Case: 2:18-cv-977 As of: 06/24/2020 07:13 PM CDT 1 of 5
U.S. District Court Alabama Middle District (Montgomery) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:18−cv−00977−WKW−SRW

CLOSED

Cook et al v. Taylor Assigned to: Honorable Judge William Keith Watkins Referred to: Honorable Judge Susan Russ Walker Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 11/19/2018 Date Terminated: 05/01/2019 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 950 Constitutional − State Statute Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Lakendra Cook on behalf of herself and those similarily situated

represented by Danielle Davis 201 St Charles Ave − Ste 2000 New Orleans, LA 70170 504−526−1531 Email: danielle.davis@splcenter.org LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Micah West Southern Poverty Law Center 400 Washington Ave Montgomery, AL 36104 334−956−8200 Fax: 334−956−8481 Email: micah.west@splcenter.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sara Michelle Zampierin Southern Poverty Law Center 400 Washington Avenue Montgomery, AL 36104 334−956−8326 Fax: 334−956−8481 Email: sara.zampierin@splcenter.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Christopher Gray on behalf of himself and those similarily situated TERMINATED: 01/22/2019

represented by Danielle Davis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/22/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Micah West (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/22/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sara Michelle Zampierin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/22/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

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Sharon Motley on behalf of herself and those similarily situated

represented by Danielle Davis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Micah West (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sara Michelle Zampierin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
Hal Taylor in his official capacity as Secretary of the Alabama Law Enforcement Agency

represented by Brad A. Chynoweth State of Alabama Office of the Attorney General 501 Washington Avenue Post Office Box 300152 Montgomery, AL 36130 334.242.7997 Fax: 334.353.8440 Email: Brad.Chynoweth@AlabamaAG.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laura Elizabeth Howell Office of the Alabama Attorney General P O Box 300152 Montgomery, AL 36130 334−353−1018 Fax: 334−353−8440 Email: laura.howell@alabamaag.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Meridith Hamilton Barnes Alabama Bureau of Parsons & Paroles 100 Capitol Commerce Blvd; Suite 310 Montgomery, AL 36117 334−242−8702 Fax: 334−315−4793 Email: Meridith.Barnes@paroles.alabama.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 11/19/2018
11/19/2018 11/19/2018

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF against Hal Taylor (Filing fee $ 400.00 receipt number 4602051480.), filed by Christopher Gray, Lakendra Cook, Sharon Motley. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Lakendra Cook, # 2 Declaration of Christopher Gray, # 3 Declaration of Sharon Motley, # 4 Civil Cover Sheet, # 5 Receipt)(wcl, ) (Entered: 11/20/2018)
2 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Lakendra Cook, Christopher Gray, Sharon Motley. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(wcl, ) (Entered: 11/20/2018)
3 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support re 2 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Lakendra Cook, Christopher Gray, Sharon Motley. (wcl, ) (Entered: 11/20/2018)

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11/19/2018 11/19/2018 11/19/2018
11/19/2018 11/21/2018 11/21/2018
11/21/2018 11/21/2018 11/29/2018 11/29/2018 11/29/2018 11/29/2018 11/29/2018 11/30/2018 12/03/2018

4 MOTION for Class Certification by Lakendra Cook, Christopher Gray, Sharon Motley. (wcl, ) (Entered: 11/20/2018)
5 MEMORANDUM of Law in Support re 4 MOTION for Class Certification filed by Lakendra Cook, Christopher Gray, Sharon Motley. (wcl, ) (Entered: 11/20/2018)
6 DECLARATION OF MICAH WEST in Support re 2 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction, 4 MOTION for Class Certification, filed by Lakendra Cook, Christopher Gray, Sharon Motley. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K, # 12 Exhibit L, # 13 Exhibit M, # 14 Exhibit N, # 15 Exhibit O, # 16 Exhibit P, # 17 Exhibit R, # 18 Exhibit S, # 19 Exhibit T, # 20 Exhibit U, # 21 Exhibit V, # 22 Exhibit W)(wcl, ) (Entered: 11/20/2018)
7 Summons Issued as to Hal Taylor and returned to counsel for personal service by process server. (wcl, ) (Entered: 11/20/2018)
8 Notice of Deficiency requiring filing of Corporate Disclosure/Conflict Statement sent to Lakendra Cook, Christopher Gray, Sharon Motley; Corporate Disclosures due by 12/3/2018. (Attachments: # 1 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Attachment) (wcl, ) (Entered: 11/21/2018)
9 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Lakendra Cook, Christopher Gray, Sharon Motley re 8 Notice of Deficiency requiring filing of Corporate Disclosure/Conflict Statement. (West, Micah) (Main Document 9 replaced on 11/21/2018) (wcl, ). Modified on 11/21/2018 to attach a corrected PDF document to reflect as filed on behalf of all plaintiffs (wcl, ). (Entered: 11/21/2018)
10 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Christopher Gray, Lakendra Cook, Sharon Motley. Hal Taylor served on 11/20/2018, answer due 12/11/2018. (West, Micah) (Entered: 11/21/2018)
11 NOTICE of Correction re 9 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement, to attach a corrected PDF document to reflect as filed on behalf of all plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Corrected Main PDF Document to Docket Entry 9 )(wcl, ) (Entered: 11/21/2018)
12 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 2 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction, 1 Complaint, 4 MOTION for Class Certification by Hal Taylor. (Chynoweth, Brad) (Entered: 11/29/2018)
***PURSUANT TO THE 12 MOTION − Attorney Laura Elizabeth Howell for Hal Taylor added. (No pdf attached to this entry) (wcl, ) (Entered: 11/29/2018)
13 Notice of Deficiency requiring filing of Corporate Disclosure/Conflict Statement sent to Hal Taylor; Corporate Disclosures due by 12/10/2018. (Attachments: # 1 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Attachment) (wcl, ) (Entered: 11/29/2018)
14 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Hal Taylor re 13 Notice of Deficiency requiring filing of Corporate Disclosure/Conflict Statement. (Chynoweth, Brad) (Entered: 11/29/2018)
15 Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice for Danielle Davis (Filing fee $ 50.00 receipt number 4602051548.) by Lakendra Cook, Christopher Gray, Sharon Motley. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Certificates of Good Standing, # 2 Text of Proposed Order, # 3 Receipt) (wcl, ) (Entered: 11/29/2018)
16 TEXT ORDER granting 15 Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice for Danielle Davis. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 11/30/2018. (No pdf attached to this entry) (wcl, ) (Entered: 11/30/2018)
17 ORDER granting 12 Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time as follows: (1) Dft shall file an answer or otherwise respond to the complaint on or before 12/21/2018; (2) Dft shall file a response to the 2 Motion for Preliminary Injunction on or before 12/21/2018; and (3) Plfs are permitted until 1/14/2019, to file a reply to the Motion for Preliminary Injunction; Plfs have also filed a 4 motion for class certification; A briefing order on that motion will be entered separately at a later date. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 12/3/2018. (wcl, ) (Entered: 12/03/2018)

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12/18/2018
12/18/2018 12/21/2018 12/21/2018 12/21/2018 01/14/2019
01/18/2019 01/22/2019 01/22/2019 01/23/2019 01/23/2019 01/24/2019 01/24/2019
01/29/2019
01/30/2019 01/30/2019

