Case 1:12-cv-00463-DDD-JDK Document 29 Filed 06/11/12 Page 1 of 29 PageID #: 145

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ALEXANDRIA DIVISION

LOUISIANA COLLEGE,
Plaintiff
v.
KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, in her official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services; HILDA SOLIS, in her official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Labor; TIMOTHY GEITHNER, in his official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of the Treasury; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; and UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) Case No. 1:12-cv-463 ) JUDGE: Dee D. Drell ) MAGISTRATE: James D. Kirk ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 1. Comes now the Plaintiff, LOUISIANA COLLEGE (“LC”) and sues the DEFENDANTS, and states as follows: I. NATURE OF THE ACTION 2. In this action, Plaintiff seeks judicial review of Defendants’ violations of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 42 U.S.C. § 2000(bb) (“RFRA”), the First and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701, et seq (“APA”).

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3. LC is a Christian school that is subject to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (Pub. L. 111-148 (March 23, 2010), and Pub. L. 111-152 (March 30, 2010); hereinafter PPACA). Final regulations implementing the PPACA require that LC provide health insurance for its employees that covers abortion-inducing drugs and counseling regarding such drugs (“Mandate” 1). This violates LC’s sincerely held religious beliefs regarding abortion.
4. With full knowledge that many religious organizations and individuals hold the same or similar beliefs, the government Defendants issued regulations that, by forcing them to pay for and otherwise facilitate the use of morally objectionable drugs, devices, and related education and counseling, trample on the freedom of LC and millions of other American organizations and individuals to abide by their religious convictions, to comply with moral imperatives they believe are decreed by God Himself.
1 The Mandate consists of a conglomerate of authorities, including: “Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,” 77 Fed. Reg. 8725–30 (Feb. 15, 2012); the prior interim final rule found at 76 Fed. Reg. 46621–26 (Aug. 3, 2011), which the Feb. 15 rule adopted “without change”; the guidelines by Defendant HHS’s Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/, mandating that health plans include no-cost-sharing coverage of “All Food and Drug Administration approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for all women with reproductive capacity” as part of required women’s “preventive care”; regulations issued by Defendants in 2010 directing HRSA to develop those guidelines, 75 Fed. Reg. 41726 (July 19, 2010); the statutory authority found in 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4), requiring unspecified preventive health services generally, to the extent Defendants have used it to mandate coverage to which Plaintiffs and other employers have religious objections; penalties existing throughout the United States Code for noncompliance with these requirements; and other provisions of PPACA or its implementing regulations that affect exemptions or other aspects of the Mandate.
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5. The regulation—the HHS Preventive Services Mandate—illegally and unconstitutionally coerces LC to violate its religious beliefs under threat of heavy fines and penalties. The Mandate also forces LC to fund government-dictated speech that is directly at odds with their religious beliefs.
6. Defendants’ refusal to accommodate conscience in this matter is highly selective. Upon information and belief, the government has provided categorical exemptions for plans that include millions of employees, and has granted thousands of exemptions from the PPACA for various groups, such as large corporations, but has refused to exempt most religious groups from this unprecedented Mandate.
7. Defendants’ actions violate LC’s right freely to exercise its religion, protected by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
8. Defendants’ actions also violate LC’s right to the freedom of speech, as secured by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and due process rights secured by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
9. Additionally, Defendants violated the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553, by imposing the Mandate without prior notice or public comment, and for other reasons.
10. LC seeks an order declaring this unconstitutional law to be in violation of RFRA, the First and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and the APA. In addition, the Plaintiff seeks an order enjoining the Defendants from enforcing the Mandate.
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II. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES AND JURISDICTIONAL ALLEGATIONS 11. Plaintiff is a Christian university located in Pineville, Louisiana. 12. Established in 1906, the mission of LC is to provide liberal arts,
professional, and graduate programs characterized by dedication to academic excellence for the glory of God.
13. Defendant Kathleen Sebelius is the Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”). In this capacity, she has responsibility for the operation and management of HHS and enforcement of the Mandate. Defendant Sebelius is sued in her official capacity only.
14. Defendant Hilda Solis is the Secretary of the United States Department of Labor. In this capacity, she has responsibility for the operation and management of the Department of Labor and enforcement of the Mandate. Defendant Solis is sued in her official capacity only.
15. Defendant Timothy Geithner is the Secretary of the Department of the Treasury. In this capacity, he has responsibility for the operation and management of the Department and enforcement of the Mandate. Defendant Geithner is sued in his official capacity only.
16. Defendant HHS is an executive agency of the United States government and is responsible for the promulgation, administration, and enforcement of the Mandate.
17. Defendant Department of Labor is an executive agency of the United States government and is responsible for the promulgation, administration, and enforcement of the Mandate.
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18. Defendant Department of Treasury is an executive agency of the United

States government and is responsible for the promulgation, administration, and

enforcement of the Mandate.

19. Jurisdiction and venue in this Court are predicated on Title 28 U.S.C. §

1331, Title 28 U.S.C. § 1343, Title 28 U.S.C. § 2201, and 5 U.S.C. § 702.

III.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

LC’s Religious Beliefs and Provision of Educational Services

20. Faith is central to the mission and identity of LC. LC describes itself as a

“private Baptist co-educational college of liberal arts” and commits, in its mission, to

provide educational programs with a “dedication to academic excellence for the glory of

God.”

21. Consistent with its mission, LC works to manifest its Christian faith in all

aspects of its administration.

22. LC adheres to, as its doctrinal statement, the Baptist Faith and Message

2000 of the Southern Baptist Convention.

23. LC’s religious beliefs include traditional Christian teachings on the

sanctity of life. The College’s doctrinal statement states, “We should speak on behalf of

the unborn and contend for the sanctity of all human life from conception to natural

death.”

24. LC is affiliated with the Southern Baptist Convention which has passed

Resolutions from as early as 1984 condemning the use of the abortion drug RU-486 as a

violation of its sincerely held religious beliefs and urging SBC members to oppose the

usage and proliferation of RU-486.

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25. LC therefore believes and teaches that abortion, or methods that harm an embryo from the moment of conception/fertilization, ends a human life and is a sin.
26. LC has more than 1,450 graduate and undergraduate students. 27. LC has approximately 180 full-time and 80 part-time employees. 28. As part of fulfilling its commitment and duty in Christian education, LC also promotes the well-being and health of its employees, spiritual and physical. This includes provision of generous health services and health insurance for its employees. 29. As part of its religious commitment, LC has ensured that its insurance policies do not cover drugs, devices, services or procedures inconsistent with its faith. 30. In particular, its insurance plans do not cover abortion. 31. As part of that same commitment, LC has ensured that its insurance policies do not cover drugs, devices, services or procedures that it believes may cause the death of an early human embryo, such as Plan B or ella. 32. LC cannot provide health care insurance covering abortion, abortifacient or embryo-endangering methods, or related education and counseling without violating its deeply held religious beliefs and its Christian witness. 33. While excluding abortifacients like ella and Plan B, LC’s employee health plan does cover contraceptives that prevent ovulation. 34. The plan year for LC’s insurance begins on January 1 of each year. Applicable Provisions of the PPACA 35. Under the PPACA, employers with over 50 full-time employees are required to provide a certain level of health insurance to their employees.
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36. Nearly all such plans must include “preventive services,” which must be offered with no cost-sharing by the employee.
37. On February 10, 2012, the Department of Health and Human Services finalized a rule (previously referred to in this Complaint as the Mandate) that imposes a definition of preventive services to include all FDA-approved “contraceptive” drugs, surgical sterilization, and education and counseling for such services.
38. This final rule was adopted without giving due weight to the hundreds of thousands of public comments submitted to HHS in opposition to the Mandate.
39. In the category of “FDA approved contraceptives” included in this Mandate are several drugs or devices that may cause the demise of an already-conceived but not-yet-implanted human embryo.
40. Likewise in that category are “emergency contraception” or “Plan B” (the “morning after” pill), and variations of oral contraceptives (“birth control pills” or “the Pill”) taken regularly through a cycle.
41. The FDA approved in this same category a drug called ella (the “week after” pill), which studies show can function to kill embryos even after they have implanted in the uterus, by a mechanism similar to the abortion drug RU-486.
42. The manufacturers of some such drugs, methods and devices in the category of “FDA-approved contraceptive methods” indicate that they can function to cause the demise of an early embryo.
43. The Mandate also requires group health care plans to pay for the provision of counseling, education, and other information concerning contraception (including
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contraceptive devices and drugs such as Plan B and ella that cause early abortions or harm to embryos) for all women beneficiaries who are capable of bearing children.
44. The Mandate applies to the first health insurance plan-year beginning after August 1, 2012.
45. The Mandate makes little or no allowance for the religious freedom of entities and individuals, including Christian ministries and educational institutions like LC, who object to paying for or providing insurance coverage for such items.
46. Any employer providing a health insurance plan that omits any abortifacients, contraception, sterilization, or education and counseling for the same, is subject (because of the Mandate) to heavy fines approximating $100 per employee per day. Such employers are also vulnerable to lawsuits by the Secretary of Labor and by plan participants.
47. An entity cannot freely avoid the Mandate by simply refusing to provide health insurance to its employees, because the PPACA imposes monetary penalties on entities that would so refuse.
48. The exact magnitude of these penalties seems to vary according to the complicated provisions of the PPACA, but it is estimated the fine is approximately $2,000 per employee per year.
49. Switching to self-insurance does not avoid the Mandate. 50. The Mandate applies not only to sponsors of group health plans like LC, but also to issuers of insurance. Accordingly, the pressure to include morally problematic drugs, devices, and counseling in group health plans comes not only from Defendants, but also through the insurers who must comply with the rule.
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51. The Mandate includes a narrow religious exemption, but it is potentially available only to those organizations that meet all of the following requirements:
(1) “The inculcation of religious values is the purpose of the organization”; (2) “The organization primarily employs persons who share the religious tenets of the organization”; (3) “The organization serves primarily persons who share the religious tenets of the organization”; and (4) “The organization is a church, an integrated auxiliary of a church, a convention or association of churches, or is an exclusively religious activity of a religious order, under Internal Revenue Code 6033(a)(1) and (a)(3)(A).” 52. The Mandate imposes no constraint on HRSA’s discretion to grant exemptions to some, all, or none of the organizations meeting the Mandate’s definition of “religious employers.” 53. LC is not “religious” enough under this definition in several respects, most notably that its purpose is other than the “inculcation of religious values” and it does not primarily serve persons who share the religious tenets of the organization, and because it is not itself a church, integrated auxiliary of a particular church, convention or association of a church, or the exclusively religious activities of a religious order. 54. There are no clear guidelines restricting the discretion of Defendants when applying the Mandate and its many exceptions. 55. In order to determine those whether employees, or persons an entity serves, share an institution’s “religious tenets,” someone would need to inquire into the detailed religious beliefs of all individuals that an entity employs, and that it serves.
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56. It is unclear how Defendants define or will interpret religious “purpose.” 57. It is unclear how Defendants define or will interpret vague terms, such as “primarily,” “share” and “religious tenets.” 58. It is unclear how Defendants will ascertain the “religious tenets” of an entity, those it employs, and those it serves. 59. It is unclear how much overlap Defendants will require for religious tenets to be “share[d].” 60. The limited and ill-defined religious employer exemption provided in the Mandate conflicts with the Constitution. 61. Moreover, the process by which Defendants determine whether an organization qualifies for the exemption will require Defendants to engage in an intrusive inquiry into whether, in the view of HHS, the organization’s “purpose” is the “inculcation of religious values” and whether it “primarily” employs and serves people who “share” its “religious tenets.” The standards are impermissibly vague and subjective. 62. By basing the exemption on shared religious tenets, the Mandate compels LC to restructure its religious affiliation, admissions, employment, and service programs in order to fall within the scope of the Mandate’s religious exemption. 63. The Mandate fails to protect the statutory and constitutional conscience rights of religious organizations like LC even though those rights were repeatedly raised in the public comments. 64. The Mandate requires that LC provide or facilitate coverage for abortifacient methods, and education and counseling related to abortifacients, against its conscience in a manner that is contrary to law.
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65. The Mandate constitutes government-imposed coercion on LC to change or suffer penalties for exercising its religious beliefs.
66. The Mandate exposes LC to substantial fines for refusal to change or violate its religious beliefs.
67. The Mandate will impose a burden on the College’s employee and student recruitment efforts by creating uncertainty as to whether or on what terms it will be able to offer or facilitate health insurance beyond the Mandate’s effect or will suffer penalties therefrom.
68. The Mandate will place LC at a competitive disadvantage in its efforts to recruit and retain employees and students.
69. The Mandate coerces LC to provide coverage for and otherwise facilitate the provision of Plan B, ella, other abortifacient drugs, and related counseling in violation of its religious beliefs.
70. LC has a sincere religious objection to providing or facilitating coverage for Plan B because it believes the drug would prevent a human embryo, which it believes is a human being from the moment of conception/fertilization (including before it implants in the uterus), from implanting in the wall of the uterus, causing the death of the embryo.
71. LC has a sincere religious objection to providing or facilitating coverage for ella because it believes the drug would either prevent a human embryo from implanting in the uterine wall, or could cause the death of a recently implanted embryo.
72. The Mandate does not apply equally to all members of religious groups.
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73. The Act is not generally applicable because it provides for numerous exemptions from its rules.
74. For instance, the Mandate does not apply to members of a “recognized religious sect or division” that conscientiously objects to acceptance of public or private insurance funds. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 5000A(d)(2)(a)(i) and (ii).
75. In addition, as described above, the Mandate exempts certain churches narrowly considered to be religious employers, it exempts grandfathered plans, and it does not apply through the employer mandate to employers having less than 50 full-time employees.
76. Furthermore, the PPACA creates a system of individualized exemptions because under the PPACA’s authorization the federal government has granted discretionary compliance waivers to a variety of businesses for purely secular reasons..
77. President Obama held a press conference on February 10, 2012 claiming to offer a compromise under which some religious non-profit organizations not meeting the above “religious employer” definition would still have to comply with the Mandate, but by means of the employer’s insurer offering the employer’s employees the same coverage for “free.”
78. This compromise is not helpful to LC because, among other reasons, it is entirely fictitious. It does not exist in the rule the Administration made final on February 10, and it need never be formally proposed or adopted.
79. The PPACA and the preventive services requirement do not authorize Defendants to compel insurers, third-party administrators, or any other third-party source
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to offer free and allegedly independent coverage of items not covered by the employer’s plan; it only encompasses requirements of the employer’s plan itself.
80. Even if one of the proposed “accommodations” did exist and had coherent boundaries, LC would deem it to violate its religious beliefs by forcing it directly to facilitate objectionable coverage by providing and paying for a plan that is itself necessary for the employee to obtain the coverage in question, and which coverage is not separate from the employer’s plan, nor is it apparently “free” since a variety of costs contained in the massive scope of the Mandate would necessarily be passed onto the employer through premiums and/or administrative charges.
81. The Mandate does not apply to employers with preexisting plans that are “grandfathered.”
82. LC does not qualify for the Mandate’s grandfathering of preexisting plans because, since March 23, 2010, it has made, and plans to make in the near future, substantial changes to its health plan, including increasing the amount of coinsurance, deductibles, or copays paid by employees, eliminating coverage for certain conditions, and the overall limit on dollar value of benefits.
83. Moreover, LC’s insurance carrier has elected not to have its plans grandfathered in order to allow more flexibility in plan design, cost sharing, and premium equality.
84. Consequently, LC is subject to the Mandate’s requirement of coverage of the above-described items starting in its January 2013 plan.
85. The Mandate makes it unclear whether LC will be able to offer health insurance as a benefit to its employees, and if so, the terms upon which it will be offered.
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86. LC must take the Mandate into account now as it is planning compensation and benefits packages for the next several years. It will have to negotiate contracts for new and existing employees and these contracts will extend into the time frame when the Mandate begins to apply to its health insurance plans.
87. On February 10, 2012 a document was issued by the Center for Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight (CCIIO), Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), of HHS, entitled “Guidance on the Temporary Enforcement Safe Harbor for Certain Employers, Group Health Plans and Group Health Insurance Issuers with Respect to the Requirement to Cover Contraceptive Services Without Cost Sharing Under Section 2713 of the Public Health Service Act, Section 715(a)(1) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, and Section 9815(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code.”
88. Referring to a January 20, 2012, HHS news release, the Guidance states that “the Secretary indicated that a temporary enforcement safe harbor would be provided to non-exempted, non-grandfathered group health plans established and maintained by non-profit religious organizations with religious objections to contraceptive coverage.”
89. The Guidance states that the temporary enforcement safe harbor “is available to non-exempted, non-grandfathered group health plans established or maintained by non-profit organizations whose plans have not covered contraceptive services for religious reasons at any point from the issuance date of this bulletin (i.e., February 10, 2012) onward.”
90. The Guidance states that the “Department of Labor and the Department of Treasury . . . will not take any enforcement action against an employer or group health
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plan that complies with the conditions of the temporary enforcement safe harbor described herein.”
91. The Guidance states that the temporary enforcement safe harbor is available only to those employers, group health plans, and group health insurance issuers who meet “all of the following criteria:
1. The organization is organized and operates as a non-profit entity. 2. From February 10, 2012 onward, contraceptive coverage has not been
provided at any point by the group health plan established or maintained by the organization, consistent with any applicable State law, because of the religious beliefs of the organization. 3. As detailed below, the group health plan established or maintained by the organization (or another entity on behalf of the plan, such as a health insurance issuer or third-party administrator) must provide to participants the attached notice, as described below, which states that contraceptive coverage will not be provided under the plan for the first plan year beginning on or after August 1, 2012. 4. The organization self-certifies that it satisfies criteria 1-3 above, and documents its self-certification in accordance with the procedures detailed herein.” 92. The Guidance states that “[a] certification must be made by the organization” and that “[t]he certification must be signed by an organizational representative who is authorized to make the certification on behalf of the organization.”
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93. The Guidance declares that “[t]he certification must be completed and made available for examination by the first day of the plan year to which the temporary enforcement safe harbor applies.”
94. The Guidance sets forth the language of the required notice that employers, group health plans, and group health insurance issuers must provide to plan participants to take advantage of the temporary enforcement safe harbor. That language states as follows:
NOTICE TO PLAN PARTICIPANTS The organization that sponsors your group health plan has certified that it qualifies for a temporary enforcement safe harbor with respect to the Federal requirement to cover contraceptive services without cost sharing. During this one-year period, coverage under your group health plan will not include coverage of contraceptive services.
95. The Guidance also includes the certification form that a group health plan must truthfully complete to take advantage of the temporary enforcement safe harbor. The form includes a space for the “[n]ame of the organization sponsoring the plan,” the “[n]ame of the individual who is authorized to make, and makes, this certification on behalf of the organization,” and the “[m]ailing and email addresses and phone numbers for the individual listed above.”
96. In the certification itself, the representative of the organization declares as follows: “I certify that the organization is organized and operated as a non-profit entity; and that, at any point from February 10, 2012 onward, contraceptive coverage has not been provided by the plan, consistent with any applicable State law, because of the religious beliefs of the organization.” The organization’s representative is also required to state, above his or her signature, as follows: “I declare that I have made this
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certification, and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, it is true and correct. I also declare that this certification is complete.” (Emphasis in original.)
97. The Certification states that “[f]ailure to provide the requisite notice to plan participants renders a group health plan ineligible for the temporary enforcement safe harbor.”
98. Defendants have not subsequently modified the language of the February 10, 2012 Guidance, the included Notice, or the included Certification.
99. LC has included non-abortifacient contraception in its group health insurance plan after February 10, 2012 and to the present day.
100. Accordingly, LC is not able to truthfully certify “that, at any point from February 10, 2012 onward, contraceptive coverage has not been provided by the plan.”
101. No organizational representative of LC could, in good conscience and with integrity, sign his or her name to the following required language of the Certification set forth in the February 10, 2012 Guidance: “I declare that I have made this certification, and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, it is true and correct. I also declare that this certification is complete.”
102. If LC were to notify its group health insurance plan participants that “coverage under your group health plan will not include coverage of contraceptive services,” it would be making an untrue statement. LC is unable and unwilling to communicate a falsehood to its group health insurance plan beneficiaries in order to invoke the temporary enforcement safe harbor.
103. Because LC is unwilling and unable to disseminate a factually untrue “Notice to Plan Participants,” it is ineligible for the temporary enforcement safe harbor
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according to the Certification form issued by Defendant HHS on February 10, 2012, which states in pertinent part that “[f]ailure to provide the requisite notice to plan participants renders a group health plan ineligible for the temporary enforcement safe harbor.”
104. Even if LC was not categorically disqualified for the “extra year” under the “Guidance,” it would still not alleviate the harm done to the College by the Mandate because, among other reasons: it can be revoked at any time; at the end of the extension the Mandate still applies in violation of the College’s rights as described herein; and even if the extension applied to the College, its effect would leave the College in violation of the Mandate despite Defendants’ promise not to enforce it, thereby subjecting the College to a vast array of legal, contractual and litigation liabilities.
105. On March 21, 2012, Defendants published in the Federal Register an “Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking” (ANPRM). (77 Fed. Reg. 16501 (Mar. 21, 2012)). It “announces the intention of the Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury to propose amendments to regulations regarding certain preventive health services under provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.”
106. The ANPRM acknowledges that many religious organizations do not qualify for the unusually narrow religious exemption found in the Mandate. It further acknowledges that many of these non-exempt religious organizations object, on religious grounds, to paying for, arranging, or otherwise facilitating the use of morally problematic drugs, devices, procedures, and counseling by the beneficiaries of their insurance plans. The ANPRM requests comments on the potential means of “accommodating” these
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religious organizations, “while ensuring contraceptive coverage [including abortifacients like ella and Plan B] for plan participants and beneficiaries covered under their plans (or, in the case of student health insurance plans, student enrollees and their dependents) without cost sharing.”
107. Defendants intend to complete the process initiated by the ANPRM by August 1, 2013, when the Temporary Enforcement Safe Harbor expires. Because LC is not eligible for the Temporary Enforcement Safe Harbor, the anticipated new rules or guidance will not affect the application of the Mandate to LC when its new employee health plan year begins on January 1, 2013, seven months earlier.
108. The “accommodation” generated by the process initiated by the ANPRM may not even apply to LC at all. The ANPRM acknowledges that Defendants will need to determine the scope of the accommodation, i.e., the criteria for deciding which religious organizations may take advantage of any accommodation that is generated by the process. The ANPRM explicitly contemplates that entities like LC – ones that object to facilitating the use of some but not all “FDA-approved contraceptives” – might end up completely outside the scope of any “accommodation”:
The Departments seek comment on whether the definition of religious organization should include religious organizations that provide coverage for some, but not all, FDA-approved contraceptives consistent with their religious beliefs. That is, under the forthcoming proposed regulations, the Departments could allow religious organizations to continue to provide coverage for some forms of contraceptives without cost sharing, and allow them to qualify for the accommodation with respect to other forms of contraceptives consistent with their religious beliefs. The ANPRM thus does not provide sufficient assurances that LC will even be able to take advantage of whatever “accommodation” the process produces.
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109. Even if Defendants define “religious organization” broadly enough to include LC, the “accommodation” produced by the process initiated by the ANPRM almost certainly will not ameliorate LC’s conscience concerns. The ANPRM makes clear that Defendants will not rescind the Mandate, expand the scope of its unusually narrow religious exemption, or remove abortifacients and related counseling from the list of drugs, devices, and services that must be provided without cost.
110. Moreover, none of the potential accommodations identified in the ANPRM – and none that could satisfy Defendants’ objective of requiring that cost-free access to abortifacients be given to LC’s plan beneficiaries – will relieve the burden on LC’s religious liberty. LC will still be required to provide an employee health insurance plan that will serve as a conduit for the provision of abortifacients and related counseling to their own employees and their dependents.
111. The Mandate, regardless of the Administration’s proposed compromises or promises of delayed enforcement, has a profound and adverse effect on LC and how it negotiates contracts and compensates its employees.
112. The Mandate makes it virtually impossible for LC to attract quality employees because of uncertainty about health insurance benefits.
113. Any alleged interest Defendants have in providing free FDA-approved abortifacients without cost-sharing could be advanced through other, more narrowly tailored mechanisms that do not burden LC’s fundamental rights.
114. LC has expended and will continue to expend a great deal of time and money ascertaining the requirements of the Mandate and how it applies to the College’s health insurance benefits.
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115. LC wishes to continue offering and facilitating health insurance coverage consistent with their religious beliefs without suffering penalties or burdens resulting from the Mandate.
116. Without injunctive and declaratory relief as requested herein, LC is suffering and will continue to suffer irreparable harm.
117. LC has no adequate remedy at law. IV. LEGAL ALLEGATIONS
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF Violation of Religious Freedom Restoration Act
42 U.S.C. § 2000(bb) 118. Plaintiff realleges all matters set forth in the preceding paragraphs numbered 1-117 and incorporates them herein. 119. LC’s sincerely held religious beliefs prohibit it from providing or facilitating coverage for abortion, abortifacients, embryo-harming mechanisms, and related education and counseling, or providing a plan that causes access to the same through its insurance company or other third party. 120. LC’s compliance with these beliefs is a religious exercise. 121. The Mandate imposes a substantial burden on LC’s religious exercise and coerces it to change or violate its religious beliefs. 122. The Mandate chills LC’s religious exercise. 123. The Mandate exposes LC to substantial fines for its religious exercise. 124. The Mandate exposes LC to substantial competitive disadvantages because of uncertainties about its health insurance benefits caused by the Mandate.
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125. The Mandate furthers no compelling governmental interest and is not narrowly tailored to any compelling governmental interest.
126. The Mandate is not the least restrictive means of furthering Defendants’ stated interests.
127. The Mandate violates RFRA. SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Violation of Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
128. Plaintiff realleges all matters set forth in the preceding paragraphs numbered 1-117 and incorporates them herein.
129. LC’s sincerely held religious beliefs prohibit it from providing coverage for abortion, abortifacients, embryo-harming mechanisms, and related education and counseling, or providing a plan that causes access to the same through its insurance company.
130. The Mandate is not neutral and is not generally applicable. 131. Defendants have created categorical exemptions and individualized exemptions to the Mandate. 132. The Mandate furthers no compelling governmental interest. 133. The Mandate is not the least restrictive means of furthering Defendants’ stated interests. 134. The Mandate coerces LC to change or violate its religious beliefs. 135. The Mandate chills LC’s religious exercise. 136. The Mandate exposes LC to substantial fines for its religious exercise.
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137. The Mandate exposes LC to substantial competitive disadvantages, in that it makes it unclear what health benefits it can offer to its employees.
138. The Mandate imposes a substantial burden on LC’s religious exercise. 139. The Mandate is not narrowly tailored to any compelling governmental interest. 140. Defendants designed the Mandate and the religious exemption thereto in a way that make it impossible for LC and other similar religious organizations to comply with their religious beliefs. 141. Defendants promulgated both the Mandate and the religious exemption in order to suppress the religious exercise of LC and others. 142. By design, Defendants framed the Mandate to apply to some religious organizations but not on others, resulting in discrimination among religions. 143. The Mandate as applied to LC violates LC’s rights secured to it by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF Violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution 144. Plaintiff realleges all matters set forth in the preceding paragraphs numbered 1-117 and incorporates them herein. 145. The First Amendment’s Establishment Clause p rohibits the establishment of any religion and/or excessive government entanglement with religion. 146. To determine whether a religious or ganization like LC i s required to comply with the Mand ate, continues to com ply with the Mandate, is eligible for an exemption, or continues to be eligible for an exem ption, Defendants must examine the
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organization’s religious beliefs and doctrinal teachings, and that of its employees and persons it serves.
147. Obtaining sufficient information for the Defendants to analyze the con tent the LC’s religious beliefs requires ongoing, comprehensive government surveillance that impermissibly entangles Defendants with religion.
148. The Mandate distinguishes am ong religions and a mong denominations, favoring some over others.
149. The Mandate adopts a particular th eological view of what is accep table moral complicity in provision of abortif acient coverage and i mposes it upon all religionists who must either conform their consciences or suffer penalty.
150. The Mandate as applied to LC violates LC’s rights secured to it by the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment
to the United States Constitution 151. Plaintiff realleges all matters set forth in the preceding paragraphs numbered 1-117 and incorporates them herein. 152. Defendants’ requirement of provision of insurance coverage for education and counseling regarding contraception causing abortion forces LC to speak in a manner contrary to its religious beliefs. 153. Defendants have no narrowly tailored compelling interest to justify this compelled speech. 154. The Mandate as applied to LC violates LC’s rights secured to it by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.
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FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 155. Plaintiff realleges all matters set forth in the preceding paragraphs numbered 1-117 and incorporates them herein. 156. Because the Mandate sweepingly infringes upon religious exercise and speech which are constitutionally protected, it is unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the due process rights of LC and other parties not before the Court. 157. Persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at the meaning, scope, and application of the Mandate and its exemptions. 158. This Mandate lends itself to discriminatory enforcement by government officials in an arbitrary and capricious manner, and lawsuits by private persons, based on the government’s vague standard. 159. The Mandate vests Defendants with unbridled discretion in deciding whether to allow exemptions to some, all, or no organizations that possess religious beliefs and/or meet the government’s definition of “religious employers.” 160. This Mandate, on its face and as applied to LC is an unconstitutional violation of the Plaintiff's due process rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Violation of the Administrative Procedure Act 161. Plaintiff realleges all matters set forth in the preceding paragraphs numbered 1-117 and incorporates them herein.
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162. Without proper notice and opportunity for public comment, Defendants were unable to take into account the full implications of the regulations by completing a meaningful consideration of the relevant matter presented.
163. Defendants did not consider or respond to the voluminous comments they received in opposition to the interim final rule.
164. Therefore, Defendants have taken agency action not in observance with procedures required by law, and LC is entitled to relief pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D).
165. In promulgating the Mandate, Defendants failed to consider the constitutional and statutory implications of the mandate on LC and similar organizations.
166. Defendants’ explanation (and lack thereof) for its decision not to exempt LC and similar religious organizations from the Mandate runs counter to the evidence submitted by religious organizations during the comment period.
167. Thus, Defendants’ issuance of the Mandate was arbitrary and capricious within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) because the Mandate fails to consider the full extent of its implications and it does not take into consideration the evidence against it.
168. As set forth above, the Mandate violates RFRA and the First and Fifth Amendments.
169. The Mandate is also contrary to the provisions of the PPACA which states that “nothing in this title”—i.e., title I of the Act, which includes the provision dealing with “preventive services”—“shall be construed to require a qualified health plan to provide coverage of [abortion] services . . . as part of its essential health benefits for any plan year.” Section 1303(b)(1)(A).
26

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170. The Mandate is also contrary to the provisions of the Weldon Amendment of the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act of 2009, Public Law 110 329, Div. A, Sec. 101, 122 Stat. 3574, 3575 (Sept. 30, 2008), which provides that “[n]one of the funds made available in this Act [making appropriations for Defendants Department of Labor and Health and Human Services] may be made available to a Federal agency or program . . . if such agency, program, or government subjects any institutional or individual health care entity to discrimination on the basis that the health care entity does not provide, pay for, provide coverage of, or refer for abortions.”
171. The Mandate also violates the provisions of the Church Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(d), which provides that “No individual shall be required to perform or assist in the performance of any part of a health service program or research activity funded in whole or in part under a program administered by the Secretary of Health and Human Services if his performance or assistance in the performance of such part of such program or activity would be contrary to his religious beliefs or moral convictions.”
172. The Mandate is contrary to existing law and is in violation of the APA under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). V. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests the following relief: A. That this Court enter a judgment declaring the Mandate and its application to LC and others not before the Court to be an unconstitutional violation of their rights as protected by RFRA, the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment
27

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to the United States Constitution, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the Administrative Procedures Act;
B. That this Court enter a permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants from continuing to apply the Mandate in a way that substantially burdens the religious belief of any person in violation of RFRA and the Constitution, and prohibiting Defendants from continuing to illegally discriminate against LC and others not before the Court by requiring them to provide health insurance coverage for abortifacients and abortion/abortificacient counseling to their employees.
C. That this Court award Plaintiff court costs and reasonable attorney's fees, as provided by the Equal Access to Justice Act and RFRA (as provided in 42 U.S.C. § 1988).
D. That this Court grant such other and further relief as to which the Plaintiff may be entitled.

