United States District Court Northern District of Illinois - CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.3.3 (Chicago)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:20-cv-02137

Barnes v. Jeffreys Assigned to: Honorable Virginia M. Kendall related Case: 1:16-cv-11471 Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

Date Filed: 04/05/2020 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Plaintiff Marcus Barnes

represented by Mark G. Weinberg Attorney at Law 3612 North Tripp Chicago, IL 60641 (312) 283-3913 Email: mweinberg@sbcglobal.net LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Adele D. Nicholas Law Office of Adele D. Nicholas 5707 W. Goodman Chicago, IL 60630 847 361 3869 Email: adele@civilrightschicago.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Mark Faller

represented by Adele D. Nicholas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jonathan Sparks

represented by Adele D. Nicholas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Paul Hubbard

represented by Adele D. Nicholas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff David Easton
Plaintiff Kenneth Green
Plaintiff Wade Council
Plaintiff John Margarella
Plaintiff Fredrick Chamblis
Plaintiff Kenneth Schroeder
Plaintiff Joshua Atkins
Plaintiff Columbo Galindo
Plaintiff

represented by Adele D. Nicholas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Adele D. Nicholas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Adele D. Nicholas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Adele D. Nicholas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Adele D. Nicholas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Adele D. Nicholas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Adele D. Nicholas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Adele D. Nicholas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher Shelton
Plaintiff Dana Monson
Plaintiff Andra Sampson
Plaintiff Corey Crowe
Plaintiff Joshua Huddleston
V. Defendant Director of IDOC Rob Jeffreys

represented by Adele D. Nicholas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Adele D. Nicholas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Adele D. Nicholas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Adele D. Nicholas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Adele D. Nicholas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Sarah Hughes Newman Illinois Attorney General 100 W. Randolph Street Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 814-6131 Email: snewman@atg.state.il.us LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael T. Dierkes Illinois Attorney General's Office (100 West Randolph) 100 West Randolph Street 13th Floor Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 814-3672

Email: mdierkes@atg.state.il.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sunil Shashikant Bhave Illinois Attorney General 100 W. Randolph St., 13th Floor Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 814-2098 Email: sbhave@atg.state.il.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 04/05/2020
04/05/2020 04/05/2020
04/05/2020 04/06/2020 04/06/2020
04/06/2020

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT filed by Marcus Barnes; Filing fee $ 400, receipt number 0752-16912248. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet)(Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 04/05/2020)
2 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Marcus Barnes by Adele D. Nicholas (Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 04/05/2020)
3 MOTION by Plaintiff Marcus Barnes for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Declaration of Delshay McDaniel)(Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 04/05/2020)
4 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Marcus Barnes by Mark G. Weinberg (Weinberg, Mark) (Entered: 04/05/2020)
5 MOTION by Plaintiff Marcus Barnes to certify class (Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 04/06/2020)
CASE ASSIGNED to the Honorable Manish S. Shah. Designated as Magistrate Judge the Honorable Jeffrey Cummings. Case assignment: Random assignment. (axc, ) (Entered: 04/06/2020)
6 NOTICE TO THE PARTIES - The Court is participating in the Mandatory Initial Discovery Pilot (MIDP). The key features and deadlines are set forth in this Notice which includes a link to the (MIDP) Standing Order and a Checklist for use by the parties. In cases subject to the pilot, all parties must respond to the mandatory initial discovery requests set forth in the Standing Order before initiating any further discovery in this case. Please note: The discovery obligations in the Standing Order supersede the disclosures required by Rule 26(a)(1). Any party seeking affirmative relief must serve a copy of the following documents (Notice of Mandatory Initial Discovery and the Standing Order) on each new party when the Complaint, Counterclaim,

Crossclaim, or Third-Party Complaint is served. (nsf, ) (Entered: 04/06/2020)

04/07/2020

7 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. Plaintiffs' Motion to reassign case 20 C 2137 to Judge Kendall based on relatedness (Dkt. 165 in 16 C 11471) is granted. Case 20 C 2137 shall be reassigned to Judge Kendall based on relatedness, as both that case and the instant case, 16 C 11471, rely on the same or similar facts and law. Telephonic Status/Motion hearing set 4/8/2020 at 10:45 AM (courtroom 2503). Call in information as as follows: Toll-Free Call-in Number: (877) 848-7030; Conference Access Code: 2413900.Mailed notice (lk, ) (Entered: 04/07/2020)

04/07/2020 8 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Rob Jeffreys by Sarah Hughes Newman (Newman, Sarah) (Entered: 04/07/2020)

04/07/2020 9 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Rob Jeffreys by Sunil Shashikant Bhave (Bhave, Sunil) (Entered: 04/07/2020)

04/08/2020 10 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Rob Jeffreys by Michael T. Dierkes (Dierkes, Michael) (Entered: 04/08/2020)

04/08/2020

11 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. Motion hearing held on 4/8/2020 regarding Plaintiff's Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction 3 (Dkt. 154 in 20 C 1792). Plaintiff has completed his sentence and remains detained because of the "One Person Per Address" provision in 730 ILCS 5/3-37(a)(7.6). This Court has already held that detaining sex offenders long after their period of incarceration has been completed is unconstitutional. See Murphy v. Raoul, 380 F. Supp. 3rd 781 (N.D. Ill. 2019). Here, Plaintiff has found a place to live that will be supportive of his transfer back into the community. The building is operated by Jordan's Dreams, a nonprofit organization aiding individuals in assimilating back into the community. Another sex offender resides in the building already and therefore Defendants will not permit him to reside there. Plaintiff is clearly suffering a constitutional harm each day he is detained past his release date (which is now nearly a year and a half) and that harm can only be remedied by release. In response to the question about what penological or rehabilitative support the Defendants have for the "one Person One Address" provision, Defendants were unable to give any. The public's interest in only have one sex offender live at one residence is not supported by any testimony, expert opinion, or evidence. Therefore, the Court finds that the statute is unconstitutional as it applies to Plaintiff and Defendants are enjoined from prohibiting his release to the address presented by Plaintiff. To the extent that the COVID-19 situation in the facility plays a factor, it is only minor at this stage

because of the speculative nature of the claim that he could be harmed. Yet certainly, being held in a facility where he may be exposed to the virus is not taken lightly, his real harm at this stage is his continued incarceration beyond his release date when he has a suitable location to live.Mailed notice (lk, ) (Entered: 04/08/2020)

04/08/2020

12 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ORDER: Case reassigned to the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall for all further proceedings. Honorable Manish S. Shah no longer assigned to the case. Signed by Executive Committee on 4/7/2020.(nsf, ) (Entered: 04/08/2020)

04/13/2020 13 WAIVER OF SERVICE returned executed by Marcus Barnes. Rob Jeffreys waiver sent on 4/6/2020, answer due 6/5/2020. (Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 04/13/2020)

04/14/2020

14 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. Initial status hearing set for 7/16/2020 at 9:00 a.m. Joint Status Report due by 7/13/2020. The parties are directed to Judge Kendall's web page found at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov for information about the Initial Status Report and for information regarding all standing orders for cases on Judge Kendall's docket. The parties shall follow all of the standing orders for Judge Kendall and all Local Rules which can be found at the same web page. For the Initial Status Report, the parties are to report on the following: (1) Possibility of settlement in the case; (2) if no possibility of settlement exists, the nature and length of discovery necessary (with specific dates) to get the case ready for trial; 3) whether the parties jointly consent to proceed before the Magistrate Judge. At the Initial Status Hearing, the Parties shall be prepared to inform the Court about the extent of monetary damages in order for the Court to address the proportionality of discovery as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. Lead counsel is directed to appear at this status hearing. Mailed notice (lk, ) (Entered: 04/14/2020)

04/24/2020

15 ORDER Third Amended General Order 20-0012 IN RE: CORONAVIRUS COVID-19 PUBLIC EMERGENCY Signed by the Chief Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on April 24, 2020. All open cases are impacted by this Third Amended General Order. Parties are must carefully review all obligations under this Order, including the requirement listed in paragraph number 5 to file a joint written status report in most civil cases. See attached Order. Signed by the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 4/24/2020: Mailed notice. (docket9, ) (Entered: 04/27/2020)

04/28/2020

16 First AMENDED complaint by Mark Faller, Jonathan Sparks, Paul Hubbard, David Easton, Kenneth Green, Wade Council, John Margarella, Fredrick Chamblis, Kenneth Schroeder, Joshua Atkins,

Columbo Galindo, Christopher Shelton, Dana Monson, Andra Sampson, Corey Crowe, Joshua Huddleston against All Defendants (Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 04/28/2020)

04/30/2020

17 MOTION by Plaintiffs Joshua Atkins, Fredrick Chamblis, Wade Council, Corey Crowe, David Easton, Mark Faller, Columbo Galindo, Kenneth Green, Paul Hubbard, Joshua Huddleston, John Margarella, Dana Monson, Andra Sampson, Kenneth Schroeder, Christopher Shelton, Jonathan Sparks for preliminary injunction (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit, # 8 Exhibit, # 9 Exhibit, # 10 Exhibit)(Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 04/30/2020)

05/01/2020

18 MOTION by Plaintiffs Joshua Atkins, Fredrick Chamblis, Wade Council, Corey Crowe, David Easton, Mark Faller, Columbo Galindo, Kenneth Green, Paul Hubbard, Joshua Huddleston, John Margarella, Dana Monson, Andra Sampson, Kenneth Schroeder, Christopher Shelton, Jonathan Sparks for hearing re MOTION by Plaintiffs Joshua Atkins, Fredrick Chamblis, Wade Council, Corey Crowe, David Easton, Mark Faller, Columbo Galindo, Kenneth Green, Paul Hubbard, Joshua Huddleston, John Margarella, Dana Monson, Andra Sampson, Kenneth Schroeder, Christopher Sh 17 (Motion for Urgent Telephonic Hearing) (Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 05/01/2020)

05/04/2020

19 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. Plaintiffs' Motion for telephonic hearing 18 regarding Motion for Preliminary Injunction 17 is granted. Telephonic Motion hearing set for 5/6/2020 at 11:30 a.m. The courtroom deputy will contact parties with call in information. Please use the Court's toll free call in number 877 848 7030, conference access code is 2413900. Mailed notice (lk, ) (Entered: 05/04/2020)

05/05/2020

20 MEMORANDUM by Joshua Atkins, Fredrick Chamblis, Wade Council, Corey Crowe, David Easton, Mark Faller, Columbo Galindo, Kenneth Green, Paul Hubbard, Joshua Huddleston, John Margarella, Dana Monson, Andra Sampson, Kenneth Schroeder, Christopher Shelton, Jonathan Sparks in support of motion for preliminary injunction, 17 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit)(Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 05/05/2020)

05/06/2020

21 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. Telephonic Hearing held on 5/6/2020 regarding Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction 17 . Per the discussion held telephonically and on the record, the parties are directed to file a proposed agreed preliminary injunction order as to the plaintiffs specified in the hearing by 5/13/2020. The Court strikes Plaintiffs' motion to certify class 5 . Plaintiffs shall file a revised

motion for class certification on or before 5/13/2020. Response due 5/27/2020. Reply due 6/3/2020. Plaintiffs shall file their dispositive motion on or before 6/19/2020. Response due 7/17/2020. Reply due 7/31/2020. Mailed notice (lk, ) (Entered: 05/06/2020)

05/13/2020 22 ORDER signed by the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 5/13/2020. Mailed notice(lk, ) (Entered: 05/13/2020)

05/13/2020

23 MOTION by Plaintiffs Joshua Atkins, Marcus Barnes, Fredrick Chamblis, Wade Council, Corey Crowe, David Easton, Mark Faller, Columbo Galindo, Kenneth Green, Paul Hubbard, Joshua Huddleston, John Margarella, Dana Monson, Andra Sampson, Kenneth Schroeder, Christopher Shelton, Jonathan Sparks to certify class (Amended Motion) (Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 05/13/2020)

05/26/2020

24 MOTION by Plaintiffs Joshua Atkins, Marcus Barnes, Fredrick Chamblis, Wade Council, Corey Crowe, David Easton, Mark Faller, Columbo Galindo, Kenneth Green, Paul Hubbard, Joshua Huddleston, John Margarella, Dana Monson, Andra Sampson, Kenneth Schroeder, Christopher Shelton, Jonathan Sparks for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint and an Amended Motion for Class Certification Instanter (unopposed motion) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit (Proposed Second Amended Complaint), # 2 Exhibit (Proposed Amended Motion for Class Certification))(Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 05/26/2020)

05/26/2020

25 MOTION by Plaintiffs Joshua Atkins, Marcus Barnes, Fredrick Chamblis, Wade Council, Corey Crowe, David Easton, Mark Faller, Columbo Galindo, Kenneth Green, Paul Hubbard, Joshua Huddleston, John Margarella, Dana Monson, Andra Sampson, Kenneth Schroeder, Christopher Shelton, Jonathan Sparks for preliminary injunction (Emergency Motion) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Declaration of Luis Aponte, # 2 Exhibit Declaration of Kevin Manson, # 3 Exhibit Declaration of Otis Williams)(Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 05/26/2020)

05/26/2020

26 ORDER ORDER Fourth Amended General Order 20-0012 IN RE: CORONAVIRUS COVID-19 PUBLIC EMERGENCY Signed by the Chief Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on May 26, 2020. This Order does not extend or modify any deadlines set in civil cases. For non-emergency motions, no motion may be noticed for presentment on a date earlier than July 15, 2020. See attached Order. Signed by the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 5/26/2020: Mailed notice. (docket10, ) (Entered: 05/26/2020)

05/27/2020

27 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. Telephonic Motion hearing set for 6/1/2020 at 9:15 AM regarding Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Call in information as as follows: Toll-Free Call-

in Number: (877) 848-7030; Conference Access Code: 2413900. Mailed notice (lk, ) (Entered: 05/27/2020)

06/01/2020

28 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. Teleconference Motion hearing held on 6/1/2020. Oral argument heard regarding Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction 25 . For the reasons as stated in open Court, Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction 25 is granted and parties shall submit an agreed Proposed Order to the Court by end of day on 6/1/2020. Plaintiffs' Motion for leave for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint and an Amended Motion for Class Certification Instanter 24 is granted. By agreement of parties, briefing schedule as to Motion for Class Certification is as follows: Defendants response to Plaintiffs' amended Motion Certify Class is due by 6/9/2020; Plaintiffs Reply in support of their Motion to Certify due by 6/16/2020. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment shall be filed by 7/1/2020; Defendants response to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment due by 7/29/2020; Plaintiffs reply in support of Motion for Summary Judgment due by 8/12/2020. Mailed notice. (lk, ) (Entered: 06/01/2020)

06/03/2020 29 ORDER signed by the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 6/3/2020. Mailed notice(lk, ) (Entered: 06/03/2020)

06/09/2020 30 RESPONSE by Defendant Rob Jeffreys to Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for Class Certification (Dkt. 24-2) (Newman, Sarah) (Entered: 06/09/2020)

07/01/2020

31 ORDER signed by the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 7/1/2020. The Court grants Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for Class Certification and for Appointment of Class Counsel 24 . See Order for further details. Mailed notice(lk, ) (Entered: 07/01/2020)

07/01/2020

32 MOTION by Plaintiffs Joshua Atkins, Paul Hubbard, Fredrick Chamblis, Christopher Shelton, Joshua Huddleston, Marcus Barnes, Corey Crowe, Kenneth Schroeder, David Easton, Kenneth Green, Andra Sampson, John Margarella, Columbo Galindo, Wade Council, Mark Faller, Dana Monson, Jonathan Sparks for summary judgment (Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 07/02/2020)

07/02/2020

33 RULE 56 (a) Statement by Joshua Atkins, Marcus Barnes, Fredrick Chamblis, Wade Council, Corey Crowe, David Easton, Mark Faller, Columbo Galindo, Kenneth Green, Paul Hubbard, Joshua Huddleston, John Margarella, Dana Monson, Andra Sampson, Kenneth Schroeder, Christopher Shelton, Jonathan Sparks regarding motion for summary judgment, 32 (Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 07/02/2020)

07/02/2020

34 APPENDIX motion for summary judgment, 32 , Rule 56 statement, 33 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit, # 8 Exhibit, # 9 Exhibit, # 10 Exhibit, # 11 Exhibit, # 12 Exhibit, # 13 Exhibit, # 14 Exhibit, # 15 Exhibit, # 16 Exhibit, # 17 Exhibit, # 18 Exhibit, # 19 Exhibit)(Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 07/02/2020)

07/02/2020

35 MOTION by Plaintiffs Joshua Atkins, Marcus Barnes, Fredrick Chamblis, Wade Council, Corey Crowe, David Easton, Mark Faller, Columbo Galindo, Kenneth Green, Paul Hubbard, Joshua Huddleston, John Margarella, Dana Monson, Andra Sampson, Kenneth Schroeder, Christopher Shelton, Jonathan Sparks for leave to file an oversized brief in support of their motion for summary judgment and their L.R. 56.1 statement (unopposed) (Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 07/02/2020)

07/02/2020 36 MOTION by Defendant Rob Jeffreys to stay answer to Second Amended Complaint (Unopposed) (Newman, Sarah) (Entered: 07/02/2020)

07/06/2020

37 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. Plaintiff's Motion to file Motion for leave to file an oversized brief in support of their motion for summary judgment and their L.R. 56.1 statement instanter 35 is granted. Defendant's Unopposed Motion to stay answer pending resolution of Motion for Summary Judgment 36 is granted. Mailed notice (lk, ) (Entered: 07/06/2020)

07/10/2020

38 ORDER Fifth Amended General Order 20-0012 IN RE: CORONAVIRUS COVID-19 PUBLIC EMERGENCY Signed by the Chief Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on July 10, 2020. This Order does not extend or modify any deadlines set in civil cases. No motions may be noticed for in-person presentment; the presiding judge will notify parties of the need, if any, for a hearing by electronic means or in-court proceeding. See attached Order. Signed by the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 7/10/2020: Mailed notice. (Clerk9, Docket) (Entered: 07/10/2020)

07/14/2020 39 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. Status hearing set for 7/16/2020 is stricken. Mailed notice (lk, ) (Entered: 07/14/2020)

07/29/2020

40 MOTION by Defendant Rob Jeffreys for extension of time to file response/reply as to motion for summary judgment, 32 (Unopposed) (Newman, Sarah) (Entered: 07/29/2020)

07/30/2020 41 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. Defendants' Unopposed Motion for extension of time to file response/reply 40 regarding Motion for summary judgment 32 .

Response due by 8/12/2020. Reply due by 8/26/2020. Mailed notice (lk, ) (Entered: 07/30/2020)

08/05/2020

42 MOTION by Plaintiff Marcus Barnes for preliminary injunction (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit)(Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 08/05/2020)

08/05/2020

43 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. Teleconference Motion hearing set for 8/7/2020 at 1:00 PM. Prior to the conference call, Please click on this hyper link: https://teleconference.uc.att.com/ecm/?bp=4044432170&mac=2413900 to take you to Judge Kendall's telephone conference login. From there, join conference As Guest, ENTER YOUR NAME, Type the digits in the picture, Click on the Call Me option and fill in your phone number (no hypens) and NAME. If you do not have access to a computer Dial: (877)848-7030, the access code is: 2413900#. Given the increased volume of users that is anticipated, we ask that you keep your phone on mute until your case is called. Please also remember to SAY YOUR NAME EACH AND EVERY TIME BEFORE YOU SPEAK. The Court prefers that you use the procedure that requires that the system calls your phone and you enter your name so that the Court and the Court reporter can see who is speaking during the hearing. Mailed notice (lk, ) (Entered: 08/05/2020)

08/05/2020

44 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. By request and agreement of Parties, Teleconference Motion hearing set for 8/7/2020 is reset 8/12/2020 at 1:00 PM. Please refer Minute Entry 43 for Teleconference instructions. Mailed notice (lk, ) (Entered: 08/05/2020)

08/11/2020

45 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. On the Court's own Motion, Motion hearing set for 8/12/2020 at 1:00 PM is reset to begin at 2:30 PM (time change only). Prior to the conference call, Please click on this hyper link: https://teleconference.uc.att.com/ecm/?bp=4044432170&mac=2413900 to take you to Judge Kendall's telephone conference login. From there, join conference As Guest, ENTER YOUR NAME, Type the digits in the picture, Click on the Call Me option and fill in your phone number (no hypens) and NAME. If you do not have access to a computer Dial: (877)848-7030, the access code is: 2413900#. Given the increased volume of users that is anticipated, we ask that you keep your phone on mute until your case is called. Please also remember to SAY YOUR NAME EACH AND EVERY TIME BEFORE YOU SPEAK. The Court prefers that you use the procedure that requires that the system calls your phone and you enter your name so that the Court and the Court reporter can see who is speaking during the hearing.Mailed notice (lk, ) (Entered: 08/11/2020)

08/11/2020 46 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. By request of Counsel, Motion hearing set for 8/12/2020 at 2:30 PM, is reset for 3:00 PM (time change only). Mailed notice (lk, ) (Entered: 08/11/2020)

08/12/2020 47 MOTION by Plaintiff Marcus Barnes for preliminary injunction Amended Motion (Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 08/12/2020)

08/12/2020

48 RESPONSE by Rob Jeffreys to MOTION by Plaintiffs Joshua Atkins, Paul Hubbard, Fredrick Chamblis, Christopher Shelton, Joshua Huddleston, Marcus Barnes, Corey Crowe, Kenneth Schroeder, David Easton, Kenneth Green, Andra Sampson, John Margarella, Columbo Galindo, Wade Council, Mark 32 (Newman, Sarah) (Entered: 08/12/2020)

08/12/2020 49 RESPONSE by Defendant Rob Jeffreys to Rule 56 statement, 33 (Newman, Sarah) (Entered: 08/12/2020)

08/12/2020

50 RULE 56 L.R. 56.1(b) Statement by Rob Jeffreys regarding motion for summary judgment, 32 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, Excerpts from the Deposition of Dion Dixon in Murphy v. Raoul, # 2 Exhibit 2, Defendants' Compliance Plan in Murphy v. Raoul, # 3 Exhibit 3, Declaration of Dion Dixon)(Newman, Sarah) (Entered: 08/12/2020)

08/12/2020

51 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. Teleconference Motion hearing held on 8/12/2020. Oral argument heard regarding Plaintiff's Amended Motion for Preliminary Injunction 47 . Plaintiff's Amended Motion for Preliminary Injunction 47 is granted. Order to follow. Mailed notice (lk, ) (Entered: 08/14/2020)

08/13/2020

52 ORDER on Plaintiff's Fourth Motion for a Preliminary Injunction signed by the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 8/13/2020. Mailed notice(lk, ) (Entered: 08/14/2020)

08/26/2020

53 REPLY by Joshua Atkins, Marcus Barnes, Fredrick Chamblis, Wade Council, Corey Crowe, David Easton, Mark Faller, Columbo Galindo, Kenneth Green, Paul Hubbard, Joshua Huddleston, John Margarella, Dana Monson, Andra Sampson, Kenneth Schroeder, Christopher Shelton, Jonathan Sparks to Response 49 reply in support of plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment (Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 08/26/2020)

08/26/2020

54 RULE 56 (a)(3) Statement by Joshua Atkins, Marcus Barnes, Fredrick Chamblis, Wade Council, Corey Crowe, David Easton, Mark Faller, Columbo Galindo, Kenneth Green, Paul Hubbard, Joshua Huddleston, John Margarella, Dana Monson, Andra Sampson, Kenneth Schroeder, Christopher Shelton, Jonathan Sparks regarding motion for summary judgment, 32 response to Defendant's Statement of Additional Material

Facts (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit)(Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 08/26/2020)

08/26/2020

55 MOTION by Plaintiffs Joshua Atkins, Marcus Barnes, Fredrick Chamblis, Wade Council, Corey Crowe, David Easton, Mark Faller, Columbo Galindo, Kenneth Green, Paul Hubbard, Joshua Huddleston, John Margarella, Dana Monson, Andra Sampson, Kenneth Schroeder, Christopher Shelton, Jonathan Sparks for leave to file (Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 08/26/2020)

08/27/2020 56 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for leave to file excess pages in support of Reply Brief Instanter 55 is granted. Mailed notice (lk, ) (Entered: 08/27/2020)

09/09/2020 57 MOTION by Plaintiff Marcus Barnes for preliminary injunction (Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 09/09/2020)

09/09/2020

58 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. By agreement of Parties, Motion hearing set for 9/10/2020 at 2:00 PM which will proceed via Teleconference. Set deadlines/hearing as to motion for preliminary injunction 57 : Motion Hearing set for 9/10/2020 at 02:00 PM. Prior to the conference call, Please click on this hyper link: https://teleconference.uc.att.com/ecm/?bp=4044432170&mac=2413900 to take you to Judge Kendall's telephone conference login. From there, join conference As Guest, ENTER YOUR NAME, Type the digits in the picture, Click on the Call Me option and fill in your phone number (no hypens) and NAME. If you do not have access to a computer Dial: (877)848-7030, the access code is: 2413900#. Given the increased volume of users that is anticipated, we ask that you keep your phone on mute until your case is called. Please also remember to SAY YOUR NAME EACH AND EVERY TIME BEFORE YOU SPEAK.The Court prefers that you use the procedure that requires that the system calls your phone and you enter your name so that the Court and the Court reporter can see who is speaking during the hearing.Mailed notice (lk, ) (Entered: 09/09/2020)

09/10/2020

59 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. Teleconference Motion hearing held on 9/10/2020. Oral argument heard regarding Plaintiff's Fifth Motion for Preliminary Injunction 57 . Plaintiff's Fifth Motion for Preliminary Injunction 57 is granted. Order to follow. Mailed notice (lk, ) (Entered: 09/11/2020)

09/11/2020 60 ORDER on Plaintiff's Fifth Motion for Preliminary Injunction signed by the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 9/11/2020. Mailed notice(lk, ) (Entered: 09/11/2020)

09/30/2020 61 MOTION by Plaintiff Marcus Barnes for preliminary injunction (Sixth Motion for a Preliminary Injunction) (Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 09/30/2020)

10/01/2020

62 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. Teleconference Motion hearing set for 10/2/2020 at 2:00 PM. Prior to the conference call, Please click on this hyper link: https://teleconference.uc.att.com/ecm/?bp=4044432170&mac=2413900 to take you to Judge Kendall's telephone conference login. From there, join conference As Guest, ENTER YOUR NAME, Type the digits in the picture, Click on the Call Me option and fill in your phone number (no hypens) and NAME. If you do not have access to a computer Dial: (877)848-7030, the access code is: 2413900#. Given the increased volume of users that is anticipated, we ask that you keep your phone on mute until your case is called. Please also remember to SAY YOUR NAME EACH AND EVERY TIME BEFORE YOU SPEAK. If Parties have issues being heard or hearing, please log off and either call in or log back in. Mailed notice (lk, ) (Entered: 10/01/2020)

10/02/2020

63 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. Teleconference Motion hearing held on 10/2/2020. Oral argument heard regarding Plaintiff's Sixth Motion for Preliminary Injunction 61 . Plaintiff's Sixth Motion for Preliminary Injunction 61 is granted. Parties are to provide the Court with a Proposed Order for review. Mailed notice (lk, ) (Entered: 10/05/2020)

10/06/2020

64 ORDER on Plaintiff's Sixth Motion for Preliminary Injunction signed by the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 10/6/2020. Mailed notice(lk, ) (Entered: 10/06/2020)

11/03/2020 65 MOTION by Plaintiff Marcus Barnes for preliminary injunction (Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 11/03/2020)

11/04/2020

66 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. By agreement of Parties, Teleconference Motion hearing set for 11/10/2020 at 12:30 PM. Prior to the conference call, Please click on this hyper link: https://teleconference.uc.att.com/ecm/?bp=4044432170&mac=2413900 to take you to Judge Kendall's telephone conference login. From there, join conference As Guest, ENTER YOUR NAME, Type the digits in the picture, Click on the Call Me option and fill in your phone number (no hypens) and NAME. If you do not have access to a computer Dial: (877)848-7030, the access code is: 2413900#. Given the increased volume of users that is anticipated, we ask that you keep your phone on mute until your case is called. Please also remember to SAY YOUR NAME EACH AND EVERY TIME BEFORE YOU SPEAK. The Court is also asking that speaker phone not be used. Please consider the sound

quality when utilizing certain devices. If Parties have issues being heard or hearing, please log off and either call in or log back in. Mailed notice (lk, ) (Entered: 11/04/2020)

11/10/2020 67 MOTION by Plaintiff Marcus Barnes to supplement to Seventh Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 11/10/2020)

11/10/2020

68 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. Teleconference Motion hearing held on 11/10/2020. Oral argument heard regarding Plaintiff's Seventh Motions for Preliminary Injunction 65 and 67 . Plaintiff's Sevventh Motion for Preliminary Injunction 65 and 67 are granted. Parties are to provide the Court with a Proposed Order for review. Mailed notice (lk, ) (Entered: 11/12/2020)

11/12/2020

69 ORDER on Plaintiffs' Seventh Motion for a Preliminary Injunction signed by the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 11/12/2020. Mailed notice(lk, ) (Entered: 11/12/2020)

12/09/2020 70 MOTION by Plaintiff Marcus Barnes for preliminary injunction Eighth Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief (Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 12/09/2020)

12/10/2020

71 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. Teleconference Motion hearing set for 12/14/2020 at 10:15 AM. Prior to the conference call, Please click on this hyper link: https://teleconference.uc.att.com/ecm/?bp=4044432170&mac=2413900 to take you to Judge Kendall's telephone conference login. From there, join conference As Guest, ENTER YOUR NAME, Type the digits in the picture, Click on the Call Me option and fill in your phone number (no hypens) and NAME. If you do not have access to a computer Dial: (877)848-7030, the access code is: 2413900#. Given the increased volume of users that is anticipated, we ask that you keep your phone on mute until your case is called. Please also remember to SAY YOUR NAME EACH AND EVERY TIME BEFORE YOU SPEAK. The Court is also asking that speaker phone not be used. Please consider the sound quality when utilizing certain devices. If Parties have issues being heard or hearing, please log off and either call in or log back in. Mailed notice (lk, ) (Entered: 12/10/2020)

12/14/2020

72 MOTION by Plaintiff Marcus Barnes to supplement their eighth preliminary injunction motion (unopposed) (Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 12/14/2020)

12/14/2020

73 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. Teleconference Motion hearing held on 12/14/2020. Oral argument heard regarding Plaintiff's Eighth Motions for Preliminary Injunction 70 and 72 . Plaintiff's Eighth Motions for Preliminary

Injunction 70 and 72 are granted. Parties are to provide the Court with a Proposed Order for review. Mailed notice (lk, ) (Entered: 12/15/2020)

12/16/2020

74 ORDER on Plaintiffs' Eighth Motion for a Preliminary Injunction signed by the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 12/16/2020. Mailed notice(lk, ) (Entered: 12/16/2020)

01/12/2021 75 MOTION by Plaintiff Marcus Barnes for preliminary injunction (Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 01/12/2021)

01/14/2021

76 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. Teleconference Motion Hearing set for 1/21/2021 at 10:30 AM. Prior to the conference call, Please click on this hyper link: https://teleconference.uc.att.com/ecm/?bp=4044432170&mac=2413900 to take you to Judge Kendall's telephone conference login. From there, join conference As Guest, ENTER YOUR NAME, Type the digits in the picture, Click on the Call Me option and fill in your phone number (no hypens) and NAME. If you do not have access to a computer Dial: (877)848-7030, the access code is: 2413900#. Given the increased volume of users that is anticipated, we ask that you keep your phone on mute until your case is called. Please also remember to SAY YOUR NAME EACH AND EVERY TIME BEFORE YOU SPEAK. The Court is also asking that speaker phone not be used. Please consider the sound quality when utilizing certain devices. If Parties have issues being heard or hearing, please log off and either call in or log back in. Mailed notice (lk, ) (Entered: 01/14/2021)

01/21/2021

77 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. Teleconference Motion hearing held on 1/21/2010. Oral argument heard regarding Plaintiff's Ninth Motion for Preliminary Injunction 75 . Plaintiff's Ninth Motion for Preliminary Injunction 75 is granted. Parties are to provide the Court with a Proposed Order for review. Mailed notice (lk, ) (Entered: 01/21/2021)

01/21/2021 78 ORDER on Plaintiffs' Ninth Motion for Preliminary Injunction 75 signed by the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 1/21/2021. Mailed notice(lk, ) (Entered: 01/21/2021)

02/19/2021 79 MOTION by Plaintiff Marcus Barnes for preliminary injunction (Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 02/19/2021)

02/21/2021

80 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. By agreement of Parties, Teleconference Motion hearing set for 2/23/2021 at 10:30 AM regarding Motion for Preliminary Injunction 79 . Prior to the conference call, you are directed to click on this hyper link: https://teleconference.uc.att.com/ecm/?bp=4044432170&mac=2413900. Once you are on Judge Kendall's teleconference page, you are directed to

join the conference as A GUEST. It is imperative that you ENTER YOUR NAME and click on the CALL ME option. Fill in your phone number (no hypens) and NAME. You are directed to use the CALL ME option because your name will appear for the Judge and the Court Reporter and they will better be able to discern who is speaking. If you do not have access to a computer Dial: (877)848-7030, the access code is: 2413900#. Given the increased volume of users that is anticipated, you are directed to mute your phone until your case is called. In spite of using the CALL ME option please also remember to SAY YOUR NAME EACH TIME YOU SPEAK so that the record of the proceedings is accurate. You are directed not to use the speaker phone function and to test the sound quality of your listening and speaking device in advance. If you experience an issue being heard or hearing, please log off and either call in or log back in.The Court prefers that you use the procedure that requires that the system calls your phone and you enter your name so that the Court and the Court reporter can see who is speaking during the hearing. Mailed notice (lk, ) (Entered: 02/21/2021)

02/23/2021

81 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. Teleconference Motion hearing held on 2/23/2021. Oral argument heard regarding Plaintiff's Tenth Motion for Preliminary Injunction 79 . Plaintiff's Tenth Motion for Preliminary Injunction 79 is granted. Parties are to provide the Court with a Proposed Order for review. Mailed notice (lk, ) (Entered: 02/24/2021)

02/24/2021

82 ORDER On Plaintiff's Tenth Motion for Preliminary Injunction Motion signed by the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 2/24/2021. Mailed notice(lk, ) (Entered: 02/24/2021)

02/25/2021

83 MOTION by Plaintiff Marcus Barnes to amend/correct order 82 Unopposed Motion for an Amended Order (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Amended Order)(Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 02/25/2021)

02/26/2021 84 AMENDED Order on Plaintiffs' Tenth Motion for a Preliminary Injunction signed by the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 2/26/2021. Mailed notice(lk, ) (Entered: 02/26/2021)

03/01/2021

85 MOTION by Plaintiff Marcus Barnes for preliminary injunction unopposed motion for emergency injunctive relief (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 03/01/2021)

03/02/2021

86 ORDER on Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief for Class Member Cayce Williams signed by the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 3/2/2021. Mailed notice(lk, ) (Entered: 03/02/2021)

03/11/2021

87 MOTION by Plaintiff Marcus Barnes for preliminary injunction unopposed emergency motion for preliminary injunctive relief for class members Andra Sampson and Jerrand Miller (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 03/11/2021)

PACER Service Center Transaction Receipt

PACER Login:
Description:
Billable Pages:

03/12/2021 10:32:41

CRClearinghouse:2563377:0 Client Code: McEvoy

Docket Report

Search Criteria:

1:20-cv02137

12

Cost:

1.20

 
 Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 1 Filed: 04/05/20 Page 1 of 16 PageID #:1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

MARCUS BARNES, individually and on )

behalf of all others similarly situated, )

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

ROB JEFFREYS, in his official

)

Capacity as the Director of the Illinois )

Department of Corrections,

)

)

Defendant.

)

No. 20-cv-2137

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF

Plaintiff Marcus Barnes, individually and on behalf of all others similarly

situated, complains against Defendant Rob Jeffreys, Director of the Illinois

Department of Corrections, as follows:

NATURE OF THE CASE

1. In the midst of a global pandemic that poses an acute risk to the health and

safety of imprisoned individuals, Plaintiff Marcus Barnes remains imprisoned in

the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) 16 months beyond the completion of

his court-ordered term of imprisonment.

2. On Sunday, April 5, 2020, IDOC confirmed that a staff member at Graham

Correctional Center (where Plaintiff is imprisoned) has been diagnosed with

COVID-19, putting the entire population of individuals imprisoned at Graham in

imminent danger of infection.

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 1 Filed: 04/05/20 Page 2 of 16 PageID #:2
3. As outlined in detail in this Court’s decision in Murphy v. Raoul, 380 F. Supp. 3d 731 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (Kendall, J.) (hereinafter “Murphy”), the IDOC will not release individuals who have an indeterminate term of Mandatory Supervised Release (“MSR”) from prison unless and until they obtain an approved “host site” at which to reside while on MSR. Plaintiff Barnes is a member of the class in Murphy.1
4. After extensive efforts by his family over the past 18 months, Plaintiff Barnes has identified a host site at which to serve his MSR time that meets almost every restriction imposed by Illinois law—it is more than 500 feet away from any schools, playgrounds, and daycares (720 ILCS 5/11-9.3 (b-5), (b-10)); and it is not “near” any “parks, … swimming pools, beaches, theaters, or any other places where minor children congregate.” (730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(b-1)(12)).
5. The sole reason the IDOC will not release Barnes to this host site is because another individual who is required to register as a sex offender lives at the same address, and Illinois law prohibits individuals on MSR for sex offenses from living “at the same address or in the same condominium unit or apartment unit or in the same condominium complex or apartment complex with another person he or she knows or reasonably should know is a convicted sex offender or has been placed on supervision for a sex offense.” 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6) (hereinafter the “One-PerAddress Statute”).
6. Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, contends that continued enforcement of the One-Per-Address Statute violates the Eighth
1 This case is being filed as “related” to Murphy v. Raoul, 16-cv-11471 and should be assigned to Judge Kendall pursuant to L.R. 40.4(a).
2

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 1 Filed: 04/05/20 Page 3 of 16 PageID #:3
Amendment as applied to members of the Murphy class and seeks an injunction prohibiting Defendant Jeffreys from continuing to enforce the Statute.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 7. Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 2201. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202 and Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court has jurisdiction to declare the rights of the parties and to grant all further relief deemed necessary and proper. 8. Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), as a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims asserted herein occurred in this district.
THE PARTIES 9. Defendant Rob Jeffreys is sued in his official capacity as director of the Illinois Department of Corrections. In his capacity as the director of IDOC, he has final authority to set the Department of Corrections’ policies with regard to approval of prisoners’ host sites. The Department of Corrections’ power to approve or deny proposed host sites is the sole mechanism through which the One-PerAddress Statute is enforced. 10. Plaintiff Marcus Barnes is a prisoner at Graham Correctional Center. He completed his prison term on December 17, 2018, and has been entitled to release from prison on MSR since that date. He remains in prison because he has been unable to obtain a “host site” that meets the IDOC’s approval. At present, the sole
3

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 1 Filed: 04/05/20 Page 4 of 16 PageID #:4
reason he is not being released is that another individual who is required to register as a sex offender resides at the proposed host site at which he seeks to reside.
11. Plaintiff Barnes seeks to represent a class of all individuals who have served their entire sentence of imprisonment and are entitled to release on MSR but remain in prison because they cannot obtain a host site that satisfies the One-PerAddress Statute.
RELEVANT FACTS Plaintiff Marcus Barnes
12. Marcus Barnes is 42 years old. He was convicted in 2008 of criminal sexual assault and sentenced to serve 12 years in IDOC plus an indeterminate term of “three years to life” on MSR.
13. With good time credits, Barnes completed his prison sentence on December 17, 2018, and was approved for release on MSR by the Prisoner Review Board.
14. Barnes has a caring family that has worked tirelessly for the past 18 months to find him a place to live while on MSR.
15. Barnes has submitted 11 different potential host sites. Some of the sites were with family members; others were private residences where Barnes would have lived alone.
16. IDOC has rejected every one of these proposed host sites. The IDOC has given Barnes various reasons for rejection of the sites, including the proposed site being too close to a daycare; in a “motel”; and too close to an “after school program.”
4

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 1 Filed: 04/05/20 Page 5 of 16 PageID #:5
17. In February 2020, Barnes’ family found him a place to stay on the 5700 block of South Sangamon in Chicago. The building is owned and operated by an organization called Jordan’s Dream, which provides transitional housing and supportive services (such as help with locating employment, religious services, and connections to mental health providers) to individuals who have been convicted of sex offenses.
18. The building is a typical Chicago two-flat with two apartments, one on the second floor and one on the first floor.
19. IDOC investigated the address and confirmed that it complies with the statutory restrictions on proximity within 500 feet of schools, playgrounds, daycares and other places where children congregate.
20. The sole reason the address has been rejected is that another registrant lives at the address.
21. Because this address has been rejected, Barnes remains imprisoned in IDOC.
22. Jordan’s Dream still has an opening for Barnes at the Sangamon address and would still like to have Barnes live there.
23. Barnes’ father died on March 31, 2020. 24. Marcus Barnes remains in prison and is unable to mourn the loss of his father with the rest of his family, although he has already served his time and should have been released 16 months ago.
5

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 1 Filed: 04/05/20 Page 6 of 16 PageID #:6
The Murphy Litigation
25. The plaintiffs in Murphy challenged the constitutionality of the “host site”
requirement as it was being applied to individuals who have been sentenced to an
indeterminate term of “three years to life” on MSR. Such individuals face the
possibility of being imprisoned for life if they are unable to find and/or pay for
housing that meets the requirements imposed by Illinois law and IDOC policy
because their MSR time never begins to run until they are released from prison to
an approved host site. See 730 ILCS 5/3-14-2.5(e).
26. The Murphy plaintiffs identified several layers of restrictions that limit
where people sentenced to indeterminate MSR can live, which together make it
impossible for the members of the class to find host sites. Among the restrictions are
the following:
• Sections of the Illinois Criminal Code which make it a crime for any individual classified as a “child sex offender” to live within 500 feet of a school, playground, or daycare (720 ILCS 5/11-9.3 (b-5), (b-10));
• Sections of the Illinois Unified Code of Corrections which prohibit persons required to register as sex offenders from living “near” “parks, schools, day care centers, swimming pools, beaches, theaters, or any other places where minor children congregate without advance approval of an agent of the Department of Corrections” (730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(b-1)(12));
• The One-Per-Address Statute, which requires individuals on MSR for sex offenses to “refrain from residing at the same address or in the same condominium unit or apartment unit or in the same condominium complex or apartment complex with another person he or she knows or reasonably should know is a convicted sex offender” (unless residing at a “licensed transitional housing facility for sex offenders,” a facility “operated or licensed by the Department of Children and Family Services or by the Department of Human Services,” or a “licensed medical facility”) (730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6));
6

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 1 Filed: 04/05/20 Page 7 of 16 PageID #:7
• Housing restrictions imposed as a matter of IDOC policy including prohibitions on living in a host site where children visit or reside (including the parolee’s own children), where there are computers or Wi-Fi access, and/or where there is no land-line telephone;
• The unavailability of half-way houses, transitional housing, homeless shelters or other free or low-cost housing for indigent parolees; and
• The IDOC’s interpretation of the One-Per-Address Statute as prohibiting a sex offender parolee from living in a building adjacent to a building where another registrant lives and/or from living in the same trailer park as another registrant.
27. Murphy was certified as a class action on behalf of “all individuals sentenced to serve three-years-to-life on MSR currently detained in the IDOC who have been approved for release on MSR by the PRB but have been denied release from IDOC custody because of their inability to obtain an approved host site.” Murphy v. Raoul, 16-cv-11471, ECF No. 63. Marcus Barnes is a member of the Murphy class.
28. On March 31, 2019, this Court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgement on their claim that the State’s statutory and regulatory scheme violates the Equal Protection Clause and the Eighth Amendment. Murphy v. Raoul, 16-cv11471, ECF No. 132; Murphy v. Raoul, 380 F. Supp. 3d 731 (N.D. Ill. 2019).
29. The Court’s summary judgment decision did not single out a particular Illinois law or IDOC policy that violated the constitution. Rather, the Court held that the State’s “statutory and regulatory scheme” as a whole (i.e., the overlapping restrictions imposed by Illinois law, the IDOC’s interpretation of the law, and the IDOC’s policies) violates the Murphy class’s constitutional rights.
7

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 1 Filed: 04/05/20 Page 8 of 16 PageID #:8
30. On January 15, 2020, the Court entered a permanent injunction requiring the Illinois Department of Corrections to put forth a plan “setting forth the specific steps [the Defendants] will take to ensure that by no later than January 2, 2021, no member of the class will remain imprisoned due to an inability to comply with the host site requirement.” Murphy v. Raoul, 16-cv-11471, ECF No. 156.
31. The permanent injunction also calls for the IDOC to provide the Court with periodic status reports concerning its implementation of the compliance plan and progress towards the January 2, 2021, compliance deadline. Id.
32. At the time of this filing, it is counsel’s understanding that the IDOC has succeeded in releasing only three members of the Murphy class from IDOC. Each of those individuals were detained in IDOC for more than eight years beyond the completion of his prison sentence.
33. As of March 2020, the Murphy class comprises 297 individuals who remain in prison beyond the completion of their court-ordered sentence of imprisonment due to an inability to meet the host site requirement.
34. The IDOC’s compliance plan for meeting the January 2, 2021, deadline includes several worthwhile proposals, including changes to IDOC interpretation of statutory restrictions (e.g., not applying the One-Per-Address Statute to trailer parks and adjacent buildings); changes to IDOC policy (e.g., allowing individuals to reside at addresses with Wi-Fi, relaxation of the land-line requirement); and contracting with private vendors to provide transitional housing. Murphy v. Raoul, 16-cv-11471, ECF No. 161.
8

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 1 Filed: 04/05/20 Page 9 of 16 PageID #:9
35. The plan also notes that “[t]here are many statutory provisions that impede the Department’s ability to approve prospective host sites for sex offenders” and states that the Department “hopes that some of the statutory impediments to identifying host sites can be reduced or eliminated through legislative change.” Id. at 3-4. Health Risks of Detention in IDOC Amid the COVID-19 Pandemic
36. We are in the midst of a world-wide health crisis caused by the rapid spread of coronavirus and COVID-19. The number of known COVID-19 infections is rising at an alarming rate. As of April 5, 2020, there have been more than 1.2 million infections globally2; and Illinois alone has nearly 9,000 known cases.3 Nearly 70,000 people have died.4
37. The risks to the health of individuals detained in close proximity to one another in prisons—as well as the staff, attorneys, medical professionals, and clergy who visit and work in these prisons—cannot be overstated. COVID-19 is highly contagious between people who are in close contact with one another.5
2 See Johns Hopkins University, Coronavirus Resource Center, https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html (last visited April 3, 2020). 3 “Coronavirus in Illinois Updates,” Chicago Tribune, April 3, 2020 (available at: https://www.chicagotribune.com/coronavirus/ct-coronavirus-pandemic-chicago-illinois-news20200403-dr4twatabrcx5ccwzcws4uwngu-story.html) 4 See note 2, supra. 5 “How COVID-19 Spreads,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (available at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/how-covid-spreads.html)
9

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 1 Filed: 04/05/20 Page 10 of 16 PageID #:10
38. The virus is transmissible through coughing, sneezing, and contact with surfaces.6 Experts advise that “talking” and “normal breathing” also likely transmit the disease.7 The CDC urges social distancing—i.e., every person should remain at least six feet away from every other person—to avoid transmission of the disease.8
39. Social distancing is of paramount importance because even entirely asymptomatic persons can be infected with COVID-19 and unknowingly transmit it to others.9
40. Proper sanitation measures, including frequent hand washing and frequent cleaning of surfaces with approved disinfectants, are also recommended.10 Governor Pritzker has issued a state-wide “stay at home” order to slow the disease’s spread.11
41. None of the recommended measures for mitigating the spread of COVID-19 are possible for persons confined in prisons and those who must interact with them.
6 Id. 7 “Experts tell White House coronavirus can spread through talking or even just breathing, CNN, April 2, 2020 (available at: https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/02/health/aerosol-coronavirus-spread-white-houseletter/index.html) 8 “Mitigation Strategies for Communities with Local COVID-19 Transmission,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Mar. 12, 2020 (available at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019- ncov/downloads/community-mitigation-strategy.pdf) 9 See n. 5, supra. 10 “How to Protect Yourself,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (available at: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prepare/prevention.html) 11 “Read the Governor’s Full Order Requiring Illinois Residents to Stay at Home,” NBC 5 Chicago (Mar. 20, 2020) (available at: https://www.nbcchicago.com/news/local/read-thegovernors-full-order-requiring-illinois-residents-to-stay-at-home/2241196/)
10

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 1 Filed: 04/05/20 Page 11 of 16 PageID #:11
42. Many IDOC facilities are overcrowded. For example, Graham Correctional Center, where Plaintiff Barnes is imprisoned, is currently 20 percent above its maximum operating capacity. According to the IDOC’s website, Graham has an operational capacity of 1,596 prisoners and currently houses 1,919 prisoners.12
43. Prisoners at Graham are housed two men to a cell; 20 men to a wing. All of these individuals are in close proximity to one another day-in and day-out. It is not possible for them to practice “social distancing” from one another.
44. On Sunday, April 5, 2020, IDOC confirmed that a staff member at Graham Correctional Center was diagnosed with COVID-19, thus greatly increasing the likelihood that prisoners at Graham will be infected.13
45. When a prisoner or staff member at a detention facility is infected with COVID-19, the disease spreads rapidly. For example, at the Cook County Jail, 210 detainees and 34 staff have been diagnosed with COVID-19, despite the jail’s having taken the drastic step of releasing approximately 10 percent of its population to alleviate crowding. The disease spread exponentially among detainees at the jail, from two infections on March 23, to 210 just nine days later.14
12 Graham Correctional Center Facility Data, Illinois Department of Corrections (available at: https://www2.illinois.gov/idoc/facilities/Pages/grahamcorrectionalcenter.aspx) (last visited April 3, 2020). 13 https://www2.illinois.gov/idoc/facilities/Pages/Covid19Response.aspx (last visited April 5, 2020) 14 “Cook County Jail Now Reports 210 Inmates Have Tested Positive for COVID-19,” NBC5 Chicago, April 4, 2020 (https://www.nbcchicago.com/news/coronavirus/cook-countyjail-now-reports-210-inmates-have-tested-positive-for-covid-19/2250366/)
11

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 1 Filed: 04/05/20 Page 12 of 16 PageID #:12
46. At Stateville Correctional Center, 56 prisoners have been diagnosed with COVID-19 and two have died.
47. With COVID-19 cases on the rise throughout the State, it is inevitable that other IDOC facilities will become loci for the spread of the disease. The Challenged Statute
48. The One-Per-Address Statute is set forth in the Illinois Uniform Code of Corrections at 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6).
49. The sole mechanism through which the One-Per-Address Statue is enforced is through the IDOC’s approval or rejection of parolees’ proposed host sites. That is, it is not a criminal offense for an individual on MSR for a sex offense to live at the same address as another registrant.15
50. The One-Per-Address Statute went into effect on July 11, 2005. Prior to that date, individuals on MSR for sex offenses were permitted to live in the same residence as other registrants.
51. On information and belief, the One-Per-Address Statute is a major cause, if not the single largest cause, of the continued imprisonment of members of the Murphy class. This is so because other statutes (e.g., the 500-foot rules) already strictly circumscribe the areas where individuals convicted of sex offenses may live. Pursuant to the One-Per-Address Statute, if a building complies with the other
15 In contrast, the statutes prohibiting individuals classified as “child sex offenders” from living within 500 feet of schools, daycares and playgrounds (720 ILCS 5/11-9.3 (b-5) and (b10)) are part of the criminal code. It is a Class 4 felony for a “child sex offender” to “knowingly” live at a prohibited location. 720 ILCS 5/11-9.3(f).
12

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 1 Filed: 04/05/20 Page 13 of 16 PageID #:13
restrictions, only one parolee may live there, even if it is a large apartment complex with hundreds of units.
52. There is no reason to conclude that people who have been convicted of sex offenses’ living near one another contributes to criminality. At least one analysis found that it has the opposite effect: it reduces the incidence of re-offense and improves supervision. A Minnesota Department of Corrections report concluded as follows:
This examination of level three re-offenders does not reveal a negative effect related to a level three offender living with another sex offender. In fact, supervision agents in both Hennepin and Ramsey County have noted benefits from having more than one level three offender living in one location. Closer supervision is possible because travel time between offenders is reduced. Also, level three offenders who live with other level three offenders experience more visits from a supervising agent because agents for both offenders visit the same property. Finally, offenders tend to inform on each other when supervision restrictions are violated or crimes are committed.16 53. There is no logical reason to believe that there is a compelling public safety need to prohibit people on MSR for sex offenses from living at the same address as one another, and in the Murphy litigation, the IDOC did not come forth with any safety or rehabilitative justification for the One-Per-Address Statute.
16 See “Level Three Sex Offender Residential Placement Issues,” Minnesota Department of Corrections (available at: https://mn.gov/doc/assets/Lvl%203%20SEX%20OFFENDERS%20report%202003%20(revise d%202-04)_tcm1089-272828.pdf) (last visited April 3, 2020)
13

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 1 Filed: 04/05/20 Page 14 of 16 PageID #:14
CLASS ALLEGATIONS 54. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), Plaintiff seeks certification of this complaint as a class action for purposes of equitable relief on behalf of a class defined as follows.
• All individuals who have been convicted of sex offenses and completed their court-imposed sentence of incarceration but remain imprisoned in the Illinois Department of Corrections because they cannot find housing that complies with the One-Per-Address Statute, 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6).
55. The Class seeks a declaration that the One-Per-Address Statute violates the Eighth Amendment as applied to them and an injunction prohibiting Defendant from continuing to enforce the statute.
56. The proposed class is numerous. According to the final report of the Illinois Sex Offenses & Sex Offender Registration Task Force, published in December 2017, “[o]n average, the Illinois Department of Corrections houses 1,200 to 1,400 offenders who may not be released from custody because they are unable to secure permanent, stable housing meeting Illinois statute requirements or agency policy.”17 On information and belief, the number of individuals imprisoned in IDOC due to a lack of compliant housing has grown substantially since the publication of that report. If only five percent of those individuals are being held due to the OnePer-Address Statute, the class would easily satisfy the numerosity requirement.
57. There are questions of law and fact common to all class members, including but not limited to the following:
• What are the rationales for the One-Per-Address Statute; 17 Available at: http://www.icjia.state.il.us/news/sex-offenses-and-sex-offenderregistration-task-force-final-report
14

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 1 Filed: 04/05/20 Page 15 of 16 PageID #:15
• Whether there is any compelling interest served by the Statute; • Whether the Statute violates the Eighth Amendment as applied to the
members of the class. 58. All individuals falling within the class definition are subject to the same Statute. Given the commonality of the questions pertinent to all class members, a single judgment would provide relief to each member of the class. 59. Defendant has acted and continues to act in a manner adverse to the rights of the proposed class, making final declaratory relief appropriate with respect to the class as a whole. 60. The named Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class; and the named Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of all members of the proposed class. 61. Plaintiff’s counsel has extensive experience and has devoted substantial professional and financial resources to representing individuals in cases involving the same type of claim raised here—namely, the Murphy class action. Plaintiff’s counsel will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class.
COUNT I 42 U.S.C. §1983 – EIGHTH AMENDMENT 62. Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of the class he seeks to represent, realleges and reincorporates, as though fully set forth herein, each and every allegation contained above.
15

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 1 Filed: 04/05/20 Page 16 of 16 PageID #:16
63. The One-Per-Address Statute and its application to the members of the
class as described herein violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Honorable Court:
a) Issue an order certifying this action to proceed as a class pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2);
b) Appoint the undersigned as class counsel pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g);
c) Enter judgment declaring that 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6) as applied to Plaintiff and the members of the class violates the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution;
d) Enter a permanent injunction prohibiting Defendant from continuing to enforce 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6);
e) Award Plaintiffs their reasonable attorneys’ fees and cost pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and other applicable law; and
f) Grant such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Adele D. Nicholas /s/ Mark G. Weinberg Counsel for Plaintiff
Law Office of Adele D. Nicholas 5707 W. Goodman Street Chicago, Illinois 60630 (847) 361-3869 adele@civilrightschicago.com
Law Office of Mark G. Weinberg 3612 N. Tripp Avenue Chicago, Illinois 60641 (773) 283-3913 mweinberg@sbcglobal.net
16

ILND 44

Case: 1:20-cv-02137
(Rev. 09/07/18)

DocCuImVeInLt #C: 1O-1VFEiRledS: H04E/0E5T/20

Page

1

of

2

PageID #:17

The ILND 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (See instructions on next page of this form.)

