FILED Case 2:02-cv-01069-WHA-SRW Document 27 Filed 04/08/2003 Page 1 of 6

NASH J. COOLEY Plaintiff

IN 1IBE PNl"'-UATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

Z"lJ"u3

NORTH:F,l~. DIVISION h~Pi QI\ -t,~ P..--=r--Zq

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'T , '.... I")!

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APR '- 8 ~?,UlOv~ I'AIl IJ ~
lj/V~
CLERK
u. S. DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DIST. OF ALA.

vs.

)

CASE NO. 02-A-I069-N

STERLING BANK,

)

SYNOVUS FINANCIAL CORP. OF

ALABAMA

)

Defendants.

)

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

1. This action arises under 42 U.S.c. § 1981, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act,

15 U.S.C.A. § 1691, and the Federal Fair Housing Act. This court has

jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 and venue is

appropriate in this forum.

2. Plaintiff, Nash Cooley, is an African American male residing in the Middle

District of Alabama in Montgomery.

3. Defendant, Sterling Bank, is a corporation doing business in the Middle District

of Alabama in Montgomery engaged in the business of making credit transactions.

4. Defendant, Synovus Financial Corp. ofAlabama, is a corporation doing business in

the Middle District of Alabama in Montgomery by and through its affiliate Sterling

Bank and is engaged in the business of making credit transactions.

5. In the summer of2000, Mr. Cooley became interested in obtaining a $100,000.00

unsecured line of credit from Sterling Bank.

1

Case 2:02-cv-01069-WHA-SRW Document 27 Filed 04/08/2003 Page 2 of 6
6. Mr. Cooley and Mr. Hill, Vice President ofSterling Bank, had done business together for several years and Mr. Hill had told Mr. Cooley that he was interested in bringing some of Mr. Cooley's business to Sterling Bank.
7. Mr. Hill knew that Mr. Cooley had substantial assets and credit sufficient to obtain a $100,000.00 line of credit from Sterling Bank.
8. Mr. Hill gave Mr. Cooley assurances that ifhe applied for the $100,000.00 line of credit that Sterling Bank would approve the transaction.
9. Mr. Cooley told Mr. Hill that he wanted an unsecured line of credit of $1 00,000.00. 10. Then, pursuant to an agreement with Mr. Hill, Mr. Cooley deposited $100,000.00
into an account with Sterling Bank and applied for a $100,000.00 unsecured line of credit. 11. Plaintiff sought the $100,000.00 unsecured line of credit, among other things, to purchase real property and to invest in other business opportunities. 12. On September 19, 2002, Sterling Bank issued a "Notice of Action Taken" and denied Mr. Cooley's application for an unsecured line of credit of $100,000.00. 13. On October 11,2002, Mr. Cooley wrote to Mr. Hill and told him that he thought that the decision was unfair and he asked Mr. Hill to check with the President of Sterling Bank, W. Allan Worrell, and the Board members of Sterling Bank, and to give him an explanation as to why his application had been denied. 14. On October 27, 2000, Mr. Hill replied and reiterated that Mr. Cooley's request had been denied by Sterling Bank. Sterling Bank refused to extend the credit to Mr. Cooley that he had requested.
2

Case 2:02-cv-01069-WHA-SRW Document 27 Filed 04/08/2003 Page 3 of 6
15. Mr. Cooley exercised in good faith his rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691, the Federal Fair Housing Act and under the Consumer Credit Protection Act and as a result Sterling Bank discriminated against him with respect to credit transactions.
16. Plaintiff suffered an injury in fact and harm to a legal interest. 17. Plaintifflost business opportunities and as a result of defendant's intentional and
unlawful conduct, plaintiff suffered and continues to suffer emotional pain and suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of income. 18. Mr. Cooley had sufficient assets and outstanding credit and should have received the $100,000.00 line of unsecured credit from Sterling Bank but his application was denied and he was discriminated against on the basis of his race. 19. Plaintiffalleges that Defendants' have treated African-Americans, including Plaintiff, less favorably than white persons in its banking and other credit transactions.
First Claim For Relief 20. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each of the foregoing allegations of fact as
though fully set forth herein. 21. Defendants' actions are in violation of42 U.S.C. § 1981. 22. As a result of defendants' intentional and unlawful conduct, plaintiff suffered and
continues to suffer emotional pain and suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life and loss of income. 23. Defendants acted with malice or with reckless indifference to plaintiffs federally protected rights.
3

Case 2:02-cv-01069-WHA-SRW Document 27 Filed 04/08/2003 Page 4 of 6
WHEREFORE, plaintiffdemands equitable damages, compensatory and punitive damages, costs and attorneys' fees and all other relief deemed appropriate by this Court and/or the jury.
Second Claim For Relief 24. Plaintiffincorporates by reference each ofthe foregoing allegations offact as though
fully set forth herein. 25. Defendants' actions are in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15
V.S.C.A. § 1691. 26. As a result of defendants' intentional and unlawful conduct, plaintiff suffered and
continues to suffer emotional pain and suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life and loss of income. 27. Defendants acted with malice or with reckless indifference to plaintiffs federally protected rights. WHEREFORE, plaintiffdemands equitable damages, compensatory and punitive damages, costs and attorneys' fees and all other relief deemed appropriate by this Court and/or the jury.
Third Claim For Relief 28. Plaintiffincorporates by reference each ofthe foregoing allegations of fact as though
fully set forth herein. 29. Defendants' actions are in violation of the Federal Fair Housing Act. 30. As a result of defendants' intentional and unlawful conduct, plaintiff suffered and
continues to suffer emotional pain and suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life and loss of income.
4

Case 2:02-cv-01069-WHA-SRW Document 27 Filed 04/08/2003 Page 5 of 6
31. Defendants acted with malice or with reckless indifference to plaintiffs federally protected rights.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffdemands equitable damages, compensatory and punitive damages, costs and attorneys' fees and all other relief deemed appropriate by this Court and/or the jury.
DANIEL A. HANNAN (884192) OF COUNSEL: FRANKLIN & STEIN, P. C. 63 South Royal Street Suite 1109 Mobile, Alabama 36602 251-433-0051
PLrJ~Er=IALBY JURY
DANIEL A. HANNAN (884 1'92)
5

Case 2:02-cv-01069-WHA-SRW Document 27 Filed 04/08/2003 Page 6 of 6 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
t I hereby certify that I have served copy of the foregoing pleading on counsel for
defendant by United States mail on this t" day of April, 2003 as follows: Dennis R. Bailey, Esq. RUSHTON, STAKELY, JOHNSTON & GARRETT, P.A. 184 Commerce Street Post Office Box 270 Montgomery, Alabama 36101-0270 (334) 206-3100
DANIEL A. HANNAN
6

 
 FILED Case 2:02-cv-01069-WHA-SRW Document 25 Filed 04/08/2003 Page 1 of 2

:" r.:: CE\VED IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

lUU) M~R

\ 0

A

o. o·

2 fOR

THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA NORTHERN DIVISION

, !R J 0 2003 ((I\~

p) CLERK

I

L~KAfJ:r~f~~~

)

U.S. 015 ·-.&I/T t I!OOLE OIS ,,,h' I

ALA~

)

Plamtiff,

)

U. S. DISTRICT COURT MIDOI r::: r)f.C~T. OF ALA.

)

vs.

)

Case No. 02-A-1069-N

)

STERLING BANK,

)

SYNOVUS FINANCIAL CORP. OF

) DEFENDANT FEDERAL DEPOSIT

ALABAMA, and

) INSURANCE CORPORATION'S

) MOTION TO DISMISS

THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT

)

INSURANCE CORPORATION "FDIC." )

)

Defendants.

)

Defendant Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation hereby moves, pursuant to Rule12 (b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to dismiss the Complaint filed herein. A Memorandum in Support of the Motion and a proposed Order are attached hereto.
Respectfully Submitted, CHARLES L. COPE Senior Counsel

Larr . Goodman - Bar No. VA 32621 Counsel FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION 550 17th Street, NW, H-2058 Washington, DC 20429 Tel: (202) 736-0313 Fax:(202) 736-0584 E-Mail: Lagoodman@fdic.gov
MOTION GRANTED

Case 2:02-cv-01069-WHA-SRW Document 25 Filed 04/08/2003 Page 2 of 2
COURTROOM TECHNOLOGY TRAlNING
is now available for lawyers, paralegals and legal assistants
The court requires litigants to use the digital evidence presentation system available in each courtroom. The system enhances evidence display to the court and the jury, provides flexibility to advocates and witnesses in identifying parts of images and documents, facilitates document enhancement to correspond with witness testimony, and permits electronic capture and retrieval of documents created during the hearing or trial.
SCHEDULE YOUR TRAINING EARLY
Training is conducted every Friday at noon - bring your lunch. Appointments must be made by noon on Tuesday before Friday training. To schedule training, or for answers to other questions, contact Karlene Burkhard, Telecommunications and Technologies Specialist, by calling 334-954-3631 or e-mailing her at Kar/ene_Burkhard@a/md.uscourts.gov You may also contact the courtroom deputy of the judge who will preside at your hearing or trial. THE DIGITAL EVIDENCE PRESENTATION SYSTEM MAY BE USED ONLY BY PERSONS WHO HAVE BEEN OFFICIALLY TRAINED AND CERTIFIED. Please schedule your training at least two weeks before tria/.
Participants can obtain 1.0 CLE credit for this training.

 
 Case 2:02-cv-01069-WHA-SRW Document 48 Filed 06/27/2003 Page 1 of 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION

NASH}. COOLEY

)

FILED
J JUN 27 2)'3
Vf'\ CLERK
U. S. DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DIST. OF ALA.

Plaintiff

)

vs.

)

CASE NO. 02-A-I069-N

STERLING BANK,

)

SYNOVUS FINANCIAL CORP. OF

ALAB~A

)

Defendants.

)

ORDER

This cause comes before this Court based on Plaintiff's Motion to Compel production of

documents propounded to Defendants. This Court has heard oral arguments from the parties and

after having considered same, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. That the subject information sought and referred to in Plaintiff's Motion to Compel

contains certain confidential information and the parties have shown good cause for the issuance

of a protective order governing the requested information.

2. That Sterling Bank is to produce to Plaintiff documents from every Sterling Bank

in Montgomery, Alabama pertaining to unsecured loan applications of One Hundred Thousand

($100,000.00) Dollars or more including, but not limited to, all documents relevant to the credit .

worthiness ofsaid loan applications, including credit reports, financial statements, tax returns, any

credit memorandums evaluating credit worthiness and all documents showing the notes and terms

of the loans which were in existence on the following dates: January 1,2000; April 1, 2000; July

1,2000; October 1, 2000; January 1,2001; April 1, 2001; July 1,2001; October 1, 2001; January

1, 2002; and April 1, 2002.

Case 2:02-cv-01069-WHA-SRW Document 48 Filed 06/27/2003 Page 2 of 2
3. That all information ordered to be produced by Defendants is subject to this Court's Protective Order.
4. That Defendants are instructed to redact any and all information which specifically identifies the loan applicant, including the applicant's name, address, telephone number, social security numbers and account numbers. However, unredacted copies of such documents shall be maintained by the Defendants throughout the course of the litigation of this case, including any appeals which may be taken by either party.
DONE this Z1fJvday of June, 2003.
~2~_ __
JUDGE SUSAN RUSS WALKER

 
 Case 2:02-cv-01069-WHA-SRW Document 1 Filed 09/17/2002 Page 1 of 5

, '\ IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

D \..': t', I

"

\

\

'

NORTHERN DIVISION

NASH J. COOLEY

)

FILED

SEp!,1 7 2002

crill u. CLERK

L..;

S. DISTRICT COURT

MIDDle DIST. OF ALA.

