Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 17 Filed 05/28/2002 Page 1 of 12

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

LINDA ROSE, JENNIFER CRADIT, JOHN DOE AND JANE DOE, DETAINEES OF THE SAGINAW COUNTY JAIL,

CASE NO. 01 10337 HON: DAVID M. LAWSON

PLAINTIFFS,

PLAINTIFF'S THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY

SAGINAW COUNTY, SAGINAW COUNTY
SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES, CHARLES BROWN AND OFFICERS JOHN DOE, AND JANE DOE, (IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY), JOINTLY & SEVERALLY,

DEFENDANTS .
r F.L~ET~C~HE~R, ~W~OL~F ~« ~AS~SO~CI-AT-ES----/ BY: CHRISTOPHER J. PIANTO, P-59160

: ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS
I 718 BEACH ST
,, FLINT MI 48502

\' (810) 238-4410

I ••

/

I

COMPLAINT

COMMON ALLEGATIONS

NOW COME Plaintiffs, by and through their' attorneys,
II II FLETCHER, WOLF & ASSOCIATES, BY: LOYST FLETCHER, JR., P·29799 and
i CHRISTOPHER J. PIANTO, P-59160, and for their complaint state as
I\ tollows:

I

fl!:TCH~R, WOlf & ASSOC I'

",ttO:'l~'';'" J' ~ elW

7: 8 Bra( h ~':~'('!"

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>i,int. Mi(fq~J.~.' ·laSCi·II05

P'10I'(': (8: :)) 21fH41O

I,,, (800'''8·'''''' \

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II

I I,I

Case

2:01-cv-10337-DML

Document 17

Filed 05/28/2002 Page 2 of 12

I'I

I

Venue is proper in the United States District Court for

)1

\i the Eastern District of Michigan as the case presents an issue

,i under the Constitution of the United States of America.

\;
agene: ':a::::::m:::,:0 :::::::n,"] II

~ic:::::a:n C:::'~o:::i::

0:

1. 1'

3. Plaintiff, Linda Rose is a resident of the city of

Montrose, county of Genesee, State of Michigan.

I:

4 . Jennifer cradit is a resident of the city of Saginaw,

I

Ii County of Saginaw, State of Michigan.

,I

5. That at all pertinent times, Defendant Saginaw County

I;1 is municipal and/or governmental entity exercising power in

I,I Saginaw County, Michigan.

rIl'

6. That at all pertinent times, and on present information

'\ and belief, Defendants Charles Brown, John and Jane Doe are
I,i residents and/or employees, agents, and/or servants of Saginaw

\; County exercising authority in Saginaw County, Michigan.

I

7. That on or about January 29, 2001, Plaintiff Linda Rose

I was detained at the Saginaw County Jail.

I

8. That in the summer of 1999 Plaintiff Jennifer Cradit

I was detained at the Saginaw County Jail.

II

9. That at all pertinent times hereto John and Jane Doe

" Plaintiffs were detainees of the Saginaw County Jail in Saginaw

\'1 Michigan.

\1

10. That at all pertinent times hereto, Defendant, Charles

;1 Brown was the Sheriff of Saginaw County.

fU:TOmt, WOt.f & A')SOC \

Att()(;l('V~ il' : ,1W 718 Be..J( ij S::'('P!

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,lid, lv'.i(~lig,H~ 485021105

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I
I'I

Case

2:01-cv-10337-DML

Document 17

Filed 05/28/2002 Page 3 of 12

II

11. That at all pertinent times hereto, Defendants Jane
I,I II and John Doe, were officers assigned to or working at the Saginaw
I' County Jail as employees, agents, and/or servants of Saginaw

,[ county and/or Saginaw County Sheriff's Department.

\1I

12. That while detainees, Plaintiffs, Linda Rose, Jennifex·

1,,\, Cradit, John and Jane Doe Plaintiffs were forced to completely

Ii disrobe and be subjected to viewing by male and/or female

,I officers and male and female jail trustees.

!

Ii
,1

13 . That while pretrial detainees Plaintiffs, Linda Rose

I

II Jennifer Cradit as well as Jane and John Doe Plaintiffs, were

I

I \ forced to completely disrobe and be subjected to viewing by male

,\ and female officers and male and female jail trustees.

rII

I 14. That at all pertinent times hereto, Defendant Saginaw

1\ County and Saginaw County Sheriff's Department owned or

1\ controlled or contributed to the ownership, operation, control,

I

'! and/or maintenance of the Saginaw County Jail.

I,I
I

15. That at all pertinent times hereto, Defendant, Charles

I
I

I Brown as sheriff of Saginaw County directed the operation,

1\, control, and/or maintenance of the Saginaw County Jail.

\

16. That upon information and belief, Plaintiffs herein aYe

1\ representative of a class of detainees of the Saginaw County
II Jail, all of which have been subjected to an unlawful custom, II policy, practice and/or procedure of stripping violative of

Ii statutory and common law authorities.

~;,~~~;'~,':':,~lf&A§SOC

II
:i
I

17.
custom,

That policy,

at all pertinent times hereto, practice, and/or procedure wi

Defendants had a thin the Saginaw

7"; ~ Urad] S:rrd

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~ ,int, Mklr,gdl' 4i;1jO.: 1105

Phor~ ..: (OW) nli--l-j1()

,

I ax: (810) 2}BOlJb

ij

3

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II

I Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 17
I !

Filed 05/28/2002 Page 4 of 12

\'I
i: county Jail in which Plaintiffs were subjected to an unlawful
'I,
I deprivation of their constitutional and civil rights.
,\
18. That Defendants did not have a warrant or any other

J\ lawful authority to strip and/or strip search Plaintiffs in the
\:1 manner more fully described herein.

I.1

19. That at the time Plaintiffs were detainees and

I,:
1,\

subjected to

the various violations

herein described,

Defendants

,
I

had no

reason

to believe,

nor any probable

cause to believe,

that

\1

II Plaintiffs were in possession of any type of dangerous weapons, contraband, or other instrumentality of questionable/suspicious

I,'I nature.

I,I

20. That Defendants' purpose for stripping and/or strip

I' searching Plaintiffs herein were for behavioral modifying,

'\ punitive, malicious, illegal, gratuitous and/or personal reasons,

Ii,I1 and were clearly unreasonable on their face.

.1

21. Pursuant to Defendant's illegal custom, policy,

I

practice an/or procedure, Plaintiffs were forced to sit naked in

1\

,I a cell commonly referred to as "the hole" or "the naked tank" for \

\'

I

as many hours on end exposing their naked bodies to male and

\1 female officers and jail trustees alike.

I

\'\

I 22. The naked Plaintiffs were left without blankets, gowns,

I \1 or any other way to shield their bodies from the video cameras or

II naked eyes of male and female jail employees and/or trustees that

chose to look and at them.

\

\1

i

I

I !U10i[~, WOi..F & ASS()('.;
An(l(r:('y~ at (,{w
718 Bh!d' .~tr0t't

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f-bn!, ,'"ljCfligJll ,to.3Dl-' :0', ~

Pho:1P: (diD,: 2~i;i-44i~)

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f-ax: {B;Ul n6..(J726

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., Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 17
II

Filed 05/28/2002 Page 5 of 12

iI'l

I,I'

Plaintiffs in violation of their Constitutional and

\' statutory rights were stripped without consent or permission of

J any type whatsoever.

I'

24. Plaintiffs, while post trial detainees are also

1

subjected warrantless, unreasonable strip searches conducted

II absent any probable cause in the manner described herein.

I:1

25. Defendants' conduct and actions were done under color

'\:
I of state and federal law.

I

26. Plaintiffs have a clearly established right to be free

\
from unreasonable searches and seizures, unwanted bodily contact,

\i

.1 invasions of their privacy, etc. Reasonable officers acting in

I the position of jail guards knew or should have known that the
\

.'Ij' conduct at issue was a moving force in violation those rights.

I,'i Pray v. Ci ty of Sandusky, 49 F.3d 1154 (6th Cir. 1995).

'I

27. That Defendants' conduct was carried out under a

I\i custom, policy, practice, and/or procedure violative of the
il Constitution of the United States of American and the
I

Constitution of the State of Michigan.

I

COUNT I

II

FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS OF CIVIL RIGHTS

II

28. Plaintiffs reincorporate each and every paragraph above

I,'I as though fully stated herein.

'I

29. That this count or cause of action arises out of che

\ Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States

I Constitucion and 42 USC §1983 and 1988.
flf!OUl(, WOI~ &. ASSOC. 'I At~orr~E'Y'i ,II I ,;w
! 16 l·h'.lCI: Stlf.~'( II;nl, Micnip"lJI .l8,~O)_' :0,; ,

I'ho:1p: (310; 1.HH41f)

'I

,"'ax: (Ii; 0) .d8-o726

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II

II Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 17
(I
II

Filed 05/28/2002 Page 6 of 12

I I

30. That Defendants did not have search warrants or other

I

',1\, lawful authority to strip the Plaintiffs in the manner described

\ more fully above.

Ii

31. That the actions of Defendants herein violated

\

Plaintiffs' clearly established rights under the Fourth, Eighth,
I,I and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution,
I',\ specifically but not by way of limitation:

I

\
I

A. The right to be free from unreasonable searches

I

I

and seizuresi

:1

I

B. Freedom from deprivation of liberty;

I

!\

C. Freedom from deprivation of privacy;

I'I

D. Freedom from deprivations of privileges;

I

I I

E. Freedom from deprivation of immunitiesj

I

I,\

F. Freedom from cruel and unusual punishment.

\

Ii

32. Defendants herein subjected Plaintiffs to these

II\ deprivations either intentionally, maliciously and/or by a

\

,I reckless disregard for whether their rights would be violated by

\,1I their actions.

II

33. Defendants' wrongful conduct described herein was done

under color of Federal and State law.
II 34. That as a direct and proximate result thereof,

II Plaintiffs suffered the following injuries:

\

\1

A. Extreme embarrassment and humiliation past and

!

II

~a ~ \i C::;CHU, WOI &. ASSOC 'Iii

'I Atl(H~"Y~ dll"",
n1':inll'Mi'i!Ce~j",rPr,.;'iat~r,fl't'!.q:.~:))-',(~-,

I'b()~{': iSlO} ;;8-4410

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~<lx: 11:\") }JtH)726

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future;

I

B. Emotional distress and mental anguish, past and

future;

\

I
6

\

,\
II

Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 17 Filed 05/28/2002 Page 7 of 12

C. Insulted honor and mortification, past and future;

D. Loss of personal liberty and dignity, past and
II future;

\,I

E. Injury to their feelings, past and future.

I.1

COUNT II

Iil'

GROSS NEGLIGENCE

i'I

(CHARLES BROWN, JOHN AND JANE DOE DEFENDANTS ONLY)

I I

35. Plaintiffs reincorporate each and every paragraph above

[, as though fully stated herein.

:1
Ii

36. That Defendants Charles Brown, John Doe and Jane Doe

I owed Plaintiffs a duty of due and reasonable care.

I.1

37. Defendants conduct as described herein constituted a

,Ii breach of their its duties owed to Plaintiffs and said conduct of Defendants Charles Brown, ,John Doe, and Jane Doe constituted
II' "gross negligence" as that term is defined in MCLA

Ii §691.1707(2c) :in that "The conduct was so reckless as to

I,Ij demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether injuries
result. II
II 38. That Defendants Charles Brown, John Doe, and Jane Doe's

II grossly negligent conduct caused all of the aforesaid events and

II injuries set forth herein with particularity.

~ i

39. Plaintiffs sustained damages from the aforesaid

II injuries as more fully described herein.

II

I'

wr:Ti-ItR, WO! r &. ASM)C ;

"'tt(~I:('Y'; .ill dW

1

I 718 Bt'.!rh S,f('P'
I Pr:t, ."..1.ichigilll . 48,,:>i)i-' i (),

Phone: (8:0) 1384410 ~i\x: (/:i,'')) 1381)i?/)

I :

7

I

I
II ___ ~..-~.

1\ Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 17
!I

Filed 05/28/2002 Page 8 of 12

I:I

COUNT III

I,I

INVASION OF PRIVACY

III'

(CHARLES BROWN, JOHN AND JANE DOE ONLY)

40. Plaintiffs reincorporate each and every paragraph above

II\1 as though fully stated herein.

Ii

41. That Defendants' conduct/actions wrongfully invaded

II Plaintiffs' privacy, seclusion, soli tude, and/or private affairs.

42. The plaintiffs' naked bodies is a matter private to

1\

i them

:\

43. Defendants invaded Plaintiffs' privacy by the illegal

I'II conduct/ e.g. custom, policy, practice of punitive, malicious,

I intentional, and/or gratuitous stripping of their clothing in
il:1 full view of officers and trustees, male and female alike.

i

44. That Defendants used the viewing of plaintiffs' naked

I'[ bodies for cheir own advantage.

'f

45. Defendants disclosed Plaintiffs' naked bodies to both
II
[I male and female officers and jail trustees alike in a manner that

was highly offensive to a reasonable person.

46. The exhibition of Plaintiffs' naked bodies is of no

'I legitimate concern to the public, officers and jail trustees of
the opposite sex.

47. The exposure of the Plaintiffs' naked bodies placed
[I Plaintiffs in a false light.

48.

II

injuries H nOIER, won &. ASSOc.I' [

I .A!:f)rn<,ys ill Law

7H1 Bt'd,h Stt('et

I

I ~!;nl, M;;:~ig,i'l 4310.L1 H!',

r>hf);W: \810) 230-44:0 I,,, (BlO:2"0126

il

Plaintiffs sustained damages from as more fully described herein.

the

aforesaid

I
11 iI
II

II Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 17 Filed 05/28/2002 Page 9 of 12

Iil'

I

I,I

I,\

COUNT IV

ASSAULT AND BATTERY
I,I

I,i

(CHARLES BROWN, JOHN DOE, JANE DOE ONLY)

49. Plaintiffs reincorporate each and every paragraph above
IIi II as though fully stated herein.

"

50. Defendants herein intended to cause the harmful or

II

I: offensive contact described more fully herein.

I'\i

51. Plaintiffs experienced imminent apprehension.

!

52. Defendants herein did in fact engage in and/or direct

I,I un-permitted offensive and/or harmful bodily contact with

II Plaintiffs as more fully described herein.

jiI

53. Plaintiffs sustained damages from the aforesaid

injuries as more fully described herein.

1\

COUNT V

J\'
['

INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

I

(DEFENDANTS CHARLES BROWN, JOHN DOE, AND JANE DOE)

II

54. Plaintiffs reincorporate each and every paragraph above

as though fully stated herein.

55. The wrongful stripping of Plaintiffs as more fully
Ii described herein is a clear example of extreme and outrageous

I conduct that exceeds all bounds of decency.

I

56. The Defendants' wrongful conduct as described more

II fully herein was intentional and/or reckless.

I
H~-ICHt;t, WOLf -lh t\SSQC ;

At1('~I''''y'i <!t i.<,w

~ 7HJ fk"o: S(r("t'i
f I,nt, !\1Ic,,)ir,dJl ':8',0) 0-, I'

I'I'orle: (8 i 0) ;; 38 441 tl

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II II

Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 17 Filed 05/28/2002 Page 10 of 12

57. The Defendancs knew or should have known the aforesaid

conduct by Defendants would cause Plaintiffs to suffer emotional

J distress then and in the future.

I<i;

58. The aforesaid conduct by Defendants resulted in severe

emotional distress, embarrassment, and/or anguish in the past and

will continue well into the future.

59. plaintiffs sustained damages from the aforesaid

injuries as more fully described herein.

COUNT VI

VIOLATION OF THE ELLIOTT LARSON CIVIL RIGHTS ACT

MCLA 37.2302 (Al; MSA 3.548 (302) (Al

60. Plainciffs reincorporate each and every paragraph above

as chough fully stated herein.

61. This is an action to enforce the civil rights of the
H
I. plaintiff's herein which arises out of their relationship as

detainees of the Saginaw County Jail.

62. MCLA 37.2302 (a); MSA 3.548 (302) (a) is a Michigan Civil
II Rights victim protection statute that provides that: a person

II shall not deny the individual the full and equal enjoyment of the
dt, goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or

accommodations of a place of public accommodation or public

service because of religion, race, color, national origin, age,
I
"" sex or marital status.
63. Under the circumstances of this case, Defendants herein

Iviolated the aforesaid victim protection law by engaging in a
Ili:iCHU, WOl.f & ASSOC. r A!tCfr;~'Y'; "r 1 ,1W ? 18 8"<lr~ S,:(·,·;

clipt, Mirf.t:i',ar, .1850':-111):'

?nolle': (810) ?lH-'1<:10

,

Ii!x: \(10) n.'l-l)726

10

I
-_1

Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 17 Filed 05/28/2002 Page 11 of 12

discriminating custom, policy, and/or practice of stripping the

Plaintiffs of their clothing and exposing their naked bodies to

male and female deputies and jail trustees alike in che manner

more fully described herein, in a place of public accommodation

and/or public service.

64. Plaintiffs herein are members of a protected class.

65. Defendants herein were predisposed to discriminate

against persons in the class, and Defendants acted upon that

predisposition when the discrimination occurred.

66. The Saginaw County Jail is a place of public

I

accommodation and/or public service.

I

67. Plaintiffs herein were treated differently than male

:1
detainees for same or similar conduct.

68. As a result of Defendants' aforementioned conduct,

I

Plaintiffs suffered damages as more fully described herein.
I

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for certification of this action
I

as a class action and judgment against Defendants herein, jointly

and severally as follows:

I
I

A. For compensatory damages in an amount proved at

I

trial.

I

B. For punitive damages against Defendants in an

I ,

amount proved at trial. I,

c. For all actual costs and attorney fees allowable
I
under USC §1983 and 1988 and other appropriate

\

11

I

II

Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 17 Filed 05/28/2002 Page 12 of 12

laws together with any other relief the Court

deems necessary and proper.

D. For whatever further relief this Honorable Court

DAT"'"

t 'f /fM±V~ -< <

deems necessary, pr.o.pe~:~. "

0 "

~C~R' 7 WOLF & ASSOCIATES

BY, CHRISTOPHER J. PIANTO, P-59160

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF

718 BEACH STREET

FLINT, MI 48502

(810) 238-4410

DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY

NOW COME Plaintiffs, by and through their Attorneys,

FLETCHER, WOLF & ASSOCIATES, BY: CHRISTOPHER J. PIANTO, P-59160

:1 and hereby relies on their previous demand foril Trial by Jury in

I

I

se of action.

DATED: __-+__-+~__

F ETCHER, WOLF & ASSOCI S BY: CHRISTOPHER J. PIANTO, P-59160 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 718 BEACH STREET FLINT, MI 48502 (810) 238-4410

C:\My Documents\LINDAROSE ET AL\THIRD AMD COMP

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\;
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!I "m",", WO" & ASSOC

Al'orn£'y' :il I ~w

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111'1 Rf'iirh Stl(,{,!

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'lir,;, Michi?,Jr. 4il~O.'-lli)]

Phone: (310) 21344:0

12

 
 I,i:II

'i
II
Ii

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I !

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

I I

II

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

II

\
I'III' LINDA ROSE; JENNIFER CRADIT,' SYLVIA DENISE BRADDOCK, LISA

CASE NO. 01 10337

'I! RENEE BRANDIMORE, DWAYNE BUTTERFIELD,

HON: DAVID M. LAWSON

BOBBIE WAYNE CARTER, DANIEL WRAY
II CLAYTON, HOPE MICHELLE DAVIS, JOSHUA
Ii FULLER, NICHOLAS ANTHONY GILES, WILLIE
II LOUIS HENDRICKS, TANISHA RAMON JOHNSON:'
i ROBERT ALLEN KELSEY, SUE ANN LETTERMAN,

\1 DONNA LYNN QUARLES, DAVID TODD REINER,
dGREGORY LOUIS SCHULTZ, AMANDA RAE
IiII SHINAVER, DWAYNE ALANN SIMMONS, ROBIN RENEE THOMAS AND JOSHUA ALLEN WEIGANT,

[ I

1\

PLAINTIFFS,

PLAINTIFF'S FOURTH

II

AMENDED COMPLAINT AND

[:V
:1

DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY

!Ii SAGINAW COUNTY, SAGINAW COUNTY

iSHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, MUNICIPAL

III[ GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES, CHARLES BROWN AND OFFICERS JOHN DOE,

I'AND JANE DOE, (IN THEIR

INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY),

I JOINTLY & SEVERALLY,

!I

DEFENDANTS.

IIi'

====---:-;c=-=:;-:-~===---_/
FLETCHER, WOLF &: ASSOCIATES

IIBY: CHRISTOPHER J. PIANTO, P-59160
IATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS

I
I

718 BEACH ST
IFLINT MI 48502
I (810) 238-4410

I

I

JENSEN GILBERT SMITH & BORRELLO PC

BY: PETER C JENSEN (P25001) IATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS

I

II 721 SOUTH MICHIGAN AVENUE

I

SAGINAW MI 48602

\, (989) 790 2500

I

II

/

I

II

I

II fUICH,fR, W,OU & AS§OC

i

Mtomrv'i dt ! ,{h'
7lfjRr~'h~[rt'PI

II )". _

I

I fl.nt,i\1lChW,dI~ 4850.-J,0, I'
Phone: (dI0) ">Vl-441O

1

'",IX: m;O) n8.{1i2fi

I

I
i

I

I

!I Ii

Ii

I,'\

I,I

I'I

II

COMPLAINT

II

Ii

COMMON ALLEGATIONS

Ii

III

NOW COME Plaintiffs, by and through their atto2-neys,

J FLETCHER, WOLF & ASSOCIATES, BY: LOYST FLETCHER, JR., P-29799 and
IiI CHRISTOPHER J. PIANTO, P-59160, and for their complaint state as
!IIi follows:

H
H

1. Venue is proper in the United States District Court for

lithe Eastern District of Michigan as the case presents an issue

II under the Constitution of the United States of America.

Ii

Ii

2. Saginaw County Sheriff's Department is a governmental

i!agency situated in the County of Saginaw, State of Michigan.

II

3. Plaintiff, Linda Rose is a resident of the city of

II Montrose, County of Genesee, State of Michigan.

II

II

4. Jennifer Cradit is a resident of the city of Saginaw,

II County of Saginaw, State of Michigan.

II I'

5 . That at all pertinent times, Defendant Saginaw County

Ilis municipal and/or governmental entity exercising power in

II
I

Sag

2'

naw

County,

Michigan.

I
I

6 . That at all pertinent

I

times,

and on present

information

II' and belief, Defendants Charles Brown, John and Jane Doe are

\

,

ilres2dents and/or employees, agents, and/or servants of Saginaw

IIICounty exerc2" s2ngh aut " or2ty 2n S ag'2naw County, M2' Ch2' gan.

\
I

7. That on or about January 29, 2001,

II was detained at the Saginaw County Jail.

~~~~;~~, ~:~if

&ASS,,,

1\
Ii

iii 'i I1;"('(,B.e'/,M:("ehir,5,:t1"1C'4/:lSf)}-110.'>

pf;tvu,: (1:1:0) 218·,:4,:) ,,, ",0I21''''!)6

II

2

Plaintiff Linda Rose

II
I
i

I I

II

I I

I.1
I:1'

II
I,I

8. That in the summer of 1999 Plaintiff Jennifer Cradit

II was detained at the Saginaw County Jail.

IIii

9. That at all pertinent times hereto all of the named

II Plaintiffs ("Plaintiffs") were detainees of the Saginaw County

I! Jail in Saginaw Michigan, who were subjected to conduct in

II violation of their State and Constitutional rights.

I,\ q

10. That at all pertinent times hereto, Defendant, Charles

Ii Brown was the Sheriff of Saginaw County.

Ii

IIi

11. That at all pertinent times hereto, Defendants Jane

Ii and John Doe, were officers assigned to or working at the Saginaw

III county Jail as employees, agents, and/or servants of Saginaw

II County and/or Saginaw County Sheriff's Department.

I!i

12. That while detainees, Plaintiffs forced to completely

I

iidisrobe and be subjected to viewing by male and/or female

I

Ii officers and male and female j ail trustees.

\

I

I

13. That while pretrial detainees Plaintiffs were forced

II
lito completely disrobe and be subjected to viewing by male and

II female officers and male and female j ail trustees.

I

II

14. That at all pertinent times hereto, Defendant Saginaw

County and Saginaw County Sheriff's Department owned or

I

controlled or contributed to the ownership, operation, control,

II and/or maintenance of the Saginaw County Jail.

I I

15. That at all pertinent times hereto, Defendant, Charles

lilBrown as sheriff of Saginaw County directed the operation,

I
I
I
i

II~ ( control , and/or maintenance of the Saginaw County Jail.

I
i

1\

I

HUO-lU, WOU 11 ASSOC lill

AtrO':1ry, at I aw
711l tl('il< h 'ilri.'t"t

;1

II f !;m, ,"'~i<"lj~jV!;1 4BSO)-: ;05 \
f'l]one, (8:0) .'j[)-14;C

3

;-,,~<: 10:0) 2.3il-07}6

'

I i
I

i

\

I

I

I'I

II

I.1

I I

Ii

Ii
Ii

16. That at all pertinent times hereto, Defendants had a

II. custom, policy, practice, and/or procedure within the Saginaw

IIII County Jail in which Plaintiffs were subjected to an unlawful

II deprivation of their Constitutional and civil rights.

III

17. That Defendants did not have a warrant or any other

I lawful authority to strip and/or strip search Plaintiffs in the
I
Ii manner more fully described herein.

IIIi

18. That at the time Plaintiffs were detainees and

Ii subjected to the various violations herein described, Defendants

1
Jihad no reason to believe, nor any probable cause to believe, that
I[.Iipla'2nt2. ff s were 2. n possess2.on 0 f any t ype 0 f d angerous weapons,
IIII contraband, or other instrumentality of questionable/suspicious

Ii nature.
II

1\

19.

That Defendants' purpose for stripping and/or strip

11 searching Plaintiffs herein were for behavioral modifying,

!punitive, malicious, illegal, gratuitous and/or personal reasons,

land were clearly unreasonable on their face.

i

20. Pursuant to Defendant's illegal custom, policy,

!Ipractice an/or procedure, Plaintiffs were forced to sit naked in
I
IIIia cell commonly referred to as "the hole" or "the naked tank" for as many hours on end exposing their naked bodies to male and

II female officers and j ail trustees alike.

II

21. The naked Plaintiffs were left without blankets, gowns,

liar any other way to shield their bodies from

ILnaked eyes of male and female jail employees

II chose to look and at them. II ~~~:r~~;;R~!~d~i ~ &. ASSOC

I ;,8 i3Nd~ S(r"p'
f lir'L M:chig.l'l 48'i02 110,',

PhO'1r: (810)211:\4410 ,,,' (810123811726

I

4

the video cameras or and/or trustees that

II

II

II

I I

II!'IiI

22. Plaintiffs in violation of their Constitutional and

Ii statutory rights were stripped without consent or permission of

II any type whatsoever.

I J
1\

23. Plaintiffs, while post trial detainees are also

!Isubjected warrantless, unreasonable strip searches conducted
III absent any probable cause in the manner described herein.

Ii
!j

24. Defendants' conduct and actions were done under color

I! of state and federal law.

d

I'I

25. Plaintiffs have a clearly established right to be free

i:I( from unreasonable searches and seizures, unwanted bodily contact,

I

II invasions of their privacy, etc. Reasonable officers acting in

II.1I the position of jail guards knew or should have known that the

II conduct at issue was a moving force in violation those rights.

I Pray v. City of Sandusky, 49 F.3d 1154 (6th Cir. 1995).
i

1\

26. That Defendants' conduct was carried out under a

I!custom, policy, practice, and/or procedure violative of the

II constitution of the United States of American and the

I'! Constitution of the State of Michigan.

I

COUNT I

I

I

II

FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS OF CIVIL RIGHTS

I

I.

I
27. Plaintiffs reincorporate each and every paragraph above

I as though fully stated herein.

I1I\

28. That this count or cause of action arises out of the

I

i

IIFourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States

I

I Constitution and 42 USC §1983 and 1988.
I fH; O-lHt, woa;- .& ASSOt:.

i
I

7i8 il('ad- StrK't

I

f 1'o1t, tv',kh!g,,:l 4850),1 ~ 05

Phnn.': fcPOl 210-44'0

[JX

:1:I~O).!lfI.;)7}b

II
II

5

\
I
i

IrIl

I

I

I
I

I

I

I
I I

I I

I I

II

29. That Defendants did not have search warrants or other

II lawful authority to strip the Plaintiffs in the manner described

Ii more fully above.

I!

30. That the actions of Defendants herein violated

I! Plaintiffs' clearly established rights under the Fourth, Eighth,

Ii and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution,

II specifically but not by way of limitation:

II

A. The right to be free from unreasonable searches

IiIiI

and seizures;

II,IiI

B. Freedom from deprivation of liberty; C. Freedom from deprivation of privacy;

I I

D. Freedom from deprivations of privileges;

ii:lI

E. Freedom from deprivation of immunities;

!I

F. Freedom from cruel and unusual punishment.

!I

31. Defendants herein subjected Plaintiffs to these

I[deprivations either intentionally, maliciously and/or by a

ilreCkless disregard for whether their rights would be violated by

I

Iith el..r actl..ons.

III

32. Defendants' wrongful conduct described herein was done

I

I under color of Federal and State law.

II

33. That as a direct and proximate result thereof,

I

I I

Plaintiffs suffered the following injuries:

I

A. Extreme embarrassment and humiliation past and

I

i

future;

I

B. Emotional distress and mental anguish, past and

I

future;

I

713 f!(>.,d. 5;"PP! ,jirl!, Mi,higJ~ 4B5G2-11G~

I

"hone: (310) 231:1-4410

~ilX:

(iI~lJ) 2 HW)77S

6

I

!
i

I

!I

I,I

.,-.-"

I,I

I I

C. Insulted honor and mortification, past and future;

I,'I

D. Loss of personal liberty and dignity, past and

i

future;

I

E. Injury to their feelings, past and future.

\1

,i

COUNT II

I,I

:1

GROSS NEGLIGENCE

\ \
I I
;,

(CHARLES BROWN, JOHN AND JANE DOE DEFENDANTS ONLY)

34. Plaintiffs reincorporate each and every paragraph above
I'1 II as though fully stated herein.

I.I

35. That Defendants Charles Brown, John Doe and Jane Doe

'Ii owed Plaintiffs a duty of due and reasonable care.

II,

36. Defendants conduct as described herein constituted a

'1:\ breach of their its duties owed to Plaintiffs and said conduct of

I\Defendants Charles Brown, John Doe, and Jane Doe constituted
II "gross negligence" as that term is defined in MCLA Ii §691.1707 (2c) : in that "The conduct was so reckless as to I demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether injuries

result."

I

37.

That Defendants Charles Brown, John Doe, and Jane Doe's

l!grOSSlY negligent conduct caused all of the aforesaid events and
II injuries set forth herein with particularity.

38. Plaintiffs sustained damages from the aforesaid

injuries as more fully described herein.

I

I'

f! 1f"H.:~.i:R, ',WOH.& ASSOC \'

AtWrnI'Y, i.l! l JI'>' 718 Bf'acf] ~!Il-'t't

I

~I:nt, tv'."ich",g.l;l, 4iJS;)) ~ ,05 Phon,~· (H,i)j )JS-44' 0

7

,,,' :a'll; J38 "7'6

\

I

II

!I

It

"-'-',

Ii

I,I

!I

I I

COUNT III

II

I.1

INVASION OF PRIVACY

I.1

II

(CHARLES BROWN, JOHN AND JANE DOE ONLY)

rII

39. Plaintiffs reincorporate each and every paragraph above

IIII as though fully stated herein.

IIi

40. That Defendants' conduct/actions wrongfully invaded

1\ Plaintiffs' privacy, seclusion, solitude, and/or private affairs.
II

!i

4l. The Plaintiffs' naked bodies is a matter private to

iI' them.

II!

42 . Defendants invaded Plaintiffs' privacy by the illegal

. 1
II conduct, e.g. custom, policy, practice of punitive, malicious,

IiI intentional, and/or gratuitous stripping of their clothing in

'11 full view of officers and trustees, male and female alike.

1\

II

43. That Defendants used the viewing of Plaintiffs' naked

il bodies for their own advantage.

!I'·

44. Defendants disclosed Plaintiffs' naked bodies to both

II" male and female officers and jail trustees alike in a manner that

Ii

iwas highly offensive to a reasonable person.

I

45. The exhibition of Plaintiffs' naked bodies is of no

I

Illegitimate concern to the public, officers and jail trustees of

II the opposite sex.

II

46. The exposure of the Plaintiffs' naked bodies placed

II Plaintiffs in a false light.

II

47.

II injuries

I H rfO-!r.R, won & ASSOC.

II A!1Gf"rtE'Y:, J
/18 ge.:ch

'Stl~fJ'W!>!

[',im, MI~'rjg.m 48',')2·110',

PnOI1(,: (810) J3f,A410
r,p,: ([110; }3S·(J726

\I'

Plaintiffs sustained damages from as more fully described herein.
8

the

aforesaid

I

II

I
:!
r I

I,I

COUNT IV

'II

ASSAULT AND BATTERY

Ii

(CHARLES BROWN, JOHN DOE, JANE DOE ONLY)

\,'\

48. Plaintiffs reincorporate each and every paragraph above

II as though fully stated herein.

I(

49. Defendants herein intended to cause the harmful or

II offensive contact described more fully herein.

II

50. Plaintiffs experienced imminent apprehension.

II

51. Defendants herein did in fact engage in and/or direct

I' un-permitted offensive and/or harmful bodily contact with

,1 Plaintiffs as more fully described herein.

II
:1

52. Plaintiffs sustained damages from the aforesaid

II injuries as more fully described herein.

I
II

COUNT V

II

INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

·1

III

(DEFENDANTS CHARLES BROWN, JOHN DOE, AND JANE DOE)

I·

53. Plaintiffs reincorporate each and every paragraph above

i as though fully stated herein.

lI

54. The wrongful stripping of Plaintiffs as more fully

\ldeSCribed herein is a clear example of extreme and outrageous ., conduct that exceeds all bounds of decency.

55. The Defendants' wrongful conduct as described more

I fully herein was intentional and/or reckless.

1\

i! HOUR, WO! i & A,SOC \

A1ton~('y~ .;~ ;, dV'.'

7!H 9('.o('il ~;:'rPl

1-:::'11. "....lie;l:?,;l!' 485OJ-~ i()S

Pho:'lf': \o::)j :'JB-44;\)

9

f ..IX: (BIO) 23i:Hl7?6

'I

I,I

,-'-'--.

i'

II

56. The Defendants knew or should have known the aforesaid

.1

'II conduct by Defendants would cause Plaintiffs to suffer emotional

1\ distress then and in the future.

II

57. The aforesaid conduct by Defendants resulted in severe

1\ emotional distress, embarrassment, and/or anguish in the past and

\1 will continue well into the future.

I[

58. Plaintiffs sustained damages from the aforesaid

1\ injuries as more fully described herein.

',II·

COUNT VI

II

VIOLATION OF THE ELLIOTT LARSON CIVIL RIGHTS ACT

I l
i

MCLA 37.2302(A); MSA 3.548(302) (A)

II

Ii

59. plaintiffs reincorporate each and every paragraph above

lias though fully stated herein.

II

60. This is an action to enforce the civil rights of the

1\ Plaintiff's herein which arises out of their relationship as
II detainees of the Saginaw County Jail.

[i

61. MCLA 37.2302(a); MSA 3.548(302) (a) is a Michigan Civil

'I Rights victim protection statute that provides that: a person

I shall not deny the individual the full and equal enjoyment of the

[gOOds, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
II accommodations of a place of public accommodation or public

[service because of religion, race, color, national origin, age,

Isex or marital status.

,j

62. Under the circumstances of this case, Defendants herein

Iviolated the aforesaid victim protection law by engaging in a

'I !'! ~tcHH~, wou & ASWc.1
Atlorrwy, d! law

fli!B:ntG,~f'k'')~(qh',:d-.lr1t'f't4H'iOJ-~,O'l
Ph::ne: \8;,)) ne·44'() I ;;X' (810) 23i:H)716

\
I\'I

10

I!II
II

II

discriminating custom, policy, and/or practice of stripping the

I Plaintiffs of their clothing and exposing their naked bodies to

'[male and female deputies and jail trustees alike in the manner

more fully described herein, in a place of public accommodation

i and/or public service.
r.

'I,

63. Plaintiffs herein are members of a protected class.

64. Defendants herein were predisposed to discriminate

,against persons in the class, and Defendants acted upon that

,[ predisposition when the discrimination occurred.

II

65. The Saginaw County Jail is a place of public

accommodation and/or public service.

66. Plaintiffs herein were treated differently than male

:1 detainees for same or similar conduct.

I" i

1\

67. As a result of Defendants' aforementioned conduct,

'I Plaintiffs suffered damages as more fully described herein.

I
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for certification of this action
Iii as a class action and judgment against Defendants herein, jointly
lIand severally as follows:

I

A. For compensatory damages in an amount proved at

trial.

B. For punitive damages against Defendants in an

I I
d

""C",",w""",,,<oc'l

Atla :wy, ,,1 law

!

7Hl fk<lch :'(re<>(

flin·.I"l,d·I~;;:;n 4B~O)-110',

?10r''::: IS10) 231!~14IC

r ,~x:

~1:I'0) lHHl726

amount proved at trial.
c. For all actual costs and attorney fees allowable
under USC §1983 and 1988 and other appropriate
11

'I
I

\
I,I

I.1'

laws together with any other relief the Court

II

deems necessary and proper.

II

D. For whatever further relief

Honorable Court

I

deems necessary,

,I DATED: I.:I I I
!I II!II

ER, WOLF & ASSOCIATES BY: CHRISTOPHER J. PlANTO, P-59160 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS 718 BEACH STREET FLINT. MI 48502 (810) 238-4410

I'I

DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY

I'I

NOW COME Plaintiffs, by and through their Attorneys,

i\FLETCHER, WOLF & ASSOCIATES, BY, CHRISTOPHER J. PlANTO, P-59160

Iland hereby relies on their previous

Trial by Jury in

\'\. this wi thi

of action.

\1 DATED: --H--'---I--"'--"--
,I
II

E , BY: CHRISTOPHER J. PIANTO, ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF

718 BEACH STREET

FLINT, MI 48502

I

(810) 238-4410

IC:\MY Documents\LINDAROSE ET AL\FOURTH AMD COMP

P-59160

I

II

[

~\~~:~:,~~~;t.~d~:~. II ;: ASIDe \ 7;8 ClI.',ol\"n ~;rf'pt &

I'I' ';illl,I\1,,/li.!!Pf1.,48502-110,5
;>"or'E': (BiO) 2.38-441(;

12

f,,, "'Of 21"'''''' .1

I
I
II

~UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SEE CASE FILE FOR
ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS OR PAGES
THAT WERE NOT
SCANNED

 
 Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 39 Filed 10/18/2002 Page 1 of 15

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

t~r i.}

"J

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

LINDA ROSE, JENNIFER CRADIT, SYLVIA DENISE BRADDOCK, LISA RENEE BRANDIMORE, DWAYNE BUTTERFIELD, BOBBIE WAYNE CARTER, DANIEL WRAY CLAYTON, HOPE MICHELLE DAVIS, JOSHUA FULLER, NICHOLAS ANTHONY GILES, WILLIE LOUIS HENDRICKS, T~gISHA RAMON JOHNSON, ROBERT ALLEN KELSEY, SUE ANN LETTERMAN, DONNA LYNN QUARLES, DAVID TODD REINER, GREGORY LOUIS SCHULTZ, AMANDA RAE SHINAVER, DWAYNE ALANN SIMMONS, ROBIN . RENEE THOMAS, JOSHUA ALLEN WE I GANT, ,RAYMOND PRAAY, JUSTIN ANDERSON AND CRAIG MASON,

~CASE NO ~ 01 10'33 '7 HON: DAVID M. LAWSON

PLAINTIFFS,
i
i, v
'I SAGINAW COUNTY, SAGINAW COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, MUNICIPAL 'GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES, CHARLES
BROWN AND OFFICERS JOHN DOE, AND JANE DOE, (IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY), !JOINTLY & SEVERALLY,

PLAINTIFF'S FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY

DEFENDANTS.
/
FLETCHER, WOLF & ASSOCIATES
BY: CHRISTOPHER J. PlANTO, P-59160
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS
1718 BEACH ST illFLINT MI 48502
(810) 238-4410

JENSEN GILBERT SMITH & BORRELLO PC

BY, PETER C JENSEN (P25001)

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS

721 SOUTH MICHIGAN AVENUE SAGINAW MI 48602 (989) 790 2500
iUKi-U:l(, wou & ASSO('.
Al:or~('y~ d: ; dW 718 Gradl S~rt'('t : lin', l\1:d1i~'1 41i.101< 10:; ?honC': mH)) 2184410 IJx: toW) }J3{)716

/
1

Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 39 Filed 10/18/2002 Page 2 of 15
."-~

COMPLAINT

COMMON ALLEGATIONS

NOW COME Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys, FLETCHER,

WOLF & ASSOCIATES, BY: LOYST FLETCHER, JR., P-29799 and CHRISTOPHER

J. PIANTO, P-59160, and for their complaint state as follows:

1. Venue is proper in the United States District Court for

the Eastern District of Michigan as the case presents an issue

under the Constitution of the United States of America.

2. Saginaw County Sheriff's Department is a governmem:al

agency situated in the County of Saginaw, State of Michigan.

3.

Plaintiff, Linda Rose is a resident of the city of

Montrose, County of Genesee, State of Michigan.

4. Jennifer Cradit is a resident of the city of Saginaw,

ICounty of Saginaw, State of Michigan.

I
I

5. That at all pertinent times, Defendant Saginaw County is

!municiPal and/or governmental entity exercising power in Saginaw

!county, Michigan.

6. That at all pertinent times, and on present information

and belief, Defendants Charles Brown, John and Jane Doe are

residents and/or employees, agents, and/or servants of Saginaw ! ICounty exercising authority in Saginaw County, Michigan.
I
7. That on or about January 29, 2001, Plaintiff Linda Rose

was detained at the Saginaw County Jail.

8. That in the summer of 1999 Plaintiff Jennifer Cradit was

detained at the Saginaw County Jail.

~llE-:-(:~"U·R, WOF & A~SO('. II,
Att()(~)('y" at I ,1W

7;8 a"J(,1' ,',lrl'('t

: :i:1!, Mid~igan 4b~02 110:, 'I'

f'h();,lP: (fl~;)) ::'38-4410 : JX: (filO) :'38-1)726

I

2

II
II
1I \

Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 39 Filed 10/18/2002 Page 3 of 15

9.

That at all pertinent times hereto all of the named

Plaintiffs ("Plaintiffs")were detainees of the Saginaw County Jail

in Saginaw Michigan, who were subjected to conduct in violation of

their State and Constitutional rights.

10. That at all pertinent times hereto, Defendant, Charles

Brown was the Sheriff of Saginaw County.

11. That at all pertinent times hereto, Defendants Jane and

,John Doe, were officers assigned to or working at the Saginaw
1
'I County Jail as employees, agents, and/or servants of Saginaw County

and/or Saginaw County Sheriff's Department.

12. That while detainees, Plaintiffs forced to completely

disrobe aad be subjected to viewing by male and/or female officers

and male and female jail trustees.

13. That while pretrial detainees Plaintiffs were forced to

:1 completely disrobe and be subjected to viewing by male and female II
'I
iofficers and male and female jail trustees.
I
14. That at all pertinent times hereto, Defendant Saginaw

Saginaw County Sheriff's Department owned or controlled

or contributed to the ownership, operation, control, and/or

maintenance of the Saginaw County Jail.

15. That at all pertinent times hereto, Defendant, Charles

,! Brown as sheriff of Saginaw County directed the operation, control,
l!

"
Ii:

a

n

d

/

o

r

maintenance

ot

the

Saginaw

County

Jail.

,

16. That at all pertinent times hereto, Defendants had a

custom, policy, practice, and/or procedure within the Saginaw

HHr~I:K, WOl~ &, AS,SQC

AttO":ley~ Jt I ilW

!~a ':I~'.u:r SIr"..:

F::nt, MiClig.u' 43',0]-1105

I>~om:: (8il)) 21f1..44'O

:1

cit)(: (310) naO!J6

Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 39 Filed 10/18/2002 Page 4 of 15

County Jail in which Plaintiffs were subj ected to an unlawful

i deprivation of their Constitutional and civil rights.

17. That Defendants did not have a warrant or any other

lawful authority to strip and/or strip search Plaintiffs in the

manner more fully described herein.

18. That at the time Plaintiffs were detainees and subjected

to the various violations herein described, Defendants had no

reason to believe, nor any probable cause to believe, tha~

Plaintiffs were in possession of any type of dangerous weapons,

contraband, or other instrumentality of

iIl: nature.

II:I

19. That Defendants' purpose for

questionable/suspicious stripping and/or strip

Ii searching Plaintiffs herein were for behavioral modifying,

[punitive, malicious, illegal, gratuitous and/or personal reasons,

and were clearly unreasonable on their face.

20. Pursuant to Defendant's illegal custom, policy, practice

an/or procedure, Plaintiffs were forced to sit naked in a cell

commonly referred to as "the hole" or "the naked tank" for as many

hours on end exposing their naked bodies to male and female

officers and jail trustees alike.

21. The naked Plaintiffs were left without blankets, gowns,

Lor any other way to shield their bodies from the video cameras or

iinaked eyes of male and female jail employees and/o:t- trustees that
I i
IChose to look and at them.

rttaOnR, WO~f 8.: ASSOC

At:orr~"I" at : aw

718 B"JI-h St~'('('t

rllll!. "'1,d~ip>,1~ .itb:))-: 0';

"'KIf'?; (810) 1 Hi-441O

4

~<lx: (W:O; 218-:)7)1)

J
I'
II

Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 39 Filed 10/18/2002 Page 5 of 15

22. Plaintiffs in violation of their Constitutional and

statutory rights were stripped without consent or permission of any

type whatsoever.

23. Plaintiffs, while post trial detainees are also subjected

warrantless, unreasonable strip searches conducted absent any

probable cause in the manner described herein.

24. Defendants' conduct and actions were done under color of

state and federal law.

25. Plaintiffs have a clearly established right to be free

from unreasonable searches and seizures, unwanted bodily contact,

invasions of their privacy, etc. Reasonable officers acting in the

position of jail guards knew or should have known that the conduct

at issue was a moving force in violation those rights. Pray v.

!
iCity of Sandusky, 49 F.3d 1154 (6th Cir. 1995).

i

II

26. That Defendants' conduct was carried out under a custom,

III'Ii policy, practice, and/or procedure violative of the Constitution of

lithe United States of American and the Constitution of the State of 1'!1 Mll, cn• l'gan.

27. Defendants herein had a duty to intercede and stop the

aforesaid conduct.

28. Defendants herein breached their duty to intercede and in

fact perpetuated the illegal customs, policies and/or practices.

ii_nUIUi:, WO~f & A:'.!',OC

Attor~<?y~ a: ~ dV'"

71 e llrd('h -;lrp(,(

'ii:1;, !'.{cb!},n 48',0)-1105

Pho:1p: (0 ~ 0) ?](f.-\t,1O

5

'dX: (810) 23fi-071f>

Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 39 Filed 10/18/2002 Page 6 of 15

COUNT I

FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS OF CIVIL RIGHTS

29. Plaintiffs reincorporate each and every paragraph above

as though fully stated herein.

30. That this count or cause of action arises out of the

Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States

constitution and 42 USC §1983 and 1988.

31. That Defendants did not have search warrants or other

lawful authority to strip the Plaintiffs in the manner described

more fully above.

32.

That the actions of Defendants herein violated

Plaintiffs' clearly established rights under the Fourth, Eighth,

and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution,

specifically but not by way of limitation:

A. The right to be free from unreasonable searches and

seizures;

B. Freedom from deprivation of liberty;

C. Freedom from deprivation of privacy;

D. Freedom from deprivations of privileges;

E. Freedom from deprivation of immunities;

F. Freedom from cruel and unusual punishment.

33.

Defendants herein subjected Plaintiffs to these

deproivations either intentionally, maliciously and/or by a reckless

disregard for whether their rights would be violated by their

actions.

H.EH:H~K, WOU & ASSOC

A'to:'nrY'.lt l.;w
n fl <{(>",-h 5t'e<',

fl:nt, N'.i(L';g,il:l 4(l.502-1 ;0',

Y'IOI'<>: (510) d8-';41f)

6

f;:x: (8'0) 2]8,)726

Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 39 Filed 10/18/2002 Page 7 of 15

34. Defendants' wrongful conduct described herein was done

1 under color of Federal and State law.

I

35. That as a direct and proximate result thereof, Plaintiffs

I
I,

suffe

r

e

d

the

following

injuries:

A. Extreme embarrassment and humiliation past and

future;

B. Emotional distress and mental anguish, past and

future;

C. Insulted honor and mortification, past and future;

,

i:
iI'

D. Loss of personal liberty and dignity, past and

i:

future;

E. Injury to their feelings, past and future.

COUNT II

I

II

GROSS NEGLIGENCE

:!

[I

(CHARLES BROWN, JOHN AND JANE DOE DEFENDANTS ONLY)

II

36. Plaintiffs reincorporate each and every paragraph above

I as though fully stated herein.

il

37. That Defendants Charles Brown, John Doe and Jane Doe owed

Iplaintiffs a duty of due and reasonable care.

II

38. Defendants conduct as described herein constituted a

breach of their its duties owed to Plaintiffs and said conduct of

'Defendants Charles Brown, John Doe, and Jane Doe constituted "gross

negligence" as that term is defined in MCLA §691.1707(2c) :in that

i"The conduct was so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack

of
I ~!lE";"(!-!}R, WOlf 8< ASSO(. I A(10"1l'Y, JI law I 1~8 'I,'del- S(rP<i"
~;:nt, M_k:ligJl' 43502-110'>
P~onr: (1j1l)) n8-,~4~O
(',:x: (aW) B8 e72!,

concern

for

whether

injuries

result."
7

Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 39 Filed 10/18/2002 Page 8 of 15

39. That Defendants Charles Brown, John Doe, and Jane Doe's grossly negligent conduct caused all of the aforesaid events and injuries set forth herein with particularity.
40. Plaintiffs sustained damages from the aforesaid injuries as more fully described herein.
COUNT I I I

INVASION OF PRIVACY

(CHARLES BROWN, JOHN AND JANE DOE ONLY)

41. Plaintiffs reincorporate each and every paragraph above

as though fully stated herein.

42. That Defendants' conduct/actions wrongfully invaded

plaintiffs' privacy, seclusion, solitude, and/or private affairs.

43. The Plaintiffs' naked bodies is a matter private to them.

44. Defendants invaded plaintiffs' privacy by the illegal

conduct, e,g. custom, policy, practice of punitive, malicious,

,iintentional, and/or gratuitous stripping of their clothing in full view of officers and trustees, male and female alike.

4.5. That Defendants used the viewing of Plaintiffs' naked
I
Ibodies for their own advantage.

i

46. Defendants disclosed Plaintiffs' naked bodies to both

!il' male and female officers and jail trustees alike in a manner that

iiwas highly offensive to a reasonable person.

Ii

47, The exhibition of plaintiffs' naked bodies is of no

legitimate concern to the public, officers and jail trustees of the

opposite sex.

A:torr.~y'i ,tt ~ <'-Vi
I 7~11,8pLBte,,.~xic"hi&S",'r-f:'l;>!1,8:'0)- ;1)') '

'.>'lOPE': (810; 23i.l-l.41 0

8

I;.:>:: (B;C) 2j3-lJ72&

I

I
II

Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 39 Filed 10/18/2002 Page 9 of 15

48. The exposure of the Plaintiffs' naked bodies placed Plaintiffs in a false light.
49. Plaintiffs sustained damages from the aforesaid injuries more fully described herein.
COUNT IV

ASSAULT AND BATTERY

(CHARLES BROWN, JOHN DOE, JANE DOE ONLY)

50. Plaintiffs reincorporate each and every paragraph above

as though fully stated herein.

51. Defendants herein intended to cause the harmful or

offensive contact described more fully herein.

52. Plaintiffs experienced imminent apprehension.

,i:

53. Defendants herein did in fact engage in and/or direct un-

I! permitted offensive and/or harmful bodily contact with Plaintiffs

I'
II as more fully described herein. iI
54. Plaintiffs sustained damages from the aforesaid injuries
i!11 as more fully described herein.

!

'I

COUNT V

INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

(DEFENDANTS CHARLES BROWN, JOHN DOE, AND JANE DOE)

55. Plaintiffs reincorporate each and every paragraph above

as though fully stated herein.

56. The wrongful stripping of Plaintiffs as more fully

described herein is a clear example of extreme and outrageous

IlHOIER, WOU:' &: ASSOC. /\!torr.<,y" ,11';'w 718 !3Pd(~ St'pp! ;-lir:', Mi(hig.l:l 4850}-: :05 ;>:'or:f>: (31(;) nli~1410 f,l>1: (810) nB-tl7}6

conduct that exceeds all bounds of decency.
.o '

Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 39 Filed 10/18/2002 Page 10 of 15

57. The Defendants' wrongful conduct as described more fully herein was intentional and/or reckless.
58. The Defendants knew or should have known the aforesaid conduct by Defendants would cause Plaintiffs to suffer emotional distress then and in the future.
59. The aforesaid conduct by Defendants resulted in severe emotional distress, embarrassment, and/or anguish in the past and will continue well into the future.
60. Plaintiffs sustained damages from the aforesaid injuries as more fully described herein.
COUNT VI

VIOLATION OF THE ELLIOTT LARSON CIVIL RIGHTS ACT

MCLA 37.2302 (Al; MSA 3.548 (302) (Al

I

61. Plaintiffs reincorporate each and every paragraph above

las though fully stated herein.

I I

62. This is an action to enforce the civil rights of the

I Plaintiff's herein which arises out of their relationship as

II detainees of the Saginaw County Jail.

II

63. MCLA 37.2302(a); MSA 3.548(302) (a) is a Michigan Civil

I! Rights victim protection statute that provides that: a person shall

not deny the individual the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,

services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of

a place of public accommodation or public service because of

religi.on, race, color, national origin, age, sex or marital status.

flHCH~R, 'NO! f & ASSOC ivtntm'Y' ~l L.\v, 71fl B(>,,(:'l s;·~,,,! fli~t, .V,i(ilig,l'l 485\)2 ~ ;0,5 C)r.0r~!': iEl\:) 73/:1-4410 Fill'.: (8:0) }j&-\)726

10

II

Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 39 Filed 10/18/2002 Page 11 of 15

640 Under the circumstances of this case, Defendants herein

violated the aforesaid victim protection law by engaging in a

discriminating custom, policy, and/or practice of stripping the

Plaintiffs of their clothing and exposing their naked bodies to

male and female deputies and jail trustees alike in the manner more

fully described herein, in a place of public accommodation and/or

public service 0

650 Plaintiffs herein are members of a protected classo

660 Defendants herein were predisposed to discriminate

against persons in the class, and Defendants acted upon that

predisposition when the discrimination occurredo

670 The Saginaw County Jail is

I

i accommodation
i

and/or

public

service 0

I

'\

680 Plaintiffs herein were treated

a place of public differently than male

fl detainees for same or similar conduct 0

I

I

690 As a result of Defendants' aforementioned conduct,

I

I Plaintiffs suffered damages as more fully described hereino

~~EREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against Defendants

herein, jointly and severally as follows:
Ii Ao For compensatory damages in an amount proved at

'I

trialo

80 For punitive damages against Defendants in an

amount proved at trialo

Co For all actual costs and attorney fees allowable

,l[,:"OII:R, WO! i &. ASSOC
Aftor'WY'> Jl I ,1W
7:8 ij<'a,h Str,"",! f :i:ll, Mid~irill1 48502 11\1', Pho:w: (i\~;) )Jg..4'~:O ! ax: 181-:)'1138-07:'6

under USC §1983 and 1988 and other appropriate laws
11

Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 39 Filed 10/18/2002 Page 12 of 15

together with any other relief the Court deems necessary and proper. 4. For injunctive relief forever barring Defendants herein from engaging in their illegal and/or unconstitutional customs, policies, and/or practices that force detainees and prisoners from removing their clothing in the manners more fully described herein. E. For whatever further relief this Honorable Court deems necessary, proper, and just.

COUNT VII

I

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

I:1

70. Plaintiffs reincorporate each and every paragraph above

Ii

Has though fully stated herein.

l!
il

71.

H

,: policies,

Defendant's illegal and/or unconstitutional custom's, and/or practices more fully described herein must. be

i enjoined; Plaintiffs and/or future detainees and/or prisoners of

II the Saginaw County Jail stand to suffer irreparable harm both

II physically and emotionally that will extend well into their lives.

72. As a result of Defendants' aforementioned conduct,

Plaintiffs suffered damages as more fully described herein.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against Defendants

,herein, jointly and severally as follows:

A. For compensatory damages in an amount proved at

flH(HHt, WOF & I.SS0C
713 '!\Vdl ~,;",~: 1-1:1:1. .\"i('~l;g,.\~, -IB::;()2-1 ;()~ !~'lorfc: (S 1Uj H8·!,.41 f) f,,-x: ;0'0) ;>J&-<)i26

trial. 12

Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 39 Filed 10/18/2002 Page 13 of 15

"!i

'j

B. For punitive damages against Defendants in an

amount proved at trial.

C. For all actual costs and attorney fees allowable

under USC §1983 and 1988 and other appropriate laws

together with any other relief the Court deems

necessary and proper.

4. For injunctive relief forever barring Defendants

herein from engaging in their illegal and/or

unconstitutional customs, policies, and/or

practices that force detainees and prisoners from

removing their clothing in the manners more ful.ly

described herein.

E. For whatever further relief

Honorable Court

deems

;

I

~ 2 IDATED: __

II
I

BY: CHRISTOPHER J. PlANTO, ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS 718 BEACH STREET FLINT, MI 48502 (810) 238-4410

P-59160

a ~ TCHH<, WO! f .& ASSOC
7'3 i:I('¥t; S(wec 11;[11, Mi(;li~r' 48502-1105 Phon!': (1l1ll) )38-44'0 rax: \fl10) 1.Hl-07J6

13

Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 39 Filed 10/18/2002 Page 14 of 15

I

DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY

I
I

NOW COME Plaintiffs, by and through their Attorneys, FLETCHER,

IWOLF & ASSOCIATES, BY: CHRISTOPHER J. PIANTO,

hereby

I relies on their previous demand for a Trial

within

I:, cause of action.

I! g(O ~l II
""~ I

DATED,

f)
! :,
'

2-

i:

r:
:\
,.I

TCHER, WOLF ASSOCIATES . Y: CHRISTOPHER J. PIANTO, P-59160 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 718 BEACH STREET FLINT, HI 48502
(810) 238-4410

C:\My Documents\LINDAROSE ET AL\FIFTH AND COMP

Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 39 Filed 10/18/2002 Page 15 of 15
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SEE CASE FILE FOR
ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS OR PAGES
THAT WERE NOT SCANNED

 
 Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 55 Filed 12/09/2002 Page 1 of 17

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

LINDA ROSE, ,JENNIFER CRADIT, SYLVIA DENISE BRADDOCK, LISA RENEE BRANDIMORE, DWAYNE BUTTERFIELD, BOBBIE WAYNE CARTER, DANIEL WRAY CLAYTON, HOPE MICHELLE DAVIS, JOSHUA FULLER, NICHOLAS ANTHONY GILES, WILLIE LOUIS HENDRICKS, TANISHA RAMON JOHNSON, ROBERT ALLEN KELSEY, SUE ANN LETTERMAN, DONNA LYNN QUARLES, DAVID TODD REINER, GREGORY LOUIS SCHULTZ, AMANDA RAE SHINAVER, DWAYNE ALANN SIMMONS, ROBIN RENEE THOMAS, JOSHUA ALLEN WE I GANT, RAYMOND PRAAY, JUSTIN ANDERSON AND CRAIG MASON, MATTHEW STARKWEATHER; RICHARD PLAMONDON-, ROBERT JAMES STEPHENS'

CASE NO. 01 10337 HON: DAVID M. LAVJSON

PLAINTIFFS,
i
i
!, V

SAGINAW COUNTY, SAGINAW COUNTY

SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, MUNICIPAL
I, GOVE~~ENTAL ENTITIES, CHARLES

i !

BROWN AND OFFICERS JOHN AND JANE DOE, (IN THEIR

DOE,

i INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY) ,

i: JOINTLY & SEVERALLY,

DEFENDANTS.
~FL=ET=CH=ER=, ~WO~LF~&~~AS~SO~CI~AT-ES----I
BY: CHRISTOPHER J. PIANTO, P-59160 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS 718 BEACH ST FLINT MI 48502
(810) 238-4410

PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY

H flOUR, WO~f II< ASsaC Att()(,~py~ '>' ~ aw
71 I) Hed('h Strp0t
Fii'l:, M'chig"n 48'>[))·: 'a5
f'hu'w: '_310) 230-1410 fd:':: (810) n&01J6

O'CONNOR, DEGRAZIA & TAMM, P.C. JAMES I. DEGRAZIA, P-22853 ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS 4111 ANDOVER ROAD, STE 300 EAST BLOOMFIELD HILLS MI 48302
(248) 433-2000
.________________________1
1

Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 55 Filed 12/09/2002 Page 2 of 17

COMPLAINT

COMMON ALLEGATIONS

NOW COME Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys, FLETCHER,

I~OLF & ASSOCIATES, BY: LOYST FLETCHER, JR" P-29799 and CHRISTOPHER

J, PIANTO, P-59160, and for their complaint state as follows:

Venue is proper in the United States District Court for

the Eastern District of Michigan as the case presents an issue

under the Constitution of the United States of America,

2, Saginaw County Sheriff's Department is a governmental

agency situated in the County of Saginaw, State of Michigan,

3,

Plaintiff, Linda Rose is a resident of the city of

Montrose, County of Genesee, State of Michigan,

4, Jennifer eradit is a resident of the city of Saginaw,

County of Saginaw, State of Michigan,

5, That at all pertinent times, Defendant Saginaw County is

municipal and/or governmental entity exercising power in Saginaw

County, Michigan,

6, That at all pertinent times, and on present information

and belief, Defendants Charles Brown, John and Jane Doe are

residents and/or employees, agents, and/or servants of Saginaw

County exercising authority in Saginaw County, Michigan,

7. That on or about January 29, 2001, Plaintiff Linda Rose

was detained at the Saginaw County Jail,

nHCHER, WOi f &. ASSOC

Attomry', at I .{\'v

718 !JeJrh SliM"

11'~t. .'0.i(higa~ 43:;C2 110.';

?hol~(': ;/!1O) )J1:I-44~O IJx: (f\'il))J8-()72&

2

Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 55 Filed 12/09/2002 Page 3 of 17

8. That in the summer of 1999 Plaintiff Jennifer Cradit was

detained at the Saginaw County Jail.

9.

That at all pertinent times hereto all of the named

Plaintiffs (nPlaintiffsn)were detainees of the Saginaw County Jail

in Saginaw Michigan, who were subjected to conduct in violation of

their State and Constitutional rights.

10. That at all pertinent times hereto, Defendant, Charles

Brown was the Sheriff of Saginaw County.

11. That at all pertinent times hereto, Defendants Jane and

John Doe, were officers assigned to or working at the Saginaw

County Jail as employees, agents, and/or servants of Saginaw County

and/or Saginaw County Sheriff's Department.

12. That while detainees, Plaintiffs forced to completely

disrobe and be subjected to viewing by male and/or female officers

and male and female jail trustees.

i

13 . That while pretrial detainees Plaintiffs were forced to

IIII completely disrobe and be SUbjected to viewing by male and female

officers and male and female jail trustees.

14. That at all pertinent times hereto, Defendant Saginaw

County and Saginaw County Sheriff's Department owned or contro1led

or contributed to the ownership, operation, control, and/o:r-

maintenance of the Saginaw County Jail.

i lnO"l~!t, WOU 3. ASSOC

Al!or~(','c, It 1"W

718 Gpa(~ S:r~'f'l

'linl, !v'.:ch:g"'l 48502,110;' Phon(~: mWj 2384410

f 3:..: \8 ~ G) LH1-072l>

3

I
~II '_~'_h __ _

Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 55 Filed 12/09/2002 Page 4 of 17

15. That at all pertinent times hereto, Defendant, Charles

Brown as sheriff of Saginaw County directed the operation, control,

and/or maintenance of the Saginaw County Jail.

16. That at all pertinent times hereto, Defendants had a

custom, policy, practice, and/or procedure wi thin the Saginaw

County Jail in which Plaintiffs were subjected to an unlawful

deprivation of their Constitutional and civil rights.

17. That Defendants did not have a warrant or any other

lawful authority to strip and/or strip search Plaintiffs in the

manner more fully described herein.

18. That at the time Plaintiffs were detainees and subjected

to the various violations herein described, Defendants had no

reason to believe, nor any probable cause to believe, that

Plaintiffs were in possession of any type of dangerous weapons,

contraband, or other instrumentality of questionable/suspicious

nature.

19. That Defendants' purpose for stripping and/or strip

searching Plaintiffs herein were for behavioral modifying,

punl- t..-.. J•. ve i malicious, illegal, gratuitous and/or personal reasons,

I I

and were clearly unreasonable on their face.

II

!Jii

20. Pursuant to Defendant's illegal custom, policy, practice

II an/or procedure, Plaintiffs were forced to sit naked in a cell

commonly referred to as "the hole" or "the naked tank" for as many

i'i.H(i-lf.:<:, WOLf & ASSOC
J: Attorr~<:,y~, ~dV~'

718 Bt'Jch Strf'('t

f-:i:lt, Nb.:blg.l'l 4fI'>0)- :05

Pho:w: ,_3:0) 13[1-4410

~ax: (oW) 21B-il!)6

4

,
_~_~___---_ Jl_>,~_>_______

Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 55 Filed 12/09/2002 Page 5 of 17

hours on end exposing their naked bodies to male and female

officers and jail trustees alike.

21. The naked Plaintiffs were left without blankets, gowns,

or any other way to shield their bodies from the video cameras or

naked eyes of male and female jail employees and/or trustees that

chose to look and at them.

22. Plaintiffs in violation of their Constitutional and

statutory rights were stripped without consent or permission of any

type whatsoever.

23. Plaintiffs, while post trial detainees are also subjected

warrantless, unreasonable strip searches conducted absent any

probable cause in the manne" described herein.

24. Defendants' conduct and actions were done under color of

state and federal law.

25. Plaintiffs have a clearly established right to be free

from unreasonable searches and seizures, unwanted bodily contact,

invasions of their privacy, etc. Reasonable officers acting in the

position of jail guards knew or should have known that the conduct

at issue was a moving force in violation those rights. Pray v.

City of Sandusky, 49 F.3d 1154 (6th Cir. 1995).

26. That Defendants' conduct was carried out under a custom,

policy, practice, and/or procedure violative of the Constitution of

the United States of American and the Constitution of the State of

Hf"!t';i~R, WOi f .& ASSOC.

Michigan.

At/ortley', <1: I dW

7~8 ded('h 'ill'('('1

f:ht, Michigan 4[,',[);;-; 0.)

Pho:w: i8 ~ J) 23(i~\/' 10

",IX: (810) 138-0726

5

Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 55 Filed 12/09/2002 Page 6 of 17
27. Defendants herein had a duty to intercede and stop the aforesaid conduct.
28. Defendants herein breached their duty to intercede and in fact perpetuated the illegal customs, policies and/or practices.
i: Ii

I
I II
I.i
i:
"'1

~! f;('j-l~t!:, WOl~ & ASSOC
Att()( 'i~'y, ..1, L;lW

l~H R';dd' Slr(';;>j

~I:nt, I\'lichigan 48502-1105

Phollt': ((ita) ;r;S-44W

rlX: (e 10) Be 0716

6

_ .-..-.-JIL____~~...

Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 55 Filed 12/09/2002 Page 7 of 17

COUNT I

FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS OF CIVIL RIGHTS

29. Plaintiffs reincorporate each and every paragraph above

I
i

as

though

fully

stated

herein.

i

i

I!

30. That this count or cause of action

I

Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of

arises out the United

of the States

constitution and 42 USC §1983 and 1988.

31. That Defendants did not have search warrants or other

lawful authority to strip the Plaintiffs in the manner described

more fully above.

32.

That the actions of Defendants herein violated

Plaintiffs' clearly established rights under the Fourth, Eighth,

and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution,

specifically but not by way of limitation:

A. The right to be free from unreasonable searches and

seizures;

B. Freedom from deprivation of liberty;

C. Freedom from deprivation of privacy;

D. Freedom from deprivations of privileges;

Freedom from deprivation of immunities;

F. Freedom from cruel and unusual punishment.

33.

Defendants herein subjected Plaintiffs to these

deprivations either intentionally, maliciously and/or by a reckless

7

ICI ase 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 55 Filed 12/09/2002 Page 8 of 17
I

disregard for whether their rights would be violated by their

actions.

34. Defendants' wrongful conduct described herein was done

under color of Federal and State law.

35. That as a direct and proximate result thereof, Plaintiffs

suffered the following injuries:

A. Extreme embarrassment and humiliation past and

future;

B. Emotional distress and mental anguish, past and

future;

C. Insulted honor and mortification, past and future;

D. Loss of personal liberty and dignity, past and

future;

E. Injury to their feelings, past and future.

COUNT II

L

GROSS NEGLIGENCE

r

(CHARLES BROWN, JOHN AND JANE DOE DEFENDANTS ONLY)

36. Plaintiffs reincorporate each and every paragraph above
I

las though fully stated herein.

37. That Defendants Charles Brown, John Doe and Jane Doe owed

Plaintiffs a duty of due and reasonable care.

38. Defendants conduct as described herein constituted a

breach of their its duties owed to Plaintiffs and said conduct of

1llC!Ciifli:, WOl r.& ASSOC. Attornl'Y" ,l: law 7~B a"dd1 ~ltl",>j f ~im, ""jrhig.,n "0502 ':O~ f'ho:1I': (il ~ :i) :>J8-441 0 ~a)(: (810) 13t1-U7:U,

Defendants Charles Brown, John Doe, and Jane Doe constituted "gross
8

________ .1

Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 55 Filed 12/09/2002 Page 9 of 17

negligence" as that term is defined in MCLA §691.1707(2c) :in that "The conduct was so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack

of concern for whether injuries result." 39. That Defendants Charles Brown, John Doe, and ,Jane Doe's

grossly negligent conduct caused all of the aforesaid events and

injuries set forth herein with particularity.

40. Plaintiffs sustained damages from the aforesaid injuries

as more fully described herein.

COUNT III

INVASION OF PRIVACY

(CHARLES BROWN, JOHN AND JANE DOE ONLY)

!

4L Plaintiffs reincorporate each and every paragraph above

i i as though fully stated herein.

42. That Defendants' conduct/actions wrongfully invaded

Plaintiffs' privacy, seclusion, solitude, and/or private affairs.

43. The Plaintiffs' naked bodies is a matter private to them.

44. Defendants invaded Plaintiffs' privacy by the illegal
Iconduct, e.g. custom, policy, practice of punitive, malicious,

intentional, and/or gratuitous stripping of their clothing in full

Iview of officers and trustees, male and female alike.

,

45. That Defendants used the viewing of Plaintiffs' naked

I!

r: bodies for their own advantage.

l" ,

ii',
nnCHHl:, \'VOl f & ASSOL

At1GH1(,y~ ,,' : dW

n8 Br,Kh Sll'f'(>\

J ;;~ll. i"lift~((1.Jn t,8)())_ '05

P~nnr: \11' 0) ? -,\1)-.\/.1 e

'ilX: (810; J3ti-u7:?6

9

Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 55 Filed 12/09/2002 Page 10 of 17

46. Defendants disclosed Plaintiffs' naked bodies to both rna_Ie and female officers and jail trustees alike in a manner that was highly offensive to a reasonable person.
47. The exhibition of Plaintiffs' naked bodies is of no legitimate concern to the public, officers and jail trustees of the opposite sex.
48. The exposure of the Plaintiffs' naked bodies placed Plaintiffs in a false light.
49. Plaintiffs sustained damages from the aforesaid injuries as more fully described herein.

COUNT IV

ASSAULT AND BATTERY

(CHARLES BROWN, JOHN DOE, JANE DOE ONLY)

50. Plaintiffs reincorporate each and every paragraph above as though fully stated herein.
51. Defendants herein intended to cause the harmful or offensive contact described more fully herein.
52. Plaintiffs experienced imminent apprehension. 53. Defendants herein did in fact engage in and/or direct unpermitted offensive and/or harmful bodily contact with Plaintiffs as more fully described herein. 54. Plaintiffs sustained damages from the aforesaid inj-Ciries as more fully described herein.

rlEc:-an, WOt I .& ASset:.
ii, Att\nu"y-; I aw
7~8 oPJ(ic Sir,,,,,,!
J 1;111, Mi(;-,igal: 48502 1105 Phon!': ~tI'O) 2.l&4~,~O
Fax: (810; lJ8-{)726

COUNT V 10

Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 55 Filed 12/09/2002 Page 11 of 17

'i
I

INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
I

I ,

(DEFENDANTS CHARLES BROWN, JOHN DOE, AND JANE DOE)

i:

ji

55. Plaintiffs reincorporate each and every paragraph above

as though fully stated herein.

56. The wrongful stripping of Plaintiffs as more fully

described herein is a clear example of extreme and outrageous

COl'.duct t:hat exceeds all bounds of decency.

57. The Defendants' wrongful conduct as described more fully

I~ herein was intentional and/or reckless.

I

I,

58. The Defendants knew or should have known the aforesaid

, conduct by Defendants would cause Plaintiffs to suffer emotional I"i distress then and in the future.

59. The aforesaid conduct by Defendants resulted in severe

emotional distress, embarrassment, and/or anguish in the past and

will continue well into the future.

60. Plaintiffs sustained damages from the aforesaid injuries as more fully described herein.

COUNT VI

VIOLATION OF THE ELLIOTT LARSON CIVIL RIGHTS ACT

MCLA 37.2302 (Al; MSA 3.548 (302) (Al

61. Plaintiffs reincorporate each and every paragraph above though fully stated herein.

f! ffO-UR, WOiJ- &: ASSOC. Atlorr;,'y~ <lL ~dW 718 Be.;('h Slrpf'l I :illt, M,('hip,.:n 48'>O)-~ ~05 f'ho:'lP: 18 i 0) 23/\-4410 'dX: (81f))J;;fI-0726

11

Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 55 Filed 12/09/2002 Page 12 of 17

62. This is an action to enforce the civil rights of the

Plaintiff's herein which arises out of their relationship as

detainees of the Saginaw County Jail.

63. MCLA 37.2302(a); MSA 3.548(302) (a) is a Michigan Civil

Rights victim protection statute that provides that: a person shal J.

not deny the individual the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,

services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of

a place of public accommodation or public service because of

religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex or marital status.

64. Under the circumstances of this case, Defendants herein

violated the aforesaid victim protection law by engaging in a
i
I
discriminating custom, policy, and/or p:t'actice of stripping the

Plaintiffs of their clothing and exposing their naked bodies to

male and female deputies and jail trustees alike in the manner more

i fully described herein, in a place of public accommodation and/or

II:1 public service.

II

65. Plaintiffs herein are members of a protected class.

66. Defendants herein were predisposed to discriminate

against persons in the class, and Defendants acted upon that

predisposition when the discrimination occurred.

67. The Saginaw County Jail is a place of public

accommodation and/or pllblic service.

68. Plaintiffs herein were treated differently than male

! ~_~rci;~R, WOU- 3. ASS(K. _Ar:Orrwy5 .:1 l iW ?1f1 Br,l(~) S:re"t 'lim, Mid'!I\':'1 4a~O}-~ ~0S ?no(l(': (fW::) .?38-441U (ax: (310) l'iM)716

detainees for same or similar conduct.
12

I

!

............................. Hij.!.~~~~

L~

Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 55 Filed 12/09/2002 Page 13 of 17

69. As a result of Defendants' aforementioned conduct, Plaintiffs suffered damages as more fully described herein.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against Defendants

herein, jointly and severally as follows:

A. For compensatory damages in an amount proved elL

trial.

B. For punitive damages against Defendants in an

amount proved at trial.

C. For all actual costs and attorney fees allowable

under USC §1983 and 1988 and other approp:date laws

together with any other relief the Court deems

i

j

necessary and proper.

\1

" "

4. For injunctive relief forever barring Defendants

\

'I

herein from engaging in their illegal and/or

unconstitutional customs, policies, and/or'

practices that force detainees and prisoners from

removing t.heir clot.hing in t.he manners more fully

described herein.

E. For whatever furt.her relief this Honorable Court.

\

deems necessary, proper, and just.

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f~ HCHtK, wou (I., ASSOC
Al:or[1,'Y~ ,,1 ,aw l18 Bl'd(h Street clint, Miz-blg..:'l 41)502 ~ ~O'i Pbr;;'w: (~; 0) 1 Hi 441 0 c dX (t110) 2,HH1726

13

I II

Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 55 Filed 12/09/2002 Page 14 of 17
.•..

COUNT VII

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

70. Plaintiffs reincorporate each and every paragraph above

as though fully stated herein.

71. Defendant's illegal and/or unconstitutional custom's,

policies, and/or practices more fully described herein must be

enjoined; Plaintiffs and/or future detainees and/or prisoners of

the Saginaw County Jail stand to suffer irreparable harm both

physically and emotionally that will extend well into their lives.

72. As a result of Defendants' aforementioned conduct,

Plaintiffs suffered damages as more fully described herein.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against Defendants

herein, jointly and severally as follows:

A. For compensatory damages in an amount proved at

trial.

B. For punitive damages against Defendants in an

amount proved at trial.
c. For all actual costs and attorney fees allowable

under USC §1983 and 1988 and other appropriate laws

together with any other relief the Court deems

necessary and proper.

4. For injunctive relief forever barring Defendants

fl~lCH~Rr WOlf 11 ASSOC.
A:torn"y" :It I ilW /18 fJ!',lC" StrE"'r' ; Ij~!, o/,j(h;g.1;\ 4B',07-110J "honE"': \01(;) nH-441O fiD': :[ilOl13f!-JJ7Jti

herein from engaging in their illegal and/or 14

I,CIaI se 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 55 Filed 12/09/2002 Page 15 of 17

unconstitutional

customs,

policies,

and/or

practices that force detainees and prisoners from

removing their clothing in the manners more fully described herein.

E. For whatever further relief this Honorable Court

deems necessary, proper, and just.