Respectfully submitted this 11th day of June, 2012.

David A. Cortman Georgia Bar No. 188810 dcortman@telladf.org
ALLIANCE DEFENSE FUND 1000 Hurricane Shoals Road NE Suite D-1100 Lawrenceville, GA 30043 (770) 339-0774 (770) 339-6744 (facsimile)

s/Kevin H. Theriot Kevin H. Theriot Kansas Bar No. 21565 ktheriot@telladf.org Erik W. Stanley Kansas Bar No. 24326 estanley@telladf.org ALLIANCE DEFENSE FUND 15192 Rosewood Leawood, KS 66224 (913) 685-8000 (913) 685-8001 (facsimile)

28

Case 1:12-cv-00463-DDD-JDK Document 29 Filed 06/11/12 Page 29 of 29 PageID #: 173
J. Michael Johnson Louisiana Bar No. 26059 mjohnson@law.lacollege.edu LOUISIANA COLLEGE PRESSLER SCHOOL OF LAW P O Box 52954 Shreveport, LA 71135 (318) 603-1435 (318) 603-1437 (facsimile) Attorneys for Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on June 11, 2012, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following: Bradley P. Humphreys and Michelle R. Bennett, Counsel for Defendants.
s/ Kevin H. Theriot
29

 
 JUL 2 6 2012
TONY R. MOORE, CLERK WESTERN DtlTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ALEXANDRIA. LOUISIANA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ALEXANDRIA DIVISION

LOUISIANA COLLEGE

DOCKET NO. 12-cv-0463

VERSUS

JUDGE DEE D. DRELL

KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, ET AL

MAGISTRATE JUDGE JAMES D. KIRK

J U D G MEN T For the reasons contained in the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge previously filed herein, noting the absence of objections thereto, and concurring with the Magistrate Judge's findings under the applicable law; IT IS ORDERED that defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. 18) is DENIED as MOOT. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants may file a motion to dismiss pertaining to the amended complaint if warranted. THUS DONE AND SIGNED at Alexandria, Louisiana on this day of July, 2012.

DEE D. DRELL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 
 Case 1:12-cv-00463-DDD-JDK Document 68 Filed 01/04/13 Page 1 of 1 PageID #: 531

RECEIVED
IN ALEXANDRIA, LA.
JAN - 4 2013 ~~NY lit MOORE. C~
DE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ALEXANDRIA DIVISION

LOUISIANA COLLEGE

CIVIL ACTION NO. 12-463

VERSUS

DISTRICT JUDGE DEE D. DRELL

KATHLEEN SEBELlUS, et al

MAGISTRATE JUDGE JAMES D. KIRK

ORDER At the status conference with Magistrate Judge Kirk on January 4, 2013, the parties advised that the government's promised regulations should be final by August, 2013. At that time it is anticipated that the issues presented in this case will be more clearly evident. For that reason and others, on oral motion of plaintiff made at the status conference IT IS ORDERED that this case is STAYED until August 15, 2013 at which time the Government is ORDERED to provide this court with a status report as to the regulations and other relevant then pending litigation. Alexandria, Louisiana, January 4, 2013.

c_-~~

DE .

LL, CHIEF JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 
 Case 1:12-cv-00463-DDD-JDK Document 69 Filed 03/26/13 Page 1 of 1 PageID #: 532

ir ~:!!.~:. RECEIVED
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA ALEXANDRIA, LOUISIANA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ALEXANDRIA DIVISION

LOUISIANA COLLEGE

CIVIL ACTION NO. 12-0463

-vs-

JUDGEDRELL

KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, ET AL

MAGISTRATE JUDGE KIRK

=====================================================================

ORDER Considering the stay of these proceedings and the likelihood that the pending motion to

dismiss (Doc. No. 35) will likely require substantial revision after completion of the Government's actions preceding August 2013 (if it remains viable at all) and further considering

that the motion to stay discovery (Doc. No. 37) is now moot in light of the stay entered in these

proceedings generally (Doc. No. 68), these two pending motions are DISMISSED, without prejudice. Amended filings, if appropriate, may be made if necessary, following August 15,

2013 or such other date as may be set by the Court on request of the parties.

U Signed on this

\f7--
day of March, 2013, at Alexandria, Louisiana.

c...:.---~~D~E~E~D~.RE~L;:::Z~.~:::H-::::I~EF:eJ~U:::D~G:'::E--------'
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 
 Case 1:12-cv-00463-DDD-JDK Document 77 Filed 09/19/13 Page 1 of 41 PageID #: 554

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ALEXANDRIA DIVISION

LOUISIANA COLLEGE,

)

)

Plaintiff

)

)

v.

) Case No. 1:12-cv-463

) JUDGE: Dee D. Drell

KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, in her official capacity ) MAGISTRATE: James D. Kirk

as Secretary of the United States Department of )

Health and Human Services; THOMAS E.

)

PEREZ, in his official capacity as Secretary of the )

United States Department of Labor; JACOB J. )

LEW, in his official capacity as Secretary of the )

United States Department of the Treasury;

)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

)

HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; UNITED )

STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; and

)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE

)

TREASURY,

)

)

Defendants.

)

)

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT Plaintiff Louisiana College (“LC” or “the College) by its attorneys, state as follows:
NATURE OF THE ACTION 1. This lawsuit challenges regulations issued by Defendants under the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act that compel employee health insurance plans to provide free coverage of contraceptive services, including so-called “emergency contraceptives” that cause early abortions. 2. Louisiana College is a Christ-centered institution of higher learning. It believes that God has condemned the intentional destruction of innocent human life. The College holds,

Case 1:12-cv-00463-DDD-JDK Document 77 Filed 09/19/13 Page 2 of 41 PageID #: 555
as a matter of religious conviction, that it would be sinful and immoral for it intentionally to participate in, pay for, facilitate, enable, or otherwise support access to abortion, which destroys human life. It holds that one of the prohibitions of the Ten Commandments (“thou shalt not murder”) precludes it from facilitating, assisting in, or enabling the use of drugs that can and do destroy very young human beings in the womb.
3. LC does not qualify for the extraordinarily narrow religious exemption from the regulations. That exemption protects only “churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and conventions or associations or churches” and “the exclusively religious activities of any religious order.”
4. For purely secular reasons, the government has elected not to impose the challenged regulations upon thousands of other organizations. Employers with “grandfathered” plans, small employers, and favored others are exempt from these rules.
5. Defendants have offered entities like LC a so-called “accommodation” of its religious beliefs and practices. However, the alleged accommodation fails. It still conscripts LC into the government’s scheme, forcing LC to obtain an insurer or third-party claims administrator and submit a form that specifically causes that insurer or third-party administrator to arrange payment for the objectionable drugs, so that such coverage will apply to LC’s own employees as a direct consequence of their employment with the College and of their participation in the health insurance benefits the College provides them.
6. Under the supposed accommodation, Defendants continue to treat entities like the College as a second-class religious organization, not entitled to the same religious freedom rights as substantially similar entities that qualify for the exemption. Defendants’ rationale for entirely exempting churches and integrated auxiliaries from the regulations – their employees are likely
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to share their religious convictions – applies equally to the College. Yet, Defendants refuse to exempt it, offering only a flimsy, superficial, and utterly semantic “accommodation” that falls woefully short of addressing and resolving the substance of its concerns.
7. If the College follows its religious convictions and declines to participate in the government’s scheme, it will face, among other injuries, enormous fines that will cripple its operations.
8. By unconscionably placing the College in this untenable position, Defendants have violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act; the Free Exercise, Establishment and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution; the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment; and the Administrative Procedure Act.
9. Plaintiff therefore respectfully requests that this Court vindicate its rights through declaratory and permanent injunction relief, among other remedies.
IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES AND JURISDICTION 10. Plaintiff is a Christian university located in Pineville, Louisiana. It is a Louisiana not-for-profit corporation. 11. Defendants are appointed officials of the United States government and United States Executive Branch agencies responsible for issuing and enforcing the Mandate. 12. Defendant Kathleen Sebelius is the Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”). In this capacity, she has responsibility for the operation and management of HHS. Sebelius is sued in her official capacity only. 13. Defendant HHS is an executive agency of the United States government and is responsible for the promulgation, administration, and enforcement of the Mandate.
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14. Defendant Thomas E. Perez is the Secretary of the United States Department of Labor. In this capacity, he has responsibility for the operation and management of the Department of Labor. Perez is sued in her official capacity only.
15. Defendant Department of Labor is an executive agency of the United States government and is responsible for the promulgation, administration, and enforcement of the Mandate.
16. Defendant Jacob L. Lew is the Secretary of the Department of the Treasury. In this capacity, he has responsibility for the operation and management of the Department and enforcement of the Mandate. Lew is sued in his official capacity only.
17. Defendant Department of Treasury is an executive agency of the United States government and is responsible for the promulgation, administration, and enforcement of the Mandate.
18. This action arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1361, jurisdiction to render declaratory and injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1, 5 U.S.C. § 702, and Fed. R. Civ. P. 65, and to award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
19. Venue lies in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). A substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in this district, and Louisiana College is located in this district.
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FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS I. Louisiana College’s Religious Beliefs and Provision of Educational Services in
General 20. Established in 1906, the mission of LC is to provide liberal arts, professional, and graduate programs characterized by dedication to academic excellence for the glory of God. 21. Faith is central to the mission and identity of LC. LC states its mission, as follows: "The mission of Louisiana College is to provide liberal arts, professional, and graduate programs characterized by devotion to the preeminence of the Lord Jesus, allegiance to the authority of the Holy Scriptures, dedication to academic excellence for the glory of God, and commitment to change the world for Christ by the power of the Holy Spirit." 22. Consistent with its mission, LC works to manifest its Christian faith in all aspects of its administration. 23. LC adheres to, as its doctrinal statement, the Baptist Faith and Message 2000 of the Southern Baptist Convention. 24. LC has more than 1,350 graduate and undergraduate students. 25. LC has approximately 180 full-time and 80 part-time employees.
II. The Religious Beliefs of Louisiana College Regarding Abortion 26. LC’s religious beliefs include traditional Christian teachings on the sanctity of
life. The College’s doctrinal statement states, “We should speak on behalf of the unborn and contend for the sanctity of all human life from conception to natural death.”
27. LC is affiliated with the Southern Baptist Convention which has passed Resolutions from as early as 1984 condemning the use of the abortion drug RU-486 as a
5

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violation of its sincerely held religious beliefs and urging SBC members to oppose the usage and proliferation of RU-486.
28. LC has a sincere religious objection to providing or facilitating coverage for Plan B because it believes the drug would prevent a human embryo, which it believes is a human being from the moment of conception/fertilization (including before it implants in the uterus), from implanting in the wall of the uterus, causing the death of the embryo.
29. LC has a sincere religious objection to providing or facilitating coverage for ella because it believes the drug would either prevent a human embryo from implanting in the uterine wall, or could cause the death of a recently implanted embryo.
30. LC has a sincere religious objection to providing or facilitating coverage for counseling regarding the use of abortifacients like ella and Plan B.
31. LC believes and teaches that abortion, or methods that harm an embryo from the moment of conception/fertilization, ends a human life and is a sin.
III. Louisiana College’s Group Health Insurance Plans 32. To fulfill its religious commitments and duties in the Christ-centered educational
context, the College promotes the spiritual and physical well-being and health of its employees. This includes the provision of generous health insurance to employees and their dependents.
33. Consistent with its religious commitments, LC has ensured that its insurance policies do not cover drugs, devices, services or procedures contrary to its faith.
34. In particular, its insurance plans do not cover abortion. 35. As part of that same commitment, LC has ensured that its insurance policies do not cover drugs, devices, services or procedures that it believes may cause the death of an early human embryo, such as Plan B or ella.
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36. LC cannot provide health care insurance covering abortion, abortifacient or embryo-endangering methods, or related education and counseling without violating its deeply held religious beliefs and its Christian witness.
37. While excluding abortifacients like ella and Plan B, LC’s employee health plan does cover contraceptives that prevent ovulation.
38. The plan year for LC’s insurance begins on January 1 of each year. 123 employees participate in the health plan LC provides. 129 of their dependents also participate.
39. LC’s employee health plan does not possess “grandfathered” status. After March 23, 2010, it has made substantial changes to its health plan, including increasing the amount of coinsurance, deductibles, or co-pays paid by employees, eliminating coverage for certain conditions, and the overall limit on dollar value of benefits.
40. Moreover, LC’s insurance carrier has elected not to have its plans grandfathered in order to allow more flexibility in plan design, cost sharing, and premium equality. IV. The ACA and Defendants’ Mandate Thereunder
41. In March 2010, Congress passed, and President Obama signed, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 (March 23, 2010), and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 11-152 (March 30, 2010), together known as the “Affordable Care Act” (ACA).
42. The ACA regulates the national health insurance market by directly regulating “group health plans” and “health insurance issuers.”
43. One ACA provision requires that any “group health plan” or “health insurance issuer offering group or individual health insurance coverage” provide coverage for certain preventive care services. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a).
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44. These services include screenings, medications, and counseling given an “A” or “B” rating by the United States Preventive Services Task Force; immunizations recommended by the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; and “preventive care and screenings” specific to infants, children, adolescents, and women that are subsequently “provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health Resources and Services Administration,” an HHS sub-agency. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(1)-(4).
45. These services must be covered without “any cost sharing.” 42 U.S.C. § 300gg13(a).
The Interim Final Rule 46. On July 19, 2010, HHS published an interim final rule regarding the ACA’s requirement that certain preventive services be covered without cost sharing. 75 Fed. Reg. 41726, 41728 (2010). 47. HHS issued the Interim Final Rule without a prior notice of rulemaking or opportunity for public comment. Defendants determined for themselves that “it would be impracticable and contrary to the public interest to delay putting the provisions . . . in place until a full public notice and comment process was completed.” 75 Fed. Reg. at 41730. 48. Although Defendants suggested in the Interim Final Rule that they would solicit public comments after implementation, they stressed that “provisions of the Affordable Care Act protect significant rights” and therefore it was expedient that “participants, beneficiaries, insureds, plan sponsors, and issuers have certainty about their rights and responsibilities.” Id. 49. Defendants stated they would later “provide the public with an opportunity for comment, but without delaying the effective date of the regulations,” demonstrating their intent
8

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to impose the regulations regardless of the legal flaws or general opposition that might be manifest in public comments. Id.
50. In addition to reiterating the ACA’s preventive services coverage requirements, the Interim Final Rule provided further guidance concerning the Act’s restriction on cost sharing.
51. The Interim Final Rule makes clear that “cost sharing” refers to “out-of-pocket” expenses for plan participants and beneficiaries. 75 Fed. Reg. at 41730.
52. The Interim Final Rule acknowledges that, without cost sharing, expenses “previously paid out-of-pocket” would “now be covered by group health plans and issuers” and that those expenses would, in turn, result in “higher average premiums for all enrollees.” Id.; see also id. at 41737 (“Such a transfer of costs could be expected to lead to an increase in premiums.”)
53. In other words, the prohibition on cost-sharing was simply a way “to distribute the cost of preventive services more equitably across the broad insured population.” 75 Fed. Reg. at 41730.
54. After the Interim Final Rule was issued, numerous commenters warned against the potential conscience implications of requiring religious individuals and organizations to include certain kinds of services—specifically contraception, sterilization, and abortion services—in their health care plans.
55. HHS directed a private health policy organization, the Institute of Medicine (IOM), to make recommendations regarding which drugs, procedures, and services all health plans should cover as preventive care for women.
56. In developing its guidelines, IOM invited a select number of groups to make presentations on the preventive care that should be included in health plans by force of law.
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These were the Guttmacher Institute, the American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), John Santelli, the National Women’s Law Center, National Women’s Health Network, Planned Parenthood Federation of America, and Sara Rosenbaum.
57. No religious groups or other groups that opposed government-mandated coverage of contraception, sterilization, abortion, and related education and counseling were among the invited presenters.
58. On July 19, 2011, the IOM published its preventive care guidelines for women, including a recommendation that preventive services include “[a]ll Food and Drug Administration approved contraceptive methods [and] sterilization procedures” and related “patient education and counseling for women with reproductive capacity.” Institute of Medicine, Clinical Preventive Services for Women: Closing the Gaps, at 102-10 and Recommendation 5.5 (July 19, 2011).
59. FDA-approved contraceptive methods include birth-control pills; prescription contraceptive devices such as IUDs; Plan B (also known as the “morning-after pill”) and its chemical cognates; ulipristal (also known as “ella” or the “week-after pill”); and other drugs, devices, and procedures.
60. Some of these drugs and devices—including “emergency contraceptives” such as Plan B and ella and certain IUDs—are known abortifacients, in that they can cause the death of an embryo by preventing it from implanting in the wall of the uterus.
61. Indeed, the FDA’s own Birth Control Guide states that Plan B and its cognates, ella, and IUDs can work by “preventing attachment (implantation) to the womb (uterus).” FDA, Office of Women’s Health, Birth Control Guide at 16-18, available as Addendum to Brief of
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Appellants at 50, Hobby Lobby Stores Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 12-6294, ECF Doc. No. 010189999834 (10th Cir. filed Feb. 11, 2013).
62. The manufacturers of some of the drugs, methods, and devices in the category of “FDA-approved contraceptive methods” indicate that they can function to cause the demise of an early embryo.
63. The requirement for related “education and counseling” accompanying abortifacients, sterilization and contraception necessarily covers education and counseling given in favor of such items, even though it might also include other education and counseling. Moreover, it is inherent in a medical provider’s decision to prescribe one of these items that she is taking the position that use of the item is in the patient’s best interests, and therefore her education and counseling related to the item will be in favor of its proper usage.
64. On August 1, 2011, a mere 13 days after IOM published its recommendations, HRSA issued guidelines adopting them in full. See http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines.
65. Insurance plans starting after August 1, 2012 were subject to the Mandate. 66. Any non-exempt employer providing a health insurance plan that omits any abortifacients, contraception, sterilization, or education and counseling for the same, is subject (because of the Mandate) to heavy fines approximating $100 per employee per day. Such employers are also vulnerable to lawsuits by the Secretary of Labor and by plan participants. 67. A large employer entity cannot freely avoid the Mandate by simply refusing to provide health insurance to its employees, because the ACA imposes monetary penalties on entities that would so refuse. 68. The annual penalty for failing to provide health insurance coverage is $2000 times the number of the employer’s employees, minus 30.
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The Religious Employer Exemption 69. On the very same day HRSA rubber-stamped the IOM’s recommendations, HHS promulgated an additional interim final rule regarding the preventive services mandate. 76 Fed. Reg. 46621 (published Aug. 3, 2011). 70. This Second Interim Final Rule granted HRSA “discretion to exempt certain religious employers from the Guidelines where contraceptive services are concerned.” 76 Fed. Reg. 46621, 46623 (emphasis added). The phrase “religious employer” was restrictively defined as an entity that (1) has as its purpose the “inculcation of religious values”; (2) “primarily employs persons who share the religious tenets of the organization”; (3) “serves primarily persons who share the religious tenets of the organization”; and (4) “is a nonprofit organization as described in section 6033(a)(1) and section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.” 76 Fed. Reg. at 46626 (emphasis added). 71. The statutory citations in the fourth prong of this test refer to “churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and conventions or associations of churches” and the “exclusively religious activities of any religious order.” 26 U.S.C. § 6033(a)(3). 72. The “religious employer” exemption was thus extremely narrow, limited to churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and religious orders, but only if (1) their purpose is to inculcate faith and (2) they hire and serve primarily people of their own faith tradition. 73. HRSA exercised its discretion to grant an exemption for religious employers via a footnote on its website listing the Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines. The footnote states that “guidelines concerning contraceptive methods and counseling described above do not apply to women who are participants or beneficiaries in group health plans sponsored by religious employers.” See http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines.
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74. Although religious organizations like the College share the same religious beliefs and concerns as objecting churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and objecting religious orders, HHS deliberately ignored the regulation’s impact on their religious liberty, stating that the exemption sought only “to provide for a religious accommodation that respects the unique relationship between a house of worship and its employees in ministerial positions.” 76 Fed. Reg. 46621, 46623.
75. Therefore, the vast majority of organizations with conscientious objections to providing contraceptive or abortifacient services were excluded from the “religious employer” exemption.
76. Like the original Interim Final Rule, the Second Interim Final Rule was made effective immediately, without prior notice or an opportunity for public comment.
77. Defendants acknowledged that “while a general notice of proposed rulemaking and an opportunity for public comment is generally required before promulgation of regulations,” they had “good cause” to conclude that public comment was “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest” in this instance. 76 Fed. Reg. at 46624.
78. Upon information and belief, after the Second Interim Final Rule was put into effect, over 100,000 comments were submitted opposing the narrow scope of the “religious employer” exemption and protesting the contraception mandate’s gross infringement on the rights of religious individuals and organizations.
79. HHS did not take into account the concerns of religious organizations in the comments submitted before the Second Interim Rule was issued. HHS was unresponsive to numerous and well-grounded assertions that the Mandate violated statutory and constitutional protections of rights of conscience.
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The Temporary Enforcement Safe Harbor 80. The public outcry for a broader religious employer exemption continued for many months. On January 20, 2012, HHS issued a press release acknowledging “the important concerns some have raised about religious liberty” and stating that religious objectors would be “provided an additional year . . . to comply with the new law.” See Jan. 20, 2012 Statement by U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Secretary Kathleen Sebelius, available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2012pres/01/20120120a.html. 81. On February 10, 2012, HHS formally announced a “temporary enforcement safe harbor” for non-exempt nonprofit religious organizations that objected to covering contraceptive and abortifacient services. 82. HHS declared that it would not take any enforcement action against an eligible organization during the safe harbor period, which would extend until the first plan year beginning after August 1, 2013. 83. HHS also indicated it would develop and propose changes to the regulations in an effort to accommodate the religious liberty objections of non-exempt, nonprofit religious organizations following the expiration of the safe harbor. 84. Despite the safe harbor and HHS’s accompanying promises, on February 10, 2012, HHS announced a final rule “finalizing, without change,” the contraception and abortifacient mandate and narrow religious employer exemption. 77 Fed. Reg. 8725-01 (published Feb. 15, 2012). The Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 85. On March 21, 2012, HHS issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM), presenting “questions and ideas” to “help shape” a discussion of how to “maintain
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the provision of contraceptive coverage without cost sharing,” while accommodating the religious beliefs of non-exempt religious organizations. 77 Fed. Reg. 16501, 16503 (2012).
86. The ANPRM conceded that forcing religious organizations to “contract, arrange, or pay for” the objectionable contraceptive and abortifacient servicers would infringe their “religious liberty interests.” Id. (emphasis added).
87. The ANPRM proposed, in vague terms, that the “health insurance issuers” for objecting religious employers could be required to “assume the responsibility for the provision of contraceptive coverage without cost sharing.” Id.
88. For the first time, and contrary to the earlier definition of “cost sharing,” Defendants suggested in the ANPRM that insurers and third party administrators could be prohibited from passing along their costs to the objecting religious organizations via increased premiums. See id.
89. “[A]pproximately 200,000 comments” were submitted in response to the ANPRM, 78 Fed. Reg. 8456, 8459, largely restating previous comments that the government’s proposals would not resolve conscientious objections, because the objecting religious organizations, by providing a health care plan in the first instance, would still be coerced to arrange for and facilitate access to morally objectionable services.
The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 90. On February 1, 2013, HHS issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) purportedly addressing the comments submitted in response to the ANPRM. 78 Fed. Reg. 8456 (published Feb. 6, 2013). 91. The NPRM proposed two changes to the then-existing regulations. 78 Fed. Reg. 8456, 8458-59.
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92. First, it proposed revising the religious employer exemption by eliminating the requirements that religious employers have the purpose of inculcating religious values and primarily employ and serve only persons of their same faith. 78 Fed. Reg. at 8461.
93. Under the NPRM’s proposal, a “religious employer” would be one “that is organized and operates as a nonprofit entity and is referred to in section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the [Internal Revenue] Code.” 78 Fed. Reg. at 8461.
94. HHS emphasized, however, that this proposal “would not expand the universe of employer plans that would qualify for the exemption beyond that which was intended in the 2012 final rules.” 78 Fed. Reg. 8456, 8461.
95. In other words, religious organizations like the College that are not churches, integrated auxiliaries, or religious orders would continue to be denied the protection of the exemption.
96. Second, the NPRM followed up on HHS’s earlier-stated intention to “accommodate” non-exempt, nonprofit religious organizations by making them “designate” their insurers and third party administrators to provide plan participants and beneficiaries with free access to contraceptive and abortifacient drugs and services.
97. The proposed “accommodation” did not resolve the concerns of religious organizations like the College because it continued to force them to deliberately provide health insurance that would trigger access to abortion-inducing drugs and related education and counseling.
98. “[O]ver 400,000 comments” were submitted in response to the NPRM, 78 Fed. Reg. 39870, 39871, with religious organizations again overwhelmingly decrying the proposed “accommodation” as a gross violation of their religious liberty because it would conscript their
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health care plans as the main cog in the government’s scheme for expanding access to contraceptive and abortifacient services.
99. The College submitted comments on the NPRM, stating essentially the same objections set forth in this complaint.
100. On April 8, 2013, the very day that the notice-and-comment period ended, Defendant Secretary Sebelius answered questions about the contraceptive and abortifacient services requirement in a presentation at Harvard University.
101. In her remarks, Secretary Sebelius stated: We have just com pleted the open comment period for the so-called accommodation, and by August 1st of this ye ar, every employer will be covered by the law with one exception. Churches and church dioceses as em ployers are exempted from this ben efit. But Cathol ic hospitals, Catholic universities, other religious entities will be providing coverage to their em ployees starting August 1st. . . . [A]s of August 1st, 2013, every employee who doesn’t work directly for a church or a diocese will be included in the benefit package. See The Forum at Harvard School of Public Health, A Conversation with Kathleen Sebelius, U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services, Apr. 8, 2013, available at http://theforum.sph.harvard.edu/events/conversation-kathleen-sebelius (Episode 9 at 2:25) (emphasis added). 102. Given the timing of these remarks, it is clear that Defendants gave no consideration to the comments submitted in response to the NPRM’s proposed “accommodation.” 103. Moreover, Secretary Sebelius’ remarks belie the utterly unpersuasive assertion that objecting employers are not “providing coverage for” morally objectionable items in the health insurance plans they provide employees.
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The Final Mandate 104. On June 28, 2013, Defendants issued a final rule (the “Final Mandate”), which ignores the objections repeatedly raised by religious organizations and others and continues to co-opt objecting employers into the government’s scheme of expanding free access to contraceptive and abortifacient services. 78 Fed. Reg. 39870 (2013). Defendants declared that the Final Mandate would be effective August 1, 2013, only one month after it was issued. 105. Under the Final Mandate, the discretionary “religious employer” exemption, which is still implemented via footnote on the HRSA website, see http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines, remains limited to churches, integrated auxiliaries, and religious orders “organized and operate[d]” as nonprofit entities and “referred to in section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the [Internal Revenue] Code.” 78 Fed. Reg. at 39874. 106. Defendants attempt to justify the extraordinarily narrow religious exemption as follows: “The Departments believe that the simplified and clarified definition of religious employer continues to respect the religious interests of houses of worship and their integrated auxiliaries in a way that does not undermine the governmental interests furthered by the contraceptive coverage requirement. Houses of worship and their integrated auxiliaries that object to contraceptive coverage on religious grounds are more likely than other employers to employ people of the same faith who share the same objection, and who would therefore be less likely than other people to use contraceptive services even if such services were covered under their plan.” 78 Fed. Reg. at 39874. 107. All other organizations, including the College, are denied the exemption’s protection.
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108. The College does not fall within the scope of this narrow religious exemption. It is not a church, the integrated auxiliary of a church, or a convention or association of churches, nor does it perform the exclusively religious activities of a religious order.
109. The Final Mandate creates a separate “accommodation” for certain non-exempt religious organizations. 78 Fed. Reg. at 39874.
110. An organization is eligible for the accommodation if it (1) “[o]pposes providing coverage for some or all of the contraceptive services required”; (2) “is organized and operates as a nonprofit entity”; (3) “holds itself out as a religious organization”; and (4) “self-certifies that it satisfies the first three criteria.” 78 Fed. Reg. at 39874.
111. The College is eligible for the so-called accommodation. 112. The self-certification must be executed “prior to the beginning of the first plan year to which an accommodation is to apply.” 78 Fed. Reg. at 39875. 113. The Final Rule also extends the current Temporary Enforcement Safe Harbor through the end of 2013, only six months after the issuance of the Final Rule. 78 Fed. Reg. at 39889. 114. Thus, an eligible organization would need to execute the self-certification prior to its first plan year that begins on or after January 1, 2014, and deliver it to the organization’s insurer. 115. If it elects to invoke the accommodation with respect to its employee plan, the College would be required to execute the self-certification and deliver it to its plan’s issuer before January 1, 2014. 116. By delivering its self-certification to its insurer, LC would trigger the insurer’s obligation to make “separate payments for contraceptive services directly for plan participants
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and beneficiaries.” 78 Fed. Reg. at 39875-76. These payments constitute coverage of the items to which LC objects. See, e.g., id. at 39872 (“the regulations provide women with access to contraceptive coverage”), and receive treatment as coverage under consumer protection requirements of the Public Health Service Act and ERISA. Id. at 39876. This coverage will not be contained in any insurance policy separate from the College’s plan. See id.
117. By issuing the self-certification, the College would be identifying its participating employees to its insurer for the distinct purpose of enabling the government’s scheme to facilitate free access to abortifacient services.
118. The insurer’s obligation to make direct payments for abortifacient services would continue only “for so long as the participant or beneficiary remains enrolled in the plan.” 78 Fed. Reg. at 39876.
119. Therefore, the College would have to coordinate with its insurer whenever it added or removed employees and beneficiaries from its healthcare plan and, as a direct and unavoidable result, from the abortifacient services payment scheme.
120. The College’s insurer is required to notify plan participants and beneficiaries of the abortifacient payment benefit “contemporaneous with (to the extent possible) but separate from any application materials distributed in connection with enrollment” in a group health plan. 78 Fed. Reg. at 39876.
121. This would also require the College to coordinate the notices with its insurer. 122. The College’s insurer would be required to provide the abortifacient benefits “in a manner consistent” with the provision of other covered services. 78 Fed. Reg. at 39876-77. 123. Thus, any payment or coverage disputes presumably would be resolved under the terms of the College’s existing plan documents.
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124. Thus, even under the accommodation, the College and every other non-exempt objecting religious organization would continue to play a central role in facilitating free access to abortifacient services.
125. Defendants state that they “continue to believe, and have evidence to support” that providing payments for contraceptive services will be “cost neutral for issuers,” because “[s]everal studies have estimated that the costs of providing contraceptive coverage are balanced by cost savings from lower pregnancy-related costs and from improvements in women’s health.” 78 Fed. Reg. at 39877.
126. On information and belief, the studies Defendants rely upon to support this claim are severely flawed.
127. Nevertheless, even if the payments, over time, eventually resulted in cost savings in other areas, it is undisputed that it would cost money at the outset to make the payments. See, e.g., 78 Fed. Reg. at 39877-78 (addressing ways insurers can cover up-front costs).
128. Moreover, if the cost savings that allegedly will arise make insuring an employer’s employees cheaper, the savings would have to be passed on to employers through reduced premiums, not retained by insurance issuers.
129. HHS suggests that, to maintain cost neutrality, issuers may simply ignore this fact and “set the premium for an eligible organization’s large group policy as if no payments for contraceptive services had been provided to plan participants.” 78 Fed. Reg. 39877.
130. This encourages issuers to artificially inflate the eligible organization’s premiums. 131. Under this methodology—assuming it is even legal—the eligible organization would still bear the cost of the required payments for contraceptive and abortifacient services in violation of its conscience, as if the accommodation had never been made.
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132. Defendants have suggested that “[a]nother option” would be to “treat the cost of payments for contraceptive services . . . as an administrative cost that is spread across the issuer’s entire risk pool, excluding plans established or maintained by eligible organizations.” 78 Fed. Reg. at 39878.
133. There is no legal authority for forcing third parties to pay for services provided to the employees of eligible organizations under the accommodation.
134. Furthermore, under the Affordable Care Act, Defendants lack authority in the first place to coerce insurers to make separate payments for contraceptive and abortifacient services for an eligible organization’s plan participants and beneficiaries.
135. Thus, the accommodation fails to protect objecting religious organizations for lack of statutory authority.
136. For all these reasons, the accommodation does nothing to relieve non-exempt religious organizations with insured plans from being co-opted as the central cog in the government’s scheme to force the free provision of contraceptive and abortifacient services even when the organizations object to facilitating those services.
137. In sum, the accommodation is nothing more than a shell game that attempts to disguise the religious organization’s role as the central cog in the government’s scheme for expanding access to contraceptive and abortifacient services.
138. Despite the accommodation’s convoluted machinations, a religious organization’s decision to offer health insurance (which the ACA’s employer mandate requires) and its selfcertification continue to serve as the sole triggers for creating access to free abortifacient services for its employees and plan beneficiaries from the same insurer it is paying for its insurance plan.
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139. The College cannot participate in or facilitate the government’s scheme in this manner without violating its religious convictions.
The Final Mandate and Plaintiff’s Health Insurance Plans 140. The plan year for the College’s next employee health plan begins on January 1, 2014. As a result, the College now faces – or will soon face – a choice. It can transgress its religious commitments by including abortifacients in its plan or by triggering its insurance issuer to provide the exact same services by providing the self-certification. Or it can transgress its religious duty to provide for the well-being of its employees and their families by dropping their employee health insurance plan altogether in order to avoid being complicit in the provision of abortifacients, thereby incurring crippling annual fines. 141. Although the government has recently announced that it will postpone implementing the annual fine of $2000 per employee (minus 30) for organizations that drop their insurance altogether, the postponement is only for one year, until 2015. This postponement does not delay the daily fines under 26 U.S.C. § 4980D or lawsuits under 29 U.S.C. § 1132. 142. The College’s religious convictions forbid it from participating in any way in the government’s scheme to provide free access to abortifacient services through its health care plans. 143. Dropping its insurance plans would place the College at a severe competitive disadvantage in its efforts to recruit and retain employees and students. 144. The Final Mandate forces the College to deliberately provide health insurance that would facilitate free access to emergency contraceptives, including Plan B and ella, regardless of the ability of insured persons to obtain these drugs from other sources.
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145. The Final Mandate forces the College to facilitate government-dictated education and counseling concerning abortion that directly conflicts with their religious beliefs and teachings.
146. Facilitating this government-dictated speech directly undermines the express speech and messages concerning the sanctity of life that the College seeks to convey.
147. The Mandate therefore imposes a variety of substantial burdens on the religious beliefs and exercise of the Plaintiff.
The Governmental Interests Allegedly Underlying the Mandate and the Availability of Other Means of Pursuing Those Interests 148. Coercing the Plaintiff to facilitate access to morally objectionable contraceptives and abortifacients advances no compelling governmental interest. 149. The required drugs, devices, and related services to which the Plaintiff objects are already widely available at non-prohibitive costs. 150. Upon information and belief, Plan B is widely available for between $30 and $65. Upon information and belief, ella is widely available for approximately $55. 151. There are numerous alternative mechanisms through which the government could provide access to the objectionable drugs and services without conscripting objecting organizations and their insurance plans in violation of their religious beliefs. 152. For example, it could pay for the objectionable services through its existing network of family planning services funded under Title X, through direct government payments, or through tax deductions, refunds, or credits. 153. The government could simply exempt all conscientiously objecting organizations, just as it has already exempted the small subset of nonprofit religious employers that are referred to in Section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal Revenue Code.
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154. In one form or another, the government also provides exemptions for grandfathered plans, 42 U.S.C. § 18011; 75 Fed. Reg. 41,726, 41,731 (2010), small employers with fewer than 50 employees, 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(2)(A), and certain religious denominations, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(d)(2)(a)(i) and (ii) (individual mandate does not apply to members of “recognized religious sect or division” that conscientiously objects to acceptance of public or private insurance funds). 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(d)(2)(b)(ii) (individual mandate does not apply to members of “health care sharing ministry” that meets certain criteria).
155. These broad exemptions further demonstrate the College could be exempted from the Mandate without measurably undermining any governmental interest allegedly served by the Mandate.
156. Employers who do not make modifications to their insurance plans that deprive the plans of “grandfathered” status may continue to use those grandfathered plans indefinitely.
157. Indeed, HHS itself has predicted that a majority of large employers, employing more than 50 million Americans, will continue to use grandfathered plans until at least 2014, and that a third of medium-sized employers with between 50 and 100 employees may do likewise. 75 Fed. Reg. 34538 (June 17, 2010); see also http://web.archive.org/web/20130620171510/http://www.healthcare.gov/news/ factsheets/2010/06/keeping-the-health-plan-you-have-grandfathered.html (archived version); https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Files/Factsheet¬_grandfather_ amendment.html (noting that amendment to regulations “will result in a small increase in the number of plans retaining their grandfathered status relative to the estimates made in the grandfathering regulation”).
158. In the ACA Congress chose to impose a variety of requirements on grandfathered health plans, but decided that extending the alleged benefits of this Mandate to tens of millions
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of additional women was not sufficiently important. Congress did not even think contraception was important enough to codify as part of this Mandate—as far as Congress is concerned, the broader preventive services mandate need not include contraception at all.
159. The Administration’s recent postponement of the employer mandate (and its attendant penalties) also belies any claim that a compelling interest justifies coercing the Plaintiff to comply with the Final mandate, as employers may now simply decide not to provide their employee health plans without incurring fines under 26 U.S.C. § 4980H, at least for one additional year.
160. These broad exemptions also demonstrate that the Final Mandate is not a general law entitled to some measure of judicial deference.
161. The available evidence does not support Defendants’ contention that making contraceptives, abortifacients, and related counseling available without cost sharing decreases the rate of unintended pregnancy or the adverse impacts on health and equality that allegedly flow from the unintended nature of a pregnancy.
162. Defendants were willing to exempt various secular organizations and postpone the employer mandate, while adamantly refusing to provide anything but the narrowest of exemptions for religious organizations.
163. The Final Mandate was promulgated by government officials, and supported by non-governmental organizations, who strongly oppose religious teachings and beliefs regarding marriage, family, and life.
164. Defendant Sebelius, for example, has long been a staunch supporter of abortion rights and a vocal critic of religious teachings and beliefs regarding abortion and contraception.
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165. On October 5, 2011, six days after the comment period for the original interim final rule ended, Defendant Sebelius gave a speech at a fundraiser for NARAL Pro-Choice America. She told the assembled crowd that “we are in a war.”
166. She further criticized individuals and entities whose beliefs differed from those held by her and the others at the fundraiser, stating: “Wouldn’t you think that people who want to reduce the number of abortions would champion the cause of widely available, widely affordable contraceptive services? Not so much.”
167. On July 16, 2013, Secretary Sebelius further compared opponents of the Affordable Care Act generally to “people who opposed civil rights legislation in the 1960s,” stating that upholding the Act requires the same action as was shown “in the fight against lynching and the fight for desegregation.” See http://www.hhs.gov/secretary /about/speeches/sp20130716.html.
168. Consequently, on information and belief, the College alleges that the purpose of the Final Mandate, including the restrictively narrow scope of the religious employer exemption, is to discriminate against religious organizations that oppose contraception and abortion.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF Violation of Religious Freedom Restoration Act
42 U.S.C. § 2000(bb) 169. Plaintiff realleges all matters set forth in the paragraphs 1-168 and incorporates them herein. 170. The College’s sincerely held religious beliefs prohibit it from providing, paying for, making accessible, or facilitating coverage or payments for abortion, abortifacients, embryoharming pharmaceuticals, and related education and counseling, or providing or facilitating a
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plan that causes access to the same through an insurance company, third-party administrator, or any other third party.
171. When the College complies with the Ten Commandments’ prohibition on murder and with other sincerely held religious beliefs, it exercises religion within the meaning of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
172. The Mandate imposes a substantial burden on the College’s religious exercise and coerces it to change or violate its religious beliefs.
173. The Mandate chills the College’s religious exercise within the meaning of RFRA and pressures it to abandon their religious convictions and religious practices.
174. The Mandate exposes the College to substantial fines and/or financial burdens for its religious exercise.
175. The Mandate exposes the College to substantial competitive disadvantages because of uncertainties about its health insurance benefits caused by the Mandate.
176. The Mandate furthers no compelling governmental interest and is not narrowly tailored to any compelling governmental interest.
177. The Mandate is not the least restrictive means of furthering Defendants’ stated interests.
178. The Mandate and Defendants’ threatened enforcement thereof violates the College’s rights protected by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
179. Absent injunctive and declaratory relief against application and enforcement of the Mandate, the College will suffer irreparable harm.
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SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF Violation of Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
to the United States Constitution 180. Plaintiff realleges all matters set forth in the paragraphs 1-168 and incorporates them herein. 181. The College’s sincerely held religious beliefs prohibit it from providing, paying for, making accessible, or otherwise facilitating coverage or payments for abortion, abortifacients, embryo-harming pharmaceuticals, and related education and counseling, or providing or facilitating a plan that causes access to the same through an insurance company or third-party administrator. 182. When the College complies with the Ten Commandments’ prohibition on murder and with other sincerely held religious beliefs, it exercises religion within the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause. 183. The Mandate is not neutral and is not generally applicable. 184. Defendants have created categorical exemptions and individualized exemptions to the Mandate. 185. The Mandate furthers no compelling governmental interest. 186. The Mandate is not the least restrictive means of furthering Defendants’ stated interests. 187. The Mandate coerces the College to change or violate its religious beliefs. 188. The Mandate chills the College’s religious exercise. 189. The Mandate exposes the College to substantial fines and/or financial burdens for its religious exercise.
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190. The Mandate exposes the College to substantial competitive disadvantages, in that it makes it unclear what health benefits it can offer to its employees.
191. The Mandate substantially burdens the College’s religious exercise. 192. The Mandate is not narrowly tailored to any compelling governmental interest. 193. Despite being informed in detail of the religious objections of the College and thousands of others, Defendants designed the Mandate and the religious exemption thereto to target the College and others like it, thereby making it impossible for the College and other similar religious organizations to comply with their religious beliefs without suffering crippling punishments. 194. Defendants promulgated both the Mandate and the religious exemption in order to suppress the religious exercise of the College and others. 195. By design, Defendants framed the Mandate to apply to some religious organizations but not others, resulting in discrimination among religions. 196. The Mandate violates the College’s rights secured to it by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF Violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution 197. Plaintiff realleges all matters set forth in the paragraphs 1-168 and incorporates them herein. 198. The First Amendment’s Establishment Clau se, together with the Free Exercis e Clause, requires the equal treatment of all religious faiths and in stitutions without discrimination or preference. It prohibits the unjustified diffe rential treatment of sim ilarly situated religious organizations.
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199. The Mandate’s narrow exemption for “religious employers” discriminates among religions on the basis of religious views, religious status, or incidental institutional structure or affiliation.
200. The Mandate adopts a particular theologica l view of what is m orally acceptable complicity in the facilitation of abortifacient coverage and payments, and imposes it upon those, like the College, who co nscientiously object, and who must either conform their consciences or suffer penalty.
201. The Establishment Clause, together with the Free Exercise Clause, also protects the freedom of religious organizations to d ecide for them selves, free from governmental interference, matters of internal governance as well as those of doctrine and practice.
202. Under the First Am endment, government may not interf ere with a religious organization’s internal decisions concerning its religious structure, leadership, practice, discipline, membership, or doctrine.
203. Under the First Am endment, government may not interf ere with a religious organization’s internal decisions if that in terference would af fect the f aith and mission of the organization itself.
204. The College m ade an i nternal decision, di ctated by its Christian faith, that the health plan it m akes available to employees may not include, subsidize, provide, pay for, or in any way facilitate access to abortifacient drugs, devices, or related services.
205. The Mandate interferes with the College ’s internal decisions concerning its structure and mission by requiring it to subsidize, provide access to, and fac ilitate practices that directly conflict with their Christian beliefs.
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206. The College also m ade internal d ecisions to not be structured as integrated auxiliary to a church, a denomination, or an association of churches.
207. The Mandate’s narrow religious exem ption unconstitutionally punishes the College for this structu ral choice, and pressures it to become an integrated auxiliary of a church or denomination in order to gain the protection of the exemption.
208. Because the Final Mandate interferes with the College’s internal decision making in a m anner that affects its faith and m ission, it violates the Establishm ent Clause (and F ree Exercise Clause) of the First Amendment.
209. Absent injunctive and declaratory relief against the Mandate, the Co llege will suffer irreparable harm.
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment
to the United States Constitution 210. Plaintiff realleges all matters set forth in the paragraphs 1-168 and incorporates them herein. 211. Defendants’ requirement to provide insurance coverage for education and counseling regarding contraception causing abortion forces the College to speak in a manner contrary to its religious beliefs. 212. The College teaches that abortion violates God’s law and that any participation in the unjustified taking of an innocent human life contradicts its religious beliefs and convictions. 213. The Mandate compels the College to facilitate expression and activities that the College teaches are inconsistent with its religious beliefs, expression, and practices. 214. The Mandate compels the College to facilitate access to government-dictated education and counseling related to abortion.
32

