U.S. District Court Eastern District of Michigan (Flint) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:17−cv−11441−LVP−MKM

CLOSED

Fowler et al v. Johnson Assigned to: District Judge Linda V. Parker Referred to: Magistrate Judge Mona K. Majzoub Case in other court: U.S. Court of Appeals − Sixth Circuit,
17−02504
U.S. Court of Appeals − Sixth Circuit, 17−02504/18−01089
U.S. Court of Appeals − Sixth Circuit, 18−01089/17−02504 Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 05/04/2017 Date Terminated: 02/24/2020 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Adrian Fowler

represented by Anthony D. Paris Maurice and Jane Sugar Law Center 4605 Cass Avenue, 2nd Floor Detroit, MI 48201 313.993.4505 Fax: 313.877.8470 Email: tparis11@yahoo.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Catherine B. Sevcenko Equal Justice Under Law 400 7th Street, Suite 602 Washington, DC 20004 703−862−5283 Email: catherine@equaljusticeunderlaw.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John C. Philo Sugar Law Center 4605 Cass Avenue Detroit, MI 48201 313−993−4505 Fax: 313−887−8470 Email: johnphilo1@comcast.net ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca R. Ramaswamy Equal Justice Under Law 400 7th Street, Suite 602 Washington, DC 20004 202−643−0340 Email: rramaswamy@equaljusticeunderlaw.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Phil Telfeyan Equal Justice Under Law 400 7th Street, Suite 602 Washington, DC 20004 202−505−2058 Email: ptelfeyan@equaljusticeunderlaw.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Kitia Harris

represented by Anthony D. Paris (See above for address)

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Catherine B. Sevcenko (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John C. Philo (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebecca R. Ramaswamy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Phil Telfeyan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Ruth Johnson

represented by Erik A. Grill Michigan Department of Attorney General PO Box 30736 Lansing, MI 48909 517−335−7659 Email: grille@michigan.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John G. Fedynsky State of Michigan Attorney General's Office Complex Litigation Division P.O. Box 30736 525 W. Ottawa St. Lansing, MI 48909 517−335−3055 Fax: 517−3357157 Email: fedynskyj@michigan.gov TERMINATED: 01/23/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 05/04/2017
05/04/2017 05/05/2017 05/05/2017

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT filed by All Plaintiffs against All Defendants with Jury Demand. Plaintiff requests summons issued. Receipt No: 0645−6213346 − Fee: &#036 400. County of 1st Plaintiff: Wayne − County Where Action Arose: Wayne − County of 1st Defendant: Wayne. [Previously dismissed case: No] [Possible companion case(s): None] (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit Exhibit 6, # 7 Index of Exhibits Index) (Telfeyan, Phil) (Entered: 05/04/2017)
2 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Index of Exhibits Index) (Telfeyan, Phil) (Entered: 05/04/2017)
A United States Magistrate Judge of this Court is available to conduct all proceedings in this civil action in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 636c and FRCP 73. The Notice, Consent, and Reference of a Civil Action to a Magistrate Judge form is available for download at http://www.mied.uscourts.gov (DPer) (Entered: 05/05/2017)
3 SUMMONS Issued for *Ruth Johnson* (DPer) (Entered: 05/05/2017)

05/06/2017 05/25/2017 05/26/2017 05/26/2017 05/26/2017 05/30/2017
06/12/2017 06/16/2017
06/30/2017 06/30/2017 07/05/2017 07/17/2017 07/21/2017 08/04/2017 10/19/2017
11/02/2017
11/07/2017 11/14/2017 11/15/2017
12/14/2017 12/15/2017

4 CERTIFICATE of Service/Summons Returned Executed. All Defendants. (Telfeyan, Phil) (Entered: 05/06/2017)
5 NOTICE of Appearance by Catherine B. Sevcenko on behalf of All Plaintiffs. (Sevcenko, Catherine) (Entered: 05/25/2017)
6 NOTICE of Appearance by John G. Fedynsky on behalf of Ruth Johnson. (Fedynsky, John) (Entered: 05/26/2017)
7 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE: John C. Philo appearing on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Philo, John) (Entered: 05/26/2017)
8 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE: Anthony D. Paris appearing on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Paris, Anthony) (Entered: 05/26/2017)
9 STIPULATED ORDER for Extension of Time to File First Response Pleading and Response (Response to 2 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction due by 6/16/2017), (Responsive Pleading due by 7/17/2017). Signed by District Judge Linda V. Parker. (RLou) (Entered: 05/30/2017)
10 NOTICE of Appearance by Rebecca R. Ramaswamy on behalf of All Plaintiffs. (Ramaswamy, Rebecca) (Entered: 06/12/2017)
11 RESPONSE to 2 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Ruth Johnson. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1− Certified Driving Record, Fowler, # 2 Exhibit 2− Certified Driving Record, Harris) (Fedynsky, John) (Entered: 06/16/2017)
12 Joint MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages for Reply Brief in Support of Preliminary Injunction by All Plaintiffs. (Telfeyan, Phil) (Entered: 06/30/2017)
13 REPLY to Response re 2 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction and Response to Motion to Dismiss filed by All Plaintiffs. (Telfeyan, Phil) (Entered: 06/30/2017)
TEXT−ONLY ORDER Granting 12 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. IT IS SO ORDERED. Issued by District Judge Linda V. Parker. (RLou) (Entered: 07/05/2017)
14 MOTION to Dismiss or Alternatively for Summary Judgment by Ruth Johnson. (Fedynsky, John) (Entered: 07/17/2017)
15 RESPONSE to 14 MOTION to Dismiss or Alternatively for Summary Judgment filed by All Plaintiffs. (Telfeyan, Phil) (Entered: 07/21/2017)
16 REPLY to Response re 14 MOTION to Dismiss or Alternatively for Summary Judgment filed by Ruth Johnson. (Fedynsky, John) (Entered: 08/04/2017)
17 NOTICE OF HEARING on 2 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction. Motion Hearing set for 11/8/2017 at 1:00 PM before District Judge Linda V. Parker. (RLou) (Entered: 10/19/2017)
18 AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING on 2 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction. Motion Hearing RESET for 11/15/2017 at 11:00 AM before District Judge Linda V. Parker (RLou) (Entered: 11/02/2017)
19 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs of Newly Issued Authority (Telfeyan, Phil) (Entered: 11/07/2017)
20 RESPONSE to 19 Notice (Other) by Ruth Johnson. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1−Updated Certified Driving Record) (Fedynsky, John) (Entered: 11/14/2017)
Minute Entry for proceedings before District Judge Linda V. Parker: Motion Hearing held on 11/15/2017 re 2 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction . Disposition: Motion Taken Under Advisement. (Court Reporter: Peg Goodrich) (RLou) (Entered: 11/15/2017)
21 OPINION and ORDER Granting Plaintiffs' 2 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Signed by District Judge Linda V. Parker. (RLou) (Entered: 12/14/2017)
22 NOTICE OF APPEAL by Ruth Johnson re 21 Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Fee Status: No Fee Paid. (Fedynsky, John) (Entered: 12/15/2017)

12/18/2017 12/18/2017 12/19/2017 12/19/2017 12/20/2017
12/20/2017 12/21/2017 12/28/2017 01/05/2018 01/10/2018 01/12/2018
01/17/2018 01/19/2018

23 Certificate of Service re 22 Notice of Appeal. (DWor) (Entered: 12/18/2017)
24 Appeal Fee received for 22 Notice of Appeal filed by Ruth Johnson in the amount of $ $505.00 − Receipt No. DET109815. (RBog) (Entered: 12/19/2017)
25 Emergency MOTION to Stay Pending Appeal by Ruth Johnson. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit 1 − Driving Record, # 3 Exhibit 2 − Gaspar Affidavit, # 4 Exhibit 3 − Carroll Affidavit w/ Attachments, # 5 Exhibit 4 − Administrative Order, # 6 Exhibit 5 − Court Collections Programs Components and Details) (Fedynsky, John) (Entered: 12/19/2017)
26 RESPONSE to 25 Emergency MOTION to Stay Pending Appeal filed by All Plaintiffs. (Ramaswamy, Rebecca) (Entered: 12/19/2017)
27 TRANSCRIPT of PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION held on November 15, 2017. (Court Reporter: Peg L. Goodrich) (Number of Pages: 64) The parties have 21 days to file with the court and Court Reporter a Redaction Request of this transcript. If no request is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 days. Redaction Request due 1/10/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 1/22/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 3/20/2018. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date, the transcript is publicly available. (Goodrich, P) (Entered: 12/20/2017)
28 REPLY to Response re 25 Emergency MOTION to Stay Pending Appeal filed by Ruth Johnson. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit 1 − Gaspar Corrected Affidavit, # 3 Exhibit 2 − SCAO Web Site Printout, # 4 Exhibit 3 − SCAO Report) (Fedynsky, John) (Entered: 12/20/2017)
29 OPINION and ORDER Denying Defendant's Emergency 25 Motion for Stay Pending Appeal. Signed by District Judge Linda V. Parker. (RLou) (Entered: 12/21/2017)
30 ORDER from U.S. Court of Appeals − Sixth Circuit re 22 Notice of Appeal filed by Ruth Johnson [Appeal Case Number 17−2504] (SKra) (Entered: 01/02/2018)
31 ORDER to Appear (Hearing set for 1/17/2018 at 10:00 AM before District Judge Linda V. Parker) ***IN JUDGE MICHELSON'S COURTROOM #242 − IN DETROIT***. Signed by District Judge Linda V. Parker. (RLou) (Entered: 01/05/2018)
32 [PLAINTIFFS BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO ORDER TO APPEAR] NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 31 Order, Set Deadlines/Hearings Plaintiffs' Brief in Response to Order to Appear (Ramaswamy, Rebecca) Modified on 1/12/2018 (LGra). Modified on 1/12/2018 (LGra). (Entered: 01/10/2018)
33 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF re 31 Order, Set Deadlines/Hearings filed by Ruth Johnson. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit 1 − Harris Records, 19th District − Dearborn, # 3 Exhibit 2 − Harris Records, 29th District Wayne, # 4 Exhibit 3 − Harris Records, 1st District Monroe, # 5 Exhibit 4 − Harris Records, 43rd District Ferndale, # 6 Exhibit 5 − Harris Records, 36th District Detroit, # 7 Exhibit 6 − Fowler Records, 46th District − Southfield, # 8 Exhibit 7 − Fowler Records, 43rd District Court − Ferndale, # 9 Exhibit 8 − Fowler Records, 38th District Eastpointe, # 10 Exhibit 9 − Fowler Records, 45th District Oak Park, # 11 Exhibit 10 − Determining Ability to Pay in the Collection of Court, # 12 Exhibit 11 − Affidavit of Colleen Tulloch−Brown, # 13 Exhibit 12 − Trial Court Collections Standards & Guidelines, # 14 Exhibit 13 − Affidavit of Thomas L. Cantrell) (Fedynsky, John) (Entered: 01/12/2018)
Minute Entry for proceedings before District Judge Linda V. Parker: Hearing re 30 Order to Appear held on 1/17/2018. Disposition: Taken Under Advisement (Court Reporter: Jodi Matthews) (JOwe) (Entered: 01/17/2018)
34 TRANSCRIPT of HEARING ON PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION held on January 17, 2018. (Court Reporter/Transcriber: Nefertiti Jodi Matthews) (Number of Pages: 51) The parties have 21 days to file with the court and Court Reporter/Transcriber a Redaction Request of this transcript. If no request is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 days.

01/24/2018 01/25/2018 01/26/2018 01/26/2018 01/26/2018 02/07/2018 02/16/2018 02/21/2018
02/26/2018 02/26/2018
03/01/2018 03/06/2018 03/07/2018 03/08/2018 03/08/2018

Redaction Request due 2/9/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/20/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/19/2018. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through WWW.TRANSCRIPTORDERS.COM before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date, the transcript is publicly available. (Matthews, N) (Entered: 01/19/2018)
35 AMENDED PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION RE: 21 OPINION and ORDER Granting Plaintiffs' 2 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Signed by District Judge Linda V. Parker. (JOwe) (Entered: 01/24/2018)
36 NOTICE OF APPEAL by Ruth Johnson re 35 Preliminary Injunction. Fee Status: No Fee Paid. (Fedynsky, John) (Entered: 01/25/2018)
37 Certificate of Service re 36 Notice of Appeal. (DAll) (Entered: 01/26/2018)
38 Notice of Appeal Filing Fee Not Paid. Correction due by 2/2/2018 (DAll) (Entered: 01/26/2018)
39 Appeal Fee received for 36 Notice of Appeal filed by Ruth Johnson in the amount of $ $505.00 − Receipt No. DET110774. (RBog) (Entered: 01/29/2018)
40 ORDER from U.S. Court of Appeals − Sixth Circuit re 36 Notice of Appeal filed by Ruth Johnson, 22 Notice of Appeal filed by Ruth Johnson [Appeal Case Number 17−2504/18−1089] (DWor) (Entered: 02/08/2018)
41 NOTICE TO APPEAR BY TELEPHONE: Status Conference set for 2/21/2018 at 10:00 AM before District Judge Linda V. Parker (RLou) (Entered: 02/16/2018)
Minute Entry for proceedings before District Judge Linda V. Parker: Telephonic Status Conference held on 2/21/2018. Disposition: The Plaintiffs are allowed the opportunity to file Ms. Harris' affidavit, on or before February 26, 2018. The Defendant can file a response to the affidavit, on or before March 7, 2018. (Court Reporter: None Present, Not on the Record) (RLou) (Entered: 02/21/2018)
42 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Brief and Declaration in Support of Standing (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Exhibit List, # 2 Exhibit Ex. 1, Fowler Decl, # 3 Exhibit Ex. 2, Fowler Driving Record, # 4 Exhibit Ex. 3, Harris Decl, # 5 Exhibit Ex. 4, Harris Driving Record) (Ramaswamy, Rebecca) (Entered: 02/26/2018)
43 MOTION for Leave to File Amended Complaint and Class Certification Motion by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Amended Complaint, # 2 Index of Exhibits, # 3 Exhibit 1, FOIA Response, # 4 Exhibit 2, Fowler Declaration, # 5 Exhibit 3, Harris Declaration, # 6 Exhibit 4, Jones Declaration, # 7 Exhibit 5, Rankin Declaration, # 8 Exhibit 6, Herson−Hord Declaration, # 9 Exhibit 7, State Dep't Letter, # 10 Exhibit 8, Garnishment Letter, # 11 Exhibit 9, Simmons Declaration, # 12 Exhibit Class Certification Motion and Brief, # 13 Index of Exhibits, # 14 Exhibit 1, Fowler Declaration, # 15 Exhibit 2, Harris Declaration, # 16 Exhibit 3, Jones Declaration, # 17 Exhibit 4, Rankin Declaration, # 18 Exhibit 5, Telfeyan Declaration) (Ramaswamy, Rebecca) (Entered: 02/26/2018)
44 MOTION to Strike 43 MOTION for Leave to File Amended Complaint and Class Certification Motion by Ruth Johnson. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Email Correspondence) (Fedynsky, John) (Entered: 03/01/2018)
45 RESPONSE to 44 MOTION to Strike 43 MOTION for Leave to File Amended Complaint and Class Certification Motion Opposition to Motion to Strike filed by All Plaintiffs. (Ramaswamy, Rebecca) (Entered: 03/06/2018)
46 RESPONSE to 42 Notice (Other), by Ruth Johnson. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Bormuth v. Johnson, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Affidavit of Linda Carroll) (Fedynsky, John) (Entered: 03/07/2018)
47 REPLY to Response re 44 MOTION to Strike 43 MOTION for Leave to File Amended Complaint and Class Certification Motion filed by Ruth Johnson. (Fedynsky, John) (Entered: 03/08/2018)
48 NOTICE TO APPEAR BY TELEPHONE: Status Conference set for 3/8/2018 at 2:00 PM before District Judge Linda V. Parker (RLou) (Entered: 03/08/2018)

03/08/2018 03/08/2018 03/14/2018 03/15/2018
03/15/2018 03/21/2018
03/22/2018
03/28/2018 04/11/2018 04/18/2018 05/08/2019 07/08/2019 12/12/2019 01/21/2020

Minute Entry for proceedings before District Judge Linda V. Parker: Telephonic Status Conference held on 3/8/2018. Disposition: The Court will enter an Order regarding the response deadline for the 43 Motion for Leave. (Court Reporter: None Present, Not on the Record) (RLou) (Entered: 03/08/2018)
TEXT−ONLY ORDER Extending the Deadline for the Defendant to File a Response to the 43 MOTION for Leave to File Amended Complaint and Class Certification Motion.( Response due by 3/21/2018). IT IS SO ORDERED. Issued by District Judge Linda V. Parker. (RLou) (Entered: 03/08/2018)
49 MOTION for Leave to File Reply Brief in Support of Standing by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Reply Brief in Support of Standing) (Ramaswamy, Rebecca) (Entered: 03/14/2018)
TEXT−ONLY Order Granting the 49 Motion for Leave to File Reply Brief in Support of Standing. The reply brief shall be filed by the close of business today, March 15, 2018. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant may file a surreply on or before March 22, 2018. The surreply is limited to five pages. IT IS SO ORDERED. Issued by District Judge Linda V. Parker. (RLou) (Entered: 03/15/2018)
50 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF re 46 Response (Free) Reply in Support of Standing filed by All Plaintiffs. (Ramaswamy, Rebecca) (Entered: 03/15/2018)
51 RESPONSE to 43 MOTION for Leave to File Amended Complaint and Class Certification Motion filed by Ruth Johnson. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit 1 − Jones Court Records, 47th District − Farmington, # 3 Exhibit 2 − Jones Court Records, 46th District − Southfield, # 4 Exhibit 3 − Jones Court Records, 24th District − Allen Park, # 5 Exhibit 4 − Jones Court Records, 34th District − Romulus, # 6 Exhibit 5 − Jones Court Records, 17th District − Redford Twp, # 7 Exhibit 6 − Rankin Court Records, 36th District, Detroit, # 8 Exhibit 7 − Rankin Court Records, 45−B District, Oak Park, # 9 Exhibit 8 − Rankin Court Records, 21st District− Garden City, # 10 Exhibit 9 − Rankin Driving Record, # 11 Exhibit 10 − Jones Driving Record, # 12 Exhibit 11 − The Secretary's Driver's License Change of Address, Voter Registration Website) (Fedynsky, John) (Entered: 03/21/2018)
52 SUR−REPLY re 49 MOTION for Leave to File Reply Brief in Support of Standing in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Reply Brief in Support of Standing filed by Ruth Johnson. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Exhibit List, # 2 Exhibit 1. State of Michigan 14−Day Notice − Traffic, # 3 Exhibit 2. Type of Court Cases Web Page) (Fedynsky, John) (Entered: 03/22/2018)
53 REPLY to Response re 43 MOTION for Leave to File Amended Complaint and Class Certification Motion filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Jones Declaration) (Ramaswamy, Rebecca) (Entered: 03/28/2018)
54 OPINION and ORDER. Signed by District Judge Linda V. Parker. (RLou) (Entered: 04/11/2018)
55 ORDER from U.S. Court of Appeals − Sixth Circuit re 36 Notice of Appeal filed by Ruth Johnson, 22 Notice of Appeal filed by Ruth Johnson [Appeal Case Number 17−2504/18−1089] (SKra) (Entered: 04/19/2018)
56 OPINION and JUDGMENT from U.S. Court of Appeals − Sixth Circuit re 36 Notice of Appeal filed by Ruth Johnson, 22 Notice of Appeal filed by Ruth Johnson [Appeal Case Number 17−2504/18−1089] (SKra) Modified on 5/8/2019 (SKra). (Entered: 05/08/2019)
57 ORDER from U.S. Court of Appeals − Sixth Circuit re 36 Notice of Appeal filed by Ruth Johnson [Appeal Case Number 17−2504/18−1089] (DWor) (Entered: 07/08/2019)
58 MANDATE from U.S. Court of Appeals − Sixth Circuit as to 56 Appeal Order/Opinion/Judgment [Appeal Case Number 18−1089/17−2504] (SKra) (Entered: 12/12/2019)
59 ATTORNEY SUBSTITUTION for Ruth Johnson: Erik A. Grill added. Remove John Fedynsky (Grill, Erik) (Entered: 01/21/2020)

01/21/2020
01/23/2020 01/23/2020 02/24/2020

60 [STRICKEN] ATTORNEY SUBSTITUTION for All Plaintiffs : Phil Telfeyan added. Marissa Hatton Substituted for Rebecca Ramaswamy and Catherine Sevcenko (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Telfeyan, Phil) Modified on 1/23/2020 (RLou). (Entered: 01/21/2020)
61 ORDER Permitting Substitution of Attorneys. Signed by District Judge Linda V. Parker. (RLou) (Entered: 01/23/2020)
62 ORDER Striking 60 Attorney Substitution. Signed by District Judge Linda V. Parker. (RLou) (Entered: 01/23/2020)
63 STIPULATED ORDER of DISMISSAL. Signed by District Judge Linda V. Parker. (RLou) (Entered: 02/24/2020)

 
 THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

____________________________________

)

ADRIAN FOWLER and KITIA HARRIS, )

on behalf of themselves and

)

others similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

Case No. 17-11441

v.

)

)

CLASS ACTION

RUTH JOHNSON, in her official capacity )

JURY DEMANDED

as Secretary of State of the Michigan

)

Department of State

)

)

Defendant.

)

____________________________________)

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Introduction

1. This case is about the Michigan Department of State running a wealth-based

driver’s license suspension scheme that traps some of the state’s poorest residents in a cycle of

poverty. The Secretary of State automatically and indefinitely suspends the driver’s licenses of

people who owe court-ordered fines, costs, fees, and assessments, even if they simply cannot

afford pay. Without driver’s licenses, people already facing the harsh realities of owing court debt

while living in poverty face additional hurdles of being unable to drive to and from work, get their

children to daycare, keep medical appointments, and care for their family members.

2. Although Michigan’s automatic suspension of driver’s licenses is designed to

coerce payment, for people who are unable to pay, Michigan’s practice will never accomplish its

intended goal; no incentive or punishment will increase the likelihood of a person paying a debt if

she does not have the money. Penalizing people for being unable to pay court debts violates the

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Due Process guarantee of fundamental

1

fairness, Plaintiffs’ right to intrastate travel, and longstanding Supreme Court precedent. Michigan has trapped Plaintiffs in an inescapable cycle of poverty by suspending their licenses, thereby narrowing or eliminating their job opportunities and impeding their ability to take care of their children and obtain necessary medical treatment.
3. The Secretary of State indefinitely suspends the driver’s licenses of people who fail to pay court-ordered fines, costs, fees, and assessments, even where nonpayment is solely due to indigence and thus not willful. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 257.321a(2). Individuals who cannot afford to pay their court debts after their licenses have been suspended must also pay a driver’s license clearance fee of $45 before the suspension is lifted, and this figure may multiply if an individual owes multiple debts. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 257.321a(5)(b). Anyone who is caught driving with a suspended license (DWLS) because of failure to pay court costs faces an additional 30-day suspension and must pay a reinstatement fee of $125. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 257.904 and 257.320e. Additionally, under MCL 257.732a, anyone guilty of a DWLS misdemeanor before October of 2018 owes a Driver Responsibility Fee of up to $1,000 over two years. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 257.732a(2) and (11).
4. Over the last three years, Michigan has assessed approximately $40 million in Driver Responsibility fees, and over 100,000 people have lost their driver’s licenses simply because they are too poor to pay court costs and fines. See Exhibit 6, FOIA Response. These suspensions deprive some of Michigan’s poorest residents of their only reliable means of transportation to and from work, further diminishing their ability to meet their court-ordered financial obligations.
5. By and through their attorneys, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendant Ruth Johnson in her
2

official capacity as Secretary of the Michigan Department of State to end this unconstitutional wealth-based suspension scheme because it violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution.
Nature of the Action 6. The Michigan Department of State automatically suspends the driver’s licenses of people who fail to pay court-ordered fines, costs, fees, and assessments, even if they are unable to pay the debts. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting this wealth-based suspension scheme. 7. Defendant violates Plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights because it is fundamentally unfair to suspend their driver’s licenses for their failure to pay court debts that they are unable to pay. 8. Defendant violates Plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights because Plaintiffs have a fundamental right to both interstate and intrastate travel, and without meaningful alternatives to driving, the lack of a valid license necessarily impedes those rights without being narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest. 9. Defendant violates Plaintiffs’ equal protection rights because the state’s suspension scheme lacks any rational basis. Suspending the driver’s licenses of people too poor to pay court debt has a demonstrably negative effect on a person’s ability to pay court debts, thus directly undermining the only possible governmental interest. 10. Defendant violates Plaintiffs’ equal protection rights because automatic driver’s license suspensions constitute an extraordinary collection effort. 11. Defendant violates Plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights because Plaintiffs have a property interest in their driver’s licenses that cannot be denied without notice and a hearing.
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Jurisdiction and Venue 12. This is a civil rights action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201, et seq., and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. 13. Venue in this Court is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
Parties 14. Plaintiff Adrian Fowler is a 31-year-old resident of Detroit, Michigan. Exhibit 1, Fowler Decl. She lives with her three-year-old daughter. Id. Ms. Fowler’s Michigan driver’s license is currently suspended because she owes at least $2,121 for unpaid traffic tickets and fines. She cannot afford to pay her court debt. Id. 15. Plaintiff Kitia Harris is a 25-year-old resident of Detroit, Michigan. Exhibit 2, Harris Decl. She lives with her eight-year-old daughter. Id. Ms. Harris’s Michigan driver’s license is currently suspended because she owes $276 for unpaid traffic tickets, fines, and fees. Id. She cannot afford to pay her court debt. Id. 16. Defendant Ruth Johnson is the Secretary of State for the State of Michigan. 17. Ms. Johnson is sued in her official capacity as Secretary of State. 18. As Secretary of State, Ms. Johnson indefinitely suspends driver’s licenses of individuals who cannot afford to pay court costs. See “Failure to Appear in Court/Failure to Comply with Judgment,” Department of State, http://www.michigan.gov/sos/0,4670,7-1271627_8665_9074-25061--,00.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2017). 19. At all times relevant to the events, acts, and/or omissions alleged in this Complaint, Secretary Johnson has acted under color of state law, pursuant to her authority and responsibility as an official of the State of Michigan.
4

Factual Allegations A. Introduction
20. The State of Michigan enforces, through the Secretary of State, suspensions of the driver’s licenses of people who fail to pay their tickets for traffic and parking violations.
21. These suspensions apply to all those who fail to appear in court or fail to comply with a court order, including failure to pay any court-ordered fines, fees, costs, and assessments. See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 257.321(a)(2).
22. The Secretary of State can suspend licenses on her own initiative or in response to notification from a court that an individual has failed to pay court debt.
23. The Secretary of State imposes suspensions under MCL 257.321(a)(2) for failure to pay regardless of the reason for nonpayment and with no consideration of whether the person has the financial means to pay.
24. A valid driver’s license is essential for people to secure and maintain employment, and the loss of a license often results in further financial hardship for individuals and their families.
25. Research has consistently found that having a driver’s license can be necessary to maintain a job, pursue educational opportunities, and care for dependent relatives. See “Letter to Colleague” from Vanita Gupta & Lisa Foster, U.S. Department of Justice (Mar. 14, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/832461/download.
26. On information and belief, each year since at least 2010, the Secretary of State has suspended more than 100,000 licenses for failure to pay court debts.
27. On information and belief, hundreds of thousands of people in Michigan currently have a suspended license for nonpayment of court debts.
28. Suspended licenses can trap people who are poor in an impossible situation: they
5

cannot afford to reinstate their licenses without steady employment, but they are unable to work without a license.
29. Paying off court debt is particularly difficult for the 1.5 million people living below the federal poverty line in Michigan. “Michigan 2016,” Talk Poverty, https://talkpoverty.org/stateyear-report/michigan-2016-report/ (last visited May 4, 2017).
30. At a ranking of 36 out of 50, Michigan is among the worst states for overall poverty rate. In 2015, 15.8% of Michigan’s residents were living below the federal poverty line. “Quick Facts: Michigan,” U.S. Census Bureau, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045216/26 (last visited May 4, 2017).
31. Suspending licenses as a means of debt collection also puts public safety at risk, because law enforcement resources are devoted to stopping, investigating, and prosecuting suspended drivers who do not present a danger behind the wheel instead of pursuing individuals who do. B. Plaintiffs’ Debts
32. Named Plaintiffs Adrian Fowler and Kitia Harris are both residents of Detroit, Michigan, who received tickets for minor traffic offenses and, because they are unable to pay the full amounts that they owe to the courts, have had their driver’s licenses suspended indefinitely.
i. Adrian Fowler 33. Adrian Fowler is a 31-year-old resident of Detroit, Michigan. Exhibit 1, Fowler Decl. 34. Ms. Fowler has a three-year-old daughter, for whom she is the sole caretaker. Id. 35. Ms. Fowler works for X-Men Security, earning $8.90 per hour, id., the current minimum wage in Michigan. Dep’t of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs,
6

http://www.michigan.gov/lara/0,4601,7-154-11407_32352-140972--,00.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2017). With about 20 hours of work each week, Ms. Fowler’s monthly income is approximately $712. Exhibit 1, Fowler Decl.
36. From 2008 until 2012, Ms. Fowler lived in Cobb County, Georgia. Id. During those years, she acquired three tickets for traffic civil infractions. Id. She has not been able to pay any of her Georgia tickets. Id.
37. In 2012, after moving back to Michigan, Ms. Fowler attempted to renew her driver’s license and discovered that it had been suspended because she had not paid her Georgia court debts. Id.
38. In the winter of 2013, Ms. Fowler’s then-infant daughter developed a fever of 103 degrees while Ms. Fowler was at work. Id. Ms. Fowler feared severe delays if she relied on emergency vehicle services because of an ice storm that had hit the city. Id. With the life of her infant daughter potentially at stake, Ms. Fowler drove home to take her baby to the hospital despite the fact that her license was still suspended. Id. Unsurprisingly, Ms. Fowler’s rush to care for her daughter resulted in a police officer stopping her for speeding in Ferndale. Id. The officer was sympathetic to Ms. Fowler’s emergency need and allowed her to continue driving so that she could get her daughter to the hospital, but he still cited her for driving while her license was suspended (DWLS) as well as issuing her a speeding ticket. Id. The total cost was almost $600. Id.
39. When Ms. Fowler went to the Ferndale courthouse to tell them that she would not be able to pay the $600, she was told that if she did not return in three weeks with the full amount, a warrant would be issued for her arrest. Id. She was further told that if she returned without the full amount, she would be arrested. Id.
40. Ms. Fowler believes that she has current warrants for her arrest in Ferndale,
7

