Case 3:01-cv-02240 Document 1 Filed 11/07/20011" Pl ioa'"Ug. dre>.';')1'ToI'''..'ftC6TCOURT "lRTHE~ DISTRICT OFTEXAs

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FILED

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TEXCA!l:j~):~-:R-K:,-U_.S._DIS_TR1_CT.CJOURT

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY }

COMMISSION,

}

}

Plaintiff,

}

}

v.

}

}

}

I-SECTOR CORPORATION,

}

}

}

}

Defendant.

}

-------------------------------}

--------~D~~ru~!y------ __J

CIVIL ACTION NO.

3~ (}l C V~24 O)~~~

COMPLAINT

--

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

NATURE OF THE ACTION This is an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to correct unlawful employment practices on the basis of sex and to provide appropriate reliefto Carrie Harris and aggrieved individual Dana Bartlett who were subjected to a sexually hostile work environment, sex-based discrimination and constructive discharge.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 1. Jurisdiction ofthis Court is invokedpursuantto 28 U.S.C. §§451, 1331, 1337, 1343, and 1345. This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to Section 706(f)(1) and (3) ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C § 2000e-5(f)(1) and (3), and Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981a. 2. The employment practices alleged to be unlawful were and are now being committed within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division.

Case 3:01-cv-02240 Document 1 Filed 11/07/2001 Page 2 of 6
PARTIES 3. Plaintiff, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "Commission"), is an agency of the United States of America charged with the administration, interpretation and enforcement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended and is expressly authorized to bring this action by Section 706(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a). 4. At all relevant times, Defendant, I-Sector Corporation, has continuously been and is now doing business in the State of Texas and has continuously had at least fifteen employees. 5. At all relevant times, Defendant, I-Sector Corporation, has continuously been an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce under Section 701(b), (g) and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-(b), (g) and (h).
STATEMENT OF CLAIMS 6. More than thirty days prior to the institution ofthis lawsuit, Carrie Harris filed charges with the Commission alleging violations ofTitle VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, by the Defendant, I-Sector Corporation. All conditions precedent to the institution ofthis lawsuit have been fulfilled. 7. During the employment ofCarrie Harris and Dana Bartlett, the Defendant has engaged in unlawful employment practices in violation of Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(1) by subjecting Harris and Bartlett to a sexually hostile work environment, discriminating against them on account of their sex, and constructively discharging them. Specifically, I-Sector Corporation subjected Harris and Bartlett to a sexually hostile work atmosphere in that they were constantly and repeatedly subjected to sexually explicit remarks, sexually explicit photographs and videos and pornographic magazines, resulting in their constructive discharge from the position.
Page -2-

Case 3:01-cv-02240 Document 1 Filed 11/07/2001 Page 3 of 6
8. The result of the foregoing practices has been to deprive Carrie Harris and the aggrieved individual of equal employment opportunities because of their sex.
9. The unlawful employment practices complained of in paragraph 7 above were intentional.
10. The unlawful employment practices complained of in paragraph 7 above were done with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of Carrie Harris and the aggrieved individual.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF Wherefore, the Commission respectfully requests that this Court: A. Grant a permanent injunction enjoining the Defendant, I-Sector Corporation, its officers, successors, assigns, and all persons in active concert or participation with it, from engaging in any employment practice which discriminates on the basis of sex, or which facilitates, condones or encourages sexual harassment. B. Order the Defendant to institute and carry out policies, practices, and programs which provide equal employment opportunities and a non-hostile work environment for all employees, including males, and which eradicate the effects of its past and present unlawful employment practices. C. Order the Defendant to make whole Carrie Harris and the aggrieved individuals by providing appropriate back pay with prejudgment interest in amounts to be determined at trial, pecuniary losses, compensatory damages including out-of-pocket expenses, and other affirmative relief necessary to eradicate the effects of its unlawful employment practices. D. Order the Defendant to make Carrie Harris and the aggrieved individual whole by
Page -3-

Case 3:01-cv-02240 Document 1 Filed 11/07/2001 Page 4 of 6
providing compensation for past and future pecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful employment practices described in paragraph 7 above, including but not limited to out of pocket job hunting expenses.
E. Order the Defendant to make Carrie Harris and the aggrieved individual whole by providing compensation for past and future nonpecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful employment practices described in paragraph 7 above, including but not limited to, pain and suffering, humiliation, embarrassment, emotional distress, anxiety, and loss ofenjoyment oflife, in amounts to be determined at trial.
F. Order the Defendant to pay Carrie Harris and the aggrieved individual punitive or exemplary damages for its intentional, malicious conduct or reckless indifference described and referenced in paragraph 7 above, in an amount to be determined at trial.
G. Grant such further relief as the Court deems necessary and proper in the public interest.
H. Award the Commission its costs in this action.
JURY TRIAL DEMAND The Commission requests a jury trial on all questions of fact raised by its Complaint.
Respectfully submitted, NICHOLAS M. INZEO Acting Deputy General Counsel
TOBY W. COSTAS Acting Regional Attorney Texas State Bar No. 04855720 Page -4-

Case 3:01-cv-02240 Document 1 Filed 11/07/2001 Page 5 of 6
SUZANNE M. ANDE
Trial Attorney Colorado Bar No. 27392 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Dallas District Office 207 South Houston, 3rd Floor Dallas, Texas 75202 (214) 655-3332 (214) 655-3331 FAX
Page -5-

Case 3:01-cv-02240 Document 1 Filed 11/07/2001 Page 6 of 6 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true copy of the foregoing has been served on all counsel of record for the De~ndant at the address below via United States first class mail, postage prepaid, on this the
~. _ day of Iv1/(" '/ , 2001.
Mario A. Barrera BRACEWELL &PATTERSON, L.L.P. 800 One Alamo Center 106 S. St. Mary's Street San Antonio, Texas 78205-3603
Keri L. Mallon
Page -6-

 
 Case 3:01-cv-02240 Document 93 Filed 03/21/2003 Page 1 of 8

u.s. mSTmCT CO~_'RT
IN THE UNITED STATES IS1f~i~t.ffl;TmcToFTEXAS

FOR THE NORTHERN DIS RICT OF TlPMS':':)
DALLAS DIViSION ~--""---l

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY)

COMMISSION,

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G.E~;r~;.. 1 . . ' 1.•H

Plaintiff,

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vs. I-SECTOR CORPORATION,
Defendant.

) CIVIL ACTION NO. 3-01CV2240-R ) ) ) ) ) )

CONSENT DECREE

THIS CONSENT DECREE is made and entered into by and between the Plaintiff, Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), the Intervenors, Carrie Harris and Dana Bartlett,

and Defendant, I-Sector Corporation, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of

Texas, Dallas Division, with regard to the EEOC's Complaint and Intervenors' Complaint filed in

Civil Action No. 3-01 CV2240-R (hereinafter "Complaints"). The Complaints were based upon a

Charge of Discrimination filed by Carrie Harris against Defendant, I-Sector Corporation.

The above-referenced Complaints allege that the Defendant I-Sector Corporation violated

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, by subjecting

Carrie Harris and Dana Bartlett to a sexually hostile work environment based upon their sex, female,

and by constructively discharging them from their positions with I-Sector Corporation. The

Defendant denies any and all of the allegations made by the EEOC in the Complaints and charge of

discrimination, and expressly denies any violation oflaw as referenced therein. The Defendant states

that it enters this Consent Decree solely to avoid the further expense and burden oflitigation or other

CONSENT DECREE

Page 1

Case 3:01-cv-02240 Document 93 Filed 03/21/2003 Page 2 of 8

proceedings.

