1 PETER BIBRING (SBN 223981) pbibring@aclusocal.org
2 CARMEN IGUINA (SBN 277369) ciguina@aclusocal.org
3 CATHERINE WAGNER (SBN 302244) cwagner@aclusocal.org
4 MELANIE P. OCHOA (SBN 284342) mpochoa@aclusocal.org
5 ACLU FOUNDATION OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 1313 West Eighth Street
6 Los Angeles, California 90017 Telephone: (213) 977-9500
7 Facsimile: (213) 977-5299

8 Counsel for Plaintiffs (Additional Counsel for Plaintiffs on Following Page)
9

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11

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

12

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

13

14 YOUTH JUSTICE COALITION, a non-profit organization; PETER
15 ARELLANO and JOSE REZA, individuals, for themselves and on
16 behalf of a class of similarly-situated individuals,
17 Plaintiffs,
18 vs.
19 CITY OF LOS ANGELES; MIKE
20 FEUER, City Attorney of the City of Los Angeles, in his official capacity;
21 CHARLIE BECK, Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department, in his
22 official capacity; DOES 1 through 10, in their official and individual
23 capacities,

Case No. COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF CLASS ACTION 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [Fourteenth Amendment] California Constitutional Claim

24

Defendants.

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26

27

28

32717913.1

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COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

1 JACOB S. KREILKAMP (SBN 248210)

2

jacob.kreilkamp@mto.com LAURA D. SMOLOWE (SBN 263012)

3

laura.smolowe@mto.com AMELIA L.B. SARGENT (SBN 280243)

4

amelia.sargent@mto.com MARIA JHAI (SBN 283059)

5

maria.jhai@mto.com MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP

6

355 South Grand Avenue Thirty-Fifth Floor

7

Los Angeles, California 90071-1560 Telephone: (213) 683-9100

8 Facsimile: (213) 687-3702

9

ANKUR MANDHANIA (SBN 302373) ankur.mandhania@mto.com

10

MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP 560 Mission Street

11

Twenty-Seventh Floor San Francisco, California 94105-2907

12

Telephone: (415) 512-4000 Facsimile: (415) 512-4077

13 JOSHUA GREEN (SBN 293749)

14

jgreen@urbanpeaceinstitute.org THE CONNIE RICE INSTITUTE FOR URBAN PEACE

15

1910 West Sunset Boulevard Suite 800

16

Los Angeles, California 90026 Telephone: (213) 404-0124

17 Facsimile: (213) 402-2843

18 Counsel for Plaintiffs

19

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21

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25

26

27

28

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1

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

2

1. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ federal

3 claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1343,

4 and over Plaintiffs’ state law claim, because it is so related to their federal law

5 claim as to form part of the same case or controversy, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

6 § 1367(a).

7

2. Venue is proper in the Central District of California under 28 U.S.C.

8 § 1391(b) because all acts, events, and occurrences giving rise to this action

9 occurred in the County of Los Angeles, California.

10

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

11

3. This action concerns the unconstitutional enforcement of restrictive

12 “gang injunctions” by the City of Los Angeles (the “City”) against thousands of

13 Los Angeles residents—most of them men of color—based on a unilateral and

14 behind-closed-doors determination by police and city attorneys that they are active

15 participants in a street gang. Without any prior notice or opportunity to contest the

16 allegations of gang membership, the City serves such individuals with these

17 injunctions that subject them to arrest for such ordinary activities as appearing in

18 public with friends and family, working alongside other members of the

19 neighborhood, or wearing the clothes they choose.1

20

4. So-called “gang injunctions” are court orders prohibiting a variety of

21 conduct that police and prosecutors argue constitutes a nuisance. In Los Angeles,

22 the process of obtaining gang injunctions works as follows: police and prosecutors

23 work together to bring state court actions against alleged gangs, claiming that their

24 activities constitute a public nuisance and seeking an injunction to abate that

25 nuisance by prohibiting not only illegal activities, but also otherwise lawful

26

27 1 The allegations of this Complaint are based on information and belief unless 28 otherwise specified.

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1 conduct—such as associating in public, drinking anywhere in public view, or

2 wearing supposed gang colors or symbols. In those actions, the City for the most

3 part names as defendants not the individual people they believe are gang members,

4 but rather the gang itself as an unincorporated association. Because the defendant

5 gangs are not organized legal entities, these state court gang injunction actions

6 have always resulted in a judgment against the gang by default, and the City has

7 obtained its gang injunctions based on those defaults. But once the City obtains

8 those judgments against the supposed gang entity, it uses those orders to restrict

9 the rights of real people who were never parties to the state court action, “serving”

10 individuals it asserts are active participants in the gang with the gang injunction

11 and subjecting them to arrest and prosecution for engaging in any of the prohibited

12 activities.

13

5. This practice runs afoul of one of the most basic principles of fairness

14 embodied in both the U.S. and California constitutions: that of procedural due

15 process—the notion that the government cannot make determinations that deprive

16 a person of legal rights without providing that person meaningful notice and an

17 opportunity to be heard. “Due process requires notice reasonably calculated, under

18 all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action

19 and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Al Haramain Islamic

20 Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Treas., 686 F.3d 965, 985 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal

21 quotation marks and citation omitted).

22

6. Relying on this fundamental principle of fairness, the Ninth Circuit

23 Court of Appeals in Vasquez v. Rackauckas, 734 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2013), held

24 unconstitutional the enforcement of a gang injunction against individuals who had

25 not been provided adequate process to contest the allegation that they were

26 members of the gang. The City of Los Angeles has refused to abide by the holding

27 of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in that case and fails to afford individuals

28 with due process before enforcing gang injunctions against them.

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1

7. By enforcing gang injunctions against individuals who were never

2 parties to the underlying state court actions, and who received no notice of or

3 opportunity to contest the gang allegations against them, the City of Los Angeles

4 has violated the Constitution of the United States and the California Constitution

5 by denying due process of law to Plaintiffs Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, and others

6 similarly situated. As a result of this disregard for Angelenos’ due process rights,

7 organizational Plaintiff Youth Justice Coalition has been forced to divert limited

8 resources to address the Defendants’ unconstitutional conduct.

9

ALLEGATIONS

10

8. The City of Los Angeles’ gang injunctions are court orders obtained

11 through civil public nuisance actions that seek to enjoin the nuisance activities of a 12 gang in a particular defined geographical area referred to as the “Safety Zone.”2

13 Within that “Safety Zone,” the injunctions uniformly prohibit not only criminal

14 gang activities, but also otherwise lawful activities that prosecutors argue

15 constitute a gang nuisance, such as associating together in public with others whom

16 the police contend are gang members, even if those individuals are not themselves

17 enjoined, and without any notice of whom the police believe to be gang members.

18 Most injunctions prohibit association even between immediate family members or

19 between co-workers while on the job, and many fail to provide an exception for

20 school or church attendance. Even those injunctions with exceptions for school or

21 church attendance still prohibit travel to and from these locations with others

22 whom the police assert to be members of the gang, such that, for example, family

23 and friends are forced to drive to church in separate cars or stop attending church

24 2 The “Safety Zone” of any particular injunction is defined in the injunction itself 25 (in fact, many injunctions include a map of the “Safety Zone”). Safety Zones can
26 encompass entire neighborhoods. For example, one gang injunction in the San Fernando Valley covers nearly 10 square miles. See Scott Gold, Gang injunction
27 splits a San Fernando Valley community, LATIMES (Sept. 26, 2008),
28 http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-outthere26-2008sep26-story.html.

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1 altogether. The majority of injunctions prohibit individuals from possessing such

2 mundane items as markers, flashlights, binoculars, and whistles; some even bar

3 them from wearing certain colors as part of their attire or possessing a cell phone.

4 Until recent litigation forced the City to change its practices, many of the

5 injunctions also contained curfew provisions. See Rodriguez v. City of Los Angeles, 6 Case No. CV11-01135 DMG (C.D. Cal.) (“Rodriguez”).3

7

9. The City of Los Angeles pioneered the use of gang injunctions,

8 beginning with its effort to obtain what is widely recognized as one of the first 9 gang injunctions in 1987.4 Currently, the City has obtained at least forty-six gang

10 injunctions against more than seventy-nine alleged gangs within the City of Los

11 Angeles. As of 2008, gang injunctions covered more than seventy-five square

12 miles, or fifteen percent of the City, and since that time the City has obtained ten

13 more gang injunctions.

14

10. Each of Defendants’ forty-six gang injunction actions named as a

15 defendant one or more alleged gangs as unincorporated associations. Most also

16 included individual Doe defendants, and fewer than a third also named a few

17 individual defendants. In none of the forty-six gang injunction actions in state court

18 was the City ever required to litigate the merits of whether a gang nuisance existed

19 that justified the permanent relief requested. Instead, in each action, the alleged

20 gang named as a defendant never contested the suit, and the City obtained a

21

22 3 The City has also stopped enforcement of other injunction provisions found by the courts to be unconstitutionally vague, including the “Obey All Laws,” “Stay

23 Away from Alcohol,” and “Stay Away from Drugs” provisions. The City,

24 however, continues to enforce the “Stay Away from” alcohol and drugs provisions if the enjoined individual is found in physical possession of an alcoholic beverage

25 in public or in physical possession of a controlled substance or marijuana without a

26

valid medical prescription or recommendation. 4 See generally Matthew Mickle Werdegar, Note, Enjoining the Constitution: The

27 Use of Public Nuisance Abatement Injunctions Against Urban Street Gangs, 51

28 Stan. L. Rev. 409, 414 (1999).

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1 judgment against the gang by default and an order granting permanent injunctive

2 relief based on that default.5

3

11. After obtaining gang injunction orders by default, Defendants then

4 personally delivered the permanent injunction to—or “served”—individuals they 5 contended to be active participants in the gang at issue.6 Personal delivery of an

6 existing injunction does not make the individual a party to any legal action or

7 begin a process such as a lawsuit or subpoena. Rather, such service means only

8 that the individual cannot claim ignorance of the injunction. In practice, by serving

9 individuals with injunction papers, the City informed them that they would be

10 subject to the terms of the order and that Los Angeles Police Department

11 (“LAPD”) officers could arrest them on the spot for violating any of its terms.

12

12. Of the close to ten thousand individuals that the City currently

13 subjects to its gang injunctions, the vast majority were never named as defendants

14 in the civil nuisance action in which the City originally obtained the injunction.

15 Instead, Defendants decided to enforce the gang injunction against them only after

16 it had been issued and the case terminated—in many cases years later—despite the

17 fact they were never parties to the case in which the gang injunction was obtained.

18

13. Defendants determine whom to serve with a gang injunction based on

19

20 5 In two of the cases, an attorney purported to enter an appearance in the state court action on behalf of the gang entity, but the papers leave unclear whether the

21 attorneys represented the gang itself or rather individuals who were attempting to

22 be heard and so filed on behalf of the only defendant. In the first case, the attorney entered an appearance after default judgment had been entered and requested that

23 the judgment be set aside as to certain individuals. In the second case, the attorney

24 filed a general denial, an answer, and response to a request for preliminary injunction purportedly on behalf of the gang, but failed to take any further action in

25 connection with the case, which ended in the entry of a permanent injunction

26

against the gang. 6 Under California law, gang injunctions may be applied only to “active” members

27 whose participation in gang activities is “more than nominal, passive, inactive or

28 purely technical.” People v. Englebrecht, 88 Cal. App. 4th 1236, 1261 (2001).

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1 a one-sided determination in which the person potentially subject to the injunction

2 plays no part.7 Defendants do not notify individuals in advance of their intent to

3 serve them with a gang injunction. Defendants provide them no opportunity for a

4 hearing, or even an opportunity to provide a written response to contest their

5 alleged participation in the gang, before Defendants serve and enforce the

6 injunction against them. With few exceptions, individuals’ first formal notice that

7 Defendants are considering subjecting them to an injunction is when they are 8 served with the order itself.8

9

14. The City of Los Angeles has subjected more than 9,000 individuals to

10 its injunctions through the process described above, that is, through service of an

11 injunction without notice or an opportunity to contest Defendants’ gang

12 membership allegations. Many of those individuals have never been convicted of

13 any gang-related crimes or otherwise judged by a court to be gang members. By

14 obtaining judgments by default against the gangs and then enforcing the

15 injunctions against individuals who were never parties to the actions, Defendants

16 7 Notably, LAPD employs a similarly one-sided determination in the decision to

17 include individuals in the CalGang Criminal Intelligence System, otherwise known

18

as the CalGang database. The California State Auditor recently found that, in a review of user agencies including LAPD, in “numerous instances” the agencies

19 could “not substantiate CalGang entries they had made.” See The CalGang

20 Criminal Intelligence System — As the Result of Its Weak Oversight Structure, It Contains Questionable Information That May Violate Individuals’ Privacy Rights,

21 Report 2015-130, AUDITOR.CA.GOV (Aug. 11, 2016),

22 https://www.auditor.ca.gov/pdfs/reports/2015-130.pdf. Partly in response to these findings, California has recently passed legislation, and the City—and all

23 California law enforcement—will soon provide notice and a limited opportunity to

24 be heard by a superior court to individuals they seek to place in the CalGang database. See Cal. Penal Code § 186.35 (added 2016 by A.B. 2298).
25 8 The relatively small number of people who were named as individual defendants

26 in the state civil nuisance action and who received notice through personal service had an opportunity for a hearing to contest their inclusion in the gang injunction in

27 those proceedings. These individuals are not members of the putative class that

28 Plaintiffs seek to represent.

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1 subject the individual Plaintiffs and the plaintiff class to the restrictive probation-

2 like terms of the injunctions, and to potential arrest and prosecution if they violate

3 those terms, without due process.

4

15. Prior to 2007, LAPD officers had discretion to determine which

5 individuals to serve with a gang injunction, and the determination process was left

6 up to the ad hoc decisions of individual police officers. Starting in 2007, and under

7 current guidelines issued by the City Attorney regarding the service of gang

8 injunctions on individuals, LAPD must obtain prior approval from a Deputy City

9 Attorney in order for LAPD officers to serve an individual with a gang injunction.

10 The guidelines provide that Defendants can serve an individual with a gang

11 injunction if there is documented evidence that the person is a gang member and

12 that his or her participation in the gang during the previous five years has been

13 more than nominal, passive, inactive, or purely technical. The guidelines purport to

14 require that gang membership be established beyond a reasonable doubt, and set

15 forth the criteria to be considered when assessing gang membership, any two of

16 which are deemed “strong proof” of gang membership:

17

a. The individual admitted to being a gang member in a non-custodial

18

situation;

19

b. The individual was identified as a gang member by a reliable

20

informant or source (such as a registered gang member);

21

c. The individual was identified as a gang member by an untested

22

informant or source with corroboration;

23

d. The individual was witnessed wearing distinctive gang attire;

24

e. The individual was seen displaying gang hand signs or symbols;

25

f. The individual has gang tattoos;

26

g. The individual frequents gang hangouts;

27

h. The individual openly associates with documented gang members; or

28

i. The individual has been arrested, alone or with known gang members,

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1

for a crime usually indicative of gang activity.

2

16. However, the determination of whether someone is an active

3 participant in a gang involves a variety of complicated factors, many of which are

4 hard to measure. The Ninth Circuit recognized as much in Vasquez. See 734 F.3d

5 at 1047.

6

17. LAPD officers can and do arrest individuals for violating the terms of

7 gang injunctions as soon as they have served those individuals with the injunction,

8 and the office of Defendant City Attorney can and does charge them with contempt

9 of court, a misdemeanor punishable by up to six months in jail and a fine of up to

10 $1,000 under California Penal Code § 166. Notably, there is no empirical evidence

11 to support gang injunctions’ long term effect on crime reduction in the targeted

12 neighborhoods.

13

18. None of the City of Los Angeles’ gang injunctions contains an

14 expiration date. With the exception of a single injunction, Defendants’ service of a

15 gang injunction upon an individual purports to subject that person to its terms

16 permanently.

17

19. About a third of the gang injunctions obtained by the City contain

18 “renunciation” or “opt out” provisions to the effect that a served individual can

19 move the court for an order that the injunction not be enforced against him. Most

20 of those require, for the City of Los Angeles not to oppose the motion, that the

21 individual swear that he is no longer, or never was, a member of the gang; declare

22 that in the past three to five years he has not claimed membership in any gang,

23 associated with members of any gang (except for immediate family members),

24 gotten any new gang-related tattoos, or committed, assisted in, or been arrested for

25 any felony or misdemeanor crime; and also demonstrate sustained employment or

26 educational pursuits. These “renunciation” or “opt out” provisions do not provide

27 any right to discovery, or even notice of the allegations against an individual, and

28 all but two fail to set out the standard that the court will employ in considering the

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1 petition for removal (or, in fact, any other information about how the court process

2 will work). Based on available court records, no more than three individuals have

3 ever attempted to use these provisions.

4

20. Beginning in about April 2007, the Los Angeles City Attorney’s

5 Office established an administrative process by which individuals subject to gang

6 injunctions can apply to be removed. This process requires that individuals show

7 that they are not anymore, or never were, members of a gang. The process is

8 painstakingly slow; even applicants who satisfy all the stated criteria for

9 presumption in favor of removal often wait more than a year for the City’s

10 decision. As with the “renunciation” or “opt out” process described above, there is

11 no right to discovery or even notice of the allegations against an individual, and no

12 meaningful guidance regarding the standard that the City Attorney will employ in

13 making a determination on the petition. Fewer than fifty applicants (of the more

14 than 9,000 people subject to injunctions) have been removed from an injunction

15 through this process during the nearly ten years it has been in place.

16 Ruling in Vasquez v. Rackauckas

17

21. In 2013, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in Vasquez v.

18 Rackauckas, 734 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2013), that the Orange County District

19 Attorney and City of Orange Police Department had violated the due process rights

20 of individuals who were subjected to the terms of a gang injunction without having

21 been provided with a pre-deprivation hearing or other opportunity by which they

22 could contest their participation in the gang. The court reasoned that the gang

23 injunction at issue, which was similar in its terms to the gang injunctions employed

24 by the City of Los Angeles, was “extraordinarily broad, interfering with a wide

25 swath of Plaintiffs’ protected liberty interests, including: family and social

26 relationships; educational and professional opportunities; freedom of movement;

27 and all manner of participation in civic life.” Id. at 1053. The court also found that

28 given the “wide variety of information that may be deemed relevant, and the

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1 difficulty of reasonably precise measurement in assessing whether someone is an

2 active gang member, the risk of error is considerable when such a determination is

3 made without any participation by, or opportunity to provide evidence on behalf

4 of, the individual served.” Id. at 1047. Based on these and other factors, the court

5 concluded that defendants’ enforcement of the gang injunction in that case had

6 “violated Plaintiffs’ rights under the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 1053.

7

22. Defendants have taken the position that the ruling in Vasquez is not

8 applicable to its injunctions because in Vasquez, the individuals who brought the

9 action against the County had been originally named as defendants in the state

10 court action, dismissed when they attempted to defend against the injunction, and

11 subsequently served after the County obtained the judgment against the gang. But

12 the procedural due process analysis in Vasquez was not dependent on that

13 “dismiss-and-serve” practice. Ignoring the clear admonition in that case regarding

14 the unconstitutionality of subjecting individuals to gang injunctions without prior

15 process, Defendants have continued to serve and enforce gang injunctions against

16 individuals without providing any opportunity for a pre-deprivation hearing.

17 Ruling and Settlement in Rodriguez v. City of Los Angeles

18

23. In 2015, in the Rodriguez class action, a federal district court issued a

19 summary judgment order concluding that Defendants City, City Attorney, and

20 LAPD were liable for violating individuals’ constitutional rights by serving and

21 enforcing curfew provisions of gang injunctions that were unconstitutionally

22 vague. The Rodriguez class action was brought in 2011 and covers twenty-six of

23 the gang injunctions that Defendant City has obtained and served on individuals.

24 The Rodriguez action challenged the curfew provisions only, and did not plead

25 claims like those Plaintiffs bring here regarding the constitutionality of the process

26 for service and enforcement on individuals who were never afforded notice or an

27 opportunity to contest the imposition of the injunction against them.

28

24. In July 2016, the court granted preliminary approval of a settlement

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1 agreement, including the creation of an expedited removal process for Rodriguez

2 class members. The Fairness Hearing regarding the settlement is scheduled for

3 December 2, 2016.

4

PARTIES

5 A. Plaintiff Peter Arellano

6

25. Plaintiff Peter Arellano is twenty-one years old. He has lived in the

7 Echo Park neighborhood of Los Angeles his entire life, and since 2001 in the house

8 his parents own. Mr. Arellano graduated high school in 2013, and has since been

9 employed. Mr. Arellano uses the income from his job to pay for his car and to

10 contribute to the family finances.

11

26. In or about June 2015, Mr. Arellano was served with and made

12 subject to the Judgment Granting Permanent Injunction in People v. Big Top

13 Locos, Case No. BC511444 (L.A. Sup. Ct. Sept. 23, 2013) (“Echo Park

14 injunction”). On the day he was served, Mr. Arellano was outside near his home

15 with his father and a few friends. LAPD officers detained Mr. Arellano and the

16 other individuals, supposedly to investigate a vandalism complaint. They released

17 Mr. Arellano after about forty minutes without charging him with any crime, but

18 served him with the Echo Park injunction at that time. The LAPD officers turned to

19 his father and informed him that Mr. Arellano was now subject to the terms of the

20 injunction. He is still subject to the Echo Park injunction.

21

27. Mr. Arellano was not named as a defendant in the nuisance abatement

22 action for the Echo Park injunction, which was filed by Defendant City Attorney

23 on June 11, 2013. Accordingly, he was not served with the civil complaint or

24 supporting documents in that case. Even though Mr. Arellano was not named as a

25 defendant in the nuisance abatement action, he was part of a community group that

26 nevertheless attempted to intervene in that case. The City’s attempt to obtain the

27 Echo Park injunction met with community opposition, and Defendants City and

28 City Attorney initially seemed receptive to community requests to stay the suit.

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1 The City ultimately proceeded with the injunction action, however, and

2 Mr. Arellano was among a number of community members who filed requests to

3 intervene in the case. The City opposed the attempts to intervene, and the court

4 denied their motions as untimely.

5

28. Prior to being served with, and being immediately subject to, the Echo

6 Park injunction in or about June 2015, Mr. Arellano did not receive notice of

7 Defendants’ allegations against him or an opportunity to contest the imposition of

8 the injunction against him.

9

29. Mr. Arellano is and at all relevant times has been a resident of the

10 City of Los Angeles, residing at his parents’ home in the geographical area referred

11 to as the “Safety Zone” for the Echo Park injunction.