Eastpointe, and Oak Park for missed court dates. Id. The Ferndale warrant carries an additional fee of $500. The Eastpointe and Oak Park warrants carry additional fees of $800 each. Id.
41. Ms. Fowler currently owes a total of at least $2,121 to the courts of Ferndale, Eastpointe, and Oak Park. Id.
42. Ms. Fowler pays $850 per month for rent and an additional $500 to $600 monthly for utilities, groceries, and other everyday needs for herself and her young daughter. Id. She earns only about $712 each month from her current part-time job, which falls far short of covering her expenses. Id. There is no hope that Ms. Fowler will be able to pay the $2,121 to get her license back in the foreseeable future. Id.
43. Meanwhile, Ms. Fowler’s ability to find better-paying employment and thus increase her ability to pay her court debt is severely hampered by her license suspension. Id.
44. Because she cannot drive legally, Ms. Fowler is unable to take a job outside the city of Detroit in the surrounding suburbs. Id. Jobs in the suburbs tend to be higher-paying than city jobs. Id.; see also Noah Urban, “Uphill Both Ways: Where are the Jobs in Metro Detroit?” Data Driven Detroit, http://datadrivendetroit.org/economy/uphill-both-ways-where-are-the-jobs-inmetro-detroit/ (analyzing data from the Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics Program).
45. In her most recent job search in April of 2017, Ms. Fowler struggled to find a job within the city that paid well, and she ended up with a minimum-wage, part-time position that does not even cover her basic monthly expenses. See Exhibit 1, Fowler Decl.
46. Ms. Fowler was forced to turn down a position with Blue Chip Endeavors that paid a wage of $12.50 per hour, well above the wage offered by X-Men Security, because the position would have required her to travel throughout the metropolitan area, something she cannot do
8

without a valid license, as there is no viable public transportation option that connects the suburbs to the city of Detroit. Id.; see also Exhibit 4, Herson-Hord Decl.
ii. Kitia Harris 47. Kitia Harris is a 25-year-old resident of Detroit. See Exhibit 2, Harris Decl. 48. Ms. Harris has an eight-year-old daughter for whom she is the sole caretaker. Id. 49. In November of 2014, Ms. Harris was diagnosed with interstitial cystitis, a chronic medical condition that makes Ms. Harris unable to work. Id. 50. Ms. Harris was most recently employed at Blue Cross Blue Shield in Rochester Hills, Michigan. Id. She was fired after about four months on the grounds that her medical condition, which she had disclosed to her employer, was interfering with her ability to perform her work. Id. She has not worked since losing this job in December of 2015. Id. 51. In July of 2016, Ms. Harris was approved for disability benefits. Id. She receives a total of $1,218 per month in disability benefits ($938 for herself and $280 for her daughter). Id. 52. On October 26, 2016, Ms. Harris was cited for “impeding traffic” in Ferndale, Michigan. Id. She was charged a total of $150 for the ticket. Id. She was not able to pay the $150. Id. 53. After receiving notices that her payment was due and being unable to pay, Ms. Harris received a notice in the mail that her driver’s license had been suspended. Id. 54. Ms. Harris currently owes a total of $276 to get her license reinstated ($150 for the original ticket, $81 in penalties accrued for nonpayment, and a $45 license clearance fee). Id. 55. Ms. Harris pays $600 per month in rent for the apartment that she shares with her daughter. Id. She pays approximately $400 for utilities and other monthly essentials. Id. 56. Ms. Harris needs her driver’s license to attend her regular medical appointments,
9

usually every two weeks and sometimes more often. Id. Her doctor’s office is a 30-minute drive from her home. Id.
57. Ms. Harris is unable to take the bus not only because the service is woefully inadequate but also because her medical condition — which is not a visible disability — makes it unsafe for her to stand for more than a few minutes. Id. Instead, she must pay people she knows to drive her where she needs to go. Id.
58. Because she cannot drive herself due to her license suspension, Ms. Harris is frequently late to her medical appointments and often has to cancel or reschedule when no one is available to drive her. Id. C. Michigan Runs a Wealth-Based Driver’s License Suspension Scheme that Traps Poor
Residents in a Cycle of Poverty i. Assessment of Fines, Fees, and Costs 59. For civil infractions, if a civil fine is ordered, the judge can also order costs of up to $100. Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.907(4). 60. For each civil infraction determination, in addition to any civil fines or costs ordered, a mandatory justice system assessment of $40 must be paid (except for parking violations or when the fine and cost total $10 or less). Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.907(13). 61. A penalty fee of 20% is applied to any costs, fees, penalties, or civil violations that have not been paid 56 days after the amount is due. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 600.4801, 600.4803. 62. The amounts assessed or the time granted for payment do not vary according to a person’s financial resources, other financial obligations, or the hardships timely payment will impose upon the person or the person’s family. ii. Defendant Suspends the License of Anyone Who Fails to Pay All Court Debts,
Regardless of the Reason for Nonpayment
10

63. A person who fails to comply with an order or judgment of the court, including failure to pay all fines, costs, fees, and assessments, “is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than 93 days or a fine of not more than $100.00, or both.” Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 257.321a(1).
64. When a person has failed to pay court debts after 28 days or more, the court gives notice that if the person fails to pay within another 14 days, the Secretary of State, Defendant Johnson, will suspend her license. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 257.321a(2).
65. If the person fails to comply within the second 14-day period, the court informs the Secretary of State. Id.
66. Upon receiving the information from the court that the person has failed to pay, the Secretary of State — Defendant Johnson — immediately suspends the license of the person and notifies the person of the suspension. Id.
67. The court does not make any inquiry into the reason for nonpayment or a person’s financial status or ability to pay before issuing notice that the person faces license suspension if she does not pay within 14 days.
68. The court does not make any inquiry into the reason for nonpayment or a person’s financial status before informing the Secretary of State that the person has failed to pay court debts.
69. Defendant Johnson does not make any inquiry into the reason for nonpayment or a person’s financial status before immediately suspending the license of the person.
70. Defendant Johnson does not make any inquiry into the reason for nonpayment or a person’s financial status after suspending the license of the person.
iii. Defendant Will Not Reinstate a License Suspended for Nonpayment of Court Debts Until the Person Has Paid a $45 Fee in Addition to All Court Debts Owed
11

71. A driver’s license suspension imposed for failure to comply with a court order or judgment, including payment of all fines, costs, fees, and assessments, is indefinite; it must remain in effect until the person whose license was suspended has paid the fine or cost as well as at least one $45 driver license clearance fee. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 257.321a(5).
72. Each court in which a person failed to pay a fine or cost must notify the Secretary of State that the person has paid the debt. Id.
73. The person whose license was suspended must pay the court a $45 driver license clearance fee for each failure to pay a fine or cost. Id.
74. Of each $45 driver license clearance fee, $15, or one-third, is disbursed to the Secretary of State for state general funds to defray costs of suspension and reinstatement actions. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 257.321a(11).
75. Another third, $15, is disbursed to the treasury of the county (for circuit court matters), the district funding unit for the court (for district court matters), or the city (for municipal court matters). Id.
76. The final $15 third is disbursed to the juror compensation reimbursement fund. Id. iv. A Person Who Drives While Her License Is Suspended Faces an Additional
Period of Suspension, a Reinstatement Fee, and a Driver Responsibility Fee 77. A person whose license has been suspended for any reason, including failure to pay court debts, is prohibited from “operat[ing] a motor vehicle upon a highway or other place open to the general public or generally accessible to motor vehicles.” Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 257.904(1). 78. Any person who violates this prohibition is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by up to 93 days’ imprisonment or a fine of up to $500 or both for the first violation, and, for subsequent violations, up to one year’s imprisonment or a fine of up to $1000 or both. Mich.
12

Comp. Laws Ann. § 257.904(3). 79. In addition to the misdemeanor punishments above, a person who drives while her
license is indefinitely suspended due to failure to pay court debts is subject to a mandatory additional 30-day period of suspension imposed by Defendant unless it is the first such offense in the person’s lifetime. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 257.904(11) and (18).
80. Anyone whose license has been suspended due to a violation of the prohibition on driving while one’s license is suspended (DWLS) must pay a reinstatement fee of $125 to the Secretary of State before her license can be reinstated. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 257.320e(1).
81. Additionally, anyone whose license has been suspended due to a DWLS violation must pay a Driver Responsibility Fee. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 257.732a(2)(b)(iii).
82. For violations that occurred before October 1, 2015, the Driver Responsibility Fee for DWLS is $500 per year for two years. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 257.732a(2)(b)(iii).
83. For violations that occurred on or after October 1, 2015, and before October 1, 2016, the Driver Responsibility Fee for DWLS is $500 for the first year and $250 for the second year. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 257.732a(11)(b)(i).
84. For violations that occur on or after October 1, 2016, and before October 1, 2018, the Driver Responsibility Fee for DWLS is $500 for the first year only. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 257.732a(11)(b)(ii).
85. For violations that occur on or after October 1, 2018, and before October 1, 2019, the Driver Responsibility Fee for DWLS is $250 for the first year only. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 257.732a(11)(b)(iii).
86. Only for violations that occur on or after October 1, 2019, is there no fee. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 257.732a(11)(b)(iv).
13

87. People with DWLS violations are excepted from the provision that allows for community service in lieu of a Driver Responsibility Fee; a Driver Responsibility Fee imposed for a DWLS violation cannot be paid in community service. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 257.732a(4)
v. License Suspensions Drive People Further into Poverty and Invite Further Infractions
88. Michigan’s wealth-based suspension scheme imposes significant hardship on individual debtors and their families, often forcing them to choose between paying for survival resources such as food, shelter, health care, and clothing, or paying their court costs and fines.
89. Because of their inability to pay monetary penalties, low-income drivers are overrepresented in the pool of suspended drivers when compared to their representation in the larger population of licensed drivers.
90. A valid driver’s license is essential for people to secure and maintain employment, get to and from medical and other appointments, and otherwise provide for themselves and their families. See Exhibit 5, Simmons Decl.
91. Not having a valid driver’s license can be a direct barrier to employment opportunities. “Not all jobs require a driver’s license, particularly those that pay very low wages. But having one is a very common requirement for the sorts of job that can actually lift people out of poverty.” Alana Semuels, “No Driver’s License, No Job,” The Atlantic (June 15, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/06/no-drivers-license-no-job/486653/.
92. Without the ability to drive, most jobs are inaccessible to people living in rural parts of Michigan, and even in urban areas, getting to and from work without the ability to drive is extremely challenging and time-consuming, if it is possible at all.
93. Detroit’s bus system is completely unreliable as a means of regular commute to and from work. In many cases, getting to or from work can be a 90-minute to two-hour process if
14

transfers are involved. The buses run very infrequently, and a single transfer can add up to an hour

of waiting to the trip. See Exhibit 4, Herson-Hord Decl.

94. People living in Detroit who must take the bus to work frequently lose their jobs

because they cannot consistently arrive on time, as buses are often late and sometimes do not arrive

at all. Id; see also Exhibit 5, Simmons Decl.

95. Indeed, a rigorous study of New Jersey drivers found that 42% of drivers lost their

jobs after their driving privileges were suspended. Jon A. Carnegie, Ian M. Voorhees

Transportation Center, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, Driver’s License

Suspensions,

Impacts

and

Fairness

Study

56

(2007),

http://www.nj.gov/transportation/refdata/research/reports/FHWA-NJ-2007-020-V1.pdf.

96. Of those drivers, 45% were unable to find new employment. Id.

97. Of those that were able to find another job, 88% reported a decrease in income. Id.

98. In many cases, Michigan’s wealth-based suspension scheme forces suspended

drivers to choose between driving illegally and losing their jobs.

99. In Michigan, driving on a suspended license is a criminal offense, with a violation

that occurs after a prior conviction carrying up to twelve months of imprisonment, a $1,000 fine,

or both. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 257.904(3)(b).

100. Thus, Michigan’s wealth-based suspension scheme creates a downward spiral from

poverty to criminal culpability: an unpaid civil infraction ticket triggers automatic suspension,

which often leads to the misdemeanor of driving while one’s license is suspended.

101. The high cost of losing a driver’s license inevitably results in an impossible choice:

drive — and risk being charged with driving while suspended, which itself can lead to additional

costs, fines, and periods of incarceration — or refrain from driving and lose access to gainful

15

employment and medical care. vi. Detroit’s Urban Sprawl and Lack of Adequate Public Transportation Exacerbate the Hardships of Living Without a License 102. Detroit’s public transit system is notoriously inadequate for a major metropolitan
area. Detroit provides only 11.3 transit rides per capita, by far the lowest compared to other cities with comparable populations. Reuben Fischer-Baum, “How Your City’s Public Transit Stacks Up,” FiveThirtyEight (July 31, 2014) https://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/how-your-citys-publictransit-stacks-up/.
103. Although Detroit ranks eighth nationally in percentage of households without cars, the region spends only $69 per capita annually on transit, compared to $119 in Atlanta, $177 in Cleveland, and $471 in Seattle. Henry Grabar, “Can America’s Worst Transit System Be Saved?” Slate (June 7, 2016), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/metropolis/2016/06/ detroit_has_america_s_worst_transit_system_could_the_regional_transit_master.html.
104. Detroit’s bus system is widely disparaged among residents. “In metro Detroit, public transportation is a bunk concept; most riders, with no hesitation, will offer a similar refrain when asked their opinion: They hate it. It’s a sick joke; ride a bus long enough and you’d surely hear a horror story.” Ryan Felton, “How Detroit Ended up with the Worst Public Transit,” Detroit Metro Times (Mar. 11, 2014), available at http://www.metrotimes.com/detroit/how-detroit-endedup-with-the-worst-public-transit/Content?oid=2143889.
105. Even during rush hour, the buses rarely arrive more than once every half-hour. Grabar, supra.
106. Detroit is the most decentralized metro employment center in the United States, with over 77 percent of jobs located outside the urban core of the city. Elizabeth Kneebone, Brookings Institution, Job Sprawl Stalls: The Great Recession and Metropolitan Employment
16

Location

8

(2013),

available

at

https://www.brookings.edu/wp-

content/uploads/2016/06/Srvy_JobSprawl.pdf.

107. The typical commute distance for a Detroiter is 10.4 miles. Elizabeth Kneebone &

Natalie Holmes, Brookings Institution, The Growing Distance Between People and Jobs in

Metropolitan America 20 (2016), available at https://www.brookings.edu/wp-

content/uploads/2016/07/Srvy_JobsProximity.pdf.

108. The majority of Detroit jobs are held by commuters who live outside the city. In

2011, only 27.3 percent of the jobs within the city of Detroit were held by residents of Detroit, and

these commuters are far more likely than Detroiters to have higher-earning jobs. Noah Urban,

“Uphill Both Ways: Where are the Jobs in Metro Detroit?” Data Driven Detroit,

http://datadrivendetroit.org/economy/uphill-both-ways-where-are-the-jobs-in-metro-detroit/

(analyzing data from the Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics

Program).

109. Detroit’s surrounding suburbs contain five times as many employment

opportunities as the city of Detroit, and over 43 percent of these suburban jobs are in the highest

wage category. Id.

110. For people living in Detroit, the higher-paying jobs that can be found in the suburbs

are completely inaccessible without a driver’s license because public transportation between the

city and the suburbs is extremely limited. See Exhibit 4, Herson-Hord Decl; see also Exhibit 5,

Simmons Decl.

111. The Detroit Department of Transportation (DDOT), which services the city of

Detroit, does not run in the suburbs or between the city and suburbs. See Exhibit 4, Herson-Hord

Decl. The Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transportation (SMART) services the

17

suburbs and runs into the city primarily to make stops in midtown and downtown Detroit — the city’s wealthiest areas. Id. With only a few exceptions at certain times of day, SMART buses do not pick up or drop off riders in the city of Detroit outside the downtown and midtown locations. Id.
112. Detroiters who live outside the wealthy midtown and downtown areas cannot take SMART buses into the suburbs without first getting to the downtown or midtown pickup locations or waiting for a long period at the edge of the city on 8 Mile Road and enduring multiple transfers. Id.
113. Moreover, many poor Detroiters who work in the suburbs have service-industry jobs that require irregular hours outside the typical nine-to-five workday. Both DDOT and SMART have scaled back their services outside regular rush hours, which results in extremely infrequent service for people who need to travel to and from work at irregular hours. Weekend service also runs on a low-frequency schedule, further complicating the transportation options for people who must work weekend hours. Id.
114. The Regional Transit Authority’s most recent attempt to build a public transportation system that connects the city and the suburbs failed in November of 2016, defeated by voters in Oakland and Macomb Counties. Frank Witsil & Eric D. Lawrence, “RTA Millage Rejected by Metro Detroit Voters,” Detroit Free Press (Nov. 9, 2016), available at http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/detroit/2016/11/09/rta-regional-transitauthority-millage/93535602/.
115. Detroit’s education system further complicates transportation for people with children. More than half of the city’s schools are charter schools that provide no coordinated transit for their students. See Exhibit 4, Herson-Hord Decl. The increase in charter schools has
18

resulted in the closure of many neighborhood public schools, so parents often have to transport their children to schools in areas of the city that are far from their homes. Id. For parents with children who are too young to ride the public buses on their own, getting their children to school without a car is extremely difficult. Id.
116. The inadequacy of Detroit Metro’s public transportation system imposes a disproportionate hardship on people with disabilities. While existing buses are compliant with the Americans with Disabilities Act, there are not enough buses to meet the needs of people with mobility limitations. Id. People who cannot walk the distance to the nearest bus stop must make arrangements through a private company several days in advance, and they often have to wait two to four hours beyond their requested pickup or drop-off time. Id. D. Michigan’s Wealth-Based Suspension Scheme Violates Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection
and Due Process Rights 117. Defendant’s indefinite suspensions of Plaintiffs’ driver’s licenses because of their inability to pay court debts violated their constitutional rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. i. Defendant’s Wealth-Based Suspension Scheme Violates Due Process Because
It Lacks Fundamental Fairness 118. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, enforceable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 119. The Due Process Clause prohibits the state from subjecting individuals to processes and penalties that fail to comport with principles of due process and fundamental fairness. 120. Michigan violates due process by suspending Plaintiffs’ driver’s licenses because penalizing people for failing to pay court debts that they cannot afford is fundamentally unfair.
19

See, e.g., Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 660 (1983) (holding that it is fundamentally unfair to revoke probation because a probationer is unable to pay fines and restitution); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (holding that it is fundamentally unfair to deny access to an appeal solely because of inability to pay court costs); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 395 (1971) (holding that it is fundamentally unfair to jail a person for inability to pay a fine); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 240–41 (1970) (holding that it is fundamentally unfair to imprison a person beyond the maximum period fixed by statute solely because he cannot pay fines or court costs).
121. Michigan suspends driver’s licenses without first determining whether the nonpayment was willful or whether the person was simply unable to pay due to indigence.
122. Michigan’s statutory scheme requires courts to inform Defendant Johnson if a person does not pay court debts within 42 days, without inquiry into the reasons for nonpayment or consideration of whether timely payment would result in hardship to the person or to the person’s family. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 257.321a(2).
123. The Secretary of State enforces Michigan’s wealth-based suspension scheme without considering the debtor’s ability to pay or offering any alternatives.
124. Thus, Michigan’s wealth-based suspension scheme inevitably results in individuals being punished for their inability to pay.
125. By converting a relatively modest penalty (e.g., a $150 traffic fine) into a serious deprivation (an indefinitely suspended driver’s license), Michigan unfairly penalizes people who are poor simply for being poor.
126. Punishing a person solely for her inability to pay violates principles of due process and fundamental fairness.
127. Accordingly, Defendant’s wealth-based suspension scheme violates the Due
20

Process Clause. ii. Defendant’s Wealth-Based Suspension Scheme Violates Due Process Because It Infringes on Plaintiffs’ Fundamental Right to Travel 128. Plaintiffs have a fundamental due process right to intrastate travel. Johnson v. City
of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the “right to travel locally through public spaces and roadways.”); see also Cole v. City of Memphis, 839 F.3d 530, 535 (6th Cir. 2016).
129. Plaintiffs live in a region with woefully inadequate public transportation. 130. Plaintiffs cannot afford to pay for taxis or other car services for daily commuting and living. 131. Due to Michigan’s weather conditions and the fact that the Plaintiffs have to get their children to day care, non-motorized modes of transport, such as walking or biking, are not feasible alternatives. 132. Thus, Plaintiffs’ only reliable form of transportation is to drive a personal vehicle. 133. Defendant has suspended Plaintiffs’ driver’s licenses simply because they are unable to pay their debts and therefore has impeded Plaintiffs’ fundamental right to intrastate travel. 134. Because it implicates a fundamental liberty interest, Defendant’s suspension scheme must be narrowly tailored to achieve compelling state objectives. 135. Defendant’s suspension scheme is not limited in scope; it is a broad prohibition on all driving in all locations at all times in all circumstances for an indefinite period. 136. While the collection of court-ordered debt is a significant state interest, suspending the driver’s licenses of those who cannot pay is not narrowly tailored to collection. Indeed, it is counterproductive because it hampers Plaintiffs’ abilities to make a living and pay their essential
21

expenses, thus decreasing their ability to pay court debts. 137. Accordingly, Defendant’s wealth-based suspension scheme violates the Due
Process Clause. iii. Defendant’s Wealth-Based Suspension Scheme Violates Equal Protection Because It Discriminates Against Poor People Without a Rational Connection to a Legitimate State Purpose 138. The Due Process Clause protects against arbitrary and capricious government
action even when the decision to take action follows adequate procedures. 139. A person has protected property and liberty interests in a driver’s license and its
attendant government-sanctioned ability to drive. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); see also Sanderson v. Village of Greenhills, 726 F.2d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1984).
140. Michigan’s wealth-based suspension scheme is not rationally related to any legitimate government objective because suspending driver’s licenses impedes lower-income workers from obtaining or maintaining employment in order to meet their financial obligations to the court.
141. Driver’s licenses are often essential in the pursuit of a livelihood, and their suspension threatens important interests of the people who hold them and also prevents their ability to pay courts debts. In other words, the state’s practice undermines the state’s only goal.
142. The purpose of licensing drivers is to promote safety on Michigan’s roads and highways by keeping dangerous drivers off the roads.
143. Suspending licenses directly undercuts any ability the state would have to recover payments from indigent residents by depriving such residents of any means of employment. Indigent residents would be better able to pay their courts debts if they had their driver’s licenses.
144. For poor debtors, avoidance of driver’s license suspension does not operate as an
22

incentive to pay when they must choose between paying the court and paying rent, buying

medication, feeding their families, and other necessary expenses.

145. Indeed, for people who lack the ability to pay court debt, driver’s license suspension

as coercion to pay is not only irrational but fundamentally counterproductive; suspension makes it

less likely — rather than more likely — that people will be able to pay court debt. See John S.

Hausman, “Driving Up Fees: Muskegon County Deals (or Not) with Michigan’s Driver

Responsibility

Fees,”

Michigan

Live

(Feb.

6,

2013),

http://www.mlive.com/news/muskegon/index.ssf/2013/02/driving_up_fees_muskegon_count_1.

html (describing efforts to avoid mandatory Driver Responsibility Fees because they hinder, rather

than help, municipal efforts to regulate driving).

146. The loss of a license often means the loss of reliable transportation to and from

work, which makes debtors less able to meet their financial obligations to the court. Id.

147. Michigan’s wealth-based suspension scheme violates the Due Process Clause of

the United States Constitution because it causes substantial hardship to poor drivers and bears no

rational relationship to any legitimate government objective.

iv. Defendant’s Wealth-Based Suspension Scheme Violates Equal Protection Because It Constitutes Extraordinary Collection

148. The United States Supreme Court has held that when governments seek to recoup

the costs of prosecution from indigent defendants, they may not take advantage of their position

to utilize unduly harsh methods of debt collection solely because the debt is owed to the

government and not to a private creditor. See James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972).

149. Fines are imposed as a penalty for unlawful behavior; similarly, restitution, is

imposed to compensate a victim. In contrast, court costs are assessed to subsidize court operations

and thus are ordinary private consumer debts incurred for services rendered.

23

150. When a private creditor seeks to enforce a judgment against a debtor via garnishment or lien, the law provides procedural and substantive protections for poor debtors against deprivation of certain basic necessities and the ability to maintain a livelihood.
151. The private creditor may coerce payment only to the extent permitted by those protections. Michigan’s wealth-based suspension scheme does not treat indigent defendants, to the extent that they owe court costs, like other judgment debtors.
152. Michigan’s wealth-based suspension scheme provides for suspension of the debtor’s driver’s license and the possibility of imprisonment.
153. When the State of Michigan, through Defendant’s actions, takes advantage of the machinery of government to peremptorily strip debtors of their driver’s licenses, it executes a form of coercion not available to private creditors for debts unrelated to driving. Thus, it denies debtors who owe court costs the procedural and substantive statutory protections that other Michigan debtors may invoke against a private creditor in ordinary debt collection proceedings.
154. Michigan’s wealth-based suspension scheme fails to offer poor debtors even a modicum of the substantive and procedural protections that prevent private creditors from stripping the debtor of the ability to maintain a livelihood and meet her basic needs.
155. The State of Michigan’s severe and coercive collection policies and practices constitute invidious discrimination and violate the fundamental principle of equal protection of the laws embedded in the United States Constitution.
v. Defendant’s Wealth-Based Suspension Scheme Violates Procedural Due Process Because It Does Not Guarantee an Ability-to-Pay Hearing
156. A person’s driver’s license is recognized as a property interest that may not be taken away without due process of law. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); see also Sanderson v. Village of Greenhills, 726 F.2d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1984)
24

157. Due Process requires the State of Michigan to conduct ability-to-pay inquiries at each stage in a case, including the point at which it proposes to take coercive action to punish nonpayment.
158. As described above, the State’s wealth-based suspension scheme imposes mandatory costs without consideration of ability to pay. Instead, Defendant Johnson suspends a person’s driver’s license upon learning from a court that that person has failed to pay court debts. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 257.321a(2).
159. Prior to suspending a debtor’s driver’s license, Defendant provides no notice to the debtor of her right to an ability-to-pay determination evaluating her present financial condition.
160. Moreover, Defendant conducts no independent review of the debtor’s ability to pay before or after enforcing the harsh punishment of suspension.
161. The purpose of the State’s wealth-based suspension scheme is to coerce payment, not to protect public safety on the roads. Therefore, Plaintiffs are entitled to pre-deprivation notice and a hearing prior to license suspension.
162. There is currently no hearing under Michigan law for those facing driver’s license suspension for unpaid court debt, creating a high risk that an indigent debtor will be deprived of her driver’s license for reasons directly attributable to her poverty.
163. The high risk of deprivation created by Defendant’s automatic, indiscriminate driver’s license suspension system violates the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.
Class Action Allegations 164. The named Plaintiffs bring this action, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, to assert the claims alleged in this Complaint on a common basis.
25

165. A class action is a superior means, and the only practicable means, by which the

named Plaintiffs and unknown Class Members can challenge Defendant’s unlawful wealth-based

suspension scheme.

166. This action is brought and may properly be maintained as a Class action pursuant

to Rule 23(a)(l)–(4) and Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

167. This action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy

requirements of those provisions.

168. Plaintiffs propose one Class seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The

Declaratory and Injunctive Class is defined as: all Michigan residents whose driver’s licenses are

currently suspended or will be suspended solely because of inability to pay court debts, including,

but not limited to, traffic fines, court costs, assessments and fees.

A. Numerosity — Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)

169. On information and belief, over 100,000 Michigan residents have their licenses

suspended each year for inability to pay court debts.

170. In 2010 alone, the Secretary of State suspended 397,826 licenses for failure to pay

and failure to appear. Am. Assoc. of Motor Vehicle Administrators, Best Practices Guide to

Reducing

Suspended

Drivers

65

(2013),

available

at

http://www.aamva.org/WorkArea/linkit.aspx?LinkIdentifier=id&ItemID=3723&libID=3709.