I. (a) PLAINTIFFS
Marcus Barnes, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated

DEFENDANTS
Rob Jeffreys, in his ofﬁcial capacity as director of the Illinois Department of Corrections

(b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff Montgomery
(Except in U.S. plaintiff cases)

County of Residence of First Listed Defendant
(In U.S. plaintiff cases only) Note: In land condemnation cases, use the location of the tract of land involved.

(c) Attorneys (firm name, address, and telephone number)
Law Ofc. of Adele D. Nicholas / 5707 W Goodman St. / Chicago, IL 60630 / 847-361-3869

Attorneys (if known)

II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Check one box, only.)

1 U.S. Government Plaintiff

■ 3 Federal Question (U.S. Government not a party)

III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES (For Diversity Cases Only.)

(Check one box, only for plaintiff and one box for defendant.)

PTF

DEF

PTF DEF

Citizen of This State

1

1 Incorporated or Principal Place

4

4

of Business in This State

2 U.S. Government Defendant

4 Diversity (Indicate citizenship of parties in Item III.)

Citizen of Another State

2

2 Incorporated and Principal Place

of Business in Another State

5

5

Citizen or Subject of a Foreign Country

IV. NATURE OF SUIT (Check one box, only.)

CONTRACT

TORTS

PRISONER PETITIONS

110 Insurance 120 Marine 130 Miller Act 140 Negotiable Instrument 150 Recovery of Overpayment
& Enforcement of Judgment 151 Medicare Act 152 Recovery of Defaulted Student
Loans (Excludes Veterans) 153 Recovery of Veteran’s Benefits

PERSONAL INJURY 310 Airplane 315 Airplane Product Liability 320 Assault, Libel & Slander 330 Federal Employers’ Liability 340 Marine 345 Marine Product Liability 350 Motor Vehicle

PERSONAL INJURY 530 General 367 Health Care/
Pharmaceutical Personal Injury Product Liability 368 Asbestos Personal Injury
Product Liability

510 Motions to Vacate Sentence 530 General 535 Death Penalty Habeas Corpus: 540 Mandamus & Other 550 Civil Rights 555 Prison Condition 560 Civil Detainee – Conditions of Confinement

160 Stockholders’ Suits 190 Other Contract 195 Contract Product Liability 196 Franchise

355 Motor Vehicle Product Liability
360 Other Personal Injury 362 Personal Injury -
Medical Malpractice

PERSONAL PROPERTY 370 Other Fraud 371 Truth in Lending 380 Other Personal
Property Damage 385 Property Damage
Product Liability

3

3 Foreign Nation

LABOR 710 Fair Labor Standards Act 720 Labor/Management Relations 740 Railway Labor Act 751 Family and Medical
Leave Act 790 Other Labor Litigation 791 Employee Retirement
Income Security Act
PROPERTY RIGHTS 820 Copyrights 830 Patent 835 Patent – Abbreviated
New Drug Application 840 Trademark

REAL PROPERTY 210 Land Condemnation 220 Foreclosure 230 Rent Lease & Ejectment 240 Torts to Land 245 Tort Product Liability 290 All Other Real Property

CIVIL RIGHTS ■ 440 Other Civil Rights
441 Voting 442 Employment 443 Housing/
Accommodations 445 Amer. w/Disabilities -
Employment
446 Amer. w/Disabilities Other
448 Education

BANKRUPTCY 422 Appeal 28 USC 158 423 Withdrawal 28 USC 157
IMMIGRATION 462 Naturalization
Application 463 Habeas Corpus - Alien
Detainee (Prisoner Petition) 465 Other Immigration
Actions

FORFEITURE/PENALTY 625 Drug Related Seizure
of Property 21 USC 881 690 Other

SOCIAL SECURITY 861 HIA (1395ff) 862 Black Lung (923) 863 DIWC/DIWW (405(g)) 864 SSID Title XVI 865 RSI (405(g))
FEDERAL TAXES 870 Taxes (U.S. Plaintiff or Defendant) 871 IRS—Third Party
26 USC 7609

6

6

OTHER STATUTES
375 False Claims Act 376 Qui Tam (31 USC 3729 (a)) 400 State Reapportionment 410 Antitrust 430 Banks and Banking 450 Commerce 460 Deportation 470 Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations 480 Consumer Credit 485 Telephone Consumer
Protection Act (TCPA) 490 Cable/Sat TV 850 Securities/Commodities/
Exchange 890 Other Statutory Actions 891 Agricultural Acts 893 Environmental Matters 895 Freedom of Information Act 896 Arbitration 899 Administrative Procedure
Act/Review or Appeal of Agency Decision 950 Constitutionality of State Statutes

V. ORIGIN (Check one box, only.)

1 Original

2 Removed from

Proceeding

State Court

3 Remanded from Appellate Court

VI. CAUSE OF ACTION (Enter U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing and
write a brief statement of cause.)
42 USC §1983, Eighth Amendment

4 Reinstated or Reopened

5 Transferred from Another District
(specify)

6 Multidistrict Litigation

8 Multidistrict Litigation Direct File

VII. PREVIOUS BANKRUPTCY MATTERS (For nature of suit 422 and 423, enter the
case number and judge for any associated bankruptcy matter previously adjudicated by a judge of this Court. Use a separate attachment if necessary.)

VIII. REQUESTED IN

Check if this is a class action Under rule 23, Demand $

COMPLAINT:

F.R.CV.P.

IX. RELATED CASE(S) (See instructions) IF ANY Murphy et al v Jeffreys Judge Kendall

Check Yes only if demanded in complaint.

Jury Demand:

Yes

No

Case Number

16-cv-11471

X. Is this a previously dismissed or remanded case? Yes

No If yes, Case #

Date
4-5-20

Signature of attorney of record
/s/ Adele D. Nicholas

Name of Judge

Case: 1I:N2S0T-RcUvC-T0I2O1N3S7FODRoAcTuTmOReNnEtY#S:C1O-M1PFLEilTeIdN:G0C4IV/0IL5C/2O0VEPRaSgHeEE2ToFfO2RMPJaSg4e4 ID #:18
Authority for Civil Cover Sheet

The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replaces nor supplements the filings and service of pleading or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. Consequently, a civil cover sheet is submitted to the Clerk of Court for each civil complaint filed. The attorney filing a case should complete the form as follows:

I.

(a) Plaintiffs-Defendants. Enter names (last, first, middle initial) of plaintiff and defendant. If the plaintiff or defendant is a government agency, use only the

full name or standard abbreviations. If the plaintiff or defendant is an official within a government agency, identify first the agency and then the official, giving both

name and title.

(b) County of Residence. For each civil case filed, except U.S. plaintiff cases, enter the name of the county where the first listed plaintiff resides at the time of filing. In U.S. plaintiff cases, enter the name of the county in which the first listed defendant resides at the time of filing. (NOTE: In land condemnation cases, the county of residence of the "defendant" is the location of the tract of land involved.)

(c) Attorneys. Enter the firm name, address, telephone number, and attorney of record. If there are several attorneys, list them on an attachment, noting in this section "(see attachment)".

II.

Jurisdiction. The basis of jurisdiction is set forth under Rule 8(a), F.R.Cv.P., which requires that jurisdictions be shown in pleadings. Place an "X" in one of

the boxes. If there is more than one basis of jurisdiction, precedence is given in the order shown below.

United States plaintiff. (1) Jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. 1345 and 1348. Suits by agencies and officers of the United States are included here.

United States defendant. (2) When the plaintiff is suing the United States, its officers or agencies, place an "X" in this box.

Federal question. (3) This refers to suits under 28 U.S.C. 1331, where jurisdiction arises under the Constitution of the United States, an amendment to the Constitution, an act of Congress or a treaty of the United States. In cases where the U.S. is a party, the U.S. plaintiff or defendant code takes precedence, and box 1 or 2 should be marked.

Diversity of citizenship. (4) This refers to suits under 28 U.S.C. 1332, where parties are citizens of different states. When Box 4 is checked, the citizenship of the different parties must be checked. (See Section III below; NOTE: federal question actions take precedence over diversity cases.)

III.

Residence (citizenship) of Principal Parties. This section of the JS 44 is to be completed if diversity of citizenship was indicated above. Mark this section

for each principal party.

IV.

Nature of Suit. Place an "X" in the appropriate box. If the nature of suit cannot be determined, be sure the cause of action, in Section VI below, is sufficient

to enable the deputy clerk or the statistical clerk(s) in the Administrative Office to determine the nature of suit. If the cause fits more than one nature of suit, select the

most definitive.

V.

Origin. Place an "X" in one of the six boxes.

Original Proceedings. (1) Cases which originate in the United States district courts.

Removed from State Court. (2) Proceedings initiated in state courts may be removed to the district courts under Title 28 U.S.C., Section 1441. When the petition for removal is granted, check this box.

Remanded from Appellate Court. (3) Check this box for cases remanded to the district court for further action. Use the date of remand as the filing date.

Reinstated or Reopened. (4) Check this box for cases reinstated or reopened in the district court. Use the reopening date as the filing date.

Transferred from Another District. (5) For cases transferred under Title 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a). Do not use this for within district transfers or multidistrict litigation transfers.

Multidistrict Litigation. (6) Check this box when a multidistrict case is transferred into the district under authority of Title 28 U.S.C. Section 1407. When this box is checked, do not check (5) above.

VI.

Cause of Action. Report the civil statute directly related to the cause of action and give a brief description of the cause. Do not cite jurisdictional statutes

unless diversity. Example: U.S. Civil Statute: 47 USC 553 Brief Description: Unauthorized reception of cable service

VII. Previous Bankruptcy Matters For nature of suit 422 and 423 enter the case number and judge for any associated bankruptcy matter previously adjudicated by a judge of this court. Use a separate attachment if necessary.

VIII. Requested in Complaint. Class Action. Place an "X" in this box if you are filing a class action under Rule 23, F.R.Cv.P. Demand. In this space enter the actual dollar amount being demanded or indicate other demand, such as a preliminary injunction Jury Demand. Check the appropriate box to indicate whether or not a jury is being demanded.

IX.

Related Cases. This section of the JS 44 is used to reference related pending cases, if any. If there are related pending cases, insert the docket numbers and the

corresponding judge names for such cases.

X.

Refiling Information. Place an "X" in the Yes box if the case is being refiled or if it is a remanded case, and indicate the case number and name of judge. If

this case is not being refiled or has not been remanded, place an “X” in the No box.

Date and Attorney Signature. Date and sign the civil cover sheet.

Rev. 09/07/2018

 
 Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 3 Filed: 04/05/20 Page 1 of 20 PageID #:20

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

MARCUS BARNES, individually and on )

behalf of all others similarly situated, )

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

ROB JEFFREYS, in his official

)

Capacity as the Director of the Illinois )

Department of Corrections,

)

)

Defendant.

)

No. 20-cv-2137

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Plaintiff Marcus Barnes, individually and on behalf of all others similarly

situated, respectfully requests that this Honorable Court enter a temporary

restraining order and preliminary injunction granting the following relief:

• An immediate order prohibiting enforcement of 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6) (hereinafter the “One-Per-Address Statute”) as to Plaintiff Marcus Barnes so he can be released from prison to a host site at 5726 S. Sangamon, Chicago, Illinois; and

• A preliminary injunction prohibiting the IDOC from enforcing the OnePer-Address Statute against individuals who have completed their courtordered sentences of incarceration and remain in prison due to an inability to identify a host site that satisfies the One-Per-Address Rule.

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 3 Filed: 04/05/20 Page 2 of 20 PageID #:21
INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Barnes, and the members of the class he seeks to represent, have all completed their court-ordered terms of incarceration and are entitled to release on Mandatory Supervised Release (“MSR”). They remain in prison because they cannot find an approved “host site” at which to live while on MSR. In Murphy v. Raoul, 380 F. Supp. 3d 731, 738 (N.D. Ill. 2019), this Court has already concluded that it is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause and the Eighth Amendment to subject individuals to indefinite incarceration solely because they cannot meet the host-site requirement, holding as follows: At the very heart of the liberty secured by the separation of powers is freedom from indefinite imprisonment by executive decree. The Attorney General and Director’s current application of the host site requirement results in the continued deprivation of the plaintiffs’ fundamental rights and therefore contravenes the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. That decision was entered more than a year ago on March 31, 2019. Today, 297 members of the Murphy class still remain imprisoned in violation of their constitutional rights. Presently, the world is in the grip of an unprecedented public health emergency that poses a particular danger to incarcerated individuals. On Sunday, April 5, 2020, IDOC confirmed that a staff member at Graham Correctional Center (where Plaintiff is imprisoned) has been diagnosed with COVID-19, putting the entire population of individuals imprisoned at Graham in imminent danger of infection. Every day that the members of the class remain incarcerated poses a grave risk to their health and safety.
2

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 3 Filed: 04/05/20 Page 3 of 20 PageID #:22
Plaintiff Marcus Barnes has a safe place to live outside of prison (5726 S. Sangamon, Chicago, Illinois) that satisfies almost every one of the onerous requirements for where individuals who have been convicted of sex offenses are permitted to reside—i.e., it is not within 500 feet of a school, playground, daycare, or any other location where children congregate. Yet, the IDOC will not permit him to be released to the aforementioned address because another registrant resides at the same address, and a section of the Illinois Uniform Code of Corrections prohibits individuals on MSR for sex offenses from living “at the same address or in the same condominium unit or apartment unit or in the same condominium complex or apartment complex with another person he or she knows or reasonably should know is a convicted sex offender or has been placed on supervision for a sex offense.” 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6) (hereinafter the “One-Per-Address Statute”).
Plaintiff now asks this court to enjoin enforcement of the One-Per-Address Statute because, for the reasons set forth below, its application to Plaintiff Barnes and others similarly situated to him violates the Eighth Amendment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND I. Plaintiff Marcus Barnes
Plaintiff Marcus Barnes is 42 years old. He was convicted in 2008 of criminal sexual assault and sentenced to serve 12 years in IDOC plus an indeterminate term of “three years to life” on MSR. With good time credits, Barnes completed his prison sentence on December 17, 2018, and was approved for release on MSR by the Prisoner Review Board.
3

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 3 Filed: 04/05/20 Page 4 of 20 PageID #:23
Barnes has a caring family that has worked tirelessly for the past 18 months to find him a place to live while on MSR. Ex. 1, Decl. of Delshay McDaniel at ¶1. Barnes has submitted 11 different potential host sites. Id. at ¶¶2, 3. Some of the sites were with family members; others were private residences where Barnes would have lived alone. Id. at ¶3. IDOC has rejected every one of these proposed host sites. Id. at ¶4. The IDOC has given Barnes various reasons for rejection of the sites, including the proposed site is too close to a daycare; in a “motel”; and within 500 feet of an “after school program.” Id.
In February 2020, Barnes’ family found him a place to stay at 5726 S. Sangamon in Chicago. Id. at ¶¶5, 6. The building is owned and operated by an organization called Jordan’s Dream, which provides transitional housing and supportive services (such as help with locating employment and connections to mental health providers) to individuals who have been convicted of sex offenses. Id. The building is a typical two-flat with two apartments, one on the second floor and one on the first floor. Id.
IDOC investigated the address and confirmed that it complies with the statutory restrictions on proximity within 500 feet of schools, playgrounds, daycares and other places where children congregate. The sole reason the address was rejected is that another registrant also lives at the address. Id. Because this address has been rejected, Barnes remains imprisoned in IDOC. At the time of filing, Jordan’s Dream still has an opening for Barnes at the Sangamon address and would still like to have Barnes live there. Id. at ¶7.
Barnes’ father died on March 31, 2020. Id. at ¶8. Barnes remains in prison and
4

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 3 Filed: 04/05/20 Page 5 of 20 PageID #:24
is unable to mourn the loss of his father with the rest of his family, although he has already served his time and should have been released 16 months ago. Barnes has also learned that a guard at Graham Correctional Center has been diagnosed with COVID-19 and fears for his safety remaining imprisoned there. Id. at ¶9. II. The Murphy Litigation
The plaintiffs in Murphy challenged the constitutionality of the “host site” requirement as it was being applied to individuals who have been sentenced to an indeterminate term of “three years to life” on MSR. Such individuals face the possibility of being imprisoned for life if they are unable to find and/or pay for housing that meets the requirements imposed by Illinois law and IDOC policy because their MSR time never begins to run until they are released from prison to an approved host site. See 730 ILCS 5/3-14-2.5(e).
The Murphy plaintiffs identified several layers of restrictions that limit where people sentenced to indeterminate MSR can live, which together make it impossible for the members of the class to find host sites. Among the restrictions are the following:
• Sections of the Illinois Criminal Code which make it a crime for any individual classified as a “child sex offender” to live within 500 feet of a school, playground, or daycare (720 ILCS 5/11-9.3 (b-5), (b-10));
• Sections of the Illinois Unified Code of Corrections which prohibit persons required to register as sex offenders from living “near” “parks, schools, day care centers, swimming pools, beaches, theaters, or any other places where minor children congregate without advance approval of an agent of the Department of Corrections” (730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(b-1)(12));
• The One-Per-Address Statute, which requires individuals on MSR for sex offenses to “refrain from residing at the same address or in the same
5

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 3 Filed: 04/05/20 Page 6 of 20 PageID #:25
condominium unit or apartment unit or in the same condominium complex or apartment complex with another person he or she knows or reasonably should know is a convicted sex offender” (unless residing at a “licensed transitional housing facility for sex offenders,” a facility “operated or licensed by the Department of Children and Family Services or by the Department of Human Services,” or a “licensed medical facility”) (730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6)); • Housing restrictions imposed as a matter of IDOC policy including prohibitions on living in a host site where children visit or reside (including the parolee’s own children), where there are computers or wi-fi access, and/or where there is no land-line telephone; • The unavailability of half-way houses, transitional housing, homeless shelters or other free or low-cost housing for indigent parolees; and
• The IDOC’s interpretation of the One-Per-Address Statute as prohibiting a sex offender parolee from living in a building adjacent to a building where another registrant lives and/or from living in the same trailer park as another registrant.
Murphy was certified as a class action on behalf of “all individuals sentenced to
serve three-years-to-life on MSR currently detained in the IDOC who have been
approved for release on MSR by the PRB but have been denied release from IDOC
custody because of their inability to obtain an approved host site.” Murphy v. Raoul,
16-cv-11471, ECF No. 63. Plaintiff Marcus Barnes is a member of the Murphy class.
On March 31, 2019, this Court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary
judgement on their claim that the state’s statutory and regulatory scheme violates
the Equal Protection Clause and the Eighth Amendment. Murphy v. Raoul, 16-cv-
11471, ECF No. 132; Murphy v. Raoul, 380 F. Supp. 3d 731 (N.D. Ill. 2019). The
Court’s summary judgment decision did not single out a particular Illinois law or
IDOC policy that violated the constitution. Rather, the Court held that the state’s
“statutory and regulatory scheme” as a whole (i.e., the overlapping restrictions
6

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 3 Filed: 04/05/20 Page 7 of 20 PageID #:26
imposed by Illinois law, the IDOC’s interpretation of the law, and the IDOC’s policies) violates the Murphy class’s constitutional rights.
On January 15, 2020, the Court entered a permanent injunction requiring the Illinois Department of Corrections to put forth a plan “setting forth the specific steps [the Defendants] will take to ensure that by no later than January 2, 2021, no member of the class will remain imprisoned due to an inability to comply with the host site requirement.” Murphy v. Raoul, 16-cv-11471, ECF No. 156. The IDOC filed its compliance plan on February 27, 2020. 16-cv-11471, ECF No. 161. The permanent injunction also calls for the IDOC to provide the court with periodic status reports concerning its implementation of the compliance plan and progress towards the January 2, 2021 compliance deadline. 16-cv-11471, ECF No. 156.
At the time of this filing, it is counsel’s understanding that the IDOC has succeeded in releasing only three members of the Murphy class from IDOC. Each of those individuals were detained in IDOC for more than eight years beyond the completion of his prison sentence. Presently, the Murphy class comprises at least 297 individuals who remain in prison beyond the completion of their court-ordered sentence of imprisonment due to an inability to meet the host site requirement, some for as long as eight years past their MSR date.
The IDOC’s compliance plan for meeting the January 2, 2021 deadline includes several worthwhile proposals, including changes to IDOC interpretation of statutory restrictions (e.g., not applying the One-Per-Address Statute to trailer parks and adjacent buildings); changes to IDOC policy (e.g., allowing individuals to reside at
7

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 3 Filed: 04/05/20 Page 8 of 20 PageID #:27
addresses with Wi-Fi, relaxation of the land-line requirement); and contracting with private vendors to provide transitional housing. Murphy v. Raoul, 16-cv-11471, ECF No. 161. The plan also notes that “[t]here are many statutory provisions that impede the Department’s ability to approve prospective host sites for sex offenders” states that the Department and “hopes that some of the statutory impediments to identifying host sites can be reduced or eliminated through legislative change.” Id. at 3-4. III. Health Risks of Detention in IDOC Amid the COVID-19 Pandemic
We are in the midst of a world-wide health crisis caused by the rapid spread of coronavirus and COVID-19. The number of known COVID-19 infections is rising at an alarming rate. As of April 5, 2020, there have been more than 1.2 million infections globally1; and Illinois alone has nearly 9,000 known cases.2 Nearly 67,000 people have died.3
The risks to the health of individuals detained in close proximity to one another in prisons—as well as the staff, attorneys, medical professionals, and clergy who visit and work in these prisons—cannot be overstated. COVID-19 is highly
1 See Johns Hopkins University, Coronavirus Resource Center, https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html (last visited April 4, 2020). 2 “Coronavirus in Illinois Updates,” Chicago Tribune, April 3, 2020 (available at: https://www.chicagotribune.com/coronavirus/ct-coronavirus-pandemic-chicago-illinois-news20200403-dr4twatabrcx5ccwzcws4uwngu-story.html) 3 See note 1, supra.
8

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 3 Filed: 04/05/20 Page 9 of 20 PageID #:28
contagious between people who are in close contact with one another.4 The virus is transmissible through coughing, sneezing, and contact with surfaces.5 Experts advise that “talking” and “normal breathing” also likely transmit the disease.6 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) urges social distancing—i.e., every person should remain at least six feet away from every other person—to avoid transmission of the disease.7 Social distancing is of paramount importance because even entirely asymptomatic persons can be infected with COVID-19 and unknowingly transmit it to others.8 Proper sanitation measures, including frequent hand washing and frequent cleaning of surfaces with approved disinfectants are also recommended.9 Governor Pritzker has issued a state-wide “stay at home” order to slow the disease’s spread.10
4 “How COVID-19 Spreads,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (available at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/how-covid-spreads.html) 5 Id. 6 “Experts tell White House coronavirus can spread through talking or even just breathing, CNN, April 2, 2020 (available at: https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/02/health/aerosol-coronavirus-spread-white-houseletter/index.html) 7 “Mitigation Strategies for Communities with Local COVID-19 Transmission,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Mar. 12, 2020 (available at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019- ncov/downloads/community-mitigation-strategy.pdf) 8 See n. 4, supra. 9 “How to Protect Yourself,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (available at: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prepare/prevention.html) 10 “Read the Governor’s Full Order Requiring Illinois Residents to Stay at Home,” NBC 5 Chicago, March 20, 2020 (available at: https://www.nbcchicago.com/news/local/read-thegovernors-full-order-requiring-illinois-residents-to-stay-at-home/2241196/)
9

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 3 Filed: 04/05/20 Page 10 of 20 PageID #:29
None of the recommended measures for mitigating the spread of COVID-19 are possible for persons confined in prisons and those who must interact with them. Many IDOC facilities are overcrowded. For example, Graham Correctional Center, where Plaintiff Barnes is imprisoned, is currently 20 percent above its maximum operating capacity. According to the IDOC’s website, Graham has an operational capacity of 1,596 prisoners and currently houses 1,919 prisoners.11 Prisoners at Graham are housed two men to a cell; 20 men to a wing. All of these individuals are in close proximity to one another day-in and day-out. It is not possible for them to practice “social distancing” from one another. On Sunday, April 5, 2020, IDOC confirmed that a staff member at Graham Correctional Center was diagnosed with COVID-19, thus greatly increasing the likelihood that prisoners at Graham already are, or soon will be, infected.12
When a prisoner or staff member at a detention facility is infected with COVID19, the disease spreads rapidly. For example, at the Cook County Jail, 210 detainees and 34 staff have been diagnosed with COVID-19, despite the jail’s having taken the drastic step of releasing approximately 10 percent of its population to alleviate crowding. The disease spread exponentially among detainees
11 Graham Correctional Center Facility Data, Illinois Department of Corrections (available at: https://www2.illinois.gov/idoc/facilities/Pages/grahamcorrectionalcenter.aspx) (last visited April 3, 2020). 12 COVID-19 Response, Illinois Department of Corrections (available at: https://www2.illinois.gov/idoc/facilities/Pages/Covid19Response.aspx) (last visited April 5, 2020)
10

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 3 Filed: 04/05/20 Page 11 of 20 PageID #:30
at the jail, from two infections on March 23 to 210 just nine days later.13 With COVID-19 cases on the rise throughout the state, it is inevitable that IDOC facilities will become loci for the spread of the disease. IV. The Challenged Statute
The One-Per-Address Statute is set forth in the Illinois Uniform Code of Corrections at 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6). The sole mechanism through which the One-Per-Address Statue is enforced is through the IDOC’s approval or rejection of parolees’ proposed host sites. That is, it is not a criminal offense for an individual on MSR for a sex offense to live at the same address as another registrant.14
The One-Per-Address Statute went into effect on July 11, 2005. Prior to that date, individuals on MSR for sex offenses were permitted to live in the same residence as other registrants. On information and belief, the One-Per-Address Statute is a major cause, if not the single largest cause, of the continued imprisonment of members of the Murphy class. This is so because other statutes (e.g., the 500-foot rules) already strictly circumscribe the areas where individuals convicted of sex offenses may live. Pursuant to the One-Per-Address Statute, if a building complies with the other restrictions, only one parolee may live there, even if it is a multi-unit building or a large apartment complex with dozens of units.
13 “Cook County Jail Now Reports 210 Inmates Have Tested Positive for COVID-19,” NBC5 Chicago, April 4, 2020 (https://www.nbcchicago.com/news/coronavirus/cook-countyjail-now-reports-210-inmates-have-tested-positive-for-covid-19/2250366/). 14 In contrast, the statutes prohibiting individuals classified as “child sex offenders” from living within 500 feet of schools, daycares and playgrounds (720 ILCS 5/11-9.3 (b-5) and (b10)) are part of the criminal code. It is a Class 4 felony for a “child sex offender” to “knowingly” live at a prohibited location. 720 ILCS 5/11-9.3(f).
11

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 3 Filed: 04/05/20 Page 12 of 20 PageID #:31
There is no reason to conclude that people who have been convicted of sex offenses’ living near one another contributes to criminality. At least one analysis found that it has the opposite effect: it reduces the incidence of re-offense and improves supervision. A Minnesota Department of Corrections report concluded as follows:
This examination of level three re-offenders does not reveal a negative effect related to a level three offender living with another sex offender. In fact, supervision agents in both Hennepin and Ramsey County have noted benefits from having more than one level three offender living in one location. Closer supervision is possible because travel time between offenders is reduced. Also, level three offenders who live with other level three offenders experience more visits from a supervising agent because agents for both offenders visit the same property. Finally, offenders tend to inform on each other when supervision restrictions are violated or crimes are committed.15 There is no logical reason to believe that there is a compelling public safety need to prohibit people on MSR for sex offenses from living at the same address as one another. In the Murphy litigation, the IDOC did not come forth with any safety or rehabilitative justification for the One-Per-Address Statute. In acknowledgement of the restriction’s excessiveness, IDOC has already reinterpreted the restriction so as not to apply to trailer parks or adjacent apartment buildings. Murphy v. Raoul, 16cv-11471, ECF No. 161.
15 See “Level Three Sex Offender Residential Placement Issues,” Minnesota Department of Corrections (available at: https://mn.gov/doc/assets/Lvl%203%20SEX%20OFFENDERS%20report%202003%20(revise d%202-04)_tcm1089-272828.pdf) (last visited April 3, 2020)
12

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 3 Filed: 04/05/20 Page 13 of 20 PageID #:32
ARGUMENT I. Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction Standards
To be entitled to a temporary restraining order a plaintiff must demonstrate that he has “(1) some likelihood of succeeding on the merits and (2) that he has ‘no adequate remedy at law’ and will suffer irreparable harm” if relief is denied. Abbott Laboratories v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 11 (7th Cir. 1992) (internal citations omitted). If these two elements are established, a court should consider “(3) the irreparable harm the non-moving party will suffer if preliminary relief is granted, balancing that harm against the irreparable harm to the moving party if relief is denied; and (4) the public interest, meaning the consequences of granting or denying the injunction to non-parties.” Id. In deciding this motion, the court “[is] sitting as would a chancellor in equity,” and should weigh all four factors “seeking at all times to minimize the costs of being mistaken.” Id.
Similarly, in order to obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must establish four elements: (1) some likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the lack of an adequate remedy at law; (3) a likelihood that they will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted; and (4) the balance of hardships tips in the moving party’s favor. Ty, Inc. v. Jones Group, Inc., 237 F.3d 891, 895 (7th Cir. 2001).
As shown below, Plaintiff meets each element for establishing an entitlement to injunctive relief, and accordingly this Court should issue a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to halt enforcement of the One-Per-Address Statute.
13

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 3 Filed: 04/05/20 Page 14 of 20 PageID #:33
II. Plaintiff Has a Likelihood of Success on his Claim that Continued Enforcement of the One-Per-Address Statute During the COVID-19 Pandemic Violates The Eighth Amendment The Eighth Amendment mandates that persons confined in prisons must “be
furnished with the basic human needs, one of which is ‘reasonable safety.’” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33-34 (1993) (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989)). In Helling, the Supreme Court held that a prisoner stated an Eighth Amendment claim that he was exposed to unsafe levels of environmental tobacco smoke even though he personally experienced no adverse health effects because the health risk posed by involuntary exposure to second-hand smoke is “sufficiently imminent.” Id. at 509 U.S. at 35.
Courts have consistently interpreted Helling to authorize an Eighth Amendment cause of action when an inmate is exposed to a risk of contracting contagious diseases. See Loftin v. Dalessandri, 3 F. App’x 658, 662-63 (10th Cir. 2001) (inmate stated an Eighth Amendment violation where he alleged he was housed in a cell with two cellmates who had tuberculosis); DeGidio v. Pung, 920 F.2d 525, 533 (8th Cir. 1990) (failure by prison officials to prevent the unchecked spread of tuberculosis violated the Eighth Amendment). Indeed, in Helling itself, the Supreme Court approvingly cited Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974) in which the court held that inmates were entitled to relief under the Eighth Amendment when they proved threats to their personal safety from “the mingling of inmates with serious contagious diseases with other prison inmates.” Helling, 506 U.S. at 34.
14

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 3 Filed: 04/05/20 Page 15 of 20 PageID #:34
The Seventh Circuit has similarly recognized that the Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from known exposure to serious diseases, holding that in such a circumstance, “[t]he prison must be allowed to choose between removing the prisoner from the unhealthy environment and protecting him from its consequences . . . provided, of course, that the protection is efficacious.” Powers v. Snyder, 484 F.3d 929, 931 (7th Cir. 2007); see also McDonald v. Hardy, 821 F.3d 882, 889 (7th Cir. 2016) (explaining that the Eighth Amendment does not excuse deliberate indifference simply because harms “have not yet reached the point of causing acute or life-threatening injuries”).
To succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendant has acted with “deliberate indifference.” Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005). That standard is met when the plaintiff establishes that he has been exposed to an “objectively serious” risk of harm and defendant acted with “conscious disregard of known or obvious dangers” to the plaintiff. Id. (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). Both components of the deliberate indifference standard are met here.
A. Imprisonment During the COVID-19 Pandemic Exposes Plaintiff Barnes and Others Similarly Situated to an Known and Objectively Serious Risk of Harm
As outlined in §III of the factual background above, the spread of COVID-19 poses a very serious risk to imprisoned individuals. COVID-19 cases are skyrocketing in Illinois, doubling every two days.16 Hospitals will soon be
16 See https://fox40.com/news/national/chicagos-covid-19-cases-doubling-every-2-days-saysmayor/
15

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 3 Filed: 04/05/20 Page 16 of 20 PageID #:35
overwhelmed with patients in need of critical care. Id. A case of COVID-19 has
already been confirmed at Graham Correctional Center, and additional cases are
imminent.17 At Stateville Correctional Center, 56 inmates have been diagnosed. Id.
Illinois officials have publicly acknowledged the severe risk COVID-19 poses to
those detained in IDOC and the impossibility of proper mitigation measures in
correctional facilities. At Governor Pritzker’s April 4, 2020, press briefing,18 Illinois
Department of Public Health Director Dr. Ngozi Ezike stated as follows:
We have seen clusters of cases in … correctional centers…. I want to touch on the difficulty of preventing the virus from infiltrating these congregate settings and the challenges of stopping that spread. The natural movement of people needing to come in and out of those settings, even when they’re decreased to the minimal amount, still … increases the potential for rapid spread of the virus to people who live, eat and recreate all in the same space. Options for medical isolation of these COVID-19 patients are limited. … Ideally, people who are positive should be isolated individually, and close contacts should be quarantined individually. However, that can’t always be possible given the constraints of space.19
17 https://www2.illinois.gov/idoc/facilities/Pages/Covid19Response.aspx 18 Available at: http://www.dph.illinois.gov/topics-services/diseases-andconditions/diseases-a-z-list/coronavirus/media-publications/daily-press-briefings
19 This is not the only case that seeks to address the pressing need to reduce the population in IDOC facilities to mitigate the spread of COVID-19. In Money, et al. v. Jeffreys, et al., No. 20-cv-2094, filed April 2, 2020, the plaintiffs have asked the court to require Governor Pritzker to release two classes of individuals from IDOC custody— individuals who have serious underlying medical conditions and people 55 years of age and older who are eligible for medical furlough pursuant to 730 ILCS 5/3-11-1. Expedited briefing has been ordered in that case as follows: Defendants’ brief is due on April 6, 2020 by 5 p.m.; Plaintiffs’ reply is due on April 8, 2020 by 5 p.m. See 20-cv-2094, ECF No. 14. Notably, the plaintiffs in Money seek release of individuals who still have time left on their prison sentences. The Plaintiffs here, in contrast, have completed their sentences and are constitutionally entitled to release on MSR.
16

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 3 Filed: 04/05/20 Page 17 of 20 PageID #:36
B. Despite Knowing of the Serious Risk, Defendant Acts With Deliberate Indifference towards Plaintiff Barnes and the Members of the Class by Continuing to Enforce the One-Per-Address Rule
As explained in §§I and II of the Factual Background above, Marcus Barnes and the other members of the Murphy class have done their time and are entitled to release. This Court has already found that it is a violation of the constitution to keep individuals who have completed their court ordered terms of incarceration in prison simply because they cannot meet the “host-site” requirement. Murphy v. Raoul, 380 F. Supp. 3d 731, 738 (N.D. Ill. 2019). The IDOC is under a permanent injunction that requires it to release the members of the Murphy class. Murphy v. Raoul, 16-cv-11471, ECF No. 156. In the Murphy litigation, which has been ongoing for four years and generated hundreds of pages of summary judgment briefing, IDOC never put forth a public safety or rehabilitative justification for the One-PerAddress Statute.
Under these circumstances, continued enforcement of the One-Per-Address Statute constitutes deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s right to “reasonable safety.” Plaintiff Barnes could be living in a safe place outside of prison where he would be able to comply with the statewide Stay-at-Home order and observe other recommended disease mitigation measures. The proposed host site on Sangamon meets every requirement imposed by Illinois law, save the One-Per-Address Statute. To expose Barnes and others who have completed their sentences and have housing outside of prison to the unmitigated risk of contracting COVID-19 falls
17

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 3 Filed: 04/05/20 Page 18 of 20 PageID #:37
short of the Eighth Amendment’s mandates. Accordingly, Plaintiff has a likelihood of success on his Eighth Amendment claim. III. Plaintiff and Others Similarly Situated are Suffering and Will
Continue to Suffer Irreparable Injury in the Absence of an Injunction If an injunction is not granted, Plaintiff and others similarly situated will suffer two forms of irreparable injury. One, they will continue to be imprisoned in violation of their constitutional right to be released from prison on MSR. And two, they will continue to be exposed to an unreasonable risk of being infected with COVID-19. Such harms unquestionably constitute irreparable injury. See Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619, 629 (7th Cir. 1973) (“Imprisonment in segregation” is “perhaps most paradigmatic” form of “irreparable harm”); Hampton v. Leibach, 99 C 5473, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20983, at *5-6 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 2001) (a plaintiff “suffers irreparable harm each day that he is imprisoned in violation of the United States Constitution.”); Harris v. Board of Supervisors, 366 F.3d 754, 766 (9th Cir. 2004) (accepting “pain,” “infection,” and “medical complications” as forms of irreparable harm warranting injunctive relief). Moreover, it is well established that when a plaintiff establishes a likelihood of success on a claim that a government action violates his constitutional rights, he meets the element of showing irreparable harm. Ezell v. City of Chi., 651 F.3d 684, 699 (7th Cir. 2011) (“When an alleged deprivation of a constitutional right is involved, most courts hold that no further showing of irreparable injury is necessary.”) (quoting 11A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 2948.1 (2d ed. 1995)); Preston v. Thompson, 589 F.2d 300, 303 n.3 (7th Cir. 1978)
18

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 3 Filed: 04/05/20 Page 19 of 20 PageID #:38
(“The existence of a continuing constitutional violation constitutes proof of an irreparable harm.”). IV. The Balance of Harms and the Public Interest Favor Granting Relief
The public interest also favors the granting of the requested relief. First, other persons imprisoned in IDOC who cannot be released at present are also endangered by overcrowding, which increases the risk of disease transmission; and the public at large is put at risk if medical resources are overwhelmed by the hospitalization of imprisoned people in downstate communities with few hospital beds. Second, the public has a strong interest in protecting constitutional rights that would be well served by granting injunctive relief here. See ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 589-90 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he public interest is not harmed by preliminarily enjoining the enforcement of a statute that is probably unconstitutional.”)
Plaintiffs anticipate that Defendant will argue that a balance of equities does not favor Plaintiff’s request because it poses an alleged “public safety” risk. But Plaintiff is not asking this Court to release any individuals from IDOC custody. Plaintiff will still be under IDOC supervision and subject to all the constraints of those on MSR, including GPS monitoring. V. Notice
Plaintiff has provided the best practicable notice of this motion to Defendant. The complaint and this motion are being served electronically on counsel for the defendants in Murphy on Monday, April 6, 2020.
19

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 3 Filed: 04/05/20 Page 20 of 20 PageID #:39
CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Honorable Court enter a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction granting the following relief:
• An immediate order prohibiting enforcement of 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6) (hereinafter the “One-Per-Address Statute”) as to Plaintiff Marcus Barnes so he can be released from prison to a host site at 5726 S. Sangamon, Chicago, Illinois; and
• A preliminary injunction prohibiting the IDOC from enforcing the OnePer-Address Statute against individuals who have completed their courtordered sentences of incarceration and remain in prison due to an inability to identify a host site that satisfies the One-Per-Address Rule.
Respectfully submitted, /s/ Adele D. Nicholas /s/ Mark G. Weinberg Counsel for Plaintiff
Law Office of Adele D. Nicholas 5707 W. Goodman Street Chicago, Illinois 60630 (847) 361-3869 adele@civilrightschicago.com Law Office of Mark G. Weinberg 3612 N. Tripp Avenue Chicago, Illinois 60641 (773) 283-3913 mweinberg@sbcglobal.net
20

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 3-1 Filed: 04/05/20 Page 1 of 4 PageID #:40
Declaration of Delshay McDaniel
1. My name is Delshay McDaniel. Marcus Barnes is my cousin. I speak with Marcus regularly and have made extensive efforts over the past year and a half to find housing for him.
2. Marcus was supposed to be released from prison in December 2018. But he remains in prison because we have not been able to find a host site for Marcus to live at that the IDOC will approve.
3. We have submitted 11 different potential host sites as places for Marcus to live, including my home, my father’s home (Marcus’s uncle), several transitional housing facilities, and several motels.
4. Every proposed host site has been rejected. According to paperwork Marcus received from IDOC in response to a request he submitted (see attached), my home was rejected because there is a daycare within 500 feet of my house. My father’s home was rejected because there is a daycare within 500 feet of his home. Other sites were rejected because they are “motels” or “half-way houses.”
5. Several months ago, I began working with Jordan’s Dream, a Chicago-based organization that provides housing and supportive services to individuals who have been convicted of sex offenses, to try to find housing for Marcus.
6. The last address we submitted is 5726 S. Sangamon, which is a two flat owned and operated by Jordan’s Dream. The address has been rejected for the sole reason that there is a “sex offender registered at this address.” It is my understanding based on conversations with the landlord, Richard Boykins, that this address meets all of the other requirements for housing of individuals who have been convicted of sex offenses. It is not within 500 feet of a school, playground, daycare, or other facility that provides services to children.
7. Jordan’s Dream still has room available for Marcus at 5726 S. Sangamon. I and Marcus’ other family members are willing and able to pay for Marcus to live there. We have no other housing options for Marcus at this time.
8. On March 31, 2020, Marcus’ father, my uncle, passed away. I unfortunately had to communicate the information that his dad had died to Marcus while he remains imprisoned at Graham Correctional Center.
9. Marcus has told me that he has heard that a prison guard employed at Graham Correctional Center has been diagnosed with COVID-19. As a result he feels that he and the other prisoners at Graham, who remain confined in units containing 20 prisoners,

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 3-1 Filed: 04/05/20 Page 2 of 4 PageID #:41

are now at serious risk of contracting the disease. He does not feel safe remaining at Graham.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1746, I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing statements are true and correct.

__________________________ Delshay McDaniel

April 3, 2020

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 3-1 Filed: 04/05/20 Page 3 of 4 PageID #:42

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 3-1 Filed: 04/05/20 Page 4 of 4 PageID #:43

 
 Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 5 Filed: 04/06/20 Page 1 of 12 PageID #:45

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

MARCUS BARNES, individually and on )

behalf of all others similarly situated, )

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

ROB JEFFREYS, in his official

)

Capacity as the Director of the Illinois )

Department of Corrections,

)

)

Defendant.

)

No. 20-cv-2137

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 23(B)(2) AND FOR APPOINTMENT
OF CLASS COUNSEL PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 23(G)(1)

Plaintiff, through counsel, respectfully requests that this Court enter an order

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) certifying this case as a class

action on behalf of all individuals who have been convicted of sex offenses and

completed their court-imposed sentence of incarceration but remain imprisoned in

the Illinois Department of Corrections because they cannot find housing that

complies with 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6). Plaintiff further requests that this Court

enter an order appointing the undersigned attorneys as class counsel. In support

thereof, Plaintiff states as follows.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6) (hereinafter

“the One-Per-Address Statute.”). The Statute prohibits any individual on

mandatory supervised release for a sex offense from residing “at the same address

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 5 Filed: 04/06/20 Page 2 of 12 PageID #:46
or in the same condominium unit or apartment unit or in the same condominium complex or apartment complex with another person he or she knows or reasonably should know is a convicted sex offender or has been placed on supervision for a sex offense.”
Plaintiff Marcus Barnes, and the members of the class he seeks to represent, have all completed their court-ordered terms of incarceration and are entitled to release on Mandatory Supervised Release (“MSR”). They remain in prison because they cannot find an approved “host site” at which to live while on MSR due to the enforcement of the One-Per-Address Statute.
Plaintiff claims enforcement of the Statute against him and others similarly situated violates the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff seeks injunctive and declaratory relief on behalf of the class against Rob Jeffreys in his official capacity as the director of the Illinois Department of Corrections. Mr. Jeffreys is the public official with ultimate authority for enforcement of the One-Per-Address Statute.
Plaintiff’s claims are ideally suited to proceed as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2). As set forth below, the proposed class satisfies each element of Rule 23(a) because (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the class; and (4) the named Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Moreover, this matter meets the requirements for class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted in a manner that applies
2

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 5 Filed: 04/06/20 Page 3 of 12 PageID #:47
generally to the class as a whole, rendering class-wide injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
ARGUMENT I. The Court Should Certify the Proposed Class
For a district court to certify a class action, the named plaintiff and the proposed class must satisfy the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements of Rule 23(a) and the requirements of at least one subsection of Rule 23(b). Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 1992). Here, because the named Plaintiff and the proposed class meet all four Rule 23(a) requirements and the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2), the class should be certified.
A. The Proposed Class Meets All of the Requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2) 1. Numerosity
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(1) requires that the class be “so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). A class “including more than 40 members” generally meets this standard. Barragan v. Evanger’s Dog and Cat Food Co., 259 F.R.D. 330, 333 (N.D.Ill. 2009); Streeter v. Sheriff of Cook County, 256 F.R.D. 609, 612 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (same); accord William B. Rubenstein, et al., Newberg on Class Actions, § 3:12 (5th ed. 2011) (“a class of 40 or more members raises a presumption of impracticability of joinder based on numbers alone.”)
Here, the proposed class easily satisfies this standard. According to the final report of the Illinois Sex Offenses & Sex Offender Registration Task Force,
3

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 5 Filed: 04/06/20 Page 4 of 12 PageID #:48
published in December 2017, “[o]n average, the Illinois Department of Corrections houses 1,200 to 1,400 offenders who may not be released from custody because they are unable to secure permanent, stable housing meeting Illinois statute requirements or agency policy.”1 If only five percent of those individuals are being held due to the One- Per-Address Statute, the class would easily satisfy the numerosity requirement. Moreover, the number of individuals imprisoned in IDOC due to a lack of compliant housing has grown substantially since the publication of the Task Force Report and continues to grow every month as additional individuals finish their sentences of imprisonment and become eligible for release on MSR.
2. Commonality Rule 23(a)(2) requires that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). The Seventh Circuit has observed that a “common nucleus of operative fact is usually enough to satisfy the commonality requirement.” Rosario, 963 F.2d at 1018; Streeter, 256 F.R.D. at 612 (same). An injunctive challenge to a statute that applies generally to all members of the class is a textbook example of a case that satisfies the commonality requirement and warrants class certification. Indeed, this Court and the Seventh Circuit have repeatedly recognized that “[a] class action is … an appropriate vehicle to address what is alleged to be a systemic problem.” Coleman v. County of Kane, 196 F.R.D. 505, 507 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (finding commonality in case challenging sheriff’s policy regarding bond fees); Corey H. v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, No. 92 C 3409,
1 Available at: http://www.icjia.state.il.us/news/sex-offenses-and-sex-offenderregistration-task-force-final-report
4

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 5 Filed: 04/06/20 Page 5 of 12 PageID #:49
2012 WL 2953217, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 19, 2012) (“Plaintiffs have attacked … systemic failures and district-wide policies that apply to every member of the certified class …”); Olson v. Brown, 594 F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding a class action was an appropriate vehicle to challenge jail policies concerning responding to inmates’ grievances and opening inmates’ legal mail); Streeter v. Sheriff of Cook County, 256 F.R.D. 609, 612–13 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (certifying class of detainees challenging the Cook County jail’s strip search policy).
Here, the named Plaintiff and all members of the proposed are challenging the constitutionality of the same statute. Accordingly, all of the core factual and legal questions are appropriate for resolution on a class-wide basis. These common questions include the following:
• What are the rationales for the One-Per-Address Statute; • Whether there is any compelling interest served by the Statute; • Whether the Statute violates the Eighth Amendment as applied to the
members of the class. Because there are common questions of law and fact pertaining to all members of the class, this matter meets the commonality requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
3. Typicality Rule 23(a)(3) requires that “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). The standard for determining typicality is not an identity of interest between the named plaintiffs and the class, but rather a “sufficient homogeneity of interest.” Jones v.
5

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 5 Filed: 04/06/20 Page 6 of 12 PageID #:50
Blinziner, 536 F. Supp. 1181, 1190 (N.D. Ind. 1982) (citing Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 403 n.13 (1975)). “[T]he typicality requirement is liberally construed.” Gaspar v. Linvatec Corp., 167 F.R.D. 51, 57 (N.D. Ill. 1996). A “plaintiff’s claim is typical if it arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members and [is] based on the same legal theory.” De La Fuente v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 713 F.2d 225, 232 (7th Cir. 1983). This requirement “is meant to assume that the named representative’s claims ‘have the same essential characteristics as the claims of the class at large.’” Oshana v. Coca– Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 514 (7th Cir. 2006).
Where, as here, the named plaintiffs’ injuries arise from a generally applicable statute affecting all members of the class, typicality exists even if there are factual differences in precisely how the policy was applied to each plaintiff. Streeter v. Sheriff of Cook County, 256 F.R.D. 609, 612-13 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (certifying class of detainees strip searched upon entry to Cook County Jail, despite the Sheriff’s argument that there were differences in the circumstances of each search “because ‘the likelihood of some range of variation in how different groups of … detainees were treated does not undermine the fact that the claims of each class [member] share a common factual basis and legal theory.’”); Areola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 798 (7th Cir. 2008) (typicality satisfied where plaintiff was in the “same boat” as other Cook County Jail detainees who had been denied crutches); Bullock v. Sheahan, 225 F.R.D. 227, 230 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (“[p]otential factual differences”
6

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 5 Filed: 04/06/20 Page 7 of 12 PageID #:51
relating to individual searches held insufficient to defeat typicality in a jail strip search case).
In this case, the named Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class as a whole. Plaintiff Barnes is currently detained in IDOC despite having completed his term of incarceration because he is subject to the One-Per-Address Statute. Each member of the proposed class is in the same situation. As such, Plaintiff is subject to the same policy applicable to every member of the class. Moreover, the named plaintiff and each class member has the same legal theories—that is, that the challenged statute violates the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, the named Plaintiff satisfies Rule 23(a)(3)’s typicality requirement. See Fonder v. Sheriff of Kankakee County, No. 12CV-2115, 2013 WL 5644754, at *6 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 2013) (typicality satisfied where “Plaintiff is challenging the same strip search policy as the class he seeks to represent”); Olson, 284 F.R.D. at 411 (typicality satisfied where class representative and members of proposed class had their legal mail opened improperly by correctional officers).
4. Adequacy Rule 23(a)(4) requires that the named plaintiffs “will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). The adequate representation inquiry consists of two parts: “(1) the adequacy of the named plaintiffs as representatives of the proposed class’ myriad members, with their differing and separate interests, and (2) the adequacy of the proposed class counsel.”
7

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 5 Filed: 04/06/20 Page 8 of 12 PageID #:52
Gomez v. St. Vincent Health, Inc., 649 F.3d 583, 592 (7th Cir. 2011). Both elements are met here.
a. Plaintiff Is an Appropriate Representative of the Interests of the Class
The named Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. The named Plaintiff is currently being detained in IDOC pursuant to the allegedly unconstitutional statute. Both the named Plaintiff and the members of the proposed class have a common interest in ensuring that this statute is enjoined. The named Plaintiff and the class members raise the same claims and seek the same relief, and the class representative does not have interests antagonistic to the interests of the class. Plaintiff Barnes is committed to obtaining an injunction to prevent future violations of detained individuals’ constitutional rights. Accordingly, Plaintiff Barnes has a strong personal stake in the proceedings that will “insure diligent and thorough prosecution of the litigation.” Rodriguez v. Swank, 318 F. Supp. 289, 294 (N.D. Ill.1970), aff'd 403 U.S. 901 (1971).
b. Adequacy of Representation The named Plaintiff is represented by experienced civil rights counsel who are well qualified to represent the interests of the members of the class and have devoted substantial time and resources to vigorously prosecuting this case. Ms. Nicholas and Mr. Weinberg have successfully litigated numerous constitutional cases in which broad equitable relief was sought, including the Murphy class action which raised claims closely related to the claim raised here. See, e.g., Murphy v. Raoul, 16 C 11471, 380 F. Supp. 3d 731 (N.D. Ill., 2019) (Kendall, J.) (certified class
8

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 5 Filed: 04/06/20 Page 9 of 12 PageID #:53
action; obtained permanent injunction governing IDOC procedures for releasing sex offenders on MSR); RCP Publications Inc. v. City of Chicago, 15 C 11398 (certified class action; obtained permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement of City’s signposting ordinance and class-wide damages); Adair v. Town of Cicero, No. 18 C 3526, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110949 (N.D. Ill. July 3, 2019) (pending certified class action on behalf of women detained in Town of Cicero police lockup); Koger v. Dart, 114 F. Supp. 3d 572 (N.D. Ill., 2015) (obtained declaratory judgment holding ban on newspapers in the Cook County Jail unconstitutional); Pindak v. Dart, 10 C 6237 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (Pallmeyer, J.) (obtained a permanent injunction ordering the sheriff to train deputies concerning First Amendment rights); Norton v. City of Springfield, 806 F. 3d 411 (7th Cir. 2015) (obtained a injunction barring the City of Springfield from enforcing its municipal panhandling ordinance).
Because the Plaintiff Barnes has demonstrated a commitment to vigorously pursuing class-wide relief and because he is represented by competent and experienced counsel, he satisfies Rule 23(a)(4)’s adequacy requirements.
5. Plaintiff Satisfies Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) Because this Case Seeks Declaratory and Injunctive Relief from Policies that Impact the Entire Proposed Class
The final requirement for class certification is that the named plaintiff must meet the requirements of at least one of the subsections of Rule 23(b). Subsection (b)(2) requires that “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a
9

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 5 Filed: 04/06/20 Page 10 of 12 PageID #:54
whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Courts have long recognized that civil rights class actions are the paradigmatic 23(b)(2) suits, “for they seek classwide structural relief that would clearly redound equally to the benefit of each class member.” Marcera v. Chinlund, 595 F.2d 1231, 1240 (2d Cir. 1979), vacated on other grounds, 442 U.S. 915 (1979); see also Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 565 F. 2d 975, 979 n.9 (7th Cir. 1977) (“Rule 23(b)(2) … is devoted primarily to civil rights class actions which allege violations of constitutional rights.”) (citing Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 Amendments to Rule 23.) As stated in the leading treatise on class actions:
Rule 23(b)(2) was drafted specifically to facilitate relief in civil rights suits. Most class actions in the constitutional and civil rights areas seek primarily declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of the class and therefore readily satisfy Rule 23(b)(2) class action criteria. A. Conte & H. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions § 25.20 (4th ed. 2002). Because this case seeks class-wide injunctive and declaratory relief, it is appropriate for certification as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). II. The Court Should Designate Plaintiff’s Counsel as Class Counsel Under Rule 23(g)(1) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(g) requires that the district court appoint class counsel for any class that is certified. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1). The attorneys appointed to serve as class counsel must “fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(B). The appointed class counsel must be listed in a court’s class certification order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(B).
10

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 5 Filed: 04/06/20 Page 11 of 12 PageID #:55
Rule 23(g) provides four factors for a court to consider in appointing class counsel: (1) “the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in the action;” (2) “counsel’s experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and the types of claims asserted in the action;” (3) “counsel’s knowledge of the applicable law”; and (4) “the resources that counsel will commit to representing the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(A).
The undersigned attorney satisfies each of these requirements. First, Plaintiff’s counsel have invested substantial work into preparation of this case, including speaking to numerous families and individuals affected by the challenged policies, drafting a complaint, drafting a motion for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, and conducting extensive legal research concerning the class members’ claims. Second, as set forth in §I(A)(4)(c) above, Plaintiff’s counsel have devoted substantial professional resources to litigation on behalf of individuals who have been convicted of sex offenses and have significant experience in handling complex civil rights litigation, including the kind of claims asserted in this case. Finally, Plaintiff’s counsel have dedicated and will continue to commit substantial resources to the representation of this class. In sum, Plaintiff’s counsel fully satisfy the criteria for class counsel set forth in Rule 23(g), and Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court appoint undersigned counsel to represent the class.
11

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 5 Filed: 04/06/20 Page 12 of 12 PageID #:56
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court grant the motion for class certification and appoint the undersigned attorney as Class Counsel.
Respectfully submitted, /s/ Adele D. Nicholas /s/ Mark G. Weinberg Counsel for Plaintiffs Law Office of Adele D. Nicholas 5707 W. Goodman Street Chicago, Illinois 60630 847-361-3869 adele@civilrightschicago.com Law Office of Mark G. Weinberg 3612 N. Tripp Avenue Chicago, Illinois 60641 (773) 283-3913 mweinberg@sbcglobal.net
12

 
 Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 16 Filed: 04/28/20 Page 1 of 23 PageID #:78

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

COLUMBO GALINDO (M08407),

)

ANDRA SAMPSON (R70879),

)

JOHN MARGARELLA (M36976),

)

JONATHAN SPARKS (S10787),

)

KENNETH GREEN (R72403),

)

FREDRICK CHAMBLIS (M32848),

)

COREY CROWE (M41508),

)

DANA MONSON (M08651),

)

DAVID EASTON (K63639),

)

JOSHUA ATKINS (Y12324),

)

KENNETH SCHROEDER (M35946), )

WADE COUNCIL (M25987),

)

CHRISTOPHER SHELTON (R34928), )

MARK FALLER (K78827),

)

PAUL D. HUBBARD (M07217), and

)

JOSHUA HUDDLESTON (M44423), )

individually and on behalf of all others )

similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ROB JEFFREYS, in his official

)

capacity as the director of the Illinois )

Department of Corrections,

)

)

Defendant.

