IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RONELD LOGORY, Individually and on Behalf of a Class of Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-CV-1448 (JUDGE CAPUTO)

v.

COUNTY of SUSQUEHANNA,

Defendants. MEMORANDUM
Presently before the Court are the County of Susquehanna’s (“Defendant”) Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 77) and Motion to Decertify Class (Doc. 93), and Roneld Logory’s (“Logory”) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 80) and Motion to Exclude Testimony of Defendant’s Expert Anthony Pizon, M.D. (Doc. 88). Logory and members of the class were subject to a mandatory delousing procedure by Defendant as part of their admission to the Susquehanna County Correctional Facility (“SCCF”). Logory contends that Defendant’s delousing policy violates his right to refuse unwanted medical treatment protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and that based on the undisputed facts, he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 Defendant seeks summary judgment in its favor, arguing that because its delousing

1 Logory’s allegations that the delousing policy violates inmates’ rights to refuse unwanted medical treatment protected by the Fourteenth Amendment are contained in his Reply Brief in Further Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification (Doc. 42). Logory acknowledges that his Complaint (Doc. 1) “arguably does not include a separate count asserting a Fourteenth Amendment claim.” Id. at 5 n.5. However, he asserts that “the parties conferred and agreed that rather than submitting an Amended Complaint, Plaintiff would explain the scope of the delousing claim in this submission and that Defendant

policy is reasonably related to a legitimate penological objective, it is valid under the

standard established by Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 89, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 96 L. Ed. 2d 64

(1987). Because Defendant’s delousing policy was reasonably related to its legitimate

interest in maintaining a healthy and sanitary facility, Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment will be granted with respect to the constitutionality of the delousing policy and

Logory’s motion for partial summary judgment will be denied. Defendant’s motion for

summary judgment with respect to disqualification of the testimony of Logory’s expert

witness will be denied. Finally, Defendant’s motion to decertify class and Logory’s motion

to exclude Defendant’s expert testimony will be denied as moot.

A. Factual Background

BACKGROUND

Defendant’s policies and procedures require inmates to undergo a delousing

procedure upon admission to SCCF if they are first subjected to a strip search. (Doc. 85,

Pl.’s Statement of Material Facts, “Pl.’s SMF,” ¶ 10.) In effect, almost all new admissions

to SCCF are strip searched. (Pl.’s SMF, ¶ 18.)

It is undisputed that there have been at least three (3) reported cases of lice at SCCF

in the past eight (8) to nine (9) years. (Pl.’s SMF, ¶ 22.) Dr. Hassan Khalil, medical doctor

at SCCF from 1999 to October 2008, testified that he did not see an “outbreak” of lice

during his employment there but did have “a few inmates with head lice.” (Pl.’s SMF, ¶ 23.)

Defendant produced records “concerning the presence of head lice at the facility, which

noted the following: on December 1, 2008, “[a]ll females in MZ on medical isolation;” on

would not contest Plaintiff’s right to make any argument about delousing.” Id. 2

December 10, 2008, five (5) inmates were checked for head lice by the facility’s nurse and were found to be free and clear; on March 20, 2011, an inmate was rechecked for head lice and was found to be clear; and on November 16, 2011, head lice were found on the hair of an inmate and the inmate was placed in isolation while two other inmates were checked and found to be free and clear of head lice. (Pl.’s SMF, ¶ 26; Doc. 83, Ex. 17.)
The medical personnel and doctors employed at SCCF during the class period were unaware of the delousing procedures used by the Corrections Officers (COs). (Pl.’s SMF, ¶ 29-30.) During the delousing procedure at SCCF, detainees were sprayed with Liceall, a delousing fluid, on the “hair, chest, underarms, [and] privates.” (Pl.’s SMF, ¶ 33.) The spray device used by SCCF to dispense Liceall is unapproved by the manufacturer. (Pl.’s SMF, ¶ 37.) The COs at SCCF did not comply with all of the directions on the Liceall label in their use of the product. (Pl.’s SMF, ¶¶ 35, 37-38, 40.) Specifically, COs did not uniformly allow the Liceall solution to remain on the inmates’ bodies as indicated, despite their training to do so. (Pl.’s SMF, ¶ 35, Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts, “Def.’s SMF,” ¶ 8.) In addition, COs did not spend extra time combing out the spray or any possible nits or lice after the initial application of Liceall and the shower process. (Pl.’s SMF, ¶40.) Failure to follow the Liceall directions impacts the effectiveness of the delousing process. (Pl.’s SMF, ¶ 39.)
SCCF Warden Nicholas Conigliaro issued a memo on December 27, 2011, stating that COs were to start using Pre-Emptive Strike, a different delousing product, as opposed to Liceall. (Doc. 81, 27; Doc. 84, Ex. 26.) Conigliaro’s memo stated that “[t]he Intake Process will remain the same with the exception of the delousing delivery system.” (Doc. 84, Ex. 26.) Section 16.5 of the SCCF Policy and Procedures Manual describes the
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delousing procedure as of December 27, 2011, as follows: “[f]ollowing the search, the new commitment will be handed approximately one (1) once [sic] of non-toxic, all natural, PreEmptive Strike everyday lice control shampoo to utilize during their initial intake shower.” (Doc. 84, Ex. 27.)
Mr. Logory was admitted to SCCF on June 18, 2008, on misdemeanor charges of driving under the influence. (Pl.’s SMF, ¶ 41.) After being strip searched, he was told to step into the shower and was “forced to be sprayed with some chemical” and subsequently to take a brief shower. (Pl.’s SMF, ¶ 46.) During the delousing procedure the COs did not explain what they were doing to Logory, and the chemical spray was “uncomfortable” and “unknown.” (Pl.’s SMF, ¶ 47.) Logory testified that the experience of being deloused and admission to SCCF was distressing. (Pl.’s SMF, ¶ 48.) Logory believes that the class period should end as of December 27, 2011 because he does not contest the constitutionality of SCCF’s delousing policy as of December 27, 2011. (Doc. 81, 20.) B. Procedural History
Mr. Logory filed a class action complaint against Defendant on July 24, 2009. (Doc. 1.) Defendant filed an answer to the complaint on September 23, 2009. On August 31, 2010, Logory moved for class certification, which was eventually granted in part on October 6, 2011. (Docs. 9 and 10.) Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3), the Court certified a class action on behalf of:
All persons who have been placed into custody of the Susquehanna County Jail after being sentenced or as pre-trial detainees who were deloused upon their entry into the Susquehanna County Jail. The Class period commences on or about July 24, 2007 and extends to the date on which the Defendant is enjoined from, or otherwise ceases, enforcing its unconstitutional policy, practice and custom of delousing
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detainees absent reasonable suspicion. Specifically excluded from the Class are Defendant and any and all of its respective affiliates, legal representatives, heirs, successors, employees or assignees.

(Doc. 51.) After class certification, discovery ensued. The Court granted a motion

to stay proceedings pending appeal to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals on December 6,

2012. (Doc. 57.) On January 19, 2012, the Third Circuit of Appeals denied Defendant’s

petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f). (Doc. 58.)

Defendant moved for summary judgment (Doc. 73) and Logory moved for partial

summary judgment (Doc. 74) on June 12, 2013. Both parties filed briefs in opposition to

the other party’s motion on July 23, 2013. (Docs. 89 and 94.) Defendant also filed a motion

to decertify class (Doc. 93) while Logory filed a motion to exclude testimony of Defendant’s

expert Anthony Pizon, M.D. (Doc. 88) on July 23, 2013. Both parties filed reply briefs

regarding their respective motions for summary judgment and partial summary judgment

on August 7, 2013. (Docs. 98 and 97.) Defendant also filed a brief in opposition to Logory’s

motion to exclude the expert testimony of Dr. Pizon on that same date. (Doc. 99.)

Therefore, the motions for summary judgement and partial summary judgment, Defendant’s

motion to decertify class, and Logory’s motion to exclude Dr. Pizon’s expert testimony are

ripe for disposition.

A. Legal Standard

DISCUSSION

Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Summary judgment is appropriate when ‘the pleadings, depositions,