B. Commonality — Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2)

171. The relief sought is common to all Class Members, and common questions of law

and fact exist as to all Class Members. The named Plaintiffs seek relief concerning whether the

automatic suspensions scheme violates the rights of the Class Members and relief mandating that

Defendant end the scheme so that the constitutional rights of the Class Members will be protected

26

in the future.
172. These common legal and factual questions arise from one scheme: Defendant’s
automatic suspensions based on inability to pay court debts. The material requirements of the
suspension statutes do not vary from Class Member to Class Member, and the resolution of these
legal and factual issues will determine whether all Class Members are entitled to the relief they
seek.
173. Among the most important, but not the only, common questions of fact are:
 Whether Michigan has a policy and practice of penalizing people who are poor more harshly than wealthy people for failing to pay court debt;
 Whether Michigan, acting by and through the Defendant, has a policy and practice of suspending driver’s licenses without conducting meaningful inquiries into the ability of a person to pay before taking such action; and
 Whether Michigan, acting by and through the Defendant, exploits its governmental status to avail itself of forms of enforcement in the collection of court debts not available to most private civil creditors.
174. Among the most important, but not the only, common questions of law are:
 Whether fundamental principles of Due Process and Equal Protection require Michigan to take into account the ability of a person to pay court costs and fines;
 Whether suspending a person’s driver’s license solely because she cannot afford to make a monetary payment toward court costs and fines previously imposed is lawful;
 Whether a person is entitled to a meaningful inquiry into her present ability to pay court costs and fines previously imposed, before the Secretary of State suspends her license for nonpayment; and
 Whether depriving persons encumbered with court debt of the protections afforded other Michigan debtors when taking the harsh action of suspending their driver’s licenses for nonpayment violates the Equal Protection Clause.
C. Typicality — Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3)
175. The named Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the other Class Members’ claims, and
they have the same interests in this case as all other Class Members. Each Class Member has had
or will have his or her driver’s license suspended due to an inability to pay court debts. The answer
27

to whether Defendant’s wealth-based suspension scheme is unconstitutional will determine the claims of the named Plaintiffs and every other Class Member.
176. If the named Plaintiffs succeed in the claim that Defendant’s policies and practices concerning wealth-based suspension violate their constitutional rights, that ruling will likewise benefit every other Class Member. D. Adequacy — Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4)
177. The named Plaintiffs are adequate representatives of the Class because their interests in the vindication of the legal claims that they raise are entirely aligned with the interests of the other Class Members, who each have the same basic constitutional claims. They are members of the Class, and their interests coincide with, and are not antagonistic to, those of the other Class Members.
178. There are no known conflicts of interest among Class Members, all of whom have a similar interest in vindicating their constitutional rights in the face of Defendant’s wealth-based suspension scheme.
179. Plaintiffs are represented by attorneys from Equal Justice Under Law and the Maurice & Jane Sugar Law Center for Economic & Social Justice, who have experience in litigating complex civil rights matters in federal court and extensive knowledge of both the details of Defendant’s scheme and the relevant constitutional and statutory law.
180. The combined efforts of Class counsel have so far included extensive investigation into Defendant’s suspension scheme, including numerous interviews with witnesses, attorneys, and advocates throughout the region, statewide experts in the functioning of state and local courts, and national experts in constitutional law, law enforcement, judicial procedures, and criminal law.
181. Class counsel have a detailed understanding of local law and practices as they relate
28

to federal constitutional requirements. 182. As a result, counsel have devoted enormous time and resources to becoming
intimately familiar with Defendant’s scheme and with the relevant state and federal laws. The interests of the Class Members will be fairly and adequately protected by the named Plaintiffs and their attorneys. E. Rule 23(b)(2)
183. Class action status is appropriate because Defendant has acted or will act in the same unconstitutional manner with respect to all Class Members. Defendant enforces a wealthbased suspension scheme: wealthy Michigan residents who are ordered to pay costs, fees, fines, and assessments by the courts are able to retain their driving privileges, while the poorest residents are further forced into a cycle of poverty.
184. The Class therefore seeks declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin Secretary of State Ruth Johnson from enforcing the automatic suspensions, reinstatement fees, and Driver Responsibility Fees. Because the putative Class challenges Defendant’s scheme as unconstitutional through declaratory and injunctive relief that would apply the same relief to every Class Member, Rule 23(b)(2) certification is appropriate and necessary.
185. Injunctive relief compelling Defendant to comply with these constitutional rights will similarly protect each Class Member from being subjected to Defendant’s unlawful policies and practices. A declaration and injunction stating that Secretary Johnson cannot suspend driver’s license as a punishment for being poor would provide relief to every Class Member. Therefore, declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the Class as a whole is appropriate.
Claims for Relief Count One: Defendant’s Wealth-Based Suspension Scheme Violates Due Process Because It Lacks Fundamental Fairness
29

186. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and all of the previous allegations in this Complaint.
187. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause requires that Michigan maintain a standard of fundamental fairness in its justice system. Defendant’s automatic suspensions for failure to pay court debts punishes people simply for being too poor to pay, which violates the principle of Due Process because it is fundamentally unfair. Count Two: Defendant’s Wealth-Based Suspension Scheme Violates Due Process Because It Infringes on Plaintiffs’ Fundamental Right to Intrastate Travel
188. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and all of the previous allegations in this Complaint.
189. The Sixth Circuit recognizes a fundamental right to intrastate travel under the Due Process Clause. Because Plaintiffs have no viable alternative to driving, Defendant’s suspension of their licenses implicates their right to intrastate travel, and these suspensions are not narrowly tailored to meet the state objective of debt collection. Count Three: Defendant’s Wealth-Based Suspension Scheme Violates Equal Protection Because It Discriminates Against Poor People Without a Rational Connection to a Legitimate State Purpose
190. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and all of the previous allegations in this Complaint.
191. Plaintiffs have protected property and liberty interests in their driver’s licenses and their ability to drive legally. Defendant’s counterproductive collection method of suspending people’s licenses when they are unable to pay court debts is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest and is therefore unconstitutional. Count Four: Defendant’s Wealth-Based Suspension Scheme Violates Equal Protection Because It Constitutes Extraordinary Collection
30

192. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and all of the previous allegations in this
Complaint.
193. Plaintiffs’ equal protection rights are implicated when the State of Michigan uses
its unique position as a government to execute forms of debt collection that are not available to
private creditors. By stripping Plaintiffs of their driver’s licenses as a means of collection,
Defendant is violating their constitutional rights under equal protection.
Count Five: Defendant’s Wealth-Based Suspension Scheme Violates Procedural Due Process Because It Does Not Guarantee an Ability-to-Pay Hearing
194. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and all of the previous allegations in this
Complaint.
195. Plaintiffs have protected property and liberty interests in their driver’s licenses and
their ability to drive legally. Defendant violates their procedural due process rights by suspending
their licenses without affording them an opportunity to be heard.
Requested Relief
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request that the Court issue the following relief:
a. A declaratory judgment that Defendant’s policies, practices, acts, and/or omissions as described herein are unlawful and violate Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ rights under the Constitution and laws of the United States;
b. An order and judgment preliminarily and permanently enjoining Defendant, her subordinates, agents, employees, representatives, and all others acting or purporting to act in concert with her or on her behalf from issuing or processing orders of driver’s license suspensions for unpaid court debt against Plaintiffs and Class Members until such time as the State of Michigan implements a system that complies with the United States Constitution;
c. An order and judgment preliminarily and permanently ordering Defendant to reinstate the Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ driver’s licenses (insofar as they are suspended based on unpaid court debt and/or on driving on licenses suspended due to unpaid court debt) and enjoining the Defendant from requiring the Plaintiffs and Class Members to pay the reinstatement fees or Driver’s Responsibility Fees as a
31

condition of such reinstatement; d. An order and judgment granting reasonable attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1988, and any other relief this Court deems proper. Respectfully submitted, /s/ Phil Telfeyan Phil Telfeyan Catherine Sevcenko Rebecca Ramaswamy Attorneys, Equal Justice Under Law 400 7th Street NW, Suite 602 Washington, D.C. 20004 (202) 505-2058 ptelfeyan@equaljusticeunderlaw.org catherine@equaljusticeunderlaw.org rramaswamy@equaljusticeunderlaw.org /s/ John C. Philo John C. Philo (MI Bar Number P52721) Maurice & Jane Sugar Law Center for Economic & Social Justice 4605 Cass Avenue Detroit, MI 48201 (313) 993-4505 jphilo@sugarlaw.org Attorneys for Plaintiffs
32

 
 4:17-cv-11441-LVP-MKM Doc # 21 Filed 12/14/17 Pg 1 of 34 Pg ID 235

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

ADRIAN FOWLER and KITIA HARRIS, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs, v.

Civil Case No. 17-11441 Honorable Linda V. Parker

RUTH JOHNSON, in her official capacity as Secretary of State of the Michigan Department of State,

Defendant. ___________________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

On May 4, 2017, Plaintiffs filed this putative class action lawsuit

challenging Defendant’s practice, pursuant to Michigan Compiled Laws

§ 257.321a, of suspending the driver’s licenses of individuals who fail to pay

court-ordered fines, costs, fees and assessments resulting from traffic violations

(“traffic debt”). On the day Plaintiffs initiated this action, they also filed a motion

for preliminary injunction to enjoin Defendant from suspending the driver’s

licenses of people unable to pay their traffic debt. (ECF No. 2.) The parties have

fully briefed the motion. (ECF No. 11, 13.) The Court held a hearing with respect

4:17-cv-11441-LVP-MKM Doc # 21 Filed 12/14/17 Pg 2 of 34 Pg ID 236
to Plaintiffs’ motion on November 15, 2017. For the reasons that follow, the Court is now granting the motion. I. Background
Under Michigan’s Motor Vehicle Code, the failure to follow certain traffic laws results in a civil infraction that includes a fine. For each civil infraction, a judge can order costs of up to $100 and, in the majority of cases, must also impose a mandatory justice system assessment of $40. Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.907(4), (13). Any fine, cost, or fee remaining unpaid after fifty-six (56) days incurs a twenty-percent (20%) late fee. Id. § 600.4803.
Michigan law provides that twenty-eight (28) days after a person fails to answer a traffic citation or notice to appear in court for a citation, the court must notify the person that the failure within fourteen (14) days to appear in court or comply with an order or judgment of the court (including the failure to pay all fines, costs, fees, and assessments) will result in the Secretary of State suspending his or her driver’s license. Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.321a(2). The statute requires the Secretary of State to “immediately suspend” a person’s license if the person does not appear or payment is not made within fourteen (14) days and to notify the person of the suspension by regular mail at his or her last known address. Id. Additionally, an individual who fails to pay their traffic debt is guilty of a
2

4:17-cv-11441-LVP-MKM Doc # 21 Filed 12/14/17 Pg 3 of 34 Pg ID 237
misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment for not more than ninety-three (93)
days or a fine of not more than $100, or both. Id. § 257.321a(1).
An individual seeking to get his or her license reinstated must pay each
underlying debt, as well as a $45 driver’s license clearance fee for each unpaid
ticket or cost. Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.321a(5). If a person is caught driving on
a suspended license (“DWLS”), he or she faces a second misdemeanor punishable
by up to ninety-three (93) days’ imprisonment or a fine of up to $500, or both. Id.
§ 257.904. Subsequent DWLS violations may lead to up to one years’
imprisonment or a fine of up to $1,000, or both. Id. An individual receiving an
additional suspension due to a DWLS must pay a reinstatement fee of $125 to the
Secretary of State before his or her license can be reinstated. Id. § 257.320e(1).
That individual also must pay a Driver Responsibility Fee of up to $1,000 over two years. Id. § 257.732a(2)(b)(iii).1
Within fourteen (14) days of the suspension or revocation of an individual’s license, the individual may file an appeal with the Secretary of State.2 Id.
1 Michigan is phasing out these Driver Responsibility Fees by statute; however, current law provides that the State will continue to impose the fees for all offenses occurring before October 1, 2019. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.732a(11). The Michigan legislature is considering laws to speed up the elimination of these fees. See SB 609-615 and HB 5040-5046, 2017 Leg. (Mich. 2017). At the motion hearing, the parties agreed that the proposed legislation would not moot Plaintiffs’ claims. 2 The record does not reflect how the State notifies an individual of his or her right to seek an administrative appeal or review in the circuit court discussed infra.
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§ 257.322(2). The appeal must be in writing. Id. The Secretary of State then is required to appoint a hearing officer to hear the appeal. Id. § 257.322(1). After the administrative appeal is concluded, the individual may petition for review in a Michigan circuit court. Id. § 257.323. The petition must be filed within sixtythree (63) days from the hearing officer’s determination, or within one hundred and eighty two (182) days if good cause is shown. The circuit court may set aside the Secretary of State’s determination if it finds inter alia that the individual’s “substantial rights have been prejudiced because the determination is … [i]n violation of the Constitution of the United States …” Id. § 257.323(4)(a)(i).
Plaintiffs Adrian Fowler and Kitia Harris are Michigan residents who claim to have had their driver’s licenses suspended pursuant to the aforementioned statutory provisions. While living in Georgia from 2008 to 2012, Ms. Fowler was issued three tickets for civil traffic infractions, which she was not able to pay. (Fowler Decl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 2-1.) When she moved back to Michigan in 2012, Ms. Fowler tried to renew her Michigan driver’s license and was informed that it was suspended because she had not paid her Georgia court debts. (Id. ¶ 5.) According to Defendant, Ms. Fowler was not able to renew her license because Michigan law precludes the Secretary of State from issuing a license to someone whose license is
4

4:17-cv-11441-LVP-MKM Doc # 21 Filed 12/14/17 Pg 5 of 34 Pg ID 239
revoked or suspended in another state.3 (Def.’s Resp. Br. at 3, ECF No. 11 at Pg
ID 117.) Defendant indicates that Georgia suspended Ms. Fowler’s license for nonpayment of court debts.4 (Id.)
Ms. Fowler is the sole caretaker of her three-year-old daughter. (Fowler
Decl. ¶ 2.) They reside in Detroit. (Id. ¶ 1.) In winter 2013, during an ice storm,
Ms. Fowler’s daughter developed a high fever. (Id. ¶ 6.) Fearing that the ice
would inhibit an ambulance from quickly arriving to transport her daughter to the
hospital, Ms. Fowler decided to drive her there. (Id.) A police officer stopped Ms.
Fowler for speeding in Ferndale, and issued her a speeding ticket and DWLS
citation. (Id.) The total cost was almost $600. (Id.)
Ms. Fowler claims that when she went to the Ferndale courthouse to report
that she was unable to pay the $600, she was told that a warrant would be issued
for her arrest if she did not return in three weeks with the full amount. (Id. ¶ 7.)
As of May 3, 2017, Ms. Fowler also had unpaid fines in Eastpointe for $752 and
3 Michigan Compiled Laws Section 257.303(1) provides, in relevant part: “The secretary of state shall not issue a license under this act to any of the following persons: … (c) A person whose license is suspended, revoked, denied, or canceled in any state.” Because Defendant did not renew Ms. Fowler’s Michigan license when she returned from Georgia because of the suspension of her driver’s license there, Defendant has not suspended Ms. Fowler’s license according to the scheme Plaintiffs now challenge. For that reason, she most likely lacks standing to pursue this lawsuit. 4 Defendant attaches a certified copy of Ms. Fowler’s driving record to its response brief, which it claims reflects her suspension in Georgia for failing to appear in court on two counts. (See Def.’s Resp., Ex. 1.)
5

4:17-cv-11441-LVP-MKM Doc # 21 Filed 12/14/17 Pg 6 of 34 Pg ID 240
Oak Park for $703. (Id. ¶ 9.) She indicates that those fees are the result of warrants issued when she missed court dates. (Id. ¶ 8.) Ms. Fowler’s driving record reflects a citation issued in Eastpointe for driving while her license was suspended and multiple traffic violations in Oak Park (prohibited turn, disobeying a stop sign, and failing to display a valid license). (Def.’s Resp., Ex. 1.)
Ms. Fowler claims that she is unable to pay these fines, but that the lack of a driver’s license severely hampers her ability to find better employment and any chance that she will be able to pay them in the future. (Fowler Decl. ¶¶ 11, 12.) Ms. Fowler currently works part-time for a security company, earning $8.90 per hour or about $712 per month. (Id. ¶ 3.) Each month, she pays $850 in rent and an additional $500 to $600 for utilities, groceries, and other everyday needs for herself and her daughter. (Id. ¶ 11.) Ms. Fowler was offered a $12.50 per hour job with Blue Chip Endeavors. (Id. ¶ 15.) She had to turn it down, however, because it required her to travel throughout the metropolitan area, which she cannot do without a valid license and viable public transportation options between the city and suburbs.5
Ms. Harris is a single mother with an eight-year-old daughter. (Harris Decl. ¶ 2.) They reside in Detroit. (Id. 1.) In November 2014, Ms. Harris was diagnosed 5 Plaintiffs contend that Detroit’s public transportation system is “notoriously inadequate” and they provide evidence reflecting that the city’s bus system is unreliable and often requires long commutes. (Pls.’ Br. in Supp. of Mot. at 9-10, ECF No. 2 at Pg ID 58-59; Exs. 4, 5.)
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4:17-cv-11441-LVP-MKM Doc # 21 Filed 12/14/17 Pg 7 of 34 Pg ID 241
with interstitial cystitis, a chronic condition that prevents her from working. (Id. ¶ 4.) Ms. Harris previously worked at Blue Cross Blue Shield in Rochester, Michigan. (Id. ¶ 5.) She was fired in December 2015, however, because her medical condition interfered with her job performance. (Id.) She has not held a job since then. (Id.)
In October 2016, a police officer in Ferndale stopped Ms. Harris and issued her a ticket for “impeding traffic.” (Id. ¶ 7.) The fine was $150, which Ms. Harris claims she is not able to pay. (Id.) About a month later, after receiving notices that her payment was due, Ms. Harris received a notice stating that her driver’s license had been suspended. (Id. ¶ 8.) Ms. Harris must pay a total of $276 to have her license reinstated. (Id. ¶ 9.)
Each month, Ms. Harris pays $600 in rent, $350 for food, and $400 for her utilities and other living expenses. (Id. ¶ 10.) She also has to pay her landlord $100 each month to build up a security deposit. (Id.) Any additional income Ms. Harris has goes to reducing her medical debt and buying clothing and school supplies for her daughter. (Id.) Ms. Harris receives $938 per month in disability benefits, plus an additional $280 in benefits for her daughter, and $300 in food stamps. (Id. ¶ 6.)
Ms. Harris’ medical condition requires her to have regular medical appointments, usually bi-weekly. (Id. ¶ 11.) Her doctor’s office is a thirty-minute
7

4:17-cv-11441-LVP-MKM Doc # 21 Filed 12/14/17 Pg 8 of 34 Pg ID 242
drive from her home. (Id.) Ms. Harris cannot ride the bus, because her medical condition makes it unsafe for her to stand for more than a few minutes. (Id. ¶ 12.) Lacking a driver’s license, Ms. Harris must pay people to drive her where she needs to go. (Id.) Because she relies on other people for rides, Ms. Harris is frequently late for her medical appointments and often has to cancel or reschedule her appointments at the last minute, which negatively impacts her health. (Id. ¶ 13.) II. Defendant’s Jurisdictional Arguments
In response to Plaintiffs’ motion, Defendant first argues that this Court lacks or should decline to exercise jurisdiction over this matter. The Court must address these arguments first.
A. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Defendant contends that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiffs’ claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because “they are at bottom launching a collateral attack against valid state court orders.” (Def.’s Resp. Br. at 8-9, ECF No. 11 at Pg ID 122-23.) Contrary to Defendant’s assertion, Plaintiffs are not collaterally attacking any state court order. As Plaintiffs’ counsel made clear at the motion hearing, Plaintiffs are not contesting their liability for violating the traffic laws for which they received citations. Nor are they challenging the imposition of any fines, costs, or
8

4:17-cv-11441-LVP-MKM Doc # 21 Filed 12/14/17 Pg 9 of 34 Pg ID 243
assessments resulting from those violations. Instead, Plaintiffs are challenging
Defendant’s revocation of their driver’s licenses for failing to pay their traffic debt
without consideration of their willfulness or ability to pay. The Rooker-Feldman
doctrine does not extend to Plaintiffs’ claims.
The Supreme Court made this clear in Exxon Mobil Corporation v. Saudi
Basic Industries Corporation, 544 U.S. 280 (2006), when it stated:
Variously interpreted in the lower courts, the doctrine has sometimes been construed to extend far beyond the contours of the Rooker and Feldman cases, overriding Congress’ conferral of federal-court jurisdiction concurrent with jurisdiction exercised by state courts, and superseding the ordinary application of preclusion law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1738.
Id. at 283. Since Exxon Mobil, the Sixth Circuit “has tightened the scope of
Rooker-Feldman[,]” explaining that it “is a doctrine with only limited application.”
Kovacic v. Cuyahoga Cty. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 606 F.3d 301, 309
(6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Coles v. Granville, 448 F.3d 853, 857 (6th Cir. 2006)).
Specifically, as the Exxon Mobil Court explained,
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine we hold today, is confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commences and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.
544 U.S. at 284. The Sixth Circuit has “explained that the pertinent inquiry after
Exxon is whether the ‘source of the injury’ upon which [the] plaintiff bases his 9

4:17-cv-11441-LVP-MKM Doc # 21 Filed 12/14/17 Pg 10 of 34 Pg ID 244
federal claim is the state court judgment, not simply whether the injury complained of is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state-court judgment[.]” Kovacic, 606 F.3d at 309. A state court judgment is not the source of Plaintiffs’ injuries. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine therefore does not deprive this Court of subject matter jurisdiction.
B. Pullman & Younger Abstention Defendants alternatively argue that the Court should abstain from exercising its subject matter jurisdiction under the doctrines set forth in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), and Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). In Pullman, the Supreme Court “held that federal courts should abstain from decision when difficult and unsettled questions of state law must be resolved before a substantial federal constitutional question can be decided.” Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 236 (1984). “[T]he primary scenario for a district court’s application of Pullman abstention is one in which the state-law question is an unsettled issue best decided by state courts.” Jones v. Coleman, 848 F.3d 744, 750 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Harris Cty. Comm’rs Court v. Moore, 467 U.S. 229, 236 (1984)). More recently, the Supreme Court has recommended the certification of a novel question of state law to the state courts as more preferable to abstaining under Pullman. Id. (citing Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43,
10

4:17-cv-11441-LVP-MKM Doc # 21 Filed 12/14/17 Pg 11 of 34 Pg ID 245
75-76 (1997)). “‘In cases involving a facial challenge to a statute,’ the threshold question is ‘whether the statute is fairly subject to an interpretation which will render unnecessary or substantially modify the federal constitutional question.’” Id. at 750-51 (quoting City of Houston, Tex. v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 468 (1987)) (additional quotation marks and citation omitted).
Defendant has not identified anything ambiguous about the relevant Michigan Motor Vehicle Code provisions to necessitate Pullman abstention. Instead, Defendant argues that Pullman abstention is appropriate because “Michigan law expressly provides that federal constitutional rights are to be protected when driver’s licenses are suspended.” (Def.’s Resp. Br. at 11, ECF No. 11 at Pg ID 125.) In other words, Defendant maintains that “because Michigan law is already written in a way that recognizes constitutional limitations[,]” this Court should abstain. Abstain to allow the state courts to do what, however? According to Defendant, the only possible interpretation of Michigan’s license revocation scheme is that it protects drivers’ constitutional rights. Thus, Pullman abstention is inapplicable.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Younger “bars a federal district court from intervening in a state civil proceeding … when the proceeding is based on a state statute believed by the district court to be unconstitutional.” Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 594 (1975). The Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit “have
11

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mandated three requirements for a district court to properly invoke Younger abstention.” Squire v. Coughlan, 469 F.3d 551, 555 (6th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted); Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). Those factors are: “‘(1) there must be on-going state judicial proceedings; (2) those proceedings must implicate important state interests; and (3) there must be an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.’” Squire, 469 F.3d at 555 (quoting Sun Ref. & Mktg. Co. v. Brennan, 921 F.2d 635, 639 (6th Cir. 1990)); Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm., 457 U.S. at 432. Here, there are no ongoing or threatened state court proceedings. Plaintiffs are not seeking to use this federal litigation to enjoin continuation of any state court proceeding. There is no basis for Younger abstention.
C. The Court’s Discretion to Exercise Jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ Request for Declaratory Relief
Defendant urges the Court to exercise its discretion and refuse to consider Plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief.
“[T]he granting of a declaratory judgment rests in the ‘sound discretion’ of the court[.]” Grand Trunk Western R.R. Co. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 746 F.2d 323, 326 (6th Cir. 1984). In Grand Trunk, the Sixth Circuit identified two principal criteria to guide a court’s determination of whether declaratory relief is appropriate: “(1) when the judgment will serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal relations in issue, and (2) when it will terminate and afford relief
12