~~~H~E~R, ~W~OE~~&~A=SS=~-T-ES---.BY: CHRISTOPHER J. PlANTO, P-59160
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS 718 BEACH STREET FLINT, MI 48502 (810) 238-4410

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718 Ht'J('h Street

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PhO'w: la' OJ 218 4t. 1C

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Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 55 Filed 12/09/2002 Page 16 of 17

DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY

NOW COME Plaintiffs, by and through their Attorneys, FLETCHER,

WOLF & ASSOCIATES, BY, CHRISTOPHER J. prANTO, P-59160 and hereby

relies on their previous demand for

within

SSOCIATES BY: CHRISTOPHER J. PIANTO, P-59160 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 718 BEACH STREET FLINT, MI 48502 (810) 238-4410

A, \SIXTH AMD COMP. wpd

RH(Hdl., WOlr <& ASSOC
A:to~nf'y~, <It L~w 71il Bp"Cl ~tr<',,: fliPt, ,V.i<llif,d:~ 41:\::>0211(1.5 ?!lQI'<': 1810; B8·44lU
L.x: :0'0) 2J3-IJ7l.h

16

Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 55 Filed 12/09/2002 Page 17 of 17
lJNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGA..N
SEE CASE FILE FOR
ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS OR PAGES
THAT WERE NOT
SCANNED

 
 Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 59 Filed 12/24/2002 Page 1 of 10

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION

LINDA ROSE, JENNIFER CRADIT, SYLVIA DENISE BRADDOCK, LISA RENEE BRANDIMORE, DWAYNE BUTTERFIELD, BOBBIE WAYNE CARTER, DANIEL WRAY CLAYTON, HOPE MICHELLE DAVIS, JOSHUA FULLER, NICHOLAS ANTHONY GILES, WILLIE LOUIS HENDRICKS, TANISHA RAMON JOHNSON, ROBERY ALLEN KELSEY, SUE ANN LETTERMAN, DONNA LYNN QUARLES, DAVID TODD REINER, GREGORY LOUIS SCHULTZ, AMANDA RAE SHINAVER, DWAYNE ALANN SIMMONS, ROBIN RENEE THOMAS, JOSHUA ALLEN WEIGANT, RAYMOND PRAAY, JUSTIN ANDERSON, CRAIG MASON, MATTHEW STARKWEATHER, RICHARD PLAMONDON, and ROBERT JAMES STEPHENS,

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Plaintiffs,
vs

Case No. 01-CV-10337-BC HON. DAVID M. LAWSON

SAGINAW COUNTY, SAGINAW COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT ENTITIES, CHARLES BROWN, AND OFFICERS JOHN DOE, AND JANE DOE (IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY), JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY,

Defendants

LOYST FLETCHER, JR. (P29799) CHRISTOPHER J. PIANTO (P59160) Attorneys for Plaintiffs 718 Beach Street Flint, Michigan 48502 (810) 238-4410

JAMES 1. DeGRAZIA (P 22853) O'CONNOR, DeGRAZIA & TAMM, P.C. Co-counsel for Defendants 4111 Andover Road - Suite 300 East Bloomfield Hills, Michigan 48302 (248) 433-2000 fax: (248) 433-2001

ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' SIXTH AMENDED COMPLAINT

NOW COME Defendants, Saginaw County, Saginaw County Sheriffs Department, and

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Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 59 Filed 12/24/2002 Page 2 of 10
Charles Brown, by and through their attorneys, O'CONNOR, DeGRAZIA & TAMM, P.C., and for their answer to Plaintiffs' Fifth Amended Complaint state as follows:
I. Neither admit nor deny for lack of sutTicient information upon which to form a beJief: and Plaintiffs are left to their proof.
2. It is denied that the Saginaw County Sheriff's Departmentis a governmental entity as same is simply a department within the County of Saginaw. The Saginaw County Sheriff's Department is not an entity capable of being sued and Defendants are entitled to Summary Disposition as to the Saginaw County Sheriff's Department.
3. Neither admit nor deny for lack of sufficient information upon which to form a belief, and Plaintiffs are left to their proof.
4. Neither admit not deny for lack of sufficient information upon which to form a belief, and Plaintiffs are left to their proof:
5. In answering paragraph 5, it is admitted that Saginaw County is a municipal corporation organized within the statutes of the State of Michigan.
6. In response to paragraph 6, Defendants admit only that Charles Drown is the Sheriff of Saginaw County, an elected official. The remainder of the paragraph is denied in the form and manner asserted as same is incapable of being answered.
7. Defendants admit same. 8. Paragraph 8 is unable to be answered in the form and manner asserted and thereforc, same is dcnied as being contrary to fact and law. There is no time frame given to which Defendants can respond. Jennifer Cradit was detained for a short period oftime. She was not detained for the entire summer.

Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 59 Filed 12/24/2002 Page 3 of 10
9. In response to paragraph 9, it appears that the named Plaintiffs were housed in the Saginaw County jail at various times. It is denied that they were subjected to conduct in violation of their State and Constitutional rights.
10. Defendants admit same. 11. Paragraph 11 is unable to be answered in the form and manner asserted and therefore same is denied as being untrue and contrary to fact and law. 12. In response to paragraph 12, same is unable to be answered in the form and manner asserted and therefore same is denied. It is specifically denied that Plaintiffs were viewed by officers of the opposite sex and it is specifically denied that they were viewed by trustees of either sex. 13. Paragraph 13 is unable to be answered in the form and manner a~serted as there is not enough specificity and therefore same is denied. It is specifically denied that they were subjected to viewing by officers of the opposite sex and specifically denied that they were subjected to any viewing by trustees. 14. In answering paragraph 14, the Saginaw County Sheriffs Department is not a separate municipal entity and does not own anything. As to the remainder ofthe paragraph, the Defendant Saginaw County does ovm, control and operate the Saginaw County Jail. 15. Defendants admit same. 16. Denied for the reason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and law. 17. Denied for the reason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and law. It is specifically denied that Defendant did not have lawful authority to remove Plaintiffs who were disorderly and potentially violent in certain cases from the general holding cells to a segregation cell for their protection ,md the protection of others. 18. Denied for the reason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and law.

Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 59 Filed 12/24/2002 Page 4 of 10
19. Denied for the reason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and law. 20. Denied for the reason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and law. 21. Denied for the reason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and law. 22. Denied for the reason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and law. 23. Denied for the reason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and law. 24. Defendants admit same. 25. In response to paragraph 25, Defendants deny breaching any duty owing to Plaintiffs or to anyone. 26. Denied for the reason that same is lmtrue and contrary to tact and law. 27. Denied for the reason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and law. 28. Denied for the reason that sanle is untrue and contrary to fact and law.
COUNT I FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS O}' CIVIL RIGHTS 29. Defendants hereby reassert their answers to paragraphs 1 through 28 as though same were set forth herein in their entirety. 30. Defendants deny that those counts arc applicable to the actions ofyour Defendants and deny any breach of any Constitutional rights. 31. Denied for the reason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and law. Defendants actions were objectively reasonable under the circumstances. It is specifically denied that Defendant did not have lawful authority to remove Plaintiffs who were disorderly and potentially violent in certain cases from the general holding cells to a segregation cell for their protection and the protection of others. 32. Denied for the reason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and law.
A. Denied for the reason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and law.

Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 59 Filed 12/24/2002 Page 5 of 10
B. Denied for the reason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and law. C. Denied for the reason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and law. D. Denied for the reason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and law. E. Denied for the reason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and law. F. Denied for the reason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and law. 33. Denied for the reason that sanle is untrue and contrary to fact and law. 34. Defendants deny that their conduct was wrongful, but admit that they were acting under color of law. 35. Denied for the reason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and law. A. Denied for the rcason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and law. B. Denied for the reason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and law.
C. Denied for the reason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and law.
D. Denied for the reason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and law. Denied for the reason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and law.
F. Denied for the reason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and law. COUNT II
GROSS NEGLIGENCE (CHARLES BROWN, JOHN AND JANE DOE DEFENDANTS ONLy) 36. Defendants hereby reassert their answers to paragraphs I through 35 as though same were set forth herein in their entirety. 37. In response to paragraph 37, it is denied that Defendants breached any duty owing to your Plaintiffs or anyone else. 38. Denied for the reason that sanle is untrue and contrary to fact and law. 39. Denied for t.'1e reason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and law.

Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 59 Filed 12/24/2002 Page 6 of 10
40. Denied for the reason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and law. COUNT III
INVASION OF PRIVACY (CHARLES BROWN. JOHN AND JANE DOE ONLy) 41. Defendants hereby reassert their answers to paragraphs 1 through 40 as though same were set forth herein in their entirety. 42. Denied for the reason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and law.
43. Paragraph 43 is unable to be answered in the itmn and manner asserted, therefore
Defendants deny same as being untrue and contrary to fact and law. 44. Denied for the reason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and law. 45. Denied for the reason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and law. 46. Denied for the reason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and law. 47. Denied fix the reason that same is lmtrue and contrary to fact and law. It is
specifically dcnied that the jail trustees viewed any of the prisoners. 48. Denied for thc reason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and Jaw. 49. Denied for the reason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and law.
COUNT IV
ASSAULT AND BATTERY (CHARLES BROWN, JOHN DOE, JANE DOE ONLy) 50. Defendants hereby reassert their answers to paragraphs 1 through 49 as though sanle were set forth herein in their entirety. 51. Denied for the reason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and law. 52. Denied for the reason that sanle is untrue and contrary to fact and law. 53. Denied for the reason that Sanle is untrue and contrary to fact and law.

Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 59 Filed 12/24/2002 Page 7 of 10
54. Denied for the reason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and law. COUNT V
INTENTIONAL JNFLlCTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS (DEFENDANTS CHARLES BROWN, JOHN DOE, AND JANE DOE) 55. Defendants hereby reassert their answers to paragraphs I through 54 as though same were set forth herein in their entirety. 56. Denied for the reason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and law. 57. Denied for the reason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and law. 58. Denied for the reason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and law. 59. Denied for the reason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and law. 60. Denied for the reason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and law.
COUNT VI VIOLATION OF ELLlOTT LARSON CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
MCLA 73.2302(A); MSA 3.548(302)(A) 61. Defendants hereby reassert their answers to paragraphs I through 60 as though same were set forth herein in their entirety. 62. In response to paragraph 62, the pleadings speak for themselves. It is denied that there was any breach of any duty owing to Plaintiils. 63. In response to paragraph 63, the statute speaks for itself. The applicability ofthe statute is denied and Defendants will seek Summary Judgment as to Count VI if Plaintiff does not dismiss same. 64. Denied for the reason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and law. 65. Denied for the reason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and law. 66. Denied for the reason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and law.

Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 59 Filed 12/24/2002 Page 8 of 10
67. Denied for the rcason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and law. 68. Denied for the reason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and law. 69. Denied for the reason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and law. WHEREFORE, your Defendants pray for a Judgment of no cause for action, together with costs and attorney fees so wrongfully sustained.
A. Plaintiffs are not entitled to any reliefwhatsoever, nor are they entitled to any damages.
B. Plaintiffs are not entitled to any relief whatsoever, nor are they entitled to any damages.
C. Plaintiffs are not entitled to any reiicfwhatsoever, nor are they entitled to any damages.
D. (improperly named 4.) Plaintiffs are not entitled to any reliefwhatsoever, nor are they entitled to any damages.
E. PlaintifIs are not entitled to any relief whatsoever, nor are they entitled to any damages. COUNT VII INJUNCTIVE RELlEF
70. Defendants hereby reassert their answers to paragraphs 1 through 69 as though same wcre set i(lrth herein in their entirety.
71. Denied for the reason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and law.
n. Denied for the reason that same is untrue and contrary to fact and law.
WHEREFORE, your Defendants pray for a Judgment of no cause for action, together with costs and attorney fees so wrongfully sustained.

Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 59 Filed 12/24/2002 Page 9 of 10

A. Plaintiffs are not entitled to any relief whatsoever, nor are they entitled to any damages.
B. Plaintiffs are not entitled to any relief whatsoever, nor are they entitled to any damages.
C. Plaintiffs are not entitled to any relief whatsoever, nor are they entitled to any damages.
D. (improperly named 4.) Plaintiffs are not entitled to any reliefwhatsoever, nor are they entitled to allY damages.
E. Plaintiffs are not entitled to any relief whatsoever, nor are they entitled to any damages.

Datt;d: November 15, 2002

O'CONNOR, DeGRAZIA & TAMM, P.e.
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BY:"'~~;;~;Z;~~~~~ 'S I. DeGRAZIA (P2285 C unsel for Defendants 4111 Andover Road - Suite 300 East Bloomfield Hills, MI 48302 (248) 433-2011

Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 59 Filed 12/24/2002 Page 10 of 10
lJNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT . EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SEE CASE FILE FOR
ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS OR PAGES
THAT WERE NOT
SCANNED

 
 Case 1:01-cv-10337-DML Document 105 Filed 05/29/2003 Page 1 of 36

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
LINDA ROSE, JENNIFER CRADIT, SYLVIA DENISE BRADDOCK, LISA RENEE BRANDIMORE, DWAYNE BUTTERFIELD, BOBBIE WAYNE CARTER, DANIEL WRAY CLAYTON, HOPE MICHELLE DAVIS, JOSHUA FULLER, NICHOLAS ANTHONY GILES, WILLIE LOUIS HENDRICKS, TANISHA RAMON JOHNSON, ROBERT ALLEN KELSEY, SUE ANN LETTERMAN, DONNA LYNN QUARLES, DAVID TODD REINER, GREGORY LOUIS SCHULTZ, AMANDA RAE SHINAVER, DWAYNE ALANN SIMMONS, ROBIN RENEE THOMAS, JOSHUA ALLEN WEIGANT, RAYMOND PRAAY, JUSTIN ANDERSON CRAIG MASON, MATTHEW STARKWEATHER, RICHARD PLAMONDON, and ROBERT JAMES STEPHENS,

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Plaintiffs, vs

Case No. 01-CV-10337-BC Hon. David M. Lawson

SAGINAW COUNTY, SAGINAW COUNTY

SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, MUNICIPAL

GOVERNMENT ENTITIES, CHARLES BROWN,

AND OFFICERS JOHN DOE, AND JANE DOE (IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY), JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY,

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Defendants

CLERK'S OFFICE
DETPnlT

LOYST FLETCHER, JR. P29799

JAMES 1. DeGRAZIA P22853

CHRISTOPHER J. PIANTO P59160

PAUL T. O'NEILL P57293

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

O'CONNOR, DeGRAZIA, TAMM &

718 Beach Street

O'CONNOR, P.C.

Flint, Michigan 48502

Attorneys for Defendants

(810) 238-4410

4111 Andover Road - Suite 300 East

Bloomfield Hills, Michigan 48302

(248) 433-2000

DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE BRIEF TO PLAINTIFFS'

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ESTABLISHING LIABILITY

Case 1:01-cv-10337-DML Document 105 Filed 05/29/2003 Page 2 of 36
/ ,

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ISSUES PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1lI

CONTROLLING OR MOST APPROPRIATE AUTHORITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

INDEX OF EXHIBITS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .v

INTRODUCTION .............................................. 1

FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

A. Background. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

B. Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

C. Basis of policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

D. Video and observation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

E. Plaintiffs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

STANDARD OF REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

LAW AND ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

I. MUNICIPAL LIABILITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

II. CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

A. Unreasonable seizure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

B. Right to Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

C. Policy as punishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

D. Substantive due process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

III. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Case 1:01-cv-10337-DML Document 105 Filed 05/29/2003 Page 3 of 36

TABLE OF CONTENTS CONTINUED

Page

IV. ADMISSION OF LIABILITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

V. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

PROOF OF SERVICE

11

Case 1:01-cv-10337-DML Document 105 Filed 05/29/2003 Page 4 of 36 / -" ISSUES PRESENTED
I. WHETHER PLAINTIFFS SUFFERED A CONSTITUTIONAL DEPRIVATION WHERE DEFENDANTS' ACTIONS WERE REASONABLY RELATED TO A LEGITIMATE PENOLOGICAL INTEREST.
II. WHETHER MUNICIPAL LIABILITY MAY BE DECIDED ON A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHERE PLAINTIFFS I-IAVE FAILED TO SHOW A CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION.
III. WHETI-IER SHERIFF BROWN IS ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY.
IV. WHETHER DEFENDANTS ARE ESTOPPED FROM DENYING LIABILITY.
iii

Case 1:01-cv-10337-DML Document 105 Filed 05/29/2003 Page 5 of 36
/ ,
CONTROLLING OR MOST APPROPRIATE AUTHORITY
I. A jail regulation is constitutionally valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.
A. Turner v Safely, 482 U.S. 78; 107 S.Ct. 2254; 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987).
B. Bell v Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520; 99 S.Ct. 1861; 60 L.Ed.2d447 (1979).
II. Privacy interests of detainees are not violated when reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.
A. Bell v Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520; 99 S.Ct. 1861; 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979).
B. Hill v McKinley, 311 F.3d. 899 (8th Cir 2002).
III. Eighth Amendment is not violatcd where there is no express intent to punish and the restriction imposed is reasonably related to a legitimate non-punitive governmental objective.
A. Bell v Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520; 99 S.Ct. 1861; 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979).
IV. Municipal Liability is considered only after Plaintiffs have shown a constitutional violation.
A. CoIlins v Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115; 112S.Ct.1061; 117L.Ed.2d261 (1992).
V. Sheriff Brown is entitled to qualified immunity.
A. Comstock v McCrary, 273 F.3d 693 (6th Cir. 2001).
VI. Defendants are not estopped from denying liability.
A. Kerry Steel, Inc. v Paragon Industries, Inc., 106 F.3d 147 (6th Cir. 1997).
iv

Case 1:01-cv-10337-DML Document 105 Filed 05/29/2003 Page 6 of 36
,/'- ..... ,.

EXHIBIT A B C D E F G I-I

INDEX OF EXHIBITS DESCRIPTION Deposition transcript of Lt. Gutzwiller Deposition transcript of Sgt. Van Riper Deposition transcript of Sheriff Brown Answer to First Interrogatories Ross Report Wilson Report Jail Incident Report of J. Cradit Bell v WolflSll,441 U.S.520; 99 S.Ct.1861; 60 L.E(I. 2d 447 (1979) Hill v McKillley, 311 F.3d. 599 (8'" Cir. 2002)

v

Case 1:01-cv-10337-DML Document 105 Filed 05/29/2003 Page 7 of 36
INTRODUCTION On April 14, 2003, prior to the deposition of several individual Plaintiffs and prior to the deposition of experts onjail practices, Plaintiffs' filed their Motion for Summary Judgment Establishing Liability. Plaintiffs' Motion must be denied because the facts asserted in their Motion and Brief in Support are belied by the deposition testimony in the instant matter and by the documentary evidence produced by Defendants. Additionally, the law applicable to the facts established do not show that a constitutional violation occurred. Applicable precedent provides that it is not a violation of a Plaintiffs' rights to require them to disrobe prior to being placed in administrative segregation for their own safety, for the safety other detainees, for the safety of jail employees, and for the internal security and the orderly operation of the jail.
FACTS A. Background
Saginaw County Jail is a detention facility operated by Saginaw County to detain arrestees and sentenced offenders. The facility holds five hundred twenty-five (525) people maximum. The jail processes between forty (40) and sixty (60) individuals per day that are delivered to the facility by County, City, Township and State Police personnel. The Saginaw County Jail books between twelve thousand (12,000) and fourteen thousand (14,000) people per year. In the present case, Plaintiffs were processed through the Saginaw County Jail between the period of May 22, 1999 through December 29, 2001. During this time, over thirty thousand (30,000) persons were processed through the jail. The twenty-seven (27)

Case 1:01-cv-10337-DML Document 105 Filed 05/29/2003 Page 8 of 36
,"-''''
Plaintiffs represent less than 1I100th of one percent of the total processed through the Saginaw County Jail during that time period. B. The Policy
In their brief in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs' miscategorized the deposition testimony and other evidence to date which describes the policy of the Saginaw County Jail. The current administrator of the Saginaw County Jail, Lt. William Gutzwiller testified as follows:
Q: And that policy was what? A: That if an individual, not just because they're disruptive
or disorderly, if they violate the security measures of that jail, or pose harm to themselves or others, the correction officer could request from the Sergeant permission to escort the person to segregation administration. Q: And once thatA: It has to be approved by the administrator. (Exhibit A, p. 33) Plaintiffs attempt to characterize the policy by stating "the Defendants have a formal policy and/or custom that requires mostly shift sergeants, to strip naked pretrial detainees for insubordination or other alleged acts of deviance." (Plaintiffs' brief, p. 1). This allegation is at odds with the very testimony referenced in Plaintiffs' brief. It is especially important to note that a detainees' clothes are forcefully removed only if they do not voluntarily comply with jail personnel orders to remove the clothes prior to entering administrative segregation. Sgt. Gary Van Riper testified:
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Clothes would be removed from a person if they did not want them taken off because that's what - the ruling from the command or the policy, however you want to look at it, I guess, stated, that they would go in there with no clothes on, yes. (Exhibit B, p. 21) The policy of the Saginaw County Jail is to place disruptive, disorderly persons, persons who violate the security measures of the jail, or those who pose harm to themselves or others in administrative segregation. If the detainee refuses to comply with jail personnel's request to remove his clothes prior to entering administrative segregation, the amount of force necessary to remove his clothes would be used to accomplish the objective. Lt. Gutzwiller further clarified the criteria for placing a detainee into administrative segregation. The description, basically, and it is in policy, if anyone that disrupts the security of the jail, anyone that is assaultive, not only towards themselves or towards another or towards staff, that would disrupt the orderly operation of the jail. (Exhibit A, p. 69). The record indicates that only a detainee who disrupts the security of the jail, disrupts the orderly operation of the jail, or is assaultive towards themselves, towards another detainee, or towards staff, is placed in administrative segregation. If a detainee fails to comply with orders to remove his or her clothing prior to placement in the administrative segregation cell, limited force is administered to remove the clothes. Sgt. Van Riper testified that he would use "only the force necessary to do it." (Exhibit B, p. 21). Additionally, Sgt. Van Riper testified that the only time a male officer
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would assist in the removal of female detainee's clothes is if the female detainee threatens the female officer's safety. Sgt. Van Riper testified:
The only time a male would be present when a female was taking off her clothes is if she became violent to the point where the female officer's safety was in danger.
(Exhibit B, p. 22)
A male officer only participates in the forceful disrobing of a female detainee when the female officer's safety is in danger.
A detainee remains in administrative segregation until such time that he no longer poses a threat to himself, others, jail staff, or the security operations of the jail. Sheriff Charles Brown stated:
It's taking away the chance that that person may hurt themselves or somebody else, and once they sober up or once they become cognizant of what they're doing, you may have saved that person from tremendous injury. (Exhibit C, p. 49). The amount of time in the segregation cell is limited to such time when the detainee shows that he or she is no longer a security threat to the jail, its personnel, other detainees or themselves.
C. Basis of Policy
In 1996, the Saginaw County Jail suffered a tragic incident in which an inmate, Laurence Riha, was placed into administrative segregation with his orange jail uniform. Mr. Riha was able to wedge his jail uniform into the very small space between the cell door and the door frame and to hang himself utilizing this method. After the suicide, the policy was
4