12

30. Mr. Arellano has suffered and continues to suffer great harm as a

13 result of being subject to the Echo Park injunction. He feels that he is under house

14 arrest. His father is also subject to the Echo Park injunction, and upon information

15 and belief, the LAPD asserts that a number of his family members and childhood

16 friends who live in or visit the “Safety Zone” are also members of the Echo Park

17 gang. Because the Echo Park injunction—like all of the City of Los Angeles’

18 injunctions—prohibits associating with any “known member” of the gang within

19 the “Safety Zone,” Mr. Arellano is afraid of going anywhere with his father or

20 being seen in public with most of the people he is close to, even if they are

21 engaging in routine day-to-day activities, for fear that they will be stopped,

22 searched, and arrested for a violation of the injunction. This includes being in his

23 own front yard or porch with his father, brother, uncle, cousin, or friends, because

24 such space is within “public view” and associating there is therefore prohibited by

25 the terms of the injunction. Mr. Arellano has skipped neighborhood gatherings,

26 holiday parties, and other social activities out of fear of arrest. He chooses to work

27 far away from the Echo Park neighborhood in order to be as far away from the

28 “Safety Zone” as possible, even though at times it has meant a long and tedious

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1 commute.

2 B. Plaintiff Jose Reza

3

31. Plaintiff Jose “Joe” Reza is thirty-nine years old. He was born and

4 raised in the Ramona Gardens neighborhood of Los Angeles, within the

5 geographical area referred to as the “Safety Zone” for the Big Hazard gang

6 injunction, and lived there until 1999, when he was twenty-two years old. He has

7 since moved and now lives in Whittier.

8

32. In or about October 2006, Mr. Reza was served with and made subject

9 to the Judgment Granting Permanent Injunction in People v. Big Hazard, Case No.

10 BC335749 (Los Angeles County Sup. Ct. 2005) (“Big Hazard injunction”). On the

11 day Mr. Reza was served, LAPD officers detained him for violating a local

12 ordinance. One officer told him that they had been waiting for a chance to serve

13 him with the injunction. He signed an acknowledgment that he had been served

14 with the injunction after being told he would be held overnight if he refused. He is

15 still subject to the Big Hazard injunction.

16

33. Mr. Reza was not named as a defendant in the nuisance abatement

17 action for the Big Hazard injunction, which was filed by Defendant City Attorney

18 on September 9, 2005. Accordingly, he was not served with the civil complaint or

19 the supporting documents.

20

34. Prior to being served with, and being immediately subject to, the Big

21 Hazard injunction in or about October 2006, Mr. Reza did not receive notice of

22 Defendants’ allegations against him or an opportunity to contest the imposition of

23 the injunction against him.

24

35. Mr. Reza has suffered and continues to suffer great harm as a result of

25 being subject to the Big Hazard injunction. Because the Big Hazard injunction—

26 like all of the City of Los Angeles’ injunctions—prohibits associating with any

27 “known member” of the gang within the “Safety Zone,” he is afraid to travel to or

28 spend time in the neighborhood where he grew up. Mr. Reza has avoided driving

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1 into the “Safety Zone” to pick up his son, who sometimes stays with family there,

2 because he fears police harassment and arrest for a violation of the injunction. The

3 LAPD asserts that a number of his family members and lifelong friends are also

4 members of the Big Hazard gang, and therefore Mr. Reza avoids seeing his family

5 and friends anywhere within the “Safety Zone,” even if they are engaging in

6 routine day-to-day activities, for fear that he will be stopped, searched, and arrested

7 for a violation of the injunction. Mr. Reza has skipped neighborhood gatherings

8 and social events, and even feared arrest while attending a friend’s funeral.

9

36. Being subject to the gang injunction also affects Mr. Reza’s ability to

10 maintain gainful employment. Mr. Reza is a carpenter by trade, and has been

11 offered a number of union job opportunities with the Housing Authority of the City

12 of Los Angeles (“HACLA”) to remodel units in housing projects. However,

13 because the jobs would have required him to go to the Ramona Gardens

14 development within the Big Hazard injunction “Safety Zone,” he has felt that he

15 had no choice but to turn down those opportunities.

16 C. Plaintiff Youth Justice Coalition

17

37. Plaintiff Youth Justice Coalition is a non-profit organization located

18 in Los Angeles, California that works with youth, currently and formerly

19 incarcerated individuals, and their families, challenging mass incarceration, over-

20 policing, and involvement of the criminal justice system in these communities.

21

38. Plaintiff Youth Justice Coalition identifies as its core mission the

22 following:

23

The Youth Justice Coalition (YJC) is working to build a youth,

family, and formerly and currently incarcerated people’s movement to

24

challenge America’s addiction to incarceration and race, gender and

class discrimination in Los Angeles County’s, California’s and the

25

nation’s juvenile and criminal injustice systems. The YJC’s goal is to

26

dismantle policies and institutions that have ensured the massive lockup of people of color, widespread law enforcement violence and

corruption, consistent violation of youth and communities’

27

Constitutional and human rights, the construction of a vicious school-

to-jail track, and the build-up of the world’s largest network of jails

28

and prisons.

32717913.1

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COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

1

39. One of its priority campaigns includes: “Exposing and Dismantling

2 the War on Gangs as a War on Youth of Color including challenging the lack of

3 due process and community input in the implementation by police, sheriffs and the

4 courts of gang suppression tactics including gang injunctions and gang databases

5 that serve to sweep thousands of youth into the system without notification, appeal,

6 removal or resources.”

7

40. However, Plaintiff Youth Justice Coalition has had to divert limited

8 resources from its core mission of building a youth-led movement and on its

9 campaign to expose and dismantle the “war on gangs” to address Defendants’

10 unconstitutional denial of process to individuals subjected to gang injunctions. For

11 example, Plaintiff Youth Justice Coalition has had to divert resources to assist and

12 advise members and other individuals who believe they have been wrongfully

13 subjected to an injunction without process, helping them understand their rights,

14 navigate the removal process, and fight police and city prosecutors’ charges

15 against them for a violation. Because of this concern over the lack of process

16 afforded to individuals in the City of Los Angeles, Plaintiff Youth Justice Coalition

17 has diverted resources to lobby the City and State to enact policy reforms that

18 would provide relief to communities, including successfully lobbying the City of

19 Los Angeles to adopt an administrative removal process and recent efforts at the

20 state level to afford notice and an opportunity to contest designation for those

21 subjected to gang injunctions. Plaintiff Youth Justice Coalition has also supported,

22 organized with, and assisted communities in their efforts to address this unfair

23 process before state courts considering a gang injunction action. Absent

24 Defendants’ unconstitutional conduct, Plaintiff Youth Justice Coalition would not

25 have been forced to divert its limited resources to address the lack of process

26 provided by the City, and would have instead focused on its core mission of

27 empowering youth and their families to build a campaign to challenge the

28 devastating effects of the criminal justice system on their communities, including

32717913.1

17
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

1 fighting the use of gang injunctions generally and gang databases as tools to target

2 and criminalize young people of color.

3

41. Consequently, Plaintiff Youth Justice Coalition has suffered and

4 continues to suffer harm as a result of Defendants’ unconstitutional methods of

5 subjecting individuals to gang injunctions.

6 D. Defendants

7

42. Defendant City of Los Angeles is a public entity organized and

8 existing under the laws of the State of California. Defendants City Attorney and

9 LAPD are duly formed agencies of the City. These Defendants are sued in their

10 own right for City policies, practices and/or customs which cause Plaintiffs’

11 injuries in violation of one or more federal constitutional guarantees, and on

12 Plaintiffs’ state law claim based on respondeat superior, under California

13 Government Code § 815.2 and mandatory duties under California Government

14 Code § 815.6.

15

43. Defendant Mike Feuer (“Feuer”) is the elected City Attorney of the

16 City of Los Angeles, and is the policy maker for the City Attorney’s Office. He is

17 sued in his official capacity.

18

44. Defendant Charlie Beck (“Beck”) is the Chief of the Los Angeles

19 Police Department, and is the policy maker for the LAPD. He is sued in his official

20 capacity.

21

45. Plaintiffs are ignorant of the true names and capacities of defendants

22 sued herein as Does 1 through 10, inclusive, and therefore sue these defendants by

23 such fictitious names. Plaintiffs will give notice of this Complaint, and of one or

24 more Does’ true names and capacities, when ascertained. Based on information

25 and belief, Defendants Does 1 through 10 are legally responsible in some manner

26 for the wrongs and injuries alleged herein.

27

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

28

46. Individual Plaintiffs Arellano and Reza bring this action on their own

32717913.1

18
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

1 behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated, pursuant to Federal Rules of

2 Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(2), or in the alternative, as a representative action

3 pursuant to a procedure analogous to Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(2). Plaintiffs bring this

4 action individually and on behalf of a class defined as:

5

All persons currently or in future subject to a City of Los

Angeles gang injunction, who were not named as

6

defendants in or otherwise parties to the civil nuisance

abatement action to obtain that injunction, and were not

7

otherwise provided a full, constitutionally adequate

8

hearing in which they could contest their designation as active gang participants prior to service with and being

subject to the gang injunction, but do not have contempt

9

proceedings for violation of that injunction currently

pending against them. 10

11

47. The proposed class satisfies the numerosity requirements of Fed. R.

12 Civ. P. 23(a)(1). Plaintiffs do not know the exact number of class members.

13 Defendant City has at least forty-six gang injunctions in effect against more than

14 seventy-nine gang entities, and several thousand individuals have been served with

15 one or more of these gang injunctions without being named as a defendant in the

16 civil action and without being provided a hearing on their alleged gang

17 involvement prior to being served. The City has served more than nine thousand

18 such individuals without providing prior process. Joinder of all class members is

19 therefore impracticable.

20

48. The number and identity of the class members is known to Defendants

21 and is readily ascertainable from Defendants’ records.

22

49. The proposed class satisfies the commonality requirements of Fed. R.

23 Civ. P. 23(a)(2). The questions of law and fact common to the class include, but

24 are not limited to: (1) whether being subject to the terms of one of Defendant

25 City’s gang injunctions deprives an individual of a liberty or property interest; and

26 (2) whether a policy or practice of failing to provide a hearing on an individual’s

27 alleged gang involvement prior to subjecting that person to one of Defendant

28 City’s gang injunctions is a denial of adequate procedural protections in violation

32717913.1

19
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

1 of the Due Process Clause of the U.S. and California constitutions.

2

50. The proposed class satisfies the typicality requirements of Fed. R.

3 Civ. P. 23(a)(3). Like the proposed class members, Plaintiffs Arellano and Reza

4 are subject to one of the City’s gang injunctions without having been afforded

5 notice and an opportunity to be heard, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the

6 U.S. and California constitutions. Plaintiffs Arellano and Reza, and all proposed

7 class members, have been served with their respective gang injunction(s) without

8 being named as defendants in the underlying civil nuisance actions for those

9 injunctions and without an opportunity for a hearing at which they could contest

10 the allegation that they are active gang participants. Plaintiffs’ interests and harms

11 are therefore typical of the proposed class.

12

51. The proposed class satisfies the adequacy requirements of Fed. R.

13 Civ. P. 23(a)(4). The named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the

14 interests of the class because their interests are consistent with and not adverse to

15 the interests of the class. Moreover, the named Plaintiffs are represented by pro

16 bono counsel from the ACLU Foundation of Southern California, The Connie Rice

17 Institute for Urban Peace, and Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP, who have extensive

18 civil rights litigation experience and broad experience litigating class actions, as

19 well as specialized knowledge regarding gang injunctions in California generally

20 and Los Angeles specifically.

21

52. The proposed class meets the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).

22 Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the class through their

23 policy and practice of subjecting individuals to the terms of Defendant City’s gang

24 injunctions without providing due process of law, making class-wide declaratory

25 and injunctive relief appropriate.

26

53. This Complaint challenges Defendants’ ongoing, systematic policy

27 and practice of subjecting individuals to the severe liberty restrictions of gang

28 injunctions without pre-deprivation hearings. At all times within the relevant

32717913.1

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COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

1 period, Defendants have maintained this unconstitutional policy and practice.

2

CAUSES OF ACTION

3

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF

4 42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Procedural Due Process Under U.S. Const. Amend. XIV

5

54. Plaintiffs re-allege and re-plead all allegations of the preceding

6 paragraphs of this Complaint and incorporate them here by reference.

7

55. Defendants acted under color of law.

8

56. The acts of Defendants deprived the individual Plaintiffs and those

9 similarly situated of their rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

10 Amendment to the United States Constitution.

11

57. Specifically, by subjecting the individual Plaintiffs and those similarly

12 situated, or causing them to be subjected, to the terms of a gang injunction as

13 described above, Defendants have deprived them of their constitutionally protected

14 liberty interests without adequate procedural protections.

15

58. The mission of Plaintiff Youth Justice Coalition is also frustrated by

16 the acts of Defendants, and Youth Justice Coalition continues to divert resources as

17 a result of these acts to ensure that its members and the communities it serves are

18 not subjected to Defendants’ unconstitutional practices.

19

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF

20

Procedural Due Process Under Cal. Const. art. I, § 7

21

1. Plaintiffs re-allege and re-plead all allegations of the preceding

22 paragraphs of this Complaint and incorporate them here by reference.

23

2. By subjecting individual Plaintiffs and those similarly situated, or

24 causing them to be subjected, to the terms of a gang injunction as described above,

25 Defendants have deprived them of their constitutionally protected liberty interests

26 without adequate procedural protections.

27

3. Defendants’ conduct deprived the individual Plaintiffs and those

28 similarly situated of their liberty without due process of law in violation of Article

32717913.1

21
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

1 I, § 7(a) of the California Constitution.

2

4. The mission of Plaintiff Youth Justice Coalition is also frustrated by

3 the acts of Defendants, and Youth Justice Coalition continues to divert resources as

4 a result of these acts to ensure that its members and the communities it serves are

5 not subjected to Defendants’ unconstitutional practices.

6

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

7

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court enter judgment

8 in their favor as follows:

9

a. Assume jurisdiction of this matter;

10

b. Temporarily enjoin Defendants and their directors, officers, agents,

11

employees, and assigns from enforcing the terms of the City of Los

12

Angeles’ gang injunctions against the individual Plaintiffs based on the

13

constitutionally deficient process provided;

14

c. Certify a class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (or other analogous procedures)

15

as described above, pursuant to the forthcoming motion for class

16

certification;

17

d. Appoint the individual Plaintiffs as Class Representatives;

18

e. Appoint Plaintiffs’ counsel as Class Counsel;

19

f. Declare that the actions, policies and practices of Defendants described

20

above constitute violations of federal and state constitutional law;

21

g. Permanently enjoin Defendants and their directors, officers, agents,

22

employees, and assigns from enforcing the terms of the City of Los

23

Angeles’ gang injunctions against the individual Plaintiffs and those

24

similarly situated based on the constitutionally deficient process

25

provided;

26

h. Award Plaintiffs their fees, expenses, costs, and other disbursements

27

associated with the filing and maintenance of this action, including

28

reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to any applicable provision of law;

32717913.1

22
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

1

and

2

i. Award such other equitable and further relief as the Court deems just and

3

proper.

4

5

6 DATED: October 25, 2016 7 8 9 10

Respectfully submitted, ACLU FOUNDATION OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
PETER BIBRING CARMEN IGUINA CATHERINE WAGNER MELANIE P. OCHOA

11

By:

s/ Carmen Iguina

12

Carmen Iguina

13

Counsel for Plaintiffs

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

32717913.1

23
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

 
 Case 2:16-cv-07932-VBF-RAO Document 37 Filed 12/15/16 Page 1 of 4 Page ID #:2255

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES -- GENERAL

Case No. LA CV 16-07932-VBF

Dated: Thursday, December 15, 2016

Title:

Youth Justice Coalition (an organization), Peter Arellano and Jose Reza

(individuals, for themselves and on behalf of a class of similarly-situated

individuals), Plaintiffs v. City of Los Angeles and Does 1-10 in their individual

and official capacities, Defendants

PRESENT: HONORABLE VALERIE BAKER FAIRBANK, SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

N/A Courtroom Deputy

N/A Court Reporter

ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR PETITIONER

ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR RESPONDENT

N/A

N/A

PROCEEDINGS (IN CHAMBERS):

ORDER

Dismissing Complaint Without Prejudice as to Defendants Beck and Feuer Pursuant to Joint Stipulation of All Named Parties

Terminating Beck as Party Defendant; Terminating Feuer as Party Defendant

Represented by counsel, the Youth Justice Coalition (“the Coalition”), Peter Arellano (“Arellano”), and Jose Reza (“Reza”) filed a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 civil-rights complaint against the City of Los Angeles, the City of Los Angeles City Attorney Mike Feuer, Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”) Chief Charlie Beck (collectively “the City”), and various Doe defendants on October 25, 2016. See Case Management / Electronic Case Filing System Document (“Doc”) 2. The complaint attacks what it calls the unconstitutional enforcement of restrictive “gang injunctions” by the City against thousands of City residents “based on a unilateral and

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behind-closed-doors determination by police and city attorneys that they are active participants in a street gang.” Doc 2 at 3 ¶ 3. The Coalition describes the process by which the City obtains and uses gang injunctions:
3. * * * Without any prior notice or opportunity to contest the allegations of gang membership, the City serves such individuals with these injunctions that subject them to arrest for such ordinary activities as appearing in public with friends and family, working alongside other members of the neighborhood, or wearing the clothes they choose. [n. 1 omitted]
4. * * * In Los Angeles, the process of obtaining gang injunctions works as follows: police and prosecutors work together to bring state[-]court actions against alleged gangs, claiming that their activities constitute a public nuisance and seeking an injunction to abate that nuisance by prohibiting not only illegal activities, but also otherwise lawful conduct – such as associating in public, drinking anywhere in public view, or wearing supposed gang colors or symbols.
In these actions, the City for the most part names as defendants not the individual people they believe are gang members, but rather the gang itself as an unincorporated association. Because the defendant gangs are not organized legal entities, these state[-]court gang injunction actions have always resulted in a judgment against the gang by default, and the City has obtained its gang injunctions based on those defaults.
But once the City obtains those judgments against the supposed gang entity, it uses those orders to restrict the rights of real people who were never parties to the state[-]court action, “serving” individuals [who] it asserts are active participants in the gang with the gang injunction and subjecting them to arrest and prosecution for engaging in any of the prohibited activities.
Doc 2 at 3-4 ¶¶ 3-4 (footnote 1 omitted after paragraph 3). The Coalition contends that this practice violates the alleged gang participants’ federal and state
constitutional rights to procedural due process by depriving them of legal rights without giving them advance notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Doc 2 at 4 ¶ 5 (citing Al Haramain Islamic Found’n, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of the Treasury, 686 F.3d 965, 985 (9th Cir. 2012)). The Coalition relies on Vasquez v. Rackauckas, 734 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2013), where the Ninth Circuit affirmed the undersigned’s decision holding that the putative gang members’ constitutional right to procedural due process was violated by enforcement of a gang injunction against them without first giving them a chance to contest the allegation that they were gang members. See Doc 2 at 4 ¶ 6. According to the Coalition, the City “has refused to abide by the holding” in Vasquez “and

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fails to afford individuals”, such as plaintiffs Arellano and Reza, “due process before enforcing gang injunctions against them.” See Doc 2 at 4 ¶ 6.
By Order issued October 26, 2016 (Doc 7), the case was initially assigned to District Judge Otero, who issued an Initial Standing Order (Doc 10) on October 27, 2016.
On October 27, 2016, the Coalition filed proofs of service (Doc 11) stating that it had served the complaint on all three named defendants on October 26 or 27, 2016, making their answers due November 16 or 17, 2016. To date, the defendants have not yet filed answers or other responses to the complaint.
On October 31, 2016, plaintiff Arellano filed a motion for a preliminary injunction (“PI”) (Doc 12), along with a supporting memorandum (Doc 13) and declarations (Docs 14-20) and a Request for Judicial Notice (Doc 21), which they served on defendants on November 1, 2016 (Doc 23). Arellano noticed a hearing on his PI motion for December 5, 2016. Arellano seeks to preliminarily enjoin the City from enforcing “the Judgment Granting Permanent Injunction in People v. Big Top Locos, Case No. BC511444 (L.A. Sup. Ct. Sept. 23, 2013) (‘Echo Park Injunction’)” against him. Arellano explains that the order sought would “not preclude Defendants from returning to Superior Court to seek a separate order binding Plaintiff Arellano to the terms of the Echo Park injunction, nor [would] it preclude Defendants from seeking to modify this order on grounds they have provided Plaintiff Arellano adequate due process through additional administrative proceedings.” Doc 12 (Arellano’s Notice of Motion) at 3.
By Order issued November 2, 2016 (Doc 24), the case was transferred to the undersigned. The Court found that Arellano’s PI motion appeared suitable for resolution without oral argument but that it warranted full briefing. Accordingly, by Order issued November 4, 2016 (Doc 25), the Court vacated the hearing that Arellano had noticed for December 5, 2016, and established deadlines for the City’s mandatory response brief and Arellano’s optional reply brief. On November 14, 2016, the other named plaintiff, Reza, filed his own application for a preliminary injunction (Doc 28). Pursuant to the parties’ joint stipulation filed November 14, 2016 (Doc 29), the Court issued an Order on November 15, 2016 (Doc 31) extending the deadlines for briefs on Arellano’s PI application and Reza’s PI application. Defendants must file a brief responding to both PI applications by Friday, December 16, 2016, and Arellano and Reza may file reply briefs by Monday, January 9, 2017. The same Order (Doc 29) also extended

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to December 16, 2016 the defendants’ deadline to file an answer or dispositive motion in response to the complaint.
Pursuant to a joint stipulation that the parties filed on December 5, 2016 (Doc 33), the Court issued an Order on December 6, 2016 (Doc 34) extending the deadlines for class-certification briefs. Plaintiffs may move to certify a class by January 30, 2017, whereafter defendants must respond by March 1, 2017 and plaintiffs may reply by March 14, 2017.
Most recently, all parties filed a joint stipulation (Doc 35) yesterday, December 14, 2016, whereby plaintiffs agreed to voluntarily dismiss their claims against defendants Michael “Mike” Feuer (named as City Attorney of the City of Los Angeles in his official capacity) and Charles “Charlie” Beck (named as Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department in his official capacity). According to the stipulation, the remaining defendant (the City of Los Angeles) promise in return that it would not file a motion to dismiss the complaint on any ground.
ORDER The complaint is dismissed without prejudice as to defendants Mike Feuer and Charlie Beck. “Mike Feuer, City Attorney of the City of Los Angeles in his official capacity” is TERMINATED as a party defendant. “Charlie Beck, Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department in his official capacity” is TERMINATED as a party defendant. The only parties defendant remaining in the case are the City of Los Angeles and “Does 1-10 in their official and individual capacities.” IT IS SO ORDERED.

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 Case 2:16-cv-07932-VBF-RAO Document 69 Filed 01/27/17 Page 1 of 3 Page ID #:4375

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA – WESTERN DIVISION

10

11 YOUTH JUSTICE COALITION, a non12 profit organization, et al.,

13

Plaintiffs,

14

v.

15

16 CITY OF LOS ANGELES, 17

Case No.: 2:16-cv-07932-VBF
ORDER
Staying Proceedings Pursuant to January 27, 2017 Joint Stipulation of the Parties

18

Defendant.