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from uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving rise to the proceeding.” Id. at 326. “[W]hen neither of these results can be accomplished, the court should decline to render the declaration prayed.” Id.
The Sixth Circuit has set forth five factors for courts to consider in deciding whether declaratory relief will accomplish those criteria:
(1) whether the declaratory action would settle the controversy; (2) whether the declaratory action would serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal relations at issue; (3) whether the declaratory remedy is being used merely for the purpose of “procedural fencing” or to provide an arena for a race for res judicata; (4) whether the use of a declaratory action would increase friction between our federal and state courts and improperly encroach upon state jurisdiction; and (5) whether there is an alternative remedy which is better or more effective. Id. at 326. Defendant argues that the first factor weighs against declaratory relief because drivers like Ms. Fowler whose driver’s licenses are suspended in other states are ineligible for a driver’s license under Michigan law. (Def.’s Resp. Br. at 13-14, Pg ID 126-27.) Defendant also argues that granting declaratory relief in this case will cause “[u]nnecessary federal intervention into Michigan’s licensing regulation and state court judgment enforcement[,]” “create unjustifiable friction
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between federal and [s]tate courts,” and “improperly interfere with the State’s ability to enforce the Motor Vehicle Code, the Revised Judicature Act, local ordinances, and all other manner of law that touches on driver responsibility.” (Id. at 13, Pg ID 127.) Finally, Defendants contend that there is no useful purpose served by granting declaratory relief “because Plaintiffs and all motorists should already know they are required to follow traffic laws, come to court when ticketed, plead their case and their circumstances (including ability to pay), and then follow whatever valid order the court enters.” (Id.) This Court disagrees with Defendant and finds that the relevant factors militate in favor of deciding whether Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory relief.
A declaratory judgment will settle the controversy between the parties and clarify the constitutionality of Michigan’s scheme for suspending driver’s licenses. Ms. Fowler may not adequately represent the putative class because she is ineligible for a driver’s license due to Georgia’s suspension of her license. In other words, she did not have a Michigan license suspended according to the scheme now challenged. Nevertheless, Ms. Harris appears to be a proper plaintiff to present the question of whether it is constitutional for Michigan to suspend a driver’s license for failure to pay court debts the licensee cannot afford. The Court’s resolution of this matter will cause no more friction than is necessarily created whenever a federal court hears a constitutional challenge to a state law.
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Undoubtedly, if the Court finds Defendant’s suspension scheme unconstitutional, it will interfere with the State’s ability to continue that scheme. However, that interference is not “improper,” but rather mandated, as the federal courts have an obligation to protect individuals from the enforcement of unconstitutional state action. For the same reason, the Court must reject Defendant’s assertion that “there is no useful purpose served here.”
Thus, a balancing of the relevant factors supports the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief. Having rejected Defendant’s abstention arguments, the Court turns to the merits of Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims. III. Preliminary Injunction Standard
A district court must balance four criteria in deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction:
“(1) whether the movant has a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant would suffer irreparable injury without the injunction; (3) whether the issuance of the injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by the issuance of the injunction.” Bailey v. Callaghan, 715 F.3d 956, 958 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Hunter v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 635 F.3d 219, 233 (6th Cir. 2011)) (brackets omitted). “‘When a party seeks a preliminary injunction on the basis of a potential constitutional violation, the likelihood of success on the merits will often be the
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determinative factor.’” Id. (quoting Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 436 (6th Cir. 2012)). IV. Plaintiffs’ Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Plaintiffs allege in their Complaint, “Defendant’s indefinite suspensions of [their] driver’s licenses because of their inability to pay court debts violated their constitutional rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.” (Compl. ¶ 117, ECF No. 1 at Pg ID 19.) Plaintiffs put forth several theories to explain how Defendant’s suspension scheme is unconstitutional.
A. The Due Process Clause & Fundamental Fairness Plaintiffs assert that Michigan’s suspension scheme violates the Due Process Clause because it lacks fundamental fairness. More specifically, Plaintiffs contend that Michigan’s practice of suspending a driver’s license because of the failure to pay a court debt the licensee cannot afford is fundamentally unfair. The Supreme Court has identified fundamental fairness as “the touchstone of due process.” Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1972). In a series of cases, the Court has struck down state practices—mainly in the context of criminal proceedings— because it has found those practices fundamentally unfair. For example, in Griffin v. Illinois, the Supreme Court struck down the State’s practice of granting appellate review of criminal convictions only to defendants able to afford a trial transcript. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). As the Court reasoned, “there can be
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no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.” Id. at 19. Plaintiffs cite the following additional cases where the Court found a state law violative of fundamental fairness: Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983) (holding that it is fundamentally unfair to revoke probation because a probationer is unable to pay fines and restitution); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) (holding that it is fundamentally unfair to jail a person for inability to pay a fine); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (holding that it is fundamentally unfair to imprison a person beyond the maximum period fixed by statute solely because he cannot pay fines or court costs); see also Powers v. Hamilton Cty. Public Defender Comm’n, 501 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that the automatic incarceration of an arrestee for failure to pay a fine, without conducting an indigency hearing to determine his ability to pay the fine, was fundamentally unfair).
These cases establish that there can be no debtor’s prison and that the States may not deny criminal defendants certain rights or their liberty based on their ability to pay. None of these cases establish, however, that it is fundamentally unfair in a constitutional sense (i.e., in violation of the Due Process Clause) for a state to deprive a person of a property interest—such as a driver’s license— because of the person’s inability to pay a fine associated with that interest. Existing case law offers no support that the Due Process Clause extends this far.
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However, this Court sees an analogous situation in Michigan where the State or a county legally forecloses on a residence due to the homeowner’s failure to pay property taxes where the homeowner lacks the funds to do so. The property interest deprived in that setting—which may lead the individual and his or her family to become homeless—is no doubt as significant as a person’s interest in his or her driver’s license. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 53 (1993) (describing the “right to maintain control over [one’s] home” as “a private interest of historic and continuing importance”). However, such an action is not barred by the Due Process Clause
It appears to be unfair to deprive individuals of their driver’s licenses due to their failure to pay traffic fines they are unable to pay. Doing so also appears to be an unwise response because, without a license, individuals in Michigan likely will find it more difficult to find and retain employment and therefore repay their debts. Nevertheless, pursuant to Supreme Court precedent, this does not render a state practice unfair in a constitutional sense. As the Supreme Court provided in the context of an Equal Protection Clause challenge to state law:
Whether embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment or inferred from the Fifth, equal protection is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices. In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably
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conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification. F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993). Absent a fundamental right or suspect classification, due process requires only that the government act rationally and afford certain procedural protections before the deprivation of protected interests. See id.; Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (holding that driver’s licenses “are not to be taken away without that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment”). Later in this decision, the Court will address whether Michigan’s challenged practice is rational and comports with procedural due process. Plaintiffs’ challenge to Michigan’s suspension scheme based on their claim that it is fundamentally unfair, however, is not likely to succeed. B. Substantive Due Process & the Right to Intrastate Travel According to Plaintiffs, “Michigan’s policy of depriving Plaintiffs of their driver’s licenses because they are too poor to pay their traffic fines strips them of their mobility, implicating their constitutional right to travel[.]” (Pls.’ Br. in Supp. of Mot. at 15, ECF No. 2 at Pg ID 64.) In Cole v. City of Memphis, 839 F.3d 530 (6th Cir. 2016), the Sixth Circuit held that intermediate scrutiny is appropriate when evaluating the city’s routine practice of sweeping “a mere two-block stretch for limited periods of time between 3 and 5 a.m., typically on weekend mornings and sometimes after special events.”
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Id. at 537-38. The Cole court acknowledged the right to intrastate travel, but reasoned that this right “‘cannot conceivably imply the right to travel whenever, wherever and however one pleases …’” Id. at 536 (quoting Lutz v. City of New York, 299 F.2d 255, 269 (3d Cir. 1990)). In fact, the Sixth Circuit, as well as many other Circuit Courts, have held that denying an individual a single mode of transportation—such as a car driven by the individual him or herself—does not unconstitutionally impede the individual’s right to intrastate travel because there is no fundamental right to drive. See, e.g., Duncan v. Cone, No. 00-5705, 2000 WL 1828089, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 7, 2000) (unpublished) (relying on Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 1999), to hold that “there is no fundamental right to drive a motor vehicle”); Matthew v. Honish, 233 F. App’x 563, 564 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that the denial of a driver’s license only denies the plaintiff the ability to drive himself in a car, and thus “does not impermissibly burden his right to travel”); Abuhouran v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 291 F. App’x 469, 473 (3d Cir. 2008) (same); see also Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112-16 (1977) (conspicuously not affording the possession of a driver’s license the weight of a fundamental right in holding that a state can summarily suspend or revoke the license of a motorist repeatedly convicted of traffic offenses with due process satisfied by a full administrative hearing available only after the suspension or revocation had taken place). As the Sixth Circuit stated in Duncan, “[a] burden on a single mode of
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transportation simply does not implicate the right to … travel.” 2000 WL 1828089, at *2.
Plaintiffs urge this Court to recognize a fundamental right to drive under the circumstances presented here—i.e., where, they assert, public transportation is woefully inadequate and thus, they argue, Plaintiffs lack access to other modes of travel. Fundamental rights are not identified by looking so narrowly or locally, however. Instead, the Due Process Clause provides heightened protection against government interference for only those liberty interests that are “traditionally protected by our society” and those “ ‘so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.’ ” Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122-23 (1989) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). As the Supreme Court has otherwise stated, fundamental liberties are those that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 (1977) (emphasis added). Thus in spite of the challenges placed on Michigan drivers due to its transportation system, particularly in certain geographical areas, such challenges would not be deemed fundamental in a national or constitutional sense.
In short, there is a fundamental right to intrastate travel, as Plaintiffs assert. Nevertheless, this right is not infringed by Defendant’s suspension scheme that deprived Plaintiffs of their driver’s licenses and thus the ability to travel by a car
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they drive. In other words, Plaintiffs are not likely to establish a violation of their
substantive due process right to intrastate travel.
C. Rational Basis Review
Michigan’s scheme for suspending driver’s licenses neither interferes with a
fundamental right nor discriminates against individuals based on a suspect class.6
Plaintiffs nevertheless argue that it fails rational basis review.
When a challenged law neither creates classifications nor burdens a
fundamental right, however, “[e]ven the deferential ‘rational basis’ scrutiny that is
applied to ordinary governmental classifications is not appropriate.”7 Johnson v.
6 Plaintiffs contend that the scheme discriminates based on wealth, but as their counsel acknowledged at the motion hearing, wealth-based classifications do not discriminate against a suspect class. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 283-84 (1977)). 7 The need for a classification in the challenged law seems to be a threshold element to prove an equal protection analysis, as the Equal Protection Clause, at its essence, requires that “all persons similarly situated … be treated alike.” Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). Nevertheless, in its research, the Court did not locate Sixth Circuit precedent clearly stating this requirement or that rational basis review is inapplicable absent a classification. Further, most decisions—in the Sixth Circuit and elsewhere—seem to bypass this step and proceed directly to a discussion of the type of classification at issue and, thus the applicable level of scrutiny. This may be because most cases involve statutes providing some type of facial classification or distinction in treatment. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (Recognizing that “most legislation classifies for one purpose or another, with resulting disadvantage to various groups or persons”). The dearth of caselaw gives this Court some pause as to whether the Sixth Circuit still would require a law lacking a classification to have some rationality. The Court finds it unnecessary to analyze the issue further at this time, however, because it concludes for other reasons that injunctive relief is appropriate.
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Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299, 306 (5th Cir. 1997); see also McCoy v. Richards, 771 F.2d 1108, 1112 (7th Cir. 1985); Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert Cty., Md., 48 F.3d 810, 819 (4th Cir. 1995) (“[O]nly if the use of a classification is thus established does the equal protection analysis proceed with the inquiry into whether the classification furthers a legitimate legislative purpose.”); “‘[I]f the challenged government action does not appear to classify or distinguish between two or more relevant persons or groups, then the action—even if irrational—does not deny them equal protection of the laws.’” Rodriguez, 110 F.3d at 306 (quoting Brennan v. Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248, 1257 (5th Cir. 1988)). On its face, Michigan Compiled Laws § 257.321a does not classify or distinguish between two or more persons or groups. All drivers who fail to pay their traffic debt will have their license revoked pursuant to the statute. That the law may have a disparate impact on indigent drivers does not change this result absent evidence of discriminatory intent. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 375 (1996) (quoting Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979) (“At bottom, Davis was a recognition of ‘the settled rule that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal laws, not equal results.’”).
Plaintiffs present no evidence suggesting that the Michigan legislature selected the current driver’s license revocation scheme “‘at least in part because of, and not merely in spite of, its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.’”
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McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987) (quoting Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In short, the lack of a rational basis to support the challenged law does not establish Plaintiffs’ likelihood of success in this matter.
D. Extraordinary Collection Plaintiffs maintain that Michigan’s scheme for suspending driver’s licenses is an “extraordinary collection effort” that violates the Equal Protection Clause. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Strange, 407 U.S. 128, Plaintiffs argue that the scheme violates the Equal Protection Clause’s guarantee that an individual will not “be treated differently as debtors to the state than they would be treated as civil debtors,” and that individuals are able “to afford basic necessities and [to] make a living.” (Pls.’ Br. in Supp. of Mot. at 20, ECF No. 2 at Pg ID 69.) Nothing in Strange suggests that the Court’s holding would apply here and Plaintiffs cite no case reading the Equal Protection Clause’s guarantees in a way that Plaintiffs assert Strange does. In Strange, the Supreme Court held that a Kansas statute violated the Equal Protection Clause because it permitted the State to recoup court-appointed attorney fees from indigent criminal defendants without permitting them to raise any of the defenses available to other civil judgment debtors, including certain protections from wage garnishment. 407 U.S. at 142. The Court stated that the Equal
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Protection Clause “imposes a requirement of some rationality in the nature of the class singled out” and that such rationality “is lacking where, as in the instant case, the State has subjected indigent defendants to such discriminatory conditions of repayment” not imposed on other judgment debtors. Id. at 140.
The Supreme Court later clarified that the issue with the statute in Strange was “its provision that in an action to compel repayment of counsel fees ‘(n)one of the exemptions provided for in the code of civil procedure (for collection of other judgment debts) shall apply to any such judgment …’ ” Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 47 (1974) (quoting Strange, 407 U.S. at 135). The Fuller Court was addressing an equal protection challenge to an Oregon recoupment statute similar to the Kansas statute in Strange, except that the Oregon statute lacked the Kansas statute’s provision stripping protective exemptions available to most judgment debtors. Fuller, 417 U.S. at 43, 47. As the Court found in Strange, the Kansas legislature’s elimination of those exemptions “embodies elements of punitiveness and discrimination which violate the rights of citizens to equal treatment under the law.” Strange, 407 U.S. at 142. The Fuller Court rejected the petitioner’s equal protection claim because it found that Oregon’s recoupment statute “suffers from no such infirmity.” 414 U.S. at 47.
Strange holds that the Fourteenth Amendment precludes the government from subjecting government debtors to unduly harsh treatment when compared to
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those individuals indebted to private creditors. The Michigan statutes at issue here, like Oregon’s recoupment statute challenged in Fuller, do not expressly eliminate any exemptions normally available to judgment creditors with respect to the collection of a government debt.
As such, Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate a likelihood of success on their claim that Michigan’s scheme for suspending driver’s licenses is an extraordinary collection effort that violates the Equal Protection Clause.
E. Procedural Due Process Lastly, Plaintiffs assert that Defendant violated their procedural due process rights by suspending their driver’s licenses without first affording them an “abilityto-pay hearing[.]” Plaintiffs challenge the content of the hearing afforded (i.e., whether it considers their ability to pay) and the timing of the hearing (i.e., whether it occurs before their license is suspended). The United States Supreme Court has recognized “that suspension of a driver’s license for statutorily defined cause implicates a protectable property interest” subject to due process protection. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 10 (1979); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. at 539 (“licenses are not to be taken away without that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment.”). The Michigan Supreme Court likewise has recognized that an individual’s interest in his or her driver’s license is entitled to due process protection because
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[i]n Michigan the independent mobility provided by an automobile is a crucial, practical necessity; it is undeniable that whether or not a person can obtain a driver’s license or register and operate his motor vehicle profoundly affects important aspects of his day-to-day life.
Shavers v. Kelley, 402 Mich. 554, 598 (Mich. 1978).
“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard
at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 333 (1976) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “A procedural rule
that may satisfy due process in one context may not necessarily satisfy procedural
due process in every case.” Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. at 540. What process is due
depends on several factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335. “[I]t is fundamental[,]” however, “that except in
emergency situations …due process requires that when a State seeks to terminate
an interest such as that here involved [a driver’s license], it must afford notice and
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case before the termination
becomes effective.” Bell, 402 U.S. at 542 (emphasis added, internal quotation
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marks and citation omitted). For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that Defendant does not afford the appropriate notice and opportunity for hearing before revoking a driver’s license pursuant to Michigan Compiled Laws § 257.321a.
First, it does not appear that Michigan licensed drivers are informed of the risk of revocation until well after they fail to answer a traffic citation. See Michigan Comp. Laws § 257.321a(2). While the parties have not submitted a sample traffic citation with their filings, the Court did locate one example on the website of Michigan’s 43rd District Court (where Ms. Harris received her traffic citation). That citation does not inform individuals that their failure to pay a traffic fine or appear in court will or may result in the suspension of their driver’s license. See http://www.ferndalecourt.com/uploads/6/3/1/8/63189429/ticket_info.pdf. It appears that the first notice a licensee receives of the risk of revocation is when the court sends out the notice required under Section 257.321a(2), which happens twenty-eight days after the individual fails to answer the citation or appear in court.
Further, when individuals do receive that notice, they are given only fourteen days to respond before their license is suspended. Moreover, the notice suggests that the only possible response that will avoid suspension is full payment of the outstanding traffic debt. The notice does not inform indigent individuals that they may seek an alternative to paying their traffic fines in full to avoid
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suspension. And unlike many states, Michigan’s statutory scheme does not include a provision informing individuals that they can, with approval of the court, pay any traffic debt by establishing a payment plan. See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-50502(d)(2); Ohio Rev. Code Ann § 4510.10; Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-395(B), (C).
Finally, the Order of Suspension Defendant sends drivers once their license is suspended for failure to answer a traffic citation or comply with a court judgment does not inform them of the right to request a hearing. (See ECF No. 201 at Pg ID 224-33.) The order instructs the driver to send his or her license to the Michigan Department of State and to contact the district court “[t]o restore your driving privileges[.]” (Id.) Highlighted is the instruction to “PLEASE MAKE PAYMENT TO THE COURT” and the recipient is informed that, in addition to fines and costs, a $45.00 reinstatement must be paid. (Id.) There are no instructions on how to request a hearing or appeal the decision; instead, the order states only that “[t]he court may require you to appear …” (Id.) Michigan law provides a right to appeal the license suspension, but there is no indication of how affected individuals are informed of this right. Moreover, the appeal must be in writing and must be received by Defendant’s division office in Lansing within fourteen days from the date of Defendant’s suspension determination. Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.322(2).
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Defendant argues that Plaintiffs should have appeared in court in response to their traffic citations to assert their inability to pay the imposed fine. Plaintiffs argue in response that nothing informed them that they had the right to do so. In fact, citations issued in Ferndale reflect that only drivers cited for defective equipment violations or no proof of insurance may get the fine waived at a court appearance. See http://www.ferndalecourt.com/uploads/6/3/1/8/63189429/ticket_info.pdf. Unless a misdemeanor violation is involved, the citation does not even appear to inform drivers of their need to appear at a hearing. Id. The information provided on the court’s website would not alert an individual with a traffic citation who does not challenge his or her liability of any alternative but paying the citation in full.8 See http://www.ferdale.court.com/trafficparking.html.
The 43rd District Court citation to the contrary reads that payment must be made within ten days and “must be PAID IN FULL at the time of assessment.” Id. (emphasis in original). This is consistent with what Fowler says she was told when she appeared at the Ferndale courthouse in response to a citation and claimed she
8 The Court reviewed the websites of the other Michigan district courts where Ms. Fowler or Ms. Harris were cited for failing to appear in response to traffic citations. See http://www.36thdistrictcourt.org/divisions-departments/traffic; http://45dc.org/45B-Ct-Traffic.html; and http://www.38thdistrictoucrt.us/trafficfines.html. None of these websites inform individuals with traffic citations that they may come to court and request a reduced fine, payment plan, or alternative to paying their traffic debt in full. Id.
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was unable to pay the fine. (Fowler Decl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 2-1.) As such, individuals lacking the means to pay their Michigan traffic debt do not receive notice and an opportunity to meaningfully challenge the threatened revocation of their licenses.
There is unquestionable value to an ability-to-pay hearing prior to the revocation of an individual’s license. The State’s interests in encouraging Michigan drivers to pay their traffic debt and to respond to traffic citations are actually harmed by the absence of such a hearing. Taking away an individual’s license to drive—particularly in a state lacking an efficient and extensive public transportation system, such as Michigan—deprives the individual of the means to earn the money needed to pay their traffic debt. Affording individuals an opportunity at a pre-revocation hearing to request alternatives to paying their traffic debt in full would provide an incentive for them to appear in court in response to traffic citations. It likely would also increase the chance of the State recouping the debt. Finally, instituting a mechanism whereby an individual’s ability to pay his or her traffic debt is considered early in the process will eliminate fiscal and administrative burdens imposed on the State under the current scheme when that individual unwillingly fails to pay that debt.
For these reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs demonstrate a likelihood of success on their claim that Michigan’s scheme for suspending driver’s licenses violates procedural due process.
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V. Other Factors The remaining factors governing a request for preliminary injunction weigh
in favor of granting Plaintiffs relief. The Court agrees with Defendant that Ms. Fowler would not benefit from the requested preliminary injunction because she was not subjected to the challenged driver’s license revocation scheme. Nevertheless, Defendant did suspend Ms. Harris’ license pursuant to the challenged law. Plaintiffs establish not only the substantial and irreparable harm to Ms. Harris normally accompanying an unconstitutional deprivation, but imminent and irreparable consequences to her of not being able to drive. Defendant’s revocation of Ms. Harris’ license interferes with her ability to obtain regular needed medical care. Plaintiffs also show that the loss of a driver’s license in Michigan makes it difficult for individuals to find and retain employment.
The harm Michigan’s revocation scheme poses to Ms. Harris and other Michigan drivers unable to pay their traffic debt outweighs any harm that the issuance of a preliminary injunction will cause others. The Court recognizes the State’s “interest in having and enforcing its Motor Vehicle Code.” (Def.’s Resp. Br. at 24, ECF No. 11 at Pg ID 138.) Nevertheless, the State’s interests are not furthered by a driver’s license revocation scheme that neither considers an individual’s ability to pay his or her traffic debt nor informs individuals of the
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opportunity to respond to a traffic citation, plead indigency, and seek an alternative to full payment of that debt.
The current law does not encourage Michigan drivers unable to pay their traffic debt to abide by the traffic laws or respond to traffic citations. Even if Michigan drivers are aware that the failure to pay their traffic debt results in the suspension of their license, they undoubtedly do not have that in mind when operating vehicles on the roadways. Unable to pay their traffic debt in full and informed that this is the only option available, indigent drivers have no incentive to appear in court or otherwise respond to their traffic citations. The current law instead discourages indigent drivers from responding to citations and makes it less likely that they will ever repay their traffic debt. The State’s and public’s interests may in fact be served by an injunction, as restoring the driver’s licenses of individuals unable to pay their traffic debt may enable them to obtain and retain employment, which will make them more likely to pay that debt. It is noteworthy that an injunction would not prevent Michigan from continuing to enforce its driver’s license revocation scheme to encourage the collection of traffic debt from individuals able to pay. VI. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed, the Court finds it unlikely that Plaintiffs will succeed in establishing that Michigan’s scheme for suspending driver’s licenses
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violates equal protection or substantive due process. Plaintiffs also are not likely to succeed in showing that the law infringes on a fundamental right or discriminates against individuals based on a suspect class.
The Court, however, finds a strong likelihood that Plaintiffs will show that the law violates procedural due process. The aforementioned remaining factors relevant to whether a preliminary injunction should be issued also favor the issuance of an injunction.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction is GRANTED; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant is enjoined from enforcing Michigan Compiled Laws § 257.321a to suspend the driver’s licenses of people unable to pay their traffic debt.
s/ Linda V. Parker LINDA V. PARKER U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE Dated: December 14, 2017 I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of record and/or pro se parties on this date, December 14, 2017, by electronic and/or U.S. First Class mail. s/ R. Loury Case Manager
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

ADRIAN FOWLER and KITIA HARRIS, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs, v.

Civil Case No. 17-11441 Honorable Linda V. Parker

RUTH JOHNSON, in her official capacity as Secretary of State of the Michigan Department of State,

Defendant. ___________________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S EMERGENCY MOTION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL

This is an action challenging Defendant’s practice, pursuant to Michigan

Compiled Laws § 257.321a, of suspending the driver’s licenses of individuals who

fail to pay court-ordered fines, costs, fees and assessments resulting from traffic

violations (“traffic debt”). On December 14, 2017, this Court entered an opinion

and order enjoining Defendant “from enforcing … § 257.321a to suspend the

driver’s licenses of people unable to pay their traffic debt.” (Op. & Order at 34,

ECF No. 21 at Pg ID 268.) Defendant filed an appeal of the Court’s decision and,

on December 19, 2017, moved for a stay of the injunction pending appeal. (ECF

4:17-cv-11441-LVP-MKM Doc # 29 Filed 12/21/17 Pg 2 of 15 Pg ID 434
No. 25.) Plaintiffs filed a response to Defendant’s motion on December 20, 2017.
(ECF No. 27.) Defendant filed a reply brief the same day. (ECF No. 28.)
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure grant district courts the power to stay
an injunction pending appeal:
While an appeal is pending from an interlocutory order or final judgment that grants, dissolves, or denies an injunction, the court may suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction on terms for bond or other terms that secure the opposing party’s rights. …
Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(c). In deciding whether to issue a stay pursuant to Rule 62(c),
the court must consider the same factors analyzed when issuing injunctive relief:
“(1) the likelihood that the party seeking the stay will prevail on the merits of the appeal; (2) the likelihood that the moving party will be irreparably harmed absent a stay; (3) the prospect that others will be harmed if the court grants the stay; and (4) the public interest in granting the stay.”
SEIU Local 1 v. Husted, 698 F.3d 341, 343 (6th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (quoting
Mich. Coal. of Radioactive Material Users, Inc. v. Griepentrog, 945 F.2d 150, 153
(6th Cir. 1991)). “These factors are not prerequisites that must be met, but are
interrelated considerations that must be balanced together.” Id. The moving party
has the burden of demonstrating entitlement to a stay. Id. (citing Overstreet v.
Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov’t, 305 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2002)).
With regard to the likelihood of reversal, Defendant argues that “the
preliminary injunction is procedurally improper.” (Def.’s Mot. at 4, ECF No. 25 at 2

4:17-cv-11441-LVP-MKM Doc # 29 Filed 12/21/17 Pg 3 of 15 Pg ID 435
Pg ID 278.) Defendant first argues that the Court failed to fulfill the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(1). Specifically, Defendant claims the injunction is ambiguous because it includes the following terms: “enforcing,” “to suspend,” “people,” “unable to pay,” and “traffic debt.” (Def.’s Mot. at 607, ECF No. 25 at Pg ID 280-81.) The terms are not ambiguous.
Rule 65(d)(1) provides: Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order must: (A) state the reasons why [the injunction] issued; (B) state its terms specifically; and (C) describe in reasonable detail—and not by referring to the complaint or other document—the act or acts restrained or required.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1). Nevertheless, “‘the rule does not require the impossible. There is a limit to what words can convey.’” Windmill Corp. v. Kelly Foods Corp., Nos. 94-5874, 94-5890, 95-5137, 1996 WL 33251, at *6 (6th Cir. Jan. 26, 1996) (unpublished) (quoting Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1431 (7th Cir. 1985)). “Rule 65(d) does not require a torrent of words when more words would not produce enlightenment about what is forbidden.’” Id. at *7 (quoting Scandia Down, 772 F.2d at 1432). Moreover, the words of the injunction must be read in the context of the Court’s entire decision and, when that is done, they are not ambiguous and the injunction satisfies Rule 65(d)(1)’s requirements.
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The Court sees no confusion as to what it was enjoining—that being,
Defendant’s suspension of Michigan driver’s licenses for failure to pay traffic debt1 when the license holder is unable to pay that debt. The Court said nothing in
its decision about reinstating driver’s licenses previously revoked. In other words,
the Court’s December 14, 2017 decision does not require Defendant to restore anyone’s license at this point. In fact, this was not relief sought by Plaintiffs in
their motion for preliminary injunction (unlike the plaintiffs in the Tennessee
license revocation case cited in the decision). See Robinson v. Purkey, No. 3:17-
cv-1263, 2017 WL 4418134 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 5, 2017).
Defendant next argues that the Court’s injunction violates the security
requirement in Rule 65(c):
The court may issue a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.
Fed. R. Civ. 65(c). The Court did not address security in its decision; but,
Defendant never asked the Court to impose a bond in response to Plaintiffs’
preliminary injunction motion. Several courts have found no error in a district
1 As stated in the Court’s decision, it used the term “traffic debt” to refer to “courtordered fines, costs, fees and assessments resulting from traffic violations[.]” (See Op. & Order at 1, ECF No. 21 at Pg ID 235.) Thus, the Court clearly was not barring Defendant from enforcing Section 257.321a to suspend licenses for other bases set forth in the statute.
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court’s failure to impose a bond where it never was requested. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. New Images of Beverly Hills, 321 F.3d 878, 882-83 (9th Cir. 2003); Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 862 F.2d 890, 895-96 (1st Cir. 1988); Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624, 632 (2d Cir. 1976); Weaver v. Sch. Bd. of Leon Cnty., No. 00-00091-cv-ws, 2006 WL 858510, at *2 n.3 (11th Cir. April 4, 2006) (unpublished); see also Laster v. District of Columbia, 439 F. Supp. 2d 93, 99 n.7 (D.D.C. 2006) (declining to order the plaintiffs to post a bond in part because the defendants never requested one); Scholle Corp. v. Rapak LLC, No. 13 c 397, 2014 WL 3687734, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 24, 2014) (unpublished) (“[Defendant] is in no position to complain about the opportunity to present its views on the bond amount after this Court enjoined it when it failed to raise the issue on its own prior to the entry of the preliminary injunction.”).
In any event, despite Rule 65(c)’s apparent mandatory language, “the rule in our circuit has long been that the district court possesses discretion over whether to require the posting of security.” Moltan Co. v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 55 F.3d 1171, 1176 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing cases). Had the Court addressed security in its decision, it would have held that no bond should be required. The Court reaches this conclusion because Plaintiffs claim to be indigent and to have suffered injuries because of their lack of financial resources. Further, the interests at stake are substantial because the loss of a driver’s license, particularly in a state like
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Michigan lacking an efficient and extensive public transportation system, hinders a person’s ability to travel and earn a living. To the extent the Court erred in not making that determination in its preliminary injunction decision, see Roth v. Bank of Commonwealth, 583 F.2d 527, 539 (6th Cir. 1978), it amends the decision to do so now.
Defendant also contends that the preliminary injunction was issued in violation of due process because the Court relied on evidence not presented by the parties, but obtained from Michigan state court websites. However, the Court was permitted to “judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it … can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned,” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2), and this includes information posted on an official government website. Qiu Yun Chen v. Holder, 715 F.3d 207, 212 (7th Cir. 2013) (“A document posted on a government website is presumptively authentic if government sponsorship can be verified by visiting the website itself.”); see also United States ex rel. Dingle v. BioPort Corp., 270 F. Supp. 2d 968, 971-72 (2003) (citations omitted) (“Public records and government documents are generally considered ‘not to be subject to reasonable dispute.’ … This includes public records and government documents available from reliable sources on the Internet.”); Lamay v. Balcarel, No. 2:13-CV-10482, 2013 WL 4053203, at *3 n. 5 (E.D. Mich. Aug.12, 2013) (unpublished) (“Public
6

