Case 1:17-cv-01597 Document 1 Filed 08/09/17 Page 1 of 15

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3,

)

JANE DOE 4, and JANE DOE 5,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as )

President of the United States; JAMES N.

)

MATTIS, in his official capacity as Secretary of )

Defense; JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., in his

)

official capacity as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs )

of Staff; the UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT )

OF THE ARMY; RYAN D. MCCARTHY, in )

his official capacity as Secretary of the Army; )

the UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

)

THE AIR FORCE; HEATHER A. WILSON, in )

her official capacity as Secretary of the Air

)

Force; the UNITED STATES COAST GUARD; )

ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as )

Secretary of Homeland Security; and the

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

)

Defendants.

) )

Case No. 17-cv-1597
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

INTRODUCTION 1. This is a constitutional and equitable challenge to President Donald J. Trump’s decision to reverse the current policy of the United States Armed Forces by prohibiting transgender servicemembers from “serv[ing] in any capacity in the U.S. military.” 2. In June 2016, the United States Department of Defense announced after an exhaustive review process that it would allow transgender people to serve openly in the United States Armed Forces. 3. Since that time, Plaintiffs, along with thousands of servicemembers, have followed protocol in informing their chain of command that they are transgender. They did so in

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reliance on the United States’ express promises that it would permit them to continue to serve their country openly. These servicemembers, like many others, have built their lives around their military service.
4. On July 26, 2017, President Trump announced in a series of tweets that he would reverse the Department of Defense’s policy on transgender servicemembers, stating that “the United States Government will not accept or allow transgender individuals to serve in any capacity in the U.S. Military.” The President’s announcement, which upon information and belief was made without consulting the Joint Chiefs of Staff, upset the reasonable expectations of Plaintiffs and thousands of other transgender servicemembers and the men and women with whom they serve and fight.
5. Upon information and belief, the White House turned that decision into official guidance, approved by the White House counsel’s office, to be communicated to the Department of Defense.
6. Plaintiffs here are five servicemembers who collectively have served this nation for decades in various branches of the United States military.
7. Execution of the President’s directive will result in an end to service by openly transgender service members and has already resulted in immediate, concrete injury to Plaintiffs by unsettling and destabilizing plaintiffs’ reasonable expectation of continued service.
8. The directive to reinstate a ban on open service by transgender people violates both the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Additionally, Defendants are estopped from terminating the continued service of Plaintiffs and other active duty transgender servicemembers.
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9. This lawsuit seeks declaratory and permanent injunctive relief against implementation of the President’s directive to prohibit transgender individuals from serving in the Armed Forces.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 10. This court has jurisdiction over the claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. 11. Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because the acts described in this Complaint occurred in this judicial district.
PLAINTIFFS 12. Plaintiffs are active duty servicemembers in the United States military who serve openly as transgender people. They proceed under pseudonyms here for fear of retribution. 13. Jane Doe 1 has served with distinction in the United States Coast Guard for more than a decade. 14. In or around June 2016, in reliance on the issuance of the policy permitting open service by transgender servicemembers, Jane Doe 1 notified her command that she is transgender. 15. Since that time, she has continued to serve without incident and has furthered her gender transition in reliance on the Department of Defense’s policy permitting open service by transgender servicemembers. 16. Following President Trump’s tweets, Jane Doe 1 submitted a prospective letter of resignation stating that she would resign rather than be involuntarily terminated on account of her transgender status. Were the Department of Defense to retreat from the policy announced by President Trump, Jane Doe 1 would withdraw her resignation and continue to serve. 17. Jane Doe 2 has been enlisted in the National Guard since 2003 and has been on active duty in the United States Army since 2006.
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18. Jane Doe 2 notified her command that she is transgender after the United States Department of Defense announced in June 2016 that it would allow transgender servicemembers to serve openly in the military.
19. In reliance on the Department’s promise to allow transgender servicemembers to serve openly, Jane Doe 2 began to seek medical treatment relating to her gender transition in September 2016.
20. Since informing her command that she is transgender, Jane Doe 2 has continued serving in her post without incident.
21. Jane Doe 2’s current contract with the military extends through November 2018. She is counting on the compensation and benefits accrued during that time to pay for further education and training to begin a civilian career, but she fears that the ban may result in early termination of her contract.
22. Jane Doe 3 has served in the United States Army since 2015. She has previously been deployed to Afghanistan and expects to be deployed to Iraq soon.
23. In or around June of 2016, in reliance on the Department of Defense policy permitting transgender people to serve openly in the military, Jane Doe 3 notified her command that she is transgender. Since then, she has continued serving her post without incident.
24. Jane Doe 3’s current contract with the military extends through December 2018. She plans to renew her contract, but fears that she will not be allowed to do so because of the ban.
25. Jane Doe 4 has served in the United States Army since 2000. 26. In or around June of 2016, in reliance on the Department of Defense policy permitting transgender people to serve openly in the military, Jane Doe 4 met with her
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commanding officer to identify herself as transgender. She began receiving medical treatment related to her gender transition in September 2016.
27. Since coming out as transgender, Jane Doe 4 continued serving in her post without incident.
28. Jane Doe 4’s current contract with the military extends through June 2018. She plans to renew her contract to complete two additional years of service following the expiration of her current contract so that she can reach twenty years of service and receive retirement benefits. She fears that the President’s directive banning transgender people from military service will result in her discharge from the military before she can reach this twenty-year benchmark, thus leading to a substantial decrease in her retirement payments. Jane Doe 5 has been an active duty member of the United States Air Force for nearly twenty years, serving multiple tours of duty abroad, including two in Iraq.
29. After June 2016, in reliance on the announcement that transgender people would be permitted to serve openly, she notified her superiors that she is transgender. She has served in the intervening time without incident.
30. Jane Doe 5’s livelihood depends on her military service. Separation from the military would have devastating financial and emotional consequences for her.
DEFENDANTS 31. Defendant Donald J. Trump is President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. On July 26, 2017, President Trump stated on Twitter that transgender people would not be permitted to serve “in any capacity in the U.S. military.” Upon information and belief, President Trump subsequently directed that decision to be turned into official guidance to be transmitted for implementation to the Department of Defense.
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32. Defendant James N. Mattis is the United States Secretary of Defense. He is the leader of the Department of Defense.
33. Defendant Joseph F. Dunford, Jr. is a United States Marine Corps General and services as the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
34. Defendant Department of the Army is one of three military departments of the Department of Defense and is responsible for the administration and operation of the United States Army.
35. Defendant Ryan D. McCarthy is the Acting United States Secretary of the Army. He is the leader of the Department of the Army.
36. Defendant Department of the Air Force is one of three military departments of the Department of Defense and is responsible for the administration and operation of the United States Air Force.
37. Defendant Heather A. Wilson is the United States Secretary of the Air Force. She is the leader of the Department of the Air Force.
38. Defendant United States Coast Guard is one of the five branches of the United States Armed Forces.
39. Defendant Elaine C. Duke is the Acting United States Secretary of Homeland Security. She is the leader of the Department of Homeland Security. The Department of Homeland Security is responsible for the administration and operation of the United States Coast Guard.
40. Defendant United States of America includes all federal government agencies and departments responsible for the implementation of the President’s decision.
41. All of the Defendants are sued in their official capacities.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS Background on Transgender People Serving Openly In the Military
42. In May 2014, then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, a decorated U.S. Army combat veteran, recommended that the military conduct a review of whether transgender people should be permitted to serve openly in the Armed Forces.
43. In August 2014, the Department of Defense issued a new regulation that eliminated its categorical ban on open service by transgender persons and instructed each branch of the Armed Forces to reassess whether maintaining a service-wide ban on service by openly transgender persons was justified.
44. Secretary Hagel explained that “[e]very qualified American who wants to serve our country should have an opportunity to do so if they fit the qualifications and can do it.”
45. Secretary Hagel was succeeded as Secretary of Defense by Ashton B. Carter, who had previously served many years within the Department, including as Deputy Secretary of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, and as a member of the Defense Policy Board and the Defense Science Board. In July 2015, Secretary Carter announced that the military would begin a comprehensive analysis of whether to maintain the prohibition on military service by transgender people.
46. Over the course of a year, Secretary Carter oversaw a comprehensive review of this issue by the leadership of the Armed Services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the service secretaries, and personnel, training, readiness, and medical specialists from across the Department of Defense.
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47. That year-long process examined all the data available on the issue, including but not limited to existing studies and research and input from transgender servicemembers, outside expert groups, and medical professionals.
48. This process also included a careful review of the eighteen other countries that permit military service by openly transgender people.
49. This process also included consultation with doctors, employers, and insurance companies regarding the provision of medical care to transgender people.
50. The Department of Defense also commissioned the RAND Corporation, an organization formed after World War II to connect military planning with research and development decisions and which now operates as an independent think tank financed by the U.S. government, to analyze relevant data and studies to determine the impact of permitting transgender servicemembers to serve openly.
51. The study, titled “Assessing the Implications of Allowing Transgender Personnel to Serve Openly” (the “RAND Study”), concluded that allowing transgender people to serve openly would “cost little and have no significant impact on unit readiness.”
52. The RAND Study concluded that health care costs for transgender servicemembers would represent “an exceedingly small proportion of [the Department of Defense’s] overall health care expenditures.” The RAND Study also concluded that this minimal incremental cost would likely be offset by savings through diminished rates of other health care costs that would be achieved by providing servicemembers with necessary transition-related medical care.
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53. Based on the results of this comprehensive, year-long review process, the Department of Defense concluded that the needs of the military would be best served by permitting openly transgender people to serve.
54. As laid out by Secretary Carter in remarks delivered on June 30, 2016, that conclusion was based on a number of considerations, including: the need to recruit and retain the most highly qualified people to serve in our nation’s Armed Forces; the fact that thousands of transgender people are already serving and that the military has already invested thousands of dollars to train each servicemember; the benefits to the military of retaining individuals who are already trained and who have already proven themselves; the need to provide both transgender servicemembers and their commanders with clear guidance on questions such as deployment and medical treatment; and the principle that “Americans who want to serve and can meet our standards should be afforded the opportunity to compete to do so.”
55. On June 30, 2016, Secretary Carter announced that “[e]ffective immediately, transgender Americans may serve openly. They can no longer be discharged or otherwise separated from the military just for being transgender.”
56. Also on June 30, 2016, Secretary Carter issued Directive-Type Memorandum 16005, titled “Military Service of Transgender Service Members.” The memorandum states: “The policy of the Department of Defense is that service in the United States military should be open to all who can meet the rigorous standards for military service and readiness. Consistent with the policies and procedures set forth in this memorandum, transgender individuals shall be allowed to serve in the military. These policies and procedures are premised on my conclusion that open service by transgender Service members while being subject to the same standards and procedures as other members with regard to their medical fitness for duty, physical fitness,
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uniform and grooming, deployability, and retention, is consistent with military readiness and with strength through diversity.”
57. In September 2016, the Department of Defense issued an implementation handbook entitled “Transgender Service in the United States Military.” The 71-page document set forth guidance and instructions to both military servicemembers and commanders about how to implement and understand the new policies enabling open service of transgender servicemembers.
58. On October 1, 2016, the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness issued “DoD Instruction 1300.28—In-Service Transition for Transgender Service Members.” The instruction set forth further guidance to ensure open service by transgender servicemembers, including details regarding revisions to medical treatment provisions. This instruction was further implemented by a memorandum issued by the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs entitled “Guidance for Treatment of Gender Dysphoria for Active and Reserve Component Service Members.”
59. On November 29, 2016, the Department of Defense revised “DoD Directive 1020.02E—Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity in the DoD” to prohibit discrimination and harassment on the basis of gender identity.
60. In 2016, the United States Coast Guard adopted policies and procedures for service by transgender servicemembers that are substantially the same as the Department of Defense policies described above.
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The Ban on Transgender Servicemembers 61. Early in the morning of July 26, 2017, without any prior indication that he would
address military transgender policy, President Trump announced in a series of tweets that the military would no longer permit the service of transgender Americans.
62. His tweets read: “After consultation with my generals and military experts, please be advised that the United States government will not accept or allow transgender individuals to serve in any capacity in the U.S. military. Our military must be focused on decisive and overwhelming victory and cannot be burdened with the tremendous medical costs and disruption that transgender in the military would entail.”
63. Shortly following the announcement, the new policy met with substantial criticism from members of Congress belonging to both political parties. These critics included Senator John McCain, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, who said in a statement that “there is no reason to force servicemembers who are able to fight, train, and deploy to leave the military—regardless of their gender identity.” Senator Joni Ernst, another Republican member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, also publicly expressed opposition to the new policy.
64. Upon information and belief, the President did not consult either the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Department of Defense before making his announcement.
65. Shortly after the announcement, fifty-six former generals and admirals issued a public statement denouncing the new policy.
66. Commandant Admiral Paul Zukunft of the United States Coast Guard criticized the proposed policy and expressly reached out to all openly transgender members of the Coast Guard, vowing not to “turn [his] back” on transgender servicemembers. Commandant Admiral
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Zukunft has arranged for Judge Advocate General’s Corps officers to assist transgender Coast Guard members affected by the change in policy.
67. Upon information and belief, the White House outlined a plan to end the active service of transgender servicemembers to be transmitted to the Department of Defense for implementation.
COUNT I (Fifth Amendment – Equal Protection) 68. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 69. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the federal government from denying equal protection of the laws. 70. President Trump’s directive to exclude transgender people from military service discriminates against Plaintiffs based on their sex and transgender status, without lawful justification, in violation of the Equal Protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 71. The categorical exclusion of transgender people from military service lacks a rational basis, is arbitrary, and cannot be justified by sufficient federal interests. 72. Through the actions above, Defendants have violated the Equal Protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
COUNT II (Fifth Amendment – Due Process) 73. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 74. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the federal government from depriving individuals of their property or liberty interests without due process of law.
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75. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires, at a minimum, that government action have some rational basis.
76. The President’s directive to exclude transgender people from military service is arbitrary and capricious and lacks any rational basis.
77. Defendants’ 2016 policy permitting transgender people to serve openly in the military, together with Plaintiffs’ reliance on that policy in notifying their superiors of their transgender status, created a protected interest in Plaintiffs’ ability to continue serving in the military as openly transgender servicemembers.
78. Defendants’ arbitrary reversal of the United States’ June 2016 policy threatens to exclude Plaintiffs from continued military service because they are transgender, thus depriving Plaintiffs of those interests without due process of law.
79. Defendants’ arbitrary reversal of the United States’ June 2016 policy also impermissibly burdens Plaintiffs’ fundamental rights to autonomy and privacy.
80. Through the actions above, Defendants have violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
COUNT III (Estoppel) 81. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 82. By virtue of its June 2016 policy allowing transgender servicemembers to serve openly in the United States Armed Forces, Defendants promised Plaintiffs that they could serve openly and continue to serve openly, subject to the same rights, responsibilities, benefits, and opportunities as other servicemembers.
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83. From the implementation of its June 2016 policy until the President’s June 26, 2017 announcement, Defendants provided Plaintiffs with ongoing support for their continued service in the military as openly transgender persons.
84. In reliance upon that promise from Defendants, Plaintiffs informed their commanding officers that they are transgender.
85. In reliance upon that promise from Defendants, Plaintiffs have undergone medical treatment for the purpose of gender transition.
86. Because they identified themselves as transgender in reliance on Defendants’ earlier promise, Plaintiffs have lost the stability and certainty they had in their careers and benefits, including post-military and retirement benefits that depend on the length of their service.
87. Plaintiffs have served honorably and successfully in the military since coming out as transgender, and their transgender status has not had any detrimental effect on their ability to serve or to fulfill their duties.
88. Through the actions above, Defendants are estopped from rescinding the rights, benefits, and protections promised to Plaintiffs.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF Plaintiffs ask the Court to grant the following relief: 1. Issue a declaratory judgment that the President’s directive to categorically exclude transgender people from military service is unconstitutional; 2. Issue a preliminary injunction prohibiting the categorical exclusion of transgender people from military service; 3. Issue a permanent injunction prohibiting the categorical exclusion of transgender people from military service;
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4. Award Plaintiffs their reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees;

5. Issue any other relief the Court deems appropriate.

August 9, 2017

Respectfully submitted,

Claire Laporte (pro hac vice forthcoming) Matthew E. Miller (pro hac vice forthcoming) Daniel McFadden (pro hac vice forthcoming) Rachel C. Hutchinson (pro hac vice forthcoming) FOLEY HOAG LLP 155 Seaport Blvd. Boston, Massachusetts 02210 Telephone: 617-832-1000 Fax: 617-832-7000
Jennifer Levi (pro hac vice forthcoming) GLBTQ LEGAL ADVOCATES & DEFENDERS 30 Winter St., Ste. 800 Boston, Massachusetts 02108 Telephone: 617-426-1350 Fax: 617-426-3594

/s/ Paul R.Q. Wolfson Paul R.Q. Wolfson (D.C. Bar No. 414759) WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE & DORR
LLP 1875 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006 Telephone: 202-663-6000 Fax: 202-663-6363
Alan E. Schoenfeld (pro hac vice forthcoming) WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
HALE & DORR LLP 7 World Trade Center 250 Greenwich St. New York, New York 10007 Telephone: 212-230-8800 Fax: 212-230-8888

Shannon P. Minter (pro hac vice forthcoming) Amy Whelan (pro hac vice forthcoming) NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS 870 Market St., Ste. 370 San Francisco, California 94102 Telephone: 415-392-6257 Fax: 415-392-8442

Adam M. Cambier (pro hac vice forthcoming) WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
HALE & DORR LLP 60 State Street Boston, Massachusetts 02109 Telephone: 617-526-6000 Fax: 617-526-5000
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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 Case 1:17-cv-01597-CKK Document 9 Filed 08/31/17 Page 1 of 20

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3,

)

JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JOHN DOE 1,

)

REGAN V. KIBBY, and DYLAN KOHERE, )

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as )

President of the United States; JAMES N.

)

MATTIS, in his official capacity as Secretary of )

Defense; JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., in his

)

official capacity as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs )

of Staff; the UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT )

OF THE ARMY; RYAN D. MCCARTHY, in )

his official capacity as Secretary of the Army; )

the UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

)

THE NAVY; RICHARD V. SPENCER, in his )

official capacity as Secretary of the Navy; the )

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE )

AIR FORCE; HEATHER A. WILSON, in her )

official capacity as Secretary of the Air Force; )

the UNITED STATES COAST GUARD;

)

ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as )

Secretary of Homeland Security; the DEFENSE )

HEALTH AGENCY; RAQUEL C. BONO, in )

her official capacity as Director of the Defense )

Health Agency; and the UNITED STATES OF )

AMERICA,

)

Defendants.

) )

Civil Action No. 17-cv-1597 (CKK)
AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

INTRODUCTION 1. This is a constitutional and equitable challenge to President Donald J. Trump’s decision to reverse the current policy of the United States Armed Forces by reverting to the “policy and practice [forbidding] military service by transgender individuals that was in place prior to June 2016.” The earlier policy, originally codified as Department of Defense Instruction 1332.38, barred transgender persons from enlisting or being retained in the U.S. Armed Forces

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by prohibiting individuals who are transgender from serving openly, whether or not they required any ongoing medical treatment and regardless of their fitness to serve.
2. In June 2016, the United States Department of Defense announced after an exhaustive review process that it would allow transgender people to serve openly in the United States Armed Forces.
3. Since that time, Plaintiffs, along with many other servicemembers, have followed protocol in informing their chain of command that they are transgender. They did so in reliance on the United States’ express promises that it would permit them to continue to serve their country openly. Some Plaintiffs, like many other servicemembers, have built their lives around their military service. Others are just beginning their careers at service academies or in the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (“ROTC”), and they hope for the opportunity to serve their country in the future.
4. On July 26, 2017, President Trump announced in a series of tweets that he would reverse the Department of Defense’s policy on transgender servicemembers, stating that “the United States Government will not accept or allow transgender individuals to serve in any capacity in the U.S. Military.” The President’s announcement, which upon information and belief was made without consulting the Joint Chiefs of Staff, upset the reasonable expectations of Plaintiffs and thousands of other transgender servicemembers and the men and women with whom they serve and fight.
5. On August 25, 2017, the President signed a formal directive to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security. The directive orders that the military return to its earlier policy forbidding transgender people from joining or serving openly in the military. It
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confers no authority on the Secretary of Defense to depart from this directive. As a consequence, no servicemembers who are openly transgender may enlist or continue their military service.
6. Plaintiffs here are eight servicemembers (including one student at the U.S. Naval Academy and one student participating in the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps) who collectively have served this Nation for decades in various branches of the United States military.
7. Execution of the President’s directive bars transgender people from enlisting or serving openly in the military and has resulted in immediate, concrete injury to Plaintiffs.
8. The President’s categorical exclusion of transgender people from enlisting or serving openly in the military violates both the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Additionally, Defendants are estopped from terminating the continued service of Plaintiffs and other active duty transgender servicemembers, transgender students enrolled in military academies, and transgender students participating in ROTC programs.
9. This lawsuit seeks declaratory, preliminary, and permanent injunctive relief against implementation of the President’s directive to prohibit transgender individuals from enlisting or serving openly in the Armed Forces.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 10. This court has jurisdiction over the claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. 11. Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because the acts described in this Complaint occurred in this judicial district.
PLAINTIFFS 12. Plaintiffs are active duty servicemembers in the United States military who serve openly as transgender people or are students, either at service academies or in ROTC programs,
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who are open as transgender to their command. Some proceed under pseudonyms here for fear of retribution.
13. Jane Doe 1 has served with distinction in the United States Coast Guard for more than a decade.
14. In or around June 2016, in reliance on the issuance of the policy permitting open service by transgender servicemembers, Jane Doe 1 notified her command that she is transgender.
15. Since that time, she has continued to serve without incident and has furthered her gender transition in reliance on the Department of Defense’s policy permitting open service by transgender servicemembers.
16. Some weeks after President Trump’s tweets, a transition-related procedure Jane Doe 1 was scheduled for was summarily canceled by the Defense Health Agency.
17. Also following President Trump’s tweets, Jane Doe 1 submitted a prospective letter of resignation stating that she would resign rather than be involuntarily terminated on account of her transgender status. Were the Department of Defense to retreat from the policy announced by President Trump, Jane Doe 1 would withdraw her resignation and continue to serve.
18. Jane Doe 2 has been enlisted in the National Guard since 2003 and has been on active duty in the United States Army since 2006.
19. Jane Doe 2 notified her command that she is transgender after the United States Department of Defense announced in June 2016 that it would allow transgender servicemembers to serve openly in the military.
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20. In reliance on the Department’s promise to allow transgender servicemembers to serve openly, Jane Doe 2 began to seek medical treatment relating to her gender transition in September 2016.
21. Since informing her command that she is transgender, Jane Doe 2 has continued serving in her post without incident.
22. Jane Doe 2’s current contract with the military extends through November 2018. She is counting on the compensation and benefits accrued during that time to pay for further education and training to begin a civilian career, but if the policy announced in the President’s August 25, 2017 order is permitted to take effect, she will be involuntarily discharged before her current contract ends.
23. Jane Doe 3 has served in the United States Army since 2015. She has previously been deployed to Afghanistan and expects to be deployed to Iraq soon.
24. In or around June 2016, in reliance on the Department of Defense policy permitting transgender people to serve openly in the military, Jane Doe 3 notified her command that she is transgender. Since then, she has continued serving her post without incident.
25. Jane Doe 3’s current contract with the military extends through December 2018. She plans to renew her contract, but she will not be allowed to do so because of the new ban.
26. Jane Doe 4 has served in the United States Army since 2000. 27. In or around June 2016, in reliance on the Department of Defense policy permitting transgender people to serve openly in the military, Jane Doe 4 met with her commanding officer to identify herself as transgender. She began receiving medical treatment related to her gender transition in September 2016.
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28. Since coming out as transgender, Jane Doe 4 continued serving in her post without incident.
29. Jane Doe 4’s current contract with the military extends through June 2018. She plans to renew her contract to complete two additional years of service following the expiration of her current contract so that she can reach twenty years of service and receive retirement benefits. If permitted to take effect, the President’s directive banning transgender people from military service will result in her discharge from the military before she can reach this twentyyear benchmark, thus leading to a substantial decrease in her retirement payments.
30. Jane Doe 5 has been an active duty member of the United States Air Force for nearly twenty years, serving multiple tours of duty abroad, including two in Iraq.
31. After June 2016, in reliance on the announcement that transgender people would be permitted to serve openly, she notified her superiors that she is transgender. She has served in the intervening time without incident.
32. Jane Doe 5’s livelihood depends on her military service. Separation from the military will have devastating financial and emotional consequences for her.
33. John Doe 1 was a Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (“ROTC”) cadet from 2014 to 2016 and has served as a Second Lieutenant in the United States Army since July 2016. He expects to be deployed to the Middle East in 2018.
34. John Doe 1 advised his superiors in ROTC that he is transgender. He was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant shortly after the Department of Defense announced that transgender people would be permitted to serve openly. In reliance on that policy, John Doe 1 notified his command that he was transgender. John Doe 1 has served since that time and has been praised for his commitment to excellence.
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35. After the President’s tweets, John Doe 1 was advised that certain types of transition-related medical care that he was expecting to receive had been suspended.
36. John Doe 1 is concerned that if the new ban is permitted to take effect, he will be discharged because he is transgender.
37. Regan V. Kibby is a midshipman at the United States Naval Academy. In reliance on the policy permitting transgender people to serve openly, he told the Naval Academy that he is transgender. He was approved for a medical leave of absence so that his transition would be complete in time for him to receive his commission in the U.S. Navy upon graduation.
38. If the policy announced in the President’s August 25, 2017 order is permitted to take effect, Plaintiff Kibby will not be permitted to return to the Naval Academy or to join the U.S. Navy as a commissioned officer.
39. Dylan Kohere is a first-year college student and a member of his school’s ROTC program. He has been open to the Sergeant of his ROTC program about being transgender since he joined the program.
40. If the policy announced in the President’s August 25, 2017 order is permitted to take effect, Plaintiff Kohere will be barred from enlisting in the military and, as a result, will no longer be eligible to participate in his ROTC program or to receive an ROTC scholarship.
DEFENDANTS 41. Defendant Donald J. Trump is President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. On July 26, 2017, President Trump stated on Twitter that transgender people would not be permitted to serve “in any capacity in the U.S. military.” On August 25, 2017, President Trump issued a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security to ban enlistment by transgender people and to reverse the policy adopted in June 2016 that permitted transgender people to serve openly in the military.
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42. Defendant James N. Mattis is the United States Secretary of Defense. He is the leader of the Department of Defense.
43. Defendant Joseph F. Dunford, Jr. is a United States Marine Corps General and services as the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
44. Defendant Department of the Army is one of three military departments of the Department of Defense and is responsible for the administration and operation of the United States Army.
45. Defendant Ryan D. McCarthy is the Acting United States Secretary of the Army. He is the leader of the Department of the Army.
46. Defendant Department of the Navy is one of three military departments of the Department of Defense and is responsible for the administration and operation of the United States Navy.
47. Defendant Richard V. Spencer is the United States Secretary of the Navy. He is the leader of the Department of the Navy.
48. Defendant Department of the Air Force is one of three military departments of the Department of Defense and is responsible for the administration and operation of the United States Air Force.
49. Defendant Heather A. Wilson is the United States Secretary of the Air Force. She is the leader of the Department of the Air Force.
50. Defendant United States Coast Guard is one of the five branches of the United States Armed Forces.
51. Defendant Elaine C. Duke is the Acting United States Secretary of Homeland Security. She is the leader of the Department of Homeland Security. The Department of
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Homeland Security is responsible for the administration and operation of the United States Coast Guard.
52. Defendant Defense Health Agency is a Combat Support Agency that administers health care services for the U.S Army, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Air Force. The Defense Health Agency exercises management responsibility for the TRICARE Health Plan, which is the health care program for all uniformed service members in the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Coast Guard, and certain other commissioned corps.
53. Defendant Raquel C. Bono is a Vice Admiral and serves as Director of the Defense Health Agency.
54. Defendant United States of America includes all federal government agencies and departments responsible for the implementation of the President’s decision.
55. All of the Defendants are sued in their official capacities. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Background on Transgender People Serving Openly In the Military 56. In May 2014, then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, a decorated U.S. Army
combat veteran, recommended that the military conduct a review of whether transgender people should be permitted to serve openly in the Armed Forces.
57. In August 2014, the Department of Defense issued a new regulation that eliminated its categorical ban on open service by transgender persons and instructed each branch of the Armed Forces to reassess whether maintaining a service-wide ban on service by openly transgender persons was justified. See Department of Defense Instruction 1332.18.
58. Secretary Hagel explained that “[e]very qualified American who wants to serve our country should have an opportunity to do so if they fit the qualifications and can do it.”
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59. Secretary Hagel was succeeded as Secretary of Defense by Ashton B. Carter, who had previously served many years within the Department, including as Deputy Secretary of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, and as a member of the Defense Policy Board and the Defense Science Board. In July 2015, Secretary Carter announced that the military would begin a comprehensive analysis of whether to maintain the prohibition on military service by transgender people.
60. In an order establishing a working group to carry out this analysis, made effective as of July 13, 2015, Secretary Carter directed that no servicemember could be involuntarily separated or denied reenlistment or continuation of active or reserve status on the basis of his or her gender identity without the approval of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.
61. Over the course of a year, Secretary Carter oversaw a comprehensive review of this issue by a working group of the military and civilian leadership of the Armed Services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the service secretaries, and personnel, training, readiness, and medical specialists from across the Department of Defense. The working group was chaired by Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Brad Carson.
62. That year-long process examined copious data on the relevant issues, including but not limited to existing studies and research and input from transgender servicemembers and their commanders, outside expert groups, and medical professionals.
63. The process also included a careful review of the eighteen other countries that permit military service by openly transgender people.
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64. The process also included consultation with doctors, employers, and insurance companies regarding the provision of medical care to transgender people.
65. The Department of Defense also commissioned the RAND Corporation, an organization formed after World War II to connect military planning with research and development decisions and which now operates as an independent think tank financed by the U.S. government, to analyze relevant data and studies to determine the impact of permitting transgender servicemembers to serve openly. Specifically, the RAND Corporation was tasked with (1) identifying the health care needs of the transgender population and the health care costs associated with providing transition-related care; (2) assessing the readiness implications of allowing transgender servicemembers to serve openly; and (3) reviewing the experiences of foreign militaries that permit transgender individuals to serve openly.
66. The study, titled “Assessing the Implications of Allowing Transgender Personnel to Serve Openly” (the “RAND Study”) and issued in May 2016, concluded that allowing transgender people to serve openly would “cost little and have no significant impact on unit readiness.”
67. The RAND Study noted that the Military Health System already provides the types of health care required by transgender servicemembers and concluded that health care costs for transgender servicemembers would represent “an exceedingly small proportion of [the Department of Defense’s] overall health care expenditures.” The RAND Study also concluded that this minimal incremental cost would likely be offset by savings through diminished rates of other health care costs that would be achieved by providing servicemembers with necessary transition-related medical care.
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68. Based on the results of this comprehensive, year-long review process and on the RAND Study, the Department of Defense concluded that the needs of the military would be best met by permitting openly transgender people to serve.
69. As laid out by Secretary Carter in remarks delivered on June 30, 2016, that conclusion was based on a number of considerations, including: the need to “recruit[] and retain[] the soldier, sailor, airman, or Marine who can best accomplish the mission” of our nation’s Armed Forces; the fact that thousands of “talented and trained” transgender people are already serving and that the military has already invested “hundreds of thousands of dollars to train and develop each” transgender servicemember; the benefits to the military of retaining individuals who are already trained and who have already proven themselves; the need to provide both transgender servicemembers and their commanders with “clear[] and consistent guidance” on questions such as deployment and medical treatment; and the principle that “Americans who want to serve and can meet our standards should be afforded the opportunity to compete to do so.”
70. On June 30, 2016, Secretary Carter announced that “[e]ffective immediately, transgender Americans may serve openly. They can no longer be discharged or otherwise separated from the military just for being transgender.”
71. Also on June 30, 2016, Secretary Carter issued Directive-Type Memorandum 16005, titled “Military Service of Transgender Service Members.” The memorandum states: “The policy of the Department of Defense is that service in the United States military should be open to all who can meet the rigorous standards for military service and readiness. Consistent with the policies and procedures set forth in this memorandum, transgender individuals shall be allowed to serve in the military. These policies and procedures are premised on my conclusion that open
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service by transgender Service members while being subject to the same standards and procedures as other members with regard to their medical fitness for duty, physical fitness, uniform and grooming, deployability, and retention, is consistent with military readiness and with strength through diversity.”
72. The year-long review process by the Department of Defense also concluded that openly transgender people should be permitted to accede to the military so long as they had completed all medical treatment associated with their transitions and had been stable in their gender for eighteen months. The accession policy was scheduled to take effect on July 1, 2017 to allow the branches of the Armed Forces additional time to develop necessary standards and policies.
73. In September 2016, the Department of Defense issued an implementation handbook entitled “Transgender Service in the United States Military.” The 71-page document set forth guidance and instructions to both military servicemembers and commanders about how to implement and understand the new policies enabling open service of transgender servicemembers.
74. Within 90 days of the lifting of the ban, on October 1, 2016, the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness issued “DoD Instruction 1300.28—InService Transition for Transgender Service Members.” The instruction set forth further guidance to ensure open service by transgender servicemembers, including details regarding revisions to medical treatment provisions. This instruction was further implemented by a memorandum issued by the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs entitled “Guidance for Treatment of Gender Dysphoria for Active and Reserve Component Service Members.”
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75. Also within 90 days of the lifting of the ban, the Department of Defense issued medical guidance for providing transition-related care to transgender servicemembers. As a result, transgender servicemembers were able to begin the process of officially changing their gender marker in the military’s personnel management system.
76. Over the next nine months, between October 2016 and June 2017, the services conducted training of the force based on detailed guidance and training materials regarding the policy change.
77. On November 29, 2016, the Department of Defense revised “DoD Directive 1020.02E—Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity in the DoD” to prohibit discrimination and harassment on the basis of gender identity.
78. In 2016, the United States Coast Guard adopted policies and procedures for service by transgender servicemembers that are substantially the same as the Department of Defense policies described above.
79. On June 30, 2017, the day before the policy permitting transgender people to accede to the military was to take effect, Secretary Mattis extended the period for the development of relevant standards by six months. The Ban on Transgender Servicemembers
80. Early in the morning of July 26, 2017, without any prior indication that he would address military transgender policy, President Trump announced in a series of tweets that the military would no longer permit the service of transgender Americans.
81. His tweets read: “After consultation with my generals and military experts, please be advised that the United States government will not accept or allow transgender individuals to serve in any capacity in the U.S. military. Our military must be focused on decisive and
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overwhelming victory and cannot be burdened with the tremendous medical costs and disruption that transgender in the military would entail.”
82. Shortly following the announcement, the new policy met with substantial criticism from members of Congress belonging to both political parties. These critics included Senator John McCain, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, who said in a statement that “there is no reason to force servicemembers who are able to fight, train, and deploy to leave the military—regardless of their gender identity.” Senator Joni Ernst, another Republican member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, also publicly expressed opposition to the new policy.
83. Upon information and belief, the President did not consult either the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Department of Defense before making his announcement.
84. Shortly after the announcement, fifty-six former generals and admirals issued a public statement denouncing the new policy.
85. Commandant Admiral Paul Zukunft of the United States Coast Guard criticized the proposed policy and expressly reached out to all openly transgender members of the Coast Guard, vowing not to “turn [his] back” on transgender servicemembers. Commandant Admiral Zukunft has arranged for Judge Advocate General’s Corps officers to assist transgender Coast Guard members affected by the change in policy.
86. On August 25, 2017, the President signed a formal directive to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security. The directive orders that the military return to its pre-June 2016 policy forbidding transgender people from joining or serving in the military.
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87. The August 25, 2017 directive also halts the use of military resources to “fund” sex reassignment surgical procedures for military personnel, subject to a limited exception where the servicemember’s health is at risk.
88. Under the terms of the directive, the Secretary of Defense has six months to develop a plan implementing the ban.
COUNT I (Fifth Amendment – Equal Protection) 89. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 90. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the federal government from denying equal protection of the laws. 91. President Trump’s directive to exclude transgender people from military service discriminates against Plaintiffs based on their sex and transgender status, without lawful justification, in violation of the Equal Protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 92. The categorical exclusion of transgender people from military service lacks a rational basis, is arbitrary, and cannot be justified by sufficient federal interests. 93. Through the actions above, Defendants have violated the Equal Protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
COUNT II (Fifth Amendment – Due Process) 94. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 95. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires, at a minimum, that government action have some rational basis.
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96. The President’s directive to exclude transgender people from military service is arbitrary and capricious and lacks any rational basis.
97. Defendants’ 2016 policy permitting transgender people to serve openly in the military, together with Plaintiffs’ reliance on that policy in notifying their superiors of their transgender status, created a protected interest in Plaintiffs’ ability to continue serving in the military as openly transgender servicemembers.
98. Defendants’ arbitrary reversal of the United States’ June 2016 policy threatens to exclude Plaintiffs from continued military service because they are transgender, thus depriving Plaintiffs of those interests without due process of law.
99. Defendants’ arbitrary reversal of the United States’ June 2016 policy also impermissibly selectively burdens Plaintiffs’ fundamental rights to autonomy and privacy.
100. Through the actions above, Defendants have violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
COUNT III (Estoppel) 101. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 102. By virtue of its June 2016 policy allowing transgender servicemembers to serve openly in the United States Armed Forces, Defendants promised Plaintiffs that they could serve openly and continue to serve openly, subject to the same rights, responsibilities, benefits, and opportunities as other servicemembers. 103. From the implementation of its June 2016 policy until the President’s July 26, 2017 announcement, Defendants provided Plaintiffs with ongoing support for their continued service in the military as openly transgender persons.
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104. In reliance upon that promise from Defendants, Plaintiffs informed their commanding officers that they are transgender.
105. In reliance upon that promise from Defendants, Plaintiffs have undergone medical treatment for the purpose of gender transition.
106. Because they identified themselves as transgender in reliance on Defendants’ earlier promise, Plaintiffs have lost the stability and certainty they had in their careers and benefits, including post-military and retirement benefits that depend on the length of their service.
107. Plaintiffs have served honorably and successfully in the military since coming out as transgender, and their transgender status has not had any detrimental effect on their ability to serve or to fulfill their duties.
108. Through the actions above, Defendants are estopped from rescinding the rights, benefits, and protections promised to Plaintiffs.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF Plaintiffs ask the Court to grant the following relief: 1. Issue a declaratory judgment that the President’s directive to categorically exclude transgender people from military service is unconstitutional; 2. Issue a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting the categorical exclusion of transgender people from military service, including ordering that:
a. Plaintiffs Jane Doe 1, Jane Doe 2, Jane Doe 3, Jane Doe 4, Jane Doe 5, and John Doe 1 may not be separated from the military, denied reenlistment, demoted, denied promotion, denied medically necessary treatment on a timely basis, or otherwise receive adverse treatment or differential terms of service on the basis that they are transgender; b. Plaintiff Regan V. Kibby may not be denied the opportunity to continue his attendance at the U.S. Naval Academy
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Case 1:17-cv-01597-CKK Document 9 Filed 08/31/17 Page 19 of 20 on the basis that he is transgender, and may not be denied the opportunity to accede to military service thereafter, or be denied promotion, reenlistment, or any other equal terms of service on the basis that he is transgender; and c. Plaintiff Dylan Kohere may not be denied the opportunity to continue his participation in the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps program on the basis that he is transgender, and may not be denied the opportunity to accede to military service thereafter, or be denied promotion, reenlistment, or any other equal terms of service on the basis that he is transgender.
3. Award Plaintiffs their reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees; 4. Issue any other relief the Court deems appropriate.
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August 31, 2017

Respectfully submitted,

Claire Laporte (pro hac vice forthcoming) Matthew E. Miller (pro hac vice forthcoming) Daniel McFadden (pro hac vice forthcoming) Kathleen M. Brill (pro hac vice forthcoming) Michael Licker (pro hac vice forthcoming) Rachel C. Hutchinson (pro hac vice forthcoming) FOLEY HOAG LLP 155 Seaport Blvd. Boston, Massachusetts 02210 Telephone: 617-832-1000 Fax: 617-832-7000
Jennifer Levi (pro hac vice forthcoming) Mary L. Bonauto (pro hac vice forthcoming) GLBTQ LEGAL ADVOCATES & DEFENDERS 30 Winter St., Ste. 800 Boston, Massachusetts 02108 Telephone: 617-426-1350 Fax: 617-426-3594
Shannon P. Minter (pro hac vice forthcoming) Amy Whelan (pro hac vice forthcoming) Chris Stoll (pro hac vice forthcoming) NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS 870 Market St., Ste. 370 San Francisco, California 94102 Telephone: 415-392-6257 Fax: 415-392-8442

/s/ Kevin M. Lamb Paul R.Q. Wolfson (D.C. Bar No. 414759) Kevin M. Lamb (D.C. Bar No. 1030783) WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
HALE & DORR LLP 1875 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006 Telephone: 202-663-6000 Fax: 202-663-6363
Alan E. Schoenfeld (pro hac vice) WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
HALE & DORR LLP 7 World Trade Center 250 Greenwich St. New York, New York 10007 Telephone: 212-230-8800 Fax: 212-230-8888
Christopher R. Looney (pro hac vice forthcoming) Harriet Hoder (pro hac vice forthcoming) Adam M. Cambier (pro hac vice forthcoming) WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
HALE & DORR LLP 60 State Street Boston, Massachusetts 02109 Telephone: 617-526-6000 Fax: 617-526-5000
Nancy Lynn Schroeder (pro hac vice forthcoming) WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
HALE & DORR LLP 350 S. Grand Ave., Ste. 2100 Los Angeles, California 90071 Telephone: 213-443-5300 Fax: 213-443-5400

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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 Case 1:17-cv-01597-CKK Document 60 Filed 10/30/17 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JANE DOE 1, et al., Plaintiffs v.
DONALD J. TRUMP, et al., Defendants

Civil Action No. 17-1597 (CKK)

ORDER (October 30, 2017)
For the reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, it is, this 30th day
of October, 2017, hereby
ORDERED that Defendants’ [45] Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED-IN-PART and
DENIED-IN-PART. The Court will grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims to
the extent they are based on the Sex Reassignment Surgery Directive, corresponding with section
2(b) of the Presidential Memorandum, as well as Plaintiffs’ estoppel claim. Defendants’ motion
to dismiss is DENIED in all other respects. It is further
ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ [13] Motion for Preliminary Injunction is GRANTED-IN-
PART and DENIED-IN-PART. Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction is DENIED with
respect to the Sex Reassignment Surgery Directive. Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction
is GRANTED, however, in that the Court will preliminarily enjoin Defendants from enforcing
the following directives of the Presidential Memorandum, referred to by the Court as the
Accession and Retention Directives:
I am directing the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Homeland Security with respect to the U.S. Coast Guard, to return to the longstanding policy and practice on military service by transgender individuals that was in place prior to June 2016 until such time as a sufficient basis exists upon which to conclude that terminating that policy and practice would not have the negative effects discussed above.

Case 1:17-cv-01597-CKK Document 60 Filed 10/30/17 Page 2 of 2
Presidential Memorandum § 1(b).
The Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Homeland Security with respect to the U.S. Coast Guard, shall . . . maintain the currently effective policy regarding accession of transgender individuals into military service beyond January 1, 2018, until such time as the Secretary of Defense, after consulting with the Secretary of Homeland Security, provides a recommendation to the contrary that I find convincing . . . .”
Presidential Memorandum § 2(a).
The effect of the Court’s Order is to revert to the status quo with regard to accession and
retention that existed before the issuance of the Presidential Memorandum—that is, the retention
and accession policies established in the June 30, 2016 Directive-type Memorandum as modified
by Secretary of Defense James Mattis on June 30, 2017.
In all other respects, the Presidential Memorandum is not enjoined. It is further
ORDERED that Plaintiffs are not required to pay a security deposit. Fed. R. Civ. P.
65(c). It is further
ORDERED that the parties shall file a Joint Status Report indicating how they propose to
proceed in this matter by no later than November 10, 2017.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY United States District Judge

 
 Case 1:17-cv-01597-CKK Document 61 Filed 10/30/17 Page 1 of 76

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JANE DOE 1, et al., Plaintiffs v.
DONALD J. TRUMP, et al., Defendants

Civil Action No. 17-1597 (CKK)

MEMORANDUM OPINION (October 30, 2017)
On July 26, 2017, President Donald J. Trump issued a statement via Twitter announcing that “the United States Government will not accept or allow transgender individuals to serve in any capacity in the U.S. Military.” A formal Presidential Memorandum followed on August 25, 2017. Before the Presidential Memorandum, the Department of Defense had announced that openly transgender individuals would be allowed to enlist in the military, effective January 1, 2018, and had prohibited the discharge of service members based solely on their gender identities. The Presidential Memorandum reversed these policies. First, the Memorandum indefinitely extends a prohibition against transgender individuals entering the military, a process formally referred to as “accession” (the “Accession Directive”). Second, the Memorandum requires the military to authorize, by no later than March 23, 2018, the discharge of transgender service members (the “Retention Directive”).
The Department of Defense is required to submit a plan implementing the directives of the Presidential Memorandum by February 21, 2018. On September 14, 2017, Secretary of Defense James Mattis promulgated Interim Guidance establishing Department of Defense policy toward transgender service members until the directives of the Presidential Memorandum take effect. Pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum and the Interim Guidance, the protections afforded to transgender service members against discharge lapse early next year.
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Plaintiffs are current and aspiring service members who are transgender. Many have years of experience in the military. Some have decades. They have been deployed on active duty in Iraq and Afghanistan. They have and continue to serve with distinction. All fear that the directives of the Presidential Memorandum will have devastating impacts on their careers and their families. They have moved the Court to enjoin the directives of the Presidential Memorandum, believing that these directives violate the fundamental guarantees of due process afforded by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Defendants have moved to dismiss this case, principally on the basis that the Court lacks jurisdiction. Although highly technical, these jurisdictional arguments reduce to a few simple points: the Presidential Memorandum has not effected a definitive change in military policy; rather, that policy is still subject to review; until that review is complete, transgender service members are protected; and any prospective injuries are too speculative to require judicial intervention.
These arguments, while perhaps compelling in the abstract, wither away under scrutiny. The Memorandum unequivocally directs the military to prohibit indefinitely the accession of transgender individuals and to authorize their discharge. This decision has already been made. These directives must be executed by a date certain, and there is no reason to believe that they will not be executed. Plaintiffs have established that they will be injured by these directives, due both to the inherent inequality they impose, and the risk of discharge and denial of accession that they engender. Further delay would only serve to harm the Plaintiffs. Given these circumstances, the Court is in a positon to preliminarily adjudicate the propriety of these directives, and it does so here.
The Court holds that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their Fifth Amendment claim. As a form of government action that classifies people based on their gender identity, and disfavors a
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class of historically persecuted and politically powerless individuals, the President’s directives
are subject to a fairly searching form of scrutiny. Plaintiffs claim that the President’s directives
cannot survive such scrutiny because they are not genuinely based on legitimate concerns
regarding military effectiveness or budget constraints, but are instead driven by a desire to
express disapproval of transgender people generally. The Court finds that a number of factors—
including the sheer breadth of the exclusion ordered by the directives, the unusual circumstances
surrounding the President’s announcement of them, the fact that the reasons given for them do
not appear to be supported by any facts, and the recent rejection of those reasons by the military
itself—strongly suggest that Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment claim is meritorious.
Accordingly, following an exhaustive review of the record, the pleadings,1 and the
relevant authorities, the Court GRANTS-IN-PART and DENIES-IN-PART Plaintiffs’ Motion
1 The Court’s consideration has focused on the following documents: Pls.’ App. for Preliminary Injunction, ECF No. 13 (“Pls.’ Mem.”); Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss and Opp’n to Pls.’ App. for Preliminary Injunction, ECF No. 45 (“Defs.’ Mem.”); Pls.’ Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss and Reply in Support of App. for Preliminary Injunction, ECF No. 55 (“Pls.’ Reply”); and Defs.’ Reply in Support of Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 57 (“Defs.’ Reply”). The Court has also considered the declarations attached to these pleadings, including: Decl. of Kevin M. Lamb, ECF No. 13-1 (“Lamb Decl.”); Decl. of Brad R. Carson, ECF No. 13-3 (“Carson Decl.”); Decl. of Deborah L. James, ECF No. 13-5 (“James Decl.”); Decl. of Eric K. Fanning, ECF No. 13-7 (“Fanning Decl.”); Decl. of Raymond E. Mabus, Jr., ECF No. 13-9 (“Mabus Decl.”); Decl. of George R. Brown, MD, ECF No. 13-11 (“Brown Decl.”); Decl. of Margaret C. Wilmoth, ECF No. 13-13 (“Wilmoth Decl.”); Decl. of Regan V. Kibby, ECF No. 13-14 (“Kibby Decl.”); Decl. of Dylan Kohere, ECF No. 13-15 (“Kohere Decl.”); Decl. of Christopher R. Looney, ECF No. 40 (“Looney Decl.”); Decl. of Robert B. Chadwick, ECF No. 45-2 (“Chadwick Decl.”); Decl. of Robert O. Burns, ECF No. 45-3 (“Burns Decl.”); Supp. Decl. of Raymond E. Mabus, Jr., ECF No. 51-1 (“Mabus Supp. Decl.”); Supp. Decl. of Deborah L. James, ECF No. 51-2 (“James Supp. Decl.”); Supp. Decl. of Eric K. Fanning, ECF No. 51-3 (“Fanning Supp. Decl.”); Decl. of Mark J. Eitelberg, ECF No. 51-4 (“Eitelberg Decl.”); Supp. Decl. of George R. Brown, MD, ECF No. 51-5 (“Brown Supp. Decl.”); Decl. Pertaining to Jane Doe 1, ECF No. 56-1 (“Decl. re Jane Doe 1”); Decl. Pertaining to Jane Doe 2, ECF No. 56-2 (“Decl. re Jane Doe 2”); Decl. Pertaining to Jane Doe 3, ECF No. 56-3 (“Decl. re Jane Doe 3”); Decl. Pertaining to Jane Doe 4, ECF No. 564 (“Decl. re Jane Doe 4”); Decl. Pertaining to Jane Doe 5, ECF No. 56-5 (“Decl. re Jane Doe 5”); Decl. Pertaining to John Doe 1, ECF No. 56-6 (“Decl. re John Doe 1”).
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for Preliminary Injunction. Defendants shall be preliminarily enjoined from enforcing the Accession and Retention Directives, corresponding with sections 1(b) and 2(a) of the Presidential Memorandum, until further order of the Court or until this case is resolved. The effect of the Court’s Order is to revert to the status quo with regard to accession and retention that existed before the issuance of the Presidential Memorandum—that is, the retention and accession policies established in a June 30, 2016 Directive-type Memorandum and later modified by Secretary of Defense James Mattis on June 30, 2017.
The Court also GRANTS-IN-PART and DENIES-IN-PART Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. The Court has jurisdiction over and reaches the merits of Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment claim as it pertains to the Accession and Retention Directives. Plaintiffs have also challenged the Presidential Memorandum’s prohibition against the expenditure of military resources on sex reassignment surgeries. Because no Plaintiff has established a likelihood of being impacted by that prohibition, the Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the propriety of this directive. Finally, Plaintiffs have also claimed relief under a theory of estoppel. At this time, that claim will be dismissed without prejudice because the Amended Complaint lacks allegations of the sort of particularized representations, reliance, or government misconduct that could justify estoppel against the government. Plaintiffs may file a further amended complaint with respect to estoppel.
In an exercise of its discretion, the Court finds that holding oral argument in this action would not be of assistance in rendering a decision. See LCvR 7(f).
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I. BACKGROUND A. The Military’s Policy Toward Transgender Service
1. Military Policy Prior to 2014 Accession Prior to 2014, Department of Defense Instruction (“DODI”) 6130.03 “contain[ed] a list of disqualifying physical and mental conditions that preclude[d] applicants from joining the military . . . .” Lamb Decl., Ex. B (Palm Center Report of the Transgender Service Commission), at 7. Disqualifying conditions included “defects of the genitalia including but not limited to change of sex,” and “[c]urrent or history of psychosexual conditions, including but not limited to transsexualism, . . . transvestism, . . . and other paraphilias.” Id.; see also Defs.’ Mem. at 4 (“For decades, [disqualifying] conditions [under DODI 6130.03] have included ‘transsexualism.’”). DODI 6130.03 also requires that the “Secretaries of the Military Departments and Commandant of the Coast Guard shall . . . [a]uthorize the waiver of the standards in individual cases for applicable reasons and ensure uniform waiver determinations.” Lamb Decl., Ex. B, at 7. Service-specific implementing rules set forth the waiver process for each branch of the military. For example, under the applicable Army regulations, “[e]xaminees initially reported as medically unacceptable by reason of medical unfitness . . . may request a waiver of the medical fitness standards in accordance with the basic administrative directive governing the personnel action.” Army Reg. 40-501 (Standards of Medical Fitness), ¶ 1-6(b); see also Lamb Decl., Ex. B, at 7. Although Defendants contend that transgender-related conditions were and remain subject to waiver, see Defs.’ Mem. at 4, evidence in the record suggests otherwise. At least under the pertinent regulations as they existed prior to 2014, “because some conditions related to
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transgender identity [were] grounds for discharge, and because recruiters [could not] waive a condition upon enlistment that would be disqualifying for retention, transgender individuals [could not] obtain medical waivers for entrance into the military.” Lamb Decl., Ex. B, at 8. A March 2014 report was unable to find “any instances in which transgender-related conditions have been waived for accession[,]” id., and Defendants have adduced no evidence of waivers ever being granted for this purpose.
Retention Pertinent regulations prior to 2014 also appear to have provided military commanders with discretion to separate enlisted personnel for transgender-related conditions. In particular, DODI 1332.14, which “controls administrative separations for enlisted persons,” provided that a “service member may be separated for the convenience of the government and at the discretion of a commander for ‘other designated physical or mental conditions,’ a category defined to include ‘sexual gender and identity disorders.’” Lamb Decl., Ex. B, at 8. Furthermore, DODI 1332.38, “which contains rules for retiring or separating service members because of physical disability” provided that “service members with conditions ‘not constituting a physical disability’ . . . can be separated administratively from military service at a commander’s discretion, without the opportunity to demonstrate medical fitness for duty or eligibility for disability compensation.” Id. This category of conditions, under prior iterations of the instruction, included “Sexual Gender and Identity Disorders, including Sexual Dysfunctions and Paraphilias.” Id. 2. August 2014 Regulation and July 28, 2015 Memorandum At least with respect to retention, changes to this regulatory scheme were first enacted in August 2014, when “the Department of Defense issued a new regulation, DODI 1332.18,
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Disability Evaluation System (DES).” Fanning Decl. ¶ 12. According to Former Secretary of the Army Eric K. Fanning and Former Secretary of the Air Force Deborah Lee James, the new regulation
eliminated a DoD-wide list of conditions that would disqualify persons from retention in military service, including the categorical ban on open service by transgender persons. This new regulation instructed each branch of the Armed Forces to reassess whether disqualification based on these conditions, including the ban on service by transgender persons, was justified. As of August 2014, there was no longer a DoD-wide position on whether transgender persons should be disqualified for retention. Id. (emphasis added); James Decl. ¶ 8. Subsequently, on July 28, 2015, then-Secretary of Defense Ash Carter issued a memorandum to the secretaries of the military departments directing that “[e]ffective as of July 13, 2015, no Service member shall be involuntarily separated or denied reenlistment or continuation of active or reserve service on the basis of their gender identity, without the personal approval of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.” Carson Decl., Ex. A. The memorandum further ordered the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to “chair a working group composed of senior representatives from each of the Military Departments, Joint Staff, and relevant components from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to formulate policy options for the DoD regarding the military service of transgender Service members.” Id. 3. The Working Group and the RAND Report The working group convened by the Undersecretary (“the Working Group”) consisted of senior uniformed officers and senior civilian officers from each department of the military. Carson Decl. ¶ 9. The Working Group sought to identify any possible issues related to open military service of transgender individuals. Id. ¶ 22. It considered a broad range of information
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provided by senior military personnel, various types of experts, health insurance companies, civilian employers, transgender service members themselves, and representatives from the militaries of other nations who allow open service by transgender people. Id. ¶ 10. Finally, the Working Group commissioned the RAND Corporation’s National Defense Research Institute to conduct a study on the impact of permitting transgender service members to serve openly. Id. ¶ 11. RAND is a nonprofit research institution that provides research and analysis to the Armed Services. Id.
The RAND Corporation subsequently issued a 91-page report entitled “Assessing the Implications of Allowing Transgender Personnel to Serve Openly.” Carson Decl., Ex. B (“RAND Report”). The RAND Report found no evidence that allowing transgender individuals to serve would have any effect on “unit cohesion,” and concluded that any related costs or impacts on readiness would be “exceedingly small,” “marginal” or “negligible.” Id. at xi–xii, 39–47, 69–70. The RAND Report also found that “[i]n no case” where foreign militaries have allowed transgender individuals to serve “was there any evidence of an effect on the operational effectiveness, operational readiness, or cohesion of the force.” Id. at xiii.
Based on all of the information it collected, the Working Group unanimously concluded that transgender people should be allowed to serve openly in the military. Not only did the group conclude that allowing transgender people to serve would not significantly affect military readiness or costs, it found that prohibiting transgender people from serving undermines military effectiveness and readiness because it excludes qualified individuals on a basis that has no
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relevance to one’s fitness to serve, and creates unexpected vacancies requiring expensive and
time-consuming recruitment and training of replacements.2
The Working Group communicated its conclusion to the Secretary of Defense, along with
detailed recommendations for policies and procedures for open transgender service.
4. June 30, 2016 Directive-Type Memorandum 16-005
On June 30, 2016, the Secretary of Defense Ash Carter issued a Directive-type
Memorandum (“DTM”) establishing a policy, assigning responsibilities, and prescribing
procedures for “the retention, accession, separation, in-service transition and medical coverage
for transgender personnel serving in the Military Services.” James Decl., Ex. B, at 1. The DTM
took effect immediately. Id. In the DTM, the Secretary of Defense stated his conclusion that
open service by transgender Americans was “consistent with military readiness and with strength
2 See generally Carson Decl. ¶¶ 26–27 (“The Working Group . . . concluded that banning service by openly transgender persons would harm the military” and “unanimously resolved that transgender personnel should be permitted to serve openly in the military.”); James Decl. ¶ 22 (“The Working Group did not find that permitting transgender soldiers to serve would impose any significant costs or have a negative impact on military effectiveness or readiness,” but did find “that barring transgender people from military service causes significant harms to the military, including arbitrarily excluding potential qualified recruits based on a characteristic with no relevance to their ability to serve.”); Fanning Decl. ¶¶ 25–26 (“At the conclusion of its discussion and analysis, the members of the Working Group did not identify any basis for a blanket prohibition on open military service of transgender people. Likewise, no one suggested to me that a bar on military service by transgender persons was necessary for any reason, including readiness or unit cohesion. The Working Group communicated its conclusions to the Secretary of Defense, including that permitting transgender people to serve openly in the United States military would not pose any significant costs or risks to readiness, unit cohesion, morale, or good order and discipline.”); Mabus Decl. ¶ 21 (stating that “all members of the Working Group . . . expressed their agreement that transgender people should be permitted to serve openly in the United States Armed Forces” and that “President Trump’s stated rationales for reversing the policy and banning military service by transgender people make no sense,” “have no basis in fact and are refuted by the comprehensive analysis of relevant data and information that was carefully, thoroughly, and deliberately conducted by the Working Group”); Wilmoth Decl. ¶ 23 (“The Working Group concluded that there were no barriers that should prevent transgender service members from serving openly in the military.”).
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through diversity.” Id. at 2. Accordingly, the DTM stated that it was the policy of the Department of Defense that “service in the United States military should be open to all who can meet the rigorous standards for military service and readiness” and that, “consistent with the policies and procedures set forth in [the DTM], transgender individuals shall be allowed to serve in the military.” Id.
Retention The DTM set forth procedures for the retention and accession of transgender military service members. It stated that “[e]ffective immediately, no otherwise qualified Service member may be involuntarily separated, discharged or denied reenlistment or continuation of service, solely on the basis of their gender identity,” or on their “expressed intent to transition genders.” James Decl., Ex. B, Attach. (Procedures), at 1. The DTM stated that “Transgender Service members will be subject to the same standards as any other Service member of the same gender; they may be separated, discharged, or denied reenlistment or continuation of service under existing processes and basis, but not due solely to their gender identity or an expressed intent to transition genders.” Id. Accession With respect to accession procedures, the DTM stated that by no later than July 1, 2017, DODI 6130.03 would be updated to allow for the accession of (i) individuals with gender dysphoria, (ii) individuals that have received medical treatment for gender transition, and (iii) individuals that have undergone sex reassignment surgeries. Id. at 1–2. The policies and procedures generally provided that these conditions would be disqualifying unless the acceding service member was medically stable in their chosen gender for at least 18 months. Id. The DTM also provided that, effective October 1, 2016, the Department of Defense would
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“implement a construct by which transgender Service members may transition gender while serving.” Id. at 2.
Equal Opportunity Finally, the DTM stated that it is “the Department’s position, consistent with the U.S. Attorney General’s opinion, that discrimination based on gender identity is a form of sex discrimination.” Id. at 2. 5. June 30, 2016 Remarks by Secretary of Defense Ash Carter On June 30, 2016, then-Secretary of Defense Ash Carter announced from the Pentagon briefing room that “we are ending the ban on transgender Americans in the United States military.” Lamb Decl., Ex. F. He stated that “[e]ffective immediately, transgender Americans may serve openly, and they can no longer be discharged or otherwise separated from the military just for being transgender.” Id. Secretary Carter also announced that he had “directed that the gender identity of an otherwise qualified individual will not bar them from military service, or from any accession program.” Id. The Secretary stated that on June 30, 2017, after a year-long implementation period, “the military services will begin acceding transgender individuals who meet all standards—holding them to the same physical and mental fitness standards as everyone else who wants to join the military.” Id. Secretary Carter gave three reasons for the Department’s decision. First, he stated that “the Defense Department and the military need to avail ourselves of all talent possible in order to remain what we are now—the finest fighting force the world has ever known.” Id. He added that “[w]e invest hundreds of thousands of dollars to train and develop each individual, and we want to take the opportunity to retain people whose talent we’ve invested in and who have proven themselves.” Id. Second, he stated that “the reality is that we have transgender service
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members serving in uniform today,” and they and their commanders need “clearer and more consistent guidance than is provided by current policies.” Id. And third, he stated that, as a matter of principle, “Americans who want to serve and can meet our standards should be afforded the opportunity to come to do so.” Id.
6. September 30, 2016 Publication of “Transgender Service in the U.S. Military: An Implementation Handbook” and Military Department Policies
Consistent with the directives of Secretary Carter in his July 2015 memorandum and June 2016 memorandum and policy announcement, Acting Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Peter Levine published an “implementation handbook” entitled “Transgender Service in the U.S. Military.” Mabus Decl., Ex. F; see also James Decl., Ex. D. The document was “the product of broad collaboration among the Services” and was intended to serve as a “practical day-to-day guide” to assist Service members and commanders to understand and implement the policy of open transgender military service. James Decl., ¶ 34. The handbook is a lengthy, exhaustive document, providing an explanation of the basics of what it means to be transgender and to undergo gender transition; guidance on how transgender service members can request an in-service transition and communicate with their leadership about their transition process; and guidance for commanders interacting with transgender service members. It also includes extensive question-and-answer and hypothetical scenario sections, as well as a “roadmap” for gender transition for military personnel.
Individual implementing memoranda were subsequently issued by the branches of the Armed Forces. On November 4, 2016, the Secretary of the Navy issued SECNAV Instruction 1000.11, the stated purpose of which was to “establish Department of Navy . . . policy for the accession and service of transgender Sailors and Marines, to include the process for transgender Service Members to transition gender in-service.” Mabus Decl., Ex. D, at 1. The memorandum
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stated that “transgender individual shall be allowed to serve openly in the [Department of the

Navy].” Id. at 2.