Plaintiff

)

VS.

STERLING BANK

)

Defendant

COMPLAINT

1. This action arises under 42 U. S. C. § 1981, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act,

15 U.S.C.A. § 1691, and the Federal Fair Housing Act. This court has

jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1331 and 1343 and venue is

appropriate in this forum.

2. Plaintiff, Nash Cooley, is an African American male residing in the Middle

District of Alabama in Montgomery.

3. Defendant, Sterling Bank, is a corporation doing business in the Middle District

of Alabama in Montgomery engaged in the business of making credit transactions.

4. In the summer of2000, Mr. Cooley became interested in obtaining a $100,000.00

unsecured line of credit from Sterling Ban1e

5. Mr. Cooley and Mr. Hill, Vice President ofSterling Bank, had done business together

for several years and Mr. Hill had told Mr. Cooley that he was interested in bringing

some of Mr. Cooley's business to Sterling Bank.

6. Mr. Hill knew that Mr. Cooley had substantial assets and credit sufficient to obtain

a $100,000.00 line of credit from Sterling Bank.

I

Case 2:02-cv-01069-WHA-SRW Document 1 Filed 09/17/2002 Page 2 of 5
7. Mr. Hill gave Mr. Cooley assurances that ifhe applied for the $100,000.00 line of credit that Sterling Bank would approve the transaction.
8. Mr. Cooley told Mr. Hill that he wanted an unsecured line of credit of $1 00,000.00. 9. Then, pursuant to an agreement with Mr. Hill, Mr. Cooley deposited $100,000.00
into an account with Sterling Bank and applied for a $100,000.00 unsecured line of credit. 10. Plaintiff sought the $100,000.00 unsecured line of credit, among other things, to purchase real property and to invest in other business opportunities. 11. On September 19,2002, Sterling Bank issued a "Notice of Action Taken" and denied Mr. Cooley's application for an unsecured line of credit of $1 00,000.00. 12. On October 11, 2002, Mr. Cooley wrote to Mr. Hill and told him that he thought that the decision was unfair and he asked Mr. Hill to check with the President of Sterling Bank, W. Allan Worrell, and the Board members of Sterling Bank, and to give him an explanation as to why his application had been denied. 13. On October 27, 2000, Mr. Hill replied and reiterated that Mr. Cooley's request had been denied by Sterling Bank. Sterling Bank refused to extend the credit to Mr. Cooley that he had requested. 14. Mr. Cooley exercised in good faith his rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691 , the Federal Fair Housing Act and under the Consumer Credit Protection Act and as a result Sterling Bank discriminated against him with respect to credit transactions. 15. Plaintiff suffered an injury in fact and harm to a legal interest. 16. Plaintiff lost business opportunities and as a result of defendant's intentional and

Case 2:02-cv-01069-WHA-SRW Document 1 Filed 09/17/2002 Page 3 of 5

unlawful conduct, plaintiff suffered and continues to suffer emotional pain and

suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss ofenjoyment oflife, loss of income.

17. Mr. Cooley had sufficient assets and outstanding credit and should have received the

$100,000.00 line of unsecured credit from Sterling Bank but his application was

denied and he was discriminated against on the basis of his race.

18. Plaintiff alleges that Sterling Bank has treated African-Americans, including

Plaintiff, less favorably than white persons in its banking and other credit

transactions.

First Claim For Relief

19. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each of the foregoing allegations of fact as

though fully set forth herein.

20. Defendant's actions are in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

21. As a result of defendant's intentional and unlawful conduct, plaintiff suffered and

continues to suffer emotional pain and suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish,

loss of enjoyment of life and loss of income.

22. Defendant acted with malice or with reckless indifference to plaintiff's federally

protected rights.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands equitable damages, compensatory and punitive

damages, costs and attorneys' fees and all other relief deemed appropriate by this Court and/or

the jury.

Second Claim For Relief

23. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each of the foregoing allegations of fact as

though fully set forth herein.

Case 2:02-cv-01069-WHA-SRW Document 1 Filed 09/17/2002 Page 4 of 5
24. Defendant's actions are in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 V.S.C.A. § 1691.
25. As a result of defendant's intentional and unlawful conduct, plaintiff suffered and continues to suffer emotional pain and suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life and loss of income.
26. Defendant acted with malice or with reckless indifference to plaintiff's federally protected rights.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffdemands equitable damages, compensatory and punitive damages, costs and attorneys' fees and all other relief deemed appropriate by this Court and/or the jury.
Third Claim For Relief 27. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each of the foregoing allegations of fact as
though fully set forth herein. 28. Defendant's actions are in violation of the Federal Fair Housing Act. 29. As a result of defendant's intentional and unlawful conduct, plaintiff suffered and
continues to suffer emotional pain and suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life and loss of income. 30. Defendant acted with malice or with reckless indifference to plaintiff's federally protected rights. WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands equitable damages, compensatory and punitive damages, costs and attorneys' fees and all other relief deemed appropriate by this Court and/or the jury.

Case 2:02-cv-01069-WHA-SRW Document 1 Filed 09/17/2002 Page 5 of 5
OF COUNSEL: FRANKLIN & STEIN, P. C. 63 South Royal Street Suite 1109 Mobile, Alabama 36602 251-433-0051
DEFENDANT MAY BE SERVED BY CERTIFIED MAIL AS FOLLOWS: Sterling Bank c/o W. Alan Worrell,Registered Agent 4121 Carmichael Road Montgomery, Alabama 36106

 
 Case 2:02-cv-01069-WHA-SRW Document 8 Filed 10/23/2002 Page 1 of 13

FILED

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FO~ THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA (i,:~ 23 tOU2

NORTHERN DIVISION

ClERK \7frt ,

u. S. DISTRICT co~MV

NASH J. COOLEY

)

MIDDLE 015T. OF ALA.

)

Plaintiff,

)

f}

)

CASE NO.: 02--r-1069-N

v.

)

)

STERLING BANK,

)

)

Defendant.

)

DEFENDANT, STERLING BANK'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT COMES NOW the Defendant, Sterling Bank, and responds to Plaintiff's Complaint as follows: 1. This Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 1 of the Complaint and demands strict proof thereof. 2. This Defendant is without sufficient information to either admit or deny the allegations contained in paragraph 2 of the Complaint. 3. This Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraph 3 of the Complaint. 4. This Defendant is without sufficient information to either admit or deny the allegations contained in paragraph 4 of the Complaint.

1

Case 2:02-cv-01069-WHA-SRW Document 8 Filed 10/23/2002 Page 2 of 13
5. This Defendant is without sufficient information to either admit or deny the allegations contained in paragraph 5 of the Complaint.
6. This Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 6 of the Complaint and demands strict proof thereof.
7. This Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 7 of the Complaint and demands strict proof thereof.
8. This Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraph 8 of the Complaint.
9. This Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 9 of the Complaint and demands strict proof thereof.
10. This Defendant is without sufficient information to either admit or deny the allegations contained in paragraph 10 of the Complaint.
11. This Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraph 11 of the Complaint.
12. This Defendant admits having knowledge ofthe correspondence referred to in paragraph 12 of the Complaint; however, this defendant denies that said correspondence was dated October 11, 2002. Rather, said correspondence was dated October 11, 2000.
2

Case 2:02-cv-01069-WHA-SRW Document 8 Filed 10/23/2002 Page 3 of 13
13. This Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraph 13 of the Complaint.
14. This Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 14 of the Complaint and demands strict proof thereof.
15. This Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 15 of the Complaint and demands strict proof thereof.
16. This Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 16 of the Complaint and demands strict proof thereof.
17. This Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 17 of the Complaint and demands strict proof thereof.
18. This Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 18 of the Complaint and demands strict proof thereof.
19. Paragraph 19 of the Complaint does not appear to require a response by this Defendant. To the extent that any liability is alleged on the part of this defendant, these allegations are denied and strict proof thereof is demanded.
20. This Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 20 of the Complaint and demands strict proof thereof.
21. This Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 21 of the Complaint and demands strict proof thereof.
3

Case 2:02-cv-01069-WHA-SRW Document 8 Filed 10/23/2002 Page 4 of 13
22. This Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 22 of the Complaint and demands strict proof thereof.
23. Paragraph 23 of the Complaint does not appear to require a response by this Defendant. To the extent that any liability is alleged on the part ofthis defendant, these allegations are denied and strict proof thereof is demanded.
24. This Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 24 of the Complaint and demands strict proof thereof.
25. This Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 25 of the Complaint and demands strict proof thereof.
26. This Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 26 of the Complaint and demands strict proof thereof.
27. Paragraph 27 of the Complaint does not appear to require a response by this Defendant. To the extent that any liability is alleged on the part ofthis defendant, these allegations are denied and strict proof thereof is demanded.
28. This Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 28 of the Complaint and demands strict proof thereof.
29. This Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 29 of the Complaint and demands strict proof thereof.
4

Case 2:02-cv-01069-WHA-SRW Document 8 Filed 10/23/2002 Page 5 of 13
30. This Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 30 of the Complaint and demands strict proof thereof.
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE The Plaintiffhas failed to satisfy the administrative and procedural requirements to filing suit.
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE Sterling Bank's actions as they related to Plaintiff were based on legitimate, non-discriminatory factors.
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE At all times relevant to this lawsuit, Sterling Bank acted in good faith with respect to Plaintiff, and it had reasonable grounds for believing that its actions were not in violation of any law.
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE Plaintiffs claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrine ofclaim and/or issue preclusion.
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE Plaintiff s claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrines of waiver, laches, and/or collateral estoppel.
5

Case 2:02-cv-01069-WHA-SRW Document 8 Filed 10/23/2002 Page 6 of 13
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE The Plaintiffhas failed to state a claim pursuant to 42 USC § 1981 and the Civil Rights Act of 1991 for which relief can be granted.
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE The Plaintiffhas failed to state a claim pursuant to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691, for which relief can be granted.
EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE The Plaintiffhas failed to state a claim pursuant to the Federal Fair Housing Act for which relief can be granted.
NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE Plaintiff s claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the applicable statute of limitations.
TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE Defendant avers that the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which punitive damages may be awarded to Plaintiff.
ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE Defendant avers that any award of punitive damages to Plaintiff in this case would be violative of the constitutional safeguards provided to Defendant under the Constitution of the State of Alabama.
6

Case 2:02-cv-01069-WHA-SRW Document 8 Filed 10/23/2002 Page 7 of 13
TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE Defendant avers that any award of punitive damages to the Plaintiff in this case will be violative of the constitutional safeguards provided to Defendant under the Constitution of the United States of America.
THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE Defendant avers that any award ofpunitive damages to Plaintiffin this case will be violative of the constitutional safeguards provided to Defendant under the constitution of the United States in that the determination of punitive damages under Alabama law is vague, is not based upon any objective standards, is in fact standardless, and is not rationally related to legitimate government interests.
FOURTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE Defendant avers that any award ofpunitive damages to Plaintiffin this case will be violative of Article I, Section 6 of the Constitution of the State of Alabama which provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property except by due process of law, in that punitive damages are vague and are not rationally related to legitimate government interests.
7

