants' conduct was clearly extreme and outrageous, given the circumstances surrounding the arrests. 330. The emotional distress of Plaintiff was caused by Defendants' conduct, and was severe. 331. Defendants' actions constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress under Connecticut common law. 332. The City of Danbury is liable pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-557n, 7-465, and/or 7-1 ala, for the tortious acts of its employees.
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TWENTY-FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (Defendants John Does 6-8 and the City of Danbury) 333. Plaintiff Danilo Brito Vargas repeats and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 334. Defendant DPD John Doe Officers 6-8, through the arrest of Plaintiff Vargas, created an unreasonable risk of causing Plaintiff Vargas emotional distress. It was clearly foreseeable that Defendants' conduct would cause Plaintiff Vargas emotional distress. 335. Plaintiff Vargas' emotional distress was caused by Defendant DPD John Doe Officers 6-8's conduct, and was severe enough that it might result in illness or bodily harm. 336. Moreover, though fully aware that civil immigration arrests are preempted by federal law, Defendant Baker negligently failed to supervise Defendant DPD John Doe Officers 6-8 as they executed Plaintiff Vargas' arrest and detention. 337. Danbury NCIC Defendants' actions constitute negligent infliction of emotional distress under Connecticut common law. 338. The City of Danbury is liable pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-557n, 7-465, and/or 7-101a, for the tortious acts of its employees.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully requests that this Court:
(I) Enter a declaratory judgment that the actions of Defendant Danbury officials and/or Defendant ICE officials, both on September 19, 2006 and with respect to Plaintiff Vargas, violated the United States Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Connecticut Constitution, and Connecticut common law.
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(2) Award Plaintiffs' compensatory damages in an amount to be proven at trial.

(3) Award Plaintiffs' punitive damages in an amount to be proven at trial.

(4) Award Plaintiffs the cost of this action and reasonable attorney fees.

(5) Grant such other relief as the Court deems just and equitable.

Dated September 26, 2007 New Haven, Connecticut

Respectfully submitted,

Michael lshme (ct27221) Supervising Attorney
Christopher Lasch (cii7i9)
Supervising Attorney
Ramzi Kassem, Supervising Attorney Justin Cox, Law Student Intern Rebecca Engel, Law Student Intern Geri Greenspan, Law Student Intern Thorn Ringer, Law Student Intern Michael Tan, Law Student Intern JEROME N. FRANK LEGAL SERVICES ORGANIZATION Yale Law School 127 Wall Street New Haven, Connecticut 06511 Phone: (203) 432-4800
Counsel for Plaintiffs

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 Case 3:07-cv-01436-RNC Document 49-2 Filed 02/01/2008 Page 1 of 11

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

JUAN BARRERA, JOSE CABRERA,

:

DANIEL CHAVEZ, JOSE DUMA,

:

JOSE LLIBISUPA, ISAAC

:

MALDONADO, EDGAR REDROVAN, :

NICHOLAS SEGUNDO SANCHEZ,

:

JUAN CARLOS SIMBANA, and

: CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:07cv01436(RNC)

DANILO BRITO VARGAS

:

:

Plaintiffs,

:

:

V.

: FEBRUARY 1, 2008

:

MARK BOUGHTON, ALAN BAKER, :

JOSE AGOSTO, RICHARD DEJESUS, :

JAMES FISHER, JAMES LALLI,

:

CRAIG MARTIN, JOSEPH NORKUS, :

JOHN DOES, CITY OF DANBURY,

:

RONALD PREBLE, RICHARD

:

McCAFFREY, JAMES BROWN, JOHN :

DOES and USA

:

:

Defendants.

:

DEFENDANTS’ MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS
The undersigned Defendants, Mark Boughton (Mayor of the City of Danbury), Alan Baker (Chief of Police of the Danbury Police Department), Jose Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus (current or former Danbury police personnel) and John Does 1-8 (Danbury police officers who have not been identified),

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(hereinafter referred to as the “Defendants”), hereby file this Memorandum of Law in Support of their Motion to Dismiss the state law claims alleged in Claims for Relief Number 3-5 and 19, as well as Claim for Relief number 16 as it relates to these Defendants, of the plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint dated November 26, 2007, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because the plaintiffs have not stated a valid cause of action as to these Claims for Relief. In support of this motion, the Defendants state as follows: I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
According to the Amended Complaint, eleven day-laborers were arrested on September 19, 2006 in connection with an undercover immigration sting operation at Kennedy Park in Danbury. (Amended Complaint at ¶ 61). Nine of the eleven arrestees have become the plaintiffs in the present case. (Id.) The plaintiffs allege that they were arrested by officers of Danbury’s Police Department (the “DPD officers”) and then transferred to the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). (Id. at ¶ 112). They further allege that ICE agents then transported the plaintiffs to various detention centers located in Massachusetts and Texas. (Id. at ¶ 116, 134-36).
In their twenty-four (24) Claims for Relief, the plaintiffs allege that they were unlawfully arrested and illegally detained in violation of their constitutional rights under the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, as well as §§ 4, 7-9, 14 and 20 of Article First of the Connecticut Constitution. In connection with the September 19, 2006 arrests, the
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plaintiffs filed their initial complaint on September 26, 2007, and an Amended Complaint on November 26, 2007.
The Amended Complaint is replete with references to defendant Mayor Boughton’s alleged implementation of discriminatory immigration policies, and, with the help of the defendant DPD officers, the enforcement of those policies, which targeted day-laborers on the basis of their race, ethnicity and perceived national origin, in an effort to encourage Ecuadorian immigrants to leave the City of Danbury. (See, e.g., Amended Compl. at ¶¶ 33-34, 37, 48-49, 110). On January 3, 2008, the court (Chatigny, J.), granted the Defendants permission to file this Motion to Dismiss, without the need for a pre-filing conference on the issue.
The plaintiffs’ state law claims in the THIRD and NINETEENTH Claims for Relief allege that they were racially discriminated against as a result of having been made targets of an illegal immigration sting operation, in violation of § 20 of Article First of the Connecticut Constitution, and consequently were deprived of equal protection of the law. (Amended Compl. at ¶¶ 184, 186, 290-92). The state law claims in the FOURTH Claim for Relief 1allege that the defendant DPD officers violated the plaintiffs’ rights to freedom of speech and to peaceably assemble in violation of §§ 4 and 14 of Article First of the Connecticut Constitution. (Id. at 18990). The state law claims in the FIFTH Claim for Relief allege that the plaintiffs’ arrests constituted a deprivation of liberty that was without due process of law, in violation of § 8 of Article First of the Connecticut Constitution. Finally, the SIXTEENTH Claim for Relief seeks to
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bring an action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), based on the alleged conspiracy between the federal agents of the Hartford Fugitive Operations Team (the “HARFOT officers”) and the DPD officers to violate the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
In all five of these Claims for Relief, the plaintiffs allege they are entitled to damages as a result of the “violations of their Constitutional rights, loss of liberty, harms to their reputations and professional prospects, monetary damages, and emotional distress.” (Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 187, 191, 194, 258 and 293). II. LAW AND ARGUMENT
A. Motion to Dismiss Standard A Court may dismiss a complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6) “only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” D’Alessio v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 258 F.3d 93, 99 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal citations and quotations omitted). “The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” County of Suffolk v. First. Am. Real Estate Solutions, 261 F.3d 179, 187 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal citations and quotations omitted). “When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6), the Court must accept all allegations in the complaint as true and draw all inferences in
4

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the non-moving party’s favor.” Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc. 198 F. Supp.2d 167, 170 (D. Conn. 2002) (citations omitted). “The case will not be dismissed unless the Court is satisfied that the complaint cannot state any set of facts that would entitle the plaintiff to relief. However, because bald assertions and conclusions of law will not suffice to state a claim, the Court need not accept averments which are legal conclusions unsupported by the facts alleged elsewhere in the complaint.” Id. at 170-71 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
B. The plaintiffs’ THIRD and NINETEENTH Claims for Relief fail to state a cause of action as Connecticut has not recognized a direct cause of action under Article First, § 20 of the Connecticut Constitution.
The state law claims in the plaintiffs’ THIRD and NINETEENTH Claims for Relief allege that the defendant DPD officers violated their rights under § 20 of Article First of the Connecticut Constitution. Section 20 provides: “No person shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be subjected to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his civil or political rights because of religion, race, color, ancestry or national origin.” Conn. Const. art. 1, § 20. More specifically, in their THIRD Claim for Relief the plaintiffs allege that they were intentionally targeted on the basis of race for an immigration sting operation “out of a malicious and bad faith intent to drive [the plaintiffs] out of the City of Danbury.” (Amended Compl. at ¶¶ 184, 186). The NINETEENTH Claim for Relief, which was brought only by plaintiff Danilo Vargas, alleges that the DPD officers (John Does 6-8), in a pretextual traffic-
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stop, intentionally treated Vargas differently from other drivers similarly situated and without any rational basis, in violation of his right to equal protection of the law. (Id. at ¶¶ 290-92).
These claims must be dismissed, because Connecticut has not recognized a direct cause of action for a violation of Article First, § 20 of the Connecticut Constitution. The plaintiffs appear to rely on Binette v. Sabo, 244 Conn. 23 (1998), presumably in support of their cause of action for a violation of § 20 of Article First of the Connecticut Constitution. In that case, the court specifically recognized a private cause of action for money damages for violations of §§ 7 and 9 of Article First of the Connecticut Constitution,1 based on an alleged unreasonable search and seizure and unlawful arrest by defendant municipal police officers. Id. at 49-50.
However, no where in Binette does the court extend a direct cause of action for a violation of any other sections of the Connecticut Constitution. Furthermore, no other case in Connecticut has extended Binette’s holding to include a direct cause of action for a violation of Article First, § 20. The Binette court held that “[w]hether to recognize a cause of action for alleged violations of other state constitutional provisions in the future must be determined on a case-by-case basis.” Binette v. Sabo, supra, 244 Conn. at 48. Our Connecticut Supreme Court
1Section 7 provides: “The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches or seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or things, shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.” Conn. Const. art. 1, § 7. Section 9 provides: “No person shall be arrested, detained or punished, except in cases clearly warranted by law.” Conn. Const. art. 1, § 9.
6

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has not recognized a direct cause of action for a violation of Article First, § 20 of the Connecticut Constitution, as it has for §§ 7 and 9. Therefore, the plaintiffs’ state law claims should be dismissed, because they have not stated a valid cause of action.
C. The plaintiffs’ Fourth Claim for Relief fails to state a valid cause of action because Sections 4 and 14 of Article First of the Connecticut Constitution only applies to citizens.
In their FOURTH Claim for Relief, the plaintiffs allege that, without probable cause to believe that the plaintiffs were in violation of any immigration laws, the DPD officers, including John Does 1-5, “knowingly and intentionally stopped, detained, investigated, and arrested [them] in retaliation for their exercise of protected speech and association in a public forum.” (Amended Compl. at ¶¶ 189-190). As part of their state law claims, the plaintiffs allege that such conduct occurred in violation of their constitutional rights under §§ 4 and 14 of Article First of the Connecticut Constitution. These claims should be dismissed, because the plaintiffs are not protected under these sections of the Connecticut Constitution, and have therefore failed to state a valid cause of action.
Article First, Section 4 of our state constitution provides: “Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty.” Article First, Section 14 of our state constitution provides: “The citizens have a right, in a peaceable manner, to assemble for their common good, and to apply to those invested with the powers of government, for redress of grievances, or other proper purposes, by petition,
7

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address or remonstrance.” Conn. Const., art. 1, §§ 4, 14 (emphasis added). Both of these sections expressly provide for the rights to be conferred upon citizens of the United States. No where in the Amended Complaint is it alleged that any of the plaintiffs are citizens of the United States or the State of Connecticut. Thus the constitutional protections offered in Article First, §§ 4 and 14 do not apply to these plaintiffs. See State v. Sinchuk, 96 Conn. 605, 610-615 (1921); Benjamin v. Bailey, 234 Conn. 455, 464 n.6 (1995). Therefore, the plaintiffs’ state law claims in their FOURTH Claim for Relief should be dismissed, as the plaintiffs have failed to state a valid cause of action.
D. The plaintiffs’ FIFTH Claim for Relief fails to state a cause of action as Connecticut does not recognize a cause of action for a violation of Article First, § 8 of the Connecticut Constitution.
In their FIFTH Claim for Relief, the plaintiffs’ state law claim is that the defendant DPD officers, including John Does 1-5, arrested them and “deprived them of their . . . liberty in a manner that was without due process of law and fundamentally unfair” in violation of § 8 of Article First of the Connecticut Constitution. (Amended Compl. at ¶ 193).
Article First, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution provides in relevant part: “No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law . . . .” Our Supreme Court has expressly refused to recognize a private cause of action for damages pursuant to a violation of this particular constitutional provision. See ATC Partnership v. Town of Windham, 251 Conn. 597, 612-17 (1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1214, 120 S. Ct. 2217, 147 L.Ed.2d 249
8

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(2000); Kelley Property Development, Inc. v. Lebanon, 226 Conn. 314, 330-331 (1993). Therefore, the plaintiffs’ state law claim should be dismissed for failure to state a valid cause of action.
E. The plaintiffs’ SIXTEENTH Claim for Relief fails to state a valid cause of action as Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics is inapplicable to the DPD officers.
In their SIXTEENTH Claim for Relief the plaintiffs allege a cause of action for conspiracy against the defendant HARFOT officers and the DPD officers under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, supra. In support of their claim, the plaintiffs allege that the “HARFOT Officers and DPD officers entered into an agreement, between and amongst themselves, to act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury on the Day-Laborer plaintiffs. . . . The conspiracy included . . . an agreement to arrest and detain DayLaborer plaintiffs in violation of their various rights . . . .” (Amended Compl. at ¶ 255).
The Bivens court held that a violation of a person’s Fourth Amendment rights by a federal agent, acting under color of his authority, would give rise to a cause of action for damages. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, supra, 403 U.S. at 397. “[A] Bivens action is the federal analog to suits brought against state officials under . . . 42 U.S.C. § 1983. . . . Section 1983 applies . . . to state and local officers, [and] the Supreme Court in Bivens . . . inferred a parallel damages action against federal officers.” Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 255 n.2 (2006) (citations omitted; internal quotation marks
9

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omitted). Because the undersigned Defendants of this Motion to Dismiss (the DPD officers) are state officials, the plaintiffs have not stated a valid cause of action under Bivens as to them. Therefore, the portion of the plaintiffs’ SIXTEENTH Claim for Relief that refers to the DPD officers should be dismissed. III. CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, the Defendants, Mark Boughton, Alan Baker, Jose Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus and John Does 1-8 , respectfully request this court to grant their motion to dismiss.

THE DEFENDANTS, MARK BOUGHTON, ALAN BAKER, JOSE AGOSTO, RICHARD DEJESUS, JAMES FISHER, JAMES LALLI, CRAIG MARTIN, JOSEPH NORKUS, JOHN DOES

By:

/s/

Charles A. Deluca, Esq., (CT 05255)

Ryan, Ryan, Johnson & Deluca, LLP

707 Summer Street

Stamford, CT 06901

Phone No. 203-357-9200

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on February 1, 2008, a copy of the above was filed electronically and served by mail on anyone unable to accept electronic filing. Notice of this filing will be sent by e-mail to all parties by operation of the court’s electronic filing system or by mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing as indicated on the Notice of Electronic Filing. Parties may access this filing through the court’s CM/ECF System.
_________/s/________________________ Charles A. Deluca, Esq.
I:\Procases\415.027\Memo of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss Claims for Relief number 3-5, 16 and 19.wpd 415.027
11

 
 Case 3:07-cv-01436-RNC Document 51-2 Filed 02/01/2008 Page 1 of 32

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

JUAN BARRERA, JOSE CABRERA, DANIEL CHAVEZ, JOSE DUMA, JOSE LLIBISUPA, ISAAC MALDONADO, EDGAR REDROVAN, NICOLAS SEGUNDO SANCHEZ, JUAN CARLOS SIMBANA, and DANILO BRITO VARGAS
V.
MARK BOUGHTON, Mayor of Danbury, et al.

: : : : : : : : No. 3:07CV1436 (RNC) : : :

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS Pursuant to Local Rule 7(a)1. of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for the District of Connecticut, and Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the federal defendants, Ronald Preble, Richard McCaffrey, and James Brown, all sued in their individual capacity for money damages, and the United States of America hereby move to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ amended complaint.
INTRODUCTION In this lawsuit, Plaintiffs challenge their arrest and detention on immigration charges. They also allege they were subjected to unconstitutional treatment once they were in immigration custody. At its core, this lawsuit is an attempt by Plaintiffs to collaterally attack their current immigration proceedings, which are pending before an Immigration Judge in Hartford, Connecticut. Plaintiffs are in removal proceedings where they are charged with being aliens present in the United States without being admitted or paroled after inspection by an immigration

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officer. In fact, Plaintiffs have raised the same legal arguments in their immigration proceedings that they raise here: that the individual federal defendants violated their Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights based on their immigration arrests, detention and the decision to commence removal proceedings to determine whether Plaintiffs are subject to removal from the United States. Here, Plaintiffs also assert various tort claims against the United States based on the same conduct.
Plaintiffs’ claims against the individual federal defendants fail for several reasons. First, the law prohibits Plaintiffs from collaterally challenging their immigration proceedings in this lawsuit. Second, the special factors present in this country’s immigration laws preclude Plaintiffs from seeking damages against individuals directly under the Constitution. As to the tort claims asserted against United States of America, those claims are jurisdictionally barred and cannot lie in this Court. Therefore, this Court should dismiss this action against all of the federal defendants.
FACTS1 On September 26, 2007, plaintiffs, ten in total, filed a civil rights complaint against six Danbury Police Officers, the Mayor of Danbury, the Danbury Chief of Police, the City of Danbury, three officers of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency ("ICE") (the "federal defendants") and John Does 1-20. On November 26, 2007, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. The amended complaint added a Federal Tort Claims Act count against the United
1 For purposes of the motion to dismiss the federal defendants accept Plaintiffs’ facts as true but note that they dispute many of the factual allegations contained in the amended complaint.
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States and dropped the number of John Doe defendants to 14.2
In response, the federal defendants now move to dismiss the amended complaint on the
following bases: 1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1);
and 2) the independent contractor exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA").3
The above-captioned civil action arises out of two separate and distinct incidents -- one
occurring on or about September 19, 2006 and one occurring on or about February 17, 2007.
2 Specifically, the amended complaint alleges that the Danbury defendants (Agosto, DeJesus, Fisher, Lalli, Martin, Norkus, and John Does 1-5): 1) violated the Fourth Amendment and §§ 7, 9 of the Connecticut Constitution by arresting them without a warrant - Count 1; 2) violated the Fourth Amendment and §§ 7, 9 of the Connecticut Constitution by intentionally and knowingly detaining and/or arresting them on suspicion of civil immigration violations - Count 2; 3) violated the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and § 20 of the Connecticut Constitution by intentionally targeting plaintiffs based on their race, ethnicity, and national origin - Count 3; 4) violated the First Amendment and §§ 4,14 of the Connecticut Constitution by stopping, detaining, investigating, and arresting plaintiffs based on their exercise of protected speech and association in a public forum - Count 4; 5) violated their due process rights afforded under the Fourteenth Amendment and § 8 of the Connecticut Constitution by civilly arresting them - Count 5; and 6) committed the torts of false arrest/false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress - Counts 10-12. The amended complaint alleges that Danbury defendants Boughton, Baker and Fisher are liable for these alleged civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 - Count 8 and that there is municipal liability against the City of Danbury - Count 9. The plaintiffs further allege that the Danbury defendants and ICE defendants conspired to inflict an unconstitutional injury and violate their equal protection rights - Counts 6 and 7.
With respect to the ICE agents, the Plaintiffs allege: 1) a Bivens claim for the arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment - Count 13; 2) a Bivens claim alleging a violation of the equal protection clause - Count 14; 3) a Bivens due process claim - Count 15; and 4) a Bivens conspiracy claim - Count 16.
Lastly, plaintiffs assert claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act against the Federal Defendants for false arrest/imprisonment; intentional infliction of emotional distress; negligent infliction of emotional distress; and abuse of process - Count 17.
3While not raised at this stage of the proceedings, the individual federal defendants do not waive their qualified immunity defense and will raise it at a later stage in these proceedings.
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Neither incident involves the same parties or underlying facts. As the Court must accept Plaintiffs' allegations as true at this stage of the proceedings, the following is a summary of the facts, for each incident, as alleged in the complaint. Not surprisingly, defendants dispute many of the facts as alleged.
A. September 19, 2006 As part of an alleged immigration enforcement campaign, the plaintiffs, Barrera, Cabrera, Chavez, Duma, Llibisupa, Maldonado, Redrovan, Sanchez, and Simbana, (the “Plaintiffs"), claim that Danbury Mayor Boughton and the Danbury defendants purposely singled out "Latino men" from the day-laborer community which congregated in Kennedy Park for special harassment. Compl., ¶¶ 48-49. Kennedy Park, a public park in the center of Danbury, was a gathering site for day-laborers. Compl., ¶ 50. On September 19, 2006, the Danbury Police Department conducted an undercover sting operation aimed at day laborers who congregated at Kennedy Park in downtown Danbury. As a result of these efforts, Plaintiffs were arrested, detained in ICE custody, and were transferred to the Suffolk County House of Correction or the Plymouth County Detention Center, both located in Massachusetts. Complaint, ¶¶ 3 through 11. Ultimately, some Plaintiffs were transferred to detention facilities in Texas. Id. All of Plaintiffs are currently released on bond. With respect to the specific allegations, plaintiffs claim that, on September 19, 2006, Danbury defendants planned a "sting" operation against day-laborers who congregated in Kennedy Park. Compl., ¶ 62. Detective Fisher, of the Danbury Police Department, informed the federal defendants about the operation and the probability that immigration violators and/or immigrants with outstanding orders of removal would be present. Compl., ¶ 65. The federal
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defendants agreed to assist the Danbury defendants in this operation. Compl., ¶ 66. Plaintiffs claim that all defendants proceeded on the basis of ethnic and racial stereotypes. Compl., ¶¶ 6770.
On the morning of September 19, 2006, the federal defendants met the Danbury defendants at the Danbury Police Station. Compl,¶ 78. The Danbury defendants, utilizing an undercover vehicle, approached Kennedy Park.4 Compl., ¶¶ 76, 83. Defendants did not approach any particular individual in the Park. Instead, Plaintiffs approached the Danbury defendants' vehicle and were then offered work for the day. Compl., ¶ 83.5
The Danbury police officer then drove the vehicle behind an office building on Main Street in Danbury. Compl., ¶ 87. The vehicle stopped in the corner of the lot, and Plaintiffs exited the vehicle. Compl., ¶¶ 87, 90. Plaintiffs allege that they were then surrounded by the Danbury and federal defendants, some with guns drawn; arrested by the Danbury defendants; handcuffed; placed in the back of a van; and their requests to make phone calls were refused. Compl., ¶¶ 90-91, 96. All of these actions allegedly occurred without a single question being asked by any defendant. Compl., ¶ 96. Plaintiffs contend that they were not asked about their identity, their nationality, the place and manner of their entry into the United States, and their immigration status until they were placed in the back of the van. Compl., ¶¶ 91, 96.6
4 Plaintiffs allege that no Town ordinance prohibited them from soliciting work in Kennedy Park, and employers seeking assistance would drive by the Park to get workers. Compl., ¶¶ 5152. 5 There are no allegations that Plaintiffs were forced to enter the vehicle.
6 Defendants assert that none of Plaintiffs are legally present in the United States. All are currently in removal proceedings.
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Plaintiffs were then transported to the Danbury Police Station where they were processed. Compl., ¶ 100. Because they were processed in the Danbury Police Department, Plaintiffs claim that they were arrested by Danbury Police and charged by them with "illegal entry into [the United States]." Compl., ¶ 104. After being booked, the Day-Laborer plaintiffs were transferred to the ICE office in Hartford, Connecticut. Compl., ¶ 113. While in custody at the ICE Hartford Office, Plaintiffs allege that they were denied access to telephones and were forced to sign documents. Compl., ¶¶ 116-124. After two nights in Hartford, Plaintiffs were then transferred to state prisons in Massachusetts. Compl., ¶ 116.
Plaintiffs also claim that they were subjected to unconstitutional treatment at these state facilities. Compl., ¶ 117. First, they allege they were denied "access to a telephone for periods ranging from several days to several weeks." Compl., ¶ 117. Second, Plaintiffs allege that, while in state custody, an "unknown law enforcement agent" questioned them regarding a murder which occurred in Danbury. Compl., ¶ 125 (emphasis added). The state prison officials allegedly subjected Plaintiffs to a medical examination and a "full-body search." Compl., ¶ 126. As part of the medical examination, Plaintiffs Barrera, Llibisupa, Maldonado, Redrovan, and Simbana, claim they were forced to give blood samples, and Plaintiffs Barrera, Maldonado, Redrovan, and Simbana claim they were forced to give urine samples. Compl., ¶¶ 127-128. Plaintiff Barrera states that, as a result of his blood test, the Suffolk County Correctional guards placed him in isolation. Compl., ¶ 129.
On October 3, 2006, Plaintiffs Barrera, Duma, Llibisupa, and Maldonado, were released on $1,500 bond. Compl., ¶ 131. However, Plaintiffs Chavez, Sanchez, Simbana, Cabrera, and Redrovan were transferred to detention facilities in Texas. Compl., ¶ 134. On October 16, 2006,
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an Immigration Judge in Texas set bond for Plaintiffs Cabrera, Chavez, Sanchez, and Simbana. Compl., ¶ 139. Another Immigration Judge in Texas set bond for Redrovan. Compl, ¶ 139. Once these Plaintiffs posted bond, they were released from custody, and the release dates ranged from October 20, 2006 to October 26, 2006. Compl, ¶¶ 141-144.
B. February 17, 2007 On or about February 17, 2007, Plaintiff Vargas claims he was driving home with his wife when he was pulled over by a Danbury Police Officer. Compl., ¶ 169. Vargas alleges that this officer, John Doe 6, told him that he was being pulled over because his muffler was too loud. Compl., ¶ 170. John Doe 6 then asked Vargas for identification. Compl., ¶ 170. Vargas states that, after he produced his Ecuadorian passport, John Doe 6 returned to his cruiser, ran his name through the NCIC database, and radioed for assistance. Compl., ¶ 171-72. Subsequently, two additional Danbury Police Officers, John Does 7 and 8, arrived. Compl., ¶ 172. Vargas contends that he was then arrested and detained before being placed in removal proceedings. Compl., ¶¶ 173-174. Vargas was removed to Ecuador in April or May of 2007. Compl, ¶ 175. In his complaint, Vargas alleges that John Does 6-8: 1) committed a violation of the Fourth Amendment and §§ 7, 9 of the Connecticut Constitution by unlawfully arresting him on an immigration warrant; 2) committed a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article First, § 20 of the Connecticut Constitution by creating a pre-textual traffic stop on the basis of his race, ethnicity, and national origin; 3) committed false arrest and false imprisonment; 4) intentionally inflicted emotional distress; and 5) negligently inflicted emotional distress. Vargas also alleges that defendants Boughton and Baker are liable in their individual capacities as supervisors for John Does 6-8 and that the City of Danbury is liable for the promulgation and
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execution of a municipal policy or custom. Compl., ¶¶ 286-325. Vargas makes no claims against any federal defendant.7
ARGUMENT I. Plaintiffs May Not Pursue Claims That Can And Should Be Raised During Their
Pending Immigration Proceedings No matter how much Plaintiffs dress up their legal arguments as Bivens or tort claims
Plaintiffs’ complaints about their arrest and detention are nothing more than a secondary attack on their pending immigration proceedings. Indeed, in determining the merits of Plaintiffs’ arrest and detention claims in this case, the Court will in essence be examining the merits of their pending immigration case. However, as detailed below, the Immigration and Nationality Act (“the INA”) explicitly prohibits this type of review, that is, district courts cannot review the merits of pending immigration proceedings. Thus, as Plaintiffs are challenging the alleged actions of the federal defendants leading up to and including their immigration arrests, detention and transfers, all of which relate to the removal process and actions taken to remove them from the United States, see Amended Complaint ¶¶ 66, 75, 96, 114-28, 132-37, this Court is jurisdictionally barred from hearing such claims by the INA. Specifically, the INA limits judicial review of immigration proceedings in three ways material to this case. First, the INA consolidates in the courts of appeals review of all legal and factual questions arising from actions taken to remove an alien. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). Second, the INA precludes challenges to the Government’s decisions and actions to commence removal proceedings, adjudicate cases, or
7 Plaintiff, Danilo Brito Vargas, does not bring any claims against the federal defendants and thus this motion only addresses the claims alleged by the remaining Plaintiffs.
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execute removal orders. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). Third, the Act bars judicial review of discretionary decisions altogether, including the decision to grant or deny bond. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e).
As the Supreme Court noted, the “theme of the legislation[’s]” jurisdiction-stripping provisions is to “protect[] the Executive’s discretion from the courts.” Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 486 (1999) (“AADC”). Likewise, as the Second Circuit explained, a “primary effect” of the amendments to the INA is “to ‘limit all aliens to one bite of the apple ... [and thereby] streamline what the Congress saw as uncertain and piecemeal review of orders of removal.’” Xiao Ji Chen v. DOJ, 471 F.3d 315, 324 n.3 (2d Cir. 2006), (quoting Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 446 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1184 (2006)). The fact that Plaintiffs seek money damages in this action does not alter the INA’s preclusive effect. See Aguilar v. U.S.I.C.E., –F.3d–, 2007 WL 4171244 (1st Cir. Nov. 27, 2007) (explaining that § 1252(b)(9) aims to consolidate “all questions of law and fact” arising from removal proceedings regardless of the characterization of the claims). Applied to this case, the INA divests this Court of jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs’ claims relating to their arrest and detention. Cf. Humphries v. Various Federal USINS Employees, 164 F.3d 936, 942, 945 (5th Cir. 1999) (dismissing First Amendment claim based on § 1252(g)); Foster v. Townsley, 243 F.3d 210 (5th Cir. 2001) (dismissing excessive force, due process, equal protection, and First Amendment claims); Van Dinh v. Reno, 197 F.3d 427 (10th Cir. 1999) (dismissing Bivens class action suit regarding the Government’s decision to transfer aliens between detention facilities); but see Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 268-70 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (claims not precluded); Medina v. United States, 92 F. Supp. 2d 545, 553 (E.D. Va. 2000) (same). As such, the Court
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should dismiss Plaintiffs’ Bivens claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
A. Congress Has Limited Challenges Arising From Any Action Taken To Remove An Alien to Being Brought In The Court Of Appeals After Being Exhausted The Act’s central avenue for judicial review is its provision requiring all legal and factual questions arising from actions taken to remove an alien to be reviewed only by the courts of appeals. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has described this provision as “the unmistakable ‘zipper’ clause” because it consolidates all judicial review in a single place, the courts of appeals. AADC, 525 U.S. at 475. Specifically, this section states: Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this subchapter [8 U.S.C. §§ 1151 et seq.] shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section. Except as otherwise provided in this section, no court shall have jurisdiction, by habeas corpus ... or by any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), to review such an order or such questions of law or fact. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). Under this clause, judicial review is thus limited to the courts of appeals, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), and “other challenges” may no longer be “brought pursuant to a federal court’s federal question . . . jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.” Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 232 F.3d 328, 340 (2d Cir. 2000), aff’d, 533 U.S. 348 (2001). The “zipper clause” provision dovetails with the Act’s exhaustion requirement. Before an alien can present a claim to the court of appeals, the alien must first “exhaust[] all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1), which includes raising his claims before an Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals. An alien’s failure to do so deprives the courts of jurisdiction to hear his claims. See 8 U.S.C.
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§ 1252(d)(1); see also McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992), superseded on other
grounds, 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e); United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61, 69 (2d Cir. 2004).
Together, the “zipper clause” and the exhaustion requirement map out the exclusive path that all
challenges arising from any action taken to remove an alien must follow.
In short, Plaintiffs have declined to follow this exclusive path and instead have also
brought this lawsuit challenging the same conduct that they challenge in their removal
proceedings. The fact that here Plaintiffs are seeking a different form of relief, that is, money
damages and not suppression of evidence or termination of removal proceedings, does not exempt them from the statutory requirements contained in the INA.8 Plaintiffs can and should be
required to present all of their claims before an Immigration Court because they all arise from the
alleged actions taken by ICE officials to remove them from the Country due to the fact that they
are unlawfully present in the United States. In fact, Plaintiffs have raised these exact claims before the Immigration Court on motions to suppress.9 Specifically, in their motions to suppress
Plaintiffs maintain that the conduct of the individual federal defendants, along with other
8 The fact that the text and legislative history of the INA do not indicate that Congress sought to preclude Bivens or FTCA claims does not alter the applicability of § 1252(b)(9) as the conduct alleged by Plaintiffs falls squarely within its coverage. No matter how they style their claims, at bottom, Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of ICE’s actions in seeking to investigate, arrest, detain and remove Plaintiffs from the country due to the fact that Plaintiffs are illegally present here. Accordingly, such claims fall squarely within § 1252(b)(9). 9 Based on representation from ICE trial attorneys within the Department of Homeland Security, those motions to suppress have been ruled on in the Immigration Court in Hartford, Connecticut. Moreover, although there are some minor differences in each Plaintiff’s motion to suppress based on their individual affidavits, the legal claims appear to be identical. Because such motions range from 63 to 71 pages excluding exhibits, the Government has not included them with this motion to dismiss. In the event the Court requires such motions the Government will file them with the Court and all parties.
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unnamed ICE officials, to remove them from the country violated the Fourth10 and Fifth Amendments–the identical claims made before this Court, although styled here as Bivens and FTCA claims. More precisely, Plaintiffs allege that they were arrested without probable cause or reasonable suspicion that they were illegally present in the United States. (See Plaintiffs’ Motion to Suppress pp. 24-28). Plaintiffs’ further assert that their arrests were based on race and thus a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. (See id. pp. 29-34). Finally, Plaintiffs maintain that the totality of the circumstances surrounding their arrest infringed upon their Fifth Amendment due process rights to fundamental fairness in immigration proceedings. (See id. pp. 52-57). If Plaintiffs are unsuccessful with their arguments before an immigration judge they can appeal that decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) and ultimately the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Because Congress plainly intended to put an end to piecemeal review that has previously been commonplace in removal proceedings and due to the fact that Plaintiffs’ claims fall squarely within § 1252(b)(9) since they arise from actions taken to remove them, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear their Bivens and FTCA claims.11 See H.R. Rep. No. 109-72, at 174 (2005).
10 In Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 236 (2d Cir. 2007), the Second Circuit concluded that “exclusion of evidence is appropriate . . . if record evidence established either (a) that an egregious violation that was fundamentally unfair had occurred, or (b) that the violation–regardless of its egregiousness or unfairness–undermined the reliability of the evidence in dispute.” 11 Prudential reasons further support the Government’s position that Plaintiffs’ claims should be raised and adjudicated before the Immigration Court. Moreover, courts have rebuffed attempts by litigants to bypass mandatory exhaustion requirements simply by claiming that the remedies they seek are not available. See Booth, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001) (holding that prisoners must exhaust administrative remedies under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act “regardless of relief offered through administrative process.”).
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Plaintiffs cannot avoid the application of § 1252(b)(9) by simply characterizing their claims as Bivens actions or FTCA claims. Again, by its terms, § 1252(b)(9) aims to consolidate “all questions of law and fact” that “aris[e] from any action taken . . . to remove an alien from the United States . . . .” (Emphasis added). By the plain language of the statute, § 1252(b)(9)’s reach is not limited only to proceedings brought to remove an alien but also applies to any action taken to remove an alien. The face of Plaintiffs’ amended complaint reveals that all of their claims arise from ICE’s action to remove them from the United States.12 Congress has explicitly channeled all such claims (not just those arising from proceedings to remove an alien) to the Court of Appeals (after being initially presented and adjudicated by the BIA) and has explicitly barred all other methods of judicial review. See § 1252(b)(9). Section 1252(b)(9) could not be clearer in precluding Plaintiffs’ claims in this lawsuit–“Except as otherwise provided in this section, no court shall have jurisdiction . . . by any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), to review such an order or such questions of law or fact.” (Emphasis added).
In addition, as outlined above, Plaintiffs’ claims are of the character that can be efficaciously raised within their pending removal hearings as delineated by the INA. Moreover, although money damages are concededly not available under the INA, Plaintiffs will still have meaningful review of their claims before the Immigration Court, the BIA and ultimately the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. In fact, if Plaintiffs’ claims are found valid, the immigration
12Any attempt by Plaintiffs to interpret § 1252(b)(9) narrowly so as not to include claims that occurred prior to the institution of removal proceedings is likewise without merit. Nothing in the statute limits its reach to claims arising from things occurring prior to the initiation of formal removal proceedings. The zipper-clause’s reach is clear– no court has jurisdiction to review a factual or legal claim arising from any action to remove an alien. It is clear Congress intended this broad language to include pre-removal arrests and detention because most removal proceedings begin with an arrest, detention and issuance of a notice to appear.
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judge (or the BIA for that matter) could terminate removal proceedings against these aliens. This type of relief creates a sufficient incentive for immigration officials to comply with the Constitution. Simply characterizing their allegations as Bivens or FTCA claims does not take them outside the scope of § 1252(b)(9) because all of their claims raise questions of law or fact arising from ICE’s actions take to remove them from the United States.13 Moreover, any assertion by Plaintiffs that their claims here do not arise from actions taken to remove them would be disingenuous considering they have raised the identical claims in this lawsuit that are pending before the Immigration Court and which can be raised on appeal to the BIA and ultimately the Court of Appeals. In the event an Immigration Judge (or the BIA for that matter) determines that Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights have been violated, although money damages are unavailable, suppression and termination of proceedings would adequately protect any violation of their constitutional rights. Additionally, such claims are subject to judicial review within the Court of Appeals. As such, Plaintiffs have meaningful administrative and judicial review of the claims they raise in this lawsuit within the statutory scheme delineated by Congress in the INA.
The bases for Plaintiffs’ arrests and detention, of course, are the same bases on which the government is seeking removal. Plaintiffs’ claims here and in removal proceedings all arise from their arrests, detention and treatment while detained. As outlined above, Plaintiffs have ample administrative review protections in place under the INA to redress violations, constitutional or otherwise, alleged to have been committed by immigration officers as part of the removal
13Although Plaintiffs’ conditions of confinement claims alleging harsh treatment arguably fall outside of the purview of § 1252(b)(9), they still must be exhausted before the immigration court. Regardless, concerning the conditions of confinement claims at the state facilities, there are no specific allegations directed at the individual federal defendants named in this lawsuit and thus any Bivens claim based on that conduct should be dismissed.
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process. Any such legal and factual claims arising from ICE’s actions to remove them can and should be raised through the appropriate channels specified in the INA. Again, the remedy sought by Plaintiffs under the INA and supporting case law–suppression of all evidence and termination of removal proceedings–is sufficient to protect their constitutional rights and to deter any alleged future misconduct by ICE officials. Plaintiffs have raised such claims administratively and they are pending within the administrative scheme outlined by Congress in the INA. To entertain their claims under § 1331, Bivens or the FTCA would overstep the limits on district court jurisdiction and read the zipper-clause and exhaustion requirements out of the INA. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are jurisdictionally barred from presenting those claims to this Court. See Copeland, 376 F.3d at 69.
B. Congress Has Precluded Challenges To Government Decisions To Commence Proceedings, Adjudicate Cases, Or Execute Removal Orders In addition to consolidating review through the “zipper clause,” Congress has also precluded district courts from entertaining claims arising from actions to commence removal proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute a removal order: Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of law[,] ... no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under [8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537]. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). In AADC, the Supreme Court concluded that where a case arises from one of the “three discrete events” encompassed by § 1252(g) – the decision or action to “commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders” – judicial review is not available in the district
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courts. AADC, 525 U.S. at 482, 487. In this case, Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim and Fifth Amendment equal protection claim attack ICE’s decision to commence proceedings. See Amended Complaint ¶ 112, 244-45, 247-49, 252-53, 255-58, 260-82. Plaintiffs’ claims against the individual federal defendants are focused almost exclusively on their allegedly wrongful actions leading up to their arrest, issuance of notices to appear and initial determination to detain them, which by their very terms serve to initiate removal proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. §1229. Plaintiffs cannot evade the jurisdictional bar by couching their cause of action as a Fourth Amendment violation or a Fifth Amendment equal protection claim. Plaintiffs were arrested solely because ICE decided to commence removal proceedings against them.
To the extent Plaintiffs claim that they do not challenge the commencement of proceedings but rather the alleged unconstitutional conduct of the federal defendants such a characterization should be rejected by this Court because at bottom Plaintiffs have challenged the commencement of proceedings both here and in the Immigration Court. The fact that Plaintiffs seek money damages in this action likewise does not foreclose § 1252(g)’s application to this case. Plaintiffs have adequate protections and relief available in Immigration Court to remedy a constitutional violation and thus protect their rights. In sum, Plaintiffs cannot challenge the propriety of the arrest and detention in this lawsuit, and this Court thus lacks jurisdiction to hear those claims. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g); see also Sissoko v. Rocha, 509 F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that Section 1252(g) bars an alien’s Bivens action for false arrest); Cf. Medina, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 553 (explaining § 1252(g) does not bar a money damages claim where the immigration proceedings have terminated).
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C. Congress Has Precluded Challenges To The Discretionary Decisions To Detain An Alien And To Deny Bond Finally, Congress has also barred judicial review of discretionary decisions authorized under the INA, including the discretionary decision to deny bond: The Attorney General’s discretionary judgment regarding the application of this section shall not be subject to review. No court may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under this section regarding the detention or release of any alien or the grant, revocation, or denial of bond or parole. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii); 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e). In this case, Plaintiffs directly challenges ICE’s initial decision to detain them without bond for varying amounts of time and objecting to bond at the various bond redetermination hearings before an immigration judge. Complaint ¶¶ 274-84. Indeed, Plaintiffs claim, among other things, that the individual federal defendants along with other unnamed ICE officials detained them without bond for improper and illegal reasons. A. Complaint ¶¶ 251-53; 274-84. Although Plaintiffs’ causes of action are styled as constitutional violations and tort claims, “‘[a] petitioner may not create the jurisdiction that Congress chose to remove simply by cloaking an abuse of discretion argument in constitutional garb.’” Saloum v. United States Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 437 F.3d 238, 243-44 (2d Cir. 2006), quoting Torres-Aguilar v. INS, 246 F.3d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir. 2001)). If Plaintiffs believed that ICE abused its discretion in initially detaining them without bond, their sole recourse under the INA was to challenge that denial through the immigration process. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 51617 (2003) (holding that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) bars judicial review of the decision over whether to release an alien). In this case, Plaintiffs exercised their legal right to have an immigration judge review ICE’s bond determination, see 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1), and all Plaintiffs were released on bond
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packages. As Congress has explicitly laid out, the INA divests district courts of jurisdiction to hear challenges to bond determinations, and thus this Court may not review Plaintiffs’ claims regarding bond, regardless of its label in the complaint or his theory of recovery. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e). See also United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 443-49 (1988).
II. Plaintiff May Not Pursue A Bivens Remedy In Light Of Alternative Remedies In Place And The Special Factors Present In The Immigration And Nationality Act
Even if Plaintiffs’ claims are properly before this Court, they have no damages remedy against the individual federal defendants for claims regarding their arrest and detention. To the extent Plaintiffs have alleged constitutional violations, such claims are actionable—if at all—under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971). In Bivens, the Supreme Court asserted its general remedial powers to imply a private cause of action for damages, directly under the Constitution, against federal officers in their individual capacities. Id. at 396. Nonetheless, Bivens and subsequent decisions have made clear that federal courts have no freewheeling authority to imply a damages remedy any time a plaintiff can show a violation of the Constitution by a federal officer. See, e.g., Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001). In fact, for twenty-five years the Supreme Court “consistently refused to extend Bivens liability to any new context or new category of defendants.” Malesko, 534 U.S. at 68; see also Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 421-25 (1988) (“[o]ur more recent decisions have responded cautiously to suggesting that Bivens remedies be extended into new contexts”).
In its last term, the Supreme Court again rejected an attempt to create a new Bivens remedy, reiterating that a damages remedy “is not an automatic entitlement ... and in most
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instances we have found a Bivens remedy unjustified.” Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2597 (2007). The Supreme Court explained that a Bivens remedy should only be inferred if (1) there is no alternative, existing process for protecting a constitutional interest, and (2) if there are no special factors counseling hesitation against a judicially created remedy. Id. In this case, the INA addresses the very subject of Plaintiffs’ complaints, and it provides an alternative, existing process to protect aliens’ constitutional interests. In addition, Congress’s plenary power over immigration is another special factor counseling hesitation. Taken together, these mutually reinforcing special factors preclude a Bivens remedy in this case for claims relating to Plaintiffs’s arrest and detention.
A. The Comprehensive Administrative and Judicial Review Scheme Of The INA Is An Existing Process For Protecting Aliens Constitutional Rights Which Precludes A Bivens Remedy The presence of a deliberately crafted statutory remedial system is a “special factor” that precludes a Bivens remedy because it demonstrates that Congress has not intended to allow a private right of action for damages. Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 421-25. That is, because there are meaningful administrative and judicial remedies available to aliens like Plaintiffs in dealing with government employees, this Court should refrain from providing a cause of action for alleged constitutional violations. In this case, Plaintiffs’ arrest and detention are governed by the INA, which the Supreme Court itself has characterized as “the comprehensive federal statutory scheme for regulation of immigration and naturalization.” De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 353 (1976). In the INA, Congress has broadly provided that all aliens are subject to detention during their removal proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. §1226(a). Congress has also delineated the types of remedies available to aliens, taking into account their status in the United States and the
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likelihood and imminence of their removal. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1225, 8 U.S.C. § 1229, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, and 8 U.S.C. § 1229b. The INA also details specific procedures for detention as well as the requirements for relief from detention. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1222, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV), 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and 8 U.S.C. § 1231.
In addition to regulating the detention of aliens, the INA and its implementing regulations encompass a host of safeguards to protect the constitutional rights of aliens: the right to seek review of an initial bond determination, see 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d); the right to challenge that determination in an adversarial evidentiary proceeding before an immigration judge with the ability to present evidence and to be represented by counsel, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d) and 8 U.S.C. § 1003.16; and the right to seek review of the Immigration Judge’s bond decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(7). An alien may also seek review of constitutional issues concerning the propriety of his detention, see Demore, 538 U.S. at 516-17, through a writ of habeas corpus in the relevant United States District Court, with a right of further review in the Courts of Appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Moreover, as explained in detail above, Plaintiffs have raised several constitutional arguments in support of their claim for suppression of evidence and termination of their removal proceedings. As such, Plaintiffs have meaningful remedies available within the administrative process, which includes judicial review before the Court of Appeals. Sugrue v. Derwinski, 26 F.3d 8 (2d Cir. 1994) (denying Bivens relief where meaningful remedies available within the administrative context). The sole fact that money damages are not available in the administrative process pursuant to the INA does not automatically mean that Plaintiffs are entitled to Bivens relief.
The aforementioned protections afforded to aliens such as Plaintiffs demonstrate that
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“Congress has provided what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional violations that may occur in the course of its administration.” Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 423. Where such a comprehensive program exists, it is a plaintiff’s burden to show that Congress has “plainly expressed an intention that the courts preserve Bivens remedies” alongside the program. Spagnola v. Mathis, 859 F.2d 223, 228 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Unless this burden is met, courts must not create additional Bivens remedies. See id.; accord Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 423; Dotson v. Griesa, 398 F.3d 156, 166-67 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2859 (2006).
Plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing that Congress expressed an intention to preserve Bivens remedies in this context. To the contrary, Congress cut off judicial review of immigration decisions except for those expressly provided in the INA, and these judicial review provisions have repeatedly been strengthened over the years. See, e.g., REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 106(a)(1)(A)(iii), 119 Stat. 23, 310 (2005) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D)). As discussed in the previous section, the INA provides a “sole and exclusive” means for questions of law and fact arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States: a petition filed in the appropriate court of appeals. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). See also id. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), and 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e). Had Congress wanted to carve out a Bivens remedy they could have explicitly done so. As such, because this is an alternative, existing process for protecting Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights (albeit a claim channeling provision), this Court should refrain from extending Bivens remedies to the immigration field.
Due to the INA’s provisions limiting judicial review, it is not unreasonable for the Court “to stay its Bivens hand.” Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2600. Indeed, Congress made clear that removal-
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related decisions would be reviewed under the administrative procedures authorized in the INA, rather than through actions in the federal courts. In situations like this, where Congress delineates specific remedial mechanisms within a statutory scheme, “federal courts will generally not attempt to supplement the relief afforded by that statute through other actions, including those implied under Bivens.” Dotson, 398 F.3d at 160 (finding that a comprehensive remedial scheme precluded a Bivens remedy). See also Hudson Valley Black Press v. IRS, 409 F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir. 2005) (same); Sugrue v. Derwinski, 26 F.3d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1994) (same). Here, the INA encompasses the same type of comprehensive scheme that this Circuit and the Supreme Court have found to be a special factor counseling hesitation. A thorough review of the INA shows that Congress has created an elaborate administrative system (with judicial review) that has been constructed step by step with careful attention to the many conflicting policy considerations that abound within the immigration field. As such, because Plaintiffs have meaningful and adequate administrative, and ultimately judicial, process available to them under the INA to redress constitutional violations regarding their arrest, detention and treatment while detained, this Court should refrain from providing a new remedy for money damages under Bivens.
B. Congress’s Plenary Power Over Immigration Is A Special Factor That Precludes A Bivens Remedy In addition to their being an alternative, existing process for protecting Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, Congress’s plenary power over immigration is a special factor counseling against the creation of a Bivens remedy in this case. In Wilkie, the Supreme Court stated that in addition to considering whether an alternative remedy exists to protect one’s constitutional rights, courts need to be mindful that “a Bivens remedy is a subject of judgment: ‘the federal
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courts must make the kind of remedial determination that is appropriate for a common-law tribunal, paying particular heed, however, to any special factors counseling hesitation before authorizing a new kind of federal litigation.’” 127 S. Ct. at 2598, quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983). One special factor that precludes a Bivens remedy is when Congress has plenary power over the subject matter for which a Bivens remedy is sought. See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 298 (1983) (citing Congress’s plenary power over military matters as a basis to deny a Bivens remedy for claims arising in the context of military affairs); accord Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (rejecting creation of Bivens remedy because of the “foreign affairs implications” of the suit).
Because Congress legislates in an area of plenary power over immigration matters, its legislative judgments carry almost conclusive weight. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952). In Shaughnessy, the Supreme Court held that immigration matters “are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference.” Id. Accordingly, federal courts must afford substantial deference to the Executive Branch entities that have been granted authority by Congress to enforce and implement those laws. See INS v. Aguirre- Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) (deference on immigration matters is “especially appropriate” because “officials ‘exercise especially sensitive political functions that implicate questions of foreign relations’”), (quoting INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988)). Thus, just as in Chappell, where Congress failed to provide a damages remedy when it legislated in military matters, “[a]ny action to provide a judicial response by way of such a remedy would be plainly inconsistent with Congress’ authority in this field.” 462 U.S. at 304.
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To permit Bivens suits in the immigration field would also unnecessarily enmesh the courts in difficult constitutional and public policy issues. See Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2602-04, n.11 (holding that even where there is no comprehensive remedial scheme, courts should consider the “difficulty” in defining and implementing the proposed Bivens remedy). The INA is a unique federal law that encompasses an intricate and carefully crafted regulatory scheme while balancing many competing policy considerations. As the Supreme Court has explained, “any policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of government.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 522 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
This case in particular would require this Court to invade the realm of federal immigration policy normally reserved to Congress. To resolve the questions posed in Plaintiffs’ amended complaint—the review of legal and factual questions arising from ICE’s actions taken to remove Plaintiffs who are alleged to be illegally present in the United States—this Court will need to interpret and apply immigration law and regulations, as well as determine whether federal immigration officers acted improperly. Even if these issues do not trigger the jurisdictional bar, they illustrate why staying “the Bivens hand” makes sense. One of the reasons Congress consolidates challenges under a statutory scheme is to avoid a patchwork body of interpretation produced by different courts during different types of proceedings. See Bush, 462 U.S. at 378. To permit a Bivens action against immigration officials who are seeking to enforce the law would invite such claims in every sphere of the immigration field from investigations of illegal aliens (including arrest, detention and removal) to the adjudication of various forms of discretionary relief available under the INA. Consequently, any damages remedy for
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immigration-related claims by aliens should come through further legislation, not judicial intervention. See Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2604-05. As such, this Court should refrain from providing a new remedy in damages under Bivens, and thus Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed.
III. FTCA Claims against the United States In the amended complaint, Plaintiffs make several tort claims against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. These counts include claims for false arrest/imprisonment; intentional infliction of emotional distress; negligent infliction of emotional distress; and abuse of process. The United States moves to dismiss these claims based on the independent contractor exception to the FTCA. A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under the FTCA "The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued ..., and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit." United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941)). Waivers of sovereign immunity must be strictly construed in favor of the Government. Lane v. Pena, 116 S. Ct. 2092, 2096 (1996); Morales v. United States, 38 F.3d 659, 660 (2d Cir. 1994). The defense of sovereign immunity is jurisdictional. Broussard v. United States, 989 F.2d 171, 177 (5th Cir. 1993); Kramer v. United States, 843 F. Supp. 1066, 1068 (E.D. Va. 1994). The FTCA creates a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, authorizing claims against the Government "to the same extent as a private person" for "injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
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Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). The FTCA defines "employee" as follows:
Employee of the government" includes officers or employees of any federal agency, members of the military or naval forces of the United States, members of the National Guard while engaged in training ..., and persons acting on behalf of a federal agency in an official capacity, temporarily or permanently in the service of the United States, whether with or without compensation.
28 U.S.C. § 2671. Because Plaintiffs have the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction, see United Food Local 919 v. Centermark Properties, 30 F.3d 298, 301 (2d Cir. 1994), they have to prove that the alleged state facility tortfeasors were Government employees under the FTCA, see McFeely v. United States, 700 F. Supp. 414, 419 (S.D. Ind. 1988).
B. The United States is not Liable for the Actions of Independent Contractors In the amended complaint, the Plaintiffs claim that state prison officials subjected them to unconstitutional treatment at two Massachusetts state facilities, Plymouth County and Suffolk County Correctional Facilities. Compl., ¶ 117. These allegations include: 1) denying plaintiffs "access to a telephone for periods ranging from several days to several weeks;" 2) questioning by an "unknown law enforcement agent" regarding a murder which occurred in Danbury; 3) subjecting plaintiffs to a medical examination and a "full-body search;" 4) forcing Plaintiffs Barrera, Llibisupa, Maldonado, Redrovan, and Simbana to give blood samples; 5) forcing Plaintiffs Barrera, Maldonado, Redrovan, and Simbana to give urine samples; and 6) placing Plaintiff Barrera in isolation. Compl., ¶¶ 117, 125-29. To the extent that any of these claims are asserted against the United States, the United States moves to dismiss these claims based on the
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independent contractor exception to the FTCA. If there are no claims against the federal defendants arising out of these claims, the federal defendants move to strike these facts as irrelevant to the claims made against these defendants. Allowing claims of alleged mistreatment by individuals who are not named as a party to the litigation would be unduly prejudicial and have no bearing on the litigation against these defendants. See 2A Moore's Federal Practice P 12.21, at 2429 ("Motions to strike allegations from a complaint are strongly disfavored and will be granted only where it is clear that (the allegations) can have no possible bearing upon the subject matter of the litigation."); accord, Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Grinnell Corp. [1968 TRADE CASES P 72,444], 287 F. Supp. 744, 747 (S. D. N. Y. 1968) (Cooper, J.).
1. Applicable Law Regarding Independent Contractors The FTCA specifically excludes "any contractor with the United States" from the category of entities for whose negligence the Government may be held liable. Id. "The Government cannot be held liable for the negligence of independent contractors." Fraser v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 2d 302, 309 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). Thus, subject matter jurisdiction over the claims regarding plaintiffs' treatment at the state facilities depends on whether the state facilities are considered agencies of the United States or independent contractors.
2. Independent Contractor v. Government Agency Whether an entity/person is a government agency/employee or an independent contractor is a question of federal law. Leone v. United States, 910 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1990). The "distinction between the servant or agent relationship and that of independent contractor turn[s] on the absence of authority in the principal to control the physical conduct of the contractor in performance of the contract." Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521, 527 (1973). A contractor is
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a Government employee under the FTCA only where the contractor's "day-to-day operations are supervised by the Federal Government." United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 815 (1976) (rejecting view that federal agency, by requiring local, federally funded grantee to select new chairman, was exercising sufficient control over grantee's workers to make them Government employees). A contractor whose daily activities are not governmentally supervised is not a Government employee under the FTCA even where the Government retains control over key personnel decisions, see Orleans, 425 U.S. at 816-17, or imposes safety conditions on the contractor, Hines v. United States, 60 F.3d 1442, 1446-47 (9th Cir. 1995); Lipka v. United States, 369 F.2d 288, 291 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 935 (1967). Whether the contractor's work was previously performed by Government employees is irrelevant for FTCA purposes. See Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521, 531-32 (1973). "Courts look to the terms of the contract to determine whether the Government controlled the detailed physical performance of the contractor or whether the Government supervised the day-to-day operations of the contractor." Fraser, 490 F. Supp. 2d at 310. 14
Here, the two contracts in question clearly delegated control over the detained plaintiffs' physical confinement and their daily supervision to the local officials running each facility. Specifically, the United States Marshals Service contract with Plymouth County states that the State government agrees, in part, to:
< provide medical care and services at the same level as provided to local
14 This Court may look to evidence outside the pleadings (i.e. the contracts) in determining whether to dismiss a case for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). Bldg. and Const. Trades Council of Buffalo, New York and Vicinity v. Downtown Dev., Inc., 448 F.3d 138, 150 (2d Cir. 2006)
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prisoners; < accept and provide for the secure custody, care and safekeeping of federal
prisoners in accordance with state and local laws; < allow periodic inspections of the jail; < provide adequate, trained jail staff provided 24 hours a day to supervise
prisoners; < provide three meals a day; < provide guard/transportation service; and < notify the Marshals’ Service of significant changes in the facility.
See Declaration of Susan D. Erickson15 and Plymouth County Contract, attached thereto as Exhibit A (emphasis added). Plymouth County had no obligation to inform the United States Marshals Service of the day-to-day operations of the facility, and the United States Marshals had no control over these day-to-day operations. Instead, Plymouth County was only obliged to inform the Marshals Service of "significant changes," which included "significant variations in inmate populations, which [would] cause[] a significant change in the level of services under [the contract]." Exhibit A, p. 7. Additionally, the contract provided that the Local Government must defend against and/or indemnify the United States for all liability caused by property provided by the federal government and for injuries to prisoners and/or employees occurring during transport. Exhibit A.
Likewise, the Suffolk County contract with the Department of Homeland Security
15The United States Marshals Service entered into an Inter-Government Agreement with Plymouth County in which the Marshals Service authorized ICE full usage of the Plymouth County Correction Facility for ICE detention services. See Declaration of Susan D. Erickson.
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provides that the Suffolk County Sheriff's Department agrees to: < provide the basic needs for all ICE detainees, including housing, subsistence, on-premises medical services, and other service, such as interpretive services; < provide escort/transportation services; < ensure compliance with ICE's detention procedures and may adopt, adapt or establish alternative procedures, provided they meet or exceed the standard; < request approval for off-site, non-emergent medical treatment; < provide 24 hour emergency medical care; < allow for periodic inspections; < indemnify the federal government for all liability claims arising out of the "occupancy, use, service, operation or performance of work ..., resulting from the negligent acts or omissions of the Service Provider, or any employee, or agent of the Service Provider;" and < and retains the Provider's right to refuse to accept or request removal of any detainee exhibiting violent or disruptive behavior or who has a medical condition beyond the prison's ability to treat.
See Declaration of Susan D. Erickson and Suffolk County Sheriff's Department, attached thereto as Exhibit B. Similar to the Plymouth contract, Suffolk County had no obligation to inform ICE of the day-to-day operations of the facility, and ICE had no control over these day-to-day operations. Suffolk County was only obliged to seek approval to incur outside medical expenses for non-emergent care. Additionally, the Suffolk County contract specifically provided for indemnification for all liability arising from the negligent acts or omissions of the Service Provider, or any employee, or agent of the Service Provider. Exhibit B, page 9.
Based on the above, it is clear that the United States did not have any role in the day-to-
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day supervision of these plaintiffs. The daily care, meals, medical coverage, transportation, and safety of prisoners, including Plaintiffs, at these state facilities was provided by the local officials. The fact the federal government reserved the right to conduct periodic inspections and approve expenses for non-emergent medical care is of no relevance. "Neither the retention of the right to inspect the contractor's work, nor the power to control a contractor's compliance with the contract's specifications, is sufficient to convert the contractor's status from an independent contractor to an agent of the Government ...." O'Neill v. United States, 927 F. Supp. 599, 606-07 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
Therefore, any claims made by Plaintiffs for the alleged 1) denial of access to a telephone; 2) questioning by an "unknown law enforcement agent;" 3) medical examinations and "full-body search[es];" 4)taking of blood and urine samples; and 5) placement of Plaintiff Barrera in isolation, cannot be maintained against the United States and should be dismissed. Additionally, these alleged facts should be stricken from the complaint.
CONCLUSION Based on the above, the individual federal defendants respectfully request that the Bivens claims asserted against them in the Amended Complaint be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and the United States also requests that any and all FTCA claims relating to Plaintiffs’ treatment at the state facilities be dismissed pursuant to the independent contractor exception.
Respectfully submitted, KEVIN J. O’CONNOR UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
/s/ DOUGLAS P. MORABITO
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Assistant U.S. Attorney Attorney Bar # ct 20962 157 Church Street New Haven, CT 06510 Telephone: (203) 821-3700 Fax: (203) 773-5373 Email: Douglas.Morabito@usdoj.gov
MICHELLE COLSON Attorney Bar # ct 27157 157 Church Street New Haven, CT 06510 Telephone: (203) 821-3700 Fax: (203) 773-5373 Email: Michelle.Colson@usdoj.com
CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on February 1, 2008, a copy of the foregoing memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss with attachments was filed electronically and served by mail on anyone unable to accept electronic filing. Notice of this filing will be sent by e-mail to all parties by operation of the Court's electronic filing system or by mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing as indicated on the Notice of Electronic Filing. Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF System.
/s/ DOUGLAS P. MORABITO Assistant U.S. Attorney Attorney Bar # ct 20962 157 Church Street New Haven, CT 06510 Telephone: (203) 821-3700 Fax: (203) 773-5373 Email: Douglas.Morabito@usdoj.gov
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 Case 3:07-cv-01436-RNC Document 21 Filed 11/26/07 Page 1 of 62

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT ------------------------------------------------------------------------X JUAN BARRERA, JOSÉ CABRERA, DANIEL CHAVEZ, JOSÉ DUMA, JOSÉ LLIBISUPA, ISAAC MALDONADO, EDGAR REDROVAN, NICHOLAS SEGUNDO SANCHEZ, JUAN CARLOS SIMBAÑA, and DANILO BRITO VARGAS,

Plaintiffs,

v.

C.A. No. 3:07-cv-01436-RNC

MARK BOUGHTON, Mayor of Danbury, ALAN BAKER, Chief of Police, Danbury Police Department, Danbury Police Officers JOSÉ AGOSTO, RICHARD DEJUSUS, JAMES A. FISHER, JAMES LALLI, CRAIG MARTIN, JOSEPH NORKUS, JOHN DOES 1-8, CITY OF DANBURY,

Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agents JAMES BROWN, RICHARD MCCAFFREY, RONALD PREBLE, JOHN DOES 9-14, and the UNITED STATES,

Defendants. ------------------------------------------------------------------------X

COMPLAINT This is a civil rights suit to remedy the discriminatory and unauthorized enforcement of federal immigration laws against Latino residents of the City of Danbury, Connecticut. Under the leadership of Mayor Mark Boughton, Danbury and its police department have repeatedly and knowingly made illegal civil immigration arrests, engaged in impermissibly discriminatory law enforcement, and retaliated against residents for expressive activities secured by the First Amendment. In their frustration with the arrival of new immigrants to Danbury, Mayor Boughton and the police department have taken the law into their own hands. In some instances the City has acted unilaterally and at other times its officials have conspired with federal immigration agents in the conduct of this unlawful campaign.