The EEOC, Carrie Harris, Dana Bartlett and I-Sector Corporation agree to compromise and

settle the claims embodied in the Complaints, and intend that the terms and conditions of the

compromise and settlement be set forth in this Consent Decree ("Consent Decree"). It is understood

and agreed that this Consent Decree is in compromise of disputed claims, and that this Consent

Decree shall not in any way be construed as an admission by the Defendant of a violation of any

federal, state, or local statute, law or regulation, or a violation of any right ofthe Intervenors or any

other person.

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and agreements set forth

herein, the sufficiency ofwhich is hereby acknowledged, the parties agree as follows, the Court finds

appropriate, and therefore, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:

l. This Consent Decree resolves all issues raised in EEOC Charge No. 31 OA 1082l.

This Decree further resolves all issues raised or that could have been raised in the Complaints filed

by the EEOC and the Intervenors in this civil action (collectively - the "Litigation"). The EEOC and

the Intervenors waive any and all claims and/or litigation on all issues raised or which could have

been raised in the above-referenced Charge and Complaints. The EEOC does not waive processing

or litigating charges other than the above-referenced Charge.

2. Defendant agrees that it shall conduct all employment practices in a manner which

Defendant believes does not subject any employee to gender discrimination, including sexual

harassment and constructive discharge under Title VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1991, about which

Defendant reasonably should have known.

3. Defendant agrees to post the Notice appended hereto as "Attachment A" in a

prominent and conspicuous place at all ofits facilities within ten (10) days after entry ofthis Consent

CONSENT DECREE

Page 2

Case 3:01-cv-02240 Document 93 Filed 03/21/2003 Page 3 of 8

Decree. Defendant will report to the EEOC that it has complied with this requirement within

fourteen (14) days after posting the Notice.

4. The Notice shall also inform employees where to report any alleged violations of

Defendant's policies against sexual harassment, the name of the person(s) to whom they should

report alleged violations, along with the address and telephone number of the Dallas District Office

of the EEOC. The notice shall remain posted for the duration of this Consent Decree. In the event

that the persons and/or departments to whom individuals should make complaints alleging sexual

harassment, sex-based harassment and/or retaliation change during the term ofthe Consent Decree

such that the information contained in the notice is no longer accurate, Defendant shall prepare and

post a revised notice within a reasonable period of time thereafter that contains the correct

information.

5. Defendant agrees to conduct written evaluations ofall ofits warehouse managers and

supervisors and salaried associates, including an evaluation on various leadership principles, during

the term ofthe Consent Decree. Such evaluation should indicate, among other things: (1) that such

managers, supervisors and salaried associates understand what they are supposed to do, or not do,

as the case may be, to ensure that illegal discrimination, of any kind, does not occur in the I-Sector

work environment; and (2) what actions they must take in order to assure that such discrimination

does not occur. Such managers and supervisors must understand that they have duties and

obligations to their fellow employees and to I-Sector to see to it that illegal discrimination does not

occur in the I-Sector work environment, and that their failure to take all necessary and reasonable

actions, such as reporting sexual harassment, or perceived sexual harassment, to James H. Long,

I-Sector's CEO and Board Chairman, to prevent such illegal discrimination could result in their

termination of employment with I-Sector. This written evaluation for warehouse managers,

CONSENT DECREE

Page 3

Case 3:01-cv-02240 Document 93 Filed 03/21/2003 Page 4 of 8

supervisors and salaried associates will be performed approximately two times per year.

6. Within 60 days after entry of this Consent Decree, Defendant agrees to provide

training to all of its employees on issues relating to Title VII, including sex discrimination, sexual

harassment and constructive discharge. The training will be for all employees ofthe Defendant and

will last for approximately 3 hours. Attendance at this training will be mandatory. Defendant will

provide written notice to the EEOC that the program has been conducted within fourteen (14) days

of its completion. The written notice shall provide a statement that all of the employees of

Defendant received the training, unless circumstances beyond I-Sector's control resulted in less than

100% participation, within the 60-day and/or 30-day period(s) prescribed below, in which case 1-

Sector shall explain, in writing why such 100% participation was not reasonably possible. The

notice shall provide the date and location ofthe training, the name ofthe individual(s) who provided

the training, the employee number and position title of each attendee and a brief summary of the

substance of the training. Defendant will use its best efforts to ensure that all of its employees

receive the required training within the 60-day period, however, if due to circumstances beyond

Defendant's control some small number of employees (less that five percent of Defendant's total

employees) are unable to complete the training within the 60-day period, Defendant will be allowed

an additional 30 days to complete the training, and Defendant. in such case, shall report the final

results oftraining the remaining employees to the EEOC within fourteen (14) days ofits completion.

I-Sector shall maintain lists ofthe names ofits employees who attend each training session and such

lists, or portions of such lists, shall be furnished to the EEOC upon reasonable, written request of

the EEOC. Any and all documents which I-Sector uses to report any matters hereunder, or

otherwise, to the EEOC shall remain the confidential information of!-Sector and shall not be utilized

or disclosed by the EEOC for any purpose other that production to the Court if such disclosure

CONSENT DECREE

Page 4

Case 3:01-cv-02240 Document 93 Filed 03/21/2003 Page 5 of 8

should become necessary.

7. Defendant agrees that it will impose appropriate disciplinary action consistent with

its policies and procedures, up to and including termination of employment, upon any supervisor or

manager who engages in sexual harassment or sex-based harassment or who knowingly permits any

such conduct in his or her work area or among employees under his or her supervision, or who is

proved to have retaliated against any person who (i) complained of such conduct or (ii) participated

in any investigation or proceeding concerning any such conduct.

8. Defendant's supervisors should monitor their work area and properly report any

incidents and/or complaints ofsexual harassment, sex-based harassment and/or retaliation ofwhich

they become aware to the persons at I-Sector who are charged with handling such complaints, i.e.,

James H. Long.

9. Defendant agrees to distribute a copy of the Notice, attached as "Attachment A", to

all of its current employees within 45 days after entry of the Consent Decree and to all future

employees who are hired during the term of the Consent Decree.

10. Defendant agrees that, in response to specific inquiries as to the Intervenors' work

history or work performance at I-Sector, it will use its best efforts to respond to such inquiries by

providing only the dates of the Intervenors' employment and title(s) held and to provide pay rate

information only when it is specifically requested and authorized in writing by the Intervenor at the

time of the request. Defendant agrees to purge any documents from the Intervenors' personnel file

that reference or relate to the Charge of Discrimination in this case, the Complaints and/or the facts

or circumstances surrounding the charge and the complaints.

11. Defendant agrees that there shall be no knowingly unlawful discrimination or

retaliation of any kind against any person involved in the referenced charge or litigation including

CONSENT DECREE

Page 5

Case 3:01-cv-02240 Document 93 Filed 03/21/2003 Page 6 of 8

the Intervenors because of opposition to any practice declared unlawful under Title VII, or because

of the filing of a charge, giving testimony or assistance or participating in any manner in any

investigation, proceeding or hearing under Title VII.

12. Defendant agrees to pay the total amount of ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY-FIVE

THOUSAND AND NOIlOO DOLLARS ($175,000.00) in settlement of this litigation, divided

EIGHTY-SEVEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED AND NOll 00 DOLLARS ($87,500.00) payable

to Carrie Harris and The Law Offices of Richard Jaramillo & Associates and EIGHTY-SEVEN

THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED AND NOll 00 DOLLARS ($87,500.00) payable to Dana Bartlett

and The Law Offices of Richard Jaramillo & Associates. The EEOC shall immediately file this

Consent Decree with the Court upon full execution by the parties and shall immediately provide to

Jack R. Bailey, counsel for I-Sector, a file-stamped copy of such filed Consent Decree. The EEOC

shall commend this Consent Decree to the attention of the Court for expedited action. The EEOC

shall provide to counsel for I-Sector a true copy of the Consent Decree, as signed by the Judge,

within five (5) days of the Judge so signing. All checks will be sent by Federal Express or certified

mail, return receipt requested, to Ray L. Vela, Attorney, Law Offices of Richard Jaramillo &

Associates, P.e., Center City Plaza, 1412 Main Street, 22nd Floor, Dallas, Texas 75202.