The Air Force issued a Policy Memorandum on October 6, 2016, which stated that “[i]t is

Air Force policy that service in the United States Air Force should be open to all who can meet

the rigorous standards for military service and readiness. Consistent with the policies set forth in

this memorandum, transgender individuals shall be allowed to serve in the Air Force.” James

Decl., Ex. C.

The Army issued Directive 2016-30 (Army Policy on Military Service of Transgender

Soldiers) on July 1, 2016. Fanning Decl., Ex. D. The Directive stated that

Id. at 1.

it is Army policy to allow open service by transgender Soldiers. The Army is open to all who can meet the standards for military service and remains committed to treating all Soldiers with dignity and respect while ensuring good order and discipline. Transgender Soldiers will be subject to the same standards as any other Soldier of the same gender. An otherwise qualified Soldier shall not be involuntarily separated, discharged, or denied reenlistment or continuation of service solely on the basis of gender identity.

Army Directive 2016-35 was promulgated on October 7, 2016. Fanning Decl., Ex. E. It

stated that “The Army allows transgender Soldiers to serve openly.” Id. at 1.

7. June 30, 2017 Press Release by Secretary James Mattis

On June 30, 2017, Secretary of Defense James Mattis deferred acceding transgender

applicants into the military until January 1, 2018, stating that the “services will review their

accession plans and provide input on the impact to the readiness and lethality of our forces.”

Lamb Decl., Ex. C.

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Case 1:17-cv-01597-CKK Document 61 Filed 10/30/17 Page 14 of 76 8. July 26, 2017 Statement by President Donald J. Trump On July 26, 2017, President Donald J. Trump issued a statement via Twitter, in which he announced that3
3 The full text reads: “After consultation with my Generals and military experts, please be advised that the United States Government will not accept or allow Transgender individuals to serve in any capacity in the U.S. Military. Our military must be focused on decisive and overwhelming victory and cannot be burdened with the tremendous medical costs and disruption that transgender in the military would entail. Thank you.” Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (July 26, 2017, 5:55 AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/ status/890193981585444864; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (July 26, 2017, 6:04 AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/890196164313833472; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (July 26, 2017, 6:08 AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/ status/890197095151546369.
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9. August 25, 2017 Presidential Memorandum On August 25, 2017, President Trump issued a memorandum entitled “Presidential Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security.” Lamb Decl., Ex. A (the “Presidential Memorandum”). The memorandum begins by stating that until “June 2016, the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (collectively, the Departments) generally prohibited openly transgender individuals from accession into the United States military and authorized the discharge of such individuals.” Presidential Memorandum § 1(a). According to the memorandum, “[s]hortly before President Obama left office, . . . his Administration dismantled the Departments’ established framework by permitting transgender individuals to serve openly in the military, authorizing the use of the Departments’ resources to fund sex-reassignment surgical procedures, and permitting accession of such individuals after July 1, 2017.” Id. The President stated that “the previous Administration failed to identify a sufficient basis to conclude that terminating the Departments’ longstanding policy and practice would not hinder military effectiveness and lethality, disrupt unit cohesion, or tax military resources, and there remain meaningful concerns that further study is needed to ensure that continued implementation of last year’s policy change would not have those negative effects.” Id. The memorandum has two operative sections, one general, and the other more specific. Section 1(b) directs “the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Homeland Security with respect to the U.S. Coast Guard, to return to the longstanding policy and practice on military service by transgender individuals that was in place prior to June 2016 until such time as a sufficient basis exists upon which to conclude that terminating that policy and practice would not have the negative effects discussed above.” Id. § 1(b). As already stated, the memorandum
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defines the pre-June 2016 policy as one under which the military “generally prohibited openly transgender individuals from accession into the United States military and authorized the discharge of such individuals.” Id. § 1(a). The directive set forth in section 1(b) takes effect on March 23, 2018. Id. § 3. The memorandum provides that the “Secretary of Defense, after consulting with the Secretary of Homeland Security, may advise [the President] at any time, in writing, that a change to this policy is warranted.” Id. § 1(b).
Section 2 contains two specific directives to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security. First, section 2(a) directs the Secretaries to “maintain the currently effective policy regarding accession of transgender individuals into military service beyond January 1, 2018, until such time as the Secretary of Defense, after consulting with the Secretary of Homeland Security, provides a recommendation to the contrary that [the President finds] convincing . . . .” Id. § 2(a). This section takes effect on January 1, 2018. Id.
Second, section 2(b) directs the Secretaries to “halt all use of DoD or DHS resources to fund sex reassignment surgical procedures for military personnel, except to the extent necessary to protect the health of an individual who has already begun a course of treatment to reassign his or her sex.” Id. § 2(b). This section, like section 1(b), takes effect on March 23, 2018. Id § 3.
By February 21, 2018, the Secretaries must submit a plan to the President “for implementing both the general policy set forth in section 1(b) of this memorandum and the specific directives set forth in section 2 of this memorandum.” Id. § 3. This implementation plan must “determine how to address transgender individuals currently serving in the United States military.” Id. Until that determination is made—and it must be made as part of the implementation plan, which must be submitted by February 21, 2018—“no action may be taken against such individuals under the policy set forth in section 1(b) of this memorandum.” Id.
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That is, only after February 21, 2018, may the Secretaries take actions toward reverting to the pre-June 2016 policy, which by the terms of the memorandum is a policy under which the military “generally prohibited openly transgender individuals from accession into the United States military and authorized the discharge of such individuals.” Id. § 1(a).
Retention Directive In sum, by March 23, 2018, the Secretaries are required by the plain text of the President’s directive to revert to a policy under which the military “authorized the discharge of [transgender] individuals.” Id. §§ 1(a), 1(b), 3. The protections of the memorandum with respect to discharge and other adverse action expire on February 21, 2018. Id. § 3. Accession Directive With respect to accession, the memorandum indefinitely delays the implementation of the accession policy of the June 2016 DTM, which was previously set for implementation on January 1, 2018, and by March 23, 2018, requires the Secretaries to revert to a policy by which the military “generally prohibit[s] openly transgender individuals from accession . . . .” Id. §§ 1(a), 1(b), 2(a), 3. 10. August 29, 2017 Statement by Secretary Mattis On August 29, 2017, Secretary Mattis issued a statement concerning the Presidential Memorandum. Lamb Decl., Ex. D. He wrote that “[t]he [Department of Defense] will carry out the president’s policy direction, in consultation with the Department of Homeland Security,” and that “[a]s directed,” the Department of Defense will “develop a study and implementation plan, which will contain the steps that will promote military readiness, lethality, and unit cohesion, with due regard to budgetary constraints and consistent with applicable law.” Id. The plan, Secretary Mattis wrote, “will address accessions of transgender individuals and transgender
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individuals currently serving in the United States military.” Id. Secretary Mattis stated that he would “establish a panel of experts serving within the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security to provide advice and recommendations on the implementation of the president’s direction.” Id. After the “panel reports its recommendations and following . . . consultation with the secretary of Homeland Security,” Secretary Mattis “will provide [his] advice to the president concerning implementation of his policy direction.” Id. In the interim, “current policy with respect to currently serving members will remain in place.” Id.
11. September 14, 2017 Interim Guidance On September 14, 2017, Secretary Mattis issued interim guidance that took “effect immediately and will remain in effect until [he] promulgate[s] DoD’s final policy in this matter.” Defs.’ Mem., ECF No. 45, Ex. 1 (“Interim Guidance”). The Interim Guidance states that “[n]ot later than February 21, 2018, [Secretary Mattis] will present the President with a plan to implement the policy and directives in the Presidential Memorandum.” Id. at 1. The “implementation plan will establish the policy, standards and procedures for transgender individuals serving in the military.” Id. Accession With respect to accession, the Interim Guidance provides that the procedures previously set forth in a 2010 policy instruction, “which generally prohibit the accession of transgender individuals into the Military Services, remain in effect . . . .” Id. at 2. Medical Care and Treatment With respect to medical care and treatment, the Interim Guidance provides that “[s]ervice members who receive a gender dysphoria diagnosis from a military medical provider will be provided treatment for the diagnosed medical condition,” but that “no new sex reassignment
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surgical procedures for military personnel will be permitted after March 22, 2018, except to the extent necessary to protect the health of an individual who has already begun a course of treatment to reassign his or her sex.” Id.
Retention With respect to the separation or retention of transgender service members, the Interim Guidance provides that “[a]n otherwise qualified transgender Service member whose term of service expires while this Interim Guidance remains in effect, may, at the Service member’s request, be re-enlisted in service under existing procedures.” Id. (emphasis in original). Finally, the Interim Guidance states that “[a]s directed by the [Presidential] Memorandum, no action may be taken to involuntarily separate or discharge an otherwise qualified Service member solely on the basis of a gender dysphoria diagnosis or transgender status.” Id. B. The Plaintiffs 1. Jane Doe 1 Plaintiff Jane Doe 1 has served in the Coast Guard since 2003. Looney Decl., Ex. A (“Redacted Jane Doe 1 Decl.”), ¶ 1. Jane Doe 1 is transgender. The Coast Guard has made a substantial investment in educating and training Jane Doe 1, and she has done her “best to be hardworking, faithful, and loyal to the Coast Guard.” Id. ¶ 11. She is married and is the primary wage earner for her family. She and her spouse receive health insurance coverage, called TRICARE, based on her enlisted status. Id. ¶ 12. When she came to the realization of her transgender identity, Jane Doe 1, with her spouse’s support, sought professional help. Id. ¶ 14. She paid for this help herself, fearing that she may be separated from the Coast Guard if she went through military health channels. Id. She was diagnosed with gender dysphoria and has
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received medical treatment for this condition. Id. ¶ 15. However, because TRICARE does not provide comprehensive gender transition healthcare, following the issuance of the June 2016 DTM, she was required to obtain waivers from the Defense Health Agency to obtain treatment. Because this process often led to delays, Jane Doe 1 has continued to pay for her care herself, including surgical care. Id. ¶ 21.
Following the President’s statement regarding transgender service members, issued via Twitter, Commandant of the Coast Guard Paul F. Zukunft stated, with respect to transgender service members, that “[w]e have made an investment in you and you have made an investment in the Coast Guard and I will not break faith.” Id. ¶ 23.
According to Jane Doe 1, the Presidential Memorandum has disrupted her medical care, and has had “serious consequences for [her] financial future.” Id. ¶¶ 29–30. For one, separation from the Coast Guard would mean loss of substantial pension benefits, and health insurance for her and her family. Id. ¶¶ 30–31. Separation also means the loss of “a central part of [her] identity.” Id. ¶ 36. In her own words: “As much as the Coast Guard has invested in me, I have invested in the Coast Guard. I love serving, . . . I had expected to continue serving as a Coast Guard officer for many years.” Id.
2. Jane Doe 2 Jane Doe 2 joined the Army National Guard in 2003, when she was 17. Looney Decl., Ex. B (“Redacted Jane Doe 2 Decl.”), ¶ 3. She met her wife while serving, who soon became pregnant. Jane Doe 2 then “made the decision to go on active duty with the U.S. Army so [she] could obtain health care benefits to support [her] growing family.” Id. ¶ 5. She now has three children. Id. While on active duty, she served in South Korea and was deployed to Kandahar in Afghanistan. Id. ¶ 7.
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During active duty, Jane Doe 2 came out to her wife as transgender. Id. ¶ 9. She felt more connected to her wife and she stopped drinking. Id. After the Department of Defense promulgated new regulations in late 2015, she made a public post on Facebook stating that she was transgender. Redacted Jane Doe 2 Decl. ¶ 10. Her company commander was very supportive. Id. ¶ 11. She began to see an Army therapist, and following the June 2016 DTM, she obtained a formal gender dysphoria diagnosis which permitted her to receive transition treatment from military healthcare providers, and she began receiving hormone treatment. Id. ¶ 13.
Following the President’s statement and the Presidential Memorandum, Jane Doe 2 believes that she has received an unfavorable work detail to keep her “separated from the rest of [her] unit because [she is] transgender and because of the President’s ban, as [she] never had any problems with this kind of treatment in [her] old unit and [does] not know of any other reason [why] she would be treated this way.” Id. ¶ 15. She also fears the loss of retirement benefits, which accrue following 20 years of service, and access to “health care services for [her] family on base.” Id. ¶ 16. She has already accrued 12 to 13 years of service toward these benefits. Id. ¶¶ 16, 18. The directives of the Presidential Memorandum have “left [her] feeling excluded, and it hurts [her] that people like [her] are being singled out and told that [they] aren’t good enough to serve our country based on a characteristic that has no relevance at all to our abilities or fitness to serve.” Id. ¶ 19.
Jane Doe 2 “loves this country and [has] served it faithfully and well.” Id. For her, to “be told that [she is] no longer worthy to serve is a terrible blow. It affects how [she sees herself] . . . .” Id. “All [she wants] is to be allowed to serve [her] country and to be evaluated based on [her] job performance rather than on [her] status as a transgender person.” Id. ¶ 20.
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3. Jane Doe 3 Jane Doe 3 serves in the Army. After completing her basic training, she was deployed to Afghanistan for six months. Looney Decl., Ex. C (“Redacted Jane Doe 3 Decl.”), ¶ 4. She is currently scheduled to deploy again to Iraq, where she will be going as a team leader, with soldiers reporting to her. Id. ¶ 6. Jane Doe 3 has received a gender dysphoria diagnosis from an Army therapist. Id. ¶ 7. Although she has developed a transition plan in coordination with medical professionals, she has not begun any of the treatment steps, which include surgery. Id. ¶ 9. Before the President’s statement regarding transgender individuals, Jane Doe 3 “had not come out to anyone in [her] chain of command.” Id. ¶ 10. However, after the statement, she had a conversation with her company commander, believing that she would receive support based on the June 2016 DTM. Id. She told her company commander that she was worried that she would not be deployed, and that she was committed to being deployed. Id. The commander was not supportive—expressing shock and surprise—but she has received support from her squad leader, the platoon sergeant, and another friend in her unit. Id. ¶ 11. Since that conversation, she has continued to prepare for deployment, with the understanding that she will not be able to begin her treatment until she returns. Id. ¶ 12. In her words, she “will not put [her] personal needs ahead of the needs of the mission and [her] fellow soldiers.” Id. Jane Doe 3 has “not told anyone else at [her] rank or below that [she] is transgender.” Id. ¶ 15. As a result, she “was able to hear an unfiltered reaction to the President’s announcement right after he tweeted it.” Id. “Some made ugly remarks about transgender service members, while others remarked [that] people who kill transgender people should not be punished.” Id.
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According to Jane Doe 3, after “the tweets, people seemed emboldened to express hostility to transgender people.” Id. ¶ 15.
4. Jane Doe 4 Jane Doe 4 serves in the Army National Guard, but was previously on active duty with the Army. After basic training, she served in South Korea, and subsequently served a tour in Iraq after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Looney Decl., Ex. D (“Redacted Jane Doe 4 Decl.”), ¶¶ 5–6. After she returned from Iraq, Jane Doe 4 enlisted in the Army National Guard, and then joined the Active Guard Reserve. Id. ¶ 7. In that capacity, she has been employed as a specialist by the Department of Defense. Id. ¶ 10. Following the June 2016 DTM, Jane Doe 4 decided to come out as transgender to her chain of command. Id. ¶ 13. She first spoke to the senior non-commissioned officer of her unit, who said she supported her decision “100%.” She then spoke with her commanding officer, a Major, “who acknowledged that he was not very knowledgeable about the experiences of transgender people, but told [her] that he and the rest of [her] unit would support and work with [her] through the process . . . .” Id. According to Jane Doe 4, the “change in policy allowing transgender soldiers to serve openly . . . changed [her] life in the military.” Id. ¶ 14. Her “fellow soldiers in [her] unit and [her] senior leaders . . . told [her] that they . . . noticed how much happier [she was].” Id. The President’s statement regarding transgender service members has been “devastating” to her, making her feel “ashamed” and “deeply saddened that he was ordering the Army, which [she] had been a part of for so long and which [she] loved so much, to stop treating [her] with respect.” Id. ¶ 15. She “went to work each day wondering whether [she] would be discharged,
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not because of any problem with [her] job performance or [her] commitment to serve this country, but solely because of [her] gender identity.” Id.
Jane Doe 4 reenlisted effective August 24, 2017, and has extended her commitment to the Army until February 2020. See Defs.’ Mem. at 11 (citing Sealed Decl. relating to Jane Doe 4, ECF No. 56-4).
5. Jane Doe 5 “Jane Doe 5 has been an active duty member of the United States Air Force for nearly twenty years, serving multiple tours of duty abroad, including two in Iraq.” Am. Compl., ECF No. 9, ¶ 30. After June 2016, she notified her superiors that she is transgender. Id. ¶ 31. Her “livelihood depends on her military service[,]” and “[s]eparation from the military w[ould] have devastating financial and emotional consequences for her.” Id. ¶ 32. 6. John Doe 1 John Doe 1 serves in the Army. His family has “a proud history of serving in the Armed Forces.” Looney Decl., Ex. E (“Redacted John Doe 1 Decl.”), ¶ 3. His great grandfather served in Europe in World War II. Id. His father served in the Air Force and was awarded the Bronze Star for valor. His uncle was a United States Marine who was wounded and paralyzed by an improvised explosive during Operation Desert Storm. His aunt served in the military as well. Id. John Doe 1 has idolized military service since childhood. Id. John Doe 1 entered college on a full academic scholarship. Id. ¶ 4. After graduating magna cum laude, he entered the Army Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (“ROTC”) program while pursuing a master’s degree. Id. ¶ 5. His fellow cadets in the program knew that he was transgender and were supportive, and his superiors were generally supportive as well. Id. ¶ 6. He was ranked third in his ROTC class, and was allowed to wear a male dress uniform as part of
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his duties for the ROTC Color Guard. Id. ¶ 6. While serving in the ROTC program, John Doe 1 also joined the National Guard. Id. ¶ 7. He met his future wife, with whom he has a two-yearold son. Id. ¶ 9. He graduated in the top 20% of his ROTC class. Id. ¶ 12.
Following the June 2016 DTM, John Doe 1 began training at the Basic Officer Leadership Course (“BOLC”), at which time he came out to his platoon instructors, who were very supportive and treated him as male despite his official gender designation. Id. ¶¶ 14–15. After the BOLC, John Doe 1 was stationed as the executive officer for his unit, performing administrative tasks on behalf of and reporting directly to his commanding officer. Id. ¶ 16. He serves as both the maintenance and supply officer for his unit. Id. He is also in charge of preparing his unit for deployment. Id. Until recently, John Doe 1 was preparing to deploy to the Middle East with his unit in mid-2018. Id; Am. Compl. ¶ 33.
During his first meeting with his commanding officer, John Doe 1 came out as transgender. Redacted John Doe 1 Decl. ¶ 17. He stressed that his “first priority was being a solider, and that in crafting an approved plan for medical treatment under the new policy, it was extremely important to [him] to make sure that [his] plan would not interfere with [his] duties.” Id. Both his company and battalion commanders have been very supportive “beyond [his] greatest expectations.” Id.
John Doe 1 has received an approved treatment plan, which includes a planned surgery. The surgery was “encouraged and supported by [his] command team at every level up to and including [his] Brigade Commander.” Id. ¶ 18. His official gender designation has been changed to male. Id. ¶ 19. John Doe 1 is scheduled for transition-related surgery on January 4, 2018. Defs.’ Mem. at 11 (citing Sealed Declaration relating to John Doe 1).
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John Doe 1 has been “devastated by the President’s cancellation of the policy [he] had relied upon to notify command of the fact that [he is] transgender and to take steps forward in treatment for gender transition.” Redacted John Doe 1 Decl. ¶ 26. If he is discharged, he fears serious financial and medical consequences for him and his family. Id. ¶¶ 27–28.
7. Regan Kibby Plaintiff Regan Kibby is a 19-year-old midshipman at the United States Naval Academy. Kibby Decl. ¶ 1. Kibby’s father served in the Navy, and Kibby has wanted to follow in his footsteps from an early age. Id. ¶¶ 2–3. He spent his summers in high school attending seminars at military academies. Id. ¶ 5. Despite being accepted with full scholarships to other schools, Kibby immediately decided to enroll at the Naval Academy when he was accepted. Id. ¶¶ 7–8. He has now successfully completed his first two years of school and hopes to become a Surface Warfare Officer in the Navy after graduation. Id. ¶ 9. Kibby is transgender. Id. ¶ 1. After Secretary of Defense Carter announced that transgender people could not be separated on the basis of their gender identity during his first year at the Naval Academy, Kibby began to come out. Id. ¶¶ 13–14. Kibby’s Company Officer was very accepting and supportive, and put Kibby in contact with the Brigade Medical Officer to begin the process of preparing a medical treatment plan. Id. ¶¶ 16–19. The first step was to receive an official diagnosis, which Kibby did. Id. ¶ 20. Working with the Brigade Medical Officer, Kibby determined that in order to comply with the 18 month stability requirement of the recently announced accession policy for transgender service members, he would have to take a year off from the Naval Academy to ensure that he had completed his transition plan prior to graduating and acceding. Id. ¶ 24. His Commandant and the Superintendent officially approved Kibby’s medical transition plan and his
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request for a year-long medical leave of absence. Id. ¶ 26. Kibby is now on medical leave undergoing his medical transition and plans to return to the Academy in the fall of 2018. Id. ¶ 28.
When Plaintiff Kibby saw the President’s Tweet he “was devastated” and felt that “[t]he entire future [he] had been planning for [himself] was crumbling around [him].” Id. ¶ 31. When Kibby came out, he was relying on the recent pronouncements by the Secretary of Defense and the Navy that he would be able to enlist despite being transgender. Id. ¶ 33. He is now living in a state of uncertainty and great distress because if the Presidential Memorandum is allowed to stand, he will never be able to serve in the Armed Forces—something he has strived for since he was a child. Id. ¶¶ 33–34.
8. Dylan Kohere Plaintiff Dylan Kohere is an 18-year-old student and member of the Army ROTC at the University of New Haven. Kohere Decl. ¶ 1. Both of Dylan’s grandfathers served in the military, and Dylan has wanted to serve since he was a young child. Id. ¶ 2. He entered the ROTC program to obtain the career opportunities that come with being a commissioned officer. Id. ¶ 2. Dylan is transgender, and has come out as such to his Sergeant. Id. ¶ 9. He has started to work with medical professionals to begin a treatment plan for his transition. Id. ¶ 10. When the President declared on Twitter that transgender service members would no longer be allowed to serve in the military in any capacity, Dylan felt that the plan he had made for his life had been “thrown out the window.” Id. ¶¶ 12–13. He had come out as transgender in the ROTC in reliance on the military’s announcement that transgender people could serve openly. Id. ¶¶ 11, 15. He feels disheartened that if the Presidential Memorandum remains in force, he will “be
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denied an opportunity to serve based on something that has nothing to do with [his] ability or performance.” Id. ¶ 15. If he is prevented from serving or completing ROTC because of his transgender status, he will lose educational and career opportunities, as well as the opportunity to apply for an ROTC scholarship. Id. ¶ 18.4
II. LEGAL STANDARDS A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction
When a motion to dismiss a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) is filed, a federal court is required to ensure that it has “the ‘statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate [the] case[.]’” Morrow v. United States, 723 F. Supp. 2d 71, 77 (D.D.C. 2010) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998)). “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction” and can adjudicate only those cases or controversies entrusted to them by the Constitution or an Act of Congress. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). In determining whether there is jurisdiction on a motion to dismiss, the Court may “consider the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record, or the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts.” Coal. for Underground Expansion v. Mineta, 333 F.3d 193, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). “Although a court must accept as true all factual allegations contained in the complaint when reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1),” the factual allegations in the complaint “will bear closer scrutiny in resolving a 12(b)(1) motion than in resolving a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim.” Wright v. Foreign Serv. Grievance Bd., 503 F. Supp. 2d 163, 170 (D.D.C. 2007) (citations omitted).
4 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Declarations Under Seal, ECF No. 51, is GRANTED for the reasons set forth in the Court’s prior Order regarding sealing.
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B. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Under Rule 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a pleading on the grounds that it
“fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “[A] complaint [does not] suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)). Rather, a complaint, or counterclaim, must contain sufficient factual allegations that, if accepted as true, “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. C. Motion for Preliminary Injunction
Preliminary injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 392 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008)). A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction “must establish [1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.” Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 1023, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting Sherley, 644 F.3d at 392 (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 20) (alteration in original; quotation marks omitted)). When seeking such relief, “‘the movant has the burden to show that all four factors, taken together, weigh in favor of the injunction.’” Abdullah v. Obama, 753 F.3d 193, 197 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). “The four factors have typically been evaluated on a ‘sliding scale.’” Davis, 571 F.3d at 1291 (citation
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omitted). Under this sliding-scale framework, “[i]f the movant makes an unusually strong showing on one of the factors, then it does not necessarily have to make as strong a showing on another factor.” Id. at 1291–92.5
III. DISCUSSION The Court’s Opinion will be divided into three parts. The first part of the Opinion assesses the Court’s jurisdiction and addresses Defendants’ arguments that Plaintiffs lack standing and that their claims are not ripe. The second part of the Opinion dismisses Plaintiffs’ estoppel cause of action for failure to state a claim. Finally, in the third part of the Opinion, the Court addresses Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction.
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of this Court to the adjudication of
“Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const., Art. III, § 2. “In an attempt to give meaning to Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement, the courts have developed a series of principles termed ‘justiciability doctrines,’ among which are standing [and] ripeness.” Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1427 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984)). Defendants challenge the Court’s jurisdiction on the basis of standing and ripeness.
5 The Court notes that it is not clear whether this circuit’s sliding-scale approach to assessing the four preliminary injunction factors survives the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter. See Save Jobs USA v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 105 F. Supp. 3d 108, 112 (D.D.C. 2015). Several judges on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”) have “read Winter at least to suggest if not to hold ‘that a likelihood of success is an independent, free-standing requirement for a preliminary injunction.’” Sherley, 644 F.3d at 393 (quoting Davis, 571 F.3d at 1296 (concurring opinion)). However, the D.C. Circuit has yet to hold definitively that Winter has displaced the sliding-scale analysis. See id.; see also Save Jobs USA, 105 F. Supp. 3d at 112. In any event, this Court need not resolve the viability of the sliding-scale approach today, as it finds that each of the preliminary injunctive factors favors awarding relief on the pending motion.
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Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing jurisdiction, and each “element must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2342 (2014) (“SBA List”) (internal quotation marks omitted). On a motion for preliminary injunction, the plaintiff “must show a substantial likelihood of standing[,]” while on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the plaintiff must merely “state a plausible claim that they have suffered an injury in fact fairly traceable to the actions of the defendant that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision on the merits.” Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack, 808 F.3d 905, 913 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Although Defendants have pressed their jurisdictional arguments in a motion to dismiss, the Court also has an independent duty to assess its jurisdiction for purposes of Plaintiffs’ pending motion for preliminary injunction. Consequently, the Court proceeds by applying the higher burden necessitated by a motion for preliminary injunction.
For the reasons stated below, the Court concludes that it has jurisdiction to adjudicate the propriety of the directives of the Presidential Memorandum with respect to the accession and retention of transgender individuals for military service, which corresponds with sections 1(b) and 2(a) of the Presidential Memorandum (i.e., the Accession and Retention Directives). The Court does not have jurisdiction over section 2(b), which prohibits the use of military resources to fund sex reassignment surgical procedures, because no Plaintiff has demonstrated that they are substantially likely to be impacted by this directive (the “Sex Reassignment Surgery Directive”).
1. Standing Standing is an element of the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, and requires, in essence,
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that a plaintiff have “a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy . . . .” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). A plaintiff cannot be a mere bystander or interested third-party, or a self-appointed representative of the public interest; he or she must show that the defendant’s conduct has affected them in a “personal and individual way.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). “The law of Article III standing, which is built on separation-of-powers principles, serves to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political branches.” SBA List, 134 S. Ct. at 2341–42 (internal quotation marks omitted). Consequently, the standing analysis is “especially rigorous when reaching the merits of the dispute would force [the court] to decide whether an action taken by one of the other two branches of the Federal Government was unconstitutional.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013).
The familiar requirements of Article III standing are: (1) that the plaintiff have suffered an “injury in fact”—an invasion of a judicially cognizable interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) that there be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court; and (3) that it be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167 (1997) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61); see also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016).
The parties disagree only over the first element of standing: injury in fact. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs have carried their burden of demonstrating a substantial likelihood of standing on the basis of at least two distinct injuries. First, Plaintiffs are subject to a competitive barrier that violates equal protection. Second, they are subject to a substantial risk
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of being denied accession, or being discharged from the military, due to their transgender status. Furthermore, Plaintiffs have demonstrated satisfactorily that both of these injuries are caused by the directives of the Presidential Memorandum, and that they are redressable by this Court.
a. The Import of the Presidential Memorandum Before turning to the legal basis of the two injuries that support Plaintiffs’ standing, the Court first addresses the crux of Defendants’ arguments regarding standing, and indeed, this Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction more generally. According to Defendants, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction with respect to the directives of the Presidential Memorandum because Plaintiffs have merely “brought a constitutional challenge to the President’s policy directive to conduct further study before the military changes its longstanding policies regarding service by transgender individuals.” Defs.’ Mem. at 15. According to Defendants, Plaintiffs “challenge a notional policy regarding military service by transgender individuals, but as they concede, that policy is currently being studied and has not been implemented or applied to anyone, let alone Plaintiffs.” Defs.’ Reply at 1. Defendants also highlight the protections afforded by the Interim Guidance: “Secretary of Defense Mattis has put in place Interim Guidance that, by its terms, maintains the status quo for both current service members and those who seek to accede into the military.” Id. In Defendants’ view, the Court is being asked “to prejudge the constitutionality of a future Government policy regarding military service by transgender individuals and issue the extraordinary relief of a worldwide preliminary injunction.” Defs.’ Mem. at 1. They further contend that “it is unclear whether those currently serving members will be affected by the future policy regarding service by transgender individuals once it is finalized and implemented.” Id. at 2.
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According to Defendants, the President has only “directed the Secretary of Defense to determine how to address transgender individuals currently serving in the military and that no action be taken against such individuals until after a policy review is completed.” Id. at 1 (emphasis in original). In their words: “Secretary Mattis’s Memorandum is unambiguous: The Interim Guidance is the operative policy and will remain so until he promulgates DoD’s final policy regarding service by transgender individuals.” Defs.’ Reply at 3. “The Interim Guidance is equally clear: Transgender service members, including the service member Plaintiffs, continue to serve fully in the military.” Id. With respect to accession, Defendants contend that the operative policy is not a “ban” because transgender individuals are “subject to the normal waiver process.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In sum, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs disregard the actual policy regarding transgender service members, and instead rely “on a hypothetical future policy on transgender military service.” Id.
Ultimately, all of these contentions can be summarized into a few overarching points: the Presidential Memorandum merely commissioned an additional policy review; that review is underway; nothing is set in stone, and what policy may come about is unknown; and regardless, Plaintiffs are protected by the Interim Guidance. And while accession by transgender individuals is not permitted, they may obtain waivers. In the Court’s view, the government’s jurisdictional arguments are a red herring.
The President controls the United States military. The directives of the Presidential Memorandum, to the extent they are definitive, are the operative policy toward military service by transgender service members. The Court must and shall assume that the directives of the Presidential Memorandum will be faithfully executed. See Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 145 F.3d 1399, 1408 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (assessing “faithful” application of
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agency rule). Consequently, the Interim Guidance must be read as implementing the directives of the Presidential Memorandum, and any protections afforded by the Interim Guidance are necessarily limited to the extent they conflict with the express directives of the memorandum. Finally, to the extent there is ambiguity about the meaning of the Presidential Memorandum, the best guidance is the President’s own statements regarding his intentions with respect to service by transgender individuals. To recount: On July 26, 2017, the President issued a statement announcing that the “United States government will not accept or allow transgender individuals to serve in any capacity in the U.S. military.” On August 25, 2017, the President issued the Presidential Memorandum. There, the President states that until “June 2016, the [military] generally prohibited openly transgender individuals from accession into the United States military and authorized the discharge of such individuals.” Finding subsequent changes to that policy unjustified, in section 1(b), the President directs the military “to return to the longstanding policy and practice on military service by transgender individuals that was in place prior to June 2016 . . . .” Accordingly, the military has been directed by section 1(b) to return to a policy under which: (i) transgender individuals are generally prohibited from accession; and (ii) the military is authorized to discharge individuals who are transgender.
This change in policy must occur by March 23, 2018, except that the prohibition on accession is extended indefinitely as of January 1, 2018. Likewise, as of March 23, 2018, the military is expressly prohibited from funding sex reassignment surgeries, except as necessary to protect the health of an already transitioning individual. The Memorandum provides that “[a]s part of the implementation plan, the Secretary of Defense . . . shall determine how to address transgender individuals currently serving in the United States military.” “Until the Secretary has made that determination, no action may be taken against such individuals under the policy set
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forth in section 1(b)”—that is, the directive that requires a return to the policy under which transgender individuals could not accede, and could be discharged. As these two clauses make clear, transgender individuals are immunized only until the Secretary of Defense makes the “determination”; the “determination” must be made “as part of the implementation plan”; and the “implementation plan” must be submitted to the President by February 21, 2018. This means that the “determination” must be made by February 21, 2018, and because the protections afforded to transgender individuals last only until the “determination” is made, those protections necessarily lapse by February 21, 2018, unless the “determination” is made earlier. Consequently, as of January 1, 2018, transgender individuals are prohibited from acceding to the military “until such time [that the President receives] a recommendation to the contrary that [he] find[s] convincing;” and as of March 23, 2018, the military must authorize the discharge of transgender service members. The protections afforded to these individuals by the terms of the Presidential Memorandum lapse, at the latest, by February 21, 2018.
Nothing in the August 2017 Statement by Secretary Mattis, or the Interim Guidance, can or does alter these realities. The Statement provides that Secretary Mattis will establish a panel of experts “to provide advice and recommendations on the implementation of the president’s direction.” After the “panel reports its recommendations and following . . . consultation with the secretary of Homeland Security,” Secretary Mattis will “provide [his] advice to the president concerning implementation of his policy direction.” Put differently, the military is studying how to implement the directives of the Presidential Memorandum. Such a policy review and implementation plan are likely necessitated by the fact that—as borne out by the RAND Report and the declarations submitted by the Pseudonym Plaintiffs—transgender service members occupy a variety of crucial positions throughout the military, including active duty postings in
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war zones. Presumably, the removal and replacement of such individuals during a time of war cannot occur overnight. Accordingly, Defendants are correct that policy decisions are still being made. But the decisions that must be made are how to best implement a policy under which transgender accession is prohibited, and discharge of transgender service members is authorized. Unless the directives of the Presidential Memorandum are altered—and there is no evidence that they will be—military policy toward transgender individuals must fit within these confines.
Similarly, the Interim Guidance provides that “[n]ot later than February 21, 2018, [Secretary Mattis] will present the President with a plan to implement the policy and directives in the Presidential Memorandum[,]” and that the “implementation plan will establish the policy, standards and procedures for transgender individuals serving in the military.” True, the exact details of the plan to carry out the directives are unknown. But what is known, and what is the bedrock of Plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge, is that the implementation plan must prohibit transgender accession and authorize the discharge of transgender service members. Otherwise, the plan would be out of compliance with the requirements of the Presidential Memorandum, and the Court shall not presume the military to be unfaithful to the orders of the President. Consequently, while the Court cannot presently adjudicate the merits of the yet-undecided details of how the directives will be carried out, it can adjudicate the constitutionality of the directives themselves, which are definite, and must be implemented by the military.
Finally, although Defendants make much of the protections afforded by the Interim Guidance to transgender individuals, that protection is necessarily qualified by the Presidential Memorandum. The Interim Guidance provides that: “As directed by the [Presidential] Memorandum, no action may be taken to involuntarily separate or discharge an otherwise qualified Service member solely on the basis of a gender dysphoria diagnosis or transgender
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status.” (Emphasis added). The protections afforded by the Presidential Memorandum lapse by February 21, 2018, and discharge must be authorized by March 23, 2018. The Interim Guidance can do nothing to obviate these facts. Nor is standing vitiated by the mere possibility that the President may alter the directives of the Presidential Memorandum. See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“[A]ll laws are subject to change. Even that most enduring of documents, the Constitution of the United States, may be amended from time to time. The fact that a law may be altered in the future has nothing to do with whether it is subject to judicial review at the moment.”). Nor is there evidence that such a change may occur, given the President’s unequivocal pronouncement that “the United States government will not accept or allow transgender individuals to serve in any capacity in the U.S. military.” Accordingly, for purposes of its standing analysis, the Court concludes that there is a substantial likelihood that transgender individuals will be indefinitely prevented from acceding to the military as of January 1, 2018, and that the military shall authorize the discharge of current service members who are transgender as of March 23, 2018.
b. Equal Protection Injury i. Relevant Case Law
The primary injury alleged by Plaintiffs, and which forms the basis of the Court’s decision on the merits, is that the directives of the Presidential Memorandum violate the guarantee of equal protection afforded by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. For purposes of the standing analysis, the Court assumes arguendo that these directives are, in fact, violative of equal protection. Schnitzler v. United States, 761 F.3d 33, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“[T]he Supreme Court has made clear that when considering whether a plaintiff has Article III
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standing, a federal court must assume arguendo the merits of his or her legal claim.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The Supreme Court and this Circuit have made clear that the “injury in fact element of standing in an equal protection case is the denial of equal treatment resulting from the imposition of the barrier.” Am. Freedom Law Ctr. v. Obama, 821 F.3d 44, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citing Ne. Florida Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, Fla., 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993) (Thomas, J.)), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1069 (2017). In City of Jacksonville, the Supreme Court assessed a city ordinance that “required that 10% of the amount spent on city contracts be set aside each fiscal year for so-called ‘Minority Business Enterprises’ (MBE’s).” 508 U.S. at 658. “Once projects were earmarked for MBE bidding by the city’s chief purchasing officer, they were deemed reserved for minority business enterprises only.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff was an association of individuals and firms in the construction industry who did business in the city and most of whom did not qualify under the ordinance. Id. at 659. The members of the association alleged that they “regularly bid on and perform[ed] construction work for the City of Jacksonville,” and that they “would have bid on designated set aside contracts but for the restrictions imposed by the ordinance.” Id. (internal quotations marks and alterations omitted). In assessing the members’ standing to challenge the ordinance under these circumstances, the Court held that:
When the government erects a barrier that makes it more difficult for members of one group to obtain a benefit than it is for members of another group, a member of the former group seeking to challenge the barrier need not allege that he would have obtained the benefit but for the barrier in order to establish standing. The “injury in fact” in an equal protection case of this variety is the denial of equal treatment resulting from the imposition of the barrier, not the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit. . . . And in the context of a challenge to a set-aside program, the “injury in fact” is the inability to compete on an equal footing in the bidding process, not the loss
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of a contract. . . . To establish standing, therefore, a party challenging a set-aside program like Jacksonville’s need only demonstrate that it is able and ready to bid on contracts and that a discriminatory policy prevents it from doing so on an equal basis. Id. at 666 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). In Adarand, the Court assessed a requirement that federal agency contracts for general contractors contain a clause providing for additional compensation if the general contractor hired subcontractors “certified as small businesses controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals,” where socially and economically disadvantaged individuals were deemed to include “Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and other minorities . . . .” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 205 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff submitted a lower bid, but lost to a competing subcontractor that qualified the general contractor for additional compensation under the clause. Id. In assessing Plaintiff’s standing for purposes of prospective injunctive relief— that is, with respect to future injuries—the Court held that the “concrete and particularized” element of injury in fact was readily satisfied by Plaintiff’s “claim that the Government’s use of subcontractor compensation clauses denies it equal protection of the laws . . . .” Id. at 211. The Court was less certain, however, “that the future use of subcontractor compensation clauses will cause [the plaintiff] ‘imminent’ injury[,]” and consequently required a “showing that sometime in the relatively near future [the plaintiff] will bid on another Government contract that offers financial incentives to a prime contractor for hiring disadvantaged subcontractors.” Id. The plaintiff made a sufficient showing by demonstrating that it was “very likely” to bid on an affected contract at least once per year, and that in so bidding, the plaintiff often competed against small disadvantaged businesses. Id. at 212.
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In Gratz, the plaintiffs, two students who were denied entrance to the University of Michigan, brought suit challenging the University’s consideration of race as part of its undergraduate admissions process as violative of equal protection. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 251 (2003) (Rehnquist, C.J.). The Court considered whether one of the plaintiffs had standing to seek prospective injunctive relief given his statement that he would not apply for admission as a transfer student until the race-based admissions policy was terminated. Id. at 261. Relying on City of Jacksonville, the Court found that the plaintiff had standing because “the University had denied him the opportunity to compete for admission on an equal basis.” Id. at 262. In particular, “[a]fter being denied admission, [the plaintiff] demonstrated that he was ‘able and ready’ to apply as a transfer student should the University cease to use race in undergraduate admissions. He therefore [had] standing to seek prospective relief with respect to the University’s continued use of race in undergraduate admissions.” Id.
More recently, in Parents Involved, the Supreme Court assessed the use by several school districts of “student assignment plans that rely upon race to determine which public schools certain children may attend.” Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 709–10 (2007) (Roberts, C.J.). “In Seattle, this racial classification [was] used to allocate slots in oversubscribed high schools.” Id. at 710. Consequently, Seattle argued that the members of the plaintiff organization would “only be affected if their children seek to enroll in a Seattle public high school and choose an oversubscribed school that is integration positive[,]” which in Seattle’s view was “too speculative a harm to maintain standing.” Id. at 718. The Court disagreed, finding that plaintiff had standing because its members had “children in the district’s elementary, middle, and high schools[,]” and injunctive relief was sought on behalf of members whose children “may be denied admission to the high schools of their choice when
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they apply for those schools in the future . . . .” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The injury was not eliminated merely because it was “possible that children of group members will not be denied admission to a school based on their race—because they choose an undersubscribed school or an oversubscribed school in which their race is an advantage . . . .” Id.
This line of authority was summarized by the D.C. Circuit in Worth v. Jackson, 451 F.3d 854 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Tatel, J.). There, the plaintiff challenged written and unwritten employment policies by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) that allegedly discriminated on the basis of gender and race, and claimed standing for purposes of prospective injunctive relief by alleging that he intended “to apply for new positions and promotions at HUD on a regular basis in the future,” and that HUD would “violate his equal protection and civil rights” when he did so. Id. at 858 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Reviewing City of Jacksonville and Adarand, the D.C. Circuit found no reason to distinguish “between contractors and job applicants[,]” and held that the source of the challenged policy—“whether a statute, a regulation, or agency guidelines”—did not control the standing inquiry. Id. at 859. Rather, according to the Circuit, “Adarand rests on the common-sense notion that when a contractor depends for its livelihood on competing for government contracts, and when the government has committed itself to doling out those contracts on a race-conscious basis, it stands to reason that the contractor will soon be competing on an uneven playing field.” Id. at 859. “Under Adarand, then, the relevant consideration is whether the agency is sufficiently committed to a particular race-conscious policy that the plaintiff will likely face a career impediment.” Id.
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ii. Application to Plaintiffs For purposes of the standing analysis, Plaintiffs fall into two groups: Named Plaintiffs— who have yet to accede—and the Pseudonym Plaintiffs—who are currently in the military and fear that they will be discharged. These two groups challenge the two fundamental directives of the Presidential Memorandum as unconstitutional: a reversion of accession and retention policy with respect to transgender individuals (i.e., the Accession and Retention Directives). For the following reasons, the Court concludes that: (i) the Accession and Retention Directives of the Presidential Memorandum impose a competitive barrier that the Named and Pseudonym Plaintiffs are substantially likely to encounter, and (ii) that this barrier constitutes an injury in fact sufficient to imbue the Named and Pseudonym Plaintiffs with standing to challenge the propriety of the Accession and Retention Directives of the Presidential Memorandum. The Accession Directive Plaintiff Kibby—one of the Named Plaintiffs—has demonstrated a substantial likelihood that he is able and ready to accede to the military in the relatively near future, and consequently, that he is in a position to challenge the Accession Directive to the extent it imposes a barrier on him from acceding based on his transgender status. Plaintiff Kibby was inducted into the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland as a midshipman on July 1, 2017, and has completed his first two years of education, out of four. Kibby Decl. ¶ 1. “[A]ll midshipmen are members of the military, [but] are still considered part of an accessions program since [they] do not receive [their] commission until graduation.” Id. ¶ 22. After graduation, Plaintiff Kibby hopes “to perform [his] service as a Surface Warfare Officer aboard a Navy ship.” Id. ¶ 9. Plaintiff Kibby informed his chain of command that he was transgender in early 2016. Id. ¶ 16. At the end of his last school year, in
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May 2017, the Commandant and Superintendent “officially approved [Plaintiff’s] medical transition plan and the request for a year-long medical leave of absence.” Id. ¶ 26. The transition plan was created in coordination with the Brigade Medical Officer and the Transgender Care Team at Portsmouth’s Naval Medical Center.” Id. ¶¶ 24–25. The medical year of absence was taken to comply with the requirement under the June 2016 DTM that acceding transgender service members be fully transitioned to their chosen gender for at least 18 months prior to accession. Id. ¶ 24. Defendants represent that “Plaintiff Kibby currently is on medical leave and faces no impediment to returning to the Naval Academy when that leave ends in May 2018.” Defs.’ Mem. at 16. The Commandant of Midshipmen at the Naval Academy, Robert B. Chadwick, has represented that Plaintiff Kibby “was afforded much support from the Brigade Medical Unit, his chain of command, and [the Commandant’s] legal advisors in developing his [transition] plan and submitting his request [for medical leave].” Chadwick Decl. ¶ 4. According to the Commandant, the “purpose of the [medical] leave is to allow MIDN Kibby to undergo hormone treatment, and to [obtain] a period of gender stability of sufficient length under current policy and guidance to ensure his eligibility to accept a commission in May 2020 if he successfully completes the course of instruction upon return to [the Naval Academy].” Id. ¶ 10.
Upon his return, Plaintiff Kibby will be required to meet the male fitness requirements, which are more difficult than their female counterpart, as well as the Academy’s academic standards. Id. ¶¶ 15-16. Plaintiff Kibby has represented that during the medical year of absence, he is “completing a rigorous exercise and training regimen so that [he] will be able to meet the male fitness standards upon [his] return[,]” and that he “can already meet the male standards for push-ups and sit-ups and will be working hard on [his] run time.” Kibby Decl. ¶ 28. Given his
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prior academic success at the Naval Academy, Kibby Decl. ¶ 39, the support afforded to his transition plan by senior officials, and his representations regarding his fitness training, the Court finds that Plaintiff Kibby has demonstrated a substantial likelihood that he will be able to meet the graduation requirements of the Naval Academy. Following graduation, he will be in a position to accede to the Navy or Marine Corps. Chadwick Decl. ¶ 16. Defendants have not argued or presented any evidence that Plaintiff Kibby will be unable to graduate from the Naval Academy—an unsurprising position, given that dismissal stemming from the inability of transgender individuals to accede would itself likely be an injury sufficient to confer standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Presidential Memorandum.
Consequently, Plaintiff Kibby has demonstrated that he is “able and ready” to apply for accession. Using the words of Adarand, he is “very likely” to apply for accession in the “relatively near future.” Indeed, Plaintiff Kibby has demonstrated a greater likelihood of his being subject to the competitive barrier than many of the plaintiffs in the equal protection cases discussed above. In Parents Involved, the members of the plaintiff organization had standing even though it was possible that they would not even apply to an affected high school—and nothing was said of the possibility that the students could fail to graduate from elementary or middle school. In Gratz, the plaintiff merely stated an intention to apply as a transfer student— surely it was possible that academic failures at his current institution, or other hardships, would have prevented him from applying. Here, Plaintiff Kibby is on a defined track toward graduation from the Naval Academy and accession to the military. The track has been approved and supported by his chain of command. Like any student at the Naval Academy, there are potential impediments to his graduation. But Plaintiff Kibby has provided affirmative evidence of his ability to overcome these impediments, and it is unlikely that his chain of command would have
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adopted a transition plan if they doubted his ability to meet the Academy’s graduation requirements. It is accordingly likely that he will graduate and attempt to accede. Anything else is the product of mere speculation.6
The remaining question is whether Plaintiff Kibby is substantially likely to “hit” a barrier when he applies for accession to the military. As of January 2018, transgender individuals shall be prohibited entry to the military, until such time that the President receives a recommendation to the contrary that he finds convincing. Given the President’s pronouncement that “the United States government will not accept or allow transgender individuals to serve in any capacity in the U.S. military,” there is no reason to believe that this directive will change by the time Plaintiff Kibby is ready to apply for accession in May 2020. Chadwick Decl. ¶ 17. In short, the only basis from which to conclude that the directive may change is the ever-present reality that every law is subject to change. But that is insufficient to deprive the Court of subject-matter jurisdiction. Appalachian Power, 208 F.3d at 1022. Nor does the potential availability of a waiver change this conclusion. First, Defendants have presented no evidence that waivers are actually made available to transgender individuals, or that they will be; and the only record evidence on this point suggests that transgender individuals are not entitled to waivers for accession purposes. See supra at 5–6. Second, even if a bona fide waiver process were made available, Plaintiff Kibby would still be subject to a competitive barrier due to his transgender
6 Because the Court concludes that Plaintiff Kibby has a substantial likelihood of attempting to accede, the Court need not and does not decide whether Plaintiff Kohere has also demonstrated a likelihood of accession sufficient to stake out an equal protection claim based on the Accession Directive. See Town of Chester, N.Y. v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1651 (2017) (“At least one plaintiff must have standing to seek each form of relief requested in the complaint.”); Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 53 (2006) (“the presence of one party with standing is sufficient to satisfy Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement”).
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status. For accession purposes, he would be presumptively disqualified because of his transgender status, unless he obtains a waiver. Those who are not transgender are not subject to the same blanket proscription. Consequently, a waiver process would not vitiate the barrier that Plaintiff Kibby claims is violative of equal protection. Accordingly, Plaintiff Kibby has demonstrated that he is substantially likely to attempt to accede, and to encounter a competitive barrier at the time of his accession due to his status as a transgender individual, which he claims is violative of equal protection. This is sufficient to confer standing to challenge the Accession Directive at this preliminary stage.
With respect to the Pseudonym Plaintiffs, there is no real doubt that they will remain in the military for long enough to hit the “barrier” that they claim is violative of equal protection. Each has submitted a declaration stating, and/or alleged, their intention to remain in military service, and Defendants have submitted declarations for each Pseudonym Plaintiff stating that they shall not be discharged until the military’s new policy regarding transgender service members takes effect. See supra at 19–28; Defs.’ Mem at 10–12. There is also no real doubt that they will face a competitive barrier to their continued retention by the military. As of March 23, 2018, the military is required to effect a policy by which these service members can be discharged solely due to their transgender status. This barrier to their continued retention is imposed upon them, but not other service members. And Plaintiffs claim that this competitive barrier is violative of equal protection. Accordingly, at this preliminary stage, the Pseudonym Plaintiffs have demonstrated a substantial likelihood of standing to challenge the Presidential Memorandum’s Retention Directive. See Worth, 451 F.3d at 859 (“Under Adarand, . . . the relevant consideration is whether the agency is sufficiently committed to a particular raceconscious policy that the plaintiff will likely face a career impediment.”).
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iii. Substantial Risk of Injury Plaintiffs have also established a substantial risk of two future injuries: denial of accession and discharge from military service. The substantial risk of these two future injuries is sufficient to constitute an injury in fact. As explained by the Supreme Court, “[a]n allegation of future injury may suffice if the threatened injury is certainly impending, or there is a substantial risk that the harm will occur.” SBA List, 134 S. Ct. at 2341 (internal quotation marks omitted; citing Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147, 1150, n.5). Here, even assuming that the future injuries are not “certainly impending,” there is a “substantial risk” of their occurrence. The D.C. Circuit has explained that “the proper way to analyze an increased-risk-of-harm claim is to consider the ultimate alleged harm . . . as the concrete and particularized injury and then to determine whether the increased risk of such harm makes injury to an individual citizen sufficiently imminent for standing purposes.” Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 627 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). In some circumstances, the chain of events that is necessary for the putative future harm to occur is too attenuated to constitute a substantial risk of that harm and to render that harm imminent. Consequently, in Clapper, the Supreme Court declined to find standing because the plaintiffs’ “theory of standing [relied] on a highly attenuated chain of possibilities . . . .” 568 U.S. at 410. “Several links in this chain would have required the assumption that independent decisionmakers charged with policy discretion . . . and with resolving complex legal and factual questions . . . would exercise their discretion in a specific way. . . . With so many links in the causal chain, the injury that the plaintiffs feared was too speculative to qualify as ‘injury in fact.’” Attias, 865 F.3d at 626 (citation omitted). Meanwhile, in Attias, a personal data theft case, the D.C. Circuit found standing where the plaintiffs plausibly alleged that “an unauthorized party has already accessed personally
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identifying data on [the] servers, and it [was] much less speculative . . . to infer that this party [had] both the intent and the ability to use that data for ill.” Id. at 628. Here, there is no doubt that the denial of accession and discharge from the military constitute concrete and particularized injuries. Whether these are also imminent, based on the reasoning of Clapper and Attias, requires an analysis of the degree to which these future harms are separated from the present by a “series of contingent events . . . .” Id.
In Navy Chaplaincy, the plaintiffs, military chaplains who were “non-liturgical Protestants,” alleged that “the Navy systematically discriminate[d] against members of their religious denominations in the awarding of promotions in violation” of the Establishment Clause. In re Navy Chaplaincy, 697 F.3d 1171, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 2012). The plaintiffs claimed standing for purposes of prospective injunctive relief on the basis that “they face[d] future injury because they [would] likely suffer discrimination on the basis of their religious denomination when they are considered for promotion . . . .” Id. at 1176. In the court’s view, the plaintiffs’ assertion of future injury depended on “two subsidiary premises: that plaintiffs will be considered for promotion by future selection boards and that selection boards will discriminate against them on the basis of their religious denomination.” Id. The court found that the plaintiffs had satisfactorily established both premises. With respect to the first, because the “Navy concede[d] that future selection boards may very well consider the promotion of at least some plaintiffs.” Id. With respect to the second, because “plaintiffs challenge[d] specific policies and procedures . . . . that they claim[ed] resulted in denominational discrimination . . . .” Id.
Plaintiffs have demonstrated a chain of causation leading to concrete and particularized injuries in which there are few links and each link is substantially likely to occur. With respect to the Accession Directive, Plaintiff Kibby will suffer an injury in fact if he: (i) graduates from
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the Naval Academy; (ii) applies for accession; and (iii) is denied accession due to his transgender status. The first two links in this chain are substantially likely to occur for the reasons already stated. See supra at 43–46. The third is likely to occur because the Presidential Memorandum indefinitely delays the accession of transgender individuals, and the President has unequivocally stated that transgender individuals shall not be permitted to serve in the military. Given this actuality, it is speculative to assume that transgender individuals will be permitted to accede by May 2020. At present, there is a substantial risk that accession will remain forbidden, and Plaintiff Kibby will be precluded from military service.
For the Pseudonym Plaintiffs, the chain of causation is even shorter. They will suffer an injury in fact if: (i) they remain in the military; and (ii) are discharged based on their transgender status after March 23, 2018 due to the Retention Directive. On the first point, there is no disagreement that the Pseudonym Plaintiffs are qualified service members who desire to remain in military service. See supra at 19–28. On the second point, the available evidence is that the President—who ultimately controls the military—issued a statement that “the United States government will not . . . allow transgender individuals to serve in any capacity in the U.S. military,” and shortly thereafter, issued a Presidential Memorandum that requires the military to authorize the discharge of transgender service members by March 23, 2018. True, it is conceivable that the Pseudonym Plaintiffs will not be discharged from the military, despite the head of the military stating that they will be. But in the absence of a crystal ball, and in light of these unequivocal factual circumstances, at the present time, the Pseudonym Plaintiffs face a substantial risk of discharge. This confers upon them an injury in fact.
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iv. Plaintiffs Have Standing to Challenge the Accession and Retention Directives
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs have established two injuries in fact with respect to the Accession and Retention Directives. First, they have demonstrated a substantial likelihood that they will face a competitive barrier with respect to accession and retention due to their transgender status. Second, they have demonstrated a substantial risk that they will be denied accession or discharged from the military due to their transgender status. Defendants do not contest that these injuries are caused by the Accession and Retention Directives of the Presidential Memorandum, or that they are redressable by judicial intervention, and the Court finds that the causation and redressability elements of standing have been satisfied. Were it not for the Presidential Memorandum, the blanket prohibition against accession by transgender individuals would have expired on January 1, 2018. Because of the Presidential Memorandum, that prohibition is extended indefinitely. Furthermore, the Presidential Memorandum requires the reversion of military policy to one where individuals can be discharged solely based on their transgender status. Previously, such action was prohibited by the June 2016 DTM. The accession and retention injuries are caused by the Presidential Memorandum, and they would be redressed to the extent the Court invalidates the directives of the memorandum. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the Accession and Retention Directives.
v. Plaintiffs Do Not Have Standing to Challenge the Sex Reassignment Surgery Directive
Although the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the Accession and Retention Directives, none of the Plaintiffs have demonstrated an injury in fact with respect to the Sex Reassignment Surgery Directive. First, only some Plaintiffs are implicated by the provision at all. For those that are, the risk of being impacted by the Sex Reassignment Surgery Directive is not sufficiently great to confer standing.
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Jane Doe 1 alleges that “a transition-related procedure Jane Doe 1 was scheduled for was summarily canceled by the Defense Health Agency.” Am. Compl. ¶ 16. However, Defendants have submitted a declaration representing that “Jane Doe 1’s application for the supplemental health care waiver necessary to receive a transition-related surgery is currently being processed by the Defense Health Agency.” Defs.’ Mem. at 10. Accordingly, Jane Doe 1 has not demonstrated that she will not receive the surgery prior to the effective date of the Sex Reassignment Surgery Directive.
Jane Doe 3 has developed a transition treatment plan, but will not begin her treatment until after she returns from active deployment in Iraq. See supra at 22. Given the possibility of discharge, the uncertainties attended by the fact that she has yet to begin any transition treatment, and the lack of certainty on when such treatment will begin, the prospective harm engendered by the Sex Reassignment Surgery Directive is too speculative to constitute an injury in fact with respect to Jane Doe 3. Furthermore, John Doe 1 is scheduled for transition related-surgery on January 4, 2018, and Defendants have represented that this date remains unaffected by the Presidential Memorandum. Defs.’ Mem. at 11. Finally, the Named Plaintiffs are not currently in the military and it is speculative whether they will need surgery while in military service. Plaintiff Kibby, in particular, has stated that he will transition prior to applying for accession. See supra at 26–27. Accordingly, no Plaintiffs have demonstrated that they are substantially likely to be impacted by the Sex Reassignment Surgery Directive, and none have standing to challenge that directive.
2. Ripeness Defendants also challenge the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction on the basis of ripeness. “Determining whether administrative action is ripe for judicial review requires [the Court] to
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evaluate (1) the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and (2) the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.” Nat’l Park Hosp. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003). On the first prong, the Court must consider: “whether the issue is purely legal, whether consideration of the issue would benefit from a more concrete setting, and whether the agency’s action is sufficiently final.” Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 440 F.3d 459, 463–64 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). On the second prong, the Court must consider “whether postponing judicial review would impose an undue burden on [the Plaintiffs] or would benefit the court.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
A facial equal protection challenge is a purely legal question. See Beach Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 959 F.2d 975, 986 (D.C. Cir. 1992). To the extent the Court considers factual issues with respect to the equal protection analysis, they are only those facts that are already established: namely, those going to the basis for the issuance of the Presidential Memorandum. Future factual development does not alter that basis, and is consequently irrelevant to the equal protection analysis. Defendants do not contest this point. See XP Vehicles, Inc. v. Dep’t of Energy, 118 F. Supp. 3d 38, 58 (D.D.C. 2015) (finding Fifth Amendment challenge to be a purely legal inquiry).
To a large extent, Defendants’ ripeness arguments have already been addressed in the standing context. The Court reiterates its conclusion here. While there is present uncertainty regarding the exact details of the military’s future policy towards transgender service members, there is no uncertainty regarding two directives of the Presidential Memorandum: the military must authorize the discharge of transgender service members, and accession by transgender individuals is prohibited, indefinitely. The Court does not adjudicate the details of that future policy, but rather, only assesses whether these directives in-and-of-themselves violate the
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Constitution. The directives are known, and so are the circumstances under which they were issued. They cannot be more concrete, and future policy by the military—absent action from the President—cannot change what the directives require. There is no reason to believe that the President will alter these directives, and the Court must assume that they will be faithfully executed by the military. See National Mining Association, 145 F.3d at 1408; Appalachian Power, 208 F.3d at 1022. Consequently, the constitutionality of the Accession and Retention Directives is a matter fit for judicial resolution.
Furthermore, the nature of the equal protection analysis in this case, which assesses the facial validity of the Presidential Memorandum, means that the Court would not benefit from delay—the salient facts regarding the issuance of the Presidential Memorandum are not subject to change. This contrasts with the burden that delay would impose upon Plaintiffs, who must continue to serve or strive toward service, expending resources and declining other opportunities, while faced with the prospect of discharge and preclusion of military service, and the stigma that the Presidential Memorandum attaches to service by transgender individuals. See supra at 19– 28. Accordingly, the propriety of the Accession and Retention Directives is a matter ripe for adjudication.
Because Plaintiffs have established standing and ripeness with respect to the Accession and Retention Directives of the Presidential Memorandum, the Court turns to the merits. B. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
Plaintiffs assert two overarching claims in this case. Plaintiffs’ first broad claim is that, for a variety of reasons, the Presidential Memorandum violates the guarantees of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Plaintiffs’ second distinct claim is for estoppel. Defendants move to dismiss both claims under Federal Rule 12(b)(6). For the same reasons the Court concludes that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their Due Process Clause
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challenge for the purposes of their motion for preliminary injunction—discussed below—the Court will not dismiss Plaintiffs’ Due Process Clause claims.
However, the Court will dismiss, without prejudice, Plaintiffs’ estoppel claim. The Supreme Court has expressed substantial skepticism with respect to government estoppel, noting that when “the Government is unable to enforce the law because the conduct of its agents has given rise to an estoppel, the interest of the citizenry as a whole in obedience to the rule of law is undermined.” Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cty., Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 60 (1984). Nonetheless, the Court has refused to adopt “a flat rule that estoppel may not in any circumstances run against the Government,” noting that “the public interest in ensuring that the Government can enforce the law free from estoppel might be outweighed by the countervailing interest of citizens in some minimum standard of decency, honor, and reliability in their dealings with their Government.” Id. at 60–61; see also Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 419 (1990) (“From our earliest cases, we have recognized that equitable estoppel will not lie against the Government as it lies against private litigants.”).
Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ estoppel claim fails because there is no recognized federal cause of action for estoppel. Defs.’ Mem. at 37. The Court declines to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim on this basis, however, because although judicial hostility has been expressed with respect to government estoppel, neither the Supreme Court or the D.C. Circuit have definitively ruled out the claim. In fact, recent decisions by the D.C. Circuit have at least assessed the claim on the merits. See Masters Pharm., Inc. v. DEA, 861 F.3d 206, 225 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Morris Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 566 F.3d 184, 191 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Graham v. SEC, 222 F.3d 994, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Accordingly, at least by implication, the D.C. Circuit has recognized that
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an estoppel claim may be brought against agency defendants—here, the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security—under certain circumstances.
The elements of a government estoppel claim are that “(1) the government made a ‘definite representation’; (2) on which the entity ‘relied in such a manner as to change its position for the worse’; (3) the entity’s reliance was reasonable; and (4) ‘the government engaged in affirmative misconduct.’” Masters Pharm., 861 F.3d at 225 (citations and alterations omitted). The affirmative misconduct element requires a showing “that government agents engage[d]—by commission or omission—in conduct that can be characterized as misrepresentation or concealment, or, at least, behave[d] in ways that have or will cause an egregiously unfair result.” GAO v. Gen. Accounting Office Pers. Appeals Bd., 698 F.2d 516, 526 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
Based on the allegations in the Amended Complaint, the Court concludes that the facts of this case are not actionable under an “estoppel” theory. Plaintiffs claim that the June 2016 DTM “constituted a definite representation to Plaintiffs that they would be able to serve openly.” Pls.’ Mem. at 26. However, the DTM was not a definite representation to any of the individuals Plaintiffs, but rather constituted a broad policy decision by the government that affected scores of individuals. The DTM did not specifically represent to any particular individual that he or she would be permitted to serve. The cases that Plaintiffs cite are distinguishable on this basis. For example, in Watkins, the Ninth Circuit estopped the Army from refusing to reenlist the plaintiff “on the basis of his homosexuality” because “the Army affirmatively acted in violation of its own regulations when it repeatedly represented that [the plaintiff] was eligible to reenlist, as well as when it reenlisted him time after time.” Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 707–08, 731 (9th Cir. 1989). These representations were directed at the plaintiff, because on “the one
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occasion when the record was unclear, [the plaintiff] sought clarification and his classification was immediately changed from ‘unknown’ to ‘eligible for reentry on active duty.’” Id. at 707. Similarly, in Johnson, the Ninth Circuit estopped the government from rescinding the plaintiff’s parole “after his parole computation had passed successfully through as many as eight administrative reviews . . . .” Johnson v. Williford, 682 F.2d 868, 872 (9th Cir. 1982).
It may be that some Plaintiffs have detrimentally relied upon specific representations from their chain of command that could more plausibly support a government estoppel claim, but if that is the case, those instances are not adequately alleged; only generalized assertions of reliance are asserted in the complaint. See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶ 3 (“Plaintiffs, along with many other service members, have followed protocol in informing their chain of command that they are transgender. They did so in reliance on the United States’ express promises that it would permit them to continue to serve their country openly.”); ¶ 14 (“In or around June 2016, in reliance on the issuance of the policy permitting open service by transgender service members, Jane Doe 1 notified her command that she is transgender.”); ¶ 31 (“After June 2016, in reliance on the announcement that transgender people would be permitted to serve openly, she notified her superiors that she is transgender. She has served in the intervening time without incident.”). Allowing estoppel claims to go forward based on such generalized theories of reliance would seem to implicate the reasonable concerns other courts have raised about government estoppel.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that government agents have engaged in specific instances of “affirmative misconduct.” No affirmative instances of misrepresentation or concealment have been plausibly alleged. While Plaintiffs point to the revocation of the June 2016 DTM—via the Presidential Memorandum—as “egregiously unfair,” they fail to articulate how that unfairness is the product of “misconduct” as the Court understands that term in this
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context. See Pl.’s Mem. at 28. Because these specific facts have not been plausibly alleged, the Court shall not permit the estoppel claim to proceed at this time. Accordingly, the claim is dismissed without prejudice. C. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction
Having determined that Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the Accession and Retention Directives and that their claims are ripe, the Court moves on to consider Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs ask the Court to enjoin the enforcement of the Accession and Retention Directives pending the final resolution of this lawsuit. The Court will grant Plaintiffs’ motion. The Court finds (1) that Plaintiffs have a likelihood of succeeding on their claim that the Accession and Retention Directives violate the Fifth Amendment, (2) that Plaintiffs would suffer irreparable injury in the absence of an injunction, and (3) that the balance of equities and the public interest favor granting injunctive relief.
1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits Although Plaintiffs’ estoppel claim has been dismissed, the Court is convinced that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed in this lawsuit under the Fifth Amendment. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that “No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. Although Plaintiffs have suggested a number of different analytical frameworks for considering whether the Accession and Retention Directives violate this guarantee, the Court finds the framework applicable to the Due Process Clause’s equal protection component most relevant. “In numerous decisions, [the Supreme Court] ‘has held that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment forbids the Federal Government to deny equal protection of the laws.’” Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 234 (1979) (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 94 n.1 (1979)); see also United States v.
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Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013) (“The liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause contains within it the prohibition against denying to any person the equal protection of the laws.”). To determine whether the Accession and Retention Directives violate the Due Process Clause’s guarantee because they deny the equal protection of the laws to transgender Americans, the Court must decide (a) the level of scrutiny applicable, and (b) whether the Accession and Retention Directives are likely to survive that level of scrutiny.7
a. Level of Scrutiny The general rule is that government action that treats certain classes of people differently “is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn . . . is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). However, this general rule does not apply where the government action draws distinctions between individuals based on certain suspect or quasi-suspect classifications. Id. at 440–41. In those instances, the Court must apply a heightened degree of scrutiny. Id. At this preliminary stage of the case, the Court is persuaded that it must apply a heightened degree of scrutiny to the Accession and Retention Directives. The Court reaches this conclusion for two reasons. First, on the current record, transgender individuals—who are alone targeted for exclusion by the Accession and Retention Directives—appear to satisfy the criteria of at least a quasi-suspect classification. “The Supreme Court has used several explicit criteria to identify suspect and quasi-suspect classifications.” Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 102 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The Court has observed that a suspect class is one that has “experienced a ‘history of purposeful unequal treatment’ or been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped
7 At the threshold, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claims are unlikely to succeed on the merits because Plaintiffs lack standing and their claims are not ripe. The Court has already found that Plaintiffs have standing and ripe claims.
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characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities.” Massachusetts Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)). Also relevant is whether the group has been “relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.” Id. Finally, the Supreme Court has also considered whether the group “exhibit[s] obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group.” Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986).
The transgender community satisfies these criteria. Transgender individuals have immutable and distinguishing characteristics that make them a discernable class. See, e.g., Medical Amici Brief at 3-13 (describing what it means to be transgender).8 As a class, transgender individuals have suffered, and continue to suffer, severe persecution and discrimination. See, e.g., State Amici Brief at 3 (describing the discrimination the transgender community suffers); Trevor Project Amici Brief at 10-12, 15-16 (discussing the harmful effects of discrimination against transgender youth); see also Whitaker By Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1051 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding that “[t]here is no denying that transgender individuals face discrimination, harassment, and violence because of their gender identity,” and noting report by the National Center for Transgender Equality finding
8 The Motions for Leave to File Amici Curiae Briefs in Support of Plaintiffs filed by Medical, Nursing, Mental Health, and other Health Care Organizations, ECF No. 44 (“Medical Amici Brief”), The Trevor Project, ECF No. 49 (“Trevor Project Amici Brief”), Massachusetts, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and the District of Columbia, ECF No. 50 (“State Amici Brief”), and the National Center for Transgender Equality, the Tennessee Transgender Political Coalition, TGI Network of Rhode Island, the Transgender Allies Group, the Transgender Legal Defense & Education Fund, TransOhio, the Transgender Resource Center of New Mexico, and the Southern Arizona Gender Alliance, ECF No. 52, are GRANTED. These amici briefs have assisted the Court in reaching its decision.
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that 78% of students who identify as transgender or as gender non-conformant report being harassed while in grades K-12). Despite this discrimination, the Court is aware of no argument or evidence suggesting that being transgender in any way limits one’s ability to contribute to society. See State Amici Brief at 2; Medical Amici Brief at 2; Trevor Project Amici Brief at 9. The exemplary military service of Plaintiffs in this case certainly suggests that it does not. Finally, transgender people as a group represent a very small subset of society lacking the sort of political power other groups might harness to protect themselves from discrimination. See Medical Amici Brief at 4 (noting that recent estimates suggest that transgender individuals make up approximately 0.6 percent of the adult population in the United States); see also Adkins v. City of New York, 143 F. Supp. 3d 134, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (noting that there is “no indication that there have ever been any transgender members of the United States Congress or the federal judiciary”).
Although the Court is aware of no binding precedent on this issue, it has taken note of the findings and conclusions of a number of other courts from across the country that have also found that discrimination on the basis of someone’s transgender identity is a quasi-suspect form of classification that triggers heightened scrutiny. See Evancho v. Pine-Richland Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 3d 267, 288 (W.D. Pa. 2017) (holding that “all of the indicia for the application of the heightened intermediate scrutiny standard are present” for transgender individuals); Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Local Sch. Dist. v. United States Dep’t of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 850, 872–74 (S.D. Ohio 2016) (finding that “transgender status is a quasi-suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause”); Adkins, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 140 (“[T]he Court concludes that transgender people are a quasi-suspect class” and “[a]ccordingly, the Court must apply intermediate scrutiny to defendants’ treatment of plaintiff”).
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Second, the Court is also persuaded that the Accession and Retention Directives are a form of discrimination on the basis of gender, which is itself subject to intermediate scrutiny. It is well-established that gender-based discrimination includes discrimination based on nonconformity with gender stereotypes. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (“[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group”). The Accession and Retention Directives’ exclusion of transgender individuals inherently discriminates against current and aspiring service members on the basis of their failure to conform to gender stereotypes. The defining characteristic of a transgender individual is that their inward identity, behavior, and possibly their physical characteristics, do not conform to stereotypes of how an individual of their assigned sex should feel, act and look. See Medical Amici Brief at 3-13. By excluding an entire category of people from military service on this characteristic alone, the Accession and Retention Directives punish individuals for failing to adhere to gender stereotypes. See Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1051 (holding that heightened scrutiny used for sex-based classifications applied to school policy requiring transgender student to use bathroom of sex listed on his birth certificate because it “treat[ed] transgender students . . . who fail to conform to the sex-based stereotypes associated with their assigned sex at birth, differently. . . . These students are disciplined under the School District’s bathroom policy if they choose to use a bathroom that conforms to their gender identity”); Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that “discrimination against a transgender individual because of her gendernonconformity is sex discrimination”); Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566, 577 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that the facts alleged by transsexual plaintiff to support his claims of gender discrimination on the basis of sex stereotyping “easily constitute a claim of sex discrimination
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grounded in the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution”). A service member who was born a male is punished by the Accession and Retention Directives if he identifies as a woman, whereas that same service member would be free to join and remain in the military if he was born a female, or if he agreed to act in the way society expects males to act. The Accession and Retention Directives are accordingly inextricably intertwined with gender classifications.
For these two reasons, the Court will apply an intermediate level of scrutiny to Defendants’ exclusion of transgender individuals from the military, akin to the level of scrutiny applicable in gender discrimination cases. Before moving on to that analysis, however, the Court pauses to note that meaningful scrutiny of the constitutionality of the Accession and Retention Directives is appropriate despite the fact that they pertain to decisions about military personnel. Although the Court recognizes that deference to the Executive and Congress is warranted in the military context, the Court is not powerless to assess whether the constitutional rights of America’s service members have been violated. The D.C. Circuit has explained that although “the operation of the military is vested in Congress and the Executive, and . . . it is not for the courts to establish the composition of the armed forces[,] . . . constitutional questions that arise out of military decisions regarding the composition of the armed forces are not committed to the other coordinate branches of government.” Emory v. Sec’y of Navy, 819 F.2d 291, 294 (D.C. Cir. 1987). “Where it is alleged, as it is here, that the armed forces have trenched upon constitutionally guaranteed rights through the promotion and selection process, the courts are not powerless to act.” Id. “The military has not been exempted from constitutional provisions that protect the rights of individuals” and, indeed, “[i]t is precisely the role of the courts to determine whether those rights have been violated.” Id.; see also Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983) (“This Court has never held, nor do we now hold, that military personnel are barred from
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all redress in civilian courts for constitutional wrongs suffered in the course of military service.”); Matlovich v. Sec’y of the Air Force, 591 F.2d 852, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“It is established, of course, that the federal courts have the power and the duty to inquire whether a military discharge was properly issued under the Constitution.”).
b. Application of Intermediate Scrutiny Having determined that an intermediate level of heightened scrutiny should apply to the Accession and Retention Directives’ discrimination against transgender individuals, the Court moves on to assessing whether Plaintiffs are likely to succeed when that level of scrutiny is actually applied. Under intermediate scrutiny, the government must demonstrate an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for its actions. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996). “The burden of justification is demanding and it rests entirely on” the government. Id. at 533. The government “must show ‘at least that the [challenged] classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.’” Id. (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (internal quotations omitted)). “The justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation.” Id. “And it must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females.” Id. Finally, it is well established that “[t]he Constitution’s guarantee of equality ‘must at the very least mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot’ justify disparate treatment of that group.” Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (quoting U. S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973)). Applying these standards, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed in demonstrating that the Accession and Retention Directives’ exclusion of transgender individuals
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from the military is unconstitutional. At the outset, the Court reiterates precisely what is at issue in this case: a policy banning the accession, and allowing the discharge, of an entire category of individuals from the military solely because they are transgender, despite their ability to meet all of the physical, psychological, and other standards for military service. Defendants argue that this policy is necessary for three reasons. First, Defendants argue that “at least some transgender individuals suffer from medical conditions that could impede the performance of their duties.” Defs.’ Mem. at 31. Second, Defendants argue that “there is room for the military to think” that certain medical conditions “may limit the deployability of transgender individuals as well as impose additional costs on the armed forces.” Id. at 32. Third, Defendants argue that “the President could reasonably conclude” that the presence of transgender individuals in the military would harm “unit cohesion.” Id. at 33.9
Plaintiffs do not dispute that maximizing military effectiveness, lethality and unit cohesion, and even budgetary considerations, are all important or at least legitimate government interests. Pls.’ Mem. at 17. They do challenge, however, whether Defendants can satisfy their burden of demonstrating that the discriminatory means that have been employed in the Presidential Memorandum—the Accession and Retention Directives—are “substantially related” to the achievement of these objectives. Based on the combined effect of a number of unusual factors, the Court finds it likely that Plaintiffs will succeed on this claim.
First, the reasons given for the decision to exclude transgender service members appear to be hypothetical and extremely overbroad. For instance, Defendants cite concerns that “some” transgender individuals “could” suffer from medical conditions that impede their duties, and
9 Plaintiffs note that similar arguments were proffered in support of prior policies precluding service members from being openly gay, maintaining racially segregated ranks and excluding women from military colleges.
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assert that “there is room for the military to think” that transgender people may be limited in their deployability at times. As an initial matter, these hypothetical concerns could be raised about any service members. Moreover, these concerns do not explain the need to discharge and deny accession to all transgender people who meet the relevant physical, mental and medical standards for service. The Accession and Retention Directives are accordingly extremely overbroad when considered in the light of their proffered justifications. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (holding that law’s “sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that [it] seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects”). The breadth of the Accession and Retention Directives is also discontinuous with the purported concern about costs, which, in addition to having been found to be minimal or negligible, apparently are primarily related to a surgical procedure that only a subset of transgender individuals will even need. Similarly, Defendants provide practically no explanation at all, let alone support, for their suggestion that the presence of transgender individuals may be harmful to “unit cohesion.”10 Indeed, Defendants themselves highlight the absence of any prior studies or evaluations supporting the proffered justifications by arguing that they must now conduct studies regarding transgender military service before they can adequately defend the President’s decision. At most, Defendants’ reasons appear therefore to be based on unsupported, “overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences,” of transgender people. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
10 To the extent this is a thinly-veiled reference to an assumption that other service members are biased against transgender people, this would not be a legitimate rationale for the challenged policy. “Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.” See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
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Nonetheless, given the deference owed to military personnel decisions, the Court has not based its conclusion solely on the speculative and overbroad nature of the President’s reasons. A second point is also crucial. As far as the Court is aware at this preliminary stage, all of the reasons proffered by the President for excluding transgender individuals from the military in this case were not merely unsupported, but were actually contradicted by the studies, conclusions and judgment of the military itself. As described above, the effect of transgender individuals serving in the military had been studied by the military immediately prior to the issuance of the Presidential Memorandum. In connection with the working group chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the RAND National Defense Research Institute conducted a study and issued a report largely debunking any potential concerns about unit cohesion, military readiness, deployability or health care costs related to transgender military service. The Department of Defense Working Group, made up of senior uniformed officers and senior civilian officers from each military department, unanimously concluded that there were no barriers that should prevent transgender individuals from serving in the military, rejecting the very concerns supposedly underlying the Accession and Retention Directives. In fact, the Working Group concluded that prohibiting transgender service members would undermine military effectiveness and readiness. Next, the Army, Air Force and Navy each concluded that transgender individuals should be allowed to serve. Finally, the Secretary of Defense concluded that the needs of the military were best served by allowing transgender individuals to openly serve. In short, the military concerns purportedly underlying the President’s decision had been studied and rejected by the military itself.11 This highly unusual
11 This differentiates this case from Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 508 (1986), a case cited by Defendants, in which the court deferred to a decision that was based on the “considered professional judgment of the Air Force.”
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situation is further evidence that the reasons offered for the Accession and Retention Directives were not substantially related to the military interests the Presidential Memorandum cited.
Third, the Court has also considered the circumstances surrounding the announcement of the President’s policy. “In determining whether a law is motived by an improper animus or purpose, ‘[d]iscriminations of an unusual character’ especially require careful consideration.” Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 633). The discrimination in this case was certainly of an unusual character. As explained above, after a lengthy review process by senior military personnel, the military had recently determined that permitting transgender individuals to serve would not have adverse effects on the military and had announced that such individuals were free to serve openly. Many transgender service members identified themselves to their commanding officers in reliance on that pronouncement. Then, the President abruptly announced, via Twitter—without any of the formality or deliberative processes that generally accompany the development and announcement of major policy changes that will gravely affect the lives of many Americans—that all transgender individuals would be precluded from participating in the military in any capacity. These circumstances provide additional support for Plaintiffs’ claim that the decision to exclude transgender individuals was not driven by genuine concerns regarding military efficacy. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 (1977) (holding that “[t]he specific sequence of events leading up the challenged decision . . . may shed some light on the decisionmaker’s purposes” and “[d]epartures from the normal procedural sequence also might afford evidence that improper purposes are playing a role”).
In sum, even if none of the reasons discussed above alone would be sufficient for the Court to conclude that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their Fifth Amendment claim, taken
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together they are highly suggestive of a constitutional violation. The likelihood of success factor accordingly weighs in favor of granting preliminary injunctive relief. For the same reasons, the Court will deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims under the Due Process Clause.
Defendants make a few additional points regarding the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims that must be addressed. First, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits regarding the Presidential Memorandum’s policy for enlisted service members in particular because Secretary Mattis’ Interim Guidance is the “operative policy,” and that guidance “does not impermissibly classify service members based on transgender status, but rather prohibits disparate treatment of existing service members based on transgender status.” Defs.’ Mem. at 24. This may be true, but the focus of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint is not the Interim Guidance, but the Presidential Memorandum. The Accession and Retention Directives of the Presidential Memorandum require the return to a policy that “generally prohibit[s] openly transgender individuals from accession into the United States military and authorize[s] the discharge of such individuals.” Presidential Memorandum § 1(a). This overt disparate treatment, which will become effective when Secretary Mattis’ Interim Guidance elapses early next year, is the subject of Plaintiffs’ lawsuit.
Second, Defendants cite a number of cases for the proposition that the Presidential Memorandum “is subject to a highly deferential form of review.” Defs.’ Mem. at 27. The Court has reviewed those cases and determined that none of them require the Court to apply a different level of scrutiny than has been applied here. Of primary importance is the Supreme Court’s opinion in Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981). The Supreme Court in Rostker expressly declined to hold that the intermediate scrutiny applicable to gender discrimination did not apply in the military personnel context. Id. at 69. Instead, the Court reviewed the particular facts
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before it and found that the district court in that case had not sufficiently deferred to the reasoned decision of Congress in the context of a particular military personnel-related decision.
The facts of that case are strikingly different than those presented here. In Rostker, the Court noted that “Congress did not act unthinkingly or reflexively and not for any considered reason,” when it passed the challenged policy. Id. at 72 (internal quotations omitted). To the contrary, the Court noted Congress’ “studied choice of one alternative in preference to another,” and relied on the fact that the policy at issue in that case had been “extensively considered by Congress in hearings, floor debate, and in committee.” Id. In other words, Congress had received extensive evidence on the issue, and simply chose one of two competing alternatives. The Supreme Court found that “[t]he District Court was quite wrong in undertaking an independent evaluation of this evidence, rather than adopting an appropriately deferential examination of Congress’ evaluation of that evidence.” Id. at 82-83.
The study and evaluation of evidence that the Rostker Court found warranted judicial deference is completely absent from the current record. Contrary to Defendants’ assertion, this does not appear to be a case where the Court is required to pick sides in a “battle of experts.” Defs.’ Mem. at 32. To the contrary, the record at this stage of the case shows that the reasons offered for categorically excluding transgender individuals were not supported and were in fact contradicted by the only military judgment available at the time. Accordingly, unlike the district court in Rostker, the Court’s analysis in this Opinion has not been based on an independent evaluation of evidence or faulting of the President for choosing between two alternatives based on competing evidence.
Third, Defendants seem to argue that they are free of the obligation of rationalizing the Accession and Retention Directives because the directives are a mere continuation of a long-
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standing policy. This is false. The Accession and Retention Directives constituted a revocation from transgender people of rights they were previously given. Before the Accession and Retention Directives, transgender people had already been given the right to serve openly and the right to accede by a date certain in early 2018. The Accession and Retention Directives took those rights away from transgender people and transgender people only. The targeted revocation of rights from a particular class of people which they had previously enjoyed—for however short a period of time—is a fundamentally different act than not giving those rights in the first place, and it will be the government’s burden in this case to show that this act was substantially related to important government objectives. See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (“Withdrawing from a disfavored group the right to obtain a designation with significant societal consequences is different from declining to extend that designation in the first place, regardless of whether the right was withdrawn after a week, a year, or a decade.”). Targeted revocations of rights are a factor that has been present in a number of cases finding equal protection violations. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 627 (holding that law that “withdr[ew] from homosexuals, but no others, specific legal protection . . . and . . . forb[ade] reinstatement of these laws and policies” was unconstitutional); Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695–96 (holding that the purpose of a law that “impose[d] a disability on [a] class by refusing to acknowledge a status” previously granted was to “disparage and to injure those” in that class).
Finally, Defendants argue that the military’s previous study of transgender service cannot forever bind future administrations from looking into the issue themselves. The Court fully agrees with this point. The Court by no means suggests that it was not within the President’s authority to order that additional studies be undertaken and that this policy be reevaluated. If the
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President had done so and then decided that banning all transgender individuals from serving in the military was beneficial to the various military objectives cited, this would be a different case. But as discussed above, that is not the case before the Court. The Court can only assess Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim based on the facts before it. At this time, it appears that the rights of a class of individuals were summarily and abruptly revoked for reasons contrary to the only then-available studies. As explained above, based on the cumulative effect of various unusual facts, the Court is convinced that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their Fifth Amendment claim. This finding in no way should be interpreted to prevent Defendants from continuing to study issues surrounding the service of transgender individuals in the military, as they have asserted that they intend to do.
The Court concludes this portion of its Memorandum Opinion with a caveat. This case comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and Defendants’ motion to dismiss. It is accordingly still at its very earliest stages, and the record is necessarily limited. The Court’s task at this time is to determine whether Plaintiffs have stated plausible claims and demonstrated a likelihood—not a certainty—of success based on the present record. The Court is persuaded that Plaintiffs have made these fairly modest showings, but this is not a final adjudication of the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims.
2. Irreparable Injury Next, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have demonstrated that they would suffer irreparable injury in the absence of preliminary injunctive relief. In order to satisfy the irreparable injury requirement, “[f]irst, the injury ‘must be both certain and great; it must be actual and not theoretical.’” Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). “Second, the injury must be beyond remediation.” Id.
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These elements are met here. Defendants argue that “for much the same reasons they lack standing, Plaintiffs cannot show that they will suffer certain, great, or any actual injuries if the Court does not enter an injunction.” Defs.’ Mem. at 21. The Court has already rejected those arguments in the context of finding that Plaintiffs have standing, at least with respect to the Accession and Retention Directives, and rejects them again in this context. Absent an injunction, Plaintiffs will suffer a number of harms that cannot be remediated after that fact even if Plaintiffs were to eventually succeed in this lawsuit. The impending ban brands and stigmatizes Plaintiffs as less capable of serving in the military, reduces their stature among their peers and officers, stunts the growth of their careers, and threatens to derail their chosen calling or access to unique educational opportunities. See Elzie v. Aspin, 841 F. Supp. 439, 443 (D.D.C. 1993) (holding that plaintiff would suffer irreparable injury in the absence of preliminary injunctive relief because “plaintiff faces the stigma of being removed from active duty as a sergeant in the Marine Corps—a position which he has performed in a sterling fashion for eleven years—and labeled as unfit for service solely on the basis of his sexual orientation, a criterion which has no bearing on his ability to perform his job”). Money damages or other corrective forms of relief will not be able to fully remediate these injuries once they occur. Moreover, these injuries are also imminent, in that they are either ongoing or, at the latest, will begin when the Accession and Retention Directives take effect early next year.
These injuries are irreparable for the additional reason that they are the result of alleged violations of Plaintiffs’ rights to equal protection of the laws under the Fifth Amendment. “It has long been established that the loss of constitutional freedoms, ‘for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” Mills v. District of Columbia, 571 F.3d 1304, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)); see also Gordon v.
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Holder, 721 F.3d 638, 653 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“‘[A] prospective violation of a constitutional right constitutes irreparable injury.’”) (quoting Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342, 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1998)); Chaplaincy, 454 F.3d at 305 (“By alleging that Appellees are engaging in conduct that violates the Establishment Clause, Appellants have satisfied the irreparable injury prong of the preliminary injunction framework.”). Under this line of authority, Plaintiffs’ allegation of constitutional injury is sufficient to satisfy the irreparable injury requirement for issuance of a preliminary injunction.
3. Balance of Equities and Public Interest Finally, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have shown that the public interest and the balance of hardships weigh in favor of granting injunctive relief. “A party seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate both ‘that the balance of equities tips in [its] favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.’” FBME Bank Ltd. v. Lew, 125 F. Supp. 3d 109, 127 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 20) (alteration in original). “These factors merge when the Government is the opposing party.” Id. (quoting Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009)). As already established, the Presidential Memorandum is causing Plaintiffs serious ongoing harms and will cause them further harms in the near future absent an injunction. On this record, there are no countervailing equities or public interest in precluding transgender service members from the military that outweigh those harms. Defendants argue that “[t]he public has a strong interest in national defense.” Defs.’ Mem. at 41. They also argue that the military “is in the process of gathering a panel of experts” to provide advice and recommendations regarding “the development and implementation of the policy on military service by transgender individuals,” and that “[g]ranting Plaintiffs their requested relief would directly interfere with the
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panel’s work and the military’s ability to thoroughly study a complex and important issue regarding the composition of the armed forces.” Id. at 40–41.
Neither point passes muster. A bare invocation of “national defense” simply cannot defeat every motion for preliminary injunction that touches on the military. On the record before the Court, there is absolutely no support for the claim that the ongoing service of transgender people would have any negative effective on the military at all. In fact, there is considerable evidence that it is the discharge and banning of such individuals that would have such effects. The Court also notes that fifteen States have filed an amici brief indicating that they and their residents will be harmed by the Presidential Memorandum if it is not enjoined. See State Amici Brief at 13-22. Moreover, the injunction that will be issued will in no way prevent the government from conducting studies or gathering advice or recommendations on transgender service. The balance of equities and public interest accordingly weigh in favor of granting Plaintiffs’ motion.
IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons set out above, the Court will GRANT-IN-PART and DENY-IN-PART Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and GRANT-IN-PART and DENY-IN-PART Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction. The Court will grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims to the extent they are based on the Sex Reassignment Surgery Directive, as well as Plaintiffs’ estoppel claim. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED in all other respects. Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction is DENIED with respect to the Sex Reassignment Surgery Directive. Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction is GRANTED, however, in that the Court will preliminarily enjoin enforcement of the Accession and Retention Directives. The effect of the Court’s Order is to revert to the status quo with regard to accession and retention
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Case 1:17-cv-01597-CKK Document 61 Filed 10/30/17 Page 76 of 76 that existed before the issuance of the Presidential Memorandum—that is, the retention and accession policies established in the June 30, 2016 Directive-type Memorandum as modified by Secretary of Defense James Mattis on June 30, 2017. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
/s/ COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY United States District Judge
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 U.S. District Court District of Columbia (Washington, DC) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:17−cv−01597−CKK