18 NOTICE of Appearance by Meridith Hamilton Barnes on behalf of Hal Taylor (Barnes, Meridith) (Main Document 18 replaced on 12/18/2018) (wcl, ). Modified on 12/18/2018 to attach the corrected PDF document to include the correct signature and service dates (wcl, ). (Entered: 12/18/2018)
19 NOTICE of Correction re 18 Notice of Appearance, to attach the corrected PDF document to include the correct signature and service dates. (Attachments: # 1 Corrected Main PDF Document to Docket Entry 18 )(wcl, ) (Entered: 12/18/2018)
20 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM by Hal Taylor. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4)(Chynoweth, Brad) (Entered: 12/21/2018)
21 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support re 20 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM and in Opposition re 2 Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Hal Taylor. (Chynoweth, Brad) (Entered: 12/21/2018)
BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 2 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Hal Taylor. (No pdf attached to this entry − See doc 21 for pdf) (wcl, ) (Entered: 12/26/2018)
22 (RESPONSE to Motion) Consolidated Reply in Support re 2 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction, and Response in Opposition re 20 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by Lakendra Cook, Christopher Gray, Sharon Motley. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Micah West, # 2 Exhibit X, # 3 Exhibit Y, # 4 Exhibit Z)(West, Micah) Modified on 1/15/2019 to clarify the docket text (wcl, ). (Entered: 01/14/2019)
23 NOTICE of Voluntary Dismissal as to Christopher Gray by All Plaintiffs (West, Micah) Modified on 1/22/2019 to clarify the docket text (kr, ). (Entered: 01/18/2019)
24 CLERK'S NOTICE of Voluntary Dismissal of Christopher Gray.(kr, ) (Entered: 01/22/2019)
25 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss by Hal Taylor. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss)(Chynoweth, Brad) (Entered: 01/22/2019)
26 TEXT ORDER granting 25 Unopposed Motion for Leave to File Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 1/23/2019. (No pdf attached to this entry) (wcl, ) (Entered: 01/23/2019)
27 REPLY to Response to Motion re 20 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by Hal Taylor. (Chynoweth, Brad) (Entered: 01/23/2019)
28 MOTION to Stay Discovery and All Rule 26 Obligations Pending a Ruling on Motion to Dismiss by Hal Taylor. (Chynoweth, Brad) (Entered: 01/24/2019)
29 TEXT ORDER: Upon consideration of Dft's 28 motion to stay discovery and all Rule 26 obligations pending a ruling on the motion to dismiss, it is ORDERED that Plfs respond to the motion on or before 2/1/2019. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 1/24/2019. (No pdf attached to this entry)(wcl, ) (Entered: 01/24/2019)
30 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File Sur−Reply in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss by Lakendra Cook, Sharon Motley. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Proposed Sur−Reply in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss)(West, Micah) (Entered: 01/29/2019)
31 TEXT ORDER granting 30 Unopposed Motion for Leave to File Sur−Reply in Opposition to Dft's Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 1/30/2019. (No pdf attached to this entry) (wcl, ) (Entered: 01/30/2019)
32 SUR−REPLY BRIEF re 20 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM , 22 Response to Motion, 27 REPLY to Response to Motion, filed by Lakendra Cook, Sharon Motley. (West, Micah) Modified on 1/30/2019 to clarify the docket text and to add the link to the 27 Reply (wcl, ). (Entered: 01/30/2019)

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02/01/2019 03/15/2019 05/01/2019 05/01/2019

33 RESPONSE to Motion re 28 MOTION to Stay Discovery and All Rule 26 Obligations Pending a Ruling on Motion to Dismiss filed by Lakendra Cook, Sharon Motley. (West, Micah) (Entered: 02/01/2019)
34 ORDER: It is ORDERED: (1) Defendant's 28 motion to stay discovery and Rule 26 obligations pending a ruling on its motion to dismiss is GRANTED. (2) The parties' discovery and Rule 26 obligations are STAYED pending the court's ruling on Defendant's 20 motion to dismiss. Signed by Honorable Judge William Keith Watkins on 3/15/2019. (kr, ) (Entered: 03/15/2019)
35 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: It is ORDERED: (1) Plaintiffs' 2 motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED; (2) Plaintiffs' 4 motion for class certification is DENIED; (3) The State's 20 motion to dismiss is GRANTED; (4) This case is DISMISSED without prejudice. Signed by Honorable Judge William Keith Watkins on 5/1/2019. (kr, ) (Entered: 05/01/2019)
36 FINAL JUDGMENT: it is the ORDER, JUDGMENT, and DECREE of the court that this action is DISMISSED without prejudice; DIRECTING the Clerk of the Court to enter this document on the civil docket as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 58 of the FRCP. Signed by Honorable Judge William Keith Watkins on 5/1/2019. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Appeals Checklist)(kr, ) (Entered: 05/01/2019)

 
 Case 2:18-cv-00977-WKW-SRW Document 1 Filed 11/19/18 Page 1 of 19

IN THE UNITED STATES‘DISTRICT COURT RECEIVED
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

Mt NOV 19 P 14: 15

LAKENDRA COOK,CHRISTOPHER GRAY,and SHARON MOTLEY,on behalf ofthemselves and those similarily situated,

DEBRA P. ti till'

ACKETT. CLK 1CT COURT

'r:.`-MICT AL A

Plaintiffs,
v.
HAL TAYLOR,in his official capacity as. Secretary ofthe Alabama Law Enforcement Agency,

q-n Case No.0:1%T.,\/- -10)41)--siztu
(CLASS ACTION)

Defendant.

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
1. The State of Alabama is violating a core principle ofthe Fourteenth Arnendment, which prohibits punishing persons simply because they are poor. Pursuant to Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.11(i)(3), courts routinely Order the suspension of driver's licenses for nonpayrnent of traffic tickets without prior notice, the opportunity to be heard, or an express finding that the person is able to pay and willfully failed to do so. The Alabama Law Enforcement Agency (hereinafter "ALEN') administers, effectuates, and enforces driver's license'suspensions under the Rule. In 2018, nearly 23,000 Alabama residents had suspended driver's licenses for failure to pay traffic tickets.
2. Alabama has the sixth highest number of individuals living in poverty- in the United States—more than 18 percent ofthe State. For those who can afford to pay,traffic tickets are a mere inconvenience. But for those who cannot afford to pay, a traffic ticket can result in

Case 2:18-cv-00977-WKW-SRW Document 1 Filed 11/19/18 Page 2 of 19
the loss of their driver's license, which frequently has much more serious economic consequences. This is especially true in a state like Alabama where a vast majority of counties are rural and lack accessible public transportation to work,home,education,and medical care.
3. The plights of Plaintiffs Lakendra Cook, Christopher Gray, and Sharon Motley are typical. Ms. Cook's driver's license is suspended because she cannot afford to pay two traffic tickets. A suspended driver's license has limited her employmerit opportunitieS. Although she lives in fear that she will be arrested while driving to work, her son to school, or her grandmother to the doctor's office, she has no choice but to drive because public transportation is limited in the ilirmifigham area, where she lives.
4. Mr. Gray has also suffered and will continue to suffer irreparable harm because his driver's license is suspended because he cannot afford to pay two traffic tickets. Having a suspended driver's license makes it more difficult for Mr. Gray to pay his traffic tickets because he does not have valid identification and cannot travel to .work without risking more tickets or arrest.
5. Ms. Motley has also suffered and will continue to suffer irreparable harm because of Alabama's unconstitutional driver's license suspension scheme. Her driver's license is currently suspended because she cannot afford to pay an old traffic ticket. Having a suspended driver's license makes it difficult for Ms. Motley to secure and retain employment, apply for housing, cash checks, and obtain medical care. Although she lives in fear of being arrested for driving with a suspended driver's license, she is often forced to drive because public transportation is so limited in Montgomery, where she lives.
6. Plaintiffs bring these claims on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated to challenge the constitutionality of Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.11(i)(3).

Case 2:18-cv-00977-WKW-SRW Document 1 Filed 11/19/18 Page 3 of 19
They seek: (1) a declaration that Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.11(i)(3) is unconstitutional; (2) an injunction preventing ALEA from effectuating any driver's license suspension pursuant to Alabama Rule of. Criminal Procedure 26.11(i)(3); (3) an injunction requiring ALEA to reinstate any driver's license previously suspended under Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.11(i)(3) without requiring a reinstatement fee, if there are no other independent reasons for suspensi9n; and (4) an injunction requiring ALEA to provide notice of reinstatement to individuals with suspended driver's licenses for nonpayment. II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
7. The Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction).
8. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because Defendant Taylor, who is sued in his official capacity, resides in this State and is employed as a State official in Montgomery, Alabama, within this District and Division, and because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs' claims occurred in this district. III. PARTIES
A. Plaintiffs 9. Plaintiff Lakendra Cook is a resident ofBirmingham, Alabama. 10. PlaintiffChristopher Gray is a resident ofHomewood,Alabama. 11. PlaintiffSharon Motley is a resident ofMontgomery,Alabama. B. Defendant 12. Defendant Hal Taylor is the Secretary ofthe Alabama Law Enforcement Agency. He is sued in his official capacity.

