Campbell v. McGruder

JC-DC-001-046
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LEONARD CAMPBELL, et al., Plaintiffs,
V
ANDERSON McGRUDER, et al., Defendants.
INMATES OF D.C. JAIL, et al., Plaintiffs,
V• DELBERT C. JACKSON, et al-,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 1462-71

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(Judge Bryant)

"
FILED

:

rAU822tt5

: JAMES F. DAVEY, Cferk

• Civil Action No. 75-1668 : (Judge Bryant)

:

STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES TO REDUCE THE POPULATION AT THE D.C. JAIL
The partieJ to the above actions hereby agree as ollows: (1) They will urge the Court to stay the effective date of the Memorandum and Order dated July 13, 1985 in the above cases conditioned on compliance with the provisions of this stipulation.
(2) The defendants will reduce the population at the D.C. Jail so that it will not exceed the levels indicated

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on the following dates:

August 23, 1985 September 1, 1985 September 13, 1985 September 27, 1985 October 11, 1985 October 25, 1985 November 8, 1985 November 22, 1985
and thereafter

2200 Residents 2050 Residents 1990 Residents 1930 Residents 1870 Residents 1810 Residents 1750 Residents 1694 Residents

If within 48 hours of a violation of the above levels, the population still exceeds the level indicated, the Court's Order dated July 13, 1985 will automatically be reinstated in full force and effect, and the defendants will be enjoined from admitting any residents to the D.C. Jail until the Order is complied with.

(3) The Mayor fully supports the Prison Overcrowding Emergency Powers Act, Bill 6-63, and he will personally lobby the Councilraembers in an all-out effort to get it passed as soon as possible. He will request that this bill be one of the first pieces of legislation considered by the Council when it returns from recess in September. The Mayor further agrees

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that if the bill is passed by the Council, he will sign it and he will effectively use the authority granted thereby to insure compliance with the Order of July 13, 1985.

(4) The District commits that all parole eligible residents

(felons and misdemeanants) in the D.C. Department of Corrections

will have parole decisions made by the Parole Board within 45 days

of Aug. 22,1985 unless waived by the resident. Henceforth, a

parole determination shall be made by the Parole Board no later

;

than ten days prior to a residents' parole eligibil

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(5) The District will begin negotiating the terms of

contracts for delivery of Half Way Houses for Fiscal Year 1986

during the week of August 26. The Department will increase its

Half Way House capacity to no less than 736 by September 30,

1986.

:

(5' In addition to existing programs, at least $100,000

in funding for the Third Party Custody Program described below

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will be immediately transferred to the Pretrial Service Agency,

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to be used to fund a Third Party Custody contract directed

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specifically toward the implementation of a program which will

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deal with persons who might otherwise be confined to the D.C.

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Jail pretrial.

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(7) The Mayor will communicate formally with the Chief Judge of the Superior Court within one week requesting him to assure that bond review hearings are regularly conducted on all pretrial detainees who remain in custody within 10 days of commitment. The Executive Branch of the Government will then monitor the results of this request to determine its effectiveness.

If bond review hearings are not being regularly conducted by September 30, 1985, the Acting Corporation Counsel will assign attorneys to appear specially before Superior Court judges to request bond review hearings on detainees at the D.C. Jail.

(8) Within the next thirty days the District will obtain

the services of nationally recognized experts agreeable to the

parties, such as Doctors Austin and Chrisberg of the National

Council on Crime and Delinquency, to assess the institutional

and internal classification system of the Department of

,

Corrections. The reasonable costs and fees of these experts

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will be paid by the defendants. The results of such assess-

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raent will be made available to the Court and counsel by

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January 30, 1986, and implemented within a

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reasonable time thereafter, unless either party shows good cause why they should not be.

(9) After November 22, 1985, the North-3 area of the Jail shall not be used for housing, other than in cells, more than 36 residents, appropriately classified for group housing.

(10) Attached hereto is the commitment of defendants regarding "Special Employment Outreach." The defendants will make good faith efforts to provide furloughs for residents to obtain employment for parole purposes.

(11) The defendants will urge the Parole Board to

exercise regularly its authority under O.C. Code $24-201c

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to seek reductions of minimum sentences in all appropriate

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cases to reduce overcrowding.

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(12) The defendants will move expeditiously to implement

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the Plan for Improvement of Mental Health Services at the Jail,

filed with the Court in July 1985.

(13) Within 30 days, the Plaintiffs and the Defendants

shall each respectively appoint one medical expert whose

reasonable costs and fees will be paid by defendants, to

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review the health services delivery system at the D.C. Jail and make recommendations for improvements in a report to be submitted to the Court and the parties by Nov. 1,1985 and implemented by March 1, 1986, unless good cause is shown by either party why they should not be.
(14) Defendants agree that in consideration of this stipulation, they will withdraw the Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment in these cases, and will not appeal or contest the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law contained in the Memorandum and Order dated July 13, 1985. Should the Order dated July 13, 1985 be reinstated pursuant to Paragraph (2) of this Stipulation, the defendants reserve the right to seek a stay of the Order as reinstated, and to appeal from any denial of such stay request.
(15) Defendants will file with the Court every two weeks beginning August 26, 1985, a report detailing their implementation of this Stipulation. Defendants will notify the Court and counsel within 48 hours of any non-compliance with the

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provisions of this Stipulation, other than Paragraph (2) Any non-compliance with Paragraph (2) shall be reported within 24 hours.

Date: August 22, 1985

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

J. JO0N H. MORE, DOUGLAS SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS &
TROWBRIDGE 1800 M Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 822-100
Counsel for Plaintiffs in Campbell v. McGruder

fON BARRY Mayor
JOHN H. SUDA Acting Corporation Counsel, D.C.
Attorney for Defendants District Building, Room 329 1350 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20004 (202) 727-6248

STEVEN NEY, ESQ7. MARY E. McCLYMONT, ESQ. ALVIN J. BRONSTEIN, ESQ. ACLU NATIONAL PRISON PROTECT 1616 P Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 331-0500
Counsel for Plaintiffs in Inmates v. Jackson

SPECIAL EMPLOYMENT OUTREACH
The Director of the Department of Employment Services will intensify the Special Temporary Employment Program (STEP) initiated in January, 1984 through which 154 ex-offenders have already been placed in full-time employment. The program is designed to assist in meeting the work contingency required for parole.
Specialized approaches is to employment and employabiiity development for this population have included and will continue on an intensified basis:
Job developers were designated to develop jobs specifically for this target group. A concerted effort has taken place to identify employers willing to hire ex-offenders. Both large and small employers have been contacted in this endeavor. These contacts were as a result of both promotional telephone contacts and personal visits.
The OJT Program (ADP) is being used as a tool to encourage employers to participate in this on-the-job training program with a commitment to hire at a later date. Hopefully, this will encourage employers to hire by the government subsidizing one half of wages up to $3.00 per hour for a designated period of time depending on the occupation.
The Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC) Program is being used as a tool to encourage employers to hire. Employers would be eligible for a tax credit of up to $3,000 provided the employee earns wages of $6,000 or more. This is not considered a subsidy.
The Federal Bonding Program will be used as a tool to encourage employers to hire ex-offenders in positions which require bonds. The bonding program is a form of insurance provided by the Federal Government used to protect employers from loss of money or pr *perty sustained through the dishonest acts of their employees. This service is free to the employer and provides bonds for persons who would not usually qualify for bonding through private insurance companies.
Staff was designated from DOES and the Corrections System to serve as Counselors with emphasis being placed on followup activities on individuals participating in the program. The delineation of activities would require DOES to work in "choice-change counseling," which involves working with a person's barriers in order to place a person in a job. Department of Corrections counselors would work with those individuals who refuse to participate, calling them in for specialized counseling and determining the action to be taken.

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Expanded Specialized Efforts
In order to work more intensively with this population, DOES has established a new .Unit under the Office of Job Service, Program Operations, to implement the STEP Program. This Unit will be responsible for all ptiases and activities of the program.
The Unit will be staffed with 6 DOES personnel (1 coordinator, 4 placement counselors, 1 clerk/secretary) and 2 Department of Corrections personnel (2 parole officers). The primary function of the Unit is the placement of offenders in unsubsidized jobs in the Washington Metropolitan Area. In addition, the Unit is responsible for assisting the participants through counseling to develop sound work habits, job skills, social adjustment to a working environment and a record of employabiiity through job per formance.
Each individual who had not yet been placed for the first time, will be contacted again and scheduled for a oneon-one interview with the probation officers and job placement counselor.
Job Search Workshops were conducted for all participants in the program in an effort to assist each ex-offender in their employment pursuit. The Job Search Workshops covered: Barriers to Employment, Motivation, Interviewing Techniques, Resume Preparation, and How To Keep Your Job Once Hired. It is felt that the Workshops were beneficial as ex-offenders were able to obtain employment through their own initiatives. Further, the information and knowledge obtained will assist those others placed by DOES.
DOES will contact contractors who have been awarded D.C. Government contracts requesting that special attention be given to placing individuals in the ex-offenders program.
D.C. Private Industry Council will be contacted to develop at least 15 on-the-job training slots in the private sector.
Personalized follow-up on each job referral will be made with each employer involved. It should also be done with the applicant within twenty-four hours to find out what the problems were if they did not receive the job. Depending on the employer and individual case, counselors may accompany applicants to job interviews.
Job development to match client profiles will be intensified, addressing specifically the barriers identified during the subsequent interviews.
Ongoing screening and assessment of ex-offender applicants at the penal institutions within 90 days of their parole or release to determine what jobs and/or training they would be ready to enter.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LEONARD CAMPBELL, et al. , Plaintiffs,
V• ANDERSON McGRUDER, et al.,
Defendants.
INMATES OF D.C. JAIL, et al., Plaintiffs,
V.
DELBERT C. JACKSON, et a_l. , Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 1462-71

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(Judge Bryant)

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Fll-ED

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:

JAMES E. DAVEY. Clerk

Civil Action No. 75-1668

:

(Judge Bryant)

:

ORDER
Whereas defendants have moved for a stay of the Order of the Court dat^d July 13, 1985, and the Court having considered the Stipulation of the Parties to Reduce the Population at the D.C. Jail ("Stipulation"), and the parties having requested in open Court the entry of this Order, and good cause having been shown, it is hereby
ORDERED: (1) The Court approves the Stipulation and incorporates it herein as if fully set forth below.

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(2) The Order of the Court dated July 13, 1985 is hereby stayed pursuant to the terms of the Stipulation.
(3) The Court maintains jurisdiction for such time as is necessary to enforce the terms of this Order and the Stipulation.

DATED: d** l*r Zj2jllll- ^ ^ - ^ 1 ^ /? /2.

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c— UNITED STATES DISTRICT JffDGE

 
 Campbell v. McGruder

...

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LEONARD CAMPBELL, et al., Plaintiffs,
V.
ANDERSON McGRUDER, et al., Defendants.

1 1 1 1 1 C.A. No. 1462-71 1 1 1 1

INMATES OF D.C. JAIL, et al., Plaintiffs,
V.
. DELBERT C. JACKSON, et a1 ,
Defendants.

1 1 1 1 1 C.A. No. 75-1668
i
1 1 1

JOINT MOTION TO AMEND THE STIPULATION AND ORDER OF AUGUST 22, 1985
The parties, by their counsel, hereby move the Court for an order amending the Stipulation and Order o f August 22, 1985, to enlarge the time for the filing of the medical consult ants^ report to December 1, 1985.
Respectfully submitted,

steven My -
Alvin J. Bronstein ACLU National Prison Project 1616 P Street, NW

Suite 340 Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 331-0500
Counsel for Plaintiffs in Inmates v . Jackson
J. Patrick Hickey John H. More Douglas Hilleboe Shaw, Pittman, Potts &
Trowbridge 1800 M Street, NW Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 822-1000
Counsel for Plaintiffs in Campbell v. McGruder

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I N THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

EEONARD CAMPBELL, e t a l . ,

-

Plaintiffs,

V.
. ANDERSON McGRUDER, et a1 ,

Defendants.

1 1 1 1 1 C.A. NO. 1462-71 1 1 1 1

INMATES OF D.C. JAIL, e t a l . ,

1

1

Plaintiffs,

1

1

V.

1

1

DELBERT C. JACKSON, e t a1.t

1

1

Defendants.

1

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- ORDER

C.A. No. 75-1668
FILED
CLERK,U.S. DISTRICT CC)U!?T DISI'RICT OF C3LLji.;31A

The p a r t i e s , h a v i n g moved f o r an o r d e r amending t h e S t i p u l a t i o n and Order of August 22, 1985, and good cause having been shown, it is hereby
ORDERED t h a t p a r a g r a p h 13 o f t h e S t i p u l a t i o n a n d O r d e r o f
A u g u s t 2'2, 1 9 8 5 is amended t o e n l a r g e t h e t i m e f o r t h e f i l i n g o f m e d i c a l e x p e r t s 1 r e p o r t t o December 1, 1985.

 
 Campbell v. McGruder

JC-DC-001-056

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LEONARD CAMPBELL, et al.,

)

FILED
MAR 5 1993
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT DiSTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Plaintiffs, ) Civil Action No. 1462-71 (WBB)

v.

)

ANDERSON McGRUDER, e_t a_l. , )

Defendants. )

INMATES OF D.C. JAIL, et a].., ) Plaintiffs, )
v.
DELBERT C. JACKSON, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 75-1668 (WBB)

ORDER A status conference was held in these consolidated actions on March 2, 1993. At the conference, defendants requested a postponement of any hearing on plaintiffs' Motion for Order to Show Cause Why Defendants Should Not be Held in Contempt of Court until after April 1, 1993. Plaintiffs requested some interim relief to ensure compliance with the prior orders of this Court. Upon consideration of the papers filed by the parties, the argument of counsel and the record as a whole, this Court finds that immediate steps are necessary to ensure that inmates at the District of Columbia Detention Facility ("Jail") receive the necessary medical and psychiatric care previously ordered. Consistent with the defendants' obligations under the June 9, 1980 and

August 22,_1985 Orders of this Court relating to the provision of psychiatric and medical services at the Jail, it is by the Court this 4*- - day of March, 1993
ORDERED, that no later than ten days after the date of this Order defendants shall employ on the mental health units at the Jail a licensed, full-time clinical psychologist to provide patient care; and it is
ORDERED that no later than ten days after the date of this Order defendants shall employ on the mental health units at the Jail only correctional officers who have received appropriate training in dealing with mentally ill residents, equivalent to the training developed by the Forensic Correctional Services Bureau of the Department of Human Services as described in Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Request for Production dated May 27, 1992; and it is
ORDE_RED^that no later than ten days after the date of this Order defendants shall provide sick call, performed by doctors or certified physician assistants, on each of the cell blocks at the Jail each and every weekday; and it is
ORDERED that no later than ten days after the date of this Order defendants shall establish chronic disease clinics for inmates to ensure that patients suffering from chronic illnesses, such as diabetes, hypertension and acquired immune deficiency
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syndrome ("AIDS"), are routinely and regularly followed and treated; and it is
ORDERED, that no later than ten days after the date of this Order defendants shall fully implement the Quality Assurance Program outlined in Division Operating Procedure 6005; and it is
ORDERED that no later than ten days after the date of this Order defendants shall employ a full time, on-site Health Administrator as described in the medical expert reports issued by Drs. Cohen and Harrison pursuant to the August 22, 1985 Stipulation and Order; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that 'clef endants shall file their response to plaintiffs1 Motion for an Order to Show Cause on or before April 1, 1993, and shall file on the same date a report to the Court, certified in the form of a sworn affidavit by the appropriate Department of Corrections official, specifying the extent to which the defendants are or are not in compliance with each provision in this order and with the medical and psychiatric care requirements of the June 9, 1980 Order, the August 22, 1985 Stipulation, the 1985 Mental Health Plan and the expert reports of Drs. Cohen and Harrison, and indicating the length of any non-compliance.
WiMfiam B. Bryant / United States District Judge
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 Campbell v. McGruder

JC-DC-001-058

FILED'

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

I 0 1993

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ^£^H,U.S.DIS

LEONARD CAMPBELL, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.

)
) ) Civil Action No. 1462-71
(WBB) )

ANDERSON McGRUDER, et al., )

Defendants. )

INMATES OF D.C. JAIL, et. a_l. , )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v.

)

)

DELBERT C. JACKSON, et al., )

) Defendants. )

Civil Action No. 75-1668 (WBB)

ORDER APPOINTING SPECIAL OFFICER
Hearings were held in these consolidated cases on April 6, April 8, and April 13, 1993 in esponse to plaintiffs' Motion for an Order to Show Cause Why Defendants Should not be Held in Contempt of Court. Based on the documents and deposition testimony received into evidence, the admissions contained in defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion and in the Declarations of William Hall, M.D., Robert Morin, Psy.D. and Carolyn Groom, the arguments of counsel and the record as a whole, this Court finds that the plaintiffs have established by clear and