Case 1:12-cv-00463-DDD-JDK Document 77 Filed 09/19/13 Page 33 of 41 PageID #: 586
215. Defendants thus violate the College’s rights to be free from compelled speech, a right secured to it by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.
216. The Mandate’s compelled speech requirement does not advance a compelling governmental interest.
217. Defendants have no narrowly tailored compelling interest to justify this compelled speech.
218. The Mandate violates the College’s rights secured to it by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
219. Absent declaratory and injunctive relief, the College will suffer irreparable harm.
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 220. Plaintiff realleges all matters set forth in the paragraphs 1-168 and incorporates them herein. 221. Because the Mandate sweepingly infringes upon religious exercise and speech rights that are constitutionally protected, it is unconstitutionally vague in violation of the due process rights of the College and other parties not before the Court. 222. Persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at the meaning, scope, and application of the Mandate and its exemptions. 223. This Mandate lends itself to discriminatory enforcement by government officials in an arbitrary and capricious manner, and lawsuits by private persons, based on the government’s vague standard.
33

Case 1:12-cv-00463-DDD-JDK Document 77 Filed 09/19/13 Page 34 of 41 PageID #: 587
224. The Mandate vests Defendants with unbridled discretion in deciding whether to allow exemptions to some, all, or no organizations that possess religious beliefs and/or that meet the government’s definition of “religious employers.”
225. This Mandate violates the College’s due process rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
Freedom of Expressive Association 226. Plaintiff realleges all matters set forth in the paragraphs 1-168 and incorporates them herein. 227. The College teaches that abortion violates God’s law and that any participation in the unjustified taking of an innocent human life contradicts its religious beliefs and convictions. 228. The Mandate compels the College to facilitate expression and activities that the College teaches are inconsistent with its religious beliefs, expression, and practices. 229. Defendants’ actions thus violate the College’s right of expressive association protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Violation of the Administrative Procedure Act 230. Plaintiff realleges all matters set forth in the paragraphs 1-168 and incorporates them herein. 231. Because they did not give proper notice and an opportunity for public comment, Defendants did not take into account the full implications of the regulations by completing a meaningful consideration of the relevant matter presented.
34

Case 1:12-cv-00463-DDD-JDK Document 77 Filed 09/19/13 Page 35 of 41 PageID #: 588
232. Defendants did not consider or respond to the voluminous comments they received in opposition to the interim final rule.
233. Defendants issued its regulations on an interim final basis and only asked for comments thereafter. Yet Defendants signaled from regulatory text of its interim rules that it had no intention of considering the requests by religious organizations to provide them with exemptions, or to hold the effective date of its rules after it received and considered all the comments submitted.
234. Thus, Defendants imposed its rules without the required “open-mindedness” that agencies must have when notice-and-comment occurs. Defendants also did not have good cause to impose the rules without prior notice and comment.
235. Moreover, Defendants issued the Final Mandate with respect to the College on June 28, 2013, and declared it effective August 1, 2013, with a “safe harbor” that imposed the Final Mandate on the College’s employee plan year beginning January 1, 2014.
236. The ACA provides, and Defendants admit, that any rule issued requiring coverage of preventive services under 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 cannot go into effect until at least a year after the rule is finalized. Under these provisions, the Final Mandate cannot be effective on the College until its employee health insurance plan year starting after the summer of 2013, namely, the College’s plan year starting January 1, 2015.
237. Thus the Final Rule, by its effective date of August 1, 2013 and its impact on Louisiana College on January 1, 2014, violates the ACA and Defendants’ regulations against imposing within a year after they are finalized, and/or violates the APA’s requirement that agencies be open-minded to comments before finalizing their rules.
35

Case 1:12-cv-00463-DDD-JDK Document 77 Filed 09/19/13 Page 36 of 41 PageID #: 589
238. Therefore, Defendants have violated the notice and comment requirements of 5 U.S.C. §§ 553 (b) and (c), have taken agency action not in accordance with procedures required by law, and the College is entitled to relief pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D).
239. In promulgating the Mandate, Defendants failed to consider the constitutional and statutory implications of the mandate on the College and similar organizations.
240. Defendants’ explanation (and lack thereof) for its decision not to exempt the College and similar religious organizations from the Mandate runs counter to the evidence submitted by religious organizations during the comment period.
241. Thus, Defendants’ issuance of the Mandate was arbitrary and capricious within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) because the Mandate fails to consider the full extent of its implications and it does not take into consideration the evidence against it.
242. As set forth above, the Mandate violates RFRA and the First and Fifth Amendments.
243. The Mandate is also contrary to the provision of the ACA that states that “nothing in this title”—i.e., title I of the Act, which includes the provision dealing with “preventive services”—“shall be construed to require a qualified health plan to provide coverage of [abortion] services . . . as part of its essential health benefits for any plan year.” Section 1303(b)(1)(A).
244. The Mandate is also contrary to the provisions of the Weldon Amendment of the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act of 2009, Public Law 110 329, Div. A, Sec. 101, 122 Stat. 3574, 3575 (Sept. 30, 2008), which provides that “[n]one of the funds made available in this Act [making appropriations for Defendants Department of Labor and Health and Human Services] may be made available to a Federal
36

Case 1:12-cv-00463-DDD-JDK Document 77 Filed 09/19/13 Page 37 of 41 PageID #: 590
agency or program . . . if such agency, program, or government subjects any institutional or individual health care entity to discrimination on the basis that the health care entity does not provide, pay for, provide coverage of, or refer for abortions.”
245. The Mandate also violates the provisions of the Church Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(d), which provides that “No individual shall be required to perform or assist in the performance of any part of a health service program or research activity funded in whole or in part under a program administered by the Secretary of Health and Human Services if his performance or assistance in the performance of such part of such program or activity would be contrary to his religious beliefs or moral convictions.”
246. The Mandate is contrary to existing law and is in violation of the APA under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests the following relief: A. That this Court enter a judgment declaring the Mandate and its application to the Plaintiff and its insurance issuer or third-party administrator to be a violation of its rights protected by RFRA, the Free Exercise, Establishment, and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the Administrative Procedure Act; B. That this Court enter a permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants from continuing to apply the Mandate to the Plaintiff and its insurance issuer or third-party administrators or in a way that violates the legally protected rights of any person, and prohibiting Defendants from continuing to illegally discriminate against Plaintiff by requiring it to provide
37

Case 1:12-cv-00463-DDD-JDK Document 77 Filed 09/19/13 Page 38 of 41 PageID #: 591 health insurance coverage or access to separate payments for contraceptives, abortifacients, and related counseling to the beneficiaries of its health insurance plan; C. That this Court award the Plaintiff court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees, as provided by the Equal Access to Justice Act and RFRA (as provided in 42 U.S.C. § 1988); and D. That this Court grant such other and further relief as to which the Plaintiff may be entitled.
38

Case 1:12-cv-00463-DDD-JDK Document 77 Filed 09/19/13 Page 39 of 41 PageID #: 592
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of September, 2013.
/s Gregory S. Baylor Gregory S. Baylor (Texas Bar No. 01941500) Matthew S. Bowman (DC Bar No. 993261) ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM 801 G Street, NW, Suite 509 Washington, DC 20001 (202) 393-8690 (202) 347-3622 (facsimile) gbaylor@alliancedefendingfreedom.org mbowman@alliancedefendingfreedom.org
David A. Cortman (Georgia Bar No. 188810) ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM 1000 Hurricane Shoals Road, NE, Suite D-1100 Lawrenceville, GA 30043 (770) 339-0774 (770) 339-6744 (facsimile) dcortman@alliancedefendingfreedom.org
Kevin H. Theriot (Kansas Bar No. 21565) ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM 15192 Rosewood Leawood, KS 66224 (913) 685-8000 (913) 685-8001 (facsimile) ktheriot@alliancedefendingfreedom.org
J. Michael Johnson (Louisiana Bar No. 26059) LAW OFFICES OF MIKE JOHNSON LLC 901 Pierremont Road Shreveport LA 71106 318-550-0372 318-550-0397 (facsimile) mike@mikejohnsonlegal.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff
39

Case 1:12-cv-00463-DDD-JDK Document 77 Filed 09/19/13 Page 40 of 41 PageID #: 593

Case 1:12-cv-00463-DDD-JDK Document 77 Filed 09/19/13 Page 41 of 41 PageID #: 594 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on September 19th, 2013 I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to all counsel of record.
s/ Gregory S. Baylor
41

 
 USDC! VVESTEB~'"·!. .:)iSTR;CT OF LA TOi\!Y R. ~vt.:·OKE, c~_CR~<

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ALEXANDRIA DIVISION

LOUISIANA COLLEGE -vsKATHLEEN SEBELIUS, et al.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 12-0463 JUDGE DRELL
MAGISTRATE JUDGE KIRK

RULING

Before the Court are Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for

Summary Judgment (Doc. 81) and Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.

91). Plaintiff asked the Court to decide the pending motions without oral argument, and

the Government did not object to proceeding in this manner. (See Docs. 102 & 105). By

minute entry on January 9, 2014 (Doc. 105), the Court agreed that motion to dismiss and

cross-motions for summary judgment would be decided on the briefing presently before

us without the necessity of oral argument. Accordingly, we have considered the filings

and evidence in the record and the parties' arguments contained in their briefs and are

prepared to rule on the pending motions in turn. For the following reasons, we find that

Plaintiffis entitled to summary judgrnent as to its Religious Freedom and Restoration Act

claim.

I.

Background

Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, 124 Stat. 119

("ACA" or "the Act"), non-exempt employment-based group health plans are required

to provide cost-free coverage for all contraceptive methods approved by the Food and

Drug Administration ("FDA"), four of which may prevent a fertilized egg from attaching

to the uterine wall ("contraceptive mandate" or "mandate"). However, recently-
promulgated regulations provide a mechanism for certain religious nonprofits to avoid
providing coverage for contraceptive services they find religiously offensive by executing
a required self-certification form ("challenged regulations").1 This mechanism-known
as the "accommodation"-requires an insurance issuer, upon receipt of the self-
certification, to exclude contraceptive coverage from the employer's plan and to provide
plan participants with separate payments for contraceptives without imposing any cost-
sharing requirements on the employer, its insurance plan, or the plan beneficiaries.
Plaintiff, Louisiana College ("LC"), is a nonprofit university affiliated with the
Southern Baptist Convention ("SBC"). 2 Plaintiff believes as a matter offaith that human
life begins at the moment of conception, or when an egg becomes fertilized. It is
therefore against Plaintiff's religious beliefs to participate in or facilitate access to
abortion or "abortifacient"3 drugs, which Plaintiff believes can end human life and are
To be clear, we use the term "challenged regulations" to refer collectively to the federal regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate and the accommodation. These regulations include: 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2713(a)(1)(iv); 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2713A(a); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2713(a)(1)(iv); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2713A(a); 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv); and 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(b).
2 The SBC is a national association of Christian churches and missions "that share common religious beliefs, including support for the sanctity of human life from conception to natural death, and opposition to abortion and abortion-inducing dmgs." Reachina Souls Int'l v. Sebelius, No. 13-cv-1092, 2013 WL 6804259, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 20, 2013).
3 Plaintiff uses the term "abortifacient" to describe four contraceptive methods that may operate after the fertilization of an egg. (Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts, Doc. 91-1 at p. 2). These include two forms of emergency contraception, Plan Band Ella, commonly known as the "morning after" pills, and two types of intrauterine devices. As the Supreme Court noted in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2014 WL 2921709, at *9 n.7 (U.S. June 30, 2014), however, those "who believe that life begins at conception regard these four methods as causing abortions, but federal regulations, which define pregnancy as beginning at implantation, see,~. 62 Fed. Reg. 8611 (1997); 45 CFR § 46.202(£) (2013), do not so classify them." This distinction is relevant because, like the plaintiffs in Hobby Lobby, Louisiana College's objection is limited to contraceptive methods that may prevent uterine implantation or otherwise harm a fertilized embryo. (Second Amended Complaint, Doc. 77 at ~"if 2, 28-29). Plaintiff does not object to contraceptive methods that merely prevent ovulation or fertilization,
2

therefore sinful. Consistent with these beliefs, Plaintiff provides health care benefits to its employees through a group health plan sponsored by GuideStone Financial Resources4 ( "GuideStone Plan"), and has excluded from coverage "contraceptive drugs or devices considered to be abortifacients." Reaching Souls Int'l v. Sebelius, No. 13-cv-
1092, 2013 WL 6804259, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 20, 2013). Plaintiff filed the instant suit against the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services ("HHS") and other federal officials and agencies (collectively, "Defendants") under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), the First Amendment Free Exercise, Establishment, Free Speech, and Freedom of Association clauses, the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, and the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), seeking to enjoin application ofthe ACA's contraceptive mandate under the challenged regulations. Plaintiff maintains that compliance with the challenged regulations, including the accommodation, violates its sincerely-held religious beliefs because, by self-certifying, it would trigger and facilitate its employees' free access to emergency contraceptive drugs and devices, which is tantamount to facilitation of sins against human life and is forbidden by its religion. Plaintiff also maintains that choosing to follow
such as prescription oral contraceptives. (Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts, Doc. 91-1 at pp. 2-3).
4 GuideStone Financial Resources is a nonprofit corporation formed and controlled by the [SBC]; it is a tax-exempt church benefits board that assists churches and other religious organizations by facilitating retirement plan services, health benefits coverage, risk management, and other benefit programs. GuideStone established the GuideStone Plan as a multiple-employer, self-insured health plan that qualifies as a "church plan" and thus is not subject to ERISA. Consistent with the religious convictions of the [SBC], the GuideStone Plan does not cover expenses associated with the elective termination of a pregnancy, including contraceptive drugs or devices considered to be abortifacients. GuideStone has agreements with two corporations, one of which is Highmark Health Services, to provide claims administrative services.
Reaching Souls, 2013 WL 6804259 at *2.
3

the commands of its faith, and thereby failing to comply with the challenged regulations,
would result in crippling financial penalties, which is a quintessential substantial burden
on the free exercise of religion.
On November 2, 2013, Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss or, in the
Alternative, for Summary Judgment as to all of Plaintiff's claims. (Doc. 81). 5 In response,
Plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment (Doc. 91) and opposed Defendants' motion
(Doc. 92). Defendants then filed a reply, combined with a memorandum in opposition to
Plaintiff's cross-motion (Doc. 96), to which opposition Plaintiff has replied (Doc. 100).
On December 2, 2013, Plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, seeking
relief on the basis ofits RFRA claim. (Doc. 94). However, on December 20,2013, the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma issued a preliminary injunction
barring enforcement of the mandate and accommodation against "any employers who
provide medical coverage to employees under the GuideStone Plan and who are 'eligible
organizations.'" Reaching Souls, 2013 WL 6804259 at *8. In light of this decision, Plaintiff
filed an unopposed motion to withdraw its preliminary injunction request on January 6,
2014. (Doc. 102). The following day, the Court ordered Plaintiff's motion for preliminary
injunction withdrawn, reserving to Plaintiffthe right to file a new motion in the event the
Reaching Souls injunction is modified. (Doc. 104).
5 While Defendants' motion is styled as a motion to dismiss under Fed. H. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), or in the alternative, for summary judgment, the Court must consider matters outside the pleadings in order to reach its decision. Therefore, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P 12(d), we must analyze the instant motion as one for summary judgment under Rule 56(c). To the extent Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Rule 12(d) does not apply. However, the motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) appears to be directed only to Plaintiff's claim that certain regulations were not promulgated in compliance with the APA. (See Doc. 81-1 at p. 8). For the reasons discussed herein, we find that Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment as to its RFRA claim, and this resolution precludes the need to rule on any remaining issues.
4