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answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’” Wright v. Corning, 679 F.3d 101, 103 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1995)). A fact is material if proof of its existence or nonexistence might affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Where there is no material fact in dispute, the moving party need only establish that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Edelman v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 83 F.3d 68, 70 (3d Cir. 1996). However, where there is a disputed issue of material fact, summary judgment is appropriate only if the factual dispute is not a genuine one. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. An issue of material fact is genuine if “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. Where there is a material fact in dispute, the moving party has the initial burden of proving that: (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact and (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See 2D Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2727 (2d ed. 1983). The moving party may present its own evidence or, where the non-moving party has the burden of proof, simply point out to the court that “the non-moving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
“When considering whether there exist genuine issues of material fact, the court is required to examine the evidence of record in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, and resolve all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.” Wishkin v. Potter, 476 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2007). Once the moving party has satisfied its initial
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burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to either present affirmative evidence supporting its version of the material facts or to refute the moving party's contention that the facts entitle it to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256–57. The Court need not accept mere conclusory allegations, whether they are made in the complaint or a sworn statement. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990).
“To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must show specific facts such that a reasonable jury could find in that party's favor, thereby establishing a genuine issue of fact for trial.” Galli v. N.J. Meadowlands Comm'n, 490 F.3d 265, 270 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). “While the evidence that the non-moving party presents may be either direct or circumstantial, and need not be as great as a preponderance, the evidence must be more than a scintilla.” Id. (quoting Hugh v. Butler Cnty. Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 267 (3d Cir. 2005)). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, “the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
Where cross-motions for summary judgment are filed, as is the case here, the summary judgment standard remains the same. Lawrence v. City of Phila., 527 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2008). Of course, when presented with cross motions for summary judgment, the Court must and does consider the motions separately. See Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 834 F.Supp. 794, 797 (E.D. Pa. 1993), aff'd, 27 F.3d 560 (3d Cir. 1994). B. Summary Judgment Motions
1. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment As noted, Defendant moved for summary judgment on June 12, 2013. First,
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Defendant asserts that the delousing portion of SCCF’s strip search policy is constitutional under Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington, 132 S. Ct 1510, 182 L. Ed. 2d 566 (2013). Second, Defendant contends that the delousing portion of SCCF’s strip search policy is constitutional under the standard set forth in Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 96 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1987). Third, Defendant contends that the decision of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Russell v. Richards, 384 F. 3d 444 (7th Cir. 2004) is “precedential and controlling.” (Doc. 78, 4.) Finally, Defendant requests that the court disqualify the testimony of Logory’s expert, Dr. Michael R. Greenberg.
2. Logory’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Liability Logory’s motion for partial summary judgment was also filed on June 12, 2013. Logory seeks a declaratory judgement that Defendant’s policy and practice of requiring sentenced and pretrial detainees to undergo the mandatory delousing procedure from July 24, 2007, to December 26, 2011, violates the Fourteenth Amendment. In support, Logory contends that the Defendant’s policy is unconstitutional under Turner because: (1) Defendant cannot demonstrate that the policy was rationally related to its interest in maintaining a healthy and sanitary facility by preventing outbreaks of lice; (2) the burden on SCCF of accommodating inmates’ rights to refuse treatment is slight; and (3) an alternative approach of confining high-risk inmates and offering other inmates the choice to undergo delousing accommodates inmates’ rights without impacting SCCF’s valid penological objectives. According to Logory, since there are no material facts in dispute regarding the SCCF’s delousing policy, summary judgment in his favor on liability is appropriate.
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C. Analysis Section 1983 provides that “[e]very person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen . . . or other person . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured, . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To establish liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that the defendants, acting under color of law, violated the plaintiff's federal constitutional or statutory rights, and thereby caused the complained of injury.” Elmore v. Cleary, 399 F.3d 279, 281 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 590 (3d Cir. 1998)). A municipality may be liable under § 1983 if the governmental body itself “subjects” a person to a deprivation of rights or “causes” a person “to be subjected” to such deprivation. See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978). A plaintiff seeking to impose liability on local governments under § 1983 must prove that “action pursuant to official municipal policy” caused their injury. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 694, 98 S. Ct. at 2037.
1. Florence Is Not Determinative Defendant first argues that SCCF’s delousing procedure is constitutional in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington, 132 S. Ct 1510, 182 L. Ed. 2d 566 (2013). The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Florence to address whether the Fourth Amendment required COs to exempt some detainees who were to be admitted to the jail’s general population from the search at issue. Id. at 1515. Admission to the jail included a requirement that “every arrestee . . . shower with a delousing agent.” Id. at 1514. The Supreme Court concluded that the
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search at issue in Florence “struck a reasonable balance between inmate privacy and the needs of the institution.” Id. at 1523. Because the issue here is not inmate privacy but rather the constitutionality of Defendant’s delousing policy in light of inmates’ right to be free from unwanted medical treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment will not be granted on this ground.
2. Application of the Factors Identified in Turner Inmates have a right to refuse unwanted medical treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22, 110 S. Ct 1028, 108 L. Ed. 2d 178 (1990); Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 111 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1990); White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 113 (3d Cir. 1990). When an inmate or detainee alleges that his constitutional rights have been violated by a prison regulation, the regulation is valid if it is “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. See also Harper, 494 U.S. at 224 (“[T]he standard of review we adopted in Turner applies to all circumstances in which the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights.”).2 Logory contends that Defendant’s policy of spraying inmates with Liceall
2 In addition to arguing that Defendant’s delousing policy is invalid under Turner, Logory also advances arguments under the standard set forth in White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103 (3d Cir. 1990). White was decided by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals on February 23, 1990, four (4) days before Harper was decided by the Supreme Court. As indicated in Harper, the standard articulated in Turner governs this case, and Logory’s arguments pursuant to the standard set forth in White will not be considered further. See also Iseley v. Dragovich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 472, 476 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (“The proper inquiry is ‘whether the regulation [at issue] is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests’” under the Turner factors).
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constitutes unwanted medical treatment. Defendant acknowledges that “[b]oth medical experts in this matter have testified that the use of Liceall is a “medical treatment” for the condition of pediculosis.” (Doc. 78, 15.) Although the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Russell “assum[ed] without deciding” that use of Liceall constitutes medical treatment, the Court is not convinced that it does. See Russell, 384 F.3d at 447. However, even if the Court did find that SCCF’s delousing policy qualifies as medical treatment, the policy is constitutional because it reasonably relates to the SCCF’s legitimate penological interest in maintaining a healthy and sanitary facility.
In Turner, the Supreme Court describes various factors “relevant to determining the reasonableness of a prison regulation. . . .” See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90. Harper specifies that three of the factors described in Turner are relevant to determining whether a prison policy infringes on inmates’ right to be free from unwanted medical treatment. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 224. First, “‘there must be a ‘valid, rational connection’ between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it.’” Id. at 224-25 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89). The burden is on the party defending the policy to demonstrate that the policy’s drafters “‘could rationally have seen a connection’ between the policy and the interest.” Wolf v. Ashcroft, 297 F.3d 305, 308 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Waterman v. Farmer, 183 F.3d 208, 217-18 (3d Cir. 1999)). Second, courts should consider “‘the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally.’” Harper, 494 U.S. at 225 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 90). Third, “‘the absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison regulation.’” Id. However, consideration of ready alternatives is not “a ‘least restrictive
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alternative’ test: prison officials do not have to set up and then shoot down every conceivable alternative method of accommodating the claimant’s constitutional complaint.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 90-91 (internal citations omitted).
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals treats the initial Turner factor as a threshold inquiry. “The first factor is ‘foremost’ in the sense that a rational connection is a threshold requirement—if the connection is arbitrary or irrational, then ‘the regulation fails, irrespective of whether the other factors tilt in its favor.’” Wolf, 297 F.3d at 310 (quoting Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 229–30, 121 S. Ct. 1475, 149 L. Ed. 2d 420 (2001)). If a defendant satisfies his initial burden of showing a valid, rational connection between the regulation and a legitimate penological interest, this “‘commences rather than concludes [the] inquiry’” and courts must “proceed to consider the remaining Turner factors in order to draw a conclusion as to the policy's overall reasonableness.” Wolf, 297 F.3d at 310 (quoting DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 53 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc)).
Applying the Turner factors to the case at hand, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment will be granted with respect to the constitutionality of the delousing policy because it is reasonably related to SCCF’s legitimate penological interest in maintaining a healthy and sanitary facility and avoiding outbreaks of lice.
a. There is a Valid, Rational Connection between the SCCF’s Delousing Policy and a Legitimate Governmental Interest
With respect to the first Turner factor, it is not disputed that SCCF has a legitimate interest in maintaining a sanitary facility. (Doc. 89, 3.) However, Logory contends that the threshold inquiry under the first Turner factor is not satisfied because Defendant cannot establish that SCCF’s delousing policy was “actually designed to
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protect” or “in fact protects” this interest. (Doc. 89, 4.) Logory also argues that the delousing policy is unnecessary because he does not consider three (3) cases of lice at the facility in eight (8) to nine (9) years sufficient to justify implementation of a delousing policy. (Doc 89, 3; Doc. 81, 6-8.) Further, Logory contends that the delousing procedure itself was ineffective because the COs at SCCF did not comply with the manufacturer’s directions in their use of Liceall (Doc 89, 3; Doc. 81, 9-12.)
Defendant contends that the connection between preventative lice treatment and the goal of maintaining a healthy and sanitary facility is clear and rational. (Doc. 78, 10.) In response to Logory’s assertion that delousing is unnecessary, Defendant does not dispute the number of recorded instances of lice at SCCF, but argues both that “there is no magic number” of lice outbreaks in the prison setting that triggers the necessity of a delousing policy, and that the low incidence of reported lice at the prison “may well be precisely because of the Defendant’s routine delousing.” (Doc. 98, 2.)
A party’s initial burden under Turner is slight, and in certain instances “may be a matter of common sense.” Wolf, 297 F.3d at 308-09. To be sure, a party must demonstrate the rational connection between the policy and the interest by more than “‘a conclusory assertion,’” but a showing of actual or factual connection, as Logory contends, is not required. See Jones v. Brown, 461 F.3d 353, 360 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Wolf, 297 F.3d at 308).
When a prison policy aims to minimize the risk of a harmful occurrence, to find a rational connection between the policy and the facility’s interest in preventing that harmful occurrence, there must be some “rational basis for believing there was a nonnegligible risk” that the harm will occur. See Jones, 461 F.3d at 361 (finding no rational
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relationship between a prison’s policy of opening mail in the absence of inmate addressees and its interest in protecting the safety of the prison by reducing the risk of anthrax contamination two (2) years after the events of September 11, 2001 and of October of 2001, when letters containing anthrax spores were posted). Here, the parties do not dispute that there have been at least three (3) reported cases of lice at the prison during the class period. This is more than a “non-negligible risk” of a lice outbreak at the prison, and is therefore sufficient to demonstrate a rational connection between the prison’s delousing policy and its interest in maintaining a healthy and sanitary facility.
Contrary to Logory’s contentions, the effectiveness of SCCF’s delousing policy as implemented is not material to whether the policy's drafters could rationally have seen a connection between the delousing policy and maintaining a healthy and sanitary facility under to the initial Turner factor. The parties agree that the COs did not uniformly follow the manufacturers precise instructions for applying Liceall. For instance, inmates were not always instructed to leave the product in their hair for ten (10) minutes prior to showering, and inmates were not subject to a combing out procedure afterwards. Although failure to precisely follow the Liceall directions may have made the delousing procedure less effective than it could have been had COs strictly adhered to the instructions, this failure to comply with the directions does not defeat the rational connection between SCCF’s policy and its legitimate penological interest. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that there was a rational connection between a jail’s legitimate interests and its “prophylactic approach of giving a cup of delousing shampoo to each inmate when he arrives at the jail and instructs him to use it in the shower,” despite the fact that COs did not abide by the manufacturer’s directions. See Russell,
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384 F.3d at 448 (“[T]he policy might be more effective if the jail also instructed the inmate to leave the shampoo in his hair for the recommended period of 10 minutes . . . and/or supplied a follow-up dose as recommended by the manufacturer.”).
Logory argues that Russell should be distinguished from the case at hand because in Russell inmates were given Liceall in a disposable cup, as opposed to being sprayed with it before a shower. The Court already found that the difference between a policy requiring self application of delousing shampoo followed by a supervised shower and being sprayed with a delousing shampoo followed by an unsupervised shower is de minimus and does not “materially alter the Fourth Amendment analysis.” Logory v. County of Susquehanna, 277 F.R.D. 135, 142 (M.D. Pa. 2011). Similarly, in the context of a Fourteenth Amendment analysis, this difference in method of application does not greatly impact the determination of whether there is a rational connection between a prison’s policy and its legitimate penological interest.
Logory also attempts to distinguish Russell by highlighting that the prison in that case had “endured a number of lice outbreaks in the past,” which demonstrated that the risk of lice was “more than an abstract possibility.” Id. at 448-49. He argues that Defendant cannot make a similar demonstration about the possibility of a lice outbreak at SCCF. (Doc. 89, 9.) Because the court did not specify that record of a precise number lice outbreaks was necessary to find that the prison policy was valid in Russell, the Court agrees with Defendant that this potential difference is insufficient to distinguish the two cases. Furthermore, the three (3) reported cases of lice at SCCF during the class period demonstrate that a lice outbreak was more than an “abstract” or theoretical possibility at the facility.
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b. Accommodating Inmates’ Right to Refuse Unwanted Medical Treatment Would Substantially Burden Defendant
With respect to the second relevant Turner factor, Logory suggests that SCCF’s current delousing policy shows that inmates’ right to refuse unwanted medical treatment can be accommodated without substantially burdening the guards, inmates, and allocation of SCCF resources generally. (Doc. 89, 5.) Alternatively, Logory suggests that Defendant could have implemented a delousing protocol “whereby detainees whom Corrections Officers actually suspected were infected with lice would be placed in isolation until they could be seen by medical personnel, and upon a finding that they were in fact infected with lice, these inmates would be treated.” Id. Logory relies on the expert report of Dr. Greenberg for this suggestion. (Doc. 81, Ex. 21). Further, Logory contends that this alternative procedure is feasible because SCCF “already has facilities available to isolate inmates if necessary for medical conditions and new admissions are routinely seen by medical staff.” (Doc. 81, 29.) In addition, Logory suggests that inmates could be given the option of showering with a delousing solution. (Doc. 81, 29.)
According to Defendant, “[i]f it is determined that an inmate had head-lice, he or she is placed into isolation . . . [and] is not returned to the general population until he or she is cleared by medical.” (Doc. 83, Ex. 20 ¶ 21). However, SCCF does not have the physical space to individually isolate all incoming inmates and detainees until they are examined by a physician to determine whether they harbor lice. (Doc. 98, Ex. A ¶ 10.) Specifically, Warden Conigliaro states that SCCF only has two (2) isolation cells, and the only other available space in the prison that could accommodate individual isolation prior to a medical examination is the “special housing” block. Id. at ¶¶ 10-11. For security
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reasons, Defendant notes that detainees cannot be housed in the “special housing” block for this purpose. Id. Further, according to Conigliaro, more than fifty (50) percent of incoming detainees are either dirty in appearance, homeless, have a history of intravenous drug use, are incoming from overcrowded conditions, or are admitted due to alcohol related offenses, and that, according to Logory’s expert, all of these people would require isolation because they would qualify as “high risk.” Id. at ¶¶ 4-5. Logory has failed to offer evidence supporting his contention that it would not be substantially burdensome for SCCF to isolate all high-risk incoming detainees. Therefore, despite Defendant’s evidence to the contrary, Logory has failed to offer evidence demonstrating that his proposed method of accommodating inmates’ rights would not substantially burden other inmates, staff, and allocation of SCCF resources generally under the second relevant Turner factor.
Further, if Defendant allowed inmates the right to refuse delousing, this would also result in a substantial burden on other inmates, guards, and prison resources generally. Given the option, infected incoming inmates could elect not to treat themselves with Liceall, enter the general prison population with lice, and expose other inmates and staff to infestation. As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals explained in Russell, “[p]ermitting the individual inmate to reject the delousing shampoo thus would place the health and sanitation of the other prisoners and jail staff at risk . . . .” Russell, 384 F.3d at 449. Therefore, accommodating inmates’ rights by offering them the option of using delousing shampoo would be a substantial burden for Defendant.
Finally, with respect to Logory’s initial argument that SCCF’s current delousing policy accommodates inmates’ rights without substantially burdening Defendant, the
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Court agrees with Defendant that SCCF’s delousing policy did not change significantly when Liceall was replaced by Pre-Emptive Strike. Beyond product name, it is not clear that there is a material difference between the two delousing products.3 Therefore, it appears that the only remaining difference between the delousing policy at issue and the policy in place as of December 27, 2011, is the method of application of the delousing solution: Liceall was sprayed on inmates and Pre-Emptive Strike is dispensed to prisoners in a disposable cup. As noted above, this difference is de minimus and thus does not represent an accommodation of inmates’ right to be free from unwanted medical treatment.
c. Reasonable Alternatives Under the final Turner factor, the absence of ready alternatives to a given prison regulation is evidence of the reasonableness of the regulation. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. “By the same token, the existence of obvious, easy alternatives may be evidence that the regulation is not reasonable, but is an ‘exaggerated response’ to prison concerns.” Id. More specifically, “if an inmate claimant can point to an alternative that fully accommodates the prisoner’s rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests, a court may consider that as evidence that the regulation does not satisfy the reasonable relationship standard.” Id. at 90-91. The parties arguments under the final Turner factor overlap with those made with respect to the second relevant factor. In terms of the availability of reasonable
3 Logory contends that Pre-Emptive Strike differs from Liceall because it has not been approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). (Doc. 83, Ex. 21.) The Court does not find this distinction to be sufficiently meaningful.
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alternatives, in addition to the approach advanced by Logory’s expert addressed above, Logory seems to assert that the policies of other correctional facilities in the state represent reasonable alternatives to SCCF’s disputed policy. Specifically, he contends that “it is significant that other Pennsylvania Correctional Facilities do not require inmates to submit to a delousing medical procedure upon admission.” (Doc. 81, 17.) In support of this position, Logory references a number of different policies from correctional facilities across the state that differ from the policy employed at SCCF.
Because consideration of ready alternatives is not a “least restrictive alternative” test, the fact that other prisons in the state employ different delousing procedures does not alone demonstrate that Defendant’s delousing policy is an exaggerated response to prison concerns, rendering it unconstitutional. Moreover, the policies of the other facilities referenced by Logory either afford inmates the option of applying a delousing solution or simply decline to engage in a delousing procedure altogether. (Pl.’s SMF ¶¶ 63-66.) Just as allowing inmates the option of treating themselves with delousing solution poses a substantial burden on Defendant as noted above, it would also pose more than a “de minimis” cost to the valid penological interest of SCCF of maintaining a healthy and sanitary facility by preventing outbreaks of lice. The same reasoning applies to the alternative policy of declining to implement a delousing procedure altogether. Therefore, in the absence of an alternative that fully accommodates inmates’ rights at a de minimis cost to valid penological interests, Defendant’s policy appears to be reasonable under the final Turner factor despite the fact that other facilities in the state employ different delousing procedures.
19