13. All notices or information to be provided to the EEOC pursuant to this Decree shall

be sent to Keri Mallon, Trial Attorney, EEOC, 207 S. Houston, Third Floor, Dallas, Texas 75202.

All notices or information to be provided to I-Sector pursuant to this Decree shall be sent to James

H. Long, CEO and Board Chairman, I-Sector Corporation, 6401 Southwest Freeway, Houston,

Texas 77074. All notices required under this agreement will be sent via United States certified or

registered mail, return receipt requested, and will be considered delivered when received by the

recipient.

CONSENT DECREE

Page 6

Case 3:01-cv-02240 Document 93 Filed 03/21/2003 Page 7 of 8

14. Neither the EEOC, the Intervenors nor Defendant shall contest the validity of this

Consent Decree nor the jurisdiction ofthe Federal District Court to enforce this Consent Decree and

its tenns or the right of either party to the Consent Decree by either such party. Nothing in this

Decree shall be construed to preclude the EEOC from enforcing this Decree in the event that

Defendant fails to perform the promises and representations contained herein.

15. The tenn of this Decree shall be for three (3) years.

16. The parties to this Consent Decree agree to bear their own attorney's fees and

expenses associated with the above-referenced Charge and Complaints.

17. If Defendant fails to tender payment or otherwise fails to timely comply with the

tenns of this Consent Decree, the EEOC shall have the right to seek an award of:

(a) Interest on any amounts set out in Paragraph 12 that are not timely paid.

Interest, if awarded by a court oflaw, shall be calculated at the rate provided pursuant to 26 U.S.c.

§ 6621 (b) on any untimely or unpaid amounts from the date of non-compliance; and

(b) Additional costs and expenses incurred by the EEOC as a result of the non-

compliance or delay by Defendant.

18. Any notice required to be given under this Consent Decree, or is/are otherwise given

pursuant to this Consent Decree shall be given by Federal Express, as follows:

If to Carrie Harris:

Carrie Harris-Nye 378 E. 1550 S. Orem, Utah 84058 (801) 787-9685

If to Dana Bartlett:

Dana Bartlett 4720 Lemmon Ct. The Colony, Texas 75056 (972) 307-4575

CONSENT DECREE

Page 7

.Case 3:01-cv-02240 )

Document 93

.Filed 03/21/2003 )

Page 8 of 8

If to Counsel for Intervenors:

RAYL. VELA Law Offices of Richard Jaramillo & Associates 1412 Main Street, 22nd Floor Dallas, Texas 75202 (214) 744-3364

If to I-Sector:

James H. Long CEO and Chainnan I-Sector Corporation 6401 Southwest Freeway Houston, Texas 77074 (713) 795-2301

If to Counsel for I-Sector:

Jack R. Bailey Law Offices of Jack R. Bailey 6200 Savoy Suite 260 Houston, Texas 77036 (713) 260-5360

Receipt of any such notice shall be the date on which the addressee actually receives such notice.

This Consent Decree is a final judgment and all relief not expressly granted herein is denied.

Mil SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED this ~I day of

ftc.."" ,2003.

GE

CONSENT DECREE

PageS

 
 E.E.O.C. v. I-Sector Corp., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2003)

2003 WL 29939 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas
Division.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v.
I–SECTOR CORPORATION, Defendant.
No. 3:01–CV–2240–R. | Jan. 2, 2003.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
BUCHMEYER, J.
*1 Now before this Court are PLAINTIFF EEOC’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (filed November 4, 2002), and DEFENDANT I–SECTOR CORPORATION’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (filed November 6, 2002). For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, and Defendant’s motion is DENIED.
I. Introduction
This is a gender discrimination case. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC” and “Plaintiff”) and Intervenors, Dana Bartlett (“Bartlett”) and Carrie Harris (“Harris”) seek injunctive relief and damages from I–Sector Corporation (f/k/a Allstar Systems) (“I–Sector” and “Defendant”) for alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., and the Civil Rights act of 1991. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Bartlett and Harris “were subjected to a sexually hostile work environment, sex-based discrimination and constructive discharge.” Complaint at 1. Harris was employed by Defendant for approximately thirteen months, from October 1998 to November 12, 1999. Appendix to Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (“Appendix” ) at 6. Bartlett was employed by Defendant from July 1998 to September 1999.

II. ANALYSIS
A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows summary judgment when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Melton v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of Am., 114 F.3d 557, 559 (5th Cir.1997). The court must decide all reasonable doubts and inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Lemelle v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 18 F.3d 1268, 1272 (5th Cir.1994); Walker v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 853 F.2d 355, 358 (5th Cir.1988). As long as there appears to be some support for the disputed allegations such that “reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence,” the motion must be denied. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Lynch Properties, Inc. v. Potomac Ins. Co., 140 F.3d 622, 625 (5th Cir.1998). Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof on a claim upon which summary judgment is sought, the moving party may discharge its summary judgment burden by showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. Once the moving party has satisfied this burden, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and by its own affidavits or depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Edwards v. Your Credit, Inc., 148 F.3d 427, 431–32 (5th Cir.1998). Summary judgment will be granted “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial .” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
*2 Because employment discrimination claims “involve nebulous questions of motivation and intent,” summary judgment is generally an inappropriate tool for resolving these cases. Thornbrough v. Columbus & Greenville R.R. Co., 760 F.2d 633, 640–41 (5th Cir.1985) (citations omitted). However, if Plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case, Bauer v. Albermarle Corp., 169 F.3d 962, 966 (5th Cir.1999), or if defendant presents strong evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions and
1

E.E.O.C. v. I-Sector Corp., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2003)

the plaintiff is unable to counter with additional evidence of pretext, summary judgment may be properly granted. Enplanar, Inc. v. Marsh, 11 F.3d 1284, 1295 (5th Cir.1994).
B. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT The EEOC argues that the summary judgment evidence clearly establishes the inapplicability of the Second and Third Defenses raised by Defendant in its Answer to the Complaint, that there are no disputed material facts relating to either the Second or Third Defenses, and thus that the EEOC is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on these two defenses.
Partial summary judgment can be used to “dispose of affirmative defenses.” Koch Industries v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 700 F.Supp. 865, 867 (M.D.La.1988). Prior to addressing the substance of Plaintiff’s motion, this Court notes that the motion is, with one exception, unaffected by the filing of the First Amended Answer subsequent to the filing of Plaintiff’s motion.1 The two defenses at issue have not substantively changed. The wording of the Third Defense, quoted infra, is unchanged in the First Amended Answer. The Second Defense alleges that the Plaintiff’s actions are time barred. The Second Defense, as stated in the Answer, was: “Harris did not timely file her Charge of Discrimination; Bartlett has filed no Charge of Discrimination, i.e., the claims are barred by limitations.” Answer at 2. In the First Amended answer, the Second Defense states:

However, the final sentence of the Second Defense is entirely new, and has not been briefed by the parties as part of Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment. Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment is, therefore, DENIED IN PART, regarding the final sentence of the Second Defense: “All claims of the EEOC are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.” *3 Turning to the remainder of the second defense, the analysis of the assertion that Harris did not timely file a charge, turns on the definition of “charge” used to determine if a charge has been filed within the 300 day deadline required in Texas under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1). See Griffin v. City of Dallas, 26 F.3d 610, 612 (5th Cir.1994); Adams v. Cal–Ark Intern. Inc., 159 F.Supp.2d 402, 406–07 (E.D.Tex 2001). On August 9, 2000, approximately 270 days after Harris left employment at Defendant, the EEOC received a letter (the “August 9th letter”) from Harris in which she alleges sexual harassment at her workplace and expresses her “utter disgust at the kind of subhuman behavior that I witnessed ... for a over a year.”2 Appendix at 6–7. Subsequently, on December 18, 2000, Harris filed a formal Form 5 Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC. Appendix at 8. On or around January 18, 2001, the EEOC sent a Notice of Charge of Discrimination to Defendant. Appendix at 18. On September 25, 2001 an unsuccessful conciliation session was held. Appendix at 5.