Case 2:18-cv-00977-WKW-SRW Document 1 Filed 11/19/18 Page 4 of 19
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS A. A driver's license is necessary to pursue a livelihood. 13. There are nearly 23,000 Alabamians with suspended driver's licenses for
nonpayrnent oftraffic tickets. 14. Many of the people with suspended licenses are among the more than 800,000
people living in poverty in Alabama or 18.5% of the State, according to the U.S. Census Bureau. This is the 6th highest poverty rate in the country.1 Suspending a driver's license for nonpayment of traffic fines and costs disproportionately affects low-income persons and communities of color. This is especially true in Alabama, which has the third highest percentage of persons in the United States living in hunger and the sixth highest unemployment rate in the country.2
15. The indefinite suspension of the driver's licenses of low-income Alabamians has devastating consequences for their ability to pursue a livelihood and meet basic human needs. Eighty-six percent of Americans describe a car as a "necessity of life," which is higher than the percentage of people who identified air conditioning, a cell phone, a computer, and every other consumer item to be a life necessity.3 Several studies have noted that a driver's license is a
1 Alemayehu Bishaw & Brian Glassman, U.S. Census Bureau, Poverty: 2014 and 2015, 3 (2015), attached as Ex. G to West Decl., available at https://goo.g1/ZtCitb. 2 Ctr. for Am. Progress, Alabama, Talkpoverty.org (2017), attached as Ex. H to West Decl., available at https://talkpoverty.org/state-year-reporhJalabama-2017-report/. 3 Paul Taylor and Wendy Wang, Pew Research Center, The Fading Glory of The Television & Telephone (2010), attached as Ex. I to West Decl., available at http://www.pewsdcialtrends.org/2010/08/19/the-fading-glory-of-the-television- and-telephone/.

Case 2:18-cv-00977-WKW-SRW Document 1 Filed 11/19/18 Page 5 of 19
"very common requirement" to obtain employment, including most jobs that "can actually lift
people out ofpoverty."4
16. The need for a car is particularly great in Alabama, where "public transit networks
...are among the weakest ofquality in the country."5
17. In Alabama, nearly 95 percent of residents travel to work by car and only 0.5
percent travel to work by public transit,6 It is not hard to understand why. According to one
report, only 32.1 percent of working-age residents in the Birmingham, Alabama metropolitan
area had access to public transportation, ranking 94th out of the 100 largest metropolitan areas
in the United States.7 Most jobs in Alabama are inaccessible by public transit even for the few
people for whom public transportation is accessible.8
4Alan Semuels, No Driver's License, No Job, The Atlantic, June 15, 2016, attached as Ex. J to West Decl., available at https://goo.gl/xQjyLj; see also Stephen Bingham, et al., Stopped, Fined, Arrested: Racial Bias in Policing and Traffic Courts in California 26-28(2016)(finding license suspensions cause loss of employment beCause they are necessary for transportation to and from work; to obtain full time, steady employment; for job-training programs; and because employers often screen out those without licenses), attached as Ex. K to West Decl., available at https://goo.gl/uLhFfL; Alan Voorhees, et al., Motor Vehicles Affordability and Fairness Task Force: Final Report xii (2006)(finding, in study of drivers with suspended licenses in New Jersey, 42% of people lost their jobs after suspension of their driver's license and 45% of those people could not find another job; these suspensions had greatest impact on seniors and lowincome individuals), attached as •Ex. L to West Decl., available at https://www.state.nj.us/mvc/pdfabout/AFTF_final_02.pdf 5 Chico Harlan, A lonely road, Wash. Post, Dec. 28, 2015, attached as Ex. M to West Decl., available at https://goo.gl/JL2Mb6. 6 See U.S. Dep't ofTransp.,Bureau ofTransp. Stats.,Alabama Transportation by the Numbers6 (2015),attached as Ex.N to West Decl.,available at https://goo.g1/8RF6Sp. 7 See Adie Tomer, et al., Brookings Institute, Missed Opportunity: Transit and Jobs in Metropolitan America 8(2011)(finding metropolitan areas in the South represent lowest transit coverage in the United States), attached as Ex. O to West Decl., available at https://goo.gl/Rg8CGx. 8 See, e.g., id. at 21, 35 (finding that only 23.3% percent of jobs in Birmingham-Hoover, Alabama metropolitan region were accessible via public transportation).

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18. According to another report, public transportation is available in only 60 percent
ofrural counties across the United States, with 20 percent providing only limited service.9
19. Suspending driver's licenses for nonpayment makes it more difficult to travel to
work and may exacerbate poverty.
20. Persons whose licenses are suspended face an unenviable choice: drive illegally
and risk further punishment, or stay home and forgo the ability to meet the daily needs of
themselves and their families. When faced with either losing their jobs or remaining
unemployed, or otherwise risking being pulled over for driving with a suspended license,
individuals often chose the latter—risking arrest, additional fines and costs, and longer
suspension periods—so they can maintain their livelihood and support their families.
21. Driving with a suspended driver's license in Alabama is a misdemeanor offense
carrying up to six months in prison and a $500 fine plus hundreds ofdollars in court costs.
B. Ala. R. Crim. P. 26.11(i)(3) authorizes courts to suspend driver's licenses without any inquiry into ability to Day.
22. Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.11(i)(3) authorizes courts to order the
suspension of an individual's driver's license for nonpayment of traffic tickets.I9 Rule
26.11(i)(3) states:
If the court orders a defendant to pay a fine and/or restitution imposed as a result of a traffic infraction, the court may suspend the defendant's privilege to operate a motor vehicle in this state upon a failure ofthe defendant to comply with the order ofthe court.
9 See S. Rural Black Women's Initiative for Econ. & Soc. Just., Unequal Lives: The State of Black Women and Families in the Rural South 16 (2015), attached as Ex. P to West Decl, available at http://srbwi.org/images/uploads/SRBWI_Report_Layoutiorweb_low_res_%281 %29.pdf. 10 Although the Rule talks about "fine and/or restitution imposed as a result of a traffic ticket," the majority of traffic tickets in Alabama do not result in restitution. Even Defendant's own policy statement references only unpaid "fines and court costs." See Department of Public. Safety Driver License Policy Order No.33 Failure to Pay Suspensions, attached as Ex.F to West Decl.

Case 2:18-cv-00977-WKW-SRW Document 1 Filed 11/19/18 Page 7 of 19
If the defendant's privilege to operate a motor vehicle has been suspended for failure to comply with such order,the privilege rnay remain suspended until the total amount ofthe fine and/or restitution imposed is paid. See also Ala. R. Crim. P. 26.11(j)("[T]he same procedures provided herein for nonpayment of fines shall apply for nonpayment of costs."). 23. Rule 26.11(i)(3) authorizes suspensions for tIonpayment without any presuspension hearing, or a finding that a motorist willfully failed to pay. The only finding that Rule 26.11(i)(3) requires prior to suspension is that the motorist failed "to comply" with a court order"to pay a fine and/or restitution imposed as a result ofa traffic infraction." 24. Rule 26.11(i)(3) does not require any notice or an opportunity to be heard prior to the suspension ofa driver's license for nonpayment ofa traffic ticket. 25. This broad authority to suspend licenses without any pre-suspension notice, opportunity to be heard, or express finding that the individual is able to pay and willfully failed to do so differs significantly from the rest of Rule 26.11(i), which prohibits courts from incarcerating any person "for inability to pay a fine or court costs or restitution" and requires a court to examine "the reasons for nonpayment" prior to incarceration. Ala. R. Crim. P. 26.11(i)(1)-(2). 26. Rule 26.11(i)(3) authorizes the indefinite suspension of a license suspended for nonpayment"until the total amount ofthe fine and/or restitution imposed is paid." There are no provisions for post-suspension process to contest the erroneous suspension of a driver's license because a person could not afford to pay the ticket.
7

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C. ALEA administers and enforces any order to suspend a driver's license for nonpayment pursuant to Ala.R.Crim.P.26.11(i)(3).
27. State law requires ALEA to administer, effectuate, and enforce any laws relating to the operation of vehicles:including Rule 26.11(i)(3). Ala. Code § 32-2-5.11
28. Defendant Taylor is the "executive hear and "appointing authority" of ALEA. Ala. Code § 41-27-2. He establishes general policies and oversees the actions of the agency,including those related to driver's license suspensions.
29. ALEA's role in the suspension process is memorialized in written policy documents. These policy documents state that."[i]t is the policy,of the Director arid the Driver License Division [of ALEA]that any person" who "fails to pay" will have their driver's license "suspended until...the fines and court costs have been paid." Ex.F to West Decl.
30. The Administrative Office of Courts issued a letter to judges and clerks at the time ofthe Rule's initial implementation further describing ALEA's role as"process[ing] driver actions in regard to failure-to-pay traffic cases." Mar. 3, 1991 Failure to Pay Memorandum, attached as Ex. C to West Decl. It states that in order to suspend a driver's license for nonpayment, a court must complete a form referred to as Form UTC-25 and "forwardn [it] to the Department of Public Safety ... to initiate the suspension for the defendant in a particular case." Id. at 2;see also Form UTC-25,attached as Ex.B to West Decl.
31. The letter continues to describe ALEA's role in suspension and reinstatement: The Department of Public Safety will suspend only once per case for failure to pay. When the defendant pays the total amount of the fine, costs, and/or restitution due the court for this same case,thejudge must sign and date the original order in the appropriate space (right side) in order for the defendant's application to the Department of Public
11 The Department of Public Safety became part of ALEA,as part of an agency restructuring in 2015. Ala. Code § 41-27-1(1). The same act made the Secretary of ALEA the department head ofthe Department ofPublic Safety.Ala. Code § 41-27-2(a).