3. Plaintiff’s Expert is Not Disqualified The Court considered the expert testimony of Dr. Greenberg in deciding to grant Defendant’s motion for summary judgment with respect to the constitutionality of the SCCF delousing policy under the Fourteenth Amendment and to deny Logory’s motion for partial summary judgment. As such, Defendant’s motion to for summary judgment is denied with respect to disqualification of Dr. Greenberg’s expert testimony. D. Logory’s Motion to Exclude Defendant’s Expert Logory moved to exclude testimony of Defendant’s expert Anthony Pizon, M.D. on July 23, 2013 on the basis that he fails to exhibit the proper qualifications to discuss appropriate procedures at Defendant’s correctional facility. Because the Court will grant Defendant’s motion for summary judgment without relying on this testimony, Logory’s motion to exclude testimony of Defendant’s expert will be denied as moot. E. Defendant’s Motion to Decertify Class Because the Court will grant summary judgment for Defendant with respect to the constitutionality of SCCF’s delousing policy, Defendant’s motion to decertify class will be denied as moot.
CONCLUSION For all the above reasons, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 77) will be granted with respect to the constitutionality of the delousing policy and denied with respect to disqualification of Logory’s expert witness. Logory’s partial motion for summary judgment (Doc. 80) will be denied. Logory’s motion to exclude the expert testimony of Dr. Pizon (Doc. 88) and Defendant’s motion to decertify class (Doc. 93) will be denied as moot.
20

An appropriate Order follows.
September 13, 2013 Date

/s/ A. Richard Caputo A. Richard Caputo United States District Judge

21

 
 Case: 3:09-cv-01448-ARC As of: 01/28/2019 10:50 AM EST 1 of 9
CLOSED,SCR,STANDARD,STAYED
United States District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania (Scranton) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:09−cv−01448−ARC

Logory v. The County of Susquehanna Assigned to: Honorable A. Richard Caputo Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff Roneld Logory individually and on behalf of a Class of others similarly situated

Date Filed: 07/24/2009 Date Terminated: 09/30/2013 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Alexandra C. Warren Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca, LLP 4725 Wisconsin Avenue NW Suite 200 Washington, DC 20016 202−789−3960 Fax: 202−789−3960 Email: awarren@cuneolaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Beverly Steinberg−Sporn 50 Brooks Bend Princeton, NJ 08540 609 688−1202 Fax: 609 586−9702 Email: bevspo@gmail.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brendan S. Thompson Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca, LLP 4725 Wisconsin Avenue NW Suite 200 Washington, DC 20016 (202) 789−3960 Fax: (202) 789−1813 Email: brendant@cuneolaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Charles J. LaDuca Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca, LLP 4725 Wisconsin Avenue NW Suite 200 Washington, DC 20016 202−789−3960 Fax: 202−789−1813 Email: charlesl@cuneolaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elmer Robert Keach , III Law Offices of Elmer Robert Keach, III, PC One Pine West Plaza Suite 109 Albany, NY 12205 518.434.1718 Email: bobkeach@keachlawfirm.com TERMINATED: 10/29/2009

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LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel C. Levin Levin Sedran & Berman 510 Walnut Street Suite 500 Philadelphia, PA 19106 215−592−1500 Email: dlevin@lfsblaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant The County of Susquehanna

represented by Michael J. Donohue Kreder, Brooks, Hailstone, LLP 220 Penn Avenue Suite 200 Scranton, PA 18503 570−346−7922 Fax: 3463715 Email: mdonohue@kbh−law.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 07/24/2009 07/27/2009 07/28/2009 07/28/2009
08/05/2009 08/06/2009
08/07/2009 08/19/2009
08/20/2009

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against The County of Susquehanna ( Filing fee $350, Receipt Number 1633221), filed by Roneld Logory. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 summons)(lh, ) (Entered: 07/27/2009)
Summons Issued as to The County of Susquehanna and provided to Attorney for service on Defendant(s)sent 7/27/09. (lh, ) (Entered: 07/27/2009)
SPECIAL ADMISSION FORM AND ECF REGISTRATE FORM SENT to Elmer Keach, Esquire (am) (Entered: 07/28/2009)
2 LETTER The above−referenced action has been assigned to me. To ensure that the Case Management Conference is conducted in a timely manner, you are directed to file a written report within thirty (30) days as to whether service has been effected or a waiver of service obtained.Signed by Honorable Thomas I. Vanaskie on 7/28/09. (jfg) (Entered: 07/28/2009)
3 NOTICE of Appearance by Michael J. Donohue on behalf of The County of Susquehanna (Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 08/05/2009)
4 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Alexandra C. Warren on behalf of Roneld Logory Attorney Brendan S. Thompson is seeking special admission. Filing fee $ 25, receipt number 03140000000001642453., filed by on behalf of Roneld Logory.(Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 08/06/2009)
5 ORDER re 4 Petition for Special Admission − Pro Hac Vice, filed by Roneld Logory. Special Admission granted for Brendan S. Thompson. Signed by Honorable Thomas I. Vanaskie on 8/7/09. (jfg) (Entered: 08/07/2009)
6 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Beverly Steinberg−Sporn on behalf of Roneld Logory Attorney Beverlt Steinberg Sporn is seeking special admission. Filing Fee: 25.00 Receipt Number: 333011127. (ts, ) (Entered: 08/19/2009)
7 ORDER re 6 Petition for Special Admission − Pro Hac Vice filed by Roneld Logory. Special Admission granted for Atty Steinberg−Sporn. Signed by Honorable Thomas I. Vanaskie on 8/20/09. (jfg) (Entered: 08/20/2009)

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08/21/2009 08/25/2009 08/26/2009 08/27/2009 09/15/2009 09/23/2009 10/28/2009 10/29/2009 10/29/2009 11/19/2009 11/24/2009
01/20/2010 02/01/2010 02/02/2010
03/16/2010 04/21/2010 04/28/2010 04/28/2010 05/05/2010

SPECIAL ADMISSION FORM SENT to Charles J. LaDuca. (jc) (Entered: 08/21/2009)
8 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Roneld Logory. The County of Susquehanna served on 8/10/2009, answer due 8/31/2009. (Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 08/25/2009)
9 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 1 Complaint by The County of Susquehanna. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Concurrence)(Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 08/26/2009)
10 ORDER granting 9 Motion for Extension of Time to Answer The County of Susquehanna answer due 9/30/2009. Signed by Honorable Thomas I. Vanaskie on August 27, 2009 (Vanaskie, Thomas) (Entered: 08/27/2009)
11 ORDER: Case Management Conference set for 11/24/2009 08:30 AM in Scranton before Honorable Thomas I. Vanaskie.Signed by Honorable Thomas I. Vanaskie on 9/15/09. (jfg) (Entered: 09/15/2009)
12 ANSWER to 1 Complaint AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES by The County of Susquehanna.(Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 09/23/2009)
13 NOTICE of Appearance by Daniel C. Levin on behalf of Roneld Logory (Levin, Daniel) (Entered: 10/28/2009)
15 WITHDRAWAL OF ATTORNEY APPEARANCE − Attorney Elmer Robert Keach, III terminated on behalf of Roneld Logory. (Keach, Elmer) (Entered: 10/29/2009)
DOCKET ANNOTATION: Attorney Keach is asked to refiled document 14 as Attorney Withdrawl of Appearance found under Other Documents. Will delete document 14 once the corrected document is filed. (cw, ) (Entered: 10/29/2009)
16 CASE MANAGEMENT PLAN (Joint) by Roneld Logory. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 11/19/2009)
18 ORDER 1. Plaintiff shall move for class certification no later than Thursday, April 1, 2010. 2. All fact discovery for class certification shall be commenced in time to be completed by Monday, March 1, 2010. 3. No discovery motion shall be filed until after the disputing parties have conferred with the Court in an effort to resolve the discovery dispute. The discovery conference with the Courtmay be conducted by telephone at the request of any of the disputing parties.4. On or before Monday, February 1, 2010, Plaintiff shall provide the Court with a written report concerning the status of discovery. Signed by Honorable Thomas I. Vanaskie on 11/24/09. (jfg) (Entered: 11/24/2009)
19 Letter from Michael J. Donohue, Esquire to Judge Vanaskie regarding deadlines. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 01/20/2010)
20 STATUS REPORT by Roneld Logory. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 02/01/2010)
21 ORDER 1. The deadline for Class Certification discovery is hereby extended to May 10, 2010; 2. The deadline for Plaintiff to file a Motion for Class Certification is hereby extended to June 10, 2010. Signed by Honorable Thomas I. Vanaskie on 2/2/10. (jfg) (Entered: 02/02/2010)
22 NOTICE of Change of Address by Alexandra C. Warren (Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 03/16/2010)
23 Letter from Defendant, County of Susquehanna. (Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 04/21/2010)
24 Letter from Defendant, The County of Susquehanna. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 04/28/2010)
25 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by The County of Susquehanna for Bates Stamped Intake Log Books (Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 04/28/2010)
26 ORDER 1. The deadline for Class Certification discovery is hereby extended to July 31, 2010 ; 2. The deadline for Plaintiff to file a Motion for Class Certification is

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06/29/2010 07/29/2010 08/05/2010 08/09/2010 08/31/2010 08/31/2010 08/31/2010 09/02/2010 09/10/2010 09/10/2010
09/20/2010 09/21/2010
10/05/2010 10/05/2010 10/08/2010

hereby extended to August 31, 2010. Signed by Honorable Thomas I. Vanaskie on 5/5/10. (jfg) (Entered: 05/05/2010)
27 VERBAL ORDER − Case Reassigned to Chief Judge Yvette Kane. Honorable Thomas I. Vanaskie no longer assigned to the case. (admin, ) (Entered: 06/29/2010)
28 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Daniel C. Levin on behalf of all plaintiffs Attorney Daniel C. Levin is seeking special admission. Filing fee $ 50, receipt number 03140000000001943019.. (Levin, Daniel) (Entered: 07/29/2010)
VERBAL ORDER REASSIGNING CASE. Case reassigned to Honorable A. Richard Caputo for all further proceedings. Chief Judge Yvette Kane no longer assigned to case. (kc, ) (Entered: 08/05/2010)
29 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Daniel C. Levin.Signed by Chief Judge Yvette Kane on 08/02/2010. (pjr) (Entered: 08/09/2010)
DOCKET ANNOTATION: Document #30 Motion to Certify & #31 "Declaration deleted, attorney will re−file correctly. (ga, ) (Entered: 08/31/2010)
30 MOTION to Certify Class by Roneld Logory. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Certificate of Nonconcurrence, # 3 Exhibit(s) Certificate of Service)(Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 08/31/2010)
31 MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation by Roneld Logory. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Certificate of Concurrence, # 3 Exhibit(s) Certificate of Service)(Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 08/31/2010)
32 ORDER granting 31 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Plaintiff may file a brief in support of the motion for class certification not to exceed 30 pages in length. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 9/2/10 (jam, ) (Entered: 09/02/2010)
33 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 30 MOTION to Certify Class filed by Roneld Logory. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Certificate of Service)(Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 09/10/2010)
34 DECLARATION by Roneld Logory re 30 MOTION to Certify Class (Declaration of Alexandra C. Warren in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) 1, Part 1, Conigliaro Deposition, # 2 Exhibit(s) 1, Part 2, Conigliaro Deposition, # 3 Exhibit(s) 2, Smith Deposition, # 4 Exhibit(s) 3, Khalil Deposition, # 5 Exhibit(s) 4, Cama Deposition, # 6 Exhibit(s) 5, Moore Deposition, # 7 Exhibit(s) 6, Stewart Deposition, # 8 Exhibit(s) 7, Hunsinger Deposition, # 9 Exhibit(s) 8, Lucas Deposition, # 10 Exhibit(s) 9, LiceAll Label, # 11 Exhibit(s) 10, Logory Deposition, # 12 Exhibit(s) 11, Policy 8.1, # 13 Exhibit(s) 12, Policy 15.1, # 14 Exhibit(s) 13, Inmate Guide and Rule Book, # 15 Exhibit(s) 14, Inmate Handbook, # 16 Exhibit(s) 15, Firm Resumes, # 17 Exhibit(s) Certificate of Service)(Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 09/10/2010)
35 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Responsive Brief, MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation by The County of Susquehanna. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Concurrence, # 2 Proposed Order)(Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 09/20/2010)
36 ORDER granting 35 Motion for Extension of Time to File; granting 35 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Defendant's Brief in Opposition to Approval of Class Certification shall be filed no later than 10/20/10. Defendant's Brief may be a maximum of 30 pages in length. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 9/21/10 (jam, ) (Entered: 09/22/2010)
37 RESPONSE by The County of Susquehanna to 34 Declaration,,,. (Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 10/05/2010)
38 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 30 MOTION to Certify Class filed by The County of Susquehanna. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) "A" − Florence Citation, # 2 Exhibit(s) "B" − Affidavit of Paralegal Mary C. Collins)(Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 10/05/2010)
39 Letter from Alexandra C. Warren Requesting That Court Schedule Telephonic Conference. (Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 10/08/2010)

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10/13/2010 10/14/2010 11/02/2010 11/02/2010 11/04/2010 11/05/2010 07/29/2011 07/29/2011 08/29/2011
09/13/2011 09/22/2011 10/06/2011

