Case 1:11-cv-01804-TWT Document 1 Filed 06/02/11 Page 1 oFfI8IE2~ /~ CUAI('S OmCE , , .", !-\ 'I ;>nf:]

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" IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ~oi~:ESH~~p~L~:kK

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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ATLANTA DIVISION

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Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights; Service Employees International Union; Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United; DREAM Activist.org; Task Force for the Homeless; Asian American Legal Advocacy Center; Alterna; Coalition of Latino Leaders; Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta; Coalition for the People's Agenda; Paul Bridges; Benjamin Speight; Everitt Howe; Paul J. Edwards; Sharon Gruner; Jane Doe # I; Jaypaul Singh; Ernesto Pinon; John Doe # I; John Doe #2; and Jane Doe #2,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Civil Action File No. . ,.
, : 11 - CV = 1B0~

Nathan Deal, Governor of the State of Georgia, in his official capacity; Samuel S. Olens, Attorney General of the State of Georgia, in his official capacity; Clyde L. Reese, III, Commissioner of the Department of Human Services of the State of Georgia, in his official capacity; Mike Beatty, Commissioner of the Department of Community Affairs of the State of Georgia, in his official capacity; and Falecia Stewart, Executive Director ofthe Housing Authority of Fulton County Georgia, in her official capacity,

Defendants.

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF


CLASS ACTION


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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
 1. This action challenges Georgia's comprehensive immigration law, House Bill 87 ("HB 87," attached as Exhibit A). In HB 87, Georgia creates a punitive and comprehensive immigration system that, among other things: (1) authorizes state and local law enforcement officers to investigate the immigration status of individuals who do not carry one of a limited set of documents prescribed by the state, and to arrest individuals on suspicion that they have violated federal civil immigration laws (Section 8); (2) creates new criminal immigration laws specific to and wholly administered by the State of Georgia (Section 7); (3) denies public benefits to anyone unable to provide one of several enumerated documents that Georgia deems sufficient proof of identity (hereinafter "qualifying identity documents") (Section 17); and (4) outlaws the use of consular identification cards, which several foreign governments issue to their citizens, for any official purpose (Section 19). 2. Governor Nathan Deal signed HB 87 on May 13,2011. The law is scheduled to take effect on July 1,2011, excepting the benefits provision (Section 17) and the ban on consular identification cards (Section 19(c)), which are scheduled to take effect on January I, 2012.
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3. If allowed to take effect, HB 87 will significantly harm Georgians, and particularly Georgians of color, for at least three reasons:
4. First, as confirmed by law enforcement officials in Georgia and elsewhere, HB 87 will subject Georgians-i-including countless U.S. citizens and non-citizens who have permission from the federal government to remain in the United States-i-to unlawful interrogations, searches, seizures, and arrests and will result in widespread racial profiling. All Georgians, and particularly those of color, will be compelled to carry additional paperwork prescribed by the State of Georgia at all times. This is because HB 87 makes individuals who do not carry the prescribed documentation subject to lengthy investigations into immigration status that last over 80 minutes on average under the best case scenario. This documentation requirement amounts to a state alien registration scheme incorporated into Georgia criminal procedure.
5. Second, HB 87 will cause countless Georgians-i-including U.S. citizens and non-citizens with federal permission to remain in the United States-i-to be erroneously deprived of the public benefits that they need and are lawfully entitled to receive. These deprivations will force individuals and families, including those with young children, to be without food and shelter, simply due to an inability to produce a qualifying identity document.
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6. Third, HB 87 will thwart the ability of potentially hundreds of thousands of Georgians to conduct basic daily tasks with ease-such as gaining admission to a state building or enrolling a child in public school-by prohibiting the use of their consular-issued identification for any "official purpose."
7. HB 87 constitutes a sweeping and comprehensive state scheme regulating immigration and the conditions under which immigrants can reside in Georgia. The state system includes provisions: creating new state documentation requirements that transform ordinary police encounters into immigration status investigations; inventing new state immigration crimes; restricting the ability of U.S. citizens and lawful immigrants to obtain benefits that they are entitled to under federal law; invalidating documentation that foreign governments offer to their own citizens; and addressing many other issues relating to non-citizens' presence and activities in Georgia, including the transportation of suspected unauthorized immigrants by law enforcement officials, the availability of bail to non-citizens in criminal proceedings, and the creation of a new public body to oversee and enforce several ofHB 87's provisions.
8. The State of Georgia's intent to displace federal immigration authority is apparent not only from the scope and design ofHB 87's immigration regulations,
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but also from the express statements of the members of the Georgia General Assembly who drafted and supported the law.
9. HB 87 interferes with the core federal interests of setting a uniform national immigration scheme and speaking for the entire nation in conducting foreign relations with other nations. The President of the United States directly invoked these federal interests in condemning HB 87 on April 26, 20 II: "It is a mistake for states to try to do this piecemeal. We can't have 50 different immigration laws around the country. Arizona tried this and a federal court already struck them down." See Matthew Bigg, "Obama criticizes new Georgia immigration law," REUTERS, Apr. 26, 20 II.
/0. HB 87 is unconstitutional in myriad ways. It violates the Supremacy Clause and core civil rights and liberties secured by the U.S. Constitution­ including the Fourth Amendment's right to freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, the Right to Travel, and the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees to equal protection and due process under the law. It also violates separation-of­ powers safeguards in the Georgia Constitution.
II. The Plaintiffs in this action will suffer serious and irreparable violations of their constitutional rights and civil liberties if HB 87 is allowed to take effect. The individually named Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and a
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class of all others similarly situated to obtain preliminary and pennanent injunctive relief and a declaration that HB 87 is unconstitutional.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 12. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 over Plaintiffs' claims under the U.S. Constitution, which are brought both directly and under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. 13. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because this action arises under the U.S. Constitution and laws of the United States, and pursuant to 28 U.S.c. § 1343 because this action seeks to redress the deprivation, under color of state law, of Plaintiffs' civil rights and to secure equitable or other relief for the violation ofthose rights. 14. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state law claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 because it is so related to the federal claims that it [OnTIS part ofthe same case or controversy under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. 15. This Court has jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 57. 16. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Defendants are sued in their official capacity and their residences are all located within this
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District and this Division. All of the events giving rise to this Complaint occurred within this District.
PARTIES
 Organizational Plaintiffs
 17. Plaintiff Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights ("GLAHR") is a statewide, grassroots membership organization founded in 1999 that emphasizes community outreach to immigrant communities in Georgia in order to ease their transition into a new culture. One key way that GLAHR achieves its goal of easing transition into a new culture is by educating the community about city ordinances of which they would otherwise be unaware. Other GLAHR functions include: providing leadership training, conducting community organizing for immigrants' rights, holding community forums on a range of issues, and hosting monthly meetings on issues facing the Georgia immigrant community. If implemented, HB 87 would harm GLAHR by causing the organization to divert significant resources away from activities central to its mission. For example, if HB 87 takes effect, GLAHR will no longer be able to conduct education around local ordinances, and instead will have to focus all of its educational efforts on determining the effects ofHB 87 and educating its members about it.
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18. Since HB 87 passed, GLAHR has experienced a steep drop in attendance at its events and meetings, by both its members and other interested community participants. Members have reported that they are too afraid to attend these events because they believe that they will be targeted by the police based on their ethnic appearance.
19. GLAHR's ability to pursue its mission is directly threatened by implementation ofHB 87. To carry out its mission, GLAHR provides transportation for its members to activities and forums related to the organization's activities and goals. GLAHR provides this transportation for all of its members, some of whom are undocumented. GLAHR will need to continue to provide transportation for its members ifHB 87 takes effect and, therefore, would be subject to criminal liability under the law. In addition, to advance its mission, GLAHR often assists individual immigrants to remain in the state by advocating on their behalf with detention centers or by helping them find attorneys. These vital organizational activities would also expose GLAHR to criminal liability ifHB 87 is implemented. Finally, GLAHR's members have already been subject to increased stops and interrogation by police since HB 87 passed based on their Latino appearance and/or English language ability. Because many of GLAHR's members lack the identity documents prescribed by HB 87, they will be harmed if
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HE 87 takes effect by being subjected to increased police scrutiny, interrogation, and detention.
20. Plaintiff Service Employees International Union ("SEIU") is one of the largest labor organizations in the world, representing 2.2 million men and women who work primarily in the public sector and in the janitorial, health services, long­ term care, and security industries. Many of SEIU's members are recent immigrants to the United States and many of its members come from racial minority groups. SEIU has long called for and worked toward comprehensive reform of U.S. immigration laws. Another priority for SEIU is fighting discrimination against minorities, women, and other groups in the workplace and society in general. In Georgia, SEIU has a local affiliate, the Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United. This affiliate represents about 4,000 employees, of whom approximately 60 percent are members. These employees work in 28 different work sites across the state with about 75 percent residing in the Atlanta metropolitan area. Between 15 and 20 percent of the employees the Joint Board represents are Latino and the majority of the remainder are other racial minorities. In Georgia, SEIU works in partnership with the Southern Regional Joint Board and other groups to combat discrimination and mobilize for immigration reform at the national level.
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21. The implementation ofHB 87 will have a severe impact on SEIU's organizational mission. Some of SEIU's Latino members or their families have already been subjected to stops by local law enforcement where they have been asked to produce proof of immigration status. SEIU will be harmed if HB 87 is implemented because its minority members will be even more likely to be stopped, detained, arrested, and questioned by state and local police. This will cause hardship for members ofSEIU. In addition, SEIU will be harmed ifHB 87 is implemented because its members and potential members, regardless of nationality and immigration status, will refrain from exercising their rights to attend rallies, demonstrations, and union meetings or to engage in leafleting or other traditional labor activities because of the possibility of being stopped by police under HB 87. This will significantly affect the ability of SEIU to protect its existing members. In addition, the Latino community is one of the fastest growing in the states and is heavily represented in the industries in which Workers' United is concentrated­ manufacturing, industrial laundries, and distribution. Finally, HB 87 has created a fear of government officials and has already led to reluctance on the part of members of this community to join the union and to take the perceived risk of supporting new organizing in unorganized workplaces, where the National Labor Relations Board is often involved. SEIU joins this lawsuit to preserve its ability to
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organize new members and to protect the rights and interests of its members and prospective members.
22. Plaintiff Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United ("Joint Board") is a labor union and an affiliate of Plaintiff SEIU. The Joint Board represents approximately 4,000 workers in Georgia. Over 15 percent ofthe Joint Board's Georgia membership is Latino. The primary mission of the Joint Board is to organize, represent, and empower employees in Georgia. In addition, the Joint Board works in partnership with SEIU and other groups to combat discrimination and mobilize for immigration reform at the national level.
23. The Joint Board will be harmed by HB 87 because its minority members, including U.S. citizens and lawful immigrants, are likely to be unlawfully stopped, detained, arrested, and questioned by state and local police after HB 87 goes into effect. This will cause hardship for members of the Joint Board. In addition, the Joint Board will be harmed ifHB 87 is implemented because its members and potential members will refrain from exercising their rights to attend rallies, demonstrations, and union meetings or to engage in leafleting or other traditional labor activities because of the possibility of being stopped by police under HB 87.
24. Members have already told the Joint Board that they have faced additional police scrutiny and questioning since HB 87 was passed. They believe
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this additional police scrutiny was based solely on their ethnic appearance and/or English speaking ability. This discriminatory treatment by law enforcement will significantly impede the ability of the Joint Board to protect its current members and to organize new members. Some members of the Joint Board lack the identity documents required by HB 87 or do not regularly carry these documents with them when traveling through the state, and are therefore at risk oflengthy detention and investigation under the new law.
25. The Joint Board will also be harmed ifHB 87 is implemented because employers in the state will refrain from hiring members and potential members of the Joint Board that they believe look or sound "foreign" out of a fear that they will be subject to increased liability under HB 87. This will have a serious impact on the ability of the Joint Board to recruit new members. The Joint Board will also be harmed ifHB 87 takes effect because of the provision criminalizing the transporting of undocumented immigrants. This provision will have a chilling effect on the Joint Board's efforts to give rides to people attending union meetings and other events. The Joint Board will have a more difficult time organizing transportation to these key union activities because people will be afraid to associate with someone whose racial/ethnic appearance might result in getting the driver stopped for a minor traffic offense leading to further police scrutiny and
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possible criminal prosecution under the law. In addition, if HB 87 is implemented, the Joint Board will need to spend significant new time educating members and potential members about the law. This will divert the Joint Board's resources from other core organizational priorities. The Joint Board joins this lawsuit to preserve its ability to organize new members and to protect the rights and interests of its members and prospective members.
26. Plaintiff DREAM Activist.org (DREAM) is a multicultural, migrant­ youth-led movement to pass the DREAM Act, also known as the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act. The DREAM Act is a bipartisan bill that seeks to address the situation faced by many young students who were brought to the United States as young infants. Under the most recent version of the DREAM Act, students with good moral character who came to the United States at age 15 or younger at least five years before the date of the legislation's enactment would quality for "conditional permanent resident status" upon acceptance to college, graduation from a U.S. high school, or being awarded a GED in the United States or have served in the armed forces. DREAM is a national membership based organization with DREAM Act student members all over the country, including Georgia. DREAM provides campaign support to DREAM Act students facing removal from the United States in Georgia and all across the country.
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27. IfHB 87 takes effect, DREAM members are at risk of being subject to prolonged immigration status checks even if they are authorized by the federal government to remain in the United States. DREAM has members, including Georgia members, who have been granted deferred action by federal immigration authorities. Deferred action is a discretionary decision not to arrest or deport a person for immigration purposes. Deferred action is often granted for one year time periods, but can be renewed. However, the temporary and indefinite nature of deferred action means that a DREAM Act student granted deferred action would not be automatically eligible to obtain identity documents in Georgia, and such students often spend months out of each year with no identification while they wait for new documentation to prove that the federal government has extended their deferred action grant. Under HB 87, these students are likely to be caught up in prolonged immigration status checks although they are authorized to remain in the United States. DREAM members, including Georgia DREAM members, may also benefit from a private immigration bill introduced by a local Senator or House of Representative preventing their removal from the United States. Upon introduction of a private bill, a DREAM Act student's removal is delayed at least until the end of the congressional session. A DREAM Act student with a private bill introduced may not have proof that the bill was introduced or an officer may be
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confused as to whether a DREAM Act student with a private bill can remain in the United States. Under HB 87, Georgia DREAM Act students with a private bill introduced but not passed in either the House or Senate may be targeted and arrested under the law.
28. IfHB 87 takes effect, DREAM will be harmed in other ways, as well. DREAM harbors undocumented students in houses within the State of Georgia and provides transportation to undocumented students with and without deferred action grants. DREAM will continue to do so even ifHB 87 takes effect. DREAM also has planned and will continue to plan conferences and training sessions in Georgia that bring together undocumented students nationwide. Under HB 87, these actions could be considered assisting, transporting, and harboring undocumented students in Georgia which would expose DREAM members to criminal liability.
29. Plaintiff Task Force for the Homeless (TFH) has served the needs of homeless men, women, and children in the Atlanta area for thirty years. Today, TFH is a non-profit organization that offers a homeless shelter that provides evening meals, a recovery program, a Resident Volunteer Program, a Transitional Housing Program, an emergency assistance hotline, support services, a day service center, permanent housing placement assistance, employment placement and assistance, computer classes, an art studio and gallery, a bike shop, a roof garden,
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and occasional transportation for residents. TFH serves more than 500 people a day-men, women, and children, including undocumented immigrants-in its shelter, resident volunteer programs, and transitional housing programs. TFH provides its services to all, without regard to their immigration status.
30. Since HB 87 has been enacted, TFH has diverted resources from other organizational priorities to educate its volunteers and residents about the law. Volunteers and residents alike are fearful that HB 87 will have a serious impact on people of color statewide. If HB 87 takes effect, TFH will have to divert additional resources from priority areas to provide education about the law.
31. If HB 87 takes effect, TFH will be harmed in several ways. First, TFH will be exposed to criminal liability for continuing to conduct emergency shelter and services core to its mission without regard to the immigration status of those it serves. Second, TFH has assisted victims of racial profiling with filing complaints in the past. If HE 87 takes effect, it will be more difficult for TFH to help the increased number of victims ofracial profiling. In addition, TFH volunteers and residents-nearly all of whom are homeless-seldom carry the identity documents prescribed by HE 87. IfHB 87 takes effect, these members would be unable to establish their identity to the satisfaction of local law enforcement and would face additional police scrutiny and detention while officers attempt to verify their
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immigration status. Moreover, TFH provides transportation to its residents occasionally without checking their immigration status; HB 87 will make any future service of that kind risky.
32. TFH also encourages its residents to apply for food stamps and public housing assistance to which they are entitled. Currently, this process does not consume significant TFH staff time. But because many TFH residents lack the most common forms of identity documents, and in some cases lack any ID, the new HB 87 requirement that applicants for public benefits present qualifying identity documents will cause many TFH residents and clients who are otherwise eligible for food stamps to be denied. Food stamps are essential for many TFH residents, and TFH will have to prioritize creating instructions and providing assistance for those who are turned away, including providing more direct food assistance. This diversion of resources will be a major impediment to TFH residents' access to essential services, and to TFH's work in other areas. TFH also tries to place individuals in public housing or to assist them in obtaining Section 8 housing vouchers when possible. Given that HB 87 creates the same identification restrictions for public housing as for food stamps, TFH will be overburdened by requests from residents for help with overcoming problems caused by these new document requirements, including the time-consuming process of obtaining
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qualifying identity documents. Because fewer of TFH's residents will have access to food stamps and public housing assistance they will, by necessity, require additional food and housing assistance directly from TFH. They will remain homeless for longer and longer periods of time.
33. Plaintiff Asian American Legal Advocacy Center is the first not-for­ profit law center focused on Asian Americans, Pacific Islanders, and Asian-ethnic refugees in Georgia and the Southeast. AALAC's mission is to protect and promote the civil, social, and economic rights of Asian Americans through public policy, legal education, community organizing and leadership development. AALAC's programs include immigration, youth and juvenile justice, language access, economic development, voter engagement and civic participation, and small business issues. AALAC reaches approximately 3,000 people on an annual basis through its community forums and multilingual educational materials. It provides bilingual materials in Chinese, Korean and Vietnamese. Since the passage of HB 87, AALAC has exhausted staff and organizational resources to respond to the law's impact the Asian American communities, immigrant communities, and small businesses. For example, along with its community partners, AALAC helped to gather 4,000 signatures provided by Korean American residents of Gwinnett County urging key legislatures to vote no to HB 87. HB 87
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has already and will continue to impact AALAC's ability to satisfy its mission because members of its community are looking to AALAC for guidance on the impact of the law on their day-to-day lives.
34. Plaintiff Alterna is a faith-based, non-profit organization that was founded in 2006 and provides a variety of social services, primarily to the Latino immigrant community in LaGrange, Georgia. Alterna is guided by the biblical teaching to love our neighbors and care for the marginal and vulnerable among us and it focuses on providing accompaniment, advocacy, and hospitality to and on behalf of those in need. Alterna's services include: providing crisis intervention case management for families and individuals experiencing legal, medical, employment, or family-related crises; accompanying clients to medical, government, or school appointments; accompanying clients to appointments to apply for public benefits such as food stamps, income verification and Medicaid; sponsoring English-language classes; delivering community education on a range of issues; maintaining a housing facility near the immigration detention center in Lumpkin, Georgia for family and friends visiting detainees; providing transitional housing for families and individuals experiencing crises; advocating on immigration issues including detention conditions for immigrant detainees; and hosting educational trips to Guatemala with a focus on social justice. Alterna has
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three staff members and several volunteers. Altema does not check the immigration status of its clients, but is aware that many of its clients and their family members are undocumented immigrants.
35. If HB 87 takes effect, Altema wil1 be harmed in several ways. First, Altema will be exposed to criminal liability for continuing to conduct services core to its mission-including transporting clients to various appointments and running its housing facility near the Lumpkin detention center and its transitional housing facility. Alterna is aware that many of the clients it transports to critical appointments or allows to use its housing facilities are undocumented. Second, Altema has already experienced a significant drop in attendance at events as well as a decrease in clients since HB 87 passed. Indeed, Altema has already been forced to cancel some of its English-language classes. This decrease in attendance and demand for services is directly attributable to fear resulting from the new law; many immigrants are too afraid to drive to any events out of fear of being stopped by law enforcement. IfHB 87 takes effect, Altema will suffer an even steeper decline in attendance and demand for services. Third, Alterna has had to alter its programming since HB 87 passed. Clients are showing up for events or services with questions about their rights under the new law and Altema has had to divert
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resources to answer these questions, which detracts from the ability to provide services more central to Altema's mission such as English-language instruction.
36. Plaintiff Coalition of Latino Leaders ("CLILA") is a not-for-profit, volunteer-based membership organization in Dalton, Georgia that was founded in 2006. CLILA's mission is to develop competent, caring Latino grassroots leadership with the skills necessary to address the critical issues facing the Northwest Georgia Latino community. CLILA has approximately 150 members and about 1,000 participants in various CLILA events throughout the year. CLILA provides the following services: advocacy and community organizing for immigrants' rights; citizenship classes; English-language classes; Homework Club for children whose parents do not speak English; computer classes; and assistance in completing applications for legal residency and naturalization. CLiLA also hosts community meetings on issues affecting the Latino community, provides educational information on various topics, and works on voter registration and education for the Latino community. In addition, CLILA identifies children, and sometimes parents, who are eligible for food stamps and instructs families on how to apply for these benefits. CLILA provides programs and services for the community living primarily in Whitfield and Murray counties. Its members are Latino immigrants, mainly from low-income families. CLiLA accepts all
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members without regard to their immigration status, but is aware that approximately 60 percent of its members are undocumented immigrants.
37. CLILA has already been harmed by the passage ofHB 87-most notably due to a drop in attendance for its programs based on members' fears that their association with CLILA will cause them to be identified as undocumented immigrants by law enforcement. In addition, CLILA's resources, both in terms of funding and staff and volunteer time, have been diverted from organizational priority projects due to the passage ofHB 87. For example, the number of calls CLILA receives daily has increased by 400 percent since HB 87 was passed. The vast majority of these calls are from community members who have questions about the new law and how it will affect them. CLILA has been forced to put on hold its citizenship classes in order to respond to this increase in calls and to answer questions about HB 87. Finally, if implemented, CLILA will face criminal liability under HB 87 because it regularly provides transportation for its members-some of whom are undocumented-to attend events such as citizenship classes or rallies across the state.
38. Plaintiff Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta ("Instituto") is a non-profit organization registered in the state of Georgia and based in Atlanta. The Institute is dedicated to fostering the development of the Mexican community in Atlanta
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and to promoting the history and culture of Mexico in the United States. The Instituto was founded in 2002 and its mission is to promote understanding and to share Mexican customs and traditions with residents of Atlanta and surrounding areas. The Instituto places a special focus on educating youth with Mexican ancestry about their heritage and culture. Another central goal of the Instituto is to cultivate friendship ties and a mutual understanding of the cultural commonalities between the United States of America and Mexico. To fulfill its mission the Instituto organizes cultural programs, which are open to all Atlanta-region residents without regard to immigration status, nationality, or citizenship. The Instituto regularly holds large cultural events for the Atlanta community that range from celebrations for Mexico's Independence Day and the Day of the Dead: a variety of concerts; conferences; health fairs; expositions; and several educational and sports events. These events draw attendees from across Atlanta and the rest of the state and regularly include thousands of participants. Although the Instituto's events are open to all, the majority of attendees are Latino-including U.S. citizens and others in lawful immigration status.
39. If HB 87 is implemented, the Instituto will be harmed because attendance at its events will drop drastically and this will undermine the Institute's ability to achieve its central purpose as an organization-to promote understanding and
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educate the public about Mexican cultural heritage. Already, since HB 87 passed people have expressed fear of attending Instituto events. Individuals who regularly attend Instituto events have expressed that they are afraid to attend these events out of fear that they wilI be targeted by local police and will be subject to immigration status inquiries if they attend large group events with primarily Latino attendees. The passage of HB 87 has created an intense climate of fear for Latinos in Georgia and individuals of Latino descent are afraid that any contact with law enforcement could result in extended interrogation, detention, and arrest regardless of their lawful immigration status.
40. Plaintiff Georgia Coalition for the Peoples' Agenda ("CPA") is a Georgia-based coalition of approximately 1000 individual and 50 organizational members representing a diverse spectrum of issues, interests, and constituencies, ranging from civil and human rights and women's and young people's rights to labor relations and environmental justice. CPA defines its mission as improving the quality of governance in Georgia, creating a more informed and active electorate, and having responsive and accountable elected officials. CPA tries to educate the public and encourage their participation through voter registration drives, town hall meetings and other events that provide information and a forum to voice community concerns on issues spanning health care, education, labor
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relations, the juvenile justice system, monitoring elected officials, and environmental justice, to name a few.
41. HB 87 will negatively impact CPA's members and organizational activities in several ways. Some CPA members, including U.S. citizens and individuals who have lawful immigration status, will be unable to provide the required documents for police inspection and will be at risk of being subject to lengthy detentions and investigations. For example, many elderly individuals do not have a Georgia driver's license or other document deemed acceptable under HB 87. For many families represented by CPA who already struggle to pay their bills and make ends meet, the costs of obtaining these documents will be a great and undue economic burden as well. In addition, CPA has already received many reports of racial profiling by the local police targeting individuals of color, for example, in a phenomenon known as "driving while black," whereby African­ American drivers who are seen driving more expensive cars are routinely stopped by the police for interrogation even when they have not violated any traffic laws. CPA is very concerned that HB 87 will increase and aggravate these incidents of racial profiling and harassment.
42. CPA also foresees a decrease in participation in its events and programs, such as town hall meetings, because of people's fear of immigration status
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investigations authorized by HB 87. The law will also negatively affect the organization by forcing CPA to divert its time, money, and resources from other important projects, such as initiatives to improve the educational and criminal justice systems, so that it can respond to HB 87.
Ind ivid ual Plaintiffs 43. Plaintiff Paul Bridges, a supporter of the Republican Party, is the mayor of Uvalda, Georgia, a town of approximately 600 people in Montgomery County. Because he speaks Spanish and English and is well-known, he often assists with interpretation in schools, doctors' offices, court, and other settings. He also provides transportation to undocumented individuals so that they can go to the Mexican Consulate in Atlanta, churches, the grocery store, appointments at doctors' and dentists' offices, and soccer tournaments in towns neighboring Uvalda, among other places. He gives rides to undocumented friends in Georgia on at least a daily basis and will continue to do so in the future. In addition, Bridges has traveled to Florida to pick up friends, including those who are undocumented, to give them rides to Georgia. Bridges will continue to do so in the future. Sometimes he exceeds the speed limit, or forgets to signal when changing lanes, when driving undocumented individuals.
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44. If HB 87 goes into effect, Bridges and the undocumented individuals traveling with him will be at risk of criminal prosecution. In the past, Bridges has opened his home to undocumented individuals who needed a place to live as they traveled through the area, and he will continue to do so in the future. If HB 87 goes into effect, he fears that he could be prosecuted for sheltering these individuals in his home.
45. As mayor of Uvalda, Bridges also wishes to inform the Court of the immense human and economic costs that HB 87 will inflict on his town. With HB 87, Bridges fears that families with mixed immigration status will be torn apart, as parents who are undocumented get picked up by immigration authorities, leaving their U.S. citizen children without anyone to care for them. IfHB 87 goes into effect, Bridges worries that there simply will not be enough agricultural workers available and this will adversely impact Uvalda businesses and its tax base. Finally, Bridges fears that HB 87 will pose enormous costs to the town for housing those arrested under the law, costs that the town cannot afford.
46. Plaintiff Benjamin Speight is the Organizing Director for the Teamsters Truck Drivers and Helpers Local 728. Speight protects the rights of all workers, without regard to their immigration status. He regularly transports undocumented students and other undocumented individuals in his union-issued twelve passenger
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van. While driving, he often receives and sends text messages, and sometimes does not come to complete stops at stop signs and drives above the speed limit. Although HB 87 will criminalize Speight's transportation of undocumented individuals, he will continue to do this even if the law takes effect. Speight also will drive the van to organize non-compliance with and targeted opposition to HB 87 both inside and outside the state. As a result of these activities, Speight fears that he will be subject to criminal prosecution under HB 87.
47. Plaintiff Everitt Howe is a retired Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Air Force. He currently serves as the Vice President of the Fulton County chapter for Atlantans Building Leadership for Empowerment ("ABLE"), an interdenominational social justice organization composed of 27 congregations, and is a caseworker in a community service program at his church. This program serves about 100 families, including some undocumented immigrants, and offers a variety of services, including providing advice on legal or tax matters, English­ language classes, food coupons, and direct financial aid to families and individuals in financial hardship. As part ofthe program, Howe regularly accompanies and transports families and individuals, including those who are undocumented, to hospital visits or other appointments. In the course of transporting and assisting these individuals, Howe has accidentally run a red light and has had problems with
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a troublesome taillight on his car, which make it likely that he will be stopped in the future for minor traffic violations. Howe fears that under HB 87, he could be found criminally liable.
48. Plaintiff Paul J. Edwards is a devout Christian who strongly believes in helping all individuals in his community regardless of their immigration status. His religious beliefs encourage actions that will be labeled as criminal offenses if HB 87 is allowed to take effect. For example, as a part of his religious commitment, Edwards transports people, including those who are undocumented, to places of worship and to locations which provide medical assistance. When transporting individuals, he has on occasion exceeded the speed limit. His activities could subject him to criminal liability for assisting, transporting, and harboring undocumented individuals under HB 87. In addition, Edwards serves as a board member of Plaintiff Altema and plans events that include housing undocumented individuals, which could be considered criminal harboring under HB 87. IfHB 87 goes into effect, individuals in Edwards's community will be even more afraid to drive, and he will be criminally liable for transporting them to church and for non-emergency medical care. Also, HB 87 would make Edwards criminally liable for inviting out-of-state undocumented friends into his home. From personal knowledge and experience, Edwards knows that laws such as HB
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87 increase fear within the immigrant community and decrease the likelihood that immigrants-both those with and without legal status-will cooperate with law enforcement, which result in a community-wide decrease in public safety.
49. Plaintiff Sharon Gruner is a graduate student who resides in Dalton, Georgia, and spends her time volunteering with Plaintiff CLILA. As part of her volunteer work, she regularly drives CLILA members-those with and without legal status-from English classes and meetings, and she will continue to do so. While driving these members, Gruner has sometimes driven over the speed limit or failed to stop completely at a stop sign, and she has been stopped by police about once every three months because of a problem with the tail lights on her car. To date, she has received warnings during these stops. But she worries that, following the implementation ofHB 87, a routine stop for the taillight problem or other minor traffic violation will result in her being prosecuted for transporting undocumented immigrants. In connection with her work for CLILA, Gruner also has provided shelter to undocumented immigrants and she will continue to do so in the future. The tines that Gruner would pay if she is found to be violating HB 87 by harboring or transporting undocumented immigrants are more than she can afford to pay as a graduate student.
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50. Plaintiff Jane Doe #1 is married to an undocumented immigrant. Her husband is currently participating in physical therapy and sees a doctor regularly as a result of an incapacitating injury he suffered that left him unable to operate an automobile. Jane Doe #1 has primary responsibility for transporting her husband to and from his doctor visits and physical therapy, as well as anywhere else that their family frequents, and has on some occasions exceeded the speed limit, or failed to use her blinker properly. If HB 87 takes effect, she fears arrest by the police for transporting her husband to and from his medical appointments and other locations. She also fears being held criminally liable for harboring undocumented immigrants if she were to invite her undocumented in-laws from Florida to visit with her here in Georgia.
51. Plaintiff Jaypaul Singh, a U.S. citizen of South Asian descent, permanently resides in the State of Washington. Singh is attending law school and will be residing in Atlanta, Georgia for the summer while he works as a law clerk in the city. He has a driver's license from the State of Washington, which he plans to use as his identification while living in Atlanta. Singh will not have with him any document that is required by HB 87 to prove that he is a U.S. citizen. He generally carries his driver's license with him, but this document will be insufficient under HB 87 because the State of Washington does not verify
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immigration status prior to issuing driving licenses. Singh occasionally commits minor infractions, such as speeding, and he has sometimes been stopped by law enforcement officers for this in the past. He is fearful that he could be stopped again for committing a minor infraction while in Atlanta, and that he will be subject to extended detention as the local police try to confirm whether he is a U.S. citizen. IfHB 87 goes into effect, Singh will avoid contact with law enforcement and will curtail some of his movement throughout the state to avoid the risk of detention.
52. PlaintiffErnesto Pinon, a U.S. citizen who is Latino, permanently resides in the State of Washington. He has dark skin and dark hair. He plans to travel to Georgia this year to visit his half-sister and her family, who live in Tucker, Georgia. Pinon has a driver's license issued by the State of Washington, which is the only form of identification he carries when he travels. Pinon has been stopped by police in the past because, he believes, he looks Latino. He is worried that ifhe travels to Georgia to visit his sister, he will be stopped by police and detained because his Washington driver's license will not be accepted as proof that he is a U.S. citizen and because, due to his skin color and accent, officers will not believe that he is a U.S. citizen. IfHB 87 goes into effect, he will be more afraid
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to travel in Georgia. When he visits his sister they will stay inside her home more than they would have before HB 87 to avoid encounter law enforcement officers.
53. Plaintiff John Doe #1, now 19 years old, has been in the United States since he was a young child. He is a Mexican national who was brought to the United States by his parents when he was about nine years old. He is a high school graduate who, while in high school, was a member of the Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps (JROTC) and vice-president of his senior class. Although he applied to and was accepted at Kennesaw State University, he could not matriculate because he could not afford the tuition and did not qualify for loans or grants because of his immigration status. Nonetheless, his goal remains to eventually attend college. IfHB 87 goes into effect, John Doe #1 will be afraid to leave his home and participate in community activities as he would otherwise, because ofthe increased risk that he will be subject to racial profiling. He has been subject to racial profiling in the past and, because of his dark skin and dark hair, fears that HB 87 will open the door to additional encounters where he is racially proftied. If HB 87 goes into effect, he will be very afraid to interact with the police, even if he is the victim of or witness to a crime, and he would likely not call the police for fear of being arrested because of his immigration status.
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54. John Doe #1 does not possess any of the documents HB 87 requires as proof of identification, and his only photo ID is a consular identification card ("matricula") issued by the Mexican Consulate. John Doe #1 has used the matricula in the past to visit the State Capitol building and would like to continue doing so in the future, but believes that HB 87 will cause public places to refuse the matricula as a valid form of ID. Likewise, although his mother and sister have used their matriculas to establish their parental identity when obtaining Women Infant and Children ("WIC") services for their U.S. citizen children, he worries that if HB 87 takes effect, they will no longer be able to access these services, which in tum will adversely affect the health and well-being of his family members.
55. Plaintiff John Doe #2, a Mexican national, has lived in Georgia for years and considers this state his home. He speaks limited English. IfHB 87 takes effect, it will harm John Doe #2 in a number of ways. For example, John Doe #2 does not possess any of the documents required by HB 87 and he is very afraid of encountering local and state law enforcement officers after HB 87 takes effect. He has been a victim of racial profiling in the past and now drives as little as possible because he fears encounters with law enforcement officers. For transportation, he now relies on his bicycle, walking, or asking friends for car rides. But ifHB 87 is
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implemented, John Doe #2 fears that officers will stop him even while he is riding his bicycle or walking and subject him to an immigration status check. As a result, ifHB 87 takes effect, John Doe #2 plans to stay in his house as much as possible and give up on daily activities, such as walking in the park. If I-1B 87 takes effect, John Doe #2 also will have difficulty convincing his friends to give him rides to the grocery store because they will be subject to criminal liability for transporting him. In addition, John Doe #2 has been robbed several times in the past. While he has reported these incidents to the police, he may not do so if HB 87 is implemented because he is fearful of getting arrested for lacking the documents required by HB 87.
56. If HB 87 takes effect, John Doe #2 will also be harmed because he will be prohibited from relying on the matricula consular issued to him by the Mexican government. John Doe #2 currently uses the matricula consular for identification on a regular basis. For example, he has used the matricula to open accounts at City Hall for water and electricity service to his home; to seek police assistance when he was the victim of robberies; and for identification at a hospital in Rome. IfHB 87 is implemented, John Doe #2 will not be able to use his matricula consular for these and other official purposes.
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57. Plaintiff Jane Doe #2, a Mexican national, is a twenty-three year old Georgia resident. She came to the United States with her parents about twelve years ago. She graduated high school and college in Georgia. About two years ago, she was pulled over by police for a traffic infraction and charged with driving without a license, and then transferred to an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention center and detained for more than a month while awaiting removal from the United States. She was granted deferred action until May 2011. Her deferred action grant has subsequently been extended until May 20 I2, but she has no paperwork documenting this extension.
58. When Jane Doe #2 first obtained deferred action, she applied for and obtained a Georgia driver's license. That license expired in May 2011, when her first grant of deferred action ended. Currently, Jane Doe #2 does not have any of the identity documents required by HB 87, nor does ICE issue identity cards or documents to those granted deferred action. Jane Doe #2 cannot apply for a Georgia driver's license now because she has no paperwork to demonstrate to the State of Georgia that she is permitted to remain in the United States. Jane Doe #2 is currently seeking federal work authorization, but that will not be granted for months. Once that is granted, Jane Doe #2 intends to apply for a Georgia's driver's license using her work authorization as proof of federal perm ission to
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remain in the United States. In the interim period of time, Jane Doe #2 does not have and cannot obtain any of the identity documents required by HB 87.
59. IfHB 87 goes into effect while she lacks a driver's license or other Georgia-issued ID, Jane Doe #2 will be at high risk of detention for immigration status investigation. Even if she is able to obtain a Georgia driver's license, she will limit her driving to avoid encounters with the police. In addition, she will avoid interacting with law enforcement officers, even if she is the victim of or witness to a crime for fear of being arrested because of her immigration status. She will avoid police contact in these circumstances even though she knows that doing so may lead to an increase in crime in the community.
60. Plaintiff David Kennedy is an immigration lawyer in Gainesville, Georgia. He frequently meets with and gives legal advice to individuals who are undocumented and/or who have violated their immigration status. He also occasionally drives these individuals to immigration court hearings, and has on some of these occasions exceeded the speed limit or failed to use his blinker properly. If HB 87 takes effect, Kennedy will be subject to arrest and criminal liability for providing legal advice to his clients and for harboring, transporting, and inducing or enticing them to enter Georgia.
Defendants
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61. Defendant Nathan Deal is the Governor of Georgia. According to the Georgia Constitution, "[tjhe chief executive powers" are "vested in the Governor." Ga. Const. art. 5 § 2, ~ I. Under Georgia law, the Governor "shall provide for the defense of any action ... the result of which is of interest to the state because of any claim inconsistent with the state's sovereignty, jurisdiction, or rights." O.e.G.A. § 45-12-26. As such, Defendant Deal is responsible for the enforcement of HB 87 in the State of Georgia and is an appropriate defendant in this case. Defendant Deal is sued in his official capacity.
62. Defendant Samuel S. Olens is the Attorney General of Georgia. According to the Georgia Constitution, the Attorney General is "the legal advisor of the executive department" and "shall perform such ... duties as shall be required by law." Ga. Const. art. 5, § 3, ~ IV; see also O.e.G.A. § 45-15-3 (detailing Attorney General's powers and duties). As such, Defendant Olens is responsible for the enforcement of HB 87 in the State of Georgia and is an appropriate defendant in this case. Defendant Olens is sued in his official capacity.
63. Defendant Clyde L. Reese, 111 is the Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Human Services. In this role, Mr. Reese oversees public assistance programs, including the Food Stamp program in Georgia. Defendant Reese is responsible for implementing and enforcing provisions of HB 87 related to public
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benefits provided through the Georgia Department of Human Services. Defendant Reese is sued in his official capacity.
64. Defendant Mike Beatty is the Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Community Affairs. The Georgia Department of Community Affairs administers the Housing Choice Voucher Program. This is a tenant-based assistance program that assists low income individuals and families to rent safe, decent, and sanitary dwelling units in the private rental market. The program was created by the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 and is funded by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Defendant Beatty is responsible for implementing and enforcing provisions of HB87 related to public benefits provided through the Georgia Department of Community Affairs. Defendant Beatty is sued in his official capacity.
65. Defendant Falecia Stewart is the Executive Director of the Housing Authority of Fulton County, Georgia. Defendant Stewart is responsible for overseeing the operations of the Housing Authority of Fulton County. The Housing Authority of Fulton County administers vouchers under the Housing Choice Voucher Program. This is a tenant-based assistance program that assists low income individuals and families to rent safe, decent, and sanitary dwelling units in the private rental market. The program was created by the Housing and
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Community Development Act of 1974 and is funded by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (BUD). The Housing Authority of Fulton County also provides project-based public housing. Defendant Stewart is responsible for implementing and enforcing provisions ofHB87 related to public benefits provided through the Housing Authority of Fulton County. Defendant Stewart is sued in her official capacity.
FACTS History and Intent of HB 87 66. On April 14, 2011, the Georgia General Assembly enacted HB 87, a comprehensive law that touches numerous aspects of immigration regulation. The full text ofHB 87 is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 67. In enacting HB 87, Georgia legislated in an area committed exclusively to the federal government under the U.S. Constitution. 68. Indeed, Georgia expressly intended not only to intrude into an area of exclusive federal control, but to supplant the federal government in key respects. 69. The legislative record makes clear that a primary motivating factor in passing this law was the Georgia General Assembly's disagreement with federal immigration policy.
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70. In September 20 I0, Lieutenant Governor Casey Cagle and House Speaker David Ralston announced the creation of the "Special Joint Committee on Immigration Reform," a 14-member committee co-chaired by Representative Matt Ramsey and Senator Jack Murphy to draft legislation to "stern] ] the flow of illegal immigration activity in Georgia." Speaker Ralston noted that the committee was "inspired by the federal government's continued failure to deal with the problem of illegal immigration and its drain on taxpayer resources in Georgia," and sought to "pick[] up where Washington D.C. has let us down." Press Release, Office of the Lieutenant Governor Casey Cagle, Speaker Ralston and Lt. Gov. Cagle Announce the Creation of the Special Joint Committee on Immigration Reform (Sept. 29, 20 I0) (available at http://www.georgia.gov/00/press/detail/0,2668,2199618_ 130107341 163595867,00.html)
71. During the debate, multiple legislators expressly stated that they intended for the State of Georgia to wrest control over immigration regulation away from the federal government. For example, Senator Renee Unterman remarked that, with respect to comprehensive immigration regulation, "[ u]nfortunateiy the federal government won't step up to the plate; the states are having to do it." Debate on HB 87 Before the Senate (Apri I 14, 20 II) (remarks of Sen. Renee Unterman). Similarly, Representative Matt Ramsey commented: "If we want to effectively
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address illegal immigration we can't wait for our federal government to act -we've got to do it ourselves." Debate on HB 87 Before the House (Mar. 3, 2011) (remarks of Rep. Matt Ramsey). Representative Rich Golick also explained that: "where Congress fails it is inevitable. It is inevitable that states will step into the breach and lead." Debate on HB 87 Before the House (Mar. 3,2011) (remarks of Rep. Rich Golick). Representative Wendell Willard, the Chair of the House Judiciary Committee, likewise remarked, "[O]ur federal government has failed on the issue [of immigration] .... it's a federal versus state issue. When the federal government displays its inertia over the course of time, states notice that and states act." Debate on HB 87 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary (Feb. 8,2011) (remarks of Rep. Wendell Willard). Representative Willard continued: "Doing nothing is not an option. And relying to our detriment on a federal government that is not going to do anything anytime soon is not a realistic alternative.... [W]hen we hear someone say it's a federal issue, let the federal government do it, that's really just a euphemism for do nothing. And that's not an option." Jd. Senator Seth Harp also commented:
[l]fyou look at the US Constitution there are precious few things that our federal government is supposed to do, but one of the things it is expressly commanded to do, is to secure our borders and provide for a common defense, and I submit to you, Ladies and Gentlemen of the Senate, that the federal government has failed miserably in that constitutional obligation it has abdicated its responsibility, they have
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walked off the job, and so what are we supposed to do? We're supposed to just throw up our hands and say "Well, the federal government is not exercising its responsibilities, so we are just going to suffer the consequences." At a certain point, you have to take action, and that's what happened in Arizona.... we are not doing anything but enforcing the federal law on the books that the federal government refuses to enforce, ... and that is what this debate is about.... There is no question in my mind that adoption of this legislation is going to address in a meaningful way, the very serious problem of illegal immigration in the State of Georgia. Debate on HB 87 Before the Senate (Apr. 14, 20 II) (remarks of Sen. Seth Harp). Senator Harp was apparently referring to Arizona's SB 1070, the major parts of which have never gone into effect because they have been enjoined by the federal courts. United States v. Arizona, F.Jd , 2011 WL 1346945, at *4-* 10, *15­ *19 (9th Cir. Apr. 11, 20 II), afJ'g 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 20 I0). 72. Contrary to long-settled law about the federal government's exclusive role in regulating immigration, multiple legislators expressed the view that the State of Georgia should regulate immigration on its own without any role, or only a limited role, for the federal government. For example, Representative Bobby Franklin remarked: "I don't see anything in the United States Constitution where the states authorize the federal government to have any policy on immigration. Which would mean under the Tenth Amendment that immigration is reserved to the states. Wouldn't you agree, then, that immigration is a state issue, not a federal issue?" Debate on HB 87 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary (Feb. 8,2011)
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(remarks of Rep. Bobby Franklin). Likewise, Representative Ed Setzler commented: "we as a state legislature have to make sure we're closing loopholes and gaps [in federal law] .... there are elements in the immigration debate that are specifically state issues that the federal government alone can't handle without some involvement by the legislature." Debate on HB 87 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary (Feb. 8,2011) (remarks of Rep. Ed Setzler).
73. Other legislators observed that HB 87 would create a "police state" in Georgia aimed at immigration enforcement in light of an alleged absence offederal action. See, e.g., Debate on HB 87 Before the Senate (April 14, 2011) (remarks of Sen. Jason Carter) ("one aspect of this bill ... [is] agreeing to put a police state in force to enforce what is undeniably a broken federal system.").
74. In short, the legislative history leaves no question that the General Assembly enacted HB 87 as a comprehensive solution to the perceived problem of the federal government's failure to regulate immigration to Georgia's liking.
75. In signing the bill, Governor Deal made clear his disapproval of the federal government's immigration policy, stating: "Today, we are taking action to uphold the rule oflaw. This legislation is a responsible step forward in the absence of federal action." See Elizabeth Llorente, Georgia Governor Signs Strictest Immigration Law in Nation, Fox News Latino, May 13,2011, at http://latino.
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foxnews.com/latino/politics/20 11 105/131georgia-gov-nathan-deal-expected-sign­ arizona-style-law-noon-strictest-nation/#ixzz1NIZeOoUI (statement made at signing ceremony).
Key Provisions of HB 87 76. The following are some of the key features ofHB 87's comprehensive state system of immigration regulation. Section 8 77. Section 8 ofHB 87 authorizes Georgia peace officers to demand certain identity documents of individuals they investigate and to investigate the immigration status of those persons unable to produce such a document during many routine encounters, converting these encounters into lengthy and intrusive immigration status investigations. 78. Section 8 effectively requires all persons in Georgia to carry one of a prescribed list of identity documents in order to avoid being detained for a prolonged period without legal justification while an officer attempts to determine his or her immigration status in the course of a routine stop or other encounter. 79. Section 8 fundamentally changes the primary role and day-to-day operations of peace officers. Under Georgia law, peace officers-who include state and local police officers, railroad officers, transportation officers, correctional
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officers, and officers affiliated with the Department of Juvenile Justice-are responsible for "enforc[ing] the criminal or traffic laws through the power of arrest and [their] duties include the preservation of public order, the protection of life and property, and the prevention, detection, or investigation of crime." O.CG.A. § 35­ 8-2(8)(A). HE 87 undermines these state goals and duties by injecting civil immigration enforcement authority into every stop, detention, or arrest made by peace officers.
80. Section 8 authorizes peace officers to demand that any person subject to "any investigation"--i.e., a consensual encounter, stop, detention, or arrestproduce one of five enumerated types of identity documents. O.CG.A. § 17-5­ 1OO(b) (emphasis added). Only individuals who can produce a document from this list receive a presumption of lawful status. Id. Individuals who cannot are subject to a verification scheme unique to Georgia that will subject numerous individuals to lengthy and intrusive immigration status investigations.
81. The five documents enumerated in Section 8 are: (1) a so-called "secure and verifiable document" as defined in Section 19 of HE 87; (2) a valid Georgia driver's license; (3) a valid Georgia identification card; (4) a valid driver's license from an entity requiring proof of legal presence or a valid identification card issued by the federal government; or (5) a valid driver's license issued to a nonresident by
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her home state or country accompanied by proof of citizenship or legal residency. O.C.G.A. §§ l7-5-100(b)(l)-(5). The statute thus excludes reliance on driver's licenses issued by states such as New Mexico and Washington that do not require such proof.
82. In cases where a person does not have one of the five enumerated documents, he may provide "[0]ther information that is sufficient to allow the peace officer to independently identify [him]." O.C.G.A. § l7-5-100(b)(6). The law provides no guidance whatsoever on what that "other information" might be and thus no direction for Georgia law enforcement officers charged with enforcing it.
83. Where a person cannot provide an enumerated document or sufficient "other information," Section 8 authorizes the officer to "determine [the person's] immigration status" by "any reasonable means available," including by relying on: (I) a "federal identification data base"; (2) "[i]dentification methods authorized by federal law"; (3) electronic fingerprint readers or "similar devices"; or (4) "[c]ontacting an appropriate federal agency." O.C.G.A. § l7-5-100(c).
84. HB 87 authorizes this immigration status investigation when an "officer has probable cause to believe that a suspect has committed a criminal violation." O.C.G.A. § l7-5-100(b) (emphasis added). This includes a wide range of
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individuals, including a motorist pulled over for a possible traffic ticket (a Class C misdemeanor), or a child in the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice who throws a significant tantrum (e.g., involving hitting, a Class C misdemeanor). In each of these instances, HB 87 authorizes immigration status investigations.
85. The immigration status verification process authorized by HB 87 will greatly prolong ordinary police stops.
86. The federal government takes over 80 minutes on average to respond to immigration status queries from state and local police-under the best case scenario. If a manual file review is required in response to an inquiry on an individual, this process can take over two days. During this time, the civilian would be detained by state or local law enforcement officers, and denied access to bond or release from custody.
87. IfHB 87 goes into effect, many ordinary police encounters will be extended beyond constitutional bounds while police officers investigate immigration status.
88. For example, peace officers throughout Georgia regularly issue citations for minor offenses such as traffic offenses. Issuing these citations is a quick process, taking only a matter of minutes, on average. But these traffic citations constitute criminal violations under Georgia law and open the door to immigration
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investigations under section 17-5-1OO(b) and (c). Those investigations would substantially prolong detentions for the individuals being investigated.
89. Immigration status queries also impose a substantial burden on federal authorities, who will be required to respond to an enormous increase in the number of immigration status inquiries because ofHB 87 and will have less ability to prioritize among their tasks according to federal regulations and policies.
90. Moreover, HB 87 opens the door to racial profiling in at least two ways. First, the law authorizes an officer to determine the immigration status of an individual who is unable to provide one ofthe five identity documents. a.c.G.A. § 17-5-1OO(b). However, the law leaves it entirely up to an officer's individual discretion when to verify the immigration status of a person who is unable to provide one of those identity documents. This unrestricted discretion systematically ensures that individual officers will engage in discrimination in determining whose immigration status to check based on an individual's appearance, language choice, or English-language ability.
91. Second, HB 87 invites racial profiling by permitting officers to consider so-called "[o]ther information" that is "sufficient" to establish an individual's identity. a.e.G.A. § 17-5-100(b)(6). But the law fails to enumerate any criteria for what "sufficient" "other information" might be. That determination is also left
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entirely to an officer's discretion and increases the likelihood that an officer will engage in discrimination in determining whose "other information" is not "sufficient" based on an individual's appearance, language choice, or English­ language ability.
92. HE 87 also authorizes peace officers to arrest and detain individuals solely on the basis that they are suspected to be in violation of federal civil immigration laws. Section 8 provides that "[i]f ... a peace officer receives verification that [a] suspect is an illegal alien" during an investigation into his immigration status also provided for under this section, "such peace officer may take any action authorized by state and federal law, including ... detaining such suspected illegal alien." O.C.G.A. § 17-5-100(e).
93. Peace officers throughout Georgia face institutional pressure to enforce all laws to the fullest extent possible.
94. Under HE 87, numerous peace officers will be compelled to exercise their authority to carry out immigration status checks during routine encounters with civilians, even for minor offenses such as traffic violations.
95. HE 87 is designed to and will in fact result in peace officers detaining individuals for the purpose of carrying out immigration status checks where they otherwise would not have done so.
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96. Notably, HB 87's immigration investigation and arrest provisions suffer from the same constitutional defects as provisions in Arizona and Utah's similar immigration laws, which have been preliminarily enjoined by the federal district court in Arizona and the Ninth Circuit, and temporarily enjoined by the federal district court in Utah, respectively. United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1006 (D. Ariz. 2010), aff'd, _ F.3d _,2011 WL 1346945, at * 4-* 10, *15-* 19 (9th Cir. Apr. II, 20 II); Utah Coalition ofLa Raza v. Herbert, No. II-cv-40 I, slip op. (D. Utah May II, 20 II). Section 7
97. In Section 7, HB 87 creates new state law crimes that penalize, with fines
and/or imprisonment, "transporting or moving an illegal alien," a.c.G.A. § 16-11­
200; "concealing or harboring an illegal alien," § 16-11-20 I; and "inducing an illegal alien to enter into this state," § 16-11-202.
98. Federal law already establishes penalties for transporting and harboring illegal aliens, and inducing illegal aliens to enter the United States. 8 U.S.c. § 1324(a). Moreover, federal and state law already grants Georgia law enforcement officers explicit authority to arrest anyone who violates these federal provisions. 8 U.S.c. § 1324(c); Ga. Code § 35-1-16(d).
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99. Georgia passed its own version of these provisions in HB 87 precisely to bypass the federal government's prosecutorial and adjudicatory processes for these federal crimes and impose its own views in these areas.
100. The new state immigration crimes created by HB 87 criminalize routine behavior undertaken on a daily basis by U.S. citizens and those with legal status in Georgia. Because ofHB 87, Georgians-such as Plaintiffs Bridges, Kennedy, Speight, Howe, Edwards, Gruner, and Jane Doe # I-who give a lift to a neighbor, a client, or fellow congregant or invite a friend or family member to visit from out of state, are subject to prosecution, fines, and incarceration if state authorities decide that they knew the other person was an "illegal alien" within the meaning of the Georgia criminal code. Section 17
101. Section 17 of HB 87 limits public benefits to those individuals able to provide a "secure and verifiable" identity document appearing on a list to be specified and posted by the Attorney General. Ga. Ann. Code § 36-50-1(e). But countless Georgians-both U.S. citizens and non-citizens with permission from the federal government to remain in the United States-who need and are entitled to receive public benefits in Georgia will not have a qualifying identity document. Low-income citizens disproportionately lack identity documentation, including
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these qualifying identity documents. For example, among non-citizens, many victims of abuse petitioning for immigration relief under the federal Violence Against Women Act, victims of human trafficking, individuals granted withholding of deportation or removal, or Cuban or Haitian entrants will not have a qualifying identity document.
102. If implemented, HB 87 will force numerous Georgians to be deprived of critical public benefits erroneously. These deprivations will force individuals and families, including those with young children, to be without food and shelter. Section 19
103. Section 19 ofHB 87 creates the "Secure and Verifiable Identity Document Act."
I04. Section 19 defines certain documents as "Secure and verifiable document[s]." The definition of "secure and verifiable document" specifically excludes "a Matricula Consular de Alta Seguridad, matricula consular card, consular matriculation card, consular identification card, or similar identification card issued by a foreign government regardless ofthe holder's immigration status" (hereafter "consular identification cards" or "matriculas"),
I05. Consular identification cards are issued by foreign governments as a way to provide their nationals a secure and verifiable form of identification.
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106. Section 19 criminalizes using a consular identification card for "any official purpose." O.e.G.A.50-36-2(d). It provides that, "[u]nless required by federal law, on or after January 1,2012, no agency or political subdivision shall accept, rely upon, or utilize an identification document for any official purpose that requires the presentation of identification ... unless it is a secure and verifiable document." [d.
107. The section exempts certain persons from liability for the acceptance of documents not considered to be "secure and verifiable," including "[a]n attorney or his or her employees for the purpose of representing a criminal defendant." Id. (emphasis added).
108. Under this provision, countless Georgians-including security guards, immigration lawyers, school officials, and public workers-risk criminal liability for allowing a person to use a consular identification card to identify herself, even ifshe is in the country lawfully.
Comprehensive Federal Immigration System 109. The federal government has exclusive power over immigration matters. The U.S. Constitution grants the federal government the power to "establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization," U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, and to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations," U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. In addition, the
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Supreme Court has held that the federal government's power to control immigration is inherent in the nation's sovereignty.
110. Congress has created a comprehensive system of federal laws regulating and enforcing immigration in the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"). See 8 U.S.C. § 110 I et seq.
III. The extensive statutory scheme created by the INA leaves no room for supplemental state immigration laws.
112. The federal government has also issued numerous regulations, policies, and procedures interpreting the provisions of the INA and has established large and complex administrative apparatuses to carry out its mandate.
113. The INA carefully calibrates the nature (criminal or civil) and degree of penalties applicable to each possible violation of its terms.
114. The INA contains complex and exclusive procedures for determining immigration and citizenship status, deciding whether the civil provisions of the immigration laws have been violated, and determining whether an individual may lawfully be removed from the United States.
115. Under the INA, a non-citizen's immigration status commonly may be subject to change over time. A non-citizen who enters the United States with authorization, with a student visa for example, may remain in the country past his
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period of authorized stay and thus no longer be in status. (Alternatively, he may overstay his original visa yet remain in status, for example, ifhe is eligible to change into a different visa classification.) Conversely, a non-citizen who enters the United States without authorization, for example by crossing into the country by foot while evading border authorities, may subsequently gain lawful status, such as through a successful asylum application or U-visa application.
116. The fluidity of immigration status is a fundamental feature of federal immigration law; it is a direct and unavoidable consequence of the system of immigration regulation that Congress has prescribed to accommodate many important national interests including, for example, the nation's humanitarian and international-law obligations regarding asylum seekers.
117. Under federal law, there is no single, readily ascertainable category or characteristic that establishes whether a particular person mayor may not remain in the United States. The answer to that question is a legal conclusion that can only be reached through the processes set forth in the INA and may depend on the discretionary determinations of federal officials.
118. There are many non-citizens who are present in the United States without formal permission who would not be removed if placed in federal removal proceedings or who actually have temporary permission from the federal
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government to be in the United States. For example, an individual without federal immigration status may be eligible for a form of immigration relief, such as asylum, adjustment of status, or withholding of removal. Some of these individuals are known to the federal government; others will not be identified until they are actually placed in proceedings by the federal government and their cases are adjudicated. In addition, some individuals, such as those granted Temporary Protected Status due to turmoil or natural disasters in their native countries, have permission to be in the United States, but are unlikely to have one of the enumerated identity documents under HB 87.
119. The fact that some persons have permission to remain in the United States without having a formal immigration status or despite being technically removable is also a fundamental feature of federal immigration law and the system of immigration regulation that Congress has prescribed. It accommodates many important national interests including, for example, Congress's desire to allow certain individuals to obtain relief from removal, and statutory limits on the detention of individuals ordered removed, see Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001 ).
120. Given these complexities, federal agencies do not and cannot determine definitively, in response to a demand from a state or local official, whether an
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individual is subject to removal. Cf o.e.G.A. § 17-5-100(e). And, it is equally impossible to make a deterrnination of whether an individual is lawfully able to remain in the United States based upon a search ofthe federal databases that are checked for an immigration status query. Such determinations involve complex questions of fact and law and are made through a federal administrative and judicial process that may take years. Moreover, the federal government often exercises its prosecutorial discretion not to pursue removal in order to prioritize certain cases for action. At best, federal agencies can respond to a query with a snapshot of what they believe to be an individual's current immigration status, which may not correspond to the ultimate finding on whether she is subject to removal. Thus, not all inquiries to the federal government regarding immigration status yield a clear response. PIs.' Mot. for Prelim. Inj., Ex. 3, Us. v. Arizona, No. 10-1413 (D. Ariz., July 7, 2010).
121. As of June 2010, inquiries into the federal database took an average of 81 minutes to process and in some cases took two days or more when a review on an individual's file was required. ld.
122. Furthermore, determining whether a person is a citizen of the United States can be a complex and counterintuitive process. U.S. citizens are not required to carry documentary proof oftheir citizenship. There is no national
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database that contains information about every U.S. citizen. Some people are actually unaware of their U.S. citizenship because they may have acquired U.S. citizenship at birth by operation oflaw due to their parents' citizenship, despite not being born in the United States. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1433. Others obtain citizenship automatically when their parents become naturalized U.S. citizens. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1431.
123. HB 87's creation of a state immigration system fundamentally conflicts with the INA's statutory scheme, impermissibly encroaches on the federal government's exclusive power to regulate immigration, and will lead to erroneous determinations and unlawful detention by state and local officials.
124. Moreover, HB 87 conflicts with and is preempted by provisions of the INA that set forth comprehensive federal schemes addressing the participation of state and local law enforcement in immigration enforcement.
125. Mere presence inside the United States without federal immigration status is not a criminal offense. Rather, it is a civil violation under federal immigration law.
126. State and local law enforcement officers have no general authority to enforce federal civil immigration law. Federallaw specifically authorizes state officers to assist in immigration enforcement only in narrowly defined
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circumstances, and otherwise reserves immigration enforcement authority to the federal government.
127. Section 1357(g) of Title 8 of the U.S. Code allows the federal government to "enter into a written agreement with a State, or any political subdivision" to carry out "function]s] of an immigration officer in relation to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens in the United States." 8 U.S.c. § I357(g). These agreements are commonly referred to as "287(g) agreements" after the section of the INA in which they are codified. Such agreements, however, may be entered into only if the federal government determines the state officers are "qualified to perform a function of an immigration officer," id., and the federal government must train and supervise each officer who is authorized under such an agreement. Currently, only 4 of Georgia's 159 counties-the Cobb County Sheriffs Office, the Gwinnett County Sheriffs Office, the Hall County Sheriffs Office, and the Whitfield County Sheriffs Office-have agreements pursuant to this statutory provision, as does the Georgia Department of Public Safety. See U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Fact Sheet: Delegation ofImmigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act.
128. HB 87 violates the U.S. Constitution by granting state and local law enforcement officers authority to make immigration determinations, civil arrests,
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and investigations without and outside of the authority provided by a 287(g) agreement. In addition, two of the four counties in Georgia with current 287(g) agreements limit state officers to making immigration status inquiries of individuals who are already in local jails. HB 87's provisions authorizing immigration status investigation and determination by all law enforcement officials in the field conflicts with the limited manner in which the federal government has allowed Georgia law enforcement agencies to engage in the enforcement of federal immigration law.
129. The other provisions in federal law authorizing state or local participation in immigration enforcement are also carefully constrained. Federal immigration statutes expressly authorize state and local police to make arrests for exactly two immigration crimes-smuggling, transporting, or harboring criminal aliens, and illegal entry by a previously deported felon. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324(c), l252c. Another provision, 8 U.S.c. § l103(a)(IO), allows the U.S. Attorney General to authorize "any State or local law enforcement officer" to enforce immigration laws upon certification of "an actual or imminent mass influx of aliens," but no such certification has ever occurred.
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130. Congress's intent that state and local officers are generally prohibited from enforcing civil immigration laws is clear both from the statutory scheme and from the statements of its members.
Federal Law on Public Benefits 131. Federal law governs the rules and procedures for verifying eligibility for federally funded food stamps and federally subsidized housing. 132. Federal law governing food stamps (the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, "SNAP"), for example, mandates that states accept any documents that reasonably establish an applicant's identity. 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(f)( 1)(vii), implementing 7 U.S.c. § 2020( e)(3). The federal regulations prohibit the state from requiring any specific document as verification of identity. Id. Where documentary evidence is unavailable, the federal rules allow a collateral contact communication between the SNAP agency and a third party that can reasonably be relied upon to verify identity. Id. This flexibility enables the country's most vulnerable citizens--including those who due to hornelessness, disability, or incapacity, or to having fled domestic violence, may lack the most secure or reliable forms of identity documentation-to participate in a program that prevents hunger.
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133. Federal laws governing federally subsidized housing programs do not mandate inspection of identification documents, but require that state and local agencies administering programs obtain and verify the Social Security Number (SSN) of citizens and immigrants who assert an eligible status. 42 U.S.c. § 3543; 24 C.F.R. § 5.216. Verification of the applicant's SSN is independent from the verification of citizenship or immigration status and serves multiple purposes, including establishing identity. States may not impose an additional eligibility requirement for these programs that is not authorized by, and is inconsistent with, federal rules.
134. In addition, federal housing law prohibits the imposition of any liability upon state and local government officials for implementing the federal system governing immigrant eligibility for housing in a manner consistent with the rules and regulations of the Department of Housing and Urban Development. 42 U.S.c. § l436a(f)(l); 24 C.F.R. § 5.526. This verification system does not include an independent identity document requirement. The civil and criminal sanctions established by Section 18 directly conflict with these federal regulations and the federal government's goal of ensuring access to the federal benefits for all eligible persons.
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HB 87 Interferes with the Federal Government's Interests in a Uniform Immigration System and Adversely Affects Foreign Relations 135. HE 87 interferes with the federal government's interests in setting a uniform federal immigration scheme, as well as in conducting foreign relations with other nations. 136. As noted supra, the President of the United States directly criticized HB 87 on this basis on April 26, 2011. 137. Georgia's immigration scheme will undermine federal immigration enforcement priorities by subjecting countless individuals in Georgia to detention and referral to federal immigration officials without regard for whether they would fit within federal immigration enforcement priorities. 138. In addition, because immigration policy is inextricably intertwined with foreign relations, Georgia's attempt to regulate immigration through HB 87 will have an adverse impact on the United States' ability to conduct foreign relations. HE 87 will undermine the ability of the U.S. government to speak with a single voice about immigration, including communicating to foreign nations what their nationals can expect when they come to visit or reside in the United States. State attempts to interfere with these inherently federal issues can have severe impacts on foreign relations.
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139. Indeed, HB 87 has already affected the foreign relations of the United States' foreign relations by upsetting a key ally. The Consul General of Mexico in Atlanta has publicly and forcefully criticized HB 87 twice: on March 4, 20 II, just after the House of Representati ves passed an earlier version of the bill, and on April 15, 2011, when HB 87 passed the Senate. In the latter statement, the Consul General expressed his concern that HB 87 "could have negative consequences on the human and civil rights of Mexican nationals living in [Georgia] ...." Press Release, Consulate General of Mexico in Atlanta reiterates its concern over the approval of an immigration bill in Georgia (Apr. IS, 20 II).
DB 87 Promotes Racial Profiling and Endangers Georgians 140. HB 87 promotes an environment of rampant racial profiling by state and local law enforcement officials. The law leaves immigration status investigation to the discretion of individual officers. As a result, law enforcement officers will make decisions about whether to investigate a person's immigration status based on the way she looks or speaks. Law enforcement officers will investigate the immigration status of individuals they believe look or sound foreign. 141. Law enforcement officials across the country have stated that HB 87 cannot be implemented in a race-neutral fashion and will inevitably lead law enforcement officers to rely inappropriately on race, ethnicity, and English­
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language ability in making decisions about whom to subject to additional scrutiny with questions regarding their immigration status.
142. Implementation ofHB 87 will have a significant negative impact on the ability of local law enforcement officers to protect immigrant communities and mixed-immigration status communities and families, i.e., those that include individuals with and without legal status. Because immigrants will avoid the police out of fear that any interaction could lead to immigration status inquiries, Georgia law enforcement officers will not get the assistance they need to prosecute cnmes.
Consular Identification Documents 143. Consular identification documents ("CIDs") are issued by governments around the globe. These CIDs serve several important purposes including providing expedient means for local law enforcement to identify individuals as well as helping facilitate nations' obligations under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, to which the United States is a signatory. 144. Under the Vienna Convention, a foreign national arrested or detained in the United States must be notified of their detention without delay. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, [1970] 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820.
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145. The U.S. State Department has recognized the utility ofClDs in the facilitation of its treaty obligations under the Vienna Convention. See Hearing on the Federal Government's Response to Consular Identification Cards Before the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims, House Committee on the Judiciary, I08th Congo 44-45, at 114 (Jun. 26, 2003) (statement of Roberta Jacobson) (available at: http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/ judiciary/hju87813.000/hju878l3_Of.htm (last visited May 24,2011)).
146. CIOs are also widely used for identification purposes with financial institutions, law enforcement agencies, and state and local governments in the United States.
147. There have been over 200,600 CIOs issued by the consulate of Mexico in Georgia since 2006.
148. Mexican law and regulations outline a detailed process for the issuance of these CIOs, which are referred to as "rnatriculas." These Mexican CIOs may only issue after an individual has produced an official Mexican identity document; a Mexican birth certificate or another ofticial document establishing their Mexican nationality; and documentation of their residence in a particular area of the United States. These documents may not be issued by mail, but must be issued in-person by Mexican consular officials. Applicants for Mexican CIOs are also
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photographed and fingerprinted and all of the documents used to establish their eligibility for a consular ID are scanned and stored in a central database by the Mexican government. In addition, the card itself has several security features making the ClD very difficult to forge. First, these CIDs expire within five years of issuance. Second, the card has several physical features making it difficult to forge, including a photo of the cardholder, the cardholder's signature, a unique bar code, optical character recognition, and an ultraviolet logo. Finally, local law enforcement officials are able to scan and verify the contents on the Mexican CID when they stop cardholders in the field.
149. ClDs have routinely been accepted as proof of identification in a wide range of public settings in Georgia. For example, parents enrolling children in Georgia public schools must present photo identification and ClDs have been widely accepted for this purpose. Similarly, admission to state buildings such as the State Capitol requires presentation of photo identification, and CIDs have routinely been accepted.
CLASS ACTION 150. The Individual Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and all other persons similarly situated pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b )(2). The class, as proposed by Plaintiffs, consists of all persons:
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(a) who as a result of their race, national origin, customary language, accent, or lack of enumerated identity documents are or will be subject to investigation of their citizenship or immigration status pursuant to the provisions ofHB 87; or (b) who are or will be deterred from living, associating, or traveling with immigrants in Georgia because of the provisions ofHB 87; or (c) who are or will be deterred from traveling into or through the State of Georgia because of the provisions ofHB 87; or (d) who will be unable to secure public benefits for which they are otherwise eligible, due to the qualifying identity document provisions ofHB 87; or (e) who are or will be barred from using their validly issued consular identification documents for any official purpose where identification is required because of the provisions ofHB 87.
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151. The requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b )(2) are met here, in that the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.
152. There are questions of law and fact common to the proposed class, including: (I) whether HB 87 is preempted by the U.S. Constitution and federal law; (2) whether HB 87 violates the Fourth Amendment ofthe U.S. Constitution; (3) whether HB 87 infringes on the Right to Travel of members of the proposed class; (4) whether HB 87 violates the Equal Protection clause of the U.S. constitution; (5) whether HB 87 violates the Due Process clause of the U.S. Constitution; and (6) whether HB 87 violates the separation-of-powers clause of the Georgia Constitution. These questions predominate over any questions affecting only the Individual Plaintiffs.
153. The claims of the Individual Plaintiffs are typical of the claims ofthe proposed class.
154. All ofthe Individual Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests of all members of the proposed class because they seek relief on behalf of the class as a whole and have no interests antagonistic to other members of the class. The Individual Plaintiffs are also represented by pro bono counsel, including the ACLU of Georgia, the ACLU Foundation, the National Immigration
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Law Center, the Southern Poverty Law Center, the Asian Law Caucus, Federal & Hasson, LLP, Kuck Immigration Partners, LLC, and G. Brian Spears, who collectively have extensive expertise in class action litigation, including litigation regarding the rights of immigrants and constitutional law. Finally, Defendants have acted and will act on grounds generally applicable to the class in executing their duties to enforce HB 87, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief with respect to the class as a whole.
DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 155. An actual and substantial controversy exists between Plaintiffs and Defendants as to their respective legal rights and duties. Plaintiffs contend that they face an imminent threat of harm ifHB 87 is enforced, and that this law violates the U.S. and Georgia Constitutions, federal law, and state law. Defendants are obligated to enforce this law unless it is found to be illegal. 156. In violating Plaintiffs' rights under the U.S. and Georgia Constitutions, federal law, and state law, Defendants have acted and will be acting under color of law. 157. If allowed to go into effect, HB 87 will cause irreparable injury to Plaintiffs.
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158. Plaintiffs have no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law against HB 87 other than the relief requested in this Complaint.
159. IfHB 87 takes effect, the Plaintiffs and other individuals of color in Georgia will be subject to unlawful detention, arrest, and harassment including plaintiffs Paul Bridges, Benjamin Speight, Everitt Howe, Paul 1. Edwards, Sharon Gruner, Emesto Pinon, Jaypaul Singh, Jane Does #1 and #2, John Does #1 and #2, and members of the proposed plaintiff class.
160. If allowed to take effect, HB 87 would also violate the rights of plaintiffs Pinon and Singh, as well as members of the proposed plaintiff class, to travel into and throughout Georgia.
161. If allowed to take effect, HB 87 would deny the right of members of plaintiffs Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Coalition of Latino Leaders, and the Task Force for the Homeless, as well as proposed class, to federal public benefits, for which they are otherwise eligible.
162. If allowed to take effect, HB 87 would also violate the right of plaintiffs John Does #1 and #2, and Jane Doe #2, as well as members of the proposed plaintiff class, to due process and equal protection of law.
163. In addition, HB 87 will thwart the missions of organizational plaintiffs such as the Task Force for the Homelessness and Alterna by forcing them to divert
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their resources towards assisting applicants for benefits and services in overcoming the new identification impediment, and towards providing direct goods, such as food and housing assistance, to individuals denied assistance.
164. In addition, HB 87 will thwart the missions of organizational Plaintiffs Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Alterna, Coalition of Latino Leaders, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Task Force for the Homeless, DREAM Activist.org, Instituto de Mexico, and the Coalition for the People's Agenda by forcing them to continue to spend more time and resources on HB 87 and immigration enforcement matters rather than other pressing organizational priorities, and by deterring their members from participating in membership activities.
165. In doing the things alleged in this Complaint, Defendants will deny Plaintiffs' rights secured by the U.S. and Georgia Constitutions, federal law, and state law.
166. Defendants' enforcement ofHB 87 will constitute an official policy of the state of Georgia.
167. Plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration that HB 87 is unconstitutional on its face and to an order preliminarily and permanently enjoining its enforcement.
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CAUSES OF ACTION COUNT ONE
SUPREMACY CLAUSE; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 168. The foregoing allegations are repeated and incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 169. The Supremacy Clause, Article VI, Section 2, of the U.S. Constitution provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution of Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 170. HE 87 conflicts with federal laws, regulations and policies, usurps powers constitutionally vested in the federal government exclusively, attempts to legislate in fields occupied by the federal government, imposes burdens and penalties on legal residents not authorized by and contrary to federal law, and unilaterally imposes burdens on the federal government's resources and processes, each in violation of the Supremacy Clause. 171. Plaintiffs move for relief on this claim directly under the Supremacy Clause and, as an action seeking redress of the deprivation of statutory rights under the color of state law, also under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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COUNT TWO FOURTH AMENDMENT; 42 U.S.c. § 1983 172. The foregoing allegations are repeated and incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 173. The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures." The Fourth Amendment's guarantees are applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. 174. HB 87 authorizes officers to seize individuals, and prolong seizures, in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
COUNT THREE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES; RIGHT TO TRAVEL; 42 U.S.c. § 1983
175. The foregoing allegations are repeated and incorporated as though fully set forth herein.
176. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Article IV, Section 2, Clause I, provides that "[tlhe Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."
177. Similarly, the Privileges and Immunities Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that "[n]o State shall make or
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enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States."
178. All residents in the United States enjoy a fundamental right to travel. which has also been held to derive from the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution as well as the Commerce Clause.
179. The constitutional right to travel prevents states from burdening, penalizing, or infringing upon the right to travel, including the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in another state, without a rational or compelling justification.
180. HB 87 interferes with the rights of out-of-state citizens to travel freely through the State of Georgia without being detained.
COUNT FOUR
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE; 42 U.S.c. § 1983 181. The foregoing allegations are repeated and incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 182. The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
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183. HB 87 impermissibly denies plaintiffs and other individuals lacking one of the preferred identity documents residing or traveling in Georgia the equal protection of the laws.
COUNT FIVE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 184. The foregoing allegations are repeated and incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 185. The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." 186. HE 87 impermissibly deprives Georgia residents of personal property by rending their consular-issued identity documents useless for any official purpose for which identification is required. 187. There is no legitimate state interest justifying this property deprivation for state residents. 188. As a result, HE 87 deprives plaintiffs and other individuals who regularly use consular-issued identity documents in Georgia of due process under the law within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
COUNT SIX
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42 U.S.c. § 1981; 42 U.S.c. § 1983 189. The foregoing allegations are repeated and incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 190. Section 1981 of Title 42 of the United States Code guarantees that "[ajll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory ... to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property." Section 1981 also provides that all persons "shall be subject to like punishments, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other." 191. Section 1981 of Title 42 of the United States Code prohibits discrimination on the basis of alienage, national origin, and race. Section 19 of HB 87 operates in such a manner as to deny access to governmental services and to deny the securing of governmental licenses and to deny entry into contracts with governmental entities on the basis of the national origin of the identification documentation of the presenter of such documentation. Section 7 ofHB 87 impermissibly prohibits the exercise of the right of association of citizens of Georgia and the United States on the basis of the alienage of those with whom they wish to associate.
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192. HB 87 impermissibly discriminates against persons within the State of Georgia on the basis of alienage and national origin and race.
COUNT SEVEN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE I, SECTION II, PARAGRAPH 3