Case 2:02-cv-01069-WHA-SRW Document 8 Filed 10/23/2002 Page 8 of 13
FIFTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE Defendant avers that any award ofpunitive damages to Plaintiffin this case will be violative of the Procedural Safeguards provided to Defendant under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution ofthe United States in that punitive damages are penal in nature and consequently, Defendant is entitled to the same Procedural Safeguards accorded to criminal defendant.
SIXTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE It is violative of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America to seek to impose against this Defendant punitive damages, which are penal in nature, yet to compel Defendant to disclose potential incriminating documents and evidence.
SEVENTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE It is violative of the self-incrimination clause of Article I, Section 6 of the Constitution of the State of Alabama to impose against this Defendant punitive damages, which are penal in nature, yet compel this Defendant to disclose documents and evidence.
8

Case 2:02-cv-01069-WHA-SRW Document 8 Filed 10/23/2002 Page 9 of 13
EIGHTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff s claim of punitive damages violates the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments ofthe Constitution of the United States, on the following
grounds:
(a) It is a violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution to impose punitive damages, which are penal in nature, against a civil defendant upon the plaintiffs satisfying a burden ofproofwhich is less than the "beyond a reasonable doubt" burden of proof required in criminal cases;
(b) The procedures pursuant to which punitive damages are awarded fail to provide a reasonable limit on the amount of the award against defendant, which thereby violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution;
(c) The procedures pursuant to which punitive damages are awarded fail to provide specific standards for the amount of the award of punitive damages which thereby violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution;
(d) The procedures pursuant to which punitive damages are awarded result in the imposition of different penalties for the same or similar acts and, thus, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution; and
(e) The procedures pursuant to which punitive damages are awarded permit the imposition of punitive damages in excess ofthe maximum criminal fine for the same or similar conduct, which thereby infringes the Due Process Clause of
9

Case 2:02-cv-01069-WHA-SRW Document 8 Filed 10/23/2002 Page 10 of 13
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
(f) The procedures pursuant to which punitive damages are awarded may result in the award of joint and several judgments against multiple defendants for different alleged acts of wrongdoing, which infringes the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
NINETEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff s claim ofpunitive damages violates the Due Process Clause ofArticle
I, Section 6 of the Constitution of Alabama, on the following grounds:
(a) It is a violation of the due process clause to impose punitive damages, which are penal in nature, upon a civil defendant upon the plaintiffs satisfying a burden of proof less than the "beyond a reasonable doubt" burden of proof required in criminal cases;
(b) The procedures pursuant to which punitive damages are awarded fail to provide a limit on the amount of the award against this defendant;
(c) The procedures pursuant to which punitive damages are awarded are unconstitutionally vague;
(d) The procedures pursuant to which punitive damages are awarded fail to provide specific standards for the amount of the award of punitive damages; and
(e) The award of punitive damages in this case would constitute a deprivation of property without due process of law·,
10

Case 2:02-cv-01069-WHA-SRW Document 8 Filed 10/23/2002 Page 11 of 13
(f) The procedures pursuant to which punitive damages are awarded fail to provide a limit on the amount of the award against this defendant.
TWENTIETH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE Plaintiff s attempt to impose punitive or extracontractual damages on this Defendant, on the basis of vicarious liability for the conduct of others, violates, the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
TWENTY-FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE An award of punitive damages to the Plaintiff in this action would constitute a deprivation of property without due process of law required under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
TWENTY-SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE An award ofpunitive damages against the Defendant in this action would violate the prohibition against laws that impair the obligations of contracts in violation of Article I, Section 22 of the Constitution of Alabama.
TWENTY-THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE The Complaint fails to state a claim for punitive damages under Alabama Code §§6-1l-20 to 6-11-30 (1975) and is barred.
11

Case 2:02-cv-01069-WHA-SRW Document 8 Filed 10/23/2002 Page 12 of 13
TWENTY-FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE It is violative of the self-incrimination clause of Article I, Section 6 of the Constitution ofthe State ofAlabama to seek to impose against the Defendant punitive damages, which are penal in nature, yet compel Defendant to disclose evidence.

OF COUNSEL:

DENNIS R. BAILEY (BAI028) P. KEITH LICHTMAN (LICO ) Attorneys for Defendant Sterling Bank

RUSHTON, STAKELY, JOHNSTON & GARRETT, P.A. 184 Commerce Street Post Office Box 270 Montgomery, Alabama 36101-0270 Telephone: (334) 206-3100 Facsimile: (334) 262-6277 E-mail: drb@rsjg.com(Mf.Bailey) E-mail: pkl@rsjg.com (Mf. Lichtman)

12

Case 2:02-cv-01069-WHA-SRW Document 8 Filed 10/23/2002 Page 13 of 13
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that the foregoing has been duly served upon the below named counsel ofrecord by placing a cgy thereof in the United States Mail, postage prepaid
and properly addressed this 1:.. day of October, 2002:
Daniel A. Hannan, Esq. FRANKLIN & STEIN, P.C. 63 South Royal Street Suite 1109 Mobile, Alabama 36602
13

 
 280 F.Supp.2d 1331 (2003)
Nash J. COOLEY, Plaintiff, v.
STERLING BANK, et al., Defendants.
No. CIV.A. 02-A-1069-N.
United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division.
September 4, 2003.
1332 *1332 Daniel A. Hannan, Mobile, Greg L. Davis, Montgomery, for Plaintiffs.
Dennis R. Bailey, R. Austin Huffaker, Montgomery, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ALBRITTON, Chief Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
This cause is before the court on a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 40) and a Motion to Strike (Doc. # 69) filed by Defendants Sterling Bank and Synovus Financial Corporation of Alabama, and two Motions to Strike (Docs. # 59 & 71) filed by Plaintiff Nash Cooley.
The Plaintiff filed his original Complaint (Doc. # 1) in this case against Sterling Bank on September 17, 2002. The Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (Doc. # 15) on January 31, 2003, in which the Plaintiff added Synovus Financial Corporation of Alabama and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") as Defendants. On March 10, 2003, the FDIC filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 20). On April 4, 2003, the Plaintiff filed a motion asking the court for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint excluding the FDIC as a Defendant (Doc. # 23). The court granted the Plaintiff's motion to amend (Doc. # 26) and the FDIC's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 25) on 1333 April 8, 2003. Thereafter, the Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint (Doc. # 27). In the Complaint, the *1333 Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 et seq., and the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., alleging that the Defendants denied his application for a $100,000 unsecured line of credit because of his race. The Defendants responded by filing a motion for Motion for Summary Judgment on June 9, 2003.
For the reasons to be discussed, the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be GRANTED, the Defendants' Motion to Strike is due to be GRANTED in part, and the Plaintiff's Motions to Strike are DENIED.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
The party asking for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the `pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence showing there is no dispute of material fact, or by showing, or pointing out to, the district court that the nonmoving

party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(e) "requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party "must do more than show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). On the other hand, the evidence of the nonmovant must be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in its favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
After the nonmoving party has responded to the motion for summary judgment, the court must grant summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
III. FACTS
The submissions of the parties establish the following facts, construed in a light most favorable to the nonmovant:
The Plaintiff is a sixty-six year old African-American male who lives in Montgomery, Alabama. See Cooley Depo., p. 8. Since the mid-1980s, the Plaintiff's primary source of income has come from his ownership of residential rental properties in the Montgomery area. Id. at p. 33. The Plaintiff currently owns approximately fifteen apartment units and twenty-four houses. Id. at p. 34.
In order to have the financial flexibility to invest in new real estate ventures, the Plaintiff has maintained active 1334 lines of credit with various financial institutions. *1334 The Plaintiff began his first line of credit with South Trust
Bank in Montgomery during the late-1980s. Id. at pp. 59-60. The Plaintiff initially started with an unsecured line for $75,000, but increased the amount to $100,000 within several years. Id. at p. 60. The Plaintiff has consistently renewed this line of credit and maintains it today. Id. at p. 59.
In 1995, the Plaintiff applied for a second line of credit at Colonial Bank in Montgomery. Id. at pp. 62-63. The Plaintiff received a one-year renewable unsecured line of credit for $100,000. Id. at p. 65. The Plaintiff renewed this line of credit annually through 2001, at which time he terminated it voluntarily. Id. at p. 70.
By the summer of 2000, the Plaintiff had $100,000 unsecured lines of credit at two separate banks.[1]Id. at p. 73. The Plaintiff ultimately hoped to establish five $100,000 lines of credit in order to complete a real estate project that he began in 1992. See id. at pp. 77-78. To meet his financial goals, the Plaintiff approached Sterling Bank ("Sterling") in September 2000 about another $100,000 unsecured line of credit. Id. at pp. 83-84. The Plaintiff chose Sterling because he had a prior business relationship with Kenny Hill, the Branch Manager of Sterling's Taylor Road Branch, when Hill worked at Colonial Bank. Id. In early 2000, Hill spoke with the Plaintiff about bringing some of his business to Sterling. Id. at p. 84. The Plaintiff agreed to this request and opened a checking account with Sterling. Id. at pp. 84-85. The Plaintiff maintained a balance of approximately $15,000 in the account, and deposited a $100,000 insurance settlement several months before applying for his credit line. Id. at p. 85.
In September 2000, the Plaintiff met with Hill to apply for a $100,000 unsecured line of credit with Sterling. The Plaintiff submitted a credit application and provided Hill with all of his relevant financial information, including tax returns and a personal financial statement. See Hill Depo., at p. 36. On September 15, 2000, Hill conducted a credit check on the Plaintiff that revealed a "Beacon Score" of 749.[2]See id. at p. 97; Plaintiff's Response, Exhibit 11 (Plaintiff's credit report). Although this score was commensurate with an "excellent credit rating," see Hill Depo., at p. 97, Hill became concerned about the Plaintiff's income level after reviewing the remainder of the Plaintiff's financial information. Id. at p. 43. Specifically, the Plaintiff's most recent tax return indicated that the Plaintiff and his wife had a joint pre-tax income of $106,214. See Plaintiff's Response, Exhibit 8. Of this amount, 1335 Hill calculated that the income attributable to the Plaintiff was $51,483.[3]Id. Because the *1335 Plaintiff was