Case 1:01-cv-10337-DML Document 105 Filed 05/29/2003 Page 11 of 36 " ;""
issued that required any inmate who was placed into the administrative segregation would be
without clothing. (Exhibit D, No. 16).
Sheriff Brown further testified about the justification for maintaining the policy of
placing detainees into administrative segregation without their clothes:
Q: How does taking a person's clothing and leaving them nude in an administrative ceIl prevent, you use the wording hanging or prevent them from hurting themselves?
A: You serious with this question? Q: I'm serious. A: That's how most hangings occur in the jail with the
inmates clothing. Q: Okay. What other harm can they do to themselves in the
jail if they stiII have their clothes on? A: They could do a lot of things. They can obviously stuff
it down their throat, they can obviously hang themselves, they urinate on their clothing and throw it at the deputies, defecate on it and throw it at the deputies, which has been done many times, they could actuaIlY use the clothing to, if the guard got close enough, to wrap it around his neck. A lot of things you could do with clothing. You've got to remember, these are the most disruptive of alI the prisoners that come in here. (Exhibit C, pp. 61-62)
The answers to interrogatories and the deposition testimony make clear that the Saginaw
County Sheriffs Department has justification for requiring detainees to remove their clothing
prior to their placement into administrative segregation.
The opinions of the jail practice experts support Defendants' policy. Jail expert,
DarreIl Ross, Ph.D. wrote in his 26(a)(2) report:
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Case 1:01-cv-10337-DML Document 105 Filed 05/29/2003 Page 12 of 36
, ./
That the procedure of placing detainees in the administrative segregation who demonstrated disruptive, combativeness, agitation, intoxication, and/or violent behavior, and/or who threaten the security of the facility, including harming themselves, detention personnel, and/or other prisoners of the Saginaw Detention Facility, comports with a legitimate and reasonable detention objective ...
* * *
That placing a detainee for a limited duration under close supervision, in the nude, in an administrative segregation cell, is a reasonable alternative legitimately related to detention of objectives. (Exhibit E, p. 3).
Dr. Darrell Ross supports the Saginaw County Jail practice. (Dr. Ross' CV, Exhibit E).
Another expert, Peter R. Wilson, stated in his 26(a)(2) report:
By removing their clothing a greater degree of protection was provided to the inmates. It is clear that the officers intention was only to provide a safe environment for the plaintiffs. . .. The removal of the clothing prevents the pre-trial detainees from disrupting the operation of the jail. (Exhibit F, p. 1).
Further, Mr. Wilson stated:
Based upon my experience in the Wayne County Jail, inmates that are assigned to a segregation cell are at a higher risk of injuring themselves....
* * *
A review of the jail incident reports point out clearly that many inmates are very manipulative, abusive toward staff, irrational and disruptive. Inmate behavior is very difficult to deal with and very unpredictable. Removing an inmate's clothing is an extraordinary measure, however necessary, to order to keep the inmates safe. (Exhibit F, p. 2 and Wilson's CV attached to Exhibit F.).
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Case 1:01-cv-10337-DML Document 105 Filed 05/29/2003 Page 13 of 36
The testimony and documentary evidence in the present case indicates that there was justification for the policies concerning the administrative segregation. D. Video and observation
The administrative segregation cell is constructed in a such a way as to preclude the viewing of detainees unless the officer was in the cell with the detainee. There are two (2) doors to the segregation cell. The inner door is covered with wired mesh. This wired mesh precludes viewing of the detainee by the correction officer. (Exhibit B, p. 25).
The only way to obtain an unobstructed view of the detainee is to look through the food slot which is approximately waist high. (Exhibit B, p. 29.). However, officers do not usually willingly stick their face near the feeding slot because of the fear of getting something thrown at them. (ExhibitB, p. 25). Officers monitor the administrative segregation cell every fifteen (15) minutes in order to check on the detainee's well being. An officer conducting the fifteen (15) minute watch does so verbally and does not look into the feeding slot unless no verbal acknowledgment is made. (Exhibit A, p. 89).
A video monitoring device was installed in the administrative segregation in December of 2000. (Exhibit A, p.). Therefore, a majority of Plaintiffs were not video taped during their detention. No officer is assigned to monitor the video, (Exhibit A, pp. 86-87). Trustees are not permitted to monitor the cameras. (Exbibit A, p. 98). The quality of the tape is such that one cannot see bodily detail. They are used only to ensure that the inmates are not in distress. Video tapes are destroyed within thirty (30) days after they are made.
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E. Plaintiffs Plaintiffs were all processed through the Saginaw County Jail between the period of
May 22, 1999 and December 29, 2001. Because Plaintiffs move for summary judgment of liability as to all Plaintiffs and did not provide how the application of the policy differs to each
Plaintiff, Defendants will not give details as to each incident which gives rise to Plaintiffs'
claim. Plaintiffs stated: "The only issue present is whether Defendants' strip seizure
policies/customs is unconstitutional and thereby entitling Plaintiffs to Summary Judgment." (Plaintiffs' Brief, p. 10).
However, one incident report may be useful to provide background information to the Court in evaluating Plaintiffs' claims.
Jennifer Cradit was brought to the Saginaw County Jail intake department by the Saginaw City Police Department. The incident report concerning Ms. Cradit's admission
states: On July 17, 1999, at 02:30 hours this sIc was in intake when the City P.O. brought in a disorderly female, named Cradit, Jennifer, #115834. Cradit was placed in observation cell, #2 after stating "fuck you" to all of the staff present in intake. While in this observation cell #2 inmate Cradit pounded and kicked the glass window and door. This rIo and other staff tried to calm inmate Cradit to no avail. Cradit would only state that she wanted to use the phone and then would tell the whole staff to "fuck you".
Cradit then proceeded to stuff toilet paper in the toilet and flush it until it flooded over. This sIc and Deputies Brown, Kolb and Thorn entered the cell to remove the paper. This was done without incident.
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Case 1:01-cv-10337-DML Document 105 Filed 05/29/2003 Page 15 of 36 / '
I
Two minutes later inmate Cradit was placing her jean shorts in the toilet and flooding the cell again. Again, these officers entered the cell to remove the shorts and to place Cradit in an administrative segregation cell as she was taking off her clothing and disrupting the jail procedures. Cradit was given every opportunity to calm down. (Exhibit F, p. 1). The jail incident report indicates that Plaintiff Cradit was not only verbally abusive to staff but disruptive to the jail operations and threatened other inmates by flooding the toilet in the holding cell twice, one time by removing her own shorts and placing them in the toilet. When Plaintiff Cradit was removed to administrative segregation, she "threatened to kill all the officers 'when she sees us in the streets...' (Exhibit F, p. 1). Numerous correction officers and medical personnel were required to subdue Inmate Cradit in order to place her in administrative segregation without her clothing. During this time, Plaintiff Cradit attempted to bite several of officers. (Exhibit F, pp. 1-2)..
STANDARD OF REVIEW Plaintiffs have moved for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. of Civil Proc. 56(c). This rule provides that judgment may be entered if a party opposing the motion will not be
able to produce sufficient evidence at trial to withstand a motion for directed verdict. Street v J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d. 1472 (6''' Cir. 1989). The Sixth Circuit utilizes several
factors to guide courts in determining whether summary judgment is appropriate in a given case. Some of these factors, include:
3. The movant must meet the initial burden of showing 'the absence of a genuine issue of material fact' as to essential element of the non-movant's case.
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Case 1:01-cv-10337-DML Document 105 Filed 05/29/2003 Page 16 of 36
", ,
4. This burden may be met by pointing out to the court that the respondent, having had sufficient opportunity for discovery, has no evidence to support an essential element of his or her case.
* * *
7. The substantive law governing the case will determine what issues of fact are material, ... Id. at 1479. Therefore, in moving for summary judgment, a party must show that the respondent will not be able produce any evidence sufficient to withstand a motion for directed verdict at trial. The movant must meet the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact in the record. These issues of material fact are governed by the substantive law governing the case. In the present case, summary judgment is inappropriate because Plaintiffs have failed to meet their initial burden of showing that there is an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Defendants have also met their burden by showing that there is sufficient evidence to submit to a trier of fact in their case. Moreover, opportunities for further discovery, including the expert discovery, will likely yield evidence favorable to Defendants on the material facts of the instant matter.
LAW AND ARGUMENT I. MUNICIPAL LIABILITY As is made clear by the United States Supreme Court, the failure to train theory is only relevant to the second element of a §1983 action, and not the threshold element of a constitutional deprivation. The failure to train theory is utilized by Plaintiffs who wish to
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Case 1:01-cv-10337-DML Document 105 Filed 05/29/2003 Page 17 of 36
( ,
show that a municipal corporation is responsible for a constitutional deprivation caused by one
of its employees. Municipal liability in a 1983 action is unique because "[rjespondeat superior or vicarious liability will not attach under §1983." Canton v Harris, 489 US 378, 385; 109
S Ct 197; 103 L Ed 2d 412 (1989). Therefore, because Defendants base this response on their showing that Plaintiffs have not stated a claim for, nor can they show by any of the undisputed facts, that they suffered a constitutional deprivation, this failure to train element of municipal liability is not material to the present motion.
In Collins v Harker Heights, 503 US 115; 112 S Ct 1061; 117 L Ed 2d 261 (1992),
the United States Supreme Court made clear that the constitutional deprivation element of a § 1983 action is separate and distinct from the issue of whether or not a municipal corporation
may be held responsible for such underlying constitutional deprivation. The Collins Court
stated held that a section 1983 action against a municipality requires analysis of two distinct issues: "(1) whether Plaintiffs harm was caused by constitutional violation, and (2) if so,
whether the City is responsible for that violation." [d. at 120. Thus, in Collins, the Court
emphasized the importance of distinguishing between the element of a constitutional violation and the element of whether or not the City is responsible for that violation.
In Collins, supra, Plaintiffs decedent was an employee in the sanitation department of
the City of Harker Heights, Texas. Mr. Collins died of asphyxia after entering a manhole to unstop a sewer line. [d. at 117. Plaintiff claimed that the City had violated Mr. Collins' constitutional right by "following a custom and policy of not training its employees about the
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Case 1:01-cv-10337-DML Document 105 Filed 05/29/2003 Page 18 of 36
dangers of working in sewer lines and manholes ... " Id. In reviewing its prior decisions on
the issue of municipal liability the court noted:
In each of those cases the Court assumed that a constitutional violation had been adequately alleged or proved and focused its attention on the separate issue of municipal liability. Id. at 121.
The Collins Court cited Monell v New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658; 98 S Ct. 2018; 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978), Oklahoma City v Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808; 105
S. Ct. 2427; 85 L. Ed. 2d 791 (1985) and Canton v Harris, supra for the purposes of
illustrating that each of those cases addressed only the issue of municipal liability and assumed
that in fact a constitutional violation had been committed by one of the governmental
employees. The Collins Court noted:
. .. We concluded that if a City employee violates another's
constitutional rights, the City may be liable if it had a policy or
custom of failing to train its employees and that failure to train caused the constitutional violation. Id. at 123. (emphasis provided).
Therefore, a plaintiffs allegations that a municipality failed to train its employees is only
actionable if a governmental employee in fact caused a constitutional violation. If there is no
such underlying constitutional violation committed by an employee, whether or not a City
policy caused that conduct is simply irrelevant. As the Supreme Court succinctly stated in an
earlier decision:
Neither Monell, supra nor any other of our cases authorizes the
award of damages against a municipal corporation based on the actions of one of its officers when in fact the jury has concluded that the officer inflicted no constitutional harm. Los Angeles v Heller, 475 US 796, 799; 106 S Ct 1571; 89 L Ed 2d 806 (1986).
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If an officer does not deprive a person of his constitutional rights, the issue of whether or not a municipality can be said to have caused the actions of the officer is irrelevant to a determination
of a claim under §1983. In other words, the cases under Monell and Harris, supra answer the
question "who is liable for a constitutional deprivation" committed by a government officer, not the question, "did Plaintiff suffer a constitutional deprivation."
In Collins, the United States Supreme Court found that dismissal of Plaintiffs claims
was proper where Plaintiff did not allege that a violation of the due process clause of the constitution.
In the present case, a finding of municipal liability on Plaintiffs' motion is not appropriate because they have failed to show that they suffered a constitutional deprivation. As shown infra, there is at least a genuine issue of material fact that Saginaw County, jail regulations are reasonably related to legitimate penological objectives.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION Plaintiffs alternately argue that Defendants' practice relating to the administrative segregation cell violates their Fourth Amendment protection to be free from unreasonable . seizures, their Fourth Amendment right to privacy, their Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from punishment prior to adjudication of gUilt in violation of the Due Process Clause, and their Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process. Each allegation will be discussed in turn.
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Case 1:01-cv-10337-DML Document 105 Filed 05/29/2003 Page 20 of 36 " ,
A. Unreasonable seizure Plaintiffs first argue that their placement into administrative segregation violates their
right to be free from unreasonable seizures pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. While they cite no authority for their argument (and Defendants have found none), they urge this Court to rule that Plaintiffs' placement into administrative segregation in a state of nudity violates the Fourth Amendment.
Plaintiffs concede that "Defendants have probable cause to seize Plaintiffs and detain them in their jail." (Plaintiff's brief p. 10) Plaintiffs argue that when Plaintiffs' clothes were removed, the seizure became unreasonable. Id. This novel argument is necessitated by the fact that no precedent, binding or advisory, has found that facts similar to those in the instant case amounts to unreasonable search. Therefore, Plaintiffs look to the seizure provision in the Fourth Amendment for their argument.
Plaintiffs' properly cite Turnerv Safely, 482 U.S. 78; 107 S. Ct. 2254; 96 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1987) to provide the analytical structure for their claims. In Turner, United States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of regulations issued by the Missouri Division of Corrections relating to inmate marriages and inmate-to-inmate correspondence. The United States Supreme Court rejected the strict scrutiny analysis utilized by the Court of Appeals, holding "that a lesser standard of scrutiny is appropriate in determining the constitutionality of the prison rules." Id. at 81.
The Turner Court, noted several principles "that necessarily frame our analysis of prisoners' constitutional claims." Id. at 84. The Supreme Court noted:
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/ ,
... [C]ourts are ill equipped to deal with increasingly urgent problems of present administration and reform . . . [T]he problems of prisons in America are complex and intractable and, more to the point, they are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree. Running a prison is an inordinately difficult undertaking that requires expertise, planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the providence of the legislative and executive branches of government. Prison administration is, moreover, a task that has been committed to the responsibility of those branches, and separation of powers concerns counsel a policy of judicial restraint. Where a state penal system is involved, federal courts have ... additional reason to accord deference to appropriate prison authorities. Id. at 84-85. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
One principle underlying federal jurisprudence or prison and jail practices is to defer to the
proper branches of government the task of jail and prison administration. The Turner Court
then enunciated the proper standard for analyzing that a prison regulation violates an inmate's
constitutional rights.
[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests ... Subjecting the dayto-day jUdgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would seriously· hamper their ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt innotative solutions to the intractable problems of prison administration. The rule would also distort the decisionmaking process, for every administrative judgment would be subject to the possibility that some court somewhere would conclude that it had a less restrictive way of solving the problem at hand. Courts inevitably would become the primary arbiters of what constitutes the best solution to every administrative problem, thereby unnecessarily perpetuat[ing] the involvement of the federal courts in affairs of prison administration. Id. at 89 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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Therefore, the proper analysis for Plaintiffs' claims of constitutional violations is to determine if the regulation at issue, the placement of Plaintiffs who are a threat to themselves, other inmates, and jail staff and who threaten the internal security and operations of the jail, without clothing is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. As will be discussed infra, the record in the instant matter demonstrates that the only testimony regarding this issue is by Defendants and their expert reports which indicate that Saginaw County's policies satisfy this standard.
Plaintiffs properly cite the factors relevant in determining the reasonableness of a regulation. These factors are: (1) whether there is a valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it, (2) whether there are alternatives means of exercising the right that remains open to prison inmates, (3) the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally, and (4) the absence of ready alternatives is evidence of reasonableness of a prison regulation. Id. at 89-91.
It is noteworthy that the Turner court relied on Bell v Wolfish, 441 U.S.520; 99 S.Ct. 1861; 60 L.Ed. 2d 447 (1979)(attached as EXHIBIT H), in support of their holding in Turner. Bell, supra, involves numerous conditions ofconfinement and practices in a federally operated short-term custodial facility which was used to house pretrial detainees. One of those practices involved the requirement of detainees to expose their body cavities for visual inspection as part of a strip search conducted after every contact visit with a person from outside the institution. Id. at 558.
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The Supreme Court held:
The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application. In each case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and a place in which it is conducted. Id. at 559.
The Supreme Court found:
... we deal here with the question whether visual body-cavity
inspections as contemplated by the MCC rules can ever be
conducted on less than probable cause. Balancing the significant and legitimate security interests of the institution against the privacy interests of the inmates, we conclude that they can. Id. at 560 (emphasis and original).
In the Bell case, the United States Supreme Court concluded that a visual body-cavity
inspection of all inmates after visitations did not violate their Fourth Amendment rights. The
courts considered that the detention facility's interest in maintaining the security of the facility
was properly balanced against the invasion of the privacy interest under the Fourth
Amendment of the inmates.
The only Court of Appeals decision considered the propriety of placing a detainee in
segregation without clothing has found that the practice did not violate the constitutional rights
of the detainee. In Hill v McKinley, 311 F.3d. 599 (8'" Cir. 2002)(attached as EXHIBIT I),
plaintiff was arrested for public intoxication in Nevada, Iowa. Id. at 901. Plaintiff Hill was
uncooperative during the booking process, "yelling and cursing at [the correction officers]. The officers placed Hill in a holding cell, where she pounded and kicked at the door of the
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Case 1:01-cv-10337-DML Document 105 Filed 05/29/2003 Page 24 of 36
cell." Id. These facts are strikingly similar to many of the facts presented by Plaintiffs' claims. Noting this behavior, the correction officers in Hill decided to place plaintiff in the jail's padded cell. Id. The jail policy provided that prisoners are not allowed to wear normal clothing but instead must wear a paper gown or nothing at all. Id. Plaintiff was placed naked into the padded cell. Id. Hill argued, among other allegations, that her constitutional rights were violated when she was required to disrobe in the presence of a male correction officer. However, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeal rejected her argument. The Circuit Court stated:
Even if it was a male guard, however, we cannot say in light of precedent that it is a violation of a prisoner's Fourth Amendment privacy rights for a male guard to require a loud and violent female prisoner to disrobe in his presence before placing her in a padded cell for her own safety. Id. at 903. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found tlmt no constitutional violation occurred when a loud, violent and abusive pre-trial detainee was placed in a padded cell without any clothing in the presence of male correction officers. In the present case, the policy used to place Plaintiffs into administrative segregation WitllOut their clothing satisfies the standard of Turner, supra, Bell, supra, and Hill, supra. The facts and the record show that the regulation utilized by Defendants' in the instant matter is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. The record illustrates that the policy was implemented following an inmate suicide who utilized his clothing in the administrative segregation cell. (EXHIBIT D, No. 16).
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Case 1:01-cv-10337-DML Document 105 Filed 05/29/2003 Page 25 of 36
The policy was implemented to prevent harm that disruptive inmates may cause to themselves, other inmates, and jail staff. The policy furthers security interests of the jail and furthers the orderly operations of the jail. Clothing is removed so that prisoners cannot stuff it down their throat, hang themselves, urinate on their clothing, defecate on their clothing, and throw it at the deputies, or to attack a corrections officer. The expert reports submitted by .Defendants' two jail practices experts, show that the inmates placed into the segregation cell are at a high risk of injuring themselves. (EXHIBIT F, p. 2) Further, expert Dr. Ross indicated that the placement of the detainee for limited duration in the nude in the segregation cell is a reasonable alternative that is reasonably related to the detention objective of the jail. (EXHIBIT E, p. 3).
Plaintiffs do not put forth any proof that the regulation of the Saginaw County Detention Facility is not rationally related to a legitimate detention objective. Plaintiffs rely on Defendants' subsequent remedial measure of issuing a paper gown to inmates. This practice cannot be used as evidence in the instant action. F.R.E. 407. Defendants intend to offer evidence ofjail practice experts and of Defendants that the paper gown does not further the objectives of the Saginaw County Jail Detention Facility as well as placing an inmate with no clothes in administrative segregation. A paper gown can be used to fashion a rope, flood the toilet, project feces or urine at a corrections officer, or attack jail staff.
Additionally, the language of Turner, supra, counsels that the test of reasonableness is not a "least restrictive alternative" test. Turner, supra, at 91. A Court may consider a
claimant's alternative which accommodates a prisoner's rights only if there is a "de minimus 19

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/"' .... ,
cost to valid penological interests." Id. As indicated, supra, the issuance of a paper gown to a prisoner in the administrative segregation is done at a great cost to the valid interests of the Saginaw County Detention Facility for safeguarding inmates from harming themselves, other detainees and the jail staff. Additionally, the issuance of a paper gown does not fully accommodate Plaintiffs' rights claimed in the instant case. In order to change into a paper gown, Plaintiffs would be required to disrobe. If they refused, Defendants' staff would have to use the force necessary to change the detainee into the paper gown. Plaintiffs would likely claim that this then would violate their privacy or would convert the seizure into a "unreasonable seizure."
Because the record provides at least a genuine issue of fact on the material question of whether the policy is reasonably related to legitimate penological objectives, Plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the issue of liability must be denied. B. Right to privacy
Plaintiffs allege that their Fourth Amendment rights to privacy under the Fourth Amendment were violated by Saginaw County. (Plaintiffs' Brief, pp. 13-15). These allegations are unsupported by the case law.
In the case cited by Plaintiffs, Cornwell v Dahlberg, 963 F.2d. 912 (6'" Cir. 1992), the Court found that the Turner, supra test was applicable to the claim. Cornwell, supra, at 916-
917. Thus, the Sixth Circuit found that the jury should be instructed "to find some valid, rational connection between the prison policy and a legitimate penological interest. ... " Id.
at 917. Utilizing this standard, the Sixth Circuit found that Cornwell raised a valid privacy 20

Case 1:01-cv-10337-DML Document 105 Filed 05/29/2003 Page 27 of 36
"""'."
claim under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 916. The Cornwell panel did not find that a
constitutional deprivation occurred. The Sixth Circuit determined, given the facts of the case, that the issue should be submitted to the jury.
The facts in Cornwell differ significantly from the instant matter. After participating
in a sit-in, Plaintiff was detained outside and forced to lie in a cold, muddy area in temperatures that were between 40 and 44 degrees. Id. at 914. The strip searches were conducted before the corrections officers, before other participating inmates, and before any corrections officer who happen to pass through the designated area. Notably, prisoners were taken inside the prison facility gymnasium prior to being forced to return to the outdoor area
for strip search. Id. at 914. The Cornwell Court did not impose liability, but rather reversed
the judgment on the Fourth Amendment privacy claim and ordered for a new trial where the jury may be instructed properly on the reasonably related standard. Id. at 918.
Moreover, since Cornwell, at least one court has held that a pretrial detainees' rights are not violated when monitored by a female guard. In Johnson v Phelan, 69 F.3d 144 (7'" Cir. 1995), Judge Easterbrook held that it is not a violation of a prisoner's Fourth Amendment
rights to be viewed and monitored by correction officers of the opposite sex. Judge
Easterbrook held that pursuant to Hudson v Palmer, 468 U.S. 517; 104 S.Ct. 3194; L.Ed.2d
393 (1984), "privacy is the thing mostsurely extinguished by a judgment committing someone
to prison." Johnson, supra, at 146. Since Cornwell, decisions in Michigan and other states
have provided that gender is not a bona fide occupational qualification for correction officers.
Everson v Michigan Department of Corrections, 222 F.Supp.2d 864 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
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/ '
Moreover, as indicated, supra, the Turner, supra and Bell, supra, cases mandate that
this Court employ a "reasonableness" standard in evaluating the allegations of right to privacy
invasions in the instant case. It is important to note that nothing in the policy provides that
the inmates be disrobed in front of other inmates. Inmates are given an opportunity to disrobe
voluntarily in the segregation cell. (EXHIBIT B). The justification recited above is equally
applicable to the invasion of Plaintiffs' privacy rights. The regulations are reasonably related
to the interests in preventing harm of the prisoners to themselves, to other prisoners, to
inmates and the disruption of jail security and internal operations. These justifications are
supported in the record by expert reports and by deposition testimony. These facts preclude
a summary judgment in Plaintiffs favor in the instant matter.
C. Policy as punishment.
Plaintiffs next allege that Defendants' policy constitutes unconstitutional punishment
prior to adjudication of gUilt. (Plaintiffs' Brief, pp. 15-18). This argument must also fail
because it is not supported by the cases. Bell v Wolfish, supra, provides the standards by
which a claim of Eighth Amendment violations must be judged. The Court stated:
A court must decide whether the disability is imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose. Absent a showing of an expressed intent to punish on the part of detention facility officials, that determination generally will turn on "whether an alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned [to it]. Thus, if a particular condition or restriction of
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Case 1:01-cv-10337-DML Document 105 Filed 05/29/2003 Page 29 of 36
/ -,
pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to "punishment. " Conversely, if a restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal--if it is arbitrary or purposeless--a court permissively may infer that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment that may not constitutionally be
inflicted upon detainees qua detainees. Courts
must be mindful that these inquiries spring from constitutional requirements and that judicial answers to them must reflect that fact rather than a court's idea of how best to operate a detention facility. Id. 441 U.S. at 538-539.
The Bell Court utilizes a reasonable relationship test to determine if a restriction is imposed
for punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. As indicated above, the testimony in
the instant case shows that the placement of the claimants in administrative segregation without
clothing did reasonably relate to the legitimate governmental objective of maintaining safety
of the detainees themselves, the safety of other detainees and staff and the orderly operation
of the jail.
Plaintiffs attempt to argue that Defendants' concern of keeping the inmates from
harming themselves is a mere pretext. (Plaintiffs' Brief, p. 17). However, it must be noted
that prisoners who are disruptive to staff in and of itself, presents a risk of later harming
themselves by attempted suicide. (EXHIBIT F, pp. 1-2). Although, Defendants did not
verbalize any suicidal ideations at intake, their combativeness, intoxication, and other factors
demonstrate that they risked harm to themselves. Notably, the inmate who committed suicide
in 1996 which gave rise to the instant policy did not express suicidal ideations prior to his
23

Case 1:01-cv-10337-DML Document 105 Filed 05/29/2003 Page 30 of 36
successful suicide attempt. Defendants justification for their policy is not that they were suicidal, but that they were a threat to themselves as well as others, and to the internal security of the facility.
Liability is imposed upon government employees and governmental units when a pretrial detainees' mental health needs are shown deliberate indifference by jail staff. Molton v Cleveland, 839 F.2d. 240 (fJl. Cir. 1988); Comstock v McCrary, 273 F.3d. 693 (fJ" Cir. 2001). The United States Supreme Court has made clear that once a person is incarcerated by governmental entity. stripping them of virtually every means of self-protection and forecloses access to outside aid. they are responsible for the well being of their detainees. Farmer v Brennan, 511 U.S. 825; 114 S.Ct. 1970; 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). Therefore, while not expressing suicidal intent, Plaintiffs by their disruptive behavior showed that they were at a risk of harming themselves, other prisoners and staff. They also showed that they were capable of disruption of the orderly operation and security of the jail detention facility. Therefore, removing their clothing and placing the inmates in administrative segregation furthered the legitimate governmental objectives of protecting these inmates, other inmates. and the jail detention facility itself. D. Substantive due process.
Lastly. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants' actions violates substantive due process in that it shocks the consciousness of the Court pursuant to Rochin v California, 342 U. S. 165; 72 S.C!. 205; 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952). This argument must also be denied because the undisputed testimony of Defendants and the experts' opinions indicate that Defendants' actions were not
24

Case 1:01-cv-10337-DML Document 105 Filed 05/29/2003 Page 31 of 36
arbitrary. Moreover, Plaintiffs have cited no cases which would support their claim that Defendants' conduct was "conscious shocking." As demonstrated supra, the only Circuit Court case addressing a situation similar to the instant matter has found that the practice of placing a disruptive and violent inmate in a segregated cell in a state of nudity does not violate
the constitution. Hill v McKinley, 311 F.3d 899 (8'" Cir. 2002). Moreover, the record
indicates that Defendants' actions were not arbitrary but rationally related to their legitimate interests in maintaining the safety of inmates and staff and in maintaining the internal security and orderly operations of the jail facility. For these reasons, Plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the basis of substantive due process must be denied.
III. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY In civil suits for money damages, governmental officials acting in their official capacity are entitled to qualified immunity for discretionary acts which do not violate clearly established law of which a reasonable person would have known. Anderson v Creighton, 43 U.S. 635; 107 S.Ct. 3034; 97 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1987). The Supreme Court has recently stated that assessment of whether an official is entitled to immunity involves a two part analysis: (1) whether the Plaintiff has alleged facts which, taken in light most favorable to him or her, show that the official's conduct violated a constitutionally protected right; (2) if the first part has been answered in the affirmative, courts must then determine whether the right was clearly established such that a reasonable official, at the time the act was committed, would have understood that his behavior violated that right. Saucier v Katz, 533 U.S. 194; 121 S.Ct. 2151; 150 L.Ed.2d (2001).
25

Case 1:01-cv-10337-DML Document 105 Filed 05/29/2003 Page 32 of 36
Further, it is important to note that the second part in the analysis must be undertaken in light of this specific context of the case, not as a broad, general proposition." Id. at 121 S.Ct. at 2156.
In the instant case, as demonstrated above, Plaintiffs cannot meet the threshold inquiry of whether a constitutional violation occurred at all. Therefore, Sheriff Brown is entitled to summary judgment on the basis ofqualified.immunity. Further, it must be noted that Plaintiffs have failed to cite any case which holds that a reasonable official on May 22, 1999, would have been aware that it was violation of a clearly established right to place Plaintiffs in administrative segregation without clothing. As demonstrated in Hill, supra, the only Circuit Court opinion to date addressing the very issue in the instant case has held that it is not a violation of constitutional rights to place a pretrial detainee who is violent in the nude in a
secured cell. Hill, supra, 311 F.3d. 899 (8''' Cir. 2002). The closest case in the Sixth Circuit, Cornwell v Dahlberg, supra, is not specific
enough to the facts in the instant case. Further, Cornwell only established that Plaintiff stated a claim given this specific facts of that case to a Fourth Amendment violation. The panel did not determine it was a violation of rights as such. The court merely remanded for trial the question whether the practice was reasonably related to a legitimate penological objective.
Given these facts, Defendant, Sheriff Charles Brown respectfully requests Summary Judgment in his favor on the issue of qualified immunity.
26

Case 1:01-cv-10337-DML Document 105 Filed 05/29/2003 Page 33 of 36
IV. ADMISSION OF LIABILITY
Plaintiffs lastly argue that Defendants are estopped from denying liability. (Plaintiffs'Bricf, p. 32). However, this argument ignores the fact that, that issue was presented to the Court and denied in an Order dated Oetober 10, 2002.
The very ease cited by Plaintiffs in support of their argument on liability, Dalla Corp. v Appeal Board ofMicJtigall EmploymelltSecllrity, 371 Mich 107; 123 NW2d 277 (1963) provides that an admission is only binding once they have been received and approved by the Court. Ill. at 110. Additionally, Michigan courts have held that a stipulation is binding until abandoned or disaffirmed. Nllriel v YOllllg Womell's Christiall Associatioll ofMetropolitall Detroit, 186 Mich App 141 (1990). In the present case, there is no written stipulation submitted and approved by the Court. Any possible stipulation has disaffirmed shortly aller it was made.
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, admissions are made in writing in response to
Request for Admissions. Fed. R. Civ. Proe. 36. Even under this rule, Courts have the discretion to
permit the withdrawal of an admission. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 36(b). The Court's discretion must be exercised in light of two (2) factors: (1) Whether the withdrawal will aid in the resolution of the case, and (2) whether the party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice the party in maintaining the action or defense on the merits. Kerry Steel, Illc. v Paragoll Illdustries, IIIC., 106 F.3d. 147 (6"' Cir. 1997). In the present case, no admission has been made pursuant to their request for admissions pursuant to Rule 26. Even if it had been submitted pursuant to this rule, the court still has discretion to allow a withdrawal of admissions. It will aid in the resolution of the case and Plaintiffs have failed to show the court that it withdrawal the admission, will prejudice the party. Plaintiffs have submitted no facts to show their
27

Case 1:01-cv-10337-DML Document 105 Filed 05/29/2003 Page 34 of 36
prejudice. Additionally, allowing Defendants to contest liability will permit ajust and equitable resolution of the elaims filed by Plaintiffs.
V. IN.JUNCTIVE RELIEF When considering a motion for preliminary injunction, the Court must balanee four (4) factors: (I) the movants' likelihood of suecess in merits; (2) whether the movant will suffer irreparable injury in the absence of a injunction; (3) whether an injunction will cause substantial harm to others; (4) whether the injunction will serve the public interest. G& V LOl/llge v Michigall Liqllor COlltrol Commissioll, 23 F.3d. 1071 (6'" Cir. 1994). In the instant case, regardless of the other factors, there is no showing that the Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable injury in the absence of an injunction. It is undisputed that the Saginaw County Detention Facility does not place detainees in the administrative segregation cell without clothing. They are now issued paper gowns. (EXHIBIT A, p. 34). Therefore, Plaintiffs have not shown they are entitled to injunctivc relief. WHEREFORE, for the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs have not shown that they have strong likelihood of success on the merits.
CONCLUSION Plaintiffs have failed to show that they are entitled to summary judgment on the issue of liability. First, Plaintiffs have miseharaeterized the record on the contents of the very policy they dispute. The deposition testimony of Defendants' employees indicates that there is a standard for placement into administrative segregation and that the justification for placement lies in the threats of harm caused by Plaintiffs and the threats to the internal security and orderly operation ofthe jail.
28

Case 1:01-cv-10337-DML Document 105 Filed 05/29/2003 Page 35 of 36
.....

While Plaintiffs were required to disrobe before entering the segregated facility, force was only applied if Plaintiffs refused to comply with the orders.
Further, the only facts in the record demonstrate that Defendants have shown that the practice of Saginaw County is reasonably related to legitimate penological objectives. Defendants should at least be able to develop this issue in further discovery of experts.
For all the reasons stated herein, Defendants respectfully request that Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment be denied.
Respectfully· submitted, O'CONNOR, DeGRAZIA, TAMM & O'CONNOR, P.C.

DATE: May 27, 2003

By ({VIM. "1. ~ JAMES 1. DeGRAZIA P22853
PAUL T. O'NEILL P57293 Attorneys for Defendants 4111 Andover Road, Ste. 300 East Bloomfield I-lills, MI 48302 (248) 433-2000

29

Case 1:01-cv-10337-DML Document 105 Filed 05/29/2003 Page 36 of 36
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OFMICmGAN
SEE CASE FILE FOR ADDITIONAL .
DOCUMENTS OR PAGES THAT WERE NOT SCANNED·

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LINDA ROSE, et al.,

Plaintiffs, v.

Case No. 01-10337

SAGINAW COUNTY, et al.,

Hon. David Lawson

Defendants.

PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR JOINDER AND CONTINUED TOLLING

Christopher J. Pianto (P-59160) FLETCHER, WOLF, PIANTO & ASSOCIATES 718 Beach Street Flint Mi 48502-1105 (810) 238-4410
Michael J. Steinberg (P43085) Kary L. Moss (P49759) American Civil Liberties Union Fund
of Michigan 60 West Hancock Street Detroit, Michigan 48201 (313) 578-6814

Michael L. Pitt (P-24429) Peggy Goldberg Pitt (P-31407) 117 West Fourth Street, Suite 200 Royal Oak, MI 48067 (248) 398-9800
Stephen Wasinger (P25963) Stephen F. Wasinger, PLC Cooperating Attorney, American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan 100 Beacon Centre 26862 Woodward Ave. Royal Oak, Michigan 48067 (248) 414-9942

TABLE OF CONTENT
TABLE OF CONTENT ................................................................................................................... i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................................... iii
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1
1. FACTS SUPPORTING CLASS CERTIFICATION .......................................................... 4
A. The Conditions At The Jail Are Far Worse Than Those That The Court Addressed In Its Summary Judgment Opinion; And They Continue To This Day .................................................................................................................. 4
B. Defendants Have Engaged In A Fraudulent Course Of Conduct Designed To Conceal The Full Extent Of Their Pervasive Patter Of Unconstitutional Conduct ................................................................................................................... 6
C. Notwithstanding Defendants' Obstruction, Plaintiffs Have Discovered That The Pattern Was Far More Pervasive And Affected Far More Persons Than Defendants Have Acknowledged................................................................... 7
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 7
1. STANDARD OF REVIEW ................................................................................................ 7
II. Because The Statutes Of Limitations Have Been Tolled, Denying Class Certification Will Not Promote Judicial Economy Or Substantial Justice; Instead, It Will Require The Filing Of Individual Actions Which Will Only Increase The Cost And Burdens Of Litigation For All Parties And The Court ............................................................................................ 8
III. Given The Choice Between Joinder, Filing Independent Actions, Or Class Certification At This Time, The Court Should Choose Certification .................................................... 10
IV. This Case Satisfies The Requirements Of Rule 23(A) ..................................................... 10
A. The Class Is So Numerous That Joinder Is Impractible ....................................... 10
B. There Are Questions Of Law And Fact Common To The Class .......................... 11
C. The Claims Of The Representative Parties Are TypicaL ..................................... 13
D. The Representative Parties Will Fairly And Adequately Protect The Interests of The Class ............................................................................................ 14
V. The Court Should Certify A Class Under Rule 23(b)(l) and (2) To Order Final Injunctive Relief................................................................................................................................. 15
VI. The Court Should Also Certify A Class Under Rule 23(b)(3) To Remedy Past Discrimination Through Awards Of Damages ................................................................. 17
VII. If The Court Does Not Certify, It Should Permit Joinder Of The Additional Persons Who Plaintiffs Have Thus Far Identified And Continue To Toll The Limitations Period Under Plaintiffs Can Obtain Complete Access To Defendants' Records So That They Can Identify Additional Parties Who Have Suffered From Defendants' Unconstitutional Practices ............................................................................................................................ 21

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 23
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Alexander v. Fulton County, 207 F.3d 1303 (11 th Cir. 2000) ................................................................................................ 22
American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974) ................................................................................................................ 2,8
Anderson v. Cornejo, 199 F.Supp.2d 229 (N.D.Il1.2000) ............................................................................................ 11
Andrews v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 95 F.3d 1014, 1023 (lIth Cir.1996) ......................................... 20 Barney v. Holzer Clinic, Ltd.,
110 F.3d 1207 (6th Cir. 1997) .................................................................................................... 3 Bittinger v. Tecumseh Products Company,
123 F.3d 877 (6th Cir. 1997) .................................................................................................... 13 Crown, Cork, & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker,
462 U.S. 345 (1983) ................................................................................................................ 2,8 De La Fuente v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc.,
713 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1983) .................................................................................................... 13 DeBoer v. Mellon Mortgage Co.,
64 F.3d 1171 (8th Cir. 1995) .................................................................................................... 13 Delgozzo v. Kenny,
628 A.2d 1080 (N.J. 1993)........................................................................................................ 18 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
417 U.S. 156 (1974) .................................................................................................................... 8 Eisenberg v. Gagnon,
766 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1985)........................................................................................................ 8
Forbush v. Jc. Penney Co., Inc.,
994 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir.1993) ................................................................................................... 13 Garrish v. UAW,
149 F. Supp. 2d 326 (E.D. Mich. 2001) .............................................................................. 11, 14 Harris v. General Development Corp.,
127 F.R.D. 655 (N.D. Ill. 1989) ................................................................................................ 11 In re Playmobil Antitrust Litigation,
35 F.Supp.2d 231 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) .......................................................................................... 14 In re The Prudential Ins Co ofAmerica Sales Practices Litigation,
148 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1998)...................................................................................................... 14 Jarrett v. Kassel,
972 F.2d 1415 (6th Cir. 1992) ................................................................................................ 2,9
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Johnson v. City ofOperowsa, 658 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1981) .................................................................................................. 11
Kanter v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48 (3rd Cir. 1994) .................................................................................................. 12, 13
Klender v. U.S., 218 F.R.D. 161 (E.D.Mich. 2003)...................................................................................... 12, 18
Little Caesar Enterprises, Inc. v. Smith, 172 F.R.D. 236 (E.D.Mich. 1997) ............................................................................ 8, 10, 11,20
Lothian v. Detroit, 414 Mich. 160,324 N.W.2d 9 (1982) ..................................................................................... 3,9
Molski v. Gleich" 318 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2003) .................................................................................................... 15
Olden v. LaFarge Corp., 203 F.R.D. 254 (E.D.Mich. 2001) ........................................ 3, 11, 13, 14 Olden v. LaFarge Corp., 383 F.3d 495 (6th Cir. 2004) ...................................................... 3, 15, 18
Paper Systems, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 193 F.R.D. 601 (E.D.Wis. 2000) .............................................................................................. 13
Penland v. Warner County Jail, 797 F.2d 332 (6th Cir. 1986)..................................................... 11
Puricelli v. CNA Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. 139 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) ............................................................................................. 22
Retired Chicago Police Ass 'n v. City ofChicago, 7 F.3d 584 (7th Cir. 1993) ........................................................................................................ 13
Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1993)...................................................................................................... 13
Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013 (7th Cir. 1992) ............................................................................................ 12, 13
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) .................................................................................................................. 14
Sprague v. General Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 1998) .................................................................................................... 11
Stewart v. Abraham, 275 F.3d 220 (3rd Cir. 2001) .................................................................................................... 15
Stout v. Byrider, 228 F.3d 709 (6th Cir.2000) ..................................................................................................... 14
VanVels v. Previer Athletic Center ofPlainfield, 182 F.R.D. 500 (W.D. Mich. 1998) .......................................................................................... 12
Warren Consolo Schools V. W R. Grace & Co., 205 Mich. App. 508, 518 N.W.2d 508 (1994) .... 8
Weston V. AmeriBank, 265 F.3d 366 (6th Cir. 2001) ...................................................................................................... 8
- IV-

Wolin v. Smith Barney Inc., 83 F.3d 847 (7th Cir. 1996) .................................................................................................... 2, 9
Statutes MCLA 600.5855 ............................................................................................................................. 3 Rules MCR 3.501(F) ................................................................................................................................. 8 Rule 20, F.R.Civ.P........................................................................................................................ 21 Rule 23(c)(I), F.R.Civ.P................................................................................................................. 3 Treatises 4 H. Newberg, Newberg On Class Actions (3d ed.), § 3.16 ......................................................... 19 5 Moore's Federal Practice_(3d ed. 1997), § 23.23 ..................................................................... 11 7A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure (2d ed.), § 1765 ...................................... 14 7A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure (2d ed.), § 1778 ...................................... 18
- v-

INTRODUCTION
Time and publicity after this Court's summary judgment opinion (issued on January 25, 2005) have demonstrated that Defendants' brutal, unconstitutional practices are far more pervasive, have existed far longer and have affected far more people than Defendants have represented to the Court. 1 While Defendants have continuously insisted that only a small number -some 30 - have been victimized by the County's unconstitutional practices, there can now be little doubt that the victims exceed a hundred and may number as many as two hundred to three hundred.
The full extent of the practice remains to be determined. Plaintiffs are informed that the FBI and the Department of Justice are conducting their own investigation, and Plaintiffs also are advised that the County's own counsel decried Defendants' practices.2 Publicity has generated communications from numerous persons, and there is substantial likelihood that the County's own records will reveal others who have been victimized by the County's practices.3
Under the circumstances, only class certification can provide substantial justice and complete relief to all of Defendants' victims and ensure that Defendants' unconstitutional

A summary of the County's representations to Plaintiffs and this Court is contained in the Affidavit of Christopher Pianto, which is being filed in support of this motion ("Pianto Affidavit").

2

In a March 30,2005 article in the Saginaw News, reporter Joe Snapper wrote: "Saginaw County

leaders had ample warning their jail policy of stripping unruly detainees was fertile ground for a major

lawsuit, former Sheriff Tom McIntryre says." Mr. Snapper also wrote: "But, McIntyre added, lawyer

Peter C. Jensen's II-page opinion also advised the county to admit mistakes and settle before the number

of plaintiffs - and damages - mushroomed. Officials didn't listen." (A copy of Mr. Snapper's article

is attached as Exhibit A to the Pianto Affidavit.) Plaintiffs' counsel has made repeated attempts to obtain

the Jensen memorandum through FOIA requests. Those requests have been ignored by Defendants-

further demonstrating their callous refusal to provide pertinent evidence which would allow Plaintiffs to

establish the full extent of Defendants' unconstitutional practices. Plaintiffs will now proceed through

more formal discovery to obtain this memorandum and other evidence showing the County willfully

ignored its responsibilities to the victims of its unconstitutional policies. Pianto Affidavit, ~ 1.

3

Plaintiffs' counsel continues to investigate the extent of Defendants' unconstitutional practices.

The investigation to date, however, establishes that Defendants have seriously misrepresented the number

of victims and the time frame of the unconstitutional practices. See Pianto Affidavit and the attached

summary of evidence which is attached as Exhibit B to the Pianto Affidavit.

practices will finally end. Class certification is necessary and appropriate because only class
certification can overcome the effects of the Defendants' prior misrepresentations to the Court
and ensure that all victims will have adequate time and resources to pursue their remedies:
A. Because there is strong evidence that the conditions are on-going, the Court should certify a class under Rule 23(b)(2), F.R.Civ.P., so that it enter permanent classwide injunctive relief to ensure that the County's unconstitutional practices in fact end.
B. Because the number of persons who have been affected by the County's unconstitutional practices are far greater than originally suspected, the Court should certify a class under Rule 23(b)(3), so that the individuals who have been victimized can only adequate monetary relief.
C. Class certification will promote judicial economy and avoid the need for numerous individual actions;
D. Class certification will ensure that all victims receive adequate representation because it will protect not only currently identified victims but will allow additional time to identify and give notice to remaining class members.
E. Denying class certification will not, as may sometimes be true, limit additional litigation. Plaintiffs now have evidence from more than 80 persons who could, if necessary, file individual claims;4 and, if they did so, judicial economy would dictate that those individual claims be consolidated with the current claims.
F. None of these individual claims are barred by the statute of limitations:
a) the commencement of this lawsuit tolled the statute of limitations for all persons who were within the original class definition on all claims which were or could have been brought under the original claim until an order denying class certification has been entered. Crown, Cork, & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 353-354 (1983) (quoting American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538,544 (1974)).
b) Even if the limitations period had not been tolled because it was filed as a class action, the limitations period would still be tolled because Defendants fraudulently concealed facts which would have caused Plaintiffs to move for class certification and Defendants' conduct estops them from asserting the limitations period as a defense to the claims of absent class members. Jarrett v. Kassel, 972 F.2d 1415, 1427-1428 (6th Cir. 1992); Wolin v. Smith Barney Inc., 83 F.3d 847, 852 (7th Cir. 1996);

4

A summary of these claims is attached as Exhibit B to the Pianto affidavit.

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Lothian v. Detroit, 414 Mich. 160, 176-177, 324 N.W.2d 9 (1982); MCLA 600.5855. The County's unconstitutional actions are not isolated. They are part of a long-standing pattern and practice which has victimized more than 100 persons - persons who are least able to take care of themselves. This case cries out for classwide relief, both equitable and monetary. Because at least the currently identified persons could pursue individual claims, judicial economy mandates class certification as the most superior way to adjudicate the classwide issues and ensure that there is a classwide remedy. Problems of individualized proof of damages has rarely been a bar to class certification, and it is not a bar in this case. See Olden v. LaFarge Corp., 383 F.3d 495 (6th Cir. 2004), affirming 203 F.R.D. 254 (E.D.Mich. 2001) (Lawson, J) (in affirming this Court's decision to certify a class under Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3) and finding that individual damage determinations did not prevent certification). If further discovery demonstrates that there may be manageability problems, then Court can modify its rulings and, if necessary, decertify the class. See Rule 23(c)(l), F.R.Civ.P., and Barney v. Holzer Clinic, Ltd., 110 F.3d 1207, 1214 (6th Cir. 1997) (as long as the court retains jurisdiction over the case it must continue carefully to scrutinize whether the requirements of Rule 23 are satisfied and withdraw or amend certification if such representation is not furnished"). Denying class certification at this point would create the serious risk that currently unidentified victims might lose their right to sue because an order denying class certification terminates the tolling of the limitations period. Thus, at a minimum, if the Court should decide to deny class certification, it should enter an order tolling the limitations period until after Plaintiffs have had an adequate opportunity to review all relevant records to identify those persons who have been victimized and give them an adequate opportunity to retain counsel and pursue individual actions.
-3-

I. FACTS SUPPORTING CLASS CERTIFICATION
A. The Conditions At The Jail Are Far Worse Than Those That The Court Addressed In Its Summary Judgment Opinion; And They Continue To This Day
From the earliest stages of this litigation, the defendants have asserted that the practice of forcibly removing inmates' clothing, placing them naked in an isolation cell where they can be observed by members of the opposite sex was curtailed by jail directive in December of 2001. As the summary of evidence supporting the pattern of pervasive constitutional violations clearly demonstrates, the j ail has continued the practice through the present time.
Plaintiffs have assembled a summary of evidence which demonstrates that Defendants' practices were far more pervasive than Defendants have represented and, worse, that they continue to this time. A summary of the evidence is attached as Exhibit B to the Pianto affidavit. 5
The policy of providing isolation cell detainees with paper gowns is, by no means, uniformly followed. Indeed, the evidence indicates that since December of 2001, inmates have been routinely stripped of their clothing by force and placed in segregation cells in a naked condition. Moreover, the paper gowns, when provided, are inadequate to cover private body

5

The Summary of Evidence Supporting Pervasive Pattern of Constitutional Violations documents

the reports of 91 victims of this policy. 72 of the individuals reporting violations were male, 19 were

female. The average age of the detainee is 31.S years. The average length of stay in the isolation cell is

22.S hours. Of those filing reports with plaintiffs' counsel, 38 are currently incarcerated in the Saginaw

County Jailor elsewhere. 6S of the victims or 71 % allege that they were observed by members of the

opposite sex. The presence of cameras in the cells make it likely that others were as well. The reports

span eight years from 1998 to 200S. These include one case in 1998; fourteen cases in 1999; eighteen

cases in 2000; fourteen cases in 2001; fourteen cases in 2002; twelve cases in 2003; fifteen cases in 2004;

and, three cases in 200S. There were 44 reports of violations occurring after January, 2002. Of the 44

reports, 23 alleged that they were placed in the isolation cell without a gown or any other type of

covering. The twenty three individuals making these allegations are (3) Ball, (IS) Cage, (16) Carson, (18)

Castillo, (27) Eudis, (36) Hasse, (42) Jakes, (43) Jekel, (4S) Johnson, (SO) Kennelly, (S4) Labelle, (SS)

Lamphere, (S6) Larkin, (62) Mayfield, (63) Merrow, (67) Newman, (69) O'Connor, (71) Peoples, (7S)

Quinnan, (77) Riggins, (78) Riggins, W, (8S) Semple, and (88) Wicker. Of the 91 reported violations, 71

individuals asserted that they were in the segregation cell totally naked. Only 19 said that they were

provided with a paper gown. On this see the affidavit of Peggy Goldberg Pitt which is filed in support of

this motion which explains the methodology used in compiling this information.

- 4-

parts. The paper gowns are of such poor quality that they usually tear. In addition, the gowns are often used by the prisoners to remove mace sprayed on them during the clothes stripping process or utilized as toilet paper, leaving them naked.
These unconstitutional isolation cells are monitored 24 hours a day by cameras from several locations. The cameras can viewed by a wide variety of personnel within the jail. See http://www.delta.edulcorrproglscsd;ailtour.html (which proudl7y shows the holding cells and the monitors which allow observation of the holding cells which the constitutional violations occurred.)
The jail has used, and currently uses, three areas in the jail as isolation cells. One cell appears to be standard size with a commode and sink but which is often inoperable or kept in an unsanitary condition. There is a concrete slab about a foot off the ground for sitting or sleeping. The other two segregation cells are barred rooms approximately eight feet-by ten feet which have neither a commode, nor a sink, nor a slab upon which the inmate can sit. There is a hole in the floor where inmates can relieve themselves. It is unclear whether the hole is attached to a sanitary drain.
The overwhelming majority of those reporting conditions in the isolation cell indicate that they were subjected to extremely cold temperatures. Reports indicate that the temperature may not be habitable for individuals who stay in the cells for more than a short time.
More than a third of those reporting described the conditions in the isolation cells as unsanitary with offensive odors. Hygiene items such as toilet paper and tampons were denied to approximately 31 % of those reporting.
It is also universally reported that there are unsanitary conditions in both cells. In the one cell where a commode is available, it is often plugged up with human feces and other waste material. The water often does not run. Fecal matter, urine, blood, pus and other human bodily fluids cover the walls, floor and the seating slab in the one cell where it is provided.
-5-

Many of the inmates report that sanitary supplies, such as toilet paper and tampons, are not available. Class counsel has received many reports that, when toilet paper is provided, naked inmates wrap themselves in the toilet paper in order to keep warm and are unable to secure additional paper products when the time comes to clean themselves after defecation.
These statistics prove that the defendants continue to misrepresent the conditions at the jail. The defendants' insistence that the unconstitutional conditions addressed in the court's January 25,2005 opinion have been cured is simply not true.
B. Defendants Have Engaged In A Fraudulent Course Of Conduct Designed To Conceal The Full Extent Of Their Pervasive Patter Of Unconstitutional Conduct
Plaintiffs suspected that Defendants' unlawful conduct was pervasive and victimized far more persons than the originally named plaintiffs. The Defendants have not only denied this in communications to Plaintiffs' counsel and in written and oral representations to the Courtbut they stonewalled Plaintiffs' efforts to discover the true facts. These misrepresentations have prejudiced Plaintiffs because they did not move early on for class certification, and they affected the Court's own analysis of the class. These misrepresentations, whether intentional or negligent at the time, include the following:
On March 14,2002, Mr. Jensen filed "Defendants' Status and Scheduling Conference Statement", wherein he stated, among other things: "[with] regard to whether this is a 'class action;, the jail records of Saginaw County reflect for the past three years there have been 11 females (including the plaintiffs in this case) and 19 males who have been placed in the holding tank. .. assuming that the class of plaintiffs is simply women who have been strip-searched by male guards, the number of plaintiffs is very slight, and there are limited fact questions to be
resolved." [Pianto Affidavit, ,-r 4]
As the case continued, the misrepresentations continued; and, upon reflection, it is difficult to view the misrepresentations as mere negligence. As the facts established in the Pianto affidavit demonstrate, Defendants (perhaps not their counsel) were engaged in a clear pattern and practice of misrepresenting to Plaintiffs and the Court what happened in the Saginaw County Jail.
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C. Notwithstanding Defendants' Obstruction, Plaintiffs Have Discovered That The Pattern Was Far More Pervasive And Affected Far More Persons Than Defendants Have Acknowledged
In early 2003, Plaintiffs' began receiving infonnation which strongly suggested that Defendants had misrepresented the extent of unconstitutional practices. On February 14,2003, a local television station aired a story on the jail's use of segregation cells. Plaintiffs' counsel began receiving calls from fonner inmates at the Saginaw County Jail claiming to have been placed in the segregation cell naked or in a partially-naked condition. Pianto Affidavit, ~ 15.
On March 10, 2003, Plaintiffs' counsel notified the court by letter of his concerns that the number of persons who were adversely affected by the jail's policies exceeded the 30 or so plaintiffs who had been identified by the defendants from their records, and requested an inperson pretrial conference. The court conducted the status conference on March 18, 2003. At the status conference, Plaintiffs' counsel described to the court the phone calls received from the newly-discovered victims, and he reiterated his concerns regarding the representations made by defense counsel that the number of victims did not exceed 30 individuals. At the conclusion of the conference, the court infonned counsel that because dispositive motions were forthcoming, the court would revisit the issues of joinder and/or class-action after it decided the dispositive motions. Pianto Affidavit, ~~ 16-18.
Since that early 2003 status conference, more infonnation has emerged. Indeed, after the Court issued its summary judgment opinion on January 25, 2005, publicity about the Saginaw County Jail has increased; and this increased publicity has caused Plaintiffs' counsel to conclude that more than 200 persons have been victims of Defendants' unconstitutional conduct. See Pianto Affidavit, ~~ 26-28.
ARGUMENT I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
It is well-established that "any doubts concerning the propriety of class certification should be resolved in favor of upholding the class." Gasperoni v. Metabolife International, Inc., 2000 WL 33365948 at *8 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (Cohn, J.). See also Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d
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770, 785 (3d Cir. 1985); Little Caesar Enterprises, Inc. v. Smith, 172 F.R.D. 236, 241 (E.D.Mich. 1997) (Gadola, J.).
When considering a class certification motion, the court may not inquire into the merits of the case, and may look beyond the pleadings solely to determine whether the plaintiff's claims, if proven, would present principally individual or common issues. Little Caesar, 172 F.R.D. at 241; Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-178 (1974).
II. Because The Statutes Of Limitations Have Been Tolled, Denying Class Certification Will Not Promote Judicial Economy Or Substantial Justice; Instead, It Will Require The Filing Of Individual Actions Which Will Only Increase The Cost And Burdens Of Litigation For All Parties And The Court
The Supreme Court has held that the filing of a class action tolls" 'the applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class action.' " Crown, Cork, & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 353-354 (1983) (quoting American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 544 (1974)). Once the statute has been tolled by the filing of the class action, "it remains tolled for all members of the putative class until class certification is denied." Crown Cork, 462 U.S. at 354. See also see Weston v. AmeriBank, 265 F.3d 366 (6th Cir. 2001) (the statute of limitations for putative class members of the original class is tolled for substantive claims that were raised, or could have been raised, in the initial complaint).6

6

The same tolling principles apply under Michigan law. As Warren Consolo Schools. V. W R.

Grace & Co., 205 Mich. App. 508,518 N.W.2d 508,511 (1994). observed: "Where class certification is

later denied, the commencement of a class action suspends the applicable period of limitation with respect

to all asserted members of the class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue

as a class action. Crown, Cork & Seal CO. V. Parker, 462 U.S. 345,353, 103 S.Ct. 2392, 2397, 76 L.Ed.2d

628 (1983); American Pipe & Construction CO. V. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554, 94 S.Ct. 756, 766, 38 L.Ed.2d

713 (1974); Lee V. Grand Rapids Bd. ofEd., 148 Mich.App. 364, 369, 384 N.W.2d 165 (1986). To hold

otherwise would frustrate the function of a class action, which is to avoid multiplicity of activity.

American Pipe, supra 414 U.S. at 551, 94 S.Ct. at 765. These principles are embodied in

MCR 3.501(F)(1), which states: "The statute of limitations is tolled as to all persons within the class

described in the complaint on the commencement of an action asserting a class action."