)

No. 20-cv-2137

FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF

Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, complain

against Defendant Rob Jeffreys, Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections,

as follows:

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 16 Filed: 04/28/20 Page 2 of 23 PageID #:79
NATURE OF THE CASE 1. The named Plaintiffs are all members of the certified class in Murphy v. Raoul, 16-cv-11471. Each of the Plaintiffs remains imprisoned in the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) beyond the completion of his court-ordered term of imprisonment because he does not have an approved “host site” at which to reside while on Mandatory Supervised Release (“MSR”). 2. Currently, the sole barrier to each of the named Plaintiffs’ release is an Illinois law that prohibits an individual on MSR for sex offense from living “at the same address or in the same condominium unit or apartment unit or in the same condominium complex or apartment complex with another person he or she knows or reasonably should know is a convicted sex offender or has been placed on supervision for a sex offense.” 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6) (hereinafter the “One-PerAddress Statute” or “the Statute”). 3. Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, contend that continued enforcement of the One-Per-Address Statute violates the Eighth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause and seek an injunction prohibiting Defendant Jeffreys from continuing to enforce the Statute.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 4. Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 2201. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202 and Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court has jurisdiction to declare the rights of the parties and to grant all further relief deemed necessary and proper.
2

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 16 Filed: 04/28/20 Page 3 of 23 PageID #:80
5. Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), as a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims asserted herein occurred in this district.
THE PARTIES 6. Defendant Rob Jeffreys is sued in his official capacity as director of the Illinois Department of Corrections. In his capacity as the director of IDOC, he has final authority to set the Department of Corrections’ policies with regard to approval of prisoners’ host sites. The Department of Corrections’ power to approve or deny proposed host sites is the sole mechanism through which the One-PerAddress Statute is enforced. 7. The named Plaintiffs are individuals who are entitled to release from IDOC and, as set forth in full below, have places to live outside of IDOC that would be approvable host sites but for the One-Per-Address Statute. 8. The named Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of all individuals who have served their entire sentence of imprisonment and are entitled to release on MSR but remain in prison because they cannot obtain a host site that satisfies the One-PerAddress Statute.
RELEVANT FACTS The Murphy Litigation
9. The plaintiffs in Murphy challenged the constitutionality of the “host site” requirement as it was being applied to individuals who have been sentenced to an indeterminate term of “three years to life” on MSR. Such individuals face the
3

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 16 Filed: 04/28/20 Page 4 of 23 PageID #:81
possibility of being imprisoned for life if they are unable to find and/or pay for
housing that meets the requirements imposed by Illinois law and IDOC policy
because their MSR time never begins to run until they are released from prison to
an approved host site. See 730 ILCS 5/3-14-2.5(e).
10. The Murphy plaintiffs identified several layers of restrictions that limit
where people sentenced to indeterminate MSR can live, which, taken together,
make it virtually impossible for the members of the class to find host sites. Among
the restrictions are the following:
• Sections of the Illinois Criminal Code which make it a crime for any individual classified as a “child sex offender” to live within 500 feet of a school, playground, or daycare (720 ILCS 5/11-9.3 (b-5), (b-10));
• Sections of the Illinois Unified Code of Corrections which prohibit persons required to register as sex offenders from living “near” “parks, schools, day care centers, swimming pools, beaches, theaters, or any other places where minor children congregate without advance approval of an agent of the Department of Corrections” (730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(b-1)(12));
• The One-Per-Address Statute which requires individuals on MSR for sex offenses to “refrain from residing at the same address or in the same condominium unit or apartment unit or in the same condominium complex or apartment complex with another person he or she knows or reasonably should know is a convicted sex offender,” unless residing at a “licensed transitional housing facility for sex offenders,” a facility “operated or licensed by the Department of Children and Family Services or by the Department of Human Services,” or a “licensed medical facility” (730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6));
• Housing restrictions imposed purely as a matter of IDOC policy, including prohibiting living in a host site where children visit or reside (including the parolee’s own children), where there are computers or Wi-Fi access, and/or where there is no land-line telephone;
• The unavailability of half-way houses, transitional housing, homeless shelters or other free or low-cost housing for indigent parolees; and
4

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 16 Filed: 04/28/20 Page 5 of 23 PageID #:82
• The IDOC’s interpretation of the One-Per-Address Statute as prohibiting a sex offender parolee from living in a building adjacent to a building where another registrant lives and/or from living in the same trailer park as another registrant.
11. On April 6, 2018, Murphy was certified as a class action on behalf of “all individuals sentenced to serve three-years-to-life on MSR currently detained in the IDOC who have been approved for release on MSR by the PRB but have been denied release from IDOC custody because of their inability to obtain an approved host site.” Murphy v. Raoul, 16-cv-11471, ECF No. 63.
12. On March 31, 2019, this Court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgement on their claim that the State’s statutory and regulatory scheme violates the Equal Protection Clause and the Eighth Amendment. Murphy v. Raoul, 16-cv11471, ECF No. 132; Murphy v. Raoul, 380 F. Supp. 3d 731 (N.D. Ill. 2019).
13. This Court’s summary judgment decision did not single out a particular Illinois law or IDOC policy that violated the constitution. Rather, the Court held that the State’s “statutory and regulatory scheme” as a whole (i.e., the overlapping restrictions imposed by Illinois law, the IDOC’s interpretation of the law, and IDOC’s policies) violates the Murphy class’s constitutional rights.
14. On January 15, 2020, the Court entered a permanent injunction requiring the Illinois Department of Corrections to put forth a plan “setting forth the specific steps [the Defendants] will take to ensure that by no later than January 2, 2021, no member of the class will remain imprisoned due to an inability to comply with the host site requirement.” Murphy v. Raoul, 16-cv-11471, ECF No. 156.
5

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 16 Filed: 04/28/20 Page 6 of 23 PageID #:83
15. The permanent injunction also calls for the IDOC to provide the Court with periodic status reports concerning its implementation of the compliance plan and progress towards the January 2, 2021, compliance deadline. Id.
16. At the time of this filing, it is counsel’s understanding that the IDOC has succeeded in releasing only four members of the Murphy class from IDOC. Each of those individuals was detained in IDOC for more than eight years beyond the completion of his prison sentence.
17. As of March 2020, the Murphy class comprises 297 individuals who remain in prison beyond the completion of their court-ordered sentence of imprisonment due to an inability to meet the host site requirement.
18. The IDOC’s compliance plan for meeting the January 2, 2021, deadline includes several worthwhile proposals, including changes to IDOC interpretation of statutory restrictions (e.g., not applying the One-Per-Address Statute to trailer parks and adjacent buildings); changes to restrictive IDOC policies (e.g., allowing individuals to reside at addresses with Wi-Fi; relaxation of the land-line requirement); and contracting with private vendors to provide transitional housing. Murphy v. Raoul, 16-cv-11471, ECF No. 161.
19. The compliance plan also notes that “[t]here are many statutory provisions that impede the Department’s ability to approve prospective host sites for sex offenders” and states that the Department “hopes that some of the statutory impediments to identifying host sites can be reduced or eliminated through legislative change.” Id. at 3-4.
6

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 16 Filed: 04/28/20 Page 7 of 23 PageID #:84
The Challenged Statute 20. The One-Per-Address Statute is set forth in the Illinois Uniform Code of
Corrections at 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6). 21. The sole mechanism through which the One-Per-Address Statue is enforced
is through the IDOC’s approval or rejection of parolees’ proposed host sites. That is, it is not a criminal offense for an individual on MSR for a sex offense to live at the same address as another registrant.1
22. The One-Per-Address Statute went into effect on July 11, 2005. Prior to that date, individuals on MSR for sex offenses were permitted to live in the same residence as other registrants.
23. On information and belief, the One-Per-Address Statute is a major cause, if not the single largest cause, of the continued imprisonment of members of the Murphy class. This is so because other statutes (e.g., the 500-foot rules) already strictly circumscribe the areas where individuals convicted of sex offenses may live, and the One-Per-Address Statute makes it so only one parolee can live at each compliant property, even if it is a large apartment complex with many units.
24. There is no reason to conclude that people who have been convicted of sex offenses’ living near one another contributes to criminality. At least one analysis found that it has the opposite effect: it reduces the incidence of re-offense and
1 In contrast, the statutes prohibiting individuals classified as “child sex offenders” from living within 500 feet of schools, daycares and playgrounds (720 ILCS 5/11-9.3 (b-5) and (b10)) are part of the criminal code. It is a Class 4 felony for a “child sex offender” to “knowingly” live at a prohibited location. 720 ILCS 5/11-9.3(f).
7

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 16 Filed: 04/28/20 Page 8 of 23 PageID #:85
improves supervision. A Minnesota Department of Corrections report concluded as
follows:
This examination of level three re-offenders does not reveal a negative effect related to a level three offender living with another sex offender. In fact, supervision agents in both Hennepin and Ramsey County have noted benefits from having more than one level three offender living in one location. Closer supervision is possible because travel time between offenders is reduced. Also, level three offenders who live with other level three offenders experience more visits from a supervising agent because agents for both offenders visit the same property. Finally, offenders tend to inform on each other when supervision restrictions are violated or crimes are committed.2
25. There is no logical reason to believe that there is a compelling public safety
need to prohibit people on MSR for sex offenses from living at the same address as
one another, and in the Murphy litigation the IDOC did not come forth with any
safety or rehabilitative justification for the One-Per-Address Statute.
Many Murphy Class Members Would Be Out of Prison But For the One-PerAddress Statute
A. NewDay Apartments Has Four Valid Host Sites Available for Murphy Class Members
26. NewDay Apartments, located in Lake County, Illinois, has partnered with
the IDOC to provide housing to individuals with sex offense convictions being
released from prison onto MSR.
27. NewDay specializes in providing compliant housing to registrants. It
currently owns seven properties which are more than 500 feet away from any
2 See “Level Three Sex Offender Residential Placement Issues,” Minnesota Department of Corrections (available at: https://mn.gov/doc/assets/Lvl%203%20SEX%20OFFENDERS%20report%202003%20(revise d%202-04)_tcm1089-272828.pdf) (last visited April 3, 2020)
8

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 16 Filed: 04/28/20 Page 9 of 23 PageID #:86
schools, playgrounds and/or daycares. One of these properties is reserved for a private-pay registrant on parole; one property currently houses a non-registrant (but will be leased to a registrant when the current tenant moves out); and one property houses six registrants who are not on parole or probation.
28. NewDay currently leases the other four properties to IDOC for the purpose of housing Murphy class members who cannot otherwise secure housing. Placement at NewDay is intended to give individuals who do not have the means or ability to secure a host site an opportunity to get out of prison and begin their MSR time in the community.
29. Murphy class members released to NewDay are given three to four months rent-free to give them an opportunity to find work, obtain government benefits to which they are entitled, and to secure housing of their own.
30. IDOC has begun releasing Murphy class members to NewDay Apartments. To date, four Murphy class members have been placed at NewDay. IDOC has been prioritizing the release of individuals who have done the most “dead-time” (i.e., extra time in prison beyond the completion of their sentence).
31. Due to the One-Per-Address Statute, the IDOC is only using half of its capacity for housing Murphy class members at the properties it leases from NewDay. That is, the units IDOC leases from NewDay have eight separate bedrooms and could comfortably accommodate eight parolees at no additional cost to the IDOC. But because of constraints imposed by the One-Per-Address Statute,
9

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 16 Filed: 04/28/20 Page 10 of 23 PageID #:87
IDOC has only released four Murphy class members to these properties—one at each separate address.
32. Plaintiff Columbo Galindo is a prisoner at Taylorville Correctional Center. In 2008, he was convicted of criminal sexual assault and sentenced to five years in IDOC plus three-years-to-life MSR. With “good time” credits, he completed his prison term on March 11, 2011, and has been entitled to release from prison on MSR since that date, but remains imprisoned because he has been unable to secure compliant housing. Because of his inability to find housing, Galindo has spent more than nine years of “dead time” in prison.
33. On information and belief, Plaintiff Galindo is next in line for placement at NewDay Apartments because he has done the most “dead time” of any member of the Murphy class who remains in prison.
34. On January 23, 2020, Galindo met with a representative of Field Services at Taylorville.3 Galindo was told that he is approved for release to NewDay Apartments and will be released when one of the units at NewDay becomes available. He was not given any definitive timeline of when a unit would be available for him. He remains imprisoned indefinitely until a unit at NewDay becomes available.
35. Plaintiff Andra Sampson is a prisoner at Big Muddy River Correctional Center. In 2007 he was convicted of predatory criminal sexual assault and sentenced to six years in IDOC plus three-years-to-life MSR. With “good time”
3 Field Services is the IDOC unit charged with responsibility for investigation and approval of host sites.
10

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 16 Filed: 04/28/20 Page 11 of 23 PageID #:88
credits, he completed his prison term on March 18, 2011, and has been entitled to release from prison on MSR since that date, but remains imprisoned because he has been unable to secure compliant housing. Because of his inability to find housing, Sampson has spent more than nine years of “dead time” in prison.
36. On information and belief, Sampson is second in line (behind Galindo) for placement at NewDay Apartments because he has done the second most “dead time” among Murphy class members who remain in prison.
37. In April 2020, Sampson met with Connie Halliday, a counselor in the Field Services office at Big Muddy River Correctional Center. Ms. Halliday informed Sampson that he is approved for placement at NewDay Apartments and will be released when one of the units at NewDay becomes available. He was not given any definitive timeline of when a unit would be available for him, but Ms. Halliday expressed hope that he would be released “soon.” He remains imprisoned indefinitely until a unit at NewDay becomes available.
38. Plaintiff John Margarella is a prisoner at Dixon Correctional Center. In 2012, he was convicted of possession of child pornography and sentenced to three years in IDOC plus three-years-to-life MSR. With “good time” credits, he completed his prison term on December 30, 2013, and has been entitled to release from prison on MSR since that date, but remains imprisoned because he has been unable to secure compliant housing. Because of his inability to find housing, Margarella has spent more than six years of “dead time” in prison.
11

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 16 Filed: 04/28/20 Page 12 of 23 PageID #:89
39. Margarella is at high risk for suffering serious health complications if he contracts COVID-19 while imprisoned. Margarella has suffered two heart attacks, internal bleeding, and dangerously low blood pressure while imprisoned at Dixon Correctional Center beyond his out date. In the past five years, he has needed an emergency blood transfusion and insertion of five stents to adequately open his blood vessels.
40. Margarella does not have any friends or family outside of prison who can offer him a place to live while on MSR or help him pay for housing. He remains imprisoned indefinitely until a unit at NewDay Apartments becomes available.
41. There is no reason why the properties IDOC leases from NewDay Apartment should sit half vacant when individuals such as Galindo, Sampson and Margarella are entitled to release and could be serving their MSR time in the community at no additional expense to IDOC. B. Wayside Cross Ministries Seeks to Provide Host Sites to at Least 10
Murphy Class Members 42. Wayside Cross Ministries is a Bible-based mission that has operated in Aurora, Illinois, for more than 90 years. 43. The Master’s Touch Ministry at Wayside Cross is a Bible-based, residential life-transformation program for troubled men. The program offers room and board at no cost, and empowers its participants to change their lives through prayer, Bible study, daily church services, mentoring with local clergy, and work rehabilitation programs. It takes a minimum of seven months for a resident to complete the Master’s Touch Ministry program. The end goal of the program is to give the men
12

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 16 Filed: 04/28/20 Page 13 of 23 PageID #:90
the tools they need to live healthy, law abiding lives, and the ability to secure their own employment and housing.
44. Wayside Cross currently has 20 openings in the Master’s Touch Ministry and is willing to accept members of the Murphy class at no cost to the IDOC or to the men.4
45. The participants in the Masters Touch Ministry all reside together in a dormitory setting at Wayside Cross, located at 215 E. New York Street in Aurora. Thus, placement at Wayside Cross does not comply with the One-Per-Address Statute.
46. Plaintiffs Kenneth Green, Fredrick Chamblis, Corey Crowe, Dana Monson, David Easton, Joshua Atkins, Kenneth Schroeder, Wade Council, Christopher Shelton and Mark Faller are all members of the Murphy class who have completed their sentences of incarceration and are entitled to release from IDOC on MSR, but remain imprisoned because they do not have resources to secure compliant housing.
47. Plaintiffs Green, Chamblis, Crowe, Monson, Easton, Atkins, Schroeder, Council, Shelton and Faller all would like to participate in the Master’s Touch Ministry at Wayside Cross.
48. Staff at Wayside Cross have conducted phone interviews with Plaintiffs Green, Chamblis, Crowe, Monson, Easton, Atkins, Schroeder, Council, Shelton and
4 Because of its proximity to a playground, Wayside Cross cannot accept into its program individuals who are classified as “child sex offenders,” but it can accept individuals whose offenses involved an adult victim. Undersigned counsel has confirmed with Aurora Corporation Counsel Rick Veenstra that Aurora police are willing to register parolees at Wayside Cross provided they are not classified as “child sex offenders.” The ten Plaintiffs seeking placement at Wayside Cross are not classified as “child sex offenders.”
13

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 16 Filed: 04/28/20 Page 14 of 23 PageID #:91
Faller. Wayside Cross has determined that each of these men meets the criteria for admission to the Master’s Touch Ministry. Wayside Cross is prepared to accept these individuals immediately, provided they test negative for COVID-19.
49. In connection with these phone interviews, Jon Beall, the program director of the Master’s Touch Ministry, spoke to Field Services officials from the IDOC facilities at which the Plaintiffs are imprisoned. The Field Services officials stated that the Plaintiffs will not be approved for release to Wayside Cross in the absence of a “court order” allowing them to reside there.
50. The sole reason Plaintiffs Green, Chamblis, Crowe, Monson, Easton, Atkins, Schroeder, Council, Shelton and Faller have not been approved for release to Wayside Cross is the One-Per-Address Statute, which prohibits them from living at the same address as one another or as others who are required to register as sex offenders. C. Members of the Murphy Class Could Be Released to Placements with
Family 51. Plaintiff Jonathan Sparks is a member of the Murphy class. He is currently a prisoner at Big Muddy River Correctional Center. In 2010, Sparks was convicted of criminal sexual assault and sentenced to four years in IDOC plus three-years-tolife MSR. He completed his prison term on July 29, 2013, and has been entitled to release from prison on MSR since that date, but remains imprisoned because he has been unable to secure housing. Because of his inability to find housing, Sparks has spent nearly seven years of “dead time” in prison.
14

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 16 Filed: 04/28/20 Page 15 of 23 PageID #:92
52. All of Sparks’ family is out of state. Sparks seeks to live with his mother who resides in Chappell, Nebraska, while on MSR. Sparks’ mother is willing and able to house and support Sparks if he is released to her home.
53. Sparks sought approval for interstate transfer to Nebraska to reside with his mother. IDOC rejected the placement solely because Sparks’ mother lives with her brother (Mr. Sparks’ uncle) who was convicted of a sex offense in the 1990s and released from prison in 2000.
54. The One-Per-Address Statute is the sole reason Mr. Sparks has not been approved to reside with his mother and uncle. D. Members of the Murphy Class Could Be Released to Single-Room
Occupancies and Extended-Stay Motels 55. Plaintiff Joshua Huddleston is a member of the Murphy class. He is currently a prisoner at Robinson Correctional Center. In 2013, Huddleston was convicted of predatory criminal sexual assault and sentenced to six years in IDOC plus three-years-to-life MSR. He completed his prison term on January 22, 2019, and has been entitled to release from prison on MSR since that date, but remains imprisoned because he has been unable to secure housing. Because of his inability to find housing, Huddleston has spent 15 months of “dead time” in prison. 56. Huddleston does not have any family outside of prison who can offer him a place to stay or help him secure housing. 57. Huddleston is retired from the U.S. military and has a savings account with sufficient funds to pay for his own housing for at least a year. However, because he is imprisoned, he is not able to search for housing, sign a lease, or set up utilities.
15

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 16 Filed: 04/28/20 Page 16 of 23 PageID #:93
58. For an individual in Mr. Huddleston’s position, an extended-stay motel or a single-room occupancy (SRO) building are the only viable options for securing housing at which to live while on MSR. This is so because IDOC requires functioning utilities at the host site prior to approving an individual for release, and an individual who doesn’t have outside help can’t set up a phone line and electric service while imprisoned.
59. Mr. Huddleston would like to parole to an extended-stay motel or an SRO. Such a host site would be ideal for him because such locations are furnished and have utilities included. Staying at such a location for a period of several months would enable Huddleston to start his MSR time, get back on his feet and locate suitable housing of his own.
60. InTown Suites, located at 350 East Roosevelt, Villa Park 60181, offers furnished rentals on a monthly basis. InTown is willing to rent to an individual on parole provided they have funds to pay for a month in advance and can show valid identification. On information and belief, InTown Suites complies with the restriction on living within 500 feet of schools, playgrounds and daycares.
61. As a matter of long-standing past practice, IDOC has not considered motels or SROs to be approvable host sites for individuals who are required to register as sex offenders due to the One-Per-Address statute. It has been the IDOC’s position that such a placement is not sufficiently stable because an individual could be forced to move if another registrant moves into the same building.
16

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 16 Filed: 04/28/20 Page 17 of 23 PageID #:94
Health Risks of Detention in IDOC Amid the COVID-19 Pandemic 62. We are in the midst of a world-wide health crisis caused by the rapid spread
of coronavirus and COVID-19. The number of known COVID-19 infections is rising at an alarming rate. As of April 27, 2020, there have been more than 3 million infections globally5; and Illinois alone has nearly 46,000 known cases.6 More than 210,000 people have died.7
63. The risks to the health of individuals detained in close proximity to one another in prisons—as well as the staff, attorneys, medical professionals, and clergy who visit and work in these prisons—cannot be overstated. COVID-19 is highly contagious between people who are in close contact with one another.8
64. The virus is transmissible through coughing, sneezing, and contact with surfaces.9 Experts advise that “talking” and “normal breathing” also likely transmit
5 Johns Hopkins University, Coronavirus Resource Center, https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html (last visited April 27, 2020). 6 Illinois Department of Public Health, Corona Virus Response, https://www.dph.illinois.gov/covid19 (last visited April 27, 2020). 7 See note 5, supra. 8 “How COVID-19 Spreads,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (available at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/how-covid-spreads.html) 9 Id.
17

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 16 Filed: 04/28/20 Page 18 of 23 PageID #:95
the disease.10 The CDC urges social distancing—i.e., every person should remain at least six feet away from every other person—to avoid transmission of the disease.11
65. Social distancing is of paramount importance because even entirely asymptomatic persons can be infected with COVID-19 and unknowingly transmit it to others.12
66. Proper sanitation measures, including frequent hand washing and frequent cleaning of surfaces with approved disinfectants, are also recommended.13 Governor Pritzker has issued a state-wide “stay at home” order to slow the disease’s spread.14
67. None of the recommended measures for mitigating the spread of COVID-19 are possible for persons confined in prisons and those who must interact with them.
68. Illinois officials have publicly acknowledged the severe risk COVID-19 poses to those detained in IDOC and the impossibility of proper mitigation measures in correctional facilities. At Governor Pritzker’s April 4, 2020, press
10 “Experts tell White House coronavirus can spread through talking or even just breathing, CNN, April 2, 2020 (available at: https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/02/health/aerosol-coronavirus-spread-white-houseletter/index.html) 11 “Mitigation Strategies for Communities with Local COVID-19 Transmission,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Mar. 12, 2020 (available at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019- ncov/downloads/community-mitigation-strategy.pdf) 12 See note 8, supra. 13 “How to Protect Yourself,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (available at: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prepare/prevention.html) 14 “Governor Pritzker’s Executive Orders and Rules,” Illinois Dept. of Public Health https://www.dph.illinois.gov/covid19/governor-pritzkers-executive-orders-and-rules.
18

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 16 Filed: 04/28/20 Page 19 of 23 PageID #:96
briefing,15 Illinois Department of Public Health Director Dr. Ngozi Ezike stated as follows:
We have seen clusters of cases in ... correctional centers.... I want to touch on the difficulty of preventing the virus from infiltrating these congregate settings and the challenges of stopping that spread. The natural movement of people needing to come in and out of those settings, even when they’re decreased to the minimal amount, still ... increases the potential for rapid spread of the virus to people who live, eat and recreate all in the same space. Options for medical isolation of these COVID-19 patients are limited. ... Ideally, people who are positive should be isolated individually, and close contacts should be quarantined individually. However, that can’t always be possible given the constraints of space.
69. At Stateville Correctional Center, 122 prisoners have been diagnosed with COVID-19. There are confirmed cases of COVID-19 in 15 IDOC facilities to date.16
CLASS ALLEGATIONS 70. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), Plaintiffs seek certification of this complaint as a class action for purposes of equitable relief on behalf of a class
defined as follows.
• All individuals who have been convicted of sex offenses and completed their court-imposed sentence of incarceration but remain imprisoned in the Illinois Department of Corrections because they cannot find housing that complies with the One-Per-Address Statute, 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6).
15 “Daily Corona Virus Press Briefings, Illinois Dept. of Public Health, http://www.dph.illinois.gov/topics-services/diseases-and- conditions/diseases-a-zlist/coronavirus/media-publications/daily-press-briefings 16 “COVID-19 Response,” Illinois Dept. of Corrections, https://www2.illinois.gov/idoc/facilities/Pages/Covid19Response.aspx (last visited April 27, 2020)
19

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 16 Filed: 04/28/20 Page 20 of 23 PageID #:97
71. The class seeks a declaration that the One-Per-Address Statute violates the Eighth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause as applied to them and an injunction prohibiting Defendant from continuing to enforce the Statute.
72. The proposed class is numerous. According to the final report of the Illinois Sex Offenses & Sex Offender Registration Task Force, published in December 2017, “[o]n average, the Illinois Department of Corrections houses 1,200 to 1,400 offenders who may not be released from custody because they are unable to secure permanent, stable housing meeting Illinois statute requirements or agency policy.”17 On information and belief, the number of individuals imprisoned in IDOC due to a lack of compliant housing has grown substantially since the publication of that report. If only five percent of those individuals are being held due to the OnePer-Address Statute, the class would easily satisfy the numerosity requirement.
73. There are questions of law and fact common to all class members, including but not limited to the following:
• What are the rationales for the One-Per-Address Statute; • Whether there is any compelling interest served by the Statute; • Whether the Statute violates the Eighth Amendment and Equal
Protection Clause as applied to the members of the class. 74. All individuals falling within the class definition are subject to the same Statute. Given the commonality of the questions pertinent to all class members, a single judgment would provide relief to each member of the class.
17 Available at: http://www.icjia.state.il.us/news/sex-offenses-and-sex-offenderregistration-task-force-final-report
20

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 16 Filed: 04/28/20 Page 21 of 23 PageID #:98
75. Defendant has acted and continues to act in a manner adverse to the rights of the proposed class, making final declaratory relief appropriate with respect to the class as a whole.
76. The named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class; and the named Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of all members of the proposed class.
77. Plaintiffs’ counsel has extensive experience and has devoted substantial professional and financial resources to representing individuals in cases involving the same type of claim raised here—namely, the Murphy class action. Plaintiffs’ counsel will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class.
COUNT I 42 U.S.C. §1983 – EIGHTH AMENDMENT 78. Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of the class they seek to represent, reallege and reincorporate, as though fully set forth herein, each and every allegation contained above. 79. In Murphy v. Raoul, 380 F. Supp. 3d 731, 738 (N.D. Ill. 2019), this Court has already concluded that it violates the Equal Protection Clause and the Eighth Amendment to subject individuals to indefinite incarceration solely because they cannot meet the host-site requirement, holding as follows: At the very heart of the liberty secured by the separation of powers is freedom from indefinite imprisonment by executive decree. The Attorney General and Director’s current application of the host site requirement results in the continued deprivation of the plaintiffs’ fundamental rights and therefore contravenes the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
21

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 16 Filed: 04/28/20 Page 22 of 23 PageID #:99
80. The One-Per-Address Statute is the sole reason the named Plaintiffs and the members of the proposed class remain imprisoned in violation of their Eighth Amendment rights.
81. Thus, the One-Per-Address Statute violates the Eighth Amendment as applied to the named Plaintiffs and the members of the proposed class.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Honorable Court: a) Issue an order certifying this action to proceed as a class pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(b)(2); b) Appoint the undersigned as class counsel pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g); c) Enter judgment declaring that 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6) as applied to
Plaintiffs and the members of the class violates the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; d) Enter a permanent injunction prohibiting Defendant from continuing to enforce 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6); e) Award Plaintiffs their reasonable attorneys’ fees and cost pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and other applicable law; and f) Grant such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT II 42 U.S.C. §1983 – FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT – EQUAL PROTECTION
82. Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of the class they seek to represent, reallege and reincorporate, as though fully set forth herein, each and every allegation contained above.
83. The One-Per-Address Statute violates the Equal Protection Clause as applied to the named Plaintiffs and the members of the proposed class.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Honorable Court:
22

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 16 Filed: 04/28/20 Page 23 of 23 PageID #:100
a) Issue an order certifying this action to proceed as a class pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2);
b) Appoint the undersigned as class counsel pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g); c) Enter judgment declaring that 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6) as applied to Plaintiff
and the members of the class violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; d) Enter a permanent injunction prohibiting Defendant from continuing to enforce 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6); e) Award Plaintiffs their reasonable attorneys’ fees and cost pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and other applicable law; and f) Grant such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
Respectfully submitted, /s/ Adele D. Nicholas /s/ Mark G. Weinberg Counsel for Plaintiff
Law Office of Adele D. Nicholas 5707 W. Goodman Street Chicago, Illinois 60630 (847) 361-3869 adele@civilrightschicago.com Law Office of Mark G. Weinberg 3612 N. Tripp Avenue Chicago, Illinois 60641 (773) 283-3913 mweinberg@sbcglobal.net
23

 
 Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 1 of 30 PageID #:101

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

COLUMBO GALINDO, et al.,

)

individually and on behalf of all others )

similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

ROB JEFFREYS, in his official

)

capacity as the Director of the Illinois )

Department of Corrections,

)

)

Defendant.

)

No. 20-cv-2137

PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Plaintiffs Columbo Galindo, Andra Sampson, John Margarella, Jonathan

Sparks, Kenneth Green, Fredrick Chamblis, Corey Crowe, Dana Monson, David

Easton, Joshua Atkins, Kenneth Schroeder, Wade Council, Christopher Shelton,

Mark Faller, Paul D. Hubbard and Joshua Huddleston, individually and on behalf

of all others similarly situated, respectfully request that this Honorable Court enter

a preliminary injunction granting the following relief:

• An immediate order prohibiting enforcement of 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6) (hereinafter the “One-Per-Address Statute”) as to the named Plaintiffs so they can be released from prison to the host sites described below; and

• A preliminary injunction prohibiting the IDOC from enforcing the OnePer-Address Statute against individuals who have completed their courtordered sentences of incarceration and remain in prison due to an inability to identify a host site that satisfies the One-Per-Address Statute.

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 2 of 30 PageID #:102
INTRODUCTION The named Plaintiffs and the members of the class they seek to represent have all completed their court-ordered terms of incarceration and are entitled to release on Mandatory Supervised Release (“MSR”). They remain in prison because they have been unable to secure an approved “host site” at which to live while on MSR. In Murphy v. Raoul, 380 F. Supp. 3d 731, 738 (N.D. Ill. 2019), this Court has already concluded that it violates the Equal Protection Clause and the Eighth Amendment to subject individuals to indefinite incarceration solely because they cannot meet the host site requirement, holding as follows: At the very heart of the liberty secured by the separation of powers is freedom from indefinite imprisonment by executive decree. The Attorney General and Director’s current application of the host site requirement results in the continued deprivation of the plaintiffs’ fundamental rights and therefore contravenes the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. That decision was entered more than a year ago on March 31, 2019. As of April 29, 2020, 317 members of the Murphy class remain imprisoned in violation of their constitutional rights. Presently, the world is in the grip of an unprecedented public health emergency that poses a particular danger to incarcerated individuals. There have been diagnosed cases of COVID-19 in 15 IDOC facilities.1 Now, not only are the members of the Murphy class being detained in prison in violation of their constitutional rights; but every day that class members remain incarcerated poses a grave risk to their health and safety.
1 “COVID-19 Response,” Illinois Dept. of Corrections, https://www2.illinois.gov/idoc/facilities/Pages/Covid19Response.aspx (last visited April 27, 2020)
2

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 3 of 30 PageID #:103
Each of the named Plaintiffs has identified a safe place to live outside of prison that satisfies almost all of the statutory requirements restricting where he is permitted to live while on MSR.
• Plaintiffs Galindo, Sampson and Margarella seek release to the vacant rooms in the four properties IDOC leases from NewDay Apartments for the purpose of providing transitional housing to Murphy class members;
• Plaintiffs Green, Chamblis, Crowe, Monson, Easton, Atkins, Schroeder, Council, Shelton, Faller, and Hubbard seek release to Wayside Cross Ministries, a Bible-based transitional housing program in Aurora, Illinois;
• Plaintiff Kenneth Sparks seeks release to his mother’s home in Chappell, Nebraska, to live with his mom and uncle; and
• Plaintiff Joshua Huddleston seeks release to InTown Suites, an extendedstay motel in Villa Park, Illinois.
IDOC is currently unable to release Plaintiffs to these host sites because a section of the Illinois Uniform Code of Corrections prohibits individuals on MSR for sex offenses from living “at the same address or in the same condominium unit or apartment unit or in the same condominium complex or apartment complex with another person he or she knows or reasonably should know is a convicted sex offender or has been placed on supervision for a sex offense.” 730 ILCS 5/3-37(a)(7.6) (hereinafter the “One-Per-Address Statute” or “the Statute”).
Plaintiffs now ask this Court to enjoin enforcement of the One-Per-Address Statute because, for the reasons set forth below, its application to the named Plaintiffs and others similarly situated violates the Equal Protection Clause and the Eighth Amendment.
3

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 4 of 30 PageID #:104
FACTUAL BACKGROUND I. All of the Named Plaintiffs Could Be Released to Approved Host Sites
But for the One-Per-Address Statute A. NewDay Apartments Has Four Valid Host Sites Available for Murphy
Class Members and Seeks to Provide More Housing to Registrants NewDay Apartments, located in Lake County, Illinois, specializes in providing compliant housing to registrants. NewDay has partnered with the IDOC to provide housing to individuals with sex offense convictions being released from prison onto MSR. Ex. 1, Declaration of Bob McKelvey, at ¶2. NewDay currently owns seven properties which are more than 500 feet away from any schools, playgrounds and/or daycares. Id. at ¶2. It leases four of these properties directly to the IDOC for the purpose of housing Murphy class members who cannot otherwise secure housing. Id. at ¶3. There are currently four parolees living in the four properties IDOC leases from NewDay. Id. at ¶4. These units have the capacity to house four additional residents in separate bedrooms that are currently empty. Id. at ¶5. But under the One-PerAddress Statute, NewDay is prohibited from having more than one registrantparolee per property. Id. As a result, four bedrooms currently sit vacant in the properties IDOC is leasing from NewDay. IDOC could release four additional Murphy class members to NewDay right now at no additional cost to the state for housing them. In addition to the four units NewDay currently leases to IDOC, NewDay seeks to greatly expand the housing it offers to registrant-parolees over the next several
4

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 5 of 30 PageID #:105
years. Id. at ¶6. NewDay’s goal is to double the number of units it makes available to registrants each year for at least the next three years. Id. The founder and manager of NewDay Apartments, Bob McKelvey, states that “[p]ermitting multiple registrant-parolees at the same address would easily double the number of available units compared to the current one-per-address rule, and would make the housing we provide more affordable for our registrant tenants.” Id. at ¶¶6, 7. But for the One-Per-Address Statute, NewDay would be willing to lease to parolees the apartments it currently makes available only to individuals who are off parole. For example, Alvin Goldberg, a member of the Murphy class is on the waiting list to rent a unit from NewDay, subject to Alvin’s being able to obtain “a court order allowing NewDay to house Alvin with other registrants who live in other units at the same address.” Ex. 10, Declaration of Stephen N. Goldberg.
Plaintiff Columbo Galindo is a prisoner at Taylorville Correctional Center. In 2008, he was convicted of criminal sexual assault and sentenced to five years in IDOC plus three-years-to-life MSR. Ex. 2, Galindo IDOC Inmate Status. According to IDOC records provided to Plaintiffs, Galindo completed his prison term on March 11, 2011, and has been entitled to release from prison on MSR since that date, but remains imprisoned because he has been unable to secure compliant housing. Because of his inability to find housing, Galindo has spent more than nine years of “dead time” in prison. On information and belief, Plaintiff Galindo is next in line for
5

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 6 of 30 PageID #:106
placement at NewDay Apartments because he has done the most “dead time” of any
member of the Murphy class who remains in prison.2
On January 23, 2020, Galindo met with a representative of Field Services at
Taylorville.3 Galindo was told that he is approved for release to NewDay
Apartments and will be released when one of the units at NewDay becomes
available. He was not given any definitive timeline of when a unit would be
available for him. He remains imprisoned indefinitely until a unit at NewDay
becomes available.
Plaintiff Andra Sampson is a prisoner at Big Muddy River Correctional Center.
In 2007, he was convicted of predatory criminal sexual assault and sentenced to six
years in IDOC plus three-years-to-life MSR. Ex. 3, Sampson IDOC Inmate Status.
According to IDOC records provided to Plaintiffs, Sampson completed his prison
term on March 18, 2011, and has been entitled to release from prison on MSR since
that date, but remains imprisoned because he has been unable to secure compliant
housing. Because of his inability to find housing, Sampson has spent more than
2 The First Amended Complaint and this motion for an injunction were drafted based on information given to Plaintiffs by the IDOC which indicated that Plaintiffs Columbo Galindo and Andra Sampson were the next in line for placement at NewDay. After Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint on April 29, 2020, IDOC gave Plaintiffs a revised database of Murphy class members that contains information different from the previous database Plaintiffs have been working from for the past several months. In particular, additional class members (at least one of whom has been detained for more than nine years beyond his release date) were added to the database, and many class members’ out dates (e.g., when their original sentences ended) were changed because of errors in the IDOC’s recordkeeping. Based on this revised database, IDOC now contends that other individuals have done more dead time than Galindo and will be prioritized for release before him. 3 Field Services is the IDOC unit charged with responsibility for investigation and approval of host sites.
6

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 7 of 30 PageID #:107
nine years of “dead time” in prison. On information and belief, Sampson is second in line (behind Galindo) for placement at NewDay Apartments because he has done the second most “dead time” among Murphy class members who remain in prison.
In April 2020, Sampson met with Connie Halliday, a counselor in the Field Services office at Big Muddy River Correctional Center. Ms. Halliday informed Sampson that he is approved for placement at NewDay Apartments and will be released when one of the units at NewDay becomes available. He was not given any definitive timeline of when a unit would be available for him, but Ms. Halliday expressed hope that he would be released “soon.” He remains imprisoned indefinitely until a unit at NewDay becomes available.
Plaintiff John Margarella is a prisoner at Dixon Correctional Center. In 2012, he was convicted of possession of child pornography and sentenced to three years in IDOC plus three-years-to-life MSR. With “good time” credits, he completed his prison term on December 30, 2013, and has been entitled to release from prison on MSR since that date, but remains imprisoned because he has been unable to secure compliant housing. Ex. 4, Declaration of Rosemary Margarella, at ¶2. Because of his inability to find housing, Margarella has spent more than six years of “dead time” in prison. Id.
Every member of Margarella’s family who is able has offered to have him come live with them, but IDOC has rejected all proposed host sites because of their proximity to schools or playgrounds, or because of the presence of children at the
7

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 8 of 30 PageID #:108
host site. Id. at ¶3. Margarella’s family cannot afford to pay for separate housing for him. Id. at ¶4.
Margarella is at high risk for suffering serious health complications if he contracts COVID-19. Id. at ¶5. Margarella is 57 years old and has suffered two heart attacks while imprisoned at Dixon Correctional Center beyond his out date. Id. While he was being treated for one of the heart attacks, he received medication that caused internal hemorrhaging resulting in a blood transfusion. Id.
There is no logical reason why Galindo, Sampson and Margarella remain in prison in violation of their constitutional rights while IDOC has vacant bedrooms in housing it currently leases from NewDay apartments. If the One-Per-Address Statute were lifted, these individuals could be immediately released to housing that the IDOC has already deemed to be suitable. In addition, lifting the One-PerAddress Statute would empower NewDay to offer significantly more housing to other Murphy class members who need host sites.
B. Wayside Cross Ministries Seeks to Provide Host Sites to at Least 10 Murphy Class Members
Wayside Cross Ministries is a Bible-based mission that has operated in Aurora, Illinois, for more than 90 years. Ex. 5, Declaration of Jonathan Beall, at ¶1. The Master’s Touch Ministry at Wayside Cross is a Bible-based, residential lifetransformation program for troubled men. Id. at ¶2. The program offers room and board at no cost, and empowers its participants to change their lives through prayer, Bible study, daily church services, mentoring with local clergy and business leaders, and work rehabilitation programs. Id. It takes a minimum of seven months
8

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 9 of 30 PageID #:109
for a resident to complete the Master’s Touch Ministry program. The goal of the program is to give the men the tools they need to secure employment and housing and to live healthy, law abiding lives through their faith in God. Id. at ¶4.
Wayside Cross currently has several openings in the Master’s Touch Ministry and is willing to accept members of the Murphy class at no cost to the IDOC or to the program participants. Id. at ¶5.4 The participants in the Masters Touch Ministry all reside together in a dormitory setting at Wayside Cross, located at 215 E. New York Street in Aurora. Id. at ¶10.
Plaintiffs Kenneth Green, Fredrick Chamblis, Corey Crowe, Dana Monson, David Easton, Joshua Atkins, Kenneth Schroeder, Wade Council, Christopher Shelton and Mark Faller are all members of the Murphy class who have completed their sentences of incarceration and are entitled to release from IDOC on MSR, but remain imprisoned because they do not have resources to secure compliant housing. Plaintiffs Green, Chamblis, Crowe, Monson, Easton, Atkins, Schroeder, Council, Shelton and Faller all would like to participate in the Master’s Touch Ministry at Wayside Cross. Id. at ¶11.
Staff at Wayside Cross have conducted phone interviews with these ten Plaintiffs and determined that each meets the criteria for admission to the Master’s
4 Because of its proximity to what the City of Aurora deems to be a playground, Wayside Cross cannot accept into its program individuals who are classified as “child sex offenders,” but it can accept individuals whose offenses involved an adult victim. Id. at ¶9. Undersigned counsel has confirmed with Aurora Corporation Counsel Rick Veenstra that Aurora police are willing to register parolees at Wayside Cross provided they are not classified as “child sex offenders.” None of the ten Plaintiffs seeking placement at Wayside Cross is classified as a “child sex offender.”
9

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 10 of 30 PageID #:110
Touch Ministry. Id. at ¶9. Wayside Cross is prepared to accept these individuals immediately, provided they test negative for COVID-19 and the information they provided in their intake screening was true and complete. Id. at ¶12.
In connection with these phone interviews, Jon Beall, the program director of the Master’s Touch Ministry, along with members of his staff spoke to Field Services officials from the IDOC facilities at which these Plaintiffs are imprisoned. Id. at ¶13. The Field Services officials stated that the Plaintiffs will not be approved for release to Wayside Cross in the absence of a “court order” allowing them to reside there. Id.
The sole reason IDOC has not allowed individuals on MSR for sex offenses against adult victims to serve their MSR time at Wayside Cross Ministries is the One-Per-Address Statute.
C. Murphy Class Member Jonathan Sparks Should Be Released to His Mother’s House
Plaintiff Jonathan Sparks is a member of the Murphy class. He is currently a prisoner at Big Muddy River Correctional Center. Ex. 6, Declaration of Sparks at ¶1.5 In 2010, Sparks was convicted of criminal sexual assault and sentenced to four years in IDOC plus three-years-to-life MSR. Id. He completed his prison term on July 29, 2013, and has been entitled to release from prison on MSR since that date, but remains imprisoned because he has been unable to secure housing. Id. at ¶2.
5 Mr. Sparks submitted a signed declaration in connection with Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment in Murphy in February 2018. Mr. Sparks’ situation has not changed since that time, and the same declaration is submitted here.
10

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 11 of 30 PageID #:111
Because of his inability to find housing, Sparks has spent nearly seven years of “dead time” in prison. Id.
All of Sparks’ family is out of state. Id. at ¶5. Sparks seeks to live with his mother who resides in Chappell, Nebraska, while on MSR. Id. Sparks’ mother is willing and able to house and support Sparks if he is released to her home. Sparks sought approval for interstate transfer to Nebraska to reside with his mother. Id. IDOC rejected the placement solely because Sparks’ mother lives with her brother (Mr. Sparks’ uncle) who was convicted of a sex offense in the 1990s. Id.
The One-Per-Address Statute is the sole reason Mr. Sparks has not been approved to reside with his mother and uncle.
D. Members of the Murphy Class Could Be Released to Single-Room Occupancies and Extended-Stay Motels
Plaintiff Joshua Huddleston is a member of the Murphy class. He is currently a prisoner at Robinson Correctional Center. Ex. 7, Huddleston IDOC Inmate Status. In 2013, Huddleston was convicted of predatory criminal sexual assault and sentenced to six years in IDOC plus three-years-to-life MSR. Id. He completed his prison term on January 22, 2019, and has been entitled to release from prison on MSR since that date, but remains imprisoned because he has been unable to secure housing. Id. Because of his inability to find housing, Huddleston has spent 15 months of “dead time” in prison. Id.
Huddleston does not have any family outside of prison who can offer him a place to stay or help him secure housing. Huddleston is retired from the U.S. military and has a savings account with sufficient funds to pay for his own housing for at least a
11

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 12 of 30 PageID #:112
year. However, because he is imprisoned, he is not able to search for housing, sign a lease, or set up utilities. For an individual in Mr. Huddleston’s position, an extended-stay motel or a single-room occupancy (SRO) building are the only viable options for securing housing at which to live while on MSR. This is so because IDOC requires functioning utilities at the host site prior to approving an individual for release, and an individual who doesn’t have outside help can’t set up a phone line and electric service while imprisoned. Ex. 8, Excerpt of Deposition of Deputy Chief Dixon, at 75.
Mr. Huddleston would like to parole to an extended-stay motel or an SRO. Such a host site would be ideal for him because such locations are furnished and have utilities included. Staying at such a location for a period of several months would enable Huddleston to start his MSR time, get back on his feet and locate suitable housing of his own.
InTown Suites, located at 350 East Roosevelt, Villa Park 60181, offers furnished rentals on a monthly basis. InTown is willing to rent to an individual on parole provided they have funds to pay for a month in advance and can show valid identification when they check in. On information and belief, InTown Suites complies with the restriction on living within 500 feet of schools, playgrounds and daycares. Ex. 9, Google Maps Aerial View of 350 E. Roosevelt and surrounding area.
As a matter of long-standing past practice, IDOC has not considered motels, SROs, or shelters to be approvable host sites for individuals who are required to register as sex offenders due to the One-Per-Address Statute. Ex. 8, Excerpt of
12

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 13 of 30 PageID #:113
Deposition of Deputy Chief Dixon, at 172-73. It has been the IDOC’s position that such a placement is not sufficiently stable because an individual could be forced to move if another registrant moves into the same building. Id. (“It’s too transient of a situation. You can have another sex offender that moves or takes up shelter there, and then now … our guy’s in violation, and will have to be returned home.”) II. The Murphy Litigation
The plaintiffs in Murphy challenged the constitutionality of the “host site” requirement as it was being applied to individuals who have been sentenced to an indeterminate term of “three years to life” on MSR. Such individuals face the possibility of being imprisoned for life if they are unable to find and/or pay for housing that meets the requirements imposed by Illinois law and IDOC policy because their MSR time never begins to run until they are released from prison to an approved host site. See 730 ILCS 5/3-14-2.5(e).
The Murphy plaintiffs identified several layers of restrictions that limit where people sentenced to indeterminate MSR can live, which together make it impossible for the members of the class to find host sites. Among the restrictions are the following:
• Sections of the Illinois Criminal Code which make it a crime for any individual classified as a “child sex offender” to live within 500 feet of a school, playground, or daycare (720 ILCS 5/11-9.3 (b-5), (b-10));
• Sections of the Illinois Unified Code of Corrections which prohibit persons required to register as sex offenders from living “near” “parks, schools, day care centers, swimming pools, beaches, theaters, or any other places where minor children congregate without advance approval of an agent of the Department of Corrections” (730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(b-1)(12));
13