applying for an unsecured line of credit in his name only, Hill was worried that the Plaintiff's income level was insufficient for him to obtain a $100,000 line of credit. See Hill Depo., at p. 44. Additionally, Hill was apprehensive about approving the Plaintiff's request with knowledge that the Plaintiff had two existing $100,000 lines of credit. Id. at p. 45.
After Hill compiled the Plaintiff's loan materials, he presented them to Bob Ramsey, Sterling's Executive Vice President in charge of lending. Id. at p. 49. Because Hill did not have the authority to approve a loan in excess of $50,000, he met with Ramsey to discuss the Plaintiff's loan application. Id. at pp. 57-59. During this meeting Ramsey reviewed the Plaintiff's financial statement and tax return. See Ramsey Aff., pp. 1-2. Hill expressed his concerns about the Plaintiff's financial situation and Ramsey concurred. See Hill Depo., p. 52. In short, Ramsey concluded that the Plaintiff's "individual income of $51,464 simply did not justify adding another $100,000 unsecured debt on top of the two existing lines of credit at other banks totaling $200,000." See Ramsey Aff., p. 2. Instead of denying the Plaintiff's request outright, Ramsey suggested making either a secured loan in the same amount or an unsecured loan for $25,000. Id. After Ramsey and Hill agreed that a counteroffer was the best solution, Hill informed Ramsey that the Plaintiff was "African American and might claim racism." Id. at p. 3. In response, Ramsey suggested discussing the matter with Alan Worrell, Sterling's Chief Executive Officer. Id. Worrell agreed with Hill and Ramsey's assessment of the Plaintiff's financial situation and indicated his preference to find an alternative way to establish a credit relationship with the Plaintiff. Id.
On September 18, 2000, Hill informed the Plaintiff of Sterling's decision and gave him a a document entitled "Notice of Action Taken." The document explained that Sterling could not provide the Plaintiff with a $100,000 unsecured line of credit, but was willing to offer "a $25,000 unsecured line of credit or a larger secured line." See Plaintiff's Response, Exhibit 6. In response, the Plaintiff immediately requested a list of the individuals on Sterling's Board of Directors so he could contact them about his loan denial. See id. at Exhibit 8. The Plaintiff also expressed his belief that Sterling was discriminating against him on the basis of race. Id.
After learning of the Plaintiff's reaction, Worrell requested that Hill arrange a meeting between the Plaintiff and Worrell. See Worrell Depo., at p. 78. During their meeting, the Plaintiff explained to Worrell that he wanted a line of credit from Sterling in order to "purchase a home and do bigger projects." See Cooley Depo., at p. 97. Knowing of the Plaintiff's two existing lines, Worrell asked the Plaintiff why he needed a third line. Id. The Plaintiff found this question "really insulting" because no banker had ever insinuated to him that he had enough money to accomplish his projects. Id. at pp. 97-99. Worrell informed the Plaintiff that he had "good credit," but expressed concerns about the Plaintiff's financial ability, given his income level and existing lines of credit, to "service that much debt if those loans were drawn upon." See Worrell Depo., at p. 80. At the conclusion of the meeting, Worrell emphasized that he wanted to do business with the Plaintiff and hoped the Plaintiff would consider Sterling's counteroffer. Id. at pp. 80-81.
During Sterling's Board of Directors meeting on September 20, 2000, Worrell informed the Board of the Plaintiff's stated intent to contact individual Board members about his loan application. Id. at p. 383. Worrell explained to 1336 the Board that *1336 the Plaintiff was accusing Sterling of discrimination because Sterling proposed a counteroffer rather than approve the Plaintiff's loan application on his terms. Id. at p. 384. Additionally, Worrell provided each Board member with a memorandum prepared by Hill that explained the reasons behind Sterling's decision. Id. The memorandum states that based on the Plaintiff's "income level, amount of outstanding debt, and open lines of credit," Hill, Worrell and Ramsey made a "group decision" to offer the Plaintiff "a $25,000 unsecured line of credit or the option to discuss a larger line on a secured basis." See Plaintiff's Response, Exhibit 8.
According to Greg Calhoun, an African-American member of Sterling's Board of Directors, individual Board members began discussing the Plaintiff's application during the meeting. Calhoun stated in his deposition that the Board "didn't think [the Plaintiff] could qualify for a hundred thousand dollar line of credit being . . . that he was a retired school teacher." See Calhoun Depo., p. 22. Moreover, Board members "jok[ed] about [the Plaintiff's application]" and "laughed about the Plaintiff." Id. In response, Calhoun told the other Board members that he believed they were putting the Plaintiff down. Id. at p. 23. Calhoun then "told them they was [sic] all Republicans, and they're all members of the Montgomery Country Club. And there's no way that a black man can come in here and get money from the bank." Id. Following this statement, Calhoun informed the Board that he was resigning.

Id. In Calhoun's opinion, Sterling denied the Plaintiff's loan application "because of [the Plaintiff's] skin color." Id. at p. 87.
On October 11, 2000, the Plaintiff sent Hill a handwritten letter requesting more information about why Sterling denied his loan application. See Plaintiff's Response, Exhibit 7. On October 27, 2000, Hill drafted a response letter explaining how Sterling reached its decision:
In the Financial Package you provided to me, you included a 1999 tax return showing a joint adjusted gross income of $106,214. Since your loan request was from you alone, I backed out your wife's salary of $54,730, leaving an income attributable to you of $51,484. On your financial statement you show a debt of $265,000 and unsecured lines totaling an additional $200,000. Bottom line, with a potential debt load of $465,000 on income of $51,484, I was prepared to offer a $25,000 unsecured line or a larger line on a secured basis.
Id. at Exhibit 9. Additionally, Hill stated that "this credit decision was a bank decision (in which I was involved) and did not involve the Board." Id.
IV. DISCUSSION
In his Second Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff contends that the Defendants, Sterling Bank and Synovus Financial Corporation of Alabama ("Synovus"), violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1691 et seq., and the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., by denying his application for a $100,000 unsecured line of credit because of his race. Section 1981 provides that "[a]ll persons . . . shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens." 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Section 1981 applies to this case because the Plaintiff contends that Sterling prevented him from signing a loan contract because of his race. See Worrell Depo., p. 293 (stating that a contract would have governed the credit relationship between Sterling and the Plaintiff). Moreover, the ECOA states that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a credit 1337 transaction . . . on the *1337 basis of race." 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1). Finally, the FHA makes it unlawful for "any person or other entity whose business includes engaging in residential real estate-related transactions to discriminate against any person in making available such a transaction, or in the terms or conditions of such a transaction, because of race." 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a). Under the FHA, a "residential real estate-related transaction" is defined to include "the making or purchasing of loans or providing other financial assistance . . . for purchasing, constructing, improving, repairing, or maintaining a dwelling." 42 U.S.C. § 3605(b). The Plaintiff's FHA rights are implicated in this case because his evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to him, establishes that he sought a loan from Sterling in order to complete his residential real estate projects. See Cooley Depo., p. 97 (stating that the Plaintiff wanted a line of credit in order to "purchase a home and do bigger projects").[4]
Before delving into the factual merits of these claims, the court must first address a legal dispute between the parties regarding the Plaintiff's burden of proof. Because section 1981, the ECOA and the FHA are antidiscrimination statutes, the Defendants contend that the court's analysis should be governed by the methods of analysis developed for use in cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. According to this approach, the Plaintiff must present either direct evidence of discriminatory intent, or use the factors set forth in burden-shifting analysis developed by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), to raise, by indirect or circumstantial evidence, an inference of discrimination. See Hall v. Lowder Realty Co., Inc., 160 F.Supp.2d 1299, 1313 (M.D.Ala.2001). In contrast, the Plaintiff relies exclusively on a decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in which that court rejected the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting model for credit discrimination claims brought under the ECOA and FHA. See Latimore v. Citibank Fed. Sav. Bank, 151 F.3d 712, 715 (7th Cir.1998) (holding that "neither McDonnell Douglas nor the kind of McDonnell Douglas knock off which we have just sketched . . . is available here"). Instead of relying on McDonnell Douglas, the Seventh Circuit explained that a plaintiff in a credit discrimination case can defeat summary judgment by "show[ing] in a conventional way, without relying on any special doctrines of burdens shifting, that there is enough evidence, direct or circumstantial, of discrimination to create a triable issue." Id.

Although the Seventh Circuit's approach to credit discrimination claims is interesting, this court is bound to follow the precedent set forth by the Eleventh Circuit. With respect to claims brought under section 1981 and the FHA, the Eleventh Circuit has expressly held that Title VII's method of analysis governs. See Wright v. Southland Corp., 187 F.3d 1287, 1298 n. 12 (11th Cir.1999) (stating that "[c]laims under 1981 are analyzed in the same manner as claims under Title VII"); Secretary, United States Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev. v. Blackwell, 908 F.2d 864, 870 (11th Cir.1990) (holding that the "the legal framework developed by the federal courts in discrimination 1338 cases brought under . . . Title VII of the Civil Rights Act" applies in *1338 FHA cases). As for the Eleventh Circuit's stance on ECOA claims, the court notes that it has been unable to locate a case in which the Eleventh Circuit applied Title VII's framework to a claim brought pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a). Nevertheless, this court concludes that Title VII's analytical approach applies to ECOA discrimination claims. The court rejects the approach take by the Seventh Circuit for two reasons. First, all circuits that have addressed the issue, other than the Seventh, have applied Title VII's framework to ECOA claims. See Matthiesen v. Banc One Mortgage Corp., 173 F.3d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir.1999) (affirming the district court's decision to analyze the plaintiff's ECOA "claim in the same manner as discrimination claims brought under Title VII"); Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs., Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 406 (6th Cir.1998) (applying Title VII's framework to ECOA claim); Moore v. United States Dep't of Agric., 55 F.3d 991, 995 (5th Cir.1995) (stating that because the plaintiff produced direct evidence of discrimination in ECOA claim, the plaintiff could "bypass the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework commonly applied in discrimination cases"); Crestar Bank v. Driggs, No. Civ. A. 99-2031-GTV, 1993 WL 198187, at *1 (4th Cir. June 11, 1993) (applying Title VII's framework to ECOA claim); Mercado-Garcia v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 979 F.2d 890, 893 (1st Cir.1992) (same); Gross v. United States Small Bus. Admin., 669 F.Supp. 50, 52-53 (N.D.N.Y.1987), aff'd 867 F.2d 1423 (2d Cir.1988) (same); see also Sallion v. SunTrust Bank, Atlanta, 87 F.Supp.2d 1323, 1327 (N.D.Ga.2000) (same); Massey v. First Greensboro Home Equity, Inc., No. 97-1292-CIV-T-17, 1998 WL 231141, *9 (M.D.Fla. April 27, 1998) ("In analyzing the ECOA statute, courts have frequently imported from the employment discrimination arena (i.e., Title VII) the tests for establishing a cause of action."). Second, the Eleventh Circuit has unflinchingly applied Title VII's analytical framework to a host of anti-discrimination statutes, thus this court does not find any reason to suspect that the Eleventh Circuit would take a different approach to the ECOA. See Durley v. APAC, Inc., 236 F.3d 651, 657 (11th Cir.2000) (applying Title VII's analysis to Americans with Disabilities Act); Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th Cir.2000) (applying Title VII's analysis to Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Wright, 187 F.3d at 1298 (applying Title VII's analysis to section 1981); Blackwell, 908 F.2d at 870 (applying Title VII's analysis to FHA); see also Carter v. Lurleen B. Wallace Junior College, 173 F.Supp.2d 1204, 1209 (M.D.Ala.2001) (applying Title VII's analysis to Rehabilitation Act).
Having concluded that Title VII's analytical framework will govern the Plaintiff's section 1981, FHA and ECOA claims, the court will now address the merits of these claims. As discussed above, Title VII's framework permits a plaintiff in a discrimination case to proceed by one of two means: 1) circumstantial evidence under McDonnell Douglas burden shifting, or 2) direct evidence. See Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets, 196 F.3d 1354, 1359 (11th Cir.1999). "Direct evidence is evidence that establishes the existence of discriminatory intent behind the employment decision without any inference or presumption. Therefore, remarks by non-decisionmakers or remarks unrelated to the decision making process itself are not direct evidence of discrimination." Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir.1998) (citations omitted). As the Eleventh Circuit has explained, "only the most blatant remarks, whose intent could be nothing other than to discriminate on the protected classification are direct evidence of discrimination." Id. (internal quotations omitted); see Gullatte v. 1339 Westpoint Stevens, Inc., 100 *1339 F.Supp.2d 1315, 1318 (M.D.Ala.2000) (explaining that "the paradigm example of direct evidence would be a statement such as `Fire Earley 0907 he is too old'.") (quoting Merritt v. Dillard Paper Company, 120 F.3d 1181, 1190 (11th Cir.1997)). In this case, none of the statements regarding the Plaintiff's race outlined above meet the standards of direct evidence of race discrimination, thus the court's analysis will be guided by the three-step framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).
Under the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of race discrimination. Id. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. At the second stage, the burden of production is placed upon the defendant to articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its adverse action. See Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). Once the defendant satisfies its burden of production, the plaintiff then has the burden of persuading the court that the proffered reason for the defendant's action is a