2

The August 9th letter also alleges racial and religious

discrimination, however, those allegations are not

currently before this Court.

1

This Court granted leave for Defendant to file its First

Amended Answer on December 10, 2002.

SECOND DEFENSE
Harris did not timely file her Charge of Discrimination; Bartlett has filed no Charge of Discrimination; i.e., all claims, including, but not limited to state law torts, e.g., infliction of mental anguish and punitive damages, as alleged by [the EEOC], are barred by limitations. All claims of the EEOC are barred by the applicable statue of limitations. First Amended Answer to the Complaint at 2–3 (emphasis added). The additional language in the second clause of this defense does not substantively change the defense, it merely replaces the statement in the Answer that “the claims” are barred with a stronger statement that “all claims” are barred and adds a non-exclusive list of the types of barred claims.

The question is whether the August 9th letter qualifies as a “charge.” Defendant argues that this letter does not qualify as a charge because it was not signed or verified by Harris as required under 29 CFR § 1601.9, which states that “a charge shall be in writing and signed and shall be verified”.3 Defendant asserts that Harris did not file a document qualifying as a charge until she submitted the Form 5 on December 18, 200, which was more than 300 days after the end of her employment (and thus the end of any claimed offense). Thus, Defendants contend that Harris’s claims as well as those of the EEOC and Bartlett are time barred.

3

Defendant does not base its argument on 42 U.S.C. §

2000e–5(b), which states that “[c]harges shall be in

writing under oath or affirmation.” Perhaps this is due

to the fact that this provision was squarely addressed in

Edelman v. Lynchburg College (see infra ).

The Supreme Court, in the recent case of Edelman v. Lynchburg College, construed the statutory provisions relating to what constitutes a “charge” under 42 U.S.C §
2

E.E.O.C. v. I-Sector Corp., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2003)

2000e–5. Edelman v. Lynchburg College, 535 U.S. 106, 122 S.Ct. 1145 (2002). Uncertainty regarding the definition of charge had arisen from attempts to reconcile 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(b), which requires that a charge “be in writing under an oath or affirmation and ... in such form as the [EEOC] requires,” with § 2000e–5(e)(1) which mandates that a charge must be filed within 180 or, in the case of deferral states such as Texas, 300 days. In Edelman, the complainant had faxed a letter to the EEOC which did not contain an oath or affirmation, and the EEOC did not receive the completed Form 5 until 313 days after the alleged offense. The 4th Circuit Court of Appeals held that §§ 2000e–5(b) and (e)(1) together provide a definition for a charge, and thus that the oath or affirmation must be submitted prior to the expiry of the deadline for timely filing. In so holding, the 4th Circuit ruled that the EEOC’s regulation, 29 CFR § 1601.12(b) which “permit[s] an otherwise timely filer to verify a charge after the time for filing has expired” was an impermissible interpretation of the statute. Id., 122 S.Ct. at 1147. The Supreme Court reversed the 4th Circuit and upheld the EEOC’s relation back regulation as “an unassailable interpretation” of 42 U.S.C.2000e–5. Edelman, 122 S.Ct. at 1152. Explaining its reasoning, the Supreme Court stated:
*4 Section [2000e–5(b) ] merely requires the verification of a charge, without saying when it must be verified; § [2000e–5(e)(1) ] provides that a charge must be filed within a given period, without indicating whether the charge must be verified when filed. Neither provision incorporates the other so as to give a definition by necessary implication.
... The point of the time limitation is to encourage a potential charging party to raise a discrimination claim before it gets stale, for the sake of a reliable result and a speedy end to any illegal practice that proves out. The verification requirement has the different object of protecting employers from the disruption and expense of responding to a claim unless a complainant is serious enough and sure enough to support it by oath subject to liability for perjury. This object, however, demands an oath only by the time the employer is obliged to respond to the charge, not at the time an employee files it with the EEOC....
The Supreme Court also emphasized the remedial purpose of the Civil Rights Act and the balancing inherent in Title VII between the rights of complainants and of employers, stating:
In requiring the oath or affirmation, however, Congress presumably did not mean to affect the nature of Title VII as “a remedial scheme in which laypersons, rather than lawyers, are expected to initiate the process.” ... Construing § [2000e–5] to permit the relation back of an oath omitted from an original filing ensures that the

lay complainant, who may not know enough to verify on filing, will not risk forfeiting his rights inadvertently. At the same time, the [EEOC] looks out for the employer’s interest by refusing to call for any response to an otherwise sufficient complaint until the verification has been supplied.
Id. at 1149–1150 (citations and other footnotes omitted); see also Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 461 (5th Cir.1970)(noting that “courts confronted with procedural ambiguities in the [Title VII] statutory framework have, with virtual unanimity, resolved them in favor of the complaining party”); Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757, 765 (2001)(holding that failure to sign a notice of appeal within the required period was not a jurisdictional defect). Defendant attempts to avoid the implications of Edelman by asserting that the relation back regulation “simply does not apply” to the signature regulation, 29 CFR § 1601.9. Defendant I–Sector Corporation’s Response to Plaintiff EEOC’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (“Defendant’s Response Brief”) at 3. In light of Edelman, such an attempt must fail. The receipt of the completed Form 5, through the operation of the relation back regulation, enabled the August 9th letter to meet the requirements of the signature provisions.
The August 9th letter, as amended by the Form 5, meets the other requirements necessary to qualify as a charge as stated in 29 CFR § 1601.12, which provides that:
*5 (a) Each charge should contain the following:
(1) The full name, address and telephone number of the person making the charge ...
(2) The full name and address of the person against whom the charge is made, if known ...
(3) A clear and concise statement of the facts, including pertinent dates, constituting the alleged unlawful employment practices ...
(4) If known, the approximate number of employees of the respondent employer ...
(5) A statement disclosing whether proceedings involving the alleged unlawful employment practice have been commenced before a State or local agency ...
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a) of this section, a charge is sufficient when the [EEOC] receives from the person making the charge a written statement sufficiently precise to identify the parties, and to describe generally the action or practices complained of. A charge may be amended to cure technical defects or omissions, including failure to verify the charge, or to clarify and amplify allegations
3

E.E.O.C. v. I-Sector Corp., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2003)

made therein. Such amendments and amendments alleging additional acts which constitute unlawful employment practices related to or growing out of the subject matter of the original charge will relate back to the date the charge was first received.
29 CFR § 1601.12 (emphasis added). The August 9th letter, meets the standard set out in § 1601.12(b) of providing “a written statement sufficiently precise to identify the parties, and to describe generally the action or practices complained of.” Id.; see also Price v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 687 F.2d 74, 78 (5th Cir.1982)(quoting Sanchez, 431 F.2d at 462)(stating that “the crucial element of a charge of discrimination is the factual statement contained therein”). The August 9th letter provides the full name, address and telephone number of Harris; the name of Defendant company; and a concise statement of her gender discrimination allegations.4 Appendix at 6–7. Detailing her allegations, Harris provides the dates she was employed by Defendant and the name of her supervisor, states that she experienced sexual harassment “on a daily basis,” recounts examples of the various types of gender discrimination, and describes the lack of adequate response provided when she reported these incidents to management. Id.