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records and government documents, including those available from reliable resources on the Internet, are subject to judicial notice”); Hames v. Sepanek, No. 0:13-111, 2013 WL 5235567, at *1 n. 1 (E.D. Ky. Sept.17, 2013) (unpublished) (finding that “[r]ecords and information located on government websites are selfauthenticating under Fed. R. Evid. 902” and thus can be judicially noticed).
Defendant also believes, however, that her due process rights were violated because the Court, when citing to this evidence, relied on a different basis to grant injunctive relief than was argued by Plaintiffs and Defendant, therefore, did not have the opportunity to address it before the Court’s ruling. (See Def.’s Mot. at 810, ECF No. 25 at Pg ID 282-84.) The Court does not believe that Defendant was blindsided by this issue and not provided an opportunity to respond to it.
The crux of Plaintiffs’ case always has been that Michigan drivers lacking the means to pay their traffic debt are denied their due process right to an abilityto-pay hearing before their licenses are suspended. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 11, 157, 159, ECF No. 1 at Pg ID 3, 25.) Defendant has argued in response that Plaintiffs could have raised their indigency and sought an alternative to full payment of their traffic debt by appearing in state court in response to their traffic citations. Defense counsel reiterated this argument at oral argument in response to the assertion by Plaintiff’s counsel that traffic citations inform drivers only that they can contest liability at a hearing and, if they do not prevail, must then pay the full
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amount of their traffic debt. Plaintiffs referred to Ms. Fowler’s affidavit to support
this assertion.
The Court therefore spent significant time at oral argument seeking
information as to what ticketed motorists are told and when. The Court’s questions
should have made clear that it was concerned about if and how drivers were
informed that they could raise their indigency before their licenses were
suspended, as defense counsel asserted they could.2 Despite making this argument,
defense counsel conceded that he really was not aware if or how this opportunity
was conveyed to Michigan drivers as the traffic hearings are governed by local
2 As the Court’s December 14, 2017 decision hopefully made clear, the Court believes that due process requires not only an opportunity to be heard but knowledge of that opportunity. Therefore, even if the State Court Administrative Office has created an administrative order establishing and requiring compliance with collection programs and the State’s traffic courts offer alternatives to paying traffic debt in full (see Def.’s Mot., Ex. 4, ECF No. 25-5), motorists’ due process rights still may be violated if they are never informed that they can seek such relief at a hearing. Plaintiffs established that motorists are informed only that they can challenge their liability at the traffic court hearing and must pay their traffic debt in full if they are liable. Defendant has not presented evidence to show otherwise. In the affidavit Defendant offers from Linda Carroll, Court Administrator for the 43rd District Court, Ms. Carroll states that payment extensions are given only to a defendant “that ask[s]” and then the extension is only for two weeks. (Def.’s Mot., Ex. 3 ¶ 4, ECF No. 25-4 at Pg ID 307.) To receive a longer extension, defendants usually must pay half of their debts. (Id.) According to Ms. Carroll, the court informs individuals of their right to a hearing to raise their ability to pay only after they fail to comply with a judgment. (Id. ¶ 8, Pg ID 308.) Ms. Carroll states that the court sets a show cause hearing where the court will determine if a payment plan, wage assignment or community service is appropriate; however, there is no evidence that individuals are told beforehand that this will happen at the hearing. (Id. ¶ 9, Pg ID 308.)
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state courts and not Defendant. Defense counsel could have requested the opportunity to supplement the record at that time to show that motorists are informed of the opportunity to raise their inability to pay and seek alternative means of paying their traffic if they come to court in response to a traffic citation. Nevertheless, counsel did not do so before the Court issued its preliminary injunction decision.3
Defendant argues in her motion to stay that if she had known that the defects in the court forms were the basis of any constitutional claim, she would have taken the opportunity to explain that she is not responsible for crafting or issuing state court notices to motorists. (Def.’s Mot. at 9, ECF No. 25 at Pg ID 283.) The defects in the notices are not the basis of Plaintiffs’ constitutional claim, however. Rather, the basis is the lack of an opportunity to be heard regarding inability to pay before one’s license is suspended. The notices are relevant only with respect to defense counsel’s assertion that Plaintiffs in fact were informed of and would have been afforded that opportunity if they had appeared in state court.
3 Defendant attaches affidavits in support of her motion to stay to show that indigency and alternatives to full payment are considered by the state traffic courts. This evidence, however, was not part of the record when the Court decided to issue the preliminary injunction and Defendant did not move for reconsideration based on this new evidence before filing her appeal. Moreover, for the reasons stated in the previous footnote, the evidence does not show that individuals are informed that these matters will be considered.
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Notably, Defendant asserts on more than one occasion in her motion for a stay that the operative state court notices are not within her control. Defense counsel made the same point at oral argument. This may be true. Nevertheless, Defendant has relied on these notices to argue that motorists are adequately informed of the opportunity to have their indigency considered before their licenses are revoked. If Defendant is delegating her constitutional obligation to provide due process to Michigan motorists to the state courts, she bears the responsibility for guaranteeing that the obligation is satisfied.4
Turning to the second and last factors the Court must consider in deciding whether a stay is warranted, Defendant argues that she and third parties will suffer irreparable harm absent a stay. Defendant first insists: “‘[A]ny time a State is enjoined by a court from effectuating statutes enacted by representatives of its people, it suffers a form of irreparable injury.”’ (Def.’s Mot. at 14, ECF No. 25 at Pg ID 288, quoting Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1, 3 (2012) (additional quotation marks and citation omitted).) Defendant’s counsel, the Michigan Department of Attorney General, made the same argument in a previous case before this Court, to which the Court responded:
4 Notably, in Section 257.321a, the Michigan legislature gave only Defendant the power to suspend a motorist’s license for inter alia failure to “pay[] all fines, costs, fees and assessments” related to a traffic violation. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.321a(2).
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Enjoining a State from enforcing its laws cannot always amount to irreparable harm. If a statute is unconstitutional, how is the State harmed by not being able to enforce it? Joelner v. Vill. of Wash. Park, 378 F.3d 613, 620 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[T]here can be no irreparable harm to a municipality when it is prevented from enforcing an unconstitutional statute[.]”) (citing Connection Distrib. Co. v. Reno, 154 F.3d 281, 288 (6th Cir. 1998)). Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Johnson, No. 16-11454, 2016 WL 6405831, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2016), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 847 F.3d 800 (6th Cir. 2017). The same rationale undermines Defendant’s second argument that the injunction intrudes into the State’s regulation of driver’s licenses and roadways, as well as administration of its trial courts. Defendant also argues that the State and its local units of government will suffer irreparable harm by the loss of revenue because, without a defined standard for “unable to pay,” “870,000 people that have not complied with a valid state court order could now potentially argue they can avoid their ‘traffic debt.’” (Def.’s Mot. at 14-15, ECF No. 25 at Pg ID 288-29.) Defendant contends that local court resources also will be taxed when those courts are inundated with drivers “potentially seek[ing] a determination on whether they are ‘unable to pay’ their traffic debt.” (Id. at 15, Pg ID 289.) Moreover, according to Defendant, the Michigan courts will be required to expend significant resources reviewing drivers’ files to assess their ability to pay.
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As the Court’s preliminary injunction does not apply retroactively, there is no need at this time for the state to review the files of drivers whose licenses already have been suspended. With respect to the potential for lost revenue and a flood of requests for inability-to-pay hearings, Defendant contends in her motion (and attaches affidavits as proof) that the Michigan courts already have in place a system for assessing motorists’ ability to pay and, when the court determines that they cannot pay in full, for directing alternative means of payment (e.g. payment plans or community service). Assuming, as Defendant urges, that motorists already are informed of the opportunity to raise indigency before the State’s traffic courts, the preliminary injunction should not cause a flood of requests for abilityto-pay hearings. Because, as Defendant maintains, the local courts already offer alternatives to full payment for indigent offenders, they presumably already have in place a defined standard for evaluating motorists’ ability to pay.
Defendant nevertheless maintains in her reply brief that “the system” is not “set up in a manner that allows flipping a switch to stop ‘enforcing Michigan Compiled Laws § 257.321a to suspend the driver’s licenses of people unable to pay their traffic debt.’” (Def.’s Reply at 2, ECF No. 28 at Pg ID 406, quoting Op. & Order at 34, ECF No. 21 at Pg ID 268.) According to Defendant, “[it] is a months-long disruptive process implicating every trial court in the State[]” and would require “herculean compliance efforts[.]” (Id.) As Defendant indicated in
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her initial motion, it is the State’s trial courts that process traffic violations and send suspension notices.
Yet, as the Court indicated earlier, the legislature granted the power to suspend licenses for failure to pay traffic debt only to Defendant. Defendant therefore must guarantee that individuals receive the process they are due before their licenses are revoked. If Defendant cannot make this happen promptly or without “herculean … efforts”, she can simply stop suspending driver’s licenses until a system is in place to adequately inform drivers of their opportunity for a pre-revocation ability-to-pay hearing and to afford such a hearing.
Defendant additionally contends that drivers whose licenses have been revoked may be irreparably harmed absent a stay because the injunction may cause them to run out and purchase a vehicle and the required insurance believing they can now drive legally. (Def.’s Mot. at 15, ECF No. 25 at Pg ID 289.) Defendant adds that if the preliminary injunction is modified or set aside, “those drivers will have invested significant resources into a diminishing asset that they cannot use.” (Id.) Again, the Court’s injunction does not require Defendant to reinstate driver’s licenses previously suspended at this time. In any event, the scenario Defendant envisions seems implausible as the same motorists lack the finances to pay their traffic debts.
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Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have not suffered irreparable injury because they both lack standing and, in any event, have adequate post-deprivation remedies. This Court already has questioned Ms. Fowler’s standing. (Op. and Order at 14, ECF No. 21 at Pg ID 248.) But the Court found that Ms. Harris “appears to be a proper plaintiff [with standing] to present the question of whether it is constitutional for Michigan to suspend a driver’s license for failure to pay court debts the licensee cannot afford.” (Id.) Defendant now claims in her motion to stay that Ms. Harris has committed additional infractions during the pendency of this lawsuit that operate to deprive her of Article III standing. Defendant also maintains that records from the district court in Ferndale indicate that “[Ms.] Harris in fact received the process that was due before her license was suspended.” (Id. at 17, Pg ID 291.)
Defendant did not raise these arguments or present this evidence before the Court issued its preliminary injunction decision, however. In any event, Defendant presents insufficient information for the Court to conclude at this juncture that Ms. Harris lacks standing or that she was informed of the opportunity to raise her indigency and seek an alternative to full payment of her traffic debt in the Ferndale court. See supra at n. 2.
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For the above reasons, the Court concludes that Defendant does not demonstrate her entitlement to a stay of the preliminary injunction order pending appeal.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s motion for stay pending appeal (ECF No. 25) is DENIED.
s/ Linda V. Parker LINDA V. PARKER U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE Dated: December 21, 2017 I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of record and/or pro se parties on this date, December 21, 2017, by electronic and/or U.S. First Class mail. s/ R. Loury Case Manager
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 4:17-cv-1C1a4s4e1:-L1V7-P2-5M0K4M DDocoucm#e3n0t: 8-F1iledF1i2le/2d8: /1127/28P/2g017of 4PaPgeg:I1D 448

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Deborah S. Hunt Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
100 EAST FIFTH STREET, ROOM 540 POTTER STEWART U.S. COURTHOUSE
CINCINNATI, OHIO 45202-3988

Tel. (513) 564-7000 www.ca6.uscourts.gov

Filed: December 28, 2017

Mr. David J. Weaver Eastern District of Michigan at Bay City 1000 Washington Avenue Suite 219 Federal Building Bay City, MI 48708-0000
Re: Case No. 17-2504, Adrian Fowler, et al v. Ruth Johnson Originating Case No. : 4:17-cv-11441
Dear Clerk,
The Court issued the enclosed Order today in this case.
Sincerely yours,

cc: Ms. Denise C. Barton Mr. John G. Fedynsky Mr. Anthony Dietrich Paris Mr. Phil Telfeyan
Enclosure

s/Antoinette S. Macon Case Manager Direct Dial No. 513-564-7015

4:17-cv-1C1a4s4e1:-L1V7-P2-5M0K4M DDocoucm#e3n0t: 8-F2iledF1i2le/2d8: /1127/28P/2g0127of 4PaPgeg:I1D 449

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FILED
Dec 28, 2017

No. 17-2504

DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

ADRIAN FOWLER, KITIA HARRIS, on behalf of )

themselves and others similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

)

)

v.

)

)

RUTH JOHNSON, Michigan Secretary of State, in )

her official capacity,

)

)

Defendant-Appellant.

)

O R D E R

Before: GUY and GILMAN, Circuit Judges; HOOD, District Judge.*
Ruth Johnson, the Michigan Secretary of State in her official capacity (the “State”), appeals a preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of Michigan Compiled Laws § 257.321a to suspend the driver’s licenses of people unable to pay their traffic debt. The State moves for a stay of the preliminary injunction pending appeal. The plaintiffs oppose the motion for a stay. The district court denied a stay pending appeal on December 21, 2017. The State requests an expedited ruling on its motion for a stay.
The State “bears the burden of showing that the circumstances justify” the exercise of discretion to grant a stay pending review. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009). Four factors guide our consideration of the motion for a stay: (1) whether the State has a likelihood of
* The Honorable Joseph M. Hood, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Kentucky, sitting by designation.

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No. 17-2504 -2-

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success on the merits; (2) whether it will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a stay;

(3) whether the requested injunctive relief will substantially injure other interested parties; and

(4) where the public interest lies. Id. at 434; see also In re EPA, 803 F.3d 804, 806 (6th Cir.

2015); Ohio ex rel. Celebrezze v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 812 F.2d 288, 290 (6th Cir.

1987). “The first two factors of the traditional standard are the most critical.” Nken, 556 U.S. at

434. Moreover, the stay factors “are not prerequisites that must be met, but interrelated

considerations that must be balanced.” In re EPA, 803 F.3d at 806.

The State has not demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits of its

challenge to the district court’s ruling on procedural due process. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S.

535, 539 (1971) (holding that the “continued possession [of a driver’s license] may become

essential in the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state action

that adjudicates important interests of the licensees. In such cases the licenses are not to be taken

away without that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment.”).

But the State argues that it will be difficult, if not impossible, to comply fully with the

preliminary injunction in the immediate future. The injunction is broad in scope and provides

very little direction as to what specific actions should be taken to comply with the constitutional

due process requirements. Clearly, additional notice about the procedures available to persons

facing license suspension is contemplated.

The motion for a stay pending appeal is therefore GRANTED for a period of thirty days.

The action is REMANDED to the district court for the limited purpose of modifying the

injunctive relief granted, after whatever additional briefing or evidentiary hearings are deemed

necessary, to provide direction to the State as to the type of process required to comply with the

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No. 17-2504 -3-

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court’s order. Any party seeking review of the amended injunctive relief granted should file a

timely notice of appeal, and any resulting appeal will be consolidated with this case.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

Deborah S. Hunt, Clerk

 
 4:17-cv-11441-LVP-MKM Doc # 35 Filed 01/24/18 Pg 1 of 4 Pg ID 644

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

ADRIAN FOWLER and KITIA HARRIS, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs, v.

Civil Case No. 17-11441 Honorable Linda V. Parker

RUTH JOHNSON, in her official capacity as Secretary of State of the Michigan Department of State,

Defendant. ___________________________________/

AMENDED PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

On December 14, 2017, this Court issued an opinion and order granting

Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction. (ECF No. 21.) In that decision, the

Court provided: “Defendant is enjoined from enforcing Michigan Compiled Laws

§ 257.321a to suspend the driver’s licenses of people unable to pay their traffic

debt.” (Id. at Pg ID 268.) Defendant appealed and asked the Sixth Circuit Court of

Appeals to stay the injunction. On December 28, 2017, the Sixth Circuit stayed

this Court’s injunction for thirty days and remanded the matter “for the limited

purpose of modifying the injunctive relief granted … to provide direction to the

State as to the type of process required to comply with the court’s order.” (ECF

No. 30, emphasis added.) The Sixth Circuit further indicated in its decision: “The

4:17-cv-11441-LVP-MKM Doc # 35 Filed 01/24/18 Pg 2 of 4 Pg ID 645
State has not demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits of its challenge to the district court’s ruling on procedural due process.” (Id. at Pg ID 450.)
In response to the Sixth Circuit’s remand order, this Court issued an order on January 5, 2018, clarifying its injunction. (ECF No. 31.) The order stated:
To be clear, in its December 14, 2017 decision, this Court intended to enjoin Defendant from suspending any further driver’s licenses of individuals because of their inability to pay their traffic debt until the State: (1) provides drivers a hearing where they have the opportunity to demonstrate their inability to pay; (2) provides reasonable notice to drivers of the hearing; and (3) institutes alternatives to full payment for those unable to pay (e.g., realistic payment plans or volunteer service). (Id. at Pg ID 452-53.) The Court further scheduled a hearing for January 17, 2018, to address any questions or concerns the parties may have had concerning the intended modification to the preliminary injunction order. (Id. at Pg ID 453.) The Court instructed Defendant to “be prepared to inform opposing counsel and the Court of how the State intends to satisfy the Court’s injunction.” (Id.) Prior to the January 17 hearing, Plaintiff filed a brief suggesting changes to the language used in the Court’s proposed modified preliminary injunction. (ECF No. 32.) Defendant filed a twenty-six page brief and exhibits, attempting to convince the Court that it should vacate the preliminary injunction. (ECF No. 33.) As the Court stated at the January 17 hearing, it did not read the Sixth Circuit’s remand order as inviting it to revisit the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims.
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While the Sixth Circuit recognized that additional briefing or evidentiary hearings may be needed, its order did not suggest that additional evidence could be considered to reconsider this Court’s December 14, 2017 decision. In fact, the Sixth Circuit specifically contemplated briefing and/or hearings only “to provide direction to the State as to the type of process required to comply with the court’s order.” (ECF No. 30 at Pg ID 450-51, emphasis added.) Nevertheless, Defendant used the remand proceedings, including the hearing on January 17, to continue to argue the merits of Plaintiffs’ lawsuit. Defendant offered little assistance to the Court in fashioning a mechanism to execute the process this Court finds constitutionally necessary before suspending driver’s licenses of individuals unable to pay the traffic fines, costs, fees, or assessments for which the lack of payment leads to suspension under Section 257.321a.
Despite the lack of cooperation from Defendant, the Court believes it now can sufficiently direct Defendant as to the specific actions it should take to comply with the constitutional due process requirement. Because Section 257.321 delegates the authority to suspend driver’s licenses (i.e., a property interest) to Defendant, the Constitution imposes on Defendant the State’s concomitant duty to see that no deprivation occurs without adequate procedural protections.
Accordingly,
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4:17-cv-11441-LVP-MKM Doc # 35 Filed 01/24/18 Pg 4 of 4 Pg ID 647
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant is enjoined from suspending any further driver’s licenses of individuals because of nonpayment of any fine, cost, fee or assessment under Michigan Compiled Laws § 257.321a unless and until Defendant or another entity: (1) offers drivers the option to request a hearing where they have the opportunity to demonstrate their inability to pay a fine, cost, fee and/or assessment; (2) provides a hearing when requested1; (3) provides reasonable notice to drivers of the hearing opportunity; and (4) institutes alternatives to full payment for those unable to pay (e.g., realistic payment plans or volunteer service).

Dated: January 24, 2018

s/Linda V. Parker U.S. District Court Judge

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record on January 24, 2018, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Julie Owens acting in the Absence of Richard Loury Case Manager

1 Defendant contends that it would be too burdensome to hold a formal hearing with a hearing officer for every individual who risks suspension of a driver’s license under Section 257.321a. There certainly are other ways for Defendant and/or the State to comply with the due process requirement. For example, Defendant could provide an opportunity for individuals to submit documentation if they claim an inability to pay and evaluate that documentation as the courts do when considering an application to proceed in forma pauperis, providing a hearing only to allow individuals deemed able to pay to challenge that finding. Further, Defendant could delegate to the courts the responsibility to conduct the hearing when individuals first appear in response to a citation but only if individuals are provided adequate notice that they may assert inability to pay in that forum.
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Deborah S. Hunt Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
100 EAST FIFTH STREET, ROOM 540 POTTER STEWART U.S. COURTHOUSE
CINCINNATI, OHIO 45202-3988

Tel. (513) 564-7000 www.ca6.uscourts.gov

Filed: February 07, 2018

Ms. Denise C. Barton Mr. John G. Fedynsky Office of the Attorney General of Michigan P.O. Box 30736 Lansing, MI 48909
Mr. Phil Telfeyan Equal Justice Under Law 400 Seventh Street, N.W. Suite 602 Washington, DC 20004
Re: Case No. 17-2504/18-1089, Adrian Fowler, et al v. Ruth Johnson Originating Case No. : 4:17-cv-11441
Dear Counsel,
The Court issued the enclosed Order today in this case.
Sincerely yours,

cc: Mr. David J. Weaver Enclosure

s/Antoinette S. Macon Case Manager Direct Dial No. 513-564-7015

4:17-cv-C11a4s4e1: -1L7V-2P5-M04KM DoDcoucm#en4t0: 16F-2iled 0F2il/e0d7:/1082/07P/2g0218of 3 PaPgge:ID1 652

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Nos. 17-2504/18-1089
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

FILED
Feb 07, 2018
DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk

ADRIAN FOWLER, KITIA HARRIS, on behalf of )

themselves and others similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

)

)

v.

)

)

RUTH JOHNSON, Michigan Secretary of State, in )

her official capacity,

)

)

Defendant-Appellant.

)

O R D E R

Before: GUY and GILMAN, Circuit Judges; HOOD, District Judge.*

Ruth Johnson, the Michigan Secretary of State in her official capacity (the “Secretary”),
appeals the district court’s amended preliminary injunction enjoining the suspension of driver’s
licenses
because of nonpayment of any fine, cost, fee or assessment under Michigan Compiled Laws § 257.321a unless and until [the Secretary] or another entity: (1) offers drivers the option to request a hearing where they have the opportunity to demonstrate their inability to pay a fine, cost, fee and/or assessment; (2) provides a hearing when requested; (3) provides reasonable notice of the hearing opportunity; and (4) institutes alternatives to full payment for those unable to pay (e.g., realistic payment plans or volunteer service).
The Secretary moves for a stay of the amended preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs
oppose the motion for a stay pending appeal. The Secretary replies and requests immediate
action on her motion.

* The Honorable Joseph M. Hood, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Kentucky, sitting by designation.

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Nos. 17-2504/18-1089 -2-
The Secretary “bears the burden of showing that the circumstances justify” the exercise

of discretion to grant a stay pending review. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009). Four

factors guide our consideration of the motion for a stay: (1) whether the Secretary has a

likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether she will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of

a stay; (3) whether the requested injunctive relief will substantially injure other interested parties;

and (4) where the public interest lies. Id. at 434; see also In re EPA, 803 F.3d 804, 806 (6th Cir.

2015); Ohio ex rel. Celebrezze v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 812 F.2d 288, 290 (6th Cir.

1987). “The first two factors of the traditional standard are the most critical.” Nken, 556 U.S. at

434.

The Secretary has challenged the standing of the plaintiffs to pursue the claims alleged in

this action. Specifically, the Secretary has submitted evidence indicating that Plaintiff Kitia

Harris contacted the state court after she was issued a traffic ticket. Although she was granted an

extension of time to pay her traffic fine and offered a payment plan, Harris allegedly failed to

make any payments to the court or otherwise contact the court again concerning the payment

plan. And the district court previously noted concerns about the standing of Plaintiff Adrian

Fowler. Because of the unresolved factual issues regarding standing, the court’s jurisdiction

over this case is unclear.

Accordingly, the motion for a stay pending appeal is GRANTED. These appeals are

again REMANDED to the district court, this time to address the plaintiffs’ standing. We retain

jurisdiction, but will hold these appeals in abeyance pending a ruling by the district court on

standing.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

Deborah S. Hunt, Clerk

 
 4:17-cv-11441-LVP-MKM Doc # 54 Filed 04/11/18 Pg 1 of 21 Pg ID 1044

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

ADRIAN FOWLER and KITIA HARRIS,

Plaintiffs, v.

Civil Case No. 17-11441 Honorable Linda V. Parker

RUTH JOHNSON, Michigan Secretary of State,

Defendant. ___________________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER

This is a putative class action lawsuit challenging Defendant’s practice,

pursuant to Michigan Compiled Laws § 257.321a, of suspending the driver’s licenses

of individuals who fail to pay court-ordered fines, costs, fees and assessments

resulting from traffic violations. The matter presently is before the Court on remand

from the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals to address Plaintiffs’ standing. See Order,

Fowler v. Johnson, Case Nos. 17-2504/18-1089 (6th Cir. Feb. 7, 2018).

Factual Background

Plaintiffs Adrian Fowler and Kitia Harris are Michigan residents who claim to

have had their driver’s licenses suspended pursuant to Michigan Compiled Laws §

257.321a. While living in Georgia from 2008 to 2012, Ms. Fowler was issued three

tickets for civil traffic infractions, which she was not able to pay. (Fowler Decl. ¶ 4;

ECF No. 42-2 at Pg ID 676.) When she moved back to Michigan in 2012, Ms. Fowler

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tried to renew her Michigan driver’s license and was informed that it was suspended because she had not paid her Georgia court debts. (Id. ¶ 5.) Defendant explains that Michigan law precludes the Secretary of State from issuing a driver’s license to someone whose license is revoked or suspended in another state. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.303(1). According to Defendant, Georgia suspended Ms. Fowler’s license for nonpayment of court debts.
In Winter 2013, a police officer stopped Ms. Fowler for speeding in Ferndale, Michigan, and issued her a citation for speeding and driving while license suspended (“DWLS”). (Fowler Decl. ¶ 6, ECF No. 42-2 at Pg ID 676.) The total cost of the ticket was almost $600. (Id.) According to Ms. Fowler, she subsequently went to the Ferndale courthouse to report that she was unable to pay the $600 and was told to return in three weeks with the full amount or a warrant would be issued for her arrest. (Id. ¶ 7.) Ms. Fowler has been unable to pay the amount owed. (Id. ¶ 11.)
In October 2016, a Ferndale police officer stopped Ms. Harris and issued her a ticket for “impeding traffic.” (Harris Decl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 42-4 at Pg ID 682.) According to Ms. Harris, the officer instructed her to call a number to see how much she owed for the ticket. (Id.) Ms. Harris called the number a couple of days later and was told the cost was $150. (Id. ¶ 8.) Unable to pay that amount, Ms. Harris asked the person on the phone if she could be placed on a payment plan. (Id. ¶ 8.) According to Ms. Harris, she was told no and that she had to pay the amount in full.
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(Id.) Ms. Harris was further informed that if she waited too long to pay, her license would be suspended. (Id.) Ms. Harris avers that she was never told to come to court to discuss a payment plan or provided other alternatives to paying the fine in full. (Id. ¶ 9.)
About a month later, Ms. Harris received a notice in the mail reflecting that the amount she owed had increased and that her license had been suspended because of her failure to pay the fine. (Id. ¶ 10.) Ms. Harris claims that she received three additional suspensions of her license for failure to pay fines in November 2017. (Id. ¶ 12.)
Defendant informs the Court that these additional suspensions were not due to Ms. Harris’ failure to pay traffic fines, but rather her failure to appear in court in response to traffic citations. (See ECF No. 25-2 at Pg ID 300-01.) These citations were accumulated after this lawsuit was filed. In the Sixth Circuit and here, Defendant has argued that these additional suspensions for failure to appear—rather than failure to pay—“remove [Ms. Harris’] situation from the terms of [this Court’s] injunctive order because now there are independent grounds for suspending her driving privileges.” (See, e.g., ECF No. 25 at Pg ID 290-91.)
Defendant also has asserted that when Ms. Harris contacted the Ferndale court regarding her October 2016 citation, she in fact received an extension to make a payment by November 7, 2016. Defendant claims Ms. Harris also was informed that
3