OF THE GEORGIA CONSTITUTION
 193. Section 19 ofHB 87, which creates a new Code section, O.C.G.A. 50-36­ 2 purporting to provide for "Secure and Verifiable Identity Documents," establishes a criminal prohibition against persons who "knowingly accept[] identification documents that are not secure and verifiable documents. Subsection (t) of the new criminal law delegates to the Attorney General the authority to establish and post a "list of acceptable secure and verifiable documents." Only those documents approved and posted by the Attorney General are to be considered "secure and verifiable documents." 194. Article I, Section II, Paragraph III of the Constitution of the State of Georgia provides that: "The legislative, judicial, and executive powers shall forever remain separate and distinct; and no person discharging the duties of one shall at the same time exercise the functions of either of the others except as herein provided."
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195. Delegation ofthe exercise of the legislative function to define the elements of any criminal offense to the Attorney General of the State of Georgia constitutes an unconstitutional delegation oflegislative authority.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing facts and arguments, Plaintiffs request that the Court: a. Assume jurisdiction over this matter; b. Declare that HB 87 is unconstitutional in its entirety; c. Enjoin Defendants from enforcing HB 87; d. Grant Plaintiffs' costs of suit, and reasonable attorneys' fees and other expenses pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1988; and e. Grant such other relief as the Court may deem appropriate.

Dated: June 2, 2011

R~ pectfu~IY~

Naomi Tsu

On behalfofAttorneys for Plaintiffs

Linton Joaquin* Karen C. Tumlin* Nora A. Preciado* Melissa S. Keaney*

Omar C. Jadwat*
 Andre Segura*
 Elora Mukherjee*
 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION


t Counsel certifies this document has been prepared in accordance with L.R. 5.1.

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Case 1:11-cv-01804-TWT Document 1 Filed 06/02/11 Page 81 of 82

NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW
 CENTER
 3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2850
 Los Angeles, California 900 I0
 T: (213) 639-3900
 F: (213) 639-3911
 Joaquin@nilc.org Tumlin@nilc.org Preciado@nilc.org Keaney@nilc.org

FOUNDATION
 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
 New York, New York 10004
 T: (212) 549-2660
 F: (212) 549-2654
 ojadwat@aclu.org asegura@aclu.org emukherjee@aclu.org

Naomi Tsu (GSB No. 507612)
 Michelle R. Lapointe (GSB No. 007080)
 Daniel Werner (GSB No. 422070)
 SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER
 233 Peachtree St., NE, Suite 2150
 Atlanta, Georgia 30303
 T: (404) 521-6700
 F: (404) 221-5857
 naomi.tsu@splcenter.org michelle.lapointe@Splcenter.org daniel. werner@splcenter.org

Cecillia D. Wang*
 Katherine Desormeau*
 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
 UNION FOUNDATION IMMIGRANTS'
 RIGHTS PROJECT
 39 Drumm Street
 San Francisco, California 94111
 T: (415) 343-0775
 F: (415) 395-0950
 cwang@aclu.org kdesormeau@aclu.org

Mary Bauer (GSB No. 142213)
 Andrew H. Turner*
 Samuel Brooke*
 SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER
 400 Washington Ave.
 Montgomery, Alabama 36104
 T: (404) 956-8200
 F: (404) 956-8481
 mary. bauer@splcenter.org andrew.turner@splcenter.org samuel. brooke@Splcenter.org

Chara Fisher Jackson (GSB No. 386101)
 Azadeh N. Shahshahani (GSB No.
 509008)
 ACLU OF GEORGIA
 1900 The Exchange, Suite 425
 Atlanta, Georgia 30339
 T: (770) 303-8111
 cfjackson@acluga.org ashahshahani@acluga.org

Tanya Broder*
 Jonathan Blazer*
 NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW


G. Brian Spears (GSB No. 670112)
 1126 Ponce de Leon Ave., N.E.
 Atlanta, Georgia 30306


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Case 1:11-cv-01804-TWT Document 1 Filed 06/02/11 Page 82 of 82

CENTER 405 14th Street, Suite 1400 Oakland, Cali fomia 94612 T: (510) 663-8282 F: (510) 663-2028 Broder@nilc.org Blazer@nilc.org
Sin Yen Ling* ASIAN LAW CAUCUS 55 Columbus Avenue San Francisco, California 94111 T: (415) 896-1701 x 110 F: (415) 896-1702 sinyenL@asianlawcaucus.org

T: (404) 872-7086 F: (404) 892-1128 Bspears@mindspring.com
R. Keegan Federal, Jr. (GSB No. 257200) FEDERAL & HASSON, LLP Two Ravinia Drive, Ste 1776 Atlanta, Georgia 30346 T: (678) 443-4044 F: (678) 443-4081
Charles H. Kuck (GSB No. 429940) Danielle M. Conley (GSB No. 222292) KUCK IMMIGRATION PARTNERS LLC 8010 Roswell Road, Suite 300 Atlanta, Georgia 30350 T: (404) 816-8611 F: (404) 816-8615 CKuck@immigrafion.nef DConley@immigrafion.nef

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

*Application for admission pro hac vice forthcoming

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 Case 1:11-cv-01804-TWT Document 29-1 Filed 06/08/11 Page 1 of 60

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION

Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. Governor Nathan Deal, et al.,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. 1:11-cv-1804-TWT ) ) ) ) ) )

PLAINTIFFS’ BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Case 1:11-cv-01804-TWT Document 29-1 Filed 06/08/11 Page 2 of 60
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................iii INTRODUCTION............................................................................................. 1 FACTUAL BACKGROUND ............................................................................ 2
Sections 8: Immigration Enforcement by State and Local Officers ............... 3 Section 7: New State-Based Criminal Immigration Offenses ....................... 5 Section 19: Restrictions on Identification Documents for Official Purposes......................................................................................................... 6 ARGUMENT .................................................................................................... 6 I. PLAINTIFFS ARE LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS ........ 7
A. HB 87 Violates the Supremacy Clause.............................................. 7 1. HB 87 Unconstitutionally Regulates Immigration ......................... 7 2. HB 87 Unconstitutionally Conflicts with Federal Law ................ 14 a. HB 87 Conflicts with Federal Limitations on State and Local ........ Officers’ Authority to Enforce Immigration Laws ....................... 16 b. HB 87 Creates New State Immigration Crimes In Conflict With Federal Law................................................................................. 20 c. HB 87’s De Facto Alien Registration Law Conflicts With Federal Law and Will Result in Unlawful Harassment of Lawfully Present Aliens .......................................................................................... 26 d. HB 87 Places an Impermissible Burden on Federal Resources and Interferes With Federal Immigration Enforcement................ 28
B. HB 87 Violates the Fourth Amendment .......................................... 31 1. The Immigration Status Investigations Authorized By HB 87 Will Cause Unlawful Detentions............................................................. 32 2. HB 87’s Documentation Requirement Cannot Substitute for a Probable Cause Determination........................................................ 34 3. The Practical Effects of HB 87’s Arrest Provisions are Serious ...... 36
C. HB 87 Violates the Constitutional Right to Travel.......................... 36

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D. HB 87 Violates the Separation-of-Powers Safeguards of the Georgia Constitution....................................................................... 41
II. PLAINTIFFS WILL SUFFER IRREPARABLE HARM IF HB 87 IS ALLOWED TO GO INTO EFFECT ............................................. 44
III. THE BALANCE OF HARMS STRONGLY FAVORS THE ISSUANCE OF AN INJUNCTION ................................................... 48
IV. AN INJUNCTION IS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST ......................... 49 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 50
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases ABC Charters, Inc. v. Bronson, 591 F. Supp. 2d 1272(S.D. Fla. 2008)........ 7, 25 Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998)................................. 9 Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003).......................................... 13 Att’y Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986)..................................... 37 Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975)......................................... 39, 40 Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) ........................................................ 39 Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141 (1989) ............................. 31 Boyes v. Shell Oil Prods. Co., 199 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2000) ........................ 15 Chamber of Commerce v. Edmonson, 594 F.3d 742 (10th Cir. 2010) .............. 49 Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1876) ...................................................... 12 Collins v. Brewer, 727 F. Supp. 2d 797 (D.Ariz. 2010) ................................... 45 Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35 (1868)............................................................ 40 Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) ............. 13, 15, 23 DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) ..................................................... passim Denson v. United States, 574 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied,
130 S. Ct. 3384 (2010) ................................................................................... 7 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).......................................................... 37 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974)......................................................... 37 Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141 (2001)................................ 28 Fla. Businessmen for Free Enterprise v. Hollywood, 648 F.2d 956
(5th Cir. 1981).............................................................................................. 49 Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987) .................................... 29 French v. Pan Am Express, Inc., 869 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989) ............................ 25 Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1983) ................................ 18 Gresham v. Windrush Partners, Ltd., 730 F.2d 1417 (11th Cir. 1984)............. 45 Grodzki v. Reno, 950 F. Supp. 339 (N.D. Ga. 1996) ........................................ 45
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Hall v. Thomas, 753 F. Supp. 2d 1113 (N.D. Ala. 2010) ................................. 22 HCA Health Servs. v. Roach, 265 Ga. 501 (1995)............................................ 42 Henderson v. Mayor of the City of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1876)................... 12 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).................................................. passim Hodgers-Durgin v. De la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999) ........................ 18 Howell v. State, 238 Ga. 95 (1976) .................................................................. 43 John Doe No. 1 v. Ga. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 147 F. Supp. 2d 1369
(N.D. Ga. 2001) ........................................................................................... 39 KH Outdoor, LLC v. Trussville, 458 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2006) ......... 44, 48, 49 Long v. State, 202 Ga. 235 (1947) ................................................................... 43 Martinez-Medina v. Holder, __ F.3d __, 2011 WL 855791
(9th Cir. Mar. 11, 2011) ......................................................................... 17, 18 Mays v. Hosp. Auth. of Henry County, 582 F. Supp. 425 (N.D. Ga. 1984)....... 47 McDonald’s Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 1998)...................... 7 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374 (1992).............................. 44, 46 Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005).............................................................. 32 Multi-Channel TV Cable Co. v. Charlottesville Quality Cable Operating Co.,
22 F.3d 546 (4th Cir. 1994) .......................................................................... 47 Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 112 F. Supp. 2d
1320 (N.D. Ga. 2000)................................................................................... 49 North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423 (1990) ....................................... 31 Pace v. CSX Transp., Inc., 613 F.3d 1066, 1068 (11th Cir. 2010).................... 15 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).............................................................. 8, 23 Pro-Choice Network of W.N.Y. v. Project Rescue W.N.Y., 799 F. Supp. 1417
(W.D.N.Y. 1992) ......................................................................................... 47 Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal v. United States, 355 U.S. 534 (1958) ................... 31 Quinchia v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 552 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2008)........................... 13 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999)................................................................... 37 Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W.N.Y., 519 U.S. 357 (1997)..................... 47
iv