TYPE−L

DOE et al v. TRUMP et al Assigned to: Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly Case in other court: USCA, 17−05267
USCA, 18−05257 Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act Non−Party Respondent HERITAGE FOUNDATION
Non−Party Respondent FAMILY RESEARCH COUNCIL, INC.
Plaintiff JANE DOE 1 TERMINATED: 04/06/2018

Date Filed: 08/09/2017 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Defendant
represented by Heidi K. Abegg WEBSTER, CHAMBERLAIN & BEAN, LLP 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Suite 1000 Washington, DC 20006 (202) 785−9500 Fax: (202) 835−0243 Email: habegg@wc−b.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Gene C. Schaerr SCHAERR JAFFE LLP 1717 K Street NW, Suite 900 Washington, DC 20006 202−787−1060 Fax: 202−776−0136 Email: gschaerr@schaerr−jaffe.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Kevin Matthew Lamb WILMER, CUTLER, PICKERING, HALE & DORR, LLP. 1875 Pennsylvania Ave., NW Washington, DC 20006 (202) 663−6000 Email: kevin.lamb@wilmerhale.com TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul R.Q. Wolfson WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE & DORR LLP 1875 Pennsylvania Ave., NW Suite 400E Washington, DC 20006 (202) 663−6000 Fax: (202) 663−6363 Email: paul.wolfson@wilmerhale.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam M. Cambier HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP

10 Saint James Ave. Suite 1100 Boston, MA 02116 (617) 526−6262 Fax: (617) 526−5000 Email: adam.cambier@wilmerhale.com TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alan E. Schoenfeld WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE & DORR, LLP 250 Greenwich Street 7 World Trade Center New York, NY 10007 (212) 937−7294 Fax: (212) 230−8888 Email: alan.schoenfeld@wilmerhale.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amy Whelan NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS 870 Market Street Suite 370 San Francisco, CA 94102 Email: awhelan@nclrights.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher R. Looney HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP 10 Saint James Ave. Suite 1100 Boston, MA 02116 (617) 526−6313 Fax: (617) 526−5000 Email: christopher.looney@wilmerhale.com TERMINATED: 09/12/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Christopher F. Stoll NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS 870 Market Street Suite 370 San Francisco, CA 94102 (415) 365−1320 Fax: (415) 392−8442 Email: cstoll@nclrights.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Claire Laporte FOLEY HOAG, LLP 155 Seaport Boulevard Boston, MA 02210−2600 (617) 832−1210 Fax: (617) 832−7000 Email: cll@foleyhoag.com TERMINATED: 07/03/2018 PRO HAC VICE

Daniel L. McFadden FOLEY HOAG, LLP 155 Seaport Boulevard Boston, MA 02210−2600 Email: DMcFadden@foleyhoag.com TERMINATED: 08/17/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Harriet Hoder WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE & DORR LLP 60 State Street Boston, MA 02109 (617) 526−6203 TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jennifer Levi GLBTQ LEGAL ADVOCATES & DEFENDERS 18 Tremont Street Suite 950 Boston, MA 02108 (617) 426−1350 Fax: (617) 426−3594 Email: jlevi@glad.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kathleen M. Brill FOLEY HOAG, LLP 155 Seaport Boulevard Boston, MA 02210−2600 (617) 832−1229 Fax: (617) 832−7000 Email: kbrill@foleyhoag.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren Godles Milgroom FOLEY HOAG, LLP 155 Seaport Boulevard Boston, MA 02210−2600 (617) 832−3052 Email: lmilgroom@foleyhoag.com TERMINATED: 07/03/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Mary L. Bonauto GLBTQ LEGAL ADVOCATES & DEFENDERS 18 Tremont Street Suite 950 Boston, MA 02108 617−426−1350 Email: mbonauto@glad.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew E. Miller FOLEY HOAG, LLP 155 Seaport Boulevard Boston, MA 02210−2600 (617) 832−3041

Plaintiff JANE DOE 2

Fax: (671) 832−7000 Email: mmiller@foleyhoag.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Licker FOLEY HOAG, LLP 155 Seaport Boulevard Boston, MA 02210−2600 (617) 832−1197 Fax: (617) 832−7000 Email: mlicker@foleyhoag.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nancy Lynn Schroeder WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE & DORR LLP 350 S. Grand Avenue Suite 2100 Los Angeles, CA 90071 (213) 443−5393 Fax: (213) 443−5400 Email: nancy.schroeder@wilmerhale.com TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rachel C. Hutchinson FOLEY HOAG, LLP 155 Seaport Boulevard Boston, MA 02210−2600 (617) 832−3063 Fax: (617) 832−7000 Email: rhutchinson@foleyhoag.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shannon P. Minter NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS 870 Market Street Suite 370 San Francisco, CA 94102 Email: sminter@nclrights.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theresa Roosevelt FOLEY HOAG LLP 1717 K Street, NW Washington, DC 20006 (202) 223−1200 Email: troosevelt@foleyhoag.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jennifer Fiorica Delgado LOWENSTEIN SANDLER LLP 1251 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10020 (646) 414−6962 Email: jdelgado@lowenstein.com LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kevin Matthew Lamb (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Meg Slachetka LOWENSTEIN SANDLER LLP 1251 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10020 (212) 419−5856 Email: mslachetka@lowenstein.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul R.Q. Wolfson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Zachary D. Rosenbaum KOBRE & KIM 800 3rd Ave 6th Floor New York, NY 10020 212−488−1200 Email: Zachary.Rosenbaum@kobrekim.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam M. Cambier (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam Granich Unikowsky JENNER & BLOCK LLP 1099 New York Avenue, NW Suite 900 Washington, DC 20001−4412 (202) 639−6041 Email: AUnikowsky@jenner.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alan E. Schoenfeld (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amy Whelan (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Benjamin Eidelson 1563 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 610−505−4214 Email: beidelson@law.harvard.edu ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher R. Looney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/12/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Christopher F. Stoll (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Claire Laporte (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/03/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Daniel L. McFadden (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/17/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Harriet Hoder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jennifer Levi (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kathleen M. Brill (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren Godles Milgroom (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/03/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Mary L. Bonauto (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew E. Miller (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Licker (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nancy Lynn Schroeder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rachel C. Hutchinson (See above for address)

Plaintiff JANE DOE 3

PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shannon P. Minter (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theresa Roosevelt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jennifer Fiorica Delgado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kevin Matthew Lamb (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Meg Slachetka (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul R.Q. Wolfson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Zachary D. Rosenbaum (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam M. Cambier (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam Granich Unikowsky (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alan E. Schoenfeld (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amy Whelan (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Benjamin Eidelson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher R. Looney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/12/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Christopher F. Stoll (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Claire Laporte (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/03/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Daniel L. McFadden (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/17/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Harriet Hoder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jennifer Levi (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kathleen M. Brill (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren Godles Milgroom (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/03/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Mary L. Bonauto (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew E. Miller (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Licker (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nancy Lynn Schroeder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rachel C. Hutchinson (See above for address)

Plaintiff JANE DOE 4

PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shannon P. Minter (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theresa Roosevelt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jennifer Fiorica Delgado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kevin Matthew Lamb (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Meg Slachetka (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul R.Q. Wolfson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Zachary D. Rosenbaum (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam M. Cambier (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam Granich Unikowsky (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alan E. Schoenfeld (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amy Whelan (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Benjamin Eidelson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher R. Looney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/12/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Christopher F. Stoll (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Claire Laporte (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/03/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Daniel L. McFadden (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/17/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Harriet Hoder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jennifer Levi (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kathleen M. Brill (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren Godles Milgroom (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/03/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Mary L. Bonauto (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew E. Miller (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Licker (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nancy Lynn Schroeder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rachel C. Hutchinson (See above for address)

Plaintiff JANE DOE 5

PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shannon P. Minter (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theresa Roosevelt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jennifer Fiorica Delgado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kevin Matthew Lamb (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Meg Slachetka (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul R.Q. Wolfson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Zachary D. Rosenbaum (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam M. Cambier (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam Granich Unikowsky (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alan E. Schoenfeld (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amy Whelan (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Benjamin Eidelson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher R. Looney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/12/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Christopher F. Stoll (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Claire Laporte (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/03/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Daniel L. McFadden (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/17/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Harriet Hoder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jennifer Levi (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kathleen M. Brill (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren Godles Milgroom (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/03/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Mary L. Bonauto (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew E. Miller (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Licker (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nancy Lynn Schroeder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rachel C. Hutchinson (See above for address)

Plaintiff DYLAN KOHERE

PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shannon P. Minter (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theresa Roosevelt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jennifer Fiorica Delgado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kevin Matthew Lamb (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Meg Slachetka (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul R.Q. Wolfson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Zachary D. Rosenbaum (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam M. Cambier (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam Granich Unikowsky (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alan E. Schoenfeld (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amy Whelan (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Benjamin Eidelson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher R. Looney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/12/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Christopher F. Stoll (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Claire Laporte (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/03/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Daniel L. McFadden (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/17/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Harriet Hoder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jennifer Levi (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kathleen M. Brill (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren Godles Milgroom (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/03/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Mary L. Bonauto (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew E. Miller (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Licker (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nancy Lynn Schroeder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rachel C. Hutchinson (See above for address)

Plaintiff REGAN V. KIBBY

PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shannon P. Minter (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theresa Roosevelt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jennifer Fiorica Delgado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kevin Matthew Lamb (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Meg Slachetka (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul R.Q. Wolfson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Zachary D. Rosenbaum (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam M. Cambier (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam Granich Unikowsky (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alan E. Schoenfeld (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amy Whelan (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Benjamin Eidelson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher R. Looney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/12/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Christopher F. Stoll (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Claire Laporte (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/03/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Daniel L. McFadden (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/17/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Harriet Hoder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jennifer Levi (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kathleen M. Brill (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren Godles Milgroom (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/03/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Mary L. Bonauto (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew E. Miller (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Licker (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nancy Lynn Schroeder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rachel C. Hutchinson (See above for address)

Plaintiff JOHN DOE, 1

PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shannon P. Minter (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theresa Roosevelt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jennifer Fiorica Delgado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kevin Matthew Lamb (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Meg Slachetka (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul R.Q. Wolfson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Zachary D. Rosenbaum (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam M. Cambier (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam Granich Unikowsky (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alan E. Schoenfeld (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amy Whelan (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Benjamin Eidelson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher R. Looney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/12/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Christopher F. Stoll (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Claire Laporte (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/03/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Daniel L. McFadden (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/17/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Harriet Hoder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jennifer Levi (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kathleen M. Brill (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren Godles Milgroom (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/03/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Mary L. Bonauto (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew E. Miller (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Licker (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nancy Lynn Schroeder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rachel C. Hutchinson (See above for address)

Plaintiff JANE DOE 6
Plaintiff JANE DOE 7

PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shannon P. Minter (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theresa Roosevelt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jennifer Fiorica Delgado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kevin Matthew Lamb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Meg Slachetka (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Zachary D. Rosenbaum (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam Granich Unikowsky (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alan E. Schoenfeld (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Benjamin Eidelson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul R.Q. Wolfson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jennifer Fiorica Delgado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kevin Matthew Lamb (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Meg Slachetka

Plaintiff JOHN DOE 2

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Zachary D. Rosenbaum (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam Granich Unikowsky (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alan E. Schoenfeld (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Benjamin Eidelson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul R.Q. Wolfson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jennifer Fiorica Delgado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kevin Matthew Lamb (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Meg Slachetka (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Zachary D. Rosenbaum (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam Granich Unikowsky (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alan E. Schoenfeld (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Benjamin Eidelson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul R.Q. Wolfson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2019

V. Defendant DONALD J. TRUMP in his official capacity as President of the United States TERMINATED: 08/06/2018
Defendant JAMES N. MATTIS in his official capacity as Secretary of Defense
Defendant JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR. in his official capacity as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Defendant UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Andrew Evan Carmichael U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch 1100 L Street NW Washington, DC 20005 (202) 514−3346 Fax: (202) 616−8460 Email: andrew.e.carmichael@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Bradley Parker U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE P.O. Box 883 Washington, DC 20044 (202) 514−4336 Fax: (202) 616−8202 Email: ryan.parker@usdoj.gov TERMINATED: 06/07/2018
represented by Andrew Evan Carmichael (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Courtney Danielle Enlow U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch 1100 L Street NW Washington, DC 20005 (202) 616−8467 Email: courtney.d.enlow@usdoj.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Bradley Parker (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/07/2018
represented by Andrew Evan Carmichael (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Courtney Danielle Enlow (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Bradley Parker (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/07/2018
represented by Andrew Evan Carmichael (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Defendant RYAN D. MCCARTHY in his official capacity as Secretary of the Army TERMINATED: 04/06/2018
Defendant UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
Defendant HEATHER A. WILSON in her official capacity as Secretary of the Air Force
Defendant UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Courtney Danielle Enlow (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Bradley Parker (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/07/2018
represented by Andrew Evan Carmichael (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Bradley Parker (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/07/2018
represented by Andrew Evan Carmichael (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Courtney Danielle Enlow (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Bradley Parker (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/07/2018
represented by Andrew Evan Carmichael (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Courtney Danielle Enlow (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Bradley Parker (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/07/2018
represented by Andrew Evan Carmichael (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Courtney Danielle Enlow (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Bradley Parker (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/07/2018

Defendant ELAINE C. DUKE in her official capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security TERMINATED: 04/06/2018
Defendant UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Defendant UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Defendant DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY
Defendant RICHARD V. SPENCER in his official capacity as Secretary of the Navy

represented by Andrew Evan Carmichael (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Bradley Parker (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/07/2018
represented by Andrew Evan Carmichael (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Courtney Danielle Enlow (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Bradley Parker (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/07/2018
represented by Andrew Evan Carmichael (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Courtney Danielle Enlow (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Bradley Parker (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/07/2018
represented by Andrew Evan Carmichael (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Courtney Danielle Enlow (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Bradley Parker (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/07/2018
represented by Andrew Evan Carmichael (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Courtney Danielle Enlow (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant RAQUEL C. BONO in her official capacity as Director of the Defense Health Agency
Defendant MARK T. ESPER In his Official Capacity as Secretary of the Army
Defendant KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN In her official capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security
Movant AMERICAN ACADEMY OF FAMILY PHYSICIANS
Movant AMERICAN ACADEMY OF NURSING

Ryan Bradley Parker (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/07/2018
represented by Andrew Evan Carmichael (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Courtney Danielle Enlow (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Bradley Parker (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/07/2018
represented by Andrew Evan Carmichael (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Courtney Danielle Enlow (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Bradley Parker (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/07/2018
represented by Andrew Evan Carmichael (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Courtney Danielle Enlow (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Bradley Parker (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/07/2018
represented by Scott B. Wilkens WILEY REIN LLP 1776 K Street, NW Washington, DC 20006 (202) 719−3346 Email: swilkens@wileyrein.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Scott B. Wilkens (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant AMERICAN COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS
Movant AMERICAN MEDICAL WOMEN'S ASSOCIATION
Movant AMERICAN NURSES ASSOCIATION
Movant ASSOCIATION OF MEDICAL SCHOOL PEDIATRIC DEPARTMENT CHAIRS
Movant ENDOCRINE SOCIETY
Movant GLMA: HEALTH PROFESSIONALS ADVANCING LGBT EQUALITY
Movant NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SOCIAL WORKERS
Movant PEDIATRIC ENDOCRINE SOCIETY
Movant WORLD PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH
Movant TREVOR PROJECT

represented by Scott B. Wilkens (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Scott B. Wilkens (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Scott B. Wilkens (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Scott B. Wilkens (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Scott B. Wilkens (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Scott B. Wilkens (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Scott B. Wilkens (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Scott B. Wilkens (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Scott B. Wilkens (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Howard Sean Hogan GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, LLP 1050 Connecticut Avenue, NW

Movant NATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY
Movant TENNESSEE TRANSGENDER POLITICAL COALITION
Movant TGI NETWORK OF RHODE ISLAND
Movant TRANSGENDER ALLIES GROUP
Movant TRANSGENDER LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATION FUND

Washington, DC 20036 (202) 955−3640 Fax: (202) 467−0539 Email: hhogan@gibsondunn.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Susan Baker Manning MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP 1111 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20004−2541 (202) 373−6172 Fax: (202) 373−6472 Email: susan.manning@morganlewis.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephanie Schuster MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP 1111 Pennsyvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20004 (202) 373−6595 Email: stephanie.schuster@morganlewis.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Susan Baker Manning (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephanie Schuster (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Susan Baker Manning (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephanie Schuster (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Susan Baker Manning (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephanie Schuster (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Susan Baker Manning (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant TRANSOHIO
Movant TRANSGENDER RESOURCE CENTER OF NEW MEXICO
Movant SOUTHERN ARIZONA GENDER ALLIANCE
Movant BUZZFEED, INC.
Amicus MASSACHUSETTS
Amicus CALIFORNIA Amicus

Stephanie Schuster (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Susan Baker Manning (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephanie Schuster (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Susan Baker Manning (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephanie Schuster (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Susan Baker Manning (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephanie Schuster (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Matthew Lynn Schafer BUZZFEED INC. 111 East 18th Street 14th Floor New York, NY 10003 (646) 798−0693 Fax: (212) 431−7461 Email: matthew.schafer@buzzfeed.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Sara A. Colb MASSACHUSETTS ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE 1 Ashburton Place Boston, MA 02108 (617) 963−2031 Email: sara.colb@state.ma.us LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

CONNECTICUT
Amicus CONNECTICUT
Amicus DELAWARE
Amicus HAWAII
Amicus ILLINOIS
Amicus IOWA
Amicus MARYLAND
Amicus NEW MEXICO
Amicus NEW YORK
Amicus OREGON
Amicus PENNSYLVANIA
Amicus RHODE ISLAND
Amicus VERMONT
Amicus RETIRED MILITARY OFFICERS AND FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY OFFICIALS

represented by Phillip Michael Spector MESSING & SPECTOR LLP Office of the President 1200 Steuart Street Suite 2112 Baltimore, MD 21230 (202) 277−8173 Email: ps@messingspector.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 08/09/2017

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, against ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE

08/09/2017 08/09/2017 08/10/2017 08/11/2017
08/11/2017 08/11/2017 08/11/2017 08/30/2017 08/30/2017
08/30/2017
08/31/2017

ARMY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON ( Filing fee $ 400 receipt number 0090−5066975) filed by JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Summons − Trump, # 3 Summons − Mattis, # 4 Summons − Dunford, # 5 Summons − U.S. Army, # 6 Summons − McCarthy, # 7 Summons − U.S. Air Force, # 8 Summons − Wilson, # 9 Summons − U.S. Coast Guard, # 10 Summons − Duke, # 11 Summons − U.S.A.)(Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 08/09/2017)
2 MOTION to Proceed Under Pseudonyms , by JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5 (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 08/09/2017)
Case Assigned to Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly. (sth) (Entered: 08/11/2017)
3 ORDER granting 2 Motion for Plaintiffs to proceed under pseudonyms. Signed by Judge Amy Berman Jackson on 8/10/17. (sth) (Entered: 08/11/2017)
4 SUMMONS (9) Issued Electronically as to ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, HEATHER A. WILSON. (Attachments: # 1 Summons, # 2 Summons, # 3 Summons, # 4 Summons, # 5 Summons, # 6 Summons, # 7 Summons, # 8 Summons, # 9 Summons)(sth) (Entered: 08/11/2017)
SUMMONS Not Issued as to US Attorney and the US Attorney General. (sth) (Entered: 08/11/2017)
5 ORDER ESTABLISHING PROCEDURES FOR CASES ASSIGNED TO JUDGE COLLEEN KOLLAR−KOTELLY. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 08/11/2017. (DM) (Entered: 08/11/2017)
6 SEALED DOCUMENT filed by JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5(This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.)(Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 08/11/2017)
7 NOTICE of Appearance by Kevin Matthew Lamb on behalf of JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5 (Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 08/30/2017)
8 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Alan E. Schoenfeld, :Firm− Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, :Address− 7 World Trade Center, 250 Greenwich Street, New York, NY 10007. Phone No. − 212−937−7294. Fax No. − 212−230−8888 Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0090−5096409. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5 (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Alan E. Schoenfeld In Support of Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 08/30/2017)
MINUTE ORDER GRANTING 8 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice of Attorney Alan E. Schoenfeld, in order for him to appear as co−counsel for Plaintiffs, contingent on said attorney filing a declaration certifying familiarity with this Court's Local Rules by no later than SEPTEMBER 6, 2017. Counsel shall promptly register for this Court's CM/ECF system. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 8/30/2017. (lcckk3) (Entered: 08/30/2017)
9 AMENDED COMPLAINT for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, against ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, RAQUEL C. BONO filed by JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, DYLAN KOHERE, REGAN V. KIBBY, JOHN DOE, 1. (Attachments: # 1 Summons − U.S. Department of the Navy, # 2 Summons − Defense Health Agency, # 3 Summons − Raquel C. Bono, # 4 Summons − Richard V. Spencer)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 08/31/2017)