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any payment would result in another extension on the balance and that her license would not be suspended. (See ECF No. 33-5.) Defendant relates that Ms. Harris failed to make any payment, which resulted in a default judgment on November 14, 2016. According to Defendant, if Ms. Harris had again contacted the court, the court would have made a payment arrangement with her to avoid the suspension of her license. (Id.)
Defendant also offers the affidavit of Linda Carroll, Court Administrator for the Ferndale court, who provides:
For civil infractions, defendant[s] that ask are given a payment extension for 2 weeks. They are told that if they bring in a payment, preferably half, we will grant another 2 week extension. If they are unable to pay in full at that time, we will give them another extension. We will give an extension until they are paid in full. Very often, we will give the defendant several extensions. Anyone that calls in and makes any type of payment will always be granted an extension. (See Carroll Aff. ¶ 4, ECF No. 25-4 at Pg ID 307.) Ms. Carroll further attests that the court allows defendants to enter into payment plans for fees that cannot be waived and that such plans can be started for as little as a dollar. (Id. ¶¶ 6-7, Pg ID 308.) She further states that individuals are informed that they can raise their inability to pay at a show cause hearing. (Id. ¶ 8, Pg ID 308.)
Procedural Background On the day they initiated this action, Plaintiffs also filed a motion for preliminary injunction to enjoin Defendant from suspending the driver’s licenses of
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individuals unable to pay their traffic debt. Concluding that Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on their claim that Defendant violated their procedural due process rights by suspending their driver’s licenses without first affording them an “ability to pay hearing”, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion and entered a preliminary injunction on December 14, 2017.1 (See ECF No. 21.) Specifically, the Court ordered “that Defendant is enjoined from enforcing Michigan Compiled Laws § 257.321a to suspend the driver’s licenses of people unable to pay their traffic debt.” (Id. at Pg ID 268.)
Defendant appealed and asked the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals to stay the injunction. On December 28, 2017, the Sixth Circuit issued an order stating that Defendant had “not demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits of its challenge to the district court’s ruling on procedural due process.” (ECF No. 30 at Pg ID 450.) Nevertheless, the court of appeals stayed the injunction for thirty days and remanded the matter “for the limited purpose of modifying the injunctive relief granted … to provide direction to the State as to the type of process required to comply with the court’s order.” (Id. at 450-51.)
1 In its December 14, 2017 decision, the Court concluded that Plaintiffs are not likely to prevail on the claims in their Complaint alleging other constitutional violations. (See ECF No. 21.)
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In response to the Sixth Circuit’s remand order, this Court issued an order on January 5, 2018, clarifying its injunction. (ECF No. 31.) The order stated:
To be clear, in its December 14, 2017 decision, this Court intended to enjoin Defendant from suspending any further driver’s licenses of individuals because of their inability to pay their traffic debt until the State: (1) provides drivers a hearing where they have the opportunity to demonstrate their inability to pay; (2) provides reasonable notice to drivers of the hearing; and (3) institutes alternatives to full payment for those unable to pay (e.g., realistic payment plans or volunteer service). (Id. at Pg ID 452-53, emphasis in original.) The Court further scheduled a hearing to address any questions or concerns the parties may have had concerning the intended modification to the preliminary injunction order. (Id. at Pg ID 453.) Prior to the hearing, Defendant filed a supplemental brief presenting evidence to convince the Court that Plaintiffs in fact “were provided well established and readily available procedural due process in state court that they willfully ignored” and that “[t]heir suspensions resulted from conscious failure to appear as required by law, and not the alleged inability to pay.” (ECF No. 33 at Pg ID 465.) Defendant also presented evidence of Ms. Harris’ November 2017 infractions and suspensions for failure to appear, arguing that these infractions deprived her of Article III standing. This Court ultimately concluded that the Sixth Circuit’s remand order did not permit it to consider new evidence and revisit the merits of Plaintiffs’ procedural due
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process claim. On January 24, 2018, the Court entered an Amended Preliminary
Injunction that enjoined Defendant
from suspending any further driver’s licenses of individuals because of nonpayment of any fine, cost, fee or assessment under Michigan Compiled Laws § 257.321a unless and until Defendant or another entity: (1) offers drivers the option to request a hearing where they have the opportunity to demonstrate their inability to pay a fine, cost, fee and/or assessment; () provides a hearing when requested[]; (3) provides reasonable notice to drivers of the hearing opportunity; and (4) institutes alternatives to full payment for those unable to pay (e.g., realistic payment plans or volunteer service.)
(ECF No. 35 at Pg ID 647, footnote omitted and emphasis in original.)
Defendant filed an appeal and an emergency motion to stay. In the motion,
Defendant argued that Plaintiffs lack standing because, even if they had suspensions
for failure to pay, they also had suspensions for failure to appear in state court.
According to Defendant, Plaintiffs could not benefit from the injunction as their
licenses had been suspended on grounds alternative to failure to pay.
On February 7, 2018, the Sixth Circuit entered an order remanding the matter
to address standing. (ECF No. 40.) The order reads, in relevant part:
The Secretary has challenged the standing of the plaintiffs to pursue the claims alleged in this action. Specifically, the Secretary has submitted evidence indicating that Plaintiff Kitia Harris contacted the state court after she was issued a traffic ticket. Although she was granted an extension of time to pay her traffic fine and offered a payment plan, Harris allegedly failed to make any payments to the court or otherwise contact the court again concerning the payment plan. And the district court previously noted concerns about the standing of Plaintiff Adrian
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Fowler. Because of the unresolved factual issues regarding standing, the court’s jurisdiction over this case is unclear. (Id.) On remand, Plaintiffs filed a “Brief and Declaration in Support of Standing” to which they attach amended declarations from Ms. Harris and Ms. Fowler. (EFC No. 42.) Defendant responded to Plaintiffs’ filing, Plaintiffs filed a reply brief, and Defendant filed a sur-reply. (ECF Nos. 46, 50, 52.) Plaintiffs also filed a motion seeking leave to file an amended complaint and a motion for class certification. (ECF No. 43.) The parties have fully briefed that motion. (ECF Nos. 51, 53.) Further, Defendant moved to strike Plaintiffs’ motion, arguing that the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the motion under the Sixth Circuit’s limited remand order. (ECF No. 44.) Defendant’s motion to strike also has been fully briefed. (ECF Nos. 45, 47.)
Standing2 “‘Under Article III of the Constitution, federal courts may adjudicate only actual, ongoing cases or controversies.’” Kentucky v. U.S. ex rel. Hagel, 759 F.3d 588, 595 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990)). “Courts have explained the ‘case or controversy’ requirement through a
2 “[O]nly one plaintiff needs to have standing in order for the suit to move forward.” Parsons v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 801 F.3d 701, 710 (2015) (citing Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 446-47 (2009); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007)). The Court therefore is focusing on Ms. Harris’ standing, as it already has independently raised concerns regarding Ms. Fowler’s standing.
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series of ‘justiciability doctrines,’ including, ‘perhaps the most important,’ that a litigant must have ‘standing’ to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts.” Parsons v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 801 F.3d 701, 709-10 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Nat’l Rifle Assoc. of Am. v. Magaw, 132 F.3d 272, 279 (6th Cir. 1997)).
An actual case or controversy also must persist throughout the entire litigation. See Hrivnak v. NCO Portfolio Mgmt., Inc., 719 F.3d 564, 567 (6th Cir. 2013). If developments during the course of litigation eliminate the plaintiff’s personal stake, the case generally must be dismissed as moot. Id. (citing Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992)). A case may become moot “when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 396, 410 (1980) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This latter “personal stake requirement” is a corollary to the rule that federal courts lack the power to “decide questions that cannot affect the rights of the litigants in the case before them.” North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971).
The Supreme Court has identified the following elements necessary to establish standing:
First, [the p]laintiff must have suffered an injury in fact—an invasion of a legally-protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized; and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged
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action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court. Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements.” Id. at 561. Defendant challenges Ms. Harris’ standing to bring this lawsuit based on evidence it claims shows she was afforded due process before her license was suspended for failure to pay. Significantly, in her declaration, Ms. Harris offers a very different version of the events leading to her license suspension. Defendant asserts that Ms. Harris also lacks standing as a result of infractions she incurred after the filing of this lawsuit resulting in license suspensions for failure to appear in court. Defendant is essentially asserting a factual attack on the subject-matter jurisdiction alleged in Plaintiffs’ Complaint. “When a factual attack, also known as a ‘speaking motion,’ raises a factual controversy, the district court must weigh the conflicting evidence to arrive at the factual predicate that subject-matter does or does not exist.” Gentek Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 491 F.3d 320, 330 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Ohio Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 922 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1990)). “In its review, the district court has wide discretion to allow affidavits, documents, and even a limited
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evidentiary hearing to resolve jurisdictional facts.” Id. “[W]hen a defendant produces evidence challenging the factual existence of standing, a plaintiff must generally prove standing with evidence, even at the motion-to-dismiss stage.” Harris v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Gov’t, 685 F. App’x 470, 472 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Taylor v. KeyCorp., 680 F.3d 609, 613 (6th Cir. 2012); Superior MRI Servs., Inc. v. All Healthcare Servs., Inc., 778 F.3d 502, 504 (5th Cir. 2015)). There is an exception to this rule, however.
“[A] district court engages in a factual inquiry regarding the complaint’s allegations only when the facts necessary to sustain jurisdiction do not implicate the merits of the plaintiff’s claim.” Gentek Bldg. Prods., 491 F.3d at 330 (citing Garcia v. Copenhaver, Bell & Assocs., 104 F.3d 1256, 1261 (11th Cir. 1997)). As the Sixth Circuit more recently stated:
If “an attack on subject matter jurisdiction … implicates an element of the cause of action,” we confine our jurisdictional inquiry to the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint, no matter what evidence a defendant has submitted in attempting to disprove jurisdiction. Harris, 685 F. App’x at 472 (citing Gentek Bldg. Prods., 491 F.3d at 330; Xerox Corp. v. Genmoora Corp., 888 F.2d 345, 350-52 (5th Cir. 1989)). If the jurisdictional attack “implicates an element of the cause of action,” the Sixth Circuit instructs district courts to “‘find that jurisdiction exists and deal with the objection as a direct attack on the merits of the plaintiff’s claim.’” Gentek Bldg. Prods., 491 F.3d at 330
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(emphasis in original) (quoting Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415-16 (5th Cir. 1981)). Stated differently, “[w]hen the basis of federal jurisdiction is intertwined with the plaintiff’s federal cause of action, the court should assume jurisdiction over the case and decide the case on the merits.” Moore v. Lafayette Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 416, 444 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681-82 (1946)).
Ms. Harris claims that Defendant denied her procedural due process before suspending her driver’s license. Defendant challenges Ms. Harris’ standing in part by presenting evidence to show that Ms. Harris in fact was informed of her right to a hearing to raise her indigency and seek an alternative to full payment of her traffic debt. According to Defendant, Ms. Harris simply failed to appear and take advantage of that opportunity. Hence, Defendant’s attack on standing implicates the elements of Ms. Harris’ procedural due process claim. In other words, Defendant’s factual attack on standing is intertwined with the merits of Ms. Harris’ § 1983 claim. Under these circumstances, Sixth Circuit precedent instructs that jurisdiction should be assumed.
Defendant also challenges Ms. Harris’ standing, however, on her accumulation of additional infractions after this lawsuit was filed which resulted in her driver’s license being suspended for failure to appear in court rather than her failure to pay her traffic debt. Defendant argues that Ms. Harris’ injury (that is, suspension of her license) therefore cannot be redressed through the relief she seeks in this litigation. In other words, even if the Court held that Defendant violated the procedural due process
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clause by suspending Ms. Harris’ license for failure to pay her traffic debt without affording her an ability to pay hearing, Defendant maintains that Ms. Harris’ failure to appear in court provides additional and separate grounds for suspending her license.
As set forth earlier, redressability is the third prong of the Article III standing test. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. “[T]he relief the plaintiff is seeking must provide redress for the injury.” Parsons, 801 F.3d at 715. “An injury is redressable if a court order can provide ‘substantial and meaningful relief.’” Id. (quoting Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 243 (1982)). “‘A plaintiff satisfies the redressability requirement when he shows that a favorable decision will relieve a discrete injury to himself. He need not show that a favorable decision will relieve his every injury.’” Id. (quoting Larson, 456 U.S. at 243 n.15) (emphasis in original); see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 525 (2007).
Here, a favorable decision would remedy the violation of Plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights caused by the suspension of their licenses for failure to pay before they were afforded ability to pay hearings. A favorable decision also puts Plaintiffs one step closer to regaining their driving privileges. The fact that there may remain other impediments for Plaintiffs regaining those privileges does not render the injury complained of—that is, the violation of their due process rights—non-redressable for standing purposes.
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For these reasons, the Court concludes that Ms. Harris has standing to pursue the due process claim alleged in the Complaint.
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint and Motion for Class Certification and Defendant’s Motion to Strike
On remand, Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint to add two additional named plaintiffs and hopefully strengthen their position on standing. Plaintiffs also seek leave to file a motion for class certification. Defendant moves to strike Plaintiffs’ motion, arguing that the Court lacks jurisdiction to decide it under the Sixth Circuit’s “limited” remand order. Defendant also opposes the motion, arguing that Plaintiffs’ proposed amendment would be futile and that it is premature to decide class certification.
“‘As a general rule, an effective notice of appeal divests the district court of jurisdiction over the matter forming the basis for the appeal.’” Zundel v. Holder, 687 F.3d 271, 282 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting NLRB v. Cincinnati Bronze, Inc., 829 F.2d 585, 588 (6th Cir. 1987)). “However, ‘an appeal from an order granting or denying a preliminary injunction does not divest the district court of jurisdiction to proceed with the action on the merits.’” Id. (quoting Moltan Co. v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 55 F.3d 1171, 1174 (6th Cir. 1995)); see also 11A Wright & Miller, Fed. Practice and Proc. § 2962, at 438-39 (2d ed. 1995) (“An appeal from the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction or prevent it from
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taking other steps in the litigation while the appeal is pending.”). “The district court retains some jurisdiction to continue deciding other issues during the pendency of an interlocutory appeal.” Zundel, 687 F.3d at 282. (citations omitted).
As such, while the appeal in the present matter may preclude this Court from revisiting Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction, the Court concludes that it does not prevent Plaintiffs from filing and the Court from deciding a motion to amend the complaint or to certify a class. The Court therefore rejects Defendant’s argument that Plaintiffs’ motion should be stricken. Moreover, even if the Court lacked authority to decide the motion because of Defendant’s appeal, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1 provides an avenue for a district court to render an indicative ruling in that instance.3
Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instructs district courts to “freely grant[]” leave to amend “where justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
3 Rule 62.1 provides: If a timely motion is made for relief that the court lacks authority to grant because of an appeal that has been docketed and is pending, the court may: (1) defer considering the motion; (2) deny the motion; or (3) state either that it would grant the motion if the court of appeals remands for that purpose or that the motion raises a substantial issue.
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This is because, as the Supreme Court has advised, “[i]f the underlying facts or
circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, he ought to
be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S.
178, 182 (1962). However, a motion to amend a complaint should be denied if the
amendment is brought in bad faith or for dilatory purposes, results in undue delay or
prejudice to the opposing party, or would be futile. Id. In the case of futility,
“[a]mendment of a complaint is futile when the proposed amendment would not
permit the complaint to survive a motion to dismiss.” Miller v. Calhoun Cty., 408 F.3d
803, 817 (6th Cir. 2005).
Defendant argues that amending Plaintiffs’ Complaint to add Nadiyah Jones
and Jeanette Rankin as plaintiffs would be futile because Ms. Jones lacks standing and Ms. Rankin’s claims are time-barred.4 Specifically, Ms. Jones’ driver’s license was
suspended because she owed approximately $626 for an unpaid traffic debt. (See
Proposed Am. Compl. ¶ 16, ECF No. 43-1 at Pg ID 701.) On March 2, 2018,
4 The statute of limitations for a claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the State’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007) (citations omitted). For § 1983 actions arising in Michigan, the applicable limitations period is three years. Wolfe v. Perry, 412 F.3d 707, 714 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(10). The “limitations period begins to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know that the act providing the basis of his or her injury has occurred.” Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 220 (6th Cir. 1995). With respect to Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim, this would be when they learned that their licenses were suspended for failure to pay without being afforded ability to pay hearings.
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however, Ms. Jones paid the outstanding fines and costs and the suspension was terminated. (ECF No. 51-11 at Pg ID 1015; see also ECF No. 53 at Pg ID 1036.) Ms. Rankin’s suspension arises from a ticket in December 2011. (See Proposed Am. Compl. ¶ 83, ECF No. 43-1 at Pg ID 712.) In April 2012, Ms. Rankin learned the amount she owed for the infractions and her driving privileges were suspended. (Id. ¶ 88, Pg ID 712; Rankin Decl. ¶¶ 13-15, ECF No. 43-7 at Pg ID 762.)
In reply, Plaintiffs point out that Ms. Jones had standing when they sought leave to amend their Complaint. Plaintiffs urge the Court to grant their motion for leave nunc pro tunc, and deem the filing date of their Amended Complaint to be the day they filed their motion—that is, while Ms. Jones’ license was still suspended. With respect to Ms. Rankin, Plaintiffs urge the Court to apply the continuing violation doctrine to find her claims not barred by the applicable three-year limitations period. (Pls.’ Reply Br. at 4-6, ECF No. 53 at Pg ID 1037-39.) Plaintiffs contend that “Defendant committed a continuing wrongful act by rendering Ms. Rankin’s license ineligible for routine renewal on the fourth anniversary of her license expiration, which occurred in 2017.” (Id. at 5, Pg ID 1038.)
While federal courts have inherent authority to issue nunc pro tunc orders to correct mistakes in the record, that power is quite limited. As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained:
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4:17-cv-11441-LVP-MKM Doc # 54 Filed 04/11/18 Pg 18 of 21 Pg ID 1061
“Nunc pro tunc amendments are permitted primarily so that errors in the record may be corrected. The power to amend nunc pro tunc is a limited one, and may be used only where necessary to correct a clear mistake and prevent injustice.” Martin v. Henley, 452 F.2d 295, 299 (9th Cir. 1971). It does not imply the ability to alter the substance of that which actually transpired or to backdate events to serve some other purpose. See Kusay v. United States, 62 F.3d 192, 193 (7th Cir.1995). Rather, its use is limited to making the record reflect what the district court actually intended to do at an earlier date, but which it did not sufficiently express or did not accomplish due to some error or inadvertence. See Fierro v. Reno, 217 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 2000).
United States v. Sumner, 226 F.3d 1005, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Patterson
v. Chrysler Group, LLC, 845 F.3d 756, 761 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing cases and
explaining that “[n]unc pro tunc orders do not revise the substance of what has
transpired, backdate events, or give rise to new substantive rights, including resetting
the statute of limitations”); Crangle v. Kelly, 838 F.3d 673, 680 (6th Cir. 2016)
(quoting Kusay v. United States, 62 F.3d at 193) (“Nunc pro tunc orders are
customarily used only ‘to correct erroneous records,’ not to ‘revise the substance of
what transpired or to backdate events.’”). Based on this authority, the Court
concludes that it lacks the power to issue the nunc pro tunc order Plaintiffs request. In
other words, the Court concludes that it cannot back-date the filing of Plaintiffs’
Amended Complaint to avoid the futility of adding Ms. Jones as a plaintiff.
Moreover, even if Ms. Jones had standing when Plaintiffs moved to add her as a
plaintiff, her claims are now moot—an additional reason to find Plaintiffs’ attempt to
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4:17-cv-11441-LVP-MKM Doc # 54 Filed 04/11/18 Pg 19 of 21 Pg ID 1062
add her as a plaintiff futile. The Court similarly concludes that the continuing
violation doctrine has no applicability here.
The Sixth Circuit has identified three requirements for finding a continuing
violation:
“First, the defendant’s wrongful conduct must continue after the precipitating event that began the pattern. … Second, injury to the plaintiff must continue to accrue after that event. Finally, further injury to the plaintiff must have been avoidable if the defendants had at any time ceased their wrongful conduct.”
Edison v. State of Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 635 (6th Cir. 2007)
(brackets omitted) (quoting Tolbert v. State of Ohio Dep’t of Transp., 172 F.3d 934,
940 (6th Cir. 1999)). “‘[A] continuing violation is occasioned by continual unlawful
acts, not continual ill effects from an original violation.’” Id. (quoting Tolbert, 172
F.3d at 940) (additional quotation marks and citation omitted). “Passive inaction does
not support a continuing violation theory.” Id. Here, the right Plaintiffs assert is the right to procedural due process.5 “‘In
procedural due process claims, the deprivation by state action of a constitutionally
protected interest in ‘life, liberty or property’ is not itself unconstitutional; what is
5 While Plaintiffs’ proposed Amended Complaint admittedly alleges additional constitutional violations (see ECF No. 43-1), this Court found them unlikely to succeed on those claims in its December 14, 2017 decision addressing Plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction motion. (See ECF No. 21.) Amending the complaint to assert those claims on behalf of Ms. Rankin would be futile for the reasons stated by the Court in that earlier decision.
19

4:17-cv-11441-LVP-MKM Doc # 54 Filed 04/11/18 Pg 20 of 21 Pg ID 1063
unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an interest without due process of law.’” Edison, 510 F.3d at 635 (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1981)) (emphasis in original) (additional quotation marks and citation omitted). The premise of Plaintiffs’ due process claim is Defendant’s failure to afford individuals ability to pay hearings before suspending their driver’s licenses for failure to pay their traffic debts. For Ms. Rankin, this occurred in April 2012. Any harmful effects resulting from that suspension (such as the ineligibility of Ms. Rankin’s license for routine renewal on the fourth anniversary of the suspension) constitute “continuing ill effects” which do not make out a continuing violation.
Because Ms. Rankin’s license was suspended without the process Plaintiffs claim was due to her more than three years before Plaintiffs moved to add her as a plaintiff, the Court holds that her procedural due process claim is time-barred. Therefore, it also would be futile for Plaintiffs to amend their complaint to add Ms. Rankin as a plaintiff.
For these reasons, the Court is denying Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file an amended complaint.
It is premature to decide Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification at this time. While the Court has found that at least Ms. Harris has standing to pursue this lawsuit on behalf of the putative class, that finding undoubtedly will be included as an issue for review by the Sixth Circuit in the pending appeal. Until the issue is finally
20

4:17-cv-11441-LVP-MKM Doc # 54 Filed 04/11/18 Pg 21 of 21 Pg ID 1064

resolved, it makes little sense for this Court to decide whether Ms. Harris’ claims are

typical of the putative class and whether she is an adequate class representative. For

that reason, the Court is denying Plaintiffs’ request to file their class certification

motion at this time.

Conclusion

To summarize, this Court concludes that Ms. Harris has standing to pursue this

lawsuit and that her claims have not been rendered moot by the additional infractions

she incurred after the action was filed. Ms. Jones lacks standing, however. Further,

Ms. Rankin’s claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. As such, the

Court concludes that it would be futile for Plaintiffs to amend their complaint to add

Ms. Jones or Ms. Rankin as plaintiffs. Therefore, the Court is DENYING Plaintiffs’

motion for leave to file an amended complaint. The Court also is DENYING

Plaintiffs’ request to file their motion for class certification at this time.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 11, 2018

s/ Linda V. Parker LINDA V. PARKER U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of record and/or pro se parties on this date, April 11, 2018, by electronic and/or U.S. First Class mail.

s/ R. Loury Case Manager

21

 
 KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment Distinguished by Mendoza v. Garrett, D.Or., May 16, 2019
924 F.3d 247 United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Adrian FOWLER; Kitia Harris, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.
Jocelyn BENSON, Michigan Secretary of State, in her official capacity, Defendant-Appellant.
Nos. 17-2504/18-1089 |
Argued: October 3, 2018 |
Decided and Filed: May 8, 2019
Synopsis Background: Indigent drivers brought putative class action under § 1983 seeking injunctive relief against Michigan’s Secretary of State, based on alleged due process and equal protection violations arising from Michigan’s driver’s-license suspension scheme as applied to indigent drivers with unpaid court debt. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, No. 4:17-cv-11441, Linda V. Parker, J., 2017 WL 6379676, granted preliminary injunction to drivers, and later denied Secretary’s emergency motion for stay pending appeal, 2017 WL 6540926. Secretary appealed. The Court of Appeals remanded for consideration of drivers’ standing. The District Court, Linda V. Parker, J., 2018 WL 1737122, found that drivers had standing.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Alice M. Batchelder, Circuit Judge, held that:
[1] redressability element for Article III standing to seek injunctive relief was satisfied;
[2] drivers were not likely to succeed on merits of their claim that they had a property interest protected by procedural due process;
[3] drivers were not likely to succeed on merits of wealth-classification equal protection claim; and
[4] drivers were not likely to succeed on merits of extraordinary debt collection theory for equal protection

violation.
Reversed and remanded.
Bernice Bouie Donald, Circuit Judge, filed a dissenting opinion.
Procedural Posture(s): On Appeal; Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
West Headnotes (31)
[1] Federal Courts Standing
The Court of Appeals reviews de novo a district court’s conclusion regarding Article III standing to bring suit. U.S. Const. art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.
Cases that cite this headnote
[2] Civil Rights Persons Aggrieved, and Standing in General
Factual dispute raised by Michigan Secretary of State as defendant, concerning plaintiff drivers’ account of the process that local court had afforded to drivers with respect to payment of their unpaid court costs, implicated merits of drivers’ procedural due process claim, which factual inquiry was inappropriate when determining whether drivers had Article III standing to seek injunctive relief in their putative class action under § 1983 against Secretary based on alleged procedural due process violation arising from Michigan’s driver’s-license suspension scheme as applied to indigent drivers with unpaid court debt. U.S. Const. art. 3, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. Const. Amend. 14;
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 257.321a.
Cases that cite this headnote
1

[3] Injunction Scope of inquiry and matters considered
The principle that a district court, when determining whether a plaintiff has Article III standing, can engage in a factual inquiry regarding the complaint’s allegations only when the facts necessary to sustain subject matter jurisdiction do not implicate the merits of the plaintiff’s claim, applies to challenges to standing to seek injunctive relief. U.S. Const. art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.
Cases that cite this headnote
[4] Federal Civil Procedure Causation;  redressability
For Article III standing, the relief sought by a plaintiff must provide redress for the injury. U.S. Const. art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.
Cases that cite this headnote
[5] Civil Rights Injury and Causation
Redressability element for Article III standing to seek injunctive relief was satisfied, in drivers’ putative class action under § 1983 against Michigan’s Secretary of State, alleging procedural due process violation arising from Michigan’s driver’s-license suspension scheme as applied to indigent licensed drivers with unpaid court debt; injunction would remedy the alleged violation of drivers’ procedural due process rights and put them one step closer to regaining their driving privileges, even if other impediments might remain. U.S. Const. art. 3, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. Const. Amend. 14; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 257.321a.
Cases that cite this headnote

[6]

Courts

Federal-Court Review of State-Court

Decisions;  Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

Courts

United States Supreme Court, exclusive

federal jurisdiction of

Under the Rooker- Feldman doctrine, only the Supreme Court may review judgments entered by state courts in civil litigation, and thus, the doctrine bars a lower federal court from reviewing a plaintiff’s claim when a state court’s judgment is the source of the plaintiff’s injury.

1 Cases that cite this headnote

[7]

Courts

Constitutional questions, civil rights, and

discrimination in general

Drivers were not appealing from adverse judgments of state trial courts, and thus,

Rooker-

Feldman doctrine was

inapplicable as bar to subject matter jurisdiction

of federal district court in drivers’ putative class

action under § 1983 seeking injunctive relief

against Michigan Secretary of State based on

alleged procedural due process violation arising

from Michigan’s driver’s-license suspension

scheme as applied to indigent drivers with

unpaid court debt; Secretary rather than a state

court suspended licenses of drivers, even if

Secretary suspended licenses only after getting

certain information from state courts. U.S.

Const. Amend. 14; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 257.321a(2).

Cases that cite this headnote

[8] Federal Courts Pullman abstention
Pullman abstention instructs federal courts to avoid exercising jurisdiction in cases involving an ambiguous state statute that may be
2

interpreted by state courts so as to eliminate, or at least alter materially, the constitutional question raised in federal court.
Cases that cite this headnote
[9] Federal Courts Motor vehicles
Pullman abstention could not be applied on grounds asserted by Michigan Secretary of State, in drivers’ putative class action under § 1983 seeking injunctive relief in federal district court against Secretary based on alleged procedural due process violation arising from Michigan’s driver’s-license suspension scheme as applied to indigent drivers with unpaid court debt, which grounds were that Michigan law already required the protection of federal constitutional rights when driver’s licenses were suspended, so state courts might interpret the challenged law in a way that would eliminate the constitutional question. U.S. Const. Amend. 14; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 257.321a, 257.323(4).
Cases that cite this headnote
[10] Federal Courts Younger abstention
The Younger abstention doctrine cautions federal courts against exercising jurisdiction in cases where they are asked to enjoin pending state proceedings.
Cases that cite this headnote
[11] Federal Courts Motor vehicles
Hypothetical proceedings in state court, which the Michigan Secretary of State alleged that the

plaintiff drivers might pursue, did not implicate Younger abstention as bar to subject matter
jurisdiction of federal district court in drivers’ putative class action under § 1983 seeking injunctive relief against Secretary based on alleged procedural due process violation arising from Michigan’s driver’s-license suspension scheme as applied to indigent drivers with unpaid court debt. U.S. Const. Amend. 14;
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 257.321a.
Cases that cite this headnote
[12] Injunction Standard of proof in general
The party seeking a preliminary injunction is not required to prove his case in full at a preliminary injunction hearing.
Cases that cite this headnote
[13] Injunction Extraordinary or unusual nature of remedy
Preliminary injunctions are an extraordinary and drastic remedy.
Cases that cite this headnote
[14] Injunction Clear showing or proof
A preliminary injunction may be awarded only upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.
Cases that cite this headnote
3

[15] Injunction Grounds in general;  multiple factors
Courts determine whether a party moving for a preliminary injunction has made the required showing by weighing whether the party has established that: (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest.
Cases that cite this headnote
[16] Civil Rights Preliminary Injunction
Where a party seeks a preliminary injunction on the basis of a potential constitutional violation, the likelihood of success on the merits will often be the determinative factor.
Cases that cite this headnote
[17] Federal Courts Preliminary injunction;  temporary restraining
order
The Court of Appeals reviews for abuse of discretion a district court’s decision to grant a preliminary injunction, but it reviews de novo conclusions of law—such as whether plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits—that undergird the district court’s decision.
Cases that cite this headnote
[18] Civil Rights Property and housing
Indigent drivers were not likely to succeed on merits, as element for preliminary injunction, of their claim that they had a property interest protected by procedural due process, in § 1983

action against Michigan Secretary of State challenging Michigan’s driver’s-license suspension scheme as applied to indigent drivers with unpaid court debt; while Michigan’s license-suspension scheme recognized that state law created a property interest in a driver’s license, drivers did not merely claim a general property interest in a driver’s license, and instead they specifically claimed an entitlement as indigent individuals to maintain their driver’s licenses when state law required that they be suspended due to unpaid court debt, but their central argument was that the scheme did not contain an indigence exemption, the whole point of the argument was that the scheme did not create an entitlement, and their reading of Michigan law appeared to be right. U.S. Const. Amend. 14; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 257.321a.
Cases that cite this headnote
[19] Constitutional Law Source of right or interest
Constitutional Law Benefits, rights and interests in
Property interests, for purposes of procedural due process, are not created by the Constitution; rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law—rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits. U.S. Const. Amend. 14.
Cases that cite this headnote
[20] Civil Rights Property and housing
Even assuming that indigent drivers with unpaid court debt had a property interest protected by procedural due process, state law did not provide an indigence exemption to license suspension, and thus, drivers were not likely to succeed on merits, as element for preliminary
4

injunction, of their procedural due process claim in § 1983 action against Michigan Secretary of State, challenging Michigan’s driver’s-license suspension scheme as applied to indigent drivers with unpaid court debt; in absence of an indigence exemption, giving indigent drivers a hearing or any other procedural opportunity to raise their indigency would be pointless because such an opportunity would do nothing to prevent the risk of erroneous deprivation. U.S. Const. Amend. 14; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 257.321a.
Cases that cite this headnote
[21] Constitutional Law Procedural due process in general
Due Process Clause does not protect procedure for procedure’s sake. U.S. Const. Amend. 14.
Cases that cite this headnote
[22] Constitutional Law Rights, Interests, Benefits, or Privileges
Involved in General
The Due Process Clause applies to both liberty and property, and when there is a distinction, property receives the lesser protection. U.S. Const. Amend. 14.
Cases that cite this headnote
[23] Constitutional Law Motor vehicles
Equal protection challenge to Michigan’s driver’s-license suspension scheme, as applied to indigent drivers with unpaid court debt, did not implicate a fundamental right, and thus, rational basis review was applicable. U.S. Const. Amend. 14; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §

257.321a.
2 Cases that cite this headnote
[24] Constitutional Law Poverty or wealth;  indigents and the
homeless Equal protection challenges to laws on grounds of wealth classification are reviewed only to see if they have a rational basis. U.S. Const. Amend. 14.
Cases that cite this headnote
[25] Constitutional Law Statutes and other written regulations and
rules Equal protection challenges to laws that neither implicate a fundamental right nor target a suspect class are subject to rational basis review. U.S. Const. Amend. 14.
Cases that cite this headnote
[26] Constitutional Law Strict scrutiny and compelling interest in
general A right counts as a fundamental right, as basis for strict scrutiny for an equal protection violation, only when it is traditionally protected by society and rooted in the traditions and conscience of the people. U.S. Const. Amend. 14.
1 Cases that cite this headnote
[27] Constitutional Law
5

Poverty or wealth;  indigents and the homeless
A class of less wealthy individuals is not a suspect class warranting strict scrutiny review for an equal protection violation. U.S. Const. Amend. 14.
Cases that cite this headnote
[28] Civil Rights Preliminary Injunction
Under rational basis review for equal protection violation, drivers were not likely to succeed on merits, as element for preliminary injunction, of their wealth-classification equal protection challenge to Michigan’s driver’s-license suspension scheme as applied to indigent licensed drivers with unpaid court debt, in § 1983 action against Michigan Secretary of State; state had legitimate interests in promoting compliance with court orders and in collecting traffic debt, even if it was unwise for state to make a policy choice that made it harder for indigent people to obtain and hold a job, which in turn made it less likely that the person could pay his debt. U.S. Const. Amend. 14; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 257.321a.
Cases that cite this headnote
[29] Constitutional Law Rational Basis Standard;  Reasonableness
A plaintiff asserting an equal protection claim may demonstrate that the government action lacks a rational basis either by negativing every conceivable basis which might support the government action, or by demonstrating that the challenged government action was motivated by animus or ill-will. U.S. Const. Amend. 14.
Cases that cite this headnote

[30] Constitutional Law Statutes and other written regulations and
rules
Misguided laws may nonetheless be constitutional under rational basis review for an equal protection violation, and the court’s task is not to weigh the law’s effectiveness, but its constitutionality. U.S. Const. Amend. 14.
Cases that cite this headnote
[31] Civil Rights Preliminary Injunction
Under rational basis review for equal protection violation, drivers were not likely to succeed on merits, as element for preliminary injunction, of their extraordinary debt collection theory, in § 1983 action against Michigan Secretary of State, asserting equal protection challenge to Michigan’s driver’s-license suspension scheme as applied to indigent drivers with unpaid court debt; scheme did not eliminate exemptions normally available to judgment debtors, and state had legitimate interests in promoting compliance with court orders and in collecting traffic debt. U.S. Const. Amend. 14; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 257.321a.
Cases that cite this headnote
*251 Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Flint. No. 4:17-cv-11441—Linda V. Parker, District Judge.
Attorneys and Law Firms
ARGUED: John G. Fedynsky, OFFICE OF THE MICHIGAN ATTORNEY GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellant. Phil Telfeyan, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW, Washington, D.C., for Appellees. ON BRIEF: John G. Fedynsky, OFFICE OF THE MICHIGAN ATTORNEY GENERAL, Lansing,
6

Michigan, for Appellant. Phil Telfeyan, Rebecca Ramaswamy, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW, Washington, D.C., John C. Philo, MAURICE & JANE SUGAR LAW CENTER FOR ECONOMIC & SOCIAL JUSTICE, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellees.
Before: BATCHELDER, DONALD, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.
BATCHELDER, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which THAPAR, J., joined. DONALD, J. (pp. 19–30), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
OPINION
ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge.
*252 This is a case about the constitutionality of Michigan’s driver’s-license suspension scheme, as applied to indigent drivers. Plaintiffs claim that the Michigan Secretary of State’s suspension of an indigent person’s driver’s license, on the basis of unpaid court debt, violates the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs contend that suspending the driver’s licenses of the poor is irrational because license suspension makes their commuting to and from work, for instance, much harder, and therefore reduces the chances that they will pay the debt. Whatever merit Plaintiffs’ argument might have as a matter of policy, its merit as a constitutional argument is diminished by the fact that our review of state legislative choices in this arena is markedly deferential. Because Plaintiffs have not shown that Michigan’s legal scheme is devoid of a rational basis, we decline Plaintiffs’ invitation to etch their preferred driver’s-license policy into constitutional bedrock.
The district court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to enjoin Michigan’s Secretary of State from enforcing Michigan’s driver’s-license suspension law. Because we find that the Secretary’s enforcement of Michigan law does not run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment, we REVERSE.