40 MOTION for Extension of Time to With Respect to Class Certification Briefing by Roneld Logory. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Certificate of Concurrence, # 3 Exhibit(s) Certificate of Service)(Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 10/13/2010)
41 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 40 Motion for an Extension of Time with Respect to Class Certification Briefing. ORDERED that Plaintiff shall file a reply brief in support of the motion for class certification no later than 11/2/10. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 10/14/10 (jam, ) (Entered: 10/14/2010)
42 REPLY BRIEF re 30 MOTION to Certify Class filed by Roneld Logory. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order (Revised), # 2 Exhibit(s) Certificate of Service)(Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 11/02/2010)
43 AFFIDAVIT in Support re 30 MOTION to Certify Class by Alexandra C. Warren (Second) filed by Roneld Logory. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A, # 2 Exhibit(s) B, # 3 Exhibit(s) C, # 4 Exhibit(s) D, # 5 Exhibit(s) Certificate of Service)(Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 11/02/2010)
44 MOTION for Leave to File A RESPONSIVE BRIEF TO THE PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION by The County of Susquehanna. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Concurrence, # 2 Proposed Order)(Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 11/04/2010)
45 ORDER denying 44 Motion for Leave to File Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 11/5/10 (jam, ) (Entered: 11/05/2010)
46 MOTION for Leave to File Supplemental Brief Relative to Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification in order to discuss the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Wal−Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, et al. by The County of Susquehanna. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 07/29/2011)
47 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 46 MOTION for Leave to File Supplemental Brief Relative to Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification in order to discuss the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Wal−Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, et al. filed by The County of Susquehanna.(Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 07/29/2011)
48 ORDER granting 46 Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Brief. Defendant granted leave to file Brief relative to the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Walmart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, et al within 20 days of the date of this Order. Plaintiff shall have 30 days after the filing of Defendant's Motion to file a Responsive Brief. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 8/29/11 (jam, ) (Entered: 08/29/2011)
49 SUR REPLY to REPLY to Response to Motion re 30 MOTION to Certify Class filed by The County of Susquehanna.(Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 09/13/2011)
50 BRIEF IN SUPPORT (Supplemental) re 30 MOTION to Certify Class filed by Roneld Logory.(Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 09/22/2011)
51 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting in part 30 Motion to Certify Class. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the class hereby certified as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3) on behalf of the following class:All persons who have been placed into custody of the Susquehanna County Jail after being sentenced or as pre−trial detainees who were deloused upon their entry into the Susquehanna County Jail. The Class period commences on or about July 24, 2007 and extends to the date on which the Defendant is enjoined from, or otherwise ceases, enforcing its unconstitutional policy, practice and custom of delousing detainees absent reasonable suspicion. Specifically excluded from the Class are Defendant and any and all of its respective affiliates, legal representatives, heirs, successors, employees or assignees. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall submit in writing their joint plan of class notice that complies with the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(c)(2)(B) within twenty−one (21) days of the date of this Opinion & Order; andIT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Roneld Logory is designated Class Representative on behalf of the Class; andIT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's attorneys Charles J. LaDuca and Alexandra C. Warren of Cueno Gilbert & LaDuca, LLP; Beverly Steinberg−Sporn; and Daniel Levin of Levin Fishbein Sedran & Berman; are designated as Class Counsel. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 10/5/11 (jam, ) (Entered: 10/06/2011)

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10/20/2011
10/21/2011
10/24/2011 10/26/2011 10/28/2011
12/06/2011 01/19/2012 01/30/2012
02/01/2012 02/10/2012 02/13/2012 05/15/2012 08/13/2012 08/23/2012 08/30/2012 09/25/2012 09/27/2012

52 MOTION to Stay Proceedings Pending Appeal to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals by The County of Susquehanna. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Petition for Permission to Appeal Order of October 5, 2011, # 2 Proposed Order)(Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 10/20/2011)
53 CERTIFICATE of (AMENDED) Concurrence by The County of Susquehanna re 52 MOTION to Stay Proceedings Pending Appeal to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) "A"− Confirmatory e−mail)(Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 10/21/2011)
54 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 52 MOTION to Stay Proceedings Pending Appeal to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals filed by The County of Susquehanna.(Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 10/24/2011)
55 MOTION for Extension of Time to File A Joint Plan For Class Notice by The County of Susquehanna. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 10/26/2011)
56 ORDER granting 55 Motion for Extension of Time to File. In the event Defendant's Petition for Permission to Appeal is denied by the Third Circuit, Defendant shall have 10 days following the denial of the Petition to file a Joint Plan of Class Notice Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 10/28/11 (jam, ) (Entered: 10/28/2011)
57 ORDER granting 52 Motion to Stay Pending Appeal to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 12/6/11 (jam, ) (Entered: 12/06/2011)
58 ORDER of USCA denying Petition for Leave to Appeal pursuant to Fed. r. Civ.P. 23(f). (White Banks, Desiree) (Entered: 01/19/2012)
59 STIPULATION of Defendant by The County of Susquehanna. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) "A" − Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit(s) "B" − Joint Plan for Notice to the Class, # 3 Exhibit(s) "C" − Notice of Pendency of Class action)(Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 01/30/2012)
60 ORDER re: Joint Plan for Notice to the Class. See Order for specific details. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 1/31/12. (jam, ) (Entered: 02/01/2012)
61 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to Effectuate Class Notice by Roneld Logory. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 02/10/2012)
62 ORDER granting 61 pltf's Motion to Extend Time with respect to Effectuating Class Notice. Pltf shall disseminate Notice to the Class no later than 4/17/12.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 2/13/12 (ao, ) (Entered: 02/13/2012)
63 AFFIDAVIT Regarding Class Notice filed by Roneld Logory of Affiant Alexandra C. Warren. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Affidavit of McGladrey LLP)(Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 05/15/2012)
64 Letter from All Counsel Regarding Scheduling . (Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 08/13/2012)
65 NOTICE : PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that a conference call re: status of case has been scheduled for 8/29/12 at 9:30 AM. Plaintiffs' counsel shall initiate the call. (jam, ) (Entered: 08/23/2012)
67 NOTICE: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that a Conference Call has been scheduled for SEPTEMBER 25, 2012 at 9:00 AM. Plainitff's counsel shall initiate the call. (jam, ) (Entered: 08/30/2012)
68 Letter from Alexandra Warren Regarding Scheduling Order . (Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 09/25/2012)
70 CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER − STANDARD CASE MANAGEMENT TRACK. Deadline for Plaintiff to issue additional written discovery is 10/1/12. Deadline for Defendant to respond is 10/31/12. Plaintiff to serve expert reports by 11/30/12. Defendant to serve expert reports by 1/29/13. Plaintiff to serve rebuttal expert reports by 2/12/13. Expert depositions completed by 4/12/13. Dispositive motions, together with supporting documents, shall be filed no later than 6/12/13. Pretrial conference

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02/11/2013 02/15/2013
06/07/2013 06/10/2013 06/10/2013 06/11/2013 06/12/2013 06/12/2013 06/12/2013
06/12/2013 06/12/2013 06/12/2013
06/12/2013

shall be held in September 2013. Ghis case placed on the October 2013 trial list. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 9/27/12. (jam, ) (Entered: 09/27/2012)
71 MOTION to Amend/Correct 70 Case Management Order − Standard Track,, (Scheduling Order) with Certificate of Concurrence by The County of Susquehanna. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 02/11/2013)
72 AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER: 1) The deadline for defendant to serve responsive expert reports is extended to February 15, 2013 2) The deadline for Plaintiff to serve rebuttal expert reports is extended to March 15, 2013. 3) Expert depositions shall be completed no later than April 30, 2013 4) Dispositive motions together with supporting documents shall be filed no later than June 12, 2013 5) A final pre−trial conference shall be held on September, 2013 6) This case is placed in the Court's October, 2013 trial list. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 2/15/13. (ts) (Entered: 02/15/2013)
73 MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation by Roneld Logory. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Concurrence, # 2 Exhibit(s) − Certificate of Service, # 3 Proposed Order)(Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 06/07/2013)
74 MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation with Certificate of Concurrence by The County of Susquehanna. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 06/10/2013)
75 ORDER granting 73 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Plaintiff may file a brief in support of the motion for summary judgment not to exceed 30 pages in length. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 6/10/13 (jam) (Entered: 06/10/2013)
76 ORDER granting 74 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Defendant may file a Brief in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment not to exceed 30 pages. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 6/11/13 (jam) (Entered: 06/11/2013)
77 MOTION for Summary Judgment by The County of Susquehanna. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 06/12/2013)
78 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 77 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by The County of Susquehanna.(Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 06/12/2013)
79 STATEMENT OF FACTS re 78 Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, 77 MOTION for Summary Judgment (Exhibits to be filed with the Clerk) filed by The County of Susquehanna.(Donohue, Michael) (Additional attachment(s) added on 6/13/2013: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B (part 1), # 3 Exhibit B (part 2), # 4 Exhibit C (part 1), # 5 Exhibit C (part 2), # 6 Exhibit D, # 7 Exhibit E, # 8 Exhibit F, # 9 Exhibit G, # 10 Exhibit H, # 11 Exhibit I, # 12 Exhibit J, # 13 Exhibit K, # 14 Exhibit L, # 15 Exhibit M, # 16 Exhibit N) (rm). (Entered: 06/12/2013)
80 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment by Roneld Logory. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Nonconcurrence, # 2 Exhibit(s) − Certificate of Service, # 3 Proposed Order)(Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 06/12/2013)
81 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 80 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Roneld Logory. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) − Certificate of Service)(Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 06/12/2013)
82 AFFIDAVIT in Support re 80 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Roneld Logory. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) − Certificate of Service, # 2 Exhibit(s) − 1, Conigliaro Deposition (Part 1), # 3 Exhibit(s) − 1, Conigliaro Deposition (Part 2), # 4 Exhibit(s) − 2, Smith Deposition, # 5 Exhibit(s) − 3, Khalil Deposition, # 6 Exhibit(s) − 4, Cama Deposition, # 7 Exhibit(s) − 5, Moore Deposition, # 8 Exhibit(s) − 6, Stewart Deposition, # 9 Exhibit(s) − 7, Hunsinger Deposition, # 10 Exhibit(s) − 8, Lucas Deposition, # 11 Exhibit(s) − 9, Liceall Label, # 12 Exhibit(s) − 10, Logory Deposition)(Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 06/12/2013)
83 AFFIDAVIT in Support re 80 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Roneld Logory. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) − 11, Susquehanna Jail Policy 8.1, # 2 Exhibit(s) − 12, Susquehanna County Jail Policy 15.1, # 3 Exhibit(s) − 13, Susquehanna County Inmate Guide and Rule Book, # 4 Exhibit(s) − 14, Susquehanna County Correctional Facility Inmate Handbook, # 5 Exhibit(s) − 15, Plaintiff's First

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06/12/2013
06/12/2013 06/18/2013 06/20/2013 07/23/2013 07/23/2013 07/23/2013 07/23/2013 07/23/2013 07/23/2013 07/23/2013 07/24/2013 07/24/2013 08/07/2013

Set of Document Requests, # 6 Exhibit(s) − 16, Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Request for Production of Documents, # 7 Exhibit(s) − 17, Defendant's Supplemental Responses to Plaintiff's Discovery Requests, # 8 Exhibit(s) − 18, Liceall Advertisement, # 9 Exhibit(s) − 19, Plaintiff's Second Set of Interrogatories, # 10 Exhibit(s) − 20, Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Second Set of Interrogatories, # 11 Exhibit(s) − 21, Expert Report of Michael R. Greenberg, M.D., M.B.A. (Dec. 12, 2012), # 12 Exhibit(s) − 22, Expert Report of Michael R. Greenberg, M.D., M.B.A. (March 8, 2013))(Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 06/12/2013)
84 AFFIDAVIT in Support re 80 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Roneld Logory. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) − 23, Greenberg Deposition, # 2 Exhibit(s) − 24, Reply Expert Report of Anthony F. Pizon, M.D. (Feb. 11, 2013), # 3 Exhibit(s) − 25, Pizon Deposition, # 4 Exhibit(s) − 26, Conigliaro Memorandum, # 5 Exhibit(s) − 27, Susquehanna Jail Policy 16.5, # 6 Exhibit(s) − 28, Clinton County Correctional Facility Policy, # 7 Exhibit(s) − 29, Philadelphia Prisons Policies and Procedures, # 8 Exhibit(s) − 30, Philadelphia Police Department, Directive 7, # 9 Exhibit(s) − 31, Dauphin County Prison Policy 9.20, # 10 Exhibit(s) − 32, County of Allegheny Policy #21, # 11 Exhibit(s) − 33, Cestra Deposition (relevant portions))(Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 06/12/2013)
85 STATEMENT OF FACTS re 80 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment , 81 Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Roneld Logory. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) − Certificate of Service)(Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 06/12/2013)
86 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Brief in Opposition to Motions for Summary Judgment and Reply Briefs filed by The County of Susquehanna. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 06/18/2013)
87 ORDER granting 86 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply re 80 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment , 77 MOTION for Summary Judgment Brief in Opposition due by 7/23/2013 Reply Brief due by 8/7/2013.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 6/20/13 (jam) (Entered: 06/20/2013)
88 MOTION to Exclude Testimony of Defendant's Expert Anthony Pizon, M.D. by Roneld Logory. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A, # 2 Exhibit(s) B, # 3 Exhibit(s) C)(Levin, Daniel) (Entered: 07/23/2013)
89 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 77 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Roneld Logory.(Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 07/23/2013)
90 ANSWER TO STATEMENT OF FACTS re 79 Statement of Facts,, filed by Roneld Logory.(Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 07/23/2013)
91 Praecipe Praecipe to Attach Certification of Daniel C. Levin to Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude Testimony of Defendant's Expert Anthony Pizon, M.D.. (Levin, Daniel) (Entered: 07/23/2013)
92 ANSWER TO STATEMENT OF FACTS filed by The County of Susquehanna.(Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 07/23/2013)
93 MOTION to Decertify Class by The County of Susquehanna.(Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 07/23/2013)
94 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 80 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment filed by The County of Susquehanna.(Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 07/23/2013)
95 BRIEF IN SUPPORT of Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude Testimony of Defendant's Expert Anthony Pizon, M.D. re 88 MOTION to Exclude Testimony of Defendant's Expert Anthony Pizon, M.D. filed by Roneld Logory. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A, # 2 Exhibit(s) B, # 3 Exhibit(s) C)(Levin, Daniel) (Entered: 07/24/2013)
96 Praecipe to Attach the Certification of Daniel C. Levin, Esquire to to Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude Testimony of Defendant's Expert Anthony Pizon, M.D. . (Levin, Daniel) (Entered: 07/24/2013)
97 REPLY BRIEF re 80 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Roneld Logory.(Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 08/07/2013)