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 14 of 30 PageID #:114
• The One-Per-Address Statute, which requires individuals on MSR for sex offenses to “refrain from residing at the same address or in the same condominium unit or apartment unit or in the same condominium complex or apartment complex with another person he or she knows or reasonably should know is a convicted sex offender” unless residing at a “licensed transitional housing facility for sex offenders,” a facility “operated or licensed by the Department of Children and Family Services or by the Department of Human Services,” or a “licensed medical facility” (730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6));
• Housing restrictions imposed purely as a matter of IDOC policy, including prohibiting living in a host site where children visit or reside (including the parolee’s own children), where there are computers or Wi-Fi access, and/or where there is no land-line telephone;
• The unavailability of half-way houses, transitional housing, homeless shelters or other free or low-cost housing for indigent parolees; and
• The IDOC’s interpretation of the One-Per-Address Statute as prohibiting a sex offender parolee from living in a building adjacent to a building where another registrant lives and/or from living in the same trailer park as another registrant.
On April 5, 2018, Murphy was certified as a class action on behalf of “all
individuals sentenced to serve three-years-to-life on MSR currently detained in the
IDOC who have been approved for release on MSR by the PRB but have been
denied release from IDOC custody because of their inability to obtain an approved
host site.” Murphy v. Raoul, 16-cv-11471, ECF No. 63. The named Plaintiffs are all
members of the Murphy class.
On March 31, 2019, this Court granted the Murphy plaintiffs’ motion for
summary judgement on their claim that the State’s statutory and regulatory
scheme violates the Equal Protection Clause and the Eighth Amendment. Murphy
v. Raoul, 16-cv-11471, ECF No. 132; Murphy v. Raoul, 380 F. Supp. 3d 731 (N.D. Ill.
2019). The Court’s summary judgment decision did not single out a particular
14

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 15 of 30 PageID #:115
Illinois law or IDOC policy that violated the constitution. Rather, the Court held that the State’s “statutory and regulatory scheme” as a whole (i.e., the overlapping restrictions imposed by Illinois law, the IDOC’s interpretation of the law, and the IDOC’s policies) violates the Murphy class’s constitutional rights.
On January 15, 2020, the Court entered a permanent injunction requiring the IDOC to put forth a plan “setting forth the specific steps [the Defendants] will take to ensure that by no later than January 2, 2021, no member of the class will remain imprisoned due to an inability to comply with the host site requirement.” Murphy v. Raoul, 16-cv-11471, ECF No. 156. The IDOC filed its compliance plan on February 27, 2020. 16-cv-11471, ECF No. 161. The permanent injunction also calls for the IDOC to provide the Court with periodic status reports concerning its implementation of the compliance plan and its progress towards meeting the January 2, 2021 compliance deadline. 16-cv-11471, ECF No. 156.
The IDOC’s compliance plan includes several worthwhile proposals, including changes to IDOC interpretation of statutory restrictions (e.g., not applying the OnePer-Address Statute to trailer parks and adjacent buildings); changes to restrictive IDOC policies (e.g., allowing individuals to reside at addresses with Wi-Fi, relaxation of the land-line requirement); and contracting with private vendors to provide transitional housing. Murphy v. Raoul, 16-cv-11471, ECF No. 161. The plan also notes that “[t]here are many statutory provisions that impede the Department’s ability to approve prospective host sites for sex offenders” states that the
15

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 16 of 30 PageID #:116
Department and “hopes that some of the statutory impediments to identifying host sites can be reduced or eliminated through legislative change.” Id. at 3-4.
At the time of this filing, the Murphy class comprises 317 individuals who remain in prison beyond the completion of their court-ordered sentence of imprisonment, some for as long as nine years past their MSR date, due to an inability to meet the host site requirement. III. The Challenged Statute
The One-Per-Address Statute is set forth in the Illinois Uniform Code of Corrections at 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6). The sole mechanism through which the One-Per-Address Statue is enforced is through the IDOC’s approval or rejection of parolees’ proposed host sites. That is, it is not a criminal offense for an individual on MSR for a sex offense to live at the same address as another registrant, and local police departments and states attorneys play no role in enforcement of the statute.6
The One-Per-Address Statute went into effect on July 11, 2005. Prior to that date, individuals on MSR for sex offenses were permitted to live in the same residence as other registrants. On information and belief, the One-Per-Address Statute is a major cause, if not the single largest cause, of the continued imprisonment of members of the Murphy class. This is so because other statutes (e.g., the 500-foot rules) already strictly circumscribe the areas where individuals convicted of sex offenses may live, and the One-Per-Address Statute makes it so
6 In contrast, the statutes prohibiting individuals classified as “child sex offenders” from living within 500 feet of schools, daycares and playgrounds (720 ILCS 5/11-9.3 (b-5) and (b10)) are part of the criminal code. It is a Class 4 felony for a “child sex offender” to “knowingly” live at a prohibited location. 720 ILCS 5/11-9.3(f).
16

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 17 of 30 PageID #:117
only one parolee can live at each compliant property, even if it is a large apartment
complex with many units.
There is no reason to conclude that people who have been convicted of sex
offenses’ living near one another contributes to criminality. At least one analysis
found that it has the opposite effect: it reduces the incidence of re-offense and
improves supervision. A Minnesota Department of Corrections report concluded as
follows:
This examination of level three re-offenders does not reveal a negative effect related to a level three offender living with another sex offender. In fact, supervision agents in both Hennepin and Ramsey County have noted benefits from having more than one level three offender living in one location. Closer supervision is possible because travel time between offenders is reduced. Also, level three offenders who live with other level three offenders experience more visits from a supervising agent because agents for both offenders visit the same property. Finally, offenders tend to inform on each other when supervision restrictions are violated or crimes are committed.7 There is no logical reason to believe that there is a compelling public safety need
to prohibit people on MSR for sex offenses from living at the same address as one
another. In the Murphy litigation, the IDOC did not come forth with any safety or
rehabilitative justification for the One-Per-Address Statute. In acknowledgement of
the restriction’s excessiveness, IDOC has already reinterpreted the restriction so as
not to apply to trailer parks or adjacent apartment buildings. Murphy v. Raoul, 16-
cv-11471, ECF No. 161.
7 See “Level Three Sex Offender Residential Placement Issues,” Minnesota Department of Corrections (available at: https://mn.gov/doc/assets/Lvl%203%20SEX%20OFFENDERS%20report%202003%20(revise d%202-04)_tcm1089-272828.pdf) (last visited April 3, 2020)
17

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 18 of 30 PageID #:118
IV. Health Risks of Detention in IDOC Amid the COVID-19 Pandemic We are in the midst of a world-wide health crisis caused by the rapid spread of
coronavirus and COVID-19. The number of known COVID-19 infections is rising at an alarming rate. As of April 27, 2020, there have been more than 3 million infections globally8; and Illinois alone has nearly 46,000 known cases.9 More than 210,000 people have died.10 The risks to the health of individuals detained in close proximity to one another in prisons—as well as the staff, attorneys, medical professionals, and clergy who visit and work in these prisons—cannot be overstated. COVID-19 is highly contagious between people who are in close contact with one another.11 The virus is transmissible through coughing, sneezing, and contact with surfaces.12 Experts advise that “talking” and “normal breathing” also likely transmit the disease.13 The CDC urges social distancing—i.e., every person should remain at least six feet away from every other person—to avoid transmission of the
8 Johns Hopkins University, Coronavirus Resource Center, https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html (last visited April 27, 2020). 9 Illinois Department of Public Health, Corona Virus Response, https://www.dph.illinois.gov/covid19 (last visited April 27, 2020). 10 See note 8, supra. 11 “How COVID-19 Spreads,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (available at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/how-covid-spreads.html) 12 Id. 13 “Experts tell White House coronavirus can spread through talking or even just breathing, CNN, April 2, 2020 (available at: https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/02/health/aerosol-coronavirus-spread-white-houseletter/index.html)
18

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 19 of 30 PageID #:119
disease.14 Social distancing is of paramount importance because even entirely asymptomatic persons can be infected with COVID-19 and unknowingly transmit it to others.15 Proper sanitation measures, including frequent hand washing and frequent cleaning of surfaces with approved disinfectants, are also recommended.16 Governor Pritzker has issued a state-wide “stay at home” order to slow the disease’s spread.17
None of the recommended measures for mitigating the spread of COVID-19 are possible for persons confined in prisons and those who must interact with them. Such individuals live in close quarters to one another where proper social distancing cannot be maintained. Illinois officials have publicly acknowledged the severe risk COVID-19 poses to those detained in IDOC and the impossibility of proper mitigation measures in correctional facilities. At Governor Pritzker’s April 4, 2020, press briefing,18 Illinois Department of Public Health Director Dr. Ngozi Ezike stated as follows:
14 “Mitigation Strategies for Communities with Local COVID-19 Transmission,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Mar. 12, 2020 (available at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019- ncov/downloads/community-mitigation-strategy.pdf) 15 See note 11, supra. 16 “How to Protect Yourself,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (available at: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prepare/prevention.html) 17 “Governor Pritzker’s Executive Orders and Rules,” Illinois Dept. of Public Health https://www.dph.illinois.gov/covid19/governor-pritzkers-executive-orders-and-rules. 18 “Daily Corona Virus Press Briefings, Illinois Dept. of Public Health, http://www.dph.illinois.gov/topics-services/diseases-and- conditions/diseases-a-zlist/coronavirus/media-publications/daily-press-briefings
19

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 20 of 30 PageID #:120
We have seen clusters of cases in ... correctional centers.... I want to touch on the difficulty of preventing the virus from infiltrating these congregate settings and the challenges of stopping that spread. The natural movement of people needing to come in and out of those settings, even when they’re decreased to the minimal amount, still ... increases the potential for rapid spread of the virus to people who live, eat and recreate all in the same space. Options for medical isolation of these COVID-19 patients are limited. ... Ideally, people who are positive should be isolated individually, and close contacts should be quarantined individually. However, that can’t always be possible given the constraints of space. At Stateville Correctional Center, 122 prisoners have been diagnosed with COVID-19. There are confirmed cases of COVID-19 in 15 IDOC facilities to date.19
ARGUMENT I. Preliminary Injunction Standard
To be entitled to a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must establish four elements: (1) some likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the lack of an adequate remedy at law; (3) a likelihood that they will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted; and (4) the balance of hardships tips in the moving party’s favor. Ty, Inc. v. Jones Group, Inc., 237 F.3d 891, 895 (7th Cir. 2001).
As shown below, Plaintiffs meet each element for establishing an entitlement to injunctive relief, and accordingly this Court should issue a preliminary injunction to halt enforcement of the One-Per-Address Statute.
19 “COVID-19 Response,” Illinois Dept. of Corrections, https://www2.illinois.gov/idoc/facilities/Pages/Covid19Response.aspx (last visited April 29, 2020).
20

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 21 of 30 PageID #:121
II. Plaintiffs Have a Likelihood of Success on their Claims that Continued Enforcement of the One-Per-Address Statute Violates the U.S. Constitution There are two ways in which the continued enforcement of the One-Per-Address
Statute violates the constitutional rights of the named Plaintiffs and others similarly situated. First, as this Court observed in its decision in Murphy, the continued imprisonment of individuals who do not have the money or outside support to comply with the host site requirement violates the Eighth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause because it “discriminates against the plaintiffs because of their poverty.” Murphy, 380 F. Supp. 3d at 755. Second, the continued incarceration of the Plaintiffs unnecessarily exposes them to an unreasonable risk of exposure to COVID-19 in violation of their right to “reasonable safety” while incarcerated under the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiffs address each in turn below.
A. Continued Enforcement of the One-Per-Address Rule Violates the Eighth Amendment and Equal Protection Clause
As explained in §§I and II of the Factual Background above, all of the named Plaintiffs are entitled to release from prison onto MSR in the community. This Court has already found that it is a violation of the constitution to keep individuals who have completed their court-ordered terms of incarceration in prison simply because they cannot meet the “host site” requirement due to their “indigence and lack of support.” Murphy v. Raoul, 380 F. Supp. 3d 731, 738 (N.D. Ill. 2019).
In particular, this Court held that the continued imprisonment of the Plaintiffs constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment and a violation of the Equal Protection Clause because it is solely “the consequence of [the
21

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 22 of 30 PageID #:122
plaintiffs’] indigency, homelessness, and the attendant powerlessness to procure
housing that will satisfy the IDOC.” Id. at 756. The IDOC is under a permanent
injunction which requires it to release the members of the Murphy class. Murphy v.
Raoul, 16-cv-11471, ECF No. 156. Significantly, over the course of the Murphy
litigation, which has been ongoing for four years and generated hundreds of pages of
summary judgment briefing, the IDOC never put forth a public safety or
rehabilitative justification for the One-Per-Address Statute.
On April 8, 2020, this Court granted an injunction prohibiting enforcement of
the One-Per-Address Statute as to Marcus Barnes, another member of the Murphy
class who had a suitable place to live but for the One-Per-Address rule. This Court
wrote as follows:
Plaintiff has found a place to live that will be supportive of his transfer back into the community. … Another sex offender resides in the building already and therefore Defendants will not permit him to reside there. Plaintiff is clearly suffering a constitutional harm each day he is detained past his release date (which is now nearly a year and a half) and that harm can only be remedied by release. In response to the question about what penological or rehabilitative support the Defendants have for the “One Person One Address” provision, Defendants were unable to give any. The public’s interest in only hav[ing] one sex offender live at one residence is not supported by any testimony, expert opinion, or evidence. Therefore, the Court finds that the statute is unconstitutional as it applies to Plaintiff and Defendants are enjoined from prohibiting his release to the address presented by Plaintiff.
ECF No. 11.
The same result should occur here. Each of the Plaintiffs has a safe host site at
which to live outside of prison. The host sites Plaintiffs wish to be released to will be
supportive of their reintegration into the community and meet every requirement
22

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 23 of 30 PageID #:123
imposed by Illinois law and IDOC policy, save the One-Per-Address Statute. In the absence of a legitimate justification for the prohibition on more than one parolee’s living at a particular address, the continued application of the One-Per-Address Statute to Plaintiffs violates their constitutional rights for all of the reasons the Court recognized in Murphy.
B. Continued Imprisonment of Individuals Who Are Entitled to Release During the COVID-19 Pandemic Constitutes Deliberate Indifference
The Eighth Amendment mandates that persons confined in prisons must “be furnished with the basic human needs, one of which is ‘reasonable safety.’” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33-34 (1993) (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989)). In Helling, the Supreme Court held that a prisoner stated an Eighth Amendment claim that he was exposed to unsafe levels of environmental tobacco smoke even though he personally experienced no adverse health effects because the health risk posed by involuntary exposure to second-hand smoke is “sufficiently imminent.” Id. at 509 U.S. at 35.
Courts have consistently interpreted Helling to authorize an Eighth Amendment cause of action when an inmate is exposed to a risk of contracting contagious diseases. See Loftin v. Dalessandri, 3 F. App’x 658, 662-63 (10th Cir. 2001) (inmate stated an Eighth Amendment violation where he alleged he was housed in a cell with two cellmates who had tuberculosis); DeGidio v. Pung, 920 F.2d 525, 533 (8th Cir. 1990) (failure by prison officials to prevent the unchecked spread of tuberculosis violated the Eighth Amendment). Indeed, in Helling itself, the Supreme Court approvingly cited Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974), in
23

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 24 of 30 PageID #:124
which the court held that inmates were entitled to relief under the Eighth Amendment when they proved threats to their personal safety from “the mingling of inmates with serious contagious diseases with other prison inmates.” Helling, 506 U.S. at 34.
The Seventh Circuit has similarly recognized that the Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from known exposure to serious diseases, holding that in such a circumstance, “[t]he prison must be allowed to choose between removing the prisoner from the unhealthy environment and protecting him from its consequences . . . provided, of course, that the protection is efficacious.” Powers v. Snyder, 484 F.3d 929, 931 (7th Cir. 2007); see also McDonald v. Hardy, 821 F.3d 882, 889 (7th Cir. 2016) (explaining that the Eighth Amendment does not excuse deliberate indifference simply because harms “have not yet reached the point of causing acute or life-threatening injuries”).
To succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendant has acted with “deliberate indifference.” Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005). That standard is met when the plaintiff establishes that he has been exposed to an “objectively serious” risk of harm and defendant acted with “conscious disregard of known or obvious dangers” to the plaintiff. Id. (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). Both components of the deliberate indifference standard are met here.
First, imprisonment during the COVID-19 pandemic exposes plaintiffs and others similarly situated to a known and objectively serious risk of harm. As
24

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 25 of 30 PageID #:125
outlined in §IV of the Factual Background above, imprisoned individuals are at a particularly high risk of contracting COVID-19. COVID-19 cases are skyrocketing in Illinois. At the time the initial complaint was filed in this case on April 5, 2020, Illinois had fewer than 9,000 cases. ECF No. 1 at ¶36. Three weeks later, Illinois has more than 48,000 confirmed cases.20 Likewise, infections in IDOC facilities continue to rise. At the time the initial complaint was filed, 56 IDOC inmates had tested positive. ECF No. 1 at 46. Now, that number is 155. 21 For an individual such as Plaintiff John Margarella, who has serious pre-existing health conditions, including two recent heart attacks, the risk of life threatening illness if exposed to COVID-19 is elevated. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “[p]eople who have serious heart conditions” are “at high-risk for severe illness from COVID-19.”22
Second, IDOC is acting in conscious disregard of these known dangers by keeping Plaintiffs in prison during the pandemic when they have safe places to go in the community. It cannot be disputed that the IDOC is aware of the grave risk that the coronavirus poses to imprisoned individuals. As explained in §IV of the Factual Background above, the top public health official of the State of Illinois has publicly acknowledged the risk that COVID-19 poses to prisoners and the
20 See COVID-19 Homepage, Illinois Department of Public Health, http://www.dph.illinois.gov/covid19 21 https://www2.illinois.gov/idoc/facilities/Pages/Covid19Response.aspx 22 “People Who Are at Higher Risk for Severe Illness,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/people-athigher-risk.html
25

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 26 of 30 PageID #:126
impossibility of proper mitigation measures in an institutional setting. Moreover, the IDOC knows that Plaintiffs are constitutionally entitled to be released. This Court’s permanent injunction requires IDOC to release the members of the Murphy class. Murphy v. Raoul, 16-cv-11471, ECF No. 156. Under these circumstances, continued enforcement of the One-Per-Address Statute constitutes deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s right to “reasonable safety.” Plaintiffs could be living in safe places outside of prison where they would be able to comply with the statewide Stay-at-Home order and observe other recommended disease mitigation measures. To expose Plaintiffs and others who have completed their sentences and have housing outside of prison to the unmitigated risk of contracting COVID-19 falls short of the Eighth Amendment’s mandates. III. Plaintiffs and Others Similarly Situated are Suffering and Will
Continue to Suffer Irreparable Injury in the Absence of an Injunction If an injunction is not granted, Plaintiffs and others similarly situated will suffer two forms of irreparable injury. One, they will continue to be imprisoned in violation of their constitutional right to be released from prison on MSR. And two, they will continue to be exposed to an unreasonable risk of being infected with COVID-19. Such harms unquestionably constitute irreparable injury. Aguilar v. Gaston-Camara, 861 F.3d 626, 631 (7th Cir. 2017) (“additional incarceration without penological justification” violates the Eighth Amendment); Hampton v. Leibach, 99 C 5473, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20983, at *5-6 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 2001) (a plaintiff “suffers irreparable harm each day that he is imprisoned in violation of the United States Constitution.”); Harris v. Board of Supervisors, 366 F.3d 754, 766
26

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 27 of 30 PageID #:127
(9th Cir. 2004) (accepting “pain,” “infection,” and “medical complications” as forms of irreparable harm warranting injunctive relief).
Moreover, it is well established that when a plaintiff establishes a likelihood of success on a claim that a government action violates his constitutional rights, he meets the element of showing irreparable harm. Ezell v. City of Chi., 651 F.3d 684, 699 (7th Cir. 2011) (“When an alleged deprivation of a constitutional right is involved, most courts hold that no further showing of irreparable injury is necessary.”) (quoting 11A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 2948.1 (2d ed. 1995)); Preston v. Thompson, 589 F.2d 300, 303 n.3 (7th Cir. 1978) (“The existence of a continuing constitutional violation constitutes proof of an irreparable harm.”). IV. The Balance of Harms and the Public Interest Favor Granting Relief
The public interest also favors the granting of the requested relief. First, there is no public safety justification for refusing to release Plaintiffs to NewDay Apartments or Wayside Cross Ministries. IDOC has leased the housing units at NewDay for the specific purpose of fostering transition back into the community for members of the Murphy class. NewDay Apartments considers its primary mission to be “to keep communities safe by housing registrants responsibly.” Ex. 1, Decl. of McKelvey at ¶7. To date, NewDay has a zero percent recidivism rate among its registrant tenants and notes that “it is our experience that housing registrants at the same address allows for more effective (and cost-effective) law enforcement oversight.” Id.
27

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 28 of 30 PageID #:128
Similarly, Wayside Cross Ministries has nearly 100 years of experience helping individuals just like the Plaintiffs reintegrate into society through its highly structured faith-based programming. Kane County State’s Attorney Joe McMahon has lauded Wayside’s long track record of success with individuals who have been convicted of sex offenses, stating, “The work that they’ve done there at the Mission has been remarkable for decades.”23
Thus, Wayside Cross and NewDay Apartments are precisely the type of rehabilitative settings to which IDOC should be releasing Murphy class members. Moreover, both of these housing options are available at no additional cost to the State of Illinois, which is currently paying tens of thousands of dollars a year to keep the Plaintiffs in prison beyond their release dates.24
Likewise, there is no public safety justification for refusing to allow members of the proposed class such as Mr. Sparks and Mr. Huddleston to parole to host sites that comply with every aspect of Illinois law except the One-Per-Address Statute. If an injunction is granted, Plaintiffs Huddleston and Sparks (and others similarly situated) will still be required to comply with restrictions on their living within 500 feet of schools, playgrounds and daycare centers, and they will still be subject to all
23 See “Convicted Sex Offenders’ Ministry Housing Too Close To Playground, City Says,” National Public Radio, January 15, 2020; audio recording available at: https://www.npr.org/2020/01/15/796021411/convicted-sex-offenders-ministry-housing-tooclose-to-playground-city-says 24 See “IDOC Fiscal Year 2017 Annual Report” at 80 (In 2018, the average annual cost of keeping a person incarcerated in an IDOC facility was $27,930) (available at https://www2.illinois.gov/idoc/reportsandstatistics/Documents/FY18%20Annual%20Report %20FINAL.pdf).
28

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 29 of 30 PageID #:129
of the restrictions attendant to being on MSR, including GPS monitoring, curfews, mandatory sex offender therapy, and restrictions on unauthorized contact with minors.
During this pandemic, other public safety factors also strongly favor issuance of an injunction that will allow Plaintiffs and others to be released to safe host sites outside of prison. Other persons imprisoned in IDOC who cannot be released at present are endangered by overcrowding, which increases the risk of disease transmission; and the public at large is put at risk if medical resources are overwhelmed by the hospitalization of imprisoned people in downstate communities with few hospital beds.
Finally, the public has a strong interest in protecting constitutional rights that would be well served by granting injunctive relief here. See ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 589-90 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he public interest is not harmed by preliminarily enjoining the enforcement of a statute that is probably unconstitutional.”)
CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Honorable Court enter a preliminary injunction granting the following relief:
• An immediate order prohibiting enforcement of 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6) (hereinafter the “One-Per-Address Statute”) as to the named Plaintiffs so they can be released from prison to the otherwise compliant host sites identified above; and
• A preliminary injunction prohibiting the IDOC from enforcing the OnePer-Address Statute against individuals who have completed their court-
29

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 30 of 30 PageID #:130

ordered sentences of incarceration and remain in prison due to an inability to identify a host site that satisfies the One-Per-Address Rule.

Law Office of Adele D. Nicholas 5707 W. Goodman Street Chicago, Illinois 60630 (847) 361-3869 adele@civilrightschicago.com
Law Office of Mark G. Weinberg 3612 N. Tripp Avenue Chicago, Illinois 60641 (773) 283-3913 mweinberg@sbcglobal.net

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Adele D. Nicholas /s/ Mark G. Weinberg Counsel for Plaintiff

30

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17-1 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:131

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17-1 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:132

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17-2 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:133
ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS INTERNET INMATE STATUS
AS OF: Wednesday, April 29, 2020

M08407 - GALINDO, COLUMBO

Parent Institution: Offender Status: Location:

TAYLORVILLE CORRECTIONAL CENTER IN CUSTODY TAYLORVILLE
Sex Offender Registry Required

PHYSICAL PROFILE

Date of Birth: Weight: Hair: Sex: Height: Race: Eyes:

05/20/1979 213 lbs. Brown Male 5 ft. 11 in. Hispanic Brown

MARKS, SCARS, & TATTOOS
TATTOO, LEG, LEFT - ALIEN, MARTIAN TATTOO, ARM, LEFT UPPER - SKULL W/CROSSBONES TATTOO, LEG, RIGHT - MAD HATTER W/PISTOL IN HAT

ADMISSION / RELEASE / DISCHARGE INFO

Admission Date: Projected Parole Date: Last Paroled Date: Projected Discharge Date:

04/23/2019 04/23/2021 04/23/2019 3 YRS TO LIFE - TO BE DETERMINED

SENTENCING INFORMATION

MITTIMUS:

09CR0112901

CLASS:

1

COUNT:

1

OFFENSE:

CRIM SEX ASSAULT/CANT CONSENT

CUSTODY DATE:

12/11/2008

SENTENCE:

5 Years 0 Months 0 Days

COUNTY:

COOK

SENTENCE DISCHARGED?: NO

The information made available on this database service is for the general public and law enforcement to promote the interest of public safety. The best effort has been made to ensure that information published is true and complete, however the information can quickly change. Accordingly, before making any assumption that said information is factual and complete, please send written correspondence to the Illinois

Case: 1:20-cDvep-0ar2tm1e3nt7ofDCoorrceuctimones-nPtub#li:c 1In7fo-rm2atFioinleOdffi:ce0, 413/0310C/2on0coPrdiaagCeour2t, Po.Of .2BoPx ageID #:134
19277, Springfield, IL 62794-9277. Please see the Illinois Department of Corrections full disclaimer page for important information.
conduct another search return to the IDOC homepage
Illinois Department of Corrections 1301 Concordia Court, PO Box 19277
Springfield, Illinois, 62794-9277 217-558-2200 | 800-546-0844 TDD

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17-3 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:135
ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS INTERNET INMATE STATUS
AS OF: Wednesday, April 29, 2020

R70879 - SAMPSON, ANDRA

Parent Institution: Offender Status: Location:

BIG MUDDY CORRECTIONAL CENTER IN CUSTODY BIG MUDDY RIVER
Sex Offender Registry Required

PHYSICAL PROFILE

Date of Birth: Weight: Hair: Sex: Height: Race: Eyes:

11/16/1987 219 lbs. Black Male 6 ft. 01 in. Black Brown

MARKS, SCARS, & TATTOOS
TATTOO, ARM, RIGHT UPPER - "VANESSA" TATTOO, FOREARM, LEFT - "YAZMINE" TATTOO, ARM, LEFT UPPER - CROSS TATTOO, FOREARM, RIGHT - "DRE" BIBLE VERSE

ADMISSION / RELEASE / DISCHARGE INFO

Admission Date: Projected Parole Date: Last Paroled Date: Projected Discharge Date:

08/24/2018 08/24/2020 08/24/2018 3 YRS TO LIFE - TO BE DETERMINED

SENTENCING INFORMATION

MITTIMUS:

07CR0462201

CLASS:

X

COUNT:

1

OFFENSE:

PREDATORY CRIMINAL SEXUAL ASLT

CUSTODY DATE:

01/10/2007

SENTENCE:

6 Years 0 Months 0 Days

COUNTY:

COOK

SENTENCE DISCHARGED?: NO

MITTIMUS: CLASS: COUNT: OFFENSE:

07CR0486801 4 1 POSS AMT CON SUB EXCEPT(A)/(D)

Case: 1:20-cCvU-S0T2O1DY37DADTEo: cument #:011/170-/2300F7iled: 04/30/20 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:136

SENTENCE:

1 Years 0 Months 0 Days

COUNTY:

COOK

SENTENCE DISCHARGED?: NO

The information made available on this database service is for the general public and law enforcement to promote the interest of public safety. The best effort has been made to ensure that information published is true and complete, however the information can quickly change. Accordingly, before making any assumption that said information is factual and complete, please send written correspondence to the Illinois Department of Corrections- Public Information Office, 1301 Concordia Court, P.O. Box 19277, Springfield, IL 62794-9277. Please see the Illinois Department of Corrections full disclaimer page for important information.
conduct another search return to the IDOC homepage
Illinois Department of Corrections 1301 Concordia Court, PO Box 19277
Springfield, Illinois, 62794-9277 217-558-2200 | 800-546-0844 TDD

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17-4 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:137
Declaration of Rosemary Margarella 1. My name is Rosemary Margarella (legally Frank J Margarella). I am the daughter of John Margarella, one of the plaintiffs who has been detained in the Illinois Department of Corrections beyond his release date because he can’t secure approved housing. 2. My father was supposed to be released from prison in December 2013. He remains in prison at Dixon Correctional Center because we cannot find housing for him that the IDOC will approve. He has been in prison for more than six years beyond the time he was sentenced to serve. 3. We have asked IDOC to release my father to homes with every family member who has the ability to offer him a place to stay. All potential placements with members of our family have been rejected because we live too close to schools or playgrounds or have children residing with or frequenting the residences. 4. No one in our family has the money to buy or rent a separate place for my father. 5. My father is 57 and has had serious health issues while in the IDOC. I am very concerned for his wellbeing during the COVID-19 pandemic. He has suffered two heart attacks while imprisoned and has had stents inserted in his blood vessels. While undergoing treatment for one of the heart attacks, he received medication that caused internal hemorrhaging and almost died. He also has a degenerative spine disorder. I am concerned that my father is at very high risk if he is exposed to the corona virus in prison. 6. We have no hope of securing my father’s release unless the IDOC gives him a place to stay in transitional housing or a halfway house.

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17-4 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:138
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1746, I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing statements are true and correct.

_____________________ Rosemary Margarella

4/29/2020 ___________ Date

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17-5 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:139

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17-5 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:140

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17-6 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:141
Declaration of Jonathan Eric Joseph Sparks
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1746, I certify under penalty of perjury that the following statements are true and correct:
1. My name is Jonathan Eric Joseph Sparks. I am currently incarcerated at Big Muddy Correctional Center. I was convicted on July 12, 2010 on one count of Criminal Sexual Assault. I was sentenced to 4 years with a 3 years to life MSR term.
2. I have been eligible for release from prison on Mandatory Supervised Release since July 29, 2013. As of July 29, 2018, I will have been incarcerated 5 years past my original sentence. I have now spent more time incarcerated under my MSR sentence than for my original crime.
3. I am not married, and have no savings or significant assets. 4. I have $100 in my account, and receive only $10 per month in State Pay. My
sister occasionally sends me money when she can, but it is never much. 5. I have no family or friends in Illinois who can help me find suitable housing. I
have made several attempts to secure housing through the Interstate Compact Commission, but have been denied each time.
i. The first home I tried was my father’s house in Colorado. This residence was rejected due to “unsafe living conditions,” a determination that was never documented or explained to me in any detail.
ii. My mother’s home in Chappel, NE was rejected because my uncle, a sex offender himself, resides there.
iii. My uncle’s home in California was rejected as he lives within 400ft of a school.
iv. I have also contacted Peoria Rescue Missions, of Peoria, IL, who refused my request for assistance.
6. I have no other family members to turn to. I have exhausted all possible avenues for me in Illinois, and without a material change in my situation, I fear I will be trapped in prison forever.

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17-6 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:142

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17-7 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:143
ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS INTERNET INMATE STATUS
AS OF: Tuesday, April 28, 2020

M44423 - HUDDLESTON, JOSHUA

Parent Institution: Offender Status: Location:

ROBINSON CORRECTIONAL CENTER IN CUSTODY ROBINSON
Sex Offender Registry Required

PHYSICAL PROFILE

Date of Birth: Weight: Hair: Sex: Height: Race: Eyes:

02/11/1979 235 lbs. Brown Male 5 ft. 08 in. White Blue

MARKS, SCARS, & TATTOOS
TATTOO, LEG, LEFT - CALF AREA TRIBAL SCAR, ANKLE, LEFT TATTOO, LEG, RIGHT - CALF AREA TRIBAL

ADMISSION / RELEASE / DISCHARGE INFO

Admission Date: Projected Parole Date: Last Paroled Date: Projected Discharge Date:

01/22/2019 03/05/2021 01/22/2019 3 YRS TO LIFE - TO BE DETERMINED

SENTENCING INFORMATION

MITTIMUS:

13CF1993

CLASS:

X

COUNT:

1

OFFENSE:

PRED CRIM SEX ASLT/VICTIM <13

CUSTODY DATE:

12/16/2013

SENTENCE:

6 Years 0 Months 0 Days

COUNTY:

CHAMPAIGN

SENTENCE DISCHARGED?: NO

The information made available on this database service is for the general public and law enforcement to promote the interest of public safety. The best effort has been made to ensure that information published is true and complete, however the information can quickly change. Accordingly, before making any assumption that said information is factual and complete, please send written correspondence to the Illinois

Case: 1:20-cDvep-0ar2tm1e3nt7ofDCoorrceuctimones-nPtub#li:c 1In7fo-rm7atFioinleOdffi:ce0, 413/0310C/2on0coPrdiaagCeour2t, Po.Of .2BoPx ageID #:144
19277, Springfield, IL 62794-9277. Please see the Illinois Department of Corrections full disclaimer page for important information.
conduct another search return to the IDOC homepage
Illinois Department of Corrections 1301 Concordia Court, PO Box 19277
Springfield, Illinois, 62794-9277 217-558-2200 | 800-546-0844 TDD

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17-8 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 1 of 4 PageID #:145

DION DIXON, 12/12/2017

·

·1· · · · · IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT · · · · · ·FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS ·2· · · · · · · · · · EASTERN DIVISION
·3· ·PAUL MURPHY, et al.,· · · · ) · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·) ·4· · · · · · · · ·Plaintiffs,· ·) · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·) ·5· · · · · · vs.· · · · · · · · )· ·No. 16 C 11471 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·) ·6· ·LISA MADIGAN, et al.,· · · ·) · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·) ·7· · · · · · · · ·Defendants.· ·)
·8· · · · · · The video-recorded deposition of DION
·9· DIXON, taken pursuant to the Federal Rules of
10· Civil Procedure, before Leanna Z. Michas, Certified
11· Shorthand Reporter No. 084-004748, at 20 North Clark
12· Street, Suite 1260, Chicago, Illinois, on Tuesday,
13· December 12, 2017, commencing at 10:05 a.m.,
14· pursuant to notice.
15 · · · · · APPEARANCES: 16 · · · · · · · LAW OFFICE OF ADELE D. NICHOLAS, by 17· · · · · · MS. ADELE D. NICHOLAS · · · · · · · (5707 West Goodman Street 18· · · · · · ·Chicago, Illinois· 60630 · · · · · · · ·847.361.3869 19· · · · · · ·adele@civilrightschicago.com)
20· · · · · · · · · · · -and-
21· · · · · · MR. MARK G. WEINBERG · · · · · · · (3612 North Tripp Avenue 22· · · · · · ·Chicago, Illinois· 60641 · · · · · · · ·773.283.3913 23· · · · · · ·mweinberg@sbcglobal.net) · · · · · · · · ·appeared on behalf of the plaintiffs; 24

Urlaub Bowen & Associates, Inc.· 312-781-9586

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17-8 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 2 of 4 PageID #:146

DION DIXON, 12/12/2017

Page 75

·1· · · · · · · · ·And then will the agent actually ·2· visit the host site itself? ·3· · · · A.· · Yes. ·4· · · · Q.· · What's the purpose of visiting the host ·5· site itself? ·6· · · · A.· · Basically, to see if the host site ·7· is -- is there, if there's an actual physical host ·8· site, and then to look at the condition of it as ·9· well.· And also to, again, look and see what's 10· available, what's there in the host site, what's 11· not in the host site, and to, finally, make contact 12· with the host. 13· · · · Q.· · You said they're going to inspect the 14· condition of the host site. 15· · · · · · · · ·What do you mean by that? 16· · · · A.· · The living condition.· If there's no 17· running water, heat, or electricity, or all -- all 18· three, you know, big holes in the floor, or walls, 19· or whatever, it's basically uninhabitable or it's 20· in very poor condition, we're not going to place a 21· parolee in those sort of -- in that sort of 22· situation. 23· · · · Q.· · What other conditions does the agent 24· have to verify at the host site before approving

Urlaub Bowen & Associates, Inc.· 312-781-9586
YVer1f

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17-8 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 3 of 4 PageID #:147

DION DIXON, 12/12/2017

Page 172

·1· electronically cannot just be allowed to roam ·2· and -- and be homeless.· They have to have -- they ·3· have to have a stable host site. ·4· · · · Q.· · People who have been convicted of ·5· offenses that are not categorized as sex offenses ·6· are allowed to be homeless while on MSR, true? ·7· · · · A.· · Yes.· But not hooked up to electronic ·8· monitoring. ·9· · · · Q.· · Right.· They're just homeless on MSR, 10· true? 11· · · · A.· · Not true.· No.· No.· They -- they still 12· have someplace to go -13· · · · Q.· · A homeless shelter, right? 14· · · · A.· · Yes. 15· · · · Q.· · Okay.· So someone has to give an 16· address, but they can give a homeless shelter, 17· right? 18· · · · A.· · Yes. 19· · · · Q.· · Can a sex offender parolee give a 20· homeless shelter as their address? 21· · · · A.· · No. 22· · · · Q.· · Why not? 23· · · · A.· · It's too transient of a situation.· You 24· can have another sex offender that moves -- or takes

Urlaub Bowen & Associates, Inc.· 312-781-9586
YVer1f

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17-8 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 4 of 4 PageID #:148

DION DIXON, 12/12/2017

Page 173

·1· up shelter there, and then now he's in violation, ·2· our guy's in -- in violation, and will have to be ·3· returned home. ·4· · · · · · · · ·Also, these shelters, the homeless ·5· shelters, are -- you're in by 8:00 o'clock in the ·6· evening, and you got to be out at 6:00 in the ·7· morning.· If you -- if a sex offender doesn't have ·8· a job that's going to occupy his time, if he's not ·9· in school at that time, if he's not doing something 10· constructive during that time, he's not going to be 11· allowed to roam around.· Absolutely not. 12· · · · Q.· · Okay.· So a person who's been convicted 13· of a sex offense cannot parole to a homeless 14· shelter, right? 15· · · · A.· · That's correct. 16· · · · Q.· · Even if they're subject to GPS 17· monitoring, true? 18· · · · A.· · True. 19· · · · Q.· · And can you tell me a little bit 20· more about the GPS systems that the department of 21· corrections currently uses?· What data does the GPS 22· monitoring bracelet return to the department? 23· · · · A.· · Where and -- where the offender goes, 24· when he goes, or when he arrives, or how -- you

Urlaub Bowen & Associates, Inc.· 312-781-9586
YVer1f

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17-9 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:149

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17-10 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 1 of 3 PageID #:150
Declaration of Stephen Goldberg 1. My name is Stephen N. Goldberg. I was formerly a member of the State Bar of Illinois and a member of the bar of this Court. I am also a now-retired inactive member of the State Bar of California and a member of the bar of various California federal district courts, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the United States Supreme Court. I am familiar with the facts stated herein and could testify about them if called as a witness. 2. I am the brother of Alvin Lee Goldberg, who pleaded guilty in November of 2012 to two offenses: PRED CRIM SEX ASLT/VICTIM <13; and AGG CRIM SEX ABUSE/FAMILY. My brother will be 81 on May 14 of this year. 3. My brother currently is an inmate at the Taylorville Correctional Center, 1144 Illinois Rte 29, Taylorville IL 62568. His IDOC number is M36526. He was scheduled for release in November of 2018, subject to required mandatory supervised release (“MSR”) with a discharge date of three years to life. He is actively looking for an apartment to move to that is acceptable to the IDOC while he is on MSR. 4. I have applied on behalf of my brother to NewDay Apartments, an organization that rents apartments to convicted sex offenders. I have spoken with their representatives. The latter have told me (1) that NewDay will put my brother, if he passes a background and credit check, on a waiting list for apartments it owns that currently are allowed by the IDOC only to house registered sex offenders who are no longer on parole or probation (i.e. MSR) and (2) that they are precluded from renting to him in such facilities by the Illinois statute precluding more than one registrant from residing at a residence housing more than one registrant. 730 ILCS 5/5-6-3(a)(8.6).

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17-10 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 2 of 3 PageID #:151

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 17-10 Filed: 04/30/20 Page 3 of 3 PageID #:152 Exhibit A

 
 Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 20 Filed: 05/05/20 Page 1 of 4 PageID #:157

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

COLUMBO GALINDO, et al.,

)

individually and on behalf of all others )

similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

ROB JEFFREYS, in his official

)

capacity as the Director of the Illinois )

Department of Corrections,

)

)

Defendant.

)

No. 20-cv-2137

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Plaintiffs, through counsel, respectfully submit the following supplement in

support of their motion for injunctive relief.

Plaintiffs filed a motion for a second preliminary injunction on April 30, 2020.

ECF No. 17. Since filing the motion, Plaintiffs’ counsel have gathered additional

information relevant to the Court’s decision on the motion and submit this brief

supplement for the Court’s consideration.

I. Thomas Smith Seeks to Serve His MSR at His Parents’ Home, But Is Prohibited from Doing So Pursuant to the One-Per-Address Statute

After filing Plaintiffs’ second motion for a preliminary injunction, counsel was

contacted by Jerry Calvin. Mr. Calvin is the step-father of Thomas Smith, an

individual who is currently imprisoned in IDOC and is seeking a host site at which

to reside while on “three-to-life” MSR. Ex. 1, Declaration of Jerry Calvin, at ¶¶1, 2.

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 20 Filed: 05/05/20 Page 2 of 4 PageID #:158
Mr. Calvin and his wife, Tammy (Thomas’ mother), would like to have Thomas live with them at their home in Pocahontas, Illinois, while he is on MSR. Id. at ¶3. They have a three-bedroom home and can give Thomas his own bedroom and bathroom. Id. The home is in a rural area, and it is Mr. Calvin’s understanding that it is not within 500 feet of any schools, playgrounds, or daycares. Id.
Thomas submitted his parents’ home as a proposed host site. IDOC rejected the host site because Mr. Calvin was convicted of a sex offense 34 years ago (in 1986), and the One-Per-Address Statute (730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6)) prohibits Thomas from residing at the same address as another person who has been convicted of a sex offense—no matter how long ago. Id. at ¶4. Mr. Calvin has no arrests or convictions subsequent to his 1986 offense. Id. at ¶5.
The only barrier to Thomas Smith’s being allowed to serve his MSR time at his parents’ home is the One-Per-Address Statute. His situation is another example of how the Statute works to keep Murphy class members in prison when they could otherwise be released to safe, welcoming homes that would foster their success on parole. II. Plaintiffs Have Identified 19 Motels that Local Law Enforcement
Entities Consider to Be Registrable Addresses As set forth in Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, motels that offer weekly or monthly rental rates would be a good housing option for members of the Murphy class who have funds to pay for housing, but lack outside supporters who can lease apartments on their behalf. ECF No. 17 at 11-12.
2

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 20 Filed: 05/05/20 Page 3 of 4 PageID #:159
After filing the motion for a preliminary injunction, counsel began researching other motels that comply with the Residency Restrictions set forth in 720 ILCS 5/11-9.3 (b-5) and (b-10) (i.e., they are not located within 500 feet of any schools, playgrounds, or daycares). Counsel contacted police departments in 15 Illinois jurisdictions to inquire about motels that local registration authorities consider to be lawful, registrable addresses. Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a list of 19 motels at which local registration officials have previously permitted individuals with convictions for “child sex offenses” to register. Some of these motels offer monthly rental rates that would be affordable even for individuals of modest means. Counsel would like to assemble a comprehensive, statewide list of similar properties and offer this list to Murphy and Barnes class-members and their families who are seeking host sites.
According to the local law enforcement officials to whom counsel spoke, most, if not all, of the identified motels currently have other registrants residing there. Thus, these addresses do not comply with the One-Per-Address Statute.1 If the Statute were enjoined, all 19 of these properties (and more) would become potential host sites that would facilitate the transition of Murphy and Barnes class-members back into the community.
WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth above and in Plaintiffs’ second motion for a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Honorable
1 The One-Per-Address Statute applies only to registrants who are on probation or MSR; not to those who are no longer under supervision.
3

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 20 Filed: 05/05/20 Page 4 of 4 PageID #:160
Court enjoin Defendant from enforcing the One-Per-Address Statute (730 ILCS 5/33-7(a)(7.6)).
Respectfully submitted, /s/ Adele D. Nicholas /s/ Mark G. Weinberg Counsel for Plaintiff Law Office of Adele D. Nicholas 5707 W. Goodman Street Chicago, Illinois 60630 (847) 361-3869 adele@civilrightschicago.com Law Office of Mark G. Weinberg 3612 N. Tripp Avenue Chicago, Illinois 60641 (773) 283-3913 mweinberg@sbcglobal.net
4

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 20-1 Filed: 05/05/20 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:161

Declaration of Jerry Calvin 1. My name is Jerry Calvin. I am the step-father of Thomas Smith (IDOC Number S10842),
who is currently imprisoned at Taylorville Correctional Center. 2. Thomas was convicted of criminal sexual assault. He is scheduled to be released from
prison on Mandatory Supervised Release on January 14, 2021. He will be on MSR for three years to life. 3. My wife, Tammy (Thomas’ mother), and I would like to have Thomas live with us at our home in Pocahontas, Illinois, while he is on parole. We have a three-bedroom home and can give Thomas his own bedroom and bathroom. We are prepared to make whatever arrangements are necessary for our home to be a suitable host site for Thomas. It is our understanding that our home is not within 500 feet of any schools, playgrounds, or daycares. 4. The IDOC told us that Thomas cannot parole to our home because I was convicted of a sex offense 34 years ago (in 1986) and Thomas is prohibited from living while on parole with another person who has been convicted of a sex offense. 5. I have no arrests or convictions subsequent to my 1986 sex offense. I have lived a law abiding life since my release from prison. I am not on the sex offender registry and am not under any kind of criminal justice supervision. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1746, I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing statements are true and correct.

_______________________ Jerry Calvin

___________ Date

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 20-2 Filed: 05/05/20 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:162

Exhibit 2 Motel Name Motel 6 Red Roof Inn Star Inn Brer Rabbit Stardust Motel Motel 6 Red Roof Inn Red Roof Inn Manor Motel Emerald Motel Alpine Inn Equality Lodge Red Roof Inn Townhouse Motel Extended Stay Motel 6 Bel-Lane America's Best Value Inn Rodeway Inn Waukegan

Address 3551 Mall Loop Dr. Joliet, IL 60431 1750 McDonough St. Joliet, IL 60436 2219 1/2 W Jefferson St. Joliet, IL 60435 65 W. N Ave. Villa Park, IL 60181 890 E. Ogden Ave. Naperville, IL 60540 1585 Naperville Wheaton Rd. Naperville, IL 60563 1698 W. Diehl Rd. Naperville, IL 60563 1905 W. Market St, Bloomington, IL 61701 23926 W. Earnes St. Channahon, IL 60410-3130 208 E. Lake St. Addison, IL 60101 4404 E. State St. Rockford, IL 61108 4605 E. State St #2118 Rockford, IL 61108 7434 E. State St. Rockford, IL 61108 1519 N. Knoxville Ave. Peoria, IL 61603 4306 N. Brandywine Peoria, IL 61614 31 N. Green Bay Rd. Waukegan, IL 60085 3100 Belvidere Rd. Waukegan, IL 60085 411 S. Green Bay Rd. Waukegan, IL 60085 630 N. Green Bay Rd. Waukegan, IL 60085

Phone Number (815) 439-1332 (815) 741-2304 (815) 744-1220 (630) 832-2850 (630) 355-3467 (630) 357-0022 (630) 369-2500 (309) 827-5333 (815) 467-5385 (630) 833-5150 (815) 399-1890 (815) 977-5982 (815) 398-9750 (628) 239-4299 (309) 688-3110 (847) 336-9000 (847) 244-5500 (847) 244-6100 (847) 249-2388

 
 Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 22 Filed: 05/13/20 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:164

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

COLUMBO GALINDO, et al.,

)

individually and on behalf of all others )

similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

ROB JEFFREYS, in his official

)

capacity as the Director of the Illinois )

Department of Corrections,

)

)

Defendant.

)

No. 20-cv-2137

ORDER

A hearing was held on May 6, 2020, on Plaintiffs’ second motion for a

preliminary injunction [17].

Plaintiffs have completed their sentences of imprisonment and remain

incarcerated because they are unable to find host site placements that can be

approved by the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC). Here, Plaintiffs have

identified housing that would otherwise be approved by IDOC, but for the “One

Person Per Address” provision in 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6). This Court has already

determined that it is unconstitutional to detain sex offenders long after their period

of incarceration has been completed solely because they are unable to find suitable

host sites. See Murphy v. Raoul, 380 F. Supp. 3rd 781 (N.D. Ill. 2019).

The following Plaintiffs have identified host sites that will be supportive of

their transition back into the community:

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 22 Filed: 05/13/20 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:165

• Kenneth Green, Fredrick Chamblis, Corey Crowe, Dana Monson, David Easton, Joshua Atkins, Kenneth Schroeder, Wade Council, Christopher Shelton, Mark Faller and Paul D. Hubbard seek to reside at Wayside Cross Ministries, a Bible-based transitional housing program in Aurora, Illinois;
• DeJuan Wright, Jerrand Miller, Andra Sampson and John Margarella seek to reside at transitional housing leased by IDOC through NewDay Apartments; and
• Alvin Goldberg seeks to reside in a private-pay unit in an apartment building owned by NewDay Apartments.
At each of these proposed housing locations, another person who has been
convicted of a sex offense already resides in the same building and therefore
Defendant cannot release these individuals to the proposed locations because of its
obligation to follow 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6).
There has been no legitimate public interest articulated in only having one
sex offender live at one residence. Therefore, the Court finds that the statute is
unconstitutional as it applies to the 16 individuals identified above and Defendant
is enjoined from prohibiting their release to the locations identified only to the
extent that it is prohibiting their release based upon the “One Person Per Address”
provision in 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6). It is further ordered that Defendant is
enjoined from enforcing the statute as to the parolees currently residing at NewDay
Apartments for so long as they continue to reside there: Stanley Meyer, J.D.
Lindenmeier, Clay Trench, and Jerry Davis.

___________________________ Hon. Virginia M. Kendall, United States District Judge

_May 13, 2020___ Date

2

 
 Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 23 Filed: 05/13/20 Page 1 of 13 PageID #:166

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

COLUMBO GALINDO, individually and )

on behalf of all others similarly situated, )

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ROB JEFFREYS, in his official

)

capacity as the Director of the Illinois )

Department of Corrections,

)

)

Defendant.