4

The August 9th letter also contains a statement, “I

would like to file a complaint,” which implies that

Harris had not filed an action in state court. Appendix at

7.

Defendant also argues that the delay in its receiving notice from the EEOC of the charge demonstrates that the EEOC did not consider the August 9th letter to be a charge. The statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(b) provides that the EEOC, after receiving a charge, shall “serve a notice of the charge ... on such employer ... within ten days.” The Supreme Court, in Edelman, noted that the EEOC generally does not require a response from a defendant until the charge has been perfected. 122 S.Ct. at 1150 n. 9. Although Harris perfected her charge on December 18, 2000, notice was not provided until January 18, 2001—a period of 31 days. As the 4th Circuit stated in its remand of Edelman, “failures of the EEOC to carry out its responsibilities under Title VII” “are not deficiencies in the charge.” Edelman v. Lynchburg College, 300 F.3d 400, 404 (4th Cir.2002)(remand opinion); A leading employment law treatise states:
*6 Employers who receive untimely notice have argued that this precludes subsequent investigation or suit. This argument normally fails, absent a showing that the employer was significantly disadvantaged by the failure to give timely notice. This outcome is bolstered by the legislative history of the 1972 amendments, which reveals that “[I]t is not intended, however, that failure

to give notice of the charge to the respondent within 10 days would prejudice the rights of the aggrieved party.” Because the responsibility for giving notice rests with the EEOC, a notoriously over-burdened agency, courts are reluctant to deny judicial redress to a plaintiff because the EEOC failed to act with the requisite diligence or within the allotted time.
4 Lex K. Larson & Arthur Larson, Employment Discrimination § 73 .01[2] (2002)(footnotes and citations omitted). While the EEOC has not offered an explanation for the delay, Defendant has not pointed to any evidence showing that it was prejudiced by the delay. Edelman, 300 F.3d at 405 n. 2. More importantly, for the purposes of this Court’s review of Plaintiff’s motion, Defendant’s Response Brief fails to point to any facts linking this delay to any part of its Second Defense. Without such a link, or a showing of prejudice, Defendant has failed to create a fact issue.
The Second Defense also states that Bartlett’s claims are barred because she never filed a charge. As the claims of Harris and Bartlett arise from the same factual circumstances, this Court granted Bartlett’s motion to intervene on March 4, 2002. Under the “single filing rule,” “co-plaintiffs with individual claims arising out of similar discriminatory treatment in the same time frame need not have satisfied the filing requirement.” Allen v. U .S. Steel Corp., 665 F.2d 689, 695 (5th Cir.1982)(citing Crawford v. U.S. Steel Corp., 660 F.2d 665–66). Bartlett was a colleague of Harris and allegedly suffered the same type of discrimination over the same period. Thus, the single-filer rule applies.5

5

This Court also notes, although it need not decide, that

Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may

serve as another possible basis for intervention by

Harris and Bartlett.

Defendant also asserts that Plaintiff has failed to provide adequate summary judgment evidence as required under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendant’s Response Brief at 2. Plaintiff has provided an affidavit from Janet V. Elizondo, Acting Director of Dallas District Office of the EEOC, supporting the authenticity of the case file it has produced. Appendix at 55–56. After considering the evidence, this Court concludes that Plaintiff has provided this Court with adequate summary judgment evidence in support of its motion. See Appendix at 1–56.
In sum, as amended by the subsequently filed Form 5 through the relation back provision, Harris’s letter of August 9, 2000 meets the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5, 29 CFR §§ 1601.9, 1601.12 and is thus a timely filed charge.6 Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary
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E.E.O.C. v. I-Sector Corp., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2003)

Judgment is therefore GRANTED IN PART as to the Second Defense, except as to the newly added final sentence: “All claims of the EEOC are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.”

6

Moreover, even if this Court were to conclude that the

letter received August 9, 2000 did not qualify as a

charge, courts have stated that technical filing

requirements of Title VII such as that of timely filing of

a charge contained in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(1) are not

jurisdictional. See, e.g., Zipes v. Trans World Airlines,

Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (1982); Jackson v. Seaboard Cost

Line R.R.., 678 F.2d 992 (11th Cir.1982). However, this

Court does not need to address this question as a timely

charge was filed in this case.

*7 Defendant’s Third Defense states:

THIRD DEFENSE
Harris, Bartlett and the [EEOC] failed to meet all conditions precedent including their failure to exhaust administrative remedies in that the “conciliation” sessions that was had was not done in good faith. First Amended Answer to the Complaint at 3. This defense can be more quickly disposed of than the second defense. The EEOC, as documented in the Appendix and discussed in Plaintiff’s brief, has satisfied the requirements of 42 U.S.C.2000e–5(f)(1) regarding conditions precedent to filing a suit. Plaintiff EEOC’s Brief in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment at 7–9. Defendant has pointed to no evidence of bad faith or failure to meet the conditions precedent to the filing of a suit by the EEOC, nor of any evidence of bad faith relating to the conciliation session, other than the notice provision addressed supra. Thus Defendant

has failed to create an issue of fact as to the Third Defense, and summary judgment is therefore GRANTED as to the Third Defense.
C. DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Defendant seeks summary judgment on the issues of: 1) the existence of a hostile work environment, 2) constructive discharge of Harris and Bartlett, 3) liability of Defendant for the alleged harassment, 4) applicability of the affirmative defense provided for by the Supreme Court’s decisions in Farragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) and Burlington Industries, Inc., v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), and 5) liability for state law tort claims. Defendant I–Sector Corporation’s First Amended Motion for Summary Judgment at 1–2. After reviewing the copious summary judgment evidence provided by the parties, which includes sharply conflicting deposition testimony from several current and former employees of Defendant, it is apparent that there are disputes of material fact relating to these issues. Therefore, summary judgment on defendant’s motion is inappropriate and is hereby DENIED.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgement is hereby GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
It is so ORDERED.
	  

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CLOSED, JURY, MREF, STICKNEY
U.S. District Court Northern District of Texas (Dallas) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:01-cv-02240

EEOC v. I-Sector Corporation Assigned to: Judge Jerry Buchmeyer Demand: $0 Cause: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Sex)
Plaintiff
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Date Filed: 11/07/2001 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Plaintiff
represented by Keri L Mallon Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Dallas District Office 207 S Houston 3rd Floor Dallas, TX 75202 214/253-2743 Fax: 214/253-2749 FAX Email: Keri.Mallon@eeoc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant I-Sector Corporation
Intervenor Plaintiff Carrie Harris TERMINATED: 03/10/2003

represented by Jack R Bailey Law Office of Jack R Bailey 6200 Savoy Suite 260 Houston, TX 77036 713/783-7480 Fax: 713/783-3258 FAX LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Ray L Vela Richard Jaramillo & Associates Center City Plaza 1412 Main St Suite 2200 Dallas, TX 75202 214/744-3364 Fax: 214/748-6603 FAX Email: rvela@jaramillolawfirm.com

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Intervenor Plaintiff
Dana Bartlett TERMINATED: 03/10/2003

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard C Jaramillo Richard Jaramillo & Associates Center City Plaza 1412 Main St Suite 2200 Dallas, TX 75202 214/744-3364 Email: richard@jaramillolawfirm.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Ray L Vela (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard C Jaramillo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 11/07/2001 11/07/2001 11/07/2001 11/07/2001 12/07/2001 12/17/2001 12/21/2001
12/21/2001

#

Docket Text

1 COMPLAINT filed. (6) (jaw) (Entered: 11/08/2001)

PRELIMINARY ASSIGNMENT TO Magistrate Judge Paul Stickney (jaw) (Entered: 11/08/2001)