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Each of the ten Plaintiffs named in this action suffered illegal arrest and detention at the hands of Danbury Police Department (“DPD”) officers for alleged civil immigration law violations. Yet federal immigration law preempts and prohibits local police from making civil immigration arrests unless explicitly authorized by prior written agreement with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). Mayor Boughton very publicly, and unsuccessfully, sought such a written agreement in Connecticut in 2005.
Despite Mayor Boughton’s failure to secure authority for the civil enforcement of immigration laws, on September 19, 2006, the DPD instigated an undercover sting operation in which DPD officers, with the knowing and willing assistance of ICE, used extraordinary deception to arrest a group of Latino day-laborers who had gathered at Kennedy Park, a park in the center of downtown Danbury. DPD targeted the men based on their race, ethnicity, and perceived national origin, having no other reason to believe that any of them had violated immigration law. Furthermore, the DPD arrested the day-laborers without probable cause, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The arrests were also calculated to silence the day-laborers’ expression of their availability for work in a traditional public forum, in violation of the First Amendment, and to chill the speech of other day-laborers who now avoid the park for fear of arrest. Nine of the day-laborers arrested on September 19, 2006 are Plaintiffs in this action.
The enforcement of civil immigration laws, despite the absence of the necessary written authorization, has been a regular custom, policy, and practice of the DPD. DPD officers routinely stage pretextual traffic stops in Danbury, in which they target drivers who are or appear Latino for the purpose of investigating their immigration status. DPD officers conducting these stops run searches for the names of drivers in the principal criminal database of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), called the National Crime Information Center (“NCIC”); arrest
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drivers on any civil immigration violations they discover; and turn the arrestees over to ICE for deportation. One Plaintiff in this action was unlawfully arrested by DPD for a civil immigration violation after a pretextual and race-based traffic stop, transferred to ICE custody, and eventually deported.
The DPD’s rogue actions have resulted in numerous constitutional violations, caused Plaintiffs suffering and ignominy, and endangered the civil rights of Danbury’s Latino and immigrant communities. Plaintiffs bring this action to redress the Defendants’ unlawful and discriminatory enforcement of federal immigration law. They ask this Court to issue a declaration stating that Plaintiffs’ arrests violated the law and to award Plaintiffs damages for the harm they have suffered as a result of Defendants’ illegal actions.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 1. This Court has jurisdiction over the Plaintiff’s claims arising under the U.S. Constitution and federal statutes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 1361 and supplemental jurisdiction over claims arising under the laws and Constitution of the State of Connecticut pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Jurisdiction to grant declaratory judgment is conferred by 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02. 2. Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) in that all events complained of and giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims arose in this district.
PARTIES Plaintiffs
3. Plaintiff Juan Barrera. DPD officers arrested Plaintiff Barrera on September 19, 2006 and subsequently transferred him to ICE custody. ICE detained Mr. Barrera in Hartford, Connecticut and then in the Suffolk County House of Corrections in Boston, Massachusetts,
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where he remained until his release on bond on or about October 3, 2006. Plaintiff Barrera is of Latino race and ethnicity and is alleged by ICE to be a citizen of Ecuador.
4. Plaintiff José Cabrera. DPD officers arrested Plaintiff Cabrera on September 19, 2006 and subsequently transferred him to ICE custody. ICE detained Mr. Cabrera in Hartford, Connecticut, the Plymouth County Detention Center in Plymouth, Massachusetts, and the Willacy Detention Center in Raymondville, Texas, where he remained until released on bond on or about October 23, 2006. Mr. Cabrera is of Latino race and ethnicity and is alleged by ICE to be a citizen of Ecuador.
5. Plaintiff Daniel Chavez. DPD officers arrested Mr. Chavez on September 19, 2006 and subsequently transferred him to ICE custody. ICE detained Mr. Chavez in Hartford, Connecticut, the Plymouth County Detention Center in Plymouth, Massachusetts, and the Willacy Detention Center in Raymondville, Texas, where he remained until released on bond on or about October 23, 2006. Mr. Chavez is of Latino race and ethnicity and is alleged by ICE to be a citizen of Ecuador.
6. Plaintiff José Edwardo Duma. DPD officers arrested Mr. Duma on September 19, 2006 and subsequently transferred him to ICE custody. ICE detained Mr. Duma in Hartford, Connecticut and then in the Suffolk County House of Corrections in Boston, Massachusetts, where he remained until released on bond on or about October 3, 2006. Mr. Duma is of Latino race and ethnicity and is alleged by ICE to be a citizen of Ecuador.
7. Plaintiff José Froilan Llibisupa. DPD officers arrested Mr. Llibisupa on September 19, 2006 and subsequently transferred him to ICE custody. ICE detained Mr. Llibisupa in Hartford, Connecticut and then in the Suffolk County House of Corrections in Boston,
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Massachusetts, where he remained until released on bond on or about October 3, 2006. Mr. Llibisupa is of Latino race and ethnicity and is alleged by ICE to be a citizen of Ecuador.
8. Plaintiff Isaac Maldonado. DPD officers arrested Plaintiff Maldonado on September 19, 2006 and subsequently transferred him to ICE custody. ICE detained Mr. Maldonado in Hartford, Connecticut and then in the Suffolk County House of Corrections in Boston, Massachusetts, where he remained until released on bond on or about October 3, 2006. Mr. Maldonado is of Latino race and ethnicity and is alleged by ICE to be a citizen of Ecuador.
9. Plaintiff Edgar Eladio Redrovan. DPD officers arrested Mr. Redrovan on September 19, 2006 and subsequently transferred him to ICE custody. ICE detained Mr. Redrovan in Hartford, Connecticut, the Plymouth County Detention Center in Plymouth, Massachusetts, and the Port Isabel Processing Center in Los Fresnos, Texas, where he remained until released on bond on or about October 23, 2006. Mr. Redrovan is of Latino race and ethnicity and is alleged by ICE to be a citizen of Ecuador.
10. Plaintiff Nicolas Segundo Sanchez. DPD officers arrested Mr. Sanchez on September 19, 2006 and subsequently transferred him to ICE custody. ICE detained Mr. Sanchez in Hartford, Connecticut, the Plymouth County Detention Center in Plymouth, Massachusetts, and the Willacy Detention Center in Raymondville, Texas, where he remained until released on bond on or about October 20, 2006. Mr. Sanchez is of Latino race and ethnicity and is alleged by ICE to be a citizen of Ecuador.
11. Plaintiff Juan Carlos Simbaña. DPD officers arrested Mr. Simbaña on September 19, 2006 and subsequently transferred him to ICE custody. ICE detained Mr. Simbaña in Hartford, Connecticut, the Plymouth County Detention Center in Plymouth, Massachusetts, and the Willacy Detention Center in Raymondville, where he remained until released on bond on or
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about October 26, 2006. Mr. Simbaña is of Latino race and ethnicity and is alleged by ICE to be a citizen of Ecuador.
12. Plaintiff Danilo Brito Vargas. On February 17, 2007, DPD officers detained Mr. Vargas in a pretextual, race-based traffic stop, unlawfully arrested him on the basis of an alleged civil immigration infraction in or around the intersection of Rose Hill Avenue and Hoyt Street in Danbury, and transferred him to ICE custody. ICE detained Mr. Vargas in Hartford, Connecticut and Rhode Island and eventually deported him to Ecuador in April or May 2007. Plaintiff Vargas is of Latino race and ethnicity. Danbury Defendants
13. Defendant Mark Boughton is the Mayor of the City of Danbury, Connecticut. Under state and municipal law, he is the city official charged with ultimate responsibility for implementing and administering the policies, practices, and/or customs of the City of Danbury. Defendant Boughton is sued in his official and personal capacities. During all times mentioned in this complaint, Defendant Boughton was acting under color of state law.
14. Defendant Alan Baker is the Chief of Police of the Danbury Police Department. Under state and municipal law, he is the city official charged with ultimate responsibility for the training and supervision of DPD officers and the administration and implementation of DPD policies, practices, and/or customs. Defendant Baker is sued in his official and personal capacities. During all times mentioned in this complaint, Defendant Baker was acting under color of state law.
15. Defendant James Fisher is a Detective Lieutenant in the DPD’s Special Investigations Division (“SID”). He is responsible for the training and supervision of SID officers and for carrying out the policies, practices, and/or customs of the DPD. He was also the
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lead DPD officer for the undercover sting operation on September 19, 2006. He is sued in his official and personal capacities. During all times mentioned in this complaint, Defendant Fisher was acting under color of state law.
16. Defendant James Lalli is a Danbury Police Officer. He is responsible for carrying out the policies, practices, and/or customs of the DPD and participated in the undercover sting operation on September 19, 2006. He is sued in his official and personal capacities. During all times mentioned in this complaint, Defendant Lalli was acting under color of state law.
17. Defendant José Agosto is a Danbury Police Officer. He is responsible for carrying out the policies, practices, and/or customs of the DPD and participated in the undercover sting operation on September 19, 2006. He is sued in his official and personal capacities. During all times mentioned in this complaint, Defendant Agosto was acting under color of state law.
18. Defendant Richard DeJesus is a Danbury Police Officer. He is responsible for carrying out the policies, practices, and/or customs of the DPD and participated in the undercover sting operation on September 19, 2006. He is sued in his official and personal capacities. During all times mentioned in this complaint, Defendant DeJesus was acting under color of state law.
19. Defendant Craig Martin is a Detective with the Danbury Police Department. He is responsible for carrying out the policies, practices, and/or customs of the DPD and participated in the undercover sting operation on September 19, 2006. He is sued in his official and personal capacities. During all times mentioned in this complaint, Defendant Martin was acting under color of state law.
20. Defendant Joseph Norkus is a former Danbury Police Officer. While a Danbury Police Officer, he was responsible for carrying out the policies, practices, and/or customs of the
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DPD and participated in the undercover sting operation on September 19, 2006. He is sued in his official and personal capacities. During all times mentioned in this complaint, Defendant Norkus was acting under color of state law.
21. Defendants John Does 1-5 are Danbury Police Officers who took part in the arrests on September 19, 2006, but whose identities are as yet unknown. They are responsible for carrying out the policies, practices, and/or customs of the DPD, and they are sued in their official and personal capacities. During all times mentioned in this complaint, Defendants John Does 15 were acting under color of state law.
22. Defendants John Does 6-8 are Danbury Police Officers who participated in the civil immigration arrest of Plaintiff Vargas on the pretext of an investigative stop for an alleged traffic violation on or about February 17, 2007. John Does 6-8 unlawfully investigated, detained, and arrested Plaintiff Vargas on suspicion of a civil immigration infraction, on the basis of information obtained from the NCIC database. They are sued in their official and personal capacities. During all times mentioned in this complaint, John Does 6-8 were acting under color of state law.
23. Plaintiffs are unaware of the true names and capacities, whether individual or otherwise, of Defendant Does 1 through 8, inclusive, and therefore sue those Defendants by fictitious names. These Doe Defendants are responsible and liable for the acts and/or damages alleged in this Complaint. Plaintiffs will amend this Complaint to allege the Doe Defendants’ true names and capacities when they have been ascertained.
24. Defendant City of Danbury is a Connecticut municipal corporation. It is sued both under Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), for the execution
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of its unconstitutional customs and policies and pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-557n, 7-465, and 7-101a for the tortious acts of its employees. ICE Defendants
25. Defendant James E. Brown is an agent of ICE’s Detention and Removal Office, Fugitive Operations Unit, in Boston, Massachusetts. He is responsible for carrying out the immigration law enforcement operations of the Fugitives Operation Unit in Boston. He took part in the sting operation at Kennedy Park in Danbury and the arrest and detention of nine Plaintiffs on September 19, 2006. He is sued in his personal capacity. During all times mentioned in this complaint, Defendant Brown was acting under color of federal law.
26. Defendant Richard L. McCaffrey is an agent of the ICE Detention and Removal Office, Hartford Fugitive Operations Team (“HARFOT”). He is responsible for carrying out HARFOT immigration law enforcement operations. He took part in the sting operation at Kennedy Park in Danbury and the arrest and detention of nine Plaintiffs on September 19, 2006. He is sued in his personal capacity. During all times mentioned in this complaint, Defendant McCaffrey was acting under color of federal law.
27. Defendant Ronald L. Preble is an agent of the HARFOT. He is responsible for carrying out HARFOT immigration law enforcement operations. He took part in the sting operation at Kennedy Park in Danbury and the arrest and detention of nine Plaintiffs on September 19, 2006. He is sued in his personal capacity. During all times mentioned in this complaint, Defendant Preble was acting under color of federal law.
28. Defendants John Does 9-14 are agents of ICE who participated in the arrest and detention of nine Plaintiffs on September 19, 2006. They are responsible for carrying out the
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policies of ICE, and they are sued in their personal capacity. During all times mentioned in this complaint, Defendants John Does 9-14 were acting under color of federal law.
29. Plaintiffs are unaware of the true names and capacities, whether individual or otherwise, of Defendant Does 9 through 14, inclusive, and therefore sue those Defendants by fictitious names. Each of the Doe Defendants is responsible and liable for the acts and/or damages alleged in this Complaint. Plaintiffs will amend this Complaint to allege the Doe Defendants’ true names and capacities when they have been ascertained.
30. During all times mentioned in this complaint, all Defendants were acting under color of law, that is, under color of the statutes, laws, charter, ordinances, rules, regulations, customs and usages of the United States, the State of Connecticut, or the City of Danbury.
STATEMENT OF FACTS Immigration Law Enforcement in Danbury under Mayor Mark Boughton
31. Mayor Mark Boughton, first elected in 2001, has been a vocal advocate of strict immigration enforcement and of local government and police involvement in immigration enforcement.
32. Mayor Boughton has promoted the local enforcement of federal immigration laws in Danbury in direct response to an increase in the number of the city’s immigrant and Latino residents and out of frustration over the federal government failure’s to address the impact of sudden, large-scale immigration on local municipalities. In recent years, Danbury has seen a significant increase in immigrants from Brazil and other Latin American countries, especially Ecuador.
33. The arrival of new Latino immigrants, and the failure of the federal government to address immigration’s local effects, has sparked a backlash from Mayor Boughton’s
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administration, which has targeted, harassed, and intimidated these new city residents through a number of discriminatory policies. These policies include discriminatory enforcement of city ordinances, such as building code and vehicle registration regulations; shutting down neighborhood volleyball games; encouraging police harassment of day-laborers; encouraging direct police enforcement of civil immigration laws through traffic stops; and requests to U.S. Senators and Representatives and ICE for federal assistance in immigration law enforcement. Upon information and belief, these policies aim ultimately to drive unwanted immigrants from Danbury and to deter future immigrants from making Danbury their home.
34. Mayor Boughton has especially directed these discriminatory policies against Danbury’s Ecuadorian community. For example, in April 2005, Danbury drew national media attention when the Danbury Common Council, with Mayor Boughton’s support, considered an ordinance banning “repetitive outdoor group activities.” The purpose of this ordinance was to shut down the Ecuadorian community’s neighborhood volleyball games, one of the primary venues for community gatherings in the spring and summer.
35. Mayor Boughton also requested that the DPD aggressively police the volleyball games in order to harass the Ecuadorian community.
36. Moreover, around the same time, pursuant to Mayor Boughton’s policy, city code inspectors discriminatorily enforced Danbury’s fire and building codes and parking regulations against the Ecuadorian community as well. For example, in a nighttime sweep on July 23, 2005, code enforcement officers shut down approximately seven sites that serviced the Ecuadorian community’s neighborhood volleyball games.
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37. The centerpiece of Danbury’s harassment campaign under Mayor Boughton, however, has been the City of Danbury’s escalating involvement in the enforcement of federal immigration laws, especially through the Danbury Police Department.
38. Mayor Boughton and other Danbury city officials are fully aware and have been informed by their own Office of Corporation Counsel that local police lack the legal authority to enforce federal civil immigration laws.
39. In a letter to Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal, dated April 15, 2005, Mayor Boughton requested that Attorney General Blumenthal enter into a Memorandum of Understanding with ICE to train, supervise, and deputize state police officers to enforce federal immigration laws, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1257(g). State officials declined to pursue this course.
40. Despite this response from state officials, in a subsequent letter to Connecticut Governor Jodi Rell, Mayor Boughton stated that he had nevertheless instructed Danbury Police Chief Alan Baker to prioritize the resources of the DPD to assist with future federal and state immigration enforcement activities in Danbury.
41. In a letter to Connecticut Citizens for Immigration Reform, dated January 19, 2006, and based on legal advice from Danbury’s Office of Corporation Counsel, Chief Baker acknowledged that DPD officers possess the authority to enforce only criminal—but not civil— immigration laws.
42. Despite their knowledge that DPD officers are not authorized to enforce civil immigration laws, Mayor Boughton and Chief Baker have nevertheless encouraged and instructed the DPD to carry out independent civil immigration law enforcement actions against
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Danbury’s unwanted immigrant, Latino, and Ecuadorian residents without the requisite training, supervision, and written agreement with ICE as required by law.
43. Pursuant to the direction of Mayor Boughton and Chief Baker, the DPD’s Special Investigations Division (“SID”) has become especially active in civil immigration law enforcement activities.
44. SID is a special vice unit of the DPD that was established to investigate narcotics, gambling, prostitution, and organized crime. SID officers have received no formal training in immigration law enforcement and they are not supervised by ICE officers.
45. In a December 2004 letter to Eduargo Aguirre, Jr., Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, which is an agency within the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), Mayor Boughton described the recent arrival of allegedly undocumented immigrants in Danbury and requested the assistance of the agency in enforcing immigration laws in Danbury. Mayor Boughton also sent a copy of this letter to Tom Ridge, then Secretary of DHS.
46. Mayor Boughton also sent copies of correspondence with state and other federal officials to the Secretary of DHS. This correspondence described the perceived problems Danbury faced as a result of illegal immigration and requested the assistance of state and federal authorities in enforcing immigration laws.
47. The ICE Defendants were fully aware of the Mayor’s unlawful immigration enforcement campaign. Harassment of the Kennedy Park Day-Laborers Under Mayor Mark Boughton
48. As part of their local immigration enforcement campaign, Mayor Boughton and the DPD have singled out the day-laborer community in Danbury’s Kennedy Park for special harassment.
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49. Upon information and belief, almost all of the day-laborers who gather at Kennedy Park each day are Latino men—many of Ecuadorian descent—and Mayor Boughton and the DPD have targeted them for harassment on the basis of their race, ethnicity, and perceived national origin. Plaintiffs Barrera, Cabrera, Chavez, Duma, Llibisupa, Maldonado, Redrovan, Sanchez, and Simbaña are all Latino and are all alleged by ICE to be citizens of Ecuador.
50. Kennedy Park is a small park, open to the public, located at the intersection of Main Street and Kennedy Avenue. Kennedy Park is at the center of Danbury’s downtown district and within walking distance of City Hall.
51. In recent years, Kennedy Park has become a gathering site for day-laborers. Contractors in the construction, landscaping, and other industries drive by Kennedy Park in the early morning to solicit workers on a job-by-job basis. Normally, wages and work arrangements are negotiated at the park, and contractors then drive workers to worksites.
52. No ordinance in the Danbury Municipal Code prohibits the expression of one’s availability to solicit work in a public forum.
53. Prior to September 2006, the daily and visible gathering of the day-laborers in Kennedy Park had become a source of political controversy in Danbury and subject of increasing debate among city residents.
54. Upon information and belief, Mayor Boughton expressly directed the Danbury Police to harass and intimidate the day-laborers who gathered peaceably in Kennedy Park in order to silence their solicitation speech and prevent them from communicating with potential employers. Mayor Boughton and the DPD targeted the day-laborers for such harassment and intimidation on the basis of their race, ethnicity, and perceived national origin.
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55. In accordance with Mayor Boughton’s directives, DPD officers, from at least as early as August 2006, repeatedly harassed day-laborers gathering peaceably in Kennedy Park by threatening to ticket, cite, or arrest them on the grounds that they were interfering with the flow of traffic.
56. Police approached even day-laborers who were not crossing or about to cross the street in front of Kennedy Park and warned them not to congregate near the edge of the park.
57. The DPD’s campaign of threats and harassment was intended to deter and effectively prohibit day-laborers from assembling peaceably in the park and to encourage them to leave Danbury. The DPD also directed these threats and harassment against the day-laborers on the basis of their race, ethnicity, and perceived national origin.
58. There is a second site in Danbury where immigrant day-laborers gather to solicit employment, located outside Minas Carne & Deli, a Brazilian restaurant at 36 Osborne Street.
59. The men who gather at the site on Osborne Street are predominantly of Brazilian descent, in contrast to the largely Ecuadorian Kennedy Park site.
60. Upon information and belief, no day-laborers have ever been arrested for civil immigration violations at the site on Osborne Street. The Arrest of Eleven Men on September 19, 2006
Planning the Sting Operation 61. On September 19, 2006, DPD’s harassment of the day-laborers culminated in an undercover immigration sting operation at Kennedy Park that resulted in the unlawful arrest of eleven men, nine of whom are Plaintiffs in this action. 62. Defendants Agosto, DeJesus, Fisher, Lalli, Martin, Norkus, and John Does 1-5 (collectively, the “DPD Officers”) planned and/or executed the operation. Defendants Brown,
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McCaffrey, Preble, and John Does 9-14 (collectively, the “HARFOT Officers”) were present in Danbury during the execution of the operation.
63. Consistent with Mayor Boughton and the DPD’s efforts to drive new Latino and Ecuadorian immigrants from the city, Defendant DPD Officers determined, prior to September 19, 2006, to arrest day-laborers at Kennedy Park.
64. The DPD Officers knew of no particular “fugitive” or other alleged immigration violators in Kennedy Park and had no specific targets in mind in planning the undercover sting operation with ICE.
65. Nevertheless, Detective Fisher communicated with one or more of the HARFOT Officers regarding the potential presence of immigration violators, including immigrants with outstanding orders of deportation or removal, among the day-laborers at Kennedy Park.
66. Pursuant to Mayor Boughton and the DPD’s goal of ridding Danbury of its new Latino and Ecuadorian immigrants, HARFOT Officers willfully and knowingly agreed to assist the DPD in an operation to arrest day-laborers at Kennedy Park. The HARFOT Officers were aware of the DPD Officers’ discriminatory intent in undertaking the operation.
67. The DPD communication to ICE was non-specific and based on group stereotypes. The communication targeted the day-laborers on the basis of their race, ethnicity, and perceived national origin, while providing no identifying information about any individuals who might have been in violation of federal law.
68. Furthermore, upon information and belief, Detective Fisher submitted the tip to retaliate against the day-laborers for gathering in public to express their availability to work and to communicate with potential employers.
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69. Similarly, although Mayor Boughton and the DPD under the leadership of Chief Baker have repeatedly alleged, in letters to state officials and to the media, that immigration law violators are present at Kennedy Park, they have no basis for these allegations other than racial and ethnic stereotype and perceived national origin. Mayor Boughton and the DPD have made these allegations to further their campaign to drive the day-laborers from Kennedy Park and to instill fear in the rest of Danbury’s immigrant population.
70. The HARFOT Officers were aware that the DPD Officers’ tip contained no identifying information about any individuals who might have been in violation of federal law and that the DPD Officers provided it to them on a racially discriminatory basis.
71. Moreover, in participating in the sting operation, the HARFOT Officers themselves proceeded on the basis of racial and ethnic stereotype and perceived national origin, and without any identifying information about any individuals who might have been in violation of federal law.
72. On or about September 18, 2006, Detective Fisher and the HARFOT Officers agreed that the operation would take place on September 19, 2006.
73. On or about September 18, 2006, Detective Fisher informed others, including but not limited to DPD Officers DeJesus, Martin, and Norkus of the planned operation. Detective Fisher personally requested the assistance of DPD Officers DeJesus, Martin, and Norkus, who agreed to work extended shifts of duty on September 19, 2006.
74. Defendants DeJesus, Martin, and Norkus were fully aware of the purpose of the operation, knowingly and willingly agreed to assist, intentionally targeted the day-laborers for arrest based on their race, ethnicity, and/or perceived national origin, and intended to retaliate against the day-laborers for their peaceable expressive activities in Kennedy Park.
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75. Before September 19, 2006, the HARFOT Officers did not identify any particular suspected immigration violators among the Kennedy Park day-laborers. The HARFOT Officers did not obtain any administrative or criminal arrest warrants in advance of the September 19th operation.
76. Detective Fisher or another of the DPD Officers arranged for the use of an undercover vehicle on September 19, 2006.
77. One of the Defendant DPD Officers dressed in clothing so as to resemble the sort of contractor or employer who typically hired day-laborers at Kennedy Park.
78. The DPD Officers and the HARFOT Officers met in Danbury in the early morning of September 19, 2006 to review final plans for the sting operation.
79. Upon information and belief, although he was aware of a potentially serious problem of unconstitutional conduct by DPD Officers, and of the serious need for corrective action and supervision, Police Chief Baker failed to inform himself about or approve and otherwise adequately supervise the sting operation as required by DPD internal policies and procedures.
80. Chief Baker failed to do so despite the importance of such procedures to protecting the rights of arrestees, his knowledge that local immigration enforcement is preempted under federal law, and his awareness of the DPD Officers’ goals of suppressing the protected speech of the day-laborers, of singling out the day-laborers for harassment on the basis of race, ethnicity, and perceived national origin, and of ultimately driving the Kennedy Park day-laborers from Danbury.
81. The DPD Officers’ misconduct was so manifest as to imply the constructive acquiescence of Police Chief Baker in his capacity as a policymaking official for the City of Danbury.
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The Arrests 82. On the morning of September 19, 2006, each of the Plaintiffs Barrera, Cabrera, Chavez, Duma, Llibisupa, Maldonado, Redrovan, Sanchez, and Simbaña (collectively, “DayLaborer Plaintiffs”) went to Kennedy Park to find work for the day. 83. Some time early that morning, each of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs saw a vehicle drive up to the park. Each of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs approached the vehicle, and the driver offered each of them work for the day demolishing a fence. The driver did not appear to be looking for any specific individuals. 84. In fact, the vehicle approached by each Day-Laborer Plaintiff was driven by one of the DPD Officers, and the offer of work demolishing a fence was a ruse. 85. Each Day-Laborer Plaintiff reasonably relied on the misrepresentation of the offer of work and entered the vehicle. 86. The vehicle made three trips to Kennedy Park that morning, picking up three to five workers each time. 87. On each of the three trips from Kennedy Park, the vehicle drove several blocks to a fenced-in lot behind an office building on Main Street in Danbury. The vehicle stopped in the corner of the parking lot behind the building, which is surrounded by a tall chain link fence and closed off on the fourth side by the building. 88. The undercover DPD officer driving the vehicle did not ask any questions of any of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs during the drive from Kennedy Park to the parking lot. 89. Both DPD Offices and HARFOT Officers were present in the parking lot when each of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs arrived.
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90. When each Day-Laborer Plaintiff exited the vehicle, the DPD Officers and/or HARFOT Officers, who were waiting in the lot, immediately surrounded each man, some officers with weapons drawn, and roughly seized each Day-Laborer Plaintiff. Some of the arresting officers had apparently been hiding in or around several vehicles that were parked in the corner of the parking lot.
91. Upon seizing each Day-Laborer Plaintiff, the DPD Officers and/or HARFOT officers then physically detained each Day-Laborer Plaintiff and told him that he was under arrest. The DPD Officers and/or HARFOT officers handcuffed each Day-Laborer Plaintiff, placed him in a white van that was parked in the lot, and closed the door to the van.
92. Those Day-Laborer Plaintiffs who arrived first were instructed to watch while the same thing happened to subsequent day-laborers. A total of eleven day-laborers were arrested and placed in the van.
93. The DPD Officers arrested the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs at approximately 7:00 a.m. on September 19, 2006.
94. In the alternative, Plaintiffs allege that HARFOT Officers arrested the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs at some point on the morning of September 19, 2006.
95. After being arrested in the parking lot, some of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs wanted to call a family member or a lawyer and asked to make a phone call. The arresting officers refused to let any of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs make such a call and confiscated the cell phones of those Day-Laborer Plaintiffs who had them.
96. Only after the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs had been physically restrained, put under arrest by the DPD Officers and/or HARFOT Officers, and told that they could not call anyone, did law
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enforcement agents question the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs about their identity, nationality, the place and manner of their entry into the United States, and their immigration status.
97. While the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs were detained in the parking lot, a DPD officer of Hispanic appearance, and who spoke Spanish well, told Plaintiff Barrera in Spanish that he had been arrested because he was standing in Kennedy Park after the DPD had previously warned day-laborers not to stand there. Upon information and belief, this individual was Defendant José Agosto.
98. None of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs had been previously warned, cited, or ticketed for standing in Kennedy Park or interfering with traffic in the area of Kennedy Park, and none had any record of causing any “safety issues” in Kennedy Park, whether related to traffic or otherwise.
99. None of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs had an outstanding deportation or removal order, and no immigration warrants had been issued for any of them before their arrests on September 19, 2006.
100. The DPD Officers and/or HARFOT Officers then transported the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs from the parking lot to the Danbury Police Station, where DPD officers fingerprinted and questioned them and entered their booking records into the DPD’s files.
101. While at the Danbury Police Station, Plaintiff Chavez saw a DPD officer that he recognized to be José Agosto. Officer Agosto told Plaintiff Chavez in Spanish that he had been arrested because they had been standing at Kennedy Park, even though the DPD had previously warned the day-laborers not to stand there.
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102. Plaintiff Chavez had never been told by any police officer not to stand at or near Kennedy Park, nor had Plaintiff Chavez previously been warned, cited, or ticketed for interfering with traffic in the area of Kennedy Park.
103. At the Danbury Police Station, Plaintiff Barrera was also mockingly told by a Danbury police officer of Hispanic appearance, and who spoke Spanish well, that when he could, Plaintiff Barrera should call family in Ecuador and tell them to meet him at the airport in Quito, because that was the first place that Plaintiff Barrera would be released from custody. Upon information and belief, this individual was Defendant José Agosto.
104. According to DPD booking records, Danbury police arrested each Day-Laborer Plaintiff in the Danbury Executive Tower parking lot at 7:06 a.m. on the charge of “Illegal Entry Into U.S.”
105. The booking reports list the arresting officer to be Defendant and DPD Officer James Lalli.
106. No criminal charges have been filed against any of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs. 107. Upon information and belief, Mayor Boughton was informed of the undercover operation and arrests no later than while they were occurring on the morning of September 19, 2006. 108. At no point that morning, or any point afterwards, did Mayor Boughton attempt to prevent the arrests of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs in spite of his knowledge that the sting operation was illegal and violated the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs’ civil rights. 109. Upon information and belief, Mayor Boughton allowed the arrests to take place pursuant to his administration’s policy of promoting local civil immigration enforcement against Danbury’s new Latino and Ecuadorian immigrants, targeting the City’s Latino and Ecuadorian
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immigrants for discrimination, and retaliating against Latino and Ecuadorian day-laborers for their use of Kennedy Park to express their availability for work.
110. Mayor Boughton also allowed the arrests to occur out of total disregard for the constitutional interests of the arrestees.
111. Upon information and belief, Mayor Boughton took no disciplinary actions against the DPD Officers upon learning of the sting operation and the arrests of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs. The Day-Laborer Plaintiffs’ Transfer to and Detention in ICE Custody
112. After detaining each Day-Laborer Plaintiff in a holding cell or otherwise for approximately two hours at Danbury Police Headquarters, DPD officers transferred custody of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs to ICE at approximately 9:00 a.m.
113. The HARFOT Officers transported the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs, handcuffed and shackled, to Hartford, Connecticut.
114. The ICE Agents responsible for accepting custody of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs were the HARFOT Officers, Defendants Brown, McCaffrey, and Preble.
115. Defendant McCaffrey also served as examining officer for the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs, though he knew or should have known that doing so violated federal immigration regulations.
116. After two nights in Hartford, ICE agents transferred Plaintiffs Barrera, Duma, Llibisupa, and Maldonado to the Suffolk County House of Corrections in Boston, Massachusetts. ICE agents transferred Plaintiffs Cabrera, Chavez, Redrovan, Sanchez, and Simbaña to Plymouth County Detention Center in Plymouth, Massachusetts.
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117. Throughout the course of their detentions, ICE officials and prison officials at the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs’ respective facilities denied each of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs access to a telephone for periods ranging from several days to several weeks, despite the Plaintiffs’ repeated requests to call family members or a lawyer.
118. Specifically, ICE officials denied Plaintiffs Barrera, Duma, Llibisupa, Maldonado, and Redrovan phone access while they were in custody in Hartford.
119. ICE officials allowed Plaintiffs Cabrera and Chavez to use a phone on their first day in Hartford, but the phone did not work.
120. While in custody in Hartford, ICE officers instructed the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs to sign a document written in English, which had not been translated or explained to them, and which they could not read. ICE officers took the men out of the room one at a time and individually intimidated them and pressured them into signing the document. ICE officers gave the men a number of different and wholly inadequate explanations for what the paper was.
121. Plaintiff Barrera did not understand what the document said. An officer who spoke some Spanish stated simply that he needed to sign it to be transferred.
122. Another officer told Plaintiff Chavez that he needed to sign the document in order to see a judge.
123. Plaintiff Maldonado similarly could not read the document, but the officers who addressed him angrily told him that he had to sign it anyway.
124. Officers informed Plaintiff Simbaña that, practically speaking, he already “signed” the document and terrorized him into actually doing so, leading him to believe that he needed to sign the document in order to see an Immigration Judge.
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125. While the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs were in custody in Massachusetts, an unknown law enforcement agent or agents questioned them as potential suspects or witnesses in a murder investigation. The agent told them that the victim had been murdered in Danbury by an Ecuadorian. During the interrogation, the agent did not offer Plaintiffs access to counsel, nor did he inform them of their Miranda rights, including their right to remain silent and to have counsel present during the interrogation. Instead, the agent promised them immigration benefits if they told him about the murder.
126. Also while in custody in Massachusetts, prison officials subjected each of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs to a medical examination and full-body search.
127. Prison officials forced at least Plaintiffs Barrera, Llibisupa, Maldonado, Redrovan, and Simbaña to give blood samples without their consent as part of the medical examination.
128. Prison officials forced at least Plaintiffs Barrera, Maldonado, Redrovan, and Simbaña to give urine samples without their consent as part of the medical examination.
129. Suffolk County correctional guards held Plaintiff Barrera in isolation for five days—in a cell with neither a toilet nor a sink—as a result of his blood test. At no point did officers explain the reason for his confinement.
130. On October 2, 2006, Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Matthew J. D’Angelo of the Immigration Court in Boston, Massachusetts held bond redetermination hearings for Plaintiffs Barrera, Duma, Llibisupa, and Maldonado. IJ D’Angelo found that Plaintiffs Barrera, Duma, Llibisupa, and Maldonado were neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community and set the statutory minimum bond of $1500 for each man.
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131. Plaintiffs Barrera, Duma, Llibisupa, and Maldonado were released on $1500 bond on October 3, 2006. In total, they each spent approximately 15 days in ICE custody. The Remaining Day-Laborers’ Transfer to and Detention in Texas
132. The Boston Immigration Court calendared bond redetermination hearings for Plaintiffs Chavez, Sanchez, and Simbaña for 1:00 p.m. on October 3, 2006.
133. After the conclusion of the bond proceedings for other Plaintiffs on the afternoon of October 2, an ICE Detention and Removal Office “(DRO”) officer in Boston personally assured counsel for Plaintiffs that ICE would not transfer Chavez, Sanchez, and Simbaña before 3:00 p.m. on October 3, 2006.
134. On the morning of October 3, however, before their 1:00 p.m. bond hearings, ICE began the process of transferring Plaintiffs Chavez, Sanchez, and Simbaña, along with Plaintiffs Cabrera, and Redrovan, to detention facilities in Texas. When the Immigration Judge in Boston attempted to call the bond cases for these Plaintiffs as scheduled at the 1:00 p.m. videoconference calendar on October 3, jail officials informed the Court that the Plaintiffs were not available for court because they were in transit to Texas.
135. On October 3, 2006, ICE flew Plaintiffs Cabrera, Chavez, Redrovan, Sanchez, and Simbaña, handcuffed and shackled, to Texas. ICE kept Plaintiffs in shackles for the entire journey to Texas—a period of nearly sixteen hours.
136. ICE briefly held Plaintiffs Cabrera, Chavez, Sanchez, and Simbaña at the Port Isabel Processing Center in Los Fresnos, Texas and then detained them at the Willacy Detention Center in Raymondville, Texas. ICE continued to hold Plaintiff Redrovan at the Port Isabel Processing Center.
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137. While at the Willacy Detention Center, Plaintiffs Cabrera, Chavez, Sanchez, and Simbaña were subjected to horrendous detention conditions. The men endured extremely overcrowded and unsanitary conditions, and prison officials denied them adequate medical care and adequate amounts of food at regular intervals. At times, the detainees were forced to eat with their bare hands. Prison guards also frequently verbally insulted, taunted, and ridiculed the detainees.
138. Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Eleazar Tovar of the Immigration Court in Harlingen, Texas held telephonic bond redetermination hearings on October 16, 2006 for Plaintiffs Cabrera, Chavez, Sanchez, and Simbaña. IJ Tovar found that the detainees were neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community and set bond.
139. IJ Peterson of the Immigration Court in Harlingen, Texas held a telephonic bond redetermination hearing for Plaintiff Redrovan. IJ Peterson found that Plaintiff Redrovan was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community and set bond.
140. Plaintiff Cabrera was released on $8,000 bond on or around October 23, 2006. In total, Mr. Cabrera was detained in ICE custody for approximately 35 days.
141. Plaintiff Chavez was released on $10,000 bond on or around October 23, 2006. In total, Mr. Chavez was detained in ICE custody for approximately 35 days.
142. Plaintiff Redrovan was released on $15,000 bond on or around October 23, 2006. In total, Mr. Redrovan was detained in ICE custody for approximately 35 days.
143. Plaintiff Sanchez was released on $10,000 bond on or around October 20, 2006. In total, Mr. Sanchez was detained in ICE custody for approximately 32 days.
144. Plaintiff Simbaña was released on $10,000 bond on or around October 26, 2006. In total, Mr. Simbaña was detained in ICE custody for approximately 38 days.
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Effect on Plaintiffs and Day-Laborer Community at Large 145. Defendants’ unlawful and retaliatory arrest and detention of the Day-Laborer
Plaintiffs and the restrictions Defendants placed on Plaintiffs’ liberty caused Plaintiffs to suffer humiliation, damage to their reputations and professional prospects, emotional distress, physical pain, and monetary damages.
146. The Day-Laborer Plaintiffs continue to fear that they, their families, or their acquaintances will be arbitrarily and unlawfully arrested by ICE, DPD, or both. Several of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs no longer gather in Kennedy Park for fear of harassment by ICE and DPD officers.
147. While sparking a great deal of political engagement and advocacy by the immigrant and Ecuadorian community in Danbury and across the State of Connecticut, the DayLaborer Plaintiffs’ unlawful arrests have also created a climate of fear among day-laborers at Kennedy Park and among Latino, Ecuadorian, and immigrant residents in Danbury more generally. This climate persists to this day.
148. Fewer day-laborers in general now assemble at Kennedy Park to seek work, fearing that they too will be arrested by ICE, DPD, or both, and those who do continue to gather there do so in part as a statement of their disagreement with the anti-immigrant tactics of Mayor Boughton and the DPD.
149. Latino, Ecuadorian, and immigrant residents in Danbury also remain fearful of harassment, detention, and arrest by ICE, DPD, or both. The Pretextual Traffic Stop and Unlawful Civil Immigration Arrest of Danilo Brito Vargas
150. Pursuant to Mayor Boughton’s campaign against immigrant, Latino, and Ecuadorian communities, the DPD has also exploited the FBI’s principal criminal database, the
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National Crime Information Center (“NCIC”), to target Latinos for make unlawful and discriminatory immigration arrests.
151. DPD officers have engaged in a series of pretextual traffic stops for the purpose of investigating the immigration status of Latino drivers. During these traffic stops, DPD officers conduct a search for drivers’ names on the NCIC database and arrest drivers on any civil immigration violations they discover.
152. The DPD’s use of the NCIC database to effect civil immigration arrests against Latino and immigrant drivers constitutes a form of racial and ethnic profiling.
153. Moreover, the DPD’s NCIC immigration arrests violate Congress’s broad preemption of state and local police from making federal civil immigration arrests outside of specific statutory procedures. Background on the NCIC Database
154. The NCIC provides direct on-line access to its computerized database of criminal justice information. The NCIC is the FBI’s principal criminal records database and is accessed millions of times each day by state, local, and tribal police nationwide.
155. Since its creation, the NCIC database has principally contained criminal justice records, such as rap sheets, criminal warrants, and stolen property records. Congress has not authorized the entry of civil immigration records, including administrative immigration warrants for arrest or removal, into the NCIC database.
156. In 2002, disregarding Congress’s careful statutory limitations on the entry and dissemination of non-criminal records via the NCIC, the Attorney General and other senior Justice Department officials announced a plan to enter hundreds of thousands of administrative immigration warrants into the NCIC.
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157. Since 2002, the Law Enforcement Support Center (“LESC”), a division of ICE, has entered administrative immigration warrants for tens of thousands of persons with outstanding orders of deportation, exclusion, or removal (collectively, “removal orders”) whom it believes have remained in the United States. DHS estimates that there are more than 632,000 such persons resident in the United States, and has announced its intention to enter administrative immigration warrants for every such person into the NCIC.
158. The administrative immigration warrants entered by DHS into the NCIC differ significantly from criminal warrants. DHS administrative warrants are issued by an agency clerk, not by an independent judge, and there is no requirement that a warrant be issued only on probable cause, based on evidence sworn under oath. There is no review by anyone other than the DHS official. They are administrative warrants, alleging only a civil violation of immigration law.
159. When a police officer runs an NCIC check on an individual who has an administrative immigration warrant listed in the NCIC, a “hit” appears with instructions to contact the LESC for confirmation.
160. According to ICE’s data, in 2002-04, the LESC failed to confirm 42% of the NCIC immigration hits that prompted the requested communication from a local police officer to LESC.
161. Of those occasions when the LESC does confirm the immigration “hit,” DHS invariably instructs the police officer to arrest and detain the individual until the DHS officials can arrive to take custody of the individual.
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DPD’s Unlawful Immigration Arrests Made Through the NCIC Database 162. Congress has enacted a complex and comprehensive statutory scheme regulating
immigration in the United States that includes numerous and detailed provisions relating to enforcement of federal immigration laws. In adopting this statutory scheme, Congress has broadly preempted immigration enforcement by state and local officials, except as specifically authorized by Congress.
163. No authority exists for DPD to make a civil immigration arrest. 164. An arrest pursuant to an administrative immigration warrant in the NCIC is a civil immigration arrest. 165. Nevertheless, the DPD has developed a policy, practice, and/or custom of arresting persons on the basis of administrative immigration warrants in the NCIC. 166. DPD officers conducting such arrests do not typically inform NCIC immigration arrestees of their Miranda rights, nor are such persons subject to state or federal prosecution. DPD typically arrests and detains such persons until they are transferred to the custody of ICE. 167. Defendants Boughton and Baker knowingly promulgated, implemented, enforced, sanctioned, and/or acquiesced in the DPD’s policy, practice, and/or custom of performing such arrests as part of the city’s ongoing immigration enforcement campaign against its new Latino and immigrant residents, despite their knowledge that DPD officers are preempted by federal law from making civil immigration arrests. 168. Moreover, upon information and belief, Defendant Baker does not supervise the execution and processing of these arrests as required by internal DPD police procedure despite his knowledge that DPD civil immigration arrests are preempted by federal law and the importance of such procedures to protecting the rights of arrestees.
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Arrest of Danilo Brito Vargas 169. On or about February 17, 2007, Plaintiff Danilo Brito Vargas and his wife were
driving near their home in Danbury. A DPD cruiser pulled up behind them in or around the intersection of Rose Hill Avenue and Hoyt Street and signaled for Plaintiff Vargas to pull over, which he did.
170. Defendant John Doe 6, a DPD officer, approached the car, told Plaintiff Vargas that he was being pulled over because his muffler was too loud, and asked to see identification. Plaintiff Vargas tendered his Ecuadorian passport, whereupon Officer Doe 6 took the passport, returned to the cruiser, and consulted a computer there.
171. On information and belief, the officer used the cruiser computer to run Plaintiff Vargas’s name through the NCIC and other databases, and the NCIC returned a response indicating the existence of an administrative immigration warrant for Plaintiff Vargas. The NCIC response further instructed the DPD officer to contact the LESC for confirmation.
172. Acting solely on the basis of this information, the DPD officer radioed for assistance. Two more officers, Defendants John Does 7 and 8, arrived on the scene. Officers Does 6-8 told Plaintiff Vargas to step out of the car. After patting him down and searching his pockets, they handcuffed him and placed him in the cruiser. They did not explain why he was being detained.
173. Officers Does 6-8 then transported Plaintiff Vargas to the Danbury Police Station, where he was detained in a holding cell for approximately two days. Officers Does 6-8 told Plaintiff Vargas that he was being detained solely because he had “immigration problems.”
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174. Plaintiff Vargas was then transferred to an immigration detention facility in Hartford, Connecticut and shuttled between that facility and another correctional facility in Rhode Island.
175. Plaintiff Vargas was deported to Ecuador in April or May 2007. 176. Plaintiff Vargas has suffered humiliation, damage to his reputation and professional prospects, emotional distress, physical pain, and monetary damages as a result of his arrest, detention, and the restrictions placed on his liberty.
CLAIMS RELATING TO ARREST OF DAY-LABORERS FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF:
Fourth Amendment and Article First, §§ 7, 9 of the Connecticut Constitution (42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Binette v. Sabo, 244 Conn. 23 (1998): Defendant DPD Officers)
177. The Day-Laborer Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
178. Defendant DPD Officers José Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, and John Does 1-5 violated the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs’ rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article First, §§ 7 and 9 of the Connecticut Constitution by arresting them for alleged civil immigration violations without valid warrants and in the absence of exigent circumstances, any probable cause, or any reason to believe that the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs were engaged in any unlawful activity, and by stopping, detaining, investigating, searching, and effecting seizures and/or arrests of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs in the absence of a reasonable, articulable suspicion of unlawful activity or probable cause.
179. As a result of Defendant DPD Officers’ actions, the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs suffered damages, including but not limited to violations of their Constitutional rights, loss of
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liberty, harms to their reputations and professional prospects, monetary damages, and emotional distress.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF: Fourth Amendment and Article First, §§ 7, 9 of the Connecticut Constitution: Preemption
(42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Binette v. Sabo: Defendant DPD Officers) 180. The Day-Laborer Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 181. Defendant DPD Officers José Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, and John Does 1-5 violated the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs’ rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article First, §§ 7 and 9 of the Connecticut Constitution by intentionally and knowingly detaining and/or arresting the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs on suspicion of civil immigration violations. The arrest and detention of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs was unlawful, wholly without authority, and in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article First, §§ 7 and 9 of the Connecticut Constitution because federal law preempts state or local police from civil immigration enforcement activity and expressly and implicitly deprives local law enforcement officials of the authority to make civil immigration arrests. The Defendant DPD Officers lacked any authority under federal law to make civil immigration arrests. 182. As a result of Defendant DPD Officers’ actions, the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs suffered damages, including but not limited to violations of their Constitutional rights, loss of liberty, harms to their reputations and professional prospects, monetary damages, and emotional distress.
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THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF: Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and Article First, § 20 of the Connecticut
Constitution (42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Binette v. Sabo: Defendant DPD Officers) 183. The Day-Laborer Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 184. Defendant DPD Officers José Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, and John Does 1-5 intentionally targeted the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs for an immigration sting operation and arrested and detained them on the basis of their race, ethnicity, and perceived national origin in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article First, § 20 of the Connecticut Constitution. 185. In addition, Defendant DPD Officers subjected the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs to selective law enforcement on the basis of their race, ethnicity, and perceived national origin in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article First, § 20 of the Connecticut Constitution. 186. Defendant DPD Officers also subjected the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs to selective law enforcement out of a malicious and bad faith intent to drive them out of the City of Danbury in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article First, § 20 of the Connecticut Constitution. 187. As a result of Defendant DPD Officers’ actions, the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs suffered damages, including but not limited to violations of their Constitutional rights, loss of liberty, harms to their reputations and professional prospects, monetary damages, and emotional distress.
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FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF First Amendment and Article First, §§ 4, 14 of the Connecticut Constitution
(Suppression of and Retaliation for Protected Speech) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Binette v. Sabo: Defendant DPD Officers) 188. The Day-Laborer Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 189. Defendant DPD Officers José Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, and John Does 1-5 knowingly and intentionally stopped, detained, investigated, and arrested the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs in retaliation for their exercise of protected speech and association in a public forum, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article First, §§ 4 and 14 of the Connecticut Constitution. 190. Defendant DPD Officers had no probable cause to stop, detain, investigate, or arrest the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs and had no reason to believe that they were in violation of any immigration laws. The DPD does not have the legal authority to make arrests solely for violations of federal civil immigration law. 191. As a result of Defendant DPD Officers’ actions, the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs suffered damages, including but not limited to violations of their Constitutional rights, loss of liberty, harms to their reputations and professional prospects, monetary damages, and emotional distress.
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: Due Process Rights Under the Fourteenth Amendment and Article First, § 8 of the
Connecticut Constitution (42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Binette v. Sabo: Defendants DPD Officers) 192. The Day-Laborer Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
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193. Defendant DPD Officers José Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, and John Does 1-5 civilly arrested the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs and deprived them of their of their liberty in a manner that was without due process of law and fundamentally unfair in the totality of its circumstances, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article First, § 8 of the Connecticut Constitution.
194. As a result of Defendant DPD Officers’ actions, the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs suffered damages, including but not limited to violations of their Constitutional rights, loss of liberty, harms to their reputations and professional prospects, monetary damages, and emotional distress.
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Conspiracy
(42 U.S.C. § 1983: Defendant DPD Officers and HARFOT Officers) 195. The Day-Laborer Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 196. Defendant DPD Officers and HARFOT Officers entered into an agreement, between and amongst themselves, to act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury on the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs. Specifically, one or more Defendant DPD Officers spoke by telephone with one or more Defendant HARFOT Officers during the week or weeks prior to the September 19, 2006 arrests to plan the operation. Furthermore, Defendant DPD Officers met with Defendant HARFOT Officers in the early morning of September 19, 2006 for the purpose of planning the operation. The conspiracy included, but may not have been limited to, an agreement to arrest and detain Day-Laborer Plaintiffs in violation of their rights under the United States and Connecticut Constitutions.
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197. Defendant DPD Officers and Defendant HARFOT Officers performed several overt acts in furtherance of this conspiracy, including but not limited to posing as a contractor in order to lure Day-Laborer Plaintiffs in a vehicle, arresting Day-Laborer Plaintiffs, and detaining Day-Laborer Plaintiffs in violation of their rights under the U.S. and Connecticut Constitutions.
198. Defendant DPD Officers played a significant role in the conspiracy and in the overt acts taken in furtherance thereof.
199. As a result of the conspiracy between and among the Defendant DPD Officers and the Defendant HARFOT Officers and the overt actions taken in furtherance thereof, the DayLaborer Plaintiffs suffered damages, including but not limited to violations of their Constitutional rights, loss of liberty, harms to their reputations and professional prospects, monetary damages, and emotional distress.
SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Conspiracy
(42 U.S.C. § 1985(3): Defendant DPD Officers and HARFOT Officers) 200. The Day-Laborer Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 201. Defendant DPD Officers and Defendant HARFOT Officers entered into an agreement to act in concert for the purpose of depriving the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws. Specifically, one or more Defendant DPD Officers spoke by telephone with one or more Defendant HARFOT Officers during the week or weeks prior to the September 19, 2006 arrests to plan the operation. Further, Defendant DPD Officers met with Defendant HARFOT Officers in the early morning of September 19, 2006 for the purpose of planning the operation. The conspiracy included, but may not have been limited to, an agreement to arrest and detain Day-Laborer Plaintiffs in violation of their right to equal protection of the law.
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202. Defendant DPD Officers and Defendant HARFOT Officers performed several overt acts in furtherance of this conspiracy, including but not limited to posing as a contractor in order to lure Day-Laborer Plaintiffs in a vehicle, arresting Day-Laborer Plaintiffs, and detaining Day-Laborer Plaintiffs in violation of their right to equal protection of the law.
203. Plaintiffs are Latino men and alleged by ICE to be citizens of Ecuador. The conspiracy between and among the Defendant DPD Officers and the Defendant HARFOT Officers and the overt actions taken in furtherance thereof were motivated by a discriminatory animus against Day-Laborer Plaintiffs based on their race, ethnicity, and/or perceived national origin.
204. As a result of the conspiracy between and among the Defendant DPD Officers and the Defendant HARFOT Officers and the overt actions taken in furtherance thereof, the DayLaborer Plaintiffs suffered damages, including but not limited to violations of their Constitutional rights, loss of liberty, harms to their reputations and professional prospects, monetary damages, and emotional distress.
EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Personal Supervisory Liability
(42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Binette v. Sabo: Defendants Boughton, Baker, and Fisher) 205. The Day-Laborer Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 206. Defendants Boughton, Baker, and Fisher are liable in their individual capacities as the supervisors of Defendant DPD Officers for the violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs’ rights described in Claims 1-7. 207. Defendants Boughton, Baker, and Fisher were personally involved in and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs’ rights by
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knowingly and intentionally creating, implementing, enforcing, encouraging, sanctioning, and/or acquiescing in a policy, practice, and/or custom in which local police engaged in the unconstitutional conduct described in Claims 1-7.
208. Defendant Boughton, the Mayor of Danbury, is responsible for promulgating, implementing, and administering the policies, practices, and/or customs of the City of Danbury and for supervising and administering all City Departments. He was directly involved in the promulgation, implementation, and administration of the policy, practice, and/or custom that proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs’ rights described in Claims 1-7.
209. Defendant Boughton was personally involved in and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs’ rights described in Claims 1-7 because he failed to remedy these violations. Specifically, Defendant Boughton failed to act on information provided to him no later than on the morning of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs’ arrests that alerted him to these violations before they occurred or while they were occurring. Upon learning of the violations, Defendant Boughton made no attempt to stop the violations from occurring, to minimize the harm that resulted from any violations that had already occurred, or to punish, sanction, or discipline the DPD Officers who committed the violations described in Claims 1-7.
210. Defendant Boughton was personally involved in and proximately caused the violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs’ rights through his deliberate indifference to the rights of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs and his grossly negligent supervision of his subordinates, including but not limited to Defendant Baker and Defendant Fisher, who proximately caused the aforementioned violations described in Claims 1-7. Defendant Boughton’s gross negligence in
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supervising Defendants Baker and Fisher permitted them to promulgate, implement, and administer the aforementioned policies, practices, and customs which proximately caused the violations of the Plaintiff Day-Laborers’ rights described in Claims 1-7 and to plan and carry out the sting operation which resulted in those violations.
211. Defendant Baker, the Chief of Police for Danbury, is responsible for promulgating, implementing, and administering the policies, practices, and/or customs of the DPD, and for supervising all DPD officers in the commission of their duties. He was directly involved in the promulgation, implementation, and administration of the policy, practice, and/or custom that proximately caused the violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs’ rights described in Claims 1-7.
212. Defendant Baker was personally involved in and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs’ rights through his deliberate indifference to the rights of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs and his grossly negligent supervision of his subordinates, including but not limited to Defendant Fisher, who proximately caused the aforementioned violations described in Claims 1-7. Defendant Baker’s gross negligence in supervising Defendant Fisher permitted Defendant Fisher to promulgate, implement, and administer the aforementioned policies, practices, and customs which proximately caused the violations of the Plaintiff Day-Laborers’ rights, and to plan and carry out the sting operation which resulted in those violations.
213. Defendant Fisher was directly involved in and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs’ rights by participating in the violations, and/or by ordering or instructing the other DPD Officers to commit the unlawful arrests
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described in Claims 1-7. Defendant Fisher knew of all relevant facts that made the actions of the DPD Officers unlawful.
214. Defendant Fisher, the head of the DPD’s SID, is responsible for promulgating, implementing, and administering the policies, practices, and/or customs of the SID, and for supervising all other SID officers in the commission of their duties. He was directly involved in the promulgation, implementation, and administration of the policy, practice, and/or custom that proximately caused the violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs’ rights described in Claims 1-7.
215. Defendant Fisher was personally involved in and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs’ rights through his deliberate indifference to the rights of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs and his grossly negligent supervision of his subordinate DPD Officers who committed the violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights described in Claims 1-7. Defendant Fisher knew or should have known of the DPD’s policy, practice, or custom of making civil immigration arrests without probable cause, and failed to act to prevent the violations of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs’ rights from occurring.
216. As a result of Defendants Boughton, Baker, and Fisher’s acts and/or omissions, the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs suffered damages, including but not limited to violations of their Constitutional rights, loss of liberty, harms to their reputations and professional prospects, monetary damages, and emotional distress.
NINTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Municipal Liability
(42 U.S.C. § 1983: Defendant City of Danbury) 217. The Day-Laborer Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
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218. The City of Danbury is liable pursuant to Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), for the promulgation and execution of municipal policy and/or custom by Defendants Boughton, Baker, and Fisher prior to and during the arrest of the DayLaborer Plaintiffs on September 19, 2006.
219. As individual policymakers who have been vested with final policymaking authority by municipal and state law, Defendants Boughton, Baker, and Fisher’s acts and edicts resulted in policies and/or customs exhibiting deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of persons in the City of Danbury and occasioned the aforementioned violation of the DayLaborers Plaintiffs’ rights described in Claims 1-7.
220. In addition, in their capacities as official policymakers, Defendants Boughton, Baker, and Fisher were averted to a potentially serious problem of unconstitutional conduct by Danbury Police Officers described in Claims 1-7. In spite of an obvious need for supervision and/or corrective action, Defendants Boughton, Baker, and Fisher failed to supervise their subordinates and/or investigate or rectify the situation, evidencing deliberate indifference to the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and conspiracies between local police and ICE to violate them, thereby rendering the City of Danbury liable.
221. The unconstitutional conduct of Danbury Police Officers described in Claims 1-7 was so manifest as to imply the constructive acquiescence of Defendants Boughton, Baker, and Fisher in their capacities as policymaking officials, thus rendering the City of Danbury liable.
222. All of the Danbury Defendants—including Officers Agosto, DeJesus, James Lalli, Martin, Norkus, John Does 1-5, and Defendants Baker and Boughton—were, at the time of the incidents in question, employees of the City of Danbury.
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TENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF False Arrest and False Imprisonment
(Defendant DPD Officers) 223. The Day-Laborer Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 224. Defendant DPD Officers José Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, and John Does 1-5 knowingly and intentionally arrested, detained, and imprisoned the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs without a warrant and without probable cause, in retaliation for protected speech, based on impermissible racial, ethnic, and national origin discrimination, and in a manner preempted by federal law. 225. The Day-Laborer Plaintiffs were forcibly restrained and subsequently imprisoned by the Danbury Defendants and suffered damages as a result of Danbury Defendants’ actions. 226. The Defendant DPD Officers’ actions constitute false arrest and false imprisonment under Connecticut common law.
ELEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
(Defendant DPD Officers) 227. The Day-Laborer Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 228. Defendant DPD Officers José Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, and John Does 1-5 intended to inflict emotional distress upon the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs by deceiving, arresting, detaining, and imprisoning them, or should have known that their conduct was likely to cause Day-Laborer Plaintiffs’ emotional distress. The Danbury Defendants’ conduct was clearly extreme and outrageous, given the circumstances surrounding the arrests.
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229. The emotional distress of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs was caused by the Danbury Defendants’ conduct and was severe.
230. The Defendant DPD Officers’ actions constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress under Connecticut common law.
TWELFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (Defendant DPD Officers, Defendant Baker, and the City of Danbury) 231. The Day-Laborer Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 232. Defendant DPD Officers José Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, and John Does 1-5 created an unreasonable risk of causing the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs emotional distress. It was clearly foreseeable that the Defendant DPD Officers’ conduct would cause the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs emotional distress. 233. Defendant DPD Officers knew that their failure to act would likely subject a group of identifiable persons to imminent harm, namely, the Latino and immigrant day-laborers gathered in Kennedy Park. 234. Moreover, Defendant Baker negligently failed to supervise Defendant DPD Officers as they executed the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs’ unlawful arrest and detention. 235. The emotional distress of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs was caused by the Defendant DPD Officers’ conduct and was severe enough that it might result in illness or bodily harm. 236. The Defendant DPD Officers’ actions constitute negligent infliction of emotional distress under Connecticut common law. 237. Pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 7-465(a) and 7-101a, the City of Danbury is required to indemnify its employees “for all sums which such employee becomes obligated to
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pay by reason of the liability imposed upon such employee by law for damages awarded for infringement of any person’s civil rights or for physical damages to person or property. . . .” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-465(a).
238. All of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs have satisfied the notice requirement of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-465(a).
239. The actions of the DPD officers and Chief Baker in subjecting the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs to be free from negligent false arrest and false imprisonment were not wanton or willful.
240. Pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-557n(a)(A), the City of Danbury is also directly liable for the “negligent acts or omissions of such political subdivision or any employee, officer or agent thereof acting within the scope of his employment or official duties.”
241. At all times relevant to this Complaint, the Danbury employees—including Officers Agosto, DeJesus, James Lalli, Martin, Norkus, John Does 1-5, and Chief Baker—were employees of the City of Danbury and acting within the scope of their employment and/or their official duties as employees of the City of Danbury.
242. In all times relevant to this complaint, the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs were the identifiable and/or foreseeable victims of the Danbury employees’ actions.
THIRTEENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Fourth Amendment
(Bivens: ICE Defendants) 243. The Day-Laborer Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 244. Defendant HARFOT Officers James Brown, Richard McCaffrey, Ronald Preble, and John Does 9-14 stopped, detained, investigated, searched, seized and/or arrested the Day-
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Laborer Plaintiffs intentionally and knowingly and without probable cause and/or reasonable suspicion, in violation of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs’ right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
245. As a result of Defendant HARFOT Officers’ actions, the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs suffered damages, including but not limited to violations of their Constitutional rights, loss of liberty, harms to their reputations and professional prospects, monetary damages, and emotional distress.
FOURTEENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: Fifth Amendment Equal Protection (Bivens: ICE Defendants)
246. The Day-Laborer Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
247. Defendant HARFOT Officers James Brown, Richard McCaffrey, Ronald Preble, and John Does 9-14 stopped, detained, investigated, searched, seized and/or arrested the DayLaborer Plaintiffs knowingly and intentionally on the basis of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs’ race, ethnicity, and perceived national origin in violation of their right to equal protection under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
248. In addition, Defendant HARFOT Officers subjected the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs to selective law enforcement on the basis of their race, ethnicity, and perceived national origin in violation of their right to equal protection under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
249. Defendant HARFOT Officers also subjected the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs to selective law enforcement out of a malicious and bad faith intent to drive them out of the City of
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Danbury in violation of their right to equal protection under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
250. As a result of Defendant HARFOT Officers’ actions, the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs suffered damages, including but not limited to violations of their Constitutional rights, loss of liberty, harms to their reputations and professional prospects, monetary damages, and emotional distress.
FIFTHTEENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Fifth Amendment Due Process (Bivens: ICE Defendants)
251. The Day-Laborer Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
252. Defendant HARFOT Officers James Brown, Richard McCaffrey, Ronald Preble, and John Does 9-14 civilly arrested and deprived Day-Laborer Plaintiffs of their liberty in a manner that was without due process of law and was fundamentally unfair in the totality of the circumstances, in violation of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs’ rights under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
253. As a result of Defendant HARFOT Officers’ actions, the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs suffered damages, including but not limited to violations of their Constitutional rights, loss of liberty, harms to their reputations and professional prospects, monetary damages, and emotional distress.
SIXTEENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Conspiracy
(Bivens: Defendant HARFOT Officers and DPD Officers) 254. The Day-Laborer Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
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255. Defendant HARFOT Officers and DPD Officers entered into an agreement, between and amongst themselves, to act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury on the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs. Specifically, one or more Defendant HARFOT Officers spoke by telephone with one or more Defendant DPD Officers during the week or weeks prior to the September 19, 2006 arrests to plan the operation. Further, Defendant HARFOT Officers met with Defendant DPD Officers in the early morning of September 19, 2006 for the purpose of planning the operation. The conspiracy included, but may not have been limited to, an agreement to arrest and detain Day-Laborer Plaintiffs in violation of their various rights under the United States and Connecticut Constitutions.
256. Defendant HARFOT Officers and Defendant DPD Officers performed several overt acts in furtherance of this conspiracy, including but not limited to posing as a contractor in order to lure Day-Laborer Plaintiffs in a vehicle, arresting Day-Laborer Plaintiffs, and detaining Day-Laborer Plaintiffs, in violation of their rights under the United States and Connecticut Constitutions and common law.
257. Defendant HARFOT Officers played a significant role in the conspiracy and in the overt acts taken in furtherance thereof.
258. As a result of the conspiracy between and among the Defendant HARFOT Officers and the Defendant DPD Officers and the overt actions taken in furtherance thereof, the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs suffered damages, including but not limited to violations of their Constitutional rights, loss of liberty, harms to their reputations and professional prospects, monetary damages, and emotional distress.
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SEVENTEENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Federal Tort Claims Act
(28 U.S.C. § 1346(b); the United States) 259. The Day-Laborer Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. False arrest and false imprisonment 260. Defendant HARFOT Officers Ronald L. Preble, Richard L. McCaffrey, James E. Brown, and John Does 9-14 knowingly and intentionally arrested, detained, and imprisoned the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs without a warrant and without probable cause, in retaliation for protected speech, based on impermissible racial, ethnic, and national origin discrimination, and in a manner preempted by federal law. 261. The HARFOT officers took custody of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs from Danbury police officers, or arrested them or caused their arrest, as but several of many Latino, Spanishspeaking, day-laborers at Kennedy Park on the morning of September 19, 2006. The “sting” operation—essentially a random sweep of the park—was based on mere speculation that immigration law violators would be found in the crowd of Latino day-laborers. 262. Accordingly, the ICE Defendants lacked any reasonable basis for believing that the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs in particular had violated immigration law. Rather, they arrested them on the basis of their race, ethnicity, and perceived national origins alone. 263. ICE also unlawfully took custody of, arrested, or caused the arrest of, and unlawfully detained the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs prior to asking them any questions regarding their immigration statuses, or even their names. Without any other reasonable basis for the arrest, ICE’s enforcement actions—where officers took custody or arrested first and asked questions later—by definition lacked probable cause.
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264. The Day-Laborer Plaintiffs were forcibly restrained and subsequently imprisoned by the ICE Defendants and suffered damages as a result of ICE Defendants’ actions.
265. The Defendant HARFOT Officers’ actions constitute false arrest and false imprisonment under Connecticut common law.
Intentional infliction of emotional distress 266. Defendant ICE Officers Ronald L. Preble, Richard L. McCaffrey, James E. Brown, and John Does 9-14 also intended to inflict emotional distress upon the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs by deceiving, arresting, detaining, and imprisoning them, or should have known that their conduct was likely to cause Day-Laborer Plaintiffs’ emotional distress. The ICE Defendants’ conduct was clearly extreme and outrageous, given the circumstances surrounding the arrests. 267. The emotional distress of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs was caused by the ICE Defendants’ conduct and was severe. 268. The Defendant HARFOT Officers’ actions constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress under Connecticut common law. Negligent infliction of emotional distress 269. Defendant HARFOT Officers Ronald L. Preble, Richard L. McCaffrey, James E. Brown, and John Does 9-14 further created an unreasonable risk of causing the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs emotional distress. It was clearly foreseeable that the Defendant HARFOT Officers’ conduct would cause the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs emotional distress. 270. Defendant HARFOT Officers knew that their failure to act would likely subject a group of identifiable persons to imminent harm, namely, the Latino and immigrant day-laborers gathered in Kennedy Park.
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271. Moreover, Defendant McCaffrey negligently failed to supervise Defendant ICE Officers as they executed the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs’ unlawful arrest and detention.
272. The emotional distress of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs was caused by the Defendant ICE Officers’ conduct and was severe enough that it might result in illness or bodily harm.
273. The Defendant HARFOT Officers’ actions constitute negligent infliction of emotional distress under Connecticut common law.
Abuse of process 274. Defendant HARFOT Officers Ronald L. Preble, Richard L. McCaffrey, James E. Brown, and John Does 9-14 abused legal process for a purpose for which it was not intended when they deceived, arrested, detained, transferred, imprisoned, coerced, intimidated, and humiliated the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs in order to force them to abandon their legal rights and privileges. 275. ICE officials also abused legal process by arbitrarily refusing to set bond at the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs’ initial custody determinations, transferring the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs to detention facilities far from their friends, family and legal counsel, and by frivolously opposing bond in order to harass and intimidate the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs into abandoning their immigration proceedings. 276. From the outset, ICE’s unnecessary and illegitimate detention of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs on the basis of the ICE District Sub-Office’s initial custody determination subjected the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs to extensive humiliation and harassment, isolated them from counsel and witnesses, and placed severe pressure on them to abandon their legal defense and to take voluntary departure.
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277. Similarly, ICE’s abrupt transfer of the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs to detention facilities as far away as Texas, where the men have no friends, family, or ties to the community not only separated them from their legal counsel and witnesses, but secured a forum for ICE in a more favorable jurisdiction and placed further pressure on the men not to contest the charges against them. ICE continued its efforts to strong-arm the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs into abandoning their legal defense at their bond hearings, where it opposed the setting of bond.
278. Unknown ICE officials at the ICE Hartford Sub-Office also abused legal process by attempting to coerce the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs into signing documents they could neither read nor understand, telling them that they had to do so.
279. The Day-Laborer Plaintiffs suffered damages as a result of Defendant ICE officials’ actions.
280. The Defendant ICE Officers’ actions constitute an abuse of process under Connecticut common law.
281. The United States is liable pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) for the tortious acts of its employees in “circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
282. At all times relevant to this Complaint, the ICE agents—including Officers Preble, McCaffrey, Brown, and John Does 9-14—were acting within the scope of their employment and/or their official duties as employees of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement in the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), an agency of the U.S. Government.
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283. In these circumstances, if the United States were a private person, liability would be imposed in accordance with the law of Connecticut.
284. The Day-Laborer Plaintiffs have administratively exhausted their claims under the FTCA. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a), the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs filed FTCA administrative claims with DHS for the tortious actions constituting false arrest and false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distresss, and abuse of process committed by Defendant ICE officers. The claims were received on May 1, 2007.
285. DHS has failed to make final disposition of the claims within six months after they were filed, and the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs deem this failure a final denial pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a).
CLAIMS RELATING TO NCIC-PROMPTED ARREST EIGHTEENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Fourth Amendment and Article First, § 7, 9 Conn. Constitution (42 U.S.C. § 1983: Defendant DPD Officers John Does 6-8)
286. Plaintiff Danilo Brito Vargas repeats and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
287. Defendant DPD Officers John Does 6-8 knowingly and intentionally conducted a pretextual investigatory stop of Plaintiff Vargas and arrested him unlawfully and without authority, in a manner preempted by federal law, based on an administrative immigration warrant listed in the NCIC database, in violation of Plaintiff Vargas’ rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and Article First, §§ 7 and 9 of the Connecticut Constitution to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
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288. As a result of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiff Vargas suffered damages, including but not limited to violations of his Constitutional rights, loss of liberty, harms to their reputations and professional prospects, monetary damages, and emotional distress.
NINETEENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and Article First, § 20 of the Connecticut
Constitution (42 U.S.C. § 1983: Defendants DPD Officers John Does 6-8) 289. Plaintiff Danilo Brito Vargas repeats and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 290. Defendant DPD Officers John Doe 6-8 targeted and arrested Plaintiff in a pretextual traffic-stop on the basis of his race, ethnicity, and national origin and for the purpose of investigating his immigration status through the NCIC database, in violation of Plaintiff Vargas’ right to Equal Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article First, § 20 of the Connecticut Constitution. 291. Defendants subjected Plaintiff Vargas to selective law enforcement out of a malicious and bad faith intent to drive him and other drivers of Latino and/or foreign-born appearance from the City of Danbury, in violation of Plaintiff Vargas’ right to Equal Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article First, § 20 of the Connecticut Constitution. 292. In targeting Plaintiff Vargas for arrest, Defendants intentionally treated him differently from other similarly situated drivers without any rational basis for doing so, in violation of Plaintiff Vargas’ right to Equal Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article First, § 20 of the Connecticut Constitution.
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293. As a result of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiff Vargas suffered damages, including but not limited to violations of his Constitutional rights, loss of liberty, harms to their reputations and professional prospects, monetary damages, and emotional distress.
TWENTIETH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Personal Supervisory Liability
(Defendants Boughton and Baker) 294. Plaintiff Danilo Brito Vargas repeats and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 295. Defendants Boughton and Baker are liable in their individual capacities as the supervisors of Defendant DPD Officers John Doe 6-8 for the violations of the Day-LaborerPlaintiffs’ rights described Claims 18-19. 296. Defendants Boughton and Baker were personally involved in and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of Plaintiff Vargas’ rights by knowingly and intentionally creating, implementing, enforcing, encouraging, sanctioning, and/or acquiescing in a policy, practice, and/or custom of making arrests based on administrative immigration warrants in the NCIC database. 297. Defendant Boughton, the Mayor of Danbury, is responsible for promulgating, implementing, and administering the policies, practices and/or customs of the City of Danbury and for supervising and administering all City Departments. He was directly involved in the promulgation, implementation, and administration of the policy, practice, and/or custom that proximately caused the violations of Plaintiff Vargas’ rights described in Claims 18-19. 298. Defendant Boughton was personally involved in and proximately caused the violations of Plaintiff Vargas’ rights through his deliberate indifference to Plaintiff Vargas’ constitutional rights and his grossly negligent supervision of his subordinates, including but not limited to Defendant Baker, who proximately caused the violations described in Claims 18-19.
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Defendant Boughton’s gross negligence in supervising Defendant Baker permitted Baker and the DPD to promulgate, implement, and administer the aforementioned policies, practices, and customs which proximately caused the violations of Plaintiff Vargas’ rights described in Claims 18-19.
299. Defendant Baker, the Chief of Police for Danbury, is responsible for promulgating, implementing, and administering the policies, practices, and/or customs of the DPD, and for supervising all DPD officers in the commission of their duties. He was directly involved in the promulgation, implementation, and administration of the policy, practice, and/or custom that proximately caused the violations of Plaintiff Vargas’ rights described in Claims 1819.
300. Defendant Baker was personally involved in and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of Plaintiff Vargas’ rights through his deliberate indifference to Plaintiff Vargas’ rights and his grossly negligent supervision of his subordinates, including but not limited to Defendant DPD Officers John Doe 6-8, who proximately caused the violations described in Claims 18-19.
301. As a result of Defendants’ Boughton and Baker’s acts and/or omissions, Plaintiff Vargas suffered damages, including but not limited to violations of his Constitutional rights, loss of liberty, harms to their reputations and professional prospects, monetary damages, and emotional distress.
TWENTY-FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF Municipal Liability
(42 U.S.C. § 1983: Defendant City of Danbury) 302. Plaintiff Danilo Brito Vargas repeats and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
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303. The City of Danbury is liable pursuant to Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) for the promulgation and execution of municipal policy and/or custom by Defendants Boughton and Baker. Defendants Boughton and Baker are individual policymakers who have been vested with final policymaking authority by municipal and state law. Their acts and edicts represent city policy within the meaning of Monell and render the City of Danbury liable for the constitutional violations occasioned by those acts and edicts described in Claims 18-19.
304. In addition, the City of Danbury is liable for the deliberate indifference of Defendants Boughton and Baker. In their capacities as official policymakers, they were averted to a potentially serious problem of unconstitutional conduct by Danbury Police Officers. In spite of an obvious need for supervision and/or corrective action, Defendants Boughton and Baker failed to supervise their subordinates and/or investigate or rectify the situation, evidencing deliberate indifference to the violations of Plaintiff Vargas’ constitutional rights described in Claims 18-19.
305. Additionally, the unconstitutional conduct of Danbury Police Officers described in Claims 18-19 was so manifest as to imply the constructive acquiescence of Defendants Boughton and Baker in their capacities as policymaking officials, thus rendering the City of Danbury liable.
306. All of the Danbury NCIC Defendants—including Boughton, Baker, and John Does 6-8–were employees of the City of Danbury at the time of the incidents in question.
TWENTY-SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF False Arrest and False Imprisonment (Defendants John Does 6-8)
307. Plaintiff Danilo Brito Vargas repeats and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
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308. Defendant DPD John Doe Officers 6-8 targeted Plaintiff Vargas for a pretextual traffic stop and arrested him on the basis of their race, ethnicity, and perceived national origins and arrested Plaintiff Vargas in a manner preempted by federal law for alleged civil violations of federal immigration law pursuant to an administrative warrant in the NCIC.
309. Plaintiff Vargas was forcibly restrained and subsequently imprisoned by Defendants and suffered damages as a result of Defendants’ actions.
310. Defendants’ actions constitute false arrest and false imprisonment under Connecticut common law.
TWENTY-THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
(Defendants John Does 6-8) 311. Plaintiff Danilo Brito Vargas repeats and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 312. Defendant DPD John Doe Officers 6-8, through the arrest of Plaintiff Vargas, intended to inflict emotional distress upon him, or should have known that Plaintiff’s emotional distress was a likely consequence of their conduct. Defendants’ conduct was clearly extreme and outrageous, given the circumstances surrounding the arrests. 313. The emotional distress of Plaintiff was caused by Defendants’ conduct and was severe. 314. Defendants’ actions constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress under Connecticut common law.
TWENTY-FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
(Defendant Baker, John Does 6-8, and the City of Danbury) 315. Plaintiff Danilo Brito Vargas repeats and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
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316. Defendant DPD John Doe Officers 6-8, through the arrest of Plaintiff Vargas, created an unreasonable risk of causing Plaintiff Vargas emotional distress. It was clearly foreseeable that Defendants’ conduct would cause Plaintiff Vargas emotional distress.
317. Plaintiff Vargas’ emotional distress was caused by Defendant John Does 6-8’s conduct, and was severe enough that it might result in illness or bodily harm.
318. Moreover, though fully aware that civil immigration arrests are preempted by federal law, Defendant Baker negligently failed to supervise Defendant John Does 6-8 as they executed Plaintiff Vargas’ arrest and detention.
319. Defendants Baker and John Does 6-8’s actions constitute negligent infliction of emotional distress under Connecticut common law.
320. Pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 7-465(a) and 7-101a, the City of Danbury is required to indemnify its employees “for all sums which such employee becomes obligated to pay by reason of the liability imposed upon such employee by law for damages awarded for infringement of any person’s civil rights or for physical damages to person or property. . . .” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-465(a).
321. The actions of the Defendants Baker and John Does 6-8 in causing Plaintiff Vargas the negligent infliction of emotional distress were not wanton or willful.
322. Plaintiff Vargas has satisfied the notice requirement of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7465(a).
323. Pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-557n(a), the City of Danbury is also directly liable for the “negligent acts or omissions of such political subdivision or any employee, officer or agent thereof acting within the scope of his employment or official duties.”
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324. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Defendants Baker and John Does 6-8 were employees of the City of Danbury and acting within the scope of their employment and/or their official duties as employees.
325. In all times relevant to this complaint, the Plaintiff Vargas was the identifiable and/or foreseeable victim of the actions of Defendants Baker and John Does 6-8.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully requests that this Court:
(1) Enter a declaratory judgment that the actions of Defendant Danbury officials and/or Defendant ICE officials, both with respect to the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs and with respect to Plaintiff Vargas, violated the United States Constitution, the Connecticut Constitution, and Connecticut common law.
(2) Award Plaintiffs compensatory damages in an amount to be proven at trial. (3) Hold Defendants jointly and severally liable for compensatory damages. (4) Award Plaintiffs punitive damages in an amount to be proven at trial. (5) Award Plaintiffs the cost of this action and reasonable attorney fees. (6) Grant such other relief as the Court deems just and equitable.

Dated November 26, 2007 New Haven, Connecticut

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Michael Wishnie Michael Wishnie (ct27221) Supervising Attorney
/s/ Christopher Lasch Christopher Lasch (ct27139) Supervising Attorney

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Case 3:07-cv-01436-RNC Document 21 Filed 11/26/07 Page 62 of 62 Ramzi Kassem, Supervising Attorney Justin Cox, Law Student Intern Geri Greenspan, Law Student Intern Thom Ringer, Law Student Intern Michael Tan, Law Student Intern JEROME N. FRANK LEGAL SERVICES ORGANIZATION Yale Law School P.O. Box 209090 New Haven, Connecticut 06520 Phone: (203) 432-4800 Counsel for Plaintiffs
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 Case 3:07-cv-01436-RNC Document 317 Filed 10/01/09 Page 1 of 62

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

---------------------------------------------------------------X

:

JUAN BARRERA, JOSÉ CABRERA, DANIEL :

CHAVEZ, JOSÉ LLIBISUPA, ISAAC

:

MALDONADO, EDGAR REDROVAN,

:

NICHOLAS SEGUNDO SANCHEZ, and JUAN :

CARLOS SIMBAÑA,

:

,

:

:

Plaintiffs,

:

:

v.

:

:

MARK BOUGHTON, Mayor of Danbury, ALAN :

BAKER, Chief of Police, Danbury Police

:

Department, MITCHELL WESTON, Captain,

:

Danbury Police Department, Danbury Police

:

Officers JOSÉ AGOSTO,RICHARD DEJESUS, :

JAMES A. FISHER, JAMES LALLI, JULIO

:

LOPEZ, CRAIG MARTIN, JOSEPH NORKUS, :

LUIS RAMOS, JOHN DOES 1-5,

:

CITY OF DANBURY

:

:

ICE Assistant Field Office Director GEORGE

:

SULLIVAN, ICE Deputy Field Office Director :

JIM MARTIN, ICE Field Office Director BRUCE :

CHADBOURNE, ICE Agents JAMES BROWN, :

RICHARD MCCAFFREY, RONALD PREBLE, :

JOHN DOES 6-11, and the UNITED STATES :

:

Defendants.

:

---------------------------------------------------------------X

Second Amended Complaint No. 3:07-cv-01436-RNC

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

This is a civil rights suit to remedy the discriminatory and unauthorized enforcement of

federal immigration laws against Latino residents of the City of Danbury. Under the leadership

of Mayor Mark Boughton, Danbury and its police department have repeatedly and knowingly

made illegal civil immigration arrests, engaged in impermissibly discriminatory law