convincing evidence that the defendants were, until recently, in
substantial non-compliance with the June 9, 1980 and
August 22, 1985 Orders and that the defendants failed to comply
with portions of the March 5, 1993 Order.
The Court finds that, among other things, the defendants
have:
(1) failed to employ a full-time clinical psychologist on the mental health units at the Jail from January 1991 through April 5, 1993, although required to do so under the 1985 Order;
(2) failed to implement procedures to ensure that only correctional officers with specialized training in psychiatric care procedures worked on the mental health units, in contravention of the 1980 Order;
(3) dramatically reduced by one-third the hours of the mental health program on the mental health units in August 1990, in contravention of the 1985 Order;
(4) employed less than the fifteen required forensic psychiatric technicians (also known as mental health technicians) on the mental health units on several occasions over the last two years, including the period from July 11, 1992 through April 15, 1993, in contravention of the 1985 Order;
(5) employed only two psychiatric nurses on the mental health units at the Jail, rather than the three required, for a period of almost five months in 1992, in contravention of the 1985 Order;
(6) failed to provide sick call services to each housing unit each weekday from midDecember 1992 to mid-March 1993, in contravention of the 1985 Order;
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(7) failed for a significant period of time to provide a full-time, on-site health administrator at the Jail, even though required to do so under the 1985 Order;
(8) failed to establish and implement a formal, functioning quality assurance program, in contravention of the 1985 Order; and
(9) discontinued chronic disease clinics until ordered by the Court to reinstate such clinics, even though the clinics were required to be maintained under the 1985 Order.
There appear to be serious deficiencies in medical and mental health care at the Jail associated with these violations. Indeed, thirteen years after defendants offered their initial plan for improving mental health services at the Jail, inmates on the mental health units appear to receive very little, if any, treatment for their illness beyond the prescription of psychiatric medication. See Declaration of Robert Morin, Psy.D. dated April 7, 1993.
Significantly, the Court finds that defendants concealed the
above-referenced violations of the 1985 Order from the Court by
not reporting them within 48 hours of their occurrence, as-
expressly required, and by not reporting them in the bi-weekly
reports to the Court which defendants continued to file. The
reporting requirement was developed precisely to inform plain-
tiffs and the Court of instances of non-compliance. The failure
to report in the required manner has unnecessarily prolonged the
discovery and proceedings in this case, and has hampered
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plaintiffs' ability to seek to enforce the orders of this Court, to the detriment of the plaintiff class.
The Court also finds that the defendants initially failed to provide the certification expressly required by this Court's March 5, 1993 Order regarding the length and extent of any non-compliance with the 1980 Order, the 1985 Mental Health Plan and the recommendations of the medical experts. This failure to file the required certification demonstrates, once again, how difficult it is for even this Court to obtain from the defendants reliable information necessary to monitor compliance with its orders. In this regard, the Court also finds that the defendants failed to produce in a timely manner numerous documents requested in discovery which evidenced significant problems in the delivery of medical and mental health care at the Jail. This was so even though many of these documents were clearly responsive to plaintiffs' document requests and were ordered to be produced pursuant to this Court's August 7, 1992 discovery Order.
This is rot the first time that this Court has found that the defendants have failed to comply with its orders. See e.g. , Campbell v. McGruder, 416 F. Supp. 106, 108-09 (D.D.C. 1975); Memorandum Opinion (September 30, 1983)(finding defendants in contempt of Court). In light of the defendants' history of non-compliance, and given the complicated and factually intensive nature of the matters at issue, this Court determines that a
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Special Officer is necessary to assist the Court in effecting future compliance with its orders. This step is not taken lightly, and is based on this Court's more than twenty years experience in this litigation. This Court also determines, based on the record presented, that the appointment of independent medical and mental health experts is necessary and appropriate.
Accordingly, it is by the Court this '2.0+i day of April, 1993
ORDERED that the Court shall, pursuant to its inherent authority to enforce its orders and Rule 53(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, appoint Grace M. Lopes as Special Master (hereinafter "Special Officer") to monitor and ensure defendants' compliance with the Court orders and Consent Decrees in these consolidated cases (hereinafter "Orders"); and it is
ORDERED that the defendants shall, pursuant to Rule 53, pay the reasonable fees and expenses incurred by the Special Officer in carrying out her assigned duties. The Special Officer shall be paid a fee of $85.00 per hour, plus expenses, unless otherwise ordered by the Court. She shall be available to p rform her duties as the needs of the Court require; and it is
ORDERED that the duties of the Special Officer shall be to observe, monitor, submit proposed findings of fact, and make recommendations to the Court and to the parties concerning steps that should be taken to achieve compliance with the Orders of
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this Court. The Special Officer should endeavor to assist the defendants in achieving compliance in whatever way possible, and should confer informally with the parties on matters affecting compliance with the Orders; and it is
ORDERED that the Special Officer shall assist the Court in monitoring defendants' compliance with the Orders by, among other things, reporting to the Court regularly, and no less than every ten months, concerning the state of defendants' compliance with the Orders of the Court; and it is
ORDERED that the Special Officer shall be granted access by the defendants to the D.C. Detention Facility and the records of the District of Columbia, to the extent necessary to permit the Special Officer to monitor and report fully on defendants' compliance with the Orders of this Court; and it is
ORDERED that the Special Officer shall have the power to require reports by tne defendants concerning matters affecting compliance with Orders of this Court; and it is
ORDERED that the Special Officer shall have the power to conduct hearings, to require the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents, and to examine witnesses under oath. The expenses of any reporter hired to transcribe such hearings before the Special Officer shall be paid for by the District of Columbia; and it is
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ORDERED that the Special Officer shall be authorized to employ such experts and consultants, including but not limited to medical and mental health experts, as are reasonably necessary to assist the Special Officer in monitoring and reporting on defendants' compliance with the Orders. The Special Officer shall notify counsel for the parties at least two weeks in advance of her intention to employ an expert or consultant. The plaintiffs and defendants shall have the opportunity to raise with the Special Officer any objection they may have to the employment of such an expert or consultant, and make alternative recommendations for who should be employed as the expert or consultant. In the event of a continued disagreement between a party and the Special Officer concerning the employment of any expert or consultant, the party shall have the opportunity to file a motion with the Court to resolve the dispute. In the event that a party does not file a motion within two weeks of receipt of a notice from the Special Officer of the intent to employ an expert or consultant, the Special Officer shall be deemed authorized to employ such expert or consultant. The ees and expenses of any expert or consultant hired by the Special Officer pursuant to this paragraph shall be paid for by the District of Columbia, and any such expert or consultant shall be granted access to the D.C. Detention Facility and the records of the District of Columbia to the extent necessary to assist the Special Officer in monitoring defendants' compliance with the Orders of this Court; and it is
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ORDERED that the Special Officer shall be authorized to employ an investigative assistant to assist the Special Officer in fact-finding and investigations concerning defendants' compliance. The investigative assistant shall be granted access to the D.C. Detention Facility and the records of the District of Columbia to the extent necessary to assist the Special Officer in monitoring the compliance of defendants with the Orders of this Court. The fees and expenses of the Special Officer's investigative assistant shall be paid for by the District of Columbia; and it is
ORDERED that the Special Officer, the investigative assistant, and any experts or consultants employed by the Special Officer shall have the right to conduct confidential interviews with officials and staff of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections. The Special Officer shall be authorized to confer and to correspond with either plaintiffs or defendants on an ex parte basis; and it is
ORDERED that the Special Of icer shall not be empowered to direct the defendants to take or refrain from taking any specific action to achieve compliance; and it is
ORDERED-that the Special Officer shall promptly select medical and mental health experts to evaluate the medical and mental health services being provided at the Jail, including those areas of concern identified in plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of
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Motion for Order to Show Cause Why Defendants Should Not be Held in Contempt. The experts shall issue reports and make specific recommendations for the improvement of medical and mental health services, including recommended staffing levels, as soon as possible but in no event later than 60 days from the date of this Order; and it is
ORDERED that the defendants shall file a detailed written report to the Court within 15 days after the issuance of an expert report responding to each recommendation contained in the report, indicating whether the defendants intend to implement the recommendation and the timeframe for implementation, and, if the defendants object to implementation, the basis for their objection; and it is
ORDERED that the Special Officer shall, within 30 days after the expert reports are issued, submit a report to the Court evaluating the state of defendants' compliance with the Orders respecting medical and mental health care and setting forth any additional concerns that the Special Officer might deem appropriate to bring to the attention of the Court; and it is
ORDERED that effective April 26, 1993, the bi-weekly reports filed by the-defendants with the Court shall be certified, in the manner set forth in 28 U.S.C. 1746, by an official (or officials) with personal knowledge and shall state, in addition to the information currently being provided, the following:
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1. The medical and mental health staff providing services at the Detention Facility during the two week period. The reports shall indicate the number of full-time equivalent employees, by job title (certified and licensed physician assistants shall be so designated) and shift, who actually worked during the time period. The defendants shall also state the number of overtime hours worked by individuals in each job category.
2. Whether sick leave was available on all housing units each weekday, without limitation on the number of prisoners who could be seen on any particular unit. The report shall list dates on which sick leave was not held on each housing unit, or on which sick leave was limited, and the housing unit or units which were effected.
3. Whether a chronic disease clinic was maintained by an appropriate health care provider, the type of health care provider or providers who delivered services at the clinic, and the number of inmates who attended the clinic in the reporting period.
4. The number of correctional officers assigned to each mental health cellblock during the reporting period, whether each officer employed on the unit had received specialized training in mental health issues and, if not, the dates and shifts on which untrained officers were used.
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w

5. The number of psychiatric screening clinics held at the Jail during the reporting period,,the approximate length of each clinic and the number of inmates seen.

6. The number of the following during the reporting period: deaths, suicides, positive PPD tests for tuberculosis infection, cases of active tuberculosis diagnosed and positive tests for HIV infection; and it is

ORDERED that the parties shall negotiate in good faith and attempt to agree on a format for more detailed, certified," reporting to be used by the defendants in their reports to the Court, which shall include such information, in addition to that which is set forth above, as is necessary for the Court, the plaintiffs and the Special Officer to assess the defendants' compliance with Court Orders; and it is

ORDERED that if the parties are unable to agree by May 15,

1993 on a format for future reporting, the parties shall submit

proposed reporting forms to the Court, and the Court shall man-

date the form of reporting; and it is

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FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants may, at any time, move to vacate the appointment of the Special Officer.
Wl11iam B. Bryant ^ United States District Judge
-12-

Copies to: David Flyer, Esq. Assistant Corporation Counsel Correctional Litigation Section Government of the District of Columbia Suite NLL-3 1923 Vermont Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20001 J. Patrick Hickey, Esq. Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 2300 N Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 Jonathan M. Smith, Esq. Executive Director D.C. Prisoners' Legal Services Project, Inc. 1400 20th Street, N.W. Suite 117 Washington, D.C. 20036 Edward I. Koren National Prison Project of the American Civil Liberties Union 1875 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Suite 410 Washington, D.C. 20009
0222:089jhz.93
-13-

 
 MOV 151993
(;•

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OP COLUMBIA

LEONARD CAMPBELL, et al.,

:

Plaintiffs, :

V.

ANDERSON McGRUDER, et al., :

Defendants. :

CLERK. U.3.W5TS5CT COURT DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
C.A. No. 1462-71 (WBB)

INMATES OF D.C. JAIL, et al., :

Plaintiffs, :

V.

DELBERT JACKSON, et al.,

:

Defendants. :

C.A. No. 75-1668 (WBB)

ORDER

Upon consideration of the Plaintiffs' Motion for Interim Relief, defendants' opposition thereto, the Special Officer's Recommendations concerning Interim Relief, the Expert Reports oi. Medical and Mental Health Services at the District of Columbia Jail, and the record in this case, it is hereby

ORDERED that the plaintiffs' motion is granted; and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that within five days of the date of this

Order, unless otherwise provided:
• • • • i l l Campbell v. McGruder

JC-DC-001-060

'"

f •-.

(1) Inmates who exhibit symptoms or behavior indicating that they may be acutely suicidal, pose a danger to themselves or others, or. require physical restraint or constant observation, shall be promptly evaluated by trained mental health professionals in consultation with an on-call psychiatrist, as needed. If a psychiatrist determines, in the exercise of his or her clinical judgment, after reasonable initial intervention, that an inmate is acutely suicidal or poses an imminent danger to him/herself or others and is in need of hospitalization, the defendants must transfer that inmate to a hospital that provides psychiatric services within eight hours.

(2) The defendants shall implement the specific recommendations regarding restraints found in the mental health report [Dr. Richard Belitsky, Report on Mental Health at the Washington D.C. Jail, at 29-31 (September 15, 1993)].

(3) The defendants shall insure that the inmates identified in paragraph (1) above are not placed in cells that contain obvious hazards, or in cells where they cannot be appropriately observed in accordance with physician orders.

(4) Under the direct supervision of Dr. Henry Edwards,

the Chief Psychiatrist, psychiatrists shall

evaluate the psychiatric condition of the following

inmates of the jail: all inmates housed on the

Mental Health Units, the infirmary, or the medical

step-down units; all inmates on suicide watch

status; and any inmate currently receiving

psychotropic medication or being seen in the

psychiatric clinics. This evaluation shall be

completed w'thin two weeks of the date of this

Order. F< r those inmates identified in the

screening as psychotically agitated, or as having

unusually complex psychiatric or combined medical-

psychiatric conditions, the evaluating psychiatrist

shall recommend to Dr. Edwards whether

hospitalization is appropriate. If Dr. Edwards

determines that hospitalization is appropriate,

defendants shall transfer the inmate to a hospital

that provides psychiatric services as soon as

possible and in any case within a maximum period of

two weeks following the completion of the

screening.

If Dr. Edwards determines that

hospitalization is not appropriate, a detailed

treatment plan will be prepared and implemented for

the inmate.

(5) The Jail shall have a trained mental health professional available on telephone call on a 24 hour basis, seven days a week.

(6) Medications for the treatment of psychiatric conditions shall be given on a "watch take" basis and such medications shall be provided in liquid form.

(7) The new intake screening form developed by Dr. Henry Edwards (attached as Exhibit 1) shall be completed on each new admittee to the Jail by the physician who conducts the intake physical examination.

(8) The infirmary shall be maintained in a clean and vermin-free condition.

(9) The defendants shall conduct sick call sessions five days a week on each housing unit and insure that all prisoners who sign up for sick call are seen in a timely fashion by a licensed health care provider.

(10) The defendants shall clean sick call areas in each cell block daily.

(11) The defendants shall refrain form conducting sick call through cell bars, but must hold sick call in an appropriate setting (i.e. f in sick call rooms or in the infirmary).

(12) The defendants shall chest x-ray or anergy test

every prisoner on intake to tho facility and

promptly identify any prisoner suspected of

suffering from infectious tuberculosis.

The

defendants shall, in consultation with the Special

Officer and her medical expert, develop and

implement, within two weeks of the date of this

Order, a protocol identifying who shall receive

chest x-rays and the procedure for tuberculosis

screening on intake to the facility. Plaintiffs'

counsel shall have an opportunity to review and

comment on the protocol before it is finalized.

(13) The defendants shall identify appropriately
equipped isolation rooms for persons with
infectious tuberculosis and insure that all
infectious cases are isolated.

(14) The defendants shall, in consultation with the Special Officer and her medical and mental health experts, develop and implement, within two weeks of the date of this Order, an appropriate emergency response plan to insure that medical staff promptly respond to medical emergencies. The plan shall also address the appropriate inventory of emergency equipment and its location. Plaintiffs' counsel shall have an opportunity to review and comment on the emergency response plan before it is finalized.
(15) The defendants shall treat inmate #15 described in the report of Dr. Richard Belitsky and provide inmate #15 with humane living conditions.
(16) The kitchen shall be maintained in a clean and vermin-free condition.
(17) Within forty-five days of the date of this Order, defendants shall arrange for an inspection of the entire Jail by the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs (DCRA). DCRA will promptly provide a report indicating the Jail's compliance or non-compliance with all applicable environmental, sanitary, plumbing, electrical, construction, dietary, pharmaceutical, and health codes and regulations. Within thirty days of receipt of the DCRA report, defendants will provide an abatement plan which addresses the findings of the DCRA report to the Special Officer and counsel for plaintiffs. DCRA will re-inspect the facility and report at four-month intervals thereafter, ad the defendants will file responsive abatement plans as herein provided.
(18) Defendants shall initiate Quality Assuranc ; review of (a) medical and psychiatric morbidity and mortality; (b) active tuberculosis cases; and (c) lithium use and monitoring. Defendants shall report on the results of these reviews on a monthly basis.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that John S. Henderson, Administrator of
the Jail, is hereby designated as the official responsible for
promptly reporting, no later than the next business day, directly

to the Court, counsel for the parties, and the Special Officer, any non-compliance with this Order. He shall receive appropriate staff support to perform this reporting and monitoring function.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants shall report on their compliance with this Order in their Bi-Weekly Reports to this Court
So ORDERED this <fr — day of November, 1993.
••-?,
William -B^ Bryant Senior United States District Judge

Serve:
J. Patrick Hickey Janice H. Ziegler
Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge
2300 N Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20037
Jonathan M. Smith D.C. Prisoners' Legal Services
Project, Inc. Suite 117 1400 20th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20001
John Payton Michael E. Zielinski Richard S. Love David A. Flyer Correctional Litigation Section 441 4th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20001
Grace M. Lopes Special Officer of the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia 1130 17th Street, N.W. Suite 400 Washington, D.C. 20036

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NOU 9 '92 18:13 FROM SPC OFFICER OF COURT

PAGE.002

UNITED 6TATBS DISTRICT COORT FOR TOT DISTRICT OF COLOMBIA

E 11 E D
^0V S 1993

LEONARD CAMPBELL, &t. f).. •

CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT Of COLUMBIA

Plaintiffs,

v.

C.A. NO. 1462-71 (WBB)

ANDERSON McGRUDER,fi£Al>'

Defendants.

INMATES OF D.C. JAIL, ££ &1., :
£
Plaintiffs, t

t

v.

$

*

DELBERT JACKSON, ££ Al.,

I

*

Defendants. :

C.A. NO. 79-1668 (WBB)

ORDBB
Upon consideration of the Plaintiffs' Motion for Interim Relief, defendants' opposition thereto, the Special Officer's Recommendations concerning r.terim Relief, the Expert Reports on Medical and Mental Health Services at the District of Columbia Jail, and the record in this case, it is hereby
ORDERED that the plaintiffs' motion is granted; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that within five days of the date of this Order, unless otherwise provided;

'• *

-

•.

vv.r

(1) inmates who exhibit symptoms or behavior indicating that they may bo acutely suicidal, pose a danger to themselves or others, or require physical restraint or constant observation, shall be promptly evaluated by trained mental health professionals in consultation with an on-call psychiatrist, as needed. If a psychiatrist determines, m the exercise of his or her elinical judgment, after reasonable initial intervention, that an inmate is acutely suicidal or poses an Imminent danger to him/herself or others and is in need of hofpitalization, the defendants must transfer that inmate to a hospital that provides psychiatric services within eight hours.

(2) The defendants shall implement the specific recommendations regarding restraints found in the mental health report [Dr. Richard Belitslcy, Report on Mental Health at the Washington D.c- Jail, at 29-31 (September 15, 1993)].

(3) The defendants shall insure that the inmates identified in paragraph (1) above are not placed in cells that contain obvious hazardsf or in cells where they cannot be appropriately observed in accordance with physician orders.

( O Under the direct supervision of Dr. Henry Edwards,

the Chief Psychiatrist, psychiatrists shall

evaluate the psychiatric condition of the following

inmates of the jail: all inmates housed on the

Mental Health Units, the infirmary, or the medical

step-down units; all inmates on suicide watch

status; and any inmate currently receiving

psychotropic medication or being seen in the

psychiatric clinics. This evaluation shall be

completed within two weeks of the date of this

Order. For those inmates identified in the

screening ar psychotically agitated, or as having

unusually complex psychiatric or combined medical-

psychiatric conditions, the evaluating psychiatrist

shall recommend to Dr. Edwards whether

hospitalization is appropriate. If Dr. Edwards

determines that hospitalization is appropriate,

defendants shall transfer the inmate to a hospital

that provides psychiatric services as soon as

possible and in any case within a maximum period of

two weeks following the coapletion of the

screening*

*f Dr. Edwards determines that

hospitalization is not appropriate, a detailed

treatment plan will be prepared and implemented for

the inmate.

3 S

r n<->n -.r>_. u i r l i h K OF COURT

PAGE . 004

(5) The Jail shall have a trained mental health professional available on telephone call on a 24 hour basis, seven days a week*
(6) Medications for the treatment of psychiatric conditions shall be given on a "watch take11 basis and such medications shall be provided in liquid form.
(7) The new intake screening fora developed by Dr. Henry Edwards (attached as Exhibit 1) shall be completed on each new admittee to the Jail by the physician who conducts the intake physical examination*
(8) The infirmary shall be maintained in a clean and vermin-free condition.
(9) The defendants shall conduct sick call sessions five days a week on each housing unit and insure that all prisoners who sign up for sick call are seen in a timely fashion by a licensed health care provider.
(10) The defendants shall clean sick call areas in each cell block daily*
(11) The defendants shall refrain form conducting sick call through cell bars, but must hold sick call in an appropriate setting fi.e.. in sick call rooms or in the infirmary).
(12) The defendants shall chest x-ray or anergy test every prisoner on intake to the facility and promptly identify any prisoner suspected of suffering from infectious tuberculosis. The defendants shall, in consultation with the Special Officer and her medical expert, develop fe.nd implemeru, within two weeks of the date of this Order, a protocol identifying who shall receive chest x-rays and the procedure for tuberculosis screening on intake to the facility. Plaintiffs' counsel shall have an opportunity to review and comment on the protocol before it is finalized.
(13) The defendants shall identify appropriately equipped isolation roosts for persons with infectious tuberculosis and insure that all infectious cases are isolated.

MOU a '93 18:14 FROM SPC OFFICER OF COURT

PAGE.00!

(14) The defendants shall, in consultation with the Special Officer and her medical and mental health experts, develop and implement, within two weeks of the date of this Order, an appropriate emergency response plan to insure that medical staff promptly respond to medical emergencies. The plan shall also address the appropriate inventory of emergency equipment and its location. Plaintiffs' counsel shall have an opportunity to review and comment on the emergency response plan before it is finalized*
(15) The defendants shall treat inmate #15 described in the report of Dr. Richard Belitsky and provide inmate #15 with humane living conditions.
(16) The kitchen shall be maintained in a clean and vermin**free condition.
(17) Within forty-five days of the date of this Order, defendants shall arrange for an inspection of the entire Jail by the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs (DCRA). DORA will promptly provide a report indicating the Jail's compliance or non-compliance with all applicable environmental, sanitary, plumbing, electrical, construction, dietary/ pharmaceutical, and health codes and regulations. Within thirty days of receipt of the DCRA report, defendants will provide an abatement plan which addresses the findings of the DCRA report to the Special Officer and counsel for plaintiffs. DCRA will re-inspect the facility and report at four-month intervals thereafter, ad the defendants will file responsive abatement plans as herein provided.
(18) Defendants shall initiate Quality Assurance review '"f (a) medical and psychiatric morbidity and mortality; (b) active tuberculosis cas^s; and (c) lithium use and monitoring. Defendants shall report on the results of these reviews on a monthly basis.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that John S. Henderson, Administrator of
the Jail, is hereby designated as the official responsible for
promptly reporting, no later than the next business day, directly

NOU 9 ' 9 3 I S : 15 FROM S P C O F F I C E R OF COURT

_

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JUKiE flRYAM^v -SLOPES

PAGE . 0 0 6
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to the Court, counsel for the parties, and the Special officer, any non-compliance with this Order* He shall receive appropriate staff support to perform this reporting and monitoring function*
XT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants shall report on their compliance with this Order in their Bi-Weekly Reports to this Court
so ORDERED this *fr^- day of November, 1993.

*"""

William JT Bryant

senior United States District Judge

NOU 9 '93 18:15 FROM SPC OFFICER OF COURT

.

Serve:
J. Patrick Hicfcay Janice H. Ziegler Shaw, Pittaan, Potts & Trowbridge 2300 N Street, N.W. Washington, D.c. 20037
Jonathan M. Smith D.C. Prisoners' Legal Services
Project, Inc. Suite 117 1400 20th Street, N»w. Washington, D.C. 20001
John Payton Kiohael S. Zielinski Kichard S. Love David A. Flyer Correctional Litigation Section 441 4th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20001
Grace M. Lopes Special Officer of the U.S. District court
for the District of Columbia 1130 17th Street, K.W. suite 400 Washington, D.c. 20036

PAGE.007

6

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 Campbell v. McGruder

-MAR 181994

JC-DC-001-062
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

FILED.
«V.AR 1 * 1334

LEONARD CAMPBELL, et al.,

<i s DISTRICT COURT

Plaintiffs, v. ANDERSON McGRUDER, et al. ,

) ) C.A. No. 1 4 6 2 - 7 1 (WBB)

Defendants.