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08/07/2013 08/07/2013 08/08/2013 09/13/2013 09/13/2013
09/30/2013

98 REPLY BRIEF re 77 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by The County of Susquehanna. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) "A" − Affidavit of Warden Conigliaro)(Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 08/07/2013)
99 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 88 MOTION to Exclude Testimony of Defendant's Expert Anthony Pizon, M.D. filed by The County of Susquehanna. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) "A" − CV of Dr. Anthony F. Pizon)(Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 08/07/2013)
100 NOTICE of Change of Address by Alexandra C. Warren (Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 08/08/2013)
101 MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry)Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 9/13/13. (jam) (Entered: 09/13/2013)
102 ORDER : IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: (1)The County of Susquehannas Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 77) is GRANTED with respect to the constitutionality of the delousing policy at Susquehanna County Correctional Facility.(2)The County of Susquehannas Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 77) is DENIED with respect to disqualification of the testimony of Plaintiffs expert, Dr. Michael R. Greenberg, M.D.(3)Plaintiff Roneld Logorys Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 80) is DENIED.(4)Plaintiff Roneld Logorys Motion to Exclude Testimony of Defendants Expert Anthony Pizon, M.D. (Doc. 88) is DENIED AS MOOT. (5)The County of Susquehannas Motion to Decertify Class (Doc. 93) is DENIED AS MOOT.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 9/13/13 (jam) (Entered: 09/13/2013)
103 CLERK'S JUDGMENT in favor of Defendant, The County of Susquehanna, and against Plaintiff,Roneld Logory.(jam) (Entered: 09/30/2013)

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RONELD LOGORY, Plaintiff, v.
THE COUNTY OF SUSQUEHANNA, Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-CV-1448 (JUDGE CAPUTO)

MEMORANDUM

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification. (Doc. 30). Roneld Logory (“Plaintiff”) seeks class certification on behalf of a class of others similarly situated against the County of Susquehanna. Plaintiff specifically maintains that (1) the Jail’s delousing policy is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment; and (2) the Jail’s delousing policy violates the detainees’ Fourteenth Amendment rights to refuse unwanted medical treatment. (Doc. 42 at 4). This action is seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against these delousing procedures as well as compensatory damages.
I. Background Roneld Logory was arrested for a misdemeanor offense on June 19, 2008. He was detained at Susquehanna County Correctional Facility (“SCCF”) where he was subjected to a strip search and a delousing agent upon his arrival. As a result of that treatment, Plaintiff filed his Complaint on August 24, 2009, complaining that SCCF had implemented “a blanket policy of delousing, showering and strip-searching all individuals who enter the custody of the [SCCF] regardless of the nature of their charged crime and without the presence of reasonable suspicion to believe that the individual was concealing a weapon or contraband.”

(Doc. 1 at ¶ 24). Plaintiff initially sought to certify a class action comprised of “[a]ll persons
who have been placed into custody of the SCCF after being charged with misdemeanor
offenses, summary offenses, traffic infractions, family court violations and/or civil
commitments and were strip-searched upon their entry into the SCCF.” (Doc. 1 at ¶ 9).
On September 21, 2010, the Third Circuit held that blanket search policies of
arrestees held over in prison populations were inherently reasonable and thus not violative
of the Fourth Amendment. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington, 621 F.3d
296, 311 (3d Cir. 2010). In light of this holding, Plaintiff abandoned his class claim as
pertaining to the strip-search policies, but instead proposed two new classes for certification:1
1) The Fourth Amendment Class–All persons who have been placed into custody of the Susquehanna County Jail as pre-trial detainees who were deloused upon their entry into the Susquehanna County Jail. The Class period commences on or about July 24, 2007 and extends to the date on which the Defendant is enjoined from, or otherwise ceases, enforcing its unconstitutional policy, practice and custom of delousing detainees absent reasonable suspicion. Specifically excluded from the Class are Defendant and any and all of its respective affiliates, legal representatives, heirs, successors, employees or assignees.
2) The Fourteenth Amendment Class–All persons who have been placed into custody of the Susquehanna County Jail after being sentenced or as pre-trial detainees who were deloused upon their entry into the Susquehanna County Jail. The Class period commences on or about July 24, 2007 and extends to the date on which the Defendant is enjoined from, or otherwise ceases,
1Plaintiff offers these amended class definitions through his reply brief. (Doc. 42). This is “procedurally appropriate, as the Court retains jurisdiction to modify the class until there is a decision on the merits.” Jordan v. Commonwealth Fin. Sys., 237 F.R.D. 132, 136 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(C)); Gulino v. Bd. of Educ., 201 F.R.D. 326, 330 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (allowing a class definition that was proposed in the plaintiffs' reply brief “in response to some of defendants' objections found in defendants' opposition briefs.”).
2

enforcing its unconstitutional policy, practice and custom of delousing detainees absent reasonable suspicion. Specifically excluded from the Class are Defendant and any and all of its respective affiliates, legal representatives, heirs, successors, employees or assignees.
(Doc. 42 at 4). Specifically, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff is seeking declaratory relief that
the SCCF delousing policies are unconstitutional, injunctive relief against the continuance of these policies, and compensatory damages for himself and other class members, as well as attorney fees and costs.
II. Discussion A. Legal Standard
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for class action certification. Under Rule 23(a), class certification may be appropriate if the following requirements are met:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable [(“numerosity”)], (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class [(“commonality”)], (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class [(“typicality”)], and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class [(“adequacy of representation”)]. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a); In re Mercedes-Benz Antitrust Litig., 213 F.R.D. 180, 183 (D.N.J. 2003). Once the requirements of 23(a) are satisfied, the class may be certified if at least one of the three subsections of 23(b) are met. In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 309 n.6 (3d Cir. 2008). A court may certify a class action only if it “is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the [requirements of Rule 23] have been satisfied.” Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457
3

U.S. 147, 161 (1982). In weighing the merits of a class certification, a “district court must make whatever factual and legal inquiries are necessary and must consider all relevant evidence and arguments presented by the parties.” Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 307. Specifically, a certifying court must find that each element of Rule 23 is met by a preponderance of evidence, and “must resolve all factual or legal disputes relevant to class certification, even if they overlap with the merits--including disputes touching on elements of the cause of action.” Id. at 305. This reflects the notion that Rule 23 is more than a “mere pleading standard,” and those “seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with the Rule.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011). B. Certification Under Rule 23(a)
Here, the Plaintiff seeks to certify both classes under Rule 23(b)(3), or (b)(2) in the alternative. Therefore, as the moving party, the Plaintiff bears the burden of first showing that the requirements of Rule 23(a) are satisfied, and then demonstrating that the elements of subsections (b)(2) or (b)(3) are met. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613–14 (1997); Behrend v. Comcast Corp., No. 10-2865, 2011 WL 3678805, at *5 (3d Cir., Aug. 23, 2011).
The “threshold requirements” of Rule 23(a) are referred to as (1) numerosity; (2) commonality; (3) typicality; and (4) adequacy of representation. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 613. Each requirement will be evaluated in turn. For the reasons stated below, the Court will find each element of Rule 23(a) satisfied as to the Fourteenth Amendment Class, but will decline to certify the Fourth Amendment Class.
4

(1.) Numerosity Numerosity under Rule 23(a)(1) requires only that the class be “so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” Unfortunately, "[n]o single magic number exists satisfying the numerosity requirement.” Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, No. 053619, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22152 at *18 (D.N.J. Mar. 20, 2008) (citation omitted). However, the Third Circuit has opined that while there is technically no minimum class size, “generally if the named plaintiff demonstrates that the potential number of plaintiffs exceeds 40, the first prong of Rule 23(a) has been met.” Stewart v. Abraham, 275 F.3d 220, 226-27 (3d Cir. 2001). All SCCF detainees who were strip searched were subjected to delousing procedures. Defendant admits that its “delousing procedure is, in fact, part of its strip search process.” (Doc. 49 at 14). Therefore, it is necessary to determine how many such detainees were strip searched over the period in question in order to determine whether numerosity is satisfied in the instant case. From the record, it is unclear how many detainees actually entered the SCCF since July 24, 2007, much less how many of those were subjected to a strip search. However, it is clear that between June 2007 to March 25, 2010, at least one hundred and seventy (170) pre-trial detainees charged with summary offenses and misdemeanors were strip searched out of five hundred and seven total pre-trial detainees over that period. (Doc. 38-3 at 2-3). As the Fourth Amendment Class would be comprised of pre-trial detainees who were deloused upon entry to the jail, the Court concludes by a preponderance of the evidence that this number easily exceeds forty (40) and thus numerosity is satisfied. Moreover, as the Fourteenth Amendment Class would be even broader in including pre-trial detainees as well
5

as sentenced prisoners, it is further apparent that this Class also easily satisfies numerosity. Plaintiff further avers that traditional joinder would be especially impractical in this
action as “Class members are likely dispersed over a large geographic area, with some members residing outside of Susquehanna County and this Judicial District. Furthermore, many members of the Class are low-income persons, may not speak English, may not know of their rights and likely would have great difficulty in pursuing their rights individually.” (Doc. 1 at 4). The Court agrees with this assessment and finds that it only bolsters a finding that numerosity is satisfied. Therefore, as the population of these classes well exceed the lower bounds of numerosity, and as regular joinder rules would be impractical, the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a) has been easily satisfied for both potential classes.
(2.) Commonality Commonality requires that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2); Danvers Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 543 F.3d 141, 148 (3d Cir. 2008). This “does not require an identity of claims or facts among class members; rather, the commonality requirement will be satisfied if the named plaintiffs share at least one question of fact or law with the grievances of the prospective class.” In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litigation, 579 F.3d 241, 264 (3d Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted). As “the requirement may be satisfied by a single common issue, it is easily met . . .” Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 56 (3d Cir. 1994). However, the Supreme Court has recently opined that commonality is not the mere existence of a classwide question, but instead the potential for a “classwide resolution.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011). “What matters to class
6

certification . . . is not the raising of common 'questions' -- even in droves -- but, rather the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.” Id. (citing Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 97, 132 (2009)).
(a) The Fourth Amendment Class The Fourth Amendment class seeks to represent solely pre-trial detainees who were subjected to delousing upon their entry to the SCCF. Specifically, Plaintiff is attempting to enjoin this delousing as an impermissible Fourth Amendment search. Reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment considers “the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). As delousing at the SCCF is predicated on an inmate’s being strip searched, Plaintiff argues that such delousing was unreasonable in that a determination of whether a strip search should be conducted on a pre-trial detainee has no bearing on whether a particular individual is a carrier of lice. Plaintiff argues that the recent decision in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington should have no effect on the viability of the Fourth Amendment Class. 621 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2010). There, the Third Circuit held that strip searches of non-indictable arestees, absent any individualized suspicion, was constitutional under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 311. Almost identical to the instant case, the searches considered in Florence also employed a delousing component. Id. at 300, 307 (requiring “arrestees to undress completely and submit to a visual observation of their naked bodies before taking a supervised shower.”). The Third Circuit specifically found that the Jails’ security interest
7

outweighed the inmates’ privacy interests, but declined to consider whether the searches could be sustained on the Jails’ interest in preventing disease alone. Id. at 307, 311 n.9.
An overlap between a class certification requirement and the merits of a claim is no reason to decline to resolve relevant disputes if necessary to determine whether a class certification requirement is met. In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 316 (3d Cir. 2008). Such an inquiry “may include a ‘preliminary inquiry into the merits,’ and the court may ‘consider the substantive elements of the plaintiffs' case in order to envision the form that a trial on those issues would take.’” Id. at 317 (citations omitted). In as much, “a district court errs as a matter of law when it fails to resolve a genuine legal or factual dispute relevant to determining the requirements.” Id. at 320. Therefore, it is necessary for the Court to evaluate whether this particular Class has a viable claim after the Third Circuit’s holding in Florence.
Florence held explicitly that “the strip search procedures . . . at [the Prisons] are reasonable.” Id. at 311. As those procedures explicitly included a delousing, it is curious as to how Plaintiff could maintain a class premised on an alleged Fourth Amendment violation that involving the very same procedures. Plaintiff attempts to play up the differences between the two procedures, that Florence utilized a self-applied shampoo followed by a supervised shower while the instant case concerns a delousing spray followed by an unsupervised shower. It is true that Fourth Amendment reasonableness is a fact-specific inquiry, "not capable of precise definition or mechanical application." Id. at 301 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979)). However, the Court agrees with the Defendant that these are de minimus differences that do not materially alter the Fourth Amendment
8