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And, even if the class action tolling principles did not extend the limitations period, Defendants' conduct estops them from invoking the statute of limitations. When they filed this action as a class action, Plaintiffs represented the putative class members. Thus, Defendants' misrepresentations affected not only Plaintiffs but the other class members as well. Jarrett v. Kassel, 972 F.2d 1415, 1427-1428 (6th Cir. 1992). Had Plaintiffs not been deceived, they would have moved for class certification earlier, and the Court would likely have granted class certification if it was aware of all the facts. And, even if the Court had denied class certification, the Court would certainly have made provision for all persons victimized by Defendants' unconstitutional conduct to be identified and either join this action or pursue separate actions. Solely because of Defendants' misconduct, that early hearing did not occur. Thus, Defendants' misconduct bars them from invoking the statute of limitations as a defense to any newly identified victims, under principles of equitable tolling and equitable estoppel.
Wolin, 83 F.3d at 852 (7th Cir. 1996), explains the difference between equitable tolling and equitable estoppel:
Equitable tolling is invoked when the prospective plaintiff simply does not have and cannot with due diligence obtain infonnation essential to
bringing a suit. * * * Equitable estoppel, as we have seen, is invoked
when the prospective defendant does make such a special effort to cover up the fraud or does something else to prevent the prospective plaintiff from suing in time, such as promising not to plead the statute of
limitations as a defense. * * *
This is the domain of equitable tolling and equitable estoppel. They differ critically in scope in the following respect: when the plea is equitable tolling rather than equitable estoppel, the defendant is innocent of the delay (though not of course of the original wrong), so the plaintiff must use due diligence to be allowed to toll the statute of limitations; if he does not, he has no equitable claim to avoid the time bar. In the case of equitable estoppel, which requires active misconduct by the defendant, the plaintiff is not required to be diligent. The disagreement, however, may be apparent rather than real, because the cases often run equitable tolling and equitable estoppel together. [Citations omitted.]
The same principles apply under Michigan law. Lothian, 414 Mich. at 176-177.
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Thus, whether the Court applies federal law or state law to detennine the appropriate limitations periods, the Court should conclude that the running of the statute of limitations has been tolled since this lawsuit was commenced and that Defendants are estopped to rely on the limitations period in defense of victims who have been newly identified or who will be identified when Defendants cease their stonewalling and provide accurate infonnation to Plaintiffs' counsel and the Court about what really happened at the Saginaw County Jail. III. Given The Choice Between Joinder, Filing Independent Actions, Or Class
Certification At This Time, The Court Should Choose Certification Doing justice demands that all victims of Defendants' unconstitutional conduct should have a remedy; and, now that it is clear that the victims exceed the County's earlier representations of 30 or so, the only question is how procedurally to manage the numerous individual claims. On first glance, the easiest solution might be to deny class certification, but any serious reflection will soon demonstrate that that solution will not only clog the Court's docket but impose huge costs on the all parties and the courts.
Individual actions would mandate individual discovery and individual trials. Joinder would mandate individual discovery and perhaps individual trials. Both individual actions and joinder would also create the risk that newly identified persons might not be protected by the tolling principles after the court enters an order denying class certification.
Rule 23 exists to prevent the precise problems that would be presented by individual actions or joinder. And, in this case at this time, there is little doubt that Plaintiffs can satisfy the requirements of Rule 23 and that a class action "is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." IV. This Case Satisfies The Requirements Of Rule 23(A)
A. The Class Is So Numerous That Joinder Is Impractible The numerosity requirement requires that joinder be impracticable, but this does not mean "impossible." The requirement is satisfied by showing that joinder would be difficult or inconvenient. Little Caesar, 172 F.R.D. at 241.
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As this court observed in Olden, 203 F.R.D. at 268: There is no strict numerical test to determine when the class is large
enough or too numerous to join under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Bremiller v. Cleveland Psychiatric Inst., 195 F.R.D. 1, 19 (N.D.Ohio 2000). The Court may consider many factors, including "class size, ease of identification of members of the proposed class, geographic distribution of class members, and the ability of the class members to pursue individual actions." Krieger v. Gast, 197 F.R.D. 310, 314 (W.D.Mich.2000).
See also Little Caesar, 172 F.R.D. at 241. Federal courts have routinely found that groups of25 to 40 individuals are sufficient to meet the numerosity requirements. See 5 Moore's Federal Practice (3d ed. 1997), § 23.23 at 23-63 ; Harris v. General Development Corp., 127 F.R.D. 655, 660 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
While Plaintiffs meet the numerosity test on numbers alone, the limited time the detainees and prisoners spend in jail makes class certification especially appropriate when the claims could become moot as the case progresses and the Plaintiffs are released from the jail. Penland v. Warner County Jail, 797 F.2d 332 (6th Cir. 1986) (reversing District Court's denial of class certification of case challenging various conditions of confinement at a small county jail); Johnson v. City ojOperowsa, 658 F.2d 1065, 1069-1070 (5th Cir. 1981). In Penland, the Sixth Circuit emphasized that potential mootness concerns mandated certification of a 23(b)(2) class seeking declaratory and injunctive relief because, without certification, the short duration of confinement would render it unlikely that any representative could prove his claim while still incarcerated in the county jail. The same factor is obviously true here.
B. There Are Questions Of Law And Fact Common To The Class
Commonality exists when there is a common issue among the plaintiffs and the resolution of that issue would advance the litigation. See Olden, 203 F.R.D. at 269; Garrish v. UAW, 149 F. Supp. 2d 326 (B.D. Mich. 2001), citing Sprague v. General Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388,397 (6th Cir. 1998); This is not a demanding requirement. Anderson v. Cornejo, 199 F.R.D. 228,239 (N.D.Ill.2000).
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A common question is one which "arises from 'a common nucleus of operative facts' regardless of whether the underlying facts change over the class period and vary as to individual claimants." Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). As this Court explained in Klender v. Us., 218 F.R.D. 161, 164-165 (E.D.Mich. 2001) (Lawson, J.):
A variance in damages does not destroy commonality or typicality provided that "the same event or practice or course of conduct [ ] gives rise to the claims of other class members," and if the named representatives' claims "are based on the same legal theory." Id. (citing Amer. Med. Sys., 75 F.3d at 1082). Although the named plaintiffs' claims must fairly encompass the class members' claims, they need not always involve the same facts or law provided there is a common element of fact or law. Senter v. General Motors Corp. 532 F.2d 511, 525 n. 31 (6th Cir.l976). In addition, the resolution ofthe common issue should advance the litigation. Sprague, 133 F.3d at 398.
Governmental action in particular may present a "common course of conduct" which makes class certification appropriate, especially where Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief. Kanter v. Casey,43 F.3d 48 (3rd Cir. 1994) (commonality found in claims of systematic deficiencies in operation of child welfare system although Plaintiffs may have received different individual damages, as differences would not affect the outcome of the central legal issue in the case and Defendant's common course of conduct toward. Plaintiffs eliminated a need for individualized determination of propriety of injunctive relief.)
In this case, the common question of law has already been established by the court in its January 25, 2005 Summary Judgment Order which found unconstitutional the Saginaw County Jail's policy of placing inmates in isolation cells in a naked or partially-naked condition where they can be viewed by members of the opposite sex.
Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief and damages as a result of this unconsitutional practice. While the particular factual circumstances and impact of the policies as applied to each individual detainee and prisoner may be different, the legal issues concerning the constitutionality of Defendants' policies, customs, and practices are the same. VanVels v. Previer Athletic Center ofPlainfield, 182 F.R.D. 500, 507 (W.D. Mich. 1998) (cases involving
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challenges to a policy or procedure readily meet the commonality requirement as the common question becomes whether the Defendants acted through an illegal policy or procedure).
C. The Claims Of The Representative Parties Are Typical In Olden, 203 F.R.D. at 268, this court observed:
A claim is typical if "it arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members, and if his or her claims are based on the same legal theory." In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1082 (6th Cir.l996). In addition, the resolution of the common issue should advance the resolution of the litigation. Sprague, 133 F.3d at 397. The typicality requirement is not overly demanding and does not require identicality. See Bittinger v. Tecumseh Products Company, 123 F.3d 877 (6th Cir. 1997). (typicality existed even though some class members had signed releases and would be subject to defenses not faced by
other class members); Forbush v. Jc. Penney Co., Inc., 994 F.2d 1101, 1106 (5th Cir.l993);
DeBoer v. Mellon Mortgage Co., 64 F.3d 1171, 1174-1175 (8th Cir. 1995); Retired Chicago Police Ass'n v. City o/Chicago, 7 F.3d 584,597 (7th Cir. 1993); Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d at 1018 (citing De La Fuente v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 713 F.2d 225, 232 (7th Cir. 1983)); Paper Systems, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 193 F.R.D. 601, 605 (E.D. Wis. 2000)
Where the focus is upon the Defendants' conduct and the Plaintiffs' legal theories, it is not necessary that all class members suffer the same injury as the named class representative or that the representative and the class have suffered to the same degree. Kanter v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48 (3rd Cir. 1994); Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931, 936-937 (32d Cir. 1993); Forbush, 994 F.2d at 1106.
Even a cursory comparison of the claims of class representatives Rose and Fuller with those of the individuals identified in the summary reveals that their claims arise from the same conditions, policies, and practices imposed on the class and are based on the same legal theories. Plaintiffs easily satisfy the typicality requirement of Rule 23(a)(3).
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D. The Representative Parties Will Fairly And Adequately Protect The Interests of The Class
"Adequate representation" requires two inquiries: (1) whether the class counsel are "qualified, experienced and generally able to conduct the litigation" and (2) whether the class members have interests that are antagonistic to the other class members. Olden, 203 F.R.D. at 270, citing Stout v. Byrider, 228 F.3d 709, 717 (6th Cir.2000).
The requirement that the named plaintiffs be adequate representatives does not require that they be the best possible representative for the class, nor must they occupy a position identical to other members of the class. In re Playmobil Antitrust Litigation, 35 F.Supp.2d 231, 242 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); 7A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure (2d ed.), § 1765. The test, ultimately, is whether the class representatives will promote the interests of the class as they protect their own. It is generally recognized that this test is met upon a showing that there are no conflicts of interest between the representative plaintiffs and there is a likelihood of vigorous prosecution of the case by competent counsel. See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 403 (1975); In re The Prudential Ins Co of America Sales Practices Litigation, 148 F.3d 283, 311 (3d Cir. 1998) ; Garrish v. UAW, 149 F. Supp. 2d 326 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
Absent a showing to the contrary, adequacy will be assumed. Plaintiffs' counsel, Michael L. Pitt, Stephen Wasinger and Christopher Pianto, are filing affidavits in support of this motion which establish a solid team of experienced trial attorneys skilled in class-action litigation and fully capable of prosecuting the case through settlement, trial and appeal. The firms involved in this matter and the ACLU of Michigan are fully capable of providing the finances necessary for successful prosecution. Similarly, Plaintiffs are filing the affidavits of class representatives Rose and Fuller which demonstrate that they will adequately represent the class. Class representative Rose has been involved in the prosecution of this matter since its inception in October of 2001. Class representative Fuller has participated in this matter since September, 2002. Both have
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demonstrated a willingness and commitment to prosecute this case through settlement, trial and, if necessary, appeal.
Plaintiffs amply meet the criteria of Rule 23 (a)(4).
v. The Court Should Certify A Class Under Rule 23(b)(l) and (2) To Order Final
Injunctive Relief Rule 23(b) sets out the three types of class-action suits that may be certified, if the requirements of subdivision (a) have been met. See Olden, 383 F.3d at 507 (affirming this Court's certification under Rule 23(b)(2) for injunctive relief and a Rule 23(b)(3) for monetary relief).
Class actions under Rule 23(b)(2) are often brought in civil-rights cases in which similar legal wrongs against each of the class members are alleged. See Molski v. Gleich:1 318 F.3d 937, 949-950 (9th Cir. 2003) (class properly certified under Rule 23(b)(2) in federal and state civilrights action in which injunction was predominant form of relief sought); Stewart v. Abraham, 275 F.3d 220, 228 (3rd Cir. 2001) (class action properly certified under Rule 23(b)(2) based on alleged civil-rights violations of persons released and then rearrested in exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
The fact that Plaintiffs also seek monetary relief does not mean that the Court should refuse to certify a case under Rule 23(b)(2). Indeed, in Olden, the Sixth Circuit affirmed this Court's certification of a class under both Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3), and specifically rejected Defendants' argument that "Rule 23(b)(2) certification is inappropriate because individualized money damages overwhelm the plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief." 383 F.3d at 510.
Because Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief and compensation for injuries stemming from Defendants' unconstitutional conduct which arise out of policies and practices which impact as a whole and which will continue to do so unless an injunction is issued, they meet the conditions for certification of a Rule 23(b)(2) class. Olden, 383 F.3d at 510-511. In addition, Plaintiffs satisfy the requirements for a Rule 23(b)(1) class because individual adjudication would run the
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risk of establishing inconsistent standards of conduct or would "as a practical matter be
dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially
impair or impede their ability to protect their interests...." In contrast, class certification will
conserve judicial resources and promote substantial justice in a manner which is fair to all
parties, including the absent class members who have not yet been identified.
Based on these reports and the defendants' efforts to cover-up the actual conditions in the
jail, permanent injunctive relief is required in order to prevent a continuation of the pervasive
pattern of constitutional violations. The court should enjoin the defendants as follows:
A. The isolation cell, if utilized, must comply with all state and industry regulations as to size, accessibility of water and appropriate sanitation equipment.
B. The court should permanently enjoin the defendants from utilizing the segregation cell which does not comply with state or industry standards regarding size and accessibility of water and sanitation equipment.
C. The court must require the defendants to regularly maintain the habitability of the segregation cell through regular monitoring, inspection and cleaning.
D. The court should require the defendants to maintain the temperature in the segregation cell at standards established by the State of Michigan or by the industry.
E. The court should order the defendant to establish an appropriate suicide prevention protocol for inmates confined to the isolation cell. The protocol shall provide, at a minimum, that for inmates placed in the isolation cell determined to be low risk, that the inmate be permitted to wear standard jail uniforms. In situations where there is a moderate or substantial risk of suicide, the inmate may be issued suicide-proof gowns of such size and quality as to provide full and complete privacy for the inmate held in the isolation cell and provide some warmth.
F. The court should order that each inmate confined to the isolation cell shall be provided a suicide-proof blanket which must be made available throughout the individual's stay in the isolation cell.
G. The court should order that forcible stripping of clothing should occur only when absolutely necessary. Whenever there is a forcible removal of clothing, the officers or jail personnel performing this task must be the same gender as the inmate. In every case where the removal of clothing is deemed to be necessary, the inmate must be provided a clear and unequivocal opportunity to remove his or her own clothing in a non-public location. Under no circumstances, should other
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inmates, including trusties, be able to observe an inmate removing his or her clothing voluntarily or involuntarily or during the time that the inmate is in the isolation cell.
H. The court should order that appropriate sanitary items, such as toilet paper and tampons, be provided in such quantities as necessary.
1. Under no circumstances shall there be more than one person detained in the isolation cell at the same time.
1. The court shall order that the jail should adopt policies which will eliminate or substantially restrict jail personnel viewing inmates of the opposite sex in a nude or partially nude condition.
K. The court should order that the use of mace, physical force or other restraints shall be used only in strict accordance with State of Michigan guidelines or industry standards.
L. The court should order the defendants to adopt a strictly-enforced policy of prohibiting jail personnel from using derogatory language, verbal harassment or taunting in connection with the utilization of the isolation cell.
M. The court should order that inmates confined to the isolation cell shall have access to the necessary and approved medication and/or medical attention as required by state regulation or industry standard.
N. The court should order that the defendants adopt a comprehensive set of policies necessary to comply with the court's order and to provide the necessary training to all personnel who are currently employed in the jail. The training program shall be a regular part of the defendants' orientation for new jail personnel.
O. The court should appoint an expert in the field of jail administration to serve as a monitor to assist the defendants in developing and implementing the necessary injunctive relief. The court should appoint a monitor for a term no less than two years. The monitor shall provide quarterly reports to the court and class counsel. The defendants shall bear all reasonable costs associated with the retention of the monitor during the two-year monitoring period.
P. The Court should order that a procedure for reporting violations without fear of retaliation be put in place.
VI. The Court Should Also Certify A Class Under Rule 23(b)(3) To Remedy Past Discrimination Through Awards Of Damages
Rule 23(b)(3) permits a class action to be brought ifthe court finds "that the questions of
law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions effecting only
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individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient administration of the controversy." Olden, 383 F.3d at 508-509; Klender v. u.s., 218
F.R.D. 161 (E.D.Mich. 2003). In doing so, the court should consider the four non-exclusive factors listed in Rule 23(b)(3): (1) any interest of the class members in pursuing individual action; (2) the existence and nature of any litigation concerning the class claims already underway; (3) whether pursuing the claims in the particular forum would be desirable; and, (4) any difficulty in administration or management of a potential class action.
The complete identity of proof is not required. Accordingly, if the court can identify some significant advantages to the class-action device, some factual differentiation in the class claims will not preclude certification. See Olden, 383 F.3d at 507-508; Little Caesar, 172 F.R.D. at 265 (the critical question for Rule 23(b)(3) is whether the method of proving [the claim] involves facts - even if complex and external to the contract - that are predominately common to the class and not individual).
Since "[n]o two claims are likely to be exactly similar [and] [a]lmost all claims will involve disparate issues of fact and law to some degree," the question is whether there is "more commonality ... than there is disparity." If so, the predominance test is met. 429 Mich. at 415416. Similarly, 7A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure (2d ed. 1986), § 1778 at pp. 528-529, explain that under Rule 23:
[t]he common questions need not be dispositive of the entire action. In other words, "predominate" should not be automatically equated with "determinative" or "significant." Therefore, when one or more of the central issues in the action are common to the class and can be said to predominate, the action will be considered proper under Rule 23(b)(3) even though other important matters will have to be tried separately.
Here, the predominance requirement is amply satisfied because proof relating to the common question of Defendants' unlawful practices will dominate any trial, whether on an individual or a classwide basis. Proofs of individual damages do not destroy predominance. Olden, 383 F.3d at 508-509; see also Delgozzo v. Kenny, 628 A.2d 1080 (N.J. 1993) ("[T]he overwhelming weight of authority holds that the need for individual damages calculations does
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not diminish the appropriateness of class action certification where common questions as to liability predominate."); 4 H. Newberg, Newberg On Class Actions (3d ed.), § 3.16 at pp 173-74.
As the Sixth Circuit observed in Olden, if individualized damage determinations become necessary, this Court has many choices:
As the district court properly noted, it can bifurcate the issue of liability from the issue of damages, and if liability is found, the issue of damages can be decided by a special master or by another method. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(4)(A); see also Simon v. Philip Morris Inc., 200 F.R.D. 21, 30 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("By bifurcating issues like general liability or general causation and damages, a court can await the outcome of a prior liability trial before deciding how to provide relief to the individual class members."). [383 F.3d at 509] Indeed, if the court does not find a superior method of determining individual issues after the trial of the common liability issues, then the Court could exercise its right under Rule 23(c)(1) to decertify the class. In this situation, at least the common liability determinations would be the law of the case and operate as a bar on further, time-consuming relitigation of the common issues. This additional trial time on individualized issues, if necessary, is far preferable to individual trials on all aspects of the case.
A class action is also the superior method of dealing with the claims in this case. First, this case has been pending since October of 2001. In the three-and-a-half years that have elapsed, the only cases that have been brought are those originally pursued by attorneys Christopher Pianto and Loyst Fletcher. Even with the most recent barrage of publicity, it is unlikely that any of the individuals who have been subjected to the unconstitutional jail policies will pursue individual cases. The reason for this should be obvious: many of the claims involve isolation-cell incidents lasting only a few hours and, for the most part, do not involve any allegations of physical harm or residual impairments or losses. In today's legal environment, pursuing an individual case of this type would be cost-prohibitive.
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Second, the only other litigation concerning the class claims which is already underway is the Brabant case which counsel in the Rose case is also pursuing on behalf of eight plaintiffs.7
The third factor evaluates whether pursuing the claims in the particular forum would be
desirable. Here there can be no doubt that this forum is most appropriate.
Finally, the court must consider any difficulty in administration or management of the
potential class action. As to this factor, the court is requested to examine its own decisions in
Klender and Olden, as well as the Sixth Circuit's Olden decision. In Olden, 203 F.R.D. at 270-
271, this Court addressed the "manageability" factor
This "manageability" factor "encompass[es] the whole range of practical problems that may render the class action format inappropriate for a particular suit." Andrews v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 95 F.3d 1014, 1023 (l1th Cir.1996)(internal quotations omitted). The problems may include cases which "break[ ] down into an unmanageable variety of individual legal and factual issues." Id. The defendant argues that is the case here. However, it appears the legal issues are common to all defendants. The individual factual questions are how much money, if any, is each plaintiff entitled to assuming liability is established; this will change with the length of time they lived in Alpena and the damages they suffered during that time. The Court can bifurcate the issue of liability from the issue of damages. See Little Caesar Enters., Inc. v. Smith, 172 F.R.D. 236, 267 (E.D.Mich.1997). Once liability is found, the issue of damages can be decided by a special master or by another method. Id.
In Klender, retired public school teachers sued the United States alleging that payments
they received pursuant to early retirement incentive plans in exchange for their property rights of
tenure and contractual rights of just-cause employment did not constitute income and,
accordingly, sought return of taxes which were withheld under the Federal Insurance
Contributions Act. This court held held that the proposed class satisfied requirements for
certification under Rule 23(b)(3) and, in addressing manageability, stated:

7

The Brabant case was filed earlier this year on behalf of the eight-named plaintiffs after the court

issued its ruling granting plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment as to the unconstitutional nature of the

Saginaw Jail policy in question but denied leave to amend the complaint to add additional parties. If class

certification is granted in Rose, the Brabant case will be dismissed and the Brabant plaintiffs will become

either party plaintiffs in Rose or class members.

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once the common legal issue is decided, individual assessments can be detennined by a special master or by other methods. This case does not present an unmanageable variety of individual legal and factual issues. [218 F.R.D. at 268]
Thus the Court's own prior decisions make clear that problems of individualized proof can be dealt with in a variety of ways either at one trial or after a bifurcated trial of liability. The effect of the unconstitutional practices on individual class members can be the subject of summary testimony or the court can use a master to take the individual testimony. Defendants can offer no rationale for compelling a multiplicity of trials addressing both liability and damages.
The trial of the damage claims will be easily managed, either by this court or a special master. As the Summary ofEvidence Supporting Pervasive Pattern of Constitutional Violations (Pianto Exhibit B) demonstrates, the presentation of evidence for each claimant would follow a definite repetitive pattern. If necessary, the court can create a subclass for those claims which allege serious physical hann or serious physical consequences. For all other cases, the factors which must be considered by the jury in detennining the appropriate level of compensation are simple and straightforward. These factors would include such things as duration in the isolation cell, the condition of the isolation cell at the time in question, whether the individual was placed in the cell completely naked or was given an inadequate paper gown, whether the individual was viewed by members of the opposite sex, whether the individual had his or her clothing forcibly removed and whether there were some aggravating factors such as verbal taunting, harassment, macing, or other physical contact which did not result in injury or other physical consequences.
VII. If The Court Does Not Certify, It Should Permit Joinder Of The Additional Persons Who Plaintiffs Have Thus Far Identified And Continue To Toll The Limitations Period Under Plaintiffs Can Obtain Complete Access To Defendants' Records So That They Can Identify Additional Parties Who Have Suffered From Defendants' Unconstitutional Practices
Rule 20, F.R.Civ.P., provides that all persons may join in one action as plaintiffs "if they assert any right or relief jointly, severally or, in the alternative, in respect of or arising out of the
- 21 -

same transaction, occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action".
Courts have regularly approved joinder of plaintiffs in civil-rights cases. In Alexander v. Fulton County, 207 F.3d 1303, 1324 (lIth Cir. 2000), 18 plaintiffs alleged that they were subject to systemic employment discrimination which arose from the same transaction or occurrence and raised common questions of law and fact, making joinder the plaintiffs proper under Rule 20. Likewise, in Puricelli v. CNA Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. 139, 142-143 (N.D.N.Y. 1999), the fact that plaintiffs were terminated at different times, under different circumstances, and by different supervisors do not compel conclusion that the claims arose from a different transaction or occurrence.
As explained above, "a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication" of this case. See Rule 23(b)(3). The individual victims of Defendants' unconstitutional conduct deserve their day in court. If the Court concludes that there are obstacles to class certification, then to do substantial justice and preserve the rights of the individuals who have been recently discovered or will be discovered, the Court should permit joinder and continue to toll the limitations period until the conclusion of all discovery in this case.
- 22-

CONCLUSION
The Court should grant class certification under both Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3).
Respectfully submitted, lsi Stephen Wasinger

Christopher J. Pianto (P-59160) FLETCHER, WOLF, PIANTO & ASSOCIATES 718 Beach Street Flint Mi 48502-1105 (810) 238-4410

Michael L. Pitt (P-24429) Peggy Goldberg Pitt (P-31407) 117 West Fourth Street, Suite 200 Royal Oak, MI 48067 (248) 398-9800

Michael J. Steinberg (P43085) Kary L. Moss (P49759) American Civil Liberties Union Fund
of Michigan 60 West Hancock Street Detroit, Michigan 48201 (313) 578-6814

Stephen Wasinger (P25963) Cooperating Attorney, American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan Stephen F. Wasinger, PLC 100 Beacon Centre 26862 Woodward Ave. Royal Oak, Michigan 48067 (248) 414-9942

Counsel For Plaintiffs

Dated: April 29, 2005
KH073535

- 23 -

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on April 28, 2005, I electronically filed the foregoing Defendants' Motion for Class Certification Brief in Support of Motion with the Clerk of the Court for the Eastern District of Michigan using ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following registered participants ofthe ECF system as listed on the Court's Notice of Electronic Filing: Christopher J. Pianto: cpianto@juno.com Michael L. Pitt: attorneypitt@aol.com and I hereby certify that I have mailed by United States Postal Service the document to the following non-ECF participants:
James E. Tamm (P38154) O'Connor, DeGrazia, 4111 Andover Suite 300E Bloomfield Hills, MI 48302-1949
/s/ Stephen Wasinger STEPHEN WASINGER
- 24-

 
 Case 1:01-cv-10337-DML Document 203 Filed 11/10/2005 Page 1 of 11

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LINDA ROSE, et al.,

Plaintiffs, v.

Case No. 01-10337

SAGINAW COUNTY, et al.,

Hon. David Lawson

Defendants.

PLAINTIFFS’ SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ADDRESSING PLRA “PHYSICAL INJURY” ISSUE

Christopher J. Pianto (P-59160) FLETCHER, WOLF, PIANTO & ASSOCIATES 718 Beach Street Flint Mi 48502-1105 (810) 238-4410

Michael L. Pitt (P-24429) Peggy Goldberg Pitt (P-31407) 117 West Fourth Street, Suite 200 Royal Oak, MI 48067 (248) 398-9800

Michael J. Steinberg (P43085) Kary L. Moss (P49759) American Civil Liberties Union Fund
of Michigan 60 West Hancock Street Detroit, Michigan 48201 (313) 578-6814

Stephen Wasinger (P25963) Stephen F. Wasinger, PLC Cooperating Attorney, American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan 100 Beacon Centre 26862 Woodward Ave. Royal Oak, Michigan 48067 (248) 414-9942

Case 1:01-cv-10337-DML Document 203 Filed 11/10/2005 Page 2 of 11
TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS................................................................................................................. i TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... ii THE EXPRESS LANGUAGE OF THE PLRA AND THE BEST-REASONED DECISIONS COMPEL THE CONCLUSION THAT PERSONS NOT IN CUSTODY NEED NOT ESTABLISH PHYSICAL INJURY ...........................................................................1 CONCLUSION................................................................................................................................7

Case 1:01-cv-10337-DML Document 203 Filed 11/10/2005 Page 3 of 11
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Billingsley v. Shelby County Dept. of Correction,
2004 WL 2757915 (W.D.Tenn., Nov. 24, 2004)........................................................................ 4 Cox v. Malone,
199 F.Supp.2d 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d 2003 WL 366724 (2d Cir. 2002)................ 4, 5 Cox v. Mayer,
332 F.3d 422 (6th Cir.2003) ....................................................................................................... 1 Doan v. Watson,
168 F.Supp.2d 932 (S.D.Ind.2001)............................................................................................. 5 Doe v. Washington County,
150 F.3d 920 (8th Cir. 1998) ...................................................................................................... 3 Gibson v. Kendrick,
2005 WL 1309161 (E.D.La., May 19, 2005).............................................................................. 3 Harris v. Garner,
216 F.3d 970 (11th Cir.2000) ................................................................................................. 3, 4 Janes v. Hernandez,
215 F.3d 541 (5th Cir. 2000) ...................................................................................................... 3 Kelsey v. County of Schoharie,
2005 WL 1972557 (N.D.N.Y., Aug. 5, 2005) ........................................................................ 3, 4 Kerr v. Puckett,
138 F.3d 321 (7th Cir. 1998) .............................................................................................. 2, 5, 6 Lee v. State of New York Dep’t of Correctional Servs.,
1999 WL 673339 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)............................................................................................. 5 Smith v. Franklin County,
227 F.Supp.2d 667 (E.D.Ky.2002) ............................................................................................. 5 Statutes 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)....................................................................................................................... 1 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e)....................................................................................................................... 1
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Case 1:01-cv-10337-DML Document 203 Filed 11/10/2005 Page 4 of 11
THE EXPRESS LANGUAGE OF THE PLRA AND THE BEST-REASONED DECISIONS COMPEL THE CONCLUSION THAT PERSONS NOT IN CUSTODY NEED NOT ESTABLISH PHYSICAL INJURY
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act provides:
No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury. [Emphasis added.]
The plain language of § 1997e(e) thus requires the Court to reject Defendants’ position.
So does virtually every decision addressing the question, including the best reasoned decisions.
The Sixth Circuit has not directly interpreted the language in § 1997e(e), but, in Cox v.
Mayer, 332 F.3d 422 (6th Cir.2003), the Court interpreted § 1997e(a) — which also uses the
“prisoner confined in jail” language — and the PLRA applies only where the plaintiff is a
prisoner at the time suit is instituted: As should any court considering the application of a statute, we begin with the plain language of the text. That text is straightforward and unmistakable, and not prone to ambiguity. It reads: (a) Applicability of Administrative Remedies No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under § 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). A natural reading of the statute suggests that its application requires consideration of three simple questions. First, is plaintiff “a prisoner confined in [a] jail, prison, or other correctional facility?” If not, the statute is inapplicable. * * * [332 F.3d at 425. Emphasis added.]
The Sixth Circuit continued: First — and most significant — even assuming that the statutory purpose may be characterized as plaintiff suggests, because the statute is unambiguous it is inappropriate for us even to consider it. In directing the court’s attention to legislative intent, plaintiff overlooks the wellestablished and long-recognized rule that, where a statute is free of ambiguity, it is to be applied as written. The Supreme Court has instructed ad nauseam: “[I]n interpreting a statute a court should always turn first to

Case 1:01-cv-10337-DML Document 203 Filed 11/10/2005 Page 5 of 11
one, cardinal canon before all others,” which is “that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.” The Court has made clear that “[w]hen the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: judicial inquiry is complete.” * * * The court would note that, while the discrete issue presented by the instant case is one of first impression, its holding today is in keeping with recent Supreme Court and circuit precedent. Significantly, both the Supreme Court and this court have recently declined to carve out exceptions to the plain language of § 1997e(a). [332 F.3d at 226. Internal citations omitted.]
In Kerr v. Puckett, 138 F.3d 321, 322-323 (7th Cir. 1998), the Seventh Circuit expressly
considered the “physical injury” provision in § 1997e(e) and rejected the position now being
advocated by Defendants. Judge Easterbrook, who wrote the Kerr opinion, explained:
Kerr brought the suit after he had been released on parole and was therefore no longer “confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility”. Nonetheless the district court applied this statute, because “common sense and the overall purposes of the PLRA favor application of § 1997e(e) to actions brought by former prisoners.” 967 F.Supp. at 362, quoting from Zehner v. Trigg, 952 F.Supp. 1318, 1325 (S.D.Ind.), affirmed on other grounds, 133 F.3d 459 (7th Cir.1997). What sense would it make, the judge wondered, to say that a person may not recover damages for mental injuries while he remained in prison, but may seek that remedy the day after release? “Common sense” is a treacherous guide to statutory interpretation. One person’s “common sense” is another’s bête noire. Statutes are compromises among legislators who may hold incompatible conceptions of the public weal. Some legislators opposed the PLRA outright; others wanted more sweeping restrictions on prisoners’ litigation; the actual statute satisfied few completely. Instead of relying on “common sense”, which is an invitation to treat the law as if one side or the other had its way, a court should implement the language actually enacted — provided the statute is not internally inconsistent or otherwise absurd. E.g., Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, —, 118 S.Ct. 469, 473-74, 139 L.Ed.2d 352 (1997); Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 135 L.Ed.2d 827 (1996).
Section 1997e(e) as enacted is self-consistent and simple to understand. A “prisoner” cannot bring an action for mental injury unless he has suffered physical injury too. Just in case anyone might be tempted to equate “prisoner” with “ex-prisoner” — to think that “prisoner” refers to the plaintiff’s status at the time of the injury rather than at the time the
- 2 -

Case 1:01-cv-10337-DML Document 203 Filed 11/10/2005 Page 6 of 11
litigation begins, cf. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997) — the statute says that its object is a “prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility” (emphasis added). Then there is an explicit definition in § 1997e(h):
As used in this section, the term “prisoner” means any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program. The statutory language does not leave wriggle room; a convict out on parole is not a “person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is . . . adjudicated delinquent for, violations of . . . the terms and conditions of parole”. Most sections of the PLRA use the term “prisoner,” and we held in Robbins v. Switzer, 104 F.3d 895 (7th Cir.1997), that in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) this term does not comprehend a felon who has been released. § 1997e(h) shows that the same reading is right for § 1997e. So by waiting until his release from prison Kerr avoided § 1997e(e). Cf. Abdul-Wadood v. Nathan, 91 F.3d 1023 (7th Cir.1996) (holding with respect to another part of the PLRA that the court must determine the prisoner’s status on the date the suit or appeal is “brought” rather than at some other time). [Emphasis added.]
Similarly, in Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 976-80 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc), the
Eleventh Circuit rejected the position now advocated by Defendants: The legislative history of the PLRA shows that Congress was concerned with the number of prisoner cases being filed, and its intent behind the legislation was to reduce the number cases filed, which is why Congress made confinement status at the time of filing the decisive factor. [216 F.3d at 978]
See also Janes v. Hernandez, 215 F.3d 541, 543 (5th Cir. 2000) (specifically approving Kerr);
Doe v. Washington County, 150 F.3d 920, 924 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that, because plaintiff
was not incarcerated or detained when he filed complaint, PLRA did not apply); Kelsey v.
County of Schoharie, 2005 WL 1972557 at *1-3 (N.D.N.Y., Aug. 5, 2005) (discussed below);
Gibson v. Kendrick, 2005 WL 1309161 at *1 (E.D.La., May 19, 2005) (because Gibson was not
a prisoner when he brought this suit, the PLRA and its physical injury requirement do not apply);
Billingsley v. Shelby County Dept. of Correction, 2004 WL 2757915 at *7 n.4 (W.D.Tenn., Nov.
- 3 -

Case 1:01-cv-10337-DML Document 203 Filed 11/10/2005 Page 7 of 11
24, 2004) (“However, as the Plaintiff was not incarcerated at the time the complaint was filed,
the PLRA does not apply.”).
Defendants rely on Cox v. Malone, 199 F.Supp.2d 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d, 56
Fed.Appx. 43, 2003 WL 366724 (2d Cir. 2002). Second Circuit Rules bars use of the opinion
outside the Cox litigation. See 2d Cir. R. 0.23, cited in Kelsey, at *3.
In Kelsey, another district judge in the Second Circuit refused to follow Cox on the
grounds that (1) the court of appeals’ decision was explicitly non-precedential under governing
rules and (2) the analysis is incorrect. The Kelsey court explained: The issue presented here is whether § 1997e(e) applies where plaintiffs were no longer incarcerated when the action was commenced. The plain language of § 1997e(e), the declared purpose of the PLRA, and case law support the conclusion that the limitation of § 1997e(e) is inapplicable where a plaintiff is no longer incarcerated. The plain language of § 1997e(e) limits its applicability to “a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility.” That language clearly limits the provision to individuals who are incarcerated when an action is commenced. There is no dispute here that the named plaintiffs and potential class members were not incarcerated when the action was commenced. This interpretation of that language is supported by the purpose of the PLRA, which was “to curtail what Congress perceived to be inmate abuses of the judicial process.” Ortiz v. McBride, 380 F .3d 649, 658 (2d Cir.2004); see also Greig v. Goord, 169 F.3d 165, 167 (2d Cir.1999) (finding that the Congressional concern motivating the enactment of the PLRA was that lawsuits had become a “recreational activity for long-term residents of our prisons” and presented “a means of gaining a short sabbatical in the nearest Federal courthouse”). Thus, where, as here, the plaintiffs are not inmates when an action is commenced, the purposes of the PLRA would not be served by application of the statute. Although the Second Circuit has yet to address the issue, it appears that the two courts of appeals which have considered the issue have drawn the same conclusion. See Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 976-80 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc) (“Because section 1997e(e) applies only to claims filed while an inmate is confined, it does not prevent a former prisoner from filing after release a monetary damages claim for mental and emotional injury suffered while confined, without a prior showing of physical
- 4 -

Case 1:01-cv-10337-DML Document 203 Filed 11/10/2005 Page 8 of 11
injury.”); Kerr v. Puckett, 138 F.3d 321, 322-23 (7th Cir.1998) (holding that “by waiting until his release from prison Kerr avoided § 1997e(e).”).
With two exceptions discussed below, district courts have held the same. See, e.g., Smith v. Franklin County, 227 F.Supp.2d 667, 676 (E.D.Ky.2002) (holding that plaintiff who had been released from the county jail before commencing an action concerning the conditions of her incarceration was not bound by the limitations of the PLRA); Doan v. Watson, 168 F.Supp.2d 932, 935 (S.D.Ind.2001) (holding that where former inmates filed suit to recover damages based on strip searches conducted by defendants, “[b]ecause Plaintiffs filed their claims following their detention, the PLRA does not require them to produce evidence of physical injury to pursue their claims.”); Lee v. State of New York Dep’t of Correctional Servs., No. 97 Civ. 7112(DAB), 1999 WL 673339, at *4 & n. 7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 1999) (“Moreover, at the time that this suit was filed, Plaintiff’s son was no longer even incarcerated, thereby removing him even further from the definition of ‘prisoner’ under the PLRA.”)
Defendants rely on Cox v. Malone, 199 F.Supp.2d 135 (S.D.N.Y.2002), aff’d, 56 Fed.Appx. 43 (2d Cir.2003). There, a former state prisoner sued state officials alleging the excessive use of force during a search in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground, inter alia, that the physical injury alleged by plaintiff was de minimis and, therefore, failed to satisfy the physical injury requirement of § 1997e(e). The district court granted the motion, holding that § 1997e(e) applied to plaintiff even though he had been released from custody before commencing the action. The court reasoned that
Section 1997e(e) . . . is a substantive limitation on the type of actions that can be brought by prisoners. Its purpose is to weed out frivolous claims where only emotional injuries are alleged. This purpose is accomplished whether section 1997e(e) is applied to suits brought by inmates incarcerated at the time of filing or by former inmates incarcerated at the time of the alleged injury but subsequently released. The fortuity of release on parole does not affect the kind of damages that must be alleged in order to survive the gate-keeping function of section 1997e(e). Because plaintiff’s suit alleges only emotional injuries, it is barred by the PLRA irrespective of his status as a parolee at the time of filing.
Id. at 140. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding in an unpublished opinion “for substantially the reasons stated in the district court’s thorough and well-reasoned opinion.” 56 Fed.Appx. 43; see also Lipton v. County of Orange, 315 F.Supp.2d 434, 456 & n. 29 (S.D.N.Y.2004) (following Cox ).
- 5 -

Case 1:01-cv-10337-DML Document 203 Filed 11/10/2005 Page 9 of 11
Cox does not address the contrary authority discussed above and its rationale appears founded on an analysis not supported by the plain language of § 1997e(e) upon which other courts have relied. Cox correctly notes that limiting § 1997e(e) to those incarcerated at the time an action is commenced leaves to the “fortuity” of a prisoner’s release date whether he or she will fall under or escape § 1997e(e)’s limitations. However, if Congress intended § 1997e(e) to apply to prisoners released from custody when an action is commenced, statutory language to accomplish this end was available. The language chosen by Congress in § 1997e(e) plainly limited its applicability to prisoners incarcerated at the time an action is commenced, was consistent with the purposes of the PLRA, and such Congressional determination and intent are not unreasonable. The Cox decision, of course, does not constitute binding precedent for this Court. Were it simply a matter of analyzing the Cox decision in light of the Kerr line of cases addressing the scope of § 1997e(e), the Kerr line of cases holding that the plain meaning of the language in § 1997e(e) limits its applicability to prisoners incarcerated at the time an action is commenced is most persuasive. The Second Circuit’s affirmance described that decision as “thorough and well-reasoned.” That affirmance, however, was unpublished and by Second Circuit rule, may not be cited as authority outside the Cox litigation. See 2d Cir. R. 0.23. Thus, the question becomes whether the Second Circuit’s unpublished affirmance of Cox should lead a court in these circumstances to follow Cox. For at least two reasons, it does not. First, Second Circuit Rule 0.23, restated on the Cox affirmance, explicitly limits the precedential value of the affirmance to the Cox case itself and bars its use in this and other cases. That rule should be followed unless and until the Second Circuit directs otherwise. Second, neither Cox nor the Second Circuit have directly considered or addressed the Kerr line of cases and their compelling rationale. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, the rationale of the Kerr line of cases is adopted. Because plaintiffs were not incarcerated at the time this action was commenced, § 1997e(e) is inapplicable and the defense which the County seeks to add in its proposed amended answer would be futile. Therefore, the County’s motion to file and serve an amended answer is denied.
- 6 -

Case 1:01-cv-10337-DML Document 203 Filed 11/10/2005 Page 10 of 11

CONCLUSION
The plain language of the PLRA compels the conclusion that the PLRA and its physical injury requirement do not bar Plaintiffs’ claims for relief. Therefore, the Court should reject Defendants’ motion to add PLRA affirmative defenses because the amendment would be futile.

/s/ Stephen Wasinger

Christopher J. Pianto (P-59160) FLETCHER, WOLF, PIANTO & ASSOCIATES 718 Beach Street Flint Mi 48502-1105 (810) 238-4410

Michael L. Pitt (P-24429) Peggy Goldberg Pitt (P-31407) 117 West Fourth Street, Suite 200 Royal Oak, MI 48067 (248) 398-9800

Michael J. Steinberg (P43085) Kary L. Moss (P49759) American Civil Liberties Union Fund
of Michigan 60 West Hancock Street Detroit, Michigan 48201 (313) 578-6814

Stephen Wasinger (P25963) sfw@sfwlaw.com Cooperating Attorney, American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan 100 Beacon Centre 26862 Woodward Ave. Royal Oak, Michigan 48067 (248) 414-9942
Counsel For Plaintiffs

Dated: November 10, 2005
KH073535

- 7 -

Case 1:01-cv-10337-DML Document 203 Filed 11/10/2005 Page 11 of 11

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on November 10, 2005, I electronically filed the foregoing
PLAINTIFFS’ SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ADDRESSING PLRA
with the Clerk of the Court for the Eastern District of Michigan using ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following registered participants of the ECF system as listed on the Court’s Notice of Electronic Filing:
Christopher J. Pianto: cpianto@juno.com Michael L. Pitt: attorneypitt@aol.com James Tamm: jetamm@odtlegal.com, cmrowland@odtlegal.com and I hereby certify that I have mailed by United States Postal Service the document to the following non-ECF participants:

NONE

/s/ Stephen Wasinger STEPHEN WASINGER

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LINDA ROSE, et al.,

Plaintiffs, v.

Case No. 01-10337

SAGINAW COUNTY, et al.,

Hon. David Lawson

Defendants.

PLAINTIFFS’ SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ADDRESSING CLASS DEFINITION

Christopher J. Pianto (P-59160) FLETCHER, WOLF, PIANTO & ASSOCIATES 718 Beach Street Flint Mi 48502-1105 (810) 238-4410

Michael L. Pitt (P-24429) Peggy Goldberg Pitt (P-31407) 117 West Fourth Street, Suite 200 Royal Oak, MI 48067 (248) 398-9800

Michael J. Steinberg (P43085) Kary L. Moss (P49759) American Civil Liberties Union Fund
of Michigan 60 West Hancock Street Detroit, Michigan 48201 (313) 578-6814

Stephen Wasinger (P25963) Stephen F. Wasinger, PLC Cooperating Attorney, American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan 100 Beacon Centre 26862 Woodward Ave. Royal Oak, Michigan 48067 (248) 414-9942

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS................................................................................................................. i TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... ii CLASS DEFINITION .....................................................................................................................1

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Cornwell v. Dahlberg,
963 F.2d 912 (6th Cir.1992) ....................................................................................................... 1 Everson v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections,
391 F.3d 737 (6th Cir.2004) ....................................................................................................... 1 Kent v. Johnson,
821 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir.1987) ..................................................................................................... 1 Rose v. Saginaw County,
353 F.Supp.2d 900 (E.D.Mich. 2005)......................................................................................... 1
- ii -

CLASS DEFINITION
For reasons explained at oral argument, Plaintiffs seek certification of the following class:
All detainees who were placed in administrative segregation in the Saginaw County Jail from October 19, 19981 and were stripped of their clothing before being placed in administrative segregation pursuant to Defendants’ policy.
Plaintiffs contend that the class should include all persons, whether pre-trial detainees or post-trial inmates, because the County’s policy applied to all persons confined at the jail. See Rose v. Saginaw County, 353 F.Supp.2d 900, 906 (E.D.Mich. 2005) (“Whenever a person is placed in administrative segregation, it is the policy and practice of the Saginaw County jail personnel to remove the person's clothing and put the detainee in the segregation cell naked. A detainee's clothes are forcefully removed if he or she does not voluntarily comply with jail personnel orders to remove the clothes prior to entering the administrative segregation cell.”).
Plaintiffs do not believe that there is any basis for distinguishing between pre-trial and post-trial detainees based on the authorities upon which this court relied in Rose, 353 F.Supp.2d at 920, citing, inter alia, Cornwell v. Dahlberg, 963 F.2d 912 (6th Cir.1992), and Kent v. Johnson, 821 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir.1987); and Everson v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 391 F.3d 737 (6th Cir.2004).
The court should first decide whether the term ”detainees” as used in this proposed class definition includes detained persons in a post trial status.
Once the court defines “detainees”, the court should then form two subclasses:
1) Detainees placed in administrative segregation without gowns-the vast majority of the members of the proposed class, and,

1

The First Amended Complaint was filed on October 18, 2001. The statute of limitations is three years.

Thus, any person who had been placed in segregation of

2) Detainees placed in administrative segregation with gowns.
Plaintiffs also do not believe that there is any basis for excluding from the class persons who may have received some sort of paper gown because, under the admitted conditions at the jail, the constitutional violation occurred when the person was stripped and, thus, at most, the gown would act as a mitigating factor with regard to the detainees invasion of privacy claim. Further, the County’s use of the gown under the admitted circumstances at the jail was not adequate to protect the privacy concerns protected by the Fourth Amendment.

/s/ Stephen Wasinger

Christopher J. Pianto (P-59160) FLETCHER, WOLF, PIANTO & ASSOCIATES 718 Beach Street Flint Mi 48502-1105 (810) 238-4410

Michael L. Pitt (P-24429) Peggy Goldberg Pitt (P-31407) 117 West Fourth Street, Suite 200 Royal Oak, MI 48067 (248) 398-9800

Michael J. Steinberg (P43085) Kary L. Moss (P49759) American Civil Liberties Union Fund
of Michigan 60 West Hancock Street Detroit, Michigan 48201 (313) 578-6814

Stephen Wasinger (P25963) sfw@sfwlaw.com Cooperating Attorney, American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan 100 Beacon Centre 26862 Woodward Ave. Royal Oak, Michigan 48067 (248) 414-9942
Counsel For Plaintiffs

Dated: November 14, 2005
KH073535

- 2 -

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on November 14, 2005, I electronically filed the foregoing
PLAINTIFFS’ SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ADDRESSING CLASS DEFINITION
with the Clerk of the Court for the Eastern District of Michigan using ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following registered participants of the ECF system as listed on the Court’s Notice of Electronic Filing:
Christopher J. Pianto: cpianto@juno.com Michael L. Pitt: attorneypitt@aol.com James Tamm: jetamm@odtlegal.com, cmrowland@odtlegal.com and I hereby certify that I have mailed by United States Postal Service the document to the following non-ECF participants:

NONE

/s/ Stephen Wasinger STEPHEN WASINGER

 
 Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 217 Filed 02/02/2006 Page 1 of 5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION

LINDA ROSE, JENNIFER CRADIT, SYLVIA DENISE BRADDOCK, LISA RENEE BRANDIMORE, DWAYNE BUTTERFIELD, BOBBIE WAYNE CARTER, DANIEL WRAY CLAYTON, JOSHUA FULLER, NICHOLAS ANTHONY GILES, WILLIE LOUIS HENDRICKS, TANISHA RAMON JOHNSON, ROBERT ALLEN KELSEY, SUE ANN LETTERMAN, DONNA LYNN QUARLES, GREGORY LOUIS SCHULTZ, AMANDA RAE SHINAVER, DWAYNE ALANN SIMMONS, ROBIN RENEE THOMAS, JOSHUA ALLEN WEIGANT, JUSTIN ANDERSON, CRAIG MASON, and MATTHEW STARKWEATHER,

Case Number 01-10337-BC Honorable David M. Lawson

Plaintiffs,

v.

SAGINAW COUNTY, SAGINAW COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES, CHARLES BROWN, and OFFICERS JOHN DOE, and JANE DOE, (in their individual capacity), jointly and severally,

Defendants. ______________________________________/

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ EMERGENCY MOTION TO COMPEL VIDEOTAPING OF JAIL FACILITIES

Before the Court is the plaintiffs’ emergency motion to compel videotaping of jail facilities.

In this case, the Court entered an order in January 2005 determining liability. The Court has entered

subsequent orders scheduling a trial on damages for a group of plaintiffs, and in the meanwhile the

parties have scheduled sessions with a facilitative mediator in an effort to resolve their differences.

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In preparation for mediation and the damages trial, the parties apparently have agreed to allow counsel for the plaintiffs to inspect the jail facilities, particularly the segregation cells, which form the subject matter of this dispute. Otherwise, discovery closed several months ago according to this Court’s Case Management and Scheduling Order.
The plaintiffs allege in their motion that the defendants seek to limit the inspection and photographing of the jail facilities as follows: (1) only two of the plaintiffs’ lawyers will be permitted to attend; (2) only still photographs will be permitted and videotaping will not be allowed; and (3) the tour will last only one and one-half hours. The plaintiffs seek an order permitting videotaping of all of the jail facilities “in order for the members of the jury to fully comprehend the nature and extent of the harm caused to the plaintiffs as a result of the violation of their constitutional rights [and to allow] the jury [to] be able to visualize the alleged adverse jail conditions.” Plaintiffs’ motion at 2.
The defendants oppose the motion on the basis of administrative inconvenience and security concerns. Although the defendants do not oppose still photography, they believe that videotaping will disrupt the operation of the jail by encouraging inmates to act out and become disruptive. They are also concerned that locations including the booking area where inmates are processed are too busy to allow disruption by videotaping. The defendants, in addition, assert that videotaping would allow dissemination of the layout of jail facilities and compromise security, particularly if the individual plaintiffs are allowed to view the tape.
The discovery rules are intended to allow the parties “to prepare for trial in a manner that will promote the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of the action.” Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2001. These rules may require parties “to disclose fully the nature
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and scope of the controversy, to narrow, simplify, and frame the issues involved, and . . . to obtain the information needed to prepare for trial.” Ibid. On occasion, discovery may encompass matters that are otherwise thouoght to be confidential and not available to public view.
However, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) allows a court to make orders protecting parties and witnesses during the discovery process. An important purpose of a pretrial protective order is to preserve the confidentiality of materials which are revealed in discovery but not made public by trial. National Polymer Products, Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 641 F.2d 418, 424 (6th Cir. 1981). Courts have great latitude in deciding whether to issue protective orders, and security is one of the factors to be considered. See Hines v. Wilkinson, 163 F.R.D. 262, 267 (S.D. Ohio 1995). The burden of establishing the propriety of a protective order is on the party seeking the order. Damiano v. Sony Music Entertainment, Inc., 168 F.R.D. 485, 490 (D.N.J. 1996).
The Court has considered the respective interests of the parties and finds no basis to permit videotaping or photography except the administrative segregation cells. Those, after all, are the only subjects of this dispute. Neither this action nor the Court’s order granting summary judgment addressed issues of general jail conditions or other prisoner hardships than confinement, naked, in the administrative segregation cells.
On the other hand, it is possible to fashion an order that would permit the plaintiffs to videotape the administration segregation cells and still preserve the security and administrative convenience interests articulated by the defendants.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the plaintiffs’ emergency motion to compel videotaping of jail facilities [dkt # 214] is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
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It is further ORDERED that the defendants shall permit two of plaintiffs’ counsel access to the Saginaw County Jail on February 2, 2006 for the purpose of inspection, photographing, and videotaping the facilities as limited herein.
It is further ORDERED that the tour of the jail facilities shall be completed by noon. It is further ORDERED that photographing and videotaping the jail facilities shall be limited to the administrative segregation cells and the area immediately adjacent to them. It is further ORDERED that no photographs, videotape, or digital images shall be taken of jail personnel, inmates, or detainees. If the administrative segregation cells are occupied, then the Court directs the defendants to cause them to be temporarily vacated until the photographing session is concluded. It is further ORDERED that upon completion of the session, the videotape, photographic film, and electronic media of any digital recording shall be turned over to counsel for the defendant, who may examine the photographic record and file any motions for a protective order necessary to address security concerns of jail personnel. Said motion shall be filed on or before February 9, 2006. However, the photographic record shall be made available to Judge Duggan, if necessary, to assist him in conducting a settlement conference. If no motions are filed by the deadline established herein, the materials shall be immediately returned to counsel for the plaintiffs. If motions are filed, the materials shall be turned over to the Court for an inspection in camera.

Dated: February 2, 2006

s/David M. Lawson DAVID M. LAWSON United States District Judge
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PROOF OF SERVICE The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served upon each attorney or party of record herein by electronic means or first class U.S. mail on February 2, 2006.
s/Tracy A. Jacobs TRACY A. JACOBS
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 Case 1:01-cv-10337-DML Document 225-1 Filed 04/11/2006 Page 1 of 8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT IN THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION

LINDA ROSE, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v.

Case No. 01-CV-10337-BC Hon. David M. Lawson

SAGINAW COUNTY, SAGINAW COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES, CHARLES BROWN, and OFFICERS JOHN DOE, and JANE DOE, (in their individual capacity), jointly and severally,

Defendants.

LOYST FLETCHER, JR. P29799 CHRISTOPHER J. PIANTO P59160 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 718 Beach Street Flint, Michigan 48502 (810) 238-4410
MICHAEL L. PITT, ESQ. PEGGY GOLDBERG-PITT, ESQ. Co-counsel for Plaintiffs 117 W. Fourth Street, Suite 200 Royal Oak, Michigan 48067 (248) 398-9800

JAMES E. TAMM (P38154) RICHARD V. STOKAN, JR. (P61997) O’CONNOR, DeGRAZIA, TAMM & O’CONNOR, P.C. Attorneys for Defendants 4111 Andover Road - Suite 300 East Bloomfield Hills, Michigan 48302 (248) 433-2000
STEPHEN F. WASINGER, ESQ. (P 25963) Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs (ACLU) 300 Balmoral Centre 32121 Woodward Avenue Royal Oak, Michigan 48073 (248) 554-6306

DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUBSTITUTION OF PARTY
NOW COME Defendants, COUNTY OF SAGINAW, SAGINAW COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, and CHARLES BROWN ONLY, by and through their attorneys, O’CONNOR, DeGRAZIA, TAMM & O’CONNOR, P.C., and for their Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Substitution of Party, states as follows:

Case 1:01-cv-10337-DML Document 225-1 Filed 04/11/2006 Page 2 of 8

1. No contest. 2. Defendants neither admit nor deny the allegations contained within this paragraph and leave the Plaintiffs to their proof. 3. Defendants neither admit nor deny the allegations contained within this paragraph and leave the Plaintiffs to their proof. 4. Defendants admit that Fed. R.Civ.P. 25 provides the Court discretion to grant a motion for substitution of parties. For reasons set forth in the attached brief, Defendants request this Honorable Court decline to exercise its discretion to order a substitution of party. 5. Defendants neither admit nor deny the allegations contained within this paragraph as Fed. R.Civ.P. 25 speaks for itself. 6. Defendants neither admit nor deny the allegations contained within this paragraph and leave the Plaintiffs to their proof. 7. Defendants neither admit nor deny the allegations contained within this paragraph and leave the Plaintiffs to their proof. WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth in the attached brief, Defendants respectfully request that his Honorable Court DENY Plaintiffs’ motion for substitution of party and dismiss the claims brought on behalf of Donna Quarles.
Respectfully submitted, O’CONNOR, DeGRAZIA, TAMM & O’CONNOR, P.C.

Dated: April 11, 2006

By: /S/ JAMES E. TAMM P 38154 jetamm@odtlegal.com Attorney for Defendants 4111 Andover Road, Ste. #300 East Bloomfield Hills, MI 48302 (248) 433-2000/(248) 433-2005 DID

2

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT IN THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION

LINDA ROSE, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v.

Case No. 01-CV-10337-BC Hon. David M. Lawson

SAGINAW COUNTY, SAGINAW COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES, CHARLES BROWN, and OFFICERS JOHN DOE, and JANE DOE, (in their individual capacity), jointly and severally,

Defendants.

LOYST FLETCHER, JR. P29799 CHRISTOPHER J. PIANTO P59160 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 718 Beach Street Flint, Michigan 48502 (810) 238-4410
MICHAEL L. PITT, ESQ. PEGGY GOLDBERG-PITT, ESQ. Co-counsel for Plaintiffs 117 W. Fourth Street, Suite 200 Royal Oak, Michigan 48067 (248) 398-9800

JAMES E. TAMM (P38154) RICHARD V. STOKAN, JR. (P61997) O’CONNOR, DeGRAZIA, TAMM & O’CONNOR, P.C. Attorneys for Defendants 4111 Andover Road - Suite 300 East Bloomfield Hills, Michigan 48302 (248) 433-2000
STEPHEN F. WASINGER, ESQ. (P 25963) Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs (ACLU) 300 Balmoral Centre 32121 Woodward Avenue Royal Oak, Michigan 48073 (248) 554-6306

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR SUBSTITUTION OF PARTY

Case 1:01-cv-10337-DML Document 225-1 Filed 04/11/2006 Page 4 of 8
Factual Background The initial complaint in this action was filed on or about October 9, 2001. On or about September 3, 2002, through the filing of Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint, Plaintiff Donna Lynn Quarles joined the action as a named Plaintiff. Because neither the complaint nor amended complaints provided a factual basis for the Plaintiffs’ claims, on October 25, 2002, Ms. Quarles was deposed by Defendants to determine the basis for her claims as well as to establish any damages she may have suffered as a result of the allegations against the Defendants. (Exh. A - Quarles Dep. Trsc.). During her deposition, Ms. Quarles was able to provide a limited description of the events that give rise to allegations against the Defendants and provided minimal, if any, testimony to support a claim for damages. (See Exh. A). She prepared no notes regarding her detention at the Saginaw County Jail and articulated no basis during her deposition upon which damages could be based. (See Exh. A). Ms. Quarles neither missed work as a result of her incarceration at the Jail nor sought medical or psychological treatment. (See Exh. A, p. 26). Specifically, Ms. Quarles testified as follows:
Q. Can you give me the names of any medical health care provider, medical care or mental health care provider you talked to relative to the - Mr. Fletcher: Did you talk to a psychiatrist or doctor about this incident, yes or no?
A. Doctor, there was not a doctor. It was a counselor. No doctor. Mr. Fletcher: About this incident?
A. About this incident? No. [Exh. A, p. 15].
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Ms. Quarles did, however, admit that she was under the influence of alcohol at the time of her arrest and had a bodily alcohol level of 0.16. She further testified that she called the arresting officers names and refusing to obey Jail staff although she could not recall whether she was swearing at the corrections officers. (Exh. A, pp. 18-22). No additional discovery has been provided by Plaintiffs’ counsel to support a claim for damages.
Donna Quarles subsequently passed away on September 17, 2003 and Defendants were advised that Ms. Quarles’ claims would be dismissed. (Exh. B - Correspondence Dated 1/9/06). After advising that the claim would be dismissed, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Substitution of Party almost 2-1/2 years after Ms. Quarles’ passing. The motion was denied on the grounds that Plaintiffs failed to establish that the movant was a proper party.1 Having subsequently been appointed personal representative of Ms. Quarles estate, Lizzie Quarles, once again moves for substitution. Defendants maintain that it is within the Court’s discretion to grant the motion, and respectfully request this Honorable Court to DENY Plaintiffs’ request for the reasons contained within this response.
LAW AND ARGUMENT In support of their Motion, Plaintiffs rely exclusively upon Fed. R. Civ. P. 25. Rule 25 specifically provides:
(A) Death. (1) If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the Court may order substitution of the proper parties. The motion for substitution may be made by any party or by the successors or representatives of the deceased party and, together with the Notice of Hearing, shall be served on the parties as provided in Rule 5 and upon persons not parties in the manner provided in Rule 4 for the service of a summons and may be served in any judicial district. Unless the
1 At the time of filing the original motion for substitution, Donna Quarles mother, Lizzie Quarles, had not been named a personal representative of her daughter’s estate.
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motion for substitution is made not later than 90 days after the death is suggested upon the record by service of a statement of the fact of the death as provided herein for the service of the motion, the action shall be dismissed as to the deceased party. [Fed.R.Civ.P. 25] [Emphasis added].
The Court’s discretion to allow substitution pursuant to Rule 25 requires first, that the claim
not be extinguished upon death, and second, that the substitution be for a proper party. Rule 25
further requires that a Motion for Substitution be made not later than 90 days after the death is suggested upon the record.2
In the case at hand, Plaintiffs’ surviving claims were brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983.
Because §1983 does not contain a survival provision, the Court must look to the common law and
the State of Michigan Survival Statute. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 588 (1978). Under
the Michigan Survival Statute, M.C.L. § 600.2921, “all actions and claims survive death.”
Consequently, Ms. Quarles claims were not automatically extinguished upon her death.
However, the allowance for substitution of parties contained within Rule 25 is not compulsory.3 The advisory committee note to the 1963 amendment states as follows:
“A motion to substitute made within the prescribed time will ordinarily be granted, but under the permissive language of the first sentence of the amended rule (“the court may order”) it may be denied by the court in the exercise of a sound discretion if made long after the death– as can occur if the suggestion of death is not made or is delayed - and circumstances have arisen rendering it unfair to allow substitution. Cf. Anderson v. Yungkau, [329 U. S. 482, 486, 67 S. Ct. 428, 430, 431, 91 L.Ed. 436 (1947)], where it was noted under the present rule that settlement and distribution of the estate of a deceased
2 Based upon a review of the Court’s docket, the death of Plaintiff, Donna Quarles was not suggested upon the Court as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1) prior to the filing of Plaintiffs’ original motion for substitution.
3 A prior version of Rule 25 required the substitution of parties to be made within two (2) years of the parties death.
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defendant might be so far advanced as to warrant denial of a motion for substitution even through made within the time limit prescribed by the rule. Accordingly, a party interested in securing substitution under the amended rule should not assume that he can rest indefinitely awaiting the suggestion of death before he makes his motion to substitute.” In the present case, both the substance of the claims brought by Ms. Quarles as well as Plaintiffs’ delay in filing a motion to substitute party merit this court exercising its discretion to deny the motion. It is undisputed that Donna Quarles passed away on or about September 17, 2003. It is presumed that Plaintiffs’ counsel was advised of Ms. Quarles passing shortly thereafter. Although Plaintiffs’ counsel did not indicate the specific date they were advised of Ms. Quarles’ passing, the information was likely relayed in 2003. It is further undisputed that more than two (2) years passed without an attempt to substitute a party for Ms. Quarles or to establish an estate on her behalf. Following the denial of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Action status on November 21, 2005, Plaintiffs were aware or should have been aware of the need to proceed with resolving the only remaining issues in the case, damages. Despite several conferences with the Court and between the parties, Plaintiffs’ made no attempt to move for substitution of party with respect to Ms. Quarles until the filing of the initial motion on or about February 9, 2006. In fact, the motion came after the parties participated in a Court-ordered Settlement Conference on February 6, 2006, and after Plaintiffs advised that Ms. Quarles would be dismissed as a Plaintiff. (See Exh. B). Having failed to present any justification for the more than two (2) year delay in either opening an Estate or proceeding with a Motion for Substitution of Party, Plaintiffs’ Motion should be considered untimely and denied.
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Finally, the nature of Ms. Quarles’ claim for damages merits the Court exercising its discretion to deny Plaintiffs’ motion. Based upon previous rulings, Plaintiffs are not entitled to punitive damages. Therefore, any award must be based on actual damages. Although her discovery deposition was taken, it provides little if no basis for an award of money damages. (See Exh. A). Consequently, because Plaintiffs have made no claims for economic losses and have no evidence of actual damages, any attempt to quantify the damages suffered by Ms. Quarles as a result of her brief detention in administrative segregation would be purely speculative without her presence.4
Wherefore, Defendants respectfully request this Honorable Court DENY Plaintiffs’ Motion, and dismiss the claims brought by Plaintiff Donna Quarles.
Respectfully submitted, O’CONNOR, DeGRAZIA, TAMM & O’CONNOR, P.C.