pretext for discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089. The plaintiff may satisfy this burden either directly, by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer, or indirectly, by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of belief. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089 ; Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1528 (11th Cir.1997). A plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the defendant's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the defendant unlawfully discriminated against the plaintiff.[5]See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000).
Although McDonnell Douglas originally articulated the elements required for a prima facie case of discrimination in the employment setting, the Eleventh Circuit has recognized that the "elements of a prima facie case are flexible and should be tailored, on a case-by-case basis, to differing factual circumstances." Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1123 (11th Cir.1993) (internal quotations omitted); see Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978) (stating that the McDonnell Douglas analysis "was never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic" and is "merely a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of common experience as it bears on the critical question of discrimination"). In the credit discrimination context, a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of discrimination by offering evidence showing: 1) that the plaintiff is a member of a protected class; 2) that the plaintiff applied for and was qualified for a loan from the defendant; 3) that the loan was rejected despite the plaintiff's qualifications; and 4) that the defendant continued to approve loans for applicants outside of the plaintiff's protected class with similar qualifications. See, e.g., Rowe v. Union Planters Bank, 289 F.3d 533, 535 (8th Cir.2002) (listing prima facie elements for credit discrimination 1340 claim brought under *1340 the FHA and ECOA); Sallion, 87 F.Supp.2d at 1329 (listing prima facie elements for credit discrimination claim brought under section 1981 and ECOA).[6]
In this case, the parties do not dispute the existence of the first and third elements, as the Plaintiff is an AfricanAmerican who applied for a line of credit and Sterling rejected his application despite his qualifications. Therefore, the only contested aspects of the Plaintiff's prima facie case are whether the Plaintiff was "qualified" for a $100,000 unsecured line of credit, and whether Sterling continued to approve loans for white applicants with "similar qualifications." Even assuming the Plaintiff could establish that he was qualified for the line of credit he requested, the court concludes that the Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence to establish that Sterling approved loans for white applicants with similar qualifications.
In the employment discrimination context, the Eleventh Circuit has explained that in order to meet the comparability requirement of a prima facie case, "a plaintiff is required to show that he is similarly situated in all relevant aspects to the non-minority employee." Silvera v. Orange County Sch. Bd., 244 F.3d 1253, 1259 (11th Cir.2001). "[T]he `relevant aspects' are those factual elements which determine whether reasoned analogy supports, or demands, a like result." Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth College, 889 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir.1989). For example, when an employee asserts a discrimination claim based on an adverse discipline decision, the most important factors to consider when comparing the plaintiff against another employee "are the nature of the offenses committed and the nature of the punishments imposed." Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th Cir.1999) (citing Dartmouth Review, 889 F.2d at 19). Applying this standard to the credit discrimination context, the Plaintiff must present evidence that he was "similarly situated in all relevant aspects" to the non-minority applicants who received loans from Sterling. In other words, a comparator's credit qualifications and loan details must be "nearly identical" to the Plaintiff's in order to prevent this court from second guessing the bank's business decision "and confusing apples with oranges." Id.; see Sallion, 87 F.Supp.2d at 1331 ("[A plaintiff] does not have to find an exact match between her application and applicants outside the protected classes who received loans, but comparator loan files must be significantly parallel in every material respect.").
In support of his position that Sterling approved loans for non-minority applicants with similar qualifications, the Plaintiff has introduced into evidence credit files of twenty Caucasian credit applicants who sought unsecured loans of $100,000 or more between January 2000 and April 2002. See Worrell Depo., Exhibits 16-35. Additionally, the Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit from Charles L. "Rusty" Williams, an expert in banking and loan decision making, that analyzes this data. See Plaintiff's Response, Exhibit 1. Although Williams concedes that "not all of the files produced are comparator loan files," he has highlighted three specific files that he believes "significantly parallel" the Plaintiff's loan file. Id. at p. 5. Williams directs the court's attention to the loan files

identified by the parties as numbers 17, 19, and 29. See Worrell Depo., Exhibits 17, 19, 29; Plaintiff's Response, Exhibits 17, 19, 29.
1341 After considering the factual specifics of these files against the Plaintiff's file, the *1341 court concludes that they are neither "nearly identical" nor "similarly situated in all relevant aspects." This conclusion is warranted for several reasons. First, unlike the three comparators, the Plaintiff was the only person who had active unsecured lines of credit at other financial institutions at the time he applied for his loan. Second, the undisputed evidence establishes that the Plaintiff's annual income was approximately $51,000.[7]See supra note 3. By comparison, "loan 17" earned $145,000, "loan 19" earned $300,000, and "loan 29" earned $148,000. See Plaintiff's Response, Exhibits 1(A)-(C). Stated differently, the closest comparator to the Plaintiff earned approximately three times as much money as he did. Third, the Plaintiff was applying for his first line of credit with Sterling, thus he did not have an established credit relationship. In contrast, "loan 17" had been renewed 3 times, "loan 19" had been renewed twice, and "loan 29" had been renewed 5 times. See Worrell Depo., Exhibit 17, p. 35; Exhibit 19, p. 63; Exhibit 29, p. 349. Taken together, the Plaintiff has not directed the court to any evidence to suggest that an applicant similarly situated to the Plaintiff in terms of a prior credit relationship, existing lines of credit, and annual income received a loan from Sterling. Each of these factors is a "relevant aspect" of a bank's decision to extend or deny credit, thus the court concludes that the Plaintiff has not established the requisite degree of similarity to meet his burden at the prima facie stage.
Although the Plaintiff has directed the court to areas of his credit history which are similar to the three comparator loans 0907 for example, total assets and Beacon Score 0907 the areas discussed above are sufficiently dissimilar to destroy any presumption of discrimination that could arise from a comparison of the loan files. As stated by the Eleventh Circuit, a "valid prima facie case creates a presumption that discrimination has occurred." Walker v. Mortham, 158 F.3d 1177, 1183 (11th Cir.1998). The "similarly situated" prong of the prima facie test is important because no presumption of discrimination arises the fact that a defendant treated dissimilar persons differently. The present case illustrates this principle, as the Plaintiff has failed to show that Sterling approved a loan for a non-minority applicant "similarly situated" to the Plaintiff "in all relevant aspects." Because the Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the Defendants.
Even assuming, however, that the Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case, the court concludes that the Plaintiff's claims would fail at the pretext stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. With respect to Sterling's legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its decision, Sterling denied the Plaintiff's loan request due to the Plaintiff's "heavy debt to income ratio." See Defendants' Brief, p. 14. Specifically, the Plaintiff had an individual income of $51,484 and his financial statement showed a debt of $265,000 and unsecured lines of credit totaling an additional $200,000. See Plaintiff's Brief, Exhibit 7. As Hill stated in his October 27, 2000 letter to the Plaintiff: 1342 "Bottom line, with a potential debt load of $465,000 on income of $51,484," Sterling was not prepared to *1342 offer a $100,000 unsecured line of credit. Id.
Because Sterling articulated a non-discriminatory reason for its decision, the burden shifts back to the Plaintiff to offer sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that Sterling's proffered reason was not the true reasons for its decision to deny the Plaintiff's credit application, but a pretext for discrimination. See Walker, 286 F.3d at 1277 ("Our pretext analysis focuses on a narrow question: Would the proffered evidence allow a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the articulated reason for the decision was not the real reason?"). The Plaintiff can accomplish this task "(1) by showing that the legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons should not be believed; or (2) by showing that, in light of all of the evidence, discriminatory reasons more likely motivated the decision than the proffered reasons." See Standard, 161 F.3d at 1332. The Plaintiff's evidence of pretext comes in three forms. First, Plaintiff points to Greg Calhoun's testimony as evidence of Sterling's racial discrimination. Second, the Plaintiff argues that Sterling's reasons are unworthy of belief because his application should have been accepted due to his superior credit rating and substantial net worth. Third, the Plaintiff contends that Sterling's failure to follow its own lending policies is evidence of pretext.
When viewed in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, Greg Calhoun's testimony establishes that members of Sterling's Board of Directors laughed and joked after Worrell informed the Board that the Plaintiff may be contacting them about the decision to deny his loan.[8] According to the Eleventh Circuit, however, "comments by

non-decisionmakers do not raise an inference of discrimination, especially if those comments are ambiguous." Mitchell v. USBI Co., 186 F.3d 1352, 1355 (11th Cir.1999). In the present case, the undisputed evidence establishes that Hill, Ramsey, and Worrell made a "group decision" to deny the Plaintiff's loan request prior to the September Board meeting, thus the Board was not a decisionmaker in this process. Only Ramsey, Worrell, or Sterling's loan committee had the requisite authority to approve a loan request. See Hill Depo., p. 50-51 (stating that before a loan can be presented to the committee, it must be approved by the president of the bank or a senior officer); Ramsey Aff., p. 1 ("Normal procedure at Sterling Bank is for loan officers to prepare a loan ticket to present to either loan committee, to Alan Worrell, to me, or any combination of the three for approval."). Furthermore, the laughter that Calhoun says he heard most certainly qualifies as an ambiguous statement that does not necessarily reflect discriminatory intent. See Mauter v. Hardy Corp., 825 F.2d 1554, 1558 (11th Cir.1987) (holding that statement by non-decisionmaker that "[t]he Hardy Corporation was going to weed out the old ones" did not raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding discriminatory intent). There is no evidence to suggest that the Board made any racially derogatory jokes or comments. Compare Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 781-82 (11th Cir.1991) (concluding that racially derogatory jokes are evidence of discriminatory intent). Consequently, the Plaintiff cannot rely on Calhoun's deposition testimony as evidence of pretext.
1343 *1343 The Plaintiff also contends that he has undermined the truthfulness of Sterling's reasons by producing evidence of his excellent credit credentials. For example, the Plaintiff states that he "was worth $2.6 million when he applied for the loan, he had an unblemished financial history, his beacon score was very high, he had over half a million dollars in liquid assets, he had over $100,000.00 in Sterling Bank and he was close friends with [Kenny Hill,] the Vice President of Sterling Bank." See Plaintiff's Brief, p. 31. The central problem with this line of argument is that it fails to recognize that proving pretext requires more than showing that a bank was wrong in its assessment of the underlying facts or was otherwise lacking in wisdom in its decision not to extend credit. Federal courts do not sit as a court of appeals that reexamines a bank's business decisions. See Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th Cir.1991). Instead, the court's inquiry at the pretext stage is limited to whether the bank "gave an honest explanation of its behavior." Id. Therefore, to establish pretext, the Plaintiff must meet the bank's non-discriminatory "reason head on and rebut it," rather than simply present evidence of his positive credentials and ask the court to substitute its business judgment for that of the bank. See Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030.
The Plaintiff relies heavily on the expert analysis of Charles "Rusty" Williams to establish pretext,[9] however, Williams's affidavit merely provides a thorough recitation of the Plaintiff's positive credentials and does not cast doubt on Sterling's assertion that the Plaintiff's individual annual income was insufficient relative to his current debt level to support another $100,000 unsecured line of credit. Although Williams states that the "assertion that [the Plaintiff's] income was not sufficient to support $300,000 of unsecured loans is unfounded[,]" Williams's only supporting evidence is the Plaintiff's "large number of liquid assets" and positive credit report. See Plaintiff's Response, Exhibit 1, p. 21. This evidence is insufficient to establish pretext because Williams completely ignores the fact that Sterling did not deny the Plaintiff's loan application because of insufficient liquid assets or a poor credit rating. Sterling rejected the Plaintiff's loan request because his annual income could not shoulder an additional $100,000 worth of debt. Rather than undermine Sterling's non-discriminatory reason "head on," Williams has "side-stepped" the issue by pointing to evidence of the Plaintiff's positive credentials, which, as the court previously explained, cannot establish pretext.[10]
1344 *1344 Finally, the Plaintiff attempts to establish pretext by arguing that Sterling has failed to follow it own banking policies. See Plaintiff's Response, pp. 9, 31. According to Williams, Sterling did not adhere to its loan policies "when granting loans to various Caucasian individuals." Id., Exhibit 1, p. 22. Nevertheless, Williams fails to direct the court to any specific loan policy provisions that Sterling violated. In his brief, the Plaintiff contends that Sterling "failed to calculate debt service coverage ratios on all but one of the twenty loan files." Id., p. 9. Even assuming that this fact is true, it is not enough to establish pretext. Although "[d]epartures from normal procedures may be suggestive of discrimination," Morrison v. Booth, 763 F.2d 1366, 1374 (11th Cir. 1985), "the mere fact that [a bank] failed to follow its own internal procedures does not necessarily suggest that [the bank] was motivated by illegal discriminatory intent." See Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441, 454 (10th Cir.1995). Here, the court concludes that Sterling's failure to calculate debt service coverage ratios in some of its loan files neither undermines its non-discriminatory reasons for denying the Plaintiff's loan nor provides a basis from which

