Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 1 Filed 04/27/16 Page 1 of 21

1:':1JS1:,·~i1::~versh~~ ~~· ~edherem;,~_'!,~?,;,:;~,~~;~,!~~No<olk.:~(;}Jj3~L ""~' 1 ThiS~~:~ a11d the inft?
prov1drd by local rules o l court,

::!by forth~ 1

1

the .lud •c•al Conterence of the U mtcd Stales m :>cptcmbcr 1974, 1s rcqmrcd

M
U>c of the Clerk o l Court lor the

purpoo;e of m itia ti ng th~ CIVil docket ~heel. f. 'EE /NSJ'H/11 ' /IONS ON NhXJ' I'A(j" <W THIS FOWvl.)

I. (a) PLAJJSTIFFS FRl\1\K I.ONG, individual!) and on bellaIf ofall other sim1larly suuat~"<l

DE FENDANTS
sou·nu.:ASTERN PI'NNSYLVAJ\lJA TRANSPORTATION AlJ'I HORITY

(b) Couniy of Rcs1dence nf F1rst L1sted Plaintiff Philadell~
(F.XCErT IN US PLAINTIFF CASES}
(c) AttomC) S (F~rm ,\"am~. Address, omf 7H<plwne NumhnJ
see attachment

County of Res1dence of First Listed D efen uant

Phi}ll.~~lp.J:!!a

(IN US. PlAINTIFF CASI:.S ONLlj

,,

NOT!:

I'I LA:-JD CO~F.I-INAJION CASF~'>. IlSI£ I JIE LOC,\TIO~ 0Jo

ntE I RACT OF LAND INVOLVED.

.•'

Attorneys (JjKM"'"J

..._ ~

II. BASIS OF ,ltJR ISDr ;IO N tPJn,~ "'' ·x " m Om' Bet<Vnl)~

01 U.S. Govemmcnt
Plamt 1 n~

3 cdcral Question (I f.::; fim ·ernment Nm n farw)

0 2 U.S. (jo, t.:nuuem Deft-ndam

0 4 IJJ\(':I'...ity
(lndu..ot~.. Cui:en~h'f' u(IJurlti!S 111 Item 1111

Ill. C IT IZENSHIP OF PH. I NCJPAL PARTIES rl'k~t·om ·x m on~ &.,Jorf?laJnJJ/f'

fi'Or /)11 t'r{lf\J Cafes On")

I' T F

CIU.t..en of Tlus ~tato

0 I

tmdOm· Ht•\ fi)r Defericlolll)

Ut:.F

l'TF DE:F

0 I Incorporated ur Pnucipal Ploec

0 4 04

ofBu..;mcss lu Tilis State

Cm.z.en of1\nothcr State

0 2 0 2 lncoq>oratcc.t uml Pnnc1p.1l Pb cc 0

05

ofBt~smess fn l\nothcr S l:lte

C•Li-<<11 or SuhJcet of• Forci!,"'l COUJIIl)

o ~ 0 3 fCH"ei¥Jl Nat1t'n

0 6 0 1·

I V. t\ATURE OF SUIT l!'lucc "'' 'X" mOne 11m. o,J,;

I

CO~T.R,\CT

0 110 ln~urancc

0110 Manne

0 130 1\llller Act

TORTS

PllltSO~AL l "'.lli RY
0 3 10 ,, ,.,,Jane
0 315 Alfjllane Product

1'1\RSONA I, IN.JliNY
0 .~' 6S PcrsouaJ luj111y •
Product lJabJioty

FORFF. JT! : I~ £/ I "ENA I .TY
0 625 Dru~ Rei:Jtcd Scizun:
of Propcl1)' 2I USC SK I 0 6<J00thcr

UAN'f<R lfP'l'('Y
0 H2 Appeal 28 USC I S~ 0 423 Withdrawal
1R USC 157

0 140 :--oJ!oUablc ln<tnunctll

I tabilil}

0 Yi7 t lealth Carel

0 I .SO Keco\ ery of 0\ crpaymeru 0 320 A»auh, l.tbcl &

PhatTl'la.CCliiH::tl

& C11 forc~nl-Cnt ofJudgmem

Stamler

P~:rsonal InJury

0 15 1 Medicare A~l

0 330 Federal l:.mp!O)•ers'

Pnxluot LtHhiltly

0 152 Reco\'ery o f Udauhed

LullHhty

0 36X Asl>cSios i'cm)IIUI

P ROPt:R'n ' RfC IITS 0 S20 Copyright> 0 810 l'au:nt
0 840 Trademark

'\rudl:'nl Loan~

0 340 ~1annc

lilJrn·y Prod\ICI

(E•cludes VcJcrun>)
0153 Reco,eryofO'cfl>a'ruem of\'<Ier.m'< lknefiLS
0 I(.0 !-Iockh<'ld,·"'' Stuts 0 190 Otbor Contr:act
0 I'J5 Cuntracl Product l.tabliity
0 I% l·tanChiS<

0 3~5 Marine f'roduct
L1ab•lny 0 350 ~101or Vchtclc
0 3H \1otor Vch•cle
f>roouct Liabllil)·
0 360 Other l'c-rsonal
lnju1 y 0 362 l'e•<onal h~wy -
Modica! l\lalpr• clicc

Liability

I.AUOil.

l't:RSONAL PllOI' t:R I Y 0 710 b" ubor Standan:ls

0 370 Other Fraud

Act

0 .l71 T ruth in lcudllllt

0 720 Labor~lanagcrocnt

0 380 Otller Personal Propeny Dama~c

R~lauuns
0 740 Railway l.nbor Act

0 ~8S Prope11y Dnmagc J>mduct Liabil ily

0 75 1 Family anu Medic(ll
Lca\'t Acl
0 790 Other L;:•lxu I i1ig.1tit"'111

SOC!A LSECl"RITY
Q 361li!A (IJ95fl)
0 862 13laek Lung (')2J)
0 863 DIWOUIW\\' (405(!!)1
0 gty1 SSID Title ).'VI
0 865 RSI (405(g))

l~"' I

REAL PROI' t:RTY

~ 210 Lund Coudt"ou•auon

0 220 l·orr.;clo:;wc

0 230 k l"lll Loase & EJc,;un<nt

C IVIL RIGHTS
Lt-:J 440 Other C" tl Ri):'hb
442 fv-u.w..lu.ymC:JH

0 240 Tom to l Hnd

441 r lon~•ng/

I' IUSO I\'ER P ETI I IO:"iS
Habeas Coqw!\:
0 '163 Al1en D~tolftCo! s 0 10 .NJolions. 10 v~cruc
S cmcn~.:c

0 791 Lmploy.., Rettrcmcnt
Income <icctmty :-\("l

n : uERAL TAX S\ fi S U S70Ta~es (LI.S_ J>Jamllfi'
nr Ddcndam)
0 R71 IRS- Tiurd P•l1)·
26 usc 7(,0')

0 245 Ton l'r()(luc l l iohili1y

;\ t.:.(:011Unodatiuns

0 5~0 General

0 290 ,\II Other R~al Propeny

0 ·1·1, A IIK'I w/Oisabilitin 0 535 Death l'cn:dty

l\j\11Gil.A'fl01\

F1nployuJL::lll

Othrr:

0462 Nat••rali1.31mn Avf>Jic..')ltOI\

OTHf: l~ S'I'ATlJn~S

I

0 375 htl~e Clrums A.ct 0 400 Stale Reappomonmcnt
0 410 .-\niiUttSt
0 4;0 R.1nks and l.lmii-u1g
0 -150 C onuncr<c 0 -160 0q>nt101tOH 0 ,170 Rru:~t:h~~r In.lucnced aud
C ~m UlJl Qf'ga:nizattons
0 480 Coohunll:r Cred it 0 4<JO C:~hlc,Sat TV 0 S50 Sccunii.->·Conunodme.l
!:.'dJ.tn!;e
0 890 Otl.et Statulory Awon>
0 891 A~flcultt~al Acts 0 ~93 Euvitonmem a l f'..,Jatt~rs 0 895 Frec<lom ofl nfonuation
Ac1
0 896 i\rhm'llliou 0 899 .\dnuru~ro.tne Proccdw·c
.-\ct Kc' 1e\\ or- Appeal of
;\~elK.} Oec"ion
0 ()50 (\m,lltuliou:-tliry of
S1a1..: !'>ltllute~

0 4~6 Anl<:t " ''Dtsabiluic<; 0 540 t.landamIL' & Other 0 465 Other hnuul!fation

Otl•e•

0 550 Ctvd R•ght•

Acllon~

0 448 Pdncollo n

0 555 Prison Cond111011

0 560 Civ1l Oet,.nec •

Conditions o f

~""\

c o. t f i ne m e n t

~G 2maIlN ,_,.U.~2··'R"e•m•o0v~ed>•fro'm'""' U 3 Remanded from

occcdmg

Stale Cow1

Appellate Coun

U 4 Reinstated or 0 5 0 Translet red from 6 Mul11dtstnct

Reopened

Anot her Dl\tnct

Lill@.alton

l.~pt!CJ/\'J

VI. CAUSE OF

Cilc the U.S. Civl l Statute under wh1ch you w·e filing (l>u u ot citejuri.wlictimwt...tutlllt':t' uult!S$ clit..er.,·ity): 15 U S C. § 1681 c·t seq.. ond 18 Pa Cons. Stat 1\Jm § 9 125

A CT I ON

Bncf dcscn ption of cause Fa•lure lo provide clear and conspicuous FCRA d1sclosure. and 1111proper demal t)fcmplovmenr based on cnmmal conv1c1ion

VII. REQUESTED I~
COMP L AT~T:

181 C H ECKlFTIIIS IS A C LASS ACTIO'I
UNDER RULE 23. F R Cv. P

VIII. RELATED C ASE(S)

DE.\11\1\0 $

CHECK YES only if d~m complamt.

JllH' DF.I\IAI'W :

-181 .

D No

IF .~NV

(ScP tnsfructi On f:).'

JUf>GE

DOCKET NUMB ER

0412712016

SI~OF~ZYOFRFCORO

FOR OFFICE tiSF:(Ir-.LY

RECEII'T #

A.\ .10u:--1 1

i\PPI.YI NG IFI'

JUDGE

Mi\0 JUDGE

lPR 7 7 2016

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 1 Filed 04/27/16 Page 2 of 21
Attachment to Civil Cover Sheet
Plaintiff's Attorney Information
OUTTEN & COLDEN LLP Adam T. Kle in (pro hac vice motion forthcoming) O ssai Miazad (pro hac vice motion forthcom ing) Le w is M. Stee l (pro hac vice motion forthcoming) C hristopher M . McNerney (pro hac vice motion forthco ming) C heryi-Ly n Be ntley (pro hac vice mo tio n fo rthcoming) 3 Park Avenue, 29th Flo or New York, N Y 10016 Tel.: (2 12) 245- 1000
LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW J on Greenbaum (pro hac vice motion fo rthcoming) Ma teya Kelley {pro hac vice m otion forth coming)
1401 New York Ave.. NW Washi ngto n. DC 20005 Tel. : (202) 662-8600
PHILADELPHIA LAWYERS FOR SOCIAL EQUITY Michael Lee (Pe nnsylvania Bar No. 307008) Michae l Hardiman (Pennsylvania Bar 'o . 2 7018) 1501 C herry Street Phi ladelphia, PA 19102 Tel. : (215) 995- 12 30
P UBLIC I NTEREST LAW CENT E R B enjamin D. Geffeo (Pennsyl vania Ba r. No. 3 10 L34) 1709 Beojamin Franklin Parkway, 2d Floor P hiladelphia, PA 19 103 Tel.: (267) 546- 1308
WILLIG, WILLIAMS & DAVIDSON Ryan Allen Hancock (Pennsylvan ia Bar No. 92590) Danielle Newsome (Pennsylvania Bar N o. 320772) 1845 Walnut Street, 24 111 F loor P h iladelphia, PA 19 J03 Te l.: (2 I5) 656-3679

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 1 Filed 04/27/16 Page 3 of 21

PSTPEN~SYLVANlA - categor~f6 tbAu~Jt 1 FORnu; £ASTERN DISTRiCT OF

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DESIGNATION I:'ORM to be used by counsel to indicate the

cue for

rlf /00/6

Does this civil action involve a nongovernmental corporate party with any parent corporation and any publicly held corporation owning I

(Attach two copies of the Disclosure Statement form in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 7.J(a))

YesD

ore of its stock?

Does this case involve multidistrict litigation possibilities?
RELATED CASE. JF ANY: Case Number: _ _ __ __ __ _ __ Judge _ _ __ __ _ __ _ _ _ __

Yeso Date Tenninated: - - -- -- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Civil cases are deemed related when yes is answered to any of tbc following questions:

1. ls this case related to property included in an e-Mlicr numbered suit pending or wtthin one year previously terminated action in this co~ut?

YesD

A - 2. Does this case involve the same issue of fact or grow out ofthe same transaction as a prior suit pending or witbin one year previously te

ted

action UJ this court?

YesD ~

3.

Does .this case involve the validity terminated action in this coun?

or

infringement

of

a

patent

already

in

suit

or

any

earlier

numbered

case

pending

or

within one YesD

year prtf!\.~ly N~

4. ls this case a second or successive habeas corpus, social security appeal, or prose civi l rights case filed by the same individual? YesD

CfVIL: (Place V' jn ONE CATEGORY ONLY)
A. Federal Question Cases: I. o Indemnity Contract, Marine Contract, and All Other Contracts

2. o FELA
3. D Jones Act-Personal rnjury 4. o Antitrust
5. o Patent
6. ~abor-Management R e lations
7. aVC il Rights

8.

abeas Corpus

9. o Securities Act(s) Cases

I 0. o Social Security Review Cases

II. o All other Federal Question Cases (Please s p e c i f y ) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- -

B. Diversity Jurisdictiun Cases: I. D Insurance Contract and Other Contracts
2. 0 Airplane Personal Injury
3. 0 Assault, Defamation 4. 0 Marine Personal J'njury
5. D Motor Vehicle Personal Injury 6. 0 Other Personal injury (Please specify) 7. 0 Products Liability 8. 0 Products Liability - Asbestos 9. 0 All other Diversity Cases
(Please specify)

B ' • cel.'r I,

:Y'U"' '~"'l ~

n
J/

·lt-IJ

ARBrTRA TION CERTIFICATlON
(Check Approprlare Category)
.counsel of record do hereby eenify:

(J?Pursua.ot to Local C1vil Rule 53.2, Section 3(c)(2), that to the best of my knowledge and belief, the damages recoverable in this c1vil act1on case exceed the sum of

$] 50,090'.00 exclusive of interest and costs;

o /Relief other than monetary damages is so ght.

3/013~

Attorney I.D.# NOTt! A trial de novo will be a trill) by jury only if there bas been compliance with r.R.C.P. 38.

except as noted abo.,c. CIV. 609 (5/20 I2)

nding or within one year previously terminated action in this court
3/ D))~
Attorney J.D.#
·APR 2t L.UJ i)l

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 1 Filed 04/27/16 Page 4 of 21

Pfal

IN THE UNITED STATES DI STRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERl\" DISTRICT Of PE ~NSYLV~'\lA

CASE MAl\AGEMENT TRACK DES IGNATION FORM

~{1\f\k Lo~1 '~~~'"/ J"'"fj ~~l ~·\ bek~lf J
a:I/ ot~s 5lt"'d"'r~l 5 ''f"'c.--rf..'\ 1 Plo-.if\t \f~

CIVIL ACTION

V.

5e.-tle. ~-.)~(/\ PvY\1\~J v~,.,r~ ·fr ~ O.f\SfC r"t.... l/
A~1 ~~n·r j 1 DetiJ"'J~"'t-

NO.

1991

In accordance with the Civil Ju stice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan of this court, counsel for

p laintiff shall complete a Case Management Track Designation Fom1 in all civil cases at the time of

filing the complaint and serve a copy on all defendants. (See§ 1:03 ofthe plan set forth on the reverse

side of this fonn.) In the event that a defendant does not agree with the plaintiff regarding said

designation, that defendant shall, with its frrst appearance, submit to the clerk of court and serve on

the plaintiff and all other parties.. a Case Management Track Designation Fonn specifying the track

to which that defendant believes the case should be assigned.

SELECT ONE OF THE FOLLOWING CASE MAl\AGE:\1El\'T TRACKS:

(a) Habeas Corpus - Cases brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 through~ 2255.

(

(b) Social Security - Cases requesting review of a decision of the Secretary of Health

and Human Services denying plaintiff Social Security Benefits.

(

(c) Arbitration - Cases required to be designated for arbitration under Local Civil Rule 53.2. (

(d) Asbestos - Cases involving claims for personal injury or property damage from exposure to asbestos.

(e) Spec ial Management - Cases that do not fall into tracks (a) through (d) that are commonly referred to as complex and that need special or intense management by the court. (See reverse side of this fonn for a detailed explanation of special
management cases.)

(1) Standard Management- Cases that do not fa ll into any one of the other tracks.

( )

Lf!Z7 / 2a}r,
Date
'"2.]2...-2 Y.f-1 0oo
Telephone

Attorney-at-law
{t{- !JD~ -20[0
FAX Number

Attorney for
0 M.eo;trt;olk" .(0"'
E-Mail Address

(Ch ·. 660) 10/02

'flfR 27 7016

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 1 Filed 04/27/16 Page 5 of 21

OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP Adam T. Klein* Ossai Mia7.ad* Lewis M. Steel* Christopher M. McNerney* Cheryi-Lyn 13entley* 3 Park A venue. 29th Floor New York, NY 10016 (2 12) 245-1000
PHILADELPHIA LAWYERS FOR SOC IAL EQUITY Michael Lee Pennsylvania Bar N o. 307008 Michael Hardiman Pennsylvania Bar No. 270 18 150 I Cherry Street Philadelphia, PA 19102 (215) 995-1230
*Pro hac vice motions forthcoming

LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR C TVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW Jon Greenbaum* M.ateya Ke lley* 1401 New York Ave., NW Washington. DC 20005 (202) 662-8600

PUBLIC I NTEREST LAW CENTER
Benjamin D. Geffen
Pennsy lvania Bar. No. 310134 1709 Benjamin Franklin Parkway. 2d Floor

FILED

Philadelphia. PA 191 03 (267) 546- 1308

APR 2 7 2016

WILLIG, WILLIAMS & DAVIDSON
Ryan Allen Hancock
Pennsylvania Bar No. 92590

~~'2!_~L>--· t\UNZ, Clerk
Y "' -Dep. Clerk

Danielle Ne wsome

Pennsylvania Bar No. 320772

1845 Walnut Stree t. 24th Floor

Philadelphia, PA 19103

(2 J5) 656-3679

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

FRANK LONG, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff.
V.
sou·rHEASTERN PENN SY LVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHOR ITY,
Defendant.

COMPLAINT - CLASS ACTION DEMAND FOR JUilY TRIAL

Plaintiff Frank Long, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, alleges, upon pe rsonal knowledge as to himself and upon information and belief as to other matters, as f o llo ws :

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 1 Filed 04/27/16 Page 6 of 21

INTRODUCTION

I. Mr. Long brings this case on his own behalf and that of a proposed class of all

others similarly situated against the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority

(""SEPTA" or ·'Defendant") for violation of his rights under Fair Credit Reporting Act ("·FCRA''),

15 U.S.C. § 1681et seq., and Pennsylvania' s C riminal History Record Information Act

("'CHRJA"), 18 Pa. Cons. Stal. Ann.§ 9125.

2. Mr. Long sought employment at SEPTA. He was qualified fo r the job he sought

and was subjected to SEPTA ' s crimina l background c heck process.

3. SEPTA routine ly rejects job applicants based on information contained in

background check reports ("consumer reports") thar it o btains from background check

companies called ''consumer reporting agencies" or '·CRAs," such as U.S. Security Care, Inc.

("Security Care'').

4.

In screening applicants, SEPTA fa ils to comply with federa l law governing the

procurement and use of consume r reports for e mployment purposes.

5. Specifically, before proc uring consumer reports from Security Care and/or other

C RAs, SEPTA fail s to prov ide job applicant:; with a clear and conspi<:uous disclosure in writing,

in a document that cons ists solely of the disclosure, that it may obta in a consumer report for

e mployment purposes, in violation of J5 U.S.C. § 168lb(b)(2)(A)(i).

6. SEPTA has willfully violated the above-mentioned prov ision of FC RA.

7. ln addition, SEPTA routine ly violates C HRTA through its blanket policy and

practice of disqualifying job applicants with unrelated fe lony convictions from employment in

positions involving the operation of SEPTA vehic les. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9 125(b)

('"Felony and misdemeanor convictions may be cons idered by the employer only to the extent to

2

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 1 Filed 04/27/16 Page 7 of 21

which they re late to the applica nt's suitabi lity for employme nLin the position for wh ich he has

a p p li e d .") .

8. SEPTA has willfully vio lated the above-mentioned provision of Cl-fRIA.

9.

On behal r of himself and others s imilarly situated. Mr. Long seeks injunctive and

declaratory relief; statutory damages; exemplary and punjtive damages; pre-judgment and post-

judgme nt inte rest; and reasonable attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses associated w ith this action.

JURJSDICTJON AND VENUE

I0. This Court has original subject matter jurisdic tion o ver Mr. Long·s FC RA claim

pursuant to .15 U.S.C. ~ 1681 p and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and jurisdiction over his C HRIA c laim

pursua nt to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (supple mental jurisdiction).

11 . Mr. Long' s C HRrA claim is so closely related to the FCRA c laim that it form s

part of the same case or controversy w1der Article lll of the United States Constitution.

12. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 139l(b)( l ) because SEPTA

res ides in this District, and under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (b)(2) because a substantial part of the events

and omissions giving rise to the c la ims a lleged herein occurred in t his District.

13. This Co urt has persona l jurisdiction over this matter because SEPTA is located in

this District, conducts substantial business activity in this District, and because many of the

unlawf'u l acts descr.ibed herein occurred in thi s District and gave ri se to the claims a lleged.

PARTIES

Plaintiff 14. Mr. Long and the proposed C lass Members he seeks to represent are "consumers"
as defined by FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 168 1a(c).

3

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 1 Filed 04/27/16 Page 8 of 21

15. Mr. Long and the proposed Class Members he seeks to represent are e mployment

applicants and persons aggrieved for the purposes of C HRIA. 16. Mr. Long is a 56-year old resident of Philadelphia, Pe nnsylvania. At the time of
bis a pplication to SEPTA, Mr. Lo ng was working as a bus driver for a Phi ladelphia-based school bus company. Prior to that he worked in the warehouse division of a nationaJ hea lthcare

compa ny for over 12 years. 17. Mr. Long has regularly vo lunteered his time to hjs community, working with
neighborhood watch p rograms, community garden clean-ups. and youth and senior c itizens

programs through his church. 18. In or about October 201 4, Mr. Long applied for the position of Bus Operator with

SEPTA. 19.

On or about October 17, 20 L4, Mr. Long inte rviewed tor a Bus Operator position

w ith SEPTA.

Defendant 20. SEPTA operates the Un ited States' sixth-largest public transportation system. It
services over 750,000 passengers on a weekday and e mploys approx imately 9,000 employees. 21. SEPTA is a public transit authority organized under the laws of the
Commonwealth of Pe nnsylvania, and maintains its headquarters ar 1234 Market Street,

Phi ladelphia, Pennsylvania 19 107. 22. At al l relevant times, SEPTA has been a '·person" using ..consumer reports" of
Mr. Long and proposed Class Members for "employme nt purposes." 23 . At all relevant times. SEPTA has been an "employer" and a " person" and/or an
'·organization" for purposes of the CHRIA.