08/31/2017
08/31/2017 08/31/2017 08/31/2017
08/31/2017 08/31/2017 09/01/2017 09/01/2017 09/01/2017

10 REQUEST FOR SUMMONS TO ISSUE (Summons − Air Force) re 9 Amended Complaint,, filed by JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 3, DYLAN KOHERE, JANE DOE 4, JOHN DOE, 1, REGAN V. KIBBY, JANE DOE 5. Related document: 9 Amended Complaint,, filed by DYLAN KOHERE, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JOHN DOE, 1, REGAN V. KIBBY. (Attachments: # 1 Summons − Army, # 2 Summons − Coast Guard, # 3 Summons − Duke, # 4 Summons − Dunford, # 5 Summons − Mattis, # 6 Summons − McCarthy, # 7 Summons − Trump, # 8 Summons − United States, # 9 Summons − Wilson)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 08/31/2017)
11 SEALED DOCUMENT filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE(This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 08/31/2017)
12 NOTICE of Appearance by Ryan Bradley Parker on behalf of All Defendants (Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 08/31/2017)
13 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with 65.1(d) Expedited Request, by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Kevin M. Lamb, # 2 Exhibit A−F (Lamb Dec.), # 3 Declaration of Brad R. Carson, # 4 Exhibit A−C (Carson Dec.), # 5 Declaration of Deborah Lee James, # 6 Exhibit A−D (James Dec.), # 7 Declaration of Eric K. Fanning, # 8 Exhibit A−F (Fanning Dec.), # 9 Declaration of Raymond Edwin Mabus, Jr., # 10 Exhibit A−F (Mabus Dec.), # 11 Declaration of George Richard Brown, MD, DFAPA, # 12 Exhibit A−D (Brown Dec.), # 13 Declaration of Margaret C. Wilmoth, # 14 Declaration of Regan V. Kibby, # 15 Declaration of Dylan Kohere, # 16 Text of Proposed Order)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 08/31/2017)
14 MOTION for Hearing Request for Expedited Hearing and Statement of Facts Making Expedition Essential, by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE re 13 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with 65.1(d) Expedited Request, (Lamb, Kevin) Modified event title on 9/1/2017 (znmw). (Entered: 08/31/2017)
15 SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Christopher R. Looney, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Text of Proposed Order (SEALED))(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 08/31/2017)
16 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Jennifer Levi, :Firm− GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders, :Address− 30 Winter St., Ste. 800, Boston, Massachusetts 02108. Phone No. − 617−426−1350. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0090−5099052. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Declaration Jennifer Levi, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 09/01/2017)
17 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Shannon P. Minter, :Firm− National Center for Lesbian Rights, :Address− 870 Market St., Ste. 370, San Francisco, California 94102. Phone No. − 415−392−6257. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0090−5099060. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Shannon P. Minter, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 09/01/2017)
18 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Mary L. Bonauto, :Firm− GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders, :Address− 30 Winter St., Ste. 800, Boston, Massachusetts 02108. Phone No. − 617−426−1350. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0090−5099075. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Mary L. Bonauto, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 09/01/2017)

09/01/2017 09/01/2017
09/01/2017 09/01/2017 09/01/2017 09/01/2017
09/01/2017 09/01/2017 09/01/2017 09/01/2017

19 NOTICE of Filing of Supplemental Declaration of Alan E. Schoenfeld in Support of Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE re Order on Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice, (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Alan E. Schoenfeld)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 09/01/2017)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court held a teleconference in this matter on September 1, 2017 to set a briefing schedule for Plaintiffs' 13 Application for a Preliminary Injunction. At the parties' request, the Court entered the following schedule: Defendants shall file an opposition to Plaintiffs' Application by no later than SEPTEMBER 22, 2017. Plaintiffs shall file a reply by no later than SEPTEMBER 29, 2017. The parties were also ordered to file a notice with the Court by no later than SEPTEMBER 6, 2017 indicating their positions as to whether the Court's consideration of Plaintiffs' preliminary injunction application should be consolidated with its final determination of the merits of the case. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 9/1/2017. (lcckk3) (Entered: 09/01/2017)
20 SUMMONS (5) Issued Electronically as to RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. (znmw) (Entered: 09/01/2017)
21 SUMMONS (9) Reissued Electronically as to ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, HEATHER A. WILSON (znmw) (Entered: 09/01/2017)
22 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Christopher R. Looney, :Firm− Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, :Address− 60 State Street, Boston, MA 02109. Phone No. − 617−526−6313. Fax No. − 617−526−5000 Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0090−5100097. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Christopher R. Looney, # 2 Proposed Order)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 09/01/2017)
23 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Nancy Lynn Schroeder, :Firm− Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, :Address− 350 S. Grand Avenue, Suite 2100, Los Angeles, CA 90071. Phone No. − (213) 443−5393. Fax No. − (213) 443−5400 Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0090−5100160. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Nancy Lynn Schroeder, # 2 Proposed Order)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 09/01/2017)
24 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Adam M. Cambier, :Firm− Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, :Address− 60 State Street, Boston, MA 02109. Phone No. − 617−526−6262. Fax No. − 617−526−5000 Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0090−5100204. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Adam M. Cambier, # 2 Proposed Order)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 09/01/2017)
25 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Christopher F. Stoll, :Firm− National Center for Lesbian Rights, :Address− 870 Market St., Ste. 370, San Francisco, California 94102. Phone No. − 415−392−6257. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0090−5100239. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Christopher F. Stoll, # 2 Proposed Order)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 09/01/2017)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Amy Berman Jackson: Telephone Conference on the record held on 9/1/2017. Defendants' Response to 13 due by 9/22/2017. Plaintiffs' Reply due by 9/29/2017. Joint Status Report due by 9/6/2017. (Court Reporter Janice Dickman.) (dot) (Entered: 09/01/2017)
26 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Amy Whelan, :Firm− National Center for Lesbian Rights, :Address− 870 Market St., Ste. 370, San

09/01/2017 09/01/2017 09/01/2017 09/01/2017 09/01/2017 09/01/2017 09/05/2017 09/06/2017

Francisco, California 94102. Phone No. − 415−392−6257. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0090−5100283. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Declration of Amy Whelan, # 2 Proposed Order)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 09/01/2017)
27 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Kathleen M. Brill, :Firm− Foley Hoag LLP, :Address− 155 Seaport Boulevard, Boston, MA 02210. Phone No. − 617−832−1229. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0090−5100368. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Kathleen M. Brill, # 2 Proposed Order)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 09/01/2017)
28 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Rachel C. Hutchinson, :Firm− Foley Hoag LLP, :Address− 155 Seaport Boulevard, Boston, MA 02210. Phone No. − 617−832−3063. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0090−5100387. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Rachel C. Hutchinson, # 2 Proposed Order)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 09/01/2017)
29 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Claire Laporte, :Firm− Foley Hoag LLP, :Address− 155 Seaport Boulevard, Boston, MA 02210. Phone No. − 617−832−1210. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0090−5100401. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Claire Laporte, # 2 Proposed Order)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 09/01/2017)
30 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Michael J. Licker, :Firm− Foley Hoag LLP, :Address− 155 Seaport Boulevard, Boston, MA 02210. Phone No. − 617−832−1197. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0090−5100412. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Michael J. Licker, # 2 Proposed Order)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 09/01/2017)
31 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Daniel L. McFadden, :Firm− Foley Hoag LLP, :Address− 155 Seaport Boulevard, Boston, MA 02210. Phone No. − 617−832−1293. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0090−5100477. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Daniel L. McFadden, # 2 Proposed Order)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 09/01/2017)
32 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Matthew E. Miller, :Firm− Foley Hoag LLP, :Address− 155 Seaport Boulevard, Boston, MA 02210. Phone No. − 617−832−3041. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0090−5100489. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Matthew E. Miller, # 2 Proposed Order)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 09/01/2017)
MINUTE ORDER GRANTING 16 , 17 , 18 , 22 , 23 , 24 , 25 , 26 , 27 , 28 , 29 , 30 , 31 and 32 Motions for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Attorneys Jennifer Levi, Shannon P. Minter, Mary L. Bonauto, Christopher R. Looney, Nancy Lynn Schroeder, Adam M. Cambier, Christopher F. Stoll, Amy Whelan, Kathleen M. Brill, Rachel C. Hutchinson, Claire Laporte, Michael J. Licker, Daniel L. McFadden and Matthew E. Miller in order for them to appear as co−counsel for Plaintiffs. Counsel shall promptly register for this Court's CM/ECF system. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 9/5/2017. (lcckk3) (Entered: 09/05/2017)
33 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Harriet Hoder, :Firm− Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP, :Address− 60 State Street, Boston, MA 02109. Phone No. − 617−526−6203. Fax No. − 617−526−5000 Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0090−5104723. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY,

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DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Harriet Hoder, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 09/06/2017)
34 NOTICE regarding Consolidation of Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and the Merits of Plaintiffs' Claims by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Presidential Memorandum regarding Military Service by Transgender Individuals)(Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 09/06/2017)
35 RESPONSE TO ORDER OF THE COURT re Order,,, filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 09/06/2017)
MINUTE ORDER GRANTING 33 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Attorney Harriet Hoder in order for her to appear as co−counsel for Plaintiffs. Counsel shall promptly register for this Court's CM/ECF system. There are now 16 attorneys who are appearing pro hac vice on behalf of Plaintiffs. The Court notes that attorneys for Plaintiffs only need to move to appear pro hac vice before the Court if they are actually going to participate in Court proceedings. LCvR 83.2(d). Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 9/8/2017. (lcckk3) (Entered: 09/08/2017)
36 ORDER Regarding Plaintiffs' 13 Application for a Preliminary Injunction, 14 Request for Expedited Hearing and 15 Motion for Leave to File Documents under Seal. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 9/10/2017. (lcckk3) (Entered: 09/10/2017)
37 Joint MOTION for Protective Order by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 09/12/2017)
38 ORDER granting 37 Motion for Protective Order. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 9/13/17. (dot) (Entered: 09/18/2017)
39 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to Respond to Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Unopposed MOTION for Briefing Schedule by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 09/20/2017)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court is in receipt of Defendants' 39 Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction and for Entry of a Briefing Schedule. Defendants request an additional two weeks to file their opposition to Plaintiffs' Application for Preliminary Injunction and a motion to dismiss. They also request a briefing schedule on these motions that would not be complete until October 27, 2017. The Court will GRANT−IN−PART Defendants' motion. The parties shall adhere to the following schedule: Defendants shall file their opposition to Plaintiffs' Application for Preliminary Injunction and Motion to Dismiss by no later than OCTOBER 2, 2017. Plaintiffs shall file a reply in support of their Application and an opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss by no later than OCTOBER 13, 2017. Defendants shall file a reply in support of their Motion to Dismiss by no later than OCTOBER 20, 2017. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 9/20/2017. (lcckk3) (Entered: 09/20/2017)
40 REDACTED DOCUMENT− Declaration of Christopher R. Looney in Support of Plaintiffs' Application for Preliminary Injunction to 13 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with 65.1(d) Expedited Request,, 36 Order by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1,

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JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 09/21/2017)
41 RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed. RAQUEL C. BONO served on 9/5/2017; DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY served on 9/5/2017; ELAINE C. DUKE served on 9/5/2017; JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR. served on 9/6/2017; JAMES N. MATTIS served on 9/6/2017; RYAN D. MCCARTHY served on 9/5/2017; RICHARD V. SPENCER served on 9/6/2017; DONALD J. TRUMP served on 9/11/2017; UNITED STATES COAST GUARD served on 9/5/2017; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE served on 9/5/2017; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY served on 9/5/2017; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY served on 9/5/2017; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA served on 9/6/2017; HEATHER A. WILSON served on 9/5/2017 (Attachments: # 1 Summons Executed as to AirForce, # 2 Summons Executed as to Army, # 3 Summons Executed as to Bono, # 4 Summons Executed as to Coast Guard, # 5 Summons Executed as to DHA, # 6 Summons Executed as to Duke, # 7 Summons Executed as to Dunford, # 8 Summons Executed as to Mattis, # 9 Summons Executed as to McCarthy, # 10 Summons Executed as to Navy, # 11 Summons Executed as to Spencer, # 12 Summons Executed as to USA, # 13 Summons Executed as to Wilson, # 14 Proof of Service as to U.S. Attorney General, # 15 Proof of Service as to U.S. Attorney's Office − District of D.C., # 16 Certificate of Service)(Schoenfeld, Alan) (Entered: 09/29/2017)
42 MOTION for Extension of Time to Respond to Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Interim Guidance, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 09/29/2017)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court is in receipt of Defendants' 42 Opposed Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Defendants request an additional two days to file their opposition to Plaintiffs' Application for Preliminary Injunction because they need additional time to prepare declarations and for senior Executive Branch officials to review their forthcoming pleadings. Defendants represent that Plaintiffs oppose this extension, but no opposition has yet been filed. Because the record supporting Plaintiffs' motion is large and the requested extension is brief, the Court will GRANT Defendants' motion over Plaintiffs' objection. Defendants shall file their opposition to Plaintiffs' Application for Preliminary Injunction and Motion to Dismiss by no later than OCTOBER 4, 2017. This is the final extension that will be granted. Additionally, the Court notes that Defendants' motion is untimely. The Order Establishing Procedures in this case states that "[m]otions for extensions of time must be filed at least four (4) business days prior to the first affected deadline." ECF No. 5 at 3. The Court expects all future motions to be filed on time. If Plaintiffs require additional time, they may file their reply and opposition by OCTOBER 16, 2017. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 9/29/2017. (lcckk3) (Entered: 09/29/2017)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Defendants' Response to 13 due by 10/4/2017. Reply due by 10/16/2017. (dot) (Entered: 10/02/2017)
43 RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed on United States Attorney General. Date of Service Upon United States Attorney General 9/5/2017., RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed as to the United States Attorney. Date of Service Upon United States Attorney on 9/11/2017. ( Answer due for ALL FEDERAL DEFENDANTS by 11/10/2017.) (See Docket Entry 41 to view document). (znmw) (Entered: 10/02/2017)
44 MOTION for Leave to File Brief as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs on Behalf of Medical, Nursing, Mental Health, and Other Health Care Organizations by AMERICAN ACADEMY OF FAMILY PHYSICIANS, AMERICAN ACADEMY OF NURSING, AMERICAN COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS, AMERICAN MEDICAL

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WOMEN'S ASSOCIATION, AMERICAN NURSES ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION OF MEDICAL SCHOOL PEDIATRIC DEPARTMENT CHAIRS, ENDOCRINE SOCIETY, GLMA: HEALTH PROFESSIONALS ADVANCING LGBT EQUALITY, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SOCIAL WORKERS, PEDIATRIC ENDOCRINE SOCIETY, WORLD PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH (Attachments: # 1 Brief of Amici Curiae Medical, Nursing, Mental Health, and Other Health Care Organizations in Support of Plaintiffs, # 2 Proposed Order)(Wilkens, Scott) (Entered: 10/04/2017)
45 MOTION to Dismiss < by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Interim Guidance, # 2 Declaration of Robert B. Chadwick, # 3 Declaration of Robert O. Burns, # 4 Text of Proposed Order)(Parker, Ryan) . (Entered: 10/04/2017)
46 SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL filed by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Declaration as to Jane Doe 1, # 2 Declaration as to Jane Doe 2, # 3 Declaration as to Jane Doe 3, # 4 Declaration as to Jane Doe 4, # 5 Declaration as to Jane Doe 5, # 6 Declaration as to John Doe 1)(Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 10/04/2017)
47 Memorandum in opposition to re 13 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with 65.1(d) Expedited Request, filed by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON. (See Docket Entry 45 to view document). (znmw) (Entered: 10/05/2017)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court has received Defendant's 46 Consent Motion for Leave to File Documents Under Seal. That motion seeks leave to file under seal certain declarations that "contain information identifying the Plaintiffs who are proceeding in this action under pseudonyms." The motion also indicates that Defendants have "requested that Plaintiffs' counsel propose redactions to the declarations that will allow them to be filed on the public record without placing the Plaintiffs' identities at risk of disclosure." Having considered the familiar Hubbard factors for sealing, and given that the Court has previously permitted Plaintiffs to proceed under pseudonyms to protect their anonymity, the 46 Motion shall be GRANTED. See EEOC v. Nat'l Childrens Ctr. Inc., 98 F.3d 1406, 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (listing factors). However, this ruling is CONTINGENT on the parties filing mutually agreeable redacted versions of the declarations at issue on the public docket by OCTOBER 20, 2017. Any content in these documents that would not expose the identities of the Plaintiffs shall be made publicly available. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 10/5/2017. (lcckk1) (Entered: 10/05/2017)
48 SEALED DOCUMENT (Declarations) re 47 Memorandum in Opposition, 45 MOTION to Dismiss and Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction filed by RYAN D. MCCARTHY, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, RICHARD V. SPENCER, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RAQUEL C. BONO, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, HEATHER A. WILSON, ELAINE C. DUKE. (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Declaration as to Jane Doe 2, # 2 Declaration as to Jane Doe 3, # 3 Declaration as to Jane Doe 4, # 4

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Declaration as to Jane Doe 5, # 5 Declaration as to John Doe 1)(znmw) (Entered: 10/06/2017)
49 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief by TREVOR PROJECT (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Proposed Amicus Brief, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Hogan, Howard) (Entered: 10/11/2017)
50 AMICUS BRIEF by MASSACHUSETTS (td) Modified on 10/16/2017 as to filer(s) (jf). (Entered: 10/16/2017)
51 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File Declarations in Opposition to the Government's Motion to Dismiss and in Further Support of Plaintiffs' Application for Preliminary Injunction by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Raymond Edwin Mabus, # 2 Declaration of Deborah Lee Jones, # 3 Declaration of Eric K. Fanning, # 4 Declaration of Mark J. Eitelberg, # 5 Declaration of George R. Brown)(Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 10/16/2017)
52 MOTION for Leave to File Brief of Amici Curiae by NATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, TENNESSEE TRANSGENDER POLITICAL COALITION, TGI NETWORK OF RHODE ISLAND, TRANSGENDER ALLIES GROUP, TRANSGENDER LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATION FUND, TRANSOHIO, TRANSGENDER RESOURCE CENTER OF NEW MEXICO, SOUTHERN ARIZONA GENDER ALLIANCE (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Brief of Amici Curiae, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Manning, Susan) (Entered: 10/16/2017)
53 NOTICE of Appearance by Susan Baker Manning on behalf of NATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, SOUTHERN ARIZONA GENDER ALLIANCE, TENNESSEE TRANSGENDER POLITICAL COALITION, TGI NETWORK OF RHODE ISLAND, TRANSGENDER ALLIES GROUP, TRANSGENDER LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATION FUND, TRANSGENDER RESOURCE CENTER OF NEW MEXICO, TRANSOHIO (Manning, Susan) (Entered: 10/16/2017)
54 NOTICE of Appearance by Stephanie Schuster on behalf of NATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, SOUTHERN ARIZONA GENDER ALLIANCE, TENNESSEE TRANSGENDER POLITICAL COALITION, TGI NETWORK OF RHODE ISLAND, TRANSGENDER ALLIES GROUP, TRANSGENDER LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATION FUND, TRANSGENDER RESOURCE CENTER OF NEW MEXICO, TRANSOHIO (Schuster, Stephanie) (Entered: 10/16/2017)
55 Memorandum in opposition to re 45 MOTION to Dismiss and Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 10/16/2017)
56 NOTICE of Filing Redacted Declarations by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Brian Judge pertaining to Jane Doe 1, # 2 Declaration pertaining to Jane Doe 2, # 3 Declaration pertaining to Jane Doe 3, # 4 Declaration pertaining to Jane Doe 4, # 5 Declaration of Daniel Sitterly pertaining to Jane Doe 5, # 6 Declaration pertaining to John Doe 1)(Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 10/20/2017)
57 REPLY to opposition to motion re 45 MOTION to Dismiss filed by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON. (Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 10/20/2017)

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58 ERRATA Correcting Defendants' Reply In Support of Their Motion to Dismiss by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON 57 Reply to opposition to Motion, filed by RYAN D. MCCARTHY, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, RICHARD V. SPENCER, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RAQUEL C. BONO, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, JAMES N. MATTIS, HEATHER A. WILSON, ELAINE C. DUKE. (Attachments: # 1 Defendants' Corrected Reply in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss)(Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 10/23/2017)
59 NOTICE of Appearance by Christopher F. Stoll on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Stoll, Christopher) (Entered: 10/23/2017)
60 ORDER GRANTING−IN−PART and DENYING−IN−PART Defendants' 45 Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs' 13 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 10/30/2017. (lcckk3) (Entered: 10/30/2017)
61 MEMORANDUM OPINION Regarding 60 ORDER GRANTING−IN−PART and DENYING−IN−PART Defendants' 45 Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs' 13 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 10/30/2017. (lcckk3) (Entered: 10/30/2017)
62 Joint STATUS REPORT in Response to October 30, 2017 Order by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 11/10/2017)
63 ORDER Regarding the parties' 62 Joint Status Report. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 11/14/2017. (lcckk3) (Entered: 11/14/2017)
64 ORDER FOR INITIAL SCHEDULING CONFERENCE. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 11/14/2017. (lcckk3) (Entered: 11/14/2017)
MINUTE ORDER. The parties shall file their Joint Statement addressing all topics listed in Local Rule 16.3(c) by no later than NOVEMBER 21, 2017. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 11/17/2017. (lcckk3) (Entered: 11/17/2017)
65 MEET AND CONFER STATEMENT. (Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 11/21/2017)
66 NOTICE OF APPEAL TO DC CIRCUIT COURT as to 60 Order on Motion for Leave to File, Order on Motion to Dismiss,,,, Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction by JAMES N. MATTIS, RAQUEL C. BONO, ELAINE C. DUKE, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, HEATHER A. WILSON, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., RICHARD V. SPENCER. Fee Status: No Fee Paid. Parties have been notified. (Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 11/21/2017)
67 MOTION to ClarifyCourt's Order of October 30, 2017 by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 11/22/2017)
68 Transmission of the Notice of Appeal, Order Appealed (Memorandum Opinion), and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals docketing fee was not paid because the appeal was filed by the government re 66 Notice of Appeal to DC Circuit Court,,. (td) (Entered: 11/22/2017)

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69 Memorandum in opposition to re 67 MOTION to ClarifyCourt's Order of October 30, 2017 filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 11/27/2017)
70 ORDER Regarding Defendants' 67 Motion for Clarification of the Court's October 30, 2017 Order. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 11/27/2017. (lcckk3) (Entered: 11/27/2017)
71 SCHEDULING AND PROCEDURES ORDER. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 11/28/2017. (lcckk3) (Entered: 11/28/2017)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly: Initial Scheduling Conference held on 11/28/2017. Amended Pleadings due by 12/15/2017. Discovery due by 3/30/2018. Joint Discovery Plan due by 12/15/2017. Initial Disclosure due by 12/15/2017. Proponent's Rule 26(a)(2)(B)&(C) Disclosures due by 2/5/2018; Opponent's Rule 26(a)(2)(B)&(C) Disclosures due by 3/5/2018; and Replies, if any due by 3/12/2018. Status Conference set for 4/6/2018 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 28A before Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly. (Court Reporter Richard Ehrlich.) (dot) (Entered: 11/28/2017)
72 TRANSCRIPT OF SCHEDULING CONFERENCE before Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly held on November 28, 2017; Page Numbers: 1 − 31. Date of Issuance:November 30, 2017. Court Reporter/Transcriber Richard D. Ehrlich, Telephone number (202) 354−3269, Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the Transcript Order Form
For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.
NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.
Redaction Request due 12/21/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/31/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/28/2018.(Ehrlich, Richard) (Entered: 11/30/2017)
USCA Case Number 17−5267 for 66 Notice of Appeal to DC Circuit Court,, filed by RYAN D. MCCARTHY, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, RICHARD V. SPENCER, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RAQUEL C. BONO, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, JAMES N. MATTIS, HEATHER A. WILSON, ELAINE C. DUKE. (zrdj) (Entered: 12/04/2017)
73 MOTION to Stay Portion of Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Lernes J. Herbert, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 12/06/2017)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court is in receipt of Defendants' 73 Motion for Partial Stay of Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal. Plaintiff shall file a response by no later than DECEMBER 8, 2017 at NOON. Defendants have waived their right to file a reply. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 12/7/2017. (lcckk3) (Entered: 12/07/2017)

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Set/Reset Deadlines: Plaintiff's Response to Motion for Partial Stay of Preliminary Injunction due by 12/8/2017. (kt) (Entered: 12/07/2017)
74 Memorandum in opposition to re 73 MOTION to Stay Portion of Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 12/08/2017)
75 ORDER DENYING Defendants' 73 Motion for a Partial Stay of the Court's Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 12/11/2017. (lcckk3) (Entered: 12/11/2017)
76 Joint STATUS REPORT Setting Forth Detailed Discovery Plan by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON. (Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 12/15/2017)
77 Joint STATUS REPORT Supplementing Discovery Plan by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON. (Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 12/22/2017)
78 ANSWER to 9 Amended Complaint,, by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON.(Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 12/29/2017)
79 MANDATE of USCA as to 66 Notice of Appeal to DC Circuit Court,, filed by RYAN D. MCCARTHY, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, RICHARD V. SPENCER, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RAQUEL C. BONO, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, JAMES N. MATTIS, HEATHER A. WILSON, ELAINE C. DUKE ; USCA Case Number 17−5267. (Attachments: # 1 USCA Order)(ztd) (Entered: 01/05/2018)
Set/Reset Hearings: Telephone Conference on the record set for 1/9/2018 at 1:30 PM in Chambers before Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly. (dot) (Entered: 01/09/2018)
80 ORDER Regarding January 9, 2018 Teleconference. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 1/9/2018. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A) (lcckk3) (Entered: 01/09/2018)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly: Telephone Conference held on 1/9/2018. (Court Reporter Sara Wick.) (dot) (Entered: 01/11/2018)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court will hold a teleconference with the parties on the record on FEBRUARY 13, 2018 at 2:30 pm to discuss a discovery dispute. The parties shall jointly call chambers at a number provided by e−mail. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 2/9/2018. (lcckk3) (Entered: 02/09/2018)
Set/Reset Hearings: Telephone Conference on the record set for 2/13/2018 at 2:30 PM in Chambers before Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly. (dot) (Entered: 02/12/2018)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly: Telephone Conference on the record held on 2/13/2018. (Court Reporter Sara Wick.) (dot) (Entered: 02/13/2018)

02/13/2018
02/13/2018 02/14/2018
02/14/2018 02/14/2018 02/14/2018 02/15/2018
02/16/2018

MINUTE ORDER. The Court held a teleconference with the parties today, February 13, 2018, to discuss a discovery dispute. The Court will hold another teleconference on Friday, FEBRUARY 16, 2018 at 2:30 PM to continue to discuss this dispute. In the meantime, the parties are to meet and confer. The parties shall be prepared during the next teleconference to discuss what information Defendants contend is covered by the presidential communications privilege that the Court can review in camera. The parties shall also meet and confer to resolve or narrow their dispute regarding the deliberative process privilege and, if the dispute cannot be fully resolved, Plaintiffs shall be prepared to identify the specific documents they would request the Court review in camera. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 2/13/2018. (lcckk3) (Entered: 02/13/2018)
Set/Reset Hearings: Telephone Conference on the record set for 2/16/2018 at 2:30 PM in Chambers before Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly. (dot) (Entered: 02/14/2018)
81 Joint MOTION for Protective Order and Cross−Use Agreement and Fed.R.Evid. 502(D) Order by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Protective Order and Cross Use Agreement, # 2 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 502(d) Order)(Parker, Ryan) Modified text on 2/15/2018 (td). (Entered: 02/14/2018)
82 STIPULATION of Voluntary Partial Dismissal as to Plaintiff Jane Doe 1 and Defendants United States Coast Guard and Kirstjen Nielsen, in her official capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Wolfson, Paul) Modified text on 2/15/2018 (td). (Entered: 02/14/2018)
84 ORDER granting 81 Motion for Uniform Protective Order and Cross−Use Agreement. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 2/14/18. (dot) (Entered: 02/16/2018)
85 ORDER on the parties Joint Motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 502(d) and Local Civil Rule 16.3(c)(10). Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 2/14/18. (dot) (Entered: 02/16/2018)
83 TRANSCRIPT OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE before Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly held on 02/13/2018; Page Numbers: 35; Date of Issuance: 02/15/2018. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Sara A. Wick, Telephone number 202−354−3284. Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the Transcript Order Form
For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporte r referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.
NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.
Redaction Request due 3/8/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/18/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/16/2018.(Wick, Sara) (Entered: 02/15/2018)
86 Letter from Plaintiffs and Defendants (Attachments: # 1 Letter, # 2 Exhibit Ex A 2017.12.15 Pltfs' 1st Set of INTs, # 3 Exhibit Ex B President Trump Interrogatory Objections − Served 2.6.18, # 4 Exhibit Ex C Secretary of Defense Mattis Interrogatory Responses − Served on 2.6, # 5 Exhibit Ex D 2018.01.25 Air Force's Objcs. and Resps. to Pltfs' 1st INTs, # 6 Exhibit Ex E Doe v. Trump − Updated Privilege Log − 2.7.18, # 7 Exhibit Ex F USDOE00061876 − with redactions, # 8 Exhibit Ex G USDOE00061945 − with redactions, # 9 Ex H President Trump RFA Objections − Served 2.6.18) "Let this be filed" signed 2/16/18 by Judge C.

02/16/2018
02/16/2018 02/20/2018 02/21/2018
02/22/2018

Kollar−Kotelly(td) (Main Document 86 replaced on 2/16/2018) (ztd). (Entered: 02/16/2018)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court held a teleconference with the parties today, February 16, 2018, to discuss a discovery dispute. The dispute relates to Defendants' assertions of two privileges: the deliberative process privilege and the presidential communications privilege. With respect to the deliberative process privilege, Plaintiffs have provided Defendants with a list of documents that they contend were inappropriately withheld in full or in part. Defendants are going to review those documents and consult with Plaintiffs next week to discuss whether they are willing to release some or all of those documents, or at least provide Plaintiffs with more information about the documents so that Plaintiffs can consider the appropriateness of Defendants' assertions of privilege. The parties will then meet and confer and attempt to resolve their disputes without further Court intervention. If unsuccessful, Plaintiffs can contact the Court again. With respect to the presidential communications privilege, Defendants refuse to provide any information to the Court for it to review in camera in order to adjudicate the legality of Defendants' assertion of privilege. Defendants are to file a motion for a protective order on this particular presidential communications privilege issue by no later than FEBRUARY 27, 2018. Plaintiffs shall file a response by no later than MARCH 12, 2018. Defendants shall file a reply by no later than MARCH 19, 2018. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 2/16/2018. (lcckk3) (Entered: 02/16/2018)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly: Telephone Conference on the record held on 2/16/2018. (Court Reporter Sara Wick.) (dot) (Entered: 02/20/2018)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Defendant's motion for protective order due by 2/27/2018. Response due by 3/12/2018. Reply due by 3/19/2018. (tb) (Entered: 02/20/2018)
87 TRANSCRIPT OF INITIAL SCHEDULING CONFERENCE before Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly held on November 28, 2017; Page Numbers: 1 − 31. Date of Issuance:December 15, 2017. Court Reporter/Transcriber Richard D. Ehrlich, Telephone number (202) 354−3269, Tape Number: NA. Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the Transcript Order Form
For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a publ ic terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.
NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.
Redaction Request due 3/14/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/24/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/22/2018.(Ehrlich, Richard) (Entered: 02/21/2018)
88 TRANSCRIPT OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE before Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly, held on 02/16/2018. Page Numbers: 11. Date of Issuance: 02/22/2018. Court Reporter/Transcriber Sara A. Wick. Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the Transcript Order Form
For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days , the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.
NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which

02/27/2018 03/02/2018 03/02/2018 03/02/2018 03/12/2018
03/16/2018 03/19/2018

includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.
Redaction Request due 3/15/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/25/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/23/2018.(Wick, Sara) (Entered: 02/22/2018)
89 MOTION for Protective Order by RAQUEL C. BONO, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit, # 8 Exhibit, # 9 Exhibit, # 10 Exhibit, # 11 Text of Proposed Order)(Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 02/27/2018)
90 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings and Motion to Partially Disolve the Preliminary Injunction by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Parker, Ryan). Added MOTION for Order to Partially Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction on 3/5/2018 (znmw). (Entered: 03/02/2018)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court is in receipt of Defendants' 90 Partial Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and to Partially Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction. Plaintiffs shall file a response by no later than MARCH 16, 2018. Defendants shall file a reply by no later than MARCH 23, 2018. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 3/2/2018. (lcckk3) (Entered: 03/02/2018)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Plaintiffs' Response to 90 due by 3/16/2018. Defendants' Reply due by 3/23/2018. (dot) (Entered: 03/02/2018)
91 RESPONSE re 89 MOTION for Protective Order filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration Daniel McFadden, # 2 Exhibit A− E−Mail to Ryan Parker March 1, 2018, # 3 Exhibit B− E−Mail exchange July 27, 2017 regarding the transgender policy message, # 4 Exhibit C− Defendants' Objections and Responses to Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories to General Dunford, # 5 Exhibit D− Defendants' Objections and Responses to Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories to the Navy and Secretary Spencer, # 6 Exhibit E− Defendants' Objections and Responses to Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories to the Army and Secretary Esper, # 7 Exhibit F− Air Force's Objections and Responses to Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories, # 8 Exhibit G− Defendants' Objections and Responses to Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories to the Defense Health Agency and Director Bono, # 9 Exhibit H− Privilege log produced by the Defendants on February 7, 2018, # 10 Exhibit I− Privilege log produced by the Defendants on February 6, 2018, # 11 Exhibit J− E−Mail exchange dated January 11−12, 2018 regarding "Proposed Discovery Response Schedule.")(Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 03/12/2018)
92 RESPONSE re 90 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings and Motion to Partially Disolve the Preliminary Injunction MOTION for Order to Partially Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 03/16/2018)
93 REPLY to opposition to motion re 89 MOTION for Protective Order filed by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON. (Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 03/19/2018)

03/23/2018
03/23/2018
03/23/2018
03/23/2018
03/26/2018 03/26/2018 03/26/2018 03/26/2018 03/27/2018
03/27/2018 03/27/2018 03/28/2018

94 REPLY to opposition to motion re 90 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings and Motion to Partially Disolve the Preliminary Injunction MOTION for Order to Partially Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction filed by RAQUEL C. BONO, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON. (Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 03/23/2018)
95 NOTICE by ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 03/23/2018)
96 MOTION to Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction by RAQUEL C. BONO, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Declaration, # 6 Declaration)(Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 03/23/2018)
97 MOTION for Protective Order by RAQUEL C. BONO, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 03/23/2018)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court will hold a teleconference with the parties on MARCH 27, 2018 at 9:30 a.m. The parties shall jointly call chambers at a number to be provided by e−mail. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 3/26/2018. (lcckk3) (Entered: 03/26/2018)
Set/Reset Hearings: Telephone Conference on the record set for 3/27/2018 at 9:30 AM in Chambers before Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly. (dot) (Entered: 03/26/2018)
MINUTE ORDER. The teleconference previously set for March 27, 2018 is hereby rescheduled for MARCH 28, 2018 at 10:30 a.m. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 3/26/2018. (lcckk3) (Entered: 03/26/2018)
Set/Reset Hearings: Telephone Conference on the record set for 3/28/2018 at 10:30 AM in Chambers before Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly. (dot) (Entered: 03/27/2018)
98 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Lauren Godles Milgroom, :Firm− Foley Hoag LLP, :Address− 155 Seaport Boulevard, Boston, MA 02210. Phone No. − 617−832−3052. Fax No. − 617−832−7000 Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0090−5391796. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Lauren Godles Milgroom, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 03/27/2018)
99 MOTION to Intervene to Seek Access to March 28, 2018 Telephone Conference by BUZZFEED, INC. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Declaration of Zoe Tillman, # 3 Declaration of Matthew L. Schafer, # 4 Text of Proposed Order, # 5 Corporate Disclosure)(Schafer, Matthew) (Entered: 03/27/2018)
100 NOTICE of Appearance by Matthew L. Schafer on behalf of BUZZFEED, INC. (Schafer, Matthew) (Entered: 03/27/2018)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court is in receipt of putative intervenor Buzzfeed, Inc.'s ("Buzzfeed") 99 Motion to Intervene to Seek Access to March 28, 2018 Telephone Conference. This motion was filed on the evening before the telephone conference to which Buzzfeed seeks access. Other members of the press likewise have sought access to the teleconference by contacting courthouse personnel. Because the teleconference

03/28/2018
03/28/2018 03/28/2018 03/28/2018

is scheduled for this morning, March 28, 2018, this Order addressing Buzzfeed's pending motion and other press inquiries must of necessity be brief.In its motion, Buzzfeed indicates that it does not know what the substance of this morning's teleconference will be. The Court hereby notifies Buzzfeed and other interested news outlets that the purpose of the March 28, 2018, telephone conference is solely to set a schedule for future proceedings. Buzzfeed also cites a number of opinionsmany of them in the criminal contextin its motion about the appropriateness of sealed or in camera proceedings. This is a civil case, and the teleconference will not be sealed. The discussion will be transcribed, and the record will be available shortly afterwards. As its practice has been, the Court also shall issue a written order summarizing the teleconference and setting forth agreed dates for the ensuing briefing.Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 77(b) allows the Court to hold this teleconference with the parties in chambers. That rule states that "[e]very trial on the merits must be conducted in open court and, so far as convenient, in a regular courtroom," but "[a]ny other act or proceeding may be done or conducted by a judge in chambers, without the attendance of the clerk or other court official, and anywhere inside or outside the district." Fed. R. Civ. P. 77(b). "Rule 77(b) simply articulates the traditional authority of a judge to speak privately with the parties to a suit, whether in bench conferences or in chambers." B.H. v. McDonald, 49 F.3d 294, 298 (7th Cir. 1995). The Court is under no obligation to allow any and all interested parties to join a teleconference held in its chambers, especially where the content of that conference does not address the merits of the case, will be memorialized in an Order, and will also be transcribed in a public transcript.Moreover, Buzzfeed frames its request as a motion to intervene under Rule 24, but does not specify whether it seeks intervention as of right (Rule 24(a)) or permissive intervention (Rule 24(b)). Language in its memorandum suggests that intervention is sought as of right, but Buzzfeed has not cited any federal statute that would give it "an unconditional right to intervene" (Rule 24(a)(1)), nor does it claim that the nature of this teleconferencea scheduling conferencewould "dispos[e] of the action" and thus "may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect its interest" (Rule 24(a)(2)). Even if Buzzfeed instead seeks permissive intervention pursuant to Rule 24(b), it has not argued that any federal statute accords it "a conditional right to intervene" (Rule 24(b)(1)) or that it "has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact" (Rule 24(b)(2)). The Court is not persuaded that intervention is appropriate.Accordingly, the Court shall DENY Buzzfeed's 99 Motion to Intervene to Seek Access to March 28, 2018 Telephone Conference, as well as any other requests by the press to participate in this teleconference. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 3/28/2018. (lcckk3) Modified to add link on 3/29/2018 (znmw). (Entered: 03/28/2018)
MINUTE ORDER GRANTING 98 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Attorney Lauren Godles Milgroom in order for her to appear as co−counsel for Plaintiffs. Counsel shall promptly register for this Court's CM/ECF system. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 3/28/2018. (lcckk3) (Entered: 03/28/2018)
101 ORDER Regarding March 28, 2018 Teleconference. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 3/28/2018. (lcckk3) (Entered: 03/28/2018)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly: Telephone Conference on the record held on 3/28/2018. (Court Reporter Richard Ehrlich.) (dot) (Entered: 03/28/2018)
102 TRANSCRIPT OF TELEPHONIC CONFERENCE before Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly held on March 28, 2018; Page Numbers: 1 − 54. Date of Issuance:March 28, 2018. Court Reporter/Transcriber Richard D. Ehrlich, Telephone number (202) 354−3269, Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the Transcript Order Form

For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from t he court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.

NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made

available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.

03/29/2018 04/04/2018 04/04/2018 04/06/2018
04/06/2018 04/06/2018 04/06/2018
04/09/2018 04/09/2018 04/12/2018

Redaction Request due 4/18/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/28/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/26/2018.(Ehrlich, Richard) (Entered: 03/28/2018)
103 NOTICE of Appearance by Theresa Roosevelt on behalf of JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Roosevelt, Theresa) (Entered: 03/29/2018)
104 NOTICE of Change of Address by Mary L. Bonauto (Bonauto, Mary) (Entered: 04/04/2018)
105 NOTICE of Change of Address by Jennifer Levi (Levi, Jennifer) (Entered: 04/04/2018)
106 AMENDED COMPLAINT (Second) for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief against RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, MARK T. ESPER filed by JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, DYLAN KOHERE, JANE DOE 4, JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, JOHN DOE 2.(Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 04/06/2018)
107 SEALED DOCUMENT filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE re 106 Amended Complaint,, (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.)(Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 04/06/2018)
108 Memorandum in opposition to re 97 MOTION for Protective Order filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Adam M. Cambier in Support of Plainttiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Protective Order, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F)(Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 04/06/2018)
109 MOTION to Compel Compliance with Subpoenas for Production of Documents Directed to Nonparties Family Research Council and Heritage Foundation by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Lauren Milgroom, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F, # 8 Exhibit G, # 9 Exhibit H)(Wolfson, Paul) (Attachment 9 replaced to make page 4 non−fillable on 4/9/2018) (td). (Entered: 04/06/2018)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court is in receipt of Plaintiffs' 109 Motion to Compel Compliance with Subpoenas for Production of Documents Directed to Nonparties Family Research Council and Heritage Foundation. Nonparties Family Research Council and Heritage Foundation, and/or Defendants, shall file a response by no later than APRIL 23, 2018. Plaintiffs shall file a reply by no later than APRIL 30, 2018. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 4/9/2018. (lcckk3) (Entered: 04/09/2018)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Nonparties Family Research Council and Heritage Foundation, and/or Defendants, shall file a Response to 109 by 4/23/2018. Plaintiffs' Reply due by 4/30/2018. (dot) (Entered: 04/09/2018)
110 REPLY to opposition to motion re 97 MOTION for Protective Order filed by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED

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STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON. (Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 04/12/2018)
111 NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY by JANE DOE 2,JOHN DOE 1, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Slip Op., Karnoski v. Trump, No. 2:17−cv−01297−MJP (Apr. 13, 2018))(Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 04/16/2018)
112 ORDER Regarding Deposition of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Paul J. Selva. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 4/16/2018. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A) (lcckk3) (Entered: 04/16/2018)
113 ORDER Regarding Deadline for Document Production and Privilege Disputes. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 4/18/2018. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A) (lcckk3) (Entered: 04/18/2018)
114 ORDER DENYING Defendants' 97 Motion for a Protective Order. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 4/18/2018. (lcckk3) (Entered: 04/18/2018)
115 MOTION to Dismiss , or in the alternative,, MOTION for Summary Judgment by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit Department of Defense Release No.: NR−272−15, # 3 Exhibit Agnes Gereben Schaefer, On RANDs Research Findings Regarding Transgender Military Personnel Policy, # 4 Exhibit Memorandum from Secretary Mattis: Terms of Reference)(Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 04/20/2018)
116 MOTION To Dissolve The Preliminary Injunction by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit 2015 Statement, # 3 Exhibit RAND Blog Post, # 4 Exhibit Terms of Reference)(Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 04/20/2018)
117 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 116 MOTION To Dissolve The Preliminary Injunction , 115 MOTION to Dismiss , or in the alternative, MOTION for Summary Judgment by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 04/23/2018)
118 ORDER Regarding Clawback Dispute. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 4/23/2018. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A) (lcckk3) (Entered: 04/23/2018)
119 Memorandum in opposition to re 109 MOTION to Compel Compliance with Subpoenas for Production of Documents Directed to Nonparties Family Research Council and Heritage Foundation filed by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON. (Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 04/23/2018)
120 NOTICE of Appearance by Heidi K. Abegg on behalf of Heritage Foundation (Abegg, Heidi) (Entered: 04/23/2018)

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121 Corporate Disclosure Statement by Heritage Foundation. (Abegg, Heidi) (Entered: 04/23/2018)
122 Memorandum in opposition to re 109 MOTION to Compel Compliance with Subpoenas for Production of Documents Directed to Nonparties Family Research Council and Heritage Foundation filed by Heritage Foundation, FAMILY RESEARCH COUNCIL, INC.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Schaerr, Gene) (Entered: 04/23/2018)
123 NOTICE of Appearance by Gene C. Schaerr on behalf of FAMILY RESEARCH COUNCIL, INC. (Schaerr, Gene) (Entered: 04/23/2018)
124 RESPONSE TO ORDER OF THE COURT re 118 Order filed by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Notice of Recall, # 2 Exhibit Partially Redacted Presentation)(Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 04/24/2018)
125 LCvR 7.1 CERTIFICATE OF DISCLOSURE of Corporate Affiliations and Financial Interests by FAMILY RESEARCH COUNCIL, INC. (Schaerr, Gene) (Entered: 04/24/2018)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court is in receipt of Defendants' 116 Motion to Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction, which apparently supersedes Defendants' earlier 96 Motion to Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction. Defendants' earlier 96 Motion is accordingly DENIED as MOOT. Only Defendants' 116 Motion remains pending. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 4/24/2018. (lcckk3) (Entered: 04/24/2018)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court is in receipt of Plaintiffs' 117 Motion for Extension of Time. Plaintiffs request a seven day extension of time up to and including May 11, 2018, within which to file their Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction and Motion to Dismiss the Complaint or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, because Plaintiffs represent that they need additional time to formulate their responses. This is the first request for an extension of this deadline and Defendants consent. Plaintiffs' motion is GRANTED. Plaintiffs' oppositions shall be filed no later than MAY 11, 2018. Granting Defendants an equivalent extension, Defendants' reply briefs shall be filed no later than MAY 24, 2018. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 4/25/2018. (lcckk3) (Entered: 04/25/2018)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Plaintiffs' Response due by 5/11/2018. Defendants' Reply due by 5/24/2018. (dot) (Entered: 04/26/2018)
126 REPLY to opposition to motion re 109 MOTION to Compel Compliance with Subpoenas for Production of Documents Directed to Nonparties Family Research Council and Heritage Foundation (Reply in Support of Motion to Compel) filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Kevin M. Lamb in Support of Plaintiffs' Reply, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E)(Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 04/30/2018)
127 ERRATA by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE 126 Reply to opposition to Motion,, filed by JANE DOE 6, JOHN DOE 2, DYLAN KOHERE, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY. (Attachments: # 1 Corrected Declaration of Kevin M. Lamb in Support of Plaintiffs' Reply)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 04/30/2018)
128 AFFIDAVIT (Declaration of Lauren Godles Milgroom in Support of the Statement of Undisputed Material Facts) by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9

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Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K, # 12 Exhibit L, # 13 Exhibit M, # 14 Exhibit N, # 15 Exhibit O, # 16 Exhibit P, # 17 Exhibit Q, # 18 Exhibit R, # 19 Exhibit S, # 20 Exhibit T, # 21 Exhibit U, # 22 Exhibit V, # 23 Exhibit W, # 24 Exhibit X, # 25 Exhibit Y, # 26 Exhibit Z, # 27 Exhibit AA, # 28 Exhibit BB, # 29 Exhibit CC, # 30 Exhibit DD, # 31 Exhibit EE, # 32 Exhibit FF, # 33 Exhibit GG, # 34 Exhibit HH, # 35 Exhibit II, # 36 Exhibit JJ, # 37 Exhibit KK, # 38 Exhibit LL, # 39 Exhibit MM, # 40 Exhibit NN, # 41 Exhibit OO, # 42 Exhibit PP, # 43 Exhibit QQ, # 44 Exhibit RR, # 45 Exhibit SS)(Schoenfeld, Alan) (Entered: 05/11/2018)
129 SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Adam M. Cambier in Support of Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction and Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Cross−Motion for Summary Judgment, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Text of Proposed Order)(Schoenfeld, Alan) (Entered: 05/11/2018)
130 Memorandum in opposition to re 116 MOTION To Dissolve The Preliminary Injunction , 115 MOTION to Dismiss , or in the alternative, MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Schoenfeld, Alan) (Entered: 05/11/2018)
131 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Statement of Facts, # 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Schoenfeld, Alan) (Entered: 05/11/2018)
132 Memorandum in opposition to re 115 MOTION to Dismiss , or in the alternative, MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Attachments: # 1 Plaintiffs' Objections and Responses to Defendants' Statement of Facts)(Schoenfeld, Alan) (Entered: 05/11/2018)
133 ERRATA by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE 128 Affidavit,,,, filed by JANE DOE 6, JOHN DOE 2, DYLAN KOHERE, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY. (Attachments: # 1 (Corrected) Declaration of Joshua D. Safer in Support of Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction)(Schoenfeld, Alan) (Entered: 05/14/2018)
134 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 05/17/2018)
135 ORDER granting 134 Motion for Extension of Time. Defendants' reply in support of motions to dissolve the preliminary injunction, to dismiss the complaint, and/or in the alternative for summary judgment and opposition to Plaintiffs' cross−motion for summary judgment due by 6/6/2018. Plaintiffs' reply in support of cross−motion for summary judgment due by 6/22/2018. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 5/17/18. (dot) (Entered: 05/21/2018)
136 Consent MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief by Retired Military Officers and Former National Security Officials (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Amicus Brief, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Spector, Phillip) (Entered: 05/21/2018)

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137 NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Op. 73−74, Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, No. 17−cv−5205, # 2 Op., Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board, No. 15−cv−00054)(Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 05/24/2018)
138 Memorandum in opposition to re 131 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment , filed by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10)(Carmichael, Andrew) Modified linkage on 6/11/2018 (ztd). (Entered: 06/06/2018)
139 SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL filed by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Statement of Facts, # 2 Exhibit 11, # 3 Exhibit 12, # 4 Text of Proposed Order)(Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 06/06/2018)
140 REPLY to opposition to motion re 116 MOTION To Dissolve The Preliminary Injunction filed by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON. (Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 06/06/2018)
144 REPLY to opposition to motion re 115 MOTION to Dismiss , or in the alternative, MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON; (SEE DOCKET ENTRY NO. 138 TO VIEW.) (ztd) (Entered: 06/13/2018)
141 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON. Attorney Ryan Bradley Parker terminated. (Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 06/07/2018)
143 ORDERED that the Motion is GRANTED. The documents attached to Defendant' motion are, hereby, placed under seal. the parties shall MEET AND CONFER regarding what redactions need to be made to these documents such that they can be filed on the public docket. Redacted versions shall be filed on the docket by no later than 6/25/2018. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 6/11/18. (dot) (Entered: 06/12/2018)

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146 SEALED DOCUMENT filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. re 130 Memorandum in Opposition, filed by JANE DOE 6, JOHN DOE 2, DYLAN KOHERE, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, 131 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by JANE DOE 6, JOHN DOE 2, DYLAN KOHERE, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, 116 MOTION To Dissolve The Preliminary Injunction filed by RYAN D. MCCARTHY, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, JAMES N. MATTIS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, HEATHER A. WILSON, ELAINE C. DUKE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, MARK T. ESPER, DONALD J. TRUMP, RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., 115 MOTION to Dismiss , or in the alternative, MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by RYAN D. MCCARTHY, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, JAMES N. MATTIS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, HEATHER A. WILSON, ELAINE C. DUKE, MARK T. ESPER, RICHARD V. SPENCER, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DONALD J. TRUMP, RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR.. (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.)(ztd) (Entered: 06/20/2018)
147 SEALED DOCUMENT filed by ASSOCIATION OF MEDICAL SCHOOL PEDIATRIC DEPARTMENT CHAIRS, RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON. re 138 Memorandum in Opposition,, filed by RYAN D. MCCARTHY, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, JAMES N. MATTIS, HEATHER A. WILSON, ELAINE C. DUKE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, MARK T. ESPER, DONALD J. TRUMP, RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR.. (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.)(ztd) (Entered: 06/20/2018)
145 ORDER Regarding the Deposition of Rear Admiral David Kriete. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 6/19/2018. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A) (lcckk3) (Entered: 06/19/2018)
148 ERRATA (Notice of Errata) by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE 128 Affidavit,,,, filed by JANE DOE 6, JOHN DOE 2, DYLAN KOHERE, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit B, # 2 Exhibit QQ)(Schoenfeld, Alan) (Entered: 06/22/2018)
149 REPLY to opposition to motion re 131 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Schoenfeld, Alan) (Entered: 06/22/2018)
150 NOTICE of Filing of Redacted Documents by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON re 138 Memorandum in Opposition,, (Attachments: # 1 Statement of Facts Redacted, # 2 Exhibit 11 Redacted, # 3 Exhibit

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12 Redacted)(Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 06/25/2018)
151 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. Attorney Lauren Godles Milgroom terminated. (Milgroom, Lauren) (Entered: 07/03/2018)
152 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. Attorney Claire Laporte terminated. (McFadden, Daniel) (Entered: 07/03/2018)
153 NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Attachments: # 1 Trump v. Hawaii)(Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 07/06/2018)
154 ORDER GRANTING Defendants' 90 Partial Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Motion to Partially Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction and DENYING Defendants' 89 Motion for a Protective Order. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 8/6/2018. (lcckk3) (Entered: 08/06/2018)
155 MEMORANDUM OPINION Regarding 154 ORDER GRANTING Defendants' 90 Partial Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Motion to Partially Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction and DENYING Defendants' 89 Motion for a Protective Order. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 8/6/2018. (lcckk3) (Entered: 08/06/2018)
156 ORDER DENYING Defendants' 115 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, or, in the Alternative, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, to the extent that Motion sought the dismissal of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint for lack of jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim, and DENYING Defendants' 116 Motion to Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 8/6/2018. (lcckk3) (Entered: 08/06/2018)
157 MEMORANDUM OPINION Regarding 156 ORDER DENYING Defendants' 115 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, or, in the Alternative, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, to the extent that Motion sought the dismissal of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint for lack of jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim, and DENYING Defendants' 116 Motion to Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 8/6/2018. (lcckk3, ) (Entered: 08/06/2018)
158 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. Attorney Daniel L. McFadden terminated. (McFadden, Daniel) (Entered: 08/17/2018)
159 ORDER DENYING Defendants' 115 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint or, in the Alternative, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, and DENYING Plaintiffs' 131 Cross−Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 8/24/2018. (lcckk3) (Entered: 08/24/2018)
160 MEMORANDUM OPINION Regarding 159 ORDER DENYING Defendants' 115 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint or, in the Alternative, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, and DENYING Plaintiffs' 131 Cross−Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 8/24/2018. (lcckk3) (Entered: 08/24/2018)
161 ORDER GRANTING 136 Motion for Leave to File Amicus Brief. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 8/27/2018. (lcckk3) (Entered: 08/27/2018)
MINUTE ORDER. The parties shall meet and confer and file a Joint Status Report by no later than SEPTEMBER 10, 2018. The Joint Status Report shall propose a plan for moving forward toward a timely resolution of this case. In particular, the Joint Status

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Report shall include a proposed protocol for the efficient resolution of the parties' outstanding discovery disputes. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 8/27/2018. (lcckk3) (Entered: 08/27/2018)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Joint Status Report due by 10/10/2018. (dot) (Entered: 08/27/2018)
162 NOTICE OF APPEAL TO DC CIRCUIT COURT as to 156 Order on Motion to Dismiss,, Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief, by JAMES N. MATTIS, MARK T. ESPER, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RAQUEL C. BONO, ELAINE C. DUKE, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, HEATHER A. WILSON, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., RICHARD V. SPENCER. Fee Status: No Fee Paid. Parties have been notified. (Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 08/27/2018)
163 AMICUS BRIEF by RETIRED MILITARY OFFICERS AND FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY OFFICIALS. (ztd) (Entered: 08/28/2018)
164 Transmission of the Notice of Appeal, Order Appealed (Memorandum Opinion), and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals docketing fee was not paid because the appeal was filed by the government re 162 Notice of Appeal to DC Circuit Court,,. (ztd) (Entered: 08/28/2018)
USCA Case Number 18−5257 for 162 Notice of Appeal to DC Circuit Court,, filed by RYAN D. MCCARTHY, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, JAMES N. MATTIS, HEATHER A. WILSON, ELAINE C. DUKE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, MARK T. ESPER, DONALD J. TRUMP, RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR. (zrdj) (Entered: 09/05/2018)
165 Joint STATUS REPORT IN RESPONSE TO AUGUST 27, 2018 ORDER by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Schoenfeld, Alan) (Entered: 09/10/2018)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court is in receipt of parties' 165 Joint Status Report in Response to August 27, 2018 Order. In that Order, the Court instructed the parties to propose a plan for moving forward toward a timely resolution of this case. In their Joint Status Report, the parties agree that there remain numerous disputes regarding discovery. Accordingly, the parties propose a schedule for resolving the outstanding disputes before depositions and other discovery resume. The Court adopts the parties' agreed upon schedule. The Court ORDERS the parties to meet and confer to identify outstanding issues for the Court's resolution by SEPTEMBER 17, 2018. The Court OREDERS that parties report to the Court which issues have been identified for the subject matter of the motions by SEPTEMBER 21, 2018. The Court ORDERS the parties to file opening motions addressing outstanding issues identified during the meet and confer process by OCTOBER 9, 2018. The Court ORDERS the parties to file crossing response briefs by OCTOBER 30, 2018. The parties dispute whether reply briefs are necessary. The Court agrees with the government that reply briefs would assist the Court given the significance of the issues at stake. The Court ORDERS the parties to file crossing reply briefs by NOVEMBER 13, 2018. This is a generous schedule, so the Court expects no requests for extensions. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 9−10−2018. (lcckk3) (Entered: 09/10/2018)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Parties shall report to the Court which issues have been identified for the subject matter of the motions due by 9/21/2018. Parties to file opening motions addressing outstanding issues identified during the meet and confer process due by 10/9/2018. Parties to file crossing response briefs by 10/30/2018. Parties to file crossing reply briefs by 11/13/2018. (dot) (Entered: 09/13/2018)
166 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE