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enforcement, and retaliated against residents for expressive activities secured by the First Amendment. In their frustration with the arrival of new immigrants to Danbury, Mayor Boughton and the police department have taken the law into their own hands. In some instances the City has acted unilaterally and at other times its officials have conspired with federal immigration agents in the conduct of this unlawful campaign.
Each of the ten Plaintiffs named in this action suffered illegal arrest and detention at the hands of Danbury Police Department ("DPD") officers for alleged civil immigration law violations. Yet federal immigration law preempts and prohibits local police from making civil immigration arrests unless explicitly authorized by prior written agreement with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"). Mayor Boughton very publicly, and unsuccessfully, sought such a written agreement in Connecticut in 2005.
Despite Mayor Boughton's failure to secure authority for the civil enforcement of immigration laws, on September 19, 2006, the DPD instigated an undercover sting operation in which DPD officers, with the knowing and willing assistance of ICE, used extraordinary deception to arrest a group of Latino day-laborers who had gathered at Kennedy Park, a park in the center of downtown Danbury. DPD targeted the men based on their race, ethnicity, and perceived national origin, having no other reason to believe that any of them had violated immigration law. Furthermore, the DPD arrested the day-laborers without probable cause, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The arrests were also calculated to silence the day-laborers' expression of their availability for work in a traditional public forum, in violation of the First Amendment, and to chill the speech of other day-laborers who now avoid the park for fear of arrest. Eight of the day-laborers arrested on September 19, 2006 are Plaintiffs in this action.
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The DPD's rogue actions have resulted in numerous constitutional violations, caused Plaintiffs suffering and ignominy, and endangered the civil rights of Danbury's Latino and immigrant communities. Plaintiffs bring this action to redress the Defendants' unlawful and discriminatory enforcement of federal immigration law. They ask this Court to issue a declaration stating that Plaintiffs' arrests violate the law and to award Plaintiffs damages for the harm they have suffered as a result of Defendants' illegal actions.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 1. This Court has jurisdiction over the Plaintiff's claims arising under the U.S. Constitution and federal statutes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 1361 and supplemental jurisdiction over claims arising under the laws and Constitution of the State of Connecticut pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Jurisdiction to grant declaratory judgment is conferred by 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02. 2. Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) in that all events complained of and giving rise to Plaintiffs' claims arose in this district.
PARTIES Plaintiffs
3. Plaintiff Juan Barrera. DPD officers arrested Plaintiff Barrera on September 19, 2006 and subsequently transferred him to ICE custody. ICE detained Mr. Barrera in Hartford, Connecticut and then in the Suffolk County House of Corrections in Boston, Massachusetts, where he remained until his release on bond on or about October 3, 2006. Plaintiff Barrera is of Latino race and ethnicity and is alleged by ICE to be a citizen of Ecuador.
4. Plaintiff José Cabrera. DPD officers arrested Plaintiff Cabrera on September 19, 2006 and subsequently transferred him to ICE custody. ICE detained Mr. Cabrera in Hartford,
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Connecticut, the Plymouth County Detention Center in Plymouth, Massachusetts, and the Willacy Detention Center in Raymondville, Texas, where he remained until released on bond on or about October 23, 2006. Mr. Cabrera is of Latino race and ethnicity and is alleged by ICE to be a citizen of Ecuador.
5. Plaintiff Daniel Chavez. DPD officers arrested Mr. Chavez on September 19, 2006 and subsequently transferred him to ICE custody. ICE detained Mr. Chavez in Hartford, Connecticut, the Plymouth County Detention Center in Plymouth, Massachusetts, and the Willacy Detention Center in Raymondville, Texas, where he remained until released on bond on or about October 23, 2006. Mr. Chavez is of Latino race and ethnicity and is alleged by ICE to be a citizen of Ecuador.
6. Plaintiff José Froilan Llibisupa. DPD officers arrested Mr. Llibisupa on September 19, 2006 and subsequently transferred him to ICE custody. ICE detained Mr. Llibisupa in Hartford, Connecticut and then in the Suffolk County House of Corrections in Boston, Massachusetts, where he remained until released on bond on or about October 3, 2006. Mr. Llibisupa is of Latino race and ethnicity and is alleged by ICE to be a citizen of Ecuador.
7. Plaintiff Isaac Maldonado. DPD officers arrested Plaintiff Maldonado on September 19, 2006 and subsequently transferred him to ICE custody. ICE detained Mr. Maldonado in Hartford, Connecticut and then in the Suffolk County House of Corrections in Boston, Massachusetts, where he remained until released on bond on or about October 3, 2006. Mr. Maldonado is of Latino race and ethnicity and is alleged by ICE to be a citizen of Ecuador.
8. Plaintiff Edgar Eladio Redrovan. DPD officers arrested Mr. Redrovan on September 19, 2006 and subsequently transferred him to ICE custody. ICE detained Mr. Redrovan in Hartford, Connecticut, the Plymouth County Detention Center in Plymouth,
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Massachusetts, and the Port Isabel Processing Center in Los Fresnos, Texas, where he remained until released on bond on or about October 23, 2006. Mr. Redrovan is of Latino race and ethnicity and is alleged by ICE to be a citizen of Ecuador.
9. Plaintiff Nicolas Segundo Sanchez. DPD officers arrested Mr. Sanchez on September 19, 2006 and subsequently transferred him to ICE custody. ICE detained Mr. Sanchez in Hartford, Connecticut, the Plymouth County Detention Center in Plymouth, Massachusetts, and the Willacy Detention Center in Raymondville, Texas, where he remained until released on bond on or about October 20, 2006. Mr. Sanchez is of Latino race and ethnicity and is alleged by ICE to be a citizen of Ecuador.
10. Plaintiff Juan Carlos Simbaña. DPD officers arrested Mr. Simbaña on September 19, 2006 and subsequently transferred him to ICE custody. ICE detained Mr. Simbaña in Hartford, Connecticut, the Plymouth County Detention Center in Plymouth, Massachusetts, and the Willacy Detention Center in Raymondville, where he remained until released on bond on or about October 26, 2006. Mr. Simbaña is of Latino race and ethnicity and is alleged by ICE to be a citizen of Ecuador. Danbury Defendants
11. Defendant Mark Boughton is the Mayor of the City of Danbury, Connecticut. Under state and municipal law, he is the city official charged with ultimate responsibility for implementing and administering the policies, practices, and/or customs of the City of Danbury. Defendant Boughton is sued in his official and personal capacities. During all times mentioned in this complaint, Defendant Boughton was acting under color of state law.
12. Defendant Alan Baker is the Chief of Police of the Danbury Police Department. Under state and municipal law, he is the city official charged with ultimate responsibility for the
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training and supervision of DPD officers and the administration and implementation of DPD policies, practices, and/or customs. Defendant Baker is sued in his official and personal capacities. During all times mentioned in this complaint, Defendant Baker was acting under color of state law.
13. Defendant Mitchell Weston is a Captain in the Danbury Police Department and is the supervisor for the Detective Bureau. Weston has supervisory responsibility for all of the DPD Defendants in the Detective Bureau, including those whose conduct resulted in the arrest and detention of Plaintiffs. He also had knowledge of the undercover sting operation before it occurred, or he directed, authorized, approved, and/or acquiesced in the operation. Defendant Weston is sued in his official and personal capacities. During all times mentioned in this complaint, Defendant Weston was acting under color of state law.
14. Defendant James Fisher is a Detective Lieutenant in the DPD's Special Investigations Division ("SID"). He is responsible for the training and supervision of SID officers and for carrying out the policies, practices, and/or customs of the DPD. He was also the lead DPD officer for the undercover sting operation on September 19, 2006. He is sued in his official and personal capacities. During all times mentioned in this complaint, Defendant Fisher was acting under color of state law.
15. Defendant José Agosto is a Danbury Police Officer. He is responsible for carrying out the policies, practices, and/or customs of the DPD and participated in the undercover sting operation on September 19, 2006. He is sued in his official and personal capacities. During all times mentioned in this complaint, Defendant Agosto was acting under color of state law.
16. Defendant Richard DeJesus is a Danbury Police Officer. He is responsible for carrying out the policies, practices, and/or customs of the DPD and participated in the
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undercover sting operation on September 19, 2006. He is sued in his official and personal capacities. During all times mentioned in this complaint, Defendant DeJesus was acting under color of state law.
17. Defendant James Lalli is a Danbury Police Officer. He is responsible for carrying out the policies, practices, and/or customs of the DPD and participated in the undercover sting operation on September 19, 2006. He is sued in his official and personal capacities. During all times mentioned in this complaint, Defendant Lalli was acting under color of state law.
18. Defendant Julio Lopez is a Detective with the Danbury Police Department. He is responsible for carrying out the policies, practices, and/or customs of the DPD and participated in the undercover sting operation on September 19, 2006. He is sued in his official and personal capacities. During all times mentioned in this complaint, Defendant Lopez was acting under color of state law.
19. Defendant Craig Martin is a Detective with the Danbury Police Department. He is responsible for carrying out the policies, practices, and/or customs of the DPD and participated in the undercover sting operation on September 19, 2006. He is sued in his official and personal capacities. During all times mentioned in this complaint, Defendant Martin was acting under color of state law.
20. Defendant Joseph Norkus is a former Danbury police officer. While a Danbury Police Officer, he was responsible for carrying out the policies, practices, and/or customs of the DPD and participated in the undercover sting operation on September 19, 2006. He is sued in his official and personal capacities. During all times mentioned in this complaint, Defendant Norkus was acting under color of state law.
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21. Defendant Luis Ramos is a Detective with Danbury Police Department. He is responsible for carrying out the policies, practices, and/or customs of the DPD and participated in the undercover sting operation on September 19, 2006. He is sued in his official and personal capacities. During all times mentioned in this complaint, Defendant Ramos was acting under color of state law.
22. Defendants John Does 1-5 are Danbury Police Officers who took part in the arrests on September 19, 2006, but whose identities are as yet unknown. They are responsible for carrying out the policies, practices, and/or customs of the DPD, and they are sued in their official and personal capacities. During all times mentioned in this complaint, Defendants John Does 1-5 were acting under color of state law.
23. Plaintiffs are unaware of the true names and capacities, whether individual or otherwise, of Defendant Does 1 through 8, inclusive, and therefore sue those Defendants by fictitious names. These Doe Defendants are responsible and liable for the acts and/or damages alleged in this Complaint. Plaintiffs will amend this Complaint to allege the Doe Defendants' true names and capacities when they have been ascertained.
24. Defendant City of Danbury is a Connecticut municipal corporation. It is sued both under Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) for the execution of its unconstitutional customs and policies and pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-557n, 7-465, and 7-101a for the tortious acts of its employees.
ICE Defendants 25. Defendant George Sullivan is the Assistant Field Office Director for the Detention and Removal Office ("DRO") in Hartford, Connecticut. Sullivan has supervisory responsibility for all of the ICE Defendants in the Hartford office, including those whose conduct resulted in
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the arrest and detention of Plaintiffs. Defendant Sullivan is sued in his personal capacity. During all times mentioned in this complaint, Defendant Sullivan was acting under color of federal law.
26. Defendant Jim Martin is the Deputy Field Office Director for the Boston regional DRO, which governs the Hartford sub-office. Defendant Martin has supervisory responsibility for all of the ICE Defendants in the Boston region, including those whose conduct resulted in the arrest and detention of Plaintiffs. Defendant Martin is sued in his personal capacity. During all times mentioned in this complaint, Defendant Martin was acting under color of federal law.
27. Defendant Bruce Chadbourne is the Field Office Director for the Boston regional DRO office, which governs the Hartford sub-office. Defendant Chadbourne is the federal official charged with the ultimate responsibility for the training and supervision of all ICE officers in the Boston region, and for the administration and implementation of the regional office's policies, practices, and/or customs. Defendant Chadbourne is sued in his personal capacity. During all times mentioned in this complaint, Defendant Chadbourne was acting under color of federal law.
28. Defendant James E. Brown is an agent of ICE's Detention and Removal Office, Fugitive Operations Unit, in Boston, Massachusetts. He is responsible for carrying out the immigration law enforcement operations of the Fugitives Operation Unit in Boston. He took part in the sting operation at Kennedy Park in Danbury and the arrest and detention of nine Plaintiffs on September 19, 2006. He is sued in his personal capacity. During all times mentioned in this complaint, Defendant Brown was acting under color of federal law.
29. Defendant Richard L. McCaffrey is an agent of the ICE Detention and Removal Office, Hartford Fugitive Operations Team ("HARFOT"). He is responsible for carrying out HARFOT immigration law enforcement operations. He took part in the sting operation at Kennedy Park in Danbury and the arrest and detention of nine Plaintiffs on September 19, 2006.
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He is sued in his personal capacity. During all times mentioned in this complaint, Defendant McCaffrey was acting under color of federal law.
30. Defendant Ronald L. Preble is an agent of the HARFOT. He is responsible for carrying out HARFOT immigration law enforcement operations. He took part in the sting operation at Kennedy Park in Danbury and the arrest and detention of nine Plaintiffs on September 19, 2006. He is sued in his personal capacity. During all times mentioned in this complaint, Defendant Preble was acting under color of federal law.
31. Defendants John Does 6-11 are agents of ICE who participated in the arrest and detention of nine Plaintiffs on September 19, 2006. They are responsible for carrying out the policies of ICE, and they are sued in their personal capacity. During all times mentioned in this complaint, Defendants John Does 6-11 were acting under color of federal law.
32. Plaintiffs are unaware of the true names and capacities, whether individual or otherwise, of Defendant Does 6 through 11, inclusive, and therefore sue those Defendants by fictitious names. Each of the Doe Defendants is responsible and liable for the acts and/or damages alleged in this Complaint. Plaintiffs will amend this Complaint to allege the Doe Defendants' true names and capacities when they have been ascertained.
33. During all times mentioned in this complaint, all Defendants were acting under color of law, that is, under color of the statutes, laws, charter, ordinances, rules, regulations, customs and usages of the United States, the State of Connecticut, or the City of Danbury.
STATEMENT OF FACTS Immigration Law Enforcement in Danbury under Mayor Mark Boughton
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34. Mayor Mark Boughton, first elected in 2001, has been a vocal advocate of strict immigration enforcement and of local government and police involvement in immigration enforcement.
35. Mayor Boughton has promoted the local enforcement of federal immigration laws in Danbury in direct response to an increase in the number of the city's immigrant and Latino residents and out of frustration over the federal government failure's to address the impact of sudden, large-scale immigration on local municipalities. In recent years, Danbury has seen a significant increase in immigrants from Brazil and other Latin American countries, especially Ecuador.
36. The arrival of new Latino immigrants, and the failure of the federal government to address immigration's local effects, has sparked a backlash from Mayor Boughton's administration.
37. For example, in early 2006, Mayor Boughton participated in or was present for discussions relating to his decision to create and lead a new nonprofit organization called "Mayors and County Executives for Immigration Reform." The organization, now disbanded, sought to lobby lawmakers to overhaul federal immigration laws.
38. Mayor Boughton's administration has also targeted, harassed, and intimidated Danbury's new city residents through a number of discriminatory policies. These policies include discriminatory enforcement of city ordinances, such as building code and vehicle registration regulations; shutting down neighborhood volleyball games; encouraging police harassment of day-laborers; encouraging direct police enforcement of civil immigration laws through traffic stops; and requests to U.S. Senators and Representatives and ICE for federal assistance in immigration law enforcement. Upon information and belief, these policies aim ultimately to
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drive unwanted immigrants from Danbury and to deter future immigrants from making Danbury their home.
39. Mayor Boughton has especially directed these discriminatory policies against Danbury's Ecuadorian community. For example, both Mayor Boughton and Chief Baker were present for or participated in discussions relating to the effect of backyard volleyball games on the City of Danbury, its government, its police department, its residents, and its neighborhoods. Mayor Boughton and Chief Baker also participated in discussions relating to how to develop a backyard volleyball game ordinance, and whether to introduce it to the Danbury Common Council.
40. In April 2005, Danbury drew national media attention when the Danbury Common Council, with Mayor Boughton's support, considered an ordinance banning "repetitive outdoor group activities." The purpose of this ordinance was to shut down the Ecuadorian community's neighborhood volleyball games, one of the primary venues for community gatherings in the spring and summer.
41. Mayor Boughton also requested that the DPD aggressively police the volleyball games in order to harass the Ecuadorian community.
42. Around this same time, Mayor Boughton and Chief Baker also participated in or were present for discussions relating to housing code violations in heavily Ecuadorian neighborhoods in Danbury. They were also present for or participated in discussions relating to the creation, promotion, or operation of housing code enforcement programs, such as the Office of Neighborhood Assistance (ONA) and the Unified Neighborhood Inspection Team (UNIT).
43. Pursuant to Mayor Boughton's policy, city code inspectors discriminatorily enforced Danbury's fire and building codes and parking regulations against the Ecuadorian community.
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For example, in a nighttime sweep on July 23, 2005, code enforcement officers shut down approximately seven sites that serviced the Ecuadorian community's neighborhood volleyball games.
44. The centerpiece of Danbury's harassment campaign under Mayor Boughton, however, has been the City of Danbury's escalating involvement in the enforcement of federal immigration laws, especially through the Danbury Police Department.
45. Mayor Boughton and other Danbury city officials are fully aware and have been informed by their own Office of Corporation Counsel that local police lack the legal authority to enforce federal civil immigration laws.
46. In a letter to Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal, dated April 15, 2005, Mayor Boughton requested that Attorney General Blumenthal enter into a Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") with ICE to train, supervise, and deputize state police officers to enforce federal immigration laws, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1257(g). State officials declined to pursue this course. Both Mayor Boughton and Chief Baker participated in or were present for discussions relating to this request for an MOU.
47. Despite this response from state officials, in a subsequent letter to Connecticut Governor Jodi Rell, Mayor Boughton stated that he had nevertheless instructed Danbury Police Chief Alan Baker to prioritize the resources of the DPD to assist with future federal and state immigration enforcement activities in Danbury.
48. In a letter to Connecticut Citizens for Immigration Reform, dated January 19, 2006, and based on legal advice from Danbury's Office of Corporation Counsel, Chief Baker acknowledged that DPD officers possess the authority to enforce only criminal-but not civilimmigration laws.
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49. Despite their knowledge that DPD officers are not authorized to enforce civil immigration laws, Mayor Boughton and Chief Baker have nevertheless encouraged and instructed the DPD to carry out independent civil immigration law enforcement actions against Danbury's unwanted immigrant, Latino, and Ecuadorian residents without the requisite training, supervision, and written agreement with ICE as required by law.
50. Pursuant to the direction of Mayor Boughton and Chief Baker, the DPD's Special Investigations Division ("SID") has become especially active in civil immigration law enforcement activities.
51. SID is a special vice unit of the DPD that was established to investigate narcotics, gambling, prostitution, and organized crime. SID officers have received no formal training in immigration law enforcement and they are not supervised by ICE officers.
52. In a December 2004 letter to Eduardo Aguirre, Jr., Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, which is an agency within the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), Mayor Boughton described the recent arrival of allegedly undocumented immigrants in Danbury and requested the assistance of the agency in enforcing immigration laws in Danbury. Mayor Boughton also sent a copy of this letter to Tom Ridge, then Secretary of DHS.
53. Mayor Boughton also sent copies of correspondence with state and other federal officials to the Secretary of DHS. This correspondence described the perceived problems Danbury faced as a result of illegal immigration and requested the assistance of state and federal authorities in enforcing immigration laws.
54. The ICE Defendants were fully aware of the Mayor's unlawful immigration enforcement campaign. Harassment of the Kennedy Park Day-Laborers Under Mayor Mark Boughton
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55. As part of their local immigration enforcement campaign, Mayor Boughton and the DPD have singled out the day-laborer community in Danbury's Kennedy Park for special harassment.
56. Upon information and belief, almost all of the day-laborers who gather at Kennedy Park each day are Latino men-many of Ecuadorian descent-and Mayor Boughton and the DPD have targeted them for harassment on the basis of their race, ethnicity, and perceived national origin. Plaintiffs Barrera, Cabrera, Chavez, Llibisupa, Maldonado, Redrovan, Sanchez, and Simbaña are all Latino and are all alleged by ICE to be citizens of Ecuador.
57. Kennedy Park is a small park, open to the public, located at the intersection of Main Street and Kennedy Avenue. Kennedy Park is at the center of Danbury's downtown district and within walking distance of City Hall.
58. In recent years, Kennedy Park has become a gathering site for day-laborers. Contractors in the construction, landscaping, and other industries drive by Kennedy Park in the early morning to solicit workers on a job-by-job basis. Normally, wages and work arrangements are negotiated at the park, and contractors then drive workers to worksites.
59. No ordinance in the Danbury Municipal Code prohibits the expression of one's availability to solicit work in a public forum.
60. Prior to September 2006, the daily and visible gathering of the day-laborers in Kennedy Park had become a source of political controversy in Danbury and subject of increasing debate among city residents.
61. Mayor Boughton and Chief Baker participated in or were present for discussions relating to Kennedy Park and other day-laborer sites, and the effect of such sites on the City of Danbury, its government, its police department, its residents, and its neighborhoods.
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62. Mayor Boughton and Chief Baker also participated in or were present for discussions about the possibility of finding alternate sites where day-laborers could gather.
63. Upon information and belief, Mayor Boughton expressly directed the Danbury Police to harass and intimidate the day-laborers who gathered peaceably in Kennedy Park in order to silence their solicitation speech and prevent them from communicating with potential employers. Mayor Boughton and the DPD targeted the day-laborers for such harassment and intimidation on the basis of their race, ethnicity, and perceived national origin.
64. In accordance with Mayor Boughton's directives, DPD officers, from at least as early as August 2006, repeatedly harassed day-laborers gathering peaceably in Kennedy Park by threatening to ticket, cite, or arrest them on the grounds that they were interfering with the flow of traffic.
65. Police approached even day-laborers who were not crossing or about to cross the street in front of Kennedy Park and warned them not to congregate near the edge of the park.
66. The DPD's campaign of threats and harassment was intended to deter and effectively prohibit day-laborers from assembling peaceably in the park and to encourage them to leave Danbury. The DPD also directed these threats and harassment against the day-laborers on the basis of their race, ethnicity, and perceived national origin.
67. There is a second site in Danbury where immigrant day-laborers gather to solicit employment, located outside Minas Carne & Deli, a Brazilian restaurant at 36 Osborne Street.
68. The men who gather at the site on Osborne Street are predominantly of Brazilian descent, in contrast to the largely Ecuadorian Kennedy Park site.
69. Upon information and belief, no day-laborers have ever been arrested for civil immigration violations at the site on Osborne Street.
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The Arrest of Eleven Men on September 19, 2006 Planning the Sting Operation-- Danbury Defendants 70. On September 19, 2006, DPD's harassment of the day-laborers culminated in an
undercover immigration sting operation at Kennedy Park that resulted in the unlawful arrest of eleven men, nine of whom are Plaintiffs in this action.
71. Defendants Agosto, DeJesus, Fisher, Lalli, Lopez, Martin, Norkus, Ramos, Weston, and John Does 1-5 (collectively, the "DPD Officers") planned and/or executed the operation. Defendants Brown, McCaffrey, Preble, and John Does 6-11 (collectively, the "HARFOT Officers") were present in Danbury during the execution of the operation.
72. Consistent with Mayor Boughton and the DPD's efforts to drive new Latino and Ecuadorian immigrants from the city, Defendant DPD Officers determined, prior to September 19, 2006, to arrest day-laborers at Kennedy Park.
73. The DPD Officers knew of no particular "fugitive" or other alleged immigration violators in Kennedy Park and had no specific targets in mind in planning the undercover sting operation with ICE.
74. Nevertheless, Detective Fisher communicated with one or more of the HARFOT Officers regarding the potential presence of immigration violators, including immigrants with outstanding orders of deportation or removal, among the day-laborers at Kennedy Park.
75. The DPD communication to ICE was non-specific and based on group stereotypes. The communication targeted the day-laborers on the basis of their race, ethnicity, and perceived national origin, while providing no identifying information about any individuals who might have been in violation of federal law.
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76. Furthermore, upon information and belief, Detective Fisher submitted the tip to retaliate against the day-laborers for gathering in public to express their availability to work and to communicate with potential employers.
77. Although Mayor Boughton and the DPD under the leadership of Chief Baker have repeatedly alleged, in letters to state officials and to the media, that immigration law violators are present at Kennedy Park, they have no basis for these allegations other than racial and ethnic stereotype and perceived national origin. Mayor Boughton and the DPD have made these allegations to further their campaign to drive the day-laborers from Kennedy Park and to instill fear in the rest of Danbury's immigrant population.
78. On or about September 18, 2006, Detective Fisher and the HARFOT Officers agreed that the operation would take place on September 19, 2006.
79. Defendant Weston was advised and knew about the planned operation in advance. 80. Defendant Weston also directed, authorized, approved, and/or acquiesced to the sting operation. 81. On or about September 18, 2006, Detective Fisher informed others, including but not limited to Captain Weston and DPD Officers DeJesus, Martin, and Norkus of the planned operation. Detective Fisher personally requested the assistance of DPD Officers DeJesus, Martin, and Norkus, who agreed to work extended shifts of duty on September 19, 2006. 82. Defendants DeJesus, Martin, and Norkus were fully aware of the purpose of the operation, knowingly and willingly agreed to assist, intentionally targeted the day-laborers for arrest based on their race, ethnicity, and/or perceived national origin, and intended to retaliate against the day-laborers for their peaceable expressive activities in Kennedy Park.
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83. Detective Fisher or another of the DPD Officers arranged for the use of an undercover vehicle on September 19, 2006.
84. One of the Defendant DPD Officers dressed in clothing so as to resemble the sort of contractor or employer who typically hired day-laborers at Kennedy Park.
85. The DPD Officers and the HARFOT Officers met in Danbury in the early morning of September 19, 2006 to review final plans for the sting operation.
86. Defendant Weston knew or should have known that the DPD Officers had no authority to make civil immigration arrests. He knew or should have known that the DPD Officers would need to make difficult choices in questioning, detaining, and/or arresting day laborers for alleged federal immigration violations, and further, that proper supervision and training would make those choices less difficult.
87. Defendant Weston also knew or should have known that the DPD Officers were likely to commit constitutional violations in questioning, detaining, and/or arresting individual day-laborers without proper supervision or training.
88. Upon information and belief, although he was aware of a potentially serious problem of unconstitutional conduct by DPD Officers, and of the serious need for corrective action and supervision, Police Chief Baker failed to inform himself about or approve and otherwise adequately supervise the sting operation as required by DPD internal policies and procedures.
89. Chief Baker and Captain Weston failed to do so despite the importance of such procedures to protecting the rights of arrestees, their knowledge that local immigration enforcement is preempted under federal law, and their awareness of the DPD Officers' goals of suppressing the protected speech of the day-laborers, of singling out the day-laborers for
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harassment on the basis of race, ethnicity, and perceived national origin, and of ultimately driving the Kennedy Park day-laborers from Danbury.
90. The DPD Officers' misconduct was so manifest as to imply the constructive acquiescence of Police Chief Baker in his capacity as supervisor and policymaking official for the City of Danbury.
Planning the Sting Operation-- ICE Defendants 91. Pursuant to Mayor Boughton and the DPD's goal of ridding Danbury of its new Latino and Ecuadorian immigrants, HARFOT Officers willfully and knowingly agreed to assist the DPD in an operation to arrest day-laborers at Kennedy Park. The HARFOT Officers were aware of the DPD Officers' discriminatory intent in undertaking the operation. 92. Before September 19, 2006, the HARFOT Officers did not identify any particular suspected immigration violators among the Kennedy Park day-laborers. The HARFOT Officers did not obtain any administrative or criminal arrest warrants in advance of the September 19th operation. 93. The HARFOT Officers were aware that the DPD Officers' tip contained no identifying information about any individuals who might have been in violation of federal law and that the DPD Officers provided it to them on a racially discriminatory basis. 94. Moreover, in participating in the sting operation, the HARFOT Officers themselves proceeded on the basis of racial and ethnic stereotype and perceived national origin, and without any identifying information about any individuals who might have been in violation of federal law. 95. The HARFORT Officers were members of a Fugitive Operations Team (FOT), whose congressional mandate is to identify, locate, apprehend, and remove dangerous fugitive aliens
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from the United States, with the highest priority placed on those fugitives who have been convicted of crimes.
96. In 2006, there were fewer than seventy-five working FOTs operating in the United States. FOTs typically consist of seven members: a Supervisory Deportation Officer (SDO), an Immigration Enforcement Agent (IEA), a Deportation Assistant, and four Deportation Officers (DOs). The SDO is responsible for planning fugitive operations, which are carried out by the SDO and the DOs, with support from other team members.
97. Since at least early 2006, FOTs have come under increasing public criticism for a pattern of widespread constitutional violations. Over the past three years, FOTs have conducted warrantless home invasions, engaged in racial profiling, conducted coercive questioning, stopped and questioned subjects without reasonable suspicion, detained individuals without probable cause, denied detained subjects access to counsel and prohibited them from using the phone in states such as Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington.
98. The FOTs' frequent constitutional violations in the course of operations have become such a widespread problem that Congress has held hearings on the issue. Nongovernmental organizations investigating the problem have revealed widespread constitutional violations ranging from due process violations, illegal entry of homes without warrants, and denying subjects access to counsel and phone calls once detained.
99. The FOT training program was woefully inadequate to prevent officers from engaging in frequent and egregious constitutional violations during their operations. The training program consists of a one-time three-week class for new FOT members, which focuses on
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teaching agents how to prepare and review fugitive case files, locate fugitives through computer databases, use confidential informants, conduct surveillance, and plan operations.
100. Much of the training is designed to show participants how to use the FOT fugitive database system and perform other administrative tasks. It does not sufficiently instruct agents in how to make arrests without violating constitutional rights.
101. Although it is purportedly mandatory, many FOT members never attend this training. Even those who may work for up to two years on an FOT before they attend this training. ICE provides no national in-service training at any time to inform agents of new legal developments or ensure their understanding of lawful enforcement tactics. Inadequate training places FOT members at heightened risk of engaging in unconstitutional actions.
102. Furthermore, ICE has no specific training program that provides instruction for FOT members about working with "partnering" cities such as Danbury, even though city police officers often participate in FOT activities alongside FOT members.
103. Nor does ICE have a specific training program that provides instruction for FOT members about how to perform "sting" or undercover operations without violating arrestees' constitutional rights.
104. Upon information and belief, Defendants Sullivan, Martin, and Chadbourne knowingly failed to implement an adequate training program for the HARFOT Defendants on how to question, detain, and make the arrests of individuals without violating their constitutional rights.
105. Defendants Sullivan, Martin, and Chadbourne knew or should have known that the HARFOT Defendants would engage in questioning, detain individuals, and make arrests; that such questioning, detention, and arrests call for agents to make difficult choices that call for
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special training to avoid serious and unconstitutional misconduct; that the FOT training provided to the HARFOT Defendants before September 19, 2006 was inadequate; that FOT teams had a long and known history of engaging in unconstitutional questioning, detention, and arrests; and that the HARFOT Defendants were likely to commit egregious constitutional violations in mishandled questioning, detention, and arrests. Defendants' failure to create an adequate training or supervision program caused Plaintiffs' injuries.
106. Defendants Sullivan, Martin, and Chadbourne were also grossly negligent in their supervision and training of their ICE agent subordinates. They knew or should have known that there was a high degree of risk that their subordinates would violate individuals' constitutional rights in the course of their questioning, detention, and arrests, and yet they consciously or recklessly disregarded that risk by failing to take any corrective actions.
107. Furthermore, the Hartford FOT had conducted numerous immigration enforcement operations or actions in and around Danbury prior to September 19, 2006.
108. Some of the Hartford FOT operations or actions in Danbury prior to September 19, 2006 had been based on information provided by the DPD.
109. In all Hartford FOT operations or actions in Danbury prior to September 19, 2006, whether based on DPD information or otherwise, the Hartford FOT had targeted a specific individual or individuals, at a specific location or locations.
110. In addition, ICE regional and national public affairs officials regularly collect and circulate throughout the agency news clippings regarding immigration matters, including reports from local media sources. These agency distributions are known as "ICE Clips."
111. Defendants Sullivan, Martin, and Chadbourne regularly receive distributions of ICE Clips.
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112. Defendants Sullivan, Martin, and Chadbourne knew or should of known of the anti-immigrant campaign and activities of Mayor Boughton and the City of Danbury before September 19, 2006, based on the inclusion of media accounts of these activities in ICE Clips, prior Hartford FOT operations or actions in Danbury, the absence of specific targets for the September 19, 2006 operation or action, and other sources.
113. As the supervisors of an FOT unit that had an extensive history with Danbury, Defendants Sullivan, Martin, and Chadbourne knew or should have known that that there was a high degree of risk that the Danbury operation or action was discriminatory and non-specific, and that one or more of the HARFOT Defendants would violate the constitutional rights of the arrestees by participating in it. However, Defendants Sullivan, Martin, and Chadbourne either deliberately or recklessly disregarded that risk by failing to take any actions to supervise the operation, and that failure caused Plaintiffs' constitutional injuries.
The Arrests 114. On the morning of September 19, 2006, each of the Plaintiffs Barrera, Cabrera, Chavez, Llibisupa, Maldonado, Redrovan, Sanchez, and Simbaña went to Kennedy Park to find work for the day. 115. Some time early that morning, each of the Plaintiffs saw a vehicle drive up to the park. Each of the Plaintiffs approached the vehicle, and the driver offered each of them work for the day demolishing a fence. The driver did not appear to be looking for any specific individuals. 116. In fact, the vehicle approached by each Day-Laborer Plaintiff was driven by one of the DPD Officers, and the offer of work demolishing a fence was a ruse. 117. Each Day-Laborer Plaintiff reasonably relied on the misrepresentation of the offer of work and entered the vehicle.
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118. The vehicle made three trips to Kennedy Park that morning, picking up three to five workers each time.
119. On each of the three trips from Kennedy Park, the vehicle drove several blocks to a fenced-in lot behind an office building on Main Street in Danbury. The vehicle stopped in the corner of the parking lot behind the building, which is surrounded by a tall chain link fence and closed off on the fourth side by the building.
120. The undercover DPD officer driving the vehicle did not ask any questions of any of the Plaintiffs during the drive from Kennedy Park to the parking lot.
121. Both DPD Officers and HARFOT Officers were present in the parking lot when each of the Plaintiffs arrived.
122. When each Day-Laborer Plaintiff exited the vehicle, the DPD Officers and/or HARFOT Officers, who were waiting in the lot, immediately surrounded each man, some officers with weapons drawn, and roughly seized each Day-Laborer Plaintiff. Some of the arresting officers had apparently been hiding in or around several vehicles that were parked in the corner of the parking lot.
123. Upon seizing each Day-Laborer Plaintiff, the DPD Officers and/or HARFOT officers then physically detained each Day-Laborer Plaintiff and told him that he was under arrest. The DPD Officers and/or HARFOT officers handcuffed each Day-Laborer Plaintiff, placed him in a white van that was parked in the lot, and closed the door to the van.
124. Those Plaintiffs who arrived first were instructed to watch while the same thing happened to subsequent day-laborers. A total of eleven day-laborers were arrested and placed in the van.
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125. The DPD Officers arrested the Plaintiffs at approximately 7:00 am on September 19, 2006.
126. In the alternative, Plaintiffs allege that HARFOT Officers arrested the Plaintiffs at some point on the morning of September 19, 2006.
127. After being arrested in the parking lot, some of the Plaintiffs wanted to call a family member or a lawyer and asked to make a phone call. The arresting officers refused to let any of the Plaintiffs make such a call and confiscated the cell phones of those Plaintiffs who had them.
128. Only after the Plaintiffs had been physically restrained, put under arrest by the DPD Officers and/or HARFOT Officers, and told that they could not call anyone, did law enforcement agents question the Plaintiffs about their identity, nationality, the place and manner of their entry into the United States, and their immigration status.
129. While the Plaintiffs were detained in the parking lot, a DPD officer of Hispanic appearance, and who spoke Spanish well, told Plaintiff Barrera in Spanish that he had been arrested because he was standing in Kennedy Park, after the DPD had previously warned laborers not to stand there. Upon information and belief, this individual was Defendant José Agosto.
130. None of the Plaintiffs had been previously warned, cited, or ticketed for standing in Kennedy Park or interfering with traffic in the area of Kennedy Park, and none had any record of causing any "safety issues" in Kennedy Park, whether related to traffic or otherwise.
131. None of the Plaintiffs had an outstanding deportation or removal order, and no immigration warrants had been issued for any of them before their arrests on September 19, 2006.
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132. The DPD Officers and/or HARFOT Officers then transported the Plaintiffs from the parking lot to the Danbury Police Station, where DPD officers fingerprinted and questioned them and entered their booking records into the DPD's files.
133. While at the Danbury Police Station, Plaintiff Chavez saw a DPD officer that he recognized to be José Agosto. Officer Agosto told Plaintiff Chavez in Spanish that he had been arrested because they had been standing at Kennedy Park, even though the DPD had previously warned the day-laborers not to stand there.
134. Plaintiff Chavez had never been told by any police officer not to stand at or near Kennedy Park, nor had Plaintiff Chavez previously been warned, cited, or ticketed for interfering with traffic in the area of Kennedy Park.
135. At the Danbury Police Station, Plaintiff Barrera was also mockingly told by a Danbury police officer of Hispanic appearance, and who spoke Spanish well, that when he could, Plaintiff Barrera should call family in Ecuador and tell them to meet him at the airport in Quito, because that was the first place that Plaintiff Barrera would be released from custody. Upon information and belief, this individual was Defendant José Agosto.
136. According to DPD booking records, Danbury police arrested each Day-Laborer Plaintiff in the Danbury Executive Tower parking lot at 7:06 am on the charge of "Illegal Entry Into U.S."
137. The booking reports list the arresting officer to be Defendant and DPD Officer James Lalli.
138. No criminal charges have been filed against any of the Plaintiffs.
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139. Upon information and belief, Mayor Boughton was informed of the undercover operation and arrests no later than while they were occurring on the morning of September 19, 2006.
140. At no point that morning, or any point afterwards, did Mayor Boughton attempt to prevent the arrests of the Plaintiffs in spite of his knowledge that the sting operation was illegal and violated the Plaintiffs' civil rights.
141. Upon information and belief, Mayor Boughton allowed the arrests to take place pursuant to his administration's policy of promoting local civil immigration enforcement against Danbury's new Latino and Ecuadorian immigrants, targeting the City's Latino and Ecuadorian immigrants for discrimination, and retaliating against Latino and Ecuadorian day-laborers for their use of Kennedy Park to express their availability for work.
142. Mayor Boughton also allowed the arrests to occur out of total disregard for the constitutional interests of the arrestees.
143. Upon information and belief, Mayor Boughton took no disciplinary actions against the DPD Officers upon learning of the sting operation and the arrests of the Plaintiffs.
The Plaintiffs' Transfer to ICE Custody 144. After detaining each Day-Laborer Plaintiff in a holding cell or otherwise for approximately two hours at Danbury Police Headquarters, DPD officers transferred custody of the Plaintiffs to ICE at approximately 9:00 am. 145. The HARFOT Officers transported the Plaintiffs, handcuffed and shackled, to Hartford, Connecticut. 146. The ICE Agents responsible for accepting custody of the Plaintiffs were the HARFOT Officers, Defendants Brown, McCaffrey, and Preble.
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147. Defendant McCaffrey also served as examining officer for the Plaintiffs, though he knew or should have known that doing so violated federal immigration regulations.
148. As the examining officer, Defendant McCaffrey made the initial custody determination for each Day-Laborer Plaintiff.
149. This initial custody decision for each Day-Laborer Plaintiff was memorialized on ICE Form I-286, Notice of Initial Custody Determination.
150. The Form I-286 for each Day-Laborer Plaintiff was printed with the name "George Sullivan" and signed for Defendant Sullivan by Defendant McCaffrey.
151. None of the Plaintiffs was in a category of persons determined by Congress to be subject to mandatory immigration detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
152. For persons not subject to mandatory detention, the factors relevant to an initial custody determination are dangerousness and risk of flight.
153. None of the Plaintiffs was dangerous or a flight risk on September 19, 2006. 154. When Defendant McCaffrey made the initial custody determination for each DayLaborer Plaintiff on September 19 or 20, 2006, he had no evidence any one of the Plaintiffs was dangerous or a flight risk. 155. Nevertheless, Defendant McCaffrey declined to set bond for each Day-Laborer Plaintiff, despite the fact that none of the Plaintiffs was subject to mandatory detention or presented a flight risk or posed any danger to the community. 156. One of the HARFOT Defendants served the appropriate Form I-286 on each DayLaborer Plaintiff and asked that Plaintiff whether he requested a redetermination of the initial custody decision by an Immigration Judge.
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157. Each Day-Laborer Plaintiff stated that he did request a review by an Immigration Judge of ICE's initial custody determination, and that request was noted on each Form I-286.
158. However, ICE officials did not file or cause to be filed the Form I-286 with Plaintiff Barrera's request for bond redetermination with any Immigration Court until March 5, 2007, 167 days after his request for review.
159. ICE officials did not file or cause to be filed the Form I-286 with Plaintiff Chavez's request for bond redetermination with any Immigration Court until October 13, 2006, 24 days after his request for review.
160. 160. ICE officials did not file or cause to be filed the Form I-286 with Plaintiff Llibisupa's request for bond redetermination with any Immigration Court until March 5, 2007, 167 days after his request for review.
161. ICE officials did not file or cause to be filed the Form I-286 with Plaintiff Maldonado's request for bond redetermination with any Immigration Court until March 5, 2007, 167 days after his request for review.
162. ICE officials did not file or cause to be filed the Form I-286 with Plaintiff Simbaña's request for bond redetermination with any Immigration Court until March 5, 2007, 167 days after his request for review.
163. ICE officials did not file or cause to be filed the Form I-286 with Plaintiff Sanchez's request for bond redetermination with any Immigration Court until October 13, 2006, 24 days after his request for review.
164. ICE officials did not file or cause to be filed the Form I-286, with Plaintiff Cabrera's request for bond redetermination with any Immigration Court until October 19, 2006 30 days after his request for review.
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165. ICE officials did not file or cause to be filed the Form I-286, with Plaintiff Redrovan's request for bond redetermination with any Immigration Court until October 19, 2006, 30 days after his request for review.
166. Defendants Sullivan, Martin, and Chadbourne supervise HARFOT officers in their detention-related decisions, and are responsible for training HARFOT officers on how to make initial custody determinations and how to set appropriate bond.
167. Upon information and belief, Defendants Sullivan, Martin, and Chadbourne knowingly failed to implement an adequate training program for the HARFOT Defendants on how to make initial custody determinations, and how to set bond for detainees without violating their constitutional rights.
168. By failing to implement an adequate training or supervision program on custody and bond decisions for the HARFOT officers, Defendants Sullivan, Martin, and Chadbourne acted with deliberate indifference to the rights of Plaintiffs. They knew their agents would make custody and bond decisions; that such decisions call for agents to make difficult choices that call for special training; that the current training was inadequate; and that agents were likely to commit egregious constitutional violations in mishandled custody and bond decisions without proper supervision or training. Defendants' Sullivan, Martin, and Chadbourne's failure to create an adequate training or supervision program caused Plaintiffs' injuries.
169. Defendants Sullivan, Martin, and Chadbourne were also grossly negligent in their supervision and training of their ICE agent subordinates on custody and bond decisions. They knew or should have known that there was a high degree of risk that their subordinates would violate individuals' constitutional rights in the course of their custody and bond decisions, and yet they consciously or recklessly disregarded that risk by failing to take any corrective actions.
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170. As a result of Defendant McCaffrey's failure to set any bond for the Plaintiffs, even though there was no evidence that any of the Plaintiffs was dangerous or a flight risk or within a category of persons subject to mandatory detention, and of Defendants' failure to file or cause to be filed in Immigration Court the request of each Plaintiff for review of the ICE nobond decision by an Immigration Judge --along with Defendant Sullivan, Martin and Chadbourne's failure to remedy these constitutional violations--the Plaintiffs were unconstitutionally detained in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
171. Several of the Plaintiffs also suffered additional injuries, including a transfer to Texas, horrendous prison conditions, and higher bond payments, due to the actions of Defendants McCaffrey, Sullivan, Martin and Chadbourne. The Plaintiffs' Detention While in ICE Custody
172. After two nights in Hartford, ICE agents transferred Plaintiffs Barrera, Llibisupa, and Maldonado to the Suffolk County House of Corrections in Boston, Massachusetts. ICE agents transferred Plaintiffs Cabrera, Chavez, Redrovan, Sanchez, and Simbaña to Plymouth County Detention Center in Plymouth, Massachusetts.
173. Throughout the course of their detentions, ICE officials and prison officials at the Plaintiffs' respective facilities denied each of the Plaintiffs access to a telephone for periods ranging from several days to several weeks, despite the Plaintiffs' repeated requests to call family members or a lawyer.
174. Specifically, ICE officials denied Plaintiffs Barrera, Llibisupa, Maldonado, and Redrovan phone access while they were in custody in Hartford.
175. ICE officials allowed Plaintiffs Cabrera and Chavez to use a phone on their first day in Hartford, but the phone did not work.
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176. While in custody in Hartford, ICE officers instructed the Plaintiffs to sign a document written in English, which had not been translated or explained to them, and which they could not read. ICE officers took the men out of the room one at a time and individually intimidated them and pressured them into signing the document. ICE officers gave the men a number of different and wholly inadequate explanations for what the paper was.
177. Plaintiff Barrera did not understand what the document said. An officer who spoke some Spanish stated simply that he needed to sign it to be transferred.
178. Another officer told Plaintiff Chavez that he needed to sign the document in order to see a judge.
179. Plaintiff Maldonado similarly could not read the document, but the officers who addressed him angrily told him that he had to sign it anyway.
180. Officers informed Plaintiff Simbaña that, practically speaking, he already "signed" the document and terrorized him into actually doing so, leading him to believe that he needed to sign the document in order to see an Immigration Judge.
181. While the Plaintiffs were in custody in Massachusetts, an unknown law enforcement agent or agents questioned them as potential suspects or witnesses in a murder investigation. The agent told them that the victim had been murdered in Danbury by an Ecuadorian. During the interrogation, the agent did not offer Plaintiffs access to counsel, nor did he inform them of their Miranda rights, including their right to remain silent and to have counsel present during the interrogation. Instead, the agent promised them immigration benefits if they told him about the murder.
182. Also while in custody in Massachusetts, prison officials subjected each of the Plaintiffs to a medical examination and full-body search.
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183. Prison officials forced at least Plaintiffs Barrera, Llibisupa, Maldonado, Redrovan, and Simbaña to give blood samples without their consent as part of the medical examination.
184. Prison officials forced at least Plaintiffs Barrera, Maldonado, Redrovan, and Simbaña to give urine samples without their consent as part of the medical examination.
185. Suffolk County correctional guards held Plaintiff Barrera in isolation for five days-in a cell with neither a toilet nor a sink-as a result of his blood test. At no point did officers explain the reason for his confinement.
186. On October 2, 2006, Immigration Judge ("IJ") Matthew J. D'Angelo of the Immigration Court in Boston, Massachusetts held bond redetermination hearings for Plaintiffs Barrera, Llibisupa, and Maldonado. IJ D'Angelo found that Plaintiffs Barrera, Llibisupa, and Maldonado were neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community and set the statutory minimum bond of $1500 for each man.
187. Plaintiffs Barrera, Llibisupa, and Maldonado were released on $1500 bond on October 3, 2006. In total, they each spent approximately 15 days in ICE custody. The Remaining Plaintiffs' Transfer to and Detention in Texas
188. The Boston Immigration Court calendared bond redetermination hearings for Plaintiffs Chavez, Sanchez, and Simbaña for 1:00 pm on October 3, 2006.
189. On the morning of October 3, however, before their 1:00 pm bond hearings, ICE began the process of transferring Plaintiffs Chavez, Sanchez, and Simbaña, along with Plaintiffs Cabrera and Redrovan, to detention facilities in Texas. When the Immigration Judge in Boston attempted to call the bond cases for these Plaintiffs as scheduled at the 1:00 pm video-conference
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calendar on October 3, jail officials informed the Court that the Plaintiffs were not available for court because they were in transit to Texas.
190. On October 3, 2006, ICE flew Plaintiffs Cabrera, Chavez, Redrovan, Sanchez, and Simbaña, handcuffed and shackled, to Texas. ICE kept Plaintiffs in shackles for the entire journey to Texas-a period of nearly sixteen hours.
191. ICE briefly held Plaintiffs Cabrera, Chavez, Sanchez, and Simbaña at the Port Isabel Processing Center in Los Fresnos, Texas and then detained them at the Willacy Detention Center in Raymondville, Texas. ICE continued to hold Plaintiff Redrovan at the Port Isabel Processing Center.
192. While at the Willacy Detention Center, Plaintiffs Cabrera, Chavez, Sanchez, and Simbaña were subjected to horrendous detention conditions. The men endured extremely overcrowded and unsanitary conditions, and prison officials denied them adequate medical care and adequate amounts of food at regular intervals. At times, the detainees were forced to eat with their bare hands. Prison guards also frequently verbally insulted, taunted, and ridiculed the detainees.
193. Immigration Judge ("IJ") Eleazar Tovar of the Immigration Court in Harlingen, Texas held telephonic bond redetermination hearings on October 16, 2006 for Plaintiffs Cabrera, Chavez, Sanchez, and Simbaña. IJ Tovar found that the detainees were neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community and set bond.
194. IJ Peterson of the Immigration Court in Harlingen, Texas held a telephonic bond redetermination hearing for Plaintiff Redrovan. IJ Peterson found that Plaintiff Redrovan was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community and set bond.
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195. Plaintiff Cabrera was released on $8,000 bond on or around October 23, 2006. In total, Mr. Cabrera was detained in ICE custody for approximately 35 days.
196. Plaintiff Chavez was released on $10,000 bond on or around October 23, 2006. In total, Mr. Chavez was detained in ICE custody for approximately 35 days.
197. Plaintiff Redrovan was released on $15,000 bond on or around October 23, 2006. In total, Mr. Redrovan was detained in ICE custody for approximately 35 days.
198. Plaintiff Sanchez was released on $10,000 bond on or around October 20, 2006. In total, Mr. Sanchez was detained in ICE custody for approximately 32 days.
199. Plaintiff Simbaña was released on $10,000 bond on or around October 26, 2006. In total, Mr. Simbaña was detained in ICE custody for approximately 38 days. Effect on Plaintiffs and Day-Laborer Community at Large
200. Defendants' unlawful and retaliatory arrest and detention of the Plaintiffs and the restrictions Defendants placed on Plaintiffs' liberty caused Plaintiffs to suffer humiliation, emotional distress, physical pain, and monetary damages.
201. The Plaintiffs continue to fear that they, their families, or their acquaintances will be arbitrarily and unlawfully arrested by ICE, DPD, or both. Several of the Plaintiffs no longer gather in Kennedy Park for fear of harassment by ICE and DPD officers.
202. While sparking a great deal of political engagement and advocacy by the immigrant and Ecuadorian community in Danbury and across the State of Connecticut, the Plaintiffs' unlawful arrests have also created a climate of fear among day-laborers at Kennedy Park and among Latino, Ecuadorian, and immigrant residents in Danbury more generally. This climate persists to this day.
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203. Fewer day-laborers in general now assemble at Kennedy Park to seek work, fearing that they too will be arrested by ICE, DPD, or both, and those who do continue to gather there do so in part as a statement of their disagreement with the anti-immigrant tactics of Mayor Boughton and the DPD.
204. Latino, Ecuadorian, and immigrant residents in Danbury also remain fearful of harassment, detention, and arrest by ICE, DPD, or both.
CLAIMS RELATING TO ARREST OF DAY-LABORERS FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF:
Fourth Amendment and Article First, §§ 7, 9 of the Connecticut Constitution (42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Binette v. Sabo, 244 Conn. 23 (1998): Defendant DPD Officers)
205. The Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
206. Defendant DPD Officers José Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James Fisher, James Lalli, Julio Lopez, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, Luis Ramos and John Does 1-5 violated the Plaintiffs' rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article First, §§ 7 and 9 of the Connecticut Constitution by arresting them for alleged civil immigration violations without valid warrants and in the absence of exigent circumstances, any probable cause, or any reason to believe that the Plaintiffs were engaged in any unlawful activity, and by stopping, detaining, investigating, searching, and effecting seizures and/or arrests of the Plaintiffs in the absence of a reasonable, articulable suspicion of unlawful activity or probable cause.
207. As a result of Defendant DPD Officers' actions, the Plaintiffs suffered damages, including but not limited to violations of their Constitutional rights, loss of liberty, and emotional distress.
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SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF: Fourth Amendment and Article First, §§ 7, 9 of the Connecticut Constitution: Preemption
(42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Binette v. Sabo: Defendant DPD Officers) 208. The Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 209. Defendant DPD Officers José Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James Fisher, James Lalli, Julio Lopez, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, Luis Ramos, and John Does 1-5 violated the Plaintiffs' rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article First, §§ 7 and 9 of the Connecticut Constitution by intentionally and knowingly detaining and/or arresting the Plaintiffs on suspicion of civil immigration violations. The arrest and detention of the Plaintiffs was unlawful, wholly without authority, and in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article First, §§ 7 and 9 of the Connecticut Constitution because federal law preempts state or local police from civil immigration enforcement activity and expressly and implicitly deprives local law enforcement officials of the authority to make civil immigration arrests. The Defendant DPD Officers lacked any authority under federal law to make civil immigration arrests. 210. As a result of Defendant DPD Officers' actions, the Plaintiffs suffered damages, including but not limited to violations of their Constitutional rights, loss of liberty, and emotional distress.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF: Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and Article First, § 20 of the
Connecticut Constitution (42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Binette v. Sabo: Defendant DPD Officers) 211. The Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
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212. Defendant DPD Officers José Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James Fisher, James Lalli, Julio Lopez, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, Luis Ramos, and John Does 1-5 intentionally targeted the Plaintiffs for an immigration sting operation and arrested and detained them on the basis of their race, ethnicity, and perceived national origin in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article First, § 20 of the Connecticut Constitution.
213. In addition, Defendant DPD Officers subjected the Plaintiffs to selective law enforcement on the basis of their race, ethnicity, and perceived national origin in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article First, § 20 of the Connecticut Constitution.
214. Defendant DPD Officers also subjected the Plaintiffs to selective law enforcement out of a malicious and bad faith intent to drive them out of the City of Danbury in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article First, § 20 of the Connecticut Constitution.
215. As a result of Defendant DPD Officers' actions, the Plaintiffs suffered damages, including but not limited to violations of their Constitutional rights, loss of liberty, and emotional distress.
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF First Amendment and Article First, §§ 4, 14 of the Connecticut Constitution
(Suppression of and Retaliation for Protected Speech) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Binette v. Sabo: Defendant DPD Officers) 216. The Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 217. Defendant DPD Officers José Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James Fisher, James Lalli, Julio Lopez, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, Luis Ramos, and John Does 1-5 knowingly and
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intentionally stopped, detained, investigated, and arrested the Plaintiffs in retaliation for their exercise of protected speech and association in a public forum, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article First, §§ 4 and 14 of the Connecticut Constitution.
218. Defendant DPD Officers had no probable cause to stop, detain, investigate, or arrest the Plaintiffs and had no reason to believe that they were in violation of any immigration laws. The DPD does not have the legal authority to make arrests solely for violations of federal civil immigration law.
219. As a result of Defendant DPD Officers' actions, the Plaintiffs suffered damages, including but not limited to violations of their Constitutional rights, loss of liberty, and emotional distress.
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: Due Process Rights Under the Fourteenth Amendment and Article First, § 8 of the
Connecticut Constitution (42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Binette v. Sabo: Defendants DPD Officers) 220. The Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 221. Defendant DPD Officers José Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James Fisher, James Lalli, Julio Lopez, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, Luis Ramos, and John Does 1-5 civilly arrested the Plaintiffs and deprived them of their of their liberty in a manner that was without due process of law and fundamentally unfair in the totality of its circumstances, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article First, § 8 of the Connecticut Constitution.
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222. As a result of Defendant DPD Officers' actions, the Plaintiffs suffered damages, including but not limited to violations of their Constitutional rights, loss of liberty, and emotional distress.
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Conspiracy
(42 U.S.C. § 1983: Defendant DPD Officers and HARFOT Officers) 223. The Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 224. Defendant DPD Officers and HARFOT Officers entered into an agreement, between and amongst themselves, to act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury on the Plaintiffs. Specifically, one or more Defendant DPD Officers spoke by telephone with one or more Defendant HARFOT Officers during the week or weeks prior to the September 19, 2006 arrests to plan the operation. Furthermore, Defendant DPD Officers met with Defendant HARFOT Officers in the early morning of September 19, 2006 for the purpose of planning the operation. The conspiracy included, but may not have been limited to, an agreement to arrest and detain Plaintiffs in violation of their rights under the United States and Connecticut Constitutions. 225. Defendant DPD Officers and Defendant HARFOT Officers performed several overt acts in furtherance of this conspiracy, including but not limited to posing as a contractor in order to lure Plaintiffs in a vehicle, arresting Plaintiffs, and detaining Plaintiffs in violation of their rights under the U.S. and Connecticut Constitutions. 226. Defendant DPD Officers played a significant role in the conspiracy and in the overt acts taken in furtherance thereof.
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227. As a result of the conspiracy between and among the Defendant DPD Officers and the Defendant HARFOT Officers and the overt actions taken in furtherance thereof, the Plaintiffs suffered damages, including but not limited to violations of their Constitutional rights, loss of liberty, and emotional distress.
SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Conspiracy
(42 U.S.C. § 1985(3): Defendant DPD Officers and HARFOT Officers) 228. The Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 229. Defendant DPD Officers and Defendant HARFOT Officers entered into an agreement to act in concert for the purpose of depriving the Plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws. Specifically, one or more Defendant DPD Officers spoke by telephone with one or more Defendant HARFOT Officers during the week or weeks prior to the September 19, 2006 arrests to plan the operation. Further, Defendant DPD Officers met with Defendant HARFOT Officers in the early morning of September 19, 2006 for the purpose of planning the operation. The conspiracy included, but may not have been limited to, an agreement to arrest and detain Plaintiffs in violation of their right to equal protection of the law. 230. Defendant DPD Officers and Defendant HARFOT Officers performed several overt acts in furtherance of this conspiracy, including but not limited to posing as a contractor in order to lure Plaintiffs in a vehicle, arresting Plaintiffs, and detaining Plaintiffs in violation of their right to equal protection of the law. 231. Plaintiffs are Latino men and alleged by ICE to be citizens of Ecuador. The conspiracy between and among the Defendant DPD Officers and the Defendant HARFOT
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Officers and the overt actions taken in furtherance thereof were motivated by a discriminatory animus against Plaintiffs based on their race, ethnicity, and/or perceived national origin.
232. As a result of the conspiracy between and among the Defendant DPD Officers and the Defendant HARFOT Officers and the overt actions taken in furtherance thereof, the Plaintiffs suffered damages, including but not limited to violations of their Constitutional rights, loss of liberty, and emotional distress.
EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Personal Supervisory Liability (42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Binette v. Sabo: Defendants Boughton, Baker, Weston, and
Fisher) 233. The Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 234. Defendants Boughton, Baker, Weston, and Fisher are liable in their individual capacities as the supervisors of Defendant DPD Officers for the violations of the Plaintiffs' rights described in Claims 1-7. 235. Defendants Boughton, Baker, Weston, and Fisher were personally involved in and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Plaintiffs' rights by knowingly and intentionally creating, implementing, enforcing, encouraging, sanctioning, and/or acquiescing in a policy, practice, and/or custom in which local police engaged in the unconstitutional conduct described in Claims 1-7. 236. Defendant Boughton, the Mayor of Danbury, is responsible for promulgating, implementing, and administering the policies, practices, and/or customs of the City of Danbury and for supervising and administering all City Departments. He was directly involved in the promulgation, implementation, and administration of the policy, practice, and/or custom that
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proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Plaintiffs' rights described in Claims 17.
237. Defendant Boughton was personally involved in and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Plaintiffs' rights described in Claims 1-7 because he failed to remedy these violations. Specifically, Defendant Boughton failed to act on information provided to him no later than on the morning of the Plaintiffs' arrests that alerted him to these violations before they occurred or while they were occurring. Upon learning of the violations, Defendant Boughton made no attempt to stop the violations from occurring, to minimize the harm that resulted from any violations that had already occurred, or to punish, sanction, or discipline the DPD Officers who committed the violations described in Claims 1-7.
238. Defendant Boughton was personally involved in and proximately caused the violations of the Plaintiffs' rights through his deliberate indifference to the rights of the Plaintiffs and his grossly negligent supervision of his subordinates, including but not limited to Defendant Baker and Defendant Fisher, who proximately caused the aforementioned violations described in Claims 1-7. Defendant Boughton's gross negligence in supervising Defendants Baker, Weston, and Fisher permitted them to promulgate, implement, and administer the aforementioned policies, practices, and customs which proximately caused the violations of the Plaintiff DayLaborers' rights described in Claims 1-7 and to plan and carry out the sting operation which resulted in those violations.
239. Defendant Baker, the Chief of Police for Danbury, is responsible for promulgating, implementing, and administering the policies, practices, and/or customs of the DPD, and for supervising all DPD officers in the commission of their duties. He was directly
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involved in the promulgation, implementation, and administration of the policy, practice, and/or custom that proximately caused the violations of the Plaintiffs' rights described in Claims 1-7.
240. Defendant Baker was personally involved in and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Plaintiffs' rights through his deliberate indifference to the rights of the Plaintiffs and his grossly negligent supervision of his subordinates, including but not limited to Defendants Weston and Fisher, who proximately caused the aforementioned violations described in Claims 1-7. Defendant Baker's gross negligence in supervising Defendants Weston and Fisher permitted Defendants Weston and Fisher to promulgate, implement, and administer the aforementioned policies, practices, and customs which proximately caused the violations of the Plaintiff Day-Laborers' rights, and for Defendant Fisher to plan and carry out the sting operation which resulted in those violations.
241. Defendant Weston, the supervisor the Danbury Police Detective Bureau, was directly involved in and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Plaintiffs' rights through his beforehand knowledge of the undercover sting operation, and/or through directing, authorizing, approving, and/or acquiescing in the unlawful arrests described in Claims 1-7. Defendant Weston knew of all relevant facts that made the actions of the DPD Officers unlawful.
242. Defendant Weston was at all relevant times responsible for promulgating, implementing, and administering the policies, practices, and/or customs of the Detective Bureau, and for supervising all DPD detectives in the commission of their duties. He was directly involved in the promulgation, implementation, and administration of the policy, practice, and/or custom that proximately caused the violations of the Plaintiffs' rights described in Claims 1-7.
243. Defendant Weston was also personally involved in and proximately caused the aforementioned violations through his deliberate indifference to the rights of the Plaintiffs. He
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knew to a moral certainty that his subordinates would need to make difficult choices in arresting day laborers with the assistance of ICE; he knew that proper supervision and training would make those choices less difficult, and he knew his subordinates were likely to commit constitutional violations without that supervision or training.
244. Defendant Weston was also personally involved in and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Plaintiffs' rights through his grossly negligent supervision of his subordinates, including but not limited to Defendant Fisher, who proximately caused the aforementioned violations described in Claims 1-7. Defendant Weston's gross negligence in supervising Defendant Fisher permitted Defendant Fisher to promulgate, implement, and administer the aforementioned policies, practices, and customs which proximately caused the violations of the Plaintiff Day-Laborers' rights, and to plan and carry out the sting operation which resulted in those violations.
245. Defendant Fisher was directly involved in and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Plaintiffs' rights by participating in the violations, and/or by ordering or instructing the other DPD Officers to commit the unlawful arrests described in Claims 1-7. Defendant Fisher knew of all relevant facts that made the actions of the DPD Officers unlawful.
246. Defendant Fisher, the head of the DPD's SID, is responsible for promulgating, implementing, and administering the policies, practices, and/or customs of the SID, and for supervising all other SID officers in the commission of their duties. He was directly involved in the promulgation, implementation, and administration of the policy, practice, and/or custom that proximately caused the violations of the Plaintiffs' rights described in Claims 1-7.
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247. Defendant Fisher was personally involved in and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of the Plaintiffs' rights through his deliberate indifference to the rights of the Plaintiffs and his grossly negligent supervision of his subordinate DPD Officers who committed the violations of the Plaintiffs' constitutional rights described in Claims 1-7. Defendant Fisher knew or should have known of the DPD's policy, practice, or custom of making civil immigration arrests without probable cause, and failed to act to prevent the violations of the Plaintiffs' rights from occurring.
248. As a result of Defendants Boughton, Baker, Fisher, and Weston's acts and/or omissions, the Plaintiffs suffered damages, including but not limited to violations of their Constitutional rights, loss of liberty, and emotional distress.
NINTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Municipal Liability
(42 U.S.C. § 1983: Defendant City of Danbury) 249. The Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 250. The City of Danbury is liable pursuant to Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), for the promulgation and execution of municipal policy and/or custom by Defendants Boughton, Baker, Weston, and Fisher prior to and during the arrest of the Plaintiffs on September 19, 2006. 251. As individual policymakers who have been vested with final policymaking authority by municipal and state law, Defendants Boughton, Baker, Weston, and Fisher’s acts and edicts resulted in policies and/or customs exhibiting deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of persons in the City of Danbury and occasioned the aforementioned violation of the Day-Laborers Plaintiffs' rights described in Claims 1-7.
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252. In addition, in their capacities as official policymakers, Defendants Boughton, Baker, Weston, and Fisher were alerted to a potentially serious problem of unconstitutional conduct by Danbury Police Officers described in Claims 1-7. In spite of an obvious need for supervision and/or corrective action, Defendants Boughton, Baker, Fisher, and Weston failed to supervise their subordinates and/or investigate or rectify the situation, evidencing deliberate indifference to the Plaintiffs' constitutional rights and conspiracies between local police and ICE to violate them, thereby rendering the City of Danbury liable.
253. The unconstitutional conduct of Danbury Police Officers described in Claims 1-7 was so manifest as to imply the constructive acquiescence of Defendants Boughton, Baker, Weston, and Fisher in their capacities as policymaking officials, thus rendering the City of Danbury liable.
254. All of the Danbury Defendants-including Officers Agosto, DeJesus, Lalli, Lopez, Martin, Norkus, Ramos, John Does 1-5, and Defendants Baker, Boughton, Weston, and Fisherwere, at the time of the incidents in question, employees of the City of Danbury.
TENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF False Arrest and False Imprisonment
(Defendant DPD Officers) 255. The Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 256. Defendant DPD Officers José Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James Fisher, James Lalli, Julio Lopez, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, Luis Ramos, and John Does 1-5 knowingly and intentionally arrested, detained, and imprisoned the Plaintiffs without a warrant and without probable cause, in retaliation for protected speech, based on impermissible racial, ethnic, and national origin discrimination, and in a manner preempted by federal law.
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257. The Plaintiffs were forcibly restrained and subsequently imprisoned by the Danbury Defendants and suffered damages as a result of the Danbury Defendants' actions.
258. The Defendant DPD Officers' actions constitute false arrest and false imprisonment under Connecticut common law.
ELEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
(Defendant DPD Officers) 259. The Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 260. Defendant DPD Officers José Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James Fisher, James Lalli, Julio Lopez, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, Luis Ramos, and John Does 1-5 intended to inflict emotional distress upon the Plaintiffs by deceiving, arresting, detaining, and imprisoning them, or should have known that their conduct was likely to cause Plaintiffs' emotional distress. The Danbury Defendants' conduct was clearly extreme and outrageous, given the circumstances surrounding the arrests. 261. The emotional distress of the Plaintiffs was caused by the Danbury Defendants' conduct and was severe. 262. The Defendant DPD Officers' actions constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress under Connecticut common law.
TWELFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (Defendant DPD Officers, Defendant Baker, Defendant Weston, and
the City of Danbury) 263. The Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
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264. Defendant DPD Officers José Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James Fisher, James Lalli, Julio Lopez, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, Luis Ramos, and John Does 1-5 created an unreasonable risk of causing the Plaintiffs emotional distress. It was clearly foreseeable that the Defendant DPD Officers' conduct would cause the Plaintiffs emotional distress.
265. Defendant DPD Officers knew that their failure to act would likely subject a group of identifiable persons to imminent harm, namely, the Latino and immigrant day-laborers gathered in Kennedy Park.
266. Moreover, Defendants Baker and Weston negligently failed to supervise Defendant DPD Officers as they executed the Plaintiffs' unlawful arrest and detention.
267. The emotional distress of the Plaintiffs was caused by the Defendant DPD Officers' conduct and was severe enough that it might result in illness or bodily harm.
268. The Defendant DPD Officers' actions constitute negligent infliction of emotional distress under Connecticut common law.
269. Pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 7-465(a) and 7-101a, the City of Danbury is required to indemnify its employees "for all sums which such employee becomes obligated to pay by reason of the liability imposed upon such employee by law for damages awarded for . . . physical damages to person or property." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-465(a).
270. All of the Plaintiffs have satisfied the notice requirement of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7465(a).
271. The actions of the DPD officers, Chief Baker, and Captain Weston in subjecting the Plaintiffs to be free from negligent false arrest and false imprisonment were not wanton or willful.
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272. Pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-557n(a)(A), the City of Danbury is also directly liable for the "negligent acts or omissions of such political subdivision or any employee, officer or agent thereof acting within the scope of his employment or official duties."
273. At all times relevant to this Complaint, the Danbury employees-including Officers Agosto, DeJesus, Fiser, Lalli, Lopez, Martin, Norkus, Ramos, John Does 1-5, Chief Baker, and Captain Weston-were employees of the City of Danbury and acting within the scope of their employment and/or their official duties as employees of the City of Danbury.
274. In all times relevant to this complaint, the Plaintiffs were the identifiable and/or foreseeable victims of the Danbury employees' actions.
THIRTEENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Fourth Amendment
(Bivens: ICE Defendants) 275. The Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 276. Defendant HARFOT Officers James Brown, Richard McCaffrey, Ronald Preble, and John Does 6-11 stopped, detained, investigated, searched, seized and/or arrested the Plaintiffs intentionally and knowingly and without probable cause and/or reasonable suspicion, in violation of the Plaintiffs' right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 277. As a result of Defendant HARFOT Officers' actions, the Plaintiffs suffered damages, including but not limited to violations of their Constitutional rights, loss of liberty, and emotional distress.
FOURTEENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: Fifth Amendment Equal Protection (Bivens: ICE Defendants)
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278. The Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
279. Defendant HARFOT Officers James Brown, Richard McCaffrey, Ronald Preble, and John Does 6-11 stopped, detained, investigated, searched, seized and/or arrested the Plaintiffs knowingly and intentionally on the basis of the Plaintiffs' race, ethnicity, and perceived national origin in violation of their right to Equal Protection under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
280. In addition, Defendant HARFOT Officers subjected the Plaintiffs to selective law enforcement on the basis of their race, ethnicity, and perceived national origin in violation of their right to Equal Protection under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
281. Defendant HARFOT Officers also subjected the Plaintiffs to selective law enforcement out of a malicious and bad faith intent to drive them out of the City of Danbury in violation of their right to Equal Protection under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
282. As a result of Defendant HARFOT Officers' actions, the Plaintiffs suffered damages, including but not limited to violations of their Constitutional rights, loss of liberty, and emotional distress.
FIFTHTEENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Fifth Amendment Due Process (Bivens: ICE Defendants)
283. The Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
284. Defendant HARFOT Officers James Brown, Richard McCaffrey, Ronald Preble, and John Does 6-11 civilly arrested and deprived Plaintiffs of their liberty in a manner that was
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without due process of law and was fundamentally unfair in the totality of the circumstances, in violation of the Plaintiffs' rights under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
285. Defendant HARFOT Officer Richard McCaffrey made the initial custody determination for each of the Plaintiffs, memorialized on the ICE Form I-286 for each Plaintiff, thus failing to provide Plaintiffs with a neutral arbitrator as required by law, in violation of their rights to due process under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
286. Defendant HARFOT Officer Richard McCaffrey detained Plaintiffs without bond without any special justification to do so, in violation of their rights to due process under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
287. Defendant HARFOT Officer Richard McCaffrey or another ICE official failed to file or cause to be filed the request of each Day-Laborer Plaintiff for an Immigration Judge to review their detention without bond for periods of 24 to 167 days, in violation of their rights to due process under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
288. As a result of Defendant HARFOT Officers' actions, the Plaintiffs suffered damages, including but not limited to violations of their Constitutional rights, loss of liberty, and emotional distress.
SIXTEENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Conspiracy
(Bivens: Defendant HARFOT Officers and DPD Officers) 289. The Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 290. Defendant HARFOT Officers and DPD Officers entered into an agreement, between and amongst themselves, to act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury on the Plaintiffs. Specifically, one or more Defendant HARFOT Officers spoke by telephone with one
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or more Defendant DPD Officers during the week or weeks prior to the September 19, 2006 arrests to plan the operation. Further, Defendant HARFOT Officers met with Defendant DPD Officers in the early morning of September 19, 2006 for the purpose of planning the operation. The conspiracy included, but may not have been limited to, an agreement to arrest and detain Plaintiffs in violation of their various rights under the United States and Connecticut Constitutions.
291. Defendant HARFOT Officers and Defendant DPD Officers performed several overt acts in furtherance of this conspiracy, including but not limited to posing as a contractor in order to lure Plaintiffs in a vehicle, arresting Plaintiffs, and detaining Plaintiffs, in violation of their rights under the United States and Connecticut Constitutions and common law.
292. Defendant HARFOT Officers played a significant role in the conspiracy and in the overt acts taken in furtherance thereof.
293. As a result of the conspiracy between and among the Defendant HARFOT Officers and the Defendant DPD Officers and the overt actions taken in furtherance thereof, the Plaintiffs suffered damages, including but not limited to violations of their Constitutional rights, loss of liberty, and emotional distress.
SEVENTEENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Personal Supervisory Liability
(Bivens: Defendants Sullivan, Martin, and Chadbourne) 294. The Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 295. Defendants Sullivan, Martin, and Chadbourne are liable in their individual capacities as the supervisors of Defendant HARFOT Officers James Brown, Richard McCaffrey,
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Ronald Preble, and John Does 6-11 for the violations of the Plaintiffs' rights described in Claims 13-16.
296. Defendants Sullivan, Martin and Chadbourne were personally involved in and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of Plaintiffs' rights by knowingly and intentionally creating, implementing, enforcing, encouraging, sanctioning, and/or acquiescing in a policy, practice, and/or custom, in which Defendant HARFOT Officers engaged in violations of Day-Laborers Plaintiffs' constitutional rights.
297. Defendants Sullivan, Martin, and Chadbourne were deliberately indifferent to the rights of Plaintiffs because they knew to a moral certainty that their ICE agent subordinates would engage in questioning, detention, and arrests and make initial custody determinations for those arrested; that such questioning, detention, arrest and initial custody determinations call for agents to make difficult choices that call for special training; that the current FOT training was inadequate; that ICE had a long and known history of mishandling these decisions; and that their agents were likely to commit egregious constitutional violations in the absence of closer supervision and improved training.
298. In the alternative, Defendants Sullivan, Martin, and Chadbourne were grossly negligent in their supervision and training of their ICE agent subordinates. They knew or should have known that there was a high degree of risk that their subordinates would violate individuals' constitutional rights in the course of both their arrests and their bond decisions, and yet they consciously or recklessly disregarded that risk by failing to take any corrective actions.
299. Defendants Sullivan, Martin, and Chadbourne were also grossly negligent in regards to the Danbury operation in particular. As the supervisors of an FOT unit that had an extensive history of enforcement operations and actions within Danbury, and the recipients of
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regular ICE media briefings on the anti-immigrant campaigns of Defendant Boughton and the City of Danbury, Defendants Sullivan, Martin, and Chadbourne knew or should have known that that there was a high degree of risk that the September 19, 2006 Danbury operation or action was discriminatory and non-specific, and that one of their subordinates would violate the constitutional rights of the arrestees by participating in it.
300. Defendants Sullivan, Martin, and Chadbourne either deliberately or recklessly disregarded that risk by failing to take any actions to supervise the operation, and that failure caused Plaintiffs' constitutional injuries.
EIGHTEENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Federal Tort Claims Act
(28 U.S.C. § 1346(b); The United States) 301. The Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. False arrest and false imprisonment 302. Defendant HARFOT Officers Ronald L. Preble, Richard L. McCaffrey, James E. Brown, and John Does 6-11 knowingly and intentionally arrested, detained, and imprisoned the Plaintiffs without a warrant and without probable cause, in retaliation for protected speech, based on impermissible racial, ethnic, and national origin discrimination, and in a manner preempted by federal law. 303. The HARFOT officers took custody of the Plaintiffs from Danbury police officers, or arrested them or caused their arrest, as but several of many Latino, Spanish-speaking, day-laborers at Kennedy Park on the morning of September 19, 2006. The "sting" operationessentially a random sweep of the park-was based on mere speculation that immigration law violators would be found in the crowd of Latino day-laborers.
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304. Accordingly, the ICE Defendants lacked any reasonable basis for believing that the Plaintiffs in particular had violated immigration law. Rather, they arrested them on the basis of their race, ethnicity, and perceived national origins alone.
305. ICE also unlawfully took custody of, arrested, or caused the arrest of, and unlawfully detained the Plaintiffs prior to asking them any questions regarding their immigration statuses, or even their names. Without any other reasonable basis for the arrest, ICE's enforcement actions-where officers took custody or arrested first and asked questions later-by definition lacked probable cause.
306. The Plaintiffs were forcibly restrained and subsequently imprisoned by the ICE Defendants and suffered damages as a result of ICE Defendants' actions.
307. The Defendant HARFOT Officers also unlawfully took custody of Plaintiffs by failing to provide a neutral adjudicator for their initial custody determination, by detaining Plaintiffs without any special justification or evidence of dangerousness or flight risk, and by failing to forward or cause to be forwarded the request of each Day-Laborer Plaintiff for an Immigration Judge to review ICE's denial of bond, as indicated on the Form I-286 served on each Day-Laborer Plaintiff.
308. The Defendant HARFOT Officers' actions constitute false arrest and false imprisonment under Connecticut common law.
Intentional infliction of emotional distress 309. Defendant ICE Officers Ronald L. Preble, Richard L. McCaffrey, James E. Brown, and John Does 6-11 also intended to inflict emotional distress upon the Plaintiffs by deceiving, arresting, detaining, and imprisoning them, or should have known that their conduct
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was likely to cause Plaintiffs' emotional distress. The ICE Defendants' conduct was clearly extreme and outrageous, given the circumstances surrounding the arrests.
310. The emotional distress of the Plaintiffs was caused by the ICE Defendants' conduct and was severe.
311. The Defendant HARFOT Officers' actions constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress under Connecticut common law.
Negligent infliction of emotional distress 312. Defendant HARFOT Officers Ronald L. Preble, Richard L. McCaffrey, James E. Brown, and John Does 6-11 further created an unreasonable risk of causing the Plaintiffs emotional distress. It was clearly foreseeable that the Defendant HARFOT Officers' conduct would cause the Plaintiffs emotional distress. 313. Defendant HARFOT Officers knew that their failure to act would likely subject a group of identifiable persons to imminent harm, namely, the Latino and immigrant day-laborers gathered in Kennedy Park. 314. Moreover, Defendant McCaffrey negligently failed to supervise Defendant ICE Officers as they executed the Plaintiffs' unlawful arrest and detention. 315. The emotional distress of the Plaintiffs was caused by the Defendant ICE Officers' conduct and was severe enough that it might result in illness or bodily harm. 316. The Defendant HARFOT Officers' actions constitute negligent infliction of emotional distress under Connecticut common law. Abuse of process 317. Defendant HARFOT Officers Ronald L. Preble, Richard L. McCaffrey, James E. Brown, and John Does 6-11 abused legal process for a purpose for which it was not intended
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when they deceived, arrested, detained, transferred, imprisoned, coerced, intimidated, and humiliated the Plaintiffs in order to force them to abandon their legal rights and privileges.
318. ICE officials also abused legal process by failing to provide a neutral arbitrator for Plaintiffs’ initial custody determination, by detaining Plaintiffs without any special justification or evidence of dangerousness or flight risk, by failing to forward or cause to be forwarded the request of each Day-Laborer Plaintiff for an Immigration Judge to review ICE's refusal to set any bond, by transferring the Plaintiffs to detention facilities far from their friends, family and legal counsel, and by frivolously opposing bond in order to harass and intimidate the Plaintiffs into abandoning their immigration proceedings.
319. From the outset, ICE's unnecessary and illegitimate detention of the Plaintiffs on the basis of the ICE District Sub-Office's initial custody determination subjected the Plaintiffs to extensive humiliation and harassment, isolated them from counsel and witnesses, and placed severe pressure on them to abandon their legal defense and to take voluntary departure.
320. Similarly, ICE's abrupt transfer of the Plaintiffs to detention facilities as far away as Texas, where they endured horrendous prison conditions, and where the men have no friends, family, or ties to the community not only separated them from their legal counsel and witnesses, but secured a forum for ICE in a more favorable jurisdiction and placed further pressure on the men not to contest the charges against them. ICE continued its efforts to strong-arm the Plaintiffs into abandoning their legal defense at their bond hearings, where it opposed the setting of bond.
321. Unknown ICE officials at the ICE Hartford Sub-Office also abused legal process by attempting to coerce the Plaintiffs into signing documents they could neither read nor understand, telling them that they had to do so.
322. The Plaintiffs suffered damages as a result of Defendant ICE officials' actions.
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323. The Defendant ICE Officers' actions constitute an abuse of process under Connecticut common law.
324. The United States is liable pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") for the tortious acts of its employees in "circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
325. At all times relevant to this Complaint, the ICE agents-including Officers Preble, McCaffrey, Brown, and John Does 6-11-were acting within the scope of their employment and/or their official duties as employees of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement in the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), an agency of the U.S. Government.
326. In these circumstances, if the United States were a private person, liability would be imposed in accordance with the law of Connecticut.
327. The Plaintiffs have also administratively exhausted their claims under the FTCA. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a), the Plaintiffs filed FTCA administrative claims with DHS for the tortious actions constituting false arrest and false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and abuse of process committed by Defendant ICE officers. The claims were received on May 1, 2007.
328. DHS has failed to make final disposition of the claims within six months after they were filed, and the Plaintiffs deem this failure a final denial pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a).
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully requests that this Court:
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(1) Enter a declaratory judgment that the actions of Defendant Danbury officials and/or Defendant ICE officials, on September 19, 2006 violated the United States Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Connecticut Constitution, and Connecticut common law.
(2) Award Plaintiffs compensatory damages in an amount to be proven at trial. (3) Hold Defendants jointly and severally liable for compensatory damages. (4) Award Plaintiffs punitive damages in an amount to be proven at trial. (5) Award Plaintiffs the cost of this action and reasonable attorney fees. (6) Grant such other relief as the Court deems just and equitable.

Dated October 1, 2009 New Haven, Connecticut

Respectfully submitted,
_____/s/_______________ Michael Wishnie, Esq., ct27221, Supervising Attorney Susan Hazeldean, Esq., ct28093, Supervising Attorney Ari Holtzblatt, Law Student Intern Rebecca Heller, Law Student Intern Dror Ladin, Law Student Intern Chesa Boudin, Law Student Intern Sophie Hood, Law Student Intern Lindsay Nash, Law Student Intern Helen O'Reilly, Law Student Intern
JEROME N. FRANK LEGAL SERVICES ORGANIZATION
Yale Law School P.O. Box 209090 New Haven, Connecticut 06520 Phone: (203) 432-4800
Joel M. Cohen, Esq., phv03297 Siham Nurhussein, Esq., phv03298 Elizabeth Goergen, Esq. phv03300 Alison Schary, Esq., phv03627
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Case 3:07-cv-01436-RNC Document 317 Filed 10/01/09 Page 62 of 62 Joseph La Perla, Esq., phv03527 GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166 Telephone: (212) 351-4000 Facsimile: (212) 351-4035 Counsel for Plaintiffs
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 Case 3:07-cv-01436-RNC Document 66 Filed 03/07/2008 Page 1 of 34

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

JUAN BARRERA, JOSE CABRERA,

:

DANIEL CHAVEZ, JOSE DUMA, JOSE :

LLIBISUPA, ISAAC MALDONADO,

:

EDGAR REDROVAN, NICHOLAS

:

SEGUNDO SANCHEZ, JUAN CARLOS :

SIMBANA, and DANILO BRITO VARGAS :

:

Plaintiffs,

:

:

v.

:

:

MARK BOUGHTON, ALAN BAKER,

:

JOSE AGOSTO, RICHARD DEJESUS, :

JAMES FISHER, JAMES LALLI, CRAIG :

MARTIN, JOSEPH NORKUS, JOHN DOES, :

CITY OF DANBURY, RONALD PREBLE, :

RICHARD McAFFREY, JAMES BROWN, :

JOHN DOES and USA

:

:

Defendants.

:

C.A. No. 3:07-cv-01436-RNC March 7, 2008

PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO DANBURY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS AND IN SUPPORT OF CROSS-MOTIONS TO
CERTIFY QUESTIONS OF LAW TO THE CONNECTICUT SUPREME COURT AND TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

I. INTRODUCTION This is a civil rights suit to remedy discriminatory and unauthorized enforcement of federal immigration laws against Latino residents of the City of Danbury, Connecticut. Danbury and its police department have repeatedly and knowingly made illegal civil immigration arrests, engaged in impermissibly discriminatory law enforcement, and retaliated against residents for expressive activities. In their frustration with the arrival of new immigrants to Danbury, Mayor Boughton and the police department have taken the law into their own hands. In some instances