analysis. Moreover, there is no component of the SCCF’s delousing procedure that would
somehow aggravate the invasiveness of the strip search that Florence deemed acceptable. While the Court agrees below that, for certification purposes, there is merit to the claim that such procedures could present unwarranted medical treatment, combining a delousing treatment with a strip search does very little to broaden the scope of that particular intrusion–the search of the naked body. The delousing procedure itself does not inherently increase the exposure or duration of a strip search, and while the Plaintiff never specifies, the Court is hard-pressed to determine exactly how delousing functionally exaggerates the scope of the approved strip search. While perhaps a medical treatment, to characterize delousing as an extension of the strip search appears redundant.
Therefore, relying on the Third Circuit’s holding that suspicionless searches of pre-trial detainees including a delousing procedure is permissible absent particularized suspicion, the Court finds no viable Fourth Amendment claim in the instant case. As it cannot be said that there is a common question of law as to the Fourth Amendment class, that Class fails on the commonality prong and will not be certified.
(b) The Fourteenth Amendment Class The Fourteenth Amendment Class seeks to include all pre-trial and sentenced detainees who were subjected to delousing procedures upon their entry to the SCCF. Within the class of detainees subjected to strip search procedures, commonality is high as each was subjected to the very same delousing procedure. There is no evidence in the record that there was any differentiation whatsoever in the delousing process. In fact, after a rigorous analysis of the facts, the Court agrees by a preponderance of the evidence
9

that the SCCF employed a policy of delousing each inmate who was strip searched.2 While
Defendant argues that there are a multitude of reasons as to why an inmate would be strip
searched, each inmate who was striped searched was necessarily subjected to delousing
without further inquiry.
Defendant maintains that at the time of Plaintiff’s intake, the SCCF had a policy in
effect requiring “individualized, reasonable suspicion before a detainee may be strip
searched.” (Doc. 49 at 8). The factors contributing to such a determination included:
the appearance and demeanor of the detainee, the nature of the charges pending against the detainee, the detainee’s conduct during the period of confinement, the detainee’s prior arrest record if known, and any other reasonable suspicion based upon specific circumstances that leads the corrections officer the suspect that the detainee is concealing weapons, evidence of a specific crime, controlled substances or other contraband.
(Id. at 8-9). Aside from potentially the appearance and demeanor of the detainee, none of
these factors speak to whether delousing, a necessary component of the strip search, is
warranted. Specifically, the factors above appear to be wholly tailored towards drugs and
contraband and include no express medical determinations. From the facts, it cannot be
said that these detainees were deloused pursuant to any sort of individualized determination.
As such, a common, if not identical, set of facts applies to each member of this Class,
comprised of detainees who were automatically subjected to a delousing “regardless of
whether there is reason to believe that detainees have a medical condition that would benefit
2In her deposition, Corrections Officer Smith denied that there would be reason to suspect that someone who was strip searched was more likely to have lice. Smith Dep., 44:22-45:1, June 25, 2010. Of course, the record well establishes that all strip searched detainees were deloused. Conigliaro Dep., 86:2-6, Feb. 24 2010; Stewart Dep., 94:5-95:11 (affirming that for those detainees who get strip searched, “there’s no attempt to determine whether they might be carrying parasites that will require them to be deloused”); Hunsinger Dep., 18:8-11, April 13, 2010.
10

from this medical treatment and without advising detainees of the scope of the medical procedure or providing them with the opportunity to decline to undergo the procedure.” (Doc. 42 at 2). Unlike Dukes, where commonality was destroyed where there was no “common mode of exercising discretion that pervade[d] the entire company,” 131 S.Ct. at 2554-55, here there is a solid policy that applied directly to all potential class members. See e.g. Churchill v. Cigna Corp., No. 10-6911, 2011 WL 3563489 at *4 (finding an indisputable national policy necessarily ran inapposite to the Dukes holding).
Flowing from these common facts is a common question of law–whether it was reasonable for the Defendant to automatically delouse all individuals who were strip searched. Even more importantly under the Dukes holding, this common question will be wholly satisfied by a singular answer.
The Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment confers the “right to refuse unwanted medical treatment, and . . . the right to sufficient information to intelligently exercise those rights.” White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 111 (3d Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). In the prison setting, prisoners “retain a limited right to refuse treatment and a related right to be informed of the proposed treatment and viable alternatives.” Id. at 113. While prisons can force medical procedures on prisoners where they are necessary in furtherance of valid penological ends, prisoners still “have a right to such information as is reasonably necessary to make an informed decision to accept or reject proposed treatment, as well as a reasonable explanation of the viable alternative treatments that can be made available in a prison setting.” Id. Flowing from this, the Fourteenth Amendment class clearly shares a common question of law–whether Defendant has “violated Plaintiff and the Class’s
11

right to refuse unwanted medical treatment.” (Doc. 42 at 7). Defendant cites a Seventh Circuit opinion for the proposition that delousing is clearly
an allowable procedure tied to a jail’s legitimate interest in sanitary conditions. Russell v. Richards, 384 F.3d 444 (7th Cir. 2004). There, inmates were instructed to self-apply a delousing shampoo, and they had the right to refuse. Id. at 446. That court accepted the premise that directing the use of shampoo did trigger the prisoners’ constitutional right to refuse unwanted medical treatment. Id. at 447. From there, that court applied the factors set out in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), to determine whether the prison’s procedures were “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Id. at 447-49. On the particular facts before that court, the judge concluded that “the record does not support the conclusion that the jail's policy with respect to delousing shampoo amounts to an unreasonable intrusion on an inmate's constitutional rights.” Id. at 449. As such a determination is highly factspecific, it is unclear at this juncture whether the same result would be had in the instant case. However, it is clear beyond a preponderance of evidence that the Plaintiff has a legitimate claim under the law that is both common in law and fact to those of the overall proposed Class.
Unlike the Fourth Amendment claims, whether delousing absent necessity and without consent provides a triable issue under the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, as there are common questions of fact and law to the Fourteenth Amendment Class, the commonality qualification is satisfied.
(3.) Typicality Rule 23(a)(3) requires that “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
12

typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” This element appraises the alignment between the named plaintiff’s particular case and the claims of the other potential class members. Stewart v. Abraham, 275 F.3d 220, 227 (3d Cir. 2001). “The typicality criterion is intended to preclude certification of those cases where the legal theories of the named plaintiffs potentially conflict with those of the absentees by requiring that the common claims are comparably central to the claims of the named plaintiffs as to the claims of the absentees.” Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 57 (3d Cir. 1994). “Factual differences will not render a claim atypical if the claim arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of the class members, and if it is based on the same legal theory." Id. at 58 (citation omitted).
Plaintiff Logory’s interests are squarely aligned with those of the putative class. For all intents and purposes, Logory’s claims arise out of the same exact course of conduct as that of all of the other putative class members–a policy that strip searches necessitate delousing regardless of any specific determinations. In fact, the class is defined as a function of being subjected to identical treatment by SCCF employees. While Plaintiff Logory’s alleged state of intoxication at his intake may have rendered him atypical as to his initial claim of being subjected to a strip search absent cause, Plaintiff now only pursues claims against the delousing procedure, and his status at intake is no longer relevant. There is no evidence that he, or any detainee entering the facility, was deloused based on any particularized determination of necessity. Furthermore, while Plaintiff seeks to represent all inmates, both pre-trial and incarcerated, there is no indication that his delousing experience as a pre-trial detainee differs in any regard from that of an incarcerated inmate.
As such, the Court concludes that Plaintiff Logory’s claim is highly typical of those of 13

the class generally, and this element of Rule 23(a) is satisfied. (4.) Adequacy of Representation Rule 23(a)(4) requires that “the representative part[y] will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class.” This requirement has been interpreted to analyze “the qualifications of the counsel to represent the class” and “to uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the class they seek to represent.” Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 141 (3d Cir. 1998). The Defendant has raised no challenge to this element of the Rule 23(a) certification.
Upon investigation of their credentials, Plaintiff’s counsel appears to be “qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation.” Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 247 (3d Cir. 1975). Plaintiff’s counsel state that they have “the resources, expertise and experience to successfully prosecute this action against the Defendant.” (Doc. 1 at 5). The Court agrees and further notes that all of the lawyers are overall accomplished and experienced, and at least one has extensive experience in the realm of complex litigation. As such, the Court finds no indication that the adequacy of representation is lacking in any respect.
The Court also finds that the named Plaintiff will adequately protect the interests of the class. Plaintiff Logory has sufficient interest in challenging the procedure and obtaining compensation and his interests in no way diverge from those of the putative class. Therefore, the Court finds representation of this class adequate, and the requirements of Rule 23(a) are fully satisfied in respect to the Fourteenth Amendment Class.
14

C. Certification Under Rule 23(b) Plaintiff is primarily seeking class certification under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule 23(b)(3). (Doc. 50 at 3). However, in the alternative, Plaintiff seeks to certify this class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2).
(1.) Rule 23(b)(3) Under Rule 23(b)(3), the Court must find that “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Rule 23(b)(3) therefore adds two further requirements to the class action calculus: predominance and superiority. (a) Predominance “Predominance tests whether the proposed class is sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.” In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 311 (citation omitted). This goes far beyond the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a), and requires the district court to “formulate some prediction as to how specific issues will play out in order to determine whether common or individual issues predominate in a given case.” Id. (quoting In re New Motor Vehicles Can. Exp. Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 20 (1st Cir. 2008)). Specifically, "[i]f proof of the essential elements of the cause of action requires individual treatment, then class certification is unsuitable." Id. (citing Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 172 (3d Cir. 2001)). “[T]he task for plaintiffs at class certification is to demonstrate that the element of [their claim] is capable of proof at trial through evidence that is common to the class rather
15

than individual to its members. Deciding this issue calls for the district court's rigorous assessment of the available evidence and the method or methods by which plaintiffs propose to use the evidence to prove impact at trial.” Id. at 311-12.
Following these standards, predominance is met in the instant case. The nature of Plaintiff’s claim is precisely that all detainees inducted into the SCCF were treated exactly the same. From the factual record, it is evident that each detainee who was strip searched was wholesale deloused, including those who evidently did not require the procedure.3 As such, the cause of action requires almost no individual treatment. The very fact that SCCF’s policy appears to have not made individualized determinations as to the necessity of delousing is precisely what satisfies the predominance requirement in this action.
Importantly, this claim is easily capable of proof at trial through evidence common to the class. As the allegation is that all detainees were treated similarly unconstitutionally, this action especially lends itself to proof that is common to the class, and Plaintiff will attempt to prove this case in the form of prison policies and sworn testimony. Factual questions as to the exact nature of this policy, its implementation, and its effects will be the same for each class member and will thus predominate to a very high degree.
Other cases have met the predominance requirement on very similar theories. In Florence, the defendants argued that predominance was not satisfied under strip search
3Deposition testimony indicates that individualized determinations were actually disregarded. In his testimony, Corrections Officer Stewart affirmed that there was “no attempt to obtain reasonable suspicion to determine whether [inmates were] carrying parasites prior to delousing them” and that the SCCF policy was “to delouse everyone regardless or what their answer to the [medical questions] may be.” Stewart Dep. 94:23-95:11. Defendant acknowledges that “the testimony . . . clearly establishes that there is no separate delousing policy at the Susquehanna County Jail; no one is deloused unless he is strip searched.” (Doc. 49 at 15).
16

claims as they believed each potential class member would be required to present individualized proof of their specific damages. Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington, No. 05-3619, 2008 WL 800970 at *13 (D.N.J. March 20, 2008). That court disagreed, noting that “liability will seemingly boil down to . . . the intake procedures . . . . a common question and, as previously stated, subject to generalized proof.” Id. This is highly analogous to the instant case, which will focus almost exclusively on the SCCF’s intake procedures. However, even if more individualized calculations were necessary, predominance can still be satisfied. Id; see also Gwiazdowski v. County of Chester, 263 F.R.D. 178, 189 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (finding that where a delousing procedure was applied pursuant to policy, “[p]laintiff will be able to show that she was searched through common rather than individual evidence.”). Here, Plaintiff’s case will substantially center around such policy, and the overall class action ranks high on the predominance scale.
Finally, predominance also requires “that the alleged damages are capable of measurement on a class-wide basis using common proof.” Behrend v. Comcast Corp., No. 10-2865, 2011 WL 3678805 at *15 (3d Cir. Aug. 23, 2011). As above, the inquiry similarly looks to whether damages can be measured “on a class-wide basis using common proof.” Id. at *18. This is a determination that sits on a continuum as some individualization in damages will not alone defeat certification. Id. However, as established, almost no individualized determinations are necessary in the instant case. Variation in damages is likely to be very rare due to the dearth of reported injury in the record, and the rare individual calculations that do arise are sure to be simple and isolated. Therefore, as the putative class will be wholly comprised of those who were subjected to the same procedure and suffered
17

essentially identical damages, the Court finds the predominance requirement is squarely satisfied.
(b) Superiority Pertinent to a finding of superiority is: “(A) the class members' interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Specifically, the superiority requirement asks a trial court to "balance, in terms of fairness and efficiency, the merits of a class action against those of alternative available methods of adjudication." Danvers Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 543 F.3d 141, 149 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Georgine v. Amchem Prods., 83 F.3d 610, 632 (3d Cir. 1996)). Allowing the instant action to proceed as a class action is a far superior method of adjudication. In fact, this is exactly the sort of claim that is best-suited to class action litigation. “In a case like this one, where the plaintiff's claims attack the same course of defendants' conduct, proceeding as a class action is far superior to allowing piecemeal litigation of the exact same claims in countless lawsuits potentially occurring throughout the country.” Stanford v. Foamex L.P., 263 F.R.D. 156, 174 n.22 (E.D. Pa. 2009). A case like this, pertaining to the Defendant’s uniform policy, is especially appropriate for the economies of scale that will result from the class action mechanism. Moreover, “class certification is preferred where the recovery being sought by each of the plaintiffs is not sufficiently large to render individualized litigation a realistic possibility.”
18