A. The Plaintiff Louisiana College was established in Pineville, Louisiana on October 3, 1906, and is the successor to two earlier Louisiana Baptist colleges: Mt. Lebanon University, an allmale college founded in 1852 by the North Louisiana Baptist Convention; and Keatchie Female College, a women's college founded in 1857 by the Grand Cane Association of Baptist Churches. After years of financial difficulties, the Louisiana Baptist Convention ("Convention")6 took control of both predecessor schools in 1899. The Convention selected an Education Commission to administer the schools, with the understanding that a more centrally-located campus would be selected and a new school would be founded to succeed them. The Education Commission continued to administer Louisiana College until 1921, when it was replaced by a new governing body, the Board of Trustees. Board members are chosen by the Convention and must be members in good standing of a Louisiana Baptist church that cooperates with the Convention. Christian faith is claimed as central to the identity and administration of Louisiana College. LC is a private, coeducational institution chartered as a "non-profit corporation with the object 'to own, operate and conduct a Baptist college to foster Christian education."' (LC Academic Catalog, Doc. 91-4, Exh. L at p. 5). The mission of LC is "to provide liberal arts, professional, and graduate programs characterized by devotion to the preeminence of the Lord Jesus, allegiance to the authority of the Holy Scriptures, dedication to academic excellence for the glory of God, and commitment to change the
6 The Convention is "a state-wide organization consisting of cooperating and autonomous Baptist churches, the purpose of which is to advance the cause of Christ in the world, in cooperation with the [SBC]." (LC Faculty Handbook, Doc. 91-4, Exh. I at p. 12).
5

world for Christ by the power of the Holy Spirit." (Id. at 6). LC also seeks "to create a supportive environment in which students 'are encouraged to develop an active Christian commitment."' (LC Christian Commitment Statement, Doc. 91-4, Exh. H). In accordance with this mission, LC "recruits faculty and staffwho are committed followers of Christ, who participate actively in a local church, and who are aware of and will teach or perform professionally in harmony with the doctrinal statement." (LC Academic Catalog, Doc. 91-4, Exh. L at p. 8). LC has approximately 180 full-time employees and 80 part-time employees who are to "exemplify a Christian lifestyle characterized by the highest standard of Christian morality by exhibiting the character of Christ and living according to the ethical principles affirmed by Holy Scripture." (LC Christian Commitment Statement, Doc. 91-4, Exh. H; Second Amended Complaint, Doc. 77 at~ 35).
Included in these principles is a belief that "[c]hildren, from the moment of conception, are a blessing and heritage from the Lord." (LC Academic Catalog, Doc. 91-4, Exh. L at p. 19). LC adheres to the 2000 Baptist Faith and Message of the SEC as its doctrinal statement, including the commandment to "speak on behalf ofthe unborn and contend for the sanctity of all human life from conception to natural death." (Id. at 18). LC believes and teaches that human life begins when an egg becomes fertilized, and that abortion, or methods that harm a fertilized human embryo, ends human life and is a sin. (Second Amended Complaint, Doc. 77 at~~ 2, 28-29, 31, 171). Thus, LC objects to the use of emergency contraceptives, believing that such drugs and devices cause the death of a fertilized embryo. In addition, LC believes that facilitating transgressions of God's law concerning the dignity of human life is equally immoral and sinful, and that
6

sin disrupts its relationship with God. LC therefore states that it "seeks to avoid facilitating sinful behavior, thereby engaging in immoral conduct itself," and that its religious beliefs "prohibit it from providing, paying for, making accessible, or facilitating coverage or payments for abortion, abortifacients, embryo-harming pharmaceuticals, and related education and counseling, or providing or facilitating a [health insurance] plan that causes access to the same through an insurance company, third-party administrator, or any other party." (Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support, Doc. 92 at p. 16; Second Amended Complaint, Doc. 77 at ~ 170).
Consistent with its religious beliefs, LC provides its employees and their dependents with health insurance coverage through the GuideStone Plan. This plan "provides group health benefits on a self-insured basis for organizations associated with the [SBC], which share its religious views regarding abortion and contraception, and [which] rely on GuideStone to provide coverage consistent with those views." (Motion to Withdraw, Doc. 102 at p. 2) (quoting Reaching Souls, 2013 WL 6804259 at *1). Accordingly, the plan does not cover emergency contraceptive drugs and devices.7
B. The Affordable Care Act At issue in the present case are HHS regulations promulgated under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 that result in the provision of health insurance coverage for emergency contraceptive drugs and devices at no additional cost to Plaintiff's employees.
7 LC's employee health plan does include coverage for other contraceptive methods that only prevent ovulation. {Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts, Doc. 91-1 at p. 3).
7

ACA generally requires employers with 50 or more full-time employees to offer a group health plan or group health insurance coverage that provides "minimum essential coverage," or incur financial penalties. 26 U.S. C. § 5000A(f)(2); §§ 4980H(a), (c)(2). Specifically, if a covered employer offers group health insurance coverage, but its plan fails to comply with the ACA's requirements for group health plans, the employer may be required to pay a regulatory tax of $100 per day for "each individual to whom such failure relates" ("regulatory tax"). Id. § 4980D(b)(1). Likewise, if the employer fails to provide group health insurance coverage altogether, and at least one of its full-time employees enrolls in a health plan and qualifies for a subsidy on one of the governmentfacilitated exchanges, the employer must pay an annual assessable payment of $2000 per full-time employee, minus 30 ("assessable payment"). Id. §§ 4980H(a), (c)(1), (d)(1).
Unless an exception applies, ACA further mandates that any employment-based "group health plan" withinthe meaning ofthe Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1), or "health insurance issuer offering group or individual health insurance coverage" provide coverage for "preventive care and screenings" for women without imposing "any cost sharing requirements" on plan participants and beneficiaries. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4). However, Congress did not define "preventive care" and instead authorized the Health Resources and Services Administration ("HRSA"), a component of HHS, to develop "comprehensive guidelines" for covered "preventive care and screenings." Id. HRSA in turn consulted the Institute of Medicine ("IOM"), a nonprofit, non-governmental health-policy organization and arm of the National Academy of Sciences, to "review what preventive services are necessary to
8

women's health and well-being and should be considered in the development of comprehensive guidelines." Institute of Medicine, Clinical Preventive Services for Women: Closing the Gaps, Washington, DC: The National Academies Press (July 19, 2011), 11 ("IOM Report"). 8 IOM made eight recomr;nendations for preventive services for women, including coverage for "the full range of [FDA]-approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for women with reproductive capacity." Id. at 10, 109-10.
In August 2011, HRSA promulgated guidelines adopting the IOM recommendations in full, 9 thereby requiring employment-based group health plans to provide coverage, without cost sharing, for all FDA-approved contraceptive methods and related services, subject to a religious-employer exemption authorized by amended interim final regulations issued at the same time. See 76 Fed. Reg. 46,621-01 (Aug. 3, 2011). The FDA has approved 20 contraceptive methods ranging from prescription oral contraceptives and intrauterine devices ("IUDs") to emergency contraceptives and sterilization surgery. While most FDA-approved contraceptive methods function by preventing fertilization of an egg, four of those methods-the emergency contraceptive drugs Plan B and Ella, commonly known as the "morning after" pills, and two types of IUDs-may have the effect of preventing attachment or implantation of a fertilized egg
8 The IOM Report is attached as an exhibit to Defendants' motion to dismiss and for summary judgment (Doc. 81) ("Doc. 81 Exhibits") and was provided to the Court on a compact disk. The report may also be read online for free at http://www.iom.edu/Reports/2011/Clinical-Preventive-Services-for-WomenClosing-the-Gaps. apx.
9 See HRSA, "Women's Preventive Services Guidelines," http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines (last visited July 8, 2014) (Doc. 81 Exhibits at pp. 283-84). 9

to the uterine wall (collectively, "emergency contraceptives"). See FDA, "Birth Control: Medicines to Help You. "10
HHS also authorized HRSA to establish an exemption from the mandate for group health plans "established or maintained by a religious employer (and health insurance coverage provided in connection with a group health plan established or maintained by a religious employer) with respect to any requirement to cover contraceptive services under such guidelines." 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a); see also 76 Fed. Reg. at 46,623-24. The term "religious employer" includes "churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and conventions or associations of churches" and "the exclusively religious activities of any religious order." 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a) (citing 26 U.S.C. §§ 6033(a)(3)(A)(i), (iii)).
During a one-year safe harbor period, and in response to objections that the religious-employer exemption was too narrow, HHS undertook new rulemaking to develop an accommodation for certain religious nonprofit organizations, known under the regulations as "eligible organizations." See 77 Fed. Reg. 16,501, 16,503 (Mar. 21, 2012). The accommodation was intended to satisfy two goals: (1) "providing contraceptive coverage without cost-sharing to individuals who want it;" and (2) "accommodating non-exempted, non-profit organizations' religious objections to covering contraceptive services." 77 Fed. Reg. 8725-01, 8727 (Feb. 15, 2012). To qualify for this accommodation, the "eligible organization" must self-certify, before the commencement of the first plan year to which the accommodation applies, that it satisfies the following eligibility criteria:
10 Online at http://www.fda.gov/forconsumers/byaudience/forwomen/freepublications/ucm;313215.htm (last visited July 8, 2014).
10

(1) The organization opposes providing coverage for some or all of any contraceptive services required to be covered under § 147.130(a)(1)(iv) on account of religious objections.
(2) The organization is organized and operates as a nonprofit entity.
(3) The organization holds itself out as a religious organization.
45 C.F.R. § 147.131(b), (d). The self-certification must be executed in the appropriate form and manner "by a person authorized to make the certification on behalf of the organization, and must be maintained in a manner consistent with" ERISA's recordretention requirements. Id. § 147.131(b)(4). In addition, the organization must submit a copy of the self-certification to its group health insurance issuer ("issuer") or third-party administrator ("TPA"). If the organization complies with these requirements, it is deemed to have complied with the mandate and will not incur any statutory penalties.
26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2713A(b), (c).
Upon receipt of the organization's self-certification, the issuer must:
(1) Expressly exclude contraceptive coverage from the group health insurance coverage provided in connection with the group health plan; and
(2) Provide separate payments for any contraceptive services required to be covered under§ 147.130(a)(1)(iv) for plan participants and beneficiaries for so long as they remain enrolled in the plan.
45 C.F.R. § 147.131(c)(2)(i). The issueristhenrequired to provide contraceptive coverage to the organization's employees and their dependents at no cost to the plan participants or beneficiaries, the group health plan, or the eligible organization. 11 The issuer must
11 In Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court observed that "[a]lthough this procedure requires the issuer to bear the cost of these services, HHS has determined that this obligation will not impose any net expense on issuers because its cost will be less than or equal to the cost savings resulting from the
11

separate the revenues collected from the organization's premium payments from the
monies used to pay for contraceptive services, and it must ensure that no premium
revenues are used to pay for these services. Id. § 147.131(c)(2)(ii). Moreover, the issuer
must give plan participants and beneficiaries written notice specifying that the
organization does not administer or fund contraceptives, but that the issuer will provide
separate payments for such services. 12 Id. § 147.131(d).
In addition to these exceptions for religious organizations, the ACA "exempts a
great many employers from most of its coverage requirements." Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2014 WL 2921709, at *9 (U.S. June 30, 2014). For example,
employers sponsoring "grandfathered" health plans-those that were in effect on March
23, 2010, and to which no significant changes have been made after that date-need not
comply with many of the ACA's provisions, including the contraceptive mandate. 42
U.S.C. § 18011(a)(2), (e). Although this provision was intended merely to "ease the
transition of the healthcare industry into" the Act's requirements, 75 Fed. Reg. 34,538,
34,540-41 (June 17, 2010), "[o]ver one-third of the 149 million nonelderly people in
America with employer-sponsored health plans were enrolled in grandfathered plans in
services." 2014 WL 2921709 at *9 (citing 78 Fed. Reg. at 39,877). Nothing in this case requires a testing of that conclusion. 12 If the organization sponsors a self-insured group health plan, the TPA must provide or arrange for payments for contraceptive services, a requirement imposed through the Department of Labor's ERISA enforcement authority. 78 Fed. Reg. 39,870, 39,874, 39,879-80 (July 2, 2013); see also 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2713A; 29 C.F.R. §§ 2510.3-16, 2590.715-2713A. The organization's self-certification is "treated as a designation of the [TPA] as plan administrator and claims administrator for contraceptive benefits pursuant to section 3(16) of ERISA," so the TPA must provide or arrange payments for contraceptive services "without cost sharing, premium, fee, or other charge to plan participants or beneficiaries, or to the eligible organization or its plan." 78 Fed. Reg. at 39,879-80. See also 26 C.F.R. § 54.98152713A(b)(2). However, the TPA may seek reimbursement for contraceptive payments through adjustments to its federally-facilitated Exchange user fees. 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2713A(b)(3).
12

2013." Hobby Lobby, 2014 WL 2921709 at *10 (citations omitted). Moreover, employers with less than 50 full-time employees are not required to provide their employees with health insurance coverage at all. 26 U.S. C.§ 4980H(c)(2). The number of people working for such employers is approximately 34 million. Accordingly, the mandate "presently does not apply to tens of millions of people." Hobby Lobby, 2014 WL 2921709 at *10 (quotations and citation omitted).
C. Application of the Challenged Regulations to Plaintiff The parties agree that Plaintiffis not eligible for the religious-employer exemption, and that Plaintiff's employee health plan does not possess grandfathered status. The parties also agree that Plaintiffwould qualify as an "eligible organization" entitled to the accommodation, provided that it fulfills the self-certification requirement. Nevertheless, Plaintiffavers that the challenged regulations offend RFRA andthe Constitution because they place a substantial burden on its freedom to follow the commands of its faith, which "forbid [it] from participating in any way in the government's scheme to provide free access to [emergency contraceptives] through its health care plans." (Second Amended Complaint, Doc. 77 at~ 142) (emphasis added). Plaintiff further argues that this burden is not the least restrictive means of advancing a compelling governmental interest. According to Plaintiff, the challenged regulations substantially burden its religious exercise by forcing it to choose among the following options: (1) maintaining its current health insurance plan, which does not provide coverage for or facilitate access to the objectionable drugs and services; (2) dropping employee health insurance altogether to avoid facilitating access to emergency contraceptives; or (3) complying with the
13

mandate, and thereby facilitating access to drugs and services that (according to Plaintiff) can destroy human life. Plaintiff contends that the ACA makes the first and second options untenable because they result in crippling financial penalties, leaving Plaintiff "without the option of fulfilling its religious convictions by providing health insurance coverage that does not facilitate access to" emergency contraceptives. (Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support, Doc. 92 at p. 17).
Under the first option, the most immediate consequence would come in the form of a $100 per day regulatory tax for each "individual to whom such failure [to provide contraceptive coverage] relates." 26 U.S.C. § 4980D(b)(1). Given its full-time workforce of 180 employees, Plaintiff claims this would amount to a total of$6,570,000 in annual tax penalties. It also would be exposed to possible regulatory action and private lawsuits. See29U.S.C. §§ 1132, 1185d. Under the second option, Plaintiffwouldface an assessable payment of $2000 per full-time employee, minus 30, which would total approximately $300,000 per year based on Plaintiff's estimate. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 4980H(a), (c)(1), (d)(1).
Finally, Plaintiff contends that the third option-compliance with the mandate-requires it to violate its sincerely-held religious beliefs. Under this option, Plaintiff would be required to execute and submit to its insurance issuer a selfcertification on a government prescribed form stating its religious objection to the mandate in order to avoid paying or providing coverage for emergency contraceptives directly (or through is affiliated GuideStone Plan). 13 But, according to Plaintiff, selfcertification "ensures the same result" as providing the coverage directly: free access
13 Defendants do not appear to dispute that requiring Plaintiff to provide direct coverage for emergency contraceptives, without the accommodation, would amount to a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion.
14

to emergency contraceptives for its employees as a direct consequence of their employment with Plaintiff and their participation in its employee health plan. (Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support, Doc. 92 at p. 18). Plaintiff claims that completing and delivering the self-certification" specifically causes" its insurer to "arrange payment for" emergency contraceptives, thereby making Plaintiff the "essential cog" in the scheme by which its employees receive such contraceptives and which is tantamount to an endorsement or facilitation of these drugs and devices. (Second Amended Complaint, Doc. 77 at~~ 5, 116; Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support, Doc. 92 at p. 25). Compliance with the mandate, Plaintiff argues, is therefore sinful and immoral in itself.
Defendants do not challenge Plaintiff's religious beliefs or the manners in which it exercises those beliefs. Instead, Defendants assert that the challenged regulations impose no more than a de minimis burden on religious exercise because they do not require Plaintiff to take action beyond what it did or would do under different circumstances. Alternatively, Defendants argue that any burden is too attenuated to qualify as substantial.
D. Recent Free-Exercise Challenges to the Challenged Regulations A number of courts have addressed similar free exercise claims by religious nonprofits that are eligible for the accommodation, but with varying results. While the Fifth Circuit has yet to weigh in on the issue definitively, at least three district courts in this circuit have considered whether to grant injunctive relief on such claims, and all three have ruled in favor of the nonprofit plaintiffs. See, e.g., Catholic Diocese of Beaumont v. Sebelius, No. 1:13-cv-709, 2014 WL 31652 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 2, 2014); Roman
15

Catholic Diocese of Fort Worth v. Sebelius, No. 4:12-cv-314 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 31, 2013) (ECF Doc. 99); E. Tex. Baptist Univ. v. Sebelius, 988 F. Supp. 2d 743 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2013) ("ETBU"). On these facts, we join with the reasoning of our sister concur in concluding that the challenged regulations offend RFRA by placing a substantial burden on Plaintiff to act in ways that (as Plaintiff sees it) involve it in the provision of emergency contraceptives, and thereby require Plaintiffto violate its sincerely-held religious beliefs. Therefore, we find the challenged regulations-26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2713(a)(1)(iv); 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2713A(a); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2713(a)(1)(iv); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2713A(a); 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv); and 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(b)-cannot stand. II. Summary Judgment Standard
A court "shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute of material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). We consider "all evidence in the light most favorable to the party resisting the motion." Seacor Holdings, Inc. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 635 F.3d 675, 680 (5th Cir. 2011) (quotations and citation omitted). It is important to note that the standard for a summary judgment is two-fold: (1) there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and (2) the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
16

III. Law & Analysis A. Religious Freedom Restoration Act In Employment Division, Department of Human Services of Oregon v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990), the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause does not prohibit the government from burdening the exercise ofreligionthrough facially neutral laws of general applicability. Recognizing that Smith "virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion," 42 U.S. C.§ 2000bb(a)(4), Congress responded by enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, et seq. RFRA provides that the " [g ]overnment shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability" unless it can show "that application of the burden to the person-(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." Id. § 2000bb-1 (a)-{b). The express purpose ofRFRA is "to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened." Id. § 2000bb(b)(1).
1. Substantial Burden Under RFRA, Plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing "the existence of a substantial interference with the right of free exercise." Diaz v. Collins, 114 F.3d 69, 72 (5th Cir. 1997). The sincerity of a claimant's belief in a particular religious exercise is an essential and threshold element of this burden. Tagore v. United States, 735 F.3d 324,
17

328 (5th Cir. 2013). RFRA broadly defines religious exercise as "any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(4) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5) (emphasis added). Importantly, RFRA does not invite courts to consider the centrality of the religious exercise to a claimant's faith or whether the claimant has correctly interpreted the commands ofits religious beliefs. See id. § 2000cc-5(7)(A); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 708, 715-16 (1981) (" [T]he guarantee offree exercise is not limited to beliefs which are shared by all of the members of a religious sect. Particularly in this sensitive area, it is not within the judicial function and judicial competence to inquire whether the petitioner or his fellow worker more correctly perceived the commands of their common faith. Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation."). In fact, the sincerity of a claimant's engagement in a religious practice "is largely a matter of individual credibility ... [and] is rarely challenged." Tagore, 735 F.3d at 328 (citing Moussazadeh v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 703 F.3d 781, 791-92 (5th Cir. 2012)).
In the present case, Plaintiff has established a sincere religious belief that it cannot provide coverage for, facilitate access to, or enable the use of emergency contraceptives because they can end a human life. Plaintiff sincerely believes that any involvement in the use or provision of emergency contraceptives is a sin and is forbidden by its religion. The undisputed facts show that these beliefs are significant tenants of Plaintiff's faith. Moreover, the record shows that Plaintiff has fashioned its institutional identity and mission around its religious beliefs. Under RFRA, the inquiry then is whether the challenged regulations substantially burden Plaintiff's freedom to exercise
18

these beliefs. See Diaz, 114 F.3d at 71. If Plaintiff establishes a substantial burden on
religious exercise, the onus then shifts to "the [g]overnment to demonstrate that the
compelling interest test is satisfied through application of the challenged law 'to the
person'-the particular claimant whose sincere exercise ofreligion is being substantially
burdened." Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
430-31 (2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b))
The core of the parties' dispute in this and similar cases concerns the appropriate
inquiry for determining whether the challenged regulations impose a substantial burden
underRFRA:
The issue currently dividing district courts is whether the court's inquiry is limited to the magnitude of the pressure the government exerts in compelling the plaintiffs to self-certifytheir objection and thereby facilitate the provision of no-cost-sharing emergency contraceptive services to their employees, as the plaintiffs contend, or whether the court may (or must) also examine from an objective perspective the nature or quality ofthe acts or behavior the government compels or pressures the plaintiffs to perform, as the government contends. Compare Roman Catholic Archdiocese [of NY v. Sebelius, No. 12 Civ. 2542,] 2013 WL 6579764, at *14 {E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2013) ("The Court cannot say that 'the line plaintiffs drew was an unreasonable one.' Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715. "),with Priests for Life [ v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 13-1261,]2013 WL 6672400, at *10 (D. D.C. Dec. 19, 2013) (finding that "Plaintiffs have not stated a prima facie case under RFRA" because objectively viewed, completing the selfcertification form was not a substantial burden.").
ETBU, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 760. While RFRA does not define the term "substantial
burden," it explicitly refers to and adopts the Supreme Court's free exercise
jurisprudence, which should control the analysis. Id. (citation omitted); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb{b) (referencing Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398, and Yoder, 406 U.S. 205); Navajo Nation
v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1069 (9th Cir. 2008).
19

In Sherbert v. Verner, a Seventh-Day Adventist was denied unemployment
benefits pursuant to a South Carolina law requiring her to show good cause for failing
to accept available work because she refused to work on Saturday, the Sabbath of her
religion. 374 U.S. at 399-402. All levels of state administrative and judicial review
determined that her religious objections to Saturday work did not constitute good cause.
Id. at 401-02. However, the Supreme Court ruled that the disqualification for benefits
imposed a burden on the employee's religious exercise, and though perhaps "only an
indirect result of welfare legislation within the [government's] general competence to
enact," the burden was nevertheless substantial:
[I]f the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or all religions or is to discriminate invidiously between religions, that law is constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. [citation omitted] Here not only is it apparent that appellant's declared ineligibility for benefits derives solely from the practice of her religion, but the pressure upon her to forego that practice is unmistakable. The ruling forces her to choose between following the
precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one ofthe precepts ofher religion in order to accept work, on
the other hand. Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship.
Id. at 403-04 (emphasis added) (internal quotations).
The Supreme Court also found a substantial burden on religious exercise in
Wisconsin v. Yoder, where members of the Amish faith were convicted and fined for
violating a compulsory school-attendance law requiring" them to send their children to
school until age 16, despite their religious beliefs to the contrary. 406 U.S. at 208-09. The
plaintiffs did not enroll their 14- and 15-year-old children in high school because they
believed that formal education beyond eighth grade "was contrary to the Amish religion
20

and way of life ... [and that it] would not only expose [plaintiffs] to the danger of the
censure of the church community, but ... also endanger their own salvation and that of
their children." Id. at 209-10. The Supreme Court held as follows:
The impact of the compulsory-attendance law on respondents' practice of the Amish religion is not only severe, but inescapable, for the Wisconsin law affirmatively compels them, under threat of criminal sanction, to
perform acts undeniably at odds with fundamental tenets oftheirreligious
beliefs. [citation omitted] Nor is the impact of the compulsory-attendance law confined to grave interference with important Amish religious tenets from a subjective point of view. It carries with it precisely the kind of objective danger to the free exercise of religion that the First Amendment was designed to prevent. As the record shows, compulsory school attendance to age 16 for Amish children carries with it a very real threat of undermining the Amish community and religious practice as they exist today; they must either abandon belief and be assimilated into society at large, or be forced to migrate to some other and more tolerant region.
Id. at 218 (emphasis added).
In this circuit, a challenged law substantially burdens religious exercise "ifit truly
pressures the adherent to significantly modify his religious behavior and significantly
violate his religious beliefs." Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 570 (5th Cir. 2004) (defining
"substantial burden" in the analog context of the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA")).14 The effect on religion is substantial when,
for example, a law "influences the adherent to act in a way that violates his religious
beliefs" or "forces the adherent to choose between, on the one hand, enjoying some
generally available, non-trivial benefit, and, on the other hand, following his religious
14 As the Supreme Court noted in Hobby Lobby, the phrase "exercise of religion," as it appears in RLUIPA, must be interpreted broadly, and RFRA states that the same phrase, as used in RFRA, means "religious exercise as defined in RLUIPA."42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(4). It necessarily follows that the "exercise of religion" under RFRA must be given the same broad meaning that applies under RLUIPA.
2014 WL 2921709 at *8 n.5. See also Longoria v. Dretke, 507 F.3d 898, 901 (5th Cir. 2007) (stating that "the test under the RLUIPA is sufficiently the same as that previously imposed under RFRA").
21

beliefs. " Id. More broadly, courts have found a substantial burden on religious exercise if the
challenged law: (1) compels the adherent to do something his religion forbids; (2) forbids the adherent from doing something his religion requires; or (3) indirectly pressures, but does not directly compel, the adherent to act in a manner forbidden by his religion, or to refrain from acting in a manner required by his religion. See, e.g., Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 706 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting) (aggregating cases into three categories of substantial burden); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1138 (10th Cir. 2013), aff'd sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores. Inc., 2014 WL 2921709 (U.S. June 30, 2014); ETBU, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 762; see also Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18 (Where the government "denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists. While the compulsion may be indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is nonetheless substantial." (emphasis added)).
Here, it is undisputed that the accommodation requires Plaintiff to act by executing and submitting a self-certification, and that Plaintiff finds the act of selfcertification religiously offensive. It is also undisputed that the regulatory tax for failing to comply with the mandate and the assessable payment for failing to offer group health insurance coverage altogether are onerous. 15 Therefore, the question here "is not whether the government is directly compelling or putting substantial pressure" on
15 Although Defendants disagree with some of Plaintiff's descriptions concerning the financial penalties, Defendants do not argue that their coercive effect is insubstantial.
22

Plaintiffto act in a manner it finds inconsistent with the commands of its faith. ETBU, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 762. See also Zubik v. Sebelius, 983 F. Supp. 2d 576, 605 (W.D. Pa. 2013) ("The [glovernment acknowledges that the act of self-certification will require the [pllaintiff-entities to sign the self-certification and supply a third party with the names of the [pllaintiffs' respective employees so that the third-party may provide (and/or pay for) contraceptive products, services, and counseling."). The answer to that question is clearly yes: The challenged regulations require Plaintiff to self-certify or incur onerous
financial penalties. 16 Plaintiff believes this "Hobson's choice" is a quintessential substantial burden
under RFRA because the challenged regulations put substantial pressure on Plaintiff,
through threat of onerous fines, to "act contrary to [itsI religious beliefs by taking actions [itI deems to be impermissible facilitation of contraception." (Plaintiff's Memorandum in
Support, Doc. 92 at p. 23). What matters here, Plaintiff argues, is not "whether the government believes the accommodation is adequate to dispel Plaintiff's religious objections," but whether Plaintiff has an "honest conviction" that self-certification conflicts with its religion. (ld.) (citing Korte, 2013 WL 5960692, at *22). But according to Defendants, Plaintiff's sincere belief that "the regulations impose a substantial burden on its religious exercise by requiring it to 'facilitate' access to contraception does not make it so." (Defendants' Memorandum in Support, Doc. 81-1 at p. 23).

16 According to the Supreme Court, a law that forces an adherent to either forgo a benefit or abandon a

precept of his religion imposes "the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would

a fine imposed Court has held it nevertheless

against" the adherent for exercising that belief. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 405. While the that a generally applicable tax imposes no substantial burden on religious exercise, has recognized that an "onerous tax rate, even if generally applicable, might effectively

choke off an adherent's religious practices." Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal.,

493 u.s. 378, 392 (1990).