1 DEMAND for jury trial by plaintiff EEOC (jaw) (Entered: 11/08/2001)

2 SUMMONS(ES) issued for defendant I-Sector Corporation. (Issued 1) (jaw) (Entered: 11/08/2001)

3 CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS by plaintiff EEOC. (2) (jaw) (Entered: 12/10/2001)

4 ANSWER to complaint by defendant I-Sector Corporation (Attorney Jack Ronald Bailey) (4) (aat) (Entered: 12/17/2001)

5 SCHEDULING ORDER setting deadline for Amending of Pleadings on 4/17/02; Discovery cutoff 6/17/02; Deadline for filing Joint Submission of dispositive motions is 7/29/02; Pretrial materials due on 11/22/02; Pretrial conference scheduled for 10:00 a.m. on 12/6/02; Docket call set for four-week docket beginning 12/9/02. See order for specifics. (Signed by Chief Judge Jerry Buchmeyer ) Copies to counsel: 12/26/01 Page(s): 11 (jaw) (Entered: 12/26/2001)

5 STATUS REPORT ORDER. Joint Status report due on 2/19/02. See

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02/12/2002 02/19/2002 02/20/2002 02/22/2002 02/22/2002 03/04/2002 03/11/2002 05/01/2002 05/08/2002 05/15/2002
05/17/2002
05/23/2002

scheduling order for specifics. ( Signed by Chief Judge Jerry Buchmeyer ) Copies to counsel: 12/26/01 Page(s): 11 (jaw) (Entered: 12/26/2001)
6 MOTION to intervene by movant Carrie Harris, movant Dana Bartlett . (14)(Exhibit not imaged.) (jaw) (Entered: 02/13/2002)
7 JOINT STATUS REPORT by plaintiff EEOC, defendant I-Sector Corporation (3) (tem) (Entered: 02/20/2002)
8 ORDER REGARDING JUDGE BUCHMEYER'S SCHEDULING ORDER See order for specifics. (Signed by Magistrate Judge Paul D. Stickney ) Copies to counsel: 02/21/02 Page(s) 2 (jaw) (Entered: 02/21/2002)
9 RESPONSE by defendant I-Sector Corporation to [6-1] motion to intervene by movant Carrie Harris, movant Dana Bartlett. (3) (jaw) (Entered: 02/25/2002)
10 MEMORANDUM by defendant I-Sector Corporation in support of [9-1] motion response. (15+)(Exhibits not imaged.) (jaw) (Entered: 02/25/2002)
11 ORDER granting [6-1] motion to intervene by movant Carrie Harris, movant Dana Bartlett. (Signed by Judge Jerry Buchmeyer ) Copies to counsel: 03/05/02 Page(s) 1 (jaw) (Entered: 03/05/2002)
12 ANSWER to Complaint (in intervention) by defendant I-Sector Corporation; jury demand. (8) (jaw) Modified on 11/12/2002 (Entered: 03/11/2002)
13 NOTICE OF LOCAL COUNSEL by defendant I-Sector Corporation (2) (aat) (Entered: 05/02/2002)
Letter confirming extension of time by plaintiff EEOC, defendant ISector Corporation, intervenor-plaintiff Carrie Harris, intervenor-plaintiff Dana Bartlett, reset discovery due for 8/2/02 (1) (cxb) (Entered: 05/09/2002)
14 *** UNFILED PER ORDER DATED 5/17/02, DOC. # 15 *** AGREED/JOINT MOTION to extend time of the dispositive motion deadline by plaintiff EEOC, defendant I-Sector Corporation, intervenorplaintiff Carrie Harris, intervenor-plaintiff Dana Bartlett. (3) (cxb) (Entered: 05/16/2002)
15 ORDER unfiling [14-1] joint motion to extend time of the dispositive motion deadline by plaintiff EEOC, defendant I-Sector Corporation, intervenor-plaintiff Carrie Harris, intervenor-plaintiff Dana Bartlett due to the following deficiency: no proposed order. Copies to counsel: 5/20/02 (signed by Judge Jerry Buchmeyer ) Page(s) 1 (cxb) (Entered: 05/20/2002)
16 AGREED MOTION to seek an extension of the dispositive motion deadline by EEOC, I-Sector Corporation, Carrie Harris, Dana Bartlett. (3)

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07/01/2002
07/17/2002 07/17/2002 07/31/2002 08/02/2002
09/27/2002 10/02/2002 10/02/2002 10/10/2002 10/16/2002 10/22/2002

(jaw) (Entered: 05/24/2002)
17 ***VACATED PER ORDER 7/17/02***ORDER quashing subpoena It is hereby ordered that the subpoena issued by Defendant upon Rush Sales Company, Standard Structures, Inc. and Watco Truck Rigging, Inc. for production of Tommy Patino's employment records is quashed effective immediately. It is hereby further ordered that if any employment records from the above named companies have already produced to Defendant, they be immediately returned, accompanied by an affidavit from defendant stating as such. ( Signed by Judge Jerry Buchmeyer ) Copies to counsel: 07/2/02 Page(s) 1 (jaw) Modified on 07/17/2002 (Entered: 07/02/2002)
18 ORDER vacating [17-2] order quashing subpoenas (Signed by Judge Jerry Buchmeyer ) Copies to counsel: 07/17/02 Page(s) 1 (jaw) (Entered: 07/17/2002)
19 ORDER granting [16-1] joint motion to seek an extension of the dispositive motion deadline. Reset scheduling order deadlines: Discovery deadline on 8/2/02; Deadline for filing of dispositive motions by 8/30/02 . See order for specifics. (Signed by Judge Jerry Buchmeyer ) Copies to counsel: 07/17/02 Page(s) 1 (jaw) (Entered: 07/17/2002)
20 AGREED MOTION by plaintiff, defendant, intervenor-plaintiff to seek an extension of the discovery, dispositive motions and pretrial disclosure deadlines . (7) (jaw) (Entered: 08/01/2002)
21 ORDER granting [20-1] motion to seek an extension of the discovery, dispositive motions and pretrial disclosure deadlines. Reset scheduling order deadlines: Discovery deadline on 10/7/02; Deadline for filing of dispositive motions by 11/4/02; Pretrial Disclosures Deadline will be extended to 11/15/02 . See order for specifics. (Signed by Judge Jerry Buchmeyer ) Copies to counsel: 08/02/02 Page(s) 1 (jaw) (Entered: 08/02/2002)
22 NOTICE OF SERVICE by plaintiff EEOC of motion for partial summary judgment, brief in support thereof and proposed order (2) (aat) (Entered: 09/30/2002)
23 MOTION by intervenor-plaintiff Carrie Harris, intervenor-plaintiff Dana Bartlett to compel discovery . (4) (jaw) (Entered: 10/03/2002)
24 MEMORANDUM by intervenor-plaintiff Carrie Harris, intervenorplaintiff Dana Bartlett in support of [23-1] motion to compel discovery. (15+)(USC/Exhibits not imaged.) (jaw) (Entered: 10/03/2002)
25 NOTICE OF SERVICE OF MOTION by defendant I-Sector Corporation. (2) (jaw) (Entered: 10/10/2002)
26 THIRD MOTION by defendant I-Sector Corporation to seek and extension of the Dispositive Motion deadline . (7) (jaw) Modified on 10/16/2002 (Entered: 10/16/2002)
27 RESPONSE by defendant I-Sector Corporation to [23-1] motion to