4

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 1 Filed 04/27/16 Page 9 of 21
STATEMENT OF FACTS Plain tiff Long's Experience
24. Tn or about October 2014, Mr. Long applied to be a Bus Operator with SEPTA. 25. On or about October 17, 2014, Mr. Long interviewed with a SEPTA recruiter for the Bus Operator position. 26. At that interv iew, Mr. Long discussed the experiences that qua lified him for the position, including his Commercial Driver's License and his job as a school bus driver at the t ime of the interview. 27. The recruiter told Mr. Long that he thought Mr. Long would be a good dri ver, he interviewed well, and was qualitied for the position. 28. Consequently, on the same day of the interview, the rec ruiter extended an oral offer of employment to Mr. I,ong contingent on a background check. 29. A t SEPTA' s behest, Mr. Long completed a SEPTA form disclosing that he has a criminal hi story and authorizing SEPTA. to conduct a background check. The SEPTA form was not only unclear and inconspicuous, but, in addition, it did not ''consist solely of the disclosure·' that a consumer report may be procured for employment purposes, and instead contained numerous statements and requests in clear violation of the requirements set out by FC RA as described more fully below. 30. SEPTA did not provide Mr. Long with any other authorization form that complied with FCRA. 3 1. In or about late October, 2014, the recruiter called Mr. Long revoking the offer of employment for the Bus Operator position based on Mr. Long's previous criminal history. The
5

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 1 Filed 04/27/16 Page 10 of 21

recruiter told Mr. Long that he could try apply ing fo r a Mainte nance Custod ian position w ith

SEPTA. 32.

On his record, Mr. Lon g had J 997 drug convictions for possession and

manufacture o f a controlled s ubstance originating from a 1994 arrest. 33. Mr. Long's criminal history was not relevant to the Bus Operator position for
which he applied for reasons including the nature of the crime, the age of t he conviction and the years Mr. Lo ng has been in the general population without any furthe r convictions.
34. Over four mo nths later, in o r a bout early March. 20 l5, Mr. l o ng received a le tter

Ji·om SEPTA 's Human Resources D.ivision Recruitment Manager, stating that '"based oo [its] hiring criteria;' S EPTA had decided not to hire Mr. Long for the Bus Operator positio n. The corresponde nce indicated that this decision was made from the info rmation SEPTA had received from Security Care's bac kgro und check. The report enclosed with tbe letter indicated that Security Care completed the background check back in November 2014. Factual Allegations Com mon to All C lass Members

The FCRA Claim
35. E nacted in 1970, the FCRA ' s passage was driven in part by two re lated concerns: First, that consumer reports were playing a central role in people's lives at c rucial mo ments, such as when they applied for a job or credit, and when they applied for housing. Second, despite the ir importance, consume r reports were unregulated and had wid espread erro rs and

i na c c u r a c ie s . 36. Con gress sought for consumer reports to be ·'fair and equitable to the consumer''
and to ensure '·the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization'' of con s umer

reports. 15 U.S.C. § 1681.

6

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 1 Filed 04/27/16 Page 11 of 21
37. Congress was particularly concerned about the use of background reports in the employment context, and therefore defined the term "consumer reports'' to explic itly include background reports procured for employment purposes. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681 a(d)( I)(B).
38. Through the FCRA, Congress required employers disclose that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes before procuring the report. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 b(b)(2)(A)( i).
39. Specifically, the FCRA requires that employers ··may not procure a consumer report or cause a consumer report to be procured, for employment purposes with respect to any consumer," unless:
(i) a clear and conspicuous disclosure has been made in writing to the consumer at any time before the report is procured or caused to be procured. in a document that consists solely of the disclosure, that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes; and
(ii) the consumer has authorized in writing (wh ich authorization may be made on the document refen·ed to in clause ( i)) the p rocurement of the report by that person.
15 U.S.C. § J68 1b(B)(2)(A){i) and (ii) (emphasis added). This requirement is freque ntly referred to as the '·stand-alone d isclosure requirement.''
40. The FCRA stand-alone disclosure requirement therefore imposes the duty on SEPT1\ to provide a "clear and conspicuous·· disclosure to prospective employees that a consumer report about them will be procured.
41. The FCRA stand-alone disclosure requirement puts consumers o n notice that a report about them may be prepared. Thi s knowledge enables consumers to exercise a variety of other substantive rights conferred by the statute, many o f which work to ensure accuracy, confidentiality, and fairness. 15 U.S.C. § L681 c(a) (l imiting temporal scope of infonnation that can be reported); § J68 1e(b) (mandating that consumer reporting agencies employ procedures to
7

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 1 Filed 04/27/16 Page 12 of 21
ensure '·maximum possible accuracy" in reports);§ 168lk (requiring consumer rep01ting agencies that report p ublic record info rmation to employers to either provide notice to the consumer that information is being rep01ted or have '·strict procedures" to ensure that information is "complete and up to date");§ 168 1i (requiring that consumer reporting agencies investigate any disputed information);§ 1681 g (requiring that consumer reporting agencies provide a complete copy of the consumer's file to the consume r).
42. SEPTA routinely and systemically violates the FCR A stand-a lone disclosure requirement by fa iling to provide " clear and conspic uo us" disclosures in writing, in a document that cons ists solely oftbe disclosures, that a consumer report may be obtained.
43. Instead, SEPTA uses extraneous language in its d isclosure forms, including, but not limited to, language inquiring about the applicant's educatio nal history. employment history. probation or paro le status, and job suitabi lity.
44. SEPTA has acted wi llfully in violating the FCRA stand-alone disclosure requirement. SEPTA knew or should have known its obligations under the PCRA. These o bligations are well-established by the plain language of the FCRA. in the promulgations and opinion letters of the Federal Trade Comm ission, and in longstanding case law. Moreover, SEPTA' s fo rm le tter denying employment to job appl icants expressly references the r:CRI\, establishing its awareness of the FCRA 's requirements. Further, employers are required to ce1tify to the consumer reporting agency that they w ill comply with FC RA's stand-a lone disclosure and authorization requirements. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681 b(b)(J ).
45. Despite SEPTA's awareness of its legal obligations, it has acted conscio us ly, recklessly and wi llfully in breaching its known duties and depriving Mr. Long a nd other job applicants of their rights under the P CRA.
8

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 1 Filed 04/27/16 Page 13 of 21

Tile CHRIA Claim 46. CHRIA provides that, ·tf]elony and misdemeanor convictions may be considered

by the employer only to the extent to which they relate to the applicant's suitability for

employment in the position for which he has applied.'' L8 Pa. Con s. Stat. Ann.§ 9125(b). 47. CTIRlA further states that, " [tJbe employer shall notify in writing the applicant if
the decision not to bire the applicant is based in whole or in part on criminal history record ·

information." 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. A nn. § 9J25(c). 48. SEPTA routine ly and systemically violates CHRIA by considering and denying
employment to job applicants based on criminal conviction(s) that do not relate to the applicants '

suitability for employment in the positions for which they have applied. 49. Through its actions, SEPTA has acted willfully in violating the requirements of

Clffi.lA.

CL ASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

50. .Mr. Long brings th is case as a proposed Class action pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civ il Procedure 23 on behalf of h.imself and two classes of persons. 51. Mr. Long asserts the first Cause of Action against SEPTA on bchalfofthe

..FCRA Disclosure Class" defined as fo llows:
FCRA D isclosure C lass: A ll applicants for employment with SEPTA in the United States, with in two years of the filing of this Complaint through the date of final judgment, about whom SEPTA procured a consumer report without provid ing a clear and conspicuous disclosure in writing, in a document that consisted solely of the disclosure, before procuring the consumer report, as required by 15U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i).
52. Mr. Long asserts the Second Cause of Action again st SEPTA on behalf of

the "CHRJA Job Denial Class·' defined as follows:

9

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 1 Filed 04/27/16 Page 14 of 21
CHRIA Job Denial C lass: All applicants for employment with SEPTA in the
United States within two yea rs of the fili ng o f this Complaint through the date of final judgment who were denied SEPTA e mploym ent involving the operation and/or maintenance of SE PTA non-paratransit vehicles based in whole or in part on a drug-related conviction dating back more than seven (7) years from the decision on their application to SEPTA. 53. The members o f the FCRA Disclosure C lass and the CliRlA Job Denial Class are collectively referred to as "C lass M e mbers." 54 . Mr. Long reserves the right to amend the definition of above-defined classes based on discovery or legal developments. 55. The C lass Membe rs identified he re in are so numerous that joinde r of all members is impracticable. SEPTA employs approximately 9,000 employees. Although Mr. Long does not know the precise number of jo b applicants harmed by SEPTA's v iolations of FCRA and CHRIA, the number is far greater than feasibly could be addressed through joinder. The precise number is also un iquely within Defe nda nt's possession and the Class M embers may be notilied
of the pendency of th is action by published and/or mailed notice. 56. There are questions of law and fact common to C las s Members, and these
questions predominate over a ny questions affecting only individual members . Common legal a nd factual questions include, among others:
(i) whether Defendant violated FCRA by !'ailing to provide Mr. Long and the
FCRA Disclosure Class with a clear and conspicuous disclosure in writing, Ln a document that consisted solely of the disclosure. prior to procuring their consume r reports for employment purposes, as required by 15 lJ.S.C. § 1681 b(b)(2)(A)(i); (ii) whether Defendant violated CHRIA by denying employment to Mr. Long and the CHRJA Job Denial C lass based on the ir criminal convictions; (iii) whether Defendant was w illful in its noncompliance w ith the require ments ofFC RA;
10

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 1 Filed 04/27/16 Page 15 of 21

(iv) whethe r Defendant was will ful in its noncompliance w ith the requirements ofCHRIA; and

(v) whether equ itable remedies, InJunctive relief, statutory damages, compe nsatory damages, exemplary and punitive damages for Class
Members are warranted.

57. Mr. Long is a member of the classes he seeks to re present. SEPTA failed to

prov ide Mr. Long with a clear and conspicuous disclosure in writir1g, io a document consisting solely of the disclosure. to procure a consumer report for employment purposes befo re procuring

suc h a report, as required by FCRA. SEPTA denied Mr. Long e mployment based on his

criminal conviction and without that crim inal conviction having suffi cient relation to his

su itability for employment in the pos ition involving the operation of SEPTA vehicles, violating

CH RIA.

58. Mr. Long's c laims are typical of the claims of the c lasses he seeks to represent.

Upo.n information and belief, it is SEPTA 's standard practice to procure consumer reports without first providing a clear and conspicuous disclosure in writing to appl icants. in a docume nt that consists solely oftbe disclosure. Upon information and belief, it is SEPTA 's standard

practice to consider felony convictions that do not relate to appli.cants' suitability for employment involving the operat ion o f SEPTA vehicles when making hiring determinations for

employment. Mr. Long is e ntit led to relief under the same causes of action as other Class

Members. 59.

Mr. Long will fairly and adequately represent a nd protect the interests of the Class

Members because his interests coincide with, and are not antagonistic to, the interests of the C lass Members he seeks to represent. Mr. Long has retained Counsel who are competent and experienced in complex class actions. employment litigation, and the intersection thereof. There

is no connict between Mr. Long and the C lass Members.

II

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 1 Filed 04/27/16 Page 16 of 21
60. Class certification of the CHR IA Job Denial Class is appropriate pursuant to Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 23(b)(2) because SEPTA has acted and/or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class Members, making declaratory and injunctive relief appropriate with respect to Mr. Long and the Class Members as a whole. The Class Members are entilled to injunctive relief to e nd Defendant's common. uniform, unfair discriminatory-and illega l- po licies and practices.
61. Class certification is appropriate pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) for the FCRA Disclosme Class because common questions of fact and law predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. C lass Members have been damaged and are cnthled to recovery as a resu lt ofDefendant' s uniform policies and practices. Because SEPTA has maintained a common po.licy of failing to properly infonn C lass Members of their rights under FCRA, many Class Members are likely unaware that their rights have been violated.
62. Class certification is also appropriate p ursuant to Federal Rule or Civi l Procedure 23(b)(3) for the CHRll\ Job Den ial Class because common questions of fact and law predominate over any questions affecting only individual C lass Members because SEPTA has maintained a common po licy of denying employment because of drug reJated convictions, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. Class Members have been damaged and are entitled to recovery as a resu lt of Defendant' s uniform policies and practices.
63. The amount of each Class Member's individual claim is also s mall compared to the expense and burden of individual prosecution of this litigation. The FCRA has statutorily
12

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 1 Filed 04/27/16 Page 17 of 21
specified damages, wh ich Class M embers w ill prove at trial are warranted, that wi iJ render calculation of damages for Class Members highly straightforward. The propriety and a mount of exemplary and pw1itive damages a re based on Defendant's conduct, making these issues common to Class Membe rs.
CAUSES OF ACTION F IRST C LAIM FOR RE LI EF SEPTA's Failure t o Provide C lea r and Conspicuo us Disclosure Before Procurement of Consumer Repo rt (15 U.S.C. § l 681b(b)(2)(A)(i), Brougbt by M r. L o ng on Behalf of Himself and the FCRA Disclosure Class) 64. Mr. Long, on be ha lf of himself and the FCRA Disclosure Class, incorporates the preceding pa ragraphs as alleged a bove. 65. SEPTA vio lated the FCRA by procuring consumer reports on M r. Long and the FCRA Disclosure Class w ithout making the stand-alone disclosure required by the FCRA. See 15 U.S.C. § l 68l b(b)(2)(A). 66. Defendant acted w illfu lly and in knowing or reckless disregard of its obligations and the ri ghts of Mr. Long and the FCRA Disc losure Class. 67. SEPTA 's willful conduc t is reflected by, among othe r things, the fact tha t it vio lated a clear statutory mandate set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 168 Ib(b)(2), and that Defendant certifi ed that it would comply with 15 U.S.C. § l68l b(b)(2). 68. SEPTA's willful conduct is still further reflected by the foJiowing: (a) The FCRA was enacted in L970, Defe ndant was founded in 1963; Defendant has had s ince its creation to become comp liant; (b) Defendant's conduct is inconsistent with the FTC's longstanding regulatory guidance, j udicial interpretation. and the p lain language of the statute; (c) Defendant repeated ly and routi nely uses the same unlawful
13

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 1 Filed 04/27/16 Page 18 of 21
documents with all of its employees and applicants on whom it procured consumer reports or otherwise failed to provide them with the required stand-alone disclosure: (d) Despite the pellucid statutory text and there being a depth of guidance, Defendant systematically procured consumer reports without first d isclosing in writing to the consumer in a document that consists solely of the disclosure, that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes; and (c) By adopting such a policy, Defendant voluntarily ran a risk o f violating the law substantially greater than the risk associated with a reading that was merely careless. 69. As a result of SEPTA's actions, Mr. Long and the F CRA Disclosure Class Members have been deprived o ftheir consumer rights and prevented from making informed decisions about whether to permit SEPTA to procure their personal information. 70. SEPTA's conduct was willful. making it liable for actual or statutory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees and costs, in an amount to be determined by the Court pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF SEPTA's Violation of C HRJA
(18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.§ 9125(b), Brought by Mr. Long on Behalf of Himself and the CHRJA Job Denial Class)
71. Mr. Long, on behalf of himself and the C IIRIA Job Denial Class, incorporates the preceding paragraphs as alleged above.
72. Mr. Long and the CHRIA Job Denial C lass have criminal drug convictions that SEPTA considered when deciding not to offer them employment invo lving the operation of SEPTA vehic les.
73. Mr. Long and the CHRIA Job Denial Class's convictions are older than seven years and not related to their suitability for employment involving the operation or mainteoancc of SEPTA non-paratransit vehicles.
14

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 1 Filed 04/27/16 Page 19 of 21
74. Mr. Long and the CHRTA Job D enial C lass have bee n aggrie ved by SEPTA's denials of emp loyment.
75 . As a result of its actions, SEPTA is liable to Mr. Lo ng a nd the CliRIA Job Den ia l C la ss for inj unctive re lief. damages and rea sonable costs o f litigatio n and attorneys' fees, pursuant to 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9 .1 83(a)-(b).
76. SEPTA ·s conduct has been willful, rende ring it liable fo r exemplary and punitive damages, pursuant to 18 Pa. Co ns. Stat. A nn. § 9 183(b).
PRAYER FOR I~E LIEF WHEREFOR E, Pia inti ff Long and C lass Members p ray lo r re lief as fo llow s: (a) Cettification o f Mr. Lo ng's FCRA and C HRlA cla ims as a class action pursuant
to Federa l Rule of C ivil Procedure 23; (b) Designation of Mr. Lo ng as representative of the Class Members; (c) Designation o f Mr. Long's counsel of record as Cla ss Counsel; (d) An o rde r enjo ining SEPTA from engaging in furthe r unlawful conduct in
violation ofFC RA and CHRlA ; (c) An award of a ll statutory damages awardable for violatio ns of FC RA including
actua l and punitive damages fo r each violatio n fo und to be wiJlful ; ( I) An award of a ll statutory damages awardable for violations of CH R lA includi.ng
actual and real damages for each violation, and exemplary and punitive damages fo r each violatio n to und to be will fu l; (g) An a ward of costs incurred herein, inc luding reasonable attorneys' fees to tbe extent allowable by law; (h) P re-j udgment a nd post-judgment interest, as prov ided by law; (i) Payment of a reasonable service award to Mr. Long , in recognition of the services he has rendered and will continue to re nder to the Class M em bers, and the risks he has taken and will take; and (j) Such other a nd further legal and equitab le relief as th is Court deems necessary, j ust and proper.
15

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 1 Filed 04/27/16 Page 20 of 21

JURY DEMAND

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b), Mr. Long demands a trial by jury in

this action. Dated: April 27, 2016

:a~-~A1 Respectfully submjtted,
By:
Ossai M iazad OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP 3 Park Avenue, 29th Floor New York, NY 10016 Tel.: (21 2) 245-1000
Adam T. Klein (pro hac vice motion forthcoming) Ossai Miazad (pro hac vice motion forthcoming) Lewis M . Steel (pro hac vice motion fmihcoming) Christopher M . McNerney (pro hac vice motion
forthcom ing ) Cheryl-Lyn Bentley (pro hac vice motion f01thcoming)
LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW Jon Greenbaum (pro hac vice motion forthcoming) Mateya Kelley (pro hac vice motion forthcoming) 1401 New York Ave., NW Washington, DC 20005 Tel.: (202) 662-8600
PIULADELPIDA L AWYERS FOR SOCIAL EQUITY Michael Lee Pennsylvania Bar No. 307008 Michael Hardiman Pennsylvania Bar No. 27018 1501 Cherry Street Philadelphia, PA 19102 Tel.: (215) 995-1230

l)UBLIC INTEREST I..AW CENTER Benjamin D. Geffen Pennsylvania Bar. No. 310134 1709 Benjamin Franklin Parkway, 2d Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103 Tel.: (267) 546-1308

16

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 1 Filed 04/27/16 Page 21 of 21
WILLIG, WILLIAMS & DAVIDSON Ryan A llen H ancock Pennsylvania Bar No. 92590 Danielle Newsome Pennsylvania 13ar No. 320772 1845 Walnut Street, 24Lh F loor Philadelphia, PA J9 103 Tel. : (2 15) 656-3679 Attorneysfor Plainti.ffand proposed Class Members
17

 
 Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 21 Filed 05/26/16 Page 1 of 28

OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP Adam T. Klein* Ossai Miazad* Lewis M. Steel* Christopher M. McNerney* Cheryl-Lyn Bentley* 3 Park Avenue, 29th Floor New York, NY 10016 (212) 245-1000
PHILADELPHIA LAWYERS FOR SOCIAL EQUITY Michael Lee Pennsylvania Bar No. 307008 Michael Hardiman Pennsylvania Bar No. 27018 1501 Cherry Street Philadelphia, PA 19102 (215) 995-1230
*Pro hac vice motions filed

LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW Jon Greenbaum* Mateya B. Kelley* 1401 New York Ave., NW Washington, DC 20005 (202) 662-8600
PUBLIC INTEREST LAW CENTER Benjamin D. Geffen Pennsylvania Bar. No. 310134 1709 Benjamin Franklin Parkway, 2d Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103 (267) 546-1308
WILLIG, WILLIAMS & DAVIDSON Ryan Allen Hancock Pennsylvania Bar No. 92590 Danielle Newsome Pennsylvania Bar No. 320772 1845 Walnut Street, 24th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103 (215) 656-3679

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

FRANK LONG, JOSEPH SHIPLEY, and MICHAEL WHITE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY,
Defendant.

FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:16-cv-1991-PBT
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiffs Frank Long, Joseph Shipley, and Michael White (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, allege, upon personal knowledge as to themselves and upon information and belief as to other matters, as follows:

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 21 Filed 05/26/16 Page 2 of 28
INTRODUCTION 1. Plaintiffs bring this case on their own behalf and that of a proposed class of all others similarly situated against the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (“SEPTA” or “Defendant”) for violation of their rights under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., and Pennsylvania’s Criminal History Record Information Act (“CHRIA”), 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9125. 2. Plaintiffs sought employment at SEPTA. They were qualified for the jobs they sought and were subjected to SEPTA’s criminal background check process. 3. In screening applicants, SEPTA fails to comply with federal law governing the procurement and use of background check reports (“consumer reports”) for employment purposes. 4. Specifically, before procuring consumer reports from U.S. Security Care, Inc. (“Security Care”) and/or other background check companies called “consumer reporting agencies” (“CRAs”), SEPTA fails to provide job applicants with a clear and conspicuous disclosure in writing, in a document that consists solely of the disclosure, that it may obtain a consumer report for employment purposes, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i). 5. In Congress’s judgment, an employer’s failure to provide job applicants with a clear and conspicuous disclosure is unfair and inequitable and causes concrete injury to those job applicants. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b). 6. SEPTA’s policy causes concrete injury to job applicants because, among other examples, it causes confusion and deprives job applicants of adequate notice of that to which they are consenting.
2

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 21 Filed 05/26/16 Page 3 of 28
7. SEPTA also routinely rejects job applicants based on information contained in consumer reports that it obtains from CRAs.
8. Specifically, SEPTA systemically violates section 1681b(b)(3)(A) of the FCRA by using consumer reports to make adverse employment decisions without first providing the applicant and/or employee who is the subject of the report with sufficient and timely notification of its intent to take an adverse action, a copy of the report, and a summary of rights under the FCRA. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(i) and (ii).
9. In Congress’s judgment, an employer’s failure to provide job applicants with a copy of their consumer report and a summary of their rights under the FCRA before it takes an adverse action is unfair and inequitable and causes concrete injury to those job applicants. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b).
10. SEPTA’s policy causes concrete injury to job applicants because, among other examples, it prevents them from reviewing the accuracy of the information reported about them that SEPTA uses in taking adverse actions, engaging with SEPTA about the information it is using to make a determination about the applicants’ suitability for the job, and learning of their statutory rights under the FCRA.
11. SEPTA has willfully violated the above-mentioned provision of the FCRA. 12. In addition, SEPTA routinely violates the CHRIA through its blanket policy and practice of disqualifying job applicants with unrelated felony convictions from employment in positions involving the operation of SEPTA vehicles. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9125(b) (“Felony and misdemeanor convictions may be considered by the employer only to the extent to which they relate to the applicant’s suitability for employment in the position for which he has applied.”).
3

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 21 Filed 05/26/16 Page 4 of 28
13. SEPTA has willfully violated the above-mentioned provision of the CHRIA. 14. On behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs seek injunctive and declaratory relief; actual or statutory damages; exemplary and punitive damages; prejudgment and post-judgment interest; and reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses associated with this action.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 15. This Court has original subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ FCRA claims pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681p and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and jurisdiction over their CHRIA claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction). 16. Plaintiffs’ CHRIA claim is so closely related to their FCRA claims that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. 17. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) because SEPTA resides in this District, and under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because a substantial part of the events and omissions giving rise to the claims alleged herein occurred in this District. 18. This Court has personal jurisdiction over this matter because SEPTA is located in this District, conducts substantial business activity in this District, and because many of the unlawful acts described herein occurred in this District and gave rise to the claims alleged.
PARTIES Plaintiffs
19. Plaintiffs and the proposed Class Members they seek to represent are “consumers” as defined by the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(c).
20. Plaintiffs and the proposed Class Members they seek to represent are employment applicants and persons aggrieved for the purposes of the CHRIA.
4