23

We are persuaded by a recent decision from our colleague in the Southern District
of Texas, East Texas Baptist University v. Sebelius. In a detailed and well-reasoned
opinion, Judge Lee Rosenthal considered whether a plaintiff's belief that a government-
compelled act is religiously offensive controls in the context of a RFRA challenge by
Baptist universities similarly situated to Plaintiff, concluding that
Fifth Circuit case law . . . supports the conclusion that the RFRA substantial-burden inquiry does not allow the court to discard the plaintiff's view that a government-compelled or government-coerced modification is substantial. ... [T]he unsettled issue does not appear to be whether the court must accept the plaintiffs' subjective view of whether they are compelled or pressured to act in a religiously offensive way, or whether the court must examine the nature and quality of the act to gauge whether it is offensive from some kind of objective perspective. The case law provides an answer to this question: the plaintiffs' view of whether the act is religiously offensive controls.
ETBU, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 765-66. For the reasons stated in ETBU, we reject Defendants'
argument and find Plaintiff's view that self-certification is religiously burdensome
controlling.
Next, Defendants contend that any burden on Plaintiff's religious exercise is at
most de minimis "because the regulations require virtually nothing" of Plaintiff.
(Defendants' Memorandum in Support, Doc. 81-1 at p. 19). In this regard, Defendants
suggest that both the character of the government-compelled acts, as well as the
magnitude ofthe religious burden, must be substantial. However, it is clear from the text
of RFRA that "substantial" refers only to the burden imposed by the government, not
to the conduct compelled by it. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb. Indeed, other district courts
considering similar arguments have squarely rejected them. In Archdiocese of New York,
for example, the court determined that
24

[t]his argument-which essentially reduces to the claim that completing the self-certification places no burden on plaintiffs' religion because "it's just a form"-finds no support in the case law.... [W]here a law places substantial pressure on a plaintiff to perform affirmative acts contrary to his religion, the Supreme Court has found a substantial burden without analyzing whether those acts are de minimis.
987 F. Supp. 2d 232, 250 (E.D. N.Y. Dec. 16, 2013) (citations omitted). Likewise, in ETBU, Judge Rosenthal observed that "[t]he Fifth Circuit considers whether a burden is insubstantial, that is, the compelling or coercive mechanism itself; not whether the modification [of behavior] is substantial. ... The case law supports the conclusion that the requirement of a 'substantial' burden focuses on the nature and effect of the government restraint." 988 F. Supp. 2d at 765-66 (emphasis in original).
Nevertheless, RFRA jurisprudence is clear that if the acts Plaintiff identifies as religiously offensive "are independent acts ofthird parties too far removed from [its] own conduct, then there may be no substantial burden." Id. at 766. If, however, the challenged regulations compel or pressure Plaintiff to "take or forebear from an action" itself, and it is Plaintiff's "own action or forbearance that [it] find[s] religiously offensive, there is a substantial burden" under RFRA. Id. We must therefore determine: (1) whether what Plaintiff objects to is an act that Plaintiff itselfis "compelled or pressured to do and that [it was] not already doing;" and (2) whether what Plaintiff is "required to do is sufficiently linked to what [Plaintiff itself has] identified as offensive to [its] religious faith to be burdensome." Id. Louisiana College has shown both that the challenged regulations compel it "to engage in an affirmative act"-the act of completing and submitting to its group health insurance issuer a self-certification-and that it finds this very act to be religiously offensive. Accordingly, we answer both questions in the
25

affirmative. We begin with the first question: whether what Plaintiff objects to is an act that
Plaintiff is compelled or pressured to do and one that Plaintiff was not already doing. There is no genuine dispute that well prior to the enactment of the mandate, Plaintiff directed its insurer to exclude coverage for emergency contraceptives. The parties disagree, however, as to whether self-certification requires Plaintiffto do anything more than it did previously. Defendants' position is that the challenged regulations require Plaintiffto do "next to nothing," except_what Plaintiffdid before their enactment or what it would do in their absence. (Defendants' Memorandum in Support, Doc 81-1 at p. 19). At least two courts have accepted this argument. See, e.g., Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 988 F. Supp. 2d 912, 920-25 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 20, 2013), aff'd, 743 F.3d 547 (7th Cir. Feb. 21, 2014); Priests for Life, 2013 WL 6672400 at *8.
In Priests for Life, the D.C. district court held that "[t]he accommodation[ ] to the contraceptive mandate simply [does] not require [p]laintiffs to modify their religious behavior." 2013 WL 6672400 at *8. Instead, the court found it "is entirely the activity of a third party[,] namely, the issuer," to provide the objectionable services, and that the plaintiff "plays no role in that activity." Id. For that reason, it held the challenged regulations did not substantially burden the plaintiffs' religious exercise. A day after Priests for Life was decided, an Indiana district court reached the same conclusion after finding the challenged regulations did not require the University of Notre Dame to modify its own actions, which decision was affirmed on appeal. Notre Dame, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 925, aff'd, 743 F.3d 547 (7th Cir. 2014). The court explained its reasoning as
26

follows:
[I]t is the compulsion to act contrary to religious beliefs that creates a substantial burden.... But as I see it, the act [of opting out by selfcertifying] isn't changing, it's the consequence of that act that is. In other words, it's not the self-certification form that 'transforms' Notre Dame's action into one it objects to. Instead, it's what the government and the TPA do, and Notre Dame can't exercise its RFRA rights to control the actions of others.
Id. (emphasis in original).
By contrast, in ETBU, Judge Rosenthal said the challenged regulations "compel
or pressure the plaintiff religious organizations themselves to perform an act that they
were not already doing." 988 F. Supp. 2d at 767. In reaching this conclusion, Judge
Rosenthal explained:
The act of self-certification does more than simply state the organization's religious objection to covering or paying for its employees to get emergency contraception. The self-certification act designates the organization's TPA as the TAP for contraception coverage. The act tells the TPA or issuer that it must provide the organization's employees coverage that gives those employees free access to emergency [contraceptive] devices and products. That act tells the TPA or issuer that it must notify the employees of that benefit.... [T]he self-certification form requires the organizations to do much more than simply protest or object. The purpose of the form is to enable the provision of the very contraceptive services to the organization's employees that the organization finds abhorrent. The form designates the organization's chosen TPA as the administrator for such benefits and requires the organization's chosen issuer or TPA to pay for the religiously offensive contraceptive services. The purpose and effect of the form is to accomplish what the organization finds religiously forbidden and protests. If the organizations do not act in the way the accommodation requires, they face onerous fines. On January 1, 2014, the plaintiffs will be compelled or pressured to do something that they did not have to do on December 31, 2013.
Id. at 766-67. Similarly, the Archdiocese of New York court was not persuaded that the
challenged regulations merely require religious organizations to instruct their TPAs not
27

to cover contraceptives, just as they did before and would do without the mandate, because "the self-certification would still transform a voluntary act that plaintiffs believe to be consistent with their religious beliefs into a compelled act that they believe forbidden. Clearly, plaintiffs view the latter as having vastly different religious significance than the former." 987 F. Supp. 2d at 251. In both decisions, the district courts accepted the plaintiffs' characterization of self-certification as facilitation of immoral conduct. The Zubik court likewise accepted the plaintiffs' belief that selfcertification equates to "facilitat[ing]!initiat[ing] the provision of contraceptive products, services and counseling" in concluding that the challenged regulations substantially burden the religious exercise ofreligious nonprofits associated with two exempt Catholic dioceses. 983 F. Supp. 2d at 605.
In the instant case, Louisiana College has the same religious belief that facilitating free access to emergency contraceptives is just as sinful and immoral as providing that access directly as did the plaintiffs in Zubik, Archdiocese of New York, and ETBU. Like those courts, we accept Plaintiff's characterization ofits beliefs because to hold otherwise would be to question whether Plaintiff has correctly interpreted "the commands of [its] common faith," which the Supreme Court has cautioned against. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716. Moreover, for the reasons stated in ETBU and Archdiocese of New York, we find the challenged regulations compel or pressure Plaintiff to perform an act it was not doing previously.
We also reject Defendants' suggestion that the determination of whether a government-compelled act is religiously burdensome depends on how much time or
28

effort is involved in performing the act. The fact that self-certification may only take "a matter of minutes" does not render the burden insubstantial. See, e.g., ETBU, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 768 ("It is insufficient to dismiss or discount the plaintiffs' religious objection to the act or forbearance based on the amount of work involved, as long as an act or forbearance on the plaintiffs' part is compelled or coerced by the government, including by the threat of large fines."); Archdiocese of N.Y., 987 F. Supp. 2d at 249 ("This argument-which essentially reduces to the claim that completing the self-certification places no burden on plaintiffs' religion because 'it's just a form'-finds no support in the case law."); Zubik, 983 F. Supp. 2d at 605 ("[T]he [c]ourt disagrees with the [g]overnment that [p]laintiffs' ability or inability to 'merely sign a piece of paper,' and thus comport with the 'accommodation,' is all that is at issue here."). In this case, we would go so far as to say that self-certification is vastly more than a mere "administrative" act. Rather, the challenged regulations and their application trigger a subterfuge requiring indirect action the regulations could not do if they applied to Plaintiff directly.
Turning to the second question of the connection between Plaintiff's own act and the religiously offensive result, Defendants assert that the actions Plaintiff finds objectionable are independent actions of third parties-namely, its employees' use of emergency contraceptives. Defendants further contend that Plaintiff's conduct is separated from these third-party acts "by 'a series of events' that must occur before the use of [emergency] contraceptives ... 'would come into play,"' and by the fact that the insurance issuer, rather than Plaintiff, "will actually contract, arrange, pay, and refer for
29

such services." (Defendants' Memorandum in Support, Doc. 81-1 at p. 26). Thus, Plaintiff's
"coerced" act of self-certification is too far removed from the use of emergency contraceptives by its employees to impose a substantial burden on the free exercise of
religion. (Id. at 18). In addition, Defendants aver that Plaintiff wants to prevent anyone
else from providing emergency contraceptives to its employees.
These arguments are similarly flawed. Although Defendants are correct that
Plaintiff objects to the use of emergency contraceptives on religious grounds, their argument overlooks the fact that Plaintiff also objects "to being required to actively
participate in a scheme to provide such services." Archdiocese of N.Y., 987 F. Supp. 2d at 250. Despite Defendants' suggestion to the contrary, Plaintiff acknowledges that a government-scheme to provide free coverage of emergency contraceptives that does not
involve Plaintiff would not violate its religious exercise under RFRA. Plaintiff does not agree, however, that the current accommodation scheme sufficiently insulates it from the immoral provision or use of emergency contraceptives, and, as we stated previously, it is not for this Court to say Plaintiff is wrong about its beliefs. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715
("Thomas drew a line, and it is not for us to say that the line he drew was an
unreasonable one. Courts should not undertake to dissect religious beliefs.").
The Zubik court rejected a similar attenuation argument, holding that
although the "accommodation" legally enables [p]laintiffs to avoid directly paying for the portion of the health plan that provides contraceptive products, services, and counseling, the "accommodation" requires them to shiftthe responsibility ofpurchasing insurance and providing contraceptive products, services, and counseling, onto a secular source. The [c]ourt concludes that [p]laintiffs have a sincerely-held belief that "shifting responsibility" does not absolve or exonerate them from the moral turpitude created by the "accommodation"; to the contrary, it still substantially
30

burdens their sincerely-held religious beliefs.
983 F. Supp. 2d at 606. Likewise, our colleague in the Southern District of Texas
determined that, while the act of self-certification is not sufficient for an organization's
employees to achieve free access to emergency contraceptives, self-certification is
"necessary to this result, and that is enough for RFRA." ETBU, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 768.17
Judge Rosenthal explained the causal link between the plaintiffs' self-certification and
the morally objectionable result as follows:
Both the TPA and issuer provide coverage and payment because the plaintiffs self-certify their unwillingness to do so through the plan itself. But the plaintiffs' employees can obtain such coverage and payment only as long as they are the plaintiffs' employees and on the plaintiffs' group health plan. It is the insurance plan that the religious-organization employer put into place, the issuer or TPA the employer contracted with, and the self-certification form the employer completes and provides the issuer or TPA, that enable the employees to obtain the free access to the contraceptive devices that the plaintiffs find religiously offensive.
Even accepting that the government has succeeded in preventing any payment by the religious organization for the religiously offensive devices, there is a causal link between the acts the plaintiffs must do under the accommodation and the provision of contraceptive devices and products to employees on a no-cost-sharing basis. The effort to accommodate the religious organizations by reducing their involvement in providing their employees with such access to emergency contraception did not end the plaintiffs' involvement so as to avoid required acts on their part that offend their faith.
17 See also, §UL, Korte, 735 F.3d at 685 (rejecting similar attenuation argument and stating that "the judicial duty to decide substantial-burden questions under RFRA does not permit the court to resolve religious questions or decide whether the claimant's understanding of his faith is mistaken." (citation omitted)); Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1142 ("[T]he question here is not whether the reasonable observer would consider the plaintiffs complicit in an immoral act, but rather how the plaintiffs themselves measure their degree of complicity." (citation omitted)); S. Nazarene Univ. v. Sebelius, No. 13-cv-1015, 2013 WL 6804265, at *8, n.4 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 23, 2013) ("The self certification is, in effect, a permission slip which must be signed by the institution to enable the plan beneficiary to get access, free of charge, from the institution's insurer or third party administrator, to the products to which the institution objects. If the institution does not sign the permission slip, it is subject to very substantial penalties or other serious consequences. Ifthe institution does sign the permission slip, and only ifthe institution signs the permission slip, institution's insurer or third party administrator is obligated to provide the free products and services to the plan beneficiary.").
31

Id. at 768-69. See also Catholic Diocese of Beaumont, 2014 WL 31652 at *8 ("Submitting the self-certification affidavit is not simply espousing a belief that [p]laintiffs hold. It is defined as an authorization for the TPA to provide coverage. It enables the exact harm that [p ]laintiffs seek to avoid, harm that [p]laintiffs find religiously forbidden."). Based on these decisions, we find that the government-compelled act of self-certification is sufficiently linked to what Plaintiff has identified as offensive to and burdensome on its religion: facilitating its employees' free access to emergency contraceptives.
One other point, not necessarily present in the other cases, is compelling in this one. As we observed above, the GuideStone Plan, which would be required under the accommodation to provide the contraceptive services in question, is itself a creature of and adjunct to the SEC. The effect, then, of Plaintiff's execution of the "purely administrative" form triggers payment for these objectionable services by GuideStone. Defendants' position that merely filling out a form imposes no substantial burden on religious exercise is particularly blinded to even the existence of the integral, faith-based relationship between and among the SEC, GuideStone, and Plaintiff. This relationship cannot be ignored in the picture and the playing out of the free exercise affiliations and the effects of the Act in this unusual situation.
In conclusion, because both failing to comply with the mandate and failing to provide group health insurance coverage altogether will result in onerous financial penalties, the only option available to Plaintiff is to violate its religious beliefs, either by providing coverage for emergency contraceptive services via its own affiliated GuideStone Plan, or by facilitating free access to such services through a self-certification
32

form. Accordingly, there is no genuine dispute of material fact that the challenged regulations substantially burden Plaintiff's free exercise of religion under RFRA.
2. Least Restrictive Means ofFurthering a Compelling Interest RFRA states that the " [g] overnment may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person ... is the least restrictive means of furthering [a] compelling governmental interest." 42 U.S. C. § 2000bb-1(b). Defendants' burden under RFRA is twofold: (1) that the mandate furthers an interest of the "highest order;" and (2) that the mandate is the least restrictive means of advancing that interest. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215 (deciding that the state's interest in universal compulsory education, while strong, is not "absolute to the exclusion or subordination of all other interests"). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b). Moreover, RFRA requires Defendants to show "that the compelling interest test is satisfied through application of the challenged law 'to the person'-the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially burdened." 0 Centro, 546 U.S. at 419-20 (citing 42 U.S. C.§ 2000bb-1{b)). In scrutinizing this claim, the Court must "look[] beyond broadly formulated interests justifying the general applicability of government mandates and scrutinize[] the asserted harm of granting specific exemptions to particular religious claimants." Id. at 431. It bears mentioning that, when confronted with markedly similar arguments to those advanced by Defendants here, every court to reach this issue in a case involving a religious nonprofit similarly situated to Plaintiff, and of which this Court is aware, has observed that the mandate and accommodation fail RFRA's compelling
33

interest test. 18
The "compelling governmental interests" identified by Defendants in this case are
two-fold: (1) promotion of public health; and (2) assuring that women have equal access
to preventive healthcare services. According to Defendants, the mandate advances these
interests by making emergency contraceptives readily available to women, which will
reduce unwanted pregnancies and related health problems for women and will remove
the cost-barrier that results in women being placed at a competitive disadvantage to men
because they are forced to forego preventive care. However, courts have noted that
[b ]y stating the public interests so generally, the government guarantees that the mandate will flunk the test. [The compelling interest test] requires a substantial congruity-a close "fit"-between the governmental interest and the means chosen to further that interest. Stating the governmental interests at such a high level of generality makes it impossible to show that the mandate is the least restrictive means of furthering them. There are many ways to promote public health and gender equality, almost all ofthem less burdensome on religious liberty.
Korte, 735 F.3d at 686. The government cannot prevail under RFRA by identifying
"'broadly formulated interests' that justify the 'general applicability of government
mandates."' ETBU, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 769 (quoting Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1143).
Instead, it must show with particularity how granting the requested exemption would
18 See, e.g., Archdiocese of St. Louis v. Burwell, No. 13-cv-02300, 2014 WL 2945859, at *9-10 (E.D. Mo. June 30, 2014); Brandt v. Burwell, No. 14-cv-00681, 2014 WL 2808910, at *6 (W.D. Penn. June 20, 2014); Colo. Christian Univ. v. Sebelius, No. 13-cv-02105, 2014 WL 2804038, at *8 (D. Colo. June 20, 2014); Dobson v. Sebelius, 13-cv-03326, 2014 WL 1571967, at *9-10 (D. Colo. April17, 2014); Archdiocese of Atlanta v. Sebelius, 1:12-cv-03489, 2014 WL 1256373, at *17-18 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 26, 2014); Ave Maria Found. v. Sebelius, 13-cv-15198, 2014 WL 117425, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 14, 2014); Catholic Diocese of Beaumont, 2014 WL 31652 at *8; ETBU, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 769-71; Diocese of Fort Wavne-S. Bend, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 1:12-cv-159, 2013 WL 6843012, at *15-17 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 27, 2013); Grace Schs. v. Sebelius, No. 3:12-cv-459, 2013 WL 6842772, at *14-16 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 27, 2013); S. Nazarene Univ. v. Sebelius, No. 13-cv-1015, 2013 WL 6804265, at *9-10 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 23, 2013); Geneva Call. v. Sebelius, No. 12-cv-0207, 2013 WL 6835094, at *11-14 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 2013); Roman Catholic Archdiocese of NY, 987 F. Supp. 2d at 252-57; Zubik, 983 F. Supp. 2d at 612. See also Diocese of Cheyenne v. Sebelius, No. 14-cv-21, 2014 WL 1911873, at *11 (D. Wyo. May 13, 2014).
34

adversely affect even an admittedly strong interest. 0 Centro, 546 U.S. at 431.
Plaintiff does not seriously dispute that the stated interests are compelling.
Instead, Plaintiff suggests that Defendants cannot show how granting Plaintiff a limited
religious exemption only from the four contraceptive methods that may prevent fertilized
eggs from implanting in the uterine wall would undermine these interests, and we agree.
According to Defendants,
[h]ouses of worship and their integrated auxiliaries that object to contraceptive coverage on religious grounds are more likely than other employers, including organizations eligible for the accommodations, to employ people of the same faith who share the same objection, and who would therefore be less likely to use contraceptive services even if such services were covered under their plan.
(Defendants' Memorandum in Support, Doc. 81-1 at pp. 32-33). Yet, Plaintiff has shown
it employs individuals who share its religious views regarding emergency contraception
and are therefore "less likely to use contraceptive services even if such services were
covered under their plan." (Id. at 32). Moreover, the record does not justify Defendants'
argument that granting Plaintiff "the much broader exemption it requests" would
undermine the government's ability to enforce the regulations effectively. (Id. at 33). As
Judge Rosenthal articulated in ETBU,
[t]hat argument depends on a showing that uniformity is critical such that granting the requested exemptions would undermine effective administration. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 102 S.Ct. 1051, 71 L.Ed.2d 127 (1982) (rejecting a claimed exception to the obligation to pay Sociai Security taxes in part because "mandatory participation is indispensable to the fiscal vitality of the social security system" and that the "tax system could not function if denominations were allowed to challenge the tax system because tax payments were spent in a manner that violates their religious belief."); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 700, 109 S.Ct. 2136, 104 L.Ed.2d 766 (1989). There are two problems with applying this argument to the religious exemption the plaintiffs seek.
35

First, there are many secular and religious exemptions already built into the ACA. Although the government justifies each, such as the exemptions for grandfathered plans and for statutorily defined religious employers (as opposed to religious nonprofit organizations), the number of exemptions seems inconsistent with a showing that granting the exemption the plaintiffs seek would undermine administrative efficacy. This is different from holding, as some courts have, that the existence of secular exemptions, such as for grandfathered plans or for small employers, undermines the government's ability to show that it is protecting a compelling interest in refusing an additional, religious exemption. See, e.g., Korte, 735 F.3d at 686; Gilardi [v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.], 733 F.3d [1208,] 1222-23 [(D.C. Cir. 2013)]. The fact that there are other exemptions does not in itself preclude the government from being able to show a compelling interest in applying the law to a particular religious organization or claimant. The point here is that if the government is opposing a RFRA exemption by asserting a general need for uniformity, the existence of a number of exemptions makes that more difficult. More important, the government's argument for uniformity does not depend on any specific showing relating to the ACA or the accommodation. Rather, it is based on general slippery-slope concerns that could be raised in response to any RFRA claim to an exception to a generally applicable law. Categorically relying on a need for uniformity is not sufficient under RFRA, but it is what the government has done here.
988 F. Supp. 2d at 769 n.8. Defendants have offered absolutely no evidence to support
their contention that granting Plaintiff the exemption it requests would have any impact
at all on the government's ability to enforce the mandate.
But even if we assume the stated interests in guaranteeing cost-free access to
emergency contraceptives are compelling, Defendants must also show that the mandate,
in light of the accommodation, is the "least restrictive means" for furthering these
interests. Again, we are guided by the well-reasoned opinion in ETBU:
The courts have identified several "less restrictive means" of serving the interests the government has identified than a total denial of the religious exemption request. One is to have the government provide the contraceptive services or coverage directly to those who want them but cannot get them from their religious-organization employers. See, e.g., Korte, 735 F.3d at 686. If the numbers seeking such services is small because ofthe organizations' emphasis on hiring employees who subscribe
36

to the same religious beliefs, the added tax consequence to the public from the religious-organization employers' refusal to pay would also be reduced. See Lee, 455 U.S. at 252 (rejecting a religious exemption from the tax laws on the basis that it would be too burdensome on taxpayers generally to pay taxes for those refusing to do so). Another alternative would be to have the government work with third parties to provide emergency contraception without requiring the plaintiffs' active participation. Korte, 735 F.3d at 686. Still another alternative could be to have the employee self-certify on an as-needed basis that their employer is a religious nonprofit that does not provide coverage for such services.
988 F. Supp. 2d at 770.
Here, in addition to the alternatives identified by the courts, Plaintiff has identified
other, less burdensome means for furthering the government's stated interests, such as
providing tax deductions, refunds, or credits to employees who must purchase
emergency contraceptives. Defendants claim they considered these alternatives "and
determined that they were not feasible because the agencies lacked statutory authority
to implement them; they would impose considerable new costs and other burdens on the
government; and they would otherwise be impractical." (Defendants' Memorandum in
Support, Doc. 81-1 at p. 35). Defendants also directed the Court's attention to a specific
section of the Administrative Record, which reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
[S]ome commenters asserted that the contraceptive coverage requirement is not the least restrictive means of advancing these compelling interests, and proposed various alternatives to these regulations. All of these proposals were considered, and it was determined that they were not feasible and/or would not advance the government's compelling interests as effectively as the mechanisms established in these final regulations and the preventive services coverage regulations more generally.
78 Fed. Reg. at 39,888. However, "[t]he regulation itself clearly announces that the
alternatives to the current regulations-including the contraceptive mandate-would not
advance the [g]overnment's interests 'as effectively as' the contraceptive mandate and
37

the 'accommodation.' Greater efficacy does not equate to the least restrictive means." Zubik, 983 F. Supp. 2d at 612 (emphasis in original). For these reasons, we find that Defendants have failed to meet their burden under RFRA.
In sum, Plaintiff has shown the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact that the challenged regulations substantially burden its religious exercise, and Defendants have failed to show that the challenged regulations are the least restrictive means of advancing a compelling governmental interest. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on its RFRA claim. Defendants' motion for summary judgment on the absence of a RFRA violation will therefore be denied.
B. Constitutional Claims In addition to the RFRA claim, Plaintiff asserts various claims under the First and Fifth Amendments. Under well-settled principles of constitutional law, this Court should not decide constitutional issues if the case can be disposed of on other, non-constitutional grounds. TeltechSys., Inc. v. Bryant, 702 F.3d232, 235 (5thCir. 2012) (quoting Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936)). For the reasons discussed above, we have concluded that Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its RFRA claim, and this resolution precludes the need to rule on Plaintiff's remaining constitutional claims. Therefore, Plaintiff's First and Fifth Amendment claims will be dismissed. C. Administrative Procedure Act Finally, Plaintiff alleges violations of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 500, et seq. As discussed above, however, we have found the challenged regulations themselves violate Plaintiff's rights under RFRA, and this conclusion does not depend on
38

an analysis of the APA. To make clear that the Court is entering a final judgment, Plaintiff's APA claim will also be dismissed. IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment (Doc. 81) will be DENIED in PART and Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 91) will be GRANTED in PART insofar as they pertain to Plaintiff's RFRA claim, which will be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. In all other respects, both motions will be considered '.'~0.OT. Disposition will follow by separate judgment.
~~. SIGNED on this day of August, 2014 at Alexandria, Louisiana.
DEE D. DRELL, CHIEF JUDGE ===::::. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
39

 
 Case 1:12-cv-00463-DDD-JDK Document 108 Filed 08/14/14 Page 1 of 2 PageID #: 1793

RECEI\TED

USDC, WESTERN D!STR!CT OF LA

TONY R. MOORE, CLERK

DATE ~ / /f / /~

~(!?

I

·-

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ALEXANDRIA DIVISION

LOUISIANA COLLEGE -vsKATHLEEN SEBELIUS, et al.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 12-0463 JUDGE DRELL
MAGISTRATE JUDGE KIRK

AMENDED JUDGMENT The Court having been informed of a confusing statement in disposition of this case in its Judgment of August 13, 2014, and for the reasons detailed in a separate ruling issued on August 13, 2014, the Court enters the following dispositions: (1) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim or, in the
Alternative, for Summary Judgment (Doc. 81) is hereby DENIED in PART, only as it pertains to Plaintiff's Religious Freedom and Restoration Act claim. In all other respects, Defendants' motion will be considered MOOT; and (2) Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 91) is hereby GRANTED in PART, as to Plaintiff's Religious Freedom and Restoration Act claim and insofar as we find the following federal regulations are invalid as to Plaintiff, Louisiana College: 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2713(a)(1)(iv); 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2713A(a); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2713(a)(1)(iv); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2713A(a); 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv); and45 C.F.R. § 147.131(b). In all other respects, Plaintiff's motion will be considered MOOT.

Case 1:12-cv-00463-DDD-JDK Document 108 Filed 08/14/14 Page 2 of 2 PageID #: 1794 Plaintiff's remaining claims under (1) the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause,
(2) the First Amendment Establishment Clause, (3) the First Amendment Free Speech Clause, (4) the First Amendment Freedom of Association Clause, (5) the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, and (6) the Administrative Procedure Act are hereby
DISMISSED as MOOT and WITHOUT PREJUDICE, reserving to Plaintiff the right to re-
urge such claims in the event the Court's ruling is not otherwise affirmed.
\?'-~<--
SIGNED on this /!/"dayof August, 2014 at Alexandria, Louisiana. DEE D. DRELL, CHIEF JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2

 
 Case: 14-31167 Document: 00513757929 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/14/2016

LYLE W. CAYCE CLERK

United States Court of Appeals
FIFTH CIRCUIT OFFICE OF THE CLERK
TEL. 504-310-7700 600 S. MAESTRI PLACE NEW ORLEANS, LA 70130

November 14, 2016
MEMORANDUM TO COUNSEL OR PARTIES LISTED BELOW:
No. 14-31167 Louisiana College v. Sylvia Burwell, Secretary, HHS, et al
USDC No. 1:12-CV-463

Enclosed is an order entered in this case.

Sincerely,
LYLE W. CAYCE, Clerk
By: _________________________ Shea E. Pertuit, Deputy Clerk 504-310-7666
Ms. Megan Barbero Mr. Gregory S. Baylor Mr. Bradley Philip Humphreys Mr. Adam Craig Jed Mr. James Michael Johnson Ms. Alisa Beth Klein Mr. Joshua Marc Salzman Mr. Kevin Hayden Theriot

Case: 14-31167 Document: 00513757939 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/14/2016
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
___________________
No. 14-31167 ___________________
LOUISIANA COLLEGE,
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
SYLVIA MATHEWS BURWELL, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, in her official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services; THOMAS E. PEREZ, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, in his official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Dept. of Labor; JACOB J. LEW, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, in his official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Dept. of Treasury; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY,
Defendants - Appellants
_______________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, Alexandria _______________________
Before JONES, SMITH, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
IT IS ORDERED that the Government’s motion for this court to issue an order that is materially identical to the orders issued by the Supreme Court in Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S.Ct. 1557, 1560 (2016) is GRANTED. The previous

Case: 14-31167 Document: 00513757939 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/14/2016
order herein holding in abeyance the Government’s appeal is amended to add the following: Nothing in this order, or in the opinions or orders of the district court, is to affect the ability of the Government to ensure that women covered by the College’s health plans “obtain, without cost, the full range of FDA approved contraceptives.” Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2807 (2014). Through this litigation, the College has made the Government aware of its view that it meets “the requirements for exemption from the contraceptive coverage requirement on religious grounds.” Id. at 2807. Nothing in this order, or in the opinions or orders of the district court, “precludes the Government from relying on this notice, to the extent it considers it necessary, to facilitate the provision of full contraceptive coverage” going forward by notifying the College’s third-party administrators of their obligation to make separate payments for contraceptives pending final resolution. Id. Because the Government may rely on this notice, the Government may not impose taxes or penalties on the College for failure to provide the relevant notice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Government’s unopposed motion for an extension of time to file a status report for 65 days is GRANTED.

 
 General Docket United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Court of Appeals Docket #: 14-31167 Nature of Suit: 2440 Other Civil Rights Louisiana College v. Eric Hargan, et al Appeal From: Western District of Louisiana, Alexandria Fee Status: United States

Docketed: 10/09/2014 Termed: 01/05/2018

Case Type Information: 1) Civil Rights 2) United States 3)

Originating Court Information:

District: 0536-1 : 1:12-CV-463

Originating Judge: Dee D. Drell, U.S. District Judge

Date Filed: 02/18/2012

Date NOA Filed:

Date Rec'd COA:

10/08/2014

10/08/2014

Prior Cases: None

Current Cases: Lead
Related 14-20112 14-31167 14-31167 15-40031 15-40031 15-40031 15-40031 15-40031

Member
14-31167 14-10241 14-40212 14-10241 14-10661 14-20112 14-31167 14-40212

Start

End

12/01/2014 12/09/2014 12/09/2014 01/23/2015 01/23/2015 01/23/2015 01/23/2015 01/23/2015

Panel Assignment: Not available

LOUISIANA COLLEGE Plaintiff - Appellee

Gregory Baylor Direct: 202-393-8690 Email: gbaylor@alliancedefendingfreedom.org Fax: 202-347-3622 [COR LD NTC Retained] Alliance Defending Freedom Suite 600

440 1st Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20001
James Michael Johnson, Esq. Direct: 318-658-9456 Email: mjohnsonlegal@gmail.com Fax: 318-658-9605 [NTC Retained] Kitchens Law Firm, A.P.L.C. Suite 248 2250 Hospital Drive Bossier City, LA 71111
Kevin Hayden Theriot Direct: 480-444-0020 Email: ktheriot@adflegal.org Fax: 480-444-0028 [COR NTC Retained] Alliance Defending Freedom 15100 N. 90th Street Scottsdale, AZ 85260
v.

THOMAS PRICE, SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, in his official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services Terminated: 10/04/2017
Defendant - Appellant

DON WRIGHT, ACTING SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, in his official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services Terminated: 10/19/2017
Defendant - Appellant

ERIC D. HARGAN, ACTING

Joshua Marc Salzman

SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

Direct: 202-532-4747

HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, in his Email: joshua.m.salzman@usdoj.gov

official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Dept. [COR LD NTC Government]

U.S. Department of Justice

of Health & Human Services Defendant - Appellant

Civil Division, Appellate Section Room 7258 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20530
Megan Barbero, Esq. Email: megan.barbero@mail.house.gov [COR NTC Government] U.S. Department of Justice Civil Division, Appellate Section 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20530

Bradley Philip Humphreys Email: bradley.p.humphreys@usdoj.gov [NTC Government] U.S. Department of Justice Civil Division Federal Programs Branch 20 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20530
Adam Craig Jed Email: adam.c.jed@usdoj.gov [COR NTC Government] U.S. Department of Justice Civil Division, Appellate Section 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20530

Alisa Beth Klein, Esq. Email: alisa.klein@usdoj.gov [COR NTC Government] U.S. Department of Justice Civil Division, Appellate Section 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20530

SYLVIA MATHEWS BURWELL, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, in her official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services Terminated: 02/10/2017
Defendant - Appellant

THOMAS E. PEREZ, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, in his official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Dept. of Labor Terminated: 04/28/2017
Defendant - Appellant

R. ALEXANDER ACOSTA, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, in his official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Dept. of Labor
Defendant - Appellant

Joshua Marc Salzman Direct: 202-532-4747 [COR LD NTC Government] (see above)
Megan Barbero, Esq. [COR NTC Government] (see above)

Bradley Philip Humphreys [NTC Government] (see above)

Adam Craig Jed [COR NTC Government] (see above)

Alisa Beth Klein, Esq. [COR NTC Government] (see above)

JACOB J. LEW, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, in his official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Dept. of Treasury Terminated: 02/14/2017
Defendant - Appellant

STEVEN T. MNUCHIN, SECRETARY, U.S. Joshua Marc Salzman

DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, in his

Direct: 202-532-4747

official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Dept. [COR LD NTC Government]

of Treasury

(see above)

Defendant - Appellant

Megan Barbero, Esq.