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the City has acted unilaterally and at other times its officials have conspired with federal immigration agents in the conduct of this unlawful campaign.
II. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND Nine of the ten Plaintiffs named in this action are Latino day-laborers (collectively, “the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs”) who suffered illegal arrest and detention at the hands of Danbury Police Department (“DPD”) and/or U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) officers in an undercover sting operation on September 19, 2006 at Kennedy Park, a park in the center of downtown Danbury. See Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 61-111. In violation of Article First, § 20 of the Connecticut Constitution (“§ 20”), the DPD and ICE officers targeted the men based on their race, ethnicity, and perceived national origin, having no other reason to believe that any of them had violated immigration law. The DPD officers subjected the men to selective law enforcement out of a bad faith and malicious intent to drive them out of the City of Danbury. Moreover, the officers knowingly and intentionally stopped, detained, investigated, and arrested the DayLaborer Plaintiffs in retaliation for their exercise of protected speech and association in a public forum, in violation of Article First, §§ 4 and 14 of the Connecticut Constitution (“§ 4” and “§ 14”). The DPD and/or ICE officers also arrested the Day-Laborer Plaintiffs without probable cause, in violation of their rights to due process of law under Article First, § 8 of the Connecticut Constitution (“§ 8”). The tenth plaintiff named in this action, Danilo Brito Vargas, is a Latino driver who suffered illegal arrest, detention, and deportation as the result of a pretextual, race-based traffic stop by the DPD. See Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 162-176. In targeting Plaintiff Vargas for arrest, the DPD Defendants intentionally treated him differently from other similarly situated drivers out of
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a bad faith and malicious intent to drive him and other drivers of Latino and/or foreign-born appearance from the City of Danbury. The DPD Defendants targeted and arrested Plaintiff on the basis of his race, ethnicity, and national origin and for the purpose of investigating his immigration status through the National Crime Information Center (“NCIC”) database, in violation of Plaintiff Vargas’ right to equal protection under Article First, § 20 of the Connecticut Constitution.
III. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Defendant DPD officers José Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, John Does 1-8, Chief of the Danbury Police Department Al Baker, and Danbury Mayor Mark Boughton (collectively, “Defendants”) now argue that Plaintiffs’ Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixteenth, and Nineteenth Claims for Relief should be dismissed. See Individual Danbury Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. In response, Plaintiffs ask that this Court certify four determinative questions of state constitutional law to the Connecticut Supreme Court and hold Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Nineteenth Claims in abeyance pending the answer to these questions. In addition, Plaintiffs ask this Court to deny Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Sixteenth Claim. If this Court declines to certify these questions of state law, the Motion to Dismiss should be denied it its entirety. Alternatively, in the event that the Court rejects supplemental jurisdiction over these questions and declines to certify them to the Connecticut Supreme Court, Plaintiffs ask that the Court dismiss the relevant claims without prejudice so that they may be refiled in state court.
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IV. ARGUMENT A. Questions for Certification
The Second Circuit has long recognized that state courts should be afforded the first opportunity to decide significant issues of state law through the certification process. See, e.g., Great Northern Ins. Co. v. Mt. Vernon Fire Ins. Co., 143 F.3d 659, 662 (2d Cir. 1998). “Where a question of [constitutional] interpretation implicates the weighing of policy concerns, principles of comity and federalism strongly support certification.” Sealed v. Sealed, 332 F.3d 51, 59 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Freedman v. American Online, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 174, 191 (D. Conn. 2005). Because Defendants seek to dismiss the state constitutional claims of Plaintiffs’ Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Nineteenth Claims, this Court should certify the following questions to the Connecticut Supreme Court: 1. Do Plaintiffs have a private right of action for damages under Article First, § 20, of the
Connecticut Constitution? 2. Do Plaintiffs have a private right of action for damages under Article First, § 8, of the
Connecticut Constitution? 3. Do non-United States citizens in Connecticut hold rights to free speech and assembly
under the Connecticut Constitution? 4. Do Plaintiffs have a private right of action for damages under Article First, §§ 4 and
14 of the Connecticut Constitution? A federal court may certify questions of state law directly to the Connecticut Supreme
Court “if the answer may be determinative of an issue in pending litigation in the certifying court and if there is no controlling appellate decision, constitutional provision or statute of this state.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-199b(d) (2002). See also Conn. App. Proc. § 82 (certification appropriate where the answer “may be determinative of the cause then pending in the certifying court”); Conn.App. Proc. § 82-3 (the “questions presented should be such as will be determinative of the
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case, and it must appear that their present determination would be in the interest of simplicity, directness and economy of judicial action”).
When deciding to certify a question to state supreme courts, the Second Circuit has considered whether: (1) state appellate precedent provides insufficient guidance on the controlling question at issue and, if so, whether that authority is conclusive; (2) the interpretation of the statute or constitutional provision implicates important public policy considerations; and (3) the issues presented in the case are likely to recur and, consequently, their resolution will assist the administration of justice in both federal and state courts. See Parrot v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 338 F.3d 140, 144 (2d Cir. 2003). See also Freedman, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 191. The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut has certified questions of law to the Connecticut Supreme Court based on those factors. See Jagger v. Mohawk Mountain Ski Area, Inc., No. 3:01CV2163 RNC, 2002 WL 31433376, at *1 (D. Conn. 2002) (Chatigny, J.)), attached as Exhibit 1.
1. The U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut should certify to the Connecticut Supreme Court the question of whether Plaintiffs have a private right of action for damages under § 20. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ Third and Nineteenth Claims for Relief fail to state
causes of action because the Connecticut Supreme Court has not explicitly recognized a private right of action under Article First, § 20 of its state constitution. Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss [hereinafter, “Defs.’ Br.”] at 6. The Equal Protection Clause of the Connecticut Constitution states, in pertinent part, that “[n]o person shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be subjected to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his civil or political rights because of religion, race, color, ancestry or national origin.” Conn. Const., Article First, § 20. At minimum, Connecticut’s Equal Protection
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Clause must ensure the same rights as its counterpart in the United States Constitution. See Zapata v. Burns, 207 Conn. 496, 542 (1988); Brunswick Corp. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 184 Conn. 75, 440 n.4 (1981); see also State v. Anonymous, 32 Conn. Supp. 306 (1979) (“It is undoubtedly true that a state may grant more protection to its inhabitants than does the United States, although it cannot grant less.”).
Plaintiffs’ Third Claim for Relief alleges that the Plaintiff day laborers were arrested and detained on the basis of their race, ethnicity, and perceived national origin, in violation of their rights to equal protection under § 20. Am. Compl at ¶¶ 183-87. The Nineteenth Claim for Relief, based on the NCIC-prompted arrest of Plaintiff Danilo Brito Vargas, similarly alleges that defendant Danbury police officers targeted and arrested Plaintiff on the basis of his perceived race, ethnicity, and national origin, in violation of his right to Equal Protection guaranteed by § 20. Am. Compl at ¶¶ 289-93.
The question as to whether, under these circumstances, a private right of action exists for Plaintiffs under § 20 is determinative of the state law portion of the Third and Nineteenth Claims for Relief in this case, but there is no controlling appellate decision that governs this important issue of Connecticut law. Because the dispute as to the existence of a private right of action under § 20 meets the Second Circuit’s three-part test for certification to a state court, see Parrot, 338 F.3d at 144, this Court should certify the issue and hold Plaintiffs’ claims in abeyance pending a decision by the Connecticut State Supreme Court.
a. Connecticut appellate precedent provides insufficient guidance on the question of whether Article First, § 20, allows for a private right of action.
While there has been no precedent to date explicitly granting a private right of action for damages under Article First, § 20 of the Connecticut Constitution, the Supreme Court of Connecticut, in Binette v. Sabo, 244 Conn. 23 (1998), held that “[w]hether to recognize a cause
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of action for alleged violations of other state constitutional provisions in the future must be determined on a case-by-case basis.” Id. at 48 (emphasis added). In Binette, the Supreme Court of Connecticut accepted the certification of a question from the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut regarding whether the state constitution gave rise to a private cause of action for money damages for violations of §§ 7 and 9 of Article First of the state constitution and answered the question in the affirmative. Id. at 26.
In doing so, the Court also emphasized that it would retain the power to find private rights of action directly under the state constitution, and that such provisions must be examined on an individual basis:
That determination will be based on a multifactor analysis. The factors to be considered include: the nature of the constitutional provision at issue; the nature of the purported unconstitutional conduct; the nature of the harm; separation of powers considerations and the other factors articulated in Bivens [403 U.S. 388 (1971)] and its progeny; the concerns expressed in Kelley Property Development, Inc. [226 Conn. 314 (1993)]; and any other pertinent factors brought to light by future litigation. Id. at 48.
To dismiss claims brought under the Equal Protection Clause of the Connecticut Constitution based merely on the absence of precedent recognizing a direct cause of action would be to disregard the logic of Binette altogether. In order to adhere to Connecticut’s own constitutional jurisprudence, as well as to respect principles of comity, it is necessary to certify the question of the existence of a private right of action under Article First, § 20 to the state’s Supreme Court.
Moreover, the factual allegations giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims for relief under Article First, § 20 of the Connecticut Constitution bear strong resemblance to the circumstances in Binette, and it is therefore likely that the Connecticut Supreme Court would recognize a private
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right of action here. Both cases deal with the unconstitutional conduct of law enforcement officials in violating civilian plaintiffs’ civil rights. Moreover, the Connecticut Supreme Court noted in Binette that “we agree with the fundamental principle underlying the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Bivens, namely, that a police officer acting unlawfully in the name of the state ‘possesses a far greater capacity for harm than an individual trespasser exercising no authority other than his own.’” Binette, 244. Conn. at 44 (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971)). As in Binette, the Connecticut Supreme Court should be given the opportunity to consider whether a direct right of action is appropriate to remedy the special harm that flows from unlawful police conduct in violation of the state equal protection clause. See id. at 36.
b. The issue of whether Plaintiffs have a private right of action under Article First, § 20, implicates important public policy considerations.
Certification is also appropriate because of the crucial public policy considerations implicated in the remedies available to vindicate state equal protection rights against abuses by law enforcement officers. As a general matter, insofar as “the state constitution is interpreted as a living document,” its development is intimately tied to problems of Connecticut public policy. See State v. Dukes, 209 Conn. 98, 110 (1988); see also Freedman, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 191. Moreover, with respect to equal protection in particular, the Supreme Court of Connecticut has said that § 20 may provide protections that extend beyond its federal counterpart as the public interest requires. As Justice Berdon explained in Barton v. Ducci Elec. Contrs., Inc., 248 Conn. 793 (1999):
Our state equal protection clause is much more expansive than its federal counterpart. See, e.g., E. Peters, Capacity and Respect: A Perspective on the Historic Role of the State Courts in the Federal System, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1065, 1067-68 (1998) (“It should be old news that state constitutions contain some provisions for which there
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are no federal counterparts. . . . Over the years, our state constitution has been amended to include an equal protection clause that is especially capacious . . . .”) Id. at 827 (Berdon, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 641-42 (1977) (emphasis added) (“decisions of the United States Supreme Court defining fundamental rights are . . . to be followed by Connecticut courts only when they provide no less individual protection than is guaranteed by Connecticut law.”); cf. State v. Stoddard, 206 Conn. 157 (1988) (holding that the due process provision of the Connecticut Constitution requires more in terms of the right to counsel than the federal Constitution).
The ongoing elaboration of the Connecticut state constitution as a “living document” that is responsive to the public interest and protects rights independently of and more expansively than their federal counterparts means that the issue of remedies made available to enforce those rights raises significant public policy concerns. And, as explained in Binette, particularly significant among those remedies is any private right of action under the state Bill of Rights. See Binette, 244 Conn. 49 (“unlike the other remedies available to the plaintiffs, a Bivens-type remedy comprehends both the fundamental nature of the rights protected by constitutional provisions and the special significance of the duty breached by their violation.”).
Moreover, the issue of equal protection is of special relevance in the law enforcement context. Local, state and federal actors the immigration context have increased immigration enforcement efforts in Connecticut, and abuses by such actors are regularly reported.1 Similarly,
1 See, e.g., Kim Martineau, Hopes and Handcuffs, Hartford Courant, Dec. 14, 2006, at A1 (reporting sting operation against Danbury day laborers in September 2006); Nina Bernstein, Promise of I.D. Cards is Followed by Peril of Arrest for Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. Times, July 23, 2007, at B1 (reporting arrest of 32 immigrants in June 2007 in a door-to-door sweep of predominantly Latino neighborhood of Fair Haven); Mark Spencer, Police Chief Explains Raids, Hartford Courant, Nov. 9, 2007, at B1 (reporting arrest of 21 immigrants in November 2007); Mark Langlois, ICE arrests four Guatemalans in Danbury, Danbury News-Times, Sept. 13, 2007; Family Feared Worst During ICE Raid, WFSB Channel 3, Aug. 23, 2007 (reporting ICE raid on Wallingford family’s home); Mark Langlois, Arrested Men Face Deportation, Danbury News-Times, Aug. 14, 2007 (reporting separate immigration arrests of two Latino men in traffic stops by local police); ICE agents arrest four in Danbury, Danbury News-Times, July 18, 2007; Mark
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both racial profiling other race-based abuses of law enforcement officials are of continuing concern in the state. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-1m (requiring that municipal police departments adopt anti-profiling policies and requiring data collection and reporting on traffic stops); see also Criminal Justice Policy Foundation, The Perceptions of Connecticut Resident of Their Police, (Aug. 1998). Given these concerns, the availability of a direct cause of action to vindicate the equal protection rights of the increasing number of Connecticut residents who are foreign-born, see Rafael Meija & Priscilla Canny, Immigration in Connecticut; a Growing Opportunity 2 (Oct. 2007), those who appear to be foreign-born, and persons of color against law enforcement misconduct is a matter of pressing public concern. As the United States Supreme Court noted in Bivens, “the very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.” Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397 (internal citations omitted). In light of the pressing public policy issues involved in the equal protection remedies available to Connecticut residents subject to both immigration law enforcement and law enforcement more generally, the Connecticut Supreme Court should be allowed to decide whether Plaintiffs may seek redress through a private right of action for damages under § 20.
c. This question is likely to recur and its resolution will assist the administration of justice in both federal and state courts.
Finally, the issue of a private right of action under the equal protection clause of Connecticut’s Constitution is sure to recur in both state and federal litigation, necessitating a prompt resolution of this question by the state Supreme Court. Equal protection claims are being actively litigated in cases involving immigration law and policy on behalf of day-laborers, noncitizens, Latinos, and those perceived to be immigrants, and these types of cases will persist at
Langois, ICE four from Danbury, Danbury News-Times, July 23, 2007 (reporting arrest, in Hartford, of Brazilian family that had lived in Connecticut for 18 years).
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both state and federal levels. See, e.g., Doe v. Village of Mamaroneck, 462 F. Supp. 2d 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
Certification to the state Supreme Court at this point will therefore advance the economical and efficient administration of justice. See Conn. App. Proc. § 82-3 (“present determination [of issue] would be in the interest of simplicity, directness and economy of judicial action” for issue to be certified”). Furthermore, certification is the most efficient means available in the context of the case at bar. Plaintiffs have raised Fourteenth Amendment claims that mirror its state law claims and are based on a common nucleus of facts. See, e.g., Am Compl. at ¶¶ 183-87; 289-93. Discovery on Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claims will cover the same factual ground supporting their claims under the speech provisions of the Connecticut Constitution. Consequently, the most efficient course of action is to allow certify the issue of non-citizens’ state constitutional speech rights and hold Plaintiffs’ claims in abeyance pending resolution by the Connecticut Supreme Court.
2. This Court should certify to the Connecticut Supreme Court the question of whether Plaintiffs have a private right of action for damages under Article First, § 8, of the Connecticut Constitution.
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ Fifth Claim for Relief fails to state a cause of action because the Connecticut Supreme Court has not explicitly recognized a private right of action under Article First, § 8 of the State Constitution. Defs.’ Br. at 8. Article First, § 8 states, in pertinent part, that “[n]o person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.” Conn. Const. art. I, § 8. The Fifth Claim for Relief alleges that Defendant DPD officers violated § 8 by depriving the DayLaborer Plaintiffs of their liberty in a manner that was both fundamentally unfair in the totality of its circumstances and without due process of law. Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 192-94.
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As with the § 20 claims, the question as to whether a private right of action exists for Plaintiffs under § 8 in the immediate circumstances may be determinative of the state law portion of the Fifth Claim for Relief in this case; however, there is no controlling appellate decision that governs this crucial question of Connecticut law. Because the dispute as to the existence of a private right of action under § 8 meets the Second Circuit’s three-part test for certification to a state court, see Parrot, 338 F.3d at 144, this Court should certify the issue and hold Plaintiffs’ claims in abeyance pending a decision by the Connecticut State Supreme Court.
a. Connecticut Appellate precedent provides insufficient guidance on the controlling question at issue.
The decision to recognize or deny a cause of action for alleged violations of Connecticut’s state constitutional provisions must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Binette, 244. Conn. at 48. The two cases cited by Defendants did address the issue of whether a direct cause of action exists under § 8 but do not control in the present circumstances. Those cases did not concern law enforcement, but instead dealt exclusively with property interests and financial interests, the impairment of which could be remedied through administrative means, see §§ I.B.1.a-b, infra, and therefore offer no meaningful guidance under the quite different factual circumstances present here.
In Kelley Property Development, Inc. v. Lebanon, 226 Conn. 314 (1993), the Supreme Court of Connecticut decided whether a direct cause of action under § 8 existed in the context of allegations that local officials had misused their zoning authority to obstruct a real estate project. The Court based its decision to deny a private right of action largely on the availability of administrative relief from the allegedly unconstitutional conduct of the defendants. Id. at 339 (“[A]s a general matter, we should not construe our state constitution to provide a basis for the recognition of a private damages action for injuries for which the legislature has provided a
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reasonably adequate statutory remedy.”). Such administrative relief does not exist here, and there are no other remedies available to Plaintiffs to vindicate their due process rights under § 8.
In ATC P’shp v. Town of Windham, 251 Conn. 597 (1999), the Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed a lower court’s holding that the defendants were not liable for damages for their violation of the plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights under § 8. The Court found that “[a] municipality is not subject to constitutional reproach . . . simply because a taxpayer disputes the validity of the municipality's recourse to statutorily authorized mechanisms for the collection of local taxes.” Id. at 615. Citing Kelley, the Court reiterated its concern that granting a private right of action would introduce the “prospect of conflict between statutorily provided administrative remedies and judicially created tort remedies arising out of the same controversy.” Id. at 611 (citing Kelley, 226 Conn. at 339-40). Yet, despite denying a private right of action in that specific instance, the Supreme Court of Connecticut was careful to emphasize that “whether such a cause of action [for an alleged § 8 violation] should be recognized would be determined on a case-by-case basis.” Id. at 614 (emphasis added) (citing Binette, 244 Conn. 23, 48).
The events that gave rise to Plaintiffs’ § 8 claim are entirely distinguishable from those that precipitated the complaint filed in ATC P’ship and Kelley, and, as such, would present a case of first impression for the Connecticut Supreme Court. This Court should allow the Connecticut Supreme Court to evaluate Plaintiffs’ Claim for Relief under Article First, § 8 in light of the totality of the troubling facts presented.
b. The issue of whether Plaintiffs have a cause of action under Article First, § 8 implicates important public policy considerations.
Certification of this question is also appropriate because of the important public policy considerations implicated in state due process rights that, under principles of comity and federalism, belong in the first instance to the Connecticut Supreme Court. Moreover, the issue of
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due process is of particular relevance in the immigration-enforcement context in light of increasing enforcement efforts by state and local actors in Connecticut. See discussion, supra, at 9.
Whether the due process rights of civilians are protected by the recognition of a direct cause of action under the state constitution is a matter of immediate public concern for every resident of Connecticut. Moreover, because of rapidly growing partnerships between local law enforcement and ICE and the considerable potential for abuse in the enforcement of immigration law2, it is particularly essential for immigrants and those perceived to be immigrants residing in the state of Connecticut to be able to claim the protection of their due process rights under the state constitution. The Supreme Court of Connecticut should be given the opportunity to reach an expeditious conclusion on this urgent matter, as so many individuals are at an obvious risk of similar, future violations.
c. This question is likely to recur and its resolution will assist the administration of justice in both federal and state courts.
Finally, the issue of a private right of action under the due process clause of the Connecticut Constitution is sure to recur in both state and federal litigation, warranting a prompt resolution of this question by the state Supreme Court. As with the Equal Protection Clause, and for the same reasons, certification to the state Supreme Court at this point will advance the economical and efficient administration of justice. See Conn. App. Proc. § 82-3, supra.
2 The Major Cities Chiefs (“MCC”) and the International Association of Chiefs of Police (“IACP”) have expressed concern about the local enforcement of immigration law. Among their worries is the fact that state and local law enforcement officers lack the knowledge, training and experience to properly enforce federal immigration law, which can lead to racial profiling and other violations of constitutional and civil rights, exposing local governments to civil liability. See MCC Immigration Committee, Recommendations for Enforcement of Immigration Laws by Local Police Agencies (June 2006), http://www.houstontx.gov/police/pdfs/mcc_position.pdf; and IACP, Police Chiefs Guide to Immigration Issues (July 2007), http://www.theiacp.org/documents/pdfs/Publications/PoliceChiefsGuidetoImmigration%2Epdf.
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3. This Court should certify the question of whether non-United States citizens possess rights to free speech and assembly under the Connecticut Constitution. Defendants have also moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim that Defendant DPD officers
knowingly and intentionally stopped, detained, investigated, and arrested Plaintiff Day-Laborers in retaliation for their exercise of protected speech and association in a public forum, in violation of Article First, §§ 4 and 14 of the Connecticut Constitution. Defs. Br. at 7-8. Section 4 of Article First of the Connecticut Constitution provides that “[e]very citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty.” Conn. Const, art. I, § 4. Section 14 of Article First of the Connecticut Constitution provides that “[t]he citizens have a right, in a peaceable manner, to assemble for their common good, and to apply to those invested with the powers of government, for redress of grievances, or other proper purposes, by petition, address or remonstrance.” Conn. Const, art. I, § 14. Relying solely on an infamous 1921 Connecticut Supreme Court decision Defendants argue the Connecticut Constitution does not guarantee Plaintiffs’ speech rights because the Connecticut Constitution only protects such rights for citizens3 of the United States. Defs. Br. at 7-8 (citing State v. Sinchuk, 96 Conn. 605 (Conn. 1921)).
As with the issues discussed above, the question of whether non-United States citizens have speech and assembly rights under the Connecticut Constitution is appropriate for certification. Under the three-part test, see Parrot, Freedman, and Jagger, supra, (1) Sinchuk provides insufficient guidance on the controlling question at issue; (2) the question of the scope of Connecticut’s constitutional speech protection implicates important public policy concerns; and (3) the question also involves issues that are likely to recur in subsequent state and federal
3 Plaintiffs are presently in removal proceedings before the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Consequently, they neither confirm nor deny that they are citizens of the United States, but assert their rights under the Connecticut Constitution attach regardless of citizenship.
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court litigation. Moreover, the scope of Connecticut’s constitutional speech provisions is a significant issue of state law that the Connecticut Supreme Court should have the first opportunity to decide, see e.g. Binette v. Sabo, 244. Conn. 23 (1998) (Important state constitutional issue taken up by the Connecticut Supreme Court following certification from federal District Court), and the resolution of this issue is determinative of the cause pending in this Court. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-199b; see also Conn. App. Proc. §§ 82-1, 82-3. Consequently, this Court should certify the issue and hold Plaintiffs’ claim in abeyance pending decision by the Connecticut State Supreme Court.
a. Sinchuk does not provide sufficient guidance on the instant case because it is distinguishable.
In Sinchuk, the Connecticut Supreme Court rejected arguments by two non- citizen anarchists that the state Sedition Act violated Article First, §§ 2, 5, 6, and 16 of the 1818 Connecticut Constitution.4 Defendants ask this court to read Sinchuk as categorically excluding non-United States citizens from Connecticut’s state constitutional speech and assembly protections. Defs. Br. at 7-8. Sinchuk, however, does not sufficiently guide the instant case for at least four reasons.
First, the Court decided Sinchuk based on the absence of non-United States citizens’ rights under § 2 of the Connecticut Constitution5 to engage in seditious speech and nonpeaceable assembly. In this respect, the Court’s reading of “citizen” in the Connecticut Constitution’s speech provisions is dicta. The Sinchuk court did not consider the question presented here, namely, whether the Connecticut Constitution restricts the rights to engage in
4 Article First, §§ 2, 5, 6, and 16 of the 1818 Connecticut Constitution have been carried over verbatim and renumbered as Article First, §§ 2, 4, 5, and 14 of the 1965 Connecticut Constitution currently in place. 5 Article First, § 2 guarantees the people’s “right to alter their form of government.”
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political or commercial speech and to assemble peaceably for such purpose in a public forum, to citizens of the United States. Second, the term “citizen” in Article First, §§ 4 and 14 means Connecticut citizen and not “citizen of the United States.” Third, a per se exclusion of nonUnited States citizens from state constitutional speech protections would be inconsistent with subsequent developments in federal constitutional law which recognize the speech rights of nonUnited States citizens and state law incorporating federal law as a constitutional floor. Fourth, such a broad rule would raise serious constitutional problems under the federal Equal Protection Clause. In order to avoid these constitutional conflicts, Sinchuk must be read narrowly and is therefore distinguishable from the instant case.
Sinchuk has been controversial since its issuance, and thus it would be inadvisable for this court, without more guidance from the Connecticut Supreme Court, to read Sinchuk’s dicta as controlling precedent. The majority opinion reached its holding by analogizing non-United States citizens to slaves, see Sinchuk, 96 Conn. at 4-5 (relying on Jackson v. Bulloch, 12 Conn. 38 (1837), a habeas case holding that slaves, as non-members of the social compact, were excluded from rights granted the “people” under the Connecticut Bill of Rights), inspiring a spirited dissent, id. at 624 (Wheeler, CJ, dissenting) (“I cannot find the parallel between the slave and the alien . . . .”).6 Sinchuk’s now-discredited reasoning casts doubt on the continuing validity even of its narrow holding and thus, makes it especially important that this Court give the Connecticut Supreme Court a chance to consider the certified question.
i. The holding of Sinchuk that non-United States citizens have no right to engage in seditious libel and non-peaceable assembly does not govern here.
6 See also Note, Illegal Aliens, the Social Compact, and the Connecticut Constitution, 13 Bridgeport L. Rev. 331, 362 (1993) (“the majority's analogy of aliens to slaves is neither sound nor in accord with federal or state precedent”).
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Sinchuk does not govern the instant action because Sinchuk addressed only seditious libel, and not the political and commercial speech and assembly at issue here, and the Court decided the case based on the absence of non-United States citizens’ rights, under § 2, to alter the form of government, rather than the speech provisions of the Connecticut Constitution. In particular, the defendant non-citizens had been charged with “publicly exhibit[ing] or advertis[ing]” with “force and arms . . . certain disloyal, scurrilous, or abusive matter concerning the form of government of the United States and of its flag and certain matter which was intended to bring them into contempt.” Sinchuk, 96 Conn. at 605.
In addressing defendants’ arguments, the Court expressly re-characterized their speech claims as claims under Article First, § 2, which guarantees the rights of the people “to alter their form of government.” Conn. Const. of 1818, art. I, § 2 (1818). See Sinchuk, 96 Conn. at 611 (“The defendants attempt to maintain that their publications are so privileged, and are a legitimate exercise of the right of free speech by what is, in practical effect, an appeal to section 2 of the Bill of Rights.”). The Court reasoned that appellants could only have free speech rights under Article First, §§ 5 and 6 of the 1818 Constitution to agitate for the overthrow of the government if appellants had a right under Article First, § 2 “to alter their form of government.” Sinchuk, 96 Conn. at 612-14. According to the Court, Section 2 “is plainly inapplicable to the defendants” insofar as they are non-citizens and therefore not members of “the people.” Id. at 610-11. See also Id. at 614 (“the second section … cannot refer to aliens, who have no political power … [and] who have no part nor lot in the government.”) Thus, the Court concluded that foreign nationals have no constitutional right “under cover of being engaged in good faith to [change the laws or forms of government] to engage in scurrilous or anarchistic propaganda
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which has been declared by the General Assembly to be dangerous to the public welfare.” Sinchuk, 96 Conn. at 615.
Indeed, the Sinchuk Court explicitly rejected the notion that the Connecticut Constitution protects no free speech rights of non-United States citizens. The Court insisted that by its holding it “[did] not mean to say that aliens have no right to free speech.” Id. at 614. Thus, the Court recognized that Sinchuk did not settle the question of whether the Connecticut Constitution guarantees the right of non-United States citizens to engage in non-seditious speech and assembly and left that question for future cases to settle.
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the Court did not rely on the Sinchuk appellants’ immigration status to reject their associational claims even though the plain language of the predecessor to Article First, § 14 also applies to “citizens.” Instead, the Court noted that Article First, § 14 guarantees only “peaceable assembly” in order to “apply to those invested with the powers of government.” Since, “[n]o right of peaceable assembly is invaded by the statute, and there is nothing to show that the publications in question were addressed, for any purpose whatever, to those invested with the powers of government” appellants’ Section 14 rights were not implicated. Sinchuk, 96 Conn. at 611 (emphasis added).
In contrast, Plaintiffs here have asserted their right under state law to engage in peaceful, protected non-seditious political and commercial speech in a public forum and to peaceably assemble for such purposes—speech that falls well within the core, of Connecticut’s constitutional speech protections and that does not depend on Article First, §2. See, e.g., Leydon v. Town of Greenwich, 257 Conn. 318, 350 (Conn. 2001) (expressive and associational use of town park); Grievance Committee for Hartford-New Britain Judicial Dist. v. Trantolo, 192 Conn. 15, 25-26 (Conn. 1984) (commercial speech).
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Plaintiffs’ speech is readily distinguishable from the seditious libel at issue in Sinchuk, speech which, at the time of Sinchuk’s issuance in 1921, categorically fell outside constitutional speech protections, see, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919), and, under more rigorous standards, can still fall outside such protections today. See also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (excluding “advocacy [that] is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action” from constitutional protection).
Here, Plaintiffs were neither “creat[ing] or foster[ing] opposition to organized government,” Sinchuk, 96 Conn. at 609, nor threatening “public peace and safety,” id. at 610. Since the speech rights at issue in Sinchuk are clearly different than those asserted here and in light of the Sinchuk’s court’s insistence that some non-United States citizens’ speech rights survive its holding, this Court should certify the question of whether the Connecticut Constitution protects Plaintiffs’ expressive and associational conduct.
ii. The plain text of Article First, §§ 4 and 14 refers to Connecticut citizens, not to United States citizens.
Defendants argue that Article First, §§ 4 and 14 “expressly provide for the rights to be conferred upon citizens of the United States.” Defs. Br. at 7-8. However, the plain text of the these sections refers only to “citizens” and not to “citizens of the United States.” Indeed, where provisions of the Connecticut Constitution are meant to apply to citizens of the United States, the plain text reads “citizen of the United States.” See Conn. Const, art. VI § 1 as amended by Conn. Const, art. IX of Amendments ("Every citizen of the United States who has attained the age of eighteen years, who is a bona fide resident of the town in which he seeks to be admitted as an elector and who takes such oath, if any, as may be prescribed by law, shall be qualified to be an elector."). Following the presumption of meaningful variation, the use of different language
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implies different substantive meaning. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983). If the Constitution meant “citizen of the United States” whenever the term “citizen” was used then there would be no reason to refer more specifically to “citizen of the United States” in Article Sixth, §1. Thus, the “citizens” protected under Article First, §§ 4 and 14 may include nonUnited States citizens.
Courts have long recognized that in our federal system individuals may be state citizens, even if they are not also United States citizens. See e.g. Slaugher House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 74 (“It is quite clear, then, that there is a citizenship of the United States, and a citizenship of a State, which are distinct from each other, and which depend upon different characteristics or circumstances in the individual.”); Alla v. Kornfeld, 84 F.Supp. 823, 824 (N.D. Ill. 1949) (“There is a distinction between citizenship of the United States and citizenship of a particular state, and a person may be the former without being the latter.”). Consistent with this practice, Article First, §§ 4 and 14 apply to Connecticut citizens and not United States citizens.
Though it is clear that the term “citizen” in Article First, §§ 4 and 14 refers to citizens of the State of Connecticut and not to citizens of the United States, it is unclear what it means to be a Connecticut citizen. Under principles of comity and federalism, the task of clarifying that ambiguity belongs in the first instance to the Connecticut Supreme Court. Therefore, certification is appropriate here.
iii. Defendants’ reading of the Connecticut Constitution’s speech and assembly provisions would violate the United States Constitution by providing less protection to speech and assembly than the First Amendment.
Under controlling state law precedent, the Connecticut Constitution must protect at least those free speech rights of non-United States citizens protected by the First Amendment. Yet, under Defendants’ reading of Sinchuk, the Connecticut Constitution never guarantees freedom of
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speech to any non-United States citizens, even though this would lower state constitutional speech protections below the federal floor. Thus, defendants’ argument that Sinchuk excludes all non-United States citizens from free speech and assembly protections under the Connecticut Constitution must be rejected.
Sinchuk was decided prior to the incorporation of the First Amendment, via the Fourteenth Amendment, against the States. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). Following incorporation, the Connecticut Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the Connecticut Constitution may protect individual rights more extensively but not less extensively than the United States Constitution. See, e.g., State v. Linares, 232 Conn. 345, 378 (1994) (noting, in speech case, that “federal constitutional law sets minimum national standards”).
Defendants ignore these “minimum national standards” set by the First Amendment when they argue that the Connecticut Constitution never protects the free speech and assembly rights of any non-United States citizens. Federal courts have recognized the First Amendment rights of non-United States citizens in a range of contexts. See, e.g., De Jornaleros De Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 475 F. Supp. 2d 952, 956-57 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (undocumented daylaborers); Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 310 n. 5 (1970) (legal resident aliens); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 136, 148 (1945) (same); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 519 (1939) (“Freedom of speech and press are rights of personal liberty secured to all persons without regard to citizenship, by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”) (internal citations omitted); Underwager v. Channel 9 Australia, 69 F.3d 361, 365 (9th Cir. 1995) (non-United States citizen legally present in the United States). Defendants’ argument, if accepted, would place Connecticut constitutional
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law in conflict with the “minimum national standards” established in these federal constitutional rulings. Defendants’ argument must therefore be rejected.
Since issuing Sinchuk in 1921, the Connecticut Supreme Court has had no occasion to consider how incorporation, together with intervening interpretations of the First Amendment affect whether state constitutional protections depend on United States citizenship. See Benjamin v. Bailey, 234 Conn. 455, 464 n.6 (Conn. 1995) (reserving the question of what “citizen” means for purposes of state constitutional analysis). Certification to the Connecticut Supreme Court is therefore appropriate for clarification of whether and to what extent nonUnited States citizens receive free speech and assembly rights under the Connecticut Constitution.
iv. Defendants’ argument that Sinchuk excludes non-United States citizens from state constitutional speech and assembly protections violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Furthermore, under federal constitutional jurisprudence, defendants’ reading of Sinchuk creating a blanket exclusion of non-United States citizens from the Connecticut Constitution’s speech and assembly guarantees would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
As is well settled, the Equal Protection Clause covers all persons within the United States, regardless of citizenship or immigration status. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210-216 (1982). State laws and policies that employ “classifications based on alienage . . . are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.” Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-2 (1971); see also Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410, 420 (1948). Moreover, any law that discriminates between different groups’ access to a fundamental right is subject to strict scrutiny as well. Plyler, 457
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U.S. at 217. Two such fundamental rights are the freedom of speech and the freedom of association. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-462 (1980) (“When government regulation discriminates among speech-related activities in a public forum, the Equal Protection Clause mandates that the legislation be finely tailored to serve substantial state interests.”).
Thus, the denial, pursuant to Defendants’ interpretation of Sinchuk, of fundamental speech and assembly rights based on alienage would raise serious constitutional problems. In fact, the Sinchuk court explicitly limited its holding more than Defendants acknowledge at least in part to avoid such equal protection concerns. See discussion supra at 19; See also Sinchuk, 96 Conn. at 614 (“We do not mean to say that aliens have no right to free speech… [because] they are entitled to the equal protection of the laws”) (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)).
This Court and the Connecticut Supreme Court can avoid these constitutional difficulties by reading “citizen” in Article First, §§ 4 and 14 to mean Connecticut citizen rather than United States citizen. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001) (“[I]t is a cardinal principle of . . . interpretation, however, that when an Act of Congress raises a serious doubt as to its constitutionality, this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the [law] is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.”) (internal citations omitted); see also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299-300 (2001) (same). Consequently, for reasons of constitutional avoidance, comity, and federalism, this Court should certify the question of whether and to what extent the Connecticut Constitution protects the free speech and assembly rights of non-United States citizens. See Dorman v. Satti, 862 F.2d 432, 435 (2d Cir. 1988) (certification is appropriate where state law in question is “readily susceptible” to proffered narrowing construction that would render an otherwise unconstitutional law constitutional). Should the
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Court accept defendants’ interpretation and opt not to certify, Plaintiffs argue, in the alternative, that Article First, §§ 4 and 14 should be declared unconstitutional as violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
b. The scope of Connecticut’s constitutional speech and assembly provisions implicates important public policy considerations.
Certification is also appropriate here because of the crucial public policy considerations implicated in non-United States citizen speech and assembly rights that, under principles of comity and federalism, should be decided in the first instance by the Connecticut Supreme Court. As discussed supra, the development and interpretation of the Connecticut Constitution is intimately tied to problems of Connecticut public policy.
The free speech and assembly rights guaranteed by the Connecticut Constitution are more extensive than those guaranteed by the First Amendment. Leydon v. Town of Greenwich, 257 Conn. 318, 347 (2001) (“This court explicitly has stated that the Connecticut constitution, under article first, §§ 4, 5 and 14, provides greater protection for expressive activity than that provided by the first amendment to the federal constitution.”); State v. Linares, 232 Conn. 345, 380-1 (1995) (same). Denying non-United States citizens’ speech and assembly protections under the Connecticut Constitution would thus materially affect non-United States citizens by guaranteeing them fewer rights than are secured by the First Amendment.
Moreover, as the instant case reveals, the issue of non-United States citizen speech rights is of particular relevance in the immigration context in light of increasing immigration enforcement efforts by state and federal actors in Connecticut. See discussion, supra, at 9. Moreover, non-United States citizens intent on protesting such actions will do so only if they are certain that their right to engage in such protests is guaranteed. For example, as recently as February 7, 2008, thousands of people, presumably including many non-United States citizens,
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rallied in Danbury, Connecticut to protest the Danbury Common Council’s decision to enter into a 287(g) joint enforcement agreement with ICE. Mark Spencer, Crowd Protests Vote in Danbury; Police to Enforce Immigration Law, Hartford Courant, Feb. 7, 2008, at A1.
Outside the immigration enforcement context, non-United States citizen speech and assembly rights bear on a wide range of activities, political mobilization and protest, publication and media distribution, and advertising and other forms of commercial speech. As of 2006, 240,526 of Connecticut’s residents—or 6.9% of Connecticut’s population—were non-United States citizens and those numbers continue to grow. United States Census Bureau American Community Survey 2006.7 Defendants’ extra-ordinary and far-reaching claim would mean the Connecticut Constitution does not protect the right of hundreds of thousands of non-United States citizens that live in Connecticut to engage in political or commercial speech or to freely assemble. Certification is appropriate here.
c. The issue of whether Connecticut’s speech and assembly provisions extend to non-United States citizens is likely to recur and resolution will assist the administration of justice in both federal and state courts.
Finally, the issue of non-United States citizens’ speech rights under the state constitution is sure to recur in both state and federal litigation, calling for resolution of this question by the state Supreme Court. Speech claims are being actively litigated in cases involving immigration law and policy on behalf of day laborers and allegedly non-United States citizen plaintiffs, and these cases will persist in state and federal fora. See, e.g., De Jornaleros De Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 475 F. Supp. 2d 952 (2006).
7 The 2006 ACS reports that 12.9% (452,358 persons) of Connecticut’s residents were born outside of the United States. From 1991 to 2006, Connecticut’s foreign-born population grew 61%. Between 1995 and 2025, Connecticut is expected to gain 337,000 residents through international migration, doubling the foreign-born population. Rafael Mejia & Priscilla Canny, Immigration in Connecticut: a Growing Opportunity 2 (Connecticut Voices for Children, Oct. 2007).
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Moreover, the growing non-citizen population engaged in a wide range of speech, see discussion, supra, at 27, guarantee that the issue of state constitutional coverage will arise again. Certification to the state Supreme Court here will therefore further the more economical and efficient administration of justice. See Conn. App. Proc. § 82-3 (“present determination [of issue] would be in the interest of simplicity, directness and economy of judicial action” for issue to be certified).
Finally, certification is also more efficient in the context of the case at bar. Plaintiffs have raised First Amendment claims that mirror their state law claims and are based on a common nucleus of facts. Discovery on Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims will cover the same factual ground supporting their claims under the speech provisions of the Connecticut Constitution. Consequently, while discovery proceeds on Plaintiffs’ federal claim the most efficient course of action is to certify the issue of non-United States citizens’ state constitutional speech and assembly rights and to hold Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in abeyance pending resolution by the Connecticut Supreme Court.
4. This Court should certify to the Connecticut Supreme Court the question of whether Plaintiffs have a private right of action for damages under Article First, §§ 4 and 14 of the Connecticut Constitution. Plaintiffs’ Fourth Claim for Relief depends on the existence of a private cause of action
for money damages for violations of §§ 4 and 14 of Article First of the Connecticut Constitution. No Connecticut court has yet considered the issue presented here. However, as discussed supra, under Binette such determinations should be made on a case-by-case basis. Binette, 244 Conn. at 48.
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As with the issues discussed supra, the question of whether Connecticut recognizes a
private right of action for Plaintiffs’ claims is appropriate for certification. Under the three-part
test, see Parrot, Freedman, and Jagger, supra, (1) Binette provides insufficient guidance on the
controlling question at issue; (2) the question of the whether a private right of action exists for
Plaintiffs to vindicate their free speech and association rights implicates important public policy
concerns; and (3) the question involves issues that are likely to recur in subsequent state and
federal court litigation. Moreover, the resolution of this issue is determinative of the cause
pending in this Court. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-199b; see also Conn. App. Proc. §§ 82-1, 82-3.
a. Connecticut appellate precedent provides insufficient guidance on the question of whether Article First, §§ 4 and 14, permit a private right of action.
The Connecticut Supreme Court has decided no cases regarding the existence of a Binette
action under the speech or assembly provisions of the state constitution. However, at least one court has assumed without deciding that such a right exists.8 See Murray v. Josvanger, No.
CV020344686S, 2002 WL 31440827, at *2-4 (Conn. Super. October 9, 2002), attached as
Exhibit 2. As discussed supra, in Binette the Connecticut Supreme Court held that each
constitutional provision and violation thereof must be examined on an individual basis to
determine whether a private right of action will lie. The factual allegations giving rise to
8 Though other Connecticut courts have declined speech-based Binette claims in some contexts, none of those cases are relevant to the case at bar. In particular, a handful of lower court have considered whether public employees have a private right of action against their public employer if that employer violates their free speech rights under Article First, §4. Notably, those courts only rejected a private right of action on the basis of the existence of adequate statutory remedy that rendered a Binette action superfluous. Hankard v. Town of Avon, No. CV 960565611S, 1999 WL 482635, at *48-49 (Conn. Super. June 22, 1999) (rejecting private right of action because “the legislature ha[d] provided an adequate remedy by statute”), attached as Exhibit 3. See also Smith v. City of Hartford, No. X07CV 980070792S, 2000 WL 1058877, *4 (Conn. Super. July 14, 2000) (same), attached as Exhibit 4; McKiernan v. Amento, No. CV010453718S, 2003 WL 22333200, at *5 (Conn. Super. Oct. 2, 2003) (same), attached as Exhibit 5. The relevant statute, General Statutes 31-51q “provides a damages (including punitive damages) remedy to any [public] employee who is subjected to discipline or discharge ‘on account of the exercise by such employee of rights guaranteed by . . . [section] 4 . . . of article first of the Constitution of the state.’” Hankard, at *49. In the case at bar, the legislature has provided no independent remedy for Plaintiffs to vindicate their free speech rights and so, without a direct cause of action, they will be unable to do so.
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Plaintiffs’ claims for relief under Article First, §§ 4 and 14 of the Connecticut Constitution bear strong resemblance to the circumstances in Binette. Both cases deal with the unconstitutional conduct of law enforcement officials in violating civilian plaintiffs' civil rights. Here, as in Binette, the Connecticut Supreme Court should be given the opportunity to take into consideration the harm likely to result from the absence of a direct right of action to respond to unlawful police conduct in violation of the Connecticut Constitution. Cf. Binette, 244. Conn. at 36. Therefore, certification is appropriate.
b. The determination of whether a private right of action exists under Article First, §§ 4 and 14, implicates important public policy considerations.
Certification is also appropriate because of the crucial public policy considerations implicated in the existence of an inferred cause of action to vindicate free speech and associational rights, issues that, under principles of comity and federalism, should be decided in the first instance by the Connecticut Supreme Court. The free speech and associational rights guaranteed by the Connecticut Constitution are more extensive than those guaranteed by the First Amendment. See Leydon, Linares supra. Consequently, the Connecticut Supreme Court has a specific public policy interest in deciding whether a cause of action will be available to enforce the distinct speech and associational rights recognized by the state constitution. Therefore, certification is appropriate here.
c. This question is likely to recur and its resolution will assist the administration of justice in both federal and state courts.
Finally, the issue of whether Connecticut recognizes a private right of action under Article First, §§ 4 and 14 of Connecticut’s Constitution is sure to recur in both state and federal
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litigation, necessitating a prompt resolution of this question by the state Supreme Court. More importantly, it is likely to recur in the instant case. Assuming arguendo that the Connecticut Supreme Court certifies that Plaintiffs are indeed protected under Article First, §§ 4 and 14, Defendants are likely to move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Fourth Claim on the grounds that the Connecticut Supreme Court has not recognized a private right of action under these constitutional provisions, just as Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ other state constitutional claims addressed herein. See Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 188-191. Resolving these issues simultaneously is strongly in the interests of judicial efficiency. Therefore, certification is appropriate here. See Conn. App. Proc. § 82-3.
B. In the alternative, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Nineteenth Claims should be denied. For the reasons stated above, if this Court declines to certify the questions of state law
outlined supra, then Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Nineteenth Claims should be denied.
C. In the alternative, Plaintiffs’ Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Nineteenth Claims should be dismissed without prejudice. In the event that this Court chooses to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims, this Court should
dismiss the state law claims in Plaintiffs’ Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Nineteenth Claims without prejudice so that plaintiffs may refile those claims in the appropriate state venue. See Lopez v. Smiley, 375 F. Supp. 2d 19, 26-27 (D.Conn. 2005). However, Plaintiffs emphasize that dismissing these claims to allow the state law issues to make their way up to the Connecticut Supreme Court through the state system would not serve the interests of judicial economy as
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well as certification. Dismissal, as opposed to certification, would require two courts to manage discovery and motion practice on overlapping constitutional claims.
D. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Sixteenth Claim should be denied. Plaintiffs Sixteenth Claim for Relief alleges a cause of action for conspiracy against the
defendant HARFOT officers and the DPD officers under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 254-58. Defendant DPD officers claim that Bivens is not applicable to them because they are not federal officials. Defs.’ Br. at 9-10.
Defendants misunderstand Plaintiffs’ Sixteenth Claim for Relief. Although “[i]t is axiomatic that a Bivens action can be brought only against one … who is acting under color of federal law,” Reuber v. United States, 750 F.2d 1039, 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1984), it is equally clear that defendants need not be federal employees to be held accountable for constitutional violations under Bivens if they were indeed acting under color of federal law. See id. at 1055 n.20. See also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941 (1982) (holding that conduct “fairly attributable” to a government actor may be the basis for a claim of a violation of a federal right); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150-52 (1970); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966) (“to act ‘under color’ of law does not require that the accused be an officer of the State. It is enough that he is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents.”); Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 1993); Island Online, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 289, 305 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). Indeed, when federal governmental authority “dominates an activity to such an extent that its participants must be deemed to act with the authority” of the federal government, then “constitutional constraints
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Case 3:07-cv-01436-RNC Document 66 Filed 03/07/2008 Page 32 of 34 apply,” and the actors are held liable under Bivens. See Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. Department of Aviation, 45 F.3d 1144, 1149 (7th Cir. 1995).
Therefore, since the Amended Complaint alleges facts that, if true, would constitute a conspiracy to deprive Plaintiffs of their rights under color of federal law,9 Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Sixteenth Claim for Relief should be denied.
9 Similarly, it could be found that the HARFOT and DPD officers were acting under color of state law, in which case they would be liable for violating the Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights under § 1983. See Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 195199 (Plaintiffs’ Sixth Claim for Relief). Since discovery has not yet commenced, and “because a conspiracy by its very nature is a secretive operation,” United States v. Pitre, 960 F.2d 1112, 1121 (2d Cir. 1992), Plaintiffs have pleaded the Conspiracy claims in the alternative.
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V. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above the aforementioned questions should be certified to the Supreme Court of Connecticut, Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Nineteenth claims should be held in abeyance pending a decision by the Connecticut State Supreme Court, and Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Sixteenth Claim should be denied. In the alternative, the Court should either deny Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss entirely, or dismiss the relevant claims without prejudice so that they may be refiled at the state level.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Michael Wishnie _ Michael Wishnie (ct27221) Supervising Attorney

/s/ Christopher Lasch _ Christopher Lasch (ct27139) Supervising Attorney

/s/ Ramzi Kassem

_

Ramzi Kassem (ct27537)

Supervising Attorney

Justin Cox, Law Student Intern Ari Holtzblatt, Law Student Intern Heide Iravani, Law Student Intern Michael Tan, Law Student Intern

JEROME N. FRANK LEGAL SERVICES ORGANIZATION Yale Law School P.O. Box 209090 New Haven, Connecticut 06520 Phone: (203) 432-4800

Counsel for Plaintiffs

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I herby certify that on March 7, 2008, a copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Opposition to the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and in Support of Cross-Motions to Certify Questions of Law to the Connecticut Supreme Court and to Hold in Abeyance Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss was filed electronically. Notice of this filing will be sent by e-mail to all parties by operation of the Court’s electronic filing system. Parties may access this filing through the Court’s system.

/s/ Michael Wishnie _ Michael Wishnie (ct27221) Supervising Attorney

/s/ Christopher Lasch _ Christopher Lasch (ct27139) Supervising Attorney

/s/ Ramzi Kassem

_

Ramzi Kassem (ct27537)

Supervising Attorney

Justin Cox, Law Student Intern Ari Holtzblatt, Law Student Intern Heide Iravani, Law Student Intern Michael Tan, Law Student Intern

JEROME N. FRANK LEGAL SERVICES ORGANIZATION Yale Law School P.O. Box 209090 New Haven, Connecticut 06520 Phone: (203) 432-4800

Counsel for Plaintiffs

34

 
 Case 3:07-cv-01436-RNC Document 48-2 Filed 02/01/08 Page 1 of 34

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

JUAN BARRERA, JOSE CABRERA,

:

DANIEL CHAVEZ, JOSE DUMA,

:

JOSE LLIBISUPA, ISAAC

:

MALDONADO, EDGAR REDROVAN, :

NICHOLAS SEGUNDO SANCHEZ,

:

JUAN CARLOS SIMBANA, and

: CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:07cv01436(RNC)

DANILO BRITO VARGAS

:

:

Plaintiffs,

:

:

V.

: FEBRUARY 1, 2008

:

MARK BOUGHTON, ALAN BAKER, :

JOSE AGOSTO, RICHARD DEJESUS, :

JAMES FISHER, JAMES LALLI,

:

CRAIG MARTIN, JOSEPH NORKUS, :

JOHN DOES, CITY OF DANBURY,

:

RONALD PREBLE, RICHARD

:

McCAFFREY, JAMES BROWN, JOHN :

DOES and USA

:

:

Defendants.

:

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION
The undersigned Defendant, Mark Boughton, the Mayor of the City of Danbury (“Mayor Boughton”), submits this memorandum of law in support of his motion, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b) and Local Rules 7(a) and 83.2(a), for an order disqualifying Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization (the “Frank Organization”) from its continued representation

Case 3:07-cv-01436-RNC Document 48-2 Filed 02/01/08 Page 2 of 34
of the plaintiffs in the present action (the “Barrera lawsuit”) because such representation constitutes an ethically impermissible concurrent conflict of interest in violation of Connecticut’s Rules of Professional Conduct.
Preliminary Statement The Frank Organization currently represents an organization called The Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding (“CCJEF”). Mayor Boughton has been president of CCJEF since December, 2006. He is also president of CCJEF’s steering committee, and plays a very active role in this organization. The Frank Organization filed an education adequacy lawsuit on CCJEF’s behalf in November, 2005 (the “education lawsuit”). The Frank Organization and Mayor Boughton communicate on a regular basis with regard to the current status of the education lawsuit and legal strategies pertaining thereto. The Mayor has placed his trust and confidence in the Frank Organization and has relied upon the legal counsel and advice the Frank Organization provides to him. In September, 2007, the Frank Organization brought suit against Mayor Boughton, who is the Mayor of the City of Danbury, on behalf of the Barrera plaintiffs. The Frank Organization has sued Mayor Boughton in both his official and individual capacities. Its Amended Complaint accuses Mayor Boughton of instituting a racially discriminatory immigration enforcement campaign that targeted Ecuadorian day-laborers that resided in the City of Danbury. Although the Frank Organization was fully aware of the potential conflict of interest, it accepted
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employment as counsel for the Barrera plaintiffs, in complete disregard of Rule 1.7 of Connecticut’s Rules of Professional Conduct.
In short, the Frank Organization has created a directly adverse relationship with Mayor Boughton as a result of its decision to represent the plaintiffs in the Barrera lawsuit in violation of Rule 1.7, and, therefore, the Danbury Defendants’ motion to disqualify should be granted.
Statement of Facts CCJEF is a non-profit organization that was formed on November 22, 2004. (See Certificate of Incorporation, attached as Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Defendant Mark Boughton (“Boughton Affidavit”.) (The Boughton Affidavit, in its entirety, has been attached as Exhibit 2 to this Motion to Disqualify.) The Frank Organization is listed as the registered agent for service of process on CCJEF's Certificate of Incorporation. (Id.) Mayor Boughton, who was first elected Mayor in November 2001, was one of the founding members of CCJEF. (See Press Release dated Dec. 20, 2006, attached as Exhibit 3 to this Motion to Disqualify.) To date, the Frank Organization has received $30,000 from the City of Danbury to partially defray the costs of its representation of CCJEF. (See CCJEF Invoices Totaling $30,000, attached as Exhibit C to the Boughton Affidavit; see also Boughton Affidavit at ¶ 6.) CCJEF is a “broad-based coalition of municipalities, local boards of education, statewide education associations, advocacy organizations, parents and others intent upon modernizing the state’s fiscal infrastructure necessary for ensuring suitable and equal educational opportunity for all Connecticut
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schoolchildren. . . . CCJEF communities . . . educate more than two-thirds of all minority, poor, and limited-English proficient schoolchildren.” (See Press Release dated Dec. 20, 2006, attached as Exhibit 3 to this Motion to Disqualify.)
In November, 2005, the Frank Organization filed an education adequacy lawsuit on behalf of CCJEF against Governor Jodi Rell, certain members of the State Board of Education, the Commissioner of Education of the State of Connecticut, and the Treasurer and Comptroller of the State of Connecticut (“CCJEF Complaint” or “education lawsuit”). (See CCJEF Complaint, attached as Exhibit B to the Boughton Affidavit.) The CCJEF Complaint also named several school children and their parents as plaintiffs, and it alleged that these plaintiffs were not receiving “suitable and substantially equal educational opportunities” in certain school districts in Connecticut, including Danbury’s school district. (CCJEF Complaint, at ¶ 37.)
As a result of its representation of CCJEF, the Frank Organization has had a series of communications with Mayor Boughton concerning the education lawsuit. (Boughton Affidavit at ¶ 8.) As mentioned earlier, Mayor Boughton is president of CCJEF’s steering committee. (Id.) Attorneys from the Frank Organization attend these committee meetings to discuss relevant issues and legal strategies pertaining to the education lawsuit, and they also keep record of the meeting minutes. (Id.) Mayor Boughton, in his capacity as president of the steering committee, has been working with the Frank Organization’s attorneys to discuss legal strategies for the
4

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education lawsuit. (Id.) He relies upon the Frank Organization’s guidance, advice and counsel. (See Boughton Affidavit at ¶ 16.)
The events leading up to the filing of the Barrera lawsuit by the Frank Organization stem from the arrest of eleven day laborers in the vicinity of Kennedy Park and Main Street in Danbury by several officers of the Danbury Police Department (“DPD”) on September 19, 2006. In October, 2006, the Frank Organization submitted two Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests on behalf of itself and several interest groups, for all records related to the arrest of the Barrera plaintiffs. (See FOIA Requests, attached as Exhibit E to the Boughton Affidavit). The first FOIA request was directed to the Office of the Mayor of Danbury, and the second was directed to the DPD. (Id.) The first FOIA request sought records that were presumed to be at the Office of the Mayor of Danbury, including, inter alia:
1. All records relating to the planning, coordination, execution and follow-up on the September 19, arrests.
2. All records of any communication with any officer or staff of the DPD, Corporation Counsel, or any other municipal agency, pertaining to the September 19 arrests.
3. Al records of any communication with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, or any other federal or state agency or official regarding the September 19 arrests.
4. All records of any communication with the press about the September 19 arrests. … 1. All records [that were in effect since December 1, 2001] pertaining to City of
Danbury policies, practices or attempts to enforce municipal ordinances, including traffic ordinances, in and around Kennedy Park. 2. Any and all complaints received about the activities of any individuals or groups of people, in or around Kennedy Park, or elsewhere in Danbury, Connecticut, and
5

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all records pertaining to any follow-up action taken in response to such complaints. … 4. All records pertaining to City of Danbury policies or practices dealing with undocumented immigrants in Danbury, Connecticut. … (Id.) In an effort to comply with the Frank Organization’s FOIA requests, the City of Danbury permitted the Frank Organization to inspect the records kept at the offices of the Corporation Counsel in Danbury. (Boughton Affidavit at ¶ 10.) The Frank Organization inspected these records on November 15, 2006. (Id.) After reviewing the records and considering them to be partly unresponsive to their FOIA requests, the Frank Organization sent another letter on November 21, 2006, requesting the records they deemed to be outstanding. (See Appeal of Denial of FOIA Request, attached as Exhibit F to Boughton Affidavit.) On December 14, 2006, the Frank Organization filed a complaint against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to compel the disclosure and release of agency records pertaining to “[Immigration and Custom Enforcement (“ICE”)]’s immigration enforcement polices, practices and activities in and around Danbury, Connecticut, including ICE’s cooperation with local elected officials and the local police department to accomplish such enforcement.” (See Complaint against DHS at ¶ 2, attached as Exhibit G to the Boughton Affidavit [emphasis added].) The DHS complaint alleged that: “Through state and national lobbying efforts as well as the implementation of local policies directed at immigrant communities, Mayor Boughton has taken several affirmative steps to limit
6

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new immigration in Danbury . . . and to drive out immigrants already living in Danbury.” (Id. at
¶ 12). The DHS complaint further alleged that:
17. Mayor Boughton and the DPD have also systematically targeted immigrant communities through numerous policies including discriminatory enforcement of city ordinances, such as housing code and vehicle registration regulations, shutting down neighborhood volleyball games, encouraging police harassment of day laborers, encouraging direct police enforcement of civil immigration laws upon stopping motorists for moving violations …
18. With Mayor Boughton’s support, code inspectors have discriminatorily enforced Danbury’s fire and building codes and parking regulations against Danbury’s immigrant and Latino communities ….
19. In April 2005, with Mayor Boughton’s support, the Danbury Common Council considered an ordinance banning ‘repetitive outdoor group activities.’ The purpose of this ordinance was to shut down the Ecuadorian community’s volleyball games. Mayor Boughton also requested that the DPD aggressively police the volleyball games to achieve the same end.
… 22. Most recently, the Mayor announced a campaign to crack down on Danbury
residents whose vehicles are registered out of state. Mayor Boughton claims that out-of-state registrations cheat the city out of tax dollars. However, the community is acutely aware that this campaign is actually designed to target immigrants, some of whom find it easier to register a vehicle out of state ….
(Id. at ¶¶ 17-19; 22 (internal quotation marks omitted.)) The Frank Organization then filed an
appeal of their first FOIA request that was directed to the Office of the Mayor of Danbury with the Freedom of Information Commission on December 19, 2006.1 (See Appeal of FOIA
1On January 4, 2007, the City of Danbury provided the Frank Organization with documentation in an effort to further comply with its FOIA request. (See Corporation Counsel letter dated Mar. 6, 2007 at p. 3, attached as Exhibit H to the Boughton Affidavit.)
7

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Request, attached as Exhibit F to the Boughton Affidavit.) The appeal was filed on the ground that “there likely existed other records responsive to [its] requests that had not yet been provided” and that as of December 14, “neither the Mayor’s office nor the [DPD] . . . provided access to any additional records” and that its FOIA request, therefore, had been denied. (Id. at p. 2.)
The following day, the Deputy Corporation Counsel for the City of Danbury sent a letter to the Frank Organization, notifying the firm of the potential conflict of interest concerning its representation in the CCJEF and FOIA matters. (See Corporation Counsel letter dated Dec. 20, 2006, attached as Exhibit H to the Boughton Affidavit.) The letter stated that, in light of the fact that Mayor Boughton is president of CCJEF as well as chief elected officer of the City of Danbury, the Frank Organization’s filing of the DHS Complaint and the two FOIA requests created a concurrent conflict of interest: “It appears to us that . . . [the Frank Organization] must review its apparent dual and conflicted position with respect to these two matters. . . . While the [Frank] organization may proclaim that there is no actual or pending suit or action against the City of Danbury, [the Frank] organization’s recent actions are tantamount to a potential pending claim or preparation for the same.” (See id. (emphasis added.))
On February 7, 2007, the Frank Organization responded, indicating that under Rule 1.13, neither Mayor Boughton nor the City of Danbury was a client of the Frank Organization, and that the Frank Organization owed a duty of loyalty only to CCJEF, and not any of its constituents. (See Frank Organization letter dated Feb. 7, 2007 at pp. 2-3, attached as Exhibit H to the
8

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Boughton Affidavit.) Deputy Corporation Counsel replied on March 6, 2007, and requested that the Frank Organization withdraw from its representation: “It is the City [of Danbury]’s position that, since the CCJEF representation is not only earlier in time, has drawn substantial time, effort and resources, involves a larger client base and, most importantly would most negatively impact the City were [the Frank Organization] to withdraw, that [the Frank Organization] . . . must withdraw from the FOIA matter and obtain other representation for those clients.” (See Corporation Counsel letter dated Mar. 6, 2007 at p. 2, attached as Exhibit H to the Boughton Affidavit.) It is undisputed that the FOIA matter concerned the parties that later became the plaintiffs in the Barrera lawsuit.
On March 19, 2007, the Frank Organization filed a Notice of Intention to Commence an Action with the Clerk of the City of Danbury. (See Notice of Intention to Commence an Action, attached as Exhibit I to the Boughton Affidavit.) The next day, the Frank Organization, Mayor Boughton, Deputy Corporation Counsel, and a representative from CCJEF had a meeting to discuss the potential conflict of interest issue. (Boughton Affidavit at ¶ 14.) Again, the Frank Organization stated that it did not believe there was a “bona fide conflict,” and that it “would not withdraw from the immigration matter, but rather would consider the risks of continuing the representation of the CCJEF matter instead.” (Id.) Several months later, on September 26, 2007, the Frank Organization filed a complaint on behalf of the Barrera plaintiffs. An Amended Complaint was then filed on November 26, 2007.
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To assist in understanding what he perceives to be a conflict of interest on the part of the Frank Organization, Mayor Boughton, through counsel, has retained Professor Charles W. Wolfram to be an expert witness in this matter to review and comment. Upon reviewing the Amended Complaint, Prof. Wolfram stated: “[i]n this Barrera litigation, the Frank Organization lawyers are accusing Mayor Boughton’s City of Danbury administration of unlawful and unconstitutional activities concerning Latino immigrants. They are doing so in language that strongly suggests an actively discriminatory and unjust frame of mind on the part of Mayor Boughton personally. Most dramatically . . . the Frank Organization has framed the complaint in this proceeding in a way that charges Mayor Boughton ‘in his official and personal capacities’ [Amended Complaint at ¶ 13] with committing wrongful and objectionable acts.” (Declaration of Professor Charles W. Wolfram (“Wolfram Declaration”) at ¶ 12 [emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted], attached as Exhibit 1 to this Motion to Disqualify)
The Amended Complaint alleges that the unlawful arrest of the plaintiffs was the result of an “undercover immigration sting operation.” (Amended Complaint at ¶ 61.) More importantly, the Amended Complaint is replete with references to Mayor Boughton’s alleged implementation of discriminatory immigration policies, and, with the help of the DPD officers, the enforcement of those policies, which targeted day-laborers on the basis of their race, ethnicity and perceived national origin, in an effort to encourage Ecuadorian immigrants to leave the City of Danbury. For example, the Amended Complaint alleges that “[t]he arrival of new Latino immigrants . . .
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has sparked a backlash from Mayor Bougton’s administration, which has targeted, harassed and intimidated these new city residents . . . . Mayor Boughton has especially directed these discriminatory polices against Danbury’s Ecuadorian community.” (Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 33-34.) “The centerpiece of Danbury’s harassment campaign under Mayor Boughton . . . has been the City of Danbury’s escalating involvement in the enforcement of federal immigration laws . . . through the [DPD].” (Id. at ¶ 37.) “Mayor Boughton and the DPD have singled out the day-laborer community in Danbury’s Kennedy Park for special harassment. . . . on the basis of their race, ethnicity, and perceived national origin.” (Id. at ¶¶ 48-49.) “Mayor Boughton also allowed the [September 19, 2006] arrests to occur out of total disregard for the constitutional interests of the arrestees.” (Id. at ¶ 110.)
“[These] adversary activities are both obviously against [Mayor Boughton’s] personal interests and are being planned and carried out by the same Frank Organization lawyers who purport to be entitled to Mayor Boughton’s trust and confidence in their zealous and clientcentered advice and other services in the CCJEF Equal Funding Litigation.” (Wolfram Declaration at ¶ 12.)
In his affidavit, Mayor Boughton responds to the allegations made against him in the Barrera lawsuit by the Frank Organization:
I am very concerned about the Frank Organization’s role as both counsel for CCJEF and the Barrera plaintiffs. … As President of [CCJEF], I believe in the policy that all children must be educationally protected, regardless of their immigration status.
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As President of CCJEF and as President of the Steering Committee, I work with the Frank Organization lawyers to further those goals in which I strongly believe. It is extraordinarily disconcerting and troublesome to me that the same lawyers with whom I work to further the laudatory goals of CCJEF have turned around and sued me in the Barrera case, alleging that I have ‘targeted, harassed, and intimidated’ new Latino immigrants in Danbury through a number of discriminatory polices . . . in an effort to drive unwanted immigrants from Danbury and to deter future immigrants from making Danbury their home …. (Boughton Affidavit at ¶ 15 (emphasis added)). Mayor Boughton further states: “The Frank Organization’s dual representation results in a chilling effect on my ability to discuss legal strategy, pending motions, and public message with the Frank Organization, its students, and its lawyers. So long as the Frank Organization continues to represent the Barrera plaintiffs, I will be guarded in my communications with them, fearing that my words and actions would or could somehow be used in the Barrera case.” (Id. at ¶ 16.) It is Professor Wolfram’s opinion that “the Frank Organization has seriously departed from the standard of conduct that would be followed by lawyers of ordinary care and prudence in undertaking representation of the Plaintiffs in a lawsuit targeted directly and personally against Mayor Boughton with whom the Frank Organization maintains a fiduciary relationship in its extensive dealings with him personally in representing the CCJEF in the [education lawsuit]. That course of conduct warrants disqualification of the Frank Organization from further participation in this matter.” (Wolfram Declaration at ¶ 3.)
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Argument It is well recognized that “[t]he district court bears the responsibility for the supervision of the members of its bar. . . . The dispatch of this duty is discretionary in nature and the finding of the district court will be upset only upon a showing that an abuse of discretion has taken place. . . . Moreover, in the disqualification situation, any doubt is to be resolved in favor of disqualification.” Hull v. Celanese Corp. et al., 513 F.2d 568, 571 (2d Cir. 1975) (citations omitted.) The issue in the present case is governed by Rule 1.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 1.7 (a) provides in relevant part: “[A] lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if: (1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or (2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client . . . . ” Conn. Rules Prof’l Conduct R. 1.7 (a) (2007).2
2Rule 1.7 (b) provides: “Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under subsection (a), a lawyer may represent a client if: (1) The lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client; (2) The representation is not prohibited by law; (3) The representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or the same proceeding before any tribunal; and (4) Each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.” Conn. Rules Prof’l Conduct R. 1.7 (b) (2007).
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The Frank Organization has argued that Rule 1.13, rather than Rule 1.7, applies in the present case. (See Frank Organization letter dated Feb. 6, 2007, attached as Exhibit H to the Boughton Affidavit; Boughton Affidavit at ¶ 14.)
Rule 1.13 (a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides: “A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents.” Conn. Rules Prof’l Conduct R. 1.13 (a) (2007) (emphasis added.) Expanding on this principle, the Commentary to Rule 1.13 provides in relevant part: “An organizational client is a legal entity, but it cannot act except through its officers, directors . . . and other constituents. Officers, directors . . . are the constituents of the corporate organizational client. . . . When constituents of the organization make decisions for it, the decisions ordinarily must be accepted by the lawyer even if their utility or prudence is doubtful.” Conn. Rules Prof’l Conduct R. 1.13 cmt. (2007). Mayor Boughton is more than just a mere constituent of CCJEF. As discussed later, cases have considered those in similar situations as the Mayor as if they were clients. As Professor Wolfram states in his Declaration, other courts have found conflicts to exist and have ordered the disqualification in cases such as this. (Wolfram Declaration at ¶¶ 13-16) As Professor Wolfram opines in his Declaration:
The situation here is . . . much more aggravated because of the need of Mayor Boughton to deal simultaneously with the same Frank Organization lawyers both as zealous advocates for the interest of the CCJEF and as adversary against the Mayor. Morever . . . the Frank Organization lawyers, in the course of their discussions of the Equal Funding Litigation with Mayor Boughton, will have ample occasions to gain
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what might be critically important insights into the Mayor’s litigation strategies, his ways of dealing with litigation risks, and his attitudes toward settlement - among many other matters - that could prove important to this [Barrera] litigation. No person should be put to the risk by his or her own lawyers that words and ideas that they might reasonably share with their own counsel will be put to use against the same person’s important interests in contemporaneous litigation. (Wolfram Declaration at ¶ 17 (emphasis in original; emphasis added)) 1. Rule 1.13 of the Rules of Professional Conduct does not shield the Frank Organization from the concurrent conflict of interest created by its representation of CCJEF and the Barrera plaintiffs, because Mayor Boughton must be viewed as a client of the Frank Organization for concurrent conflict of interest purposes. It is undisputed that the Frank Organization is suing Mayor Boughton, while at the same time it represents CCJEF in the education lawsuit. It is also undisputed that Mayor Boughton is president of CCJEF’s steering committee, which is intimately involved in the education lawsuit, and he regularly meets with the Frank Organization to discuss the status of the education lawsuit and available legal strategies. The Frank Organization takes direction from Mayor Boughton on behalf of CCJEF’s steering committee on how to proceed in the education lawsuit, as a result of these meetings. The Frank Organization has chosen to ignore the relevance of the above facts for purposes of a concurrent conflict of interest analysis. “[T]he Frank Organization’s position . . . is incomplete and unduly formalistic in view of the facts here, and it ignores the important and highly relevant human elements involved in representations of, even entity clients such as CCJEF.” (Wolfram Declaration at ¶ 8)
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The Frank Organization cites to Rule 1.13 in support of its position that it does not represent Mayor Boughton because he is only a constituent of CCJEF. (See Frank Organization letter dated Feb. 6, 2007, attached as Exhibit H to the Boughton Affidavit; Boughton Affidavit at ¶ 14.) However, the Frank Organization’s reliance on Rule 1.13 is misplaced. Although the Commentary to Rule 1.13 explains that a lawyer’s representation of an organization does not necessarily mean that the lawyer also represents the organization’s constituents, under the facts and circumstances presented in this case, as Professor Wolfram points out, such a view is overly formalistic. (See Wolfram Declaration at ¶ 8.)
“The facts indicate that Mayor Boughton is serving as far more than a figurehead leader of CCJEF.” (Wolfram Declaration at ¶ 10.) In his capacity as president of both the organization and the steering committee, Mayor Boughton makes decisions on behalf of CCJEF with respect to the CCJEF litigation, based upon the legal advice and guidance he receives from the Frank Organization. CCJEF’s steering committee meets on a monthly basis. (Boughton Affidavit at ¶ 8.) The Frank Organization coordinates and attends these meetings, to provide Mayor Boughton with updates as to the status of the education lawsuit, and to discuss legal strategies that are available to CCJEF in the case. (Id.) Based on the information provided by the Frank Organization, the steering committee decides how the organization should proceed with the education lawsuit. (Boughton Affidavit at ¶ 8; Wolfram Declaration at ¶ 10.)
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As evidence of his dedication in furtherance of CCJEF’s ultimate goals and purpose, Mayor Boughton authored the preface of a document on behalf of CCJEF’s steering committee in February 2007, entitled “A Framework for Adequately and Equitably Funding Connecticut's Public Schools.” The preface explains that the Framework illustrates a means by which increased funding can be provided to Connecticut students, so that all Connecticut schoolchildren can have access to adequate educational opportunities. (See Framework, attached as Exhibit D to Boughton’s Affidavit.)
“[T]he Steering Group, with Mayor Boughton as its head and serving that important function actively, represents the practical and personal embodiment of the theoretical ‘entity’ that is CCJEF.” (Wolfram Declaration at ¶ 11.) Mayor Boughton’s “role as president of CCJEF and president of its Steering Committee in the Equal Funding Litigation finds him . . . involved in a direct and personal way in dealing with the same law firm, if on factually unrelated matters, as is suing him personally in this Barrera litigation. And, the charges that the Frank Organization lawyers have brought against him in this [Barrera] litigation threaten both obvious personal and political interests of Mayor Boughton.” (Wolfram Declaration at ¶ 13.) In short, Mayor Boughton must be viewed as a client of the Frank Organization.
In North Star Hotels Corp. v. Mid-City Hotel Assocs., 118 F.R.D. 109 (D. Minn. 1987), the court disqualified counsel in a similar situation. In that case, plaintiff North Star Hotels Corp. managed and operated a hotel that was owned by defendant Mid-City Hotel Associates, in
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accordance with a management contract. Id. at 110. The law firm of Faegre & Benson represented the plaintiff in connection with this contract. Id. The defendant filed a motion to disqualify after Faegre & Benson refused to voluntarily withdraw from its representation of the plaintiff. Id. The defendant was a partnership comprised of two general partners, one of whom was Harry A. Johnson. Id. The defendant claimed that Faegre & Benson’s representation of the plaintiff created a conflict of interest with respect to two of Faegre’s other clients, St. Louis Centre Partners and Burnsville Woods Partnership, because Johnson was also a principal owner in these two partnerships. Id. Specifically, three general partners owned St. Louis Centre: AP Development, Rosewood Corporation (another client of Faegre & Benson), and Pineapple Management, of which Johnson was a 96 percent owner. Id. Concerning Burnsville Woods Partnership, Rosewood Corporation and an entity known as HAJ Construction were each 50 percent owners. Id. HAJ Construction was entirely owned by Johnson. Id. In support of its motion for disqualification, counsel for the defendant represented to the court that Johnson, its general partner, was denied a letter of credit that would have predicated a certain real estate transaction for Burnsville Woods, because of a lis pendens Faegre & Benson filed in connection with its representation of the plaintiff North Star Hotels. Id.
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The court, relying on Minnesota's Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7 (which is substantially similar to Connecticut’s Rule 1.7),3 concluded that: “Faegre & Benson represents a plaintiff who has the potential for collecting a large judgment which would be financially adversarial to its other clients. If the suit is successful, a judgment for which Harry Johnson is personally liable puts [St. Louis Centre and Burnsville Woods] at a direct financial risk.” Id. at 111. The court further reasoned: “Harry Johnson is a key principal in St. Louis Centre, Burnsville Woods, and [the defendant Mid-City Hotel Assocs.]. . . . As assets belonging to him, Harry Johnson’s interests in the two partnerships represented by Faegre & Benson could be impaired or reduced. His financial position is clearly significant to the two partnerships represented by Faegre & Benson.” Id. at 112. For these reasons, the court granted the defendant’s motion to disqualify Faegre & Benson from its representation of the plaintiff. Id. at 113.
3“Rule 1.7 of Minnesota’s Rules of Professional Conduct provides: (a) ‘A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client will be directly adverse to another client, unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect the relationship with the other client; and (2) each client consents after consultation. (b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected; and (2) the client consents after consultation. When representation of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation of the implications of the common representation and the advantages and risks involved.’” North Star Hotels Corp. v. Mid-City Hotel Associates, supra, 118 F.R.D. at 111 (internal quotation marks omitted.)
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In the present case, just as in North Star Hotels, Mayor Boughton can be viewed as a key principal of CCJEF, as a result of his active participation in the CCJEF organization, as well as his interactions with the Frank Organization on a personal level, justifying the disqualification of the Frank Organization. 2. An adversarial relationship exists between the Frank Organization and Mayor
Boughton, and it results in a direct violation of Rule 1.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. “[T]he maintenance of public confidence in the bar requires an attorney to decline employment adverse to his client, even though the nature of such employment is wholly unrelated to that of his existing representation.” Cinema 5, Ltd., v. Cinerama, Inc. et al., 528 F.2d 1384, 1386-87 (2d Cir. 1976). When the issue is that of a concurrent conflict of interest, as is present here, the “substantial relationship” test (where the court determines whether the central issue in both cases is essentially the same) is inapplicable. Id. at 1385-86. Rather, to properly analyze a potential concurrent conflict of interest, “the propriety of [the lawyer’s] conduct must be measured not so much against the similarities in litigation, as against the duty of undivided loyalty which an attorney owes to each of his clients.” Id. at 1386. The Frank Organization’s actions soon after the September 19, 2006 incident helped create the adversarial relationship which now exists between itself and Mayor Boughton. Approximately one month after the September 19, 2006 arrests, the Frank Organization submitted two FOIA requests on behalf of itself and several interest groups for all records related
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to the arrest of the Barrera plaintiffs, one of which was directed to the Office of the Mayor of Danbury, and the other to Danbury’s Police Department. (See FOIA Requests, attached as Exhibit E to the Boughton Affidavit.) After having inspected the records kept at the office of the Corporation Counsel in Danbury and deeming them to be incomplete, the Frank Organization filed an appeal with the Freedom of Information Commission on December 19, 2006, on the ground that its FOIA request had been denied because “neither the Mayor’s Office nor the Danbury Police Department had provided access to any additional records.” (See Appeal of Denial of FOIA Request, attached as Exhibit F to Boughton Affidavit.)
However, several days before filing its appeal, the Frank Organization filed a complaint against DHS, which essentially was a third FOIA request, seeking the disclosure and release of agency records pertaining to “ICE’s immigration enforcement polices, practices and activities in and around Danbury, Connecticut, including ICE’s cooperation with local elected officials and the local police department to accomplish such enforcement.” (See Complaint against DHS at ¶ 2, attached as Exhibit G to the Boughton Affidavit [emphasis added].)
Even before the Barrera lawsuit was filed, the conflict of interest issue was addressed. In response to the Frank Organization’s actions, the City’s Deputy Corporation Counsel, acting on Mayor Boughton’s behalf, discussed the potential conflict of interest issue with the Frank Organization on three separate occasions: 1) via letter dated December 20, 2006, 2) via letter dated March 6, 2007, which expressly requested that the Frank Organization withdraw from its
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representation concerning the FOIA matters, and 3) during a meeting on March 20, 2007, one day after the Frank Organization filed its Notice of Intention to Commence an Action. The Frank Organization’s position remained the same: there was no actual or bona fide conflict of interest, and it represented CCJEF, not Mayor Boughton. (See all letters attached as Exhibit H to the Boughton Affidavit; Boughton Affidavit at ¶ 14.) Despite having been given ample notice of the potential conflict of interest, the Frank Organization filed the Barrera lawsuit against Mayor Boughton.
Indeed, the Barrera suit was filed more than six months after the City’s Deputy Corporation Counsel requested that the Frank Organization withdraw as counsel. In light of the rule recognized in Cinema 5, Ltd., v. Cinerama, Inc. et al., supra, the Frank Organization’s conduct was improper. See id. at 1386-87 (“[T]he maintenance of public confidence in the bar requires an attorney to decline employment adverse to his client, even though the nature of such employment is wholly unrelated to that of his existing representation.”)
Mayor Boughton has been sued in his official and individual capacities. (Amended Complaint at ¶ 13.) The Amended Complaint filed by the Frank Organization accuses Mayor Boughton of racially discriminatory conduct that constitutes a personal attack on Mayor Boughton, as well as his administration. In essence, the complaint blames Mayor Boughton for the September 19, 2006 arrests, and seeks to hold him personally responsible for the alleged implementation of immigration policies that were intended to intimidate, harass and force out the
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Latino immigrant community from Danbury. It alleges that “[t]he arrival of new Latino immigrants … has sparked a backlash from Mayor Bougton’s administration, which has targeted, harassed and intimidated these new city residents …. (Amended Complaint at ¶ 33.) Mayor Boughton has especially directed these discriminatory polices against Danbury’s Ecuadorian community.” (Id. at ¶ 34.) “The centerpiece of Danbury’s harassment campaign under Mayor Boughton … has been the City of Danbury’s escalating involvement in the enforcement of federal immigration laws, especially through the [DPD].” (Id. at ¶ 37.) “Mayor Boughton and the DPD have singled out the day-laborer community in Danbury’s Kennedy Park for special harassment.” (Id. at ¶ 48.) “Mayor Boughton and the DPD have targeted them for harassment on the basis of their race, ethnicity, and perceived national origin.” (Id. at ¶ 49.) “Mayor Boughton also allowed the [September 19, 2006] arrests to occur out of total disregard for the constitutional interests of the arrestees.” (Id. at ¶ 110.)
Viewing the totality of the circumstances presented here, it is clear that an adversarial relationship exists between the Frank Organization and Mayor Boughton. In accordance with Rule 1.7 (a)(1), this relationship constitutes a concurrent conflict of interest. Additionally, under Rule 1.7 (a)(2), there is a significant risk that Mayor Boughton’s ability to work with the Frank Organization on behalf of CCJEF in the education lawsuit has been severely compromised, thus materially limiting the Frank Organization’s representation of CCJEF. As Professor Wolfram opines:
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[T]he Steering Group, with Mayor Boughton as its head and serving that important function actively, represents the practical and personal embodiment of the theoretical ‘entity’ that is CCJEF. Given that capacity, it is clear that, at a future point, Mayor Boughton well might find himself listening to advice of the Frank Organization lawyers about their recommendations concerning such critical matters as a proposed settlement offer. At that and many similarly important decision points, clients are entitled to be able to rest complete trust and confidence in the loyalty and commitment of their counsel. As would any person, whether sophisticated in dealings with lawyers or not, Mayor Boughton would most likely find it extremely uncomfortable if forced to continue to rely on lawyers who are also his present and ongoing adversaries in [the Barrera lawsuit] brought personally against him. (Wolfram Declaration at ¶ 11.) 3. Disqualification of the Frank Organization from continued representation of the Barrera plaintiffs is warranted, and the conflict cannot be cured. “Where the relationship is a continuing one, adverse representation is prima facie improper . . . and the attorney must be prepared to show, at the very least, that there will be no actual or apparent conflict in loyalties or diminution in the vigor of his representation.” Cinema 5, Ltd., v. Cinerama, Inc. et al., supra, 528 F.2d at 1387 (citation omitted; emphasis added.) This standard is a heavy burden for the Frank Organization to meet. Again, it is important to mention that Mayor Boughton has been sued by the lawyers who advise him. He is concerned that whatever is discussed at CCJEF, or whatever decisions he makes on behalf of CCJEF, will be used against him in the Barrera lawsuit. (Boughton Affidavit at ¶ 16.) Mayor Boughton’s fears are not unreasonable, considering the antagonistic approach the Frank Organization has taken
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toward Mayor Boughton since October 16, 2006. (See discussion in part 2, supra, concerning the allegations made against Mayor Boughton personally in the Amended Complaint.)
“Mayor Boughton’s discomfort would be shared by any person of normal sensibilities in the same or a similar position. In this Barrera litigation, the Frank Organization lawyers are accusing Mayor Boughton’s City of Danbury administration of unlawful and unconstitutional activities concerning Latino immigrants. They are doing so in language that strongly suggests an actively discriminatory and unjust frame of mind on the part of Mayor Boughton personally. … The [Barrera] complaint clearly accuses Mayor Boughton of personal acts that are wrongful, illegal, and abhorrent. … There can be little wonder why Mayor Boughton feels, as he states in his affidavit, that his ability to work with the same Frank Organization lawyers in the CCJEF Equal Funding Litigation is severely compromised by their representation of his adversaries in this Barrera litigation.” (Wolfram Declaration at ¶ 12.)
In Colorpix Systems of America v. Broan Mfg. Co., Inc., 131 F.Supp.2d 331 (D. Conn. 2001), which was a fire subrogation case, the plaintiff alleged that certain fires were caused due to defective products manufactured by the defendant. Id. at 333. The law firm of Robinson & Cole represented the plaintiff. However, Robinson & Cole also represented the defendant’s parent company and affiliated company in a prior fire subrogation case. Id. The defendant moved for an order to disqualify Robinson & Cole from representing the plaintiff in the Colorpix
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case, alleging that there was a conflict of interest that prevented Robinson & Cole from continuing to represent the plaintiff. Id.
The defendant, its parent company and affiliated company all shared the same legal department to defend fire subrogation cases. Id. at 334. As a result, all three companies had adopted a uniform legal strategy and approach in defending such cases. Id. Additionally, there was significant overlap in the three companies’ use of expert witnesses and other legal resources to defend such cases. Id. Kevin Donnelly was the vice president, secretary and general counsel of all three companies, and he hired Robinson & Cole to represent the defendant’s parent company and affiliated company in the prior case. Id. Robinson & Cole regularly corresponded with Donnelly concerning the status of the defenses and litigation strategy in the prior case. Id. at 334-35. Donnelly also had supervised the defendant’s defense of the current case, and had been in regular contact with the defendant’s counsel and officers to discuss legal strategies in the Colorpix case. Id. at 335.
The court noted that, in light of all three companies’ shared use of legal resources, and Donnelly’s active supervision and involvement in developing the litigation strategy and defense in both the former and current cases, Robinson and Cole was likely to have had access to information that would potentially disadvantage’ the defendant’s defense, and, therefore, the
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defendant’s motion to disqualify Robinson and Cole from continuing to represent the plaintiff in the Colorpix case should be granted. Id. at 339-40 (emphasis added.)4
The situation in Colorpix is similar to the siguation here. The Frank Organization is likely to have learned valuable information with regard to Mayor Boughton concerning legal tactics, strategies and approaches to particular situations as they arose during the course of the education lawsuit, which could now be used to potentially disadvantage Mayor Boughton in the Barrera lawsuit. As Professor Wolfram opines:
The situation here is very similar to [the Colorpix case] except that it is much more aggravated because of the need of Mayor Boughton to deal simultaneously with the same Frank Organization lawyers both as zealous advocates for the interests of the CCJEF and as adversary against the Mayor. Morever, as was found objectionable in Colorpix, the Frank Organization lawyers, in the course of their discussions of the Equal Funding Litigation with Mayor Boughton, will have ample occasions to gain what might be critically important insights into the Mayor’s litigation strategies, his ways of dealing with litigation risks, and his attitudes toward settlement among many other matters - that could prove important to this litigation. No person should be put to the risk by his or her own lawyers that words and ideas that they might reasonably share with their own counsel will be put to use against the same person’s important interests in contemporaneous litigation. (Wolfram Declaration at ¶ 17 [emphasis in original] [emphasis added]) Finally, the Frank Organization has already indicated that it cannot satisfy the standard enunciated in Cinema 5, Ltd., v. Cinerama, Inc. et al., supra. During the meeting that was held
4 Before performing this analysis, the court had first determined that a substantial relationship existed between the prior representation and the current representation. Id. at 338. However, as discussed in section 2, infra, the “substantial relationship” test is inapplicable in situations, where as here, there is a concurrent conflict of interest.
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on March 20, 2007, the Frank Organization lawyers stated that they would not consider withdrawing from the Barrera lawsuit, and that they would just consider the risks associated with its continued representation of CCJEF. (Boughton Affidavit at ¶ 14.) They also stated at this meeting that CCJEF could commence a grievance process against the Frank Organization if it so chose. (Id.) These statements are not indicative of any efforts on the Frank Organization’s part to show that “there will be no actual or apparent conflict in loyalties or diminution in the vigor of [its] representation” of Mayor Boughton or CCJEF. Cinema 5, Ltd., v. Cinerama, Inc. et al., supra, 528 F.2d at 1387. Rather, the Frank Organization’s position appears to be that it will accept any adverse consequences that might arise as a result of their continued representation in both the education lawsuit and the Barrera lawsuit. The Frank Organization’s current position is unacceptable in light of the principles established by Rule 1.7 and its Commentary. 4. The Frank Organization cannot cure the conflict under either the “hot potato”
principle or the “flexible approach” method. In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Sony Corp., No. 04-CV-6095, 04-CV-6098, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29883, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2004) (attached as Exhibit 4 to this Motion to Disqualify), the court considered application of the hot potato principle as well as the flexible approach method for purposes of considering a disqualification motion. The facts of that case are relevant for the purposes of the discussion here. In that case, the law firm of Woods Oviatt Gilman, LLP represented Heidelberg Digital LLC (hereinafter Heidelberg). Id. at *1. For several
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years, Woods Oviatt handled two employment discrimination matters for Heidelberg (Jackson and McEwen). Id. Subsequently, Eastman Kodak Company (hereinafter Kodak) acquired Heidelberg. Id. Woods Oviat was aware of the acquisition before it occurred, and the firm continued to represent Heidelberg in the Jackson and McEwen cases. Id. As a result of the acquisition, Heidelberg was wholly owned by Kodak, and Kodak’s legal department assumed responsibility for all litigation matters involving Heidelberg, including the Jackson and McEwen cases. Id. at *2-3. After the acquisition, Woods Oviat appeared as local counsel in two cases in which Kodak was the opposing litigant: Sony Corporation and Employees Committed for Justice (“ECJ”). Id. at *2. Kodak filed motions to disqualify Woods Oviat from continuing representation in these two cases. Id.
The court found that a prima facie conflict of interest existed, because by accepting employment as local counsel in the Sony Corp. and ECJ cases, Woods Oviatt essentially agreed to participate in two lawsuits in which Kodak was an adverse party. Id. The court further reasoned: “Because such concurrent representation could weaken Woods Oviatt’s fiduciary and fundamental duty of undivided loyalty owed to Kodak, it is ‘prima facie improper.’” Id. After considering the Cinema 5 standard, the court noted that Kodak clearly did not consent to the conflict, and the court found that it would be “ethically impermissible” for Woods Oviat to continue to represent Kodak’s adversaries in the Sony Corp. and ECJ cases, due to the parent/subsidiary relationship between Kodak and Heidelberg. Id. at *5.
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The court then considered whether the hot potato rule should be applied to the facts of that case. Under the “hot potato” rule, a lawyer may not “avoid disqualification . . . merely by ‘firing’ the disfavored client, dropping the client like a hot potato, and transforming a continuing relationship to a former relationship by way of client abandonment.” Id. at **5-6. The court noted that under the hot potato rule, Woods Oviat’s continued representation of Sony Corp. and ECJ. would be “ethically problematic.” Id. at *7.
In the present case, at a meeting on March 20, 2007, where Mayor Boughton and Robert Solomon, supervising attorney for the Frank Organization, and others were present, the parties attempted to reach a mutual understanding concerning the conflict of interest issues. (Boughton Affidavit at ¶ 14.) The Frank Organization responded that it did not feel that there was a “bona fide conflict,” and that it “would not withdraw from the immigration matter, but rather would consider the risks of continuing the representation of the CCJEF matter instead.” (Boughton Affidavit at ¶ 14. Under the hot potato rule, the Frank Organization cannot cure the conflict simply by withdrawing from the CCJEF case.
The court in Eastman Kodak also applied the flexible approach rule to Kodak’s motion to disqualify. Under the flexible approach, the court takes several factors into consideration in order to determine the disqualification issue: “(1) prejudice to the parties, including whether confidential information has been conveyed, (2) costs and inconvenience to the party being required to obtain new counsel, (3) the complexity of the various litigations, and (4) the origin of
30

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the conflict.” Id. at *6. The court concluded that under the flexible approach method as well, Woods Oviat would have to be disqualified from its continued representation of Sony Corp. and ECJ. Id. at *7. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that Kodak’s labor department had assumed supervisory responsibility over both the Jackson and McEwen cases, which raised concerns as to whether Woods Oviat might have received confidential information in the course of its representation of Heidelberg that could unfairly disadvantage Kodak in the Sony Corp. and ECJ cases. Id. Additionally, the court noted that the Sony Corp. and ECJ cases were still in the early stages of litigation, whereas in the Jackson and McEwen cases, Woods Oviat had already filed a summary judgment motion which was currently pending. Id. Finally, the court noted that the conflict of interest was created because of an affirmative act on the part of Woods Oviat, who accepted employment in the Sony Corp. and ECJ cases, after being made fully aware of the Kodak-Heidelberg acquisition. Id. at *8.
Similarly, in the present case, prejudice to the parties is clearly a significant factor, due to Mayor Boughton’s and the Frank Organization’s joint participation in the monthly meetings of CCJEF’s steering committee, where legal strategies were discussed, and during which time confidential information may have been transferred. As for the second and third factors of the flexible approach, the immigration lawsuit is still in the early stages of litigation. Although the Complaint was filed on September 26, 2007, Mayor Boughton was not served with the Complaint until October 19, 2007. (Boughton Affidavit at ¶ 13.) Subsequently, an Amended
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Complaint was filed on November 26, 2007. None of the defendants has filed an answer to the Amended Complaint and discovery has not yet begun. In short, the Danbury Defendants’ motion to disqualify is being filed at the very outset of the litigation proceedings. In light of these circumstances, any inconvenience to the Barrera plaintiffs stemming from the court’s granting of the Danbury Defendants’ motion to disqualify would be relatively mild. The CCJEF litigation, on the other hand, is over two years old and the Frank Organization has recently filed an appeal with the Connecticut Supreme Court on behalf of CCJEF.
As for the fourth and final factor, the conflict of interest was created by an affirmative act on the part of the Frank Organization, which brought the Barrera lawsuit against Mayor Boughton in his official and individual capacities after having been put on notice that such conduct could give rise to a potential conflict of interest. By letter dated December 20, 2006, Laszlo Pinter, Deputy Corporation Counsel for the City of Danbury, requested that the Frank Organization review its “apparent dual and conflicted position” with respect to the education lawsuit and its attempts to obtain information from the City of Danbury concerning the September 19, 2006 arrest of the plaintiffs. (Corporation Counsel letter dated Dec. 20, 2006, attached as Exhibit H to the Boughton Affidavit.) Subsequently, in March 2007, the Frank Organization was then asked to withdraw from further representation in the FOIA matters. (Corporation Counsel letter dated Mar. 6, 2007, attached as Exhibit H to the Boughton Affidavit.) Despite having been given ample notice of the conflict, on March 19, 2007, the Frank
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Organization submitted its Notice of Intention to Commence an Action to the Clerk of the City of Danbury. (Boughton Affidavit at ¶ 13; Exhibit I to the Boughton Affidavit.) The following day, CCJEF, the Frank Organization and Mayor Boughton had a meeting to discuss the potential conflict of interest issue, but the issue could not be resolved because the Frank Organization opted to just accept the risks associated with its course of conduct. (See id. at ¶ 14.) The Frank Organization brought this action approximately six months later. Therefore, under either the hot potato rule or the flexible approach method, this motion to disqualify should be granted.
Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant, Mayor Boughton, respectfully requests that the Court grant his Motion to Disqualify.
THE DEFENDANT, MARK BOUGHTON,
By: /s/ Charles A. Deluca, Esq., (CT 05255) Ryan, Ryan, Johnson & Deluca, LLP 707 Summer Street Stamford, CT 06901 Phone No. 203-357-9200
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on February 1, 2008, a copy of the above was filed electronically and served by mail on anyone unable to accept electronic filing. Notice of this filing will be sent by e-mail to all parties by operation of the court’s electronic filing system or by mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing as indicated on the Notice of Electronic Filing. Parties may access this filing through the court’s CM/ECF System.
_________/s/________________________ Charles A. Deluca, Esq.
I:\Procases\415.027\Memo of Law in Support of Motion to Disqualify Jerome Frank.wpd 415.027
34

 
 Case 3:07-cv-01436-RNC Document 95 Filed 07/03/08 Page 1 of 7

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

JUAN BARRERA, JOSE CABRERA,

:

DANIEL CHAVEZ, JOSE DUMA,

:

JOSE LLIBISUPA, ISAAC

:

MALDONADO, EDGAR REDROVAN,

:

NICHOLAS SEGUNDO SANCHEZ,

:

JUAN CARLOS SIMBANA, and

:

DANILO BRITO VARGAS,

:

:

Plaintiffs,

:

:

v.

:

:

MARK BOUGHTON, ALAN BAKER,

:

JOSE AGOSTO, RICHARD DEJESUS, :

JAMES FISHER, JAMES LALLI,

:

CRAIG MARTIN, JOSEPH NORKUS, :

JOHN DOES, CITY OF DANBURY,

:

RONALD PREBLE, RICHARD

:

McCAFFREY, JAMES BROWN,

:

JOHN DOES and USA,

:

:

Defendants.