a reasonable jury could conclude that Sterling was more likely motivated by a discriminatory reason.[11]See Standard, 161 F.3d at 1332.
V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the reasons stated above, the court concludes that the Plaintiff has not proven a prima facie case of credit discrimination due to the absence of sufficient evidence to establish that Sterling approved loans for applicants outside of the plaintiff's protected class with similar loan qualifications. Even if the Plaintiff could prove his prima facie case, however, the court finds that the evidence submitted is insufficient to establish that Sterling's nondiscriminatory reasons for its loan decision are pretextual. Accordingly, Sterling's Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be GRANTED, and it is hereby ORDERED as follows:
1) Plaintiff's Motions to Strike (Docs. # 59 & 71) are DENIED as moot.
2) Defendants' Motion to Strike (Doc. # 69) is GRANTED with respect to the statements made by Gregory Calhoun that are not based on his personal knowledge, and the statements made by Charles L. "Rusty" Williams that amount to conclusions of law. In all other respects, the Motion is DENIED as moot.
3) Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 40) is GRANTED as to all of the Plaintiff's claims.
4) Final Judgment will be entered in favor of the Defendants.
5) A separate judgement will be entered in accordance with this Memorandum Opinion and Order.
FINAL JUDGMENT
In accordance with the Memorandum Opinion and Order entered on this day granting the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment,
1345 Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Defendants Sterling Bank and Synovus Financial *1345 Corporation of Alabama, and against Plaintiff Nash J. Cooley.
Costs are taxed against the Plaintiff.
[1] The evidence submitted also reflects the fact that the Plaintiff established a third line of credit with South Trust Bank in Atlanta, Georgia in 1998. See Jackson Depo., pp. 16-18. Like his other lines, the Plaintiff received a renewable $100,000 unsecured line for credit in his name only. Id. at p. 17. Although the evidence is unclear on this point, this line had apparently lapsed or was up for renewal during the summer of 2000. The Plaintiff stated in his deposition that he had this line of credit, however, "he hadn't signed the papers yet." See Cooley Depo., at p. 74.
[2] According to Sterling's Loan Policy:
A Beacon Score identifies the risk of delinquency within 24 months and is calculated by the Credit Bureau. This score does not take into account capacity to repay, value of collateral, etc. and therefore should not be used as the sole basis for extending or denying credit.
See Plaintiff's Response, Exhibit 9, p. SB 106.
[3] The Plaintiff does not dispute this calculation and even admits that his personal income was "approximately forty-something to fifty-something that year." See Cooley Depo., at p. 93.
[4] Although the Plaintiff raises claims under both the ECOA and FHA, the court notes that the Plaintiff would only be entitled to recovery under one statute. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(i) ("No person aggrieved by a violation of [15

U.S.C. § 1691] and by a violation of section 3605 of Title 42 shall recover under [15 U.S.C. § 1691] and section 3612 of Title 42, if such violation is based on the same transaction.").
[5] "Although the defendant is entitled to summary judgment in its favor if the plaintiff does not proffer sufficient evidence of pretext, the converse is not necessarily true. If the plaintiff does proffer sufficient evidence that the defendant's stated reasons are pretextual, the plaintiff still may not be entitled to take his case to a jury." Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1025 n. 11 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc). Indeed, there may "be instances where, although the plaintiff has established a prima facie case and set forth sufficient evidence to reject the defendant's explanation, no rational factfinder could conclude that the action was discriminatory." Id.
[6] The court notes that neither party disputes the elements required to establish a prima facie case of credit discrimination. See Plaintiff's Response, p. 25 (listing prima facie elements of a credit discrimination claim); See Defendants' Brief, p. 11 (same).
[7] Although the Plaintiff's expert repeatedly states that the Plaintiff's income was $104,400, this figure ignores the fact that the Plaintiff filed a joint tax return with his wife. Had the Plaintiff applied for a joint line of credit with his wife, joint income would be appropriate for the income analysis. However, by opting for a line of credit in his name only, the Plaintiff's individual income is the only relevant figure for present purposes.
[8] The court agrees with the Defendants that Calhoun's testimony regarding why Sterling denied the Plaintiff's loan is due to be stricken. Calhoun was not involved in the decision-making process and admits that he never saw the Plaintiff's financial statement or income tax returns. See Calhoun Depo., p. 34. Consequently, Calhoun had no personal knowledge upon which to base his conclusion that Sterling denied the Plaintiff's loan application because of his race.
[9] Although Williams repeatedly states that Sterling's reasons for denying the Plaintiff's loan are "merely pretextual," these statements are legal conclusions that are due to be stricken. See Strickland v. Royal Lubricant Co., Inc., 911 F.Supp. 1460, 1469 (M.D.Ala. 1995) ("[A]n an expert may not give an opinion that amounts to a blanket assertion of how a case should be decided. Particularly on a motion for summary judgment, the admission of such an opinion would be contrary to the plaintiff's burden, which is to present a genuine issue of material fact. Hence, the court will disregard any attempt by Purswell to instruct the court on the requisite legal conclusion in regard to the defendant's motion for summary judgment.").
[10] Williams's failure to calculate the Plaintiff's "income-to-debt" ratio is telling. According to the court's calculations, the Plaintiff's ratio is .11 ($51,484/$465,000). Using the figures provided by the Plaintiff, the court reached this figure by dividing the Plaintiff's individual income by the sum of his total liabilities and existing lines of credit. In contrast, all three of the closest comparators had stronger ratios: "Loan 29" = .14 ($148,000/ $1,030,000); "Loan 19" = .21 ($300,000/$1,443,000); "Loan 17" = .21 ($145,000/$696,208). See Plaintiff's Response, Exhibit 1(A)-(C). As these figures detail, the Plaintiff cannot establish that Sterling approved a loan for an individual with a ratio less than .14. Therefore, even a comparison of the income-to-debt ratios does not provide any evidence of pretext.
[11] The Plaintiff has moved to strike those portions of Robert Ramsey's Affidavit that explain the reasons for the omissions in the credit files (Doc. # 71). This motion is due to be denied as moot because, even assuming the truth of the omissions without regard to Sterling's explanations, they do not establish pretext.
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 CM/ECF - U.S. District Court: ALMD - Docket Report

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U.S. District Court Alabama Middle District (Montgomery) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:02-cv-01069-WHA-SRW

CLOSED

Cooley v. Sterling Bank, et al Assigned to: Honorable W. Harold Albritton, III Referred to: Mag. Judge Susan Russ Walker Demand: $0 Cause: 42:1981 Civil Rights

Date Filed: 09/17/2002 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Plaintiff Nash J. Cooley

represented by Daniel Alexander Hannan Franklin & Stein PC 63 South Royal Street Suite 1109 Mobile, AL 36602 251-433-0051 Fax: 251-433-3919 Email: dahlawyer@hotmail.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Greg Louis Davis 6987 Halycon Park Drive Montgomery, AL 36117 334-832-9080 Fax: 334-409-7001 Email: gldavis@knology.net LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Sterling Bank

represented by Dennis R. Bailey Rushton Stakely Johnston & Garrett PC PO Box 270 Montgomery, AL 36101-0270 334-206-3100 Fax: 262-6277 Email: drb@rsjg.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Philip Keith Lichtman Rushton Stakely Johnston & Garrett PC

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Defendant Synovus Financial Corp. of Alabama
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PO Box 270 Montgomery, AL 36101-0270 334-206-3100 Fax: 262-6277 TERMINATED: 05/02/2003 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
R. Austin Huffaker, Jr. Rushton Stakely Johnston & Garrett PC PO Box 270 Montgomery, AL 36101-0270 334-206-3126 Fax: 334-262-6277 Email: rah2@rsjg.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Charles Ward, Jr. Rushton Stakely Johnston & Garrett PC PO Box 270 Montgomery, AL 36101-0270 334-206-3229 Fax: 262-0033 Email: rcw@rsjg.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Dennis R. Bailey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Philip Keith Lichtman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/02/2003 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
R. Austin Huffaker, Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Charles Ward, Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
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Defendant
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation "FDIC" TERMINATED: 04/08/2003

represented by Charles L. Cope Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 550 17th Street, NW Washington, DC 20429 (202) 393-8400 Fax: 736-0584 TERMINATED: 04/08/2003 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Larry L. Goodman Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 550 17th Street, NW Washington, DC 20429 (202) 393-8400 Fax: 736-0584 TERMINATED: 04/08/2003 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 09/17/2002 09/17/2002 09/26/2002 09/26/2002 09/26/2002 09/30/2002
10/03/2002 10/15/2002 10/15/2002 10/16/2002 10/17/2002