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Safety to reinstate the license [to] be approved.... As stated earlier, Public Safety will suspend only once per case for failure to pay and will not reinstate the license until an order is received from the judge stating that the defendant has paid the total amount due the court. Ex. C to West Decl. at 2-3. 32. This is the exclusive process available to effectuate or clear suspensions for nonpayment. See Ex. F to West Decl.("Only Form UTC-25 is acceptable to clear a fail to pay suspension:"). 33. Forrn UTC-25 authorizes judges to order the suspension of a driver's license for nonpayment after making a finding that a motorist was "ordered to pay a fine, court costs and/or restitution" and "failed to pay." Ex. B to West Decl. In order to suspend a license for nonpayment, the form does not require ajudge to represent that a pre-suspension ability to pay hearing was conducted and that a finding was made that the motorist willfully failed to pay. See id. 34. Form UTC-25 additionally states that a license will remain suspended "until the fine is paid in fulr and prohibits reinstatement until a judge or clerk certifies that the motorist "paid the total amount"ofthe fine, court cost, and/or restitution. See id. 35. These practices and policies are further reflected in the standard notice that ALEA mails to motorists following suspension. The Suspension Notice states that the motorist's driver's license will remain suspended for an "indefinite duration until he or she pays "the outstanding fine and/or court costs," the court mails Form UTC-25 to ALEA as proof of payinent, and the motorist pays a $100 reinstatement fee. See ALEA Suspension Notice, attached as Ex. D to West Dec1.12 The letter does not provide motorists with any notice about
12 ALEA charges an additional $50 reinstatement fee if a motorist does not surrender his or her driver's license to ALEA within 30 days ofthe mailing Ofthe stispension notice.

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the possibility of a hearing to contest the suspension because the motorist is indigent and unable to pay.
Plaintiffs' driver's licenses have been unlawfully suspended for failing to pav traffic tickets without an inquiry into or finding that they had the ability to pav 1. Ms.Lakendra Cook 36. Plaintiff Lakendra Cook lives in Jefferson County, Alabama. 37. Ms. Cook's driver's license was suspended for failing to pay two traffic tickets in the Wetutnpka Municipal Court. 38. Neither the court nor ALEA conducted an ability to pay hearing prior to suspending Ms. Cook's driver's license. 39. Ms. Cook has had difficulty traveling to work, doctor's appointments, and her ten-year old son's school because her driver's license is suspended. 4o. Ms. Cook would pay the traffic tickets if she could, but her paycheck,from working in a warehouse is not enough to pay all ofher bills. As a result, she is sometimes forced to make the choice between paying for groceries or utilities. 41. Although Ms. Cook tries to avoid driving, sometimes she has no choice because publit transportation is limited in Birm_irigham 42. She worries that ifshe is arrested for driving with a suspended driver's license her son will be left without his mother and she will lose herjob. 43. This fear has limited Ms. Cook's employment opportunities because she worries about driving too far from home while her driver's license remains suspended. 2. Mr.Christopher Gray 44 PlaintiffChristopher Gray is a resident ofJefferson County.

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45. Mr. Grays driver's license is currently suspended because he, cannot afford to pay two traffic tickets that he received in the Lee County District Court.
46. Mr. Gray also has an active failure to pay arrest warrant. 47. Neither the court nor ALEA conducted an ability to pay hearing prior to suspending Mr. Gray's driver's license or issuing the warrant for his arrest. 48. Mr. Gray's driver's license suspension is a double-edged sword: he needs a license in order to work and improve his financial situation, but he needs money in order to reinstate his license so that he can work. • 49. Mr. Grays driver's license has also handicapped his earning potential because he cannot legally drive and because many jobs require a driver's license for travel and to pass a background check. 50. Mr. Gray's driver's license suspension has deepened his depression: he feels stigmatized by the suspension and fearful that he will be arrested for driving with a suspended license when he does drive. 51. Having a suspended driver's license has made it more difficult for Mr. Gray to change banks,fill prescriptions, and visit friends and family.
3. Ms.Sharon Motley 52. PlaintiffSharon Motley is a resident ofMontgomery County. 53. Ms. Motleys driver's license is currently suspended because she cannot afford to pay a traffic ticket that she received in the Montgomery County District Court in 2013. 54. Neither the court nor ALEA conducted an ability to pay hearing prior to suspending Ms. Motley's driver's license.

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• 55. Having a suspended driver's license has made it difficult for Ms. Motley to secure
and retain employment employers have rescinded employment offers because she could not
perform certain job functions without a valid driVer's license like deposit checks or travel for work.
56. A suspended driver's license has also made it difficult for Ms. Motley to apply for housing, cash checks, and obtain medical care.
57. Because public transportation is limited in Montgomery, she is often forced to drive and lives in fear ofbeing arrested for driving with a suspended driver's license. V. CLASS ALLEGATIONS
58. Plaintiffs seek class certification pursuant to Federal Rules of. Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(2) related to their Claim, for which prospective injunctive and declaratory relief only is sought. This Class is defined as: All individuals whose driver's licenses are suspended for nonpayment oftraffic tickets.
59. A class action is the only practicable means by which Plaintiffs and unknown members ofthe Class can challenge Alabama's unconstitutional driver's license suspension law, Alabama Rule ofCriminal Procedure 26.11(i)(3), and ALEA's policy and practice ofrindefinitely suspending driver's licenses for nonpayment without any prior notice, the opportunity to be heard,or an express finding that that the individual is able to pay and willfully failed to do so.
60. As set forth below, this action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements of Rule 23(a). This action also satisfies Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2).
61. Numerositp: The exact size of the Class is unknown by Plaintiffs, but the Class plainly meets the numerosity requirement, thereby making joinder impracticable. In April 2018,
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there were nearly 23,000 people with suspended driver's licenses in Alabama for nonpayment of traffic fines and costs. April 20,2018 Letter from ALEA,attached as Ex. A to West Decl. That number is likely to continue to grow.
62. Members of the proposed Class, such as Plaintiffs, are also geographically diverse, and many are low-income individuals who lack financial resources to bring an independent action or to be joined in this action. Putative members have experienced the suspension of their driver's licenses precisely because of their inability to pay; thus, they are unlikely to be able to afford counsel to bring their own separate action against Defendant.
63. Commonality: All persons comprising the proposed Class are equally subject to Alabarna Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.11(i)(3), which authorizes courts to order ALEA to suspend licenses for nonpayment without prior notice, the opportunity to be heard, or an express finding that a motorist is able to pay and willfullY failed to do so.
64. Plaintiffs raise claims based on questions oflaw and fact that are common to, and typical of,the putative class members. Common questions offact include:
a. Whether Alabama Rule of Criminal PrOcedure 26.11(i)(3) authorizes courts to order the suspension of driver's licenses for nonpayment without any prior notice, the opportunity to be heard, and an express finding that the motorist is able to pay and willfully failed to do so; and
b Whether ALEA has a policy and practice of administering, effectuating, and enforcing any suspension order without any documentary evidence that the,motorist received notice, the opportunity to be heard, and there was an express finding that the motorist is able to pay and willfully failed to do so.
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Common questions oflaw include: a. Whether Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.11(i)(3) violates the Fourteenth Arnendment by authorizing courts to suspend driver's licenses for nonpayment without any prior notice, the opportunity to be heard, and an express finding that the motorist is able to pay and willfully failed to do so; and b. Whether injunctive and declaratory relief is appropriate and if so, what the terms ofsuch reliefshould be.
65. The relief sought is common to all members of the Class. Plaintiffs seek relief declaring Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.11(i)(3) unconstitutional. They additionally seek:(a) an injunction preventing ALEA from effectuating any driver's license suspension for nonpayment under Rule 26.11(i)(3);(b) an injunction requiring ALEA to reinstate any driver's license previously suspended under Rule 26.11(i)(3) without requiring a reinstatement fee, if there are no other independent reasons for the suspension; and (c) an injunction requiring ALEA to give notice to individuals with suspended driver's licenses for nonpayment of their reinstatement.
66. Typicality: The claims ofPlaintiffs are typical ofthe claims ofthe proposed Class as a whole. Plaintiffs and the,putative Class members have suffered the same direct, irreparable injury of loss of their driver's license, and this injury will continue unless Rule 26.11(i)(3) is declared unconstitutional and enjoined.
67. Because Plaintiffs and the proposed Class challenge the same unconstitutional Rule and practices, ALEA will likely assert similar defenseš against Plaintiffs and proposed Class mernbers. Moreover, the answer to whether Rule 26.11(i)(3) and the challenged practices