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10/22/2002 10/22/2002
10/30/2002 10/31/2002 11/04/2002 11/04/2002 11/05/2002 11/06/2002 11/06/2002 11/06/2002
11/07/2002
11/08/2002
11/12/2002

compel discovery. (3) (jaw) (Entered: 10/23/2002)
28 MEMORANDUM by defendant I-Sector Corporation in support of [271] motion response. (15+)(Exhibits not imaged.) (jaw) (Entered: 10/23/2002)
29 ORDER Motion hearing set for 9:00 a.m. on 11/6/02 for [23-1] motion to compel discovery . See order for specifics. (Signed by Magistrate Judge Paul D. Stickney ) Copies to counsel: 10/23/02 Page(s) 1 (jaw) Modified on 10/23/2002 (Entered: 10/23/2002)
30 NOTICE OF RESPONSE by intervenor-plaintiffs. (2) (jaw) (Entered: 10/31/2002)
31 NOTICE OF SERVICE OF EEOC'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT by plaintiff EEOC. (2) (jaw) (Entered: 11/01/2002)
32 AGREED MOTION by EEOC, I-Sector Corporation for extension of time to jointly file summary judgment documents . (4) (jaw) (Entered: 11/05/2002)
33 JOINT MOTION SUBMISSION for partial summary judgment by plaintiff EEOC. (15+)(USC/Not imaged.) (jaw) (Entered: 11/05/2002)
34 TENDER OF DOCUMENTS FOR IN CAMERA INSPECTION by defendant I-Sector Corporation. (2) (jaw) (Entered: 11/05/2002)
35 JOINT MOTION SUBMISSION for summary judgment by defendant ISector Corporation. (15+)(USC/Not imaged.) (jaw) (Entered: 11/06/2002)
Motion hearing held re: [23-1] motion to compel discovery. (jaw) (Entered: 11/06/2002)
36 Minute order: Motion hearing held before Magistrate Judge Paul D. Stickney; Court Reporter: Gladys Janssen. Re: Plaintiffs in Intervention Harris' and Bartlett's motion to compel discovery. Order to enter. (1) (jaw) (Entered: 11/06/2002)
37 ORDER granting in part, taking part under advisement, [23-1] motion to compel discovery. See order for specifics. (Signed by Magistrate Judge Paul D. Stickney ) Copies to counsel: 11/07/02 Page(s) 1 (jaw) (Entered: 11/07/2002)
38 ORDER granting [32-1] motion for extension of time to jointly file summary judgment documents. Reset scheduling order deadlines: Deadline for filing of dispositive motions by 11/14/02 . See order for specifics. (Signed by Judge Jerry Buchmeyer ) Copies to counsel: 11/08/02 Page(s) 1 (jaw) (Entered: 11/08/2002)
39 MOTION by defendant I-Sector Corporation to amend [12-1] answer to complaint in intervention . (12)(Exhibit not imaged.) (jaw) (Entered: 11/12/2002)

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11/12/2002 11/14/2002 11/14/2002 11/14/2002 11/15/2002 11/15/2002 11/15/2002
11/15/2002 11/19/2002
11/21/2002 11/26/2002
11/26/2002 11/27/2002

40 MOTION by defendant I-Sector Corporation to amend [4-1] answer . (9) (Exhibit not imaged.) (jaw) (Entered: 11/12/2002)
41 PRETRIAL DISCLOSURES/Witness list by defendant I-Sector Corporation. (9) (jaw) (Entered: 11/15/2002)
41 PRETRIAL DISCLOSURES/Exhibit list by defendant I-Sector Corporation. (jaw) (Entered: 11/15/2002)
42 OBJECTION by plaintiff EEOC to [40-1] motion to amend [4-1] answer. (4) (jaw) (Entered: 11/21/2002)
43 PRE-TRIAL DISCLOSURES PURSUANT TO TO FRCP 26(a) (3)/Witness list by plaintiff, intervenor-plaintiffs. (8) (jaw) (Entered: 11/18/2002)
43 PRE-TRIAL DISCLOSURES PURSUANT TO TO FRCP 26(a) (3)/Exhibit list by plaintiff, defendant, intervenor-plaintiffs. (jaw) (Entered: 11/18/2002)
44 ORDER granting [39-1] motion to amend [12-1] answer to complaint in intervention. See order for specifics. ( Signed by Judge Jerry Buchmeyer ) Copies to counsel: 11/18/02 Page(s) 1 (jaw) (Entered: 11/18/2002)
45 FIRST AMENDED ANSWER to Complaint In Intervention by defendant I-Sector Corporation: amends [12-1] answer; jury demand. (8) (jaw) (Entered: 11/18/2002)
46 SCHEDULING ORDER setting Docket call for four-week docket beginning 1/6/03; Pretrial conference set for 10:00 a.m. on 1/3/03; Pretrial materials due on 12/16/02. (Signed by Judge Jerry Buchmeyer ) Copies to counsel: 11/20/02 Page(s): 2 (jaw) (Entered: 11/20/2002)
47 REPLY by defendant I-Sector Corporation to response to [40-1] motion for leave to amend [4-1] answer. (3) (jaw) (Entered: 11/21/2002)
48 AGREED ORDER NUNC PRO TUNC granting in part and taking under advisement, [23-1] motion to compel discovery. ...the motion to compel answers to Interrogatories numbers 4, 12, and 16 is granted. The Motion to compel is also granted with respect to Requests for Production numbers 54 and 56. The dispute with respect to Interrogatory number 9 and Request for Production number 51 is taken under advisement. See order for specifics. ( Signed by Magistrate Judge Paul D. Stickney ) Copies to counsel: 11/26/02 Page(s) 5 (jaw) (Entered: 11/26/2002)
49 OBJECTIONS TO DEFENDANT'S PRE TRIAL DISCLOSURES by EEOC, Carrie Harris, Dana Bartlett. (4) (jaw) (Entered: 11/27/2002)
50 ORDER re: [23-1] motion to compel discovery. The Court previously granted the motion in part and denied it in part, but took under advisement the dispute with respect to Interrogatory Number 9 and Request for Production Number 51. ...Movants' motion to compel is denied to the extent that Defendant shall not be required to answer

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12/06/2002 12/06/2002 12/06/2002 12/06/2002 12/09/2002 12/09/2002 12/10/2002 12/10/2002 12/10/2002
12/12/2002
12/12/2002
12/12/2002
12/13/2002

Interrogatory number 9 and shall not be required to produce the documents requested by Request for Production number 51. See order for specifics. (signed by Magistrate Judge Paul D. Stickney ) Copies to counsel: 11/27/02 Page(s) 3 (jaw) (Entered: 11/27/2002)
51 MOTION by defendant I-Sector Corporation in limine . (4) (jaw) (Entered: 12/06/2002)
52 BRIEF by defendant I-Sector Corporation in support of [51-1] motion in limine. (10) (jaw) (Entered: 12/06/2002)
53 APPENDIX by defendant I-Sector Corporation in support of [51-1] motion in limine. (15+)(Not imaged.) (jaw) (Entered: 12/06/2002)
54 MOTION by plaintiff, intervenor-plaintiffs for leave to take depositions outside of the discovery deadline and request for expedited review . (13) (Exhibit not imaged.) (jaw) (Entered: 12/09/2002)
55 RESPONSE by defendant I-Sector Corporation to [49-1] plaintiff EEOC and intervenors Bartlett and Harris' Objections to Defendant's Pre Trial Disclosures. (5) (jaw) (Entered: 12/10/2002)
56 APPENDIX by defendant I-Sector Corporation in support of [55-1] response. (15+)(Not imaged.) (jaw) (Entered: 12/10/2002)
57 ORDER granting [40-1] motion to amend [4-1] answer. ( Signed by Judge Jerry Buchmeyer ) Copies to counsel: 12/10/02 Page(s) 1 (jaw) (Entered: 12/10/2002)
58 AMENDED ANSWER to Complaint by defendant I-Sector Corporation: amends [4-1] answer. (5) (jaw) (Entered: 12/10/2002)
59 ***VACATED PER ORDER 12/13/02***ORDER granting [54-1] motion for leave to take depositions outside of the discovery deadline and request for expedited review. See order for specifics. (Signed by Judge Jerry Buchmeyer ) Copies to counsel: 12/10/02 Page(s) 1 (jaw) Modified on 12/13/2002 (Entered: 12/10/2002)
60 RESPONSE by defendant I-Sector Corporation to [54-1] motion for leave to take depositions outside of the discovery deadline and request for expedited review (and Motion for the Court to vacate its order dated 12/10/02). (7) (jaw) (Entered: 12/12/2002)
60 (Response to Motion) and MOTION by defendant I-Sector Corporation to vacate [59-1] order dated 12/10/02, granting above referred to motion and request for expedited review . (jaw) Modified on 12/13/2002 (Entered: 12/12/2002)
61 APPENDIX by defendant I-Sector Corporation in support of [60-1] motion response and [60-1] motion to vacate [59-1] order dated 12/10/02, granting above referred to motion and request for expedited review. (15) (Not imaged.) (jaw) Modified on 12/13/2002 (Entered: 12/12/2002)
62 ORDER (Motion termed: [60-1] motion to vacate [59-1] order dated