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Scott v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2010) ....................................... 44, 49 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) ............................................... 37, 39 Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984)...................................... 15 Sprint Corp. v. Evans, 818 F. Supp. 1447 (M.D. Ala. 1993) ............................ 26 Sundberg v. State, 234 Ga. 482 (1975) ...................................................... 42, 43 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) ............................................................... 32, 45 Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982) ..................................................................... 8 United States v. Arizona, __ F.3d __, 2011 WL 1346945
(9th Cir. Apr. 11, 2011)......................................................................... passim United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010) ........................ 10 United States v. Encarnacion, 239 F.3d 395 (1st Cir. 2001) ............................ 18 United States v. Holloman, 113 F.3d 192 (11th Cir. 1997) .............................. 32 United States v. Madrigal-Valadez, 561 F.3d 370 (4th Cir. 2009) ................... 18 United States v. Pruitt, 174 F.3d 1215 (11th Cir. 1999) ................................... 32 United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2001)................................. 32 United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989).................................................... 32 United States v. Tapia, 912 F.2d 1367 (11th Cir. 1990) ................................... 34 United States v. Urrieta, 520 F.3d 569 (6th Cir. 2008) .................................... 18 Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 701 F. Supp. 2d 835
(N.D. Tex. 2010) .................................................................................... 12, 50 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).......................................................... 13 Statutes and Regulations 8 U.S.C. § 1101 ............................................................................................... 15 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(10) .............................................................................. 16, 17 8 U.S.C. § 1252c ....................................................................................... 16, 17 8 U.S.C. § 1304(d)........................................................................................... 26 8 U.S.C. § 1324 ........................................................................................ passim 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) ...................................................................................... 19
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8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)........................................................................................... 17 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1) ...................................................................................... 16 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10) .................................................................................... 17 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(3) ...................................................................................... 17 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(5) ...................................................................................... 17 N.M. Admin. Code § 18.19.5.12(D) ................................................................ 38 N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-5-9(B) (1978)................................................................. 38 O.C.G.A. § 16-11-200 ................................................................................. 5, 20 O.C.G.A. § 16-11-201 ........................................................................... 5, 20, 23 O.C.G.A. § 16-11-201(a)(1) ............................................................................ 22 O.C.G.A. § 16-11-202 ................................................................................. 5, 21 O.C.G.A. § 17-5-100(b)............................................................................ passim O.C.G.A. § 17-5-100(e)............................................................................... 5, 18 O.C.G.A. § 17-5-100(c)............................................................................... 4, 33 O.C.G.A. § 35-1-16(d)....................................................................................... 5 O.C.G.A. § 40-5-1(15)..................................................................................... 38 O.C.G.A. § 40-5-20 ......................................................................................... 34 O.C.G.A. § 42-4-14(c)..................................................................................... 29 O.C.G.A. § 50-36-2(a)....................................................................................... 6 O.C.G.A. § 50-36-2(b)............................................................................. 4, 6, 41 O.C.G.A. § 50-36-2(c)..................................................................................... 41 O.C.G.A. § 50-36-2(d)....................................................................................... 6 Wash. Rev. Code § 46.20.035(3) ..................................................................... 38 Other Authorities Brief for the Respondents, Zadvydas v. Davis, (No. 99-7791) ......................... 13 Ga. Const. Art. I, § II, Para. III. ....................................................................... 42 Ga. Const. Art. III, § I, Para. I. ........................................................................ 42
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INTRODUCTION Plaintiffs move for a preliminary injunction barring the enforcement of Georgia’s Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011 (“HB 87”). Most of HB 87 is currently scheduled to take effect on July 1, 2011. The requested injunction is urgently needed to prevent this unconstitutional law from causing irreparable injury to plaintiffs and similarly-situated individuals. With HB 87, Georgia has greatly overstepped its constitutional bounds. The law violates the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution by attempting to wrest core immigration regulation functions from the federal government and conflicting with federal law in multiple ways. As the President of the United States has publicly stated, HB 87 is “a mistake. . . . We can't have 50 different immigration laws around the country. Arizona tried this, and a federal court already struck them down.” Obama criticizes new Georgia immigration law, Reuters, Apr. 26, 2011, attached as Ex. A to Decl. of Molly Lauterback; see United States v. Arizona, __ F.3d __, 2011 WL 1346945 (9th Cir. Apr. 11, 2011). HB 87 runs afoul of other constitutional protections as well. Indeed, in its eagerness to single out and punish those it regards as “illegal aliens” the state has created a set of laws that violate the basic rights of citizens and non-citizens alike. HB 87 violates the Fourth Amendment because it authorizes detention without
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sufficient legal justification. It violates the right to travel of residents of certain other states by treating them as “unfriendly aliens” in the State of Georgia. And it violates Georgia separation-of-powers requirements by allowing an executive officer to define the content of the state’s criminal laws.
All of the requirements for issuance of an injunction are met here. Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court enjoin the enforcement of HB 87 pending a final ruling on this challenge.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND The Georgia General Assembly enacted HB 87 on April 14, 2011. Touted by its supporters as a comprehensive response to the perceived “very serious problem of illegal immigration in the State of Georgia,” (Deb. on HB 87 Before the Senate (Apr. 14, 2011), attached as Ex. B to Lauterback Decl. (remarks of Sen. Seth Harp)), HB 87’s provisions touch on numerous aspects of immigration—from broadly authorizing state immigration enforcement, to prescribing the immigrationrelated documentation persons must carry, to creating criminal prohibitions and penalties regulating the daily interactions that Georgians have with unauthorized immigrants, to instituting state-specific immigration-related requirements for participation in federal government programs, to directly provoking conflict with
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foreign nations regarding their legitimate consular activities. Its most problematic provisions include the following.1 Sections 8: Immigration Enforcement by State and Local Officers
Section 8 authorizes Georgia peace officers to demand certain identity documents and to investigate the immigration status of persons unable to produce such a document, converting many routine encounters into lengthy and intrusive immigration status investigations. Under Section 8, officers are authorized to demand that any person subject to “any investigation”—i.e., a consensual encounter, a stop, a detention, or an arrest—produce one of five enumerated types of identity documents. O.C.G.A. § 17-5- 100(b). Only individuals who can produce a document from this list receive a presumption of lawful status. Id.
The five state-approved identity documents enumerated in Section 8 are: (1) a “secure and verifiable document” as defined in Section 19 of HB 87; (2) a valid Georgia driver’s license; (3) a valid Georgia identification card; (4) a valid driver’s license from an entity requiring proof of legal presence or a valid identification
1 Section 17 and 18 of HB 87, which impose new requirements on applicants for federal public benefits as well as related penalties, conflict with federal law and are also problematic. Similarly, Section 19 imposes an explicit bar on the use of consular identification documents for any official purpose. Because the implementation of these provisions is delayed, and they do not take effect until January 2012, Plaintiffs do not address them in this motion, but intend to do so at a later time.
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card issued by the federal government; or (5) a valid driver’s license issued to a nonresident by her home state or country accompanied by proof of citizenship or legal residency. O.C.G.A. §§ 17-5-100(b)(1)-(5). The statute thus excludes reliance on driver’s licenses issued by states such as New Mexico and Washington that do not require proof of legal presence. In cases where a person does not have a state-approved identity document, he may provide “[o]ther information . . . that is sufficient to allow the peace officer to independently identify [him].” O.C.G.A. § 17-5-100(b)(6). The law provides no guidance on what that “other information” might be and thus no direction for peace officers charged with enforcing it.
Where a person cannot provide a state-approved identity document or sufficient “other information,” and an officer “has probable cause to believe that a suspect has committed a criminal violation,” O.C.G.A. § 17-5-100(b), Section 8 authorizes the officer to “determine [the person’s] immigration status” by “any reasonable means available,” including by relying on: (1) a “federal identification data base”; (2) “[i]dentification methods authorized by federal law”; (3) electronic fingerprint readers or “similar devices”; or (4) “[c]ontacting an appropriate federal agency.” O.C.G.A. § 17-5-100(c). These immigration status determination procedures are time intensive and will necessarily and unreasonably prolong ordinary police stops, including stops for speeding and jaywalking. And notably,
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Section 8 does not require an officer to have any suspicion that an individual is in the country unlawfully before commencing an immigration status investigation.
Section 8 effectively requires all individuals in Georgia to carry a stateapproved identity document in order to avoid the risk of extended police questioning each time they encounter law enforcement.
Section 8 also specifically authorizes peace officers to arrest and detain individuals solely based on suspicion that they are in violation of federal civil immigration laws. § 17-5-100(e). Thus, under HB 87, ordinary police will be authorized to make warrantless arrests for civil immigration violations. Section 7: New State-Based Criminal Immigration Offenses
Section 7 creates new state law crimes penalizing “transporting or moving an illegal alien,” O.C.G.A. § 16-11-200, “concealing or harboring an illegal alien,” § 16-11-201, and “inducing an illegal alien to enter into this state,” § 16-11-202. Federal law has long included provisions that address “[b]ringing in and harboring certain aliens.” 8 U.S.C. § 1324. Federal and state laws already grant Georgia law enforcement officers explicit authority to arrest anyone who violates these federal provisions. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(c); O.C.G.A. § 35-1-16(d). By enacting these new state immigration crimes, HB 87 effectively circumvents the federal government’s
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definitions and prosecutorial and adjudicatory processes for these federal crimes, permitting Georgia state officers and prosecutors to impose their own views. Section 19: Restrictions on Identification Documents for Official Purposes
Section 19 of HB 87 creates the “Secure and Verifiable Identity Document Act,” which defines certain documents as “[s]ecure and verifiable document[s]” that may be used for official purposes. O.C.G.A. § 50-36-2(a), (b)(3). The definition of a “[s]ecure and verifiable document” specifically excludes consular identification cards. Id. § 50-36-2(b)(3). Section 19 criminalizes accepting a document that is not “secure and verifiable” for “any official purpose.” O.C.G.A. § 50-36-2(d). It provides that, “on or after January 1, 2012, no agency or political subdivision shall accept, rely upon, or utilize an identification document for any official purpose that requires the presentation of identification . . . unless it is a secure and verifiable document.” Section 19 delegates to the Attorney General the authority to determine what constitutes a “secure and verifiable document.” O.C.G.A. § 50-36-2(b)(3) (“Only those documents approved and posted by the Attorney General . . . shall be considered secure and verifiable documents.”).
ARGUMENT A preliminary injunction is appropriate if the moving party establishes the following: “(1) substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable
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injury will be suffered unless the injunction issues; (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) if issued, the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.” McDonald’s Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 1998). I. PLAINTIFFS ARE LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS
A. HB 87 Violates the Supremacy Clause HB 87 violates the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution in two ways: first, it is a state “regulation of immigration,” DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 35354 (1976), which is categorically prohibited because immigration regulation is exclusively a federal function; and second, it conflicts with federal law by “stand[ing] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). See also Denson v. United States, 574 F.3d 1318, 1345 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3384 (2010); ABC Charters, Inc. v. Bronson, 591 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1303-04 (S.D. Fla. 2008).
1. HB 87 Unconstitutionally Regulates Immigration A state law regulating immigration is unconstitutional, regardless of whether Congress has enacted comparable federal statutory provisions, because immigration regulation is “unquestionably exclusively a federal power.” DeCanas,
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424 U.S. at 354 (emphasis added); see Hines, 312 U.S. at 66. The “determination of who should or should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain” constitute direct regulation of immigration exclusively reserved for the federal government. DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 355; see Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 11 (1982); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982) (states may not engage in “classification of aliens”). Moreover, to withstand constitutional scrutiny a state law relating to immigration must primarily address legitimate local concerns and have only a “purely speculative and indirect impact on immigration.” DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 355. HB 87 is preempted under these standards for three independent reasons: because it is expressly intended to regulate immigration; because by its design and operation it actually regulates immigration; and because it directly interferes with the core federal interests that the rule against state immigration regulation is designed to protect.
1. HB 87’s plain and stated intent is to regulate immigration, as the law’s text and legislative history demonstrate. HB 87 is entitled the “Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act,” and its stated purposes include, for example, “to provide for offenses involving illegal aliens,” “to provide for the investigation of illegal alien status,” and “to provide for penalties for failure of agency heads to abide by certain state immigration laws” which are themselves established or
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amended by HB 87. See Ga. House Bill 87 (2011) at 1:1, 7-8, 10, 27-28, attached as Ex. 1; see Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 234 (1998) (title of statute is a legitimate guide for legislative interpretation). The purpose and motivation behind HB 87 is to affect the “entry and stay,” DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 355, 359, of foreign nationals, especially those whom Georgia believes to be present without federal approval.
The legislative history of HB 87 confirms that it is specifically intended to take over immigration regulation from the federal government. The law originated from a “Special Joint Committee on Immigration Reform” that was “inspired by the federal government’s continued failure to deal with the problem of illegal immigration,” and sought to “pick[] up where Washington D.C. has let us down” by drafting legislation to “stem[] the flow of illegal immigration activity in Georgia.” Press Release, Speaker Ralston and Lt. Gov. Cagle Announce the Creation of the Special Joint Committee on Immigration Reform (Sept. 29, 2010), attached as Ex. C to Lauterback Decl.
Many legislators confirmed that they, too, view HB 87 as Georgia stepping into the federal government’s shoes.2 Senator Seth Harp spoke at particular length:
2 For example, Senator Renee Unterman remarked that, with respect to comprehensive immigration regulation, “[u]nfortunately the federal government won’t step up to the plate; the states are having to do it.” Deb. on HB 87 Before
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[I]f you look at the US Constitution there are precious few things that our federal government is supposed to do, but one of the things it is expressly commanded to do, is to secure our borders and provide for a common defense, and I submit to you, Ladies and Gentlemen of the Senate, that the federal government has failed miserably in that constitutional obligation it has abdicated its responsibility, they have walked off the job, and so what are we supposed to do? We’re supposed to just throw up our hands and say “Well, the federal government is not exercising its responsibilities, so we are just going to suffer the consequences.” At a certain point, you have to take action, and that’s what happened in Arizona. . . . There is no question in my mind that adoption of this legislation is going to address in a meaningful way, the very serious problem of illegal immigration in the State of Georgia.
Deb. on HB 87 Before the Senate at p. 59-61, April 14, 2011;3 see Press Release,
Governor Deal, May 13, 2011, Ex. D to Lauterback (HB 87 “crack[s] down on the
influx of illegal immigrants into our state” in absence of “a federal solution”).
the Senate at p. 32, Apr. 14, 2011. Representative Matt Ramsey, a sponsor of the bill, commented: “If we want to effectively address illegal immigration we can’t wait for our federal government to act – we’ve got to do it ourselves.” Deb. on HB 87 Before the House at p. 2, Mar. 3, 2011, attached as Ex. E to Lauterback Decl. Representative Rich Golick likewise remarked, “doing nothing is not an option and relying to our detriment on a federal government that is not going to do anything anytime soon is not a realistic alternative. . . . [W]hen we hear someone say it’s a federal issue, let the federal government do it, that’s really just a euphemism for do nothing and that’s not an option at this point.” Deb. on HB 87 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary at p. 33-34, Feb. 8, 2011, Ex. F to Lauterback Decl. 3 Senator Harp was referring to Arizona’s SB 1070, the major parts of which have never gone into effect because they have been enjoined by the federal courts. United States v. Arizona, __ F.3d __, 2011 WL 1346945, at * 4-*10, *15-*19 (9th Cir. Apr. 11, 2011) (aff’g 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010)).
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Representative Bobby Franklin further remarked: “I don’t see anything in the United States Constitution where the states authorize the federal government to have any policy on immigration. Which would mean under the Tenth Amendment that immigration is reserved to the states. Wouldn’t you agree, then, that immigration is a state issue, not a federal issue?” Deb. on HB 87 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary at p. 17, Feb. 8, 2011. This contention directly conflicts with settled law allocating immigration regulation authority to the federal government.
Thus, HB 87 was not intended to “further[] a legitimate state goal,” Plyler, 457 U.S. at 225, but rather was enacted as Georgia’s attempt to replace federal law and policy with state-crafted solutions.
2. HB 87’s impact on immigration is direct, not “incidental and speculative.” HB 87 subjects individuals in Georgia, including U.S. citizens and individuals in a lawful immigration status, to a new set of state-created immigration rules, legal interpretations, and procedures that do not exist in other states, including: (1) state-created requirements to carry certain documentation that establishes citizenship or immigration status; (2) state-authorized interrogations and detentions to investigate immigration status; (3) state and local officials’ judgments—independent of federal law, regulation, or policy—about
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what immigration violations justify warrantless arrest; and (4) investigation and prosecution by state officials for state-defined immigration crimes. Thus, HB 87 directly regulates the conditions under which non-citizens may remain in the country—an exclusively federal function. DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 355-56; see also Henderson v. Mayor of the City of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 274-75 (1876) (enjoining statute imposing additional local regulations on immigrants); Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 701 F. Supp. 2d 835, 855 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (invalidating ordinance requiring non-citizens to demonstrate immigration status prior to renting housing).
Indeed, HB 87 implements precisely what the Supreme Court struck down 70 years ago—the subjection of non-citizens to “indiscriminate and repeated interception and interrogation by public officials” and “the possibility of inquisitorial practices and police surveillance.” Hines, 312 U.S. at 66, 74.
3. HB 87’s demonstrated impact on foreign relations requires that it be held invalid. Historically, one of the main reasons that the federal government has exclusive power to regulate immigration is to prevent states from interfering with U.S. foreign relations through separate regulation of foreign nationals in the United States. See Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 279 (1876); Henderson, 92 U.S. at 273; see also Hines, 312 U.S. at 64 (“Experience has shown that international
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controversies of the gravest moment . . . may arise from real or imagined wrongs to another’s subjects inflicted, or permitted, by a government.”). Such concerns are so paramount that “even . . . the likelihood that state legislation will produce something more than incidental effect in conflict with express foreign policy of the National Government would require preemption of the state law.”4 Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 420 (2003); see also United States v. Arizona, __ F.3d __, 2011 WL 1346945, at *22-23 (Noonan, J., concurring) (“Whatever in any substantial degree attempts to express a policy by a single state or by several states toward other nations enters an exclusively federal field.”). And the Supreme Court has recognized the “Nation’s need to ‘speak with one voice’ in immigration matters.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 700 (2001) (quoting Brief for the Respondents, Zadvydas, (No. 99-7791)); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 379 (2000) (finding state law imposing foreign trade restrictions preempted for “stand[ing] in the way of Congress’s diplomatic objectives”).
4 Even individual immigration enforcement decisions can have profound implications for U.S. foreign policy interests. See Quinchia v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 552 F.3d 1255, 1259 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[I]mmigration cases often involve complex public and foreign policy concerns with which the executive branch is better equipped to deal.”); Decl. of James B. Steinberg ¶¶ 19, 21, filed in United States v. Arizona, No. 10-CV-1413 (D. Ariz. filed July 6, 2010), Ex. G to Lauterback Decl.
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Here, such implications are real. Foreign governments have expressed concerns that this law will significantly strain diplomatic relations with the United States. In a press release, the Mexican government criticized HB 87, stating that the law “potentially affects human and civil rights of Mexicans who live in or visit Georgia” and that “[t]he legislators who voted for the law and the Governor of Georgia overlooked the many contributions made by the immigrant community to the state’s economy and society, as well as Mexico’s importance as its third-largest export market.” The Mexican Government Regrets the Enactment of HB 87 in Georgia, Press Release, May 13, 2011, Mexico City, attached as Ex. H to Lauterback Decl.; see Decl. of Abraham F. Lowenthal ¶¶ 11-14, attached as Ex. 2. Such statements reflect the unacceptable strain that HB 87 puts on the United States’ relations with foreign nations.
That strain is one reason for the President of the United States’ declaration that “[w]e can’t have 50 different immigration laws around the country” and his specific condemnation of HB 87 as a “mistake.” See Ex. A to Lauterback Decl. HB 87 intrudes on exclusively federal terrain and must be enjoined.
2. HB 87 Unconstitutionally Conflicts with Federal Law HB 87 is also preempted on the additional ground that it conflicts with federal immigration law. A state law conflicts with federal law when “ ‘the state
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law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives’ of federal law.” Boyes v. Shell Oil Prods. Co., 199 F.3d 1260, 1269 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984)). And even if the state and the federal government share the same concerns, “[t]he fact of a common end hardly neutralizes conflicting means” of addressing those concerns. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 379. Under the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., Congress has set forth a comprehensive system of immigration laws, regulations, procedures, and policies under which the federal government regulates many of the exact topics covered by HB 87. The Georgia law directly conflicts with this comprehensive federal scheme by: (1) superseding federal limitations on the authority of state and local officers to enforce immigration laws, (2) creating new immigration crimes defined and enforced by the state, (3) implementing a de facto state alien registration law, and (4) placing an impermissible burden on federal resources and creating obstacles to the accomplishment of federal priorities.5
5 By enacting the Immigration and Nationality Act, Congress has occupied the entire field of immigration enforcement, and thus HB 87 is also subject to statutory “field preemption,” which “occurs when federal regulation in a legislative field is so pervasive that we can reasonably infer that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it.” Pace v. CSX Transp., Inc., 613 F.3d 1066, 1068 (11th Cir. 2010).
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a. HB 87 Conflicts with Federal Limitations on State and Local Officers’ Authority to Enforce Immigration Laws
HB 87 broadly authorizes Georgia peace officers to act as immigration agents in direct conflict with federal mandates and limitations.
Federal law contains narrow authorizations for state and local police to enforce federal immigration laws in specific circumstances. First, federal law authorizes state and local officers to enforce two specific criminal immigration offenses. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252c, state and local officers may arrest and detain a non-citizen for the federal crime of illegal reentry by a deported felon into the United States, if the federal government provides “appropriate confirmation” of the suspect’s status. And under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(c), federal law allows state and local officers to make arrests for the federal immigration crimes of transporting, smuggling, or harboring certain aliens.
Second, Congress has authorized state and local officers to assist with the enforcement of civil immigration offenses in only two specific circumstances. The U.S. Attorney General may authorize “any State or local enforcement officer” to enforce immigration laws upon certification of “an actual or imminent mass influx of aliens.” 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(10). (This provision has never been invoked by the Attorney General.) Additionally, under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1), the federal
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government may enter into written agreements (i.e., “287(g) agreements”) with state or local agencies in order for certain designated officers to exercise delegated immigration enforcement authority in clearly specified circumstances. These officers must first be “determined by the Attorney General to be qualified to perform [such] functions” and “shall be subject to the direction and supervision of the Attorney General.” §§ 1357(g)(1), (3). The written agreement must specify “the specific powers and duties that may be, or are required to be, exercised or performed by the individual, [and] the duration of the authority of the individual.” § 1357(g)(5).6
HB 87 goes beyond any Congressional authorization to enforce civil immigration laws by allowing officers to broadly detain and arrest individuals for the civil violation of unlawful presence.7 HB 87 authorizes peace officers to
6 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10) further provides that § 1357(g) does not forbid police from “cooperat[ing] with the Attorney General” in certain aspects of immigration enforcement. That provision plainly does not authorize states to pursue their own policy objectives or enact their own immigration enforcement initiatives that correct the federal government’s alleged failures, as Georgia has here. Indeed, if § 1357(g)(10) authorized the enforcement at issue here, the specific authorizations Congress provided in §§ 1103(a)(10), 1357(g)(1)-(9), 1252c, and 1324(c) would be surplusage. As the Ninth Circuit has explained, “Congress intended for state officers to aid in federal immigration enforcement only under particular conditions, including the Attorney General’s supervision.” United States v. Arizona, 2011 WL 1346945, at *5. 7 Being present in the United States without lawful immigration status is not a crime. Martinez-Medina v. Holder, __ F.3d __, 2011 WL 855791, at *6 (9th Cir.
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prolong detentions and undertake custodial immigration investigations when
individuals cannot produce a state-approved identity document. O.C.G.A. § 17-5-
100(b). Section 8 further authorizes peace officers to arrest without warrant
anyone they determine to be an “illegal alien.” O.C.G.A. § 17-5- 100(e). But
under federal law, state and local officers are not authorized to detain individuals
on such grounds.8 Thus, even if a peace officer has received verification from the
federal government that a person appears to lack immigration status, the officer
may not detain the person solely on that basis.9
Mar. 11, 2011) (“unlike illegal entry, which is a criminal violation, an alien’s illegal presence in the United States is only a civil violation”); United States v. Madrigal-Valadez, 561 F.3d 370, 376 (4th Cir. 2009) (no “authority . . . makes the status of being in the United States after entering in violation of § 1325(a) a separate crime”) (emphasis in original); United States v. Encarnacion, 239 F.3d 395, 399 (1st Cir. 2001) (defendant’s admission of illegal entry to INS officials did not transform his case from a civil to a criminal case). 8 See United States v. Arizona, 2011 WL 1346945, at *17 ( “states do not have the inherent authority to enforce the civil provisions of federal immigration law.”); Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 474 (9th Cir. 1983), overruled on other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v. De la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Urrieta, 520 F.3d 569, 574 (6th Cir. 2008) (“local law enforcement officers cannot enforce completed violations of civil immigration law (i.e., illegal presence) unless specifically authorized to do so by the Attorney General under special conditions”). 9 HB 87 is preempted even as to the few Georgia agencies that have 287(g) agreements—the Cobb, Gwinnett, Hall, and Whitfield County Sheriff’s Offices and the state Department of Public Safety. For these agencies, HB 87 improperly creates a source of immigration enforcement authority distinct from the 287(g) agreement and outside of the direction and supervision of federal authorities.
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Indeed, Section 8’s immigration enforcement authorization is so broad that it permits peace officers to make warrantless civil immigration arrests in circumstances where even federal immigration agents could not. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2). In order to arrest an individual for undocumented presence without a warrant, the arresting federal officer must reasonably believe that the alien is in the country illegally and that he is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest. Id. HB 87 does not provide these limitations and thus allows for the arrests of non-citizens in circumstances where federal law requires a warrant.
The dangers of HB 87’s unconstitutional immigration scheme are particularly acute for the many non-citizens who lack immigration status, and whose continued presence technically violates federal immigration law, yet are allowed to remain in the United States with the knowledge and consent of the federal government. Jane Doe #2 illustrates the problem: she lacks immigration status, but remains in the United States through the favorable exercise of discretion by federal officials in light of the compelling circumstances of her case, including the fact that she came to the country as a child and that Georgia is the only home that she has ever known. Decl. of Jane Doe #2 ¶¶ 2, 6-8, attached as Ex. 3. Although the federal government would have no interest in arresting Jane Doe #2, federal agents could not, if asked, truthfully tell a Georgia peace officer that she is
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in a lawful status. HB 87 authorizes that peace officer to arrest Jane Doe #2 on immigration grounds without a warrant and without regard to the fact that the federal government has already declined to seek her removal.
Because of the structure and operation of federal immigration law, there are countless individuals in Georgia who are in a similar position because they are presently not in lawful status, but are eligible for a form of immigration relief, such as asylum, adjustment of status, or withholding of removal—relief which is fundamental to the proper administration of federal immigration laws. Some of these individuals are known to the federal government; others will not be identified until they are actually placed in proceedings by the federal government and their cases are adjudicated. HB 87 is an obstacle to the functioning of this federal statutory scheme.
b. HB 87 Creates New State Immigration Crimes In Conflict With Federal Law
Section 7 creates three new Georgia-specific immigration crimes: knowingly (1) transporting or moving an illegal alien for the purpose of furthering their illegal presence, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-200; (2) concealing, harboring, or shielding an illegal alien from detection, § 16-11-201; and (3) inducing, enticing,
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or assisting an illegal alien to enter into Georgia, § 16-11-202.10 These new provisions impermissibly interfere with the operation of federal immigration law.
Section 1324 of Title 8 of the U.S. Code defines several federal offenses that appear superficially similar to the new state offenses created by Section 7. The federal crimes in § 1324 include knowingly “transport[ing] . . . within the United States,” “conceal[ing], harbor[ing], or shield[ing] from detection,” or “encourage[ing] or induc[ing] . . . to come to, enter, or reside in the United States” an alien whose entry or presence violates the law.
The superficial resemblance of Section 7 to 8 U.S.C. § 1324 masks significant differences between the state and federal laws. For example, § 1324’s “encourage or induce” provisions concern aliens entering the United States—not the movement of non-citizens within the United States; but O.C.G.A. § 16-11-202 criminalizes “induc[ing], entic[ing], or assist[ing]” an “illegal alien” to enter the state of Georgia, regardless of whether the state is the alien’s first destination in the country or whether she entered the United States twenty years ago in California. 10 The Georgia crimes also require that the accused be acting “in violation of another criminal offense” or “while committing another criminal offense.” In many cases the additional offense may be another crime created by Section 7 itself: for example, a person transporting an undocumented individual from another state into Georgia may be simultaneously violating §§ 16-11-200 and -202, and under the state law’s broad definition of “harboring,” -201 as well. Moreover, a variety of other minor criminal offenses, including commonplace traffic offenses, would suffice to satisfy this element of the definition.
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Similarly, § 1324’s “harboring” provision is the topic of extensive analysis and interpretation in the federal courts, see, e.g., Hall v. Thomas, 753 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1159 (N.D. Ala. 2010), but Section 7 specifically defines “harboring” as “any conduct that tends to substantially help an illegal alien to remain in the United States in violation of federal law,” with limited exceptions determined by the Georgia legislature. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-201(a)(1).
The most meaningful difference between HB 87 and the federal law that it pays lip service to imitating is not, however, any of the multiple specific differences in the provisions at issue, but the very creation of a separate and independent state system of criminal immigration laws. These state laws will be enforced by state police and prosecutors and interpreted by state judges—not by their federal counterparts. Under HB 87, decisions about when to charge a person or what penalty to seek for this conduct would not longer be under control of the federal government. HB 87 includes no provision for federal discretion and no mechanism to accommodate the immense complexity of federal immigration law. Section 7’s resemblance to § 1324 does not make it a “mirror” of federal law. Cf.
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Plyler, 457 U.S. at 225. Instead, it allows the state to challenge and “undermine[] the congressional calibration” of federal law and policy.11 Crosby, 530 U.S. at 380.
For example, plaintiff David Kennedy, an immigration lawyer in Gainesville, Georgia, frequently meets with and gives legal advice to individuals who are undocumented and occasionally drives these individuals to immigration court hearings. Decl. of David Kennedy ¶¶ 2-9, attached as Ex. 4. He serves a vital role in the federal immigration system by representing parties in administrative proceedings and does not fear prosecution under § 1324. But HB 87 appears to specifically target immigration lawyers: it exempts an “attorney or his or her employees for the purpose of representing a criminal defendant,” and conspicuously does not exempt an immigration attorney or other civil attorney, from the definition of the state harboring crime created in O.C.G.A. § 16-11-201. In putting Kennedy and other immigration lawyers at risk of prosecution, HB 87 interferes with the proper administration of federal immigration law and the rights of individuals in the federal system to counsel (at their own expense).
11 The federal government frequently does not prosecute potential § 1324 violations. For example, from 2001 to 2005 there were, on average, only 10 reported prosecutions under §1324 in Georgia each year, while in 2005 – the latest year for which plaintiffs have been able to obtain statistics—there were only five prosecutions for such conduct. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Percent of Immigration Criminal Convictions by Lead Charge (2006), available at http://trac.syr.edu/tracins/findings/05/criminal/glawgph05.html.
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Likewise, plaintiff Paul Bridges, the Mayor of Uvalda, Georgia, would be criminally liable for providing Spanish-to-English translation services for his friends at church, the grocery store, the doctor’s and dentist’s office, and soccer tournaments. Decl. of Paul Bridges ¶¶ 2, 6-10, attached as Ex. 5. He, along with plaintiffs Benjamin Speight, Everitt Howe, Paul J. Edwards, and Sharon Gruner, could face criminal consequences for giving rides to their friends, neighbors, and fellow parishioners. Decls. of Benjamin Speight ¶¶ 6-7, attached as Ex. 6; Everitt Howe ¶¶ 5-7, attached as Ex. 7; Paul Edwards ¶¶ 4-8, attached as Ex. 8; Sharon Gruner ¶¶ 3-7, attached as Ex. 9. Those same criminal consequences would apply to Jane Doe #1, who drives her husband to doctor’s appointments and physical therapy following an incapacitating injury that he suffered. Decl. of Jane Doe #1 ¶ 3, attached as Ex. 10. For inviting friends into their homes and providing them with a place to stay, Plaintiffs Bridges and Gruner likewise are at risk of criminal prosecution. Bridges Decl. ¶ 15; Sharon Gruner Decl. ¶ 6.
In this way, Section 7 amounts to a scheme for determining and punishing unlawful presence in the state through the operation of state criminal laws. As discussed above, the conditions and penalties associated with the entry into and continued presence of non-citizens in the United States are constitutionally reserved to the federal government. DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 359. Yet, Section 7’s
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criminalization of routine and innocuous conduct is at odds with Congress’s careful choices in federal immigration law and the federal government’s use of its discretion to employ these statutes in a way that is harmonious with, rather than destructive of, the overall statutory scheme. See ABC Charters, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 2d at 1301 (“What is a sufficient obstacle is determined by examining the federal statute and identifying its purpose and intended effects.”).
It is worth emphasizing that under § 1324, Georgia law enforcement officers already have the authority to arrest individuals for violation of that federal law. If Georgia really wanted simply to enforce federal law in this area, it could arrest violators and turn them over to the federal government for prosecution. But Georgia has decided, instead, to create its own independent state crimes to be administered in its own state system, out of apparent dissatisfaction and disagreement with federal law. The Supremacy Clause permits no such unilateral state vetoes. And “the threat of 50 states layering their own immigration enforcement rules on top of the INA also weighs in favor of preemption.” United States v. Arizona, __ F.3d __, 2011 WL 1346945, at *10 (9th Cir. Apr. 11, 2011); see, e.g., French v. Pan Am Express, Inc., 869 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1989) (If the states were free to regulate in the area of aviation, “a patchwork of state laws . . . some in conflict with each other, would create a crazyquilt effect.”); Sprint Corp.
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v. Evans, 818 F. Supp. 1447, 1457-58 (M.D. Ala. 1993) (“To allow each state to impose its own duties and requirements governing the interstate transmission of material by common carriers would result in precisely the type of piecemeal regulation that Congress wanted to avoid in passing the Act.”).
c. HB 87’s De Facto Alien Registration Law Conflicts With Federal Law and Will Result in Unlawful Harassment of Lawfully Present Aliens
Section 8 effectively requires all individuals who are stopped on suspicion of any criminal activity (including traffic violations and other misdemeanors) to produce a document that presumptively establishes lawful presence in the United States. O.C.G.A. § 17-5-100(b). By requiring individuals to present one of these specified documents, Georgia has created its own alien registration system. Cf. 8 U.S.C. § 1304(d) (federal alien registration statute). HB 87 effectively requires all individuals in Georgia to carry a state-approved identity document in order to avoid extended police questioning each time they encounter law enforcement. Those who do not possess or do not happen to be carrying one of the identity documents preferred by Georgia will be treated as suspected illegal aliens and at risk of prolonged detention.
The Supreme Court has already held that state alien registration and documentation schemes are broadly preempted. In Hines, the court invalidated
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Pennsylvania’s Alien Registration Act, which required, among other things, that every alien 18 years or over to receive a state alien identification card, carry it at all times, and show the card whenever it may be demanded by an officer. 312 U.S. at 56. The Court found that,
Having the constitutional authority so to do, [Congress] has provided a standard for alien registration in a single integrated and allembracing system in order to obtain the information deemed to be desirable in connection with aliens. When it made this addition to its uniform naturalization and immigration laws, it plainly manifested a purpose to do so in such a way as to protect the personal liberties of law-abiding aliens through one uniform national registration system, and to leave them free from the possibility of inquisitorial practices and police surveillance. Id. at 74 (emphasis added). HB 87’s de facto documentation requirement is particularly problematic because many foreign nationals who reside in the United States with the permission of the United States do not possess or have readily available documentation that is acceptable under HB 87. These categories of foreign nationals include those with deferred action, such as Plaintiff Jane Doe #2, travelers visiting from countries participating in the Visa Waiver Program, and individuals with temporary protected status or who have applied for visas as victims of crimes. Jane Doe #2 Decl. ¶ 6; Decl. of Michael Aytes ¶¶ 17, 19, 21, filed in United States v. Arizona, 10-CV-1413 (D. Ariz. filed July 7, 2010) (copy
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attached as Ex. I to Lauterback Decl.). The number of individuals in these situations is significant. In fiscal year 2009, more than 14 million aliens were admitted under the Visa Waiver Program, Decl. of David V. Aguilar ¶ 24, filed in United States v. Arizona, No. 10-CV-1413 (D. Ariz. filed July 6, 2010) (copy attached as Ex. J to Lauterback Decl.), and DHS estimates that up to 200,000 individuals were eligible for temporary protected status based solely on the designation of Haiti due to last year’s earthquake, Steinberg Decl. ¶ 19. Such increased police intrusion into the lives of these lawfully present aliens, among others, is impermissible. See DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 358, n.6 (“Of course, state regulation not congressionally sanctioned that discriminates against aliens lawfully admitted to the country is impermissible if it imposes additional burdens not contemplated by Congress.”).
d. HB 87 Places an Impermissible Burden on Federal Resources and Interferes With Federal Immigration Enforcement
HB 87 is also preempted because it imposes an impermissible burden on federal resources that creates “obstacle[s] to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Hines, 312 U.S. at 67; see Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 150 (2001) (holding that “differing state regulations affecting an ERISA plan’s ‘system for processing claims and paying
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benefits’ impose ‘precisely the burden that ERISA pre-emption was intended to avoid.’”) (quoting Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 10 (1987)).
Sections 8 and 13 will directly undermine federal immigration enforcement priorities by vastly increasing the number of immigration status verification queries to the federal government. In addition to the immigration queries authorized by Section 8, Section 13 mandates that a verification request be submitted to the federal government for every suspected foreign national— regardless of whether they are suspected to be unlawfully present or not—who is confined for any period of time in a county or municipal jail and who does not have documents on hand to establish immigration status. O.C.G.A. § 42-4-14(c). As discussed above, a large number of foreign nationals will be unable to readily demonstrate their lawful status, and HB 87 authorizes an immigration investigation that includes querying the federal government in each of these cases.
HB 87’s across-the-board approach to immigration enforcement thus undermines the federal government’s ability to focus on its priorities, including the apprehension of the most dangerous aliens. Decl. of David C. Palmatier ¶ 18, filed in United States v. Arizona, No. 10-CV-1413 (D. Ariz. filed July 6, 2010) (copy attached as Ex. K to Lauterback Decl.); Decl. of Daniel H. Ragsdale ¶ 41, filed in United States v. Arizona, No. 10-CV-1413 (D. Ariz. filed July 7, 2010) (copy
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attached as Ex. L to Lauterback Decl.). The federal Law Enforcement Support Center (“LESC”), which is responsible for responding to immigration status queries from law enforcement agencies, has experienced “continuous and dramatic increases” in immigration status determination queries over the past four years. Palmatier Decl., ¶ 9. The verification process at the LESC is time-intensive and takes, on average, over 80 minutes even for simpler cases. Id. at ¶ 8. In some cases, where a review of the individual’s physical file is required, the review may take two days or more. Id. at ¶ 11. In addition, the LESC is unable to verify the status of most U.S. citizens, since their records are not contained in the LESC databases. Id. at ¶ 19. The additional queries created by HB 87, combined with the already time-intensive verification process, will necessarily strain the federal government’s resources.
Following congressional guidance, the “LESC [has] prioritize[d] its efforts in order to focus on criminal aliens and those most likely to pose a threat to their communities,” and the increase in requests attributable to HB 87 creates a significant risk that the federal government will be forced to shift resources away from its priorities. Palmatier Decl. ¶ 7. Like the enjoined provisions of Arizona’s SB 1070, HB 87 “is inconsistent with the discretion Congress vested in the
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Attorney General to supervise and direct State officers in their immigration work according to federally-determined priorities.” Arizona, 2011 WL 1346945, at *8.
Finally, the Court should consider the cumulative impact of other states passing similar legislation. See, e.g., Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 161 (1989) (considering “[t]he prospect of all 50 States establishing similar [rules]” in finding law preempted); accord North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 458 (1990) (Brennan J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding state legislation preempted in part because difficulties presented “would increase exponentially if additional States adopt equivalent rules” and noting that such a nation-wide consideration was found “dispositive” in Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 355 U.S. 534, 545-46 (1958). This concern is far from speculative. Georgia is the fourth state to have passed far-reaching immigration enforcement measures and a fifth, Alabama, has now followed suit. Although the similar state laws that preceded HB 87 are either currently enjoined or not yet in effect, the actual implementation individually and, in particular, when aggregated, will further burden the federal government’s immigration priorities. Palmatier Decl. ¶ 7.
B. HB 87 Violates the Fourth Amendment Section 8 authorizes the prolonged detention of individuals solely to verify their immigration status, based on their failure to produce a state-approved identity
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document—conduct which does not provide suspicion of, or probable cause to believe a person is engaged in any unlawful conduct. By allowing such detention without suspicion of wrongdoing, much less criminal activity, Section 8 violates the Fourth Amendment.
1. The Immigration Status Investigations Authorized By HB 87 Will Cause Unlawful Detentions
Bedrock Fourth Amendment law permits a brief investigatory stop if an officer has “a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). The stop, however, “must be limited to the time necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” United States v. Pruitt, 174 F.3d 1215, 1220 (11th Cir. 1999). Once the purpose of the initial stop has been effectuated, the stop “may not last ‘any longer than necessary to process the [original] violation’ unless there is articulable suspicion of other illegal activity.” United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274, 1277 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Holloman, 113 F.3d 192, 196 (11th Cir. 1997)); see also Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 100-01 (2005) (holding that officers may ask questions unrelated to the original purpose of the stop as long as such questioning does not unreasonably prolong the stop).
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Section 8 provides that when an officer stops an individual based on probable cause to believe the person is engaged in criminal activity, if the person fails to provide the officer with a state-approved identity document that HB 87 deems to be sufficient proof of immigration status, the officer may, based only on the lack of such a document, investigate and “determine” the person’s immigration status. O.C.G.A. § 17-5-100(b).
HB 87 does not set any time limits on the immigration status investigations that it authorizes, and these investigations are generally lengthy.12 On average, ICE takes more than 80 minutes to provide a response to an officer via telephone. Palmatier Decl. ¶ 8. Additionally, immigration status inquiries to ICE do not necessarily provide accurate or definite results. For example, in Arizona almost 10,000 of the 80,000 request for immigration status verification received during 2009 produced an indeterminate answer, which would require DHS to search additional databases and even paper files in an attempt to resolve the inquiry.13 See Palmatier Decl. ¶¶ 12, 19.
12 Section 8 authorizes an officer to “determine immigration status” by “any reasonable means available,” including by relying on: (1) a “federal identification data base”; (2) “[i]dentification methods authorized by federal law”; (3) electronic fingerprint readers or “similar devices”; or (4) “[c]ontacting an appropriate federal agency.” O.C.G.A. § 17-5-100(c). 13 Where a database search is inconclusive, it may take up to two days to conduct a search through paper files. Palmatier Decl. ¶ 11. Additionally, either a database or
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Thus, in many cases, and especially in those numerous encounters that otherwise ordinarily would be resolved with a citation or warning from a police officer, see Decl. of George Gascón ¶ 14, attached as Ex. 11; Decl. of Eduardo Gonzalez ¶ 15, attached as Ex. 12; Decl. of Lewis Smith ¶ 14, attached as Ex. 13, the immigration status investigation authorized by HB 87 will be the only basis for continuing to detain a person for a significant period of time. By allowing such detentions without additional suspicion of any unlawful conduct, Section 8 violates the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Tapia, 912 F.2d 1367, 1370 (11th Cir. 1990) (finding that officer’s further investigation of a lawfully stopped driver unlawfully prolonged the detention because of lack of suspicion of criminal activity beyond a speeding citation).
2. HB 87’s Documentation Requirement Cannot Substitute for a Probable Cause Determination
Critically, the lack of a state-approved identity document does not give rise on its own to any suspicion of unlawful activity. Gonzalez Decl. ¶ 15; Gascón Decl. ¶ 14. While in Georgia it is unlawful to drive without a valid driver’s license, O.C.G.A. § 40-5-20, HB 87 does not limit prolonged investigation and paper file search may not produce any definitive information or any information at all, especially for many U.S. citizens. The fact that a person does not appear in ICE databases could equally mean either that the person is a U.S. citizen or is a non-citizen who entered without inspection, depending on whether the person was born in the United States. Id. ¶ 12.
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detention to that circumstance. Gonzalez Decl. ¶ 16; Gascón Decl. ¶ 9. For example, persons driving in Georgia with a valid New Mexico or Washington driver’s license (which are issued pursuant to those states’ laws without a requirement of evidence of lawful immigration status), including Lawful Permanent Residents or U.S. citizens like Plaintiffs Singh and Piñon, would be unable to produce a state-approved identity document when stopped. Decl. of Ernesto Piñon ¶ 7, attached as Ex. 14; Decl. of Jaypaul Singh ¶ 4, attached as Ex. 15. Similarly, pedestrians and passengers in vehicles are not required by law to carry any identification document, but would be subject to additional investigation under Section 8 if they do not possess or have on them a state-approved identity document. As a result, HB 87 subjects even U.S. citizens and lawful immigrants to prolonged detention pending immigration status verification. Gonzalez Decl. ¶ 15; Gascón Decl. ¶ 15.
As discussed above in Section I(A)(2)(c), many foreign nationals authorized to be in the United States do not possess or have readily available qualifying identity documents required under § 17-5-100(b)(1-5), or any other documentation that would demonstrate their immigration status, such as to prevent being subjected to additional investigation under Section 8. For example, Plaintiff Jane Doe #2’s presence in the United States is known to the federal authorities and while she has
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no formal immigration status, federal authorities have decided to allow her to remain in the United States until at least May 2012 through deferred action. However, she does not possess paperwork documenting her situation. Jane Doe #2 Decl. ¶ 7. Individuals like her would be subject to prolonged detention under HB 87, even though they are not subject to immediate removal by federal authorities and there is no evidence of criminal activity justifying any additional investigation.
3. The Practical Effects of HB 87’s Arrest Provisions are Serious
HB 87 will cause widespread and significant Fourth Amendment violations if allowed to go into effect. Section 8’s authorization for police to undertake immigration investigations applies to situations in which an officer has probable cause to believe a person is committing any criminal violation, regardless of how minor. Gonzalez Decl. ¶ 15; Gascón Decl. ¶ 14. In Georgia, all traffic violations, including minor violations such as speeding, failure to properly signal a turn, or jaywalking, are criminal violations. See generally Georgia Code Title 40. Therefore, a wide variety of traffic violations will become occasions for unlawfully prolonged detention to investigate immigration status if HB 87 goes into effect.
C. HB 87 Violates the Constitutional Right to Travel By subjecting individuals traveling in Georgia to prolonged stops if they do not have a qualifying identity document, even if they have valid driver’s licenses,
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HB 87 violates the fundamental right to travel. The Supreme Court has long “recognized that the nature of our Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.” Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969), overruled on other grounds by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the right is fundamental. Att’y Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 902-03 (1986) (plurality). A state law infringes on the right to travel if it uses “ ‘any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right’ ” even in an “indirect manner,” Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 903 (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 340 (1972)), or treats residents of other states as “unfriendly alien[s]” rather than “welcome visitor[s],” Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999). If either condition is met, the law must be analyzed under strict scrutiny and invalidated unless the state can satisfy the “heavy burden of proving that it has selected a means of pursuing a compelling state interest which does not impinge unnecessarily on constitutionally protected interests.” Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 911.
HB 87, on its face, burdens and penalizes certain out-of-state travelers’ exercise of the right to travel. As discussed above, Section 8 allows a peace officer
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to verify an individual’s immigration status when the individual is unable to
produce “a valid Georgia driver’s license” or certain other documents that
“require[] proof of legal presence in the United States before issuance.” O.C.G.A. § 17-5-100(b).14,15 Many people travel with a valid driver’s license as their only
form of identification, yet some states—currently New Mexico and Washington— issue driver’s licenses without requiring proof of federal immigration status.16
Thus, although Georgians can use their driver’s licenses to avoid an immigration
determination, travelers from certain other states, including people from New
Mexico and Washington, such as Plaintiffs Piñon and Singh, cannot use their valid
state driver’s licenses for the same purpose. Instead, those out-of-state travelers
will face additional scrutiny by Georgia peace officers and will be effectively
14 In order to receive a driver’s license in Georgia, individuals must demonstrate that they are “either a United States citizen or an alien with legal authorization from the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service.” O.C.G.A. § 40-5-1(15). 15 Although Section 8 contains an exception if a person provides other information sufficient for an officer to independently identify them, O.C.G.A. § 17-5100(b)(6), Section 8 provides no guidance on what information suffices under this section and entrusts such determinations entirely to an officer’s discretion, leaving individuals who do not have adequate identification at constant risk of detention. 16 N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-5-9(B) (1978); N.M. Admin. Code § 18.19.5.12(D) (allowing foreign national to obtain driver’s license with federal tax identification number and valid foreign passport or Matricula Consular card); Wash. Rev. Code § 46.20.035(3) (allowing use of “other available documentation,” on a discretionary basis, for issuance of driver’s license); Lauterback Decl. Ex. M (Washington Department of Licensing rules allowing issuance of driver’s license if resident provides valid foreign passport or other identification).
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required to obtain and carry additional documentation acceptable under HB 87 while traveling in Georgia. See Singh Decl. ¶¶ 2, 5; Piñon Decl. ¶¶ 2, 7. This burden will force Plaintiff Singh to limit his driving in Georgia if HB 87 takes effect. See Singh Decl. ¶ 6. Although the right to travel does not guarantee access to any “single mode of transportation,” John Doe No. 1 v. Ga. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 147 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1375 (N.D. Ga. 2001), HB 87’s burden on travelers from Washington and New Mexico applies regardless of mode of travel and in fact reaches beyond transportation. According to its plain language, Section 8 applies to any peace officer investigation, whether the investigation occurs on MARTA, on the sidewalk, following a routine traffic stop, or in someone’s home. O.C.G.A. § 17-5-100; see also Singh Decl. ¶ 4.
While frequently invoked with regard to residency requirements, see, e.g., Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 622, the right to travel reaches more broadly than simply guaranteeing access to benefits for new residents to a state. See, e.g., Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 666-67 (1975) (striking down tax that discriminatorily applied to out-of-state commuters); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 824 (1975) (prohibiting ban on advertising abortion services that required outof-state travel). Rather, it has long been recognized that the right to travel guarantees that “all citizens of the United States . . . must have the right to pass and
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repass through every part of [the United States] without interruption, as freely as in our own States.” Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, 49 (1868).
HB 87 further violates the right to travel because it pressures other states to legislate in response so that their citizens do not face discriminatory treatment in Georgia. See Austin, 420 U.S. at 666-67 (explaining that such pressure on other states “compounds” the constitutional violation). In addition, HB 87 burdens the ability of other states to enact driver documentation policies akin to those in New Mexico and Washington by creating a penalty for those states’ residents who travel in Georgia. See id. at 666. By creating a discriminatory classification for travelers from certain states, HB 87 interferes with those states’ sovereign power to regulate issuance of their own driver’s licenses.
HB 87’s differential treatment of travelers based on their state’s driver’s license policies cannot withstand strict scrutiny because it is not narrowly tailored to the purpose of the law—immigration regulation and enforcement, see supra Section I(A)(1)—even if such a purpose could be deemed a compelling state interest (which it is not). HB 87 penalizes all travelers carrying driver’s licenses from certain states, including U.S. citizens and lawfully present immigrants, and subjects them to investigation and prolonged detention to which people with
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licenses from Georgia and other states are not subject. This discrimination violates the right to travel.
D. HB 87 Violates the Separation-of-Powers Safeguards of the Georgia Constitution
The sweeping discretion delegated to the Attorney General by Section 19 of HB 87 violates the Georgia Constitution’s separation-of-powers guarantee. Section 19 prohibits the acceptance of an identification document that is not “a secure and verifiable document” by any agency or political subdivision for “any official purpose,” O.C.G.A. § 50-36-2(c), and criminalizes the knowing and willful acceptance of such a document in violation of that code. Critically, Section 19 unconstitutionally delegates to the Attorney General the authority to determine what conduct is prohibited or unlawful by granting him virtually unfettered discretion to decide what constitutes a “secure and verifiable document.” O.C.G.A. § 50-36-2 (b)(3) (“Only those documents approved and posted by the Attorney General . . . shall be considered secure and verifiable documents.”).
Although Section 19 defines a “secure and verifiable document” as “a document issued by a state or federal jurisdiction or recognized by the United States government and that is verifiable by federal or state law enforcement, intelligence, or homeland security agencies,” id., it provides no guidance as to the meaning of these requirements. Instead, Section 19 places the ultimate decision as
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to what documents shall be considered “secure and verifiable” solely with the Attorney General’s unreviewable discretion. Moreover, the Attorney General’s list is exclusive: no matter what authority issues a given document, and no matter how easy it is to verify, if it is not on the Attorney General’s list it is not a “secure and verifiable document” under Georgia law.
The Georgia Constitution prohibits precisely this type of delegation. “The legislative, judicial, and executive powers shall forever remain separate and distinct; and no person discharging the duties of one shall at the same time exercise the functions of either of the others . . . .” Ga. Const. Art. I, § II, Para. III. Legislative power lies exclusively with the General Assembly and cannot be delegated to the Attorney General. See id.; Ga. Const. Art. III, § I, Para. I. The Attorney General only has “the power to adopt rules and regulations to carry into effect a law already passed.” HCA Health Servs. v. Roach, 265 Ga. 501, 502-03 (1995) (“[An executive’s] authority can extend only to the performance of the latter administrative function, as it has no constitutional authority to legislate.”).
The Georgia Supreme Court has struck down legislation that, like HB 87, purports to delegate the General Assembly’s legislative authority. In Sundberg v. State, 234 Ga. 482 (1975), the Court found that legislation that declared certain chemicals to be “controlled substances,” but empowered the State Board of
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Pharmacy to thereafter augment the law’s original list of prohibited chemicals, was an unconstitutional delegation of power. The Court explained that “while the General Assembly may delegate certain powers to the executive branch of government in order to carry out the law as enacted by the General Assembly,” the General Assembly could not “delegate . . . the authority to determine what acts (the possession of such substances) would constitute a crime.” Id. at 484.
Section 19 of HB 87 suffers from the same constitutional defect by expanding the purported authority of the Attorney General beyond that of merely “carrying out the law” to the role of determining the very conduct that will either be lawful or unlawful. See id.; Long v. State, 202 Ga. 235 (1947) (delegation to counties of authority to set speed limits unconstitutional); Howell v. State, 238 Ga. 95 (1976) (statute providing that “[a]ny person or corporation who shall violate any of the rules or regulations promulgated by the commission [of Natural Resources] shall be guilty of a misdemeanor” was an “unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority” to the commission.). By delegating to the Attorney General the power to determine which documents are “secure and verifiable,” and which by exclusion are prohibited from use by public officials and agencies, HB 87 violates the Georgia Constitution’s separation of powers doctrine.
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II. PLAINTIFFS WILL SUFFER IRREPARABLE HARM IF HB 87 IS ALLOWED TO GO INTO EFFECT Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm if HB 87 is not enjoined. “An injury is
irreparable if it cannot be undone through monetary remedies” or “if damages would be difficult or impossible to calculate.” Scott v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279, 1295 (11th Cir. 2010) (citations and quotations omitted). Harm resulting from the enforcement of a law that violates the Supremacy Clause is generally irreparable, see, e.g., Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374, 381 (1992); Arizona, 2011 WL 1346945, at *19, as are other constitutional harms that are intangible in nature, KH Outdoor, LLC v. Trussville, 458 F.3d 1261, 1272 (11th Cir. 2006).
If HB 87 goes into effect, it will immediately subject numerous plaintiffs and members of plaintiff organizations to the risk of unconstitutional and extended detention while police officers investigate immigration status. Decl. of Eliseo Medina ¶ 8, attached as Ex. 24; Decl. of Harris Raynor ¶¶ 4-6, attached as Ex. 25. Plaintiffs are a diverse group of individuals and organizations who represent racial minorities, national origin minorities, individuals who speak foreign languages or who have accents when speaking English, and individuals who lack the qualifying identity documents enumerated in HB 87. If HB 87 takes effect, Plaintiffs will be at risk of discriminatory treatment, unwarranted police scrutiny, prolonged detentions, and arrest every time they come into contact with Georgia law
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enforcement. Several of the individual Plaintiffs have experienced racial profiling in the past, and all of them are worried that if HB 87 goes into effect they will be subjected to repeated stops, questioning, detention, arrest, and even criminal prosecution. Speight Decl. ¶¶ 7-11; Kennedy Decl. ¶¶ 5-9; Piñon Decl. ¶¶ 5-8; Howe Decl. ¶¶ 5–7, 11; Jane Doe #1 Decl. ¶¶ 3-4, 7-8; Jane Doe #2 Decl. ¶¶ 8-11; Singh Decl. ¶¶ 4, 6-7; John Doe #1 Decl. ¶¶ 8, 10-11, attached as Ex. 16; John Doe #2 Decl. ¶¶ 3-6, 8, attached as Ex. 17; Bridges Decl. ¶¶ 9-16; Edwards Decl. ¶¶ 68; Sharon Gruner Decl. ¶¶ 3-8; see also Silva America Gruner Decl. ¶¶ 15-17, attached as Ex. 18 (noting same fear in community); Anton Flores Decl. ¶¶ 8-12, attached as Ex. 19 (same); Adelina Nicholls Decl. ¶¶ 12, 14, 18-21, attached as Ex. 20 (same). These harms are inherently intangible and unquantifiable, and cannot be adequately remedied after the fact. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (describing liberty of person as “sacred” right); Gresham v. Windrush Partners, Ltd., 730 F.2d 1417, 1423 (11th Cir. 1984) (discriminatory treatment irreparable); Grodzki v. Reno, 950 F. Supp. 339, 342 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (unlawful detention irreparable); Collins v. Brewer, 727 F. Supp. 2d 797, 813 (D.Ariz. 2010).
Because of the threat of unreasonable searches and seizures and racial profiling and the threat of unlawful criminal prosecutions, Plaintiffs will fear contact with law enforcement if HB 87 goes into effect, and several will fear
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reporting crimes to the police or acting as witnesses, thus making them vulnerable targets for criminals and undermining public safety in their communities. See Gonzalez Decl. ¶¶ 10-14; Smith Decl. ¶¶ 9-14; see also Jane Doe #2 Decl. ¶ 11; John Doe #1 Decl. ¶ 11; John Doe #2 Decl. ¶ 6; Flores Decl. ¶¶ 10-12; Nicholls Decl. ¶¶ 12, 21; Edwards Decl. ¶ 9. Some will avoid contact with police altogether if HB 87 goes into effect. See Jane Doe # 1 Decl. ¶ 4; John Doe # 1 Decl. ¶ 11. These harms are quintessential examples of irreparable harm because of their intangible and unquantifiable nature. See Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. at 381.
Moreover, all Plaintiffs and Georgians will be harmed as local law enforcement resources are diverted away from criminal law enforcement to effectuate HB 87’s status-verification and immigration enforcement provisions. See Gonzalez Decl. ¶ 14; Smith Decl. ¶¶ 9-14.
In addition, HB 87’s severe burdening of several Plaintiffs’ constitutional right to travel threatens further irreparable harm. Plaintiffs Singh and Piñon will be residing in or plan to soon visit Georgia, and will use out-of-state licenses as their identification. See Piñon Decl. ¶¶ 2-3, 7; Singh Decl. ¶ 2. Because they lack a qualifying identity document that would protect them from additional inquiry by peace officers, they will be afraid to travel to or drive within Georgia once HB 87 goes into effect, and will suffer irreparable harm due to the limitation on their
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freedom of movement and their reduction in travel to avoid police interrogation. See Piñon Decl. ¶ 8; Singh Decl. ¶¶ 4-7; Pro-Choice Network of W.N.Y. v. Project Rescue W.N.Y., 799 F. Supp. 1417, 1428, 1430 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding alleged violation of right to travel constitutes irreparable injury), aff’d and rev’d in part on other grounds by Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W.N.Y., 519 U.S. 357 (1997).
Finally, the organizational Plaintiffs will suffer and are already suffering irreparable harm because they are required to divert organizational resources away from core mission activities to address their members’ and clients’ concerns about the law and repercussions from its enforcement, and will face diminished membership and clients if the law were to go into effect. See Nicholls Decl. ¶¶ 78, 17-18; America Gruner Decl. ¶¶ 9-10; Anita Beaty Decl. ¶¶ 9, 15-16, attached as Ex. 21; Flores Decl. ¶¶ 6, 7, 13; Helen Kim Ho Decl. ¶ 7, attached as Ex. 22; Mohammad Abdollahi Ali-Beik Decl. ¶¶ 4, 6-9, attached as Ex. 23; Decl. of Gabriela Gonzalez-Lamberson ¶ 8, attached as Ex. 26; Medina Decl. ¶¶ 9-10; Raynor Decl. ¶¶ 5, 9-10; see, e.g., Multi-Channel TV Cable Co. v. Charlottesville Quality Cable Operating Co., 22 F.3d 546, 552 (4th Cir. 1994) (threat of loss of customers irreparable); Mays v. Hosp. Auth. of Henry County, 582 F. Supp. 425, 428 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (same). The missions of the organizational Plaintiffs have been and will continue to be frustrated as their members will be afraid to gather in
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public places, attend marches and meetings, and engage in other advocacy and organizing activities that might bring them into contact with law enforcement. See Nicholls Decl. ¶ 9; America Gruner Decl. ¶ 15; Flores Decl. ¶ 13; Ali-Beik Decl. ¶¶ 4, 6-9; Gonzalez-Lamberson Decl. ¶¶ 9-10; Raynor Decl. ¶¶ 5, 9-10. None of these harms can be compensated after the fact, making each a quintessential irreparable injury that justifies an injunction. See KH Outdoor, 458 F.3d at 1272. III. THE BALANCE OF HARMS STRONGLY FAVORS THE ISSUANCE
OF AN INJUNCTION A preliminary injunction will impose only minimal harm on the state of Georgia because Plaintiffs ask merely for the status quo to be maintained while serious questions about the law’s constitutionality are adjudicated. This is precisely the purpose of a preliminary injunction: “to preserve the status quo and prevent allegedly irreparable injury until the court [has] the opportunity to decide whether to issue a permanent injunction.” Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1261, 1262 (11th Cir. 2005). Any harm to the State in adhering to the status quo is dramatically outweighed by the immediate and irreparable harms Plaintiffs will face, outlined above, if HB 87 is allowed to go into effect. The requested injunction is intended to prevent the implementation of a new law that would upset the longstanding allocation of authority between state and federal government regarding the regulation of immigration, intrude on the federal
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government’s ability to regulate immigration and conduct foreign affairs, and impose irreparable harms on Plaintiffs and the public. The equities tip sharply in favor of granting a preliminary injunction while the constitutionality of HB 87 is decided. See Scott, 612 F.3d at 1297 (“the public, when the state is a party asserting harm, has no interest in enforcing an unconstitutional law”); KH Outdoor, 458 F.3d at 1272. IV. AN INJUNCTION IS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
The interests of Plaintiffs and the general public are aligned in favor of a preliminary injunction in this case. The public interest is not served by allowing an unconstitutional law to take effect. See Scott, 612 F.3d at 1297; KH Outdoor, 458 F.3d at 1272 (“The public has no interest in enforcing an unconstitutional ordinance.”); Fla. Businessmen for Free Enterprise v. Hollywood, 648 F.2d 956, 959 (5th Cir. 1981). Particularly where civil rights are at stake, an injunction serves the public interest because the injunction “would protect the public interest by protecting those rights to which it too is entitled.” Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 112 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1328 (N.D. Ga. 2000). And courts have specifically held that enjoining a state statute that is preempted by federal law will serve the public interest. See Chamber of Commerce v. Edmonson, 594 F.3d 742, 771 (10th Cir. 2010); Villas at Parkside Partners v. City
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of Farmers Branch, 701 F. Supp. 2d 835, 859 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (“[T]he public

interest favor[s] preserving the uniform application of federal immigration

standards.”). This is particularly true in the field of immigration, in light of the

risk of encroachment on the federal government’s relations with foreign countries.

See Hines, 312 U.S. at 64; United States v. Arizona, 2011 WL 1346945, at *21-23.

Without an injunction, Georgia residents and visitors will face enforcement

of a statutory scheme that violates the Constitution in numerous respects and

presents a grave risk of other harms to the public interest, such as the undermining

of public safety as a result of diversion of resources away from criminal

investigations.

CONCLUSION

The motion should be granted.

Dated: June 8, 2011

Respectfully submitted,17

/s/ Michelle Lapointe Michelle Lapointe On behalf of Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Linton Joaquin (pro hac vice) Karen C. Tumlin (pro hac vice) Nora A. Preciado* Melissa S. Keaney (pro hac vice) NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER

Omar C. Jadwat* Andre Segura* Elora Mukherjee* AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor

17 Counsel certifies this document has been prepared in accordance with L.R. 5.1.

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3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2850 Los Angeles, California 90010 T: (213) 639-3900 F: (213) 639-3911 Joaquin@nilc.org Tumlin@nilc.org Preciado@nilc.org Keaney@nilc.org

New York, New York 10004 T: (212) 549-2660 F: (212) 549-2654 ojadwat@aclu.org asegura@aclu.org emukherjee@aclu.org

Naomi Tsu (GSB No. 507612) Michelle R. Lapointe (GSB No. 007080) Daniel Werner (GSB No. 422070) SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 233 Peachtree St., NE, Suite 2150 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 T: (404) 521-6700 F: (404) 221-5857 naomi.tsu@splcenter.org michelle.lapointe@splcenter.org daniel.werner@splcenter.org

Cecillia D. Wang (pro hac vice) Katherine Desormeau (pro hac vice) AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS PROJECT 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, California 94111 T: (415) 343-0775 F: (415) 395-0950 cwang@aclu.org kdesormeau@aclu.org

Mary Bauer (GSB No. 142213) Andrew H. Turner* Samuel Brooke* SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 400 Washington Ave. Montgomery, Alabama 36104 T: (404) 956-8200 F: (404) 956-8481 mary.bauer@splcenter.org andrew.turner@splcenter.org samuel.brooke@splcenter.org

Chara Fisher Jackson (GSB No. 386101) Azadeh N. Shahshahani (GSB No. 509008) ACLU OF GEORGIA 1900 The Exchange, Suite 425 Atlanta, Georgia 30339 T: (770) 303-8111 cfjackson@acluga.org ashahshahani@acluga.org

Tanya Broder (pro hac vice) Jonathan Blazer* NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 405 14th Street, Suite 1400

G. Brian Spears (GSB No. 670112) 1126 Ponce de Leon Ave., N.E. Atlanta, Georgia 30306 T: (404) 872-7086 F: (404) 892-1128

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Oakland, California 94612 T: (510) 663-8282 F: (510) 663-2028 Broder@nilc.org Blazer@nilc.org
Sin Yen Ling* ASIAN LAW CAUCUS 55 Columbus Avenue San Francisco, California 94111 T: (415) 896-1701 x 110 F: (415) 896-1702 sinyenL@asianlawcaucus.org

Bspears@mindspring.com
R. Keegan Federal, Jr. (GSB No. 257200) FEDERAL & HASSON, LLP Two Ravinia Drive, Ste 1776 Atlanta, Georgia 30346 T: (678) 443-4044 F: (678) 443-4081
Charles H. Kuck (GSB No. 429940) Danielle M. Conley (GSB No. 222292) KUCK IMMIGRATION PARTNERS LLC 8010 Roswell Road, Suite 300 Atlanta, Georgia 30350 T: (404) 816-8611 F: (404) 816-8615 CKuck@immigration.net DConley@immigration.net

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

*Application for admission pro hac vice pending

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I have this date electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will automatically send e-mail notification to the following attorney for Defendants Deal, Olens, Reese, and Beatty, to whom a copy is also being hand-delivered today:
Devon Orland Office of State Attorney General 40 Capitol Square, S.W. Atlanta, GA 30334-1300 dorland@law.ga.gov Attorney for Defendants Deal, Olens, Reese and Beatty
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing is being hand-delivered on this date to the following non-CM/ECF participant:
Falecia Stewart Executive Director, Housing Authority of Fulton County HAFC Headquarters 4273 Wendell Drive Atlanta, GA 30336
This 8th day of June, 2011.
/s/ Michelle R. Lapointe

 
 Case 1:11-cv-01804-TWT Document 47-1 Filed 06/14/11 Page 1 of 65

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION

GEORGIA LATINO ALLIANCE *

FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, et al., *

*

Plaintiffs,

*

*

V.

*

*

NATHAN DEAL, Governor of the *

State of Georgia, et al.,

*

*

Defendants.

*

1:11-CV-1804-TWT

DEFENDANTS DEAL, OLENS, REESE AND BEATTY’S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO DISMISS
Come Now, Defendants, Deal, Olens, Reese and Beatty, through Counsel and file this brief in support of their Motion to Dismiss.
Plaintiffs, a combination of organizations and individuals, filed this suit as a facial challenge to HB87, entitled the “Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011.” (hereinafter HB87)(doc. 1, Ex. A). Defendants move that this case be dismissed in its entirety.

Case 1:11-cv-01804-TWT Document 47-1 Filed 06/14/11 Page 2 of 65
A. The Statute under review and the applicable legal theory While Plaintiffs’ complaint is riddled with anecdotal accounts of racial
profiling and improper early enforcement of the Bill, as the effective date of the Bill had not occurred as of the date the Complaint was filed, Plaintiffs can only pursue a facial challenge to the statute.
Facial challenges are disfavored in the law. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008). A facial challenge can succeed only when a plaintiff shows that “no set of circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid.” Id. at 449 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). To be facially invalid, the law must be unconstitutional in all of its applications. Id.; Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 494 n.5 (1982) (a successful facial challenge means that the law is incapable of any valid application).
A statute “should not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts.” Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975). A court may choose to adopt a narrowing construction if that construction is “reasonable” and “readily apparent.” Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 944 (2000).
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“An as-applied challenge, by contrast, addresses whether ‘a statute is constitutional on the facts of a particular case or to a particular party.’” Harris v. Mexican Speciality Foods, Inc., 564 F.3d 1301, 1308 (11th Cir. 2009) quoting Black’s Law Dictionary. “The practical effect of holding a statute unconstitutional ‘as applied’ is to prevent its future application in a similar context, but not to render it utterly inoperative.” Ada v. Guam Society of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 506 U.S. 1011 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). As Plaintiffs seek to invalidate portions of the statute and render it uniformly inoperative, they have clearly brought a facial challenge. (doc. 1, p. 180 “Prayer for relief” b and c).1
1. The legal framework for statutory challenges “The starting point for all statutory interpretation is the language of the statute itself.” United States v. DBB, Inc., 180 F.3d 1277, 1281 (11th Cir. 1999). The court is to “read the statute to give full effect to each of its provisions.” Id.; see also Samantar v. Yousuf, ___U.S.___; 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2289 (2010) (“we read statutes as a whole”). The court does not look at terms or phrases in isolation, but instead “look[s] to the entire statutory context.” DBB, Inc., 180 F.3d at 1281; see also Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989) (“It is a
1 Defendants note that while Plaintiffs’ prayer for relief asks to enjoin enforcement of the entire statute they only express claims related to parts 7, 8, 17, 18 and 19 thus Defendants presume these are the only portions that Plaintiffs seek to enjoin.
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fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme”); Woodard v. Wainwright, 556 F.2d 781, 785 (5th Cir. 1977) (when assessing the constitutionality of a statute, it “must be read as a whole.”).
Federal courts should be hesitant to declare a state statute unconstitutional. Cotton States Mutual Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 749 F.2d 663, 667 (11th Cir. 1984). When ruling on the constitutionality of a state statute, federal courts may only consider the plain meaning of the statute and constructions given by state courts. Id. The Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed that federal courts are required to construe state statutes in a manner to “avoid constitutional difficulties.” Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483 (1988); see also Hooper v. Calif., 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895) (“The elementary rule is that every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality”).
2. The Statute under review HB87
Plaintiffs reference the Bill as HB87 throughout their complaint but in reality appear to limit their challenge to specific provisions of the Bill. The only provisions referenced in the complaint are sections 7, 8, 17, 18 and 19. Since these
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are the only provisions specifically referenced by Plaintiffs, Defendants limit their argument to these specific provisions.
Section 7 of the act provides criminal penalties for individuals who have committed another criminal offense and who knowingly and intentionally transport, harbor or entice an illegal alien to enter the state. Generally, Plaintiffs complain that Section 7 improperly restricts their ability to transport, house, or assist illegal aliens and express concern that the provisions will result in racial profiling. All provisions define illegal alien as, “a person who is verified by the federal government to be present in the United States in violation of federal immigration law.” O.C.G.A. § 16-11-200 (a)(1); 16-11-201 (2); 16-11-202(a); O.C.G.A. § 17-5-100(a)(2).
The complained of provisions in Section 7 are codified in 3 different statutes, the relevant portions are as follows:
(b) A person who, while committing another criminal offense, knowingly and intentionally transports or moves an illegal alien in a motor vehicle for the purpose of furthering the illegal presence of the alien in the United States shall be guilty of the offense of transporting or moving an illegal alien….
Specifically excluded from this provision are:
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(1)

a government employee transporting or moving an illegal alien as

a part of his or her official duties or to any person acting at the

direction of such employee;

(2)

A person who transports an illegal alien to or from judicial or

administrative proceeding when such illegal alien is required to

appear pursuant to a summons, subpoena, court order, or other

legal process;

(3)

A person who transports an illegal alien to a law enforcement

agency or a judicial officer for official government purposes;

(4)

An employer transporting an employee who was lawfully hired; or

(5)

A person providing privately funded social services. O.C.G.A. §

16-11-200.

Next O.C.G.A. § 16-11-201 provides for penalty when an individual harbors

an illegal alien. “‘Harboring or harbors’ means any conduct that tends to

substantially help an illegal alien to remain in the United States in violation of

federal law but shall not include a person providing services to infants, children, or

victims of a crime; a person providing privately funded social services; a person

providing emergency medical service; or an attorney or his or her employees for

the purpose of representing a criminal defendant.” O.C.G.A. § 16-11-201 (1).

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This provision provides that, “A person who is acting in violation of another criminal offense and who knowingly conceals, harbors, or shields an illegal alien from detection in any place in this state, including any building or means of transportation, when such person knows that the person being concealed, harbored, or shielded us an illegal alien, shall be guilty of the offense of concealing or harboring an illegal alien.” Id. (b).
Lastly, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-202 provides that, “A person who is acting in violation of another criminal offense and who knowingly induces, entices, or assists an illegal alien to enter into this state, when such person knows that the person being induced, enticed or assisted to enter into this state is an illegal alien, shall be guilty of the offense of inducing an illegal alien to enter into this state.” Id. (b).
All three provisions require the commission of another criminal offense prior to being charged and specific knowledge by the offender of the alien status of the person transported, harbored or induced. The statutes do not provide for additional identification checks of passengers or cohabitants nor do they provide for an enforcement mechanism against the illegal alien but rather against the individual who transports, harbors or induces the illegal alien. Importantly, the statutes specifically exclude from criminal liability persons who perform a
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prohibited act as part of the provision of social services under O.C.G.A. § 16-11200 and 16-11-201. (emphasis added).
Next, Plaintiffs appear to complain about the provisions in Section 8 of the Bill. Section 8 is codified as O.C.G.A. § 17-5-100. This provision allows a peace officer who has probable cause to believe an individual has committed a criminal offense to verify an individual’s immigration status through a variety of means. If the individual is determined to be an illegal alien, the statute permits the officer to take any action he is authorized to take under state or federal law. Plaintiffs complain that this provision could lead to prolonged investigatory stops and racial profiling.
Plaintiffs also complain about sections 17, 18 and 19 of the Bill. These provisions address individuals who need to produce valid identification when seeking a public benefit or service. Specifically, section 17 requires public agencies to require proof of identification and verification of lawful presence in the United States prior to providing a public benefit; section 18 provides a criminal penalty for a failure to comply with section 17; and section 19 defines the scope of acceptable documentation and provides the Attorney General with direction to create a list of such documents.
8

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B. Plaintiffs fail to state a claim with sufficient particularity to entitle them to any relief Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint is
subject to dismissal if it does not “state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” When reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, the question to be answered is whether the well-pleaded factual allegations give rise to a “plausible” suggestion of unlawful conduct. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 565-66 (2007). Conclusory allegations are insufficient to meet the plausibility standard. Id. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Unsupported conclusory allegations are entitled to no presumption of truth and should be disregarded when deciding a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
The Supreme Court has sanctioned a two-step approach for reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint. First, conclusory allegations should be separated from well-pleaded factual allegations. Id., 129 S. Ct. 1949-50. If well-pleaded facts remain, the court should assume them to be true and “determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief.” Id., 129 S. Ct. at 1950. The facts necessary to meet the plausibility standard will depend on the constitutional provision at issue. Id., 129 S. Ct. at 1948. The plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id., 129 S.
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Ct. at 1950. Importantly, if the well-pleaded allegations are consistent with lawful behavior, the complaint must be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
In this case, as pled, Plaintiffs have presented this Court with an 82 page, 195 paragraph complaint. The first 39 and ½ pages define the parties, the next section enumerated as “Facts” sets forth, legislators’ commentary, legal authority and conclusory rubric. The conclusory allegations continue until Plaintiffs state their first claim on page 74 at which point Plaintiffs set forth 7 counts to support their causes of action. Within those counts Plaintiffs do nothing to tie the “facts” or other conclusory statements to their claims nor do they allege how the statute itself violates the provisions specified in each count. Rather, Plaintiffs state in a conclusory fashion the constitutional and/statutory provision at issue and declare the Bill to be violative of the provision. Danow v. Borack, 197 Fed. Appx. 853, 855 (11th Cir. 2006). Plaintiffs make no attempt to connect the Plaintiffs to the facts or to the various claims for relief. See id.; see also Anderson v. District Board of Trustees of Central Florida Community College, 77 F.3d 364, 366-67 (11th Cir. 1996). As Plaintiffs claims are based solely upon conclusory declarations unsupported with related factual averments tied to the claims, they are due to be dismissed.
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C. Plaintiffs lack standing “Standing is the threshold question in every federal case, determining the
power of the court to entertain the suit.” Camp Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 451 F.3d 1257, 1269 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotations and citations omitted). The party invoking federal jurisdiction has the burden of proving standing. National Alliance for the Mentally Ill, 376 F.3d 1292, 1294 (11th Cir. 2004). To establish standing, the plaintiff, whether an individual or an organization, must demonstrate three constitutional requirements “(1) an injury in fact, meaning an injury that is concrete and particularized, and actual or imminent, (2) a causal connection between the injury and the causal conduct, and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Camp Legal Defense Fund, Inc., 451 F.3d at 1269 (quotations and citations omitted); see also Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378-79 (1982).
To meet the actual injury requirement, there must be a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statutory enforcement. Babbitt v. United Farm Workers National Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979). The plaintiff is required to allege both “an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and . . . a credible threat of prosecution thereunder.” Id. The fear of prosecution must be more than imaginary
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or speculative. Id. Abstract harm is insufficient; the litigant must establish actual or threatened injury that is not hypothetical or conjectural. Warth v. Seldon, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975); Florida State Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153, 1161 (11th 2008) 1161; E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Hadley, 901 F.2d 979, 984 (11th Cir. 1990). To be imminent, the harm must be “one that is likely to occur immediately,” meaning, “within some fixed period of time in the future.” Browning, 522 F.3d at 1160-61.
In addition to showing an injury in fact, the plaintiffs must also show that the injury is fairly traceable to the alleged unlawful conduct. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Finally, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that the requested relief likely will redress the injury. E.F. Hutton & Co., 901 F.2d at 984 (citing, Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United For Separation Of Church And State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)). It is not sufficient for the party to speculate that the alleged injury would be redressed. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
1. The individual plaintiffs lack standing to bring this lawsuit. First, none of the individual plaintiffs have standing to bring challenges against Section 7 (setting forth criminal offenses) or Section 8 (verification of immigration status during investigation of criminal suspect) of HB87 because both sections demand either the commission of a criminal offense or probable cause to
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believe a person has committed a criminal violation, which undermines any suggestion that the alleged harm in enforcing the statute is imminent or likely to occur. Instead, the injury asserted by plaintiffs is speculative and hypothetical. This point is best illustrated by the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983), where the Court concluded that a plaintiff lacked standing to enjoin the police from using a choke hold on suspects absent a threat of deadly force to resist arrest because he failed to sufficiently demonstrate an injury in fact.
More specifically, the plaintiff’s purported injury of being subjected to unlawful choke holds in Lyons amounted to nothing more than “conjecture and speculation” because it required an open-ended sequence of improbable events to occur. Browning, 522 F.3d at 1162 (explaining that the plaintiff would have to cause a police encounter, the city would have to authorize unnecessary choke holds, and police would have to use an unnecessary choke hold in a specific encounter). Moreover, the injury alleged “was predicated on the plaintiff first doing something that would at least give an officer probable cause to detain or arrest him” but the Supreme Court was hesitant to assume a plaintiff would routinely violate the law. Id. Finally, the plaintiff in Lyons had an adequate
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remedy at law for any threatened injury because he could sue for damages if the police unconstitutionally applied a choke hold against him. Id.
Before any offense set forth in Section 7 could be enforced against an individual, he or she would have to be “committing another criminal offense” or “acting in violation of another criminal offense.” HB87, Section 7, Article 5, 1611-200(b), 16-11-201(b), 16-11-201(b). Similarly, in order to be subjected to verification of immigration status pursuant to Section 8, the officer would have to be investigating a criminal suspect and have “probable cause to believe that a suspect has committed a criminal violation.” HB87, Section 8, Article 5, 17-5100(b). As a result, just as with the plaintiff in Lyons, the individual plaintiffs’ purported fears are too speculative. Browning, 522 F.3d at 1162. Moreover, in the event the statute was applied in an unconstitutional manner, the individual plaintiffs could address those violations in a lawsuit for damages. Id.
Furthermore, although some individual plaintiffs allege a fear of criminal liability because they and their associated organizations provide transportation to illegal aliens to attend medical appointments, church or classes, or provide housing to those in need, HB87 expressly exempts any such conduct from liability. More specifically, under Section 7, the offenses for transporting and harboring an illegal alien do not apply to a “person providing privately funded social services.” HB 87,
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Section 7, Article 5, 16-11-200(d)(5), 16-11-201(a)(1). Similarly, while some individual plaintiffs allege that HB 87 causes them fear of racial profiling or deters them from reporting crimes, the statute itself expressly indicates otherwise. In particular, HB87 provides that “race, color, or national origin” should not be considered to implement Section 8 except as permitted by the Georgia and U.S. Constitutions. HB 87, Section 8, Article 5, 17-5-100(d). In addition, the verification of immigration status provided for in Section 8 expressly states that no status investigations may be based on good faith contact regarding witnessing a crime, reporting criminal activity or seeking assistance as a crime victim. HB 87, Section 8, Article 5, 17-5-100(f). As a result, the individual plaintiffs can have no reasonable fear of prosecution under HB87, and thus, no actual or imminent injury sufficient to establish standing. See Babbit, 442 U.S. at 298.
Additionally, while some individual plaintiffs also allege fears for others in the community, such as a decrease in public safety, the disruption of families, increased costs to the town and economic impact on businesses, none of these allegations are specific enough to take the purported injury beyond the realm of speculation and conjecture, Browning, 522 F.3d at 1162, nor do individuals typically have standing to raise claims for injuries suffered by third parties, Warth, 422 U.S. at 499. Further, the purported fears asserted by some of the individual
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plaintiffs with regard to “secure and verifiable documents” are speculative and unfounded because, despite alleged concerns about visiting public places, securing utilities, seeking police assistance, securing services for children and infants, or receiving treatment at a hospital, “secure and verifiable documents” are only demanded by state agencies or political subdivisions and, even when dealing with state entities, the requirement does not apply when reporting a crime, providing emergency medical services or providing services to infants, children or victims of a crime. HB 87, Section 19, 50-36-2(e)(1). In sum, the individual plaintiffs’ claimed injuries are too speculative and conjectural to amount to an injury in fact. Further, for the same reasons outlined above, Plaintiffs cannot establish that their claimed future injuries would be caused by HB87 (particularly where their desired actions are not precluded by the statute) or that any such injuries would be redressed by a favorable decision. Accordingly, they lack standing to challenge HB87 and should be dismissed.
2. The organizational plaintiffs lack standing to bring this lawsuit. An organizational plaintiff may bring a lawsuit either in its own right or based on the rights of its members. Warth, 422 U.S. at 511. The organizational plaintiffs in the present action lack standing under either framework.
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a.

The organizational plaintiffs lack standing to bring claims in

their own right.

To establish standing to bring claims in its own right, an organization must

allege, and ultimately prove, the same requirements discussed above with respect

to the individual plaintiff. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.

(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 177 (2000); White’s Place, Inc. v. Glover, 222 F.3d 1327, 1329 (11th Cir. 2000). Thus, as an initial matter, the organizational plaintiffs

must allege that they have suffered a tangible injury. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405

U.S. 727, 735 (1972). It is not sufficient for the organization to claim that it has an

ideological or abstract social interest that has been adversely affected. Id. at 739-40

(explaining that “a mere interest in a problem, no matter how longstanding the

interest and no matter how qualified the organization is in evaluating the problem,

is not sufficient by itself”); Havens, 455 U.S. at 379. Rather, the injury must be

concrete and demonstrable. Havens, 455 U.S. at 379.

In Havens, the Supreme Court addressed standing under the Fair Housing

Act where an organization alleged that unlawful racial steering practices had

frustrated the organization’s mission to assist with equal access and housing

referral services because the organization was required to devote resources to

counteract the racially discriminatory practices. Havens, 455 U.S. at 378-79. The

Supreme Court concluded that the organization suffered an injury in fact because

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the illegal practice of racial steering had “perceptibly impaired” the organization’s ability to provide the services it was formed to provide. Id. at 379. The Supreme Court explained that “concrete and demonstrable injury to the organization’s activities—with the consequent drain on the organization’s resources—constitutes far more than simply a setback to the organization’s abstract societal interests.” Havens, 455 U.S. at 379 (citing, Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 739).
This Circuit subsequently applied the Havens analysis outside the context of the Fair Housing Act in cases involving voting rights. In Browning, the plaintiff organization alleged that because of an impending voter registration requirement, the organization had to divert resources away from voter registration drives to instead educate voters regarding compliance with the regulation and to assist those who encountered problems as a result on election day. 522 F.3d at 1165-66. The Court found that the organization had alleged injuries sufficient to establish standing because it alleged an inability to conduct specific projects instead of “abstract societal interests” and the anticipated injuries satisfied the immediacy and likelihood requirements because they would all occur before the November 2008 election and it was likely that at least one injury would occur. Id. at 1161-64, 1166. The Court concluded that the organization “reasonably anticipated” the need to divert resources and provided that “an organization has standing to sue on its
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own behalf if the defendant’s illegal acts impair its ability to engage in its projects by forcing the organization to divert resources to counteract those illegal acts.” Id. at 1165. In Billups, this Circuit again applied Havens to analyze organizational standing in the voting rights context finding that the organization had established an injury in fact for purposes of standing because it was actively involved in voting rights activities and would be required to divert resources from its normal activities to educate and assist voters in complying with a new photo identification requirement. Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2009).
In the present lawsuit, the organizational plaintiffs have not alleged facts sufficient to establish that HB87 impacts their particular missions in specific ways requiring them to divert resources in a manner that establishes the requisite injury in fact. First, the organizational plaintiffs largely make only conclusory assertions that they either have or will divert unspecified resources from nonspecific activities or projects in order to educate their members and the community concerning HB87. (see, e.g., doc. 1 ¶¶ 25, 30, 33, 42). Thus, unlike the organizations in Havens, Browning and Billups, the organizational plaintiffs here seek only to service abstract societal interests, which is insufficient to establish standing under Article III. Havens, 455 U.S. at 379; Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 735.
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Additionally, the stated missions and purposes of the organizational plaintiffs are not sufficiently related to the statute at issue. In Havens, the organization’s purpose was to provide equal housing and referrals and the illegal practice was racial discrimination; thus, the alleged harm and purported cause were intimately related. See Havens, 455 U.S. at 378-79. In Browning and Billups, the organizations identified specific voting projects interfered with in a distinct time period by the imposition of additional voting requirements; thus, the alleged harms and purported causes were intimately related. See Browning, 522 F.3d at 1165-66; Billups, 554 F.3d 1340. The same cannot be said here where many of the organizational plaintiffs simply serve causes related to the broad societal issues of immigration that lack components or purposes directly related to the requirements actually imposed by HB87.2 As such, the present case is distinguishable. Further, even in Browning where this Circuit found allegations of sufficient injuries, the Court did not end its inquiry there, but rather, noted that the organizational plaintiffs had also satisfied the requirements of immediacy and likelihood of injury. Browning, 522 F.3d at 1165-66. Comparatively, in the present action, there
2 For example, one of the organizational plaintiffs, DREAM, describes itself as a youth-led movement seeking to pass a bill, the DREAM Act, which addresses issues faced by young students brought into the United States when they were infants or young children. (doc. 1 ¶ 26). It is unclear how this organization’s mission has any relation to the challenged provisions of HB87 other than through the broad societal interest involving issues of immigration generally.
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is not the same immediacy or likelihood of injury as previously addressed at length. See Section C.1, supra. Rather, the organizational plaintiffs are speculating that an injury may or may not occur. Therefore, the organizational plaintiffs do not have standing to bring this action in their own right.
Moreover, although some of the organizational plaintiffs assert that they have or may have a decreased membership or attendance at events because members will be targeted based on appearance and are scared to be stopped and interrogated by police in light of HB87, as already addressed above, any such fear is purely hypothetical and speculative in light of the clear terms of HB87 that prohibit unconstitutional racial profiling and require criminal conduct before any verification of immigration status would enter the realm of possibility. See Section C.1, supra. At a minimum, because HB87 does not allow or provide for the police conduct and actions the organizational plaintiffs purportedly fear, they cannot establish that their injury of diverting resources to educate about the bill is “fairly traceable” to the mere enactment of HB87. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 360. Despite their characterizations otherwise, it appears that the plaintiffs do not fear enforcement of the terms of HB87, but rather, fear a misapplication of its requirements. However, such fears fail to establish the redressability required for standing. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561; see, e.g., Mancha v. Immigration and
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Customs Enforcement, 2007 WL 4287766 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (finding no

redressability where the plaintiff sought an injunction requiring defendants to obey

the law).