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are unconstitutional will determine the success of Plaintiffs' claims and every other proposed Class member: if Plaintiffs succeed in their claims, that ruling will likewise benefit every other member ofthe proposed Class.
68. Adequacy: Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the proposed Class they seek to represent.
69. Plaintiffs have no interests separate from, or in conflict with, those of the proposed Class they seek to represent and seek no relief other than the declaratory and injunctive reliefsought on behalfofthe entire proposed Class.
70. Rule 23(b)(2): Class action status under Rule 23(b)(2) is appropriate because ALEA has acted or failed and/or refused to act on grounds that generally apply to the proposed Class, such that preliminary and final injunctive and declaratory relief is appropriate and necessary with respect to each member of the Class. Specifically, ALEA effectuates suspension orders pursuant to Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.11(i)(3), which authorizes driver's license suspensions for nonpayment of traffic tickets without any determination of willfulness or ability to pay, and Without a pre-deprivation hearing.
71. Accordingly, (a) a declaration that Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.11(i)(3) .violates the Fourteenth Amendment; (b) an injunction preventing ALEA from effectuating any driver's license suspension for nonpayment under Rule 26.11(i)(3); (.c) an injunction requiring ALEA to reinstate any driver's license previously suspended under Rule 26.11(i)(3) without requiring a reinstatement fee ifthere are no other independent reasons for the suspension; and (d) an injunction requiring ALEA to provide notice to individuals with suspended driver's licenses for nonpayment about reinstatement would benefit every member of the proposed Class.

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72. Rule 23(2): Plaintiffs respectfully request that the undersigned be appointed as Class Counsel. The undersigned attorneys from the Southern Poverty Law Center have experience in class-actiOn litigation involving complex civil rights matters in federal court and knowledge ofthe relevant constitutional and statutory law and Defendant's suspension practices. Counsel also have the resources, expertise, and experience to prosecute this action. VI. CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution (Equal Protection and Due Process Bearden Violation) 73. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as iffully set forth here. 74. Plaintiffs bring this claim on behalf of themselves and the proposed Class they seek to represent. 75. The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits punishing individuals for nonpayment without first determining that they had the ability to pay and willfully refused to make a monetary payment. See Bearden v. Georgia,461 U.S.660(1983). 76. Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.11(i)(3) authorizes courts to indefinitely suspend motorists' driver's licenses for nonpayment oftraffic fines, restitution and/or court costs without prior notice, the opportunity to be heard, and an express finding that the individual is able to pay and willfully failed to do so. ALEA administers, effectuates, and enforces these suspension orders. 77. Plaintiffs have a substantial interest in their driver's licenses. 78. Suspending the driver's license ofa motorist who does not have the means to pay, through no fault of his or her own, is not substantially related to any important government interest.
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79. There are alternate means to effectuate Alabama's interest in collecting unpaid fines, restitution and/or court costs, including, inter alia, extending the time to make payments, reducing the amount owed,or ordering a motorist to complete community service or coursework.
80. Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.11(i)(3) violates Plaintiffs' rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution by authorizing courts to suspend any motorist's driver's license for nonpayment of fines, restitution and/or court costs without first considering the reason for nonpayment, and without determining ifthe motorist willfully refused to pay. ALEA violates Plaintiffs' rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by administering, effectuating, and enforcing these suspensions. VII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE,Plaintiffs request the following relief: a. Assumejurisdiction over this action; b. Certify a Class under Rules 23(a) and (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure represented by Plaintiffs Ms. Cook, Mr. Gray, and Ms. Motley; c. A declaration that Rule 26.11(i)(3) of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure
violates the Equal protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, as articulated in Bearden v. Georgia, by suspending a motorist's driver's license for nonpayment without prior notice, the opportunity to be heard, and an express finding that the motorist is able to pay and willfully failed to do so; d. An injunction:
Preventing ALEA from effectuating driver's license suspensions for nonpayment under Alabama Rule ofCriminal Procedure 26.11(i)(3);
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ii.

Requiring ALEA to reinstate any driver's license previously suspended

under Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.11(i)(3) without charging a

reinstatement fee, if there is not an independent reason to continue the

suspension; and

iii.

Requiring ALEA to provide notice, to drivers with suspended licenses of

their driver's license reinstatement;

e. Award Plaintiffs costs; including attorney fees; and

f. Grant such other reliefas the Court deemsjust and appropriate.

Dated: November 19,2018

Respectfully submitted,
Micah West On BehalfofCounselfor Plaintiffs
Micah West(ASB-1842-J82F) Sara Zampierin(ASB-1695-S34H) SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 400 Washington Avenue. Montgomery,Alabama 36104 Telephone:(334)956-8200 Fax:(334)956-8481 samuel.brooke@splcenter.org micah.west@splcentenorg sara.zampierin@splcenter.org
Danielle Davis* SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 201 St. Charles Avenue, Suite 2000 New Orleans, LA 70170 Telephone:(504)526-8982 Fax:(504)486-8947 danielle.davis@splcenter.org
* applicationforpro hac viceforthcoming
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that arrangements have been made to deliver a true and correct copy of the foregoing by process service to the following parties, at the below addresSes:
Hal Taylor, Secretary of Alabama Law Enforcement Agency 201 South Union Street, Suite 3000 Montgomery, AL 36130 Formal prOofofservice will be filed with the Court when cOmpleted. I further certify that arrangements have been made to deliver a true and correct courtesy copy ofthe foregoing by hand delivery and by electronic mail to the following: James W.Davis, Section Chief Constitutional Defense Section Office ofthe Attorney General 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, AL 36104 E:jimdavis@ago.state.al.us DATED this November 19,2018.
Micah West

 
 Case 2:18-cv-00977-WKW-SRW Document 35 Filed 05/01/19 Page 1 of 21

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION

LAKENDRA COOK, SHARON MOTLEY,
Plaintiffs,
v.
HAL TAYLOR, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Alabama Law Enforcement Agency,
Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

) CASE NO. 2:18-CV-977-WKW

)

[WO]

)

)

)

)

)

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs Lakendra Cook and Sharon Motley, two indigent Alabama

residents, currently have suspended driver’s licenses. Those licenses were

suspended by state courts because Plaintiffs failed to pay their traffic tickets.

Plaintiffs say those suspensions were unconstitutional because the courts did not

consider whether Plaintiffs were unable to pay through no fault of their own.

Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit to get their licenses back.