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12/16/2002 12/16/2002 12/16/2002 12/16/2002 12/16/2002 12/16/2002 12/16/2002 12/16/2002 12/16/2002 12/16/2002 12/16/2002 12/16/2002 12/16/2002 12/17/2002
12/17/2002

12/10/02, granting above referred to motion and request for expedited review ); Vacating [59-1] order granting EEOC and Intervenor's Motion for Leave to Take Depositions Outside the Discovery Deadline, entered 12/20/02 . See order for specifics. ( Signed by Judge Jerry Buchmeyer ) Copies to counsel: 12/13/02 Page(s) 1 (jaw) (Entered: 12/13/2002)
63 Designation of Deposition Portions that may be offered at trial by defendant I-Sector Corporation. (5) (jaw) (Entered: 12/17/2002)
64 Exhibit list by defendant I-Sector Corporation. (5) (jaw) (Entered: 12/17/2002)
65 Proposed jury issues, instructions and definitions by defendant I-Sector Corporation. (15+)(Exhibits not imaged.) (jaw) (Entered: 12/17/2002)
66 Proposed voir dire questions by defendant I-Sector Corporation. (8) (jaw) (Entered: 12/17/2002)
67 Witness list by defendant I-Sector Corporation. (7) (jaw) (Entered: 12/17/2002)
68 Proposed jury instructions and interrogatories by EEOC, Carrie Harris, Dana Bartlett. (15+) (jaw) (Entered: 12/17/2002)
69 Exhibit list by plaintiff, intervenor-plaintiffs. (7) (jaw) (Entered: 12/17/2002)
70 Witness list by plaintiff, intervenor-plaintiffs. (6) (jaw) (Entered: 12/17/2002)
71 Proposed jury voir dire by EEOC, Carrie Harris, Dana Bartlett. (6) (jaw) (Entered: 12/17/2002)
72 TRIAL BRIEF by plaintiff, intervenor-plaintiffs. (12) (jaw) (Entered: 12/17/2002)
73 Designation of Depositions by plaintiff, intervenor-plaintiffs. (5) (jaw) (Entered: 12/17/2002)
74 MOTION by plaintiff, intervenor-plaintiffs in limine . (4) (jaw) (Entered: 12/17/2002)
75 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff, intervenor-plaintiffs in support of [74-1] motion in limine. (13) (jaw) (Entered: 12/17/2002)
76 ORDER granting [54-1] motion for leave to take depositions outside of the discovery deadline and request for expedited review. The depositions shall be completed prior to 1/10/03. Reset scheduling order deadlines: Docket call reset for 3/3/03; Pretrial conference set for 10:00 a.m. on 2/28/03; Pretrial materials due 2/14/03 . See order for specifics. (Signed by Judge Jerry Buchmeyer ) Copies to counsel: 12/17/02 Page(s) 1 (jaw) (Entered: 12/17/2002)
77 NOTICE of attorney appearance for intervenor-plaintiff Carrie Harris, intervenor-plaintiff Dana Bartlett by Richard C Jaramillo. (2) (jaw)

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01/02/2003
01/09/2003 01/09/2003 01/15/2003 01/15/2003 01/15/2003 01/15/2003 01/24/2003 01/27/2003
01/29/2003 01/29/2003 01/29/2003 03/04/2003 03/10/2003

(Entered: 12/18/2002)
78 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting in part, denying in part [33-1] Plaintiff EEOC's joint motion for partial summary judgment; and denying [35-1] Defendant I-Sector's joint motion for summary judgment. See Memorandum Opinion and Order for specifics. (Signed by Judge Jerry Buchmeyer ) Copies to counsel: 01/02/03 Page(s): 12 (jaw) (Entered: 01/02/2003)
79 RESPONSE by defendant I-Sector Corporation to [74-1] motion in limine. (3) (jaw) (Entered: 01/09/2003)
80 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM by defendant I-Sector Corporation in support of [79-1] motion response. (15+) (jaw) (Entered: 01/09/2003)
81 MOTION by defendant I-Sector Corporation pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 412(c) . (4) (jaw) Modified on 01/15/2003 (Entered: 01/15/2003)
82 MEMORANDUM by defendant I-Sector Corporation in support of [811] motion pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 412(c). (3) (jaw) (Entered: 01/15/2003)
83 APPENDIX by defendant I-Sector Corporation in support of [81-1] motion pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 412(c). (15+)(Not imaged.) (jaw) (Entered: 01/15/2003)
84 RESPONSE by plaintiff EEOC and intervenors to [51-1] motion in limine. (6) (jaw) Modified on 01/16/2003 (Entered: 01/15/2003)
85 UNOPPOSED MOTION by intervenor-plaintiff Carrie Harris, intervenor-plaintiff Dana Bartlett for continuance . (8)(Exhibits not imaged.) (jaw) (Entered: 01/27/2003)
86 THIRD AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER/ORDER terminating [851] motion for continuance. Reset scheduling order deadlines: Docket call reset for 6/2/03; Pretrial conference set for 10:00 a.m. on 5/30/03; Pretrial materials due 5/16/03 . See order for specifics. (Signed by Judge Jerry Buchmeyer ) Copies to counsel: 01/27/03 Page(s) 2 (jaw) (Entered: 01/28/2003)
87 REPLY by defendant I-Sector Corporation to response to [51-1] motion in limine. (3) (jaw) (Entered: 01/30/2003)
88 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM by defendant I-Sector Corporation in support of [87-1] response reply. (8) (jaw) (Entered: 01/30/2003)
89 APPENDIX by defendant I-Sector Corporation in support of [87-1] response reply. (15+)(Not imaged.) (jaw) (Entered: 01/30/2003)
90 JOINT MOTION to Dismiss with Prejudice by Dana Bartlett, Carrie Harris, I-Sector Corporation. (jaw, ) (Entered: 03/04/2003)
91 AGREED ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE/granting 90 Joint Motion to Dismiss. It is, therefore, ordered adjudged and decreed

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03/19/2003 03/21/2003

byt the Court that any and all actions or other claims for relief which were asserted or could have been asserted by the Intervenors... against the defendant...are hereby dismissed with prejudice... Ordered, adjudged and decreed that all costs herein are ordered taxed against the party incurring same. See Agreed Order for specifics. (Signed by Judge Jerry Buchmeyer on 03/07/03) (jaw, ) (Entered: 03/12/2003)
92 MOTION for Leave to Re-submit Consent Decree per Court's Instructions by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, I-Sector Corporation. (jaw) (Entered: 03/19/2003)
93 CONSENT DECREE See Consent Decree for specifics. (Signed by Judge Jerry Buchmeyer on 03/21/03) (jaw) (Entered: 03/21/2003)

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