:

________________________________:

CIVIL NO. 3:07CV1436(RNC)

RULING ON MOTIONS TO DISQUALIFY

Defendant Mark Boughton, Mayor of the City of Danbury, has filed a Motion for Disqualification of the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization and its affiliated attorneys (hereafter referred to as “Frank Legal Services”) from representing the plaintiffs. Doc. # 48. Defendant City of Danbury has joined that motion. Doc. # 50.
The defendants’ objection relates to asserted attorneyclient relationships among Frank Legal Services, The Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding (hereinafter the

1

Case 3:07-cv-01436-RNC Document 95 Filed 07/03/08 Page 2 of 7
“Connecticut Coalition”), and Mayor Boughton. In addition to representing the plaintiffs here, Frank Legal Services also represents the Connecticut Coalition in an “education adequacy” lawsuit begun in late 2005. See generally Doc. # 48 at 2. According to the defendants, Mayor Boughton has been president of the Connecticut Coalition since December 2006 and otherwise has held a key leadership position in the Coalition. Frank Legal Services provided legal advice to the Connecticut Coalition and to Boughton, in his capacity as the Connecticut Coalition former president. Since the filing of the motion, Boughton ended his term as president of the Connecticut Coalition.1
The defendants further explain that Frank Legal Services’ representation of the plaintiffs in this suit places it in an adverse relationship with its former client, past Connecticut Coalition president Boughton. They argue: “[Frank Legal Services], in the course of its discussions with Mayor Boughton in the [Connecticut Coalition] litigation has had occasion to gain insights into the Mayor’s thinking with respect to litigation strategies, his method of dealing with litigation, and his attitude toward different legal issues, which may benefit [Frank Legal Services] in the Barrera litigation.” Doc. # 48 at
1 Boughton’s tenure as president of the Connecticut Coalition expired on February 29, 2008. See Affidavit of Dianne Kaplan deVries (appended as Exh. 4 to Doc. # 64) at para. 16 (“Mayor Boughton did not run for reelection” when his term of office expired . . .).
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4. Frank Legal Services counters that its representation of the
plaintiffs in this suit does not constitute a conflict of interest under the Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct. See generally Doc. # 64. “[T]his Court recognizes the authority of the ‘Rules of Professional Conduct,” as approved by the Judges of the Connecticut Superior Court as expressing the standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers practicing in the District of Connecticut.” Rule 83.2(a) of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. Accordingly, with certain exceptions not relevant in this matter, in this District, the standards for attorney conduct are set by the Rules of Professional Conduct. See Colorpix Sys. of America v. Broan Mfg. Co., Inc., 131 F. Supp. 2d 331, 335 (D. Conn. 2001); see also Local Rule 83.2(a)(1) (“changes” made by Connecticut Superior Court are not binding on District Court “unless such changes are expressly adopted . . .”).
Connecticut Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7 provides that “a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest,” including a situation where “the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client.” Similarly, under Rule 1.9(a), “[a] lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in . . . a
3

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substantially related matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client . . . .” In addition, Rule 1.13(a) specifies that “[a] lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents.”
The defendants maintain that the Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct effectively render Mayor Boughton, in his capacity as former president of the Connecticut Coalition, a client of Frank Legal Services. This position is not well taken; on its face, Rule 1.13 indicates a lawyer represents the “organization,” thereby making the Connecticut Coalition, not Boughton, the actual client of Frank Legal Services.
By virtue of his status as Connecticut Coalition president, Mayor Boughton, at best, is considered a “vicarious client.” A vicarious client relationship arises here because Boughton was an officer and member of the association represented by Frank Legal Services. See Discotrade Ltd. v. Wyeth-Ayerst Int’l, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 355, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (strict disqualification standards need not always be applied when a firm brings suit against a member of an association it represents).
“[W]hen an adverse party is only a vicarious client by virtue of membership in an association, the risks against which Canon 5 [prohibiting representation of one client in a suit against another] guards will not inevitably arise.” Glueck v.
4

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Jonathan Logan, Inc., 653 F.2d 746, 749 (2d Cir. 1981). As an example, Glueck notes that “[a] law firm that represents the American Bar Association need not decline to represent a client injured by an automobile driven by a member of the ABA.” Id.
The issue is not whether Boughton’s former relationship with Frank Legal Services “is in all respects that of attorney and client, but whether there exist sufficient aspects of an attorney-client relationship” to inquire as to whether there is a potential conflict involved in Frank Legal Services’ role as plaintiffs’ counsel in this action. Id. at 748-49 (footnote and quotation marks omitted). The Second Circuit applies a “substantial relationship” test to situations where, as here, an alleged problem arises from “vicarious or attenuated representation.” Anderson v. Nassau County Dep’t of Corr., 376 F. Supp. 2d 294, 298 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). When applying the substantial relationship test, a court seeks to prevent the possibility that former client confidences will be used to his disadvantage or will otherwise taint the trial. Glueck, 653 F.2d at 748-49.
Where, however, a disqualification motion is based upon an attorney’s representation of a currently adverse party that it had previously represented as “a vicarious client by virtue of membership in an association,” disqualification is not automatic. Id. at 749. As explained in Glueck,
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[d]isqualification will ordinarily be required whenever the subject matter of a suit is sufficiently related to the scope of the matters on which a firm represents an association as to create a realistic risk either that the plaintiff will not be represented with vigor or that unfair advantage will be taken of the defendant. Moreover, once that risk appears, it is appropriate to assess the risk that prosecution of a plaintiff’s lawsuit by an association’s law firm will inhibit the free flow of information from the defendant to the firm that is necessary for the firm’s proper representation of the association.
Id. at 750; accord Evans v. Artek Sys. Corp., 715 F.2d 788, 792 (2d Cir. 1983) (“he may not serve the corporation in a particular matter and then represent a plaintiff in a suit against it or its officers in a substantially related matter.”).
Here, disqualification of Frank Legal Services is unwarranted. As an initial observation, Mayor Boughton’s tenure as Connecticut Coalition president recently expired. In any event, Mayor Boughton is simply an indirect or vicarious client. See Glueck, 653 F.2d at 749 (a party “is only a vicarious client by virtue of membership in an organization”); see also Doc. # 64 at 2, 12. In addition, there appears to be no substantial relationship between this litigation and the litigation involving the Connecticut Coalition. This action concerns the City of Danbury, Connecticut and its law enforcement policies as applied to non-citizens; the Connecticut Coalition litigation is a suit under the Connecticut Constitution involving the rights of Connecticut school children to an adequately-funded education.
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See Doc. # 64 at 29. Furthermore, the movants present no persuasive claim that
Frank Legal Services learned relevant confidences from Mayor Boughton, as president of the Connecticut Coalition, or that any trial in this case may be tainted as a result of Frank Legal Services’ former involvement him. The claimed “appearance of impropriety is simply too slender a reed on which to rest a disqualification order except in the rarest cases.” Bd. Of Ed. Of City of New York v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1247 (2d Cir. 1979).
The Motions to Disqualify (Doc. # 48 and 50) are DENIED. SO ORDERED. Dated at Hartford, Connecticut, this 3rd day of July, 2008.
___________/s/ DFM ___________ Donna F. Martinez United States Magistrate Judge
7

 
 2009 WL 4274819 (D.Conn.)

Page 1

United States District Court, D. Connecticut. Juan BARRERA, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Mark BOUGHTON, et al., Defendants. No. 3:07CV01436. April 10, 2009.
Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Protective Order
Christopher N. Lasch, Supervising Attorney, ct27139, Michael J. Wishnie, Supervising Attorney, ct27221, Ramzi Kassem, Supervising Attorney, ct27537, Ari Holtzblatt, Law Student Intern, Heide Iravani, Law Student Intern, Elizabeth Simpson, Law Student Intern, Rebecca Heller, Law Student Intern, Dror Ladin, Law Student Intern, Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization, Yale Law School, 127 Wall Street, New Haven, CT 06511, Telephone: (203) 432-4800, Facsimile: (203) 432-1426, michael.wishnie@yale.edu, christopher.lasch @yale.edu, ramzi.kassem@yale.edu, Counsel for Plaintiffs.
April 10, 2009
This is a motion for a protective order pursuant to Rule 26(c) to bar Defendants from obtaining discovery into the immigration status and alienage of nine Plaintiffs.[FN1] All Defendants have sought such information in a number of discovery requests. See Local Rule 7(a)(1) Statement (attached).[FN2] Numerous courts in the Second Circuit and elsewhere have granted protective orders barring similar discovery in recognition that immigration status and alienage are often irrelevant to the adjudication of civil rights claims and also of the powerful in terrorem effect that would result from compelled disclosure of such information. See infra Part II, B.
FN1. This motion is submitted on behalf of all Plaintiffs except Danilo Brito Vargas, an Ecuadoran national who was removed in 2007. See Am. Comp. at ¶¶ 12, 169, 175. For purposes of this brief, the nine day-laborer Plaintiffs will be referred to as “Plaintiffs.”
FN2. Absent a protective order, Plaintiffs intend to invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in response to these requests. The Fifth Amendment may be invoked in civil proceedings. Where appropriate, an adverse inference may be drawn. McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924).
The compelled production of such evidence would force Plaintiffs to sacrifice one set of rights in order to vindicate another. Information about Plaintiffs' immigration status and alienage could potentially lead to their eventual prosecution or deportation. Id. Requiring such discovery in this case would have the effect of conditioning Plaintiffs' access to the courts on the disclosure of immigration status and alienage information, and would severely chill vindication of fundamental constitutional and civil rights. Id.
Finally, discovery into Plaintiffs' immigration status and alienage is not reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence, and would annoy, embarrass, oppress and unduly burden Plaintiffs. Cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c). It is not relevant to Plaintiffs' claims, nor to any specific defense Defendants have invoked or may assert. See infra, Part II, C. At best, it is remotely related to the general subject matter of the case. This is not enough to satisfy the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 26(c), nor does it justify the terrorizing effect on Plaintiffs of such production.[FN3]
FN3. Plaintiffs acknowledge that an Immigration Judge has found that each of the nine moving Plaintiffs is a native and citizen of Ecuador, present without inspection in this country. See Decision of the Immigration Judge, Jan. 30, 2008, attached as Ex. A. However, this finding was based on the Immigration Judge's erroneous denial of Plaintiffs' Motions to Suppress in their removal proceedings, and subsequent admission of evidence obtained through the illegal arrests of moving Plaintiffs by Defendants on September 19, 2006. Id.

2009 WL 4274819 (D.Conn.)

Page 2

Plaintiffs have appealed the denial of their motions to suppress to the Board of Immigration Appeals; those appeals are pending. See Notice of Appeal of Decision of Immigration Judge, Feb. 28, 2008, attached as Exhibit B.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
On September 19, 2006, Defendants arrested Plaintiffs in an undercover sting operation designed to target day-laborers in the area of Kennedy Park in Danbury, Connecticut. Amended Complaint at ¶ 61, Dkt # 21 [hereinafter “Am. Comp”]. The Government did not bring criminal charges against the Plaintiffs, but placed them in removal proceedings based on statements obtained on the day of the arrest. Id. at ¶¶ 104, 106. Plaintiffs moved to suppress this evidence before the Immigration Judge, but the motion was denied and Plaintiffs were subsequently either ordered removed or granted voluntary departure. See Orders of the Immigration Judge, Feb. 4, 2008, attached as Exhibit C. Plaintiffs are currently appealing this ruling to the Board of Immigration Appeals. See Notice of Appeal of Decision of Immigration Judge, attached as Exhibit B.
Plaintiffs brought the current suit to vindicate their constitutional and civil rights, alleging claims under the First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution, and Article 1, §§ 4, 7, 8, 9, and 20, of the Connecticut State Constitution. See Am. Comp. All Defendants have sought information about Plaintiffs' immigration status and alienage in numerous interrogatories, Requests for Admission and Requests for Production. See Local Rule 7(a)(1) Statement.
If Plaintiffs are compelled to produce this information, it will severely prejudice their ability to defend themselves in the removal proceedings now pending against them. In all removal proceedings, the burden is on the government to prove alienage and deportability by “clear and convincing evidence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3). During Plaintiffs' removal proceedings, they denied the government's allegations of alienage and unlawful presence. The government attempted to carry its burden by questioning Plaintiffs about their alienage and immigration status. The Plaintiffs invoked their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused to answer. The government then offered a U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) Form I-213, Record of Deportable Alien, as alternative proof. The I-213's in this case were completed by ICE agents based upon interviews of the Plaintiffs on the day of their arrests. Plaintiffs moved to suppress the Form I-213 tendered in their removal proceedings on the basis of constitutional, statutory, regulatory, and sub-regulatory violations that occurred during their arrest. Plaintiffs were denied any discovery or evidentiary hearings in the case. The Immigration Judge denied Plaintiffs' Motion to Suppress, and on the basis of the I-213's, concluded that the government had carried its burden and ordered Plaintiffs removed. See Orders of the Immigration Judge, Ex. A, C.
Plaintiffs have appealed this determination. Upon information and belief, the only evidence of alienage available to the government in Plaintiffs' deportation proceedings is in the I-213's. The government should not be allowed to obtain in this action evidence of Plaintiffs' alienage or immigration status that it could then seek to introduce to carry its burden in the removal proceedings.
For this reason, among others, Plaintiffs objected to these lines of discovery and conferred with Defendants pursuant to Local Rule 37(a). The Defendants refused to withdraw their request. See Declaration of Rebecca Heller.
II. ARGUMENT
A. Standard of review.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 was amended in 2000 specifically to narrow the scope of discovery “to any non-privileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The amendment of Rule 26 was intended to limit the prior version of the Rule, which had allowed discovery into any information relevant

2009 WL 4274819 (D.Conn.)

Page 3

to the subject matter of the lawsuit. According to the Advisory Committee, the purpose of the change was “to involve the court more actively in regulating the breadth of sweeping or contentious discovery.” Advisory Committee's Note on 2000 Amendments to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
The Second Circuit has ruled that the amended 26(b)(1) defines the boundaries of permissible discovery, but has also ruled that Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) directly limits the purview of 26(b)(1). In re Agent Orange, 517 F.3d 76, 102 (2d Cir. 2008). Rule 26(c) “permits a District Court to make any Order which justice requires to protect any party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense upon a showing by a movant for the order of good cause.” Gambale v. Deutsche Bank Ag, 377 F.3d 133, 142 (2d Cir. 2004). See also Yancey v. Hooten, 180 F.R.D. 203, 207 (D. Conn. 1998) (“The Federal Rules afford courts wide discretion in resolving discovery disputes, which should be exercised by determining the relevance of discovery requests, assessing their oppressiveness, and weighing these factors in deciding whether discovery should be compelled”) (internal quotation omitted); Chamberlain v. Farmington Sav. Bank, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70376 (D. Conn., Sept. 25, 2007), attached as Exhibit D, (same).
Because evidence regarding Plaintiffs' immigration status and alienage is not relevant, and because any potential relevance is outweighed by the oppressiveness and chilling effects of the request, Plaintiffs' motion for protective order should be granted.
B. Courts in the Second Circuit and elsewhere have granted protective orders against compelled production relating to immigration status and alienage, in recognition of the powerful in terrorem effects of such disclo-
sures.
The Supreme Court has long held that one cannot be compelled to choose between her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the vindication of her other rights. For instance, the Supreme Court has ruled that it is unconstitutional to force a Defendant to choose between his Fourth Amendment Rights and his Fifth Amendment Rights. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968) (“[I]t is intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another.”). In the current case, forcing Plaintiffs to disclose information about their alienage or immigration status, which might later be used against them in their immigration proceedings, similarly forces them to surrender one set of rights in order to preserve another.
Courts in the Second Circuit have maintained that forcing a Plaintiff to answer discovery requests related to immigration status or alienage is prejudicial, oppressive and embarrassing. The Second Circuit Court has explicitly recognized that “[f]orcing an alien to perform the act of producing a foreign passport, I-94, or statement regarding immigration status at least arguably forces the alien to admit alienage and thus provide possible evidence of one or more crimes involving immigration violations.” Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 441-42 (2d. Cir 2008) (citing to 8 U.S.C. § 1302 (failure to register unless exempted by the attorney general); id. § 1306 (willful failure to register); id. § 1325 (entering without inspection)). The Rajah court further found that “an alien who is not in legal status could be exposed to further investigation and subsequent prosecution by producing a foreign passport, I-94, or statements regarding immigration status.” Id. See also EEOC v. First Wireless Group, Inc., 225 F.R.D. 404, 406 ( E.D.N.Y. 2004) (“[D]iscovery of the Charging Parties' immigration status would cause them embarrassment and if their status is found to be illegal would subject them to criminal charges and, possibly, deportation.”)
Consistent with these well-settled principles, courts have repeatedly and specifically held that Defendants in civil rights, employment, and other matters may not obtain discovery of the immigration status or alienage of a Plaintiff, lest the evident “in terrorem” effects of permitting such discovery prevent immigrants from vindicating their constitutional and civil rights and deny them their fundamental right of access to the courts. Numerous courts within the Second Circuit have granted immigration-related protective orders, both to protect individual plaintiffs from harassment and retaliation, and to prevent the chilling effect that discovery into immigration status would have on future lawsuits. See, e.g., Trejos v. Edita's Bar & Rest., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21239 **6-7 (E.D.N.Y., Mar. 17, 2009), attached as Exhibit E, (“[E]ven if the information sought [about Plaintiffs' immigration status] were somehow relevant, the in terrorem effect of the questions defendants seek to press outweighs the need for disclosure.”); Hocza v. City of

2009 WL 4274819 (D.Conn.)

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New York, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3574 *5 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 19, 2009), attached as Exhibit F, (“[W]hatever probative value illegal alien status may have is far outweighed by its prejudicial impact.”); Avila-Blum v. Casa de Cambio Delgado, 236 F.R.D. 190, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“The court shares the concerns animating the [protective] order and the decisions of other courts that have balanced the imperatives of optimal discovery, the introduction of unduly prejudicial evidence at trial, and the chilling effect of inquiry into immigration status...”); EEOC v. First Wireless Group, Inc., 225 F.R.D. 404, 405 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (discovery into charging parties immigration status “would constitute an unacceptable burden on the public interest due to a chilling effect”); Topo v. Dhir, 210 F.R.D. 76, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Courts have generally recognized the in terrorem effect of inquiring into a p arty's immigration status when irrelevant to any material claim”); Zeng Liu v. Donna Karan International, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 191, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (to permit inquiry into immigration status of plaintiff would present “a danger of intimidation [that] would inhibit plaintiffs in pursuing their rights”); Flores v. Amignon, 233 F. Supp. 2d 462, 465 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Not only does this Court find that the information is not relevant to defendant's defense, but as the court in Liu noted, even if it were, the potential for prejudice far outweighs whatever minimal probative value such information would have”).
Courts outside the Second Circuit have similarly protected plaintiffs from compelled disclosure of their immigration status. See, e.g., In re Reyes, et al., 814 F.2d 168, 170 (5th Cir. 1985) (issuing writ of mandamus to overturn District Court decision allowing discovery into Plaintiffs' immigration status because it “could inhibit petitioners in pursuing their rights in the case because of possible collateral wholly unrelated consequences, because of embarrassment and inquiry into their private lives which was not justified, and also because it opened for litigation issues which were not present in the case”); Incalza v. Fendi, 479 F.3d 1005, 1009 (9th Cir. 2006) (Under California law, “in proceedings or discovery undertaken to enforce [labor, employment and civil rights] state laws no inquiry shall be permitted into a person's immigration status except where the person seeking to make this inquiry has shown by clear and convincing evidence that this inquiry is necessary in order to comply with federal immigration law”); United States v. Arias-Izquierdo, 449 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 2006) (denying motion for post-trial discovery into defendant's immigration status for purposes of discrediting his prior testimony); Calderon v. Witovet, 999 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1993) (denying Defendant's request for discovery into Plaintiffs' immigration status in class action lawsuit under AWPA and FLSA); EEOC v. Restaurant CO., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7836 at *3 (D. Minn. 2007), attached as Exhibit G, (“the discovery sought [into Plaintiffs' immigration status] is not sufficiently relevant to justify its potential chilling effect on victims of discrimination”); Sandoval v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97773 at *58 (D. Minn., Oct. 23, 2007), attached as Exhibit H, (“Defendant employers may not use the discovery process to delve into a p laintiff's immigration status”); Vanek v. I.I. Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59311 at **5-6 (D. Neb. Aug. 14, 2007), attached as Exhibit I, (“I fail to see how evidence concerning Mr. Ruffin's immigration status might assist in the development of a reasonable inference of discrimination within the context of [this] case's . . . facts”); Lozano v. City of Hazelton, 239 F.R.D. 397, 400 ( M.D. Penn. 2006) (“It is important in balancing the defendant's need against the burden on the plaintiffs to bear in mind that this case involves the constitutional and statutory rights asserted by the plaintiffs with regard to certain ordinances. This case is not an action to enforce United States immigration laws. Plaintiffs' interest in keeping this information confidential outweighs the defendant's need for it, and the request for a protective order will be granted”); De La O v. Arnold-Williams, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76816 at *11 (E.D. Wa., Oct. 20, 2006), attached as Exhibit J, (“Defendants also argue they need to know the immigration status of Plaintiffs in order to show that the investigation into Plaintiffs was based on legitimate police concerns of criminal conduct and to challenge Plaintiffs' credibility. The Court concludes Plaintiffs' immigration status has little, if any, relevance to either of these issues”); EEOC v. City of Joliet, 239 F.R.D. 490 at **7-8 (N.D. Ill., May 5, 2006) (“[C]ourts have found that the in terrorem effect of inquiring into the immigration status of employees suing their employer for unfair labor practices is devastating. Not only does an undocumented alien face the reality of possible retaliatory adverse work place actions by the employer, but he or she also faces the very real possibility of being reported to the Department of Homeland Security and subsequent deportation or even criminal prosecution”) (internal citation omitted); Galaviz-Zamora v. Brady Farms, Inc., 230 F.R.D. 499, 502 (W.D. Mich. 2005) (“[T]he effect upon the...witnesses of this wholly irrelevant probe into their immigration status which I observed at the hearing ranged from unsettling to devastating and certainly affected their ability to testify”); Garcia-Andrade v. Madra's Café Corp., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22122 at *5 (W.D. Mich., Aug. 3, 2005), attached as Exhibit K, (“[T]here is sufficient case law to support the assertion that immigration status is irrelevant in this matter and what little relevance the other information sought by the Defendants in this matter is outweighed by the Fifth Amendment concerns expressed by the Plaintiffs”); EEOC v. Bice of Chicago, 229 F.R.D.

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581, 582 (N.D. Ill. 2005) ([W]e find good cause exists to enter this protective order because questions about immigration status are oppressive, they constitute a substantial burden on the parties and on the public interest and they would have a chilling effect on victims of employment discrimination from coming forward to assert discrimination claims”). Flores v. Albertsons Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6171 (C.D.Cal., April 9, 2002), attached as Exhibit L, (“[I]t is entirely likely that any undocumented [litigant] forced to produce documents related to his or her immigration status will withdraw from the suit rather than produce such documents and face ... potential deportation.”); See also Montoya v. S.C.C.P. Painting Contrs., Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16354 (D. Md., Feb. 26, 2008), attached as Exhibit M; Garcia v. Monument Management Group, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48532 (D. Neb., July 17, 2006), attached as Exhibit N; Recinos-Recinos v. Express Forestry, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2510 (E.D. La., Jan. 23, 2006), attached as Exhibit O; Librado v. M.S. Carriers, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10817 (N.D. Tex., March 23, 2004), attached as Exhibit P.
The chilling effects described in these cases span a number of contexts. For instance, in Topo v. Dhir, the plaintiff sought damages in tort for human trafficking, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and other causes of action. Topo v. Dhir, 210 F.R.D. 76 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Moreover, proof of Ms. Topo's alienage was an element of her own proof on claims brought under the Alien Tort Claims Act. Nevertheless, Magistrate Judge Ellis granted a protective order regarding immigration status information. As the Court explained, “[a]lthough the cases addressing this issue typically relate to the Fair Labor Standards Act, the underlying principle is still the same. When the potential for abuse of procedure is high, the Court can and should act within its discretion to limit the discovery process, even if relevancy is determined.” Id. at 78.
In many other cases, courts have entered a p rotective order regarding immigration status and/or alienage where plaintiffs alleged tort and contract claims. See, e.g., Hocza, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3574 at *5, Ex. F (tort claims for negligence and state labor code violations); Collins v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp., 201 A.D.2d 447 (App. Div. 1994) (damages for negligence and wrongful death); Incalza v. Fendi, 479 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2006) (wrongful termination in breach of contract); Librado, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10817, Ex. P (wrongful death tort action).
Courts have also entered protective orders against discovery of immigration status and alienage in civil rights suits. See, e.g., Avila-Blum v. Casa de Cambio Delgado, 236 F.R.D. 190, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (discrimination claims under Title VII and the Family Medical Leave Act); EEOC v. First Wireless Group, Inc., 225 F.R.D. 404, 405 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (charging workplace discrimination based on race and ethnicity); EEOC v. Restaurant Co., 490 F. Supp. 2d 1039 (D. Minn. 2007) (Title VII claim for civil rights violation based on gender discrimination); Sandoval, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97773, Ex. H, (workplace discrimination and sexual harassment); Vanek, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5931, Ex. I, (age discrimination); Lozano v. City of Hazelton, 239 F.R.D. 397 (M.D. Penn. 2006) (discrimination claims brought against municipality), appeal pending; De La O, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76816, Ex. J, (various civil rights claims against municipality and state); Garcia, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48532, Ex. N, (pregnancy discrimination); EEOC v. City of Joliet, 239 F.R.D. 490 (N.D. Ill., May 5, 2006) (Title VII sexual harassment and discrimination claim); EEOC v. Bice of Chicago, 229 F.R.D. 581 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (employment discrimination).
A district court in Washington specifically extended the rationale of these opinions entering protective orders against discovery of immigration status or alienage to a case involving police misconduct. In De La O, Plaintiffs alleged that police had detained and arrested them without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. The Defendants sought discovery of Plaintiffs' immigration status, arguing that it was relevant to the existence of “reasonable suspicion” justifying Plaintiffs' arrest. De La O, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76816 at *11, Ex. J. The Court evaluated the claims of the arresting police officers as to relevance, and then held that Plaintiffs had “satisfied their burden of showing good cause by demonstrating harm or prejudice that would result if they were forced to disclose their immigration status.” Id.[FN4] See also infra, Part II, C, 1.
FN4. The risk that court-compelled disclosure of immigration status or alienage information about a particular individual will chill many persons from ever asserting important constitutional or civil rights claims has

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also prompted many courts to approve the use of anonymous or “John Doe” pleadings by non-citizens bringing civil rights suits. For example, the Supreme Court allowed children who were undocumented immigrants to proceed anonymously in a suit seeking access to Texas schools. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); see also Lozano v. City of Hazelton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Penn. 2007) (upholding the rights of immigrants challenging discriminatory municipal ordinances to proceed anonymously), notice of appeal pending; Doe v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2000) (overturning trial court and allowing non-citizen plaintiffs to proceed anonymously in order to vindicate their rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act).
Allowing Plaintiffs to vindicate their rights without forcing them to disclose oppressive, burdensome, damaging, and irrelevant information about their immigration status and alienage, is consistent with a wide range of case law on the issue. A protective order is critical to preserve the ability of wronged, abused and oppressed non-citizens to seek justice in federal courts.
C. Plaintiffs' alleged immigration status and alienage are not relevant to any specific claim or defense in this case.
Defendants' requests for discovery into Plaintiffs' immigration status and alienage in this case are not relevant to any specific claim or defense. Plaintiffs' causes of action can be divided into three categories, those relating to: illegal arrest and detention; racial or ethnic profiling; and freedom of speech and association. None of the elements of these causes of action, nor possible defenses to them, relates to immigration status or alienage.
Courts in the District of Connecticut have followed other district courts in the Second and Seventh Circuits, ruling that protective orders are proper when defendants seek documents or information that do not “pertain directly” to Plaintiffs' complaint. Badr v. Liberty Mutual Group, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73437 (D. Conn. 2007), attached as Exhibit Q, (request for all records relating Plaintiffs' previous employment in workplace discrimination suit was overly broad when the only relevance was to contradict Plaintiff's testimony on one specific issue); Franzon v. Massena Mem. Hosp., 189 F.R.D. 220, 222 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (Plaintiffs in suit against medical review board had to justify each category of records sought as relevant to their specific complaint); see also Chamberlain v. Farmington Savings Bank, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70376 at *8, Ex. D, (forcing Plaintiff to produce records “would constitute an unwarranted intrusion” and Defendant could not discover irrelevant records based solely on hope that within them he would discover plausible defense); Chemical Bank v. Dana, 149 F.R.D. 11, 14 (D. Conn. 1993) (discovery request was overly broad when it sought a wide range of bank records with no relevance to the claim at issue in the case).
In this case, although Plaintiffs' alleged immigration status and alienage may be relevant to their civil immigration proceedings, Defendants cannot “transfer” the relevance to this lawsuit. See e.g., Chemical Bank v. Dana, 149 F.R.D. 11, 14 (D. Conn. 1993) (materials related only to separate civil litigation involving same Plaintiffs was subject to protective order). It would be highly unjust if the same illegal arrest that resulted in the commencement of deportation proceedings against Plaintiffs also barred them from vindicating their constitutional claims against the perpetrators of the rights violations in this action.
1. Information obtained in discovery relating to Plaintiffs' immigration status is not relevant to any claim or defense relating to illegal seizure, arrest and detention.
Plaintiffs have pled five causes of action relating to their unlawful seizure, arrest, and detention. Am. Comp., First, Second, Tenth, and Thirteenth Causes of Action. In order to justify the seizure, arrest and detention of Plaintiffs, Defendants will need to prove that they had, at the very least, “reasonable suspicion” that an enforceable law was being violated at the time of seizure and “probable cause” at the time of arrest. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). Reasonable suspicion and probable cause must be based on specific, articulable evidence available to the officers prior to the time of detention or arrest. Id. See also United States v. Brig-

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non-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); U.S. v. Padilla, 548 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. McCargo, 464 F.3d 192 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2006). Arresting officers cannot use discovery to retroactively create reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Ramirez v. Webb, 599 F. Supp. 1278, 1284 (W.D. Mich. 1984) aff'd without opinion 787 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. Mich. 1987) (“It would appear that [the officer] believes he can stop a v ehicle and then discover reasonable articulable facts for doing so, based on closer observation and interrogation. That is not the case law or the constitutional principle. The reasonable articulable facts must precede the stop.”).
Thus, evidence obtained through discovery in this case cannot be used to retroactively create reasonable suspicion or probable cause in the minds of the Defendants three years prior. This standard has been specifically upheld to prohibit discovery into immigration status and alienage. In a case involving the arrest and detention of alleged illegal immigrants, the District Court in the Eastern District of Washington ruled that defendant police officers seeking to justify their detention and arrest of plaintiffs (alleged illegal immigrants) were prohibited from seeking discovery into plaintiffs' immigration status or alienage. De La O, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76816 **9-12, Ex. J. The court in De La O explained that Defendants had to prove that there was a legitimate police concern that justified the arrest of immigrants at the time they were detained and arrested, and that evidence obtained later through discovery could have no bearing on the reasons for arrest. Id. Plaintiffs' immigration status and alienage are thus not relevant to the defense of the seizure, arrest or detention claims.
2. Evidence related to Plaintiffs' immigration status and alienage is not relevant to any claim or defense regarding Plaintiffs' claims of unlawful profiling based on race, ethnicity, or perceived national origin.
Plaintiffs have pled four causes of action alleging unlawful profiling. Am. Comp., Third, Fifth, and Fourteenth Claims for Relief. These equal protection claims assert that Plaintiffs were singled out for discriminatory treatment based on their race, ethnicity and perceived national origin. Plaintiffs have not claimed discrimination based on immigration status or alienage.
Equal protection claims regarding race, ethnicity and national origin are subject to strict scrutiny. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (national origin discrimination against Mexican-Americans in grand jury selection is impermissible); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-47 (1948) (restriction on transfer of agricultural property of Japanese Lawful Permanent Resident is a violation of Equal Protection). Equal protection extends to all persons in the United States, regardless of citizenship or immigration status. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (the protections of the Constitution “are universal in their application to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color or of nationality”).
Defendants' response to Plaintiffs' claims must thus be to argue that Plaintiffs' were not detained based on their race, ethnicity, or national origin, and were instead targeted based on a facially neutral policy that was being applied in a neutral manner, without any intent to discriminate. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66, 270 n. 21. (1977) (if discrimination is so much as a “motivating factor,” even in official action that appears facially neutral, the action is unconstitutional). Defendants do not need information about Plaintiffs' immigration status or alienage to prove that they were enforcing a policy that did not discriminate on the base of race, ethnicity or national origin.
3. Evidence related to Plaintiffs' immigration status and alienage is not relevant to any claim or defense relating to Plaintiffs' First Amendment claims.
Plaintiffs have also alleged that they were singled out based on their protected speech and association. Plaintiffs have pled one cause of action alleging unlawful restriction of speech. Am. Comp., Fourth Claim for Relief. It is undisputed that Plaintiffs' speech took place in a public forum. Although Plaintiffs maintain that they were gathered in Kennedy Park and Defendants maintain they were gathered on Main Street, both of these would constitute public forums. Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Co., 468 U.S. 750, 797 (1988) (city streets have been recognized as public forums for First

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Amendment purposes since “time immemorial”). Because Plaintiffs' speech occurred in a public forum, Defendants must prove first that their restriction of that speech was one based on the time, place or manner of the speech, and not its content. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). Plaintiffs' immigration status and alienage are not relevant to whether the restriction of their speech was one of time, place or manner[FN5]
FN5. In their motion to dismiss, the Individual Danbury Defendants contended that the state constitutional protections for speech and association applied only to citizens, and may therefore argue that, on this theory, citizenship statuts is relevant to Plaintiffs' speech and association Binette claims. In opposing the motion, Plaintiffs disputed the contention that Connecticut's constitutional protections are limited to U.S. citizens, and Judge Chatigny denied the motion.
Second, Defendants must prove that their time, place or manner restriction was narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government interest. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989). Individual Danbury Defendants have admitted that Plaintiffs were originally picked up by Joseph Norkus, that Norkus was acting as an official of the City of Danbury, and that the vehicle used to transport them from the public forum was owned, leased or operated by the Danbury Police Department. See Individual Danbury Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Requests for Admission of Facts, Feb. 10, 2009, attached as Exhibit R, at ¶¶ 1, 2, 3, 10. Because the Danbury Police Department is not authorized to make immigration arrests, the government interest in this case would have to be something other than the enforcement of immigration regulations. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (limiting authority to detain suspected aliens to officers of the Department of Homeland Security); see also Id. § 1357(g) (authorizing state and local jurisdictions to enter into memorandum agreement with DHS to deputize local police as immigration agents).[FN6] Discovery into Plaintiffs' immigration status or alienage will thus have no relevance to Defendants' defense against Plaintiffs' First Amendment claims.
FN6. It is undisputed that at the time of Sept. 19, 2006 arrests, as at present, the Danbury Police Department had not entered into a memorandum agreement pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) deputizing them to enforce immigration laws.
III. Conclusion
In light of the foregoing, Plaintiffs request this Court grant this motion for a protective order prohibiting inquiry into and discovery of any record or admission bearing on Plaintiffs' immigration status or alienage.
April 10, 2009
END OF DOCUMENT

 
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United States District Court, D. Connecticut. Juan BARRERA, José Cabrera Daniel Chavez, José Duma, José Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Ni-
cholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbaña, and Danilo Brito Vargas, Plaintiffs, v.
Mark BOUGHTON, Alan Baker, José Agosto, Richard Dejesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, John Does, City of Danbury, James Brown, Richard McCaffrey, Ronald Preble, John Does and the United
States, Defendants. No. 3:07-cv-01436-RNC.
May 8, 2009.
Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Compel Discovery
Clifford Chance US LLP, Joel M. Cohen (phv03297), Elizabeth Goergen (phv03300), Siham Nurhussein (phv03298), Lawrence Bluestone (phv03296), 31 West 52nd Street, New York, New York 10019, Telephone: (212) 878-8000, Fax: (212) 878-8375; Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization, Yale Law School, Christopher N. Lasch, Supervising Attorney, (ct27139), Michael J. Wishnie, Supervising Attorney, (ct27221), Ramzi Kassem, Supervising Attorney, (ct27537), Ari Holtzblatt, Law Student Intern, Heide Iravani, Law Student Intern, Elizabeth Simpson, Law Student Intern, Rebecca Heller, Law Student Intern, Dror Ladin, Law Student Intern, 127 Wall Street, New Haven, CT 06511, Telephone: (203) 432-4800, Facsimile: (203) 432-1426, michael.wishnie@yale.edu, christopher.lasch @yale.edu, ramzi.kassem@yale.edu, Counsel for Plaintiffs.
May 8, 2009
Day Laborer Plaintiffs[FN1] move this court pursuant to Rules 26(a) and 37(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and Local Rule 37(b) for an Order compelling Federal Defendants[FN2] to “[p]roduce all documents relating to the employment of all officers and/or employees of the United States of America, the Department of Homeland Security, and/or Immigrations and Customs Enforcement that were present during the investigation, questioning, arrest and/or detention of the Danbury 11[FN3] including but not limited to each person's personnel file and documents relating to overtime, disciplinary actions, performance reviews, hiring, promotions, demotions, transfers, and terminations” [hereinafter “personnel records”] as requested by Day Laborer Plaintiffs in Plaintiffs' Request for Production of Documents dated December 24, 2008. Federal Defendants refused to produce the files and continue to fail to fulfill their discovery obligations despite repeated requests for responses by Day Laborer Plaintiffs.
FN1. The Day Laborer Plaintiffs are Juan Barrera, José Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, José Duma, José Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segunda Sanchez, and Juan Carlos Simbaña.
FN2. Federal Defendants are James Brown, Richard McCaffrey, Ronald Preble, John Does, and the United States of America.
FN3. The Danbury 11 are Day Laborer Plaintiffs and Manuel Morocho Alvaraein and Jose Luis Marca Fernandez.
The Federal Defendants' personnel records are relevant, reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and clearly bear on issues involved in this case. The production of these documents is relevant to proving the various claims that Day Laborer Plaintiffs have made, in particular ICE Defendants' willful violation of Day Laborer Plaintiffs' Constitutional rights and the liability of ICE Defendants' superiors for failure to properly supervise and train them. This Court should order that the requested documents be produced.

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Facts and Proceedings
On September 19, 2006, ICE Defendants James Brown, Richard McCaffrey, and Ronald Preble, acting together with the Danbury Defendants,[FN4] arrested Day Laborer Plaintiffs as part of an undercover sting operation designed to target day laborers in the area of Kennedy Park in Danbury, Connecticut. Amended Complaint at ¶ 61, [Dkt. No. 21] [hereinafter “Am. Comp”]. Contrary to normal practice, the ICE Defendants participated in the operation even though they lacked any specific identifying information about any individuals targeted that day who might have violated federal immigration law. See Ex. B. (Transcript of Deposition of James Brown on February 20, 2009 at 104). The ICE Defendants participated in the arrest of Day Laborer Plaintiffs although no Day Laborer Plaintiff had an outstanding deportation or removal order, and no immigration warrants had been issued for any of them before their arrests on September 19, 2006. Am. Comp at ¶ 99. Day Laborer Plaintiffs were forcibly restrained and subsequently imprisoned by the ICE Defendants, and were detained for periods ranging from fourteen to thirty-four days. The United States did not bring criminal charges against the Day Laborer Plaintiffs, but placed them in civil removal proceedings based solely on statements obtained from the Day Laborer Plaintiffs themselves on the day of the arrest. Id. at ¶¶ 104, 106. Day Laborer Plaintiffs denied the allegations against them in the removal proceeding and moved to suppress the United States' evidence before the Immigration Judge; their motions were denied and Day Laborer Plaintiffs were subsequently either ordered removed or granted voluntary departure. See Ex. C. (Decision of Immigration Judge, Jan. 30, 2008). All of the Day Laborer Plaintiffs have appealed these rulings to the Board of Immigration Appeals. See Ex. D (Notice of Appeal of Decision of Immigration Judge, Feb. 28, 2008).
FN4. The “Danbury Defendants” are Mark Boughton, Alan Baker, José Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, John Does, and the City of Danbury.
Day Laborer Plaintiffs allege that their arrests and subsequent detention were unlawful because the Federal Defendants seized, detained, and arrested them without probable cause and/or reasonable suspicion on the basis of racial and ethnic stereotype and perceived national origin. Id. at ¶ 244. Day Laborer Plaintiffs brought the current suit to vindicate their constitutional and civil rights, alleging claims against the ICE Defendants under the First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. See Am. Comp.
Federal Defendants moved to dismiss all claims against them on February 1, 2008. [Dkt. No. 51]. On the same date, the Individual Danbury Defendants[FN5] brought a motion seeking to dismiss in part Plaintiffs' claims against them, and Danbury Defendants sought to disqualify Plaintiffs' counsel. [Dkts. No. 48, 50]. On July 3, 2008, Magistrate Judge Martinez denied Danbury Defendants' Motions to Disqualify Counsel. [Dkt. No. 95], and Defendants did not appeal. On September 25, 2008, Federal Defendants moved to stay discovery. [Dkt. No. 101]. On September 26, 2008, Individual Danbury Defendants moved to stay discovery. [Dkt. No. 102]. On October 20, 2008, Defendant City of Danbury also moved to stay discovery in this action. [Dkt. No. 104]. On December 10, 2008, Magistrate Judge Martinez denied all motions to stay discovery. [Dkt. No. 121]. Chief Judge Chatigny denied Federal Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in full and Danbury Defendants' Motion to Dismiss except as to one count on March 10, 2009. [Dkt. No. 129].
FN5. The “Individual Danbury Defendants” are Mark Boughton, Alan Baker, José Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, and John Does.
Discovery Request in Dispute
Plaintiffs propounded their first Request for Production on December 24, 2009 and it was received by Federal Defendants on December 29, 2008. See Ex. E (Request for Production). In Item Twelve of this request, Plaintiffs requested that Federal Defendants “[p]roduce all documents relating to the employment of all officers and/or employees of the United States of America, the Department of Homeland Security, and/or Immigrations and Customs Enforcement that were present during the investigation, questioning, arrest and/or detention of the Danbury 11 including but not limited to each person's personnel file and documents relating to overtime, disciplinary actions, performance

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reviews, hiring, promotions, demotions, transfers, and terminations.” [hereinafter “RFP #12”].
Federal Defendants requested, and Plaintiffs consented to, several extensions such that a response was ultimately due on April 8, 2009 and was received by Plaintiffs on that date. See Ex. F. (Federal Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Requests for Production). Federal Defendants objected to RFP #12 only on relevancy grounds and did not list any responsive documents in their privilege log. Id.
Plaintiffs conferred with Federal Defendants on April 23, 2009 with regard to Federal Defendants' responses and objections to Plaintiffs' First Request for Production. During that conferral, Federal Defendants explained that they did not believe the personnel records requested were relevant to the claims at issue in this action, and that they would only produce documents responsive to this request pursuant to a court order. Defendants confirmed that they were asserting no privilege with regard to the files. Plaintiffs now file this motion for an order compelling discovery within thirty days of the due date of Federal Defendants' response, as required by Judge Martinez's Scheduling Order. [Dkt. No. 124].
Legal Argument
I. Plaintiffs are Entitled to Broad Discovery of Information Relevant to the Complaint
“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense...the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action. Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
Courts have construed the term “relevance” broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matters that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978). In a leading case, Judge Weinstein elaborated that “except for reasonable redactions of names and addresses to protect privacy or informer sources, plaintiffs in federal civil rights actions are presumptively entitled to recollections as well as documents on prior complaints and police history.” King v. Conde, 121 F.R.D. 180 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
The general policy allowing broad discovery extends to personnel records. McKenna v. Incorporated Village of North, 2007 WL 2071603 at *7 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (attached as Ex. G.). There, the court held that plaintiffs are presumptively entitled to discovery of personnel documents in a civil rights action against police officers. Id. If defendants “mak[e] a ‘substantial threshold showing’ that there are specific harms likely to accrue from disclosure of the specific materials,” a court must then balance the interests favoring and opposing confidentiality. Id. See also MacNamara v. City of New York, 249 F.R.D. 70 at *80 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). Citing the test established in King, the court stated that the police must specify which documents are privileged and the reasons for nondisclosure. Id. at *8.
Once the police have met the threshold burden, the court must balance their interest in confidentiality against factors favoring disclosure, such as the relevance to the plaintiff's case, the importance to and strength of the plaintiff's case, and the importance to the public interest. Id. at *8. See also MacNamara, 249 F.R.D. at *80. Discussing the balancing process, Judge Sullivan stated that, “in light of the great weight of the policy in favor of discovery in civil rights actions and the normal presumption in favor of broad discovery, defendants' case for nondisclosure or restricted disclosure must be extremely persuasive.” Id. (citing King, 121 F.R.D. at 195).
In this case, Federal Defendants have not claimed that the personnel records are protected by any privilege, nor has it articulated any particular harm that would result from their disclosure. See Ex. F. Therefore, the issue before the court is whether the personnel files contain information that is relevant to Day Laborer Plaintiffs' claims, Federal Defendants' defenses, or to the subject matter involved in this action, and is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of

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admissible evidence, and the court need not consider issues of confidentiality.[FN6] See McKenna, 2007 WL 2071603 at *9 (holding that because the police failed to establish any particular harm that would accrue if the records were disclosed, and made only a “generalized objection under New York Civil Rights Law” that the records were confidential, the plaintiffs were entitled to discover relevant information including any records of complaints of professional misconduct against the defendant police officers and their personnel records). See also Barrett v. City of New York, 237 F.R.D. 39, 41-42 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that all relevant materials which are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence should be discoverable.)
FN6. The Plaintiffs note that information of a personal nature included in the personnel files that is not relevant may be redacted, such as social security numbers, home addresses, telephone numbers, and medical information, prior to disclosure.
II. The Personnel Files are Relevant to Material Issues in this Case
The Federal Defendants' personnel records are relevant, reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and clearly bear on issues involved in this case. The production of these documents is relevant to proving the various claims that Day Laborer Plaintiffs have made, in particular ICE Defendants' willful violation of Day Laborer Plaintiffs' Constitutional rights and the liability of ICE Defendants' superiors for failure to properly supervise and train them.
The personnel records requested by Day Laborer Plaintiffs are reasonably expected to contain, inter alia, information regarding any prior misconduct of and complaints against the federal agents who participated in the arrest, detention, or investigation of Day Laborer Plaintiffs. Indications of prior misconduct are relevant to the ICE Defendants' motive, intent, knowledge, or absence of mistake or accident and would be admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). See generally Session v. Rodriguez, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43761 (2008) (Martinez, M.J.) (holding that prior complaints in a defendant's disciplinary history were relevant if the conduct was similar) (Attached as Ex. H.). Indications of prior misconduct are also relevant to establish that the supervisors of ICE Defendants and other federal employees responsible for Day Laborers' arrest and detention are liable for failing to properly train and supervise them.[FN7] See Hayut v. State Univ. of N.Y., 352 F.3d 733, 753 (2d Cir. 2003) (elaborating the test for supervisory liability in the Second Circuit).
FN7. On or before May 29, 2009, see Dkt. No. 124, Plaintiffs will seek to join supervisory ICE officers as defendants in this action for their failure to train and supervise ICE Defendants and other federal employees responsible for Day Laborer Plaintiffs' arrest and detention. Plaintiffs raise the relevancy of the personnel records at issue in this motion to Plaintiffs' claims against the New ICE Supervisor Defendants now because the Court's Scheduling Order Regarding Case Management Plan requires Plaintiffs file a Motion to Compel Discovery within thirty days of Defendants' production or waive the ability to move the Court, and dealing with the related issues at the same time may serve the interests of judicial economy. [Dkt. No. 124].
The personnel records requested by Day Laborer Plaintiffs are relevant if they contain any indication that Federal Defendants have engaged in or been investigated for conduct similar to their conduct in the current case. In the present case, Federal Defendants unlawfully detained and imprisoned Day Laborer Plaintiffs. ICE Defendants arrested the Day Laborer Plaintiffs without probable cause and/or seized them without reasonable suspicion, intentionally targeted them based on race, ethnicity, and perceived national origin, and intentionally or negligently inflicted emotional distress on them, among other violations. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 244, 247, 267, 272. ICE Defendants arrested Day Laborer Plaintiffs as part of a sting operation that was not preceded by investigation into or knowledge of their immigration status. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 64, 67, 70, 71. ICE Defendants confiscated Day Laborer Plaintiffs cell phones and prevented them from calling an attorney. Am. Compl. ¶ 95. In violation of ICE regulations, Defendant McCaffrey served as the arresting officer and the examining officer for Day Laborer Plaintiffs. ¶¶ 114, 115. ICE Defendants instructed Day Laborer Plaintiffs to sign documents without translating those documents to Day Laborer Plaintiffs. Am. Compl. ¶ 120. While in custody in Massachusetts, an unknown law enforcement agent questioned Day Laborer Plaintiffs as potential

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suspects or witnesses in a murder investigation but did not offer Day Laborer Plaintiffs access to counsel or inform them of their Miranda rights. Am. Compl. ¶ 120.
Personnel records of ICE Defendants and other federal employees responsible for Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' arrest and detention are relevant to the extent they establish a history of discriminatory law enforcement activities or disregard for constitutional protections. See, e.g., Unger v. Cohen, 125 F.R.D. 67 at *70 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Moore v. City of New York, 2006 WL 1134146 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (Attached as Ex. I.); Wisniewski v. Claflin, 2007 WL 1120464 at *4 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (ordering production of relevant complaints in discipline records of defendant officers for in camera review) (Attached as Ex. J.). Additionally, prior complaints against ICE Defendants and other federal employees responsible for Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' arrest and detention or incidents of misconduct might lead to the discovery of names of individuals who could produce admissible evidence. See, e.g., Unger, 125 F.R.D. at *70; Moore, 2006 WL at *70 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). Finally, allegations of dissimilar misconduct involving false statements are relevant to credibility. See, e.g., Giles v. Coughlin, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 236 at *9 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (citing Hynes v. Coughlin, 79 F.3d 285, 293-94 (2d Cir. 1996)) (attached as Ex. K.).
Many decisions within the Second Circuit hold that personnel records of law enforcement officers who are defendants in a civil rights suit are subject to discovery. For instance, in a 2008 decision, Magistrate Judge Martinez considered whether a defendant police officer's disciplinary history is discoverable. Session v. Rodriguez, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43761 (2008) (Attached as Ex. H.). In that civil rights action against the police, the court held that “police internal investigations files are discoverable when they involve allegations of similar conduct.” Id. at *4.
In a Section 1983 action alleging a police officer used excessive force, Judge Barbara A. Lee concluded that personnel records and records pertaining to civilian complaints were relevant and should be produced in their entirety. Unger v. Cohen, 125 F.R.D. 67 at *70 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). The court held the officer's training records, evaluations and disciplinary records were relevant because the offending conduct occurred while the officer was on-duty. Id. The conduct of the officer in Unger is similar to the conduct at issue in this case, including allegations of arrest without probable cause and denial of the opportunity to telephone a lawyer. See id. The personnel records of the defendant ICE agents and other federal employees responsible for Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' arrest and detention are similarly relevant to their on-duty conduct. See id. at *68-69. See also McKenna, 2007 WL at *9 (granting motion to compel production of defendant police officers' personnel records and any records of complaints of professional misconduct against them without stating grounds for relevance).
The court in Unger also held that civilian complaints were relevant because they might contain names of other individuals whose rights had been violated by the officer, which in turn might lead to admissible evidence. Id. at *69. Similarly, in the instant case, any records of prior misconduct by the defendant ICE agents and other federal employees responsible for Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' arrest and detention might lead to evidence relating to intent, knowledge, absence of mistake or pattern. On that theory, Judge Richard Cardinale ordered production of employment records concerning acts of police misconduct, including acts that occurred after the incident, because they might be relevant to issues of intent, absence of mistake or pattern. Moore v. City of New York, 2006 WL 1134146 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
Finally, the personnel files are relevant to personal supervisor liability claims Day Laborer Plaintiffs intend to pursue against supervisors of ICE Defendants and other federal employees responsible for Day-Laborer Plaintiffs' arrest and detention. See supra note 7. The information in the personnel files about employee evaluations, prior misconduct, or other evidence of disregard for proper procedure should be produced because it is relevant to the questions of whether the supervisors created a policy or custom allowing such misconduct, whether they were negligent in supervising their subordinates, and whether the supervisors failed to act on information that constitutional rights were being violated. See Hayut v. State Univ. of N.Y., 352 F.3d 733, 753 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding relevant issues as to supervisor liability to include, inter alia, whether the supervisor: (1) created a policy or custom under which the violation occurred, (2) was grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who committed the violation, or (3) was deliberately indifferent to the rights of others by failing to act on information that constitutional rights were being violated). Other Second Circuit

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courts in analogous cases have found the personnel records of one defendant to be relevant to supervisory claims against that defendant's supervisor. See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of New York, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14198, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (Attached as Ex. L.) (holding personnel records subject to discovery on claims of supervisory liability for negligent hiring and negligent retention). Similarly, information in the personnel files of the Federal Defendants in this action pertaining to training is relevant to determine what policies and customs the supervisors established regarding constitutional rights and working with local police departments.
Conclusion
The personnel files are highly relevant to the claims presented in this case. Thus, the documents should be discoverable under Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a). This Court has broad discretion to compel discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 and so Federal Defendants should be ordered to produce all portions of the personnel files that contain relevant information.
DATED: May 8, 2009
END OF DOCUMENT

 
 Case 3:07-cv-01436-RNC Document 293 Filed 09/02/09 Page 1 of 36

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

JUAN BARRERA, JOSÉ CABRERA, DANIEL CHAVEZ, JOSÉ DUMA, JOSÉ LLIBISUPA, ISAAC MALDONADO, EDGAR REDROVAN, NICHOLAS SEGUNDO SANCHEZ, JUAN CARLOS SIMBAÑA, and DANILO BRITO VARGAS,
Plaintiffs,
v.
MARK BOUGHTON, ALAN BAKER, JOSÉ AGOSTO, RICHARD DEJESUS, JAMES A. FISHER, JAMES LALLI, CRAIG MARTIN, JOSEPH NORKUS, JOHN DOES, CITY OF DANBURY, JAMES BROWN, RICHARD MCCAFFREY, RONALD PREBLE, JOHN DOES, and the UNITED STATES,
Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:07-cv-01436-RNC September 2, 2009

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND TO OBTAIN COSTS FROM CITY OF DANBURY AND INDIVIDUAL DANBURY DEFENDANTS
This is a civil rights lawsuit to remedy the discriminatory and unauthorized enforcement
of federal immigration laws against the Plaintiffs1 in the City of Danbury. Plaintiffs have
asserted claims against the Individual Danbury Defendants for, inter alia, violating their rights
under the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and under the Connecticut constitution, by

1 Plaintiffs refers to the following eight individuals: Juan Barrera, José Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, José Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicolas Segundo Sanchez and Juan Carlos Simbaña.

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targeting them on the basis of their race, ethnicity and perceived national origin; arresting them without valid warrants, without probable cause, and without the authority to make civil immigration arrests; and doing so in retaliation for their exercise of free speech and association. Plaintiffs also assert claims against the City of Danbury for its role in promulgating and executing an unconstitutional municipal policy and/or custom of immigration enforcement and impermissible discriminatory law enforcement, which led to Plaintiffs’ arrest.2
Plaintiffs file this motion because Danbury Defendants3 have refused to produce documents requested by Plaintiffs in a Request for Production dated February 13, 2009 (“February 13 RFP”) that are relevant to parties’ claims and defenses and to the subject matter of this action. See Nurhussein Decl. Ex. A. Moreover, in response to Plaintiffs’ good faith efforts to resolve this dispute over the course of five months, Danbury Defendants have dragged their feet, shifted positions, and refused to produce material even after Plaintiffs’ narrowed requests have caused the Danbury Defendants to withdraw their objections. Plaintiffs now ask this Court to compel production of the relevant, non-privileged documents that Plaintiffs have requested.4
2 Plaintiffs also have claims against Immigration & Customs Enforcement (ICE) and several of its agents.
3 “Danbury Defendants” refers to both the City of Danbury and the Individual Danbury Defendants (Mark Boughton, Alan Baker, José Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, Julio Lopez, Luis Ramos, Mitchell Weston and John Does).
4 Consistent with Plaintiffs' February 13 RFP, “document(s)” should be understood as encompassing both hard copy and electronic documents. See February 13 RFP Definitions ¶ 2. The Danbury Defendants have produced hard copy documents responsive to some of the discovery requests, but have failed to conduct any electronic searches whatsoever. 2

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ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs are entitled to broad discovery of information relevant to the Amended
Complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Courts have construed the term “relevance” broadly to
encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matters that could
bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S.
340, 351 (1978).
I. The City of Danbury and Individual Danbury Defendants have refused to produce documents relating to immigration enforcement activities.
Plaintiffs propounded several Requests relating to immigration enforcement by the
Danbury Police Department and collaboration between the City and ICE. The Requests, together
with the Danbury Defendants' objections, are set out below:
Request 3: Produce all documents relating to the investigation, arrest, or detention of any suspected immigration violators or removable aliens in Danbury, Connecticut from December 1, 2001 to the present, including but not limited to any investigative activities, arrests or detentions made on February 14, 2006, June 8, 2006 and October 11, 2006.
Objection: Vague, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and seeks materials not relevant to the claim or defense of any party; seeks disclosure of documents related to matters which occurred after September 19, 2006, the date of the subject incident – such documents, to the extent they exist, are irrelevant to the present matter; seeks the disclosure of sensitive information which, if disclosed, could compromise the safety of the DPD officers who work undercover;5 unduly burdensome and costly as applied to electronically stored information.
Request 4: Produce all documents relating to surveillance, investigative or enforcement activities in the City of Danbury by the Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, or employees thereof from December 1, 2001 to the present.
Objection: Defendants are not the proper parties to respond to this request as it seeks information not within their knowledge or possession – the United States is a party to this lawsuit and this document request is more properly directed to it; unduly burdensome and costly as applied to electronically stored information.
5 Only the Individual Danbury Defendants invoked the law enforcement privilege for this request.
3

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Request 5: Produce all documents relating to communication, cooperation, coordination and/or dealings by the City of Danbury, the City of Danbury Police Department, and/or employees, departments, or agencies thereof, including but not limited to the Mayor, the Mayor’s office, Corporation Counsel, and the Special Investigations Division (SID) with the Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, or employees thereof with from December 1, 2001 to the present.
Objection: No objection as to hard copy documents; unduly burdensome and costly as applied to electronically stored information.
Request 13: Produce all documents relating to the surveillance, investigation, or arrest of immigration absconders or fugitives in Danbury, Connecticut from January 1, 2002 to the present.
Objection: Vague, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and seeks materials not relevant to the claim or defense of any party; seeks the disclosure of sensitive information which, if disclosed, could compromise the safety of DPD officers who work undercover; seeks disclosure of documents which, to the extent they exist, may contain indications of law enforcement methods which should remain confidential to protect their effectiveness; unduly burdensome and costly as applied to electronically stored information.
Request 14: Produce all documents relating to any other dealings by the Department of Homeland Security, Immigrations and Customs Enforcement, and/or employees thereof with the City of Danbury or its agents, not covered in the foregoing descriptions including but not limited to any other surveillance, investigations, arrests, or detentions of suspected undocumented aliens.
Objection: Vague, overly broad and unduly burdensome and seeks materials not relevant to the claim or defense of any party; seeks disclosure of sensitive information which, if disclosed, could compromise the safety of DPD officers who work undercover; seeks disclosure of documents which, to the extent they exist, may contain indications of law enforcement methods which should remain confidential to protect their effectiveness; unduly burdensome and costly as applied to electronically stored information.
Request 23: Produce all documents regarding the Alien Absconder Initiative (AAI), the National Fugitive Operations Program (NFOP), Operation Return to Sender, the Office of Detention and Removal (DRO), Fugitive Operations Team (FOT), Operation Predator, Operation Community Shield, Secure Border Initiative, Operation FLASH, or any other documents related to any Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) operations, including but not limited to communication with the Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, relating to the identification, apprehension, or arrest of any alien with an outstanding order to removal, deportation , or exclusion, in Danbury, Connecticut.
4

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Objection: Defendants are not the proper parties to respond to this request as it seeks information not within their knowledge or possession – the United States is a party to this lawsuit and this document request is more properly directed at it; seeks disclosure of documents which, to the extent they exist, may contain references to law enforcement informants and indications of law enforcement methods which should remain confidential to protect their effectiveness;6 unduly burdensome and costly as applied to electronically stored information.
Request 25: Produce all documents indicating that HARFOT’s assistance was requested by Danbury PD/SID to identify aliens with possible ICE warrants among the day laborers near Kennedy Park.7
Objection: No objection as to hard copy documents (Defendants state that, upon information and belief, they have no responsive documents); unduly burdensome and costly as applied to electronically stored information.
A. Documents relating to immigration enforcement are relevant to material issues in this case.
Documents related to the Danbury Defendants’ immigration enforcement activities are
highly relevant to Plaintiffs’ allegation that they were arrested as part of the City’s pattern and
practice of unauthorized, unlawful, and discriminatory immigration enforcement, which was
carried out at the direction of Defendants Boughton and Baker by Defendant DPD Officers with
the help of Defendant ICE Agents. Plaintiffs have alleged, and Danbury Defendants have
conceded, that Mayor Boughton has promoted the enforcement of federal immigration laws in
Danbury. See Am. Compl. ¶ 32; City of Danbury Ans. ¶¶ 31-32 (“City’s Answer”); Individual
Danbury Defendants’ Answer to Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 147, ¶¶ 31-32 (“Individual Defs.
Answer”). However, there remains considerable disagreement between the parties about whether
the Danbury Police Department has enforced federal immigration law unlawfully, in a
6 Only the Individual Danbury Defendants invoked the law enforcement privilege for this request.
7 Danbury Defendants stated in their Responses and Objections to Plaintiffs’ February 13 RFP that, upon information and belief, they were not in possession of any such documents. However, as with the other Requests, they have not conducted any electronic searches. 5

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discriminatory fashion, with the goal of driving unwanted immigrants and Ecuadorians from Danbury, through pretextual enforcement of local ordinances, in violation of the Federal and State Constitutions, and in coordination with and the full knowledge of the ICE Defendants. See, e.g., Am. Compl., City’s Answer, and Individual Defs. Answer ¶¶ 15, 32-33, 37-38, 42-43, 47. These documents would shed light on all these allegations and are thus relevant to Plaintiffs’ Second (preemption), Third (equal protection), Fourth (retaliation and suppression for protected speech and assembly), Sixth (Conspiracy), Seventh (Conspiracy), Eighth (supervisory liability), Ninth (Monell liability), and Sixteenth (Conspiracy) claims for relief. These documents are also relevant to the Danbury Defendants’ Affirmative Defenses against Plaintiffs’ municipal and supervisory liability claims. See City’s Answer, Affirmative Defense 4; Individual Defs. Answer, Affirmative Defense 5.
B. Evidence about immigration enforcement events that occurred after September 19, 2006 is relevant to show that the City of Danbury had a pattern and practice of discriminatory and unauthorized enforcement of federal immigration laws.
Defendants have argued that “documents related to matters which occurred after September 19, 2006 . . . . are irrelevant to the present matter.”8 Courts in the District of Connecticut, however, have held that post-event evidence may be highly relevant. See Jones v. Town of East Haven, 493 F. Supp. 2d 302, 331 (D. Conn. 2007) (“Evidence of incidents that occurred subsequent to the incident out of which the plaintiff’s claim arises . . . is probative for purposes of showing the existence of a municipal policy or custom.”). See also Foley v. City of Lowell, 948 F.2d 10, 14 (1st Cir. 1991) (“[A]ctions taken subsequent to an event are admissible
8 City of Danbury’s Responses and Objections to Plaintiffs’ Request for Production of Documents – Request 9; Individual Danbury Defendants’ Objections to Plaintiffs’ Request for Production of Documents – Request 6. 6

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if, and to the extent that, they provide reliable insight into the policy in force at the time of the incident.”); Bordanaro v. McLeod, 871 F.2d 1151, 1167 (1st Cir. 1989) (“Post-event evidence can shed some light on what policies existed in the city on the date of an alleged deprivation of constitutional right.”).
Evidence about immigration enforcement events that occurred after September 19, 2006 is relevant for showing that the City of Danbury had a pattern and practice of discriminatory and unauthorized enforcement of federal immigration laws. Therefore, the Court should compel Defendants to produce documents related to matters within the full responsive period of the Requests for Production.
C. Plaintiffs have spent months conferring with Defendants’ counsel over the immigration enforcement records but still have not received the requested documents.
Plaintiffs’ counsel have conferred extensively with counsel for the Individual Danbury Defendants regarding these requests in an effort to address their concerns regarding the cost and burden of conducting the searches. Plaintiffs narrowed the scope of their requests to three search strategies to help guide Defendants’ search.
First, Plaintiffs provided a list of 305 dates and/or individuals related to immigration enforcement by the Danbury Police Department, which were found in documents produced by Federal Defendants.9 See Declaration of Siham Nurhussein, dated Sept. 2, 2009 (“Nurhussein
9 This list, which was offered by Plaintiffs’ counsel on June 4, 2009 to help guide the Individual Danbury Defendants’ search, referred to approximately 80 immigration enforcement incidents where there was known Danbury police involvement and approximately 225 additional incidents where there may have been Danbury police involvement. Plaintiffs produced these lists at Plaintiffs’ own expense from documents of ICE enforcement activities in the City of Danbury produced by the Federal Defendants to Plaintiffs as well as to the Danbury Defendants. The first list (80 incidents) was provided to 7

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Decl.”), ¶¶ 16-19. Second, Plaintiffs asked Danbury Defendants to perform a comprehensive search of the DPD Special Investigation Division (“SID”) files for documents related to immigration enforcement, since SID was the small division that has been responsible for many of the city’s immigration enforcement activities, including the undercover sting operation at issue in this litigation.10 Id. at Ex. I. Third, Plaintiffs asked counsel for the Individual Danbury Defendants to consult with their clients and ask them to identify any events that they are aware of related to immigration enforcement or ICE. Id.
Counsel for the Danbury Defendants have not indicated whether they have searched the SID files or consulted with the Individual Danbury Defendants, nor have they indicated whether they have any intention of doing so, despite repeated requests by Plaintiffs’ counsel. As for the first strategy (using a specific list of dates and/or individuals, provided by Plaintiffs, to search for documents, counsel for the Individual Danbury Defendants confirmed that he “would be amenable to [Plaintiffs] providing . . . dates and other information [Plaintiffs] have. This would address our overbreadth objections to those items.” Id. Ex. I. After reviewing the initial list, counsel for the Individual Danbury Defendants questioned the relevance of any incidents that occurred after September 19, 2006 (all but approximately 10 of the incidents on the list provided). See Nurhussein Decl. ¶ 20. Then, on July 20, 2009, counsel for the Individual Danbury Defendants reversed course, stating that Defendants were unwilling to search for even
counsel for the Individual Danbury Defendants on July 1 and the second list (225 incidents) was provided on July 8. 10 By “SID files,” Plaintiffs mean any documents in the possession, custody, or control of the Danbury Defendants related to law enforcement activities that SID was involved in or to collaboration between SID and ICE.
8

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the limited number of records referenced on the lists provided by Plaintiffs, unless additional identifying information was provided. See Nurhussein Decl. ¶ 21.
Plaintiffs’ counsel has already spent at least 30 hours conferring with Danbury Defendants regarding the immigration enforcement records and compiling a list of specific incidents to facilitate their search. Id. ¶ 17. Despite these months of conferrals and substantial efforts to narrow the dispute by providing dates of specific incidents, Plaintiffs still have yet to receive any of the requested records regarding immigration enforcement activities in Danbury.
D. Danbury Defendants have improperly invoked the law enforcement privilege. 1. Defendants have not met their burden to demonstrate the existence of a law enforcement privilege over the requested documents.
Danbury Defendants seek to withhold various immigration enforcement records by asserting a law enforcement privilege (Requests 13, 14, 23) .11 They claim that these documents would contain “indications of law enforcement methods which should remain confidential to protect their effectiveness” or “sensitive information which . . . could compromise the safety of . . . officers who work undercover.”
The Second Circuit has recognized a qualified “law enforcement privilege” in civil discovery. See In re Dep’t of Investigation of the City of New York, 856 F.2d 481, 483-84 (2d Cir. 1988). As with other common-law discovery privileges, the party seeking to assert the privilege bears the burden of establishing that it applies. See Green v. St. Vincent’s Med. Ctr., 252 F.R.D. 125, 127 (D. Conn. 2008). When the government seeks to assert the law enforcement privilege, it “must make a substantial threshold showing that there are specific
11 The Danbury Defendants have also asserted a law enforcement privilege with respect to Requests 1, 2, 6, 7, 24 and 33, which are discussed in Sections III and VI, infra. 9

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harms likely to accrue from disclosure of specific material . . . by presenting those facts that are the essential elements of the privileged relationship and not by mere conclusory or ipse dixit assertions.” MacNamara v. City of New York, 249 F.R.D. 70, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (internal citations omitted). In the absence of such a showing, “the question is resolved in favor of direct disclosure.” King v. Conde, 121 F.R.D. 180, 190 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
To properly invoke the law enforcement privilege, an objecting party must submit with its objections a declaration or affidavit by an agency official “based on personal review of the documents by an official in the police agency (not the defendants’ attorney).” Id. at 189. The statement must explain—“not merely state conclusorily”—how the documents have been “generated or collected”; how they have been kept confidential; what “specific interests” would be harmed by disclosure; and the “projected severity” of each injury. Id. In determining the existence of the privilege, courts must not “rely simply on generalized reiterations of the policies underlying the privilege” and need not “defer blindly” to the declarations of law enforcement officials. MacNamara, 249 F.R.D. at 79, 86.
The City has not submitted an affidavit or sworn statement indicating that its objections are based on any personal review of the documents, much less by an agent besides its counsel. It has failed to explain how these documents have been kept confidential, identify specifically the interests that would be injured by disclosure, or provide any other information to support its bare statement that the privilege exists. See King, 121 F.R.D. at 189. Furthermore, the City and Individual Danbury Defendants have failed to identify even a single document on their privilege logs as being withheld pursuant to a law enforcement privilege. Second Circuit law makes clear that even where a privilege log is used, the court will reject a privilege claim where the party
10

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invoking privilege fails to provide sufficient detail to demonstrate that it has met the legal requirements for the application of that privilege. See United States v. Constr. Prods. Research, Inc., 73 F.3d 464, 473-74 (2d. Cir. 1996) (rejecting party’s privilege claim where privilege log was “deficient” and “cursory,” and finding that “general allegations of privilege . . . are not supported by the information provided” because “[t]he descriptions and comments simply do not provide enough information to support the privilege claim, particularly in the glaring absence of any supporting affidavits or other documentation”); Bowne of New York City, Inc. v. AmBase Corp., 150 F.R.D. 465, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (“[I]f the party invoking the privilege does not provide sufficient detail to demonstrate fulfillment of all the legal requirements for application of the privilege, his claim will be rejected.”).
As a result, the City’s objections based on law enforcement privilege should be denied, and the City should be compelled to comply with Plaintiffs’ discovery requests.
2. Even if Defendants had demonstrated the existence of such a privilege, Plaintiffs’ need for discovery of the information outweighs Defendants’ interest in confidentiality.
Even if the City were to properly invoke the law enforcement privilege, Plaintiffs’ clear need for the requested information outweighs the City’s interest in confidentiality. The law enforcement privilege is a qualified privilege. See MacNamara, 249 F.R.D. at 79. Once the government meets its burden of showing the privilege applies, the district court has a “duty . . . to balance the need for discovery of information contained in law enforcement files with the need for confidentiality.” Hodgson v. Roessler, Civ. No. 14, 200, 1973 WL 1102, at *3 (D. Conn. Jan. 30, 1973). A number of courts in the Second Circuit have set forth factors to be considered in
11

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this balance. See King, 121 F.R.D. at 191 (collecting cases).12 Furthermore, in determining whether to order disclosure, the court “must also consider the value of appropriate protective orders and redactions,” MacNamara, 249 F.R.D. at 79 (quoting King, 121 F.R.D. at 190-91), particularly where “[s]uch an order can mitigate many if not all of the oft-alleged injuries to the police and to law enforcement.” Schiller v. City of New York, 252 F.R.D. 204, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
Plaintiffs have demonstrated that the immigration enforcement records are highly relevant to their claims. Furthermore, as these requests are made in the context of a federal civil rights action, on claims that have already survived a motion to dismiss, there is a presumptively strong public interest in favor of disclosure. See El Badrawi v. Dep’t Homeland Security, No. 07 Civ. 1074, --- F.R.D. ---, 2009 WL 2255293, at *6 (D. Conn. July 24, 2009) (finding strong public interest in disclosure outweighed law enforcement privilege where plaintiff’s civil rights suit would “expose[] extreme and outrageous conduct on the part of those who are charged with policing us all,” especially where claims were “clearly not frivolous” for having survived defendants’ motion to dismiss); see also Skibo v. City of New York, 109 F.R.D. 58, 61 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (“In a federal civil rights action, a claim that the evidence is privileged must be so meritorious as to overcome the fundamental importance of a law meant to insure each citizen from unconstitutional state action.”) (internal citations omitted). As a result, the City should be compelled to respond to Plaintiffs’ discovery requests. 12 The factors in favor of confidentiality are: (1) threat to police officers’ own safety; (2)
invasion of police officers’ privacy; (3) weakening of law enforcement programs; (4) chilling of police internal investigative candor; (5) chilling of citizen complainant candor; and (6) state privacy law. The factors in favor of disclosure are: (1) relevance to the plaintiff’s case; (2) importance to the plaintiff’s case; (3) strength of the plaintiff’s case; and (4) importance to the public interest. Id. at 191-95.
12

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E. Individual Danbury Defendants Should Pay for the Costs Plaintiffs Incurred Compiling a List of Dates and Names that Correspond to Immigration Enforcement Actions in Danbury
Plaintiffs respectfully request costs and attorney’s fees incurred compiling the list of dates and names that the Danbury Defendants indicated would facilitate their search of immigration enforcement records. Plaintiffs also seek costs and attorney’s fees for time spent conferring regarding the immigration enforcement records, as well as drafting the portion of this motion to compel that deals with those documents.
An award of costs and fees is “presumptively mandatory” under Rule 37(a)(5). Green v. St. Vincent’s Med. Ctr., 252 F.R.D. 125, 130 (D. Conn. 2008) (Smith, M.J.). While a finding of bad faith is not necessary for the Court to award costs and fees under Rule 37(a), see Messier v. Southbury Training Sch., No. 3:94-CV-1706, 1998 WL 841641, at *5 (D. Conn. Dec. 2, 1998), where, as here, a party has exhibited bad faith during the conferral process an award of costs and fees is especially appropriate. This Court should order Defendants to pay costs and fees for not producing immigration enforcement documents that correspond to the list of dates and names compiled by Plaintiffs. II. Defendants City of Danbury and Individual Danbury Defendants have refused to
produce documents from the employment files of officers involved in the planning or execution of the operation that resulted in the arrest of Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs seek employment records pertaining to all officers or government employees present during the investigation, questioning, arrest and/or detention of Plaintiffs, as well as any civilian complaints naming any of those officers. The Danbury Defendants have refused to produce any responsive documents. The relevant Requests, and the Danbury Defendants’ objections, are as follows:
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Request 15: Produce all documents relating to the employment of all officers and/or employees of the City of Danbury that were present during the planning, investigation, questioning, arrest, and/or detention of the Danbury 11 including but not limited to each person’s personnel file and documents relating to overtime, disciplinary actions, performance reviews, hiring, promotions, demotions, transfers, and terminations.
Request 16: Produce all documents relating to formal or informal citizen complaints made to the Danbury Police Department or to any other agency or department of the City of Danbury or to any employee of the City of Danbury that name any of the officers and/or employees of the City of Danbury that were present during the planning, investigation, questioning, arrest, and/or detention of the Danbury 11 including but not limited to written forms, written complaints, written letters, e-mails, faxes, phone messages, and memos, letters, faxes phone messages, or emails referring to such a complaint.
Objection (both requests): Requested documents are prohibited from disclosure by C.G.S. § 31128 (f); vague, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and seeks materials not relevant to the claim or defense of any party; unduly burdensome and costly as applied to electronically stored information.
A. The personnel files are relevant to material issues in this case. The Danbury defendants’ employment files are relevant, reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence, and clearly bear on issues involved in this case. The
production of these documents is relevant to proving the various claims that Plaintiffs have
made, in particular Defendants’ willful violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional and common law
rights and the liability of their superiors for failure to properly supervise and train them.
The employment records requested by Plaintiffs are reasonably expected to contain, for
example, information regarding any prior misconduct of and complaints against the Danbury
officers who participated in the arrest, detention, or investigation of Plaintiffs. Any records of
prior misconduct by the defendant Danbury officers and other Danbury employees responsible
for Plaintiffs’ arrest and detention, including acts that occurred after the incident leading to the
arrest of Plaintiffs, should be produced because they might lead to evidence relating to intent,
knowledge, absence of mistake or pattern. See Moore v. City of New York, No. CV-05-6127,
14

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2006 WL 1134146 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2006) (ordering production of employment records concerning acts of police misconduct, including acts that occurred after the incident, because they might be relevant to issues of intent, absence of mistake or pattern). See also Session v. Rodriguez, No. 3:03CV0943, 2008 WL 2338123, at *2 (D. Conn. June 4, 2008) (Martinez, M.J.) (holding that prior complaints in a defendant’s disciplinary history were relevant if conduct was similar). These employment records are also relevant to the extent they establish a history of discriminatory law enforcement activities or disregard for constitutional protections. See Unger v. Cohen, 125 F.R.D. 67, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). Additionally, allegations of any misconduct involving false statements would be relevant to the credibility of the individual officers. See, e.g., Giles v. Coughlin, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 236 at *9 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Hynes v. Coughlin, 79 F.3d 285, 293-94 (2d Cir. 1996). Both personnel records and records pertaining to civilian complaints should be produced. See Unger v. Cohen, 125 F.R.D. 67, 69-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (in § 1983 action alleging excessive force, court concluded that personnel records and records pertaining to civilian complaints were relevant and should be produced in their entirety because they might contain names of other individuals whose rights had been violated by the defendant police officer, which in turn might lead to admissible evidence).
Indications of prior misconduct are also relevant to establish that the supervisors of the Danbury Defendants and other Danbury employees responsible for Plaintiffs’ arrest and detention are liable for failing to properly train and supervise them. Information in the personnel files about employee evaluations, prior misconduct, and other evidence of disregard for proper procedure is relevant to the claims that Defendants Mayor Mark Boughton, Alan Baker, and James Fisher created a policy or custom allowing such misconduct, were negligent in supervising
15

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their subordinates, and failed to act on information that constitutional rights were being violated. See Hayut v. State Univ. of N.Y., 352 F.3d 733, 753 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding relevant issues as to supervisor liability include, inter alia, whether supervisor: (1) created policy or custom under which violation occurred, (2) was grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who committed violation, or (3) was deliberately indifferent to rights of others by failing to act on information that constitutional rights were being violated).
B. Plaintiffs are entitled to broad discovery of information relevant to the complaint.
The general policy allowing broad discovery extends to employment files including personnel records and complaints of misconduct. See McKenna v. Incorporated Vill. of Northport, No. CV 06-2895, 2007 WL 2071603, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. July 13, 2007). If defendants “mak[e] a ‘substantial threshold showing’ that there are specific harms likely to accrue from disclosure of the specific materials,” a court must then balance the interests favoring and opposing confidentiality.” Id; see also MacNamara v. City of New York, 249 F.R.D. 70, 79-80 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). In this showing, the police must specify which documents are privileged and the reasons for nondisclosure. MacNamara, 249 F.R.D. at 78-79.
Once the police have met the threshold burden, the court must balance their interest in confidentiality against factors favoring disclosure, such as the relevance to the plaintiff’s case, the importance to and strength of the plaintiff’s case, and the importance to the public interest. MacNamara, 249 F.R.D. at 78-80. “In light of the great weight of the policy in favor of discovery in civil rights actions and the normal presumption in favor of broad discovery, defendants’ case for non-disclosure or restricted disclosure must be extremely persuasive.” Id. at 80 (citing King, 121 F.R.D. at 195). The Danbury Defendants have not claimed that the
16

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employment files are protected by any privilege, nor have they articulated any particular harm that would result from their disclosure. As a result, these documents are discoverable if they contain information that is relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims or defenses or is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.13 See McKenna, 2007 WL 2071603, at *9 (where police failed to establish any particular harm from disclosure and made only a “generalized objection” that records were confidential, plaintiffs were entitled to discover records of defendant police officers’ personnel records and complaints of professional misconduct against them).
C. The Court is not inhibited by the Connecticut General Statutes from ordering production of the employment files.
The Connecticut statute governing production of personally identifiable information contained in an employee’s personnel file does not present any obstacle to this Court ordering production of the files. See Conn. Gen. Stat § 31-128(f). As a preliminary matter, it is far from clear that § 31-128(f) applies in this federal civil rights action. Moreover, even if § 31-128(f) did apply, an order to compel issued by this Court would clearly fall under the second statutory exception (personally identifiable information contained in personnel records may be produced “pursuant to a lawfully issued administrative summons or judicial order”). Ruran v. Beth El Temple of W. Hartford, Inc., 226 F.R.D. 165, 169 (D. Conn. 2005) (court order to produce documents “satisf[ies] the second exception to section 31-218[f] of the Connecticut General Statutes”). Because the personnel files and other employment records are relevant to Plaintiffs’
13 The Plaintiffs stipulate that information of a personal nature included in the personnel files that is not relevant may be redacted, such as social security numbers, home addresses, telephone numbers, and medical information, prior to disclosure. 17

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claims, their production should be ordered by this Court, thereby satisfying the second exception
to Conn. Gen. Stat § 31-128(f).
Moreover, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-128(f) applies only to employers, not to employees and
thus in no way prevents the Individual Danbury Defendants from producing their own personnel
files and employment records even without a court order.14 The Individual Danbury Defendants
have control over the requested documents since they may obtain their own records upon
request. Because the Individual Danbury Defendants are not bound by Conn. Gen. Stat.
§ 31-128(f) and have control over the requested documents, the Individual Danbury Defendants
should already have produced them in response to Plaintiffs’ February 13 RFP.
III. Defendants have failed to conduct a good-faith search for documents relating to the operations of SID and should be compelled to produce additional records. Plaintiffs seek documents relating to the establishment or operation of the Danbury Police
Department Special Investigations Division (SID)” (“SID Documents”):
Request 33: Produce all documents relating to the establishment or operation of the Danbury Police Department Special Investigations Division (SID), including but not limited to, documents relating to participation of SID officers or staff in the arrest of the Danbury 11; identification, apprehension, and arrest of alien absconders or fugitives; and other cooperation or assistance with U.S. Department of Homeland Security in any immigration enforcement operation in Danbury.
Objection: Vague, overly broad, unduly burdensome, not relevant to the claim or defense of any party and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; seeks the disclosure of sensitive information which , if disclosed, could compromise the safety of the SID officers who work undercover; seeks disclosure of documents which , to the extent they exist, may contain references to law enforcement informants and indications of law enforcement methods which should remain confidential to protect their effectiveness; unduly burdensome and costly as applied to electronically stored information.
14 The statute states that “[n]o individually identifiable information contained in the personnel file or medical records of any employee shall be disclosed by an employer . . . without the written authorization of such employee.” Id. (emphasis added). 18

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A. Documents pertaining to SID’s operations are relevant to material issues in this case.
Plaintiffs were arrested as part of an undercover sting operation planned by Defendant Detective Lieutenant James Fisher, the head of the Danbury Police Department SID, a small unit within the Danbury Police Department, and executed by Detective Fisher in cooperation with other members of SID. Defendants have asserted that the arrests of Plaintiffs occurred as part of a Danbury Police operation aimed at addressing traffic congestion and safety issues related to the gathering of day laborers at Kennedy Park. See Am. Compl. ¶132; City’s Answer ¶78.
Any evidence that SID operates as a unit targeting immigrants under the pretext of enforcing traffic or other minor infractions is directly relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims. Moreover, if SID engaged in traffic safety operations only on September 19, 2006, this would tend to indicate that traffic safety was not the focus of SID’s undercover operation on that day.
B. Defendants have failed to properly respond to Plaintiffs’ request for SID documents despite Plaintiffs’ efforts to address their concerns.
In a June 4, 2009 e-mail to counsel for the Individual Danbury Defendants, Plaintiffs responded to Defendants’ Objections by proposing a more narrow request for SID Documents.15 In spite of Plaintiffs’ good-faith attempts to reach an agreement with Defendants over the scope of the request for SID Documents, Defendants have failed to respond to Plaintiffs’ proposals and have failed to properly invoke the law enforcement privilege they asserted in response to
15 Plaintiffs requested any documents pertaining a) to the establishment and purpose of SID; b) any documents relating to SID’s investigation and enforcement of traffic violations; c) any documents relating to SID’s investigation and enforcement of municipal code violations; d) any documents relating to SID’s investigation and enforcement of housing code violations; e) any documents relating to SID’s investigation or enforcement activity related to backyard volleyball games in the City of Danbury; f) any documents relating to SID’s investigation and enforcement of crowd control and parade policing; g) any documents relating to SID’s investigation and enforcement of other offenses that carry penalties that do not include incarceration.
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Plaintiffs’ initial request. See Section I.D, supra. While the Individual Danbury Defendants have provided Plaintiffs with General Order #84-02, which identifies the purpose of and procedures to be followed by the Special Investigations Section, this production falls far short of even Plaintiffs’ narrower request. See note 14. Moreover, in the June 4, 2009 e-mail to the Individual Danbury Defendants’ counsel, Plaintiffs indicated their willingness to negotiate a protective order to address Defendants’ concerns with disclosure of law enforcement information. Defendants have not responded.
IV. Defendants have failed to conduct a good faith search for documents relating to the regulation of volleyball games in Danbury and should be compelled to produce additional records. Plaintiffs propounded the following requests for documents relating to the regulation of
volleyball games in Danbury: Request 26: Produce all documents relating to the regulation of volleyball games in Danbury, Connecticut, including but not limited to studies and proposals of new ordinances, and studies and proposals and the enforcement of already-existing ordinances. Request 28: Produce all documents relating to the issuance of cease-and-desist orders on or about July 23, 2005, to properties hosting volleyball games. Request 29: Produce all documents relating to the study of proposal of an ordinance regarding control or regulation of “repetitive outdoor activities.” Objection (all requests): Seeks disclosure of information not relevant to the claim or defense of any party and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; unduly burdensome and costly as applied to electronically stored information.
20

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The Danbury Defendants have raised only a relevance objection to these Requests.16 However, documents related to actions taken by the Danbury Defendants against backyard volleyball games in the City of Danbury are highly relevant to Plaintiffs’ allegation that they were arrested as part of a campaign of harassment and intimidation, developed by Mayor Boughton, Police Chief Baker, and Lieutenant Fisher, and carried out, in part, by the Defendant DPD Officers, that targeted Danbury’s Latino, Ecuadorian, and immigrant communities through discriminatory policies.17 These policies included, inter alia, discriminatory enforcement of city ordinances aimed at shutting down neighborhood volleyball games, which are a primary venue for Ecuadorian community gatherings. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 33-35. The Danbury Defendants have admitted that “the Danbury Common Council, with Mayor Boughton’s support, considered an ordinance banning certain ‘repetitive outdoor group activities’” but have otherwise denied Plaintiffs’ allegations that the City discriminatorily enforced city ordinances in order to target Ecuadorian volleyball games. See City’s Answer, ¶¶ 33-35; Individual Defs. Answer, ¶¶ 33-35.
16 The Danbury Defendants have thus waived any other potential objections. See Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 238 F.R.D. 536, 538 (D. Conn. 2006); Senat v. City of New York, 255 F.R.D. 338, 339 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
17 The Danbury Defendants can hardly argue that such discovery is not relevant, as the Individual Danbury Defendants issued subpoenas to four non-party organizations seeking depositions and documents related to the discriminatory targeting of volleyball games by the City of Danbury and Mayor Boughton. The City of Danbury argued in favor of those subpoenas at a hearing on May 20, 2009 held before Magistrate Judge Martinez. See Dkt. No. 200. In defending these requests, Individual Danbury Defendants called them “highly relevant.” Individual Danbury Defendants’ Objection to Nonparties’ Motion to Quash, Dkt. No. 165, at 5 (filed Apr. 28, 2009). Having sought and received from organizations who are not even parties to this litigation documents that are related to their discriminatory targeting of backyard volleyball games, the Danbury Defendants can hardly resist Plaintiffs’ request for similar materials now. 21