I.
Adrian Fowler and Kitia Harris (“Plaintiffs”) are Michigan residents who claim that their driver’s licenses were suspended due to their inability to pay court debt.1 Fowler lived in Georgia between 2008 and 2012, where she acquired three tickets for civil infractions. She has not paid the court debt associated with those tickets. In 2012, after moving to Michigan, Fowler attempted to renew her Michigan driver’s license, but was unable to do so because she had outstanding court debts in Georgia. In 2013, Fowler was cited for driving with a suspended license as well as speeding. Fowler claims that she went to the Ferndale, Michigan, court to explain that she could not pay the costs associated with her ticket—nearly $ 600—and was told that if she did not return in three weeks with full payment, a warrant would be issued for her arrest.
Fowler works 20 hours a week making $ 8.90 per hour. She claims that she lacks the resources to repay her court debts. Fowler claims that she is unable to find good-paying work as a result of her suspended license because many desirable jobs require a commute for which there is no reliable public transit.
Harris was ticketed in Michigan in 2016 for “impeding traffic.” She claims that the citing officer told her to call a particular phone number to determine the amount she owed for the ticket. Harris called the number (which put her in touch with the Michigan 43rd District Court-Ferndale Division) and was told that she owed $ 150. Because she could not make that payment, Harris claims, she asked if she could be placed on a payment program, but was told that she could not, and that if she waited too long to pay off the ticket, her *253 driver’s license would be suspended. Roughly a month after her phone call, Harris received a notice in the mail saying that her failure to pay the fine resulted in an increase in the amount she owed and that her driver’s license had been suspended. After this lawsuit was filed, Harris’ license was subject to suspension on three new grounds unrelated to her failure to pay the court debt stemming from her impeding traffic charge.
Michigan’s Secretary of State, Jocelyn Benson (“Secretary Benson”),2 disputes Harris’ account of her interaction with the Ferndale court. Secretary Benson claims that when Harris contacted the court in October 2016, she was given an extension to permit her to make a payment by November 7, 2016, and was informed that a payment by that deadline would give her another extension on the balance and keep her license from being suspended. But because Harris failed to make a payment, the Ferndale court entered default judgment against her on
7

November 14, 2016, and her license was suspended. Secretary Benson claims that, had Harris contacted the Ferndale court again, the court would have made a payment arrangement with her to avoid the suspension of her license. In support of this claim, Secretary Benson provided the affidavit of Linda Carroll, the Court Administrator for the Ferndale court, who explained that “[a]nyone that calls in and makes any type of payment will always be granted an extension.” These repayment plans can be started at as little as $ 1 per payment. Carroll also claims that individuals are informed that they can raise their inability to pay at a show-cause hearing.
According to Harris, having her license suspended has been a burden, and she lacks the resources to pay her court debt. Although she receives disability benefits, she claims that, after accounting for living expenses, caring for her daughter, and paying off her medical debt, she lacks sufficient resources to pay the amount she owes in order to have her suspended license reinstated. Harris claims that, on account of her suspended license, among other consequences, she struggles to attend her regular medical appointments.
Plaintiffs brought a putative class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Secretary Benson for unlawfully suspending their driver’s licenses. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, claiming that Secretary Benson’s suspension of the driver’s licenses of the indigent who are unable to make payments violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution. The district court found only one of Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims likely to succeed on the merits—Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim that they were constitutionally entitled to an “ability to pay” hearing prior to the deprivation of their driver’s licenses. The current version of the preliminary injunction order issued by the district court is as follows:
Defendant is enjoined from suspending any further driver’s licenses of individuals because of nonpayment of any fine, cost, fee or assessment under Michigan Compiled Laws § 257.321a unless and until Defendant or another entity: (1) offers drivers the option to request a hearing where they have the opportunity to demonstrate their inability to pay a fine, cost, fee and/or assessment; (2) provides a hearing when requested; (3) provides reasonable notice to

drivers of the hearing opportunity; and (4) institutes alternatives to full payment for those *254 unable to pay (e.g. realistic payment plans or volunteer service).

II.

Before reviewing the district court’s preliminary injunction order on the merits, we must address Secretary Benson’s four challenges to the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.

[1] [2] [3]Standing. We review de novo the district court’s

conclusion regarding standing. Friends of Tims Ford v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 585 F.3d 955, 966 (6th Cir. 2009). Secretary Benson challenges on two distinct grounds Plaintiffs’ standing to bring suit. First, Secretary Benson disputes Plaintiffs’ factual account of the process the Ferndale court afforded to Plaintiffs. The district court,

following

Gentek Building Products, Inc. v.

Sherwin-Williams Co., 491 F.3d 320 (6th Cir. 2007),

correctly held that Secretary Benson’s factual dispute

implicates the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims, and therefore a

factual inquiry into the allegations was inappropriate to

determine standing. Secretary Benson argues that

Gentek is inapplicable because it concerned a motion to dismiss rather than what we have here—a standing challenge to a claim seeking injunctive relief. This is a

distinction without a material difference as Gentek’s holding—“a district court engages in a factual inquiry regarding the complaint’s allegations only when the facts necessary to sustain jurisdiction do not implicate the merits of the plaintiff’s claim”—applies equally in this

situation. 491 F.3d at 330.

[4] [5]Second, Secretary Benson argues that Plaintiffs’ claimed injury is not redressible. For Article III standing, the relief sought by a plaintiff “must provide redress for
the injury.” Parsons v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 801 F.3d 701, 715 (6th Cir. 2015). The district court rightly found this requirement met by Plaintiffs insofar as “a favorable decision would remedy the violation of Plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights ... [and] puts Plaintiffs one step closer to regaining their driving privileges.” The district court acknowledged that “other impediments” may remain for Plaintiffs to regain their

8

driver’s licenses but held that the elimination of one substantial obstacle for Plaintiffs to regain their licenses constituted “substantial and meaningful relief” sufficient to render their claimed injury redressable. The district court’s conclusion was justified under Supreme Court

precedent. In

Village of Arlington Heights v.

Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., the Court held

that even if “[a]n injunction would not ... guarantee that”

a plaintiff will achieve his desired final outcome, the

injunction will have provided constitutionally sufficient

redress if it “removed” a “barrier” to doing so. 429 U.S. 252, 261, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977).

[6]Rooker-Feldman. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923), and
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983), hold that only the Supreme Court may review judgments entered by state courts in civil litigation. The doctrine, therefore, bars a lower federal appellate court from reviewing a plaintiff’s claim when a state court’s judgment is the source of the plaintiff’s injury. See
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283-84, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005).
[7]Secretary Benson argues that Plaintiffs are appealing the adverse judgment of Michigan trial courts, thereby contravening the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. But the Michigan statute is clear—it is the Secretary who suspends licenses, even if the Secretary does so only after getting *255 certain information from trial courts. Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.321a(2). As we explained in
McCormick v. Braverman:

The inquiry then is the source of the injury the plaintiff alleges in the federal complaint. If the source of the injury is the state court decision, then the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would prevent the district court from asserting jurisdiction. If there is some other source of injury, such as a third-party’s actions, then the plaintiff asserts an independent claim.

decision. The fact that state court decisions form part of the basis for the Secretary’s suspension action is
immaterial. Id. at 394 (“To the extent that Defendants argue that these claims, even though they do not assert injury from the state court judgments, are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with those judgments so as to fall within the reach of Rooker-Feldman, that argument must fail.”).
[8] [9]Pullman and Younger. Secretary Benson argues that the district court should have abstained from exercising
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims under Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61
S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941), and Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971).
Pullman abstention instructs courts to avoid exercising jurisdiction in cases involving an ambiguous state statute that may be interpreted by state courts so as to eliminate, or at least alter materially, the constitutional question raised in federal court. Jones v. Coleman, 848 F.3d 744, 749-50 (6th Cir. 2017). Secretary Benson argues that because Michigan law already requires the protection of federal constitutional rights when driver’s licenses are suspended,3 state courts might interpret the challenged law in a way that would eliminate the constitutional question. But the Supreme Court has rejected applying
Pullman abstention on those grounds. See Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 251, 88 S.Ct. 391, 19 L.Ed.2d 444
(1967) (explaining that Pullman “abstention cannot be ordered simply to give state courts the first opportunity to vindicate the federal claim”).
[10] [11]The Younger abstention doctrine, meanwhile, cautions federal courts against exercising jurisdiction in cases where they are asked to enjoin pending state
proceedings. See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 364, 109 S.Ct. 2506, 105 L.Ed.2d 298 (1989). But the district court did no such thing. There are no ongoing state proceedings here, only hypothetical proceedings that Secretary Benson claims Plaintiffs may pursue.
Declaratory relief. Secretary Benson also claims that the district court abused its discretion by holding that it had jurisdiction to decide Plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief. But no declaratory judgment has been issued, and our holding on the merits below moots the possibility that one will be issued.

451 F.3d 382, 393 (6th Cir. 2006). Plaintiffs’ suit seeks review of Secretary Benson’s suspension of their licenses regardless of the validity of any state court
9

III.
[12] [13] [14]Standard of Review. Having established that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claim, *256 we now review the merits of the district court’s decision granting a preliminarily injunction against Secretary Benson. While the party seeking a preliminary injunction “is not required to prove his case in full at a preliminary injunction hearing,”
Cert. Rest. Dry Cleaning Network L.L.C. v. Tenke Corp., 511 F.3d 535, 542 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted), it remains the case that preliminary injunctions are an “extraordinary and drastic remedy,” Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689, 128 S.Ct. 2207, 171 L.Ed.2d 1 (2008) (citation omitted). A preliminary injunction “may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008).
[15] [16]Courts determine whether a party moving for a preliminary injunction has made that showing by weighing whether the party (1) “establish[ed] that he is likely to succeed on the merits,” (2) “that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,” (3) “that the balance of equities tips in his favor,” and (4) “that an injunction is in the public interest.” Id. at 20, 129 S.Ct. 365. However, in a case such as this, where “a party seeks a preliminary injunction on the basis of a potential constitutional violation, the likelihood of success on the merits will often be the determinative factor.” Bailey v. Callaghan, 715 F.3d 956, 958 (6th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
[17]We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s decision to grant a preliminary injunction, but we review de novo conclusions of law—such as whether Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits—that undergird the district court’s decision. See City of Pontiac Retired Emps. Ass’n v. Schimmel, 751 F.3d 427, 430 (6th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
A.
[18] [19]We begin by reviewing the district court’s legal conclusion that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their procedural due process claim. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits “any State” from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property, without

due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Plaintiffs claim that they have been deprived of a property interest—their driver’s licenses—without due process of law. “Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law—rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that
support claims of entitlement to those benefits.” Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972).
As a threshold matter we must acknowledge that Plaintiffs do not claim merely a general property interest in a driver’s license; their specific claim is to a property interest, as indigent individuals, in maintaining their driver’s licenses when state law requires they be suspended due to unpaid court debt. Identifying with specificity the nature of the claimed property interest
makes a difference, as shown in Roth. There, a college professor’s one-year teaching contract expired and was not renewed. He claimed that the university’s failure to provide him with any notice or opportunity for a hearing concerning its decision not to retain him violated his right to procedural due process. The district court was persuaded. After finding that the professor’s interest in retaining his job constituted a property interest (created by the public university’s employment contract with the professor) within the contours of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due *257 Process Clause, the district court deployed a balancing test weighing the relative interests of the professor and the university and concluded that the university should have provided notice and an opportunity for a hearing before deciding not to retain the professor.
Id. at 570, 92 S.Ct. 2701. The Supreme Court had previously held that a teaching position at a public university can constitute a property interest “that is
safeguarded by procedural due process.” Id. at 576, 92
S.Ct. 2701 (collecting cases). The Roth Court, however, reversed the district court, explaining that the “[professor]’s ‘property’ interest in employment at Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh was created and
defined by the terms of his appointment.” Id. at 578, 92 S.Ct. 2701. The terms of the professor’s contract with the state university were akin to a property interest
created by a statutory entitlement. Id. Looking to those terms, the Court concluded they did not create a property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment:
Those terms secured his interest in employment up to June 30, 1969.
10

But the important fact in this case is that they specifically provided that the respondent’s employment was to terminate on June 30. They did not provide for contract renewal absent ‘sufficient cause.’ Indeed, they made no provision for renewal whatsoever. ... In these circumstances, the respondent surely had an abstract concern in being rehired, but he did not have a property interest sufficient to require the University authorities to give him a hearing when they declined to renew his contract of employment.
Id. at 578, 92 S.Ct. 2701.
Similarly here. Supreme Court case law recognizes a protectible property interest in a driver’s license under
state law. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 10 n.7, 99 S.Ct. 2612, 61 L.Ed.2d 321 (1979). And indeed, Michigan’s license-suspension scheme recognizes such an interest by providing notice and an opportunity to be heard if a license holder wants to challenge his underlying liability for a traffic violation or the misapplication of a fine. Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.321a(1)-(3). But the mere fact that a driver has a property interest in his license (or an interest in continued employment as a professor) under the Fourteenth Amendment does not answer the more particular question of whether Michigan law creates the
specific property entitlement Plaintiffs claim. Roth illustrates the point because its holding depended on examining the nature of the claimed property interest (in continued employment) and seeing if the professor enjoyed an entitlement to that interest under the relevant law. In that case, the terms of the professor’s employment contract with the public university showed he lacked an entitlement to continued employment.
State law was likewise dispositive in Bell v. Burson, where the Court held that because Georgia’s statutory scheme made “liability [for an accident] an important factor in the State’s determination to deprive an individual of his licenses, the State may not, consistently with due process, eliminate consideration of that factor in its prior
hearing.” 402 U.S. 535, 541, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971). The Court also made clear that if “fault and liability [were] irrelevant to [Georgia’s] statutory scheme,” then the absence of any hearing on liability “would be appropriate to the nature of the case.”

Id. (citation omitted); see also Memphis Light, Gas, and Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 1554, 56 L.Ed.2d 30 (1978) (holding that Tennessee law established a right not to have utility services terminated except for good cause and therefore that the absence of any pre-termination opportunity for a hearing violated procedural due process).
*258 Here, as in Roth, Bell, and Memphis Light, we must ask whether state law establishes the entitlement that Plaintiffs’ claim in this case—a right of the indigent, who cannot pay court debt, to be exempt from driver’s-license suspension on the basis of unpaid court debt.4 The answer is it has not.
Neither the district court nor Plaintiffs identify any legal authority showing that Michigan law directs anyone to consider a license holder’s indigency as part of the process of suspending his driver’s license for failure to pay court debt. On the contrary, Plaintiffs’ central argument throughout this litigation has been that “[Michigan] law—enforced by the Secretary—that mandates suspensions for failure to pay court debt with no exception for indigence or non-willfulness.” Plaintiffs’ whole point is that Michigan’s statutory scheme does not create such an entitlement.
And that reading of Michigan law appears to be right. Michigan’s statutory scheme for license suspension makes no reference to the indigency status of those whose licenses are subject to suspension. See e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.321a(2) (“If the person fails to appear or fails to comply with the order or judgment within the 14-day period, the court shall, within 14 days, inform the secretary of state, who shall immediately suspend the license of the person.”).5
*259 Because Plaintiffs do not claim a legal entitlement that falls within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of property, there is no need to proceed, as the district
court did, to the balancing test laid out in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18
(1976). See Roth, 408 U.S. at 570-71, 92 S.Ct. 2701 (“[A] weighing process has long been a part of any determination of the form of hearing required in particular situations by procedural due process. But, to determine whether due process requirements apply in the first place, we must look not to the ‘weight’ but to the nature of the interest at stake.”) (footnote and citation omitted). Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim fails.
[20] [21]The same result would hold true even if we were to
proceed to the Mathews analysis, as the dissent argues
11

we should. The reason is simple. If Plaintiffs’ indigency is not relevant to the state’s underlying decision to suspend their licenses, then giving them a hearing—or any other procedural opportunity—where they can raise their indigency would be pointless. Such a procedure would do nothing to prevent the “the risk of erroneous deprivation.”
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). The Court’s driver’s-license-due-process cases recognize this basic
truth. For instance, as explained above, Bell’s conclusion specifically hinged on whether state law made the factor at issue relevant to the license-suspension
decision. 402 U.S. at 541, 91 S.Ct. 1586. Likewise,
Dixon rejected a due process challenge because the plaintiff conceded that he had no substantive basis to
contest the license-suspension decision. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 113–14, 97 S.Ct. 1723, 52 L.Ed.2d 172 (1977). That concession meant plaintiff’s requested hearing “might make [him] feel that he has received more personal attention, but it would not serve to protect any
substantive rights.” Id. at 114, 97 S.Ct. 1723. The Due Process Clause “does not protect procedure for
procedure’s sake.” Rector v. City and County of Denver, 348 F.3d 935, 943-44 (10th Cir. 2003). Here, Plaintiffs’ requested indigency hearing would be exactly that, absent a showing that indigency is relevant to the license-suspension decision under Michigan law.
The dissent does not argue otherwise. Instead, the dissent claims that indigency is relevant under Michigan law. But as explained above, neither the dissent nor any party cites to anything in Michigan law establishing an indigency exception, and in fact the Plaintiffs themselves argue that Michigan law does not have one. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Of course, if Michigan law did have an indigency exception—for instance, if Michigan law prohibited the Secretary from suspending the driver’s license of an indigent person—this case would look very different. Under that scenario, a suspension procedure that wholly failed to consider a person’s indigency would violate due process. But that is not the case before us. Instead, the record does not establish this *260 critical point, and therefore we cannot justify the “extraordinary and drastic remedy” of a preliminary injunction.
Munaf, 553 U.S. at 689, 128 S.Ct. 2207; see also
North Carolina v. Covington, ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 1624, 1626, 198 L.Ed.2d 110 (2017). Plaintiffs have not shown that their procedural due process claim is likely to succeed on the merits.

B.

Plaintiffs have two more arrows in their quiver, both

aimed

at

showing

that

Michigan’s

driver’s-license-suspension scheme violates their

Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection of the

law. They argue that Secretary Benson’s suspension of

their licenses constitutes impermissible wealth

discrimination under Griffin v. Illinois and its progeny. They also claim a violation of their rights against extraordinary debt collection, as established under

James v. Strange. The district court found Plaintiffs’ arguments unlikely to succeed. As do we.6

The Griffin Framework. Plaintiffs argue that Michigan’s driver’s-license-suspension scheme violates the
Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted under Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956),
and the cases following it: Williams v. Illinois, 399
U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970), Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 91 S.Ct. 668, 28 L.Ed.2d 130
(1971), Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 92
S.Ct. 410, 30 L.Ed.2d 372 (1971), and Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 76 L.Ed.2d 221 (1983). Plaintiffs argue that, under these cases, the challenged law is subject to something more than rational basis review. Alternatively, they argue that Michigan’s laws cannot survive even rational basis review as they are manifestly “irrational and counterproductive when applied to indigent drivers.” Both arguments are unavailing.

[22]First, the district court correctly distinguished the
Griffin cases from Plaintiffs’ claims because none of
the Griffin cases concerned a property interest. Those cases dealt with basic features of the criminal justice system—imprisonment, probation, and appeals.7 Property interests are *261 not due the same degree of legal protection as the fundamental liberty interests implicated
in the Griffin line of cases. As a judge from one of our sister circuits said well:

The Due Process Clause applies to both liberty and property. When there is a distinction, property receives the lesser protection. The burden at a criminal trial, where liberty is at issue, is “beyond a reasonable doubt”; the burden at a civil trial involving property, by
12

contrast, is “preponderance of the evidence.” In a criminal trial that can end in a sentence of imprisonment, the defendant is entitled to counsel at public expense if he cannot afford a lawyer; in a civil trial, by contrast, a defendant who cannot afford a lawyer must represent himself. The list could be extended, but the point has been made. Liberty receives the greater protection.
Markadonatos v. Vill. of Woodridge, 760 F.3d 545, 554 (7th Cir. 2014) (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
Cases cited by Plaintiffs do not show otherwise. True, the
Supreme Court held in Mayer that an indigent defendant seeking to appeal a nonfelony conviction that did not entail imprisonment was as entitled to access his trial transcripts as an indigent defendant seeking to appeal
a conviction punishable by imprisonment. 404 U.S. at 195-98, 92 S.Ct. 410. That holding does not, however, undermine the critical distinction between liberty and property interests. An indigent defendant’s interest in accessing an appeal to challenge a finding of his criminal liability is not the same as an indigent person’s property interest in a driver’s license.
Plaintiffs’ reliance on Bearden is likewise misplaced.
They cite Bearden for the proposition that Secretary Benson’s refusal to exempt those who are willing but unable to pay violates “the fundamental fairness required
by the Fourteenth Amendment.” The Bearden Court, however, merely held that the automatic revocation of a defendant’s probation (thereby sending him to jail) because of non-payment of a fine serves no legitimate penological interest unless the sentencing judge inquires further into whether the defendant’s non-payment reflected an unwillingness rather than an inability to pay.
461 U.S. at 670-73, 103 S.Ct. 2064. Bearden, then, concerns what kind of process is due before a probationer is subject to confinement, not what kind of process is due before a driver’s license is subject to suspension.
[23] [24] [25] [26] [27]Second, contrary to Plaintiffs’ claims, their challenge to Michigan’s driver’s-license-suspension scheme is subject to rational basis review. We review equal protection challenges to laws on grounds of “wealth-classification” only to see if they have a rational
basis. Molina-Crespo v. U.S. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 547

F.3d 651, 660 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973)) (“[W]ealth discrimination alone does not provide an adequate basis for invoking
strict scrutiny.”). We explained in Johnson v. Bredesen that equal protection challenges to laws that “neither implicate[ ] a fundamental right nor target a
suspect class” are subject to rational basis review. 624 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2010). Michigan’s challenged statute is such a law.8
*262 [28] [29]Third, Michigan’s driver’s-license-suspension scheme passes rational basis review. “A ‘plaintiff may demonstrate that the government action lacks a rational basis either by negativing every conceivable basis ... which might support the government action, or by demonstrating that the challenged government action was
motivated by animus or ill-will.’ ” Johnson, 624 F.3d at 747 (citation omitted). Plaintiffs do not argue the latter, so we are left with the question of whether Plaintiffs have met their burden by showing that they are likely to succeed in refuting “every conceivable basis” for Michigan’s driver’s-license-suspension scheme. To qualify as having a rational basis, the challenged law “need only be rationally related to legitimate government
interests.” Id. at 746 (citation omitted).
It is no struggle to conceive of the legitimate government interests pursued by a law suspending driver’s licenses for nonpayment of court debt. The state has a general interest in compliance with traffic laws. By imposing greater consequences for violating traffic laws, the state increases deterrence for would-be violators. The state also has legitimate interests in promoting compliance with court
orders and in collecting traffic debt. See id. at 747; see
also Blackhawk Mining Co., Inc., v. Andrus, 711 F.2d 753, 757 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that a law requiring prepayment of fines before an adequate hearing was justified because “the government’s interest in prompt assessment and collection of civil penalties to ensure compliance with the Act is substantial”).
[30]Plaintiffs maintain that suspending the driver’s license of an indigent license holder for nonpayment is patently irrational because doing so makes it harder for him to obtain and hold a job, which in turn makes him less likely to pay his court debt. Perhaps Plaintiffs are right that the policy is unwise, even counterproductive. But under rational basis review we ask only whether Michigan’s statutes are “rationally related to legitimate government
*263 interests.” Johnson, 624 F.3d at 746. Michigan’s choice to wield the cudgel of driver’s-license suspension for nonpayment of court debt dramatically heightens the
13

incentive to pay. Such a policy is rationally related to “the government’s interest in prompt assessment and
collection of civil penalties.” Blackhawk Mining, 711 F.2d at 757. That this policy may in many cases make that—now more highly incentivized—payment harder to accomplish does not show that the law lacks a rational basis. “Misguided laws may nonetheless be constitutional. ... Our task ... is not to weigh this statute’s
effectiveness but its constitutionality.” James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 133-34, 92 S.Ct. 2027, 32 L.Ed.2d 600 (1972).
[31]Plaintiffs’ Extraordinary Debt Collection Claim. Lastly, Plaintiffs claim that Michigan’s license-suspension scheme violates their constitutional right against
extraordinary debt collection under James v. Strange.
In Strange, the Supreme Court struck down a Kansas recoupment scheme that required indigent criminal defendants who were afforded counsel at public expense
to repay those expenses. Id. at 129-31, 92 S.Ct. 2027. The constitutional defect with this policy was that it “strip[ped] from indigent defendants the array of protective exemptions Kansas has erected for other civil judgment debtors, including restrictions on the amount of
disposable earnings subject to garnishment, [etc.].” Id. at 135, 92 S.Ct. 2027. The Court found this disparity not just when comparing indigent defendants to private debtors, but also when comparing indigent defendants to individuals who owed debts to the state for public
assistance. Id. at 136-37, 92 S.Ct. 2027.
Plaintiffs cite Strange for the proposition that Secretary Benson may not, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause, “subject[ ] [Plaintiffs] to a significantly harsher collection method than people who owe other types of debt.” Michigan law violates this principle, according to Plaintiffs, because their licenses are suspended due to their court debt, while “people with unpaid private debt do not face license suspension.”
The district court correctly rejected this argument under
Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 94 S.Ct. 2116, 40
L.Ed.2d 642 (1974). The problem that Strange
identified, according to the Fuller Court, was “the elimination of exemptions normally available to judgment
debtors.” Id. at 47, 94 S.Ct. 2116. Here, there is no dispute that the challenged Michigan statutes do not eliminate any such exemptions. Moreover, the State is uniquely empowered to grant, suspend, or reinstate driver’s licenses. Supreme Court precedent does not require anything like exact parity between the State and

private creditors in this regard. The Court in Strange said: “[w]e recognize, of course, that the State’s claim to reimbursement may take precedence, under appropriate circumstances, over the claims of private creditors and that enforcement procedures with respect to judgments need not be identical.” 407 U.S. at 138, 92 S.Ct. 2027. It would be passing strange indeed to interpret
Strange as putting Michigan to the choice of either giving up its right to suspend the licenses of those with unpaid court debt or empowering private creditors to suspend the driver’s licenses of those indebted to them.
In any event, laws challenged under Strange are subject to rational basis review. Johnson, 624 F.3d at 746. As established above, Michigan’s statutory scheme is rationally related to legitimate government interests.
C. As we have held before “[b]ecause the district court committed an error of law—on *264 the all-important likelihood-of-success factor, no less—it abused its discretion in granting a preliminary injunction.” Southern Glazer’s Distribs. of Ohio, LLC v. Great Lakes Brewing Co., 860 F.3d 844, 854 (6th Cir. 2017). The district court here erred in finding Plaintiffs likely to succeed on the merits and therefore abused its discretion in granting Plaintiffs’ requested preliminary injunction. Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 436 (6th Cir. 2012) (“When a party seeks a preliminary injunction on the basis of a potential constitutional violation, the likelihood of success on the merits will often be the determinative factor.”).
IV.
We REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge, dissenting.1
14

DISSENT
The question before us is whether Michigan may, in accord with due process, impose an automatic license-suspension-scheme on indigent drivers for failure to pay court fines without regard to their ability to pay and without affording them reasonable payment alternatives. In my view, it may not.
The Supreme Court has long recognized a protected property interest in the continued possession of a driver’s
license. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971). Once issued, it cannot “be taken away without that procedural due process
required by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. Yet, on its own account and without the benefit of briefing by the parties,2 the majority recasts the Plaintiffs’ claims as seeking “a [new] property interest” in an indigency exception, one the majority concludes Plaintiffs have “no claim of legal entitlement.” Maj. Op. 256, 259. The majority’s analysis relies solely upon its determination that “Michigan law” does not “establish[ ] [an] entitlement ... right of the indigent ... to be exempt from driver’s license suspension,” and thus the majority finds “no need to proceed ... to the balancing test laid out in
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976).” Maj. Op. 256, 259.
The majority commits two critical errors. First, it ignores age-old Supreme Court precedent that squarely recognizes a protected property interest in the continued possession of a driver’s license and proceeds as if Plaintiffs must establish a more specific property interest. Second, and relatedly, it relies solely on Michigan’s deprivation procedures to define the extent of Plaintiffs’ property interests. See Maj. Op. 257 (“Michigan’s statutory scheme for license suspension makes no reference to the indigency status of those whose licenses are subject to suspension.”). This puts the cart before the horse. Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly admonished courts not to define a property interest by its deprivation procedures.
See *265 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985) (“ ‘Property’ cannot be defined by the procedures provided for its deprivation any more than can life or liberty.”). Thus, the majority’s approach contravenes binding precedent and stifles fundamental due process protections.
Under the proper due process framework, I believe Plaintiffs have an uncontroverted property interest in the continued possession of their driver’s licenses. This principle holds true without regard to the procedures a

state establishes for its deprivation. Balancing the relevant

interests,

Michigan’s

license-suspension

scheme—mandating the suspension of driver’s licenses

for failure to pay, without consideration of a person’s

ability to pay—violates Plaintiffs’ procedural due process

rights. I respectfully dissent.