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DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. Attorney Christopher R. Looney terminated. (Looney, Christopher) (Entered: 09/12/2018)
167 Joint STATUS REPORT in Response to September 10, 2018 Order by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Schoenfeld, Alan) (Entered: 09/21/2018)
168 SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit C to the Declaration of Alan E. Schoenfeld, # 2 Exhibit D to the Declaration of Alan E. Schoenfeld, # 3 Text of Proposed Order, # 4 Certificate of Service)(Schoenfeld, Alan) (Entered: 10/09/2018)
169 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents and Information Withheld Under the Deliberative Process Privilege by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Alan E. Schoenfeld in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Production of Documents and Information Withheld Under the Deliberative Process Privilege, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F, # 8 Text of Proposed Order)(Schoenfeld, Alan) (Entered: 10/09/2018)
170 MOTION for Protective Order to preclude the deposition of Vice Admiral David Kriete by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit)(Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 10/09/2018)
171 MOTION for Protective Order to preclude discovery of documents and information subject to the presidential communications privilege and to preclude further deposition testimony of Jennifer Hay by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit)(Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 10/09/2018)
172 SEALED ORDER re 168 SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons. filed by JANE DOE 6, JOHN DOE 2, DYLAN KOHERE, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY.(This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.)Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 10/9/18.(zdot) (Entered: 10/10/2018)
173 SEALED DOCUMENT(Main Document Exhibit C to the Declaration of Alan E. Schoenfeld) filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. re 169 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents and Information Withheld Under the Deliberative Process Privilege filed by JANE DOE 6, JOHN DOE 2, DYLAN KOHERE, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY. (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit D to the Declaration of Alan E. Schoenfeld)(ztd) (Entered: 10/11/2018)

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11/13/2018

174 RESPONSE re 169 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents and Information Withheld Under the Deliberative Process Privilege filed by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4)(Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 10/30/2018)
175 Memorandum in opposition to re 171 MOTION for Protective Order to preclude discovery of documents and information subject to the presidential communications privilege and to preclude further deposition testimony of Jennifer Hay filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Schoenfeld, Alan) (Entered: 10/30/2018)
176 Memorandum in opposition to re 170 MOTION for Protective Order to preclude the deposition of Vice Admiral David Kriete filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Schoenfeld, Alan) (Entered: 10/30/2018)
177 AFFIDAVIT re 175 Memorandum in Opposition, 176 Memorandum in Opposition, (Declaration of Alan E. Schoenfeld in Support of Plaintiffs' Memoranda in Opposition to Defendants' Motions for Protective Orders) by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Schoenfeld, Alan) (Entered: 10/30/2018)
178 NOTICE Re: Letter by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 11/07/2018)
179 NOTICE of Filing by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Schoenfeld, Alan) (Entered: 11/08/2018)
180 REPLY to opposition to motion re 169 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents and Information Withheld Under the Deliberative Process Privilege filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 11/13/2018)
181 REPLY to opposition to motion re 171 MOTION for Protective Order to preclude discovery of documents and information subject to the presidential communications privilege and to preclude further deposition testimony of Jennifer Hay filed by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 11/13/2018)
182 REPLY to opposition to motion re 170 MOTION for Protective Order to preclude the deposition of Vice Admiral David Kriete filed by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON. (Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 11/13/2018)

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02/26/2019

183 MOTION to Stay re 156 Order on Motion to Dismiss,, Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief, by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 11/21/2018)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court is in receipt of Defendants' 183 Motion to Stay the Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal. Defendants indicate that Plaintiffs oppose this Motion. In light of Defendants' request for an expedited ruling, the Court ORDERS Plaintiffs to file a response to Defendants' Motion by NOVEMBER 28, 2018. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 11/25/2018. (lcckk3) (Entered: 11/25/2018)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Plaintiffs' Reply due by 11/28/2018. (dot) (Entered: 11/26/2018)
184 NOTICE of Filing Petition for a Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Attachments: # 1 Petition)(Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 11/27/2018)
185 NOTICE of Change of Address by Andrew Evan Carmichael (Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 11/27/2018)
186 Memorandum in opposition to re 183 MOTION to Stay re 156 Order on Motion to Dismiss,, Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief, filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 11/28/2018)
187 ORDER denying 183 Motion to Stay. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 11/30/2018. (lcckk3) (Entered: 11/30/2018)
188 ORDER DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE 109 Motion to Compel; 169 Motion to Compel; 170 Motion for Protective Order; and 171 Motion for Protective Order. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 1−30−2019. (lcckk3) (Entered: 01/30/2019)
189 Joint STATUS REPORT by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON. (Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 02/26/2019)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court is in receipt of the Parties' 189 Joint Status Report in Response to January 30, 2019 Order. On January 30, 2019, the Court ordered the parties to meet and confer regarding the scope and breadth of discovery as the case now stands. See ECF No. 188. The Court further ordered the parties to inform the Court on how the parties intend to proceed with discovery by February 26, 2019. The parties report that they have been working together to attempt to narrow or eliminate discovery disputes. The parties request additional time to resolve these disputes. The parties are ORDERED to file another Joint Status Report by MARCH 28, 2019, informing the Court on the status of any remaining disputes and proposing a schedule for discovery and the filing of dispositive motions. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 2/26/2019. (lcckk3) (Entered: 02/26/2019)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Joint Status Report due by 3/28/2019, informing the Court on the status of any remaining disputes and proposing a schedule for discovery and the filing of dispositive motions. (dot) (Entered: 02/27/2019)

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03/21/2019 03/22/2019

190 NOTICE by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 03/08/2019)
191 RESPONSE re 190 Notice (Other), filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 03/12/2019)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court is in receipt of the Government's 190 Notice and Plaintiffs' 191 Response to Government's Notice. The Court ORDERS the Government to file a Reply in support of its Notice by MARCH 15, 2019. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 3/12/2019. (lcckk3) (Entered: 03/12/2019)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Government's tReply in support of its Notice due by 3/15/2019. (kt) (Entered: 03/13/2019)
192 RESPONSE re 190 Notice (Other), (Supplemental Response) filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 03/13/2019)
193 REPLY re 190 Notice (Other), filed by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON. (Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 03/15/2019)
194 RESPONSE re 193 Reply to Document, (Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' "Alternative Request" for a Stay) filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 03/15/2019)
195 Notice. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 3/19/2019. (lcckk3) (Entered: 03/19/2019)
196 MOTION to Stay re 60 Order on Motion for Leave to File, Order on Motion to Dismiss,,,, Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Carmichael, Andrew). Added MOTION to Expedite on 3/20/2019 (znmw). (Entered: 03/20/2019)
197 Memorandum in opposition to re 196 MOTION to Stay re 60 Order on Motion for Leave to File, Order on Motion to Dismiss,,,, Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction MOTION to Expedite filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 03/21/2019)
198 REPLY to opposition to motion re 196 MOTION to Stay re 60 Order on Motion for Leave to File, Order on Motion to Dismiss,,,, Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction MOTION to Expedite filed by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON. (Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 03/22/2019)

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04/09/2019 04/09/2019

199 MOTION to Expedite Ruling by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON; (See docket entry no. 198 to view.) (ztd) (Entered: 03/26/2019)
201 MANDATE of USCA as to 162 Notice of Appeal to DC Circuit Court,, filed by RYAN D. MCCARTHY, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, JAMES N. MATTIS, HEATHER A. WILSON, ELAINE C. DUKE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, MARK T. ESPER, DONALD J. TRUMP, RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR. ; USCA Case Number 18−5257. (Attachments: # 1 USCA Order)(zrdj) (Entered: 04/01/2019)
200 Joint STATUS REPORT by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON. (Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 03/28/2019)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court hereby SCHEDULES a teleconference with both parties for APRIL 9, 2019 at 10:00 a.m. in order to discuss the parties' 200 Joint Status Report and how to proceed with discovery in this case. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 4/4/2019. (lcckk3) (Entered: 04/04/2019)
Set/Reset Hearings: Telephone Conference on the record set for 4/9/2019 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 28A before Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly. (dot) (Entered: 04/04/2019)
MINUTE ORDER. On April 9, 2019, the Court conducted a teleconference with the parties. A court reporter was present. Pursuant to the parties' 200 Joint Status Report, the Court reviewed a series of agreements between the parties concerning discovery. First, Defendant has agreed to produce data generated after the development of the Mattis policy concerning service members who had been diagnosed with gender dysphoria. And, Plaintiffs have agreed to review the supplemental data prior to determining if a dispute remains. Second, Defendant has agreed to produce recommendations from the Services and the Surgeons General to then−Secretary Mattis related to the delay of the Carter accessions policy in June 2017. Third, Defendant offered to waive the deliberative process privilege over emails between then−Secretary Mattis and third parties. Fourth, Defendant offered to waive the deliberative process privilege over the final versions of the Panel of Experts briefing presentations to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. Defendant intends to produce these documents to Plaintiffs by the end of April.However, the parties still dispute certain documents in category four relating to documents considered and generated by the Panel of Experts as well as communications to or from members of the Panel regarding their work, drafts of the Panel's report communicated to any third parties, and communications that followed the submission of the Panel's report but predated the publication of the implementation plan. A Vaughn Index will be required for these documents. The parties also remain in dispute as to Defendant's clawback of certain documents. The Court ORDERS the parties to file by APRIL 16, 2019 a briefing schedule for these matters. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 4/9/2019. (lcckk3) (Entered: 04/09/2019)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly: Telephone Conference on the record held on 4/9/2019. (Court Reporter Lisa Edwards.) (dot) (Entered: 04/09/2019)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Joint briefing schedule due by 4/16/2019. (dot) (Entered: 04/09/2019)

04/15/2019

202 TRANSCRIPT OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE before Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly held on April 9, 2019; Page Numbers: 1−26. Date of Issuance: April 15, 2019. Court Reporter/Transcriber Lisa Edwards. Telephone number (202) 354−3269. Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the Transcript Order Form

For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.

NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.

04/16/2019
04/16/2019
04/17/2019 05/10/2019 05/10/2019 05/10/2019 05/10/2019 05/10/2019

Redaction Request due 5/6/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/16/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/14/2019.(Edwards, Lisa) (Entered: 04/15/2019)
203 Joint STATUS REPORT by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON. (Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 04/16/2019)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court is in receipt of the parties' 203 Joint Status Report. In line with the parties' requested schedule, the Court ORDERS Defendants to produce the documents identified in the first paragraph of the Court's April 9, 2019 Minute Order by APRIL 30, 2019. The Court further ORDERS Defendants to produce a "Vaughn Index" to Plaintiffs encompassing the documents identified in the second paragraph of the Court's April 9, 2019 Minute Order by MAY 14, 2019. The Court further ORDERS Plaintiffs to file a motion to compel documents still in dispute as described in paragraph two of the Court's April 9, 2019 Minute Order, including any remaining dispute as to Defendants' clawback of certain documents, by JUNE 4, 2019. The Court further ORDERS Defendants to file their Opposition to Plaintiffs' motion to compel by JUNE 25, 2019, and Plaintiffs to file their Reply by JULY 2, 2019. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 4/16/2019. (lcckk3) (Entered: 04/16/2019)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Defendant's production of documents due by 4/30/2019. Defendant's Vaughn Index due by 5/14/2019. Plaintiffs' motion to compel due by 6/4/2019. Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs' motion due by 6/25/2019. Plaintiffs' Reply due by 7/2/2019. (hmc) (Entered: 04/17/2019)
204 NOTICE of Appearance by Zachary D. Rosenbaum on behalf of JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Rosenbaum, Zachary) (Entered: 05/10/2019)
205 NOTICE of Appearance by Jennifer Fiorica Delgado on behalf of JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Delgado, Jennifer) (Entered: 05/10/2019)
206 NOTICE of Appearance by Meg Slachetka on behalf of JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Slachetka, Meg) (Entered: 05/10/2019)
207 NOTICE of Change of Address by Scott B. Wilkens (Wilkens, Scott) (Entered: 05/10/2019)
208 NOTICE of Appearance by Adam Granich Unikowsky on behalf of JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Unikowsky, Adam)

05/10/2019 05/13/2019 05/14/2019 06/04/2019
06/04/2019 06/04/2019
06/06/2019 06/06/2019 06/06/2019

(Entered: 05/10/2019)
209 NOTICE of Appearance by Benjamin Eidelson on behalf of JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Eidelson, Benjamin) (Entered: 05/10/2019)
210 Unopposed MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney (Motion to withdraw counsel Paul R.Q. Wolfson, Kevin Matthew Lamb, Alan E Schoenfeld, Harriet Hoder, Adam M Cambier, and Nancy Schroeder) by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 05/13/2019)
211 ORDER granting 210 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Kevin Matthew Lamb; Alan E. Schoenfeld; Nancy Lynn Schroeder; Paul R.Q. Wolfson; Adam M. Cambier and Harriet Hoder terminated. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 5/14/19. (dot) (Entered: 05/14/2019)
212 SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A to the Declaration of Z. Rosenbaum, # 2 Exhibit B to the Declaration of Z. Rosenbaum, # 3 Exhibit C to the Declaration of Z. Rosenbaum, # 4 Exhibit D to the Declaration of Z. Rosenbaum, # 5 Exhibit E to the Declaration of Z. Rosenbaum, # 6 Exhibit F to the Declaration of Z. Rosenbaum, # 7 Exhibit G to the Declaration of Z. Rosenbaum, # 8 Exhibit H to the Declaration of Z. Rosenbaum, # 9 Exhibit I to the Declaration of Z. Rosenbaum, # 10 Exhibit K to the Declaration of Z. Rosenbaum, # 11 Exhibit M to the Declaration of Z. Rosenbaum, # 12 Exhibit O to the Declaration of Z. Rosenbaum)(Rosenbaum, Zachary) (Entered: 06/04/2019)
213 SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel Production)(Rosenbaum, Zachary) (Entered: 06/04/2019)
214 LARGE ADDITIONAL ATTACHMENTS Production by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Z. Rosenbaum, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F, # 8 Exhibit G, # 9 Exhibit H, # 10 Exhibit I, # 11 Exhibit J, # 12 Exhibit K, # 13 Exhibit L, # 14 Exhibit M, # 15 Exhibit N, # 16 Exhibit O, # 17 Exhibit P, # 18 Exhibit Q, # 19 Exhibit R, # 20 Exhibit S)(Rosenbaum, Zachary) Modified on 6/5/2019 (ztd). (Entered: 06/04/2019)
215 ORDER granting 212 Sealed Motion for Leave to File Document Under Seal; granting 213 Sealed Motion for Leave to File Document Under Seal. Exhibits A−I, K, M, and O to the Rosenbaum Declaration will be filed under seal, the Memorandum of Law will be filed under seal, and a redacted version of the Memorandum of Law will be publicly filed by JUNE 20, 2019. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 6/5/19. (dot) (Entered: 06/06/2019)
216 MOTION to Compel Production REDACTED by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Rosenbaum, Zachary) (Entered: 06/06/2019)
217 SEALED DOCUMENT (Exhibits A−O to the Declaration of Z. Rosenbaum) filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.)(ztd) (Entered: 06/07/2019)

06/24/2019
06/25/2019 06/25/2019
06/25/2019
07/01/2019 07/01/2019 07/01/2019
07/02/2019 07/10/2019

MINUTE ORDER. With the Court's encouragement, the parties presented the Court with a conflict involving a document which was referred to in Plaintiffs' 216 Motion to Compel and filed under seal as an attachment. The Court has been addressing this issue by email but has determined that more formal briefing is required. The Court will address the issue of the clawback of this document in conjunction with Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel. Plaintiffs are Ordered to file a Motion, of no more than 15 pages, explaining why the document is not subject to clawback by JULY 10, 2019. Defendants are ORDERED to file a Response of no more than 15 pages by JULY 24, 2019, and Plaintiffs to file a Reply of no more than 10 pages by August 2, 2019. The parties' briefing should explain the effect of the parties' 85 Agreement under Fed. R. Evid. 502(D) on the clawback as well as arguments for why or why not this document is subject to attorney client privilege and work product privilege. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 6/24/2019. (lcckk3) (Entered: 06/24/2019)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Plaintiffs' Motion due by 7/10/2019; Response due by 7/24/2019; Reply due by 8/2/2019. (kt) (Entered: 06/25/2019)
218 RESPONSE re 216 MOTION to Compel Production REDACTED filed by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10, # 11 Exhibit 11, # 12 Text of Proposed Order)(Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 06/25/2019)
219 SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL filed by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 7, # 2 Exhibit 10, # 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 06/25/2019)
220 NOTICE of Change of Address by Benjamin Eidelson (Eidelson, Benjamin) (Entered: 07/01/2019)
221 ORDER granting 219 Sealed Motion for Leave to File Document Under Seal. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 7/1/2019. (lcckk3) (Entered: 07/01/2019)
223 SEALED DOCUMENT(EXHIBIT 7 MAIN DOCUMENT) filed by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. re 218 Response to motion,, filed by UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, MARK T. ESPER, RICHARD V. SPENCER, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RAQUEL C. BONO, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, JAMES N. MATTIS, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., HEATHER A. WILSON. (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 10)(ztd) (Entered: 07/03/2019)
222 REPLY to opposition to motion re 216 MOTION to Compel Production REDACTED filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix A, # 2 Appendix B, # 3 Declaration of Matthew E. Miller)(Rosenbaum, Zachary) (Entered: 07/02/2019)
224 SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE

07/11/2019
07/11/2019 07/24/2019
07/29/2019 07/29/2019 07/29/2019 08/02/2019 08/02/2019

DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Declaration of Z. Rosenbaum, # 3 Exhibit A, # 4 Exhibit B, # 5 Exhibit C, # 6 Exhibit D, # 7 Exhibit E, # 8 Exhibit F, # 9 Exhibit G, # 10 Exhibit H, # 11 Exhibit I)(Rosenbaum, Zachary) (Entered: 07/10/2019)
225 SEALED ORDER granting re 224 SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons. filed by JANE DOE 6, JOHN DOE 2, DYLAN KOHERE, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY. The Memorandum, the Rosenbaum Declaration and all exhibits thereto are, hereby, placed under seal.(This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.)Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 7/11/19.(zdot) (Entered: 07/11/2019)
226 SEALED DOCUMENT filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Declaration, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F, # 8 Exhibit G, # 9 Exhibit H, # 10 Exhibit I)(ztd) (Entered: 07/12/2019)
227 SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL filed by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Defendants' Response Memorandum, # 2 Declaration, # 3 Declaration, # 4 Text of Proposed Order)(Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 07/24/2019)
228 SEALED ORDER granting 227 Motion for Leave to File documents Under Seal. Defendants' Response Memorandum, the Declarations of Robert E. Easton and Courtney D. Enlow and all exhibits thereto are, hereby, placed under seal.(This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.)Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 7/27/19.(zdot) (Entered: 07/29/2019)
229 NOTICE of Appearance by Courtney Danielle Enlow on behalf of All Defendants (Enlow, Courtney) (Entered: 07/29/2019)
230 SEALED DOCUMENT filed by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON. (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Declaration, # 2 Declaration)(ztd) (Entered: 07/31/2019)
231 SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support − Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of their Motion in Opposition to Defendants' Clawback Notice Pursuant to the Court's June 24, 2019 Minute Order)(Rosenbaum, Zachary) (Entered: 08/02/2019)
232 SEALED ORDER granting 231 Motion for Leave to File Documents Under Seal. The Reply Memorandum is, hereby, placed under seal. (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.)Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 8/2/19.(zdot) (Entered: 08/05/2019)

08/02/2019
09/13/2019
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01/15/2020 01/17/2020

233 SEALED REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS CLAWBACK NOTICE PURSUANT TO THE COURTS JUNE 24, 2019 MINUTE ORDER filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.)(zjf) (Entered: 08/12/2019)
234 ORDERED that Plaintiffs' 226 Motion in Opposition to Defendants' Claw−Back Notice Pursuant to the Court's June 24, 2019 Minute Order is DENIED. Plaintiffs may not rely on the challenged document, which is under seal, and must comply with the return or destruction requirements of the 502(D) Order. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 9/13/19. (dot) (Entered: 09/13/2019)
235 SEALED MEMORANDUM OPINION (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.)Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 9/13/19.(zdot) (Entered: 09/13/2019)
236 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 216 Motion to Compel. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 9−13−2019. (lcckk3) (Entered: 09/13/2019)
237 MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 9−13−2019. (lcckk3) (Entered: 09/13/2019)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Joint Status Report due by 10/25/2019. (dot) (Entered: 09/17/2019)
238 Joint STATUS REPORT by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Rosenbaum, Zachary) (Entered: 10/25/2019)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court hereby schedules a teleconference in this matter for JANUARY 14, 2020 at 9:00 a.m. to discuss matters pertaining to the scope of discovery. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 1−10−2019. (lcckk3) (Entered: 01/10/2020)
Set/Reset Hearings: Telephone Conference on the record set for 1/14/2020 at 9:00 AM in Chambers before Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly. (dot) (Entered: 01/14/2020)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly: Telephone Conference on the record held on 1/14/2020. (Court Reporter Lisa Edwards.) (dot) (Entered: 01/14/2020)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court held a teleconference in this matter on January 14, 2020. A court reporter was present. Based on the communications during the teleconference, the parties are ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report by MARCH 1, 2020 indicating that the parties have completed document production. The Joint Status Report shall further set forth a schedule for taking any needed fact depositions. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 1−14−2020. (lcckk3) (Entered: 01/14/2020)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Joint Status Report due by 3/1/2020. (kt) (Entered: 01/15/2020)
239 TRANSCRIPT OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE before Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly held on January 14, 2020; Page Numbers: 1−42. Date of Issuance: January 17, 2020. Court Reporter/Transcriber Lisa Edwards. Telephone number (202) 354−3269. Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the Transcript Order Form

For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the c ourt reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.

NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.

03/02/2020 03/04/2020
03/04/2020 04/07/2020 04/09/2020
04/09/2020 05/07/2020 05/07/2020
05/07/2020

Redaction Request due 2/7/2020. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/17/2020. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/16/2020.(Edwards, Lisa) (Entered: 01/17/2020)
240 Joint STATUS REPORT by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Slachetka, Meg) (Entered: 03/02/2020)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court is in receipt of the parties' 240 Joint Status Report in Response to January 14, 2020 Minute Order. The parties report that discovery has been ongoing and that Defendants are still completing their document production and development of a metadata overlay. The Court ORDERS the parties to file a further Joint Status Report on APRIL 7, 2020, updating the Court on the status of document discovery and proposing a schedule for the completion of fact depositions and other discovery.In the Joint Status Report, the parties informed the Court of two issues. First, there is a dispute as to Plaintiffs' designation of several expert witnesses and service of several expert reports. Defendants contend that expert testimony and reports should not be permitted. The Court does not require briefing on this issue at this time. If Plaintiffs elect to proceed with their expert discovery, Defendants may elect not to depose those expert witnesses. The Court will decide on the use of the expert opinions in concert with seeing how those expert opinions are used. As such, this issue is premature. Second, Defendants indicated that they oppose the depositions of certain individuals. The Court finds that this issue is also premature. Plaintiffs have indicated that they have not noticed these depositions as they are waiting until other discovery has been completed to determine if the depositions are necessary. The parties shall provide the Court with an update on this issue in the April 7, 2020 Joint Status Report. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 3−4−2020. (lcckk3) (Entered: 03/04/2020)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Joint Status Report due by 4/7/2020. (kt) (Entered: 03/04/2020)
241 Joint STATUS REPORT by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Slachetka, Meg) (Entered: 04/07/2020)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court is in receipt of the parties' 241 Joint Status Report. The parties report that Defendants served supplemental document productions as well as a metadata overlay on Plaintiffs. Additionally, the parties have negotiated a fact deposition schedule. However, due to the travel restrictions of COVID−19, it is unclear whether or not these depositions will take place on schedule. But, the parties remain hopeful that they will be able to conduct the depositions in May. The Court ORDERS the parties to file another Joint Status Report on MAY 7, 2020, updating the Court on the status of discovery and setting a schedule for the completion of fact depositions and fact discovery. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 4/9/2020. (lcckk3) (Entered: 04/09/2020)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Joint Status Report due by 5/7/2020, updating the Court on the status of discovery and setting a schedule for the completion of fact depositions and fact discovery. (dot) (Entered: 04/09/2020)
242 Joint STATUS REPORT by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Slachetka, Meg) (Entered: 05/07/2020)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court is in receipt of the parties' 242 Joint Status Report. The parties report that Defendants served supplemental document productions. Additionally, the parties have negotiated a tentative fact deposition schedule. However, due to the travel restrictions of COVID−19, it is unclear whether or not these depositions will take place at the scheduled times. The parties remain hopeful that they will be able to conduct many of the depositions in June. The Court ORDERS the parties to file another Joint Status Report on JUNE 24, 2020, updating the Court on the status of discovery and setting a schedule for the completion of fact depositions and fact discovery. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 5−7−2020. (lcckk3) (Entered: 05/07/2020)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Joint Status Report due by 6/24/2020, updating the Court on the status of discovery and setting a schedule for the completion of fact depositions and fact discovery. (dot) (Entered: 05/08/2020)

 
 United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
____________

No. 17-5267
Jane Doe 1, et al., Appellees
v. Donald J. Trump, in his official capacity as President of the United States, et al.,
Appellants

September Term, 2017
1:17-cv-01597-CKK Filed On: January 4, 2018 [1711445]

BEFORE: Rogers, Tatel, and Millett, Circuit Judges

O R D E R
Upon consideration of appellants’ motion for voluntary dismissal of appeal, it is
ORDERED that the motion be granted and this case be dismissed.
The Clerk is directed to issue the mandate forthwith to the district court.
Per Curiam
FOR THE COURT: Mark J. Langer, Clerk
BY: /s/ Michael C. McGrail Deputy Clerk

 
 Case: 1:17-cv-01597-CKK As of: 04/02/2019 09:58 AM EDT 1 of 51
U.S. District Court District of Columbia (Washington, DC) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:17−cv−01597−CKK

TYPE−L

DOE et al v. TRUMP et al Assigned to: Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly Case in other court: USCA, 17−05267
USCA, 18−05257 Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act Non−Party Respondent HERITAGE FOUNDATION
Non−Party Respondent FAMILY RESEARCH COUNCIL, INC.
Plaintiff JANE DOE 1 TERMINATED: 04/06/2018

Date Filed: 08/09/2017 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Defendant
represented by Heidi K. Abegg WEBSTER, CHAMBERLAIN & BEAN, LLP 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Suite 1000 Washington, DC 20006 (202) 785−9500 Fax: (202) 835−0243 Email: habegg@wc−b.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Gene C. Schaerr SCHAERR DUNCAN LLP 1717 K Street, NW Suite 900 Washington, DC 20006 (202) 787−1060 Fax: (571) 730−4429 Email: gschaerr@schaerr−duncan.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Kevin Matthew Lamb WILMER, CUTLER, PICKERING, HALE & DORR, LLP. 1875 Pennsylvania Ave., NW Washington, DC 20006 (202) 663−6000 Email: kevin.lamb@wilmerhale.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul R.Q. Wolfson WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE & DORR LLP 1875 Pennsylvania Ave., NW Washington, DC 20006 (202) 663−6000 Fax: (202) 663−6363 Email: paul.wolfson@wilmerhale.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam M. Cambier WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE & DORR LLP

Case: 1:17-cv-01597-CKK As of: 04/02/2019 09:58 AM EDT 2 of 51
60 State Street Boston, MA 02109 (617) 526−6262 Fax: (617) 526−5000 Email: adam.cambier@wilmerhale.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alan E. Schoenfeld WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE & DORR, LLP 250 Greenwich Street 7 World Trade Center New York, NY 10007 (212) 937−7294 Fax: (212) 230−8888 Email: alan.schoenfeld@wilmerhale.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amy Whelan NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS 870 Market Street Suite 370 San Francisco, CA 94102 Email: awhelan@nclrights.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher R. Looney WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE & DORR LLP 60 State Street Boston, MA 02109 (617) 526−6313 Fax: (617) 526−5000 Email: christopher.looney@wilmerhale.com TERMINATED: 09/12/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Christopher F. Stoll NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS 870 Market Street Suite 370 San Francisco, CA 94102 (415) 365−1320 Fax: (415) 392−8442 Email: cstoll@nclrights.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Claire Laporte FOLEY HOAG, LLP 155 Seaport Boulevard Boston, MA 02210−2600 (617) 832−1210 Fax: (617) 832−7000 Email: cll@foleyhoag.com TERMINATED: 07/03/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Daniel L. McFadden FOLEY HOAG, LLP

Case: 1:17-cv-01597-CKK As of: 04/02/2019 09:58 AM EDT 3 of 51
155 Seaport Boulevard Boston, MA 02210−2600 Email: DMcFadden@foleyhoag.com TERMINATED: 08/17/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Harriet Hoder WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE & DORR LLP 60 State Street Boston, MA 02109 (617) 526−6203 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jennifer Levi GLBTQ LEGAL ADVOCATES & DEFENDERS 18 Tremont Street Suite 950 Boston, MA 02108 (617) 426−1350 Fax: (617) 426−3594 Email: jlevi@glad.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kathleen M. Brill FOLEY HOAG, LLP 155 Seaport Boulevard Boston, MA 02210−2600 (617) 832−1229 Fax: (617) 832−7000 Email: kbrill@foleyhoag.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren Godles Milgroom FOLEY HOAG, LLP 155 Seaport Boulevard Boston, MA 02210−2600 (617) 832−3052 Email: lmilgroom@foleyhoag.com TERMINATED: 07/03/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Mary L. Bonauto GLBTQ LEGAL ADVOCATES & DEFENDERS 18 Tremont Street Suite 950 Boston, MA 02108 617−426−1350 Email: mbonauto@glad.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew E. Miller FOLEY HOAG, LLP 155 Seaport Boulevard Boston, MA 02210−2600 (617) 832−3041 Fax: (671) 832−7000 Email: mmiller@foleyhoag.com PRO HAC VICE

Case: 1:17-cv-01597-CKK As of: 04/02/2019 09:58 AM EDT 4 of 51

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Licker FOLEY HOAG, LLP 155 Seaport Boulevard Boston, MA 02210−2600 (617) 832−1197 Fax: (617) 832−7000 Email: mlicker@foleyhoag.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nancy Lynn Schroeder WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE & DORR LLP 350 S. Grand Avenue Suite 2100 Los Angeles, CA 90071 (213) 443−5393 Fax: (213) 443−5400 Email: nancy.schroeder@wilmerhale.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rachel C. Hutchinson FOLEY HOAG, LLP 155 Seaport Boulevard Boston, MA 02210−2600 (617) 832−3063 Fax: (617) 832−7000 Email: rhutchinson@foleyhoag.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shannon P. Minter NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS 870 Market Street Suite 370 San Francisco, CA 94102 Email: sminter@nclrights.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Theresa Roosevelt FOLEY HOAG LLP 1717 K Street, NW Washington, DC 20006 (202) 223−1200 Email: troosevelt@foleyhoag.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff JANE DOE 2

represented by Kevin Matthew Lamb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Paul R.Q. Wolfson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Adam M. Cambier

Case: 1:17-cv-01597-CKK As of: 04/02/2019 09:58 AM EDT 5 of 51
(See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alan E. Schoenfeld (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amy Whelan (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher R. Looney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/12/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Christopher F. Stoll (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Claire Laporte (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/03/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Daniel L. McFadden (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/17/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Harriet Hoder (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jennifer Levi (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kathleen M. Brill (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren Godles Milgroom (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/03/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Mary L. Bonauto (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew E. Miller (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Licker

Case: 1:17-cv-01597-CKK As of: 04/02/2019 09:58 AM EDT 6 of 51

(See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nancy Lynn Schroeder (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rachel C. Hutchinson (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shannon P. Minter (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Theresa Roosevelt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff JANE DOE 3

represented by Kevin Matthew Lamb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Paul R.Q. Wolfson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Adam M. Cambier (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alan E. Schoenfeld (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amy Whelan (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher R. Looney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/12/2018 PRO HAC VICE

Christopher F. Stoll (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Claire Laporte (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/03/2018 PRO HAC VICE

Case: 1:17-cv-01597-CKK As of: 04/02/2019 09:58 AM EDT 7 of 51

Daniel L. McFadden (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/17/2018 PRO HAC VICE

Harriet Hoder (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jennifer Levi (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kathleen M. Brill (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren Godles Milgroom (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/03/2018 PRO HAC VICE

Mary L. Bonauto (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew E. Miller (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Licker (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nancy Lynn Schroeder (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rachel C. Hutchinson (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shannon P. Minter (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Theresa Roosevelt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff JANE DOE 4

represented by Kevin Matthew Lamb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:17-cv-01597-CKK As of: 04/02/2019 09:58 AM EDT 8 of 51
Paul R.Q. Wolfson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam M. Cambier (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alan E. Schoenfeld (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amy Whelan (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher R. Looney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/12/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Christopher F. Stoll (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Claire Laporte (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/03/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Daniel L. McFadden (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/17/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Harriet Hoder (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jennifer Levi (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kathleen M. Brill (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren Godles Milgroom (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/03/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Mary L. Bonauto (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:17-cv-01597-CKK As of: 04/02/2019 09:58 AM EDT 9 of 51

Plaintiff JANE DOE 5

Matthew E. Miller (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Licker (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nancy Lynn Schroeder (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rachel C. Hutchinson (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shannon P. Minter (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theresa Roosevelt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Kevin Matthew Lamb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul R.Q. Wolfson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam M. Cambier (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alan E. Schoenfeld (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amy Whelan (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher R. Looney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/12/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Christopher F. Stoll (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE

Case: 1:17-cv-01597-CKK As of: 04/02/2019 09:58 AM EDT 10 of 51
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Claire Laporte (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/03/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Daniel L. McFadden (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/17/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Harriet Hoder (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jennifer Levi (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kathleen M. Brill (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren Godles Milgroom (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/03/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Mary L. Bonauto (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew E. Miller (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Licker (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nancy Lynn Schroeder (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rachel C. Hutchinson (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shannon P. Minter (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theresa Roosevelt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:17-cv-01597-CKK As of: 04/02/2019 09:58 AM EDT 11 of 51

Plaintiff DYLAN KOHERE

represented by Kevin Matthew Lamb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul R.Q. Wolfson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam M. Cambier (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alan E. Schoenfeld (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amy Whelan (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher R. Looney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/12/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Christopher F. Stoll (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Claire Laporte (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/03/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Daniel L. McFadden (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/17/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Harriet Hoder (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jennifer Levi (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kathleen M. Brill (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren Godles Milgroom (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/03/2018

Case: 1:17-cv-01597-CKK As of: 04/02/2019 09:58 AM EDT 12 of 51

PRO HAC VICE

Mary L. Bonauto (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew E. Miller (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Licker (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nancy Lynn Schroeder (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rachel C. Hutchinson (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shannon P. Minter (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Theresa Roosevelt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff REGAN V. KIBBY

represented by Kevin Matthew Lamb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Paul R.Q. Wolfson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Adam M. Cambier (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alan E. Schoenfeld (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amy Whelan (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher R. Looney (See above for address)

Case: 1:17-cv-01597-CKK As of: 04/02/2019 09:58 AM EDT 13 of 51
TERMINATED: 09/12/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Christopher F. Stoll (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Claire Laporte (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/03/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Daniel L. McFadden (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/17/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Harriet Hoder (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jennifer Levi (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kathleen M. Brill (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren Godles Milgroom (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/03/2018 PRO HAC VICE
Mary L. Bonauto (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew E. Miller (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Licker (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nancy Lynn Schroeder (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rachel C. Hutchinson (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shannon P. Minter (See above for address)

Case: 1:17-cv-01597-CKK As of: 04/02/2019 09:58 AM EDT 14 of 51

PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Theresa Roosevelt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff JOHN DOE, 1

represented by Kevin Matthew Lamb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Paul R.Q. Wolfson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Adam M. Cambier (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alan E. Schoenfeld (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amy Whelan (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher R. Looney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/12/2018 PRO HAC VICE

Christopher F. Stoll (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Claire Laporte (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/03/2018 PRO HAC VICE

Daniel L. McFadden (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/17/2018 PRO HAC VICE

Harriet Hoder (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jennifer Levi (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kathleen M. Brill

Case: 1:17-cv-01597-CKK As of: 04/02/2019 09:58 AM EDT 15 of 51

(See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren Godles Milgroom (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/03/2018 PRO HAC VICE

Mary L. Bonauto (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew E. Miller (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Licker (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nancy Lynn Schroeder (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rachel C. Hutchinson (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shannon P. Minter (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Theresa Roosevelt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff JANE DOE 6

represented by Kevin Matthew Lamb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alan E. Schoenfeld (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Paul R.Q. Wolfson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff JANE DOE 7

represented by Kevin Matthew Lamb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alan E. Schoenfeld

Case: 1:17-cv-01597-CKK As of: 04/02/2019 09:58 AM EDT 16 of 51

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Paul R.Q. Wolfson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff JOHN DOE 2

represented by Kevin Matthew Lamb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alan E. Schoenfeld (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Paul R.Q. Wolfson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant DONALD J. TRUMP in his official capacity as President of the United States TERMINATED: 08/06/2018
Defendant JAMES N. MATTIS in his official capacity as Secretary of Defense
Defendant JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR. in his official capacity as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

represented by Andrew Evan Carmichael U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch 1100 L Street NW Washington, DC 20005 (202) 514−3346 Fax: (202) 616−8460 Email: andrew.e.carmichael@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Bradley Parker U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE P.O. Box 883 Washington, DC 20044 (202) 514−4336 Fax: (202) 616−8202 Email: ryan.parker@usdoj.gov TERMINATED: 06/07/2018
represented by Andrew Evan Carmichael (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Bradley Parker (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/07/2018
represented by Andrew Evan Carmichael (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Bradley Parker (See above for address)

Case: 1:17-cv-01597-CKK As of: 04/02/2019 09:58 AM EDT 17 of 51

TERMINATED: 06/07/2018

Defendant
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

represented by Andrew Evan Carmichael (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ryan Bradley Parker (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/07/2018

Defendant
RYAN D. MCCARTHY in his official capacity as Secretary of the Army TERMINATED: 04/06/2018

represented by Andrew Evan Carmichael (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ryan Bradley Parker (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/07/2018

Defendant
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

represented by Andrew Evan Carmichael (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ryan Bradley Parker (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/07/2018

Defendant
HEATHER A. WILSON in her official capacity as Secretary of the Air Force

represented by Andrew Evan Carmichael (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ryan Bradley Parker (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/07/2018

Defendant UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

represented by Andrew Evan Carmichael (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ryan Bradley Parker (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/07/2018

Defendant
ELAINE C. DUKE in her official capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security TERMINATED: 04/06/2018

represented by Andrew Evan Carmichael (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ryan Bradley Parker (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/07/2018

Case: 1:17-cv-01597-CKK As of: 04/02/2019 09:58 AM EDT 18 of 51

Defendant UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Defendant UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Defendant DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY
Defendant RICHARD V. SPENCER in his official capacity as Secretary of the Navy
Defendant RAQUEL C. BONO in her official capacity as Director of the Defense Health Agency
Defendant MARK T. ESPER In his Official Capacity as Secretary of the Army
Defendant

represented by Andrew Evan Carmichael (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Bradley Parker (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/07/2018
represented by Andrew Evan Carmichael (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Bradley Parker (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/07/2018
represented by Andrew Evan Carmichael (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Bradley Parker (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/07/2018
represented by Andrew Evan Carmichael (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Bradley Parker (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/07/2018
represented by Andrew Evan Carmichael (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Bradley Parker (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/07/2018
represented by Andrew Evan Carmichael (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Bradley Parker (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/07/2018

Case: 1:17-cv-01597-CKK As of: 04/02/2019 09:58 AM EDT 19 of 51

KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN In her official capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security

represented by Andrew Evan Carmichael (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ryan Bradley Parker (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/07/2018

Movant
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF FAMILY PHYSICIANS

represented by Scott B. Wilkens JENNER & BLOCK LLP 1099 New York Avenue, NW Suite 900 Washington, DC 20001−4412 (202) 639−6072 Email: swilkens@jenner.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF NURSING

represented by Scott B. Wilkens (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS

represented by Scott B. Wilkens (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant
AMERICAN MEDICAL WOMEN'S ASSOCIATION

represented by Scott B. Wilkens (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant
AMERICAN NURSES ASSOCIATION

represented by Scott B. Wilkens (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant
ASSOCIATION OF MEDICAL SCHOOL PEDIATRIC DEPARTMENT CHAIRS

represented by Scott B. Wilkens (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant ENDOCRINE SOCIETY

represented by Scott B. Wilkens (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant
GLMA: HEALTH PROFESSIONALS ADVANCING LGBT EQUALITY

represented by Scott B. Wilkens (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 1:17-cv-01597-CKK As of: 04/02/2019 09:58 AM EDT 20 of 51

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SOCIAL WORKERS

represented by Scott B. Wilkens (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant PEDIATRIC ENDOCRINE SOCIETY

represented by Scott B. Wilkens (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant
WORLD PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH

represented by Scott B. Wilkens (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant TREVOR PROJECT

represented by Howard Sean Hogan GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, LLP 1050 Connecticut Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036 (202) 955−8500 Fax: (202) 467−0539 Email: hhogan@gibsondunn.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant
NATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY

represented by Susan Baker Manning MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP 1111 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20004 (202) 373−6172 Fax: (202) 373−6472 Email: susan.manning@morganlewis.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephanie Schuster MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP 1111 Pennsyvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20004 (202) 373−6595 Email: stephanie.schuster@morganlewis.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant
TENNESSEE TRANSGENDER POLITICAL COALITION

represented by Susan Baker Manning (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephanie Schuster (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant

Case: 1:17-cv-01597-CKK As of: 04/02/2019 09:58 AM EDT 21 of 51

TGI NETWORK OF RHODE ISLAND

represented by Susan Baker Manning (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephanie Schuster (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant TRANSGENDER ALLIES GROUP

represented by Susan Baker Manning (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephanie Schuster (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant
TRANSGENDER LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATION FUND

represented by Susan Baker Manning (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephanie Schuster (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant TRANSOHIO

represented by Susan Baker Manning (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephanie Schuster (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant
TRANSGENDER RESOURCE CENTER OF NEW MEXICO

represented by Susan Baker Manning (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephanie Schuster (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant
SOUTHERN ARIZONA GENDER ALLIANCE

represented by Susan Baker Manning (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephanie Schuster (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant BUZZFEED, INC.

represented by

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Matthew Lynn Schafer BUZZFEED INC. 111 East 18th Street 14th Floor New York, NY 10003 (646) 798−0693 Fax: (212) 431−7461 Email: matthew.schafer@buzzfeed.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus MASSACHUSETTS

represented by Sara A. Colb MASSACHUSETTS ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE 1 Ashburton Place Boston, MA 02108 (617) 963−2031 Email: sara.colb@state.ma.us LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus CALIFORNIA

Amicus CONNECTICUT

Amicus CONNECTICUT

Amicus DELAWARE

Amicus HAWAII

Amicus ILLINOIS

Amicus IOWA

Amicus MARYLAND

Amicus NEW MEXICO

Amicus NEW YORK

Amicus OREGON

Amicus PENNSYLVANIA

Case: 1:17-cv-01597-CKK As of: 04/02/2019 09:58 AM EDT 23 of 51

Amicus RHODE ISLAND
Amicus VERMONT
Amicus RETIRED MILITARY OFFICERS AND FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY OFFICIALS

represented by Phillip Michael Spector MESSING & SPECTOR LLP Office of the President 1200 Steuart Street Suite 2112 Baltimore, MD 21230 (202) 277−8173 Email: ps@messingspector.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 08/09/2017
08/09/2017 08/09/2017 08/10/2017 08/11/2017
08/11/2017 08/11/2017 08/11/2017 08/30/2017

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, against ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON ( Filing fee $ 400 receipt number 0090−5066975) filed by JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Summons − Trump, # 3 Summons − Mattis, # 4 Summons − Dunford, # 5 Summons − U.S. Army, # 6 Summons − McCarthy, # 7 Summons − U.S. Air Force, # 8 Summons − Wilson, # 9 Summons − U.S. Coast Guard, # 10 Summons − Duke, # 11 Summons − U.S.A.)(Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 08/09/2017)
2 MOTION to Proceed Under Pseudonyms , by JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5 (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 08/09/2017)
Case Assigned to Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly. (sth) (Entered: 08/11/2017)
3 ORDER granting 2 Motion for Plaintiffs to proceed under pseudonyms. Signed by Judge Amy Berman Jackson on 8/10/17. (sth) (Entered: 08/11/2017)
4 SUMMONS (9) Issued Electronically as to ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, HEATHER A. WILSON. (Attachments: # 1 Summons, # 2 Summons, # 3 Summons, # 4 Summons, # 5 Summons, # 6 Summons, # 7 Summons, # 8 Summons, # 9 Summons)(sth) (Entered: 08/11/2017)
SUMMONS Not Issued as to US Attorney and the US Attorney General. (sth) (Entered: 08/11/2017)
5 ORDER ESTABLISHING PROCEDURES FOR CASES ASSIGNED TO JUDGE COLLEEN KOLLAR−KOTELLY. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 08/11/2017. (DM) (Entered: 08/11/2017)
6 SEALED DOCUMENT filed by JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5(This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.)(Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 08/11/2017)
7 NOTICE of Appearance by Kevin Matthew Lamb on behalf of JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5 (Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 08/30/2017)

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08/30/2017 08/30/2017 08/31/2017
08/31/2017
08/31/2017 08/31/2017 08/31/2017
08/31/2017 08/31/2017

8 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Alan E. Schoenfeld, :Firm− Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, :Address− 7 World Trade Center, 250 Greenwich Street, New York, NY 10007. Phone No. − 212−937−7294. Fax No. − 212−230−8888 Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0090−5096409. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5 (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Alan E. Schoenfeld In Support of Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 08/30/2017)
MINUTE ORDER GRANTING 8 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice of Attorney Alan E. Schoenfeld, in order for him to appear as co−counsel for Plaintiffs, contingent on said attorney filing a declaration certifying familiarity with this Court's Local Rules by no later than SEPTEMBER 6, 2017. Counsel shall promptly register for this Court's CM/ECF system. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 8/30/2017. (lcckk3) (Entered: 08/30/2017)
9 AMENDED COMPLAINT for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, against ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, RAQUEL C. BONO filed by JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, DYLAN KOHERE, REGAN V. KIBBY, JOHN DOE, 1. (Attachments: # 1 Summons − U.S. Department of the Navy, # 2 Summons − Defense Health Agency, # 3 Summons − Raquel C. Bono, # 4 Summons − Richard V. Spencer)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 08/31/2017)
10 REQUEST FOR SUMMONS TO ISSUE (Summons − Air Force) re 9 Amended Complaint,, filed by JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 3, DYLAN KOHERE, JANE DOE 4, JOHN DOE, 1, REGAN V. KIBBY, JANE DOE 5. Related document: 9 Amended Complaint,, filed by DYLAN KOHERE, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JOHN DOE, 1, REGAN V. KIBBY. (Attachments: # 1 Summons − Army, # 2 Summons − Coast Guard, # 3 Summons − Duke, # 4 Summons − Dunford, # 5 Summons − Mattis, # 6 Summons − McCarthy, # 7 Summons − Trump, # 8 Summons − United States, # 9 Summons − Wilson)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 08/31/2017)
11 SEALED DOCUMENT filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE(This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 08/31/2017)
12 NOTICE of Appearance by Ryan Bradley Parker on behalf of All Defendants (Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 08/31/2017)
13 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with 65.1(d) Expedited Request, by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Kevin M. Lamb, # 2 Exhibit A−F (Lamb Dec.), # 3 Declaration of Brad R. Carson, # 4 Exhibit A−C (Carson Dec.), # 5 Declaration of Deborah Lee James, # 6 Exhibit A−D (James Dec.), # 7 Declaration of Eric K. Fanning, # 8 Exhibit A−F (Fanning Dec.), # 9 Declaration of Raymond Edwin Mabus, Jr., # 10 Exhibit A−F (Mabus Dec.), # 11 Declaration of George Richard Brown, MD, DFAPA, # 12 Exhibit A−D (Brown Dec.), # 13 Declaration of Margaret C. Wilmoth, # 14 Declaration of Regan V. Kibby, # 15 Declaration of Dylan Kohere, # 16 Text of Proposed Order)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 08/31/2017)
14 MOTION for Hearing Request for Expedited Hearing and Statement of Facts Making Expedition Essential, by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE re 13 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with 65.1(d) Expedited Request, (Lamb, Kevin) Modified event title on 9/1/2017 (znmw). (Entered: 08/31/2017)
15 SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (This document is SEALED and only

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09/01/2017 09/01/2017 09/01/2017 09/01/2017 09/01/2017
09/01/2017 09/01/2017 09/01/2017 09/01/2017

available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Christopher R. Looney, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Text of Proposed Order (SEALED))(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 08/31/2017)
16 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Jennifer Levi, :Firm− GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders, :Address− 30 Winter St., Ste. 800, Boston, Massachusetts 02108. Phone No. − 617−426−1350. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0090−5099052. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Declaration Jennifer Levi, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 09/01/2017)
17 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Shannon P. Minter, :Firm− National Center for Lesbian Rights, :Address− 870 Market St., Ste. 370, San Francisco, California 94102. Phone No. − 415−392−6257. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0090−5099060. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Shannon P. Minter, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 09/01/2017)
18 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Mary L. Bonauto, :Firm− GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders, :Address− 30 Winter St., Ste. 800, Boston, Massachusetts 02108. Phone No. − 617−426−1350. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0090−5099075. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Mary L. Bonauto, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 09/01/2017)
19 NOTICE of Filing of Supplemental Declaration of Alan E. Schoenfeld in Support of Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE re Order on Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice, (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Alan E. Schoenfeld)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 09/01/2017)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court held a teleconference in this matter on September 1, 2017 to set a briefing schedule for Plaintiffs' 13 Application for a Preliminary Injunction. At the parties' request, the Court entered the following schedule: Defendants shall file an opposition to Plaintiffs' Application by no later than SEPTEMBER 22, 2017. Plaintiffs shall file a reply by no later than SEPTEMBER 29, 2017. The parties were also ordered to file a notice with the Court by no later than SEPTEMBER 6, 2017 indicating their positions as to whether the Court's consideration of Plaintiffs' preliminary injunction application should be consolidated with its final determination of the merits of the case. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 9/1/2017. (lcckk3) (Entered: 09/01/2017)
20 SUMMONS (5) Issued Electronically as to RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. (znmw) (Entered: 09/01/2017)
21 SUMMONS (9) Reissued Electronically as to ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, HEATHER A. WILSON (znmw) (Entered: 09/01/2017)
22 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Christopher R. Looney, :Firm− Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, :Address− 60 State Street, Boston, MA 02109. Phone No. − 617−526−6313. Fax No. − 617−526−5000 Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0090−5100097. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Christopher R. Looney, # 2 Proposed Order)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 09/01/2017)
23 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Nancy Lynn Schroeder, :Firm− Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, :Address− 350 S. Grand Avenue, Suite 2100, Los Angeles, CA 90071. Phone No. − (213) 443−5393. Fax No. − (213) 443−5400 Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0090−5100160. Fee

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09/01/2017 09/01/2017 09/01/2017 09/01/2017 09/01/2017 09/01/2017 09/01/2017 09/01/2017 09/01/2017

Status: Fee Paid. by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Nancy Lynn Schroeder, # 2 Proposed Order)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 09/01/2017)
24 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Adam M. Cambier, :Firm− Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, :Address− 60 State Street, Boston, MA 02109. Phone No. − 617−526−6262. Fax No. − 617−526−5000 Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0090−5100204. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Adam M. Cambier, # 2 Proposed Order)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 09/01/2017)
25 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Christopher F. Stoll, :Firm− National Center for Lesbian Rights, :Address− 870 Market St., Ste. 370, San Francisco, California 94102. Phone No. − 415−392−6257. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0090−5100239. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Christopher F. Stoll, # 2 Proposed Order)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 09/01/2017)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Amy Berman Jackson: Telephone Conference on the record held on 9/1/2017. Defendants' Response to 13 due by 9/22/2017. Plaintiffs' Reply due by 9/29/2017. Joint Status Report due by 9/6/2017. (Court Reporter Janice Dickman.) (dot) (Entered: 09/01/2017)
26 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Amy Whelan, :Firm− National Center for Lesbian Rights, :Address− 870 Market St., Ste. 370, San Francisco, California 94102. Phone No. − 415−392−6257. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0090−5100283. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Declration of Amy Whelan, # 2 Proposed Order)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 09/01/2017)
27 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Kathleen M. Brill, :Firm− Foley Hoag LLP, :Address− 155 Seaport Boulevard, Boston, MA 02210. Phone No. − 617−832−1229. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0090−5100368. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Kathleen M. Brill, # 2 Proposed Order)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 09/01/2017)
28 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Rachel C. Hutchinson, :Firm− Foley Hoag LLP, :Address− 155 Seaport Boulevard, Boston, MA 02210. Phone No. − 617−832−3063. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0090−5100387. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Rachel C. Hutchinson, # 2 Proposed Order)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 09/01/2017)
29 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Claire Laporte, :Firm− Foley Hoag LLP, :Address− 155 Seaport Boulevard, Boston, MA 02210. Phone No. − 617−832−1210. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0090−5100401. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Claire Laporte, # 2 Proposed Order)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 09/01/2017)
30 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Michael J. Licker, :Firm− Foley Hoag LLP, :Address− 155 Seaport Boulevard, Boston, MA 02210. Phone No. − 617−832−1197. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0090−5100412. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Michael J. Licker, # 2 Proposed Order)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 09/01/2017)
31 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Daniel L. McFadden, :Firm− Foley Hoag LLP, :Address− 155 Seaport Boulevard, Boston, MA 02210.