Dated: April 11, 2006

By: /S/ JAMES E. TAMM P 38154 jetamm@odtlegal.com Attorney for Defendants 4111 Andover Road, Ste. #300 East Bloomfield Hills, MI 48302 (248) 433-2000/(248) 433-2005 DID

PROOF OF SERVICE The undersigned certifies that a copy of Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Substitution of Party was served upon the attorneys of record of all parties to the above cause by ELECTRONIC FILING same to them at the respective business addresses as disclosed by the pleadings of record herein on April 11, 2006. I declare under the penalty of perjury that the statement above is true to the best of my information, knowledge and belief.
/S/ Rebecca Richardson
4 Alternatively, should the court grant Plaintiffs’ Motion, Defendants would request an opportunity to depose the Personal Representative to ascertain additional information regarding Plaintiffs’ claim for damages with respect to Donna Quarles.
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 Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 235 Filed 07/19/2007 Page 1 of 5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LINDA ROSE, JENNIFER CRADIT, SYLVIA DENISE BRADDOCK, LISA RENEE BRANDIMORE, DWAYNE BUTTERFIELD, BOBBIE WAYNE CARTER, DANIEL WRAY CLAYTON, JOSHUA FULLER, NICHOLAS ANTHONY GILES, WILLIE LOUIS HENDRICKS, TANISHA RAMON JOHNSON, ROBERT ALLEN KELSEY, SUE ANN LETTERMAN, LIZZIE QUARLES, Personal Representative of the Estate of DONNA LYNN QUARLES, deceased, GREGORY LOUIS SCHULTZ, AMANDA RAE SHINAVER, DWAYNE ALANN SIMMONS, ROBIN RENEE THOMAS, JOSHUA ALLEN WEIGANT, JUSTIN ANDERSON, CRAIG MASON, and MATTHEW STARKWEATHER,

Case Number 01-10337 Honorable David M. Lawson

Plaintiffs,

v.

SAGINAW COUNTY, SAGINAW COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES, CHARLES BROWN, and OFFICERS JOHN DOE, and JANE DOE, (in their individual capacity), jointly and severally,

Defendants. ______________________________________ /

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS OR FOR SANCTIONS AND SCHEDULING STATUS CONFERENCE

This matter is before the Court on a motion filed by the defendants to dismiss or for other

sanctions because of the alleged failure of the plaintiffs to attend and properly participate in

settlement conferences. The plaintiffs responded in opposition to the motion, and the Court heard

arguments on the motion in open court on June 30, 2006. Based on the information presented, the

Court believes that all parties are participating and will continue to participate in settlement

Case 2:01-cv-10337-DML Document 235 Filed 07/19/2007 Page 2 of 5
discussions in god faith. No sanctions are appropriate at this time, and certainly dismissal is not called for.
On January 18, 2006, the Court ordered the parties to participate in a settlement conference with Judge Patrick Duggan of this court to take place on February 6, 2006. The Court directed the parties “to appear in person with the clients or decision makers with full settlement authority.”
The next day, the Court scheduled a facilitative mediation session to take place by March 15, 2006 if the settlement conference did not resolve the matter. The parties agreed to amend the facilitation order, and on March 14, 2006 the Court entered an order appointing former Wayne County, Michigan circuit judge Pamela Harwood as a facilitator to conduct a mediation session before March 31, 2006. The Court order provided that “[a]ll parties or individuals with settlement authority are required to attend the facilitative mediation sessions. All parties are directed to attend all scheduled mediation session(s) with their respective counsel of record. Corporate parties must be represented by an agent with authority to negotiate a binding settlement.” Docket # 221.
The defendants state the plaintiffs failed to appear at settlement conferences on February 6, 2006 before Judge Duggan and April 24, 2006 with Judge Harwood. Only the plaintiffs’ attorneys appeared, in direct violation of this Court’s orders. The defendants believe further attempts at settlement would be meaningless unless the plaintiffs attend. The defendants argue that the plaintiffs have “repeatedly failed to participate in the prosecution of the case and have defied discovery and pretrial orders.” The defendants ask for dismissal and/or sanctions. The defendants’ motion does not state that concurrence was sought, as required by E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(a).
The plaintiffs attorneys admit no plaintiffs were present at the February 6, 2006 conference, but prior to that session Mr. Pianto made contact with all but two Rose plaintiffs and obtained
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settlement authority. At the settlement conference, no objection was made to the plaintiffs’ absence by Judge Duggan, who was conducting the mediation, or by defense counsel. The plaintiffs believe they substantially complied with the Court’s order, which required that “[a]ll parties or individuals with settlement authority are required to attend.”
The parties subsequently began discussing a global settlement of all four of the related cases – Rose, Brabant v. Saginaw County, Abner v. Saginaw County, and Whittum v. Saginaw County – in which there are approximately 94 plaintiffs. On March 16, 2006, a telephone conference was conducted with the parties and Judge Harwood. The plaintiffs state it was agreed that the plaintiffs themselves did not need to attend conferences involving discussion of a global settlement. Plaintiffs’ counsel explains that none of the plaintiffs appeared at the April mediation session for that reason. At the conference, defendants were upset that the plaintiffs were not present, but the plaintiffs’ attorneys apparently were surprised given the previously recited agreement. The plaintiffs’ attorneys offered to produce the plaintiffs the following day, but the defendants rejected the offer. The plaintiffs state that global settlement discussions have continued with Judge Harwood. They have stalled, however, because the parties have been waiting for this Court’s decision on the summary judgment motions filed in Abner and Brabant.
The settlement conferences ordered by the Court are pretrial conferences governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16. That rule includes the following provision:
If a party or party’s attorney fails to obey a scheduling or pretrial order, or if no appearance is made on behalf of a party at a scheduling or pretrial conference, or if a party or party’s attorney is substantially unprepared to participate in the conference, or if a party or party’s attorney fails to participate in good faith, the judge, upon motion or the judge's own initiative, may make such orders with regard thereto as are just, and among others any of the orders provided in Rule 37(b)(2)(B), (C), (D).
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Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 16(f). Rule 37(b)(2) allows the court to impose a variety of sanctions for disobeying a court order, including dismissal and contempt. However, courts should not impose the ultimate penalty absent clear abuse of its orders by counsel amounting to contempt. Freeland v. Amigo, 103 F.3d 1271, 1277 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that “absent a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct, an abuse of discretion occurs if the district court dismisses an action with prejudice”) (citing Carter v. City of Memphis, 636 F.2d 159, 161 (6th Cir. 1980)). The propriety of a dismissal as a sanction under Rule 37 generally is assessed in light of four factors identified by the Sixth Circuit in Regional Refuse Sys. v. Inland Reclamation Co., 842 F.2d 150, 154 (6th Cir. 1988), which were succinctly summarized by the court in United States v. Reyes, 307 F.3d 451 (6th Cir. 2002), as follows: “(1) whether the party’s failure is due to willfulness, bad faith, or fault; (2) whether the adversary was prejudiced by the dismissed party’s conduct; (3) whether the dismissed party was warned that failure to cooperate could lead to dismissal; and (4) whether less drastic sanctions were imposed or considered before dismissal was ordered.” Id. at 458.
In this case, none of the four factors favors dismissal. The plaintiffs’ counsel attempted to comply with the first order, which directed the parties “to appear in person with the clients or decision makers with full settlement authority.” Docket # 228. Mr. Pianto had settlement authority from 20 of the 22 Rose plaintiffs. Although the Court’s preference in the second order for personal appearances by the parties themselves is clear, the order does allow “[a]ll parties or individuals with settlement authority” to attend. More importantly, if global settlement talks were underway, requiring all the plaintiffs to attend is impractical until the discussions begin to focus on the individual claims, if they ever do.
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Finally, the defendants cannot demonstrate that the plaintiffs’ actions were wilful or in bad faith, and the defendants were not prejudiced. The defendants have not stated that they were ready to settle this case but were unable because the plaintiffs were not present. The plaintiffs were not on notice that their actions could result in dismissal.
There is no basis to dismiss the action, and lesser sanctions are not called for here either. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the defendants’ motion to dismiss of for sanctions [dkt #228] is DENIED. It is further ORDERED that counsel shall appear for a status conference at the Court’s chambers on August 31, 2007 at 3:00 p.m. to discuss further case management.

Dated: July 19, 2007

s/David M. Lawson DAVID M. LAWSON United States District Judge

PROOF OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served upon each attorney or party of record herein by electronic means or first class U.S. mail on July 19, 2007.
s/Felicia M. Moses FELICIA M. MOSES

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 2:01-cv-10337-DML Doc # 239 Filed 01/11/08 Pg 1 of 4 Pg ID 1499

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LINDA ROSE, JENNIFER CRADIT, SYLVIA DENISE BRADDOCK, LISA RENEE BRANDIMORE, DWAYNE BUTTERFIELD, BOBBIE WAYNE CARTER, DANIEL WRAY CLAYTON, JOSHUA FULLER, NICHOLAS ANTHONY GILES, WILLIE LOUIS HENDRICKS, TANISHA RAMON JOHNSON, ROBERT ALLEN KELSEY, SUE ANN LETTERMAN, LIZZA QUARLES, personal representative of the estate of Donna Lynn Quarles, GREGORY LOUIS SCHULTZ, AMANDA RAE SHINAVER, DWAYNE ALANN SIMMONS, ROBIN RENEE THOMAS, JOSHUA ALLEN WEIGANT, JUSTIN ANDERSON, CRAIG MASON, and MATTHEW STARKWEATHER,

Case Number 01-10337 Honorable David M. Lawson

Plaintiffs,

v.

SAGINAW COUNTY and SAGINAW COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT,

Defendants. ______________________________________ /

ORDER REGARDING SPECIAL CASE EVALUATION, DISCOVERY AND ATTORNEY’S FEES

The parties, by and through their respective counsel, agree that the claim of the plaintiffs in

Abner v Saginaw County (case no. 05-10323), Brabant v Saginaw County (case no. 05-10030), and

Rose v Saginaw County (case no. 01-10337), shall be submitted to special case evaluation process.

The terms and conditions of the facilitation are set forth in this Order.

1. Panel. The panel shall consist of three attorn eys, a plaintiff specialist chosen by

plaintiffs’ counsel, a defense specialist chosenby defense counsel and the chairman, retired Wayne

2:01-cv-10337-DML Doc # 239 Filed 01/11/08 Pg 2 of 4 Pg ID 1500
County Circuit Court Judge Pamela Harwood. The feesof the case evaluatorswill be shared equally between the parties.
2. Submission of Documents. Case evaluation summaries shall be submitted to the evaluators at least fourteen (14) days before the hearing.
3. Conduct of Hearing. The plaintiffs need not be present for t he case evaluation hearing. In addition to summaries, the parties may submit documents including, but not limited to, photographs, medical records, jail records, or other documents to support their position. The Rules of Evidence do not apply before the panel.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that: A. The claims of each plaintiff shall be ev aluated individually with a separ ate award established for each plaintiff. B. The oral presentation shall be lim ited to fifte en (15) m inutes per party, unless otherwise agreed to counsel for plaintiffs and defendants and the evaluators. C. Statements by attorneys and summaries submitted shall not be admissible in any court or evidentiary proceeding to reflect the position taken by the parties. D. The Panel shall not consider or award equitable relief. E. The conduct of the hearings shall otherwise comply with Michigan Court Rule 2.403. 4. Date of Evaluation. The Case Evaluation for all the plaintiffs shall occur on or before February 15, 2008. 5. Acceptance or Rejection of Evaluation. Each party shall file a written acceptance or rejection within fourteen (14) days after service of the panel’s evaluation. 6. Acceptance or Rejection of Evaluation. If a plaintiff and the defendants accept an
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2:01-cv-10337-DML Doc # 239 Filed 01/11/08 Pg 3 of 4 Pg ID 1501
evaluation, it shall resolve the claims between the accepting parties and an Order of Dismissal shall be entered and a Release Agreement signed by the plaintiff at or before the time a settlement in the amount is paid. The amount of the settlement shall not be disclosed. The acceptance by both parties (a plaintiff and the defendants) shall conclusively resolve the claims between the accepting parties, including cost and interest. A party must accept an award in its entirety and a partial acceptance of an award shall not be permitted.
8. Procedures after Rejection. If either party rejects the evaluation, the action shall proceed to trial in accordance with the Scheduling Order previously issued by the Court.
9. Liability for Costs. The provisions of Michigan Court Rule 2.403(O) regarding a rejecting party’s liability for costs shall not apply to this special Case Evaluation.
10. Effect of Settlement on Statutory Jail Housing Claim. If both a plaintiff and the defendants accept the evaluation and a settlement results, the settlement will not be offset by any statutory jail housing claim.
11. Attorney’s Fees. The parties dispute whether theplaintiffs are entitled to attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988. The plani tiffs and their counsel agree to waive a claim for court awarded at torney’s fees and costs in exchange for the defendants agreeing to pay the plaintiffs’ counsel a fee equal to thirty-percent (30%) of the amount of each case settled or tried to a conclusion subject to a cap in the amount of $400,000 on the total amount of attorney’s fees and costs claimed by the plaintiffs. Under no circumstances shall the recovery of attorney’s fees exceed $400,000 regardless of the total amount of settlements or judgments entered against the defendants. The case evaluators will be inf ormed that they are not to consider attorney’s fees as part of their deliberation. The case evaluators shall not be advi sed of the agreem ent of the parties regarding
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2:01-cv-10337-DML Doc # 239 Filed 01/11/08 Pg 4 of 4 Pg ID 1502
attorney’s fees. 11. Equitable Relief. This order shall not prevent the Court from ruling on any claim
for equitable relief raised at trial or by motion. 12. This Agreement is binding on the parties, their heirs and assigns. IT IS SO ORDERED. s/David M. Lawson DAVID M. LAWSON United States District Judge
Dated: January 11, 2008
PROOF OF SERVICE The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served upon each attorney or party of record herein by electronic means or first class U.S. mail on January 11, 2008.
s/Felicia M. Moses FELICIA M. MOSES
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 2:01-cv-10337-DML Doc # 252 Filed 03/10/08 Pg 1 of 2 Pg ID 1599

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LINDA ROSE, JENNIFER CRADIT, SYLVIA DENISE BRADDOCK, LISA RENEE BRANDIMORE, DWAYNE BUTTERFIELD, BOBBIE WAYNE CARTER, DANIEL WRAY CLAYTON, JOSHUA FULLER, NICHOLAS ANTHONY GILES, WILLIE LOUIS HENDRICKS, TANISHA RAMON JOHNSON, ROBERT ALLEN KELSEY, SUE ANN LETTERMAN, LIZZA QUARLES, personal representative of the estate of Donna Lynn Quarles, GREGORY LOUIS SCHULTZ, AMANDA RAE SHINAVER, DWAYNE ALANN SIMMONS, ROBIN RENEE THOMAS, JOSHUA ALLEN WEIGANT, JUSTIN ANDERSON, CRAIG MASON, and MATTHEW STARKWEATHER,

Case Number 01-10337 Honorable David M. Lawson

Plaintiffs,

v.

SAGINAW COUNTY and SAGINAW COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT,

Defendants. ______________________________________ /

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Several plaintiffs and defendants have accepted their case evaluation award and have agreed

to have their case dismissed, in accordance with the Order Regarding Special Case Evaluation.

Accordingly, it isORDERED that the complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and

without costs with respect to the plaintiffs Linda Rose, Jennifer Cradit, Sylvia Denise Braddock,

Lisa Renee Brandimore, Dwayne Butterfield, Bobbie Wayne Carter, Daniel Wray Clayton, Nicholas

Anthony Giles, Tanisha Ram on Johnson, Robert Allen Kelsey, Lizza Quarles, f or Donna Lynn

Quarles and Amanda Rae Shinaver. A party may apply to reopen this matter on or before April 9,

2:01-cv-10337-DML Doc # 252 Filed 03/10/08 Pg 2 of 2 Pg ID 1600

2008 to enforce the settlement. Dated: March 10, 2008

s/David M. Lawson DAVID M. LAWSON United States District Judge

PROOF OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served upon each attorney or party of record herein by electronic means or first class U.S. mail on March 10, 2008.
s/Felicia M. Moses FELICIA M. MOSES

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 2:01-cv-10337-DML Doc # 256 Filed 03/12/08 Pg 1 of 2 Pg ID 1607

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LINDA ROSE, JENNIFER CRADIT, SYLVIA DENISE BRADDOCK, LISA RENEE BRANDIMORE, DWAYNE BUTTERFIELD, BOBBIE WAYNE CARTER, DANIEL WRAY CLAYTON, JOSHUA FULLER, NICHOLAS ANTHONY GILES, WILLIE LOUIS HENDRICKS, TANISHA RAMON JOHNSON, ROBERT ALLEN KELSEY, SUE ANN LETTERMAN, LIZZA QUARLES, personal representative of the estate of Donna Lynn Quarles, GREGORY LOUIS SCHULTZ, AMANDA RAE SHINAVER, DWAYNE ALANN SIMMONS, ROBIN RENEE THOMAS, JOSHUA ALLEN WEIGANT, JUSTIN ANDERSON, CRAIG MASON, and MATTHEW STARKWEATHER,

Case Number 01-10337 Honorable David M. Lawson

Plaintiffs, v.

SAGINAW COUNTY,

Defendant. ______________________________________ /

ORDER OF ADDITIONAL DISMISSALS

On March 11, 2008, several plaintiffs and the defendant reached an agreement to settle the

case.

Accordingly, it isORDERED that the complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICEand

without costs with respect to Craig Mason and Dwayne Alann Simmons. A party may apply to

2:01-cv-10337-DML Doc # 256 Filed 03/12/08 Pg 2 of 2 Pg ID 1608 reopen this matter on or before April 9, 2008 to enforce the settlement.
s/David M. Lawson DAVID M. LAWSON United States District Judge Dated: March 12, 2008
PROOF OF SERVICE The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served upon each attorney or party of record herein by electronic means or first class U.S. mail on March 12, 2008.
s/Felicia M. Moses FELICIA M. MOSES
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 2:01-cv-10337-DML Doc # 257 Filed 03/12/08 Pg 1 of 2 Pg ID 1609

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LINDA ROSE, JENNIFER CRADIT, SYLVIA DENISE BRADDOCK, LISA RENEE BRANDIMORE, DWAYNE BUTTERFIELD, BOBBIE WAYNE CARTER, DANIEL WRAY CLAYTON, JOSHUA FULLER, NICHOLAS ANTHONY GILES, WILLIE LOUIS HENDRICKS, TANISHA RAMON JOHNSON, ROBERT ALLEN KELSEY, SUE ANN LETTERMAN, LIZZA QUARLES, personal representative of the estate of Donna Lynn Quarles, GREGORY LOUIS SCHULTZ, AMANDA RAE SHINAVER, DWAYNE ALANN SIMMONS, ROBIN RENEE THOMAS, JOSHUA ALLEN WEIGANT, JUSTIN ANDERSON, CRAIG MASON, and MATTHEW STARKWEATHER,

Case Number 01-10337 Honorable David M. Lawson

Plaintiffs, v.

SAGINAW COUNTY,

Defendant. ______________________________________ /

ORDER OF ADDITIONAL DISMISSAL

The plaintiffs allege that Joshua Allen Weigant accepted his settlement in a timely fashion.

The Court considered the parties’ evidence and found on the record that the acceptance was timely.

Accordingly, it isORDERED that the complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICEand

without costs with respect to Joshua W eigant for the reasons stated on the record. A party m ay

apply

2:01-cv-10337-DML Doc # 257 Filed 03/12/08 Pg 2 of 2 Pg ID 1610 to reopen this matter on or before April 9, 2008 to enforce the settlement.
s/David M. Lawson DAVID M. LAWSON United States District Judge Dated: March 12, 2008
PROOF OF SERVICE The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served upon each attorney or party of record herein by electronic means or first class U.S. mail on March 12, 2008.
s/Felicia M. Moses FELICIA M. MOSES
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 2:01-cv-10337-DML Doc # 258 Filed 03/12/08 Pg 1 of 2 Pg ID 1611

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LINDA ROSE, JENNIFER CRADIT, SYLVIA DENISE BRADDOCK, LISA RENEE BRANDIMORE, DWAYNE BUTTERFIELD, BOBBIE WAYNE CARTER, DANIEL WRAY CLAYTON, JOSHUA FULLER, NICHOLAS ANTHONY GILES, WILLIE LOUIS HENDRICKS, TANISHA RAMON JOHNSON, ROBERT ALLEN KELSEY, SUE ANN LETTERMAN, LIZZA QUARLES, personal representative of the estate of Donna Lynn Quarles, GREGORY LOUIS SCHULTZ, AMANDA RAE SHINAVER, DWAYNE ALANN SIMMONS, ROBIN RENEE THOMAS, JOSHUA ALLEN WEIGANT, JUSTIN ANDERSON, CRAIG MASON, and MATTHEW STARKWEATHER,

Case Number 01-10337 Honorable David M. Lawson

Plaintiffs, v.

SAGINAW COUNTY,

Defendant. ______________________________________ /

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

The Court ordered that the plaintifs appear for a settlement conference to be held on March

11, 2008. The Court also ordered the plaintiffs to appear for trial, set to commence on March 12,

2008. The plaintiffs Willie Louis Hendricks and Gregory Louis Schultz failed to appear on March

11 and March 12. The defendant orally moved for dismissal, and the Court granted the defendant’s

oral motion on March 12, 2008. The Court finds that dismissal of these two plaintiffs is an

appropriate sanction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f). The Court further finds that these plaintiffs have

abandoned their case, and dismissal is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

2:01-cv-10337-DML Doc # 258 Filed 03/12/08 Pg 2 of 2 Pg ID 1612 Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the that the com plaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and without costs with respect to Willie Louis Hendricks and Gregory Louis Schultz.
s/David M. Lawson DAVID M. LAWSON United States District Judge Dated: March 12, 2008
PROOF OF SERVICE The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served upon each attorney or party of record herein by electronic means or first class U.S. mail on March 12, 2008.
s/Felicia M. Moses FELICIA M. MOSES
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 2:01-cv-10337-DML Doc # 259 Filed 03/18/08 Pg 1 of 2 Pg ID 1613

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
 EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION


JOSHUA FULLER, SUE ANN
 LETTERMAN, JUSTIN ANDERSON,
 and MATTHEW STARKWEATHER,

Plaintiffs,
v.

Case Number 01-10337 Honorable David M. Lawson

SA GINA W COUNTY,

Defendant.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _-:1

VERDICT FORM

We, the jury, answer the questions submitted as follows:

(answer each question 1 through 4)

X1.

On the claim of plaintiff Joshua Fuller, we find:

..30 for the plaintiff and assess his damages at $

1000


for the plaintiff, and award a nominal damages of $1.


2. On the claim of plaintiff Sue Ann Letterman, we find:
. for the plaintiff and assess her damages at $ LI 0 J 0 0 6
for the plaintiff, and award a nominal damages of $1.

3.
K

On the claim of plaintiff Justin Anderson, we find:
for the plaintiff and assess his damages at $ ;;l.-.5'/ 0 0 0 .

for the plaintiff, and award a nominal damages of $1.

2:01-cv-10337-DML Doc # 259 Filed 03/18/08 Pg 2 of 2 Pg ID 1614

4. On the claim of plaintiff Matthew Starkweather, we find:
. X for the plaintiff and assess his damages at $ 5 Of 0 0 0 

for the plaintiff, and award a nominal damages of $1.


Dated: March Icf , 2008

sl Foreperson Foreperson Signature
In accordance with the Privacy Policy
 the verdict form with original signature has been

filed under seal


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 2:01-cv-10337-DML Doc # 262 Filed 03/20/08 Pg 1 of 2 Pg ID 1617

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LINDA ROSE, JENNIFER CRADIT, SYLVIA DENISE BRADDOCK, LISA RENEE BRANDIMORE, DWAYNE BUTTERFIELD, BOBBIE WAYNE CARTER, DANIEL WRAY CLAYTON, JOSHUA FULLER, NICHOLAS ANTHONY GILES, WILLIE LOUIS HENDRICKS, TANISHA RAMON JOHNSON, ROBERT ALLEN KELSEY, SUE ANN LETTERMAN, LIZZA QUARLES, personal representative of the estate of Donna Lynn Quarles, GREGORY LOUIS SCHULTZ, AMANDA RAE SHINAVER, DWAYNE ALANN SIMMONS, ROBIN RENEE THOMAS, JOSHUA ALLEN WEIGANT, JUSTIN ANDERSON, CRAIG MASON, and MATTHEW STARKWEATHER,

Case Number 01-10337 Honorable David M. Lawson

Plaintiffs,

v.

SAGINAW COUNTY,

Defendant. ______________________________________ /

ORDER TRANSFERRING CLAIMS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSES AND CLOSING CASES

This action was brought by twenty-six plaintiffsalleging violations of their civil rights while

they were detainees at the Saginaw County jail. Sim ilar claims were brought by nine additional

plaintiffs in the case of Christopher Brabant, et al. v. Saginaw County, docket no. 05-10030; and

by sixty-three more plaintiffs in the case of James Abner, III, et al. v. Saginaw County, docket no.

05-10323. These cases were consolidated for pretrai l proceedings and settlement discussions. The

parties have engaged in settlement efforts (including case evaluation); and in theRose matter a trial

was held on the claims of four of the plaintiffs. There now remain two plaintiffs in the Rose case

2:01-cv-10337-DML Doc # 262 Filed 03/20/08 Pg 2 of 2 Pg ID 1618
and one plaintiff in the Brabant case. Thirty-three plaintiffs remain in the Abner case. The Court sees no purpose in ma intaining three open files in these cases. Therefore, the
Court will transfer the claims of Lisa Renee Brandimore and Robin Renee Thomas from the Rose case and the claims of Sherry Bill in the Brabant case all to the Abner case. The Rose and Brabant files will be closed.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the claims of Lisa Renee Brandimore and Robin Renee Thomas are transferred for further adjudication from the present matter to be joined in the matter of James Abner, III, et al. v. Saginaw County , docket no. 05-10323. Thi s transfer is for administrative purposes only and will not alter the nature or timing of these claims.
It is further ORDERED that the claims of Sherry Bill are transferred for further adjudication from the case of Christopher Brabant, et al. v. Saginaw County, docket no. 05-10030 to be joined in the matter of James Abner, III, et al. v. Saginaw County, docket no. 05-10323. This transfer is for administrative purposes only and will not alter the nature or timing of these claims.
It is further ORDERED that the present matter and the case of Christopher Brabant, et al. v. Saginaw County, docket no. 05-10030 are CLOSED.
s/David M. Lawson DAVID M. LAWSON United States District Judge Dated: March 20, 2008
PROOF OF SERVICE The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served upon each attorney or party of record herein by electronic means or first class U.S. mail on March 20, 2008.
s/Felicia M. Moses FELICIA M. MOSES
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 2:01-cv-10337-DML Doc # 263 Filed 03/20/08 Pg 1 of 2 Pg ID 1619

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LINDA ROSE, JENNIFER CRADIT, SYLVIA DENISE BRADDOCK, LISA RENEE BRANDIMORE, DWAYNE BUTTERFIELD, BOBBIE WAYNE CARTER, DANIEL WRAY CLAYTON, JOSHUA FULLER, NICHOLAS ANTHONY GILES, WILLIE LOUIS HENDRICKS, TANISHA RAMON JOHNSON, ROBERT ALLEN KELSEY, SUE ANN LETTERMAN, LIZZA QUARLES, personal representative of the estate of Donna Lynn Quarles, GREGORY LOUIS SCHULTZ, AMANDA RAE SHINAVER, DWAYNE ALANN SIMMONS, ROBIN RENEE THOMAS, JOSHUA ALLEN WEIGANT, JUSTIN ANDERSON, CRAIG MASON, and MATTHEW STARKWEATHER,

Case Number 01-10337 Honorable David M. Lawson

Plaintiffs,

v.

SAGINAW COUNTY,

Defendant. ______________________________________ /

JUDGMENT

In accordance with the jury verdict of March 18, 2008,

It is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the plaintiff, Joshua Fuller, shall recover from the

defendant, Saginaw County, in the amount of Thirty Thousand Dollars ($30,000) plus such interest

as he is entitled to under law.

It is further ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the plaintiff, Sue Ann Letterman, shall

recover from the defendant, Saginaw County, in the amount of Forty Thousand Dollars ($40,000)

plus such interest as she is entitled to under law.

2:01-cv-10337-DML Doc # 263 Filed 03/20/08 Pg 2 of 2 Pg ID 1620
It is furtherORDERED AND ADJUDGEDthat the plaintiff, Justin Anderson, shall recover from the defendant, Saginaw County, in the amount of Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars ($25,000) plus such interest as he is entitled to under law.
It is further ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the plaintiff, Matthew Starkweather, shall recover from the defendant, Saginaw County, in the amount of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000) plus such interest as he is entitled to under law.
s/David M. Lawson DAVID M. LAWSON United States District Judge Dated: March 20, 2008
PROOF OF SERVICE The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served upon each attorney or party of record herein by electronic means or first class U.S. mail on March 20, 2008.
s/Felicia M. Moses FELICIA M. MOSES
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 2:01-cv-10337-DML Doc # 269 Filed 06/19/08 Pg 1 of 2 Pg ID 1690

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

JOSHUA FULLER, SUE ANN LETTERMAN, JUSTIN ANDERSON, and MATTHEW STARKWEATHER,

Plaintiffs,

Case Number 01-10337

v.

Honorable David M. Lawson

SAGINAW COUNTY,

Defendant. ______________________________________ /

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR INTEREST

The matter is before the Court on the plaintiffs’ motion for interest. After a jury verdict, the

Court entered judgment for the plaintiffs on March 20, 2008. The plaintiffs’ motion for interest was

filed on May 5, 2008. The Court has reviewed the parties’ submissions and heard oral argument in

open court on June 18, 2008. At the conclusion oforal argument, the Court announced its decision

from the bench and granted the plaintiffs’ motion. The Court finds that the plaintiffs are entitled to

prejudgment interest, to be calculated in a manner derived from 28 U.S.C. § 1961. The interest shall

begin to accrue from the filing of the earliest complaint that brought the relevant plaintiff into the

case. For each year after the com plaint, the interest rate to be used is the weekly average of the

1-year constant maturity Treasury yield during that year. The rate should be computed daily and

compounded annually. The Court further finds that the plaintiffs are entitled to post-judgm ent

interest to be calculated as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a).

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion for interest [dkt. #264] isGRANTED

2:01-cv-10337-DML Doc # 269 Filed 06/19/08 Pg 2 of 2 Pg ID 1691

for the reasons stated on the record. Dated: June 19, 2008

s/David M. Lawson DAVID M. LAWSON United States District Judge

PROOF OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served upon each attorney or party of record herein by electronic means or first class U.S. mail on June 19, 2008.
s/Felicia M. Moses FELICIA M. MOSES

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 2:0C5a-scev:-10093-236-D5ML-DCoEcBumDenotc: 0#016314914F3i2le3d102/F17ile/1d0: 02P/g171/2o0f120 PPgaIDge2: 5164

Case No. 09-2365 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ORDER
JAMES ABNER, III, et al, Plaintiff
and CARL DELANEY,
Plaintiff - Appellant v. SAGINAW COUNTY, MI., et al,
Defendants - Appellees

Appellant/Petitioner having previously been advised that failure to satisfy certain specified
obligations would result in dismissal of the case for want of prosecution and it appearing that the appellant/petitioner has failed to satisfy the following obligation(s):
The Appellant/Petitioner's Brief was not filed by January 25, 2010.
It is therefore ORDERED that this cause be, and it hereby is, dismissed for want of prosecution.
ENTERED PURSUANT TO RULE 45(a), RULES OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Leonard Green, Clerk

Issued: February 17, 2010

___________________________________

2:0C5a-scev:-10093-236-D5ML-DCoEcBumDenotc: 0#016314914F3i2le3d202/F17ile/1d0: 02P/g172/2o0f120 PPgaIDge2: 5165

Leonard Green Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
100 EAST FIFTH STREET, ROOM 540 POTTER STEWART U.S. COURTHOUSE
CINCINNATI, OHIO 45202−3988

Tel. (513) 564−7000 www.ca6.uscourts.gov

Filed: February 17, 2010

Carl Delaney 4102 Hiland Saginaw, MI 48601
Re: Case No. 09−2365, James Abner, III, et al v. Saginaw County, MI., et al Originating Case No. : 05−10323
Dear Sir or Madam,
The Court issued the enclosed (Order/Opinion) today in this case.
Sincerely yours,

cc: Ms. Julie McCann O'Connor Richard V. Stokan Jr. Mr. James E. Tamm Mr. David J. Weaver
Enclosure

s/Scott J. Swearingen Case Manager Direct Dial No. 513−564−7011 Fax No. 513−564−7096

 
 Rose v. Saginaw County, 232 F.R.D. 267 (2005)
232 F.R.D. 267 United States District Court,
E.D. Michigan, Northern Division.
Linda ROSE, Jennifer Cradit, Sylvia Denise Braddock, Lisa Renee Brandimore, Dwayne Butterfield, Bobbie Wayne Carter, Daniel Wray Clayton, Joshua Fuller, Nicholas Anthony Giles, Willie Louis Hendricks, Tanisha Ramon Johnson, Robert Allen Kelsey, Sue Ann Letterman, Donna Lynn Quarles, Gregory Louis Schultz, Amanda Rae Shinaver, Dwayne Alann Simmons, Robin Renee Thomas, Joshua Allen Weigant, Justin Anderson, Craig Mason, and Matthew Starkweather,
Plaintiffs, v.
SAGINAW COUNTY, Saginaw County Sheriff’s Department, Municipal Governmental Entities, Charles Brown, and Officers John Doe, and Jane Doe, (in their individual capacity), jointly and
severally, Defendants.
No. 01-10337-BC. | Nov. 21, 2005.
Attorneys and Law Firms
*269 Christopher J. Pianto, Fletcher, Wolf, Flint, MI, Michael L. Pitt, Peggy G. Pitt, Pitt, Dowty, Stephen Wasinger, Wasinger, Kickham, Royal Oak, MI, for Plaintiffs.
James E. Tamm, Richard V. Stokan, Jr., O’Connor, Degrazia, Bloomfield Hills, MI, Peter C. Jensen, Currie, Kendall, Saginaw, MI, for Defendants.
Opinion
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION AND
DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO AMEND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
LAWSON, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on various procedural motions filed by the parties. Although the Court previously bifurcated the case and determined the liability question upon adjudication of the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment, through the present motions-the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification and the defendants’ motion for leave to file new affirmative defenses-the parties seek to unwind the litigation as it has

proceeded thus far and litigate different theories involving additional claimants. The Court heard the parties arguments in open court on November 9, 2005 and now finds that the plaintiffs have not demonstrated the propriety of certifying the matter as a class action, the plaintiffs’ motion is filed too late, equitable estoppel or tolling does not save it because they have submitted no evidence of wrongful behavior by the defendant, the defendants’ proposed amended affirmative defenses would be futile because (with one exception) they would not bar the plaintiffs’ claims, and the request to amend is untimely. The Court, therefore, will deny the parties motions.
I.
The plaintiffs initial complaint was filed on October 9, 2001. It named as plaintiffs Linda Rose, Jennifer Cradit, and Jane Doe Detainees of the Saginaw County Jail. The complaint sought class action certification. According to the case management and scheduling order, as amended by this Court’s July 23, 2002 order, the plaintiffs were required to file any motion for class certification by September 13, 2002.
The present plaintiffs, twenty-two individuals, claim they were subjected to an unconstitutional policy by officials at the Saginaw County jail when they were held as pretrial detainees at various times between May 1999 and December 2001. They contend that the Saginaw County sheriff instituted a policy and practice of housing uncooperative and disruptive detainees in administrative segregation cells; and jail personnel would take all of the clothing from such detainees so that they were naked for the time that they spent in administrative segregation. The complaint and its several amendments assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law.
At a scheduling conference on May 14, 2002, the defendants stated that only thirty prisoners housed as pretrial detainees had been put in a cell naked over the prior three years. The defendants claimed to have eliminated the practice after the suit was filed. The plaintiffs failed to file a motion for class *270 certification prior to September 13, 2002, apparently based on the defendants’ representation that only thirty people were affected by the policy.
The plaintiffs amended their complaint from time to time with leave of court in order to add additional plaintiffs who emerged during the pendency of the case and alleged that they also were subjected to the naked detention policy. On December 9, 2002, the plaintiffs filed their sixth amended complaint. The amended complaint added
1

Rose v. Saginaw County, 232 F.R.D. 267 (2005)
more named plaintiffs and repeated the allegations that the plaintiffs, when detained while awaiting arraignment or trial, were forced to disrobe in the presence of corrections officers even though there was no reason to believe the plaintiffs were dangerous or possessed weapons. The amended complaint focused on the viewing of the plaintiffs’ naked bodies by jail personnel and alleged constitutional violations, gross negligence, invasion of privacy, assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of the Michigan Elliott Larson Civil Rights Act, Mich. Comp. Laws. § 37.2101 et seq. This version of the complaint omitted reference to class action certification, but it did request injunctive relief to prevent the defendants from engaging in the alleged illegal behavior.
In February 2003, a local television station showed a story about the naked segregation policy. The plaintiffs’ lawyers apparently received a number of phone calls after the story aired, leading them to dozens of potential plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have collected data from these potential plaintiffs, which they have presented to the court in a chart attached to the motion.
On December 22, 2004, the plaintiffs filed a motion to join even more parties as plaintiffs. They argued that the defendant had misrepresented the extent to which the naked segregation policy had been applied. The plaintiffs stated this misrepresentation prevented them from discovering 100 additional potential grievants in a timely manner and caused them to withdraw their class action claims. The plaintiffs’ motion requested permission to add additional plaintiffs discovered some time after the filing of the lawsuit. The defendants opposed the motion stating the plaintiffs had not shown good cause, and the defendants would be prejudiced if the motion were granted. The defendant also claimed many of the new plaintiffs’ claims would be barred by the statute of limitations.
On January 26, 2005, the Court filed an opinion adjudicating the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment. The Court addressed and resolved all of the liability issues in the case, holding that the naked detention policy was unconstitutional as applied to pretrial detainees. The Court dismissed the other counts. Rose v. Saginaw County, 353 F.Supp.2d 900 (E.D.Mich.2005). The Court also denied the plaintiffs’ motion to add additional parties plaintiff and stated that “[a]dding new parties as plaintiffs would serve to further complicate the litigation” because extensive discovery had already taken place and the defendants’ assertion that the statute of limitations barred many of the new plaintiffs’ claims. Id. at 926. The Court suggested that any new claimants not barred by the statute could file their own lawsuits.
On April 29, 2005, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class

certification or, in the alternative, for joinder. The plaintiffs submitted an affidavit of Peggy Goldberg Pitt, a lawyer working on the case. Attached to the affidavit is a chart listing plaintiffs and potential plaintiffs, a summary of what happened to them, the date of their detention, and other information. The list indicates that sixty-four people were subject to the naked detention policy. Twenty of these people are original plaintiffs in the case, leaving forty-four new possible plaintiffs. The affidavit states that twenty-three people were segregated while naked from 2002 through the date of the motion, despite the defendants claims that they have ended the naked detention policy.
The defendants dispute much of the data included in the chart and point out that the chart contains either unsworn averments or statements not based on firsthand knowledge of any of these incidents actually happening. The defendants state they ended the unconstitutional policy in November 2001 when this lawsuit was filed. They also contend that only seven of the new potential plaintiffs on the chart were actually pretrial detainees *271 when they were placed in administrative segregation cell. The other thirty-seven had been convicted of a criminal offense. Moreover, the defendants state, eleven of the potential plaintiffs were not even in the jail on the dates alleged according to jail records, and eight were never in administrative segregation.
In the mean time, on July 25, 2005 the defendants filed a motion to amend their affirmative defenses to claim that the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), requires the plaintiffs to exhaust their remedies prior to filing suit in court and limits damages where no physical injury has been sustained. The plaintiffs contest this motion on the ground that it is untimely and the PLRA does not apply to them.
II.
[1] In order to be certified as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the moving party must establish that the class meets the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation requirements of Rule 23(a) and falls into one of the subcategories found in Rule 23(b). Sprague v. General Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388, 397 (6th Cir.1998). However, before the Court can assess the application of Rule 23’ s elements, the moving party must offer a definition of the class itself. Without such a definition, a proper analysis of the utility and propriety of proceeding as a class action cannot be made. As explained by other district courts:
Rule 23(a) also contains an implicit
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Rose v. Saginaw County, 232 F.R.D. 267 (2005)
requirement that the class be adequately defined and clearly ascertainable.... While the precise numbers of proposed class members need not be established, ... the class description must be sufficiently definite for the court to ascertain member status.
Rink v. Cheminova, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 648, 659 (M.D.Fla.2001) (internal quotes and citations omitted).
Before the Court may certify a class pursuant to Rule 23, “the class definition must be sufficiently definite so that it is administratively feasible for the court to determine whether a particular individual is a member of the proposed class.” 5 James W. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice et al. ¶ 23.21[1] (3d ed.1998). The identity of class members, moreover, must be ascertainable by reference to objective criteria.... A precise definition allows the Court to determine who would be entitled to relief, who would be bound by a judgment, and who is entitled to notice of the action. See 5 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 23.21[3].
Garrish v. United Auto., Aerospace, and Agric. Implement Workers of Am., 149 F.Supp.2d 326, 330-31 (E.D.Mich.2001) (citations omitted).
[2] The lack of a precise definition compounds the problem in a case in the procedural posture of this one because the previous liability determination necessarily turned on the status and circumstances surrounding the detention of the named plaintiffs. Where the implied definition of the class advanced by the plaintiffs would allow others who do not share all of the features of those named plaintiffs to benefit from that ruling, the Court’s liability holding could be distorted.
At oral argument, the plaintiffs conceded that they had not offered a specific class definition in their motion papers. The Court directed them to submit a definition, and the one furnished after the argument reads as follows:
All detainees who were placed in administrative segregation in the Saginaw County Jail from October 19, 1998 and were stripped of their clothing before being placed in administrative segregation pursuant to Defendants’ policy.
Pls.’ Supplemental Br. at 1. As discussed at oral argument, that definition certainly includes the named plaintiffs-and more. Despite the arguments of the plaintiffs to the contrary, the definition expands the class to deal with a broader group of persons that includes those who are materially different than the named plaintiffs in

at least two respects: inmates who are not pretrial detainees; and persons placed in administrative segregation who were given “suicide gowns,” that is, paper gowns that covered their private parts.
*272 The core holding of the liability opinion in this case was that the County’s policy of removing all clothing from pretrial detainees housed in administrative segregation violated the detainees’ due process rights, inasmuch as policy was an exaggerated response to the County’s articulated concerns about suicide, the guards’ safety, and administrative costs, and given the magnitude of the right to privacy in one’s own body and availability of alternatives to the policy (such as suicide gowns); and the policy was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the scope of the intrusion was substantial, and the detainees had a legitimate expectation that they would not be required to forfeit all clothing and covering, even for a brief time, when they had been detained for relatively minor violations, there was no individualized suspicion of drug, weapon, contraband possession, and there was no indication that they were suicidal. Rose, 353 F.Supp.2d at 922-23. The plaintiffs argue that in reaching that result, the Court cited cases that dealt with convicted inmates, such as Cornwell v. Dahlberg, 963 F.2d 912 (6th Cir.1992), Kent v. Johnson, 821 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir.1987), Wilson v. City of Kalamazoo, 127 F.Supp.2d 855 (W.D.Mich.2000), and Everson v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 391 F.3d 737 (6th Cir.2004). But those cases were cited for the sole proposition that “prisoners have a liberty and privacy interest in shielding their naked bodies from view by others, especially members of the opposite gender.” Rose, 353 F.Supp.2d at 919. In order to determine whether a particular practice is unconstitutional, the Court must balance that interest against the competing consideration whether “the regulation is ... reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). In this case, the Court relied heavily on Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), in striking that balance, which discusses the rules applicable to pretrial detainees.
The difference between pretrial detainees-that is, those who are presumed innocent of crime-and convicted inmates who are sentenced to a punishment, might call upon the Court to weigh that balance on different scales. On the other hand, the interests might be identical. However, injecting the extra factor into this case by expanding the universe of possible plaintiffs makes this a different case than the one the Court decided in its summary judgment opinion. It is that primary reason that impels the Court to view the plaintiffs’ proposed class definition as problematical at this stage of the proceedings. In order to accommodate the definition, the Court must plow old ground and reassess the issues already decided in the summary judgment motions in a
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Rose v. Saginaw County, 232 F.R.D. 267 (2005)
new light. Of course, the defendants quite properly could demand their right to be heard again since the case becomes a new and different lawsuit.
The court is simply unable to grant certification without a class definition “sufficiently definite so that it is administratively feasible for the court to determine whether a particular individual is a member of the proposed class.” Garrish, 149 F.Supp.2d at 330-31. From the list of potential claimants submitted by the plaintiffs, it appears that the class they seek to have certified includes all detainees from 1998 to present who were sent to administrative segregation, either naked or with a paper gown, whether they were pretrial or postconviction detainees, and whether or not they were exposed to members of the opposite sex.
The plaintiffs state in their reply brief that they “have not limited their claim to pretrial detainees.” Pl.’s Reply at 4. However, all the named plaintiffs in the several amended complaints were pretrial detainees. In their motion for summary judgment, which resulted in a ruling that the policy was unconstitutional as applied to pretrial detainees, the plaintiffs stated, “Plaintiffs are pretrial detainees accused of misdemeanors, not felonies.” Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. at 9. The plaintiffs describe the policy as one that requires officers “to strip naked pretrial detainees for insubordination.” Id. at 1. The argument section of their brief stated that the officers must have probable cause for “any significant pretrial restraint of liberty.” Id. at 10. The brief contains an entire section about the punishment of people not convicted of any crime. Id. at 15-17. It plainly appears that the plaintiffs were arguing on behalf of a *273 group of plaintiffs defined as pretrial detainees who were stripped naked.
Certifying the plaintiffs’ proposed class is not the superior method of addressing the issue of other individuals who claim a violation of their constitutional rights. Accepting the plaintiff’s proposed class definition would require the Court to scuttle its previous decision and rebalance the factors it assessed when determining the constitutional issues under the Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clause. The Court is not willing to pursue that course.
Attempting to define the class after the liability determination has been made creates additional problems with respect to the other requirements of Rule 23(a). In determining whether “the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,” the Court must consider the plaintiffs’ submissions in light of the opinion deciding the cross motions for summary judgment. Although a strict numerical test does not exist to determine when the class is too numerous to join, BreMiller v. Cleveland Psychiatric Inst., 195 F.R.D. 1, 19 (N.D.Ohio 2000), there must be some evidence to establish generally that “the number of potential class members is large, even if plaintiffs do not know the exact

figure.” In re Consumers Power Co. Sec. Litig., 105 F.R.D. 583, 601 (E.D.Mich.1985). Even “[w]here the exact size of the class is unknown but general knowledge and common sense indicate that it is large, the numerosity requirement is satisfied.” Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F.Supp. 351, 370 (C.D.Cal.1982).
The plaintiffs argue that they have identified forty-four new possible plaintiffs. However, as the defendants point out, only seven of the new potential plaintiffs on the chart were actually pretrial detainees when they were placed in administrative segregation cell. It is not clear how many of those were given paper gowns when their clothing was taken. However, the Court is not satisfied that the number of potential new plaintiffs is so large that class certification is a preferred or joinder of all plaintiffs is impractical.
[3] The commonality requirement, that is, establishing that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a), is also problematic, given the plaintiffs’ proposed class definition. The Sixth Circuit has held that the commonality and typicality requirements tend to merge because “[b]oth serve as guideposts for determining whether under the particular circumstances maintenance of a class action is economical and whether the named plaintiff’s claim and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class members will be fairly and adequately protected in their absence.” Rutherford v. City of Cleveland, 137 F.3d 905, 909 (6th Cir.1998) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n. 13, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982)). The Court does not believe it allowable to confound pretrial detainees and convicted inmates, as the plaintiffs propose to do, because each group presents different questions as to the application of custodial policies. The groups do not present common questions of law; different considerations may apply when balancing constitutional rights against legitimate penological interests.
As to the third element, a claim is typical if “it arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members, and if his or her claims are based on the same legal theory.” In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1082 (6th Cir.1996). Although the named plaintiffs’ claims must fairly encompass the class members’ claims, they need not always involve the same facts or law provided there is a common element of fact or law. Senter v. General Motors Corp. 532 F.2d 511, 525 n. 31 (6th Cir.1976). However, the potential difference between pretrial and postconviction inmates, and those who were confined completely naked and those given paper gowns, presents distinguishing legal issues that upset the claim of typicality.
The fourth prerequisite for class certification is the
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Rose v. Saginaw County, 232 F.R.D. 267 (2005)
adequate representation of the class by the class representatives. Adequate representation includes two inquiries: (1) whether the class counsel are “qualified, experienced and generally able to conduct the litigation” and (2) whether the class members have interests that are antagonistic to the other class members. *274 Stout v. J.D. Byrider, 228 F.3d 709, 717 (6th Cir.2000). “The bedrock requirement of adequacy is that the named representatives be a member of the class.” Rockey v. Courtesy Motors, Inc., 199 F.R.D. 578, 585 (W.D.Mich.2001). This factor likely is satisfied because the named plaintiffs occupy a smaller universe within the broader definition of class proposed.
The plaintiffs cite Tardiff v. Knox County, 365 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.2004), in support of their position that class certification is appropriate, but the Court reads that case as an illustration of the difficulty that can result from an attempt to broaden the class definition, as the plaintiffs here propose, after a decision on the merits that accounts for characteristics of the named plaintiffs not shared by the broader proposed class. In that case, the court of appeals affirmed district court orders certifying classes of pretrial detainees who were subjected to a strip search policy as part of a county jail’s intake process. The district court had addressed the “complications” arising from the fact that the policy “might be lawful as to some groups of arrestees ... and not others ... by narrowing the class.” Id. at 5. The court of appeals discussed the potential difficulties in class administration that might arise when individual class members present issues as to liability that are not common to the other members of the class. That possibility, the court believed, did not present an obstacle to class certification in the beginning of the case because the district court retained the option “to consider [further] narrowing or de-certifying the class.” Id. at 6. Those options no longer exist in this case because the Court’s opinion, discussed above, likely applies to a narrower range of detainees than the group proposed by the plaintiffs.
For these reasons, the Court will deny the motion to certify the action as a class action.

limitations because the defendants’ misbehavior prevented them from discovering these new potential plaintiffs in a timely fashion, making equitable tolling applicable. Equitable tolling requires proof that the defendants took affirmative steps to conceal the plaintiffs’ cause of action and that the plaintiffs could not have discovered the cause of action despite exercising due diligence. Jarrett v. Kassel, 972 F.2d 1415, 1423-24 (6th Cir.1992).
The plaintiffs claim that they were misled by the defendants’ assertion that only thirty people were affected by the policy. However, the defendants were working on the assumption, reasonably based on the plaintiffs’ prior assertions and motions, that the class was limited to pretrial detainees. The plaintiffs have submitted no evidence that the group of pretrial detainees who were stripped naked and not given a paper gown is significantly larger than thirty people. Moreover, the comment allegedly was made by the defendants in May 2002. Many of the new people the plaintiffs want to add were incarcerated after that date and could not have been considered by the defendants at the time the comment was made.
The defendants state that the plaintiffs did not use due diligence and therefore do not qualify for equitable tolling. “If the plaintiff has delayed beyond the limitations period, he must fully plead the facts and circumstances surrounding his belated discovery ‘and the delay which has occurred must be shown to be consistent with the requisite diligence.’ ” Campbell v. Upjohn Co., 676 F.2d 1122, 1127 (6th Cir.1982). The plaintiffs have not provided any information about steps it took to verify that the comment made by the defendant was correct or not.
Finally, if defenses against the statute of limitations could be brought in this case, they also could be advanced in a separate action by individual plaintiffs who claim that they were aggrieved by the County’s detention policy. The Court will not permit a further amendment of the complaint.