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Discovery into the City’s enforcement actions against backyard volleyball games is directly relevant to establish whether that enforcement targeted certain communities. Accordingly, these Requests are relevant to Plaintiffs’ Monell claim against the City of Danbury (Am. Compl., Claim for Relief 9); supervisory liability claims against Defendants Boughton, Baker, and Fisher (id., Claim for Relief 8); federal and state equal protection claims against the Defendant DPD Officers18 (id., Claim for Relief 3); federal and state speech and assembly claims against the Defendant DPD Officers (id., Claim for Relief 4); and the Danbury Defendants’ Affirmative Defenses that Plaintiffs’ damages and injuries were not proximately caused by a policy or custom (see City’s Answer, Affirmative Defense 4; Individual Defs. Answer, Affirmative Defense 5).
The Danbury Defendants’ production in response to these requests is incomplete since it does not include documents related to enforcement actions taken by the City of Danbury and, in particular, by the Danbury Police Department and by the Unified Neighborhood Inspection Team (“UNIT”), against backyard volleyball games.19 The Danbury Defendants should be ordered to produce such documents. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 37(a)(4) (“[A]n evasive or incomplete . . . response must be treated as a failure to . . . respond.”).
18 The Defendant DPD Officers include Defendants Fisher, Agosto, DeJesus, Lalli, Martin, and Norkus.
19 The City of Danbury produced cease-and-desist orders from various dates in July 2005; documents related to deliberations about whether to pass a City ordinance which could be used to shut-down backyard volleyball games; newspaper articles covering the controversy over that ordinance; and residents’ complaints about backyard volleyball games. 22

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V. Defendants have failed to conduct a good faith search for documents relating to the Unified Neighborhood Assistance Team (UNIT) and should be compelled to produce additional records. Plaintiffs propounded the following Request seeking documents relating to the Unified
Neighborhood Enforcement Team (UNIT): Request 30: Produce all documents relating to the Unified Neighborhood Enforcement Teams’s (UNIT) formation, coordination, planning, and activities. Objection: Seeks disclosure of information not relevant to the claim or defense of any party and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; unduly burdensome and costly as applied to electronically stored information.
The Danbury Defendants have raised only a relevance objection to the substance of this request.20 However, these documents are relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims that they were arrested as part of an effort by Mayor Boughton, Police Chief Baker, the City of Danbury, and the Defendant DPD Officers to harass, intimidate, and target Latinos in the City of Danbury through the discriminatory enforcement of local ordinances. That effort included discriminatory enforcement of building code regulations through a specially constituted office called the Unified Neighborhood Assistance Team (“UNIT”). See Am. Compl. ¶ 33. The Danbury Defendants have denied this allegation. See City’s Answer ¶¶ 33; Individual Defs. Answer ¶¶ 33. Discovery into “the formation, coordination, planning, and activities” of the UNIT would help confirm or deny Plaintiffs’ allegations and the claims and defenses that rest, in part, on those allegations, including Plaintiffs’ Third (equal protection), Eighth (Monell liability), and Ninth (supervisory liability) claims and the Danbury Defendants’ Affirmative Defenses regarding Monell and
20 Accordingly, the Danbury Defendants have waived any other potential objections not already raised. See sources cited supra, note 15. 23

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supervisory liability.21 City’s Answer, Affirmative Defense 4; Individual Defs. Answer,
Affirmative Defense 5.
The Danbury Defendants’ production in response to this request is incomplete since it
does not include documents related to the formation of the UNIT and the Office of
Neighborhood Assistance; documents related to internal reviews of the activities of the UNIT;
and documents related to the Danbury Police Department’s role in the activities and operation of
the UNIT.22 Accordingly, the Danbury Defendants should be ordered to produce the requested
documents. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 37(a)(4).
VI. Danbury Defendants have improperly invoked the law enforcement privilege. Plaintiffs seek the following documents, for which the Danbury Defendants have
improperly invoked the law enforcement privilege:
Request 1: Produce all documents relating to the planning, investigation, questioning, arrest, detention, and/or removal of the Danbury 11, including but not limited to all pre-operation plans, post-operation reports, press releases, arrest records, booking reports, and incident reports.
Objection: Seeks disclosure of documents which, to the extent they exist, would contain indications of law enforcement methods which should remain confidential to protect their effectiveness; unduly burdensome and costly as applied to electronically stored information.
Request 2: Produce all documents relating to equipment or vehicles used in connection with the investigation, arrest and/or detention of the Danbury 11.
21 Moreover, as discussed in note 16, supra, the Danbury Defendants can only argue that these documents are not relevant by contradicting a position taken earlier in this litigation. With the City of Danbury’s support, the Individual Danbury Defendants have sought and received documents from four non-party organizations related to the City’s and Mayor Boughton’s discriminatory housing code enforcement. The Individual Danbury Defendants defended these requests as “highly relevant.” Individual Danbury Defendants’ Objection to Nonparties’ Motion to Quash, Dkt. No. 165, at 5 (filed Apr. 28, 2009).
22 The City of Danbury produced printouts from the UNIT’s website, a UNIT brochure, and what appears to be a partial list of UNIT inspections. 24

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Objection: Vague, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and seeks materials not relevant to the claim or defense of any party; seeks disclosure of sensitive information which, if disclosed, could compromise the safety of the DPD officers who work undercover; unduly burdensome and costly as applied to electronically stored information.
Request 6: Produce all documents relating to how the City of Danbury and/or the City of Danbury Police Department should work with, has worked with, or will work with the Department of Homeland Security, Immigrations and Customs Enforcement, and/or employees thereof, including but not limited to any agreement, memoranda of understanding, guidelines, and/or any documents that review past operations.
Objection: Vague, overly broad, and unduly burdensome and seeks materials not relevant to the claim or defense of any party; seeks documents relating to future conduct; which by its nature is speculative and irrelevant to the present action; seeks disclosure of documents which, to the extent they exist, may contain indications of law enforcement methods which should remain confidential to protect their effectiveness.; unduly burdensome and costly as applied to electronically stored information.
Request 7: Produce all documents relating to how officers or employees of the DPD should conduct surveillance, investigations, undercover operations, investigative detentions, arrests and interagency or intergovernmental operations including but not limited to any laws, regulations, policies, guidelines, directives, memos, handbooks, manuals, checklists, training materials, and any formal or informal documents reviewing past DPD activities.
Objection: Vague, overly broad, unduly burdensome and seeks materials not relevant to the claim or defense of any party; seeks disclosure of sensitive information which, if disclosed, could compromise the safety of DPD officers who work undercover; seeks disclosure of documents which, to the extent they exist, would contain indications of law enforcement methods which should remain confidential to protect their effectiveness; unduly burdensome and costly as applied to electronically stored information.
Request 24: Produce all documents indicating that SID had information that aliens with Warrants of Removal would be encountered in the group of day laborers near Kennedy Park.
Objection: Seeks disclosure of documents which, to the extent they exist, may contain references to law enforcement informants and indications of law enforcement methods which should remain confidential to protect their effectiveness; unduly burdensome and costly as applied to electronically stored information.
It is clear that the information requested by Plaintiffs in the discovery requests is vital to
Plaintiffs’ case. Requests 1, 2 and 24 seek documents relating to the planning and execution of
25

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the Danbury 11 operation. These requests are directly relevant to, or are likely to lead to the
discovery of relevant information regarding, Plaintiffs’ claims that Defendants acted unlawfully
when they stopped, detained, investigated and arrested the Plaintiffs without probable cause on
September 19, 2006.
Furthermore, the Danbury Defendants have improperly invoked the law enforcement
privilege. As discussed in detail in Section I.D, supra, the Danbury Defendants have failed to
meet their burden of showing that the law enforcement privilege applies and, even if they had
done so, the need for discovery outweighs Defendants’ interest in confidentiality in this case.
VII. Danbury Defendants have improperly failed to conduct any searches for electronic documents responsive to Plaintiffs’ requests. The Danbury Defendants have failed to conduct any electronic search for documents
responsive to Plaintiffs’ February 13 RFP, claiming that the searches would be unduly
burdensome and costly. Plaintiffs have made every effort to work with Defendants to reach an
agreement regarding electronic discovery,23 but the City has failed to negotiate in good faith.24
23 On April 9, 2009, the City requested an extension of time to respond and/or object to Plaintiffs’ Request for Production of Documents on the ground that it needed additional time to gather responsive information, particularly with respect to the electronic documents. In its May 14, 2009 Responses and Objections to Plaintiffs’ Request for Production of Documents, and in letters dated May 6 and May 18, 2009, the City provided ever-increasing estimates of the time and cost associated with conducting the searches. See Nurhussein Decl. ¶¶ 7-9.
24 For example, four months into the process, the City for the first time argued that it did not need to conduct a search because, in the City’s opinion, its liability is wholly contingent on Plaintiffs’ first establishing the liability of individual defendants. See Nurhussein Decl. ¶ 11, Ex. H. There is no merit to the City’s position, and it has provided no authority for it. In another example, the Defendants have entirely ignored the proposal of Plaintiffs’ counsel that the parties’ respective IT personnel confer to gain a better understanding of the City’s revised estimates and determine if there was a more efficient way to conduct the searches. 26

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Accordingly, Plaintiffs have no choice but to seek the aid of this Court in securing relevant, non-
privileged electronic records responsive to their February 13 RFP.
Plaintiffs move to compel production of electronic documents responsive to all requests
in the February 13 RFP. This includes all requests discussed above, as well as the following
requests:
Request 8: Produce all documents relating to how and when officers of the DPD should book individuals including but not limited to any laws, regulations, policies, guidelines, directives, memos, handbooks, manuals, checklists, training manuals, and any documents describing any of the fields contained on any booking documents including but not limited to booking reports and uniform arrest reports.
Objection: Vague, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and seeks materials not relevant to the claim or defense of any party; unduly burdensome and costly as applied to electronically stored information.
Request 9: Produce all documents relating to how and when officers or employees of the DPD should complete incident reports including but not limited to any laws, regulations, policies, guidelines, directives, memos, handbooks, manuals, checklists, training materials, and any documents describing any of the fields contained on incident reports.
Objection: Vague, overly broad, unduly burdensome and seeks materials not relevant to the claim or defense of any party; unduly burdensome and costly as applied to electronically stored information.
Request 10: Produce all documents relating to any application for, inquiry about, or negotiation, consummation, or potential consummation of, any Memorandum of Agreement pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (“287g agreement”) between DHS or ICE and the City of Danbury and/or the Danbury Police Department.
Objection: No objection as to hard copy documents; unduly burdensome and costly as to electronically stored information.
Request 11: Produce all documents relating to the training of employees or officers of the City of Danbury by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE), or employees thereof including but not limited to communications within the City of Danbury, the Danbury Police Department, and/or the Danbury Mayor’s Office relating to such trainings, communications between DHS or ICE and the City of Danbury or employees thereof relating to such trainings, schedules, or calendars indicating when such trainings have occurred or were scheduled to occur, agenda and draft agenda for such trainings, training
27

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materials and draft training materials prepared for or used during such trainings, notes taken by City of Danbury employees prior to, during, or after such training that relate to such trainings, written evaluations of such trainings, and any documents relating to the need for such trainings.
Objection: No objection as to hard copy documents (upon information and belief, no responsive documents); unduly burdensome and costly as applied to electronically stored information.
Request 12: Produce all documents relating to communication by any agent or employee of the City of Danbury with any state or federal agency, including but not limited to any communication with the Office of the Attorney General of the State of Connecticut, pertaining to any request to deputize state or local police to enforce federal immigration law, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) or otherwise.
Objection: No objection as to hard copy documents; unduly burdensome and costly as applied to electronically stored information.
Request 17: Produce all documents relating to any communication by any agent or employee of the Danbury Police Department, Corporation Counsel, Mayor’s Office, or any other municipal agency, pertaining to the Danbury 11, immigrants, immigration, immigration reform, or Hispanics, living or working in the City of Danbury.
Objection: Vague, overly broad, unduly burdensome and seeks materials not relevant to the claim or defense of any party25; seeks disclosure of documents protected by the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine26; some hard copy documents produced by City, but unduly burdensome and costly as applied to electronically stored information.
Request 18: Produce all documents relating to any communication by any agent or employee of the City of Danbury with any member of the press pertaining to the Danbury 11.
Objection: To the extent this request seeks newspaper articles, or other public statements in print or electronic media, responsive documents are available to plaintiffs as they are to defendant; some hard copy documents produced, but unduly burdensome and costly as applied to electronically stored information.
Request 19: Produce all documents relating to City of Danbury policies, practices, or attempts to enforce municipal ordinances, including traffic ordinances.
Objection: Vague, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and seeks materials not relevant to the claim or defense of any party; unduly burdensome and costly as applied to electronically stored information.
25Individual Danbury Defendants’ objection
26City of Danbury’s objection.
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Request 20: Produce all documents relating to complaints received about the activities of alleged immigrants, or Hispanics in general, either in or around Kennedy Park, or elsewhere in Danbury, Connecticut, and all documents relating to any follow-up action taken in response to such complaints.
Objection: Vague, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and seeks materials not relevant to the claim or defense of any party; unduly burdensome and costly as applied to electronically stored information.
Request 21: Produce all documents relating to complaints received about the activities of any individuals or groups of people, in and around Kennedy Park, and all documents relating to any follow-up action taken in response to such complaints.
Objection: Vague, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and seeks materials not relevant to the claim or defense of any party; some hard copy documents produced, but unduly burdensome and costly as applied to electronically stored information.
Request 22: Produce all documents relating to City of Danbury policies or practices dealing with suspected undocumented immigrants in Danbury, Connecticut.
Objection: No objection as to hard copy documents (upon information and belief, no responsive documents); unduly burdensome and costly as applied to electronically stored information.
Request 27: Produce all documents relating to any communication by the Danbury Police Department, Corporation Counsel, or any other employee, agent, or agency of the City of Danbury relating to the policing and crowd control of marches, rallies, and other public protests about the topic of immigrants, immigration, or immigration reform, including a march and rally on or about June 21, 2005, and a march and rally on or about September 30, 2006.
Objection: Vague, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and seeks materials not relevant to the claim or defense of any party; seeks disclosure of documents related to matters which occurred after September 19, 2006, the date of the subject incident – such documents, to the extent they exist, are irrelevant to the present matter; unduly burdensome and costly as applied to electronically stored information.
Request 31: Produce all documents relating to any trip taken by Mayor Boughton to Brazil, either to attend a conference on immigration and fraud, or for any other reason.
Objection: Not relevant to the claim or defense of any party and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; some responsive documents produced, but unduly burdensome and costly as applied to electronically stored information.
29

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Request 32: Produce all documents relating to Mayor Boughton’s participation in the coalition, Mayors and County Executives for Immigration Reform, and the website http://www.supportreform.org. Objection: Not relevant to the claim or defense of any party and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; some responsive documents produced, but unduly burdensome and costly as applied to electronically stored information. Request 34: Produce all documents that contain the name of any of the Danbury 11, or that refer to the Danbury 11 explicitly or implicitly. Objection: Vague, overly broad and unduly burdensome; unduly burdensome and costly as applied to electronically stored information.
A. The e-mail and other electronic files are clearly relevant to material issues in this case.
Plaintiffs’ requests for the Danbury Defendants’ e-mail and other electronic files responsive to the February 13 RFP are relevant, reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and clearly bear on issues involved in this case. In particular, Defendants’ e-mail is likely to bear directly on claims that Defendants willfully violated Plaintiffs’ federal and state constitutional rights and Connecticut common law. The e-mail and other electronic files requested by Plaintiffs are reasonably expected to contain, for example, communications among the Defendants regarding their hostility toward the immigrant population of Danbury and their efforts to reduce the number of immigrants in the community through various unlawful means. Such e-mails bear directly on whether Danbury Defendants intentionally engaged in discriminatory conduct and are therefore critical to Plaintiffs’ claims.
Danbury Defendants’ e-mails and other electronic files capture communications that are not likely preserved in any other form, including internal discussions between the Mayor and his staff, members of the police department, and other City employees. For this reason, Plaintiffs seek discovery of responsive e-mails or other electronic records Danbury Defendants have in any
30

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e-mail accounts they maintain, including any personal e-mail accounts or other communication tools such as social networking sites or blogs.
While failing to produce any e-mail or other electronic records responsive to Plaintiffs’ discovery requests, the Individual Danbury Defendants have particularly objected to producing documents from their personal e-mail or other social networking accounts. See Nurhussein Decl. ¶ 14. There is no merit to this position. Defendants’ personal e-mail and other social networking accounts likely contain material that may be highly relevant and probative of Plaintiffs’ claims.27 See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“An e-mail contains the precise words used by the author. Because of that, it is a particularly powerful form of proof at trial when offered as an admission of a party opponent.”). Defendants should therefore be required to search for documents responsive to Plaintiffs’ discovery requests in any e-mail account they maintain, including any personal e-mail or other social networking accounts. Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ requests for electronic materials dated subsequent to Sept. 19, 2006 are relevant to Plaintiffs’ pattern-and-practice claims. See Section I.B, supra.
B. Defendants have failed to establish that their email and other electronic files are not reasonably accessible, and good cause justifies discovery of the materials in any event.
“[I]t is black letter law that computerized data is discoverable if relevant.” AntiMonopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 2120 1995 WL 649934, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3,
27 These sources are expected to include communications related to Defendants’ hostility toward the immigrant population of Danbury and desire to drive immigrants out of the community, as well as knowledge of the legal restrictions on the authority of DPD officers to enforce civil immigration laws. Evidence that Defendants harbored such sentiments would clearly support Plaintiffs’ contention that Defendants targeted them based on their ethnicity and as part of a deliberate campaign of conduct defendants knew to be illegal and discriminatory. 31

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1995). The 2006 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “confirm[ed] that discovery of electronically stored information stands on equal footing with discovery of paper documents.” Adv. Committee note to 2006 amendment to Rule 34(a). Search and review of a party’s e-mail is “a routine aspect of modern discovery.” SEC v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 256 F.R.D. 403, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). While a party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from sources that are not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost without good cause shown, active user e-mail files that reside in an on-line server are assumed to be readily accessible. Zubulake v. Warburg, 217 F.R.D. 309, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The burden is on the responding party to show that particular sources of electronically stored information are not reasonably accessible. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (“[T]he party from whom discovery is sought must show that the information is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.”) There is no automatic assumption that an undue burden or expense may arise simply because electronic evidence is involved. Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 318.
To date, Defendants have refused to search any source for e-mails or other electronic files responsive to Plaintiffs’ requests, and they have failed to make any showing that the electronic files are not “reasonably accessible.” See Nurhussein Decl. ¶ 3. Defendants’ flat-out refusal to engage in electronic discovery is patently unreasonable in light of the “routine aspect” of electronic searches in modern discovery. Collins & Aikman Corp., 256 F.R.D. 417. As an initial matter, Defendants cannot be considered to have responded in good faith to any Plaintiffs’ discovery requests as long as they refuse to conduct any electronic searches, to negotiate in good faith for a set of targeted search terms, or to use a sampling method to estimate the cost of a search and the likelihood that it would produce relevant, non-privileged material. The court in
32

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Collins & Aikman recently held that a party’s similar “blanket refusal” to engage in electronic discovery was “unacceptable”:
Without even an attempt to negotiate search terms that would weed out privileged, protected, or irrelevant e-mails, the SEC cannot reasonably assert that a routine aspect of modern discovery-search and review of a party’s e-mail-is beyond its capability. Essentially, the SEC’s position is that the cost of such a search is simply too high, but it has made no effort to document the cost or the likelihood that it would produce relevant, nonprivileged material. The concept of sampling to test both the cost and the yield is now part of the mainstream approach to electronic discovery. 256 F.R.D. at 417-18. Plaintiffs have reached out to Defendants to resolve this issue, including by offering to schedule a telephone conference between Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ respective IT professionals, but Defendants have refused to respond. See Nurhussein Decl. ¶¶ 10-11. Defendants have failed to specify the data sources in their possession that contain e-mails and other electronic files responsive to Plaintiffs’ requests but which they decline to search or produce due to alleged burdensomeness or cost.28 They have given Plaintiffs no information about the likelihood that the searches requested will produce the documents sought. Without any of this information, Plaintiffs have no ability to weigh the burden and cost of production against the anticipated benefit. As such, Defendants have not met their burden of showing that the documents at issue are not reasonably accessible. See Collins & Aikman Corp., 256 F.R.D. at 417.
28 A responding party must “identify, by category or type, the sources containing potentially responsive information that it is neither searching nor producing. The identification should, to the extent possible, provide enough detail to enable the requesting party to evaluate the burden and costs of providing the discovery and the likelihood of finding responsive information on the identified sources.” Fed R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2), advisory comm. notes to 2006 Amend. 33

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Even if Defendants were to make a showing that their e-mails and electronic files were not reasonably accessible, Plaintiffs clearly demonstrate good cause for this Court to order their production. A responding party must produce even those materials that are not reasonably accessible upon a showing of good cause. Fed R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2). In determining good cause to order the production of electronic materials that are not reasonably accessible, courts have considered the following factors: the specificity of the discovery request, the quantity of information available from more easily accessed sources, the likelihood of finding relevant, responsive information that cannot be obtained elsewhere, the usefulness of the further information, the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the parties’ relative resources. See Fed R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2), advisory comm. notes to 2006 Amend.; W.E. Aubuchon Co., Inc. v. BeneFirst, LLC, 245 F.R.D. 38, 43 (D. Mass. 2007); Peskoff v. Faber, 251 F.R.D. 59, 60 (D.D.C. 2008). Here, Plaintiffs have made every effort to narrow their requests so as to specifically tailor them to discover relevant information. Had Defendants been willing to negotiate in good faith, the parties may have been able to reach agreement on a narrowly tailored production of electronic materials.29
Few other records exist that are likely to capture Defendants’ internal communications about their hostility toward immigrants or knowledge that their enforcement of civil immigration laws is unlawful. Defendants’ email is likely to yield critical information that is highly probative of Plaintiffs’ claims. The issues at stake in this case are of significant public interest. Finally, Plaintiffs are indigent and represented by pro bono counsel; their resources are no match for 29 Defendants cut off conferral on this issue months after Plaintiffs propounded their
discovery requests with the novel assertion that the City of Danbury is not obligated to comply with discovery requests since the City’s liability depends on first establishing individual defendants’ liability. See Nurhussein Decl. ¶ 11, Ex. H.
34

Case 3:07-cv-01436-RNC Document 293 Filed 09/02/09 Page 35 of 36 those of the Defendants. As a result, the Defendants must be compelled to conduct the full search and bear the resulting costs.
CONCLUSION The documents requested are highly relevant to the claims presented in this case. The Plaintiffs, through counsel, have attempted in good faith to resolve this dispute with Defendants. This Court has broad discretion to compel discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 and should order the City of Danbury and the Individual Danbury Defendants to fully comply with Plaintiffs’ Request for Production of Documents.
35

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Respectfully submitted,
_________/s/________________ Joel M. Cohen, Esq., phv03297 Siham Nurhussein, Esq., phv03298 Elizabeth Goergen, Esq., phv 03300 Alison Schary, Esq.30 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166 Telephone: (212) 351-4000 Facsimile: (212) 351-4035 Michael J. Wishnie, Esq., ct27221 Susan Hazeldean, Esq., ct28093 Rebecca Heller, Law Student Intern Ari Holtzblatt, Law Student Intern Dror Ladin, Law Student Intern Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Law Student Intern Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization Yale Law School 127 Wall Street New Haven, CT 06511 Telephone: (203) 432-4800 Facsimile: (203) 432-1426 michael.wishnie@yale.edu Counsel for Plaintiffs
September 2, 2009
30Pro hac vice motion forthcoming.
36

 
 Slip Copy, 2010 WL 1240904 (D.Conn.) (Cite as: 2010 WL 1240904 (D.Conn.))
United States District Court, D. Connecticut.
Juan BARRERA, et al, Plaintiffs, v.
Mark BOUGHTON, et al., Defendants.
No. 3:07cv1436(RNC). March 19, 2010.
RULING ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
DONNA F. MARTINEZ, United States Magistrate Judge.
*1 The plaintiffs bring this action against the Mayor of Danbury, Danbury police officers, the City of Danbury, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers and the United States alleging that their arrest and detention violated their civil rights. Pending before the court is the plaintiffs' motion for a protective order.FN1 (Doc. # 284.) The motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
FN1. The court previously denied the plaintiffs' motion for protective order (doc. # 156) without prejudice and ordered that any new motion set forth each particular discovery request at issue. (Doc. # 246; doc. # 269, tr. 7/13/09 at 8.) The plaintiffs represent that since that ruling, the parties have conferred and “made significant progress in narrowing the issues in dispute.” (Doc. # 284, Pls' Mem. at 5.)
I. Factual Background The plaintiffs allege that they were arrested for
immigration violations in an undercover sting operation conducted by Danbury police officers in conjunction with United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agents. The targets of the operation were Latino day laborers in Kennedy Park, a gathering site for day-laborers. At the time of operation, the Danbury police were not aware of any particular immigration violators in Kennedy Park and did not have any specific targets in mind. (Doc. # 3 17, Second Am. Compl. ¶ 73.) On September 19, 2006, the plaintiffs, eight Latino residents of Danbury, went to Kennedy Park to look for work. (Am.Compl.¶ 114.) None of the plaintiffs had an outstanding deportation or removal order and no immigration warrants had

Page 1
been issued for any of them. (Am.Compl.¶ 131.) Each of the plaintiffs approached a vehicle. (Am.Compl.¶ 115.) They entered the vehicle after the driver, a Danbury police officer working undercover, offered them work. (Am.Compl.¶¶ 115-116.) The undercover police officer driving the vehicle did not ask the plaintiffs any questions during the drive and drove them to a parking lot. (Am.Compl.¶¶ 119-120.) Danbury police officers and ICE agents were waiting in the parking lot. (Am.Compl.¶ 122.) When the plaintiffs exited the vehicle, Danbury police officers and/or ICE agents seized them and told them that they were under arrest. (Am.Compl.¶¶ 122-123 .)
After the plaintiffs were placed under arrest, law enforcement agents questioned each of them about their identity, nationality, the place and manner of their entry into the United States and their immigration status. (Am.Compl.¶ 128.) ICE agents placed the plaintiffs in removal proceedings based on the statements they made on the day of the arrest.FN2 (Am.Compl.¶¶ 136, 138.)
FN2. During the removal proceedings, the plaintiffs invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination and refused to answer questions about alienage and immigration status. (Doc. # 284, Pls' Mem. at 4.) As alternative proof, the government offered a U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Form I-213 (“I213”), Record of Deportable Alien. (Id.) ICE agents completed the I-213s based on their interviews with the plaintiffs on the day of their arrest. (Id.) The Immigration Judge found that each I-213 “establishes that the respondent is an alien based on his birth in Ecuador” and that the government had “met its burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence.” (Doc. # 284, Ex. A, IJ decision at 12.) The plaintiffs were either ordered removed or granted voluntary departure. (Doc. # 284, Pls' Mem. at 4.) The plaintiffs are appealing the Immigration Judge's ruling. (Doc. # 284, Pls' Mem. at 3 n.3)
The plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that federal immigration law prohibited local police from making civil immigration arrests and therefore the Danbury police were not authorized to make the arrests. (Am.Compl.¶ 86.) They further allege that Danbury

Slip Copy, 2010 WL 1240904 (D.Conn.) (Cite as: 2010 WL 1240904 (D.Conn.))
police officers and ICE agents improperly targeted them based on race, ethnicity, and perceived national origin, arrested them without probable cause and made the arrests in retaliation for the plaintiffs' exercise of protected speech and association in a p ublic place. (Am. Compl. at 2.) The plaintiffs assert claims under the First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, Article First, §§ 4, 7, 8, 9 and 20 of the Connecticut Constitution and Connecticut common law.
II. Discussion *2 The plaintiffs seek a protective order that they
not be compelled to disclose information bearing on immigration status or alienage. The plaintiffs contend that such information is not relevant to their claims or to any defense the defendants might assert and that any potential relevance is outweighed by the oppressive and in terrorem effect of the request. (Pls' Mem. at 6.) They further argue that compelling them to produce the requested information will prejudice their ability to defend themselves in the removal proceedings. (Pls' Mem. at 4.)
“Immigration status discovery in cases where plaintiffs are possibly undocumented is a very sensitive area of inquiry.” E.E.O.C. v. First Wireless Group, Inc., No. 03-CV-4990(JS)(ARL), 2007 WL 586720, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2007). In some cases, such information is not relevant; in other cases, “the in terrorem effect of the proposed inquiry outweighs the probative value of the discovery.” Id. “The harm in disclosing Plaintiffs' immigration status is significant and real. If disclosed ... [undocumented plaintiffs] would fear criminal prosecution and deportation [and] would be reluctant to exercise their rights under existing state and federal laws.” Sandoval v. Rizzuti Farms, No. CV-07-3076 (EFS), 2009 WL 959478, at *2 (E.D.Wash. Apr.7, 2009).
At issue are requests propounded by the Mayor of Danbury and Danbury police defendants (hereinafter “Danbury defendants”).FN3 In addition to immigration status and alienage (production request 1, interr. 6), the Danbury defendants seek discovery that the plaintiffs contend implicates alienage and immigration status. For each plaintiff, the Danbury defendants seek social security numbers (interr.1); addresses of spouses and children over 18 ( interr.2, 3); place of birth (interr.7); number of times of entry into the United States, including date, location, means, immi-

Page 2
gration status upon entry and whether the plaintiff had permission (interr. 10, 11, production request 2) and documents submitted to any employer including passport, driver's license and social security card (interr.26, 27).FN4
FN3. The plaintiffs' motion initially was directed to requests propounded by the Danbury defendants as well as the federal defendants. The federal defendants withdrew the challenged requests without prejudice. See doc. # 301. The federal defendants subsequently filed a motion to compel as to certain requests that the parties were unable to resolve. See doc. # 314.
FN4. As required by the local rule and the court's order, the plaintiffs set forth the specific discovery requests at issue and the reason why each request should not permitted. Contrary to the court's order, the Danbury defendants did not set forth for each request in dispute “why the request is relevant and should be permitted.” (Doc. # 269, tr. 7/13/09 at 8.)
The plaintiffs maintain they do not seek to withhold relevant discovery. They indicate that they have “produced hundreds of pages in response” to the Danbury defendants' discovery requests. (Pls' Mem. at 16.) They have agreed, for example, to provide medical records, federal income tax returns and wage and employment records; they seek however to redact discrete information that might tend to reveal immigration status or alienage such as social security numbers and nationality. (Requests for Production 3, 5, 6 and 7.) The plaintiffs also have agreed to provide information regarding any arrests, warnings and citations they might have received in the United States; however they seek protection from having to disclose any like incidents that occurred outside the United States. (Interr.14, 15.)
A. Claims and Defenses *3 The plaintiffs contend that immigration status
and alienage is not relevant to any of their claims or defenses thereto. The Danbury defendants FN5 disagree: they broadly assert that the plaintiffs' immigration status is the “heart of the case.” (Doc. # 45 1, tr. 2/24/10 at 64.) According to the defendants, the plaintiffs' complaint is “replete with allegations” that

Slip Copy, 2010 WL 1240904 (D.Conn.) (Cite as: 2010 WL 1240904 (D.Conn.))
place the plaintiffs' immigration status and alienage at issue. (Doc. # 303, Defs' Mem. at 9.) Examination of the plaintiffs' claims, however, does not bear out this argument.
FN5. The City of Danbury did not file a brief but filed a statement saying it j oined the Danbury defendants' opposition. (Doc. # 306.)
The plaintiffs' causes of action fall into three categories: illegal seizure, arrest and detention; racial and ethnic profiling; and freedom of speech and association.
In the first category, the plaintiffs allege that the Danbury defendants were not authorized to enforce federal civil immigration laws. (Am. Compl. ¶ 45, count 2.) The plaintiffs' immigration status is not relevant to the defense of this claim.
The plaintiffs further allege that the Danbury defendants lacked reasonable suspicion to detain them and/or probable cause to effect their arrests. (Pls' Mem. at 17; Am. Compl., counts 1, 2, 10 and 13 .) The Danbury defendants argue that the plaintiffs' immigration status is relevant to the defense of these claims because it is “why [the plaintiffs] were arrested and that's why the defendants had probable cause to make the arrest.” (Doc. # 451, tr. at 56.) The defendants misapprehend the legal standards underpinning the plaintiffs' claims.
In a Terry stop, “the police can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a r easonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot,’ even if the officer lacks probable cause.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, the court must determine: (1) when the plaintiffs were seized, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, i.e., when “a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave,” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980); and (2) whether, based on the facts known to the officer at the time of seizure, there was some “objective justification for making the stop” more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activ-

Page 3
ity.” Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7.
An arrest, as opposed to a Terry stop, must be supported by probable cause. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370, 124 S.Ct. 795, 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003). “Whether probable cause exists depends upon the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest.” Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152, 125 S.Ct. 588, 160 L.Ed.2d 537 (2004). “Probable cause to arrest a person exists if the law enforcement official, on the basis of the totality of the circumstances, has sufficient knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information to justify a person of reasonable caution in believing that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested.” United States v. Patrick, 899 F.2d 169, 171 (2d Cir .1990).
*4 Whether the defendants had a lawful basis for the detention and/or arrest of the plaintiffs depends on what the officers knew at the time they detained and/or arrested the plaintiffs. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S .Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (only “the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure” may be evaluated in determining whether reasonable suspicion warranted the detention); Lowth v. Town of Cheektowaga, 82 F.3d 563, 570 (2d Cir.1996)(“[P]robable cause for an arrest must be determined on the basis of the information reasonably available to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest.”); Mejia v. City of New York, 119 F.Supp.2d 232, 253 (E.D.N.Y.2000) (“[S]ubsequently discovered evidence cannot be used to cure an arrest that was made without probable cause.”) The plaintiffs' immigration status and alienage is not probative of facts the defendants knew at the time of detention or arrest and therefore, contrary to the defendants' argument, is not relevant to whether the defendants had reasonable suspicion or probable cause.
The second category of the plaintiffs' claims concerns unlawful profiling. (Am. Compl., counts 3, 5.) The plaintiffs allege they were singled out for discriminatory treatment based on their race, ethnicity and perceived national origin in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. To state a claim for an equal protection violation, the plaintiffs “must allege that a government actor intentionally discriminated against them on the basis of race, national origin or gender.” Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 48 (2d Cir.1999). The defendants do not argue, nor can the

Slip Copy, 2010 WL 1240904 (D.Conn.) (Cite as: 2010 WL 1240904 (D.Conn.))
court discern, how the plaintiffs' immigration status and alienage is relevant to rebutting allegations that the defendants acted discriminatorily.
Finally, the plaintiffs allege that they were retaliated against for the exercise of protected speech and association in a public forum in violation of the First Amendment and Article First §§ 4 and 14 of the Connecticut Constitution. (Am. Compl., count 4.) The defendants do not argue that the plaintiffs' immigration status is relevant to their First Amendment claim. Rather, they say that the information is relevant to the plaintiffs' claim under the Connecticut Constitution because, they contend, §§ 4 and 14 of the Connecticut Constitution apply only to United States “citizens.” According to the defendants, the plaintiffs must “prove” they are citizens to be entitled to any protection under these provisions of the state constitution. (Tr. at 58.) This argument appears to be foreclosed. The Danbury defendants previously moved to dismiss these state law claims on the grounds that the plaintiffs did not allege citizenship in the complaint and therefore failed to state a claim. (Doc. # 49, Defs' Mem. at 8.) The court rejected this argument and denied the motion. (Doc. # 129.)
B. Credibility In addition to discovery requests that seek immi-
gration status specifically, the plaintiffs seek protection from having to respond to requests that implicate immigration status. These requests seek for each plaintiff: social security number, place of birth, the number of times of entry into the United States, including date, location, means, immigration status upon entry and whether each entered with permission and documents submitted to employers including passport, driver's license and social security card. During oral argument, the defendants argued that this information is discoverable because it is relevant to credibility.FN6 They suggest, for example, that if any plaintiff used a f alse social security number, this information could be used as impeachment evidence.
FN6. During oral argument the defendants cited Fed.R.Evid. 608(b) as a basis for permitting discovery. They did not include any discussion of Rule 608(b) in their briefs.
*5 In Rengifo v. Erevos Enterprises, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 4266(SHS)(RLE), 2007 WL 894376 ( S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2007), a Fair Labor Standards Act case, the

Page 4
plaintiff sought a protective order barring discovery related to his immigration status, social security number and authorization to work in the United States. As here, the defendants argued that the validity of the plaintiff's social security number, immigration status and authorization to work in this country were relevant to his credibility. The court granted the plaintiff's motion for a protective order, concluding that the opportunity to test the credibility of a party “does not outweigh the chilling effect that disclosure of immigration status has on employees seeking to enforce their rights.” Id. at *3.
The court reached a s imilar conclusion in E.E.O.C. v. First Wireless Group, Inc., No. 03-CV-4990 (JS)(ARL), 2007 WL 586720 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2007). In that case, the defendants sought to compel the plaintiffs in an employment discrimination action to disclose information regarding the accuracy of their social security numbers. The defendants argued that the information was relevant to the plaintiffs' credibility. The court observed that although discovery of immigration status might be relevant, it “is a potential weapon for harassing and intimidating individuals.” Id . at *3. The court denied the defendants' request, finding that there were other areas of inquiry the defendants could pursue to explore the plaintiffs' credibility that did not implicate their immigration status or social security number. Id. at *4.
In Avila-Blum v. Casa de Cambio Delgado, Inc., 236 F.R.D. 190 (S.D.N.Y.2006), an employment discrimination case, the defendants sought discovery of the plaintiff's immigration status as potential impeachment evidence. Id. at 192. The court determined that the “chilling” and “highly prejudicial” effects of such an inquiry outweighed the relevance and probative value of the discovery. Id. In so concluding, the court observed that “a witness's credibility is always at issue and may be tested in a variety of ways without imposing an undue burden on a party.... [T]hat a party's credibility is at issue does not by itself warrant unlimited inquiry into the subject of immigration status when such examination would impose an undue burden on private enforcement of employment discrimination laws.” Id.
This court is similarly persuaded that whatever value the information might hold as to impeachment is outweighed by the chilling and prejudicial effect of disclosure.FN7 See, e.g., Topo v. Dhir, 210 F.R.D. 76,

Slip Copy, 2010 WL 1240904 (D.Conn.) (Cite as: 2010 WL 1240904 (D.Conn.))
78 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (“When the potential for abuse of procedure is high, the Court can and should act within its discretion to limit the discovery process, even if relevancy is determined.”) See also Corona et al. v. Adriatic Italian Restaurant & Pizzeria, No. 08 C iv. 5399(KNF), 2010 WL 675702, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.23, 2010) (granting motion in limine barring defendants from inquiring into plaintiffs' immigration status, noting that “defendants are free to employ all other means and methods typically available to litigants to attack the credibility of a witness”); David et al. v. Signal Intern., LLC, 257 F.R.D. 114, 124 (E.D.La.2009) (in action pursuant to Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1590, court granted plaintiffs' motion for protective order as to their immigration status, finding “defendants' opportunity to test the credibility of plaintiffs does not outweigh the public interest in allowing employees to enforce their rights.”); Sandoval et al. v. American Bldg. Maintenance Industries, Inc., No. 06 CV 1772(RHK)(JSM), 2007 WL 7072423, at *19 (D.Minn. Oct. 23, 2007)(denying defendants' motion to compel plaintiffs to answer deposition questions regarding social security numbers they allegedly used, finding “the minimal bearing that using multiple social security numbers may have on plaintiffs' credibility does not outweigh the chilling effect it would have on them as victims of sexual harassment from coming forward to assert their claims”); Flores v. Albertson's, Inc., No. CV 01-0515 PA(SHX), 2004 WL 3639290, at *3 (C.D.Cal. Apr.9, 2004) (court noted “[a] SSN (particularly if a false number) is a highly sensitive piece of information and could readily be used to determine a plaintiff's immigration status” and precluded production based on its in terrorem effect).
FN7. At oral argument, counsel for the City of Danbury suggested that the plaintiffs' immigration status was relevant to their claim for damages. Their alleged emotional distress, the argument goes, might be attributable to their immigration status. This claim was not briefed and in any event, does not alter the court's conclusion.
*6 Accordingly, the plaintiffs' motion for protective order is granted as to immigration status (production request 1, interr. 6); social security numbers (interr.1); birthplace (interr.7); information regarding the plaintiffs' entry into the United States (interr. 10, 11, production request 2); any arrests warnings and

Page 5
citations the plaintiffs might have received outside the United States (interr.14, 15); and the plaintiffs' passports, driver's licenses and/or social security cards (interr.26, 27). The plaintiffs' motion for protective order as to interrogatories 2 and 3 is denied as moot in light of the court's ruling on the federal defendants' motion to compel.
III. Conclusion For these reasons, the plaintiffs' motion for pro-
tective order is granted in part and denied in part.
SO ORDERED at Hartford, Connecticut this 19th day of March, 2010.
D.Conn.,2010. Barrera v. Boughton Slip Copy, 2010 WL 1240904 (D.Conn.)
END OF DOCUMENT

 
 Slip Copy, 2010 WL 3926070 (D.Conn.) (Cite as: 2010 WL 3926070 (D.Conn.))
United States District Court, D. Connecticut.
Juan BARRERA, et al, Plaintiffs, v.
Mark BOUGHTON, et al., Defendants.
No. 3:07cv1436(RNC). Sept. 30, 2010.
RULING ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL AND FOR COSTS
DONNA F. MARTINEZ, United States Magistrate Judge.
*1 Pending before the court is the plaintiffs' motion to compel the City of Danbury and individual Danbury defendants to respond to their requests for production and for an award of costs. (Doc. # 292, 295.) Having considered the arguments made by counsel in their briefs FN1 and during oral argument, the motion is granted in part and denied in part as follows.
FN1. These motions have been the subject of extensive briefing. In addition to the initial moving papers, the court has before it the defendants' opposition (doc.338, 339, 341, 362, 453 and 456) and plaintiffs' reply (doc.371, 372).
I. Specific Requests for Production Requests for production 3, 4, 5, 13, 14, 23 and 25
concern immigration enforcement activities. In an effort to address the defendants' objections, the plaintiffs proposed that in lieu of the requests, the defendants: (1) search a list of 305 da tes of incidents of immigration enforcement activity in Danbury in which Danbury police might have been involved FN2; (2) search Danbury Police department Special Investigation Division (“SID”) records for documents related to immigration enforcement; and (3) produce records for any incidents the defendants are able to identify. (Doc. # 29 2 at 7-8, # 294, Ex. J, K.) The defendants contend that the proposed modification does not address their concerns and maintain their objections to the production requests. (Doc. # 341 at 2.) The court rules as follows:
FN2. The plaintiffs compiled the list of dates

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from information provided by the federal defendants. (Doc. # 292 at 7 n. 9.)
1. Request for Production 3: The defendants objected on the grounds that the request is vague, not relevant and unduly burdensome.FN3 These objections are over-ruled: the request is not vague, the information is relevant and the defendants have made no showing as to burden for the production of non-electronically stored information. The defendants argue that the temporal scope of the request, which seeks responsive documents from December 2001 to the present, is overly broad. The court agrees. The incident at issue occurred in September 2006. During oral argument, the plaintiffs indicated willingness to modify the cut-off date and suggested, inter alia, a cut-off date of September 2007. (Tr. at 24.) That date is reasonable. Accordingly, production request 3 is granted as limited by the plaintiffs to the period of January 2002 to September 2007.
FN3. The defendants also objected on the grounds of the law enforcement privilege. During oral argument, however, they withdrew this objection as to all requests. (Tr. at 9.)
2. Request for Production 5: Granted absent objection as to hardcopy documents.
3. Request for Production 13: The defendants objected on the grounds that the request is vague, not relevant and unduly burdensome. These objections are over-ruled: the request is not vague, the information is relevant and the defendants have made no showing as to burden for the production of non-electronically stored information. The defendants' objection as to overbreadth, however, is sustained. The defendants argue, and the court agrees, that the temporal scope of the requests, which seek responsive documents from January 2002 t o the present is overly broad. The motion to compel is granted for the period of January 2002 to September 2007.
4. Requests for Production 14, 23 and 25: The defendants' objections of vagueness, over breadth, undue burden and relevance are overruled and the motion to compel as to these requests is granted.
*2 As to the aforementioned requests, to the ex-

Slip Copy, 2010 WL 3926070 (D.Conn.) (Cite as: 2010 WL 3926070 (D.Conn.))
tent that the plaintiffs request that the defendant officers search for and produce responsive emails still on their computers, their request is granted.FN4
FN4. The record is unclear as to whether the defendants have produced these records. (Tr. at 73.)
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(5)(A), the plaintiffs move for costs and attorney fees they incurred in trying to resolve the dispute as to immigration enforcement records and in briefing this aspect of their motion to compel. (Doc. # 292 at 13.) Upon consideration of all of the circumstances, the court has determined that an award of costs would be unjust.
5. Requests 15 an d 16: The motion to compel is denied as moot in light of the parties' resolution.
6. Request 33: The defendants' objections on the grounds that the request is vague, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and not relevant are overruled and the motion to compel is granted.
7. Requests 26, 28 and 29: The defendants' objections on the grounds that the requests are not relevant and unduly burdensome (except as to electronically stored information) are overruled. During oral argument, the defendants indicated that they have produced responsive documents and agreed to ask individual UNIT members search their computers for responsive documents. In view of this representation, the plaintiffs stated during oral argument that the motion to compel as to these requests is moot. (Tr. at 62.)
8. Request for Production 30: The court granted this request on the record during oral argument. (Tr at 70.)
II. Electronically Stored Information FN5
FN5. Amended Rule 26(f) directs parties to discuss any issues relating to disclosure or discovery of ESI, including the form or forms in which it should be produced. The amended rule requires the parties to address and attempt to resolve at the outset of the case some of the issues that the parties now face in the midst of discovery.

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As to all requests for production, the plaintiffs move to compel production of electronically stored information (“ESI”) on the defendants' server. The parties met and conferred in a good faith effort to resolve the issue of the defendants' production of ESI.FN6 The plaintiffs subsequently proposed search parameters and conveyed to the defendants a list of 40 custodians, 80 k ey words and a temporal scope of January 2004 to the present. (Doc. # 372, Ex. A; tr. at 76.)
FN6. “As the Sedona Conference recognized last year, cooperation between counsel regarding the production of electronically stored information ‘allows the parties to save money, maintain greater control over the dispersal of information, maintain goodwill with courts, and generally get to the litigation's merits at the earliest practicable time.’ The Case for Cooperation, 10 Sedona Conf. J.. 339, 339 (2009).” Trusz v. UBS Realty Investors LLC, No. 3:09 CV 268(JBA) (JGM), --- F.R.D. ----, 2010 WL 3583064, at *4 (D.Conn. Sept. 7, 2010).
The defendants object to this proposal. They state that they have already produced 948 emails, none of which support the plaintiffs' claims of racial profiling and harassment. (Tr. at 105, 108). They argue that the proposed search is unduly burdensome and proffer the declarations of two IT experts who opine that such a search, absent costs for attorney review of the documents, would cost approximately $60,000. (Doc. # 453.) The defendants further maintain that the proposed temporal scope is overly broad and seek to limit it to a period of 2005 to 2007. (Tr. at 102.)
In response to this impasse, the parties worked diligently but could not agree on a phased approach to ESI discovery. The defendants contend that the initial ESI search be limited to three individuals-Mayor Boughton, Chief of Police Baker and Lieutenant Fisher-for a cost of approximately $13-15,000, which they argue the plaintiffs should bear. The plaintiffs counter that they want a larger sample that includes, at a minimum, the three individuals as well as former Deputy Corporation Counsel Eric Gottschalk, former Mayoral Chief of Staff Michael McLachlan and Police Captain Weston. During oral argument, the plaintiffs stated that (1) any sampling should include the de-

Slip Copy, 2010 WL 3926070 (D.Conn.) (Cite as: 2010 WL 3926070 (D.Conn.))
fendants and (2) they stand by their initial proposal of 40 custodians. (Tr. at 137.)
*3 Under the Federal Rules, a party is required to provide discovery of electronically stored information unless that party shows that the source of such information is “not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(2)(B).FN7 Once it is shown that a source of electronically stored information is not reasonably accessible, the requesting party may still obtain discovery by showing good cause, considering the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C) which balance the costs and potential benefits of discovery. “The decision whether to require a responding party to search for and produce information that is not reasonably accessible depends not only on the burdens and costs of doing so, but also on whether those burdens and costs can be justified in the circumstances of the case.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26, Advisory Committee Note to the 2006 amendments to Rule 26(b)(2).FN8
FN7. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(2)(B), which provides:
A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. On motion to compel discovery or for a protective order, the party from whom discovery is sought must show that the information is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. If that showing is made, the court may nonetheless order discovery from such sources if the requesting party shows good cause, considering the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C). The court may specify conditions for the discovery.
FN8. According to the Advisory Committee's Notes to the 2006 a mendments to Rule 26(b)(2),
Appropriate considerations may include: (1) the specificity of the discovery request; (2) the quantity of information available from other and more easily accessed sources; (3) the failure to produce relevant information that seems likely to have existed but is no longer available on more

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easily accessed sources; (4) the likelihood of finding relevant, responsive information that cannot be obtained from other, more easily accessed sources; (5) predictions as to the importance and usefulness of the further information; (6) the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and (7) the parties' resources.
In view of their submissions, the defendants have met their burden of showing that the information sought by the plaintiffs in their proposal of 40 custodians is not reasonably accessible. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(2)(B). On the present record, the court is not persuaded that the plaintiffs have shown good cause for the production of ESI that is not reasonably accessible.
At this juncture, the court is persuaded that a phased approach to ESI discovery is appropriate. See S.E.C. v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 256 F.R.D. 403, 418 (S.D.N.Y.2009)(“The concept of sampling to test both the cost and the yield is now part of the mainstream approach to electronic discovery.”); McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 34-35 (D.D.C.2001) (authorizing a “test-run” of costly data restoration). Accordingly, the defendants shall conduct a search of the electronically stored files of Mayor Boughton, Baker and Lieutenant Fisher using the terms proposed by the plaintiffs for the period of January 2004 to September 2007.
The defendants request that the plaintiffs bear the cost of any ESI production. This request is denied. Cost-shifting is not to be “considered in every case involving the discovery of electronic data, which-in today's world-includes virtually all cases.... The Supreme Court has instructed that ‘the presumption is that the responding party must bear the expense of complying with discovery requests....' Any principled approach to electronic evidence must respect this presumption.” Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 317 ( S.D.N.Y.2003). Rather “cost-shifting should be considered only when electronic discovery imposes an ‘undue burden or expense’ on the responding party.” Id. at 318. “The burden or expense of discovery is, in turn, ‘undue’ when it ‘outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance of the pro-

Slip Copy, 2010 WL 3926070 (D.Conn.) (Cite as: 2010 WL 3926070 (D.Conn.))
posed discovery in resolving the issues.’ “ Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(2)(C). Under the circumstances of this case and having considered all the relevant factors, Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. at 321-22, the discovery request, as modified, does not constitute an “undue burden or expense.” FN9
FN9. This ruling does not foreclose the possibility that costs for requests for additional ESI may be proportioned. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y.2003).
*4 SO ORDERED.
D.Conn.,2010. Barrera v. Boughton Slip Copy, 2010 WL 3926070 (D.Conn.)
END OF DOCUMENT

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 Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 1 of 96
CLOSED, DFM, EFILE, MOTREF, REFCNF, REFDIS
U.S. District Court United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (New Haven)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:07−cv−01436−RNC

Barrera et al v. Boughton et al Assigned to: Judge Robert N. Chatigny Referred to: Judge Donna F. Martinez Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 09/26/2007 Date Terminated: 02/25/2011 Jury Demand: Defendant Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Defendant

Juan Barrera

represented by Alison B. Schary Gibson, Dunn &Crutcher − NY 200 Park Ave. New York, NY 10166−0193 212−351−2497 Email: aschary@gibsondunn.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Anne Coyle Gibson, Dunn &Crutcher − NY 200 Park Ave. New York, NY 10166−0193 212−351−2341 Email: acoyle@gibsondunn.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bryan Bloom Gibson, Dunn &Crutcher − NY 200 Park Ave. New York, NY 10166−0193 212−351−2627 Email: bbloom@gibsondunn.com TERMINATED: 07/22/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cedric Logan Gibson, Dunn &Crutcher − NY 200 Park Ave. New York, NY 10166−0193 212−351−2499 Email: clogan@gibsondunn.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher Nelson Lasch Yale Law School −POB PO Box 209090 New Haven, CT 06520−9090 203−779−9401 Email: clasch@suffolk.edu TERMINATED: 07/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 2 of 96
Daniel Michaels Clifford Chance US LLP − NY 31 West 52nd Street New York, NY 10019−6131 212−878−3390 Email: daniel.michaels@cliffordchance.com TERMINATED: 01/28/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth Goergen Gibson, Dunn &Crutcher − NY 200 Park Ave. New York, NY 10166−0193 212−351−3958 Email: egoergen@gibsondunn.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jacob S. Sherkow Gibson, Dunn &Crutcher − NY 200 Park Ave. New York, NY 10166−0193 212−351−2659 Email: jsherkow@gibsondunn.com TERMINATED: 07/22/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joel M. Cohen Gibson, Dunn &Crutcher − NY 200 Park Ave. New York, NY 10166−0193 212−351−2664 Email: jcohen@gibsondunn.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Johanna Coats Gibson, Dunn &Crutcher − NY 200 Park Ave. New York, NY 10166−0193 212−351−3914 Email: jcoats@gibsondunn.com TERMINATED: 07/22/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph La Perla Gibson, Dunn &Crutcher − NY 200 Park Ave. New York, NY 10166−0193 212−351−5385 Fax: 212−351−5345 Email: jlaperla@gibsondunn.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth Juan Figueroa

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 3 of 96
Gibson, Dunn &Crutcher − NY 200 Park Ave. New York, NY 10166−0193 212−351−2654 Email: kfigueroa@gibsondunn.com TERMINATED: 07/22/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
La Shann DeArcy Gibson, Dunn &Crutcher − NY 200 Park Ave. New York, NY 10166−0193 212−31−3809 Fax: 212−351−4035 Email: ldearcy@gibsondunn.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ladan F. Stewart Gibson, Dunn &Crutcher − NY 200 Park Ave. New York, NY 10166−0193 212−351−5377 Email: lstewart@gibsondunn.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence Bluestone Clifford Chance US LLP − NY 31 West 52nd Street New York, NY 10019−6131 212−878−3433 Email: lawrence.bluestone@cliffordchance.com TERMINATED: 01/28/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa Debin Keith Gibson, Dunn &Crutcher − NY 200 Park Ave. New York, NY 10166−0193 212−351−2348 Email: lkeith@gibsondunn.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Elizabeth Morales Gibson, Dunn &Crutcher − NY 200 Park Ave. New York, NY 10166−0193 212−351−2639 Email: bmoralessingh@gibsondunn.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Wishnie Jerome N. Frank Legal Services − Wall St Yale Law School

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 4 of 96
127 Wall Street New Haven, CT 06511 203−432−4800 Fax: 203−432−1426 Email: michael.wishnie@yale.edu LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
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Ramzi Kassem Yale Law School −POB PO Box 209090 New Haven, CT 06520−9090 203−432−0138 Fax: 203−432−1222 Email: ramzi.kassem@mail.law.cuny.edu TERMINATED: 08/13/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
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Siham Nurhussein Sanford Wittels &Heisler, LLP 1350 Avenue of the Americas, 31st Floor New York, NY 10019 646−723−2947 Fax: 646−723−2948 Email: snurhussein@swhlegal.com TERMINATED: 10/01/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Victoria Hazeldean Yale Law School 127 Wall St. New Haven, CT 06520

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 5 of 96

203−432−4800 Email: susan.hazeldean@yale.edu LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William T. Han Gibson, Dunn &Crutcher, LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166 212−351−2423 Email: whan@gibsondunn.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Yeeta Yeger Gibson, Dunn &Crutcher − NY 200 Park Ave. New York, NY 10166−0193 212−351−2309 Email: yyeger@gibsondunn.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Anya R. Grossmann Gibson, Dunn &Crutcher − NY 200 Park Ave. New York, NY 10166−0193 212−351−3815 Email: AGrossmann@gibsondunn.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karen Grus Gibson, Dunn &Crutcher − NY 200 Park Ave. New York, NY 10166−0193 212−351−2432 Email: kgrus@gibsondunn.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Kay Dunning Gibson, Dunn &Crutcher − NY 200 Park Ave. New York, NY 10166−0193 212−351−2307 Email: mkdunning@gibsondunn.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott Ceresia Scott Ceresia Gibson, Dunn &Crutcher, LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166 212−351−2489 Email: sceresia@gibsondunn.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jose Cabrera

represented by Alison B. Schary (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 6 of 96
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Anne Coyle (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
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Cedric Logan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher Nelson Lasch (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Michaels (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/28/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth Goergen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jacob S. Sherkow (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joel M. Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Johanna Coats (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph La Perla (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 7 of 96
Kenneth Juan Figueroa (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
La Shann DeArcy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ladan F. Stewart (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence Bluestone (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/28/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa Debin Keith (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Elizabeth Morales (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Wishnie (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rachel Lavery (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ramzi Kassem (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/13/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard Cashman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sarah Blackman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/28/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 8 of 96

PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Siham Nurhussein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/01/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan Victoria Hazeldean (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William T. Han (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Yeeta Yeger (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Anya R. Grossmann (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karen Grus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Kay Dunning (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Daniel Chavez

represented by Alison B. Schary (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Anne Coyle (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bryan Bloom (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cedric Logan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 9 of 96
Christopher Nelson Lasch (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Michaels (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/28/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth Goergen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jacob S. Sherkow (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joel M. Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Johanna Coats (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph La Perla (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth Juan Figueroa (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
La Shann DeArcy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ladan F. Stewart (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 10 of 96
Lawrence Bluestone (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/28/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa Debin Keith (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Elizabeth Morales (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Wishnie (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rachel Lavery (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ramzi Kassem (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/13/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard Cashman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sarah Blackman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/28/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Siham Nurhussein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/01/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Victoria Hazeldean (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William T. Han (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 11 of 96

Plaintiff
Jose Duma TERMINATED: 10/01/2009

Yeeta Yeger (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Anya R. Grossmann (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen Grus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Kay Dunning (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott Ceresia (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Anne Coyle (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bryan Bloom (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher Nelson Lasch (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Michaels (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth Goergen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joel M. Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 12 of 96

Plaintiff Jose Llibisupa

Joseph La Perla (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
La Shann DeArcy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence Bluestone (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Wishnie (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ramzi Kassem (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sarah Blackman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Siham Nurhussein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alison B. Schary (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Anne Coyle (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bryan Bloom (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 13 of 96
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cedric Logan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher Nelson Lasch (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Michaels (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/28/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth Goergen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jacob S. Sherkow (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joel M. Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Johanna Coats (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph La Perla (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth Juan Figueroa (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
La Shann DeArcy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 14 of 96
Ladan F. Stewart (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence Bluestone (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/28/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa Debin Keith (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Elizabeth Morales (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Wishnie (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rachel Lavery (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ramzi Kassem (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/13/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard Cashman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sarah Blackman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/28/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Siham Nurhussein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/01/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Victoria Hazeldean (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 15 of 96

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William T. Han (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Yeeta Yeger (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Anya R. Grossmann (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karen Grus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Kay Dunning (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott Ceresia (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Isaac Maldonado

represented by Alison B. Schary (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Anne Coyle (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bryan Bloom (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cedric Logan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher Nelson Lasch (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Michaels

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 16 of 96
(See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/28/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth Goergen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jacob S. Sherkow (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joel M. Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Johanna Coats (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph La Perla (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth Juan Figueroa (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
La Shann DeArcy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ladan F. Stewart (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence Bluestone (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/28/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa Debin Keith

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 17 of 96
(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Elizabeth Morales (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Wishnie (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rachel Lavery (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ramzi Kassem (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/13/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard Cashman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sarah Blackman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/28/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Siham Nurhussein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/01/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Victoria Hazeldean (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William T. Han (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Yeeta Yeger (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Anya R. Grossmann

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 18 of 96

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karen Grus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Kay Dunning (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott Ceresia (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Edgar Redrovan

represented by Alison B. Schary (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Anne Coyle (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bryan Bloom (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cedric Logan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher Nelson Lasch (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Michaels (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/28/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elizabeth Goergen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jacob S. Sherkow (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2010

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 19 of 96
LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joel M. Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Johanna Coats (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph La Perla (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth Juan Figueroa (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
La Shann DeArcy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ladan F. Stewart (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence Bluestone (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/28/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa Debin Keith (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Elizabeth Morales (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Wishnie (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 20 of 96
Rachel Lavery (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ramzi Kassem (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/13/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard Cashman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sarah Blackman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/28/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Siham Nurhussein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/01/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Victoria Hazeldean (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William T. Han (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Yeeta Yeger (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Anya R. Grossmann (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen Grus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Kay Dunning (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott Ceresia (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 21 of 96

Plaintiff Nicholas Segundo Sanchez

represented by Alison B. Schary (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Anne Coyle (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bryan Bloom (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cedric Logan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher Nelson Lasch (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Michaels (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/28/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth Goergen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jacob S. Sherkow (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joel M. Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Johanna Coats (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 22 of 96
Joseph La Perla (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth Juan Figueroa (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
La Shann DeArcy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ladan F. Stewart (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence Bluestone (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/28/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa Debin Keith (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Elizabeth Morales (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Wishnie (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rachel Lavery (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ramzi Kassem (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/13/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard Cashman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 23 of 96

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sarah Blackman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/28/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Siham Nurhussein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/01/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan Victoria Hazeldean (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William T. Han (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Yeeta Yeger (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Anya R. Grossmann (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karen Grus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Kay Dunning (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott Ceresia (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Juan Carlos Simbana

represented by Alison B. Schary (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Anne Coyle (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bryan Bloom

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 24 of 96
(See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cedric Logan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher Nelson Lasch (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Michaels (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/28/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth Goergen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jacob S. Sherkow (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joel M. Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Johanna Coats (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph La Perla (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth Juan Figueroa (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
La Shann DeArcy

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 25 of 96
(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ladan F. Stewart (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence Bluestone (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/28/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa Debin Keith (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Elizabeth Morales (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Wishnie (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rachel Lavery (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ramzi Kassem (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/13/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard Cashman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sarah Blackman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/28/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Siham Nurhussein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/01/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 26 of 96

Plaintiff
Danilo Brito Vargas TERMINATED: 10/01/2009

Susan Victoria Hazeldean (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William T. Han (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Yeeta Yeger (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Anya R. Grossmann (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen Grus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Kay Dunning (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott Ceresia (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Anne Coyle (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bryan Bloom (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher Nelson Lasch (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Michaels (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth Goergen (See above for address)

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 27 of 96
TERMINATED: 05/14/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joel M. Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph La Perla (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
La Shann DeArcy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence Bluestone (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Wishnie (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ramzi Kassem (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sarah Blackman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Siham Nurhussein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
Mark Boughton I/O Mayor of Danbury

represented by Catherine S. Nietzel Ryan Ryan Deluca LLP 707 Summer Street Stamford, CT 06901

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 28 of 96
203−357−9200 Fax: 203−961−9872 Email: cnietzel@ryandelucalaw.com TERMINATED: 09/16/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Charles A. Deluca Ryan Ryan Deluca, LLP 707 Summer Street Stamford, CT 06901 203−357−9200 Fax: 203−357−7915 Email: cdeluca@ryandelucalaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Clarisse Nicole Thomas Shipman &Goodwin LLP 300 Atlantic Street Stamford, CT 06901 203−324−8100 Fax: 203−324−8199 Email: cthomas@goodwin.com TERMINATED: 12/16/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel E. Casagrande Cramer &Anderson − Danbury 30 Main Street Suite 303 Danbury, CT 06810 203−744−1234 Fax: 203−730−2500 Email: dcasagrande@crameranderson.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph J. Arcata , III Halloran &Sage LLP 225 Asylum Street Hartford, CT 06103 860−522−6103 Fax: 860−548−0006 Email: jjarcata@ryandelucalaw.com TERMINATED: 08/13/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael T. Ryan Ryan Ryan Deluca, LLP 707 Summer Street Stamford, CT 06901 203−357−9200 Fax: 203−357−7915 Email: mtryan@ryandelucalaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan B. Parzymieso Webster Szanyi, LLP 1400 Liberty Building Buffalo, NY 14202 716−842−2800

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 29 of 96

Fax: 716−845−6709 Email: SPARZYMIESO@WEBSTERSZANYI.COM TERMINATED: 05/20/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William N. Wright Ryan Ryan Deluca, LLP 707 Summer Street Stamford, CT 06901 203−357−9200 Fax: 203−357−7915 Email: wnwright@ryandelucalaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Alan Baker I/O Chief of Police, Danbury Police Dept

represented by Catherine S. Nietzel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/16/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charles A. Deluca (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Clarisse Nicole Thomas (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/16/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph J. Arcata , III (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/13/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael T. Ryan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan B. Parzymieso (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/20/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William N. Wright (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Jose Agosto I/O Danbury Police Ofcr

represented by Catherine S. Nietzel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/16/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charles A. Deluca

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 30 of 96

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Clarisse Nicole Thomas (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/16/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph J. Arcata , III (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/13/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael T. Ryan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan B. Parzymieso (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/20/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William N. Wright (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Richard DeJesus I/O Danbury Police Ofcr

represented by Catherine S. Nietzel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/16/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charles A. Deluca (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Clarisse Nicole Thomas (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/16/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph J. Arcata , III (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/13/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael T. Ryan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan B. Parzymieso (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/20/2009

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 31 of 96

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William N. Wright (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
James A. Fisher I/O Danbury Police Ofcr

represented by Catherine S. Nietzel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/16/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charles A. Deluca (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Clarisse Nicole Thomas (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/16/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph J. Arcata , III (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/13/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael T. Ryan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan B. Parzymieso (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/20/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William N. Wright (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
James Lalli I/O Danbury Police Ofcr

represented by Catherine S. Nietzel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/16/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charles A. Deluca (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Clarisse Nicole Thomas (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/16/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 32 of 96

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph J. Arcata , III (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/13/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael T. Ryan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan B. Parzymieso (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/20/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William N. Wright (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Craig Martin I/O Danbury Police Ofcr

represented by Catherine S. Nietzel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/16/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charles A. Deluca (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Clarisse Nicole Thomas (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/16/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph J. Arcata , III (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/13/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael T. Ryan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan B. Parzymieso (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/20/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William N. Wright (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 33 of 96

Defendant
Joseph Norkus I/O Danbury Police Ofcr

represented by Catherine S. Nietzel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/16/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charles A. Deluca (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Clarisse Nicole Thomas (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/16/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph J. Arcata , III (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/13/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael T. Ryan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan B. Parzymieso (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/20/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William N. Wright (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
John Does I/O, 1−8

represented by Catherine S. Nietzel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/16/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charles A. Deluca (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Clarisse Nicole Thomas (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/16/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph J. Arcata , III (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/13/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 34 of 96

Michael T. Ryan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan B. Parzymieso (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/20/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William N. Wright (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant City Of Danbury

represented by Daniel E. Casagrande (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David P. Burke Cramer &Anderson − Danbury 30 Main Street Suite 303 Danbury, CT 06810 203−744−1234 Fax: 203−730−2500 Email: dburke@crameranderson.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kim E. Nolan Cramer &Anderson − Danbury 30 Main Street Suite 303 Danbury, CT 06810 203−744−1234 Fax: 203−730−2500 Email: knolan@crameranderson.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Ronald Preble I/O, ICE Agent

represented by David Christopher Nelson U.S. Attorney's Office − HTFD 450 Main Street Room328 Hartford, CT 06103 (860) 947−1101 Fax: (860) 760−7979 Email: David.C.Nelson@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Douglas P. Morabito U.S. Attorney's Office−NH 157 Church St., 23rd floor New Haven, CT 06510 203−821−3700 Fax: 203−773−5373 Email: Douglas.Morabito@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 35 of 96

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michelle Lynn McConaghy U.S. Attorney's Office−NH 157 Church St., 23rd floor New Haven, CT 06510 203−821−3700 Fax: 203−773−5373 Email: michelle.mcconaghy@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Victoria S Shin Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &Flom LLP−NY Four Times Square. New York, NY 10036−6522 212−735−3732 Fax: 203−773−5373 Email: Victoria.Shin@usdoj.gov TERMINATED: 03/18/2008 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Richard McCaffrey I/O, ICE Agent

represented by David Christopher Nelson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Douglas P. Morabito (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michelle Lynn McConaghy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Victoria S Shin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/18/2008 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
James Brown I/O, ICE Agent

represented by David Christopher Nelson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Douglas P. Morabito (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michelle Lynn McConaghy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Victoria S Shin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/18/2008

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 36 of 96

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
John Does I/O, 9−14

represented by David Christopher Nelson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan B. Parzymieso (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/20/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Victoria S Shin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/18/2008 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William N. Wright (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/11/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant USA

represented by David Christopher Nelson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Douglas P. Morabito (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michelle Lynn McConaghy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
George Sullivan ICE, Assistant Field Ofc

represented by Douglas P. Morabito (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michelle Lynn McConaghy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Jim Martin ICE, Deputy Field Ofc Dir

represented by Douglas P. Morabito (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michelle Lynn McConaghy (See above for address)

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 37 of 96

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Bruce Chadbourne ICE, Field Ofc Dir

represented by Douglas P. Morabito (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michelle Lynn McConaghy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Mitchell Weston

represented by Catherine S. Nietzel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/16/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charles A. Deluca (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Clarisse Nicole Thomas (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/16/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph J. Arcata , III (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/13/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William N. Wright (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Luis Ramos

represented by Catherine S. Nietzel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/16/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charles A. Deluca (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Clarisse Nicole Thomas (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/16/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph J. Arcata , III (See above for address)

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 38 of 96

TERMINATED: 08/13/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William N. Wright (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Julio Lopez

represented by Catherine S. Nietzel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/16/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charles A. Deluca (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Clarisse Nicole Thomas (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/16/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph J. Arcata , III (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/13/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William N. Wright (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Interested Party Maria−Cinta Lowe

represented by Blair Silver Kirkland &Ellis − NY, NY 601 Lexington Avenue New York, NY 10022− 212−446−6423 Email: blair.silver@kirkland.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sharon Billington Kirkland &Ellis − NY, NY 601 Lexington Avenue New York, NY 10022− 212−446−6441 Email: sharon.billington@kirkland.com TERMINATED: 05/19/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Simeon Papacostas Kirkland &Ellis − NY, NY 601 Lexington Avenue New York, NY 10022−

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 39 of 96

212−446−4815 Email: simeon.papacostas@kirkland.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Interested Party Wilson Hernandez

represented by Blair Silver (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sharon Billington (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/19/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Simeon Papacostas (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Interested Party Lynn Taborsak

represented by Blair Silver (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sharon Billington (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/19/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Simeon Papacostas (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Amicus
Doe Doe

represented by Albert Llosas Barrueco Day Pitney LLP−Trmbl St Htfd−CT 242 Trumbull St. Hartford, CT 06103−1212 860−275−0327 Fax: 860−275−0343 Email: abarrueco@daypitney.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David C. Salazar−Austin Jackson Lewis − Htfd, CT 90 State House Sq., 8th Fl.

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 40 of 96

Hartford, CT 06103−3708 860−522−0404 Fax: 860−247−1330 Email: DAVID.SALAZARAUSTIN@JACKSONLEWIS.COM TERMINATED: 08/17/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael P. Shea Day Pitney LLP−Htfd−CT 242 Trumbull St. Hartford, CT 06103−1212 860−275−0146 Fax: 860−275−0343 Email: mpshea@DayPitney.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rene Alejandro Ortega Day Pitney LLP−Htfd−CT 242 Trumbull St. Hartford, CT 06103−1212 860−275−0376 Fax: 860−275−0343 Email: raortega@daypitney.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Witness
Junta for Progressive Action Inc

represented by Christopher Nelson Lasch (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Wishnie Jerome N. Frank Legal Services − Wall St 127 Wall Street New Haven, CT 06511 203−432−4800 Fax: 203−432−1426 Email: michael.wishnie@yale.edu LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Witness Unidad Latina En Accion

represented by Christopher Nelson Lasch (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Wishnie (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Witness
Ecuadorian Civic Center of Danbury

represented by Christopher Nelson Lasch (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Witness
Danbury Area Coalition for the Rights of Immigrants

Michael J. Wishnie (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Christopher Nelson Lasch (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Wishnie (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 09/26/2007
09/26/2007 09/26/2007 09/26/2007 09/26/2007 10/24/2007 10/24/2007 10/24/2007 10/25/2007 10/30/2007
10/30/2007

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against Mark Boughton, Alan Baker, Jose Agosto, Richard Dejesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, John Does(I/O, 1−15), City Of Danbury, Ronald Preble, Richard McCaffrey, James Brown, John Does(I/O, 15−20) ( Filing fee $ 350 receipt number N022445), filed by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez.(Malone, P.) (Entered: 09/27/2007)
2 Order on Pretrial Deadlines: Amended Pleadings due by 11/25/2007.,Discovery due by 3/27/2008. Signed by Clerk on 9/26/07. (Malone, P.) (Entered: 09/27/2007)
3 ELECTRONIC FILING ORDER. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 9/26/07. (Attachments: # 1 E−Filing Notice)(Malone, P.) (Entered: 09/27/2007)
Summons Issued I/O as to Mark Boughton, Alan Baker, Jose Agosto, Richard Dejesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, John Does(I/O, 1−15), City Of Danbury. (Malone, P.) (Entered: 09/27/2007)
Summons Issued as to Ronald Preble, Richard McCaffrey, James Brown, John Does(I/O, 15−20), U.S. Attorney and U.S. Attorney General (Malone, P.) (Entered: 09/27/2007)
4 NOTICE of Appearance by Charles A. Deluca on behalf of Alan Baker, Jose Agosto Mark Boughton, James Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, and John Does 1−15 (Deluca, Charles) (Entered: 10/24/2007)
5 NOTICE of Appearance by Susan B. Parzymieso on behalf of Alan Baker, Jose Agosto Mark Boughton, Richard Dejesus, James Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, and John Does 1−15 (Parzymieso, Susan) (Entered: 10/24/2007)
6 NOTICE of Appearance by Charles A. Deluca on behalf of Richard Dejesus (Deluca, Charles) (Entered: 10/24/2007)
7 NOTICE of Appearance by Daniel E. Casagrande on behalf of City Of Danbury (Casagrande, Daniel) (Entered: 10/25/2007)
8 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. Ronald Preble served on 10/15/2007, answer due 12/14/2007; Richard McCaffrey served on 10/15/2007, answer due 12/14/2007; James Brown served on 10/15/2007, answer due 12/14/2007. (Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 10/30/2007)
9 MOTION for Extension of Time until November 28, 2007 To Respond to Plaintiffs' Complaint 1 Complaint, by Mark Boughton, Alan Baker, Jose Agosto, Richard Dejesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, John Does(I/O,

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10/31/2007 10/31/2007 10/31/2007 11/01/2007 11/01/2007 11/07/2007
11/07/2007 11/07/2007 11/07/2007
11/07/2007
11/08/2007 11/14/2007 11/14/2007 11/21/2007

1−15). (Deluca, Charles) (Entered: 10/30/2007)
10 ORDER granting 9 Motion for Extension of Time until 11/28/07 to respond to 1 Complaint. Signed by Clerk on 10/31/07. (Bauer, J.) (Entered: 10/31/2007)
Answer deadline updated for Mark Boughton to 11/28/2007; Alan Baker to 11/28/2007; Jose Agosto to 11/28/2007; Richard Dejesus to 11/28/2007; James A. Fisher to 11/28/2007; James Lalli to 11/28/2007; Craig Martin to 11/28/2007; John Does(I/O, 1−15) to 11/28/2007. (Bauer, J.) (Entered: 10/31/2007)
11 First MOTION for Extension of Time until November 28, 2007 to Answer Complaint by City Of Danbury. (Casagrande, Daniel) (Entered: 10/31/2007)
12 ORDER granting 11 Motion for Extension of Time until 11/28/2007 to respond to 1 Complaint. Signed by Clerk on 11/1/07. (Bauer, J.) (Entered: 11/01/2007)
Answer deadline updated for City Of Danbury to 11/28/2007. (Bauer, J.) (Entered: 11/01/2007)
13 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. Mark Boughton served on 10/19/2007, answer due 11/28/2007; Alan Baker served on 10/19/2007, answer due 11/28/2007; Jose Agosto served on 10/19/2007, answer due 11/28/2007; Richard Dejesus served on 10/19/2007, answer due 11/28/2007; James A. Fisher served on 10/19/2007, answer due 11/28/2007; James Lalli served on 10/19/2007, answer due 11/28/2007; Craig Martin served on 10/19/2007, answer due 11/28/2007; City Of Danbury served on 10/19/2007, answer due 11/28/2007. (Wishnie, Michael) Additional attachment(s) added on 11/8/2007 (Bauer, J.). (Entered: 11/07/2007)
14 ENTERED IN ERROR: SUMMONS Returned Executed by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Wishnie, Michael) Modified on 11/8/2007 (Bauer, J.). (Entered: 11/07/2007)
Summons Reissued as to Joseph Norkus I/O. (Rodko, B.) (Entered: 11/07/2007)
15 ENTERED IN ERROR: AFFIDAVIT of Service for SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT served on JAMES BROWN IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY, RICHARD MCCAFFREY IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY, RONALD PREBLE IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY, ATTORNEY−GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY on 10/10/2007, filed by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Wishnie, Michael) Modified on 11/8/2007 (Bauer, J.). (Entered: 11/07/2007)
16 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. Ronald Preble served on 10/10/2007, answer due 12/9/2007; Richard McCaffrey served on 10/10/2007, answer due 12/9/2007; James Brown served on 10/10/2007, answer due 12/9/2007. (correction to entry 15) (Bauer, J.) (Entered: 11/08/2007)
Docket Entry Correction re 14 Summons Returned Executed, 13 Summons Returned Executed, : 14 is an incomplete entry, see 13 for complete service information. (Bauer, J.) (Entered: 11/08/2007)
17 NOTICE of Appearance by Charles A. Deluca on behalf of Joseph Norkus (Deluca, Charles) (Entered: 11/14/2007)
18 NOTICE of Appearance by Susan B. Parzymieso on behalf of Joseph Norkus (Parzymieso, Susan) (Entered: 11/14/2007)
19 NOTICE of Appearance by Victoria S Shin on behalf of Ronald Preble, Richard McCaffrey, James Brown, John Does(I/O, 15−20) (Shin, Victoria) Additional attachment(s) added on 11/26/2007 (Bauer, J.). (Entered: 11/21/2007)

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11/26/2007 11/26/2007 11/26/2007 11/26/2007 11/27/2007 11/29/2007 11/29/2007 11/30/2007
12/03/2007 12/04/2007 12/04/2007
12/04/2007 12/04/2007 12/06/2007

20 Docket Entry Correction re 19 Notice of Appearance : replaced pdf. (Bauer, J.) (Entered: 11/26/2007)
21 AMENDED COMPLAINT against all defendants, filed by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez.(Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 11/26/2007)
22 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. Joseph Norkus served on 11/10/2007, answer due 11/30/2007. (Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 11/26/2007)
23 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 11/26/2007)
24 NOTICE of Appearance by Michelle Lynn Colson on behalf of Ronald Preble, Richard McCaffrey, James Brown, John Does(I/O, 15−20) (Colson, Michelle) (Entered: 11/27/2007)
25 MOTION for Extension of Time until December 26, 2007 to Respond to Amended Complaint by Mark Boughton, Alan Baker, Jose Agosto, Richard Dejesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, John Does(I/O, 1−8), John Does(I/O, 9−14). (Parzymieso, Susan) (Entered: 11/29/2007)
26 First MOTION for Extension of Time until 12/26/07 to file Answer to Amended Complaint by City Of Danbury. (Casagrande, Daniel) (Entered: 11/29/2007)
27 STIPULATION re 21 Amended Complaint re Deadline By Which All Federal Defendants Shall Answer by Jose Duma, USA, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Ronald Preble, Richard McCaffrey, James Brown, John Does(I/O, 9−14), Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Shin, Victoria) (Entered: 11/30/2007)
28 First MOTION for Extension of Time until Dec. 21, 2007 To file form 26(f) by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 12/03/2007)
29 ORDER granting 25 Motion for Extension of Time to respond to 21 Amended Complaint. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 11/30/07. (S−D'Onofrio, B.) (Entered: 12/04/2007)
Answer deadline updated for Mark Boughton to 12/26/2007; Alan Baker to 12/26/2007; Jose Agosto to 12/26/2007; Richard Dejesus to 12/26/2007; James A. Fisher to 12/26/2007; James Lalli to 12/26/2007; Craig Martin to 12/26/2007; Joseph Norkus to 12/26/2007; John Does(I/O, 1−8) to 12/26/2007. (S−D'Onofrio, B.) (Entered: 12/04/2007)
30 ORDER granting 26 Motion for Extension of Time to respond to 21 Amended Complaint. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 11/30/07. (S−D'Onofrio, B.) (Entered: 12/04/2007)
Answer deadline updated for City Of Danbury to 12/26/2007. (S−D'Onofrio, B.) (Entered: 12/04/2007)
31 ORDER approving 27 Stipulation, filed by Juan Barrera, Richard McCaffrey, Ronald Preble, Juan Carlos Simbana, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Jose Llibisupa, Edgar Redrovan, Daniel Chavez, John Does, USA, Jose Cabrera, Danilo Brito Vargas, Isaac Maldonado, James Brown, Jose Duma, Answer updated for USA to 1/15/2008; Ronald Preble to 1/15/2008; Richard McCaffrey to 1/15/2008; James Brown to 1/15/2008; John Does(I/O, 9−14) to 1/15/2008. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 12/6/07. (D'Onofrio, B.) (Entered: 12/10/2007)

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12/06/2007 12/06/2007 12/11/2007 12/11/2007 12/13/2007 12/19/2007 12/19/2007 12/21/2007
12/24/2007 12/27/2007 12/27/2007
12/27/2007 01/03/2008 01/04/2008
01/04/2008 01/22/2008 01/22/2008 01/23/2008 01/23/2008

32 ORDER granting 28 Motion for Extension of Time. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 12/6/07. (D'Onofrio, B.) (Entered: 12/10/2007)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Rule 26 Meeting Report due by 12/21/2007 (D'Onofrio, B.) (Entered: 12/10/2007)
33 NOTICE of Appearance by Douglas P. Morabito on behalf of James Brown ,Ronald Preble, Richard McCaffrey and John Does 15−20 (Morabito, Douglas) Filer Modified on 12/12/2007 (Bauer, J.). (Entered: 12/11/2007)
34 NOTICE of Appearance by Douglas P. Morabito on behalf of USA, Ronald Preble, Richard McCaffrey, James Brown &John DOes 15−20(Morabito, Douglas) Filers Modified on 12/12/2007 (Bauer, J.). (Entered: 12/11/2007)
35 Second MOTION for Extension of Time until February 8, 2008 21 Amended Complaint by USA, Ronald Preble, Richard McCaffrey, James Brown. (Morabito, Douglas) (Entered: 12/13/2007)
36 ORDER granting 35 Motion for Extension of Time. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 12/19/07. (D'Onofrio, B.) (Entered: 12/19/2007)
Answer deadline updated for USA to 2/8/2008; Ronald Preble to 2/8/2008; Richard McCaffrey to 2/8/2008; James Brown to 2/8/2008. (D'Onofrio, B.) (Entered: 12/19/2007)
37 Second MOTION for Extension of Time to Respond to Amended Complaint by Mark Boughton, Alan Baker, Jose Agosto, Richard Dejesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, John Does(I/O, 1−8), City Of Danbury. (Parzymieso, Susan) (Entered: 12/21/2007)
38 First REPORT of Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting. (Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 12/24/2007)
39 ORDER granting 37 Motion for Extension of Time. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 12/26/2007. (Kunofsky, L.) (Entered: 12/28/2007)
Answer deadline updated for Mark Boughton; Alan Baker; Jose Agosto; Richard Dejesus; James A. Fisher; James Lalli; Craig Martin; Joseph Norkus; John Does(I/O, 1−8); and City Of Danbury to 2/1/2008. (Kunofsky, L.) (Entered: 12/28/2007)
40 ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Donna F. Martinez for Scheduling Order and to supervise Discovery. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 12/27/07. (Ferguson, L.) (Entered: 12/28/2007)
41 Letter from Ryan, Ryan, Johnson &DeLuca LLP Dated 12/28/07 Re: regarding filing of Motion to Dismiss or Answer Amended Complaint until 2/1/08 with endorsement thereon. (D'Onofrio, B.) (Entered: 01/04/2008)
42 ORDER: A telephonic conference call is scheduled for Wednesday 1/23/08 at 10:00 a.m. with Judge Martinez to discuss the parties' 26(f) report and to enter a scheduling order. Plaintiffs' counsel shall initiate the call and shall have opposing counsel on the line when calling chambers at (860) 240 3605. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 1/4/08. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 01/04/2008)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Telephone Status Conference set for 1/23/2008 10:00 AM before Judge Donna F. Martinez (Pesta, J.) (Entered: 01/07/2008)
43 Letter from AUSA Morabito Dated 1/14/08 Re: Filing Motion to Dismiss (D'Onofrio, B.) (Entered: 01/22/2008)
44 ORDER re 43 Letter asking permission to file Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 1/22/08. (D'Onofrio, B.) (Entered: 01/22/2008)
45 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Donna F. Martinez: Telephone Status Conference held on 1/23/2008 ; 5 minutes (Pesta, J.) (Entered: 01/23/2008)
46 ORDER: The court conducted a telephonic status conference on 1/23/08 regarding the parties' Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(f) report and entry of a scheduling order. During the conference, Attorney Deluca, counsel for the Mayor and the individual City of