Finally, as a matter of policy, the conclusory assertions by the organizational

plaintiffs of varying missions and endeavors that they must divert resources away

from to educate individuals about HB87 should not be deemed sufficient to

establish the requisite injury for purposes of standing under Article III because it

would completely eviscerate the standing doctrine. If an organization obtains standing merely by expending resources in response to a statute, then Article III standing could be obtained through nothing more than filing a lawsuit. Such an interpretation flies in the face of well-established standing principles.

Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 816-17 (S.D. Ind. 2006).

Accordingly, the organizational plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the statute in

their own right.

b.

The organizational plaintiffs lack standing to bring claims on

behalf of their members because their members would lack

standing to sue.

In the absence of injury to itself, an organization may still have standing

solely as the representative of its members. Warth, 422 U.S. at 511. For an

organization to have such representational standing, however, it must meet the

three-part test articulated by the Supreme Court in Hunt v. Washington State Apple

Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333 (1977). Under the Hunt test, an association

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has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (1) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (2) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation in the lawsuit of the individual members. Id. at 343; see also Doe v. Stincer, 175 F.3d 879, 882 (11th Cir. 1999).
Here, the members have no standing in their own right to challenge HB87. For instance, while some organizational plaintiffs allege that members have already been stopped and targeted because of their appearance, any such allegation lacks the required causation because if the members are already targeted, it cannot be the result of HB87, which has not yet gone into effect. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. In any event, as already addressed, HB87 specifically provides that officers may not consider race, color or national origin except to the extent already permitted by the Georgia and U.S. Constitutions so any fear otherwise is unreasonable, and thus, insufficient to establish the required injury in fact. See Section C.1, supra; Babbit, 442 U.S. at 298. Similarly, although some organizational plaintiffs assert that members are fearful they will face scrutiny and additional stops by police because they do not have a form of identification acceptable under HB87, to be subjected to a verification of status, they would first
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have to commit or give probable cause to believe they committed a criminal offense. See Section C1, supra. As already addressed, relying on an intentional commission of a criminal offense is too speculative to establish an injury. Id. The same is true for allegations that members fear criminal liability for transporting or providing housing to illegal aliens as both provisions first require a criminal offense. Id. In addition, these provisions expressly set forth exceptions for privately funded social services as already addressed at length above. Id. Thus, the organizational plaintiffs fail to establish that their members would have standing to challenge HB87. Furthermore, the interests the organizational plaintiffs seek to protect are not germane to any of their stated purposes which, as already discussed, are largely unrelated to the subject matter of the specific provisions of HB87 at issue. See Section C.2(a), supra. Accordingly, the organizational plaintiffs fail to establish standing through their members and their claims should be dismissed. D. Plaintiffs fail to show that HB87 is preempted by federal legislation
Plaintiffs claim that HB 87 is preempted by federal law. This claim is premised upon the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution (U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl 2) which provides:
The Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof,….shall be the supreme law of the Land;
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and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, and Thing in the Constitution or Laws to the Contrary notwithstanding. Initially it should be recognized that the Supremacy clause does not create rights enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103 (1989). In Golden State the court recognized that the Supremacy clause is not a source of any federal rights, but only “secure[s] federal rights by according them priority whenever they come in conflict with state law.” Id. at 107. See also Pirolo v. City of Clearwater, 711 F.2d 1006 (11th Cir. 1983) (a federal preemption claim premised upon a violation of the Supremacy Clause is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983) 3 However, the fact that a federal statute has preempted certain state action does not preclude the possibility that the same federal statute may create a federal right for which § 1983 provides a remedy. The critical question is whether the particular federal statute creates rights enforceable under Section 1983. It has been stated that:
3 It should also be noted that Plaintiffs claim for attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for alleged violation of the Supremacy Clause should likewise be dismissed. See generally Scurlock v. City of Lynn Haven, 858 F.2d 1521, 1529 n.9 (11th Cir. 1988) (a federal preemption claim premised upon a violation of the Supremacy Clause is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and, as such, a plaintiff is not entitled to attorney’s fees and costs under section 1988 for such a claim); Gustafson v. City of Lake Angelus, 76 F.3d 778 (6th Cir. 1996) (a federal preemption claim premised upon a violation of the Supremacy Clause is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and, as such, a plaintiff is not entitled to attorney’s fees and costs under section 1988 for such a claim).
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[T]he availability of the § 1983 remedy turns on whether the [federal] statute, by its terms or as interpreted, creates obligations “sufficiently specific and definite” to be within “the competence of the judiciary to enforce[,]” is intended to benefit the putative plaintiff, and is not foreclosed “by express provision or other specific evidence from the statute itself.” Golden State 493 U.S. at 108.
Thus, although it is clear that the supremacy clause does not create a cause of action under § 1983 this Court must determine whether the underlying federal statute is enforceable under § 1983. It has been recognized that not all federal statutory and regulatory violations under color of state law give rise to a § 1983 claim for relief. A number of United States Supreme Court cases from the 1980 decision in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) to the decisions in Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992) and Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002) have established a framework for making such a determination. A federal statute is enforceable under § 1983 unless (1) the statute was not intended to create enforceable rights or (2) the statute reflects a congressional intent to preclude its enforcement under § 1983. The analysis must include not only an examination of the underlying federal statute, but also must include an interpretation of § 1983 in light of said statute.
The statutory and regulatory scheme under Immigration and Naturalization Code (INC), does not create privately enforceable rights. Rather the
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Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, in conjunction with the United States Attorney General and the Department of Justice, is responsible for enforcement of the INC. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 et. seq. Defendants have been unable to ascertain any aspects of the aforesaid act or amendment which demonstrate that Congress intended to create rights in private individuals for anything alleged by Plaintiffs, that would either expressly or impliedly would authorize private enforcement under § 1983.
Arguably, Plaintiffs may be claiming that they have some entitlement to social programs that have been impacted by provisions in the Bill that extend beyond the scope of the federal requirement. While Plaintiffs are not specific as to which programs they claim to have a federal right to that preempt the Bill, the Eleventh Circuit has disavowed the creation of such a federally enforceable right as to social programs where a federally created statutory scheme provides for funding and regulation of distribution of funds. See Arrington v. Helms, 438 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 2006); Am. Ass’n of People with Disabilities v. Harris, 605 F.3d 1124 (11th Cir. 2010); See also Shotz v. City of Plantation, 344 F.3d 1161 (11th Cir. 2003); 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2003).
Notwithstanding the fact that the INC imposes no basis for a claim under § 1983, the Plaintiffs still assert that the underlying statutes and regulations have
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preempted Georgia’s ability to enforce HB 87. 4 Under the supremacy clause of
the U.S. Constitution, it has well been settled that state law that conflicts with
federal law is ‘without effect.’ “ Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. 505 U.S. 504,
4 Defendants note that the Supreme Court has determined Federal-question jurisdiction over a preemption claim is proper, but the route to this conclusion is slightly more circuitous. Ordinarily, federal preemption is a federal defense to a state-law suit, and, as such, it does not create federal-question jurisdiction. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987). While unclear, the plaintiffs seem to be bringing their preemption claims directly under the federal statutes upon whose preemptive force they rely. The specific statutes relied on to support this claim remain unclear but they appear generally to rely upon the INC and specific laws related to the provisions of social programs. The Court has also held that, once jurisdiction is properly established over the action for injunctive relief, the separate remedy available through a declaratory judgment may also be asserted before the federal court. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Const. Laborers Vac. Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 20 n. 20(1983); see also Gay Student Services v. Texas A & M Univ., 612 F.2d 160, 166 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1034 (1980). The Supreme Court in these cases seems to assume that the plaintiff has a valid federal cause of action, although the Court has never identified the precise source of the plaintiff’s claim in these kinds of preemption disputes. Most commentators have concluded that such causes of action arise directly under the Constitution, see, e.g., A. Althouse, When to Believe a Legal Fiction: Federal Interests and the Eleventh Amendment, 40 Hastings L.J. 1123 (1989); 13B C. Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3566 p. 102 (1984) (“The best explanation of Ex Parte Young and its progeny is that the Supremacy Clause creates an implied right of action for injunctive relief against state officers who are threatening to violate the federal constitution or laws”), and at least one court has found that such claims are cognizable under § 1983, Playboy Enterprises v. Public Service Com’n, 906 F.2d 25, 31-33 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 959(1990). In any event, the Supreme Court has not questioned the propriety of these types of claims even when the federal statute whose preemptive power is at issue cannot be the source of the plaintiff’s cause of action. See id. While recognizing the Court’s obligation to follow this precedent Defendants question its viability in light of the reasoning articulated in Gonzaga and its progeny.
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516 (1992). The Supreme Court has recognized three types of preemption: (1) express preemption, where a federal statute contains “explicit preemptive language”; (2) field preemption, where the federal regulatory scheme is “so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it”; and (3) conflict preemption, where “compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility” or where state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 604-05(1991). Congressional intent is the “ultimate touchstone” in a preemption case, Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996), and this intent “governs our determination of whether federal law preempts state law.” Boyes v. Shell Oil Prods. Co., 199 F.3d 1260, 1267 (11th Cir. 2000). Preemption may be either expressed, by a statute’s language or implied by the statute’s structure and purpose. Id. 505 U.S. at 516. In the absence of an express command, federal law will preempt state law if that law actually conflicts with federal law or if the federal law “so thoroughly occupies a legislative field as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it. Id.; DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976); See also Lohr, 518 U.S. at 478-89 (explained that deference should be shown to state sovereignty and cautioned that
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the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every preemption case). Congress does not “cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action.” Id., at 485. The “presumption is that the state or local regulation of matters related to health and safety is not invalidated under the Supremacy Clause.” Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Lab, 471 U.S. 707 (1985); See also Barnhill v. Teva Phramaceuticals USA, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44718 *6 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 24, 2007).
As Plaintiffs do not allege, nor have Defendants found, an explicit preemption declaration in the INC, it appears that Plaintiffs in this case are attempting to claim an implied field preemption and conflict preemption. Where a party alleges that Congress has legislated so comprehensively that federal law occupies an entire field of regulation leaving no room for state law (field preemption) or that federal law conflicts with state law (conflict preemption), the party alleging preemption must “present a showing of implicit preemption of the whole field, or a conflict between a particular local provision and the federal scheme that is strong enough to overcome the presumption that state and local regulation of health and safety matters can constitutionally coexist with federal regulations. Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 716. Plaintiffs have done neither.
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Federal law preempts state law where it is impossible for a private party to comply simultaneously with both state and federal law, or when state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Id. (citing Hines, 312 U.S. at 67). Defining what is a sufficient obstacle is a matter of judgment, to be informed by examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and intended effects. Id. The Crosby Court stated specifically that “For when the question is whether a Federal act overrides a state law, the entire scheme of the statute must of course be considered and that which needs must be implied is of no less force than that which is expressed. If the purpose of the act cannot otherwise be accomplished-if its operation within its chosen field else must be frustrated and its provisions be refused their natural effect-the state law must yield to the regulation of Congress within the sphere of its delegated power.” Id. at 373 (citing Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533(1912)).
Here, the Plaintiffs must identify some specific requirement imposed that would preempt any conflicting or additional state requirement. The Supreme Court has held that a state statute that “mirrors federal objectives and furthers a legitimate state goal” is not preempted by the federal government’s authority to regulate immigration. Plyler, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982). In De Canas v. Bica, 424
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U.S. 351 (1976), the Court explained: Power to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power. . . . But the Court has never held that every state enactment which in any way deals with aliens is a regulation of immigration and thus per se preempted by this constitutional power, whether latent or exercised. . ..” Id. at 355.
Plaintiffs appear to argue that HB87 is preempted in three ways. Initially they claim that Congress has a comprehensive system that leaves no room for supplemental state law. (doc. 1 ¶ 111). Secondly, they claim, without factual support, that HB87 will have an adverse impact on the federal immigration scheme and foreign policy. (doc. 1 ¶ 137-138). Lastly they claim that by authorizing local law enforcement to make arrests and by failing to accept forms of identification that would ordinarily be accepted by the federal government that the Bill is preempted by federal law. (doc. 1 ¶ 128, 132, 133).
As to the first two theories, the recent Supreme Court case of Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, No. 09-115, slip. op. p. 15; 463 U.S. ____ (U.S. May, 26 2011), clearly resolves these issues adverse to Plaintiffs. As to the last issue, Plaintiffs fail to acknowledge the plain language of the statute and the scope of the federal and state partnership in the provision of public benefits. Moreover, the scope of the law mirrors rather than contradicts federal requirements and further
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supports the stated federal objective of ensuring federal, state and local monies are not used to provide public services to individuals not in the country legally.
The federal government has made it an express requirement that the states not allow illegal aliens to obtain public assistance in all but a few circumstances that would be considered the provision of emergency care. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1611 and 1621 prohibit the use of federal, state or local funds to provide public benefits to an alien who is not a “qualified alien.” 8 U.S.C. § 1611(a) (stating that “an alien who is not a qualified alien . . . is not eligible for any Federal public benefit”); 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a) (same with regard to “any State or local public benefit”).
Public benefits have been defined to include any grant, contract or loan secured by appropriated federal, state or local funds, as well as welfare, health, public or assisted housing, postsecondary education, food assistance, “or any other similar benefit,” secured by appropriated federal, state or local funds. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1611(c)(1), 1621(c). The definition of a “qualified alien” does not include unlawful aliens. See 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b) (identifying aliens that are deemed to be “qualified aliens”). In addition, § 1621 provides that an unlawful alien may be eligible for a State or local public benefit if a State law “affirmatively provides for such eligibility.” 8 U.S.C § 1621(d). Georgia, has expressly stated that unlawful aliens who are 18 years of age or older are not entitled to any such benefits, with
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the exception of treatment for an “emergency medical condition,” non-monetary and short-term disaster relief, public health assistance with immunizations, programs such as short-term shelters or soup kitchens that meet specified conditions, prenatal care and postsecondary education that is in compliance with federal law. See O.C.G.A. § 50-36-1(a).
As part of this statutory scheme 8 U.S.C. § 1625 specifically provides that, “A state or political subdivision of a State is authorized to require an applicant for State and local public benefits (as defined in section 1621(c) of this title) to provide proof of eligibility.
Plaintiffs complain that the identification requirements of HB87 regarding the provision of public service is usurped by federal law by failing to accept forms of identification that would be accepted by the federal government. As HB87 merely implements the process which Congress preserved for the states, there is no preemption. Whiting, slip. op. at 15. Moreover, just as with the Arizona law at issue in Whiting, HB87 specifically provides for an exclusion where “required by federal law.” HB-87 Part 19; O.C.G.A. § 50-36-2 (c) further adopts the definition of illegal alien as one who “is verified by the federal government to be present in the United States in violation of federal immigration law.” O.C.G.A. §§ 16-11-200
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(a)(1); 16-11-201 (a)(2); 16-11-202 (a); 17-5-11(a)(2). As with the Arizona law where there is agreement there can be no preemption. Whiting, slip op. at 15-16.
Plaintiffs also argue that allowing states to support federal enforcement of immigration laws will create an “adverse impact” on the United States’ ability to conduct foreign relations and “undermine federal enforcement priorities.” (doc. 1 ¶¶ 136-138). Setting aside that Plaintiffs have failed to factually support this conclusory allegation, Whiting, rejects such a proposition. Indeed, the Court in Whiting, recognized the balancing employed by Congress in the development of the INC and the interests of the federal government in regulating immigration issues when it found that there is no conflict if the federal “program operates unimpeded by the state law.” Slip op. at 20; See also De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355-63 (as long as regulations address harm to the state and does not conflict with federal law there’s no preemption). It is indisputable that allowing anyone to transport, harbor or entice illegal aliens into the state and/or utilize public resources once they are here adversely impacts the state and as such the prevention of those actions is for the benefit of the state. Plaintiffs have pointed to no provision of HB87 which impedes the federal enforcement scheme and as such have failed to state a valid preemption claim.
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Plaintiffs argue that criminalizing behaviors that are also prohibited and subject to criminal penalties under federal law violates the supremacy clause.5 Dual sovereignty has long been recognized between the federal and state governments in a variety of criminal matters. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922). See also Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) (due process clause does not prohibit a state from prosecuting a defendant for the same act for which he was acquitted in federal court). The “dual sovereignty” doctrine rests on the premise that, where both sovereigns legitimately claim a strong interest in penalizing the same behavior, they have concurrent jurisdiction to vindicate those interests and neither need yield to the other. Such is the case here. These statutes support rather than conflict with their federal counterparts. Indeed 18 U.S.C. § 1324 specifically criminalizes the transportation of an illegal alien within the United States, harboring an illegal alien within or enticing an alien to illegally enter the United States. Id. at (a)(1)(A)(ii), (iii), (iv). Significant differences between the state and
5 It certainly cannot be argued that criminalization of behaviors that are subject to federal criminal enforcement violate the preemption clause as there are many such enforcement schemes represented in state and federal code. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1028 to O.C.G.A. § 16-9-4 (identification fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1461 to O.C.G.A. § 16-12-100, 100.1 (distribution of obscenity); 18 U.S.C. § 1961-64 to O.C.G.A. § 16-14-2, 3, 4, 5 (R.I.C.O.); 18 U.S.C. § 2421 to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-46 (trafficking of persons); 21 U.S.C. § 851-865 to O.C.G.A. § 16-13-20-56 (controlled substances); 18 U.S.C. § 921-931 to O.C.G.A. § 16-11-101.1 through 16-11-106 (firearms).
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the federal code are that the state code requires the action to be taken in conjunction with another criminal offense and the state provides for exclusions for culpability which are not provided for in the federal code.6 Neither of these differences, conflicts with the federal law. As such, there is no preemption issue.
In conclusion, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’ preemption argument fails because HB87 has established no requirements which are in conflict with any “requirements” established under the INC. Moreover, regarding Plaintiffs’ § 1983 cause of action, Plaintiffs have not established that Congress intended that a private right of action exists under § 1983 based upon any alleged violation of the INC. E. Plaintiffs have failed to state a fourth amendment claim
Plaintiffs complain that Sections 7 and 8 of the Bill violate the Fourth Amendment by authorizing “officers to seize individuals, and prolong seizures, in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” (doc. 1 ¶ 174). Presumably, Plaintiffs are complaining about the Bill provision that allows (but does not require) officers to check the immigration status of persons where the officer already has probable
6 As no inquiry into immigration status can be made absent the existence of probable cause, HB87 codifies a mechanism by which state and local law enforcement can utilize the dictates of the federal code which require that state and local governments be allowed to communicate with the federal government regarding an individual’s immigration status. 8 U.S.C. § 1644; 8 U.S.C. § 1373.
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cause to believe that another crime has been committed. O.C.G.A § 17-5-100. Alternatively, Plaintiffs might be complaining about the portions of the Bill that make it a crime to knowingly transport or harbor or induce into the state illegal aliens while engaged in the commission of another criminal offense. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-200; 16-11-201; 16-11-202. Despite the Plaintiffs attempts to repaint the landscape of the Bill, the statute does not:
1) provide an officer with authority to detain anyone where there is no probable cause to believe he/she has already committed a criminal offense; or 2) give any authority to arrest anyone beyond that which is already provided under existing federal and state law ; or 3) give authority to question others who may be traveling or with the individual for whom the officer has probable cause beyond that which is already provided for under the United States Constitution. O.C.G.A § 17-5100(b); O.C.G.A. § 16-11-200(b); 16-11-201(b); 16-11-202(b).7
7 As noted, in note 5, the Federal Code already allows for state and local governments to communicate with federal authorities on matters related to immigration. HB87 provides state and local officials with guidance of how and when such action can be taken.
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Fourth Amendment protections occur when a government actor restrains the liberty of a person by a show of physical force or authority. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, n.16 (1968). The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 168 (2008). The Virginia court noted that:
[w]hen history has not provided a conclusive answer, we have analyzed a search or seizure in light of traditional standards of reasonableness “by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” . . . In a long line of cases, we have said that when an officer has probable cause to believe a person committed even a minor crime in his presence, the balancing of private and public interests is not in doubt. The arrest is constitutionally reasonable.
Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. at 171 (citations omitted). Reasonableness of a seizure is determined by the presence or absence of probable cause. Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1137 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). A seizure or a warrantless arrest is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if probable cause exists. Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 878 (11th Cir. 2003). The existence of probable cause is an absolute bar to claim under the Fourth Amendment for a violation of a right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Kingsland v. City
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of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1226 (11th Cir. 2004) (false arrest); Kjellsen v. Mills, 517 F.3d 1232, 1237 (11th Cir. 2008)(malicious prosecution).8
Plaintiffs appear to claim that this provision will improperly cause extended detentions of persons committing minor traffic offenses.9 Even if this unsubstantiated fear bears true, the United States Supreme Court has conclusively determined that officers can arrest individuals where they have probable cause to believe they have committed a minor traffic offense. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001). As the individual involved could not only be detained as a result of the traffic offense but could be arrested and booked into a corrections facility, this argument is of no merit. Moreover, the law is clear that the validity of a stop without probable cause is a case specific inquiry such that Plaintiffs presumption that an 80 minute wait would equate to an unreasonable search is without merit. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985) (16 hour detention does not constitute an arrest and was not unreasonable in light of the case specific inquiry); United States v. Hardy, 855 F.2d 753 (11th Cir. 8 Moreover, the United States Supreme Court held in Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005) specifically determined that questioning someone about immigration status does not amount to a separate detention within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 9 Defendants note that violations of county or municipal law, regulation or ordinance are specifically excluded as a basis for checking identification. O.C.G.A. § 17-5-100 (a)(1). Defendants also acknowledge that the State of Georgia has codified its traffic code with Title 40 of its official code.
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1988)(51 minute detention after the issuance of a traffic ticket which took over 25
minutes to issue was not an unreasonable seizure); Medvar v. State, 286 Ga. App.
177 (2007)(58 minute detention for a traffic stop not unreasonable); State v. Grant,
195 Ga.App. 859 (1990)(90 minute detention of passenger and luggage not sufficient to amount to an unlawful arrest).10
Plaintiffs also appear to argue that officers may use the Bill as a means to
racially profile individuals and have an improper motive when effectuating an
arrest for a minor traffic offense. The United States Supreme Court has just ruled
that where there is probable cause to arrest, regardless of an alleged improper
motive, that there is no Fourth Amendment violation. Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, No. 10-
98, slip.op. at 3-9 (U.S. May 31, 2011). Thus, regardless of the motive involved,
if there’s probable cause to believe a crime was committed, as is required under
10 Officers can also stop a vehicle when they have reasonable suspicion that it may contain illegal aliens, “[W]hen an officer’s observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular vehicle may contain aliens who are illegally in the country, he may stop the car briefly and investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion.” United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). Although “[t]he reasonable suspicion must be more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch,” United States v. Powell, 222 F.3d 913, 917 (11th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted), “the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002). The officer’s reasonable suspicion must be based on “specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts.” BrignoniPonce, 422 U.S. at 884.
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HB87, then the motive of the officer involved is irrelevant from a Fourth Amendment perspective. It should also be noted that as this is a facial challenge, the Court, “must be careful not to go beyond the statute’s facial requirements and speculate about ‘hypothetical’ or ‘imaginary’ cases.” Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008). The speculative nature of Plaintiffs’ complaint is further evidenced by their claim that such profiling is already occurring. Since the statute was not in effect at the time the suit was filed, it can hardly be responsible for such action. F. Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under the privileges and
immunities clause As an initial matter, only individuals can seek protection from the Privileges and Immunities Clause. While Plaintiffs do not specify, Defendants presume that they are only pursuing this claim on behalf of individuals. See, e.g., W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. Bd. Of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 656 (1981). To the extent that they pursue the claim on behalf of the associational Plaintiffs, these claims should be dismissed. Plaintiffs maintain that HB87 interferes with the “fundamental right to travel” and that the right includes the right to be “treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in another state, without a rational or compelling justification.” (doc. 1 ¶ 179). Once again, Plaintiffs claims
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are far from clear but presumably they are criticizing the prohibition against the use of driver’s licenses as proof of immigration status from states that do not verify citizenship prior to the issuance of the license. See O.C.G.A. § 17-5-100(b)(4).
Admittedly, the Supreme Court has clearly determined that there is a constitutional right to interstate travel, although the source of the right is undetermined. Defendants are willing to accept, for the purposes of argument, that the claim would be premised upon the Privileges and Immunities Clause to the United States Constitution. See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution provides that “The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States. “The purpose of this provision is to protect non-residents from discrimination “where there is no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of other states.” Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502 (1999) (citing Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948)). HB87 in no way impedes that right. There is nothing in the statute which prohibits any citizen or other person who is legally in the country from entering into the state. To the
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contrary, as noted previously, HB87 does not authorize an officer to investigate immigration status unless he/she otherwise has probable cause.
Plaintiffs appear to contend that since certain driver’s licenses will not be accepted as conclusive evidence of citizenship that HB87 that the citizens of those states will be unfairly burdened.11 There is no merit to the contention that where a state does not require citizenship as a condition of obtaining a license that another state must accept the identification for that purpose. Simply put, there is no legal support for the proposition that Georgia is required to accept a driver’s license from another state as proof of citizenship especially where there is no requirement to be a citizen in order to obtain the license.12
Statutes that have been found to violate this right, have required tenure in a state for a period of time prior to obtaining some benefit. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974). Nothing in HB87 confers a benefit to residents of the state that is not being given to non-residents. Rather, all are
11 Recognizing the issue was not specifically addressed by the United States Supreme Court, it should be noted that the Arizona statute at issue in Whiting has a virtually identical provision. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 2-11-7 (8)(B)(4) (2007). 12 Importantly, the federal government does not accept licenses from these states as proof of citizenship. See 42 CFR § 435.407(4)
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subject to the same requirement should they commit a crime and an officer decides to verify citizenship. This does not impede interstate travel, as the license at issue could not be accepted as proof of citizenship in the state of origin. Georgia is simply recognizing the limits of the forms of identification used, what is factually supported by the document and what is not. The recognition of different interstate policies is not an impediment to interstate travel, merely an acknowledgement of what a document does or does not evidence. G. Plaintiffs have failed to state a valid equal protection claim
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does “prohibit[] selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). In Washington v. Davis, the Supreme Court rejected the idea that a law that is facially neutral but impacts one race more than another violates equal protection. 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976). In other words, the Equal Protection Clause guarantees equal laws, not equal results. Personnel Administrator of Mass. v.Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979). The law requires more than a claim that one race of person may suffer a harsher impact then others. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 324, n. 26, (1980) (“The equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment prohibits only purposeful discrimination, and
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when a facially neutral federal statute is challenged on equal protection grounds, it is incumbent upon the challenger to prove that Congress selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part because of, not merely in spite of, its adverse effects upon an identifiable group” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
Simply showing that the intent was to discriminate against illegal aliens is insufficient as illegal aliens, are not a suspect class. In Plyler, the Court held that a Texas statute that denied a free public education to the children of illegal immigrants violated the Equal Protection Clause. In reaching its decision, the Court applied what some commentators have called intermediate scrutiny based on the special circumstances of the children. The Court specifically drew a distinction, however, between the children and their parents:
We reject the claim that ‘illegal aliens’ are a ‘suspect class.’ No case in which we have attempted to define a suspect class. . . has addressed the status of persons unlawfully in our country. Unlike most of the classifications that we have recognized as suspect, entry into this class, by virtue of entry into this country, is the product of voluntary action. Indeed, entry into the class is itself a crime. In addition, it could hardly be suggested that undocumented status is a ‘constitutional irrelevancy.’ Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219 n.19. In other words, “illegal alien” is not a constitutionally suspect class.
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The Supreme Court has established two elements for determining whether a superficially neutral law violates the Equal Protection Clause: “discriminatory effect” and “purposeful discrimination.” McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (citing Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550 (1967); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)).
All Plaintiffs have shown is a desire by the state to ensure that the resources of the state are utilized for those lawfully present by ensuring that there is a penalty for those who employ, transport, harbor or entice illegal aliens. As these are all related to the legitimate government purpose of preserving jobs and resources for individuals lawfully in the state, the Bill does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. See Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981). This rational basis for legislative action may be wholly notional; it need only be conceivable by a court, not actually contemplated by lawmakers. See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960)) (“Where . . . there are plausible reasons . . . our inquiry is at an end. It is, of course, constitutionally irrelevant whether this reasoning in fact underlay the legislative decision.”)
Plaintiffs appear to allege that HB87 will lead to racial profiling and thus selective enforcement of the law—in other words a discriminatory effect.
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However, a plaintiff must do more than make the conclusory allegation that a defendant has engaged in racially discriminatory profiling. “Plaintiffs must present evidence that individuals of a different race could have been . . . arrested for the same crime, but were not.” Urbanique Prod. v City of Montgomery, 428 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1224 (M.D. Ala. 2006); Swint v. City of Wadley, 51 F.3d 988, 1000 (11th Cir. 1995). Here Plaintiffs speculate that they might get stopped as a result of their race, because of the individual they help or because of the individuals they are transporting. They offer selective anecdotal accounts of incidents where they believe police interaction occurred as a result of profiling and ask the court to conclude that as a result of these incidents that the statute will be improperly enforced and should be enjoined.
Plaintiffs however fail to show how, on its face, the statute compels racial profiling. A statutory classification that does not burden a suspect class or infringe upon the exercise of a fundamental right must be upheld against equal protection challenge “if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.” Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993). Here on its face, the statute does not reference a suspect class. Indeed, the law specifically treats anyone,
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where the officer has probable cause to believe another criminal offense has been committed, the same.
Lastly, Plaintiffs claim that since they were subject to profiling before the prior to the effective date of the statute, then it is a foregone conclusion that they will be subject to racial profiling after the statute comes into effect. In fact what Plaintiffs have shown, assuming their perception is accurate, is that racial profiling is not caused by HB87 but rather that it occurred, in isolation, prior to HB87. It should also be noted that the Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in Whiting where they found that it could not be presumed that employers would act in a discriminatory fashion in order to comply with statutory dictates related to the verification of immigration status. Whiting, supra at slip op. 21. HB87 is rationally related to a legitimate government interest and thus does not violate the equal protection clause. H. Plaintiffs have failed to state a valid due process claim
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. XIV, § 1. “[T]he core of the concept [of due process is] to be protect[ed] against arbitrary action.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998). Arbitrary conduct, in the constitutional sense, is conduct that “shocks the
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conscience.” Id. at 1716-1717 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-3 (1952)). Two kinds of constitutional protections are derived from the Fourteenth Amendment: procedural due process and substantive due process. McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1555 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc). Here, Plaintiffs claim that they have been deprived of property without due process of law. Namely they claim to have been denied the use of their consular-issued identity documents (CID), “for any official purpose for which identification is required.” (doc. 1 ¶ 186). A successful § 1983 claim “alleging a denial of procedural due process requires proof of three elements: (1) a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest; (2) state action; and (3) constitutionally-inadequate process.” Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003). Since Plaintiffs do not have a constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest in the use of their CID’s, they have no claim for a due process violation.
Essentially Plaintiffs are claiming, without support, that they have a property right in the CID’s and that since they cannot use them for identification that the statute causes them to lose their property right. As an initial matter Plaintiffs fail to acknowledge that the statute provides for the acceptance of the documents if “required by federal law.” O.C.G.A. § 50-36-2 (c). Further the scope of a property interest under § 1983 is defined by state law. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344
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(1976). Plaintiffs point to no state statute which provides for the creation of a property interest related to the use of a CID. Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law . . . .” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972);Cheek v. Gooch, 779 F.2d 1507, 1508 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding no violation of due process where Georgia state law does not grant Plaintiff a property interest in the opportunity to acquire a license). Plaintiffs have not alleged nor have Defendants found any provision in state or federal law which creates a private property right for identification from a foreign country let alone a property right in the ability to use foreign issued documents for the provision of public services or other official business. Even if such a right did exist, the Bill still would not violate due process as there is nothing making it illegal for Plaintiffs to possess CID’s and/or use them for other than “official” business. Private entities are not prohibited from accepting the CID’s for whatever purpose they deem appropriate. As Plaintiffs have not been deprived of use of the CID’s they can allege no taking. See Penn Central Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
It is further worth noting that the Defendants have not found any authority for the proposition that foreign governments tie any property right to the CID’s.
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Indeed the reliability of the cards for purposes of identification has been the topic of concern for many years. They have been heralded as unreliable and subject to fraud. See Steve McCraw, Testimony at the House Judicial Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims Of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One Hundred Eighth Congress, First Session, June 19 and June 26, 2003. (transcript available at http://judiciary.house.gov/Legacy/mccraw062603.htm); See also Hearing on Consular Identification Cards (transcript available http://judiciary.house.gov/Legacy/87813.PDF). Regardless of their reliability, there is no legal or evidentiary support for the proposition that these cards create a property right and thus Plaintiffs fail to state a valid due process claim. I. Plaintiffs do not have a separate and distinct claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 In Count Six of their complaint, Plaintiffs claim that § 19 of HB 87 operates “in such a manner as to deny access to governmental services and to deny the securing of governmental licenses and to deny entry into contracts with governmental entities on the basis of the national origin of the identification documentation of the presenter.” Plaintiffs claim further that § 7 of the Bill impermissibly prohibits the right of association based upon, “the alienage of those with whom they wish to associate.” (doc. 1 ¶ 191). Plaintiffs then summarily aver
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that the Bill discriminates “on the basis of alienage and national origin and race.” (doc. 1 ¶ 192). While the heading of Count Six delineates the claim as brought under § 1981 and § 1983, the count only describes § 1981. See doc. 1 ¶ 190-191. § 1981, does not create a private right of action against state actors. Butts v. County of Volusia, 222 F. 3d 891 (11th Cir. 2000). Since there is no other basis stated for a claim under Count Six, this claim should be dismissed. J. Plaintiffs do not have a cause of action under the Vienna Convention
While not entirely clear, Plaintiffs appear to contend that they have a federally protected right to use Consular identification cards to establish identification and as proof of legitimate presence in the Country. They state no basis for this proposition other then to suggest that the use of these cards, assists in assuring that the notification provisions of the Vienna Convention are complied with. The violation of these provisions, however, is not actionable under § 1983. Gandara v. Bennett, 528 F.3d 823 (11th Cir. 2008). Consequently, there could be no right of action for ensuring ease of compliance with the provision. K. Defendants Deal and Olens do not have direct enforcement authority
for the Statute, and therefore, are not the proper parties for Plaintiffs’ requested injunctive relief. Plaintiffs claim, in part, is that local law enforcement will improperly utilize HB87 to engage in racial profiling. Neither the Governor nor the Attorney General
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have authority to direct local law enforcement. While Governor Deal and Attorney General Olens, in their official capacities are the correct parties for the purpose of defending the constitutionality of the Statute under the Federal Constitution, they are not the proper parties to enjoin against its enforcement. The Georgia Constitution generally provides that it is the Governor’s responsibility to, “take care that the laws are faithfully executed and shall be the conservator of the peace. . . .” The Governor is vested with, “The chief executive powers . . . .” Ga. Const. art. IV, § 2, P 1. Under the Georgia Constitution, “[t]he Attorney General shall act as the legal advisor of the executive department, shall represent the State in the Supreme Court in all capital felonies and in all civil and criminal cases in any court when required by the Governor, and shall perform such other duties as shall be required by law.” Ga. Const. art. V, § 3, P 4. There is, however, no constitutional or statutory provision that allows the Governor or the Attorney General to dictate to independently elected officials or to locally appointed law enforcement officers what law enforcement action may or may not be taken.
Instead, the Georgia Constitution provides for the “self-government of municipalities.” Ga. Const. art. IX, § 2, P 1, 2. Counties are authorized to provide police and fire protection. Id. at P 3. The county police are under the control of the county governing authority and have law enforcement powers, including the
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power to make arrests and execute and return criminal warrants in the county of appointment. O.C.G.A. § 36-8-5. Sheriffs are constitutional “county officers” who are “elected by the qualified voters of their respective counties” and who “have such qualifications, powers, and duties as provided by the general law.” Ga. Const. art. IX, § 1, P III(a).
As independently elected officials, the local sheriffs have specific duties, including the enforcement of State laws. Sheriffs do not act under the supervision or direction of the Governor or the Attorney General. O.C.G.A. §§ 15-16-9, 1516-10. Thus, it is the responsibility of local law enforcement to manage the specific enforcement of the provisions of the Statute and Governor Deal and Attorney General Olens in their official capacities are not the proper Defendants to carry Plaintiffs’ objective.
Since neither the Governor nor the Attorney General have enforcement authority over local law enforcement, these claims, against them are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Ex Parte Young exception does not apply when the defendant has no connection to the enforcement of the challenged act. Summit Med. Assoc., P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326, 1341 (11th Cir. 1999). Unless the state officer has some responsibility to enforce the provision in question, the fiction of Ex Parte Young does not apply and the claim is barred by the Eleventh
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Amendment. Id. Because the Governor and Attorney General have no authority to enforce provisions of criminal statutes, the Ex Parte Young doctrine does not apply and Plaintiffs’ claim seeking to enjoin enforcement of the Statute is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. L. Plaintiffs’ claim under the Georgia Constitution must be dismissed.
This Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Plaintiffs’ claim premised on the Georgia Constitution. (See Doc. 1, ¶¶ 193-195). Moreover, even if jurisdiction existed, such claims are barred by sovereign immunity. In the alternative, the Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over the claims.
1. This Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Plaintiffs’ claims under the Georgia Constitution.
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. By its own terms, the amendment affords states immunity from suits, both legal and equitable. Id. This Amendment has been interpreted to also bar suits against a state brought by that state’s own citizens. McClendon v. Georgia Dep’t of Cmty. Health, 261 F.3d 1252, 1256 (11th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, the Eleventh Amendment bars a federal court from exercising
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jurisdiction over any lawsuit against a non-consenting state. Vermont Agency of Natural Res. v. United States, 529 U.S. 765, 778 (2000); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 97-102 (1984).
Because claims against public officials in their official capacities are merely another way of pleading an action against the entity of which an officer is an agent, “official capacity” claims against a state officer are included in the Eleventh Amendment’s bar. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985). The Eleventh Amendment bars suit against a State’s agencies, departments, or officials, absent a waiver by the State or a valid congressional override, when the State is the real party in interest or when any monetary recovery would be paid from State funds. Kentucky, 473 U.S. at 163; Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 100-01.
The State of Georgia has specifically preserved its immunity against claims filed in federal court. The State of Georgia’s Constitution and the Georgia Tort Claims Act clearly preserve the State’s immunity from suit on federal claims and in federal court. O.C.G.A. § 50-21-23(b); Ga. Const. art. I, § II, P IX (f). As such, the Eleventh Amendment provides an absolute bar to actions against the State of Georgia, its entities, and its officials. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989); Gamble v. Florida Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 779 F.2d 1509, 1511-20 (11th Cir. 1986).
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An exception to the Eleventh Amendment bar exists for suits against state officers in their official capacities seeking prospective equitable relief to end continuing violations of federal law. Scott v. Taylor, 405 F.3d 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2005); Summitt Med. Assoc. P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326, 1336 (11th Cir. 1999). Plaintiffs’ request for prospective relief from alleged continuing violations of federal law – i.e., their request that this Court declare the Statute unconstitutional under the United States Constitution – is the only claim not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. As a result, their claim challenging the constitutionality of the Statute under the Georgia Constitution brought against the State Officials in their official capacities is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
2. Plaintiffs’ state constitutional claim is barred by sovereign immunity.
Plaintiffs’ state constitutional claim is also barred by sovereign immunity. The Georgia Constitution extends sovereign immunity to the State and all of its departments and agencies except as specifically provided in paragraph IX of article I, § II, which provides:
Except as specifically provided in this Paragraph, sovereign immunity extends to the state and all of its departments and agencies. The sovereign immunity of the state and its departments and agencies can only be waived by an Act of the General Assembly which specifically provides that sovereign immunity is thereby waived and the extent of such waiver.
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Ga. Const. art I, § II, P IX(e). Thus the State is immune from suit except as specifically waived in the Georgia Constitution or except as provided by an act of the General Assembly specifically providing that sovereign immunity has been waived and the extent thereof. Woodard v. Laurens County, 265 Ga. 404, 405 (1995). “Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the State cannot be sued without its consent.” State Bd. of Educ. v. Drury, 263 Ga. 429, 430 (1993). “Where the sovereign has sovereign immunity from a cause of action, and has not waived that immunity, the immunity rises to a constitutional right and cannot be abrogated by any court.” Tyson v. Bd. of Regents, 212 Ga. App. 550, 551 (1994). The burden of demonstrating a waiver of sovereign immunity rests with the Plaintiff. Balasco v. County of San Diego, 140 Ga. App. 482, 487 (1976).
There is no state provision “equivalent to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,” which provides a cause of action for violation of the state constitution. Howard v. Miller, 222 Ga. App. 868, 872 (1996); accord Davis v. Standifer, 275 Ga. App. 769, 772 n. 2 (2005); Draper v. Reynolds, 278 Ga. App. 401, 403 n. 2 (2006). Therefore, Plaintiffs cannot pursue a claim for injunctive relief for the alleged violation of state constitutional rights.13
13 Plaintiffs are further precluded from raising alleged violations of state law under § 1983. Knight v. Jacobson, 300 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2002).
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3. Alternatively, the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims brought under the Georgia Constitution. Even if jurisdiction existed over claims not barred by sovereign immunity, this Court should decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction. Ordinarily, federal courts have supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims that are closely related to claims falling within the court’s original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). District courts may decline to exercise such jurisdiction when the claim raises a novel or complex issue of state law. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1). That is precisely the case here. State courts, not federal courts, are the final interpreters of state law. Hardy v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 954 F.2d 1546, 1553 (11th Cir. 1992). Indeed, the Georgia Constitution gives the Georgia Supreme Court the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases involving the construction of the Georgia Constitution and the construction of laws where the constitutionality under the Georgia Constitution has been called into question. Ga. Const. art. VI, § VI, P 2; Methany v. Hammonds, 216 F.3d 1307, 1313 (11th Cir. 2000). This Court should decline Plaintiffs’ invitation to consider the constitutionality of the Statute under the Georgia Constitution. Consideration of such a claim involves a novel issue of state law that falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Georgia Supreme Court.
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CONCLUSION

For the above and foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs complaint should be

dismissed in its entirety.

Respectfully submitted,

SAMUEL S. OLENS Attorney General

551540

KATHLEEN PACIOUS 558555 Deputy Attorney General

Please Address All Communications To:

/s/ Devon Orland

DEVON ORLAND

554301

Sr. Assistant Attorney General

Devon Orland 40 Capitol Square, S.W. Atlanta, GA 30334-1300 (404) 463-8850 (404) 651-5304

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(D), I hereby certify that the foregoing has been prepared in compliance with Local Rule 5.1(B) in 14-point New Times Roman type face.
This the 14th day of June, 2011.

40 Capitol Square, S.W. Atlanta, GA 30334-1300 (404) 463-8850 (Telephone) (404) 651-5304 (Fax) Email: Dorland@law.ga.gov

/s/ Devon Orland

DEVON ORLAND

554301

Sr. Assistant Attorney General

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on this date I electronically filed the foregoing BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will automatically send email notification of such filing to the following attorneys of record: Andrew H. Turner Chara Fisher Jackson Charles H. Kuck Daniel Werner Danielle M. Conley Georgia Brian Spears Mary C. Bauer Michelle R. Lapointe Naomi Ruth Tsu Robert Keegan Federal, Jr. Samuel Brooke I further certify that I have served, by U.S. mail, first class postage prepaid, the following non-CM/ECF participants:
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Andre I. Segura Omar C. Jadwat American Civil Liberties Union Foundation – NY 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, NY 10004
Azadeh N. Shahshahani ACLU of Georgia Building 400, Suite 425 1900 The Exchange, SE Atlanta, GA 30339
Cecillia D. Wang Katherine Desormeau ACLU Immigrant’s Rights Project 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, CA 94111
Elora Mukherjee ACLU Racial Justice Program 18th Floor, 125 Broad Street New York, NY 10004
Jonathan Blazer Karen C. Tumlin Linton Joaquin Melissa S. Keaney Nora Preciado Tanya Broder National Immigration Law Center 3435 Wilshire Blvd, Suite 2850 Los Angles, CA 90010
Sin Yen Ling Asian Law Caucus 55 Columbus Avenue San Fancisco, CA 94111
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This 14th day of June, 2011.

State Law Department 40 Capitol Square SW Atlanta, GA 30334 Tel: (404) 463-8850 Fax: (404) 651-5304 Email: dorland@law.ga.gov

s/ Devon Orland

65

 
 Case 1:11-cv-01804-TWT Document 78 Filed 06/17/11 Page 1 of 8

FILED IN CLERK'S OF ICE
U,S,D,C, - Atlanta
2
JUN 17 Z011
3
J~~~ENj;,et ~
4
'(_~ U
5

6

7

8

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

10

ATLANTA DIVISION

11

12 Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights; Service

)No. 1:11-CV-1804

Employees International Union; Southern Regional Joint

)

13 Board of Workers' United; DREAM Activistorg; Task Force )

for the Homeless; Asian American Legal Advocacy Center; )AMICUS BRIEF OF

14 Alterna; Coalition of Latino Leaders; Instituto de Mexico, Inc, )RIGHTMARCH.COM, JOSHUA

of Atlanta; Coalition for the People's Agenda; Paul Bridges; ) CLARK, AND BRETT HARRELL IN

15 Benjamin Speight; Everitt Howe; Paul J. Edwards; Sharon ) SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'

Gruner; Jane Doe # I; Jaypaul Singh; Ernesto Pinon; John Doe )MOTION TO DISMISS

16 # I; John Doe # 2; and Jane Doe # 2,

)

Plaintiffs,)

17

)

v.

)

18

)

Nathan Deal, Governor of the State of Georgia, in his official )

19 capacity; Samuel S. Olens, Attorney General of the State of )

Georgia, in his official capacity; Clyde L. Reese, III,

)

20 Commissioner of the Department of Human Services of the )

State of Georgia, in his official capacity; Mike Beatty

)

21 Commissioner of the Department of Community Affairs of the )

State of Georgia, in his official capacity; and Falecia Stewart, )

22 Executive Director of the Housing Authority of Fulton County )

Georgia, in her official capacity,

)

23

Defendants.)

24

25

AMICUS BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

Case 1:11-cv-01804-TWT Document 78 Filed 06/17/11 Page 2 of 8

Amicus curiae, Rightmarch.com, Joshua Clark, and Brett Harrell respectfully move for leave of 2 Court to file the acmmpanying brief. Notice has been given by amicus curiae to each party of the 3 intention to file this brief, but no consent to the filing ofthis brief has been obtained.

4

5

STATEMENT OF INTEREST

6

7

Rightmarch.com is a nonprotit, donor-supported, civil liberties organization dedicated to helping

8 give patriotic Americans a collective voice. Thousands of donors to Rightmarch.com arc Georgia

9 residents and citizens of the United States who feel they do not have a voice other than to join together

]0 through this one organization to speak for them.

1]

Representative Joshua Clark is a resident of Gwinnett County, Georgia and State Representative

12 of House District 98, The legislation in the above-styled matter directly affects the constituents of Mr.

13 Clark and Mr. Clark personally as Gwinnett County has become a corridor for illegal dmg trafficking as

14 well as other crimes from illegal immigrants. The life, liberty and property ofMr, Clark, his family and

15 his mnstituents are continually at risk since the Federal government has not properly enforced its

16 immigration laws.

17

Representative Brett Harrell is a resident of Gwinnett County, Georgia and State Representative

18 of House District 106. . The legislation in the above-styled matter directly affects the constituents of Mr.

19 Harrell and Mr. Harrell personally as Gwinnett County has bemme a corridor for illegal drug trafficking

20 as well as other crimes from illegal immigrants. The health, safety and welfare of Mr. Harrell, his family

21 and his c{)nstituents are continually at risk since the Federal government has not properly enforced its

22 immigration laws.

23

1/

1/

24

II

II

25

II

II

2

AMICUS BRlEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

Case 1:11-cv-01804-TWT Document 78 Filed 06/17/11 Page 3 of 8

For these reasons, amicus curiae respectfully requests that the Court grant leave to file this brief 2 
 June 17,201 L

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Respectfully Submitted,

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(J, JASON THOMPSON

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NATHANIEL J. OLESON

lINITED STATES JUSTICE FOCNDATION

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Counsel for Amicus

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BRIEF OF AJ\\ICUS CURIAE 


&VlICUS BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOnON TO DISMISS

Case 1:11-cv-01804-TWT Document 78 Filed 06/17/11 Page 4 of 8

IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTIO~ TO DISMISS' 


2

3

LEGAL DISCUSSION 


4

PREEMPTION DOCTRINE 


5

Plaintiffs initially filed suit against Defendants on the grounds that any state legislation passed

6 concerning illegal immigration is preempted by Federal law and would likely cause unnecessary and long

7 detentions of those illegal immigrants apprehended by local law enforcement, If the duty to enforce any

8 law even remotely connected to immigration is exclusively the jurisdiction of the Federal government, as

9 Plaintifls suggest, then Georgia should be permitted to bring an action to compel the appropriate Federal

10 agencies to enforce the immigration laws, However, as the United States Supreme Court discussed in the

II case of New Jersey v. United States, "no prccedent suggests that inaction by Congress or the Executive

12 Branch constitutes the kind of coercion that violates the Tenth Amendment. As defendants succinctly

13 state in their hrief: 'the Tenth Amendment provides a shield against the federal exercise of powers

14 reserved to the states, not a sword to compel federal action.' " (New Jersey v. United States, 91 F3d 463

15 (1996)), Plaintiffs point out that the Georgia legislature disagreed with the immigration policy ()fthe

16 Obama administration and passed the underlying immigration law because ofthis disagreement.

17 Plaintifl's did not argue that the underlying Georgia law was contrary to Federal immigration law, only

18 contrary to the current policy of enforcement. If the current policy ofthe Federal immigration

19 enforcement agencies is to disregard many established Federal immigration laws, why should Georgia be

20 prevenJed from taking steps to enforce similar laws given that the Federal government refuses to do so?

21 Plaintiffs are unable to demonstrate why disagreement with a current Federal policy precludes a State

22 from acting contrary to that policy in areas where the State has a right and the authority to legislaJe.

24
25 1 No counsel for a party authored this briefin whole or in part, and no counselor party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No person other than amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel made a monetary contribution to ijs preparation or submission.

AMICUS BRIEF TN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTTON TO DlSMISS

Case 1:11-cv-01804-TWT Document 78 Filed 06/17/11 Page 5 of 8

The general rule with regard to the preemption doctrine is that no act of Congress is presumed to

2 preempt State law unless Congress has made such an intention "clear and manifest:"

3

" "[B]ecause the States are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed

4

that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action." Jo.1edtronic, Inc. v. I.ohr,

5

518 e.S., at 485, 135 L. Ed. 2d 700, 116 S. Ct. 2240. In areas of traditional state regulation, we

6

assume that a federal statute has not supplanted state law unless Congress has made such an

7

intention '''clear and manifest.''' New York State Co'!ierence olBlue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.

8

Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655, 131 L. Ed. 2d 695, 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995)(quoting Rice v.

9

Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 \j.S. 218,230,91 L. Ed. 1447, 67 S. Ct. 1146 (1947)); See also

10

Medtronic, Inc. v. I.ohr, 518 U.S., at 485, 135 L. Ed. 2d 700, 116 S. Ct. 2240. "

11

Bates v. Dow Agrosciences I..I..c.. 544 U.S. 431.

12

Plaintiffs' have alleged, with regard to the enforcement of immigration laws, that Congress has

13 intended for Federal immigration laws to preempt State laws and that any attempt by Georgia, or any

14 other State, to tlnd a means to deal with the growing and continuing problem of illegal immigration

15 would be interference with the Federal government's plan of enforcement. However, the Federal

16 agencies responsible for enforcement of Federal immigration laws have neglected to so enforce the law in

17 Georgia, which has caused the State of Georgia to attempt to control the after effects of this non­

1& enforcement of immigration laws at great expense to the State and its taxpayers.

19

SOVERIGN STATE POLICE POWERS

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No State can compel the Federal government to act where the Federal government, through law

21 or current policy of a particular President, has not acted in a particular manner or to deal with a particular

22 problem. (New Jersey v. United States, 91 F.3d 463 (1996». In a similar manner, the Federal

23 government cannot compel a State to follow the dictates or instructions of the Federal government or to

24 involuntarily act as an agent of the Federal government. (Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,912

25 (1996)). However, when the Federal government has failed to act, or has refused to act in any particular

5

AMICUS BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOnON TO DISMISS

Case 1:11-cv-01804-TWT Document 78 Filed 06/17/11 Page 6 of 8

area, the Federal government cannot claim to have preempted the field against State action in that

2 particular area unless Congress expressly intended to do so:

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"There is no federal pre-emption in vacuo, without a constitutional text or a federal statute to

4

assert it Where a comprehensive federal scheme intentionally leaves a portion ofthe regulated

5

field without controls, then the pre-emptive inference can be drawn -- not from federal inaction

6

alone, but from inaction joined with action."

7

Puerto Rico Dep't of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S. 495 (1988).

8 Plaintiffs have alleged that any action that Georgia takes to deal with problems resulting from illegal

9 immigrant activities in the State would be an interference with the immigration policy ofthe Federal

10 government. Since this Federal policy seems to be to ignore the problem of illegal immigration, rather

11 tban taking steps to enforce existing law, then the argument of the Plaintiffs should be read as where

12 there is inaction on the part of the Federal government the States may not act. Laws are meaningless if

13 the government agencies responsible for the enforcement of those laws refuse to do so. The Tenth

14 Amendment states, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by

15 it to the States, arc reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." (United States Constitution,

16 Tenth Amendment). As discussed above. unless Congress makes a "clear and manifest" intention to fully

17 regulate an area oflaw, States are not prevented from doing so. Contrary to Plaintiffs unsupported

18 allegation that there is long-settled law giving the Federal government an exclusive role in regulating

19 immigration, recent Supreme Court decisions would suggest that the contrary is true (see Chamber of

20 Commerce v. Whiting. 09-115 (2011»), and, since the Federal government seems intent on pursuing a

21 policy of non-enforcement of immigration laws, Georgia is left with no option but to address the problem

22 directly. The immigration status law passed by the State of Georgia. which is the basis of the underlying

23 complaint, should be found by the Court to be a valid State action under the Tenth Amendment, because

24 Congress has not prohibited the State from so acting and because the State of Georgia has a compelling

25 interest in protecting the health, safely, and welfare of all those who are lawfully within its borders.

6

AMICUS BRIEF I" SUPPORT OF DEFENDA:'-;TS' MOTION TO DISMISS

Case 1:11-cv-01804-TWT Document 78 Filed 06/17/11 Page 7 of 8

DIFFICULTY IN MAKING DETERMINATIONS OF LEGAL STATUS BASED ON FEDERAL 


2

LAW DOES NOT PREVENT STATES FROM PASSING LAWS REGARDING ILLEGAL 


3

IMMIGRATION 


4

The plaintiffs frequently refer to the difficulty of making determinations of immigration stalus,

5 extending to the Federal agencies that are supposed to be experts making such determinations. The mere

6 fact that Congress has written laws that are immensely complicated, even for those whose responsibility it

7 is to enforce said laws, should not require that Georgia refrain from attempting to do anything about the

8 problem of illegal immigration in the State. Likewise, it is not the problem of the State of Georgia that

9 the Federal immigration database requires an average of 80 minutes to conduct a search. Tfthe Federal

10 government needs to upgrade their databases, it should do so, but whether the Federal government does s

II should not prevent Georgia from attempting to take control over the problems that illegal immigration

12 cause to the State of Georgia, and its citizens, as that is something that the police powers of the State

13 allow the State to deal with.

14

Tn addition, Plaintiffs, allege throughout their complaint, that ordinary law enforcement officials

15 in Georgia lack the training and expertise to make determinations with regard to a person's immigration

16 status, specifically pointing to the fact that the Federal government only authorizes certain approved law

17 enforcement agencies in Georgia to work with the Federal government in this regard. However, the

18 voluntary partnership that some Georgia counties have entered into with the Federal government does not

19 preclude Georgia from independently taking action to address problems that exist within the State's

20 borders.

21

Finally, Plaintiffs cited several cases where injunctions were issued to stay the immigration laws

22 of several States pending resolution of the cases. However, Plaintiffs failed to cite the recent Supreme

23 Court ofthe United States decision in Chamber o/Commerce v. Whiling, 09-115 (2011), where the

24 Supreme Court upheld an Arizona law that punished businesses that hire illegal immigrants. At the very

25 least, this case shows that there is no settled case law that exclusively reserves to the Federal government

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AMICUS BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DlSMISS

Case 1:11-cv-01804-TWT Document 78 Filed 06/17/11 Page 8 of 8

any law relating to immigration, as alleged by Plaintiffs. Whiting, instead, demonstrates that the U. S.

2 
 Supreme Court recognizes that the various States of the United States have the right to legislate issues

3 
 related to illegal immigration within their state borders without running afoul of Federal law. All states,

4 
 Georgia included, have the right, as recognized by the Tenth Amendment, to exercise its police powers

5 over the health, safety and welfare of the citizens of the State, unless Congress has expressly intended to

6 
 preempt such State laws. Apart from Plaintiffs' mere allegation of this "intent" of Congress, the State of

7 
 Georgia has the right, and the authority, to defend its citizens from unlawful activity, even in the arena of

8 
 illegal immigration.