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Case 2:16-cv-07932-VBF-RAO Document 69 Filed 01/27/17 Page 2 of 3 Page ID #:4376

1

WHEREAS, on October 25, 2016, Plaintiffs filed their class action

2 complaint, Youth Justice Coalition v. City of Los Angeles, et al., Case No. 2:16-

3 cv-07932-VBF-RAO;

4

WHEREAS, on October 31, 2016, Plaintiffs filed and served the Motion for

5 Preliminary Injunction for Plaintiff Peter Arellano (“Arellano PI Motion”) to stop

6 Defendant from enforcing against Plaintiff Arellano the gang injunction ordered by

7 the Judgment Granting Permanent Injunction in People v. Big Top Locos, et al.,

8 LASC Case No. BC511444 (Sept. 23, 2013);
9 WHEREAS, on December 5, 2017, the Court entered an order adopting the
10 Parties’ stipulation to extend the deadline for Plaintiffs to submit a motion for class
11

certification to January 30, 2017; 12

13

WHEREAS, on January 9, 2017, in accordance with the stipulated briefing

14 schedule on the Arellano PI Motion, Plaintiffs filed and served the Reply in

15 Support of Motion for PI for Plaintiff Peter Arellano, as well as Plaintiffs’

16 Objections to Evidence Submitted By Defendant in Opposition to Plaintiff

17 Arellano’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction;

18

WHEREAS, on January 12, 2017 the Court entered an order directing

19 Defendant to respond to Plaintiffs’ evidentiary objections by February 3, 2017, and

20 permitting Plaintiff Arellano to reply by February 20, 2017;

21

WHEREAS, on January 27, 2017, counsel for the Parties conferred pursuant

22 to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) and agreed that, aided by mediation, the

23 Parties may be able to resolve this matter via settlement and further agreed to seek

24 to stay the case for a period of 45 days to pursue mediation and settlement;

25

WHEREAS, the Parties additionally agreed to exempt from the request to

26 stay the remaining deadlines regarding the briefing on Evidentiary Objections

27 related to the Arellano PI Motion.

28

Case 2:16-cv-07932-VBF-RAO Document 69 Filed 01/27/17 Page 3 of 3 Page ID #:4377

1

Based on the above facts, representations, and promises, and good cause

2 appearing therefore, THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS AS FOLLOWS:

3

 This action is STAYED as follows:

4

5

• The deadlines for briefs regarding the Evidentiary Objections related

6

to the Arellano PI Motion remain as previously ordered by this Court.

7

8 • All remaining proceedings, including but not limited to, the deadlines
9 to submit their Rule 26(f) Conference Statement and class
10 certification briefing, are stayed until Friday, March 17, 2017.
11

12

13

• The parties SHALL FILE a status report on Friday, March 17, 2017

14

if they have not reached and informed the Court of a settlement before

15

that date.

16

17

IT IS SO ORDERED.

18

19 Dated: Friday, January 27, 2017 ______________________________

20

The Honorable Valerie B. Fairbank

21

Senior United States District Judge

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 
 Case 2:16-cv-07932-VAP-RAO Document 106 Filed 09/07/17 Page 1 of 29 Page ID #:4733

United States District Court Central District of California

Youth Justice Coalition, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. City of Los Angeles, et al.,
Defendants.

CV 16-7932-VAP (RAOx)
Order GRANTING Plaintiff PeterArellano’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction

On October 31, 2016, Plaintiff Peter Arellano filed a motion for a preliminary injunction “to stop police and prosecutors from enforcing against him a restrictive civil ‘gang injunction.’” Doc. No. 13 at 7. On December 16, 2016, Defendant City of Los Angeles (“the City”) filed an opposition to that motion. Doc. No. 40. On January 9, 2017, Plaintiff filed a reply. Doc. No. 59.
On January 27, 2017, this Court stayed proceedings to allow the Parties to resolve the matter via mediation. Doc. No. 69. On July 3, 2017, this Court lifted the stay after the Parties submitted a report informing the Court that they were unable to reach a settlement. Doc. No. 86.
The Court now considers the pending motion for a preliminary injunction. Having considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the motion, the Court GRANTS the motion.

1

Case 2:16-cv-07932-VAP-RAO Document 106 Filed 09/07/17 Page 2 of 29 Page ID #:4734
I. Background Over the past three decades, prosecutors in Southern California have used
public nuisance law to obtain civil injunctions prohibiting suspected gang members from participating in a variety of activities. Matthew Mickle Werdegar, Note, Enjoining the Constitution: The Use of Public Nuisance Abatement Injunctions Against Urban Street Gangs, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 409, 411 (1999). The injunctions are often broad in scope and can include activities such as “fighting, trespassing, and spraying graffiti,” as well as “otherwise legal activities such as appearing in public together or carrying pagers or cellular telephones.” Id.
At issue in the present action is an injunction obtained by the City against six alleged gang entities, including the “Echo Park Locos” (hereinafter referred to as “Echo Park Injunction”). Doc. No. 21-2 at 13. To obtain the Echo Park Injunction, the Los Angeles City Attorney filed a public nuisance action in the California Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles. Instead of naming as defendants the persons who police and prosecutors suspected were active participants in the gang at the time, the City sued the six alleged gang entities. Id. The gang entities were not represented during the public nuisance proceedings, and the City obtained the Echo Park Injunction by default judgment on September 24, 2013. Doc. Nos. 21-2 at 1; 46 at 114.
On October 2, 2013, Plaintiff filed a motion to intervene in the state court action to oppose the Echo Park Injunction. Doc. No. 45 at 64. In the motion, Plaintiff contended that he had “an interest in the subject of [the] action” and “an interest in the ‘property’ that is the subject of [the] litigation” because the injunction would restrict his personal freedom. Id. at 68-71. He also argued that, if the court
2