)

No. 20-cv-2137

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 23(B)(2) AND FOR APPOINTMENT
OF CLASS COUNSEL PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 23(G)(1)

Plaintiffs, through counsel, respectfully request that this Court enter an order

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) certifying this case as a class

action on behalf of all individuals who have been convicted of sex offenses and

completed their court-imposed sentence of incarceration but remain imprisoned in

the Illinois Department of Corrections because they cannot find housing that

complies with 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6). Plaintiffs further request that this Court

enter an order appointing the undersigned attorneys as class counsel. In support

thereof, Plaintiffs state as follows.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6) (hereinafter

“the One-Per-Address Statute” or “the Statute”). The Statute prohibits any

individual on Mandatory Supervised Release (“MSR”) for a sex offense from residing

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 23 Filed: 05/13/20 Page 2 of 13 PageID #:167
“at the same address or in the same condominium unit or apartment unit or in the same condominium complex or apartment complex with another person he or she knows or reasonably should know is a convicted sex offender or has been placed on supervision for a sex offense.” Id.
The named Plaintiffs and the members of the class they seek to represent have all completed their court-ordered terms of incarceration and are entitled to release on MSR. They remain in prison because they cannot find an approved “host site” at which to live while on MSR due to the enforcement of the One-Per-Address Statute.
Plaintiffs claim the enforcement of the Statute against them and others similarly situated violates the Eighth Amendment and Equal Protection Clause. Plaintiffs seek injunctive and declaratory relief on behalf of the class against Rob Jeffreys in his official capacity as the director of the Illinois Department of Corrections. Mr. Jeffreys is the public official with ultimate authority for enforcement of the One-Per-Address Statute.
Plaintiffs’ claims are ideally suited to proceed as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2). As set forth below, the proposed class satisfies each element of Rule 23(a) because (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims of the named Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the class; and (4) the named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Moreover, this matter meets the requirements for class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted in a manner that
2

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 23 Filed: 05/13/20 Page 3 of 13 PageID #:168
applies generally to the class as a whole, rendering class-wide injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
ARGUMENT I. The Court Should Certify the Proposed Class
For a district court to certify a class action, the proposed class must satisfy the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements of Rule 23(a) and the requirements of at least one subsection of Rule 23(b). Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 1992). Here, because the proposed class meets all four Rule 23(a) requirements and the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2), the class should be certified.
A. The Proposed Class Meets All of the Requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2) 1. Numerosity
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(1) requires that the class be “so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). A class “including more than 40 members” generally meets this standard. Barragan v. Evanger’s Dog and Cat Food Co., 259 F.R.D. 330, 333 (N.D.Ill. 2009); Streeter v. Sheriff of Cook County, 256 F.R.D. 609, 612 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (same); accord William B. Rubenstein, et al., Newberg on Class Actions, § 3:12 (5th ed. 2011) (“a class of 40 or more members raises a presumption of impracticability of joinder based on numbers alone.”)
Here, the proposed class easily satisfies this standard. According to the final report of the Illinois Sex Offenses & Sex Offender Registration Task Force,
3

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 23 Filed: 05/13/20 Page 4 of 13 PageID #:169
published in December 2017, “[o]n average, the Illinois Department of Corrections houses 1,200 to 1,400 offenders who may not be released from custody because they are unable to secure permanent, stable housing meeting Illinois statute requirements or agency policy.”1 Many such individuals remain incarcerated solely because of the One-Per-Address provision. Plaintiffs’ pleadings to date have identified 17 individuals who have otherwise compliant addresses that have not been approved because of the One-Per-Address Statute.2
As explained in Plaintiffs’ most recent preliminary injunction motion (ECF No. 17), these individuals fall into three broad categories: (1) individuals such as Marcus Barnes, Kenneth Green and Dana Monson who would like to reside at charitably operated transitional housing such as Jordan’s Dream or Wayside Cross Ministries; (2) individuals such as Alvin Goldberg and Joshua Huddleston who could obtain privately financed housing at addresses where other individuals with sex offense convictions already reside; (3) individuals such as Andra Sampson and John Margarella who are eligible for placement at the units IDOC leases from NewDay Apartments. Each of these categories likely contains dozens of other people
1 Available at: http://www.icjia.state.il.us/news/sex-offenses-and-sex-offenderregistration-task-force-final-report 2 Marcus Barnes, Kenneth Green, Fredrick Chamblis, Corey Crowe, Dana Monson, David Easton, Joshua Atkins, Kenneth Schroeder, Wade Council, Christopher Shelton, Mark Faller, Paul Hubbard, Alvin Goldberg, DeJuan Wright, Andra Sampson, John Margarella, and Joshua Huddleston.
4

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 23 Filed: 05/13/20 Page 5 of 13 PageID #:170
who could identify housing but for the restriction on residing at the same address as another offender.3
Moreover, as noted in Plaintiffs’ second motion for a preliminary injunction, membership in the class is growing as additional individuals finish their sentences of incarceration and become eligible for release on MSR but remain imprisoned due to an inability to obtain compliant housing. Accordingly, the class easily meets the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1).
2. Commonality Rule 23(a)(2) requires that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). Where, as here, the named Plaintiffs and the members of the class they seek to represent bring a facial challenge to an allegedly unconstitutional statute, the central questions of law and fact are necessarily common to all members of the class. See Smiley v. Calumet City, No. 08 C 3017, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41701, at *15-16 (N.D. Ill. May 15, 2009) (Where the Plaintiff brings “a facial challenge to the validity of [a statute] … the statute itself serves as the required ‘common nucleus of operative fact.’”) (citing Keele v. Wexler, 149 F. 3d 589, 594 (7th Cir. 1998) and Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 1992)).
3 Indeed, since the May 6, 2020, hearing on Plaintiffs’ second motion for a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs have identified several additional transitional housing providers who could accept members of the proposed class but for the One-Per-Address restriction and several additional extended-stay motels that will accept individuals with sex offense convictions.
5

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 23 Filed: 05/13/20 Page 6 of 13 PageID #:171
Here, the named Plaintiff and all members of the proposed are challenging the constitutionality of the same statute. Accordingly, all of the core factual and legal questions are appropriate for resolution on a class-wide basis. These common questions include the following:
• What are the rationales for the One-Per-Address Statute; • Whether there is any compelling interest served by the Statute; • Whether the Statute violates the Eighth Amendment and/or Equal
Protection Clause as applied to the members of the class. Because there are common questions of law and fact pertaining to all members of the class, this matter meets the commonality requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
3. Typicality Rule 23(a)(3) requires that “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). The standard for determining typicality is not an identity of interest between the named plaintiffs and the class, but rather a “sufficient homogeneity of interest.” Jones v. Blinziner, 536 F. Supp. 1181, 1190 (N.D. Ind. 1982) (citing Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 403 n.13 (1975)). “[T]he typicality requirement is liberally construed.” Gaspar v. Linvatec Corp., 167 F.R.D. 51, 57 (N.D. Ill. 1996). A “plaintiff’s claim is typical if it arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members and [is] based on the same legal theory.” De La Fuente v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 713 F.2d 225, 232 (7th Cir. 1983). This requirement “is meant to assume that the named representative’s claims ‘have the
6

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 23 Filed: 05/13/20 Page 7 of 13 PageID #:172
same essential characteristics as the claims of the class at large.’” Oshana v. Coca– Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 514 (7th Cir. 2006).
Where, as here, the named Plaintiffs’ injuries arise from a generally applicable statute affecting all members of the class, typicality exists even if there are factual differences in precisely how the statute was applied to each plaintiff. Sherman v. Twp. High Sch. Dist. 214, 540 F. Supp. 2d 985, 992 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (“variations in factual circumstances … do not defeat the typicality of the class representative’s defenses.”) (citing Brown v. Kelly, 244 F.R.D. 222, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“if factual distinctions could preclude findings of commonality and typicality under Rule 23(a), they would be the death knell for class actions challenging the systemic enforcement of an unconstitutional statute.”); Areola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 798 (7th Cir. 2008) (typicality satisfied where plaintiff was in the “same boat” as other Cook County Jail detainees who had been denied crutches).
In this case, the named Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the class as a whole. Each named Plaintiff has a place to live that would meet IDOC approval but for the OnePer-Address Statute. The members of the proposed class are in the same situation— that is, they will be imprisoned beyond the completion of their court-ordered term of incarceration unless and until they find housing that satisfies this rule. Moreover, the named Plaintiffs and each class member have the same legal theories—that is, the application of the challenged statute keeps them in prison in violation of the Eighth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. Accordingly, the named Plaintiffs satisfy Rule 23(a)(3)’s typicality requirement. See Fonder v. Sheriff of
7

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 23 Filed: 05/13/20 Page 8 of 13 PageID #:173
Kankakee County, No. 12-CV-2115, 2013 WL 5644754, at *6 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 2013) (typicality satisfied where “Plaintiff is challenging the same strip search policy as the class he seeks to represent”); Olson v. Brown, 284 F.R.D. 398, 411 (N.D. Ind. 2012) (typicality satisfied where class representative and members of proposed class had their legal mail opened improperly by correctional officers).
4. Adequacy Rule 23(a)(4) requires that the named plaintiffs “will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). The adequacy inquiry consists of two parts: “(1) the adequacy of the named plaintiffs as representatives of the proposed class’ myriad members, with their differing and separate interests, and (2) the adequacy of the proposed class counsel.” Gomez v. St. Vincent Health, Inc., 649 F.3d 583, 592 (7th Cir. 2011). Both elements are met here.
a. The Named Plaintiffs Are Appropriate Representatives of the Interests of the Class
The named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. The named Plaintiffs and the class members raise the same claims, seek the same relief, and their interests are aligned. The named Plaintiffs are a diverse group who represent the various ways in which the One-Per-Address Statute keeps individuals in prison beyond their release dates. Each of the named Plaintiffs has a strong personal stake in the proceedings that will “insure diligent and thorough prosecution of the litigation.” Rodriguez v. Swank, 318 F. Supp. 289, 294 (N.D. Ill.1970), aff'd 403 U.S. 901 (1971). At present, there are 16 named Plaintiffs who
8

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 23 Filed: 05/13/20 Page 9 of 13 PageID #:174
remain in prison because of the One-Per-Address Statute.4 Even if such individuals are released pursuant to preliminary injunctive relief, they will remain invested in seeing this litigation through to its conclusion because in the absence of permanent injunctive relief, they will be returned to prison on a technical violation of their parole (i.e., their housing will no longer be valid because of the One-Per-Address Statute). Accordingly, the name Plaintiffs will adequately represent the interests of the class.
b. Adequacy of Representation The named Plaintiffs are represented by experienced civil rights counsel who are well qualified to represent the interests of the members of the class and have devoted substantial time and resources to vigorously prosecuting this case. Ms. Nicholas and Mr. Weinberg have successfully litigated numerous constitutional cases in which broad equitable relief was sought, including the Murphy class action which raised claims closely related to the claims raised here. See, Murphy v. Raoul, 16 C 11471, 380 F. Supp. 3d 731 (N.D. Ill., 2019) (Kendall, J.) (certified class action; obtained permanent injunction governing IDOC procedures for releasing sex offenders on MSR); RCP Publications Inc. v. City of Chicago, 15 C 11398 (certified class action; obtained permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement of City’s signposting ordinance and class-wide damages); Adair v. Town of Cicero, No. 18 C 3526, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110949 (N.D. Ill. July 3, 2019) (pending certified class action
4 Columbo Galindo, Joshua Huddleston, Alvin Goldberg, Kenneth Green, Fredrick Chamblis, Corey Crowe, Dana Monson, David Easton, Joshua Atkins, Kenneth Schroeder, Wade Council, Christopher Shelton, Mark Faller, Paul Hubbard, Andra Sampson, and John Margarella.
9

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 23 Filed: 05/13/20 Page 10 of 13 PageID #:175
on behalf of women detained in Town of Cicero police lockup); Koger v. Dart, 114 F. Supp. 3d 572 (N.D. Ill., 2015) (obtained declaratory judgment holding ban on newspapers in the Cook County Jail unconstitutional); Pindak v. Dart, 10 C 6237 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (Pallmeyer, J.) (obtained a permanent injunction ordering the sheriff to train deputies concerning First Amendment rights); Norton v. City of Springfield, 806 F. 3d 411 (7th Cir. 2015) (obtained an injunction barring the City of Springfield from enforcing its municipal panhandling ordinance).
Because the named Plaintiffs have demonstrated a commitment to vigorously pursuing class-wide relief and because they are represented by competent and experienced counsel, they satisfy Rule 23(a)(4)’s adequacy requirements.
5. Plaintiffs Satisfy Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) Because this Case Seeks Declaratory and Injunctive Relief from Policies that Impact the Entire Proposed Class
The final requirement for class certification is that the named plaintiff must meet the requirements of at least one of the subsections of Rule 23(b). Subsection (b)(2) requires that “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Courts have long recognized that civil rights class actions are the paradigmatic 23(b)(2) suits. See Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 565 F. 2d 975, 979 n.9 (7th Cir. 1977) (“Rule 23(b)(2) … is devoted primarily to civil rights class actions which allege violations of constitutional rights.”) (citing Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 Amendments to Rule 23);
10

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 23 Filed: 05/13/20 Page 11 of 13 PageID #:176
Chi. Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 797 F.3d 426, 441 (7th Cir. 2015) (“23(b)(2) is the appropriate rule to enlist when the plaintiffs’ primary goal is not monetary relief, but rather to require the defendant to do or not do something that would benefit the whole class. Not surprisingly, civil rights cases … are prime examples of Rule 23(b)(2) classes.”) (citations omitted).
As stated in the leading treatise on class actions: Rule 23(b)(2) was drafted specifically to facilitate relief in civil rights suits. Most class actions in the constitutional and civil rights areas seek primarily declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of the class and therefore readily satisfy Rule 23(b)(2) class action criteria.
A. Conte & H. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions § 25.20 (4th ed. 2002). Because this case seeks class-wide injunctive and declaratory relief, it is appropriate for certification as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). II. The Court Should Designate Plaintiffs’ Counsel as Class Counsel
Under Rule 23(g)(1) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(g) requires that the district court appoint class counsel for any class that is certified. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1). The attorneys appointed to serve as class counsel must “fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(B). The appointed class counsel must be listed in a court’s class certification order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(B). Rule 23(g) provides four factors for a court to consider in appointing class counsel: (1) “the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in the action;” (2) “counsel’s experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and the types of claims asserted in the action;” (3) “counsel’s
11

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 23 Filed: 05/13/20 Page 12 of 13 PageID #:177
knowledge of the applicable law”; and (4) “the resources that counsel will commit to representing the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(A).
The undersigned attorneys satisfy each of these requirements. First, Plaintiffs’ counsel have invested substantial work into preparation of this case, including speaking to numerous families and individuals affected by the challenged statute, drafting a Complaint and First Amended Complaint, drafting two successful motions for a preliminary injunctive relief, and conducting extensive legal research concerning the class members’ claims. Second, as set forth in §I(A)(4)(c) above, Plaintiffs’ counsel have devoted substantial professional resources to litigation on behalf of individuals who have been convicted of sex offenses and have significant experience in handling complex civil rights litigation, including the kind of claims asserted in this case. Finally, Plaintiffs’ counsel have dedicated and will continue to commit substantial resources to the representation of this class. In sum, Plaintiffs’ counsel fully satisfy the criteria for class counsel set forth in Rule 23(g), and Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court appoint undersigned counsel to represent the class.
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court grant the motion for class certification and appoint the undersigned attorneys as Class Counsel.
12

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 23 Filed: 05/13/20 Page 13 of 13 PageID #:178
Respectfully submitted, /s/ Adele D. Nicholas /s/ Mark G. Weinberg Counsel for Plaintiffs Law Office of Adele D. Nicholas 5707 W. Goodman Street Chicago, Illinois 60630 847-361-3869 adele@civilrightschicago.com Law Office of Mark G. Weinberg 3612 N. Tripp Avenue Chicago, Illinois 60641 (773) 283-3913 mweinberg@sbcglobal.net
13

 
 Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 24 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 1 of 3 PageID #:179

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

MARCUS BARNES, individually and )

on behalf of all others similarly situated, )

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ROB JEFFREYS, in his official

)

capacity as the Director of the Illinois )

Department of Corrections,

)

)

Defendant.

)

No. 20-cv-2137

PLAINTIFFS’ UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE THEIR SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT AND AMENDED MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION INSTANTER Plaintiffs, through counsel, respectfully request that this Court grant them leave to file their second amended complaint and amended motion to certify the class instanter. In support, Plaintiffs state as follows: 1. Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of a proposed class, challenge the constitutionality of 730 ILCS5/3-3-7(a)(7.6) (hereinafter the “One-Per-Address Statute” or “the Statute”), a section of the Illinois Code of Corrections that prohibits an individual on Mandatory Supervised Release (“MSR”) for a sex offense from living “at the same address or in the same condominium unit or apartment unit or in the same condominium complex or apartment complex with another person he or she knows or reasonably should know is a convicted sex offender or has been placed on supervision for a sex offense.” Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint on April 5,

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 24 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 2 of 3 PageID #:180
2020, and their First Amended Complaint on April 28, 2020. Defendant has not yet filed a responsive pleading.
2. Plaintiffs request leave to file a Second Amended Complaint (attached hereto as Exhibit 1) for the purpose of adding additional named Plaintiffs who seek immediate injunctive relief. The Second Amended Complaint also expands the definition of the proposed class. In particular, the initial proposed class definition encompassed only those individuals who remained in prison and were unable to secure their release on MSR because of the One-Per-Address Statute. The class definition in the Second Amended Complaint includes those individuals who have been released on MSR into the community but face a risk of having their MSR revoked and being sent back to prison for violation of the One-Per-Address Statute. The Second Amended Complaint puts forth the same legal theories as the First Amended Complaint.
3. Plaintiffs also seek leave to file an amended motion to certify the class (attached hereto as Exhibit 2) to address this broader class definition. In their amended motion for class certification, Plaintiffs offer a proposed class definition encompassing both those who are unable to secure their release from prison due to the One-Per-Address Statute and those who face a risk of revocation due to the Statute.
4. Defendant does not oppose Plaintiffs’ request for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint and Amended Motion for Class Certification.
2

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 24 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 3 of 3 PageID #:181

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Honorable Court grant them leave to file instanter their Second Amended Complaint and Amended Motion for Class Certification.

Law Office of Adele D. Nicholas 5707 W. Goodman Street Chicago, Illinois 60630 (847) 361-3869 adele@civilrightschicago.com
Law Office of Mark G. Weinberg 3612 N. Tripp Avenue Chicago, Illinois 60641 (773) 283-3913 mweinberg@sbcglobal.net

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Adele D. Nicholas Counsel for Plaintiffs

3

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 24-1 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 1 of 25 PageID #:182

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

MARCUS BARNES (R01946),

)

COLUMBO GALINDO (M08407),

)

ANDRA SAMPSON (R70879),

)

DeJUAN WRIGHT (R58500),

)

JERRAND MILLER (R60718),

)

JOHN MARGARELLA (M36976),

)

KENNETH GREEN (R72403),

)

FREDRICK CHAMBLIS (M32848),

)

COREY CROWE (M41508),

)

DANA MONSON (M08651),

)

DAVID EASTON (K63639),

)

JOSHUA ATKINS (Y12324),

)

KENNETH SCHROEDER (M35946),

)

WADE COUNCIL (M25987),

)

CHRISTOPHER SHELTON (R34928),

)

MARK FALLER (K78827),

)

PAUL D. HUBBARD (M07217),

)

JUAN MEDINA (K67974),

)

ADAM ESCAMILLA (M27513),

)

AISHEF SHAFFER (R73825),

)

EDWARD BARTGEN (R62783),

)

REGINALD HARRIS (R29434),

)

JOHNNY HARRIS (K84472),

)

LAVONNE GIVENS (M37946),

)

LASHAUN DEAN (R68665),

)

JUSTIN FLUCKERT (M41103),

)

DONTAE BOYKIN (Y14234),

)

RONALD GARRISON (S11118),

)

JOSHUA HUDDLESTON (M44423)

)

MANUEL ALEMAN (M11213),

)

ARNOLD LLOYD (Y41718),

)

MELVIN KELLEY (R48255),

)

ANDRE DUNN (M32088),

)

THOMAS SMITH (S10842),

)

ALVIN GOLDBERG (M36526),

)

LUIS APONTE (M26368), and

)

KEVIN MANSON (M10708),

)

individually and on behalf of all others

)

similarly situated,

)

)

No. 20-cv-2137 Judge Kendall

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 24-1 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 2 of 25 PageID #:183

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ROB JEFFREYS, in his official

)

capacity as the director of the Illinois

)

Department of Corrections,

)

)

Defendant.

)

SECOND AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF

Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, complain

against Defendant Rob Jeffreys, Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections,

as follows:

NATURE OF THE CASE

1. All of the named Plaintiffs are in the custody of the Illinois Department of

Corrections (“IDOC”) and have been convicted of sex offenses.

2. Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6)

(hereinafter the “One-Per-Address Statute” or “the Statute”), a section of the Illinois

Code of Corrections that prohibits an individual on Mandatory Supervised Release

(“MSR”) for a sex offense from living “at the same address or in the same

condominium unit or apartment unit or in the same condominium complex or

apartment complex with another person he or she knows or reasonably should know

is a convicted sex offender or has been placed on supervision for a sex offense,” on

its face and as applied to them.

2

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 24-1 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 3 of 25 PageID #:184
3. In order to be released from the physical custody of an IDOC facility at the completion of their court-imposed sentences of incarceration, Plaintiffs must identify an approved “host site” at which to reside while on MSR.
4. As of this filing, 25 of the named Plaintiffs have completed their courtimposed sentences of incarceration and are approved for release on MSR, but they all remain imprisoned because they do not have an approved “host site” at which to reside while on MSR. Each of these individuals has a suitable place to live outside of prison that would meet IDOC approval but for the One-Per-Address Statute.1
5. Eleven of the named Plaintiffs have been released from prison to host sites in the community, but they all are at risk of having their MSR revoked and being sent back to IDOC because their housing does not comply with the One-Per-Address Statute.2
6. One of the named Plaintiffs (Thomas Smith) has not yet completed his sentence of incarceration, but is currently making a plan for his release on MSR (scheduled for January 2021). Solely because of the One-Per-Address Statute, he will be unable to obtain IDOC approval to serve his MSR at his parents’ home.
1 The 25 Plaintiffs who remain imprisoned are Columbo Galindo, Andra Sampson, DeJuan Wright, Jerrand Miller, John Margarella, Kenneth Green, David Easton, Paul D. Hubbard, Juan Medina, Adam Escamilla, Aishef Shaffer, Edward Bartgen, Reginald Harris, Johnny Harris, Lavonne Givens, Lashaun Dean, Justin Fluckert, Dontae Boykin, Ronald Garrison, Joshua Huddleston, Manuel Aleman, Arnold Lloyd, Melvin Kelley, Andre Dunn, and Alvin Goldberg. 2 The 11 Plaintiffs who have been released but are at risk of revocation are Marcus Barnes, Luis Aponte, Kevin Manson, Fredrick Chamblis, Corey Crowe, Dana Monson, Joshua Atkins, Kenneth Schroeder, Wade Council, Christopher Shelton and Mark Faller.
3

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 24-1 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 4 of 25 PageID #:185
7. Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, contend that continued enforcement of the One-Per-Address Statute violates the Eighth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause and seek an injunction prohibiting Defendant Jeffreys from continuing to enforce the Statute.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 8. Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 2201. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202 and Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court has jurisdiction to declare the rights of the parties and to grant all further relief deemed necessary and proper. 9. Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), as a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims asserted herein occurred in this district.
THE PARTIES 10. Defendant Rob Jeffreys is sued in his official capacity as director of the Illinois Department of Corrections. In his capacity as the director of IDOC, he has final authority to set the Department of Corrections’ policies with regard to approval of prisoners’ host sites. The Department of Corrections’ power to approve or deny proposed host sites is the sole mechanism through which the One-PerAddress Statute is enforced. 11. The named Plaintiffs are individuals who have been convicted of sex offenses and have identified places to live outside of IDOC that would be approvable host sites but for the One-Per-Address Statute.
4

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 24-1 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 5 of 25 PageID #:186
12. The named Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of all individuals who have been convicted of sex offenses and cannot identify a host site at which to live while on MSR that satisfies the One-Per-Address Statute.
RELEVANT FACTS The Murphy Litigation
13. The plaintiffs in Murphy v. Raoul, 16-cv-11471, challenged the constitutionality of the “host site” requirement as it was being applied to individuals who have been sentenced to an indeterminate term of “three years to life” on MSR. Such individuals face the possibility of being imprisoned for life if they are unable to find and/or pay for housing that meets the requirements imposed by Illinois law and IDOC policy because their MSR time never begins to run until they are released from prison to an approved host site. See 730 ILCS 5/3-14-2.5(e).
14. The Murphy plaintiffs identified several layers of restrictions that limit where people sentenced to indeterminate MSR can live, which, taken together, make it virtually impossible for the members of the class to find host sites. Among the restrictions are the following:
• Sections of the Illinois Criminal Code which make it a crime for any individual classified as a “child sex offender” to live within 500 feet of a school, playground, or daycare (720 ILCS 5/11-9.3 (b-5), (b-10));
• Sections of the Illinois Unified Code of Corrections which prohibit persons required to register as sex offenders from living “near” “parks, schools, day care centers, swimming pools, beaches, theaters, or any other places where minor children congregate without advance approval of an agent of the Department of Corrections” (730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(b-1)(12));
• The One-Per-Address Statute which requires individuals on MSR for sex offenses to “refrain from residing at the same address or in the same
5

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 24-1 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 6 of 25 PageID #:187
condominium unit or apartment unit or in the same condominium complex or apartment complex with another person he or she knows or reasonably should know is a convicted sex offender,” unless residing at a “licensed transitional housing facility for sex offenders,” a facility “operated or licensed by the Department of Children and Family Services or by the Department of Human Services,” or a “licensed medical facility” (730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6)); • Housing restrictions imposed purely as a matter of IDOC policy, including prohibiting living in a host site where children visit or reside (including the parolee’s own children), where there are computers or Wi-Fi access, and/or where there is no land-line telephone; • The unavailability of half-way houses, transitional housing, homeless shelters or other free or low-cost housing for indigent parolees; and
• The IDOC’s interpretation of the One-Per-Address Statute as prohibiting a sex offender parolee from living in a building adjacent to a building where another registrant lives and/or from living in the same trailer park as another registrant.
15. On April 6, 2018, this Court certified Murphy as a class action on behalf of
“all individuals sentenced to serve three-years-to-life on MSR currently detained in
the IDOC who have been approved for release on MSR by the PRB but have been
denied release from IDOC custody because of their inability to obtain an approved
host site.” Murphy v. Raoul, 16-cv-11471, ECF No. 63.
16. On March 31, 2019, this Court granted the Murphy plaintiffs’ motion for
summary judgement on their claim that the State’s statutory and regulatory
scheme violates the Equal Protection Clause and the Eighth Amendment. Murphy
v. Raoul, 16-cv-11471, ECF No. 132; Murphy v. Raoul, 380 F. Supp. 3d 731 (N.D. Ill.
2019).
17. This Court’s summary judgment decision did not single out a particular
Illinois law or IDOC policy that violated the constitution. Rather, the Court held
6

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 24-1 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 7 of 25 PageID #:188
that the State’s “statutory and regulatory scheme” as a whole (i.e., the overlapping restrictions imposed by Illinois law, the IDOC’s interpretation of the law, and IDOC’s policies) violates the Murphy class’s constitutional rights.
18. On January 15, 2020, this Court entered a permanent injunction requiring the Illinois Department of Corrections to put forth a compliance plan “setting forth the specific steps [the Defendants] will take to ensure that by no later than January 2, 2021, no member of the class will remain imprisoned due to an inability to comply with the host site requirement.” Murphy v. Raoul, 16-cv-11471, ECF No. 156.
19. The permanent injunction also calls for the IDOC to provide the Court with periodic status reports concerning its implementation of the compliance plan and progress towards the January 2, 2021, compliance deadline. Id.
20. As of this filing, the Murphy class comprises more than 300 individuals who remain in prison beyond the completion of their court-ordered sentence of imprisonment due to an inability to meet the host site requirement.
21. The IDOC’s compliance plan for meeting the January 2, 2021, deadline includes several worthwhile proposals, including changes to IDOC’s interpretation of certain statutory restrictions (e.g., not applying the One-Per-Address Statute to trailer parks and adjacent buildings); changes to restrictive IDOC policies (e.g., allowing individuals to reside at addresses with Wi-Fi; relaxation of the land-line requirement); and contracting with private vendors to provide transitional housing. Murphy v. Raoul, 16-cv-11471, ECF No. 161.
7

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 24-1 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 8 of 25 PageID #:189
22. The compliance plan also notes that “[t]here are many statutory provisions that impede the Department’s ability to approve prospective host sites for sex offenders” and states that the Department “hopes that some of the statutory impediments to identifying host sites can be reduced or eliminated through legislative change.” Id. at 3-4. The Challenged Statute
23. The One-Per-Address Statute is set forth in the Illinois Uniform Code of Corrections at 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6).
24. The sole mechanism through which the One-Per-Address Statue is enforced is through the IDOC’s approval or rejection of parolees’ proposed host sites. That is, it is not a criminal offense for an individual on MSR for a sex offense to live at the same address as another registrant.3
25. The One-Per-Address Statute went into effect on July 11, 2005. Prior to that date, individuals on MSR for sex offenses were permitted to live in the same residence as other registrants.
26. On information and belief, the One-Per-Address Statute is a major cause, if not the single largest cause, of the continued imprisonment of members of the proposed class. This is so because other statutes (e.g., the 500-foot rules) already strictly circumscribe the areas where individuals convicted of sex offenses may live,
3 In contrast, the statutes prohibiting individuals classified as “child sex offenders” from living within 500 feet of schools, daycares and playgrounds (720 ILCS 5/11-9.3 (b-5) and (b10)) are part of the criminal code. It is a Class 4 felony for a “child sex offender” to “knowingly” live at a prohibited location. 720 ILCS 5/11-9.3(f).
8

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 24-1 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 9 of 25 PageID #:190
and the One-Per-Address Statute makes it so only one parolee can live at each compliant property, even if it is a large apartment complex with many units.
27. There is no reason to conclude that allowing people who have been convicted of sex offenses to live near one another contributes to criminality. At least one analysis found that it has the opposite effect: it reduces the incidence of reoffense and improves supervision. A Minnesota Department of Corrections report concluded as follows:
This examination of level three re-offenders does not reveal a negative effect related to a level three offender living with another sex offender. In fact, supervision agents in both Hennepin and Ramsey County have noted benefits from having more than one level three offender living in one location. Closer supervision is possible because travel time between offenders is reduced. Also, level three offenders who live with other level three offenders experience more visits from a supervising agent because agents for both offenders visit the same property. Finally, offenders tend to inform on each other when supervision restrictions are violated or crimes are committed.4 28. There is no logical reason to believe that there is a compelling public safety need to prohibit people on MSR for sex offenses from living at the same address as one another, and in the Murphy litigation the IDOC did not come forth with any safety or rehabilitative justification for the One-Per-Address Statute.
4 See “Level Three Sex Offender Residential Placement Issues,” Minnesota Department of Corrections (available at: https://mn.gov/doc/assets/Lvl%203%20SEX%20OFFENDERS%20report%202003%20(revise d%202-04)_tcm1089-272828.pdf) (last visited April 3, 2020)
9

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 24-1 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 10 of 25 PageID #:191
Plaintiffs and the Members of the Proposed Class Would Have Compliant Places to Live while on MSR But for the One-Per-Address Statute A. NewDay Apartments Has Valid Host Sites Available for Class Members
29. NewDay Apartments, located in Lake County, Illinois, has partnered with the IDOC to provide housing to individuals with sex offense convictions being released from prison onto MSR.
30. NewDay specializes in providing compliant housing to registrants. It currently owns seven properties, all of which comply with the prohibition on residence within 500 feet of schools, playgrounds and daycares.
31. NewDay currently leases four of these properties to IDOC for the purpose of housing Murphy class members who cannot otherwise secure housing. Placement at NewDay is intended to give individuals who do not have the means or ability to secure a host site an opportunity to get out of prison and begin their MSR time in the community.
32. Murphy class members released to NewDay are given three to four months rent-free to give them an opportunity to find work, obtain government benefits to which they are entitled, and to secure housing of their own.
33. IDOC has begun releasing Murphy class members to NewDay Apartments. To date, four Murphy class members have been placed at NewDay. IDOC has been prioritizing the release of individuals who have done the most “dead time” (i.e., extra time in prison beyond the completion of their sentence).
34. Due to the One-Per-Address Statute, the IDOC is only using half of its capacity for housing Murphy class members at the properties it leases from
10

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 24-1 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 11 of 25 PageID #:192
NewDay. That is, the units IDOC leases from NewDay have eight separate bedrooms and could comfortably accommodate eight parolees at no additional cost to the IDOC. But because of constraints imposed by the One-Per-Address Statute, IDOC has only released four Murphy class members to these properties—one at each separate address.
35. Plaintiffs DeJuan Wright, Jerrand Miller and Andra Sampson are members of the Murphy class. Wright, Miller and Sampson have each spent more than eight years of “dead time” in prison due to their indigence and inability to secure housing. On information and belief, they are the next three individuals in line for placement at NewDay Apartments because they have done the most “dead time” among the members of the Murphy class who remain in prison.
36. Plaintiff John Margarella is a prisoner at Dixon Correctional Center. In 2012, he was convicted of possession of child pornography and sentenced to three years in IDOC plus three-years-to-life MSR. With “good time” credits, he completed his prison term on December 30, 2013, and has been entitled to release from prison on MSR since that date, but remains imprisoned because he has been unable to secure compliant housing. Because of his inability to find housing, Margarella has spent more than six years of “dead time” in prison.
37. Margarella is at high risk for suffering serious health complications if he contracts COVID-19 while imprisoned. Margarella has suffered two heart attacks, internal bleeding, and dangerously low blood pressure while imprisoned at Dixon Correctional Center beyond his out date.
11

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 24-1 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 12 of 25 PageID #:193
38. Margarella does not have any friends or family outside of prison who can offer him a place to live while on MSR or help pay for his housing. He remains imprisoned indefinitely until a unit at NewDay Apartments becomes available.
39. There is no reason why the properties IDOC leases from NewDay Apartment should sit half vacant when individuals such as Plaintiffs Miller, Wright, Sampson and Margarella are entitled to release and could be serving their MSR time in the community at no additional expense to IDOC.
40. Pursuant to this Court’s May 13, 2020, Order (ECF No. 22), Plaintiffs Miller, Wright, Sampson and Margarella have been approved for release to these units and can reside at NewDay Apartments pending further order of the Court. In the absence of permanent injunctive relief, however, this housing will no longer be considered compliant, and these individuals will be at risk of having their MSR revoked and being sent back to prison because of the One-Per-Address Statute.
41. In addition to the units NewDay Apartments leases to IDOC, NewDay also owns several other multi-unit properties that it privately rents to registrants. These properties are considered compliant addresses for individuals subject to the prohibition on living within 500 feet of schools, playgrounds and daycares.
42. Because of the One-Per-Address Statute, these properties are currently only available to registrants who are off MSR. But for the One-Per-Address Statute, NewDay would be willing to lease to individuals on MSR the apartments it currently makes available only to individuals who are off MSR.
12

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 24-1 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 13 of 25 PageID #:194
43. Plaintiff Alvin Goldberg is a prisoner at Taylorville Correctional Center. With “good time” credits, Goldberg completed his prison term on November 11, 2018, and has been entitled to release from prison on MSR since that date, but he remains imprisoned because he has been unable to secure compliant housing. Because of his inability to find housing, Goldberg has spent more than 18 months of “dead time” in prison.
44. Goldberg, who is 81 years old, is at high risk for suffering serious health complications if he contracts COVID-19 while imprisoned.
45. Plaintiff Goldberg and his family are able to privately pay for an apartment through NewDay Apartments. Goldberg is on the waiting list to rent a unit from NewDay, subject to his being able to obtain “a court order allowing NewDay to house Alvin with other registrants who live in other units at the same address.”
46. Pursuant to this Court’s May 13, 2020, Order (ECF No. 22), Plaintiff Goldberg has been approved for release to NewDay when a unit becomes available and can reside at NewDay pending further order of the Court. In the absence of permanent injunctive relief, however, this housing will no longer be considered compliant because of other registrants at the same address, and Goldberg will be at risk of having his MSR revoked and being sent back to prison because of the OnePer-Address Statute. B. Wayside Cross Ministries Has Valid Host Sites Available for Class
Members 47. Wayside Cross Ministries is a Bible-based mission that has operated in Aurora, Illinois, for more than 90 years.
13

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 24-1 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 14 of 25 PageID #:195
48. The Master’s Touch Ministry at Wayside Cross is a Bible-based, residential life-transformation program for troubled men. The program offers room and board at no cost, and empowers its participants to change their lives through prayer, Bible study, daily church services, mentoring with local clergy, and work rehabilitation programs. It takes a minimum of seven months for a resident to complete the Master’s Touch Ministry program. The end goal of the program is to give the men the tools they need to live healthy, law abiding lives, and the ability to secure their own employment and housing.
49. The participants in the Masters Touch Ministry all reside together in a dormitory setting at Wayside Cross, located at 215 E. New York Street in Aurora. Thus, placement at Wayside Cross does not comply with the One-Per-Address Statute.
50. Pursuant to this Court’s May 13, 2020, Order (ECF No. 22), Plaintiffs Atkins, Schroeder, Chamblis, Crowe, Faller, Shelton, Monson and Council have been released to Wayside Cross Ministries and are currently participating in the Master’s Touch Ministry program. Pursuant to the preliminary injunction order, these Plaintiffs may reside at Wayside Cross pending further order of the court. In the absence of permanent injunctive relief, however, these individuals will be at risk of having their MSR revoked and being sent back to prison because of the OnePer-Address Statute.
14

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 24-1 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 15 of 25 PageID #:196
51. Wayside Cross currently has additional openings in the Master’s Touch Ministry and is willing to accept additional members of the Murphy class at no cost to the IDOC or to the parolees.5
52. Plaintiffs Kenneth Green, Paul Hubbard, David Easton, Juan Medina, Adam Escamilla, Ashief Shaffer, Reginald Harris and Edward Bartgen are all members of the Murphy class who have completed their sentences of incarceration and are entitled to release from IDOC on MSR, but remain imprisoned because they do not have resources to secure compliant housing. Each of these Plaintiffs would like to participate in the Master’s Touch Ministry at Wayside Cross.
53. On information and belief, each of these Plaintiffs meets the criteria for release to Wayside Cross and participation in the Master’s Touch Ministry.
54. But for the One-Per-Address Statute, Wayside Cross Ministries would be willing to accept these Plaintiffs and other individuals being released from IDOC on MSR for admission to the Master’s Touch Ministry. C. Jordan’s Dream Has Valid Host Sites Available for Class Members
55. Plaintiff Marcus Barnes was convicted in 2008 of criminal sexual assault and sentenced to serve 12 years in IDOC plus an indeterminate term of “three years to life” on MSR. With good time credits, Barnes completed his prison sentence on December 17, 2018, and was approved for release on MSR.
5 Because of its proximity to a playground, Wayside Cross cannot accept into its program individuals who are classified as “child sex offenders,” but it can accept individuals whose offenses involved an adult victim. Undersigned counsel has confirmed with Aurora Corporation Counsel Rick Veenstra that Aurora police are willing to register parolees at Wayside Cross provided they are not classified as “child sex offenders.” The Plaintiffs seeking placement at Wayside Cross are not classified as “child sex offenders.”
15

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 24-1 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 16 of 25 PageID #:197
56. Barnes’ family identified 11 different potential host sites, all of which IDOC rejected for various reasons, including proximity to daycares and schools. Because of his inability to secure compliant housing, Barnes spent more than 18 months of “dead time” in prison.
57. In February 2020, Barnes’ family found him a place to stay on the 5700 block of South Sangamon in Chicago. The building is owned and operated by an organization called Jordan’s Dream, which provides transitional housing and supportive services (such as help with locating employment, religious services, and connections to mental health providers) to individuals who have been convicted of sex offenses.
58. IDOC investigated the address and confirmed that it complies with the statutory restrictions on proximity within 500 feet of schools, playgrounds, daycares and other places where children congregate.
59. However, IDOC rejected the host site pursuant to the One-Per-Address Statute because another registrant resided there.
60. Pursuant to this Court’s April 8, 2020, Order (ECF No. 11), Plaintiff Barnes was released to Jordan’s Dream on April 14, 2020, and can reside there pending further order of the court. In the absence of permanent injunctive relief, however, this housing will no longer be considered compliant, and Barnes will be at risk of having his MSR revoked and being sent back to prison because of the One-PerAddress Statute.
16

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 24-1 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 17 of 25 PageID #:198
61. But for the One-Per-Address Statute, Jordan’s Dream would be willing to offer housing to other registrants being released from IDOC on MSR whenever openings become available. D. New Beginnings Has Valid Host Sites Available for Class Members
62. New Beginnings is a Chicago-based not-for-profit corporation. New Beginnings owns and operates five buildings on the South Side of Chicago at which it provides affordable transitional housing, meals and supportive services to individuals who have been released from prison or have experienced homelessness.
63. All five of the buildings New Beginnings owns are compliant with the restriction on living within 500 feet of schools, playgrounds and daycares.
64. Plaintiffs Galindo, Huddleston, Givens, Dean, Fluckert, Boykin, Garrison, Harris, Aleman, Lloyd and Kelley have all completed their sentences of incarceration and are entitled to release from IDOC on MSR, but they all remain imprisoned because they have been unable to secure compliant housing. Each of these Plaintiffs would like to reside while on MSR at properties operated by New Beginnings. Galindo, Huddleston, Givens, Dean, Boykin, Garrison, Harris and Dunn would like to be released to 6655 S. Perry, Chicago, Illinois 60621; and Fluckert, Aleman, Lloyd, and Kelley would like to be released to 11934 S. Lowe, Chicago, Illinois 60628.
65. Plaintiffs and/or their families are prepared to pay for their placements at these locations.
17

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 24-1 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 18 of 25 PageID #:199
66. New Beginnings has sufficient beds available at each of these locations and is prepared to accept the Plaintiffs immediately.
67. In the future, New Beginnings is prepared to offer housing to other members of the proposed class, space permitting.
68. The sole reason IDOC cannot approve Plaintiffs for release to New Beginnings properties is the One-Per-Address Statute. E. Individuals Who Have Been Released to Host Sites Outside of Prison
are at Risk of Revocation 69. Plaintiff Luis Aponte was released from IDOC onto MSR in January 2020 to his father’s home in Waukegan, Illinois. 70. The host site is in a four-story apartment building that contains approximately 12 separate units. When Aponte was released, no other registrant lived in the building. IDOC determined that the address complies with the prohibition on residing within 500 feet of a school, playground or daycare, and approved Aponte to live there while on MSR. 71. Aponte is doing well on MSR. He has full-time employment in a warehouse and has been attending required sex offender therapy regularly. 72. In March 2020, another registrant (not on MSR) moved into a different unit in the same building where Aponte resides with his father. 73. Aponte has received notice from his parole agent that if he does not find somewhere else to live, he will have his MSR revoked and will be sent back to prison because the One-Per-Address Statute prohibits him from living in the same apartment building as another registrant.
18

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 24-1 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 19 of 25 PageID #:200
74. Aponte has not been able to find another host site that IDOC will approve and that he can afford. He wants to keep residing with his father.
75. If the One-Per-Address Statute is enforced against Aponte, he will have his MSR revoked and be sent back to prison, resulting in loss of his job, halting the progress he has made on MSR so far, and forcing him to serve dead time until he can secure a new place to live.
76. Plaintiff Kevin Manson was released from IDOC onto MSR on May 6, 2020. He currently resides in Chicago Heights, Illinois, with his aunt.
77. IDOC approved Manson for release to his aunt’s home, but the approval was given in error. When Manson tried to register with Chicago Heights police after his release, he was informed that his aunt’s house is too close to a school. Chicago Heights police told him that he must move because he in violation of the prohibition on residing within 500 feet of a school.
78. Manson does not have funds to pay for housing of his own at present. The Cook County Justice Advisory Council (“CCJAC”), a governmental entity that provides reentry assistance to citizens returning to Cook County after imprisonment, is willing to pay for Manson’s housing.
79. New Beginnings has a bed available for Manson at 11934 S. Lowe Chicago Illinois, 60628, and is able to take him immediately. As set forth above, this placement complies with the restriction on residence within 500 feet of schools, playgrounds and daycares. CCJAC is prepared to pay to house Manson at this location.
19

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 24-1 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 20 of 25 PageID #:201
80. IDOC cannot approve Manson to move to New Beginnings pursuant to the One-Per-Address Statute because another registrant already lives at that address.
81. If the One-Per-Address Statute is enforced against Manson, he will have his MSR revoked and be sent back to prison. He will also be at serious risk of new criminal charges for failure to register and/or for residing too close to a school. F. Class Members Could Be Released to Placements with Family
82. Plaintiff Thomas Smith is an individual who is currently imprisoned in IDOC and is seeking a host site at which to reside while on “three-to-life” MSR.
83. Plaintiff Smith’s mother Tammy and step-father Jerry would like to have Thomas live with them at their home in Pocahontas, Illinois, while he is on MSR.
84. Plaintiff Smith’s parents have a three-bedroom home and can give Thomas his own bedroom and bathroom. The home is in a rural area, and it is not within 500 feet of any schools, playgrounds, or daycares.
85. Plaintiff Smith submitted his parents’ home as a proposed host site. IDOC rejected the host site because his stepfather was convicted of a sex offense 34 years ago (in 1986), and the One-Per-Address Statute (730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6)) prohibits Thomas from residing at the same address as another person who has been convicted of a sex offense—no matter how long ago.
86. The only barrier to Plaintiff Smith’s being allowed to serve his MSR time at his parents’ home is the One-Per-Address Statute.
20

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 24-1 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 21 of 25 PageID #:202
CLASS ALLEGATIONS 87. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), Plaintiffs seek certification of this complaint as a class action for purposes of equitable relief on behalf of a class defined as follows.
• All individuals who are or will in the future be on Mandatory Supervised Release for a sex offense and cannot secure housing that complies with the One-Per-Address Statute, 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6).
88. The class seeks a declaration that the One-Per-Address Statute violates the Eighth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause on its face and as applied to them and an injunction prohibiting Defendant from continuing to enforce the Statute.
89. The proposed class is numerous. According to the final report of the Illinois Sex Offenses & Sex Offender Registration Task Force, published in December 2017, “[o]n average, the Illinois Department of Corrections houses 1,200 to 1,400 offenders who may not be released from custody because they are unable to secure permanent, stable housing meeting Illinois statute requirements or agency policy.”6 On information and belief, the number of individuals imprisoned in IDOC due to a lack of compliant housing has grown substantially since the publication of that report. This complaint identifies 37 people who have been unable to secure housing solely because of the challenged Statute and there are likely hundreds more who are, or will be in the future, in the same situation.
6 Available at: http://www.icjia.state.il.us/news/sex-offenses-and-sex-offenderregistration-task-force-final-report
21

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 24-1 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 22 of 25 PageID #:203
90. There are questions of law and fact common to all class members, including but not limited to the following:
• What are the rationales for the One-Per-Address Statute; • Whether there is any compelling interest served by the Statute; • Whether the Statute violates the Eighth Amendment and Equal
Protection Clause as applied to the members of the class. 91. All individuals falling within the class definition are subject to the same Statute. Given the commonality of the questions pertinent to all class members, a single judgment would provide relief to each member of the class. 92. Defendant has acted and continues to act in a manner adverse to the rights of the proposed class, making final declaratory relief appropriate with respect to the class as a whole. 93. The named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class; and the named Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of all members of the proposed class. 94. Plaintiffs’ counsel has extensive experience and has devoted substantial professional and financial resources to representing individuals in cases involving the same type of claim raised here—namely, the Murphy class action. Plaintiffs’ counsel will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class.
22

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 24-1 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 23 of 25 PageID #:204
COUNT I 42 U.S.C. §1983 – EIGHTH AMENDMENT 95. Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of the class they seek to represent, reallege and reincorporate, as though fully set forth herein, each and every allegation contained above. 96. In Murphy v. Raoul, 380 F. Supp. 3d 731, 738 (N.D. Ill. 2019), this Court has already concluded that it violates the Equal Protection Clause and the Eighth Amendment to subject individuals to indefinite incarceration solely because they cannot meet the host-site requirement, holding as follows: At the very heart of the liberty secured by the separation of powers is freedom from indefinite imprisonment by executive decree. The Attorney General and Director’s current application of the host site requirement results in the continued deprivation of the plaintiffs’ fundamental rights and therefore contravenes the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. 97. The One-Per-Address Statute is the sole reason the named Plaintiffs and the members of the proposed class cannot secure housing that will enable them to be released on MSR (or remain in the community while on MSR). 98. Thus, the One-Per-Address Statute violates the Eighth Amendment on its face and as applied to the named Plaintiffs and the members of the proposed class. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Honorable Court: a) Issue an order certifying this action to proceed as a class pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2); b) Appoint the undersigned as class counsel pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g); c) Enter judgment declaring that 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6) violates the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution;
23

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 24-1 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 24 of 25 PageID #:205
d) Enter a permanent injunction prohibiting Defendant from continuing to enforce 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6);
e) Award Plaintiffs their reasonable attorneys’ fees and cost pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and other applicable law; and
f) Grant such other relief as this Court deems just and proper. COUNT II
42 U.S.C. §1983 – FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT – EQUAL PROTECTION 99. Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of the class they seek to represent,
reallege and reincorporate, as though fully set forth herein, each and every allegation contained above.
100. The One-Per-Address Statute violates the Equal Protection Clause on its face and as applied to the named Plaintiffs and the members of the proposed class.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Honorable Court: a) Issue an order certifying this action to proceed as a class pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(b)(2); b) Appoint the undersigned as class counsel pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g); c) Enter judgment declaring that 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6) violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; d) Enter a permanent injunction prohibiting Defendant from continuing to
enforce 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6); e) Award Plaintiffs their reasonable attorneys’ fees and cost pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1988, and other applicable law; and f) Grant such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
24

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 24-1 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 25 of 25 PageID #:206

Law Office of Adele D. Nicholas 5707 W. Goodman Street Chicago, Illinois 60630 (847) 361-3869 adele@civilrightschicago.com
Law Office of Mark G. Weinberg 3612 N. Tripp Avenue Chicago, Illinois 60641 (773) 283-3913 mweinberg@sbcglobal.net

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Adele D. Nicholas /s/ Mark G. Weinberg Counsel for Plaintiff

25

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 24-2 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 1 of 13 PageID #:207

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

MARCUS BARNES, individually and )

on behalf of all others similarly situated, )

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ROB JEFFREYS, in his official

)

capacity as the Director of the Illinois )

Department of Corrections,

)

)

Defendant.

)

No. 20-cv-2137

PLAINTIFFS’ AMENDED MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 23(B)(2) AND FOR APPOINTMENT
OF CLASS COUNSEL PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 23(G)(1)

Plaintiffs, through counsel, respectfully request that this Court enter an order

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) certifying this case as a class

action on behalf of a class defined as follows:
• All individuals who have been convicted of sex offenses and completed their court-imposed sentence of incarceration who cannot find housing that complies with 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6) at which to reside while on Mandatory Supervised Release.