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01/24/2008 02/01/2008 02/01/2008 02/01/2008 02/01/2008 02/11/2008 02/11/2008 02/13/2008 02/13/2008 02/14/2008 02/20/2008
02/21/2008

Danbury defendants, indicated that the defendants intend to file by 2/1/08 a motion to disqualify plaintiff's counsel, the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services organization. In light of the issues surrounding representation, discovery is stayed until the court resolves the motion to disqualify. After the court has decided the motion, the undersigned shall conduct another teleconference regarding scheduling. Plaintiff's counsel shall contact chambers to arrange a conference call after the motion is decided. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 1/23/08. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 01/23/2008)
47 NOTICE of Appearance by Ramzi Kassem on behalf of Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez (Kassem, Ramzi) (Entered: 01/24/2008)
48 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel by Mark Boughton. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Disqualification)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Deluca, Charles) # 2 Exhibit 1−4, manually filed (D'Onofrio, B.). Modified on 2/4/2008 (D'Onofrio, B.). (Entered: 02/01/2008)
49 MOTION to Dismiss by Mark Boughton, Alan Baker, Jose Agosto, Richard Dejesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, John Does(I/O, 1−8).Responses due by 2/22/2008 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss)(Deluca, Charles) (Entered: 02/01/2008)
50 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel Jerome N. Frank Legal Services by City Of Danbury. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Casagrande, Daniel) (Entered: 02/01/2008)
51 MOTION to Dismiss by USA, Ronald Preble, Richard McCaffrey, James Brown.Responses due by 2/22/2008 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Affidavit)(Morabito, Douglas) (Entered: 02/01/2008)
52 NOTICE by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez of Law Student Intern Appearance (Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 02/11/2008)
53 NOTICE by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Daniel Chavez of Law Student Intern Appearance (Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 02/11/2008)
54 ORDER approving 52 Notice re Law Student Intern Appearance filed by Juan Barrera, Juan Carlos Simbana, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Jose Llibisupa, Edgar Redrovan, Daniel Chavez, Jose Cabrera, Isaac Maldonado, Jose Duma. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 2/12/08. (D'Onofrio, B.) (Entered: 02/13/2008)
55 ORDER approving 53 Notice Law Student Intern Apearance filed by Juan Barrera, Juan Carlos Simbana, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Jose Llibisupa, Edgar Redrovan, Daniel Chavez, Isaac Maldonado, Jose Duma. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 2/12/08. (D'Onofrio, B.) (Entered: 02/13/2008)
56 NOTICE of Appearance by Clarisse Nicole Thomas on behalf of Mark Boughton, Alan Baker, Jose Agosto, Richard Dejesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, John Does(I/O, 1−8) (Thomas, Clarisse) (Entered: 02/14/2008)
57 First MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 49 MOTION to Dismiss, 50 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel Jerome N. Frank Legal Services, 48 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel until 3/7/08 by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 02/20/2008)
58 ORDER granting 57 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to 49 MOTION to Dismiss, 48 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel, 50 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel. Responses due by 3/7/2008. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 2/20/08. (Martinez, Donna) (Entered: 02/21/2008)

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 46 of 96

02/25/2008 02/25/2008 02/26/2008 03/04/2008 03/07/2008 03/07/2008
03/07/2008
03/07/2008 03/07/2008
03/07/2008 03/13/2008 03/13/2008

59 Memorandum in Opposition re 51 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 02/25/2008)
60 MOTION for Leave to File Overlength Brief by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 02/25/2008)
61 ORDER granting 60 Motion for Leave to File Oversized Brief. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 2/26/08. (Martinez, Donna) (Entered: 02/26/2008)
62 REPLY to Response to 51 MOTION to Dismiss filed by USA, Ronald Preble, Richard McCaffrey, James Brown. (Morabito, Douglas) (Entered: 03/04/2008)
63 MOTION for Victoria S. Shin to Withdraw as Attorney by Ronald Preble, Richard McCaffrey, James Brown, John Does(I/O, 9−14). Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Shin, Victoria) (Entered: 03/07/2008)
64 Memorandum in Opposition re 50 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel Jerome N. Frank Legal Services, 48 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel filed by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit, # 8 Exhibit, # 9 Exhibit, # 10 Exhibit, # 11 Exhibit, # 12 Exhibit, # 13 Exhibit, # 14 Exhibit, # 15 Exhibit)(Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 03/07/2008)
65 Cross MOTION to Strike 50 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Exhibit 1 (Wolfram Declaration) by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez.Responses due by 3/28/2008 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 03/07/2008)
66 Memorandum in Opposition re 49 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit)(Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 03/07/2008)
67 Cross MOTION to Certify Questions of Law to the Connecticut Supreme Court and to Hold Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in Abeyance re 49 MOTION to Dismiss by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez.Responses due by 3/28/2008 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 03/07/2008)
68 MOTION to Stay re 49 MOTION to Dismiss by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez.Responses due by 3/28/2008 Second relief requested in motion 67 .Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Bauer, J.) (Entered: 03/10/2008)
69 First MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Plaintiffs' Memo of Law in Opposition as to 49 MOTION to Dismiss, 48 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel until up to and including March 28, 2008 by Mark Boughton, Alan Baker, Jose Agosto, Richard Dejesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, John Does(I/O, 1−8). Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Thomas, Clarisse) (Entered: 03/13/2008)
70 First MOTION for Extension of Time until March 28, 2008 to respond re: 48 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel, 50 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel, 65 Cross MOTION to Strike , 67 Cross MOTION to Certify Questions of Law to the

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 47 of 96

03/17/2008 03/17/2008
03/18/2008 03/28/2008 03/28/2008
03/28/2008 03/28/2008 04/08/2008

Connecticut Supreme Court and to Hold Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in Abeyance by City Of Danbury. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Casagrande, Daniel) Motion relief and links Modified on 3/14/2008 (Bauer, J.). (Entered: 03/13/2008)
71 ORDER granting 69 defendants' Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply ; granting 70 defendants' Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply Responses due by 3/28/2008. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 3/17/08. (Martinez, Donna) (Entered: 03/17/2008)
Set/Reset Deadlines as to 65 Cross MOTION to Strike 50 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Exhibit 1 (Wolfram Declaration)Cross MOTION to Strike 50 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Exhibit 1 (Wolfram Declaration), 49 MOTION to Dismiss, 48 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel, 67 Cross MOTION to Certify Questions of Law to the Connecticut Supreme Court and to Hold Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in Abeyance re 49 MOTION to DismissCross MOTION to Certify Questions of Law to the Connecticut Supreme Court and to Hold Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in Abeyance re 49 MOTION to DismissCross MOTION to Certify Questions of Law to the Connecticut Supreme Court and to Hold Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in Abeyance re 49 MOTION to Dismiss, 50 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel Jerome N. Frank Legal Services. Responses due by 3/28/2008 (Bauer, J.) (Entered: 03/18/2008)
72 ORDER granting 63 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Victoria S Shin terminated. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 3/18/08. (Pesta, J.) (Entered: 03/18/2008)
73 REPLY to Response to 48 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel filed by Mark Boughton. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Parzymieso, Susan) (Entered: 03/28/2008)
74 Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Cross−Motions re 68 MOTION to Stay re 49 MOTION to Dismiss MOTION to Stay re 49 MOTION to Dismiss, 67 Cross MOTION to Certify Questions of Law to the Connecticut Supreme Court and to Hold Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in Abeyance re 49 MOTION to DismissCross MOTION to Certify Questions of Law to the Connecticut Supreme Court and to Hold Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in Abeyance re 49 MOTION to DismissCross MOTION to Certify Questions of Law to the Connecticut Supreme Court and to Hold Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in Abeyance re 49 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Mark Boughton, Alan Baker, Jose Agosto, Richard Dejesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, John Does(I/O, 1−8). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit Exhibit E)(Deluca, Charles) (Entered: 03/28/2008)
75 REPLY to Response to 49 MOTION to Dismiss Claims for Relief Number 3−5, 16 and 19 filed by Mark Boughton, Alan Baker, Jose Agosto, Richard Dejesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, John Does(I/O, 1−8). (Deluca, Charles) (Entered: 03/28/2008)
76 Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Exclude Wolfram's Declaration re 65 Cross MOTION to Strike 50 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Exhibit 1 (Wolfram Declaration)Cross MOTION to Strike 50 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Exhibit 1 (Wolfram Declaration) filed by Mark Boughton. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K)(Deluca, Charles) (Entered: 03/28/2008)
77 First MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 65 Cross MOTION to Strike 50 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Exhibit 1 (Wolfram Declaration)Cross MOTION to Strike 50 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Exhibit 1 (Wolfram Declaration), 68 MOTION to Stay re 49 MOTION to Dismiss MOTION to Stay re 49 MOTION to Dismiss, 67 Cross MOTION to Certify Questions of Law to the Connecticut Supreme Court and to Hold Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in Abeyance re 49 MOTION to DismissCross MOTION to Certify Questions of Law

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 48 of 96

04/10/2008 04/10/2008 04/18/2008
04/18/2008
04/18/2008 04/28/2008 04/28/2008 04/29/2008 05/05/2008 05/05/2008

to the Connecticut Supreme Court and to Hold Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in Abeyance re 49 MOTION to DismissCross MOTION to Certify Questions of Law to the Connecticut Supreme Court and to Hold Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in Abeyance re 49 MOTION to Dismiss until April 18, 2008 by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 04/08/2008)
78 ORDER granting 77 Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply. Reply due by 4/18/2008. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 4/11/08. (Martinez, Donna) (Entered: 04/10/2008)
Set/Reset Deadlines as to 50 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel, 65 Cross MOTION to Strike, 67 Cross MOTION to Certify Questions of Law to the Connecticut Supreme Court and to Hold Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in Abeyance, 68 MOTION to Stay re 49 MOTION to Dismiss.Responses due by 4/18/2008 (Bauer, J.) (Entered: 04/11/2008)
79 REPLY to Response to 68 MOTION to Stay re 49 MOTION to Dismiss MOTION to Stay re 49 MOTION to Dismiss, 67 Cross MOTION to Certify Questions of Law to the Connecticut Supreme Court and to Hold Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in Abeyance re 49 MOTION to DismissCross MOTION to Certify Questions of Law to the Connecticut Supreme Court and to Hold Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in Abeyance re 49 MOTION to DismissCross MOTION to Certify Questions of Law to the Connecticut Supreme Court and to Hold Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in Abeyance re 49 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 04/18/2008)
80 REPLY to Response to 65 Cross MOTION to Strike 50 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Exhibit 1 (Wolfram Declaration)Cross MOTION to Strike 50 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Exhibit 1 (Wolfram Declaration) filed by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 04/18/2008)
81 First MOTION for Leave to File Sur−Reply by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 04/18/2008)
82 Second MOTION for Extension of Time until 30 days from decision on motion to dismiss to answer 21 Amended Complaint by City Of Danbury. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Casagrande, Daniel) (Entered: 04/28/2008)
83 Memorandum in Opposition re 82 Second MOTION for Extension of Time until 30 days from decision on motion to dismiss to answer 21 Amended Complaint filed by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 04/28/2008)
84 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez re 83 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion, (Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 04/29/2008)
85 Memorandum in Opposition re 81 First MOTION for Leave to File Sur−Reply filed by Mark Boughton. (Thomas, Clarisse) (Entered: 05/05/2008)
86 MOTION to Strike all materials that were filed by the plaintiffs after Boughtons reply by Mark Boughton.Responses due by 5/26/2008 Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Bauer, J.) (Entered: 05/06/2008)

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 49 of 96

05/07/2008 05/08/2008 05/08/2008 05/08/2008 05/19/2008 06/12/2008 06/12/2008 06/12/2008
07/03/2008 07/14/2008 08/05/2008 08/05/2008 08/07/2008
08/11/2008 08/11/2008 08/15/2008

87 Memorandum in Support re 86 MOTION to Strike all pleadings filed after Defendant Boughton's Reply to the plaintiffs' Opposition Brief to the Motion for Disqualification filed by Mark Boughton. (Thomas, Clarisse) (Entered: 05/07/2008)
88 ORDER granting absent objection 82 Second MOTION for Extension of Time until 5/19/08 to answer 21 Amended Complaint. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 5/8/08. (Pesta, J.) (Entered: 05/08/2008)
89 REPLY to Response to 81 First MOTION for Leave to File Sur−Reply filed by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 05/08/2008)
90 OBJECTION re 86 MOTION to Strike filed by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 05/08/2008)
91 ANSWER to 21 Amended Complaint with Affirmative Defenses. by City Of Danbury.(Casagrande, Daniel) (Entered: 05/19/2008)
92 ORDER denying 86 Motion to Strike. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 6/12/08. (Pesta, J.) (Entered: 06/12/2008)
93 ORDER granting 81 Motion for Leave to File sur−reply to 48 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel &50 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 6/12/08. (Pesta, J.) (Entered: 06/12/2008)
94 ORDER denying 65 Cross MOTION to exclude the Wolfram declaration. The Wolfram declaration has been filed in conjunction with a motion for disqualification. The Court will decide that motion as a matter of law, and it is capable of critically reviewing the Wolfram declaration and affording it any consideration it may properly be due. See F.R.E. 403. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 6/12/08. (Pesta, J.) (Entered: 06/12/2008)
95 RULING denying 48 Motion to Disqualify Counsel; denying 50 Motion to Disqualify Counsel. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 7/3/08. (Walker, J.) (Entered: 07/03/2008)
96 ORDER &CALENDAR : A Telephonic Status Conference is scheduled for July 31, 2008 at 11:30 a.m. Plaintiff's counsel shall initiate the conference call and shall have opposing counsel on the line when calling chambers at (860)240−3605. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 7/14/08. (Pesta, J.) (Entered: 07/14/2008)
97 ORDER: Telephonic status conference held 7/31/08. Counsel will confer and shall file with the court by 8/7/08 a new Rule 26(f) report. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 8/4/08. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 08/05/2008)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Rule 26 Meeting Report due by 8/7/2008 (Bauer, J.) (Entered: 08/06/2008)
98 MOTION for Extension of Time until 8/14/2008 to obtain approval from all counsel for new Rule 26(f) report 97 Order by Juan Barrera. &ALL Plaintiffs (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Lasch, Christopher) Filers Modified on 8/8/2008 (Bauer, J.). (Entered: 08/07/2008)
99 ORDER: The plaintiff's motion for an extension of time in which to file an amended Rule 26(f) report (doc. # 98 ) is granted. The report shall be filed by 8/15/08. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 8/11/08. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 08/11/2008)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Rule 26 Meeting Report due by 8/15/2008 (Bauer, J.) (Entered: 08/12/2008)
100 Amended REPORT of Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting. (Lasch, Christopher) (Entered: 08/15/2008)

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 50 of 96

09/25/2008 09/26/2008 10/16/2008 10/20/2008 10/20/2008 10/21/2008 10/27/2008 10/28/2008 11/06/2008
11/06/2008 11/06/2008 11/10/2008 11/11/2008

101 MOTION to Stay Discovery by USA, Ronald Preble, Richard McCaffrey, James Brown.Responses due by 10/16/2008 Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Morabito, Douglas) (Entered: 09/25/2008)
102 MOTION to Stay Discovery by Mark Boughton, Alan Baker, Jose Agosto, Richard Dejesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, John Does(I/O, 1−8).Responses due by 10/17/2008 Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Parzymieso, Susan) (Entered: 09/26/2008)
103 Memorandum in Opposition re 102 MOTION to Stay Discovery filed by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 10/16/2008)
104 MOTION to Stay Discovery by City Of Danbury.Responses due by 11/10/2008 Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Casagrande, Daniel) (Entered: 10/20/2008)
105 ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Donna F. Martinez to supervise discovery and resolve discovery disputes including 101 MOTION to Stay Discovery, 102 MOTION to Stay Discovery. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 10/20/08. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(S−D'Onofrio, B.) (Entered: 10/21/2008)
106 REPLY to Response to 102 MOTION to Stay Discovery filed by Mark Boughton, Alan Baker, Jose Agosto, Richard Dejesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, John Does(I/O, 1−8). (Thomas, Clarisse) (Entered: 10/21/2008)
107 Memorandum in Opposition re 104 MOTION to Stay Discovery filed by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 10/27/2008)
108 NOTICE OF ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez of Supplemental Authorities (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Attachment 1, # 2 Exhibit Attachment 2)(Wishnie, Michael) Modified on 10/29/2008 (Bauer, J.). (Entered: 10/28/2008)
109 ORDER &CALENDAR: Oral argument is scheduled on the defendants' motions to stay (##101, 102 &104) on 11/13/08 at 1:00 p.m. before Judge Martinez. Oral argument shall be conducted telephonically. Plaintiff's counsel shall initiate the conference call and shall have opposing counsel on the line when calling chambers at (860) 240 3605. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 11/6/08. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 11/06/2008)
110 MOTION for Leave to Appear Law Student Intern Ari Holtzblatt by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Wishnie, Michael) (Additional attachment(s) added on 11/10/2008: # 1 proposed appearance) (Bauer, J.). (Entered: 11/06/2008)
111 MOTION for Leave to Appear Law Student Intern Elizabeth Simpson by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Wishnie, Michael) (Additional attachment(s) added on 11/10/2008: # 1 proposed appearances) (Bauer, J.). (Entered: 11/06/2008)
112 Docket Entry Correction re 110 MOTION for Leave to Appear Law Student Intern Ari Holtzblatt, 111 MOTION for Leave to Appear Law Student Intern Elizabeth Simpson (Attachments: # 1 proposed appearance 110, # 2 motion to appear doc 111, # 3 proposed appearance 111) : EDITED to Attach the pdfs for the ACTUAL MOTIONS (Bauer, J.) (Entered: 11/10/2008)
113 ENTERED IN ERROR: NOTICE of Appearance by Michael J. Wishnie on behalf of Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez (Attachments: # 1 Supplement Student and Plaintiff Certification)(Wishnie, Michael) Modified on

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 51 of 96

11/11/2008 11/12/2008
11/12/2008 11/12/2008 11/12/2008
11/12/2008 11/19/2008 12/04/2008
12/10/2008 01/23/2009 01/23/2009 01/30/2009 02/10/2009
02/12/2009

11/12/2008 (Bauer, J.). (Entered: 11/11/2008)
114 MOTION for Leave to Appear law student intern by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez [correction to entry 113](Bauer, J.) (Entered: 11/12/2008)
115 First MOTION for Extension of Time until November 24, December 2, or December 3 Oral Arguments on Defendants' Motions to Stay Discovery by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 11/12/2008)
116 ORDER granting (doc.# 111 ) plaintiffs' motion for leave for law student intern Elizabeth Simpson to appear. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 11/12/08. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 11/12/2008)
117 ORDER granting (doc.# 110 ) plaintiffs' motion for leave for law student intern ARI HOLTZBLATT to appear. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 11/12/08. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 11/12/2008)
118 ORDER granting plaintiffs' motion to reschedule oral argument (doc.# 115 ). Oral argument is rescheduled to 12/3/08 at 3:30 p.m. before Judge Martinez. Oral argument shall be conducted telephonically. Plaintiff's counsel shall initiate the conference call and shall have opposing counsel on the line when calling chambers at (860) 240 3605. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 11/12/08. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 11/12/2008)
Set/Reset Deadlines as to 101 MOTION to Stay Discovery, 102 MOTION to Stay Discovery, 104 MOTION to Stay Discovery. Telephonic motion hearing set for 12/3/2008 @ 03:30 PM before Judge Donna F. Martinez (Glynn, T.) (Entered: 11/13/2008)
119 ORDER granting (doc.# 114 ) motion for leave for law student intern HEIDE IRAVANI to appear on behalf of the plaintiffs. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 11/19/08. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 11/19/2008)
120 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Donna F. Martinez: Motion Hearing held on 12/4/2008 re 101 MOTION to Stay Discovery filed by Richard McCaffrey, Ronald Preble, James Brown, USA, 102 MOTION to Stay Discovery filed by Alan Baker, James Lalli, Jose Agosto, James A. Fisher, Richard Dejesus, Mark Boughton, Craig Martin, John Does, Joseph Norkus, 104 MOTION to Stay Discovery filed by City Of Danbury. (26 minutes)(Court Reporter Wendy Allen.) (Glynn, T.) (Entered: 12/04/2008)
121 ORDER denying 101 Motion to Stay; denying 102 Motion to Stay; denying 104 Motion to Stay. See attached ruling. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 12/10/08. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 12/10/2008)
122 ORDER: By 2/2/09, counsel shall file a revised Rule 26(f) report.Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 1/23/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 01/23/2009)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Revised Rule 26 Meeting Report due by 2/2/2009 (Glynn, T.) (Entered: 01/26/2009)
123 Amended REPORT of Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting. (Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 01/30/2009)
124 SCHEDULING ORDER: See attached. Amended Pleadings due by 5/29/2009, Joint Status Report due by 5/11/2009, Prefiling conference for the filing of Dispositive Motions must be requested by 12/18/2009, Discovery due by 2/1/2010, Joint Trial Brief due by 5/4/2010. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 2/10/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 02/10/2009)
125 NOTICE of Appearance by Joseph J. Arcata, III on behalf of Mark Boughton, Alan Baker, Jose Agosto, Richard Dejesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, John Does(I/O, 1−8) (Arcata, Joseph) (Entered: 02/12/2009)

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 52 of 96

02/24/2009
03/03/2009 03/05/2009 03/10/2009
03/12/2009 03/13/2009 03/17/2009 03/20/2009 03/20/2009 03/20/2009

126 NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR. THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE THE COURT SHALL ISSUE.ALL PERSONS ENTERING THE COURTHOUSE MUST PRESENT PHOTO IDENTIFICATION. Motion Hearing re: 68 MOTION to Stay, 51 MOTION to Dismiss, 67 Cross MOTION to Certify Questions of Law to the Connecticut Supreme Court and to Hold Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in Abeyance and 49 MOTION to Dismiss all set for 3/10/2009 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom Three, 450 Main St., Hartford, CT before Judge Robert N. Chatigny. (Walker, J.) (Entered: 02/24/2009)
127 MOTION Leave for Law Student Intern to Appear Dror Ladin by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez.Responses due by 3/24/2009 (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Actual Appearance of Law Student Intern Dror Ladin)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Wishnie, Michael) Text Modified on 3/4/2009 (Bauer, J.). (Entered: 03/03/2009)
128 ORDER re 127 Motion for leave for Law Student Intern to Appear. Granted. So ordered. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 3/4/09. (Gothers, M.) (Entered: 03/06/2009)
129 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Robert N. Chatigny: Motion Hearing held on 3/10/2009 re 49 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Alan Baker, James Lalli, Jose Agosto, James A. Fisher, Richard Dejesus, Mark Boughton, Craig Martin, John Does, Joseph Norkus, 51 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Richard McCaffrey, Ronald Preble, USA, James Brown, 68 MOTION to Hold Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in Abeyance re 49 MOTION to Dismiss, and 67 Cross MOTION to Certify Questions of Law to the Connecticut Supreme Court filed by Juan Barrera, Juan Carlos Simbana, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Jose Llibisupa, Edgar Redrovan, Daniel Chavez, Jose Cabrera, Danilo Brito Vargas, Isaac Maldonado, Jose Duma. Oral order granting in part (count 16 only) and denying in part 49 Motion to Dismiss filed by Danbury defendants; denying 51 Motion to Dismiss filed by USA defendants; taking under advisement 67 Motion to certify question to CT Supreme Court; denying 68 Motion to hold defendants' motion to dismiss 49 in abeyance. Total Time: 3 hours and 5 minutes.(Court Reporter Darlene Warner.) (Walker, J.) (Entered: 03/10/2009)
130 NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL/THE PARTIES WILL RECEIVE. Telephone Status Conference set for 3/25/2009 at 03:00 PM before Judge Robert N. Chatigny. Counsel will initiate the conference call to chambers at 860−240−3659 with all counsel on the line. (Walker, J.) (Entered: 03/12/2009)
131 MOTION Leave for Law Student Intern to Appear Rebecca Heller by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez.Responses due by 4/3/2009 (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Actual Appearance of Law Student Intern Rebecca Heller)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 03/13/2009)
132 ORDER re 131 Motion for Law School Intern to Appear. Granted. So ordered. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 3/16/09. (Gothers, M.) (Entered: 03/17/2009)
133 NOTICE of Appearance by Michael T. Ryan on behalf of Mark Boughton, Alan Baker, Jose Agosto, Richard Dejesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, John Does(I/O, 1−8) (Ryan, Michael) (Entered: 03/20/2009)
134 ANSWER to 21 Amended Complaint with Affirmative Defenses. by USA, James A. Fisher, Ronald Preble, Richard McCaffrey.(McConaghy, Michelle) (Entered: 03/20/2009)
137 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Attorney Sarah Balckman. Filing Fee $25. Receipt Number N027067. by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Sarah Blackman)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Gothers, M.) (Entered: 03/27/2009)

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03/20/2009
03/20/2009
03/20/2009 03/20/2009
03/20/2009
03/20/2009
03/25/2009 03/26/2009 03/27/2009
03/30/2009 04/03/2009 04/08/2009

138 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Attorney Lawrence Bluestone. Filing Fee $25.00. Receipt Number N027067. by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Lawrence Bluestone)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Gothers, M.) (Entered: 03/27/2009)
139 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Attorney Joel M. Cohen. Filing Fee $25.00. Receipt Number N027067. by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Gothers, M.) (Additional attachment(s) added on 3/27/2009: # 1 Affidavit Joel M. Cohen) (Gothers, M.). (Entered: 03/27/2009)
Docket Entry Correction re 139 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Attorney Joel M. Cohen. Filing Fee $25.oo. Receipt Number N027067. Clerk has added Affidavit of Joel M. Cohen to the pdf as an attachment. (Gothers, M.) (Entered: 03/27/2009)
140 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Attorney Siham Nurhussein. Filing Fee $25.00. Receipt Number N027067. by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Siham Nurhussein)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Gothers, M.) (Entered: 03/27/2009)
141 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Attorney Daniel Michaels. Filing Fee $25.00. Receipt Number N027067. by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Daniel Michaels)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Gothers, M.) (Entered: 03/27/2009)
142 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Attorney Elizabeth Georgen. Filing Fee $25.00. Receipt Number N027067. by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Georgen)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Gothers, M.) (Entered: 03/27/2009)
136 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Robert N. Chatigny: Telephone Status Conference held on 3/25/2009. Oral order denying 67 Motion to certify questions to CT Supreme Court. (3 minutes)(Court Reporter Darlene Warner) (Walker, J.) (Entered: 03/27/2009)
135 NOTICE of Appearance by David P. Burke on behalf of City Of Danbury (Burke, David) (Entered: 03/26/2009)
143 ORDER granting 137 Motion to Appear Pro Hace Vice Sarah Blackman granting 138 Motion to Appear Pro Hace Vice Lawrence Bluestone granting 139 Motion to Appear Pro Hace Vice Joel M. Cohen granting 140 Motion to Appear Pro Hace Vice Shiham Nurhussein granting 141 Motion to Appear Pro Hace Vice Daniel Michaels Pro Hac Vic 142 Motion to Appear Pro Hace Vice Elizabeth Goergen. Signed by Clerk on 3/27/09. (Gothers, M.) (Entered: 03/27/2009)
144 PROPOSED ORDER by USA, Ronald Preble, Richard McCaffrey, James Brown. (Morabito, Douglas) (Entered: 03/30/2009)
145 ENDORSEMENT ORDER re 144 Proposed Order filed by Richard McCaffrey, Ronald Preble, James Brown, USA. See attached. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 4/2/09. (Walker, J.) (Entered: 04/06/2009)
146 MOTION for Extension of Time extending the time to designate expert witnesses, to produce Fed R. Civ. P 26(a)(2)(B) expert witness reports and to depose expert witnesses by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Bluestone, Lawrence) (Entered:

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 54 of 96

04/08/2009 04/09/2009 04/09/2009
04/09/2009
04/09/2009 04/09/2009 04/09/2009
04/09/2009 04/09/2009 04/10/2009

04/08/2009)
147 ANSWER to 21 Amended Complaint with Affirmative Defenses. by Mark Boughton, Alan Baker, Jose Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, John Does(I/O, 1−8).(Thomas, Clarisse) (Entered: 04/08/2009)
148 NOTICE of Appearance by Christopher Nelson Lasch on behalf of Junta for Progressive Action Inc, Unidad Latina En Accion, Ecuadorian Civic Center of Danbury, Danbury Area Coalition for the Rights of Immigrants (Lasch, Christopher) (Entered: 04/09/2009)
149 MOTION to Quash by Junta for Progressive Action Inc, Unidad Latina En Accion, Ecuadorian Civic Center of Danbury, Danbury Area Coalition for the Rights of Immigrants.Responses due by 4/30/2009 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit (Exhibit A − Subpoena to JUNTA for Progressive Action), # 3 Exhibit (Exhibit B − Subpoena to Danbury Area Coalition for the Rights of Immigrants), # 4 Exhibit (Exhibit C − Subpoena to Ecuadorian Civic Center of Danbury), # 5 Exhibit (Exhibit D − Subpoena to Unidad Latina en Accion), # 6 Text of Proposed Order)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Lasch, Christopher) (Entered: 04/09/2009)
150 MOTION to Stay re 149 MOTION to Quash [Motion to Stay Discovery as to Movants Pending Resolution of Movants' Motion to Quash] by Junta for Progressive Action Inc, Unidad Latina En Accion, Ecuadorian Civic Center of Danbury, Danbury Area Coalition for the Rights of Immigrants.Responses due by 4/30/2009 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit (Exhibit A − Subpoena to JUNTA for Progressive Action), # 3 Exhibit (Exhibit B − Subpoena to Danbury Area Coalition for the Rights of Immigrants), # 4 Exhibit (Exhibit C − Subpoena to Ecuadorian Civic Center of Danbury), # 5 Exhibit (Exhibit D − Subpoena to Unidad Latina en Accion), # 6 Text of Proposed Order)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Lasch, Christopher) (Entered: 04/09/2009)
151 DEMAND for Trial by Jury by Mark Boughton, Alan Baker, Jose Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, John Does(I/O, 1−8). (Thomas, Clarisse) (Entered: 04/09/2009)
152 MOTION for Protective Order by Junta for Progressive Action Inc, Unidad Latina En Accion, Ecuadorian Civic Center of Danbury, Danbury Area Coalition for the Rights of Immigrants.Responses due by 4/30/2009 [additional relief requested in motion 149]Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Bauer, J.) (Entered: 04/09/2009)
153 ORDER &CALENDAR: The nonparties' motion to stay 150 is denied as moot in light of the defendants' representation that the depositions at issue will not go forward during the pendency of the movants' motions to quash and for protective order. Oral argument on the pending motions is scheduled for 5/20/09 at 10:00 a.m. before Judge Martinez, East Courtroom, U.S. District Court, 450 Main Street, Hartford, CT 06103. All persons entering the courthouse must present photo identification. The scheduling of oral argument does not relieve the opposing party from filing a memorandum in opposition. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 04/09/2009)
154 MOTION for Extension of Time until May 14, 2009 to respond and/or object to Plaintiffs' Request For Production of Documents dated February 13, 2009 by City Of Danbury. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Casagrande, Daniel) (Entered: 04/09/2009)
155 First MOTION for Extension of Time until May 19, 2009 to respond and/or object to Plaintiff Barrera Interrogatory dated March 20, 2009 by City Of Danbury. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Casagrande, Daniel) (Entered: 04/09/2009)
156 First MOTION for Protective Order on All Discovery Requests Regarding Plaintiffs' Immigration Status or Alienage by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez.Responses due by 5/1/2009 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support Memorandum of Law, # 2 Memorandum in Support Local Rule 37 Memo, # 3 Affidavit Rebecca Heller Decl,

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04/13/2009 04/13/2009 04/13/2009 04/15/2009 04/20/2009 04/24/2009
04/24/2009 04/28/2009 04/28/2009
04/29/2009

# 4 Exhibit A, # 5 Exhibit B, # 6 Exhibit C, # 7 Exhibit D, # 8 Exhibit E, # 9 Exhibit F, # 10 Exhibit G, # 11 Exhibit H, # 12 Exhibit I, # 13 Exhibit J, # 14 Exhibit K, # 15 Exhibit L, # 16 Exhibit M, # 17 Exhibit N, # 18 Exhibit O, # 19 Exhibit P, # 20 Exhibit Q, # 21 Exhibit R, # 22 Exhibit S, # 23 Exhibit S, # 24 Exhibit U, # 25 Exhibit V, # 26 Exhibit W)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 04/10/2009)
157 ORDER granting 146 plaintiffs' motion for Extension of Time. Plaintiffs shall disclose their experts by 5/30/09 and their experts shall be deposed by 8/31/09. Defendants' shall disclose their experts by 11/30/09 and their experts shall be deposed by 2/1/10. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 4/13/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 04/13/2009)
158 ORDER granting 154 absent objection defendant City of Danbury's motion for extension of time until 5/14/09 in which to answer and/or object to plaintiffs' request for production dated 2/13/09. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 4/13/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 04/13/2009)
159 ORDER granting 155 absent objection the City of Danbury's Motion for Extension of Time until 5/19/09 in which to answer and/or object to plaintiffs' interrogatories dated 3/20/09. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 4/13/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 04/13/2009)
160 Set Deadlines as to 152 MOTION for Protective Order, 149 MOTION to Quash. Oral argument set for 5/20/2009 10:00 AM in East Courtroom, 450 Main St., Hartford, CT before Judge Donna F. Martinez (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 04/15/2009)
161 MOTION for Extension of Time until 5/14/09 to Respond and/or Object to Plaintiff's Request for Production of Documents dated 2/13/09 158 Order on Motion for Extension of Time, by Mark Boughton, Alan Baker, Jose Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, John Does(I/O, 1−8). Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Arcata, Joseph) (Entered: 04/20/2009)
162 Memorandum in Opposition re 161 MOTION for Extension of Time until 5/14/09 to Respond and/or Object to Plaintiff's Request for Production of Documents dated 2/13/09 158 Order on Motion for Extension of Time, MOTION for Extension of Time until 5/14/09 to Respond and/or Object to Plaintiff's Request for Production of Documents dated 2/13/09 158 Order on Motion for Extension of Time, filed by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 04/24/2009)
163 ORDER granting 161 Motion for Extension of Time. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 4/24/09. (Martinez, Donna) (Entered: 04/24/2009)
164 OBJECTION re: 149 152 MOTION to Quash and for Protective Order to Nonparties' Motion to Quash and for Protective Order filed by Mark Boughton, Alan Baker, Jose Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, John Does(I/O, 1−8). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, Part 1, # 3 Exhibit B, Part 2)(Arcata, Joseph) Links Modified on 4/29/2009 (Bauer, J.). (Entered: 04/28/2009)
165 OBJECTION re: 149 152 MOTION to Quash and for Protective Order to Nonparties Motion to Quash anf for Protective Order filed by Mark Boughton, Alan Baker, Jose Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, John Does(I/O, 1−8). (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support of Objection to Nonparties' Motion to Quash and for Protective Order, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, Part 1, # 4 Exhibit B, Part 2)(Arcata, Joseph) Links Modified on 4/29/2009 (Bauer, J.). (Entered: 04/28/2009)
166 OBJECTION re 152 MOTION for Protective Order, 149 MOTION to Quash to Nonparties' Motion to Quash and For Protective Order filed by City Of Danbury. (Casagrande, Daniel) (Entered: 04/29/2009)

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04/29/2009
04/29/2009
04/30/2009 04/30/2009 04/30/2009 05/04/2009 05/06/2009 05/08/2009
05/11/2009 05/11/2009

167 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on 03.10.09 before Judge Robert N. Chatigny. Court Reporter: Darlene A. Warner. NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. The policy is located on our website at www.ctd.uscourts.gov. Redaction Request due 5/20/2009. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/30/2009. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/28/2009. (Warner, D.) (Entered: 04/29/2009)
168 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on 03.25.09 before Judge Robert N. Chatigny. Court Reporter: Darlene A. Warner. NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. The policy is located on our website at www.ctd.uscourts.gov. Redaction Request due 5/20/2009. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/30/2009. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/28/2009. (Warner, D.) (Entered: 04/29/2009)
169 RESPONSE re 156 First MOTION for Protective Order on All Discovery Requests Regarding Plaintiffs' Immigration Status or Alienage filed by USA, Ronald Preble, Richard McCaffrey, James Brown. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit)(Morabito, Douglas) (Entered: 04/30/2009)
170 MOTION Leave for Law Student Intern to Appear Rebecca Engel by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez.Responses due by 5/21/2009 (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Actual Appearance of Law Student Intern Rebecca Engel)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 04/30/2009)
171 OBJECTION re 156 First MOTION for Protective Order on All Discovery Requests Regarding Plaintiffs' Immigration Status or Alienage filed by Mark Boughton, Alan Baker, Jose Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, John Does(I/O, 1−8). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G)(Thomas, Clarisse) (Entered: 04/30/2009)
172 OBJECTION re 156 First MOTION for Protective Order on All Discovery Requests Regarding Plaintiffs' Immigration Status or Alienage filed by City Of Danbury. (Casagrande, Daniel) (Entered: 05/04/2009)
173 ORDER granting plaintiffs' motion 170 for leave for law student intern REBECCA ENGEL to appear. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 5/6/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 05/06/2009)
174 First MOTION to Compel Discovery of Federal Requests for Production by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez.Responses due by 5/29/2009 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel Discovery, # 2 Certificate of Service, # 3 Exhibit A, # 4 Exhibit B, # 5 Exhibit C, # 6 Exhibit D, # 7 Exhibit E, # 8 Exhibit F, # 9 Exhibit G, # 10 Exhibit H, # 11 Exhibit I, # 12 Exhibit L, # 13 Exhibit K)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Bluestone, Lawrence) (Entered: 05/08/2009)
175 MOTION for Michael Wishnie, Christopher N. Lasch, Ramzi Kassem, Daniel Michaels, Elizabeth Goergen, Joel M. Cohen, Lawrence Bluestone, Sarah Blackman, Siham Nurhussein to Withdraw as Attorney by Jose Duma, Danilo Brito Vargas. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 05/11/2009)
176 MOTION for Protective Order by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez AND ALL DEFENDANTS .Responses due by 6/1/2009 (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Wishnie, Michael) FILERS Modified on 5/12/2009

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05/12/2009
05/13/2009 05/13/2009 05/13/2009
05/14/2009 05/14/2009
05/14/2009 05/14/2009 05/15/2009 05/15/2009 05/15/2009 05/15/2009

(Bauer, J.). (Entered: 05/11/2009)
177 REPLY to Response to 152 MOTION for Protective Order, 149 MOTION to Quash filed by Junta for Progressive Action Inc, Unidad Latina En Accion, Ecuadorian Civic Center of Danbury, Danbury Area Coalition for the Rights of Immigrants. (Attachments: # 1 EXHIBIT A Defendants Requests for Production, Directed to Plaintiffs, # 2 EXHIBIT B Defendants First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production to Juan Barrera, # 3 EXHIBIT C Defendants Objections to Plaintiffs' Request for Production of Documents)(Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 05/12/2009)
178 MOTION for Extension of Time until May 25, 2009 To File Joint Status Report by City Of Danbury. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Casagrande, Daniel) (Entered: 05/13/2009)
179 NOTICE of Appearance by Michael J. Wishnie on behalf of Junta for Progressive Action Inc, Unidad Latina En Accion, Ecuadorian Civic Center of Danbury, Danbury Area Coalition for the Rights of Immigrants (Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 05/13/2009)
180 MOTION for Extension of Time to designate expert witnesses, to produce Fed R. Civ. P 26(a)(2)(B) expert witness reports and to depose expert witnesses by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Michaels, Daniel) (Entered: 05/13/2009)
181 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 05/14/2009)
182 REPLY to Response to 156 First MOTION for Protective Order on All Discovery Requests Regarding Plaintiffs' Immigration Status or Alienage filed by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Heller Declaration, # 2 Exhibit Brown Transcript)(Wishnie, Michael) (Additional attachment(s) added on 5/19/2009: # 3 Replacement Exhibit 2) (S−Walker, J.). (Entered: 05/15/2009)
184 ORDER granting 175 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney − see order for instructions. Attorney Joel M. Cohen; Elizabeth Goergen; Ramzi Kassem; Christopher Nelson Lasch; Daniel Michaels; Siham Nurhussein; Michael J. Wishnie; Sarah Blackman and Lawrence Bluestone terminated. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 5/14/09. (Walker, J.) (Entered: 05/15/2009)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Dismissal due by 6/15/2009 as to plaintiffs Duma and Brito Vargas. See 184 . (Walker, J.) (Entered: 05/15/2009)
183 REPLY to Response to 156 First MOTION for Protective Order on All Discovery Requests Regarding Plaintiffs' Immigration Status or Alienage filed by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 05/15/2009)
185 First MOTION for Extension of Time File Consolidated Motion to Compel by USA, Ronald Preble, Richard McCaffrey, James Brown. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Morabito, Douglas) (Entered: 05/15/2009)
186 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez re 182 Reply to Response to Motion, (Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 05/15/2009)
187 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez re 183 Reply to Response to Motion, (Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 05/15/2009)

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05/15/2009
05/15/2009
05/15/2009
05/18/2009
05/19/2009 05/19/2009 05/19/2009 05/19/2009
05/19/2009 05/19/2009 05/19/2009 05/19/2009 05/19/2009 05/20/2009

188 MOTION to Seal Exhibt 2 to Docket #182, Full Transcript of Brown Deposition, MOTION to Amend/Correct 182 Reply to Response to Motion, Exhibit 2 (Responses due by 6/5/2009, ) by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Excerpts from Brown Deposition Transcript)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 05/15/2009)
189 AFFIDAVIT of Rebecca Heller by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez re 182 Reply to Response to Motion,. (Wishnie, Michael) (Additional attachment(s) added on 5/19/2009: # 1 Exhibit 3) (Bauer, J.). (Entered: 05/15/2009)
190 AFFIDAVIT of Rebecca Heller by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez re 183 Reply to Response to Motion, 182 Reply to Response to Motion,. (Wishnie, Michael) (Additional attachment(s) added on 5/19/2009: # 1 Exhibit 4) (Bauer, J.). (Entered: 05/15/2009)
191 MOTION to Appear Law Student Intern to Appear Rebecca Engel by Junta for Progressive Action Inc, Unidad Latina En Accion, Ecuadorian Civic Center of Danbury, Danbury Area Coalition for the Rights of Immigrants. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Actual Appearance of Law Student Intern Rebecca Engel)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Lasch, Christopher) Motion relief Modified on 5/19/2009 (Bauer, J.). (Entered: 05/18/2009)
192 Docket Entry Correction re 189 Exhibit, 190 Exhibit, (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 3, # 2 Exhibit 4) : Replaced pdfs (Bauer, J.) (Entered: 05/19/2009)
193 ORDER granting 178 absent objection defendant City of Danbury's Motion for Extension of Time until 5/25/09 in which to file a joint status report. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 5/19/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 05/19/2009)
194 ORDER granting 181 plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages in their reply brief. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 5/19/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 05/19/2009)
195 ORDER granting 180 upon consent the plaintiffs' motion for extension of time regarding experts. Plaintiffs' experts must be disclosed by 11/1/09 and deposed by 2/1/10. Defendants' experts must be disclosed by 1/1/10 and deposed by 2/1/10. The discovery deadline of 2/1/10 remains unchanged. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 5/15/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 05/19/2009)
196 MOTION for Susan B. Parzymieso to Withdraw as Attorney by Mark Boughton, Alan Baker, Jose Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, John Does(I/O, 1−8). Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Parzymieso, Susan) (Entered: 05/19/2009)
197 ORDER granting 191 Motion for leave for Law school intern REBECCA ENGEL to appear on behalf of the nonparty movants DACORIM, the Ecuadorian Civic Center, Junta for Progressive Action and Unidad Latina en Accion. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 5/19/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 05/19/2009)
198 ORDER granting 188 Motion to Seal exhibit 2 to document 182 ; granting 188 Motion to replace exhibit 2 to document 182 . Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 5/19/09. (Walker, J.) (Entered: 05/19/2009)
199 Docket Entry Correction re 182 : Exhibit 2 has been replaced. See 189 . (Walker, J.) (Entered: 05/19/2009)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Joint Status Report due by 5/25/2009 (Glynn, T.) (Entered: 05/20/2009)
200 Minute Entry. Proceedings held before Judge Donna F. Martinez: taking under advisement 149 Motion to Quash; taking under advisement 152 Motion for Protective Order; Motion Hearing held on 5/20/2009 re 152 MOTION for Protective Order filed by Junta for Progressive Action Inc, Unidad Latina En

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 59 of 96

05/20/2009 05/20/2009 05/21/2009 05/26/2009 05/26/2009 05/27/2009
05/27/2009 05/27/2009 05/29/2009 05/29/2009
05/29/2009 06/01/2009

Accion, Ecuadorian Civic Center of Danbury, Danbury Area Coalition for the Rights of Immigrants, 149 MOTION to Quash filed by Junta for Progressive Action Inc, Unidad Latina En Accion, Ecuadorian Civic Center of Danbury, Danbury Area Coalition for the Rights of Immigrants. 38 minutes(Court Reporter Sanchez.) (Johnson, D.) (Entered: 05/20/2009)
201 ORDER granting 185 federal defendants' Motion for Extension of Time in which to file a consolidated motion to compel. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 5/20/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 05/20/2009)
202 ORDER granting 196 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Susan B. Parzymieso terminated. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 5/20/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 05/20/2009)
203 DEMAND for Trial by Jury by Ronald Preble, Richard McCaffrey, James Brown. (McConaghy, Michelle) (Entered: 05/21/2009)
204 OBJECTION re 174 First MOTION to Compel Discovery of Federal Requests for Production filed by USA, Ronald Preble, Richard McCaffrey, James Brown. (Morabito, Douglas) (Entered: 05/26/2009)
205 Joint STATUS REPORT by City Of Danbury.AND ALL PARTIES (Casagrande, Daniel) FILERS Modified on 5/27/2009 (Bauer, J.). (Entered: 05/26/2009)
206 ORDER: The nonparties' motion to quash and for a protective order (doc. 149 , 152 ) is granted in part and denied in part. The motion to quash the subpoenas duces tecum is denied; the movants shall produce responsive documents. The motion to quash the deposition subpoenas is granted. The movants are small volunteer community groups who are not parties to this action. On the record before the court, they have met their burden of demonstrating that the depositions would impose an undue burden on them. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 5/27/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 05/27/2009)
207 NOTICE by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez of Service of Order Regarding Motion to Withdraw Appearances as to Plaintiffs Jose Duma and Danilo Brito Vargas (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 05/27/2009)
208 ORDER Setting Hearing on Plaintiffs' 156 motion for Protective Order on all Discovery Requests Regarding Plaintiffs' Immigration Status or Alienage: Motion Hearing set for 6/11/2009 at 1:00 PM in East Courtroom, 450 Main St., Hartford, CT before Judge Donna F. Martinez. All persons entering the courthouse must present photo identification.(Constantine, A.) (Entered: 05/27/2009)
209 ORDER granting 176 the parties' joint motion for a stipulated Protective Order. See attached order. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 5/29/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 05/29/2009)
210 MOTION to Amend/Correct 21 AMENDED COMPLAINT by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez.Responses due by 6/19/2009 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint, Amend the Caption, and Join Additional Defendants, # 2 Proposed Second Amended Complaint)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Wishnie, Michael) Link Modified on 6/1/2009 (Bauer, J.). (Entered: 05/29/2009)
211 MOTION for Joinder by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. [Additional Relief requested in motion 210]Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Bauer, J.) (Entered: 06/01/2009)
212 First MOTION for Extension of Time until 14 Days after Production by Defendant Boughton Deadline for Plaintiffs to File a Motion to Compel by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Lasch, Christopher) (Entered: 06/01/2009)

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06/02/2009 06/05/2009 06/05/2009
06/08/2009
06/08/2009 06/09/2009 06/09/2009 06/09/2009 06/10/2009 06/11/2009 06/12/2009 06/12/2009 06/12/2009

213 ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Donna F. Martinez for ruling on the following pending motions: 211 MOTION for Joinder, 210 First MOTION to Amend/Correct. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 6/2/09. (Walker, J.) (Entered: 06/02/2009)
214 ORDER: The plaintiffs' motion 212 for extension of time in which to file a motion to compel as to defendant Boughton's responses to plaintiff's 4/7/09 requests is granted. Any such motion shall be filed by 7/31/09. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 6/5/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 06/05/2009)
215 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 174 First MOTION to Compel Discovery of Federal Requests for Production until June 12, 2009 by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Goergen, Elizabeth) (Entered: 06/05/2009)
216 ORDER: Oral argument on the plaintiffs' motion (doc. #156) for Protective Order on all Discovery Requests Regarding Plaintiffs' Immigration Status or Alienage is RESCHEDULED from 6/11/2009 to 6/12/09 at 2:45 PM in East Courtroom, 450 Main St., Hartford, CT before Judge Donna F. Martinez. All persons entering the courthouse must present photo identification. Please note new date and time. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 06/08/2009)
Reset Deadlines as to 156 First MOTION for Protective Order on All Discovery Requests Regarding Plaintiffs' Immigration Status or Alienage. Motion Hearing re−set for 6/12/2009 02:45 PM in East Courtroom, 450 Main St., Hartford, CT before Judge Donna F. Martinez (Glynn, T.) (Entered: 06/09/2009)
217 NOTICE of Appearance by David Christopher Nelson on behalf of USA, Ronald Preble, Richard McCaffrey, James Brown, John Does(I/O, 9−14) (Nelson, David) (Entered: 06/09/2009)
218 ORDER granting 215 plaintiffs' motion for Extension of Time until 6/12/09 in which to File a Reply brief in response to the federal defendants' objection (doc. 204) to the plaintiffs' motion to Compel Discovery (doc. #174). Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 6/9/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 06/09/2009)
Set/Reset Deadlines as to 174 First MOTION to Compel Discovery of Federal Requests for Production. Responses due by 6/12/2009 (Glynn, T.) (Entered: 06/11/2009)
219 First MOTION for Extension of Time until 30 days following Court's ruling on Plaintiffs' Motion for Protective Order to file motion to compel by Mark Boughton, Alan Baker, Jose Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, John Does(I/O, 9−14). Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Arcata, Joseph) (Entered: 06/10/2009)
220 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Motion to Compel by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Nurhussein, Siham) (Entered: 06/11/2009)
221 ORDER : Oral argument shall begin at 2:30 p.m. on 6/12/09. PLEASE NOTE NEW TIME. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 6/12/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 06/12/2009)
222 REPLY to Response to 174 First MOTION to Compel Discovery of Federal Requests for Production filed by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Goergen, Elizabeth) (Entered: 06/12/2009)
224 Minute Entry. Proceedings held before Judge Donna F. Martinez: taking under advisement 156 Motion for Protective Order; Motion Hearing held on 6/12/2009 re 156 First MOTION for Protective Order on All Discovery Requests Regarding Plaintiffs' Immigration Status or Alienage filed by Juan Barrera, Juan Carlos

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 61 of 96

06/15/2009
06/16/2009 06/16/2009 06/17/2009 06/17/2009 06/18/2009 06/18/2009 06/18/2009 06/19/2009
06/24/2009 06/30/2009 06/30/2009 06/30/2009

Simbana, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Jose Llibisupa, Edgar Redrovan, Daniel Chavez, Jose Cabrera, Isaac Maldonado, Jose Duma. Total Time: 1 hours and 12 minutes(Court Reporter Sanchez, I. w/Falzarano Court Reporters.) (Glynn, T.) (Entered: 06/16/2009)
223 MOTION for Protective Order on Deposition Transcripts and Videotaped Testimony by Mark Boughton, Alan Baker, Jose Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, John Does(I/O, 1−8).Responses due by 7/6/2009 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Affidavit of Joseph J. Arcata)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Arcata, Joseph) (Entered: 06/15/2009)
225 ORDER granting 219 absent objection the Individual Danbury defendants' Motion for Extension of Time in which to file a motion to compel. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 6/16/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 06/16/2009)
226 ORDER granting 220 absent objection plaintiffs' unopposed Motion for Extension of Time until 7/20/09 in which to file a motion to compel. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 6/16/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 06/16/2009)
227 RESPONSE re 210 First MOTION to Amend/Correct filed by USA, Ronald Preble, Richard McCaffrey, James Brown, John Does(I/O, 9−14). (Nelson, David) (Entered: 06/17/2009)
228 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Prosecution as to plaintiffs Duma and Brito Vargas by USA, Ronald Preble, Richard McCaffrey, James Brown, John Does(I/O, 9−14).Responses due by 7/8/2009 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support)(Nelson, David) (Entered: 06/17/2009)
229 MOTION to Amend/Correct 210 First MOTION to Amend/Correct by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez.Responses due by 7/9/2009 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 06/18/2009)
230 OBJECTION re 210 First MOTION to Amend/Correct filed by Mark Boughton, Alan Baker, Jose Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, John Does(I/O, 1−8). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Thomas, Clarisse) (Entered: 06/18/2009)
231 OBJECTION re 210 First MOTION to Amend/Correct filed by City Of Danbury. (Casagrande, Daniel) (Entered: 06/18/2009)
232 Memorandum in Support re 156 First MOTION for Protective Order on All Discovery Requests Regarding Plaintiffs' Immigration Status or Alienage Supplemental Filing on Specific Discovery Requests filed by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 06/19/2009)
233 REPLY to Response to 210 First MOTION to Amend/Correct filed by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 06/24/2009)
234 MOTION for Protective Order by USA, Ronald Preble, Richard McCaffrey, James Brown.Responses due by 7/21/2009 (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Morabito, Douglas) (Entered: 06/30/2009)
235 MOTION for Christopher N. Lasch to Withdraw as Attorney by Junta for Progressive Action Inc, Unidad Latina En Accion, Ecuadorian Civic Center of Danbury, Danbury Area Coalition for the Rights of Immigrants. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Lasch, Christopher) (Entered: 06/30/2009)
236 MOTION for Christopher N. Lasch to Withdraw as Attorney by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos

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07/02/2009 07/02/2009
07/06/2009 07/06/2009
07/08/2009
07/10/2009
07/13/2009 07/13/2009 07/13/2009 07/16/2009 07/20/2009 07/20/2009 07/27/2009

Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Lasch, Christopher) (Entered: 06/30/2009)
237 ENDORSEMENT ORDER granting 235 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney and 236 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Granted. So ordered. Attorney Christopher Nelson Lasch terminated. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 7/2/09. (Walker, J.) (Entered: 07/02/2009)
238 MOTION TO APPEAR AS LAW STUDENT INTERN by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Law Student Appearance Student Certification and Client Authorization)(Wishnie, Michael) MOTION RELIEF Modified on 7/6/2009 (Bauer, J.). . (Entered: 07/02/2009)
239 ENDORSEMENT ORDER granting 238 Motion to Appear as law student intern as to Lisa Ouellette. Granted. So ordered. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 7/6/09. (Walker, J.) (Entered: 07/06/2009)
240 Memorandum in Opposition re 223 MOTION for Protective Order on Deposition Transcripts and Videotaped Testimony filed by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Declaration of Lisa Ouellette)(Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 07/06/2009)
241 ORDER: A teleconference regarding the plaintiffs' motion to compel (doc. #156) is scheduled for 7/13/09 at 2:30 p.m. Plaintiffs' counsel shall initiate the conference call and shall have opposing counsel on the line when calling chambers at (860) 240 3605. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 7/8/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 07/08/2009)
242 Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition re 156 First MOTION for Protective Order on All Discovery Requests Regarding Plaintiffs' Immigration Status or Alienage filed by Mark Boughton, Alan Baker, Jose Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, John Does(I/O, 1−8). (Arcata, Joseph) (Entered: 07/10/2009)
243 ORDER : The teleconference scheduled for 7/13/09 is regarding the plaintiffs' motion for Protective Order on Plaintiffs' Immigration Status or Alienage (doc. #156)(Constantine, A.) (Entered: 07/13/2009)
244 Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition re 156 First MOTION for Protective Order on All Discovery Requests Regarding Plaintiffs' Immigration Status or Alienage filed by City Of Danbury. (Casagrande, Daniel) (Entered: 07/13/2009)
245 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Donna F. Martinez: Status Conference held on 7/13/2009. −25 minutes (Glynn, T.) (Entered: 07/13/2009)
246 ORDER: For reasons stated on the record on the 7/13/09 teleconference, the plaintiffs' motion for a protective order 156 is denied without prejudice to refiling. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 7/16/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 07/16/2009)
247 Second MOTION for Extension of Time until July 31, 2009 File Motion to Compel by Juan Barrera. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Goergen, Elizabeth) (Entered: 07/20/2009)
248 ORDER granting 247 absent objection plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time in which to file a motion to compel. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 7/20/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 07/20/2009)
249 MOTION for Sarah Blackman, Lawrence Bluestone, and Daniel Michaels of Clifford Chance US LLP to Withdraw as Attorney as counsel for Plaintiffs by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Bluestone, Lawrence) (Entered: 07/27/2009)

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07/28/2009 07/28/2009 07/28/2009 07/28/2009 07/30/2009
07/30/2009 07/31/2009 08/01/2009 08/01/2009

250 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Attorney Jospeh La Perla. Filing Fee $25.00. Receipt Number H028824. by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Gothers, M.) (Entered: 07/30/2009)
251 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Attorney LaShann M. DeArcy. Filing Fee $25.00. Receipt Number H028823. by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Gothers, M.) (Entered: 07/30/2009)
252 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Attorney Anne Coyle. Filing Fee $25.00. Receipt Number H028821. by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Gothers, M.) (Entered: 07/30/2009)
253 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Attorney Bryan Bloom. Filing Fee $25.00. Receipt Number H028822. by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Gothers, M.) (Entered: 07/30/2009)
254 ORDER granting 250 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice Attorney Joseph La Perla for Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera and Daniel Chavez; granting 251 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera and Daniel Chavez added La Shann M. DeArcy ; granting 252 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice Attorney Anne Coyle for Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera and Daniel Chavez ; granting 253 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice Attorney Bryan Bloom for Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera and Daniel Chavez. Signed by Clerk on 7/30/09. (Gothers, M.) Modified on 8/3/2009 to correct spelling attorney's names (Gothers, M.). (Entered: 07/30/2009)
255 ORDER: The motion to withdraw appearance 249 is denied without prejudice for failure to comply with D. Conn. L. Civ. R 7(e). Any new motion shall be signed by the attorney wishing to withdraw and show "that the party whose counsel seeks to withdraw has received actual notice by personal service or by certified mail of the motion to withdraw." Local Rule 7(e).Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 7/30/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 07/30/2009)
256 First MOTION to Compel Danbury Defendants by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez.Responses due by 8/21/2009 Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Nurhussein, Siham) (Entered: 07/31/2009)
257 First Memorandum in Support re 256 First MOTION to Compel Danbury Defendants filed by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Nurhussein, Siham) (Entered: 08/01/2009)
258 AFFIDAVIT re 256 First MOTION to Compel Danbury Defendants Signed By Siham Nurhussein filed by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K, # 12 Exhibit L)(Nurhussein, Siham) (Entered: 08/01/2009)

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08/01/2009 08/05/2009 08/10/2009 08/10/2009 08/10/2009
08/10/2009 08/11/2009 08/11/2009 08/13/2009 08/18/2009 08/19/2009
08/21/2009 08/21/2009

259 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez re 256 First MOTION to Compel Danbury Defendants (Nurhussein, Siham) (Entered: 08/01/2009)
260 Amended EXHIBIT J to Nurhussein Affidavit in Support of the First Motion to Compel by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez re 256 First MOTION to Compel Danbury Defendants. (Nurhussein, Siham) (Entered: 08/05/2009)
261 NOTICE of Appearance by Anne Coyle on behalf of Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez (Coyle, Anne) (Entered: 08/10/2009)
262 ORDER granting 234 Motion for Protective Order. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 8/10/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 08/10/2009)
263 ORDER: The plaintiff's motion to compel 256 is denied without prejudice for failure to comply with D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 37. Any new motion shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law that contains a specific verbatim listing of each of the items of discovery sought, the opposing party's objection and immediately following each specification, the reason why the item should be allowed. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 8/10/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 08/10/2009)
264 MOTION for Ramzi Kassem to Withdraw as Attorney by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Danilo Brito Vargas, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Kassem, Ramzi) (Entered: 08/10/2009)
265 NOTICE of Appearance by Susan Victoria Hazeldean on behalf of Juan Barrera Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana (Hazeldean, Susan) (Entered: 08/11/2009)
266 NOTICE of Appearance by Joseph La Perla on behalf of Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez (La Perla, Joseph) (Entered: 08/11/2009)
267 ORDER granting 264 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Ramzi Kassem terminated. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 8/13/09. (Martinez, Donna) (Entered: 08/13/2009)
268 NOTICE of Appearance by Bryan Bloom on behalf of Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez (Bloom, Bryan) (Entered: 08/18/2009)
269 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on July 13, 2009 before Judge D. Martinez. Court Reporter: I. Sanchez. Type of Hearing: Telephone Conference. NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. The policy is located on our website at www.ctd.uscourts.gov. Redaction Request due 9/9/2009. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/19/2009. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/17/2009. (Sanchez, I.) (Entered: 08/19/2009)
270 MOTION to Amend 253 Motion for Pro Hac Vice − Bryan Bloom by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez.Responses due by 9/11/2009 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Bryan Bloom)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Gothers, M.) (Entered: 08/24/2009)
271 MOTION to Amend 252 Motion to Appear Pro Hav Vice attorney Anne Coyle by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez.Responses due by

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08/21/2009
08/21/2009
08/24/2009 08/24/2009 08/24/2009 08/25/2009 08/27/2009 08/27/2009
08/27/2009 08/27/2009 08/27/2009 08/27/2009 08/27/2009

9/11/2009 (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Anne Coyle)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Gothers, M.) (Entered: 08/24/2009)
272 MOTION to Amend 251 Motion for Pro Hac Vice of attorney LaShann M. DeArcy by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez.Responses due by 9/11/2009 (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit La Shann M. DeArcy)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Gothers, M.) (Entered: 08/25/2009)
273 MOTION to Amend 250 Motion for Pro Hac Vice of attorney Joseph La Perla by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez.Responses due by 9/11/2009 (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Joseph La Perla)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Gothers, M.) (Entered: 08/25/2009)
274 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Attorney Sharon Billington. Filing Fee $25.00. Receipt Number H028988. by Maria−Cinta Lowe, Wilson Hernandez, Lynn Taborsak. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Gothers, M.) (Entered: 08/25/2009)
275 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Attorney Blair Silver. Filing Fee $25.00. Receipt Number H028986 by Maria−Cinta Lowe, Wilson Hernandez, Lynn Taborsak. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Gothers, M.) Modified on 8/26/2009 to edit text with receipt number(Gothers, M.). (Entered: 08/25/2009)
276 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Attorney Simeon Papacostas. Filing Fee $25.00. Receipt Number H028987. by Maria−Cinta Lowe, Wilson Hernandez, Lynn Taborsak. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Gothers, M.) (Entered: 08/25/2009)
277 ORDER granting 274 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice Sharon Billington; granting 275 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice Blair Silver; granting 276 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice Simeon Papcostas. Signed by Clerk on 8/25/09. (Gothers, M.) (Entered: 08/25/2009)
278 Emergency MOTION for Protective Order Forbidding Inquiry Into Plaintiffs Immigration Status and Alienage at Depositions of Three Non−Parties by Juan Barrera.Responses due by 9/17/2009 Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Goergen, Elizabeth) (Entered: 08/27/2009)
279 Memorandum in Support re 278 Emergency MOTION for Protective Order Forbidding Inquiry Into Plaintiffs Immigration Status and Alienage at Depositions of Three Non−Parties filed by Juan Barrera. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit G, # 7 Exhibit G)(Goergen, Elizabeth) (Entered: 08/27/2009)
280 Memorandum in Support re 278 Emergency MOTION for Protective Order Forbidding Inquiry Into Plaintiffs Immigration Status and Alienage at Depositions of Three Non−Parties and Pursuant to Local Rule 37(b) filed by Juan Barrera. (Goergen, Elizabeth) (Entered: 08/27/2009)
281 AFFIDAVIT re 279 Memorandum in Support of Motion, Declaration Signed By Elizabeth Goergen filed by Juan Barrera. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Goergen, Elizabeth) (Entered: 08/27/2009)
282 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Juan Barrera re 278 Emergency MOTION for Protective Order Forbidding Inquiry Into Plaintiffs Immigration Status and Alienage at Depositions of Three Non−Parties (Goergen, Elizabeth) (Entered: 08/27/2009)
283 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Juan Barrera re 279 Memorandum in Support of Motion, (Goergen, Elizabeth) (Entered: 08/27/2009)
284 MOTION for Protective Order Regarding Discovery Requests on Immigration Status and Alienage by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez.Responses due by 9/17/2009 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support Memorandum of Law in Support of Renewed Motion for Protective Order,

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08/29/2009
08/31/2009 08/31/2009 08/31/2009 08/31/2009 08/31/2009 09/02/2009 09/02/2009 09/02/2009
09/02/2009

# 2 Affidavit Heller Declaration in Support of Renewed Motion for Protective Order, # 3 Exhibit Ex. A, # 4 Exhibit B, # 5 Exhibit Ex C, # 6 Exhibit Ex D, # 7 Exhibit Ex E, # 8 Exhibit Ex F, # 9 Exhibit Ex G, # 10 Exhibit Ex H, # 11 Exhibit Ex I, # 12 Exhibit Ex J, # 13 Exhibit Ex K, # 14 Exhibit Ex L, # 15 Exhibit Ex M, # 16 Exhibit Ex N, # 17 Exhibit Ex O, # 18 Exhibit Ex P, # 19 Exhibit Ex Q, # 20 Exhibit Ex R, # 21 Exhibit Ex S, # 22 Exhibit Ex T, # 23 Exhibit Ex U, # 24 Exhibit Ex V, # 25 Exhibit Ex W, # 26 Exhibit Ex X, # 27 Exhibit Ex Y, # 28 Exhibit Ex Z, # 29 Exhibit Ex AA, # 30 Exhibit Ex BB, # 31 Exhibit Ex CC, # 32 Exhibit Ex DD)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 08/27/2009)
285 Emergency MOTION for Protective Order Forbidding Inquiry into Plaintiffs' Immigration Status and Alienage at Plaintiff Depositions by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez.Responses due by 9/19/2009 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Protective Order, # 2 Memorandum in Support Rule 37 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Protective Order, # 3 Affidavit Declaration of Michael Wishnie in Support of Motion for Protective Order, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit A to Motion for Protective Order, # 5 Exhibit Exhibit B to Motion for Protective Order, # 6 Exhibit Exhibit C to Motion for Protective Order, # 7 Exhibit Exhibit D to Motion for Protective Order)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(La Perla, Joseph) (Entered: 08/29/2009)
286 MOTION for Protective Order by Maria−Cinta Lowe, Wilson Hernandez, Lynn Taborsak.Responses due by 9/21/2009 Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Silver, Blair) (Entered: 08/31/2009)
287 Memorandum in Support re 286 MOTION for Protective Order filed by Maria−Cinta Lowe, Wilson Hernandez, Lynn Taborsak. (Silver, Blair) (Entered: 08/31/2009)
288 Memorandum in Support re 286 MOTION for Protective Order Pursuant to Local Rule 37(b) filed by Maria−Cinta Lowe, Wilson Hernandez, Lynn Taborsak. (Silver, Blair) (Entered: 08/31/2009)
289 AFFIDAVIT re 286 MOTION for Protective Order Signed By Blair Silver filed by Maria−Cinta Lowe, Wilson Hernandez, Lynn Taborsak. (Silver, Blair) (Entered: 08/31/2009)
290 ENDORSEMENT ORDER granting 228 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Prosecution as to plaintiffs Duma and Vargas. Granted absent opposition. So ordered. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 8/31/09. (Walker, J.) (Entered: 09/01/2009)
291 ORDER: The plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend 210 , motion for joinder 211 and supplement 229 are granted as set forth in the court's ruling. The plaintiffs shall file a Second Amended Complaint in conformity with the court's order. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 9/2/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 09/02/2009)
292 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents and to Obtain Costs from the City of Danbury and Individual Danburt Defendants by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez.Responses due by 9/23/2009 (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Nurhussein, Siham) (Entered: 09/02/2009)
293 Memorandum in Support re 292 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents and to Obtain Costs from the City of Danbury and Individual Danburt Defendants filed by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H)(Nurhussein, Siham) (Entered: 09/02/2009)
294 AFFIDAVIT re 292 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents and to Obtain Costs from the City of Danbury and Individual Danburt Defendants − Declaration

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09/02/2009 09/03/2009 09/04/2009
09/10/2009 09/10/2009 09/11/2009 09/15/2009 09/15/2009 09/15/2009 09/16/2009

in Support Signed By Siham Nurhussein filed by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K)(Nurhussein, Siham) (Entered: 09/02/2009)
295 MOTION for Cost and Fees by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez.Responses due by 9/23/2009 [additional relief requested in motion 292]Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Bauer, J.) (Entered: 09/03/2009)
296 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez re 294 Affidavit,, (Nurhussein, Siham) (Entered: 09/03/2009)
297 ORDER: In the plaintiffs' "emergency motion 285 for a protective order," the plaintiffs seek a prophylactic ruling that certain areas of inquiry that is, plaintiff's immigration status and alienage not be permitted at their depositions on the grounds that such inquiry is oppressive, not relevant and would prejudice them because the information could be used against them in immigration proceedings. The plaintiffs also seek an order staying the depositions pending resolution of their motion. (Doc. #285 at 8.) The motion for a protective order is denied without prejudice and the motion for a stay of depositions is denied. Under the circumstances of this case, the court declines to issue a protective order in the absence of a record indicating the specific questions to which the plaintiffs object and the basis of the objection. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c)(2); 7 Moores' Federal Practice §30.43 2 (3rd ed.) (outlining procedure and stating that when a deponent refuses to answer, counsel should make a record that will permit meaningful judicial evaluation upon motion after the deposition has concluded). Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 9/4/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 09/04/2009)
298 RESPONSE re 286 MOTION for Protective Order, 278 Emergency MOTION for Protective Order Forbidding Inquiry Into Plaintiffs Immigration Status and Alienage at Depositions of Three Non−Parties filed by USA, Ronald Preble, Richard McCaffrey, James Brown. (Morabito, Douglas) (Entered: 09/10/2009)
299 REPLY to Response to 286 MOTION for Protective Order, 278 Emergency MOTION for Protective Order Forbidding Inquiry Into Plaintiffs Immigration Status and Alienage at Depositions of Three Non−Parties filed by Maria−Cinta Lowe, Wilson Hernandez, Lynn Taborsak. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit, # 2 Exhibit)(Silver, Blair) (Entered: 09/10/2009)
300 REPLY to Response to 286 MOTION for Protective Order filed by USA, Ronald Preble, Richard McCaffrey, James Brown, John Does(I/O, 9−14). (Nelson, David) (Entered: 09/11/2009)
301 RESPONSE re 284 MOTION for Protective Order Regarding Discovery Requests on Immigration Status and Alienage filed by USA, Ronald Preble, Richard McCaffrey, James Brown. (Morabito, Douglas) (Entered: 09/15/2009)
302 First MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 292 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents and to Obtain Costs from the City of Danbury and Individual Danburt Defendants until October 23, 2009 by City Of Danbury. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Casagrande, Daniel) (Entered: 09/15/2009)
303 OBJECTION re 284 MOTION for Protective Order Regarding Discovery Requests on Immigration Status and Alienage filed by Mark Boughton, Alan Baker, Jose Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, John Does(I/O, 1−8). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D)(Thomas, Clarisse) (Entered: 09/15/2009)
304 First MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 292 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents and to Obtain Costs from the City of Danbury and Individual Danburt Defendants until October 23, 2009 by Mark Boughton, Alan Baker, Jose Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 68 of 96

09/16/2009 09/17/2009 09/17/2009 09/17/2009 09/17/2009 09/17/2009 09/17/2009 09/17/2009 09/22/2009 09/22/2009
09/29/2009 09/29/2009

Martin, Joseph Norkus, John Does(I/O, 1−8). Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Arcata, Joseph) (Entered: 09/16/2009)
305 MOTION to Seal Exhibit B to Doc 303 on Court Docket by Mark Boughton, Alan Baker, Jose Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, John Does(I/O, 1−8). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit REDACTED Exhibit B)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Thomas, Clarisse) (Entered: 09/16/2009)
Docket Entry Correction re 303 Exhibit B − sealed pursuant to judge's order granting protective order 209 re Motion for Protective Order 176 . (Gothers, M.) (Entered: 09/17/2009)
306 OBJECTION re 284 MOTION for Protective Order Regarding Discovery Requests on Immigration Status and Alienage filed by City Of Danbury. (Burke, David) (Entered: 09/17/2009)
308 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Attorney Kenneth Juan Figueroa. Filing Fee $25. Receipt Number H029172. by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit)Motions referred to Magistrate Judge Donna F. Martinez(Ferguson, L.) (Entered: 09/22/2009)
309 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Attorney Rachel A. Lavery. Filing Fee $25. Receipt Number H029170. by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit)Motions referred to Magistrate Judge Donna F. Martinez(Ferguson, L.) (Entered: 09/22/2009)
310 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Attorney Alison B. Schary. Filing Fee $25. Receipt Number H029169. by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit)Motions referred to Magistrate Judge Donna F. Martinez(Ferguson, L.) (Entered: 09/22/2009)
311 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Attorney Ladan F. Stewart. Filing Fee $25. Receipt Number H029171. by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit)Motions referred to Magistrate Judge Donna F. Martinez(Ferguson, L.) (Entered: 09/22/2009)
312 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Attorney Yeeta Yeger. Filing Fee $25. Receipt Number H029173. by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit)Motions referred to Magistrate Judge Donna F. Martinez(Ferguson, L.) (Entered: 09/22/2009)
307 ORDER granting 302 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response to 292 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents and to Obtain Costs from the City of Danbury and Individual Danbury Defendants Responses due by 10/23/2009. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 9/22/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 09/22/2009)
313 ORDER granting 308 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Attorney Kenneth Juan Figueroa; granting 309 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Attorney Rachel A. Lavery; granting 310 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Attorney Alison B. Schary; granting 311 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Attorney Ladan F. Stewart; granting 312 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Attorney Yeeta Yeger. Signed by Clerk on 9/22/09. (Ferguson, L.) (Entered: 09/22/2009)
314 MOTION to Compel by USA, Ronald Preble, Richard McCaffrey, James Brown.Responses due by 10/20/2009 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Affidavit, # 3 Exhibit)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Morabito, Douglas) (Entered: 09/29/2009)
315 MOTION for Leave to Appeal for Student Appearance by Jose Llibisupa, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Appearance of

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09/30/2009 10/01/2009 10/01/2009 10/01/2009 10/01/2009 10/02/2009 10/05/2009 10/06/2009 10/07/2009
10/08/2009

Law Student Interns Chesa Boudin, Sophie Hood, Lindsay Nash, and Helen O'Reilly)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 09/29/2009)
316 REPLY to Response to 284 MOTION for Protective Order Regarding Discovery Requests on Immigration Status and Alienage filed by Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 09/30/2009)
317 AMENDED COMPLAINT (Second Amended Complaint) against all defendants, filed by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Mitchell Weston, Julio Lopes &Luis Ramos . (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Certificate of Service)(Wishnie, Michael) Modified on 10/19/2009 − added Weston, Lopez &Ramos to text of pleading (Gothers, M.). (Entered: 10/01/2009)
318 NOTICE by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Duma, Danilo Brito Vargas re 317 Amended Complaint, Notice of Filing Second Amended Complaint (Wishnie, Michael) Modified on 10/5/2009 − to include additional filers (Gothers, M.). (Entered: 10/01/2009)
319 STIPULATION of Dismissal Plaintiffs' Sixteenth Claim for Relief, Second Amended Complaint, by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 10/01/2009)
320 REPLY to Response to 284 MOTION for Protective Order Regarding Discovery Requests on Immigration Status and Alienage Reply to City of Danbury Response filed by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 10/01/2009)
321 MOTION for Extension of Time until November 16, 2009 to Respond to Plaintiffs' Discovery Requests dated July 28, 2009 by James A. Fisher. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Thomas, Clarisse) (Entered: 10/02/2009)
323 ORDER re 319 Stipulation of Dismissal to partially dismiss plaintiffs' Sixteenth Claim for Relief, filed by Juan Barrera, Juan Carlos Simbana, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Jose Llibisupa, Edgar Redrovan, Daniel Chavez, Jose Cabrera, Isaac Maldonado. Approved. So ordered. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 10/2/09. (Gothers, M.) (Entered: 10/07/2009)
322 First RESPONSE re 321 MOTION for Extension of Time until November 16, 2009 to Respond to Plaintiffs' Discovery Requests dated July 28, 2009 Request for Stay of Adjudication Pending Conferral filed by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 10/06/2009)
324 RESPONSE re 321 MOTION for Extension of Time until November 16, 2009 to Respond to Plaintiffs' Discovery Requests dated July 28, 2009 OPPOSING MOTION AND STIPULATING TO EXTENSION OF 14 DAYS filed by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Declaration of Rebecca Heller, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit A Lopez Deposition Excerpts, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit B Brown Depo Excerpts, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit C Aogosto Rog Excerpts, # 5 Exhibit Fisher Objections to July 28 Rogs)(Wishnie, Michael) (Additional attachment(s) added on 10/9/2009: # 6 corrected opposition) (Gothers, M.). (Entered: 10/07/2009)
328 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Attorney Jacob S. Sherkow. Filing Fee $25.00. Receipt Number H029325. by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Gothers, M.) (Entered: 10/15/2009)

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10/09/2009 10/09/2009 10/13/2009 10/13/2009
10/15/2009 10/15/2009 10/19/2009 10/19/2009 10/20/2009 10/21/2009
10/24/2009
10/27/2009
10/28/2009 10/28/2009 10/28/2009

Docket Entry Correction re 324 Response modified: attorney wanted pdf replaced. Minor corrections to the replaced opposition. (Gothers, M.) (Entered: 10/09/2009)
Summons Issued as to George Sullivan, Jim Martin, Bruce Chadbourne, Mitchell Weston, Luis Ramos, Julio Lopez. (Brown, S.) (Entered: 10/20/2009)
325 NOTICE of Appearance by William N. Wright on behalf of Mark Boughton, Alan Baker, Jose Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, John Does(I/O, 1−8), John Does(I/O, 9−14) (Wright, William) (Entered: 10/13/2009)
326 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 314 MOTION to Compel until November 3, 2009 by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 10/13/2009)
327 NOTICE of Appearance by Kim E. Nolan on behalf of City Of Danbury (Nolan, Kim) (Entered: 10/15/2009)
329 ORDER granting 328 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice of attorney Jacob S. Sherkow. Signed by Clerk on 10/15/09. (Gothers, M.) (Entered: 10/15/2009)
Docket Entry Correction re 317 Amended Complaint modified: Clerk has added 3 additonal parties; Mitchell Weston, Julio Lopez &Luis Ramos (Gothers, M.) (Entered: 10/19/2009)
Summons Issued as to George Sullivan. (Kelsey, N.) (Entered: 10/19/2009)
330 ORDER granting 326 plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time to File Response to federal defendants' motion to 314 Compel. Responses due by 11/3/2009. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 10/20/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 10/20/2009)
331 Second MOTION for Extension of Time until October 30, 2009 To Respond To Plaintiffs' Motion To Compel 292 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents and to Obtain Costs from the City of Danbury and Individual Danburt Defendants, 293 Memorandum in Support of Motion, 294 Affidavit,, 295 MOTION for Cost and Fees by Mark Boughton, Alan Baker, Jose Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, City Of Danbury. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Casagrande, Daniel) (Entered: 10/21/2009)
332 First MOTION for Extension of Time until November 13, 2009 TO MOVE TO COMPEL INDIVIDUAL DANBURY DEFENDANTS RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS INTERROGATORIES DATED JULY 28, 2009 by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 10/24/2009)
336 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Attorney Johanna Coats. Filing Fee $25.00. Receipt Number H029442. by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Gothers, M.) (Entered: 10/28/2009)
333 ORDER granting 331 absent objection Danbury defendants' Motion for Extension of Time until 10/30/09 in which to file a response to the plaintiffs' 9/2/09 motion to compel. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 10/28/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 10/28/2009)
334 ORDER granting 332 plaintiffs' unopposed Motion for Extension of Time until 11/13/09 in which to file a motion to compel the individual Danbury defendants' responses to plaintiffs' discovery requests. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 10/28/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 10/28/2009)
335 ORDER: The defendant Fisher's motion 321 for an extension of time in which to respond to the plaintiffs' discovery requests is granted in part and denied in part. The defendant's responses are due 11/9/09. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 10/28/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 10/28/2009)

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10/28/2009 10/28/2009 10/28/2009 10/28/2009 10/29/2009
10/30/2009
11/02/2009
11/03/2009 11/03/2009 11/05/2009
11/05/2009 11/09/2009 11/09/2009 11/09/2009 11/09/2009