INMATES OF D.C. JAIL, et al. , Plaintiffs,
v. DELBERT JACKSON, et al.,

) )
) ) C.A. No. 7 5 - 1 6 6 8 (WBB)
)

Defendants.

)

CONSENT ORDER Upon consideration of the Report of the Special Officer on Medical Care at the District of Columbia Jail, the Special Officer's Outline of her Findings on Mental Health Care at the District of Coluirjia Jail, the Expert Reports on Medical and Mental Health Services at the District of Columbia Jail, the Plaintiffs' Motion that the Court Adopt the Special Officer's Report on Medical Care at the District of Columbia Jail as the Court•s Findings and that the Defendants be held in Contempt of Court, the Court's findings in its April 20, 1993 Order Appointing Special Officer, the Court's findings in its March 5, 1993 Order, the defendants' acknowledgement and representation

that while it disagrees with some of the statements in the

Special Officer's Reports, it is in non-compliance with numerous

material provisions of the orders of this Court, that it intends

to remedy its non-compliance and does not oppose entry of this

remedial order, and the entire record in this case,

it is by this Court this

/<£"£? day of March, 1994

ORDERED that the defendants are found to be in Contempt of

this Court, and it is further

ORDERED that the Special Officer shall, within 120 days of this Order submit a plan to cure the defendants1 contempt and

that will insure that the defendants render medical and mental

health services to prisoners at the Jail in a manner consistent

with the United States Constitution, and it is further

ORDERED that the Special Officer's remedial plan shall

address all issues raised in her reports, the Expert Reports on

Medical and Mental Health Services, as well as any additional

issue that may come to the attention of the Special Officer or

the Court that adversely impacts on the defendants' compliance

with the Court's orders concerning the delivery of medical and

mental hea]ch services at the Jail or that adverse"y impacts on

the defendants' delivery of medical and mental health services at

the Jail in a manner consistent with the United States

Constitution, and it is further

ORDERED that the remedial plan shall include a time table

for implementation, graduated automatic fines for failure to meet

- 2-

implementation deadlines, and a procedure for the defendants to report on their compliance, and it is further
ORDERED that in developing the remedial plan that the Special Officer shall consult with the defendants and their counsel, with counsel for the plaintiffs, and with such experts as she deems necessary, the fees and expenses of any expert hired pursuant to this paragraph shall be paid by the District of Columbia, and it is further
ORDERED that the defendants shall implement the remedial plan in accordance with the time table established by the Special Officer unless good cause is shown by any party why the plan should not be implemented or should be modified, and it is further
ORDERED that the Special Officer shall file, and the defendants shall implement, such interim remedial plans as the Special Officer deems necessary in order to address conditions that, in the opinion of the Special Officer, must be addressed on an expedited basis, and it is further
ORDFRED that the defendants shall implement within 30 days the recommendation of the Special Officer for a compliance monitor contained at 127-8 of her report.
William B.Bryant^/ United States District Judge
- 3-

m
Agreed to:
/kichard S. Love Correctional Litigation Unit Corporation Counsel 441 4th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20001 Counsel for the Defendants dated:
J.PatricKHickey Teresa Diaz Shaw, Pittman, Potts &
Trowbridge 2300 N Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20037 Counsel for the Plaintiffs Campbell v. McGruder dated
JonaUhk^l M ./&ni/th
r.C. Prisoners1 Legal Services Project,line.
1400 20th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 Counsel for the Plaintiffs Inmates of D.C. Jail v. Jackson
dated: 3/7,
- 4-

Serve: Grace M. Lopes 1130 17th Street, N.W. Suite 400 Washington, D.C. 20036 Jonathan M. Smith D.C. Prisoners' Legal Services
Project, Inc. 1400 20th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 J. Patrick Hickey Shaw, Pittman, Potts &
Trowbridae 2300 N Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20037 Richard S. Love Correctional Litigation Unit Corporation Counsel 441 4th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20001
- 5-

 
 Campbell v. McGruder

141394

™ ••

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HB

JC-DC-001-064

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LEONARD CAMPBELL, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
ANDERSON McGRUDER, et al.. Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1462-71 (WBB)

INMATES OF D.C. JAIL, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
DELBERT C. JACKSON, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 75-1668 (WBB)

NOTICE OF FILING
The defendants hereby file the attached completed drafts of
the Emergency Response and Tuberculosis Protocols to be implemented
by the Defendants according to the November 9, 1993 Order of the
Court.
JOHN PEYTON Corporation Counsel, D.C. MICHAEL E. ZIELINSKI Assistant Deputy Corporation Counsel Civil Division RICHARD S. LOVE Assistant Corporation Counsel, D.C. Chief, Correctional Litigation Section

DAVID A. FLYER, #430535 Assistant Corporation Counsel, D.C. Correctional Litigation Section 441 4th Street, N.W. 6th Floor, South Washington, D.C. 20001 (202) 727-6295 (Ex. 3468)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Notice of Filing was mailed, postage prepaid, to Patrick Hickey, Tara Flynn, Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge, 2300 N. Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037; and to Jonathan Smith and Aurie Hall, D.C. Prisoners' Legal Services, 1400 20th Street, N.W., Suite 117, Washington, D.C. 20036 this /J? day of April, 1994.
DAVID A. FLYER Assistant Corporation Counsel

PPD reading within the prior three (3) months, shall have a PPD test. All inmates shall have a screening test for pregnancy during intake.
2. The results of the pregnancy test shall be obtained within 24 hours. If the pregnancy test is negative, the female inmate shall have a chest x-ray within 24 hours. Lead apron screening shall be used.
3. Pregnant inmates who are PPD negative shall be tested for anergy to a panel of two or more antigens in addition to the PPD. All anergic patients shall have a chest x-ray. Lead apron screening shall be used.
4. A pregnant inmate shall only be x-rayed if she is PPD positive or exhibits signs or symptoms of TB. Lead apron screening must be used.1
5. All new female intakes shall be housed on the female intake tier of the female cellblock and segregated from the other inmates until the results of the PPD test and chest xray are read and a negative TB result is determined. The intake units shall be evaluated within 60 days to determine if the ventilation is adequate. The identity of the inspectors and the standards to be applied will be determined by the parties in consultation with the Special Officer within 30 days.
C. Reading and Recording of PPD Tests and Chest X-rays
1. The Chief Medical Officer of the Jail shall designate a sufficient number of licensed health care providers on each shift who will be responsible for the reading of PPD tests and the proper documentation of the results of all TB screening tests in the inmates1 medical records. These individuals shall be responsible for the tracking of PPD tests and chest x-rays in accor .ance vJLth a protocol to be developed by the TB Coordinator or an appropriately trained and qualified individual by May 18, 1994.
2. The site of the PPD injection is to be examined for any reaction by a designated licensed health care provider within 48 to 72 hours after implantation.
3. The diameter of any induration is to be measured, disregarding erythema or bruising. The result of this PPD reading is to be charted on the form appended as Attachment A and
1 With proper lead apron screening, there is no contraindication to x-raying a pregnant woman who has signs and symptoms of TB. Chest x-ray using proper lead screening is essential in these inmates.

©

#

placed in the inmate's medical record.

(mm) :

4. The PPD reading is to be recorded in millimeters

Positive - 10 mm or greater induration

Negative - 0 - 4 mm induration

Questionable - 5 - 9 mm induration

Consider questionable reading to be positive if:

* patient is HIV positive; * patient has had a close recent contact
with an infectious person; or * patient has an abnormal chest x-ray
consistent with TB.
If the reaction is swollen, red and painful, but there is no measurable induration, the PPD may have been given subcutaneously. If it appears that the PPD was improperly administered, it should be repeated, but only after 10 days from the original date of administration, to avoid the booster phenomenon.

5. Chest x-ray readings are to be recorded on the forms appended as Attachments A and B.

D. Preventive Therapy

1. PPD tests are to be repeated annually for all inmates.

2. All inmates with a positive PPD should be evaluated for INH prophylaxis tr atment when a negative chest x-ray rul s out active disease. Evaluation shall include the performance, of liver function tests (SGOT, SGPT, Alkaline Phosphatase, Total Bilirubin).

3. Medical providers shall advise inmates of the potential risks and side effects associated with TB prophylaxis prior to prescribing the medication. Inmates who are prescribed TB medication solely as prophylaxis have the right to refuse the medication. Inmates who are PPD positive, but without active disease, are not subject to medical holds for refusing prophylactic medication.

4. The following PPD positive patients shall receive INH preventive therapy:

* Under 35 years old;

* previously untreated or inadequately treated persons with abnormal chest x-rays consistent with old healed TB - under 35;
* persons with HIV infection - any age; * close contacts of infections TB cases - any age; * new tuberculin convertors: persons who have had a
history of negative PPD or a change in size greater than 6 mm increase in skin test reaction within a two year period - any age; * persons of any age with medical conditions that increase the risk of TB infection, including:
- Silicosis - Diabetes Mellitus - Prolonged corticosteroid therapy - Inununosuppressive therapy - Hematologic and reticuloendo-'-helial
diseases - End-stage renal disease - Intestinal bypass - Postgastrectomy - Chronic malabsorption syndrome - Carcinomas of the oropharynx and upper
GI tract - 10% or more below ideal body weight
5. Inmates over 35 years of age may be offered prophylactic treatment but the risks of liver toxicity must be clearly explained.
6. If an inmate is PPD positive and has an abnormal chest x-ray consistent with TB, the inmate shall be referred for TB therapy. HIV counseling and testing shall also be offered to any inmate who is PPD positive.
7. Prophylactic treatment shall be given as follows: Isoniazid (INF 300 mg daily or',900 mg 2x weekly. Inmates who are HIV negative shall receive this course of treatment for 6 months. Inmates who are HIV positive shall receive this course of treatment for 12 months. This medication shall be given on a watch-take basis to ensure that the inmate ingests the medication. This involves watching the inmate swallow and checking the hands and mouth to ensure compliance.
8. Inmates receiving prophylactic INH shall be evaluated to determine if Vitamin B 6 therapy is necessary with particular attention to inmates with past or present signs or symptoms of neuropathy and inmates with signs of malnourishment. Inmates who are HIV positive shall receive multivitamins.
E. Positive Chest X-rav or Syptomatic Inmate
1. Any inmates with an abnormal chest x-ray consistent
4

.

&

•

with TB or with symptoms of TB, i.e., productive cough, coughing up blood, weight loss, loss of appetite, lethargy, weakness, night sweats, or fever shall be referred for therapy and to D.C. General Hospital for a sputum smear and culture within 24 hours.
2. Until the results of the sputum smear or culture are known, the symptomatic patient is a "suspect" case and shall be placed in respiratory isolation which conforms with the guidelines established for respiratory isolation by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC).
3. In accordance with D.C. Health Regulations, Chapter 5, Section 8-5:104, the medical provider who identifies any suspected or diagnosed case of TB must report to the Bureau of Tuberculosis Control in writing within 48 hours of diagnosis or the appearance of suspicious symptoms by completing the attached Tuberculosis Case Report form. (See Attachment C.)* The medical provider shall also provide a duplicate copy of the Tuberculosis Case Report to the TB Coordinator at the Jail for monitoring and follow-up.
P. Isolation
1. Inmates with active or suspected TB shall be transferred to isolation rooms that conform with current CDC guidelines in the Correctional Treatment Facility (CTF) or D.C. General Hospital until they are no longer infectious. Respiratory isolation rooms must have separate ventilation to the outside, negative air pressure in relation to adjacent areas, a minimum of six room air exchanges per hour, and properly shielded ultraviolet lights.
2. Any inmate who has had a positive sputum smear shall not be released from isolation until three (3) negative sputum smears are collected on consecutive days and the patient is receiving appropriate therapy.
3. Procedures such as sputum collection, bronchoscopy and the administration of aerosolized pentamidine are to be conducted at the CTF or D.C. General Hospital in an appropriate treatment room or booth with negative pressure in accordance with current CDC guidelines. Patients are to remain in the treatment room or booth until coughing has subsided.
4. DOC shall obtain proper inspections of the isolation rooms at the CTF annually.
2 This may be sent by facsimile in accordance with the correspondence appended as Attachment D.

6. Treatment

1. The following medications are used for the

treatment of TB:

Isoniazid (INH)

300 mg daily or

900 mg 2x weekly

Rifampin (RIF)

600 mg daily if greater than 50 kg 450 mg daily if less than 50 kg or same dosages 2x weekly

Pyrazinamide (PZA)

20-30 mg/kg daily or 50 mg/kg 2x weekly

Ethambutol (EMB) OR

25 mg/kg daily or 50 mg/kg 2x weekly

Streptomycin

1 gm 2x weekly

2. Inmates receiving TB treatment shall be evaluated to determine if Vitamin B 6 therapy is necessary with particular attention to inmates with past or present signs or symptoms of neuropathy and inmates with signs of malnourishment. Inmates who are HIV positive shall receive multivitamins.
3. When symptoms and/or results of PPD test, chest xray, and sputum smear suggest active pulmonary TB, the inmate should be placed on a TB treatment regimen of medications as follows:

Regimens

Recommended Treatment Regimer^

HIV Negative

HIV Positive

Initial Phase

2 months INH/RIF/ PZA/EMB daily

2 months INH/RIF/ PZA/EMB daily

Continuation Phase

4-7 months INH/RIF daily or 2x weekly

10 months INH/RIF daily or 2x weekly

Total

6-9 months

12 months

4. The treatment regimen of each patient shall be determined in accordance with the culture and sensitivity laboratory test result.

•£••••
5. "Watch take" requirements should be implemented for all patients with evidence of active TB to ensure that the inmate ingests the medication.
6. Inmates with clinically active disease shall receive sputum examinations in an appropriate treatment room or booth with negative pressure at D.C. General Hospital or the CTF in accordance with standard medical practice, at least weekly until sputum conversion and then monthly until discharged. Discharge from the hospital or CTF will be based on the acquisition of three negative sputum smears on consecutive days.
7. Persistence or reappearance of organisms in the sputum smear necessitates an immediate evaluation of compliance with the medication regimen and the performance of drug susceptibility tests. All inmates shall remain in isolation until three consecutive sputum smears are negative.
H. Side Effects of Medication
1. Clinical staff who administer TB medications must be familiar with common side effects and adverse reactions. Specific protocols for management and evaluation of side effects shall be developed and the clinical staff shall receive the appropriate training.
2. The following patients should receive careful monitoring when given INH:
* Dilantin users - may need to decrease Dilantin; * Alcohol users - higher incidence of INH hepatitis; * Previous INH users - discontinued due to headaches; * Concurrent use with other medications.
3. If an inmate exhibits signs or symptoms of drug tcxicity, the medication shall lje discontinued and the Bureau of Taberculosis (202) 724-2191 shall be contacted for expert advice.
4. Expert advice for the handling of adverse reactions to medications and for the management of complicated cases (i.e., drug resistance, extrapulmonary disease, or disease in pregnant women) will be obtained from the Bureau of Tuberculosis Control at (202) 724-2191.
I. Refusal of TB Screening Procedures - Medical Hold
1. Any inmate who refuses any TB screening procedure shall be placed on "medical hold" for the protection of the prison community. A medical hold is the process by which an inmate is placed in an isolated area when refusing to accept screening, diagnosis, or treatment for a communicable disease which poses a public health threat to the safety of the inmate or

others.
2. Any inmate placed on medical hold due his/her refusal to participate in TB screening shall receive immediate, comprehensive and appropriate education from a licensed health care provider regarding the refused procedure at the time of refusal. All available literature regarding TB shall be provided. Inmates on medical hold shall receive counseling daily from the TB Coordinator regarding the importance of the screening procedure. Inmates on medical hold shall also be seen daily by a physician or physician assistant in order to observe any signs or symptoms of TB. Proper documentation of each visit by the TB Coordinator and physician or physician assistant shall be noted in the medical record.
3. If the inmate does not consent to the screening procedure within two weeks, and the inmate shows no signs or symptoms of TB in the judgment of a DOC physician, s/he shall be released to the general population. When a medical hold is extended beyond the initial two week period, the requirements of section I, paragraph 2 remain applicable.
J. Inmate Education and Referral to Community Services
1. When an inmate's PPD is read, the licensed health care provider shall distribute and explain written educational materials regarding TB control, prevention and treatment. The TB Coordinator shall be responsible for selecting appropriate materials in Spanish and English written at a basic literacy level.
2. When an inmate is prescribed INH or any other medication as TB prophylaxis or treatment, written information regarding follow up care in the event of release from the Jail during the course of treatment shaM be given and explained. This information shall direct th,e tnmate to contact Dr. James Wills, Area C Chest Clinic, 1905 ii' Street, S.E., Washington, D.C., 20003 at (202) 727-5155. The TB Coordinator shall develop the form to be provided and explained.
3. The TB Coordinator shall monitor daily the releases from the Jail to determine if any inmate on TB medications has been released. The identity of any such inmate shall be reported to the Bureau of Tuberculosis Control and the Area C Chest Clinic.
4. If the release date of an inmate taking TB medication is known to be prior to the completion of the inmate's treatment regimen, the inmate shall be provided with a two week supply of the prescribed medication upon release along with written instructions to contact the Area C Chest Clinic.
8

#

M

K. Tuberculosis Coordinator
1. The DOC shall hire a properly credentialed and appropriately trained full-time TB Coordinator to work at the Jail by April 18, 1994.
2. The TB Coordinator shall monitor the ongoing screening program at the Jail for continuity of care and followup. The TB Coordinator shall be responsible for monitoring TB intake screening, inmates placed on prophylactic treatment, inmates with active disease, inmates placed in the hospital for therapy, and those placed on medical hold related to TB.
3. The TB Coordinator shall function as the liaison with the Bureau of Tuberculosis Control, D.C. General Hospital and the laboratory.
4. The TB Coordinator shall obtain a comprehensive daily list of all persons undergoing intake physical examinations with TB screening. Results of PPD tests and chest x-rays shall be placed on the appropriate forms by the medical staff and monitored daily by the TB Coordinator. The TB Coordinator shall develop a protocol for the tracking of PPD tests and chest x-rays to be approved by the Chief Medical Officer of the Jail by May 18, 1994. The TB Coordinator shall monitor all inmates receiving prophylactic treatment or treatment for active TB.
5. The TB Coordinator shall maintain an accurate account of inmates tested, cleared, inmates not tested, inmates on medical holds, and referrals for inmates released into the community.
6. The TB Coordinator shall coordinate referrals and discharge planning for inmates receiving TB prophylaxis or treatment.
7. The TB Coordinator shall monitor the case reporting to the Bureau of Tuberculosis Control to ensure that all appropriate cases are reported properly and within the required time limits.
8. The TB Coordinator shall monitor at least monthly all inmates taking anti-TB medications. Special attention shall be given to inmates who are taking other medications or who have a history of alcohol abuse or liver disease.
9. The TB Coordinator shall develop and implement an educational program regarding TB for the inmate population, including monitoring the distribution of any written materials that are to be provided to the inmates housed at the Jail.
10. The TB Coordinator shall answer directly to the
9

Chief Medical Officer of the Jail and shall provide information and education to other providers at the Jail. The TB Coordinator shall submit a monthly report to the Chief Medical Officer at the Jail and the Bureau of Tuberculosis Control.
11. The TB Coordinator shall coordinate in-service training which will be provided to all staff at the DOC training academy. Specialized training will be provided to clinical staff by specialists from the Public Health Commission, Bureau of Tuberculosis Control, community hospitals and from other correctional institutions regarding clinical signs, symptoms, and treatment issues involving TB.
12. The TB Coordinator shall be responsible for conducting any contact investigations when pulmonary or laryngeal TB disease is suspected or diagnosed.
13. The TB Coordinator shall be responsible for developing a tracking system to provide notification to the medical units at other DOC facilities when a patient under treatment for TB or on prophylaxis is transferred from the Jail. This duty may be delegated to another licensed health care provider, however, the TB Coordinator is responsible to ensure that it is developed and implemented.
L. Contact Investigation
1. Whenever pulmonary or laryngeal TB disease is suspected or diagnosed, all close contacts should be skin tested unless there is a documented history of a positive skin test. Close contacts include all cell mates, all inmates and staff on the same tier, or all inmates and staff in the same building who share air, and visitors who have shared airspace.
2. The "concentric circle* approach can be used to determine the extent of contact tinvestigation needed. First, identify those persons rfho were \nost likely to have been infected by the source case. This first group should include: persons who shared breathing space with the source case for the longest time, persons who may have spent less time with the source case but are immunosuppressed; and persons who have TB symptoms. If positive PPD tests are identified among persons in this first group or "circle" ( with no previous history of TB infection) , new infections have probably occurred. Expand the investigation into widening circles until PPD testing identifies a group of persons with no evidence of new TB infection
3. If exposure was less than 10 to 12 weeks prior to PPD testing, a contact with a negative PPD test should be retested 10 to 12 weeks after the initial negative PPD test.
10

-<§

ray:

4. The following contacts should receive a chest x-
a) those who have a positive skin test — greater than 5 nun;
b) those with a history of a positive skin test; c) those who are HIV positive, regardless of skin
test results.