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09/01/2017 09/05/2017
09/06/2017 09/06/2017
09/06/2017 09/08/2017 09/10/2017 09/12/2017 09/13/2017

Phone No. − 617−832−1293. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0090−5100477. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Daniel L. McFadden, # 2 Proposed Order)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 09/01/2017)
32 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Matthew E. Miller, :Firm− Foley Hoag LLP, :Address− 155 Seaport Boulevard, Boston, MA 02210. Phone No. − 617−832−3041. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0090−5100489. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Matthew E. Miller, # 2 Proposed Order)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 09/01/2017)
MINUTE ORDER GRANTING 16 , 17 , 18 , 22 , 23 , 24 , 25 , 26 , 27 , 28 , 29 , 30 , 31 and 32 Motions for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Attorneys Jennifer Levi, Shannon P. Minter, Mary L. Bonauto, Christopher R. Looney, Nancy Lynn Schroeder, Adam M. Cambier, Christopher F. Stoll, Amy Whelan, Kathleen M. Brill, Rachel C. Hutchinson, Claire Laporte, Michael J. Licker, Daniel L. McFadden and Matthew E. Miller in order for them to appear as co−counsel for Plaintiffs. Counsel shall promptly register for this Court's CM/ECF system. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 9/5/2017. (lcckk3) (Entered: 09/05/2017)
33 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Harriet Hoder, :Firm− Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP, :Address− 60 State Street, Boston, MA 02109. Phone No. − 617−526−6203. Fax No. − 617−526−5000 Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0090−5104723. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Harriet Hoder, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 09/06/2017)
34 NOTICE regarding Consolidation of Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and the Merits of Plaintiffs' Claims by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Presidential Memorandum regarding Military Service by Transgender Individuals)(Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 09/06/2017)
35 RESPONSE TO ORDER OF THE COURT re Order,,, filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 09/06/2017)
MINUTE ORDER GRANTING 33 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Attorney Harriet Hoder in order for her to appear as co−counsel for Plaintiffs. Counsel shall promptly register for this Court's CM/ECF system. There are now 16 attorneys who are appearing pro hac vice on behalf of Plaintiffs. The Court notes that attorneys for Plaintiffs only need to move to appear pro hac vice before the Court if they are actually going to participate in Court proceedings. LCvR 83.2(d). Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 9/8/2017. (lcckk3) (Entered: 09/08/2017)
36 ORDER Regarding Plaintiffs' 13 Application for a Preliminary Injunction, 14 Request for Expedited Hearing and 15 Motion for Leave to File Documents under Seal. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 9/10/2017. (lcckk3) (Entered: 09/10/2017)
37 Joint MOTION for Protective Order by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 09/12/2017)
38 ORDER granting 37 Motion for Protective Order. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 9/13/17. (dot) (Entered: 09/18/2017)

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09/20/2017 09/20/2017 09/21/2017 09/29/2017
09/29/2017 09/29/2017

39 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to Respond to Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Unopposed MOTION for Briefing Schedule by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 09/20/2017)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court is in receipt of Defendants' 39 Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction and for Entry of a Briefing Schedule. Defendants request an additional two weeks to file their opposition to Plaintiffs' Application for Preliminary Injunction and a motion to dismiss. They also request a briefing schedule on these motions that would not be complete until October 27, 2017. The Court will GRANT−IN−PART Defendants' motion. The parties shall adhere to the following schedule: Defendants shall file their opposition to Plaintiffs' Application for Preliminary Injunction and Motion to Dismiss by no later than OCTOBER 2, 2017. Plaintiffs shall file a reply in support of their Application and an opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss by no later than OCTOBER 13, 2017. Defendants shall file a reply in support of their Motion to Dismiss by no later than OCTOBER 20, 2017. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 9/20/2017. (lcckk3) (Entered: 09/20/2017)
40 REDACTED DOCUMENT− Declaration of Christopher R. Looney in Support of Plaintiffs' Application for Preliminary Injunction to 13 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with 65.1(d) Expedited Request,, 36 Order by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 09/21/2017)
41 RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed. RAQUEL C. BONO served on 9/5/2017; DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY served on 9/5/2017; ELAINE C. DUKE served on 9/5/2017; JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR. served on 9/6/2017; JAMES N. MATTIS served on 9/6/2017; RYAN D. MCCARTHY served on 9/5/2017; RICHARD V. SPENCER served on 9/6/2017; DONALD J. TRUMP served on 9/11/2017; UNITED STATES COAST GUARD served on 9/5/2017; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE served on 9/5/2017; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY served on 9/5/2017; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY served on 9/5/2017; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA served on 9/6/2017; HEATHER A. WILSON served on 9/5/2017 (Attachments: # 1 Summons Executed as to AirForce, # 2 Summons Executed as to Army, # 3 Summons Executed as to Bono, # 4 Summons Executed as to Coast Guard, # 5 Summons Executed as to DHA, # 6 Summons Executed as to Duke, # 7 Summons Executed as to Dunford, # 8 Summons Executed as to Mattis, # 9 Summons Executed as to McCarthy, # 10 Summons Executed as to Navy, # 11 Summons Executed as to Spencer, # 12 Summons Executed as to USA, # 13 Summons Executed as to Wilson, # 14 Proof of Service as to U.S. Attorney General, # 15 Proof of Service as to U.S. Attorney's Office − District of D.C., # 16 Certificate of Service)(Schoenfeld, Alan) (Entered: 09/29/2017)
42 MOTION for Extension of Time to Respond to Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Interim Guidance, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 09/29/2017)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court is in receipt of Defendants' 42 Opposed Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Defendants request an additional two days to file their opposition to Plaintiffs' Application for Preliminary Injunction because they need additional time to prepare declarations and for senior Executive Branch officials to review their forthcoming

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09/29/2017 09/29/2017 10/04/2017
10/04/2017 10/04/2017
10/04/2017

pleadings. Defendants represent that Plaintiffs oppose this extension, but no opposition has yet been filed. Because the record supporting Plaintiffs' motion is large and the requested extension is brief, the Court will GRANT Defendants' motion over Plaintiffs' objection. Defendants shall file their opposition to Plaintiffs' Application for Preliminary Injunction and Motion to Dismiss by no later than OCTOBER 4, 2017. This is the final extension that will be granted. Additionally, the Court notes that Defendants' motion is untimely. The Order Establishing Procedures in this case states that "[m]otions for extensions of time must be filed at least four (4) business days prior to the first affected deadline." ECF No. 5 at 3. The Court expects all future motions to be filed on time. If Plaintiffs require additional time, they may file their reply and opposition by OCTOBER 16, 2017. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 9/29/2017. (lcckk3) (Entered: 09/29/2017)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Defendants' Response to 13 due by 10/4/2017. Reply due by 10/16/2017. (dot) (Entered: 10/02/2017)
43 RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed on United States Attorney General. Date of Service Upon United States Attorney General 9/5/2017., RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed as to the United States Attorney. Date of Service Upon United States Attorney on 9/11/2017. ( Answer due for ALL FEDERAL DEFENDANTS by 11/10/2017.) (See Docket Entry 41 to view document). (znmw) (Entered: 10/02/2017)
44 MOTION for Leave to File Brief as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs on Behalf of Medical, Nursing, Mental Health, and Other Health Care Organizations by AMERICAN ACADEMY OF FAMILY PHYSICIANS, AMERICAN ACADEMY OF NURSING, AMERICAN COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS, AMERICAN MEDICAL WOMEN'S ASSOCIATION, AMERICAN NURSES ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION OF MEDICAL SCHOOL PEDIATRIC DEPARTMENT CHAIRS, ENDOCRINE SOCIETY, GLMA: HEALTH PROFESSIONALS ADVANCING LGBT EQUALITY, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SOCIAL WORKERS, PEDIATRIC ENDOCRINE SOCIETY, WORLD PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH (Attachments: # 1 Brief of Amici Curiae Medical, Nursing, Mental Health, and Other Health Care Organizations in Support of Plaintiffs, # 2 Proposed Order)(Wilkens, Scott) (Entered: 10/04/2017)
45 MOTION to Dismiss < by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Interim Guidance, # 2 Declaration of Robert B. Chadwick, # 3 Declaration of Robert O. Burns, # 4 Text of Proposed Order)(Parker, Ryan) . (Entered: 10/04/2017)
46 SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL filed by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Declaration as to Jane Doe 1, # 2 Declaration as to Jane Doe 2, # 3 Declaration as to Jane Doe 3, # 4 Declaration as to Jane Doe 4, # 5 Declaration as to Jane Doe 5, # 6 Declaration as to John Doe 1)(Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 10/04/2017)
47 Memorandum in opposition to re 13 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with 65.1(d) Expedited Request, filed by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON. (See Docket Entry 45 to view document). (znmw) (Entered: 10/05/2017)

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10/05/2017
10/05/2017
10/11/2017 10/16/2017 10/16/2017 10/16/2017 10/16/2017 10/16/2017

MINUTE ORDER. The Court has received Defendant's 46 Consent Motion for Leave to File Documents Under Seal. That motion seeks leave to file under seal certain declarations that "contain information identifying the Plaintiffs who are proceeding in this action under pseudonyms." The motion also indicates that Defendants have "requested that Plaintiffs' counsel propose redactions to the declarations that will allow them to be filed on the public record without placing the Plaintiffs' identities at risk of disclosure." Having considered the familiar Hubbard factors for sealing, and given that the Court has previously permitted Plaintiffs to proceed under pseudonyms to protect their anonymity, the 46 Motion shall be GRANTED. See EEOC v. Nat'l Childrens Ctr. Inc., 98 F.3d 1406, 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (listing factors). However, this ruling is CONTINGENT on the parties filing mutually agreeable redacted versions of the declarations at issue on the public docket by OCTOBER 20, 2017. Any content in these documents that would not expose the identities of the Plaintiffs shall be made publicly available. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 10/5/2017. (lcckk1) (Entered: 10/05/2017)
48 SEALED DOCUMENT (Declarations) re 47 Memorandum in Opposition, 45 MOTION to Dismiss and Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction filed by RYAN D. MCCARTHY, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, RICHARD V. SPENCER, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RAQUEL C. BONO, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, HEATHER A. WILSON, ELAINE C. DUKE. (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Declaration as to Jane Doe 2, # 2 Declaration as to Jane Doe 3, # 3 Declaration as to Jane Doe 4, # 4 Declaration as to Jane Doe 5, # 5 Declaration as to John Doe 1)(znmw) (Entered: 10/06/2017)
49 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief by TREVOR PROJECT (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Proposed Amicus Brief, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Hogan, Howard) (Entered: 10/11/2017)
50 AMICUS BRIEF by MASSACHUSETTS (td) Modified on 10/16/2017 as to filer(s) (jf). (Entered: 10/16/2017)
51 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File Declarations in Opposition to the Government's Motion to Dismiss and in Further Support of Plaintiffs' Application for Preliminary Injunction by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Raymond Edwin Mabus, # 2 Declaration of Deborah Lee Jones, # 3 Declaration of Eric K. Fanning, # 4 Declaration of Mark J. Eitelberg, # 5 Declaration of George R. Brown)(Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 10/16/2017)
52 MOTION for Leave to File Brief of Amici Curiae by NATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, TENNESSEE TRANSGENDER POLITICAL COALITION, TGI NETWORK OF RHODE ISLAND, TRANSGENDER ALLIES GROUP, TRANSGENDER LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATION FUND, TRANSOHIO, TRANSGENDER RESOURCE CENTER OF NEW MEXICO, SOUTHERN ARIZONA GENDER ALLIANCE (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Brief of Amici Curiae, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Manning, Susan) (Entered: 10/16/2017)
53 NOTICE of Appearance by Susan Baker Manning on behalf of NATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, SOUTHERN ARIZONA GENDER ALLIANCE, TENNESSEE TRANSGENDER POLITICAL COALITION, TGI NETWORK OF RHODE ISLAND, TRANSGENDER ALLIES GROUP, TRANSGENDER LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATION FUND, TRANSGENDER RESOURCE CENTER OF NEW MEXICO, TRANSOHIO (Manning, Susan) (Entered: 10/16/2017)
54 NOTICE of Appearance by Stephanie Schuster on behalf of NATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, SOUTHERN ARIZONA GENDER ALLIANCE, TENNESSEE TRANSGENDER POLITICAL COALITION, TGI NETWORK OF RHODE ISLAND, TRANSGENDER ALLIES GROUP, TRANSGENDER LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATION FUND, TRANSGENDER RESOURCE CENTER OF NEW MEXICO, TRANSOHIO (Schuster, Stephanie) (Entered: 10/16/2017)

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10/16/2017 10/20/2017
10/20/2017
10/23/2017
10/23/2017 10/30/2017 10/30/2017 11/10/2017 11/14/2017 11/14/2017 11/17/2017

55 Memorandum in opposition to re 45 MOTION to Dismiss and Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 10/16/2017)
56 NOTICE of Filing Redacted Declarations by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Brian Judge pertaining to Jane Doe 1, # 2 Declaration pertaining to Jane Doe 2, # 3 Declaration pertaining to Jane Doe 3, # 4 Declaration pertaining to Jane Doe 4, # 5 Declaration of Daniel Sitterly pertaining to Jane Doe 5, # 6 Declaration pertaining to John Doe 1)(Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 10/20/2017)
57 REPLY to opposition to motion re 45 MOTION to Dismiss filed by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON. (Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 10/20/2017)
58 ERRATA Correcting Defendants' Reply In Support of Their Motion to Dismiss by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON 57 Reply to opposition to Motion, filed by RYAN D. MCCARTHY, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, RICHARD V. SPENCER, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RAQUEL C. BONO, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, JAMES N. MATTIS, HEATHER A. WILSON, ELAINE C. DUKE. (Attachments: # 1 Defendants' Corrected Reply in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss)(Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 10/23/2017)
59 NOTICE of Appearance by Christopher F. Stoll on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Stoll, Christopher) (Entered: 10/23/2017)
60 ORDER GRANTING−IN−PART and DENYING−IN−PART Defendants' 45 Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs' 13 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 10/30/2017. (lcckk3) (Entered: 10/30/2017)
61 MEMORANDUM OPINION Regarding 60 ORDER GRANTING−IN−PART and DENYING−IN−PART Defendants' 45 Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs' 13 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 10/30/2017. (lcckk3) (Entered: 10/30/2017)
62 Joint STATUS REPORT in Response to October 30, 2017 Order by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 11/10/2017)
63 ORDER Regarding the parties' 62 Joint Status Report. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 11/14/2017. (lcckk3) (Entered: 11/14/2017)
64 ORDER FOR INITIAL SCHEDULING CONFERENCE. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 11/14/2017. (lcckk3) (Entered: 11/14/2017)
MINUTE ORDER. The parties shall file their Joint Statement addressing all topics listed in Local Rule 16.3(c) by no later than NOVEMBER 21, 2017. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 11/17/2017. (lcckk3) (Entered: 11/17/2017)

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11/21/2017 11/21/2017
11/22/2017
11/22/2017 11/27/2017 11/27/2017 11/28/2017 11/28/2017
11/30/2017

65 MEET AND CONFER STATEMENT. (Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 11/21/2017)
66 NOTICE OF APPEAL TO DC CIRCUIT COURT as to 60 Order on Motion for Leave to File, Order on Motion to Dismiss,,,, Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction by JAMES N. MATTIS, RAQUEL C. BONO, ELAINE C. DUKE, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, HEATHER A. WILSON, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., RICHARD V. SPENCER. Fee Status: No Fee Paid. Parties have been notified. (Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 11/21/2017)
67 MOTION to ClarifyCourt's Order of October 30, 2017 by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 11/22/2017)
68 Transmission of the Notice of Appeal, Order Appealed (Memorandum Opinion), and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals docketing fee was not paid because the appeal was filed by the government re 66 Notice of Appeal to DC Circuit Court,,. (td) (Entered: 11/22/2017)
69 Memorandum in opposition to re 67 MOTION to ClarifyCourt's Order of October 30, 2017 filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 11/27/2017)
70 ORDER Regarding Defendants' 67 Motion for Clarification of the Court's October 30, 2017 Order. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 11/27/2017. (lcckk3) (Entered: 11/27/2017)
71 SCHEDULING AND PROCEDURES ORDER. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 11/28/2017. (lcckk3) (Entered: 11/28/2017)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly: Initial Scheduling Conference held on 11/28/2017. Amended Pleadings due by 12/15/2017. Discovery due by 3/30/2018. Joint Discovery Plan due by 12/15/2017. Initial Disclosure due by 12/15/2017. Proponent's Rule 26(a)(2)(B)&(C) Disclosures due by 2/5/2018; Opponent's Rule 26(a)(2)(B)&(C) Disclosures due by 3/5/2018; and Replies, if any due by 3/12/2018. Status Conference set for 4/6/2018 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 28A before Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly. (Court Reporter Richard Ehrlich.) (dot) (Entered: 11/28/2017)
72 TRANSCRIPT OF SCHEDULING CONFERENCE before Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly held on November 28, 2017; Page Numbers: 1 − 31. Date of Issuance:November 30, 2017. Court Reporter/Transcriber Richard D. Ehrlich, Telephone number (202) 354−3269, Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the Transcript Order Form

For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.

NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.

Redaction Request due 12/21/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/31/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/28/2018.(Ehrlich, Richard) (Entered: 11/30/2017)

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12/01/2017 12/06/2017
12/07/2017 12/07/2017 12/08/2017 12/11/2017 12/15/2017
12/22/2017 12/29/2017 01/04/2018

USCA Case Number 17−5267 for 66 Notice of Appeal to DC Circuit Court,, filed by RYAN D. MCCARTHY, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, RICHARD V. SPENCER, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RAQUEL C. BONO, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, JAMES N. MATTIS, HEATHER A. WILSON, ELAINE C. DUKE. (zrdj) (Entered: 12/04/2017)
73 MOTION to Stay Portion of Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Lernes J. Herbert, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 12/06/2017)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court is in receipt of Defendants' 73 Motion for Partial Stay of Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal. Plaintiff shall file a response by no later than DECEMBER 8, 2017 at NOON. Defendants have waived their right to file a reply. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 12/7/2017. (lcckk3) (Entered: 12/07/2017)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Plaintiff's Response to Motion for Partial Stay of Preliminary Injunction due by 12/8/2017. (kt) (Entered: 12/07/2017)
74 Memorandum in opposition to re 73 MOTION to Stay Portion of Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 12/08/2017)
75 ORDER DENYING Defendants' 73 Motion for a Partial Stay of the Court's Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 12/11/2017. (lcckk3) (Entered: 12/11/2017)
76 Joint STATUS REPORT Setting Forth Detailed Discovery Plan by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON. (Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 12/15/2017)
77 Joint STATUS REPORT Supplementing Discovery Plan by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON. (Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 12/22/2017)
78 ANSWER to 9 Amended Complaint,, by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON.(Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 12/29/2017)
79 MANDATE of USCA as to 66 Notice of Appeal to DC Circuit Court,, filed by RYAN D. MCCARTHY, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, RICHARD V. SPENCER, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RAQUEL C. BONO, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, JAMES N. MATTIS, HEATHER A. WILSON, ELAINE C. DUKE ; USCA Case Number

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01/08/2018 01/09/2018 01/09/2018 02/09/2018 02/09/2018 02/13/2018 02/13/2018
02/13/2018 02/14/2018
02/14/2018 02/14/2018 02/14/2018 02/15/2018

17−5267. (Attachments: # 1 USCA Order)(ztd) (Entered: 01/05/2018)
Set/Reset Hearings: Telephone Conference on the record set for 1/9/2018 at 1:30 PM in Chambers before Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly. (dot) (Entered: 01/09/2018)
80 ORDER Regarding January 9, 2018 Teleconference. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 1/9/2018. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A) (lcckk3) (Entered: 01/09/2018)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly: Telephone Conference held on 1/9/2018. (Court Reporter Sara Wick.) (dot) (Entered: 01/11/2018)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court will hold a teleconference with the parties on the record on FEBRUARY 13, 2018 at 2:30 pm to discuss a discovery dispute. The parties shall jointly call chambers at a number provided by e−mail. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 2/9/2018. (lcckk3) (Entered: 02/09/2018)
Set/Reset Hearings: Telephone Conference on the record set for 2/13/2018 at 2:30 PM in Chambers before Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly. (dot) (Entered: 02/12/2018)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly: Telephone Conference on the record held on 2/13/2018. (Court Reporter Sara Wick.) (dot) (Entered: 02/13/2018)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court held a teleconference with the parties today, February 13, 2018, to discuss a discovery dispute. The Court will hold another teleconference on Friday, FEBRUARY 16, 2018 at 2:30 PM to continue to discuss this dispute. In the meantime, the parties are to meet and confer. The parties shall be prepared during the next teleconference to discuss what information Defendants contend is covered by the presidential communications privilege that the Court can review in camera. The parties shall also meet and confer to resolve or narrow their dispute regarding the deliberative process privilege and, if the dispute cannot be fully resolved, Plaintiffs shall be prepared to identify the specific documents they would request the Court review in camera. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 2/13/2018. (lcckk3) (Entered: 02/13/2018)
Set/Reset Hearings: Telephone Conference on the record set for 2/16/2018 at 2:30 PM in Chambers before Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly. (dot) (Entered: 02/14/2018)
81 Joint MOTION for Protective Order and Cross−Use Agreement and Fed.R.Evid. 502(D) Order by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Protective Order and Cross Use Agreement, # 2 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 502(d) Order)(Parker, Ryan) Modified text on 2/15/2018 (td). (Entered: 02/14/2018)
82 STIPULATION of Voluntary Partial Dismissal as to Plaintiff Jane Doe 1 and Defendants United States Coast Guard and Kirstjen Nielsen, in her official capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Wolfson, Paul) Modified text on 2/15/2018 (td). (Entered: 02/14/2018)
84 ORDER granting 81 Motion for Uniform Protective Order and Cross−Use Agreement. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 2/14/18. (dot) (Entered: 02/16/2018)
85 ORDER on the parties Joint Motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 502(d) and Local Civil Rule 16.3(c)(10). Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 2/14/18. (dot) (Entered: 02/16/2018)
83 TRANSCRIPT OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE before Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly held on 02/13/2018; Page Numbers: 35; Date of Issuance: 02/15/2018. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Sara A. Wick, Telephone number 202−354−3284. Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the Transcript Order Form

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02/16/2018 02/16/2018
02/16/2018 02/20/2018 02/21/2018

For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporte r referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.
NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.
Redaction Request due 3/8/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/18/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/16/2018.(Wick, Sara) (Entered: 02/15/2018)
86 Letter from Plaintiffs and Defendants (Attachments: # 1 Letter, # 2 Exhibit Ex A 2017.12.15 Pltfs' 1st Set of INTs, # 3 Exhibit Ex B President Trump Interrogatory Objections − Served 2.6.18, # 4 Exhibit Ex C Secretary of Defense Mattis Interrogatory Responses − Served on 2.6, # 5 Exhibit Ex D 2018.01.25 Air Force's Objcs. and Resps. to Pltfs' 1st INTs, # 6 Exhibit Ex E Doe v. Trump − Updated Privilege Log − 2.7.18, # 7 Exhibit Ex F USDOE00061876 − with redactions, # 8 Exhibit Ex G USDOE00061945 − with redactions, # 9 Ex H President Trump RFA Objections − Served 2.6.18) "Let this be filed" signed 2/16/18 by Judge C. Kollar−Kotelly(td) (Main Document 86 replaced on 2/16/2018) (ztd). (Entered: 02/16/2018)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court held a teleconference with the parties today, February 16, 2018, to discuss a discovery dispute. The dispute relates to Defendants' assertions of two privileges: the deliberative process privilege and the presidential communications privilege. With respect to the deliberative process privilege, Plaintiffs have provided Defendants with a list of documents that they contend were inappropriately withheld in full or in part. Defendants are going to review those documents and consult with Plaintiffs next week to discuss whether they are willing to release some or all of those documents, or at least provide Plaintiffs with more information about the documents so that Plaintiffs can consider the appropriateness of Defendants' assertions of privilege. The parties will then meet and confer and attempt to resolve their disputes without further Court intervention. If unsuccessful, Plaintiffs can contact the Court again. With respect to the presidential communications privilege, Defendants refuse to provide any information to the Court for it to review in camera in order to adjudicate the legality of Defendants' assertion of privilege. Defendants are to file a motion for a protective order on this particular presidential communications privilege issue by no later than FEBRUARY 27, 2018. Plaintiffs shall file a response by no later than MARCH 12, 2018. Defendants shall file a reply by no later than MARCH 19, 2018. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 2/16/2018. (lcckk3) (Entered: 02/16/2018)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly: Telephone Conference on the record held on 2/16/2018. (Court Reporter Sara Wick.) (dot) (Entered: 02/20/2018)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Defendant's motion for protective order due by 2/27/2018. Response due by 3/12/2018. Reply due by 3/19/2018. (tb) (Entered: 02/20/2018)
87 TRANSCRIPT OF INITIAL SCHEDULING CONFERENCE before Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly held on November 28, 2017; Page Numbers: 1 − 31. Date of Issuance:December 15, 2017. Court Reporter/Transcriber Richard D. Ehrlich, Telephone number (202) 354−3269, Tape Number: NA. Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the Transcript Order Form
For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a publ ic terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.
NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal

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02/22/2018
02/27/2018 03/02/2018 03/02/2018 03/02/2018 03/12/2018

identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.
Redaction Request due 3/14/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/24/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/22/2018.(Ehrlich, Richard) (Entered: 02/21/2018)
88 TRANSCRIPT OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE before Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly, held on 02/16/2018. Page Numbers: 11. Date of Issuance: 02/22/2018. Court Reporter/Transcriber Sara A. Wick. Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the Transcript Order Form
For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days , the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.
NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.
Redaction Request due 3/15/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/25/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/23/2018.(Wick, Sara) (Entered: 02/22/2018)
89 MOTION for Protective Order by RAQUEL C. BONO, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit, # 8 Exhibit, # 9 Exhibit, # 10 Exhibit, # 11 Text of Proposed Order)(Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 02/27/2018)
90 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings and Motion to Partially Disolve the Preliminary Injunction by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Parker, Ryan). Added MOTION for Order to Partially Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction on 3/5/2018 (znmw). (Entered: 03/02/2018)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court is in receipt of Defendants' 90 Partial Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and to Partially Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction. Plaintiffs shall file a response by no later than MARCH 16, 2018. Defendants shall file a reply by no later than MARCH 23, 2018. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 3/2/2018. (lcckk3) (Entered: 03/02/2018)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Plaintiffs' Response to 90 due by 3/16/2018. Defendants' Reply due by 3/23/2018. (dot) (Entered: 03/02/2018)
91 RESPONSE re 89 MOTION for Protective Order filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration Daniel McFadden, # 2 Exhibit A− E−Mail to Ryan Parker March 1, 2018, # 3 Exhibit B− E−Mail exchange July 27, 2017 regarding the transgender policy message, # 4 Exhibit C− Defendants' Objections and Responses to Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories to General Dunford, # 5 Exhibit D− Defendants' Objections and Responses to Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories to the Navy and Secretary Spencer, # 6 Exhibit E− Defendants' Objections and Responses to

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03/16/2018 03/19/2018
03/23/2018
03/23/2018 03/23/2018
03/23/2018 03/26/2018 03/26/2018 03/26/2018

Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories to the Army and Secretary Esper, # 7 Exhibit F− Air Force's Objections and Responses to Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories, # 8 Exhibit G− Defendants' Objections and Responses to Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories to the Defense Health Agency and Director Bono, # 9 Exhibit H− Privilege log produced by the Defendants on February 7, 2018, # 10 Exhibit I− Privilege log produced by the Defendants on February 6, 2018, # 11 Exhibit J− E−Mail exchange dated January 11−12, 2018 regarding "Proposed Discovery Response Schedule.")(Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 03/12/2018)
92 RESPONSE re 90 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings and Motion to Partially Disolve the Preliminary Injunction MOTION for Order to Partially Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 03/16/2018)
93 REPLY to opposition to motion re 89 MOTION for Protective Order filed by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON. (Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 03/19/2018)
94 REPLY to opposition to motion re 90 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings and Motion to Partially Disolve the Preliminary Injunction MOTION for Order to Partially Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction filed by RAQUEL C. BONO, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON. (Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 03/23/2018)
95 NOTICE by ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 03/23/2018)
96 MOTION to Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction by RAQUEL C. BONO, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Declaration, # 6 Declaration)(Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 03/23/2018)
97 MOTION for Protective Order by RAQUEL C. BONO, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 03/23/2018)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court will hold a teleconference with the parties on MARCH 27, 2018 at 9:30 a.m. The parties shall jointly call chambers at a number to be provided by e−mail. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 3/26/2018. (lcckk3) (Entered: 03/26/2018)
Set/Reset Hearings: Telephone Conference on the record set for 3/27/2018 at 9:30 AM in Chambers before Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly. (dot) (Entered: 03/26/2018)
MINUTE ORDER. The teleconference previously set for March 27, 2018 is hereby rescheduled for MARCH 28, 2018 at 10:30 a.m. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 3/26/2018. (lcckk3) (Entered: 03/26/2018)

Case: 1:17-cv-01597-CKK As of: 04/02/2019 09:58 AM EDT 38 of 51

03/26/2018 03/27/2018 03/27/2018 03/27/2018 03/28/2018
03/28/2018

Set/Reset Hearings: Telephone Conference on the record set for 3/28/2018 at 10:30 AM in Chambers before Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly. (dot) (Entered: 03/27/2018)
98 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Lauren Godles Milgroom, :Firm− Foley Hoag LLP, :Address− 155 Seaport Boulevard, Boston, MA 02210. Phone No. − 617−832−3052. Fax No. − 617−832−7000 Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0090−5391796. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Lauren Godles Milgroom, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 03/27/2018)
99 MOTION to Intervene to Seek Access to March 28, 2018 Telephone Conference by BUZZFEED, INC. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Declaration of Zoe Tillman, # 3 Declaration of Matthew L. Schafer, # 4 Text of Proposed Order, # 5 Corporate Disclosure)(Schafer, Matthew) (Entered: 03/27/2018)
100 NOTICE of Appearance by Matthew L. Schafer on behalf of BUZZFEED, INC. (Schafer, Matthew) (Entered: 03/27/2018)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court is in receipt of putative intervenor Buzzfeed, Inc.'s ("Buzzfeed") 99 Motion to Intervene to Seek Access to March 28, 2018 Telephone Conference. This motion was filed on the evening before the telephone conference to which Buzzfeed seeks access. Other members of the press likewise have sought access to the teleconference by contacting courthouse personnel. Because the teleconference is scheduled for this morning, March 28, 2018, this Order addressing Buzzfeed's pending motion and other press inquiries must of necessity be brief.In its motion, Buzzfeed indicates that it does not know what the substance of this morning's teleconference will be. The Court hereby notifies Buzzfeed and other interested news outlets that the purpose of the March 28, 2018, telephone conference is solely to set a schedule for future proceedings. Buzzfeed also cites a number of opinionsmany of them in the criminal contextin its motion about the appropriateness of sealed or in camera proceedings. This is a civil case, and the teleconference will not be sealed. The discussion will be transcribed, and the record will be available shortly afterwards. As its practice has been, the Court also shall issue a written order summarizing the teleconference and setting forth agreed dates for the ensuing briefing.Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 77(b) allows the Court to hold this teleconference with the parties in chambers. That rule states that "[e]very trial on the merits must be conducted in open court and, so far as convenient, in a regular courtroom," but "[a]ny other act or proceeding may be done or conducted by a judge in chambers, without the attendance of the clerk or other court official, and anywhere inside or outside the district." Fed. R. Civ. P. 77(b). "Rule 77(b) simply articulates the traditional authority of a judge to speak privately with the parties to a suit, whether in bench conferences or in chambers." B.H. v. McDonald, 49 F.3d 294, 298 (7th Cir. 1995). The Court is under no obligation to allow any and all interested parties to join a teleconference held in its chambers, especially where the content of that conference does not address the merits of the case, will be memorialized in an Order, and will also be transcribed in a public transcript.Moreover, Buzzfeed frames its request as a motion to intervene under Rule 24, but does not specify whether it seeks intervention as of right (Rule 24(a)) or permissive intervention (Rule 24(b)). Language in its memorandum suggests that intervention is sought as of right, but Buzzfeed has not cited any federal statute that would give it "an unconditional right to intervene" (Rule 24(a)(1)), nor does it claim that the nature of this teleconferencea scheduling conferencewould "dispos[e] of the action" and thus "may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect its interest" (Rule 24(a)(2)). Even if Buzzfeed instead seeks permissive intervention pursuant to Rule 24(b), it has not argued that any federal statute accords it "a conditional right to intervene" (Rule 24(b)(1)) or that it "has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact" (Rule 24(b)(2)). The Court is not persuaded that intervention is appropriate.Accordingly, the Court shall DENY Buzzfeed's 99 Motion to Intervene to Seek Access to March 28, 2018 Telephone Conference, as well as any other requests by the press to participate in this teleconference. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 3/28/2018. (lcckk3) Modified to add link on 3/29/2018 (znmw). (Entered: 03/28/2018)
MINUTE ORDER GRANTING 98 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Attorney Lauren Godles Milgroom in order for her to appear as co−counsel for Plaintiffs. Counsel shall promptly register for this Court's CM/ECF system. Signed by

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03/28/2018 03/28/2018 03/28/2018

Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 3/28/2018. (lcckk3) (Entered: 03/28/2018)
101 ORDER Regarding March 28, 2018 Teleconference. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 3/28/2018. (lcckk3) (Entered: 03/28/2018)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly: Telephone Conference on the record held on 3/28/2018. (Court Reporter Richard Ehrlich.) (dot) (Entered: 03/28/2018)
102 TRANSCRIPT OF TELEPHONIC CONFERENCE before Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly held on March 28, 2018; Page Numbers: 1 − 54. Date of Issuance:March 28, 2018. Court Reporter/Transcriber Richard D. Ehrlich, Telephone number (202) 354−3269, Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the Transcript Order Form

For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from t he court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.

NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.

03/29/2018 04/04/2018 04/04/2018 04/06/2018
04/06/2018 04/06/2018
04/06/2018

Redaction Request due 4/18/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/28/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/26/2018.(Ehrlich, Richard) (Entered: 03/28/2018)
103 NOTICE of Appearance by Theresa Roosevelt on behalf of JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Roosevelt, Theresa) (Entered: 03/29/2018)
104 NOTICE of Change of Address by Mary L. Bonauto (Bonauto, Mary) (Entered: 04/04/2018)
105 NOTICE of Change of Address by Jennifer Levi (Levi, Jennifer) (Entered: 04/04/2018)
106 AMENDED COMPLAINT (Second) for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief against RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., JAMES N. MATTIS, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, MARK T. ESPER filed by JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, DYLAN KOHERE, JANE DOE 4, JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 5, REGAN V. KIBBY, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, JOHN DOE 2.(Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 04/06/2018)
107 SEALED DOCUMENT filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE re 106 Amended Complaint,, (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.)(Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 04/06/2018)
108 Memorandum in opposition to re 97 MOTION for Protective Order filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Adam M. Cambier in Support of Plainttiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Protective Order, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F)(Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 04/06/2018)
109 MOTION to Compel Compliance with Subpoenas for Production of Documents Directed to Nonparties Family Research Council and Heritage Foundation by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5,

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04/09/2018 04/09/2018 04/12/2018
04/16/2018 04/16/2018 04/18/2018 04/18/2018 04/20/2018
04/20/2018

JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Lauren Milgroom, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F, # 8 Exhibit G, # 9 Exhibit H)(Wolfson, Paul) (Attachment 9 replaced to make page 4 non−fillable on 4/9/2018) (td). (Entered: 04/06/2018)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court is in receipt of Plaintiffs' 109 Motion to Compel Compliance with Subpoenas for Production of Documents Directed to Nonparties Family Research Council and Heritage Foundation. Nonparties Family Research Council and Heritage Foundation, and/or Defendants, shall file a response by no later than APRIL 23, 2018. Plaintiffs shall file a reply by no later than APRIL 30, 2018. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 4/9/2018. (lcckk3) (Entered: 04/09/2018)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Nonparties Family Research Council and Heritage Foundation, and/or Defendants, shall file a Response to 109 by 4/23/2018. Plaintiffs' Reply due by 4/30/2018. (dot) (Entered: 04/09/2018)
110 REPLY to opposition to motion re 97 MOTION for Protective Order filed by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON. (Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 04/12/2018)
111 NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY by JANE DOE 2,JOHN DOE 1, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Slip Op., Karnoski v. Trump, No. 2:17−cv−01297−MJP (Apr. 13, 2018))(Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 04/16/2018)
112 ORDER Regarding Deposition of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Paul J. Selva. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 4/16/2018. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A) (lcckk3) (Entered: 04/16/2018)
113 ORDER Regarding Deadline for Document Production and Privilege Disputes. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 4/18/2018. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A) (lcckk3) (Entered: 04/18/2018)
114 ORDER DENYING Defendants' 97 Motion for a Protective Order. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 4/18/2018. (lcckk3) (Entered: 04/18/2018)
115 MOTION to Dismiss , or in the alternative,, MOTION for Summary Judgment by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit Department of Defense Release No.: NR−272−15, # 3 Exhibit Agnes Gereben Schaefer, On RANDs Research Findings Regarding Transgender Military Personnel Policy, # 4 Exhibit Memorandum from Secretary Mattis: Terms of Reference)(Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 04/20/2018)
116 MOTION To Dissolve The Preliminary Injunction by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit 2015 Statement, # 3 Exhibit RAND Blog Post, # 4 Exhibit Terms of Reference)(Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 04/20/2018)

Case: 1:17-cv-01597-CKK As of: 04/02/2019 09:58 AM EDT 41 of 51

04/23/2018
04/23/2018 04/23/2018
04/23/2018 04/23/2018 04/23/2018 04/23/2018 04/24/2018
04/24/2018 04/24/2018 04/25/2018

117 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 116 MOTION To Dissolve The Preliminary Injunction , 115 MOTION to Dismiss , or in the alternative, MOTION for Summary Judgment by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 04/23/2018)
118 ORDER Regarding Clawback Dispute. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 4/23/2018. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A) (lcckk3) (Entered: 04/23/2018)
119 Memorandum in opposition to re 109 MOTION to Compel Compliance with Subpoenas for Production of Documents Directed to Nonparties Family Research Council and Heritage Foundation filed by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON. (Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 04/23/2018)
120 NOTICE of Appearance by Heidi K. Abegg on behalf of Heritage Foundation (Abegg, Heidi) (Entered: 04/23/2018)
121 Corporate Disclosure Statement by Heritage Foundation. (Abegg, Heidi) (Entered: 04/23/2018)
122 Memorandum in opposition to re 109 MOTION to Compel Compliance with Subpoenas for Production of Documents Directed to Nonparties Family Research Council and Heritage Foundation filed by Heritage Foundation, FAMILY RESEARCH COUNCIL, INC.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Schaerr, Gene) (Entered: 04/23/2018)
123 NOTICE of Appearance by Gene C. Schaerr on behalf of FAMILY RESEARCH COUNCIL, INC. (Schaerr, Gene) (Entered: 04/23/2018)
124 RESPONSE TO ORDER OF THE COURT re 118 Order filed by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Notice of Recall, # 2 Exhibit Partially Redacted Presentation)(Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 04/24/2018)
125 LCvR 7.1 CERTIFICATE OF DISCLOSURE of Corporate Affiliations and Financial Interests by FAMILY RESEARCH COUNCIL, INC. (Schaerr, Gene) (Entered: 04/24/2018)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court is in receipt of Defendants' 116 Motion to Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction, which apparently supersedes Defendants' earlier 96 Motion to Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction. Defendants' earlier 96 Motion is accordingly DENIED as MOOT. Only Defendants' 116 Motion remains pending. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 4/24/2018. (lcckk3) (Entered: 04/24/2018)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court is in receipt of Plaintiffs' 117 Motion for Extension of Time. Plaintiffs request a seven day extension of time up to and including May 11, 2018, within which to file their Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction and Motion to Dismiss the Complaint or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, because Plaintiffs represent that they need additional time to formulate their responses. This is the first request for an extension of this deadline and Defendants consent. Plaintiffs' motion is GRANTED. Plaintiffs' oppositions shall be filed no later than MAY 11, 2018. Granting Defendants an equivalent extension, Defendants' reply briefs shall be filed no later than MAY 24, 2018. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 4/25/2018. (lcckk3) (Entered: 04/25/2018)

Case: 1:17-cv-01597-CKK As of: 04/02/2019 09:58 AM EDT 42 of 51

04/25/2018 04/30/2018 04/30/2018 05/11/2018
05/11/2018
05/11/2018 05/11/2018 05/11/2018 05/14/2018

Set/Reset Deadlines: Plaintiffs' Response due by 5/11/2018. Defendants' Reply due by 5/24/2018. (dot) (Entered: 04/26/2018)
126 REPLY to opposition to motion re 109 MOTION to Compel Compliance with Subpoenas for Production of Documents Directed to Nonparties Family Research Council and Heritage Foundation (Reply in Support of Motion to Compel) filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Kevin M. Lamb in Support of Plaintiffs' Reply, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E)(Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 04/30/2018)
127 ERRATA by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE 126 Reply to opposition to Motion,, filed by JANE DOE 6, JOHN DOE 2, DYLAN KOHERE, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY. (Attachments: # 1 Corrected Declaration of Kevin M. Lamb in Support of Plaintiffs' Reply)(Lamb, Kevin) (Entered: 04/30/2018)
128 AFFIDAVIT (Declaration of Lauren Godles Milgroom in Support of the Statement of Undisputed Material Facts) by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K, # 12 Exhibit L, # 13 Exhibit M, # 14 Exhibit N, # 15 Exhibit O, # 16 Exhibit P, # 17 Exhibit Q, # 18 Exhibit R, # 19 Exhibit S, # 20 Exhibit T, # 21 Exhibit U, # 22 Exhibit V, # 23 Exhibit W, # 24 Exhibit X, # 25 Exhibit Y, # 26 Exhibit Z, # 27 Exhibit AA, # 28 Exhibit BB, # 29 Exhibit CC, # 30 Exhibit DD, # 31 Exhibit EE, # 32 Exhibit FF, # 33 Exhibit GG, # 34 Exhibit HH, # 35 Exhibit II, # 36 Exhibit JJ, # 37 Exhibit KK, # 38 Exhibit LL, # 39 Exhibit MM, # 40 Exhibit NN, # 41 Exhibit OO, # 42 Exhibit PP, # 43 Exhibit QQ, # 44 Exhibit RR, # 45 Exhibit SS)(Schoenfeld, Alan) (Entered: 05/11/2018)
129 SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Adam M. Cambier in Support of Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction and Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Cross−Motion for Summary Judgment, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Text of Proposed Order)(Schoenfeld, Alan) (Entered: 05/11/2018)
130 Memorandum in opposition to re 116 MOTION To Dissolve The Preliminary Injunction , 115 MOTION to Dismiss , or in the alternative, MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Schoenfeld, Alan) (Entered: 05/11/2018)
131 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Statement of Facts, # 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Schoenfeld, Alan) (Entered: 05/11/2018)
132 Memorandum in opposition to re 115 MOTION to Dismiss , or in the alternative, MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Attachments: # 1 Plaintiffs' Objections and Responses to Defendants' Statement of Facts)(Schoenfeld, Alan) (Entered: 05/11/2018)
133 ERRATA by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE 128 Affidavit,,,, filed by JANE DOE 6, JOHN DOE 2, DYLAN KOHERE, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JOHN DOE, 1, JANE

Case: 1:17-cv-01597-CKK As of: 04/02/2019 09:58 AM EDT 43 of 51

05/17/2018 05/17/2018 05/21/2018 05/24/2018 06/06/2018
06/06/2018
06/06/2018 06/06/2018

DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY. (Attachments: # 1 (Corrected) Declaration of Joshua D. Safer in Support of Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction)(Schoenfeld, Alan) (Entered: 05/14/2018)
134 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 05/17/2018)
135 ORDER granting 134 Motion for Extension of Time. Defendants' reply in support of motions to dissolve the preliminary injunction, to dismiss the complaint, and/or in the alternative for summary judgment and opposition to Plaintiffs' cross−motion for summary judgment due by 6/6/2018. Plaintiffs' reply in support of cross−motion for summary judgment due by 6/22/2018. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 5/17/18. (dot) (Entered: 05/21/2018)
136 Consent MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief by Retired Military Officers and Former National Security Officials (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Amicus Brief, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Spector, Phillip) (Entered: 05/21/2018)
137 NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Op. 73−74, Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, No. 17−cv−5205, # 2 Op., Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board, No. 15−cv−00054)(Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 05/24/2018)
138 Memorandum in opposition to re 131 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment , filed by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10)(Carmichael, Andrew) Modified linkage on 6/11/2018 (ztd). (Entered: 06/06/2018)
139 SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL filed by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Statement of Facts, # 2 Exhibit 11, # 3 Exhibit 12, # 4 Text of Proposed Order)(Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 06/06/2018)
140 REPLY to opposition to motion re 116 MOTION To Dissolve The Preliminary Injunction filed by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON. (Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 06/06/2018)
144 REPLY to opposition to motion re 115 MOTION to Dismiss , or in the alternative, MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD

Case: 1:17-cv-01597-CKK As of: 04/02/2019 09:58 AM EDT 44 of 51

06/07/2018 06/11/2018 06/11/2018
06/11/2018

V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON; (SEE DOCKET ENTRY NO. 138 TO VIEW.) (ztd) (Entered: 06/13/2018)
141 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON. Attorney Ryan Bradley Parker terminated. (Parker, Ryan) (Entered: 06/07/2018)
143 ORDERED that the Motion is GRANTED. The documents attached to Defendant' motion are, hereby, placed under seal. the parties shall MEET AND CONFER regarding what redactions need to be made to these documents such that they can be filed on the public docket. Redacted versions shall be filed on the docket by no later than 6/25/2018. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 6/11/18. (dot) (Entered: 06/12/2018)
146 SEALED DOCUMENT filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. re 130 Memorandum in Opposition, filed by JANE DOE 6, JOHN DOE 2, DYLAN KOHERE, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, 131 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by JANE DOE 6, JOHN DOE 2, DYLAN KOHERE, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, 116 MOTION To Dissolve The Preliminary Injunction filed by RYAN D. MCCARTHY, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, JAMES N. MATTIS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, HEATHER A. WILSON, ELAINE C. DUKE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, MARK T. ESPER, DONALD J. TRUMP, RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., 115 MOTION to Dismiss , or in the alternative, MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by RYAN D. MCCARTHY, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, JAMES N. MATTIS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, HEATHER A. WILSON, ELAINE C. DUKE, MARK T. ESPER, RICHARD V. SPENCER, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DONALD J. TRUMP, RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR.. (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.)(ztd) (Entered: 06/20/2018)
147 SEALED DOCUMENT filed by ASSOCIATION OF MEDICAL SCHOOL PEDIATRIC DEPARTMENT CHAIRS, RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON. re 138 Memorandum in Opposition,, filed by RYAN D. MCCARTHY, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, JAMES N. MATTIS, HEATHER A. WILSON, ELAINE C. DUKE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, MARK T. ESPER, DONALD J. TRUMP, RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR.. (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.)(ztd) (Entered: 06/20/2018)

Case: 1:17-cv-01597-CKK As of: 04/02/2019 09:58 AM EDT 45 of 51

06/19/2018 06/22/2018 06/22/2018 06/25/2018
07/03/2018 07/03/2018 07/06/2018
08/06/2018 08/06/2018 08/06/2018 08/06/2018

145 ORDER Regarding the Deposition of Rear Admiral David Kriete. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 6/19/2018. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A) (lcckk3) (Entered: 06/19/2018)
148 ERRATA (Notice of Errata) by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE 128 Affidavit,,,, filed by JANE DOE 6, JOHN DOE 2, DYLAN KOHERE, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit B, # 2 Exhibit QQ)(Schoenfeld, Alan) (Entered: 06/22/2018)
149 REPLY to opposition to motion re 131 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Schoenfeld, Alan) (Entered: 06/22/2018)
150 NOTICE of Filing of Redacted Documents by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON re 138 Memorandum in Opposition,, (Attachments: # 1 Statement of Facts Redacted, # 2 Exhibit 11 Redacted, # 3 Exhibit 12 Redacted)(Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 06/25/2018)
151 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. Attorney Lauren Godles Milgroom terminated. (Milgroom, Lauren) (Entered: 07/03/2018)
152 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. Attorney Claire Laporte terminated. (McFadden, Daniel) (Entered: 07/03/2018)
153 NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Attachments: # 1 Trump v. Hawaii)(Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 07/06/2018)
154 ORDER GRANTING Defendants' 90 Partial Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Motion to Partially Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction and DENYING Defendants' 89 Motion for a Protective Order. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 8/6/2018. (lcckk3) (Entered: 08/06/2018)
155 MEMORANDUM OPINION Regarding 154 ORDER GRANTING Defendants' 90 Partial Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Motion to Partially Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction and DENYING Defendants' 89 Motion for a Protective Order. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 8/6/2018. (lcckk3) (Entered: 08/06/2018)
156 ORDER DENYING Defendants' 115 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, or, in the Alternative, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, to the extent that Motion sought the dismissal of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint for lack of jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim, and DENYING Defendants' 116 Motion to Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 8/6/2018. (lcckk3) (Entered: 08/06/2018)
157 MEMORANDUM OPINION Regarding 156 ORDER DENYING Defendants' 115 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, or, in the Alternative, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, to the extent that Motion sought the dismissal of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint for lack of jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim, and DENYING Defendants' 116 Motion to Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 8/6/2018. (lcckk3,

Case: 1:17-cv-01597-CKK As of: 04/02/2019 09:58 AM EDT 46 of 51

08/17/2018 08/24/2018 08/24/2018 08/27/2018 08/27/2018
08/27/2018 08/27/2018
08/27/2018 08/28/2018 08/29/2018
09/10/2018 09/10/2018

) (Entered: 08/06/2018)
158 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. Attorney Daniel L. McFadden terminated. (McFadden, Daniel) (Entered: 08/17/2018)
159 ORDER DENYING Defendants' 115 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint or, in the Alternative, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, and DENYING Plaintiffs' 131 Cross−Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 8/24/2018. (lcckk3) (Entered: 08/24/2018)
160 MEMORANDUM OPINION Regarding 159 ORDER DENYING Defendants' 115 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint or, in the Alternative, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, and DENYING Plaintiffs' 131 Cross−Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 8/24/2018. (lcckk3) (Entered: 08/24/2018)
161 ORDER GRANTING 136 Motion for Leave to File Amicus Brief. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 8/27/2018. (lcckk3) (Entered: 08/27/2018)
MINUTE ORDER. The parties shall meet and confer and file a Joint Status Report by no later than SEPTEMBER 10, 2018. The Joint Status Report shall propose a plan for moving forward toward a timely resolution of this case. In particular, the Joint Status Report shall include a proposed protocol for the efficient resolution of the parties' outstanding discovery disputes. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 8/27/2018. (lcckk3) (Entered: 08/27/2018)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Joint Status Report due by 10/10/2018. (dot) (Entered: 08/27/2018)
162 NOTICE OF APPEAL TO DC CIRCUIT COURT as to 156 Order on Motion to Dismiss,, Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief, by JAMES N. MATTIS, MARK T. ESPER, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RAQUEL C. BONO, ELAINE C. DUKE, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, HEATHER A. WILSON, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., RICHARD V. SPENCER. Fee Status: No Fee Paid. Parties have been notified. (Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 08/27/2018)
163 AMICUS BRIEF by RETIRED MILITARY OFFICERS AND FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY OFFICIALS. (ztd) (Entered: 08/28/2018)
164 Transmission of the Notice of Appeal, Order Appealed (Memorandum Opinion), and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals docketing fee was not paid because the appeal was filed by the government re 162 Notice of Appeal to DC Circuit Court,,. (ztd) (Entered: 08/28/2018)
USCA Case Number 18−5257 for 162 Notice of Appeal to DC Circuit Court,, filed by RYAN D. MCCARTHY, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, JAMES N. MATTIS, HEATHER A. WILSON, ELAINE C. DUKE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, MARK T. ESPER, DONALD J. TRUMP, RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR. (zrdj) (Entered: 09/05/2018)
165 Joint STATUS REPORT IN RESPONSE TO AUGUST 27, 2018 ORDER by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Schoenfeld, Alan) (Entered: 09/10/2018)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court is in receipt of parties' 165 Joint Status Report in Response to August 27, 2018 Order. In that Order, the Court instructed the parties to propose a plan for moving forward toward a timely resolution of this case. In their Joint Status Report, the parties agree that there remain numerous disputes regarding

Case: 1:17-cv-01597-CKK As of: 04/02/2019 09:58 AM EDT 47 of 51

09/10/2018 09/12/2018 09/21/2018 10/09/2018 10/09/2018
10/09/2018
10/09/2018

discovery. Accordingly, the parties propose a schedule for resolving the outstanding disputes before depositions and other discovery resume. The Court adopts the parties' agreed upon schedule. The Court ORDERS the parties to meet and confer to identify outstanding issues for the Court's resolution by SEPTEMBER 17, 2018. The Court OREDERS that parties report to the Court which issues have been identified for the subject matter of the motions by SEPTEMBER 21, 2018. The Court ORDERS the parties to file opening motions addressing outstanding issues identified during the meet and confer process by OCTOBER 9, 2018. The Court ORDERS the parties to file crossing response briefs by OCTOBER 30, 2018. The parties dispute whether reply briefs are necessary. The Court agrees with the government that reply briefs would assist the Court given the significance of the issues at stake. The Court ORDERS the parties to file crossing reply briefs by NOVEMBER 13, 2018. This is a generous schedule, so the Court expects no requests for extensions. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 9−10−2018. (lcckk3) (Entered: 09/10/2018)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Parties shall report to the Court which issues have been identified for the subject matter of the motions due by 9/21/2018. Parties to file opening motions addressing outstanding issues identified during the meet and confer process due by 10/9/2018. Parties to file crossing response briefs by 10/30/2018. Parties to file crossing reply briefs by 11/13/2018. (dot) (Entered: 09/13/2018)
166 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. Attorney Christopher R. Looney terminated. (Looney, Christopher) (Entered: 09/12/2018)
167 Joint STATUS REPORT in Response to September 10, 2018 Order by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Schoenfeld, Alan) (Entered: 09/21/2018)
168 SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit C to the Declaration of Alan E. Schoenfeld, # 2 Exhibit D to the Declaration of Alan E. Schoenfeld, # 3 Text of Proposed Order, # 4 Certificate of Service)(Schoenfeld, Alan) (Entered: 10/09/2018)
169 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents and Information Withheld Under the Deliberative Process Privilege by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Alan E. Schoenfeld in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Production of Documents and Information Withheld Under the Deliberative Process Privilege, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F, # 8 Text of Proposed Order)(Schoenfeld, Alan) (Entered: 10/09/2018)
170 MOTION for Protective Order to preclude the deposition of Vice Admiral David Kriete by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit)(Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 10/09/2018)
171 MOTION for Protective Order to preclude discovery of documents and information subject to the presidential communications privilege and to preclude further deposition testimony of Jennifer Hay by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, ELAINE C. DUKE, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED

Case: 1:17-cv-01597-CKK As of: 04/02/2019 09:58 AM EDT 48 of 51

10/09/2018
10/09/2018
10/30/2018
10/30/2018 10/30/2018 10/30/2018 11/07/2018 11/08/2018 11/13/2018

STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit)(Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 10/09/2018)
172 SEALED ORDER re 168 SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons. filed by JANE DOE 6, JOHN DOE 2, DYLAN KOHERE, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY.(This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.)Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 10/9/18.(zdot) (Entered: 10/10/2018)
173 SEALED DOCUMENT(Main Document Exhibit C to the Declaration of Alan E. Schoenfeld) filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. re 169 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents and Information Withheld Under the Deliberative Process Privilege filed by JANE DOE 6, JOHN DOE 2, DYLAN KOHERE, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY. (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit D to the Declaration of Alan E. Schoenfeld)(ztd) (Entered: 10/11/2018)
174 RESPONSE re 169 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents and Information Withheld Under the Deliberative Process Privilege filed by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, RYAN D. MCCARTHY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4)(Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 10/30/2018)
175 Memorandum in opposition to re 171 MOTION for Protective Order to preclude discovery of documents and information subject to the presidential communications privilege and to preclude further deposition testimony of Jennifer Hay filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Schoenfeld, Alan) (Entered: 10/30/2018)
176 Memorandum in opposition to re 170 MOTION for Protective Order to preclude the deposition of Vice Admiral David Kriete filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Schoenfeld, Alan) (Entered: 10/30/2018)
177 AFFIDAVIT re 175 Memorandum in Opposition, 176 Memorandum in Opposition, (Declaration of Alan E. Schoenfeld in Support of Plaintiffs' Memoranda in Opposition to Defendants' Motions for Protective Orders) by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Schoenfeld, Alan) (Entered: 10/30/2018)
178 NOTICE Re: Letter by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 11/07/2018)
179 NOTICE of Filing by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Schoenfeld, Alan) (Entered: 11/08/2018)
180 REPLY to opposition to motion re 169 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents and Information Withheld Under the Deliberative Process Privilege filed by JOHN

Case: 1:17-cv-01597-CKK As of: 04/02/2019 09:58 AM EDT 49 of 51

11/13/2018
11/13/2018
11/21/2018
11/25/2018 11/26/2018 11/27/2018
11/27/2018 11/28/2018 11/30/2018 01/30/2019

DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 11/13/2018)
181 REPLY to opposition to motion re 171 MOTION for Protective Order to preclude discovery of documents and information subject to the presidential communications privilege and to preclude further deposition testimony of Jennifer Hay filed by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 11/13/2018)
182 REPLY to opposition to motion re 170 MOTION for Protective Order to preclude the deposition of Vice Admiral David Kriete filed by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON. (Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 11/13/2018)
183 MOTION to Stay re 156 Order on Motion to Dismiss,, Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief, by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 11/21/2018)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court is in receipt of Defendants' 183 Motion to Stay the Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal. Defendants indicate that Plaintiffs oppose this Motion. In light of Defendants' request for an expedited ruling, the Court ORDERS Plaintiffs to file a response to Defendants' Motion by NOVEMBER 28, 2018. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 11/25/2018. (lcckk3) (Entered: 11/25/2018)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Plaintiffs' Reply due by 11/28/2018. (dot) (Entered: 11/26/2018)
184 NOTICE of Filing Petition for a Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Attachments: # 1 Petition)(Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 11/27/2018)
185 NOTICE of Change of Address by Andrew Evan Carmichael (Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 11/27/2018)
186 Memorandum in opposition to re 183 MOTION to Stay re 156 Order on Motion to Dismiss,, Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief, filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 11/28/2018)
187 ORDER denying 183 Motion to Stay. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 11/30/2018. (lcckk3) (Entered: 11/30/2018)
188 ORDER DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE 109 Motion to Compel; 169 Motion to Compel; 170 Motion for Protective Order; and 171 Motion for Protective Order. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 1−30−2019. (lcckk3) (Entered: 01/30/2019)

Case: 1:17-cv-01597-CKK As of: 04/02/2019 09:58 AM EDT 50 of 51

02/26/2019
02/26/2019
02/26/2019 03/08/2019 03/12/2019 03/12/2019 03/13/2019 03/13/2019 03/15/2019
03/15/2019 03/19/2019 03/20/2019

189 Joint STATUS REPORT by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON. (Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 02/26/2019)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court is in receipt of the Parties' 189 Joint Status Report in Response to January 30, 2019 Order. On January 30, 2019, the Court ordered the parties to meet and confer regarding the scope and breadth of discovery as the case now stands. See ECF No. 188. The Court further ordered the parties to inform the Court on how the parties intend to proceed with discovery by February 26, 2019. The parties report that they have been working together to attempt to narrow or eliminate discovery disputes. The parties request additional time to resolve these disputes. The parties are ORDERED to file another Joint Status Report by MARCH 28, 2019, informing the Court on the status of any remaining disputes and proposing a schedule for discovery and the filing of dispositive motions. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 2/26/2019. (lcckk3) (Entered: 02/26/2019)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Joint Status Report due by 3/28/2019, informing the Court on the status of any remaining disputes and proposing a schedule for discovery and the filing of dispositive motions. (dot) (Entered: 02/27/2019)
190 NOTICE by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 03/08/2019)
191 RESPONSE re 190 Notice (Other), filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 03/12/2019)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court is in receipt of the Government's 190 Notice and Plaintiffs' 191 Response to Government's Notice. The Court ORDERS the Government to file a Reply in support of its Notice by MARCH 15, 2019. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 3/12/2019. (lcckk3) (Entered: 03/12/2019)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Government's tReply in support of its Notice due by 3/15/2019. (kt) (Entered: 03/13/2019)
192 RESPONSE re 190 Notice (Other), (Supplemental Response) filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 03/13/2019)
193 REPLY re 190 Notice (Other), filed by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON. (Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 03/15/2019)
194 RESPONSE re 193 Reply to Document, (Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' "Alternative Request" for a Stay) filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 03/15/2019)
195 Notice. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 3/19/2019. (lcckk3) (Entered: 03/19/2019)
196 MOTION to Stay re 60 Order on Motion for Leave to File, Order on Motion to Dismiss,,,, Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER,

Case: 1:17-cv-01597-CKK As of: 04/02/2019 09:58 AM EDT 51 of 51

03/21/2019 03/22/2019 03/22/2019 03/26/2019 03/28/2019

JAMES N. MATTIS, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON (Carmichael, Andrew). Added MOTION to Expedite on 3/20/2019 (znmw). (Entered: 03/20/2019)
197 Memorandum in opposition to re 196 MOTION to Stay re 60 Order on Motion for Leave to File, Order on Motion to Dismiss,,,, Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction MOTION to Expedite filed by JOHN DOE, 1, JANE DOE 2, JOHN DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7, REGAN V. KIBBY, DYLAN KOHERE. (Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 03/21/2019)
198 REPLY to opposition to motion re 196 MOTION to Stay re 60 Order on Motion for Leave to File, Order on Motion to Dismiss,,,, Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction MOTION to Expedite filed by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON. (Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 03/22/2019)
199 MOTION to Expedite Ruling by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON; (See docket entry no. 198 to view.) (ztd) (Entered: 03/26/2019)
201 MANDATE of USCA as to 162 Notice of Appeal to DC Circuit Court,, filed by RYAN D. MCCARTHY, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, JAMES N. MATTIS, HEATHER A. WILSON, ELAINE C. DUKE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, RICHARD V. SPENCER, MARK T. ESPER, DONALD J. TRUMP, RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR. ; USCA Case Number 18−5257. (Attachments: # 1 USCA Order)(zrdj) (Entered: 04/01/2019)
200 Joint STATUS REPORT by RAQUEL C. BONO, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY, JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., MARK T. ESPER, JAMES N. MATTIS, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, RICHARD V. SPENCER, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HEATHER A. WILSON. (Carmichael, Andrew) (Entered: 03/28/2019)

 
 Case 1:17-cv-01597-CKK Document 106 Filed 04/06/18 Page 1 of 22

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JANE DOE 21, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4,

)

JANE DOE 5, JANE DOE 6, JANE DOE 7,

)

JOHN DOE 1, JOHN DOE 2, REGAN V.

)

KIBBY, and DYLAN KOHERE,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as )

President of the United States; JAMES N.

)

MATTIS, in his official capacity as Secretary of )

Defense; JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., in his

)

official capacity as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs )

of Staff; the UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT )

OF THE ARMY; MARK T. ESPER, in his

)

official capacity as Secretary of the Army; the )

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE )

NAVY; RICHARD V. SPENCER, in his official )

capacity as Secretary of the Navy; the UNITED )

STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR

)

FORCE; HEATHER A. WILSON, in her

)

official capacity as Secretary of the Air Force; )

the UNITED STATES COAST GUARD;

)

KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, in her official

)

capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security; the )

DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY; RAQUEL C. )

BONO, in her official capacity as Director of the )

Defense Health Agency; and the UNITED

)

STATES OF AMERICA,

)

Defendants.