Bizzarro v. Ocean County, No. 07-5665, 2009 WL 1617887 at *17 (D.N.J. June 9, 2009) (citation omitted). Addressing the rights of those who would not otherwise be appropriately incentivized to bring their own singular claims was precisely the aim of the Advisory Committee in promulgating Rule 23(b)(3). Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997). Here, as Plaintiff points out, the class is likely to “contain poor and marginalized class members who are unlikely to be able to litigate these cases individually, especially when the prosecution of delousing cases generally requires expensive testimony from medical doctors.” (Doc. 33 at 36). As such, class certification might not just be superior, but necessary in order to try these particular claims. See e.g. Tardiff v. Knox County, 365 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2004). Thus, to allow this to proceed as a class action would not be removing claims from the hands of the class members, but would instead afford them an opportunity to pursue them.
Finally. the Court is not aware of any claims pending by or against class members on this matter, and notes that such an action is most sensibly brought within the same judicial district in which the SCCF is located. Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the Court finds superiority satisfied in the instant case.
(2.) Rule 23(b)(2) Certification as a Rule 23(b)(2) class may be warranted where “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). As the Court is prepared to certify this Class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), it is not
19

necessary to endeavor on a lengthy analysis of the merits of a Rule 23(b)(2) certification. However, such actions are not appropriate where, as here, the Plaintiff is seeking monetary damages. In his Prayer for Relief, Plaintiff specifically requests compensatory damages for himself and “each member of the proposed Class in an amount to be determined by a jury and/or the Court on both an individual and a class-wide basis.” (Doc. 1 at 10). The Supreme Court has recently clarified Rule 23(b)(2) actions in holding that “individualized monetary claims belong in Rule 23(b)(3).” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2558 (2011). While Rule 23(b)(2) may allow monetary claims on an indivisible basis, individual relief is inapposite to the Rule’s purpose of remedying classwide relief in a single classwide order. Id. at 2557-58. D. Notice to Potential Class Members
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(2)(B) provides that in any action maintained under Rule 23(b)(3), the Court must direct notice to all members that can be identified through reasonable effort. As such, the Court will order the parties to formulate a plan for such notice to be presented to the Court. E. Appointment of Class Counsel and Class Representative
As the Court finds Plaintiff Roneld Logory will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class, he will therefore be appointed as Class Representative.
Rule 23(g)(1) further requires the Court to appoint class counsel. As noted above, the Court finds Plaintiff's counsel to be “qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation.” Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 247 (3d Cir. 1975). As such, the Court will therefore grant Plaintiff’s motion to appoint them as Class Counsel.
20

III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court will certify the Fourteenth Amendment Class as a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23(b)(3) class action. The Fourth Amendment Class will not be certified. An appropriate order follows.

October 5, 2011 Date

/s/ A. Richard Caputo A. Richard Caputo United States District Judge

21

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RONELD LOGORY, Plaintiff, v.
THE COUNTY OF SUSQUEHANNA, Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-CV-1448 (JUDGE CAPUTO)

ORDER
NOW, this 5th day of October, 2011, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion
for Class Certification (Doc. 30) is GRANTED IN PART; and IT IS FURTHER ORDERED
that the class hereby certified as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(a) and 23(b)(3) on behalf of the following class:
All persons who have been placed into custody of the Susquehanna County Jail after being sentenced or as pre-trial detainees who were deloused upon their entry into the Susquehanna County Jail. The Class period commences on or about July 24, 2007 and extends to the date on which the Defendant is enjoined from, or otherwise ceases, enforcing its unconstitutional policy, practice and custom of delousing detainees absent reasonable suspicion. Specifically excluded from the Class are Defendant and any and all of its respective affiliates, legal representatives, heirs, successors, employees or assignees.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall submit in writing their joint plan of class notice that complies with the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(c)(2)(B) within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this Opinion & Order; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Roneld Logory is designated Class Representative on behalf of the Class; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's attorneys Charles J. LaDuca and Alexandra C. Warren of Cueno Gilbert & LaDuca, LLP; Beverly Steinberg-Sporn; and Daniel Levin of Levin Fishbein Sedran & Berman; are designated as Class Counsel.
/s/ A. Richard Caputo A. Richard Caputo United States District Judge
2

 
 Case 3:09-cv-01448-TIV Document 1 Filed 07/24/2009 Page 1 of 11

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RONELD LOGORY,

)

individually and on behalf of a Class of )

others similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

)

v.

)

)

THE COUNTY OF SUSQUEHANNA )

)

)

Defendant.

)

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

INTRODUCTION 1. This is a class action lawsuit brought to redress the deprivation by The County of Susquehanna, of rights secured to the plaintiff, Roneld Logoroy, and the proposed Class, by the United States Constitution and the laws of the United States of America. For at least the past two years prior to the date of the commencement of this litigation, Susquehanna County and the Susquehanna County Jail have had a blanket policy of delousing, showering and strip-searching all individuals who enter the Susquehanna County Prison ("SCCF") and are placed in jail clothing, regardless of the crime for which they are charged. This blanket policy is, in part, derived from the written procedures of the SCCF, and was promulgated by senior Susquehanna County officials. 2. It has been well established in this Judicial Circuit for many years that individuals charged with misdemeanors or minor violations cannot be strip-searched absent particularized suspicion that they possess weapons or contraband. In short, the blanket policy of Susquehanna

Case 3:09-cv-01448-TIV Document 1 Filed 07/24/2009 Page 2 of 11
County and the SCCF to force those charged with minor crimes to undergo the indignities of a strip search upon entry into the SCCF ("SCJ") is illegal. 3. Roneld Logory ("Plaintiff') brings this action on behalf of himself, and on behalf of a class of thousands of others who were deloused, showered, and strip searched after being charged with petty offenses, to vindicate the clear and unnecessary violation of his civil rights and those of the class members he proposes to represent. Plaintiff was charged with a misdemeanor offense, and subjected to a strip search, in violation of his right against unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages for himself and each member of the proposed class, a declaration that the Jail's policies are unconstitutional, and an injunction precluding Susquehanna County and the SCCF from continuing to violate the rights of those placed into their custody. With the foregoing as background, and upon information and belief except as to the allegations concerning himself, Plaintiff complains as follows:
JURISDICTION
4. This Court has jurisdiction over this action under the provisions of28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1341 and 1343 because the action was filed to obtain compensatory damages and injunctive relief for the deprivation, under color of state law, of the rights of citizens of the United States secured by the United States Constitution and by federal law pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. This Court also has jurisdiction over this action under the provisions of28 U.S.C. § 2201, as it was filed to obtain declaratory relief relative to the constitutionality of the policies of a local government. 5. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (2) because the events giving rise to the Plaintiff's claims and those of the proposed class members occurred in this judicial district.
2

Case 3:09-cv-01448-TIV Document 1 Filed 07/24/2009 Page 3 of 11

PARTIES

6. Plaintiff, Roneld Logory, is, and at all times relevant hereto has been, a resident of the State ofNew Jersey, and is domiciled in Princeton, New Jersey. On or about June 19,2008, Mr. Logory was detained at the SCCF. 7. Defendant Susquehanna County (the "County") is a county government organized and existing under the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. At all times relevant hereto, the County was responsible for the policies, practices, supervision, implementation and conduct of all matters pertaining to the SCCF and was responsible for the appointment, training, supervision and conduct of all SCCF personnel. In addition, at all relevant times, the County was responsible for enforcing the rules of the SCCF and for ensuring that SCCF employees obey the Constitution and the laws of the United States.

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

8.

Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Rules 23(b)(l), 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of Plaintiff and a class of similarly situated

individuals who were arrested for misdemeanors or minor violations and who were unlawfully

strip-searched upon their entry into the SCCF .

9.

The class that Plaintiff seeks to represent is defined as follows:

All persons who have been be placed into custody of the SCCF after being charged with misdemeanor offenses, summary offenses, traffic infractions, family court violations and/or civil commitments and were strip-searched upon their entry into the SCCF. The Class period commences on or about July 24, 2007 and extends to the date on which the Defendant is enjoined from, or otherwise ceases, enforcing its unconstitutional policy, practice and custom of conducting strip-searches absent reasonable suspicion. Specifically excluded from the Class are Defendant and any and all of its respective affiliates, legal representatives, heirs, successors, employees or assignees.

3

Case 3:09-cv-01448-TIV Document 1 Filed 07/24/2009 Page 4 of 11
10. This action may be brought and may properly be maintained as a class action under Federal law and satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy requirements for maintaining a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). 11. The members of the Class are so numerous as to render joinder impracticable. There are, and have been, hundreds and probably thousands of people who have been arrested for misdemeanors, summary offenses, traffic infractions, failing to make payment on outstanding traffic violations, failing to make payment on outstanding fines, family court commitments or other minor crimes, who were strip-searched under the circumstances described herein. 12. Joinder of all these individuals is impracticable because of the large number of Class members and the fact that Class members are likely dispersed over a large geographic area, with some members residing outside of Susquehanna County and this Judicial District. Furthermore, many members of the Class are low-income persons, may not speak English, may not know of their rights and likely would have great difficulty in pursuing their rights individually. 13. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class, in that all Class members' rights to be free from unreasonable searches were violated by Defendant, which conducted blanket strip searches absent particularized suspicion. All members of the Class were charged with misdemenaor crimes or other minor crimes when placed into the custody of the SCCF, and all were illegally strip searched in violation of the established law in this Judicial Circuit. 14. Plaintiffs claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class. Plaintiff and all members of the Class have sustained damages arising out of Defendant's course of conduct. The harms suffered by the Plaintiff are typical of the harms suffered by the Class.
4

Case 3:09-cv-01448-TIV Document 1 Filed 07/24/2009 Page 5 of 11
15. The representative Plaintiff has the requisite personal interest in the outcome of this action and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiff has no interests that are adverse to the interests of the members of the Class. 16. The named Plaintiffhas retained counsel with substantial experience and success in the prosecution of class action and civil rights litigation. Plaintiff is being represented by Charles J. LaDuca, Alexandra Warren, and Brendan Thompson of Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca, LLP; Elmer Robert Keach, III, Esquire ofthe Law Offices of Elmer Robert Keach, III, PC; and Beverly Steinberg-Spom, Esquire. Plaintiff's counsel have the resources, expertise and experience to successfully prosecute this action against the Defendant. No conflict exists between the Plaintiff and members of the Class, or between counsel and members of the Class. 17. This action, in part, seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. As such, the Plaintiff seeks class certification under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2), in that all Class members were subject to the same policy requiring the illegal strip searches of individuals charged with misdemeanor or other minor crimes and placed into the custody ofthe SCJ. In short, the County of Susquehanna, and SCCF Officers acted on grounds generally applicable to all Class members. 18. In addition to certification under Rule 23(b)(2), and in the alternative, Plaintiff seeks certification under Rule 23(b)(3). 19. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class that predominate over any questions that affect only individual members of the Class. The predominant common questions of law and fact include, without limitation, the common and predominate question of whether the Defendant's written and/or de facto blanket policy of strip-searching individuals who were charged with misdemeanor charges or violations when transferred to and placed into
5

Case 3:09-cv-01448-TIV Document 1 Filed 07/24/2009 Page 6 of 11
the custody of the Jail violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and whether such a written and/or de facto policy existed during the Class period. 20. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy since joinder of all of the individual members of the Class is impracticable given the large number of Class members and the fact that they are dispersed over a large geographic area. Furthermore, the expense and burden of individual litigation would make it difficult or impossible for individual members of the Class to redress these constitutional violations. The cost to the federal court system of adjudicating thousands of individual cases would be enormous. Individualized litigation would also magnify the delay and expense to all parties and the court system. By contrast, the classification of this action as a class action in this District presents far fewer management difficulties, conserves the resources of the parties and the court system, and protects the rights of each member of the Class. 21. There are no other actions pending to address the Defendant's flagrant violation of the civil rights of detainees, even though the Defendant has maintained its illegal strip search regimen for at least the past several years. 22. In addition to, and in the alternative, Plaintiff seeks certification under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3) or seeks partial certification under Fed. R.Civ.P. 23(c)(4).
FACTS Facts Applicable to the Class Generally 23. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits the Defendant from performing strip searches of pre-trial detainees who have been charged with misdemeanors, summary offenses, civil commitments or other minor crimes unless there is reasonable suspicion to believe that the arrestee is concealing a weapon or contraband.
6

Case 3:09-cv-01448-TIV Document 1 Filed 07/24/2009 Page 7 of 11
24. Susquehanna County has instituted a blanket policy of delousing, showering and stripsearching all individuals who enter the custody of the SCJ regardless of the nature of their charged crime and without the presence of reasonable suspicion to believe that the individual was concealing a weapon or contraband. 25. Susquehanna County has instituted a written blanket policy of delousing, showering, and conducting visual inspections of all detainees who enter the SCJ while they are in a state of complete undress, regardless of the individual characteristics or the nature of their charged crime. For purposes of this Complaint, this practice is collectively referred to as "stripsearches." 26. Defendant knows or should know, that it may not institute, enforce or permit enforcement of a policy or practice of conducting strip-searches without particularized, reasonable suspicion. The SCJ written policy is based on a policy promulgated by Susquehanna County and/or the SCCF. 27. The Defendant's written and/or de facto policy, practice and custom mandating blanket strip-searches of pre-trial misdemeanor detainees has been promulgated, effectuated and/or enforced in bad faith and contrary to clearly established law. 28. Reasonable suspicion to conduct a strip search may emanate only from the circumstances incident to the search, such as the nature of the crime charged, the characteristics of the arrestee, and/or the circumstances of the arrest. 29. Susquehanna County has promulgated, implemented, enforced, and/or failed to rectify a written and/or de facto policy, practice or custom of strip-searching all individuals placed into the custody of the SCJ without any requirement of reasonable suspicion in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This written and/or de facto policy has
7