#

Docket Text

1 COMPLAINT Filing Fee $ 150.00 Receipt # 93939 (vmc) (Entered: 09/25/2002)
1 DEMAND for jury trial by Nash J. Cooley (vmc) (Entered: 09/25/2002)
2 SUMMONS issued for Sterling Bank; summons and complaint mailed by cmrrr to named dft (vmc) (Entered: 09/26/2002)
NOTICE of Assignment to a United States Magistrate Judge sent to Counsel for Nash J. Cooley. (vmc) (Entered: 09/26/2002)
file referred to Judge McPherson (vmc) (Entered: 09/26/2002)
3 RETURN RECEIPT CARD showing service of summons and complaint on Laura Keener on 9/27/02 for Sterling Bank . Answer due on 10/17/02 for Sterling Bank (vmc) (Entered: 09/30/2002)
file referred to Judge Walker (vmc) (Entered: 10/03/2002)
4 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance for Sterling Bank by Philip Keith Lichtman, Dennis R. Bailey (vmc) (Entered: 10/16/2002)
5 MOTION by Sterling Bank for Extension of Time to respond to complaint referred to Mag. Judge Susan R. Walker (vmc) (Entered: 10/16/2002)
NOTICE of Assignment to a United States Magistrate Judge sent to Counsel for Sterling Bank . (vmc) (Entered: 10/16/2002)
6 Stamped ORDER granting [5-1] motion for Extension of Time to respond to complaint reset Answer deadline to 10/23/02 for Sterling Bank ( by Mag. Judge

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10/22/2002 10/22/2002 10/22/2002 10/23/2002 10/23/2002 10/24/2002
11/07/2002 11/12/2002
12/20/2002
01/31/2003
02/03/2003 02/03/2003 02/03/2003 02/12/2003
02/14/2003 02/25/2003

Susan R. Walker ) , copies provided to counsel. (vmc) (Entered: 10/17/2002)
CASE reassigned to Judge W. H. Albritton III (vmc) (Entered: 10/23/2002)
REFERRAL JUDGE assigned to Mag. Judge Susan R. Walker (vmc) (Entered: 10/23/2002)
7 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance for Sterling Bank by Robert Charles Ward Jr. (vmc) (Entered: 10/23/2002)
file referred to Judge Albritton (vmc) (Entered: 10/23/2002)
8 ANSWER to Complaint by Sterling Bank , referred to Judge W. H. Albritton III (vmc) (Entered: 10/24/2002)
9 ORDER that the Rule 26(f) report containing the discovery plan shall be filed as soon as practicable but not later than 11/7/02 Planning Meeting report due on 11/7/02 ( signed by Judge W. H. Albritton III ) , copies provided to counsel. (vmc) (Entered: 10/24/2002)
10 Rule 26(f) REPORT; referred to Judge Albritton (vmc) (Entered: 11/08/2002)
11 SCHEDULING ORDER setting Pretrial Conference for 9/9/03 before Judge W. H. Albritton III Motion Filing deadline on 6/12/03 ; Discovery cutoff 8/4/03 ; jury trial set for 10/20/03 before Judge W. H. Albritton III; set amended pleading deadline for 1/12/03 for the plaintiff and 2/16/03 for the dft ( signed by Judge W. H. Albritton III ) , copies provided to counsel; furn: yg war el md. (vmc) (Entered: 11/12/2002)
12 ORDER reset Jury Trial 10/27/03 before Judge W. H. Albritton III ( signed by Judge W. H. Albritton III ) , copies provided to counsel; furn: el hc yg. (vmc) (Entered: 12/20/2002)
13 MOTION by Nash J. Cooley to Amend [1-1] complaint ; (w/proposed amended complaint attached) referred to Judge W. H. Albritton III (vmc) (Entered: 02/03/2003)
14 ORDER granting [13-1] motion to Amend [1-1] complaint ( signed by Judge W. H. Albritton III), copies provided to counsel. (vmc) (Entered: 02/03/2003)
15 AMENDED COMPLAINT by Nash J. Cooley against Synovus Financial, FDIC amending [1-1] complaint; jury demand; (vmc) (Entered: 02/03/2003)
16 SUMMONS issued for Synovus Financial, FDIC; summons and amended complaint mailed by cmrrr to named dfts (vmc) (Entered: 02/03/2003)
17 RETURN RECEIPT CARD showing service of summons and amended complaint on Fred Harris on 2/7/03 for Synovus Financial. Answer due on 2/27/03 for Synovus Financial (vmc) (Entered: 02/13/2003)
18 Response/ANSWER by Sterling Bank to amended complaint referred to Judge W. H. Albritton III (vmc) (Entered: 02/18/2003)
19 Response/ANSWER by Synovus Financial (Attorney Dennis R. Bailey, Robert Charles Ward Jr., Philip Keith Lichtman) to amended complaint referred to Judge W. H. Albritton III (vmc) (Entered: 02/26/2003)

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03/10/2003 03/10/2003 03/12/2003
04/04/2003 04/04/2003 04/07/2003 04/08/2003 04/08/2003 04/08/2003 04/08/2003 04/18/2003 04/22/2003
04/25/2003 04/28/2003 05/02/2003

20 MOTION by FDIC to Dismiss ; (w/proposed order attached) referred to Judge W. H. Albritton III (vmc) (Entered: 03/11/2003)
21 MEMORANDUM by FDIC in support of [20-1] motion to Dismiss by FDIC referred to Judge W. H. Albritton III (vmc) (Entered: 03/12/2003)
22 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE as to why dft's FDIC's motion to dismiss should not be granted: Response to Order to Show Cause due on 4/2/03 for Nash J. Cooley set reply brief deadline for 4/9/03 for FDIC [20-1] motion to Dismiss by FDIC set for submission on 4/9/03 ( signed by Judge W. H. Albritton III ) , copies provided to counsel. (vmc) (Entered: 03/12/2003)
23 RESPONSE by Nash J. Cooley to [20-1] motion to Dismiss by FDIC referred to Judge W. H. Albritton III (vmc) (Entered: 04/07/2003)
23 Second MOTION by Nash J. Cooley to Amend [1-1] complaint ; (w/proposed second amended complaint attached) referred to Judge W. H. Albritton III (vmc) (Entered: 04/07/2003)
24 MOTION by Nash J. Cooley for Extension of Time to name experts referred to Judge W. H. Albritton III (vmc) (Entered: 04/08/2003)
25 Stamped ORDER granting [20-1] motion to Dismiss ( by Judge W. H. Albritton III ) , copies provided to counsel. (vmc) (Entered: 04/08/2003)
26 Stamped ORDER granting [23-1] motion to Amend [1-1] complaint ( by Judge W. H. Albritton III ) , copies provided to counsel. (vmc) (Entered: 04/08/2003)
27 Second AMENDED COMPLAINT by Nash J. Cooley amending [1-1] complaint; jury demand (vmc) (Entered: 04/08/2003)
28 Stamped ORDER granting [24-1] motion for Extension of Time to name experts ( by Judge W. H. Albritton III ) , copies provided to counsel. (vmc) (Entered: 04/08/2003)
29 MOTION by Sterling Bank, Synovus Financial to Strike expert testimony ; (w/attach) referred to Judge W. H. Albritton III (vmc) (Entered: 04/18/2003)
30 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE as to why dft's motion to strike expert testimony should not be granted: Response to Order to Show Cause due on 4/28/03 for Nash J. Cooley ( signed by Judge W. H. Albritton III ) , copies provided to counsel. (vmc) (Entered: 04/22/2003)
31 MOTION by Sterling Bank for P. Keith Lichtman to Withdraw as counsel for defendant referred to Judge W. H. Albritton III (vmc) (Entered: 04/28/2003)
32 RESPONSE by Nash J. Cooley to [29-1] motion to Strike expert testimony by Synovus Financial, Sterling Bank referred to Judge W. H. Albritton III (vmc) (Entered: 04/29/2003)
33 ORDER set reply brief deadline for 5/9/03 for Synovus Financial, for Sterling Bank ; Counsel should attempt to resolve this matter by agreement, if possible, before the filing of the reply ( signed by Judge W. H. Albritton III ) , copies provided to counsel. (vmc) (Entered: 05/02/2003)

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05/02/2003 05/06/2003 05/08/2003
05/14/2003 06/09/2003 06/09/2003 06/09/2003 06/09/2003 06/10/2003
06/17/2003 06/17/2003 06/19/2003 06/19/2003 06/19/2003 06/23/2003

34 Stamped ORDER granting [31-1] motion for P. Keith Lichtman to Withdraw as counsel for defendant (Terminated P. Keith Lichtman) ( by Judge W. H. Albritton III ) , copies provided to counsel. (vmc) (Entered: 05/02/2003)
35 NOTICE of Resolution of Matter by Agreement by Sterling Bank, Synovus Financial; (w/attachments) referred to Judge Albritton (vmc) Modified on 05/07/2003 (Entered: 05/07/2003)
36 ORDER extending deadline for defendant to exchange expert witness information by five days; denying as moot [29-1] motion to Strike expert testimony (signed by Judge W. H. Albritton III), copies provided to counsel. (ajr) (Entered: 05/08/2003)
37 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance for Nash J. Cooley by Greg L. Davis (vmc) (Entered: 05/15/2003)
38 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance for Sterling Bank, Synovus Financial by R. Austin Huffaker Jr. (vmc) (Entered: 06/10/2003)
39 OBJECTION by Sterling Bank, Synovus Financial to Plaintiff's Exhibit List; (w/attachments) referred to Judge W. H. Albritton III (vmc) (Entered: 06/10/2003)
40 MOTION by Sterling Bank, Synovus Financial for Summary Judgment [EXHIBITS A-F maintained in separate binder]; referred to Judge W. H. Albritton III (vmc) (Entered: 06/10/2003)
41 BRIEF by Sterling Bank, Synovus Financial in support of [40-1] motion for Summary Judgment referred to Judge W. H. Albritton III (vmc) (Entered: 06/10/2003)
42 ORDER [40-1] motion for Summary Judgment by Synovus Financial, Sterling Bank set for submission on 7/8/03 set Brief deadline to 7/1/03 , set reply brief deadline for 7/8/03 for Synovus Financial, for Sterling Bank ( signed by Judge W. H. Albritton III ) , copies provided to counsel . (vmc) (Entered: 06/10/2003)
43 MOTION by Nash J. Cooley for Extension of Time to file its respsonse to dfts' motion for summary judgment referred to Judge W. H. Albritton III (vmc) (Entered: 06/18/2003)
44 MOTION by Nash J. Cooley to Compel referred to Mag. Judge Susan R. Walker (vmc) (Entered: 06/18/2003)
45 ORDER Defendants' Response to Motion set to 7/7/03 for [44-1] motion to Compel ( signed by Mag. Judge Susan R. Walker ) , copies provided to counsel. (vmc) (Entered: 06/19/2003)
46 Witness list by Sterling Bank; referred to Judge Albritton (vmc) (Entered: 06/19/2003)
46 Exhibit list by Sterling Bank; referred to Judge Albritton (vmc) (Entered: 06/19/2003)
47 ORDER setting Telephone Conference for 10:00 6/24/03 before Mag. Judge Susan R. Walker (signed by Mag. Judge Susan R. Walker), copies provided to counsel, JT, HC, YG. (ajr) (Entered: 06/23/2003)

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06/27/2003
06/27/2003 07/08/2003
07/15/2003 07/17/2003
07/25/2003 07/25/2003 07/28/2003 07/28/2003 07/28/2003 08/06/2003