If the chest x-ray is negative for evidence of the disease, these contacts should receive preventive therapy, unless medically contraindicated.

5. During contact investigations, the confidentiality of the infected person must be maintained.

M. Screening of DOC Employees

1. All DOC staff shall be strongly encouraged to receive PPD tests annually and these tests shall be made available to all employees free of charge. The defendants shall determine whether mandatory testing can be required and shall report to the Special Officer and plaintiffs' counsel within 60 days regarding this matter.

N. Review of Protocol

1. This procedure and protocol shall be reviewed annually by the DOC Assistant Director for Health Services to determine if any revisions should be made in light of new developments in the treatment of TB. Any proposed revisions shall be submitted to the Special Officer for approval. Plaintiffs' counsel must be advised of all proposed revisions to this document.

III. Effective Date

1. The defendants shall immediately implement fie policies and procedures set forth in this document.

11

ATTACHMENT D

>•; :._ I ~6 . 0

GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES WASHINGTON. D. C. 200O2

IN REPLY REFER TO-

To whom It may concern:

November 20, ".990
D.c. Commission of Pubiic Health 3ureau of Tuberculosis Control 1905 E St., s.E. Washington, D.C. 20003

The Bureau of Tuberculosis Control, Registry, ' has installed a racs*nrrie- fFAX) machine to be used for the expressed purpose of receiving both case and laboratory reports or suspected and confirmed tuberculosis from health care providers.

Tie Fax machine will be available for receiving reports 24 hours a day, including weekends. It is anticipate! that the availability of the Fax machine will improve both tie 'timeliness and the accuracy of Tuberculosis case reporting.

The District of Columbia requires, as written In the D. C. Health

Regulations, for Communicable and Heportable Diseases, Chapter 5,

1963, section 8-5:104 Denomination of communicable Diseases: "tne

following diseases

Tuberculosis

are hereby

denominated communicable diseases and shall be reported in writing

within 48 hours of diagnosis or the appearance of suspicious

symptoms in the manner indicated in sections 8-5:106 and 8-5:107 of

this part. The transmission of case and laboratory TB reports by

Fax machine within 48 hours of diagnosis, fully satisfies the

reporting requirements of the D.C. Health aegulatlons.

The Bureau of Tuberculosis Contrql, Reglstn Fax macl? .ne telephone number la: 2C2-724-2363. If there are any duestions regarding the use of the Fax machine, please call Glenn Ac&am, supervisory Public Health Advisor, at 724-2193.
sincerely yours,

P.S.

HazeTM. Swann, M.D., Chief Bureau of Tuberculosis Control
Enclosed is a letter to infection Control Practitioners, dated September 18, 1990, regarding the reporting of tuberculosis cases.

I •!

SI ATTACHMENT A
D.C iPARTMENT OF CORRECT _JNS HEALTH SERVICES
TUBERCULOSIS SCREENING

Date:

1. Patient has / has not had previous skin testing for tuberculosis.

2. Last PPD was done on

at

and was neg / pos.

3.Mantoux skin testing was performed on

by (initials)

4. Date read:

Results: ;

mm induration which is neg / pos. (initials)

5. Chest X-Ray done on tuberculosis.

Is neg / positive / auspicious for active

6. Recommendations:

Patient's Name: (Last)

(First)

. DCDC #: -

D.O.B.:

Race:

Sex:

•• Center for D U M M Controlrecommend*that an induration of 3mm or greater in the Ixnmunocompromlsed be considered positive. In the non-immunoconiproniised host an induration of 10mm or greater Is positive.

ATTACHMENT B

PATIENT? IDENTIFICATION

AO6

SEX

Pfl

NAME DOS oeoct

EXAMINATION AEOUE8TEO ( J ROUTINE CMEST
• OTHER

FACILITY

REQUESTED 0Y

PfiflTlNENT CLINICAL HISTORY, OPERATIONS. PHYSICAL WN0IN08. ANO PROVISIONAL, 0MQNOSIS

£1

PWQNANT

-v

\

DATE OF REQUEtT

DATE OF EXAMINATION (hoMf r # ^ RAOKKIflAPHIC REPOAT

DATE & REPORT

OATB OF TRANSCRIPnON

M0 9IQNATURE IDPS 1M7

AAOIOLOGV RCOUEST/R6PORT

Name (lust)

(llrsi)

ATTACHMENT C

&

ENT OF THE DISTRICT OF CC ^i DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES

TUBERCULOSIS CASE REPORT

SSN »

Address

Telephone

Marital Status
Occupation

Sex Race D Black
D Whits

D American Indian or Alaskan Native Asian or Pacific Islander

Ethnic Orgin Q Hispanic D Not Hispanic

School or Place of Employment

Address

Date of Report
1 L
Oats of Birth JL
Country of Orgin if not U.S.
Date arrv. in U.S.

Classification • Tuberculosis:
current disease
D Tuberculosis no current disease
D Tuberculosis Suspect*
D Tuberculosis Infection No disease
(If applicable)
OHS • 1447 (At*. 3f»\\ l-UM-1

Diagnosis
O Pulmonary D Non-Pulmonary (sptci/y)

Q Miliary

D Meningitis

D Bones & • • Pleural Joints

O Lymphatic D Peritoneal

D GenltoUrinary

O Other (spicily)

O Reported at time of death SIGNS & SYMPTOMS

Bacteriology

PCS. NEG. Pending Not Done

Smear D O

D

•

Culture D D

O

O

Type of Specimen

D Sputum

a Fluid

Q Tissue D Other (spicity)

(date<sj of collection Laboratory Performed

Chest X-Ray
O Not done
Q Normal
O Abnormal D Cavitary D Non-cavitary
Q Stable D Worsening Q I tprovlng
DATE OF X-RAY

Tuberculin Skin Test
a Not done a Mantouz (PPD) a Tine a Other a (specify)
Significant
a Not Significant

.mm

Chemotherapy Dosage

D Isoniazfd

D Ethambutol _

D Rlfampin

D Pyrazlnamlde

Q Streptomycin

D Other

(specify)

atient to be followed by: OMMENTS:

3 Send Additional Report Forms sported by (Print Name)

Signature

Previous diagnosis D Yes date / /
Hospitalixation Chart No Admission Date: Discharge Date:.

D-No

Office or Hospital Address

3uce No.

Ward

TO BE COMPLETED BY HEALTH DEPARTMENT

Census Tract

Date Recorded in Registry

Case *

Verified

m
MEDICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROTOCOL
I. Introduction
The parties, in consultation with the Special Officer and her experts, agree that this Medical Emergency Protocol, filed with the Court on April 11, 1994, will govern the policies and procedures regarding the response to medical emergencies at the Central Detention Facility pursuant to the November 9, 1993 Consent Order issued in Campbell v. McGruder. C.A. No. 1462-71 and Inmates of D.C. Jail v. Jackson. C.A. No. 1462-71. The defendants understand that they are obligated to promulgate policies which implement this protocol.
II. Procedures
A. Notification and Response
1. Any employee who determines that a medical emergency exists shall immediately notify the Command Center using the Emergency Direct Line Communication system where possible, or by calling extension 38136 through 38144. If an emergency occurs in a location where there is no telephone, the employee will go to the nearest telephone, or notify the Command Center by walkie talkie. The employee will then return to the location of the emergency.
2. The employee placing the call will give all necessary information to the Command Center Officer including the location of the injured or ill person, type of injury or illness, and if the injured person is conscious.
3. The Command Center Officer will immediately page the Medical Emergency Response Team (MERT) Leader. The Command Center Officer will then immediately notify a supervisor and the Sick Call Officer by the Direct Line communication System, and inform them of the location of the person, type of injury or illness, and if the injured person is conscious. The Command Center Officer will then make the emergency announcement over the public address system. The Command Center Officer will only relay the location of the injured person on the public address system. The Command Center Officer shall also notify the Shift Commander who will immediately dispatch a correctional officer to ensure the proper operation and reception of the medical elevator on the floor where the eaergency exists.
4. The respective Zone Supervisor will immediately respond to the location of all medical emergencies. The Supervisor will assist the MERT and ensure full cooperation by the correctional force to include timely correctional coverage, as well as security and escort requirements. Other correctional duties may include lifting residents onto stretchers.

5. The MERT will immediately respond to all medical emergencies with the portable emergency medical cart. They will use the medical elevator for all medical emergencies. K service elevator will be used when the -medical elevator is inoperable. All employees will assist the MERT as requested.
6. The MERT Leader is responsible for directing emergency care and treatment. The MERT Leader shall determine the means of transportation to D.C. General Hospital, if necessary, and shall call 911 in all life-threatening emergencies.
7. The MERT Leader shall notify the Shift Commander when an injured person must be transported to D.C. General Hospital. The MERT leader shall inform the Shift Commander of the means of transportation, i.e., 911 or DOC ambulance. The Shift Commander shall facilitate the entry of the 911 staff as well as the prompt dispatching of EMTs and other designated staff for operation of the DOC ambulance. When the DOC ambulance is inoperable, 911 will be used for all emergency transfers to D.C. General Hospital.
8. The MERT Leader is responsible for ensuring that all medical emergencies are documented on the Medical Emergency Information Form immediately after each emergency. A copy of the form is appended as Attachment A. All completed Medical Emergency Information Forms shall be filed in a MERT log. The Sick Call Officer shall record all emergency call information in the Sick Call Officer's log-book.
B. Medical Emergency Response Team Composition
1. The MERT will be composed of three medical personnel. The MERT Leader will be a physician, with two other licensed medical providers (nurses or physician assistants).
2. The Chief Medical Officer is responsible for devising and posting a MERT schedule that includes alternates. This schedule will be completed by the second Monday in January and July of each year. The posting of the schedule will be accessible to the Sick Call Officer who must review it at the beginning of each shift.
3. The MERT Leader will wear a pager while on duty at all times. The pager will be transferred from MERT Leader to MERT Leader on each shift.
C. Location and Inspection of Emergency Medical Equipment and Supplies
1. The on duty charge nurse is responsible for having the emergency medical cart and the portable crash boxes inspected at the beginning of each shift and will make an entry in the

VO'
designated log books indicative of same. The Sick Call Officer in charge is responsible for inspection of the medical elevator and on board stretcher at the beginning of each shift. The officer will ride the elevator to all floors and check the operation of the gate locks on all floors. The inspection of the medical elevator and gate locks shall be noted in the shift activity report.
2. The elevator key shall be kept in the Infirmary Control Bubble and the Emergency Medical Cart shall be located in room 326. The medical cart will be taken to all medical emergencies and a medical stretcher will be kept on the medical elevator at all times.
3. The Zone Supervisor will include as part of her/his regular duties an inspection of the medical elevators to ensure that the medical stretcher is on the medical elevator. This inspection must be conducted at least twice daily ani all efforts will be exhausted to replace the stretcher if it is not on the elevator.
4. The Chief Nurse is responsible for ensuring that the Charge Nurse restocks the Medical Emergency Cart per the inventory sheet as prescribed after each emergency. If it is necessary to restock the Medical Emergency Cart when the pharmacy is closed, back up medication will be stored in the psychotropic medication room.
5. The security bubble on each cellblock, the medical unit and the receiving and discharge unit shall be equipped within 60 days with an Ambu Bag to assist with mouth-to-mouth resuscitation and an Addis Wonder Knife or an equivalent emergency rescue tool to assist in cutting down hanging victims. Pending the receipt and installation of this equipment, each of the aboveidentified security bubbles shall be equipped with blunt-nosed scissors. All correctional officers shall be trained in the most effective use of the Ambu bag, .emergency rescue tool aid bluntnosed scissors v:rthin 14 days of the installation of the equipment.
D. Ambulance Inspection and Restocking
1. The supervisory nurse is responsible for certifying that the ambulance has been sanitized and restocked at the beginning of each shift and after each use. The nursing assistant will sanitize the ambulance. The EMT will restock the ambulance and oversee sanitizing the unit after each use. Two separate log books will be maintained: one to indicate each medical run and the other to indicate each inspection. Both log books will be certified by the Chief Medical Officer bi-weekly. Maintenance documentation will be completed by the DOC Transportation Unit.
2. The DOC ambulance assigned to the Jail will be operated and maintained in full compliance with all applicable laws

-#

•#

and regulations of the United States and the District of Columbia. The ambulance shall not be used for any purpose other than emergency medical transport and shall not be used in circumstances necessitating advanced life support. The DOC must certify in writing to the Special Officer and plaintiffs' counsel when the DOC ambulance can be operated in accordance with the applicable laws and regulations of the United States and the District of Columbia. Until the DOC provides this written certification, only 911 will be used for all emergency medical transports.
E. Training
1. All medical staff and correctional personnel assigned to the Detention Facility shall receive C.P.R. training and training regarding the identification and appropriate clinical response to medical emergencies through DOC's in-service training program within 30 days. The training will include the following areas: medical emergencies such as asthma, heart attacks, strokes, seizures, outward effects of diabetics, hangings and other psychiatric emergencies. Refresher training will be held each year for all staff.
2. All medical staff and officers assigned to the Detention Facility will receive training in this emergency response protocol within three weeks. Refresher training will be held for all staff on an annual basis.
F. Officers' Duties
1. The duties of each and every correctional officer described in this procedure shall be specified in their respective post orders.
III. Effective Date
1. The defendants .shall immediately inclement the policies and practices outlined In this protocol.

ATTACHMENT A

Medical Emergency Log Boole Form

Patient's Name:.

DCDC No.:

Housing Unit:

Date:

If transportation was used, circle one: 911 DOC ambulance

Time Medical Staff Notified of Emergency:

Time Medical Staff Responded to Patient:

Identity of MERT Team Members who Responded:

Nature of Emergency:. Describe Medical Intervention:

Outcome:
Full Name and Title of Staff Member Completing this Form:
Comments:
THIS FORM MUST BE INSERTED IN EMERGENCY LOG

ATTACHMENT B

SUPPLY INVENTORY

Emergency Box Proventil Epinephrine (1:1,000) (1:10,000) Benadryl 2% Lidocaine Sodium Chloride .9% Isuprel HCL .2 mg/ml Narcan .4mg Atropine .4mg Monoject (Insulin reaction jell) Ipecac Nitrostat Bottle . 4mg Ammonia Inhalants Surgilube Syringes 35cc Butterflys Scissors Tongue Blades Compazine 5 mg/ml

1 inhaler
10 injectable 1 injectable 1 injectable 1 bottle 1 bottle 50 ml 2 vials 1 box 2 vials 2 packs 1 bottle 1 bottle 1 box 1 tube 2 2 2
12
1 vial

Page 2 Supply Inventory
Angiocaths Syringes 3cc Gloves Oxygen Tubing Ambu Bag and mask 2nd Emergency Box Laryngoscope and blade Oral Airway IV tubing Mask Sterile Gloves Oxygen Mask Angiocaths Syringes 3cc Endotracheal Tubes Alcohol pads 4x4 Oxygen tank Stretcher Stethoscope Blood Pressure Cuff Nasal Cannula

@

2 2 1 box 2 1

v

l

2

2

2

2 pair

2

2

2

3

,

l box

6 packs

1

1

1

1

2

Page 3 Supply Inventory
Tape IV Solution Lactate Ringers Normal Saline Flashlights

1 roll
1 1 2

TUBERCULOSIS SCREENING, PREVENTION, AND TREATMENT PROCEDURE AID PROTOCOL
I. Introduction
The parties, in consultation with the Special Officer and her experts, agree that this Tuberculosis Screening, Prevention, and Treatment Procedure and Protocol, filed with the Court on April 11, 1994, will govern the policies and procedures regarding tuberculosis screening, prevention and treatment at the Central Detention Facility pursuant to the November 9, 1993 Consent Order issued in Campbell v. McGruderf C.A. No. 1462-71 and Inmates of D.C. Jail v. Jackson. C.A. No. 75-1668. The defendants understand that they are obligated to promulgate policies which implement this protocol.
II. Procedures
A. Intake Procedure for Male Inmates
1. Upon entry into the Central Detention Facility, all male inmates, except those with a documented prior positive PPD reading or a documented negative PPD reading within the prior three (3) months, will be screened for tuberculosis (TB) with the Mantoux skin test. The Mantoux skin test Is to be administered by intradermal injection of purified protein derivative (PPD) of killed tubercle bacilli on the inmate's inner forearm by a licensed medical provider.
2. All incoming inmates will have a chest x-ray within 24 hours except asymptomatic inmates who have had a documented normal chest x-ray within the previous six (6) months. Lead aprons will be used to minimize radiation to the gonads.
3. Any inmat* exhibiting a clinical indication for a chest x-ray, i.e. fever, cough, weight loss, recent exposure to TB, or a new conversion to positive PPD status, shall have a chest x-ray within 24 hours regardless of the date of his last chest x-ray.
4. All new male intakes shall be housed on the intake cellblocks and fully segregated from inmates on other cell blocks until the results of the PPD test and chest x-ray are read and a negative TB result is determined. The intake units shall be evaluated within 60 days to determine if the ventilation is
adequate. The identity of the inspectors and the standards to be
applied will be determined by the parties in consultation with the Special Officer within 30 days.
B. Intake Procedures for Female Inmates
1. All incoming female inmates, except those with a documented prior positive PPD reading or a documented negative

PPD reading within the prior three (3) months, shall have a PPD test. All inmates shall have a screening test for pregnancy during intake.
2. The results of the pregnancy test shall be obtained within 24 hours. If the pregnancy test is negative, the female inmate shall have a chest x-ray within 24 hours. Lead apron screening shall be used.
3. Pregnant inmates who are PPD negative shall be tested for anergy to a panel of two or more antigens in addition to the PPD. All anergic patients shall have a chest x-ray. Lead apron screening shall be used.
4. A pregnant inmate shall only be x-rayed if she is PPD positive or exhibits signs or symptoms of TB. Lead apron screening must be used.1
5. All new female intakes shall be housed on the female intake tier of the female cellblock and segregated from the other inmates until the results of the PPD test and chest xray are read and a negative TB result is determined. The intake units shall be evaluated within 60 days to determine if the ventilation is adequate. The identity of the inspectors and the standards to be applied will be determined by the parties in consultation with the Special Officer within 30 days.
C. Reading and Recording of PPD Test3 and Chest X-rays
1. The Chief Medical Officer of the Jail shall designate a sufficient number of licensed health care providers on each shift who will be responsible for the reading of PPD tests and the proper documentation of the results of all TB screening tests in the inmates' medical records. These individuals shall be responsible for the tracking of PPD tests and chest x-rayr in accordance w,ith a protocol to be developed by the TB Coordinator or an appropriately trained and qualified individual by May 18, 1994.
2. The site of the PPD injection is to be examined for any reaction by a designated licensed health care provider within 48 to 72 hours after implantation.
3. The diameter of any induration is to be measured, disregarding erythema or bruising. The result of this PPD reading is to be charted on the form appended as Attachment A and
1 With proper lead apron screening, there is no contraindication to x-raying a pregnant woman who has signs and symptoms of TB. Chest x-ray using proper lead screening is essential in these inmates.

placed in the inmate's medical record.

(mm) :

4. The PPD reading is to be recorded in millimeters Positive - 10 mm or greater induration

Negative - 0 - 4 mm induration

Questionable - 5 - 9 mm induration

Consider questionable reading to be positive if:

* patient is HIV positive;
* patient has had a close recent contact with an infectious person; or
* patient has an abnornal chest x-ray consistent with TB.
If the reaction is swollen, red and painful, but there is no measurable induration, the PPD may have been given subcutaneously. If it appears that the PPD was improperly administered, it should be repeated, but only after 10 days from the original date of administration, to avoid the booster phenomenon.

5. Chest x-ray readings are to be recorded on the forms appended as Attachments A and B.

D. Preventive Therapy
1. PPD tests are to be repeated annually for all inmates.
2. All inmates with a positive PPD should he evaluated for INH prophylaxis treatment when a negative chest y ray rules out active disease. Evaluation shall include the performance of liver function tests (SGOT, SGPT, Alkaline Phosphatase, Total Bilirubin).