Case 3:09-cv-01448-TIV Document 1 Filed 07/24/2009 Page 8 of 11
made the strip-searching of pre-trial detainees routine; neither the nature of the offense charged, the characteristics of the arrestee, nor the circumstances of a particular arrest have been taken into account in enforcing the policy, practice and custom of routine strip-searches. 30. Pursuant to this written and/or de facto policy, each member of the Class, including the named Plaintiff, was the victim of a routine strip-search upon their entry into the SCCF. These searches were conducted without inquiry into or establishment of reasonable suspicion, and in fact, were not supported by reasonable suspicion. Strip searches are conducted for individuals arrested for, among other minor offenses, unpaid parking tickets, traffic violations, outstanding traffic fines and other minor offenses. 31. As a direct and proximate result of the unlawful strip-search conducted pursuant to this written and/or de facto policy, the victims ofthe unlawful blanket strip-searches-each member of the Class, including the named Plaintiff- has suffered or will suffer psychological pain, humiliation, suffering and mental anguish.
Facts Applicable to the Named Plaintiff 32. Plaintiffs experiences are representative of the Class. 33. On the evening of June 19, 2008, Mr. Logory was arrested for Driving Under the Influence, a misdemeanor offense. Upon being transported to the SCJ, Plaitiffwas taken to a bathroom by two Correctional Officers. Mr. Logory was directed to remove all of his clothing and, among other things, spread the lobes of his buttocks and lift his testicles, to allow for inspection by the Correctional Officers. After the strip search, a Correctional Officer sprayed Plaintiff with a delousing agent on his genitals and was then required to undergo a supervised shower. Plaintiff was humiliated and degraded by these illegal unconstitutional acts.
8

Case 3:09-cv-01448-TIV Document 1 Filed 07/24/2009 Page 9 of 11
CAUSES OF ACTION AS AND FOR A FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST
DEFENDANT SUSQUEHANNA COUNTY Violation of Constitutional Rights Under Color of State Law -Unreasonable Search and Failure to Implement Municipal Policies to Avoid · Constitutional Deprivation Under Color of State Law34. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every allegation stated in the preceding paragraphs, as if fully set forth herein. 35. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens from unreasonable searches by law enforcement officers, and prohibits officers from conducting strip searches of individuals arrested for misdemeanor offenses or violations absent some particularized suspicion that the individual in question has either contraband or weapons. 36. The actions of the Defendant Susquehanna County, as detailed above, violated Plaintiff's and the Class's rights under the United States Constitution. Simply put, it was not objectively reasonable for SCCF personnel to strip search Plaintiff and the members of the Class based on their arrests for misdemeanor or other minor criminal charges. 37. These strip searches were conducted pursuant to the blanket policy, custom or practice of Susquehanna County. As such, Defendant Susquehanna County is directly liable for the damages of the Class. 38. This conduct on the part ofthe Defendants represents a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, given that their actions were undertaken under color of state law. 39. As a direct and proximate result of the unconstitutional acts described above, Plaintiff and the Class have been irreparably injured and seek damages, as well as the declaratory and injunctive relief set forth immediately below in the Prayer for Relief.
9

Case 3:09-cv-01448-TIV Document 1 Filed 07/24/2009 Page 10 of 11
DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY
40. The Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of a Class of others similarly situated, requests that this Honorable Court grant them the following relief:
A. An order certifying this action as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. B. A judgment against Defendant Susquehanna County on Plaintiff's claims
detailed herein, awarding compensatory damages to Plaintiff and each member of the proposed Class in an amount to be determined by a jury and/or the Court on both an individual and a class-wide basis. C. A declaratory judgment against Defendant declaring Susquehanna County's policy, practice and custom of strip searching all detainees entering the SCCF, regardless of the offense charged or suspicion of contraband, to be unconstitutional and improper. D. A preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining Defendant from continuing to strip search individuals charged with misdemeanor offenses and minor crimes absent particularized, reasonable suspicion that the arrestee subjected to the search is concealing weapons or other contraband. E. A monetary award for attorneys' fees and the costs ofthis action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Fed.R.Civ. P. 23, F. Such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.
10

Case 3:09-cv-01448-TIV Document 1 Filed 07/24/2009 Page 11 of 11

Dated: July 24, 2009

Respectfully submitted,
~~
Alexandra C. Warren Supreme Court ID No. 93651 Member of the Bar, U.S.D.C., M.D.Pa. Charles J. LaDuca Brendan S. Thompson CUNEO GILBERT & LADUCA, LLP 507 C Street, NE Washington, DC 20002 Telephone: 202-789-3960 Telecopier: 202-789-1813
Elmer Robert Keach, Ill LAW OFFICES OF ELMER ROBERT KEACH, III, PC 1040 Riverfront Center Post Office Box 70 Amsterdam, NY 12010 Telephone: 518-434-1718 Telecopier: 518-770-1558
Beverly Steinberg-Spom 50 Brooks Bend Princeton, NJ 08540 Telephone: (609) 688-1202 Telecopier: (609) 586-9702
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF AND THE CLASS

11

Case 3:09-cv-01448-TIV Document 1-2 Filed 07/24/2009 Page 1 of 1

.,JS 44 (Rev. I V07)

CIVIL COVER SHEET

The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplem by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference ofthe United States the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON TilE REVERSE OF THE FORM.)

ent the filing in Septembe

and servic r 1974, is r

e ofpleadings or other
equired for the use oft

pa he

pers as required by
Clerk ofCourt for

law, except the purpose

a~ of

provided initiating

L (a) PLAINTIFFS RONELD LOGORY, individually and on behalf of a Class of others similarly situated,

DEFENDANTS
The County of Susquehanna

(b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff State of New Jersey
(EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES)

County of Residence of First Listed Defendant

Susquehanna

(IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY)

NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE TilE LOCATION OF TilE LAND !NVOLVED.

(c) Attorney's (Firm Name, Address, and Telephone Number)
Alexandra C. Warren, Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca, LLP, 507 C Street NE, Washin ton DC 20002, 202 789-3960
IL BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Place an "X'' in One Box Only)

01 U.S. Government Plaintiff

l!l3 Fcderal Question (U.S. Government Not a Party)

02 U.S. Government Defendant

04 Diversity (Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III)

Attorneys (If Known)

m. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL p ARTIES(Place an "X'' in One Box for Plaintiff

(For Diversity Cases Only)

and One Box for Defendant)

PTF DEF

PTF DEF

Citizen of This State

0 I 0 I Incorporated or Principal Place

0 4 04

of Business In This State

Citizen of Another State

0 2 0 2 Incorporated and Principal Place of Business In Another State

0 5 05

Citizen or Subject of a

0 3 0 3 Foreign Nation

0 6 06

IV. NATURE OF SUIT lace an "X" in One Box On

0 11 0 Insurance

PERSONAL INJURY

0 120 Marine

0 310 Airplane

0 130 Miller Act

0 315 Airplane Product

0 140 Negotiable Instrument

Liab ility

0 150 Recovery of Overpayment 0 320 Assaul~ Libel &

& Enforcement ofJudgment

Slander

0 151 Medicare Act

0 330 Federal Employers·

0 15 2 Recovery of Defau !ted

Liab11ity

Student Loans

0 340 Marine

(Excl. Veterans)

0 345 Marine Product

0 153 Recovery of Overpayment

Liability

of Veteran's Benefits

0 350 Motor Vchicle

0 160 Stockholders· Suits

0 355 Motor Vehicle

0 190 Other Contract

Product Liability

0 195 Contract Product Liability 0 360 Other Personal

0 196 Franchise

rn·u

0 210 Land Condemnation 0 220 Foreclosure 0 230 Rent Lease & Ejectment 0 240 Torts to Land 0 245 Tort Product Liability 0 290 All Other Real Property

,--""-~
0 441 Voting 0 442 Employment 0 443 Housing/
Accommodations 0 444 Welfare 0 445 Amer. w/Disabilities -
Employment 0 446 Amer. w/Disabilities -
Other (X 440 Other Civil Rights

PERSONAL INJURY 0 362 Personal Injury ·
Med Malpractice 0 365 Personallnjwy -
Product Liability 0 368 Asbestos Personal
Inj wy Product Liability PERSONAL PROPERTY 0 370 Other Fraud 0 371 Truth in Lending 0 380 Other Personal Property Damage 0 385 Property Damage Product Liability
0 510 Motions to Vacate Sentence
Habeas Corpus: 0 530 General 0 535 Death Penalty 0 540 Mandamus & Other 0 550 Civil Rights 0 555 Prison Condition

0 61 0 Agriculture

0 422 Appeal28 USC 158

0

0 620 Other Food & Drug

0 423 Withdrawal

0

0 625 Drug Related Seizure

28 usc 157

0

of Property 21 USC 881

0

0 630 Liquor Laws

0

0 640 R.R. & Truck

0 820 Copyrights

0

0 650 Airline Regs.

0 830 Patent

0 660 Occupational

0 840 Trademark

0

Safety/Health

0

0 690 Other

0

"'

~. '

.: 0

0 710 Fair Labor Standards

0 861 HIA (!395ft)

Act

0 862 Black Lung (923)

0

0 720 Labor/Mgmt. Relations 0 863 DIWCJDIWW (40S(g))

0 730 Labor/Mgmt.Reporting 0 864 SS!D Title XVI

0

& Disclosure Act 0 740 Railway Labor Act 0 790 Other Labor Litigation
0 791 Empl. Ret. Inc.

"0--8-65~~R~SI~~40-5iiji!fj§llj0o

0 870 Taxes (U.S. Plaintiff

0

or Defendant)

0

Security Act

0 871 IRS-Third Party

0

26 "USC 7609

0

462 NaturalizatJon Applicat10n

0 463 Habeas Corpus -

Alien Detainee

0

0 465 Other Immigration

Actions

400 State Reapportionment 410 Antitrust 430 Banks and Banking 450 Commerce 460 Deportation 470 Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations 480 Consumer Credit 490 CableiSat TV 810 Selective Service 850 Securities/Commodities/
Exchange 875 Customer Challenge
12 USC 3410 890 Other Statutory Actions 891 Agr1cultural Acts
892 Economic Stabilization Act 893 Environmental Matters 894 Energy Allocation Act 895 Freedom of Information
Act 900Appeal of Fee Detennination
Under Equal Access to Justice 950 Constitutionali ty of State Statutes

V. ORIGIN
0 1 Original
Proceeding

(Place an "X" m One Box Only)

n 2 Removed from

n 3 Remanded from

State Court

Appellate Court

n n n 4 Reinstated or

5 Transferred from

6 Multidistrict

Reopened

anoth.er dtstnct s ec1f

Litigation

n 1

Appeal to District Judge from Magistrate Jud ent

VI. CAUSE OF ACTION ~CB4ir~ti2ee~fthUdee~s.UcSr.S~i.pC.tCi~oinv-iol~fS1ctaa~tuus9tee:8un~d3er~w-hi-ch-y-ou-a-re-fi-lin-g-(-Do-n-o-t c-lt-e j-ur-ls-dl-ct-lo-na-l s-ta-tu-te-s-un-le-ss-d-iv-er-si-ty-): ----------------­

Class actton addressing illegal strip searches at local jail

VD. REQUESTED IN
COMPLAINT:

~ CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACfiON UNDER F.RC.P. 23

DEMAND $

CHECK YES only if demanded in complaint:
JURY DEMAND: 0 Yes 0 No

VIII. RELATED CASE(S)

IF ANY

(See instructions):

DATE

JUDGE
""~

DOCKET NUMBER

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

-------- RECEIPT #

------------ AMOUNT

APPL Y!NG IFP

JUDGE --------- MAG. JUDGE---------------

Case 3:09-cv-01448-TIV Document 1-3 Filed 07/24/2009 Page 1 of 2

AO 440 (Rev. 01/09) Summons in a Civil Action
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

RONELD LOGORY
Plaintiff
v.
The County of Susquehanna
Defendant

) ) ) Civil Action No. ) )

SUMMONS IN A CIVIL ACTION
To: (Defendant's name and address) The County of Susquehanna C/0 Clerk, Susquehanna Board of Commissioners 11 Maple Street Montrose, PA 18801

A lawsuit has been filed against you.
Within 20 days after service ofthis summons on you (not counting the day you received it)- or 60 days if you are the United States or a United States agency, or an officer or employee ofthe United States described in Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (a)(2) or (3)- you must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached complaint or a motion under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer or motion must be served on the plaintiff or plaintiffs attorney, whose name and address are: Alexandra C. Warren
Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca, LLP 507 C Street NE Washington, DC 20002

If you fail to respond, judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in the complaint. You also must file your answer or motion with the court.

Date: -------------------

CLERK OF COURT
Signature ofClerk or Deputy Clerk

Case 3:09-cv-01448-TIV Document 1-3 Filed 07/24/2009 Page 2 of 2

AO 440 (Rev. 01/09) Swnmons in a Civil Action (Page 2)
Civil Action No.

PROOF OF SERVICE (This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 45.)
This summons for (name ofindividual and title, ifany) was received by me on (date)

0 I personally served the summons on the individual at (place)

--------------------------------------

on (date)

; or

-------------------------------------------------

---------

0 I left the summons at the individual's residence or usual place of abode with (name)

------------

, a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there,
---------------------

on (date)

,and mailed a copy to the individual's last known address; or

--------

0 I served the summons on (name ofindividual) designated by law to accept service of process on behalf of (name oforganization)

, who is

on (date)

; or

--------

0 I returned the summons unexecuted because 0 Other (specify):

; or
------------------------

My fees are$ ________ for travel and$ _________ for services, for a total of$ _0_.0_0_ _ _ __ I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true.

Date:

Server's signature

Printed name and title

Additional information regarding attempted service, etc:

Server's address