III.
[4] The plaintiffs request in the alternative that they be allowed to amend their complaint to join additional plaintiffs and that the statute of limitations be tolled for the new claimants. That request was made earlier and denied as part of the Court’s January 26, 2005 opinion. See Rose, 353 F.Supp.2d at 926. No reason has been presented to change that ruling now.
The plaintiffs claim they are not barred by the statute of

*275 IV.
The defendants likewise seek to amend their pleadings. They contend that the plaintiffs were required to exhaust their administrative remedies under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act prior to filing suit, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), and because the defendants failed to raise that defense earlier in the litigation, they seek leave to amend their answer so they can raise it now. They also wish to plead the PLRA’s limitation on damages, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), as an affirmative defense.
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Rose v. Saginaw County, 232 F.R.D. 267 (2005)
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), a party may amend its pleadings at this stage of the proceedings only after obtaining leave of court. Although the Rule provides that “leave of court shall be freely granted when justice so requires,” leave may be denied on the basis of undue delay, bad faith by the moving party, repeated failure to cure defects by previously-allowed amendments, futility of the proposed new claim, or undue prejudice to the opposite party. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962); Duggins v. Steak & Shake, Inc., 195 F.3d 828, 834 (6th Cir.1999); Fisher v. Roberts, 125 F.3d 974, 977 (6th Cir.1997). “Notice and substantial prejudice to the opposing party are critical factors in determining whether an amendment should be granted.” Wade v. Knoxville Util. Bd., 259 F.3d 452, 45859 (6th Cir.2001). The Rule does not establish a deadline within which a party must file a motion to amend. See Lloyd v. United Liquors Corp., 203 F.2d 789, 793 (6th Cir.1953) (reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to amend after the entry of summary judgment). However, the party seeking to amend should “act with due diligence if it wants to take advantage of the Rule’s liberality.” Parry v. Mohawk Motors of Michigan, Inc., 236 F.3d 299, 306 (6th Cir.2000). Thus, where “amendment is sought at a late stage in the litigation, there is an increased burden to show justification for failing to move earlier.” Wade, 259 F.3d at 459. Courts are especially inclined to deny a motion brought under Rule 15 “if the moving party knew the facts on which the claim or defense sought to be added were based at the time the original pleading was filed and there is no excuse for his failure to plead them.” 6 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1487 (2d ed.1990); see Wade, 259 F.3d at 459 (finding undue delay where the plaintiff knew the facts forming the basis of the amended claims but failed to plead the claims in the original complaint).
The plaintiffs argue that the defendants should not be allowed to amend their affirmative defenses because the request comes too late, that is, six months after the liability opinion was filed, and the amendment would be futile because the PLRA does not apply to them. The Court agrees.
[5] The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement reads as follows:
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The plaintiffs argue that the statute

does not apply to former prisoners, and the defendants contend that it does. The Sixth Circuit has not ruled on this issue.
By its terms, the statute applies to lawsuits brought by “a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility.” None of the named plaintiffs, save one, was an inmate at the time suit was filed; they all had been released. The statute has a temporal element in its language: it is directed to lawsuits by prisoners who are presently confined, not those who were confined at the time the cause of action arose or any other time.
That construction is consistent with the purpose of the PLRA, which, according to its sponsors, was enacted to curb abuses by prisoners filing frivolous lawsuits in the federal courts. For example, Senator Dole commented that “[t]his legislation is a new and improved version of S. 866, which I introduced earlier this year to address the alarming explosion in the number of frivolous lawsuits filed by State and Federal prisoners.” *276 141 Cong Rec S14413 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995). Senator Kyl, a sponsor of an earlier version of the Bill, decried the proliferation of frivolous lawsuits by prison inmates, noting that “[f]iling frivolous civil rights lawsuits has become a recreational activity for long-term residents of our prisons.” 141 Cong Rec S7526 (daily ed. May 25, 1995). The reforms introduced included the exhaustion requirement. Senator Kyl explained, “Section 7 will make the exhaustion of administrative remedies mandatory. Many prisoner cases seek relief for matters that are relatively minor and for which the prison grievance system would provide an adequate remedy.” Id. at S7527. He based the need for such reform in part on the comment by Justice Rehnquist in his dissent in Cleavinger v. Saxner, where he observed, “With less to profitably occupy their time than potential litigants on the outside, and with a justified feeling that they have much to gain and virtually nothing to lose, prisoners appear to be far more prolific litigants than other groups in the population.” Cleavinger, 474 U.S. 193, 211, 106 S.Ct. 496, 88 L.Ed.2d 507 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). It plainly appears that the purpose of the PLRA reforms was to curb the litigiousness of prisoners presently in custody.
The Sixth Circuit has observed that another purpose of the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement was “to give increased powers to prisons so that they could solve their problems according to their own internal dispute resolution systems.” Jones Bey v. Johnson, 407 F.3d 801, 807 (6th Cir.2005); see also Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 525, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002) (observing that by enacting the PLRA, “Congress afforded corrections officials time and opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a federal case. In some instances, corrective action taken in response to an inmate’s grievance might improve prison
6

Rose v. Saginaw County, 232 F.R.D. 267 (2005)
administration and satisfy the inmate, thereby obviating the need for litigation”). That goal would not be achieved by requiring a plaintiff who no longer is part of the prison population to return to the institution to partake of an internal administrative dispute mechanism.
Other courts have reached the opposite view. See, e.g., Morgan v. Maricopa County, 259 F.Supp.2d 985, 991-92 (D.Ariz.2003); Zehner v. Trigg, 952 F.Supp. 1318, 1327 (S.D.Ind.1997), aff’d, 133 F.3d 459 (7th Cir.1997); Kerr v. Puckett, 967 F.Supp. 354, 361-62 (E.D.Wis.1997). However, those decisions appear to constitute a minority position, as several other courts have held that the PLRA applies only to inmates confined at the time the lawsuit is commenced. See Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that the exhaustion requirement applies only to “individuals who, at the time they seek to file their civil actions, are detained as a result of being accused of, convicted of, or sentenced for criminal offenses”); Greig v. Goord, 169 F.3d 165, 167 (2d Cir.1999) (former prisoner not required to comply with PLRA); Kerr v. Puckett, 138 F.3d 321, 323 (7th Cir.1998) (same); Doe v. Washington County, 150 F.3d 920, 924 (8th Cir.1998) (same); Kritenbrink v. Crawford, 313 F.Supp.2d 1043, 1047-48 (D.Nev.2004) (stating that the “plain language of the statute” compels the “holding that the exhaustion requirement does not apply to former prisoners”).
A district court in this circuit also has held that the PLRA does not apply to former inmates. See Smith v. Franklin County, 227 F.Supp.2d 667 (E.D.Ky.2002). In that case, the court observed that the reforms of the PLRA “will not be subverted by holding that the PLRA does not apply to former prisoners,” and rejected the defendant’s contention that the PLRA should be “stretched to include former prisoners.” Id. at 675-76. The court reasoned:
[T]his Court finds Defendants’ proposed interpretation to be nonsensical. To require former prisoners to initiate or pursue those internal, administrative remedies once they have left the confines of a facility is a strained application of § 1997e at best. Former prisoners are no longer members of the community that such administrative processes and limitations are meant to serve. This is particularly so with those prisoners who are incarcerated for short periods of time as their opportunity to initiate and pursue administrative remedies *277 while incarcerated is temporally limited at best.
Ibid.

This Court is convinced that the plain language of section 1997e(a) compels the conclusion that its requirements apply to prisoners who are confined when they file their lawsuits, and not to former inmates who bring actions after their release from custody. That construction of the statute is consistent with the purposes and goals of the Act and tracks the legislative history. Consequently, allowing the defendants to amend their affirmative defenses to plead the failure to exhaust remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) would be futile because that statute does not apply to all the named plaintiffs.
[6] The defendants contend that even if the exhaustion requirement is inapplicable, the damage limitation should apply. That section of the statute states:
No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
In Cox v. Malone, 199 F.Supp.2d 135, 139-40 (S.D.N.Y.2002), the district court attempted to distinguish circuit precedent that the exhaustion requirement did not apply to former prisoners as a “procedural requirement” and held that the damage limitation did apply to former prisoners because it is a “substantive limitation.” This Court cannot accept that distinction, however, because it ignores the plain language of the statute. Subsections (a) and (e) both refer only to “a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility.” The court in Smith v. Franklin County stated:
The Sixth Circuit has yet to address this issue, but it is widely held that “prisoner” means someone confined, incarcerated, or detained, not a former prisoner. See AbdulAkbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 314 (3rd Cir.2001); Janes v. Hernandez, 215 F.3d 541, 543 (5th Cir.2000); Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir.2000); Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 981 (11th Cir.2000); Greig v. Goord, 169 F.3d 165, 167 (2nd Cir.1999); Kerr v. Puckett, 138 F.3d 321, 323 (7th Cir.1998); Doe v. McKee, 150 F.3d 920, 924 (8th Cir.1998).
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Rose v. Saginaw County, 232 F.R.D. 267 (2005)
Smith, 227 F.Supp.2d at 675. This Court agrees with that observation and further holds that there is no principled way to construe one section to include only current prisoners and expand the other to apply to former prisoners. This Court has held in the past that the PLRA prohibits inmates from suing to recover mental anguish damages absent physical injury, although nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages are available upon appropriate proof. See Meade v. Plummer, 344 F.Supp.2d 569, 572-74 (E.D.Mich.2004). That limitation, however, does not apply to individuals who bring actions against their former custodians after release from custody, as in this case.
[7] The defendants’ proposed amendment also fails because it comes too late. The Sixth Circuit has not addressed in a published opinion whether the exhaustion requirement is an affirmative defense that can be waived. In fact, the court expressly declined to do so in Curry v. Scott, 249 F.3d 493, 501 (6th Cir.2001) (stating “Plaintiffs point out that most courts to consider the issue have characterized the PLRA’s exhaustion requirements as affirmative defenses.... We need not answer this argument here”). Courts in other circuits have treated the PLRA’s requirements as affirmative defenses that must be pleaded lest they be waived. See, e.g., Anderson v. XYZ Correctional Health Serv., Inc., 407 F.3d 674, 681 (4th Cir.2005) (stating that “an inmate’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies must be viewed as an affirmative defense that should be pleaded or otherwise properly raised by the defendant”); Johnson v. Testman, 380 F.3d 691, 695 (2d Cir.2004) (observing that “[t]he failure to exhaust available administrative remedies is an affirmative defense” and holding that “that this defense is waiveable”); Foulk v. Charrier, 262 F.3d 687, 697 (8th Cir.2001) (holding that “the assertion that a plaintiff prisoner failed to exhaust all available administrative remedies as required under the PLRA is an affirmative defense under Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c). It is the burden of the defendant asserting this affirmative defense *278 to plead and prove it”); Massey v. Helman, 196 F.3d 727, 735 (7th Cir.1999) (holding exhaustion requirements are waivable

if not asserted); Perez v. Wisconsin Department of Corrections, 182 F.3d 532, 536 (7th Cir.1999) (holding that PLRA’s exhaustion requirement is an affirmative defense that can be waived or forfeited by defendants); Jenkins v. Haubert, 179 F.3d 19, 29 (2d Cir.1999) (ruling that section 1997e sets forth affirmative defenses under Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(e)); Jackson v. District of Columbia, 89 F.Supp.2d 48, 57 (D.D.C.2000) (same).
If, as the majority of courts hold, the defenses are waiveable, surely the defendants have waived them here. Almost three years have past since the plaintiffs filed their sixth amended complaint. The defendants have filed motions and made appearances before this court arguing the merits of the case. The court has adjudicated the cross motions for summary judgment and held that the defendants’ practice and policy is unconstitutional. The request to amend the affirmative defenses is untimely.
V.
The Court finds that the plaintiffs have not established the required elements to permit certification of their proposed class. The defendants’ request to amend their affirmative defenses must fail because of futility and untimeliness.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification or joinder and continued tolling [dkt. # 172] is DENIED.
It is further ORDERED that the defendants’ motion to amend affirmative defenses [dkt. # 194] is DENIED.
It is further ORDERED that the attorneys for the parties shall appear for a status conference on December 15, 2005 at 2 p.m. to discuss a schedule for resolution of the claims that remain.
	  

8

 
 Case: 2:01-cv-10337-DML As of: 06/28/2012 12:48 PM EDT 1 of 34
CLOSED, JURY_TRIAL, MEDIATION
U.S. District Court Eastern District of Michigan (Detroit) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:01−cv−10337−DML

Rose, et al v. Saginaw Cnty, et al Assigned to: District Judge David M. Lawson Demand: $0
Plaintiff Linda Rose TERMINATED: 03/10/2008

Date Filed: 10/09/2001 Date Terminated: 03/20/2008 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Christopher J. Pianto Pianto &Associates 131 Saundersville Road, Suite 210 Hendersonville, TN 37075 615−445−9349 Fax: 866−702−2677 Email: cpianto@juno.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Loyst Fletcher , Jr. Law Office of Loyst Fletcher, Jr. 718 Beach Street Flint, MI 48502−1105 810−238−4410 Fax: 810−238−0726 Email: fletcherwolfjc@msn.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael L. Pitt Pitt, McGehee, 117 W. Fourth Street Suite 200 Royal Oak, MI 48067−3804 248−398−9800 Email: mpitt@pittlawpc.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peggy G. Pitt Pitt, McGehee, 117 W. Fourth Street Suite 200 Royal Oak, MI 48067−3804 248−398−9800 Email: ppitt@pittlawpc.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen F. Wasinger Stephen F. Wasinger PLC 32121 Woodward Avenue Suite 300 Royal Oak, MI 48073 United Sta 248−544−1500 Fax: 248−544−1501 Email: sfw@sfwlaw.com TERMINATED: 02/26/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 2:01-cv-10337-DML As of: 06/28/2012 12:48 PM EDT 2 of 34

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Jennifer Cradit TERMINATED: 03/10/2008

represented by Christopher J. Pianto (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Loyst Fletcher , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peggy G. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen F. Wasinger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/26/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Jane Doe Detainees of Saginaw County Jail

represented by Loyst Fletcher , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peggy G. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen F. Wasinger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/26/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher J. Pianto (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Donna Lynn Quarles Estate of

represented by Christopher J. Pianto (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

Case: 2:01-cv-10337-DML As of: 06/28/2012 12:48 PM EDT 3 of 34

Lizzie Quarles Personal Representative of the Estate of Donna Lynn Quarles TERMINATED: 03/10/2008

represented by Christopher J. Pianto (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Saginaw, County of a Municipal Governmental Entity
Defendant Charles Brown TERMINATED: 01/26/2005

represented by James I. DeGrazia O'Connor, DeGrazia, 4111 Andover Suite 300E Bloomfield Hills, MI 48302−1949 248−433−2000 Fax: 248−433−2000 TERMINATED: 06/10/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY
James E. Tamm O'Connor, DeGrazia, 40701 Woodward Avenue Suite 105 Bloomfield Hills, MI 48304 248−433−2000 Fax: 248−433−2001 Email: jetamm@odtlegal.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter C. Jensen − INACTIVE 6420 Normandy Drive Saginaw, MI 48638 989−799−6970 Fax: 989−799−2553 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard V. Stokan , Jr. O'Connor, DeGrazia, 4111 Andover Road Suite 300 E. Bloomfield Hills, MI 48302 248−433−2000 Fax: 248−433−2001 Email: rvstokan@odtlegal.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher J. Pianto (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by James I. DeGrazia (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/10/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY
Peter C. Jensen − INACTIVE (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:01-cv-10337-DML As of: 06/28/2012 12:48 PM EDT 4 of 34

Christopher J. Pianto (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James E. Tamm (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
John Doe TERMINATED: 01/26/2005

represented by James I. DeGrazia (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/10/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

Peter C. Jensen − INACTIVE (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher J. Pianto (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Jane Doe TERMINATED: 01/26/2005

represented by James I. DeGrazia (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/10/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

Peter C. Jensen − INACTIVE (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher J. Pianto (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff John Doe

represented by Loyst Fletcher , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peggy G. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen F. Wasinger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/26/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher J. Pianto (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:01-cv-10337-DML As of: 06/28/2012 12:48 PM EDT 5 of 34

V. Defendant Saginaw County Sheriff Department
Plaintiff Sylvia Denise Braddock TERMINATED: 03/10/2008
Plaintiff Lisa Renee Brandimore

represented by James I. DeGrazia (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/10/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY
James E. Tamm (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter C. Jensen − INACTIVE (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard V. Stokan , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher J. Pianto (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Christopher J. Pianto (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Loyst Fletcher , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peggy G. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen F. Wasinger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/26/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Christopher J. Pianto (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Loyst Fletcher , Jr. (See above for address)

Case: 2:01-cv-10337-DML As of: 06/28/2012 12:48 PM EDT 6 of 34

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peggy G. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen F. Wasinger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/26/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Dwayne Butterfield TERMINATED: 03/10/2008

represented by Christopher J. Pianto (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Loyst Fletcher , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peggy G. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen F. Wasinger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/26/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Bobbie Wayne Carter TERMINATED: 03/10/2008

represented by Christopher J. Pianto (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Loyst Fletcher , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peggy G. Pitt (See above for address)

Case: 2:01-cv-10337-DML As of: 06/28/2012 12:48 PM EDT 7 of 34

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen F. Wasinger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/26/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Daniel Wray Clayton TERMINATED: 03/10/2008

represented by Christopher J. Pianto (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Loyst Fletcher , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peggy G. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen F. Wasinger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/26/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Hope Michelle Davis TERMINATED: 07/22/2003

represented by Christopher J. Pianto (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2003 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Joshua Fuller

represented by Christopher J. Pianto (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Loyst Fletcher , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peggy G. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:01-cv-10337-DML As of: 06/28/2012 12:48 PM EDT 8 of 34

Plaintiff Nicholas Anthony Giles TERMINATED: 03/10/2008
Plaintiff Willie Louis Hendricks TERMINATED: 03/12/2008
Plaintiff

Stephen F. Wasinger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/26/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Christopher J. Pianto (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Loyst Fletcher , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peggy G. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen F. Wasinger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/26/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Christopher J. Pianto (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Loyst Fletcher , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peggy G. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen F. Wasinger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/26/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by

Case: 2:01-cv-10337-DML As of: 06/28/2012 12:48 PM EDT 9 of 34

Tanisha Ramon Johnson TERMINATED: 03/10/2008

Christopher J. Pianto (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Loyst Fletcher , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peggy G. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen F. Wasinger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/26/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Robert Allen Kelsey TERMINATED: 03/10/2008

represented by Christopher J. Pianto (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Loyst Fletcher , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peggy G. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen F. Wasinger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/26/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Sue Ann Letterman

represented by Christopher J. Pianto (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Loyst Fletcher , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:01-cv-10337-DML As of: 06/28/2012 12:48 PM EDT 10 of 34

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peggy G. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen F. Wasinger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/26/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Donna Lynn Quarles TERMINATED: 04/12/2006

represented by Christopher J. Pianto (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Loyst Fletcher , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peggy G. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen F. Wasinger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/26/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
David Todd Reiner TERMINATED: 07/22/2003

represented by Christopher J. Pianto (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2003 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Gregory Louis Schultz TERMINATED: 03/12/2008

represented by Christopher J. Pianto (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Loyst Fletcher , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address)

Case: 2:01-cv-10337-DML As of: 06/28/2012 12:48 PM EDT 11 of 34

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peggy G. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen F. Wasinger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/26/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Amanda Rae Shinaver TERMINATED: 03/10/2008

represented by Christopher J. Pianto (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Loyst Fletcher , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peggy G. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen F. Wasinger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/26/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Dwayne Alann Simmons TERMINATED: 03/12/2008

represented by Christopher J. Pianto (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Loyst Fletcher , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peggy G. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen F. Wasinger (See above for address)

Case: 2:01-cv-10337-DML As of: 06/28/2012 12:48 PM EDT 12 of 34

TERMINATED: 02/26/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Robin Renee Thomas

represented by Christopher J. Pianto (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Loyst Fletcher , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peggy G. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen F. Wasinger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/26/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Joshua Allen Weigant TERMINATED: 03/12/2008

represented by Christopher J. Pianto (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Loyst Fletcher , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peggy G. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen F. Wasinger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/26/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Raymond Praay TERMINATED: 10/06/2004

represented by Christopher J. Pianto (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:01-cv-10337-DML As of: 06/28/2012 12:48 PM EDT 13 of 34

Plaintiff Justin Anderson
Plaintiff Craig Mason TERMINATED: 03/12/2008
Plaintiff Matthew Starkweather

represented by Christopher J. Pianto (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Loyst Fletcher , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peggy G. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen F. Wasinger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/26/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Christopher J. Pianto (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Loyst Fletcher , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peggy G. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen F. Wasinger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/26/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Christopher J. Pianto (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Loyst Fletcher , Jr. (See above for address)

Case: 2:01-cv-10337-DML As of: 06/28/2012 12:48 PM EDT 14 of 34

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peggy G. Pitt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen F. Wasinger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/26/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Richard Plamondon TERMINATED: 10/06/2004

represented by Christopher J. Pianto (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Robert James Stephens TERMINATED: 07/22/2003

represented by Christopher J. Pianto (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2003 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 10/09/2001 10/18/2001
10/19/2001
10/25/2001
10/25/2001 10/25/2001
10/25/2001 10/31/2001 11/09/2001

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT; jury demand − Receipt # 45996 (Flint) − Date Fee Received: 10/9/01 (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 10/12/2001)
2 AMENDED complaint 1 by plaintiff Linda Rose, plaintiff Jennifer Cradit, plaintiff Jane Doe adding John Doe, Saginaw Cnty Sher; jury demand (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 10/22/2001)
7 PROOF of mailing by plaintiff Linda Rose, plaintiff Jennifer Cradit, plaintiff Jane Doe, plaintiff John Doe re: first amended complaint and jury demand (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 10/29/2001)
3 APPEARANCE for defendant Saginaw Cnty, defendant Charles Brown, defendant John Doe, defendant Jane Doe of attorney Peter C. Jensen with proof of mailing (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 10/25/2001)
4 SUMMONS returned executed by process server on 10/18/01 − answer due 11/7/01 for Saginaw Cnty (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 10/29/2001)
5 SUMMONS returned executed by process server on 10/18/01 − answer due 11/7/01 for John Doe, for Jane Doe (Saginaw County Clerk) (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 10/29/2001)
6 SUMMONS returned executed by process server on 10/18/01 − answer due 11/7/01 for Charles Brown (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 10/29/2001)
8 PROOF of mailing re: first amended complaint (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 11/01/2001)
9 AMENDED complaint 2 by plaintiff Jane Doe, plaintiff Jennifer Cradit, plaintiff Linda Rose, plaintiff John Doe ; jury demand with proof of mailing (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 11/14/2001)

Case: 2:01-cv-10337-DML As of: 06/28/2012 12:48 PM EDT 15 of 34

11/15/2001
02/14/2002 03/11/2002 04/01/2002 04/11/2002 05/03/2002 05/14/2002 05/20/2002
05/28/2002 05/28/2002 05/28/2002 05/28/2002 06/17/2002 07/12/2002
07/17/2002 07/23/2002
07/24/2002

10 ANSWER by defendant Jane Doe, defendant John Doe, defendant Charles Brown, defendant Saginaw Cnty to amended complaint by John Doe, Linda Rose, Jennifer Cradit, Jane Doe [9−1]; affirmative defenses and proof of mailing (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 11/15/2001)
11 NOTICE of setting civil status and scheduling conference for 2:30 3/15/02 (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 02/14/2002)
12 NOTICE of setting civil status and scheduling conference for 4:00 4/9/02 (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 03/11/2002)
13 NOTICE of setting civil status and scheduling conference for 1:30 4/11/02 (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 04/01/2002)
14 NOTICE of setting civil status conference for 2:00 4/29/02 , setting scheduling conference for 2:00 4/29/02 (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 04/11/2002)
15 NOTICE of resetting scheduling conference for 3:00 5/14/02 , setting civil status conference for 3:00 5/14/02 (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 05/07/2002)
SCHEDULING conference held − Judge David M. Lawson (tj) (Entered: 05/15/2002)
16 PRETRIAL scheduling order by Judge David M. Lawson − setting civil status conference for 3:30 8/5/02 , setting final pretrial conference for 2:30 2/18/03 , setting deadline for final pretrial order for 2/11/03 , setting civil jury trial for 8:30 3/4/03 (sm) (Entered: 05/20/2002)
17 AMENDED complaint 3 by plaintiff Linda Rose, plaintiff Jennifer Cradit, plaintiff Jane Doe, plaintiff John Doe ; jury demand (sm) (Entered: 05/29/2002)
18 NOTICE by plaintiff Linda Rose, plaintiff Jennifer Cradit, plaintiff Jane Doe, plaintiff John Doe of Disclosures pursuant to FRCP 26(A)(1) (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 05/29/2002)
19 WITNESS list by plaintiff Linda Rose, plaintiff Jennifer Cradit, plaintiff Jane Doe, plaintiff John Doe (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 05/29/2002)
20 PROOF of service by plaintiff Linda Rose, plaintiff Jennifer Cradit, plaintiff Jane Doe, plaintiff John Doe of [19−1], [18−1], [17−1] (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 05/29/2002)
21 PROOF of service of notice of taking depositions (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 06/19/2002)
22 MOTION by plaintiff Linda Rose, plaintiff Jennifer Cradit, plaintiff Jane Doe, plaintiff John Doe to compel answers to interrogatories , to compel FRCP 26 Disclosures and Witness List , to extend time to for Class Action Cerfification , for additional interrogatories , to file fourth amended complaint [1−1] , to publish notice to potential plaintiffs and witnesses with brief, exhibits and proof of service (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 07/15/2002)
23 PROOF of service of discovery materials (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 07/19/2002)
24 ORDER by Judge David M. Lawson granting motion to compel answers to interrogatories [22−1], granting motion to compel FRCP Disclosures and Witness List [22−2], and granting motion to extend time for Class Action Cerfification by plaintiffs [22−3]; motion for class certification to be filed by 9/13/02 and Defense counsel to Show Cause in writing by 8/8/02 why he should not be held in contempt for disregarding the provisions of the Court's scheduling order and referring motion for additional interrogatories [22−4] and motion to file fourth amended complaint by plaintiffs [22−5] to Magistrate Judge Binder for hearing and determination, referring motion to publish notice to potential plaintiffs and witnesses by plaintiffs [22−6] to Magistrate Judge Binder for report and recommendation [EOD Date 7/23/02] (sm) Modified on 07/24/2002 (Entered: 07/23/2002)
25 NOTICE of setting deadline for response to motion for additional interrogatories by John Doe, Jane Doe, Jennifer Cradit, Linda Rose [22−4] for 8/2/02, motion to file fourth amended complaint [1−1] by John Doe, Jane Doe, Jennifer Cradit, Linda

Case: 2:01-cv-10337-DML As of: 06/28/2012 12:48 PM EDT 16 of 34

07/26/2002 08/05/2002 08/08/2002 08/12/2002 08/12/2002 09/03/2002
09/09/2002 09/10/2002 09/11/2002
09/11/2002

Rose [22−5] for 8/2/02, motion to publish notice to potential plaintiffs and witnesses by John Doe, Jane Doe, Jennifer Cradit, Linda Rose [22−6] for 8/2/02 , setting hearing on motion for additional interrogatories by John Doe, Jane Doe, Jennifer Cradit, Linda Rose [22−4] for 2:30 8/8/02, motion to file fourth amended complaint [1−1] by John Doe, Jane Doe, Jennifer Cradit, Linda Rose [22−5] for 2:30 8/8/02, motion to publish notice to potential plaintiffs and witnesses by John Doe, Jane Doe, Jennifer Cradit, Linda Rose [22−6] for 2:30 8/8/02 (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 07/24/2002)
26 ANSWER by defendant Saginaw Cnty Sher, defendant Saginaw Cnty, defendant Charles Brown, defendant Jane Doe to order [24−1] with affidavit and proof of service (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 07/26/2002)
STATUS conference held − Judge David M. Lawson (tj) (Entered: 08/07/2002)
27 ORDER by Judge David M. Lawson, Pursuant to Status and Scheduling Conference, setting deadline for filing of amended complaint for 9/3/02 , setting civil ADR status conference for 3:00 9/5/02 [EOD Date 8/8/02] (cg) (Entered: 08/08/2002)
Hearing cancelled on motion for additional interrogatories [22−4], motion to file fourth amended complaint [22−5], and motion to publish notice to potential plaintiffs witnesses by plaintiffs [22−6] − disposition: withdrawn − Magistrate Judge Binder (jb) (Entered: 08/12/2002)
28 LETTER by plaintiff Linda Rose, plaintiff Jennifer Cradit, plaintiff Jane Doe, plaintiff John Doe withdrawing motions scheduled for August 8,2002 (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 08/12/2002)
29 AMENDED complaint 4 by plaintiff John Doe, plaintiff Linda Rose, plaintiff Jennifer Cradit, plaintiff Jane Doe adding Slyvia Denise Braddock, Lisa Renee Brandimore, Dwayne Butterfield, Bobbie Wayne Carter, Daniel Wray Clayton, Hope Michelle Davis, Joshua Fuller, Nicholas Anthony Giles, Willie Louis Hendricks, Tanisha Ramon Johnson, Robert Allen Kelsey, Sue Ann Letterman, Donna Lynn Quarles, David Todd Reiner, Gregory Louis Schultz, Amanda Rae Shinaver, Dwayne Alann Simmons, Robin Renee Thomas, Joshua Allen Weigant; jury demand and proof of service (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 09/04/2002)
30 ANSWER by defendant Saginaw Cnty Sher, defendant Saginaw Cnty, defendant Charles Brown, defendant John Doe, defendant Jane Doe to amended complaint by Jane Doe, Jennifer Cradit, Linda Rose, John Doe [29−1] with proof of service (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 09/09/2002)
31 ORDER by Judge David M. Lawson, of referral to Mediation Tribunal Association [EOD Date 9/10/02] (bs) (Entered: 09/10/2002)
32 MOTION by plaintiff John Doe, plaintiff Linda Rose, plaintiff Jennifer Cradit, plaintiff Jane Doe, plaintiff Slyvia Denise Braddock, plaintiff Lisa Renee Brandimore, plaintiff Dwayne Butterfield, plaintiff Bobbie Wayne Carter, plaintiff Daniel Wray Clayton, plaintiff Hope Michelle Davis, plaintiff Joshua Fuller, plaintiff Nicholas Anthony Giles, plaintiff Willie Louis Hendricks, plaintiff Tanisha Ramon Johnson, plaintiff Robert Allen Kelsey, plaintiff Sue Ann Letterman, plaintiff Donna Lynn Quarles, plaintiff David Todd Reiner, plaintiff Gregory Louis Schultz, plaintiff Amanda Rae Shinaver, plaintiff Dwayne Alann Simmons, plaintiff Robin Renee Thomas, plaintiff Joshua Allen Weigant establishing liability with brief and attachments (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 09/12/2002)
33 ANSWER to defendants' affirmative defenses and other matters dated 9/6/02 by plaintiff John Doe, plaintiff Linda Rose, plaintiff Jennifer Cradit, plaintiff Jane Doe, plaintiff Slyvia Denise Braddock, plaintiff Lisa Renee Brandimore, plaintiff Dwayne Butterfield, plaintiff Bobbie Wayne plaintiff Daniel Wray Clayton, plaintiff Hope Michelle Davis, plaintiff Joshua Fuller, plaintiff Nicholas Anthony Giles, plaintiff Willie Louis Hendricks, plaintiff Tanisha Ramon Johnson, plaintiff Robert Allen Kelsey, plaintiff Sue Ann Letterman, plaintiff Donna Lynn Quarles, plaintiff Todd Reiner, plaintiff Gregory Louis Schultz, plaintiff Amanda Rae Shinaver, plaintiff Dwayne Alann Simmons, plaintiff Robin Renee Thomas,

Case: 2:01-cv-10337-DML As of: 06/28/2012 12:48 PM EDT 17 of 34

09/11/2002
09/11/2002
09/17/2002
10/01/2002 10/11/2002 10/18/2002 11/04/2002 11/07/2002

plaintiff Joshua Allen (sm) (Entered: 09/12/2002)
34 PROOF of service by plaintiff John Doe, plaintiff Linda Rose, plaintiff Jennifer Cradit, plaintiff Jane Doe, plaintiff Slyvia Denise Braddock, plaintiff Lisa Renee Brandimore, plaintiff Dwayne Butterfield, plaintiff Bobbie Wayne Carter, plaintiff Daniel Wray Clayton, plaintiff Hope Michelle Davis, plaintiff Joshua Fuller, plaintiff Nicholas Anthony Giles, plaintiff Willie Louis Hendricks, plaintiff Tanisha Ramon Johnson, plaintiff Robert Allen Kelsey, plaintiff Sue Ann Letterman, plaintiff Donna Lynn Quarles, plaintiff David Todd Reiner, plaintiff Gregory Louis Schultz, plaintiff Amanda Rae Shinaver, plaintiff Dwayne Alann Simmons, plaintiff Robin Renee Thomas, plaintiff Joshua Allen Weigant of [33−1], [32−1] (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 09/12/2002)
35 PROOF of service by plaintiff John Doe, plaintiff Linda Rose, plaintiff Jennifer Cradit, plaintiff Jane Doe, plaintiff Slyvia Denise Braddock, plaintiff Lisa Renee Brandimore, plaintiff Dwayne Butterfield, plaintiff Bobbie Wayne Carter, plaintiff Daniel Wray Clayton, plaintiff Hope Michelle Davis, plaintiff Joshua Fuller, plaintiff Nicholas Anthony Giles, plaintiff Willie Louis Hendricks, plaintiff Tanisha Ramon Johnson, plaintiff Robert Allen Kelsey, plaintiff Sue Ann Letterman, plaintiff Donna Lynn Quarles, plaintiff David Todd Reiner, plaintiff Gregory Louis Schultz, plaintiff Amanda Rae Shinaver, plaintiff Dwayne Alann Simmons, plaintiff Robin Renee Thomas, plaintiff Joshua Allen Weigant of [33−1] (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 09/12/2002)
36 MOTION by plaintiff John Doe, plaintiff Linda Rose, plaintiff Jennifer Cradit, plaintiff Jane Doe, plaintiff Sylvia Denise Braddock, plaintiff Lisa Renee Brandimore, plaintiff Dwayne Butterfield, plaintiff Bobbie Wayne Carter, plaintiff Daniel Wray Clayton, plaintiff Hope Michelle Davis, plaintiff Joshua Fuller, plaintiff Nicholas Anthony Giles, plaintiff Willie Louis Hendricks, plaintiff Tanisha Ramon Johnson, plaintiff Robert Allen Kelsey, plaintiff Sue Ann Letterman, plaintiff Donna Lynn Quarles, plaintiff David Todd Reiner, plaintiff Gregory Louis Schultz, plaintiff Amanda Rae Shinaver, plaintiff Dwayne Alann Simmons, plaintiff Robin Renee Thomas, plaintiff Joshua Allen Weigant to exclude prior arrest and misdemeanor convictions of plaintiffs and to amend complaint [1−1] with brief, notice of hearing and proof of service (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 09/19/2002)
37 ORDER by Judge David M. Lawson with stipulation, extending time to 10/11/02 to answer plaintiffs'motions [EOD Date: 10/1/02] (sm) (Entered: 10/01/2002)
38 ORDER by Judge David M. Lawson denying motion to exclude prior arrest and misdemeanor convictions of plaintiffs by plaintiffs, defendant, plaintiff, defendant, plaintiff [36−1] granting motion to amend complaint [1−1] by plaintiffs, defendant, plaintiff, defendant, plaintiff [36−2], denying motion establishing liability by plaintiffs, defendant, plaintiff, defendant, plaintiff [32−1] [EOD 10/11/02] (sm) (Entered: 10/11/2002)
39 AMENDED complaint 5 by plaintiff adding Raymond Praay, Justin Anderson, Craig Mason; jury demand with proof of service (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 10/21/2002)
40 APPEARANCE for defendants of attorney James I. DeGrazia with proof of service (jl) (CGre). (Entered: 11/04/2002)
41 MOTION by plaintiff John Doe, plaintiff Linda Rose, plaintiff Jennifer Cradit, plaintiff Jane Doe, plaintiff Sylvia Denise Braddock, plaintiff Lisa Renee Brandimore, plaintiff Dwayne Butterfield, plaintiff Bobbie Wayne Carter, plaintiff Daniel Wray Clayton, plaintiff Hope Michelle Davis, plaintiff Joshua Fuller, plaintiff Nicholas Anthony Giles, plaintiff Willie Louis Hendricks, plaintiff Tanisha Ramon Johnson, plaintiff Robert Allen Kelsey, plaintiff Sue Ann Letterman, plaintiff Donna Lynn Quarles, plaintiff David Todd Reiner, plaintiff Gregory Louis Schultz, plaintiff Amanda Rae Shinaver, plaintiff Dwayne Alann Simmons, plaintiff Robin Renee Thomas, plaintiff Joshua Allen Weigant, plaintiff Raymond Praay, plaintiff Justin Anderson, plaintiff Craig Mason to affirm the parties stipulation to liability and order for same and memorandum of law with brief, exhibits, notice of hearing and proof of service (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 11/08/2002)

Case: 2:01-cv-10337-DML As of: 06/28/2012 12:48 PM EDT 18 of 34

11/12/2002 11/12/2002 11/12/2002 11/15/2002
11/15/2002 11/20/2002 11/25/2002 12/05/2002 12/06/2002
12/06/2002
12/09/2002 12/09/2002 12/09/2002 12/09/2002 12/09/2002 12/09/2002 12/12/2002 12/16/2002 12/17/2002 12/24/2002

42 APPLICATION by plaintiffs' for clerk's entry of default as to defendant Saginaw Cnty Sher, defendant Saginaw Cnty, defendant Charles Brown with affidavit (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 11/13/2002)
43 STATEMENT by plaintiffs' regarding concurrence [EOD Date: 11/13/02] (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 11/13/2002)
44 PROOF of service by plaintiffs' of [43−1], [42−1] (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 11/13/2002)
45 MOTION by defendant Saginaw Cnty Sher, defendant Saginaw Cnty, defendant Charles Brown to excuse default and response to plaintiffs' application for entry of default with brief, attachments and proof of service (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 11/20/2002)
46 ANSWER by defendant Saginaw Cnty Sher, defendant Saginaw Cnty, defendant Charles Brown to amended complaint by plaintiffs [39−1]; jury demand, affirmative defenses and proof of service (sm) (Entered: 11/20/2002)
STATUS conference held − Judge David M. Lawson (tj) (Entered: 11/21/2002)
47 PROOF of service of [46−1], [45−1] (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 11/25/2002)
TELE−CONFERENCE held: new dates set − Judge David M. Lawson (tj) (Entered: 12/05/2002)
48 ORDER by Judge David M. Lawson with stipulation withdrawing application for clerk's entry of default as to defendant Saginaw Cnty Sher, defendant Saginaw Cnty, defendant Charles Brown by defendant by plaintiffss, defendant, plaintiff [42−1] [EOD Date: 12/6/02] (sm) (Entered: 12/06/2002)
49 ORDER by Judge David M. Lawson, for defendant Saginaw Cnty Sher, defendant Saginaw Cnty, defendant Charles Brown, defendant John Doe, defendant Jane Doe attorney Peter C Jensen to show cause why appearance on behalf of defendants should not be stricken, and why he should not be sanctioned for failure to attend status conference of 11/20/02 [EOD Date 12/6/02] (sm) (Entered: 12/06/2002)
50 NOTICE by plaintiff of taking deposition of Sheriff Charles Brown 12/19/02 @2:00 (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 12/11/2002)
51 NOTICE by plaintiff of taking deposition of Sargent Vanriper 12/17/02 @10:00 (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 12/11/2002)
52 NOTICE by plaintiff of taking deposition of Sargent Fitzsimons 12/17/02 @11:00 (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 12/11/2002)
53 NOTICE by plaintiff Craig Mason of taking deposition of Sargent Harvey 12/17/02 @10:30 (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 12/11/2002)
54 PROOF of service by plaintiff Craig Mason of [53−1], [52−1], [51−1], [50−1] (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 12/11/2002)
55 AMENDED complaint 6 by plaintiff Craig Mason adding Matthew Starkweather, Richard Plamondon, Robert James Stephens; jury demand and proof of service (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 12/11/2002)
56 PROOF of service of [55−1] (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 12/13/2002)
57 ORDER by Judge David M. Lawson, setting civil status conference for 2:30 1/22/03; sixth amended complaint by 12/9/02; defendants answer by 12/23/02 [EOD Date 12/16/02] (sm) (Entered: 12/16/2002)
58 ORDER with Consent by Judge David M. Lawson, withdrawing by Peter C. Jensen as attorney for Saginaw Cnty Sher, Saginaw Cnty, Charles Brown, John Doe, Jane Doe [EOD Date 12/17/02] (sm) (Entered: 12/17/2002)
59 ANSWER by defendant Saginaw Cnty Sher, defendant Saginaw Cnty, defendant Charles Brown to amended complaint by Craig Mason [55−1] with proof of service (jl) (CGre). (Entered: 12/24/2002)

Case: 2:01-cv-10337-DML As of: 06/28/2012 12:48 PM EDT 19 of 34

12/24/2002 12/24/2002 12/24/2002 12/24/2002 12/24/2002 12/24/2002 12/26/2002
01/02/2003 01/03/2003
01/06/2003
01/07/2003 01/09/2003 01/09/2003 01/13/2003 01/14/2003 01/14/2003 01/17/2003
01/22/2003
01/23/2003 01/28/2003 02/03/2003 02/10/2003

60 AFFIRMATIVE defenses by defendant Saginaw Cnty Sher, defendant Saginaw Cnty, defendant Charles Brown (jl) (CGre). (Entered: 12/24/2002)
61 DEMAND by defendant Saginaw Cnty Sher, defendant Saginaw Cnty, defendant Charles Brown for jury trial (jl) (CGre). (Entered: 12/24/2002)
62 WITNESS list by defendant Saginaw Cnty Sher, defendant Saginaw Cnty, defendant Charles Brown (jl) (CGre). (Entered: 12/24/2002)
62 EXHIBIT list by defendant Saginaw Cnty Sher, defendant Saginaw Cnty, defendant Charles Brown (jl) (Entered: 12/24/2002)
63 PROOF of service by defendant Saginaw Cnty Sher, defendant Saginaw Cnty, defendant Charles Brown of [62−1], [62−1] (jl) (CGre). (Entered: 12/24/2002)
64 PROOF of service by defendant Saginaw Cnty Sher, defendant Saginaw Cnty, defendant Charles Brown of disclosures (jl) (CGre). (Entered: 12/24/2002)
65 MOTION (Emergency) by defendant Saginaw Cnty, defendant Charles Brown, defendant John Doe, defendant Jane Doe to amend Order pursuant to status conference with of service (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 12/27/2002)
68 PROOF of service of notice of taking deposition and to produce (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 01/08/2003)
66 NOTIFICATION by defendants' of withdrawing motion to amend Order pursuant to status conference by Jane Doe, John Doe, Charles Brown, Saginaw Cnty [65−1] (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 01/06/2003)
67 AMENDED WITNESS list and EXHIBIT list by defendant Saginaw Cnty Sher, defendant Saginaw Cnty, defendant Charles Brown (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 01/07/2003)
69 PROOF of service of expert disclosures (sm) Modified on 01/16/2003 (CGre). (Entered: 01/08/2003)
70 APPLICATION by plaintiffs' to file excess page brief with brief, proof of service (sm) Modified on 01/13/2003 (CGre). (Entered: 01/10/2003)
71 PROOF of service by plaintiffs' of amended notice of taking deposition and notice to produce (Lt. Gutzwiller) (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 01/10/2003)
72 PROOF of service of re−notice of taking deposition and re−notice to produce (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 01/15/2003)
73 MOTION (Emergency) by plaintiffs' to amend order pursuant to status conference with attachment and proof of service (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 01/15/2003)
74 PROOF of service of re−notice of taking deposition and re−notice to produce (Lt Gutzwiller) Location only (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 01/15/2003)
75 ORDER by Judge David M. Lawson denying application to file excess page brief by Justin Anderson, Craig Mason [70−1] without prejudice [EOD Date 1/17/03] (sm) (Entered: 01/17/2003)
76 RESPONSE by defendant Saginaw Cnty Sher, defendant Saginaw Cnty, defendant Charles Brown to motion to amend order pursuant to status conference by plaintiffs', [73−1] with attachment and proof of service (sm) Modified on 01/27/2003 (CGre). (Entered: 01/24/2003)
77 RESUBMITTED EX−PARTE APPLICATION by plaintiffs' to file excess page brief with brief, proof of service (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 01/24/2003)
78 AMENDED PRETRIAL scheduling order by Judge David M. Lawson − setting civil status conference for 3:30 6/19/03 (sm) (Entered: 01/28/2003)
79 PROOF of service of offer of Judgment and certificate of service (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 02/04/2003)
80 RULE 26 DISCLOSURES by plaintiffs' with proof of service (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 02/20/2003)

Case: 2:01-cv-10337-DML As of: 06/28/2012 12:48 PM EDT 20 of 34

02/14/2003 02/18/2003 02/20/2003 02/20/2003 03/12/2003 03/18/2003 03/19/2003 03/19/2003 03/23/2003 03/31/2003 04/14/2003 04/14/2003 04/14/2003 04/14/2003
04/14/2003
04/14/2003
04/14/2003 04/14/2003 04/14/2003

81 WITNESS list by plaintiffs' with proof of service (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 02/20/2003)
82 SECOND AMENDED WITNESS and EXHIBIT list by defendant Saginaw Cnty Sher, defendant Saginaw Cnty, defendant Charles Brown (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 02/20/2003)
83 RULE 26(A)(2) EXPERT DISCLOSURES by plaintiffs' with attachments (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 02/21/2003)
84 PROOF of service by plaintiffs' of [83−1] (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 02/21/2003)
85 NOTICE of setting civil status conference for 2:00 3/18/03 (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 03/12/2003)
STATUS conference held − Judge David M. Lawson (tj) (Entered: 03/19/2003)
86 ORDER by Judge David M. Lawson mooting motion to amend order pursuant to status conference by plaintiffs [73−1] [EOD Date 3/20/03] (sm) (Entered: 03/20/2003)
87 ORDER by Judge David M. Lawson granting application to file excess page brief by Craig Mason [77−1] [EOD Date 3/20/03] (sm) (Entered: 03/20/2003)
88 PROOF of service of Dr Roy Aston's expert disclosures pursuant to FRCP 26(a)(2) (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 03/26/2003)
89 PROOF of service of fourth request for production of documents by plaintiff (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 04/02/2003)
90 MOTION by plaintiff for summary judgment with brief, statment, notice of hearing and proof of service (sm) # 1 Document Continuation) (CGre). (Entered: 04/15/2003)
91 EXHIBITS 1−4 filed by plaintiffs' in support of motion for summary judgment [90−1] (sm) (Additional attachment(s) added on 8/29/2011: # 1 Document Continuation, # 2 Document Continuation) (CGre). (Entered: 04/15/2003)
92 EXHIBITS 5−10 filed by plaintiffs' in support of motion for summary judgment [90−1] (sm) (Additional attachment(s) added on 8/29/2011: # 1 Document Continuation, # 2 Document Continuation) (CGre). (Entered: 04/15/2003)
93 EXHIBITS 11−16 filed by plaintiffs' in support of motion for summary judgment [90−1] (sm) (Additional attachment(s) added on 8/29/2011: # 1 Document Continuation, # 2 Document Continuation # 3 Document Continuation, # 4 Document Continuation (CGre). (Entered: 04/15/2003)
94 EXHIBITS 17a−17l filed by plaintiffs' in support of motion for summary judgment [90−1] (sm) (Additional attachment(s) added on 8/29/2011: # 1 Document Continuation, # 2 Document Continuation, # 3 Document Continuation, # 4 Document Continuation, # 5 Document Continuation, # 6 Document Continuation) (CGre). (Entered: 04/15/2003)
95 EXHIBITS 17m−17u filed by plaintiffs' in support of motion for summary judgment [90−1] (sm) (Additional attachment(s) added on 8/29/2011: # 1 Document Continuation, # 2 Document Continuation, # 3 Document Continuation, # 4 Document Continuation, # 5 Document Continuation) (CGre). (Entered: 04/15/2003)
96 EXHIBITS 18 filed by plaintiffs' in support of motion for summary judgment [90−1] (sm) (Additional attachment(s) added on 8/29/2011: # 1 Document Continuation) (CGre). (Entered: 04/15/2003)
97 EXHIBITS 19−27 filed by plaintiffs' in support of motion for summary judgment [90−1] (sm) (Additional attachment(s) added on 8/29/2011: # 1 Document Continuation) (CGre). (Entered: 04/15/2003)
98 EXHIBITS 28−33 filed by plaintiffs' in support of motion for summary judgment [90−1] (sm) (Additional attachment(s) added on 8/30/2011: # 1 Document Continuation, # 2 Document Continuation, # 3 Document Continuation, # 4

Case: 2:01-cv-10337-DML As of: 06/28/2012 12:48 PM EDT 21 of 34

04/14/2003 05/05/2003 05/06/2003 05/19/2003
05/27/2003 05/29/2003 05/29/2003
06/02/2003 06/04/2003 06/05/2003 06/09/2003 06/16/2003 06/16/2003 06/16/2003
06/16/2003

Document Continuation) (CGre). (Entered: 04/15/2003)
99 EXHIBITS 34−39 filed by plaintiffs' in support of motion for summary judgment [90−1] (sm) (Additional attachment(s) added on 8/30/2011: # 1 Document Continuation, # 2 Document Continuation, # 3 Document Continuation, # 4 Document Continuation) (CGre). (Entered: 04/15/2003)
101 MOTION by plaintiffs' to re depose William Gutzwiller and to compel proper responses and prevent excessibe and improper speaking objections with brief, statment regarindg concurrence, notice of hearing and proof of service (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 05/07/2003)
100 ORDER by Judge David M. Lawson with stipulation, setting deadline for response to motion for summary judgment by defendants' [90−1] for 5/24/03 [EOD Date: 5/6/03] (sm) (Entered: 05/06/2003)
102 RESPONSE by defendant Saginaw Cnty Sher, defendant Saginaw Cnty, defendant Charles Brown to motion to re depose William Gutzwiller and to compel proper responses and prevent excessibe and improper speaking objections by Robert James Stephens [101−1] with brief, proof of service (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 05/20/2003)
103 EXPARTE APPLICATION by defendant Saginaw Cnty Sher, defendant Saginaw Cnty, defendant Charles Brown to file excess page response brief (sm) (Entered: 05/29/2003)
104 ORDER by Judge David M. Lawson granting application to file excess page response brief by Charles Brown, Saginaw Cnty, Saginaw Cnty Sher [103−1] [EOD Date 5/29/03] (sm) (Entered: 05/29/2003)
105 RESPONSE by defendant Saginaw Cnty Sher, defendant Saginaw Cnty, defendant Charles Brown, defendant John Doe, defendant Jane Doe to motion for summary judgment by plaintiffs, [90−1] with brief, attachments and proof of service (sm) (Additional attachment(s) added on 8/30/2011: # 1 Document Continuation, # 2 Document Continuation) (CGre). (Entered: 05/29/2003)
106 MOTION by plaintiffs' to compel discovery with attachments and proof of service (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 06/02/2003)
107 REPLY by plaintiffs' to response to motion for summary judgment [90−1] by plaintiffs' with brief, attachment and proof of service (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 06/06/2003)
108 ORDER by Judge David M. Lawson, referring motion to compel discovery by plaintiffs' [106−1] to Magistrate Judge Charles E. Binder [EOD Date 6/6/03] (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 06/06/2003)
109 NOTICE of setting hearing on motion to compel discovery by defendant by plaintiffs' [106−1] for 10:30 6/24/03 (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 06/09/2003)
110 MOTION by plaintiffs' challenging defendant experts or in the alternative to compel with brief, attachments and proof of service (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 06/17/2003)
112 APPLICATION by defendant Saginaw Cnty Sher, defendant Saginaw Cnty, defendant Charles Brown to file brief in excess of 20 pages (sm) (Entered: 06/18/2003)
113 MOTION by defendant Saginaw Cnty Sher, defendant Saginaw Cnty, defendant Charles Brown for judgment on the pleadings ,or in the alternative for summary judgment with brief, attachments and proof of service (sm) (Additional attachment(s) added on 8/30/2011: # 1 Document Continuation, # 2 Document Continuation, # 3 Document Continuation) (CGre). (Entered: 06/18/2003)
114 RESPONSE by defendant Saginaw Cnty Sher, defendant Saginaw Cnty, defendant Charles Brown to motion to compel discovery by defendant by plaintiffss, defendant, plaintiff [106−1] with brief, proof of service (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 06/18/2003)

Case: 2:01-cv-10337-DML As of: 06/28/2012 12:48 PM EDT 22 of 34

06/16/2003
06/16/2003 06/17/2003 06/19/2003 06/19/2003 06/30/2003 06/30/2003
07/01/2003 07/01/2003
07/03/2003 07/03/2003
07/11/2003
07/11/2003 07/16/2003
07/22/2003 08/28/2003 08/28/2003

115 MOTION by defendant Saginaw Cnty Sher, defendant Saginaw Cnty, defendant Charles Brown to dismiss plaintiffs Hope Davis, Richard Plamondon, Scott Praay, David Reiner and Robert James Stephens with brief, attachments and proof of service (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 06/18/2003)
116 PROOF of service of of defendants' response to plaintiffs' fourth request for production of documents (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 06/18/2003)
111 NOTICE of setting hearing on motion to compel discovery by defendant by plaintiffss, defendant, plaintiff [106−1] for 2:30 6/30/03 (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 06/17/2003)
117 ORDER by Judge David M. Lawson denying as moot motion to excuse default and response to plaintiffs' application for entry default by Charles Brown, Saginaw Cnty, Saginaw Cnty Sher [45−1] [EOD Date 6/20/03] (sm) (Entered: 06/20/2003)
STATUS conference held − Judge David M. Lawson (tj) (Entered: 06/23/2003)
118 NOTIFICATION by plaintiffs' of withdrawing motion to compel discovery by plaintiffs' [106−1] with proof of service (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 06/30/2003)
119 RESPONSE by defendant Saginaw Cnty Sher, defendant Saginaw Cnty, defendant Charles Brown to motion challenging defendant experts or in the alternative to compel by plaintiffs' [110−1] with brief, attachments and proof of service (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 07/01/2003)
Hearing cancelled on motion to compel discovery by plaintiff [106−1] − disposition: withdrawn − Magistrate Judge Binder (jb) (Entered: 07/01/2003)
120 RESPONSE by plaintiffs' to motion to dismiss plaintiffs Hope Davis, Richard Plamondon, Scott Praay, David Reiner and Robert James Stephens by Charles Brown, Saginaw Cnty, Saginaw Cnty Sher [115−1] with brief, exhibit and proof of service (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 07/02/2003)
121 ORDER by Judge David M. Lawson denying motion to affirm the parties stipulation to liability and order for same and memorandum of law by defendant by plaintiffs, defendant, [41−1] [EOD Date 7/7/03] (sm) (Entered: 07/07/2003)
122 RESPONSE by plaintiffs' to motion for judgment on the pleadings by Charles Brown, Saginaw Cnty, Saginaw Cnty Sher [113−1], motion for summary judgment by Charles Brown, Saginaw Cnty, Saginaw Cnty Sher [113−2] with proof of service (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 07/07/2003)
123 REPLY by defendant Saginaw Cnty Sher, defendant Saginaw Cnty, defendant Charles Brown, defendant John Doe, defendant Jane Doe to response to motion to dismiss plaintiffs Hope Davis, Richard Plamondon, Scott Praay, David Reiner and Robert James Stephens by Charles Brown, Saginaw Cnty, Saginaw Cnty Sher [115−1] with exhibits and proof of service (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 07/14/2003)
124 AFFIDAVIT regarding attorney James I Degrazia (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 07/14/2003)
125 REPLY by defendant Saginaw Cnty Sher, defendant Saginaw Cnty, defendant Charles Brown, defendant John Doe, defendant Jane Doe to response to motion for judgment on the pleadings by Charles Brown, Saginaw Cnty, Saginaw Cnty Sher [113−1], motion for summary judgment by Charles Brown, Saginaw Cnty, Saginaw Cnty Sher [113−2] with brief and proof of service (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 07/18/2003)
126 ORDER by Judge David M. Lawson with stipulation, dismissing plaintiffs' Hope Davis, David Reiner and Robert James Stephens, ONLY, with prejudice [EOD Date: 7/23/03] (sm) (Entered: 07/23/2003)
127 MOTION by plaintiffs to compel payment with discovery sanctions with attachments. (bs) (CGre). (Entered: 09/02/2003)
128 MEMORANDUM by plaintiffs in support of motion to compel payment with discovery sanctions [127−1] (bs) (Entered: 09/02/2003)