Case 2:16-cv-07932-VAP-RAO Document 106 Filed 09/07/17 Page 3 of 29 Page ID #:4735
denied his request to intervene, the injunction would curtail his civil liberties without due process. Id. at 71.
On October 7, 2013, Plaintiff filed an ex parte application for an order staying enforcement of the Echo Park Injunction. Id. at 25. The application argued that the injunction “abridges the Constitutional rights of those who fall within its ambit under the [F]irst, [S]econd, [F]ourth, and [F]ourteenth [A]mendments” and that the “deprivation of rights will occur without procedural due process” because “no one who will be served with the injunction was named as a party to the case.” Id. at 28. The superior court denied Plaintiff’s ex parte application as untimely on October 8, 2013. Id. at 56-57. The court noted that “individuals need not be named parties [to an] action for a judgment of injunction to apply to them.” See Doc. No. 45 at 56.
Likewise, the superior court denied the motion to intervene on November 13, 2013. Doc. No. 46 at 19-22. In its order, the superior court held that the City “took steps reasonably calculated . . . to provide notice,” the motion to intervene was untimely, and the reasons for intervention were insufficient. Id. at 19. The court determined that “the [permanent injunction] judgment already provides for exceptions, exemptions and means to further avoid its application, . . . and no person at this time is so situated that the disposition may as a practical matter impair or impede that person’s ability to protect that interest.” Id. at 19-20.
On November 22, 2013, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Vasquez v. Rackuackas, 734 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2013), established that the “Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution
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requires individuals have the right to defend against the imposition of a permanent gang injunction before such an injunction is issued” and “post-deprivation remedies are no substitute for pre-deprivation procedural safeguards.”1 Doc. No. 47 at 7, 9 (emphasis in original). The superior court denied the motion for reconsideration on July 30, 2014. Doc. No. 47 at 162. In its order, the superior court incorporated by reference an earlier ruling that determined Vasquez was inapplicable because Vasquez merely “enjoined county prosecutors from enforcing a gang injunction” against a set of specific persons that had been denied due process, rather than ruling the terms of the injunction order were invalid. Id. at 44-45, 162. The superior court stated that the Vasquez opinion “uniquely addressed how Orange County enforcement aggressively prosecuted” and “enforce[d]” an injunction order after it had been obtained, and the court noted “its expectation that Los Angeles authorities will implement the injunction [at issue in this case] only lawfully and fairly.” Id. at 45 (emphasis added). The court also distinguished Vasquez on the ground that the injunction it dealt with lacked exceptions for law-abiding citizens and noted that federal case law is not binding upon California courts. Id.
II. Evidentiary Issues Plaintiff and Defendant request the Court take judicial notice of several facts
contained in exhibits filed in conjunction with the briefings in this matter. Doc. Nos. 21, 55, 60. Neither Party disputes any of the requests, and the Court finds good cause appears to approve them. The Court, therefore, GRANTS the Parties’ requests for judicial notice.
1 Plaintiff also filed an amended brief in support of his motion to intervene raising similar arguments pursuant to Vasquez. Doc. No. 46 at 24-37.
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Plaintiff also submitted several evidentiary objections in response to the City’s opposition to his motion for a preliminary injunction. Doc. No. 61. “In assessing the evidence with respect to irreparable harm,” the district court need not “rely only on admissible evidence to support its finding of irreparable harm.” Herb Reed Enterprises, LLC v. Florida Entm’t Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1250 n.5 (9th Cir. 2013). Rather, “[d]ue to the urgency of obtaining a preliminary injunction at a point when there has been limited factual development, the rules of evidence do not apply strictly to preliminary injunction proceedings.” Id.; see also Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1363 (9th Cir. 1988) (“It was within the discretion of the district court to accept . . . hearsay for purposes of deciding whether to issue the preliminary injunction.”).
The Court, therefore, OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objection No. 33 as to the portion of the objected-to paragraph that describes Plaintiff’s December 2013 arrest and subsequent conviction and Plaintiff’s Objection No. 77 as to the portion of the objected-to paragraph that describes Plaintiff’s January 2016 arrest.
As to the remaining objections, the Court has not relied upon objected-to evidence in ruling on the present motion. Accordingly, the remaining objections are OVERRULED as moot.
III. Facts A. Echo Park Injunction Application and Terms The Echo Park Injunction applies to “active members” of the following
gangs: Big Top Locos aka Big Top aka BTLS, Crazys aka CYS aka Mayberry aka MB, Diamond Street Locos aka Diamond Street aka DST, Echo Park Locos aka
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Echo Park aka Echo Parque aka ExP aka EP, Frogtown Rifa aka Frogtown aka FTR, and Head Hunteres aka HHS (“Defendant Gangs”). Doc. No. 21-2 at 13. The injunction states that the following factors may be used to determine whether a person is an “active member” of one of the applicable gangs:
(1) whether the person admits to being a member of a Defendant Gang, (2) whether the person has tattoos that are associated with a Defendant Gang, (3) whether the person has been arrested while participating with active members of a Defendant Gang, or (4) whether a reliable informant provides information that the person is an active member of a Defendant Gang. Clothing, accessories, photographs and close association with known gang members may also be relevant to whether a person is an active gang member, but these factors alone are insufficient to validate a subject as an “active member” of a Defendant Gang for purposes of this injunction. “Part time” and “weekend” gang members can be an “active member” for the purpose of this injunction if they otherwise satisfy the above criteria. A person need not devote a majority of his or her time to gang activities to be an “active member.”
Id. at 15.
Pursuant to the “Gang Injunction Program Guidelines” issued by the Los Angeles City Attorney, the Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”) must obtain prior approval from a deputy city attorney before serving a person with a gang injunction. Doc. No. 20-1 at 15. The guidelines state that “[a] suspected gang
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member may be served . . . if, at the time of service, there is documented evidence establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that: (a) the suspected gang member is, in fact, a gang member; and (b) his or her participation in the enjoined gang during the past five (5) years has been more than nominal, passive, inactive, or purely technical.” Id. The guidelines list a series of factors for the deputy city attorney to consider similar to those listed in the Echo Park Injunction and note that the deputy city attorney “should exercise independent and informed judgment based on all available evidence and the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 49-50.
The injunction, among other things, prohibits enjoined persons from associating in public or in common areas of residential buildings with other “known” gang members under a “Do Not Associate” provision. Doc. No. 21-2 at 15-16. Specifically, the “Do Not Associate” provision prohibits enjoined persons from “[s]tanding, sitting, walking, driving, gathering, or appearing, anywhere in public view, in a public place, or any place accessible to the public, with any other known member of a Defendant Gang.” Id. The provision also applies to “all methods of travel.” Id. at 16. The provision includes exceptions to its restrictions if the enjoined person is: (1) inside a school attending class or conducting school business; (2) inside a church or religious institution for the purposes of worship; or (3) inside a place where he or she is lawfully employed and is engaged in a lawful business, trade, profession, or occupation which requires such presence. Id.
The injunction also prohibits enjoined persons from engaging in several other activities, such as possessing any ﬁrearm or ammunition, trespassing, engaging in graffiti, or possessing an aerosol paint container, felt tip marker, paint marker, spray paint tip, slap tag, or any other item that can be used to apply graffiti. (Id.) In
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addition, enjoined persons are prohibited from selling, transporting, possessing, or using any controlled substance without a prescription, as well as drinking or possessing an open container of alcohol in public, except on a licensed premises where alcohol consumption is authorized. Id.
The limitations imposed by the injunction on active gang members last for five years after personal service, after which a new five-year period may be initiated with re-service. Id. at 19.
B. Echo Park Injunction “Opt-Out” Provision and Administrative Process
The Echo Park Injunction affords enjoined persons two processes—one judicial and one administrative—to challenge its enforcement. First, the injunction includes an “opt-out” provision by which a person served with the injunction may move the superior court for an order not to enforce the injunction against him or her. Doc. No. 21-2 at 18. The City will not oppose the motion if the person challenging the injunction’s application satisfies certain criteria, including declaring, under oath, that for the past three years he or she has not been a member of any enjoined gang, has not been documented by law enforcement as having associated with any known, active members of any relevant gang other than immediate family members, has not been arrested for any felony or misdemeanor crime, and has not obtained any new gang-related tattoos. Id. The enjoined person must also declare, under oath, that he or she has been consistently and gainfully employed or enrolled in and attending school for at least one year. Id. If an enjoined person is able to obtain a court order granting removal, he or she may still be re-served with the injunction if, after being removed, he or she claims membership in a gang, associates with known gang
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members other than immediate family, is arrested for any felony or misdemeanor, or obtains any gang-related tattoos. Id. at 18-19.
Second, the City has established a post-deprivation administrative process by which enjoined persons can apply to be removed from the injunction. Doc. No. 202 at 116. The process is initiated by the enjoined person submitting a petition to the City Attorney’s Office. Id. The petition is then reviewed by a senior supervising attorney who is outside of the gang enforcement section. Id. The senior supervising attorney considers evidence provided by an LAPD gang expert for the enjoined gang, the deputy city attorney assigned to prosecute the injunction, and the petitioner before making a final determination. Doc. No. 42 at 7, ¶ 21.
C. Application Against Plaintiff In June 2015, LAPD officers served Plaintiff with the Echo Park Injunction and told him he was subject to its terms. Doc. No. 14 at 7. Since he was served with the injunction, Plaintiff has been arrested and threatened with arrest multiple times for alleged violations of the injunction’s terms. Id.
IV. Legal Standard “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy” and “is
never awarded as of right.” Munaf v. Green, 553 U.S. 674, 689-90 (2007) (citations omitted). Typically, “[a] plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
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Under the Ninth Circuit’s “sliding scale” approach, however, “serious questions going to the merits and a hardship balance that tips sharply toward the plaintiff can support the issuance of an injunction, assuming the other two elements of the Winter test are also met.” Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 2011). The “sliding scale” approach allows “district courts to preserve the status quo where difficult legal questions require more deliberate investigation.” Greene v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. C 15-00048 JSW, 2015 WL 3945996, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2015); see also Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 971 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that, under the “sliding scale” approach, a petitioner had “made a sufficiently strong showing of likely success on the merits” where he presented “a case which raises serious legal questions, or has a reasonable probability or fair prospect of success”).
IV. Analysis As a threshold matter, the City argues that Plaintiff is collaterally estopped
from relying on Vasquez and due process contentions to support his motion for relief because he presented identical issues to the superior court during his unsuccessful attempt to intervene. Doc. No. 40 at 14. This argument fails.
As the party asserting collateral estoppel, the City bears the burden of establishing each element. See Murphy v. Murphy, 164 Cal. App. 4th 376, 400 (2008) (“[T]he the burden of proof is on the party asserting collateral estoppel to show that a particular issue was adjudicated.”). For collateral estoppel to apply, “the particular legal or factual issue must have been presented and determined in the former action.” Bleeck v. State Bd. of Optometry, 18 Cal. App. 3d 415, 428 (1971);
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see also Hernandez v. City of Pomona, 46 Cal. 4th 501, 514 (2009) (“[A]n issue was actually litigated in a prior proceeding if it was properly raised, submitted for determination, and determined in that proceeding.”).
In the present motion, Plaintiff contends that, pursuant to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Vasquez, the City violated his due process rights by enforcing the Echo Park Injunction against him before providing him with an adequate opportunity to contest his designation as a gang member. Doc. No. 13 at 7. The City argues that the superior court “necessarily decided” the due process issues raised by Plaintiff “on the merits” in three separate orders: the October 8, 2013 order denying Plaintiff’s ex parte application; the November 13, 2013 order denying Plaintiff’s motion to intervene; and the July 30, 2014 order denying Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.
The City fails to observe the key distinction between Plaintiff’s position before the superior court and his position now. In his motions to the superior court, Plaintiff sought to intervene in an action that he claimed threatened to deprive his due process rights by arguing that the City’s procedures, in theory, would be insufficient to afford him due process. Doc. Nos. 45 at 28 (noting that the “deprivation of rights will occur without procedural due process”) (emphasis added); 45 at 71 (“Were Applicant’s request to intervene denied, his due process rights under the Constitution would be violated.”) (emphasis added); 47 at 15 (“[T]he proposed intervenors face significant deprivations of their constitutional rights . . . .”) (emphasis added).
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The superior court rejected those arguments, finding that the procedures, on their face, were sufficient. Doc. Nos. 46 at 19-20 (“[T]he judgment already provides for exceptions, exemptions and means to further avoid its application to any person, . . . and no person at this time is so situated that the disposition may as a practical matter impair or impede that person’s ability to protect that interest.”); 47 at 43-45 (distinguishing Vasquez as a case that dealt with the enforcement of a gang injunction order, rather than the facial validity of the order itself, and noting the “expectation that Los Angeles authorities will implement the injunction only lawfully and fairly”) (emphasis added).
Here, however, Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the City from enforcing the injunction against him by arguing that that the procedures, as applied, are insufficient to afford due process. Doc. No. 13 at 15, 22 (arguing that the Echo Park Injunction “deprives [Plaintiff] of basic constitutionally protected freedoms” because “the post-deprivation remedies provided by the City are insufficient”) (emphasis added); see also Doc. No. 59 at 28 (“The pleadings the City relies upon confirm that the due process claim invoked [before the superior court] was against the issuance of the injunction, not its individual application.”) (emphasis added).
“[I]t is well-established that the facial upholding of a law does not prevent future as-applied challenges.” In re Cao, 619 F.3d 410, 430 (5th Cir. 2010); see, e.g., Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 546 U.S. 410, 411-12 (2006) (holding that the plaintiff could bring an as-applied challenge to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act despite the Court upholding the statute on its face); Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 2391, (AFGE) v. Martin, 969 F.2d 788, 793 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that a U.S. Department of Labor drug testing plan did not, on its
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face, violate the Fourth Amendment but “emphasiz[ing]]” that the ruling did “not preclude an as applied constitutional challenge”).
Moreover, even if Plaintiff’s prior arguments to the superior court could be read to include an as-applied challenge to the City’s procedures, Plaintiff would not be precluded from raising it now as the issue was not decided by the superior court. See Los Altos El Granada Inv’rs v. City of Capitola, No. C04-5138, 2010 WL 3835665, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2010) (“In its amended state court complaint, Los Altos asserted an as-applied equal protection challenge under the California constitution. The superior court construed it as a time-barred facial challenge. The superior court did not make any factual or legal findings that would preclude the instant as-applied equal protection challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
Accordingly, the proceedings before the superior court do not estop Plaintiff from bringing an as-applied challenge to the City’s procedures, and the Court proceeds to analyze the merits of Plaintiff’s motion pursuant to the Winter factors below.
A. Likelihood of Success Courts “analyze a procedural due process claim in two steps. The first asks whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the State; the second examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient.” United States v. Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d 999, 1013 (9th Cir. 2012). Under the second step of the analysis, courts examine a set of factors outlined in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976):
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[F]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id. at 334-35. The Court address both steps, in turn, below.
I. Interference with a Liberty or Property Interest Plaintiff’s argument that he is likely to succeed in establishing that the City interfered with his liberty interests rests largely on analogizing the present action to Vasquez. Indeed, the cases appear quite similar.
In the underlying state court case that preceded Vasquez, the Orange County District Attorney’s Office had filed a public nuisance action in superior court against a street gang and 115 named persons, some of whom were juveniles. Vasquez, 734 F.3d at 1030. After 32 individual defendants filed answers or general denials, the county filed a request to dismiss them and thirty other individual defendants from the case “because of the ‘aggressive effort on the [] part’ of those individuals to defend themselves in court, and because of the concerns that the state court judge raised regarding entering a judgment against unrepresented juveniles.” Id. at 1031-32. The superior court granted the request, and the county then obtained
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a default judgment, including a permanent injunction, against the street gang. Id. at 1032.
Approximately four months later, four persons on whom the county had served the injunction filed the Vasquez action in district court, alleging the county’s “dismiss-and-serve strategy” had violated due process. Id. at 1034. The plaintiffs presented no challenge to the terms of the injunction; rather, they “challenged only the adequacy of their opportunity to contest the application of the [gang injunction] to them.” Id. The plaintiffs represented two classes: (1) adults and minors “named as individual defendants” in the state case, “who appeared . . . to defend themselves and were voluntarily dismissed by [the county]; and (2) minors “named as individual defendants” in the state case for whom no guardian ad litem was appointed and who were voluntarily dismissed by [the county].” Id. After an eleven-day bench trial, the district court concluded that the county had deprived “the [p]laintiffs and those similarly situated of their constitutionally protected liberty or property interests without adequate procedural protections.” Id. The court enjoined the county from enforcing the superior court order against the class members but emphasized that “it was ‘not instructing the state court as to the nature of any hearing.’” Id.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court and noted that its “analysis depend[ed] in significant part on the procedural history of the state case.” Id. at 1030. Like the district court, the court of appeals determined that the injunction interfered with “liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 1042. The court also found that the private interests affected by the injunction were “very strong”; the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
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procedures used was “considerable” and was not adequately remedied by postdeprivation remedies; and the county had not established that it faced an administrative, fiscal, or other substantial burden in providing “some procedure for Plaintiffs to challenge [the County’s] gang membership determination before they were subjected to the terms of the Order.” Id. at 1053. Thus, as all of the Mathews factors weighed in favor of the plaintiffs, the court of appeals held that the county violated due process by failing to provide “class members [with] an adequate opportunity to contest whether they are active gang members before . . . subject[ing] [them] to a gang injunction.” Id. at 1030.
As noted above, there are substantial similarities between the present action and Vasquez. For example, both the Echo Park Injunction and the Vasquez injunction prohibit association between suspected gang members, without exception for immediate family members, modes of travel, or in expressive activities protected by the First Amendment, such as public demonstrations. Compare Doc. No. 21-2 at 15-16 with Vasquez, 734 F.3d at 1042-43. Given those similarities, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the Echo Park Injunction, much like the injunction at issue in Vasquez, “profoundly implicates liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause, including rights of free movement, association, and speech, and that [the City’s] conduct interferes with those protected liberty interests.” Id. at 1042.
II. Constitutional Sufficiency of City’s Procedures As to whether the process provided by the City was “constitutionally sufficient,” Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d at 1013, Plaintiff contends that Vasquez compels the conclusion that he is likely to prevail on his claim that Defendants
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violated due process by enforcing the Echo Park Injunction against him without providing any pre-deprivation process.
The City attempts to distinguish this case from Vasquez on several grounds. Most notably, the City points out the difference in the procedural history of the present case—in which the City did not name individual defendants in the underlying state court action—and Vasquez—in which Orange County strategically moved to dismiss named defendants after they made an “aggressive effort . . . to defendant themselves in court,” 734 F.3d at 1032. This distinction is immaterial. In Vasquez, Orange County made the “decision to thwart [p]laintiffs’ efforts to use procedures available in the state court that . . . were constitutionally sufficient.” Id. at 1050. The same occurred here, as the City first declined to name the persons it suspected of gang membership in the public nuisance complaint and then opposed their attempts to intervene when they sought to challenge the injunction order. As the Vasquez decision notes, “the contingent right to file an opposed motion to intervene, subject to discretionary denial, is not an adequate assurance of due process to meet constitutional standards.”2 Id.
The City also highlights several factual distinctions between the two cases to argue that Plaintiff was not denied adequate process. The Court addresses those distinctions within its analysis of the Mathews factors below.
2 At the hearing on the present motion, the City argued that Plaintiff had sufficient process because he had the opportunity to attempt to intervene in the superior court proceedings before the court entered judgment. As noted above, however, such an opportunity does not ensure constitutionally adequate process.
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i. Private Interest As noted above, both the Echo Park Injunction and the injunction at issue in Vasquez prohibit association between suspected gang members, without exception for immediate family members, modes of travel, or a wide-variety of other protected activities. Thus, it appears that the Echo Park Injunction, like the injunction at issue in Vasquez, affects private interests of great importance.
The City, however, offers the following distinctions to argue that Plaintiff’s private interests are insubstantial: (1) unlike the Vasquez injunction, the Echo Park Injunction lists specific factors to determine active gang membership and includes an “opt-out” provision that allows the superior court to adjudicate gang membership; (2) unlike the Vasquez injunction, the Echo Park Injunction contains exceptions for school, work, and religious worship, as well as a hardship exception; (3) unlike Orange County, Los Angeles does not have a policy of seeking increased bail amounts for violations of the injunction; and (4) unlike the Vasquez injunction, which has no expiration date, the Echo Park Injunction expires five years after service.
None of those distinctions, however, are significant. For example, despite setting forth criteria to be considered in determining who is an active gang member, the Echo Park Injunction does not include any procedure by which this determination is made. Moreover, had Plaintiff applied for removal pursuant to the injunction’s “opt-out” provision, the City would have objected to the application due to Plaintiff’s April 2014 arrest for vandalism with a gang enhancement, Doc.
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No. 14 at 5, or his December 2013 arrest for “assault with a deadly weapon, . . . vandalism, and . . . witness intimidation,” Doc. No. 41 at 9, ¶ 33.3
Notwithstanding the Echo Park Injunction’s limited exceptions for associations at school, work, and places of religious worship, the injunction still prevents Plaintiff from participating in an enormous variety of activities with anyone who the City also believes is an active gang participant, such as sitting on his porch; visiting neighborhood parks, libraries, stores, and restaurants; or participating in political organizing activities. Likewise, even though the City does not seek increased bail amounts for violations of the injunction, Plaintiff has submitted a sworn declaration stating that he does not have enough money to bail himself out if arrested for an injunction violation. Doc. No. 14 at 9. Finally, that the injunction expires every five years does little to lessen the significance of the private interests at issue. Five years is a long time to be prevented from freely
3 Although neither party briefed the effect of an objection to an “opt-out” application, the City argued at the hearing on the present motion that an objection does not necessarily deny an applicant due process. The City contended that, despite an objection, the applicant retains the opportunity to persuade the superior court of his or her lack of membership in a gang, which affords the applicant adequate process. That assertion, however, is inconsistent with the plain terms of the injunction. Indeed, the same behaviors that allow the City to object to an “opt-out” application—claimed membership in a gang, association with known gang members other than immediate family, an arrest for any felony or misdemeanor, or obtaining new gang tattoos—also allow the City to re-serve the gang injunction on any persons that previously qualified for removal. Doc. No. 21-2 at 18-19. Thus, the opt-out provision appears to promote a zero tolerance policy towards such behaviors. Moreover, as explained in more detail below, the “opt-out” provision is an inadequate remedy due to the restrictions that remain on removed persons.
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associating with family members and friends in public and, in any event, the order permits re-service on a person as soon as its five-year window expires.
Thus, much like the injunction at issue in Vasquez, the Echo Park Injunction “impose[s] significant restrictions on Plaintiffs’ liberty” and implicates interests that are “truly weighty.” 734 F.3d at 1045.
ii. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation The Ninth Circuit in Vasquez found that “[d]etermining whether an individual is an active gang member presents a considerable risk of error.” Id. at 1046. The court noted that the “informal structure of gangs, the often fleeting nature of gang membership, and the lack of objective criteria in making the assessment,” and found it problematic that Orange County’s process of assessing gang membership was an entirely “unilateral” and “one-sided.” Id. at 1046-48.
As in Vasquez, the City in this case makes its initial determination of active gang membership unilaterally and without input from alleged members. See Doc. No. 20-1 at 15, 53-50 (describing procedures by which the LAPD and deputy city attorney work together to determine active gang membership). As noted in Vasquez, “fairness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of facts decisive of rights.” Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1069 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
The City argues that the risk of erroneous deprivation under its procedures is not as great as the risk in Vasquez because it, unlike Orange County, follows
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consistent criteria that were approved by the superior court to determine active gang membership, offers a detailed removal process that has been implemented successfully, and serves a removal petition with each injunction. Those distinctions fail.
Plaintiff has offered expert testimony from Professors Malcolm Klein and Diego Vigil—the same experts the Ninth Circuit relied upon in Vasquez—that suggests that the fluid nature of gangs makes it difficult to determine membership at any given time. Doc. Nos. 17 at 4-7; 19 at 8-14. Klein and Vigil also contend that several of the factors the City purportedly uses to identify active gang membership—close association, joint criminal activity, and even self-admissions— are unreliable and depend upon subjective assessment of facts and witness credibility. Doc. Nos. 19 at 7 (“[I]t is very common for non-gang members to maintain some type of relationship with their friends-turned-gang-members.”); 17 at 7 (“[P]eople who are not members [may] claim membership, because they do not want to show the wrong face in front of their peers; they do not want to be seen denying association with gang members.”). The City has offered no evidence to rebut Klein or Vigil’s testimony in any meaningful way.
Nor do the City’s removal procedures appear to be an adequate rememdy to cure the deprivation of Plaintiff’s liberty interests.4 As explained above, Plaintiff’s
4 The Parties vigorously dispute whether post-deprivation remedies in cases such as this one are always inadequate. As the Court can resolve the present motion without answering that question, it declines to do so. See PDK Labs., Inc. v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“[I]f it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more.”) (Roberts, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
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arrest record likely would have prevented him from successfully “opting out” until very recently, and his association with friends and extended family members who may be suspected of gang membership would likely render him ineligible going forward. Doc. Nos. 14 at 8; 21-1 at 17-18. Moreover, even if Plaintiff is eligible for removal pursuant to the “opt-out” provision, it remains an inadequate remedy because the provision allows for re-service of persons that have successfully “opted-out” if they associate with known gang members other than immediate family post-removal. Doc. No. 21-2 at 18. Plaintiff has offered undisputed evidence the LAPD believes that some of his extended family members, such as his uncle and cousin, as well as some of his friends and neighbors, are members of a Defendant Gang. Doc. No. 14 at 7-8. Thus, even if he were able to successfully “opt out,” Plaintiff would still be effectively prevented from associating with friends and family members.
Likewise, Plaintiff remains ineligible for a presumption of removal pursuant to the City’s administrative process due to an arrest in January 2016 for an alleged violation of the gang injunction.5 Doc. Nos. 14 at 7, 20-1 at 26. In order to qualify
5 Plaintiff states in his declaration that, on January 2, 2016, he and his family members were arrested, for “walking out of the front yard” of a neighbor’s house. Doc. No. 14 at 7. The City filed a declaration from an LAPD police officer stating that the arrest was for being “drunk in public at a ‘going away’ party the gang held for [an] Echo Park gang member.” Doc. No. 41 at 21, ¶ 61. Plaintiff has not been charged with any crime in relation to the January 2, 2016 arrest. Doc. No. 14 at 7. While it is possible that Plaintiff could have applied for removal through the administrative process in the six months between the City serving him with the injunction and his January 2016 arrest, his December 2013 arrest for what the City claims was “assault with a deadly weapon, . . . vandalism, and . . . witness intimidation,” Doc. No. 41 at 9, ¶ 33, as well as his March 2014 arrest for “vandalism with a gang enhancement,” Doc. No. 14 at 5,
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for a rebuttable presumption of removal under the City’s administrative process, an enjoined person cannot have been “convicted of, charged with, or arrested for a crime of violence, a felony offense, or a violation of a Gang Injunction” within the last three years. Doc. No. 20-1 at 26. The net effect of those requirements is to flip the burden of proof onto enjoined persons. Hence, once an LAPD officer makes an arrest—even if the arrest is for a crime that has nothing to do with gang membership—the enjoined person will have to prove that he or she is not a gang member. As in Vasquez, such a requirement creates the a “critical[]” defect because it places “the burden on the petitioning individual to demonstrate to he or she is not an active gang participant, even though the State ordinarily has the burden of demonstrating active gang participation by ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” Vasquez, 734 F.3d at 1049 (citing People v. Englebrecht, 88 Cal. App. 4th 1236, 1256 (2001)).
Moreover, the City’s administrative process does not afford enjoined persons the opportunity to be presented with the evidence against them. Doc. No. 20-1 at 22-25. Thus, where a person, such as Plaintiff, has an arrest record that disqualifies him from the presumption of removal, that person is required to prove that he or she is not a gang member in a vacuum of evidence. Given such requirements, the administrative process cannot serve as an adequate remedy. 734 F.3d at 1049 (rejecting Orange County’s removal process because “there are no provisions requiring an explanation of the basis for the conclusion that the individual is a gang member, either before or at the hearing,” which leaves “the alleged gang member . . . in a factual vacuum, to prove a negative”).
likely would have disqualified him from the rebuttable presumption of removal during that period as well.
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Accordingly, given the record presently before the Court, Plaintiff has shown that he is likely to establish that the risk of erroneous deprivation under the City’s current procedures is considerable and the City’s removal procedures do not adequately remedy the lack of pre-deprivation process.
iii. Government Interest In assessing the government interest at stake, the question is “not whether [the City] has a significant interest in combating gang violence . . . but rather whether they have a significant interest in failing to provide [additional] process.” Vasquez, 734 F.3d at 1052 (brackets omitted). The City contends that requiring it to provide all alleged gang members pre-deprivation hearings would substantially delay its ability to obtain and enforce gang injunctions. But such burdens “are precisely the sort of administrative cost that we expect our government to shoulder.” Humphries v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 554 F.3d 1170, 1194 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d on other grounds, Los Angeles Cty. v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29 (2010). Moreover, the record shows that at least three other jurisdictions in California—San Francisco, Oakland, and Orange—provide some form of pre-deprivation process to persons subject to gang injunctions. See generally Doc. No. 21-3 335-549. Those “examples of procedures . . . cast further doubt on [the City’s] claimed administrative burden in providing pre-deprivation protections of some kind.” Vasquez, 734 F.3d at 1053. Thus, the City has not established an “administrative, fiscal or other substantial burden[]” that would prevent it from providing suspected gang members with additional process.
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iv. Conclusion as to Likelihood of Success Given the record presently before the Court, Plaintiff has established that all of the Mathews factors appear to weigh decisively in his favor. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has established a likelihood of success on the merits.
B. Likelihood of Irreparable Harm Plaintiff must also demonstrate a likelihood of “irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. The City contends that because Plaintiff, who was served with the Echo Park Injunction in June 2015, has not availed himself of either the administrative or judicial post-deprivation remedies, he cannot establish such a likelihood. The Court disagrees.
“Usually, delay is but a single factor to consider in evaluating irreparable injury; courts are ‘loath to withhold relief solely on that ground.’” Arc of Cal. v. Douglas, 757 F.3d 975, 990 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Lydo Enters., Inc. v. City of Las Vegas, 745 F.2d 1211, 1214 (9th Cir. 1984)). “Although a plaintiff’s failure to seek [a remedy] can imply the lack of need for speedy action . . ., such tardiness is not particularly probative in the context of ongoing, worsening injuries.” Id. (citation omitted).
Plaintiff’s hesitance to pursue either the “opt-out” procedure through the superior court or the City’s administrative removal process is understandable given the likelihood that he would not successfully qualify for either due to his arrest record and familial associations, as discussed above. Indeed, the resolution of the likelihood of irreparable harm element, in this case, is necessarily tied to Plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits. “Because Plaintiff[] ha[s] succeeded in
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demonstrating a likelihood of success on the merits (i.e., that [his due process and] First Amendment rights are being violated), [he] ha[s] also succeeded in demonstrating a likelihood of irreparable harm.” Occupy Fresno v. Cty. of Fresno, 835 F. Supp. 2d 849, 870 (E.D. Cal. 2011); see also Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (“The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”).
C. Balance of Equities and Public Interest The final two Winter factors that Plaintiff must establish are that the “balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” See Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. Plaintiff has demonstrated both.
The Parties dispute the efficacy of gang injunctions such as the one at issue in this case. But even assuming that these types of injunctions are effective in limiting criminal activity, the balance of the equities still tips in Plaintiff’s favor. As noted above, the relevant question is not whether the City has an interest in combating gang violence, but whether the City’s interest in quickly and efficiently serving Plaintiff with a gang injunction outweighs Plaintiff’s interest in having due process before being subjected to such an injunction. Vasquez, 734 F.3d at 1052. As the City has not rebutted Plaintiff’s evidence that the City’s unilateral procedures include a considerable risk of erroneous deprivation, the Court cannot conclude that the burdens it faces in providing additional process outweigh the Plaintiff’s hardships. Nor do the risks posed by gang violence create a public interest in allowing the continued use of constitutionally inadequate procedures. Cf. Fernandez v. Nevada, No. 3:06-CV-00628-LRH, 2010 WL 5678693, at *6 (D. Nev. Oct. 28, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:06-CV-00628-LRH
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(RAMx), 2011 WL 344745 (D. Nev. Feb. 1, 2011) (“[T]he public’s interest in ensuring that individuals receive due process protections and in ensuring that high risk offenders are correctly identified outweighs the public’s interest in seeing a law enforced in this instance which does not assure that Plaintiff will be provided with the procedural protections he is entitled.”).
Therefore, both the balance of equities and public interest weigh in Plaintiff’s favor.
D. Scope of Injunction “Injunctive relief . . . must be tailored to remedy the specific harm alleged.” Lamb–Weston, Inc. v. McCain Foods, Ltd., 941 F.2d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1991). “An overbroad injunction is an abuse of discretion.” Id.
Plaintiff moves the Court to enter an order barring the City from enforcing the Echo Park Injunction against him. As the Court has determined that Plaintiff is likely to establish that the City did not provide him with due process in enforcing the injunction against him, that continued enforcement of the injunction is likely to result in irreparable injury, and that the balance of the equities and public interest weigh in his favor, the Court finds the scope of Plaintiff’s requested remedy reasonable.
E. Issuance of Bond Typically, a plaintiff may not be granted a preliminary injunction without first posting security “in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or
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restrained.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). Among other things, this requirement both discourages “parties from requesting injunctions based on tenuous legal grounds” and “assures district court judges that defendants will receive compensation for their damages in cases where it is later determined a party was wrongfully enjoined.” Nintendo of America, Inc. v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 16 F.3d 1032, 1037 (9th Cir. 1994). “The district court retains discretion ‘as to the amount of security required, if any.’” Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008, 1015 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Johnson v. Couturier, 572 F.3d 1067, 1086 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasis in original)).
Neither party has briefed whether the Court should require a security in this case or what type of a payment would be appropriate to protect the City’s interests. Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s motion is not based on “tenuous legal grounds,” and the City’s status as an institutional defendant lessens the need for an assurance of compensation in case the Court’s decision to enter an injunction turns out to be wrong. Moreover, the City declined to be heard on the need for a security when presented with the opportunity at the hearing on this motion. Plaintiff’s counsel, however, stated that they were unsure if their client would be able to pay a bond. That uncertainty is consistent with Plaintiff’s declaration, in which he states in “[m]oney is tight in our house” and that he does not have “enough savings to be able to bail [him]self out” if he is arrested for violating the Echo Park Injunction. Doc. No. 14 at 9. Accordingly, the Court finds that a bond is not necessary here. See Elliott v. Kiesewetter, 98 F.3d 47, 60 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Where the balance of . . . equities weighs overwhelmingly in favor of the party seeking the injunction, a district court has the discretion to waive the Rule 65(c) bond requirement.”); Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 385 n.42 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (“Where
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. . . the action is brought by an impecunious class of plaintiffs, preliminary injunctive relief may be granted without any security whatsoever.”) (citing Bartels v. Biernat, 405 F. Supp. 1012, 1019 (E.D. Wis. 1975)).

V. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for a
preliminary injunction to stop the City from enforcing the Echo Park Injunction against him.
The City of Los Angeles and its agents, employees, assigns, and all those acting in concert with them are hereby barred from enforcing the Judgment Granting Permanent Injunction in People v. Big Top Locos, et al., Case No. BC511444 (L.A. Sup. Ct. Sept. 23, 2013), against Plaintiff Peter Arellano. This order does not preclude the City, its agents, employees, assigns, or all those acting in concert with them from returning to the California Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles to seek a separate order binding Plaintiff Arellano to the terms of the Echo Park injunction, nor does it preclude the City from seeking to modify this order on grounds they have provided Plaintiff Arellano adequate due process through additional administrative proceedings.

IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: 9/7/17

Virginia A. Phillips Chief United States District Judge

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 Case 2:16-cv-07932-VAP-RAO Document 106 Filed 09/07/17 Page 1 of 29 Page ID #:4733

United States District Court Central District of California

Youth Justice Coalition, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. City of Los Angeles, et al.,
Defendants.

CV 16-7932-VAP (RAOx)
Order GRANTING Plaintiff PeterArellano’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction

On October 31, 2016, Plaintiff Peter Arellano filed a motion for a preliminary injunction “to stop police and prosecutors from enforcing against him a restrictive civil ‘gang injunction.’” Doc. No. 13 at 7. On December 16, 2016, Defendant City of Los Angeles (“the City”) filed an opposition to that motion. Doc. No. 40. On January 9, 2017, Plaintiff filed a reply. Doc. No. 59.
On January 27, 2017, this Court stayed proceedings to allow the Parties to resolve the matter via mediation. Doc. No. 69. On July 3, 2017, this Court lifted the stay after the Parties submitted a report informing the Court that they were unable to reach a settlement. Doc. No. 86.
The Court now considers the pending motion for a preliminary injunction. Having considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the motion, the Court GRANTS the motion.