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 21 Filed 05/26/16 Page 5 of 28
Frank Long 21. Mr. Long is a 56-year old resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. At the time of his application to SEPTA, Mr. Long was working as a bus driver for a Philadelphia-based school bus company. Prior to that, he worked in the warehouse division of a national healthcare company for over 12 years. 22. Mr. Long has regularly volunteered his time to his community, working with neighborhood watch programs, community garden clean-ups, and youth and senior citizens programs through his church. 23. In or about October 2014, Mr. Long applied for the position of Bus Operator with SEPTA. 24. On or about October 17, 2014, Mr. Long interviewed for a Bus Operator position with SEPTA. Joseph Shipley 25. Mr. Shipley is a 45-year old resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. At the time of his application to SEPTA, Mr. Shipley was working as a conductor for an international transportation company. Prior to that, Mr. Shipley worked for approximately two years as a Transportation Counselor for a company transporting juveniles from court to school. 26. In or about October 2015, Mr. Shipley applied for the position of Railroad Supervision Manager with SEPTA. 27. On or about January 28, 2016, Mr. Shipley interviewed for a Railroad Supervision Manager position with SEPTA.
5

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 21 Filed 05/26/16 Page 6 of 28
Michael White 28. Mr. White is a 33-year old resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. At the time of his application to SEPTA, Mr. White had been working as a delivery driver for approximately two years. Prior to that, he worked as a driver and mailroom clerk for another company for approximately one-and-a-half years. 29. Mr. White is active in his church where he has served as a deacon for the last two years. 30. In or about April 2015, Mr. White applied for the position of Bus Operator with SEPTA. 31. On or about April 29, 2015, Mr. White interviewed for a Bus Operator position with SEPTA. Defendant 32. SEPTA operates the United States’ sixth-largest public transportation system. It services over 750,000 passengers on a weekday and employs approximately 9,000 employees. 33. SEPTA is a public transit authority organized under the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and maintains its headquarters at 1234 Market Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19107. 34. At all relevant times, SEPTA has been a “person” using “consumer reports” of Plaintiffs and proposed Class Members for “employment purposes” and has taken “adverse action” against Plaintiffs and similarly situated applicants, as defined by the FCRA. These adverse actions have been based wholly or in part on those consumer reports. 35. At all relevant times, SEPTA has been an “employer” and a “person” and/or an “organization” for purposes of the CHRIA.
6

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 21 Filed 05/26/16 Page 7 of 28
36. At all relevant times, SEPTA has been aware of the requirements of the FCRA and CHRIA, and yet has disregarded those requirements.
STATEMENT OF FACTS Plaintiff Long’s Experience
37. In or about October 2014, Mr. Long applied to be a Bus Operator with SEPTA. 38. On or about October 17, 2014, Mr. Long interviewed with a SEPTA recruiter for the Bus Operator position. 39. At that interview, Mr. Long discussed the experiences that qualified him for the position, including his Commercial Driver’s License and his job as a school bus driver at the time of the interview. 40. The recruiter told Mr. Long that he thought Mr. Long would be a good driver, he interviewed well, and was qualified for the position. 41. Consequently, on the same day of the interview, the recruiter extended an oral offer of employment to Mr. Long contingent on a background check. 42. At SEPTA’s behest, Mr. Long completed a SEPTA form disclosing that he has a criminal history and authorizing SEPTA to conduct a background check. The SEPTA form was not only unclear and inconspicuous, but, in addition, it did not “consist solely of the disclosure” that a consumer report may be procured for employment purposes, and instead contained numerous statements and requests in clear violation of the requirements set out by the FCRA as described more fully below. 43. SEPTA did not provide Mr. Long with any other authorization form that complied with the FCRA.
7

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 21 Filed 05/26/16 Page 8 of 28
44. In or about late October, 2014, the recruiter called Mr. Long revoking the offer of employment for the Bus Operator position based on Mr. Long’s previous criminal history. The recruiter told Mr. Long that he could try applying for a Maintenance Custodian position with SEPTA.
45. On his record, Mr. Long had 1997 drug convictions for possession and manufacture of a controlled substance originating from a 1994 arrest.
46. Mr. Long’s criminal history is not relevant to the Bus Operator position for which he applied for reasons including the nature of the crime, the age of the conviction and the years Mr. Long has been in the general population without any further convictions.
47. Over four months later, in or about early March, 2015, Mr. Long received a letter from SEPTA’s Human Resources Division Recruitment Manager, stating that “based on [its] hiring criteria,” SEPTA had decided not to hire Mr. Long for the Bus Operator position. The correspondence indicated that this decision was made from the information SEPTA had received from Security Care’s background check. The report enclosed with the letter indicated that Security Care completed the background check back in November 2014. Plaintiff Shipley’s Experience
48. In or about October 2015, Mr. Shipley applied to be a Railroad Supervision Manager with SEPTA.
49. On or about January 28, 2016, Mr. Shipley interviewed with a SEPTA employee for the Railroad Supervision Manager position.
50. Pursuant to SEPTA’s policies, the Railroad Supervision Manager position is considered a position involving the operation of a SEPTA vehicle.
8

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 21 Filed 05/26/16 Page 9 of 28
51. At that interview, Mr. Shipley discussed the experiences that qualified him for the position, including his significant experience working for transportation companies.
52. At SEPTA’s behest, Mr. Shipley completed two SEPTA forms disclosing that he has a criminal history and authorizing SEPTA to conduct a background check. The SEPTA forms were not only unclear and inconspicuous, but, in addition, did not “consist solely of the disclosure” that a consumer report may be procured for employment purposes, and instead contained numerous statements and requests in clear violation of the requirements set out by the FCRA as described more fully below.
53. SEPTA did not provide Mr. Shipley with any other authorization form that complied with the FCRA.
54. Mr. Shipley’s interview went well, and SEPTA offered him the position on approximately February 29, 2016.
55. On approximately March 22, 2016, Mr. Shipley received a letter from SEPTA informing him that SEPTA’s new hire orientation was scheduled for March 28, 2016.
56. Approximately two days later, Mr. Shipley received a telephone call from a SEPTA recruiter telling him not to report to work, and that his background check had not been cleared.
57. On approximately March 25, 2016, the SEPTA recruiter called Mr. Shipley back and told him that SEPTA was denying him the Railroad Supervision Manager position because of his criminal history. The recruiter followed up on her call to Mr. Shipley with a letter stating the same.
58. In response to Mr. Shipley’s request for more information, SEPTA sent him a second letter from its counsel, dated April 26, 2016, notifying Mr. Shipley that SEPTA
9

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 21 Filed 05/26/16 Page 10 of 28
disqualified him pursuant to its categorical lifetime ban on hiring anyone who was convicted of a crime “involving the possession, sale, distribution, manufacture and use of controlled substances,” for “[a]ll positions which require the operation of a SEPTA vehicles as part thereof, whether or not they are in revenue service” and “[a]ll positions requiring the maintenance, repair or operation of power facilities, substations, towers, signals, vehicles or rolling stock,” and enclosing a copy of the SEPTA policy with the relevant section highlighted.
59. On his record, Mr. Shipley has 2001 drug-related convictions arising out of a single arrest in 2000.
60. Mr. Shipley’s criminal history is not relevant to the Railroad Supervisor Manager position for which he applied for reasons including the nature of the crime, the age of the conviction, and the years Mr. Shipley has been in the general population without any further convictions.
61. Mr. Shipley never received a copy of his consumer report or a statement of his rights under the FCRA from SEPTA. Plaintiff White’s Experience
62. In or about April 2015, Mr. White applied to be a Bus Operator with SEPTA. 63. On or about April 29, 2015, Mr. White interviewed with a SEPTA employee for the Bus Operator position. 64. At that interview, Mr. White discussed the experiences that qualified him for the position, including his job as a delivery driver at the time of the interview and that he had recently obtained his Commercial Driver’s License. 65. At SEPTA’s behest, Mr. White completed a SEPTA form disclosing that he has a criminal history and authorizing SEPTA to conduct a background check. The SEPTA form was
10

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 21 Filed 05/26/16 Page 11 of 28
not only unclear and inconspicuous, but, in addition, it did not “consist solely of the disclosure” that a consumer report may be procured for employment purposes, and instead contained numerous statements and requests in clear violation of the requirements set out by the FCRA as described more fully below.
66. SEPTA did not provide Mr. White with any other authorization form that complied with the FCRA.
67. Mr. White’s interview went well, and the SEPTA employee with whom he interviewed told him that he would receive more information about starting training.
68. Mr. White followed-up with SEPTA repeatedly, and was told that SEPTA was waiting on the results of his background check.
69. Approximately six months after his interview, and following Mr. White’s numerous follow ups, Mr. White received a letter from SEPTA denying him the Bus Operator position because of his criminal history.
70. On his record, Mr. White has 2006 and 2007 drug-related convictions. 71. Mr. White’s criminal history is not relevant to the Bus Operator position for which he applied for reasons including the nature of the crime, the age of the conviction and the years Mr. White has been in the general population without any further convictions. 72. Mr. White never received a copy of his consumer report or a statement of his rights under the FCRA from SEPTA. Factual Allegations Common to All Class Members The FCRA Claim 73. Enacted in 1970, the FCRA’s passage was driven in part by two related concerns: First, that consumer reports were playing a central role in people’s lives at crucial moments, such
11

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 21 Filed 05/26/16 Page 12 of 28
as when they applied for a job or credit, and when they applied for housing. Second, despite their importance, consumer reports were unregulated and had widespread errors and inaccuracies.
74. Congress sought for consumer reports to be “fair and equitable to the consumer” and to ensure “the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization” of consumer reports. 15 U.S.C. § 1681.
75. Congress was particularly concerned about the use of background reports in the employment context, and therefore defined the term “consumer reports” to explicitly include background reports procured for employment purposes. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1)(B).
76. Through the FCRA, Congress required employers to disclose that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes before procuring the report. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i).
77. Specifically, the FCRA requires that employers “may not procure a consumer report or cause a consumer report to be procured, for employment purposes with respect to any consumer,” unless:
(i) a clear and conspicuous disclosure has been made in writing to the consumer at any time before the report is procured or caused to be procured, in a document that consists solely of the disclosure, that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes; and
(ii) the consumer has authorized in writing (which authorization may be made on the document referred to in clause (i)) the procurement of the report by that person.
15 U.S.C. § 1681b(B)(2)(A)(i) and (ii) (emphasis added). This requirement is frequently referred to as the “stand-alone disclosure requirement.”
78. The FCRA stand-alone disclosure requirement imposes the duty on SEPTA to provide a “clear and conspicuous” disclosure to prospective employees that a consumer report
12

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 21 Filed 05/26/16 Page 13 of 28
about them will be procured. 79. The FCRA stand-alone disclosure requirement puts consumers on notice that a
report about them may be prepared. This knowledge enables consumers to exercise a variety of other substantive rights conferred by the statute, many of which work to ensure accuracy, confidentiality, and fairness. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a) (limiting temporal scope of information that can be reported); § 1681e(b) (mandating that consumer reporting agencies employ procedures to ensure “maximum possible accuracy” in reports); § 1681k (requiring consumer reporting agencies that report public record information to employers to either provide notice to the consumer that information is being reported or have “strict procedures” to ensure that information is “complete and up to date”); § 1681i (requiring that consumer reporting agencies investigate any disputed information); § 1681g (requiring that consumer reporting agencies provide a complete copy of the consumer’s file to the consumer).
80. SEPTA routinely and systemically violates the FCRA stand-alone disclosure requirement by failing to provide “clear and conspicuous” disclosures in writing, in a document that consists solely of the disclosures, that a consumer report may be obtained.
81. Instead, SEPTA uses extraneous language in its disclosure forms, including, but not limited to, language inquiring about the applicant’s educational history, employment history, probation or parole status, and job suitability.
82. In Congress’s judgment, an employer’s failure to provide a stand-alone disclosure form is a harm to a consumer sufficient to establish Article III standing.
83. The FCRA also requires that “before taking any adverse action based in whole or in part on [a consumer report],” the employer taking the adverse action must provide “the consumer to whom the report relates” with:
13

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 21 Filed 05/26/16 Page 14 of 28
(i) a copy of the report; and (ii) a description in writing of the rights of the consumer under this
subchapter, as prescribed by the [Consumer Financial Protection] Bureau under section 1681g(c)(3). 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(i) and (ii). 84. The FCRA defines adverse action as both “a denial of employment or any other decision for employment purposes that adversely affects any current or prospective employee,” and “an action taken or determination that is . . . adverse to the interests of the consumer.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(k)(1)(B). 85. SEPTA has routinely and systematically failed to provide Plaintiffs and other job applicants with their consumer report and a summary of their rights under the FCRA before taking adverse actions against them. 86. In Congress’s judgment, an employer’s failure to provide a consumer with his or her consumer report and a summary of his or her rights under the FCRA are both harms sufficient to establish Article III standing. 87. SEPTA has acted willfully in violating the FCRA. SEPTA knew or should have known its obligations under the FCRA. These obligations are well-established by the plain language of the FCRA, in the promulgations and opinion letters of the Federal Trade Commission, and in longstanding case law. Moreover, SEPTA’s form letter denying employment to job applicants expressly references the FCRA, establishing its awareness of the FCRA’s requirements. Further, employers like SEPTA are required to certify to the consumer reporting agency that they will comply with the FCRA’s stand-alone disclosure and authorization requirements. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(1).
14

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 21 Filed 05/26/16 Page 15 of 28
88. Despite SEPTA’s awareness of its legal obligations, it has acted consciously, recklessly and willfully in breaching its known duties and depriving Plaintiffs and other job applicants of their rights under the FCRA.
The CHRIA Claim 89. The CHRIA provides that, “[f]elony and misdemeanor convictions may be considered by the employer only to the extent to which they relate to the applicant’s suitability for employment in the position for which he has applied.” 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9125(b). 90. The CHRIA further states that, “[t]he employer shall notify in writing the applicant if the decision not to hire the applicant is based in whole or in part on criminal history record information.” 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9125(c). 91. SEPTA routinely and systemically violates the CHRIA by considering and denying employment to job applicants based on criminal conviction(s) that do not relate to the applicants’ suitability for employment in the positions for which they have applied. 92. Specifically, SEPTA has a categorical and lifetime ban on hiring anyone with a felony drug conviction for “[a]ll positions which require the operation of a SEPTA vehicles as part thereof, whether or not they are in revenue service” and “[a]ll positions requiring the maintenance, repair or operation of power facilities, substations, towers, signals, vehicles or rolling stock.” 93. SEPTA knew or should have known its obligations under the CHRIA. These obligations are well-established by the plain language of the CHRIA and in longstanding case law. 94. Through its actions, SEPTA has acted willfully in violating the requirements of the CHRIA.
15

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 21 Filed 05/26/16 Page 16 of 28
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
95. Plaintiffs bring this case as a proposed Class action pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23 on behalf of themselves and four classes of persons (collectively, the
“Classes”).
96. Messrs. Long, Shipley, and White assert the First Cause of Action against SEPTA
on behalf of the “FCRA Disclosure Class” defined as follows:
FCRA Disclosure Class: All applicants for employment with SEPTA in the United States, within two years of the filing of this Complaint through the date of final judgment, about whom SEPTA procured a consumer report without providing a clear and conspicuous disclosure in writing, in a document that consisted solely of the disclosure, before procuring the consumer report, as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i).
97. Messrs. Long, Shipley and White assert the Second and Third Causes of
Action against SEPTA on behalf of the “FCRA Consumer Report Class” and the “FCRA
Summary of Rights Class” defined as follows:
FCRA Consumer Report Class: All applicants for employment with SEPTA in the United States within five years of the filing of the initial Complaint through the date of final judgment who were subject to an adverse action based in whole or in part on information contained in a consumer report without receiving a copy of the consumer report before the adverse action, as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(i).
FCRA Summary of Rights Class: All applicants for employment with SEPTA in the United States within five years of the filing of the initial Complaint through the date of final judgment who were subject to an adverse action based in whole or in part on information contained in a consumer report without receiving a written description of their rights under the FCRA before the adverse action, as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(ii).
98. Messrs. Long, Shipley, and White assert the Fourth Cause of Action
against SEPTA on behalf of the “CHRIA Job Denial Class” defined as follows:
CHRIA Job Denial Class: All applicants for employment with SEPTA in the United States within two years of the filing of the initial Complaint through the date of final judgment who were denied SEPTA employment involving the
16

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 21 Filed 05/26/16 Page 17 of 28
operation and/or maintenance of SEPTA non-paratransit vehicles based in whole or in part on a drug-related conviction dating back more than seven (7) years from the decision on their application to SEPTA. 99. The members of the FCRA Disclosure Class, FCRA Consumer Report Class, FCRA Summary of Rights Class, and CHRIA Job Denial Class are collectively referred to as “Class Members.” 100. Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend the definition of above-defined classes based on discovery or legal developments. 101. The Class Members identified herein are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. SEPTA employs approximately 9,000 employees. Although Plaintiffs do not know the precise number of job applicants harmed by SEPTA’s violations of the FCRA and CHRIA, the number is far greater than feasibly could be addressed through joinder. The precise number is also uniquely within Defendant’s possession and the Class Members may be notified of the pendency of this action by published and/or mailed notice. 102. There are questions of law and fact common to Class Members, and these questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. Common legal and factual questions include, among others: (a) whether Defendant violated the FCRA by failing to provide Messrs. Long,
Shipley, and White and the FCRA Disclosure Class with a clear and conspicuous disclosure in writing, in a document that consisted solely of the disclosure, prior to procuring their consumer reports for employment purposes, as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i); (b) whether Defendant violated the FCRA by failing to provide Messrs. Long, Shipley, and White and the FCRA Consumer Report Class with a copy of their consumer report before taking adverse action against them in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(i); (c) whether Defendant violated the FCRA by failing to provide Messrs. Long, Shipley, and White and the FCRA Summary of Rights Class with a
17

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 21 Filed 05/26/16 Page 18 of 28
written description of their rights under the FCRA before taking adverse action against them in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(ii); (d) whether Defendant violated the CHRIA by denying employment to Messrs. Long, Shipley, and White and the CHRIA Job Denial Class based on their criminal convictions; (e) whether Defendant was willful in its noncompliance with the requirements of the FCRA; (f) whether Defendant was willful in its noncompliance with the requirements of the CHRIA; and (g) whether equitable remedies, injunctive relief, actual damages, statutory damages, compensatory damages, exemplary damages and punitive damages for Class Members are warranted. 103. Plaintiffs are members of the classes they seek to represent. SEPTA failed to provide Messrs. Long, Shipley, and White with a clear and conspicuous disclosure in writing, in a document consisting solely of the disclosure, to procure a consumer report for employment purposes before procuring such a report, as required by the FCRA. SEPTA took adverse action against Messrs. Long, Shipley, and White without first providing them with a copy of their consumer reports and a written summary of their rights under the FCRA. SEPTA denied Messrs. Long, Shipley, and White employment based on their criminal convictions and without those criminal convictions having sufficient relation to their suitability for employment in the positions involving the operation of SEPTA vehicles, violating the CHRIA. 104. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the classes they seek to represent. Upon information and belief, it is SEPTA’s standard practice to procure consumer reports without first providing a clear and conspicuous disclosure in writing to applicants, in a document that consists solely of the disclosure. Upon information and belief, it is SEPTA’s standard practice to take adverse action against applicants without first providing them with a copy of their consumer reports and a written summary of their rights under the FCRA. Upon information
18

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 21 Filed 05/26/16 Page 19 of 28
and belief, it is SEPTA’s standard practice to consider felony convictions that do not relate to applicants’ suitability for employment involving the operation of SEPTA vehicles when making hiring determinations for employment. Plaintiffs are entitled to relief under the same causes of action as other Class Members.
105. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because their interests coincide with, and are not antagonistic to, the interests of the Class Members they seek to represent. Plaintiffs have retained Counsel who are competent and experienced in complex class actions, including litigation pertaining to criminal background checks, the FCRA, and other employment litigation, and the intersection thereof. There is no conflict between Plaintiffs and the Class Members.
106. Class certification of the CHRIA Job Denial Class is appropriate pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) because SEPTA has acted and/or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class Members, making declaratory and injunctive relief appropriate with respect to Plaintiffs and the Class Members as a whole. The Class Members are entitled to injunctive relief to end Defendant’s common, uniform, unfair discriminatory—and illegal—policies and practices.
107. Class certification is appropriate pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) for the FCRA Disclosure Class because common questions of fact and law predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class Members. For example, SEPTA has maintained a common policy of failing to provide a clear and conspicuous disclosure in writing, in a document that consisted solely of that disclosure, before procuring a consumer report. Moreover, a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. Class Members have been damaged and are entitled to recovery as
19

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 21 Filed 05/26/16 Page 20 of 28
a result of Defendant’s uniform policies and practices. Because SEPTA has maintained a common policy of failing to properly inform Class Members of their rights under the FCRA, many Class Members are likely unaware that their rights have been violated.
108. Class certification is appropriate pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) for the FCRA Consumer Report Class and the FCRA Summary of Rights Class because common questions of fact and law predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class Members. For example, SEPTA has maintained a common policy of taking adverse action without first providing applicants with copies of their consumer reports and/or a written description of their rights under the FCRA. Moreover, a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. Class Members have been damaged and are entitled to recovery as a result of Defendant’s uniform policies and practices. Because SEPTA has maintained a common policy of failing to properly inform Class Members of their rights under the FCRA, many Class Members are likely unaware that their rights have been violated.
109. Class certification is appropriate pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) for the CHRIA Job Denial Class because common questions of fact and law predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class Members. For example, SEPTA has maintained a common policy of denying employment because of drug related convictions. Moreover, a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. Class Members have been damaged and are entitled to recovery as a result of Defendant’s uniform policies and practices.
110. The amount of each Class Member’s individual claim is also small compared to the expense and burden of individual prosecution of this litigation. The FCRA and CHRIA have
20

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 21 Filed 05/26/16 Page 21 of 28
statutorily specified damages, which Class Members will prove at trial are warranted, that will render calculation of damages for Class Members highly straightforward. The propriety and amount of exemplary and punitive damages are based on Defendant’s conduct, making these issues common to Class Members.
CAUSES OF ACTION FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF SEPTA’s Failure to Provide Clear and Conspicuous Disclosure Before Procurement of Consumer Report (15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i), Brought by Messrs. Long, Shipley, and White on Behalf of Themselves and the FCRA Disclosure Class)
111. Messrs. Long, Shipley, and White, on behalf of themselves and the FCRA Disclosure Class, incorporate the preceding paragraphs as alleged above.
112. SEPTA violated the FCRA by procuring consumer reports on Messrs. Long, Shipley, and White and the FCRA Disclosure Class without making the stand-alone disclosure required by the FCRA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A).
113. SEPTA’s policy caused concrete injury (including the risk of harm) to Messrs. Long, Shipley, and White and the FCRA Disclosure Class, including because the form’s:
(a) extraneous information causes confusion about the purpose of the authorization, when Congress created this provision so that consumers would undoubtedly know they were authorizing a consumer report.
(b) extraneous information impedes consumers from learning of their substantive rights conferred by the FCRA, including those pertaining to ensuring the reports’ accuracy, confidentiality, and fairness; and
(c) requests for additional information including consumers’ contact information, education history, and criminal history provides an opportunity for job applicants to incorrectly or incompletely answer, which has the risk of leading to consumers’ denial of employment.
21