When they filed suit, Plaintiffs also had license suspensions for failing to

appear in court for different traffic tickets. Plaintiffs do not challenge those

suspensions. And those suspensions mean that the court cannot give Plaintiffs what

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they want: the reinstatement of their driver’s licenses. And since the court cannot give Plaintiffs what they want, they lack standing to bring this suit.
Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction (Doc. # 2) to prohibit Defendant Hal Taylor, head of the Alabama Law Enforcement Agency (ALEA),1 from enforcing an Alabama rule that authorizes state courts to suspend indigent individuals’ driver’s licenses without finding that they willfully refused to pay. Plaintiffs also seek an order requiring the State to reinstate licenses suspended under this rule. Finally, Plaintiffs move to certify a class of similarly situated individuals. (Doc. # 4.) The State moved to dismiss (Doc. # 20) on jurisdictional grounds as well as on the merits. This opinion addresses those motions.
I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE Because this case involves a constitutional challenge to state actions, subjectmatter jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question). The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW An attack on subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) may be either a facial attack or a factual attack. Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1528–29 (11th Cir. 1990). A facial attack simply challenges the
1 Because Plaintiffs sue Taylor in his official capacity, the court will refer to Defendant as “the State.”
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sufficiency of the plaintiff’s jurisdictional allegations, which are taken as true. Id. at 1529 (quotation omitted). Factual attacks, however, challenge “the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings, and matters outside the pleadings, such as testimony and affidavits, are considered.” Id. (quotation omitted). The State attacks Plaintiffs’ standing based on their separate license suspensions for failing to appear in court. This is a factual attack on jurisdiction that requires the court to look beyond the allegations of the complaint and to the evidence presented by the parties. See MSPA Claims 1, LLC v. Tenet Fla., Inc., 918 F.3d 1312, 1318–19 (11th Cir. 2019). Thus, in deciding the motion, the court has reviewed all the evidence presented by the parties.
III. BACKGROUND A. Alabama’s Driver’s License-Suspension Scheme
1. Receiving a Traffic Ticket Alabama police officers are required by statute to use a uniform traffic ticket. See Ala. Code § 12-12-53(a). That statute is implemented by Alabama Rule of Judicial Administration 19(A), which is promulgated by the Alabama Supreme Court. Rule 19(A) provides what each traffic ticket must contain and includes the standard ticket form, called Form UTTC-1. Prior to November 30, 2018, Form UTTC-1 (Series N) was the standard traffic ticket throughout the state. (Doc. # 204, at 2.)
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The Series N ticket has a section entitled “NOTICE,” which gives “INSTRUCTIONS TO THE DEFENDANT.” (Doc. # 20-4, at 14.) The notice states that the defendant must appear in court on a given date unless she has already settled the case. If the defendant fails to appear, the Department of Public Safety will be notified to suspend her license. (Doc. # 20-4, at 14.) Series N does not give notice that defendants who fail to pay their fines are subject to license suspension. (Doc. # 20-4, at 3.)
2. The State’s Changes to the Traffic Ticket System On January 26, 2018, the Standing Committee on the Alabama Rules of Judicial Administration recommended that the Alabama Supreme Court amend Rule 19(A) and the UTTC-1 ticket to include language notifying persons who received traffic tickets that their license is subject to suspension for failure to pay fines or enter into a court-approved payment plan. (Doc. # 20-4, at 3.) On May 9, 2018, the Alabama Supreme Court entered an order amending Rule 19(A) to include the Standing Committee’s proposed language. (Doc. # 20-4, at 3.) On August 10, 2018, the Standing Committee recommended that the court adopt an updated Form UTTC-1 that includes: (1) the new notice language already approved by the court; and (2) several corrective changes, such as replacing references to the “Department of Public Safety” with the “Alabama Law Enforcement Agency.” (Doc. # 20-4, at 4.) Form UTTC-1 (Series P) contains the
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additional notice language approved by the court in the amendments to Rule 19(A). (Doc. # 20-4, at 3.)
Form UTTC-1 (Series P) was approved by the Alabama Supreme Court on November 30, 2019, eleven days after this lawsuit was filed. (Doc. # 20-4, at 4.) Series P is now the operative uniform traffic ticket in Alabama.
3. Courts’ Authority to Impose Fines and Suspend Licenses a. Courts’ Authority to Impose Fines
Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.11 governs fines and restitutions in state courts.2 Rule 26.11(b) provides that courts, in deciding whether to impose a fine, “should consider” five factors, including “the financial resources and obligations of the defendant and the burden that payment of a fine will impose,” as well as the “ability of the defendant to pay a fine forthwith on an installment basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court.” Ala. R. Crim. P. 26.11(b)(2), (3) (emphasis added).
If the defendant fails to pay a fine, the court “may inquire and cause an investigation to be made into the defendant’s financial, employment, and family standing, and the reasons for nonpayment of the fine,” including whether nonpayment “was contumacious or due to indigency,” — that is, whether the
2 “Rule 26.11 is taken from the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures 18-2.7 (2d ed. 1986).” Ala. R. Crim. P. 26.11 committee comments.
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defendant willfully chose not to pay or was simply too poor. Ala. R. Crim. P. 26.11(g) (emphasis added). The words should and may, when read in their ordinary sense, mean that courts are not required to consider the indigency of the defendant in deciding whether to impose a fine or in determining why a fine has not been paid.3
b. Courts’ Authority to Suspend Driver’s Licenses When a court imposes a fine for a traffic violation, it “may suspend” the defendant’s driver’s license “upon a failure of a defendant to comply with the order of the court” — that is, when the defendant fails to pay the fine. Ala. R. Crim. P. 26.11(i)(3). And the license “may remain suspended until the total amount of the fine” has been paid. Id. 4. Implementing Court-Ordered Suspensions To effectuate a license suspension, the court sends a form, called a UTC-25, to the Alabama State Law Enforcement Agency (ALEA).4 (Docs. # 6-3, at 3.) That form contains a box that the judge or clerk must check certifying that the defendant was ordered to pay a fine and failed to pay. (Doc. # 6-2.) ALEA then mails a notice to the defendant that her license has been suspended. (Doc. # 6-4.)
3 The parties have not cited, and the court has not found, an Alabama case construing the language in Rule 26.11 as mandatory.
4 ALEA includes the Department of Public Safety and the State Bureau of Investigations. See Ala. Code § 41-27-1.
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If a defendant receives a traffic ticket and fails to show up on her court date, a separate provision governs. Upon receiving “written notice from the court” that the defendant failed to appear, ALEA “shall suspend the driver license and driving privilege of the defaulting driver until notified by the court” that the defendant has appeared. Ala. Admin. Code. r. 760-X-1-.12.
Defendant Hal Taylor, as head of ALEA, is tasked with administering and enforcing the laws governing motor vehicles in the state. See Ala. Code §§ 32-2-5; 41-27-2(a). He also implements court-ordered license suspensions. (See Docs. # 63, 6-4, 6-5, 6-6.) B. The Plaintiffs
1. Lakendra Cook Plaintiff Lakendra Cook is a single mother living in Birmingham, Alabama. Her driver’s license is currently suspended for two reasons. First, Cook’s license was suspended on March 12, 2018, for her failure to pay a total of $313 in fines and costs for two traffic tickets in Wetumpka Municipal Court. (Doc. # 20-1, at 10, 14.) That was after she agreed to a court-approved payment plan and stated that she was financially able to meet it (Doc. # 20-1, at 15), and failed to appear at a review hearing on January 30, 2018 (Doc. # 20-1, at 12, 14, 15). Following the Wetumpka suspension, Cook’s driver’s license was suspended in a Hale County case. Cook received a ticket in Hale County and failed to appear
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in court on June 11, 2018. (Doc. # 20-1, at 21, 22.) In a written notice, the court reset the case for September 7, 2018, ordering Cook to pay her ticket in full or appear in court on that date, or else her license would be subject to suspension. (Doc. # 201, at 22, 23.) Cook failed to appear at her September 7 court date, (Doc. # 20-1, at 24), and a suspension notice was issued on September 14, 2018 (Doc. # 20-1, at 20).
Thus, when the complaint was filed, Cook’s driver’s license was suspended for: (1) failure to pay in her Wetumpka case; and (2) failure to appear in her Hale County case. Cook “is in the process of addressing her suspension in Hale County.” (Doc. # 22, at 5 n.2.) After signing a court document to the contrary, Cook now says she cannot afford to make the payments in her Wetumpka case.5 (Doc. # 1-1, at 1.)
2. Sharon Motley Plaintiff Sharon Motley lives in Montgomery, Alabama. Her license is currently suspended for two reasons. First, on June 6, 2005, the Montgomery Municipal Court issued alias warrants after Motley failed to appear at her court date for two tickets she received. (Doc. # 20-3, at 12, 16.)
5 Cook offers no explanation for her signed agreement in a Wetumpka Municipal Court document that “I AM FINANCIALLY ABLE TO PAY THE PAYMENTS SET OUT ABOVE.” (Doc. # 20-1, at 15.) While that statement does not necessarily bind Cook as a judicial admission because it was made in a different case, see Raiford v. Abney (Matter of Raiford), 695 F.2d 521, 523 (11th Cir. 1983), it nonetheless serves as an evidentiary admission, see Higgins v. Mississippi, 217 F.3d 951, 954–5 (7th Cir. 2000), and Cook has not attempted to explain it away. Were the court to reach the merits of Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction, Cook’s statement would count against her in the weighing of the equities.