Plaintiffs further request that this Court enter an order appointing the

undersigned attorneys as class counsel. In support thereof, Plaintiffs state as

follows.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6) (hereinafter

“the One-Per-Address Statute” or “the Statute”). The Statute prohibits any

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 24-2 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 2 of 13 PageID #:208
individual on Mandatory Supervised Release (“MSR”) for a sex offense from residing “at the same address or in the same condominium unit or apartment unit or in the same condominium complex or apartment complex with another person he or she knows or reasonably should know is a convicted sex offender or has been placed on supervision for a sex offense.” Id.
The named Plaintiffs and the members of the class they seek to represent have all completed their court-ordered terms of incarceration and are entitled to release on MSR. As of this filing, 25 of the named Plaintiffs remain imprisoned because they do not have an approved “host site” at which to reside while on MSR. Eleven of the named Plaintiffs have been released from prison to host sites in the community, but they are at risk of having their MSR revoked and being sent back to IDOC because their housing does not comply with the One-Per-Address Statute.
Plaintiffs claim the enforcement of the Statute against them and others similarly situated violates the Eighth Amendment and Equal Protection Clause. Plaintiffs seek injunctive and declaratory relief on behalf of the class against Rob Jeffreys in his official capacity as Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections. Mr. Jeffreys is the public official with ultimate authority for enforcement of the One-Per-Address Statute.
Plaintiffs’ claims are ideally suited to proceed as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2). As set forth below, the proposed class satisfies each element of Rule 23(a) because (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;
2

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 24-2 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 3 of 13 PageID #:209
(3) the claims of the named Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the class; and (4) the named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Moreover, this matter meets the requirements for class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted in a manner that applies generally to the class as a whole, rendering class-wide injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
ARGUMENT I. The Court Should Certify the Proposed Class
For a district court to certify a class action, the proposed class must satisfy the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements of Rule 23(a) and the requirements of at least one subsection of Rule 23(b). Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 1992). Here, because the proposed class meets all four Rule 23(a) requirements and the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2), the class should be certified.
A. The Proposed Class Meets All of the Requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2) 1. Numerosity
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(1) requires that the class be “so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). A class “including more than 40 members” generally meets this standard. Barragan v. Evanger’s Dog and Cat Food Co., 259 F.R.D. 330, 333 (N.D.Ill. 2009); Streeter v. Sheriff of Cook County, 256 F.R.D. 609, 612 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (same); accord William B. Rubenstein, et al., Newberg on Class Actions, § 3:12 (5th ed. 2011) (“a class of 40
3

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 24-2 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 4 of 13 PageID #:210
or more members raises a presumption of impracticability of joinder based on numbers alone.”)
Here, the proposed class easily satisfies this standard. According to the final report of the Illinois Sex Offenses & Sex Offender Registration Task Force, published in December 2017, “[o]n average, the Illinois Department of Corrections houses 1,200 to 1,400 offenders who may not be released from custody because they are unable to secure permanent, stable housing meeting Illinois statute requirements or agency policy.”1 Many such individuals remain incarcerated solely because of the One-Per-Address provision. Plaintiffs’ pleadings to date have identified 36 individuals who have otherwise compliant addresses that have not been approved because of the One-Per-Address Statute.
As explained in Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, these individuals fall into four broad categories: (1) individuals, such as Marcus Barnes, Dana Monson, and Columbo Galindo, who would like to reside at charitably operated transitional housing such as Jordan’s Dream, New Beginnings or Wayside Cross Ministries; (2) individuals, such as Alvin Goldberg, who could obtain privately financed housing at addresses where other individuals with sex offense convictions already reside; (3) individuals, such as Andra Sampson and John Margarella, who are eligible for placement at the units IDOC leases from NewDay Apartments; and (4) individuals, such as Luis Aponte and Thomas Smith, who could reside with members of their
1 Available at: http://www.icjia.state.il.us/news/sex-offenses-and-sex-offenderregistration-task-force-final-report
4

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 24-2 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 5 of 13 PageID #:211
families but for the One-Per-Address restriction. Each of these categories likely contains dozens of other people who could identify housing but for the restriction on residing at the same address as another offender.
Moreover, as noted in Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction (ECF No. 17), membership in the class is growing as additional individuals finish their sentences of incarceration and become eligible for release on MSR but remain imprisoned due to an inability to obtain compliant housing. Accordingly, the class easily meets the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1).
2. Commonality Rule 23(a)(2) requires that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). Where, as here, the named Plaintiffs and the members of the class they seek to represent bring a facial challenge to an allegedly unconstitutional statute, the central questions of law and fact are necessarily common to all members of the class. See Smiley v. Calumet City, No. 08 C 3017, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41701, at *15-16 (N.D. Ill. May 15, 2009) (Where the Plaintiff brings “a facial challenge to the validity of [a statute] … the statute itself serves as the required ‘common nucleus of operative fact.’”) (citing Keele v. Wexler, 149 F. 3d 589, 594 (7th Cir. 1998) and Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 1992)). Here, the named Plaintiffs and all members of the proposed class are challenging the constitutionality of the same statute. Accordingly, all of the core
5

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 24-2 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 6 of 13 PageID #:212
factual and legal questions are appropriate for resolution on a class-wide basis. These common questions include the following:
• What are the rationales for the One-Per-Address Statute; • Whether there is any compelling interest served by the Statute; • What evidence supports the restriction imposed by the Statute; • Whether the Statute violates the Eighth Amendment and/or Equal
Protection Clause as applied to the members of the class. Because there are common questions of law and fact pertaining to all members of the class, this matter meets the commonality requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
3. Typicality Rule 23(a)(3) requires that “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). The standard for determining typicality is not an identity of interest between the named plaintiffs and the class, but rather a “sufficient homogeneity of interest.” Jones v. Blinziner, 536 F. Supp. 1181, 1190 (N.D. Ind. 1982) (citing Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 403 n.13 (1975)). “[T]he typicality requirement is liberally construed.” Gaspar v. Linvatec Corp., 167 F.R.D. 51, 57 (N.D. Ill. 1996). A “plaintiff’s claim is typical if it arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members and [is] based on the same legal theory.” De La Fuente v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 713 F.2d 225, 232 (7th Cir. 1983). This requirement “is meant to assume that the named representative’s claims ‘have the
6

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 24-2 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 7 of 13 PageID #:213
same essential characteristics as the claims of the class at large.’” Oshana v. Coca– Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 514 (7th Cir. 2006).
Where, as here, the named Plaintiffs’ injuries arise from a generally applicable statute affecting all members of the class, typicality exists even if there are factual differences in precisely how the statute was applied to each plaintiff. Sherman v. Twp. High Sch. Dist. 214, 540 F. Supp. 2d 985, 992 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (“variations in factual circumstances … do not defeat the typicality of the class representative’s defenses.”) (citing Brown v. Kelly, 244 F.R.D. 222, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“if factual distinctions could preclude findings of commonality and typicality under Rule 23(a), they would be the death knell for class actions challenging the systemic enforcement of an unconstitutional statute.”); Areola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 798 (7th Cir. 2008) (typicality satisfied where plaintiff was in the “same boat” as other Cook County Jail detainees who had been denied crutches).
In this case, the named Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the class as a whole. Each named Plaintiff has a place to live that would meet IDOC approval but for the OnePer-Address Statute. The members of the proposed class are in the same situation— that is, they will be imprisoned beyond the completion of their court-ordered term of incarceration unless and until they find housing that satisfies this rule. Moreover, the named Plaintiffs and each class member have the same legal theories—that is, the application of the challenged Statute keeps them in prison in violation of the Eighth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. Accordingly, the named Plaintiffs satisfy Rule 23(a)(3)’s typicality requirement. See Fonder v. Sheriff of
7

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 24-2 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 8 of 13 PageID #:214
Kankakee County, No. 12-CV-2115, 2013 WL 5644754, at *6 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 2013) (typicality satisfied where “Plaintiff is challenging the same strip search policy as the class he seeks to represent”); Olson v. Brown, 284 F.R.D. 398, 411 (N.D. Ind. 2012) (typicality satisfied where class representative and members of proposed class had their legal mail opened improperly by correctional officers).
4. Adequacy Rule 23(a)(4) requires that the named plaintiffs “will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). The adequacy inquiry consists of two parts: “(1) the adequacy of the named plaintiffs as representatives of the proposed class’ myriad members, with their differing and separate interests, and (2) the adequacy of the proposed class counsel.” Gomez v. St. Vincent Health, Inc., 649 F.3d 583, 592 (7th Cir. 2011). Both elements are met here.
a. The Named Plaintiffs Are Appropriate Representatives of the Interests of the Class
The named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. The named Plaintiffs and the class members raise the same claims, seek the same relief, and their interests are aligned. The named Plaintiffs are a diverse group who represent the various ways in which the One-Per-Address Statute results in the unnecessary imprisonment of individuals who have completed their sentences of incarceration and who should be permitted to serve their MSR time in the community. Each of the named Plaintiffs has a strong personal stake in the proceedings that will “insure diligent and thorough prosecution of the litigation.” Rodriguez v. Swank, 318 F. Supp. 289, 294 (N.D. Ill.1970), aff'd 403 U.S. 901 (1971).
8

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 24-2 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 9 of 13 PageID #:215
At present, there are 25 named Plaintiffs who remain in prison because of the OnePer-Address Statute and 11 named Plaintiffs who are at risk of revocation because of the Statute.2 Even if every named Plaintiff is released pursuant to preliminary injunctive relief, they will remain invested in seeing this litigation through to its conclusion because in the absence of permanent injunctive relief, they risk being returned to prison on a technical violation of their parole (i.e., their housing will no longer be valid because of the One-Per-Address Statute). Accordingly, the named Plaintiffs will adequately represent the interests of the class.
b. Adequacy of Representation The named Plaintiffs are represented by experienced civil rights counsel who are well qualified to represent the interests of the members of the class and have devoted substantial time and resources to vigorously prosecuting this case. Ms. Nicholas and Mr. Weinberg have successfully litigated numerous constitutional cases in which broad equitable relief was sought, including the Murphy class action which raised claims closely related to the claims raised here. See, Murphy v. Raoul, 16 C 11471, 380 F. Supp. 3d 731 (N.D. Ill., 2019) (Kendall, J.) (certified class action; obtained permanent injunction governing IDOC procedures for releasing sex
2 The 25 Plaintiffs who remain imprisoned are Columbo Galindo, Andra Sampson, DeJuan Wright, Jerrand Miller, John Margarella, Kenneth Green, David Easton, Paul D. Hubbard, Juan Medina, Adam Escamilla, Aishef Shaffer, Edward Bartgen, Reginald Harris, Johnny Harris, Lavonne Givens, Lashaun Dean, Justin Fluckert, Dontae Boykin, Ronald Garrison, Joshua Huddleston, Manuel Aleman, Arnold Lloyd, Melvin Kelley, Andre Dunn, and Alvin Goldberg. The 11 Plaintiffs who have been released but are at risk of revocation are Marcus Barnes, Luis Aponte, Kevin Manson, Fredrick Chamblis, Corey Crowe, Dana Monson, Joshua Atkins, Kenneth Schroeder, Wade Council, Christopher Shelton and Mark Faller.
9

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 24-2 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 10 of 13 PageID #:216
offenders on MSR); RCP Publications Inc. v. City of Chicago, 15 C 11398 (certified class action; obtained permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement of City’s signposting ordinance and class-wide damages); Adair v. Town of Cicero, No. 18 C 3526, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110949 (N.D. Ill. July 3, 2019) (pending certified class action on behalf of women detained in Town of Cicero police lockup); Koger v. Dart, 114 F. Supp. 3d 572 (N.D. Ill., 2015) (obtained declaratory judgment holding ban on newspapers in the Cook County Jail unconstitutional); Pindak v. Dart, 10 C 6237 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (Pallmeyer, J.) (obtained a permanent injunction ordering the sheriff to train deputies concerning First Amendment rights); Norton v. City of Springfield, 806 F. 3d 411 (7th Cir. 2015) (obtained an injunction barring the City of Springfield from enforcing its municipal panhandling ordinance).
Because the named Plaintiffs have demonstrated a commitment to vigorously pursuing class-wide relief and because they are represented by competent and experienced counsel, they satisfy Rule 23(a)(4)’s adequacy requirements.
5. Plaintiffs Satisfy Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) Because this Case Seeks Declaratory and Injunctive Relief from Policies that Impact the Entire Proposed Class
The final requirement for class certification is that the named plaintiff must meet the requirements of at least one of the subsections of Rule 23(b). Subsection (b)(2) requires that “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Courts have long recognized that civil rights class
10

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 24-2 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 11 of 13 PageID #:217
actions are the paradigmatic 23(b)(2) suits. See Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 565 F. 2d 975, 979 n.9 (7th Cir. 1977) (“Rule 23(b)(2) … is devoted primarily to civil rights class actions which allege violations of constitutional rights.”) (citing Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 Amendments to Rule 23); Chi. Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 797 F.3d 426, 441 (7th Cir. 2015) (“23(b)(2) is the appropriate rule to enlist when the plaintiffs’ primary goal is not monetary relief, but rather to require the defendant to do or not do something that would benefit the whole class. Not surprisingly, civil rights cases … are prime examples of Rule 23(b)(2) classes.”) (citations omitted).
As stated in the leading treatise on class actions: Rule 23(b)(2) was drafted specifically to facilitate relief in civil rights suits. Most class actions in the constitutional and civil rights areas seek primarily declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of the class and therefore readily satisfy Rule 23(b)(2) class action criteria.
A. Conte & H. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions § 25.20 (4th ed. 2002). Because this case seeks class-wide injunctive and declaratory relief, it is appropriate for certification as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). II. The Court Should Designate Plaintiffs’ Counsel as Class Counsel
Under Rule 23(g)(1) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(g) requires that the district court appoint class counsel for any class that is certified. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1). The attorneys appointed to serve as class counsel must “fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(B). The appointed class counsel must be listed in a court’s class certification order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(B).
11

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 24-2 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 12 of 13 PageID #:218
Rule 23(g) provides four factors for a court to consider in appointing class counsel: (1) “the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in the action;” (2) “counsel’s experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and the types of claims asserted in the action;” (3) “counsel’s knowledge of the applicable law”; and (4) “the resources that counsel will commit to representing the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(A).
The undersigned attorneys satisfy each of these requirements. First, Plaintiffs’ counsel have invested substantial work into preparation of this case, including speaking to numerous families and individuals affected by the challenged Statute, drafting a Complaint and two amended Complaints, drafting two successful motions for a preliminary injunctive relief, and conducting extensive legal research concerning the class members’ claims. Second, as set forth in §I(A)(4)(c) above, Plaintiffs’ counsel have devoted substantial professional resources to litigation on behalf of individuals who have been convicted of sex offenses and have significant experience in handling complex civil rights litigation, including the kind of claims asserted in this case. Finally, Plaintiffs’ counsel have dedicated and will continue to commit substantial resources to the representation of this class. In sum, Plaintiffs’ counsel fully satisfy the criteria for class counsel set forth in Rule 23(g), and Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court appoint undersigned counsel to represent the class.
12

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 24-2 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 13 of 13 PageID #:219

CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court grant the motion for class certification and appoint the undersigned attorneys as Class Counsel.

Law Office of Adele D. Nicholas 5707 W. Goodman Street Chicago, Illinois 60630 847-361-3869 adele@civilrightschicago.com
Law Office of Mark G. Weinberg 3612 N. Tripp Avenue Chicago, Illinois 60641 (773) 283-3913 mweinberg@sbcglobal.net

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Adele D. Nicholas /s/ Mark G. Weinberg Counsel for Plaintiffs

13

 
 Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 25 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 1 of 16 PageID #:220

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

MARCUS BARNES, et al.,

)

individually and on behalf of all others )

similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

ROB JEFFREYS, in his official

)

capacity as the Director of the Illinois )

Department of Corrections,

)

)

Defendant.

)

No. 20-cv-2137

PLAINTIFFS’ THIRD MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Plaintiffs Luis Aponte, Kevin Manson, Columbo Galindo, Juan Medina, Adam

Escamilla, Aishef Shaffer, Reginald Harris, Edward Bartgen, Johnny Harris,

Lavonne Givens, Lashaun Dean, Justin Fluckert, Dontae Boykin, Ronald Garrison,

Joshua Huddleston, Manuel Aleman, Arnold Lloyd, Melvin Kelley, and Andre Dunn

respectfully request that this Honorable Court enter a preliminary injunction

prohibiting Defendant from enforcing 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6) (hereinafter the

“One-Per-Address Statute” or the “Statute”) against them.

INTRODUCTION

This is Plaintiffs’ third motion for a preliminary injunction. As set forth in their

previous motions (ECF Nos. 3 and 17), Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of

One-Per Address Statute, a section of the Illinois Code of Corrections which

prohibits an individual on MSR for a sex offense from living “at the same address or

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 25 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 2 of 16 PageID #:221
in the same condominium unit or apartment unit or in the same condominium complex or apartment complex with another person he or she knows or reasonably should know is a convicted sex offender or has been placed on supervision for a sex offense.”
Urgent court intervention is necessary to halt the application of the Statute to the Plaintiffs identified in this motion. In the absence of injunctive relief, (1) Plaintiffs Kevin Manson and Luis Aponte, who have been released to approved host sites in the community, will be revoked and sent back to prison because their housing no longer complies with the One-Per-Address Statute; and (2) Plaintiffs Galindo, Medina, Escamilla, Shaffer, Barguen, Givens, Dean, Fluckert, Boykin, Garrison, Huddleston, Aleman, Lloyd, Kelley, Dunn, Reginald Harris and Johnny Harris, all of whom are entitled to release on MSR, will continue to be incarcerated beyond the completion of their sentences.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND1 I. Enforcement of the One-Per-Address Statute Will Result in the Unjust
Imprisonment of Plaintiffs A. Luis Aponte and Kevin Manson are at Risk of Revocation of their
MSR Because of the One-Per-Address Statute 1. Luis Aponte Plaintiff Luis Aponte was released from IDOC onto MSR in January 2020 to his father’s home in Waukegan, Illinois. Ex. 1, Decl. of Aponte, at ¶1. The host site is in
1 For purposes of brevity, Plaintiffs do not reiterate factual matters set forth in full in Plaintiffs’ first two motions for a preliminary injunction (ECF Nos. 3 and 17), including details about the Murphy litigation and the risks posed by the spread of COVID-19 in IDOC facilities.
2

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 25 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 3 of 16 PageID #:222
a four-story apartment building that contains approximately 12 separate units. Id. at ¶2. When Aponte was released, no other registrant lived in the building. Id. IDOC determined that the address complies with the prohibition on residing within 500 feet of a school, playground or daycare, and approved Aponte to live there while on MSR. Id. Aponte is doing well on MSR. He has full-time employment in a warehouse and consistently has been attending required sex offender therapy since his release. Id. at ¶3.
In March 2020, another registrant (not on MSR) moved into a different unit in the same building where Aponte resides with his father. Id. at ¶4. Aponte had no knowledge that this person had moved in until Aponte has received notice from his parole agent that if he does not find somewhere else to live, he will have his MSR revoked and be sent back to prison because the One-Per-Address Statute prohibits him from living in the same apartment building as another registrant. Id. at ¶5.
Aponte has not been able to find another host site that IDOC will approve and that he can afford on his current income. Id. at ¶6. He wants to keep residing with his father, which has been a good environment for him and has been fostering his success on MSR. Id. at ¶7. If the One-Per-Address Statute is enforced against him, he will be revoked and sent back to prison, resulting in loss of his job, halting the progress he has made on MSR so far, and forcing him to serve “dead time” until he can secure a new place to live.
3

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 25 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 4 of 16 PageID #:223
2. Kevin Manson Plaintiff Kevin Manson was released from IDOC onto MSR on May 6, 2020. He currently resides in Chicago Heights, Illinois, with his aunt. Ex. 2, Decl. of Kevin Manson, at ¶1. IDOC approved Manson for release to his aunt’s home, but that approval was given in error. Id. at ¶2. When Manson tried to register with Chicago Heights police after his release, he was informed that his aunt’s house is too close to a school and thus he may not register there. Id. If he does not move, he will be charged with violation of the registration statute and the prohibition on residing within 500 feet of a school. Id. Manson does not have funds to pay for housing of his own at present. Id. at ¶3. The Cook County Justice Advisory Council (“CCJAC”), a governmental entity that provides reentry assistance to citizens returning to Cook County after imprisonment, is willing to pay for Manson’s housing. Id. New Beginnings, a notfor-profit corporation that provides transitional housing and supportive services on the South Side of Chicago, has a bed available for Manson at 11934 S. Lowe, Chicago, Illinois, 60628, and is able to take him immediately. Id. at ¶4; Ex. 3, Decl. of New Beginnings CEO Otis Williams, at ¶¶2,3. This placement complies with the restriction on residence within 500 feet of schools, playgrounds and daycares. CCJAC is prepared to pay to house Manson at this location. Ex. 2 at ¶3. IDOC has not approved Manson to move to New Beginnings pursuant to the One-Per-Address Statute because another registrant already lives at that address. Id. at ¶5. If the One-Per-Address Statute is enforced against Manson, he will be
4

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 25 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 5 of 16 PageID #:224
revoked and sent back to prison. Id. at ¶6. He will also be at serious risk of new criminal charges for failure to register and/or for residing too close to a school. Id.
B. New Beginnings Has Valid Host Sites Available for Class Members and Is Prepared to Immediately Offer Housing to Plaintiffs Galindo, Huddleston, Givens, Dean, Fluckert, Boykin, Garrison, Johnny Harris, Aleman, Lloyd, Kelly, Dunn and Manson
New Beginnings Recovery Homes Inc. is a Chicago-based not-for-profit corporation that was established in 1993. Ex. 3, Decl. of New Beginnings CEO Otis Williams at ¶1. New Beginnings owns and operates five buildings on the South Side of Chicago at which it provides affordable transitional housing, meals and supportive services to individuals who are released from prison or have experienced homelessness. Id. Residents at New Beginnings receive meals and have access to services, including peer support groups, counseling with licensed providers and case management. Id. at ¶2. All of New Beginnings’ properties are compliant with the housing restrictions that prohibit people who have been convicted of sex offenses from living within 500 feet of schools, daycares or playgrounds. Id. Each of these buildings has 24-hour a day security and structured supervision for residents. Id. New Beginnings has significant experience with housing individuals recently released from prison and assisting with their successful transition back into the community. Id.
Plaintiffs Galindo, Huddleston, Givens, Dean, Fluckert, Boykin, Garrison, Johnny Harris, Aleman, Lloyd and Kelley have all completed their sentences of incarceration and are entitled to release from IDOC on MSR, but they all remain imprisoned because they have been unable to secure compliant housing. Each of
5

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 25 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 6 of 16 PageID #:225
these Plaintiffs would like to reside while on MSR at properties operated by New Beginnings. Galindo, Huddleston, Givens, Dean, Boykin, Garrison, Johnny Harris and Dunn would like to be released to 6655 S. Perry, Chicago, Illinois 60621; and Fluckert, Aleman, Lloyd, and Kelley would like to be released to 11934 S. Lowe, Chicago, Illinois 60628. Id. at ¶¶3, 4. Plaintiffs all have a satisfactory way to pay for housing at New Beginnings. Id. at ¶3. New Beginnings has sufficient beds available at each of these locations and is prepared to accept the Plaintiffs immediately. Id. The sole reason IDOC cannot approve Plaintiffs for release to New Beginnings properties is the One-Per-Address Statute. Thus, the Plaintiffs remain imprisoned.
C. Wayside Cross Ministries Can Accept Additional Class Members As set forth in Plaintiffs’ previous motion for a preliminary injunction (ECF No. 17), Wayside Cross Ministries is a Christian ministry that has operated in Aurora, Illinois, for more than 90 years. See ECF No. 17-5, Declaration of Jonathan Beall, at ¶1. The Master’s Touch Ministry at Wayside Cross is a Bible-based, residential lifetransformation program for troubled men. Id. at ¶2. The program offers room and board at no cost, and empowers its participants to change their lives through prayer, Bible study, daily church services, mentoring with local clergy, and work rehabilitation programs. Id. It takes a minimum of seven months for a resident to complete the Master’s Touch Ministry program. The goal of the program is to give the men the tools they need to secure employment and housing and to live healthy, law-abiding lives through their faith in God. Id. at ¶4. The participants in the
6

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 25 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 7 of 16 PageID #:226
Master’s Touch Ministry all reside together in a dormitory setting at Wayside Cross, located at 215 E. New York Street in Aurora. Id. at ¶10.
Pursuant to the Court’s May 13, 2020, Order (ECF No. 22), eight Plaintiffs already have been released to Wayside Cross Ministries and are currently participating in the Master’s Touch Ministry program there. Wayside Cross has several additional openings in the Master’s Touch Ministry and is willing to accept other members of the proposed class at no cost to the IDOC or to the program participants. Id. at ¶5.2
Plaintiffs Juan Medina, Adam Escamilla, Ashief Shaffer, Reginald Harris and Edward Bartgen are all members of the proposed class who have completed their sentences of incarceration and are entitled to release from IDOC on MSR, but they remain imprisoned because they do not have resources to secure compliant housing. These Plaintiffs all would like to participate in the Master’s Touch Ministry at Wayside Cross and have been determined preliminarily to meet the criteria for admission to the program. Id. at ¶11. IDOC is currently prohibited from allowing these individuals to be released to Wayside Cross because of the One-Per-Address Statute. Thus, Plaintiffs Medina, Escamilla, Shaffer, Bartguen and Harris remain imprisoned indefinitely.
2 Because of its proximity to what the City of Aurora deems to be a playground, Wayside Cross cannot accept into its program individuals who are classified as “child sex offenders,” but it can accept individuals whose offenses involved an adult victim. Id. at ¶9. Undersigned counsel has confirmed with Aurora Corporation Counsel Rick Veenstra that Aurora police are willing to register parolees at Wayside Cross provided they are not classified as “child sex offenders.” None of the ten Plaintiffs seeking placement at Wayside Cross is classified as a “child sex offender.”
7

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 25 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 8 of 16 PageID #:227
II. The Challenged Statute The One-Per-Address Statute is set forth in the Illinois Uniform Code of
Corrections at 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6). The sole mechanism through which the One-Per-Address Statue is enforced is through the IDOC’s approval or rejection of parolees’ proposed host sites. That is, it is not a criminal offense for an individual on MSR for a sex offense to live at the same address as another registrant.3
The One-Per-Address Statute went into effect on July 11, 2005. Prior to that date, individuals on MSR for sex offenses were permitted to live in the same residence as other registrants. On information and belief, the One-Per-Address Statute is a major cause, if not the single largest cause, of the continued imprisonment of members of the Murphy class. This is so because other statutes (e.g., the 500-foot rules) already strictly circumscribe the areas where individuals convicted of sex offenses may live, and the One-Per-Address Statute makes it so only one parolee can live at each compliant property, even if it is a large apartment complex with many units.
There is no reason to conclude that allowing people who have been convicted of sex offenses to live near one another contributes to criminality. At least one analysis found that it has the opposite effect: it reduces the incidence of re-offense and improves supervision. A Minnesota Department of Corrections report concluded as follows:
3 In contrast, the statutes prohibiting individuals classified as “child sex offenders” from living within 500 feet of schools, daycares and playgrounds (720 ILCS 5/11-9.3 (b-5) and (b10)) are part of the criminal code. It is a Class 4 felony for a “child sex offender” to “knowingly” live at a prohibited location. 720 ILCS 5/11-9.3(f).
8

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 25 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 9 of 16 PageID #:228
This examination of level three re-offenders does not reveal a negative effect related to a level three offender living with another sex offender. In fact, supervision agents in both Hennepin and Ramsey County have noted benefits from having more than one level three offender living in one location. Closer supervision is possible because travel time between offenders is reduced. Also, level three offenders who live with other level three offenders experience more visits from a supervising agent because agents for both offenders visit the same property. Finally, offenders tend to inform on each other when supervision restrictions are violated or crimes are committed.4
There is no logical reason to believe that there is a compelling public safety need
to prohibit people on MSR for sex offenses from living at the same address as one
another. In the Murphy litigation, the IDOC did not come forth with any safety or
rehabilitative justification for the One-Per-Address Statute. In acknowledgement of
the restriction’s excessiveness, IDOC has already reinterpreted the restriction so as
not to apply to trailer parks or adjacent apartment buildings. Murphy v. Raoul, 16-
cv-11471, ECF No. 161.
ARGUMENT
I. Preliminary Injunction Standard
To be entitled to a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must establish four
elements: (1) some likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the lack of an adequate
remedy at law; (3) a likelihood that they will suffer irreparable harm if the
injunction is not granted; and (4) the balance of hardships tips in the moving party’s
favor. Ty, Inc. v. Jones Group, Inc., 237 F.3d 891, 895 (7th Cir. 2001).
4 See “Level Three Sex Offender Residential Placement Issues,” Minnesota Department of Corrections (available at: https://mn.gov/doc/assets/Lvl%203%20SEX%20OFFENDERS%20report%202003%20(revise d%202-04)_tcm1089-272828.pdf) (last visited April 3, 2020)
9

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 25 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 10 of 16 PageID #:229
As shown below, Plaintiffs meet each element for establishing an entitlement to injunctive relief, and accordingly this Court should issue a preliminary injunction to halt enforcement of the One-Per-Address Statute. II. Plaintiffs Have a Likelihood of Success on their Claims that Continued
Enforcement of the One-Per-Address Statute Violates the U.S. Constitution As this Court determined in ruling on Plaintiffs’ previous motions for preliminary injunctive relief, Plaintiffs have a likelihood of success on their claim that the continued enforcement of the One-Per-Address Statute violates the constitutional rights of the Plaintiffs. In Murphy v. Raoul, 380 F. Supp. 3d 731, 738 (N.D. Ill. 2019), this Court has already determined that it violates the Equal Protection Clause and the Eighth Amendment to subject individuals to indefinite incarceration solely because they cannot meet the host site requirement, holding as follows: At the very heart of the liberty secured by the separation of powers is freedom from indefinite imprisonment by executive decree. The … current application of the host site requirement results in the continued deprivation of the plaintiffs’ fundamental rights and therefore contravenes the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. In particular, this Court concluded that the continued imprisonment of individuals who do not have the money or outside support to comply with the host site requirement violates the Eighth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause because it is solely “the consequence of [the plaintiffs’] indigency, homelessness, and the attendant powerlessness to procure housing that will satisfy the IDOC.” Id. at 756.
10

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 25 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 11 of 16 PageID #:230
The Plaintiffs who bring this motion are all in the same boat as the members of the Murphy class because they are all entitled to be released from prison to serve their MSR time in the community, but they remain imprisoned (or in the case of
Aponte and Manson, face the imminent possibility of re-imprisonment) because they lack the resources to obtain housing that complies with the onerous restrictions imposed by Illinois law and IDOC policy.5
For these Plaintiffs, there is one particular aspect of law that stands in the way
of their being able to reside at otherwise compliant and affordable host sites: the One-Per-Address Statute. Significantly, over the course of the Murphy litigation, which has been ongoing for four years and generated hundreds of pages of summary judgment briefing, the IDOC never put forth a public safety or rehabilitative justification for the One-Per-Address Statute. Indeed, when this Court granted an
injunction prohibiting enforcement of the One-Per-Address Statute as to Marcus Barnes, another member of the Murphy class who had a suitable place to live but for the One-Per-Address rule, this Court noted the lack of evidentiary support for the Statute, writing as follows:
In response to the question about what penological or rehabilitative support the Defendants have for the “One Person One Address” provision, Defendants were unable to give any. The public’s interest in only hav[ing] one sex offender live at one residence is not supported by any testimony,
5 Plaintiffs Columbo Galindo, Juan Medina, Adam Escamilla, Aishef Shaffer, Reginald Harris, Edward Bartgen, Lavonne Givens, Lashaun Dean, Justin Fluckert, Dontae Boykin, Joshua Huddleston, Manuel Aleman, Melvin Kelley and Andre Dunn are members of the Murphy class. Plaintiffs Luis Aponte and Kevin Manson are former Murphy class members who will become members of the class again if they are revoked. Plaintiffs Ronald Garrison and Johnny Harris are not members of the Murphy class because they have determinate MSR sentences, but they also remain imprisoned beyond the completion of their courtimposed sentences.
11

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 25 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 12 of 16 PageID #:231
expert opinion, or evidence. Therefore, the Court finds that the statute is unconstitutional as it applies to Plaintiff and Defendants are enjoined from prohibiting his release to the address presented by Plaintiff. ECF No. 11. The same result should occur here. Each of the Plaintiffs has a safe host site at which to live outside of prison. The host sites at which Plaintiffs wish to live will be supportive of their reintegration into the community and meet every requirement imposed by Illinois law and IDOC policy, save the One-Per-Address Statute. In the absence of a legitimate justification for the prohibition on more than one parolee’s living at a particular address, the continued application of the One-Per-Address Statute to Plaintiffs violates their constitutional rights for all of the reasons the Court recognized in Murphy. III. Plaintiffs and Others Similarly Situated are Suffering and Will
Continue to Suffer Irreparable Injury in the Absence of an Injunction If an injunction is not granted, Plaintiffs and others similarly situated will suffer two forms of irreparable injury. One, they will continue to be imprisoned in violation of their constitutional right to be released from prison on MSR. And two, they will continue to be exposed to a high risk of being infected with COVID-19.6 Such harms unquestionably constitute irreparable injury. Aguilar v. GastonCamara, 861 F.3d 626, 631 (7th Cir. 2017) (“additional incarceration without
6 As set forth in full in Plaintiffs’ previous motions for a preliminary injunction, imprisoned individuals are at a particularly high risk of contracting COVID-19. COVID-19 infections in IDOC facilities continue to rise. At the time the initial complaint was filed, 56 IDOC inmates had tested positive. ECF No. 1 at ¶46. Now, that number is 215 (See IDOC, COVID-19 Response, available at: https://www2.illinois.gov/idoc/facilities/Pages/Covid19Response.aspx).
12

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 25 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 13 of 16 PageID #:232
penological justification” violates the Eighth Amendment); Hampton v. Leibach, 99 C 5473, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20983, at *5-6 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 2001) (a plaintiff “suffers irreparable harm each day that he is imprisoned in violation of the United States Constitution.”); Harris v. Board of Supervisors, 366 F.3d 754, 766 (9th Cir. 2004) (accepting “pain,” “infection,” and “medical complications” as forms of irreparable harm warranting injunctive relief).
Moreover, it is well established that when a plaintiff establishes a likelihood of success on a claim that a government action violates his constitutional rights, he meets the element of showing irreparable harm. See Ezell v. City of Chi., 651 F.3d 684, 699 (7th Cir. 2011) (“When an alleged deprivation of a constitutional right is involved, most courts hold that no further showing of irreparable injury is necessary.”) (quoting 11A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 2948.1 (2d ed. 1995)); Preston v. Thompson, 589 F.2d 300, 303 n.3 (7th Cir. 1978) (“The existence of a continuing constitutional violation constitutes proof of an irreparable harm.”). IV. The Balance of Harms and the Public Interest Favor Granting Relief
The public interest also favors the granting of the requested relief. First, there is no public safety justification for refusing to release Plaintiffs to New Beginnings or Wayside Cross Ministries. New Beginnings has 27 years of experience with helping individuals successfully transition from prison to the community. All of its properties have 24-hour a day security and structured supervision for residents. Similarly, Wayside Cross Ministries has nearly 100 years of experience helping
13

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 25 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 14 of 16 PageID #:233
individuals just like the Plaintiffs reintegrate into society through its highly structured faith-based programming. Kane County State’s Attorney Joe McMahon has lauded Wayside’s long track record of success with individuals who have been convicted of sex offenses, stating, “The work that they’ve done there at the Mission has been remarkable for decades.”7
Thus, Wayside Cross and New Beginnings are precisely the type of rehabilitative settings to which IDOC should be releasing the Plaintiffs. Moreover, both of these housing options are available at no additional cost to the State of Illinois, which is currently paying tens of thousands of dollars a year to keep the Plaintiffs in prison beyond their release dates.8
Likewise, there is no public safety justification for refusing to allow Plaintiff Aponte to remain at his father’s home. The IDOC approved Aponte for release to his father’s home six months ago after determining it met all of the requirements of state law and IDOC policy. Since his release in January, Aponte has done well on MSR. He has had no violations of the terms of his MSR; he is working full time; and he has consistently attended sex offender therapy. Aponte should not be sent back
7 See “Convicted Sex Offenders’ Ministry Housing Too Close To Playground, City Says,” National Public Radio, January 15, 2020; audio recording available at: https://www.npr.org/2020/01/15/796021411/convicted-sex-offenders-ministry-housing-tooclose-to-playground-city-says 8 See “IDOC Fiscal Year 2017 Annual Report” at 80 (In 2018, the average annual cost of keeping a person incarcerated in an IDOC facility was $27,930) (available at https://www2.illinois.gov/idoc/reportsandstatistics/Documents/FY18%20Annual%20Report %20FINAL.pdf).
14

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 25 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 15 of 16 PageID #:234
to prison simply because another registrant (whom he does not know and has never met) lives in another unit in the same building.
During this pandemic, other public safety factors also strongly favor issuance of an injunction that will allow Plaintiffs and others to be released to safe host sites outside of prison. Other persons imprisoned in IDOC who cannot be released at present are endangered by overcrowding, which increases the risk of disease transmission; and the public at large is put at risk if medical resources are overwhelmed by the hospitalization of imprisoned people in downstate communities with few hospital beds.
Finally, the public has a strong interest in protecting constitutional rights that would be well served by granting injunctive relief here. See ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 589-90 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he public interest is not harmed by preliminarily enjoining the enforcement of a statute that is probably unconstitutional.”)
CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Honorable Court enter a preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6) as to Plaintiffs so they can be released from prison to the otherwise compliant host sites identified above.
Respectfully submitted, /s/ Adele D. Nicholas /s/ Mark G. Weinberg Counsel for Plaintiff
15

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 25 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 16 of 16 PageID #:235 Law Office of Adele D. Nicholas 5707 W. Goodman Street Chicago, Illinois 60630 (847) 361-3869 adele@civilrightschicago.com Law Office of Mark G. Weinberg 3612 N. Tripp Avenue Chicago, Illinois 60641 (773) 283-3913 mweinberg@sbcglobal.net
16

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 25-1 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:236
Declaration of Luis Aponte 1. My name is Luis Aponte. I was released from IDOC onto mandatory supervised release in January 2020 to my father’s home in Waukegan, Illinois. I have three-years-to-life of MSR. 2. My father’s home is in a four-story apartment building that contains approximately 12 separate units. When I was released, no other registrant lived in the building. IDOC determined that the address complies with the prohibition on residing within 500 feet of a school, playground or daycare, and approved me to live there while on MSR. 3. I am doing well on MSR. I have a full-time job in a warehouse and have been attending required sex offender therapy regularly. 4. In March 2020, another registrant (not on parole) moved into a different unit in the same building where I live with my father. 5. I received notice from my parole agent that I have to move because of this other registrant in the building. If I do not find somewhere else to live, I will have my MSR revoked and will be sent back to prison. If I go back to prison, I will lose my job and will be stuck in IDOC until I can find another place to live. 6. I have been looking for another place to live, but I have not been able to find a host site that IDOC will approve and that I can afford with my current income. 7. I want to keep living with my father while I adjust to life on parole and get back on my feet.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1746, I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing statements are true and correct.

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 25-1 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:237

_________________ Luis Aponte

_5_-2_4_-_2_0_____ Date

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 25-2 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:238
Declaration of Kevin Manson 1. My name is Kevin Manson. I was released from IDOC onto mandatory supervised release on May 6, 2020. I currently reside in Chicago Heights, Illinois, with my aunt. I have three-years-to life of MSR. 2. IDOC approved me for release to my aunt’s home, but when I tried to register with Chicago Heights police, I was informed that my aunt’s house is too close to a school and I have to move somewhere else. 3. I just got out of prison and don’t have funds to pay for housing of my own. The Cook County Justice Advisory Council (“CCJAC”), a governmental entity that provides reentry assistance to citizens returning to Cook County after imprisonment, is willing to pay for my housing through an agency called New Beginnings. 4. It is my understanding that New Beginnings has a bed available for me at 11934 S. Lowe Chicago Illinois, 60628, and is able to take me immediately. 5. I have not yet been approved to go to New Beginnings because there is another registrant living at 11934 S. Lowe and I am prohibited from living at the same address as another sex offender. 6. If I am not allowed to go to New Beginnings I will not have a compliant place to live and will be sent back to prison. I could also be criminally charged with failure to register and residing too close to a school.

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 25-2 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:239

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1746, I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing statements are true and correct.

_________________ Kevin Manson

_5_-_2_5-_2_0_____ Date

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 25-3 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:240
Declaration of Otis Williams 1. My name is Otis Williams. I am the founder and CEO of New Beginnings Recovery Homes Inc. (NBRHI). NBRHI is a Chicago-based not-for-profit corporation that has been in operation since 1993. NBRHI provides affordable transitional housing and supportive services to people transitioning from prison to the community, individuals who are experiencing housing insecurity, and individuals who are in recovery from drug or alcohol abuse. 2. NBHRI owns five buildings on the south side of Chicago at which it provides dormitory style or semi-private shared living accommodations. Residents at NBHRI buildings receive meals and have access to services including peer support groups, counseling with licensed providers and case management. Our properties are compliant with the housing restrictions that prohibit people who have been convicted of sex offenses from living within 500 feet of schools, daycares or playgrounds. Each of these buildings has 24-hour a day security and structured supervision for residents. Our goal is to help our residents become positive, productive citizens. We have significant experience with housing individuals who are being released from prison and assisting with their successful transition back into the community. 3. We currently have openings in our buildings located at 6655 S Perry Chicago, IL 60621 and 11934 S. Lowe Chicago Illinois, 60628. We are prepared to immediately accept Columbo Galindo, Joshua Huddleston, Lavonne Givens, Lashaun Dean, Justin Fluckert, Dontae Boykin, Ronald Garrison, Johnny Harris, Manuel Aleman, Arnold Lloyd, Melvin Kelley, Andre Dunn, and Kevin Manson to reside at these locations. These individuals meet the requirements for enrollment in our program and each has a satisfactory way to make payment for his room and board.

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 25-3 Filed: 05/26/20 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:241

4. We are aware that each of these individuals will be on parole for a sex offense and therefore is legally prohibited from living at the same address as another person with a sex offense conviction. That is the only barrier standing in the way of these individuals’ being released to NBRHI.
5. If the restriction on housing more than one sex offender at the same address is eliminated, we are willing and able to house additional parolees at these and other properties, space permitting.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1746, I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing statements are true and correct.

___________________ Otis J. Williams

May 25, 2020

 
 Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 29 Filed: 06/03/20 Page 1 of 3 PageID #:252

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

MARCUS BARNES, et al.,

)

individually and on behalf of all others )

similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

ROB JEFFREYS, in his official

)

capacity as the Director of the Illinois )

Department of Corrections,

)

)

Defendant.

)

No. 20-cv-2137

ORDER

A hearing was held on June 1, 2020, on Plaintiffs’ third motion for a preliminary

injunction [25].

Plaintiffs have completed their sentences of imprisonment and are entitled to be

released from the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) to

serve their Mandatory Supervised Release time in the community, provided that

they are able to submit a host site that is acceptable to the IDOC. Each of the

Plaintiffs has identified housing that would otherwise be approved by IDOC, but for

the “One Person Per Address” provision in 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6). This Court has

already determined that it is unconstitutional to imprison sex offenders long after

their period of incarceration has been completed solely because they are unable to

find suitable host sites. See Murphy v. Raoul, 380 F. Supp. 3d 781 (N.D. Ill. 2019).

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 29 Filed: 06/03/20 Page 2 of 3 PageID #:253
The following Plaintiffs have identified host sites that will be supportive of their transition back into the community:
• Plaintiff Luis Aponte seeks to continue residing with his father at 2120 Lorraine Avenue, Apt. 5C, Waukegan, Illinois, 60085;
• Plaintiffs Kevin Manson, Columbo Galindo, Joshua Huddleston, Lavonne Givens, Lashaun Dean, Justin Fluckert, Dontae Boykin, Ronald Garrison, Johnny Harris, Manuel Aleman, Arnold Lloyd, Melvin Kelley, Andre Dunn, Charles Rucker and Michael Johnstone seek to reside at properties operated by New Beginnings, a transitional housing provider with locations at 6655 S. Perry, Chicago, Illinois 60621 and 11934 S. Lowe, Chicago, Illinois 60628; and
• Plaintiffs Juan Medina, Adam Escamilla, Ashief Shaffer, Reginald Harris, Edward Bartgen and John Berry seek to reside at Wayside Cross Ministries, a Bible-based transitional housing program at 215 E. New York Street, Aurora, Illinois, 60505.
At each of these proposed housing locations, another person who has been convicted of a sex offense already resides in the same building and therefore Defendant cannot release these individuals to the proposed locations because of its obligation to follow 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6).
There has been no legitimate public interest articulated in only having one sex offender live at one residence. Therefore, the Court finds that the statute is unconstitutional as it applies to the 22 individuals identified above, and Defendant is enjoined from enforcing the “One Person Per Address” provision in 730 ILCS 5/33-7(a)(7.6) as to these individuals to the extent they seek release to the locations identified above, or in the case of Mr. Aponte, to the extent that he seeks to continue residing at the location identified above. Defendant is enjoined from prohibiting these individuals’ release to the locations identified above, subject to the approval of
2

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 29 Filed: 06/03/20 Page 3 of 3 PageID #:254

the program operators at New Beginnings and Wayside Cross Ministries. It is further ordered that Defendant is enjoined from enforcing the statute as to any other parolees currently residing at Wayside Cross Ministries or New Beginnings housing, for so long as they continue to reside there.

___________________________ Hon. Virginia M. Kendall, United States District Judge

_June 3, 2020__ Date

3

 
 Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 30 Filed: 06/09/20 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:255

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

MARCUS BARNES, et al., individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
ROB JEFFREYS, in his official capacity as the Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections,
Defendant.

)

)

)

No. 20-cv-2137

)

)

)

)

Judge Virginia Kendall

)

)

)

)

)

)

DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ AMENDED MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION AND APPOINTMENT OF CLASS COUNSEL

Plaintiffs in this case have moved for certification of a class pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), with that class defined as follows:

All individuals who have been convicted of sex offenses and completed their court-imposed sentence of incarceration who cannot find housing that complies with 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6) at which to reside while on Mandatory Supervised Release.
Plaintiffs’ Amended Motion for Class Certification, Dkt. 24-2, at 1.

Defendant Rob Jeffreys, Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections, does not

oppose certification of a class as defined above. Further, Defendant does not oppose appointment

of Adele Nicholas and Mark Weinberg as class counsel.

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 30 Filed: 06/09/20 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:256

KWAME RAOUL Attorney General of Illinois Attorney No. 99000

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Sarah H. Newman ____________ By: Sarah H. Newman
Michael T. Dierkes Sunil Bhave Assistant Attorneys General General Law Bureau 100 W. Randolph St., 13th Fl. Chicago, Illinois 60601 312-814-6131 312-814-3672 snewman@atg.state.il.us mdierkes@atg.state.il.us sbhave@atg.state.il.us
Attorneys for Defendant Rob Jeffreys

2

 
 Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 31 Filed: 07/01/20 Page 1 of 3 PageID #:257

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

MARCUS BARNES, et al., individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

) ) ) )

Plaintiffs,

) )

v.

) )

ROB JEFFREYS, in his official

)

capacity as the director of the Illinois )

Department of Corrections,

)

)

Defendant.

)

No. 20 C 2137 Judge Virginia M. Kendall

ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Amended Motion for Class Certification pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and for Appointment of Class Counsel pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(g)(1). (Dkt. 24-2). The Plaintiffs have been convicted of sex offenses and are in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections. (Dkt. 24-1 ¶ 1). They challenge the constitutionality of 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6), which they refer to as the One-Per-Address Statute. (Dkt. 24-1 ¶ 2). The statute prevents those convicted of a sex offense from “residing at the same address or in the same condominium unit or apartment unit or in the same condominium complex or apartment complex with another person he or she knows or reasonably should know is a convicted sex offender or has been placed on supervision for a sex offense.” 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6). Plaintiffs argue that enforcement of the statute violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and seek an injunction barring its continued enforcement. (Dkt. 24-1 ¶ 7).
The class that Plaintiffs propose to certify is: “All individuals who have been convicted of sex offenses and completed their court-imposed sentence of incarceration who cannot find housing that complies with 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6) at which to reside while on Mandatory Supervised Release.” (Dkt. 24-2 at 1). Defendant does not oppose certification of the class or appointment of the proposed class counsel. (Dkt. 30).

1

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 31 Filed: 07/01/20 Page 2 of 3 PageID #:258
The Court grants Plaintiffs’ motion. For the reasons set forth by Plaintiffs in their motion, which are uncontested by the Defendant, the Court concludes that the class meets the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements of Rule 23, and that relief is appropriate for the class as a whole as the grounds raised by Plaintiffs apply generally to the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) &(b)(2); see also Orr v. Shicker, 953 F.3d 490, 497 (7th Cir. 2020) (“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 requires a plaintiff seeking class certification to satisfy all four requirements of Rule 23(a)—numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation—and any one of the general categories of Rule 23(b).”).
As to numerosity, “[a] class can be certified without determination of its size, so long as it’s reasonable to believe it large enough to make joinder impracticable and thus justify a class action suit,” and “[w]hile there is no magic number that applies to every case, a forty–member class is often regarded as sufficient to meet the numerosity requirement.” Orr, 953 F.3d at 497–98 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Plaintiffs have already identified 36 class members and reasonably anticipate there will be many more. Defendant does not contest this. The Court concludes that the numerosity requirement is met.
As to commonality, “Plaintiffs’ claims ‘must depend upon a common contention. . . of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution—which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.’” Id. at 498 (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011)). The class seeks a common determination—whether they are being subjected to an unconstitutional statute. The same questions of law and fact apply across class members and the resolution of that issue is central to the claims of all class members. Defendant does not contest this. The Court concludes that the commonality requirement is met.
As to typicality, “Plaintiffs must show that the ‘claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.’” Id. at 500 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3)). As Plaintiffs state, “[e]ach named Plaintiff has a place to live that would meet IDOC approval but for the One-Per-Address Statute,” they are or risk being “imprisoned beyond the completion of their court-ordered term of incarceration unless and until they find housing that satisfies this rule,” and “the application of the challenged Statute keeps them in prison in violation of the Eighth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause.” (Dkt. 24-2 at 7). These claims are typical of the class as a whole. Though the specific facts for each individual may differ, e.g., where they plan to reside or how long they have been incarcerated, the claims all share these key similarities. There is “enough congruence” between the claims of the named Plaintiffs and the class to justify allowing the named plaintiffs to litigate on the class’s behalf. Orr, 953 F.3d at 500 (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendant does not contest this. The Court concludes that the typicality requirement is met.
2

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 31 Filed: 07/01/20 Page 3 of 3 PageID #:259
As to adequacy, Plaintiffs must show that “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). “A class representative must be part of the class and must possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as the other class members.” Orr, 953 F.3d at 499 (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs set forth 36 named Plaintiffs as representatives.1 As noted above, the named Plaintiffs have suffered the same alleged injury as the class. And, as the Plaintiffs raise, they have a strong personal stake in diligently pursuing this litigation. Even if they are released from incarceration, they may still face reincarceration as a result of the statute, and so their personal stake continues to remain strong. Defendant does not contest this. The Court concludes that the named Plaintiffs will adequately represent the interests of the class.
The adequacy inquiry has two parts: “(1) the adequacy of the named plaintiffs as representatives of the proposed class’s myriad members, with their differing and separate interests, and (2) the adequacy of the proposed class counsel.” Gomez v. St. Vincent Health, Inc., 649 F.3d 583, 592 (7th Cir. 2011). For the reasons set forth by Plaintiffs in their motion, which are uncontested by the Defendant, the Court concludes that Adele D. Nicholas and Mark G. Weinberg are qualified under Rule 23(g) to serve as class counsel and will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class. The Court notes in particular that counsel was appointed to represent the class in a related case and did so with diligence. See Murphy v. Raoul, 380 F. Supp. 3d 731 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (counsel successfully advocated on behalf of plaintiffs with related claims). Counsel has the necessary skill, experience, knowledge, and resources to represent the class, and has already done substantial work to develop the claims at issue. Defendant does not contest this. The Court concludes that counsel will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ Amended Motion for Class Certification and for Appointment of Class Counsel.

Date: July 1, 2020

____________________________________ Virginia M. Kendall United States District Judge

1 They are: Columbo Galindo, Andra Sampson, DeJuan Wright, Jerrand Miller, John Margarella, Kenneth Green, David Easton, Paul D. Hubbard, Juan Medina, Adam Escamilla, Aishef Shaffer, Edward Bartgen, Reginald Harris, Johnny Harris, Lavonne Givens, Lashaun Dean, Justin Fluckert, Dontae Boykin, Ronald Garrison, Joshua Huddleston, Manuel Aleman, Arnold Lloyd, Melvin Kelley, Andre Dunn, Alvin Goldberg, Marcus Barnes, Luis Aponte, Kevin Manson, Fredrick Chamblis, Corey Crowe, Dana Monson, Joshua Atkins, Kenneth Schroeder, Wade Council, Christopher Shelton, and Mark Faller.
3

 
 Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 32 Filed: 07/01/20 Page 1 of 35 PageID #:260

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

MARCUS BARNES, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
ROB JEFFREYS, Defendant.

)

)

No. 20 C 2137

)

)

)

Judge Kendall

)

)

)

)

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 32 Filed: 07/01/20 Page 2 of 35 PageID #:261
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ........................................................................................................... 1
Material Facts ........................................................................................................ 3
I. The Murphy Litigation................................................................................. 3
II. The Challenged Statute ............................................................................... 6
III. There Is No Evidence in the Record that The One-Per-Address Statute Serves Government Interests......................................................... 7
IV. The One-Per-Address Statute Results in the Imprisonment of Class Members Who Could Otherwise Reside in Safe, Rehabilitative Housing While on MSR ................................................................................ 8
A. New Day Apartments Has Valid Host Sites Available for Class Members................................................................................................. 8
B. Wayside Cross Ministries Has Valid Host Sites Available for Class Members....................................................................................... 11
C. Pastor James Cockrell Has Valid Host Sites Available for Class Members................................................................................................. 12
D. New Beginnings Has Valid Host Sites Available for Class Members................................................................................................. 14
E. Jordan’s Dream Has Valid Host Sites Available for Class Members................................................................................................. 15
F. Placements with Families Are Put Off Limits by the OnePer-Address Statute .............................................................................. 16
G. Class Members Are Prohibited from Sharing Living Expenses Because of the One-Per-Address Statute ............................................. 17
H. Class Members Are At Risk of Revocation and Reimprisonment Because of the One-Per-Address Statute ............................................. 17
Argument ............................................................................................................... 19
I. Summary Judgment Standard .................................................................... 19
ii

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 32 Filed: 07/01/20 Page 3 of 35 PageID #:262
II. The One-Per-Address Statute Violates the Substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ........................................................ 19 A. There is a Fundamental Right to Freedom from Bodily Restraint .... 20 B. The One-Per-Address Statute Is Not Narrowly Tailored to Meet a Compelling Government Interest ...................................................... 21
III. The One-Per-Address Statute Violates the Eighth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause ............................ 24 A. The One-Per-Address Statute Violates the Eighth Amendment ........ 25 B. The One-Per-Address Statute Violates the Equal Protection Clause..................................................................................................... 29 1. The Statute Discriminates Based on Wealth ................................ 30 2. The Wealth-Based Distinction Does Not Serve a Compelling Government Interest ...................................................................... 31
Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 31
iii

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 32 Filed: 07/01/20 Page 4 of 35 PageID #:263
Plaintiffs, through counsel, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, respectfully move this Court for entry of summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs and the class they represent and against Defendant Rob Jeffreys, Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections, on Plaintiffs’ claim that 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6) violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments on its face and as applied to them.
INTRODUCTION There are currently at least 1,200 people imprisoned in the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) who have completed their court-ordered sentences of incarceration and are entitled to release to a community setting on mandatory supervised release (“MSR”). These individuals remain in prison because they are unable to secure an approved “host site” at which to live while on MSR.1 One of the principal barriers to these individuals’ finding host sites is 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6), a section of the Illinois Uniform Code of Corrections which prohibits an individual on MSR for a sex offense from living “at the same address or in the same condominium unit or apartment unit or in the same condominium complex or apartment complex with another person he or she knows or reasonably should know
1 The precise number of individuals currently imprisoned in IDOC due to a lack of housing is not currently known. A report published by the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority estimates the number to be between 1,200 and 1,400 people. See Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, Sex Offenses & Sex Offender Registration Task Force Final Report (Jan. 2017) at 6 (“On average, the Illinois Department of Corrections houses 1,200 to 1,400 offenders who may not be released from custody because they are unable to secure permanent, stable housing meeting Illinois statute requirements or agency policy.”) (citing the Illinois Department of Corrections’ Research and Planning Unit).