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CONCLUSION

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For these reasons, Amicus respectfully requests that the Court grant leave to file this briefin

11 
 support of Defendants' motion to dismiss.

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Respectfully Submitted,

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.....

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~ C-­

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15 G. Jason Thompson (GA SBN 709789) THE THOMPSON LAW FIRM, PC
16 
 200 East Crogan Street Suite 101
17 
 Lawrenceville, GA 30046 Tel: (678) 442-6464
18 
 email: thompsonlawfirm@hotmail.com
19 
 Attorney for Amicus Rightmarch.com, Joshua Clark, and Brett Harrell
20

NATHANIEL J. OLESON' (CA SBN 276695) 
 UNITED STATES JUSTICE FOUNDATION 
 932 "D" Street, Suite 3 
 Ramona, California 92065 
 Tel: (760) 788-6624 
 Fax: (760) 788-6414 
 email: usjf@usjf.net 
 email: njoleson@gmail.com
Attorneys for Amicus Rightmarch.com, Joshua Clark, and Brett Harrell

21 
 • Application for admission pro hac vice forthcoming

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AMICUS BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

 
 Case 1:11-cv-01804-TWT Document 93 Filed 06/27/11 Page 1 of 79

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION

GEORGIA LATINO ALLIANCE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v.
NATHAN DEAL Governor of the State of Georgia, in his official capacity, et al.,
Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 1:11-CV-1804-TWT

ORDER

This is a constitutional challenge to Georgia’s new illegal immigration law. It is before the Court on the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction [Doc. 29] and the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 47]. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction [Doc. 29] and GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 47].
I. Background On April 14, 2011, the Georgia General Assembly enacted House Bill 87, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011 (“HB87”). Most provisions of HB87 are scheduled to take effect on July 1, 2011. The Act was designed to

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address the “very serious problem of illegal immigration in the State of Georgia.” (Debt. on HB87 Before the Georgia Senate (April 14, 2011); Lauterback Decl., Ex. B.)
Section 8 of HB87 authorizes Georgia law enforcement officers to investigate the immigration status of criminal suspects where the officer has probable cause to believe the suspect committed another criminal offense. O.C.G.A. § 17-5-100(b). The suspect may show legal immigration status by providing one of five types of identification.1 If, however, the suspect fails to present one of the five listed forms of identification, the officer may use “any reasonable means available to determine the immigration status of the suspect.” O.C.G.A. § 17-5-100(c). If the officer determines

1The forms of identification include: (1) A secure and verifiable document as defined in Code Section 50-362; (2) A valid Georgia driver’s license; (3) A valid Georgia identification card issued by the Department of Driver Services; (4) If the entity requires proof of legal presence in the United States before issuance, any valid driver’s license from a state or district of the United States or any valid identification document issued by the United States federal government; (5) A document used in compliance with paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of Code Section 40-5-21; or (6) Other information as to the suspect’s identity that is sufficient to allow the peace officer to independently identify the suspect. O.C.G.A. § 17-5-100(b). HB87 in effect requires all individuals in Georgia to carry a state-approved identity document in order to avoid extended questioning each time they encounter law enforcement.

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that the suspect is in the United States illegally, he may detain the suspect, transport him to a state or federal detention facility, or notify the United States Department of Homeland Security. O.C.G.A. § 17-5-100(e).
Section 7 of HB87 prohibits “transporting or moving an illegal alien,” “concealing or harboring an illegal alien,” or “inducing an illegal alien to enter into [Georgia]” while committing another criminal offense. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-200; O.C.G.A. § 16-11-201; O.C.G.A. § 16-11-202. Finally, Section 19 of HB87 requires Georgia agencies and political subdivisions to accept only “secure and verifiable” identity documents for official purposes and provides criminal penalties for those who “knowingly accept[ ]” documents that are not secure and verifiable. O.C.G.A. § 5036-2(c) & (d). HB87 defines secure and verifiable documents as those “approved and posted by the Attorney General.” O.C.G.A. § 50-36-2(b)(3). Consular identification cards are specifically excluded. Id.
The Plaintiffs are nonprofit organizations, business associations, and individuals. The Plaintiff organizations claim that HB87 will cause them to divert resources from their traditional missions in order to educate the public on the effects of the new law. The individual Plaintiffs claim that they will be subject to investigation, detention, and arrest under HB87 because of their status as, or association with, unauthorized aliens. The Plaintiffs filed this class action lawsuit on

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June 2, 2011 [Doc. 1]. On June 8, 2011, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction [Doc. 29]. The Plaintiffs seek to enjoin enforcement of the portions of HB87 that will go into effect on July 1, 2011.2 The Plaintiffs argue that HB87 violates the Supremacy Clause, the Fourth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the constitutional right to travel.3 The Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 47]. The Defendants contend that the Plaintiffs lack standing and that the Court lacks jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs’ claims. The Court held a hearing on the motions on June 20, 2011.
II. Legal Standards A. Preliminary Injunction Standard A “preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be granted until the movant clearly carries the burden of persuasion as to the four prerequisites.” Northeastern Fla. Chapter v. Jacksonville, Fla., 896 F.2d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir. 1990). In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, a movant must demonstrate: “(1) a substantial likelihood that he will ultimately prevail on the merits;

2The Plaintiffs also object to other portions of HB87 that are not scheduled to go into effect until January 2012. The Motion for Preliminary Injunction, however, only addresses Sections 7, 8, and 19.

3The Plaintiffs have withdrawn their claim for violations of the Georgia Constitution. (Pls.’ Br. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, at 45.)

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(2) that he will suffer irreparable injury unless the injunction issues; (3) that the threatened injury to the movant outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) that the injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the public interest.” Zardui-Quintana v. Richard, 768 F.2d 1213, 1216 (11th Cir. 1985); Gold Coast Publications, Inc. v. Corrigan, 42 F.3d 1336, 1343 (11th Cir. 1994). “The purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.” University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). “[A] preliminary injunction is customarily granted on the basis of procedures that are less formal and evidence that is less complete than in a trial on the merits.” Id. “At the preliminary injunction stage, a district court may rely on affidavits and hearsay materials which would not be admissible evidence for a permanent injunction, if the evidence is ‘appropriate given the character and objectives of the injunctive proceeding.’” Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Intern. Trading Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 985 (11th Cir. 1995).
B. Motion to Dismiss Standard A complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) only where it appears that the facts alleged fail to state a “plausible” claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A complaint may survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, however, even if it is “improbable” that a

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plaintiff would be able to prove those facts; even if the possibility of recovery is extremely “remote and unlikely.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citations and quotations omitted). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must accept factual allegations as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Quality Foods de Centro America, S.A. v. Latin American Agribusiness Dev. Corp., S.A., 711 F.2d 989, 994-95 (11th Cir. 1983). Generally, notice pleading is all that is required for a valid complaint. See Lombard’s, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 753 F.2d 974, 975 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082 (1986). Under notice pleading, the plaintiff need only give the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
III. Discussion A. Standing The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs do not have standing to sue. “Standing ‘is the threshold question in every federal case, determining the power of the court to entertain the suit.’” CAMP Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 451 F.3d 1257, 1269 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)). “A plaintiff who invokes the jurisdiction of a federal court bears the burden to show ‘(1) an injury in fact, meaning an injury that is concrete and particularized, and actual or

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imminent, (2) a causal connection between the injury and the causal conduct, and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.’” Id. (quoting Granite State Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 351 F.3d 1112, 1116 (11th Cir. 2003)). Further, “[a] plaintiff who challenges a statute must demonstrate a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute’s operation or enforcement.” Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979). The Plaintiff need not “first expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled to challenge [the] statute that he claims deters the exercise of his constitutional rights.” Id. (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974)). However, “persons having no fears of state prosecution except those that are imaginary or speculative, are not to be accepted as appropriate plaintiffs.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42 (1971). “[W]hen lack of standing is raised in a motion to dismiss, the issue is properly resolved by reference to the allegations of the complaint.” Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1336 (11th Cir. 1994).
1. The Individual Plaintiffs The Defendants claim that the individual Plaintiffs do not have standing because the Plaintiffs’ injuries are too speculative. In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), the plaintiff sued to enjoin the use of chokeholds by California police officers. The plaintiff argued that he faced a realistic danger of being choked

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by police officers in the future. The defendants argued that the plaintiff lacked standing because his potential injury was too speculative. The United States Supreme Court agreed, reasoning that “[i]n order to establish an actual controversy in this case, [the plaintiff] would have had not only to allege that he would have another encounter with the police but also to make the incredible assertion either, (1) that all police officers in Los Angeles always choke any citizen with whom they happen to have an encounter, whether for the purpose of arrest, issuing a citation or for questioning or, (2) that the City ordered or authorized police officers to act in such manner.” Id. at 105-106. The Court further noted that “assuming that [the plaintiff] would again be stopped for a traffic or other violation in the reasonably near future, it is untenable to assert . . . that strangleholds are applied by the Los Angeles police to every citizen who is stopped or arrested regardless of the conduct of the person stopped.” Id. at 108. Thus, “the ‘odds,’ that Lyons would not only again be stopped for a traffic violation but would also be subjected to a chokehold without any provocation whatsoever” were not sufficiently high to support equitable relief. Id. at 108. See also Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 382-83 (1976) (no standing where plaintiff alleged possibility of future harm from unconstitutional acts of small, unnamed minority of policemen).

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By contrast, in Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1336 (11th Cir. 1994), homeless plaintiffs sued to enjoin the defendant from arresting, harassing, or removing them from the city limits. The defendant argued that there was no realistic threat that the plaintiffs would be arrested or removed in the future. The court, however, held that the plaintiffs had standing to sue. Further, the court noted that, unlike in Lyons, the plaintiffs had alleged a “custom, practice and policy of arresting, harassing and otherwise interfering with homeless people for engaging in the ordinary and essential activities of daily life.” Id. at 1339.
Here, as in Church, HB87 represents a formal policy that the Plaintiffs allege is unconstitutional. See id. at 1339 (distinguishing Lyons on grounds that “plaintiffs have alleged that it is the custom, practice, and policy of the City to commit the constitutional deprivations of which they complain.”). For example, Jane Doe # 2 is in violation of federal civil immigration law, but has been given deferred status by the federal government. (See Compl. ¶ 58; Decl. of Jane Doe # 2, Doc. 29-5.) Nevertheless, Jane Doe #2 would be subject to investigation, detention, and potential arrest under Section 8 of HB87 because she does not have paperwork to establish her deferred federal status.4 Similarly, Plaintiff David Kennedy is an immigration

4There are other individual Plaintiffs who, like Jane Doe #2, claim potential injury under Section 8 of HB87. (See Ali-Beik Decl. ¶ 8.)

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attorney. (Kennedy Decl. ¶ 4; Doc. 29-6.) He regularly represents undocumented aliens. In the course of this representation, Kennedy meets with clients in his office and gives them rides. (Id.) Despite HB87’s exception for criminal attorneys, Kennedy may be subject to prosecution under Section 7 of HB87 for transporting or harboring illegal aliens in the course of his representation of them in civil matters. (See also Compl. ¶¶ 43-60.)
The Defendants stress, however, that local police must find probable cause of a separate criminal offense before investigating the Plaintiffs’ immigration status or charging a suspect under Section 7. This condition does not make the Plaintiffs’ injury unrealistic, however. See Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298 (plaintiff “must demonstrate a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute’s operation or enforcement.”). First, the Plaintiffs need not actually commit any criminal offense to trigger an immigration investigation under HB87. Rather, probable cause will suffice. Second, the Plaintiffs will be subject to such allegedly unconstitutional investigations based on probable cause that they committed any criminal violation, including (and perhaps most commonly) minor traffic violations.5 Significantly, probable cause to

5HB87 excludes violations of county and municipal law, regulation, and ordinance as a basis for an immigration status investigation. O.C.G.A. § 17-5100(a)(1).

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suspect transporting or harboring (Section 7) would justify interrogation and detention (Section 8).
Further, unlike Lyons, the Court may assume that police officers will investigate the Plaintiffs’ immigration status each time there is probable cause to believe the Plaintiffs have committed a crime. See Lyons, at 461 U.S. at 108 (“[A]ssuming that [the plaintiff] would again be stopped for a traffic or other violation in the reasonably near future, it is untenable to assert . . . that strangleholds are applied by the Los Angeles police to every citizen who is stopped or arrested regardless of the conduct of the person stopped.”). Unlike in Lyons, no attenuated series of events is required to provoke the allegedly unconstitutional conduct. Indeed, the underlying offense need not result in arrest and the suspect need not resist to trigger an investigation. Section 8 will convert many routine encounters with law enforcement into lengthy and intrusive immigration status investigations. Thus, the individual Plaintiffs have shown a realistic threat of injury as a result of HB87.
2. The Plaintiff Organizations The Defendants also argue that the Plaintiff organizations lack standing. An organization may have standing in its own right or based on the rights of its members. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975). To sue in its own right, the Court must consider whether the Plaintiffs have “‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome

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of the controversy’ as to warrant [their] invocation of federal-court jurisdiction.” Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378-79 (1982) (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261 (1977)). The organization may establish such an interest by showing that the challenged statute would cause it to “divert resources from its regular activities.” Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340, 1350 (11th Cir. 2009). In Billups, the plaintiffs challenged a statute requiring voters to present photo identification. The organizational plaintiff alleged that it had traditionally directed resources toward voter registration. The challenged statute, however, would force it to “divert resources from its regular activities to educate and assist voters in complying with the statute that requires photo identification.” Id.; see also Havens, 455 U.S. at 379 (organization had standing where defendants’ racial steering practices frustrated plaintiff’s efforts and forced plaintiff to “devote significant resources to identify and counteract” the defendants’ actions.).
Here, the Plaintiff organizations have alleged that HB87 will cause them to “divert resources from [their] regular activities to educate and assist” members in complying with the new law. Billups, 554 F.3d at 1350. Indeed, the Coalition of Latino Leaders (“CLL”) traditionally provides “citizenship classes; English-language classes; Homework Club for children whose parents do not speak English; computer

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classes; and assistance in completing applications for legal residency and naturalization.” (Compl. ¶ 36.) Since the passage of HB87, CLL has received 400 percent more calls per day. (Id. ¶ 37.) CLL has already been forced to cancel its citizenship classes to respond to questions about HB87. (Id.) There is a realistic danger that this trend will worsen when HB87 takes effect.
Similarly, Plaintiff Task Force for the Homeless (“TFH”) traditionally encourages people to apply for food stamps and public housing. (Id. ¶ 32.) TFH has already “diverted resources from other organizational priorities to educate its volunteers and residents about the law.” (Id. ¶ 30.) If HB87 takes effect, “TFH will be overburdened by requests from residents for help with overcoming problems caused by [HB87’s] new document requirements” and related criminal penalties. (Id. ¶ 32.) Thus, the Plaintiff organizations have sufficiently alleged that HB87 will cause them to divert resources from regular activities. For this reason, the Plaintiff organizations have standing to sue in their own right.6

6The Plaintiff organizations may also have standing to assert the rights of their members. Having found that the organizations have standing in their own right, however, the Court will not address this issue.

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B. Jurisdiction The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs have not properly stated a preemption claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.7 To establish a claim under § 1983, “the plaintiff must assert the violation of a federal right.” Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989). Further, “even when the plaintiff has asserted a federal right, the defendant may show that Congress ‘specifically foreclosed a remedy under § 1983.’” Id. (quoting Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1005 n.9 (1984)). The Supremacy Clause “is not a source of any federal rights,” and thus cannot support § 1983 liability. Id. Nevertheless, a federal statute may create a right enforceable under § 1983. “In all cases, the availability of the § 1983 remedy turns on whether the statute, by its terms or as interpreted, creates obligations ‘sufficiently specific and definite’ to be within ‘the competence of the judiciary to enforce,’ is intended to benefit the putative plaintiff, and is not foreclosed ‘by express provision or other specific evidence from the statute itself.’” Id. (quoting Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 432 (1987)). The statutorily created right must be “unambiguously conferred.” Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 282 (2002).

7The Defendants do not assert that the Plaintiffs’ other constitutional claims cannot be brought under § 1983.

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In Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of Puerto Rico, 906 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1990), the plaintiffs brought a § 1983 action claiming that the Cable Act preempted a state obscenity statute. The court held that the Cable Act, while preempting state law, also created a right enforceable under § 1983. The First Circuit reasoned that “the protection from liability provided cable operators by [the Cable Act] for the content of leased access channel programming is an ‘immunity’ created by federal law and enforceable by the courts.” Id. at 32.
Here, Congress has adopted a comprehensive statutory framework regulating aliens and immigration. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. Determinations of legal residency can be legally and factually complex. The varieties of immigration statuses are numerous and include many categories of individuals who have technically violated the immigration law but who are nonetheless present in the United States with the permission of the United States government, as well as many people who are awaiting adjudication of their removability or claims to asylum or other relief from removal. Indeed, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 defines “special immigrants” who may be in violation of federal immigration law, but are authorized to be in the United States under federal law. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J).
For example, Jane Doe #2 is an unauthorized alien who has been given deferred status by the federal government. Like the plaintiffs in Playboy, she is entitled to

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“protection from liability provided [aliens] by” federal law. Similarly, “special immigrants,” as defined by § 1101, are entitled to the specific and definite protections provided by the Immigration and Naturalization Act. This protection “is an ‘immunity’ created by federal law and enforceable by the courts.” Playboy, 906 F.2d at 32. Thus, the Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., creates a right enforceable under § 1983. For this reason, the Court has jurisdiction over the individual Plaintiffs’ preemption claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
In addition, the United States Supreme Court has upheld federal jurisdiction over preemption claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 n.14 (1983); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of Puerto Rico, 906 F.2d 25, 29-30 (1st Cir. 1990) (exercising jurisdiction federal jurisdiction over claim that Puerto Rican criminal statute was preempted by federal regulatory law). In Shaw, the plaintiff airlines argued that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act preempted two New York laws. The Court found that it had jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs’ preemption challenge. The Court noted “[i]t is beyond dispute that federal courts have jurisdiction over suits to enjoin state officials from interfering with federal rights.” Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96 n.14 (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 160-162 (1908)). “A plaintiff who seeks injunctive relief from state regulation, on the ground that such regulation is pre-empted by a federal statute which, by virtue of the

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Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, must prevail, thus presents a federal question which the federal courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to resolve.” Id. Here, the Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief from HB87, “on the ground that such regulation is pre-empted by a federal statute.”8 Id. Thus, the Court has jurisdiction of the Plaintiffs’ preemption claims under § 1331.
C. Preemption The Plaintiffs argue that HB87 is unconstitutional because it violates the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Federal law preempts state law in two circumstances. First, “[w]hen Congress intends federal law to ‘occupy the field,’ state law in that area is preempted.” Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000) (quoting California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100 (1989)). Second, “even if Congress has not occupied the field, state law is naturally preempted to the extent of any conflict with a federal statute.” Id. Conflict preemption, in turn, occurs “where it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal law . . . [or] where ‘under the circumstances of [a] particular case, [the challenged state law] stands as an obstacle

8The Defendants recognize that courts have exercised federal jurisdiction over preemption claims, but dispute the wisdom and clarity of such decisions. (See Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, at 28 n.4.) Regardless of any inconsistencies in this line of precedent, the Court is bound by Ex parte Young and Shaw.

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to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of

Congress.’” Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). Finally, the

preemption analysis “must be guided by two cornerstones.” Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S.

Ct. 1187, 1194 (2009). “First, ‘the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in

every pre-emption case.’” Id. (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485

(1996)). Second, where “Congress has ‘legislated ... in a field which the States have

traditionally occupied,’” there is a presumption against preemption without clear

Congressional intent. Id.

Seventy years ago the United States Supreme Court declared that the federal

government had the exclusive right to legislate in the general field of foreign affairs,

including power over immigration, naturalization and deportation. Hines v.

Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941):

When the national government by treaty or statute has established rules and regulations touching the rights, privileges, obligations or burdens of aliens as such, the treaty or statute is the supreme law of the land. No state can add to or take from the force and effect of such treaty or statute, for Article VI of the Constitution provides that ‘This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.’ The Federal Government, representing as it does the collective interests of the ... states, is entrusted with full and exclusive responsibility for the conduct of affairs with foreign sovereignties. ‘For local interests the several states of the Union exist, but for national purposes, embracing our relations

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with foreign nations, we are but one people, one nation, one power.’ Our system of government is such that the interest of the cities, counties and states, no less than the interest of the people of the whole nation, imperatively requires that federal power in the field affecting foreign relations be left entirely free from local interference.

Id. at 62-63(footnotes deleted). In striking down a state alien registration law, the

Court emphasized the close connection between foreign relations and regulation of

immigration:

One of the most important and delicate of all international relationships, recognized immemorially as a responsibility of government, has to do with the protection of the just rights of a country's own nationals when those nationals are in another country. Experience has shown that international controversies of the gravest moment, sometimes even leading to war, may arise from real or imagined wrongs to another's subjects inflicted, or permitted, by a government. This country, like other nations, has entered into numerous treaties of amity and commerce since its inception-treaties entered into under express constitutional authority, and binding upon the states as well as the nation. Among those treaties have been many which not only promised and guaranteed broad rights and privileges to aliens sojourning in our own territory, but secured reciprocal promises and guarantees for our own citizens while in other lands. And apart from treaty obligations, there has grown up in the field of international relations a body of customs defining with more or less certainty the duties owing by all nations to alien residents-duties which our State Department has often successfully insisted foreign nations must recognize as to our nationals abroad. In general, both treaties and international practices have been aimed at preventing injurious discriminations against aliens. Concerning such treaties, this Court has said: ‘While treaties, in safeguarding important rights in the interest of reciprocal beneficial relations, may by their express terms afford a measure of protection to aliens which citizens of one or both of the parties may not be able to demand against their own government, the general purpose of treaties of amity and commerce is to avoid injurious discrimination in either country against the citizens of the other.’

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Id. at 64-65. Accordingly, the states are not permitted to subject aliens to burdens that
are unique to them:
Legal imposition of distinct, unusual and extraordinary burdens and obligations upon aliens-such as subjecting them alone, though perfectly law-abiding, to indiscriminate and repeated interception and interrogation by public officials-thus bears an inseparable relationship to the welfare and tranquillity of all the states, and not merely to the welfare and tranquillity of one. Laws imposing such burdens are not mere census requirements, and even though they may be immediately associated with the accomplishment of a local purpose, they provoke questions in the field of international affairs. And specialized regulation of the conduct of an alien before naturalization is a matter which Congress must consider in discharging its constitutional duty ‘To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization * * *.’ It cannot be doubted that both the state and the federal registration laws belong ‘to that class of laws which concern the exterior relation of this whole nation with other nations and governments.’ Consequently the regulation of aliens is so intimately blended and intertwined with responsibilities of the national government that where it acts, and the state also acts on the same subject, ‘the act of congress, or the treaty, is supreme; and the law of the state, though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to it.’ And where the federal government, in the exercise of its superior authority in this field, has enacted a complete scheme of regulation and has therein provided a standard for the registration of aliens, states cannot, inconsistently with the purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail or complement, the federal law, or enforce additional or auxiliary regulations.
Id. at 66-67. That remains the law of the land.
1. Section 8
The Plaintiffs argue that Section 8 of HB87 conflicts with federal immigration
law. Section 8 provides that “when [an] officer has probable cause to believe that a

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suspect has committed a criminal violation, the officer shall be authorized to seek to verify such suspect’s immigration status when the suspect is unable to provide one of” five specified identity documents. O.C.G.A. § 17-5-100(b). Officers are “authorized to use any reasonable means available to determine the immigration status of the suspect.” O.C.G.A. § 17-5-100(c). There are no time limits on the immigration status investigations. Further, where state officers determine that a suspect is an illegal alien, Section 8 authorizes officers to “take any action authorized by state and federal law, including, but not limited to detaining such suspected illegal alien, securely transporting such suspect to any authorized federal or state detention facility.” See O.C.G.A. 17-5-100(e).
First, mere presence in this country without authorization is not a federal crime. Enforcement of civil immigration offenses is not “a field which the States have traditionally occupied.” Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1194. Thus, the Court will not apply a presumption against preemption. Federal law authorizes the Attorney General of the United States to enter into written agreements with states “pursuant to which an officer or employee of the State . . . who is determined by the Attorney General to be qualified” to enforce federal civil immigration laws may do so. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1). Further, 8 U.S.C. § 1103 provides that in the event of a mass influx of illegal aliens, “the Attorney General may authorize any State or local law enforcement

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officer . . . to perform or exercise any of the powers, privileges, or duties” of federal immigration officers. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(10).
8 U.S.C. § 1252c does not contradict § 1357 or § 1103. Rather, § 1252c authorizes state and local law enforcement to arrest an illegal alien who “has previously been convicted of a felony in the United States and deported or left the United States after such conviction, but only after the State or local law enforcement officials obtain appropriate confirmation from the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the status of such individual.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252c.9 The statute does not authorize local law enforcement to detain individuals for mere illegal presence in the United States. Rather “local law enforcement officers cannot enforce completed violations of civil immigration law (i.e., illegal presence) unless specifically authorized to do so by the Attorney General under special conditions.” United States v. Urrieta, 520 F.3d 569, 574 (6th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Arizona, No. 10-16645, 2011 WL 1346945, at *17 (9th Cir. April 11, 2011) (finding that § 1252c did not authorize local officers to enforce civil immigration law).

9As discussed in the Court’s analysis of Section 7, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(c) authorizes federal and state officers to make arrests “for a violation of any provision of this section.” 8 U.S.C. § 1324(c). 8 U.S.C. § 1324, however, does not criminalize the civil offense of being in the United States illegally. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (criminalizing transporting and harboring illegal alien or bringing an illegal alien into United States).

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In United States v. Arizona, the United States brought an action to enjoin a state law similar to the one at issue here. The Arizona law provided that where officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that a suspect who had been lawfully detained was an unauthorized immigrant, they “‘shall’ make ‘a reasonable attempt ... when practicable, to determine the immigration status’ of that person.” United States v. Arizona, 2011 WL 1346945, at *3 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B)). The Ninth Circuit held that the law was preempted by 8 U.S.C. § 1357. The court reasoned that “Congress intended for state officers to systematically aid in immigration enforcement only under the close supervision of the Attorney General—to whom Congress granted discretion in determining the precise conditions and direction of each state officer’s assistance.” Id. at *6. Further, the court noted that “[b]y imposing mandatory obligations on state and local officers, Arizona interferes with the federal government’s authority to implement its priorities and strategies in law enforcement, turning Arizona officers into state-directed DHS agents.” Id. at *8.
Here, Section 8 of HB87 authorizes local law enforcement officers to investigate a suspect’s illegal immigration status and, if the officer determines the suspect has violated federal immigration law, detain and arrest the suspect without a warrant. O.C.G.A. § 17-5-100. Congress, however, has already addressed the circumstances in which local law enforcement personnel may enforce federal civil

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immigration law. 8 U.S.C. § 1357 and § 1103 clearly express Congressional intent that the Attorney General should designate state and local agents authorized to enforce immigration law. Indeed, Congress has provided that local officers may enforce civil immigration offenses only where the Attorney General has entered into a written agreement with a state, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1), or where the Attorney General has expressly authorized local officers in the event of a mass influx of aliens. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(10). See United States v. Arizona, 2011 WL 1346945, at *6 (“8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) demonstrates that Congress intended for state officers to systematically aid in immigration enforcement only under the close supervision of the Attorney General.”).
Thus, Congress has established a system providing Executive Branch discretion to establish “immigration enforcement priorities and strategies.” United States v. Arizona, 2011 WL 1346945, at *8; see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 226 (1982) (with respect to federal discretion in immigration enforcement, Court noted that “there is no assurance that a[n] [illegal alien] subject to deportation will ever be deported. An illegal entrant might be granted federal permission to continue to reside in this country, or even to become a citizen.”). HB87 transfers this discretion to local law enforcement. Indeed, Section 8 provides local law enforcement significant discretion to develop its own enforcement priorities and strategies. First, after finding probable

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cause to believe that a suspect has committed a crime, local officers are “authorized,” but not required, “to seek to verify [a] suspect’s immigration status.” O.C.G.A. § 175-100(b). This will undermine federal immigration enforcement priorities by vastly increasing the number of immigration queries to the federal government from Georgia. Second, during the investigation, the officer is “authorized to use any reasonable means available to determine the immigration status of the suspect.” O.C.G.A. § 17-5-100(c). Finally, if, after investigation, the officer “receives verification” that the suspect is an illegal alien, the officer “may take any action authorized by state and federal law.” O.C.G.A. § 17-5-100(e) (emphasis added). Thus, HB87 gives local officers discretion in determining whether to initiate an investigation, what “reasonable means” to take during an investigation, and how to proceed at the conclusion of the investigation if the suspect is confirmed to be an illegal alien. Such discretion poses a serious risk that HB87 will result in inconsistent civil immigration policies not only between federal and state governments, but among law enforcement jurisdictions within Georgia.10 That risk is compounded by the threat of other states creating their own immigration laws. See United States v. Arizona, 2011 WL 1346945, at *10; Wisconsin Dep’t of Indus., Labor and Human Relations

10This concern may be a reason Congress chose to craft such specific statutes governing the Attorney General’s supervision of local law enforcement.

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v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 288-289 (1986) (“Each additional statute incrementally diminishes the [federal government’s] control over enforcement of the [federal statute] and thus further detracts from the ‘integrated scheme of regulation’ created by Congress.”).
The Defendants argue, however, that Section 8 “does not criminalize any activity . . . that isn’t already criminal under federal statute.” (Defs.’ Br. in Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Injunction, at 17.) Rather, the Defendants contend, “it creates a mechanism by which the crime could be prosecuted at a local level.” (Id.)11 That mechanism, however, conflicts with federal law. Not only has Congress legislated the contours of civil immigration law, but it has also legislated a mechanism by which state and local officers may enforce those offenses. HB 87 is state regulation of immigration. Section 8 attempts an end-run–not around federal criminal law–but around federal statutes defining the role of state and local officers in immigration enforcement.
Conflict between state and federal law is especially acute where, as here, the “legislation is in a field which affects international relations, the one aspect of our government that from the first has been most generally conceded imperatively to

11The Declaration of Lewis Smith (attached for convenience as Appendix A) outlines the problems that rural, small town Georgia law enforcement officers will have in trying to enforce Section 8.

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demand broad national authority.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 68 (1941). Indeed, both the United States government and several foreign nations have expressed concern about the international relations impact of HB87. In reference to HB87, the President of the United States stated that “[i]t is a mistake for states to try to do this piecemeal. We can’t have 50 different immigration laws around the country.” (Lauterback Decl., Ex. A, Doc. 29-29.) Mexico has also filed an amicus brief registering its concern that HB87 will impede bilateral negotiations, hinder trade and tourism, and damage diplomatic relations between the United States and Mexico [See Doc. 50]. These international relations concerns underscore the conflict between HB87 and federal immigration law. The conflict is not a purely speculative and indirect impact on immigration. It is direct and immediate.
Ultimately, Section 8 circumvents Congress’ intention to allow the Attorney General to authorize and designate local law enforcement officers to enforce civil immigration law. The statute thus “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373 (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 67). For this reason, the Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their preemption claim with respect to Section 8.
2. Section 7

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Section 7 of HB87 creates three criminal violations: (1) transporting or moving an illegal alien in a motor vehicle, O.C.G.A. 16-11-200(b); (2) concealing, harboring or shielding an illegal alien from detection, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-201(b); and (3) inducing, enticing, or assisting an illegal alien to enter Georgia, O.C.G.A. § 16-11202(b). All three crimes require knowledge that the person being transported, harbored, or enticed is an illegal alien. Also, all three sections require that the defendant be engaged in another criminal offense.12 The Defendants’ claim that the new criminal statutes will prevent exploitation of illegal aliens is gross hypocrisy. The apparent legislative intent is to create such a climate of hostility, fear, mistrust and insecurity that all illegal aliens will leave Georgia.
The Plaintiffs contend that Section 7 is preempted by 8 U.S.C. § 1324. That statute provides criminal penalties for bringing an alien into the United States, transporting an alien within the United States, concealing, harboring or shielding an alien from detection, or encouraging or inducing an alien to enter or reside in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A).
In De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976), the United States Supreme Court considered whether federal law preempted a state statute that assessed civil fines

12It appears that violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324, discussed below, would be “another criminal offense” under Section 7.

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against businesses employing unauthorized aliens. The Court held that the state law was not preempted, reasoning that although the “[p]ower to regulate immigration is unquestionably . . . a federal power,” id. at 354, “States possess broad authority under their police powers to regulate the employment relationship to protect workers within the State.” Id. at 356. Further, the Court noted that the federal government had, at the time,13 expressed only “a peripheral concern with [the] employment of illegal entrants.” Id. at 360.
In Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011), the Court revisited a state law regulating the employment of illegal aliens. In Whiting, the plaintiff argued that federal law preempted an Arizona statute providing for suspension and revocation of business licenses for entities employing unauthorized aliens. The statute also required employers to verify employees’ immigration status using an online database. The plaintiff argued that the Arizona law was preempted by 8 U.S.C. § 1324a, which expressly preempts “any State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens.” 8 U.S.C.

13Ten years after De Canas, Congress expressed a clear interest in the employment of illegal aliens by passing 8 U.S.C. § 1324a. That statute makes it “unlawful for a person or other entity . . . to hire, or to recruit or refer for a fee, for employment in the United States an alien knowing the alien is an unauthorized alien.” 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a).

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§ 1324a(h)(2) (emphasis added). The plaintiff argued that Congress intended for this federal system to be exclusive. The Court, however, held that the Arizona statute was not preempted, reasoning that “Arizona’s procedures simply implement the sanctions that Congress expressly allowed the States to pursue through licensing laws.” Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1971. Indeed, “[g]iven that Congress specifically preserved such authority for the States, it stands to reason that Congress did not intend to prevent the States from using appropriate tools to exercise that authority.” Id. Finally, the Court noted that Arizona acted in an area of traditional state concern, finding that “[r]egulating in-state businesses through licensing laws is not” an area of exclusive federal interest. Id.
By contrast, in Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941), the plaintiffs challenged a Pennsylvania law that required aliens to obtain and carry alien identification cards. The United States Supreme Court held that the state law was preempted by federal immigration law. The Court reasoned that “where the federal government, in the exercise of its superior authority in [the immigration] field, has enacted a complete scheme of regulation . . . states cannot, inconsistently with the purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail or complement, the federal law, or enforce additional or auxiliary regulations.” Id. at 66-67. The Court further noted that given the international relations implications, “[a]ny concurrent state power that

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may exist is restricted to the narrowest of limits; the state’s power here is not bottomed on the same broad base as is its power to tax.” Id. at 68.
First, the Defendants argue that Section 7 simply reinforces § 1324’s parallel provisions. Despite superficial similarities, however, Section 7 is not identical to § 1324. See Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1982 (noting that state law traces federal law). For example, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-202 prohibits knowingly inducing, enticing or assisting illegal aliens to enter Georgia. Section 1324’s corresponding “inducement” provision prohibits inducing an alien to “come to, enter, or reside in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1324. Once in the United States, it is not a federal crime to induce an illegal alien to enter Georgia from another state.
Similarly, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-201 defines “harboring” as “any conduct that tends to substantially help an illegal alien to remain in the United States in violation of federal law,” subject to several exceptions. Under § 1324, federal courts have also discussed the bounds of “harboring,” developing a significantly different definition. See Hall v. Thomas, 753 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1158 (N.D. Ala. 2010) (“The plain language reading of ‘harbor’ to require provision of shelter or refuge, or the taking of active steps to prevent authorities from discovering that the employee is unauthorized or illegally remaining in the country, should control.”); United States v. Kim, 193 F.3d 567, 573-74 (2d Cir. 1999) (harboring defined as “conduct tending substantially to

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facilitate an alien’s remaining in the United States illegally and to prevent government authorities from detecting his unlawful presence.”); Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1298-99 (11th Cir. 2010) (discussing whether hiring illegal alien constituted harboring under § 1324). The Defendants wildly exaggerate the scope of the federal crime of harboring under § 1324 when they claim that the Plaintiffs are violating federal immigration law by giving rides to their friends and neighbors who are illegal aliens. This is a good reason to require federal supervision of any attempts by Georgia to enforce federal immigration law.
Still, the Defendants contend that HB87 does not create new crimes, but rather “creates a mechanism by which [immigration crimes] could be prosecuted at a local level.” (Defs.’ Br. in Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Injunction, at 17.) No doubt the Defendants believe such a mechanism is necessary. Indeed, the Defendants assert that “every day that passes with passive enforcement of the federal law is a day that drains the state coffers.” (Id. at 14.) In response to this concern, Section 7 creates a state system for prosecuting and interpreting immigration law, just as Section 8 creates a state system for policing civil immigration offenses. Under Section 7, state agents will exercise prosecutorial discretion. Decisions about when to charge a person or what penalty to seek for illegal immigration will no longer be under the control of the federal government. Similarly, Georgia judges will interpret Section 7’s provisions,

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unconstrained by the line of federal precedent mentioned above. Thus, although Section 7 appears superficially similar to § 1324, state prosecutorial discretion and judicial interpretation will undermine federal authority “to establish immigration enforcement priorities and strategies.” United States v. Arizona, 2011 WL 1346945, at *8.
The widespread belief that the federal government is doing nothing about illegal immigration is the belief in a myth. Although the Defendants characterize federal enforcement as “passive,” that assertion has no basis in fact. On an average day, Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers arrest approximately 816 aliens for administrative immigration violations and remove approximately 912 aliens, including 456 criminal aliens, from the United States. (Declaration of Daniel H. Ragsdale ¶ 5) (Attached for convenience as Appendix B). In 2010, immigration offenses were prosecuted in federal court more than any other offense. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION–2010 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 11-12 (2010). Of the 83,946 cases prosecuted under the federal sentencing guidelines, 28,504, or 34% involved immigration offenses. Id. In 2010, of 81,304 criminal cases prosecuted in federal court, 38,619 (47.5%) were non-United States citizens. It is true that there are thousands of illegal immigrants in Georgia that are here because of the insatiable demand in decades gone by for cheap labor in agriculture and certain industries such

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as construction and poultry processing. The federal government gives priority to prosecuting and removing illegal immigrants that are committing crimes in this country and to those who have previously been deported for serious criminal offenses such as drug trafficking and crimes of violence. (Declaration of Daniel H. Ragsdale ¶¶ 16-28.) To the extent that federal officers and prosecutors have priorities that differ from those of local prosecutors, those priorities are part of the flexibility that “is a critical component of the statutory and regulatory framework” under which the federal government pursues the difficult (and often competing) objectives, of “protecting national security, protecting public safety, and securing the border.” United States v. Arizona, 2011 WL 1346945, at *8.
Further, whereas the Arizona statute in Whiting imposed licensing laws specifically authorized by a statutory savings clause, HB87 imposes additional criminal laws on top of a comprehensive federal scheme that includes no such carve out for state regulation. See Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1981 (noting that Congress “specifically preserved” states’ authority to enact licensing laws). Finally, unlike in De Canas and Whiting, HB87 does not address an area traditionally subject to state regulation. See Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1971; De Canas, 424 U.S. at 356 (“[T]o prohibit the knowing employment by California employers of persons not entitled to lawful residence in the United States, let alone to work here, is certainly within the

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mainstream of such police power regulation.”). Rather, unlike concurrent state and federal regulations in other areas, the movement of unauthorized aliens is not a traditional area of state regulation. Thus, “[a]ny concurrent state power that may exist is restricted to the narrowest of limits; the state’s power here is not bottomed on the same broad base as is its power to tax.” Id. at 68. Indeed, the same international relations concerns mentioned with respect to Section 8 apply equally to Section 7 [see Doc. 50]. Thus, “where the federal government, in the exercise of its superior authority in [the immigration] field, has enacted a complete scheme of regulation . . . states cannot, inconsistently with the purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail or complement, the federal law, or enforce additional or auxiliary regulations.” Hines, 312 U.S. at 66-67 (emphasis added).
Unlike De Canas, Congress has expressed much more than “peripheral concern” with the transportation, harboring, and inducement of illegal aliens. See De Canas at 424 U.S. at 360. That concern is expressed in the text of § 1324. Section 7 seeks not only to replace and complement the text of § 1324 with its own criminal provisions, but to replace the discretionary and interpretive mechanisms of the federal government as well. For these reasons, the Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on the merits as to their claim that Section 7 of HB87 is preempted.

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D. Fourth Amendment The Plaintiffs assert that Section 8 of HB87 violates the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. As discussed above, Section 8 authorizes state and local police officers to check the immigration status of suspects where there is probable cause that the suspect has committed another crime. O.C.G.A. § 17-5-100. Initially, the Court notes that this is a facial challenge to HB87. “Facial challenges are disfavored” in the law. Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008). “[A] plaintiff can only succeed in a facial challenge by ‘establish[ing] that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid,’ i.e., that the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications.” Id. at 449 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). “In determining whether a law is facially invalid, [the Court] must be careful not to go beyond the statute’s facial requirements and speculate about ‘hypothetical’ or ‘imaginary’ cases.” Id. at 449-50. In Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005), police detained the plaintiff during a search of her home. While detained during the search, the officers interrogated the plaintiff regarding her immigration status. The Court held that the interrogation did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Noting that “mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure,” id. at 101, the Court reasoned that no reasonable suspicion was

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required because the questioning did not prolong the plaintiff’s detention. Importantly, the Court “noted that a lawful seizure ‘can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission.’” Id. (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)); see also United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274, 1277 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Holloman, 113 F.3d 192, 196 (11th Cir. 1997)) (“The traffic stop may not last ‘any longer than necessary to process the traffic violation’ unless there is articulable suspicion of other illegal activity.”).
Here, the Plaintiffs contend that Section 8 allows for seizures without probable cause while officers investigate a suspect’s immigration status. The Plaintiffs suggest that such investigations could take between 80 minutes and two days. Where, after processing a minor violation, police detain a suspect without probable cause while investigating the suspect’s immigration status, a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred. See Holloman, 113 F.3d at 196. Where, however, the officer conducts the immigration investigation while the suspect is lawfully detained based on probable cause, the Fourth Amendment is not violated. See Muehler, 544 U.S. at 101 (finding no Fourth Amendment violation where police engaged in immigration investigation without reasonable suspicion while suspect was lawfully detained). Indeed, there are many “circumstances . . . under which the [HB87] would be valid,” Washington, 552

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U.S. at 449 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)), including circumstances in which officers arrest a suspect based on probable cause and investigate the suspect’s immigration status while in custody. The scenarios posed by the Plaintiffs, although unconstitutional, are also “hypothetical” and “imaginary.” Id. at 450. “The State has had no opportunity to implement [HB87], and its courts have had no occasion to construe the law in the context of actual disputes . . . or to accord the law a limiting construction to avoid constitutional questions.” Id. For these reasons, the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim is granted.
E. Right to Travel The Plaintiffs argue that HB87 violates the constitutional right to travel. The right to travel is grounded in the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution. See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 169 (1941); U.S. CONST. art IV, § 2, cl. 1. “A state law implicates the right to travel when it actually deters such travel, when impeding travel is its primary objective, or when it uses any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right.” Attorney Gen. of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 903 (1986) (citations omitted). The Plaintiffs contend that HB87 violates the right to travel because Georgia does not accept driver’s licenses issued by states that do not require confirmation of

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legal residence as proof of immigration status. Thus, Plaintiffs assert, that HB87 “facially discriminates against certain out-of-state drivers by denying them a presumption enjoyed by drivers from all other states.” (Pls.’ Br. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, at 39.) HB87, however, does not facially discriminate against drivers from any particular state. HB87’s distinction is clearly related to investigating immigration status. Driver’s licenses issued by states that do not confirm legal presence in the United States have no bearing on immigration status. Georgia has not violated the Constitution by refusing to accept documents that have nothing to do with immigration status as proof of legal immigration status. Indeed, the federal government does not accept such driver’s licenses as proof of citizenship. See 42 C.F.R. § 435.407(4). Further, residents of states that do not confirm immigration status can produce any of the other forms of identification listed in O.C.G.A. § 17-5100. Thus, HB87 is clearly related to the state’s interest in confirming immigration status and does not “penalize the exercise” of the right to travel. For these reasons, the Plaintiffs’ right to travel claim is dismissed.
F. Fourteenth Amendment The Plaintiffs argue that HB87 violates the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
1. Equal Protection

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The Equal Protection Clause “prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). Where the law is facially neutral, the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit laws that impact one race more than another. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 324 n.26 (1980) (quoting Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (“when a facially neutral federal statute is challenged on equal protection grounds, it is incumbent upon the challenger to prove that Congress ‘selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.’”)); see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976) (requiring discriminatory purpose to challenge facially neutral statute that has disparate impact on protected class).
Here, the Plaintiffs do not contend that HB87 was motivated by racial discrimination. (Pls.’ Br. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, at 40.) Rather, the Plaintiffs contend that HB87 restricts access to government services on the basis of national origin because Section 19 excludes consular identification cards from the definition of “secure and verifiable” documents. See O.C.G.A. § 50-36-2(b)(3). Although some countries issue consular identification cards, HB87 does not facially

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discriminate against citizens of those countries.14 The Plaintiffs must therefore show not only that Section 19 has an adverse effect on foreign nationals, but that the Defendants “selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” (Harris, 448 U.S. at 324 n.26 (quoting Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279)). The Plaintiffs have not alleged facts showing that the Defendants did so here. For these reasons, the Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim is dismissed.
2. Due Process The Plaintiffs claim that HB87 violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, the Plaintiffs contend that Section 19 of HB87 denies them the right to use Consular Identification Documents for any official purpose. This, the Plaintiffs claim, deprives them of a property interest protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. Property interests, however, are not created by the United States Constitution. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). Rather, property rights “are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.” Id. Here,

14Georgia’s Attorney General, however, has yet to determine what documents will be considered “secure and verifiable.” The Plaintiffs seem to argue that citizens from countries that issue consular identification cards will be unlikely to have another form of “secure and verifiable” identification.

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the Plaintiffs note that they regularly use Consular Identification Documents as a form of identification. (See Pls.’ Br. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, at 42.) The Plaintiffs do not, however, cite any state law that creates a property interest in using Consular Identification Documents as official forms of identification. See Cheek v. Gooch, 779 F.2d 1507, 1508 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding no due process violation where state law did not grant property interest in opportunity to acquire liquor license). The Plaintiffs cannot create a constitutionally protected property interest simply by showing that they have used Consular Identification Documents in the past. For these reasons, the Plaintiffs’ due process claim is dismissed.
G. Georgia Constitution The Plaintiffs have withdrawn their claim that Section 19 of HB87 violates the Georgia Constitution. (Defs.’ Br. in Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. to Dismiss, at 45.) For this reason, the Plaintiffs’ state constitutional claim is dismissed. H. Deal and Olens The Defendants contend that Governor Nathan Deal and Attorney General Sam Olens are not proper parties. The Defendants admit, however, that “Governor Deal and Attorney General Olens, in their official capacities are the correct parties for the purpose of defending the constitutionality of the Statute under the Federal Constitution.” (Defs.’ Br. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, at 54.) Further, under

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the Georgia Constitution, the Governor must “take care that the laws are faithfully executed and shall be the conservator of the peace.” GA. CONST. art. V, § 2, par. 2. Finally, the Attorney General has authority to initiate prosecutions under HB87. See O.C.G.A. § 45-15-35. For these reasons, the Governor and Attorney General are proper parties to this lawsuit.
I. Equitable Factors “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008). A preliminary injunction is especially appropriate where, as here, it would “preserve the status quo and prevent allegedly irreparable injury until the court had the opportunity to decide whether to issue a permanent injunction.” Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1261, 1262 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092, 1101 n.13 (11th Cir. 2004)). As discussed above, the Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their Supremacy Clause claim. The Court must therefore determine whether the Plaintiffs are likely to suffer irreparable harm. “[A]n alleged constitutional infringement will often alone constitute irreparable harm.” United States v. Arizona, 2011 WL

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1346945, at *19; see also KH Outdoor, LLC v. City of Trussville, 458 F.3d 1261, 1271-72 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (finding “[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”)). Here, the Plaintiffs will be subject to criminal penalties under laws that are allegedly preempted by federal law and the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. Thus, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs are likely to suffer irreparable injury.
Further, the balance of equities favors the Plaintiffs. First, an injunction will only slightly burden the state. Indeed, by merely preserving the status quo, an injunction will impose no new and onerous burdens on the Defendants. Also, the state’s interest in preserving its resources is not determinative. Although HB87 may prevent some unauthorized aliens from obtaining state benefits, it will not completely stem the tide unless it has the effect of driving all non citizens (along with many citizen family members) from Georgia. By contrast, as discussed above, the Plaintiffs face irreparable injury if HB87 takes effect.
Finally, the public interest weighs in favor of issuing a preliminary injunction. Where civil rights are at stake, an injunction “protect[s] the public interest by protecting those rights to which it too is entitled.” National Abortion Fed’n v. Metro Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 112 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1328 (N.D. Ga. 2000). Further,

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“the public, when the state is a party asserting harm, has no interest in enforcing an unconstitutional law.” Scott v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279, 1297 (11th Cir. 2010). For these reasons, the Court finds that a preliminary injunction is proper. The enforcement of Sections 7 and 8 of HB87 is preliminarily enjoined. State and local law enforcement officers and officials have no authorization to arrest, detain or prosecute anyone based upon Sections 7 and 8 of HB87 while this injunction remains in effect.
IV. Conclusion For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction [Doc. 29] and GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 47]. SO ORDERED, this 27 day of June, 2011.
/s/Thomas W. Thrash THOMAS W. THRASH, JR. United States District Judge

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Appendix A

CCaassee 11::1111--ccvv--0011880044--TTWWTT DDooccuummeenntt 2993-15FileFdile0d6/0267//0181/11PagPeag4e7 2ofo7f 99

CCaassee 11::1111--ccvv--0011880044--TTWWTT DDooccuummeenntt 2993-15FileFdile0d6/0267//0181/11PagPeag4e8 3ofo7f 99

CCaassee 11::1111--ccvv--0011880044--TTWWTT DDooccuummeenntt 2993-15FileFdile0d6/0267//0181/11PagPeag4e9 4ofo7f 99

CCaassee 11::1111--ccvv--0011880044--TTWWTT DDooccuummeenntt 2993-15FileFdile0d6/0267//0181/11PagPeag5e0 5ofo7f 99

CCaassee 11::1111--ccvv--0011880044--TTWWTT DDooccuummeenntt 2993-15FileFdile0d6/0267//0181/11PagPeag5e1 6ofo7f 99

CCaassee 11::1111--ccvv--0011880044--TTWWTT DDooccuummeenntt 2993-15FileFdile0d6/0267//0181/11PagPeag5e2 7ofo7f 99

CCaassee 11::1111--ccvv--0011880044--TTWWTT DDooccuummeenntt 2993-15FileFdile0d6/0267//0181/11PagPeag5e3 8ofo7f 99

CCaassee 11::1111--ccvv--0011880044--TTWWTT DDooccuummeenntt 2993-15FileFdile0d6/0267//0181/11PagPeag5e4 9ofo7f 99

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Appendix B

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 


THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 Plaintiff,
v. THE STATE OF ARIZONA, et al.,
Defendants.

Civil Action No.

DECLARATION OF DANIEL H. RAGSDALE Pursuant to 28 U.S.c. § 1746, I, Daniel H. Ragsdale, declare and state as follows: 1. I am the Executive Associate Director for Management and Administration at U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) within the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). I have served in this position since January 2010. Before that, I served as a Senior Counselor to ICE's Assistant Secretary from November 2008 until October 2009, and, prior to that, as the Chief of the ICE Enforcement Law Division from October 2006 until November 2008. From September 1999 until September 2006, I served in several positions in ICE's Office of Chief Counsel in Phoenix, Arizona. I also was designated as a Special Assistant u.S. Attorney (SAUSA), which allowed me to prosecute immigration crimes. 2. Under the supervision of ICE's Assistant Secretary, I have direct managerial and supervisory authority over the management and administration of ICE. I am closely involved in the management of ICE's human and financial resources, matters of significance to the agency, and the day-to-day operations of the agency. I make this declaration based on personal

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knowledge of the subject matter acquired by me in the course of the performance of my official duties. Overview ofICE Programs
3. ICE consists of two core operational programs, Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO), which handles civil immigration enforcement, and Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), which handles criminal investigations. I am generally aware of the operational activities of all offices at ICE, and I am specifically aware oftheir activities as they affect and interface with the programs I directly supervise.
4. HSI houses the special agents who investigate criminal violations ofthe federal customs and immigration laws. HSI also primarily handles responses to calls from local and state law enforcement officers requesting assistance, including calls requesting that ICE transfer aliens into detention. However, because of the policy focus on devoting investigative resources towards the apprehension of criminal aliens, the responsibility of responding to state and local law enforcement is shared with, and is increasingly transitioning to, ERO to allow HSI special agents to focus more heavily on criminal investigations. On an average day in FY 2009, HSI special agents nationwide arrested 62 people for administrative immigration violations, 22 people for criminal immigration offenses, and 42 people for criminal customs offenses.
5. ERO is responsible for detaining and removing aliens who lack lawful authority to remain in the United States. On an average day, ERO officers nationwide arrest approximately 816 aliens for administrative immigration violations and remove approximately 912 aliens, including 456 criminal aliens, from the United States to countries around the globe. As of June 2, 2010, ICE had approximately 32,313 aliens in custody pending their removal proceedings or removal from the United States.
2 


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6. In addition to HSI and ERO, ICE has the Office of State and Local Coordination (OSLC) which focuses on outreach to state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies to build positive relationships with ICE. In addition, OSLC administers the 287(g) Program, through which ICE enters into agreements with state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies for those agencies to perform certain federal immigration enforcement functions under the supervision of federal officials. Each agreement is formalized through a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) and authorized pursuant to Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g).
7. Consistent with its policy of focusing enforcement efforts on criminal aliens, ICE created the Secure Communities program to improve, modernize, and prioritize ICE's efforts to identify and remove criminal aliens from the United States. Through the program, ICE has leveraged biometric information-sharing to ensure accurate and timely identification of criminal aliens in law enforcement custody. The program office arranges for willing jurisdictions to access the biometric technology so they can simultaneously check a person's criminal and immigration history when the person is booked on criminal charges. When an individual in custody is identified as being an alien, ICE must then determine how to proceed with respect to that alien, induding whether to lodge a detainer or otherwise pursue the alien's detention and removal from the United States upon the alien's release from criminal custody. ICE does not lodge detainers or otherwise pursue removal for every alien in custody, and has the discretion to decide whether lodging a detainer and / or pursuing removal reflects ICE's policy priorities.
3 


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ICE Initiatives andActivities in Arizona and at the Southwest Border 8. ICE has devoted substantial resources to increasing border security and combating
smuggling of contraband and people. Indeed, 25 percent of all ICE special agents are stationed in the five Southwest border offices. Of those, 353 special agents are stationed in Arizona to investigate crimes, primarily cross-border crimes. ERO currently has 361 law enforcement officers in Arizona. Further, the ICE Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA) has 147 attorneys stationed in the areas of responsibility on the Southwest border, including 37 attorneys in Arizona alone to prosecute removal cases and advise ICE officers and special agents, as well as one attorney detailed to the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District ofArizona to support the prosecution of criminals identified and investigated by ICE agents. Two additional attorneys have been allocated and are expected to enter on duty as SAUSAs in the very near future.
9. ICE's attention to the Southwest Border has included the March 2009 launch of the Southwest Border Initiative to disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking organizations operating along the Southwest border. This initiative was designed to support three goals: guard against the spillover of violent crime into the United States; support Mexico's campaign to crack down on drug cartels in Mexico; and reduce movement of contraband across the border. This initiative called for additional personnel, increased intelligence capability, and better coordination with state, local, tribal, and Mexican law enforcement authorities. This plan also bolstered the law enforcement resources and infornlation-sharing capabilities between and among DHS and the Departments of Justice and Defense. ICE's efforts on the Southwest border between March 2009 and March 2010 have resulted in increased seizures of weapons, money, and narcotics along the Southwest border as compared to the same time period between 2008 and 2009. ICE also
4 


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increased administrative arrests of criminal aliens for immigration violations by 11 percent along the Southwest border during this period.
10. ICE has focused even more closely on border security in Arizona. ICE is participating in a multi-agency operation known as the Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats (ACTT) (formerly the Arizona Operational Plan). Other federal agencies, including the Department of Defense, as well as state and local law enforcement agencies also support the ACTT. To a much smaller degree, ACTT receives support from the Government of Mexico through the Merida initiative, a United States funded program designed to support and assist Mexico in its efforts to disrupt and dismantle transnational criminal organizations, build capacity, strengthen its judicial and law enforcement institutions, and build strong and resilient communities.
11. The ACTT began in September 2009 to address concerns about crime along the border between the United States and Mexico in Arizona. The primary focus ofACTT is conducting intelligence-driven border enforcement operations to disrupt and dismantle violent cross-border criminal organizations that have a negative impact on the lives of the people on both sides of the border. The ACTT in particular seeks to reduce serious felonies that negatively affect public safety in Arizona. These include the smuggling of aliens, bulk cash, and drugs; document fraud; the exportation of weapons; street violence; homicide; hostage-taking; money laundering; and human trafficking and prostitution.
12. In addition to the ACTT, the Federal Government is making other significant efforts to secure the border. On May 25, 2010, the President announced that he will be requesting $500 million in supplemental funds for enhanced border protection and law enforcement activities, and that he would be ordering a strategic and requirements-based
5 


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deployment of 1,200 National Guard troops to the border. This influx of resources will be utilized to enhance technology at the border; share information and support with state, local, and tribal law enforcement; provide intelligence and intelligence analysis, surveillance, and reconnaissance support; and additional training capacity.
13. ICE also is paying increasing attention to alien smuggling, along with other contraband smuggling, with the goal of dismantling large organizations. Smuggling organizations are an enforcement priority because they tend to create a high risk of danger for the persons being smuggled, and tend to be affiliated with the movement of drugs and weapons. ICE has had success of late in large operations to prosecute and deter alien smugglers and those who transport smuggled aliens. During recent operations in Arizona and Texas, ICE agents made a combined total of 85 arrests, searched 18 companies, and seized more than 100 vehicles and more than 30 firearms.
14. This summer, ICE launched a surge in its efforts near the Mexican border. This surge was a component of a strategy to identify, disrupt, and dismantle cartel operations. The focus on cartel operations is a policy priority because such cartels are responsible for high degrees of violence in Mexico and the United States-the cartels destabilize Mexico and threaten regional security. For 120 days, ICE will add 186 agents and officers to its five Southwest border offices to attack cartel capabilities to conduct operations; disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking organizations; diminish the illicit flow of money, weapons, narcotics, and people into and out of the U.S.; and enhance border security. The initiative, known as Operation Southern Resolve, is closely coordinated with the Government of Mexico, as well as Mexican and U.S. federal, state and local law enforcement to ensure maximum impact. The initiative also includes
6 


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targeting transnational gang activity, targeting electronic and traditional methods of moving illicit proceeds, and identifying, arresting, and removing criminal aliens present in the region.
15. Although ICE continues to devote significant resources to immigration enforcement in Arizona and elsewhere along the Southwest border, ICE recognizes that a full solution to the immigration problem will only be achieved through comprehensive immigration reform (CIR). Thus, ICE, in coordination with DHS and the Department's other operating components, has committed personnel and energy to advancing CIR. For example, ICE's Assistant Secretary and other senior leaders have advocated for comprehensive immigration reform during meetings with, and in written letters and statements to, advocacy groups, non­ governmental organizations, members of the media, and members of Congress. Other ICE personnel have participated in working groups to develop immigration reform proposals to include in CIR and to prepare budget assessments and projections in support of those proposals. ICE Enforcement Priorities
16. DHS is the federal department with primary responsibility for the enforcement of federal immigration law. Within DHS, ICE plays a key role in this enforcement by, among other functions, serving as the agency responsible for the investigation of immigration-related crimes, the apprehension and removal of individuals from the interior United States, and the representation of the United States in removal proceedings before the Executive Office for Immigration Review within the Department of Justice. As the department charged with enforcement of federal immigration laws, DHS exercises a large degree of discretion in determining how best to carry out its enforcement responsibilities. This discretion also allows ICE to forego criminal prosecutions or removal proceedings in individual cases, where such forbearance will further federal immigration priorities.
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CaCsaese1:121:11-10c-vc-v0-1081084401-43T-WTNWVTWT DoDDcoouccmuumemneetnn2tt996-33-41 FFiFleiillededd00607/62//0706/81//1101 PPaPagagegee69320ofo57f5972
17. ICE's priorities at a national level have been refined to reflect Secretary Napolitano's commitment to the "smart and tough enforcement of immigration laws." Currently, ICE's highest enforcement priorities-meaning, the most important targets for apprehension and removal efforts-are aliens who pose a danger to national security or a risk to public safety, including: aliens engaged in or suspected of terrorism or espionage; aliens convicted of crimes, with a particular emphasis on violent criminals, felons, and repeat offenders; certain gang members; and aliens subject to outstanding criminal warrants.
18. Other high priorities include aliens who are recent illegal entrants and "fugitive aliens" (i.e., aliens who have failed to comply with final orders of removal). The attention to fugitive aliens, especially those with criminal records, recognizes that the government expends significant resources providing procedural due process in immigration proceedings, and that the efficacy of removal proceedings is undermined if final orders of removal are not enforced. Finally, the attention to aliens who are recent illegal entrants is intended to help maintain control at the border. Aliens who have been present in the U.S. without authorization for a prolonged period of time and who have not engaged in criminal conduct present a significantly lower enforcement priority. And aliens who meet certain humanitarian criteria may not be an "enforcement" priority at all-in such humanitarian cases, federal immigration priorities may recommend forbearance in pursuing removal.
19. ICE bases its current priorities on a number of different factors. One factor is the differential between the number of people present in the United States illegally-approximately 10.8 million aliens, including 460,000 in Arizona-and the number of people ICE is resourced to remove each year-approximately 400,000. This differential necessitates prioritization to ensure that ICE expends resources most efficiently to advance the goals of protecting national security,
8 


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protecting public safety, and securing the border. Another factor is ICE's consideration of

humanitarian interests in enforcing federal immigration laws, and its desire to ensure aliens in

the system are treated fairly and with appropriate respect given their individual circumstances.