[COR NTC Government]

(see above)

Bradley Philip Humphreys

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
Defendant - Appellant
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Defendant - Appellant

[NTC Government] (see above)
Adam Craig Jed [COR NTC Government] (see above)
Alisa Beth Klein, Esq. [COR NTC Government] (see above)
Joshua Marc Salzman Direct: 202-532-4747 [COR LD NTC Government] (see above)
Megan Barbero, Esq. [COR NTC Government] (see above)
Bradley Philip Humphreys [NTC Government] (see above)
Adam Craig Jed [COR NTC Government] (see above)
Alisa Beth Klein, Esq. [COR NTC Government] (see above)
Joshua Marc Salzman Direct: 202-532-4747 [COR LD NTC Government] (see above)
Megan Barbero, Esq. [COR NTC Government] (see above)
Bradley Philip Humphreys [NTC Government] (see above)

Adam Craig Jed [COR NTC Government] (see above)

Alisa Beth Klein, Esq. [COR NTC Government] (see above)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY
Defendant - Appellant

Joshua Marc Salzman Direct: 202-532-4747 [COR LD NTC Government] (see above)
Megan Barbero, Esq. [COR NTC Government] (see above)
Bradley Philip Humphreys [NTC Government] (see above)
Adam Craig Jed [COR NTC Government] (see above)

Alisa Beth Klein, Esq. [COR NTC Government] (see above)
LOUISIANA COLLEGE,
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
ERIC D. HARGAN, ACTING SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, in his official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services; R. ALEXANDER ACOSTA, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, in his official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Dept. of Labor; STEVEN T. MNUCHIN, SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, in his official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Dept. of Treasury; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY,
Defendants - Appellants

10/09/2014
3 pg, 36.92 KB

CIVIL RIGHTS CASE docketed. NOA filed by Appellants Ms. Sylvia Matthews Burwell, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, Mr. Jacob J. Lew, Secretary, Department of

Treasury, Mr. Thomas E. Perez, Secretary, Department of Labor, HHS, LABR and TREA [14-31167] (RLL) [Entered: 10/09/2014 09:49 AM]

10/15/2014
4 pg, 180.72 KB

INITIAL CASE CHECK by Attorney Advisor complete, Action: Case OK to Process. [7753685-2] Initial AA Check Due satisfied.. Transcript order due on 10/30/2014 for Appellants Sylvia Matthews Burwell, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, Jacob J. Lew, Secretary, Department of Treasury, Thomas E. Perez, Secretary, Department of Labor, United States Department Of Health And Human Services, United States Department of Labor and United States Department of Treasury [14-31167] (RLL) [Entered: 10/15/2014 03:43 PM]

10/28/2014

Attorney Joshua M. Salzman added as counsel of record for Appellants HHS, LABR, TREA, Jacob J. Lew, Secretary, Department of Treasury, Thomas E. Perez, Secretary, Department of Labor and Sylvia Matthews Burwell, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services in 14-31167 [14-31167] (SBS) [Entered: 10/28/2014 03:44 PM]

10/28/2014
2 pg, 31.65 KB

TRANSCRIPT ORDER received from Appellants Ms. Sylvia Matthews Burwell, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, Mr. Jacob J. Lew, Secretary, Department of Treasury, Mr. Thomas E. Perez, Secretary, Department of Labor, HHS, LABR and TREA advising transcript unnecessary for appeal purposes. Date of Service: 10/28/2014 via US mail - Attorney for Appellant: Humphreys; email - Attorney for Appellant: Salzman; Attorney for Appellee: Johnson [14-31167] REVIEWED AND/OR EDITED. Advising transcript unnecessary for appeal purposes. Transcript Order ddl satisfied. Electronic ROA due on 11/12/2014. [14-31167] (Joshua Marc Salzman ) [Entered: 10/28/2014 04:42 PM]

10/31/2014

APPEARANCE FORM FILED by Attorney Joshua Marc Salzman for Appellant TREA in 14-31167, Attorney Joshua Marc Salzman for Appellant LABR in 14-31167, Attorney Joshua Marc Salzman for Appellant HHS in 14-31167, Attorney Joshua Marc Salzman for Appellant Jacob J. Lew, Secretary, Department of Treasury in 14-31167, Attorney Joshua Marc Salzman for Appellant Thomas E. Perez, Secretary, Department of Labor in 14-31167, Attorney Joshua Marc Salzman for Appellant Sylvia Matthews Burwell, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services in 14-31167 [14-31167] (MAC) [Entered: 10/31/2014 10:05 AM]

10/31/2014

APPEARANCE FORM FILED by Attorney(s) Adam Craig Jed for party(s) Appellant HHS Appellant TREA Appellant LABR

11/04/2014
11/17/2014 11/17/2014
4 pg, 91.34 KB
11/26/2014
4 pg, 91.48 KB
12/08/2014 12/09/2014 12/12/2014
3 pg, 83.24 KB

Appellant Jacob J. Lew, Secretary, Department of Treasury Appellant Sylvia Matthews Burwell, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services Appellant Thomas E. Perez, Secretary, Department of Labor, in case 14-31167 [14-31167] (RLL) [Entered: 10/31/2014 01:02 PM]
APPEARANCE FORM FILED by Attorney(s) Alisa Beth Klein for party(s) Appellant HHS Appellant TREA Appellant LABR Appellant Jacob J. Lew, Secretary, Department of Treasury Appellant Sylvia Matthews Burwell, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services Appellant Thomas E. Perez, Secretary, Department of Labor, in case 14-31167 [14-31167] (AJV) [Entered: 11/04/2014 03:59 PM]
ELECTRONIC RECORD ON APPEAL FILED. Exhibits on File in District Court? No. Electronic ROA deadline satisfied. [1431167] (SMH) [Entered: 11/17/2014 10:58 AM]
BRIEFING NOTICE ISSUED A/Pet's Brief Due on 12/29/2014 for Appellants Sylvia Matthews Burwell, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, Jacob J. Lew, Secretary, Department of Treasury, Thomas E. Perez, Secretary, Department of Labor, United States Department Of Health And Human Services, United States Department of Labor and United States Department of Treasury. [14-31167] (SMH) [Entered: 11/17/2014 10:58 AM]
UNOPPOSED MOTION filed by Appellants Ms. Sylvia Matthews Burwell, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, Mr. Jacob J. Lew, Secretary, Department of Treasury, Mr. Thomas E. Perez, Secretary, Department of Labor, HHS, LABR and TREA to stay further proceedings in this court. Reason: Identical legal questions are already being addressed by this Court in East Texas Baptist University v. Burwell, No. 14-20112 & cases consolidated with same. Date of service: 11/26/2014 via email - Attorney for Appellants: Jed, Klein, Salzman; Attorney for Appellee: Johnson [14-31167] (Joshua Marc Salzman ) [Entered: 11/26/2014 02:37 PM]
APPEARANCE FORM FILED by Attorney(s) Gregory S. Baylor for party(s) Appellee Louisiana College, in case 14-31167 [1431167] (RLL) [Entered: 12/08/2014 10:40 AM]
APPEARANCE FORM FILED by Attorney(s) Kevin Hayden Theriot for party(s) Appellee Louisiana College, in case 14-31167 [14-31167] (MAS) [Entered: 12/09/2014 10:22 AM]
COURT ORDER granting motion to stay further proceedings in this court filed by Appellants LABR, TREA, HHS, Mr. Jacob J.

Lew, Secretary, Department of Treasury, Mr. Thomas E. Perez, Secretary, Department of Labor and Ms. Sylvia Matthews Burwell, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, pending resolution by this Court in appeal nos. 14-20112, 14-10661, and 14-40212. [7785905-2] Stay Follow-up Due on 03/12/2015. Judge(s): JLD. [14-31167] (SEP) [Entered: 12/12/2014 01:51 PM]

12/19/2014

LETTER OF ADVISEMENT. Reason: Updated Caption [14-

2 pg, 82.7 KB 31167] (ST) [Entered: 12/19/2014 10:26 AM]

05/23/2016

APPEARANCE FORM Megan Barbero for the court's review. Lead Counsel? No.. THE IMAGE FOR THIS FILING WILL NOT BE VIEWABLE AS IT CONTAINS SENSITIVE INFORMATION. [14-31167] (Megan Barbero ) [Entered: 05/23/2016 01:49 PM]

05/23/2016

LETTER filed advising that the Supreme Court issued a per curiam

15 pg, 182.37 KB opinion in Zublik v. Burwell and other cases pending before it

"vacating the judgments below and remanding to the respective

United States Courts of Appeals. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule

45, the Supreme Court's judgment or mandate will not issue for at

least twenty-five days after the Court's opinion. Counsel is

studying the Zublik opinion and the remand orders and will file a

status report in 30 days. [14-31167] REVIEWED AND/OR

EDITED - The original text prior to review appeared as follows:

LETTER filed by Appellants Ms. Sylvia Mathews Burwell,

Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, Mr. Jacob J.

Lew, Secretary, Department of Treasury, Mr. Thomas E. Perez,

Secretary, Department of Labor, HHS, LABR and TREA

Notifying Court of pertinent Supreme Court orders. Date of

Service: 05/23/2016 via email - Attorney for Appellants:

Humphreys, Jed, Klein, Salzman; Attorney for Appellees: Baylor,

Johnson, Theriot [14-31167] (Joshua Marc Salzman ) [Entered:

05/23/2016 02:53 PM]

05/24/2016

APPEARANCE FORM FILED by Attorney(s) Megan Barbero for party(s) Appellant HHS Appellant Sylvia Mathews Burwell, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services Appellant Jacob J. Lew, Secretary, Department of Treasury Appellant LABR Appellant TREA Appellant Thomas E. Perez, Secretary, Department of Labor, in case 14-31167 [14-31167] (SBS) [Entered: 05/24/2016 09:17 AM]

05/24/2016

SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITIES (FRAP 28j) FILED by

11 pg, 288.13 KB Appellee Louisiana College Date of Service: 05/24/2016 via email

- Attorney for Appellants: Barbero, Jed, Klein, Salzman; Attorney

for Appellees: Baylor, Johnson, Theriot; US mail - Attorney for

Appellant: Humphreys [14-31167] (Gregory Baylor ) [Entered: 05/24/2016 04:02 PM]

06/22/2016
3 pg, 85.25 KB

STATUS REPORT advising the U.S. Supreme Court issued its judgment on 06/17/16, vacating the the judgments below and remanding the cases to the respective United States Courts of Appeals. Case is stayed pending resolution by this Court in appeal nos. 14-20112, 14-10661 and 14-40212. Stay Follow-up deadline updated to 07/22/2016. [14-31167] REVIEWED AND/OR EDITED - The original text prior to review appeared as follows: STATUS REPORT from Appellants Ms. Sylvia Mathews Burwell, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, Mr. Jacob J. Lew, Secretary, Department of Treasury, Mr. Thomas E. Perez, Secretary, Department of Labor, HHS, LABR and TREA Date of Service: 06/22/2016 via email - Attorney for Appellants: Barbero, Jed, Klein, Salzman; Attorney for Appellees: Baylor, Johnson, Theriot [14-31167] (Joshua Marc Salzman ) [Entered: 06/22/2016 12:57 PM]

06/27/2016
2 pg, 6.97 KB

STATUS REPORT advising that on 06/17/2016, the Supreme Court issued judgments in Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016), and related cases, vacating and remanding the cases to their respective Courts of Appeals. the Supreme Court "anticipate[d] that the Courts of Appeals w[ould] allow the parties sufficient time to resolve any outstanding issues between them." Consistent with that understanding, we are continuing to study the Zubik opinion and the remand orders. [14-31167] REVIEWED AND/OR EDITED - The original text prior to review appeared as follows: STATUS REPORT from Appellee Louisiana College Date of Service: 06/27/2016 via email - Attorney for Appellants: Barbero, Jed, Klein, Salzman; Attorney for Appellees: Baylor, Johnson, Theriot; US mail - Attorney for Appellant: Humphreys [14-31167] (Gregory Baylor ) [Entered: 06/27/2016 12:42 PM]

07/22/2016
8 pg, 124.26 KB

OPPOSED MOTION for this court to issue an order that is materially identical to the remand orders issued by the Supreme Court in Zubik, 136 S. Ct. at 1560-61; [8264024-2] UNOPPOSED MOTION to allow the government 65 days in which to submit its next status report. [8264024-2] Date of service: 07/22/2016. Response/Opposition due on 08/04/2016. [14-31167] REVIEWED AND/OR EDITED - The original text prior to review appeared as follows: OPPOSED MOTION filed by Appellants Ms. Sylvia Mathews Burwell, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, Mr. Jacob J. Lew, Secretary, Department of Treasury, Mr. Thomas E. Perez, Secretary, Department of Labor, HHS, LABR and TREA to extend time to file brief of appellee until

07/28/2016
08/15/2016
3 pg, 72.81 KB
08/16/2016
1 pg, 52.99 KB
08/16/2016

09/27/2016 at 05:00 pm [8264024-2]. Date of service: 07/22/2016 via email - Attorney for Appellants: Barbero, Jed, Klein, Salzman; Attorney for Appellees: Baylor, Johnson, Theriot; US mail Attorney for Appellant: Humphreys [14-31167] (Megan Barbero ) [Entered: 07/22/2016 02:26 PM]
RESPONSE DUE to motion for this court to issue an order that is materially identical to the remand orders issued by the Supreme Court in Zubik, 136 S. Ct. at 1560-61; [8264024-2] motion to allow the government 65 days in which to submit its next status report [8264024-3] filed by Appellants LABR, TREA, HHS, Mr. Jacob J. Lew, Secretary, Department of Treasury, Mr. Thomas E. Perez, Secretary, Department of Labor and Ms. Sylvia Mathews Burwell, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services in 14-31167. Response/Opposition deadline updated to 08/15/2016. [14-31167] (SEP) [Entered: 07/28/2016 01:49 PM]
UNOPPOSED MOTION to extend the time to file a response to the motion of the government for a Zubik order [8264024-3] filed by Appellants LABR, TREA, HHS, Mr. Jacob J. Lew, Secretary, Department of Treasury, Mr. Thomas E. Perez, Secretary, Department of Labor and Ms. Sylvia Mathews Burwell, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services in 14-31167 until 08/29/2016 [8283765-2]. [14-31167] REVIEWED AND/OR EDITED - The original text prior to review appeared as follows: UNOPPOSED LEVEL 1 EXTENSION REQUESTED by Appellee Louisiana College for filing Reply to Appellants Opposed Motion until 08/29/2016 at 11:59 pm. [1431167] (Gregory Baylor ) [Entered: 08/15/2016 12:57 PM]
CLERK ORDER granting motion to extend time to file a response filed by Appellee Louisiana College to the motion to issue an order that is materially identical to the remand order issued by the Supreme Court in Zubik, 136 S. Ct. at 1560-61. The response is due by 08/29/2016. [8283765-2] [14-31167] (CB) [Entered: 08/16/2016 07:55 AM]
RESPONSE DUE to motion for for this court to issue an order that is materially identical to the remand orders issued by the Supreme Court in Zubik, 136 S. Ct. at 1560-61 filed by Appellants LABR, TREA, HHS, Mr. Jacob J. Lew, Secretary, Department of Treasury, Mr. Thomas E. Perez, Secretary, Department of Labor and Ms. Sylvia Mathews Burwell, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services in 14-31167 [8264024-2], motion to allow the government 65 days in which to submit its next status report filed by Appellants LABR, TREA, HHS, Mr. Jacob J. Lew, Secretary, Department of Treasury, Mr. Thomas E. Perez, Secretary,

Department of Labor and Ms. Sylvia Mathews Burwell, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services in 14-31167 [82640243] [8269375-2] Response/Opposition deadline updated to 08/29/2016 [14-31167] (CB) [Entered: 08/16/2016 08:02 AM]

08/29/2016
9 pg, 296.62 KB

RESPONSE/OPPOSITION filed by Louisiana College [82960561] to the motion for extraordinary relief filed by Appellants LABR, TREA, HHS, Mr. Jacob J. Lew, Secretary, Department of Treasury, Mr. Thomas E. Perez, Secretary, Department of Labor and Ms. Sylvia Mathews Burwell, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services in 14-31167 [8264024-2], motion for extraordinary relief filed by Appellants LABR, TREA, HHS, Mr. Jacob J. Lew, Secretary, Department of Treasury, Mr. Thomas E. Perez, Secretary, Department of Labor and Ms. Sylvia Mathews Burwell, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services in 14-31167 [8264024-3] Date of Service: 08/29/2016 via email Attorney for Appellants: Barbero, Jed, Klein, Salzman; Attorney for Appellees: Baylor, Johnson, Theriot; US mail - Attorney for Appellant: Humphreys. [14-31167] (Gregory Baylor ) [Entered: 08/29/2016 06:09 PM]

09/07/2016

REPLY filed by Appellants Ms. Sylvia Mathews Burwell,

10 pg, 117.91 KB Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, Mr. Jacob J.

Lew, Secretary, Department of Treasury, Mr. Thomas E. Perez,

Secretary, Department of Labor, HHS, LABR and TREA

[8303055-1] to the response/opposition filed by Appellee

Louisiana College in 14-31167 [8296056-2], to the motion for

extraordinary relief filed by Appellants LABR, TREA, HHS, Mr.

Jacob J. Lew, Secretary, Department of Treasury, Mr. Thomas E.

Perez, Secretary, Department of Labor and Ms. Sylvia Mathews

Burwell, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services in

14-31167 [8264024-2],to the motion for extraordinary relief filed

by Appellants LABR, TREA, HHS, Mr. Jacob J. Lew, Secretary,

Department of Treasury, Mr. Thomas E. Perez, Secretary,

Department of Labor and Ms. Sylvia Mathews Burwell, Secretary,

Department of Health and Human Services in 14-31167 [8264024-

3]. Date of Service: 09/07/2016 via email - Attorney for

Appellants: Barbero, Jed, Klein, Salzman; Attorney for Appellees:

Baylor, Johnson, Theriot; US mail - Attorney for Appellant:

Humphreys. [14-31167] (Megan Barbero ) [Entered: 09/07/2016

02:11 PM]

09/07/2016

EXHIBITS IN SUPPORT of Reply to response/opposition

56 pg, 388.99 KB [8303055-2] filed by Appellants Ms. Sylvia Mathews Burwell,

Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, Mr. Jacob J.

Lew, Secretary, Department of Treasury, Mr. Thomas E. Perez,

Secretary, Department of Labor, HHS, LABR and TREA. Date of Service: 09/07/2016. [14-31167] (SEP) [Entered: 09/07/2016 02:30 PM]

09/14/2016

SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITIES (FRAP 28j) FILED by

13 pg, 176.32 KB Appellants Ms. Sylvia Mathews Burwell, Secretary, Department of

Health and Human Services, Mr. Jacob J. Lew, Secretary,

Department of Treasury, Mr. Thomas E. Perez, Secretary,

Department of Labor, HHS, LABR and TREA Date of Service:

09/14/2016 via email - Attorney for Appellants: Barbero, Jed,

Klein, Salzman; Attorney for Appellees: Baylor, Johnson, Theriot;

US mail - Attorney for Appellant: Humphreys [14-31167] (Megan

Barbero ) [Entered: 09/14/2016 01:09 PM]

09/20/2016
6 pg, 103.88 KB

SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITIES (FRAP 28j) FILED by Appellants Ms. Sylvia Mathews Burwell, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, Mr. Jacob J. Lew, Secretary, Department of Treasury, Mr. Thomas E. Perez, Secretary, Department of Labor, HHS, LABR and TREA Date of Service: 09/20/2016 via email - Attorney for Appellants: Barbero, Jed, Klein, Salzman; Attorney for Appellees: Baylor, Johnson, Theriot; US mail - Attorney for Appellant: Humphreys [14-31167] (Megan Barbero ) [Entered: 09/20/2016 01:07 PM]

09/26/2016
3 pg, 99.61 KB

STATUS REPORT advising that the Departments issued a Request for Information on 07/22/2016. Comment period closed on 09/20/2016. The Departments are evaluating the information submitted to determine whether changes to the current accomodation regulations should be made, and, if so, to inform the nature of those changes. Stay Follow-up deadline updated to 10/26/2016. [14-31167] REVIEWED AND/OR EDITED - The original text prior to review appeared as follows: STATUS REPORT from Appellants Ms. Sylvia Mathews Burwell, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, Mr. Jacob J. Lew, Secretary, Department of Treasury, Mr. Thomas E. Perez, Secretary, Department of Labor, HHS, LABR and TREA Date of Service: 09/26/2016 via email - Attorney for Appellants: Barbero, Jed, Klein, Salzman; Attorney for Appellees: Baylor, Johnson, Theriot; US mail - Attorney for Appellant: Humphreys [14-31167] (Megan Barbero ) [Entered: 09/26/2016 01:55 PM]

10/05/2016
8 pg, 262.7 KB

SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITIES (FRAP 28j) FILED by Appellants Ms. Sylvia Mathews Burwell, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, Mr. Jacob J. Lew, Secretary, Department of Treasury, Mr. Thomas E. Perez, Secretary, Department of Labor, HHS, LABR and TREA Date of Service: 10/05/2016 via email - Attorney for Appellants: Barbero, Jed,

Klein, Salzman; Attorney for Appellees: Baylor, Johnson, Theriot; US mail - Attorney for Appellant: Humphreys [14-31167] (Megan Barbero ) [Entered: 10/05/2016 09:48 AM]

11/14/2016
3 pg, 96.8 KB

COURT ORDER granting motion for this court to issue an order that is materially identical to the orders issued by the Supreme Court in Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S.Ct. 1557, 1560 (2016) filed by Appellants LABR, TREA, HHS, Mr. Jacob J. Lew, Secretary, Department of Treasury, Mr. Thomas E. Perez, Secretary, Department of Labor and Ms. Sylvia Mathews Burwell, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services; [8264024-2] granting unopposed motion for an extension of time to file a status report for 65 days filed by Appellants LABR, TREA, HHS, Mr. Jacob J. Lew, Secretary, Department of Treasury, Mr. Thomas E. Perez, Secretary, Department of Labor and Ms. Sylvia Mathews Burwell, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services. (IN DETAIL). Stay Follow Up Deadline updated to 01/18/2017. [8264024-3] Judge(s): EHJ, JES and JLD. [14-31167] (SEP) [Entered: 11/14/2016 10:01 AM]

01/10/2017
3 pg, 86.43 KB

STATUS REPORT. [14-31167] REVIEWED AND/OR EDITED - The original text prior to review appeared as follows: STATUS REPORT from Appellants Ms. Sylvia Mathews Burwell, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, Mr. Jacob J. Lew, Secretary, Department of Treasury, Mr. Thomas E. Perez, Secretary, Department of Labor, HHS, LABR and TREA Date of Service: 01/10/2017 via email Attorney for Appellants: Barbero, Humphreys, Jed, Klein, Salzman; Attorney for Appellees: Baylor, Johnson, Theriot [1431167] (Megan Barbero ) [Entered: 01/10/2017 01:50 PM]

01/10/2017
5 pg, 158.18 KB

DOCUMENT RECEIVED - NO ACTION TAKEN. No action will be taken at this time on the request for an extension of 60 days to file another status letter received from Appellants Ms. Sylvia Mathews Burwell, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, Mr. Jacob J. Lew, Secretary, Department of Treasury, Mr. Thomas E. Perez, Secretary, Department of Labor, HHS, LABR and TREA because any request for permission to file another status report in 60 days must be done by filing a formal motion. We will allow the filing only as to the status of the case. [14-31167] (CB) [Entered: 01/10/2017 02:31 PM]

02/15/2017
3 pg, 79.84 KB

STATUS REPORT requesting that the Court take no action at this time, to allow incoming leadership personnel adequate time to consider the issues. (Previously the Departments issued a Request for Information. On January 9, 2017, the Departments issued a response to a Frequently Asked Question.) Stay Follow-up

03/17/2017
3 pg, 79.38 KB
04/17/2017
3 pg, 79.42 KB
05/24/2017
3 pg, 79.82 KB

deadline updated to 03/17/2017. [14-31167] REVIEWED AND/OR EDITED - The original text prior to review appeared as follows: STATUS REPORT from Appellants Mr. Steven T. Mnuchin, Secretary, U.S. Department of Treasury, Mr. Thomas E. Perez, Secretary, Department of Labor, Mr. Thomas Price, Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, HHS, LABR and TREA Date of Service: 02/15/2017 via email Attorney for Appellants: Barbero, Jed, Klein, Salzman; Attorney for Appellees: Baylor, Johnson, Theriot [14-31167] (Joshua Marc Salzman ) [Entered: 02/15/2017 11:31 AM]
STATUS REPORT advising that the Court take no action at this time, to allow incoming leadership personnel adequate time to consider the issues. Stay Follow-up deadline updated to 04/17/2017. [14-31167] REVIEWED AND/OR EDITED - The original text prior to review appeared as follows: STATUS REPORT from Appellants Mr. Steven T. Mnuchin, Secretary, U.S. Department of Treasury, Mr. Thomas E. Perez, Secretary, Department of Labor, Mr. Thomas Price, Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, HHS, LABR and TREA Date of Service: 03/17/2017 via email - Attorney for Appellants: Barbero, Jed, Klein, Salzman; Attorney for Appellees: Baylor, Johnson, Theriot [14-31167] (Joshua Marc Salzman ) [Entered: 03/17/2017 12:18 PM]
STATUS REPORT advising that the Court take no action at this time, to allow leadership personnel adequate time to consider the issues. Stay Follow-up deadline updated to 05/17/2017. [14-31167] REVIEWED AND/OR EDITED - The original text prior to review appeared as follows: STATUS REPORT from Appellants Mr. Steven T. Mnuchin, Secretary, U.S. Department of Treasury, Mr. Thomas E. Perez, Secretary, Department of Labor, Mr. Thomas Price, Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, HHS, LABR and TREA Date of Service: 04/17/2017 via email Attorney for Appellants: Barbero, Jed, Klein, Salzman; Attorney for Appellees: Baylor, Johnson, Theriot [14-31167] (Joshua Marc Salzman ) [Entered: 04/17/2017 02:19 PM]
STATUS REPORT advising that the Court take no action at this time, to allow leadership personnel adequate time to consider the issues. Stay Follow-up deadline updated to 06/23/2017. [14-31167] REVIEWED AND/OR EDITED - The original text prior to review appeared as follows: STATUS REPORT from Appellants Mr. R. Alexander Acosta, Secretary, Department of Labor, Mr. Steven T. Mnuchin, Secretary, U.S. Department of Treasury, Mr. Thomas Price, Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,

06/23/2017
3 pg, 80.1 KB
07/24/2017
3 pg, 80.48 KB
08/23/2017
3 pg, 80.13 KB

HHS, LABR and TREA Date of Service: 05/24/2017 via email Attorney for Appellants: Barbero, Jed, Klein, Salzman; Attorney for Appellees: Baylor, Johnson, Theriot [14-31167] (Joshua Marc Salzman ) [Entered: 05/24/2017 03:22 PM]
STATUS REPORT advising that the new Administration has been analyzing the legal and policy issues presented by the regulations at issue here and has now initiated the rulemaking process. That process is ongoing. Stay Follow-up deadline updated to 07/24/2017. [14-31167] REVIEWED AND/OR EDITED - The original text prior to review appeared as follows: STATUS REPORT from Appellants Mr. R. Alexander Acosta, Secretary, Department of Labor, Mr. Steven T. Mnuchin, Secretary, U.S. Department of Treasury, Mr. Thomas Price, Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, HHS, LABR and TREA Date of Service: 06/23/2017 via email - Attorney for Appellants: Barbero, Jed, Klein, Salzman; Attorney for Appellees: Baylor, Johnson, Theriot [14-31167] (Joshua Marc Salzman ) [Entered: 06/23/2017 03:26 PM]
STATUS REPORT. The new administration has been analyzing the legal and policy issues presented by the regulations at issue here and has now initiated the rulemaking process. That process is ongoing. Stay Follow-up deadline updated to 08/23/2017. [1431167] REVIEWED AND/OR EDITED - The original text prior to review appeared as follows: STATUS REPORT from Appellants Mr. R. Alexander Acosta, Secretary, Department of Labor, Mr. Steven T. Mnuchin, Secretary, U.S. Department of Treasury, Mr. Thomas Price, Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, HHS, LABR and TREA Date of Service: 07/24/2017 via email - Attorney for Appellants: Barbero, Jed, Klein, Salzman; Attorney for Appellees: Baylor, Johnson, Theriot [14-31167] (Joshua Marc Salzman ) [Entered: 07/24/2017 03:23 PM]
STATUS REPORT. The new administration has been analyzing the legal and policy issues presented by the regulations at issue here and has now initiated the rulemaking process. That process is ongoing. Stay Follow-up deadline updated to 09/22/2017 [1431167] REVIEWED AND/OR EDITED - The original text prior to review appeared as follows: STATUS REPORT from Appellants Mr. R. Alexander Acosta, Secretary, Department of Labor, Mr. Steven T. Mnuchin, Secretary, U.S. Department of Treasury, Mr. Thomas Price, Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, HHS, LABR and TREA Date of Service: 08/23/2017 via email Attorney for Appellants: Barbero, Jed, Klein, Salzman; Attorney

for Appellees: Baylor, Johnson, Theriot [14-31167] (Joshua Marc Salzman ) [Entered: 08/23/2017 03:52 PM]

09/22/2017
3 pg, 93.43 KB

STATUS REPORT. The new administration has been analyzing the legal and policy issues presented by the regulations at issue here and has now initiated the rule-making process. That process is ongoing. Stay Follow-up deadline updated to 10/23/2017. [1431167] REVIEWED AND/OR EDITED - The original text prior to review appeared as follows: STATUS REPORT from Appellants Mr. R. Alexander Acosta, Secretary, Department of Labor, Mr. Steven T. Mnuchin, Secretary, U.S. Department of Treasury, Mr. Thomas Price, Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, HHS, LABR and TREA Date of Service: 09/22/2017 via email - Attorney for Appellants: Barbero, Humphreys, Jed, Klein, Salzman; Attorney for Appellees: Baylor, Johnson, Theriot [1431167] (Joshua Marc Salzman ) [Entered: 09/22/2017 03:56 PM]

10/05/2017

LETTER OF ADVISEMENT. Reason: Advising parties of the

2 pg, 132.59 KB updating caption that should be used in all future filings. [14-

31167] (SEP) [Entered: 10/05/2017 08:31 AM]

10/19/2017
2 pg, 132.6 KB

LETTER OF ADVISEMENT. Reason: Advising parties of the updated caption that should be used in all future filings. [14-31167] (SEP) [Entered: 10/19/2017 12:47 PM]

10/23/2017
3 pg, 89.47 KB

STATUS REPORT advising that on October 6, 2017, the Departments issued new regulations that modify the regulations at issue in this litigation. The parties are discussing an appropriate resolution of these appeals. We therefore ask that the Court maintain the existing abeyance in these cases. Stay Follow-up deadline updated to 11/22/2017. [14-31167] REVIEWED AND/OR EDITED - The original text prior to review appeared as follows: STATUS REPORT from Appellants Mr. R. Alexander Acosta, Secretary, Department of Labor, Mr. Eric D. Hargan, Acting Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Mr. Steven T. Mnuchin, Secretary, U.S. Department of Treasury, HHS, LABR and TREA Date of Service: 10/23/2017 via email Attorney for Appellants: Barbero, Humphreys, Jed, Klein, Salzman; Attorney for Appellees: Baylor, Johnson, Theriot [1431167] (Joshua Marc Salzman ) [Entered: 10/23/2017 04:31 PM]

11/22/2017
3 pg, 80.27 KB

STATUS REPORT. On October 6, 2017, the Departments issued new regulations that modify the regulations at issue in this litigation. The parties are discussing an appropriate resolution of these appeals. We therefore ask that the Court maintain the existing abeyance in these cases. Stay Follow-up deadline updated to 12/22/2017. [14-31167]

REVIEWED AND/OR EDITED - The original text prior to review appeared as follows: STATUS REPORT from Appellants Mr. R. Alexander Acosta, Secretary, Department of Labor, Mr. Eric D. Hargan, Acting Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Mr. Steven T. Mnuchin, Secretary, U.S. Department of Treasury, HHS, LABR and TREA Date of Service: 11/22/2017 via email - Attorney for Appellants: Barbero, Jed, Klein, Salzman; Attorney for Appellees: Baylor, Johnson, Theriot [14-31167] (Joshua Marc Salzman ) [Entered: 11/22/2017 08:09 AM]

12/22/2017
2 pg, 66.03 KB

STATUS REPORT advising that the parties are continuing to discuss an appropriate resolution of these appeals. Stay Follow-up deadline updated to 01/22/2018. [14-31167] REVIEWED AND/OR EDITED - The original text prior to review appeared as follows: STATUS REPORT from Appellants Mr. R. Alexander Acosta, Secretary, Department of Labor, Mr. Eric D. Hargan, Acting Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Mr. Steven T. Mnuchin, Secretary, U.S. Department of Treasury, HHS, LABR and TREA Date of Service: 12/22/2017 via email Attorney for Appellants: Barbero, Jed, Klein, Salzman; Attorney for Appellees: Baylor, Johnson, Theriot [14-31167] (Joshua Marc Salzman ) [Entered: 12/22/2017 03:07 PM]

01/05/2018
3 pg, 69.19 KB

UNOPPOSED MOTION filed by Appellants Mr. R. Alexander Acosta, Secretary, Department of Labor, Mr. Eric D. Hargan, Acting Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Mr. Steven T. Mnuchin, Secretary, U.S. Department of Treasury, HHS, LABR and TREA to dismiss appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 42 [8672983-2]. Date of service: 01/05/2018 via email Attorney for Appellants: Barbero, Jed, Klein, Salzman; Attorney for Appellees: Baylor, Johnson, Theriot [14-31167] (Joshua Marc Salzman ) [Entered: 01/05/2018 11:25 AM]

01/05/2018
3 pg, 213.64 KB

CLERK ORDER granting motion to dismiss appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 42 filed by Appellants LABR, TREA, HHS, Mr. Steven T. Mnuchin, Secretary, U.S. Department of Treasury, Mr. R. Alexander Acosta, Secretary, Department of Labor and Mr. Eric D. Hargan, Acting Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. [8672983-2] [14-31167] (SEP) [Entered: 01/05/2018 02:30 PM]

 
 Case 1:12-cv-00463-DDD-JDK Document 139 Filed 03/13/19 Page 1 of 5 PageID #: 1916
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA RECEIVED

MAR 13 2019
TONY R. MOO~CLERK BY: ---~@ .;,:.~~-­
DEPUTY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ALEXANDRIA DIVISION

LOUISIANA COLLEGE -vsKATHLEEN SEBELIUS, ET AL.