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 32 Filed: 07/01/20 Page 5 of 35 PageID #:264
is a convicted sex offender or has been placed on supervision for a sex offense.” (hereinafter the “One-Per-Address Statute” or “the Statute”).
But for the One-Per-Address Statute, members of the class who remain in prison beyond the completion of their sentences could be released to safe, affordable housing that would foster their reintegration into the community and support their success on MSR. The Statute puts off limits every halfway house and shelter in the State, including the only provider (Wayside Cross Ministries) that is willing to house indigent persons on MSR for sex offenses at no cost to the releasee or the IDOC. Moreover, because of the One-Per-Address Statute, members of the class who have been released from IDOC to approved host sites in the community are at constant risk of being revoked and re-imprisoned if another individual with a sex offense conviction moves into the same building or apartment complex.
Meanwhile, there is not a shred of evidence in the record that the One-PerAddress Statute serves any legitimate government interest. Indeed, when this Court granted an injunction prohibiting enforcement of the One-Per-Address Statute as to Plaintiff Marcus Barnes, this Court noted the lack of evidentiary support for the Statute, writing as follows:
In response to the question about what penological or rehabilitative support the Defendants have for the “One Person One Address” provision, Defendants were unable to give any. The public’s interest in only hav[ing] one sex offender live at one residence is not supported by any testimony, expert opinion, or evidence. Therefore, the Court finds that the statute is unconstitutional as it applies to Plaintiff and Defendants are enjoined from prohibiting his release to the address presented by Plaintiff. ECF No. 11.
2

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 32 Filed: 07/01/20 Page 6 of 35 PageID #:265
For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on their claims that the One-Per-Address Statute violates their rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
MATERIAL FACTS I. The Murphy Litigation
The plaintiffs in Murphy v. Raoul, 16-cv-11471, challenged the constitutionality of the “host site” requirement as it was being applied to individuals who have been sentenced to an indeterminate term of “three years to life” on MSR. Such individuals face the possibility of being imprisoned for life if they are unable to find and/or pay for housing that meets the requirements imposed by Illinois law and IDOC policy because their MSR time never begins to run until they are released from prison to an approved host site. See 730 ILCS 5/3-14-2.5(e).
The Murphy plaintiffs identified several layers of restrictions that limit where people who have been convicted of sex offenses can live while on MSR, which together make it impossible for the members of the class to find host sites. Among the restrictions are the following:
• Sections of the Illinois Criminal Code which make it a crime for any individual classified as a “child sex offender” to live within 500 feet of a school, playground, or daycare (720 ILCS 5/11-9.3 (b-5), (b-10));
• Sections of the Illinois Unified Code of Corrections which prohibit persons required to register as sex offenders from living “near” “parks, schools, day care centers, swimming pools, beaches, theaters, or any other places where minor children congregate without advance approval of an agent of the Department of Corrections” (730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(b-1)(12));
• The One-Per-Address Statute, which requires individuals on MSR for sex offenses to “refrain from residing at the same address or in the same
3

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 32 Filed: 07/01/20 Page 7 of 35 PageID #:266
condominium unit or apartment unit or in the same condominium complex or apartment complex with another person he or she knows or reasonably should know is a convicted sex offender” unless residing at a “licensed transitional housing facility for sex offenders,” a facility “operated or licensed by the Department of Children and Family Services or by the Department of Human Services,” or a “licensed medical facility” (730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6));
• Housing restrictions imposed as a matter of IDOC policy, including prohibiting living in a host site where children visit or reside (including the parolee’s own children), where there are computers or Wi-Fi access, and/or where there is no land-line telephone;
• The unavailability of licensed half-way houses, transitional housing, homeless shelters or other free or low-cost housing for indigent parolees; and
• The IDOC’s interpretation of the One-Per-Address Statute as prohibiting a sex offender parolee from living in a building adjacent to a building where another registrant lives and/or from living in the same trailer park as another registrant.2
On April 5, 2018, Murphy was certified as a class action on behalf of “all
individuals sentenced to serve three-years-to-life on MSR currently detained in the
IDOC who have been approved for release on MSR by the PRB but have been
denied release from IDOC custody because of their inability to obtain an approved
host site.” Murphy v. Raoul, 16-cv-11471, ECF No. 63.
On March 31, 2019, this Court granted the Murphy plaintiffs’ motion for
summary judgement on their claim that the State’s statutory and regulatory
scheme violates the Equal Protection Clause and the Eighth Amendment. Murphy
v. Raoul, 16-cv-11471, ECF No. 132; Murphy v. Raoul, 380 F. Supp. 3d 731 (N.D. Ill.
2019). The Court’s summary judgment decision did not single out a particular
2 These restrictions were discussed at length in this Court’s summary judgment decision in Murphy v. Raoul, 380 F. Supp. 3d 731, 738–743 (N.D. Ill. 2019). Because this Court has already thoroughly analyzed the facts relevant to Murphy, Plaintiffs have not included these facts in their L.R. 56.1 Statement of Facts in support of this motion.
4

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 32 Filed: 07/01/20 Page 8 of 35 PageID #:267
Illinois law or IDOC policy that violated the constitution. Rather, the Court held that the State’s “statutory and regulatory scheme” as a whole (i.e., the overlapping restrictions imposed by Illinois law, the IDOC’s interpretation of the law, and the IDOC’s policies) violates the Murphy class’s constitutional rights.
On January 15, 2020, the Court entered a permanent injunction requiring the IDOC to put forth a plan “setting forth the specific steps [the Defendants] will take to ensure that by no later than January 2, 2021, no member of the class will remain imprisoned due to an inability to comply with the host site requirement.” Murphy v. Raoul, 16-cv-11471, ECF No. 156. The IDOC filed its compliance plan on February 27, 2020. 16-cv-11471, ECF No. 161. The permanent injunction also calls for the IDOC to provide the Court with periodic status reports concerning its implementation of the compliance plan and its progress towards meeting the January 2, 2021 compliance deadline. 16-cv-11471, ECF No. 156.
The IDOC has taken several steps to ease the difficulty Murphy class members have with finding housing, including changes to IDOC interpretation of statutory restrictions (e.g., not applying the One-Per-Address Statute to trailer parks and adjacent buildings); changes to restrictive IDOC policies (e.g., allowing individuals to reside at addresses with Wi-Fi, relaxation of the land-line requirement); and contracting with private vendors to provide transitional housing. Murphy v. Raoul, 16-cv-11471, ECF No. 161.
Notwithstanding these efforts, the IDOC’s first compliance report (filed on June 15, 2020), states that the Murphy class currently comprises 327 individuals who
5

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 32 Filed: 07/01/20 Page 9 of 35 PageID #:268
remain in prison beyond the completion of their court-ordered sentence of imprisonment due to an inability to meet the host site requirement, up from 290 at the time the permanent injunction was entered. Murphy v. Raoul, 16-cv-11471, ECF Nos. 156, 172. II. The Challenged Statute
The One-Per-Address Statute is set forth in the Illinois Uniform Code of Corrections at 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6). The sole mechanism through which the One-Per-Address Statue is enforced is through the IDOC’s approval or rejection of parolees’ proposed host sites. That is, it is not a criminal offense for an individual on MSR for a sex offense to live at the same address as another registrant, and local police departments and states attorneys play no role in enforcement of the statute.3
The One-Per-Address Statute is a major cause, if not the single largest cause, of the continued imprisonment of members of the Murphy class and other individuals who have been convicted of sex offenses. This is so because other statutes (e.g., the 500-foot rules) already strictly circumscribe the areas where individuals convicted of sex offenses may live, and the One-Per-Address Statute makes it so only one parolee can live at each compliant property, even if it is a large apartment complex with many units.
3 In contrast, the statutes prohibiting individuals classified as “child sex offenders” from living within 500 feet of schools, daycares and playgrounds (720 ILCS 5/11-9.3 (b-5) and (b10)) are part of the criminal code. It is a Class 4 felony for a “child sex offender” to “knowingly” live at a prohibited location. 720 ILCS 5/11-9.3(f).
6

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 32 Filed: 07/01/20 Page 10 of 35 PageID #:269
III. There Is No Evidence in the Record that The One-Per-Address Statute Serves Government Interests
In the Murphy litigation, the IDOC did not come forth with any safety or rehabilitative justification for the One-Per-Address Statute. In his deposition in Murphy, the IDOC’s Deputy Chief of Parole, Dion Dixon, was asked what the reason was for the Department’s application of the One-Per-Address Statute to trailer parks. SOF at ¶1.4 He did not reference any safety or rehabilitative purpose. Rather, he simply stated that the state police had interpreted the Statute to apply to trailer parks and IDOC followed suit. Id. In acknowledgement of the restriction’s excessiveness, IDOC has already reinterpreted the restriction so as not to apply to trailer parks or adjacent apartment buildings. Murphy v. Raoul, 16-cv-11471, ECF No. 161.
Not only is there no evidence in the record supporting the One-Per-Address Statute, there is no logical reason to conclude that allowing people who have been convicted of sex offenses to live near one another contributes to criminality. At least one analysis found that it has the opposite effect: it reduces the incidence of reoffense and improves supervision. SOF at ¶2. A Minnesota Department of Corrections report concluded as follows:
This examination of level three re-offenders does not reveal a negative effect related to a level three offender living with another sex offender. In fact, supervision agents … have noted benefits from having more than one level three offender living in one location. Closer supervision is possible because travel time between offenders is reduced. Also, level three offenders who
4 References to factual statements in this brief are to the numbered paragraphs of Plaintiffs’ L.R. 56.1 Statement of Facts (“SOF”). The paragraphs of the Statement of Facts are supported by reference to declarations, deposition testimony and other evidence in the record.
7

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 32 Filed: 07/01/20 Page 11 of 35 PageID #:270
live with other level three offenders experience more visits from a supervising agent because agents for both offenders visit the same property. Finally, offenders tend to inform on each other when supervision restrictions are violated or crimes are committed. Id. Similarly, Bob McKelvey, the founder and manager of NewDay Apartments, which specializes in providing housing to registrants, testified that in his experience “housing registrants at the same address allows for more effective (and costeffective) law enforcement oversight” and “also allows registrants to police one another and share resources to better support themselves, which ultimately helps them focus on the future and reduces recidivism.” SOF at ¶7. IV. The One-Per-Address Statute Results in the Imprisonment of Class
Members Who Could Otherwise Reside in Safe, Rehabilitative Housing While on MSR A. New Day Apartments Has Valid Host Sites Available for Class
Members NewDay Apartments, located in Lake County, Illinois, has partnered with the IDOC to provide housing to individuals with sex offense convictions being released from prison onto MSR. SOF at ¶3. NewDay specializes in providing compliant housing to registrants. Id. It currently owns eight properties, all of which comply with the prohibition on residence within 500 feet of schools, playgrounds and daycares. Id. at ¶4. NewDay currently leases four of these properties to IDOC for the purpose of housing indigent members of the Murphy class who cannot otherwise secure housing. Id.
8

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 32 Filed: 07/01/20 Page 12 of 35 PageID #:271
Placement at the units IDOC leases from NewDay is intended to give individuals who do not have the means to secure a host site an opportunity to get out of prison and begin their MSR time in the community. Murphy class members released to NewDay are given three to four months rent-free to give them an opportunity to find work, obtain government benefits to which they are entitled, and to secure housing of their own. See Murphy v. Raoul, 16-cv-11471, ECF No. 161 at 2.
Under the One-Per-Address Statute, NewDay is limited to housing four registrant-parolees in these four units. Pursuant to the Court’s May 13, 2020, Order granting preliminary injunctive relief (ECF No. 22), three additional registrants were permitted to move into these units.5 SOF at ¶5.
In addition to the units NewDay Apartments leases to IDOC, NewDay also owns several other multi-unit properties that it privately rents to registrants. SOF at ¶6. Because of the One-Per-Address Statute, these properties are currently only available to registrants who are off MSR. Id. But for the One-Per-Address Statute, NewDay would be willing to lease to individuals on MSR the apartments it currently makes available only to individuals who are off MSR. Id.
Plaintiff Alvin Goldberg is a prisoner at Taylorville Correctional Center. With “good time” credits, Goldberg completed his prison term on November 11, 2018, and has been entitled to release from prison on MSR since that date, but he remains imprisoned because he has been unable to secure compliant housing. SOF at ¶8.
5 The seven class members currently residing at NewDay are Stan Meyer, J.D. Lindenmeier, Jerry Davis, Clay Trench, DeJuan Wright, John Margarella, and Jerrand Miller.
9

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 32 Filed: 07/01/20 Page 13 of 35 PageID #:272
Because of his inability to find housing, Goldberg, who is 81 years old, has spent more than 18 months of “dead time” in prison. Id. at ¶9. Plaintiff Goldberg and his family are able to privately pay for an apartment through NewDay Apartments. Goldberg is on the waiting list to rent a unit from NewDay, subject to his being able to obtain “a court order allowing NewDay to house Alvin with other registrants who live in other units at the same address.” Id. at ¶10. Pursuant to this Court’s May 13, 2020, Order (ECF No. 22), Plaintiff Goldberg has been approved for release to NewDay when a unit becomes available and can reside at NewDay pending further order of the Court.
NewDay is expanding despite the current pandemic. SOF ¶11. It plans to double the number of registrant units available year-over-year for at least the next three years. Id. The long term goal of NewDay is to become the No. 1 provider of safe, affordable registrant housing in the United States. Id. According to Bob McKelvey, the founder of NewDay, permitting multiple registrant-parolees at the same address would easily double the number of units NewDay can offer compared to what is possible under current law, and would make the housing NewDay provides more affordable for registrant-tenants. Id. at ¶12. While NewDay’s housing obviously helps registrants, McKelvey describes its primary purpose as keeping “communities safe by housing registrants responsibly.” To-date, NewDay has a 0 percent recidivism rate among its registrant tenants. Id.
10

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 32 Filed: 07/01/20 Page 14 of 35 PageID #:273
B. Wayside Cross Ministries Has Valid Host Sites Available for Class Members
Wayside Cross Ministries is a Bible-based residential program that has operated in Aurora, Illinois, for more than 90 years. SOF at ¶13. The Master’s Touch Ministry is a life-transformation program for men with various destructive behaviors not limited to drug and alcohol addiction. Id. The program offers room and board at no cost, and empowers its participants to change their lives through the Gospel of Christ, prayer, Bible study, daily chapel services, mentoring with local church and business leaders, and work rehabilitation programs. Id. at ¶14. It takes a minimum of seven months for a resident to complete the Master’s Touch Ministry program. Id. at ¶15. The end goal of the program is to give the men the tools they need to live healthy, law abiding lives through their faith. Id.
The Master’s Touch Ministry is a highly structured program with a strict code of conduct, which includes adherence to a curfew, attendance at scheduled Bible study and church services, no use of drugs or alcohol, refraining from the use of profane or abusive language, listening only to music that glorifies God, and only using technology in a manner that conforms to God’s high standards. Id. at ¶16. Successful completion of the program hinges on successful random drug and alcohol tests, active participation in programming, as well as adherence to all the rules of Master’s Touch. Id.
The participants in the Master’s Touch Ministry all reside together in a dormitory setting at Wayside Cross, located at 215 E. New York Street in Aurora. Id. at ¶17. Due to the One-Per-Address Statute, Wayside Cross Ministries was
11

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 32 Filed: 07/01/20 Page 15 of 35 PageID #:274
prohibited from accepting individuals who were on MSR. However, pursuant to the May 13, 2020, and June 3, 2020, Orders entered by the Court on Plaintiffs’ motions for preliminary injunctive relief (ECF Nos. 22 and 29), Wayside Cross currently has 13 residents in the Master’s Touch Ministry who are on parole from the Illinois Department of Corrections.6 Id. at ¶18. Wayside Cross provides room and board to these individuals at no cost to them or to the IDOC. Each of these individuals has successfully registered with the Aurora Police Department. Id.
The Master’s Touch Ministry is currently near its capacity for program participants. Id. at ¶19. But in the future, when space in the building and in the program permits, Wayside Cross is willing to accept other individuals on mandatory supervised release from the Illinois Department of Corrections who meet the program criteria.7 Id.
C. Pastor James Cockrell Has Valid Host Sites Available for Class Members
James Cockrell is a pastor with Abundant Faith Ministries in Springfield, Illinois. SOF at ¶20. He regularly ministers to individuals imprisoned in the Illinois Department of Corrections, and in particular individuals who have been convicted of sex offenses. Id. Mr. Cockrell has assisted individuals with community re-entry
6 These residents are Dana Monson, Corey Crowe, Fredrick Chamblis, Ashief Shaffer, Kenneth Green, David Easton, Joshua Atkins, Kenneth Schroeder, Christopher Shelton, Reginald Harris, Adam Escamilla and John Berry. Plaintiff Mark Faller was released to Wayside Cross Ministries, but was not permitted to continue in the program after a verbal altercation with staff. 7 Because of its proximity to McCarty Park, Wayside Cross cannot accept into its program individuals who are classified as “child sex offenders,” but it can accept individuals whose offenses involved an adult victim. SOF at ¶17.
12

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 32 Filed: 07/01/20 Page 16 of 35 PageID #:275
after imprisonment through Freedom House, a transitional housing facility operated by Abundant Faith Ministries.
Mr. Cockrell owns and oversees a house located at 1611 E. Matheny Avenue, Springfield, Illinois 62702, at which he plans to provide housing and supportive services to individuals being released from the Illinois Department of Corrections, including individuals who have been convicted of sex offenses. Id. at ¶21. Mr. Cockrell’s program at 1611 E. Matheny offers individuals one month rent-free, during which time he assists the individual with finding employment. Id. at ¶22. Through his work with Freedom House, he has a relationship with an employer near Springfield that is willing to hire individuals with sex offense convictions and will provide residents a shuttle to and from this job. Id. at ¶23. Once someone is working, Mr. Cockrell will charge $300/month for continued residence at 1611 E. Matheny, or in the alternative, will assist the resident with finding his own housing. Id. at ¶24.
Mr. Cockrell currently has three openings and is prepared to accept three individuals who are on mandatory supervised release if the Department of Corrections will approve them for release. Id. at ¶25. Mr. Cockrell has a personal relationship with class member Henry Smith (IDOC No. R12201), who is imprisoned in Jacksonville Correctional Center. He is prepared to accept Mr. Smith to reside at 1611 E. Matheny Avenue immediately. Id. at ¶26.
13

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 32 Filed: 07/01/20 Page 17 of 35 PageID #:276
D. New Beginnings Has Valid Host Sites Available for Class Members New Beginnings Recovery Homes Inc. is a Chicago-based not-for-profit corporation that has been in operation since 1993. SOF at ¶27. New Beginnings provides affordable shared transitional housing and case management services to people transitioning from prison to the community, especially individuals who are experiencing housing insecurity, lacking gainful employment and food as well as individuals who are in recovery from drug or alcohol abuse. Id. at ¶28. New Beginnings leases five buildings on the south side of Chicago at which it provides dormitory style or semi-private shared living accommodations. Id. at ¶29. Residents at New Beginnings’ buildings receive meals and have access to services including peer support groups, counseling with licensed providers and case management. Id. New Beginnings’ properties are compliant with the housing restrictions that prohibit people who have been convicted of sex offenses from living within 500 feet of schools, daycares or playgrounds. Id. at ¶30. Each building has 24-hour a day security and structured supervision for residents. Id. at ¶31. New Beginnings’ goal is to help residents become positive, productive citizens. Id. New Beginnings has significant experience with housing sex offenders who are being released from prison and assisting with their successful transition back into the community. Id. Program participants must abide by the rules of New Beginnings’ program, including adherence to a curfew, no use of drugs or alcohol, and no minors or women on the premises. Id. at ¶32.
14

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 32 Filed: 07/01/20 Page 18 of 35 PageID #:277
Pursuant to this Court’s June 3, 2020, order on Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunctive relief (ECF No. 29), New Beginnings is currently housing 12 class members.8 These parolees are adjusting well to being on MSR in the community, and New Beginnings is assisting them with obtaining identification, searching for jobs, and compliance with the terms of their supervision. Id. at ¶33. If the restriction on housing more than one sex offender at the same address is eliminated, New Beginnings is willing and able to house additional parolees, space permitting. Id. at ¶34.
E. Jordan’s Dream Has Valid Host Sites Available for Class Members Plaintiff Marcus Barnes was convicted in 2008 of criminal sexual assault and sentenced to serve 12 years in IDOC plus an indeterminate term of “three years to life” on MSR. With good time credits, Barnes completed his prison sentence on December 17, 2018, and was approved for release on MSR. Barnes’ family identified 11 different potential host sites, all of which IDOC rejected for various reasons, including proximity to daycares and schools. SOF at ¶35. Because of his inability to secure compliant housing, Barnes spent more than 18 months of “dead time” in prison. Id. In February 2020, Barnes’ family found him a place to stay on the 5700 block of South Sangamon in Chicago. Id. at ¶36. The building is owned and operated by an organization called Jordan’s Dream, which provides transitional housing and supportive services (such as help with locating
8 The class members currently residing at New Beginnings are Kevin Manson, Joshua Huddleston, Columbo Galindo, Lavonne Givens, Justin Fluckert, Dontae Boykin, Ronald Garrison, Johnny Harris, Arnold Lloyd, Melvin Kelley, Andre Dunn, and Michael Johnstone. See SOF at ¶¶70-79.
15

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 32 Filed: 07/01/20 Page 19 of 35 PageID #:278
employment, religious services, and connections to mental health providers) to individuals who have been convicted of sex offenses. Id.
IDOC investigated the address and confirmed that it complies with the statutory restrictions on proximity within 500 feet of schools, playgrounds, daycares and other places where children congregate. Id. at ¶37. However, IDOC rejected the host site pursuant to the One-Per-Address Statute because another registrant resided there. Id. Pursuant to this Court’s April 8, 2020, Order (ECF No. 11), Plaintiff Barnes was released to Jordan’s Dream on April 14, 2020, and can reside there pending further order of the court.
F. Placements with Families Are Put Off Limits by the One-PerAddress Statute
Plaintiff Thomas Smith is an individual who is currently imprisoned in IDOC and is seeking a host site at which to reside while on “three-to-life” MSR. SOF at ¶38. Plaintiff Smith’s mother Tammy and step-father Jerry would like to have Thomas live with them at their home in Pocahontas, Illinois, while he is on MSR. SOF at ¶39. Plaintiff Smith’s parents have a three-bedroom home and can give Thomas his own bedroom and bathroom. The home is in a rural area, and it is not within 500 feet of any schools, playgrounds, or daycares. Id.
Plaintiff Smith submitted his parents’ home as a proposed host site. SOF at ¶40. IDOC rejected the host site because his stepfather was convicted of a sex offense 34 years ago (in 1986), and the One-Per-Address Statute prohibits Thomas from residing at the same address as another person who has been convicted of a sex
16

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 32 Filed: 07/01/20 Page 20 of 35 PageID #:279
offense—no matter how long ago. Id. The only barrier to Plaintiff Smith’s being allowed to serve his MSR time at his parents’ home is the One-Per-Address Statute.
G. Class Members Are Prohibited from Sharing Living Expenses Because of the One-Per-Address Statute
Class members of limited means who have been released from IDOC custody would like to reside together and share living expenses, but they are currently prohibited from doing so pursuant to the One-Per-Address Statute. In particular, Plaintiffs J.D. Lindenmeier and Stan Meyer are currently residing in units IDOC leases from NewDay apartments. SOF at ¶41. Mr. Meyer and Mr. Lindenmeier are currently seeking work. SOF at ¶42. Once they both have jobs and the means to support themselves, they would like to rent an apartment together to share living expenses such as rent and utilities. Id. Many one bedroom apartments in North Chicago and Waukegan rent for approximately $750 to $850 per month, which is difficult for an individual earning minimum wage to afford on his own. Id. at ¶43. However, two-bedroom apartments in the area often rent for approximately $900 to $1,100 per month, which is more affordable when split between two people. Id. at ¶44.
H. Class Members Are At Risk of Revocation and Reimprisonment Because of the One-Per-Address Statute
Plaintiff Luis Aponte was released from IDOC onto MSR in January 2020 to his father’s home in Waukegan, Illinois. SOF at ¶45. The host site is in a four-story apartment building that contains approximately 12 separate units. Id. When Aponte was released, no other registrant lived in the building. SOF at ¶46. IDOC
17

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 32 Filed: 07/01/20 Page 21 of 35 PageID #:280
determined that the address complies with the prohibition on residing within 500 feet of a school, playground or daycare, and approved Aponte to live there while on MSR. Id. Aponte is doing well on MSR. He has full-time employment in a warehouse and has been attending required sex offender therapy regularly. Id. at ¶47.
In March 2020, another registrant (not on MSR) moved into a different unit in the same building where Aponte resides with his father. Id. at ¶48. Aponte received notice from his parole agent that he had to find somewhere else to live or he would be sent back to prison because the One-Per-Address Statute prohibits him from living in the same apartment building as another registrant. Id. Aponte was not able to find another host site that met IDOC approval that he could afford and wanted to keep residing with his father. Id. at ¶49.
Pursuant to preliminary injunctive relief granted by the Court on June 3, 2020, (ECF No. 29), Aponte has been able to remain in his father’s home pending further order of the Court. If the One-Per-Address Statute is enforced against Aponte, he will have his MSR revoked and be sent back to prison, resulting in loss of his job, halting the progress he has made on MSR so far, and forcing him to serve dead time until he can secure a new place to live. Id.
Plaintiff Kevin Manson was released from IDOC onto MSR on May 6, 2020, to a host site in Chicago Heights, Illinois, with his aunt. Id. at ¶50. IDOC approved Manson for release to his aunt’s home, but the approval was given in error. When Manson tried to register with Chicago Heights police after his release, he was
18

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 32 Filed: 07/01/20 Page 22 of 35 PageID #:281
informed that his aunt’s house is too close to a school. Id. at ¶51. Chicago Heights police told him that he must move. Id. Manson did not have funds to pay for housing of his own. The Cook County Justice Advisory Council (“CCJAC”), a governmental entity that provides reentry assistance to citizens returning to Cook County after imprisonment, was willing to pay for Manson’s housing and secured a place for him at New Beginnings. Id. at ¶52.
Pursuant to preliminary injunctive relief granted by the Court (ECF No. 29), Manson has been permitted to reside at New Beginnings pending further order of the Court. If the One-Per-Address Statute is enforced against Manson, he will have his MSR revoked and be sent back to prison because he cannot secure housing that complies with the rule.
ARGUMENT I. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Reed v. Columbia St. Mary’s Hosp., 915 F.3d 473, 485 (7th Cir. 2019). II. The One-Per-Address Statute Violates the Substantive Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment For a government policy that infringes on “fundamental rights and liberties” to survive scrutiny under the substantive due process clause, the government must show that the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (“the Fourteenth
19

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 32 Filed: 07/01/20 Page 23 of 35 PageID #:282
Amendment ‘forbids the government to infringe . . . fundamental liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.’”) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U. S. 292, 302 (1993)).
Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment on their substantive due process claim because, as set forth below, the One-Per-Address Statute interferes with the fundamental liberty interest in freedom from bodily restraint and is not narrowly tailored to serve state interests in public safety or rehabilitation.
A. There is a Fundamental Right to Freedom from Bodily Restraint The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that “freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the due process clause] protects.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (“Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action.”); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003) (the constitution “permits detention only where ‘heightened, substantive due process scrutiny’ finds a ‘sufficiently compelling’ governmental need.”) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987)); Reno, 507 U.S. at 316 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The institutionalization of an adult by the government triggers heightened, substantive due process scrutiny.”) The fact that Plaintiffs have a term of MSR after their sentence of imprisonment does not negate their liberty interest in release into the community. In Murphy, this
20

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 32 Filed: 07/01/20 Page 24 of 35 PageID #:283
Court recognized that individuals in IDOC custody have a protectable “liberty interest” in release from prison onto MSR once the Prisoner Review Board has approved them for release. Murphy v. Raoul, 380 F. Supp. 3d 731, 760 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (concluding that “the language and structure of the supervised release system in Illinois creates an expectancy of release, which would entitle releasees to conditional liberty” once the PRB “granted the plaintiffs their release.”); see also Murdock v. Walker, No. 08 C 1142, 2014 WL 916992, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 10, 2014) (After the PRB approved prisoners for release “that approval [becomes] a form of statutory liberty...”). Similarly, Courts have recognized that “a person serving a sentence of probation or parole in the community has a limited liberty interest in his freedom that cannot be curtailed without the procedural protections of notice and hearing.” Werner v. Wall, 836 F.3d 751, 760 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)).
B. The One-Per-Address Statute Is Not Narrowly Tailored to Meet a Compelling Government Interest
Narrow tailoring requires the government entity that seeks to restrict a person’s liberty to make a showing that its justification for the detention is compelling and that the government interest served by the detention cannot be met without detention. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 557 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“In sum, due process requires a special justification for physical detention that outweighs the individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint as well as adequate procedural protections. There must be a sufficiently compelling governmental interest to justify such an action, usually a punitive
21

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 32 Filed: 07/01/20 Page 25 of 35 PageID #:284
interest in imprisoning the convicted criminal or a regulatory interest in
forestalling danger to the community.”) (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690–691;
Flores, 507 U.S. at 316 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
On the record before this Court, Defendant cannot meet his burden to show that
enforcement of the One-Per-Address Statute is an appropriately tailored means of
achieving any government objective. This is so for at least seven reasons.
1. The Department has not put forth any evidence (or even argument) that there’s a public safety or rehabilitative justification for the One-Per-Address Statute. Over the course of the Murphy litigation, which has been ongoing for four years and generated hundreds of pages of summary judgment briefing, the IDOC never put forth a public safety or rehabilitative justification for the One-Per-Address Statute. Similarly, in litigation of the three motions for preliminary injunctive relief in this case, the only justification the Department has offered for the One-Per-Address Statute is that IDOC has an obligation to enforce the statutes that the legislature has written;
2. In his deposition in Murphy, when Deputy Chief Dixon was asked what the reason was for the Department’s application of the One-Per-Address Statute to individuals who seek to reside in trailer parks, he did not reference any safety or rehabilitative purpose. Rather, he simply stated that the state police had interpreted the Statute to apply to trailer parks and IDOC followed suit. SOF at ¶1;
3. There is evidence that allowing releasees to reside together reduces the incidence of re-offense and improves supervision. A Minnesota Department of Corrections report concluded that when releasees reside together, “closer supervision is possible because travel time between offenders is reduced,” and releasees “experience more visits from a supervising agent because agents for both offenders visit the same property.” The report also noted that offenders who reside together “tend to inform on each other when supervision restrictions are violated or crimes are committed.” SOF at ¶2;
Similarly, Bob McKelvey, the founder and manager of NewDay Apartments, testified that in his experience “housing registrants at the same address allows for more effective (and cost-effective) law enforcement oversight” and “also allows registrants to police one another and share resources to better
22

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 32 Filed: 07/01/20 Page 26 of 35 PageID #:285
support themselves, which ultimately helps them focus on the future and reduces recidivism.” SOF at ¶7.
4. The host sites at which Plaintiffs and members of the class seek to live comply with all of the other restrictions imposed by Illinois law and IDOC policy, including the restrictions set forth in 720 ILCS 5/11-9.3 (b-5) and (b10) (prohibiting any individual classified as a “child sex offender” from living within 500 feet of a school, playground, or daycare) and the prohibition on residing at a host site where minor children reside;
5. If the One-Per-Address Statute is eliminated, the IDOC will retain discretion to deny a host site if the reviewing parole agent determines the host site would be unsafe or would not foster the parolee’s rehabilitation. See 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(b-1)(1), (15);
6. Releasees who reside at Wayside Cross, Jordan’s Dream, New Beginnings and New Day Apartments are required to abide by house rules and participate in structured, supervised programming that is designed to insure their compliance with parole conditions, foster their reintegration, and prevent re-offense. See SOF at ¶¶12, 14-16, 31-32, 36;
7. Plaintiffs released to host sites that do not comply with the One-Per-Address Statute will remain subject to all of the other constraints of MSR, including GPS monitoring; employment restrictions; drug testing; polygraph examinations; sex offender therapy; regular reporting to their parole agents; curfews; and any other conditions that the Department deems necessary to ensure safety and limit risk. See 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7 (a) and (b-1)(1)-(18).
In its detention cases, the Supreme Court has stressed the importance of
confining restrictions on liberty to “a sphere of real need,” and has required the
Government to prove “by clear and convincing evidence” that a detention is justified
based on “an identified and articulable threat to an individual or the community.”
Demore, 538 U.S. at 550 (quoting Salerno, 481 U.S., at 748). Defendant has not
shown and cannot show that there is a “real need” to detain in prison those
individuals who wish to reside at otherwise compliant host sites at which other
individuals who have been convicted of sex offenses also reside. Accordingly, the
23

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 32 Filed: 07/01/20 Page 27 of 35 PageID #:286
One-Per-Address Statute does not survive strict scrutiny and should be found unconstitutional under the substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. III. The One-Per-Address Statute Violates the Eighth Amendment and the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause In Murphy v. Raoul, 380 F. Supp. 3d 731 (N.D. Ill. 2019), this Court concluded that it violates the Equal Protection Clause and the Eighth Amendment to subject individuals to indefinite incarceration solely because they cannot meet the host site requirement, holding as follows: At the very heart of the liberty secured by the separation of powers is freedom from indefinite imprisonment by executive decree. The Attorney General and Director’s current application of the host site requirement results in the continued deprivation of the plaintiffs’ fundamental rights and therefore contravenes the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. Id. at 738. In particular, this Court concluded that the continued imprisonment of individuals who do not have the money or outside support to comply with the host site requirement runs afoul of the Eighth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause because their detention is solely “the consequence of [their] indigency, homelessness, and the attendant powerlessness to procure housing that will satisfy the IDOC.” Id. at 756. For the members of the Barnes class who are impoverished and lack outside financial support, the One-Per-Address Statute is an insurmountable roadblock cutting them off from access to free or low cost housing that would enable them to secure their release. Thus, as shown below, the continued enforcement of the
24

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 32 Filed: 07/01/20 Page 28 of 35 PageID #:287
statute violates their rights under the Eighth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause.
A. The One-Per-Address Statute Violates the Eighth Amendment The Eighth Amendment “imposes substantive limits on what can be made criminal and punished as such.” Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667-668 (1977) (internal citations omitted). In particular, the Eighth Amendment forbids the government from imposing criminal penalties that punish “status.” See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968). In Robinson, the Supreme Court struck down a California statute making it illegal to “be addicted to the use of narcotics,” Robinson, 370 U.S. at 660, as constituting cruel and unusual punishment because the statute punished the defendant solely for the status of being an addict and not for any particular conduct. In Powell, a plurality of the Court upheld a Texas statute making it illegal to “be in a state of intoxication in any public place,” Powell, 392 U.S. at 516, despite evidence indicating that the defendant was a chronic alcoholic, on the ground that the statute punished the defendant’s conduct of being intoxicated in public and not his status as an alcoholic. As this Court observed in its summary judgment decision in Murphy, “the relevant distinction lies in applying criminal laws to punish conduct, which is constitutionally proper, and applying criminal laws to punish status, which is constitutionally improper.” 380 F.Supp.3d at 763. In State v. Adams, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals applied Robinson and Powell in circumstances similar to those the Plaintiffs face here. The defendant
25

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 32 Filed: 07/01/20 Page 29 of 35 PageID #:288
in Adams challenged the constitutionality of a statute that required people convicted of sex offenses to provide the Alabama Department of Corrections “the actual address at which he or she will reside or live upon release” and provided that any individual who did not comply with the requirement to identify a residential address would be “remanded to the custody of the sheriff of the county in which the violation occurred.” Adams, 91 So.3d at 734. Adams was indigent and homeless and, as a result, was unable to comply with the statute, leading to his re-incarceration after the completion of his prison sentence. The Adams court determined that the statute violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment because it “punishes the defendant solely for his status of being homeless.” Id. at 739. Relying on Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2006), the Adams court found that “[r]ead together, [Powell and Robinson] stand for the proposition that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment forbids punishing criminally not only a person’s pure status, but also a person’s involuntary conduct that is inseparable from that person’s status.” Id. at 754. The court concluded that imprisoning Adams solely because of his inability to afford housing essentially punished him for his status, writing as follows:
The undisputed evidence ... established that Adams was indigent, that he had no family or friends with whom he could live, and that, despite his efforts, he had not been accepted to any homeless shelter or halfway house ... For Adams, then, the failure to provide an ‘actual address at which [he would] reside or live’ ... was not voluntary conduct merely related to, or derivative from, the status of homelessness, but was entirely involuntary conduct that was inseparable from his status of homelessness.
26

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 32 Filed: 07/01/20 Page 30 of 35 PageID #:289
Id. Applying these precedents in Murphy, this Court observed that because “it is
virtually impossible” for a homeless individual to comply with the host site requirement, the IDOC’s application of the host site requirement to homeless individuals “constitutes cruel and unusual punishment” in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Murphy, 380 F.Supp.3d at 764.
The same result is appropriate here. The One-Per-Address Statute inevitably results in the continued imprisonment of homeless and indigent offenders beyond the completion of their sentences of incarceration because it prohibits them from seeking release to all free and low-cost placements such as shelters, religious missions, and halfway houses. But for the One-Per-Address Statute, indigent and homeless individuals would be able to secure their release from prison to otherwise compliant locations such as Wayside Cross Ministries or the units IDOC rents from NewDay Apartments.
For example, Dana Monson is indigent and does not have family outside of prison who can offer him financial support or a place to live. SOF at ¶53. Monson completed his sentence of incarceration and was entitled to release from IDOC on March 25, 2012. Id. at ¶54. Because he lacked funds to secure approved housing, Monson remained incarcerated for more than eight additional years until May, 20 2020. Id. Because of the One-Per-Address Statute, Monson was not eligible for release to any free placement (such as a halfway house, shelter, or religious ministry) because other individuals with sex offense convictions may also reside at
27

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 32 Filed: 07/01/20 Page 31 of 35 PageID #:290
such locations. Id. at ¶55. Thus, Monson remained incarcerated until this Court granted a preliminary injunction (ECF No. 22), which allowed him to be released to Wayside Cross Ministries, where he now resides along with other individuals who are on MSR for sex offenses. Id. at ¶56.9
Similarly, Plaintiff John Margarella is indigent. Id. at ¶57. His family was unable to take him in, and no one in his family had the funds to rent or buy a separate place for him. Id. He completed his sentence of incarceration and was entitled to release on MSR in December 2013. Id. at ¶58. Because he lacked funds to secure approved housing, Margarella remained incarcerated for more than six additional years, until June 23, 2020. Id. Because of the One-Per-Address Statute, Margarella was not eligible for release to any free placement (such as a halfway house, shelter, or religious ministry) because other individuals with sex offense convictions may also reside at such locations. Id. at ¶59. Thus, Margarella remained incarcerated until this Court granted a preliminary injunction (ECF No. 22), which allowed him to be released to one of the units IDOC leases from NewDay Apartments where he now resides with Jerry Davis, another individual who is on MSR for a sex offense.10 Id. at ¶60.
For indigent individuals, their failure to find housing that complies with the One-Per-Address Statute is not a voluntary act, but involuntary conduct
9 Plaintiffs Corey Crowe, Fredrick Chamblis, and others who have now been released to Wayside Cross Ministries are in the same situation. See SOF at ¶¶ 61-66. 10 Other Plaintiffs currently at NewDay Apartments, including J.D. Lindenmeier, Jerry Davis, and Stanley Meyer are in similar situations. See SOF at ¶¶ 67-69.
28

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 32 Filed: 07/01/20 Page 32 of 35 PageID #:291
inseparable from their status as being homeless and indigent. Thus, continued enforcement of the One-Per-Address Statute violates the Eighth Amendment.
B. The One-Per-Address Statute Violates the Equal Protection Clause The Equal Protection Clause “is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). There are two primary ways an equal protection violation occurs. One is when the disparate treatment among similarly situated groups results in the denial of a fundamental right. The other is when disparate treatment among similarly situated groups is based on a person’s membership in a “suspect” class. Srail v. Village of Lisle, Ill., 588 F.3d 940, 943 (7th Cir. 2009). Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim rests on the first theory, namely, that the One-Per-Address Statute denies Plaintiffs the fundamental right to be free from confinement based solely on their indigence. Where a challenged restriction impinges on a fundamental right, it is subject to strict scrutiny and can only survive if it is “suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” Cleburne at 440; see also Vision Church v. Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 1000 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Government action [that] interferes with a person’s fundamental rights” is subject to strict scrutiny.) In Murphy, this Court found that continued imprisonment of indigent individuals who cannot afford housing violated the Equal Protection Clause because it “creates an illegal classification based on wealth, which indefinitely deprives the class members of their liberty as a result of their incapacity to pay.” 380 F.Supp.3d at 759.
29

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 32 Filed: 07/01/20 Page 33 of 35 PageID #:292
The same result should occur here. The One-Per-Address Statute fails strict scrutiny because it draws a wealth-based classification that deprives indigent individuals of a fundamental right (i.e., the right to be released from prison on MSR after the completion of one’s sentence) and is not suitably tailored to serve any compelling interest.
1. The Statute Discriminates Based on Wealth The record shows that the One-Per-Address Statute discriminates against the poor by making it impossible for indigent individuals to obtain housing and secure their release from prison.11 See SOF at ¶¶53-69 (Plaintiffs Monson, Margarella, Crowe, and Chamblis remained imprisoned well past their release dates until the court ordered relief from the One-Per-Address Statute that allowed them to be released to free placements at Wayside Cross Ministries and NewDay Apartments). The Supreme Court has repeatedly struck down practices that deprive a person of liberty because of indigency. In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), the Court found that an Illinois rule permitting a criminal appeal only if a defendant could pay for a trial transcript violated due process and equal protection. Likewise, in Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970), the Court overturned an Illinois law that permitted extended prison sentences, beyond the statutory maximum, for those prisoners who could not pay a fine, writing that “[o]nce the State has defined the outer limits of incarceration necessary to satisfy its penological interests and
11 The fact that the One-Per-Address Statute applies to all individuals who have been convicted of sex offenses is of no consequence. A law that is “nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly discriminatory in its operation.” Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17, n. 11 (1956).
30

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 32 Filed: 07/01/20 Page 34 of 35 PageID #:293
policies, it may not then subject a certain class of convicted defendants to a period of imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum solely by reason of their indigency.” Id. at 241-42.
2. The Wealth-Based Distinction Does Not Serve a Compelling Government Interest
As this Court has already held in Murphy, keeping “homeless sex offenders locked up (while non-indigent sex offenders roam free) has no reasonable relation to public protection. Quite the contrary, ‘the condition at issue here—indigency—is itself no threat to the safety or welfare of society.’” 380 F. Supp. 3d at 756-57 (quoting Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 669 n. 9 (1983)); See also, Adams, 91 So.3d at 741-42 (finding a state statute requiring sex offenders to provide a home address prior to release violated the Equal Protection Clause because it “create[d] a classification based on wealth, depriving a certain class of citizens indefinitely of their liberty as a result of their inability to pay.”)
The One-Per-Address Statute produces the same type of discrimination condemned by the Supreme Court in Griffin and by this Court in Murphy—wealthbased discrimination that deprives individuals of their fundamental rights solely because of their indigency. Thus, Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on their claim that the One-Per-Address Statute violates the Equal Protection Clause.
CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Honorable Court grant summary judgment to Plaintiffs on their claim that the OnePer-Address Statute violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
31

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 32 Filed: 07/01/20 Page 35 of 35 PageID #:294
Respectfully submitted, /s/ Adele D. Nicholas /s/ Mark G. Weinberg Counsel for Plaintiffs Law Office of Adele D. Nicholas 5707 W. Goodman Street Chicago, Illinois 60630 (847) 361-3869 adele@civilrightschicago.com Law Office of Mark G. Weinberg 3612 N. Tripp Avenue Chicago, Illinois 60641 (773) 283-3913 mweinberg@sbcglobal.net
32

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:312

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

MARCUS BARNES, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
ROB JEFFREYS, Defendant.

)

)

No. 20 C 2137

)

)

)

Judge Kendall

)

)

)

)

APPENDIX OF EXHIBITS IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Exhibit 1 ...................................................... Declaration of Otis Williams Exhibit 2 ..................................................... Declaration of Jonathon Beall Exhibit 3 ...................................................... Declaration of Bob McKelvey Exhibit 4 ...................................................... Declaration of James Cockrell Exhibit 5 ...................................................... Declaration of Stephen Goldberg Exhibit 6 ...................................................... Excerpts of Deposition of Dion Dixon Exhibit 7 ...................................................... Mn. Dept. of Corrections’
Residential Placement Report Exhibit 8 ...................................................... Declaration of Delshay McDaniel Exhibit 9 ...................................................... Declaration of Jerry Calvin Exhibit 10 .................................................... Declaration of Stanley Meyer Exhibit 11 .................................................... Declaration of Luis Aponte Exhibit 12 .................................................... Declaration of Kevin Manson Exhibit 13 .................................................... Declaration of Dana Monson Exhibit 14 .................................................... Declaration of John Margarella Exhibit 15 .................................................... Declaration of Fredrick Chamblis Exhibit 16 .................................................... Declaration of Corey Crowe Exhibit 17 .................................................... Declaration of Jerry Davis

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:313 Exhibit 18 .................................................... Declaration of Joshua Huddleston Exhibit 19 .................................................... Declaration of Ronald Garrison Law Office of Adele D. Nicholas 5707 W. Goodman Street Chicago, Illinois 60630 (847) 361-3869 adele@civilrightschicago.com Law Office of Mark G. Weinberg 3612 N. Tripp Avenue Chicago, Illinois 60641 (773) 283-3913 mweinberg@sbcglobal.net
2

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-1 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:314
Declaration of Otis Williams 1. My name is Otis Williams. I am the founder and CEO of New Beginnings Recovery Homes Inc. (NBRHI). NBRHI is a Chicago private minority-based not-for-profit corporation that has been in operation since 1993. NBRHI provides affordable shared transitional housing, social, supportive and case management services to people transitioning from prison to the community especially, individuals who are experiencing housing insecurity, lacking gainful employment and food as well as individuals who are in recovery from drug or alcohol abuse. 2. NBHRI leases five buildings on the south side of Chicago at which it provides dormitory style or semi-private shared living accommodations. Residents at NBHRI buildings receive meals and have access to services including peer support groups, counseling with licensed providers and case management. Our properties are sex offender compliant with the housing restrictions that prohibit people who have been convicted of sex offenses from living within 500 feet of schools, daycares or playgrounds. Each building has 24-hour a day security and structured supervision for residents. Our goal is to help our residents become positive, productive citizens. We have significant experience with housing sex offenders who are being released from prison and assisting with their successful transition back into the community. 3. Program participants agree to abide by the rules of our program, including adherence to a curfew, no use of drugs or alcohol and no minors or women on the premises of our residential buildings. 4. We currently are currently housing 12 individuals on mandatory supervised release who have been convicted of sex offenses at our buildings located at 6655 S Perry Chicago, IL 60621 and 11934 S. Lowe Chicago Illinois, 60628. These parolees are adjusting well to being on

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-1 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:315

MSR in the community and we are assisting them with obtaining identification, searching for jobs, and compliance with the terms of their supervision.
5. We are aware that individuals on parole for a sex offense and are currently legally prohibited from living at the same address as another person with a sex offense conviction. If the restriction on housing more than one sex offender at the same address is eliminated, we are willing and able to house additional parolees at these and other properties in the future, space permitting.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1746, I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing statements are true and correct.

___________________ Otis J. Williams

July 1, 2020

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-2 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:316
Declaration of Jonathan Beall 1. My name is Jonathan Beall. I am the program director of the Master’s Touch Ministry, a division of Wayside Cross Ministries. 2. Wayside Cross Ministries is a Christ-centered Bible-based residential program that has operated in Aurora, Illinois, for more than 90 years. 3. The Master’s Touch Ministry is a life-transformation program for men with various destructive behaviors not limited to drug and alcohol addiction. The program offers room and board at no cost, and empowers its participants to change their lives through the Gospel of Christ, prayer, Bible study, daily chapel services, mentoring with local church and business leaders, and work rehabilitation programs. 4. It takes a minimum of seven months for a resident to complete the Master’s Touch Ministry program. The end goal of the program is to give the men the tools they need to live healthy, law abiding lives through trust in Jesus Christ for their faith and conduct. 5. Wayside Cross currently has fourteen residents in the Master’s Touch Ministry who are on parole from the Illinois Department of Corrections. Wayside Cross provides room and board to these individuals at no cost to them or to the IDOC. Each of these individuals has successfully registered with the Aurora Police Department. 6. The Master’s Touch Ministry is a highly structured program with a strict code of conduct, which includes adherence to a curfew, attendance at scheduled Bible study and church services, no use of drugs or alcohol, refraining from the use of profane or abusive language, listening only to music that glorifies God, and only using technology in a manner that conforms to God’s high standards. Acceptance into the program is at the sole discretion of the

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-2 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:317

Director of Master’s Touch. Successful completion of the program hinges on successful random drug and alcohol tests, active participation in programming, as well as adherence to all the rules of Master’s Touch.
7. Because of its proximity to McCarty Park, Wayside Cross cannot accept into its program individuals who are classified as “child sex offenders,” but it can accept individuals whose offenses involved an adult victim.
8. The participants in the Master’s Touch Ministry all reside together in a dormitory setting at Wayside Cross, located at 215 E. New York Street in Aurora.
9. The Master’s Touch Ministry is currently near its capacity for program participants. But in the future, when space in the building and in the program permits, we are willing to accept other individuals on mandatory supervised release from the Illinois Department of Corrections who meet our program criteria, pending the parolee’s successful completion of a phone screening interview.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1746, I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing statements are true and correct.

_________________ Jonathan Beall

_7_-_1_-2_0______ Date

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-3 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:318
Declaration of Bob McKelvey 1. My name is Bob McKelvey. I am the founder and Manager of NewDay Apartments LLC. 2. NewDay Apartments has partnered with the Illinois Department of Corrections to provide housing to individuals with sex offense convictions being released from prison onto supervised release. 3. NewDay Apartments currently owns eight properties which are more than 500 feet away from any schools, playgrounds and/or daycare centers. NewDay Apartments currently leases four properties to the Illinois Department of Corrections. Two properties are reserved for private-pay registrants. One unit currently houses a non-registrant but will be available to house registrants when the current tenant moves out. One property houses seven registrants who are neither on parole nor probation. 4. There are currently seven parolees living in the four properties IDOC leases from NewDay. Under current law, we are limited to housing four registrant-parolees in these units because we are permitted to have a maximum of one registrant-parolee per address (unless a court approves otherwise). 5. The permission of the court to house additional registrants at the same address has allowed NewDay to quickly house and provide services for additional parolees in these units. That number will increase once current, non-registrant tenants move out over time. 6. NewDay is expanding despite the current pandemic. We plan to double the number of registrant units available year-over-year for at least the next three years. The long term goal of NewDay is to become the #1 provider of safe, affordable registrant housing in the

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-3 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:319

United States. Permitting multiple registrant-parolees at the same address would easily double the number of available units compared to the current one-per-address rule, and would make the housing we provide more affordable for our registrant-tenants. 7. While our housing obviously helps registrants, NewDay's primary purpose is to keep communities safe by housing registrants responsibly. To-date, we have a 0% recidivism rate among our registrant tenants. It is our experience that housing registrants at the same address allows for more effective (and cost-effective) law enforcement oversight. It also allows registrants to police one another and share resources to better support themselves, which ultimately helps them focus on the future and reduce recidivism. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1746, I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing statements are true and correct to the best of my ability.

__________________

__7_-1_-_2_0____________

Bob McKelvey

Date

Manager, NewDay Apartments LLC

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-4 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:320
Declaration of James Cockrell 1. My name is James Cockrell. I am a pastor with Abundant Faith Ministries in Springfield, Illinois. I regularly minister to individuals imprisoned in the Illinois Department of Corrections, and in particular individuals who have been convicted of sex offenses. 2. James Cockrell owns/oversees a house located at 1611 E. Matheny Avenue, Springfield, Illinois 62702, at which we will provide housing and supportive services to individuals being released from the Illinois Department of Corrections, including individuals who have been convicted of sex offenses. 3. Our program offers individuals one month rent-free, during which time we assist the individual with finding employment. We have a relationship with an employer near Springfield that is willing to hire individuals with sex offense convictions. We provide our residents a shuttle to and from this job. 4. Once someone is working, we charge $300/month for their continued residence in our housing, or in the alternative, we assist them with finding their own housing. 5. We currently have three openings in our building and are prepared to accept three individuals who are on mandatory supervised release if the Department of Corrections will approve them for release to our address. 6. I have a personal relationship with Henry Smith (IDOC Number R12201), who is imprisoned in Jacksonville Correctional Center. We are prepared to accept him to reside at 1611 E. Matheny Avenue immediately.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1746, I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing statements are true and correct.

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-4 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:321

_______________________ James Cockrell

_7_/1_/_2_0_2_0____ Date

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-5 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 1 of 3 PageID #:322
Declaration of Stephen Goldberg 1. My name is Stephen N. Goldberg. I was formerly a member of the State Bar of Illinois and a member of the bar of this Court. I am also a now-retired inactive member of the State Bar of California and a member of the bar of various California federal district courts, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the United States Supreme Court. I am familiar with the facts stated herein and could testify about them if called as a witness. 2. I am the brother of Alvin Lee Goldberg, who pleaded guilty in November of 2012 to two offenses: PRED CRIM SEX ASLT/VICTIM <13; and AGG CRIM SEX ABUSE/FAMILY. My brother will be 81 on May 14 of this year. 3. My brother currently is an inmate at the Taylorville Correctional Center, 1144 Illinois Rte 29, Taylorville IL 62568. His IDOC number is M36526. He was scheduled for release in November of 2018, subject to required mandatory supervised release (“MSR”) with a discharge date of three years to life. He is actively looking for an apartment to move to that is acceptable to the IDOC while he is on MSR. 4. I have applied on behalf of my brother to NewDay Apartments, an organization that rents apartments to convicted sex offenders. I have spoken with their representatives. The latter have told me (1) that NewDay will put my brother, if he passes a background and credit check, on a waiting list for apartments it owns that currently are allowed by the IDOC only to house registered sex offenders who are no longer on parole or probation (i.e. MSR) and (2) that they are precluded from renting to him in such facilities by the Illinois statute precluding more than one registrant from residing at a residence housing more than one registrant. 730 ILCS 5/5-6-3(a)(8.6).

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-5 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 2 of 3 PageID #:323

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-5 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 3 of 3 PageID #:324 Exhibit A

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-6 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 1 of 6 PageID #:325

DION DIXON, 12/12/2017

·

·1· · · · · IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT · · · · · ·FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS ·2· · · · · · · · · · EASTERN DIVISION
·3· ·PAUL MURPHY, et al.,· · · · ) · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·) ·4· · · · · · · · ·Plaintiffs,· ·) · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·) ·5· · · · · · vs.· · · · · · · · )· ·No. 16 C 11471 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·) ·6· ·LISA MADIGAN, et al.,· · · ·) · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·) ·7· · · · · · · · ·Defendants.· ·)
·8· · · · · · The video-recorded deposition of DION
·9· DIXON, taken pursuant to the Federal Rules of
10· Civil Procedure, before Leanna Z. Michas, Certified
11· Shorthand Reporter No. 084-004748, at 20 North Clark
12· Street, Suite 1260, Chicago, Illinois, on Tuesday,
13· December 12, 2017, commencing at 10:05 a.m.,
14· pursuant to notice.
15 · · · · · APPEARANCES: 16 · · · · · · · LAW OFFICE OF ADELE D. NICHOLAS, by 17· · · · · · MS. ADELE D. NICHOLAS · · · · · · · (5707 West Goodman Street 18· · · · · · ·Chicago, Illinois· 60630 · · · · · · · ·847.361.3869 19· · · · · · ·adele@civilrightschicago.com)
20· · · · · · · · · · · -and-
21· · · · · · MR. MARK G. WEINBERG · · · · · · · (3612 North Tripp Avenue 22· · · · · · ·Chicago, Illinois· 60641 · · · · · · · ·773.283.3913 23· · · · · · ·mweinberg@sbcglobal.net) · · · · · · · · ·appeared on behalf of the plaintiffs; 24

Urlaub Bowen & Associates, Inc.· 312-781-9586

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-6 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 2 of 6 PageID #:326

DION DIXON, 12/12/2017

Page 64

·1· examines the map to see whether it's too near to ·2· something, they're also going to run the address ·3· through the registry? ·4· · · · A.· · Yes. ·5· · · · Q.· · And the purpose of that is to find out ·6· whether a person required to register as a sex ·7· offender is already living at that address? ·8· · · · A.· · Yes. ·9· · · · Q.· · Okay.· If you can look at page 1 of 10· Exhibit 1, subsection (7.6) on that first page. 11· · · · · · · · ·Are you there? 12· · · · A.· · Yes. 13· · · · Q.· · Okay.· So this is subsection (a)(7.6). 14· And it says:· If convicted of a sex offense as 15· defined in the Sex Offender Management Board Act, 16· refrain from residing at the same address or in the 17· same condominium unit or apartment unit or in the 18· same condominium complex or apartment complex with 19· another person he or she knows or reasonably should 20· know is a convicted sex offender or has been placed 21· on supervision for a sex offense. 22· · · · · · · · ·You see that? 23· · · · A.· · Yes. 24· · · · Q.· · Is this statute the reason that the

Urlaub Bowen & Associates, Inc.· 312-781-9586
YVer1f

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-6 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 3 of 6 PageID #:327

DION DIXON, 12/12/2017

Page 65

·1· agent is going to look on the registry to see if ·2· there is a registrant at that address? ·3· · · · A.· · Yes. ·4· · · · Q.· · Let's talk a little bit about this ·5· restriction. ·6· · · · · · · · ·So the restriction itself says you ·7· can't reside in the same residence or in the same ·8· condominium complex or apartment complex, right? ·9· · · · A.· · Yes. 10· · · · Q.· · How does the department interpret that 11· restriction? 12· · · · A.· · By the letter of the law. 13· · · · · · · · ·And if we pull up an address and put 14· it on the sex offender website, and we see that 15· there's a -- a sex offender already in -- in the 16· building or in the complex that the inmate wants to 17· move to or parole to, he's not able to. 18· · · · Q.· · Does this -- or does the department 19· apply that restriction to a sex offender living 20· within the same trailer park as another person 21· who's required to register? 22· · · · A.· · Yes and no. 23· · · · · · · · ·Can I explain? 24· · · · MS. NEWMAN:· (Nodding.)