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 21 Filed 05/26/16 Page 22 of 28
114. Defendant acted willfully and in knowing or reckless disregard of its obligations and the rights of Messrs. Long, Shipley, and White and the FCRA Disclosure Class.
115. SEPTA’s willful conduct is reflected by, among other things, the fact that it violated a clear statutory mandate set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2), and that Defendant certified that it would comply with 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2).
116. SEPTA’s willful conduct is still further reflected by the following: (a) The FCRA was enacted in 1970, Defendant was founded in 1963; Defendant has had almost fifty years to become compliant; (b) Defendant’s conduct is inconsistent with the FTC’s longstanding regulatory guidance, judicial interpretation, and the plain language of the statute; (c) Defendant repeatedly and routinely uses the same unlawful documents with all of its employees and applicants on whom it procured consumer reports or otherwise failed to provide them with the required stand-alone disclosure; (d) Despite the pellucid statutory text and there being a depth of guidance, Defendant systematically procured consumer reports without first disclosing in writing to the consumer in a document that consists solely of the disclosure, that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes; and (e) By adopting such a policy, Defendant voluntarily ran a risk of violating the law substantially greater than the risk associated with a reading that was merely careless.
117. As a result of SEPTA’s actions, Messrs. Long, Shipley, and White and the FCRA Disclosure Class Members have been deprived of their consumer rights and prevented from making informed decisions about whether to permit SEPTA to procure their personal information.
22

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 21 Filed 05/26/16 Page 23 of 28
118. SEPTA’s willful conduct makes it liable for actual or statutory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs, in an amount to be determined by the Court pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF SEPTA’s Failure to Provide Consumer Reports Before Taking Adverse Action (15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(i), Brought by Messrs. Long, Shipley and White on Behalf of
Themselves and the FCRA Consumer Report Class) 119. Messrs. Long, Shipley, and White, on behalf of themselves and the FCRA Consumer Report Class, incorporate the preceding paragraphs as alleged above. 120. SEPTA violated the FCRA by taking adverse employment actions against Messrs. Long, Shipley and White and the FCRA Consumer Report Class based in whole or in part on the information contained within their consumer reports. 121. Before taking these adverse employment actions, SEPTA failed to provide Messrs. Long, Shipley and White and the FCRA Consumer Report Class with a copy of their consumer reports and a reasonable amount of time to respond. 122. SEPTA’s policy caused concrete injury (including the risk of harm) to Messrs. Long, Shipley, and White and the FCRA Consumer Report Class, including because they could not:
(a) evaluate information contained in the consumer reports to ensure accuracy;
(b) challenge and correct information; (c) explain the circumstances surrounding misleading (even if accurate)
information; and (d) explain why information reported should not preclude employment. 123. Defendant acted willfully and in knowing or reckless disregard of its obligations and the rights of Messrs. Long, Shipley, and White and the FCRA Disclosure Class.
23

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 21 Filed 05/26/16 Page 24 of 28
124. SEPTA’s willful conduct is reflected by, among other things, the fact that it violated a clear statutory mandate set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A).
125. SEPTA’s willful conduct is still further reflected by the following: (a) The FCRA was enacted in 1970, Defendant was founded in 1963; Defendant
has had almost 50 years to become compliant; (b) Defendant’s conduct is inconsistent with the FTC’s longstanding regulatory
guidance, judicial interpretation, and the plain language of the statute; (c) Defendant repeatedly and routinely took adverse action based in whole or in
part on information contained in a consumer report before providing consumers with a copy of the consumer report; and (d) By adopting such a policy, Defendant voluntarily ran a risk of violating the law substantially greater than the risk associated with a reading that was merely careless. 126. As a result of SEPTA’s actions, Messrs. Long, Shipley, and White and the FCRA Consumer Report Class have been deprived of their consumer rights and prevented from timely and effectively contesting the adverse action. 127. SEPTA’s willful conduct makes it liable for actual or statutory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs, in an amount to be determined by the Court pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF SEPTA’s Failure to Provide Summary of FCRA Rights Before Taking Adverse Action (15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(i), Brought by Messrs. Long, Shipley, and White on Behalf of
Themselves and the FCRA Summary of Rights Class) 128. Messrs. Long, Shipley and White, on behalf of themselves and the FCRA Summary of Rights Class, incorporate the preceding paragraphs as alleged above. 129. SEPTA violated the FCRA by taking adverse employment actions against Messrs. Long, Shipley, and White and the FCRA Summary of Rights Class based in whole or in part on the information contained within their consumer reports.
24

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 21 Filed 05/26/16 Page 25 of 28
130. Before taking these adverse employment actions, SEPTA failed to provide Messrs. Long, Shipley, and White and the FCRA Summary of Rights Class with a written description of their rights under the FCRA.
131. SEPTA’s policy caused concrete injury (including the risk of harm) to Messrs. Long, Shipley, and White and the FCRA Summary of Rights Class, including because they could not learn of their rights under the FCRA.
132. Defendant acted willfully and in knowing or reckless disregard of its obligations and the rights of Messrs. Long, Shipley, and White and the FCRA Disclosure Class.
133. SEPTA’s willful conduct is reflected by, among other things, the fact that it violated a clear statutory mandate set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A).
134. SEPTA’s willful conduct is still further reflected by the following: (a) The FCRA was enacted in 1970, Defendant was founded in 1963; Defendant
has had almost 50 years to become compliant; (b) Defendant’s conduct is inconsistent with the FTC’s longstanding regulatory
guidance, judicial interpretation, and the plain language of the statute; (c) Defendant repeatedly and routinely took adverse action based in whole or in
part on information contained in a consumer report before providing consumers with a written description of their rights under the FCRA; and (d) By adopting such a policy, Defendant voluntarily ran a risk of violating the law substantially greater than the risk associated with a reading that was merely careless. 135. As a result of SEPTA’s actions, Messrs. Long, Shipley, and White and the FCRA Summary of Rights Class have been deprived of their consumer rights and prevented from timely and effectively contesting the adverse action.
25

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 21 Filed 05/26/16 Page 26 of 28
136. SEPTA’s willful conduct makes it liable for actual or statutory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs, in an amount to be determined by the Court pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n.
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF SEPTA’s Violation of CHRIA’s Use of Information Provision (18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9125(b), Brought by Messrs. Long, Shipley, and White on Behalf
of Themselves and the CHRIA Job Denial Class) 137. Messrs. Long, Shipley, and White, on behalf of themselves and the CHRIA Job Denial Class, incorporate the preceding paragraphs as alleged above. 138. Messrs. Long, Shipley, and White and the CHRIA Job Denial Class have criminal drug convictions that SEPTA considered when deciding not to offer them employment involving the operation of SEPTA vehicles. 139. Messrs. Long, Shipley, and White and the CHRIA Job Denial Class’s convictions are older than seven years and not related to their suitability for employment involving the operation or maintenance of SEPTA non-paratransit vehicles. 140. Messrs. Long, Shipley, and White and the CHRIA Job Denial Class have been aggrieved by SEPTA’s denials of employment. 141. As a result of its actions, SEPTA is liable to Messrs. Long, Shipley, and White and the CHRIA Job Denial Class for injunctive relief, damages and reasonable costs of litigation and attorneys’ fees, pursuant to 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9183(a)-(b). 142. SEPTA’s conduct has been willful, rendering it liable for exemplary and punitive damages, pursuant to 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9183(b).
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs and Class Members pray for relief as follows:
26

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 21 Filed 05/26/16 Page 27 of 28

(a) Certification of Plaintiffs’ FCRA and CHRIA claims as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23;

(b) Designation of Plaintiffs as representative of the Class Members;

(c) Designation of Plaintiffs’ counsel of record as Class Counsel;

(d) An order enjoining SEPTA from engaging in further unlawful conduct in violation of the FCRA and CHRIA;

(e) An award of all statutory damages awardable for violations of the FCRA including punitive damages for each violation found to be willful;

(f) An award of all statutory damages awardable for violations of the CHRIA including actual and real damages for each violation, and exemplary and punitive damages for each violation found to be willful;

(g) An award of costs incurred herein, including reasonable attorneys’ fees to the extent allowable by law;

(h) Pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, as provided by law;

(i) Payment of a reasonable service award to Plaintiffs, in recognition of the services they have rendered and will continue to render to Class Members, and the risks they have taken and will take; and

(j) Such other and further legal and equitable relief as this Court deems necessary, just and proper. JURY DEMAND

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b), Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury in this

action.

Dated: May 26, 2016

Respectfully submitted, By:

Ossai Miazad OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP 3 Park Avenue, 29th Floor New York, NY 10016 Tel.: (212) 245-1000 Adam T. Klein (pro hac vice filed) Ossai Miazad (pro hac vice filed) Lewis M. Steel (pro hac vice filed)
27

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 21 Filed 05/26/16 Page 28 of 28
Christopher M. McNerney (pro hac vice filed) Cheryl-Lyn Bentley (pro hac vice filed)
LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW Jon Greenbaum (pro hac vice filed) Mateya B. Kelley (pro hac vice filed) 1401 New York Ave., NW Washington, DC 20005 Tel.: (202) 662-8600
PHILADELPHIA LAWYERS FOR SOCIAL EQUITY Michael Lee Pennsylvania Bar No. 307008 Michael Hardiman Pennsylvania Bar No. 27018 1501 Cherry Street Philadelphia, PA 19102 Tel.: (215) 995-1230
PUBLIC INTEREST LAW CENTER Benjamin D. Geffen Pennsylvania Bar. No. 310134 1709 Benjamin Franklin Parkway, 2d Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103 Tel.: (267) 546-1308
WILLIG, WILLIAMS & DAVIDSON Ryan Allen Hancock Pennsylvania Bar No. 92590 Danielle Newsome Pennsylvania Bar No. 320772 1845 Walnut Street, 24th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103 Tel.: (215) 656-3679
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and proposed Class Members
28

 
 Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 52 Filed 04/05/17 Page 1 of 9

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

FRANK LONG, et al.,

:

:

Plaintiffs,

:

:

v.

:

:

SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA

:

TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY,

:

:

Defendant.

:

CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-1991

MEMORANDUM

TUCKER, C.J.

April 5, 2017

Presently before the Court are Defendant Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation

Authority’s Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Class Action Complaint (Doc. 25), Plaintiffs’

Memorandum of Law in Opposition thereto (Doc. 27), and Defendant’s Reply in Further Support

of its Motion (Doc. 34). Upon careful consideration of the parties’ submissions and the

arguments presented to the Court during Oral Argument held on October 12, 2016, and for the

reasons set forth below, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”)

This action arises out of alleged violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., and Pennsylvania state law.1 The FCRA was created “to ensure fair and

accurate credit reporting, promote efficiency in the banking system, and protect consumer

privacy.” Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 52 (2007). The FCRA requires employers

1 Because the Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ FCRA claims, the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over Plaintiffs’ state law claims. Thus, the Court will not address Plaintiffs’ state law claims in this Memorandum.
1

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 52 Filed 04/05/17 Page 2 of 9
who obtain consumer reports for employment purposes to provide a clear and conspicuous disclosure, in writing, and in a document that consists solely of the disclosure (“stand-alone disclosure”) to the consumer, before procurement. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) and (ii). The FCRA also requires employers to provide a consumer with a copy of his consumer report and a summary of rights under the FCRA before taking any adverse action against him. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(i) and (ii). Adverse actions include “a denial of employment or any other decision for employment purposes that adversely affects any current or prospective employee” and “an action taken or determination that is . . . adverse to the interests of the consumer.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(k)(1)(B).
“Any person who willfully fails to comply with any requirement [of the FCRA] with respect to any consumer is liable to that consumer.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a).
B. The Parties and Allegations Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (“SEPTA”) is a public transit
authority organized under the laws of the Pennsylvania with its headquarters in Philadelphia. (Compl. ¶ 33.) SEPTA is alleged to be a “person using consumer reports . . . for employment purposes” who “has taken adverse action . . . based wholly or in part on” Plaintiffs’ consumer reports. (Compl. ¶ 34.) Plaintiffs Frank Long, Joseph Shipley, and Michael White are Philadelphia residents who applied and interviewed for positions with SEPTA between 2014 and 2016. (Compl. ¶¶ 21, 23–28, 30–31.) For the purposes of this Memorandum, Plaintiffs are assumed to be “Consumers” as defined by the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(c). Plaintiffs allege that they were denied employment by SEPTA because of their criminal history. (Compl. ¶¶ 44, 57, 69.)
2

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 52 Filed 04/05/17 Page 3 of 9
Plaintiffs assert that they completed forms disclosing prior drug-related convictions and authorizing SEPTA to conduct background checks. (Compl. ¶¶ 42, 52, 65.) Plaintiffs claim that the forms did not comply with the FCRA’s stand-alone disclosure requirement. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the forms contained extraneous language, including language inquiring about their educational history, employment history, probation or parole status, and job suitability. Plaintiffs further allege that SEPTA did not provide any other authorization form that complied with the FCRA. (Compl.¶¶ 43, 53, 66.)
Plaintiffs also allege that SEPTA did not provide Plaintiffs with a copy of their consumer reports or a summary of their rights under the FCRA before revoking or denying their employment offers. (Compl. ¶ 85.)
Plaintiff Long filed a class action complaint in this Court on April 27, 2016. Long later amended his complaint, adding Shipley and White on May 26, 2016 (“First Amended Complaint”). In Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs assert four claims against SEPTA.2 First, Plaintiffs allege that SEPTA willfully violated the FCRA because SEPTA failed to provide a clear and conspicuous written disclosure, which would meet the FCRA’s stand-
2 In each claim, Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of individuals who applied for employment with SEPTA within a specified period. The first cause of action is on behalf of the “FCRA Disclosure Class,” which is comprised of SEPTA employment applicants for whom SEPTA obtained a consumer report without providing a clear and conspicuous disclosure in writing, in a document that consisted solely of the disclosure, before obtaining the report. (Compl. ¶ 96.) The second cause of action is on behalf of the “FCRA Consumer Report Class,” which is comprised of SEPTA employment applicants who were subject to an adverse action based on information contained in a consumer report without receiving a copy of the consumer report before the adverse action. (Compl. ¶ 97.) The third cause of action is on behalf of the “FCRA Summary of Rights Class,” which is comprised of SEPTA employment applicants who were subject to an adverse action based on information contained in a consumer report without receiving a written description of their rights. (Compl. ¶ 97.) The fourth cause of action is on behalf of SEPTA employment applicants who assert a violation of Pennsylvania state law. (Compl. ¶ 98.)
3

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 52 Filed 04/05/17 Page 4 of 9
alone requirement, before obtaining Plaintiffs’ consumer reports. (Compl. ¶¶ 112, 114–16.) Second, Plaintiffs allege that SEPTA willfully violated the FCRA by failing to provide consumer reports to Plaintiffs before revoking their employment offers. (Compl. ¶¶ 120–21, 123–25.) Third, Plaintiffs allege that SEPTA willfully violated the FCRA by failing to provide Plaintiffs with a summary of their rights under the FCRA before taking adverse employment actions against them. (Compl. ¶¶ 129–30.) Lastly, Plaintiffs allege that SEPTA violated Pennsylvania state law. (Compl. ¶¶ 138–39, 142.)
In the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs do not allege that their consumer reports were inaccurate in any way.
Plaintiffs seek, inter alia, injunctive and declaratory relief, actual or statutory damages, and exemplary and punitive damages. (Compl. ¶ 14.) II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) permits a court to dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. When deciding a 12(b)(1) motion, the trial court must first determine whether the motion presents a “facial” or “factual” attack on the claim “because that distinction determines how the pleading must be reviewed.” Constitution Party of Pennsylvania v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 357 (3d Cir. 2014). When a party asserts a facial attack, it asserts that the claim is insufficient to invoke subject matter jurisdiction as a threshold issue. Id.
When reviewing a 12(b)(1) motion that presents a facial attack, the court applies the same standard of review as it would in reviewing a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6). In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 633 (3d Cir. 2017). Consequently, all well-pleaded factual allegations contained in a complaint must be accepted as true and interpreted in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Argueta v. U.S. Immigration and Customs
4

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 52 Filed 04/05/17 Page 5 of 9
Enf’t., 643 F.3d 60, 74 (3d Cir. 2011). “To survive a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter that would establish standing if accepted as true.” In re Horizon, 846 F.3d at 633 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
In the 12(b)(1) motion presently before the Court, SEPTA asserts that there is a threshold jurisdictional defect, lack of standing, but does not challenge the factual assertions in the First Amended Complaint. Thus, SEPTA presents a facial 12(b)(1) motion. Accordingly, this Court must review the motion by construing the factual allegations in the pleadings in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. III. DISCUSSION
SEPTA moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ FCRA claims for lack of standing alleging, in part, that Plaintiffs have not pled facts which demonstrate that Plaintiffs suffered a concrete and particularized injury as a consequence of SEPTA’s purported FCRA violations. (Def.’s Mem. 6.) SEPTA also moves to dismiss the First Amended Complaint for Plaintiffs’ failure to state a claim for relief.
Plaintiffs argue that Defendant’s motion should be denied because Plaintiffs have pled sufficient facts to establish every element of Article III standing, including that SEPTA’s violation of their statutory rights caused Plaintiffs to suffer concrete and particularized harm. (Pls.’ Mem. 7–15.) Plaintiffs further argue that they have sufficiently pled facts to support their claims for relief under the FCRA and state law. (Pls.’ Mem. 16–24).
For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Plaintiffs lack standing. Therefore, the Court will not address SEPTA’s failure to state a claim argument.
5

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 52 Filed 04/05/17 Page 6 of 9
Standing Standing is “the threshold question in every federal case” and requires the court to determine “whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). Standing requires a plaintiff to have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of a defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016).The party asserting federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing each element of standing. Lujuan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). The same standing requirements apply to plaintiffs in class actions, and at least one named plaintiff in a class action must have standing to maintain a suit. In re Horizon, 846 F.3d at 634. SEPTA argues that Plaintiffs do not have standing because, in part, Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that Plaintiffs suffered an injury in fact resulting from SEPTA’s purported procedural violations. (Def.’s Mem. 7–8.) Plaintiffs assert that the first element of the standing requirement is met because each Plaintiff has pled a violation of his statutory right, which establishes a particularized harm, and that SEPTA invaded Plaintiffs’ privacy and caused informational injury, resulting in concrete harm. (Pls.’ Mem. 7.) To establish an injury in fact, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he has suffered harm “which is (a) [particularized and concrete] . . . and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujuan, 504 U.S. at 560. Harm is “particularized” when it “affect[s] [a] plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548. Harm is “concrete” when it actually exists and is real, and is not abstract. Id. An injury may be concrete even when it is intangible. Id. at 1549. History and congressional judgment are instructive in determining whether an intangible harm may satisfy the concreteness requirement. Id. Congress may “elevate to the status of legally
6

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 52 Filed 04/05/17 Page 7 of 9
cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law.” Id. (internal citation omitted). Despite Congress’ ability to elevate intangible harms, establishing injury in fact is not automatic “whenever a statute grants [him] a statutory right and purports to authorize [him] to sue to vindicate that right” because standing “requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation.” Id. Therefore, a bare procedural violation without concrete harm is insufficient to establish an injury in fact. Id. However, “the violation of a procedural right granted by statute can be sufficient in some circumstances3 to constitute injury in fact . . . . [such that a plaintiff] need not allege any additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified.” Id. (emphasis added).
The Third Circuit has held that “Congress has the power to define injuries . . . that were previously inadequate in law.” In re Horizon, 846 F.3 at 638. However, “there are some circumstances where the mere technical violation of a procedural requirement of a statute cannot, in and of itself, constitute an injury in fact.” 846 F.3d at 638. Nevertheless, the Third Circuit has yet to “consider the full reach of congressional power to elevate a procedural violation into an injury in fact.” Id.
At the motion to dismiss stage, the injury in fact element requires a plaintiff to “allege some specific, identifiable trifle of injury.” In re Horizon, 846 F.3d at 633 (citing Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 278 (3d Cir. 2014)). Therefore, “general factual allegations of injury resulting from a defendant’s conduct may suffice.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
The Supreme Court in Spokeo did not change the requirements to establish Article III standing. The Court simply highlighted the responsibility of courts to evaluate both particularity and concreteness to establish an injury in fact.
3 These circumstances may be limited to instances where there is a risk of real harm. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549.
7

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 52 Filed 04/05/17 Page 8 of 9
Here, Plaintiffs’ purported harm is particularized because each Plaintiff has pled a violation of his statutory right, which affects each Plaintiff in a personal and individual way. The purported harm is alleged to affect each plaintiff, not just the class. However, the Court is unable to find that the purported harm in this case is concrete.
The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ allegations amount to bare procedural violations without concrete harm. Plaintiffs have pled that SEPTA’s purported violation of the stand-alone disclosure requirement caused them harm because SEPTA’s forms’:
(a) extraneous information causes confusion about the purpose of the authorization . . . ; (b) extraneous information impedes consumers from learning of their substantive rights conferred by the FCRA, including those pertaining to ensuring the reports’ accuracy, confidentiality, and fairness; and (c) requests for additional information including consumers’ contact information, education history, and criminal history provides an opportunity for job applicants to incorrectly or incompletely answer, which has the risk of leading to consumers’ denial of employment. (Compl. ¶ 113.) Plaintiffs also allege that SEPTA’s failure to provide Plaintiffs with a copy of their consumer reports or a summary of their rights, as required by the FCRA, caused them harm because Plaintiffs could not “evaluate information contained in the consumer reports to ensure accuracy,” “challenge and correct information,” or learn of their FCRA rights. (Compl. ¶¶ 122, 131.) However, Plaintiffs have failed to allege any specific, identifiable trifle of injury or allege that they were harmed in any non-abstract way as a consequence of SEPTA’s purported FCRA violations. The Supreme Court stated that “a violation of one of the FCRA’s procedural requirements may result in no harm.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1550. The case before the Court is an
8

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 52 Filed 04/05/17 Page 9 of 9
example of that. Plaintiffs allege that SEPTA denied jobs to Plaintiffs based on their criminal history, which Plaintiffs disclosed prior to SEPTA procuring their background checks. Additionally, Plaintiffs do not allege that their reports were inaccurate in any way. Taking all of Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, SEPTA’s purported FCRA violations did not cause the type of harm to Plaintiffs, or present any material risk of harm, that would give rise to a de facto injury.
Although Plaintiffs assert in their brief that SEPTA invaded Plaintiffs’ privacy and caused informational injury, resulting in concrete harm, these assertions are not pled in the First Amended Complaint and, therefore, cannot properly be considered by the Court. Even if they were, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ arguments unpersuasive. Plaintiffs’ attempt to turn a bare procedural violation into an injury in fact fails.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not met their burden of establishing that any one of them has suffered an injury in fact that would enable them to assert their FCRA claims. Thus, the Court need not consider the other elements or whether Plaintiffs can establish a claim on which relief can be granted for their FCRA and state law claims. IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court grants Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. An appropriate Order follows.
9

 
 Case: 2:16-cv-1991 As of: 01/21/2020 03:11 PM EST 1 of 10
United States District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:16−cv−01991−PBT

SPECIAL

LONG v. SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY Assigned to: HONORABLE PETRESE B. TUCKER Case in other court: USCA FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT,
17−01889 Cause: 15:1681 Fair Credit Reporting Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 04/27/2016 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Employment Jurisdiction: Federal Question

FRANK LONG INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED

represented by ADAM T. KLEIN Outten & Golden LLP 685 Third Avenue 25th Floor New York New York, NY 10017 212−245−1000 Email: atk@outtengolden.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

BENJAMIN D. GEFFEN PUBLIC INTEREST LAW CENTER OF PHILA 1709 BENJAMIN FRANKIN PKWY 2ND FL PHILADELPHIA, PA 19103 267−546−1308 Email: bgeffen@PubIntLaw.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

CHRISTOPHER M MCNERNEY OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP 685 THIRD AVE 25TH FL NEW YORK, NY 10017 212 245 1000 Fax: 646 509 2060 Email: cmcnerney@outtengolden.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

JON M GREENBAUM LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW 1401 NEW YORK AVENUE, NW SUITE 400 WASHINGTON, DC 20005 202−662−8315 Email: jgreenbaum@lawyerscommittee.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

LEWIS M STEEL Outten & Golden LLP 685 Third Avenue 25th Floor New York New York, NY 10017 212 245 1000