CASE NO. 12-CV-00463 JUDGEDRELL
MAG. JUDGE PEREZ-MONTES

RULING The original plaintiff in this litigation filed two motions within the same document (Doc. 123). We recount the procedural history of the case to clarify the underpinnings of this ruling and status of the case.
I. Procedural History
The original complaint was filed by Louisiana College ("LC") seeking several forms of relief from this court. LC' s main claim sought sanctuary under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, et seq. by judicial review of certain regulations requiring LC to, inter alia, self-certify that it was an "eligible organization" with a religious objection to providing contraceptive coverage in order to avoid the contraceptive mandate contained within the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA"), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), which would otherwise require employers, like LC, to provide employee health benefits including contraceptives as a covered benefit.
As have many other similarly-situated organizations, LC asserted that the regulations promulgated by the United States Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS"), the United States Department of Labor ("DOL") and the United States Department of Treasury ("Treasury") (collectively, "Agencies") impermissibly infringed upon its sincerely held religious beliefs and
1

Case 1:12-cv-00463-DDD-JDK Document 139 Filed 03/13/19 Page 2 of 5 PageID #: 1917
that it was entitled to an exemption from compliance with the both the contraceptive mandate and the self-certification exception based upon protections afforded to it by RFRA. (Docs. 1, 29, 77). LC's complaint initially sought injunctive relief. However, at that time, district courts across the country were simultaneously considering similar claims. Notably, because of the ruling of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, Denver, Colorado v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151 (lOth Cir. 2015), LC voluntarily withdrew its demand for injunctive relief. (Doc. 102). In Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S.Ct. 1557 (2016), the United States Supreme Court consolidated many of these cases, including cases from the Fifth and Third Circuits in which injunctive relief was denied and, recognizing the emerging feasibility of a workable compromise between the ACA's contraceptive mandate and petitioners' sincere desire to take no part in the provision of such benefit, vacated the circuits' prior rulings and remanded them to their respective circuit courts for disposition without expressing any view on the merits of the several claims. Id. at 1560.
While factually significant in terms of the larger national issues of religious freedom, the Zubik decision had only marginal effect in the instant case, given LC's voluntary withdrawal of its motion for injunctive relief. In short, this court has not ruled on the merits ofLC's prior motion for such relief. Instead, this case proceeded to decision on the merits by motion to dismiss and cross-motion for summary judgment. (Docs. 81, 91, 106, 107, 108). In our August 13, 2014 ruling and accompanying judgment, we found LC was entitled to relief under RFRA and ruled in LC' s favor. Finding that the relief afforded under RFRA disposed ofthe issues, we did not address LC' s constitutional claims. In addition, we designated our ruling as final. (Docs. 107, 107, 108).
The government appealed the ruling to the Fifth Circuit in October of 2014 and the appeal sat, essentially without action, until January 5, 2018. (Doc. 115). It is our understanding that this
2

Case 1:12-cv-00463-DDD-JDK Document 139 Filed 03/13/19 Page 3 of 5 PageID #: 1918
delay is owed mostly to the route of Zubik toward and through the U.S. Supreme Court and the time awaiting a decision in that matter. In any event, on January 5, 2018, the government' s appeal was voluntarily dismissed, and no further action was taken in this case until the current motion was filed in August of2018. (Doc. 123).
I. Louisiana College's Current Requests
LC makes three (3) current requests of this court. First, it takes the position that, because its motion for injunctive relief was withdrawn and before being argued before the court, the matter of injunctive relief is not final and a matter which might still be considered by this court. It asks this court for issuance of a permanent injunction in its favor recognizing its rights under RFRA in accordance with our prior ruling on the merits.
Next, LC asks for declaratory relief that, in the court' s view, is identical to the injunctive relief described above. LC vaguely requests a dyclaration of relationship between the parties that entitles it to some relief greater than that previously granted by this court in 2014. Though, again, no detail is provided as to what specific traits this declaratory relief would possess to make it somehow better than relief already obtained, we understand that its purpose would be to act as a shield for this court' s 2014 ruling and judgment. Recent edits to regulations intended to bolster the positions of entities like LC have generated a host of new litigation and this court is aware of the relative insecurity created by this climate. Inclusion of larger numbers and types of organizations within the ambit ofreligious objectors exempted from the ACA's contraceptive mandate now forms the basis of a multitude of lawsuits and, notably, nationwide injunctions. See, e.g. Pennsylvania v. Trump, 281 F.Supp.3d 553 (E.D. Pa. 2017).
While we understand LC ' s concerns, they do not translate into an actionable basis for relief in this court. LC is unable to articulate an actual harm at this point and, as such, this court would not
3

Case 1:12-cv-00463-DDD-JDK Document 139 Filed 03/13/19 Page 4 of 5 PageID #: 1919
be able to articulate a specific relief and is not permitted to render hypothetical relief. Gagliardi v. TJCV Land Trust, 889 F.3d 2018 (11th Cir. 2018) (Florida court's invalidation of proposed government expenditure rendered appellants' claims moot because any relief that could be fashioned by the court would have been hypothetical and such advisory ruling violates the justiciability requirement of constitutional standing). Of course, should some future circumstance bring actual harm to the relief afforded to LC under this court's 2014 ruling, it is free to file suit to protect its rights under that ruling, based on facts as they would then exist.
Finally, LC requests leave to bring an out-of-time claim for attorney fees. The record in this case is clear that the issue of attorney fees is barred, making this third request for relief an equitable one. Specifically, as reflected in its original and supplemental complaints (Docs. 81, 91, 106, 107, 108), LC requested attorney fees early on in this litigation. Following issuance of the court's August 2014 ruling and judgment, LC requested an extension oftime to file its motion for attorney fees, which was granted, permitting LC to file any such motion no later than 21 days after the issuance of a mandate by the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals as to any appeal that might be filed by the government. (Doc. 110). As recounted above, that mandate was issued on January 5, 2018, giving LC until January 26, 2018 to file its motion for attorney fees. The record shows that LC filed no motion for attorney fees and the delay afforded by the court has long expired.
This matter lies within the court's sound discretion and, in the interest of thorough consideration, we note several aspects of the choice we must make. First, the request is justifiably opposed by the government because of its potential precedential effect. Second, the request's arrival, some seven (7) months after its due date, is excessive in its untimeliness and is not owed to excusable neglect. Third, this case was allowed to proceed to ruling and judgment without further request from LC along the way. The court finds that permitting LC to reopen the issue of
4

Case 1:12-cv-00463-DDD-JDK Document 139 Filed 03/13/19 Page 5 of 5 PageID #: 1920

attorney fees at this time would neither be fair, nor appropriate and would substantially prejudice

the government in this case. Based on these conclusions, LC's claim for leave to file its untimely

attorney fee claim will be denied.

In conclusion, we express our mystification at these motions. LC possesses a favorable

final judgment decreeing and describing the protection of its religious freedoms from the ACA

and affiliated enactments. To grant the declaratory and/or injunctive relief LC seeks could

conceivably reopen the underlying proceedings to litigation that, given the now-existing

regulations and recent jurisprudence, may result in a less-favorable result. Recognizing the

government' s frank concession, on the record at oral argument, that the relief granted to LC by

this court in 2014 is final and that the government is bound by it, the court is convinced that LC ' s

current claims lack justiciability. Considering the foregoing, LC ' s claims for declaratory and

injunctive relief will be denied.

The court will issue a judgment in conformity with these findings.

AlexandriaJ.t2uisiana

<=--~---~-~-~ ~--------­

March -f-X.-":2019

DEE D. DRELL, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5

 
 U.S. District Court Western District of Louisiana (Alexandria) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:12−cv−00463−DDD−JDK

CLOSED

Louisiana College v. Sebelius et al Assigned to: Judge Dee D Drell Referred to: Magistrate Judge James D Kirk Demand: $0 Case in other court: 5CCA, 14−31167 Cause: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 02/18/2012 Date Terminated: 08/13/2014 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Defendant

Louisiana College

represented by Gregory Scott Baylor Alliance Defending Freedom (DC) 440 1st St N W Ste 600 Washington, DC 20001 202−393−8690 Fax: 202−347−3622 Email: gbaylor@ADFlegal.org LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David A Cortman Alliance Defending Freedom (GA) 1000 Hurrican Shoals Rd NE Ste D−1100 Lawrenceville, GA 30043 770−339−0774 Fax: 770−339−6744 Email: dcortman@alliancedefendingfreedom.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Denise Mayo Harle Alliance Defending Freedom (GA) 1000 Hurrican Shoals Rd NE Ste D−1100 Lawrenceville, GA 30043 770−339−0774 Fax: 770−339−6744 Email: dharle@ADFlegal.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Erik William Stanley Alliance Defending Freedom (KS) 15192 Rosewood Leawood, KS 66224 913−685−8000 Fax: 913−685−8001 Email: estanley@alliancedefendingfreedom.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James C Lewis Glenn Armentor Law Corp 300 Stewart St Lafayette, LA 70501 337−233−1471 Fax: 337−233−5655 Email: clewis@glennarmentor.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Kathleen Sebelius in her official capacity as Secretary of the U S Dept of Health & Human Services
Defendant

Kevin Hayden Theriot Alliance Defending Freedom (AZ) 15100 N 90th St Scottsdale, AZ 85260 480−444−0020 Fax: 480−444−0024 Email: ktheriot@alliancedefendingfreedom.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew S Bowman Alliance Defending Freedom (DC) 440 1st St N W Ste 600 Washington, DC 20001 202−393−8690 Fax: 202−347−3622 Email: mbowman@alliancedefendingfreedom.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven H Aden Alliance Defending Freedom (DC) 440 1st St N W Ste 600 Washington, DC 20001 202−393−8690 Fax: 202−347−3622 Email: saden@alliancedefendingfreedom.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
J Michael Johnson 2250 Hospital Dr Ste 248 Bossier City, LA 71111 318−658−9456 Fax: 318−658−9605 Email: mjohnsonlegal@gmail.com TERMINATED: 08/17/2018 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Bradley Philip Humphreys U S Dept of Justice Civil Division/Federal Programs 20 Massachusetts Ave N W Washington, DC 20530 202−514−3367 Fax: 202−616−8470 Email: bradley.p.humphreys@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY
Michelle Renee Bennett U S Dept of Justice Civil Division (MASS) 20 Massachusetts Ave N W Rm 7200 Washington, DC 20530 202−305−8902 Fax: 202−616−8470 Email: michelle.bennett@usdoj.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by

Hilda L Solis in her official capacity as Secretary of the U S Dept of Labor
Defendant Timothy Geithner in his official capacity as Secretary of the U S Dept of Treasury
Defendant U S Dept of Health & Human Services
Defendant U S Dept of Labor
Defendant U S Dept of Treasury
Amicus American Civil Liberties Union TERMINATED: 11/12/2013

Bradley Philip Humphreys (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY
Michelle Renee Bennett (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Bradley Philip Humphreys (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY
Michelle Renee Bennett (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Bradley Philip Humphreys (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY
Michelle Renee Bennett (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Bradley Philip Humphreys (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY
Michelle Renee Bennett (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Bradley Philip Humphreys (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY
Michelle Renee Bennett (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Justin Paul Harrison American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of LA P O Box 56157 New Orleans, LA 70156 504−522−0628 Email: harrison.justin.p@gmail.com LEAD ATTORNEY
Brigitte Amiri American Civil Liberties Union Foundation (NY) 125 Borad St 18th Fl New York, NY 10004 215−549−2633 Fax: 212−549−2650 Email: bamiri@aclu.org

Amicus
American Civil Liberties Union of Louisiana TERMINATED: 11/12/2013

PRO HAC VICE
Daniel Mach American Civil Liberties Union Foundation (DC) 915 15th St NW Washington, DC 20005 202−675−2330 Fax: 202−546−0738 Email: dmach@aclu.org PRO HAC VICE
Jennifer Lee American Civil Liberties Union Foundation (NY) 125 Borad St 18th Fl New York, NY 10004 212−549−2633 Fax: 212−549−2650 Email: jlee@aclu.org PRO HAC VICE
represented by Justin Paul Harrison (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY
Brigitte Amiri (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Daniel Mach (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Jennifer Lee (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE

Date Filed 02/18/2012
02/18/2012 02/20/2012
02/20/2012
02/22/2012 02/23/2012

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against Kathleen Sebelius, Hilda L Solis, Timothy Geithner, U S Dept of Health & Human Services, U S Dept of Labor and U S Dept of Treasury (Filing fee $350, receipt number 0536−1876104) filed by Louisiana College.(aty,Johnson, J) Modified on 2/22/2012 to edit text (Dauterive, C). (Entered: 02/18/2012)
CASE Assigned to Judge Dee D Drell and Magistrate Judge James D Kirk. (crt,Dauterive, C) (Entered: 02/23/2012)
2 MOTION for Erik William Stanley to Appear Pro Hac Vice (Admission fee: $25, receipt number 0536−1876198) by Louisiana College. (aty,Johnson, J) Modified on 2/23/2012 to reflect proposed order included within pdf of main document (Dauterive, C). (Entered: 02/20/2012)
3 MOTION for Kevin Hayden Theriot to Appear Pro Hac Vice (Admission fee: $25, receipt number 0536−1876205) by Louisiana College. (aty,Johnson, J) Modified on 2/23/2012 to reflect proposed order included within pdf of main document (Dauterive, C). (Entered: 02/20/2012)
4 CIVIL COVER SHEET by Louisiana College. (aty,Johnson, J) (Entered: 02/22/2012)
5 SUMMONS ISSUED as to U S Attorney, U S Attorney General, Kathleen Sebelius, Hilda L Solis, Timothy Geithner, U S Dept of Health & Human Services, U S Dept of Labor, U S Dept of Treasury (crt,Dauterive, C) (Entered: 02/23/2012)

02/24/2012 02/24/2012 02/24/2012 04/13/2012 04/13/2012 04/13/2012 04/13/2012 04/13/2012
04/13/2012 04/13/2012 04/16/2012 05/11/2012 05/11/2012 05/16/2012 05/17/2012 05/18/2012

6 CIVIL CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER NO 1 for cases assigned to Judge Dee D Drell sent to counsel of record. Plan of Work due 05/18/2012. (crt,Leleux, M) (Entered: 02/24/2012)
7 ORDER granting 2 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice for appearance of Erik William Stanley for Louisiana College. Signed by Magistrate Judge James D Kirk on 2/24/2012. (crt,Dauterive, C) (Entered: 02/27/2012)
8 ORDER granting 3 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice for appearance of Kevin Hayden Theriot for Louisiana College. Signed by Magistrate Judge James D Kirk on 2/24/2012. (crt,Dauterive, C) (Entered: 02/27/2012)
9 AFFIDAVIT of Service for all documents of record including Summons and Complaint served on Kathleen Sebelius on 03/13/2012, filed by Louisiana College. (aty,Johnson, J) (Entered: 04/13/2012)
10 AFFIDAVIT of Service for all documents of record including Summons and Complaint served on United States Department of Health & Human Services on 03/13/2012, filed by Louisiana College. (aty,Johnson, J) (Entered: 04/13/2012)
11 AFFIDAVIT of Service for all documents of record including Summons and Complaint served on United States Department of Labor on 03/21/2012, filed by Louisiana College. (aty,Johnson, J) (Entered: 04/13/2012)
12 AFFIDAVIT of Service for all documents of record including Summons and Complaint served on Hilda L. Solis on 03/13/2012, filed by Louisiana College. (aty,Johnson, J) (Entered: 04/13/2012)
13 (ELECTRONICALLY FILED IN ERROR) AFFIDAVIT of Service for all documents of record including Summons and Complaint served on United States Department of the Treasury on 03/13/2012, filed by Louisiana College. (aty,Johnson, J) Modified on 4/16/2012 to indicate "Electronically Filed in Error", counsel refiled as document 15 attaching correct pdf (Dauterive, C). (Entered: 04/13/2012)
14 AFFIDAVIT of Service for all documents of record including Summons and Complaint served on Timothy Geithner on 03/13/2012, filed by Louisiana College. (aty,Johnson, J) (Entered: 04/13/2012)
15 AFFIDAVIT of Service for all documents of record including Summons and Complaint served on United States Department of the Treasury on 03/13/2012, filed by Louisiana College. (aty,Johnson, J) (Entered: 04/13/2012)
16 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Louisiana College. U S Dept of Health & Human Services; U S Dept of Labor; U S Dept of Treasury served on 3/13/2012 through the the U S Attorney and the U S Attorney General, answer due 5/14/2012. (aty,Johnson, J) Modified on 4/17/2012 to edit text (Dauterive, C). (Entered: 04/16/2012)
17 NOTICE of Appearance by Bradley Philip Humphreys on behalf of Timothy Geithner, U S Dept of Health & Human Services, U S Dept of Labor, Kathleen Sebelius, Hilda L Solis, U S Dept of Treasury (aty,Humphreys, Bradley) (Entered: 05/11/2012)
18 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction by Timothy Geithner, U S Dept of Health & Human Services, U S Dept of Labor, Kathleen Sebelius, Hilda L Solis, U S Dept of Treasury. Motions referred to James D Kirk. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum / Brief)(aty,Humphreys, Bradley) (Entered: 05/11/2012)
19 MOTION for David A. Cortman to Appear Pro Hac Vice ( Admission fee: $25, receipt number 0536−1949512) by Louisiana College. Motions referred to James D Kirk. (aty,Johnson, J) Modified on 5/17/2012 to reflect proposed order included within pdf of main document (Dauterive, C). (Entered: 05/16/2012)
20 NOTICE of Motion Setting regarding 18 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Motions referred to James D Kirk. (crt,Dauterive, C) (Entered: 05/17/2012)
21 ORDER granting 19 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice for appearance of David A Cortman for Louisiana College. Signed by Magistrate Judge James D Kirk on 5/18/2012. (crt,Dauterive, C) (Entered: 05/18/2012)

05/18/2012 06/01/2012
06/01/2012 06/01/2012
06/01/2012
06/04/2012
06/06/2012 06/07/2012 06/11/2012 06/11/2012 06/11/2012 06/12/2012 06/13/2012
06/15/2012

22 MINUTE ENTRY: Rule 16 Scheduling Conference set for 6/14/2012 at 2:30 PM in Chambers before Judge Dee D Drell. Counsel must attend in person. Signed by Judge Dee D Drell on 05/18/12. (crt,Burge, J) (Entered: 05/22/2012)
23 PROPOSED Plan of Work by Louisiana College, Timothy Geithner, U S Dept of Health & Human Services, U S Dept of Labor, Kathleen Sebelius, Hilda L Solis and U S Dept of Treasury. (Attachments: # 1 Text of proposed order Proposed order)(aty,Theriot, Kevin) Modified on 6/4/2012 to add filers (Dauterive, C). (Entered: 06/01/2012)
24 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to Amend 1 Complaint, and to oppose Motion to Dismiss with consent by Louisiana College. Motions referred to James D Kirk. (Attachments: # 1 Text of proposed order)(aty,Theriot, Kevin) (Entered: 06/01/2012)
24 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 18 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, MOTION to Continue Rule 16 Scheduling Conference with consent by Louisiana College. ADMINISTRATIVE ENTRY as 24 Motion for Extension of Time to Amend Complaint electronically filed without selecting all reliefs requested within the pleading. (crt,Dauterive, C) Modified on 6/4/2012 to assign document number (Dauterive, C). (Entered: 06/04/2012)
Motions Transferred regarding 24 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to Amend 1 Complaint, MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 18 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and MOTION to Continue Rule 16 Scheduling Conference with consent. Motions referred to Dee D Drell. (crt,Dauterive, C) (Entered: 06/04/2012)
25 ORDER granting 24 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply re 18 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction ( Responses due by 6/11/2012); granting 24 Motion to Continue Rule 16 Conference. The Rule 16 Conference is reset for 7/17/2012 11:00 AM before Judge Dee D Drell. Signed by Judge Dee D Drell on 6/4/12. (crt,Roaix, G) (Entered: 06/04/2012)
26 MOTION for Steven H. Aden to Appear Pro Hac Vice ( Admission fee: $25, receipt number 0536−1968444) by Louisiana College. Motions referred to James D Kirk. (aty,Johnson, J) (Entered: 06/06/2012)
27 MOTION for Matthew S. Bowman to Appear Pro Hac Vice ( Admission fee: $25, receipt number 0536−1969164) by Louisiana College. Motions referred to James D Kirk. (aty,Johnson, J) (Entered: 06/07/2012)
28 ORDER granting 26 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice for appearance of Steven H Aden for Louisiana College. Signed by Magistrate Judge James D Kirk on 6/7/2012. (crt,Keifer, K) (Entered: 06/11/2012)
29 AMENDED COMPLAINT against All Defendants filed by Louisiana College.(aty,Theriot, Kevin) (Entered: 06/11/2012)
30 RESPONSE to Motion re 18 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction filed by Louisiana College. (aty,Theriot, Kevin) (Entered: 06/11/2012)
31 ORDER granting 27 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice for appearance of Matthew S Bowman for Louisiana College. Signed by Magistrate Judge James D Kirk on 6/8/2012. (crt,Dauterive, C) (Entered: 06/13/2012)
32 First MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 29 Amended Complaint with consent by Timothy Geithner, U S Dept of Health & Human Services, U S Dept of Labor, Kathleen Sebelius, Hilda L Solis, U S Dept of Treasury. Motions referred to James D Kirk. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed order)(aty,Humphreys, Bradley) (Entered: 06/13/2012)
33 ORDER granting 32 Motion for Extension of Time to Answer re 29 Amended Complaint: Timothy Geithner answer due 7/9/2012; U S Dept of Health & Human Services answer due 7/9/2012; U S Dept of Labor answer due 7/9/2012; Kathleen Sebelius answer due 7/9/2012; Hilda L Solis answer due 7/9/2012; U S Dept of Treasury answer due 7/9/2012. Signed by Magistrate Judge James D Kirk on 6/14/2012. (crt,Dauterive, C) (Entered: 06/15/2012)

07/06/2012
07/09/2012 07/10/2012 07/10/2012 07/13/2012 07/17/2012 07/18/2012 07/18/2012
07/19/2012 07/26/2012 08/07/2012 08/10/2012

34 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS re 18 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction filed by U S Dept of Labor, Timothy Geithner, Kathleen Sebelius, Hilda L Solis, U S Dept of Health & Human Services, U S Dept of Treasury RECOMMENDING that the motion be DENIED as MOOT. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that defendants be allowed to file a motion to dismiss pertaining to the amended complaint, if warranted. Objections to R&R due by 7/23/2012. Signed by Magistrate Judge James D Kirk on 07/06/12. (crt,Burge, J) (Entered: 07/09/2012)
35 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint by Timothy Geithner, U S Dept of Health & Human Services, U S Dept of Labor, Kathleen Sebelius, Hilda L Solis, U S Dept of Treasury. Motions referred to James D Kirk. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum / Brief)(aty,Humphreys, Bradley) (Entered: 07/09/2012)
36 NOTICE of Motion Setting regarding 35 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. Motions referred to James D Kirk. (crt,Dauterive, C) (Entered: 07/10/2012)
37 MOTION to Stay Discovery Pending Resolution of Motion to Dismiss by Timothy Geithner, U S Dept of Health & Human Services, U S Dept of Labor, Kathleen Sebelius, Hilda L Solis, U S Dept of Treasury. Motions referred to James D Kirk. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed order)(aty,Humphreys, Bradley) (Entered: 07/10/2012)
38 NOTICE of Motion Setting regarding 37 MOTION to Stay Discovery Pending Resolution of Motion to Dismiss. Motions referred to James D Kirk. (crt,Burge, J) (Main Document 38 replaced on 7/13/2012 to delete reference to LR 7.5 regarding the response deadline) (Burge, J). Modified on 7/13/2012 and regenerated nef (Burge, J). (Entered: 07/13/2012)
40 MINUTES (TEXT ONLY ENTRY − NO PDF ATTACHED) for proceedings held before Judge Dee D Drell: STATUS CONFERENCE held on 7/17/2012. (crt,Roaix, G) (Entered: 07/18/2012)
39 MOTION for Gregory Scott Baylor to Appear Pro Hac Vice ( Admission fee: $25, receipt number 0536−2002197) by Louisiana College. Motions referred to James D Kirk. (aty,Johnson, J) Modified on 7/19/2012 to indicate Proposed Order and Certificate of Good Standing included within pdf of main document (Dauterive, C). (Entered: 07/18/2012)
41 MINUTE ENTRY: Set Deadlines/Hearing as to 35 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, 37 MOTION to Stay Discovery Pending Resolution of Motion to Dismiss. Responses due by 8/10/2012, Replies due by 8/24/2012. Defendants shall produce a list of similar pending cases in other districts, including docket numbers, within 30 days. Signed by Judge Dee D Drell on 7/18/2012. (crt,Dauterive, C) (Entered: 07/18/2012)
42 ORDER granting 39 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice for appearance of Gregory Scott Baylor for Louisiana College. Signed by Magistrate Judge James D Kirk on 7/19/2012. (crt,Dauterive, C) (Entered: 07/19/2012)
43 JUDGMENT ADOPTING 34 Report and Recommendations; denying as MOOT 18 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants may file a motion to dismiss pertaining to the amended complaint if warranted. Signed by Judge Dee D Drell on 07/26/12. (crt,Guillot, M) (Entered: 07/26/2012)
44 NOTICE by Timothy Geithner, U S Dept of Health & Human Services, U S Dept of Labor, Kathleen Sebelius, Hilda L Solis, U S Dept of Treasury of pending challenges to the preventive services coverage regulations re 41 Minute Entry (aty,Humphreys, Bradley) Modified on 8/9/2012 to create docket entry relationship with 41 Minute Entry (Whidden, C). (Entered: 08/07/2012)
45 DEFICIENT MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 35 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint filed by Louisiana College. (aty,Bowman, Matthew) Modified on 8/13/2012 to reflect deficient status (Keifer, K). Modified on 8/14/2012 to remove ?; memorandum refiled as 48 (Keifer, K). (Entered: 08/10/2012)

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46 DEFICIENT MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 37 MOTION to Stay Discovery Pending Resolution of Motion to Dismiss filed by Louisiana College. (aty,Bowman, Matthew) Modified on 8/13/2012 to reflect deficient status (Keifer, K). Modified on 8/14/2012 to remove ?; memorandum refiled as 49 (Keifer, K). (Entered: 08/10/2012)
47 NOTICE of Deficiency to Matthew S Bowman on behalf of Louisiana College regarding 46 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion, 45 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion. Reason: For attorneys admitted pro hac vice, signature or endorsement of local counsel is required. (crt,Keifer, K) (Entered: 08/13/2012)
48 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 35 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint filed by Louisiana College. (aty,Johnson, J) (Entered: 08/13/2012)
49 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 37 MOTION to Stay Discovery Pending Resolution of Motion to Dismiss filed by Louisiana College. (aty,Johnson, J) (Entered: 08/13/2012)
50 REPLY to Response to Motion re 35 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint filed by Timothy Geithner, U S Dept of Health & Human Services, U S Dept of Labor, Kathleen Sebelius, Hilda L Solis, U S Dept of Treasury. (aty,Humphreys, Bradley) (Entered: 08/24/2012)
51 REPLY to Response to Motion re 37 MOTION to Stay Discovery Pending Resolution of Motion to Dismiss filed by Timothy Geithner, U S Dept of Health & Human Services, U S Dept of Labor, Kathleen Sebelius, Hilda L Solis, U S Dept of Treasury. (aty,Humphreys, Bradley) (Entered: 08/24/2012)
52 NOTICE by Timothy Geithner, U S Dept of Health & Human Services, U S Dept of Labor, Kathleen Sebelius, Hilda L Solis, U S Dept of Treasury of Supplemental Authority re 37 MOTION to Stay Discovery Pending Resolution of Motion to Dismiss, 35 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (aty,Humphreys, Bradley) (Entered: 08/27/2012)
53 MOTION for Leave to File Sur−Reply re 35 Motion to Dismiss, 37 Motion to Stay Discovery with opposition by Louisiana College. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed order)(aty,Johnson, J) Modified on 8/29/2012 to create link to proper pleadings. (Putch, A) (Entered: 08/28/2012)
Motions Transferred regarding 53 MOTION for Leave to File Sur−Reply with opposition . Motions referred to James D Kirk. (crt,Putch, A) (Entered: 08/29/2012)
54 RESPONSE to Motion re 53 MOTION for Leave to File Sur−Reply with opposition filed by Timothy Geithner, U S Dept of Health & Human Services, U S Dept of Labor, Kathleen Sebelius, Hilda L Solis, U S Dept of Treasury. (aty,Humphreys, Bradley) (Entered: 08/29/2012)
55 REPLY to Response to Motion re 53 MOTION for Leave to File Sur−Reply with opposition filed by Louisiana College. (aty,Johnson, J) (Entered: 08/31/2012)
56 ORDER granting 53 Motion for Leave to File Sur−Reply re 35 Motion to Dismiss and 37 Motion to Stay Discovery. Sur−Reply due on or before September 5, 2012. Signed by Magistrate Judge James D Kirk on 08/31/12. (crt,Burge, J) (Entered: 08/31/2012)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Compliance Deadline set for 9/5/2012 for Sur−Replies re 35 Motion to Dismiss, 37 Motion to Stay Discovery. (crt,Burge, J) (Entered: 08/31/2012)
57 SUR−REPLY in Opposition re 37 MOTION to Stay Discovery Pending Resolution of Motion to Dismiss, 35 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint filed by Louisiana College. (aty,Johnson, J) Modified on 9/7/2012 to edit text to more accurately identify document (Dauterive, C). (Entered: 09/05/2012)
58 MOTION for Leave to File Sur−Sur Reply with opposition by Timothy Geithner, U S Dept of Health & Human Services, U S Dept of Labor, Kathleen Sebelius, Hilda L Solis, U S Dept of Treasury. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed order)(aty,Humphreys, Bradley) (Entered: 09/07/2012)
Motions Transferred regarding 58 MOTION for Leave to File Sur−Sur Reply with opposition. Motions referred to James D Kirk. (crt,Dauterive, C) (Entered:

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09/10/2012)
59 ELECTRONIC ORDER denying 58 Motion for Leave to File Sur−reply (jud,Kirk, James) (Entered: 09/10/2012)
60 NOTICE of Supplemental Authority by Timothy Geithner, U S Dept of Health & Human Services, U S Dept of Labor, Kathleen Sebelius, Hilda L Solis, U S Dept of Treasury re 37 MOTION to Stay Discovery Pending Resolution of Motion to Dismiss, 35 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Legatus v. Sebelius)(aty,Humphreys, Bradley) Modified on 11/8/2012 to edit text (Dauterive, C). (Entered: 11/08/2012)
61 NOTICE of Supplemental Authority by Timothy Geithner, U S Dept of Health & Human Services, U S Dept of Labor, Kathleen Sebelius, Hilda L Solis, U S Dept of Treasury re 37 MOTION to Stay Discovery Pending Resolution of Motion to Dismiss, 35 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Catholic Diocese of Nashville v. Sebelius)(aty,Humphreys, Bradley) Modified on 11/27/2012 to edit text (Dauterive, C). (Entered: 11/26/2012)
62 NOTICE by Timothy Geithner, U S Dept of Health & Human Services, U S Dept of Labor, Kathleen Sebelius, Hilda L Solis, U S Dept of Treasury of Supplemental Authority re 37 MOTION to Stay Discovery Pending Resolution of Motion to Dismiss, 35 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Zubik v. Sebelius)(aty,Humphreys, Bradley) (Entered: 11/28/2012)
63 MINUTE ENTRY: Telephone conference set for 1/4/2013 at 11:00 AM before Magistrate Judge James D Kirk. Plaintiff's counsel instructed to initiate conference call. Signed by Magistrate Judge James D Kirk on 11/29/12. (crt,Burge, J) (Entered: 11/29/2012)
64 NOTICE of Supplemental Authority by Louisiana College (aty,Johnson, J) Modified on 12/12/2012 to edit text (Dauterive, C). (Entered: 12/10/2012)
65 NOTICE by Timothy Geithner, U S Dept of Health & Human Services, U S Dept of Labor, Kathleen Sebelius, Hilda L Solis, U S Dept of Treasury of Supplemental Authority, Response re 64 Notice (Other) (aty,Humphreys, Bradley) (Entered: 12/17/2012)
66 NOTICE by Timothy Geithner, U S Dept of Health & Human Services, U S Dept of Labor, Kathleen Sebelius, Hilda L Solis, U S Dept of Treasury of Supplemental Authority re 37 MOTION to Stay Discovery Pending Resolution of Motion to Dismiss, 35 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Wheaton College v. Sebelius − D.C. Cir., # 2 Exhibit Catholic Diocese of Biloxi v. Sebelius − S.D. Miss.)(aty,Humphreys, Bradley) (Entered: 12/28/2012)
67 MINUTES for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge James D Kirk: TELEPHONE CONFERENCE held on 1/4/2013. The parties and court discussed the status of the new regulations and of other pending litigation involving these same issues. The Court was advised that the regulations will be published for comment during the first quarter of this year and should be finally promulgated by August 2013. Plaintiff orally moved for a stay of these proceedings pending developments on both fronts. The District Judge will consider an Order for a stay of proceedings. (jud,Kirk, James) (Entered: 01/04/2013)
68 ORDER STAYING CASE. IT IS ORDERED that this case is STAYED until 8/15/2013 at which time the Government is ORDERED to provide this court with as status report as to the regulations and other relevant then pending litigation. Signed by Chief Judge Dee D Drell on 1/4/13. (crt,Kennedy, T) (Entered: 01/04/2013)
69 ORDER dismissing without prejudice 35 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction; dismissing without prejudice 37 Motion to Stay. Signed by Chief Judge Dee D Drell on 3/26/13. (crt,Roaix, G) (Entered: 03/26/2013)
70 STATUS REPORT by Timothy Geithner, U S Dept of Health & Human Services, U S Dept of Labor, Kathleen Sebelius, Hilda L Solis, U S Dept of Treasury. (aty,Humphreys, Bradley) (Entered: 08/15/2013)

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71 MINUTE ENTRY: A Telephone Status Conference is set for 9/10/2013 10:00 AM before Chief Judge Dee D Drell. Counsel for the defendants will initiate the call. Signed by Chief Judge Dee D Drell on 8/19/13. (crt,Roaix, G) (Entered: 08/20/2013)
72 MINUTES for proceedings held before Chief Judge Dee D Drell: TELEPHONE CONFERENCE held on 9/10/2013. (crt,Guillot, M) (Entered: 09/10/2013)
73 NOTICE by Timothy Geithner, U S Dept of Health & Human Services, U S Dept of Labor, Kathleen Sebelius, Hilda L Solis, U S Dept of Treasury and Louisiana College of Proposed Briefing Schedule upon agreement of the parties (Attachments: # 1 Proposed order)(aty,Humphreys, Bradley) Modified on 9/12/2013 to add filer (Dauterive, C). (Entered: 09/12/2013)
74 Joint MOTION for Leave to File Documents in Excess of Page Limits with consent by Timothy Geithner, U S Dept of Health & Human Services, U S Dept of Labor, Kathleen Sebelius, Hilda L Solis, U S Dept of Treasury and Louisiana College. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed order)(aty,Humphreys, Bradley) Modified on 9/12/2013 to add filer (Dauterive, C). (Entered: 09/12/2013)
75 ORDER SETTING BRIEFING SCHEDULING. Signed by Chief Judge Dee D Drell on 9/12/2013. (crt,Dauterive, C) (Entered: 09/16/2013)
76 ORDER granting 74 Motion for Leave to File Documents in Excess of Page Limits re 75 ORDER SETTING BRIEFING SCHEDULING. Signed by Chief Judge Dee D Drell on 9/12/2013. (crt,Dauterive, C) (Entered: 09/16/2013)
77 SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT against All Defendants filed by Louisiana College.(aty,Baylor, Gregory) Modified on 9/24/2013 to edit text (Dauterive, C). (Entered: 09/19/2013)
78 Ex Parte MOTION to Stay Briefing in Light of Lapse of Appropriations by Timothy Geithner, U S Dept of Health & Human Services, U S Dept of Labor, Kathleen Sebelius, Hilda L Solis, U S Dept of Treasury. Motions referred to James D Kirk. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed order)(aty,Humphreys, Bradley) (Entered: 10/01/2013)
Motions Transferred regarding 78 Ex Parte MOTION to Stay Briefing in Light of Lapse of Appropriations. Motions referred to Dee D Drell. (crt,Dauterive, C) (Entered: 10/01/2013)
79 ORDER granting 78 Motion to Stay. IT IS ORDERED that any and all deadlines in the captioned matter are continued for thirty (30) days. Signed by Chief Judge Dee D Drell on 10/2/13. (crt,Roaix, G) (Entered: 10/03/2013)
80 ORDER IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff is given until December 2, 2013 to filed any motion for injunctive relief. Responsive brief should be submitted in accordance with the standard rule of this Court. Signed by Chief Judge Dee D Drell on 10/31/13. (crt,Roaix, G) (Entered: 10/31/2013)
81 MOTION to Dismiss For Failure to State a Claim, or in the Alternative, MOTION for Summary Judgment by Timothy Geithner, U S Dept of Health & Human Services, U S Dept of Labor, Kathleen Sebelius, Hilda L Solis, U S Dept of Treasury. Motions referred to James D Kirk. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum / Brief, # 2 Statement of material facts)(aty,Humphreys, Bradley). Added MOTION for Summary Judgment on 11/4/2013 (Dauterive, C). Modified on 11/4/2013 to edit text (Dauterive, C). (Entered: 11/02/2013)
82 NOTICE of Motion Setting without oral argument regarding 81 MOTION to Dismiss For Failure to State a Claim, alternative, MOTION for Summary Judgment. Motions referred to Dee D Drell. Motion day set for 12/13/2013 before Chief Judge Dee D Drell. (crt,Dauterive, C) (Entered: 11/04/2013)
83 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Brief with consent by American Civil Liberties Union, American Civil Liberties Union of Louisiana. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Amicus Brief of ACLU and ACLU − LA, # 2 Proposed Order)(Attorney Justin Paul Harrison added to party American Civil Liberties Union(pty:am), Attorney Justin Paul Harrison added to party American Civil Liberties Union of Louisiana(pty:am))(aty,Harrison, Justin) Modified on 11/5/2013 to edit text (Dauterive, C). (Entered: 11/05/2013)

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84 MOTION for Daniel Mach to Appear Pro Hac Vice ( Admission fee: $105, receipt number 0536−2379311) by American Civil Liberties Union, American Civil Liberties Union of Louisiana. Motions referred to James D Kirk. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed order)(aty,Harrison, Justin) (Entered: 11/05/2013)
85 MOTION for Brigitte Amiri to Appear Pro Hac Vice ( Admission fee: $105, receipt number 0536−2379331) by American Civil Liberties Union, American Civil Liberties Union of Louisiana. Motions referred to James D Kirk. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed order)(aty,Harrison, Justin) (Entered: 11/05/2013)
86 MOTION for Jennifer Lee to Appear Pro Hac Vice ( Admission fee: $105, receipt number 0536−2379335) by American Civil Liberties Union, American Civil Liberties Union of Louisiana. Motions referred to James D Kirk. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed order)(aty,Harrison, Justin) (Entered: 11/05/2013)
87 ORDER granting 84 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice for appearance of Daniel Mach for American Civil Liberties Union and American Civil Liberties Union of Louisiana. Signed by Magistrate Judge James D Kirk on 11/7/2013. (crt,Dauterive, C) (Entered: 11/07/2013)
88 ORDER granting 86 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice for appearance of Jennifer Lee for American Civil Liberties Union and American Civil Liberties Union of Louisiana. Signed by Magistrate Judge James D Kirk on 11/7/2013. (crt,Dauterive, C) (Entered: 11/07/2013)
89 ORDER granting 85 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice for appearance of Brigitte Amiri for American Civil Liberties Union and American Civil Liberties Union of Louisiana. Signed by Magistrate Judge James D Kirk on 11/7/2013. (crt,Dauterive, C) (Entered: 11/12/2013)
90 ORDER denying 83 Motion for Leave to File Amicus Brief. Signed by Chief Judge Dee D Drell on 11/8/2013. (crt,Dauterive, C) (Entered: 11/13/2013)
91 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment by Louisiana College. (Attachments: # 1 Statement of material facts Plainitff's Statement, # 2 Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Statement of Material Facts, # 3 Index of Exhibits, # 4 Exhibit All Exhibits)(aty,Baylor, Gregory) Modified on 11/19/2013 to indicate Memorandum in Support electronically filed as document 92 (Dauterive, C). (Entered: 11/18/2013)
92 MEMORANDUM in Support re 91 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Louisiana College. (aty,Baylor, Gregory) (Entered: 11/18/2013)
93 NOTICE of Motion Setting without oral argument regarding 91 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment. Motions referred to Dee D Drell. Motion day set for 1/17/2014 before Chief Judge Dee D Drell. (crt,Dauterive, C) (Entered: 11/19/2013)
94 (WITHDRAWN) MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Louisiana College. (aty,Baylor, Gregory) Modified on 12/3/2013 to reflect memorandum in support filed as Doc 95 and to reflect consent of local counsel filed as 97 Corrective Document. (Putch, A) Modified on 1/7/2014 to indicate motion is "Withdrawn" pursuant to 104 Order (Dauterive, C). (Entered: 12/02/2013)
95 MEMORANDUM in Support re 94 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Louisiana College. (aty,Baylor, Gregory) Modified on 12/3/2013 to reflect consent of local counsel filed as 97 Corrective Document. (Putch, A) (Entered: 12/02/2013)
96 REPLY to Response to Motion re 81 MOTION to Dismiss For Failure to State a Claim, MOTION for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Plaintiff's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Timothy Geithner, U S Dept of Health & Human Services, U S Dept of Labor, Kathleen Sebelius, Hilda L Solis, U S Dept of Treasury. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts)(aty,Humphreys, Bradley) (Entered: 12/02/2013)
96 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 91 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Timothy Geithner, U S Dept of Health & Human Services, U S Dept of Labor, Kathleen Sebelius, Hilda L Solis, U S Dept of Treasury. ADMINISTRATIVE ENTRY as pleading electronically filed as 96 Reply to Response to Motion. Counsel is reminded that multiple pleadings should not be combined into one document, but

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should be filed separately. (crt,Putch, A) Modified on 12/3/2013 to add document number. (Putch, A) (Entered: 12/03/2013)
97 CORRECTIVE DOCUMENT entitled Corrected Signature Block filed by Louisiana College regarding 94 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction, 95 Memorandum in Support of Motion. (aty,Baylor, Gregory) Modified on 12/3/2013 to edit text. (Putch, A) (Entered: 12/03/2013)
98 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 91 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment with consent by Louisiana College. Motions referred to James D Kirk. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed order)(aty,Baylor, Gregory) (Entered: 12/03/2013)
Motions Transferred regarding 98 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 91 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment with consent. Motions referred to Dee D Drell. (crt,Dauterive, C) (Entered: 12/04/2013)
99 ORDER granting 98 Motion for Extension of Page Limit and Extension of Time to File Response/Reply re 91 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment. Replies due by 12/16/2013. It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff's reply may not exceed 35 pages. Signed by Chief Judge Dee D Drell on 12/5/2013. (crt,Dauterive, C) (Entered: 12/06/2013)
100 REPLY to Response to Motion re 91 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Louisiana College. (aty,Baylor, Gregory) (Entered: 12/16/2013)
101 ORDER re 94 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Louisiana College. Defendants' opposition due by 1/6/2014. Plaintiff's reply due by 1/13/2014. Hearing on Motion 94 set for 1/17/2014 at 1:15 PM in Alexandria, 2nd floor, before Chief Judge Dee D Drell. Signed by Chief Judge Dee D Drell on 12/19/13. (crt,Burge, J) (Entered: 12/20/2013)
102 Unopposed MOTION to Withdraw 94 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Louisiana College. Motions referred to James D Kirk. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit W.D. Okla. Decision in Reaching Souls Int'l v. Sebelius, # 2 Proposed order)(aty,Baylor, Gregory) (Entered: 01/06/2014)
Motions Transferred regarding 102 Unopposed MOTION to Withdraw 94 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction. Motions referred to Dee D Drell. (crt,Dauterive, C) (Entered: 01/07/2014)
103 MINUTE ENTRY: January 17, 2014 hearing re 94 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction is CANCELLED. Signed by Chief Judge Dee D Drell on 01/06/14. (crt,Burge, J) (Entered: 01/07/2014)
104 ORDER granting 102 Motion to Withdraw 94 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction. It is Further ORDERED that the 1/17/2014 hearing on the Motion for Preliminary Injunction is vacated. Signed by Chief Judge Dee D Drell on 1/7/2014. (crt,Dauterive, C) (Entered: 01/07/2014)
105 MINUTE ENTRY: Regarding attached letter from counsel for Louisiana College; at this time the Court does not see a need for oral argument and will proceed to decide the pending motion to dismiss and cross motions for summary judgment on the briefs. Signed by Chief Judge Dee D Drell on 1/9/2014. (Attachments: # 1 Letter regarding oral argument)(crt,Dauterive, C) (Entered: 01/10/2014)
106 MEMORANDUM RULING re 81 MOTION to Dismiss For Failure to State a Claim, MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by U S Dept of Labor, Timothy Geithner, Kathleen Sebelius, Hilda L Solis, U S Dept of Health & Human Services, U S Dept of Treasury, 91 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Louisiana College. Signed by Chief Judge Dee D Drell on 08/13/14. (crt,Burge, J) (Entered: 08/13/2014)
107 JUDGMENT DENYING IN PART defendants' 81 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment only as it pertains to plaintiff's Religious Freedom and Restoration Act claim. In all other respects, defendants' motion is considered MOOT. Further, JUDGMENT GRANTING IN PART plaintiff's 91 Cross−Motion for Summary Judgment as to plaintiff's Religious Freedom and Restoration Act claim and insofar as we find the following federal regulations are invalid as to plaintiff, Louisiana College: 26 C.F.R. Section

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54.9815−2713(a)(1)(iv); 26 C.F.R. Section 54.9815−2713A(a); 29 C.F.R. Section 2590.715−2713(a)(1)(iv); 29 C.F.R. Section 2590.715−2713A(a); 45 C.F.R. Section 147.130(a)(1)(iv); and 45 C.F.R. Section 147.131(b). In all other respects, plaintiff's motion is considered MOOT. Accordingly, plaintiff's Religious Freedom and Restoration Act claim is hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff's remaining claims under (1) the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause, (2) the First Amendment Establishment Clause, (3) the First Amendment Free Speech Clause, (4) the First Amendment Freedom of Association Clause, (5) the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, and (6), the Administrative Procedure Act are hereby DISMISSED as MOOT and WITHOUT PREJUDICE, reserving to plaintiff the right to reurge such claims in the event the Court's ruling is not otherwise affirmed. Signed by Chief Judge Dee D Drell on 08/13/14. (crt,Burge, J) (Entered: 08/13/2014)
108 AMENDED JUDGMENT: The Court having been informed of a confusing statement in disposition of this case in its August 13, 2014 Judgment, the Court enters the following dispositions: JUDGMENT DENYING IN PART defendants' 81 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment only as it pertains to plaintiff's Religious Freedom and Restoration Act claim. In all other respects, defendants' motion is considered MOOT. Further, JUDGMENT GRANTING IN PART plaintiff's 91 Cross−Motion for Summary Judgment as to plaintiff's Religious Freedom and Restoration Act claim and insofar as we find the following federal regulations are invalid as to plaintiff, Louisiana College: 26 C.F.R. Section 54.9815−2713(a)(1)(iv); 26 C.F.R. Section 54.9815−2713A(a); 29 C.F.R. Section 2590.715−2713(a)(1)(iv); 29 C.F.R. Section 2590.715−2713A(a); 45 C.F.R. Section 147.130(a)(1)(iv); and 45 C.F.R. Section 147.131(b). In all other respects, plaintiff's motion is considered MOOT. Plaintiff's remaining claims under (1) the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause, (2) the First Amendment Establishment Clause, (3) the First Amendment Free Speech Clause, (4) the First Amendment Freedom of Association Clause, (5) the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, and (6), the Administrative Procedure Act are hereby DISMISSED as MOOT and WITHOUT PREJUDICE, reserving to plaintiff the right to reurge such claims in the event the Court's ruling is not otherwise affirmed. Signed by Chief Judge Dee D Drell on 08/14/14. (crt,Burge, J) (Entered: 08/14/2014)
109 MOTION FOR EXTENSION of Time to File Motion for Attorneys Fees and Non−Taxable Expenses with consent by Louisiana College. Motions referred to James D Kirk. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed order)(aty,Baylor, Gregory) (Entered: 08/25/2014)
Motions Transferred regarding 109 MOTION FOR EXTENSION of Time to File Motion for Attorneys Fees and Non−Taxable Expenses with consent. Motions referred to Dee D Drell. (crt,Dauterive, C) (Entered: 08/26/2014)
110 ORDER granting 109 Motion for Extension. Signed by Chief Judge Dee D Drell on 8/27/14. (crt,DickersonSld, D) (Entered: 08/28/2014)
111 BILL OF COSTS by Louisiana College. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum / Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Bill of Costs)(aty,Baylor, Gregory) (Entered: 09/12/2014)
112 CLERKS TAXATION OF COSTS for Louisiana College (crt,Dauterive, C) (Entered: 09/24/2014)
113 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 106 Memorandum Ruling, 108 Judgment,,,,,, 107 Order on Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim,,,,,,, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,,,,,,,,,,, by Timothy Geithner, U S Dept of Health & Human Services, U S Dept of Labor, Kathleen Sebelius, Hilda L Solis, U S Dept of Treasury. (Filed on behalf of USA − Filing Fee not required) Appeal Record due by 10/23/2014. (aty,Humphreys, Bradley) (Entered: 10/08/2014)
USCA Case Number 14−31167 for 113 Notice of Appeal, filed by U S Dept of Labor, Timothy Geithner, Kathleen Sebelius, Hilda L Solis, U S Dept of Health & Human Services, U S Dept of Treasury. (crt,Lundy, N) (Entered: 10/20/2014)
ELECTRONICALLY CERTIFIED Record on Appeal to US Court of Appeals re 113 Notice of Appeal. To obtain the Record on Appeal, please log into CM/ECF and select Request for Record on Appeal event under the Appeal Documents category. (crt,Lundy, N) (Entered: 11/17/2014)

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114 LETTER (COURTESY COPY) from USCA to Joshua Marc Salzman that the appeal caption has been updated. Please use this caption in all future filings. (crt,Mitchell, Pam) (Entered: 12/19/2014)
115 USCA JUDGMENT/MANDATE (certified copy) as to 113 Notice of Appeal, filed by U S Dept of Labor, Timothy Geithner, Kathleen Sebelius, Hilda L Solis, U S Dept of Health & Human Services, U S Dept of Treasury that the appeal is DISMISSED as of January 05, 2018, pursuant to appellants motion. (USCA #14−31167) (crt,WalkerSld, B) (Entered: 01/08/2018)
116 DEFICIENT NOTICE by Louisiana College of Appearance of Christian Lewis (aty,Baylor, Gregory) Modified to reflect deficient status on 8/10/2018 (ThomasSld, T). Modified on 8/20/2018 to indicate corrected as 120 Motion to Substitute Attorney (Dauterive, C). (Entered: 08/10/2018)
117 DEFICIENT MOTION for Permanent Injunction , MOTION for Declaratory Judgment by Louisiana College. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum / Brief in Support, # 2 Proposed order)(aty,Baylor, Gregory) Modified to reflect deficient status on 8/10/2018 (ThomasSld, T). Modified on 8/20/2018 to indicate corrected and refiled as document 123 (Dauterive, C). (Entered: 08/10/2018)
118 NOTICE of Deficiency to Gregory Scott Baylor on behalf of Louisiana College regarding 116 Notice of Appearance. Reason: This party is already represented by other counsel. Please refer to provisions under LR83.2.12 regarding appearance of other counsel to ensure compliance with this rule. A motion to enroll as co−counsel or to substitute counsel (signed by the current counsel of record) is required to remedy this situation. Please also refer to LR5.7.08 regarding electronic filing of documents requiring signatures of more than one party. (crt,ThomasSld, T) (Entered: 08/10/2018)
119 NOTICE of Deficiency to Gregory Scott Baylor on behalf of Louisiana College regarding 117 MOTION for Permanent Injunction MOTION for Declaratory Judgment . Reason: For attorneys admitted pro hac vice, signature or endorsement of local counsel is required. Please refer to LR83.2.6 for more specific requirements. This party is already represented by other counsel. Please refer to provisions under LR83.2.12 regarding appearance of other counsel to ensure compliance with this rule. A motion to enroll as co−counsel or to substitute counsel (signed by the current counsel of record) is required to remedy this situation. Please also refer to LR5.7.08 regarding electronic filing of documents requiring signatures of more than one party. (crt,ThomasSld, T) (Entered: 08/10/2018)
120 MOTION to Substitute Attorney Christian Lewis in place of J. Michael Johnson with consent sought but not yet obtained by Louisiana College. Motions referred to Magistrate Judge James D Kirk. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed order)(Attorney James C Lewis added to party Louisiana College(pty:pla))(aty,Lewis, James) (Entered: 08/16/2018)
Motions Transferred regarding 120 MOTION to Substitute Attorney Christian Lewis in place of J. Michael Johnson with consent sought but not yet obtained. Motions referred to Magistrate Judge Joseph H L Perez−Montes. (crt,Williams, L) (Entered: 08/17/2018)
121 CERTIFICATE re 120 MOTION to Substitute Attorney Christian Lewis in place of J. Michael Johnson with consent sought but not yet obtained by James C Lewis on behalf of Louisiana College, indicating Consent (aty,Lewis, James) (Entered: 08/17/2018)
122 ORDER granting 120 Motion to Substitute Attorney Christian Lewis in place of J Michael Johnson. Attorney J Michael Johnson terminated. Signed by Magistrate Judge Joseph H L Perez−Montes on 8/17/2018. (crt,Dauterive, C) (Entered: 08/20/2018)
123 CORRECTED MOTION for Permanent Injunction, Motion for Declaratory Judgment filed by Louisiana College regarding 117 MOTION for Permanent Injunction MOTION for Declaratory Judgment . (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum / Brief, # 2 Proposed order)(aty,Lewis, James) Modified on 8/20/2018 to edit text and create motion event (Dauterive, C). (Entered: 08/20/2018)
123 MOTION for Declaratory Judgment by Louisiana College. ADMINISTRATIVE ENTRY to capture additional motion event; see pdf filed as 123 Corrected Motion for Permanent Injunction, Motion for Declaratory Judgment. (crt,Dauterive, C) Modified

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on 8/20/2018 to assign document number (Dauterive, C). (Entered: 08/20/2018)
Motions Transferred regarding 123 MOTION for Permanent Injunction, MOTION for Declaratory Judgment. Motions referred to Judge Dee D Drell. (crt,Dauterive, C) (Entered: 08/20/2018)
124 NOTICE of Motion Setting without oral argument regarding: 123 MOTION for Declaratory Judgment, 123 MOTION for Permanent Injunction. Motion day set for 10/12/2018 before Judge Dee D Drell. (crt,Roaix, G) (Entered: 08/22/2018)
125 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 123 MOTION for Declaratory Judgment, 123 MOTION for Permanent Injunction filed by Timothy Geithner, U S Dept of Health & Human Services, U S Dept of Labor, Kathleen Sebelius, Hilda L Solis, U S Dept of Treasury. (aty,Bennett, Michelle) (Entered: 09/12/2018)
126 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 123 MOTION for Permanent Injunction with consent by Louisiana College. Motions referred to James D Kirk. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed order)(aty,Baylor, Gregory) (Entered: 09/18/2018)
Motions Transferred regarding 126 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 123 MOTION for Permanent Injunction with consent. Motions referred to Judge Dee D Drell. (crt,Dauterive, C) (Entered: 09/18/2018)
127 ORDER granting 126 Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply re 123 MOTION for Declaratory Judgment and for Permanent Injunction. Replies due by 10/1/2018. Signed by Judge Dee D Drell on 9/19/2018. (crt,Roaix, G) (Entered: 09/19/2018)
128 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 123 MOTION for Permanent Injunction with consent by Louisiana College. Motions referred to James D Kirk. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed order)(aty,Baylor, Gregory) (Entered: 09/27/2018)
Motions Transferred regarding 128 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 123 MOTION for Permanent Injunction with consent . Motions referred to Judge Dee D Drell. (crt,Williams, L) (Entered: 09/28/2018)
129 ORDER granting 128 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply re 123 MOTION for Declaratory Judgment, 123 MOTION for Permanent Injunction. Replies due by 10/11/2018.. Signed by Judge Dee D Drell on 10/1/2018. (crt,Roaix, G) (Entered: 10/01/2018)
130 REPLY to Response to Motion re 123 MOTION for Declaratory Judgment, 123 MOTION for Permanent Injunction filed by Louisiana College. (aty,Baylor, Gregory) (Entered: 10/11/2018)
131 ORDER SETTING 123 MOTION for Permanent Injunction : Motion day set for 2/6/2019 10:30 AM in Alexandria, 2nd floor before Judge Dee D Drell. Signed by Judge Dee D Drell on 1/28/2019. (crt,Roaix, G) (Entered: 01/29/2019)
132 MOTION for Denise Harle to Appear Pro Hac Vice ( Admission fee: $105, receipt number 0536−3868571) by Louisiana College. Motions referred to James D Kirk. (Attachments: # 1 Text of proposed order)(aty,Baylor, Gregory) (Entered: 02/05/2019)
133 Ex Parte MOTION to Change Trial Attorney Designation from Kevin H. Theriot to Gregory S. Baylor by Louisiana College. Motions referred to James D Kirk. (aty,Baylor, Gregory) Modified on 2/5/2019 to reflect deficient status (Dauterive, C). Modified on 2/6/2019 to remove deficient status; see 135 Corrective Document (Dauterive, C). (Entered: 02/05/2019)
134 NOTICE of Deficiency to Gregory Scott Baylor on behalf of Louisiana College regarding 133 Ex Parte MOTION to Change Trial Attorney Designation from Kevin H. Theriot to Gregory S. Baylor. Reason: no proposed order accompanied this motion. (crt,Dauterive, C) (Entered: 02/05/2019)
135 CORRECTIVE DOCUMENT entitled Ex Parte Motion to Change Trial Attorney Designation filed by Louisiana College regarding 133 Ex Parte MOTION to Change Trial Attorney Designation from Kevin H. Theriot to Gregory S. Baylor . (Attachments: # 1 Text of proposed order)(aty,Baylor, Gregory) (Entered: 02/05/2019)

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Motions Transferred regarding 133 Ex Parte MOTION to Change Trial Attorney Designation from Kevin H. Theriot to Gregory S. Baylor. Motions referred to Judge Dee D Drell. (crt,Dauterive, C) (Entered: 02/06/2019)
136 MINUTES for proceedings held before Judge Dee D Drell: taking under advisement 123 Motion for Permanent Injunction ; taking under advisement 123 Motion for Declaratory Judgment; MOTION HEARING held on 2/6/2019 (Court Reporter: Gayle Wear) (crt,Roaix, G) (Entered: 02/06/2019)
137 ORDER granting 132 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice for appearance of Denise Mayo Harle for Louisiana College. Signed by Magistrate Judge Joseph H L Perez−Montes on 2/6/2019. (crt,Dauterive, C) (Entered: 02/07/2019)
138 ORDER granting 133 Motion to Change Trial Attorney Designation from Kevin H. Theriot to Gregory S. Baylor. Signed by Judge Dee D Drell on 2/6/2019. (crt,Dauterive, C) (Entered: 02/07/2019)
139 MEMORANDUM RULING re 123 MOTION for Declaratory Judgment filed by Louisiana College, 123 MOTION for Permanent Injunction filed by Louisiana College. Signed by Judge Dee D Drell on 3/12/2019. (crt,Bunting, M) (Entered: 03/13/2019)
140 JUDGMENT denying 123 Motion for Permanent Injunction; denying 123 Motion for Declaratory Judgment. FURTHER ORDERED that the request for leave to file an untimely motion for attorney fees incorporated in LC's MOtion 123 is also denied. Signed by Judge Dee D Drell on 3/12/2019. (crt,Bunting, M) (Entered: 03/13/2019)