48 ORDER as follows: 1) That the subject info sought and referred to in pla's motion to compel contains certain confidential information and the parties have shown good cause for the issuance of a protective order governing the requested info; 2) that Sterling Bank is to produce to pla documents from every Sterling Bank in Mont., AL pertaining to unsecured loan applications of $100,000.00 as further set out in order ( signed by Mag. Judge Susan R. Walker ) , copies provided to counsel. (vmc) (Entered: 06/27/2003)
49 PROTECTIVE ORDER that the following procedures and provisions shall govern pla anddfts for material info produced in this action, as set forth as further set out in order ( signed by Mag. Judge Susan R. Walker ) , copies provided to counsel. (vmc) (Entered: 06/27/2003)
50 ORDER granting [43-1] motion for Extension of Time to file its respsonse to dfts' motion for summary judgment Plaintiff's Response to Motion reset to 7/18/03 for [40-1] motion for Summary Judgment , reset reply brief deadline for 7/25/03 for Synovus Financial, for Sterling Bank [40-1] motion for Summary Judgment by Synovus Financial, Sterling Bank set for submission on 7/25/03 ( signed by Judge W. H. Albritton III ) , copies provided to counsel. (vmc) (Entered: 07/08/2003)
51 MOTION by Nash J. Cooley for extension of time to respond to defendant's motion for summary judgment referred to Judge W. H. Albritton III (djy) (Entered: 07/16/2003)
52 ORDER granting [51-1] motion for extension of time to respond to defendant's motion for summary judgment Response to Motion reset to 8/1/03 for [40-1] motion for Summary Judgment , reset reply brief deadline for 8/8/03 for Synovus Financial, for Sterling Bank [40-1] motion for Summary Judgment by Synovus Financial, Sterling Bank set for submission on 8/8/03 ( signed by Judge W. H. Albritton III ) , copies provided to counsel. (vmc) (Entered: 07/17/2003)
53 MOTION by Nash J. Cooley for extension of time to file plaintiff's response to defendants' motion for summary judgment referred to Judge W. H. Albritton III (vmc) (Entered: 07/28/2003)
54 MOTION by Nash J. Cooley to determine whether plaintiff should have topay defendants' attorney fees for producing discovery documents referred to Judge W. H. Albritton III (vmc) (Entered: 07/28/2003)
55 Stamped ORDER granting [53-1] motion for extension of time to file plaintiff's response to defendants' motion for summary judgment Plaintiff's Response to Motion reset to 8/11/03 for [40-1] motion for Summary Judgment ( by Judge W. H. Albritton III ) , copies provided to counsel. (vmc) (Entered: 07/28/2003)
** Renoticed document [55-2] order (did not pick parties) (vmc) (Entered: 07/28/2003)
Motion(s) referred to Mag. Judge Susan R. Walker : [54-1] motion to determine whether plaintiff should have to pay defendants' attorney fees for producing discovery documents (vmc) (Entered: 07/28/2003)
56 ORDER directing the defendants to file a response; Response to Motion set to 8/15/03 for [54-1] motion to determine whether plaintiff should have to pay

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08/11/2003
08/11/2003 08/11/2003 08/11/2003 08/11/2003
08/12/2003
08/13/2003
08/15/2003 08/18/2003 08/18/2003
08/18/2003 08/18/2003 08/18/2003

defendants' attorney fees ( signed by Mag. Judge Susan R. Walker ) , copies provided to counsel. (cc) (Entered: 08/06/2003)
57 ORDER set Scheduling Order Deadlines: Pretrial Conference for 11:00 9/9/03 before Judge W. H. Albritton III ; Proposed Pretrial Order due 9/5/03 ; Jury Trial set for 10/27/03 before Judge W. H. Albritton III ; ( signed by Judge W. H. Albritton III ) , copies provided to counsel; furn: yg hc war el. (vmc) (Entered: 08/11/2003)
58 MOTION by Sterling Bank, Synovus Financial for Extension of Time to file dft's reply to pla's response to dft's motion for summary jgm. referred to Judge W. H. Albritton III (vmc) (Entered: 08/12/2003)
59 MOTION by Nash J. Cooley to Strike the affidavit of F.J. Smyser referred to Judge W. H. Albritton III (vmc) (Entered: 08/12/2003)
60 RESPONSE by Nash J. Cooley to [40-1] motion for Summary Judgment by Synovus Financial, Sterling Bank; (w/attachments) referred to Judge W. H. Albritton III (vmc) (Entered: 08/12/2003)
61 RESPONSE by Nash J. Cooley to [40-1] motion for Summary Judgment by Synovus Financial, Sterling Bank; [EXHIBITS MAINTAINED IN SEPARATE BINDER Vol.1 and Vol. 2] referred to Judge W. H. Albritton III (vmc) Modified on 08/12/2003 (Entered: 08/12/2003)
62 Stamped ORDER granting [58-1] motion for Extension of Time to file dft's reply to pla's response to dft's motion for summary jgm. reset reply brief deadline for 8/18/03 for Synovus Financial, for Sterling Bank ( by Judge W. H. Albritton III ) , copies provided to counsel. (vmc) (Entered: 08/12/2003)
63 RESPONSE by Sterling Bank, Synovus Financial to [54-1] motion to determine whether plaintiff should have topay defendants' attorney fees for producing discovery documents by Nash J. Cooley (w/attachments) referred to Judge W. H. Albritton III (vmc) Modified on 08/14/2003 (Entered: 08/14/2003)
64 MOTION by Nash J. Cooley to substitute original copy ; (w/attachments) referred to Judge W. H. Albritton III (vmc) (Entered: 08/18/2003)
65 ORDER granting [64-1] motion to substitute original copy ( signed by Judge W. H. Albritton III ) , copies provided to counsel. (vmc) (Entered: 08/18/2003)
66 Reply EVIDENTIARY SUBMISSION by Sterling Bank, Synovus Financial in support of [40-1] motion for Summary Judgment [EXHIBIT G - Volume 1, 2, & 3; EXHIBITS H-M MAINTAINED IN SEPARATE BINDERS] referred to Judge W. H. Albritton III . (vmc) (Entered: 08/19/2003)
67 REPLY by Nash J. Cooley to [63-1] motion response by Synovus Financial, Sterling Bank referred to Judge W. H. Albritton III (vmc) (Entered: 08/19/2003)
68 REPLY by Sterling Bank, Synovus Financial to [67-1] brief reply by Nash J. Cooley referred to Judge W. H. Albritton III (vmc) (Entered: 08/19/2003)
69 MOTION by Sterling Bank, Synovus Financial to Strike legal conclusions asserted by the "expert" for the pla in opposition to the motion for sum. jgm; and strike legal conclusions or factual conclusions asserted by lay witness Greg

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08/20/2003 08/27/2003 09/04/2003
09/04/2003
09/04/2003 09/12/2003
09/16/2003 09/23/2003 09/25/2003 09/25/2003 10/16/2003 12/09/2003 12/09/2003

Calhoun, etc. ; (w/attachments) referred to Judge W. H. Albritton III (vmc) (Entered: 08/19/2003)
70 Supplemental REPLY by Nash J. Cooley to [68-1] brief reply by Synovus Financial, Sterling Bank referred to Judge W. H. Albritton III (vmc) (Entered: 08/21/2003)
71 MOTION by Nash J. Cooley to Strike the affidavit of Robert R. Ramsey referred to Judge W. H. Albritton III (vmc) (Entered: 08/28/2003)
72 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER (1) denying as moot [59-1] motion to Strike the affidavit of F.J. Smyser; denying as moot [71-1] motion to Strike the affidavit of Robert R. Ramsey; 2) granting [69-1] motion to Strike legal conclusions, etc. with respect to the statements made by Gregory Calhoun that are not based on his personal knowledge, and the statements made by Charles L. "Rusty" Williams that amount to conclusions of law; In all other respects, the motion is denied as moot; 3) granting [40-1] motion for Summary Judgment as to all of the plaintiff's claims; 4) Final Judgment will be entered in favor of the defendants ( signed by Judge W. H. Albritton III ), copies provided to counsel. (vmc) (Entered: 09/04/2003)
73 FINAL JUDGMENT that Judgment is hereby entered in favor of defendants Sterling Bank and Synovus Financial Corporation of AL, and against plaintiff Nash J. Cooley; Costs are taxed against the plaintiff ( signed by Judge W. H. Albritton III ), copies provided to counsel. (vmc) (Entered: 09/04/2003)
Case closed (vmc) (Entered: 09/04/2003)
74 NOTICE OF APPEAL to the United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit by Nash J. Cooley from the final judgment entered in this action on September 4, 2003. FILING FEE $ 105.00 RECEIPT # 98970; Copies Provided (kcg) (Entered: 09/16/2003)
Notice of Appeal and certified copy of docket to USCA: [74-1] appeal by Nash J. Cooley (kcg) (Entered: 09/16/2003)
USCA Case Number Re: [74-1] appeal by Nash J. Cooley USCA NUMBER: 03-14727-FF (kcg) (Entered: 09/29/2003)
75 Bill of costs (w/attachments) in the amount of $ 3,830.85 entered by Sterling Bank, Synovus Financial (vmc) (Entered: 09/26/2003)
Costs $ 3,830.85 taxed for Sterling Bank, Synovus Financial (vmc) (Entered: 09/26/2003)
CERTIFICATE OF READINESS of record on appeal mailed to USCA, 11th Circuit and counsel: [74-1] appeal by Nash J. Cooley (ydw) (Entered: 10/16/2003)
REQUEST for Record On Appeal from USCA re: [74-1] appeal by Nash J. Cooley (ydw) (Entered: 12/09/2003)
Certified and transmitted Record on Appeal to U.S. Court of Appeals: [74-1] appeal by Nash J. Cooley (ydw) (Entered: 12/09/2003)

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12/22/2003 08/18/2004 08/18/2004 08/18/2004 08/18/2004

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT of RECEIPT of RECORD ON APPEAL from USCA Re: [74-1] appeal by Nash J. Cooley USCA Number: 03-14727-FF (ydw) (Entered: 12/29/2003)
76 Per Curiam Opinion received from USCA Eleventh Circuit of Opinion Entered on July 16, 2004. AFFIRMED (ydw, ) (Entered: 08/18/2004)
77 USCA JUDGMENT issued as MANDATE on 8/17/04 as to 03-14727-FF, 74 Notice of Appeal filed by Nash J. Cooley; AFFIRMING the District Court's decision (ydw, ) (Entered: 08/18/2004)
78 BILL OF COSTS in the amount of $78.30 by Sterling Bank, Synovus Financial Corp. of Alabama. (ydw, ) (Entered: 08/18/2004)
Appeal Record (consisting of one box of exhibits and one volume of pleading) Returned from USCA: re: 03-14727-FF, 74 Notice of Appeal. There is no pdf document with this entry (ydw, ) (Entered: 08/18/2004)

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 Cooley v. Sterling Bank, 116 Fed.Appx. 242 (Table) (2004)

116 Fed.Appx. 242 (Table) (The decision of the Court is referenced in a “Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions” appearing
in the Federal Reporter. The Eleventh Circuit provides by rule that unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent. They may be cited as
persuasive authority, provided that a copy of the unpublished opinion is attached to or incorporated within the brief, petition or motion. Eleventh Circuit
Rules, Rule 36-2, 28 U.S.C.A.) United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
Nash J. Cooley

v. Sterling Bank NO. 03-14727 | July 16, 2004 Appeal From: M.D.Ala., No. 02-01069-CV-A-N, 280 F.Supp.2d 1331
Opinion
Affirmed.
	  

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