Case: 2:01-cv-10337-DML As of: 06/28/2012 12:48 PM EDT 23 of 34

08/28/2003 08/28/2003 08/28/2003 09/05/2003 09/11/2003 09/15/2003 09/23/2003 09/24/2003 10/09/2003 10/09/2003 10/09/2003 10/09/2003 10/17/2003 11/12/2003
12/01/2003

129 STATEMENT by plaintiffs counsel regarding concurrence [EOD Date: 9/2/03] (bs) (CGre). (Entered: 09/02/2003)
130 NOTICE by plaintiffs of hearing on motion to compel payment with discovery sanctions by plaintiffs [127−1] , to be set by court (bs) (CGre). (Entered: 09/02/2003)
131 PROOF of service by plaintiffs of [127−1], [128−1], [129−1], [130−1] (bs) (CGre). (Entered: 09/02/2003)
132 ORDER by Judge David M. Lawson, referring motion to compel payment with discovery sanctions by Richard Plamondon [127−1] to Magistrate Judge Charles E. Binder [EOD Date 9/5/03] (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 09/05/2003)
133 NOTICE of setting hearing on motion to compel payment with discovery sanctions by Richard Plamondon [127−1] for 10:00 9/23/03 (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 09/11/2003)
134 RESPONSE by defendant Saginaw Cnty Sher, defendant Saginaw Cnty, defendant Charles Brown to motion to compel payment with discovery sanctions by Richard Plamondon [127−1] with brief, attachments and proof of service (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 09/16/2003)
Hearing held on motion to compel payment with discovery sanctions by plaintiff [127−1] − disposition: denied − Magistrate Judge Binder − P/Atty: Christopher Pianto − D/Atty: James DeGrazia − Tapes 1049, 1050 (jb) (Entered: 09/23/2003)
135 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Charles E. Binder denying motion to compel payment with discovery sanctions by Richard Plamondon [127−1] [EOD Date 9/24/03] (sm) (Entered: 09/24/2003)
136 DEPOSITION of James Houston, Ph. D. taken on 6/2/03 (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 10/09/2003)
137 DEPOSITION of Peter Richard Wilson taken on 8/25/03 (sm) (Additional attachment(s) added on 8/31/2011: # 1 Document Continuation, # 2 Document Continuation, # 3 Document Continuation, # 4 Document Continuation) (CGre). (Entered: 10/09/2003)
138 DEPOSITION of Robert Brown, Jr taken on 6/2/03 (sm) (Additional attachment(s) added on 8/31/2011: # 1 Document Continuation) (CGre). (Entered: 10/09/2003)
139 DEPOSITION of Dr Darrell Ross taken on 8/14/03 with exhibits (sm) (Additional attachment(s) added on 8/31/2011: # 1 Document Continuation, # 2 Document Continuation, # 3 Document Continuation) (CGre). (Entered: 10/09/2003)
140 TRANSCRIPT taken on 9/23/03 of motion to compel payment of expenses with discovery sanctions (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 10/17/2003)
141 NOTICE of setting hearing on motion challenging defendant experts or in the alternative to compel by plaintiff, defendant, plaintiff [110−1] for 2:30 1/21/04, motion to dismiss plaintiffs Hope Davis, Richard Plamondon, Scott Praay, David Reiner and Robert James Stephens by Charles Brown, Saginaw Cnty, Saginaw Cnty Sher [115−1] for 2:30 1/21/04, motion for judgment on the pleadings by Charles Brown, Saginaw Cnty, Saginaw Cnty Sher [113−1] for 2:30 1/21/04, motion for summary judgment by Charles Brown, Saginaw Cnty, Saginaw Cnty Sher [113−2] for 2:30 1/21/04, motion to re depose William Gutzwiller and to compel proper responses and prevent excessibe and improper speaking objections by Robert James Stephens [101−1] for 2:30 1/21/04, motion for summary judgment by defendant by plaintiffss, defendant, plaintiff [90−1] for 2:30 1/21/04 (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 11/12/2003)
142 NOTICE of setting hearing on motion to dismiss plaintiffs Hope Davis, Richard Plamondon, Scott Praay, David Reiner and Robert James Stephens by Charles Brown, Saginaw Cnty, Saginaw Cnty Sher [115−1] for 3:00 12/15/03, motion to re depose William Gutzwiller and to compel proper responses and prevent excessibe and improper speaking objections by Robert James Stephens [101−1] for 3:00 12/15/03 (sm) (CGre). (Entered: 12/01/2003)

Case: 2:01-cv-10337-DML As of: 06/28/2012 12:48 PM EDT 24 of 34

02/02/2004 02/03/2004 02/09/2004 03/04/2004 03/12/2004 03/16/2004
03/16/2004 03/17/2004 10/06/2004 12/22/2004 12/22/2004
12/22/2004 12/22/2004

143 NOTICE of Rescheduled Hearing on Motion 110 Motion Challenging Defendants Experts, 90 Motion for Summary Judgment, 113 Motion for Judgment on the PleadingsMotion for Summary Judgment, 115 Motion to Dismiss: Motion Hearing set for 2/11/2004 01:30 PM before Honorable David M Lawson. (TJac, ) (Entered: 02/02/2004)
144 STIPULATION by parties re: depositions.(CGre, ) (Entered: 02/03/2004)
145 Letter from James DeGrazia (JLam, ) (Entered: 02/09/2004)
146 ORDER denying as moot 101 Motion to Compel, denying as moot 115 Motion to Dismiss . Signed by Judge David M Lawson. (CGre, ) (Entered: 03/04/2004)
147 NOTICE of rescheduled hearing on 110 Motion Challenging Defendants Experts, 90 Motion for Summary Judgment, 113 Motion for Judgment on the PleadingsMotion for Summary Judgment. Motion Hearing reset for 3/16/2004 09:00 AM before Honorable David M Lawson. (TJac, ) (Entered: 03/12/2004)
Minute Entry −Motion Hearing held on 3/16/2004 re 110 Motion for Miscellaneous Relief filed by John Doe, Justin Anderson, Linda Rose, Lisa Renee Brandimore, Dwayne Butterfield, Bobbie Wayne Carter, Daniel Wray Clayton, Hope Michelle Davis, Joshua Fuller, Nicholas Anthony Giles, Willie Louis Hendricks, Tanisha Ramon Johnson, Robert Allen Kelsey, Sue Ann Letterman, Donna Lynn Quarles, David Todd Reiner, Gregory Louis Schultz, Amanda Rae Shinaver, Dwayne Alann Simmons, Robin Renee Thomas, Joshua Allen Weigant, Sylvia Denise Braddock, Raymond Praay, Craig Mason, Matthew Starkweather, Richard Plamondon, Robert James Stephens, 113 Motion for Judgment on the PleadingsMotion for Summary Judgment filed by Saginaw, County of, Charles Brown, Saginaw County Sheriff Department, 90 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Jane Doe, John Doe, Justin Anderson, Linda Rose, Jennifer Cradit, Lisa Renee Brandimore, Dwayne Butterfield, Bobbie Wayne Carter, Daniel Wray Clayton, Hope Michelle Davis, Joshua Fuller, Nicholas Anthony Giles, Willie Louis Hendricks, Tanisha Ramon Johnson, Robert Allen Kelsey, Sue Ann Letterman, Donna Lynn Quarles, David Todd Reiner, Gregory Louis Schultz, Amanda Rae Shinaver, Dwayne Alann Simmons, Robin Renee Thomas, Joshua Allen Weigant, Sylvia Denise Braddock, Raymond Praay, Craig Mason, Matthew Starkweather, Richard Plamondon, Robert James Stephens before Honorable David M Lawson. Disposition: taken under advisement(Court Reporter Charlene McLoughlin) (TJac, ) (Entered: 03/16/2004)
148 STIPULATION by plaintiffs and defendants of withdrawal of 110 Motion for Miscellaneous Relief. (JLam, ) (Entered: 03/16/2004)
149 ORDER denying re 110 Motion by all plaintiffs Challenging defendant's experts. Signed by Judge David M Lawson. (CGre, ) (Entered: 03/17/2004)
150 STIPULATION AND ORDER, Richard Plamondon and Raymond Praay terminated. Signed by Honorable David M Lawson. (SMar, ) (Entered: 10/06/2004)
151 MOTION to Join Parties by all plaintiffs. (SMar, ) (Entered: 12/27/2004)
152 STATEMENT Regarding Concurrence by Sylvia Denise Braddock, Lisa Renee Brandimore, Dwayne Butterfield, Bobbie Wayne Carter, Daniel Wray Clayton, Joshua Fuller, Nicholas Anthony Giles, Willie Louis Hendricks, Tanisha Ramon Johnson, Linda Rose, Robert Allen Kelsey, Sue Ann Letterman, Donna Lynn Quarles, Gregory Louis Schultz, Amanda Rae Shinaver, Dwayne Alann Simmons, Robin Renee Thomas, Joshua Allen Weigant, Jennifer Cradit, Justin Anderson, Craig Mason, Matthew Starkweather, Jane Doe, John Doe.(SMar, ) (Entered: 12/27/2004)
153 MOTION for Order Allowing Plaintiffs' to Add a Damage Expert by all plaintiffs. (SMar, ) (Entered: 12/27/2004)
154 STATEMENT Regarding Concurrence by Sylvia Denise Braddock, Lisa Renee Brandimore, Dwayne Butterfield, Bobbie Wayne Carter, Daniel Wray Clayton, Joshua Fuller, Nicholas Anthony Giles, Willie Louis Hendricks, Tanisha Ramon Johnson, Linda Rose, Robert Allen Kelsey, Sue Ann Letterman, Donna Lynn

Case: 2:01-cv-10337-DML As of: 06/28/2012 12:48 PM EDT 25 of 34

12/22/2004 12/22/2004
12/22/2004 12/27/2004 12/27/2004 12/27/2004 12/27/2004 01/11/2005 01/11/2005 01/11/2005 01/11/2005 01/26/2005
02/24/2005
02/24/2005

Quarles, Gregory Louis Schultz, Amanda Rae Shinaver, Dwayne Alann Simmons, Robin Renee Thomas, Joshua Allen Weigant, Jennifer Cradit, Justin Anderson, Craig Mason, Matthew Starkweather, Jane Doe, John Doe.(SMar, ) (Entered: 12/27/2004)
155 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by all plaintiffs. (SMar, ) (Entered: 12/27/2004)
156 STATEMENT Regarding Concurrence by Sylvia Denise Braddock, Lisa Renee Brandimore, Dwayne Butterfield, Bobbie Wayne Carter, Daniel Wray Clayton, Joshua Fuller, Nicholas Anthony Giles, Willie Louis Hendricks, Tanisha Ramon Johnson, Linda Rose, Robert Allen Kelsey, Sue Ann Letterman, Donna Lynn Quarles, Gregory Louis Schultz, Amanda Rae Shinaver, Dwayne Alann Simmons, Robin Renee Thomas, Joshua Allen Weigant, Jennifer Cradit, Justin Anderson, Craig Mason, Matthew Starkweather, Jane Doe, John Doe.(SMar, ) (Entered: 12/27/2004)
157 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 152 Statement, 153 MOTION for Order, 154 Statement, 155 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction, 156 Statement, 151 MOTION to Join Parties. (SMar, ) (Entered: 12/27/2004)
158 NOTICE of hearing 151 MOTION to Join Parties by all Plaintiffs'. (SMar, ) (Entered: 12/27/2004)
159 NOTICE of hearing 153 MOTION for Order by All Plaintiffs'. (SMar, ) (Entered: 12/27/2004)
160 NOTICE of hearing 155 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by All Plaintiffs'. (SMar, ) (Entered: 12/27/2004)
161 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 158 Notice of Hearing on Motion, 159 Notice of Hearing on Motion, 160 Notice of Hearing on Motion. (SMar, ) (Entered: 12/27/2004)
162 RESPONSE to 151 MOTION to Join Parties filed by Saginaw, County of, Charles Brown, Saginaw County Sheriff Department. (SMar, ) (Entered: 01/11/2005)
163 RESPONSE to 155 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Saginaw, County of, Charles Brown, Saginaw County Sheriff Department. (SMar, ) (Entered: 01/11/2005)
164 RESPONSE to 153 MOTION for Order filed by Saginaw, County of, Charles Brown, Saginaw County Sheriff Department. (SMar, ) (Entered: 01/11/2005)
165 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Saginaw, County of, Charles Brown, Saginaw County Sheriff Department 162 Response to Motion, 163 Response to Motion, 164 Response to Motion. (SMar, ) (Entered: 01/11/2005)
166 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 90 Motion for Summary Judgment, granting in part and denying in part 113 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Motion for Summary Judgment, denying 151 Motion to Amend Complaint to Add Additional Parties, denying 153 Motion for Order to add an Expert Witness, denying 155 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Signed by Honorable David M Lawson. (CGre, ) (Entered: 01/26/2005)
167 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE: Peggy G. Pitt, Michael L. Pitt appearing on behalf of Sylvia Denise Braddock, Lisa Renee Brandimore, Dwayne Butterfield, Bobbie Wayne Carter, Daniel Wray Clayton, Joshua Fuller, Nicholas Anthony Giles, Willie Louis Hendricks, Tanisha Ramon Johnson, Linda Rose, Robert Allen Kelsey, Sue Ann Letterman, Donna Lynn Quarles, Gregory Louis Schultz, Amanda Rae Shinaver, Dwayne Alann Simmons, Robin Renee Thomas, Joshua Allen Weigant, Jennifer Cradit, Justin Anderson, Craig Mason, Matthew Starkweather, Jane Doe, John Doe.(SMar, ) (Entered: 02/25/2005)
Minute Entry −Status Conference held on 2/24/2005 before Honorable David M Lawson. (TJac, ) (Entered: 02/28/2005)

Case: 2:01-cv-10337-DML As of: 06/28/2012 12:48 PM EDT 26 of 34

03/04/2005 03/17/2005 03/28/2005 04/28/2005 04/29/2005 04/29/2005 04/29/2005
04/29/2005 04/29/2005 04/29/2005 04/29/2005 05/03/2005 05/03/2005 05/03/2005 05/10/2005 05/24/2005
06/08/2005 06/10/2005 06/10/2005

168 PRETRIAL ORDER Motion To Certify Class or Add Parties Cut−off set for 4/29/2005 Responses due by 5/27/2005. Signed by Honorable David M Lawson. (TJac, ) (Entered: 03/04/2005)
Minute Entry −Telephone Conference held on 3/17/2005 before Honorable David M Lawson. (CGre, ) (Entered: 03/17/2005)
169 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE: Stephen Wasinger appearing on behalf of all plaintiffs as counsel for ACLU.(Wasinger, Stephen) (Entered: 03/28/2005)
170 PETITION Requesting Permission to File Brief over Twenty Pages by all plaintiffs. (SMar, ) (Entered: 04/28/2005)
171 [STRICKEN 5/3/05] MOTION to Certify Class Or For Joinder by all plaintiffs. (Wasinger, Stephen) Modified on 5/3/2005 (CGre, ). Additional attachment(s) added on 5/3/2005 (CGre, ). (Entered: 04/29/2005)
172 MOTION to Certify Class Or, In The Alternative, Joinder by all plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Document Continuation Brief In Support Of Motion To Certify Class)(Wasinger, Stephen) (Entered: 04/29/2005)
173 [STRICKEN 5/3/05] AFFIDAVIT of Christopher Pianto re 172 MOTION to Certify Class Or, In The Alternative, Joinder by Linda Rose.(Pitt, Michael) Modified on 5/3/2005 (CGre, ). Additional attachment(s) added on 5/3/2005 (CGre, ). (Entered: 04/29/2005)
174 AFFIDAVIT of Pianto Aff re 172 MOTION to Certify Class Or, In The Alternative, Joinder Pianto Aff by Linda Rose.(Pitt, Michael) (Entered: 04/29/2005)
175 AFFIDAVIT of Michael Pitt re 172 MOTION to Certify Class Or, In The Alternative, Joinder by Linda Rose.(Pitt, Michael) (Entered: 04/29/2005)
176 AFFIDAVIT re 172 MOTION to Certify Class Or, In The Alternative, Joinder Fuller/Rose Affidavits by Linda Rose.(Pitt, Michael) (Entered: 04/29/2005)
177 AFFIDAVIT of Goldberg Pitt Affidavit re 172 MOTION to Certify Class Or, In The Alternative, Joinder by Linda Rose.(Pitt, Michael) (Entered: 04/29/2005)
178 AFFIDAVIT of Peggy Goldberg Pitt re 172 MOTION to Certify Class Or, In The Alternative, Joinder Revised Goldberg Pitt Affidavit by Linda Rose.(Pitt, Michael) (Entered: 05/03/2005)
179 ORDER to Strike 171 MOTION to Certify Class Or For Joinder filed by all plaintiffs and 173 Affidavit of Christopher Pianto filed by Linda Rose. Signed by Honorable David M Lawson. (CGre, ) (Entered: 05/03/2005)
180 ORDER granting 170 Petition to Exceed Page Limitation filed by all plaintiffs. Signed by Honorable David M Lawson. (CGre, ) (Entered: 05/03/2005)
181 NOTICE of hearing on 172 MOTION to Certify Class Or, In The Alternative, Joinder. Motion Hearing set for 8/3/2005 02:30 PM before Honorable David M Lawson. (CGre, ) (Entered: 05/10/2005)
182 STIPULATION AND ORDER to Adjourn the Filing Deadline for defendant's Response to plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, or in the Alternative, for Joinder and Continued Tolling. Signed by Honorable David M Lawson. (CGre, ) (Entered: 05/24/2005)
183 EXPARTE APPLICATION for Permission to File Brief in Excess of 20 Pages by Saginaw, County of, Charles Brown, Saginaw County Sheriff Department. (SMar, ) (Entered: 06/08/2005)
184 ORDER Granting 183 Application filed by Saginaw, County of, Charles Brown, Saginaw County Sheriff Department. Signed by Honorable David M Lawson. (SMar, ) (Entered: 06/13/2005)
185 RESPONSE to 172 MOTION to Certify Class Or, In The Alternative, Joinder filed by Saginaw, County of, Saginaw County Sheriff Department. (Attachments: # 1 Document Continuation # 2 # 3 # 4 # 5)(SMar, ) (Entered: 06/13/2005)

Case: 2:01-cv-10337-DML As of: 06/28/2012 12:48 PM EDT 27 of 34

06/17/2005
06/21/2005 06/22/2005 06/22/2005 06/22/2005 07/18/2005 07/19/2005 07/22/2005 07/25/2005 07/29/2005 08/08/2005 08/15/2005 08/23/2005 08/30/2005 09/19/2005
09/19/2005
11/02/2005

186 [STRICKEN 6/22/05] STIPULATION TO EXTEND TIME TO FILE PLAINTIFFS' REPLY BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION by Linda Rose.(Fletcher, Loyst) Modified on 6/22/2005 (CGre, ). Additional attachment(s) added on 6/22/2005 (CGre, ). (Entered: 06/17/2005)
187 STIPULATION TO EXTEND TIME TO FILE PLAINTIFFS' REPLY BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION by Linda Rose.(Fletcher, Loyst) (Entered: 06/21/2005)
188 ORDER to Extend Time to File Reply Brief to Motion for Class Certification re 187 Stipulation filed by Linda Rose. Signed by Honorable David M Lawson. (CGre, ) (Entered: 06/22/2005)
189 ORDER to Strike 186 Stipulation filed by Linda Rose. Signed by Honorable David M Lawson. (CGre, ) (Entered: 06/22/2005)
190 REPLY to Response re 172 MOTION to Certify Class Or, In The Alternative, Joinder filed by Linda Rose. (Attachments: # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4 # 5 # 6 # 7 # 8)(Pitt, Michael) (Entered: 06/22/2005)
191 MOTION for Leave to Amend Affirmative Defenses by Saginaw, County of, Charles Brown, Saginaw County Sheriff Department. (SMar, ) (Entered: 07/19/2005)
192 NOTICE of hearing on 172 MOTION to Certify Class Or, In The Alternative, Joinder. Motion Hearing reset for 9/21/2005 02:30 PM before Honorable David M Lawson. (CGre, ) (Entered: 07/19/2005)
193 STIPULATION TO EXTEND TIME TO FILE PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO AMEND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES by Linda Rose.(Fletcher, Loyst) (Entered: 07/22/2005)
194 MOTION for Leave to Amend Affirmative Defenses by Saginaw, County of, Charles Brown, Saginaw County Sheriff Department. (Attachments: # 1 Document Continuation)(SMar, ) (Entered: 07/25/2005)
195 ORDER to Extend Time for Plaintiffs to Respond to re 194 MOTION for Leave to Amend Affirmative Defenses. Signed by Honorable David M Lawson. (CGre, ) (Entered: 07/29/2005)
196 RESPONSE to 194 MOTION for Leave to File filed by all plaintiffs. (Wasinger, Stephen) (Entered: 08/08/2005)
197 NOTICE of hearing on 194 MOTION for Leave to Amend Affirmative Defenses. Motion Hearing set for 9/21/2005 02:30 PM before Honorable David M Lawson. (TJac, ) (Entered: 08/15/2005)
198 STIPULATION AND ORDER to Extend Time to File Response to Plaintiffs Reply Brief to Defendants Motion for Leave to Amend Affirmative Defenses. Signed by Honorable David M Lawson. (SMar, ) (Entered: 08/23/2005)
199 REPLY to Response re 194 MOTION for Leave to File filed by Saginaw, County of, Charles Brown, Saginaw County Sheriff Department. (SMar, ) (Entered: 08/31/2005)
200 NOTICE of hearing on 194 MOTION for Leave to Amend Affirmative Defenses 172 MOTION to Certify Class Or In The Alternative Joinder. Motion Hearing reset for 11/9/2005 02:00 PM before Honorable David M Lawson. (TJac, ) (Entered: 09/19/2005)
201 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF re 194 MOTION for Leave to File : Supplemental Affidavits addressing Defendants' Reply Brief filed by all plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Affidavit of Pamala Schanck# 2 Exhibit Affidavit of Joshua Fuller)(Wasinger, Stephen) (Entered: 09/19/2005)
202 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF re 172 MOTION to Certify Class Or, In The Alternative, Joinder −− Citation of Supplemental Authority filed by all plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits # 2 Exhibit A: Opinion in Gallagher v. County of San Mateo, dated October 31, 2005)(Wasinger, Stephen) (Entered: 11/02/2005)

Case: 2:01-cv-10337-DML As of: 06/28/2012 12:48 PM EDT 28 of 34

11/09/2005
11/10/2005 11/14/2005 11/17/2005
11/17/2005
11/21/2005 12/13/2005 12/13/2005 12/19/2005 12/21/2005 01/10/2006
01/12/2006 01/13/2006 01/18/2006 01/19/2006 01/26/2006 01/30/2006

Minute Entry −Motion Hearing held on 11/9/2005 re 194 MOTION for Leave to Amend Affirmative Defenses, 172 MOTION to Certify Class or, In The Alternative, Motion for Joinder, before Honorable David M Lawson. Disposition: taken under advisement(Court Reporter Charlene McLoughlin) (TJac, ) (Entered: 11/10/2005)
203 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF re 194 MOTION for Leave to File −− Addressing PLRA "Physical Injury" Requirement filed by all plaintiffs. (Wasinger, Stephen) (Entered: 11/10/2005)
204 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF re 172 MOTION to Certify Class Or, In The Alternative, Joinder : Addressing Class Certification filed by all plaintiffs. (Wasinger, Stephen) (Entered: 11/14/2005)
205 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF re 204 Supplemental Brief Response to Plaintiffs' Supplemental Brief addressing Class Definition filed by Saginaw, County of, Charles Brown, Saginaw County Sheriff Department. (Tamm, James) (Entered: 11/17/2005)
206 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF re 203 Supplemental Brief Response to Plaintiffs' Supplemental Brief addressing PRLA Physical Injury Issue filed by Saginaw, County of, Charles Brown, Saginaw County Sheriff Department. (Tamm, James) (Entered: 11/17/2005)
207 ORDER denying 172 Motion to Certify Class, denying 194 Motion for Leave to File, and scheduling status conference 12/15/05 at 2:00 p.m. Signed by Honorable David M Lawson. (SGam, ) (Entered: 11/21/2005)
208 NOTICE of Appearance by Loyst Fletcher, Jr on behalf of all plaintiffs. (Fletcher, Loyst) (Entered: 12/13/2005)
209 NOTICE by Linda Rose AMENDED APPEARANCE (Fletcher, Loyst) (Entered: 12/13/2005)
210 NOTICE TO APPEAR: Status Conference reset for 12/21/2005 10:30 AM before Honorable David M Lawson. (TJac, ) (Entered: 12/19/2005)
Minute Entry −Status Conference held on 12/21/2005 before Honorable David M Lawson. (TJac, ) (Entered: 12/22/2005)
211 SCHEDULING ORDER: Final Pretrial Conference set for 4/24/2006 02:30 PM before Honorable David M Lawson. Jury Trial set for 5/10/2006 08:30 AM before Honorable David M Lawson. Status Conference set for 1/12/2006 02:30 PM before Honorable David M Lawson. Signed by Honorable David M Lawson. (Refer to image for additional dates)(SGam, ) (Entered: 01/10/2006)
Minute Entry −Status Conference held on 1/12/2006 before Honorable David M Lawson. (TJac, ) (Entered: 01/13/2006)
Minute Entry −Set Deadlines/Hearings: before Honorable Patrick J Duggan. Settlement Conference set for 2/6/2006 02:30 PM before Honorable Patrick J Duggan. (TJac, ) (Entered: 01/13/2006)
212 ORDER referring case to Judge Patrick J. Duggan for settlement conference. Settlement Conference set for 2/6/2006 02:30 PM before Honorable Patrick J Duggan. Signed by Honorable David M Lawson. (TJac, ) (Entered: 01/18/2006)
213 ORDER REFERRING CASE to Facilitative Mediation. Status Conference set for 3/27/2006 02:30 PM before Honorable David M Lawson. Signed by Honorable David M Lawson. (TJac, ) (Entered: 01/19/2006)
214 Emergency MOTION for Order Permitting Videotaping of Jail Facilities by Linda Rose. (Pitt, Michael) (Entered: 01/26/2006)
215 ORDER directing filing of response to plaintiffs' emgergency motion dkt #214. Response due 2/1/2006. Signed by Honorable David M Lawson. (SGam, ) (Entered: 01/30/2006)

Case: 2:01-cv-10337-DML As of: 06/28/2012 12:48 PM EDT 29 of 34

02/01/2006
02/02/2006 02/02/2006 02/06/2006 02/09/2006 02/20/2006
02/23/2006 03/14/2006 03/27/2006
03/30/2006 04/04/2006 04/11/2006 04/12/2006 05/12/2006 05/16/2006 06/09/2006

216 [FILING ERROR − R11; PROPOSED ORDER] RESPONSE to 214 Emergency MOTION for Order Permitting Videotaping of Jail Facilities filed by Saginaw, County of, Charles Brown, Saginaw County Sheriff Department. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits # 2 Exhibit A − Protective Order)(Tamm, James) Modified on 2/1/2006 (SMar, ). (Entered: 02/01/2006)
217 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 214 Emergency Motion to compel videotaping of jail facilities. Signed by Honorable David M Lawson. [refer to image for details] (SGam, ) (Entered: 02/02/2006)
Minute Entry −Telephone Conference held on 2/2/2006 before Honorable David M Lawson. (TJac, ) (Entered: 02/03/2006)
Minute Entry −Settlement Conference held on 2/6/2006 before Honorable Patrick J Duggan. (MOre, ) (Entered: 02/07/2006)
218 MOTION SUBSTITUTION OF PARTY AND STATEMENT OF FACT OF DEATH by Donna Lynn Quarles. (Fletcher, Loyst) (Entered: 02/09/2006)
219 RESPONSE to 218 MOTION SUBSTITUTION OF PARTY AND STATEMENT OF FACT OF DEATH filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Index of Exhibits to Response to Plaintiffs' Statement of the Fact of Death of Plaintiff Donna Quarles and Motion for Substitution of Party# 2 Exhibit Exhibit A−D.Quarles Deposition Transcript# 3 Exhibit Exhibit B−Correspondence from Plaintiff's Counsel, M. Pitt dated 1/9/06)(Tamm, James) (Entered: 02/20/2006)
220 ORDER denying without prejudice 218 Motion for substitution of party. Signed by Honorable David M Lawson. (SGam, ) (Entered: 02/23/2006)
221 AMENDED ORDER REFERRING CASE to Facilitative Mediation. Status Conference reset for 4/17/2006 03:30 PM before Honorable David M Lawson. Signed by Honorable David M Lawson. (TJac, ) (Entered: 03/14/2006)
222 NOTICE of Change of Attorney Information by Stephen Wasinger on behalf of Sylvia Denise Braddock, Lisa Renee Brandimore, Dwayne Butterfield, Bobbie Wayne Carter, Daniel Wray Clayton, Joshua Fuller, Nicholas Anthony Giles, Willie Louis Hendricks, Tanisha Ramon Johnson, Linda Rose, Robert Allen Kelsey, Sue Ann Letterman, Donna Lynn Quarles, Gregory Louis Schultz, Amanda Rae Shinaver, Dwayne Alann Simmons, Robin Renee Thomas, Joshua Allen Weigant, Jennifer Cradit, Justin Anderson, Craig Mason, Matthew Starkweather, Jane Doe, John Doe. (Wasinger, Stephen) (Entered: 03/27/2006)
223 SECOND AMENDED ORDER REFERRING CASE to Facilitative Mediation. Status Conference reset for 6/13/2006 02:30 PM before Honorable David M Lawson. Signed by Honorable David M Lawson. (TJac, ) (Entered: 03/30/2006)
224 MOTION to Substitute Party by Donna Lynn Quarles. (Attachments: # 1)(Pianto, Christopher) (Entered: 04/04/2006)
225 RESPONSE to 224 MOTION to Substitute Party filed by Saginaw, County of, Charles Brown, Saginaw County Sheriff Department. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits # 2 Exhibit A# 3 Exhibit B)(Tamm, James) (Entered: 04/11/2006)
226 ORDER granting 224 Motion to Substitute Party. Estate of Donna Lynn Quarles rep by Christopher J. Pianto, and Lizzie Quarles, Personal Representative rep by Christopher J. Pianto added. Donna Lynn Quarles terminated− Signed by Honorable David M Lawson. (BSoc, ) (Entered: 04/12/2006)
227 NOTICE of telephone status conference before Judge David M. Lawson, telephone conference set for 05/16/2006 at 12:30 p.m. (TJac, ) (Entered: 05/12/2006)
Minute Entry −Telephone Conference held on 5/16/2006 before Honorable David M Lawson. (TJac, ) (Entered: 05/23/2006)
228 {FILING ERROR: INCORRECT LABELING OF EXHIBITS} MOTION to Dismiss AND/OR FOR SANCTIONS FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH COURT ORDERS by Saginaw, County of, Charles Brown, Saginaw County Sheriff Department. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits # 2 Exhibit A# 3 Exhibit B# 4 Exhibit C# 5 Exhibit D)(Tamm, James) Modified on 6/9/2006 (DEld, ). (Entered:

Case: 2:01-cv-10337-DML As of: 06/28/2012 12:48 PM EDT 30 of 34

06/29/2006 06/29/2006
06/30/2006 09/12/2006 02/05/2007 04/05/2007 04/30/2007 05/31/2007
05/31/2007
06/05/2007 07/19/2007 08/31/2007

06/09/2006)
229 NOTICE of hearing on 228 MOTION to Dismiss AND/OR FOR SANCTIONS FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH COURT ORDERS. Motion Hearing set for 6/30/2006 12:30 PM before Honorable David M Lawson. (TJac, ) (Entered: 06/29/2006)
230 RESPONSE to 228 MOTION to Dismiss AND/OR FOR SANCTIONS FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH COURT ORDERS filed by all parties. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhbit 1 − February 9, 2006 Correspondence from Michael Pitt to James Tamm# 2 Exhibit Exhibit 2 − February 16, 2006 Correspondence from James Tamm to Michael Pitt# 3 Exhibit Exhibit 3 − April 28, 2006 Correspondence from Michael Pitt to James Tamm# 4 Exhibit Exhibit 4 − Affidavit of Christopher Pianto)(Pitt, Michael) (Entered: 06/29/2006)
Minute Entry −Motion Hearing held on 6/30/2006 re 228 MOTION to Dismiss AND/OR FOR SANCTIONS FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH COURT ORDERS filed by Saginaw, County of, Charles Brown, Saginaw County Sheriff Department, before Honorable David M Lawson. Disposition: granted in part(Court Reporter Charlene McLoughlin) (TJac, ) (Entered: 06/30/2006)
231 NOTICE of Case Relocation from Bay City to Detroit pursuant to Admin. Order 06−AO−027. (Schoenherr, S.) (Entered: 09/12/2006)
232 NOTICE TO APPEAR: Status Conference set for 4/5/2007 at 2:00 PM before Honorable David M Lawson. (FMos, ) (Entered: 02/05/2007)
ReSet Deadlines/Hearings: Status Conference reset for 5/8/2007 11:00 AM before Honorable David M Lawson (SPin) (Entered: 04/05/2007)
Reset Deadlines/Hearings: Status Conference reset for 6/25/2007 at 3:00 PM before Honorable David M Lawson (FMos) (Entered: 04/30/2007)
233 NOTICE of Change of Electronic Filing Registration Information by Christopher J. Pianto on behalf of Sylvia Denise Braddock, Lisa Renee Brandimore, Dwayne Butterfield, Bobbie Wayne Carter, Daniel Wray Clayton, Hope Michelle Davis, Joshua Fuller, Nicholas Anthony Giles, Willie Louis Hendricks, Tanisha Ramon Johnson, Linda Rose, Robert Allen Kelsey, Sue Ann Letterman, Donna Lynn Quarles, David Todd Reiner, Gregory Louis Schultz, Amanda Rae Shinaver, Dwayne Alann Simmons, Robin Renee Thomas, Joshua Allen Weigant, Raymond Praay, Jennifer Cradit, Justin Anderson, Craig Mason, Matthew Starkweather, Richard Plamondon, Robert James Stephens, Jane Doe, Saginaw, County of, Donna Lynn Quarles(Estate of), Lizzie Quarles, Charles Brown, John Doe, Jane Doe, Saginaw County Sheriff Department. (Pianto, Christopher) (Entered: 05/31/2007)
234 NOTICE of Change of Electronic Filing Registration Information by Christopher J. Pianto on behalf of Sylvia Denise Braddock, Lisa Renee Brandimore, Dwayne Butterfield, Bobbie Wayne Carter, Daniel Wray Clayton, Hope Michelle Davis, Joshua Fuller, Nicholas Anthony Giles, Willie Louis Hendricks, Tanisha Ramon Johnson, Linda Rose, Robert Allen Kelsey, Sue Ann Letterman, Donna Lynn Quarles, David Todd Reiner, Gregory Louis Schultz, Amanda Rae Shinaver, Dwayne Alann Simmons, Robin Renee Thomas, Joshua Allen Weigant, Raymond Praay, Jennifer Cradit, Justin Anderson, Craig Mason, Matthew Starkweather, Richard Plamondon, Robert James Stephens, Jane Doe, Donna Lynn Quarles(Estate of), Lizzie Quarles, John Doe. (Pianto, Christopher) (Entered: 05/31/2007)
ReSet Deadlines/Hearings: Status Conference reset for 8/31/2007 at 3:00 PM before Honorable David M. Lawson (SPin) (Entered: 06/05/2007)
235 ORDER denying defendants' 228 Motion to Dismiss or for Sanctions and Scheduling Status Conference − Signed by Honorable David M Lawson. (FMos) (Entered: 07/19/2007)
Minute Entry −Status Conference held on 8/31/2007 before Honorable David M Lawson. Disposition: Status conference continued to 10/5/07 at 10:00 a.m. (FMos) (Entered: 08/31/2007)

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09/19/2007 10/11/2007 11/20/2007 12/03/2007
12/03/2007 01/10/2008
01/11/2008 02/04/2008 02/20/2008 02/21/2008 02/28/2008
03/10/2008 03/10/2008 03/10/2008 03/10/2008
03/10/2008
03/10/2008
03/10/2008

Reset Deadlines/Hearings: Status Conference rescheduled for 10/9/2007 at 2:30 PM before Honorable David M Lawson (FMos) (Entered: 09/19/2007)
Reset Deadlines/Hearings: Status Conference reset for 11/20/2007 at 2:00 PM before Honorable David M. Lawson (SPin) (Entered: 10/11/2007)
Minute Entry −Status Conference held on 11/20/2007 before Honorable David M Lawson. (FMos) (Entered: 11/21/2007)
236 [INCORRECT] SEE {dkt 237} ORDER Setting Dates Pursuant to Status Conference. Discovery c/o, Trial set for 3/10/2008 at 8:30 AM before Honorable David M Lawson − Signed by Honorable David M Lawson. (FMos) Modified on 12/5/2007 (Moses, F.). (Entered: 12/04/2007)
237 ORDER Setting Dates Pursuant to Status Conference. Signed by Honorable David M Lawson. (FMos) (Entered: 12/05/2007)
238 [Filing Error Rule 11 Violation] STIPULATION Regarding Special Case Evaluation, Discovery and Attorneys' Fees by Saginaw, County of, Charles Brown, Saginaw County Sheriff Department (Tamm, James) Modified on 1/10/2008 (Creary, J.). (Entered: 01/10/2008)
239 ORDER Regarding Special Case Evaulation, Discovery and Attorney Fees. Signed by Honorable David M Lawson. (FMos) (Entered: 01/11/2008)
240 ORDER Scheduling Individual Plaintiff's Cases for Case Evaluation − Signed by Honorable David M Lawson. (FMos) (Entered: 02/04/2008)
Minute Entry −Telephone Conference held on 2/20/2008 before Honorable David M Lawson. (FMos) (Entered: 02/21/2008)
241 Notice of Failure to Comply with ECF Policies and Procedures as to attorney Peter C. Jensen. (DHam) (Entered: 02/21/2008)
242 ORDER Regarding Final Pretrial Conference and Joint Final Pretrial Order, and Rescheduling Trial Date; ( Final Pretrial Conference set for 3/10/2008 at 10:00 AM before Honorable David M Lawson, Jury Trial set for 3/11/2008 at 8:30 AM before Honorable David M Lawson,Joint Jury Instructions, and Exhibit List due on 3/6/08 − Signed by Honorable David M Lawson. (FMos) (Entered: 02/29/2008)
243 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Reference at Trial to the Practices or Policies of Other Jails or Correctional Facilities by Saginaw, County of. (Stokan, Richard) (Entered: 03/10/2008)
244 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Reference at Trial to Subsequent Remedial Measures by Saginaw, County of. (Stokan, Richard) (Entered: 03/10/2008)
245 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Plaintiffs from Referring to the Discovery Depositions of Saginaw County Jail Personnel at Trial by Saginaw, County of. (Stokan, Richard) (Entered: 03/10/2008)
246 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Reference at Trial to Any Claims Not Set Forth in Plaintiffs' Complaints by Saginaw, County of. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A−Defendant's Request to Produce) (Stokan, Richard) (Entered: 03/10/2008)
247 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Refrence at Trial to Any Physical Injury Allegedly Suffered by Any Plaintiff by Saginaw, County of. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A−Defendant's Request to Produce) (Stokan, Richard) (Entered: 03/10/2008)
248 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Reference at Trial to Alleged Damage or Injury Caused by the Use of Chemical Spray by Saginaw, County of. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A−Defendant's Request to Produce) (Stokan, Richard) (Entered: 03/10/2008)
249 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Reference at Trial to Allegations of Assault and Battery by Saginaw, County of. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A−Defendant's Request to Produce) (Stokan, Richard) (Entered: 03/10/2008)

Case: 2:01-cv-10337-DML As of: 06/28/2012 12:48 PM EDT 32 of 34

03/10/2008 03/10/2008 03/10/2008 03/10/2008 03/10/2008
03/10/2008 03/10/2008 03/11/2008 03/12/2008 03/12/2008 03/12/2008 03/12/2008 03/12/2008 03/12/2008 03/13/2008 03/14/2008

250 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Reference at Trial to Any Claims Not Set Forth in Plaintiffs' Complaints by Saginaw, County of. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A−Defendant's Request to Produce) (Stokan, Richard) (Entered: 03/10/2008)
251 NOTICE of Acceptance of Case Evaluation (FMos) (Entered: 03/10/2008)
252 ORDER of Dismissal. Signed by Honorable David M Lawson. (FMos) (Entered: 03/10/2008)
Minute Entry −Final Pretrial Conference held on 3/10/2008 before Honorable David M Lawson. (FMos) (Entered: 03/10/2008)
Minute Entry −Motion Hearing held on 3/10/2008 re 246 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Reference at Trial to Any Claims Not Set Forth in Plaintiffs' Complaints filed by Saginaw, County of, 243 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Reference at Trial to the Practices or Policies of Other Jails or Correctional Facilities filed by Saginaw, County of, 244 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Reference at Trial to Subsequent Remedial Measures filed by Saginaw, County of, 247 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Refrence at Trial to Any Physical Injury Allegedly Suffered by Any Plaintiff filed by Saginaw, County of, 245 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Plaintiffs from Referring to the Discovery Depositions of Saginaw County Jail Personnel at Trial filed by Saginaw, County of, 248 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Reference at Trial to Alleged Damage or Injury Caused by the Use of Chemical Spray filed by Saginaw, County of, 249 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Reference at Trial to Allegations of Assault and Battery filed by Saginaw, County of before Honorable David M Lawson. Disposition: Dismissed Motions #243, #244, #245, Granted in Part and Denied in Part Motions #246, #247, #248, Dismissed Motion #249(Court Reporter Rene Twedt) (FMos) (Entered: 03/10/2008)
253 NOTICE of Error Regarding 246 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Reference at Trial to Any Claims Not Set Forth in Plaintiffs' Complaints. (JCre) (Entered: 03/10/2008)
254 ORDER Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motions in Limine 246 , 250 , 247 , 248 and Dismissing Other Motions in Limine as Moot 243 , 244 , 245 , 249 . Signed by Honorable David M Lawson. (FMos) (Entered: 03/11/2008)
Minute Entry −Settlement Conference held on 3/11/2008 before Honorable David M Lawson. Disposition: Two plaintiffs in this case settled, settlement made on the record(Court Reporter Rene Twedt) (FMos) (Entered: 03/12/2008)
255 ORDER Vacating Dismissal and Reinstating Case. Signed by Honorable David M Lawson. (FMos) (Entered: 03/12/2008)
256 ORDER of Additional Dismissals − Signed by Honorable David M Lawson. (FMos) (Entered: 03/12/2008)
257 ORDER of Additional Dismissal. Signed by Honorable David M Lawson. (FMos) (Entered: 03/12/2008)
Minute Entry −Voir Dire Not Held before Honorable David M Lawson. Disposition: Voir Dire adjourned to 3/13/08 at 10:15 a.m.(Court Reporter Rene Twedt) (FMos) (Entered: 03/12/2008)
Minute Entry −Miscellaneous Hearing held on 3/12/2008 before Honorable David M Lawson. (Court Reporter Rene Twedt) (FMos) (Entered: 03/12/2008)
258 ORDER of Dismissal. Signed by Honorable David M Lawson. (FMos) (Entered: 03/12/2008)
Minute Entry −Voir Dire begun and concluded on 3/13/2008 before Honorable David M. Lawson. Disposition: Held(Court Reporter Rene Twedt) (SPin) (Entered: 03/14/2008)
Minute Entry −Jury Impaneled before Honorable David M Lawson. (Court Reporter Rene Twedt) (FMos) (Entered: 03/18/2008)

Case: 2:01-cv-10337-DML As of: 06/28/2012 12:48 PM EDT 33 of 34

03/14/2008
03/17/2008 03/17/2008 03/18/2008 03/18/2008 03/18/2008 03/18/2008 03/18/2008 03/19/2008
03/19/2008
03/19/2008 03/20/2008 03/20/2008 05/05/2008
05/16/2008 05/19/2008
05/22/2008
06/05/2008 06/11/2008 06/18/2008

Minute Entry −Jury Trial begun on 3/14/2008 and continued to 3/17/08 at 8:00 am before Honorable David M Lawson. (Court Reporter Rene Twedt) (FMos) (Entered: 03/18/2008)
Minute Entry −Jury Trial held on 3/17/2008 before Honorable David M Lawson. (Court Reporter Rene Twedt) (FMos) (Entered: 03/18/2008)
Minute Entry −Jury Deliberation begun and continued to 3/18/08. (FMos) (Entered: 03/18/2008)
Minute Entry −Jury Deliberation Concluded. (FMos) (Entered: 03/18/2008)
Minute Entry −JURY VERDICT before Honorable David M Lawson. (Court Reporter Rene Twedt) (FMos) (Entered: 03/18/2008)
259 JURY VERDICT FORM (FMos) (Entered: 03/18/2008)
Minute Entry −Jury Trial completed on 3/18/2008 before Honorable David M Lawson. (Court Reporter Rene Twedt) (FMos) (Entered: 03/18/2008)
261 Sealed Matter (JCre) (Entered: 03/20/2008)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Settlement Conference (Group 2 Plaintiffs) set for 4/21/2008 at 8:00 AM before Honorable David M Lawson (FMos) (Entered: 03/19/2008)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Settlement Conference (Group 3 Plaintiffs) set for 4/23/2008 10:00 AM before Honorable David M Lawson (FMos) (Entered: 03/19/2008)
260 Notice of Death REPORT by Lisa Renee Brandimore (Pitt, Michael) (Entered: 03/19/2008)
262 ORDER Transferring Claims for Administrative Purposes and Closing Cases Signed by Honorable David M Lawson. (JCre) (Entered: 03/20/2008)
263 JUDGMENT Signed by Honorable David M Lawson. (JCre) (Entered: 03/20/2008)
264 MOTION for Order Awarding Interest to Plaintiffs by Justin Anderson. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Judgment, # 3 Exhibit Interest Calculation − Michigan Statutory Rate, # 4 Exhibit Interest Calculation − Average Treasury Bill Rate, # 5 Exhibit Interest Calculation Chart − Federal Statutory Rate, # 6 Exhibit Summary of Interest Calculation) (Pitt, Michael). (Entered: 05/05/2008)
265 Concurrence Statement REPORT by Linda Rose (Pitt, Michael) (Entered: 05/16/2008)
266 NOTICE of hearing on 264 MOTION for Order Awarding Interest to Plaintiffs. Motion Hearing set for 6/30/2008 at 11:00 AM before District Judge David M Lawson. (FMos) (Entered: 05/19/2008)
267 RESPONSE to 264 MOTION for Order Awarding Interest to Plaintiffs filed by Saginaw, County of. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A − Judgment, # 3 Exhibit B − Beck v. Manistee County (Unpublished Opinion), # 4 Exhibit C − Allison v. City of East Lansing (Unpublished Opinion), # 5 Exhibit D − Post Judgment Interest Rate Charts) (Stokan, Richard) (Entered: 05/22/2008)
268 REPLY to Response re 264 MOTION for Order Awarding Interest to Plaintiffs filed by Linda Rose. (Pitt, Michael) (Entered: 06/05/2008)
Reset Hearing: Hearing on Motion re Interest reset for 6/18/2008 at 10:00 AM before District Judge David M. Lawson (SPin) (Entered: 06/11/2008)
Minute Entry −Motion Hearing held on 6/18/2008 re 264 MOTION for Order Awarding Interest to Plaintiffs filed by Justin Anderson before District Judge David M Lawson. Disposition: Granted(Court Reporter Rene Twedt) (FMos) (Entered: 06/18/2008)

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06/19/2008 02/26/2009

269 ORDER Granting 264 Motion for Interest. Signed by District Judge David M Lawson. (FMos) (Entered: 06/19/2008)
270 NOTICE of Withdrawal of Attorney Stephen F. Wasinger by Linda Rose. (Wasinger, Stephen) (Entered: 02/26/2009)

 
 353 F.Supp.2d 900 (2005)
Linda ROSE, Jennifer Cradit, Sylvia Denise Braddock, Lisa Renee Brandimore, Dwayne Butterfield, Bobbie Wayne Carter, Daniel Wray Clayton, Joshua Fuller, Nicholas Anthony
Giles, Willie Louis Hendricks, Tanisha Ramon Johnson, Robert Allen Kelsey, Sue Ann Letterman, Donna Lynn Quarles, Gregory Louis Schultz, Amanda Rae Shinaver, Dwayne Alann Simmons, Robin Renee Thomas, Joshua Allen Weigant, Justin Anderson, Craig
Mason, and Matthew Starkweather, Plaintiffs, v.
SAGINAW COUNTY, Saginaw County Sheriff's Department, Municipal Governmental Entities, Charles Brown, and Officers John Doe, and Jane Doe, (in their individual capacity), jointly and severally, Defendants.
No. 01-10337-BC.
United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Northern Division.
January 25, 2005.
9012345 *901 *902 *903 *904 *905 Christopher J. Pianto, Fletcher, Wolf, Flint, MI, for Plaintiffs.
James I. DeGrazia, O'Connor, DeGrazia, Bloomfield Hills, MI, Peter C. Jensen, Currie, Kendall, Saginaw, MI, for Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS TO AMEND COMPLAINT TO ADD PARTIES, ADD EXPERT WITNESS AND FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
LAWSON, District Judge.
The plaintiffs in this case are twenty-two individuals who claim that they were subjected to an unconstitutional policy by officials at the Saginaw County jail when they were held as pretrial detainees at various times between May 1999 and December 2001. The Saginaw County sheriff instituted a policy and practice of housing 906 uncooperative and disruptive detainees in administrative segregation cells; and jail *906 personnel would take all of the clothing from such detainees so that they were naked for the time that they spent in administrative segregation. All of the plaintiffs were subjected to this treatment, and some of them allege that they were viewed while naked by jail personnel and inmates of the opposite gender. The defendants have filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings or alternately for summary judgment, and the plaintiffs have filed a cross motion for partial summary judgment. The Court heard arguments from counsel in open court on March 16, 2004, and the matter is now ready for decision. The plaintiffs also have filed additional procedural motions.
The Court finds that the County's policy of confining detainees without any clothing or covering whatsoever is unconstitutional; the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from the federal claims; all defendants are entitled to governmental immunity from the state law claims; the plaintiffs have not established facts sufficient to withstand summary judgment on their claim under the state civil rights act; and the plaintiffs' recently-filed procedural motions and motion for a preliminary injunction lack merit. The Court, therefore, will grant in part and deny in part the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, grant in part and deny in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and deny the plaintiffs' procedural motions and motion for a preliminary injunction.

I.
This case arises from the alleged mistreatment of twenty-seven plaintiffs while they were in custody at the Saginaw County Jail. The jail is a detention facility operated by Saginaw County to detain arrestees awaiting trial and offenders sentenced to custodial terms of one year or less. The facility holds 525 people at maximum capacity and receives between forty and sixty individuals per day from several law enforcement agencies within Saginaw County; it takes in between 12,000 and 14,000 people per year. The defendants estimate that ten percent or fewer of the detainees are female.
The plaintiffs were processed through the jail between May 22, 1999 and December 29, 2001. During this time over 30,000 people were processed through the jail. Each of the plaintiffs was in some way uncooperative or disruptive during the booking process and therefore was subjected to the jail administrator's policy of being placed in administrative segregation. The jail administrator described the policy as follows:
That if an individual, not just because they're disruptive or disorderly, if they violate the security measures of that jail, or pose harm to themselves or others, the correction officer could request from the sergeant permission to escort the person to segregation administration.
Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. A, Dep. of William Gutzwiller at 33.
Whenever a person is placed in administrative segregation, it is the policy and practice of the Saginaw County jail personnel to remove the person's clothing and put the detainee in the segregation cell naked. A detainee's clothes are forcefully removed if he or she does not voluntarily comply with jail personnel orders to remove the clothes prior to entering the administrative segregation cell. Saginaw County deputy sheriff sergeant Gary Van Riper testified: "Clothes would be removed from a person if they did not want them taken off because that's whatthe ruling from the command or the policy, however you want to look at it. I guess, stated, that they would go in there with no clothes on, yes." Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. B, Dep. of Gary VanRiper at 21. The record evidence 907 discloses that only a detainee who disrupts the security of the jail, *907 disrupts the orderly operation of the jail, or is assaultive towards themselves, another detainee, or staff, is placed in administrative segregation. However, the policy of removing clothes is applied to those in administrative segregation without regard to the nature of the offense for which they are detained and in the absence of any individualized suspicion of drugs, weapons, contraband, or threat of suicide. None of the plaintiffs were placed in the jail's general population or on suicide watch.
If a detainee failed to comply with orders to remove his or her clothing prior to placement in the administrative segregation cell, limited force was administered to remove the clothes. "[O]nly the force necessary to do it" was used. Ibid. Male officers would assist in the removal of a female detainee's clothes if the female detainee threatened the female officer's safety. Id. at 22 (stating that "[t]he only time a male would be present when a female was taking off her clothes is if she became violent to the point where the female officer's safety was in danger").
According to the defendants, the naked confinement policy was formulated in August 1996 following an incident that ended in the suicide of a detainee who had been placed in administrative segregation. Apparently, the detainee, dressed in a standard-issue orange jail jumpsuit, was placed in the administrative segregation cell and left unobserved and unattended for several hours. The defendants report that this detainee wedged his jail uniform into the tiny space between the cell door and the door frame and hanged himself. About three months later, another inmate purportedly vandalized one of the direct observation cells and rendered it unusable. The defendants' response to these events was the policy that called for disruptive detainees to be placed in administration cells and mandated that "any inmate placed into these cells would be placed into them without clothes." Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. D, Defs' Ans. to Pls.' First Interrog. and Second Request for Prod. of Docs. at No. 16 (italics deleted).
The defendants' policy required a detainee to remain in administrative segregation until such time that he or she no longer posed a threat to himself or herself, others, jail staff, or the secure operations of the jail. See Defs.' Mot.

for Summ. J., Ex. C, Dep. of Sheriff Brown at 49. (asserting that "[i]t's taking away the chance that that person may hurt themselves or somebody else, and once they sober up or once they become cognizant of what they're doing, you may have saved that person from tremendous injury").
The parties have submitted incident reports from the jail that recount the circumstances under which jail personnel decided to place the various plaintiffs in administrative segregation:
Linda Rose:
At the above date and time [1/27/01], female listed above was housed in 1IOC2 and began pounding and kicking the door. R/O notified S/C. S/C instructed staff to place female in 1ISC1. Officers Onweller, Worden, D. Brown and Kolb placed subject in Seg. without incident. Property taken and watchsheet placed.
Pls' Ex. 14 at 35.
Jennifer Cradit:
On July 17, 1999 at 0230 hours this S/C was in intake when the city P.D. brought in a disorderly female named Cradit, Jennifer ... Cradit was placed in observation cell # 2 after stating "fuck you" to all of the staff present in intake. While in this observation cell # 2 Inmate Cradit pounded and kicked the glass window and door.
This R/O and other staff tried to calm Inmate Cradit down to no avail. Cradit would only state that she wanted to 908 use *908 the phone and then would tell the whole staff to "fuck off."
Cradit then proceeded to stuff toilet paper in the toilet and flush it until it flooded over. This S/C and Deputies Brown, Kolb, and Thom entered the cell to remove the paper. This was done without incident.
Two minutes later Inmate Cradit was placing her jean shorts in the toilet and flooding the cell again. Again, these officers entered the cell to remove the shorts and to place Cradit in an administrative segregation cell as she was taking off her clothing and disrupting the jail procedures. Cradit was given every opportunity to calm down.
As these officers attempted to remove Inmate Cradit she began to resist and would not let us remove her sandals and jewelry. During this struggle Inmate Cradit attempted to bite this S/C, S/O Miller and Deputy Brown. Inmate Miller was bitten on his right ring finger, and this S/C was scratched on the left wrist. Deputy Kolb was scratched on the left wrist. Inmate Cradit was handcuffed and her jewelry removed.
Inmate Cradit was carried to the administrative segregation cell in her underwear, t-shirt, and bra. The remaining clothing was removed by S/O Allen in the administrative segregation cell.
Inmate Cradit was placed in the administrative segregation cell due to her constantly kicking and pounding the glass, flooding the cell, verbally assaulting the staff, and removing her clothing.
It should also be noted that Inmate Cradit continuously made verbal threats toward all of the staff present. Cradit threatened to kill all of the officers "When she sees us in the streets."
This S/C, S/O Allen, S/O Miller, S/O Bates, Deputy Kolb, Deputy Thom, Deputy Brown, and Nurse Sharrow were present during the incident ... Cradit was placed under a 15 minute watch....
Pls.' Ex. 14 at 9.
Sylvia Denise Braddock:
At approximately 2330 City PD brought in a disorderly which R/O and C/O Batts and Classification Officer Nellett and Galsterer responded. Through our attempt to search Inmate Braddock in which she was uncooperative. C/O Marquez notified S/C and S/C advised place her in Admin Cell ISC2. Placed Inmate Braddock in Admin Cell without further incident.
Pls.' Ex. 14 at 2.
Lisa Renee Brandimore:

On 5-22-2000 at approximately 1900 hours R/O arrived for work. Inmate Brandimore was in cell 1IOC2. She was hitting and kicking cell door. R/O opened the cell door and told Inmate to stop hitting the door. Inmate stepped out of the cell door. R/O asked Inmate to step back into cell. Inmate refused and had to be escorted into cell. Inmate refused to stop hitting and kicking the door. Officers Robins, Nellett, and Blondin escorted Inmate to 1ISC1. Inmates [sic] clothing was removed and bagged... A watch sheet was posted and shift commander was notified. Inmate was brought in by the Saginaw City PD for OUIL. Inmate blew a .27, .30., .25 blood alcohol content on the breath analyzer. Inmate hit cell wall for approximately 10 minutes. Afterward she calmed down and no further incident to report. S/C; Brandimore was questioned by the R/O as to how much she had to drink? S/C had to respond to her old address in the past as a member of James Twp Fire Department[.] She is [] 48. Brandimore 909 has no idea how much she had to drink. Brandimore was changed back into her clothing by *909 S/O Nellett and then finished the intake process.
Pls.' Ex. 14 at 3.
Dwayne Butterfield:
On the above date [12/8/01] at 0200 SPD brought in Inmate Butterfield for DWLS warrant. Inmate Butterfield was very disorderly and intox. Staff placed Inmate in 1IOC3 to let him calm down. Inmate was warned several times not to pound on the door and window. Inmate Butterfield continued to do so, R/O along with Dep. Anderson, and C/O's Roat and Riefenbaugh escorted Inmate to 1IOC2. Inmate Butterfield started to remove his clothing but then stopped and clinched his riht [sic] fist. At this point staff restrained inmate and removed the rest of his clothing and jewelry ... S/C Demand this inmate is highly intoxed [sic] this Inmate will be staying in admin seg cell. This Inmate is still yelling some 3 hours later and it looks like he needs a few more hours.
Pls.' Ex. 14 at 4.
Bobbie Wayne Carter:
On the abpve [sic] date [2/12/01] city brought Inmate Carter, Bobbie to jail. Inmate Carter began kicking the glass in IOC4. He was moved to the cuff tank with force because he refused to be moved. When in the cuff tank he kept kicking the door. He was moved to 1IOC1 per S/C. In the tank he began to resist and kick. He was sprayed. His clothing was removed ... S/C was informed of same.
Pls.' Ex. 14 at 5.
Daniel Wray Clayton:
At the above date [5/22/99] and time [3:30], Birchrun PD brought in the above subject for two misd charges. Once subject arrived in the intake area, subject became verbal and out of control w/ officers. R/O along w/ C/O's Weber, Tohm [sic], Miller, Kolb and the Birchrun Officers escorted the subject to 1ISC2.
Once in the cell, R/O asked Birchrun Officers to exit the cell and County Officers would take over. Subject was asked to get on his knees and remove clothing. Subject refused and was placed on his stomach by Officers and clothing removed by officers.
During the take down of subject, subject tried to resist. PPCT was applied to subject to bring subject under control. Subject received one strike to the common peroneal area by R/O. S/C notified.
Pls.' Ex. 14 at 8.
Joshua Fuller:
At the above date [11/24/00] and time [3:20], R/O told Fuller who was lodge in 1IOC4 to stay off the door. S/C informed this Officer that Fuller was warned twice prior. Moments later, Fuller started pounding on the door again. S/C instructed intake staff to place Fuller in 1ISC1.