Humanitarian interests may, in appropriate cases, support a conclusion that an alien should not be

,

removed or detained at all. And yet another factor is ICE's recognition that immigration

detainees are held for a civil purpose-namely, removal-and not for punishment. Put another

I

way, although entering the United States illegally or failing to cooperate with ICE during the

r
removal process is a crime, being in the United States without authorization is not itself a crime. 


ICE prioritizes enforcement to distinguish between aliens who commit civil immigration

I

violations from those commit or who have been convicted of a crime. 


I

20. Consequently, ICE is revising policies and practices regarding civil immigration
I
enforcement and the immigration detention system to ensure the use of its enforcement

personnel, detention space, and removal resources are focused on advancing these priorities. For

J

example, ICE has two programs within ERO designed to arrest convicted criminal aliens and

l

alien fugitives. These are the Criminal Alien Program (CAP) and the National Fugitive
I
Operations Program (fugitive operations). ICE officers assigned to CAP identify criminal aliens

who are incarcerated within federal, state, and local prisons and jails, as well as aliens who have

I

been charged or arrested and remain in the custody of the law enforcement agency. ICE officers

assigned to fugitive operations seek to locate and arrest aliens with final orders of removal.

These officers also seek to locate, arrest, and remove convicted criminal aliens living at large in

I

communities and aliens who previously have been deported but have returned unlawfully to the

I

United States. They also present illegal reentry cases for prosecution in federal courts to deter

I

such recidivist conduct.

I

9
i

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21. Likewise, in keeping with the Secretary's policy determination that immigration enforcement should be "smart and tough" by focusing on specific priorities, ICE issued a new strategy regarding worksite enforcement. This strategy shift prioritized the criminal investigation and prosecution of employers and de-emphasized the apprehension and removal of illegal aliens working in the United States without authorization. Although Federal law does not make it a distinct civil or criminal offense for unauthorized aliens merely to seek employment in the U.S., such aliens may be removed for being in the U.S. illegally. ICE's new strategy acknowledges that many enter the United States illegally because of the opportunity to work. Thus, the strategy seeks to address the root causes of illegal immigration and to do the following: (i) penalize employers who knowingly hire illegal workers; (ii) deter employers who are tempted to hire illegal workers; and (iii) encourage all employers to take advantage of well-crafted compliance tools. At the same time, the policy recognizes that humanitarian concerns counsel against focusing enforcement efforts on unauthorized workers. The strategy permits agents to exercise discretion and work with the prosecuting attorney to assess how to best proceed with respect to illegal alien witnesses. One of the problems with Arizona Senate Bill 1070 (SB 1070) is that it will divert focus from this "smart and tough" focus on employers to responses to requests from local law enforcement to apprehend aliens not within ICE's priorities.
22. In addition to refocusing ICE's civil enforcement priorities, ICE has also refocused the 287(g) program so that state and local jurisdictions with which ICE has entered into agreements to exercise federal immigration authority do so in a manner consistent with ICE's priorities. The mechanism for this refocusing has been a new MOA with revised terms and conditions. Jurisdictions that already had agreements were required to enter into this revised MOA in October of2009. Also, ICE opted not to renew 287(g) agreements with task force
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officers with the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office and officers stationed within the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office's jail. These decisions were based on inconsistency between the expectations of the local jurisdiction and the priorities of ICE.
23. ICE communicates its enforcement priorities to state and local law enforcement officials in a number of ways. With respect to the 287(g) program, the standard MOA describes the focus on criminals, with the highest priority on the most serious offenders. In addition, when deploying interoperability technology through the Secure Communities program, local jurisdictions are advised of ICE's priorities in the MOA and in outreach materials.
24. In addition to the dissemination of national civil enforcement priorities to the field, the refocusing of existing ICE programs, and other efforts to prioritize immigration enforcement to most efficiently protect the border and public safety, the Assistant Secretary and his senior staff routinely inform field locations that they have the authority and should exercise discretion in individual cases. This includes when deciding whether to issue charging documents, institute removal proceedings, release or detain aliens, place aliens on alternatives to detention (e.g., electronic monitoring), concede an alien's eligibility for relief from removal, move to terminate cases where the alien may have some other avenue for relief, stay deportations, or defer an alien's departure.
25. The Assistant Secretary has communicated to ICE personnel that discretion is particularly important when dealing with long-time lawful permanent residents, juveniles, the immediate family members of U.S. citizens, veterans, members of the armed forces and their families, and others with illnesses or special circumstances.
26. ICE exercises prosecutorial discretion throughout all the stages of the removal process-investigations, initiating and pursuing proceedings, which charges to lodge, seeking
11 


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tennination of proceedings, administrative closure of cases, release from detention, not taking an

appeal, and declining to execute a removal order. The decision on whether and how to exercise

prosecutorial discretion in a given case is largely infonned by ICE's enforcement priorities.

During my tenure at ICE as an attorney litigating administrative immigration cases, as well as

my role as a SAUSA prosecuting criminal offenses and in my legal and management roles at ICE

headquarters, I am aware of many cases where ICE has exercised prosecutorial discretion to

benefit an alien who was not within the stated priorities of the agency or because of humanitarian

factors. For example, ICE has released an individual with medical issues from detention,

tenninated removal proceedings to allow an alien to regularize her immigration status, declined

to assert the one year filing deadline in order to allow an individual to apply for asylum before

the immigration judge, and tenninated proceedings for a long-term legal permanent resident who

served in the military, among numerous other examples.

27. ICE's exercise of discretion in enforcement decisions has been the subject of

several internal agency communications. For example, Attachment A is a true and accurate copy

I

of a November 7, 2007 memorandum from ICE Assistant Secretary Julie Myers to ICE Field

I

Office Directors and ICE Special Agents in Charge. Pursuant to this memorandum, ICE agents

and officers should exercise prosecutorial discretion when making administrative arrests and

I

custody determinations for aliens who are nursing mothers absent any statutory detention

requirement or concerns such as national security or threats to public safety.. Attachment B is a

true and accurate copy, omitting attachments thereto, of an October 24, 2005 memorandum from

,I

ICE Principal Legal Advisor William J. Howard to OPLA Chief Counsel as to the manner in

which prosecutorial discretion is exercised in removal proceedings. Attachment C is a true and

accurate copy of a November 17,2000 memorandum from Immigration and Naturalization

12 


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CCaCasasesee12:11::110-1c--cvcv-v0--0101814081403-4T--NWTVWTWT DDocoucmumenetn2t 969-3341 FFiFlieleildedd00607/6/20/706/8/11/1101 PPaPagagegee618245oofof7f59752
Service (INS) Commissioner Doris Meissner to various INS personnel concerning the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The Assistant Secretary also outlined in a recent memorandum to all ICE employees the agency's civil immigration enforcement priorities relating to the apprehension, detention, and removal of aliens (available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/civil enforcement priorities.pdf).
28. In sum, ICE does not seek to arrest, detain, remove, or refer for prosecution, all aliens who may be present in the United States illegally. ICE focuses its enforcement efforts in a manner that is intended to most effectively further national security, public safety, and security of the border, and has affirmative reasons not to seek removal or prosecution of certain aliens. International Cooperation with ICE Enforcement
29. ICE cooperates with foreign governments to advance our criminal investigations of transnational criminal organizations (such as drug cartels, major gangs, and organized alien smugglers) and to repatriate their citizens and nationals who are facing deportation. With respect to our criminal investigations, ICE's Office ofInternational Affairs has 63 offices in 44 countries staffed with special agents who, among other things, investigate crime. In Mexico alone, ICE has five offices consisting of a total of 38 personnel. Investigators in ICE attache offices investigate cross-border crime, including crime that affects Arizona and the rest of the Southwest. In addition, they work with foreign governments to secure travel documents and clearance for ICE to remove aliens from the United States. ICE negotiates with foreign governments to expedite the removal process, including negotiating electronic travel document arrangements. International cooperation for ICE is critical.
30. International cooperation advances ICE's goal of making the borders more secure. To address cross-border crime at the Southwest border, ICE is cooperating very closely with the
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Government of Mexico in particular. Two prime examples ofICE and Mexican cooperation include Operation Armas Cruzadas, designed to improve information sharing and to identify, disrupt, and dismantle criminal networks engaged in weapons smuggling, and Operation Firewall, as part of which Mexican customs and ICE-trained Mexican Money Laundering-Vetted Units target the illicit flow of money out of Mexico on commercial flights and in container shipments.
31. Also to improve border security and combat cross-border crime, ICE is engaged in other initiatives with the Government of Mexico. For instance, ICE is training Mexican customs investigators. ICE also provides Mexican law enforcement officers and prosecutors training in human trafficking, child sexual exploitation, gang investigations, specialized investigative techniques, and financial crimes. ICE has recruited Mexican federal police officers to participate in five of the ICE-led Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (BESTs). The BEST platform brings together multiple law enforcement agencies at every level to combat cross-border crime, including crime touching Arizona. Sharing information and agents is promoting more efficient and effective investigations. ICE has benefited from the Government of Mexico's increased cooperation, including in recent alien smuggling investigations that resulted in arrests in Mexico and Arizona.
32. In addition to the importance of cooperation from foreign governments in criminal investigations, ICE also benefits from good relationships with foreign governments in effecting removals of foreign nationals. Negotiating removals, including country clearance, to approvals and securing travel documents, is a federal matter and often one that requires the cooperation of the country that is accepting the removed alien. ICE removes more nationals of Mexico than of any other country. In FY 2009, ICE removed or returned approximately 275,000
14 


CCaCasasesee12:11::110-1c--cvcv-v0--0101814081403-4T--NWTVWTWT DDocoucmumenetn2t 969-3341 FFiFlieleildedd00607/6/20/706/8/11/1101 PPaPagagegee710267oofof7f59752
Mexican nationals, which constitutes more than 70 percent of all removals and returns. Not all countries are equally willing to repatriate their nationals. Delays in repatriating nationals of foreign countries causes ICE financial and operational challenges, particularly when the aliens are detained pending removal. Federal law limits how long ICE can detain an alien once the alien is subject to a final order of removal. Therefore, difficulties in persuading a foreign country to accept a removed alien mns the risk of extending the length of time that a potentially dangerous or criminal alien remains in the United States. Thus, the efficient operation of the immigration system relies on cooperation from foreign governments. Reliance on Illegal Aliens in Enforcement and Prosecution
33. ICE agents routinely rely on foreign nationals, including aliens unlawfully in the United States, to build criminal cases, including cases against other aliens in the United States illegally. Aliens who are unlawfully in the United States, like any other persons, may have important information about criminals they encounter-from narcotics smugglers to alien smugglers and beyond-and routinely support ICE's enforcement activities by serving as confidential informants or witnesses. When ICE's witnesses or informants are illegal aliens who are subject to removal, ICE can exercise discretion and ensure the alien is able to remain in the country to assist in an investigation, prosecution, or both. The blanket removal or incarceration of all aliens unlawfully present in Arizona or in certain other individual states would interfere with ICE's ability to pursue the prosecution or removal of aliens who pose particularly significant threats to public safety or national security. Likewise, ICE can provide temporary and long-term benefits to ensure victims of illegal activity are able to remain in the United States.
34. Tools relied upon by ICE to ensure the cooperation of informants and witnesses include deferred action, stays of removal, U visas for crime victims, T visas for victims of human
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trafficking, and S visas for significant cooperators against other criminals and to support investigations. These tools allow aliens who otherwise would face removal to remain in the United States either temporarily or permanently, and to work in the United States in order to support themselves while here. Many of these tools are employed in situations where federal immigration policy suggests an affirmative benefit that can only be obtained by not pursuing an alien's removal or prosecution. Notably, utilization ofthese tools is a dynamic process between ICE and the alien, which may play out over time. An alien who ultimately may receive a particular benefit-for example, an S visa-may not immediately receive that visa upon initially coming forward to ICE or other authorities, and thus at a given time may not have documentation or evidence of the fact that ICE is permitting that alien to remain in the United States.
35. Although ICE may rely on an illegal alien as an informant in any type of immigration or custom violation it investigates, this is particularly likely in alien smuggling and illegal employment cases. Aliens who lack lawful status in the United States are routinely witnesses in criminal cases against alien smugglers. For example, in an alien smuggling case, the smuggled aliens are in a position to provide important information about their journey to the United States, including how they entered, who provided them assistance, and who they may have paid. If these aliens were not available to ICE, special agents would not be positioned to build criminal cases against the smuggler. ICE may use a case against the smuggler to then build a larger case against others in the smuggling organization that assisted the aliens across the border.
36. ICE also relies heavily on alien informants and witnesses in illegal employment cases. In worksite cases, the unauthorized alien workers likewise have important insight and
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information about the persons involved in the hiring and employment process, including who may be amenable to a criminal charge.
37. ICE also relies heavily on alien informants and cooperators in investigations of transnational gangs, including violent street gangs with membership and leadership in the United States and abroad. Informants and cooperating witnesses help ICE identify gang members in the United States and provide information to support investigations into crimes the gang may be committing. In some cases, this includes violent crime in aid of racketeering, narcotics trafficking, or other crimes.
38. During my years at ICE, I have heard many state and local law enforcement and immigration advocacy groups suggest that victims and witnesses of crime may hesitate to come forward to speak to law enforcement officials if they lack lawful status. The concern cited is that, rather than finding redress for crime, victims and witnesses will face detention and removal from the United States. To ensure that illegal aliens who are the victims of crimes or have witnessed crimes come forward to law enforcement, ICE has a robust outreach program, particularly in the context of human trafficking, to assure victims and witnesses that they can safely come forward against traffickers without fearing immediate immigration custody, extended detention, or removal. If this concern manifested itself-and if crime victims became reluctant to come forward-ICE would have a more difficult time apprehending, prosecuting, and removing particularly dangerous aliens. PotentialAdverse Impact ofSB 1070 on ICE's Priorities and Enforcement Activities
39. I am aware that the State ofArizona has enacted new immigration legislation, known as SB 1070. I have read SB 1070, and I am generally familiar with the purpose and
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provisions of that legislation. SB 1070 will adversely impact ICE's operational activities with respect to federal immigration enforcement.
40. I understand that section two of SB 1070 generally requires Arizona law enforcement personnel to inquire as to the immigration status of any individual encountered during "any lawful stop, detention or arrest" where there is a reasonable suspicion to believe that the individual is unlawfully present in the United States. I also understand that section two contemplates referral to DHS of those aliens confirmed to be in the United States illegally.
41. As a federal agency with national responsibilities, the burdens placed by SB 1070 on the Federal Government will impair ICE's ability to pursue its enforcement priorities. For example, referrals by Arizona under this section likely would be handled by either the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) Phoenix (the local HSI office), or the Field Office Director (FOD) Phoenix (the local ERO office). Both offices currently have broad portfolios of responsibility. Notably, SAC Phoenix is responsible for investigating crimes at eight ports of entry and two international airports. FOD Phoenix is responsible for two significant detention centers located in Florence and Eloy, Arizona, and a large number of immigration detainees housed at a local county jail in Pinal County, Arizona. FOD Phoenix also has a fugitive operations team, a robust criminal alien program, and it manages the 287(g) programs in the counties of Maricopa, Yavapai, and Pinal, as well as at the Arizona Department of Corrections.
42. Neither the SAC nor the FOD offices in Phoenix are staffed to assume additional duties. Inquiries from state and local law enforcement officers about a subject's immigration status could be routed to the Law Enforcement Support Center in Vermont or to agents and officers stationed at SAC or FOD Phoenix. ICE resources are currently engaged in investigating criminal violations and managing the enforcement priorities and existing enforcement efforts,
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and neither the SAC nor FOD Phoenix are scheduled for a significant increase in resources to accommodate additional calls from state and local law enforcement. Similarly, the FOD and SAC offices in Arizona are not equipped to respond to any appreciable increase in requests from Arizona to take custody of aliens apprehended by the state.
43. Moreover, ICE's detention capacity is limited. In FY 2009, FOD Phoenix was provided with funds to detain no more than approximately 2,900 detention beds on an average day. FOD Phoenix uses that detention budget and available bed space not only for aliens arrested in Arizona, but also aliens transferred from Los Angeles, San Francisco, and San Diego. Notably, the President's budget for FY 2011 does not request an increase in money to purchase detention space. And with increasing proportions of criminal aliens in ICE custody and static bed space, the detention resources will be directed to those aliens who present a danger to the community and the greatest risk of flight.
44. Thus, to respond to the number of referrals likely to be generated by enforcement of SB 1070 would require ICE to divert existing resources from other duties, resulting in fewer resources being available to dedicate to cases and aliens within ICE's priorities. This outcome is especially problematic because ICE's current priorities are focused on national security, public safety, and security of the border. Diverting resources to cover the influx of referrals from Arizona (and other states, to the extent similar laws are adopted) could, therefore, mean decreasing ICE's ability to focus on priorities such as protecting national security or public safety in order to pursue aliens who are in the United States illegally but pose no immediate or known danger or threat to the safety and security of the public.
45. An alternative to responding to the referrals from Arizona, and thus diverting resources, is to largely disregard referrals from Arizona. But this too would have adverse
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consequences in that it could jeopardize ICE's relationships with state and local law enforcement agencies (LEAs). For example, LEAs often request ICE assistance when individuals are encountered who are believed to be in the United States illegally. Since ICE is not always available to immediately respond to LEA calls, potentially removable aliens are often released back into the community. Historically, this caused some LEAs to complain that ICE was unresponsive. In September 2006, to address this enforcement gap, the FOD office in Phoenix created the Law Enforcement Agency Response (LEAR) Unit, a unit of officers specifically dedicated to provide 24-hour response, 365 days per year. ICE's efforts with this project to ensure better response to LEAs would be undermined iflCE is forced to largely disregard referrals from Arizona, and consequently may result in LEAs being less willing to cooperate with ICE on various enforcement matters, including those high-priority targets on which ICE enforcement is currently focused.
46. In addition to section two of SB 1070, I understand that the stated purpose of the act is to "make attrition through enforcement the public policy of all state and local government agencies in Arizona," and that the "provisions of this act are intended to work together to discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens and economic activity by persons unlawfully present in the United States." To this end, I understand that section three of SB 1070 authorizes Arizona to impose criminal penalties for failing to carry a registration document, that sections four and five, along with existing provisions ofArizona law, prohibit certain alien smuggling activity, as well as the transporting, concealing, and harboring of illegal aliens, and that section six authorizes the warrantless arrest of certain aliens believed to be removable from the United States.
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47. The Arizona statute does not appear to make any distinctions based on the circumstances of the individual aliens or to take account of the Executive Branch's determination with respect to individual aliens, such as to not pursue removal proceedings or grant some form of relief from removal. Thus, an alien for whom ICE deliberately decided for humanitarian reasons not to pursue removal proceedings or not to refer for criminal prosecution, despite the fact that the alien may be in the United States illegally, may still be prosecuted under the provisions of the Arizona law. DHS maintains the primary interest in the humane treatment of aliens and the fair administration of federal immigration laws. The absence of a federal prosecution does not necessarily indicate a lack of federal resources; rather, the Federal Government often has affirmative reasons for not prosecuting an alien. For example, ICE may exercise its discretionary authority to grant deferred action to an alien in order to care for a sick child. ICE's humanitarian interests would be undermined if that alien was then detained or arrested by Arizona authorities for being illegally present in the United States.
48. Similarly, certain aliens who meet statutory requirements may seek to apply for asylum in the United States, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1158, based on their having been persecuted in the past or because of a threat of future persecution. The asylum statute recognizes a policy in favor of hospitality to persecuted aliens. In many cases, these aliens are not detained while they pursue protection, and they do not have the requisite immigration documents that would provide them lawful status within the United States during that period. Under SB 1070, these aliens could be subjected to detention or arrest based on the state's priorities, despite the fact that affirmative federal policy supports not detaining or prosecuting the alien.
49. Additionally, some aliens who do not qualify for asylum may qualify instead for withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). Similar to asylum, withholding of removal
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provides protection in the United States for aliens who seek to escape persecu~ion. Arizona's detention or arrest of these aliens would not be consistent with the Government's desire to ensure their humanitarian treatment.
50. Further, there are many aliens in the United States who seek protection from removal under the federal regulatory provisions at 8 C.F.R. § 208.18 implementing the Government's non-refoulement obligations under Article 3 of the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). In many cases, these aliens are not detained while they pursue CAT protection. Under SB 1070, these aliens could be subjected to detention or arrest based on the state's priorities. The detention or arrest of such aliens would be inconsistent with the Government's interest in ensuring their humane treatment, especially where such aliens may have been subject to torture before they came to the U.S.
51. Application ofSB 1070 also could undermine ICE's efforts to secure the cooperation of confidential informants, witnesses, and victims who are present in the United States without legal status. The stated purpose of SB 1070, coupled with the extensive publicity surrounding this law, may lead illegal aliens to believe, rightly or wrongly, that they will be subject to immigration detention and removal if they cooperate with authorities, not to mention the possibility that they may expose themselves to sanctions under Arizona law if they choose to cooperate with authorities. Consequently, SB 1070 very likely will chill the willingness of certain aliens to cooperate with ICE. Although ICE has tools to address those concerns, SB 1070 would undercut those efforts, and thus risks ICE's investigation and prosecution of criminal activity, such as that related to illegal employment, the smuggling of contraband or people, or human trafficking.
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52. Moreover, just as the ICE offices in Arizona are not staffed to respond to additional inquiries about the immigration status of individuals encountered by Arizona, or to and arrest or detain appreciably more aliens not within ICE's current priorities, the offices are not staffed to provide personnel to testify in Arizona state criminal proceedings related to a defendant's immigration status, such as a "Simpson Hearing" where there is indication that a person may be in the United States illegally and the prosecutor invokes Arizona Revised Statute § 13-3961(A)(a)(ii) (relating to determination of immigration status for purposes of bail). In some federal criminal immigration cases, Assistant United States Attorneys call ICE special agents to testify to provide such information as a person's immigration history or status. If ICE agents are asked to testify in a significant number of state criminal proceedings, as contemplated under SB 1070, they will be forced either to divert resources from federal priorities, or to refuse to testify in those proceedings, thus damaging their relationships with the state and local officials whose cooperation is often of critical importance in carrying out federal enforcement priorities.
53. Enforcement ofSB 1070 also threatens ICE's cooperation from foreign governments. For example, the Government of Mexico, a partner to ICE in many law enforcement efforts and in repatriation of Mexican nationals, has expressed strong concern about Arizona's law. On May 19,2010, President Barack Obama and Mexican President Felipe Calderon held a joint news conference, during which President Calderon criticized the Arizona immigration law, saying it criminalized immigrants. President Calderon reiterated these concerns to a joint session of the United States Congress on May 20,2010. Any decrease in participation and support from the Government of Mexico will hinder ICE efforts to prioritize and combat cross-border crime.
23 


CCaCasasesee12:11::110-1c--cvcv-v0--0101814081403-4T--NWTVWTWT DDocoucmumenetn2t 969-3341 FFiFlieleildedd00607/6/20/706/8/11/1101 PPaPagagegee729356oofof7f59752 54. The Government of Mexico is not the only foreign nation that has expressed concern about SB 1070. Should there be any decreased cooperation from foreign governments in response to Arizona's enforcement of SB 1070, the predictable result of such decreased cooperation would be an adverse impact on the effectiveness and efficiency ofICE's enforcement activities, which I have detailed above. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my
knowledge and belief. Executed the ICJ4. day of July 2010 in Washington, D.C.
D e . agsdale Executive Associate Director Management and Administration U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
24 


 
 Case 1:11-cv-01804-TWT Document 100-1 Filed 07/08/11 Page 1 of 9

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION

GEORGIA LATINO ALLIANCE *

FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, et al., *

*

Plaintiffs,

*

*

V.

*

*

NATHAN DEAL, Governor of the *

State of Georgia, et al.,

*

*

Defendants.

1:11-CV-1804-TWT

DEFENDANTS’ BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION STAY THE CASE

In order to avoid the potentially unnecessary cost and burden of litigation, Defendants move that this case including their answer, discovery, including all disclosures and planning conferences pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 and L.R. 26.1 be stayed pending a ruling on Defendants’ Appeal.
PROCEDURAL POSTURE Plaintiffs, a group of organizations and individuals filed the instant case on June 2, 2011 challenging the constitutionality of Georgia’s House Bill 87 (HB 87) in its entirety. (doc. 1). Shortly after filing the complaint, Plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction seeking to preliminarily enjoin enforcement of section 7,

Case 1:11-cv-01804-TWT Document 100-1 Filed 07/08/11 Page 2 of 9
8 and 19 of the Bill. (doc. 29). Defendants Deal, Olens, Beatty and Rease filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint in its entirety (doc. 47) to which Plaintiffs filed a response. (doc. 76). Defendants also filed a response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction and an objection to much of the evidence relied on by Plaintiffs. (doc. 70, 72). All briefing subsequent to the filing of the Motion for Preliminary Injunction occurred in an expedited fashion at Plaintiffs request and pursuant to the Court’s direction. The Court conducted a hearing and heard argument on the Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on June 20. 2011. The Court entered an order on both of these motions on June 27, 2011 where it granted in part and denied in part Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. The Court enjoined the enforcement of Sections 7 & 8 of HB 87 based upon Plaintiffs’ likelihood of prevailing on the merits of their claims related to preemption and dismissed all of Plaintiffs’ other claims. Defendants filed a Notice of Appeal of the Court’s order enjoining enforcement of Sections 7 & 8 of the Bill. (doc. 97). Defendants now seek to stay the case pending the outcome of the appeal.
2

Case 1:11-cv-01804-TWT Document 100-1 Filed 07/08/11 Page 3 of 9
ARGUMENT AND CITATION OF AUTHORITY The Supreme Court has explained that "a federal district court and a federal court of appeals should not attempt to assert jurisdiction over a case simultaneously. The filing of a notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional significance -- it confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal." Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58, 103 S. Ct. 400, 401, 74 L. Ed. 2d 225 (1982); see also Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 379, 105 S. Ct. 1327, 1331, 84 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1985), reh'g denied, 471 U.S. 1062, 105 S. Ct. 2127, 85 L. Ed. 2d 491 (1985). As the Eleventh Circuit has explained, once a notice of appeal has been filed, the "district court retains only the authority to act in aid of the appeal, to correct clerical mistakes, or to aid in the execution of a judgment that has not been superseded." Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc. v. Covered Bridge Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 895 F.2d 711, 713 (11th Cir. 1990).
Moreover, Rule 26(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides the Court broad discretion to alter the sequence of discovery “for the convenience of the parties . . . and in the interests of justice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d). Further, federal courts routinely exercise their power to stay a proceeding where a stay
3

Case 1:11-cv-01804-TWT Document 100-1 Filed 07/08/11 Page 4 of 9
would promote judicial economy and efficiency. See, e.g., Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 559 F.3d 1191, 1198 (11th Cir. 2009) (approving district court's decision to stay case pending appeal in another case that was "likely to have a substantial or controlling effect on the claims and issues in the stayed case"). As any decision from the Court of Appeals will have profound impact on the development of this case and because it is in the interests of efficiency and justice, this Court should exercise its discretion this case and relieve the parties from having to exert additional resources pending a ruling on Defendants’ appeal.
This case involves novel questions related to the constitutionality of a state statute. As part of the review related to the appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals will necessarily be required to examine the viability of Plaintiffs’ claims related to preemption including their ability to pursue the claims, the implication of law of preemption and their likelihood to succeed on the merits. As such the issues on appeal bear directly on the further adjudication of this case before this Court. In consultation with the Plaintiffs, they agreed to stay the case as it relates to Sections 7 & 8 of the Bill but as they believe that there are other claims remaining before this Court, presumably related to the enforcement of Section 17 of the Bill, they would not agree to stay the case.
4

Case 1:11-cv-01804-TWT Document 100-1 Filed 07/08/11 Page 5 of 9
It is Defendants’ belief that all claims, as pled, related to other portions of the Bill, including Section 17, have been dismissed by this Court. The only possible claim that might lack clarity in the Court’s order relates to a possible preemption claim related to Section 17. As Plaintiffs conceded that based upon Section 17’s clear adoption of the language in Section 19, codified as 50-36-2, which provides, in no uncertain terms that a “secure and verifiable document” includes any document “recognized by the United States government…” and that which is required “by federal law,” that Plaintiffs’ conflict preemption claims regarding Section 17, would be resolved. (doc. 76 p. 29). Plaintiffs have not with any particularity pled other preemption claims related to this or any other section of the Bill. Even if the Court were to determine that there are additional claims related to other provisions of the Bill and preemption, any ruling by the Court of Appeals related to the viability of these claims would certainly be instructive to the parties and the Court.
Consequently, the issues in the pending appeal mirror the issues remaining in this court and Defendants believe that in the interest of judicial economy, and a desire to conserve the resources of the parties that a stay of the case is warranted.
5

Case 1:11-cv-01804-TWT Document 100-1 Filed 07/08/11 Page 6 of 9

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, Defendants respectfully request that the Court stay this

matter until the appeal is adjudicated.

Respectfully submitted,

Samuel S. Olens Attorney General

551540

KATHLEEN M. PACIOUS 558555 Deputy Attorney General

/s/ Devon Orland

DEVON ORLAND

554301

Senior Assistant Attorney General

6

Case 1:11-cv-01804-TWT Document 100-1 Filed 07/08/11 Page 7 of 9

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this date I electronically filed the foregoing BRIEF

IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STAY PENDING APPEAL with the Clerk of

Court using the CM/ECF system which will automatically send email notification

of such filing to the following attorneys of record:

Andre I. Segura Andrew H. Turner Azadeh N. Shahshahani Cecillia D. Wang Chara Fisher Jackson Charles H. Kuck Dale M. Schwartz Daniel Werner Danielle M. Conley Douglas Brooks Rohan Elora Mukherjee Emmet J. Bondurant, II George Brian Spears Gerald Jason Thompson

Gerald R. Weber Karen C. Tumlin Katerine Desormeau Linton Joaquin Mary C. Bauer Melissa S. Keaney Michelle R. Lapointe Naomi Ruth Tsu Nora Preciado Omar C. Jadwat Robert Keegan Federal, Jr. Samuel Brooke Sin Yen Ling Socheat Chea

Case 1:11-cv-01804-TWT Document 100-1 Filed 07/08/11 Page 8 of 9
I further certify that I have served, by U.S. mail, first class postage prepaid,
the following non-CM/ECF participants:
Carla Gorniak Christopher R. Clark Henry L. Solano Dewey & LeBoeuf, LLP-NY 1301 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10019
Farrin Rose Anello Rebecca Ann Sharpless Immigration Clinic, University of Miami School of Law 1311 Miller Drive E257 Coral Gables, FL 33146
Jonathan Blazer Tanya Broder National Immigration Law Center Suite 1400 405 14th Street Oakland, CA 94612
Kenneth John Sugarman ACLU Immigrant’s Rights Project 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, CA 94111
Pickens Andrew Patterson, Jr. Thomas Kennedy Sampson & Patterson 3355 Main Street Atlanta, GA 30337
2

Case 1:11-cv-01804-TWT Document 100-1 Filed 07/08/11 Page 9 of 9

This 8th day of July, 2011.

State Law Department 40 Capitol Square SW Atlanta, GA 30334 Tel: (404) 463-8850 Fax: (404) 651-5304 Email: dorland@law.ga.gov

/s/ Devon Orland Sr. Assistant Attorney General Georgia Bar No. 554301

3

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION

GEORGIA LATINO ALLIANCE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v.
NATHAN DEAL Governor of the State of Georgia, in his official capacity, et al.,
Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 1:11-CV-1804-TWT

OPINION AND ORDER

This case is a facial challenge to th e constitutionality of Georgia’s Illeg al Immigration Reform and Enforcem ent Act of 2011. Now, following the Suprem e Court’s decision in Arizona v. United State,sa remand from the Eleventh Circuit, and a permanent injunction against section 7 of the act, the remaining Defendants move to dismiss the claim regarding section 8. The Plaintiffs seek discovery to pursue their facial challenge against s ection 8 of the act . Unfortunately for the Plaintiffs, their burden to establish the facial unconstitu tionality of section 8 now appears to be insurmountable. Any further challenges to the Illegal Im migration Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011 must take the form of as-applied challenges.

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I. Background This action, filed on June 2, 2011, challenges the constitutionality of Georgia House Bill 87, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011 (“HB87” or the “Act”), enacted on April 14, 2011. The Plaintiffs initially argued that, on its face, HB87 violated the Supremacy Clause, the Fourth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the constitutional right to travel. They sought injunctive relief. After briefing, the Court dism issed the Plaintiffs’ challenges under the Supremacy Clause to all but two sections of the Ac t, and dism issed the Plaintiffs’ challenges under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, the Court held that the Plaintiffs had not adequately pled facts toshow that enforcement of section 8 of HB87 would be violative of the Fourth Am endment in all circumstances, that it would penalize the exercise of the right t o t ravel, that HB87 facially restricts access to government service on the basis of national oirgin, or that the Act on its face deprives individuals of a property interest protect ed by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1336-1339 (N.D. Ga. 2011). The Court dismissed those claims and then granted the Plaintiffs’ request to preliminarily enjoin sections 7 and 8 of the Act, ruling that the Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claims that those sections were preempted by federal law. The Defendants appealed.

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The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld the preliminary injunction of section 7. That section sought to create three new crim inal violations: (1) transporting or moving an illegal alien; (2) concealing or harboring an illegal alien; and (3) inducing an illegal alien toenter the state of Georgia. SeeO.C.G.A. §§ 16-11200 - 202. But, as the Court of App eals noted, the federal Im migration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., “provides a com prehensive framework to penalize the transportation, concealment , and inducem ent of unlawfully present aliens.” Georgia Latino Alliance forHuman Rights v. Governor of Georgia, 691 F.3d 1250, 1263 (11th Cir. 2012). It concluded that the Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that section 7 was preemptedby federal law and affirmed the issuance of the preliminary injunction. Id. at 1267.
However, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on their claim t hat section 8 wa s preempted by federal law. Section 8 provides that law enforcement officers inGeorgia, having established probable cause that an individual has committed a crime, may investigate the citizenship status of that individual if the individual cannot produce adequate identification to prove citizenship. See O.C.G.A. § 17-5-100. In determ ining whether to investigate citizenship, police officers are expressly prohibited from considering “race, color, or national origin … except to the extent permitted by” the United States and Georgia

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Constitutions. O.C.G.A. § 17-5-100(d). The Court of Appeals noted that, in Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2011), the Superme Court refused to rule that Arizona’s analogue to section 8 was likely tobe preempted by federal law. The Court of Appeals also noted that, in Arizona , a preenforcement challenge was considered premature a lthough “the [ Supreme] C ourt le ft ope n the possibility tha t the interpretation and application of Arizona’s law could prove problematic in practice and refused to foreclose future challenges to the law.” Georgia Latino Alliance, 691 F.3d at 1268 (quoting Arizona , 132 S. Ct. at 2510). Th e Eleventh Circuit was ultimately reluctant to conclude that section 8 of HB87 would “be construed in a way that creates a conflict with federal law.” Id. (quoting Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2510).1
On re mand, t his C ourt pe rmanently e njoined se ction 7, [ Doc. 143] , a nd dismissed Defendants Beatty(Commissioner of the Department of Community Affairs of the State of Georgia),Reese (Commissioner of the Department of Human Services

1The Court of Appeals followed Justice Kennedy in confusing and conflating the Supremacy Clause and Fourth Amendment claims. My analysis of section 8 under the Supremacy Clause was not based upon th e Plaintiffs' claims of potential racial profiling and excessive detention. My anal ysis of section 8 was that federal law already sets forth the circumstances underwhich local law enforcement are authorized to aid in immigration enforcement under the supervision of the attorney general. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g). On its face,HB87 conflicts with that. Inaddition, my analysis of section 8 was that it will undermine federal law enforcement priorities and strategies by authorizing individual law enforcement jurisdictions within Georgia to implement their own immigration policies.

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of the State of Georgia), and Stewart (Executive Director of the Housing Authority of Fulton County Ge orgia), in the ir offic ial c apacities. [ Doc. 141] . T he re maining Defendants, Governor Nathan Deal an d At torney Genera l Sam uel Olens, filed a supplemental motion to dismiss on March 20, 2013. In their motion, the Defendants argue that the Eleventh Circuit’s deci sion in this case precludes the Plaintiffs from establishing that section 8 is facially unconstitutional. The Plaintiffs oppose the motion and argue they are entitled to discoveryin furtherance of their facial challenge.
II. Motion to Dismiss Standard A complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) only where it appears that the facts alleged fail to state a “plausibel” claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqba,l129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A complaint may survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, however,even if it is “improbable” that a plaintiff would be able to prove those facts; even if the possibility of recovery is ex tremely “remote and unlikely.” Bell Atlantic v. Twom bly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court musat ccept the facts pleadedin the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Quality Foods de Centro America, S.A. v. LatinAmerican Agribusiness Dev. Corp., S.A,. 711 F.2d 989, 994-95 (11th Cir. 1983); see also Sanjuan v. American Bd. of Psychiatry and Neurology, Inc. , 40 F. 3d 247, 251 (7th C ir. 1994) (noting tha t at the pleading

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stage, the plaintiff “receives the benefit ofimagination”). Generally, notice pleading is all that is required for a valid complaint. See Lombard's, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 753 F.2d 974, 975 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082 (1986). Under notice pleading, the plaintiff need only give the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff's claim and the grounds upon which it rests. SeeErickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citing Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1964).
III. Discussion The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs ’ facial challenge to section 8 should be dismissed for several reasons. First, theystate that the Plaintiffs cannot meet their burden in establishing that section 8 is facially invalid because the Eleventh Circuit ruling in th is case indicates that the s ection could be applied in a constitutional manner. The Defendants further argue thatthe Plaintiffs’ request for discovery itself is an acknowledgment that the law could beenforced in a constitutional manner. The Defendants also contend that the Plaintiffs’ discovery request, which could involve 159 counties and 536 m unicipalities, is unprecedented and unsupported by any authority. Finally, the Defendants argue thatthe Governor and the Attorney General are no longer the proper Defendants because they are not directly responsible for the Act’s enforcement.

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The Plaintiffs contend that t heir f acial challenge is not lim ited to the preenforcement stage of the Act. Because their challenge was not mooted by the enforcement of HB87, they argue, they s hould be able to obt ain discovery on the training of law enforcement in Georgia. They also argue that the Eleventh Circuit’s decision was only in the context of a preliminary injunction and should not preclude their ability to pursue their facial challenge.
“To succeed on a facial challenge to a statute, a plaintiff must establish that no set of circum stances exists under wh ich the statute would be valid.” GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia , 687 F.3d 1244, 1255 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). 2 “When a plaintiff m ounts a facial challenge to a statute or regulation,the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the law could never be applied in a constitutional manner.” AFSCME Council 79 v. Scott, No. 12-12908, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 10786,at *18 (11th Cir. May 29, 2013).

2 In a recent case, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that the Salernodecision, which provides the standard for prevailing on a facial challenge, has been subject to considerable criticism. However, the circuit court continued that, “[w]hile Salerno is often criticized, its holding remainsbinding precedent.” GeorgiaCarry.Org, 687 F.3d at 1255 n.19. See also AFSCME Council 79 v. Scott, No. 12-12908, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 10786, at *19 (11th Cir. May29, 2013) (quoting GeorgiaCarry.Org, 687 F.3d at 1255 n.19) (“[J]ust last year, a panel of this Court reiterated that the strict ‘no set of circumstances’ test is the proper standard for evaluating a facial challenge.”).

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Here, in the face of the Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion that section 8 could be applied

in a constitutional manner,3 the Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this high burden.

In vacating the preliminary injunction against section 8, the Eleventh Circuit

noted that the Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. United Stateshad approved of

a state provision similar to esction 8 and accordingly concluded that the “Plaintiffs are

not likely to succeed on the claim that s ection 8 i s p reempted by federal law.”

Georgia Latino Alliance, 691 F.3d at 1267 (citing Arizon,a132 S. Ct. at 2510). While

the Supreme Court’s decision had recognized potential constitutional problems with

Arizona’s analogue to section 8, it “noted that the state’s interpretation of its statute

could rem edy these concerns.” Id. (quoting Arizona , 132 S. Ct. at 2508). The

Eleventh Circuit continued:

The Supreme Court's holding and explanation apply with full force to section 8, and we reject the curre nt preenforcement challenge to its validity. First, we note that section 8is less facially problematic than the provision at issue in Arizona. Unlike Arizona's section 2(B), which is a mandatory investigation provision, section 8 authorizes--but does not require--state officials to conduct an inquiry into im migration status whenever a detained indivi dual cannot produce satisfactory identification. [] Furtherm ore, section 8 has the sam e three built-in limitations as the Arizona statute. See O.C.G.A. § 17-5-100(b) (providing that certain docum entation is sufficient to establish immigration status); id. § 17-5-100(d) (prohibiting use of race, color, or national origin in implem enting the provision); Ga. L. 2011, p. 794, § 1(c) (requiring implementation consistent with "federal laws governing immigration and civil rights"). Indeed, at oral argument, counsel for the

3But see footnote 1.

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state of Georgia emp hasized that section 8 authorizes arrest and detention only to the extent permitted by federal law. This interpretation is consistent with the plain language of O.C.G.A. § 17-5-100(e). We are therefore reluctant to conclude thatthe state statute "will be construed in a way that creates a conflic t with federal law." Arizona , 132 S. Ct. at 2510.

Id. Implicit in this passage is the Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion that section 8 of the

Act could be im plemented in a m anner which does not conflict w ith federal law.

Indeed, the court noted that “the nonmandatory nature of section 8 invites a host of

other problems, namely racial profiling,” bu,t because the statuteitself prevents racial

profiling, the court concluded that it would be “inappropriate … to assume that the

state will disregard its own law,” and noted that an “unconstitutional application of

the statute could be challenged in later litigation.” Id. at 1268 n.12 (citing Arizona,

132 S. Ct. at 2510). Because the Eleventh Circuit concluded that there could be

situations in which section 8 is applied constitutionally, albeit at the prelim inary

injunction stage, the Plaintiffs’ facial challenge to section 8 must fail.

The Arizona District Court reached a similar conclusion after the Supreme

Court’s decision in Arizona. Following the Supreme Court mandate, the district court

in that case considered a new motion for a preliminary injunction against section 2(B)

of the Arizona Statute, the analogue to section 8 in Georgia. See Valle del Sol v.

Whiting, No. CV 10-1061-PHX-SRB, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172196, at *31 (D.

Ariz. Sep. 5, 2012). The plaintiffs argued that the Supreme Court’s conclusion that

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section 2(B) was n ot p reempted on its face was made without the record that the

plaintiffs had developed before the districct ourt, which demonstrated that 2(B) would

be enforced in an unconstitutional m anner. Id. at *32. The court rejected the

plaintiffs’ argument and stated that the Supreme Court’s decision barred further facial

preenforcement challenges, and cited the El eventh Circuit’s opinion in this case to

support its conclusion. Id. at *33 (citing Georgia Latino Alliance, 691 F.3d at 1250;

United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2012)). The court stated that it:

will not ignore the clear direction in the Arizonaopinion that Subsection 2(B) cannot be challengedfurther on its face beforethe law takes effect. As the Supreme Court stated, Plain tiffs and the United States m ay be able to challenge the provision on other preemption and constitutional grounds “as interpreted a nd applied after it goes into effect.” See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2510. Plaintiffs have not shown that they are likely to succeed on their facial challenges to Subsection 2(B) becau se of the conclusions of the Supreme Court in Arizona.
Id. at *33-34. The court concluded that, “[ w]ithout a set of as-applied facts, the

Supreme Court has held that it would be speculative to decide as a matter of law that

Subsection 2(B) will be enforced in an unconstitutional m anner.” Id. at *35.

Although the court was considering a preliminary injunction request and the Plaintiffs

here are seek ing t o defeat a motion to di smiss, the sam e reasoning applies. The

Eleventh Circuit has instructed that sec tion 8 could be applie d in a constitutional

manner in the same way that the Supreme Court instructed that Subsection 2(B) could

be applied in a constitutional manner. Following that instruction, it is inappropriate

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to rule on the section’s validity prior to an as-applied challenge, an d therefore the Plaintiffs cannot establish that section 8 is facially infirm.
The Plaintiffs suggest that the South Caorlina district court’s ruling concerning South Carolina’s analogue to section 8 supports the Plaintiffs’ request for discovery to further develop their facial challenge. However, the court in that case did not, as the Plaintiffs argue, endorse discovery pertaining to a facial challenge. The district court there rem oved a prelim inary inju nction it had issued prior to the Suprem e Court’s decision in Arizona. The court stated that, with respect to South Carolina’s analogue to section 8, and in light of Arizona , “an injunction at this stage of the litigation is not appropriate… This litig ation is only at the prelim inary injunction stage, and this Court’s decision to disso lve the injunction regarding these statuschecking provisions does not foreclose a future as-applied challenge based upon subsequent factual and legal developments.” United States v. South Carolina, 906 F. Supp. 2d 463, 471 (D.S.C. 2012) (emphasis supplied). The Plaintiffs rely on the next sentence in the opinion, which states that, “[in] the course of this litigation, the parties will have the opportunity to conduct disc overy regarding the actual practices and procedures associated withthe implementation of [the South Carolina provision,]and this Court can then address these issueswith the benefit of a full record.” Id.Reading the passage as a whole, the court’s refere nce to “this litigation” does not appear to

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reference solely the facial challenge but instead references the litigation challenging

the statute in general. See id. Indeed, in a footnote following the passage the district

court stated that “[a] legitimate line of inquiry in discovery would be whether law

enforcement officers, in circumstances where the work a ssociated with the original

purpose of the stop or detention has been com pleted, term inate or prolong the

detention while awaiting the completion ofthe immigration status inquiry.” Id.at 471

n.4. This line of inquiry relates to an as-applied challenge, as it discusses specific

facts associated with specific stops or detentions and specific officers. See Harris v.

Mexican Specialty Foods, Inc., 564 F.3d 1301, 1308 (11th Cir.2009) (“An as-applied

challenge … addresses whether a statute is unconstitutional on the facts of a particular

case or to a particular party.”).

In the face of the El eventh Circuit’ s opinion in this case and the Supreme

Court’s opinion in Arizona , the Plaintiffs face an insurm ountable burden in

establishing the facial invalidity of section 8. The opinions establish that therecould

be situations in which section 8 of HB87 is applied without conflicting with federal

law.4 Georgia has not had the opportunity “to accord [section 8

] a l imiting

construction to avoid constitutional ques tions.” Washington State Grange v.

Washington State Republican Party , 552 U.S. 442, 450 (1987). Accordingly, the

4But see footnote 1.
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Plaintiffs cannot meet their burden of showing that section 8 “couldnever be applied in a constitutional manner.” AFSCME Council 79 , No. 12-12908, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 10786, at *18 (emphasis supplied). However, the Court’s determination that the Plaintiffs cannot establish the facial invalidity of section 8 “does not foreclose other preemption and constitutional challenges to the law as interpreted and applied after it goes into effect.” Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2510.
IV. Conclusion For the reasons set forth above, the Defendants’ Supplem ental Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 144] is GRANTED. SO ORDERED, this 18 day of July, 2013.
/s/Thomas W. Thrash THOMAS W. THRASH, JR. United States District Judge

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 Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 1 of 70
4months,CLOSED,SUBMDJ
U.S. District Court Northern District of Georgia (Atlanta) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:11−cv−01804−TWT

Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights et al v. Deal et al Assigned to: Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr Case in other court: USCA, 11−13044−FF Cause: 42:1981 Civil Rights
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 06/02/2011 Date Terminated: 07/19/2013 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 950 Constitutional − State Statute Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights

represented by Andre I. Segura American Civil Liberties Union Foundation−NY 125 Broad Street 18th Floor New York, NY 10004 212−549−2676 Email: asegura@aclu.org LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carolyn Hsu Asian Law Caucus 55 Columbus Avenue San Francisco, CA 94111 415−896−1701 ext. 108 Email: CarolynH@asianlawcaucus.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cecillia D. Wang ACLU Immigrant's Rights Project 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, CA 94111 415−343−0775 Email: CWANG@ACLU.ORG LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elora Mukherjee ACLU Racial Justice Program 18th Floor 125 Broad Street New York, NY 10004 212−549−2664 Email: emukherjee@aclu.org LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karen C. Tumlin National Immigration Law Center Suite 2850 3435 Wilshire Boulevard Los Angles, CA 90010 213−639−3900 Email: tumlin@nilc.org LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 2 of 70
PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Desormeau ACLU Immigrant's Rights Project 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, CA 94111 415−343−0778 Email: KDESORMEAU@ACLU.ORG LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linton Joaquin National Immigration Law Center Suite 2850 3435 Wilshire Boulevard Los Angles, CA 90010 213−639−3900 Email: joaquin@nilc.org LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa S. Keaney National Immigration Law Center Suite 2850 3435 Wilshire Boulevard Los Angles, CA 90010 213−639−3900 Email: keaney@nilc.org LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nora Preciado National Immigration Law Center Suite 2850 3435 Wilshire Boulevard Los Angles, CA 90010 213−639−3900 Email: preciado@nilc.org LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel Brooke Southern Poverty Law Center−AL 400 Washington Avenue Montgomery, AL 36104 334−956−8200 Email: sbrooke@splcenter.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tanya Broder National Immigration Law Center Suite 401 405 14th Street Oakland, CA 94612 510−663−8282 Fax: 510−663−2028 Email: Broder@nilc.org LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 3 of 70
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Winifred Kao Asian Americans Advancing Justice − Asian Law Caucus 55 Columbus Avenue San Francisco, CA 94111 415−896−1701 ext. 102 Email: winifredk@asianlawcaucus.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew H. Turner Southern Poverty Law Center−AL 400 Washington Avenue Montgomery, AL 36104 334−956−8326 Email: andrew.turner@splcenter.org PRO HAC VICE
Azadeh N. Shahshahani ACLU of Georgia Building 400, Suite 425 1900 The Exchange, SE Atlanta, GA 30339 770−303−8111 Email: ashahshahani@acluga.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Chara Fisher Jackson ACLU of Georgia Building 400, Suite 425 1900 The Exchange, SE Atlanta, GA 30339 770−303−8111 Fax: 770−303−0060 Email: cfjackson@acluga.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Charles H. Kuck Kuck Immigration Partners LLC 8010 Roswell Road Suite 300 Atlanta, GA 30350 404−816−8611 Fax: 404−816−8615 Email: ckuck@immigration.net ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Werner Southern Poverty Law Center − Atl Immigrant Justice Project 1989 College Ave. N.E. Atlanta, GA 30317 404−521−6700 Fax: 404−221−5857 Email: daniel.werner@splcenter.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Danielle M. Claffey Kuck Immigration Partners LLC 8010 Roswell Road Suite 300 Atlanta, GA 30350 404−816−8611

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 4 of 70
Fax: 404−816−8615 Email: dconley@immigration.net ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
George Brian Spears Law Office of Brian Spears 1126 Ponce de Leon Avenue Atlanta, GA 30306 404−872−7086 Fax: 404−892−1128 Email: Bspears@mindspring.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Blazer National Immigration Law Center Suite 1400 405 14th Street Oakland, CA 94612 510−663−8282 Email: blazer@nilc.org TERMINATED: 01/05/2012 PRO HAC VICE
Kenneth John Sugarman ACLU Immigrant's Rights Project 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, CA 94111 415−343−0777 Email: irp_ks@aclu.org TERMINATED: 04/27/2012 PRO HAC VICE
Mary C. Bauer Southern Poverty Law Center−AL 400 Washington Avenue Montgomery, AL 36104 334−956−8200 Email: mbauer@splcenter.org TERMINATED: 06/12/2013
Michelle R. Lapointe Southern Poverty Law Center − Atl Immigrant Justice Project 1989 College Ave. N.E. Atlanta, GA 30317 404−521−6700 Fax: 404−221−5857 Email: michelle.lapointe@splcenter.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Naomi Ruth Tsu Southern Poverty Law Center − Atl Immigrant Justice Project 1989 College Ave. N.E. Atlanta, GA 30317 404−521−6700 Fax: 404−221−5857 Email: naomi.tsu@splcenter.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar C. Jadwat American Civil Liberties Union Foundation−NY 125 Broad Street 18th Floor

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 5 of 70

New York, NY 10004 212−549−2620 Email: ojadwat@aclu.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert Keegan Federal , Jr. The Federal Firm, LLC Building #12, Suite 200 750 Hammond Drive Atlanta, GA 30328 404−843−1009 Fax: 678−443−4081 Email: keegan@fedfirm.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sin Yen Ling Asian Americans Advancing Justice − Asian Law Caucus 55 Columbus Avenue San Francisco, CA 94111 415−896−1701 Email: sinyenl@asianlawcaucus.org TERMINATED: 07/23/2013 PRO HAC VICE

Plaintiff Service Employees International Union

represented by Andre I. Segura (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carolyn Hsu (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cecillia D. Wang (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karen C. Tumlin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine Desormeau (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linton Joaquin (See above for address)

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 6 of 70
LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa S. Keaney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nora Preciado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel Brooke (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tanya Broder (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Winifred Kao (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew H. Turner (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Azadeh N. Shahshahani (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Chara Fisher Jackson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Charles H. Kuck (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Werner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Danielle M. Claffey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
George Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Blazer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/05/2012 PRO HAC VICE

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 7 of 70

Kenneth John Sugarman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/27/2012 PRO HAC VICE

Mary C. Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/12/2013

Michelle R. Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Naomi Ruth Tsu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Omar C. Jadwat (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert Keegan Federal , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/23/2013 PRO HAC VICE

Plaintiff
Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United

represented by Andre I. Segura (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carolyn Hsu (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cecillia D. Wang (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jonathan Blazer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/05/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE

Karen C. Tumlin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 8 of 70
PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Desormeau (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linton Joaquin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa S. Keaney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nora Preciado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel Brooke (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tanya Broder (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Winifred Kao (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew H. Turner (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Azadeh N. Shahshahani (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Chara Fisher Jackson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Charles H. Kuck (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Werner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Danielle M. Claffey (See above for address)

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 9 of 70

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

George Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kenneth John Sugarman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/27/2012 PRO HAC VICE

Mary C. Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/12/2013

Michelle R. Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Naomi Ruth Tsu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Omar C. Jadwat (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert Keegan Federal , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/23/2013 PRO HAC VICE

Plaintiff DREAM Activist.org

represented by Andre I. Segura (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carolyn Hsu (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cecillia D. Wang (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karen C. Tumlin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 10 of 70
PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Desormeau (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linton Joaquin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa S. Keaney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nora Preciado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel Brooke (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tanya Broder (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Winifred Kao (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew H. Turner (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Azadeh N. Shahshahani (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Chara Fisher Jackson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Charles H. Kuck (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Werner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Danielle M. Claffey (See above for address)

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 11 of 70

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

George Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jonathan Blazer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/05/2012 PRO HAC VICE

Kenneth John Sugarman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/27/2012 PRO HAC VICE

Mary C. Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/12/2013

Michelle R. Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Naomi Ruth Tsu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Omar C. Jadwat (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert Keegan Federal , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/23/2013 PRO HAC VICE

Plaintiff Task Force for the Homeless

represented by Andre I. Segura (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carolyn Hsu (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cecillia D. Wang (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 12 of 70
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen C. Tumlin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Desormeau (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linton Joaquin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa S. Keaney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nora Preciado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel Brooke (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tanya Broder (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Winifred Kao (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew H. Turner (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Azadeh N. Shahshahani (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Chara Fisher Jackson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Charles H. Kuck (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Werner

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 13 of 70

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Danielle M. Claffey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

George Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jonathan Blazer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/05/2012 PRO HAC VICE

Kenneth John Sugarman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/27/2012 PRO HAC VICE

Mary C. Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/12/2013

Michelle R. Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Naomi Ruth Tsu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Omar C. Jadwat (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert Keegan Federal , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/23/2013 PRO HAC VICE

Plaintiff
Asian American Legal Advocacy Center

represented by Andre I. Segura (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carolyn Hsu (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cecillia D. Wang (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 14 of 70
Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen C. Tumlin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Desormeau (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linton Joaquin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa S. Keaney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nora Preciado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel Brooke (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tanya Broder (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Winifred Kao (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew H. Turner (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Azadeh N. Shahshahani (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Chara Fisher Jackson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 15 of 70

Charles H. Kuck (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Werner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Danielle M. Claffey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

George Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jonathan Blazer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/05/2012 PRO HAC VICE

Kenneth John Sugarman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/27/2012 PRO HAC VICE

Mary C. Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/12/2013

Michelle R. Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Naomi Ruth Tsu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Omar C. Jadwat (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert Keegan Federal , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/23/2013 PRO HAC VICE

Plaintiff Alterna

represented by Andre I. Segura (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carolyn Hsu (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 16 of 70
Cecillia D. Wang (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen C. Tumlin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Desormeau (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linton Joaquin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa S. Keaney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nora Preciado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel Brooke (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tanya Broder (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Winifred Kao (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew H. Turner (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Azadeh N. Shahshahani (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 17 of 70

Plaintiff Coalition of Latino Leaders

Chara Fisher Jackson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Charles H. Kuck (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Werner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Danielle M. Claffey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
George Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Blazer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/05/2012 PRO HAC VICE
Kenneth John Sugarman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/27/2012 PRO HAC VICE
Mary C. Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/12/2013
Michelle R. Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Naomi Ruth Tsu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar C. Jadwat (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Keegan Federal , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/23/2013 PRO HAC VICE
represented by Andre I. Segura (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 18 of 70
Carolyn Hsu (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cecillia D. Wang (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen C. Tumlin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Desormeau (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linton Joaquin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa S. Keaney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nora Preciado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel Brooke (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tanya Broder (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Winifred Kao (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew H. Turner (See above for address)

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 19 of 70

PRO HAC VICE

Azadeh N. Shahshahani (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Chara Fisher Jackson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charles H. Kuck (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Werner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Danielle M. Claffey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

George Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jonathan Blazer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/05/2012 PRO HAC VICE

Kenneth John Sugarman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/27/2012 PRO HAC VICE

Mary C. Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/12/2013

Michelle R. Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Naomi Ruth Tsu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Omar C. Jadwat (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert Keegan Federal , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/23/2013 PRO HAC VICE

Plaintiff Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta

represented by

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 20 of 70
Andre I. Segura (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carolyn Hsu (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cecillia D. Wang (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen C. Tumlin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Desormeau (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linton Joaquin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa S. Keaney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nora Preciado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel Brooke (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tanya Broder (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Winifred Kao

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 21 of 70
(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew H. Turner (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Azadeh N. Shahshahani (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Chara Fisher Jackson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Charles H. Kuck (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Werner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Danielle M. Claffey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
George Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Blazer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/05/2012 PRO HAC VICE
Kenneth John Sugarman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/27/2012 PRO HAC VICE
Mary C. Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/12/2013
Michelle R. Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Naomi Ruth Tsu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar C. Jadwat (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Keegan Federal , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sin Yen Ling (See above for address)

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 22 of 70

TERMINATED: 07/23/2013 PRO HAC VICE

Plaintiff Coalition for the People's Agenda

represented by Andre I. Segura (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carolyn Hsu (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cecillia D. Wang (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karen C. Tumlin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine Desormeau (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linton Joaquin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Melissa S. Keaney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nora Preciado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Samuel Brooke (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Tanya Broder (See above for address)

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 23 of 70
LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Winifred Kao (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew H. Turner (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Azadeh N. Shahshahani (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Chara Fisher Jackson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Charles H. Kuck (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Werner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Danielle M. Claffey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
George Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Blazer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/05/2012 PRO HAC VICE
Kenneth John Sugarman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/27/2012 PRO HAC VICE
Mary C. Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/12/2013
Michelle R. Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Naomi Ruth Tsu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar C. Jadwat (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Keegan Federal , Jr.