3. Medical providers shall advise inmates of the potential risks and side effects associated with TB prophylaxis prior to prescribing the medication. Inmates who are prescribed TB medication solely as prophylaxis have the right to refuse the medication. Inmates who are PPD positive, but without active disease, are not subject to medical holds for refusing prophylactic medication.

4. The following PPD positive patients shall receive INH preventive therapy:

* Under 35 years old;

* previously untreated or inadequately treated persons with abnormal chest x-rays consistent with old healed TB - under 35;
* persons with HIV infection - any age; * close contacts of infectious TB cases - any age; * new tuberculin convertors: persons nho have had a
history of negative PPD or a change in size greater than 6 mm increase in skin test reaction within a two year period - any age; * persons of any age with medical conditions that increase the risk of TB infection, including:
- Silicosis - Diabetes Mellitus - Prolonged corticosteroid therapy - Immunosuppressive therapy - Hematologic and reticuloendothelial
diseases - End-stage renal disease - Intestinal bypass - Postgastrectomy - Chronic malabsorption syndrome - Carcinomas of the oropharynx and upper
GI tract - 10% or more below ideal body weight
5. Inmates over 35 years of age may be offered prophylactic treatment but the risks of liver toxicity must be clearly explained.
6. If an inmate is PPD positive and has an abnormal chest x-ray consistent with TB, the inmate shall be referred for TB therapy. HIV counseling and testing shall also be offered to any inmate who is PPD positive.
7. Prophylactic treatment shall be given as follows: Isoni zid (INH) 300 mg daily or',900 mg 2x wer xly. Inmates who are HIV negative shall receive this course or treatment for 6 months. Inmates who are HIV positive shall receive this course of treatment for 12 months. This medication shall be given on a watch-take basis to ensure that the inmate ingests the medication. This involves watching the inmate swallow and checking the hands and mouth to ensure compliance.
8. Inmates receiving prophylactic INH shall be evaluated to determine if Vitamin B 6 therapy is necessary with particular attention to inmates with past or present signs or symptoms of neuropathy and inmates with signs of »alnourishment. Inmates who are HIV positive shall receive multivitamins.
E. Positive Chest X-rav or Symptomatic Inmate
1. Any inmates with an abnormal chest x-ray consistent
4

with TB or with symptoms of TB, i.e., productive cough, coughing up blood, weight loss, loss of appetite, lethargy, weakness, night sweats, or fever shall be referred for therapy and to D.c. General Hospital for a sputum smear and culture within 24 hours.
2. Until the results of the sputum smear or culture are known, the symptomatic patient is a "suspect" case and shall be placed in respiratory isolation which conforms with the guidelines established for respiratory isolation by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC).
3. In accordance with D.C. Health Regulations, Chapter 5, Section 8-5:104, the medical provider who identifies any suspected or diagnosed case of TB must report to the Bureau of Tuberculosis Control in writing within 48 hours of diagnosis or the appearance of suspicious symptoms by completing the attached Tuberculosis Case Report form. (See Attachment C>* The medical provider shall also provide a duplicate copy of the Tuberculosis Case Report to the TB Coordinator at the Jail for monitoring and follow-up.
P. Isolation
1. Inmates with active or suspected TB shall be transferred to isolation rooms that conform with current CDC guidelines in the Correctional Treatment Facility (CTF) or D.C. General Hospital until they are no longer infectious. Respiratory isolation rooms must have separate ventilation to the outside, negative air pressure in relation to adjacent areas, a minimum of six room air exchanges per hour, and properly shielded ultraviolet lights.
2. Any inmate who has had a positive sputum smear shall not be released from isolation until three (3) negative sputum smears are collected on consecutive days and the patient is receiving appropriate therapy.
3. Procedures such as sputum collection, bronchoscopy and the administration of aerosolized pentamidine are to be conducted at the CTF or D.C. General Hospital in an appropriate treatment room or booth with negative pressure in accordance with current CDC guidelines. Patients are to remain in the treatment room or booth until coughing has subsided.
4. DOC shall obtain proper inspections of the isolation rooms at the CTF annually.
2 This may be sent by facsimile in accordance with the correspondence appended as Attachment D.

6. Treatment

1. The following medications are used for the

treatment of TB:

Isoniazid (INH)

300 mg daily or

900 mg 2x weekly

Rifampin (RIF)

600 mg daily if greater than 50 kg 450 mg daily if less than 50 kg or same dosages 2x weekly

Pyrazinamide (PZA)

20-30 mg/kg daily or 50 ag/kg 2x weekly

Ethambutol (EMB) OR

25 «g/kg daily or 50 Mj/kg 2x weekly

Streptomycin

1 g» 2x weekly

2. Inmates receiving TB treatment shall be evaluated to determine if Vitamin B 6 therapy is necessary with particular attention to inmates with past or present signs or symptoms of neuropathy and inmates with signs of malnourishment. Inmates who are HIV positive shall receive multivitamins.
3. When symptoms and/or results of PPD test, chest xray, and sputum smear suggest active pulmonary TB, the inmate should be placed on a TB treatment regimen of medications as follows:

Regimens

Recommended Treatment Regimens

HIV Negative

HIV Positive

Initial Phase
Continuation Phase

2 months INH/RIF/ PZA/EMB daily
4-7 months INH/RIF daily or 2x weekly

2 months INH/RIF/ PZA/EMB daily
10 months INH/RIF daily or 2x weekly

Total

6-9 months

12 months

4. The treatment regimen of each patient shall be determined in accordance with the culture and sensitivity laboratory test result.

5. "Watch take" requirements should be implemented for all patients with evidence of active TB to ensure that the inmate ingests the medication.
6. Inmates with clinically active disease shall receive sputum examinations in an appropriate treatment room or booth with negative pressure at D.C. General Rospital or the CTF in accordance with standard medical practice, at least weekly until sputum conversion and then monthly until discharged. Discharge from the hospital or CTF will be based on the acquisition of three negative sputum smears an consecutive days.
7. Persistence or reappearance of organisms in the sputum smear necessitates an immediate evaluation of compliance with the medication regimen and the performance of drug susceptibility tests. All inmates shall remain in isolation until three consecutive sputum smears are negative.
H. Side Effects of Medication
1. Clinical staff who administer TB medications must be familiar with common side effects and adverse reactions. Specific protocols for management and evaluation of side effects shall be developed and the clinical staff shall receive the appropriate training.
2. The following patients should receive careful monitoring when given INH:
* Dilantin users - may need to decrease Dilantin; * Alcohol users - higher incidence of INH hepatitis; * Previous INH users - discontinued due to headaches; * Concurrent use with other medications.
3. If an inmate exhibits signs or symptoms of drug toxicity, the medication shall je discontinued and the Bureau of Tuberculosis (202) 724-2191 shull be contacted; for expert advice.
4. Expert advice for the handling of adverse reactions to medications and for the management of complicated cases (i.e., drug resistance, extrapulmonary disease, or disease in pregnant women) will be obtained from the Bureau of Tuberculosis Control at (202) 724-2191.
I. Refusal of TB Screening Procedures - Medical Hold
1. Any inmate who refuses any TB screening procedure
shall be placed on "medical hold" for the protection of the prison community. A medical hold is the process by which an inmate is placed in an isolated area when refusing to accept screening, diagnosis, or treatment for a communicable disease which poses a public health threat to the safety of the inmate or

others.
2. Any inmate placed on medical hold due his/her refusal to participate in TB screening shall receive immediate, comprehensive and appropriate education from a licensed health care provider regarding the refused procedure at the time of refusal. All available literature regarding TB shall be provided. Inmates on medical hold shall receive counseling daily
from the TB Coordinator regarding the importance of the screening
procedure. Inmates on medical hold shall also be seen daily by a physician or physician assistant in order to observe any signs or symptoms of TB. Proper documentation of each visit by the TB Coordinator and physician or physician assistant shall be noted in the medical record.
3. If the inmate does not consent to the screening procedure within two weeks, and the inmate shows no signs or symptoms of TB in the judgment of a DOC physician, s/he shall be released to the general population. When a Medical hold is extended beyond the initial two week period, the requirements of section I, paragraph 2 remain applicable.
J. Inmate Education and Referral tnffnnnnunityServices
1. When an inmate's PPD is read, the licensed health care provider shall distribute and explain written educational materials regarding TB control, prevention and treatment. The TB Coordinator shall be responsible for selecting appropriate materials in Spanish and English written at a basic literacy level.
2. When an inmate is prescribed INH or any other medication as TB prophylaxis or treatment, written information regarding follow up care in the event of release from the Jail during the course of treatment shall be given and explained. This information shall < irect th,e inmate to contact Dr. James Wills, Area C Chest Clinic, 1905 E Street, S.E., Washington, D.C., 20003 at (202) 727-5155. The TB Coordinator shall develop the form to be provided and explained.
3. The TB Coordinator shall monitor daily the releases from the Jail to determine if any inmate on TB medications has been released. The identity of any such inmate shall be reported to the Bureau of Tuberculosis Control and the Area C Chest Clinic.
4. If the release date of an inmate taking TB medication is known to be prior to the completion of the inmate's treatment regimen, the inmate shall be provided with a two week supply of the prescribed medication upon release along with written instructions to contact the Area C Chest Clinic.

K. Tuberculosis Coordinator
1. The DOC shall hire a properly credentialed and appropriately trained full-time TB Coordinator to work at the Jail by April 18, 1994.
2. The TB Coordinator shall monitor the ongoing screening program at the Jail for continuity of care and followup. The TB Coordinator shall be responsible for monitoring TB intake screening, inmates placed on prophylactic treatment, inmates with active disease, inmates placed in the hospital for therapy, and those placed on medical hold related to TB.
3. The TB Coordinator shall function as the liaison with the Bureau of Tuberculosis Control, D.C. General Hospital and the laboratory.
4. The TB Coordinator shall obtain a comprehensive daily list of all persons undergoing intake physical examinations with TB screening. Results of PPD tests and chest x-rays shall be placed on the appropriate forms by the medical staff and monitored daily by the TB Coordinator. Hie TB Coordinator shall develop a protocol for the tracking of PPD tests and chest x-rays to be approved by the Chief Medical Officer of the Jail by May 18, 1994. The TB Coordinator shall monitor all inmates receiving prophylactic treatment or treatment for active TB.
5. The TB Coordinator shall maintain an accurate account of inmates tested, cleared, inmates not tested, inmates on medical holds, and referrals for inmates released into the community.
6. The TB Coordinator shall coordinate referrals and discharge planning for inmates receiving TB prophylaxis or treatment.
I
7. The TB Coordinator shall monitor the case reporting to the Bureau of Tuberculosis Control to ensure that all appropriate cases are reported properly and within the required time limits.
8. The TB Coordinator shall monitor at least monthly all inmates taking anti-TB medications. Special attention shall be given to inmates who are taking other medications or who have a history of alcohol abuse or liver disease.
9. The TB Coordinator shall develop and implement an educational program regarding TB for the inmate population, including monitoring the distribution of any written materials that are to be provided to the inmates housed at the Jail.
10. The TB Coordinator shall answer directly to the

Chief Medical Officer of the Jail and shall provide information and education to other providers at the Jail. The TB Coordinator shall submit a monthly report to the Chief Medical Officer at the Jail and the Bureau of Tuberculosis Control.
11. The TB Coordinator shall coordinate in-service training which will be provided to all staff at the DOC training academy. Specialized training will be provided to clinical staff by specialists from the Public Health Commission, Bureau of Tuberculosis Control, community hospitals and from other correctional institutions regarding clinical signs, symptoms, and treatment issues involving TB.
12. The TB Coordinator shall be responsible for conducting any contact investigations when pulmonary or laryngeal TB disease is suspected or diagnosed.
13. The TB Coordinator shall be responsible for developing a tracking system to provide notification to the medical units at other DOC facilities when a patient under treatment for TB or on prophylaxis is transferred from the Jail. This duty may be delegated to another licensed health care provider, however, the TB Coordinator is responsible to ensure that it is developed and implemented.
L. Contact Investigation
1. Whenever pulmonary or laryngeal TB disease is suspected or diagnosed, all close contacts should be skin tested unless there is a documented history of a positive skin test. Close contacts include all cell mates, all inmates and staff on the same tier, or all inmates and staff in the same building who share air, and visitors who have shared airspace.
2. The "concentric circle" approach can be used to determine the extent of contact dnvestigation needed First, identify thore persons who were ^nost likely to have jeen infected by the source case. This first group should include: persons who shared breathing space with the source case for the longest time, persons who may have spent less time with the source case but are immunosuppressed; and persons who have TB symptoms. If positive PPD tests are identified among persons in this first group or "circle" ( with no previous history of TB infection), new infections have probably occurred. Expand the investigation into widening circles until PPD testing identifies a group of persons with no evidence of new TB infection
3. If exposure was less than 10 to 12 weeks prior to PPD testing, a contact with a negative PPD test should be retested 10 to 12 weeks after the initial negative PPD test.
10

•-•i..'

ray:

4. The following contacts should receive a chest x-
a) those who have a positive skin test — greater than 5 mm;
b) those with a history of a positive skin test; c) those who are HIV positive, regardless of skin
test results.

If the chest x-ray is negative for evidence of the disease, these contacts should receive preventive therapy, unless medically contraindicated.

5. During contact investigations, the confidentiality of the infected person must be maintained.

M. Screening of DOC Employees

1. All DOC staff shall be strongly encouraged to receive PPD tests annually and these tests shall be made available to all employees free of charge. The defendants shall determine whether mandatory testing can be required and shall report to the Special Officer and plaintiffs1 counsel within 60 days regarding this matter.

N. Review of Protocol

1. This procedure and protocol shall be reviewed annually by the DOC Assistant Director for Health Services to determine if any revisions should be made in light of new developments in the treatment of TB. Any proposed revisions shall be submitted to the Special Officer for approval. Plaintiffs' counsel must be advised of all proposed revisions to this document.

III. Effective Date
i
1. The defendants shall immediately .mplement the policies and procedures set forth in this document.

11

ATTACHMENT A
D.C IPARTMENT OF CORRECT . JNS HEALTH SERVICES
TUBERCULOSISSCREENING

o = i. i ps . si

Date:

1. Patient has / has not had previous skin testing for tuberculosis.

2. Last PPD was done on

_ at

and was neg / pos.

3.Mantoux skin testing was performed on

by (initials)

4. Date read:.

Results:

mm Induration which is neg / pos. (initials)

5. Chest X-Ray done on, tuberculosis.

is neg / positive / suspicious for active

6. Recommendations:

Patient's Name:
D.O.B.:

(Last)

Race:

(First)

DCDC #:
Sex:

*• Center for Disease Control recommends that an Induration of 3mm or greater In the imnjunocompromlsed be considered positive. In the non-lmnjunocomprombed host, an Induration of 10mm or greater U positive.

•i, u >J 3 z> c

ATTACHMENT B

PATlENtS loeNTtFICATTON

Aoe sex Pf«

NAMC DOS
ococ»

EXAMINATION AEQUE8T6O ( J ROUTINE CMEST
QOTHER

FACIUTY

REQU6STIO8Y

K R T I N E N T CUNICAU HIS TORV, OPEAAtiONS. PHYSICAL FINOINOd. AND PROVISIONAL OtAONOSIfl

fS. SI dbW

PWSONANT OfSB

\ ^NQ^

DATE OF REQUC8T

DAT? OF EXAMINATION <lnokj4*y*tr) RAOKXWAPHIC REPORT

DATEOfHEPORT

OATH OP TRANSCRIPTION

MO SIGNATURE IDP8 I M 7

AAOIOLOGY BEQUEST I REPORT

Name U*st) Address Marital Status
Occupation

ATTACHMENT C

OF THE DISTRICT OF CC ^IBIA

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES

TUBERCULOSIS CASE REPORT

(Hrtt)

(middltlmsidea)

SSN •

Telephone

Sex Race D Black
Q White

D American Indian or
Alaskan Native Asian or Pacific Islander

Ethnic Orgin D Hispanic D Not Hispanic

School or Place of Employment

Address

Oate of Report

/

/

Oate of Birth

/

/

Country of Orgin if not U.S.

Oate arrv. In U.S.

Classification
• a Tuberculosis: current disease a Tuberculosis no current disease • Tuberculosis Suspect:
a Tuberculosis Infection No disease
(It applicable)
OMS • 1*47 (A*v. 3191) I-11M-1 -fl-360

Diagnosis

Bacteriology

O Pulmonary O Non-Pulmonary (sptdty)

D Miliary

D Meningitis

PCS. NEC Pending Not Oone

Smear D D D

D

n a Culture a

a

• Bones & • • Pleural Join;*

Type of Specimen

a Sputum

Q Fluid

D Lymphatic D Peritoneal

D Tissue • Other (specify)

• GenitoUrinary

O Other (specify)

D Reported at time of death

(date(s) of collection

SIGNS & SYMPTOMS

Laboratory Performed

Chest X-Ray
Q Not done • Normal D Abnormal
• Cavitary D Non-cavitary O Stable • Worsening Q Improving
DATE OF X-RAY

Tuberculin Skin Test

D Not done D Mantouz (PPD)

D Tine

a Other

(specify)

a Significant Not Significant

D

.mm

Chemotherapy Dosage

D Isoniazid

Q Ethambutol _

D Rlfampin

D Pyrazinamide

n Streptomycin

D Other

(specify)

itient to be followed by: DMMENTS:

] Send Additional Report Forms aported by (Print Name)

Signature

Previous diagnosis D Yea date /

D- No

Hospitallzation

Chart No Admission Oate:

Discharge Date:.

Office or Hospital Address

)uce No.

Ward

TO BE COMPLETED BY HEALTH DEPARTMENT

Census Tract

Oate Recorded in Registry

Case

Verified

ATTACHMENT D

5 Z - >_ t ~6 .

GOVtRNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES WASHINGTON. D. C. 2OOO2

•$. 5

IN REPLY nzrcn TO-

To wnosi it may concern:

November 20, ".990 D.C. Commission of Public Keaisn
3ureau of Tuberculosis Control 1905 S St., S.E.
Washington, D.C. 20003

Tne 3urea.u of Tuberculosis Control, Registry,'has installed a racsTBrrre- (FAX) machine to be used for tne expressed purpose of receiving both case ani laboratory reports of suspected and confirmed tuberculosis from nealtn care providers.

Tne Fax machine will be available for receiving reports 24 nours a day, including weekends. It is anticipated that tne availability of tne Fax macnine w i n improve both tne 'timeliness and the accuracy of Tuberculosis case reporting.

Tne District of Columbia requires, as written in tne D. C. Healtn

Regulations, for communicable and Reportable Diseases, cnapter 5,

1963, section 8-5:104 Denomination of Communicable Diseases: "tne

following diseases

Tuberculosis

are hereby

denominated communicable diseases and snail be reported in writing

within 48 hours of diagnosis or tne appearance of suspicious

symptoma in tne manner Indicated in sections 8-5:106 and 8-5:107 of

this part. The transmission of case and laboratory TB reports by

Fax macnine within 48 hours of diagnosis, fully satisfies tne

reporting requirements of the D.C. Healtn Regulations.

The Bureau of Tuberculosis Ccntrql, Registry Fax mac&ine telephone number la: 202-724-2363- I there are any questions regarding the use of the Fax machine, please call Glenn Acham, Supervisory Public Health Advisor, at 724-2193.

sincerely yours,

P.S.

HazeT M. Swann, M.D., Chief Bureau of Tuberculosis control
Enclosed is a letter to Infection Control Practitioners, dated September 18, 1990, regarding the reporting of tuberculosis cases.

OHl-IOf

MEDICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROTOCOL
I. Introduction
The parties, in consultation with the Special Officer and her experts, agree that this Medical Emergency Protocol, filed with the Court on April 11, 1994, will govern the. policies and procedures regarding the response to medical eaergencies at the Central Detention Facility pursuant to the November 9, 1993 Consent Order issued in Campbell v. McGruder. C.A. No. 1462-71 and Inmates of D.C. Jail v. Jackson. C.A. No. 1462-71. The defendants understand that they are obligated to promulgate policies which implement this protocol.
II. Procedures
A. Notification and Response
1. Any employee who determines that a medical emergency exists shall immediately notify the Command Center using the Emergency Direct Line Communication system where possible, or by calling extension 38136 through 38144. If an emergency occurs in a location where there is no telephone, the employee will go to the nearest telephone, or notify the Command Center by walkie talkie. The employee will then return to the location of the emergency.
2. The employee placing the call will give all necessary information to the Command Center Officer including the location of the injured or ill person, type of injury or illness, and if the injured person is conscious.
3. The Command Center Officer will immediately page the Medical Emergency Response Team (MERT) Leader. The Command Center Officer will then imrediately notify a supervisor and the Sic) Call Officer by the Direct Line Communication System, and inform tiem of the location of the person, type of injury or illness, and if the injured person is conscious. The Command Center Officer will then make the emergency announcement over the public address system. The Command Center Officer will only relay the location of the injured person on the public address system. The Command Center Officer shall also notify the Shift Commander who will immediately dispatch a correctional officer to ensure the proper operation and reception of the medical elevator on the floor where the emergency exists.
4. The respective Zone Supervisor will immediately respond to the location of all medical emergencies. The Supervisor will assist the MERT and ensure full cooperation by the correctional force to include timely correctional coverage, as well as security and escort requirements. Other correctional duties may include lifting residents onto stretchers.