) )

Civil Action No. 17-cv-1597 (CKK)
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR
DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

INTRODUCTION

1.

This is a constitutional challenge to the ban on military service by transgender

individuals (“transgender military ban” or “ban”). That policy, first announced last July by

1

The parties agreed to the dismissal of the claims brought by Jane Doe 1, who is no longer

in the Armed Forces.

1

Case 1:17-cv-01597-CKK Document 106 Filed 04/06/18 Page 2 of 22

President Trump and now more specifically set forth in a February 22, 2018 Memorandum for the

President from Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis (“February 22 Memorandum”), excludes

transgender people from military service, regardless of their fitness to serve.

2.

The transgender military ban, as originally articulated in tweets from the President

and as set forth in the February 22 Memorandum, inflicts immediate, concrete injury upon

Plaintiffs. It violates both the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment and the Due

Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

3.

This lawsuit seeks declaratory, preliminary, and permanent injunctive relief

against implementation of the ban.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

4.

This court has jurisdiction over the claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.

5.

Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because the acts

described in this Complaint occurred in this judicial district.

PLAINTIFFS

6.

Plaintiffs are five active duty servicemembers in the United States military who

serve openly as transgender people; one active duty servicemember who has not yet disclosed her

transgender status; and four transgender people who seek admission to the military, either through

the process of enlistment or through an academic program that leads to a commission. Some

proceed under pseudonyms here to protect their privacy and for fear of retribution.

7.

Jane Doe 2 has been enlisted in the National Guard since 2003 and has been on

active duty in the United States Army since 2006.

8.

Jane Doe 2 notified her command that she was transgender after the United States

Department of Defense announced in June 2016 that it would allow transgender servicemembers to

serve openly in the military.

2

Case 1:17-cv-01597-CKK Document 106 Filed 04/06/18 Page 3 of 22

9.

In reliance on the Department’s promise to allow transgender servicemembers to

serve openly, Jane Doe 2 began to seek medical treatment relating to her gender transition in

September 2016.

10. Since informing her command that she is transgender, Jane Doe 2 has continued

serving in her post without incident.

11. Jane Doe 2’s current contract with the military extends through November 2018.

Under the transgender military ban, she will be forced to serve under a cloud of uncertainty about

continued service, promotions, and health care; and she will suffer harm because her continued

service will be permitted only under a conditional and limited exception to a policy that deems

transgender people unfit for service.

12. Jane Doe 3 has served in the United States Army since 2015. She has previously

been deployed to Afghanistan and is currently deployed to Iraq.

13. In or around June 2016, in reliance on the Department of Defense policy

permitting transgender people to serve openly in the military, Jane Doe 3 notified her command

that she was transgender. Since then, she has continued serving in her post without incident.

14. Jane Doe 3’s current contract with the military extends through December 2018.

She plans to renew her contract and is also interested in applying to become a warrant officer or

making other career transitions that could be considered a new accession to the Army. Under the

transgender military ban, it is unclear whether Jane Doe 3 will be able to make these career

transitions. At a minimum, she will be forced to serve under a cloud of uncertainty about

continued service and health care; and she will suffer harm because her continued service will be

permitted only under a conditional and limited exception to a policy that deems transgender people

unfit for service.

3

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15. Jane Doe 4 has served in the United States Army since 2000. 16. In or around June 2016, in reliance on the Department of Defense policy permitting transgender people to serve openly in the military, Jane Doe 4 met with her commanding officer to identify herself as transgender. She began receiving medical treatment related to her gender transition in September 2016. 17. Since coming out as transgender, Jane Doe 4 has continued serving in her post without incident. 18. Jane Doe 4’s current contract with the military extends through June 2018. She plans to renew her contract to complete two additional years of service following the expiration of her current contract so that she can reach twenty years of service and receive retirement benefits. Under the transgender military ban, Jane Doe 4 will be forced to serve under a cloud of uncertainty about continued service, promotions, and health care; and she will suffer harm because her continued service will be permitted only under a conditional and limited exception to a policy that deems transgender people unfit for service. 19. Jane Doe 5 has been an active duty member of the United States Air Force for nearly twenty years, serving multiple tours of duty abroad, including two in Iraq. 20. After June 2016, in reliance on the announcement that transgender people would be permitted to serve openly, she notified her superiors that she was transgender. Since she made this disclosure, she has continued to serve without incident. 21. Under the transgender military ban, Jane Doe 5 will be forced to serve under a cloud of uncertainty about continued service, promotions, and health care; and she will suffer harm because her continued service will be permitted only under a conditional and limited exception to a policy that deems transgender people unfit for service.
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22. Jane Doe 6 joined the Army in 2014. She has received hundreds of hours of specialized training, above the basic training required for her position, in joint target development, joint battle assessment, unmanned aerial surveillance, and computer science.
23. Jane Doe 6 is transgender. She had made a behavioral health appointment to obtain a transition plan and begin her gender transition when President Trump tweeted his announcement that transgender people were no longer permitted to serve. As a result, Jane Doe 6 never came out to her doctors or chain of command as transgender.
24. Under the transgender military ban, if Jane Doe 6 notifies her command that she is transgender and seeks health care for the distress she experiences from having to serve in a manner inconsistent with her gender identity, she faces separation from the military. Separation would have serious consequences for Jane Doe 6. She would be ineligible for a military pension and other benefits upon which she relies. A separation would also have serious negative repercussions for her career and livelihood. In addition, the transgender military ban causes Jane Doe 6 the immediate harms of curtailing her access to health care and forcing her to live inconsistently with her gender identity to avoid separation from the military.
25. Jane Doe 7 is a transgender woman who was seeking to join the Coast Guard when the Trump administration announced its implementation plan banning service by transgender people on March 23, 2018. Jane Doe 7 went through the process of gender transition seven years ago.
26. Under the transgender military ban, Jane Doe 7 will be unable to join the Coast Guard. She will be deprived of the opportunity to serve her country and the many benefits that enlistment in the Coast Guard would afford her.
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27. John Doe 1 was a Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (“ROTC”) cadet from 2014 to 2016 and has served as a Second Lieutenant in the United States Army since July 2016.
28. John Doe 1 advised his superiors in ROTC that he is transgender. He was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant shortly after the Department of Defense announced that transgender people would be permitted to serve openly. In reliance on that policy, John Doe 1 notified his command that he was transgender. John Doe 1 has served since that time and has been praised for his commitment to excellence.
29. After the President’s tweets, John Doe 1’s transition-related care was subject to prolonged delays and substantial disruption. He did, however, undergo transition-related surgery in January 2018 and is currently ready to be deployed. His unit is now on standby to deploy to PACOM (Pacific Command) and is scheduled for deployment to CENTCOM (Central Command) next spring.
30. Under the transgender military ban, John Doe 1 will be forced to serve under a cloud of uncertainty about continued service and health care; and he will suffer harm because his continued service will be permitted only under a conditional and limited exception to a policy that deems transgender people unfit for service.
31. John Doe 2 is a transgender man who was in the process of enlisting in the Army when the Trump administration announced its implementation plan banning service by transgender people on March 23, 2018, specifically prohibiting enlistment for anyone who has undergone gender transition. John Doe 2 went through the process of gender transition almost a decade ago. He disclosed his transgender status to the recruiter when he began the enlistment process.
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32. Under the transgender military ban, John Doe 2 will be unable to join the Army. He will be deprived of the opportunity to serve his country, including the financial and career benefits that enlistment in the Army will afford him.
33. Regan V. Kibby is a midshipman at the United States Naval Academy. In reliance on the policy permitting transgender people to serve openly, he told the Naval Academy that he is transgender. He was approved for a medical leave of absence so that his transition would be complete in time for him to receive his commission in the U.S. Navy upon graduation.
34. Under the transgender military ban, it is unclear whether Plaintiff Kibby will be permitted to return to the Naval Academy or to join the U.S. Navy as a commissioned officer. If he is permitted to return to the Naval Academy and join the U.S. Navy as a commissioned officer, he will be forced to serve under a cloud of uncertainty about continued service and health care; and he will suffer harm because his service will be permitted only under a conditional and limited exception to a policy that deems transgender people unfit for service.
35. Dylan Kohere is a first-year college student who is taking academic ROTC classes at the university he attends. He is also transgender. After President Trump’s announcement of a ban on transgender people serving in the military, he was barred from joining the ROTC Program, including being denied the ability to partake in physical training or ROTC labs. While Plaintiff Kohere has continued to take ROTC academic classes, he never enrolled in the ROTC Program because of the ban.
36. Under the transgender military ban, Plaintiff Kohere is barred from enlisting in the military and, as a result, is not permitted to enroll in the ROTC program or to receive an ROTC scholarship.
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DEFENDANTS 37. Defendant Donald J. Trump is President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. On July 26, 2017, President Trump stated on Twitter that transgender people would not be permitted to serve “in any capacity in the U.S. military.” 38. Defendant James N. Mattis is the United States Secretary of Defense and the leader of the Department of Defense. Pursuant to a directive issued by President Trump on August 25, 2017, Secretary Mattis led an effort to develop a plan to implement the President’s ban. He transmitted that plan to the President in February 2017, and it was released to the public on March 23, 2018. 39. Defendant Joseph F. Dunford, Jr. is a United States Marine Corps General and serves as the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 40. Defendant Department of the Army is one of three military departments of the Department of Defense and is responsible for the administration and operation of the United States Army. 41. Defendant Mark T. Esper is the United States Secretary of the Army. He is the leader of the Department of the Army. 42. Defendant Department of the Navy is one of three military departments of the Department of Defense and is responsible for the administration and operation of the United States Navy. 43. Defendant Richard V. Spencer is the United States Secretary of the Navy. He is the leader of the Department of the Navy. 44. Defendant Department of the Air Force is one of three military departments of the Department of Defense and is responsible for the administration and operation of the United States Air Force.
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45. Defendant Heather A. Wilson is the United States Secretary of the Air Force. She is the leader of the Department of the Air Force.
46. Defendant United States Coast Guard is one of the five branches of the United States Armed Forces.
47. Defendant Kirstjen M. Nielsen is the United States Secretary of Homeland Security. She is the leader of the Department of Homeland Security. The Department of Homeland Security is responsible for the administration and operation of the United States Coast Guard.
48. Defendant Defense Health Agency is a Combat Support Agency that administers health care services for the U.S Army, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Air Force. The Defense Health Agency exercises management responsibility for the TRICARE Health Plan, which is the health care program for all uniformed servicemembers in the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Coast Guard, and certain other commissioned corps.
49. Defendant Raquel C. Bono is a Vice Admiral and serves as Director of the Defense Health Agency.
50. Defendant United States of America includes all federal government agencies and departments responsible for the implementation of the President’s decision.
51. All of the Defendants are sued in their official capacities. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Adoption and Implementation of Open Service Policy 52. In May 2014, then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, a decorated U.S. Army
combat veteran, recommended that the military conduct a review of whether transgender people should be permitted to serve openly in the Armed Forces.
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53. In August 2014, the Department of Defense issued a new regulation that eliminated its categorical ban on open service by transgender people and instructed each branch of the Armed Forces to reassess whether maintaining a service-wide ban on service by openly transgender persons was justified. See Department of Defense Instruction 1332.18.
54. Secretary Hagel explained that “[e]very qualified American who wants to serve our country should have an opportunity to do so if they fit the qualifications and can do it.”
55. Secretary Hagel was succeeded as Secretary of Defense by Ashton B. Carter, who had previously served many years within the Department, including as Deputy Secretary of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, and as a member of the Defense Policy Board and the Defense Science Board. In July 2015, Secretary Carter announced that the military would begin a comprehensive analysis of whether to maintain the prohibition on military service by transgender people.
56. In an order establishing a working group to carry out this analysis, made effective as of July 13, 2015, Secretary Carter directed that no servicemember could be involuntarily separated or denied reenlistment or continuation of active or reserve status on the basis of his or her gender identity without the approval of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.
57. Over the course of a year, Secretary Carter oversaw a comprehensive review of this issue by a working group of the military and civilian leadership of the Armed Services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the service secretaries, and personnel, training, readiness, and medical specialists from across the Department of Defense.
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58. That year-long process examined copious data on the relevant issues, including but not limited to existing studies and research and input from transgender servicemembers and their commanders, outside expert groups, and medical professionals.
59. The process also included a careful review of the eighteen other countries that permit military service by openly transgender people.
60. The process also included consultation with doctors, employers, and insurance companies regarding the provision of medical care to transgender people.
61. The Department of Defense also commissioned the RAND Corporation, an organization formed after World War II to connect military planning with research and development decisions and which now operates as an independent think tank financed by the U.S. government, to analyze relevant data and studies to determine the impact of permitting transgender servicemembers to serve openly. Specifically, the RAND Corporation was tasked with (1) identifying the health care needs of the transgender population and the health care costs associated with providing transition-related care; (2) assessing the readiness implications of allowing transgender servicemembers to serve openly; and (3) reviewing the experiences of foreign militaries that permit transgender individuals to serve openly.
62. The study, titled “Assessing the Implications of Allowing Transgender Personnel to Serve Openly” (the “RAND Study”) and issued in May 2016, concluded that allowing transgender people to serve openly would “cost little and have no significant impact on unit readiness.”
63. The RAND Study noted that the Military Health System already provides the types of health care required by transgender servicemembers and concluded that health care costs for transgender servicemembers would represent “an exceedingly small proportion of [the
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Department of Defense’s] overall health care expenditures.” The RAND Study also concluded that this minimal incremental cost would likely be offset by savings through diminished rates of other health care costs that would be achieved by providing servicemembers with necessary transition-related medical care.
64. Based on the results of this comprehensive, year-long review process and on the RAND Study, the Department of Defense concluded that the needs of the military would be best met by permitting openly transgender people to serve.
65. As laid out by Secretary Carter in remarks delivered on June 30, 2016, that conclusion was based on a number of considerations, including: the need to “recruit[] and retain[] the soldier, sailor, airman, or Marine who can best accomplish the mission” of our nation’s Armed Forces; the fact that thousands of “talented and trained” transgender people are already serving and that the military has already invested “hundreds of thousands of dollars to train and develop each” transgender servicemember; the benefits to the military of retaining individuals who are already trained and who have already proven themselves; the need to provide both transgender servicemembers and their commanders with “clear[] and consistent guidance” on questions such as deployment and medical treatment; and the principle that “Americans who want to serve and can meet our standards should be afforded the opportunity to compete to do so.”
66. On June 30, 2016, Secretary Carter announced that “[e]ffective immediately, transgender Americans may serve openly. They can no longer be discharged or otherwise separated from the military just for being transgender.”
67. Also on June 30, 2016, Secretary Carter issued Directive-Type Memorandum 16005, titled “Military Service of Transgender Service Members.” It states: “The policy of the Department of Defense is that service in the United States military should be open to all who can
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meet the rigorous standards for military service and readiness. Consistent with the policies and procedures set forth in this memorandum, transgender individuals shall be allowed to serve in the military. These policies and procedures are premised on my conclusion that open service by transgender Service members while being subject to the same standards and procedures as other members with regard to their medical fitness for duty, physical fitness, uniform and grooming, deployability, and retention, is consistent with military readiness and with strength through diversity.”
68. The year-long review process by the Department of Defense also concluded that openly transgender people should be permitted to accede to the military so long as they had completed all medical treatment associated with their transitions and had been stable in their gender for eighteen months. The accession policy was scheduled to take effect on July 1, 2017 to allow the branches of the Armed Forces additional time to develop necessary standards and policies.
69. In September 2016, the Department of Defense issued an implementation handbook entitled “Transgender Service in the United States Military.” The 71-page document set forth guidance and instructions to both military servicemembers and commanders about how to implement and understand the new policies enabling open service of transgender servicemembers.
70. On October 1, 2016, the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness issued “DoD Instruction 1300.28—In-Service Transition for Transgender Service Members.” The instruction set forth further guidance to ensure open service by transgender servicemembers, including details regarding revisions to medical treatment provisions. This instruction was further implemented by a memorandum issued by the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs entitled “Guidance for Treatment of Gender Dysphoria for Active and
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Reserve Component Service Members.” The Department of Defense also issued medical guidance for providing transition-related care to transgender servicemembers.
71. Over the next nine months, between October 2016 and June 2017, the services conducted training of the force based on detailed guidance and training materials regarding the policy change.
72. On November 29, 2016, the Department of Defense revised “DoD Directive 1020.02E—Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity in the DoD” to prohibit discrimination and harassment on the basis of gender identity.
The Ban on Transgender Servicemembers 73. On June 30, 2017, the day before the policy permitting transgender people to
accede to the military was to take effect, Secretary Mattis extended the period for the development of relevant standards by six months.
74. Early in the morning of July 26, 2017, without any prior indication that he would address military transgender policy, President Trump announced in a series of tweets that the military would no longer permit the service of transgender Americans.
75. His tweets read: “After consultation with my generals and military experts, please be advised that the United States government will not accept or allow transgender individuals to serve in any capacity in the U.S. military. Our military must be focused on decisive and overwhelming victory and cannot be burdened with the tremendous medical costs and disruption that transgender in the military would entail.”
76. This announcement met with substantial criticism from members of Congress belonging to both political parties. These critics included Senator John McCain, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and a decorated combat veteran of the Navy, who said in a
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statement that “there is no reason to force servicemembers who are able to fight, train, and deploy to leave the military—regardless of their gender identity.” Senator Joni Ernst, another Republican member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and a combat veteran who served in the Iowa National Guard, also publicly expressed opposition to the new policy.
77. Upon information and belief, the President did not consult either the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Department of Defense before making his announcement. General Joseph Dunford, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President’s most senior uniformed military advisor, wrote to the Joint Chiefs that the President’s announcement was “unexpected” and that that he “was not consulted.”
78. Shortly after the announcement, fifty-six former generals and admirals issued a public statement denouncing the new policy. Commandant Admiral Paul Zukunft of the United States Coast Guard also criticized the proposed policy and expressly reached out to all openly transgender members of the Coast Guard, vowing not to “turn [his] back” on transgender servicemembers.
79. On August 25, 2017, the President released a memorandum (“August 25 Memorandum”) containing a formal directive to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security. It required the military to return to its pre-June 2016 policy forbidding transgender people from joining or serving in the military, effective March 23, 2018.
80. The August 25 Memorandum also required the ban on accessions to be extended indefinitely beyond January 1, 2018; halted all use of government resources to “fund sex-reassignment surgical procedures for military personnel, except to the extent necessary to protect the health of an individual who has already begun a course of treatment to reassign his or her sex,” effective March 23, 2018; and required the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with
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Homeland Security, to “submit to [the President] a plan for implementing” the ban within six months.
81. On September 14, 2017, Secretary of Defense Mattis issued a Memorandum directing the implementation process. Secretary Mattis affirmed that “DoD will carry out the President’s policy and directives” and will “comply with” the President’s August 25 directive. Secretary Mattis directed the Department of Defense to “develop[] an Implementation Plan on military service by transgender individuals, to effect the policy and directives” issued by President Trump on August 25. Secretary Mattis also indicated that the implementation plan would be released within the six months prescribed by the President.
82. In a separate Memorandum entitled “Terms of Reference – Implementation of Presidential Memorandum on Military Service by Transgender Individuals” (“Terms of Reference”), also issued on September 14, 2017, Secretary Mattis “direct[ed] the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to lead the [Department] in developing an Implementation Plan on military service by transgender individuals, to effect the policy and directives in Presidential Memorandum, Military Service by Transgender Individuals, dated August 25, 2017.” The Terms of Reference required that, in carrying out the duties delegated to them, the Deputy Secretary and Vice Chairman would be “supported by a panel of experts,” comprised of “the Military Department Under Secretaries, Service Vice Chiefs, and Service Senior Enlisted Advisors” and chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.
83. The panel was tasked with developing a plan to implement the President’s policy as announced in his tweets and promulgated to the Department of Defense in his August 25 Memorandum. The Terms of Reference explained that “[t]he Presidential Memorandum directs
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that the Department return to the longstanding policy and practice on military service by transgender individuals that was in place prior to June 2016” and “also allows the Secretary to determine how to address transgender individuals currently serving in the Armed Forces.” It directed the Panel to “set forth, in a single policy document, the standards and procedures applicable to military service by transgender persons, with specific attention to addressing transgender persons currently serving.” The Terms of Reference also explained that “[t]he Presidential Memorandum directs DoD to maintain the policy currently in effect, which generally prohibits accession of transgender individuals into military service.”
84. On October 30, 2017, this Court issued a preliminary injunction that, among other things, ordered Defendants to “revert to the status quo with regard to accession and retention that existed before the [August 25, 2017] issuance of the Presidential Memorandum.” Pursuant to that order, the Armed Forces began permitting openly transgender people to accede to the service beginning on January 1, 2018.
85. On February 22, 2018, Secretary Mattis sent a Memorandum to the President endorsing policies set out in an attached report entitled “Department of Defense Report and Recommendations on Military Service by Transgender Persons.” The February 22 Memorandum and its attachment were released to the public on March 23, 2018. The policy set forth in the February 22 Memorandum and its attachment expressly targets transgender individuals; they do not apply to non-transgender individuals at all.
86. The policy prevents any transgender individual from serving consistent with their gender identity, including by excluding anyone who “require[s] or ha[s] undergone gender transition” and by requiring proof that applicants are “stable … in their biological sex.”
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87. The policy also includes a limited and conditional provision permitting continued service by servicemembers “who were diagnosed with gender dysphoria by a military medical provider” during the period when open service by transgender servicemembers was allowed. The policy also states that “should its decision to exempt these Service members be used by a court as a basis for invalidating the entire policy, this exemption instead is and should be deemed severable from the rest of the policy.”
88. In addition, although the provision permitting continued service by some small number of transgender servicemembers states that they will “continue to receive all medically necessary treatment,” the substance of what may be provided may fall short of servicemembers’ actual medical needs. The policy set forth in the February 22 Memorandum and its attachment rejects the established medical consensus confirming the safety and efficacy of gender-transition related medical care and instead concludes that the available scientific evidence is “unclear.” As a result, transgender servicemembers who remain in provisional and conditional service face the likely denial of surgical and other care for transgender health needs.
89. The American Psychological Association responded to the February 22 Memorandum and its attachment, stating that it was “alarmed by the administration’s misuse of psychological science to stigmatize transgender Americans and justify limiting their ability to serve in uniform and access medically necessary health care.” The American Medical Association also responded in a statement saying that “there is no medically valid reason—including a diagnosis of gender dysphoria—to exclude transgender individuals from military service” and denouncing the Memorandum because it “mischaracterized and rejected the wide body of peerreviewed research on the effectiveness of transgender medical care.” And the American
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Psychiatric Association released a statement confirming that transgender people “suffer no impairment whatsoever in their judgment or ability to work.”
COUNT I (Fifth Amendment – Equal Protection) 90. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 91. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the federal government from denying equal protection of the laws. 92. The policies excluding transgender people from military service discriminate against Plaintiffs based on their sex and transgender status, without lawful justification, in violation of the Equal Protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 93. The exclusion of transgender people from military service lacks a rational basis, is arbitrary, and cannot be justified by sufficient federal interests. 94. Through the actions above, Defendants have violated the Equal Protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
COUNT II2 (Fifth Amendment – Due Process) 95. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 96. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires, at a minimum, that government action have some rational basis. 97. The policies excluding transgender people from military service are arbitrary and capricious and lack any rational basis.

2

The Court has dismissed Count III. Plaintiffs reserve all rights to appeal that dismissal

but do not repeat the Count here.

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98. Defendants’ 2016 policy permitting transgender people to serve openly in the

military, together with Plaintiffs’ reliance on that policy in notifying their superiors of their

transgender status, created a protected interest in Plaintiffs’ ability to continue serving in the

military as openly transgender servicemembers.

99. Defendants’ arbitrary reversal of the United States’ June 2016 policy threatens to

exclude Plaintiffs from continued military service because they are transgender, thus depriving

Plaintiffs of those interests without due process of law.

100. Defendants’ arbitrary reversal of the United States’ June 2016 policy also

impermissibly selectively burdens Plaintiffs’ fundamental rights to autonomy and privacy.

101. Through the actions above, Defendants have violated the Due Process Clause of

the Fifth Amendment.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Plaintiffs ask the Court to grant the following relief:

1.

Issue a declaratory judgment that the President’s directive to categorically exclude

transgender people from military service is unconstitutional;

2.

Issue a preliminary and permanent injunction, against all Defendants other than

President Trump, prohibiting the categorical exclusion of transgender people from military service,

including ordering that:

a. Defendants shall revert to the status quo with regard to accession and retention that existed before the August 25, 2017 issuance of the Presidential Memorandum.

b. Plaintiffs Jane Doe 2, Jane Doe 3, Jane Doe 4, Jane Doe 5, Jane Doe 6, and John Doe 1 may not be separated from the military, denied reenlistment, demoted, denied promotion, denied medically necessary treatment on a timely basis, or otherwise receive adverse treatment or differential terms of service on the basis that they are transgender;

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c. Plaintiff Regan V. Kibby may not be denied the opportunity to continue his attendance at the U.S. Naval Academy on the basis that he is transgender, and may not be denied the opportunity to accede to military service thereafter, or be denied promotion, reenlistment, or any other equal terms of service on the basis that he is transgender;

d. Plaintiff Dylan Kohere may not be denied the opportunity to fully enroll and participate in the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps program on the basis that he is transgender, and may not be denied the opportunity to accede to military service thereafter, or be denied promotion, reenlistment, or any other equal terms of service on the basis that he is transgender; and

e. Plaintiffs Jane Doe 7 and John Doe 2 may not be denied the opportunity to accede to military service on the basis that they are transgender, and may not be denied promotion, reenlistment, or any other equal terms of service on the basis that they are transgender.

3.

Award Plaintiffs their reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees;

4.

Issue any other relief the Court deems appropriate.

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April 6, 2018
Claire Laporte (pro hac vice) Matthew E. Miller (pro hac vice) Daniel McFadden (pro hac vice) Kathleen M. Brill (pro hac vice) Michael Licker (pro hac vice) Rachel C. Hutchinson (pro hac vice) Lauren Godles Milgroom (pro hac vice) FOLEY HOAG LLP 155 Seaport Blvd. Boston, Massachusetts 02210 Telephone: 617-832-1000 Fax: 617-832-7000
Theresa M. Roosevelt (D.C. Bar No. 1021853) FOLEY HOAG LLP 1717 K Street NW Washington, DC 20006 Telephone: 202-223-1200 Fax: 202-785-6687
Jennifer Levi (pro hac vice) Mary L. Bonauto (pro hac vice) GLBTQ LEGAL ADVOCATES & DEFENDERS 18 Tremont St., Ste. 950 Boston, Massachusetts 02108 Telephone: 617-426-1350 Fax: 617-426-3594
Shannon P. Minter (pro hac vice) Amy Whelan (pro hac vice) Chris Stoll (pro hac vice) NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS 870 Market St., Ste. 370 San Francisco, California 94102 Telephone: 415-392-6257 Fax: 415-392-8442

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Paul R.Q. Wolfson Paul R.Q. Wolfson (D.C. Bar No. 414759) Kevin M. Lamb (D.C. Bar No. 1030783) WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
HALE & DORR LLP 1875 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006 Telephone: 202-663-6000 Fax: 202-663-6363
Alan E. Schoenfeld (pro hac vice) WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
HALE & DORR LLP 7 World Trade Center 250 Greenwich St. New York, New York 10007 Telephone: 212-230-8800 Fax: 212-230-8888
Christopher R. Looney (pro hac vice) Harriet Hoder (pro hac vice) Adam M. Cambier (pro hac vice) WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
HALE & DORR LLP 60 State Street Boston, Massachusetts 02109 Telephone: 617-526-6000 Fax: 617-526-5000
Nancy Lynn Schroeder (pro hac vice) WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
HALE & DORR LLP 350 S. Grand Ave., Ste. 2100 Los Angeles, California 90071 Telephone: 213-443-5300 Fax: 213-443-5400
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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 Case 1:17-cv-01597-CKK Document 155 Filed 08/06/18 Page 1 of 9

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JANE DOE 2, et al., Plaintiffs v.
DONALD J. TRUMP, et al., Defendants

Civil Action No. 17-1597 (CKK)

MEMORANDUM OPINION (August 6, 2018)
On July 26, 2017, President Donald J. Trump issued a statement via Twitter announcing that “the United States Government will not accept or allow transgender individuals to serve in any capacity in the U.S. Military.” This lawsuit followed. On October 30, 2017, the Court issued a preliminary injunction, the effect of which was to revert to the status quo ante with regard to military policy on transgender service.
Defendants have filed several motions which are currently pending before the Court, including Defendants’ [89] Motion for a Protective Order and [90] Partial Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Unopposed Motion to Partially Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction, both of which relate only to the status of President Donald J. Trump as a party in this litigation. In summary form, Defendants move for the dismissal of the President as a party in this case. In addition, Defendants move to dissolve the preliminary injunction as it applies to the President only. Finally, Defendants also move for an order that the President himself does not have to respond to certain discovery requests that Plaintiffs have issued to him as a party in this case.
Upon consideration of the pleadings,1 the relevant legal authorities, and the record as a whole, the Court will GRANT Defendant’s Partial Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and to

1 The Court’s consideration has focused on the following documents: 1

Case 1:17-cv-01597-CKK Document 155 Filed 08/06/18 Page 2 of 9
Partially Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction only as to President Trump as a Defendant in this case. The President will be dismissed as a party and the Court’s preliminary injunction will be dissolved only as it applies to the President. The Court shall not grant injunctive or declaratory relief directly against the President with respect to his discretionary acts that are the focus of this lawsuit. Because no relief will be granted directly against the President in this case, the Court will dismiss him as a party to avoid unnecessary constitutional confrontations. The Court emphasizes that, regardless of this decision, the Court is still able to review the legality of the President’s actions, and Plaintiffs—if successful—can still obtain all of the relief that they seek. Given that the President is no longer a party to the case, the Court will DENY as MOOT Defendants’ Motion for a Protective Order. That motion sought to prevent discovery that Plaintiffs had requested from the President as a party to this case. The President is no longer a party.
I. LEGAL STANDARD Pursuant to Federal Rule 12(c), a party may move for judgment on the pleadings “[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial.” The standard for reviewing a motion for judgment on the pleadings is virtually identical to that applied to a motion to dismiss
• Defs.’ Mot. for a Protective Order, ECF No. 89; • Defs.’ Partial Mot. for Judgment on the Pleadings and Mot. to Partially Dissolve the
Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 90 (“Defs.’ Mot.”); • Pls.’ Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for a Protective Order, ECF No. 91; • Pls.’ Opp’n to Defs.’ Partial Mot. for Judgment on the Pleadings and Resp. to Mot. to
Partially Dissolve the Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 92 (“Pls.’ Opp’n”); • Defs.’ Reply in Supp. of Mot. for a Protective Order, ECF No. 93; and • Defs.’ Reply in Supp. of Partial Mot. for Judgment on the Pleadings and Mot. to Partially
Dissolve the Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 94 (“Defs.’ Reply”). In an exercise of its discretion, the Court finds that holding oral argument in this action would not be of assistance in rendering a decision. See LCvR 7(f).
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under Rule 12(b)(6). See Haynesworth v. Miller, 820 F.2d 1245, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1987), abrogated on other grounds by Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006); Jung v. Ass’n of Am. Med. Colleges, 339 F.Supp.2d 26, 36 (D.D.C. 2004) (“[T]he standard of review for motions for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is essentially the same as that for motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).”). “The court is limited to considering facts alleged in the complaint, any documents attached to or incorporated in the complaint, matters of which the court may take judicial notice, and matters of public record.” Baumann v. D.C., 744 F. Supp. 2d 216, 222 (D.D.C. 2010).
II. DISCUSSION A. Partial Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Motion to Partially Dissolve the
Preliminary Injunction As an initial matter, Plaintiffs do not oppose the dissolution of the preliminary injunction
insofar as it runs against the President. See Pls.’ Opp’n at 14. In fact, in their recently-filed Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs specify that they are no longer seeking preliminary (or permanent) injunctive relief from the President at all. See Second Amended Compl., ECF No. 106 (“Compl.”), at 20. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to partially dissolve the preliminary injunction as unopposed. The Court will dissolve its October 30, 2017 preliminary injunction to the extent that the injunction applied to the President. The injunction remains in force as it applies to all other Defendants.
Next, the Court also GRANTS Defendants’ motion in that it will dismiss the President himself as a party to this case. Through this lawsuit, Plaintiffs ask this Court to enjoin a policy that represents an official, non-ministerial act of the President, and declare that policy unlawful. See Compl. at 20. Sound separation-of-power principles counsel the Court against granting these forms of relief against the President directly. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 802-
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03 (1992) (holding that “in general ‘this court has no jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties.’”) (quoting State of Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. 475, 501 (1866)); Id. at 827 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The apparently unbroken historical tradition supports the view, which I think implicit in the separation of powers established by the Constitution, that the principals in whom the executive and legislative powers are ultimately vested—viz., the President and the Congress (as opposed to their agents)—may not be ordered to perform particular executive or legislative acts at the behest of the Judiciary. For similar reasons, I think we cannot issue a declaratory judgment against the President.”); Newdow v. Roberts, 603 F.3d 1002, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“With regard to the President, courts do not have jurisdiction to enjoin him, and have never submitted the President to declaratory relief”) (internal citation omitted); Swan v. Clinton, 100 F.3d 973, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that courts do not have authority to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties, and noting that the rationale for this limitation is “painfully obvious”); Id. at 976 n.1 (“similar considerations regarding a court’s power to issue relief against the President himself apply to [plaintiff’s] request for a declaratory judgment.”); Newdow v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 265, 280 (D.D.C. 2005) (“There is longstanding legal authority that the judiciary lacks the power to issue an injunction or declaratory judgment against the co-equal branches of the government—the President and the Congress.”).2
Given that the Court will not grant Plaintiffs the relief that they seek against the President himself, the President should be dismissed. “‘[O]ccasion[s] for constitutional confrontation
2 Indeed, Plaintiffs themselves appear to recognize that at least the injunctive relief they originally sought in this case should not be entered against the President, as they have now amended their complaint to exempt the President from their prayer for that relief. See Compl. at 20.
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between the two branches’ should be avoided whenever possible.” Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 389-90 (2004) (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 692 (1974)). Confrontation can be easily avoided here, because dismissing the President will have little or no substantive effect on this litigation. Plaintiffs argue that the acts of the President himself are central to this case, and the Court agrees. But dismissing the President as a Defendant does not mean that those acts will not be subject to judicial review. The Court can still review those acts and, if Plaintiffs are successful in proving that they are unconstitutional, Plaintiffs can still obtain all of the relief that they seek from the other Defendants. See Defs.’ Mot. at 7 (conceding that “Plaintiffs could obtain full relief for their alleged injuries through injunctive relief against” the Defendants other than the President); see also Swan, 100 F.3d at 978 (“In most cases, any conflict between the desire to avoid confronting the elected head of a coequal branch of government and to ensure the rule of law can be successfully bypassed, because the injury at issue can be rectified by injunctive relief against subordinate officials.”).
Plaintiffs raise a number of arguments against dismissal of the President, but none of them are persuasive. First, Plaintiffs argue that the case law cited above addresses whether injunctive and declaratory relief is available against the President, not whether the President must be dismissed from a civil lawsuit altogether. This is true. However, the Court’s decision, informed by this case law, that it will not grant relief against the President still counsels in favor of dismissing him as a party from this case. It makes little sense to retain a party in a case from whom no relief will be granted under ordinary circumstances, and especially little sense when retaining that party risks unnecessary constitutional confrontations. By this ruling the Court does not, as Plaintiffs suggest, announce a new rule of “absolute immunity” for the President from civil suits for equitable relief. The Court merely holds that on the particular facts of this case—
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where no relief is available from the President himself, the Court can review the policy at issue without the President as a party, and Plaintiffs can obtain all of the relief that they seek from other Defendants—there is no sound reason for risking constitutional confrontations by retaining the President as a Defendant.3
Second, Plaintiffs point out that Defendants did not move to dismiss the President earlier, and suggest that Defendants are only now seeking to do so now in order to avoid the President having to respond to pending discovery requests. Defendants’ motion was technically timely. A party may move for judgment on the pleadings “[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). More importantly, even assuming that Plaintiffs are correct about Defendants’ motive in moving to dismiss the President, the Court would hesitate to deny the motion on that basis. Regardless of the motivation for filing it, Defendants’ motion presents sound reasons for dismissing the President based on wellestablished separation of power principles set forth in United States Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit precedent. Plaintiffs argue that if the President is dismissed, seeking discovery from him will be more difficult. Pls.’ Opp’n at 1-2. But it would not be appropriate to retain the President as a party to this case simply because it will be more complicated to seek discovery from him if he is dismissed. To the extent that there exists relevant and appropriate discovery related to the President, Plaintiffs will still be able to obtain that discovery despite the President not being a party to the case.
3 Plaintiffs point to a number of cases where the President has been a named party. See, e.g., Pls.’ Opp’n at 4. But in those cases, the issue of dismissing the President as a party does not appear to have been raised or analyzed. The Court is unwilling to interpret those Courts’ silence as an implicit holding on whether retaining the President under the present circumstances is appropriate. Cf. Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 144 (2011) (“When a potential jurisdictional defect is neither noted nor discussed in a federal decision, the decision does not stand for the proposition that no defect existed.”).
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Third, Plaintiffs cite Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (“NTEU”) for the proposition that “no immunity established under any case known to this Court bars every suit against the President for injunctive, declaratory or mandamus relief.” Id. at 609. As an initial matter, NTEU predated the Supreme Court’s decision in Franklin—which warned that injunctive relief against the President personally is an extraordinary measure not lightly to be undertaken—and accordingly the D.C. Circuit has commented that “[i]t is not entirely clear, of course, whether, and to what extent, [that] decision[ ] remain[s] good law.” Swan, 100 F.3d at 978. Regardless, NTEU is distinguishable. That case dealt with the question—left open by Mississippi v. Johnson—of “whether a court can compel the President to perform a ministerial act” (in that case, adjusting the pay of federal employees as required by an act of Congress). Id. at 607 (emphasis added). “A ministerial duty . . . is one in respect to which nothing is left to discretion.” State of Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. at 498. “It is a simple, definite duty, arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and imposed by law.” Id. The acts of the President at issue in this case cannot plausibly be considered “ministerial.” In addition, the court in NTEU distinguished the facts of that case from those in Mississippi v. Johnson by noting that “[i]n sharp contrast to Mississippi v. Johnson are the circumstances of this suit wherein failure to permit the President to be sued on the ground of separation of powers would prevent the appellant from enforcing its legal rights in federal court.” NTEU at 614-15. In this case, as discussed above, Plaintiffs will be able to enforce their legal rights and obtain all relief sought in this case without the President as a party.
In sum, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Partial Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and to Partially Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction. The President will be dismissed as a
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Defendant and the Court’s preliminary injunction will be dissolved only as it applies to the President. B. Motion for a Protective Order
Through their Motion for a Protective Order, Defendants sought an order excusing the President himself from responding to certain discovery requests Plaintiffs had issued to him as a party in this case. Because the President will no longer be a party in this case, he will not personally be obligated to respond to those requests. Defendants’ motion is accordingly MOOT and will be DENIED on that basis. However, the Court reiterates that dismissing the President as a party to this case does not mean that Plaintiffs are prevented from pursuing discovery related to the President. The Court understands that the parties dispute whether discovery related to the President which has been sought by Plaintiffs is precluded by the deliberative process or presidential communication privileges, and the Court makes no ruling on those disputes at this point.4 The Court will be issuing further opinions addressing other dispositive motions that have been filed in this case. After all of those opinions have been issued, if necessary, the Court will give the parties further guidance on the resolution of the discovery disputes in this case.5
4 The Court is aware that the court in Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17-1297-MJP (W.D. Wash.), has recently ordered Defendants to produce materials that they have withheld on the basis of privilege and that Defendants have sought appellate review of that order. 5 Restating the arguments in their Partial Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Motion to Partially Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction, Defendants argue in their recently-filed Motion to Dismiss that the Court should “dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against the President because any alleged injury caused by the President is not redressable.” Defs.’ Mem. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss Pls.’ 2d Amended Compl. or, in the Alternative, for Summ. J., ECF No. 115, at 14-17. Because the President will be dismissed as a party, these aspects of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss are now moot.
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Case 1:17-cv-01597-CKK Document 155 Filed 08/06/18 Page 9 of 9 III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will GRANT Defendants’ Partial Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and to Partially Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction, and DENY as MOOT Defendants’ Motion for a Protective Order. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
/s/ COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY United States District Judge
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JANE DOE 2, et al., Plaintiffs v.
DONALD J. TRUMP, et al., Defendants

Civil Action No. 17-1597 (CKK)

MEMORANDUM OPINION (August 6, 2018)
On July 26, 2017, President Donald J. Trump issued a statement via Twitter announcing that “the United States Government will not accept or allow transgender individuals to serve in any capacity in the U.S. Military.” A formal Presidential Memorandum followed on August 25, 2017. Before the 2017 Presidential Memorandum, the Department of Defense had announced that openly transgender individuals would be allowed to enlist in the military, effective January 1, 2018, and had prohibited the discharge of service members based solely on their gender identities. The 2017 Presidential Memorandum reversed these policies. It indefinitely extended the prohibition against transgender individuals entering the military (a process formally referred to as “accession”), and required the military to authorize the discharge of transgender service members. The President ordered Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis to submit a plan for implementing the policy directives of the 2017 Presidential Memorandum by February 2018. Plaintiffs filed suit and sought preliminary injunctive relief, which the Court granted.
Currently pending before the Court are Defendants’ [115] Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, or, in the Alternative, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, and Defendants’ [116] Motion to Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction. Upon consideration of the

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pleadings,1 the relevant legal authorities, and the record as a whole, the Court DENIES
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, and DENIES
Defendants’ Motion to Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction.2 Both of these motions are based
on the same fundamental premise: that Defendants have recently proposed a “new policy” that
will now allow transgender individuals to serve in the military. Based on this premise,
Defendants argue in these motions that Plaintiffs no longer have standing, that their claims are
moot, and that there is no longer any need for this Court’s preliminary injunction. For reasons
discussed in more detail below, the Court is not persuaded by these arguments. This case shall
proceed, and the Court’s preliminary injunction shall continue to maintain the status quo ante.
1 The Court’s consideration has focused on the following documents: • Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss Pls.’ 2d Am. Compl., or, in the Alternative, Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 115 (“Defs.’ Mem.”); • Defs.’ Mot. to Dissolve the Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 116; • Pls.’ Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss and to Dissolve the Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 130 (“Pls.’ Opp’n”); • Defs.’ Reply in Supp. of their Mot. to Dismiss Pls.’ 2d Am. Compl., or, in the Alternative, for Summ. J., and Opp’n to Pls.’ Cross-Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 138 (“Defs.’ Reply”); and • Defs.’ Reply in Support of their Mot. to Dissolve the Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 140.
In an exercise of its discretion, the Court finds that holding oral argument in this action would not be of assistance in rendering a decision. See LCvR 7(f).
2 Although the parties’ briefing mixes arguments about dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and summary judgment, the Court has exercised its discretion to first consider their arguments in the context of Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Because those arguments largely resolve the issues raised in Defendants’ Motion to Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction, the Court also addresses that motion in this Memorandum Opinion. However, this Opinion does not address the summary judgment aspects of Defendants’ [115] Motion, nor does it address Plaintiffs’ [131] Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. Those motions will be dealt with separately. In addition, this Opinion does not address Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs do not have standing to press their claims against the President. This argument is moot because the Court has issued a separate Memorandum Opinion and Order today which dismisses the President as a party from this case.
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I. BACKGROUND Plaintiffs are current and aspiring transgender service members. Many have years of experience in the military. Some have decades. They have been deployed on active duty in Iraq and Afghanistan. They have and continue to serve with distinction. All fear that the directives of the 2017 Presidential Memorandum will have devastating impacts on their careers and their families. Accordingly, they filed this lawsuit challenging those directives and moved this Court to enjoin the implementation of the 2017 Presidential Memorandum. They claimed that the President’s directives violate the fundamental guarantees of due process afforded by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. On October 30, 2017, the Court issued a preliminary injunction in this case. As particularly relevant here, the Court found that Plaintiffs had standing and were likely to succeed on their Fifth Amendment claim. The Court concluded that, as a form of government action that classifies people based on their gender identity, and disfavors a class of historically persecuted and politically powerless individuals, the President’s directives were subject to heightened scrutiny. Plaintiffs claimed that the President’s directives could not survive such scrutiny because they were not genuinely based on legitimate concerns regarding military effectiveness or budget constraints, but were instead driven by a desire to express disapproval of transgender people generally. The Court found that a number of factors—including the breadth of the exclusion ordered by the directives, the unusual circumstances surrounding the President’s announcement of them, the fact that the reasons given for them did not appear to be supported by any facts, and the recent rejection of those reasons by the military itself—strongly suggested that Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment claim was meritorious. Accordingly, the Court enjoined Defendants from enforcing the President’s directives. The effect of the Court’s preliminary
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injunction was to revert to the status quo ante with regard to accession and retention that existed before the issuance of the 2017 Presidential Memorandum.
Defendants appealed, see Defs.’ Notice of Appeal, ECF No. 66, and moved this Court to stay the portion of its preliminary injunction that required Defendants to begin accepting transgender individuals into the military on January 1, 2018, see Defs.’ Mot. for Partial Stay of Prelim. Inj. Pending Appeal, ECF No. 73. On December 11, 2017, the Court denied Defendants’ motion to stay. See Dec. 11, 2017 Order, ECF No. 75.
Defendants then sought the same relief from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”). On December 22, 2017, the D.C. Circuit denied Defendants’ motion to stay this Court’s preliminary injunction. See Doe 1 v. Trump, No. 175267, 2017 WL 6553389 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 2017). The D.C. Circuit concluded that Defendants had not demonstrated that they had a strong likelihood of success on appeal, that they would be irreparably harmed absent a stay, or that the stay would not harm the other parties to the proceeding. Id. It held that “given that the enjoined accession ban would directly impair and injure the ongoing educational and professional plans of transgender individuals and would deprive the military of skilled and talented troops, allowing it to take effect would be counter to the public interest.” Id. at *3. The D.C. Circuit also explained that “in the balancing of equities, it must be remembered that all Plaintiffs seek during this litigation is to serve their Nation with honor and dignity, volunteering to face extreme hardships, to endure lengthy deployments and separation from family and friends, and to willingly make the ultimate sacrifice of their lives if necessary to protect the Nation, the people of the United States, and the Constitution against all who would attack them.” Id. After the D.C. Circuit’s opinion was issued, Defendants
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voluntarily dismissed their appeal of this Court’s preliminary injunction. The military began permitting openly transgender individuals to accede on January 1, 2018.
This case then moved forward into the discovery stage. Defendants strenuously resisted engaging in discovery. As noted above, the 2017 Presidential Memorandum had called for the Secretary of Defense to submit a plan to implement the President’s policy directives by February 2018. Defendants repeatedly argued that discovery should be halted until that plan was submitted. Defendants even argued at one point that Plaintiffs were not entitled to discovery in this case at all. The Court repeatedly rejected Defendants’ arguments and ordered Defendants to cooperate with discovery so that this case could move forward efficiently toward an ultimate resolution on the merits. Despite the Court’s orders, discovery remains unfinished because Defendants have asserted that a substantial portion of the documents and information sought by Plaintiffs are privileged (pursuant to the deliberative process privilege and the presidential communications privilege), and the parties’ disputes about these assertions of privilege remain outstanding.3
In February 2018, as ordered by the 2017 Presidential Memorandum, Secretary of Defense Mattis presented a memorandum to the President that proposed a policy to effectively prevent transgender military service. See Defs.’ Mot. to Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction, Ex. 1, ECF No. 96-1 (hereinafter, the “Mattis Implementation Plan”). The Mattis Implementation Plan, unlike the President’s 2017 tweet and memorandum, purports not to be a blanket ban on all “transgender individuals.” However, the plan effectively implements such a ban by targeting proxies of transgender status, such as “gender dysphoria” and “gender transition,” and by
3 The Court is aware that the court in Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17-1297-MJP (W.D. Wash.), has recently ordered Defendants to produce materials that they have withheld on the basis of privilege and that Defendants have sought appellate review of that order.
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requiring all service members to serve “in their biological sex.” Based on the conclusion “that

there are substantial risks associated with allowing the accession and retention of individuals

with a history or diagnosis of gender dysphoria and require, or have already undertaken, a course

of treatment to change their gender,” Mattis Implementation Plan at 2, the Mattis Implementation

Plan proposes the following policies:

• Transgender persons with a history or diagnosis of gender dysphoria are disqualified from military service, except under the following limited circumstances: (1) if they have been stable for 36 consecutive months in their biological sex prior to accession; (2) Service members diagnosed with gender dysphoria after entering into service may be retained if they do not require a change of gender and remain deployable within applicable retention standards; and (3) currently serving Service members who have been diagnosed with gender dysphoria since the previous administration’s policy took effect and prior to the effective date of this new policy, may continue to serve in their preferred gender and receive medically necessary treatment for gender dysphoria.

• Transgender persons who require or have undergone gender transition are disqualified from military service.

Id. at 2-3.

• Transgender persons without a history or diagnosis of gender dysphoria, who are otherwise qualified for service, may serve, like all other Service members, in their biological sex.

To summarize: under the Mattis Implementation Plan, individuals who require or have

undergone gender transition are absolutely disqualified from military service; individuals with a

history or diagnosis of gender dysphoria are largely disqualified from military service; and, to

the extent that there are any individuals who identify as “transgender” but do not fall under the

first two categories, they may serve, but only “in their biological sex.” By definition,

transgender persons do not identify or live in accord with their biological sex, which means that

the result of the Mattis Implementation Plan is that transgender individuals are generally not