Case: 2:16-cv-1991 As of: 01/21/2020 03:11 PM EST 2 of 10
Fax: 646 509 2060 Email: ls@outtengolden.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
MATEYA BETH KELLEY LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 1401 NEW YORK AVENUE, NW SUITE 400 WASHINGTON, DC 20005 202 662 8321 Email: mkelley@lawyerscommittee.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
OSSAI MIAZAD OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP 3 PARK AVE 29TH FL NEW YORK, NY 10016 212−245−1000 Email: om@outtengolden.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
CHERYL−LYN BENTLEY OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP 685 THIRD AVE 25TH FL NEW YORK, NY 10017 212 245 1000 Fax: 646 509 2060 Email: cbentley@outtengolden.com TERMINATED: 09/06/2019
CLAUDIA DEPALMA PUBLIC INTEREST LAW CENTER 1709 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN PKWY 2nd FL PHILADELPHIA, PA 19103 267−546−1313 Email: cdepalma@pubintlaw.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
DANIELLE K. NEWSOME WILLIG WILLIAMS & DAVIDSON 1845 WALNUT ST 24TH FL PHILADELPHIA, PA 19103 215−656−3600 Email: dnewsome@wwdlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
JESSICA RUSZKIEWICZ BROWN Willig, Williams and Davidson 1845 Walnut Street 24th Floor PHILADELPHIA, PA 19103 215−656−3629 Fax: 215−561−5135 Email: jbrown@wwdlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
MICHAEL HARDIMAN PHILADELPHIA LAWYERS FOR SOCIAL EQUITY 1501 CHERRY STREET

Case: 2:16-cv-1991 As of: 01/21/2020 03:11 PM EST 3 of 10

PHILADELPHIA, PA 19102 215−955−1230 Email: hardiman@plsephilly.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

RYAN ALLEN HANCOCK WILLIG WILLIAMS & DAVIDSON 1845 WALNUT STREET, 24TH FLOOR PHILADELPHIA, PA 19103 215−656−3679 Email: rhancock@wwdlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff JOSEPH SHIPLEY

represented by OSSAI MIAZAD (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

CLAUDIA DEPALMA (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

JESSICA RUSZKIEWICZ BROWN (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
MICHAEL WHITE INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED

represented by OSSAI MIAZAD (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

CLAUDIA DEPALMA (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

JESSICA RUSZKIEWICZ BROWN (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY

represented by CANDIDUS K. DOUGHERTY SWARTZ CAMPBELL LLC One Liberty Place 1650 Market Street, 38th Floor PHILADELPHIA, PA 19103 215−299−4296 Fax: 215−299−4301 Email: cdougherty@swartzcampbell.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
ELIZABETH A. MALLOY Cozen O'Connor One Liberty Place 1650 Market Street, Suite 2800 PHILADELPHIA, PA 19103 215−665−2000 Fax: 215−665−2013

Case: 2:16-cv-1991 As of: 01/21/2020 03:11 PM EST 4 of 10
Email: emalloy@cozen.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
ANDREW HOPE BUCHANAN INGERSOLL & ROONEY PC 50 S 16TH ST SUITE 3200 PHILADELPHIA, PA 19102 215−665−5322 Email: andrew.hope@bipc.com TERMINATED: 07/24/2019
ANNA B. WILL KENTZ Cozen O'Connor One Liberty Place 1650 Market Street Suite 2800 Philadelphia, PA 19103 215−665−6926 Email: awillkentz@cozen.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
JEFFREY B. MCCARRON SWARTZ CAMPBELL LLC One Liberty Place 1650 Market Street, 38th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103 215−564−5190 Fax: 215−299−4301 Email: jmccarron@swartzcampbell.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
MICHAEL A. COGNETTI SWARTZ, CAMPBELL LLC TWO LIBERTY PLACE 28TH FL 50 SOUTH 16TH ST. PHILADELPHIA, PA 19102 215−564−5190 Email: mcognetti@swartzcampbell.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
SAMANTHA L. SOUTHALL BUCHANAN INGERSOLL & ROONEY PC 50 S. 16TH ST STE 3200 TWO LIBERTY PLACE PHILADELPHIA, PA 19102 215−665−3884 Email: samantha.southall@bipc.com TERMINATED: 07/24/2019
STEVEN DANIEL MILLMAN COZEN O'CONNOR 1650 MARKET ST SUITE 2800 PHILADELPHIA, PA 19103 215−446−0031 Email: smillman@cozen.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 04/27/2016

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY ( Filing fee $ 400 receipt number 139385.), filed by FRANK LONG.(rt)

Case: 2:16-cv-1991 As of: 01/21/2020 03:11 PM EST 5 of 10

04/27/2016 04/27/2016 05/17/2016
05/18/2016 05/18/2016 05/18/2016 05/18/2016 05/18/2016 05/18/2016 05/19/2016 05/19/2016 05/19/2016 05/23/2016
05/23/2016 05/24/2016
05/24/2016

(Entered: 04/27/2016)
Summons Issued as to SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY. One Forwarded To: Counsel on April 27, 2016 (rt) (Entered: 04/27/2016)
DEMAND for Trial by Jury by FRANK LONG. (rt) (Entered: 04/27/2016)
2 AFFIDAVIT of Service by John D. Scanlon re: served Summons In A Civil Action, Class Action Complaint, and related documents listed in affidavit upon Sylvia Page (authorized agent) on behalf of SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY by Personal Service on 5/4/2016, answer due 5/25/2016. (GEFFEN, BENJAMIN) Modified on 5/19/2016 (md). (Entered: 05/17/2016)
3 NOTICE of Appearance by RYAN ALLEN HANCOCK on behalf of FRANK LONG with Certificate of Service(HANCOCK, RYAN) (Entered: 05/18/2016)
4 APPLICATION FOR PRO HAC VICE ADMISSION OF CHERYL−LYN BENTLEY, SPONSORS STATEMENT, CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by FRANK LONG. (PPE140628−$40) (rf, ) (Entered: 05/19/2016)
5 APPLICATION FOR PRO HAC VICE ADMISSION OF ADAM T. KLEIN, SPONSORS STATEMENT, CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by FRANK LONG. (PPE140628−$40) (rf, ) (Entered: 05/19/2016)
6 APPLICATION FOR PRO HAC VICE ADMISSION OF CHRISTOPHER M. MCNERNEY, SPONSORS STATEMENT, CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by FRANK LONG. (PPE140628−$40) (rf, ) (Entered: 05/19/2016)
7 APPLICATION FOR PRO HAC VICE ADMISSION OF LEWIS M. STEEL, SPONSORS STATEMENT, CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by FRANK LONG. (PPE140628−$40) (rf, ) (Entered: 05/19/2016)
8 APPLICATION FOR PRO HAC VICE ADMISSION OF OSSAI MIAZAD, SPONSORS STATEMENT, CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by FRANK LONG. (PPE140628−$40) (rf, ) Modified on 5/23/2016 (md). (Entered: 05/19/2016)
9 APPLICATION FOR PRO HAC VICE ADMISSION OF MATEYA BETH KELLEY, SPONSORS STATEMENT, CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by FRANK LONG. (PPE140662−$40)(rf, ) (Entered: 05/19/2016)
10 APPLICATION FOR PRO HAC VICE ADMISSION OF JON M. GREENBAUM, SPONSORS STATEMENT, CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by FRANK LONG. (PPE140662−$40) (rf, ) (Entered: 05/19/2016)
11 NOTICE of Appearance by DANIELLE K. NEWSOME on behalf of FRANK LONG with Jury Demand / Certificate of Service (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(NEWSOME, DANIELLE) (Entered: 05/19/2016)
12 STIPULATION AND ORDER THAT THE PARTIES STIPULATE THAT THE TIME FOR DEFENDANT TO ANSWER THE COMPLAINT IS EXTENDED FOR A PERIOD OF THIRTY DAYS UP TO AND INCLUDING 6/24/2016. SIGNED BY CHIEF JUDGE PETRESE B. TUCKER ON 5/20/16. 5/23/16 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(gs) (Entered: 05/23/2016)
13 NOTICE of Appearance by ELIZABETH A. MALLOY on behalf of SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY with Certificate of Service(MALLOY, ELIZABETH) (Entered: 05/23/2016)
14 NOTICE of Appearance by CANDIDUS K. DOUGHERTY on behalf of SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY with Certificate of Service (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(DOUGHERTY, CANDIDUS) (Entered: 05/24/2016)
15 NOTICE of Withdrawal of Appearance by CANDIDUS K. DOUGHERTY on behalf of SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(DOUGHERTY, CANDIDUS) (Entered: 05/24/2016)

Case: 2:16-cv-1991 As of: 01/21/2020 03:11 PM EST 6 of 10

05/24/2016 05/24/2016 05/24/2016 05/24/2016 05/24/2016 05/26/2016 05/27/2016 06/02/2016
06/20/2016
06/24/2016 07/06/2016 07/22/2016 07/28/2016

16 NOTICE of Appearance by ANDREW HOPE on behalf of SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY with Certificate of Service(HOPE, ANDREW) (Entered: 05/24/2016)
17 NOTICE of Appearance by SAMANTHA L. SOUTHALL on behalf of SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY with Certificate of Service(SOUTHALL, SAMANTHA) (Entered: 05/24/2016)
18 NOTICE of Appearance by JEFFREY B. MCCARRON on behalf of SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service of Entry of Appearance)(MCCARRON, JEFFREY) (Entered: 05/24/2016)
19 NOTICE of Appearance by CANDIDUS K. DOUGHERTY on behalf of SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(DOUGHERTY, CANDIDUS) (Entered: 05/24/2016)
20 NOTICE of Appearance by MICHAEL A. COGNETTI on behalf of SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(COGNETTI, MICHAEL) (Entered: 05/24/2016)
21 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT against SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY filed by FRANK LONG, JOSEPH SHIPLEY, MICHAEL WHITE, JURY TRIAL DEMAND(rf, ) Modified on 6/2/2016 (rf, ). (Entered: 05/27/2016)
22 NOTICE of Appearance by MICHAEL HARDIMAN on behalf of FRANK LONG, CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE. (rf, ) (Entered: 05/27/2016)
23 ORDER THAT CHERYL−LYN BENTLEY, ADAM T. KLEIN, CHRISTOPHER M. MCNERNEY, LEWIS M. STEEL, OSSAI MIAZAD, MATEYA BETH KELLY AND JON M. GREENBAUM ARE ADMITTED PRO HAC VICE TO THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA FOR THE PENDENCY OF THIS MATTER. SIGNED BY CHIEF JUDGE PETRESE B. TUCKER ON 6/1/16. 6/2/16 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED, E−MAILED.(rf, ) (Entered: 06/02/2016)
24 STIPULATION AND ORDER THAT DEFENDANT HEREBY CONSENTS TO THE FILING OF THE FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT (DOC. 21). TIME FOR DEFENDANT TO ANSWER, MOVE OR OTHERWISE RESPOND TO THE FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT IS 6/24/16. SIGNED BY CHIEF JUDGE PETRESE B. TUCKER ON 6/20/16. 6/20/16 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED, E−MAILED.(rf, ) (Entered: 06/20/2016)
25 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Standing and Failure to State a Claim filed by SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY.Memorandum. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Memorandum of Law, # 3 Exhibit s A and B, # 4 Certificate of Service)(SOUTHALL, SAMANTHA) (Entered: 06/24/2016)
26 STIPULATION AND ORDER BY AND BETWEEN COUNSEL THAT THE TIME FOR PLAINTIFFS TO RESPOND TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF STANDING AND FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM IS 7/22/2016. SIGNED BY CHIEF JUDGE PETRESE B. TUCKER ON 7/6/16. 7/6/16 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(gs) (Entered: 07/06/2016)
27 Memorandum of Law in Opposition re 25 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Standing and Failure to State a Claim filed by FRANK LONG, JOSEPH SHIPLEY, MICHAEL WHITE. Certificate of Service. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(MIAZAD, OSSAI) Modified on 7/26/2016 (tjd). (Entered: 07/22/2016)
28 MOTION for Leave to File Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Class Action Complaint filed by SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY.Memorandum and Certificate of Service. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(SOUTHALL, SAMANTHA) (Entered: 07/28/2016)

Case: 2:16-cv-1991 As of: 01/21/2020 03:11 PM EST 7 of 10

07/28/2016 08/01/2016
08/03/2016
08/04/2016 08/15/2016
08/17/2016 08/24/2016 09/01/2016 09/01/2016 09/01/2016 09/08/2016
09/19/2016 09/19/2016 10/04/2016

29 RESPONSE to Motion re 28 MOTION for Leave to File Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Class Action Complaint filed by FRANK LONG, JOSEPH SHIPLEY, MICHAEL WHITE. (MIAZAD, OSSAI) (Entered: 07/28/2016)
30 ORDER THAT PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A REPLY (DOC. 28) IS GRANTED. PLAINTIFFS SHALL FILE THEIR REPLY BRIEF WITHIN 10 DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS ORDER. SIGNED BY CHIEF JUDGE PETRESE B. TUCKER ON 8/1/16. 8/2/16 ENTERED AND COPIES EMAILED.(rf, ) (Main Document 30 replaced on 8/2/2016) (rf, ). *ORDER IS VACATED PER COURT ORDER OF 8/3/16, DOC. 31* (Entered: 08/02/2016)
31 ORDER THAT COURTS ORDER DATED 8/1/16 IS VACATED. FURTHER ORDERED THAT UPON CONSIDERATION OF DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A REPLY (DOC. 28) AND PLAINTIFFS RESPONSE (DOC. 29), DEFENDANTS MOTION IS GRANTED. DEFENDANT SHALL FILE ITS REPLY BRIEF WITHIN 10 DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS ORDER. SIGNED BY CHIEF JUDGE PETRESE B. TUCKER ON 8/3/16. 8/3/16 ENTERED AND COPIES EMAILED.(rf, ) (Entered: 08/03/2016)
32 NOTICE by FRANK LONG, JOSEPH SHIPLEY, MICHAEL WHITE re 25 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Standing and Failure to State a Claim Plaintiffs' Notice of Supplemental Authority (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(MIAZAD, OSSAI) (Entered: 08/04/2016)
33 Memorandum re 25 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Standing and Failure to State a Claim Reply Memoradum in Further Support of Motion to Dismiss filed by SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY. (SOUTHALL, SAMANTHA) (FILED IN ERROR BY ATTY; ATTY HAS RE−FILED AT PAPER 34 ) Modified on 8/17/2016 (md). (Entered: 08/15/2016)
34 REPLY to Response to Motion re 25 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Standing and Failure to State a Claim filed by SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY. (SOUTHALL, SAMANTHA) (Entered: 08/17/2016)
35 ORDER THAT MOTION HEARING SET FOR 9/27/2016 10:00 AM. SIGNED BY CHIEF JUDGE PETRESE B. TUCKER ON 8/24/16. 8/25/16 ENTERED AND COPIES EMAILED.(rf, ) (Entered: 08/25/2016)
36 NOTICE of Change of Address by CHERYL−LYN BENTLEY(BENTLEY, CHERYL−LYN) (Entered: 09/01/2016)
37 NOTICE of Change of Address by CHRISTOPHER M MCNERNEY(MCNERNEY, CHRISTOPHER) (Entered: 09/01/2016)
38 NOTICE of Change of Address by OSSAI MIAZAD(MIAZAD, OSSAI) (Entered: 09/01/2016)
39 ORDER THAT UPON CONSIDERATION OF THE JOINT REQUEST TO CHANGE THE DATE OF ORAL ARGUMENT, FAXED TO THE COURT ON 8/30/16, IT IS ORDERED THAT ORAL ARGUMENT SHALL BE RE−SCHEDULED FOR 10/12/2016 AT 10:00 AM IN COURTROOM 16A. SIGNED BY CHIEF JUDGE PETRESE B. TUCKER ON 9/7/16. 9/8/16 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(gs) (Entered: 09/08/2016)
40 NOTICE of Change of Address by LEWIS M STEEL(STEEL, LEWIS) (Entered: 09/19/2016)
41 NOTICE of Change of Address by ADAM T. KLEIN(KLEIN, ADAM) (Entered: 09/19/2016)
42 NOTICE by FRANK LONG, JOSEPH SHIPLEY, MICHAEL WHITE re 25 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Standing and Failure to State a Claim Plaintiffs' Notice of Supplemental Authority (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(MIAZAD, OSSAI) (Entered: 10/04/2016)

Case: 2:16-cv-1991 As of: 01/21/2020 03:11 PM EST 8 of 10

10/06/2016 10/07/2016 10/12/2016 10/12/2016
11/28/2016 01/25/2017 02/01/2017 02/07/2017 02/10/2017 04/05/2017 04/05/2017 04/18/2017 04/18/2017
04/21/2017 10/16/2018

43 NOTICE by SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY re 25 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Standing and Failure to State a Claim (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2)(SOUTHALL, SAMANTHA) (Entered: 10/06/2016)
44 NOTICE by FRANK LONG, JOSEPH SHIPLEY, MICHAEL WHITE re 43 Notice (Other) Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's Notice of Supplemental Authority (MIAZAD, OSSAI) (Entered: 10/07/2016)
45 NOTICE by FRANK LONG, JOSEPH SHIPLEY, MICHAEL WHITE re 25 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Standing and Failure to State a Claim Plaintiffs' Notice of Supplemental Authority (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(MIAZAD, OSSAI) (Entered: 10/12/2016)
46 Minute Entry for proceedings held before CHIEF JUDGE PETRESE B. TUCKER Motion Hearing held on 10/12/16 re 25 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Standing and Failure to State a Claim filed by SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY Court Reporter: L. MCCLOSKEY. (rf, ) (Entered: 10/13/2016)
47 TRANSCRIPT of Oral Argument Proceedings held on 10/12/16 before Judge TUCKER. Court Reporter: L. MCCLOSKEY.. (rf, ) (Entered: 11/28/2016)
48 NOTICE by FRANK LONG, JOSEPH SHIPLEY, MICHAEL WHITE re 25 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Standing and Failure to State a Claim Plaintiffs' Notice of Supplemental Authority (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(MIAZAD, OSSAI) (Entered: 01/25/2017)
49 NOTICE by SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY re 48 Notice (Other), Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs' Notice of Supplemental Authority (COGNETTI, MICHAEL) (Entered: 02/01/2017)
50 NOTICE by SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY re 25 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Standing and Failure to State a Claim Defendant's Notice of Supplemental Authority (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(COGNETTI, MICHAEL) (Entered: 02/07/2017)
51 Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's February 7, 2017 Notice of Supplemental Authority by FRANK LONG, JOSEPH SHIPLEY, MICHAEL WHITE re 50 Notice (Other). (MIAZAD, OSSAI) Modified on 2/13/2017 (fb). (Entered: 02/10/2017)
52 MEMORANDUM AND/OR OPINION. SIGNED BY CHIEF JUDGE PETRESE B. TUCKER ON 4/5/17. 4/5/17 ENTERED AND COPIES EMAILED.(rf, ) (Entered: 04/05/2017)
53 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER THAT DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. 25) IS GRANTED. SIGNED BY CHIEF JUDGE PETRESE B. TUCKER ON 4/5/17. 4/5/17 ENTERED AND COPIES EMAILED. (rf) (Entered: 04/07/2017)
54 ORDER THAT THE CLERK OF COURT SHALL MARK THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER CLOSED FOR STATISTICAL PURPOSES. SIGNED BY CHIEF JUDGE PETRESE B. TUCKER ON 4/18/17. 4/18/17 ENTERED AND COPIES EMAILED.(rf, ) (Entered: 04/18/2017)
55 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 52 Memorandum and/or Opinion, 53 Order (Memorandum and/or Opinion) by FRANK LONG, JOSEPH SHIPLEY, MICHAEL WHITE, Certificate of Service. Filing fee $ 505, receipt number 0313−12009736. Copies to Judge, Clerk USCA, Appeals Clerk. (MIAZAD, OSSAI) Modified on 4/18/2017 (md). (Entered: 04/18/2017)
56 NOTICE of Docketing Record on Appeal from USCA re 55 Notice of Appeal (Credit Card Payment), filed by FRANK LONG, MICHAEL WHITE, JOSEPH SHIPLEY. USCA Case Number 17−1889 (rf, ) (Entered: 04/21/2017)
57 ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the order of the District Court entered April 7, 2017, be and the same is hereby AFFIRMED as to the dismissal of Plaintiffs claim based on SEPTAs failure to provide them with notice of their FCRA rights as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(ii). REVERSED as to the dismissal of Plaintiffs claim based on SEPTAs failure to provide them with copies of their consumer reports as

Case: 2:16-cv-1991 As of: 01/21/2020 03:11 PM EST 9 of 10

11/07/2018 12/17/2018
07/18/2019 07/24/2019 07/24/2019 07/24/2019 07/26/2019 07/30/2019 08/06/2019 08/13/2019 08/13/2019
08/21/2019 09/05/2019 09/06/2019 10/22/2019

required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(i), and REMANDED for further proceedings. All of the above in accordance with the opinion of this Court. Costs shall not be taxed. (rf, ) (Entered: 10/17/2018)
58 ORDER THAT TELEPHONE STATUS CONFERENCE SET FOR 12/10/2018 11:00 AM, ETC. SIGNED BY HONORABLE PETRESE B. TUCKER ON 11/7/18. 11/8/18 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(rf, ) (Entered: 11/08/2018)
59 ORDER THAT ON OR BEFORE 12/28/18 THE PARTIES SHALL PROVIDE STATUS UPDATES IN WRITING TO THE COURT. THE LETTERS SHALL BE FAXED TO CHAMBERS AT 267−299−5072. SIGNED BY HONORABLE PETRESE B. TUCKER ON 12/17/18. 12/18/18 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(rf, ) (Entered: 12/18/2018)
60 MOTION for Leave to File a Second Amended Class Action Complaint filed by FRANK LONG, JOSEPH SHIPLEY, MICHAEL WHITE.Memorandum, Declaration. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum of Law, # 2 Declaration of Ossai Miazad, # 3 Exhibit A, # 4 Exhibit B, # 5 Exhibit C)(MIAZAD, OSSAI) (Entered: 07/18/2019)
61 NOTICE of Appearance by ANNA B. WILL KENTZ on behalf of SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY with Certificate of Service(WILL KENTZ, ANNA) (Entered: 07/24/2019)
62 NOTICE of Withdrawal of Appearance by SAMANTHA L. SOUTHALL on behalf of SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY(SOUTHALL, SAMANTHA) (Entered: 07/24/2019)
63 NOTICE of Withdrawal of Appearance by ANDREW HOPE on behalf of SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY(HOPE, ANDREW) (Entered: 07/24/2019)
64 NOTICE of Appearance by JESSICA RUSZKIEWICZ BROWN on behalf of FRANK LONG, JOSEPH SHIPLEY, MICHAEL WHITE, with Certificate of Service.(BROWN, JESSICA) Modified on 8/1/2019 (md). (Entered: 07/26/2019)
65 NOTICE of Withdrawal of Appearance by RYAN ALLEN HANCOCK on behalf of FRANK LONG. (FILED IN ERROR; ATTORNEY WITHDRAWING APPEARANCE MUST ELECTRONICALLY FILE ON OWN BEHALF). (HANCOCK, RYAN) Modified on 7/30/2019 (fb). (Entered: 07/30/2019)
66 Second Amended Complaint against SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY filed by FRANK LONG, MICHAEL WHITE and JOSEPH SHIPLEY.(mbh, ) (Entered: 08/07/2019)
67 NOTICE of Appearance by CLAUDIA DEPALMA on behalf of FRANK LONG, JOSEPH SHIPLEY, MICHAEL WHITE with Certificate of Service(DEPALMA, CLAUDIA) (Entered: 08/13/2019)
68 ORDER THAT THE PARTIES' STIPULATION IS GRANTED AND PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT (DOC. NO. 60 ) IS WITHDRAWN. SIGNED BY HONORABLE PETRESE B. TUCKER ON 8/13/2019.8/14/2019 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(amas) (Entered: 08/14/2019)
69 ANSWER to 66 Amended Complaint by SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY.(WILL KENTZ, ANNA) (Entered: 08/21/2019)
70 NOTICE of Hearing: Rule 16 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE SET FOR 10/23/2019 11:00 AM BEFORE HONORABLE PETRESE B. TUCKER.(adr) (Entered: 09/05/2019)
71 NOTICE of Withdrawal of Appearance by CHERYL−LYN BENTLEY on behalf of FRANK LONG, JOSEPH SHIPLEY, MICHAEL WHITE (BENTLEY, CHERYL−LYN) (Entered: 09/06/2019)
72 NOTICE of Appearance by STEVEN DANIEL MILLMAN on behalf of SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY with Certificate of Service(MILLMAN, STEVEN) (Entered: 10/22/2019)

Case: 2:16-cv-1991 As of: 01/21/2020 03:11 PM EST 10 of 10

10/28/2019
10/29/2019 12/04/2019

73 STIPULATION AND ORDER THAT PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR RULE 23 CLASS CERTIFICATION AND OPENING EXPERT REPORT(S) DUE 7/31/20. ALL OTHER SCHEDULING ORDER DEADLINES OUTLINED HEREIN. SIGNED BY HONORABLE PETRESE B. TUCKER ON 10/28/19. 10/28/19 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(rf, ) (Entered: 10/28/2019)
74 Minute Entry for proceedings held before HONORABLE PETRESE B. TUCKER Pretrial Conference held on 10/23/19. (rf, ) (Entered: 10/30/2019)
75 DISCOVERY CONFIDENTIALITY ORDER. SIGNED BY HONORABLE PETRESE B. TUCKER ON 12/2/19. 12/4/19 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(rf, ) (Entered: 12/04/2019)

 
 Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 25 Filed 06/24/16 Page 1 of 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

____________________________________

FRANK LONG, JOSEPH SHIPLEY, and :

MICHAEL WHITE, individually and on :

Behalf of all others similarly situated ,

:

:

Plaintiffs, :

v.