5. The MERT will immediately respond to all medical emergencies with the portable emergency medical cart. They will use the medical elevator for all medical emergencies- A service elevator will be used when the medical elevator is inoperable. All employees will assist the MERT as requested.
6. The MERT Leader is responsible for directing emergency care and treatment. The MERT Leader shall determine the means of transportation to D.C. General Hospital, if necessary, and shall call 911 in all life-threatening emergencies.
7. The MERT Leader shall notify the Shift Commander when an injured person must be transported to D.C. General Hospital. The MERT leader shall inform the Shift Commander of the means of transportation, i.e., 911 or DOC ambulance. The Shift Commander shall facilitate the entry of the 911 staff as well as the prompt dispatching of EMTs and other designated staff for operation of the DOC ambulance. When the DOC ambulance is inoperable, 911 will be used for all emergency transfers to D.C. General Hospital.
8. The MERT Leader is responsible for ensuring that all medical emergencies are documented on the Medical Emergency Information Form immediately after each emergency. A copy of the form is appended as Attachment A. All completed Medical Emergency Information Forms shall be filed in a MERT log. The Sick Call Officer shall record all emergency call information in the Sick Call Officer's log-book.
B. Medical Emergency Response Team Composition
1. The MERT will be composed of three medical personnel. The MERT Leader will be a physician, with two other licensed medical providers (nurses or physician assistants).
2. The Chief Medical Officer is responsible for devising and porcing a MERT schedule that includes alternates. This schedule will be completed by the second Monday in January and July of each year. The posting of the schedule will be accessible to the Sick Call Officer who must review it at the beginning of each shift.
3. The MERT Leader will wear a pager while on duty at all times. The pager will be transferred from MERT Leader to MERT Leader on each shift.
C. Location and Inspection of Emergency Medical Equipment and Supplies
1. The on duty charge nurse is responsible for having the emergency medical cart and the portable crash boxes inspected at the beginning of each shift and will make an entry in the

designated log books indicative of same. The Sick Call Officer in charge is responsible for inspection of the medical elevator and on board stretcher at the beginning of each shift. The officer will ride the elevator to all floors and check the operation of the gate locks on all floors. The inspection of the medical elevator and gate locks shall be noted in the shift activity report.
2. The elevator key shall be kept in the Infirmary Control Bubble and the Emergency Medical Cart shall be located in room 326. The medical cart will be taken to all medical emergencies and a medical stretcher will be kept on the medical elevator at all times.
3. The Zone Supervisor will include as part of her/his regular duties an inspection of the medical elevators to ensure that the medical stretcher is on the medical elevator. This inspection must be conducted at least twice daily and all efforts will be exhausted to replace the stretcher if it is not on the elevator.
4. The Chief Nurse is responsible for ensuring that the Charge Nurse restocks the Medical Emergency Cart per the inventory sheet as prescribed after each emergency. If it is necessary to restock the Medical Emergency Cart when the pharmacy is closed, back up medication will be stored in the psychotropic medication room.
5. The security bubble on each cellblock, the medical unit and the receiving and discharge unit shall be equipped within 60 days with an Ambu Bag to assist with mouth-to-mouth resuscitation and an Addis Wonder Knife or an equivalent emergency rescue tool to assist in cutting down hanging victims. Pending the receipt and installation of this equipment, each of the aboveidentified security bubbles shall be equipped with blunt-nosed scissors. All correctional officers shall be trained in the most effective ur?e of the Ambu bag, ,emergency rescue tc ol and bluntnosed sciss /rs within 14 days of the installation of the equipment.
D. Ambulance Inspection and Restocking
1. The supervisory nurse is responsible for certifying that the ambulance has been sanitized and restocked at the beginning of each shift and after each use. The nursing assistant will sanitize the ambulance. The EMT will restock the ambulance and oversee sanitizing the unit after each use. Two separate log books will be maintained: one to indicate each Medical run and the other to indicate each inspection. Both log books will be certified by the Chief Medical Officer bi-weekly. Maintenance documentation will be completed by the DOC Transportation Unit.
2. The DOC ambulance assigned to the Jail will be operated and maintained in full compliance with all applicable laws

and regulations of the United States and the District of Columbia. The ambulance shall not be used for any purpose other than emergency medical transport and shall not be used in circumstances necessitating advanced life support. The DOC must certify in writing to the Special Officer and plaintiffs1 counsel when the D O C ambulance can be operated in accordance with the applicable laws and regulations of the United States and the District of Columbia. Until the DOC provides this written certification, only 911 will be used for all emergency medical transports.
E. Training
1. All medical staff and correctional personnel assigned to the Detention Facility shall receive C.P.R. training and training regarding the identification and appropriate clinical response to medical emergencies through DOC's in-service training program within 30 days. The training will include the following areas: medical emergencies such as asthma, heart attacks, strokes, seizures, outward effects of diabetics, hangings and other psychiatric emergencies. Refresher training will be held each year for all staff.
2. All medical staff and officers assigned to the Detention Facility will receive training in this emergency response protocol within three weeks. Refresher training will be held for all staff on an annual basis.
F. Officers' Duties
1. The duties of each and every correctional officer described in this procedure shall be specified in their respective post orders.
III. Effective Date
1. The defendants shall immediately implement the policie , and practices outlined In this protocol.

ATTACHMENT A

Medical Emergency Log Book Form

Patient's Name:.

DCDC No.:

Housing Unit:

Date:

If transportation was used, circle one: 911 DOC ambulance

Time Medical Staff Notified of Emergency:

Time Medical Staff Responded to Patient:

Identity of MERT Team Members who Responded:

Nature of Emergency:. Describe Medical Intervention:

Outcome:
Full Name and Title of Staff Member Completing this Form:
Comments: THIS FORM MUST BE INSERTED IN EMERGENCY LOG

ATTACHMENT B

SUPPLY INVENTORY

Portable Emergency Box

Proventil

Epinephrine (1:1,000)

(1:10,000)

Benadryl

2% Lidocaine

Sodium Chloride .9%

Isuprel HCL .2 mg/ml

Narcan .4mg

Atropine .4mg

Monoject (Insulin reaction jell)

Ipecac

Nitrostat Bottle .4mg

Ammonia Inhalants

Surgilube

'

Syringes 35cc

Butterflys

Scissors

Tongue Blades

Compazine 5 mg/ml

Quantity of Supplies 1 inhaler
10 injectable 1 injectable 1 injectable 1 bottle 1 bottle 50 ml. 2 vials 1 box 2 vials 2 packs 1 bottle 1 bottle 1 box 1 tube 2 2 2 12 1 vial

Page 2 Supply Inventory
Angiocaths Syringes 3cc Gloves Oxygen Tubing Ambu Bag and mask 2nd Emergency Box Laryngoscope and blade Oral Airway IV tubing Mask Sterile Gloves Oxygen Mask Angiocaths Syringes 3cc Endotracheal Tubes Alcohol pads 4x4 Oxygen tank Stretcher Stethoscope Blood Pressure Cuff Nasal Cannula

2 2 1 box 2 1

. 1

2

2

2

2 pair

2

2

2

3

.

1 box

6 packs

1

1

1

1

2

Page 3 Supply Inventory
Tape IV Solution Lactate Ringers Normal Saline Flashlights

1 roll
1 1 2

 
 < V

^to 191994

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LEONARD CAMPBELL, et al., Plaintiffs,

)

C.A. No. 1462-71

)

(WBB)

v.

)

ANDERSON McGRUDER, et al., )

Defendants.

)

INMATES OF D.C. JAIL, et al. , )

m
c~>
CO m
rn —_ o

Plaintiffs,

v. DELBERT C. JACKSON, et al.,

C.A. No. 75-1668 (Cases consolidated before
Judge William B. Bryant)

Defendants.

NOTICE OF FILING Pursuant to the April 20, 1993 Order appointing her Special Master in the above-captioned matters, and with the consent of the defendants, the Special Officer retained James Balsamo to evaluate environmental health and safety at the D.C. Jail. During August of 1994 Mr. Balsamo conducted an audit of the Jail. This audit Ailminated in a report which was issued oy Mr. Balsamo in November of 1994. Mr. Balsamo's report, which is attached hereto, describes many substantial violations of this Court's Orders related to environmental health and safety and also sets forth recommendations for curing each violation. The Special Officer provided the parties with copies of Mr. Balsamo*s report and recommended that the defendants develop a

own.

The Special Officer adopts Mr. Balsamo's findings as her
Campbell v. McGruder

JC-DC-001-068

proposed corrective action plan and implementation schedule that could be submitted to the Court for approval. The defendants have failed to meet the deadlines established by the Special Officer for submission of a proposal to cure the deficiencies identified in Mr. Balsamo's report. However, defendants' counsel advised the Special Officer today that the defendants may be able to submit a proposal by the last day of January, 1995. Accordingly, if this matter cannot be resolved informally by the end of January, 1995, the Special Officer shall submit a report recommending that the Court impose contempt sanctions and that the Court order that the defendants implement the recommendations made by Mr. Balsamo.

Date: December 16, 1994

Grade M. Lopes Bar No. 358650 Special Officer of the Court 1130 - 17th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 778-1168

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that a copy of the Notice of Filing was

mailed first class, ppostage prepaid, on this IU

day r£ $jm^-*-~ —

1994 to the following:

Richard S. Love, Esq. David Flyer, Esq. Correctional Litigation Section Office of the Corporation Counsel 441 - 4th Street, N.W. Room 6S065 Washington, D.C. 20001

J. Patrick Hickey, Esq. Tara Flynn, Esq. Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 2300 N Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20037

- 2-

Jonathan Smith, Esq. D.C. Prisoners' Legal Services Project, Inc. 1400 - 20th Street, N.W. Suite 117 Washington, D.C. 20036
- 3-

m
RECEIVED
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND SAFETY SURVEY
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA JAIL WASHINGTON, D. C. ON AUGUST 1-5, 1994 BY
J . BTOSAMO, J R . , M . P ^ H . , CSP, R . S .

I, James J. Balsamo, Jr., was retained by Grace M. Lopes, Special Officer of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to evaluate the District of Columbia Jail during a visit August 1-5, 1994.
Prior to this inspection, I was provided with two Reports of Environmental Health and Safety Inspections of the District of Columbia Jail prepared by the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs (DCRA) and these were reviewed prior to my inspection. I later received for my review, a copy of the Department of Corrections abatement plan which was prepared in response to the May 1994 DCRA Environmental inspection of the jail facilities. During my inspection of the jail facilities, I spoke with many jail personnel, both correctional officers and administrative personnel and reviewed on site documents that related to safety and environmental issues.
My findings and recommendations are based on all of the above information, but especially my tour of the facility.
In summary fashion, fire safety, food sanitation, housekeeping and general cleanliness, insect and rodent control, disaster preparedness, clothing issues, staff knowledge and training and inadequate written policies and procedures are issues that must be corrected in order to provide a safe, clean, and healthful environment for the inmates. Bloodborne pathogen and tuberculosis awareness and training are not being adequately addressed.

I. Introduction

I toured this facility after having read the detailed

environmental reports of the District of Columbia Department

of Regulatory Affairs. My findings corresponded very well

with the July 18, 1994 report in so far as sanitation and

safety are concerned. Many cells have very dirty walls and

floors; showers are filthy and rusty; flying insects near the

showers are in evidence; lighting is inadequate in the cells;

pest control is inadequate; vents are obstructed; inadequate

bedding and clothing is provided; water temperatures in

showers and lavatories are not well regulated; food sanitation

in the kitchen is poor; and, some plumbing fixtures are in bad

repair. Bloodborne pathogen and fire safety training, food

service staffing, and refrigerated and non-refrigerated

storage space, is totally inadequate.

Electrical and

plumbing systems need upgrading and ventilation and

temperature control needs to be updated.

Because of this, I did not feel the need to repeatedly list these items in each and every cell or area. I summarized the items with which I am concerned, discussed the problems and attempted to offer reasonable solutions.

II. Inspection Results
The twenty-five major issues that need attention in order to improve the safety and sanitation in this facility are as follows:
A. Fire Exits
Problem:
Fire exits at the rear of the cell blocks are not readily available for inmate egress.
Discussion:
Section 6, page 6-3, of the description of the fire protection system of this facility as designed states: "All stairs are locked, unlike ordinary buildings, therefore quick access to emergency keys is essential for basic safety of the building occupants. All exterior doors can be unlocked only from the exterior therefore the need for a quick and deliberate response in the event of a fire cannot be stressed enough. There are three areas where inmates may be relocated or evacuated:
1. Other interior portions of the facility 2. The recreation yard

3. The periphery of the building
Use of the periphery for evacuation poses a more serious problem from a security standpoint. Review of all Fire Department Procedures by correctional personnel on a regular basis is recommended to assure that a positive and aggressive policy is available for use during any fire emergency."
I was told that in the event of a fire on a tier that would require evacuation through the exit at the rear of the unit, an officer would be sent to the command center to get the key and proceed to the periphery exit doors. This officer is not pre-designated and would have to be identified at the time of the emergency. Someone in authority should be pre-assigned to make sure this assignment is carried out. This should be part of the fire emergency plan and be part of the drill process and critique.
I asked if any training is provided with respect to this task and is it part of the drill. Security Lt. Givan said that he is not aware of any such training.
I then asked to be shown the exits on the perimeters of the building and determine if the locks worked. After about ten (10) minutes of futile efforts to get a key to the recreation yard the proper key was secured from the locksmith. When we did enter the recreation area, it was learned that we could not get to the perimeter of the building from the recreation yard. We then went back into the building and exited the perimeter area through the staff exit. Finally arriving at the fire exit doors at the ground level, correctional officers tried to open the doors and were unable to open them with the set of keys they said were for the doors. After going back to the command center, another set of keys were secured from the locksmith. Upon returning to the perimeter of the building, '.he exterior fire stairwell doors were opened, but the correctional officers were unable to open the interior doors leading to the inmate confinement units.
This took approximately forty-five (45) minutes and the exercise was unsuccessful. This points out that this vital part of the fire exit plan is in shambles and is not a routine part of the fire drills held at this facility. Not having keys readily available for safe escape and not being able to open the rear exit doors on the housing units, thereby creating "dead end" corridors, is prohibited by the 1986 APHA "Fire Protection and Fire Safety Practices Standards." Plans for extra security, when this avenue of evacuation must be taken, must also

be part of the overall exit plan. Keys for fire exiting purposes are clearly not readily available and it should be recognized that there is only one (1) locksmith for this entire facility and he had to determine which keys to use to open these exits. When he is on vacation or is sick, who is the person with the knowledge to be able to provide the needed information on keys and locks. If a fire occurs when he is off work what alternate plan is available to have someone with his knowledge available? Even the facility officer in charge of Security and keys could not find the correct keys.
Solution:
1. The keys for these perimeter locks understandable must be secured at all time, but must be readily available if needed or time and lives may be lost in a fire emergency.
Standard: 1986 APHA Standard for Correctional Facilities (APHA-SCF), Part 8-D^3 F&G
2. A fire safety plan must incorporate fire exit access and evacuation in a pre-determined plan of action in coordination with the Washington, D. C. Fire Department and jail personnel. This must become part of all fire drill exercises.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-D-3 G & M
3. Plans and personnel assignments requirements SCBA's to be brought to the unit for search and evacuation purposes is not in the version of the Fire Drill/Evacuation of Housing Units plan provided for my review. This must also be part of the plan and be part of the fire drill exercise.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-D-3 L N, 0
4. Many of these perimeter doors are rusted and are in need of immediate repair.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part I-D-3 F, G & M
B. Training and Documentation
Problem:
Civilian employee training for such things as fire safety, bloodborne pathogens, and hazardous materials is lacking. Fire safety training for correctional personnel at this facility only began in June 1994.

•&••
Discussion:
In speaking with correctional, maintenance, and other civilian personnel, it became very clear that civilian personnel have not received fire safety training and that correctional officers had just begun their on-site fire safety training. The duties of civilian personnel during such emergencies are not fully understood. If in fact they have any such assignments.
In trying to determine if correctional personnel understand the hazards of the chemicals they use, sometimes in inmate areas, I feel there is a great lack of such knowledge. They have a right to know the hazards of such chemicals and how to protect themselves and others (including inmates) when these materials are used. Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) could not be located in this facility.
Solution:
1. Institute a "Chemical Right to Know" Program for officers and civilian staff to include the provision of MSDSs and how to read them, the hazards of such chemicals, and the methods of protecting themselves, and others in the area, from the hazards of such chemicals.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-D-l H and OSHAHazard Communication Standard
2. Provide fire safety training to those civilian employees who have a role in fire safety at this facility and continue officers training.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-D-3 0
3. Bloodborne pathogen training shouJ d be provided to all employees, civilian and corre tional officers, who may be exposed to blood and body fluids as part of their job. This is to include the laundry staff and inmates working in the laundry, as well as correctional officers and other staff in this facility. This is not being done.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-D-l H and OSHA Bloodborne Pathogens Standard
4. All training should be documented.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-F-l

C. Housekeeping
Problem:
The entire facility has many areas that are extremely dirty, making these areas unhealthy for the inmates.
Discussion:
In checking the various housing units and reviewing the reports of the District of Columbia Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs, it is very apparent that the showers, cells, and storage closets are very dirty, harbor roaches and flies, and are very odoriferous. Showers have corrosion and scum on them. Lt. Bonaparte, who supervises the Environmental Squad which assists in abating sanitary problems, was very helpful during our visits to the housing units. The "Environmental Squad" assists in cleaning common areas such as vent shafts, utility rooms, etc. They also remove trash from the cell blocks. Inside cell blocks, inmate details clean the showers and some cells of those who will not clean their own areas. In SE-3, food cartons and other items were noted in the ventilation shaft in the utility room. Standing water was noted on the floor outside of NE-3.
In SO-2, inmates claimed that they are not provided with buckets and brushes to clean their cells. Sgt. Cooper said that they are given soap, sanitizers, and brushes to clean their cells. The inmates say that sometimes this is done but there are not enough to go around to all cells.
In SW-2, lower left tier, there are broken valves, water standing on the floor, cobwebs, and dirt in the janitor's closet.
In N-2, lower right tier, cell number 55, there are no mattress covers provided; the l£/atory runs constantly; floor tiles are missing; moisture is on the floor; and, the cell is generally dirty. In this same area, the utility closet door between cells is filthy and clogged with dust and dirt. Air circulation is impeded especially when smoke evacuation is necessary.
In the intake area, paint is peeling and corrosion exists in the showers and on stall dividers. Scum is on the floor of the shower area and mildew is present on the ceiling.
Cells in SE-3 are dirty and in cell number 56 a yellowish-brown scum was evident in the toilet. The

inmate said only a few brushes are available and they try to get them but are not always successful.
In the two-man cells in NW-2, the cells have very dirty walls and floors.
These are just some examples of the sanitation problems which also include roaches, mice and other insects but which will be discussed in a separate section.
Solution:
1. A Housekeeping Plan must be developed for this facility to include cells, day rooms, storage areas, showers, utility areas, loading dock, and receiving areas. This plan should identify areas to be cleaned, frequency of cleaning, assignments to make sure cleaning is done, procurement plans for securing appropriate and needed items, training needs of jail personnel as to how to obtain needed supplies for their areas, schedules for the cleaning various cells per day, and adequate storage areas for supplies. This must also include a schedule of trash removal from the cell blocks. This is called a "Program Cleaning Schedule or Guide" listing surfaces and fixtures to be cleaned and methods and chemicals to clean these various surfaces and fixtures. If facility personnel can not do this, an executive housekeeper accredited by the National Executive Housekeeping Association could be retained to develop such a plan.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-B-5 & 9
2. A routine inspection of all cells must be undertaken weekly by correctional officers and reports of deficiencies sent to the highest ranking person who can effect compliance.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-F-2
3. The housekeeping plan should include a schedule whereby all mop heads are cleaned daily or they are used for a short limited number of days, such as one or two days, and then discarded. The laundry does not process the nopheads and I could not find anyone who knew if they were ever cleaned. They must also be put on a programmed cleaning schedule.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-5
4. The Housekeeping Plan must include the types of
7

V-v
chemicals and their use strengths, and the types of cleaning implements needed for cleaning the walls, floors, toilets, and showers. The floors should be cleaned, using an appropriate cleaning solution, in a two-bucket system. The buckets must be emptied as they become soiled after cleaning several cells. The buckets must be cleaned and air dried each day.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-5
D. Clothing
Problem:
Insufficient underwear, socks, t-shirts, and jumpsuits.
Discussion:
Underwear and socks are not issued at intake. One d*y each week Officer Smith, the clothing issue officer, sends a package of six socks, six t-shirts, and twelve underwear (shorts) to each cell block to be issued to those inmates supposedly most in need of then. Cell blocks such as SW-2 holds one hundred forty (14 Of inmates and the small number of socks, t-shirts, and underwear is insufficient. Officer Smith said if he had to issue underclothes at intake he would need more storage space. Because of this, inmates often wash their underwear in buckets and toilets. They say if they send these to the laundry, they may never get them back and they don't have but one or two sets. Some floors have washing nachines and dryers for inmates to wash their own personal items, but this doesn't exist throughout the jail. The dryer was broken in one area where provided. Upon admission inmates are issued two shirts and pants or two jumpsuits according to jail personnel. Several female inmates in Housing Unit SO-3 said they got one jumpsuit, one bra, and one pair of underwear. When they turn in one jumpsuit they ge - one. This is done twice a week. Mr. Singleton, Laundry Superintendent, said that clothing is exchanged twice a week. Mr. Smith, clothing issue person, made very confusing and often conflicting statements as to clothing exchange schedules. He said he has it (the schedule) in his head and it is not written anywhere.
Solution:
1. Adequate amounts of underwear should be provided to all inmates so they can have at least one change of clothing per week.