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 24 of 70

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/23/2013 PRO HAC VICE

Plaintiff Paul Bridges

represented by Andre I. Segura (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carolyn Hsu (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cecillia D. Wang (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karen C. Tumlin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine Desormeau (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linton Joaquin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Melissa S. Keaney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nora Preciado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Samuel Brooke (See above for address)

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 25 of 70
LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tanya Broder (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Winifred Kao (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew H. Turner (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Azadeh N. Shahshahani (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Chara Fisher Jackson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Charles H. Kuck (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Werner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Danielle M. Claffey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
George Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Blazer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/05/2012 PRO HAC VICE
Kenneth John Sugarman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/27/2012 PRO HAC VICE
Mary C. Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/12/2013
Michelle R. Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Naomi Ruth Tsu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar C. Jadwat

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 26 of 70

(See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert Keegan Federal , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/23/2013 PRO HAC VICE

Plaintiff Benjamin Speight

represented by Andre I. Segura (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carolyn Hsu (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cecillia D. Wang (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karen C. Tumlin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine Desormeau (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linton Joaquin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Melissa S. Keaney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nora Preciado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 27 of 70
PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel Brooke (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tanya Broder (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Winifred Kao (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew H. Turner (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Azadeh N. Shahshahani (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Chara Fisher Jackson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Charles H. Kuck (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Werner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Danielle M. Claffey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
George Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Blazer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/05/2012 PRO HAC VICE
Kenneth John Sugarman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/27/2012 PRO HAC VICE
Mary C. Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/12/2013
Michelle R. Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 28 of 70

Naomi Ruth Tsu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Omar C. Jadwat (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert Keegan Federal , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/23/2013 PRO HAC VICE

Plaintiff Everitt Howe

represented by Andre I. Segura (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carolyn Hsu (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cecillia D. Wang (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karen C. Tumlin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine Desormeau (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linton Joaquin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Melissa S. Keaney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 29 of 70
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nora Preciado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel Brooke (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tanya Broder (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Winifred Kao (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew H. Turner (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Azadeh N. Shahshahani (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Chara Fisher Jackson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Charles H. Kuck (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Werner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Danielle M. Claffey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
George Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Blazer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/05/2012 PRO HAC VICE
Kenneth John Sugarman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/27/2012 PRO HAC VICE
Mary C. Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/12/2013

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 30 of 70

Plaintiff Paul C. Edwards

Michelle R. Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Naomi Ruth Tsu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar C. Jadwat (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Keegan Federal , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/23/2013 PRO HAC VICE
represented by Carolyn Hsu (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cecillia D. Wang (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen C. Tumlin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Desormeau (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linton Joaquin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa S. Keaney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 31 of 70
Nora Preciado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel Brooke (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tanya Broder (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Winifred Kao (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew H. Turner (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Azadeh N. Shahshahani (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Chara Fisher Jackson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Charles H. Kuck (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Werner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Danielle M. Claffey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
George Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Blazer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/05/2012
Kenneth John Sugarman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/27/2012 PRO HAC VICE
Mary C. Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/12/2013
Michelle R. Lapointe

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 32 of 70

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Naomi Ruth Tsu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Omar C. Jadwat (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert Keegan Federal , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/23/2013 PRO HAC VICE

Plaintiff Sharon Gruner

represented by Andre I. Segura (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carolyn Hsu (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cecillia D. Wang (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karen C. Tumlin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine Desormeau (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linton Joaquin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Melissa S. Keaney

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 33 of 70
(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nora Preciado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel Brooke (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tanya Broder (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Winifred Kao (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew H. Turner (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Azadeh N. Shahshahani (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Chara Fisher Jackson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Charles H. Kuck (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Werner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Danielle M. Claffey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
George Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Blazer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/05/2012 PRO HAC VICE
Kenneth John Sugarman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/27/2012 PRO HAC VICE

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 34 of 70

Mary C. Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/12/2013

Michelle R. Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Naomi Ruth Tsu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Omar C. Jadwat (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert Keegan Federal , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/23/2013 PRO HAC VICE

Plaintiff Jane Doe # 1

represented by Carolyn Hsu (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cecillia D. Wang (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karen C. Tumlin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine Desormeau (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linton Joaquin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Melissa S. Keaney (See above for address)

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 35 of 70
LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nora Preciado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel Brooke (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tanya Broder (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Winifred Kao (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew H. Turner (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Azadeh N. Shahshahani (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Chara Fisher Jackson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Charles H. Kuck (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Werner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Danielle M. Claffey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
George Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Blazer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/05/2012
Kenneth John Sugarman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/27/2012 PRO HAC VICE
Mary C. Bauer (See above for address)

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 36 of 70

TERMINATED: 06/12/2013

Michelle R. Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Naomi Ruth Tsu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Omar C. Jadwat (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert Keegan Federal , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/23/2013 PRO HAC VICE

Plaintiff Jaypaul Singh

represented by Andre I. Segura (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cecillia D. Wang (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karen C. Tumlin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine Desormeau (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linton Joaquin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Melissa S. Keaney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 37 of 70
PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nora Preciado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel Brooke (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tanya Broder (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew H. Turner (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Azadeh N. Shahshahani (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Chara Fisher Jackson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Charles H. Kuck (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Werner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Danielle M. Claffey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
George Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Blazer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/05/2012 PRO HAC VICE
Kenneth John Sugarman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/27/2012 PRO HAC VICE
Mary C. Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/12/2013
Michelle R. Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 38 of 70

Plaintiff Ernesto Pinon

Naomi Ruth Tsu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar C. Jadwat (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Keegan Federal , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/23/2013 PRO HAC VICE
represented by Andre I. Segura (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carolyn Hsu (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cecillia D. Wang (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen C. Tumlin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Desormeau (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linton Joaquin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa S. Keaney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 39 of 70
PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nora Preciado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel Brooke (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tanya Broder (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Winifred Kao (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew H. Turner (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Azadeh N. Shahshahani (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Chara Fisher Jackson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Charles H. Kuck (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Werner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Danielle M. Claffey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
George Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Blazer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/05/2012 PRO HAC VICE
Kenneth John Sugarman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/27/2012 PRO HAC VICE
Mary C. Bauer (See above for address)

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 40 of 70

TERMINATED: 06/12/2013

Michelle R. Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Naomi Ruth Tsu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Omar C. Jadwat (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert Keegan Federal , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/23/2013 PRO HAC VICE

Plaintiff
John Doe # 1 TERMINATED: 01/08/2013

represented by Carolyn Hsu (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cecillia D. Wang (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karen C. Tumlin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine Desormeau (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linton Joaquin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Melissa S. Keaney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 41 of 70
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nora Preciado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel Brooke (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tanya Broder (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Winifred Kao (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew H. Turner (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Azadeh N. Shahshahani (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Chara Fisher Jackson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Charles H. Kuck (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Werner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Danielle M. Claffey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
George Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Blazer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/05/2012
Kenneth John Sugarman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/27/2012 PRO HAC VICE
Mary C. Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/12/2013

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 42 of 70

Michelle R. Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Naomi Ruth Tsu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Omar C. Jadwat (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert Keegan Federal , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/23/2013 PRO HAC VICE

Plaintiff John Doe # 2

represented by Carolyn Hsu (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cecillia D. Wang (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karen C. Tumlin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine Desormeau (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linton Joaquin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Melissa S. Keaney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 43 of 70
Nora Preciado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel Brooke (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tanya Broder (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Winifred Kao (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew H. Turner (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Azadeh N. Shahshahani (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Chara Fisher Jackson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Charles H. Kuck (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Werner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Danielle M. Claffey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
George Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Blazer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/05/2012
Kenneth John Sugarman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/27/2012 PRO HAC VICE
Mary C. Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/12/2013
Michelle R. Lapointe (See above for address)

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 44 of 70

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Naomi Ruth Tsu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Omar C. Jadwat (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert Keegan Federal , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/23/2013 PRO HAC VICE

Plaintiff Jane Doe # 2

represented by Carolyn Hsu (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cecillia D. Wang (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karen C. Tumlin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine Desormeau (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linton Joaquin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Melissa S. Keaney (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nora Preciado (See above for address)

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 45 of 70
LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel Brooke (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tanya Broder (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Winifred Kao (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew H. Turner (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Azadeh N. Shahshahani (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Chara Fisher Jackson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Charles H. Kuck (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Werner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Danielle M. Claffey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
George Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Blazer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/05/2012
Kenneth John Sugarman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/27/2012 PRO HAC VICE
Mary C. Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/12/2013
Michelle R. Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 46 of 70

Naomi Ruth Tsu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Omar C. Jadwat (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert Keegan Federal , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/23/2013 PRO HAC VICE

Plaintiff David Kennedy

represented by Carolyn Hsu (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Samuel Brooke (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Winifred Kao (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andre I. Segura (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew H. Turner (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE

Azadeh N. Shahshahani (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cecillia D. Wang (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Chara Fisher Jackson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charles H. Kuck (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Werner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 47 of 70
Danielle M. Claffey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
George Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Blazer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/05/2012 PRO HAC VICE
Karen C. Tumlin (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Desormeau (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth John Sugarman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/27/2012 PRO HAC VICE
Linton Joaquin (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary C. Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/12/2013
Melissa S. Keaney (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle R. Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Naomi Ruth Tsu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nora Preciado (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar C. Jadwat (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 48 of 70
Robert Keegan Federal , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/23/2013 PRO HAC VICE
Tanya Broder (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Nathan Deal Governor of the State of Georgia, in his official capacity
Defendant Samuel S. Olens Attorney General of the State of Georgia, in his official capacity
Defendant Clyde L. Reese, III Commissioner of the Department of Human Services of the State of Georgia, in his official capacity TERMINATED: 03/20/2013 Defendant Mike Beatty Commissioner of the Department of Community Affairs of the State of Georgia, in his official capacity TERMINATED: 03/20/2013 Defendant

represented by Devon Orland Office of State Attorney General 40 Capitol Square, S.W. Atlanta, GA 30334−1300 404−463−8850 Fax: 404−651−5304 Email: dorland@law.ga.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Meghan Robson Davidson Nall &Miller, LLP 235 Peachtree Street, N.E. North Tower, Suite 1500 Atlanta, GA 30303−1401 678−608−1704 Fax: 404−522−2208 Email: mdavidson@nallmiller.com TERMINATED: 08/18/2011
represented by Devon Orland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Meghan Robson Davidson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/2011
represented by Devon Orland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Devon Orland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 49 of 70

Falecia Stewart Executive Director of the Housing Authority of Fulton County Georgia, in her official capacity TERMINATED: 03/20/2013

Pickens Andrew Patterson , Jr. Thomas Kennedy Sampson &Patterson 3355 Main Street Atlanta, GA 30337 404−688−4503 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus ANTI−DEFAMATION LEAGUE

represented by Dale M. Schwartz Schwartz Posel Immigration Law Group 5500 Interstate North Parkway RiverEdge One, Suite 450 Atlanta, GA 30328−4662 770−951−1100 Fax: 770−951−1113 Email: dale@immlawfirm.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus United Mexican States

represented by Carla Gorniak Clifford Chance LLP−NY 31 W. 52nd Street New York, NY 10019 212−878−8000 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher R. Clark Dewey &LeBoeuf, LLP−NY 1301 Avenue of he Americas New York, NY 10019 212−259−7163 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Henry L. Solano Dewey &LeBoeuf, LLP−NY 1301 Avenue of he Americas New York, NY 10019 212−259−8030 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Emmet J. Bondurant , II Bondurant Mixson &Elmore, LLP 1201 West Peachtree Street, N.W. 3900 One Atlantic Center Atlanta, GA 30309−3417 404−881−4126 Email: bondurant@bmelaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus Argentina

represented by Emmet J. Bondurant , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 50 of 70

Brazil

represented by Emmet J. Bondurant , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus Chile

represented by Emmet J. Bondurant , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus Colombia

represented by Emmet J. Bondurant , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus Costa Rica

represented by Emmet J. Bondurant , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus El Salvador

represented by Emmet J. Bondurant , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus Guatemala

represented by Emmet J. Bondurant , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus Honduras

represented by Emmet J. Bondurant , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus Nicaragua

represented by Emmet J. Bondurant , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus Peru

represented by Emmet J. Bondurant , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus
American Immigration Lawyers Association

represented by Farrin Rose Anello Immigration Clinic, University of Miami School of Law 1311 Miller Drive E257 Coral Gables, FL 33146 305−284−3476 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca Ann Sharpless Immigration Clinic, University of Miami School of Law

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 51 of 70

1311 Miller Drive E257 Coral Gables, FL 33146 305−284−3476 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Socheat Chea Socheat Chea, P.C. Bldg. 300 3500 Duluth Park Lane Duluth, GA 30096 770−623−8880 Fax: 770−623−8852 Email: schea@mindspring.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus GALEO

represented by Douglas Brooks Rohan Rohan Law, P.C. 4360 Chamblee Dunwoody Rd. Suite 208 Atlanta, GA 30341 404−923−0446 Email: doug@rohanlawpc.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus
Southern Center for Human Rights 83 Poplar Street Atlanta, GA 30303 404−688−1202

represented by Gerald R. Weber Law Offices of Gerry Weber, LLC P.O. Box 5391 642 Gaskill Street Atlanta, GA 31107 404−522−0507 Email: wgerryweber@gmail.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus Uruguay

represented by Emmet J. Bondurant , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus Rightmarch.com

represented by Nathaniel J. Oleson United States Justice Foundation 932 D. Street Suite 3 Ramona, CA 92065 760−788−6624 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gerald Jason Thompson The Thompson Law Firm Suite 101 200 East Crogan Street Lawrenceville, GA 30046 678−442−6464 Email: thompsonlawfirm@hotmail.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 52 of 70

Amicus Joshua Clark
Amicus Brett Harrell

represented by Gerald Jason Thompson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Gerald Jason Thompson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 06/02/2011
06/02/2011
06/02/2011 06/02/2011 06/02/2011
06/02/2011
06/02/2011

# Docket Text
1 CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT filed by Sharon Gruner, Alterna, Benjamin Speight, Ernesto Pinon, Coalition of Latino Leaders, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Jane Doe # 1, Paul J. Edwards, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Everitt Howe, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul Bridges, John Doe # 1, Service Employees International Union, DREAM Activist.org, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Task Force for the Homeless, Jaypaul Singh, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta, and summon(s) issued. Consent form to proceed before U.S. Magistrate and pretrial instructions provided. Filing fee $350 receipt number 35925. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Summons, # 3 Civil Cover Sheet) (jtj) Please visit our website at http://www.gand.uscourts.gov to obtain Pretrial Instructions. (Entered: 06/02/2011)
2 Certificate of Interested Persons and Corporate Disclosure Statement by Alterna, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Paul Bridges, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Coalition of Latino Leaders, DREAM Activist.org, Jane Doe # 1, John Doe # 1, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul J. Edwards, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Sharon Gruner, Everitt Howe, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta, Ernesto Pinon, Service Employees International Union, Jaypaul Singh, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Benjamin Speight, Task Force for the Homeless. (jtj) (Entered: 06/02/2011)
3 MOTION for Leave to Proceed under Pseudonyms by Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Text of Proposed Order) (jtj) (Entered: 06/02/2011)
4 MOTION for Leave to Exceed Page Limits for Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction by Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order) (jtj) (Entered: 06/02/2011)
5 APPLICATION for Admission of Omar C. Jadwat Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3334161)by Alterna, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Paul Bridges, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Coalition of Latino Leaders, DREAM Activist.org, Jane Doe # 1, John Doe # 1, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul J. Edwards, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Sharon Gruner, Everitt Howe, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta, Ernesto Pinon, Service Employees International Union, Jaypaul Singh, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Benjamin Speight, Task Force for the Homeless. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Lapointe, Michelle) (Entered: 06/02/2011)
6 APPLICATION for Admission of Andre I Segura Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3334183)by Alterna, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Paul Bridges, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Coalition of Latino Leaders, DREAM Activist.org, Jane Doe # 1, John Doe # 1, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul J. Edwards, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Sharon Gruner, Everitt Howe, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta, Ernesto Pinon, Service Employees International Union, Jaypaul Singh, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Benjamin Speight, Task Force for the Homeless. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Lapointe, Michelle) (Entered: 06/02/2011)
7 APPLICATION for Admission of Jonathan Blazer Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3334223)by Alterna, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Paul Bridges, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Coalition of Latino

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 53 of 70

06/02/2011 06/02/2011 06/02/2011 06/02/2011 06/02/2011 06/02/2011

Leaders, DREAM Activist.org, Jane Doe # 1, John Doe # 1, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul J. Edwards, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Sharon Gruner, Everitt Howe, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta, Ernesto Pinon, Service Employees International Union, Jaypaul Singh, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Benjamin Speight, Task Force for the Homeless. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Lapointe, Michelle) (Entered: 06/02/2011)
8 APPLICATION for Admission of Tanya Broder Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3334227)by Alterna, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Paul Bridges, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Coalition of Latino Leaders, DREAM Activist.org, Jane Doe # 1, John Doe # 1, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul J. Edwards, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Sharon Gruner, Everitt Howe, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta, Ernesto Pinon, Service Employees International Union, Jaypaul Singh, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Benjamin Speight, Task Force for the Homeless. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Lapointe, Michelle) (Entered: 06/02/2011)
9 APPLICATION for Admission of Cecillia D. Wang Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3334243)by Alterna, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Paul Bridges, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Coalition of Latino Leaders, DREAM Activist.org, Jane Doe # 1, John Doe # 1, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul J. Edwards, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Sharon Gruner, Everitt Howe, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta, Ernesto Pinon, Service Employees International Union, Jaypaul Singh, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Benjamin Speight, Task Force for the Homeless. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Lapointe, Michelle) (Entered: 06/02/2011)
10 APPLICATION for Admission of Elora Mukherjee Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3334250)by Alterna, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Paul Bridges, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Coalition of Latino Leaders, DREAM Activist.org, Jane Doe # 1, John Doe # 1, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul J. Edwards, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Sharon Gruner, Everitt Howe, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta, Ernesto Pinon, Service Employees International Union, Jaypaul Singh, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Benjamin Speight, Task Force for the Homeless. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Lapointe, Michelle) (Entered: 06/02/2011)
11 APPLICATION for Admission of Linton Joaquin Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3334271)by Alterna, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Paul Bridges, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Coalition of Latino Leaders, DREAM Activist.org, Jane Doe # 1, John Doe # 1, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul J. Edwards, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Sharon Gruner, Everitt Howe, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta, Ernesto Pinon, Service Employees International Union, Jaypaul Singh, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Benjamin Speight, Task Force for the Homeless. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Lapointe, Michelle) (Entered: 06/02/2011)
12 APPLICATION for Admission of Katherine Desormeau Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3334284)by Alterna, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Paul Bridges, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Coalition of Latino Leaders, DREAM Activist.org, Jane Doe # 1, John Doe # 1, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul J. Edwards, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Sharon Gruner, Everitt Howe, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta, Ernesto Pinon, Service Employees International Union, Jaypaul Singh, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Benjamin Speight, Task Force for the Homeless. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Lapointe, Michelle) (Entered: 06/02/2011)
13 APPLICATION for Admission of Melissa S. Keaney Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3334289)by Alterna, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Paul Bridges, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Coalition of Latino Leaders, DREAM Activist.org, Jane Doe # 1, John Doe # 1, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul J. Edwards, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Sharon Gruner, Everitt Howe, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta, Ernesto Pinon, Service Employees International Union, Jaypaul Singh, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Benjamin Speight, Task Force for the Homeless. (Attachments: #

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 54 of 70

06/02/2011 06/02/2011 06/03/2011 06/03/2011 06/03/2011 06/03/2011 06/03/2011 06/03/2011

1 Text of Proposed Order)(Lapointe, Michelle) (Entered: 06/02/2011)
14 APPLICATION for Admission of Nora Preciado Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3334298)by Alterna, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Paul Bridges, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Coalition of Latino Leaders, DREAM Activist.org, Jane Doe # 1, John Doe # 1, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul J. Edwards, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Sharon Gruner, Everitt Howe, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta, Ernesto Pinon, Service Employees International Union, Jaypaul Singh, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Benjamin Speight, Task Force for the Homeless. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Lapointe, Michelle) (Entered: 06/02/2011)
15 APPLICATION for Admission of Karen C. Tumlin Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3334307)by Alterna, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Paul Bridges, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Coalition of Latino Leaders, DREAM Activist.org, Jane Doe # 1, John Doe # 1, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul J. Edwards, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Sharon Gruner, Everitt Howe, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta, Ernesto Pinon, Service Employees International Union, Jaypaul Singh, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Benjamin Speight, Task Force for the Homeless. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Lapointe, Michelle) (Entered: 06/02/2011)
16 DOCUMENT FILING ERROR Application for Refund of Fees paid online through Pay.gov for receipt number 3334183. (Lapointe, Michelle) Modified on 6/3/2011 attorney contacted clerk's office, this application has erroneous information and is re−filing the document as to the correct receipt number (rvb). (Entered: 06/03/2011)
17 APPLICATION for Admission of Sin Yen Ling Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3335040)by Alterna, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Paul Bridges, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Coalition of Latino Leaders, DREAM Activist.org, Jane Doe # 1, John Doe # 1, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul J. Edwards, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Sharon Gruner, Everitt Howe, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta, Ernesto Pinon, Service Employees International Union, Jaypaul Singh, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Benjamin Speight, Task Force for the Homeless. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Lapointe, Michelle) (Entered: 06/03/2011)
18 APPLICATION for Admission of Samuel Brooke Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3335105)by Alterna, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Paul Bridges, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Coalition of Latino Leaders, DREAM Activist.org, Jane Doe # 1, John Doe # 1, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul J. Edwards, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Sharon Gruner, Everitt Howe, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta, Ernesto Pinon, Service Employees International Union, Jaypaul Singh, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Benjamin Speight, Task Force for the Homeless. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Lapointe, Michelle) (Entered: 06/03/2011)
19 APPLICATION for Admission of Andrew Hess Turner Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3335661)by Alterna, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Paul Bridges, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Coalition of Latino Leaders, DREAM Activist.org, Jane Doe # 1, John Doe # 1, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul J. Edwards, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Sharon Gruner, Everitt Howe, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta, Ernesto Pinon, Service Employees International Union, Jaypaul Singh, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Benjamin Speight, Task Force for the Homeless. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Lapointe, Michelle) (Entered: 06/03/2011)
20 ORDER granting 4 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages not to exceed 50 pages for the Memorandum in Support of their Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 6/3/11. (dr) (Entered: 06/03/2011)
21 Return of Service Executed by Sharon Gruner, Alterna, Benjamin Speight, Ernesto Pinon, Coalition of Latino Leaders, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Jane Doe # 1, Paul J. Edwards, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Everitt Howe, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul Bridges, John Doe # 1, Service Employees International Union, DREAM

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 55 of 70

06/03/2011
06/03/2011
06/03/2011
06/03/2011
06/03/2011 06/03/2011 06/03/2011 06/07/2011 06/07/2011

Activist.org, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Task Force for the Homeless, Jaypaul Singh, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta. Clyde L. Reese, III served on 6/2/2011, answer due 6/23/2011. (Lapointe, Michelle) (Entered: 06/03/2011)
22 Return of Service Executed by Sharon Gruner, Alterna, Benjamin Speight, Ernesto Pinon, Coalition of Latino Leaders, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Jane Doe # 1, Paul J. Edwards, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Everitt Howe, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul Bridges, John Doe # 1, Service Employees International Union, DREAM Activist.org, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Task Force for the Homeless, Jaypaul Singh, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta. Falecia Stewart served on 6/3/2011, answer due 6/24/2011. (Lapointe, Michelle) (Entered: 06/03/2011)
23 Return of Service Executed by Sharon Gruner, Alterna, Benjamin Speight, Ernesto Pinon, Coalition of Latino Leaders, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Jane Doe # 1, Paul J. Edwards, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Everitt Howe, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul Bridges, John Doe # 1, Service Employees International Union, DREAM Activist.org, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Task Force for the Homeless, Jaypaul Singh, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta. Mike Beatty served on 6/2/2011, answer due 6/23/2011. (Lapointe, Michelle) (Entered: 06/03/2011)
24 Return of Service Executed by Sharon Gruner, Alterna, Benjamin Speight, Ernesto Pinon, Coalition of Latino Leaders, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Jane Doe # 1, Paul J. Edwards, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Everitt Howe, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul Bridges, John Doe # 1, Service Employees International Union, DREAM Activist.org, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Task Force for the Homeless, Jaypaul Singh, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta. Nathan Deal served on 6/2/2011, answer due 6/23/2011. (Lapointe, Michelle) (Entered: 06/03/2011)
25 Return of Service Executed by Sharon Gruner, Alterna, Benjamin Speight, Ernesto Pinon, Coalition of Latino Leaders, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Jane Doe # 1, Paul J. Edwards, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Everitt Howe, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul Bridges, John Doe # 1, Service Employees International Union, DREAM Activist.org, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Task Force for the Homeless, Jaypaul Singh, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta. Samuel S. Olens served on 6/2/2011, answer due 6/23/2011. (Lapointe, Michelle) (Entered: 06/03/2011)
26 NOTICE of Appearance by Devon Orland on behalf of Mike Beatty, Nathan Deal, Samuel S. Olens, Clyde L. Reese, III (Orland, Devon) (Entered: 06/03/2011)
27 Request for Leave of Absence for the following date(s): June 22, 2011 through and including June 29, 2011, by Devon Orland. (Orland, Devon) (Entered: 06/03/2011)
28 Application for Refund of Fees paid online through Pay.gov for receipt number 3334193. (Lapointe, Michelle) (Entered: 06/03/2011)
Clerks Approval re 28 Application for Refund of Fees paid online. (mmc) (Entered: 06/07/2011)
APPROVAL by Clerks Office re: 9 APPLICATION for Admission of Cecillia D. Wang Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3334243), 11 APPLICATION for Admission of Linton Joaquin Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3334271) 12 APPLICATION for Admission of Katherine Desormeau Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3334284), 13 APPLICATION for Admission of Melissa S. Keaney Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3334289) 15 APPLICATION for Admission of Karen C. Tumlin Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3334307) APPLICATION for Admission of Karen C. Tumlin Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3334307) APPLICATION for Admission of Karen C. Tumlin Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3334307). Attorney Tanya Broder, Karen C. Tumlin, Katherine

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 56 of 70

06/08/2011 06/08/2011
06/08/2011

Desormeau, Melissa S. Keaney, Linton Joaquin, Cecillia D. Wang added appearing on behalf of Alterna, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Paul Bridges, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Coalition of Latino Leaders, DREAM Activist.org, Jane Doe # 1, John Doe # 1, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul J. Edwards, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Sharon Gruner, Everitt Howe, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta, Ernesto Pinon, Service Employees International Union, Jaypaul Singh, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Benjamin Speight, Task Force for the Homeless (cdg) (Entered: 06/07/2011)
APPROVAL by Clerks Office re: 5 APPLICATION for Admission of Omar C. Jadwat Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3334161), 17 APPLICATION for Admission of Sin Yen Ling Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3335040), 10 APPLICATION for Admission of Elora Mukherjee Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3334250) APPLICATION for Admission of Elora Mukherjee Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3334250). Attorney Sin Yen Ling, Omar C. Jadwat, Elora Mukherjee added appearing on behalf of Alterna, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Paul Bridges, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Coalition of Latino Leaders, DREAM Activist.org, Jane Doe # 1, John Doe # 1, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul J. Edwards, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Sharon Gruner, Everitt Howe, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta, Ernesto Pinon, Service Employees International Union, Jaypaul Singh, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Benjamin Speight, Task Force for the Homeless (cdg) (Entered: 06/08/2011)
29 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Brief In Support by Alterna, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Paul Bridges, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Coalition of Latino Leaders, DREAM Activist.org, Jane Doe # 1, John Doe # 1, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul J. Edwards, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Sharon Gruner, Everitt Howe, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta, Ernesto Pinon, Service Employees International Union, Jaypaul Singh, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Benjamin Speight, Task Force for the Homeless. (Attachments: # 1 Brief Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, # 2 Index of Exhibits, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit 1 Georgia House Bill 87, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit 2 Declaration of Abraham F. Lowenthal, # 5 Exhibit Exhibit 3 Declaration of Jane Doe 2, # 6 Exhibit Exhibit 4 Declaration of David S. Kennedy, Jr., # 7 Exhibit Exhibit 5 Declaration of Paul Bridges, # 8 Exhibit Exhibit 6 Declaration of Benjamin Speight, # 9 Exhibit Exhibit 7 Declaration of Everitt Howe, # 10 Exhibit Exhibit 8 Declaration of Paul C. Edwards, Jr., # 11 Exhibit Exhibit 9 Declaration of Sharon Gruner, # 12 Exhibit Exhibit 10 Declaration of Jane Doe 1, # 13 Exhibit Exhibit 11 Declaration of George Gascon, # 14 Exhibit Exhibit 12 Declaration of Eduardo Gonzalez, # 15 Exhibit Exhibit 13 Declaration of Lewis Smith, # 16 Exhibit Exhibit 14 Declaration of Ernesto Pion, # 17 Exhibit Exhibit 15 Declaration of Jaypaul Singh, # 18 Exhibit Exhibit 16 Declaration of John Doe 1, # 19 Exhibit Exhibit 17 Declaration of John Doe 2, # 20 Exhibit Exhibit 18 Declaration of Silvia America Gruner, # 21 Exhibit Exhibit 19 Declaration of Anton Flores, # 22 Exhibit Exhibit 20 Declaration of Adelina C. Nicholls, # 23 Exhibit Exhibit 21 Declaration of Anita Beaty, # 24 Exhibit Exhibit 22 Declaration of Helen Kim Ho, # 25 Exhibit Exhibit 23 Declaration of Mohammad Abdollahi Ali−Beik, # 26 Exhibit Exhibit 24 Declaration of Eliseo Medina, # 27 Exhibit Exhibit 25 Declaration of Harris Raynor, # 28 Exhibit Exhibit 26 Declaration of Gabriela Gonzalez−Lamberson, # 29 Exhibit Exhibit 27 Declaration of Molly Lauterback and Exhibits A through F, # 30 Exhibit Exhibit 28 Exhibits G through J for Declaration of Molly Lauterback, # 31 Exhibit Exhibit 29 Exhibits K through M for Declaration of Molly Lauterback, # 32 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order Granting Motion for Preliminary Injunction)(Lapointe, Michelle) (Attachment 20 replaced on 6/10/2011) (dgs). (Attachment 29 replaced on 6/10/2011) (dgs). (Entered: 06/08/2011)
30 MOTION to Expedite Consideration of Motion for Preliminary Injunction and for Expedited Hearing by Alterna, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Paul Bridges, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Coalition of Latino Leaders, DREAM Activist.org, Jane Doe # 1, John Doe # 1, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul J. Edwards, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Sharon Gruner, Everitt

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06/08/2011 06/08/2011
06/08/2011
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06/08/2011 06/08/2011 06/08/2011

Howe, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta, Ernesto Pinon, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Benjamin Speight, Task Force for the Homeless. (Lapointe, Michelle) (Entered: 06/08/2011)
31 PROPOSED ORDER Proposed Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Expedited Consideration and Setting Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction re: 30 MOTION to Expedite Consideration of Motion for Preliminary Injunction and for Expedited Hearing. (Lapointe, Michelle) (Entered: 06/08/2011)
32 MOTION to Amend Caption by Alterna, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Paul Bridges, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Coalition of Latino Leaders, DREAM Activist.org, Jane Doe # 1, John Doe # 1, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul J. Edwards, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Sharon Gruner, Everitt Howe, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta, Ernesto Pinon, Service Employees International Union, Jaypaul Singh, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Benjamin Speight, Task Force for the Homeless. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Caption)(Lapointe, Michelle) (Entered: 06/08/2011)
33 Supplemental Certificate of Interested Persons by Alterna, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Paul Bridges, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Coalition of Latino Leaders, DREAM Activist.org, Jane Doe # 1, John Doe # 1, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul J. Edwards, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Sharon Gruner, Everitt Howe, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta, Ernesto Pinon, Service Employees International Union, Jaypaul Singh, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Benjamin Speight, Task Force for the Homeless. (Lapointe, Michelle) (Entered: 06/08/2011)
34 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by Mike Beatty, Nathan Deal, Samuel S. Olens, Clyde L. Reese, III. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Orland, Devon) (Entered: 06/08/2011)
APPROVAL by Clerks Office re: 6 APPLICATION for Admission of Andre I Segura Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3334183) 7 APPLICATION for Admission of Jonathan Blazer Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3334223). Attorney Andre I. Segura, Jonathan Blazer added appearing on behalf of Alterna, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Paul Bridges, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Coalition of Latino Leaders, DREAM Activist.org, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Sharon Gruner, Everitt Howe, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta, Ernesto Pinon, Service Employees International Union, Jaypaul Singh, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Benjamin Speight, Task Force for the Homeless (cdg) (Entered: 06/08/2011)
NOTICE of Hearing: Status Conference set for 6/10/2011 at 10:00 AM in ATLA Courtroom 2108 before Judge Thomas W. Thrash Jr. The Court will be soliciting suggestions on how to proceed and discussing scheduling as to the Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (ss) (Entered: 06/08/2011)
Remark re Notice of Hearing, mailed to non−registered counsel and advised by letter that no further paper orders/notices will be mailed to non−registered counsel by the Court. Pro Hac Vice counsel may make arrangements with the Clerks Office to receive electronic notices or arrange to have your local counsel forward electronic notices and/or orders. (ss) (Entered: 06/08/2011)
APPROVAL by Clerks Office re: 14 APPLICATION for Admission of Nora Preciado Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3334298) Attorney Nora Preciado added appearing on behalf of Alterna, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Paul Bridges, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Coalition of Latino Leaders, DREAM Activist.org, Jane Doe # 1, John Doe # 1, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul J. Edwards, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Sharon Gruner, Everitt Howe, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta, Ernesto Pinon, Service Employees International Union, Jaypaul Singh, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Benjamin Speight, Task Force for the Homeless (cdg) (Entered: 06/08/2011)

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35 ORDER granting 32 Motion to Amend Caption. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 6/8/11. (ss) (Entered: 06/08/2011)
Clerks Certificate of Mailing re 35 Order on Motion to Amend to non−registered counsel: Andre I. Segura, Azadeh N. Shahshahani, Cecillia D. Wang, Elora Mukherjee, Jonathan Blazer, Karen C. Tumlin, Katherine Desormeau, Linton Joaquin, Melissa S. Keaney, Nora Preciado, Omar C. Jadwat, Sin Yen Ling, Tanya Broder, along with letter that no further copies of order or notices would be mailed by the court. (ss) (Entered: 06/08/2011)
36 Amended MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by Mike Beatty, Nathan Deal, Samuel S. Olens, Clyde L. Reese, III. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Orland, Devon) (Entered: 06/09/2011)
Clerks Notation re 33 Supplmental Certificate of Interested Persons, and 2 Certificate of Interested Persons, OK, per TWT. (ss) (Entered: 06/09/2011)
37 ORDER granting 34 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages; granting 36 Amended Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. The brief in support of defendants Deal, et al Motion to Dismiss not to exceed 65 pages.. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 6/9/11. (ss) (Entered: 06/09/2011)
APPROVAL by Clerks Office re: 19 APPLICATION for Admission of Andrew Hess Turner Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3335661) 18 APPLICATION for Admission of Samuel Brooke Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3335105) Attorney Samuel Brooke, Andrew H. Turner added appearing on behalf of Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Paul Bridges, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Coalition of Latino Leaders, DREAM Activist.org, Jane Doe # 1, John Doe # 1, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul C. Edwards, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Sharon Gruner, Everitt Howe, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta, David Kennedy, Ernesto Pinon, Service Employees International Union, Jaypaul Singh, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Benjamin Speight, Task Force for the Homeless (cdg) (Entered: 06/09/2011)
38 ORDER granting 9 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice for Cecillia Wang. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 6/8/11. (dr) (Entered: 06/10/2011)
39 ORDER granting 11 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice for Linton Joaquin. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 6/8/11. (dr) (Entered: 06/10/2011)
40 ORDER granting 12 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice for Katherine Desormeau. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 6/8/11. (dr) (Entered: 06/10/2011)
41 ORDER granting 13 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice for Melissa Keaney. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 6/8/11. (dr) (Entered: 06/10/2011)
42 ORDER granting 15 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice for Karen Tumlin. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 6/8/11. (dr) (Entered: 06/10/2011)
43 ORDER granting 7 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice for Jonathan Blazer. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 6/8/11. (dr) (Entered: 06/10/2011)
44 ORDER granting 14 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice for Nora Preciado. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 6/9/11. (dr) (Entered: 06/10/2011)
45 ORDER granting 6 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice for Andre Segura. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 6/9/11. (dr) (Entered: 06/10/2011)
46 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr: granting 30 Motion to Expedite; Status Conference held on 6/10/2011. The Court will hold a hearing on the Motion for Preliminary Injunction on June 20, 2011 at 10:00 a.m. (Court Reporter Susan Baker)(ss) (Entered: 06/10/2011)
NOTICE of Hearing on Motion re: 29 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Motion Hearing set for 6/20/2011 at 10:00 AM in ATLA Courtroom 2108 before Judge Thomas W. Thrash Jr. The Court will also hear argument on Defendant Deal, et al's Motion to Dismiss that is to be filed. (ss) (Entered: 06/10/2011)

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Clerks Certificate of faxing as to Falecia Stewart, Executive Director of the Housing Authority of Fulton County Georgia, re Notice of Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction scheduled for 6/20/11 at 10:00 a.m., Courtroom 2108. (ss) (Entered: 06/10/2011)
Clerks Notation re 27 Leave of Absence June 22, 2011 through and including June 29, 2011, by Devon Orland. The Court will not require an appearance by D. Orland on these dates. (ss) (Entered: 06/10/2011)
47 MOTION to Dismiss Defendants, Nathan Deal, Samuel Olens, Clyde Reese and Mike Beatty with Brief In Support by Mike Beatty, Nathan Deal, Samuel S. Olens, Clyde L. Reese, III. (Attachments: # 1 Brief in Support)(Orland, Devon) (Entered: 06/14/2011)
APPROVAL by Clerks Office re: 8 APPLICATION for Admission of Tanya Broder Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3334227) Attorney Tanya Broder added appearing on behalf of Alterna, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Paul Bridges, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Coalition of Latino Leaders, DREAM Activist.org, Jane Doe # 1, John Doe # 1, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul C. Edwards, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Sharon Gruner, Everitt Howe, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta, David Kennedy, Ernesto Pinon, Service Employees International Union, Jaypaul Singh, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Benjamin Speight, Task Force for the Homeless (cdg) (Entered: 06/15/2011)
RETURN of 18 APPLICATION for Admission of Samuel Brooke Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3335105) to attorney for correction. Petitioners signature needed. (cdg) Modified on 6/15/2011 to terminate application. Application was orginally approved in error. (cdg). (Entered: 06/15/2011)
48 Amicus Curiae APPEARANCE entered by Dale M. Schwartz on behalf of ANTI−DEFAMATION LEAGUE. (Schwartz, Dale) (Entered: 06/15/2011)
49 APPLICATION for Admission of Samuel Brooke Pro Hac Vice by Alterna, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Paul Bridges, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Coalition of Latino Leaders, DREAM Activist.org, Jane Doe # 1, John Doe # 1, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul C. Edwards, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Sharon Gruner, Everitt Howe, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta, David Kennedy, Ernesto Pinon, Service Employees International Union, Jaypaul Singh, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Benjamin Speight, Task Force for the Homeless. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Lapointe, Michelle) (Entered: 06/15/2011)
50 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Complaint and for Declaratory and Injuctive Relief with Brief In Support by United Mexican States. (Attachments: # 1 Brief of Amicus Curiae, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B)(Bondurant, Emmet) (Entered: 06/15/2011)
51 APPLICATION for Admission of Henry Solano Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3357135)by United Mexican States. (Bondurant, Emmet) (Entered: 06/15/2011)
52 APPLICATION for Admission of Carla Gorniak Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3357145)by United Mexican States. (Bondurant, Emmet) (Entered: 06/15/2011)
53 APPLICATION for Admission of Christopher R. Clark Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3357148)by United Mexican States. (Bondurant, Emmet) (Entered: 06/15/2011)
54 MOTION to Join Brief of the United Mexican States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs 50 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Complaint and for Declaratory and Injuctive Relief by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Bondurant, Emmet) (Entered: 06/15/2011)

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55 Amicus Curiae APPEARANCE entered by Socheat Chea on behalf of American Immigration Lawyers Association. (Chea, Socheat) (Entered: 06/15/2011)
56 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunctionby American Immigration Lawyers Association. (Attachments: # 1 Brief Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction)(Chea, Socheat) (Entered: 06/15/2011)
NOTICE re 29 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction hearing scheduled for 6/20/11 at 10:00 A.M. THE LOCATION OF THE HEARING HAS CHANGED TO COURTROOM 2308. The Courtroom doors will be unlocked at 9:00 a.m., an overflow courtroom (Courtroom 2306) will be made available for spectator and media with simultaneous video/audio feed. (ss) (Entered: 06/16/2011)
57 ORDER granting 54 Motion for Miscellaneous Relief (to Join Brief of United Mexican States as Amicus Curiae). Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 6/16/11. (ss) (Entered: 06/16/2011)
58 ORDER granting 56 Motion for Leave to File Brief of Amicus Curiae of AILA. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 6/16/11. (ss) (Entered: 06/16/2011)
59 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by Mike Beatty, Nathan Deal, Samuel S. Olens, Clyde L. Reese, III. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order)(Orland, Devon) (Entered: 06/16/2011)
60 ORDER granting 10 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice of Elora Murkherjee. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr. on 06/15/2011. (jtj) Modified on 6/16/2011 to correct file date (jtj). (Entered: 06/16/2011)
61 ORDER granting 19 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice of Andrew Hess Turner. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr. on 06/15/2011. (jtj) (Entered: 06/16/2011)
62 ORDER granting 17 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice of Sin Yen Ling. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr. on 06/15/2011. (jtj) (Entered: 06/16/2011)
63 ORDER granting 5 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice of Omar C. Jadwat. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr. on 06/15/2011. (jtj) (Entered: 06/16/2011)
64 Amicus Curiae APPEARANCE entered by Douglas Brooks Rohan on behalf of GALEO. (Rohan, Douglas) (Entered: 06/16/2011)
65 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction by Georgia Association of Latino Elected Officials with Brief In Support by GALEO. (Attachments: # 1 Brief Brief in Support)(Rohan, Douglas) (Entered: 06/16/2011)
66 Amicus Curiae APPEARANCE entered by Gerald R. Weber on behalf of Southern Center for Human Rights. (Weber, Gerald) (Entered: 06/16/2011)
67 RESPONSE in Support re 29 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction (Amicus Southern Center for Human Rights, et. al.) filed by Southern Center for Human Rights. (Weber, Gerald) (Entered: 06/16/2011)
68 APPLICATION for Admission of Rebecca Sharpless Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3359425)by American Immigration Lawyers Association. (Chea, Socheat) (Entered: 06/16/2011)
69 APPLICATION for Admission of Farrin Anello Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3359843)by American Immigration Lawyers Association. (Chea, Socheat) (Entered: 06/16/2011)
70 RESPONSE in Opposition re 29 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Mike Beatty, Nathan Deal, Samuel S. Olens, Clyde L. Reese, III. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A Part 1, # 2 Exhibit A Part 2, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F Part 1, # 8 Exhibit F Part 2, # 9 Exhibit F Part 3, # 10 Exhibit F Part 4, # 11 Exhibit F Part 5, # 12 Exhibit G, # 13 Exhibit H, # 14 Exhibit I, # 15 Exhibit J, # 16 Exhibit K, # 17 Exhibit L)(Orland, Devon) (Entered: 06/17/2011)

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71 ORDER granting 59 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 6/17/11. (ss) (Entered: 06/17/2011)
72 OBJECTION to Irrelevant and Inadmissible Evidence by Mike Beatty, Nathan Deal, Samuel S. Olens, Clyde L. Reese, III (Orland, Devon) Modified on 6/20/2011 (dr). (Entered: 06/17/2011)
73 MOTION Leave to Join Brief of the United Mexican States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs re 50 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief by Uruguay. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Bondurant, Emmet) Modified event/text on 6/20/2011 (dr). (Entered: 06/17/2011)
74 NOTICE Of Filing by Mike Beatty, Nathan Deal, Samuel S. Olens, Clyde L. Reese, III re 70 Response in Opposition to Motion,, (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit G)(Orland, Devon) (Entered: 06/17/2011)
75 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages for Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss by Alterna, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Paul Bridges, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Coalition of Latino Leaders, DREAM Activist.org, Jane Doe # 1, John Doe # 1, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul C. Edwards, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Sharon Gruner, Everitt Howe, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta, David Kennedy, Ernesto Pinon, Service Employees International Union, Jaypaul Singh, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Benjamin Speight, Task Force for the Homeless. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Lapointe, Michelle) (Entered: 06/17/2011)
76 RESPONSE in Opposition re 47 MOTION to Dismiss Defendants, Nathan Deal, Samuel Olens, Clyde Reese and Mike Beatty filed by Alterna, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Paul Bridges, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Coalition of Latino Leaders, DREAM Activist.org, Jane Doe # 1, John Doe # 1, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul C. Edwards, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Sharon Gruner, Everitt Howe, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta, David Kennedy, Ernesto Pinon, Service Employees International Union, Jaypaul Singh, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Benjamin Speight, Task Force for the Homeless. (Lapointe, Michelle) (Entered: 06/17/2011)
77 RESPONSE re 72 Objection to Irrelevant and Inadmissible Evidence filed by Alterna, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Paul Bridges, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Coalition of Latino Leaders, DREAM Activist.org, Jane Doe # 1, John Doe # 1, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul C. Edwards, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Sharon Gruner, Everitt Howe, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta, David Kennedy, Ernesto Pinon, Service Employees International Union, Jaypaul Singh, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Benjamin Speight, Task Force for the Homeless. (Lapointe, Michelle) Modified on 6/20/2011 (dr). (Entered: 06/17/2011)
78 AMICUS BRIEF in Support of 47 MOTION to Dismiss Defendants, Nathan Deal, Samuel Olens, Clyde Reese and Mike Beatty filed by Rightmarch.com, Joshua Clark, Brett Harrell. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(dr) (Entered: 06/20/2011)
79 APPLICATION for Admission of Nathaniel J. Oleson Pro Hac Viceby Rightmarch.com. (dr) (Entered: 06/20/2011)
80 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr: Motion Hearing held on 6/20/2011; taking under advisement 29 Motion for Preliminary Injunction, taking under advisement 47 Motion to Dismiss; it is the Court's intient to issue an order prior to 7/1/11. (Court Reporter Susan Baker)(dr) (Entered: 06/20/2011)
81 NOTICE by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights (Regarding Additional Government Memoranda) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Spears, George) (Entered: 06/21/2011)
APPROVAL by Clerks Office re: 49 APPLICATION for Admission of Samuel Brooke Pro Hac Vice. Attorney Samuel Brooke added appearing on behalf of Alterna, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Paul Bridges, Coalition for the

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06/21/2011
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People's Agenda, Coalition of Latino Leaders, DREAM Activist.org, Jane Doe # 1, John Doe # 1, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul C. Edwards, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Sharon Gruner, Everitt Howe, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta, David Kennedy, Ernesto Pinon, Service Employees International Union, Jaypaul Singh, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Benjamin Speight, Task Force for the Homeless (cdg) (Entered: 06/21/2011)
APPROVAL by Clerks Office re: 52 APPLICATION for Admission of Carla Gorniak Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3357145), 53 APPLICATION for Admission of Christopher R. Clark Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3357148). Attorney Christopher R. Clark, Carla Gorniak added appearing on behalf of United Mexican States (cdg) (Entered: 06/21/2011)
Mail Returned as Undeliverable. Mail sent to Azadeh Shahshahani re Notice of Hearing file 6/8/11. (dr) (Entered: 06/23/2011)
APPROVAL by Clerks Office re: 69 APPLICATION for Admission of Farrin Anello Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3359843), 68 APPLICATION for Admission of Rebecca Sharpless Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3359425). Attorney Rebecca Ann Sharpless, Farrin Rose Anello added appearing on behalf of American Immigration Lawyers Association (cdg) (Entered: 06/22/2011)
RETURN of 79 APPLICATION for Admission of Nathaniel J. Oleson Pro Hac Vice to attorney for payment. (cdg) (Entered: 06/22/2011)
82 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on June 20, 2011, before Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr.. Court Reporter/Transcriber Susan C. Baker, Telephone number (404) 215−1558. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 7/13/2011. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 7/25/2011. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 9/20/2011. (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing) (fem) (Entered: 06/22/2011)
APPROVAL by Clerks Office re: 51 APPLICATION for Admission of Henry Solano Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3357135). Attorney Henry L. Solano added appearing on behalf of United Mexican States (cdg) (Entered: 06/22/2011)
83 ANSWER to 1 COMPLAINT by Falecia Stewart. Discovery ends on 11/21/2011.(dr) Please visit our website at http://www.gand.uscourts.gov to obtain Pretrial Instructions. (Entered: 06/23/2011)
84 NOTICE OF REQUIREMENT TO FILE ELECTRONICALLY pursuant to Standing Order 04−01 as to Pickens Andrew Patterson, Jr re 83 Answer to Complaint. (dr) (Entered: 06/23/2011)
Clerks Certificate of Mailing as to P Andrew Patterson re 84 Notice of E−filing Requirement. (dr) (Entered: 06/23/2011)
85 ORDER granting 51 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice for Henry Solano. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 6/23/11. (dr) (Entered: 06/23/2011)
86 ORDER granting 68 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice for Rebecca Sharpless. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 6/23/11. (dr) (Entered: 06/23/2011)
87 ORDER granting 69 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice for Farrin Anello. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 6/23/11. (dr) (Entered: 06/23/2011)
88 ORDER granting 53 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice for Christopher Clark. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 6/23/11. (dr) (Entered: 06/23/2011)
89 ORDER granting 52 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice for Carla Gorniak. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 6/23/11. (dr) (Entered: 06/23/2011)

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06/23/2011 06/25/2011 06/27/2011
06/27/2011 06/29/2011
06/30/2011 06/30/2011 06/30/2011 07/01/2011
07/01/2011 07/05/2011 07/05/2011 07/06/2011

90 ORDER granting 49 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice for Samuel Brooke. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 6/23/11. (dr) (Entered: 06/23/2011)
91 NOTICE by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights Regarding Buquer v. City of Indianapolis (Attachments: # 1 Buquer v. City of Indianapolis Opinion)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 06/25/2011)
92 APPLICATION for Admission of Kenneth Sugarman Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3375250)by Alterna, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Paul Bridges, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Coalition of Latino Leaders, DREAM Activist.org, Jane Doe # 1, John Doe # 1, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul C. Edwards, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Sharon Gruner, Everitt Howe, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta, David Kennedy, Ernesto Pinon, Service Employees International Union, Jaypaul Singh, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Benjamin Speight, Task Force for the Homeless. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Lapointe, Michelle) (Entered: 06/27/2011)
93 ORDER granting 29 Motion for Preliminary Injunction; granting in part and denying in part 47 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 6/27/11. (ss) (Entered: 06/27/2011)
APPROVAL by Clerks Office re: 92 APPLICATION for Admission of Kenneth Sugarman Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3375250). Attorney Kenneth John Sugarman added appearing on behalf of Alterna, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Paul Bridges, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Coalition of Latino Leaders, DREAM Activist.org, Jane Doe # 1, John Doe # 1, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul C. Edwards, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Sharon Gruner, Everitt Howe, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta, David Kennedy, Ernesto Pinon, Service Employees International Union, Jaypaul Singh, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Benjamin Speight, Task Force for the Homeless (cdg) (Entered: 06/29/2011)
Submission of 3 MOTION for Leave to Proceed under Pseudonyms, submitted to District Judge Thomas W. Thrash. (dr) (Entered: 06/30/2011)
94 ORDER granting 92 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice for Kenneth Sugarman. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 6/30/11. (dr) (Entered: 06/30/2011)
95 ORDER granting 8 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice for Tanya Broder. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 6/30/11. (dr) (Entered: 06/30/2011)
Payment declined by credit card company re 52 APPLICATION for Admission of Carla Gorniak Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3357145), 53 APPLICATION for Admission of Christopher R. Clark Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3357148), 51 APPLICATION for Admission of Henry Solano Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−3357135). Payment due from Emmet Bondurant within 10 days in the amount of $$585.00. Payment must be made to the Clerks Office. (mmc) (Entered: 07/01/2011)
Pro Hac Vice and Returned Check Fee: $585.00, receipt number 36789 (dr) (Entered: 07/06/2011)
96 NOTICE of Appearance by Meghan Robson Davidson on behalf of Nathan Deal, Samuel S. Olens (Davidson, Meghan) (Entered: 07/05/2011)
97 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 93 Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Order on Motion to Dismiss by Nathan Deal, Samuel S. Olens. Filing fee $ 455, receipt number 113E−3388558. Transcript Order Form due on 7/19/2011 (Orland, Devon) (Entered: 07/05/2011)
98 TRANSCRIPT ORDER FORM for proceedings held on June 20, 2011 before Judge Thrash, re 97 Notice of Appeal. Court Reporter: Susan C. Baker. (Orland, Devon) Financial Arrangements due 7/20/11. Modified on 7/6/2011 (fem). (Entered: 07/06/2011)

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07/06/2011 07/06/2011 07/08/2011 07/08/2011 07/08/2011 07/11/2011 07/11/2011
07/12/2011 07/13/2011 07/13/2011 07/13/2011
07/13/2011
07/13/2011 07/14/2011 07/14/2011 07/14/2011