:

:

SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA :

TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY,

:

:

Defendant. :

____________________________________:

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:16-cv-01991-PBT

DEFENDANT SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
Defendant Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (“SEPTA”), moves the Court pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) to dismiss the First Amended Complaint. The grounds for this Motion are set forth in the attached supporting Memorandum of Law. Dated: June 24, 2016
Respectfully submitted,

__________________________________ Elizabeth A. Malloy (Pa. I.D. No. 48297) Samantha L. Southall (Pa. I.D. No. 80709) Andrew G. Hope (Pa. I.D. No. 317932) Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney PC Two Liberty Place 50 S. 16th Street, Suite 3200 Philadelphia, PA 19102-2555 (215) 665-8700

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 25 Filed 06/24/16 Page 2 of 2 Candidus K. Dougherty (Pa. I.D. No. 206106) Jeffrey B. McCarron (Pa. I.D. No. 49467) Michael A. Cognetti (Pa. I.D. No. 55819) Swartz Campbell LLC Two Liberty Place 50 S. 16th Street, 28th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19102 Attorneys for Defendant Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority
2

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 25-2 Filed 06/24/16 Page 1 of 23

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

____________________________________

FRANK LONG, JOSEPH SHIPLEY, and :

MICHAEL WHITE, individually and on :

Behalf of all others similarly situated ,

:

:

Plaintiffs, :

v.

:

:

SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA :

TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY,

:

:

Defendant. :

___________________________________ :

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:16-cv-01991-PBT

DEFENDANT SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF ITS
MOTION TO DISMISS THE FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

BUCHANAN INGERSOLL & ROONEY, PC Elizabeth A. Malloy (Pa. I.D. No. 48297) Samantha L. Southall (Pa. I.D. No. 80709) Andrew G. Hope (Pa. I.D. No. 317932) Two Liberty Place 50 S. 16th Street, Suite 3200 Philadelphia, PA 19102-2555 (215) 665-8700
SWARTZ CAMPBELL LLC Candidus K. Dougherty (Pa. I.D. No. 206106) Jeffrey B. McCarron (Pa. I.D. No. 49467) Michael A. Cognetti (Pa. I.D. No. 55819) Two Liberty Place 50 S. 16th Street, 28th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19102 (215) 564-5190
Attorneys for Defendant Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 25-2 Filed 06/24/16 Page 2 of 23 TABLE OF CONTENTS Pages
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................... 1 FACTUAL BACKGROUND ......................................................................................................... 3 ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 6 I. PLAINTIFFS LACK STANDING TO ASSERT THEIR FCRA CLAIMS. ..................... 6 II. THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE
GRANTED. ...................................................................................................................... 10 A. SEPTA Provided Plaintiffs With the Required “Stand Alone” Disclosure and
Authorization Before Obtaining Consumer Reports About Them. .................................. 11 B. Plaintiffs Have Failed to State a Claim for Willfulness Under the FCRA. ....................... 12 C. Plaintiffs Have Failed to State a Claim for Willful Violation of the CHRIA.................... 14 CONCLUSION........................................................................................................................... 188
i

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 25-2 Filed 06/24/16 Page 3 of 23
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).................................................................................................................10
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)...........................................................................................................10, 14
Burghy v. Dayton Racquet Club, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 689 (S.D. Ohio 2010) ....................................................................................12
Cushman v. Trans Union Corp., 115 F.3d 220 (3d Cir. 1997)...............................................................................................12, 13
David v. Neumann Univ., No. CV 15-4098, 2016 WL 1404153 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2016) ..............................................10
Davis v. Wells Fargo, No. 15-2658, 2016 WL 3033938 (3d Cir. May 27, 2016) .......................................................10
Dean v. Specialized Sec. Response, No. CIV.A. 09-515, 2011 WL 3734238 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2011) ........................................15
Duquesne Light Co. v. U.S. E.P.A., 166 F.3d 609 (3d Cir. 1999).......................................................................................................9
El v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 297 F. Supp. 2d 758 (E.D. Pa. 2003) .......................................................................................15
El v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 418 F. Supp. 2d 659 (E.D. Pa. 2005), aff’d, 479 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2007)...............................15
El v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2007)...............................................................................................15, 16
Gubala v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., No. 15-CV-1078-PP, 2016 WL 3390415 (E.D. Wis. June 17, 2016) (appeal filed) ...........................................................................................................................................7
Hughes v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 15-1690, 2016 WL 386220 (3d Cir. Feb. 1, 2016) ...........................................................11
Hutchinson v. Carco Grp., Inc., No. CV 15-1570, 2015 WL 5698283 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2015) .......................................13, 16
ii

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 25-2 Filed 06/24/16 Page 4 of 23
Just v. Target Corp., No. 15-4117, 2016 WL 2757370 (D. Minn. May 12, 2016)....................................................12
Long v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc., 671 F.3d 371 (3d Cir. 2012).....................................................................................................16
Lopez v. Wendy's Int'l, Inc., No. CV 11-00275 MMM JCX, 2011 WL 6967932 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2011) ........................8
Miller v. Clinton County, 544 F.3d 542 (3d. Cir. 2008)....................................................................................................11
Moore v. Johnson & Johnson, 83 F. Supp. 3d 629, 630 (E.D. Pa. 2014) ...................................................................................8
In re NAHC, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. CIV. A. 00-4020, 2001 WL 1241007 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 17, 2001), aff'd, 306 F.3d 1314 (3d Cir. 2002)..........................................................................................................11
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192 (3d Cir. 1993)...................................................................................................11
Perl v. Plains Commerce Bank, No. 11 CIV. 7972 KBF, 2012 WL 760401 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2012)......................................13
Ramos v. Genesis Healthcare, LLC, 141 F. Supp. 3d 341, 347 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (appeal filed)...........................................................9
Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007).............................................................................................................13, 16
Smith v. Ohio State Univ., No. 2:15-CV-3030, 2016 WL 3182675 (S.D. Ohio June 8, 2016) ....................................6, 7, 8
Smith v. Waverly Partners, LLC, No. 3:10-CV-00028-RLV, 2012 WL 3645324 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 23, 2012) ............................12
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) ...........................................................................................................6, 7
Springfield Tp. v. Lewis, 702 F.2d 426 (3d Cir. 1983).......................................................................................................9
U.S. ex rel. Streck v. Allergan, Inc., 894 F. Supp. 2d 584 (E.D. Pa. 2012) .......................................................................................17
Statutes
15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A) ...........................................................................................................11
iii

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 25-2 Filed 06/24/16 Page 5 of 23 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) .........................................................................................................4 15 U.S.C. § 1681n..............................................................................................................12, 13, 14 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a) .....................................................................................................................13 Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. .......................................................................1 Pennsylvania’s Criminal History Record Information Act, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
§ 9125 et seq. .................................................................................................................1, 14, 15 U.S. Security Care, Inc./SEPTA Notice and Authorization Under the Fair Credit
Reporting Act.............................................................................................................................3 Other Authorities Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) .................................................................1
iv

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 25-2 Filed 06/24/16 Page 6 of 23
Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), Defendant Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (“SEPTA”), by its undersigned counsel, respectfully submits this Memorandum of Law in support of its Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Class Action Complaint (the “Amended Complaint”).
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT This putative class action was brought by three individuals, Frank Long, Joseph Shipley and Michael White, who allegedly applied for positions as a Bus Operator or Railroad Supervision Manager with SEPTA between 2014 and 2016. Plaintiffs aver that, in each instance, SEPTA extended them a conditional offer of employment, which was contingent upon a background check. Plaintiffs also aver that, in each instance, they disclosed the existence of a drug conviction to SEPTA. Plaintiffs contend that SEPTA obtained a consumer report about each of them, which, consistent with Plaintiffs’ disclosures to SEPTA, demonstrated that Plaintiffs did, in fact, have one or more felony drug convictions. Plaintiffs further allege that, because of a SEPTA policy, their conditional offers of employment were revoked as a result of their criminal history. Arising from this background, the Amended Complaint asserts four separate claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (the “FCRA”) and Pennsylvania’s Criminal History Record Information Act, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9125 et seq. (the “CHRIA”). More specifically: • In Count I, Plaintiffs allege that SEPTA willfully violated the FCRA because it
failed to make a disclosure to Plaintiffs purportedly required by the FCRA before it obtained consumer reports about Plaintiffs (Am. Compl. at ¶ 112); • In Count II, Plaintiffs allege SETPA willfully violated the FCRA because it failed to provide Plaintiffs with a pre-adverse action letter and a copy of the consumer report before revoking their conditional offers of employment (Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 120-21);
1

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 25-2 Filed 06/24/16 Page 7 of 23
• In Count III, Plaintiffs allege that SEPTA willfully violated the FCRA because it failed to provide Plaintiffs with a written description of their rights under the FCRA before revoking their conditional offers of employment (Am. Compl. at ¶ 130); and
• In Count IV, Plaintiffs allege that SEPTA willfully violated the CHRIA because it declined to employ Plaintiffs as Bus Operators and a Railroad Supervision Manager because of their criminal drug convictions. (Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 138-39).
Plaintiffs lack standing to assert their FCRA claims in Counts I, II and III of the Amended Complaint because Plaintiffs have not alleged facts sufficient to show that they suffered a concrete and particularized injury as a consequence of the purported FCRA violations. In addition, Plaintiffs have not alleged facts that demonstrate any linkage between the revocation of Plaintiffs’ conditional offers and the alleged FCRA violations. In each instance, Plaintiffs disclosed the existence of the conviction at issue to SEPTA before SEPTA obtained a consumer report about Plaintiffs. Moreover, Plaintiffs do not allege that the consumer reports were inaccurate in any manner. Thus, Plaintiffs have not suffered any injury in fact as a consequence of SEPTA’s purported failures to provide them with a pre-adverse action letter, consumer report, and summary of rights.
Plaintiffs also have failed to state a claim for relief in the Amended Complaint. Indeed, contrary to Plaintiffs’ allegations, they were provided with the required “stand alone” disclosure when they authorized SEPTA to obtain a consumer report about their criminal history. Plaintiffs’ allegations that SETPA willfully violated the FCRA are insufficient because they lack the necessary factual support. In addition, Plaintiffs cannot contend that SEPTA willfully violated the CHRIA when at least one court has found that a similar policy was justified by business necessity and Plaintiffs have identified no facts that SEPTA’s policy is objectively unreasonable.
2

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 25-2 Filed 06/24/16 Page 8 of 23
For all of these reasons and as further set forth below, this Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint with prejudice.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND For purposes of this Motion, the allegations in the Amended Complaint must be accepted as true. Plaintiffs are three individuals who reside in Philadelphia and applied for positions with SEPTA between 2014 and 2016: Frank Long and Michael White applied for Bus Operator positions, while Joseph Shipley applied to be a Railroad Supervision Manager. (Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 21, 23, 25, 26, 28, 30). Plaintiffs allege that, during the application and interview process, they each executed a document entitled “Authorization to Review Criminal History.” (the “SEPTA Authorization”) (Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 42, 52, 65; copies of executed SEPTA Authorizations are attached collectively as Exhibit A). In each SEPTA Authorization, the Plaintiffs disclosed their criminal convictions. (Ex. A; see also Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 45, 59, 70). More specifically, each Plaintiff disclosed that he had a drug conviction. (Id.) Plaintiffs aver that SEPTA did not “provide [them] with any other authorization form that complied with FCRA.” (Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 43, 53, 66). On the contrary, SEPTA provided each Plaintiff with a second document entitled “U.S. Security Care, Inc./SEPTA Notice and Authorization Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act” (the “U.S. Security Care Notice and Authorization”) (Copies of executed U.S. Security Care Authorizations are attached collectively as Exhibit B). The U.S. Security Care Notices and Authorizations state in relevant part:
Notice: As part of the job application process, the Company named above (the “Company”) may request a Consumer Report which may include an Investigative Consumer Report and may rely upon such Report in making its employment decision. By signing this form, you authorize U.S. Security Care, Inc. to compile such Report on you and provide to the Company. A “Consumer Report” is any written, oral, or other communication of any information bearing on your credit worthiness, credit standing,
3

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 25-2 Filed 06/24/16 Page 9 of 23
credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living which is used for employment purposes. An “Investigative Consumer Report” is obtained through personal interviews with your neighbors, friends, or associates, or with others with whom you are acquainted who may have knowledge concerning any such items of information. Your authorization to obtain these Reports is required by federal law (Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.). Upon your written request within a reasonable time after today, you will receive a complete and accurate disclosure of the nature and scope of this Investigation.
* * *
Authorization: I hereby authorize U.S. Security Care, Inc. to obtain a Consumer Report on me and to provide such Report to the Company. I authorize and direct all schools, landlords, employers, criminal justice agencies, departments of motor vehicles, government agencies, credit bureaus, consumer reporting agencies, collection agencies, retail business establishments, or other sources of information to release such information upon request of U.S. Security Care, Inc. regardless of any previous statement to the contrary. I understand that I will be notified by the Company if information contained in such Report results in a negative employment decision, including, without limitation, a decision to terminate my employment, and in that case I will be given a copy of such report. I hereby certify that I have received a Summary of My Rights Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act. This authorization is valid for five (5) years from the date signed or upon termination of my affiliation with Company, whichever is sooner.
(Ex. B). The U.S. Security Care Notices and Authorizations do not contain any additional
substantive information. (Id.). Indeed, the U.S. Security Care Notice and Authorization
complies with and satisfies the “stand alone disclosure requirement” of 15 U.S.C. §
1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) - (ii).
Plaintiffs allege that, after they were given conditional offers of employment, they
received telephone calls from SEPTA recruiters revoking the offers because of their previous
criminal history. (Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 44 (“In or about late October, 2014, the recruiter called Mr.
4

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 25-2 Filed 06/24/16 Page 10 of 23
Long revoking the offer of employment for the Bus Operator position based on Mr. Long’s previous criminal history.”); 57 (“On approximately March 25, 2016, the SEPTA recruiter called Mr. Shipley back and told him that SEPTA was denying him the Railroad Supervision Manager position because of his criminal history.”); 69 (“Approximately six months after his interview, and following Mr. White’s numerous follow ups, Mr. White received a letter from SEPTA denying him the Bus Operator position because of his criminal history.”). Plaintiffs allege that they did not receive pre-adverse action letters with copies of their consumer reports and other required disclosures before SEPTA revoked the conditional offers of employment. (See Am. Compl. at ¶ 85).
Plaintiffs further allege that SEPTA has a “blanket policy and practice of disqualifying job applicants with unrelated felony convictions from employment in positions involving the operation of SEPTA vehicles.” (Am. Compl. at ¶ 12). More specifically, Plaintiffs aver that “SEPTA has a categorical and lifetime ban on hiring anyone with a felony drug conviction for ‘[a]ll positions which require the operation of a SEPTA vehicles as part thereof, whether or not they are in revenue service’ and ‘[a]ll positions requiring the maintenance, repair or operation of power facilities, substations, towers, signals, vehicles or rolling stock.’” (Am. Compl. at ¶ 92).
Plaintiffs allege not only that SEPTA willfully violated the FCRA by failing to provide them with the proper disclosure before obtaining their consumer report but that it also willfully violated the FCRA by taking an adverse employment action against Plaintiffs without providing them with a pre-adverse action notice, a copy of the report at issue, and a summary of rights. Notably, Plaintiffs do not allege that the consumer reports were inaccurate. Nor could they. Indeed, Plaintiffs themselves disclosed their felony drug convictions.
5

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 25-2 Filed 06/24/16 Page 11 of 23
In addition to raising claims based upon SEPTA’s interview process, Plaintiffs challenge the underlying policy. Simply put, Plaintiffs contend that SEPTA improperly considered their felony drug convictions in their applications for Bus Operator and Railroad Supervision Manager positions based on both the age of the convictions and the fact that the convictions purportedly do not relate to Plaintiffs’ suitability for employment in these positions. (Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 9091).
As set forth below, these averments are insufficient to support Plaintiffs’ claims that SEPTA willfully violated the FCRA and CHRIA.
ARGUMENT I. PLAINTIFFS LACK STANDING TO ASSERT THEIR FCRA CLAIMS.
It is axiomatic that a particular plaintiff must have standing to bring a claim. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). “Standing to sue is a doctrine rooted in the traditional understanding of a case or controversy . . . . The doctrine limits the category of litigants empowered to maintain a lawsuit in federal court to seek redress for a legal wrong.” Id. (citing cases). Put another way, if a plaintiff lacks standing, the federal court lacks jurisdiction. Smith v. Ohio State Univ., No. 2:15-CV-3030, 2016 WL 3182675, at *3 (S.D. Ohio June 8, 2016).
As the party invoking federal jurisdiction, Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing these elements. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547 (citing FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990)). And, where, as here, the case is at the pleading stage, Plaintiffs must clearly allege facts demonstrating each element. Id. (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975)).
Standing consists of three elements -- Plaintiffs must have (i) suffered an injury in fact, (ii) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant; and (iii) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Id. (citing cases). To establish injury in fact, Plaintiffs must show that they suffered an invasion of a legally protectable interest that is
6

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 25-2 Filed 06/24/16 Page 12 of 23
concrete and particularized, and actual or imminent, rather than conjectural or hypothetical. Id. at 1548 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). “For an injury to be ‘particularized,’ it must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Id. at 1548 (citing cases). And, for an injury to be concrete, it must actually exist, it cannot be an abstract injury. Id. at 1548.
As the Supreme Court noted, “Congress’ role in identifying and elevating intangible harms does not mean that a plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate the right, Article III standing requires a concrete injury in the context of a statutory violation.” Id. at 1549. Indeed, “[a] violation of one of the FCRA’s procedural requirements may result in no harm. For example, a consumer reporting agency fails to provide the required notice to a user of the agency’s consumer information, that information regardless may be entirely accurate.” Id.
Where a plaintiff is unable to allege facts sufficient to show that there is a concrete injury resulting from the alleged violation of the FCRA, courts have dismissed those complaints for lack of standing. See Gubala v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., No. 15-CV-1078-PP, 2016 WL 3390415, at *4-5 (E.D. Wis. June 17, 2016) (appeal filed) (applying Spokeo to dismiss a complaint under the FCRA and holding that privacy of personally identifiable information is not a concrete harm); Smith, 2016 WL 3182675, at *4 (applying Spokeo to hold that plaintiffs have not suffered a concrete injury where the plaintiffs alleged that their privacy was invaded and they were misled as to their rights under the FCRA).
Here, the procedural violations of which Plaintiffs complain have not caused them any particularized or concrete harms. Plaintiffs allege that they failed to receive the “stand alone”
7

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 25-2 Filed 06/24/16 Page 13 of 23
disclosure required before a consumer report is obtained about a person and that they failed to receive the pre-adverse action letter with a copy of the report and summary of rights before their conditional offers of employment were revoked. (Am. Compl. at ¶ 9, 82). Plaintiffs contend in a conclusory manner that this failure caused concrete injury including confusion, lack of notice of their rights, and denial of an opportunity to explain the circumstances of the criminal convictions. (Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 6, 113, 122). These averments are insufficient to support a finding of injury in fact.
First, Plaintiffs did receive and execute the required “stand alone” disclosure. Supra at pp. 4-5. Second, Plaintiffs do not allege that the consumer reports were inaccurate in any way. Plaintiffs themselves disclosed the disqualifying convictions to SEPTA. As the Smith court held, being misled as to your rights under the FCRA, without suffering any concrete consequential damage is insufficient to establish Article III standing. Smith, 2016 WL 3182675, at *4. In fact, federal “courts have concluded that the mere absence of information and resulting confusion is not a sufficiently concrete harm to constitute an injury.” Lopez v. Wendy's Int'l, Inc., No. CV 1100275 MMM JCX, 2011 WL 6967932, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2011). Therefore, because Plaintiffs did not suffer any particularized or concrete injury as a consequence of any purported violation of FCRA, they lack standing to bring this action.
Further, to satisfy the causation requirement of Article III standing, Plaintiffs must establish that their alleged injuries “fairly can be traced to the challenged action” of the defendants. Moore v. Johnson & Johnson, 83 F. Supp. 3d 629, 630 (E.D. Pa. 2014). In Moore, this Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing where their injuries had nothing to do with the defendant’s failure to properly remove defective pain medication from retail stores. Id. The court reasoned that the complaint failed to establish how the defendants’ actions could have
8

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 25-2 Filed 06/24/16 Page 14 of 23
possibly caused their injuries, and as such, they failed to establish Article III causation. Id. at 632; see also Springfield Tp. v. Lewis, 702 F.2d 426, 450–451 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing even assuming that they had suffered injury, where injury was not caused by alleged failure to comply with federal regulations, especially where there was no showing that had there been compliance, they would not have suffered injury).
Therefore, even if this Court were to find that Plaintiffs met the first prong of the standing requirement, they nevertheless lack standing to assert their FCRA claims because they have not, and cannot, allege that the revocation of their conditional offers was fairly traceable to SEPTA’s failure to provide the pre-adverse action letter with a copy of the report and summary of rights. See Duquesne Light Co. v. U.S. E.P.A., 166 F.3d 609, 613 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding that plaintiffs lack standing where alleged injury was not fairly traceable to challenged action of defendant because of independent action of a third party).
For the same reason that the Complaint’s allegations fail to allege traceability, the Amended Complaint fails the redressability requirement. “To be ‘redressable’ for standing purposes, it must ‘be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.’” Id. The purpose of the FCRA notice requirements is to “provide individuals an opportunity to contest inaccurate information and to avoid an adverse decision by a potential employer based on erroneous information.” Ramos v. Genesis Healthcare, LLC, 141 F. Supp. 3d 341, 347 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (appeal filed). As such, injury to a plaintiff would generally consist of an inability to contest inaccurate information, leading to an adverse action by a potential employer. Id. Here, Plaintiffs do not allege that the information was inaccurate; to the contrary, they voluntarily provided this information to SEPTA. Even if SEPTA had provided the pre-adverse action letter with a copy of the report and summary of rights, SEPTA would still
9