337 ORDER granting 336 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice attorney Johanna Coats. Signed by Clerk on 10/28/09. (Gothers, M.) (Entered: 10/28/2009)
338 Memorandum in Opposition re 292 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents and to Obtain Costs from the City of Danbury and Individual Danburt Defendants, 295 MOTION for Cost and Fees filed by City Of Danbury. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Cases)(Casagrande, Daniel) (Entered: 10/28/2009)
339 AFFIDAVIT re 338 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion, filed by City Of Danbury. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit)(Casagrande, Daniel) (Entered: 10/28/2009)
Set/Reset Deadlines as to 292 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents and to Obtain Costs from the City of Danbury and Individual Danbury Defendants. Responses due by 10/30/2009. (Walker, J.) (Entered: 10/30/2009)
340 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time until May 1, 2010, June 1, 2010, September 1, 2010, September 1, 2010, December 1, 2010 Schedule for Fact and Expert Discovery by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Bloom, Bryan) (Entered: 10/29/2009)
341 Memorandum in Opposition re 292 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents and to Obtain Costs from the City of Danbury and Individual Danburt Defendants filed by Jim Martin, Mitchell Weston, Luis Ramos, Julio Lopez, Mark Boughton, Alan Baker, Jose Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, John Does(I/O, 1−8). (Arcata, Joseph) (Entered: 10/30/2009)
342 Second MOTION for Extension of Time until 11/05/09 to respond to 314 MOTION to Compel by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 11/02/2009)
343 ORDER granting 342 Motion for Extension of Time. The plaintiffs' response shall be filed on or before 11/5/09. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 11/3/09. (Turner, M.) (Entered: 11/03/2009)
Reset Deadlines as to 314 MOTION to Compel. Responses due by 11/5/2009. (Walker, J.) (Entered: 11/05/2009)
344 First MOTION for Extension of Time until December 7, 2009 to file a renewed Motion for a Protective Order and review and sign transcripts from deposition of J. Simbana by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Goergen, Elizabeth) (Entered: 11/05/2009)
345 Memorandum in Opposition re 314 MOTION to Compel filed by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 11/05/2009)
346 ORDER granting 315 Motion for Leave for Law Student Interns to Appear. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 11/9/09. (Martinez, Donna) (Entered: 11/09/2009)
347 ORDER : The individual Danbury defendants' motion 304 to join the City of Danbury's motion for extension of time (doc. #302) in which to respond to the plaintiffs' motion to compel is granted nunc pro tunc. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 11/9/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 11/09/2009)
348 ORDER granting 305 Individual Danbury Defendants' Motion to Seal and Replace Exhibit B to Document 303 on the court docket. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 11/9/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 11/09/2009)
349 MOTION for Extension of Time until November 25, 2009 to file Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of the Motion to Compel and for Excess pages for Consolidated Reply by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar

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11/10/2009 11/10/2009
11/11/2009 11/11/2009 11/11/2009 11/11/2009 11/11/2009 11/12/2009 11/13/2009 11/13/2009 11/13/2009 11/13/2009 11/17/2009 11/18/2009
11/18/2009

Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Nurhussein, Siham) (Entered: 11/09/2009)
350 ORDER Setting Hearing on Motion: Oral argument on Plaintiff's motion to compel 174 directed at Federal Defendants is scheduled for 12/9/2009 at 10:30 AM in East Courtroom, 450 Main St., Hartford, CT before Judge Donna F. Martinez. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 11/10/2009)
351 Second MOTION for Extension of Time until 11/20/2009 Motion to Compel Responses from Individual Danbury Defendants by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 11/10/2009)
352 NOTICE of Appearance by Charles A. Deluca on behalf of Mitchell Weston, Luis Ramos, Julio Lopez (Deluca, Charles) (Entered: 11/11/2009)
353 NOTICE of Appearance by Jospeh J. Arcata on behalf of Mitchell Weston, Luis Ramos, Julio Lopez (Deluca, Charles) Modified on 11/16/2009 − edited text to read the correct attorney appearing o/b/o the three defendants (Gothers, M.). (Entered: 11/11/2009)
354 NOTICE of Appearance by William N. Wright on behalf of Mitchell Weston, Luis Ramos, Julio Lopez (Wright, William) (Entered: 11/11/2009)
355 NOTICE of Appearance by Clarisse Nicole Thomas on behalf of Mitchell Weston, Luis Ramos, Julio Lopez (Thomas, Clarisse) (Entered: 11/11/2009)
356 NOTICE of Appearance by Joseph J. Arcata, III on behalf of Mitchell Weston, Luis Ramos, Julio Lopez (Arcata, Joseph) (Entered: 11/11/2009)
357 ORDER : Oral argument on the individual defendants' motion for protective order (doc.# 223) is scheduled for 12/9/2009 at 10:30 AM in East Courtroom, 450 Main St., Hartford, CT before Judge Donna F. Martinez. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 11/12/2009)
358 ORDER : The plaintiffs' motion 349 for an extension of time until 11/25/09 in which to file a reply brief to their motion to compel (doc. #292) and for leave to file a 20 page reply brief is granted. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 11/13/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 11/13/2009)
359 ORDER granting 344 Plaintiffs' Motion for Extension of Time until 12/7/09 in which to file a renewed motion for a protective order as to plaintiff Simbana. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 11/13/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 11/13/2009)
360 ORDER granting 351 plaintiffs' unopposed Motion for Extension of Time until 11/20/09 in which to file a motion to compel as to the individual Danbury defendants' responses to plaintiff's discovery requests dated 7/28/09. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 11/13/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 11/13/2009)
361 Set/Reset Deadlines as to 292 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents and to Obtain Costs from the City of Danbury and Individual Danburt Defendants. Responses due by 11/25/2009 (Glynn, T.) (Entered: 11/13/2009)
362 Supplemental AFFIDAVIT re 292 as to 339 Affidavit Declaration of Daniel E. Casagrande as to [ filed by City Of Danbury. (Casagrande, Daniel) Modified on 11/18/2009 − linked to appropriate motion (Gothers, M.). (Entered: 11/17/2009)
363 MOTION to Compel the Deposition Testimony of Defendant George Sullivan by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez.Responses due by 12/9/2009 (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Nurhussein, Siham) (Entered: 11/18/2009)
364 Memorandum in Support re 363 MOTION to Compel the Deposition Testimony of Defendant George Sullivan filed by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 73 of 96

11/18/2009 11/19/2009 11/20/2009 11/20/2009 11/20/2009
11/24/2009 11/25/2009 11/25/2009 12/01/2009

Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Sullivan Transcript, # 2 Exhibit B − Molfese v Fairfaxx, # 3 Exhibit C − Miller v Praxair, # 4 Exhibit D − Moore v. City of New York, # 5 Exhibit E − Giles v. Coughlin, # 6 Exhibit F − Namoury v. Tibbets, # 7 Exhibit G − Fiero Bros. v. Mishkin, # 8 Exhibit H − Luc Vets Diamant v. Akush, # 9 Exhibit I − Bristol−Myers v. Rhone Poulenc, # 10 Exhibit J − Pugliese v. United Technologies Corp)(Nurhussein, Siham) (Entered: 11/18/2009)
365 AFFIDAVIT re 363 MOTION to Compel the Deposition Testimony of Defendant George Sullivan − Declaration Signed By Siham Nurhussein filed by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Nurhussein, Siham) (Entered: 11/18/2009)
366 ORDER granting 270 Motion to Amend/Correct; granting 271 Motion to Amend/Correct; granting 272 Motion to Amend/Correct; granting 273 Motion to Amend/Correct. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 11/19/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 11/19/2009)
367 MOTION to Compel Individual Danbury Defendants' Responses to Plaintiffs' Interrogatories Dated July 28, 2009 by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez.Responses due by 12/11/2009 Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 11/20/2009)
368 Memorandum in Support re 367 MOTION to Compel Individual Danbury Defendants' Responses to Plaintiffs' Interrogatories Dated July 28, 2009 filed by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9)(Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 11/20/2009)
369 AFFIDAVIT re 367 MOTION to Compel Individual Danbury Defendants' Responses to Plaintiffs' Interrogatories Dated July 28, 2009 Signed By Chesa Boudin filed by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K, # 12 Exhibit L, # 13 Exhibit M, # 14 Exhibit N, # 15 Exhibit O, # 16 Exhibit P, # 17 Exhibit Q, # 18 Exhibit R, # 19 Exhibit S, # 20 Exhibit T)(Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 11/20/2009)
370 MOTION for Extension of Time until December 28, 2009 Move to Compel Depo Responses of Pl Juan Carlos Simbana by Mitchell Weston, Luis Ramos, Julio Lopez, Mark Boughton, Alan Baker, Jose Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, John Does(I/O, 1−8). Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Deluca, Charles) (Entered: 11/24/2009)
371 REPLY to Response to 292 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents and to Obtain Costs from the City of Danbury and Individual Danburt Defendants filed by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Certificate of Service)(Nurhussein, Siham) (Entered: 11/25/2009)
372 AFFIDAVIT re 292 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents and to Obtain Costs from the City of Danbury and Individual Danburt Defendants − Supplemental Declaration in Support Signed By Siham Nurhussein filed by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Nurhussein, Siham) (Entered: 11/25/2009)
373 NOTICE of Appearance by Daniel E. Casagrande on behalf of Mark Boughton (Casagrande, Daniel) (Entered: 12/01/2009)

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12/03/2009 12/04/2009 12/04/2009
12/04/2009 12/07/2009 12/08/2009 12/08/2009 12/09/2009 12/09/2009 12/09/2009 12/09/2009
12/11/2009 12/11/2009

374 ORDER granting 370 absent objection the Individual Danbury defendants' Motion for Extension of Time until 12/28/09 in which to move to compel the deposition responses of plaintiff Simbana. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 12/3/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 12/03/2009)
375 Second MOTION for Extension of Time until January 6, 2010 to file a renewed Motion for a Protective Order regarding deposition testimony by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Goergen, Elizabeth) (Entered: 12/04/2009)
376 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. Mitchell Weston served on 11/5/2009, answer due 11/26/2009; Luis Ramos served on 11/5/2009, answer due 11/26/2009; Julio Lopez served on 11/5/2009, answer due 11/26/2009. (Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 12/04/2009)
377 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. George Sullivan served on 10/19/2009, answer due 12/18/2009. (Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 12/04/2009)
378 MOTION to Dismiss by George Sullivan, Jim Martin, Bruce Chadbourne, Ronald Preble, Richard McCaffrey, James Brown.Responses due by 12/28/2009 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support)(Morabito, Douglas) (Entered: 12/07/2009)
379 NOTICE of Appearance by William N. Wright on behalf of Joseph Norkus (Wright, William) (Entered: 12/08/2009)
380 MOTION for William N. Wright, Esq. to Withdraw as Attorney John Does 9−14 only by John Does(I/O, 9−14). Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Wright, William) (Entered: 12/08/2009)
381 ORDER granting 375 Motion for Extension of Time. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 12/9/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 12/09/2009)
382 First MOTION for Extension of Time until December 19, 2009 to File Response/Reply re 363 MOTION to Compel the Deposition Testimony of Defendant George Sullivan by George Sullivan. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Morabito, Douglas)MOTION RELIEF Modified on 12/10/2009 (Bauer, J.). (Entered: 12/09/2009)
383 First MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 378 MOTION to Dismiss until February 1, 2010 by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 12/09/2009)
384 Minute Entry. Proceedings held before Judge Donna F. Martinez: taking under advisement 174 Motion to Compel; taking under advisement 223 Motion for Protective Order; Motion Hearing held on 12/9/2009 re 223 MOTION for Protective Order on Deposition Transcripts and Videotaped Testimony filed by Alan Baker, James Lalli, Jose Agosto, James A. Fisher, Mark Boughton, Craig Martin, John Does, Joseph Norkus, Richard DeJesus, 174 First MOTION to Compel Discovery of Federal Requests for Production filed by Juan Barrera, Juan Carlos Simbana, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Jose Llibisupa, Edgar Redrovan, Daniel Chavez, Jose Cabrera, Isaac Maldonado, Jose Duma. Total Time: 1 hour and 25 minutes(Court Reporter FTR.) (Wood, R.) (Entered: 12/10/2009)
385 ORDER granting 382 the federal defendants' Motion for Extension of Time until 12/19/09 in which to file a response to the plaintiff's motion to compel as to George Sullivan. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 12/11/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 12/11/2009)
386 ORDER The individual Danbury defendants' motion for protective order 223 is granted in part and denied in part. The plaintiffs shall redact sensitive personal

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12/11/2009 12/11/2009
12/11/2009 12/11/2009 12/14/2009 12/14/2009 12/14/2009 12/18/2009
12/18/2009 12/18/2009 12/18/2009

identifying information from all defendant police officers' deposition transcripts. As to the three defendant officers currently working undercover, the parties have resolved their dispute. The plaintiffs agree to keep confidential the videos of their depositions. As to the remaining police officers, the plaintiffs shall keep confidential deposition videos of any officer who has worked undercover in the past or is reasonably likely to work undercover in the future. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 12/11/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 12/11/2009)
387 ORDER granting 380 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney William N. Wright terminated for defendants John Does 9 −14. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 12/11/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 12/11/2009)
388 MOTION for Extension of Time until December 31, 2009 to Respond to 367 MOTION to Compel Individual Danbury Defendants' Responses to Plaintiffs' Interrogatories Dated July 28, 2009, 368 Memorandum in Support of Motion, 369 Affidavit,, by Jose Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Thomas, Clarisse) (Entered: 12/11/2009)
Reset Deadlines as to 363 MOTION to Compel the Deposition Testimony of Defendant George Sullivan. Responses due by 12/19/2009 (Gothers, M.) (Entered: 12/14/2009)
Set/Reset Deadlines as to 367 MOTION to Compel Individual Danbury Defendants' Responses to Plaintiffs' Interrogatories Dated July 28, 2009. Responses due by 12/31/2009 (Wood, R.) (Entered: 12/14/2009)
389 ORDER re 383 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response re 378 MOTION to Dismiss Responses due by 2/1/2010. Granted. So ordered. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 12/11/09. (Gothers, M.) (Entered: 12/14/2009)
Set/Reset Deadlines as to 367 MOTION to Compel Individual Danbury Defendants' Responses to Plaintiffs' Interrogatories Dated July 28, 2009. Responses due by 12/19/2009 (Wood, R.) (Entered: 12/21/2009)
Docket Entry Correction re Set Motion and Rcmd Ruling Deadlines/Hearings as to Doc. #367 back to original response date of 12/19/09, because the Court has not ruled on this motion. (Wood, R.) (Entered: 12/21/2009)
390 ORDER: The plaintiffs' motion to compel 174 a response to request for production 12 is granted in part and denied in part. The court notes that the request at issue subsequently was revised. The revised request was not included in the papers; rather, it was presented to the court during oral argument. As to the modified request, any documents which concern or include allegations similar to those in this lawsuit shall be disclosed. For any responsive documents the defendants contend should not be produced on the grounds that the allegations are dissimilar to those in this case, the defendants shall: (1) Bates stamp the documents; (2) provide a list identifying the documents and the corresponding Bates stamp numbers to the plaintiff and (3) as suggested by the parties, submit the documents to the court for in camera review. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 12/18/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 12/18/2009)
391 ORDER Setting Hearing on the federal defendants' motion 314 to Compel and the plaintiffs' motion 284 for Protective Order Regarding Discovery Requests on Immigration Status and Alienage : oral argument is scheduled for 1/22/2010 at 1:00 PM in East Courtroom, 450 Main St., Hartford, CT before Judge Donna F. Martinez(Constantine, A.) (Entered: 12/18/2009)
392 ORDER: The parties' joint motion 340 for an extension of time is granted. The court will permit some extension of time and will hear the parties on how much to permit at oral argument on 1/22/10. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 12/18/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 12/18/2009)
393 ORDER Setting Hearing on 292 Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Production of Documents and 295 to Obtain Costs from the City of Danbury and Individual Danbury Defendants: oral argument is scheduled for 2/10/2010 at 1:00 PM in East Courtroom, 450 Main St., Hartford, CT before Judge Donna F.

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12/18/2009 12/21/2009 12/22/2009
12/22/2009 12/22/2009 12/28/2009 12/28/2009 12/30/2009 12/31/2009 01/04/2010

Martinez(Constantine, A.) (Entered: 12/18/2009)
394 First MOTION for Extension of Time until January 29, 2010 to answer and/or object to plaintiffs' Second Interrogatory and Request For Production dated November 30, 2009 by Mark Boughton, City Of Danbury. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Casagrande, Daniel) (Entered: 12/18/2009)
395 Second MOTION for Extension of Time Set Motion and Rcmd Ruling Deadlines/Hearings by George Sullivan. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Morabito, Douglas) (Entered: 12/21/2009)
396 ORDER: The defendants' motion 388 for an extension of time until 12/31/09 in which to file a response to the plaintiffs' motion to compel (doc. #367) is GRANTED. The plaintiffs' motion seeks to compel responses to an unusually large number of discovery requests and the parties have had ongoing discovery disputes. Before the defendant files its response, counsel are directed to meet and confer in a good faith effort to narrow or eliminate areas of controversy. After the meet and confer conference (and before the defendants file their response), the plaintiffs shall file a notice specifying which discovery requests are no longer at issue because they have been resolved. The notice also shall specify which requests have been narrowed or modified and shall set forth the text of the revised requests so the court has an accurate record of the current disputes between the parties. (See doc. #390, where the court noted that the parties' motion papers did not indicate that discovery request had been modified and did not set forth the text of the modified discovery request). Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 12/22/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 12/22/2009)
397 ORDER granting 394 Defendants Boughton and the City of Danbury's Motion for Extension of Time until 1/29/10 in which to respond to plaintiffs' discovery requests dated 11/30/09. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 12/22/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 12/22/2009)
398 ORDER granting 395 defendant's Motion for Extension of Time until 1/8/10 in which to file a response to plaintiffs' 363 Motion to Compel the Deposition Testimony of Defendant George Sullivan. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 12/22/09. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 12/22/2009)
399 MOTION to Compel Deposition responses by Mitchell Weston, Luis Ramos, Julio Lopez, Mark Boughton, Alan Baker, Jose Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, John Does(I/O, 1−8).Responses due by 1/18/2010 Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Wright, William) (Entered: 12/28/2009)
400 Memorandum in Support re 399 MOTION to Compel Deposition responses filed by Mitchell Weston, Luis Ramos, Julio Lopez, Mark Boughton, Alan Baker, Jose Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, John Does(I/O, 1−8). (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Joseph J. Arcata, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F, # 8 Exhibit G, # 9 Exhibit H)(Wright, William) (Entered: 12/28/2009)
401 Amended EXHIBIT C by Mitchell Weston, Luis Ramos, Julio Lopez, Mark Boughton, Alan Baker, Jose Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, John Does(I/O, 1−8) re 400 Memorandum in Support of 399 Motion,. (Wright, William) Modified on 12/31/2009 to link to appropriate motion (Gothers, M.). (Entered: 12/30/2009)
Docket Entry Correction re 401 Exhibit modified: linked to appropriate motion (Gothers, M.) (Entered: 12/31/2009)
402 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on 12/9/09 before Judge Donna F. Martinez. Court Reporter: Suzanne Benoit. Type of Hearing: Motions Hearing. NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. The policy is located on our website at www.ctd.uscourts.gov. Redaction Request due 1/25/2010. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/4/2010. Release of Transcript Restriction set for

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01/06/2010
01/06/2010
01/07/2010 01/08/2010
01/08/2010 01/08/2010 01/08/2010 01/08/2010 01/08/2010 01/08/2010 01/08/2010 01/11/2010

4/4/2010. (Benoit, S.) (Entered: 01/04/2010)
403 MOTION for Summary Judgment as to Defendants Lopez, Ramos, and Weston by Mitchell Weston, Luis Ramos, Julio Lopez, Mark Boughton, Alan Baker, Jose Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, John Does(I/O, 1−8).Responses due by 1/27/2010 (Attachments: # 1 Statement of Material Facts, # 2 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment)(Wright, William) (Entered: 01/06/2010)
404 Second MOTION for Extension of Time to file Response/Reply until January 27, 2010 to Respond to 367 MOTION to Compel Individual Danbury Defendants' Responses to Plaintiffs' Interrogatories Dated July 28, 2009 by Jose Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Thomas, Clarisse) Motion relief Modified on 1/7/2010 (Bauer, J.). (Entered: 01/06/2010)
405 ANSWER to 317 Amended Complaint, with Affirmative Defenses. by Mitchell Weston, Luis Ramos, Julio Lopez, Alan Baker, Jose Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, John Does(I/O, 1−8).(Arcata, Joseph) (Entered: 01/07/2010)
406 ORDER &AMENDED CALENDAR: At the request of the plaintiffs and absent objection, oral argument on the federal defendants' motion (314) to compel; the plaintiffs' motion (284) for Protective Order Regarding Discovery Requests on Immigration Status and Alienage; and the parties' joint motion for extension of time (340) is rescheduled from 1/22/10 to 2/10/10 at 1:00 p.m.(Constantine, A.) (Entered: 01/08/2010)
407 ORDER &AMENDED CALENDAR: Oral argument on the plaintiff's motion (292) to Compel Production of Documents and (295) to Obtain Costs from the City of Danbury and Individual Danbury Defendants is rescheduled from 2/10/10 to 2/24/10 at 1:00 p.m. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 01/08/2010)
408 ORDER granting 404 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response to 367 MOTION to Compel Individual Danbury Defendants' Responses to Plaintiffs' Interrogatories Dated July 28, 2009. Response due by 1/27/2010. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 1/8/10. (Martinez, Donna) (Entered: 01/08/2010)
409 First MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 399 MOTION to Compel Deposition responses until 2/17/2010 by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Goergen, Elizabeth) (Entered: 01/08/2010)
410 ANSWER to 317 Amended Complaint, with Affirmative Defenses. by Mark Boughton, City Of Danbury.(Casagrande, Daniel) (Entered: 01/08/2010)
411 Third MOTION for Extension of Time 363 MOTION to Compel the Deposition Testimony of Defendant George Sullivan by George Sullivan. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Morabito, Douglas) (Entered: 01/08/2010)
Set/Reset Deadlines as to 292 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents and to Obtain Costs from the City of Danbury and Individual Danburt Defendants, 295 MOTION for Cost and Fees. Motion Hearing set for 2/24/2010 at 1:00 PM in East Courtroom, 450 Main St., Hartford, CT before Judge Donna F. Martinez (Wood, R.) (Entered: 01/11/2010)
Set/Reset Deadlines as to 314 MOTION to Compel, 284 MOTION for Protective Order Regarding Discovery Requests on Immigration Status and Alienage. Motion Hearing set for 2/10/2010 at 1:00 PM in East Courtroom, 450 Main St., Hartford, CT before Judge Donna F. Martinez (Wood, R.) (Entered: 01/11/2010)
412 Amended MOTION for Clifford Chance US LLP and attorneys Sarah Blackman, Lawrence Bluestone &Daniel Michaels to Withdraw as Attorney for plaintiffs by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Blackman, Sarah) (Entered: 01/11/2010)

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01/13/2010 01/13/2010
01/14/2010
01/18/2010 01/19/2010 01/19/2010 01/22/2010
01/26/2010 01/27/2010 01/27/2010 01/27/2010
01/28/2010 01/28/2010 02/01/2010

413 ORDER granting 409 Plaintiffs' Motion for Extension of Time until 2/17/10 in which to file an opposition to defendants' motion 399 to Compel Deposition responses. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 1/13/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 01/13/2010)
414 First NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE WITH PRETRIAL ORDER by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez re 367 MOTION to Compel Individual Danbury Defendants' Responses to Plaintiffs' Interrogatories Dated July 28, 2009, 396 Order on Motion for Extension of Time,,,, (Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 01/13/2010)
415 NOTICE by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez re 363 MOTION to Compel the Deposition Testimony of Defendant George Sullivan − Withdrawal of the Motion to Compel (Attachments: # 1 Certicate of Service)(Nurhussein, Siham) (Entered: 01/14/2010)
416 ORDER denying 403 Motion for Summary Judgment. The motion is denied without prejudice for noncompliance with scheduling order. Parties must request a pre−filing conference before filing dispositive motions. So ordered. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 01/13/2010. (Swan, N.) (Entered: 01/18/2010)
417 ORDER: The plaintiffs' motion to compel as to George Sullivan 363 is withdrawn without prejudice by the moving party. See doc. #415. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 1/19/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 01/19/2010)
418 ORDER: The defendants' motion for extension of time 411 in which to file a response to the plaintiffs' motion to compel is denied as moot in the withdrawal of the motion to compel. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 1/19/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 01/19/2010)
419 Second MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 378 MOTION to Dismiss until February 11, 2010 by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 01/22/2010)
420 Second MOTION for Extension of Time until February 5, 2010 To Respond and/or Object to Plaintiffs' Interrogatories and Requests for Production dated November 30, 2009 by Mark Boughton, City Of Danbury. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Casagrande, Daniel) (Entered: 01/26/2010)
421 ORDER granting 419 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply re 378 MOTION to Dismiss Responses due by 2/11/2010. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 1/27/10. (Macare, L.) (Entered: 01/27/2010)
Summons Reissued as to Jim Martin, Bruce Chadbourne. (Kelsey, N.) (Entered: 01/27/2010)
422 Memorandum in Opposition re 367 MOTION to Compel Individual Danbury Defendants' Responses to Plaintiffs' Interrogatories Dated July 28, 2009 filed by Jose Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G)(Thomas, Clarisse) (Entered: 01/27/2010)
423 ORDER granting 412 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Lawrence Bluestone terminated. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 1/28/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 01/28/2010)
Attorney Daniel Michaels terminated.see doc.412(Constantine, A.) (Entered: 01/28/2010)
424 ORDER &AMENDED CALENDAR: Oral argument scheduled for 2/24/10 shall begin at 3:00 p.m. due to a change in the court's schedule. Please note the change in the time. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 02/01/2010)

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02/01/2010 02/03/2010
02/04/2010 02/04/2010 02/05/2010 02/05/2010
02/08/2010 02/09/2010 02/09/2010
02/09/2010 02/09/2010 02/09/2010

425 ORDER granting 420 Motion for Extension of Time. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 2/1/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 02/01/2010)
426 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time until February 17, 2010 to file a Reply Memorandum in Further Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Compel the Individual Danbury Defendants responses to Plaintiffs Interrogatories and Requests for Production dated July 28, 2009 (Motion to Compel) [Dkt. # 367]. by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Nurhussein, Siham) Modified on 2/4/2010 − Clerk has corrected motion event type (Gothers, M.). (Entered: 02/03/2010)
Docket Entry Correction re 426 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response modified: Clerk has corrected event type. (Gothers, M.) (Entered: 02/04/2010)
435 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Attorney Mary Elizabeth Morales. Filing Fee $25.00. Receipt Number H030115. by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Gothers, M.) (Entered: 02/09/2010)
427 Third MOTION for Extension of Time To Respond and/or Object to Plaintiffs' Interrogatories and Requests For Production dated November 30, 2009 by Mark Boughton, City Of Danbury. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Casagrande, Daniel) (Entered: 02/05/2010)
428 Memorandum in Opposition re 399 MOTION to Compel Deposition responses filed by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit, # 8 Exhibit, # 9 Exhibit, # 10 Exhibit, # 11 Exhibit, # 12 Exhibit, # 13 Exhibit, # 14 Exhibit, # 15 Exhibit, # 16 Exhibit, # 17 Exhibit, # 18 Exhibit, # 19 Exhibit, # 20 Exhibit, # 21 Exhibit, # 22 Exhibit, # 23 Exhibit, # 24 Exhibit, # 25 Exhibit)(Goergen, Elizabeth) (Entered: 02/05/2010)
429 Proposed MOTION to Compel Deposition Responses by City Of Danbury.Responses due by 3/1/2010 Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Casagrande, Daniel) (Entered: 02/08/2010)
430 Third MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 378 MOTION to Dismiss until February 18, 2010 by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 02/09/2010)
431 ORDER &AMENDED CALENDAR: Oral argument on the federal defendants' motion (#314) to Compel and the plaintiffs' motion (#284) for Protective Order Regarding Discovery Requests on Immigration Status and Alienage has been rescheduled to February 24, 2010 at 3:00 p.m. The Court will also hear the parties on how much time to permit regarding the parties' joint motion for an extension of time which was granted (doc.#340). Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 2/9/2010. (Wood, R.) (Entered: 02/09/2010)
432 ORDER &AMENDED CALENDAR: Oral argument on the plaintiff's motion [#292] to Compel Production of Documents and [#295] to Obtain Costs from the City of Danbury and Individual Danbury Defendants is rescheduled to March 10, 2010 at 2:00 p.m., U.S.D.C., East Courtroom, Hartford, CT. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 2/9/2010. (Wood, R.) (Entered: 02/09/2010)
433 ORDER granting 426 plaintiffs' Motion for Extension of Time until 2/17/10 in which to File a reply brief re 367 their motion to Compel Individual Danbury Defendants' Responses. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 2/9/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 02/09/2010)
434 ORDER granting 427 Mark Boughton and City of Danbury's Motion for Extension of Time until 2/15/10 in which to respond and/or object to plaintiffs' interrogatories and requests for production dated 11/30/09. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on

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02/09/2010 02/11/2010 02/11/2010 02/16/2010 02/16/2010 02/16/2010 02/16/2010
02/18/2010 02/19/2010 02/23/2010 02/24/2010
02/24/2010 02/25/2010

2/9/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 02/09/2010)
436 ORDER granting 435 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice of attorney Mary Elizabeth Morales. Signed by Clerk on 2/9/2009. (Gothers, M.) (Entered: 02/09/2010)
437 ORDER granting 430 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply re 378 MOTION to Dismiss Responses due by 2/18/2010. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 2/11/10. (Macare, L.) (Entered: 02/11/2010)
438 Letter MOTION for Pre− filing Conference by Mitchell Weston, Luis Ramos, Julio Lopez, Mark Boughton, Alan Baker, Jose Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, John Does(I/O, 9−14). Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Gothers, M.) (Entered: 02/12/2010)
439 ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate for a prefiling conference. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 02/16/2010. (Swan, N.) (Entered: 02/16/2010)
440 Memorandum in Opposition re 429 Proposed MOTION to Compel Deposition Responses filed by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Morales, Mary) (Entered: 02/16/2010)
441 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 02/16/2010)
442 REPLY to Response to 367 MOTION to Compel Individual Danbury Defendants' Responses to Plaintiffs' Interrogatories Dated July 28, 2009 filed by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment − Brown v Sheahan, 1994 WL 148659, # 2 Attachment − Greystone Construction v. National Fire &Marine, 2008 WL 795815, # 3 Certifcate of Service)(Nurhussein, Siham) (Entered: 02/16/2010)
443 Memorandum in Opposition re 378 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez. (Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 02/18/2010)
444 ORDER &AMENDED CALENDAR: The Oral argument scheduled for February 24, 2010 shall begin at 2:30 (not 3:00 p.m.) Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 2/19/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 02/19/2010)
445 ORDER granting nunc pro tunc 441 plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages in response to the Federal Defendants' motion to dismiss. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 2/23/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 02/23/2010)
446 Minute Entry. Proceedings held before Judge Donna F. Martinez: taking under advisement 284 Motion for Protective Order; taking under advisement 314 Motion to Compel; Motion Hearing held on 2/24/2010 re 284 MOTION for Protective Order Regarding Discovery Requests on Immigration Status and Alienage filed by Juan Barrera, Juan Carlos Simbana, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Jose Llibisupa, Edgar Redrovan, Daniel Chavez, Jose Cabrera, Isaac Maldonado, 314 MOTION to Compel filed by Richard McCaffrey, Ronald Preble, USA, James Brown. Total Time: 2 hours and 14 minutes(Court Reporter I. Sanchez.) (Wood, R.) (Entered: 02/25/2010)
448 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Attorney Cedric Logan. Filing Fee $25.00. Receipt Number H030324. by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Gothers, M.) (Entered: 02/26/2010)
447 NOTICE by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana re 314 MOTION to Compel regarding Supplemental Authority (Attachments: # 1 Aguilar Order)(Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 02/25/2010)

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02/26/2010 03/05/2010 03/06/2010
03/08/2010 03/08/2010 03/09/2010 03/10/2010
03/11/2010 03/17/2010 03/18/2010 03/19/2010 03/22/2010

449 ORDER granting 448 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice of attorney Cedric Logan. Signed by Clerk on 2/26/2010. (Gothers, M.) (Entered: 02/26/2010)
450 STIPULATION re 396 Order on Motion for Extension of Time,,,, 390 Order on Motion to Compel,,, by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana. (Nurhussein, Siham) (Entered: 03/05/2010)
451 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on February 24, 2010 before Judge D. Martinez. Court Reporter: I. Sanchez. Type of Hearing: Hearing on Motions. NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. The policy is located on our website at www.ctd.uscourts.gov. Redaction Request due 3/27/2010. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/6/2010. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/4/2010. (Sanchez, I.) (Entered: 03/06/2010)
452 First MOTION for Extension of Time until March 31, 2010 443 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion by James Brown, Bruce Chadbourne, Jim Martin, Richard McCaffrey, Ronald Preble, George Sullivan. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Morabito, Douglas) (Entered: 03/08/2010)
453 Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition re 292 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents and to Obtain Costs from the City of Danbury and Individual Danburt Defendants filed by City Of Danbury. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit)(Casagrande, Daniel) (Entered: 03/08/2010)
454 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 314 Federal defendants' Motion to Compel. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 3/9/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 03/09/2010)
455 Minute Entry. Proceedings held before Judge Donna F. Martinez: taking under advisement 292 Motion to Compel; taking under advisement 295 Motion for Cost and Fees; Motion Hearing held on 3/10/2010 re 292 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents and to Obtain Costs from the City of Danbury and Individual Danburt Defendants filed by Juan Barrera, Juan Carlos Simbana, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Jose Llibisupa, Edgar Redrovan, Daniel Chavez, Jose Cabrera, Isaac Maldonado, 295 MOTION for Cost and Fees filed by Juan Barrera, Juan Carlos Simbana, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Jose Llibisupa, Edgar Redrovan, Daniel Chavez, Jose Cabrera, Isaac Maldonado. Total Time: 2 hours and 58 minutes(Court Reporter D. Falzarano &FTR.) (Wood, R.) (Entered: 03/11/2010)
456 Supplemental AFFIDAVIT re 453 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion, filed by City Of Danbury. (Casagrande, Daniel) (Entered: 03/11/2010)
457 First MOTION for Extension of Time until March 30, 2010 to file Plaintiffs' OBJECTION to the Magistrate Judge's Order dated March 9, 2010, 454 Order on Motion to Compel (Hazeldean, Susan) . (Entered: 03/17/2010)
458 NOTICE of Appearance by Cedric Logan on behalf of Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana (Logan, Cedric) (Entered: 03/18/2010)
459 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 284 plaintiffs' motion for protective order. See attached order. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 3/19/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 03/19/2010)
460 MOTION to Stay re 454 Order on Motion to Compel or in the alternative for a limited protective order by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana.Responses due by 4/12/2010 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Affidavit Declaration in support of Plaintiffs' Memorandum, # 3 Exhibit Declaration Exhibit A)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Hazeldean, Susan) (Entered: 03/22/2010)

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03/22/2010 03/22/2010 03/22/2010
03/22/2010 03/22/2010 03/23/2010
03/23/2010 03/23/2010 03/23/2010 03/24/2010 03/24/2010 03/24/2010
03/25/2010
03/26/2010 03/30/2010

461 ORDER granting 452 Motion for Extension of Time. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 03/19/2010. (Swan, N.) (Entered: 03/22/2010)
462 ORDER granting 457 Motion for Extension of Time. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 03/22/2010. (Swan, N.) (Entered: 03/22/2010)
463 ORDER: A telephonic conference is scheduled for Tuesday 3/23/10 at 11:30 a.m. with Judge Martinez concerning the plaintiffs' motion to stay (doc.#460). Plaintiffs' counsel shall initiate the conference call and shall have opposing counsel on the line when calling chambers at (860) 240 3605. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 03/22/2010)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 3/23/2010 at 11:30 AM before Judge Donna F. Martinez (Wood, R.) (Entered: 03/23/2010)
Set/Reset Deadlines as to 378 MOTION to Dismiss. Responses due by 3/31/2010 (Glynn, T.) (Entered: 03/23/2010)
464 Scheduling Order: Fact discovery shall be completed (not propounded) by 8/15/10; plaintiffs shall disclose experts by 8/15/10 and deposition of plaintiffs' experts shall be completed by 10/1/10. If the plaintiffs disclose experts, the defendants shall disclose their experts by 11/15/10 and depositions of defendants' experts shall be completed by 1/1/11. If the plaintiffs do not disclose experts, defendants shall disclose their experts by 9/15/10 and deposition of defendants' experts shall be completed by 11/1/10. Any request for a prefiling conference must be requested by the close of expert discovery. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 3/23/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 03/23/2010)
465 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Donna F. Martinez: Telephonic Status Conference held on 3/23/2010. Time 15 minutes (Wood, R.) (Entered: 03/23/2010)
466 ORDER: The plaintiffs' motion 460 for a stay is granted. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 3/23/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 03/23/2010)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Discovery due by 8/15/2010 (Wood, R.) (Entered: 03/25/2010)
467 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by James Brown, Bruce Chadbourne, Jim Martin, Richard McCaffrey, Ronald Preble, George Sullivan. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Morabito, Douglas) (Entered: 03/24/2010)
468 REPLY to Response to 378 MOTION to Dismiss, 467 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages filed by James Brown, Bruce Chadbourne, Jim Martin, Richard McCaffrey, Ronald Preble, George Sullivan. (Morabito, Douglas) (Entered: 03/24/2010)
469 ORDER: The non−parties' 286 and plaintiffs' 278 motions for protective order as to the non−parties' deposition are denied without prejudice. In a good faith effort to resolve this dispute counsel are directed to meet and confer in light of the current state of discovery as it has developed since the filing of these motions as well as the court's ruling in doc. #459. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 3/24/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 03/24/2010)
470 First MOTION for Extension of Time until April 9, 2010 to file an Objection to the Magistrate Judge's Order dated March 19, 2010 459 Order on Motion for Protective Order by Jose Agosto, Alan Baker, Richard DeJesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Julio Lopez, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, Luis Ramos, Mitchell Weston. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Thomas, Clarisse) (Entered: 03/25/2010)
471 ORDER granting 470 Defendants' unopposed Motion for Extension of Time until 4/9/10 in which to file a Rule 72 objection with the District Judge to the undersigned's ruling (doc.#459). Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 3/26/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 03/26/2010)
472 NOTICE of Appearance by Catherine S. Nietzel on behalf of Jose Agosto, Alan Baker, Mark Boughton, Richard DeJesus, John Does(I/O, 1−8), James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Julio Lopez, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, Luis Ramos, Mitchell

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 83 of 96

03/31/2010
03/31/2010 03/31/2010
03/31/2010 04/05/2010 04/06/2010 04/06/2010 04/06/2010 04/06/2010 04/06/2010 04/09/2010
04/09/2010

Weston (Nietzel, Catherine) (Entered: 03/30/2010)
473 OBJECTION re 454 Order on Motion to Compel by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K, # 12 Exhibit L, # 13 Exhibit M, # 14 Exhibit N, # 15 Exhibit O, # 16 Exhibit P, # 17 Exhibit Q, # 18 Exhibit R, # 19 Exhibit S, # 20 Exhibit T, # 21 Exhibit U, # 22 Exhibit V, # 23 Exhibit W, # 24 Exhibit X, # 25 Exhibit Y, # 26 Exhibit Z, # 27 Exhibit AA, # 28 Exhibit BB, # 29 Exhibit CC, # 30 Exhibit DD, # 31 Exhibit EE)(Nurhussein, Siham) (Entered: 03/31/2010)
474 AFFIDAVIT re 473 Objection in Support of the Objection to the Order of March 9, 2010 signed by Judge D. Martinez Signed By Siham Nurhussein filed by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana. (Nurhussein, Siham). (Entered: 03/31/2010)
475 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time until March 31, 2010 to File Objection to Magistrate Judge's March 9, 2010 Discovery Ruling, Nunc Pro Tunc 473 Objection,,, by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Angel S. Arias in Support of Motion for Enlargement of Time, # 2 Certificate of Service)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Nurhussein, Siham) (Entered: 03/31/2010)
476 First MOTION to Stay re 459 Order on Motion for Protective Order as to Interrogatories 2 and 3 by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana.Responses due by 4/21/2010 Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Hazeldean, Susan) (Entered: 03/31/2010)
477 First OBJECTION re 459 Order on Motion for Protective Order as to Interrogatories 2 and 3 filed by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana. (Hazeldean, Susan) (Entered: 04/05/2010)
478 NOTICE of Appearance by David C. Salazar−Austin on behalf of Doe (Salazar−Austin, David) (Entered: 04/06/2010)
479 NOTICE of Appearance by Albert Llosas Barrueco on behalf of Doe , anonymous amicus curiae (Barrueco, Albert) (Entered: 04/06/2010)
480 NOTICE of Appearance by Michael P. Shea on behalf of Doe , anonymous amicus curiae (Shea, Michael) (Entered: 04/06/2010)
481 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Objection to Magistrate Judge Martinez's March 9, 2010 Order by Doe. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Shea, Michael) (Entered: 04/06/2010)
482 NOTICE of Appearance by Rene Alejandro Ortega on behalf of Doe , anonymous amicus curiae (Ortega, Rene) (Entered: 04/06/2010)
483 OBJECTION re 459 Order on Motion for Protective Order filed by Jose Agosto, Alan Baker, Mark Boughton, Richard DeJesus, John Does(I/O, 1−8), James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Julio Lopez, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, Luis Ramos, Mitchell Weston. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K, # 12 Exhibit L, # 13 Exhibit M, # 14 Exhibit N, # 15 Exhibit O, # 16 Exhibit P)(Deluca, Charles) (Entered: 04/09/2010)
484 ORDER granting 476 plaintiffs' unopposed Motion to Stay pending appeal of that portion of the 3/19/10 order as to interrogatories 2 and 3. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 4/9/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 04/09/2010)

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04/13/2010 04/21/2010
04/21/2010
04/21/2010
04/22/2010 04/22/2010 04/22/2010 04/22/2010 04/27/2010 04/29/2010 05/03/2010 05/03/2010 05/04/2010
05/05/2010

485 MOTION for Extension of Time until April 27, 2010 473 Objection,,, by James Brown, Bruce Chadbourne, Jim Martin, Richard McCaffrey, Ronald Preble, George Sullivan, USA. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Morabito, Douglas) (Entered: 04/13/2010)
486 First MOTION for Extension of Time until May 7, 2010 to respond to 483 Defendants' Objection to the Magistrate Judge's grant of a Protective Order by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Wishnie, Michael) . (Entered: 04/21/2010)
487 MOTION for Attorney Karen Grus to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana. Filing Fee $25.00. Receipt Number N030205. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Malone, P.) (Entered: 04/22/2010)
489 MOTION for Attorney Anya R. Grossmann to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana. Filing Fee $25.00. Receipt Number N030204. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Malone, P.) (Entered: 04/22/2010)
488 ORDER granting 487 Motion For Attorney Karen Grus to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Clerk on 4/22/10. (Malone, P.) (Entered: 04/22/2010)
490 ORDER granting 489 Motion For Attorney Anya R. Grossmann to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Clerk on 4/22/10. (Malone, P.) (Entered: 04/22/2010)
491 ORDER granting 485 Motion for Extension of Time. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 4/22/10. (Chatigny, Robert) (Entered: 04/22/2010)
492 ORDER granting 486 Motion for Extension of Time. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 4/22/10. (Chatigny, Robert) (Entered: 04/22/2010)
493 RESPONSE re 473 Objection,,, filed by James Brown, Bruce Chadbourne, Jim Martin, Richard McCaffrey, Ronald Preble, George Sullivan, USA. (Morabito, Douglas) (Entered: 04/27/2010)
494 RESPONSE re 493 Plaintiffs' Reply in Response to Federal Defendants' Response to Plainiffs' Objection to Magistrate's Ruling by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Juan Carlos Simbana. (Nurhussein, Siham) . (Entered: 04/29/2010)
495 ORDER finding as moot 475 Motion for Extension of Time in light of the agreement announced in defendants' response 493 . So ordered. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 04/29/2010. (Swan, N.) (Entered: 05/03/2010)
496 ORDER finding as moot 481 Motion for Leave to File in light of the agreement announced in defendants' response 493 . So ordered. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 04/29/2010. (Swan, N.) (Entered: 05/03/2010)
497 STIPULATION of Dismissal of Party John Does 6−11 by Jose Agosto, Alan Baker, Juan Barrera, Mark Boughton, James Brown, Jose Cabrera, Bruce Chadbourne, Daniel Chavez, City Of Danbury, Richard DeJesus, John Does(I/O, 1−8), John Does(I/O, 9−14), James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Jose Llibisupa, Julio Lopez, Isaac Maldonado, Craig Martin, Jim Martin, Richard McCaffrey, Joseph Norkus, Ronald Preble, Luis Ramos, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, George Sullivan, USA, Mitchell Weston. (Nelson, David) (Entered: 05/04/2010)
498 STIPULATION of Dismissal of Party John Does 1−5 by Jose Agosto, Alan Baker, Juan Barrera, Mark Boughton, James Brown, Jose Cabrera, Bruce Chadbourne, Daniel Chavez, City Of Danbury, Richard DeJesus, John Does(I/O, 1−8), John Does(I/O, 9−14), James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Jose Llibisupa, Julio Lopez, Isaac Maldonado, Craig Martin, Jim Martin, Richard McCaffrey, Joseph Norkus, Ronald Preble, Luis Ramos, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, George Sullivan, USA, Mitchell Weston. (Thomas, Clarisse) (Entered:

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05/06/2010
05/07/2010 05/07/2010
05/12/2010 05/12/2010
05/12/2010 05/14/2010 05/14/2010 05/17/2010 05/17/2010

05/05/2010)
499 ORDER ACCORDINGLY re 498 Joint Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice, filed by James Lalli, Jose Agosto, City Of Danbury, Juan Barrera, Ronald Preble, James A. Fisher, Mark Boughton, Jose Llibisupa, Bruce Chadbourne, Daniel Chavez, George Sullivan, Jim Martin, James Brown, Alan Baker, Mitchell Weston, Richard McCaffrey, Juan Carlos Simbana, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Julio Lopez, Edgar Redrovan, Craig Martin, USA, John Does, Luis Ramos, Jose Cabrera, Joseph Norkus, Isaac Maldonado, Richard DeJesus. Signed by Clerk on 5/6/10. (Glynn, T.) (Entered: 05/06/2010)
500 MOTION for Leave to File an Overlong Brief in Response to Danbury Defendants' Objections to Magistrate Judge's Ruling on Plaintiffs' Motion for Protective Order by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Juan Carlos Simbana. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Nurhussein, Siham) . (Entered: 05/07/2010)
501 RESPONSE re 483 Objection,, by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Juan Carlos Simbana. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K, # 12 Exhibit L, # 13 Exhibit M, # 14 Exhibit N, # 15 Exhibit O, # 16 Exhibit P, # 17 Exhibit Q, # 18 Exhibit R, # 19 Exhibit S, # 20 Exhibit T, # 21 Exhibit U, # 22 Exhibit V, # 23 Exhibit W, # 24 Exhibit X, # 25 Exhibit Y, # 26 Exhibit Z, # 27 Exhibit AA, # 28 Exhibit BB, # 29 Exhibit CC, # 30 Exhibit DD, # 31 Exhibit EE, # 32 Exhibit FF, # 33 Exhibit GG, # 34 Exhibit HH, # 35 Exhibit II, # 36 Exhibit JJ, # 37 Exhibit KK, # 38 Exhibit LL)(Nurhussein, Siham) (Entered: 05/07/2010)
502 First MOTION for Extension of Time until May 24, 2010 to File Reply to 501 Response,,, by Jose Agosto, Alan Baker, Mark Boughton, Richard DeJesus, John Does(I/O, 1−8), James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Julio Lopez, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, Luis Ramos, Mitchell Weston. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Wright, William) (Entered: 05/12/2010)
503 Joint MOTION for Protective Order by Jose Agosto, Alan Baker, Juan Barrera, Mark Boughton, James Brown, Jose Cabrera, Bruce Chadbourne, Daniel Chavez, City Of Danbury, Richard DeJesus, James A. Fisher, Wilson Hernandez, James Lalli, Jose Llibisupa, Julio Lopez, Maria−Cinta Lowe, Isaac Maldonado, Craig Martin, Jim Martin, Richard McCaffrey, Joseph Norkus, Ronald Preble, Luis Ramos, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, George Sullivan, Lynn Taborsak, USA, Mitchell Weston.Responses due by 6/2/2010 (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Stipulated Confidentiality Order, # 2 Certificate of Service)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Nurhussein, Siham) (Entered: 05/12/2010)
504 MOTION for Extension of Time until May 24, 2010 to file its Reply to Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Danbury Defendants' Objection to Magistrate Judge's Ruling on Plaintiffs' Motion for Protective Order by City Of Danbury. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Casagrande, Daniel) (Entered: 05/12/2010)
505 ORDER granting 500 Motion for Leave to File; granting 502 Motion for Extension of Time; granting 504 Motion for Extension of Time. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 05/14/2010. (Swan, N.) (Entered: 05/14/2010)
506 Sealed Offer of Judgment by Jose Agosto, Alan Baker, Mark Boughton, City Of Danbury, Richard DeJesus, John Does(I/O, 1−8), James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Julio Lopez, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, Luis Ramos, Mitchell Weston. (Blue, A.) . (Entered: 05/14/2010)
507 MOTION for Leave to Appear pro hac vice Attorney Scott Ceresia, Filing Fee $25.00. Receipt Number H030921 by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Blue, A.) (Entered: 05/17/2010)
508 ORDER granting 507 Motion to Appear pro hac vice Attorney Scott Ceresia, Signed by Clerk on 5/17/2010. (Blue, A.) (Entered: 05/17/2010)

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05/18/2010 05/18/2010
05/18/2010
05/18/2010
05/19/2010 05/20/2010
05/20/2010 05/20/2010 05/21/2010
05/24/2010
05/25/2010 05/25/2010 05/26/2010 05/27/2010

509 MOTION for Sharon Billington to Withdraw as Attorney by Wilson Hernandez, Maria−Cinta Lowe, Lynn Taborsak. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Silver, Blair) (Entered: 05/18/2010)
510 Supplemental Memorandum in Support re 367 MOTION to Compel Individual Danbury Defendants' Responses to Plaintiffs' Interrogatories Dated July 28, 2009 and for Costs filed by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana. (Nurhussein, Siham). (Entered: 05/18/2010)
511 AFFIDAVIT re 367 MOTION to Compel Individual Danbury Defendants' Responses to Plaintiffs' Interrogatories Dated July 28, 2009 and for Costs Signed By Chesa Boudin filed by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana. (Nurhussein, Siham). (Entered: 05/18/2010)
512 AFFIDAVIT re 367 MOTION to Compel Individual Danbury Defendants' Responses to Plaintiffs' Interrogatories Dated July 28, 2009 and for Costs Signed By Anya R. Grossmann filed by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G)(Nurhussein, Siham). (Entered: 05/18/2010)
513 ORDER granting 509 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Sharon Billington terminated. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 5/19/10. (Martinez, Donna) (Entered: 05/19/2010)
514 MOTION for Leave to Appear pro hac vice Attorney Mary Kay Dunning. Filing Fee $25.00 Receipt Number H030949, by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Blue, A.) (Entered: 05/20/2010)
515 ORDER granting 514 Motion to Appear pro hac vice Attorney Mary Kay Dunning, Signed by Clerk on 5/20/2010. (Blue, A.) (Entered: 05/20/2010)
516 OBJECTION re 510 Memorandum in Support of Motion, filed by Jose Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Thomas, Clarisse) (Entered: 05/20/2010)
517 MOTION for Leave to File Student appearance for Jeremy Kaplan−Lyman by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana. (Attachments: # 1 Law Student Certification, # 2 Client and Attorney Consent)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Wishnie, Michael) . (Entered: 05/21/2010)
518 RESPONSE re 483 Objection,, 501 Response,,, 459 Order on Motion for Protective Order filed by Jose Agosto, Alan Baker, Mark Boughton, Richard DeJesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Julio Lopez, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, Luis Ramos, Mitchell Weston. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Wright, William) (Entered: 05/24/2010)
519 ORDER granting 517 Motion for Leave for Law Student Intern Jeremy Kaplan−Lyman to appear on behalf of the plaintiffs. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 5/25/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 05/25/2010)
520 RESPONSE To Plaintiffs' Opposition To Danbury Defendants' Objection To Magistrate Judge's Ruling on Plaintiffs' Motion For Protective Order filed by City Of Danbury. (Casagrande, Daniel). (Entered: 05/25/2010)
521 ORDER granting 467 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 05/21/2010. (Swan, N.) (Entered: 05/26/2010)
522 ORDER: The parties' joint motion for stipulated confidentiality order 503 is granted. SO ORDERED. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 5/27/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 05/27/2010)

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05/27/2010 05/28/2010 06/02/2010 06/02/2010 06/02/2010 06/02/2010 06/03/2010 06/04/2010 06/07/2010 06/08/2010 06/08/2010 06/08/2010 06/10/2010 06/14/2010

523 Consent MOTION Leave for Law Student Interns to Appear (Dror Ladin, Rebecca Heller, Ari Holtzblatt, and Lindsay Nash) by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana.Responses due by 6/17/2010 Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Wishnie, Michael). (Entered: 05/27/2010)
524 ORDER granting 523 Motion for Law Student Intern Appearance. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 5/28/10. (Martinez, Donna) (Entered: 05/28/2010)
525 MOTION for Leave to File Law Student Appearance for Isis Goldberg by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Law Student and Client Certification)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Wishnie, Michael). (Entered: 06/02/2010)
526 MOTION for Leave to File Law Student Appearance for Michael Formichelli by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana. (Attachments: # 1 Law Student and Client Certification)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Wishnie, Michael) . (Entered: 06/02/2010)
527 REPLY to Response to 367 MOTION to Compel Individual Danbury Defendants' Responses to Plaintiffs' Interrogatories Dated July 28, 2009 filed by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana. (Nurhussein, Siham). (Entered: 06/02/2010)
528 AFFIDAVIT re 367 MOTION to Compel Individual Danbury Defendants' Responses to Plaintiffs' Interrogatories Dated July 28, 2009 Signed By Anya R. Grossmann filed by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Nurhussein, Siham). (Entered: 06/02/2010)
529 MOTION for Extension of Time until June 17, 2010 Motion to Compel regarding the Plaintiffs' Fifth and Sixth Requests for Production by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 06/03/2010)
530 REPLY to Response to 367 MOTION to Compel Individual Danbury Defendants' Responses to Plaintiffs' Interrogatories Dated July 28, 2009 filed by Jose Agosto, Richard DeJesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus. (Thomas, Clarisse). (Entered: 06/04/2010)
531 ORDER granting 525 526 plaintiffs' Motions for Leave to for law student interns Michael Formichelli and Isis Goldberg File to appear. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 6/7/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 06/07/2010)
532 MOTION for Leave to Appear pro hac vice Attorney Richard Cashman. Filing Fee $25.00 Receipt Number H031104, by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Blue, A.) (Entered: 06/08/2010)
533 ORDER granting 532 Motion to Appear pro hac vice Attorney Richard Cashman, Signed by Clerk on 6/8/2010. (Blue, A.) (Entered: 06/08/2010)
534 MOTION for Extension of Time until December 15, 2010 464 Order,, by James Brown, Bruce Chadbourne, Jim Martin, Richard McCaffrey, Ronald Preble, George Sullivan, USA. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Morabito, Douglas) (Entered: 06/08/2010)
535 MOTION for Extension of Time until December 15, 2010 re 464 Order, by City Of Danbury. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez (Casagrande, Daniel). (Entered: 06/10/2010)
536 First Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Second Motion for Extension of Fact Discovery Deadline re 535 MOTION for Extension of Time until December

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 88 of 96

06/15/2010 06/16/2010 06/17/2010
06/19/2010
06/22/2010 06/23/2010 06/23/2010
07/01/2010 07/06/2010 07/06/2010 07/14/2010 07/14/2010 07/14/2010

15, 2010 , 464 Order, 534 MOTION for Extension of , filed by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana. (Wishnie, Michael). (Entered: 06/14/2010)
537 MOTION for Order by City Of Danbury. (Casagrande, Daniel) (Entered: 06/15/2010)
538 REPLY to Response to 534 MOTION for Extension of Time until December 15, 2010 464 Order,, filed by James Brown, Bruce Chadbourne, Jim Martin, Richard McCaffrey, Ronald Preble, George Sullivan, USA. (Morabito, Douglas) (Entered: 06/16/2010)
539 Second MOTION for Extension of Time until July 1, 2010 Motion to Compel Production for the Fifth and Sixth Requests for Production by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Duma, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Juan Carlos Simbana. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 06/17/2010)
540 Memorandum in Opposition re 537 MOTION for Order filed by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Holtzblatt Declaration, # 2 Exhibit Exhibits 1−14)(Wishnie, Michael). (Entered: 06/19/2010)
541 RESPONSE re 540 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion, filed by Mark Boughton, City Of Danbury. (Casagrande, Daniel) (Entered: 06/22/2010)
542 ORDER granting 539 Plaintiffs' unopposed Motion for Extension of Time until 7/1/10 in which to file a motion to compel as to plaintiffs' fifth and sixth requests for production of documents. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 6/23/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 06/23/2010)
543 ORDER: The defendant City of Danbury's motion for order 537 to reschedule the depositions of Mark Boughton and Michael McLachlan currently scheduled for June until November and December is denied. The defendant has not made the requisite legal showing to permit the requested relief. See D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 7(b). Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 6/23/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 06/23/2010)
544 ORDER granting 529 nunc pro tunc plaintiff's unopposed motion for extension of time in which to file a motion to compel. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 7/1/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 07/01/2010)
545 MOTION for Leave to Appear pro hac vice Attorney William Han. Filing Fee $25.00 Receipt Number H031327, by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Blue, A.) (Entered: 07/06/2010)
546 ORDER granting 545 Motion to Appear pro hac vice Attorney William Han, Signed by Clerk on 7/6/2010. (Blue, A.) (Entered: 07/06/2010)
547 MOTION for Jacob S. Sherkow to Withdraw as Attorney for Plaintiffs by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Sherkow, Jacob) (Entered: 07/14/2010)
548 MOTION for Bryan Bloom to Withdraw as Attorney for Plaintiffs by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Sherkow, Jacob) (Entered: 07/14/2010)
549 MOTION for Johanna Coats to Withdraw as Attorney for Plaintiffs by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Sherkow, Jacob) (Entered: 07/14/2010)

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 89 of 96

07/14/2010 07/15/2010
07/22/2010 07/22/2010 07/22/2010 07/22/2010 08/12/2010 08/13/2010 08/13/2010 08/13/2010
08/13/2010 08/17/2010 08/23/2010

550 MOTION for Kenneth Juan Figueroa to Withdraw as Attorney for Plaintiffs by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Sherkow, Jacob) (Entered: 07/14/2010)
551 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana re 547 MOTION for Jacob S. Sherkow to Withdraw as Attorney for Plaintiffs, 548 MOTION for Bryan Bloom to Withdraw as Attorney for Plaintiffs, 550 MOTION for Kenneth Juan Figueroa to Withdraw as Attorney for Plaintiffs, 549 MOTION for Johanna Coats to Withdraw as Attorney for Plaintiffs (Sherkow, Jacob). (Entered: 07/15/2010)
552 ORDER granting 547 Jacob Sherkow's motion for leave to Withdraw as Attorney for the plaintiffs. Attorney Jacob S. Sherkow terminated. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 7/22/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 07/22/2010)
553 ORDER granting 548 Bryan Bloom's motion for leave to Withdraw as Attorney for the plaintiffs. Attorney Bryan Bloom terminated. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 7/22/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 07/22/2010)
554 ORDER granting 549 Johanna Coats' Motion for leave to Withdraw as Attorney for plaintiffs. Attorney Johanna Coats terminated. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 7/22/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 07/22/2010)
555 ORDER granting 550 Kenneth Juan Figueroa's Motion for leave to Withdraw as Attorney for plaintiffs. Attorney Kenneth Juan Figueroa terminated. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 7/22/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 07/22/2010)
556 MOTION for Joseph J. Arcata, III to Withdraw as Attorney by Jose Agosto, Alan Baker, Mark Boughton, Richard DeJesus, John Does(I/O, 1−8), James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Julio Lopez, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, Luis Ramos, Mitchell Weston. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Arcata, Joseph) (Entered: 08/12/2010)
557 MOTION for David C. Salazar−Austin to Withdraw as Attorney by Doe. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Salazar−Austin, David) (Entered: 08/13/2010)
558 ORDER granting 556 attorney Joseph Arcata's Motion to Withdraw as counsel for the defendants. Attorney Joseph J. Arcata, III terminated. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 8/13/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 08/13/2010)
559 First MOTION to Compel Production of Documents Responsive to Plaintiffs Sixth Request for Production by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana.Responses due by 9/3/2010 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Affidavit Declaration of Michael Formichelli, # 3 Affidavit Declaration of Susan Hazeldean, # 4 Exhibit A, # 5 Exhibit B, # 6 Exhibit C, # 7 Exhibit D)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Wishnie, Michael) . (Entered: 08/13/2010)
560 MOTION for Extension of Time for Expert Discovery by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Certificate of Service)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Nurhussein, Siham). (Entered: 08/13/2010)
561 ORDER granting 557 Motion by attorney David Salazar−Austin to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney David C. Salazar−Austin terminated. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 8/17/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 08/17/2010)
562 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on 3−10−10 before Judge Donna F. Martinez. Court Reporter: Dolores A. Falzarano. Type of Hearing: Motions Hearing. NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. The policy is located on our website at www.ctd.uscourts.gov. Redaction Request due

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09/01/2010
09/02/2010
09/02/2010 09/02/2010 09/03/2010 09/08/2010 09/10/2010 09/12/2010 09/13/2010 09/13/2010 09/14/2010

9/13/2010. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/23/2010. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/21/2010. (Falzarano, D.) (Entered: 08/23/2010)
563 ORDER Setting Hearing on Motions: Oral argument is scheduled for 9/16/2010 10:00 AM in East Courtroom, 450 Main St., Hartford, CT before Judge Donna F. Martinez as to the Individual Danbury defendants' request 438 for a pre− filing Conference, plaintiff's motion 367 to compel Individual Danbury Defendants' Responses to Plaintiffs' Interrogatories Dated July 28, 2009 and the defendants' motions 534 , 535 for extension of the discovery deadline. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 09/01/2010)
564 ORDER granting 560 plaintiffs' Motion on consent for an Extension of the expert discovery schedule. Plaintiffs shall disclose their experts by 9/14/10 and their depositions shall be completed by 10/31/10. If plaintiffs disclose experts, the Defendants shall disclose their experts by 12/15/10 and their depositions shall be completed by 1/31/11. In the event the Plaintiffs do not disclose experts, the defendants shall disclose their experts by 10/15/10 and their depositions shall be completed by 12/1/10. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 9/2/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 09/02/2010)
565 ORDER: The individual Danbury defendants' and the City of Danbury's motions to compel deposition responses ( 399 429 ) are denied without prejudice. In a good faith effort to resolve this dispute counsel are directed to meet and confer in light of the current state of discovery as it has developed since the filing of these motions as well as the court's ruling in doc. #459. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 9/2/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 09/02/2010)
566 ORDER granting 438 defendants' request for a prefiling Conference. The prefiling conference shall be conducted at the hearing on 9/16/10. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 9/2/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 09/02/2010)
567 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 559 First MOTION to Compel Production of Documents Responsive to Plaintiffs Sixth Request for Production until October 4, 2010 by James Brown, Bruce Chadbourne, Jim Martin, Richard McCaffrey, Ronald Preble, George Sullivan, USA. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez (McConaghy, Michelle) . (Entered: 09/03/2010)
568 ORDER granting 567 Federal defendants' consented−to Motion for Extension of Time until 10/4/10 in which to file a response to the plaintiffs' motion 559 to Compel production of Documents Responsive to Plaintiffs Sixth Request for Production. Defs' responses due by 10/4/2010. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 9/8/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 09/08/2010)
569 ORDER: Plaintiff's 367 Motion to Compel is moot based on the moving party's representation that counsel have resolved their dispute. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 9/10/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 09/10/2010)
570 MOTION for Leave to File Law Student Appearance for Amanda Gutierrez by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit law student certification, # 2 Exhibit client certification)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Wishnie, Michael) . (Entered: 09/12/2010)
571 "DOCKETED IN ERROR" NOTICE by City Of Danbury re 535 MOTION for Extension of Time until December 15, 2010 , 464 Order, Withdrawal of the Motion For Extension of Time (Casagrande, Daniel) Modified on 9/14/2010 (Blue, A.). (Entered: 09/13/2010)
572 MOTION to Withdraw 535 MOTION for Extension of Time until December 15, 2010, 464 Order, by City Of Danbury. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Blue, A.) (Entered: 09/14/2010)
573 MOTION to Withdraw 534 MOTION for Extension of Time until December 15, 2010 464 Order,, by James Brown, Bruce Chadbourne, Jim Martin, Richard McCaffrey, Ronald Preble, George Sullivan, USA. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Morabito, Douglas) (Entered: 09/14/2010)

Case: 3:07-cv-01436-RNC As of: 04/30/2011 07:52 AM EDT 91 of 96

09/15/2010 09/15/2010 09/15/2010 09/15/2010 09/15/2010 09/15/2010
09/15/2010
09/16/2010 09/16/2010 09/17/2010
09/20/2010 09/20/2010 09/27/2010
09/28/2010 09/30/2010 09/30/2010

574 ORDER granting 570 Motion for Leave to File for Law Student Intern AMANDA GUTIERREZ to Appear. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 9/15/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 09/15/2010)
575 ORDER granting 573 Federal Defendants' Motion to Withdraw their motion 534 for Extension of Time until December 15, 2010 464 Order. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 9/15/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 09/15/2010)
576 ORDER: The Federal Defendants' motion 534 for Extension of Time is withdrawn at the request of the moving parties. See doc. 573. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 9/15/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 09/15/2010)
577 ORDER granting 572 Motion to Withdraw 535 the motion for Extension of Time until December 15, 2010. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 9/15/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 09/15/2010)
578 ORDER withdrawing 535 Motion for Extension of Time at the request of the moving party. See doc. 571. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 9/15/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 09/15/2010)
579 ORDER &NOTICE: Oral argument scheduled for 9/16/10 is cancelled in light of the resolution of the motions scheduled for argument. A telephonic status conference is scheduled for Tuesday, 10/5/10 at 3:00 p.m. Plaintiff's counsel shall initiate the conference call and shall have opposing counsel on the line when calling chambers at (860) 240 3605. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 09/15/2010)
580 MOTION for Catherine S. Nietzel, Esq. to Withdraw as Attorney by Jose Agosto, Alan Baker, Mark Boughton, Richard DeJesus, John Does(I/O, 1−8), James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Julio Lopez, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, Luis Ramos, Mitchell Weston. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Nietzel, Catherine) (Entered: 09/15/2010)
581 ORDER granting 580 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Catherine S. Nietzel terminated. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 9/16/10. (Martinez, Donna) (Entered: 09/16/2010)
582 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time until November 15, 2010 to Disclose Defendants' Expert Witnesses by James Brown, Bruce Chadbourne, Jim Martin, Richard McCaffrey, Ronald Preble, George Sullivan, USA. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(McConaghy, Michelle) (Entered: 09/16/2010)
583 MOTION for Extension of Time until 11/15/2010 to file disclosure of experts by Jose Agosto, Alan Baker, Mark Boughton, City Of Danbury, Richard DeJesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Julio Lopez, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, Luis Ramos, Mitchell Weston. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Casagrande, Daniel) (Entered: 09/17/2010)
584 ORDER granting 583 Motion for Extension of Time. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 9/20/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 09/20/2010)
585 ORDER granting 582 Motion for Extension of Time absent objection. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 9/20/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 09/20/2010)
586 MOTION for Extension of Time to Extend Fact Discovery to Conduct Deposition of Maria−Cinta Lowe by Jose Agosto, Alan Baker, Mark Boughton, Richard DeJesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Julio Lopez, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, Luis Ramos, Mitchell Weston. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Wright, William) (Entered: 09/27/2010)
587 MOTION for Extension of Time of Fact Discovery Deadline by City Of Danbury. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Casagrande, Daniel) (Entered: 09/28/2010)
588 ORDER granting in part and denying in part Plaintiffs' Motion 292 to Compel and denying 295 Motion for Cost and Fees. See attached ruling. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 9/30/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 09/30/2010)
589 ORDER granting the defendants' motions 586 587 for extension of the discovery deadline for the limited purpose of deposing Ms. Lowe. The deposition shall be completed by October 22, 2010. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 9/30/10.

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09/30/2010 10/01/2010 10/04/2010
10/04/2010
10/05/2010 10/05/2010 10/05/2010 10/07/2010 10/12/2010
10/12/2010
10/13/2010 10/13/2010 10/13/2010 10/15/2010

(Constantine, A.) (Entered: 09/30/2010)
590 MOTION for Siham Nurhussein to Withdraw as Attorney for Plaintiffs by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez (Nurhussein, Siham) . (Entered: 09/30/2010)
591 ORDER granting 590 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Siham Nurhussein terminated as counsel. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 10/1/10. (Martinez, Donna) (Entered: 10/01/2010)
592 "DOCKETED IN ERROR" NOTICE by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana re 559 First MOTION to Compel Production of Documents Responsive to Plaintiffs Sixth Request for Production Withdrawal of the Motion to Compel (Wishnie, Michael) Modified on 10/5/2010 (Blue, A.). (Entered: 10/04/2010)
593 MOTION to Withdraw 559 First MOTION to Compel Production of Documents Responsive to Plaintiffs Sixth Request for Production by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Blue, A.) (Entered: 10/05/2010)
594 ORDER granting 593 Motion to Withdraw 559 First MOTION to Compel Production of Documents Responsive to Plaintiffs Sixth Request for Production. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 10/5/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 10/05/2010)
595 ORDER: Plaintiffs' motion 559 to Compel is withdrawn at the request of the moving party. See doc. #592. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 10/5/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 10/05/2010)
597 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Donna F. Martinez: Telephonic Status Conference held on 10/5/2010. Time 50 minutes (Wood, R.) (Entered: 10/07/2010)
596 ORDER &CALENDAR: A Settlement Conference is scheduled for 11/23/2010 at 11:00 AM in Chambers Room 262, 450 Main St., Hartford, CT with Judge Donna F. Martinez. See attached order for important instructions. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 10/07/2010)
598 MOTION for Leave to File Law Student Appearance for Jingni Zhao by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit − Student Certification, # 2 Exhibit − Client and Attorney Certification) Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez (Wishnie, Michael) . (Entered: 10/12/2010)
599 MOTION for Leave to File Law Student Appearance for Crystal Robles by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit − Student Certification, # 2 Exhibit − Client and Attorney Certification) Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez (Wishnie, Michael) . (Entered: 10/12/2010)
600 First MOTION for Extension of Time until October 29, 2010 to comply with the Court's September 28, 2010 Order by City Of Danbury, Mark Boughton. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez (Casagrande, Daniel) . (Entered: 10/13/2010)
601 ORDER granting 598 plaintiffs' motion for Leave for law Student intern JINGNI ZHAO to appear. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 10/13/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 10/13/2010)
602 ORDER granting 599 plaintiffs' Motion for Leave for law student CRYSTAL ROBLES to appear. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 10/13/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 10/13/2010)
603 ORDER: The defendants' motion 600 for an extension of time is granted in part. The defendants' production shall be due by 10/25/10. With regard to any delay

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10/20/2010 10/26/2010
10/26/2010 11/02/2010 11/15/2010 11/15/2010
11/23/2010 11/29/2010 12/03/2010
12/07/2010 12/10/2010

attributable to a privilege review, counsel's attention is directed to the possibility of a "quick peek" or "claw back" agreement, to the provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5) and to Fed. R. Evid. 502(d) which authorizes a court order to protect against waiver of privilege. See also The Sedona Principles − Second Edition: Best Practices Recommendations and Principles for Addressing Electronic Document Production, June 2007 Cmt. 10.a, page 159 ("Because of the large volumes typically involved when electronically stored information is produced, parties should consider entering into agreements among themselves, including nonwaiver agreements, which outline the procedures to be followed to protect against any waiver of privilege or work product protection due to the inadvertent production of documents and data.") Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 10/15/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 10/15/2010)
604 MOTION for Entry of "Clawback" Agreement as Order by City Of Danbury. (Casagrande, Daniel) (Entered: 10/20/2010)
605 MOTION for Leave to Appear pro hac vice Attorney Lisa Debin Keith. Filing Fee $25.00 Receipt Number H032100, by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Blue, A.) (Entered: 10/26/2010)
606 ORDER granting 605 Motion to Appear pro hac vice Attorney Lisa Debin Keith, Signed by Clerk on 10/26/10. (Blue, A.) (Entered: 10/26/2010)
607 ORDER granting 604 absent objection the defendant City of Danbury's motion for entry of a "clawback" agreement. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 11/2/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 11/02/2010)
608 "DOCKETED IN ERROR" NOTICE by James Brown, Bruce Chadbourne, Jim Martin, Richard McCaffrey, Ronald Preble, George Sullivan, USA of designation of expert (Nelson, David) Modified on 11/16/2010 (Blue, A.). (Entered: 11/15/2010)
609 "DOCKETED IN ERROR" NOTICE by Jose Agosto, Alan Baker, Mark Boughton, City Of Danbury, Richard DeJesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Julio Lopez, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, Luis Ramos, Mitchell Weston of Designation of Expert (Wright, William) Modified on 11/16/2010 (Blue, A.). (Entered: 11/15/2010)
610 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Donna F. Martinez: Settlement Conference held on 11/23/2010. Case did not settle. Total Time: 6 hours and 30 minutes (Martinez, Donna) (Entered: 11/23/2010)
611 ORDER: A telephonic conference is scheduled with lead counsel on 12/14/2010 at 10:30 AM with Judge Martinez. Counsel for the plaintiffs shall initiate the conference call and have opposing counsel on the line when calling chambers at (860) 240 3605.(Constantine, A.) (Entered: 11/29/2010)
612 MOTION for Extension of Time for Expert Discovery by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Certificate of Service) Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez (La Perla, Joseph). (Entered: 12/03/2010)
613 RESPONSE re 612 MOTION for Extension of Time for Expert Discovery filed by James Brown, Bruce Chadbourne, Jim Martin, Richard McCaffrey, Ronald Preble, George Sullivan, USA. (Nelson, David) . (Entered: 12/07/2010)
614 MOTION to Compel Danbury Defendants to Produce Additional Electronically Stored Documents and a Privilege Log by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana.Responses due by 12/31/2010 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A. Declaration of William Han, # 2 Exhibit B. Boughton Deposition Transcript Excerpt, # 3 Exhibit C. McLachlan Deposition Transcript Excerpt, # 4 Exhibit D. Myles Deposition Transcript Excerpt, # 5 Exhibit E. Shanahan Deposition Transcript Excerpt, # 6 Exhibit F. CITYESI0077320, # 7 Exhibit G.

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12/13/2010 12/15/2010 12/16/2010 12/16/2010 12/21/2010 12/22/2010
01/04/2011 01/04/2011 01/04/2011 01/05/2011 01/11/2011 02/03/2011

CITYESI0068043, # 8 Exhibit H. CITYESI0050269, # 9 Exhibit I. CITYESI0012604, # 10 Text of Proposed Order, # 11 Certificate of Service)Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(La Perla, Joseph) . (Entered: 12/10/2010)
615 REPLY to Response to 612 MOTION for Extension of Time for Expert Discovery filed by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(La Perla, Joseph) . (Entered: 12/13/2010)
616 MOTION for Clarisse N. Thomas to Withdraw as Attorney by Jose Agosto, Alan Baker, Mark Boughton, Richard DeJesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Julio Lopez, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, Luis Ramos, Mitchell Weston. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Thomas, Clarisse) (Entered: 12/15/2010)
617 OBJECTION re 612 MOTION for Extension of Time for Expert Discovery filed by Jose Agosto, Alan Baker, Mark Boughton, City Of Danbury, Richard DeJesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Julio Lopez, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, Luis Ramos, Mitchell Weston. (Casagrande, Daniel) (Entered: 12/16/2010)
618 ORDER granting 616 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Clarisse Nicole Thomas terminated. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 12/16/10. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 12/16/2010)
619 STIPULATION re 617 Objection, by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Certificate of Service)(La Perla, Joseph) (Entered: 12/21/2010)
620 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 614 MOTION to Compel Danbury Defendants to Produce Additional Electronically Stored Documents and a Privilege Log until January 15, 2011 by Jose Agosto, Alan Baker, Mark Boughton, City Of Danbury, Richard DeJesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Julio Lopez, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, Luis Ramos, Mitchell Weston. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Casagrande, Daniel) . (Entered: 12/22/2010)
621 ORDER : A conference call with lead counsel is scheduled for Tuesday 1/18/2011 at 1:00 PM with Judge Martinez regarding the status of settlement negotiations. Plaintiff's counsel shall initiate the conference call and shall have opposing counsel on the line when calling chambers at (860) 240 3605. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 01/04/2011)
622 ORDER granting 620 on consent the Danbury defendants' Motion for Extension of Time until 1/15/11 in which to file a response to the plaintiffs' motion to compel. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 1/4/11. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 01/04/2011)
Set/Reset Deadlines as to 614 MOTION to Compel Danbury Defendants to Produce Additional Electronically Stored Documents and a Privilege Log. Responses due by 1/15/2011 (Blue, A.) (Entered: 01/06/2011)
623 ORDER: The conference call with Judge Martinez is RESCHEDULED at the request of counsel to Tuesday 1/11/2011 at 2:45 PM. Plaintiff's counsel shall initiate the conference call and shall have opposing counsel on the line when calling chambers at (860) 240 3605. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 01/05/2011)
624 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Donna F. Martinez: Telephonic Settlement Conference held on 1/11/2011. 55 minutes (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 01/11/2011)
625 ORDER : A settlement conference for all parties is scheduled for 2/25/2011 at 11:00 AM in Chambers Room 262, 450 Main St., Hartford, CT before Judge Donna F. Martinez. Karen Smith of ICE's Office of the Principal Legal Advisor shall attend on behalf of the federal defendants. See attached order for instructions. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 2/3/11. (Constantine, A.) (Entered: 02/03/2011)

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02/23/2011
02/25/2011 02/25/2011
02/25/2011 02/25/2011 02/25/2011

626 NOTICE of Appearance by Catherine S. Nietzel on behalf of Jose Agosto, Alan Baker, Mark Boughton, Richard DeJesus, John Does(I/O, 1−8), James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, Luis Ramos, Mitchell Weston (Nietzel, Catherine) (Entered: 02/23/2011)
627 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Donna F. Martinez: Settlement Conference held on 2/25/2011. Case settled. Total Time: 3 hours (Martinez, Donna) (Entered: 02/25/2011)
628 ORDER denying 378 Motion to Dismiss; denying 612 Motion for Extension of Time ; denying 614 Motion to Compel. These motions are all denied without prejudice in light of the reported settlement of the case. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 2/25/11. (Martinez, Donna) (Entered: 02/25/2011)
629 ORDER DISMISSING CASE.Case reported settled. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 2/25/11. (Glynn, T.) (Glynn, T.). (Entered: 02/25/2011)
Docket Entry Correction re 629 Order Dismissing Case. Modified to attach pdf to docket. (Glynn, T.) (Entered: 02/25/2011)
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS SURVEY: The following link to the survey requires you to log into CM/ECF for SECURITY purposes. Once in CM/ECF you will be prompted for the case number. Upon entering the survey, all responses are completely anonymous.

03/24/2011 03/24/2011
03/25/2011
03/25/2011 03/25/2011 03/25/2011 04/08/2011 04/08/2011

https://ecf.ctd.uscourts.gov/cgi−bin/Dispatch.pl?survey (Glynn, T.) (Entered: 02/25/2011)
630 First MOTION for Extension of Time until 4/24/2011 to file stipulation of dismissal by Juan Barrera, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, Jose Llibisupa, Isaac Maldonado, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Wishnie, Michael) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
631 ENTERED IN ERROR − STIPULATION of Dismissal by Jose Agosto, Alan Baker, Juan Barrera, Mark Boughton, Jose Cabrera, Daniel Chavez, City Of Danbury, Richard DeJesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Jose Llibisupa, Julio Lopez, Isaac Maldonado, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, Luis Ramos, Edgar Redrovan, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Mitchell Weston. (Casagrande, Daniel) Modified on 3/25/2011−entered in error (Glynn, T.). (Entered: 03/24/2011)
632 ENTERED IN ERROR − ORDERED ACCORDINGLY re 631 Stipulation of Dismissal, filed by James Lalli, Jose Agosto, City Of Danbury, Juan Barrera, James A. Fisher, Mark Boughton, Jose Llibisupa, Daniel Chavez, Alan Baker, Mitchell Weston, Julio Lopez, Nicholas Segundo Sanchez, Juan Carlos Simbana, Craig Martin, Edgar Redrovan, Jose Cabrera, Luis Ramos, Joseph Norkus, Isaac Maldonado, Richard DeJesus. Signed by Clerk on 3/25/11. (Glynn, T.) Modified on 3/25/2011 as stipulation was not suppose to be entered (Glynn, T.). (Entered: 03/25/2011)
633 ORDER granting 630 Motion for Extension of Time to 4/24/11 to file stipulation of dismissal. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 3/25/11. (Macare, L.) (Entered: 03/25/2011)
ENTERED IN ERROR − Docket Entry Correction re 632 Ordered accordingly re−stipulation (Glynn, T.) (Entered: 03/25/2011)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Stipulation of Dismissal due by 4/24/2011 (Glynn, T.) (Entered: 03/28/2011)
634 STIPULATION of Dismissal of Parties by Jose Agosto, Alan Baker, Mark Boughton, City Of Danbury, Richard DeJesus, James A. Fisher, James Lalli, Julio Lopez, Craig Martin, Joseph Norkus, Luis Ramos, Mitchell Weston. (Casagrande, Daniel) (Entered: 04/08/2011)
635 STIPULATION of Dismissal of case by James Brown, Bruce Chadbourne, Jim Martin, Richard McCaffrey, Ronald Preble, George Sullivan, USA. (McConaghy, Michelle) (Entered: 04/08/2011)

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04/11/2011 04/11/2011

636 ORDERED ACCORDINGLY re 634 Stipulation of Dismissal filed by Alan Baker, James Lalli, Mitchell Weston, Jose Agosto, City Of Danbury, Julio Lopez, James A. Fisher, Mark Boughton, Craig Martin, Luis Ramos, Joseph Norkus, Richard DeJesus. Signed by Clerk on 4/11/11. (Glynn, T.) (Entered: 04/11/2011)
637 ORDERED ACCORDINGLY re 635 Stipulation of Dismissal filed by Richard McCaffrey, Ronald Preble, Bruce Chadbourne, George Sullivan, Jim Martin, James Brown, USA. Signed by Clerk on 4/11/11. (Glynn, T.) (Entered: 04/11/2011)

 
 Mayor Boughton Addresses "Danbury 11" Lawsuit
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Contact: Michael McLachlan 203-797-4511 September 26, 2007
MAYOR BOUGHTON ADDRESSES “DANBURY 11” LAWSUIT
In response to a lawsuit filed by lawyers representing ten people claiming racial profiling and flawed arrests, Mayor Mark Boughton held a press conference today at City Hall. During the press conference Mayor Boughton answered reporters’ questions and explained, “This lawsuit is all about politics of immigration, driven by a group from Yale Law School that wish to silence my views on the urgent need for immigration reform in this country.”
Mayor Boughton was unable to comment on details of the complaint saying, “I have not seen or reviewed the complaint with my attorneys because Yale did not have the courtesy to provide me a copy.”
The City of Danbury plans to mount a vigorous defense of this lawsuit. The city is apparently being sued for civil rights violations claiming racial profiling, targeting Latinos and flawed arrests. Danbury Police routinely assist Federal and State law enforcement agencies as standard operating procedures similar to every local law enforcement agency in the United States. Danbury has continued to be open and forthcoming with the plaintiffs and all parties requesting information on this matter, including extensive F.O.I. disclosures over the last year.
Danbury Police Chief Alan Baker explained, “Danbury has not and will not participated in law enforcement racial profiling activities.”
“The lawsuit is not just against the Mayor and Chief of Police but it is against the citizens of Danbury who clearly want our laws enforced fairly and firmly.” Mayor Boughton added.
Mayor Boughton has supported federal immigration reform that addresses the challenges of Danbury and communities across the country. The Mayor expressed his concerns about the lack of meaningful immigration reform measures that include border protection, interior enforcement and a measured approach to addressing millions of illegal aliens residing here. Mayor Boughton previously asked the Connecticut State Police to develop a strategic partnership with federal immigration authorities to address concerns in Danbury and other communities across the state, however the request was denied.
Note: If you have any questions regarding this press release, please call Michael McLachlan at 203-797-4511

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http://www.ci.danbury.ct.us/tempstorage/Printable_10771_0_2872.aspx

2/26/2008