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I. Background Over the past three decades, prosecutors in Southern California have used
public nuisance law to obtain civil injunctions prohibiting suspected gang members from participating in a variety of activities. Matthew Mickle Werdegar, Note, Enjoining the Constitution: The Use of Public Nuisance Abatement Injunctions Against Urban Street Gangs, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 409, 411 (1999). The injunctions are often broad in scope and can include activities such as “fighting, trespassing, and spraying graffiti,” as well as “otherwise legal activities such as appearing in public together or carrying pagers or cellular telephones.” Id.
At issue in the present action is an injunction obtained by the City against six alleged gang entities, including the “Echo Park Locos” (hereinafter referred to as “Echo Park Injunction”). Doc. No. 21-2 at 13. To obtain the Echo Park Injunction, the Los Angeles City Attorney filed a public nuisance action in the California Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles. Instead of naming as defendants the persons who police and prosecutors suspected were active participants in the gang at the time, the City sued the six alleged gang entities. Id. The gang entities were not represented during the public nuisance proceedings, and the City obtained the Echo Park Injunction by default judgment on September 24, 2013. Doc. Nos. 21-2 at 1; 46 at 114.
On October 2, 2013, Plaintiff filed a motion to intervene in the state court action to oppose the Echo Park Injunction. Doc. No. 45 at 64. In the motion, Plaintiff contended that he had “an interest in the subject of [the] action” and “an interest in the ‘property’ that is the subject of [the] litigation” because the injunction would restrict his personal freedom. Id. at 68-71. He also argued that, if the court
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denied his request to intervene, the injunction would curtail his civil liberties without due process. Id. at 71.
On October 7, 2013, Plaintiff filed an ex parte application for an order staying enforcement of the Echo Park Injunction. Id. at 25. The application argued that the injunction “abridges the Constitutional rights of those who fall within its ambit under the [F]irst, [S]econd, [F]ourth, and [F]ourteenth [A]mendments” and that the “deprivation of rights will occur without procedural due process” because “no one who will be served with the injunction was named as a party to the case.” Id. at 28. The superior court denied Plaintiff’s ex parte application as untimely on October 8, 2013. Id. at 56-57. The court noted that “individuals need not be named parties [to an] action for a judgment of injunction to apply to them.” See Doc. No. 45 at 56.
Likewise, the superior court denied the motion to intervene on November 13, 2013. Doc. No. 46 at 19-22. In its order, the superior court held that the City “took steps reasonably calculated . . . to provide notice,” the motion to intervene was untimely, and the reasons for intervention were insufficient. Id. at 19. The court determined that “the [permanent injunction] judgment already provides for exceptions, exemptions and means to further avoid its application, . . . and no person at this time is so situated that the disposition may as a practical matter impair or impede that person’s ability to protect that interest.” Id. at 19-20.
On November 22, 2013, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Vasquez v. Rackuackas, 734 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2013), established that the “Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution
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requires individuals have the right to defend against the imposition of a permanent gang injunction before such an injunction is issued” and “post-deprivation remedies are no substitute for pre-deprivation procedural safeguards.”1 Doc. No. 47 at 7, 9 (emphasis in original). The superior court denied the motion for reconsideration on July 30, 2014. Doc. No. 47 at 162. In its order, the superior court incorporated by reference an earlier ruling that determined Vasquez was inapplicable because Vasquez merely “enjoined county prosecutors from enforcing a gang injunction” against a set of specific persons that had been denied due process, rather than ruling the terms of the injunction order were invalid. Id. at 44-45, 162. The superior court stated that the Vasquez opinion “uniquely addressed how Orange County enforcement aggressively prosecuted” and “enforce[d]” an injunction order after it had been obtained, and the court noted “its expectation that Los Angeles authorities will implement the injunction [at issue in this case] only lawfully and fairly.” Id. at 45 (emphasis added). The court also distinguished Vasquez on the ground that the injunction it dealt with lacked exceptions for law-abiding citizens and noted that federal case law is not binding upon California courts. Id.
II. Evidentiary Issues Plaintiff and Defendant request the Court take judicial notice of several facts
contained in exhibits filed in conjunction with the briefings in this matter. Doc. Nos. 21, 55, 60. Neither Party disputes any of the requests, and the Court finds good cause appears to approve them. The Court, therefore, GRANTS the Parties’ requests for judicial notice.
1 Plaintiff also filed an amended brief in support of his motion to intervene raising similar arguments pursuant to Vasquez. Doc. No. 46 at 24-37.
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Plaintiff also submitted several evidentiary objections in response to the City’s opposition to his motion for a preliminary injunction. Doc. No. 61. “In assessing the evidence with respect to irreparable harm,” the district court need not “rely only on admissible evidence to support its finding of irreparable harm.” Herb Reed Enterprises, LLC v. Florida Entm’t Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1250 n.5 (9th Cir. 2013). Rather, “[d]ue to the urgency of obtaining a preliminary injunction at a point when there has been limited factual development, the rules of evidence do not apply strictly to preliminary injunction proceedings.” Id.; see also Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1363 (9th Cir. 1988) (“It was within the discretion of the district court to accept . . . hearsay for purposes of deciding whether to issue the preliminary injunction.”).
The Court, therefore, OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objection No. 33 as to the portion of the objected-to paragraph that describes Plaintiff’s December 2013 arrest and subsequent conviction and Plaintiff’s Objection No. 77 as to the portion of the objected-to paragraph that describes Plaintiff’s January 2016 arrest.
As to the remaining objections, the Court has not relied upon objected-to evidence in ruling on the present motion. Accordingly, the remaining objections are OVERRULED as moot.
III. Facts A. Echo Park Injunction Application and Terms The Echo Park Injunction applies to “active members” of the following
gangs: Big Top Locos aka Big Top aka BTLS, Crazys aka CYS aka Mayberry aka MB, Diamond Street Locos aka Diamond Street aka DST, Echo Park Locos aka
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Echo Park aka Echo Parque aka ExP aka EP, Frogtown Rifa aka Frogtown aka FTR, and Head Hunteres aka HHS (“Defendant Gangs”). Doc. No. 21-2 at 13. The injunction states that the following factors may be used to determine whether a person is an “active member” of one of the applicable gangs:
(1) whether the person admits to being a member of a Defendant Gang, (2) whether the person has tattoos that are associated with a Defendant Gang, (3) whether the person has been arrested while participating with active members of a Defendant Gang, or (4) whether a reliable informant provides information that the person is an active member of a Defendant Gang. Clothing, accessories, photographs and close association with known gang members may also be relevant to whether a person is an active gang member, but these factors alone are insufficient to validate a subject as an “active member” of a Defendant Gang for purposes of this injunction. “Part time” and “weekend” gang members can be an “active member” for the purpose of this injunction if they otherwise satisfy the above criteria. A person need not devote a majority of his or her time to gang activities to be an “active member.”
Id. at 15.
Pursuant to the “Gang Injunction Program Guidelines” issued by the Los Angeles City Attorney, the Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”) must obtain prior approval from a deputy city attorney before serving a person with a gang injunction. Doc. No. 20-1 at 15. The guidelines state that “[a] suspected gang
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member may be served . . . if, at the time of service, there is documented evidence establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that: (a) the suspected gang member is, in fact, a gang member; and (b) his or her participation in the enjoined gang during the past five (5) years has been more than nominal, passive, inactive, or purely technical.” Id. The guidelines list a series of factors for the deputy city attorney to consider similar to those listed in the Echo Park Injunction and note that the deputy city attorney “should exercise independent and informed judgment based on all available evidence and the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 49-50.
The injunction, among other things, prohibits enjoined persons from associating in public or in common areas of residential buildings with other “known” gang members under a “Do Not Associate” provision. Doc. No. 21-2 at 15-16. Specifically, the “Do Not Associate” provision prohibits enjoined persons from “[s]tanding, sitting, walking, driving, gathering, or appearing, anywhere in public view, in a public place, or any place accessible to the public, with any other known member of a Defendant Gang.” Id. The provision also applies to “all methods of travel.” Id. at 16. The provision includes exceptions to its restrictions if the enjoined person is: (1) inside a school attending class or conducting school business; (2) inside a church or religious institution for the purposes of worship; or (3) inside a place where he or she is lawfully employed and is engaged in a lawful business, trade, profession, or occupation which requires such presence. Id.
The injunction also prohibits enjoined persons from engaging in several other activities, such as possessing any ﬁrearm or ammunition, trespassing, engaging in graffiti, or possessing an aerosol paint container, felt tip marker, paint marker, spray paint tip, slap tag, or any other item that can be used to apply graffiti. (Id.) In
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addition, enjoined persons are prohibited from selling, transporting, possessing, or using any controlled substance without a prescription, as well as drinking or possessing an open container of alcohol in public, except on a licensed premises where alcohol consumption is authorized. Id.
The limitations imposed by the injunction on active gang members last for five years after personal service, after which a new five-year period may be initiated with re-service. Id. at 19.
B. Echo Park Injunction “Opt-Out” Provision and Administrative Process
The Echo Park Injunction affords enjoined persons two processes—one judicial and one administrative—to challenge its enforcement. First, the injunction includes an “opt-out” provision by which a person served with the injunction may move the superior court for an order not to enforce the injunction against him or her. Doc. No. 21-2 at 18. The City will not oppose the motion if the person challenging the injunction’s application satisfies certain criteria, including declaring, under oath, that for the past three years he or she has not been a member of any enjoined gang, has not been documented by law enforcement as having associated with any known, active members of any relevant gang other than immediate family members, has not been arrested for any felony or misdemeanor crime, and has not obtained any new gang-related tattoos. Id. The enjoined person must also declare, under oath, that he or she has been consistently and gainfully employed or enrolled in and attending school for at least one year. Id. If an enjoined person is able to obtain a court order granting removal, he or she may still be re-served with the injunction if, after being removed, he or she claims membership in a gang, associates with known gang
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members other than immediate family, is arrested for any felony or misdemeanor, or obtains any gang-related tattoos. Id. at 18-19.
Second, the City has established a post-deprivation administrative process by which enjoined persons can apply to be removed from the injunction. Doc. No. 202 at 116. The process is initiated by the enjoined person submitting a petition to the City Attorney’s Office. Id. The petition is then reviewed by a senior supervising attorney who is outside of the gang enforcement section. Id. The senior supervising attorney considers evidence provided by an LAPD gang expert for the enjoined gang, the deputy city attorney assigned to prosecute the injunction, and the petitioner before making a final determination. Doc. No. 42 at 7, ¶ 21.
C. Application Against Plaintiff In June 2015, LAPD officers served Plaintiff with the Echo Park Injunction and told him he was subject to its terms. Doc. No. 14 at 7. Since he was served with the injunction, Plaintiff has been arrested and threatened with arrest multiple times for alleged violations of the injunction’s terms. Id.
IV. Legal Standard “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy” and “is
never awarded as of right.” Munaf v. Green, 553 U.S. 674, 689-90 (2007) (citations omitted). Typically, “[a] plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
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Under the Ninth Circuit’s “sliding scale” approach, however, “serious questions going to the merits and a hardship balance that tips sharply toward the plaintiff can support the issuance of an injunction, assuming the other two elements of the Winter test are also met.” Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 2011). The “sliding scale” approach allows “district courts to preserve the status quo where difficult legal questions require more deliberate investigation.” Greene v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. C 15-00048 JSW, 2015 WL 3945996, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2015); see also Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 971 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that, under the “sliding scale” approach, a petitioner had “made a sufficiently strong showing of likely success on the merits” where he presented “a case which raises serious legal questions, or has a reasonable probability or fair prospect of success”).
IV. Analysis As a threshold matter, the City argues that Plaintiff is collaterally estopped
from relying on Vasquez and due process contentions to support his motion for relief because he presented identical issues to the superior court during his unsuccessful attempt to intervene. Doc. No. 40 at 14. This argument fails.
As the party asserting collateral estoppel, the City bears the burden of establishing each element. See Murphy v. Murphy, 164 Cal. App. 4th 376, 400 (2008) (“[T]he the burden of proof is on the party asserting collateral estoppel to show that a particular issue was adjudicated.”). For collateral estoppel to apply, “the particular legal or factual issue must have been presented and determined in the former action.” Bleeck v. State Bd. of Optometry, 18 Cal. App. 3d 415, 428 (1971);
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see also Hernandez v. City of Pomona, 46 Cal. 4th 501, 514 (2009) (“[A]n issue was actually litigated in a prior proceeding if it was properly raised, submitted for determination, and determined in that proceeding.”).
In the present motion, Plaintiff contends that, pursuant to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Vasquez, the City violated his due process rights by enforcing the Echo Park Injunction against him before providing him with an adequate opportunity to contest his designation as a gang member. Doc. No. 13 at 7. The City argues that the superior court “necessarily decided” the due process issues raised by Plaintiff “on the merits” in three separate orders: the October 8, 2013 order denying Plaintiff’s ex parte application; the November 13, 2013 order denying Plaintiff’s motion to intervene; and the July 30, 2014 order denying Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.
The City fails to observe the key distinction between Plaintiff’s position before the superior court and his position now. In his motions to the superior court, Plaintiff sought to intervene in an action that he claimed threatened to deprive his due process rights by arguing that the City’s procedures, in theory, would be insufficient to afford him due process. Doc. Nos. 45 at 28 (noting that the “deprivation of rights will occur without procedural due process”) (emphasis added); 45 at 71 (“Were Applicant’s request to intervene denied, his due process rights under the Constitution would be violated.”) (emphasis added); 47 at 15 (“[T]he proposed intervenors face significant deprivations of their constitutional rights . . . .”) (emphasis added).
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The superior court rejected those arguments, finding that the procedures, on their face, were sufficient. Doc. Nos. 46 at 19-20 (“[T]he judgment already provides for exceptions, exemptions and means to further avoid its application to any person, . . . and no person at this time is so situated that the disposition may as a practical matter impair or impede that person’s ability to protect that interest.”); 47 at 43-45 (distinguishing Vasquez as a case that dealt with the enforcement of a gang injunction order, rather than the facial validity of the order itself, and noting the “expectation that Los Angeles authorities will implement the injunction only lawfully and fairly”) (emphasis added).
Here, however, Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the City from enforcing the injunction against him by arguing that that the procedures, as applied, are insufficient to afford due process. Doc. No. 13 at 15, 22 (arguing that the Echo Park Injunction “deprives [Plaintiff] of basic constitutionally protected freedoms” because “the post-deprivation remedies provided by the City are insufficient”) (emphasis added); see also Doc. No. 59 at 28 (“The pleadings the City relies upon confirm that the due process claim invoked [before the superior court] was against the issuance of the injunction, not its individual application.”) (emphasis added).
“[I]t is well-established that the facial upholding of a law does not prevent future as-applied challenges.” In re Cao, 619 F.3d 410, 430 (5th Cir. 2010); see, e.g., Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 546 U.S. 410, 411-12 (2006) (holding that the plaintiff could bring an as-applied challenge to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act despite the Court upholding the statute on its face); Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 2391, (AFGE) v. Martin, 969 F.2d 788, 793 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that a U.S. Department of Labor drug testing plan did not, on its
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face, violate the Fourth Amendment but “emphasiz[ing]]” that the ruling did “not preclude an as applied constitutional challenge”).
Moreover, even if Plaintiff’s prior arguments to the superior court could be read to include an as-applied challenge to the City’s procedures, Plaintiff would not be precluded from raising it now as the issue was not decided by the superior court. See Los Altos El Granada Inv’rs v. City of Capitola, No. C04-5138, 2010 WL 3835665, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2010) (“In its amended state court complaint, Los Altos asserted an as-applied equal protection challenge under the California constitution. The superior court construed it as a time-barred facial challenge. The superior court did not make any factual or legal findings that would preclude the instant as-applied equal protection challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
Accordingly, the proceedings before the superior court do not estop Plaintiff from bringing an as-applied challenge to the City’s procedures, and the Court proceeds to analyze the merits of Plaintiff’s motion pursuant to the Winter factors below.
A. Likelihood of Success Courts “analyze a procedural due process claim in two steps. The first asks whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the State; the second examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient.” United States v. Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d 999, 1013 (9th Cir. 2012). Under the second step of the analysis, courts examine a set of factors outlined in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976):
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[F]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id. at 334-35. The Court address both steps, in turn, below.
I. Interference with a Liberty or Property Interest Plaintiff’s argument that he is likely to succeed in establishing that the City interfered with his liberty interests rests largely on analogizing the present action to Vasquez. Indeed, the cases appear quite similar.
In the underlying state court case that preceded Vasquez, the Orange County District Attorney’s Office had filed a public nuisance action in superior court against a street gang and 115 named persons, some of whom were juveniles. Vasquez, 734 F.3d at 1030. After 32 individual defendants filed answers or general denials, the county filed a request to dismiss them and thirty other individual defendants from the case “because of the ‘aggressive effort on the [] part’ of those individuals to defend themselves in court, and because of the concerns that the state court judge raised regarding entering a judgment against unrepresented juveniles.” Id. at 1031-32. The superior court granted the request, and the county then obtained
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a default judgment, including a permanent injunction, against the street gang. Id. at 1032.
Approximately four months later, four persons on whom the county had served the injunction filed the Vasquez action in district court, alleging the county’s “dismiss-and-serve strategy” had violated due process. Id. at 1034. The plaintiffs presented no challenge to the terms of the injunction; rather, they “challenged only the adequacy of their opportunity to contest the application of the [gang injunction] to them.” Id. The plaintiffs represented two classes: (1) adults and minors “named as individual defendants” in the state case, “who appeared . . . to defend themselves and were voluntarily dismissed by [the county]; and (2) minors “named as individual defendants” in the state case for whom no guardian ad litem was appointed and who were voluntarily dismissed by [the county].” Id. After an eleven-day bench trial, the district court concluded that the county had deprived “the [p]laintiffs and those similarly situated of their constitutionally protected liberty or property interests without adequate procedural protections.” Id. The court enjoined the county from enforcing the superior court order against the class members but emphasized that “it was ‘not instructing the state court as to the nature of any hearing.’” Id.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court and noted that its “analysis depend[ed] in significant part on the procedural history of the state case.” Id. at 1030. Like the district court, the court of appeals determined that the injunction interfered with “liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 1042. The court also found that the private interests affected by the injunction were “very strong”; the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
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procedures used was “considerable” and was not adequately remedied by postdeprivation remedies; and the county had not established that it faced an administrative, fiscal, or other substantial burden in providing “some procedure for Plaintiffs to challenge [the County’s] gang membership determination before they were subjected to the terms of the Order.” Id. at 1053. Thus, as all of the Mathews factors weighed in favor of the plaintiffs, the court of appeals held that the county violated due process by failing to provide “class members [with] an adequate opportunity to contest whether they are active gang members before . . . subject[ing] [them] to a gang injunction.” Id. at 1030.
As noted above, there are substantial similarities between the present action and Vasquez. For example, both the Echo Park Injunction and the Vasquez injunction prohibit association between suspected gang members, without exception for immediate family members, modes of travel, or in expressive activities protected by the First Amendment, such as public demonstrations. Compare Doc. No. 21-2 at 15-16 with Vasquez, 734 F.3d at 1042-43. Given those similarities, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the Echo Park Injunction, much like the injunction at issue in Vasquez, “profoundly implicates liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause, including rights of free movement, association, and speech, and that [the City’s] conduct interferes with those protected liberty interests.” Id. at 1042.
II. Constitutional Sufficiency of City’s Procedures As to whether the process provided by the City was “constitutionally sufficient,” Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d at 1013, Plaintiff contends that Vasquez compels the conclusion that he is likely to prevail on his claim that Defendants
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violated due process by enforcing the Echo Park Injunction against him without providing any pre-deprivation process.
The City attempts to distinguish this case from Vasquez on several grounds. Most notably, the City points out the difference in the procedural history of the present case—in which the City did not name individual defendants in the underlying state court action—and Vasquez—in which Orange County strategically moved to dismiss named defendants after they made an “aggressive effort . . . to defendant themselves in court,” 734 F.3d at 1032. This distinction is immaterial. In Vasquez, Orange County made the “decision to thwart [p]laintiffs’ efforts to use procedures available in the state court that . . . were constitutionally sufficient.” Id. at 1050. The same occurred here, as the City first declined to name the persons it suspected of gang membership in the public nuisance complaint and then opposed their attempts to intervene when they sought to challenge the injunction order. As the Vasquez decision notes, “the contingent right to file an opposed motion to intervene, subject to discretionary denial, is not an adequate assurance of due process to meet constitutional standards.”2 Id.
The City also highlights several factual distinctions between the two cases to argue that Plaintiff was not denied adequate process. The Court addresses those distinctions within its analysis of the Mathews factors below.
2 At the hearing on the present motion, the City argued that Plaintiff had sufficient process because he had the opportunity to attempt to intervene in the superior court proceedings before the court entered judgment. As noted above, however, such an opportunity does not ensure constitutionally adequate process.
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i. Private Interest As noted above, both the Echo Park Injunction and the injunction at issue in Vasquez prohibit association between suspected gang members, without exception for immediate family members, modes of travel, or a wide-variety of other protected activities. Thus, it appears that the Echo Park Injunction, like the injunction at issue in Vasquez, affects private interests of great importance.
The City, however, offers the following distinctions to argue that Plaintiff’s private interests are insubstantial: (1) unlike the Vasquez injunction, the Echo Park Injunction lists specific factors to determine active gang membership and includes an “opt-out” provision that allows the superior court to adjudicate gang membership; (2) unlike the Vasquez injunction, the Echo Park Injunction contains exceptions for school, work, and religious worship, as well as a hardship exception; (3) unlike Orange County, Los Angeles does not have a policy of seeking increased bail amounts for violations of the injunction; and (4) unlike the Vasquez injunction, which has no expiration date, the Echo Park Injunction expires five years after service.
None of those distinctions, however, are significant. For example, despite setting forth criteria to be considered in determining who is an active gang member, the Echo Park Injunction does not include any procedure by which this determination is made. Moreover, had Plaintiff applied for removal pursuant to the injunction’s “opt-out” provision, the City would have objected to the application due to Plaintiff’s April 2014 arrest for vandalism with a gang enhancement, Doc.
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No. 14 at 5, or his December 2013 arrest for “assault with a deadly weapon, . . . vandalism, and . . . witness intimidation,” Doc. No. 41 at 9, ¶ 33.3
Notwithstanding the Echo Park Injunction’s limited exceptions for associations at school, work, and places of religious worship, the injunction still prevents Plaintiff from participating in an enormous variety of activities with anyone who the City also believes is an active gang participant, such as sitting on his porch; visiting neighborhood parks, libraries, stores, and restaurants; or participating in political organizing activities. Likewise, even though the City does not seek increased bail amounts for violations of the injunction, Plaintiff has submitted a sworn declaration stating that he does not have enough money to bail himself out if arrested for an injunction violation. Doc. No. 14 at 9. Finally, that the injunction expires every five years does little to lessen the significance of the private interests at issue. Five years is a long time to be prevented from freely
3 Although neither party briefed the effect of an objection to an “opt-out” application, the City argued at the hearing on the present motion that an objection does not necessarily deny an applicant due process. The City contended that, despite an objection, the applicant retains the opportunity to persuade the superior court of his or her lack of membership in a gang, which affords the applicant adequate process. That assertion, however, is inconsistent with the plain terms of the injunction. Indeed, the same behaviors that allow the City to object to an “opt-out” application—claimed membership in a gang, association with known gang members other than immediate family, an arrest for any felony or misdemeanor, or obtaining new gang tattoos—also allow the City to re-serve the gang injunction on any persons that previously qualified for removal. Doc. No. 21-2 at 18-19. Thus, the opt-out provision appears to promote a zero tolerance policy towards such behaviors. Moreover, as explained in more detail below, the “opt-out” provision is an inadequate remedy due to the restrictions that remain on removed persons.
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associating with family members and friends in public and, in any event, the order permits re-service on a person as soon as its five-year window expires.
Thus, much like the injunction at issue in Vasquez, the Echo Park Injunction “impose[s] significant restrictions on Plaintiffs’ liberty” and implicates interests that are “truly weighty.” 734 F.3d at 1045.
ii. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation The Ninth Circuit in Vasquez found that “[d]etermining whether an individual is an active gang member presents a considerable risk of error.” Id. at 1046. The court noted that the “informal structure of gangs, the often fleeting nature of gang membership, and the lack of objective criteria in making the assessment,” and found it problematic that Orange County’s process of assessing gang membership was an entirely “unilateral” and “one-sided.” Id. at 1046-48.
As in Vasquez, the City in this case makes its initial determination of active gang membership unilaterally and without input from alleged members. See Doc. No. 20-1 at 15, 53-50 (describing procedures by which the LAPD and deputy city attorney work together to determine active gang membership). As noted in Vasquez, “fairness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of facts decisive of rights.” Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1069 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
The City argues that the risk of erroneous deprivation under its procedures is not as great as the risk in Vasquez because it, unlike Orange County, follows
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consistent criteria that were approved by the superior court to determine active gang membership, offers a detailed removal process that has been implemented successfully, and serves a removal petition with each injunction. Those distinctions fail.
Plaintiff has offered expert testimony from Professors Malcolm Klein and Diego Vigil—the same experts the Ninth Circuit relied upon in Vasquez—that suggests that the fluid nature of gangs makes it difficult to determine membership at any given time. Doc. Nos. 17 at 4-7; 19 at 8-14. Klein and Vigil also contend that several of the factors the City purportedly uses to identify active gang membership—close association, joint criminal activity, and even self-admissions— are unreliable and depend upon subjective assessment of facts and witness credibility. Doc. Nos. 19 at 7 (“[I]t is very common for non-gang members to maintain some type of relationship with their friends-turned-gang-members.”); 17 at 7 (“[P]eople who are not members [may] claim membership, because they do not want to show the wrong face in front of their peers; they do not want to be seen denying association with gang members.”). The City has offered no evidence to rebut Klein or Vigil’s testimony in any meaningful way.
Nor do the City’s removal procedures appear to be an adequate rememdy to cure the deprivation of Plaintiff’s liberty interests.4 As explained above, Plaintiff’s
4 The Parties vigorously dispute whether post-deprivation remedies in cases such as this one are always inadequate. As the Court can resolve the present motion without answering that question, it declines to do so. See PDK Labs., Inc. v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“[I]f it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more.”) (Roberts, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
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arrest record likely would have prevented him from successfully “opting out” until very recently, and his association with friends and extended family members who may be suspected of gang membership would likely render him ineligible going forward. Doc. Nos. 14 at 8; 21-1 at 17-18. Moreover, even if Plaintiff is eligible for removal pursuant to the “opt-out” provision, it remains an inadequate remedy because the provision allows for re-service of persons that have successfully “opted-out” if they associate with known gang members other than immediate family post-removal. Doc. No. 21-2 at 18. Plaintiff has offered undisputed evidence the LAPD believes that some of his extended family members, such as his uncle and cousin, as well as some of his friends and neighbors, are members of a Defendant Gang. Doc. No. 14 at 7-8. Thus, even if he were able to successfully “opt out,” Plaintiff would still be effectively prevented from associating with friends and family members.
Likewise, Plaintiff remains ineligible for a presumption of removal pursuant to the City’s administrative process due to an arrest in January 2016 for an alleged violation of the gang injunction.5 Doc. Nos. 14 at 7, 20-1 at 26. In order to qualify
5 Plaintiff states in his declaration that, on January 2, 2016, he and his family members were arrested, for “walking out of the front yard” of a neighbor’s house. Doc. No. 14 at 7. The City filed a declaration from an LAPD police officer stating that the arrest was for being “drunk in public at a ‘going away’ party the gang held for [an] Echo Park gang member.” Doc. No. 41 at 21, ¶ 61. Plaintiff has not been charged with any crime in relation to the January 2, 2016 arrest. Doc. No. 14 at 7. While it is possible that Plaintiff could have applied for removal through the administrative process in the six months between the City serving him with the injunction and his January 2016 arrest, his December 2013 arrest for what the City claims was “assault with a deadly weapon, . . . vandalism, and . . . witness intimidation,” Doc. No. 41 at 9, ¶ 33, as well as his March 2014 arrest for “vandalism with a gang enhancement,” Doc. No. 14 at 5,
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for a rebuttable presumption of removal under the City’s administrative process, an enjoined person cannot have been “convicted of, charged with, or arrested for a crime of violence, a felony offense, or a violation of a Gang Injunction” within the last three years. Doc. No. 20-1 at 26. The net effect of those requirements is to flip the burden of proof onto enjoined persons. Hence, once an LAPD officer makes an arrest—even if the arrest is for a crime that has nothing to do with gang membership—the enjoined person will have to prove that he or she is not a gang member. As in Vasquez, such a requirement creates the a “critical[]” defect because it places “the burden on the petitioning individual to demonstrate to he or she is not an active gang participant, even though the State ordinarily has the burden of demonstrating active gang participation by ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” Vasquez, 734 F.3d at 1049 (citing People v. Englebrecht, 88 Cal. App. 4th 1236, 1256 (2001)).
Moreover, the City’s administrative process does not afford enjoined persons the opportunity to be presented with the evidence against them. Doc. No. 20-1 at 22-25. Thus, where a person, such as Plaintiff, has an arrest record that disqualifies him from the presumption of removal, that person is required to prove that he or she is not a gang member in a vacuum of evidence. Given such requirements, the administrative process cannot serve as an adequate remedy. 734 F.3d at 1049 (rejecting Orange County’s removal process because “there are no provisions requiring an explanation of the basis for the conclusion that the individual is a gang member, either before or at the hearing,” which leaves “the alleged gang member . . . in a factual vacuum, to prove a negative”).
likely would have disqualified him from the rebuttable presumption of removal during that period as well.
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Accordingly, given the record presently before the Court, Plaintiff has shown that he is likely to establish that the risk of erroneous deprivation under the City’s current procedures is considerable and the City’s removal procedures do not adequately remedy the lack of pre-deprivation process.
iii. Government Interest In assessing the government interest at stake, the question is “not whether [the City] has a significant interest in combating gang violence . . . but rather whether they have a significant interest in failing to provide [additional] process.” Vasquez, 734 F.3d at 1052 (brackets omitted). The City contends that requiring it to provide all alleged gang members pre-deprivation hearings would substantially delay its ability to obtain and enforce gang injunctions. But such burdens “are precisely the sort of administrative cost that we expect our government to shoulder.” Humphries v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 554 F.3d 1170, 1194 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d on other grounds, Los Angeles Cty. v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29 (2010). Moreover, the record shows that at least three other jurisdictions in California—San Francisco, Oakland, and Orange—provide some form of pre-deprivation process to persons subject to gang injunctions. See generally Doc. No. 21-3 335-549. Those “examples of procedures . . . cast further doubt on [the City’s] claimed administrative burden in providing pre-deprivation protections of some kind.” Vasquez, 734 F.3d at 1053. Thus, the City has not established an “administrative, fiscal or other substantial burden[]” that would prevent it from providing suspected gang members with additional process.
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iv. Conclusion as to Likelihood of Success Given the record presently before the Court, Plaintiff has established that all of the Mathews factors appear to weigh decisively in his favor. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has established a likelihood of success on the merits.
B. Likelihood of Irreparable Harm Plaintiff must also demonstrate a likelihood of “irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. The City contends that because Plaintiff, who was served with the Echo Park Injunction in June 2015, has not availed himself of either the administrative or judicial post-deprivation remedies, he cannot establish such a likelihood. The Court disagrees.
“Usually, delay is but a single factor to consider in evaluating irreparable injury; courts are ‘loath to withhold relief solely on that ground.’” Arc of Cal. v. Douglas, 757 F.3d 975, 990 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Lydo Enters., Inc. v. City of Las Vegas, 745 F.2d 1211, 1214 (9th Cir. 1984)). “Although a plaintiff’s failure to seek [a remedy] can imply the lack of need for speedy action . . ., such tardiness is not particularly probative in the context of ongoing, worsening injuries.” Id. (citation omitted).
Plaintiff’s hesitance to pursue either the “opt-out” procedure through the superior court or the City’s administrative removal process is understandable given the likelihood that he would not successfully qualify for either due to his arrest record and familial associations, as discussed above. Indeed, the resolution of the likelihood of irreparable harm element, in this case, is necessarily tied to Plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits. “Because Plaintiff[] ha[s] succeeded in
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demonstrating a likelihood of success on the merits (i.e., that [his due process and] First Amendment rights are being violated), [he] ha[s] also succeeded in demonstrating a likelihood of irreparable harm.” Occupy Fresno v. Cty. of Fresno, 835 F. Supp. 2d 849, 870 (E.D. Cal. 2011); see also Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (“The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”).
C. Balance of Equities and Public Interest The final two Winter factors that Plaintiff must establish are that the “balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” See Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. Plaintiff has demonstrated both.
The Parties dispute the efficacy of gang injunctions such as the one at issue in this case. But even assuming that these types of injunctions are effective in limiting criminal activity, the balance of the equities still tips in Plaintiff’s favor. As noted above, the relevant question is not whether the City has an interest in combating gang violence, but whether the City’s interest in quickly and efficiently serving Plaintiff with a gang injunction outweighs Plaintiff’s interest in having due process before being subjected to such an injunction. Vasquez, 734 F.3d at 1052. As the City has not rebutted Plaintiff’s evidence that the City’s unilateral procedures include a considerable risk of erroneous deprivation, the Court cannot conclude that the burdens it faces in providing additional process outweigh the Plaintiff’s hardships. Nor do the risks posed by gang violence create a public interest in allowing the continued use of constitutionally inadequate procedures. Cf. Fernandez v. Nevada, No. 3:06-CV-00628-LRH, 2010 WL 5678693, at *6 (D. Nev. Oct. 28, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:06-CV-00628-LRH
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(RAMx), 2011 WL 344745 (D. Nev. Feb. 1, 2011) (“[T]he public’s interest in ensuring that individuals receive due process protections and in ensuring that high risk offenders are correctly identified outweighs the public’s interest in seeing a law enforced in this instance which does not assure that Plaintiff will be provided with the procedural protections he is entitled.”).
Therefore, both the balance of equities and public interest weigh in Plaintiff’s favor.
D. Scope of Injunction “Injunctive relief . . . must be tailored to remedy the specific harm alleged.” Lamb–Weston, Inc. v. McCain Foods, Ltd., 941 F.2d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1991). “An overbroad injunction is an abuse of discretion.” Id.
Plaintiff moves the Court to enter an order barring the City from enforcing the Echo Park Injunction against him. As the Court has determined that Plaintiff is likely to establish that the City did not provide him with due process in enforcing the injunction against him, that continued enforcement of the injunction is likely to result in irreparable injury, and that the balance of the equities and public interest weigh in his favor, the Court finds the scope of Plaintiff’s requested remedy reasonable.
E. Issuance of Bond Typically, a plaintiff may not be granted a preliminary injunction without first posting security “in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or
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restrained.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). Among other things, this requirement both discourages “parties from requesting injunctions based on tenuous legal grounds” and “assures district court judges that defendants will receive compensation for their damages in cases where it is later determined a party was wrongfully enjoined.” Nintendo of America, Inc. v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 16 F.3d 1032, 1037 (9th Cir. 1994). “The district court retains discretion ‘as to the amount of security required, if any.’” Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008, 1015 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Johnson v. Couturier, 572 F.3d 1067, 1086 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasis in original)).
Neither party has briefed whether the Court should require a security in this case or what type of a payment would be appropriate to protect the City’s interests. Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s motion is not based on “tenuous legal grounds,” and the City’s status as an institutional defendant lessens the need for an assurance of compensation in case the Court’s decision to enter an injunction turns out to be wrong. Moreover, the City declined to be heard on the need for a security when presented with the opportunity at the hearing on this motion. Plaintiff’s counsel, however, stated that they were unsure if their client would be able to pay a bond. That uncertainty is consistent with Plaintiff’s declaration, in which he states in “[m]oney is tight in our house” and that he does not have “enough savings to be able to bail [him]self out” if he is arrested for violating the Echo Park Injunction. Doc. No. 14 at 9. Accordingly, the Court finds that a bond is not necessary here. See Elliott v. Kiesewetter, 98 F.3d 47, 60 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Where the balance of . . . equities weighs overwhelmingly in favor of the party seeking the injunction, a district court has the discretion to waive the Rule 65(c) bond requirement.”); Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 385 n.42 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (“Where
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. . . the action is brought by an impecunious class of plaintiffs, preliminary injunctive relief may be granted without any security whatsoever.”) (citing Bartels v. Biernat, 405 F. Supp. 1012, 1019 (E.D. Wis. 1975)).

V. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for a
preliminary injunction to stop the City from enforcing the Echo Park Injunction against him.
The City of Los Angeles and its agents, employees, assigns, and all those acting in concert with them are hereby barred from enforcing the Judgment Granting Permanent Injunction in People v. Big Top Locos, et al., Case No. BC511444 (L.A. Sup. Ct. Sept. 23, 2013), against Plaintiff Peter Arellano. This order does not preclude the City, its agents, employees, assigns, or all those acting in concert with them from returning to the California Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles to seek a separate order binding Plaintiff Arellano to the terms of the Echo Park injunction, nor does it preclude the City from seeking to modify this order on grounds they have provided Plaintiff Arellano adequate due process through additional administrative proceedings.

IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: 9/7/17

Virginia A. Phillips Chief United States District Judge

29

 
 Case: 2:16-cv-7932 As of: 03/20/2019 04:06 PM PDT 1 of 18
ACCO,(RAOx),APPEAL,DISCOVERY,MANADR,PROTORD,RELATED−G
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA (Western Division − Los Angeles)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:16−cv−07932−VAP−RAO

Youth Justice Coalition et al v. City of Los Angeles et al Assigned to: Judge Virginia A. Phillips Referred to: Magistrate Judge Rozella A. Oliver Related Case: 8:09−cv−01090−VBF−RNB
Case in other court: 9th CCA, 18−55485 Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 10/25/2016 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Youth Justice Coalition a non−profit organization

represented by Joshua D Green Urban Peace Institute 1910 West Sunset Boulevard Suite 800 Los Angeles, CA 90026 213−404−0124 Email: jgreen@urbanpeaceinstitute.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laura Danielle Smolowe Munger Tolles and Olson LLP 350 South Grand Avenue 50th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90071 213−683−9100 Fax: 213−687−3702 Email: laura.smolowe@mto.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Adele M El−Khouri Munger Tolles and Olson LLP 1155 F Street NW 7th Floor Washington, DC 20004 202−220−1100 Fax: 202−220−2300 Email: adele.el−khouri@mto.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Aditi Fruitwala ACLU Foundation of Southern California 1313 West Eighth Street Los Angeles, CA 90017 213−977−9500 Fax: 213−977−5299 Email: afruitwala@aclusocal.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amelia L B Sargent Munger Tolles and Olson LLP 355 South Grand Avenue 35th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90071 213−683−9100 Fax: 213−687−3702 Email: amelia.sargent@mto.com TERMINATED: 05/16/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ankur Mandhania Munger Tolles and Olson LLP

Case: 2:16-cv-7932 As of: 03/20/2019 04:06 PM PDT 2 of 18
560 Mission Street 27th Floor San Francisco, CA 94105 415−512−4000 Fax: 415−644−6949 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carmen Iguina 2845 Hollister Avenue Los Angeles, CA 90032 6176946590 Fax: 6176946590 Email: carmen.iguina@nyu.edu TERMINATED: 05/16/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Catherine Wagner Calderaro LOYR APC 3130 Wilshire Boulevard Suite 402 Los Angeles, CA 90010 888−365−8686 Fax: 800−576−1170 Email: catherine.wagner@loywr.com TERMINATED: 04/11/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jacob S Kreilkamp Munger Tolles and Olson LLP 350 South Grand Avenue 50th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90071 213−683−9100 Fax: 213−687−3702 Email: jacob.kreilkamp@mto.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Jhai Munger Tolles and Olson LLP 350 South Grand Avenue 50th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90071 213−683−9100 Fax: 213−687−3702 Email: maria.jhai@mto.com TERMINATED: 02/12/2018
Melanie Rose Penny Ochoa ACLU Fountation of Southern California 1313 West 8th Street Los Angeles, CA 90071 213−977−9500 x 233 Fax: 213−977−5299 Email: mpochoa@aclusocal.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter Bibring ACLU Foundation of Southern California 1313 West Eight Street Los Angeles, CA 90017 213−977−9500 Fax: 213−977−5299 Email: pbibring@aclu−sc.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rekha Elaine Arulanantham ACLU of Southern California 313 West 8th Street Los Angeles, CA 90017

Case: 2:16-cv-7932 As of: 03/20/2019 04:06 PM PDT 3 of 18

213−977−5215 Email: rarulanantham@aclusocal.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sean M Garcia−Leys Connie Rice Institute for Urban Peace 1910 West Sunset Boulevard Suite 800 Los Angeles, CA 90026 213−404−0130 Fax: 213−402−2843 Email: sgarcialeys@urbanpeaceinstitute.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Peter Arellano individuals, for themselves and on behalf of a class of similarly−situated individuals

represented by Adele M El−Khouri (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Aditi Fruitwala (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amelia L B Sargent (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/16/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ankur Mandhania (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carmen Iguina (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/16/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Catherine Wagner Calderaro (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/11/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jacob S Kreilkamp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joshua D Green (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laura Danielle Smolowe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maria Jhai (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/12/2018

Melanie Rose Penny Ochoa (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter Bibring (See above for address)

Case: 2:16-cv-7932 As of: 03/20/2019 04:06 PM PDT 4 of 18

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rekha Elaine Arulanantham (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Jose Reza individuals, for themselves and on behalf of a class of similarly−situated individuals

represented by Joshua D Green (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY
Adele M El−Khouri (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Aditi Fruitwala (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ankur Mandhania (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carmen Iguina (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/16/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Catherine Wagner Calderaro (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/11/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jacob S Kreilkamp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laura Danielle Smolowe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maria Jhai (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/12/2018

Melanie Rose Penny Ochoa (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter Bibring (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rekha Elaine Arulanantham (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant City of Los Angeles

represented by Agnes Patricia Ursea Los Angeles City Attorney

Case: 2:16-cv-7932 As of: 03/20/2019 04:06 PM PDT 5 of 18

City Hall East 200 North Main Street Room 675 Los Angeles, CA 90012 213−978−7569 Fax: 213−978−7011 Email: patricia.ursea@lacity.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Mike Feuer City Attorney of the City of Los Angeles, in his official capacity TERMINATED: 12/15/2016

represented by Agnes Patricia Ursea (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Charlie Beck Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department, in his official capacity TERMINATED: 12/15/2016

represented by Agnes Patricia Ursea (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
DOES 1 through 10, in their official and individual capacities

Date Filed 10/25/2016 10/25/2016
10/25/2016 10/25/2016 10/25/2016 10/25/2016 10/26/2016 10/26/2016 10/26/2016 10/27/2016

# Docket Text
1 CIVIL COVER SHEET filed by Plaintiffs Peter Arrellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition. (Iguina, Carmen) (Entered: 10/25/2016)
2 COMPLAINT with filing fee previously paid ($400.00 paid on 10/25/2016, receipt number 097318776207), filed by plaintiffs Youth Justice Coalition, Jose Reza, Peter Arrellano. (Attorney Carmen G Iguina added to party Peter Arrellano(pty:pla), Attorney Carmen G Iguina added to party Jose Reza(pty:pla), Attorney Carmen G Iguina added to party Youth Justice Coalition(pty:pla))(Iguina, Carmen) (Entered: 10/25/2016)
3 Request for Clerk to Issue Summons on Complaint (Attorney Civil Case Opening), 2 filed by plaintiffs Peter Arrellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition. (Iguina, Carmen) (Entered: 10/25/2016)
4 CERTIFICATE of Interested Parties filed by plaintiffs Peter Arrellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition, (Iguina, Carmen) (Entered: 10/25/2016)
5 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT filed by Plaintiffs Peter Arrellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition (Iguina, Carmen) (Entered: 10/25/2016)
6 NOTICE of Related Case(s) filed by plaintiffs Peter Arrellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition. Related Case(s): CV09−1090 VBF (RNBx), CV11−01135 DMG (JEMx), CV14−00805 ODW (JEMx) (Iguina, Carmen) (Entered: 10/25/2016)
7 NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT to District Judge S. James Otero and Magistrate Judge Rozella A. Oliver. (jtil) (Entered: 10/26/2016)
8 NOTICE TO PARTIES OF COURT−DIRECTED ADR PROGRAM filed. (jtil) (Entered: 10/26/2016)
9 21 DAY Summons Issued re Complaint (Attorney Civil Case Opening), 2 as to Defendants Charlie Beck, City of Los Angeles, Mike Feuer. (jtil) (Entered: 10/26/2016)
10 INITIAL STANDING ORDER upon filing of the complaint by Judge S. James Otero. (jy) (Entered: 10/27/2016)

Case: 2:16-cv-7932 As of: 03/20/2019 04:06 PM PDT 6 of 18

10/27/2016
10/31/2016 10/31/2016 10/31/2016 10/31/2016 10/31/2016 10/31/2016 10/31/2016 10/31/2016 10/31/2016 10/31/2016 11/01/2016

11 PROOF OF SERVICE Executed by Plaintiff Youth Justice Coalition, Jose Reza, Peter Arellano, upon Defendant Charlie Beck served on 10/27/2016, answer due 11/17/2016; City of Los Angeles served on 10/27/2016, answer due 11/17/2016; Mike Feuer served on 10/26/2016, answer due 11/16/2016. in compliance with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by substituted service at business address and no service by mail was executed.Original Summons returned. (Attachments: # 1 Proof of Service 2, # 2 Proof of Service 3)(Sargent, Amelia) (Entered: 10/27/2016)
12 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction re Plaintiff Peter Arellano . Motion filed by Plaintiffs Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition. Motion set for hearing on 12/5/2016 at 10:00 AM before Judge S. James Otero. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Iguina, Carmen) (Entered: 10/31/2016)
13 MEMORANDUM in Support of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction re Plaintiff Peter Arellano . Motion 12 filed by Plaintiffs Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition. (Iguina, Carmen) (Entered: 10/31/2016)
14 DECLARATION of Peter Arellano in support of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction re Plaintiff Peter Arellano . Motion 12 filed by Plaintiffs Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition. (Iguina, Carmen) (Entered: 10/31/2016)
15 DECLARATION of Sean Garcia−Leys in support of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction re Plaintiff Peter Arellano . Motion 12 filed by Plaintiffs Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition. (Iguina, Carmen) (Entered: 10/31/2016)
16 DECLARATION of Joshua Green in support of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction re Plaintiff Peter Arellano . Motion 12 filed by Plaintiffs Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition. (Iguina, Carmen) (Entered: 10/31/2016)
17 DECLARATION of Malcolm W. Klein in support of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction re Plaintiff Peter Arellano . Motion 12 filed by Plaintiffs Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Iguina, Carmen) (Entered: 10/31/2016)
18 DECLARATION of Ana Muniz in support of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction re Plaintiff Peter Arellano . Motion 12 filed by Plaintiffs Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibits C − F)(Iguina, Carmen) (Entered: 10/31/2016)
19 DECLARATION of James Diego Vigil in support of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction re Plaintiff Peter Arellano . Motion 12 filed by Plaintiffs Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibits A − F)(Iguina, Carmen) (Entered: 10/31/2016)
20 DECLARATION of Catherine Wagner in support of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction re Plaintiff Peter Arellano . Motion 12 filed by Plaintiffs Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibits B − G)(Iguina, Carmen) (Entered: 10/31/2016)
21 REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE re NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction re Plaintiff Peter Arellano . Motion 12 filed by Plaintiffs Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibits 1 − 50, # 3 Exhibits 51 − 106)(Iguina, Carmen) (Entered: 10/31/2016)
22 NOTICE TO PARTIES by District Judge S. James Otero. Effective November 7, 2016, Judge Otero will be located at the 1st Street Courthouse, COURTROOM 10C on the 10th floor, located at 350 W. 1st Street, Los Angeles, California 90012. All Court appearances shall be made in Courtroom 10C of the 1st Street Courthouse, and all mandatory chambers copies shall be hand delivered to the judge's mail box outside the Clerk's Office on the 4th floor of the 1st Street Courthouse. The location for filing civil documents in paper format exempted from electronic filing and for viewing case files and other records services remains at the United States Courthouse, 312 North Spring Street, Room G−8, Los Angeles, California 90012. The location for filing criminal documents in paper format exempted from electronic filing remains at Edward R. Roybal Federal Building and U.S. Courthouse, 255 East Temple Street, Room 178,

Case: 2:16-cv-7932 As of: 03/20/2019 04:06 PM PDT 7 of 18

11/01/2016 11/02/2016 11/04/2016
11/07/2016 11/07/2016 11/14/2016 11/14/2016 11/15/2016