Urlaub Bowen & Associates, Inc.· 312-781-9586
YVer1f

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-6 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 4 of 6 PageID #:328

DION DIXON, 12/12/2017

Page 66

·1· · · · THE WITNESS:· I've had conversations with the ·2· state police, and -- regarding the very same thing, ·3· and it was detailed to me -- and, also, not just ·4· with state police, but local law enforcement ·5· registering entities, that if -- now, trailer parks ·6· are different, are a little tricky.· Because some ·7· trailer parks you have the ability to own the actual ·8· pad, but rent the trailer; or vice versa, you can ·9· own the trailer, but you have to rent on the ground. 10· · · · · · · · ·And the information that I got back 11· from the state police was, if the pad or the land 12· is owned by one entity, regardless of whether you 13· own that trailer or you are renting the trailer, 14· it's considered a -- an apartment complex.· It's 15· considered a complex area because the actual land 16· is owned by one person. 17· · · · · · · · ·So, therefore, if, you know, trailer 18· No. 17, you have a sex offender here, and there 19· could be, you know, an insanely large trailer park, 20· 17 and No. 240, which is, you know, 300 feet away 21· or whatever, as long as that property, that land is 22· owned by one entity, then that's considered a -- a 23· complex. 24

Urlaub Bowen & Associates, Inc.· 312-781-9586
YVer1f

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-6 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 5 of 6 PageID #:329

DION DIXON, 12/12/2017

Page 67

·1· BY MS. NICHOLAS: ·2· · · · Q.· · Who decided to interpret the term ·3· apartment complex or condominium complex that way? ·4· · · · A.· · I've had conversations with state ·5· police, as well as Chicago Police Department, too. ·6· · · · Q.· · Why is it being interpreted that way? ·7· · · · A.· · I -- I have no -- I don't know. ·8· · · · Q.· · So am I correct in understanding that, ·9· if a trailer park, regardless of its size, is 10· organized such that there's one entity that owns 11· the park, but each individual trailer is rented by 12· a separate person -13· · · · A.· · Um-hmm. 14· · · · Q.· · -- that's going to be classified 15· under -16· · · · A.· · Yes. 17· · · · Q.· · -- subsection (7.6) as an apartment 18· complex or condominium complex? 19· · · · A.· · Yes. 20· · · · Q.· · If, on the other hand, a person can buy 21· a piece of the land within a trailer park, that 22· would be considered separate? 23· · · · A.· · Yes. 24· · · · Q.· · So it has nothing to do with the actual

Urlaub Bowen & Associates, Inc.· 312-781-9586
YVer1f

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-6 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 6 of 6 PageID #:330

DION DIXON, 12/12/2017

Page 68

·1· physical distance between the parolee and the ·2· existing sex offender who's living there? ·3· · · · A.· · Correct. ·4· · · · Q.· · Did you push back at all against that ·5· interpretation of this statute? ·6· · · · A.· · No. ·7· · · · Q.· · Would you agree that that restricts the ·8· potential locations where a person can serve their ·9· parole? 10· · · · A.· · To be honest, I don't have an opinion 11· about it one way or another.· It's to -- to operate 12· within the law.· And I looked at it as, if -- if 13· the -- if they were not going to allow the offender 14· to register, or there were going to be some -15· other registration was rejected, it -- it would be 16· counterproductive to approve that placement and 17· have him to come out.· Because he would only have 18· to be returned back to the institution. 19· · · · Q.· · Okay.· Well, we'll come back to that, 20· and I'll ask you some more specific questions about 21· that. 22· · · · A.· · Okay. 23· · · · Q.· · But let's go back to the investigation 24· and approval process.

Urlaub Bowen & Associates, Inc.· 312-781-9586
YVer1f

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-7 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 1 of 15 PageID #:331
LEVEL THREE SEX OFFENDERS RESIDENTIAL PLACEMENT ISSUES
2003 Report to the Legislature
Minnesota Department of Corrections
1450 Energy Park Drive, Suite 200 St. Paul, Minnesota 55108-5219 (651) 642-0200 TTY (651) 643-3589 www.doc.state.mn.us January 2003 (revised 2/04)
This information will be made available in an alternative format upon request. The cost of salaries, printing,
and supplies incurred in the development and preparation of this report was $5,948 (reported as required by M.S. 3.197).

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-7 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 2 of 15 PageID #:332
Level Three Sex Offenders Residential Placement Issues
2003 Report to the Legislature
Table of Contents
Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 1 Offender Characteristics .........................................................................................................................1 Issues .........................................................................................................................................................1
1) How level three offenders re-enter the community ......................................................................1 2) Statewide locations and concentrations of the level three offenders ............................................4 3) Effects of having the offenders live in close proximity to one another ........................................ 4 4) Efforts to mitigate the concentration.............................................................................................9 5) Likely effects of school proximity policy .....................................................................................9 6) Likely effects of offender proximity policy................................................................................10 7) Restricted zones ..........................................................................................................................10 8) Policies adopted by other states ..................................................................................................10 Findings................................................................................................................................................... 11 Recommendations .................................................................................................................................. 11
Appendices Appendix A – Minnesota Statutes.....................................................................................................14 Appendix B-1—County locations of level three offenders ...............................................................15 Appendix B-2—Map of level three offenders in Minnesota .............................................................16 Appendix B-3—Map of level three offenders in Minneapolis..........................................................17 Appendix B-4—Map of level three offenders in Ramsey County ....................................................18 Appendix C-1—Notes on Minneapolis schools and parks................................................................19 Appendix C-2—Map of 1,500’ school and park zones in Minneapolis ............................................20 Appendix C-3—Map of unrestricted areas in Minneapolis...............................................................21 Appendix D—Notes on day care facilities in Minneapolis ............................................................... 22 Appendix E—Alabama statute on prohibited residence locations ....................................................23 Appendix F—Iowa statute on prohibited residence locations...........................................................24 Appendix G—Article on Iowa residence prohibition........................................................................25

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-7 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 3 of 15 PageID #:333
Introduction
The Minnesota Legislature requested a report from the commissioner of corrections to address issues regarding residential locations of level three sex offenders (see Appendix A: Minnesota Session Laws 2002, Chapter 385, Sec. 10).
Offender Characteristics
As of December 31, 2002, there are 329 designated level three offenders in Minnesota. Of those, 97 are in residential settings in a Minnesota community. All are male. Fifty of those live in Hennepin County, 14 in Ramsey County, six in Olmsted County, and four in St. Louis County. Twenty-three live elsewhere, with no county having more than two.
Issues
Legislation mandating this report directed the commissioner of corrections to report on eight issues concerning level three sex offenders. This section of the report responds to that directive.
1. How level three offenders re-enter the community, including how housing and jobs are found and the role that corrections agents play in helping an offender find housing and jobs.
The specific resource for offenders is the institutional caseworker at each Minnesota correctional facility (MCF). While level three offenders may be released from any correctional facility, the majority of releases are done from the MCF-Lino Lakes. The MCF-Moose Lake, MCF-Rush City, and MCF-Stillwater are the release institutions for the greatest number of remaining releasees.
In anticipation of release, the caseworker will work with the offender on transition plans. This may include a three-day workshop on effective transition from incarceration. Topics covered include residential and job issues. In addition, the transitions program will cover related areas of identification, money management, education, health and life skills, family/friend reunification and relationships, and living under supervision. For those leaving to a supervised release status, the caseworker will coordinate with the prospective supervising agent on a re-entry plan. That re-entry plan must include an acceptable residence. At that time, special conditions may be applied to the supervision plan. Special conditions may include restrictions on proximity to victims, minors, or vulnerable adults. Special conditions are applied on an individual basis to each offender. Common conditions subject to agent approval may be:
a) No residence in a building where children are present; b) No direct or indirect contact with minors; c) No direct or indirect contact with vulnerable adults; d) No direct or indirect contact with victims; e) No membership in groups or organizations;
1

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-7 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 4 of 15 PageID #:334
f) Must not be in any location where children or minors tend to congregate; or g) Other variations as determined by the supervising agent.
Residential placement is dependent on the offender’s personal and financial resources in the community. The caseworker and agent may be able to help the offender find placement, but limited opportunities exist if an acceptable supervision location is not provided by the offender.
Halfway house placement is one of the most common first steps in the transition, but there are a limited number of beds available at those placements. St. Paul, Minneapolis, Golden Valley, and Duluth each provide a halfway house facility but fall far short in meeting the housing needs of all sex offenders in need of transitional housing. These halfway houses provide not only for level three offenders but also level two and one offenders as well as nonsex offenders in need of such transition (primarily person offenders convicted of such crimes as Assault, Aggravated Robbery, Murder, etc.). Approximately 60 percent of level three predatory offenders are first released to a halfway house placement.
Transition services for offenders leaving prison at expiration of sentence are even more limited. These offenders leave an MCF without supervision. They are required to register an address with the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) but receive no assistance other than that provided by a caseworker prior to release. Keeping track of these offenders is difficult due to their often transient housing options. Anecdotally, it appears that a small number (at least 12) of level three offenders have left Minnesota once their sentences expired, and several other level three offenders have come out of compliance with registration after the expiration of their sentences (although it appears they have stayed in Minnesota).
Generally, the housing options available to offenders are limited and well known to supervising agents. Specific properties and landlords are amenable to providing housing for level three offenders. In Minneapolis, certain landlords appear to have developed a specialty in renting to level three offenders. This has resulted in a concentration of level three offenders in some areas of the city. According to corrections agents, when a landlord rents one unit of a duplex to a level three offender, occupants of the other unit feel uncomfortable and seek other housing. The resulting vacancy is likely to be filled by another level three (or lower level) sex offender. Subsequent vacancies are also filled by sex offenders. The landlords then post information about vacancies at halfway houses, and level three offenders learn about potential openings through word of mouth. Such housing is a limited and finite resource in Minneapolis but can be even scarcer in other counties where the placement of level two offenders causes as much of a problem.
Job search is another topic covered in the transition program but, again, the offender bears most of the responsibility for finding employment. Halfway house placement provides the best transition period for job search. Without connections to a previous employer or family assistance, most employment tends to be in low-pay, non-public service jobs. Knowledge of the offender’s level three status is an impediment to seeking employment. Fear of liability if re-offense occurs is a common roadblock to employer willingness to hire offenders. A common release condition is that offenders must maintain 40 hours per week of work or other productive activity. Corrections agents become aware of employers who are willing to hire ex-inmates, including sex offenders. If an offender has difficulty obtaining employment on his or her own, the agent will refer the offender to one of these employers.
2

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-7 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 5 of 15 PageID #:335
In meetings and discussions with community corrections agents working throughout Minnesota, the common issue expressed was the ever-increasing difficulty in procuring residences and employment by level three offenders. The close connection between residence and job means that limiting residential options concurrently limits job options. For example, if offenders are required because of residential restrictions to live in largely unpopulated areas, it is likely that they will have difficulty securing employment as many do not own automobiles (and even have release conditions prohibiting ownership).
Expansion of halfway house beds and expansion of emergency housing funds were most commonly cited as needs when planning for level three releases and moves. Landlords willing to rent to a level three offender are non-existent in many communities, according to corrections agents.
Recent release plans for selected level three offenders:
a) Offender A Released in early 2002 (expiration of sentence). Release address was his parent’s home in St. Paul. Maintained that address until mid 2002. This initial placement with a family member is often the ideal placement for transition. Upon leaving that residence, he has been in a transient stage to this date. Registered address was in an outer-ring suburb for one day, the Minneapolis Salvation Army for 18 days, a Bloomington apartment for 19 days, another metro address for 11 days, South Minneapolis for 16 days, an inner ring suburban motel for seven days, and at a downtown St. Paul boarding house for the last 30 days. He has spoken with local law enforcement about living under a bridge. He has made numerous complaints about inability to find acceptable housing of any kind. He has done a fairly good job of maintaining his registration, but constant moving makes tracking difficult.
b) Offender B Released in mid 2002 (intensive supervised release). His release was to a halfway house from which he absconded in late 2002. He was apprehended and returned to the MCFLino Lakes in the same month. He was then released in one month later (expiration of sentence). He was unable to provide a release address prior to release and has no support network. His responsibility for registration was explained to him. He did provide notice of a shelter address in Minneapolis for the first night. He moved to a second shelter the second night and is now officially registered with the BCA as “homeless.”
c) Offender C Released in late 2002 (intensive supervised release). Initial release plan was to a friend’s house in rural Minnesota. Due to neighborhood pressure, the invitation was rescinded. His release address then became a transitional motel in a southeastern Minnesota city. His plan is to move into a house he owns in southeastern Minnesota as soon as the current tenant vacates the property. His ownership of property has solved this housing issue.
d) Offender D Released in mid 2000 (intensive supervised release). His release was to a halfway house. He then moved to South Minneapolis in early 2001. He moved to a trailer park in an outer-ring suburb two months later. He then purchased rural property in an outstate
(revised 2/04) 3

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-7 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 6 of 15 PageID #:336
county. He was returned to prison for violating a release condition and was released again in late 2002, to his rural property. With financial resources available, he has been able to provide his own housing.
e) Offender E Released in mid 2000 (intensive supervised release) to a halfway house. Two months later, he moved into the community in North Minneapolis. This is one of the limited number of rental properties available to level three offenders. In early 2001 he registered his address as his father’s home but was infrequently there. His release was revoked two months later, due to use of chemicals. He was again released in mid 2001, to his father’s home in Minneapolis. He left his father’s home two months later. He registered in St. Paul for two weeks before returning to a North Minneapolis residence and then eventually registered at his father’s house once again in early 2002. That same month, his sentence expired and he was no longer on supervision. Since that time, while he has been registered at his father’s address, most contacts with police have pointed to a status as homeless.
2. Statewide locations and concentrations of the level three offenders.
As of December 31, 2002, there were 97 level three offenders in residential locations in Minnesota. Of these, 50 were in Hennepin County, 14 were in Ramsey County, and 33 others were scattered in other counties. Olmsted County had six level three offenders and St. Louis County had four; they were the only counties other than Hennepin and Ramsey with more than two level three offenders (see maps for locations, Appendices B-1 to B-4).
3. Effects of having the offenders live in close proximity to one another.
There have been 13 level three offenders released in 1997, 1998, or 1999 who are known to have been re-arrested for a new sex offense by March 2002. Each case has been reviewed to determine the offender’s circumstances at the time of the new sex offense. This includes examining whether the re-offense was related to the offender’s proximity to a school or park, and whether the offender was living with another sex offender at the time that he re-offended. Each case is summarized below.
Level three offenders released from January 1, 1997, through December 31, 1999, who have been rearrested for a new sex offense:
a) Offender F Released in early 1997 (he was previously released in mid 1994, prior to notification, but was re-incarcerated for a serious release violation and served an additional two years). He had been referred for civil commitment, but Hennepin County chose not to pursue the case. He was re-released twice and re-incarcerated both times before he was released at the expiration of his sentence in late 1997. He re-offended in early 1998, against his livein girlfriend. He was intoxicated and demanded that she have sex with him. When she refused, he slapped her in the face and raped her. He was registered as living at an address in Minneapolis, and the offense occurred at that location. He was not living with
(revised 2/04) 4

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-7 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 7 of 15 PageID #:337
another sex offender at the time of the offense. He was sentenced to 90 months in prison and was identified as a Minnesota Sex Offender Program-DOC (MSOP-DOC) referral. He has been in treatment at the MSOP-DOC site since late 2001.
b) Offender G Released in early 1997 to the custody of a southwestern Minnesota county and placed in the county jail. He had been referred for civil commitment, and the county attorney was deliberating on whether to pursue commitment. This offender sexually assaulted a fellow inmate at the jail the following month. He pled guilty to 4th Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct (CSC) and received a sentence of 60 months. He has since stipulated to being a Sexually Dangerous Person and has been released to the custody of the Department of Human Services (DHS). He was incarcerated at the time of the offense, but it is unclear if any of his fellow inmates at the time were sex offenders.
c) Offender H Released in early 1997, at the expiration of his sentence. He sought to have his risk level reduced by administrative review but was denied. He had been referred for civil commitment, but Hennepin County determined it was unlikely they could prove that he met commitment criteria. He was rearrested and charged with 5th Degree CSC for an offense that occurred in the following month. At the time, this offender had two addresses registered with the BCA: in South Minneapolis and a rural route address in a small town in the southeastern region of the state. It appears that he was not living with another sex offender. His re-offense was committed in downtown Minneapolis. He was in a bookstore where he harassed two separate victims – a juvenile female and an adult female. He was intoxicated. In both cases he grabbed the breast of the victim, but the victims were able to escape. The offender was arrested at the scene, ironically by the lieutenant in charge of Minneapolis’ community notification at the time. He received a sentence to the county workhouse. He was re-incarcerated for Possession of Controlled Substance, 5th Degree, in mid 2000 and was again referred to Hennepin County for civil commitment Again, Hennepin County determined it was unlikely they could prove that he met commitment criteria. He is reportedly now living in Chicago.
d) Offender I Released in mid 1997 to a halfway house. He had been referred for civil commitment, but Hennepin County determined it was unlikely they could prove that he met commitment criteria. While at the halfway house during the following month, this offender fondled the genitals of a fellow resident. There were other level three offender residents at the halfway house at the time of his re-offense. He was convicted of 4th Degree CSC and received a sentence of 36 months. At the same time there were allegations that he had fondled the genitals of a 13-year-old family member, but he was not convicted of this. He has since been re-released to the community in mid 1999 and has apparently not been arrested for a new sex offense since that time.
e) Offender J Released in mid 1997, but detained until early 1998 at the Minnesota Security Hospital while he was undergoing a civil commitment trial. He was found not to meet the criteria for commitment and was released to a South Minneapolis address (his sentence had expired in late 1997). He left Minneapolis in early 1998 and lived in New Mexico for six
(revised 2/04)
5

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-7 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 8 of 15 PageID #:338
months. He then relocated to Nebraska where he was arrested for molesting children (reports are that it was in a Greyhound Bus Station). He was not known to be living with another sex offender at the time of this offense. He was convicted of Sexual Assault on a Child and received a sentence of one year, eight months to five years. He was imprisoned in Nebraska from late 1998 until his mandatory release date in late 2000. He is currently registered as living in Nebraska.
f) Offender K Released in early 1998. Absconded from supervision in early 1999 and reincarcerated within 30 days. Not referred for civil commitment either time. Released again in late 2000. In early 2001, found to be in possession of child pornography involving children as young as three to five years old. Supervising agent made unannounced visit to his residence and found a videotape containing child pornography. Offender had subscribed to a Web TV service (without permission of agent) and recorded the videotape. He was living with a level two sex offender at the time. This roommate provided information to his therapist, who passed it along to his supervising agent, which led to discovery of the sexually-explicit material. He absconded again but was apprehended within two weeks. He pled guilty to three counts of Possession of Pornographic Work Involving Minors and received a sentence of 36 months. He is currently incarcerated with an expected release date of early 2004. He is currently involved in treatment at the MSOP-DOC site.
g) Offender L Released in early 1998 (expiration of sentence). Referred for civil commitment, but Ramsey County determined it was unlikely they could prove he met commitment criteria. Rearrested in late1998 and convicted of False Imprisonment in early 1999. Registered as living in southwestern Minnesota at the time of the offense. He was not living with another sex offender. The offense occurred in his house. The victim (an adult female acquaintance) voluntarily entered his apartment after they had been out drinking. She lay down on the bed where the offender coerced her to take off her clothes, after which she fell asleep. She awoke to find he had tied her hands and legs to the bed. He threatened to rape her but didn’t. He did slap the victim across the face and struck her breast. He was sentenced to 19 months but was civilly committed upon his release from prison.
h) Offender M Released in late 1998; sentence expired two months later. Referred for civil commitment to Hennepin County, but they determined it was unlikely they could prove he met commitment criteria. Rearrested in late 1999, after exposing himself to four female children (ages four to eight). He called the children over to his truck and identified himself as a policeman, saying he was looking for a suspect. He opened the door and exposed himself to the children. He had reportedly been driving around the neighborhood during the summer and fall months watching children. Offenses were committed in Northeast Minneapolis; he was living in South Minneapolis at the time. Unknown if he was living with another sex offender at time of the offense. Convicted of felony-level 5th Degree CSC and sentenced to 43 months in prison. Reincarcerated in early 2000, and released 26 months later in early 2002, when his release date was reached. Currently on intensive supervised release and living in North Minneapolis. Again referred for civil commitment to Hennepin County, but they determined it was unlikely they could prove he met commitment criteria.
(revised 2/04)
6

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-7 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 9 of 15 PageID #:339
i) Offender N Released in late 1999 and returned to prison twice on technical violations. He was not referred for civil commitment and sought by administrative review to have his risk level lowered, but his request was denied. He was most recently released in late 2000 to intensive supervised release. Three months later, in early 2001, he abducted a 17-year-old female stranger and sexually assaulted her. He was registered as living in South Minneapolis. He was not living with another sex offender. The offense occurred in a neighborhood a couple of miles south of the offender’s residence. He has been convicted of 1st Degree CSC and recently received the statutory maximum sentence of 30 years.
j) Offender O Released in late 1998 but immediately placed at the MSOP after being civilly committed. He was arrested for 3rd Degree CSC in mid 2001 for sexually assaulting a fellow resident of the MSOP. It appears that he was never convicted of this offense but instead was returned to MSOP where he remains today. He was incarcerated with other sex offenders at the time of his offense.
k) Offender P Released in late 1998 at expiration of sentence. He was not referred for civil commitment. In mid 2000 he requested that his risk level be lowered but withdrew this request after finding out that the End of Confinement Review Committee (ECRC) had received a recommendation from a sex offender treatment professional that his risk level not be lowered. He was rearrested in early 2001 and convicted of 1st Degree CSC in 2001. He was registered as living in outstate Minnesota at the time of the offense. He was not living with another sex offender. The offense occurred in his house. He was allowed access to the victims by the victims’ parent/family. He was sentenced to 144 months in prison and is currently at the MSOP-DOC site.
l) Offender Q Released in late 1999. He had been referred for civil commitment, but Hennepin County determined it was unlikely they could prove that he met commitment criteria. He was reincarcerated on three occasions after violating the conditions of his release. His most recent release was in early 2002, and his sentence expired the following month. Later that same month he was arrested after having accosted a female stranger and attempted to kidnap and possibly sexually assault her. The offense occurred near downtown Minneapolis; he was registered as living in North Minneapolis at the time of the offense. He has been convicted of 4th Degree CSC but has not yet been sentenced. The Hennepin County Attorney is preparing to ask the judge to sentence this offender to more than the 10-year statutory maximum sentence for 4th Degree CSC by recommending that he be sentenced under the Patterned Sex Offender statute.
m) Offender R Released as a level two offender in late 1999, but due to his extensive history (more than 20 sex offense convictions, all for indecent exposure, mostly misdemeanors and gross misdemeanors), he was warned by the ECRC that any violation, especially for a new sexrelated offense, would likely result in an increase in his risk level. He was not referred for civil commitment, as courts have on more than one occasion rejected commitment of offenders whose history is exclusively “hands-off” sex offending. His sentence expired
(revised 2/04)
7

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-7 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 10 of 15 PageID #:340
in late December, but he had already been arrested five months earlier for another Indecent Exposure offense against children. At the time he was registered as residing in Northeast Minneapolis. He was not living with another sex offender at the time of the offense. The offense occurred in Fridley, approximately four miles from his residence. He was sentenced to 16 months in prison for Attempted 5th Degree CSC and was assigned risk level three in early 2001. He was released in mid 2001. He was going to appeal his risk level but was again arrested for a gross misdemeanor exposure and was confined in the Hennepin County Workhouse until late 2002. Since that time he has returned to his Northeast Minneapolis address.
This examination of level three re-offenders does not reveal a negative effect related to a level three offender living with another sex offender. In fact, supervision agents in both Hennepin and Ramsey County have noted benefits from having more than one level three offender living in one location. Closer supervision is possible because travel time between offenders is reduced. Also, level three offenders who live with other level three offenders experience more visits from a supervising agent because agents for both offenders visit the same property. Finally, offenders tend to inform on each other when supervision restrictions are violated or crimes are committed. There is one case described above of an offender who re-offended by downloading child pornography from a Web TV service that was discovered only after the offender’s roommate (a sex offender) told his therapist about the existence of the unapproved Web TV equipment in the house.
Voluntary relocations of neighborhood residents have not been evident, but real estate agents report that sale of properties are limited by any negative information about a neighborhood. This may involve the perception of a high concentration of level three offenders but can also include information that suggests a neighborhood is, in general, a high-crime area in which gang activities are prevalent and drug dealing takes place on street. Discussions with real estate agents indicated that the presence of level three sex offenders tends to have the greatest effect on prospective buyers with young children.
At a December 2002 community meeting, residents of the Phillips neighborhood in South Minneapolis expressed frustration with the concentration of sex offenders in their neighborhood. Many stated that their neighborhood is always first to get treatment centers and housing for social problems. The concentration of sex offenders is just one of many concentration issues for these residents. An additional problem expressed was that once a neighborhood develops a reputation for being a focus area for this type of housing and treatment, it is difficult to maintain housing and economic stability.
This meeting was attended by residents of both the Phillips and Jordan neighborhoods as well as members of the Minneapolis City Council and Minnesota Legislature. Representatives from the Department of Corrections (DOC), Hennepin County Community Corrections, and
(revised 2/04)
8

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-7 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 11 of 15 PageID #:341
the Minneapolis Police Department were present to explain the roles of their organizations in fulfilling responsibilities under the community notification law and to listen to the concerns of residents. A map was produced detailing residency patterns of all offenders on probation and supervised release in Minneapolis that revealed a similarity to the residency patterns of level three offenders as displayed in Appendix B-3.
Based on the examination of level three re-offenders, there were no examples that residential proximity to a park or school was a contributing factor in any of the sexual re-offenses noted above. Enhanced safety due to proximity restrictions may be a comfort factor for the general public, but it does not have any basis in fact. The two level three offenders described above whose re-offenses took place near parks both drove from their residences to park areas that were several miles away. Because neither was under supervision, there were no supervision conditions that would prohibit them from driving near parks. Based on these cases, it appears that a sex offender attracted to such locations for purposes of committing a crime is more likely to travel to another neighborhood in order to act in secret rather than in a neighborhood where his or her picture is well known.
4. Efforts to mitigate the concentration of the offenders, especially with regard to proximity to schools.
According to Minnesota Statute §244.052, subdivision 4a, “the agency responsible for the offender’s supervision shall take into consideration the proximity of the offender’s residence to that of other level three offenders and proximity to schools and, to the greatest extent feasible, shall mitigate the concentration of level three offenders and concentration of level three offenders near schools.” Because of limited placement options, rarely does a supervising agency have a choice between two separate placements for an offender that would allow mitigation of the concentration of level three offenders near schools or other level three offenders to be taken into consideration. Mitigation of concentration of and proximity to schools can be a factor if two essentially equal placement options are available. If on an individual basis supervision restrictions preclude location near schools, then that is taken into account as a high priority factor. So far, there has not been one example of a level three offender re-offending at a nearby school.
5. Likely effects of a policy requiring that offenders live a certain distance from schools.
Residential choices are already limited under current statutes that do not prohibit level three offenders from living near schools. Additional restrictions would severely affect already meager placement choices. Minneapolis and St. Paul have a well-disbursed system of neighborhood schools that would create a restriction on the majority of residential property in both cities. (See Appendices C-1 and C-2 for a map of Minneapolis that indicates areas in which residence of level three offenders would be prohibited if a 1,500-foot restriction were to become law.) Having such restrictions in the cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul would likely force level three offenders to move to more rural areas that would not contain nearby schools and parks but would pose other problems, such as a high concentration of offenders with no ties to the community; isolation; lack of work, education, and treatment options; and an increase in the distance traveled by agents who supervise offenders. Again, no evidence points to any effect on offense rates of school proximity residential restrictions.
9

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-7 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 12 of 15 PageID #:342
6. Likely effects of a policy requiring that offenders not live within a certain distance of each other.
In Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Rochester there are some concentrated areas where offenders live together or in the same building. Of the 50 level three offenders living in Hennepin County as of December 31, 2002, 30 lived in just three zip codes. A proximity restriction would mean that 15 to 20 of these offenders would have to relocate or face being sanctioned under the law. Given the current difficulty that a single offender has in finding placement, it is highly likely that many of these offenders would become transient, which would severely restrict an agent’s ability to closely supervise their activities.
7. Restricted zones that would result if a 1,500-foot proximity restriction were adopted in relation to schools, parks, and other offenders.
Adoption of a 1,500-foot restriction would exclude every residential area of Minneapolis and St. Paul with minor exceptions. (See map of Minneapolis school and park zones, Appendices C-1, C-2, and C-3). Again, the well-disbursed location of schools and parks in both cities would lead to overlapping restriction zones that essentially forbid any residential options in either city.
8. Policies adopted by other states relating to the mitigating concentration of sex offenders.
Iowa and Alabama are two states with general proximity restrictions on the location of sex offenders (see Appendices E and F).
Alabama originally set a 2,000-foot proximity restriction from schools. This was amended in 2001 to a 1,000-foot restriction, as of July 1, 2002. It appears that this law has not yet been enforced.
Iowa adopted Senate File 2197 in May 2002 with an effective date of July 1, 2002. The law includes a 2,000-foot proximity restriction from schools and child care facilities for any offender who offended against a minor. This has severely restricted residential options, especially in urban areas. In October 2002, the first charge under this law was made. The offender was living within 2,000 feet of a school and several registered child care centers.
Additional information on Minneapolis child care centers is attached (Appendix D).
Other states have held to the position that, except for court-ordered restrictions, the state has no authority to impose residency or proximity restrictions.
10

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-7 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 13 of 15 PageID #:343
Findings
1. Proximity restrictions have been adopted in other states, but there has been little experience with actual implementation of these laws. Two states, Alabama and Iowa, recently enacted or revised proximity restrictions. In October 2002, Iowa had the first charge against an offender for violating their law. This is considered a test case for the restrictions.
2. Proximity restrictions would severely limit already scarce residential options for level three offenders.
3. There is no evidence in Minnesota that residential proximity to schools or parks affects reoffense. Thirteen level three offenders released between 1997 and 1999 have been rearrested for a new sex offense since their release from prison, and in none of the cases has residential proximity to schools or parks been a factor in the re-offense.
4. There is no evidence that concentration of level three sex offenders increases the likelihood of reoffense within the community. Four of the 13 level three reoffenders were living with other sex offenders at the time of their re-arrest. However, in three of these cases, the sex offenders were living together while in county jail, civilly committed, or in a halfway house. In the fourth instance, a level three offender re-offended while he was living with a level two sex offender. This offender provided information to his therapist, which eventually led to the re-arrest of the level three offender for a child pornography offense.
5. Information on sex offenders has a negative effect on the perception of safety in a neighborhood. Increased information on sex offenders has a negative effect on property values. Increased residential concentration of level three offenders – in addition to other negative neighborhood issues such as crime, housing deterioration, environmental hazards, and traffic problems – expands that negative effect.
6. Proximity restrictions will have the effect of restricting level three offenders to less populated areas, with fewer supervising agents and fewer services for offenders (i.e., employment, education, and treatment). The result of proximity restrictions would be to limit most level three offenders to rural, suburban, or industrial areas.
Recommendations
1. Since blanket proximity restrictions on residential locations of level three offenders do not enhance community safety, the current offender-by-offender restrictions should be retained. Proximity restrictions, based on circumstances of an individual offender, serve as a valuable supervision tool. Continued use – through extension of conditional release and specific release conditions and restrictions – is appropriate. Most of these supervision proximity restrictions address the issue of the offender associating or interacting with children or minors, rather than where the offender resides.
2. Public notification of residential locations of level three offenders serves a valuable service and should continue. Community residents with this knowledge are able to determine what level of interaction they feel is acceptable for their family safety. The information raises awareness, dispels rumors, and allows greater knowledge of safety issues.
11

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-7 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 14 of 15 PageID #:344
3. A legislative hearing on the expansion of housing options should be held. Appropriate housing is the key to dispersal and successful placement of the sex offender population. A legislative hearing to address all the issues related to housing of released level three sex offenders would prove valuable. The DOC is currently conducting an interagency work group on offender housing. Included in this group’s study are the unique challenges of finding housing options for level three offenders. Options under exploration are public/private partnerships, charitable and nonprofit efforts, changes in policy, and other outreach programs
4. Explore various housing options. The interagency work group on offender housing sponsored by the DOC is approaching the need for offender housing through several methods. These methods include identifying ways to assist offenders in becoming more attractive tenants, as well as identifying ways to encourage and assist landlords in providing housing to offenders. Also, the work group is identifying various models of existing housing programs that may be adaptable to address the housing needs of offenders as they transition from prison to the community. Approaches such as master leases and “three-quarter way” houses seem appropriate for the offender population for several reasons – among them the flexibility to expect many offenders to reach and maintain housing self-sufficiency fairly soon after release.
The population that presents the most daunting housing issues is sex offenders who are identified as levels two and three through the community notification process. At present, no special solutions have been identified for this population.
Although the work group has not completed its task the time of this report, the following recommendations are offered:
a) Increase the number and capacity of halfway houses. In some cases the needs of the offender and public safety are best served when the offender transitions to the community through the highly structured environment of a halfway house. Current halfway house resources are inadequate to meet the number of offenders who need services. Also, there are regions of the state that have no halfway house resources.
b) Provide funding to establish “three-quarter way” houses. These houses provide another step in a continuum of housing options. Three-quarter way houses provide affordable housing for offenders and a positive supportive community within the house. There is no staff on the premises, but some degree of monitoring of the house is done by off-site staff. Such a facility also allows for an increased level of community supervision by agents, law enforcement, and the public. Most often these houses are expected to be nearly financially self-sufficient after an initial start-up period.
c) Provide funding for scattered site lease programs. Housing for offenders can be economically provided by contracting with housing programs. Housing programs can lease properties from owners and sublease to offenders. Included in this plan is the expectation that the offender is assessed payment on a sliding fee schedule. It is also an expectation that the offender will assume responsibility for all housing expenses soon after release.
12

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-7 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 15 of 15 PageID #:345 d) Increase funding of the emergency housing fund. Some offenders are released to regions of the state in which there is no housing program available. Increased funds in this account will allow the DOC to provide assistance to an offender in meeting housing expenses during transition. Repayment would be assessed on a sliding fee schedule. e) Evaluate the feasibility of building and operating regional correctional centers. These centers would provide a comprehensive set of correctional services. The services may range from probationary supervision, an alternative to incarceration for short-term offenders, and supervision services for offenders on release from state correctional facilities. The services would include housing for some offenders.
13

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-8 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 1 of 4 PageID #:346
Declaration of Delshay McDaniel
1. My name is Delshay McDaniel. Marcus Barnes is my cousin. I speak with Marcus regularly and have made extensive efforts over the past year and a half to find housing for him.
2. Marcus was supposed to be released from prison in December 2018. But he remains in prison because we have not been able to find a host site for Marcus to live at that the IDOC will approve.
3. We have submitted 11 different potential host sites as places for Marcus to live, including my home, my father’s home (Marcus’s uncle), several transitional housing facilities, and several motels.
4. Every proposed host site has been rejected. According to paperwork Marcus received from IDOC in response to a request he submitted (see attached), my home was rejected because there is a daycare within 500 feet of my house. My father’s home was rejected because there is a daycare within 500 feet of his home. Other sites were rejected because they are “motels” or “half-way houses.”
5. Several months ago, I began working with Jordan’s Dream, a Chicago-based organization that provides housing and supportive services to individuals who have been convicted of sex offenses, to try to find housing for Marcus.
6. The last address we submitted is 5726 S. Sangamon, which is a two flat owned and operated by Jordan’s Dream. The address has been rejected for the sole reason that there is a “sex offender registered at this address.” It is my understanding based on conversations with the landlord, Richard Boykins, that this address meets all of the other requirements for housing of individuals who have been convicted of sex offenses. It is not within 500 feet of a school, playground, daycare, or other facility that provides services to children.
7. Jordan’s Dream still has room available for Marcus at 5726 S. Sangamon. I and Marcus’ other family members are willing and able to pay for Marcus to live there. We have no other housing options for Marcus at this time.
8. On March 31, 2020, Marcus’ father, my uncle, passed away. I unfortunately had to communicate the information that his dad had died to Marcus while he remains imprisoned at Graham Correctional Center.
9. Marcus has told me that he has heard that a prison guard employed at Graham Correctional Center has been diagnosed with COVID-19. As a result he feels that he and the other prisoners at Graham, who remain confined in units containing 20 prisoners,

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-8 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 2 of 4 PageID #:347

are now at serious risk of contracting the disease. He does not feel safe remaining at Graham.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1746, I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing statements are true and correct.

__________________________ Delshay McDaniel

April 3, 2020

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-8 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 3 of 4 PageID #:348

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-8 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 4 of 4 PageID #:349

 
 Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-9 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:350

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-10 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:351

Declaration of Stanley Meyer
1. My name is Stanley Meyer. I was convicted of one count of criminal sexual assault in 2008 and was sentenced to serve 48 months in the Illinois Department of Corrections at 85 percent, with a MSR term of three years to life. The victim of my offense was an adult. The PRB approved me for release on MSR on July 15, 2011.
2. I remained imprisoned for more than eight years after my release date because I did not have money to pay for housing and did not have family outside of prison who were willing or able to help me.
3. On January 13, 2020, I was released on MSR to an apartment in North Chicago operated by NewDay Apartments. I resided there by myself for approximately four months. The apartment has two bedrooms and could easily accommodate two people. On May 27, 2020, another person on MSR from the Illinois Department of Corrections, Jerrand Miller, came and lived with me. We are currently both residing here.
4. I am currently looking for work in Lake County. Once I find a job and have a means to support myself, I will rent an apartment in the area. I have spoken to J.D. Lindenmeier, another individual who is on MSR and currently residing at NewDay Apartments, about the possibility of being roommates when we move.
5. It would be beneficial for J.D. and I to live together and share expenses like rent and utilities while we both serve our MSR sentences. J.D. and I get along well. Because I was released before him, I have tried to offer him help with things like obtaining clothing, applying for SNAP benefits, and navigating public transit in the area.
6. I have researched apartments for rent in the North Chicago and Waukegan areas. Many one bedroom apartments rent for approximately $750 to $850 per month, would be very difficult for me to afford on my own. However, two-bedroom apartments in the area often rent for approximately $900 to $1,100 per month, which is more affordable when split between two people.
7. It would enable both J.D. and me to move out of NewDay Apartments more quickly if we could live together and share living expenses.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1746, I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing statements are true and correct.

________________ Stanley Meyer

_7_-1_-2_0_______ Date

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-11 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:352
Declaration of Luis Aponte 1. My name is Luis Aponte. I was released from IDOC onto mandatory supervised release in January 2020 to my father’s home in Waukegan, Illinois. I have three-years-to-life of MSR. 2. My father’s home is in a four-story apartment building that contains approximately 12 separate units. When I was released, no other registrant lived in the building. IDOC determined that the address complies with the prohibition on residing within 500 feet of a school, playground or daycare, and approved me to live there while on MSR. 3. I am doing well on MSR. I have a full-time job in a warehouse and have been attending required sex offender therapy regularly. 4. In March 2020, another registrant (not on parole) moved into a different unit in the same building where I live with my father. 5. I received notice from my parole agent that I have to move because of this other registrant in the building. If I do not find somewhere else to live, I will have my MSR revoked and will be sent back to prison. If I go back to prison, I will lose my job and will be stuck in IDOC until I can find another place to live. 6. I have been looking for another place to live, but I have not been able to find a host site that IDOC will approve and that I can afford with my current income. 7. I want to keep living with my father while I adjust to life on parole and get back on my feet.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1746, I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing statements are true and correct.

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-11 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:353

_________________ Luis Aponte

_5_-2_4_-_2_0_____ Date

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-12 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:354
Declaration of Kevin Manson 1. My name is Kevin Manson. I was released from IDOC onto mandatory supervised release on May 6, 2020. I currently reside in Chicago Heights, Illinois, with my aunt. I have three-years-to life of MSR. 2. IDOC approved me for release to my aunt’s home, but when I tried to register with Chicago Heights police, I was informed that my aunt’s house is too close to a school and I have to move somewhere else. 3. I just got out of prison and don’t have funds to pay for housing of my own. The Cook County Justice Advisory Council (“CCJAC”), a governmental entity that provides reentry assistance to citizens returning to Cook County after imprisonment, is willing to pay for my housing through an agency called New Beginnings. 4. It is my understanding that New Beginnings has a bed available for me at 11934 S. Lowe Chicago Illinois, 60628, and is able to take me immediately. 5. I have not yet been approved to go to New Beginnings because there is another registrant living at 11934 S. Lowe and I am prohibited from living at the same address as another sex offender. 6. If I am not allowed to go to New Beginnings I will not have a compliant place to live and will be sent back to prison. I could also be criminally charged with failure to register and residing too close to a school.

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-12 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:355

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1746, I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing statements are true and correct.

_________________ Kevin Manson

_5_-_2_5-_2_0_____ Date

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-13 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:356

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-14 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:357

Declaration of John Margarella
1. My name is John Margarella. I was convicted of possession of child pornography in 2012. I was sentenced to three years of incarceration at 50 percent and three years to life on mandatory supervised release. I completed my sentence of incarceration and was approved for release on MSR in December 2013.
2. I remained imprisoned for more than six years beyond the completion of my sentence because couldn’t secure housing. My family asked IDOC to release me to homes with every family member who was willing to take me in. Every proposed location with members of my family was rejected because of proximity to schools or playgrounds or the presence of children. No one in my family has the money to buy or rent a separate place for me to live and I do not have savings to pay for my own housing.
3. While in IDOC, I was told that I was not eligible for release to a halfway house or shelter.
4. On June 23, 2020, I was released on MSR to an apartment operated by NewDay Apartments in Waukegan, Illinois. I reside with Jerry Davis, another person on MSR from the Illinois Department of Corrections. It is a two-bedroom apartment. Jerry and I get along well. We are both grateful for the opportunity to be out of prison and to have the ability to get our lives back on track and reestablish our relationships with our families.
5. Since my release, I have been looking for work and talking with my family frequently.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1746, I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing statements are true and correct.

________________ John Margarella

7-1-20
___________ Date

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-15 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:358
Declaration of Fredrick Chamblis 1. My name is Fredrick Chamblis. My date of birth is July 13, 1992. I was convicted of criminal sexual assault in 2012 and was sentenced to serve four years in the Illinois Department of Corrections plus three years to life of mandatory supervised release. 2. My original out date for release from prison was January 22, 2016. I was not released from prison at that time because I could not find housing. I did not have savings to pay for my own housing. I submitted addresses with every member of my family who was willing to take me in both in Illinois and in Wisconsin, but every address was rejected. 3. I remained in prison until May 19, 2020, when I was approved for release to Wayside Cross Ministries, where I currently reside. 4. Wayside Cross has a positive, uplifting and motivating atmosphere that makes it a great place for me to build a foundation for reentry into society. There are many resources and services that help with parole, and there is a strong sense of love, brotherhood and fellowship. The daily routine and schedule here helps all of the residents focus on our priorities and set high standards and expectations for ourselves. It has helped me look at the bigger picture and begin thinking about and planning for short and long term goals such as successfully completing the program at WCM, obtaining employment, and saving up to go back to college to earn a degree. Most importantly, it allows me a chance to really establish a close relationship with God that will be the foundation for my future.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1746, I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing statements are true and correct.

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-15 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:359

_____________________ Fredrick Chamblis

_6-_3_0_-2_0_2_0____ Date

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-16 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:360

Declaration of Corey Crowe 1. My name is Corey Crowe. My date of birth is February 7, 1979. I was convicted of criminal sexual assault in 2013 and was sentenced to serve six years in the Illinois Department of Corrections plus three years to life of mandatory supervised release. 2. My original out date was June 5, 2018. I was held for almost two years past my out date because I could not find housing. My family in Illinois and Kentucky tried to help me find a place to live, but all of their homes were rejected by the IDOC. I didn’t have money to pay for my own housing, and my family was unable to pay for a place on my behalf. My mother is older and has minimal income. 3. Before I learned about the possibility of going to Wayside Cross, I was convinced I would die in prison. My mental state was in jeopardy and I was becoming depressed because I saw no way that I would ever be able to get out of prison. It was also an emotional burden on my family who worried about me but helpless to get me out. 4. On May 19, 2020, I was released to Wayside Cross Ministries. I now have the opportunity to move past my conviction and have a normal life. I am looking forward to working, helping my mother, and being a father to my daughter again.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1746, I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing statements are true and correct.

_____________________ Corey Crowe

_7-_1_-2_0_______ Date

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-17 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:361

Declaration of Jerry Davis
1. My name is Jerry Davis. I was convicted of criminal sexual assault in 2006 and was sentenced to four years in prison plus three years to life of mandatory supervised release. I became eligible for release on MSR on December 30, 2008. I was not released at that time because I could not find housing.
2. I had family members who were willing to take me in, but IDOC did not approve any family members’ addresses because they were all deemed to be too close to schools or parks.
3. In June 2016, nearly eight years after my out date, I was released to Hand-n-Hand Outreach, a transitional housing provider in Chicago. I was out on MSR for approximately a year and half. I was doing well on MSR. I had a job and was enrolled in school. Unfortunately, in November 2017, I lost my housing at Hand-n-Hand because I returned there after curfew.
4. The PRB did not revoke my MSR. I was immediately eligible for re-release if I could find a place to live. But, I was not able to find housing for the next two years. In total I served ten years of dead time before I was released to NewDay Apartments in December 2019.
5. I am currently residing at NewDay Apartments in Waukegan with John Margarella. I have obtained employment in a warehouse and will be able to move into my own place in the near future.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1746, I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing statements are true and correct.

________________ Jerry Davis

_7_-2_-2_0_______ Date

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-18 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:362

Declaration of Joshua Huddleston 1. My name is Joshua Huddleston. I was convicted in 2013 of predatory criminal sexual
assault and sentenced to six years in IDOC plus three-years-to-life MSR. I completed my prison term on January 22, 2019, but I remained imprisoned because I was unable to secure housing. 2. My parents were unable to help me find a place to stay outside of prison and did not have room to let me stay with them. 3. I am medically retired from the U.S. military and have savings sufficient to pay for my own housing for at least a year. But, while I was imprisoned, I wasn’t able to secure housing because I couldn’t search for housing, sign a lease or set up utilities. Because of my inability to find housing, I spent 16 months of “dead time” in prison. 4. On June 8, 2020, I was released to New Beginnings at 6655 S. Perry in Chicago, where I currently resides with eight other parolees. New Beginnings is a very encouraging and positive place. Everyone here is very committed to succeeding on parole and highly motivated to stay out of prison. 5. We offer each other mutual support and encouragement; share our respective faiths; and all pitch in to make the house a home. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1746, I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing statements are true and correct.

_______________________ Joshua Huddleston

__7-_1_-2_0______ Date

Case: 1:20-cv-02137 Document #: 34-19 Filed: 07/02/20 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:363

Declaration of Ronald Garrison 1. My name is Ronald Garrison. I was convicted of predatory criminal sexual assault in
2009. I was sentenced to serve 12 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections and three years of mandatory supervised release. 2. I completed my sentence and became entitled to be released on MSR on March 6, 2019. However, because I was unable to secure housing, I remained imprisoned for 15 additional months. I was released to New Beginnings at 6655 S. Perry, on June 12, 2020, when my mother and a friend agreed to help me pay for a month’s rent. I am currently residing at New Beginnings with eight other parolees at this address. 3. New Beginnings is a structured environment where the residents look out for and support one another. We have a brief meeting every day where we discuss ways to stay positive and hopeful for the future. We have a support group twice a week where we share insights and advice and offer each other support. 4. I am looking for full-time employment that will enable me to pay rent and remain at New Beginnings. In the meantime, I am earning some money by cooking and doing landscaping and drywall at New Beginnings. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1746, I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing statements are true and correct.

_______________________ Ronald Garrison

_7-_1_-2_0_______ Date

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

MARCUS BARNES, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ROB JEFFREYS, in his official

)

Capacity as the Director of the Illinois )

Department of Corrections,

)

)

Defendant.

)

No. 20-cv-2137

ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS’ FOURTH MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

A hearing was held on August 12, 2020, on Plaintiffs’ fourth motion for a

preliminary injunction [47].

The members of the class identified below have completed their sentences of

imprisonment and are entitled to be released from the custody of the Illinois

Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) to serve their Mandatory Supervised Release

time in the community, provided that they are able to submit a host site that is

acceptable to the IDOC. Each of the Plaintiffs has identified housing that would

otherwise be approved by IDOC, but for the “One Person Per Address” provision in

730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6). This Court has already determined that it is

unconstitutional to imprison sex offenders after their period of incarceration has

been completed solely because they are unable to find suitable host sites. See

Murphy v. Raoul, 380 F. Supp. 3d 781 (N.D. Ill. 2019).

The following class members have identified host sites that will be supportive of
their transition back into the community:
Wayside Cross Ministries, 215 E. New York St., Aurora, IL 60505
• Joe Dordies, B17653
House of Hope, 1611 Matheny St., Springfield, Illinois 62702
• Anton Ruth, M14977 • Maurice Hopkins-Bey, M11568 • Henry Smith, R12201
New Beginnings, 718 W. 103rd St., Chicago, Illinois 60628
• Charles Rucker, A71978 • Frank Waltrip, K02188 • Juan Medina, K67974 • Paul Hubbard, M07217 • Morris Harris, M19779 • John Cegielski, Y20579 • Patrick Schneider, M20333 • Mudy Munoz-Salgado, M43061 • James Spencer, M02701 • Gary Kluber, M36082 • Laroy Jackson, K52889 • Edward Taylor, M30456 • John Gonzales, M19989 • Elias Sabaleta, Y26397 • Everett Cade III, S11681 • Marvin Haymon, M12792 • Lucas Rehor, M33256 • Howard Jackson, R18773
96 W. 157th Place, Harvey IL 60426
• James Young, K59592
326 N. Avon, Rockford, Illinois 61101
• Paul Murphy, M40321 • Jeffrey Kramer, M55631

6655 S. Perry, Various Units, Chicago, Illinois 60621
• Antoine Younger, M31285 • Anthony Navarro, M34149 • Jason Wright, M35008 • Dwayne Loyde, B69827 • Jarvis Beane, M48216 • Michael Lewis, S00745 • Christopher Williams, M05123 • James Jackson, M46973 • Gino Camacho, Y20046 • Paul Boron, R67726 • Jerry Behm, M38655 • Larry Eubanks, M32255 • Brian Dodd, R67171 • Daniel Morris, M37365 • Mickey Ball, M12575 • Andrew Ford, M34011 • Gregory Alexander, M05918 • Darian Atwood Jr., Y25847
Locations Owned and Operated by NewDay Apartments and Home-At-Last
• Lavert Kidd, R68385 • Dudley Robinson, R42392 • Ronnie Howard, R60483 • Michael Jachim, M26284 • Efrain Cordova, M28877 • Curtin Barfield, R66565 • James Brewer, M32532 • Ramon Henderson, M26358 • William Freitag, M00305 • Christopher Williams, M05123 • Lorenzo Sandoval, R40238 • Kelly Anderson, M34698 • Cody Cooper, B86998 • Steven Captain, K68098 • John Neal, R66793 • Mickey Ball, M12575 • Brian Adams, M36916 • Michael Blakes, K83496

NewDay Apartments, 522 Hill Ave, Elgin, Illinois 60120 • Alvin Goldberg, M36526, • Arnulfo Juarez, Y41407, and • Aaron Salgado, M32744 At each of these proposed housing locations, the class member would be residing
in the same building as another person who has been convicted of a sex offense, and therefore Defendant cannot release these individuals to the proposed locations because of its obligation to follow 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6).
There has been no legitimate public interest articulated in only having one sex offender live at one residence. Therefore, the Court finds that the statute is unconstitutional as it applies to the individuals identified above, and Defendant is enjoined from enforcing the “One Person Per Address” provision in 730 ILCS 5/3-37(a)(7.6) as to these individuals to the extent they seek release to the locations identified above.
The release of the above-identified class members is subject to the approval of the host, program operator, or landlord at each housing location; and subject to the proposed housing locations otherwise being approved by IDOC as meeting all requirements and satisfying applicable provisions of Illinois law.

___________________________ Hon. Virginia M. Kendall, United States District Judge

August 13, 2020 Date