99 Transmission of Certified Copy of Notice of Appeal, Judgment, Order and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals re 97 Notice of Appeal (fem) (Entered: 07/06/2011)
Set/Reset Deadlines re 97 Notice of Appeal : Financial Arrangements due on 7/20/2011 (fem) (Entered: 07/06/2011)
100 MOTION to Stay The Case with Brief In Support by Mike Beatty, Nathan Deal, Samuel S. Olens, Clyde L. Reese, III. (Attachments: # 1 Brief In Suppot of Motion to Stay the Case)(Orland, Devon) (Entered: 07/08/2011)
101 ORDER granting 3 Motion for Leave to Proceed Under Pseudonyms. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 7/8/11. (dr) (Entered: 07/08/2011)
108 Court Reporter Notification that Transcript has been filed in District Court re 97 Notice of Appeal. Court Reporter: Susan Baker (fem) Modified on 7/19/2011 (fem). (Entered: 07/19/2011)
102 Notice for Leave of Absence for the following date(s): 7/21−7/22/11, 7/29/11, 8/19−8/22/11, 9/8−9/22/11, 10/13−10/14/11, 10/21−10/24/11, by George Brian Spears. (Spears, George) (Entered: 07/11/2011)
Submission of 50 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Complaint and for Declaratory and Injuctive Relief, 65 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction by Georgia Association of Latino Elected Officials, 75 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages for Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, 73 MOTION for Joinder, submitted to District Judge Thomas W. Thrash. (dr) (Entered: 07/11/2011)
NOTICE of Hearing on Motion re: 100 MOTION to Stay The Case Motion Hearing set for 7/28/2011 at 02:00 PM in ATLA Courtroom 2108 before Judge Thomas W. Thrash Jr.. (ss) (Entered: 07/12/2011)
Clerks Notation re 102 Leave of Absence 7/21−22/11, 7/29/11, 8/19−22/11, 9/8−22/11, 10/13−14/11, 10/21−24/11, by George Brian Spears. The Court will not require an appearance by G. Spears on these dates. (ss) (Entered: 07/13/2011)
103 Request for Leave of Absence for the following date(s): September 29, 2011; and December 26, 2011 through and including January 3, 2012, by Devon Orland. (Orland, Devon) (Entered: 07/13/2011)
104 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to Respond to Defendants' Motion to Stay Case and Defer Hearing re: 100 MOTION to Stay The Case with Brief In Support by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Spears, George) (Entered: 07/13/2011)
105 ORDER granting 50 Motion for Leave to File, granting 54 Motion to Join, granting 65 Motion for Leave to File, granting 73 Motion for Joinder, granting 75 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 7/13/11. (dr) (Entered: 07/13/2011)
109 USCA Acknowledgment of 97 Notice of Appeal filed by Samuel S. Olens, Nathan Deal. Case Appealed to USCA Case Number 11−13044−C (fem) (Entered: 07/20/2011)
Clerks Notation re 103 Leave of Absence September 29, 2011; and December 26, 2011 − January 3, 2012, by Devon Orland. The Court will not require an appearance by D. Orland on these dates. (ss) (Entered: 07/14/2011)
106 ANSWER to 1 COMPLAINT by Mike Beatty, Nathan Deal, Samuel S. Olens, Clyde L. Reese, III.(Orland, Devon) Please visit our website at http://www.gand.uscourts.gov to obtain Pretrial Instructions. (Entered: 07/14/2011)
107 ORDER granting 104 Motion for Extension of Time and to Vacate Hearing; Plaintiffs are directed to file their response to Defendants' Motion to Stay the Case on or before 8/8/11. Hearing scheduled for 7/18/11 is deferred until later order of the Court. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 7/14/11. (dr) (Entered: 07/15/2011)

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07/21/2011 07/25/2011 07/26/2011 08/08/2011
08/10/2011
08/17/2011 08/18/2011 09/19/2011 09/20/2011 10/06/2011 10/20/2011 10/20/2011 10/20/2011 10/26/2011 10/27/2011 01/04/2012

110 APPLICATION for Admission of Nathaniel J. Oleson Pro Hac Viceby Rightmarch.com.Filing Fee received $150.00, Receipt #37391. (dr) (Entered: 07/22/2011)
APPROVAL by Clerks Office re: 110 APPLICATION for Admission of Nathaniel J. Oleson Pro Hac Vice. Attorney Nathaniel J. Oleson added appearing on behalf of Rightmarch.com (pb) (Entered: 07/25/2011)
111 ORDER granting 110 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice for Nathaniel Oleson. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 7/26/11. (dr) (Entered: 07/27/2011)
112 RESPONSE re 100 MOTION to Stay The Case and Proposed Consent Order filed by Alterna, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Paul Bridges, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Coalition of Latino Leaders, DREAM Activist.org, Jane Doe # 1, John Doe # 1, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul C. Edwards, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Sharon Gruner, Everitt Howe, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta, David Kennedy, Ernesto Pinon, Service Employees International Union, Jaypaul Singh, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Benjamin Speight, Task Force for the Homeless. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Tsu, Naomi) (Entered: 08/08/2011)
113 ORDER granting 100 Motion to Stay. Defendants obligation to file an answerand stays discovery between the parties including all disclosures and planningconferences pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 and L.R. 26.1. This Order does not stayPlaintiffs from moving for leave to amend their Complaint nor does it stayDefendants from responding to such a motion for leave to amend. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr. on 8/10/2011. (rej) (Entered: 08/10/2011)
114 MOTION to Withdraw Meghan Robson Davidson as Attorneyby Samuel S. Olens. (Davidson, Meghan) (Entered: 08/17/2011)
115 ORDER granting 114 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Meghan Robson Davidson terminated. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 8/18/11. (dr) (Entered: 08/18/2011)
116 Notice for Leave of Absence for the following date(s): 10/6/11−10/10/11, by George Brian Spears. (Spears, George) (Entered: 09/19/2011)
Clerks Notation re 116 Leave of Absence 10/6−10/11, by George Brian Spears. The Court will not require an appearance by G. Spears on these dates. (ss) (Entered: 09/20/2011)
117 FORTHWITH LETTER from USCA re 97 Notice of Appeal filed by Samuel S. Olens, Nathan Deal. Case Appealed to USCA Case Number 11−13044−GG. Appeal Record due by 10/20/2011. (fem) (Entered: 10/20/2011)
CERTIFICATE OF READINESS of Appeal Record re 97 Notice of Appeal filed by Samuel S. Olens, Nathan Deal. Case Appealed to USCA Case Number 11−13044−GG. (fem) (Entered: 10/20/2011)
118 Certified copy of CERTIFICATE OF READINESS transmitted to USCA re 97 Notice of Appeal. Case Appealed to USCA Case Number 11−13044−GG (fem) (Entered: 10/20/2011)
119 Certified and Transmitted Record on Appeal to US Court of Appeals re 97 Notice of Appeal Case Appealed to USCA Case Number 11−13044−GG. (fem) (Entered: 10/21/2011)
120 USCA Acknowledgment of receipt of record on appeal re 97 Notice of Appeal filed by Samuel S. Olens, Nathan Deal. Case Appealed to USCA Case Number 11−13044−GG. (fem) (Entered: 11/01/2011)
121 USCA Acknowledgment of receipt of certificate of readiness re 97 Notice of Appeal filed by Samuel S. Olens, Nathan Deal. Case Appealed to USCA Case Number 11−13044−GG. (fem) (Entered: 11/02/2011)
122 MOTION to Withdraw Jonathan Blazer as Attorneyby Alterna, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Paul Bridges, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Coalition

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01/05/2012 04/26/2012
04/27/2012 04/30/2012 05/02/2012 05/04/2012 05/07/2012 08/20/2012 12/06/2012 12/07/2012 12/11/2012 12/11/2012 12/19/2012 12/20/2012

of Latino Leaders, DREAM Activist.org, Jane Doe # 1, John Doe # 1, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul C. Edwards, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Sharon Gruner, Everitt Howe, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta, David Kennedy, Ernesto Pinon, Service Employees International Union, Jaypaul Singh, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Benjamin Speight, Task Force for the Homeless. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Blazer, Jonathan) (Entered: 01/04/2012)
123 ORDER granting 122 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney Jonathan Blazer. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 1/4/12. (dr) (Entered: 01/06/2012)
124 MOTION to Withdraw Kenneth John Sugarman as Attorneyby Alterna, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Paul Bridges, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Coalition of Latino Leaders, DREAM Activist.org, Jane Doe # 1, John Doe # 1, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul C. Edwards, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Sharon Gruner, Everitt Howe, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta, David Kennedy, Ernesto Pinon, Service Employees International Union, Jaypaul Singh, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Benjamin Speight, Task Force for the Homeless. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Sugarman, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/26/2012)
125 ORDER granting 124 Motion to Withdraw Attorney Kenneth John Sugarman. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 4/27/12. (dr) (Entered: 04/27/2012)
126 Notice for Leave of Absence for the following date(s): 6/15−18/2012, 7/2−6, 2012, 7/10−12, 2012, 7/16−26, 2012, 8/15−17, 2012, by George Brian Spears. (Spears, George) (Entered: 04/30/2012)
Clerks Notation re 126 Leave of Absence 6/15−18/2012, 7/2−6, 2012, 7/10−12, 2012, 7/16−26, 2012, 8/15−17, 2012, by George Brian Spears. The Court will not require an appearance by G. Spears on these dates. (ss) (Entered: 05/02/2012)
127 Request for Leave of Absence for the following date(s): July 18, 2012 through and including July 19, 2012; July 31, 2012 through and including August 7, 2012; and August 13, 2012, by Devon Orland. (Orland, Devon) (Entered: 05/04/2012)
Clerks Notation re 127 Leave of Absence July 18, 2012 through and including July 19, 2012; July 31, 2012 through and including August 7, 2012; and August 13, 2012, by Devon Orland. The Court will not require an appearance by D. Orland on these dates. (ss) (Entered: 05/07/2012)
128 USCA Opinion received re: 97 Notice of Appeal filed by Samuel S. Olens, Nathan Deal. In accordance with FRAP 41(b), the USCA mandate will issue at a later date. Case Appealed to usca Case Number 11−13044. (fem) (Entered: 08/21/2012)
129 Certified copy of JUDGMENT of USCA AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED the decision of the District Court re: 97 Notice of Appeal filed by Samuel S. Olens, Nathan Deal Case Appealed to USCA Case Number 11−13044. (dr) (Entered: 12/06/2012)
Submission of 129 USCA Judgment, submitted to District Judge Thomas W. Thrash. (dr) (Entered: 12/07/2012)
130 ORDER making the USCA mandate the judgment of this Court re 97 Notice of Appeal Case Appealed to 11th Circuit Case Number 11−13044. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 12/10/12. (ss) (Entered: 12/11/2012)
NOTICE of Hearing: In Chambers Status Conference set for 12/19/2012 at 10:00 AM before Judge Thomas W. Thrash Jr.. (ss) (Entered: 12/11/2012)
131 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr: In Chambers Conference held on 12/19/2012. If Petition for Certiorari not filed, defendants have until 3/20/2013 to file renewed motion to dismiss. (Court Reporter Susan Baker)(ss) (Entered: 12/19/2012)
132 APPLICATION for Admission of Winifred Kao Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−4322027)by Alterna, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Paul Bridges, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Coalition of Latino

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12/20/2012
12/21/2012
12/21/2012 12/27/2012 12/31/2012 12/31/2012 01/08/2013
01/08/2013 01/18/2013

Leaders, DREAM Activist.org, Jane Doe # 1, John Doe # 1, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul C. Edwards, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Sharon Gruner, Everitt Howe, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta, David Kennedy, Ernesto Pinon, Service Employees International Union, Jaypaul Singh, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Benjamin Speight, Task Force for the Homeless. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Tsu, Naomi) (Entered: 12/20/2012)
133 APPLICATION for Admission of Carolyn Hsu Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−4322063)by Alterna, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Paul Bridges, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Coalition of Latino Leaders, DREAM Activist.org, Jane Doe # 1, John Doe # 1, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul C. Edwards, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Sharon Gruner, Everitt Howe, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta, David Kennedy, Ernesto Pinon, Service Employees International Union, Jaypaul Singh, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Benjamin Speight, Task Force for the Homeless. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Tsu, Naomi) (Entered: 12/20/2012)
APPROVAL by Clerks Office re: 132 APPLICATION for Admission of Winifred Kao Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−4322027), 133 APPLICATION for Admission of Carolyn Hsu Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−4322063). Attorney Winifred Kao, Carolyn Hsu added appearing on behalf of Alterna, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Paul Bridges, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Coalition of Latino Leaders, DREAM Activist.org, Jane Doe # 1, John Doe # 1, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul C. Edwards, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Sharon Gruner, Everitt Howe, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta, David Kennedy, Ernesto Pinon, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Benjamin Speight, Task Force for the Homeless (pb) (Entered: 12/21/2012)
134 Amended ANSWER to 1 COMPLAINT by Mike Beatty, Nathan Deal, Samuel S. Olens, Clyde L. Reese, III.(Orland, Devon) Please visit our website at http://www.gand.uscourts.gov to obtain Pretrial Instructions. (Entered: 12/21/2012)
NOTICE of Undeliverable Electronic Mail re: Approval of Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice,,, 132 APPLICATION for Admission of Winifred Kao Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−4322027), 131 In Chambers Conference, 133 APPLICATION for Admission of Carolyn Hsu Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−4322063), 134 Answer to Complaint. Mail returned for Andrew H. Turner due to no longer employed with the agency. (aar) (Entered: 12/27/2012)
135 ORDER GRANTING 133 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice of Carolyn Hsu. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 12/31/2012. (adg) (Entered: 12/31/2012)
136 ORDER GRANTING 132 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice of Winifred Kao. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 12/31/2012. (adg) (Entered: 12/31/2012)
137 STIPULATION of Dismissal of claims of John Doe #1 by Alterna, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Paul Bridges, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Coalition of Latino Leaders, DREAM Activist.org, Jane Doe # 1, John Doe # 1, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul C. Edwards, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Sharon Gruner, Everitt Howe, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta, David Kennedy, Ernesto Pinon, Service Employees International Union, Jaypaul Singh, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Benjamin Speight, Task Force for the Homeless. (Tsu, Naomi) (Entered: 01/08/2013)
Clerk's Entry of Dismissal APPROVING 137 Stipulation of Dismissal of John Doe #1's claims, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.41(a)(1)(ii). (dr) (Entered: 01/09/2013)
138 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on December 19, 2012, before Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr.. Court Reporter/Transcriber Susan C. Baker, Telephone number (404) 215−1558. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release

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01/25/2013 03/19/2013
03/20/2013
03/20/2013
03/20/2013 03/20/2013 04/03/2013 04/05/2013 04/22/2013
04/23/2013

of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 2/8/2013. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/19/2013. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/18/2013. (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing Transcript) (fem) (Entered: 01/18/2013)
139 Appeal Record Returned: 97 Notice of Appeal Case Appealed to USCA Case Number 11−13044−FF. (fem) (Entered: 01/25/2013)
140 CONSENT MOTION to (1) Voluntarily Dismiss Defendants Reece, Beatty, and Stewart, (2) Set Briefing Schedule on Defendants' Supplemental Motion to Dismiss, and (3) Permanently Enjoin Section 7 of HB 87, by Alterna, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Paul Bridges, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Coalition of Latino Leaders, DREAM Activist.org, Jane Doe # 1, John Doe # 1, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul C. Edwards, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Sharon Gruner, Everitt Howe, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta, David Kennedy, Ernesto Pinon, Service Employees International Union, Jaypaul Singh, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Benjamin Speight, Task Force for the Homeless. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order of Dismissal, # 2 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Briefing Scheduling, # 3 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Permanent Injunction)(Jadwat, Omar) . Added MOTION to Dismiss, MOTION for Permanent Injunction on 3/20/2013 (dr). (Entered: 03/19/2013)
141 ORDER granting 140 Motion to Dismiss certain Defendants and terminating Falecia Stewart (Executive Director of the Housing Authority of Fulton County Georgia, in her official capacity), Mike Beatty (Commissioner of the Department of Community Affairs of the State of Georgia, in his official capacity) and Clyde L. Reese, III (Commissioner of the Department of Human Services of the State of Georgia, in his official capacity). Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 3/20/13. (hfm) (Entered: 03/20/2013)
142 ORDER granting 140 Motion for briefing schedule on Defendants supplemental motion to dismiss Plaintiffs claims against Section 8 of the Georgia Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011 (HB 87). Defendants supplemental motion to dismiss is due on or before March 20, 2013; Plaintiffs response is due on or before April 25, 2013; and Defendants reply, if any, is due on or before May 9, 2013. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 3/20/13. (hfm) (Entered: 03/20/2013)
143 PERMANENT INJUNCTION. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 3/20/13. (hfm) (Entered: 03/20/2013)
144 Supplemental MOTION to Dismiss with Brief In Support by Mike Beatty, Nathan Deal, Samuel S. Olens, Clyde L. Reese, III. (Orland, Devon) (Entered: 03/20/2013)
145 Request for Leave of Absence for the following date(s): 05−28−2013 thru 06−05−2013, by Devon Orland. (Orland, Devon) (Entered: 04/03/2013)
Clerks Notation re 145 Leave of Absence 05−28−2013 thru 06−05−2013, by Devon Orland. Judge Thrash will not require an appearance by D. Orland on these dates. (ss) (Entered: 04/05/2013)
146 MOTION for Extension of Time re: 144 Supplemental MOTION to Dismiss by Alterna, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Paul Bridges, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Coalition of Latino Leaders, DREAM Activist.org, Jane Doe # 1, John Doe # 1, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul C. Edwards, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Sharon Gruner, Everitt Howe, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta, David Kennedy, Ernesto Pinon, Service Employees International Union, Jaypaul Singh, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Benjamin Speight, Task Force for the Homeless. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed order)(Tumlin, Karen) (Entered: 04/22/2013)
147 ORDER granting 146 Motion for Extension of Time through 5/9/2013 for plaintiffs to respond re 144 Supplemental MOTION to Dismiss . Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 4/23/2013. (ss) (Entered: 04/23/2013)

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 69 of 70

05/09/2013
05/22/2013 06/06/2013 06/11/2013
06/12/2013 07/19/2013 07/19/2013 07/19/2013 07/19/2013 07/23/2013 07/24/2013 08/16/2013
08/20/2013 08/27/2013

148 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF in Opposition re 144 Supplemental MOTION to Dismiss filed by Alterna, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Paul Bridges, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Coalition of Latino Leaders, DREAM Activist.org, Jane Doe # 1, John Doe # 1, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul C. Edwards, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Sharon Gruner, Everitt Howe, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta, David Kennedy, Ernesto Pinon, Service Employees International Union, Jaypaul Singh, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Benjamin Speight, Task Force for the Homeless. (Preciado, Nora) Modified on 5/10/2013 (dr). (Entered: 05/09/2013)
149 REPLY in Support re 144 Supplemental MOTION to Dismiss filed by Mike Beatty, Nathan Deal, Samuel S. Olens, Clyde L. Reese, III. (Orland, Devon) Modified on 5/22/2013 to accurately reflect e−filed pleading (fap). (Entered: 05/22/2013)
Submission of 144 Supplemental MOTION to Dismiss , submitted to District Judge Thomas W. Thrash. (dr) (Entered: 06/06/2013)
150 MOTION to Withdraw Naomi Ruth Tsu as Attorneyby Alterna, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Paul Bridges, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Coalition of Latino Leaders, DREAM Activist.org, Jane Doe # 1, John Doe # 1, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul C. Edwards, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Sharon Gruner, Everitt Howe, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta, David Kennedy, Ernesto Pinon, Service Employees International Union, Jaypaul Singh, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Benjamin Speight, Task Force for the Homeless. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Tsu, Naomi) (Entered: 06/11/2013)
151 ORDER granting 150 Motion to Withdraw Attorney Mary C. Bauer. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 6/12/13. (dr) (Entered: 06/12/2013)
152 MOTION to Withdraw Winifred Kao as Attorneyby Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. (Kao, Winifred) (Entered: 07/19/2013)
153 NOTICE of Name Change by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. (Kao, Winifred) Modified on 7/22/2013 (dr). (Entered: 07/19/2013)
154 OPINION AND ORDER granting 144 Supplemental Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 7/18/13. (dr) (Entered: 07/19/2013)
Civil Case Terminated. (dr) (Entered: 07/24/2013)
155 ORDER granting 152 Motion to Withdraw Attorney Sin Yen Ling. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 7/23/13. (dr) (Entered: 07/23/2013)
156 CLERK'S JUDGMENT dismissing case. (dr)−−Please refer to http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov to obtain an appeals jurisdiction checklist−− (Entered: 07/24/2013)
157 MOTION for Reconsideration re 154 Order on Motion to Dismiss with Brief In Support by Alterna, Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Paul Bridges, Coalition for the People's Agenda, Coalition of Latino Leaders, DREAM Activist.org, Jane Doe # 1, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe # 2, Paul C. Edwards, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Sharon Gruner, Everitt Howe, Instituto de Mexico, Inc. of Atlanta, David Kennedy, Ernesto Pinon, Service Employees International Union, Jaypaul Singh, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers' United, Benjamin Speight, Task Force for the Homeless. (Attachments: # 1 Brief Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Reconsideration)(Jadwat, Omar) (Entered: 08/16/2013)
158 Request for Leave of Absence for the following date(s): September 9, 2013 through and including September 16, 2013, November 8, 2013, November 25, 2013 through and including November 29, 2013, by Devon Orland. (Orland, Devon) (Entered: 08/20/2013)
159 RESPONSE re 157 MOTION for Reconsideration re 154 Order on Motion to Dismiss filed by Nathan Deal, Samuel S. Olens. (Orland, Devon) (Entered: 08/27/2013)

Case: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT As of: 03/21/2015 10:52 PM EDT 70 of 70

09/19/2013 09/26/2013

Submission of 157 MOTION for Reconsideration re 154 Order, submitted to District Judge Thomas W. Thrash. (dr) (Entered: 09/19/2013)
160 ORDER denying 157 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 9/25/2013. (ss) (Entered: 09/26/2013)

 
 Case: 11-13044 Date F(i1leodf: 3048)/20/2012 Page: 1 of 33
[PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________ No. 11-13044 ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cv-01804-TWT
GEORGIA LATINO ALLIANCE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, SOUTHERN REGIONAL JOINT BOARD OF WORKERS’ UNITED, DREAM ACTIVIST.ORG, TASK FORCE FOR THE HOMELESS, et al., llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellees, versus GOVERNOR OF GEORGIA, ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF GEORGIA, llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellants, COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA, et al., llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllDefendants.

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________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia ________________________ (August 20, 2012)
Before WILSON and MARTIN, Circuit Judges, and VOORHEES,* District Judge. WILSON, Circuit Judge:
In April 2011, Georgia lawmakers enacted House Bill 87, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011 (H.B. 87), to address the problem of illegal immigration within the state. Although the provisions of H.B. 87 seek to tackle numerous issues, only two sections are at issue in this appeal of the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction.
Section 7 codifies three separate crimes for interactions with an “illegal alien,” defined as “a person who is verified by the federal government to be present in the United States in violation of federal immigration law.” O.C.G.A. §§ 16-11-200(a)(1), 201(a)(2), 202(a). The first provision of section 7 creates the offense of “transporting or moving an illegal alien,” which applies to “[a] person who, while committing another criminal offense, knowingly and intentionally
* Honorable Richard L. Voorhees, United States District Judge for the Western District of North Carolina, sitting by designation.
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transports or moves an illegal alien in a motor vehicle for the purpose of furthering the illegal presence of the alien in the United States.” Id. § 16-11-200(b). Excepted from this criminal provision are, among others, persons providing privately funded social services. Id. § 16-11-200(d)(5).
The second provision creates the offense of “concealing or harboring an illegal alien,” which applies to “[a] person who is acting in violation of another criminal offense and who knowingly conceals, harbors, or shields an illegal alien from detection in any place in [Georgia], including any building or means of transportation, when such person knows that the person being concealed, harbored, or shielded is an illegal alien.” Id. § 16-11-201(b). No criminal liability attaches to certain acts committed by government employees or persons acting at the direction of a government employee that would otherwise fall within the scope of the prohibited conduct. Id. § 16-11-201(d).
The third provision creates the offense of “inducing an illegal alien to enter into [Georgia],” which applies to “[a] person who is acting in violation of another criminal offense and who knowingly induces, entices, or assists an illegal alien to enter into [Georgia], when such person knows that the person being induced, enticed, or assisted to enter into [Georgia] is an illegal alien.” Id. § 16-11-202(b).
Section 8 of H.B. 87 authorizes Georgia law enforcement officers to
3

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investigate the immigration status of an individual if the officer has probable cause to believe the individual has committed another crime and the individual cannot provide one of the pieces of identification listed in the statute. O.C.G.A. § 17-5-100(b). If the officer verifies that the individual is not lawfully present in the United States, the officer “may take any action authorized by state and federal law,” including detaining the person, transporting the person to a detention facility, or notifying the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Id. § 17-5-100(e). Section 8 prohibits consideration of “race, color, or national origin” in implementing its requirements “except to the extent permitted by the Constitutions of Georgia and of the United States.” Id. § 17-5-100(d). It also prohibits investigation into the immigration status of persons who witness or report criminal activity, where the reason for investigation is based on information arising from that contact. Id. § 17-5-100(f).
On June 2, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a preenforcement constitutional challenge to sections 7 and 8 claiming that, among other things, they were preempted by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.1 Shortly
1 Plaintiffs also claimed that these sections violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and burdened their constitutional right to travel. The district court denied an injunction on these alleged constitutional violations, Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1336–39 (N.D. Ga. 2011), and those rulings are not at issue on appeal.
4

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thereafter, Plaintiffs moved to preliminarily enjoin enforcement of these sections. The district court granted Plaintiffs’ motion and preliminarily enjoined enforcement of sections 7 and 8 on the ground that each was preempted by federal law. Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1317 (N.D. Ga. 2011). Defendants (hereafter referred to as the State Officers) appeal the district court’s order, and the central issue we face is whether Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their challenge to the constitutionality of sections 7 and 8.
I. Standard of Review We review de novo whether plaintiffs have standing to bring a suit, Bochese v. Town of Ponce Inlet, 405 F.3d 964, 975 (11th Cir. 2005), and whether a cause of action exists to bring suit, see Miller v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 677 F.3d 1113, 1115 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). We review a district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. McDonald’s Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 1998). Legal determinations underlying the grant of an injunction are reviewed de novo, and factual determinations are reviewed for clear error. Cumulus Media, Inc. v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc., 304 F.3d 1167, 1171–72 (11th Cir. 2002).
II. Discussion
5

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A. Standing Before considering the merits of the challenge to H.B. 87, we confront the threshold issue of whether Plaintiffs may properly challenge the law at all. First, we must address the State Officers’ contention that Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the provisions at issue. The State Officers argue that Plaintiffs fail to satisfy the standing requirement of Article III, which limits federal jurisdiction to actual cases and controversies. To invoke our jurisdiction, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he has suffered an “injury in fact,” meaning “an invasion of a judicially cognizable interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167, 117 S. Ct. 1154, 1163 (1997). In addition to a cognizable injury, “a causal connection” must exist that links the injury to the complained-of conduct, requiring in essence that the injury be “fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant” rather than “the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court.” Id. Finally, it must be “likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. When, as here, plaintiffs file a preenforcement, constitutional challenge to a state statute, the injury requirement may be satisfied by establishing “‘a realistic danger of sustaining direct injury as a result of the statute’s operation or
6

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enforcement.’” Socialist Workers Party v. Leahy, 145 F.3d 1240, 1245 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting Am. Civil Liberties Union v. The Fla. Bar (ACLU), 999 F.2d 1486, 1492 (11th Cir. 1993)). A plaintiff may meet this standard in any of three ways: “(1) [the plaintiff] was threatened with application of the statute; (2) application is likely; or (3) there is a credible threat of application.” Id. (citing ACLU, 999 F.2d at 1492). While it is unnecessary for a plaintiff to “expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution” to challenge a statute, Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S. Ct. 2301, 2309 (1979), we will not accept as plaintiffs “persons having no fears of state prosecution except those that are imaginary or speculative,” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42, 91 S. Ct. 746, 749 (1971).
The State Officers contest the standing of all plaintiffs, individual and organizational. Finding jurisdiction proper, we first identify the individuals who may challenge provisions of H.B. 87 and then turn to the organizations. To hear the case, we must find that “at least one plaintiff has standing to raise each claim.” Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1243–44 (11th Cir. 2011), rev’d in part on other grounds, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
1. Injury to Individual Plaintiffs We agree with the district court that plaintiff David Kennedy faces a
7

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“credible threat of application” of section 7. Socialist Workers Party, 145 F.3d at 1245. Kennedy is a civil immigration attorney who has alleged and declared that he regularly transports undocumented immigrants to and from court hearings, meets with immigrant clients in his law office, gives legal advice to undocumented immigrants who wish to remain in Georgia, and helps undocumented immigrants to enter Georgia for court business and hearings. These actions fall within the plain language of the section 7 prohibitions on transporting, harboring, and inducing undocumented immigrants. Although section 7 contains an exception for transportation to or from judicial proceedings that require the undocumented individual’s presence, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-200(d)(2), that does not exempt Kennedy’s activities undertaken pursuant to representation of undocumented individuals in civil immigration matters where presence is not required. See also id. § 16-11-201(a)(1) (exempting from the harboring provision an attorney providing services “for the purpose of representing a criminal defendant”); id. § 16-11-201(d) (exempting from the harboring provision certain government employees or persons acting at the express direction of a government employee).
Similarly, we agree that plaintiff Jane Doe #2 satisfies the standing requirement to challenge section 8. Jane Doe #2 is an undocumented immigrant
8

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currently classified under “deferred action” status.2 As a result of this status, Jane Doe #2 remains permissibly in the United States but has not acquired the requisite documentation to stave off the investigatory detention permitted by section 8. See O.C.G.A. § 17-5-100(b) (listing acceptable documentation to prove lawful status and thereby prevent further detention). Thus, Jane Doe #2 faces a credible threat of detention under section 8, as she possesses none of the listed documentation to prove that she has permission to remain temporarily in the United States. See id. § 17-5-100(e) (authorizing peace officers, after verification of illegal status, to “take any action authorized by state and federal law,” including “detaining [the] suspected illegal alien”). This is sufficient to meet the injury requirement.
The State Officers, relying on City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103 S. Ct. 1660 (1983), argue that the underlying probable cause requirement of sections 7 and 8 renders their application sufficiently speculative to deprive the individual plaintiffs of a realistic danger of injury. In Lyons, the plaintiff sought to enjoin the use of a chokehold technique that police officers allegedly used to restrain arrestees. Id. at 97–98, 103 S. Ct. at 1662–63. However, in order to be
2 “Deferred action status, also known as ‘non-priority status,’ amounts to, in practical application, a reprieve for deportable aliens. No action (i.e., no deportation) will be taken . . . against an alien having deferred action status.” Pasquini v. Morris, 700 F.2d 658, 661 (11th Cir. 1983) (internal citation omitted).
9

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subject to the chokehold at issue, the Court explained that Lyons would have to allege a future police encounter along with “the incredible assertion either (1) that all police officers in Los Angeles always choke any citizen with whom they happen to have an encounter, whether for the purpose of arrest, issuing a citation, or for questioning, or (2) that the City ordered or authorized police officers to act in such manner.” Id. at 106, 103 S. Ct. at 1667 (emphases omitted). We do not agree with the State Officers that the probability of an officer’s finding of probable cause for any violation of state or federal law is comparable to the likelihood of the “sequence of individually improbable events” held to be speculative in Lyons. See Fla. State Conference of the NAACP v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153, 1162 (11th Cir. 2008). The uncontradicted declarations from three experienced law enforcement officers support this conclusion, as they confirm that any minor traffic violation such as failure to use a turn signal or failure to come to a complete stop can provide the requisite probable cause to trigger application of either section.3
The State Officers further contend that we must assume that Plaintiffs “will conduct their activities within the law and so avoid prosecution and conviction.”
3 Collectively, the relevant declarants have close to one-hundred years of law enforcement experience that informs their sworn statements in support of Plaintiffs’ contention.
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O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 497, 94 S. Ct. 669, 677 (1974). Whereas in Littleton the alleged unconstitutional conduct could only result from an actual legal violation, prosecution, and conviction for that crime, here all that is necessary for application is an officer’s finding of probable cause that a legal violation has occurred. See id. at 497, 94 S. Ct. at 676 (“[T]he proposition is that if respondents proceed to violate an unchallenged law and if they are charged, held to answer, and tried in any proceedings before petitioners, they will be subjected to the discriminatory practices that petitioners are alleged to have followed.”). As with Lyons, we find that the possible injury facing Plaintiffs is not sufficiently similar to the attenuated chain of events required prior to the alleged injury in Littleton so as to preclude an individual plaintiff from having standing.4
2. Injury to Organizational Plaintiffs “‘[A]n organization has standing to sue on its own behalf if the defendant’s illegal acts impair its ability to engage in its projects by forcing the organization to divert resources to counteract those illegal acts.’” Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340, 1350 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Browning, 522 F.3d at 1165). In
4 We are also reluctant to hold that a state could insulate a statute from a preenforcement constitutional challenge by simply adding a layer of probable cause that another crime has been committed. To endorse this result would undermine the longstanding principle that a plaintiff “should not be required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief.” Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188, 93 S. Ct. 739, 745 (1973).
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Common Cause, we found that an organizational plaintiff suffered cognizable injury when it was forced to “divert resources from its regular activities to educate and assist [affected individuals] in complying with the [challenged] statute.” Id. Browning presented an injury similar to that in Common Cause, and we found organizational standing proper in that case on the ground that the organizations “reasonably anticipate[d] that they [would] have to divert personnel and time to educating volunteers and [affected individuals] on compliance” with the statute’s requirements. 522 F.3d at 1165–66. Because several organizational plaintiffs here claim injuries analogous to those present in Common Cause and Browning, we are satisfied that they meet the minimum requirements of Article III.
First, plaintiff Coalition of Latino Leaders (CLL) has shown that H.B. 87 has strained its limited resources and will continue to do so. CLL provides services to the Latino community that include citizenship classes, language classes, and assistance in completing legal documents for residency and naturalization. The enactment of H.B. 87 caused CLL to receive an increased number of inquiries about the law, forcing it to divert volunteer time and resources to educating affected members of the community and fielding inquiries. As a result, CLL has cancelled citizenship classes to focus on these effects. According to CLL, “these problems will only get worse if the bill goes into effect.” For
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similar reasons, we find that plaintiffs Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights
and Task Force for the Homeless also have standing because both organizations
have diverted resources to educate their members, staff, and volunteers on the
consequences of the law.
3. Causation and Redressability
Finding that numerous plaintiffs have suffered cognizable injuries, we are
also easily satisfied that the other two requirements of standing are met by each of
the plaintiffs noted above. Each injury is directly traceable to the passage of H.B. 87 and would be redressed by enjoining each provision.5 To the extent the State
Officers rely on arguments that the probable cause requirement defeats these two
aspects of standing, we reject that position for the reasons stated above in the discussion of injury.6
B. Cause of Action
We next consider the State Officers’ argument that no cause of action
5 The State Officers also argue that the named defendants lack enforcement authority over H.B. 87 and that, therefore, an injunction as to these parties will not redress the harm to Plaintiffs. Our binding precedent from Luckey v. Harris forecloses this argument. 860 F.2d 1012, 1015–16 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that Georgia’s Governor is a proper party in a challenge to the state’s indigent defense program because he has sufficient, albeit indirect, contact with the program’s enforcement); see also Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 157, 161, 28 S. Ct. 441, 453, 454 (1908).
6 Having found that multiple plaintiffs possess standing, we do not address associational standing of the plaintiff organizations to assert claims on behalf of their members.
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permits private plaintiffs to challenge H.B. 87 under the Supremacy Clause or 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under precedent of the Supreme Court, this circuit, and other courts of appeals, these arguments cannot succeed.
The propriety of bringing a challenge for injunctive and declaratory relief on the grounds that a state law is preempted by virtue of the Supremacy Clause has gone largely unquestioned. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting, 563 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011) (upholding state statute against private organizational plaintiffs’ preemption challenge); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 61 S. Ct. 399 (1941) (finding state law preempted in a suit brought by a private plaintiff against state officials). In Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., the Supreme Court resolved claims in which plaintiffs alleged that federal employment law preempted several state statutes. 463 U.S. 85, 92, 103 S. Ct. 2890, 2897 (1983). The Court plainly stated that “[a] plaintiff who seeks injunctive relief from state regulation, on the ground that such regulation is pre-empted by a federal statute which, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, must prevail, . . . presents a federal question which the federal courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to resolve.” Id. at 96 n.14, 103 S. Ct. at 2899; see also Lawrence Cnty. v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 259 n.6, 105 S. Ct. 695, 697 (1985) (noting error in the lower court’s dismissal on
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jurisdictional grounds of an action for declaratory judgment based on the
Supremacy Clause). We have similarly resolved claims for injunctive relief where
the asserted right of action sounded in the Supremacy Clause and have no reason
to arrive at a contrary conclusion now.7 See, e.g., Sims v. Fla., Dep’t of Highway
Safety & Motor Vehicles, 862 F.2d 1449, 1454, 1455 (11th Cir. 1989) (en banc)
(addressing a claim that federal law preempted Florida state law and enjoining
enforcement of the law); Scurlock v. City of Lynn Haven, 858 F.2d 1521, 1525
(11th Cir. 1988) (enjoining a city ordinance claimed to be preempted by federal
law); see also BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. MCImetro Access Transmission
Servs., Inc., 317 F.3d 1270, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (Tjoflat, J.,
dissenting) (noting that Shaw held that plaintiffs may assert a private action for
preemption under the Supremacy Clause).
Other circuits have more explicitly identified the right of action that permits
7 The State Officers rely on the recent dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Roberts in Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., where four members of the Supreme Court concluded that the Supremacy Clause did not provide private plaintiffs a cause of action to enforce federal Medicaid law that was allegedly at odds with a California reimbursementreduction statute. 565 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1212 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). In dissent, Chief Justice Roberts did not purport to disturb the federal courts’ power grounded in Ex Parte Young to address the “pre-emptive assertion in equity of a defense that would otherwise have been available in the State’s enforcement proceedings at law.” Douglas, 132 S. Ct. at 1213 (citing Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1642 (2011) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). Because that is the precise situation we face today, Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent is not in tension with our resolution of this issue. See also Douglas, 132 S. Ct. at 1212 (“It is not even necessary to decide whether the Supremacy Clause can ever provide a private cause of action.”).
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private challenges to state actors’ enforcement of state statutes allegedly preempted by federal law. In 2006, then-judge Sotomayor proclaimed that a plaintiff’s “right to bring an action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from municipal regulation on the ground that federal law preempts that regulation is undisputed.” Loyal Tire & Auto Ctr., Inc. v. Town of Woodbury, 445 F.3d 136, 149 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Local Union No. 12004, USW v. Massachusetts, 377 F.3d 64, 75 (1st Cir. 2004) (“[I]n suits against state officials for declaratory and injunctive relief, a plaintiff may invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts by asserting a claim of preemption, even absent an explicit statutory cause of action.”); Bud Antle, Inc. v. Barbosa, 45 F.3d 1261, 1269 (9th Cir. 1994). Like the other circuits to address the issue head on, we “have little difficulty in holding that [Plaintiffs] have an implied right of action to assert a preemption claim seeking injunctive . . . relief.” Planned Parenthood of Houston & Se. Tex. v. Sanchez, 403 F.3d 324, 334 n.47, 335 (5th Cir. 2005).8
C. Preliminary Injunction We next must address the appropriateness of the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of sections 7 and 8. A preliminary
8 Because we are satisfied that Plaintiffs’ claim for relief is permissible under the Supremacy Clause, we need not address the propriety of their action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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injunction may be granted to a moving party who establishes “(1) substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury will be suffered unless the injunction issues; (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) if issued, the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.” McDonald’s Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 1998). We review each aspect of this standard in turn.
1. Likelihood of Success on Preemption Claim Our Constitution provides Congress with the power to preempt state law, see U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2, and that preemption may be express or implied. Although preemption law cannot always be neatly categorized, we generally recognize three classes of preemption. See Browning, 522 F.3d at 1167 (recognizing the doctrines of express, field, and conflict preemption). The first, express preemption, is not at issue in this appeal.9 The second, field preemption, “occurs when a congressional legislative scheme is ‘so pervasive as to make the reasonable inference that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it.’” Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S. Ct. 1146,
9 The absence of an express preemption provision in federal law does not bear on the question of whether a challenged state statute is impliedly preempted. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 386–88, 120 S. Ct. 2288, 2301–02 (2000).
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Case: 11-13044 Date F(i1le8do: f0384/2)0/2012 Page: 18 of 33
1152 (1947)). To determine the boundaries that Congress sought to occupy within the field, we look to “‘the federal statute itself, read in the light of its constitutional setting and its legislative history.’” De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 360 n.8, 96 S. Ct. 933, 938 (1976) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 78–79, 61 S. Ct. 399, 410 (1941) (Stone, J., dissenting)).
The third, conflict preemption, may arise in two ways. First, conflict preemption can occur “when it is physically impossible to comply with both the federal and the state laws.” Browning, 522 F.3d at 1167. It may also arise “when the state law stands as an obstacle to the objective of the federal law.” Id. The court utilizes its judgment to determine what constitutes an unconstitutional obstacle to federal law, and this judgment is “informed by examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and intended effects.” Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373, 120 S. Ct. 2288, 2294 (2000).
In determining the extent to which federal statutes preempt state law, we are “guided by two cornerstones.” Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194 (2009). First, “‘the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.’” Id. (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2250 (1996)). Second, we presume “that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was
18

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the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Id. at 565, 116 S. Ct. at 1194–95 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); see also Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012).
With these considerations in mind, we turn to the merits of whether sections 7 and 8 are preempted by federal law.
a. Section 7 As explained previously, section 7 creates three distinct state criminal violations: (1) transporting or moving an illegal alien, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-200(b); (2) concealing or harboring an illegal alien, id. § 16-11-201(b); and (3) inducing an illegal alien to enter the state of Georgia, id. § 16-11-202(b). Each of these offenses requires that the accused also be engaged in another criminal activity, and each further requires that the accused know of the illegal status of the subject. The State Officials argue that the district court erred in finding that section 7 is preempted by the criminal provisions of the INA, particularly 8 U.S.C. § 1324. We disagree. To determine the intent of Congress, we first look to the text of the relevant federal statutes. The INA provides a comprehensive framework to penalize the transportation, concealment, and inducement of unlawfully present aliens. Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii)–(iv), it is a federal crime for any person
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to transport or move an unlawfully present alien within the United States; to
conceal, harbor, or shield an unlawfully present alien from detection; or to encourage or induce an alien to “come to, enter, or reside in the United States.”10
Any person who conspires or aids in the commission of any of those criminal
activities is also punishable. Id. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v). Section 1324(c) permits local
law enforcement officers to arrest for these violations of federal law, but the
federal courts maintain exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute for these crimes and
interpret the boundaries of the federal statute. See id. § 1329. Subsection (d) of
§ 1324 further dictates evidentiary rules governing prosecution of one of its
enumerated offenses, and subsection (e) goes so far as to mandate a community
outreach program to “educate the public in the United States and abroad about the
penalties for bringing in and harboring aliens in violation of this section.” Rather
than authorizing states to prosecute for these crimes, Congress chose to allow state
officials to arrest for § 1324 crimes, subject to federal prosecution in federal court.
10 As early as 1917, Congress determined that it was necessary to enter the field of regulating the harboring and concealment of unlawfully present aliens. See United States v. Sanchez-Vargas, 878 F.2d 1163, 1168 (9th Cir. 1989). By 1952, Congress expanded its regulation to cover both the transport of unlawfully present aliens and the inducement of their entry into the country. See id. at 1169; see also Pub. L. No. 82-283, 66 Stat. 26; Pub. L. No. 82414, 66 Stat. 163, 228. Since then, the federal interest has not diminished through repeal of the provisions or any additional legislation that detracts from its original force. See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502–04, 76 S. Ct. 477, 480–81 (1956) (chronicling the history of federal sedition law to support an inference that the field was dominated by federal regulation).
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See id. §§ 1324(c), 1329. In the absence of a savings clause permitting state regulation in the field, the inference from these enactments is that the role of the states is limited to arrest for violations of federal law. See De Canas, 424 U.S. at 363, 96 S. Ct. at 940.
The comprehensive nature of these federal provisions is further evident upon examination of how § 1324 fits within the larger context of federal statutes criminalizing the acts undertaken by aliens and those who assist them in coming to, or remaining within, the United States. Regarding the aliens themselves, § 1325, for example, imposes civil and criminal penalties for unlawful entry into the United States. Congress has similarly authorized criminal penalties for individuals who bring aliens into the United States, id. § 1323, aid the entry of an inadmissible alien, id. § 1327, and import an alien for an immoral purpose, id. § 1328. In enacting these provisions, the federal government has clearly expressed more than a “peripheral concern” with the entry, movement, and residence of aliens within the United States, see De Canas, 424 U.S. at 360–61, 96 S. Ct. at 939, and the breadth of these laws illustrates an overwhelmingly dominant federal interest in the field.
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Arizona v. United States provides an instructive analogy. Section 3 of Arizona’s Senate Bill 1070 (S.B. 1070) added
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a “state-law penalty for conduct proscribed by federal law”—the failure to complete and carry alien registration documents as required by 8 U.S.C. §§ 1304(e), 1306(a). Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501. The Court explained the comprehensive nature of the current federal registration scheme, which holds aliens to certain standards of conduct and penalizes their willful failure to register with the federal government. Id. at 2502. Based on the breadth of federal regulation, the Court concluded that “the Federal Government has occupied the field of alien registration” and therefore found impermissible “even complementary state regulation” within that field. Id.; see also id. (“Even if a State may make violation of federal law a crime in some instances, it cannot do so in a field . . . that has been occupied by federal law.”). The Supreme Court dismissed the state’s argument that its goal of concurrent enforcement was appropriate in a field occupied by federal regulation. Id. at 2502–03. Like the federal registration scheme addressed in Arizona, Congress has provided a “full set of standards” to govern the unlawful transport and movement of aliens. Id. at 2502. The INA comprehensively addresses criminal penalties for these actions undertaken within the borders of the United States, and a state’s attempt to intrude into this area is prohibited because Congress has adopted a calibrated framework within the INA to address this issue. See id. at 2502–03.
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Our conclusion also finds support in the Supreme Court’s decision in Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 76 S. Ct. 477 (1956). In Nelson, the Court held that Pennsylvania’s sedition act, which “proscribe[d] the same conduct” as the federal sedition statute, was preempted by federal law. Id. at 499, 76 S. Ct. at 479. As it did in Arizona, the Court rejected the state’s argument that its purported supplementation of federal law shielded the state statute from federal preemption. See id. at 504, 76 S. Ct. at 481; see also Charleston & W. Carolina Ry. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597, 604, 35 S. Ct. 715, 717 (1915) (“When Congress has taken the particular subject-matter in hand, coincidence is as ineffective as opposition, and a state law is not to be declared a help because it attempts to go farther than Congress has seen fit to go.”). The Court later discussed that the federal statute’s preemptive effect was implied because it occupied “the specific field which the States were attempting to regulate.” De Canas, 424 U.S. at 362, 96 S. Ct. at 940. The finding of preemption in Nelson was further justified because, like here, Congress had not sanctioned concurrent state legislation “on the subject covered by the challenged state law.” Id. at 363, 96 S. Ct. at 940.
We are further convinced that section 7 presents an obstacle to the execution of the federal statutory scheme and challenges federal supremacy in the
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realm of immigration.11 By confining the prosecution of federal immigration
crimes to federal court, Congress limited the power to pursue those cases to the
appropriate United States Attorney. See 8 U.S.C. § 1329; Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at
2503 (explaining that if the state provision came into force, states would have “the
power to bring criminal charges against individuals for violating a federal law
even in circumstances where federal officials in charge of the comprehensive
scheme determine that prosecution would frustrate federal policies”). As officers
of the Executive Branch, U.S. Attorneys for the most part exercise their discretion
in a manner consistent with the established enforcement priorities of the
Administration they serve. The terms of section 7, however, are not conditioned
on respect for the federal concerns or the priorities that Congress has explicitly
granted executive agencies the authority to establish. See Department of
Homeland Security Appropriations Act 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-83, 123 Stat. 2142,
2149 (2009) (requiring the Secretary of Homeland Security to “prioritize the
11 We reject the State Officers’ characterization of section 7 as an exercise of its police power wholly removed from the federal immigration scheme. Even if we accept this basic premise (which is problematic given (1) the criminal provisions of section 7 are modeled after those found in the federal Immigration and Nationality Act and (2) the Georgia legislature codified them in a new article entitled “Offenses Involving Illegal Aliens”), legislation in a field where states traditionally have power does not defeat a claim of federal preemption. E.g. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350, 121 S. Ct. 1012, 1018 (2001) (holding that federal law preempted state tort regulation); see also Charleston & W. Carolina Ry. Co., 237 U.S. at 604, 35 S. Ct. at 717 (“The legislation is not saved by calling it an exercise of the police power . . . .”).
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identification and removal of aliens convicted of a crime by the severity of that crime”). Indeed, the State Officers have taken the position that an individual driving an unlawfully present alien to the supermarket could be prosecuted under section 7 and under the similar provisions of the INA. (There has been, to our knowledge, no reported federal conviction premised on that type of ordinary conduct.) This contention illustrates the State Officers’ misunderstanding of the nature of federal immigration law and the reach of state authority in the realm of immigration-related law enforcement.
Along those same lines, interpretation of the section 7 crimes by state courts and enforcement by state prosecutors unconstrained by federal law threaten the uniform application of the INA. Each time a state enacts its own parallel to the INA, the federal government loses “control over enforcement” of the INA, thereby “further detract[ing] from the integrated scheme of regulation created by Congress.” Wis. Dep’t of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 288–89, 106 S. Ct. 1057, 1062 (1986) (quotation marks omitted); see also Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2503 (addressing dilution of federal power in the context of the alien registration scheme); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 265, 49 S. Ct. 108, 110 (1929) (“The national purpose to establish uniformity necessarily excludes state regulation.”). Given the federal primacy in the field of
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enforcing prohibitions on the transportation, harboring, and inducement of unlawfully present aliens, the prospect of fifty individual attempts to regulate immigration-related matters cautions against permitting states to intrude into this area of dominant federal concern.
The conflict that exists is exacerbated by the inconsistency between section 7 and provisions of federal law. For one, Georgia’s enticement provision creates a new crime unparalleled in the federal scheme. Federal law prohibits an individual from encouraging or inducing an alien to “come to, enter, or reside in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) (emphasis added). Once inside the territory, though, it is not (and has never been) a federal crime for a person to encourage an alien to migrate into another state. The Supreme Court has indicated that such additional regulation conflicts with federal law, at least when federal interests dominate. See Hines, 312 U.S. at 66–67, 61 S. Ct. at 404 (“[W]here the federal government, in the exercise of its superior authority in th[e immigration] field, has enacted a complete scheme of regulation . . . , states cannot, inconsistently with the purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail or complement, the federal law, or enforce additional or auxiliary regulations.” (emphasis added)). Similarly, the criminal acts of harboring and transporting unlawfully present aliens constitute an impermissible “complement” to the INA that is inconsistent with
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Congress’s objective of creating a comprehensive scheme governing the movement of aliens within the United States. See id.
Although the State Officers argue that the objectives of federal law and section 7 are the same, “[i]dentity of ends does not end our analysis of preemption.” Crosby, 530 U.S. at 379 n.14, 120 S. Ct. at 2298 (citing Gould, 475 U.S. at 286, 106 S. Ct. at 1061). In Crosby, the Court found preempted a Massachusetts statute that, according to the state, shared the federal government’s goal of economically pressuring the Burmese government. Id. at 378–79, 120 S. Ct. at 2297. The state law at issue there imposed restrictions on the capacity of state agencies to purchase goods and services from companies that conducted business with Burma, id. at 367, 120 S. Ct. at 2291, while federal law imposed both mandatory and conditional economic sanctions on Burma, id. at 368, 120 S. Ct. at 2291. The Court found no merit in the state’s argument that the shared goals and the possibility of compliance with both federal and state law rendered the Massachusetts law a constitutional complement to federal law. See id. at 379–80, 120 S. Ct. at 2297–98. The Court also explained that a conflict between federal and state law “‘is imminent’ when ‘two separate remedies are brought to bear on the same activity.’” Id. at 380, 120 S. Ct. at 2298 (quoting Gould, 475 U.S. at 286, 106 S. Ct. at 1061). That statement is instructive here, where section 7 imposes
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criminal penalties on conduct that the INA in most instances already regulates. The end result of section 7 is to layer additional penalties atop federal law in direct opposition to the Court’s direction in Crosby.
In light of the foregoing, we are convinced that Plaintiffs have met their burden to show a likelihood of success on the claim that section 7 is preempted by federal law.
b. Section 8 Section 8 authorizes police officers to investigate the immigration status of individuals who cannot produce adequate identification to prove citizenship, provided probable cause exists that the individual has committed a crime. O.C.G.A. § 17-5-100(b). In implementing this investigatory provision, officers are not permitted to “consider race, color, or national origin . . . except to the extent permitted by” the United States and Georgia Constitutions. Id. § 17-5100(e). In Arizona v. United States, the Supreme Court approved of a similar state provision, and in light of that holding we likewise conclude at this stage of litigation that Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on the claim that section 8 is preempted by federal law. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2507–10. In Arizona, the Supreme Court rejected a preenforcement challenge to section 2(B) of S.B. 1070, which requires state officers to make a reasonable
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attempt to determine the immigration status of a person stopped, detained, or arrested if there exists reasonable suspicion that the detained individual is an unlawfully present alien. 132 S. Ct. at 2507; see Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-1051(B). The Arizona statute contains three limitations: production of certain identification renders an individual presumptively lawfully present, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 111051(B); officers may not consider race, color, or national origin except as authorized by the United States and Arizona Constitutions, id.; and the statute must be implemented consistently with federal law and in a manner protective of civil rights, id. § 11-1051(L).
Arizona clarified the principle that “[c]onsultation between federal and state officials is an important feature of the immigration system.” 132 S. Ct. at 2508. Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10), state officers may permissibly communicate with the federal government about “the immigration status of any individual,” even absent a formalized agreement between the locality and federal government. Moreover, Congress has set up a system to provide assistance to state officers and has mandated that Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) respond to state inquiries concerning the immigration status of individuals. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2508. Above all, Congress has “encouraged the sharing of information about possible immigration violations,” and federal law permits “a policy requiring state
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officials to contact ICE as a routine matter.” Id. The state’s failure to incorporate or reference federal enforcement priorities in its immigration-inquiry statute is irrelevant. Id.
The Court also explained in Arizona that a preenforcement challenge to the scope of detention authorized by the state statute is premature. Id. at 2509–10. It noted the potential problems with a state statute that would permit detention “solely to verify [an individual’s] immigration status” but noted that the state’s interpretation of its statute could remedy these concerns. Id. at 2509. In sum, if all the state statute requires is that state officers conduct an immigration inquiry “during the course of an authorized, lawful detention or after a detainee has been released, the provision likely would survive preemption—at least absent some showing that it has other consequences that are adverse to federal law and its objectives.” Id. Notably, the Court left open the possibility that the interpretation and application of Arizona’s law could prove problematic in practice and refused to foreclose future challenges to the law. Id. at 2510.
The Supreme Court’s holding and explanation apply with full force to section 8, and we reject the current preenforcement challenge to its validity. First, we note that section 8 is less facially problematic than the provision at issue in Arizona. Unlike Arizona’s section 2(B), which is a mandatory investigation
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provision, section 8 authorizes—but does not require—state officials to conduct an inquiry into immigration status whenever a detained individual cannot produce satisfactory identification.12 Furthermore, section 8 has the same three built-in limitations as the Arizona statute. See O.C.G.A. § 17-5-100(b) (providing that certain documentation is sufficient to establish immigration status); id. § 17-5100(d) (prohibiting use of race, color, or national origin in implementing the provision); Ga. L. 2011, p. 794, § 1(c) (requiring implementation consistent with “federal laws governing immigration and civil rights”). Indeed, at oral argument, counsel for the state of Georgia emphasized that section 8 authorizes arrest and detention only to the extent permitted by federal law. This interpretation is consistent with the plain language of O.C.G.A. § 17-5-100(e). We are therefore reluctant to conclude that the state statute “will be construed in a way that creates a conflict with federal law.” Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2510. As a result, Plaintiffs cannot establish that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their preemption argument in this preenforcement challenge to section 8.
12 At the same time, we recognize arguments of Plaintiffs and amici that the nonmandatory nature of section 8 invites a host of other problems, namely racial profiling. Reliance on race, color, or national origin that is constitutionally prohibited, however, is expressly forbidden by the Georgia statute. O.C.G.A. § 17-5-100(d). It is inappropriate for us to assume that the state will disregard its own law, and we therefore reject the argument in this respect, keeping in mind that unconstitutional application of the statute could be challenged in later litigation. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2510.
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2. Equitable Factors The State Officers also argue that the district court was incorrect to determine that Plaintiffs meet the three additional requirements relevant to a preliminary injunction.13 More specifically, they contend that (1) Plaintiffs will suffer no irreparable harm in the absence of the injunction and (2) the equities favor enforcement of H.B. 87. We find no clear abuse of discretion in the district court’s resolution of these equitable issues. See Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1175 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (per curiam). Plaintiffs are under the threat of state prosecution for crimes that conflict with federal law, and we think enforcement of a state law at odds with the federal immigration scheme is neither benign nor equitable. We therefore agree with the district court’s conclusion that Plaintiffs have met their burden to enjoin enforcement of section 7.
III. Conclusion The illegal-immigration issues that our country faces today are, no doubt, exceptionally important to both the state and federal governments. As a federal court, we do not sit in judgment of the policy decisions of state legislatures, and we are usually reluctant to conclude that states are forbidden from enacting
13 Because Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on the merits of their challenge to section 8, the discussion of equitable factors relates only to section 7.
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statutes related to activities within their borders. However, when state laws intrude into areas of overwhelming federal interest and erode the discretion implicit in the sovereignty of the country, we must recognize the supremacy of federal law. Here, section 7 of H.B. 87 cannot be reconciled with the federal immigration scheme or the individual provisions of the INA. As a result, we affirm in part the district court’s order preliminarily enjoining enforcement of section 7. We reverse in part the portion of that order enjoining section 8. This case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
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John Ley Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
ELBERT PARR TUTTLE COURT OF APPEALS BUILDING 56 Forsyth Street, N.W. Atlanta, Georgia 30303
August 20, 2012

For rules and forms visit www.ca11.uscourts.gov

MEMORANDUM TO COUNSEL OR PARTIES
Appeal Number: 11-13044-FF Case Style: Georgia Latino Alliance for Hu, et al v. Governor of Georgia, et al District Court Docket No: 1:11-cv-01804-TWT

Enclosed is a copy of the court's decision filed today in this appeal. Judgment has this day been entered pursuant to FRAP 36. The court's mandate will issue at a later date in accordance with FRAP 41(b).
The time for filing a petition for rehearing is governed by 11th Cir. R. 40-3, and the time for filing a petition for rehearing en banc is governed by 11th Cir. R. 35-2. Except as otherwise provided by FRAP 25(a) for inmate filings, a petition for rehearing or for rehearing en banc is timely only if received in the clerk's office within the time specified in the rules. Costs are governed by FRAP 39 and 11th Cir.R. 39-1. The timing, format, and content of a motion for attorney's fees and an objection thereto is governed by 11th Cir. R. 39-2 and 39-3.
Please note that a petition for rehearing en banc must include in the Certificate of Interested Persons a complete list of all persons and entities listed on all certificates previously filed by any party in the appeal. See 11th Cir. R. 26.1-1. In addition, a copy of the opinion sought to be reheard must be included in any petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. See 11th Cir. R. 35-5(k) and 40-1 .
Counsel appointed under the CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT must file a CJA voucher claiming compensation for time spent on the appeal no later than 60 days after either issuance of mandate or filing with the U.S. Supreme Court of a petition for a writ of certiorari (whichever is later).
Pursuant to Fed.R.App.P. 39, each party to bear own costs.
For questions concerning the issuance of the decision of this court, please call the number referenced in the signature block below. For all other questions, please call Janet K. Spradlin, FF at (404) 335-6178.
Sincerely,
JOHN LEY, Clerk of Court
Reply to: Jeff R. Patch Phone #: 404-335-6161

OPIN-1A Issuance of Opinion With Costs