Los Angeles, California 90012. THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY. (rrp) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 11/01/2016)
23 PROOF OF SERVICE filed by plaintiffs Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition, re NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction re Plaintiff Peter Arellano . Motion 12 served on November 1, 2016. (Jhai, Maria) (Entered: 11/01/2016)
24 ORDER RE TRANSFER PURSUANT TO GENERAL ORDER 14−03−Related Case− filed. Related Case No: 8:09−cv−01090 VBF(RNBx). Case transferred from Judge S. James Otero to Judge Valerie Baker Fairbank for all further proceedings. The case number will now reflect the initials of the transferee Judge 2:16−cv−07932 VBF(RAOx). Signed by Judge Valerie Baker Fairbank (rn) (Entered: 11/02/2016)
25 MINUTE ORDER IN CHAMBERS by Judge Valerie Baker Fairbank re: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction re Plaintiff Peter Arellano 12 . The hearing that plaintiff−movant Arellano noticed for December 5, 2016 is VACATED sine die. No later than Monday, November 21, 2016, defendants SHALL FILE a brief responding to plaintiff Arellanos motion for a preliminary injunction.No later than Monday, December 5, 2016, plaintiff Arellano MAY FILE a reply to such response. Until and unless otherwise ordered by the undersigned, the parties SHALL COMPLY with the Initial Standing Order issued by Judge Otero on October 27, 2016 with the following exception: contrary to paragraph 3a of that Order, a document that is e−filed before midnight will be considered filed on that date, not the next day. (See order for further details). (shb) (Entered: 11/07/2016)
26 PROOF OF SERVICE filed by Plaintiffs Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition, served on 11/2/16 and 11/7/16. (Jhai, Maria) (Entered: 11/07/2016)
27 Notice of Appearance or Withdrawal of Counsel: for attorney Agnes Patricia Ursea counsel for Defendants Charlie Beck, City of Los Angeles, Mike Feuer. Adding A. Patricia Ursea as counsel of record for City of Los Angeles, Mike Feuer, Charlie Beck for the reason indicated in the G−123 Notice. Filed by Defendants City of Los Angeles, Mike Feuer, Charlie Beck. (Attorney Agnes Patricia Ursea added to party Charlie Beck(pty:dft), Attorney Agnes Patricia Ursea added to party City of Los Angeles(pty:dft), Attorney Agnes Patricia Ursea added to party Mike Feuer(pty:dft))(Ursea, Agnes) (Entered: 11/07/2016)
28 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction re for Plaintiff Jose Reza . Motion filed by plaintiffs Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition. Motion set for hearing on 12/12/2016 at 01:30 PM before Judge Valerie Baker Fairbank. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction for Plaintiff Jose Reza, # 2 Declaration Declaration of Jose Reza in support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction for Plaintiff Jose Reza, # 3 Supplement [Proposed] Order Granting Motion for Preliminary Injunction for Plaintiff Jose Reza) (Iguina, Carmen) (Entered: 11/14/2016)
29 First STIPULATION to Continue Deadline to respond to Complaint and Preliminary Injunction Motions from Various dates in Nov. to December 16 for response to Complaint and both PI Motions Re: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction re for Plaintiff Jose Reza . Motion 28 , NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction re Plaintiff Peter Arellano . Motion 12 , Complaint (Attorney Civil Case Opening), 2 filed by Defendants Charlie Beck, City of Los Angeles, Mike Feuer. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Continuing Certain Deadlines)(Ursea, Agnes) (Entered: 11/14/2016)
30 NOTICE TO PARTIES by District Judge Valerie B. Fairbank. Effective November 22, 2016, Judge Fairbank will be located at the 1st Street Courthouse, located at 350 W. 1st Street, Los Angeles, California 90012. All mandatory chambers copies shall be hand delivered to the judge's mail box outside the Clerk's Office on the 4th floor of the 1st Street Courthouse. The location for filing civil documents in paper format exempted from electronic filing and for viewing case files and other records services remains at the United States Courthouse, 312 North Spring Street, Room G−8, Los Angeles, California 90012. The location for filing criminal documents in paper format exempted from electronic filing remains at Edward R. Roybal Federal Building and U.S. Courthouse, 255 East Temple Street, Room 178, Los Angeles, California 90012. THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY. (rrp) TEXT

Case: 2:16-cv-7932 As of: 03/20/2019 04:06 PM PDT 8 of 18

11/15/2016
11/16/2016 12/05/2016 12/06/2016 12/14/2016 12/15/2016 12/15/2016
12/16/2016 12/16/2016 12/16/2016

ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 11/15/2016)
31 ORDER by Judge Valerie Baker Fairbank, re Stipulation to Continue Deadlines 29 . IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the new deadlines are as follows: The deadline for all Defendants to respond to the Complaint, currently November 16, 2016 for Defendant Feuer and November 17, 2016 for Defendants City and Beck, will be continued to and including December 16, 2016. In the event that Defendants file a motion challenging the Complaint, Plaintiffs opposition will be due on January 16, 2017, and Defendants Reply will be due on January 30, 2017. The deadline for the Defendants to respond to the Arellano Preliminary Injunction Motion, currently November 21, 2016, and to the Reza Preliminary Injunction Motion, once filed, will be continued to and including December 16, 2016. The deadline for Plaintiffs to file any Replies, currently December 5, 2016, will be continued to and including January 9, 2017. The motion hearing previously noticed by plaintiff−movant Reza for December 12, 2016 is VACATED sine die, the Court finds Rea's application for preliminary injunction to be suitable for disposition without oral argument. (shb) (Entered: 11/15/2016)
32 NOTICE of Change of Attorney Business or Contact Information: for attorney Carmen G Iguina counsel for Plaintiffs Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition. Changing email to ciguina@aclusocal.org. Filed by Plaintiffs Carmen Iguina. (Iguina, Carmen) (Entered: 11/16/2016)
33 Joint STIPULATION to Continue Motion for Class Certification Deadline from January 25, 2017 to January 30, 2017 filed by Plaintiffs Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Iguina, Carmen) (Entered: 12/05/2016)
34 ORDER by Judge Valerie Baker Fairbank, GRANTING Stipulation to Continue Deadlines Related to Plaintiff's Arellano and Reza's Motion for Class Certification 33 . IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: Notwithstanding Local Rule 23−3, Plaintiffs deadline to file a motion for class certification is hereby extended to and includes January 30, 2017. Defendants response is due on or before March 1, 2017. Plaintiffs reply is due on or before March 14, 2017. (shb) (Entered: 12/07/2016)
35 Joint STIPULATION to Dismiss defendants Charlie Beck, Mike Feuer filed by plaintiffs Youth Justice Coalition, Jose Reza, Peter Arellano.(Bibring, Peter) (Entered: 12/14/2016)
36 NOTICE TO FILER OF DEFICIENCIES in Electronically Filed Documents RE: Stipulation to Dismiss Party 35 . The following error(s) was found: Proposed Document was not submitted as separate attachment. In response to this notice the court may order (1) an amended or correct document to be filed (2) the document stricken or (3) take other action as the court deems appropriate. You need not take any action in response to this notice unless and until the court directs you to do so. (shb) (Entered: 12/15/2016)
37 ORDER by Judge Valerie Baker Fairbank, re Stipulation to Dismiss Party 35 . The complaint is dismissed without prejudice as to defendants Mike Feuer and Charlie Beck. Mike Feuer, City Attorney of the City of Los Angeles in his official capacity is TERMINATED as a party defendant. Charlie Beck, Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department in his official capacity is TERMINATEDas a party defendant. The only parties defendant remaining in the case are the City of Los Angeles and Does 1−10 in their official and individual capacities.,Charlie Beck (Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department, in his official capacity) and Mike Feuer (City Attorney of the City of Los Angeles, in his official capacity) terminated. (shb) (Entered: 12/15/2016)
38 ANSWER to Complaint (Attorney Civil Case Opening), 2 filed by Defendant City of Los Angeles.(Ursea, Agnes) (Entered: 12/16/2016)
39 NOTICE OF NON−OPPOSITION to NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction re for Plaintiff Jose Reza . Motion 28 filed by Defendant City of Los Angeles. (Ursea, Agnes) (Entered: 12/16/2016)
40 OPPOSITION re: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction re Plaintiff Peter Arellano . Motion 12 filed by Defendant City of Los Angeles. (Ursea, Agnes) (Entered: 12/16/2016)

Case: 2:16-cv-7932 As of: 03/20/2019 04:06 PM PDT 9 of 18

12/16/2016 12/16/2016 12/16/2016 12/16/2016 12/16/2016 12/16/2016 12/16/2016 12/16/2016 12/16/2016 12/16/2016 12/16/2016 12/16/2016 12/16/2016

41 DECLARATION of Officer Lamar In Opposition To NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction re Plaintiff Peter Arellano . Motion 12 filed by Defendant City of Los Angeles. (Ursea, Agnes) (Entered: 12/16/2016)
42 DECLARATION of Arturo Martinez In Opposition To (Arellano) and Non−Opposition to (Reza) NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction re for Plaintiff Jose Reza . Motion 28 , NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction re Plaintiff Peter Arellano . Motion 12 filed by Defendant City of Los Angeles. (Ursea, Agnes) (Entered: 12/16/2016)
43 EXHIBIT TO ARTURO MARTINEZ DECLARATION re NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction re for Plaintiff Jose Reza . Motion 28 , NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction re Plaintiff Peter Arellano . Motion 12 filed by Defendant City of Los Angeles. (Ursea, Agnes) (Entered: 12/16/2016)
44 DECLARATION of James McDougal In Opposition To (Arellano) and Non−Opposition to (Reza) NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction re for Plaintiff Jose Reza . Motion 28 , NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction re Plaintiff Peter Arellano . Motion 12 filed by Defendant City of Los Angeles. (Ursea, Agnes) (Entered: 12/16/2016)
45 VOL. I EXHIBITS TO JAMES MCDOUGAL DECLARATION re NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction re for Plaintiff Jose Reza . Motion 28 , NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction re Plaintiff Peter Arellano . Motion 12 filed by Defendant City of Los Angeles. (Ursea, Agnes) (Entered: 12/16/2016)
46 VOL. 2 EXHIBITS TO JAMES MCDOUGAL DECLARATION re NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction re Plaintiff Peter Arellano . Motion 12 filed by Defendant City of Los Angeles. (Ursea, Agnes) (Entered: 12/16/2016)
47 VOL. 3 EXHIBITS TO JAMES MCDOUGAL DECLARATION re NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction re Plaintiff Peter Arellano . Motion 12 In support of opposition filed by Defendant City of Los Angeles. (Ursea, Agnes) (Entered: 12/16/2016)
48 DECLARATION of A. Patricia Ursea In Opposition To NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction re Plaintiff Peter Arellano . Motion 12 filed by Defendant City of Los Angeles. (Ursea, Agnes) (Entered: 12/16/2016)
49 VOL. I EXHIBITS TO A. PATRICIA URSEA DECLARATION re NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction re Plaintiff Peter Arellano . Motion 12 In support of opposition filed by Defendant City of Los Angeles. (Ursea, Agnes) (Entered: 12/16/2016)
50 VOL. 2 EXHIBITS TO A. PATRICIA URSEA DECLARATION re NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction re Plaintiff Peter Arellano . Motion 12 In support of opposition filed by Defendant City of Los Angeles. (Ursea, Agnes) (Entered: 12/16/2016)
51 VOL. 3 EXHIBITS TO A. PATRICIA URSEA DECLARATION re NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction re Plaintiff Peter Arellano . Motion 12 In support of opposition filed by Defendant City of Los Angeles. (Ursea, Agnes) (Entered: 12/16/2016)
52 VOL. 4 EXHIBITS TO A. PATRICIA URSEA DECLARATION re NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction re Plaintiff Peter Arellano . Motion 12 In support of opposition filed by Defendant City of Los Angeles. (Ursea, Agnes) (Entered: 12/16/2016)
53 VOL. 5 EXHIBITS TO A. PATRICIA URSEA DECLARATION re NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction re Plaintiff Peter Arellano . Motion 12 In support of opposition filed by Defendant City of Los Angeles. (Ursea, Agnes) (Entered: 12/16/2016)

Case: 2:16-cv-7932 As of: 03/20/2019 04:06 PM PDT 10 of 18

12/16/2016 12/16/2016 12/19/2016
12/21/2016 12/22/2016
01/09/2017 01/09/2017 01/09/2017
01/10/2017

54 VOL. 6 EXHIBITS TO A. PATRICIA URSEA DECLARATION re NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction re Plaintiff Peter Arellano . Motion 12 In support of opposition filed by Defendant City of Los Angeles. (Ursea, Agnes) (Entered: 12/16/2016)
55 REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE re NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction re Plaintiff Peter Arellano . Motion 12 In support of opposition filed by Defendant City of Los Angeles. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Ursea, Agnes) (Entered: 12/16/2016)
56 NOTICE TO FILER OF DEFICIENCIES in Electronically Filed Documents RE: Motion Related Document 52 , Motion Related Document 49 , Motion Related Document, 45 , Motion Related Document 47 , Motion Related Document 50 , Motion Related Document 51 , Motion Related Document 46 , Motion Related Document 53 , Motion Related Document, 43 , Motion Related Document 54 . The following error(s) was found RE various exhibits to declarations of Martinez, McDougal and Ursea : Title page and its required LR 11−3,8 information is missing. In response to this notice the court may order (1) an amended or correct document to be filed (2) the document stricken or (3) take other action as the court deems appropriate. You need not take any action in response to this notice unless and until the court directs you to do so. (lc) (Entered: 12/19/2016)
57 STIPULATION to Exceed Page Limitation as to Plaintiffs' Reply briefs in support of the Motions for Preliminary Injunction filed by Plaintiffs Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Jhai, Maria) (Entered: 12/21/2016)
58 ORDER by Judge Valerie Baker Fairbank, re STIPULATION to Exceed Page Limitation as to Plaintiffs' Reply briefs in support of the Motions for Preliminary Injunction, 57 . Plaintiffs MAY FILE a memorandum of points and authorities not to exceed twenty−five (25) pages in length in support of their Reply in Support of Plaintiff Peter Arellanos application for preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs shall not file any reply brief in support of Jose Rezas application for preliminary injunction. This is because the only remaining named defendant, the City of Los Angeles, has filed a notice stating that it does not oppose Rezas application for preliminary injunction (Document #39 filed December 16, 2016). By separate order to be issued shortly, the Court will enter the unopposed preliminary injunction sought by plaintiff Reza. (shb) (Entered: 12/22/2016)
59 REPLY in support of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction re Plaintiff Peter Arellano . Motion 12 filed by Plaintiff Peter Arellano. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration James Diego Vigil)(Ochoa, Melanie) (Entered: 01/09/2017)
60 REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE re NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction re Plaintiff Peter Arellano . Motion 12 filed by Plaintiff Peter Arellano. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit 107)(Ochoa, Melanie) (Entered: 01/09/2017)
61 OBJECTIONS to Declaration (Motion related), 42 , Motion Related Document 52 , Declaration (Motion related) 41 , Motion Related Document 49 , Motion Related Document, 45 , Motion Related Document 47 , Declaration (Motion related) 48 , Motion Related Document 50 , Motion Related Document 51 , Motion Related Document 46 , Motion Related Document 53 , Motion Related Document, 43 , Declaration (Motion related), 44 , Motion Related Document 54 Plaintiffs' Objections to Evidence Submitted By Defendants in Opposition to Plaintiff Arellano's Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Plaintiffs Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition. (Ochoa, Melanie) (Entered: 01/09/2017)
62 NOTICE TO FILER OF DEFICIENCIES in Electronically Filed Documents RE: Reply (Motion related) 59 . The following error(s) was found: Case number is incorrect or missing.: Case number is missing the correct judge initials. The correct case number is: 2:16−cv−7932−VBF (RAOx). In response to this notice the court may order (1) an amended or correct document to be filed (2) the document stricken or (3) take other action as the court deems appropriate. You need not take any action in response to this notice unless and until the court directs you to do so. (shb) (Entered: 01/10/2017)

Case: 2:16-cv-7932 As of: 03/20/2019 04:06 PM PDT 11 of 18

01/12/2017 01/12/2017 01/12/2017
01/24/2017 01/27/2017 01/27/2017 01/27/2017 02/03/2017 02/17/2017 03/06/2017 03/16/2017 03/17/2017
04/11/2017

63 STIPULATION to Continue RE FED. R. CIV. PROC. 16(b) AND 26(f) CONFERENCES AND ORDER filed by Plaintiffs Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order RE FED. R. CIV. PROC. 16(b) AND 26(f) CONFERENCES AND ORDER)(Ochoa, Melanie) (Entered: 01/12/2017)
64 MINUTE ORDER IN CHAMBERS by Judge Valerie Baker Fairbank: No later than Friday, February 3, 2017, the defendant City SHALL RESPOND to the evidentiaryobjections that plaintiff Reza lodged on January 9, 2017. No later than Monday, February 20, 2017, plaintiffs MAY FILE a reply. (See order for details) (shb) (Entered: 01/12/2017)
65 ORDER ORDER Re: Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b) Conference and Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f) Conference and Related Orders by Judge Valerie Baker Fairbank: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the new deadlines are as follows: The deadline to conduct the Rule 26(f) Conference is continued to Tuesday, January 31, 2017. The deadline to submit the Rule 26(f) Conference Statement is continued to Friday, February 17, 2017. The Court shall hold a Rule 16(b) Scheduling Conference or issue its Rule 16(b) Scheduling Order on or after Friday, March 3, 2017. (See order for details). (shb) (Entered: 01/12/2017)
66 NOTICE of Decision: of Recent Authority filed by Plaintiff Peter Arellano. [Link to Docket No. 12] (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Ochoa, Melanie) (Entered: 01/24/2017)
67 Joint STIPULATION to Stay Case pending Settlement Discussions filed by Plaintiffs Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order TO STAY PROCEEDINGS)(Ochoa, Melanie) (Entered: 01/27/2017)
68 MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS) by Judge Valerie Baker Fairbank: 28 LAINTIFF, JOSE REZA'S PMOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION. Plaintiff Jose Rezas application for preliminary injunction [Doc #28] is GRANTED without opposition. The preliminary injunction proposed at Document #28−3 is hereby ISSUED. (shb) (Entered: 01/27/2017)
69 ORDER by Judge Valerie Baker Fairbank GRANTING Stipulation to Stay Case 67 . (See order for further details). (shb) (Entered: 01/27/2017)
70 Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs' Objections to Evidence re NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction re Plaintiff Peter Arellano . Motion 12 (Response to Dckt 61) filed by Defendant City of Los Angeles. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Chart Response to Objections)(Ursea, Agnes) (Entered: 02/03/2017)
71 REPLY support of motion NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction re Plaintiff Peter Arellano . Motion 12 filed by Plaintiffs Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Ochoa, Melanie) (Entered: 02/17/2017)
72 NOTICE of Change of address by Maria Jhai attorney for Plaintiffs Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition. Changing attorneys address to 350 S. Grand Avenue, 50th Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90071. Filed by Plaintiffs Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition. (Jhai, Maria) (Entered: 03/06/2017)
73 JOINT STATUS REPORT AND STIPULATION TO CONTINUE STAY OF PROCEEDINGS filed by Plaintiffs Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Ochoa, Melanie) (Entered: 03/16/2017)
74 ORDER by Judge Valerie Baker Fairbank. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the stay of proceedings will be continued as follows: All remaining proceedings, including but not limited to, Parties deadlines to submit their Rule 26(f) Conference Statement and class certification briefing, are stayed for an additional period of 45 days until May 1, 2017. The Parties SHALL FILE a status report by Monday, May 1, 2017 if they have not yet reached and informed the Court of a settlement before that date. (shb) (Entered: 03/17/2017)
75 Notice of Appearance or Withdrawal of Counsel: for attorney Melanie Rose Penny Ochoa counsel for Plaintiffs Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition. Catherine Wagner is no longer counsel of record for the aforementioned party in this case for the reason indicated in the G−123 Notice. Filed by Plaintiff Youth Justice Coalition, et al.. (Ochoa, Melanie) (Entered: 04/11/2017)

Case: 2:16-cv-7932 As of: 03/20/2019 04:06 PM PDT 12 of 18

04/21/2017 04/24/2017
05/12/2017 05/12/2017 05/15/2017 05/15/2017 05/22/2017 05/23/2017 05/23/2017
06/23/2017 07/03/2017

76 STIPULATION to Continue Stay of Proceedings from May 1, 2017 to May 12, 2017 filed by Plaintiff Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Ochoa, Melanie) (Entered: 04/21/2017)
77 ORDER by Judge Valerie Baker Fairbank, GRANTING Stipulation to Continue Stay of Proceedings 76 . IT IS ORDERED that the stay of proceedings will continue as follows: All remaining proceedings, including but not limited to the parties deadlines to submit their Rule 26(f) Conference Statement and class−certification briefing, are stayed for an additional period of 11 days until Friday, May 12, 2017. The Parties SHALL FILE a status report on Friday, May 12, 2017 if they have not yet reached and informed the Court of a settlement before that date. (shb) (Entered: 04/25/2017)
78 STATUS REPORT and Stipulation to Continue Stay of Proceedings filed by Plaintiffs Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Ochoa, Melanie) (Entered: 05/12/2017)
81 ORDER by Judge Valerie Baker Fairbank. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the proceedings are stayed as follows: All remaining proceedings, including but not limited to deadlines to submit Rule 26(f) Conference Statement and class certification briefing, are stayed for an additional ten days until May 22, 2017. The Parties SHALL FILE a status report by May 22, 2017 if they have not yet reached and informed the Court of a settlement before that date. (shb) (Entered: 05/16/2017)
79 Notice of Appearance or Withdrawal of Counsel: for attorney Melanie Rose Penny Ochoa counsel for Plaintiffs Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition. Amelia L.B. Sargent is no longer counsel of record for the aforementioned party in this case for the reason indicated in the G−123 Notice. Filed by Plaintiff Youth Justice Coalition, et al.. (Ochoa, Melanie) (Entered: 05/15/2017)
80 Notice of Appearance or Withdrawal of Counsel: for attorney Melanie Rose Penny Ochoa counsel for Plaintiffs Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition. Carmen Iguina is no longer counsel of record for the aforementioned party in this case for the reason indicated in the G−123 Notice. Filed by Plaintiff Youth Justice Coalition, et al.. (Ochoa, Melanie) (Entered: 05/15/2017)
82 STATUS REPORT Request For One−Day Extension to File Joint Status Report filed by Plaintiffs Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition. (Jhai, Maria) (Entered: 05/22/2017)
83 STATUS REPORT and Stipulation to Continue Stay of Proceedings filed by Plaintiffs Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Ochoa, Melanie) (Entered: 05/23/2017)
84 ORDER Continuing Stay Until Friday, June 23, 2017 and Directing Parties to File Status Report or Notice of Settlement on Friday, June 23, 2017 83 by Judge Valerie Baker Fairbank. The proceedings are hereby stayed as follows: All remaining proceedings, including but not limited to, Parties' deadlines to submit their Rule 26(f) Conference Statement and class certification briefing, are stayed for an additional period of 31 days until Friday, June 23, 2017. The Parties SHALL FILE a status report by Friday, June 23, 2017 in which they either will (a) request a further brief stay so that they may continue, with the mediator's assistance, to attempt to reach a final settlement of the pending claims, or (b) inform the Court that the Parties have been unable to reach a settlement, and propose a new briefing schedule for the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification. (lom) (Entered: 05/24/2017)
85 STATUS REPORT and Stipulation Rule 26(f) Conference Statement filed by Plaintiffs Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Kreilkamp, Jacob) (Entered: 06/23/2017)
86 ORDER LIFTING STAY by Judge Valerie Baker Fairbank: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the stay is LIFTED. The Parties shall submit letters, not to exceed three single−spaced pages each, setting forth their respective positions regarding appropriate next steps on Monday, July 17, 2017. The Parties shall submit their Rule 26(f) Conference Statement on or before Monday, July 31, 2017, and the Court shall issue its Rule 16(b) Scheduling Order on or after Friday, August 18, 2017. In a separate order forthcoming shortly, the Court will rule on plaintiff Peter Arellanos application for a preliminary injunction and on the plaintiffs objections to the evidence that the City submitted in opposition thereto. (shb) (Entered: 07/05/2017)