Fuller was escorted to 1ISC1 from 1IOC4 without a problem. Once Officers reached 1IS1, Fuller was asked by C/ O Onweller to get on his knees and remove his clothing. Fuller told Officer Onweller that he wasn't going to get on his knees. Fuller was given one burst of OC spray and was taken to the ground by R/O.
All clothing and property removed from Fuller....
Pls.' Ex. 14 at 13.
Nicholas Anthony Giles:
On 8-7-99 at approximately 0220 Inmate Giles was brought in by Bridgeport PD. Inmate came in peacefully but as soon as he was put in cell 1IOC4 Inmate became hostile. Inmate began kicking and hitting the door to the cell. 910 R/O instructed Inmate to exit the cell door and walk toward the end of the *910 hall. Inmate refused to walk so C/ O Huiskens, Bohls, Hanafin, Smith and R/O escorted Inmate. Inmates [sic] clothing was removed....
Pls.' Ex. 14 at 14.
Willie Louis Hendricks:
While working intake Inmate Hendricks, who was placed into 1IOC3, started knocking on the door requesting to be moved into a different cell. R/O informed subject to sit down and not to hit or kick the door Inmate refused R/ O's instructions and hit the door a second time. R/O informed subject to sit down and not to hit or kick the door Inmate refused R/O's instructions and hit the door a second time. R/O and Officers Huiskens, Bohls, Anderson, and Hanafin escorted Inmate to 1ISC2. Once at the cell the Inmate was asked to remove his clothing. While complaining started to remove his clothing. R/O instructed Inmate to put his clothing into the bag which R/O was holding. Inmate took his sweatshirt and threw it at R/O hitting R/O in the head. R/O along with other Officers helped remove his other clothing. Inmate caused no further incident. His clothing was logged and put into locker # 50. S/C was notified and watch sheet was posted due to the high breath test. Inmate was brought in by Officer Kratz from Buena Twp. PD for OUIL. He blew a .27 on the BAC DATA Maters....
Pls.' Ex. 14 at 16.
Tanisha Ramon Johnson:
On 7-28-99 at approximately 2200 hours Inmate Johnson was brought from 1IOC1 to the intake counter. Immediately Inmate Johnson became hostile toward R/O and staff. Inmate refused to sign any paperwork and started name calling toward R/O. R/O instructed Inmate several times to sit up on the couch, Inmate refused. C/O Kutchinski and C/O Nelson escorted Inmate Johnson to 1ISC1. Inmates [sic] clothing was removed and taken to female dorm to be put in a locker. Shift Commander was notified and a watch sheet was placed.
Pls.' Ex. 14 at 17.
Robert Allen Kelsey:
This Officer was in intake, when the Saginaw County Police, brought in Inmate Kelsey. At the time was hog-tied, but was not acting violent, and after restraints were removed, Inmate Kelsey was placed into 1IOC4 as, at the time we had no other observation cells open, and his action did not warrant placing him into 1ISC1.
While in 1IOC4 Inmate Kelsey kicked the cell door, several times demanding his immediate phone call. Inmate Kelsey appeared intox or high, or both, as he would quiet down for awhile and then become hostile.
At 2250 hrs, these Officers noticed Inmate Kelsey was standing over Inmate (Roosevelt Daniels) and it appeared that he was making some kind of threats. Staff responded and Inmate Kelsey had to be forcefably [sic] removed from the cell. As these Officers were doing so, other inmates demanded his removal, as he was trying to start a fight, and had something in his hand using it like a weapon.

Inmate Kelsey did have something in his hand, and was holding it in a threatening manner. Inmate Kelsey resisted staff's orders and went to square off them with this possible weapon, and was taken to the floor immediately for everyone's safety.
Inmate Kelsey was moved to 1IOC1 (which was now available) and durin [sic] move and key chain was removed, from this Inmate's left hand. This key chain has a 30.06 shell & bullet on it, and Inmate Kelsey had in his hand as 911 one *911 would hold a knife, if they would be using it as a weapon.
Inmate Kelsey was search again, and nothing else was found.
Around 2255 hrs; Inmate Kelsey had to be moved again. For about 5 minutes Inmate Kelsey continued to kick the cell door, hard enough to move it and it appeared that he would damage same, even after being told to stop his actions. This Officer went to the cell, and ordered Inmate Kelsey to come out, and Inmate Kelsey immediately backed up and went into a fighting stance, fist closed and up in assaultive position this officer ordered Inmate Kelsey to come out of the cell, but he refused, stating "you want me, come and get me" this Officer entered the cell, and removed Inmate Kelsey, and with the least force necessary to do so. This Officer escorted Inmate Kelsey to 1ISC2 and staff then had Inmate Kelsey remove his clothing.
Staff advised during this time, Inmate Kelsey advised that "He was with the FBI and we need to treat him better." Staff advised that when Inmate Kelsey was totally undressed, they found a lighter hidden in his underwear, and Inmate Kelsey did square off on staff, as he was refusing to remove his watch. This was done by a show of force, and no further problems occured [sic].
As soon as staff, closed the cell door, Inmate Kelsey immediately began assaulting the door.
Inmate Kelsey is in on a Chapter #4 0907 and could be released as soon as he can calm down enough to be processed.
Pls.' Ex. 14 at 19.
Sue Ann Letterman:
On the above date [9/21/99] at approx 0140 hrs, R/O pulled out Inmate Letterman to be booked. Subject was very uncooperative and argumentative throughout this process. R/O gave numerous chances for her to comply with the process, but Inmate was still uncooperative and demanding. Inmate also made comments saying that she hopes we would get "bomb." At this time, R/O had to escort Inmate back into 1IOC2. C/O Tohm [sic] and S/C were present during this incident.
Pls.' Ex. 14 at 20.
C/O Nellett was called to intake reference a disorderly female. Sue Letterman was throwing toilet paper, screaming and making threats to C/O Brown while she was in IOC2. Subject was taken to administrative segregation cell and was told to remove her clothing. Nurse Stella, C/O Miller, C/O Marquez and C/O Nellett were in the room with her. Subject was given numerous chances to remove her clothing and jewelry by herself. Clothing was removed w/o incident or force....
Pls.' Ex. 14 at 22.
Donna Lynn Quarles:
On 9-3-2000 at approximately 0315 hours Inmate Quarles was brought in by Troopers Korzek and Campbell from the MSP Bridgeport Post. Inmate was taken to the breathalyzer room for an alcohol test. Inmate immediately started being loud and obnoxious toward all officers (state and county). After her breath test Inmate was brought to booking counter to be processed. As R/O starting asking Inmate questions for booking Inmates started giving R/O a difficult time (Inmate wouldn't give SSN #). R/O finally finished booking and sent to the next station (picture and prints). While Inmate was being pictured R/O heard Inmate disrespect S/C by asking him if he wanted some popcorn and donuts. Inmate was asked to sit on the couch until the finger print machine was ready for her prints. 912 While Officer Bohls was working on setting up the *912 machine for prints the Saginaw City PD brought in James

Woolfolk who was acting very disorderly. R/O and several other officer [sic] responded to that. After Woolfolk was calmed down R/O noticed that Inmate Quarles had been escorted to cell 1ISC2. Since Inmate was a female and not fighting with Officers Blondin and Kutchinski R/O just stood in the hall listening for Inmate to become hostile. Officers were able to remove clothing and exit the cell without incident. Inmate was lodged for OUIL, her blood alcohol content was . 16. Inmate caused no further incident.
S/C; I was present with S/O Blondin and Trooper Campbell with Quarles in the classification/breath room. Qurles [sic] was having everything explained to her 3 and 4 times. Quarles refused 2 times and then Trp Campbell got a reading of her test .16.
Quarles was escorted out to the intake area and Deputy Houge started the intake/booking questions. Quarles didn't want to give her SS# out loud and wanted Houge to remove her keys from the property bag. Quarles was informed that she was on tape and she stated "I don't give a fuck what I'm on.["] This S/C informed her that nobody was making fun of her and that she just needed to fill the forms out.
S/O Bohl requested that Quarles get up off from the couch and come over to get [sic] he [sic] photo's [sic] taken. Boyl was stopped to [sic] many times by this Inmate as she wanted to see her photo first. S/C questioned Quarles if she had her own hair or a wig. Quarles said something smart why done [sic] you check my hair. I informed her I would have somebody check it as it is policy to check to see if something is in it.
Bohl was done with the photo's [sic] and was starting to take her prints when he departed intake for the sallyport to assist the city. Quarles was informed to sit down and wait until they got back to her. Quarles got off the couch and walked over to the phone by Pams [sic] work station to see what was going.
Quarles was instructed to sit down by this S/C and she informed me that I'm not her dad so "Shut the fuck up and I don't have to sit down do you want some popcorn or donuts.["] S/C requested that she be escorted to admin seg cell until she come down off her intoxed state of mind.
Pls.' Ex. 14 at 26-27.
Gregory Louis Schultz:
On the above date [6/14/00] Carrollton lodged Inmate Shultz [sic] for OUIL, subject was disorderly when placed in the cell. Subject finally started to pound on the door of IOC4 and being insolent towards booking staff. Subject started calling staff "Mother fuckers" and "Fuck you assholes."
R/O then contacted S/C and was informed to take subject to admin seg. Dep Kolb then called for assistance from tower. C/O Miller and Dep Brown came down to assist. R/O along with Dep Kolb, Brown and C/O Miller took subject to admin. seg. Inmate Schultz was cooperative up to the point of taking off his underwear. Subject was again told to take off his underwear but refused. R/O then used one burst of guardian stream to the face of the subject. Inmate Schultz's underwear was then taken and S/C notified of use of spray....
Pls.' Ex. 14 at 36.
Amanda Rae Shinaver:
On the above date [9/1/00] and time [6:26], R/O pulled Amanda Shinaver from 1IOC2 for processing. Shinaver was brought in by the City PD for OUIL.
913 While in the process of booking Shinaver, Shinaver became upset w/ intake *913 staff because of her present situation. She was trying to throw blame on the county for the city arrest.
R/O was trying to explain to her that we were not responsible for her arrest but she just wanted to be insolent and argue w/ this R/O. R/O told Officer Brown to lock subject back down to her present state of mind. At this time, Shinaver gave R/O the finger and spit on R/O.
Shinaver was pulled away from the counter by Officer Brown at which time she began flailing her arms in a threatening manner. Officer Nellett then arrived to help Officer Brown bring Shinaver under control. Still having problems with Shinaver R/O assisted C/O's Brown and Nellet [sic] w/ handcuffing Shinaver. S/C was notified and

intake staff was given permission to place Shinaver in 1ISC1. Clothing and property were removed by C/O Nellet [sic] w/ assistance from Officers Brown, Miller and R/O....
Pls.' Ex. 14 at 37.
Dwayne Alann Simmons:
On 10-22-99 at approximately 0320 Inmate Simmons was brought to the booking counter for processing. Inmate started becoming disorderly and uncooperative. Inmate told R/O to "Fuck you and lock me back into the cell." R/ O along with Deputy Huiskens and C/O Bates escorted Inmate to ISC1.... SC/; This Inmate knows it all and can sit in Admin Seg Cell until he sleeps off his intox buzz.
Pls.' Ex. 14 at 39.
Robin Renee Thomas:
On the above date [12/25/01] and time City PD Officers Rocha, Ifill and Teneyuque brought in a female subject by the name of Robin Thomas. As R/O was walking the subject back to 1ISC1 to be searched, subject stopped and refused to walk. R/O and Officer Ifill attempted to walk her back and subject pushed back.
Officers Rocha and Teneyuque were behind R/O and Officer Ifill and assisted in trying to get subject into 1ISC1.
Upon entering 1ISC1 subject braced herself against the door jam and would not enter the cell.
Officers Rocha and Teneyuque took subject to the ground after several requests by R/O and the other officers to let go of the door.
Subject was held to the floor until S/C was contacted and advised of the situation. Subject remained combative while on the floor.
S/C advised to place subject in 1ISC1.
Clothing and jewelry was taken. Underpants was left w/ subject and white gown was given. Watch sheet placed on subject.
Pls.' Ex. 14 at 43 (emphasis added).
Joshua Allen Weigant:
While taking money at window, R/O heard loud voices coming from the breathalizer [sic] room and then heard what sounded like a fight R/O did call for assistance. Subject then was taken back to seg cell.
Pls.' Ex. 14 at 47.
Justin Anderson:
On 9-30-2000 at approximately 0210 hours Inmate Anderson was brought into jail by Officer Neilson from Frankemuth PD. Inmate immediately started being verbally abusive toward arresting officer. Officer Neilson took Inmate back to the breathalyzer room for a test. Afterward Inmate was brought to booking counter to be booked. Inmate continued to [be] abusive not only to Officer Nielson but to jail personal [sic]. R/O started to book Inmate, 914 during the process Inmate responded to Officer Blondin to stop fucking staring. Then Inmate *914 called Officer Nellet [sic] if she was ignorant. R/O along with Officer Bohls, Anderson, and Smith escorted Inmate to 1ISC1. His clothing were removed.... S/C was notified and watch sheet was posted. Inmate was brought in for OUIL. Subject blew a .10 BAC.
Pls.' Ex. 14 at 1.
Craig Mason:
On above date [10/8/00] and time [5:39] City P.D brought in above Inmate Mason, Craig (083600) from hospital were they had to go for a blood draw. When P.D. arrived in intake Inmate stayed louid [sic] and saying that we

had to do as he said. Inmate was seen by med for his eye that was bothering him. Inmate was placed in IOC4 were he started to knock on the door and kick. Inmate acted like this for a few hours after this time R/O called S/ C for OK to place Inmate in ISC cell. Dep. Brown opened door to IOC4 and informed Inmate to seat and wait his turn or he will be placed in ISC cell. Inmate started to push on door trying to get past Dep. Brown at this time R/O went to IOC 4 to help put Inmate back in cell. Officers had to remove another Inmate in ISC so Officers could place Mason in ISC1. Inmate was escorted to ISC1. Once in ISC1 Officer administrative segregation unit.
Asked Inmate to remove clothing Inmate would not so Officers removed clothes. R/O placed clothes in locker and hang watch sheet. S/C was called after Inmate was placeds [sic] in cell.
Pls.' Ex. 14 at 23.
Matthew Starkweather
On 6/11/2000 at approximately 0210 hours inmate was lodged into jail by Frankenmuth PD for OUIL. Inmate refused a breathalyzer and reluctantly had blood drawn. Inmate was then put into cell 1IOC4. Approximately 0245 inmate was then brought to the booking counter for booking processing. Inmate was asked to place his left arm on the counter for a wrist band to placed on. Inmate refused to give his left arm. Inmate was asked a second and htird time to give his left arm. Inmate replied "No". Inmate was the escorte [sic] to ISC2 by R/O, and Deputy Anderson.
Inmates [sic] clothing was removed and placed into a bag. S/C was notified and a watch sheet was posted. Inmate refused the breathalyzer but blew a .26 on the PBT.
Pls.' Ex. 14 at 40.
The plaintiffs filed a complaint in this Court on October 19, 2001 alleging a violation of their constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment via 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as claims sounding in gross negligence, invasion of privacy, assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and gender discrimination under the Michigan Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act, Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2101, et seq. The complaint has been amended six times, mostly to add or delete plaintiffs.
During various case management and status conferences, the parties discussed a mechanism for resolving the disputes of the several plaintiffs, and at one point it appeared that the municipal defendant would admit liability and arbitrate the issue of damages. It has been represented to this Court that Saginaw County no longer adheres to its naked confinement policy, and therefore it has discontinued the conduct that the plaintiffs have found offensive. However, new counsel substituted on behalf of the defendants, who now vigorously contest liability. The defendants have filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings or in the alternative for summary judgment. 915 They argue that the conditions of confinement of the plaintiffs did not violate their constitutional rights because *915 the regulations imposed on those detainees placed in administrative segregation were reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. The County asserts that all state tort claims must be dismissed on the basis of governmental immunity. Sheriff Charles Brown and the unnamed officers contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims and absolute immunity from the plaintiffs' state tort claims.
The plaintiffs likewise have moved for summary judgment. They argue that Saginaw County's naked confinement policy was unconstitutional as a matter of law, and therefore they were subjected to unreasonable and illegal conditions of confinement.
II.
A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) on the ground that the complaint does not state a cognizable claim is reviewed under the standards that govern motions brought under Rule 12(b)(6). See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h); Ziegler v. IBP Hog Market, Inc., 249 F.3d 509, 511 (6th Cir.2001); Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 11 (6th Cir.1987). The purpose of a motion under Rule 12(b) is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint, not the probability of success on the merits. Ecclesiastical Order of the Ism of Am, Inc. v. Chasin, 653 F.Supp. 1200, 1205 (E.D.Mich.1986). In considering a motion to dismiss under

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the allegations in the complaint are taken as true and are viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Herrada v. City of Detroit, 275 F.3d 553, 556 (6th Cir.2001). The Court may consider only whether the allegations contained in the complaint state a claim for which relief can be granted. Roth Steel Prods. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 705 F.2d 134, 155 (6th Cir.1983). The motion may be granted only if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Buchanan v. Apfel, 249 F.3d 485, 488 (6th Cir.2001) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). However, "the complaint is not to be dismissed because the plaintiff has misconceived the proper theory of the claim, if he is entitled to any relief under any theory." Myers v. United States, 636 F.2d 166, 169 (6th Cir.1981). If matters outside the pleadings must be considered in ruling on the merits of the claim, as here, the motion more properly should follow the standards and procedures of Rule 56, and reviewing courts generally will treat the motion as one for summary judgment. Michigan Paytel Joint Venture v. City of Detroit, 287 F.3d 527, 533 (6th Cir.2002) (quoting Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845, 850 (6th Cir.1999)). The defendants have made liberal and frequent references in their motion briefs to the evidentiary record assembled through the discovery process. The Court believes, therefore, that the defendants' motion ought to be adjudicated under their alternate theory as a motion for summary judgment.
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment, and neither suggests that there are facts in dispute. Nonetheless, the Court must apply the well-recognized standards when deciding cross motions; "[t]he fact that the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment does not mean, of course, that summary judgment for one side or the other is necessarily appropriate." Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 444 (6th 916 Cir.2003). Thus, *916 when this Court evaluates cross motions for summary judgment, it "must evaluate each motion on its own merits and view all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Westfield Ins. Co. v. Tech Dry, Inc., 336 F.3d 503, 506-07 (6th Cir.2003).
A motion for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 presumes the absence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial. The Court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and determine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (quotation and citation omitted).
The basic facts, recited above, are not in serious dispute. The practice of stripping naked all jail detainees placed in administrative segregation was memorialized in a formal jail policy consistently and regularly applied by Saginaw County jail personnel at the direction of the County's chief law enforcement officer. Therefore, if the policy is unconstitutional, the plaintiffs have established a case of municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 698, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (holding that municipal liability will be found when the alleged unconstitutional act "implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by the body's officers"); see also Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1345 (6th Cir.1994) (observing that a municipality also "may be sued for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental `custom' even though such custom has not received formal approval through the body's official decision making channels"). Since the County concedes that the individual officers acted pursuant to an established policy, it is unnecessary to pursue the plaintiffs' failure-to-train theory because that claim is simply an alternate method of establishing an unconstitutional act that was committed by the municipality itself. See City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) (holding that "[t]he issue in a [failure-to-train] case ... is whether that training program is adequate; and if it is not, the question becomes whether such inadequate training can justifiably be said to represent `city policy'").
In addition, for the purpose of these motions the plaintiffs do not contest that probable cause existed to seize them and detain them in the jail. However, they insist that the otherwise proper seizure of the plaintiffs was transformed into an unreasonable seizure as soon as their clothes were removed pursuant to a policy that applied to non-violent misdemeanants and did not require individualized suspicion of possession of drugs,

weapons, contraband, or threat of suicide. They also assert that no legitimate purpose existed for allowing members of the opposite sex to participate in disrobing detainees, sometimes forcefully. Finally, they contend that liability should not be an issue in this case because of an alleged prior stipulation by the defendants.
A.
The question whether the defendants stipulated to liability admits of ready disposition. The plaintiffs claim that a 917 prior attorney for the defendants agreed *917 to admit liability and then submit the issue of damages for each
individual plaintiff to facilitative mediation. Present counsel for the defendants does not subscribe to that agreement.
The plaintiffs previously filed a motion to establish liability on September 11, 2002, which the Court construed as a motion for partial summary judgment and denied. The Court found "that the plaintiffs have failed to make the required showing for summary judgment.... Plaintiffs' reliance on letters between counsel discussing settlement proposal is inappropriate, as such evidence would not be admissible at trial. See Federal Rule of Evidence 408 (barring introduction of offers to compromise).... At a chambers conference, [previous] defense counsel did indicate that he was inclined to admit liability and contest damages only.... On the current record, however, there is no basis for concluding that the facts material to a determination [of] liability are undisputed, thus entitling the plaintiffs to judgment as a matter of law." See October 10, 2002 Order Denying Motion to Exclude Prior Arrests and Convictions, Denying Motion to Establish Liability and Granting Motion to Amend Complaint. The plaintiffs filed a second motion to affirm the parties' stipulation to liability on November 7, 2002, which the Court on July 3, 2003 found to be mooted by the by the plaintiffs' present motion for summary judgment.
The plaintiffs now offer numerous letters, Exs. 22 and 23 to Pls.' App., an affidavit by counsel, Ex. 24 to Pls.' App., and the following evidence regarding the issue of a stipulation by the defendants at a deposition admitting liability:
Mr. Fletcher [plaintiffs' counsel]: Just so that I understand we have an agreement that you guys are stipulating to liability on the 1983 action only?
Mr. Jensen [defense counsel]: Yes.
Mr. Fletcher: Okay. And that you're going to supply that with the Court?
Mr. Jensen: Yes.
Mr. Fletcher: Okay. And I believe that you indicated to me, I think this should be on the record, both you, Mr. DeGrazia and also the risk manager who I believe is Ms. Kelly.
Ms. Lenhart: Kelly Lenhart.
Mr. Fletcher: Kelly Lenhart. That you guys all agree that that's a done deal?
Mr. Jensen: Yes.
Mr. Fletcher: Okay. I just want a separate record for that.
Tr. of statement (10/28/2002), Pls.' App. Ex. 26.
The primary function of a stipulation is to narrow disputes. Leuhsler v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 963 F.2d 907, 911 (6th Cir.1992). Although stipulations waiving an issue or argument that might otherwise be tried will generally be treated as conclusive and binding, ibid., the validity of a stipulation is dependant upon a clear and unequivocal expression either in writing or in open court. See Orsini v. Kugel, 9 F.3d 1042 (2d Cir.1993); but see Oliver v. City of Shattuck ex rel. Versluis, 157 F.2d 150, 153 (10th Cir.1946) (observing that "[i]t is true that ordinarily courts will not recognize or give effect to oral agreements not made in the presence of the court or without the Court's knowledge ... But this rule is sufficiently flexible to allow courts to give effect to oral agreements between parties, if failure to do so would allow one party to take an unconscientious advantage of his breach."). The Sixth Circuit

recognizes that an oral stipulation can form the basis of an estoppel when an opposite party relies to his detriment on the representation. See United States v. Spikes, 158 F.3d 913, 928 (6th Cir.1998) (stating that 918 "[w]here one side's efforts at presenting its theory of the case is actually prejudiced by the other *918 side reneging on its obligations under the [informal stipulation], some form of relief is appropriate"). However, there is no evidence in this case that the plaintiffs were prejudiced in the preparation of their case as a result of such reliance.
Recognizing that informal or oral stipulations can cause confusion, this District enacted a local rule to address the formal requirements of stipulations:
(b) Stipulations and Orders; Service of Orders. The party initiating a stipulation and proposing an order shall submit a self-addressed stamped envelope and shall be responsible for serving copies of an order on all parties within 10 days of the date of the order, unless otherwise directed by the judge in a particular case.
E.D. Mich. LR 5.2(b). In this case, despite the deposition transcript offered by the plaintiffs, no clear and unequivocal expression of this agreement was expressed in open court; nor did the parties reduce the stipulation to a signed writing. The plaintiffs also failed to submit an order regarding the stipulation to the Court as required by E.D. Mich. LR 5.2(b). The purported stipulation, therefore, is ineffective unless the plaintiffs demonstrate that they relied upon this agreement to their detriment, which they have failed to do.
B.
The critical question in this case is whether the County's policy of removing the clothing of all detainees placed in administrative segregation violates the Constitution, since the plaintiffs have the burden when asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 of proving that (1) that there was a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a person acting under of color of state law. Wittstock v. Mark A. Van Sile, Inc. 330 F.3d 899, 902 (6th Cir.2003). Although the defendants do not dispute that the second element has been established, they vigorously contest the plaintiffs' contention that the challenged practice violated rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The seminal case dealing with the constitutionality of conditions of confinement of pretrial detainees, such as the plaintiffs in this case, is Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). There, the Supreme Court evaluated claims that certain confinement conditions (including double bunking, limitations on sources of reading material, restrictions on receipt of packages, unannounced room searches, and body cavity searches after contact visits) imposed on pretrial detainees in a federal detention facility were unconstitutional. The Court confirmed that "[t]here is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country," id. at 545, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-556, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974)), and that "pretrial detainees, who have not been convicted of any crimes, retain at least those constitutional rights that we have held are enjoyed by convicted prisoners." Ibid. Constitutional rights concerning conditions of confinement, analyzed for pretrial detainees under the Due Process Clause, id. at n. 16, 99 S.Ct. 1861, however, must be balanced against the "Government['s] ... legitimate interests that stem from its need to manage the facility in which the individual is detained." Id. at 540, 99 S.Ct. 1861. Therefore, courts must strike a balance "between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application." Id. at 546, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (quoting Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556, 94 S.Ct. 2963). In striking that balance, courts must give great deference to jail administrators "in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their 919 judgment are needed to preserve internal *919 order and discipline and to maintain institutional security," id. at 547, 94 S.Ct. 2963, lest courts become "enmeshed in the minutiae of prison operations." Id. at 562, 94 S.Ct. 2963.
The Court in Wolfish set down some guiding principles to assist courts confronted with such challenges. First, for detention conditions that implicate only a detainee's liberty interests, "[a] court must decide whether the disability is imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose." Id. at 538, 99 S.Ct. 1861. "[P]unitive measures ... may not constitutionally be imposed prior to a determination of guilt." Id. at 537, 99 S.Ct. 1861. If the measure does not constitute punishment and is reasonably related to a legitimate penological concern, then deference will be afforded jail officials unless there is

"substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations." Id. at 548, 99 S.Ct. 1861. Next, where the condition implicates the detainee's privacy interest under the Fourth Amendment, it will be upheld if it is reasonable, which assessment requires balancing the needs of the institution against the invasion of personal rights that results. Id. at 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861. Therefore, "[c]ourts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted." Ibid.
Subsequent decisions have expanded upon and refined the factors used to detect constitutional violations resulting from conditions of confinement. The Court set forth four factors in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987): "First, there must be a `valid, rational connection' between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it.... [T]he second factor... is whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates.... A third consideration is the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally.... Finally, the absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison regulation." Id. at 89-90, 107 S.Ct. 2254. These factors operate as "guidelines to be weighed in the evaluation of a regulation" not prongs of a four-part test in which each prong must be met. Whitney v. Brown, 882 F.2d 1068, 1071 (6th Cir.1989). The guiding principle, however, is that "when a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254.
As noted above, the question in this case does not focus on the reasonableness of placing uncooperative and disruptive detainees in administrative segregation. Rather, the issue is whether the regulation requiring removal of all of the detainees' clothes violates the Constitution. Courts in this Circuit have recognized that prisoners have a liberty and privacy interest in shielding their naked bodies from view by others, especially members of the opposite gender. For instance, in Cornwell v. Dahlberg, 963 F.2d 912 (6th Cir.1992), the court held that a prison inmate had a Fourth Amendment privacy interest that may have been violated when he was strip-searched in view of female prison guards and others after a prison uprising. In Kent v. Johnson, 821 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir.1987), the court held that an inmate challenging a Michigan prison's regulation stated a Fourth Amendment claim in light of Turner's four factors where he "alleged that the defendants-appellees' policy and practice of according female 920 prison guards *920 full and unrestricted access to all areas of the housing unit at the prison allows the female guards to view him performing necessary bodily functions in his cell and to view his naked body in the shower area." Id. at 1222. The court observed that "[p]erhaps it is merely an abundance of common experience that leads inexorably to the conclusion that there must be a fundamental constitutional right to be free from forced exposure of one's person to strangers of the opposite sex when not reasonably necessary for some legitimate, overriding reason, for the obverse would be repugnant to notions of human decency and personal integrity." Id. at 1226. In Johnson v. City of Kalamazoo, 124 F.Supp.2d 1099 (W.D.Mich.2000), the district court held there was no Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment violation resulting from the practice of placing detainees who refused to answer an inquiry as to whether they were suicidal in a cell clad only in their underwear. However, the same court found both Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations under similar circumstances when the detainees were put in cells with no clothes at all. See Wilson v. City of Kalamazoo, 127 F.Supp.2d 855, 862 (W.D.Mich.2000) (observing that "the Court remains unpersuaded that society is not, as a matter of law, prepared to recognize as legitimate an inmate's subjective expectation that he may not be stripped of all clothing and covering, even for a short period of time, simply because he refuses to answer a question as to whether he is suicidal"). Most recently, the court of appeals made the following observations concerning an inmate's privacy rights in Everson v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 391 F.3d 737 (6th Cir.2004), in which the court held that gender was a bona fide occupational qualification for Michigan prison guards:
"Prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution." Turner, 482 U.S. at 84, 107 S.Ct. 2254. "Thus, while inmates may lose many of their freedoms at the prison gate, they retain `those rights [that are] not fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment itself or incompatible with the objectives of incarceration.'" Covino v. Patrissi, 967 F.2d 73, 77 (2d Cir.1992) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984)). Our court has recognized that "a convicted prisoner maintains some reasonable expectations of privacy while in prison, particularly where those claims are related to forced exposure to strangers of the opposite sex, even though those privacy rights may be less than those enjoyed by non-prisoners." Cornwell v. Dahlberg, 963 F.2d 912, 916 (6th Cir.1992); see also Kent v. Johnson, 821

F.2d 1220, 1227 (6th Cir.1987) (assuming that "there is some vestige of the right to privacy retained by state prisoners and that this right protects them from being forced unnecessarily to expose their bodies to guards of the opposite sex"). As one of our sister circuits has explained, most people "have a special sense of privacy in their genitals, and involuntary exposure of them in the presence of people of the other sex may be especially demeaning and humiliating. When not reasonably necessary, that sort of degradation is not to be visited upon those confined in our prisons." Lee v. Downs, 641 F.2d 1117, 1119 (4th Cir.1981); see also York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 455 (9th Cir.1963) ("We cannot conceive of a more basic subject of privacy than the naked body. The desire to shield one's unclothed figure from view of strangers, and particularly strangers of the opposite sex, is impelled by elementary self-respect and personal dignity.").
Id. at 756-57.
921 These well-established interests must be balanced against the defendants' asserted *921 penological interests in evaluating the claims under both the Fourth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. To assess a due process violation, the Court must accept the defendants' articulated purpose for the regulation and consider whether the regulation is an exaggerated response to the problem by applying the four factors identified in Turner, that is, a valid, rational connection between the regulation and the County's asserted interest put forward to justify it; whether the plaintiffs had alternative means of exercising their rights 0907 which in this case is the right to privacy; the impact accommodation of their privacy right would have on the allocation of jail resources; and the existence of ready alternatives. See Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861; Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90 107 S.Ct. 2254. Under the Fourth Amendment, the Court determines whether the practice is reasonable by considering the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted. See Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861.
The main justification for removing the clothes of those detainees placed in administrative segregation is the prevention of suicide, although defendant Charles Brown, the county sheriff, gave additional reasons at his deposition when he said that inmates "can obviously stuff [their clothes] down their throat, they can obviously hang themselves, they urinate on their clothing and throw it at the deputies, defecate on it and throw it at the deputies, which has been done many times, they could actually use the clothing to, if the guard got close enough, to wrap it around his neck." Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. C, Dep. of Sheriff Brown at 62. The defendants also have offered the reports of two expert witnesses who believe that "placing a detainee for a limited duration under close supervision, in the nude, in an administrative segregation cell, is a reasonable alternative legitimately related to detention objectives." Defs.' Mot. Summ. J., Ex. E, Expert Report of Darrell Ross at ¶ 11. See also Defs.' Mot. Summ. J., Ex. E, Expert Report of Peter Wilson at ¶ 1 (stating that "[b]y removing their clothing, a greater degree of protection was provided to the inmates").
The Court finds, however, that confining such detainees with no clothing whatsoever is an exaggerated response to the articulated security and safety concerns of the defendants in light of the importance of the right described in this Circuit's precedents and the availability of reasonable alternatives. First, there is a rational connection between the interest of jail security and confining unruly prisoners in segregation, but that alone does not justify removing all their clothes. One of the defendants' experts states that the practice amounts to "behavior modification," Defs.' Mot. Summ. J., Ex. E, Expert Report of Darrell Ross at ¶ 11, but that purpose suggests a punitive rationale that is not permissible under the Due Process Clause. The defendants also argue that obstreperous detainees could use their clothes to assault guards, but once the detainee is in the segregation cell, that concern dissipates. Finally, the defendants offer suicide prevention as a rationale, but none of these plaintiffs were screened for suicidal tendencies, and the intake papers indicate that they were not suicide risks. Moreover, according to the defendants' expert, the "operational system" in place included both voice and visual "officer monitoring ... documenting security checks every 15 minutes, [and] monitoring by medical personnel." Ibid. There is no indication that these measures were in place in 1996 when an inmate committed suicide, and they appear 922 to be quite adequate to ensure that a detainee is not using clothing to harm him-or herself. *922 Further, the Saginaw County jail has a "suicide cell" available for those prisoners who truly are suicide risks. The defendants' other expert noted that "[r]emoving an inmates [sic] clothing is an extraordinary measure." Defs.' Mot. Summ. J., Ex. E, Expert Report of Peter Wilson at ¶ 5.

Second, the plaintiffs had no alternative means of exercising their right to privacy. Once their clothes were removed, they were exposed to all who could view them in the segregation cell by video monitoring device or through the slot in the door. The record indicates that some of the plaintiffs were observed naked by members of the opposite gender. They had no way to protect that "special sense of privacy in their genitals" or avoid the "especially demeaning and humiliating" experience and "degradation" resulting from the "involuntary exposure of them in the presence of people of the other sex." Lee, 641 F.2d at 1119.
Third, the defendants argue that allowing the detainees in the segregation cells to maintain some vestige of their modesty will result in substantially increased administrative costs. They contend that keeping disruptive and violent detainees in cells with other detainees would impact guards and other detainees; other detainees would be subject to the disruptive and violent conduct of one detainee; jail staff would be forced to focus their attention on one detainee who is violating the security and orderly operation of the jail to the necessary detriment of other detainees and to their other responsibilities; and posting one officer outside the segregation cell while one detainee is housed in the cell with his or her clothing on would place a serious strain on the resources of the jail. Most of these arguments, however, address the practice of placing disruptive prisoners in isolation to begin with, a practice not challenged here. The plaintiffs do not contend that they should not have been taken to an isolation cell or that they should have been able to act out in the observation cell with other inmates. Nor would the practice of providing some form of bodily covering require a guard to maintain a vigil outside the isolation cell door. Rather, video monitoring, that is in use in at least some parts of the jail, likely would suffice.
The alternatives to naked confinement include those discussed in the cases cited above, such as allowing detainees to wear underwear, Johnson, 124 F.Supp.2d at 1104, 1106; providing paper suicide gowns, Wilson, 127 F.Supp.2d at 858; and restricting access by jail personnel of the other gender, Kent v. Johnson, 821 F.2d at 1222; Everson, 391 F.3d at 756. As mentioned above, the guards also could make use of the jail's suicide observation cell. Given the magnitude of the right to privacy in one's own body described by the cases, these rather rudimentary alternatives demonstrate the unreasonableness of the defendants' regulation and a violation of the Due Process Clause.
The policy requiring confinement in the nude also is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The scope of the intrusion is substantial. The manner in which clothes are removed depends on the degree of vehemence exhibited by the detainee, but at times will include the forced removal of clothes by guards of the other gender. The justification for the extraordinary measure does not withstand scrutiny for reasons stated earlier. And the removal of clothing at times occurred in view of other jail personnel. Although the record demonstrates that isolating many of these plaintiffs was justified as a legitimate security measure because of their outrageous conduct, the Court is persuaded that society recognizes as legitimate an inmate's subjective expectation that he 923 or *923 she may not be required to forfeit all clothing and covering, even for a brief time, when he or she has been detained for relatively minor violations, there is no individualized suspicion of drug, weapon, contraband possession, and there is no indication that he or she is suicidal.
The Court finds, therefore, that the plaintiffs have shown that the defendants' policy of taking all the clothing from detainees confined in administrative segregation violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution based on the undisputed facts. They are entitled to partial summary judgment on their Section 1983 claim against the County of Saginaw.
C.
Sheriff Charles Brown and the unnamed officers also argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity on the claim filed against them in their individual capacities. Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that protects government actors performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages when their conduct does "not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The purpose of this defense is to strike a balance that "accommodates the tension between permitting litigants to recover damages, which is often the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional guarantees, and the social costs of such suits, including the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, and the

deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office." Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 893, 900 (6th Cir.2004) (internal quotes and citation omitted).
The Supreme Court has held that a claim of qualified immunity must be examined in two stages, see Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001): "[f]irst, a court must consider whether the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, `show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right,'" and then "the court must then decide `whether the right was clearly established.'" Solomon v. Auburn Hills Police Dept., 389 F.3d 167, 172 (6th Cir.2004) (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201-02, 121 S.Ct. 2151). The Sixth Circuit has expanded that inquiry into a three-step sequential analysis when the qualified immunity defense is raised in a summary judgment motion brought after discovery has been conducted, as here. "The first inquiry is whether the plaintiff has shown a violation of a constitutionally protected right; the second inquiry is whether that right was clearly established at the time such that a reasonable official would have understood that his behavior violated that right; and the third inquiry is `whether the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts, and supported the allegations by sufficient evidence, to indicate that what the official allegedly did was objectively unreasonable in light of the clearly established rights.'" Tucker v. City of Richmond, 388 F.3d 216, 220 (6th Cir.2004) (quoting Higgason v. Stephens, 288 F.3d 868, 876 (6th Cir.2002)); Champion, 380 F.3d at 901 (citing Feathers v. Aey, 319 F.3d 843, 848 (6th Cir.2003)).
Once the defense is raised, the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating a violation of a constitutional right and showing that the right was clearly established. Barrett v. Steubenville City Schools, 388 F.3d 967, 970 (6th Cir.2004). Ordinarily, these questions can be answered by the court as a matter of law. See Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1157 (6th Cir.1996).
924 *924 The Court has determined that the plaintiffs have established a violation of constitutional rights. However, the plaintiffs must also prove that the right was clearly established. The critical inquiry is "whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation confronted." Solomon, 389 F.3d at 173 (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151) (internal quotations omitted). The plaintiff need not prove that "the very action in question has previously been held unlawful," but rather "in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). In other words, "[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Ibid.
In this case, the right to be free from unreasonable seizures is clearly established. But the qualified immunity defense requires the Court to look beyond the right in the abstract. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that "[i]t is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine ... will apply to the factual situation the officer confronts." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205, 121 S.Ct. 2151. Qualified immunity protects police personnel who must operate along the "hazy borders" that divide acceptable from unreasonable conduct. Id. at 206, 121 S.Ct. 2151.
The Court finds that the contours of the right to reasonable seizures pertaining to pretrial detainees was not sufficiently clear to impose liability on individual actors following the County's policy in effect during the period at issue in this case. Issues relating to strip and body cavity searches, viewing of naked inmates by guards of the other gender, and removal of clothing from unruly detainees have troubled courts over the past several years and have not yielded a uniform set of decisions on the subject. For example, in Hill v. McKinley, 311 F.3d 899 (8th Cir.2002), the court held that placing a violent female inmate in a padded cell without clothes was proper (although the defendant claimed it offered her a paper gown and she refused), but leaving her naked after she was strapped to a restraining board violated the Fourth Amendment. The court in Kennedy v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 901 F.2d 702 (9th Cir.1989), held unconstitutional the practice of performing a body cavity search on a plaintiff arrested for grand theft; but the court held the same practice constitutional in Dufrin v. Spreen, 712 F.2d 1084 (6th Cir.1983). At the time of the detentions in this case, there was no clear precedent that would have provided guidance to the individual defendants, who were attempting to walk the line between protecting detainees from harming themselves and violating their rights to personal privacy. That they transgressed that "hazy border" here will not forfeit their qualified immunity from suit.

D.
The plaintiffs also have alleged state law claims against Sheriff Brown and other unnamed officers to which the defendants claim absolute immunity under the state governmental immunity statutes. Michigan Compiled Laws Section 691.1407(5) states: "A judge, a legislator, and the elective or highest appointive executive official of all levels of government are immune from tort liability for injuries to persons or damages to property if he or she is acting within the scope of his or her judicial, legislative, or executive authority." That statute creates absolute immunity from state tort claims for the highest elected official in local government. See Am. Transmissions, Inc. v. 925 Attorney General, 454 Mich. 135, 139, 560 N.W.2d 50, 52 *925 (1997). Charles Brown, the elected sheriff of Saginaw County, falls within the ambit of Section 691.1407(5) and is therefore immune from the plaintiffs' claims under state law.
Michigan law also states that employees of a governmental unit are immune from state tort claims if "(a) [t]he officer, employee, member, or volunteer is acting or reasonably believes he or she is acting within the scope of his or her authority; (b) [t]he governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function; [and] (c) [t]he officer's, employee's, member's, or volunteer's conduct does not amount to gross negligence that is the proximate cause of the injury or damage." Mich. Comp. Laws § 691.1407(2). The plaintiffs have named several "John Doe" defendants but they have not identified any of them. Nonetheless, there is no evidence that these individuals were acting other than in accordance with established policy and were not grossly negligent. The individual officers, therefore, are immune from the state tort claims.
E.
In count six of their sixth amended complaint, the plaintiffs allege a claim for gender discrimination under Michigan's Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2101 et seq., contending that Saginaw County's detention policy is applied differently to women than to men. The defendants argue in their motion for summary judgment that there is no evidence in the record to support that claim.
The Michigan Civil Rights Act states:
The opportunity to obtain employment, housing and other real estate, and the full and equal utilization of public accommodations, public service, and educational facilities without discrimination because of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, height, weight, familial status, or marital status as prohibited by this act, is recognized and declared to be a civil right.
Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2102(1). The Michigan courts have held that this legislation applies to inmates in state correctional facilities. See Neal v. Dept. of Corr., 232 Mich.App. 730, 741, 592 N.W.2d 370, 376 (1998) (observing, however, that the department of corrections may "treat prisoners differently on the basis of gender without violating subsection 302(a), as long as the gender-based treatment serves important penological interests and is substantially related to the achievement of those interests"), aff'd by special panel sub nom Doe v. Dept. of Corr., 240 Mich.App. 199, 611 N.W.2d 1 (2000), remanded 463 Mich. 982, 625 N.W.2d 750 (2001), aff'd 249 Mich.App. 49, 641 N.W.2d 269 (2001). However, in 1999 the Michigan legislature amended the applicable statute to state:
"Public service" means a public facility, department, agency, board, or commission, owned, operated, or managed by or on behalf of the state, a political subdivision, or an agency thereof or a tax exempt private agency established to provide service to the public, except that public service does not include a state or county correctional facility with respect to actions and decisions regarding an individual serving a sentence of imprisonment.
Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2301(b) (emphasis added). The plaintiffs in this case were not serving "a sentence of imprisonment." Nonetheless, there is a serious question as to whether the legislation applies to the plaintiffs' claims.

The Court need not decide that question, however, because the defendants have alleged that the plaintiffs have not come forward with any evidence of discriminatory treatment, and the plaintiffs have not responded to that 926 argument. *926 Once the defendants have pointed out the deficiencies in the plaintiffs' case, it is incumbent upon the plaintiffs to come forward with evidence establishing a material fact on the issue. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The Court is not obliged to "comb through the record to ascertain whether a genuine issue of material fact exists." Cacevic v. City of Hazel Park, 226 F.3d 483, 492 (6th Cir.2000) (citing Guarino v. Brookfield Twp. Trustees, 980 F.2d 399, 407, 410 (6th Cir.1992)). The plaintiffs have not met their burden on their state civil rights claim, and the defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
III.
The plaintiffs have recently filed three additional motions in this case: a motion to join additional parties as plaintiffs; a motion for an order to add a damage expert to its list of witnesses; and a motion for a preliminary injunction. The defendants have filed answers in opposition to these motions. The Court has reviewed the parties' submissions and finds that the relevant law and facts have been set forth in the motion papers and that oral argument will not aid in the disposition of the motion. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the motions be decided on the papers submitted. See E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(e)(2).
A.
The plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint to add additional parties as plaintiffs was filed December 27, 2004. They allege that in May 2003, a television report of this case resulted in contacts by other citizens to the plaintiffs' attorneys' offices, and the defendants subsequently identified one hundred other individuals who were subjected to the naked confinement policy. The plaintiffs identify eight additional individuals who wish to join this action, and they cite Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 as their authority to amend their complaint a seventh time for that purpose. The defendants respond that the request to add new plaintiffs comes long after the close of discovery, and that many of the prospective new plaintiffs will not be able to overcome the statute of limitations bar.
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), a party may amend a complaint at this stage of the proceedings only after obtaining leave of court. Although the Rule provides that "leave of court shall be freely granted when justice so requires," leave may be denied on the basis of undue delay, bad faith by the moving party, repeated failure to cure defects by previously-allowed amendments, futility of the proposed new claim, or undue prejudice to the opposite party. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962); Duggins v. Steak `N Shake, Inc., 195 F.3d 828, 834 (6th Cir.1999); Fisher v. Roberts, 125 F.3d 974, 977 (6th Cir.1997).
The request to amend here comes too late. The parties have engaged in extensive discovery, including deposing each of the available plaintiffs, and they have litigated summary judgment motions. Adding new parties as plaintiffs would serve to further complicate the litigation. Moreover, if the prospective new plaintiffs cannot withstand a statute of limitations defense, allowance of the amendment would be futile. Finally, there is no reason that these new claimants cannot file a separate action of their own. The Court, therefore, will deny the motion to add new parties as plaintiffs.
B.
The plaintiffs' motion to add a damage expert to its list of witnesses effectively requires an amendment to the Case Management and Scheduling Order. The Court initially entered a scheduling order following the initial 927 conference held pursuant *927 to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16. The parties thereafter suspended their discovery activity and engaged in efforts to reach a settlement of the several claims. After the parties failed settlement efforts, the Court entered an amended scheduling order on January 28, 2003 that required the plaintiffs to file expert disclosures under Rule 26(a)(2) by February 20, 2003. The plaintiffs named three experts who were deposed by the defendants in June 2003. This request to add a new expert witness was filed on December 22, 2004. They cite no federal authority in support of their request.

The Amended Case Management and Scheduling Order in this case was entered pursuant to Rule 16(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires the court to "enter a scheduling order that limits the time ... to file motions[ ] and ... to complete discovery." Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(b)(2), (3). Once entered, "[a] schedule shall not be modified except upon a showing of good cause and by leave of the district judge." Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(b); see also Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 906 (6th Cir.2003). Moreover, a court may change a schedule "only `if it cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.'" Ibid. (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 16, 1983 advisory committee's notes). Stated another way, "the primary measure of Rule 16's `good cause' standard is the moving party's diligence in attempting to meet the case management order's requirements." Inge v. Rock Fin. Corp., 281 F.3d 613, 625 (6th Cir.2002) (quoting Bradford v. DANA Corp., 249 F.3d 807, 809 (8th Cir.2001); see also Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 340 (2d Cir.2000) (joining the Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits)), cited in Leary, 349 F.3d at 906.
The plaintiffs have offered no reason in support of their request from which the Court could find good cause. There is no suggestion that the information recently became known to the plaintiffs or that their other experts are not up to the task. The disclosure and discovery periods have closed some time ago. There is no evidence that the plaintiffs could not meet the deadlines despite their exercise of diligence. The motion, therefore, will be denied.
C.
Finally, the plaintiffs have asked the Court to issue a preliminary injunction to prohibit the defendants from enforcing their policy of removing all clothes from detainees placed in administrative segregation. Although the plaintiffs seek permanent injunctive relief in their sixth amended complaint, they have not asked for a preliminary injunction until this motion was filed on December 22, 2004. The plaintiffs have offered no facts or affidavits to support their claim, but they contend that plaintiffs' counsel has heard a report that the practice continues. They cite no authority in support of their request.
The grant of a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy. Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 739 (6th Cir.2000). When a party seeks injunctive relief, the Court should consider the following four factors: (1) the likelihood of the party's success on the merits of the claim; (2) whether the injunction will save the party from irreparable injury; (3) the probability that granting the injunction will substantially harm others; and (4) whether the public interest will be served by the injunction. See Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and Museum, Inc. v. Gentile Prods., 134 F.3d 749, 753 (6th Cir.1998), Six Clinics Holding Corp. v. Cafcomp Sys., Inc., 119 F.3d 393, 399 (6th Cir.1997); Frisch's Rest., Inc. v. Shoney's, Inc., 759 F.2d 1261, 1263 (6th Cir.1985). The district court must make 928 specific findings regarding *928 each of the four factors, unless fewer factors are dispositive of the issue. See Six Clinics Holding Corp., 119 F.3d at 399.
In this case, the plaintiffs' request must fail because they have not demonstrated that a preliminary injunction will save them from irreparable harm. Although the Court determines today that the defendants' policy is unconstitutional, none of the plaintiffs are confined any longer, and there is no evidence that any of them anticipate engaging in conduct that would subject them to arrest in Saginaw County. Because there is virtually no prospect on this record of the plaintiffs being subjected to placement in administrative segregation in the Saginaw County jail, they cannot, and do not, claim with any credibility that they are in danger of suffering irreparable harm even if the policy continues to be enforced. Moreover, the defendants have asserted that they no longer confine detainees in administrative segregation without offering them paper "suicide" gowns, and except for the rumor mentioned by the plaintiffs in their motion, which has no factual support, there is nothing to contradict the defendants' assertions. The motion for a preliminary injunction, therefore, will be denied.
IV.
The Court finds that there are no material facts in dispute with respect to the official policy and practice of confining Saginaw County jail detainees in administrative segregation without clothing or covering of any kind. The Court determines that this policy is unconstitutional, and the municipality is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for the federal claims and governmental immunity for the state law claims. The plaintiffs have not come forward with evidence to establish a material fact issue on their claims under the state civil rights act. The plaintiffs have not demonstrated a right to relief on any of their recently filed motions.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment [dkt # 90] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
It is further ORDERED that the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings or for summary judgment [dkt # 113] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
It is further ORDERED that the plaintiffs' sixth amended complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE with respect to defendants Charles Brown and all other individual defendants.
It is further ORDERED that Counts two through six of the plaintiffs' sixth amended complaint are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE in their entirety.
It is further ORDERED that the plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint to add additional parties as plaintiffs [dkt # 151] is DENIED.
It is further ORDERED that the plaintiffs' motion for an order to add an expert witness [dkt # 153] is DENIED.
It is further ORDERED that the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction [dkt # 155] is DENIED.
It is further ORDERED that counsel for the parties appear before the Court for a status conference on February 24, 2005 at 3:30 p.m. to discuss a schedule for resolution of the remaining issues in this case.
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