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 25-2 Filed 06/24/16 Page 15 of 23
have revoked Plaintiffs’ offers of conditional employment because Plaintiffs themselves disclosed their convictions, separate and apart from any FCRA forms. Consequently, it is clear that Plaintiffs’ injuries were not caused by the alleged failure of SEPTA to provide notices, and as such, Plaintiffs cannot meet the traceability or redressability prongs of Article III standing with respect to their FCRA claims. II. THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN
BE GRANTED. To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679–80 (2009). That is, the complaint’s “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the general standard is that the Court must take all allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant. Davis v. Wells Fargo, No. 15-2658, 2016 WL 3033938, at *3 (3d Cir. May 27, 2016). While the Court must accept all well-pleaded allegations as true, it should not credit mere “labels and conclusions” or “naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also David v. Neumann Univ., No. CV 15-4098, 2016 WL 1404153, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2016) (holding that a complaint “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do . . . . the Court is ‘not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation’”). Moreover, the court is not confined to reviewing the allegations in the Amended Complaint because Plaintiffs reviewed, quoted, and relied upon several documents in the Amended Complaint. When ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court may properly consider any “undisputedly authentic document that
10

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 25-2 Filed 06/24/16 Page 16 of 23
a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the document.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993); see Hughes v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 15-1690, 2016 WL 386220, at *3 (3d Cir. Feb. 1, 2016); Miller v. Clinton County, 544 F.3d 542, 550 (3d. Cir. 2008); In re NAHC, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. CIV. A. 00-4020, 2001 WL 1241007, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 17, 2001), aff'd, 306 F.3d 1314 (3d Cir. 2002).
In Hughes, the Third Circuit stated, When a plaintiff relies on a document without attaching it to the complaint, the plaintiff nevertheless has notice that the document will be at issue. Because notice to the plaintiff is the principal reason for which courts decline to look beyond the complaint, the consideration of documents upon which the plaintiff relies does not implicate this rationale. Indeed, failure to consider such documents would raise the countervailing concern that ‘a plaintiff with a legally deficient claim could survive a motion to dismiss simply by failing to attach a dispositive document on which it relied.’
2016 WL 386220, at *3 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). Here, although Plaintiffs did not attach either the SEPTA Authorizations or the U.S. Security Care Notices and Authorizations to the Amended Complaint, this Court can and should consider them.
Because the allegations in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint do not, and cannot, raise a claim upon which relief can be granted against SEPTA, this Court should dismiss those counts with prejudice.
A. SEPTA Provided Plaintiffs With the Required “Stand Alone” Disclosure and Authorization Before Obtaining Consumer Reports About Them.
In Count I of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that SEPTA willfully violated the FCRA because it obtained consumer reports about Plaintiffs without making the “stand alone” disclosure required by the FCRA. (Am. Compl. at ¶ 112). 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A) prohibits potential employers from obtaining consumer reports about an individual unless “(i) a clear and
11

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 25-2 Filed 06/24/16 Page 17 of 23
conspicuous disclosure has been made in writing to the consumer at any time before the report is procured or caused to be procured, in a document that consists solely of the disclosure, that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes” and “(ii) the consumer has authorized in writing (which authorization may be made on the document referred to in clause (i)) the procure of the report by that person.”
Plaintiffs base their claim on their execution of the SEPTA Authorization, claiming that it was not the required stand alone disclosure. However, as set forth above, supra at pp. 4-5, Plaintiffs also received and signed the U.S. Security Care Notices and Authorizations. The U.S. Security Care Notices and Authorizations refer only to the consumer reports obtained pursuant to the FCRA. Thus, contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertions, there is no basis to assert that they contain extraneous information likely to cause confusion or impeding individuals of understanding their rights under the FCRA. (See Am. Compl. at ¶ 113). Moreover, courts routinely find that language such as that in the U.S. Security Care Notices and Authorizations complies with the FCRA. See, e.g, Smith v. Waverly Partners, LLC, No. 3:10-CV-00028-RLV, 2012 WL 3645324, at *6 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 23, 2012); Burghy v. Dayton Racquet Club, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 689, 698-99 (S.D. Ohio 2010); see also Just v. Target Corp., No. 15-4117 (DWF/TNL), 2016 WL 2757370, at *3-4 (D. Minn. May 12, 2016) (discussing the types of authorizations that courts routinely find that comply with the disclosure requirements). This Court should therefore dismiss Count I of the Amended Complaint with prejudice.
B. Plaintiffs Have Failed to State a Claim for Willfulness Under the FCRA. It is axiomatic that the FCRA is not a strict liability statute. See Cushman v. Trans Union Corp., 115 F.3d 220, 226 (3d Cir. 1997). “[T]o state a cause of action for willful noncompliance, and thereby collect punitive damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n, the complaint must allege facts that support the inference that the defendant acted in knowing or reckless disregard of the
12

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 25-2 Filed 06/24/16 Page 18 of 23
FCRA’s requirements.” Hutchinson v. Carco Grp., Inc., No. CV 15-1570, 2015 WL 5698283, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2015) (citing Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 57-58 (2007)). Simply violating the statute is not enough to impose liability. See, e.g., Hutchinson, 2015 WL 5698283, at *3; Perl v. Plains Commerce Bank, No. 11 CIV. 7972 KBF, 2012 WL 760401, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2012) (stating claim that only alleges violation of FCRA is legally insufficient, since claim could plausibly be based on innocent mistake). It is not enough for the plaintiff to simply state that the defendant’s conduct was willful. See, e.g., Hutchinson, 2015 WL 5698283, at *6-7 (granting motion to dismiss claim of willfulness under FCRA).
When pleading a claim for willfulness, the Supreme Court elaborated that recklessness is “conduct violating an objective standard: action entailing an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be known.” Safeco, 551 U.S. at 49 (internal quotation omitted). Plaintiff must at least plead facts that could not just as easily support a claim for negligence. See Hutchinson, 2015 WL 5698283, at *6 (dismissing allegation of willfulness where claims “may ultimately fall under the negligence prong”). If a plaintiff succeeds on a claim alleging a willful violation of the FCRA, he may be entitled to punitive damages. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a).
Here, Plaintiffs attempt to assert a claim that SEPTA has willfully violated the FCRA because it failed to provide the “stand alone” disclosure before obtaining a consumer report and because it failed to provide a pre-adverse action letter with a copy of the consumer report and summary of rights to an applicant. Plaintiff seeks punitive damages for these purported willful violations pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n. (Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 23-24).
Plaintiffs, however, fail to plead any facts that show SEPTA knowingly or intentionally disregarded their rights. Plaintiffs also fail to plead facts that show that SEPTA acted in reckless
13

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 25-2 Filed 06/24/16 Page 19 of 23

disregard of the FCRA’s requirements. Plaintiffs instead allege in a conclusory manner that SEPTA knew or should have known of its obligations under the FCRA. (Am. Compl. at ¶ 87). More is required under Twombly, and the Amended Complaint should be dismissed to the extent it asserts a claim for willful violation of the FCRA.
C. Plaintiffs Have Failed to State a Claim for Willful Violation of the CHRIA. In Count IV of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs aver that SEPTA willfully violated the CHRIA because they improperly considered Plaintiffs’ felony drug convictions when deciding not to offer them employment because they are more than seven years old and are not related to their suitability for employment for “[a]ll positions which require the operation of a SEPTA vehicles as part thereof, whether or not they are in revenue service” and “[a]ll positions requiring the maintenance, repair or operation of power facilities, substations, towers, signals, vehicles or rolling stock.” (Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 92, 138-39). Plaintiffs, however, have failed to plead facts sufficient to show that SEPTA willfully violated the statute and this Court should dismiss this count.1 The CHRIA provides, in relevant part, “whenever an employer is in receipt of information which is part of an employment applicant's criminal history record information file, it may use that information for the purpose of deciding whether or not to hire the applicant.” 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9125(a). The statute permits employers, such as SEPTA, to consider an applicant’s felony and misdemeanor convictions to the extent that they relate to the applicant’s suitability for employment in the applied position. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9125(b). Put another way, “[w]hen an employer denies employment to an individual because of his criminal record, the employer's denial of employment must be reasonably related to the

1

The CHRIA creates a private right of action for damages and authorizes the imposition of exemplary and

punitive damages for willful violations of the CHRIA. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9183(b).

14

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 25-2 Filed 06/24/16 Page 20 of 23
furtherance of a legitimate public objective.” Dean v. Specialized Sec. Response, No. CIV.A. 09-515, 2011 WL 3734238, at *15 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2011); see El v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 297 F. Supp. 2d 758, 761 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (citing cases). Examples of recognized legitimate public objectives include “a bar against the employment of convicted felons as police officers” reasoning that “a person who has committed a felony may be thought to lack the qualities of self-control or honesty that this sensitive job requires.” Dean, 2011 WL 3734238, at *15 (quoting Upshaw v. McNamara, 435 F.2d 1188, 1190 (1st Cir. 1970)). Similarly, a bar against the employment of convicted felons as security guards may be in the interest of public safety. Id. at *16. Another example is a bar against the employment of convicted felons as couriers on the basis that a legitimate reason exists to prevent such individuals from entering onto the premises of others and delivering parcels. Id. (citing Cisco v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 476 A.2d 1340, 1344 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984)).
These examples are analogous to SEPTA’s legitimate public objective of protecting passengers of its transit system. Indeed, the Third Circuit upheld a policy similar to the one challenged by Plaintiffs in this litigation in El v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 237 (3d Cir. 2007). In El, an African-American paratransit driver-trainee was terminated because of a 40-year old homicide conviction. The policy at issue in El prohibited anyone with a past criminal conviction for homicide from providing paratransit services for SEPTA. El v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 418 F. Supp. 2d 659, 668 (E.D. Pa. 2005), aff’d, 479 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2007). SEPTA asserted that (i) the drivers were in close proximity to the public; (ii) drivers can be alone with passengers; (iii) disabled persons are disproportionately targeted by sexual and violent criminals; (iv) violent criminals recidivate at a higher rate; (v) it is impossible to predict with a higher degree of accuracy which criminals will recidivate; (vi)
15

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 25-2 Filed 06/24/16 Page 21 of 23
someone with a violent crime record is more likely than someone without a record to commit a future crime irrespective of how remote in time the conviction is; and (vii) the policy is the most accurate way to screen out applicants who present an unacceptable risk. The district court upheld the policy, finding that it was justified by business necessity, and entered summary judgment against the plaintiff on his Title VII claim. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, also concluding that the policy was job-related and consistent with business necessity. El, 479 F.3d at 247-48.
Where willfulness is a statutory condition of civil liability, the plaintiff must plead facts necessary to demonstrate that violation of the statute was either knowing or reckless. Safeco, 551 U.S. at 57. In holding that the defendant’s failure to transmit adverse action notices reflecting negative credit reports did not constitute a willful violation of the FCRA, the Court in Safeco observed that a company subject does not act in reckless disregard of a statute “unless the action is not only a violation under a reasonable reading of the statute's terms, but shows that the company ran a risk of violating the law substantially greater than the risk associated with a reading that was merely careless.” 551 U.S. at 69. The “objectively reasonable” standard set forth in Safeco has been consistently applied by courts in this circuit with respect to FCRA claims, as well as in a variety of other contexts. See, e.g., Hutchinson, 2015 WL 5698283, at *6-7 (granting motion to dismiss claim for willful violation of FCRA by consumer reporting agency); Long v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc., 671 F.3d 371, 376-78 (3d Cir. 2012) (granting motion to dismiss putative nationwide class action claim for willful violation of FACTA by clothing retailer); U.S. ex rel. Streck v. Allergan, Inc., 894 F. Supp. 2d 584, 593 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (granting motion to dismiss qui tam action for willful violation of False Claims Act and various
16

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 25-2 Filed 06/24/16 Page 22 of 23 state laws by multiple pharmaceutical manufacturers that participated in Medicaid Drug Rebate Program).
Plaintiffs have not pled any facts which could show that any violation of the CHRIA was willful. For example, Plaintiffs have not articulated any facts demonstrating why SEPTA should be precluded from considering a conviction more than seven years old or why a felony drug conviction does not relate to Plaintiffs’ suitability for employment as a Bus Operator or Railroad Supervision Manager. In addition, Plaintiffs only aver in a conclusory fashion that SEPTA willfully violated the CHRIA because “SEPTA knew or should have known its obligations under the CHRIA. These obligations are well-established by the plain language of the CHRIA and in the longstanding case law.” (Am. Compl. at ¶ 93). This is insufficient to assert a claim for willful violation of the statute. This Court should therefore dismiss Count IV of the Amended Complaint.
17

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 25-2 Filed 06/24/16 Page 23 of 23
CONCLUSION For all of the foregoing reasons, Defendant Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Association respectfully requests that this Court grant its motion and dismiss the First Amended Class Action Complaint. Dated: June 24, 2016
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Samantha L. Southall Elizabeth A. Malloy (Pa. I.D. No. 48297) Samantha L. Southall (Pa. I.D. No. 80709) Andrew G. Hope (Pa. I.D. No. 317932) Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney, PC Two Liberty Place 50 S. 16th Street, Suite 3200 Philadelphia, PA 19102-2555 (215) 665-8700 Candidus K. Dougherty (Pa. I.D. No. 206106) Jeffrey B. McCarron (Pa. I.D. No. 49467) Michael A. Cognetti (Pa. I.D. No. 55819) Swartz Campbell LLC Two Liberty Place 50 S. 16th Street, 28th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19102 Attorneys for Defendant Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority
18

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 25-3 Filed 06/24/16 Page 1 of 8

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 25-3 Filed 06/24/16 Page 2 of 8

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 25-3 Filed 06/24/16 Page 3 of 8

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 25-3 Filed 06/24/16 Page 4 of 8

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 25-3 Filed 06/24/16 Page 5 of 8

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 25-3 Filed 06/24/16 Page 6 of 8

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 25-3 Filed 06/24/16 Page 7 of 8

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 25-3 Filed 06/24/16 Page 8 of 8

 
 Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 55 Filed 04/18/17 Page 1 of 3

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

FRANK LONG, JOSEPH SHIPLEY, and MICHAEL WHITE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY,
Defendant.

No. 16 Civ. 1991 (PBT)
NOTICE OF APPEAL IN A CIVIL CASE

Notice is hereby given that Plaintiffs Frank Long, Joseph Shipley, and Michael White in

the above-captioned case hereby appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit from the Order dated and entered on April 5, 2017, and Memorandum dated and entered

on April 5, 2017, granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Class Action

Complaint.

Dated: April 18, 2017

Respectfully submitted, /s/ Ossai Miazad OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP 685 Third Avenue, 25th Floor New York, NY 10017 Tel.: (212) 245-1000 Adam T. Klein (admitted pro hac vice) Ossai Miazad (admitted pro hac vice) Lewis M. Steel (admitted pro hac vice) Christopher M. McNerney (admitted pro hac vice) Cheryl-Lyn Bentley (admitted pro hac vice)

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 55 Filed 04/18/17 Page 2 of 3
LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW Jon Greenbaum (admitted pro hac vice) Dariely Rodriguez (pro hac vice admission pending) 1401 New York Ave., NW Washington, DC 20005 Tel.: (202) 662-8600 PHILADELPHIA LAWYERS FOR SOCIAL EQUITY Michael Lee (Pennsylvania Bar No. 307008) Michael Hardiman (Pennsylvania Bar No. 27018) 1501 Cherry Street Philadelphia, PA 19102 Tel.: (215) 995-1230 PUBLIC INTEREST LAW CENTER Benjamin D. Geffen (Pennsylvania Bar. No. 310134) 1709 Benjamin Franklin Parkway, 2d Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103 Tel.: (267) 546-1308 WILLIG, WILLIAMS & DAVIDSON Ryan Allen Hancock (Pennsylvania Bar No. 92590) Danielle Newsome (Pennsylvania Bar No. 320772) 1845 Walnut Street, 24th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103 Tel.: (215) 656-3679 Attorneys for Plaintiffs and proposed Class Members
2

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 55 Filed 04/18/17 Page 3 of 3
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal in a Civil Case was served on this 18th day of April, 2017, upon counsel of record via the Court’s ECF filing system.
/s/ Ossai Miazad Ossai Miazad

 
 Case:C1a7s-1e828:916-cDv-o0c1u9m91e-nPt:B0T03D11o3c0u26m83e80n41t7457 PFailgeed: 10/16D/1a8te FPialegde: 1090o/f1206/2018
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ______
No. 17-1889 ______
FRANK LONG; JOSEPH SHIPLEY; MICHAEL WHITE,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Appellants
v. SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY
______
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (E. D. Pa. No. 2-16-cv-01991)
District Judge: Honorable Petrese B. Tucker ______
Argued December 12, 2017 Before: CHAGARES, RESTREPO and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
______
JUDGMENT ______
This cause came on to be heard on the record from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and was argued on December 12, 2017.

Case:C1a7s-1e828:916-cDv-o0c1u9m91e-nPt:B0T03D11o3c0u26m83e80n41t7457 PFailgeed: 120/16D/1a8te FPialegde: 20190o/f1206/2018

On consideration whereof, it is now hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the order of the District Court entered April 7, 2017, be and the same is hereby AFFIRMED as to the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claim based on SEPTA’s failure to provide them with notice of their FCRA rights as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(ii). REVERSED as to the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claim based on SEPTA’s failure to provide them with copies of their consumer reports as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(i), and REMANDED for further proceedings. All of the above in accordance with the opinion of this Court. Costs shall not be taxed.

ATTEST:

Dated: September 10, 2018

s/ Patricia S. Dodszuweit Clerk

Certified as a true copy and issued in lieu
of a formal mandate on October 16, 2018
Teste: Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

2

 
 Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 66 Filed 08/06/19 Page 1 of 24

OUTIEN & GOLDEN LLP Adam T. Klein* Ossai Miazad* Lewis M. Steel* Christopher M. McNerney* Cheryl-Lyn Bentley Pennsylvania Bar No. 324858 685 Third Avenue, 25th Floor New York, NY 10017 (212) 245-1000
LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW Jon Greenbaum* Dariely Rodriguez** 1401 New York Ave., NW Washington, DC 20005 (202) 662-8600
* Pro hac vice motions granted
**Pro hac vice motionforthcoming

PUBLIC INTEREST LAW CENTER Benjamin D. Geffen Pennsylvania Bar. No. 310134 Claudia De Palma Pennsylvania BarNo. 320136 1709 Benjamin Franklin Parkway, 2d Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103 (267) 546-1308
WILLIG, WILLIAMS & DAVIDSON Ryan Allen Hancock Pennsylvania Bar No. 92590 Jessica Brown Pennsylvania Bar No. 87322 1845 Walnut Street, 24th Floor Philadelphia, PA 191 03 (215) 656-3679

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

FRANK LONG, JOSEPH SHIPLEY, MICHAEL WHITE, and RAMEE GARNETI, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY,
Defendant.

SECOND AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:16-cv-1991-PBT
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiffs Frank Long, Joseph Shipley, Michael White, and Ramee Garnett (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, allege, upon personal knowledge as to themselves and upon information and belief as to other matters, as follows:

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 66 Filed 08/06/19 Page 2 of 24
INTRODUCTION 1. Plaintiffs bring this case on their own behalf and that of a proposed class of all others similarly situated against the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority ("SEPTA" or "Defendant") for violation of their rights under the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., and Pennsylvania's Criminal History Record Information Act ("CHRIA"), 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.§ 9125. 2. Plaintiffs sought employment at SEPTA. They were qualified for the jobs they sought and were subjected to SEPTA's criminal background check process. 3. In screening applicants, SEPTA fails to comply with the FCRA, the federal law governing the procurement and use of background check reports ("consumer reports") for employment purposes. 4. Specifically, SEPTA systemically violates section 1681b(b)(3)(A) of the FCRA by using consumer reports to make adverse employment decisions without first providing the applicant and/or employee who is the subject of the report with sufficient and timely notification of its intent to take an adverse action and a copy ofthe report. 15 U.S.C. § 168lb(b)(3)(A)(i). 5. In Congress's judgment, an employer's failure to provide job applicants with this information under the FCRA before it takes an adverse action is unfair and inequitable and causes concrete injury to those job applicants. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (b). 6. SEPTA's policy causes concrete injury to job applicants because, among other examples, it prevents them from reviewing the accuracy of the information reported about them that SEPTA uses in taking adverse actions and engaging with SEPTA about the information it is uses to make a determination about the applicants' suitability for the job. 7. SEPTA has willfully violated the above-mentioned provision ofthe FCRA.
2

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 66 Filed 08/06/19 Page 3 of 24
8. In addition, SEPTA routinely violates the CHRIA through its policy and practice of disqualifying job applicants with unrelated criminal convictions from employment. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9125(b) ("Felony and misdemeanor convictions may be considered by the employer only to the extent to which they relate to the applicant's suitability for employment in the position for which he has applied.").
9. SEPTA has willfully violated the above-mentioned provision ofthe CHRIA. 10. On behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs seek injunctive and declaratory relief; actual or statutory damages; nominal damages; exemplary and punitive damages; pre- judgment and post-judgment interest; and reasonable attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses associated with this action.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 1I. This Court has original subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' FCRA claim pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 168lp and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and jurisdiction over their CHRIA claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction). 12. Plaintiffs ' CHRIA claim is so closely related to their FCRA claim that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article Ill of the United States Constitution. 13. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 139l(b)(l) because SEPTA resides in this District, and under 28 U.S.C. § 139l(b)(2) because a substantial part of the events and omissions giving rise to the claims alleged herein occurred in this District. 14. This Court has personal jurisdiction over this matter because SEPTA is located in this District, conducts substantial business activity in this District, and because many of the unlawful acts described herein occurred in this District and gave rise to the claims alleged.
3

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 66 Filed 08/06/19 Page 4 of 24
PARTIES Plajptjffs
15. Plaintiffs and the proposed Class Members they seek to represent are "consumers" as defined by the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(c).
16. Plaintiffs and the proposed Class Members they seek to represent are employment applicants and persons aggrieved for the purposes of the CHRIA.
Frank Long 17. Mr. Long is a 59-year old resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. At the time of his application to SEPTA, Mr. Long was working as a bus driver for a Philadelphia-based school bus company. Prior to that, he worked in the warehouse division of a national healthcare company for over 12 years. 18. Mr. Long has regularly volunteered his time to his community, working with neighborhood watch programs, community garden clean-ups, and youth and senior citizens programs through his church. 19. In or about October 2014, Mr. Long applied for the position of Bus Operator with SEPTA. 20. On or about October 17, 2014, Mr. Long interviewed for a Bus Operator position with SEPTA. Joseph Shipley 21. Mr. Shipley is a 48-year old resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. At the time of his application to SEPTA, Mr. Shipley was working as a conductor for an international transportation company. Prior to that, Mr. Shipley worked for approximately two years as a Transportation Counselor for a company transporting juveniles from court to school.
4

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 66 Filed 08/06/19 Page 5 of 24

22. In or about October 2015, Mr. Shipley applied for the position of Railroad

Supervision Manager with SEPTA. 23. On or about January 28, 2016, Mr. Shipley interviewed for a Railroad Supervision

Manager position with SEPTA.

Michael White 24. Mr. White is a 36-year old resident ofPhiladelphia, Pennsylvania. At the time of his application to SEPTA, Mr. White had been working as a delivery driver for approximately two years. Prior to that, he worked as a driver and mailroom clerk for another company for

approximately one-and-a-halfyears. 25. Mr. White is active in his church where he has served as a deacon for the last two

years. 26.

In or about April2015, Mr. White applied for the position ofBus Operator with

SEPTA. 27.

On or about April29, 2015, Mr. White interviewed for a Bus Operator position

with SEPTA.

Ramee Garnett 28. Mr. Garnett is a 25-year old resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. At the time of his application to SEPTA, Mr. Garnett had been working (and continues to work) as a cook employed by OTG Management at a restaurant in Philadelphia International Airport. Prior to that, he worked as a cook for another restaurant. 29. In or about March 2019, Mr. Garnett applied for the position of Maintenance

Custodian with SEPTA.