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Motley’s failure to appear in the 2005 Montgomery Municipal Court cases appears to have resulted in a suspension of her driver’s license. Although no direct documentation of the 2005 suspension appears in the record, Motley received a ticket in 2013 for driving with a suspended license. (Doc. # 20-3.) That ticket could not have been validly issued, of course, unless Motley’s license had already been suspended. The State contends, and Motley does not dispute, that the 2005 failure to appear resulted in a suspension, and that Motley’s license “has been suspended continuously since 2005 as a result of her failure to appear in connection with her Montgomery Municipal Court cases.” (Doc. # 21, at 10; see Doc. # 22, at 4.)
The 2013 ticket for driving with a suspended license is the second reason Motley’s license is suspended. On September 24, 2013, Motley pleaded guilty in Montgomery District Court to the ticket for driving with a suspended license. The court imposed a fine and court costs totaling $310, and gave Motley a little less than a month to pay it in full. (Doc. # 20-3, at 4.) On December 20, 2013, the court issued a failure to pay warrant, and the case action summary shows that a suspension notice was also issued that same day. (Doc. # 20-3, at 7.)
On November 21, 2018, just two days after Plaintiffs’ complaint was filed, Motley appeared in Montgomery Municipal Court to address her 2005 tickets. (Doc. # 20-3, at 18, 19.) She obtained a payment plan for those tickets, and the case was set for a hearing on January 14, 2019, to determine whether Motley had complied
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with the plan. (Doc. # 20-3, at 18, 19.) That hearing apparently never occurred because, on December 7, 2018, Motley received notices from the Montgomery Municipal Court that her 2005 tickets had been cleared. (Doc. # 22-3, at 2, 3.)
Thus, when the complaint was filed, Motley’s license was suspended as the result of: (1) a 2005 failure to appear in Montgomery Municipal Court; and (2) a 2013 failure to pay in Montgomery District Court. Motley cannot afford to pay for her outstanding traffic tickets. (Doc. # 1-3, at 1.) C. The Claim
On November 19, 2018, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit, alleging that the State’s suspension of their licenses violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of due process and equal protection as explained by Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983). Bearden held that, before ordering imprisonment for failure to pay a fine, a sentencing court must determine whether an indigent probationer willfully refused to pay and, if his inability to pay was through no fault of his own, must consider alternative measures of punishment. Id. at 672.
“Due process and equal protection principles converge” to protect indigent defendants from imprisonment solely because of their inability to pay fines. Id. at 665. The principle that the states must provide “equal justice for poor and rich, weak and powerful alike,” Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16 (1956), “has not been confined to cases in which imprisonment is at stake,” M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102,
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111 (1996). Plaintiffs seek to extend Bearden to protect indigent persons from having their driver’s licenses suspended without a finding of fault.
Plaintiffs’ claim, brought on behalf of all similarly situated persons, is based on the State’s suspension of their driver’s licenses under Rule 26.11(i)(3) “without prior notice, the opportunity to be heard, and an express finding that the individual is able to pay and willfully failed to do so.” (Doc. # 1, at 16.) Plaintiffs seek to: (1) enjoin ALEA from suspending licenses under Rule 26.11(i)(3) for nonpayment; (2) require ALEA to reinstate licenses that were suspended for nonpayment (assuming there is no other reason for suspension); and (3) require ALEA to provide notice to the drivers who are eligible to have their licenses reinstated. (Doc. # 1, at 17–18.)
IV. DISCUSSION Article III limits federal courts’ jurisdiction to “cases” and “controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. “[T]he core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Standing is assessed at the time the complaint is filed, Newman–Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo–Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 830 (1989), and a plaintiff must maintain standing throughout her entire case, Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67 (1997). A plaintiff must also demonstrate standing for each of her claims and for each form of relief she seeks. Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008).
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To have standing, a plaintiff must establish: (1) an injury in fact which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) that her injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61. Plaintiffs’ standing goes awry on causation and redressability. A. Because Plaintiffs’ licenses were also suspended for failing to appear in court, they lack standing to challenge the suspensions for nonpayment.
As this court recently explained, When two laws independently prohibit the same thing but a plaintiff challenges only one law, the plaintiff lacks standing. That is because the challenged law does not cause the plaintiff’s injury (the unchallenged law does), and striking down the challenged law would not remedy the injury (because the unchallenged law would still apply). Doe 1 v. Marshall, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 2:15-CV-606-WKW, 2019 WL 539055, at *12 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 11, 2019) (footnote omitted); see also 13A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3531.5 (3d ed. 2008 & Supp. 2018) (“Independent causation may be found when a plaintiff’s activity is independently proscribed by two different laws. One law alone does not cause the injury if the other law validly outlaws all the same activity.”). The independent-cause principle implicates redressability as well. See Doe 1, 2019 WL 539055, at *12; see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 543 (2007) (“As is often the case, the questions of causation and redressability overlap.”). That
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is because a plaintiff whose conduct is proscribed by another, unchallenged law cannot get what she wants because the other law still stands in the way.6
The Eleventh Circuit applied the independent-cause principle in two cases to bar advertising companies from bringing First Amendment challenges to billboard bans. In KH Outdoor, LLC v. Clay County, a county denied a permit to a billboard company seeking to build several large signs because the signs did not comply with a city ordinance. 482 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2007). The company’s “injury” was that it could not erect the signs. Id. But the company did not have standing because the state’s building code also prevented it from building the signs. Id. at 1303. Likewise, in Maverick Media Group, Inc. v. Hillsborough County, the court held that an advertising company lacked standing to challenge the county’s denial of its permit application because the proposed sign was also prohibited by unchallenged height and size restrictions. 528 F.3d 817, 821 (11th Cir. 2008).
Courts have applied the independent-cause principle to other contexts. For example, in Howard v. New Jersey Department of Civil Service, the Third Circuit considered a challenge to a physical agility test that was required for public employment. 667 F.2d 1099, 1101 (3d Cir. 1981). The court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they failed the written test, which was also required for
6 See generally The Rolling Stones, You Can’t Always Get What You Want, on Let It Bleed (Decca Records 1969).
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employment (and which they did not challenge). Id. at 1102. And in Delta Construction Co. v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit held that plaintiffs who challenged an EPA rule lacked standing because their injury was independently caused by an identical, unchallenged NHTSA rule. 783 F.3d 1291, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see also White v. United States, 601 F.3d 545, 552–53 (6th Cir. 2010) (federal cockfighting ban was not cause of plaintiffs’ injuries because cockfighting is independently proscribed by the laws of all fifty states).
The independent-cause principle prevents Plaintiffs from maintaining their claim. Plaintiffs’ injuries are their license suspension, and their reason for suing is to have them reinstated. At the time they filed their complaint, Plaintiffs’ licenses were suspended for two different reasons, one of which they do not challenge.
First, both Cook and Motley had their licenses suspended for failing to pay fines that were imposed without a finding of fault. Plaintiffs challenge that suspension, which occurred under Rule 26.11(i)(3), as unconstitutional.
Second, at the time they filed their complaint, both Cook and Motley had separate license suspensions based on their failures to appear on their designated court dates. Cook’s failure-to-appear suspension was based on her Hale County case, and Motley’s was based on her Montgomery Municipal Court cases.
License suspensions for failure to appear in court are governed by another law. Though the parties do not cite a rule under which a court or ALEA may suspend
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a license for failure to appear, such authority appears to be given in Alabama Administrative Code r. 760-X-1-.12, which states that ALEA “shall suspend the driver license . . . of the defaulting driver” upon “written notice from the court.” Plaintiffs do not challenge this rule, nor do they “dispute that courts have various tools at their disposal when an individual fails to appear at a properly noticed hearing — including suspending an individual’s license or issuing a warrant.” (Doc. # 22, at 9 n.4.) When the complaint was filed, Plaintiffs’ licenses were suspended for failures to appear in separate cases — suspensions that were mandated by a rule they do not challenge. Thus, under the independent-cause principle, Plaintiffs lack standing to bring their claim.