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allowed to serve openly in the military. There is only one narrow class of transgender individuals who are allowed to serve as openly transgender under the Mattis Implementation Plan. Pursuant to a “grandfather provision,” those “currently serving Service members who have been diagnosed with gender dysphoria since the previous administration’s policy took effect and prior to the effective date of” the policy set forth in the Mattis Implementation Plan, may continue to serve in their preferred gender.
The reasoning underlying the Mattis Implementation Plan is spelled out in a second memorandum that was sent from the Department of Defense to the President in February 2018. See Defs.’ Mot. to Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction, Ex. 2, ECF No. 96-2 (hereinafter, the “Panel Report”). Like the Mattis Implementation Plan, the Panel Report carefully avoids categorical language banning all transgender individuals. Instead, the document speaks in terms of individuals with “gender dysphoria” and those who have undergone or will require “gender transition” (both of which, again, are proxies for transgender status). Generally speaking, the Panel Report concludes that individuals with gender dysphoria or who have undergone or will require gender transition undermine the military. According to the report, these service members are fundamentally incompatible with the military’s mental health standards, physical health standards, and sex-based standards. The report suggests that they are a detriment to military readiness and unit cohesion. It likens gender dysphoria to conditions such as “bipolar disorder, personality disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, suicidal behavior, and even body dysmorphic disorder.” Panel Report at 20. It concludes that individuals with gender dysphoria or who have undergone or will require gender transition are more likely to have other mental health conditions and substance abuse problems, and to commit suicide. Id. at 21. The Panel Report also states that these individuals impose “disproportionate costs” on the military. Id. at
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41. For the most part, in lieu of affirmative evidence, the Panel Report repeatedly cites “uncertainty” in the medical field about these individuals as a reason to urge that the military “proceed with caution.” Id. at 6. Although not necessary to the outcome of this particular Memorandum Opinion, it is worth noting that these conclusions were immediately denounced by the American Psychological Association and the American Medical Association. See Decl. of Lauren Godles Milgroom, ECF No. 128 (“Milgroom Decl.”), Exs. GG, HH.
On March 23, 2018, Defendants filed a Notice informing the Court that President Trump had issued a second memorandum on military service by transgender individuals. See Defs.’ Notice, ECF No. 95. In the 2018 Presidential Memorandum, the President stated that he “revokes” his 2017 Presidential Memorandum, “and any other directive [he] may have made with respect to military service by transgender individuals.” Id. at 1. The President ordered that “[t]he Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, with respect to the U.S. Coast Guard, may exercise their authority to implement any appropriate policies concerning military service by transgender individuals.” Id. To be clear, as has just been laid out, the “appropriate policies” that the Secretaries intended to implement had already been developed and proposed to the President at the time he issued this memorandum.
The events described above have sparked a great debate between the parties as to the future of this case, and prompted the filing of numerous motions. As relevant to this Memorandum Opinion, pending before the Court are Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, or, in the Alternative, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, and Defendants’ Motion to Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction. Defendants argue that the Mattis Implementation Plan represents a “new policy” divorced and distinct from the President’s 2017 policy directives that were previously enjoined by this Court. They also contend that the
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Mattis Implementation Plan does not harm the Plaintiffs in this case. Accordingly, Defendants seek the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ recently filed Second Amended Complaint for lack of jurisdiction because Plaintiffs lack standing and because their claims are now moot. For largely the same reasons, Defendants also argue that the Court’s preliminary injunction should be dissolved. In sum, it is Defendants’ view that they have preempted this lawsuit by drafting and issuing the Panel Report, the Mattis Implementation Plan, and the 2018 Presidential Memorandum. The Court disagrees.
Summary: This Memorandum Opinion sets forth the Court’s reasoning for denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint and Defendants’ Motion to Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction. The Court first concludes that Plaintiffs have standing because they would all be harmed if the Mattis Implementation Plan were allowed to take effect. The Court next concludes that the Mattis Implementation Plan has not mooted Plaintiffs’ claims because that plan is not a “new policy” that is meaningfully distinct from the President’s 2017 directives that were originally challenged in this case. Instead, at a fundamental level, the Mattis Implementation Plan is just that—a plan that implements the President’s directive that transgender people be excluded from the military. For largely the same reasons, the rationale for the Court’s preliminary injunction maintaining the status quo ante until the final resolution of this case remains intact. Nothing in this Memorandum Opinion represents a final adjudication of whether Defendants’ actions were constitutional. The Court merely holds that whatever legal relevance the Mattis Implementation Plan might have, it has not fundamentally changed the circumstances of this lawsuit such that Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, or that the need for the Court’s preliminary injunction has dissipated.
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II. LEGAL STANDARD When a motion to dismiss a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) is filed, a federal court is required to ensure that it has “the ‘statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate [the] case[.]’” Morrow v. United States, 723 F. Supp. 2d 71, 77 (D.D.C. 2010) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998)). “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction” and can adjudicate only those cases or controversies entrusted to them by the Constitution or an Act of Congress. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). In determining whether there is jurisdiction on a motion to dismiss, the Court may “consider the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record, or the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts.” Coal. for Underground Expansion v. Mineta, 333 F.3d 193, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). “Although a court must accept as true all factual allegations contained in the complaint when reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1),” the factual allegations in the complaint “will bear closer scrutiny in resolving a 12(b)(1) motion than in resolving a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim.” Wright v. Foreign Serv. Grievance Bd., 503 F. Supp. 2d 163, 170 (D.D.C. 2007) (citations omitted).
III. DISCUSSION The Court begins this Memorandum Opinion with an assessment of its jurisdiction. Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of this Court to the adjudication of “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const., Art. III, § 2. “In an attempt to give meaning to Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement, the courts have developed a series of principles termed ‘justiciability doctrines,’ among which are standing [and] mootness.” Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1427 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
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737, 750 (1984)). Defendants argue that the issuance of the 2018 Presidential Memorandum, the Mattis Implementation Plan, and the Panel Report have rendered this case moot and have deprived all Plaintiffs of standing. They contend that the Court must therefore dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. Defendants are wrong. In addition, for largely the same reasons that the Court continues to have jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims, Defendants have not satisfied their burden of demonstrating that the Court’s preliminary injunction should be dissolved.
1. Standing Standing is an element of the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, and requires, in essence, that a plaintiff have “a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). A plaintiff cannot be a mere bystander or interested third-party, or a selfappointed representative of the public interest; he or she must show that the defendant’s conduct has affected them in a “personal and individual way.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). “The law of Article III standing, which is built on separation-of-powers principles, serves to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political branches.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014). Consequently, the standing analysis is “especially rigorous when reaching the merits of the dispute would force [the court] to decide whether an action taken by one of the other two branches of the Federal Government was unconstitutional.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013). “[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press” and for each form of relief sought, DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006), but “the presence of one party with standing is sufficient to satisfy Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement,” Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 53 (2006). The familiar requirements of Article III standing are:
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(1) that the plaintiff have suffered an “injury in fact”—an invasion of a judicially cognizable interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) that there be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court; and (3) that it be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167 (1997) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61); see also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). With respect to the “injury in fact” requirement, which is predominantly at issue in this case, “future injury may suffice if the threatened injury is ‘certainly impending,’ or there is a ‘substantial risk that the harm will occur.’” Susan B. Anthony List, 134 S. Ct. at 2341 (quoting Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409, 414 n.5). The Court rejects Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs no longer have standing because they are not harmed by the Mattis Implementation Plan. In its October 30, 2017 Memorandum Opinion, the Court explained in detail why the Plaintiffs in this case had standing. See Doe 1 v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167, 192-203 (D.D.C. 2017). The Court will assume familiarity with that discussion and will not repeat it here (although it does expressly incorporate that discussion into this Memorandum Opinion as though stated in full). With the principles set forth in that earlier Opinion as a baseline, in this Opinion the Court focuses more narrowly on Defendants’ arguments about why the Mattis Implementation Plan has nullified Plaintiffs’ standing. As explained above, the effect of that plan would be that individuals who require or have undergone gender transition would be absolutely disqualified from military service, individuals with a history or diagnosis of gender dysphoria would be largely disqualified from military service, and, to the extent that there are any individuals who identify as “transgender” but do not fall under the first two categories, they would be allowed serve, but only “in their biological sex” (which
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means that openly transgender persons would generally not be allowed to serve in conformance with their identity).
i. Current Service Members With Diagnoses of Gender Dysphoria Who Either Have Transitioned or Have Begun to Transition
Plaintiffs Regan Kibby, Jane Does 2 through 5, and John Doe 1 are current service members who have been diagnosed with gender dysphoria.4 The Mattis Implementation Plan generally bans individuals who have been diagnosed with gender dysphoria from military service on the grounds that they are mentally unstable and that their presence in the military disrupts unit cohesion, prevents good order and discipline, and is generally incompatible with military readiness and lethality. However, the Mattis Implementation Plan contains a limited exception from this ban for current service members who, like Plaintiffs Regan Kibby, Jane Does 2 through 5, and John Doe 1, were “diagnosed with gender dysphoria since the previous administration’s policy took effect and prior to the effective date of this new policy.” Mattis Implementation Plan at 2. This “grandfather provision” purports to be based on the military’s prior “commitment to these Service members” and “the substantial investment it has made in them.” Panel Report at 43. Defendants argue that the existence of this grandfather provision means that the Mattis Implementation Plan does not harm these Plaintiffs.
Defendants are wrong. The Mattis Implementation Plan clearly harms all current service members with gender dysphoria—even those who are allowed to remain in the military as a result of a narrow grandfather provision. It singles them out from all other service members and marks them as categorically unfit for military service. See generally Panel Report. It sends the message to their fellow service members and superiors that they cannot function in their
4 Plaintiff Regan Kibby is a midshipman at the U.S. Naval Academy. The parties agree that for the purposes of the Court’s standing analysis, he should be treated as a current service member.
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respective positions. That they are mentally unstable. That their presence in the military is incompatible with military readiness, unit cohesion, good order, and discipline. In sum, it is an express statement that these individuals’ very presence makes the military weaker and less combat-ready.
By singling these Plaintiffs out and stigmatizing them as members of an inherently inferior class of service members, the Mattis Implementation Plan causes Plaintiffs grave non-economic injuries that are alone sufficient to confer standing. See Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 73940 (1984) (“[D]iscrimination itself, by perpetuating ‘archaic and stereotypic notions’ or by stigmatizing members of the disfavored group as ‘innately inferior’ and therefore as less worthy participants in the political community, can cause serious non-economic injuries to those persons who are personally denied equal treatment solely because of their membership in a disfavored group.”) (internal citation omitted).
Defendants disagree that this “stigmatic” injury alone is sufficient to confer standing. They claim that “an alleged injury arising from discrimination ‘accords a basis for standing only to those persons who are personally denied equal treatment by the challenged discriminatory conduct.’” Defs.’ Reply at 11 (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 755). But the principal case Defendants cite in support of this argument, Allen v. Wright, is readily distinguishable. The plaintiffs in Allen were the parents of African American public school children. Allen, 468 U.S. at 739. They challenged the Internal Revenue Service’s grant of tax-exempt status to racially segregated private schools. Id. at 744-45. The Allen Court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim of standing based on the “stigmatic injury, or denigration” that is “suffered by all members of a racial group when the Government discriminates on the basis of race.” Id. at 754. The Supreme Court held that “[t]here can be no doubt that this sort of noneconomic injury is one of the most
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serious consequences of discriminatory government action and is sufficient in some circumstances to support standing.” Id. at 755. However, it concluded that such stigmatic injury did not support standing for the particular plaintiffs in Allen because their children had never applied to any of the private schools at issue, and therefore they had not been “personally denied equal treatment.” Id. Instead, they had merely alleged an “abstract stigmatic injury” that would be equally applicable to “all members” of an entire racial group, nationwide. Id. at 756.
The situation here is fundamentally different. Plaintiffs are not merely concerned members of the public or bystanders presenting a generalized grievance. They are members of the precisely defined group that the Mattis Implementation Plan discriminates against by labelling as unsuited for military service. The Mattis Implementation Plan sends a blatantly stigmatizing message to all members of the military hierarchy that has a unique and damaging effect on a narrow and identifiable set of individuals, of which Plaintiffs are members. Moreover, unlike the alleged injury in Allen, the stigmatic injury alleged by Plaintiffs is caused by their receiving unequal treatment under the Mattis Implementation Plan. Under that plan, Plaintiffs would be allowed to remain in the military but, unlike any other service members, only pursuant to an exception to a policy that explicitly marks them as unfit for service. No other service members are so afflicted. These Plaintiffs are denied equal treatment because they will be the only service members who are allowed to serve only based on a technicality; as an exception to a policy that generally paints them as unfit. In their words, “[w]hile other service members will enjoy the security and status of serving as honored, respected, and equal members of the Armed Forces,” Plaintiffs “will serve only on conditional sufferance and therefore on objectively unequal terms.” Pls.’ Reply in Support of their Cross-Mot. for Summary Judgment,
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ECF No. 149, at 23.5 Because their stigmatic injury derives from this unequal treatment, it is sufficient to confer standing.
Regardless, even assuming that the “stigmatic” aspects of Plaintiffs’ injuries were not alone sufficient to confer standing, the Mattis Implementation Plan does more than just stigmatize Plaintiffs. It creates a substantial risk that Plaintiffs will suffer concrete harms to their careers in the near future. There is a substantial risk that the plan will harm Plaintiffs’ career development in the form of reduced opportunities for assignments, promotion, training, and deployment. These harms are an additional basis for Plaintiffs’ standing.
Defendants argue that these alleged harms are too “speculative,” but the Court disagrees. The Secretary of Defense has personally issued a policy, with a lengthy supporting memorandum, that, in effect, instructs the entire armed forces that Plaintiffs’ service is harmful to the military. There is nothing speculative about the proposition that, having been so instructed by the very top of the military hierarchy, Plaintiffs’ supervisors will place less trust in Plaintiffs and be less likely to give Plaintiffs quality assignments and opportunities. The very nature of such a pronouncement from the Secretary of Defense creates a non-speculative and substantial risk that Plaintiffs’ experience, career development, and growth in the military will be hampered. To pretend otherwise is fanciful. This fairly obvious conclusion is buttressed by evidence of the effects of prior negative proclamations about transgender service. For instance, Jane Doe 2 declares that she received an unfavorable work detail to keep her “separated from the rest of [her] unit because [she is] transgender and because of the President’s ban, as [she] never had any
5 In re Navy Chaplaincy, 534 F.3d 756 (D.C. Cir. 2008) is also distinguishable. Unlike in that case, Plaintiffs here do not merely take offense to a message that can be interpreted from government action. Plaintiffs assert that they are directly injured by an explicit government message about their suitability as service members.
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problems with this kind of treatment in [her] old unit and [does] not know of any other reason [why] she would be treated this way.” Decl. of Jane Doe 2, ECF No. 40-2, at ¶ 15. The detail requires Jane Doe 2 to “driv[e] far away from my base all day every day” and despite the fact that she is “supposed to be in charge of four or five other soldiers, [she has] yet to meet them.” Id. The conclusion is also supported by the declarations of the former United States Secretaries of the Army and Navy, and a Professor Emeritus at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. See, e.g., Supp. Decl. of Raymond E. Mabus, Jr., ECF No. 51-1, at ¶ 7 (“transgender service members are losing opportunities for assignments that they are capable of doing”); Supp. Decl. of Eric K. Fanning, ECF No. 51-3, at ¶ 6 (transgender service members’ “advancement and promotion opportunities in the military” are being substantially limited); Decl. of Mark J. Eitelberg, ECF No. 51-4, at ¶ 11 (directives “instruct[ing] commanders and other service members that transgender individuals are detrimental to the military . . . erode[ ] the value that members serving with them place on their contributions or performance” which “harm[s] and restrict[s] artificially” their ability to serve).6
The grandfather provision of the Mattis Implementation Plan does not alleviate these harms. That provision does not state, nor does it appear to be based on, a conclusion that those who will be allowed to remain in the military like Regan Kibby, Jane Does 2 through 5, and John Doe 1 are somehow more fit to serve than those who will be banned. Instead, the provision is based—purportedly—on a conclusion that discharging these particular individuals would be
6 Defendants argue that the statements of these individuals are all irrelevant because they predate the Mattis Implementation Plan, Defs.’ Reply at 13-14, but that argument assumes what the Court rejects in the latter portions of this Opinion: that the Mattis Implementation Plan is a “new policy” separate and distinct from the President’s 2017 directives. The Mattis Implementation Plan merely implements the basic policy directives in the President’s 2017 tweet and memorandum. Evidence about the effects of the 2017 directives is therefore relevant to assessing the impact of the Mattis Implementation Plan.
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unfair because they relied on the military’s prior policy pronouncements, and also inefficient because the military has already invested time and money into their training. Accordingly, the message of the policy—that, under general circumstances, these Plaintiffs should not be in the military—remains intact. That message is substantially likely to harm Plaintiffs’ careers in very real ways. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs Regan Kibby, Jane Does 2 through 5, and John Doe 1 have standing.
ii. Prospective Service Members Who Have Undergone Gender Transition Jane Doe 7 and John Doe 2 are prospective service members who have already undergone,
or are currently undergoing, gender transition, and are also actively taking steps toward enlistment. See Decl. of Jane Doe 7, at ¶ 1 (attesting that she “went through the process of gender transition seven years ago” and has “been trying to enlist in the Coast Guard”); Decl. of John Doe 2, at ¶¶ 8-13 (attesting that he has “completed transition” and been “actively working with [his] recruiter to enlist in the Army”). If the Mattis Implementation Plan takes effect, these individuals will be barred from military service because they have undergone gender transition. Being barred from service is clearly an “injury in fact” sufficient to give these Plaintiffs standing. See Doe 1, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 203 (explaining in Court’s prior Opinion that Plaintiffs have standing due to the “substantial risk that they will be denied accession or discharged from the military due to their transgender status”).
Defendants argue that the Mattis Implementation Plan deprives these Plaintiffs of standing because (if they rush to enlist) they can still join the military while this Court’s preliminary injunction is in effect and the Mattis Implementation Plan is not allowed to be implemented. See Defs.’ Mem. at 12-13. Distilled to its essence, Defendants’ argument is that because transgender service members who enlist before the Mattis Implementation Plan goes into effect will be allowed to remain in the military under the plan’s grandfather provision, Plaintiffs can and
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should enlist now to avoid any harm. Id. If Plaintiffs do not enlist right now while the preliminary injunction is in effect and take advantage of the grandfather provision, their harm is self-inflicted. Id. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot manufacture standing based on “selfinflicted” harm. Id.
This argument is based on a misunderstanding of the Court’s standing analysis. Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of the policies realized in the Mattis Implementation Plan, which Defendants are prepared to implement. Those policies, and that plan in particular, are not yet in effect, but only because the Court granted Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction in this case, not because Defendants have decided to allow Plaintiffs to enlist as transgender military personnel during this period. All indications suggest that the Defendants have every intention of enforcing the plan as soon as they are no longer enjoined from doing so and, in fact, Defendants have moved this Court and other courts to dissolve injunctions so that they can accomplish that goal. That the plan does not harm Plaintiffs so long as the preliminary injunction is in force, of course, does not mean that Plaintiffs lack standing. To assess whether Plaintiffs have standing, the Court must determine whether that plan would harm them if the Court lifted its injunction and allowed the plan to go into effect. There is no dispute that if the Court did so, Jane Doe 7 and John Doe 2 would be barred from military service by the Mattis Implementation Plan. Accordingly, they have standing.7
Moreover, even if these Plaintiffs did rush to enlist in the military while this Court’s injunction was in place and therefore fell into the Mattis Implementation Plan’s grandfather
7 Moreover, the very fact that these Plaintiffs are required to enlist in the military immediately, while the Court’s preliminary injunction remains in effect, or be forever banned, is a sufficient injury to confer standing. These Plaintiffs are harmed by such a “now-or-never” requirement because it subjects them to a barrier on their entry into the military that their competitors are not subject to.
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provision, they would still be subject to the same stigmatic and career-damaging injuries that afflict those Plaintiffs who are current service members who have been diagnosed with gender dysphoria.
Finally, Defendants argue that, even assuming that the Mattis Implementation Plan has taken effect, and thus Jane Doe 7 and John Doe 2 are barred from military service, there would still be no injury because these Plaintiffs “would not be personally denied equal treatment.” Defs.’ Reply at 15. This is so, Defendants argue, because Plaintiffs “have not shown that they would be treated differently than any other individual who seeks to join the military with a preexisting medical condition.” Id. This argument “concerns the merits rather than the justiciability of plaintiffs’ claims.” Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2416 (2018). It has no relevance to the Court’s assessment of standing. When assessing standing, the Court assumes that the challenged policies in fact violate equal protection. Schnitzler v. United States, 761 F.3d 33, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“[T]he Supreme Court has made clear that when considering whether a plaintiff has Article III standing, a federal court must assume arguendo the merits of his or her legal claim.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).8
iii. Current Service Member Without a Diagnosis of Gender Dysphoria Jane Doe 6 is a current service member who does not yet have a diagnosis of gender
dysphoria. Jane Doe 6 had made a behavioral health appointment to obtain a transition plan and begin her gender transition, but—for obvious reasons—aborted that effort when President Trump tweeted that transgender individuals would not be permitted to serve. After that, Jane Doe 6 has
8 Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs who are prospective service members lack standing because, even though they are generally prohibited from acceding under the Mattis Implementation Plan, they may seek waivers from the policy. See Defs.’ Mem. at 12 n.4. The Court already explained in its October 30, 2017 Memorandum Opinion why the hypothetical potential for waivers does not divest Plaintiffs of standing. See Doe 1, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 201.
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not disclosed her transgender identity and has not received a military diagnosis of gender dysphoria because she is afraid that she will be discharged. Because she has not yet received a diagnosis of gender dysphoria, Jane Doe 6 would face discharge under the Mattis Implementation Plan if she sought such a diagnosis after the plan took effect.
As with Jane Doe 7 and John Doe 2, Defendants argue that the Mattis Implementation Plan has alleviated any harm Jane Doe 6 might have suffered under the President’s 2017 directives. Defendants claim that if Jane Doe 6 seeks a diagnosis of gender dysphoria from a military doctor while this Court’s preliminary injunction is still in place and the Mattis Implementation Plan has not yet gone into effect, she will be able to continue to serve under the plan’s grandfather provision. Defs.’ Reply at 14-15. Again, the Court rejects the logic of this argument. The Court asks whether the Mattis Implementation Plan, if allowed to go into effect, would harm Jane Doe 6. The answer is clear: it would. It would subject her to discharge if she sought a diagnosis of gender dysphoria and gender transition therapy.
Moreover, even if Jane Doe 6 were to obtain a diagnosis prior to the implementation of the plan and therefore fall within the grandfather provision, she would still be subject to the same stigmatic and career-damaging injuries that afflict those Plaintiffs who are current service members who have been diagnosed with gender dysphoria. Jane Doe 6 does not lack standing simply because she has the option of either remaining in the military and disavowing her identity as a transgender person, or coming out and serving as a member of an officially branded inferior class of service members. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 129 (2007) (holding that where a plaintiff “eliminated the imminent threat of harm by simply not doing what he claimed the right to do,” the court still had “subject-matter jurisdiction because the threateliminating behavior was effectively coerced”).
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iv. Dylan Kohere Finally, Plaintiff Dylan Kohere—who is transgender and has begun working with medical
professionals on a treatment plan for transition—has standing. Kohere is barred from joining his university’s ROTC program and ultimately will not be allowed to accede into the military. As the D.C. Circuit has already acknowledged, Kohere is injured by a policy that prevents him from acceding if for no other reason than because “inability to accede in the future . . . disqualifies [him] from educational opportunities now.” Doe 1, 2017 WL 6553389, at *3.
Defendants argue that Kohere now lacks standing because “since DoD’s policy was announced in March 2018, Mr. Kohere has failed to respond to any of the cadre’s multiple requests to discuss his enrollment in ROTC and did not register for any ROTC classes in the upcoming fall semester,” nor did he apply for a scholarship. Defs.’ Reply at 17. In other words, Defendants appear to be implying that Kohere lacks standing because he is no longer interested in pursuing a military career. The Court is not convinced. Kohere has attested that his goal is “to spend [his] entire career in the military.” Decl. of Dylan Kohere, ECF No. 13-15, ¶ 2. The Mattis Implementation Plan would prevent him from doing so and deprive him of educational opportunities. This is enough to establish his standing.9
Finally, Defendants also argue that “[f]ar from being ‘categorically barred because he is transgender’ . . . under the new policy, Mr. Kohere would be allowed to serve in his biological sex.” Defs.’ Reply at 16. This argument misses the point. Mr. Kohere is transgender. That means that he does not identify with his biological sex. To serve in his biological sex would be to suppress his identity. To do so would be a harm in and of itself, sufficient to confer standing.
9 As with the Plaintiffs discussed above, the fact that Kohere could fall within the Mattis Implementation Plan’s grandfather provision does not change this analysis.
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The fact that a plaintiff can avoid the effect of a discriminatory policy by renouncing the characteristic that leads to the discrimination in the first place does not mean that the plaintiff lacks standing.
* * * In sum, each Plaintiff that remains in this case continues to have standing, despite the issuance of the 2018 Presidential Memorandum, the Mattis Implementation Plan, and the Panel Report. Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of standing will be denied. 2. Mootness Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed as moot. Defendants’ mootness argument reduces to the following points: Plaintiffs’ lawsuit challenges President Trump’s 2017 policy of banning transgender military service. The Mattis Implementation Plan does not completely ban transgender military service. It is instead a “new policy” that is distinct from the policy directives announced by President Trump in 2017. Because Defendants are no longer attempting to implement the challenged policy, Plaintiffs’ suit is now moot. The Supreme Court has commanded that a party asserting mootness through cessation of challenged conduct carries a “heavy burden.” Hardaway v. D.C. Hous. Auth., 843 F.3d 973, 980 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000)). Defendants have not satisfied their burden here. The Court begins by noting that even if it were to accept Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs’ challenge to the President’s 2017 directives is moot, Plaintiffs’ lawsuit would not be dismissed in its entirety. Plaintiffs have recently amended their complaint to challenge the Mattis Implementation Plan, and that challenge is clearly still live. “[W]hen a plaintiff files a complaint in federal court and then voluntarily amends the complaint, courts look to the
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amended complaint to determine jurisdiction.” Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 473-74 (2007). Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint alleges that the Mattis Implementation Plan “expressly targets transgender individuals,” “prevents transgender individuals from serving consistent with their gender identity,” and violates the Fifth Amendment. Pls.’ 2d Am. Compl., ECF No. 106, at ¶¶ 86, 87, 92, 97. Accordingly, even if the Court were to accept Defendants’ arguments regarding claims focused on the President’s 2017 directives, Plaintiffs’ lawsuit would not be moot to the extent that it challenges the Mattis Implementation Plan.
Regardless, the Court does not accept Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs’ challenge to the President’s 2017 directives is moot. This argument attempts to draw artificial and unwarranted boundaries between the various policy pronouncements in this case. As explained above, Defendants’ mootness argument is based upon the premise that the Mattis Implementation Plan is a new and different policy than the one announced by President Trump in 2017. But Defendants have not demonstrated that this is the case in any meaningful way. To the contrary, the Mattis Implementation Plan appears to be just that—an implementation plan. The plan implements the President’s 2017 directives that the military not allow transgender individuals to serve in the military.
The Court reaches this conclusion for three basic reasons. First, a plan to implement a policy prohibiting transgender military service is precisely what the President ordered be submitted to him by February 2018 in his 2017 Presidential Memorandum. Second, over the months following the issuance of the 2017 Presidential Memorandum, Department of Defense officials repeatedly stated that they were preparing such an implementation plan. And third, the
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Mattis Implementation Plan was provided to the President in February 2018, and it in fact prohibits transgender military service.
First, the 2017 Presidential Memorandum directed the Department of Defense to submit, by February 2018, a plan to implement the President’s directives that transgender service be prohibited. It did not ask for the submission of a “new policy” on transgender service. In the 2017 Presidential Memorandum, the President directed the military to return to a policy under which: (i) transgender individuals are generally prohibited from accession and (ii) the military is authorized to discharge individuals who are transgender. The 2017 Presidential Memorandum ordered the Secretary of Defense to prepare an “implementation plan” that was circumscribed to suggestions about how to “implement a policy under which transgender accession is prohibited, and discharge of transgender service members is authorized.” Doe 1, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 195. It is clear from the 2017 Presidential Memorandum that the “implementation plan” requested by the President was required to “prohibit transgender accession and authorize the discharge of transgender service members.” Id. The plan was not intended to be a proposal for a “new policy” that allowed transgender service. See Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17-1297-MJP, 2018 WL 1784464, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 13, 2018) (“The 2017 Memorandum did not direct Secretary Mattis to determine whether or not the directives should be implemented, but instead ordered the directives to be implemented by specific dates and requested a plan for how to do so.”) (emphasis in original).
Second, the actions and statements of Secretary Mattis, and the Department of Defense generally, during the time between the issuance of the 2017 Presidential Memorandum and the Mattis Implementation Plan indicate that the plan being developed was not a “new one” to propose to President Trump, but instead simply one to implement President Trump’s 2017 policy
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directives. In an August 29, 2017 Statement, Secretary Mattis stated that the Department of Defense had “received the [2017] Presidential Memorandum” and would “carry out the president’s policy direction.” Milgroom Decl., Ex. U. He further stated that he would establish a panel of experts not to consider “new policies,” but instead simply “to provide advice and recommendations on the implementation of the president’s direction.” Id. (emphasis added). After the “panel reports its recommendations and following . . . consultation with the secretary of Homeland Security,” Secretary Mattis stated that he would “provide [his] advice to the president concerning implementation of his policy direction.” Id. (emphasis added); see also Doe 1, 2017 WL 6553389, at *2 (noting that “the Secretary’s August 29, 2017 statement makes clear that his actions are being undertaken to ‘carry out the president’s policy direction’”).
In a September 14, 2017 document entitled “Military Service by Transgender Individuals – Interim Guidance,” Secretary Mattis again stated that he would present the President with a “plan to implement the policy and directives in the [2017] Presidential Memorandum.” Milgroom Decl., Ex. W, at 1 (emphasis added). The Interim Guidance further stated that the Department of Defense would “carry out the President’s policy and directives” and would “comply with the [2017] Presidential Memorandum.” Id. (emphasis added). A separate document issued to direct the implementation process stated that Secretary Mattis had convened a panel to “develop[ ] an Implementation Plan on military service by transgender individuals, to effect the policy and directives of the Presidential Memorandum.” Milgroom Decl., Ex. X, at 1 (emphasis added). That document further acknowledges that the Department was required to “return to the longstanding policy and practice on military service by transgender individuals that was in place prior to June 2016,” that is, the general prohibition on transgender service. Id. at 2. It stated that the Department had been “direct[ed]” to prohibit accession by transgender
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individuals and asked the panel of experts merely how the “guidelines” for such a policy should be updated “to reflect currently accepted medical terminology.” Id. Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Anthony M. Kurta, also issued a memorandum in September 2017 that stated that the Department had convened a panel of experts “to support the . . . development of an Implementation Plan on military service by transgender individuals.” Milgroom Decl., Ex. Y.10
Third, and most importantly, the Mattis Implementation Plan in fact prohibits transgender military service—just as President Trump’s 2017 directives ordered. It is true that the plan takes a slightly less direct approach to accomplishing this goal than the President’s 2017 tweet and memorandum. Instead of expressly banning all “transgender individuals” from military service, the Mattis Implementation Plan works by absolutely disqualifying individuals who require or have undergone gender transition, generally disqualifying individuals with a history or diagnosis of gender dysphoria, and, to the extent that there are any individuals who identify as “transgender” but do not fall under the first two categories, only allowing them to serve “in their biological sex” (which means that openly transgender persons are generally not allowed to serve in conformance with their identity).
But it is not at all surprising that an implementation plan, crafted over the course of months (clearly with assistance from lawyers and an eye to pending litigation) is a longer, more nuanced expression of the President’s policy direction than the brief, blanket assertions made by the President himself in 2017. To determine whether Plaintiffs’ claims are moot, the Court must
10 Defendants cite statements from Secretary Mattis about the “independence” of the process that led to the creation of the Mattis Implementation Plan, but the context suggests that such “independence” related to how, not whether, to implement the President’s policy directives.
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look past these surface-level differences and ask whether, in effect, the Mattis Implementation Plan accomplishes the President’s policy that is challenged in this case.
The Court concludes that the Mattis Implementation Plan does just that: it prevents service by transgender individuals. The plan succeeds at doing so in part by prohibiting individuals with traits associated with being transgender: those with “gender dysphoria” and who have undergone or require “gender transition.” In addition, although the plan purports to allow some transgender individuals (those without a diagnosis of gender dysphoria or who have not undergone or require gender transition) to serve in the military under certain narrow circumstances, even this purported allowance is illusory. Under the Mattis Implementation Plan, those transgender persons who are not summarily banned are only allowed in the military if they serve in their biological sex. But by definition—at least the definition relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims in this lawsuit—transgender persons do not identify or live in accord with their biological sex. Accordingly, the Mattis Implementation Plan effectively translates into a ban on transgender persons in the military. Tolerating a person with a certain characteristic only on the condition that they renounce that characteristic is the same as not tolerating them at all.11 As Plaintiffs correctly argue, “[j]ust as a policy allowing Muslims to serve in the military if they
11 Defendants argue that forcing all transgender service members to live in accordance with their biological sex is not the same as a ban on transgender service members because not all transgender individuals choose to come out as such and “live and work in accordance with [their] identity.” Defs.’ Reply at 21. That this would be the case is not at all surprising, and certainly does not demonstrate that Defendants’ policy is not a ban on transgender service members. Decisions about whether and when to admit one’s transgender identity and initiate the process of gender transition are presumably affected by many factors, including career considerations, medical considerations, and fear of discrimination. Service members in particular might reasonably choose to delay due to upcoming deployments or other opportunities. That not all transgender service members have openly admitted to their status as such and sought to live in accordance with their gender identities by personal choice does not mean that an official policy forbidding them from doing so is not discriminatory.
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renounce their Muslim faith would be a ban of military service by Muslims, a policy requiring transgender individuals to serve in their birth sex is a ban on transgender service.” Pls.’ Opp’n at 10 (emphasis in original); see also Karnoski, 2018 WL 1784464, at *6 (“Requiring transgender people to serve in their ‘biological sex’ does not constitute ‘open’ service in any meaningful way, and cannot reasonably be considered an ‘exception’ to the Ban. Rather, it would force transgender service members to suppress the very characteristic that defines them as transgender in the first place.”). Accordingly, despite superficial differences between it and the President’s 2017 directives, the Mattis Implementation Plan essentially effectuates the policy announced by President Trump in 2017: the banning of military service by transgender individuals. It accordingly does not moot Plaintiffs’ claims. See Glob. Tel*Link v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 866 F.3d 397, 413-14 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“replacing the challenged law ‘with one that differs only in some insignificant respect’ and ‘disadvantages [petitioners] in the same fundamental way’ does not moot the underlying challenge”) (quoting Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 662 (1993)).12
Finally, Defendants repeatedly argue that the 2017 Presidential Memorandum has been “revoked.” Even if the Court were to favor form over substance and accept this as an accurate description of what has genuinely occurred, it would not alone be enough to warrant a finding of mootness. As Defendants argue, “[w]hen a law is repealed and replaced, the relevant question is ‘whether the new [policy] is sufficiently similar to the repealed [one] that it is permissible to say
12 Defendants argue that the Mattis Implementation Plan is similar to the currently operative policy on transgender service. See, e.g., Defs.’ Reply at 1. The Court disagrees. Any similarities Defendants are able to find between the policies are red herrings. The policies are fundamentally different because one allows transgender individuals to serve in accordance with their gender identity, and the other does not (with the exception of a small group of individuals who will be allowed to remain in the armed forces under a grandfather provision).
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that the challenged conduct continues,’ or, put differently, whether the policy ‘has been
sufficiently altered so as to present a substantially different controversy from the one . . .
originally decided.’” Defs.’ Mot. at 4 (quoting Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors
of Am., 508 U.S. at 662 n.3). Even assuming that the 2017 Presidential Memorandum has been
“revoked,” and the Mattis Implementation Plan could be viewed as a “new policy,” at the very
least, the new plan is sufficiently “similar” to the President’s 2017 directives that Plaintiffs’
claims are not moot. As already discussed, like the 2017 Presidential Memorandum, the Mattis
Implementation Plan generally bars service by transgender individuals.13
* * *
In sum, whatever legal relevance the Mattis Implementation Plan and associated
documents might have, they are not sufficiently divorced from, or different than, the President’s
2017 directives such that Plaintiffs’ claims are now moot.14
13 Defendants argue that the voluntary cessation doctrine does not apply to them. Defs.’ Mem. at 3. This argument does not survive scrutiny for two reasons. First, because the Court finds that the Mattis Implementation Plan is simply a plan that implements the Presidential directives that were already at issue in this case, the challenged conduct simply has not ceased, and the Court need not rely on the voluntary cessation doctrine. Second, the Court is not persuaded that the Defendants in this case—various Executive Branch departments and officials—are all immune from the doctrine. In a separate Memorandum Opinion and Order issued today, the Court has dismissed the President as a party from this case. Accordingly, at most, the Court would be applying the voluntarily cessation doctrine to lower Executive Branch officials. Defendants have not brought to the Court’s attention any cases that hold that the voluntary cessation doctrine does not apply to such defendants. See Defs.’ Mem. at 3 (citing only Clarke v. United States, 915 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1990), which relates to Congress, not Executive Branch departments or officials). As indicated by the facts of this very case, the Executive Branch is able to change military policies back and forth with relative ease and speed, giving rise to the concerns that animate the voluntary cessation doctrine.
14 To the extent Defendants revive their motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim in this case, that motion is DENIED. The Court already explained in detail why Plaintiffs’ claims were likely meritorious in its October 30, 2017 Memorandum Opinion, and thus not subject to dismissal on the pleadings. See Doe 1, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 205, 207-215. For the same reasons that the Mattis
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3. Motion to Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction Finally, as the discussion above has likely already made clear, the Court will not dissolve its preliminary injunction. It is true that a preliminary injunction “may be dissolved where, for instance, changed circumstances eviscerate the justification therefor.” S.E.C. v. Vision Commc’ns, Inc., No. CIV. A. 94-0615 CRR, 1995 WL 109037, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 6, 1995). However, the party seeking relief from an injunction bears the burden of establishing that changed circumstances warrant relief. See Am. Council of the Blind v. Mnuchin, 878 F.3d 360, 366 (D.C. Cir. 2017). The Court is not persuaded that the circumstances of this case have in fact genuinely changed in such a way that the Court’s preliminary injunction is no longer warranted.15 Like Defendants’ mootness argument, the basic premise of Defendants’ argument in support of dissolving the preliminary injunction is that the Mattis Implementation Plan is a “new policy” that does not implement the 2017 directives that were preliminarily enjoined by this Court. For the reasons already set forth above, Defendants have not persuaded the Court that this is the case. Instead, the Court finds that the Mattis Implementation Plan effectively implements the policy directives that were already at issue when the Court’s preliminary injunction was ordered. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ challenge to those directives is not moot, and the need remains intact for the Court’s preliminary injunction maintaining the status quo ante until the final resolution of this case on the merits.
Implementation Plan does not moot Plaintiffs’ claims, it also does not mean that their allegations now fail to state a claim. 15 Defendants argue, yet again, that the Court’s injunction should be dissolved insofar as it applies to anyone other than the Plaintiffs in this case. The Court has already rejected this argument, see Dec. 11, 2017 Order, ECF No. 75, at 7, and rejects it now for the same reasons.
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The only material development that has occurred since the Court’s preliminary injunction was issued is that the Defendants have prepared a plan to implement the enjoined directives, and a report that purportedly provides support for that plan. These developments do not change the Court’s conclusion on any of the preliminary injunction factors.
On the merits, the Mattis Implementation Plan still accomplishes an extremely broad prohibition on military service by transgender individuals that appears to be divorced from any transgender individual’s actual ability to serve. In the absence of the challenged policy, transgender individuals are subject to all of the same standards and requirements for accession and retention as any other service member. The Mattis Implementation Plan establishes a special additional exclusionary rule that precludes individuals who would otherwise satisfy the demanding standards applicable to all service members simply because they have certain traits that are associated with being transgender. Moreover, because the plan fundamentally implements the policy directives set forth by the President in 2017, the unusual factors associated with the issuance of the 2017 directives are still relevant. For example, the Court is still concerned that, immediately prior to the announcement of the 2017 Presidential directives, the military had studied the issue and found no reason to exclude transgender service members. The Court is likewise still concerned that the President’s 2017 directives constituted an abrupt reversal in policy, and a revocation of rights, announced without any of the formality, deliberative process, or factual support usually associated with such a significant action. Although it makes no final ruling on the merits in this Memorandum Opinion, the Court is not convinced at this stage that the processes implemented by Defendants after President Trump’s 2017 Presidential Memorandum, and the memoranda that they have issued since that time, resolve the constitutional issues that persuaded the Court that a preliminary injunction was
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warranted in the first place. Based on the record before the Court, these post hoc processes and rationales appear to have been constrained by, and not truly independent from, the President’s initial policy decisions.
With regard to irreparable injury, Defendants argue again that the Mattis Implementation Plan protects Plaintiffs from any injury. The Court has already rejected those arguments. If the Court were to dissolve its injunction and allow the Mattis Implementation Plan to go into effect, Plaintiffs would suffer very real harms. Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs will not be irreparably injured if the Court dissolves its preliminary injunction because other courts have since issued injunctions that are still in place. The Court rejects this argument as well. The fact that other courts16 have similarly concluded that Defendants’ policy is likely unconstitutional and warrants being preliminarily enjoined is no reason for this Court to lift its own injunction. This is especially so given that Defendants have moved to dissolve those preliminary injunctions, and have appealed the decision of the first court to deny such a motion. Finally, the Court’s assessment of the balance of equities and public interest in its preliminary injunction Opinion still stands. It should not be forgotten that the United States military remains engaged in numerous armed conflicts throughout the world, and service members are still being injured and killed in those conflicts. The public interest and equities lie with allowing young men and women who are qualified and willing to serve our Nation to do so.
In short, because the Mattis Implementation Plan would effectively implement the very policies preliminarily enjoined by the Court, the development of that plan is not a reason to dissolve that injunction. To avoid any possible need for clarification, the Court states expressly:
16 See Karnoski v. Trump, No. 17-cv-1297-MJP (W.D. Wash.); Stone v. Trump, No. 17-cv-2459GLR (D. Md.); Stockman v. Trump, 17-cv-1799-JGB (C.D. Cal).
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IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on standing and mootness grounds is DENIED. Defendants’ Motion to Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction is also DENIED. The Court has made no final ruling on the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims. It has simply held that all Plaintiffs still have standing to pursue their claims, this case is not moot, and there are no changed circumstances that justify dissolving the preliminary injunction. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
/s/ COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY United States District Judge
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JANE DOE 2, et al., Plaintiffs v.
JAMES N. MATTIS, et al., Defendants

Civil Action No. 17-1597 (CKK)

MEMORANDUM OPINION (August 24, 2018)
On July 26, 2017, President Donald J. Trump issued a statement via Twitter announcing that “the United States Government will not accept or allow transgender individuals to serve in any capacity in the U.S. Military.” A formal Presidential Memorandum followed on August 25, 2017. Before the 2017 Presidential Memorandum, the Department of Defense had announced that openly transgender individuals would be allowed to enlist in the military, effective January 1, 2018, and had prohibited the discharge of service members based solely on their gender identities. The 2017 Presidential Memorandum reversed these policies. It indefinitely extended the prohibition against transgender individuals entering the military (a process formally referred to as “accession”), and required the military to authorize the discharge of transgender service members. The President ordered Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis to submit a plan for implementing the policy directives of the 2017 Presidential Memorandum by February 2018. Plaintiffs filed suit and sought preliminary injunctive relief, which the Court granted.
Currently pending before the Court are Defendants’ [115] Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint or, in the Alternative, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, and Plaintiffs’ [131] Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order denying Defendants’ Motion to the extent that it sought the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims on mootness and standing grounds. As an alternative form of relief,
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Defendants’ Motion also seeks summary judgment. Plaintiffs oppose Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and have filed their own cross-motion for summary judgment. However, Plaintiffs also ask this Court to defer ruling on summary judgment because Plaintiffs have not been able to conclude the discovery process to develop a record, due to Defendants’ overly broad assertions of privilege.
Upon consideration of the pleadings,1 the relevant legal authorities, and the record as a whole, the Court DENIES both parties’ motions for summary judgment. Defendants claim that their decisions regarding transgender military service are owed great deference because they are the product of extensive deliberation, study and review. However, at the same time, Defendants have withheld information concerning this deliberation, study and review from Plaintiffs. As a result, there undeniably are factual disputes in this case. Among other areas of dispute, the parties disagree about the nature of the process that resulted in the challenged policies. The facts about that process are clearly material. They affect the threshold question that the Court must answer before assessing the constitutionality of Defendants’ policy: what level of scrutiny the Court should apply. Because genuine disputes of material fact exist, summary judgment for either party cannot be entered. Instead, the Court will grant Plaintiffs’ request to continue with discovery.
1 The Court’s consideration has focused on the following documents: • Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss Pls.’ 2d Am. Compl., or, in the Alternative, Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 115 (“Defs.’ Mem.”); • Pls.’ Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. and Cross-Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 131-1 (“Pls.’ Opp’n and Cross-Mot.”); • Defs.’ Reply in Supp. of their Mot. to Dismiss Pls.’ 2d Am. Compl., or, in the Alternative, for Summ. J., and Opp’n to Pls.’ Cross-Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 138 (“Defs.’ Reply”); and • Pls.’ Reply in Support of their Cross-Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 149 (“Pls.’ Reply”).
In an exercise of its discretion, the Court finds that holding oral argument in this action would not be of assistance in rendering a decision. See LCvR 7(f).
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I. BACKGROUND Plaintiffs are current and aspiring transgender service members. Many have years of experience in the military. Some have decades. They have been deployed on active duty in Iraq and Afghanistan. They have and continue to serve with distinction. All fear that the directives of the 2017 Presidential Memorandum will have devastating impacts on their careers and their families. Accordingly, they filed this lawsuit challenging those directives and moved this Court to enjoin the implementation of the 2017 Presidential Memorandum. They claimed that the President’s directives violate the fundamental guarantees of due process afforded by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. On October 30, 2017, the Court issued a preliminary injunction in this case. The Court found that Plaintiffs had standing and were likely to succeed on their Fifth Amendment claim. The Court concluded that, as a form of government action that classifies people based on their gender identity, and disfavors a class of historically persecuted and politically powerless individuals, the President’s directives were subject to heightened scrutiny. Plaintiffs claimed that the President’s directives could not survive such scrutiny because they were not genuinely based on legitimate concerns regarding military effectiveness or budget constraints, but were instead driven by a desire to express disapproval of transgender people generally. The Court found that a number of factors—including the breadth of the exclusion ordered by the directives, the unusual circumstances surrounding the President’s announcement of them, the fact that the reasons given for them did not appear to be supported by any facts, and the recent rejection of those reasons by the military itself—strongly suggested that Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment claim was meritorious. Accordingly, the Court enjoined Defendants from enforcing the President’s directives. The effect of the Court’s preliminary injunction was to revert to the status quo ante
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with regard to accession and retention that existed before the issuance of the 2017 Presidential Memorandum.
Defendants appealed, see Defs.’ Notice of Appeal, ECF No. 66, and moved this Court to stay the portion of its preliminary injunction that required Defendants to begin accepting transgender individuals into the military on January 1, 2018, see Defs.’ Mot. for Partial Stay of Prelim. Inj. Pending Appeal, ECF No. 73. On December 11, 2017, the Court denied Defendants’ motion to stay. See Dec. 11, 2017 Order, ECF No. 75.
Defendants then sought the same relief from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”). On December 22, 2017, the D.C. Circuit denied Defendants’ motion to stay this Court’s preliminary injunction. See Doe 1 v. Trump, No. 175267, 2017 WL 6553389 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 2017). The D.C. Circuit concluded that Defendants had not demonstrated that they had a strong likelihood of success on appeal, that they would be irreparably harmed absent a stay, or that the stay would not harm the other parties to the proceeding. Id. The D.C. Circuit explained that “in the balancing of equities, it must be remembered that all Plaintiffs seek during this litigation is to serve their Nation with honor and dignity, volunteering to face extreme hardships, to endure lengthy deployments and separation from family and friends, and to willingly make the ultimate sacrifice of their lives if necessary to protect the Nation, the people of the United States, and the Constitution against all who would attack them.” Id. at *3. After the D.C. Circuit’s opinion was issued, Defendants voluntarily dismissed their appeal of this Court’s preliminary injunction. The military began permitting openly transgender individuals to accede on January 1, 2018.
This case then moved forward into the discovery stage. Defendants strenuously resisted engaging in discovery. As noted above, the 2017 Presidential Memorandum had called for the
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Secretary of Defense to submit a plan to implement the President’s policy directives by February 2018. Defendants repeatedly argued that discovery should be halted until that plan was submitted. Defendants even argued at one point that Plaintiffs were not entitled to discovery in this case at all. The Court repeatedly rejected Defendants’ arguments and ordered Defendants to cooperate with discovery so that this case could move forward efficiently toward an ultimate resolution on the merits. Despite the Court’s orders, discovery remains unfinished because Defendants have asserted that a substantial portion of the documents and information sought by Plaintiffs are privileged (pursuant to the deliberative process privilege and the presidential communications privilege), and the parties’ disputes about these assertions of privilege remain outstanding.
In related cases throughout the country, Defendants’ assertions of privilege have not fared well. The courts in Karnoski v. Trump, No. 17-cv-1297-MJP (W.D. Wash.) and Stone v. Trump, No. 17-cv-2459-GLR (D. Md.) have recently rejected Defendants’ arguments and ordered Defendants to produce much of the discovery that they have withheld.
In February 2018, as ordered by the 2017 Presidential Memorandum, Secretary of Defense Mattis presented a memorandum to the President that proposed a policy to effectively prevent transgender military service. See Defs.’ Mot. to Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction, Ex. 1, ECF No. 96-1 (hereinafter, the “Mattis Implementation Plan”). The Mattis Implementation Plan, unlike the President’s 2017 tweet and memorandum, purports not to be a blanket ban on all “transgender individuals.” However, the plan effectively implements such a ban by targeting proxies of transgender status, such as “gender dysphoria” and “gender transition,” and by requiring all service members to serve “in their biological sex.” Based on the conclusion “that there are substantial risks associated with allowing the accession and retention of individuals
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with a history or diagnosis of gender dysphoria and require, or have already undertaken, a course

of treatment to change their gender,” Mattis Implementation Plan at 2, the Mattis Implementation

Plan proposes the following policies:

• Transgender persons with a history or diagnosis of gender dysphoria are disqualified from military service, except under the following limited circumstances: (1) if they have been stable for 36 consecutive months in their biological sex prior to accession; (2) Service members diagnosed with gender dysphoria after entering into service may be retained if they do not require a change of gender and remain deployable within applicable retention standards; and (3) currently serving Service members who have been diagnosed with gender dysphoria since the previous administration’s policy took effect and prior to the effective date of this new policy, may continue to serve in their preferred gender and receive medically necessary treatment for gender dysphoria.

• Transgender persons who require or have undergone gender transition are disqualified from military service.

Id. at 2-3.

• Transgender persons without a history or diagnosis of gender dysphoria, who are otherwise qualified for service, may serve, like all other Service members, in their biological sex.

To summarize: under the Mattis Implementation Plan, individuals who require or have

undergone gender transition are absolutely disqualified from military service; individuals with a

history or diagnosis of gender dysphoria are largely disqualified from military service; and, to

the extent that there are any individuals who identify as “transgender” but do not fall under the

first two categories, they may serve, but only “in their biological sex.” By definition,

transgender persons do not identify or live in accord with their biological sex, which means that

the result of the Mattis Implementation Plan is that transgender individuals are generally not

allowed to serve openly in the military. There is only one narrow class of transgender

individuals who are allowed to serve as openly transgender under the Mattis Implementation

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Plan. Pursuant to a “grandfather provision,” those “currently serving Service members who have been diagnosed with gender dysphoria since the previous administration’s policy took effect and prior to the effective date of” the policy set forth in the Mattis Implementation Plan, may continue to serve in their preferred gender.
The reasoning underlying the Mattis Implementation Plan is spelled out in a second memorandum that was sent from the Department of Defense to the President in February 2018. See Defs.’ Mot. to Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction, Ex. 2, ECF No. 96-2 (hereinafter, the “Panel Report”). Like the Mattis Implementation Plan, the Panel Report carefully avoids categorical language banning all transgender individuals. Instead, the document speaks in terms of individuals with “gender dysphoria” and those who have undergone or will require “gender transition” (both of which, again, are proxies for transgender status). Generally speaking, the Panel Report concludes that individuals with gender dysphoria or who have undergone or will require gender transition undermine the military. According to the report, these service members are fundamentally incompatible with the military’s mental health standards, physical health standards, and sex-based standards. The report suggests that they are a detriment to military readiness and unit cohesion. It likens gender dysphoria to conditions such as “bipolar disorder, personality disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, suicidal behavior, and even body dysmorphic disorder.” Panel Report at 20. It concludes that individuals with gender dysphoria or who have undergone or will require gender transition are more likely to have other mental health conditions and substance abuse problems, and to commit suicide. Id. at 21. The Panel Report also states that these individuals impose “disproportionate costs” on the military. Id. at 41. For the most part, in lieu of affirmative evidence, the Panel Report repeatedly cites “uncertainty” in the medical field about these individuals as a reason to urge that the military
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“proceed with caution.” Id. at 6. Although not necessary to the outcome of this particular Memorandum Opinion, it is worth noting that these conclusions were immediately denounced by the American Psychological Association and the American Medical Association. See Decl. of Lauren Godles Milgroom, ECF No. 128 (“Milgroom Decl.”), Exs. GG, HH.
On March 23, 2018, Defendants filed a Notice informing the Court that President Trump had issued a second memorandum on military service by transgender individuals. See Defs.’ Notice, ECF No. 95. In the 2018 Presidential Memorandum, the President stated that he “revokes” his 2017 Presidential Memorandum, “and any other directive [he] may have made with respect to military service by transgender individuals.” Id. at 1. The President ordered that “[t]he Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, with respect to the U.S. Coast Guard, may exercise their authority to implement any appropriate policies concerning military service by transgender individuals.” Id. To be clear, as has just been laid out, the “appropriate policies” that the Secretaries intended to implement had already been developed and proposed to the President at the time he issued this memorandum.
The events described above sparked a great debate between the parties as to the future of this case, and prompted the filing of numerous motions. First, Defendants moved to dismiss and to dissolve the preliminary injunction on the grounds that the Mattis Implementation Plan has changed the circumstances of this case. Defendants argued that the Mattis Implementation Plan represents a “new policy” divorced and distinct from the President’s 2017 policy directives that were previously enjoined by this Court. They also argued that the Mattis Implementation Plan does not harm the Plaintiffs in this case. Accordingly, Defendants sought the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint for lack of jurisdiction because Plaintiffs lack standing and because their claims are moot. For largely the same reasons, Defendants also argued that the
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Court’s preliminary injunction should be dissolved. On August 6, 2018, the Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order rejecting these arguments and denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint and Defendants’ Motion to Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction. See Doe 2 v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 474 (D.D.C. 2018).
Defendants have also moved for summary judgment. A major premise of Defendants’ summary judgment argument is their contention that the Court should defer to Defendants’ assessment about transgender military service because it was the product of a careful, independent examination of this issue. Plaintiffs oppose Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and have also filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. However, citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d), Plaintiffs also ask this Court to defer ruling on the parties’ crossmotions “[i]f the Court determines that resolution of the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment turns on whether or not the process that resulted in the Mattis Plan and the Panel Report reflected independent military judgment.” Pls.’ Opp’n and Cross-Mot. at 18 n.5. This is because, according to Plaintiffs, “Defendants have objected to virtually all discovery requests seeking evidence concerning whether, as a factual matter, the review process was an exercise of independent judgment.” Id. Accordingly, “Plaintiffs seek the opportunity to complete fact discovery.” Id.
The Court’s August 6, 2018 Memorandum Opinion and Order left the parties’ crossmotions for summary judgment unresolved. This Memorandum Opinion now addresses those motions. The Court DENIES both motions for summary judgment because genuine disputes of material fact remain. The parties dispute the facts related to the process used by Defendants to prepare the current proposed policy on transgender military service. Those facts are material because they affect the degree of deference owed by this Court to Defendants’ policy decisions,
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and the level of scrutiny this Court will apply to the challenged policy. The Court does not mean to imply that these are the only genuine disputes of material fact that remain in this case. But the existence of these disputes alone is sufficient to render summary judgment inappropriate. Accordingly, instead of summarily adjudicating this case, the Court will allow the parties to continue to engage in discovery.
II. LEGAL STANDARD Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The mere existence of some factual dispute is insufficient on its own to bar summary judgment; the dispute must pertain to a “material” fact. Id. Accordingly, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Nor may summary judgment be avoided based on just any disagreement as to the relevant facts; the dispute must be “genuine,” meaning that there must be sufficient admissible evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to find for the non-movant. Id. When faced with a motion for summary judgment, the district court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence; instead, the evidence must be analyzed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, with all justifiable inferences drawn in its favor. Id. at 255. If material facts are genuinely in dispute, or undisputed facts are susceptible to divergent yet justifiable inferences, summary judgment is inappropriate. Moore v. Hartman, 571 F.3d 62, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2009). In the end, the district court’s task is to determine “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 251-52. In this
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regard, the non-movant must “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (internal citations omitted).
III. DISCUSSION The Court cannot summarily adjudicate the claims in this case on the present record. There are two steps to the Court’s analysis of Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims. The first step is to determine what level of scrutiny the Court should apply, and how much deference should be given, when reviewing the challenged policy. Only once that threshold step has been completed can the Court move on to the second step: applying that level of scrutiny to the policy and determining whether or not it is constitutional. Due in part to Defendants’ refusal to provide discovery, summary judgment is not currently appropriate on the first step. Defendants’ primary defense in this case thus far has been their argument that the Court should apply an extremely low level of scrutiny to their proposed policy on transgender military service. As support, Defendants primarily rely on Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981), another case regarding alleged discrimination in the military context. In Rostker, the United States Supreme Court assessed the constitutionality of a law that authorized the President to require the registration of males, but not females, for military service. Id. at 59. The Supreme Court in that case did not hold that courts must simply rubber stamp any allegedly discriminatory policy if it relates to military personnel. The Court expressly declined to hold that the heightened level of scrutiny that is generally applicable to gender discrimination does not apply in the context of the military. Id. at 69. However, that Court did hold—based on the particular
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facts before it—that the district court in that case had not sufficiently deferred to the reasoned consideration and decision-making of Congress regarding female military registration.
Defendants argue that the military personnel decision in this case—largely excluding transgender persons from the military—deserves similar deference. When granting Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, this Court held that it was not convinced—at that preliminary stage—that Rostker required the Court to apply a low level of scrutiny in this case. See Doe 1 v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167, 214 (D.D.C. 2017). This Court reasoned that the facts in Rostker were starkly different than the facts in this case. Id. The Rostker Court had noted that “Congress did not act unthinkingly or reflexively and not for any considered reason,” when it passed the challenged policy. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 72. To the contrary, the Rostker Court relied on Congress’ “studied choice of one alternative in preference to another,” and the fact that the policy at issue in that case had been “extensively considered by Congress in hearings, floor debate, and in committee.” Id. At the preliminary injunction stage, this Court held that such reasoned decision-making did not appear to have occurred in this case. See Doe 1, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 214. The Court’s holding was, of course, based on the preliminary record at that time.
Now, Defendants contend that the military has conducted the sort of reasoned decisionmaking that warrants deference. According to Defendants, even if deference was not owed to the President’s original directives (a point Defendants do not concede), the Court must now engage in a “highly deferential form of review” because, after the President’s 2017 directives, the military conducted an “independent reexamination” of the issue that consisted of “an extensive deliberative process lasting over seven months and involving many of DoD’s highranking officials as well as experts in a variety of subjects.” Defs.’ Mot. at 35, 39. According to Defendants, they “received extensive evidence on the issue,” and their decision to propose the
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policy set forth in the Mattis Implementation Plan “rested on the considered professional judgment of multiple military experts.” Id. at 37. Defendants argue that this process entitles them to the sort of deferential review discussed in Rostker. This is the crux of Defendants’ defense. It is restated in some form or another in nearly all of Defendants’ briefs.
But Plaintiffs do not agree that any legitimate, independent review of transgender military service has taken place. They contend that the only process that has occurred since the President’s 2017 Tweet and Memorandum was one merely to prepare a plan to implement an initial, unsupported, decision of the President to ban transgender military service. According to Plaintiffs, whatever process occurred was not meaningfully independent from, and indeed was constrained by, that initial decision. Because there was no independent assessment of the issue or independent exercise of military judgment, Plaintiffs argue that no special deference is owed.
Faced with this dispute, the Court holds that summary judgment is not appropriate at this stage. Summary judgment cannot be granted to the Plaintiffs or the Defendants if there are genuine disputes of material fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The facts about the process leading up to the development of the Mattis Implementation Plan are both material and in dispute.
First, the facts are material—they go to the heart of the degree of deference owed, and the level of scrutiny to be applied, in this case. The military’s assessment of transgender military service is a primary reason Defendants cite for their argument that this Court must be highly deferential to their proposed policy. As the court in Karnoski v. Trump recently explained, the constitutionality of the challenged policy “necessarily turns on facts related to Defendants’ deliberative process.” Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17-1297-MJP, 2018 WL 3608401, at *4 (W.D. Wash. July 27, 2018). In ordering discovery on this issue, that court held that “Defendants may not simultaneously claim that deference is owed to the Ban because it is the product of
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‘considered reason [and] deliberation,’ ‘exhaustive study,’ and ‘comprehensive review’ by the military . . . while also withholding access to information concerning these deliberations, including whether the military was even involved.” Id. “This information is central to the litigation.” Id. This Court agrees that this information is material to the parties’ dispute in this case.
Second, these material facts are still in dispute. The parties disagree about the fundamental nature of the process leading up to the issuance of the Mattis Implementation Plan, and both cite support for their positions in the (limited) record. For example, Defendants cite statements by Department of Defense officials regarding the “independent” nature of the process and the fact that their “review” was not affected by “external factors.” Plaintiffs cite other statements that suggest that the process was inherently circumscribed by an already-made decision of the President to exclude transgender persons from the military. This is a genuine factual dispute.
Citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d), Plaintiffs have asked this Court to defer ruling on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment “[i]f the Court determines that resolution of the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment turns on whether or not the process that resulted in the Mattis Plan and the Panel Report reflected independent military judgment.” Pls.’ Opp’n and Cross-Mot. at 18 n.5. This is because, Plaintiffs argue, “Defendants have objected to virtually all discovery requests seeking evidence concerning whether, as a factual matter, the review process was an exercise of independent judgment.” Id. Accordingly, “Plaintiffs seek the opportunity to complete fact discovery.” Id.
Plaintiffs are entitled to complete discovery. As already stated above, despite the fact that one of Defendants’ main defenses in this action is that their decisions regarding transgender
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military service are owed great deference because they are the product of reasoned deliberation, study and review by the military, Defendants have withheld nearly all information concerning this alleged deliberation. This is not how civil litigation works. Defendants cannot prevent Plaintiffs from obtaining the facts about a disputed issue and then expect to be granted summary judgment on that issue. Because genuine disputes of material fact exist and Plaintiffs are entitled to continue pursuing discovery of those facts, the Court will not summarily adjudicate this case at this time.
IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the parties’ Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment will be DENIED. The level of scrutiny the Court must apply, and the degree of deference owed, are threshold questions that must be resolved before the Court can assess the constitutionality of the challenged policy. Summary judgment on this question is not appropriate at this time because the parties dispute the basic facts that will inform its answer, and Plaintiffs have asked for leave to finish discovery into these facts before summary judgment is entered. Instead of granting either of the parties’ motions for summary judgment, the Court will allow Plaintiffs the opportunity to complete discovery. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
/s/ COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY United States District Judge
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JANE DOE 2, et al., Plaintiffs v.
PATRICK SHANAHAN, et al., Defendants

Civil Action No. 17-1597 (CKK)

NOTICE (March 19, 2019) The Court is in receipt of Defendants’ [190] Notice. In their Notice, Defendants informed the Court that, as there was no longer an impediment to the military’s implementation of the Mattis Policy, Defendants intended to release a Directive-Type Memorandum (“DTM”) formally implementing the new policy in the near future. Four days later, Defendants released the DTM. The DTM will formally take effect 30 days after its release, on April 12, 2019. Defendants were incorrect in claiming that there was no longer an impediment to the military’s implementation of the Mattis Policy in this case. Originally, there were four nationwide preliminary injunctions mandating that Defendants maintain the status quo. However, on January 22, 2019, the Supreme Court of the United States issued a short order staying the nationwide preliminary injunctions which had been in place in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington and the United States District Court for the Central District of California. And, on March 7, 2019, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland stayed its own nationwide preliminary injunction. Accordingly, three of the nationwide preliminary injunctions which had been in place are now stayed. But, the nationwide preliminary injunction issued by this Court remains in place. On October 30, 2017, this Court issued a preliminary injunction directing Defendants “to revert to the status quo with regard to accession and retention that existed before the issuance of the
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Presidential Memorandum.” Oct. 30, 2017 Memorandum Opinion, ECF No. 61, 4. On January 4, 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”) issued a per curiam opinion vacating this Court’s preliminary injunction. Jane Doe 2 v. Shanahan, No. 18-5257, Jan. 4, 2019 Judgment. However, that Judgment has not been made final through a mandate.
In their opinion, the D.C. Circuit ordered the Clerk of the Court “to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any timely petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc.” Jane Doe 2, No. 18-5257, Jan. 4, 2019 Judgment, 5. Usually, a party has 45 days to file a petition for rehearing or for rehearing en banc when an officer of the United States is sued in an official capacity. Fed. R. App. P. 40(a). Under the Rules, Plaintiffs’ petition for rehearing or for rehearing en banc would have been due February 18, 2019. But, on January 31, 2019, the D.C. Circuit ordered, on its own motion, that the time for filing any petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc be extended to 21 days after the issuance of the court’s forthcoming separate opinions. Jane Doe 2, No. 18-5257, Jan. 31, 2019 Order. The D.C. Circuit’s separate opinions were filed on March 8, 2019. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have until March 29, 2019 to file for rehearing or rehearing en banc. As of this date, Plaintiffs’ time has not expired. As such, the D.C. Circuit’s mandate vacating this Court’s preliminary injunction has not issued, and the mandate will not issue until March 29, 2019, at the earliest.
Absent a mandate, the D.C. Circuit’s January 4, 2019 Judgment vacating this Court’s preliminary injunction is not final. Under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, “[t]he mandate is effective when issued.” Fed. R. App. P. 41(c). And, as the Advisory Committee notes explain, “[a] court of appeals’ judgment or order is not final until issuance of the mandate; at that time the parties’ obligations become fixed.” Fed. R. App. P. 41(c) Advisory Committee’s notes
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(1998). Lacking a mandate, the D.C. Circuit’s Judgment is not final, and this Court’s preliminary injunction remains in place. See United States v. DeFries, 129 F.3d 1293, 1302-1304 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding that the D.C. Circuit’s judgment was not final absent a mandate).
The fact that the three other nationwide preliminary injunctions which had been in place are now stayed has no impact on the continued effectiveness of this Court’s preliminary injunction. On October 30, 2017, this Court ordered Defendants to maintain the status quo as it relates to the accession and retention of transgender individuals in the military. That preliminary injunction remains in place until the D.C. Circuit issues its mandate vacating the preliminary injunction. Lacking a mandate, Defendants remain bound by this Court’s preliminary injunction to maintain the status quo. The Court understands, as a practical matter, that because the three other nationwide preliminary injunctions are now stayed, Defendants are permitted by those cases to implement the DTM, but they are not permitted to do so in this case until the mandate is issued.
/s/ COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY United States District Judge
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