Standard: APHA-SCF, Part 8-E-l
2. Provide more space in the clothing issue area so this increased amount of clothing can be stored.
Standard: APHA-SCF, Part 8-E-l
3. Increase the equipment capacity of the laundry to handle personal clothing or extend the work hours of the laundry so they can process the increased load.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-B-6
4. Personal laundry bags need to be issued to the inmates with their names on them so they can be returned with clothes intact.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-E-l an<? B-6
5. An alternate plan to increasing the laundry size or capacity is to provide adequate washers and dryers on each cell block and assign tier workers to wash these items. Bags with the inmates name could be used so the bags, with contents could be returned to the correct person.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-B-6
6. A written plan must be put in place so there are three exchanges of clean towels per week and one exchange of clothing per week for each inmate. Inmates assigned to work details must be provided with at least three changes of clothes per week. If this takes more clothing, then the current supply may be inadequate and must be corrected.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-E-l
E. Purchasing System
Problem:
Inadequate monitoring of requested equipment and nonrequests for Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDSs) for chemical items purchased.
Discussion:
During my inspection in August 1994, it was learned that one of the large washers had been non-operational since about June 2, 1994, nearly two months. Mr. Roland

Singleton, who operates the laundry, said that he was told the jail could not get any parts because there is no money. Mr. Singleton is unaware of any further status of the broken washer. Officer Etienne, procurement officer, was contacted and no record of such a request on an appropriate form, BUS 2, could be found. Apparently the request was not put on the appropriate form and no one has been checking to see why the washer is still broken.
It should be noted that inmates fill the chemical containers for the washing machines and no HBDSs are available in the laundry for such chemicals as Fluor-ocide, Perchloroethylene, and Dowper Solvent.
Mr. Fillard of the Receiving Department has no MSDSs.
Also, Officer Etienne stated that no requests for MSDSs have been made when items are requested through her office. In summary, there is no concentrated effort to acquire MSDSs for the chemicals used in this facility.
Solution:
1. All areas of the jail, including the laundry need to be checked and an inventory of all chemical based materials made. Then MSDSs for these materials must be secured from the manufacturers or distributor and kept in locations where personnel who use these materials, including inmates, can be trained how to read MSDSs and how to protect themselves from hazards listed on the MSDSs.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-D-l H and OSHA Hazard Communication Standard
2. Every purchase order for chemicals such as dry cleaning chemicals, cleaning solutions, soaps, bleaching agents, etc. must contain a statement requesting a current MSDS. These should be collected, kept in a central location and copies sent to the areas where these chemicals are being used. Only Sgt. Poe of the Environmental Squad receives MSDSs and if he does not get them for the materials he orders, he calls and requests them. These are only for chemicals he uses.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-D-l H and OSHA Hazard Communication Standard
3. When a request for equipment parts or repairs is made, there must be put in place a system to periodically check and determine if the request is
10

being processed and if not why! Personnel should be taught which forms are to be used when requesting items.
Professional observation and need to maintain adequate institutional controls.

4. Based on the hazards of the chemicals noted in the

laundry area (as will be noted when MSDSs are

received and reviewed) environmental sampling for

the hazardous chemicals must be undertaken to

determine if the inmates (and also facility

employees) are being subjected to dangerous levels

of these chemicals. I was told that OSHA and

District Environmental people have done some type

of air studies in the laundry but laundry personnel

did not know what tests were done nor the results

of such tests. MSDSs state the acceptable airborne

levels. I was told by Mr Singleton, Laundry

Superintendent, that if there is a chemical spill,

he would clean it up with a blanket and discard the

blanket. The proper procedures are listed on the

MSDS and his stated actions may constitute improper

disposal of hazardous materials.

Purchased

chemicals must be accompanied by MSDSs.

Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part D-l H and OSHA Hazard Communication Standard

F. Insect and Rodent Control
Problem:
An inadequate and in-effective pest control program now exists at this facility.

Discussion:
Starting in the intake area, roach iriestation is very apparent. The reasons include the fact that the showers provide for high humidity in the area, food is eaten in the area, vents are blocked in the clothing storage room, where inmates's old clothes are kept for three weeks, and Sgt. Davis said that the area is not treated for roaches.
Many roaches were noted in the laundry, as it is very warm and humid in the area and the inmates eat there. Roach infestations were noted throughout the facility including the Pharmacy, infirmary bathroom, inmate cells, janitor closets, pipe chases, the dry storage areas of the dietary facility, and the storage areas under the stairs in the cell areas.
11

Only one rodent burrow was noted on the perimeter of the building near the loading dock but this means there are several more borrow openings concealed in the area. Dead mice and mice droppings and nesting material were noted under the stairs in Units SE-3 and N-2 lower right. Rats were sighted and movement was heard in the warehouse area. The canteen, pipe chases and utility closets show evidence of mice infestation. Officer Hicks, the pest control exterminator and facility Fire Marshall says that he cleans dead rodents from pipe chases and tries to rebait the area. He said the entire jail was once baited but he has not had time to go through the entire jail for rebaiting purposes. He started keeping a log in June of 1994 of the areas treated and baited.
Some types of flying bugs were noted in many showers in the areas surrounding the showers and in the floor drains in front of the showers. They are drawn there because of the constant wet and unsanitary condition of the showers, utility closets, and janitor rooms in the immediate area. Water is standing in the open areas and most probably under and around the showers thereby giving rise to the infestation of these insects.
Officer Hicks stated that spraying of the jail takes place weekly but he also said that the housing units are not completed except every three months. The entire jail is covered approximately only two times a year. No spraying is done in the intake area. Mr. Charles told me that all 1,800 cells and administrative offices are treated every six weeks. This is apparently a goal but is not realistic with the personnel now performing the task. Mr. Charles is the licensed pest control person for nine institutions and four half-way houses in the District. He uses personnel at each facility to perform daily tasks.
Mr. Charles told me that every t me he comes to this facility they assign a different person to work with him and he has to again train that person and looses time and momentum in his quest to provide adequate pest control for this facility. Mr. Charles told me that he rotates roach spraying chemicals every two to three weeks. This may not be the best procedure if it takes three months to get back to an area to spray and if resistance to a pesticide is the reason for rotating the materials. Resistance is a factor to be considered, however there should be some written technical information to support this effort. If resistance to some type of synthetic pyrethrins is suspected, there are products which require a long period before resistance is noted.
12

Solution:
It is my considered opinion that the program now in effect and operated as it was operating in August 1994 is ineffective and needs to be greatly upgraded. I believe a reputable Pest Control Company like Prism could offer this facility the manpower and knowledge base to effectively bring this institution's pest control problem under control. After a concerted effort and control is achieved, they may be willing to train and advise adequate numbers of in-house personnel in the proper methods of pest control. This facility could then maintain the program with oversight by Prism. Special problems could then be dealt with quickly and effectively, thereby preventing the problem from becoming overwhelming. The industry is now using the words "Integrated Pest Control Management" (IPM). This is the effective use of all tools, not only pesticides, to control insects and rodents. Sanitation is a major part of any pest control program as is eliminating entry, travel and ideal harborage sites. I have enclosed an article to give you some idea of the elements of an IPM Program. IPM includes inspections, housekeeping, the elimination of harborage areas, physical, mechanical, and chemical means of control. These include the use of moisture control, temperature control, electric fly traps, glue boards, sealing of openings and the use of general use and restricted pesticides.
Standard: APHA-SCF, Part 8-B-10 and Professional Evaluation
G. Ventilation:
Problem:
There are areas in this facility where adequate air circulation especially in the shower, utility rooms, storage rooms, and cell a' eas is not being provided. This leads to odors, mold and mildew build-up, slip and fall events, and insect control problems.
Discussion:
In general, ventilation control is poor and is exacerbated by inmates obstructing the vents in their cells. They do this mostly because they say it is too cold or too hot in an area. I was informed that in the new section of the cell blocks, return air is monitored for temperature control and automatically adjusts. In the old section this is done manually, but because manpower is short, this activity is limited. In these
13

times, with tuberculosis becoming a major health problem, proper ventilation for disease prevention is very important. The obstruction of vents must become an issue jail personnel will have to deal with during their daily and weekly tours of the facility. If proper balance of air volume and temperature is achieved, I feel most inmates will stop obstructing the vents and enforcement will help with the remaining inmates who insist on such actions.

Ventilation in two-man cells is of special concern. In some areas the mal-odor is very pronounced. Areas where inmates have occluded the vent opening usually fit in this category. APHA Standards call for a minimum of 7 cfm of outside air or recirculated air with 33% being fresh air. Air flow volumes varied from 22-87 cfm in cells in the NW-2 area and from 34-94 era in cells in the SE-3 area. In N-2 LR the air volume was measured at 33 cfm and in SW2-LL air volume varied from 31-49 cfm. This is adequate volume, however these measurements were taken at non-occluded vents. Also, please note in many cells, the vents were obstructed because there is too much air and it either makes the cells too cold or too hot. Inmates take charge and effectively block the flow for temperature reasons and interfere with the proper flow of air. Better volume control and temperature regulation could make inmates' actions unnecessary.

Many janitor closets and utility closets where mops and buckets are kept, have inadequate or no ventilation and this leads to mold and mildew build-up, insect harboraging, and odors. The vents in the intake clothing store room has been sealed with plastic and the area is very odoriferous.

Solutions:

1. Proper balancing of air in the housing units to

provide air at 7-1' cfm per inmate of outside air

or recirculated air that has 33% fresh air make-up

provided.

Higher volumes can be used if

temperature controls are adequately maintained.

Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-1
2. Temperature control of at least 65°F during the coldest months must be maintained and temperatures at other times should be comfortable for sedentary type living. If it is too cold in the cells
because the combination of low temperature air and
high volume, the inmates will continue to obstruct the openings and unbalance the system.

14

i
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-2 E
3. Proper enforcement of the obstruction of the ventilation system by inmates through cell inspections will also help maintain a balanced ventilation system providing comfortable air temperatures.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-B-2 E
4. The janitor closets and utility closets need to be properly ventilated so as not to be breeding areas for roaches, flying bugs, mold and mildew, and offensive odors. Ventilation will help dry out mop heads and mop buckets.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-B-5
H. Staffing of Maintenance Department
Problem:
Inadequate control of hot water systems in the cell area, inadequate control of temperatures in the housing units, dirty vents in pipe chases, dirty, dingy discolored walls in cells and poor upkeep of the showers in so far as corrosion and mildew are concerned.
Discussion:
The above listed items are items that require painters, not plaster foremen, and plumbers not pipe fitter foremen. In looking at the maintenance staff list of authorized positions only four vacancies exist. Maintenance management, when questioned, said they need plumbers and painters and another locksmith instead of plasterers and pipe fitter forenen. I feel that some positions need to be reassigned to the needed trades. Even though addi -ional personnel may be needed because maintenance personnel from this facility also provide much maintenance at other facilities operated by the Department of Corrections, a reassignment of positions would lessen this need.
Only one locksmith is at this facility and the other authorized position is vacant. If he get sick or goes on vacation a serious problem exists at this facility.
Solutions:
1. Review the authorized staffing levels to determine if the authorized positions «eet today's needs.
15

Professional observation for adequate staffing/maintenance.
2. Bring the maintenance staff up to full authorized level.
Professional observation for adequate staffing/maintenance
3. While implementing item #2 above, reassign those vacancies to needed positions such as painters and plumbers.
Professional observation for adequate staffing/maintenance
4. Current staff allocations need to be changed to reflect current needs. Strict adherence to an old outdated staffing pattern does not appear to be serving this facility well.
Professional observation for adequate staffing/maintenance
5. The position of locksmith must be immediately filled to provide assistance with repairing fire door locks, cell door locks and providing keys for areas in emergency situations. Only the locksmith knew which keys opened the rear stairwells in the housing units.
Professional observation for adequate staffing/maintenance
I. Staffing and Training in the Food Service Area
Problem:
Both civiliftii staff and inmate staff are below t.iat needed to provide for adequate preparation and delivery of food to the inmates and for proper cleaning and sanitizing food contact surfaces, equipment, walls and floors in the food service area. Inadequate numbers and ill-trained inmate workers present a truly serious food safety issue.
Discussion:
Food contact surfaces are not being properly sanitized as workers are not using a sanitizing agent in the solution used to wipe down these surfaces. This is needed to prevent cross contamination of foods.
16

©
Pots and pans are being inadequately cleaned in that food particles were noted on four of four pans checked.
Standing water is in evidence on the floor of the milk refrigerator. Hand soap is not provided at the lavatory in the kitchen and food from a freezer that went out the night before was delayed in being moved to a working unit.
Mr. Sanders, the steward, said that he is authorized to have a thirty-five (35) «an detail and he is getting only seven (7) man details. He has four civilian food service workers who have little time to train or supervise inmate workers because they have to actively cook all foods.
On August 2, 1994, on Unit 2N, sliced meat registered 80°F and the beans registered 120°F.
On August 3, 1994, the time delay between tray preparation and delivery to inmates was 30-45 minutes and the spaghetti which had registered 150°F on the serving line now registered 112°F when served to the inmates. Food must be served to inmates at 140°F.
The freezer inside the kitchen registered 10°F and it should be at or very near zero. The garbage disposal unit drain is in bad repair. It is draining to the floor. The meat slicer, which was said to be cleaned, contained food particles. Food was uncovered in the refrigerator.
The blast freezer located in the warehouse registered 48°F and the turkey inside the freezer registered 20°F. Food was still being stored in this inoperative freezer. This was discovered early in the morning and at about noon, a D.C. Sanitarian, Mr. Howard Maupin, had to advise Mr. Fitzgerald that he could use a standing order to get. a freezer truck delivered to the jaiT so the freezer contents could be moved to a properly temperature controlled freezer.
On the day of this inspection, Mr. Fitzgerald, the Food Steward, said that there were not enough single service trays for dinner, but he expected a shipment to arrive very soon. There is inadequate storage space provided.
A hand sink was being used for cleaning foods and this must be stopped. A three-compartment sink was not being used correctly.
Solutions:
17

1. Adequate inmate staffing to a full complement (long term inmates should be considered for this detail) will allow the civilian staff to supervise and train the inmate workers so that the problems noted in the discussion can be corrected.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-B-4-2
2. More training for the Food Steward and the four civilian workers so that they can transmit proper food handling information to the inmates. Knowledge of the ability to activate a standing order for a freezer trailer when a freezer breaks needs to be provided to all supervising personnel, especially the Food Steward.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-B-4-2
3. Adequate food supplies and cooking and holding equipment should be reviewed in light of routine operations and especially during disaster situations. More storage spaced is needed.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-B-4-3 & 4
4. The proper way to set up a three-compartment sink must be better transmitted to those responsible for equipment cleaning and sanitizing.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-B-4-2
5. A system must be put in place so food service equipment and systems can be quickly (without delay) repaired.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-B-4-3
J. Fire Safety
Proclem:
Fire safety issues such as the flammability of mattresses used in this facility, obstructed fire dampers, an inoperative fire department notification system, the absence of a hot work permit system, inadequate knowledge of fire extinguishers, and the lack of a written preventive maintenance and servicing schedule for fire extinguishers are serious problems that must be corrected. Smoke detector testing is not being routinely accomplished and documented. There are no extinguisher service contracts for refilling ABC and C02 extinguishers nor is hydrostatic testing part of a service contract.
18

Fire drills must be conducted in all areas and on all shifts.
Discussion:
Neither the flammability of the covered foam mattresses and the cotton mattresses nor the provision of mattress covers for each inmate upon assignment to a cell, could be determined. Because some foams emit very toxic combustion products this information is needed. Also, because of the dense population in this facility these need to be as fire resistant as possible.
Hot work permits should be issued at a central point, either at the command center and/or at the maintenance office before either jail maintenance personnel or outside contractors are allowed to do any hot work, welding or cutting, in the jail. The permit lists pertinent fire safety instructions to those doing hot work. Also, when the job is completed, correctional officers and/or correctional facility maintenance personnel can go back to the area later to check for any smoldering fires. An example is appended to this report.
In the clothing issue area, there is a flex conduit traversing the openings in the fire damper and this prevents the fire damper from closing properly.
When the Coded Gamewell Fire Alarm Manual Station, located in the Command Center, was activated in order to directly notify the fire department of a mock fire emergency at this facility, the unit did not work.
Corporal Hicks answers to Lt. Bonaparte and keeps tract of fire extinguishers and their monthly checks, yearly maintenance inspections, six year refills, and twelve year hydrostatic tests. No written Departmental Operating Procedure (DOP) exists for this function in so far as I could determine. A water ( xtinguisher in 2-SO had no pin in it. The water extinguishers in the laundry had no pin in one of them and the pin was pulled on the other one. The last annual maintenance of these extinguishers was September 1992, which is greater than one year. The gauges indicated that the extinguisher maintained a full charge. In the clothing issue area one carbon dioxide (C02) extinguisher had no pin or seal on it and no inspection date was noted on it. The gauge on the water extinguisher in the clothing issue area was in the "unsafe" zone and it had not been checked since April 1992.
In Unit NE-3, Correctional Officers T. Jenkin and C. Bush
19

m

&

did not know what type of fire the C02 extinguisher was effective against. Officer Jenkin could not lift the extinguishers. The safety pin on the C02 extinguisher had been pulled out of its proper position. The water extinguisher in the bubble had no pin in the extinguisher handle and it had been discharged. Neither officer had reported the condition of these extinguishers nor really knew how to use these extinguishers. In the bubble of N1, two ABC extinguishers had been discharged. One pin was in place and the other one was missing, however the condition of the extinguisher had not been reported.
Smoke detectors were checked one time when they were installed about a year ago. Mr. Simpson stated that these are single station smoke detectors and only sound in the area where smoke or a fire is detected. No smoke detectors are in the air return system according to Mr. Simpson.
Fire extinguishers are checked monthly and this is documented on the grey sticker on each extinguisher. Carbon dioxide (C02) extinguishers are weighed if they do not have a pressure gauge on them. A policy needs to be developed stating how yearly maintenance and inspection service, six year refilling and inspections and twelve year hydrostatic tests will be carried out since service contracts for these services do not exist.
Fire drills are never conducted on the 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. shift when the laundry is operational according to laundry personnel.
Solutions:
1. The flammability of all mattresses used in this facility must be determined and those not providing adequate fire protection should be discarded. Foams should be checked tc make sure they do not give off toxic combustion products.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-D-3 A & C
2. A "Hot Works Permit System" with appropriate DOP should be instituted for this facility.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-D-3 E & B
3. The flex conduit traversing the fire damper in the clothing issue area must be removed and re-routed.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-D-3 F

20

4. The Gamewell Fire Alarm Manual Station needs to be repaired so a direct signal of a fire emergency can be sent to the D. C. Fire Department.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-D-3 J
5. A Departmental Operating Procedure must be developed to set forth the tine table and actions to be taken with reference to the upkeep of all fire extinguishers in this facility after a complete fire extinguisher inventory has been made. Monthly checks of all extinguishers must be undertaken to help find and replace defective extinguishers.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-D-3 J
6. Proper fire extinguisher training must be undertaken at this facility and such training must be documented.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-D-3 0
7. Smoke detectors must be provided in sleeping areas, areas of public assembly, in boiler rooms, kitchens, laundry, shops, and other work areas of the facility. The detectors now in place must be checked at least twice a year or at a frequency that can assure the proper operation of these units.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-D-3 K
8. A fire extinguisher policy must be developed that includes provisions delineating how monthly checks, annual maintenance inspections, six year refills on ABC extinguishers and twelve year hydrostatic testing will be accomplished and documented.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-D-3 J
9. As per APHA Standards, fire drills that include building evacuation when possible must be conducted at least twice annually for each shift and the results documented and drills critiqued. More frequent drills are recommended such as quarterly for each shift.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-D-3 N
K. Lighting in Cells and Janitor and Utility Closets
21

Problem:

Lighting levels in cells are below APHA Standards and impede good sanitation, personal hygiene and a safety. Lights in many janitor and utility closets are either inoperative, missing bulbs, or devoid of fixtures. Adequate lighting is needed to properly clean the mops, buckets, and other items stored in these utility or janitor's closets.