That Motley remedied her Montgomery Municipal Court failure-to-appear suspension a mere two days after filing suit does not change the analysis. “The existence of federal jurisdiction ordinarily depends on the facts as they exist when the complaint is filed.” Newman-Green, 490 U.S. at 830 (emphasis added). Actions taken after the complaint’s filing cannot “retroactively create[]” jurisdiction “that did not exist at the outset.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 598 n.4. Plaintiffs have identified no exception to this rule, and the court may not create one, especially in view of an apparent attempt to manipulate jurisdiction.
One district court considering a Bearden challenge to a license-suspension statute held that the plaintiffs had standing despite their other, unchallenged
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suspensions. See Robinson v. Purkey, 326 F.R.D. 105, 129 (M.D. Tenn. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-6121 (6th Cir. Oct. 24, 2018). In so holding, Robinson characterized the multiple suspensions as a “cumulative barrier” to license reinstatement and said that “[a] plaintiff who seeks removal of a barrier to obtaining a particular outcome ‘need not allege that he would have obtained the benefit but for the barrier in order to establish standing.’” Id. (quoting Lac Vieux Desert Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Mich. Gaming Control Bd., 172 F.3d 397, 404 (6th Cir. 1999)). Thus, the court said, a plaintiff need not remedy her other suspensions before suing as long as she challenges one of them as unlawful.
Robinson’s standing analysis is not sound because of two reasons.7 First, Robinson analyzed injury-in-fact too narrowly and, in doing so, lost sight of causation and redressability. The court held that the plaintiffs’ injuries-in-fact “include not only the simple fact of not having a driver’s license, but also the particular barriers placed between the plaintiffs and reinstatement.” Id. at 130 (emphasis added). In other words, that there were reasons for suspension other than the challenged law did not matter because the challenged law created its own, separate injury. The court then addressed whether that injury — the suspension
7 Although it does not explicitly disagree with Robinson, another district court considering a Bearden challenge to a license-suspension statute noted in dicta that a plaintiff whose license was suspended under a different, unchallenged law “most likely lacks standing to pursue” such a challenge. Fowler v. Johnson, Civ. Case No. 17-11441, 2017 WL 6379676, at *2 n.3 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 14, 2017).
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based on the challenged law — was fairly traceable to and redressable by each public official or public entity defendant. See id. at 130–132.
This analysis misses the forest for the trees. Robinson would hold that a Rule 26.11(i)(3) license suspension is its own injury, and a failure-to-appear suspension merely creates a “cumulative suspension” that Plaintiffs need not remove to establish standing. But if Robinson is right, KH Outdoor and Maverick would have come out differently. The advertising companies would have had standing because the billboard bans caused their own injuries. That the proposed signs also violated height and size and building code barriers would not matter because a plaintiff “need not allege that he would have obtained the benefit but for th[ose] barrier[s] in order to establish standing.” Robinson, 326 F.R.D. at 129 (quoting Lac Vieux, 172 F.3d at 404). But the Eleventh Circuit held just the opposite — height and size and building code restrictions did prevent the companies from having standing. And the court is bound to apply that reasoning.
As made clear in their complaint and affidavits, Plaintiffs’ injury is their license suspensions, and their requested relief is getting their licenses back. (Doc. # 1, 17–18; Doc. # 1-1, at 3; Doc. # 1-3, at 3.) But Rule 26.11(i)(3) did not cause their suspensions (their failures to appear did) and, taking the facts as they existed when the complaint was filed, declaring that rule unconstitutional would not remedy
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their suspensions (because their licenses would still be suspended for failing to appear in separate cases).
Second, Robinson failed to address the authorities applying the independentcause principle. The cases it did cite are inapposite. Robinson cited several cases in which courts held that factual improbability that a plaintiff achieve his desired outcome does not defeat standing. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993) (contractors challenging racial set-aside need not prove actual loss of a contract, only denial of an opportunity to compete on equal footing); Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 280 n.14 (1978) (student challenging racial preference in college admissions need not prove that he would have been admitted in the absence of the preference); Lac Vieux, 172 F.3d at 405 (Indian tribe challenging preference in competitive-bidding process to build a casino need not prove that it would have ultimately submitted a successful bid). These cases do not address the situation when there is an independent legal barrier to a plaintiff’s obtaining her desired result. As explained in KH Outdoor, Maverick, Howard, Delta Construction, and White, unchallenged laws that keep a plaintiff from getting what she wants vitiate standing.
The court respectfully disagrees with Robinson. Independent, unchallenged legal barriers — Plaintiffs’ failure-to-appear suspensions under a different law —
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keep Plaintiffs from having standing to bring this suit.8 Because Plaintiffs lack
standing, the court must dismiss this action for lack of jurisdiction.9
A dismissal for lack of standing “is necessarily without prejudice.” DiMaio
v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 520 F.3d 1299, 1303 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Boda v.
United States, 698 F.2d 1174, 1177 n.4 (11th Cir. 1983)). The court will therefore
dismiss this action without prejudice.
8 As a practical matter, it is worth noting the difficulty of explaining to the sentencing court that, because of indigency, a fine should be suspended or reduced, when the defendant does not attend the hearing. See Garcia v. City of Abilene, 890 F.2d 773, 776 (5th Cir. 1989) (“Even assuming an individual who is fined is too poor to pay, if he does not appear and assert his indigency, the court cannot inquire into his reasons for not paying and offer alternatives.”).
9 The State also argues that Plaintiffs’ injury is neither traceable to or redressable by Defendant Taylor because courts are ultimately responsible for suspending a license and Taylor merely follows courts’ directives. Not so. “[T]he inquiry is not into the nature of an official’s duties but into the effect of the official’s performance of his duties on the plaintiff’s rights.” Strickland v. Alexander, 772 F.3d 876, 886 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 54 (3d Cir. 1980)). In Strickland, the plaintiff challenged Georgia’s post-judgment garnishment statute as unconstitutional. Id. at 878–79. The court asked whether the plaintiff’s injury — his subjection to unlawful garnishment proceedings — was fairly traceable to the conduct of a court clerk responsible for implementing the garnishment statute. Id. at 886. The court concluded that it was, and that an injunction against the statute’s implementation would also redress the plaintiff’s injury. Id. Strickland compels the same conclusion here. Defendant Taylor is responsible for suspending licenses in Alabama. That he lacks discretion when implementing court-ordered license suspensions does not change the analysis. Without Taylor’s actions. “it would be impossible to effectuate a license suspension.” Stinne v. Holcomb, 355 F. Supp. 3d 514, 526 (W.D. Va. 2018) (holding that plaintiffs with suspended licenses had standing to sue state official responsible for enforcing state license-suspension law, even though suspension was automatic under the statute). Plaintiffs’ license suspensions are therefore fairly traceable to and redressable by Defendant Taylor.
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B. Absent a named plaintiff with standing, class certification is inappropriate.
To maintain a class action, the named plaintiffs must have standing. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 n.20 (1976)). Because no named plaintiff has standing, the court may not certify a class. C. Because Plaintiffs lack standing, the court will not consider the State’s alternative grounds for dismissal.
Since Plaintiffs do not have standing, the court lacks jurisdiction and may not reach the merits of their claim. See Az. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 129 (2011) (“To obtain a determination on the merits in federal court, parties seeking relief must show that they have standing under Article III of the Constitution.”). That means the court may not decide the State’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
The court will also not consider the State’s other nonmerits challenges to Plaintiff’s complaint, including its arguments that: (1) Plaintiffs’ claim is moot in view of the State’s changes to Form UTTC-1; and (2) sovereign immunity bars Plaintiffs’ claim. See Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 (2007) (recognizing that “a federal court has leeway ‘to choose among threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits’”) (quoting Ruhrgas
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AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 585 (1999)); Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 584 (stating that there is no “sequencing of jurisdictional issues”).
V. CONCLUSION At bottom, Plaintiffs cannot get what they want (the reinstatement of their driver’s licenses) because there are independent, unchallenged legal reasons why those licenses were suspended (their failures to appear in court in separate cases). That means Plaintiffs lack standing, and the court must dismiss the case without reaching the merits of their Bearden claim. It is ORDERED: (1) Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction (Doc. # 2) is DENIED. (2) Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification (Doc. # 4) is DENIED. (3) The State’s motion to dismiss (Doc. # 20) is GRANTED. (4) This case is DISMISSED without prejudice. A separate final judgment will be entered. DONE this 1st day of May, 2019.
/s/ W. Keith Watkins UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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