I.
The facts are largely undisputed. Michigan imposes fines for traffic violations. If those fines are not paid within 14 days from the notice of suspension, Michigan law instructs the Secretary to “immediately suspend” the person’s driver’s license.3 A driver is notified for the first time that his or her driver’s license is subject to suspension 28 days after he or she fails to pay.
Adrian Fowler and Kitia Harris are indigent and unable to pay the fines that resulted from their traffic infractions. Fowler, a single mother, works part-time and earns $ 712 each month. Fowler alleges she turned down a better employment opportunity because it required her to travel through the metropolitan area, something she cannot do without a driver’s license or suitable public transportation. She also contends that her inability to drive has reduced the likelihood that she will be able to pay her fines. Harris, also a single mother, suffers from a chronic medical condition and receives disability benefits in the amount of $ 1,218 each month. Harris alleges that, because she is unable to stand for long periods of time due to her health, she cannot use public transportation and is unable to attend many of her doctor’s appointments. Fowler and Harris both tried to establish a payment plan to pay their fines, but Michigan courts refused.
The Secretary does not dispute that Plaintiffs are indigent and unable to pay their fines. Nor does the Secretary contest that due process requires that Plaintiffs receive notice and an opportunity to demonstrate that they are unable to pay. To these points, the Secretary emphatically agrees. Rather, the Secretary contends that Plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights are satisfied because Michigan does permit drivers to assert their inability to pay and seek alternatives, and that Plaintiffs would have been provided notice of the available procedures had they appeared in court for the underlying traffic violation.4
*266 The Due Process clause safeguards against a state’s impermissible deprivation of a protected property interest. Under the due process analysis, we consider two primary
15

questions: whether the plaintiff has a liberty or property interest entitled to due process protection; and if so, whether the plaintiff was provided sufficient notice and
afforded an opportunity to present objections. Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950) (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 278 (1940)Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 278 (1940)). “Property interests are ... created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source
such as state law.” Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). Once it is determined that a property interest exists, “the question remains what process is due.”
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972).
The first question under the due process framework is forthright: The Supreme Court has long recognized that “[o]nce [driver’s] licenses are issued, ... their continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood ... [and they] are not to be taken away without that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Bell, 402 U.S. at 539, 91 S.Ct. 1586
(citation omitted); Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 10,
99 S.Ct. 2612, 61 L.Ed.2d 321 (1979) (same); Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112, 97 S.Ct. 1723, 52 L.Ed.2d 172 (1977) (same). There is—without question—a property interest in the continued possession of a driver’s license. Therefore, the only question remaining in the due process analysis is what process is due before Michigan may suspend the driver’s license of an indigent person for
failure to pay fines. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481, 92
S.Ct. 2593. The factors set forth in Mathews provide the framework for determining the specific dictates of due process.
Despite clearly established law, the majority concludes that Plaintiffs have no entitlement right at all to challenge their license suspensions on the basis that they are indigent. According to the majority, “the mere fact” that the Supreme Court has “recognize[d] a protectable property interest in a driver’s license under state law,” does not create the “more specific” entitlement interest in an indigency exception from license suspension. Maj. Op. 257. The majority’s analysis rests entirely on its misapprehension of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Roth.
The Supreme Court in Roth held that a professor who was hired on a fixed term of one academic year did not

have a protected property interest in continued
employment after his contract ended. Roth, 408 U.S.
at 578, 92 S.Ct. 2701. The majority reads Roth to suggest that the specific “nature of the claimed property interest” by Plaintiffs’ here is an indigency exception, not in continued possession their driver’s licenses. This
misreads Roth.
The majority observes correctly that Roth looked to the “nature of the interest at stake” to determine whether
the Plaintiff had a protected property interest. Id. at 570–71, 92 S.Ct. 2701. Missed by the majority, however,
is that Roth looked to the professor’s employment contract—the “rules or understanding” that conferred the underlying property interest—to determine *267 the
nature of the interest. Id. at 577–78, 92 S.Ct. 2701. According to those terms, the Court explained that “the important fact” was that the plaintiff’s employment contract “specifically provided that ... [his] employment was to terminate on June 30” and that “they made no
provision for renewal whatsoever.” Id. at 578, 92 S.Ct.
2701. Only then did the Court in Roth find that no
property interest existed. Thus, Roth stands for the principle that due process does not protect against the deprivation of a continued interest in property where state rules or regulations do not confer such an interest in its
continued possession. Id. at 573, 92 S.Ct. 2701.
The majority likens the one-year teaching contract in
Roth to the Plaintiffs’ property interest in continued possession of their driver’s licenses. This comparison falls short. Central to Roth’s holding was that the plaintiff had
no “no tenure rights to continued employment.” Id. at 566, 576–77, 92 S.Ct. 2701 (distinguishing the plaintiff’s one-year contract from cases where a property interest existed in the continued employment of public college professors employed under “tenure provisions”) (citations omitted). Whereas here, the Supreme Court has held that there is a property interest in the “continued possession” of a driver’s license and that it may “not to be taken away
without that procedural due process.” Bell, 402 U.S. at
539, 91 S.Ct. 1586 (citation omitted). Employing Roth, there is no question that the nature of the property interest at stake here is the continued possession of Plaintiffs’ driver’s license.
In cases following Roth, the Court has held steadfast to the principle that the nature of the property interest at stake is ingrained in the rules or regulations that confer the underlying property interest, not in the state’s
16

deprivation procedures. For example, in Goss v. Lopez, several high school students challenged Ohio’s statute that permitted school officials to suspend students for 10 days for misconduct without providing students a pre-suspension hearing. 419 U.S. 565, 568–69, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975). To determine the nature of the interest at stake, the Court turned to the provision in Ohio’s law that conferred the underlying right to a free education and concluded that the students “plainly had legitimate claims of entitlement to a public education.” Id. at 573, 95 S.Ct. 729. Ohio’s statutory provision that set forth the suspension procedures was immaterial to the nature of the property interest at stake.
Id. at 573–74, 95 S.Ct. 729.
This Court has since reiterated this principle in the clearest of terms:
[T]he parties suggest two sources for [plaintiff’s] property interest: the Village’s procedure for evaluating requests for building permits and the building permit itself. Of the two possible sources for the property interest at stake, only the latter is cognizable. This Court has held that processes mandated by municipal ordinances or state law are insufficient to establish a property interest.
Chandler v. Vill. of Chagrin Falls, 296 F. App’x 463, 469 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Richardson v. Twp. of Brady, 218 F.3d 508 (6th Cir. 2000)). There is no question that, pursuant to controlling precedent, Michigan’s license-suspension scheme should not be considered in evaluating the nature of the property interest at stake here. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 541, 105 S.Ct. 1487 (“In short, once it is determined that the Due Process Clause applies, ... the [answer to the] question [of] what process is due ... is not to be found in the [state] statute.”).
Compounding its foundational misapprehension of Roth, the majority then misreads the Supreme Court’s
decision in Bell, taking it to stand for the proposition *268 that this Court should look to Michigan’s license-suspension statute to determine whether “Michigan law” creates a claim of entitlement in an indigency exception. Maj. Op. 257. However, Bell

does not support such an approach. In Bell, the plaintiff challenged Georgia’s Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, which provided that the driver’s license of an uninsured motorist involved in an accident would be suspended unless that motorist could post a security bond for the amount of damages claimed by a
party to the accident. Bell, 402 U.S. at 536, 91 S.Ct. 1586. The pre-suspension procedures under the Georgia statute excluded any consideration of fault or
responsibility for the accident. Id. The Supreme Court held that the law’s failure to afford an uninsured motorist a pre-suspension hearing on fault was constitutionally
deficient. Id. at 543, 91 S.Ct. 1586.
Although Bell canvassed the state’s deprivation statute to determine whether the statutory scheme made “liability an important factor in the State’s determination to deprive an individual of his licenses,” it did so only to determine what process was due, not to define the plaintiff’s property interest, as the majority does here.
Bell began its analysis by first emphasizing the driver’s protected property interest in the continued
possession of his driver’s license. Id. at 539, 91 S.Ct. 1586 (citation omitted). Once the plaintiff’s protected property interest was clearly established, only then did the Court “turn ... to the nature of the procedural due process which must be afforded the licensee on the question of his
fault or liability for the accident.” Id. at 539–40, 91 S.Ct. 1586. Despite the majority’s averment to the contrary, the Court’s examination of the state’s license-suspension statute was of no consequence to its determination of whether the plaintiff had a claim of entitlement to continued possession of his driver’s license.
Having established that Plaintiffs have a protected property interest in the continued possession of their driver’s licenses, “the question remain[ing] [is] what
process is due.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593. At a minimum, due process requires that Michigan provide notice “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise [Plaintiffs] of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections.” Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314, 70 S.Ct. 652 (citation omitted).
Michigan did not provide Plaintiffs sufficient notice before it deprived them of their driver’s licenses. Even assuming that the Secretary is correct in the assertion that Plaintiffs were provided alternatives to payment in full before having their licenses suspended, it sets forth no basis for its failure to provide Plaintiffs with “adequate notice” of the available alternatives in the statute, the
17

citations, or through the court’s website. See Mathews,

424 U.S. at 325 n.4, 96 S.Ct. 893 (explaining that the

essence of due process requires “timely and adequate

notice”). To satisfy the notice requirement under due

process, Michigan must apprise drivers of the risk of

having their licenses suspended if they fail to pay court

fines and provide notice that they may contest their ability

to pay by establishing that they are indigent and may seek

alternatives to payment. It is undisputed that the only

notice provided to Plaintiffs instructs them that they must

pay the costs in full, unless a misdemeanor is involved, or

they dispute liability of the traffic violation. Thus,

Michigan

fails

to

afford

Plaintiffs

constitutionally-sufficient notice before it suspends their

driver’s licenses for failure to pay.

Because, “unlike some legal rules,” due process is “flexible” and “calls for such procedures as the particular situation demands,” we weigh the factors set forth in *269
Mathews to determine the scope of the hearing required:

[f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail.

Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334–35, 96 S.Ct. 893. Applying

the balancing approach outlined in

Mathews,

Michigan’s law violates procedural due process.

The first and third factors are simple. It is unquestionable that the private interests at stake are high when a state deprives a person of his or her driver’s license. A driver’s license can be a necessary element to maintaining a livelihood, and the Supreme Court has “frequently recognized the severity of depriving a person of the
means of livelihood.” Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 543,
105 S.Ct. 1487; see also Bell, 402 U.S. at 539, 91 S.Ct. 1586 (recognizing that a driver’s license may become “essential in the pursuit of a livelihood.”). The impact of

the deprivation is far more severe for indigent drivers whose precarious financial position only worsens without
the ability to drive. See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 460, 93 S.Ct. 631, 34 L.Ed.2d 626 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“But no one who has had close contact with poor people can fail to understand how close to the margin of survival many of them are.”). Certainly, an individual who has had their license suspended because they cannot afford to pay a fine is at an extraordinary disadvantage in earning an income and obtaining basic
essentials. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) (“[D]riving an automobile” is “a virtual necessity for most Americans.”). Indeed, Fowler alleges she was forced to turn down a better-paying job after Michigan suspended her license, and Harris contends she is unable to regularly attend doctor’s appointments.
On the other hand, the government’s interests in suspending driver’s licenses without a pre-deprivation hearing are minimal. The Secretary advances no argument that permitting the Plaintiffs to challenge their ability to pay fines before having their licenses suspended would cause undue fiscal or administrative burdens. Quite the opposite: the Secretary maintains that Michigan does provide a pre-deprivation hearing for a driver to contest his or her ability to pay. See Appellant’s Br. at 50–51 (“[T]he process that was due was available to [the Plaintiffs], including pre-deprivation indigency accommodations.”).
Finally, the risk of erroneous deprivation of the driver’s license of a person who is truly unable to pay is far too great unless there are added procedures. The question of whether one is indigent would involve a fact-intensive inquiry that might require a driver to testify regarding their financial status and provide documentation. This is a small price to pay to avoid financial ruination of an indigent individual or family. Given the balancing of these factors, due process requires that Michigan provide drivers a pre-deprivation hearing to contest their license-suspension on the basis that they are indigent and to provide reasonable alternatives to payment. See
Bell, 402 U.S. at 542, 91 S.Ct. 1586 (“[E]xcept in emergency situations (and this is not one) due process requires that when a State seeks to terminate an interest [in a driver’s license], it must afford ‘notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case’ before the termination becomes effective.”).5
*270 The majority, on the other hand, concludes that
“even if we proceed to the Mathews analysis,” Plaintiffs’ due process claim still fails for the same reason it concludes Plaintiffs have no property interest in the first
18

instance: “indigency is not relevant to the state’s underlying decision to suspend their licenses.” Maj. Op. 259. The majority reads Bell and Dixon for the principle that a state’s decision not to make a factor relevant to its deprivation scheme is dispositive under
Mathews. Neither case can be stretched so far; it would render the balancing test in Mathews meaningless.
The Court in Bell affirmatively answered whether due process might still require a state to consider factors that were not relevant to its deprivation scheme. According to
Bell, if fault and liability were “irrelevant to the [state’s] statutory scheme,” the specific “nature of the case” would dictate whether the state must nonetheless consider those factors. Bell, 402 U.S. at 541, 91 S.Ct. 1586. In other words, the answer to this question depends on the “demands” of the “particular situation,” which can only be determined by balancing the Mathews factors—a crucial step the majority foregoes.
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 321, 96 S.Ct. 893. Bell provides no support for the majority’s failure to apply
Mathews.
Neither does Dixon. The majority, seizing upon a single phrase in Dixon—that the pre-deprivation hearing sought by the plaintiff “would not serve to protect any [of the plaintiff’s] substantive rights” id. at 114, 97 S.Ct. 1723—concludes that Plaintiffs have “no substantive basis to contest [Michigan’s] license-suspension decision.” Maj. Op. 259. The majority places more on this phrase than it can bear. First, the “only question” before the Court in Dixon was “one of timing.” See Dixon, 431 U.S. at 112, 97 S.Ct. 1723 (recognizing that it was “clear” that the licensee enjoyed “all the safeguards procedural due process could be thought to require ....”). Second, the phrase was relative only to the Court’s assessment of the risk-of-erroneous-deprivation factor under Mathews.
Id. at 113–14, 97 S.Ct. 1723. Considering this factor alone, the Court determined that the risk was minimal because the plaintiff did not challenge his convictions or the “adequacy of his procedural rights.” Id. Unlike in
Dixon, Plaintiffs’ do challenge the adequacy of their procedural rights under Michigan law. The majority’s comparison to Dixon fails.
What is more, the majority cannot escape that the Dixon Court upheld the state’s pre-deprivation
procedures only after carefully weighing each of the

Mathews factors. Id. at 113, 97 S.Ct. 1723. The majority’s reliance upon a single phrase that related to only one of the three Mathew’s factors, while ignoring the Court’s analysis of the remaining factors, falls short. See
Bd. of Curators of University of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 86 n.3, 98 S.Ct. 948, 55 L.Ed.2d 124 (1977) (weighing “all relevant factors” to determine the specific dictates of due process). The majority’s approach skips over critical safeguards of due process.
*271 II.
Because I would affirm the district court on the basis that Michigan’s license-suspension statute violates Plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights, I would not reach the equal protection issue. However, because I also part ways with the majority’s equal protection analysis, I write separately to express my divergent views.
At the outset, the fundamental principle pronounced in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed.
891 (1956) and its progeny, guides our equal protection analysis. Namely, that a state may not subject an indigent person “who, by definition, is without funds,” to a harsher punishment “solely because [they are] unable to pay.”
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 242, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970).
In Griffin, the Supreme Court invalidated an Illinois statute that required all defendants to purchase transcripts in order to appeal their convictions. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 13, 76 S.Ct. 585. Though facially neutral, it failed to “afford[ ] every convicted person, financially competent or not, the opportunity to take an appeal,” because indigent persons were not provided an alternative mechanism to receive an adequate transcript. Id. at 23, 76 S.Ct. 585; see also Williams, 399 U.S. at 244, 90 S.Ct. 2018 (invalidating an Illinois statute that required all persons to pay fines arising from their conviction before being released from jail without affording an exception for the indigent). Extending Griffin’s principle, the Court in Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 668–69, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 76 L.Ed.2d 221 (1983) held that, absent evidence that the defendant “willfully refused” to pay or that “alternative methods of punish[ment]” are inadequate to meet the state’s interest, the state could not constitutionally revoke the defendant’s probation for
19

failure to pay.
As its sole basis for distinguishing Griffin, the majority—relying on a single Seventh Circuit
concurrence in Markadonatos v. Vill. of Woodridge, 760 F.3d 545, 554 (7th Cir. 2014) (Easterbrook, J., concurring)—contends that “property receives ... less[ ] protection” than liberty interests. Maj. Op. 260–61. On this faulty foundation, the majority presumes that Griffin is inapplicable here. Such sparse reasoning begs the question rather than answers it. That liberty interests receive a higher degree of protection than property is nearly inapposite to the more particular question of
whether Griffin applies here. Certainly, when a state deprives an indigent person of their liberty, they are entitled to the full panoply of constitutional protections. But the majority does not explain why that means it must draw an arbitrary line between liberty and property here. In my view, when a state deprives a person of an essential source of livelihood, “solely because [they are] indigent
and cannot immediately pay the fine in full,” Georgia, 461 U.S. at 664, 103 S.Ct. 2064, the principle set forth in
Griffin is implicated.
To be sure, later cases reveal that Griffin’s principle cannot be so easily cabined to instances where
imprisonment is at stake. Indeed, in Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 196, 92 S.Ct. 410, 30 L.Ed.2d 372 (1971), the Court rejected the state’s argument that
Griffin was distinguishable because the defendant sought a fee exemption to obtain his transcript to appeal a
judgment that resulted in only a civil fine. Mayer
underscored Griffin’s holding that the refusal to allow an exception for the indigent was, as a constitutional matter, no different from adopting an “unreasoned distinction,” punishing indigent individuals more severely than non-indigent individuals for reasons unrelated to
their culpability. Id. at 196, 92 S.Ct. 410; see also *272 M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 117 S.Ct. 555, 136
L.Ed.2d 473 (1996) (applying Griffin to the state’s
authority to terminate a parent-child bond); Kras, 409 U.S. at 445, 93 S.Ct. 631 (declining to extend
Griffin’s principle to a fee waiver in the bankruptcy context because “not getting a discharge will effect no change with respect to basic necessities.”). Certainly, depriving a person of the means to a “basic, pervasive, and often necessary mode of transportation to and from one’s home [and] workplace” implicates a basic and
Footnotes

fundamental necessity for which Griffin should apply.
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979).

The majority concludes that Michigan’s license-suspension scheme withstands rational basis review because Michigan “has legitimate interests in promoting compliance with court orders and in collecting

traffic debt.” Maj. Op. 262. Like the Courts in Griffin,

Bearden, and

Mayer, I find Michigan’s

license-suspension scheme problematic. It is difficult to

rationalize—and, notably, the Secretary does not even

attempt to do so—how suspending the driver’s license of

a person who is truly unable to pay makes it any more

likely that Michigan will recover the costs it seeks to

collect. Surely, suspending the driver’s license of

“someone who through no fault of his own is unable to

[pay]” will not “make [payment] suddenly forthcoming.”

Bearden, 461 U.S. at 670, 103 S.Ct. 2064. Indeed, the “reasons for non-payment [are] of critical importance

here.” Id. at 668, 103 S.Ct. 2064. Thus, like

Bearden, the high interests at stake warrant that Michigan “inquire into the reasons for [Plaintiffs’] failure to pay” and “consider alterna[tives]” to payment in full before it imposes an automatic suspension of licenses.

Id. at 673, 103 S.Ct. 2064.

III.
Michigan’s license-suspension scheme imposes a harsher sanction on indigent drivers than their non-indigent peers. Given the great degree of deprivation at stake, Michigan’s failure to inquire into a driver’s ability to pay and afford alternatives violates due process and equal protection. Because the majority’s decision today erodes essential constitutional promises, I dissent!
All Citations
924 F.3d 247

20

1

We refer to court debt as a catch-all term for fines, court costs, fees, or assessments identified under Michigan

Compiled Laws § 257.321a.

2

This appeal was filed when Ruth Johnson held the office of Secretary of State of the State of Michigan. Pursuant to

FRAP 43(c)(2) Automatic Substitution of Officeholder, the court has substituted her successor, Jocelyn Benson, as a

party.

3

See Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.323(4) (“The court shall set aside the secretary of state’s determination only if 1 or

more of following apply: (a) In determining whether a petitioner is eligible for full driving privileges, the petitioner’s

substantial rights have been prejudiced because the determination is any of the following: (i) In violation of the

Constitution of the United States.”).

4

We hold aside, for the moment, the question of whether such an entitlement can be found in the Equal Protection

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which we address in Part III.B.

5

Secretary Benson’s approach to this litigation, meanwhile, muddies the waters. At first glance, one might think that

Secretary Benson has in fact conceded that a pre-deprivation indigency hearing is currently required under state law. A

more discerning look reveals that she made no such claim.

Secretary Benson argues that Plaintiffs neglected to pursue an “ability to pay” hearing at the Ferndale court that

ultimately sent the information to Secretary Benson that triggered their license suspension. Secretary Benson

maintains that Plaintiffs have not shown that the Ferndale court fails to provide what Plaintiffs request—“extensions for

defendants who are unable to pay the full amount.” As a consequence, says Secretary Benson, Plaintiffs are barred

from pursuing their procedural due process claim because they never took advantage of the process provided.

This argument does not concede that Michigan law clearly entitles Plaintiffs to an indigency exception. Secretary

Benson’s account of the process Plaintiffs failed to pursue relies on an affidavit from Linda Carroll, the Court

Administrator for the 43rd District Court-Ferndale Division. The Carroll affidavit says nothing about Michigan law, and

more specifically it says nothing about the Michigan laws that the district court enjoined Secretary Benson from

enforcing. Instead, the Carroll affidavit says that there are court rules or policies with provisions “for night court (to

allow an opportunity to appear in court without conflicting with work schedules), extensions on payment requirements,

ability to pay hearings, payment plans, as well as alternative payment options which include community service.”

But there are two problems with the Carroll affidavit with respect to Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim. First, even

if the process accounted for in Carroll’s affidavit can serve as a body of law creating a legal entitlement to an “ability to

pay” hearing, Plaintiffs’ argument runs into a still more fundamental problem—their suit names the wrong party. Any

injunction aimed at getting adequate notice of an available “ability to pay” hearing would need to be directed at either

the 43rd District Court or the Clerk’s office. Whether such a claim would be likely to succeed is another matter for

another day.

Second, it is doubtful whether the process described in the affidavit amounts to a legal entitlement of any sort. The

affidavit does not describe or cite the “provisions” to which it refers. When the affidavit refers to the specific “ability to

pay” procedures of the court, they are described in discretionary terms as things that “the Clerk’s office will” do.

Moreover, it appears from the Carroll affidavit that the procedures the Clerk makes available may be in tension with

other court rules:

Although court rules generally state that fees, costs and other financial obligations imposed by the court must be

paid at the time of assessment, for individuals present in court, the Clerk’s office will: [lists relevant procedures].

Whatever the Carroll affidavit shows vis-à-vis the local rules or office practices of the 43rd District Court-Ferndale

Division, it does not show that Michigan law establishes a right to an indigency exception from license suspension. The

discretionary actions of a court administrator, or even a state judge, in adopting an administrative process, do not

amount to the statutory entitlement the Supreme Court has acknowledged as a legitimate basis for a procedural due

process claim. Upon so flimsy a basis as that we could not conclude that “looking to the operation of the State’s

statutory scheme, it is clear that [indigency] ... plays a crucial role ....” Bell, 402 U.S. at 541, 91 S.Ct. 1586.

6

If found likely to succeed on these claims, Plaintiffs would have resuscitated the district court’s conclusion on the

procedural due process claim because they would have identified a legal entitlement in federal constitutional law that

triggers the Due Process Clause. Of course, they would still have to show that the procedures in place are

constitutionally inadequate, an issue we do not address.

7

Griffin, through divided opinions, held that Illinois violated both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of

the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to furnish trial transcripts to indigent criminal defendants who needed transcripts

in order to file an appeal. Justice Black’s opinion explained that by doing so, Illinois “den[ied] adequate appellate

review to the poor while granting such review to all others.” 351 U.S. at 13, 76 S.Ct. 585 (plurality). Williams, in

21

turn, relied on Griffin in concluding that a court could not increase an indigent defendant’s imprisonment past her maximum sentence solely on the grounds that the defendant could not afford to pay fines stemming from the original
conviction. 399 U.S. at 242, 90 S.Ct. 2018. In Tate, the Supreme Court decided a case concerning a debtor who had failed to pay fines accumulated from traffic offenses and had, as a consequence, been committed by a court
to a municipal farm where he would work “to satisfy the fines at the rate of five dollars for each day.” 401 U.S. at
397, 91 S.Ct. 668. The Supreme Court found that this situation fell within Williams’ holding because the “petitioner
was subjected to imprisonment solely because of his indigency.” Id. at 398, 91 S.Ct. 668. Mayer extended
Griffin’s right of indigent defendants to an appellate record to cases where a defendant seeks to appeal a conviction
that threatens fines, not imprisonment. 404 U.S. at 196, 92 S.Ct. 410. Lastly, in Bearden the Court held that Georgia’s law permitting probation to be revoked due to a probationer’s inability to pay a fine (without a finding of fault
or inquiry into alternative forms of punishment) violated the Fourteenth Amendment under Griffin, 461 U.S. at 672-73, 103 S.Ct. 2064.

8

First, Plaintiffs’ claim does not implicate a fundamental right. Plaintiffs concede that we have held “there is no

fundamental right to drive,” Duncan v. Cone, 2000 WL 1828089, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 7, 2000), but nonetheless claim

that Michigan’s suspension of their driver’s licenses implicates the fundamental right to travel because, for the indigent,

especially where public transit is inadequate and distances between work, home, and market are great, an inability to

drive “actually deters travel.” Plaintiffs’ argument is misguided. A right only counts as fundamental when it is

“traditionally protected by our society” and “rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people.” Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122-23, 109 S.Ct. 2333, 105 L.Ed.2d 91 (1989) (citation omitted). A putative right of the indigent to drive—even in a car-bound society where public transit may be woefully inadequate—is not a right rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people. None of the authority cited by Plaintiffs indicates otherwise. The language “actually deters travel” comes from

Attorney Gen. of New York v. Soto-Lopez, in which a plurality of the Court stated that “[a] state law implicates the right to travel when it actually deters such travel, when impeding travel is its primary objective, or when it uses any

classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right.” 476 U.S. 898, 903, 106 S.Ct. 2317, 90 L.Ed.2d

899 (1986). Soto-Lopez is not itself instructive because the Court did not rely on the “actually deters travel”

language in reaching its holding. The authority relied upon by Soto-Lopez for the “actually deters travel” language

was Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 73 U.S. 35, 18 L.Ed. 745 (1867), and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,

89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969). Neither case is relevant to Plaintiffs’ claim. Shapiro concerned state laws denying welfare assistance to residents who had not resided within their jurisdiction for at least one year before

applying for welfare assistance. Crandall dealt with a Nevada law that imposed a capitation tax on all passengers leaving or passing through the state. Second, Michigan’s law does not target a suspect class. “[A] class of less wealthy individuals is not a suspect class

warranting strict scrutiny review.” Molina-Crespo, 547 F.3d at 660 (citation omitted); see also Johnson, 624 F.3d at 746.

1

I agree with the majority that Plaintiffs have standing to bring this action and that we need not abstain under the

Younger or Pullman doctrines from reaching the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims.

2

The Secretary does not dispute Plaintiffs’ claim that Michigan must provide them a hearing to contest their ability to pay

and seek alternatives before it suspends their driver’s licenses, much less contend Plaintiffs have no claim of

entitlement for which to challenge their suspensions. Tellingly, of the Secretary’s seventy-three-page brief, she devoted

only three pages to due process.

3

In addition to fines, a driver is also subject to court costs of up to $ 100 and a mandatory assessment fee of $ 40.

Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.907(4), (13). The statute further provides that a 20% late fee be imposed on any amount unpaid after 56 days. Id. § 600.4803. Finally, a person “who fails to ... pay[ ] all fines, costs, fees, and assessments, is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than 93 days or a fine of not more than $ 100.00, or both.” Id. § 257.321a(1).

4

Despite these averments, in the majority’s view, the Secretary “does not concede that Michigan law clearly entitles

Plaintiffs to an indigency exception.” Maj. Op. 258 n.5 (emphasis in original). Rather, according to the majority, the

22

Secretary merely states the “rules or policies” of Michigan courts as provided by the court administrator. Maj. Op. 258 n.5. The record, however, belies this contention. According to the Secretary, “[o]fficial state records ... show that the opportunity to raise an ability to pay for the enforcement of a court order is provided by Michigan courts under existing law.” R. 33, at 465 (emphasis added). The “existing law” the Secretary references is surely that of Michigan. Thus, the Secretary’s concession is unequivocal.

5

The Secretary points to Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 97 S.Ct. 1723, 52 L.Ed.2d 172 (1977) and argues that a

post-deprivation hearing alone is sufficient to comport with due process. Dixon does not support the Secretary’s argument because the government interest in that case was more urgent and compelling than the government interest

in this case. The scheme in Dixon targeted drivers who had accumulated a large number of traffic offenses, which gave rise to a reasonable inference that they were significantly more likely to pose a risk to public safety if allowed to remain on the road. In contrast, Michigan’s license-suspension scheme relates solely to the collection of money. Under

the Mathews factors, these different government interests justify different levels of process.

23