Case: 2:16-cv-7932 As of: 03/20/2019 04:06 PM PDT 13 of 18

07/06/2017
07/07/2017 07/17/2017 07/17/2017 07/19/2017
07/21/2017
07/31/2017 07/31/2017 07/31/2017 07/31/2017 08/03/2017 08/09/2017

87 Notice of Appearance or Withdrawal of Counsel: for attorney Aditi Fruitwala counsel for Plaintiffs Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition. Adding Aditi Fruitwala as counsel of record for Plaintiffs Youth Justice Coalition, et al. for the reason indicated in the G−123 Notice. Filed by Plaintiff Youth Justice Coalition, et al.. (Attorney Aditi Fruitwala added to party Peter Arellano(pty:pla), Attorney Aditi Fruitwala added to party Jose Reza(pty:pla), Attorney Aditi Fruitwala added to party Youth Justice Coalition(pty:pla))(Fruitwala, Aditi) (Entered: 07/06/2017)
88 Notice of Appearance or Withdrawal of Counsel: for attorney Melanie Rose Penny Ochoa counsel for Plaintiffs Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition. Adding Sean Garcia−Leys as counsel of record for Plaintiffs Youth Justice Coalition, et al. for the reason indicated in the G−123 Notice. Filed by Plaintiff Youth Justice Coalition, et al.. (Ochoa, Melanie) (Entered: 07/07/2017)
89 Letter Brief regarding appropriate next steps re: Lifting Stay,,, Set/Reset Deadlines,, 86 (Ochoa, Melanie) (Entered: 07/17/2017)
90 BRIEF filed by Defendant City of Los Angeles. Defendant's Letter Brief re Next Steps regarding Lifting Stay,,, Set/Reset Deadlines,, 86 . (Ursea, Agnes) (Entered: 07/17/2017)
91 NOTICE TO FILER OF DEFICIENCIES in Electronically Filed Documents RE: Miscellaneous Document 89 . The following error(s) was found: Incorrect event selected. The correct event is: Civil Events − select − Other Filings − select − Miscellaneous Filings − select − Brief (non motion non appeal). No letters to the Judge − Local Rule 83−2.5. In response to this notice the court may order (1) an amended or correct document to be filed (2) the document stricken or (3) take other action as the court deems appropriate. You need not take any action in response to this notice unless and until the court directs you to do so. (shb) (Entered: 07/19/2017)
92 ORDER RETURNING CASE FOR REASSIGNMENT by Judge Valerie Baker Fairbank. ORDER case returned to the Clerk for random reassignment pursuant to General Order 16−05. Case randomly reassigned from Judge Valerie Baker Fairbank to Judge Virginia A. Phillips for all further proceedings. The case number will now reflect the initials of the transferee Judge 2:16−cv−07932 VAP(RAOx). (rn) (Entered: 07/21/2017)
93 JOINT REPORT Rule 26(f) Discovery Plan ; estimated length of trial 15 days, filed by Plaintiffs Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition.. (Ochoa, Melanie) (Entered: 07/31/2017)
94 REQUEST for ADR Procedure No. 1 filed. Parties request to Appear Before Magistrate Judge for settlement proceedings. Filed by Plaintiffs Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition.(Ochoa, Melanie) (Entered: 07/31/2017)
95 REQUEST for Hearing Expedited Status Conference filed by Plaintiff Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition. (Ochoa, Melanie) (Entered: 07/31/2017)
96 AMENDED DOCUMENT filed by Plaintiffs Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition. Amendment to Request for ADR Procedure No. 1 − (ADR−1) 94 Corrected (Ochoa, Melanie) (Entered: 07/31/2017)
97 TEXT ONLY ENTRY ORDER by Judge Virginia A. Phillips: At the request 95 of plaintiffs, the Court hereby sets a Status Conference for 8/9/2017 at 9:00 AM. THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY. (vv) (Entered: 08/03/2017)
98 MINUTES OF STATUS CONFERENCE held before Judge Virginia A. Phillips: Matter called. Counsel for the respective parties are present. The above matter is before the Court on a status conference having been reassigned to this Court. Court and counsel confer regarding the posture of the case and the pending motion for preliminary injunction, and discovery for the anticipated motion for class certification. Having heard from counsel, and as directed on the record, the Court issues the following briefing schedule. 1. Motion for Class Certification shall be filed no earlier than October 2, 2017. 2. Opposition shall be filed by no later than October 30, 2017. 3. Reply shall be filed by no later than November 13, 2017. 4. Hearing set for November 27, 2017 at 2:00 p.m. 5. Moving papers and opposition shall not exceed 35 pages in length. 6. Reply shall not exceed 25 pages in length. Court Reporter: Maria Bustillos

Case: 2:16-cv-7932 As of: 03/20/2019 04:06 PM PDT 14 of 18

08/17/2017 08/17/2017 08/18/2017 08/21/2017 08/25/2017 08/25/2017 08/28/2017 08/30/2017 09/07/2017 10/02/2017
10/19/2017 10/23/2017 10/27/2017

(bm) (Entered: 08/10/2017)
99 Application of Non−Resident Attorney to Appear in a Specific Case Pro Hac Vice filed by Plaintiffs Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition for Adele M. El−Khouri (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Smolowe, Laura) (Entered: 08/17/2017)
PHV FEE PAID for Non−Resident Attorney Adele M. El−Khouri Application to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Receipt No. 0973−20370559 for $325 pro hac vice fee. (Smolowe, Laura) (Entered: 08/17/2017)
100 NOTICE of Deficiency in Electronically Filed Pro Hac Vice Application. The following error(s) was/were found: Incorrect event selected. Correct event is Appear Pro Hac Vice (G−64) (lt) (Entered: 08/18/2017)
101 RESPONSE BY THE COURT TO NOTICE TO FILER OF DEFICIENCIES IN ELECTRONICALLY FILED DOCUMENTS RE: Miscellaneous Document 99 by Judge Virginia A. Phillips. The document is accepted as e−filed. (ab) (Entered: 08/21/2017)
102 SCHEDULING NOTICE: (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER by Chief Judge Virginia A. Phillips Counsel of record are hereby notified, that the Pending Motion for Preliminary Injunction is set on 8/31/2017 AT 02:00 PM before Chief Judge Virginia A. Phillips. THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY. (bh) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 08/25/2017)
103 STIPULATION to Continue Hearing on Plaintiff Peter Arellano's Motion for Preliminary Injunction from August 31, 2017 to first available hearing date after August 31, 2017 Re: Text Only Scheduling Notice, 102 filed by Plaintiff Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Ochoa, Melanie) (Entered: 08/25/2017)
104 SCHEDULING NOTICE: The Court has received and reviewed the parties stipulation 103 resetting hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction 12 . Court ORDERS the hearing is ADVANCED from 8/31/17 to 8/30/2107 AT 2:00 PM before Chief Judge Virginia A. Phillips. THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY. (bh) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 08/28/2017)
105 MINUTES OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; [DOC NO. 12] Hearing held before Judge Virginia A. Phillips: Matter called. Counsel make their appearance. Court issues a tentative ruling, hears oral argument and takes the matter under submission. Court and counsel confer regarding the issue of bond. Court to issue ruling. Court Reporter: Phyllis Preston. (bm) (Entered: 09/05/2017)
106 ORDER GRANTING Plaintiff Peter Arellano's Motion for Preliminary Injunction 12 by Judge Virginia A. Phillips. The Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction to stop the City from enforcing the Echo Park Injunction against him. (ah) (Entered: 09/07/2017)
107 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Certify Class , NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Appointment of Counsel filed by plaintiffs Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition. Motion set for hearing on 11/27/2017 at 02:00 PM before Judge Virginia A. Phillips. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration, # 2 Declaration, # 3 Declaration, # 4 Declaration, # 5 Declaration, # 6 Declaration, # 7 Proposed Order) (Smolowe, Laura) (Entered: 10/02/2017)
108 STIPULATION for Protective Order filed by Plaintiffs Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Ochoa, Melanie) (Entered: 10/19/2017)
109 PROTECTIVE ORDER by Magistrate Judge Rozella A. Oliver re Stipulation for Protective Order 108 NOTE CHANGES HAVE BEEN MADE TO THIS DOCUMENT (sbu) (Entered: 10/23/2017)
110 SCHEDULING NOTICE by Chief Judge Virginia A. Phillips re: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Certify Class NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Appointment of Counsel 107 . On the Court's own motion, the hearing for the above motions are herby CONTINUED from 11/27/17 to 12/11/17 at 2:00 PM before

Case: 2:16-cv-7932 As of: 03/20/2019 04:06 PM PDT 15 of 18

10/30/2017 11/06/2017 12/07/2017 01/04/2018
01/29/2018 02/05/2018 02/05/2018
02/05/2018 02/05/2018 02/05/2018

Chief Judge Virginia A. Phillips. The briefing schedule shall remain as originally set. THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY. (bh) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 10/27/2017)
111 NOTICE OF NON−OPPOSITION to NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Certify Class NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Appointment of Counsel 107 filed by Defendant City of Los Angeles. (Ursea, Agnes) (Entered: 10/30/2017)
112 STIPULATION to Certify Class filed by Defendant City of Los Angeles. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Re Class Certification)(Ursea, Agnes) (Entered: 11/06/2017)
113 SCHEDULING NOTICE (IN CHAMBERS) by Chief Judge Virginia A. Phillips. Counsel of record are hereby notified, that the Motion to Certify Class and for Appointment of Class Counsel, is TAKEN OFF CALENDAR the hearing date is VACATED. No appearance by counsel will be necessary. Court to issue order. THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY. (bh) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 12/07/2017)
114 ORDER Granting Joint Stipulation re Class Certification and Amended Class Definition and Granting Unopposed Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Doc. Nos. 107, 112.) by Judge Virginia A. Phillips granting 107 MOTION to Certify Class Action; granting 107 MOTION for Appointment of Counsel: For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' Motion to the extent that it is modified by the Parties' Stipulation and GRANTS Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Appointment of Counsel. (see document for further details) (bm) (Entered: 01/05/2018)
115 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Expand Preliminary Injunctions Entered on Behalf Plaintiffs Peter Arellano and Jose Reza to the Entire Class. Motion filed by Plaintiff Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition. Motion set for hearing on 2/26/2018 at 02:00 PM before Judge Virginia A. Phillips. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration Melanie Ochoa, # 2 Proposed Order) (Ochoa, Melanie) (Entered: 01/29/2018)
116 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Expand Preliminary Injunctions Entered on Behalf Plaintiffs Peter Arellano and Jose Reza to the Entire Class. Motion 115 filed by Defendant City of Los Angeles. (Ursea, Agnes) (Entered: 02/05/2018)
117 STRICKEN PURSUANT TO COURT ORDER DATED 2/12/18, DOCUMENT 126 . DECLARATION of Arturo Martinez NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Expand Preliminary Injunctions Entered on Behalf Plaintiffs Peter Arellano and Jose Reza to the Entire Class. Motion 115 In support of opposition filed by Defendant City of Los Angeles. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit)(Ursea, Agnes) Modified on 2/12/2018 (bm). (Entered: 02/05/2018)
118 STRICKEN PURSUANT TO COURT ORDER DATED 2/12/18, DOCUMENT 126 . DECLARATION of Patricia Ursea NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Expand Preliminary Injunctions Entered on Behalf Plaintiffs Peter Arellano and Jose Reza to the Entire Class. Motion 115 In support of opposition filed by Defendant City of Los Angeles. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Ursea, Agnes) Modified on 2/12/2018 (bm). (Entered: 02/05/2018)
119 Evidentiary Objection In Opposition to re: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Expand Preliminary Injunctions Entered on Behalf Plaintiffs Peter Arellano and Jose Reza to the Entire Class. Motion 115 filed by Defendant City of Los Angeles. (Ursea, Agnes) (Entered: 02/05/2018)
120 STRICKEN PURSUANT TO COURT ORDER DATED 2/12/18, DOCUMENT 126 . DECLARATION of Patricia Ursea (Amended) In Opposition To NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Expand Preliminary Injunctions Entered on Behalf Plaintiffs Peter Arellano and Jose Reza to the Entire Class. Motion 115 filed by Defendant City of Los Angeles. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit)(Ursea, Agnes) Modified on 2/12/2018 (bm). (Entered: 02/05/2018)

Case: 2:16-cv-7932 As of: 03/20/2019 04:06 PM PDT 16 of 18

02/05/2018
02/06/2018 02/12/2018 02/12/2018 02/12/2018 02/12/2018 02/13/2018
02/13/2018 02/15/2018
02/26/2018

121 STRICKEN PURSUANT TO COURT ORDER DATED 2/12/18, DOCUMENT 126 . DECLARATION of Arturo Martinez (Amended) In Opposition To NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Expand Preliminary Injunctions Entered on Behalf Plaintiffs Peter Arellano and Jose Reza to the Entire Class. Motion 115 filed by Defendant City of Los Angeles. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit Amended, # 5 Exhibit Amended, # 6 Exhibit Amended)(Ursea, Agnes) Modified on 2/12/2018 (bm). (Entered: 02/05/2018)
122 NOTICE TO FILER OF DEFICIENCIES in Electronically Filed Documents RE: Declarations 117 , 118 , 120 , 121 . The following error(s) was/were found: Title page is missing. In response to this notice, the Court may: (1) order an amended or correct document to be filed; (2) order the document stricken; or (3) take other action as the Court deems appropriate. You need not take any action in response to this notice unless and until the Court directs you to do so. (bm) (Entered: 02/06/2018)
123 REPLY In Support Of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Expand Preliminary Injunctions Entered on Behalf Plaintiffs Peter Arellano and Jose Reza to the Entire Class. Motion 115 filed by Plaintiffs Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition. (Ochoa, Melanie) (Entered: 02/12/2018)
124 RESPONSE IN SUPPORT of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Expand Preliminary Injunctions Entered on Behalf Plaintiffs Peter Arellano and Jose Reza to the Entire Class. Motion 115 Response to City's Objections to Evidence filed by Plaintiffs Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition. (Ochoa, Melanie) (Entered: 02/12/2018)
125 NOTICE Withdrawal of Counsel (Maria Jhai) filed by Plaintiffs Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition. (Mandhania, Ankur) (Entered: 02/12/2018)
126 RESPONSE BY THE COURT TO NOTICE TO FILER OF DEFICIENCIES IN ELECTRONICALLY FILED DOCUMENTS 122 RE: Declarations 117 , 118 , 120 , 121 , by Clerk of Court. Documents are STRICKEN. DECLARATIONS ONLY SHALL BE RE−FILED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LOCAL RULES. (bm) (Entered: 02/12/2018)
127 DECLARATION of Arturo Martinez (Corrected) In Opposition To NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Expand Preliminary Injunctions Entered on Behalf Plaintiffs Peter Arellano and Jose Reza to the Entire Class. Motion 115 CORRECTED filed by Defendant City of Los Angeles. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex 1 to Corrected Martinez Decl, # 2 Exhibit Ex 2 to Corrected Martinez Declaration, # 3 Exhibit Ex 3 to Corrected Martinez Declaration, # 4 Exhibit Ex 4 to Corrected Martinez Declaration, # 5 Exhibit Ex 5 to Corrected Martinez Declaration, # 6 Exhibit Ex 6 to Corrected Martinez Declaration)(Ursea, Agnes) (Entered: 02/13/2018)
128 DECLARATION of Patricia Ursea (Corrected) In Opposition To NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Expand Preliminary Injunctions Entered on Behalf Plaintiffs Peter Arellano and Jose Reza to the Entire Class. Motion 115 CORRECTED filed by Defendant City of Los Angeles. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex 1 to Corrected Ursea Declaration, # 2 Exhibit Ex 2 to Corrected Ursea Declaration)(Ursea, Agnes) (Entered: 02/13/2018)
129 NOTICE TO FILER OF DEFICIENCIES in Electronically Filed Documents RE: Notice (Other) 125 . The following error(s) was/were found: Incorrect event selected. Correct event to be used is: Notice of Appearance or Withdrawal of Counsel (G−123). In response to this notice, the Court may: (1) order an amended or correct document to be filed; (2) order the document stricken; or (3) take other action as the Court deems appropriate. You need not take any action in response to this notice unless and until the Court directs you to do so. (lom) (Entered: 02/15/2018)
130 MINUTES OF PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO EXPAND THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS ENTERED ON BEHALF OF PETER ARELLANO AND JOSE REZA TO THE ENTIRE CLASS; [DOC NO. 115]held before Judge Virginia A. Phillips: Matter called. Counsel for the respective parties are present. Court issues a tentative ruling and hears oral argument of counsel. Having heard from counsel, Court takes the motion under submission. IT IS SO ORDERED. Court Reporter: Miranda Algorri. (yl) (Entered: 02/28/2018)

Case: 2:16-cv-7932 As of: 03/20/2019 04:06 PM PDT 17 of 18

03/01/2018 03/15/2018
04/11/2018
04/13/2018 04/16/2018 04/17/2018 04/18/2018 06/11/2018 06/11/2018 02/25/2019

131 TRANSCRIPT ORDER as to Defendant City of Los Angeles for Court Reporter. Court will contact Irene Perez at irene.m.perez@lacity.org with further instructions regarding this order. Transcript preparation will not begin until payment has been satisfied with the court reporter. (Ursea, Agnes) (Entered: 03/01/2018)
132 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO EXPAND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 115 by Judge Virginia A. Phillips. On January 29, 2018, Plaintiffs Youth Justice Coalition, Peter Arellano (Arellano), and Jose Reza (Reza) for themselves and on behalf of a class of similarly−situated individuals (collectively Plaintiffs) filed a Motion to Expand the Preliminary Injunctions Entered on Behalf of Plaintiffs Arellano and Reza to the Entire Class (Motion). (Doc. No. 115 ). (SEE DOCUMENT FOR FURTHER DETAILS). For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs Motion to the extent that it seeks to extend the Arellano Preliminary Injunction to class members served with a Los Angeles Gang Injunction before January 19, 2018. IT IS SO ORDERED. (ab) (Entered: 03/15/2018)
133 NOTICE TO PARTIES: Effective April 17, 2018, Magistrate Judge Rozella A. Oliver will be located at the Edward R. Roybal Federal Building and U.S. Courthouse, COURTROOM 590 on the 5th floor, located at 255 East Temple Street, Los Angeles, California 90012. All Court appearances shall be made in Courtroom 590 of the Roybal Federal Building, and all mandatory chambers copies shall be hand delivered to the judge's mail box located outside the Clerk's Office on the 12th floor of the Roybal Federal Building. The location for filing civil and criminal documents in paper format exempted from electronic filing and for viewing case files and other records services is located at the Roybal Federal Building, 255 East Temple Street, Room 180 (Terrace Level), Los Angeles, California 90012. THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY. (rrey) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 04/11/2018)
134 NOTICE OF APPEAL to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals filed by Defendant City of Los Angeles. Appeal of Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction,, 132 . (Appeal Fee − $505 Fee Paid, Receipt No. 0973−21583837.) (Attachments: # 1 Attachment: Order (Dkt. 132), # 2 Attachment: Representation Statement)(Ursea, Agnes) (Entered: 04/13/2018)
135 NOTIFICATION from Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals of case number assigned and briefing schedule. Appeal Docket No. 18−55485 assigned to Notice of Appeal to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, 134 as to Defendant City of Los Angeles. (bm) (Entered: 04/17/2018)
136 TRANSCRIPT ORDER re: Court of Appeals case number 18−55485, as to Defendant City of Los Angeles for Court Reporter. Court will contact Irene Perez at irene.m.perez@lacity.org with further instructions regarding this order. Transcript preparation will not begin until payment has been satisfied with the court reporter. (Ursea, Agnes) (Entered: 04/17/2018)
137 DESIGNATION of Record on Appeal by Defendant City of Los Angeles re 134 (Ursea, Agnes) (Entered: 04/18/2018)
138 TRANSCRIPT for proceedings held on 8/30/17. Court Reporter: Phyllis Preston, email: stenojag@aol.com. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Notice of Intent to Redact due within 7 days of this date. Redaction Request due 7/2/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 7/12/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 9/10/2018. (Preston, Phyllis) (Entered: 06/11/2018)
139 NOTICE OF FILING TRANSCRIPT filed for proceedings 8/30/17 re Transcript 138 THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY. (Preston, Phyllis) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 06/11/2018)
140 Notice of Appearance or Withdrawal of Counsel: for attorney Rekha Elaine Arulanantham counsel for Plaintiffs Peter Arellano, Jose Reza, Youth Justice Coalition. Adding Rekha Elaine Arulanantham as counsel of record for Youth Justice Coalition, Peter Arellano, Jose Reza for the reason indicated in the G−123 Notice. Filed by Plaintiff Youth Justice Coalition, Peter Arellano, and Jose Reza. (Attorney Rekha Elaine Arulanantham added to party Peter Arellano(pty:pla), Attorney Rekha

Case: 2:16-cv-7932 As of: 03/20/2019 04:06 PM PDT 18 of 18

02/26/2019

Elaine Arulanantham added to party Jose Reza(pty:pla), Attorney Rekha Elaine Arulanantham added to party Youth Justice Coalition(pty:pla))(Arulanantham, Rekha) (Entered: 02/25/2019)
141 NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC FILING re Notice of Appearance or Withdrawal of Counsel (G−123) 140 e−mailed to ankur.mandhania@mto.com bounced due to 550 5.1.10 RESOLVER.ADR.RecipientNotFound; Recipient not found by SMTP address lookup. The primary e−mail address associated with the attorney record has been deleted. Pursuant to Local Rules it is the attorneys obligation to maintain all personal contact information including e−mail address in the CM/ECF system. THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY. (nhac) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 02/26/2019)