5

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 66 Filed 08/06/19 Page 6 of 24
30. In or about April2019, Mr. Garnett interviewed for a Maintenance Custodian position at SEPTA. Defendant
31. SEPTA operates the United States' sixth-largest public transportation system. It services over 750,000 passengers on a weekday and employs approximately 9,000 employees.
32. SEPTA is a public transit authority organized under the laws ofthe Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and maintains its headquarters at 1234 Market Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 191 07.
33. At all relevant times, SEPTA has been a "person" using "consumer reports" of Plaintiffs and proposed Class Members for "employment purposes" and has taken "adverse action" against Plaintiffs and similarly situated applicants, as defined by the FCRA. These adverse actions have been based wholly or in part on those consumer reports.
34. At all relevant times, SEPTA has been an "employer" and a "person" and/or an "organization" for purposes of the CHRIA.
35. At all relevant times, SEPTA has been aware ofthe requirements of the FCRA and CHRIA, and yet has disregarded those requirements.
STATEMENT OF FACTS PlajptjffLooK's Experjepce
36. In or about October 2014, Mr. Long applied to be a Bus Operator with SEPTA. 37. On or about October 17, 2014, Mr. Long interviewed with a SEPTA recruiter for the Bus Operator position.
6

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 66 Filed 08/06/19 Page 7 of 24

38. At that interview, Mr. Long discussed the experiences that qualified him for the position, including his Commercial Driver's License and his job as a school bus driver at the

time of the interview. 39. The recruiter told Mr. Long that he thought Mr. Long would be a good driver, he

interviewed well, and was qualified for the position. 40. Consequently, on the same day ofthe interview, the recruiter extended an oral
offer of employment to Mr. Long contingent on a background check. 41. At SEPTA's behest, Mr. Long completed a SEPTA form disclosing that he has a
criminal history and authorizing SEPTA to conduct a background check. 42. In or about late October 2014, the recruiter called Mr. Long revoking the offer of
employment for the Bus Operator position based on Mr. Long's previous criminal history. The recruiter told Mr. Long that he could try applying for a Maintenance Custodian position with

SEPTA.
43 .

On his record, Mr. Long had 1997 drug convictions for possession and

manufacture of a controlled substance originating from a 1994 arrest. 44. Mr. Long's criminal history is not relevant to the Bus Operator position for which
he applied for reasons including the nature of the crime, the age of the conviction and the years

Mr. Long has been in the general population without any further convictions. 45. Over four months later, in or about early March 2015, Mr. Long received a letter
from SEPTA's Human Resources Division Recruitment Manager, stating that "based on [its] hiring criteria," SEPTA had decided not to hire Mr. Long for the Bus Operator position. The correspondence indicated that this decision was made from the information SEPTA had received

7

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 66 Filed 08/06/19 Page 8 of 24
from US Security Care, Inc.'s ("Security Care") background check. The report enclosed with the letter indicated that Security Care completed the background check back in November 2014. Plaiptjff Shipley's Experience
46. In or about October 2015, Mr. Shipley applied to be a Railroad Supervision Manager with SEPTA.
47. On or about January 28, 2016, Mr. Shipley interviewed with a SEPTA employee for the Railroad Supervision Manager position.
48. Pursuant to SEPTA's policies, the Railroad Supervision Manager position is considered a position involving the operation of a SEPTA vehicle.
49. At that interview, Mr. Shipley discussed the experiences that qualified him for the position, including his significant experience working for transportation companies.
50. At SEPTA's behest, Mr. Shipley completed two SEPTA forms disclosing that he has a criminal history and authorizing SEPTA to conduct a background check.
51. Mr. Shipley's interview went well, and SEPTA offered him the position on approximately February 29,2016.
52. On approximately March 22, 2016, Mr. Shipley received a letter from SEPTA informing him that SEPTA's new hire orientation was scheduled for March 28,2016.
53. Approximately two days later, Mr. Shipley received a telephone call from a SEPTA recruiter telling him not to report to work, and that his background check had not been cleared.
54. On approximately March 25, 2016, the SEPTA recruiter called Mr. Shipley back and told him that SEPTA was denying him the Railroad Supervision Manager position because
8

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 66 Filed 08/06/19 Page 9 of 24
of his criminal history. The recruiter followed up on her call to Mr. Shipley with a letter stating the same.
55. In response to Mr. Shipley's request for more information, SEPTA sent him a second letter from its counsel, dated April26, 2016, notifying Mr. Shipley that SEPTA disqualified him pursuant to its categorical lifetime ban on hiring anyone who was convicted of a crime "involving the possession, sale, distribution, manufacture and use of controlled substances," for "[a]ll positions which require the operation of a SEPTA vehicles as part thereof, whether or not they are in revenue service" and "[a]ll positions requiring the maintenance, repair or operation of power facilities, substations, towers, signals, vehicles or rolling stock," and enclosing a copy of the SEPTA policy with the relevant section highlighted.
56. On his record, Mr. Shipley has drug-related convictions from 200 I arising out of a single arrest in 2000.
57. Mr. Shipley's criminal history is not relevant to the Railroad Supervisor Manager position for which he applied for reasons including the nature of the crime, the age ofthe conviction, and the years Mr. Shipley has been in the general population without any further convictions.
58. Mr. Shipley never received a copy of his consumer report or a statement ofhis rights under the FCRA from SEPTA. Plaintiff White's Experience
59. In or about April2015, Mr. White applied to be a Bus Operator with SEPTA. 60. On or about April29, 2015, Mr. White interviewed with a SEPTA employee for the Bus Operator position.
9

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 66 Filed 08/06/19 Page 10 of 24
61. At that interview, Mr. White discussed the experiences that qualified him for the position, including his job as a delivery driver at the time of the interview and his Commercial Driver's License.
62. At SEPTA's behest, Mr. White completed a SEPTA form disclosing that he has a criminal history and authorizing SEPTA to conduct a background check.
63. Mr. White's interview went well, and the SEPTA employee with whom he interviewed told him that he would receive more information about starting training.
64. Mr. White followed-up with SEPTA repeatedly, and was told that SEPTA was waiting on the results of his background check.
65. Approximately six months after his interview, and following Mr. White's numerous follow ups, Mr. White received a letter from SEPTA denying him the Bus Operator position because of his criminal history.
66. On his record, Mr. White has 2006 and 2007 drug-related convictions. 67. Mr. White's criminal history is not relevant to the Bus Operator position for which he applied for reasons including the nature of the crime, the age of the conviction and the years Mr. White has been in the general population without any further convictions. 68. Mr. White never received a copy of his consumer report or a statement ofhis rights under the FCRA from SEPTA. Plaintiff Garnett's Experience 69. In or about March 2019, Mr. Garnett applied to be a Maintenance Custodian with SEPTA. 70. After submitting his application, Mr. Garnett completed and passed an online assessment test.
10

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 66 Filed 08/06/19 Page 11 of 24
71. In or about Apri12019, Mr. Garnett completed a three-hour in-person assessment at SEPTA's headquarters.
72. In or about May 2019, Mr. Garnett had an initial interview with SEPTA for the Maintenance Custodian position. The interviewer reviewed Mr. Garnett's application and indicated that he would be a good fit for the job and should proceed to the second interview stage.
73. In or about May 2019, Mr. Garnett had a second interview with SEPTA for the Maintenance Custodian position. Mr. Garnett and the interviewer discussed his qualifications for the job, and the interviewer commented that Mr. Garnett's restaurant experience qualified as relevant experience.
74. At SEPTA's behest, Mr. Garnett completed a SEPTA form disclosing that he has a criminal history and authorizing SEPTA to conduct a background check.
75. On or about June 7, 2019, SEPTA offered Mr. Garnett the job and told him that his background check was cleared.
76. On or about June 10,2019, SEPTA informed Mr. Garnett that they were withdrawing the job offer because he did not pass the criminal background check process.
77. Mr. Garnett's criminal history is not relevant to the Maintenance Custodian position for which he applied for reasons including the nature of the crime, the age of the conviction, and the years Mr. Garnett has been in the general population without any further convictions.
11

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 66 Filed 08/06/19 Page 12 of 24
Factual Allegations Common to All Class Members The FCR4 Claim 78. Enacted in 1970, the FCRA's passage was driven in part by two related concerns: First, that consumer reports were playing a central role in people's lives at crucial moments, such as when they applied for a job or credit, and when they applied for housing. Second, despite their importance, consumer reports were unregulated and had widespread errors and inaccuracies. 79. Congress sought for consumer reports to be "fair and equitable to the consumer" and to ensure "the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization" of consumer reports. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b). 80. Congress was particularly concerned about the use of background reports in the employment context, and therefore defined the term "consumer reports" to explicitly include background reports procured for employment purposes. See 15 U.S.C. § 168la(d)(l)(B). 81 . Specifically, the FCRA requires that "before taking any adverse action based in whole or in part on [a consumer report}," the employer taking the adverse action must provide "the consumer to whom the report relates" with: (i) a copy of the report; and (ii) a description in writing ofthe rights of the consumer under this subchapter, as
prescribed by the [Consumer Financial Protection] Bureau under section 1681g(c)(3). 15 U.S.C. § 168lb(b)(3)(A)(i) and (ii).
12

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 66 Filed 08/06/19 Page 13 of 24

82. The FCRA defmes adverse action as both "a denial of employment or any other

decision for employment purposes that adversely affects any current or prospective employee,"

and "an action taken or determination that is ... adverse to the interests of the consumer." 15

U.S.C. § 168la(k)(l)(B).

83. SEPTA has routinely and systematically failed to provide Plaintiffs and otherjob

applicants with their consumer report and a summary of their rights under the FCRA before

taking adverse actions against them.

84. In Congress' s judgment, an employer's failure to provide a consumer with his or

her consumer report and a summary of his or her rights under the FCRA are both harms

sufficient to establish Article III standing.

85. SEPTA has acted willfully in violating the FCRA. SEPTA knew or should have

known its obligations under the FCRA. These obligations are well-established by the plain

language of the FCRA, in the promulgations and opinion letters of the Federal Trade

Commission, and in longstanding case law. Moreover, SEPTA's form letter denying

employment to job applicants expressly references the FCRA, establishing its awareness of the

FCRA's requirements.

86. Despite SEPTA's awareness of its legal obligations, it has acted consciously,

recklessly and willfully in breaching its known duties and depriving Plaintiffs and other job

applicants of their rights under the FCRA.

TheC

Claim

87. The CHRIA provides that, "[f]elony and misdemeanor convictions may be

considered by the employer only to the extent to which they relate to the applicant's suitability

for employment in the position for which he has applied." 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9125(b).

13

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 66 Filed 08/06/19 Page 14 of 24
88. The CHRIA further states that, "[t]he employer shall notify in writing the applicant ifthe decision not to hire the applicant is based in whole or in part on criminal history record infonnation." 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.§ 9125(c).
89. SEPTA routinely and systemically violates the CHRlA by considering and denying employment to job applicants based on criminal conviction(s) that do not relate to the applicants' suitability for employment in the positions for which they have applied.
90. Specifically, SEPTA has had a categorical and lifetime ban on hiring anyone with a felony drug conviction for " [a]ll positions which require the operation of a SEPTA vehicles as part thereof, whether or not they are in revenue service" and "[a]11 positions requiring the maintenance, repair or operation ofpower facilities, substations, towers, signals, vehicles or rolling stock."
91. In addition to this categorical and lifetime ban, SEPTA continues to have a policy and practice ofdisqualifying job applicants because of their criminal histories although those criminal histories do not relate to the applicant's suitability for employment in the position for which they applied.
92. SEPTA knew or should have known its obligations under the CHRIA. These obligations are well-established by the plain language of the CHRIA and in longstanding case law.
93 . Through its actions, SEPTA has acted willfully in violating the requirements of theCHRIA.
14

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 66 Filed 08/06/19 Page 15 of 24
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 94. Plaintiffs bring this case as a proposed class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on behalf of themselves and four classes of persons (collectively, the "Classes"). 95. Messrs. Long, Shipley, and White assert the First Cause of Action against SEPTA on behalf of the "FCRA Consumer Report Class" defined as follows: FCRA Consumer Report Class: All applicants for employment with SEPTA in the United States within five years of the filing of the initial Complaint through the date of final judgment who were subject to an adverse action based in whole or in part on information contained in a consumer report without receiving a copy of the consumer report before the adverse action, as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681 b(b)(3)(A)(i). 96. Messrs. Long, Shipley, White, and Garnett assert the Second Cause of Action against SEPTA on behalfofthe "CHRIA Job Denial Class." 97. Specifically, Messrs. Long, Shipley, and White assert the Second Cause of Action on behalf of the "CHRIA Job Denial Sub-Class One" defined as follows: CHRIA Job Denial Sub-Class One: All applicants for employment with SEPTA in the United States within six years of the filing of the initial Complaint through the date of final judgment who were denied SEPTA employment involving the operation and/or maintenance of SEPTA non-paratransit vehicles based in whole or in part on a drug-related conviction. 98. Mr. Garnett asserts the Second Cause of Action against SEPTA on behalf of the "CHRIA Job Denial Sub-Class Two" defined as follows: CHRIA Job Denial Sub-Class Two: All applicants for employment with SEPTA from August 2018 through the date offinaljudgment who were denied employment by SEPTA based on their criminal history record. 99. The members of the FCRA Consumer Report Class, and the CHRIA Job Denial Class are collectively referred to as "Class Members."
15

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 66 Filed 08/06/19 Page 16 of 24
100. Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend the definition of above-defined classes based on discovery or legal developments.
I01. The Class Members identified herein are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. SEPTA employs approximately 9,000 employees. Although Plaintiffs do not know the precise number ofjob applicants harmed by SEPTA's violations ofthe FCRA and CHRIA, the number is far greater than feasibly could be addressed through joinder. The precise number is also uniquely within Defendant's possession and the Class Members may be notified of the pendency of this action by published and/or mailed notice.
102. There are questions of law and fact common to Class Members, and these questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. Common legal and factual questions include, among others:
(a) whether Defendant violated the FCRA by failing to provide Messrs. Long, Shipley, and White and the FCRA Consumer Report Class with a copy of their consumer report before taking adverse action against them in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(i);
(b) whether Defendant violated the CHRIA by denying employment to Messrs. Long, Shipley, White, Garnett and the CHRIA Job Denial Class based on their criminal convictions;
(c) whether Defendant was willful in its noncompliance with the requirements of the FCRA;
(d) whether Defendant was willful in its noncompliance with the requirements of the CHRIA;and
16

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 66 Filed 08/06/19 Page 17 of 24
(e) whether equitable remedies, injunctive relief, actual damages, statutory damages, compensatory damages, nominal damages, exemplary damages and punitive damages for Class Members are warranted.
103. Plaintiffs are members of the classes they seek to represent. SEPTA took adverse action against Messrs. Long, Shipley, and White without first providing them with a copy of their consumer reports. SEPTA denied Messrs. Long, Shipley, White, and Garnett employment based on their criminal convictions and without those criminal convictions having sufficient relation to their suitability for employment with SEPTA, violating the CHRIA.
104. Plaintiffs' claims are typical ofthe claims of the classes they seek to represent. Upon information and belief, it is SEPTA' s standard practice to take adverse action against applicants without first providing them with a copy of their consumer reports. Upon information and belief, it is SEPTA's standard practice to consider convictions that do not relate to applicants' suitability for employment when making hiring determinations for employment. Plaintiffs are entitled to relief under the same causes of action as other Class Members .
or 105. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests the Class
Members because their interests coincide with, and are not antagonistic to, the interests of the Class Members they seek to represent. Plaintiffs have retained Counsel who are competent and experienced in complex class actions, including litigation pertaining to criminal background checks, the FCRA, and other employment litigation, and the intersection thereof. There is no conflict between Plaintiffs and the Class Members.
106. Class certification of the CHRIA Job Denial Class is appropriate pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) because SEPTA has acted and/or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class Members, making declaratory and injunctive relief
17

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 66 Filed 08/06/19 Page 18 of 24
appropriate with respect to Plaintiffs and the Class Members as a whole. The Class Members are entitled to nominal damages and to injunctive relief to end Defendant's common, uniform, unfair discriminatory-and illegal-policies and practices.
107. Class certification is appropriate pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) and/or (c)(4) for the FCRA Consumer Report Class because common questions of fact and law predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class Members. For example, SEPTA has maintained a common policy oftaking adverse action without first providing applicants with copies of their consumer reports. Moreover, a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. Class Members have been damaged and are entitled to recovery as a result ofDefendant's uniform policies and practices. Because SEPTA has maintained a common policy of failing to properly inform Class Members of their rights under the FCRA, many Class Members are likely unaware that their rights have been violated.
108. Class certification is appropriate pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) and/or (c)(4) for the CHRIA Job Denial Class because common questions offact and law predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class Members. For example, SEPTA has maintained a common policy of denying employment because of convictions unrelated to the jobs in question. Moreover, a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. Class Members have been damaged and are entitled to recovery as a result of Defendant's uniform policies and practices, including as to nominal damages.
109. The amount of each Class Member's individual cJaim is also small compared to the expense and burden of individual prosecution of this litigation. The FCRA and CHRIA have
18

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 66 Filed 08/06/19 Page 19 of 24
statutorily specified damages, which Class Members will prove at trial are warranted, and that will render calculation of damages for Class Members highly straightforward. The propriety and amount of exemplary and punitive damages are based on Defendant's conduct, making these issues common to Class Members.
CAUSES OF ACTION FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF SEPTA's Failure to Provide Consumer Reports Before Taking Adverse Action (15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(i), Brought by Messrs. Long, Shipley, and White on Behalf of Themselves and the FCRA Consumer Report Class) 110. Messrs. Long, Shipley, and White, on behalfofthemselves and theFCRA Consumer Report Class, incorporate the preceding paragraphs as alleged above. Ill. SEPTA violated the FCRA by taking adverse employment actions against Messrs. Long, Shipley, and White and the FCRA Consumer Report Class based in whole or in part on the information contained within their consumer reports. 112. Before taking these adverse employment actions, SEPTA failed to provide Messrs. Long, Shipley, and White and the FCRA Consumer Report Class with a copy oftheir consumer reports and a reasonable amount of time to respond. 113. SEPTA's policy caused concrete injury (including the risk of harm) to Messrs. Long, Shipley, and White and the FCRA Consumer Report Class, including because they could not: (a) evaluate information contained in the consumer reports to ensure accuracy; (b) challenge and correct information; (c) explain the circumstances surrounding misleading (even if accurate) information; and (d) explain why information reported should not preclude employment.
19

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 66 Filed 08/06/19 Page 20 of 24
114. SEPTA acted willfully and in knowing or reckless disregard of its obligations and the rights of Messrs. Long, Shipley, and White and the FCRA Consumer Report Class.
115. SEPTA's willful conduct is reflected by, among other things, the fact that it violated a clear statutory mandate set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 1681 b(b)(3)(A).
116. SEPTA's willful conduct is still further reflected by the following: (a) The FCRA was enacted in 1970, Defendant was founded in 1963; Defendant has
had almost 50 years to become compliant; (b) Defendant's conduct is inconsistent with the FTC's longstanding regulatory
guidance, judicial interpretation, and the plain language of the statute; (c) Defendant repeatedly and routinely took adverse action based in whole or in part
on information contained in a consumer report before providing consumers with a copy of the consumer report; and (d) By adopting such a policy, Defendant voluntarily ran a risk of violating the law substantially greater than the risk associated with a reading that was merely careless. 117. As a result of SEPTA' s actions, Messrs. Long, Shipley, and White and the FCRA Consumer Report Class have been deprived of their consumer rights and prevented from timely and effectively contesting the adverse action. 118. SEPTA's willful conduct makes it liable for actual or statutory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees and costs, in an amount to be determined by the Court pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 168ln.
20

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 66 Filed 08/06/19 Page 21 of 24
SECOND CLAIM FOR BELIEF SEPTA's Violation ofCHRIA's Use oflnformation Provision (18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.§ 9125(b), Brought by Messrs. Long, Shipley, White, and Garnett on Behalf of Themselves and the CHRIA Job Denial Class) 119. Messrs. Long, Shipley, White, and Garnett on behalf of themselves and the CHRIA Job Denial Class, incorporate the preceding paragraphs as alleged above. 120. Messrs. Long, Shipley, White, and Garnett and the CHRIA Job Denial Class have convictions that SEPTA considered when deciding not to offer them employment involving the operation of SEPTA vehicles. 121. Messrs. Long, Shipley, White, and Garnett and the CHRIA Job Denial Class's convictions are not related to their suitability for employment with SEPTA. 122. Messrs. Long, Shipley, White, and Garnett and the CHRIA Job Denial Class have been aggrieved by SEPTA's denials of employment. 123. As a result of its actions, SEPTA is liable to Messrs. Long, Shipley, White, and Garnett and the CHRIA Job Denial Class for declaratory and injunctive relief, damages and reasonable costs oflitigation and attorneys' fees, pursuant to 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.§ 9183(a)(b). 124. SEPTA's conduct has been willful, rendering it liable for exemplary and punitive damages, pursuant to 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.§ 9183(b).
PBAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs and Class Members pray for relief as follows: (a) Certification of Plaintiffs' FCRA and CHRIA claims as a class action pursuantto
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23; (b) Designation of Plaintiffs as representative of the Class Members; (c) Designation of Plaintiffs' counsel of record as Class Counsel;
21

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 66 Filed 08/06/19 Page 22 of 24
(d) An order enjoining SEPTA from engaging in further unlawful conduct in violation of the FCRA and CHRIA;
(e) An order restoring Plaintiffs and Class Members to their rightful positions or those positions equivalent at SEPTA (i.e., reinstatement), or in lieu of reinstatements, an order for front pay benefits;
(f) An order requiring SEPTA to develop and institute accurate and validated standards for evaluating applicants with criminal records;
(g) An order appointing a monitor to ensure that SEPTA complies with the injunction provisions of any decree that the Court orders;
(h) An order retaining jurisdiction over this action to ensure that SEPTA complies with such a decree;
(i) An award of all statutory damages awardable for violations of the FCRA including punitive damages for each violation found to be willful;
(j) An award of all statutory damages awardable for violations of the CHRIA including actual and real damages for each violation, and exemplary and punitive damages for each violation found to be willful;
(k) An award of all nominal damages; (l) An award of costs incurred herein, including reasonable attorneys' fees to the
extent allowable by law; (m) Pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, as provided by law; (n) Payment of a reasonable service award to Plaintiffs, in recognition of the services
they have rendered and will continue to render to Class Members, and the risks they have taken and will take; and
22

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 66 Filed 08/06/19 Page 23 of 24
(o) Such other and further legal and equitable relief as this Court deems necessary,
just and proper.
.WRY DEMAND
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b), Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury in this
action.
Dated: August 06, 2019
Adam T. Klein (admitted pro hac vice) Ossai Miazad (admitted pro hac vice) Lewis M. Steel (admitted pro hac vice) Christopher M. McNerney (admitted pro hac vice) Cheryl-Lyn Bentley, Pennsylvania Bar No. 324858 685 Third Avenue, 25th Floor New York, NY 10017 Tel.: (212) 245-1000
LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW Jon Greenbaum (admitted pro hac vice) Dariely Rodriguez (pro hac vice forthcoming) 1401 New York Ave., NW Washington, DC 20005 Tel.: (202) 662-8600
PUBLIC INTEREST LAW CENTER Benjamin D. Geffen Pennsylvania Bar. No. 31 0134 Claudia De Palma Pennsylvania Bar No. 320136 1709 Benjamin Franklin Parkway, 2d Floor Philadelphia, PA 191 03 Tel.: (267) 546-1308
WILLIG, WILLIAMS & DAVIDSON Ryan Allen Hancock Pennsylvania Bar No. 92590 Jessica Brown Pennsylvania Bar No. 87322
23

Case 2:16-cv-01991-PBT Document 66 Filed 08/06/19 Page 24 of 24 1845 Walnut Street, 24th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103 Tel.: (215) 656-3679
Attorneys for Plaintiffs andproposed Class Members
24