Discussion:

Lighting levels in cells are very low. Examples are noted below but please note, not all cells were checked.

Location & Cell No.

Lighting Levels in Footcandles

SW-2 Cell #26 SW-2 Cell #30 SW-2 Cell #74 N-2 Upper Left Cell #16 N-2 Medical Room SE-3 Cell #65 SE-3 Cell #53 NW-2 Cell #54

<20 f.c. <10 f.c. <10 f.c. No Lighting
24 f.c. <10 f.c. <10 f.c.
17 f.c.

Bulbs are missing in many utility or janitor's closets, the fixtures are broken, or the fixtures were never put in these closets. Cleaning of oops and other cleaning utensils can not be properly carried out in dark closets.

Solutions:

1. Adequate lighting must be installed to provide minimum lighting levels in cells at 30 f.c, and in medical rooms at 30-50 f.c.

Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-B-7 and American Society of Illuir mating Engineers Standards (ANSI)

2. Bulbs must be replaced in closets where they are missing or burned out. Electrical repairs may have to be made in some closets on the tiers. New fixtures will have to be installed in closets that have none.

Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-B-7

L. Hot Water for Showers and Lavatories

Problem:

22

In some areas the hot water temperature in showers and at lavatories varied from low (inadequate) to very high (scalding).

Discussion:

Examples are noted below. Please note that not all locations in this facility were checked.

Location

Hot Water Temperature

Shower SO-3

81"F

Lavatory SE-3 Cell #56

138"S

Shower 2-South

100"F

Lavatory N-l Cell #55

No Hot Water

SW-2 Cell #26 Lavatory

77°F

SW-2 Cell #30 Lavatory

78"F

N-2 Cell #55 Lavatory

No Hot Water

N-2 Lower Right Shower

80*F

N-2 Cell #65 Lower Right Lavatory No Hot Water

N-2 Cell #16 Upper Left Lavatory 87°F

SE-3 Cell #65 Lavatory

130°F

SE-3 Cell #53 Lavatory

138*F

I was told that lavatory hot water is provided from boilers in the penthouse area and that they are not the fast recovery type. Hot water for showers comes from hot water heaters on each floor and control should be possible.

Solutions:

1. Replace the hot water heating units in the penthouse with new fast recovery type and then control at these fixtures can be aaintained in the optimal range of 105-120°F but as near to 110°F as possible.

Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-B-8 and 8-D-l E

2. Better regulation of shower water temperature through proper settings on the mixing valves should be undertaken. The hot water heaters in the units should be regulated better.

Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-B-8 and 8-D-l E

The missing hot water valve rods jEst be replaced in order that hot water can be provided in all cells. Inmates should not have access to the equipment chases between cells where they can remove these rods and make shanks. These rods do

23

no appear to be able to be removed from the front of the lavatory inside the cell.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Fart 8-B-8
M. Plumbing
Problem:
Several fixtures are not properly plumbed to drain and backsiphonage protectors are not being used to protect the potable water system from contamination due to backflow.
Discussion:
Even though all areas were not checked, the following are examples of this problem.
There are three hose bibs an sinks in Receiving and
Discharge which are not protected by vacuum
breakers.
In the laundry area toilet room, the sink is cracked and the pipe under the sink leaks water on the floor. No towels are provided in this toilet room.
- Generally accepted practice dictates that fixtures (sinks) used to wash utensils and equipment have a solid waste line connection to the sewer pipes.
- Sinks used to wash (soak) foods, such as lettuce, chickens, etc. are not normally hard connected to the sewer but rather have indirect waste lines to a floor drain. This is done to protect food from being contaminated. While unattended, a drain line may bnck up into the sink where foods are located and +iien clears itself out very quickly, thereby contaminating the food without anyone knowing this ever happened.
The hot water in the mop closet in the main kitchen will not stop flowing. The valve is leaking.
There is a submerged inlet in the mop closet which is not protected by a vacuum breaker and which has the potential to contaminate the potable water supply.
The lavatory faucet in SW-2 Cell #26 will not turn off.
24

-<sxk
Solutions:
1. It should be noted that maintenance managers feel they need more plumbers and not pipe fitters to correct the above problems.
Professional evaluation
2. Vacuum breakers must be provided at all hose bibs to prevent back siphonage.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-B-8
3. All plumbing pipes from fixtures must be properly plumbed.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-B-8
4. Severely cracked sinks must be promptly replaced.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-B-8
5. Broken or leaking faucets need to be repaired.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-B-8
N. Electrical
Problem:
Electrical outlets in wet areas are not protected by Ground Fault Circuit Interrupters (GFCI) and these devices can protect people from shock in areas around sinks in the kitchen and medical areas. Some outlets are broken or cracked and some have no tension on the hot, neutral, or ground prongs thereby possibly causing a spark and fire. Some power cords are frayed and plugs broken.
Discussion:
In the laundry area, the electrical receptacles near the maintenance cabinet have no tension on the hot, neutral, nor ground prongs.
In the laundry area the ground prong on the fan power cord is broken and needs to be repaired.
In the Pharmacy, electrical cords are draped behind the
sink and the outlet is within one (1) foot of the sink. No GFIC is provided.
25

The electrical outlets in the hall in N-2 lower right are cracked and must be repaired.
The electrical outlets in the hall of N-2 lower right are not protected by GFCIs.
Solutions: (In confonnance with NFPA-70 National Electric Code)
1. All electrical outlets should be tested for polarity and tension. Those found to be wired improperly or having no tension on the hot, neutral, or ground prong must be repaired and or replaced.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-B-3
2. The ground prongs on the plugs of the equipment must keep remain intact to prevent a shock hazard.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-B-3
3. All electrical receptacles within close proximity of sinks or lavatories (i.e. wet areas) must be protected by ground fault circuit interrupters.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-B-3
4. Frayed power cords must be replaced.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-B-3
5. All cracked, burned, or broken wall receptacles must be repaired or replaced.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-B-3
Asbestos
Problem:
Asbestos, if released into the air and breathed by people, can cause asbestosis, mesothelioma, and other stomach and lung diseases or abnormalities. Many asbestos insulated pipes in the laundry area are in need of repair, especially on the ends. No asbestos management plan could be produced for this facility.
Discussion:
Mr. Burgess said that he remembered that an OSHA inspector did check the laundry about five year ago.
26

Some abatement was undertaken when new laundry equipment was installed. No management plan exists for this facility.
Solutions:
1. Repair loose and frayed asbestos materials.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-A-2 and OSHA and EPA
2. Enlist the support of a private Asbestos Inspector/Management Planner or a D. C. Environmental Quality person knowledgeable of asbestos inspections and management plans development to help inspect the facility and develop a Management Plan for handling the asbestos remaining in the building.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-A-2 and OSHA and EPA
P. Emergency Power and Lights
Problem:
There are three emergency generators which according to facility personnel are supposed to be exercised for one hour per week and tested under full load for one hour per month. This is not being done. When the generators are operating, all the systems that are supposed to be on the emergency circuits are not being checked and the information recorded. Also, there are battery powered emergency light packs in some of the bubbles that are not on anyone's maintenance schedule and several did not operate when tested. Noise levels are a problem when these emergency generators are running in enclosed areas.
Discussion:
I was told thai monthly testing under full load is th: policy at this jail, however records indicate that this was not done in January, February, or March, 1994, and not since February 1992 in the South Tunnel. I was told by a maintenance worker who just transferred back to the jail that when he was at this jail, monthly load testing was done and now that his is back at the jail, he will make sure it is again done properly.
Excessive noise levels were recorded in the North Tunnel when the generator was tested. The sound level reached
a steady 108 dBA. Sound attenuating ear protection, ear
muffs, ear plugs, etc. having at least a 30 Noise Reduction Rating must be utilized if a worker is to stay
27

in the area with the generator operating.
Also, the battery powered emergency lights in the bubbles need to be operational in case of an emergency outage.
Solutions:
1. Weekly testing and monthly full load testing in accordance with emergency generator manufacturers' instructions must be routinely performed and documented.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-B-3 and 8-F-2
2. The battery operated emergency lights in some bubbles must be put on a routine, weekly or monthly, preventive program and these checks must be properly documented.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-B-3 and 8-F-2
3. Proper hearing protectors of at least 30 Noise Reduction Rating must be worn inside the generator area when they are operating.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-D-5 and OSHA Standard
Q. Overcrowding and Inadequate Number of Showers
Problem:
Overcrowding exists in double bunked two-man cells and the showers in all areas are inadequate in number for the occupancy especially in the double bunk cells.
Discussion:
The gross size of the cells is only about 68 square i^et. Considering the space occupied by the bed, 60 square feet of floor space indicated as a requirement in the APHA Standards is not being met.
The situation becomes extremely serious in the two-man cells where the APHA Standards call for 120 square feet of floor space and less than 60 square feet is being provided.
Also, the APHA Standards call for one shower for every eight inmates and in the single man cell area the ratio is 1:10. In the double bunked cells the shower to man ratio is 1:20.
28

Solution:
Discontinue two-man cells or provide at least three more showers in these areas.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-E-3 C and Part 8-E-4 A
R- Disaster Preparedness
Problem:
Other than the fire safety and evacuation plans and the work stoppage plan there appears to be no hurricane, winter storm, tornado, flooding, earthquake, utility (electricity and water) outage, or civil unrest plans developed for this facility in so far as I could determine.
Discussion:
Emergency plans for all natural and man-made disasters that could reasonably be anticipated to occur in the area need to be developed and tested in conjunction with the D. C. emergency operations and planning units. This should include communications, food and water service, life safety, personnel deployment, and medical services.
Solution:
Prepare the needed emergency planning documents, train all personnel, and then annually test the system to determine if the plan meets the needs of the facility in emergency situations.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-D-2
S. Inadequate Bedding
Problem:
Many mattresses, including foam and cotton ones were noted without mattress coverings. The blankets are so worn, many are down to the weave only.
Discussion:
Mattress covers are needed for fire prevention purposes, sanitary reasons, and comfort. Blankets with some thermal insulating capability are needed for comfort when sleeping.
Solutions:
29

1. Provide mattresses with fire retardant covers where applicable and at least 2 sheets or 1 sheet and a mattress cover for cotton type mattresses. Sheets, mattress covers, and pillow cases must be changed at least weekly.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-E-2
2. Replace the old worn blankets with thicker, more comfortable ones that still retain some thermal insulating properties.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-E-2
T. Barberina
Problem:
Inmates are performing barbering procedures in an insanitary manner.
Discussion:
Skin disease may be transmitted either through direct contact or by objects such as towels, combs, or clippers.
Solution:
Combs, clippers and similar objects must be routinely sanitized between use on different inmates. Common brushes are not to be used. Also hands must be washed with soap and running water before cutting the next person's hair.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-C-3
U. Safety Issues in The Laundry
Problem:
Many steam pipes are not insulated at all. Eye protection and eye wash fountains are not provided in the laundry.
Discussion:
The uninsulated pipes can cause severe burns if accidently touched. Several chemicals, including a corrosive one, are used in the laundry by inmates and these materials can damage the eyes, if splashed in them.
Solution:
30

m
1. The pipes must be insulated with non-asbestos material. Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-D-l E
2. Provide suitable eye protection and eyewash fountains in the laundry. Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-D-l D & G & H and OSHA Standard
V. Bloodborne Pathogen Training and Supplies

Problem:

Areas such as the medical area and just about any area in the jail because of accidents and fights, may subject personnel to exposure to blood and body fluids. No sanitizing agents could be located in the medical facility nor on the tiers.

Discussion:

HIV and Hepatitis, as well as other bloodborne pathogens

can be transmitted by blood and body fluids and medical

and correctional officers are potentially exposed to

these substances.

Training, personal protective

equipment, vaccines, and sanitizing agents are needed to

protect jail personnel.

Solution:

1. Provide the Hepatitis Vaccine for those subject to exposure.

Standard: 1986 APHA-S .F, Part 8-D-l H and Appendix II

2. Train personnel how to protect themselves by wearing personal protective equipment when cleaning up a spill of blood or body fluids.

Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-D-l G and 8-F-l

3. Provide proper sanitizing solutions and waste bags,
so that spills can be properly cleaned and
sanitized and the waste properly discarded in red
or properly labelled bio-hazardous bags.

31

Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-D-l H and Appendix II
W. Outdated Medical Supplies
Problem:
A box of 0.9% Sodium Chloride Injection, Lot #C215 94 7 with the expiration date of June 1994 was noted in the medical unit on a cart in the hallway on August 2, 1994.
Discussion:
Outdated medical supplies could loose their effectiveness.
Solution:
Discard this box and retain properly dated materials.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-C-4 B
X. Self-contained Breathing Apparatuses fSCBA)
Problem:
SCBSs need to be positioned where they can be used for rescue purposes, by trained, medically fit, personnel.
Discussion:
Two (2) airpacks are in one of the floor control stations and one (1) unit is in the Fire Marshall's Office.
Solution:
Personnel need to ye medically qualified and properly trained to use SCBAs. The units must be located where qualified personnel can have ready access to them.
Standard: 1986 APHA-SCF, Part 8-D-3 L & 0 and Part 7-C-3
Y. Askarel Liquid Filled Transformers
Problem:
Documents describing the electrical distribution system indicate that Askarel, an oil containing Polychlorinated Biphenyls, which are said to be carcinogenic, is the transformer oil used in this facility.
32

Discussion: Leaks of this material or spread of this material in smoke should the transformers catch on fire and explode could subject personnel to PCBs and the entire facility could become contaminated. Solution: The transformer can be replaced or retro-filled with nonPCB containing cooling oils. EPA Standard and Toxic Substances Control Act
III. Conclusion There are many problems existing in this facility and not all require additional resources but the better application of existing resources. Yes, lighting, pest control, ventilation system balancing, more clothing and storage space, more refrigerated storage space and more housekeeping supplies will cost money but many things can be done in-house with current staffing. Some positions may no longer be needed and they can be replaced with the types of personnel that will help improve the facility. Training, written DOPs, and documentation should not cost very much to improve. Overall this facility can be greatly improved if the steps outlined in the body of this report are implemented.
33

I p

What's it all About Anyway?

bv Eric Snell

cian on the use of this new tool or

When you think about the term Integrated Pest Management (IPM). do you

Integrated

provide adequate understanding of cockroach movement and habits.

Management islmgice'

Other examples of what is not IPM include:

automatically think of sticky traps and bait stations? Do you think about accounts that will "accept a

than eliminating^ • Telling someone that they need pesticides"lfs3^ to clean their drains to solve a fruit
fly problem, and not providing fur-

few bugs?" Are you reminded of accounts with pests that the previous pest control company had left uncontrolled while trying to caulk cracks and use sticky traps?

knowing abouMp insects; you t r e a r "
staying one^sfr

ther assistance.
• Removing a tool used too often, such as a dust bulb, toforcea technician to use other tools.

Are you currently trying to dig through the debns of information to

ahead of themJII Evaluating IPM Needs The first step toward effectively

incorporate various components of

using IPM is choosing the tools and

IPM into your own programs? This

methods for a particular pest man-

article will discuss what components

agement program. It is important to

should be considered

be familiar with all of

crucial to the success

the tools and methods

of any IPM program

available, and then

without sacrificing

determine how effec-

program effectiveness.

tively each meets the

Integrated Pest

specific needs of an

Management means

individual program.

having access to a

For instance, one

wide variety of tools to

aspect of a German

solve pest problems in

cockroach manage-

the most effective and

ment program is mon-

efficient manner possi-

itoring. To meet this

ble. All too often,

requirement, the pos-

when describing IPM.

sible ools include:

only the products are

flash'ights. sticky

considered. For

traps, double stick

instance, the effective-

tape and various

ness of a particular

chemical flushing

bait, sticky trap, or

agents.

vacuum cleaner is doc-

Obviously the flash-

umented. IPM is more. It is a process Some tools used for erfecuve Integrated Pest Management include flashlitftts. that implies an under- caulking guns and non-toxic tracking powder, in addition to traps and baas.

light is a must for any program. The remainder of the list

standing and use of

is variable, and

an equal balance of methods and less explain what is not IPM. A perfect depends on the needs of your prodependency on one particular tool. exampie of abusing the term IPM is a gram. Sticky traps may be consid-

situation in which a company uses ered a priority during the long peri-

What is Mot IPM? ,

•c..- T ;ch bait stations as their

ods between services. The particular

Integrated Pest Management ha been defined in hundreds of wa; However, after years of being li buzz word" for the pest control

Integniied" program and then places them in the middle of a wall. This is not IPM!
In this example, the company has

flushing system(s) you choose may depend on a number of issues. For example, do you perform all services at nieht? Does the customer prep the

industry, perhaps it is best to

failed jo properly train the techni-

continued an page 76

; C ~ 3 E 3 -39* 0557CONTROL 7 5

continued from page 75

control methods between service

;&hd in a crack, immediate kill may

calls (i.e. baits), void treatment

be required. Certain chemical formu-

kitchen for each service? Do two

methods, exclusion mediods and

lations and active ingredients pro-

technicians perform every service?. communication with the customer. vide instant results. For accounts

Effective IPM programs can be

A few examples of tools and tech-

such as nursing homes or hospitals,

devised by summarizing the needs of niques that fit each of these needs various types of vacuums may be the

your accounts and considering all of are reviewed here.

ideal choice for eliminating pests

the options carefully. Once the tools

Inspection Methods: All pro-

when sighted.

have been determined, training pro- grams should include methods of

Between Service Control Meth-

grams should be completedforeach inspection. The best approach

ods: In most situations it is possible

method.

should involve on-site method(s) as to immediately eliminate only a cer-

When an adequate balance of

well as inspection systems that can tain percentage of a pest population.

tools and methods is not included

monitor pest activity between ser-

into the program, problems are likely vices.

Many of the remaining pests can be controlled with products that work

to occur. A perfect example involves

Following is a list of tools that can between services. Baits are an excel-

an IPM program that depended upon be used:

lent example, since this method

sticky traps as the primary means of

• flashlight

causes little disruption of pest behav-

inspection. The monitors were

• flushing agents (mixed or pre- ior. For methods to be effective

placed in precise locations through- packaged)

between services, it is most efficient

out a commercial

to use tools that allow the

restaurant. One

pests to live naturally, instead

particular location

of avoiding chemical residues.

was in the back

Cockroach bait stations

comer on a shelf

actually provide two crucial

under a table. This

components for pest survival

trap had no cock-

including food and harborage.

roach activity for

Other "between service" medi-

months. A kitchen

ods can be used to exploit

employee recog-

known pest activities. For

nized that the tech-

example, glueboards can be

nician was not con-

successful in controlling occa-

trolling the cock-

sional invaders (such as crick-

roaches in that

ets) entering under doors and

tocation and com-

moving close to the edge of

plained that he had

walls. By understanding how

been seeing cock-

crickets may enter a house,

roaches on the

glueboards can be used to

table.

intercept them before they are

After flushing

sighted by the customer.

with pyrethrins, a

Some of those tools

large number of

include:

cockroaches were

• cockroach baits

flushed from the

• ant baits

framing of the

• rcient baits

table, not one foot

• ne«dent traps - snap traps,

from the trap! In this illustration the

Using non-toxic powder, such program to track rodents.

as

baby

powder,

can

be

IuPsMed

in

manu•luf-lycattrcahpstrjaapr.s,ligglhute,bboaaitredds

cockroaches were

glueboards. etc.)

foraging for food on

• glueboards

the table and on the floor and had no • compressor powered void injec- Void Treatments: When pest

reason to move in the direction of

tion equipment

infestations are identified inside

the trap (i.e. onto the shelf). This

• sticky traps & glueboards

voids and out of reach, a variety of

example is not intended to diminish

• [racking patches of non-toxic methods for treating each pest

the value of the sticky trap, but to

powder

and/or void should be available. For

caution against the dependance on only one tool for a specific program need.
Selecting the IOIS
An IPM approach to a t >icai pest problem will normally fquire:

• inspection mirrors & graph
pacer •eference books
Elimination of Pest Sightings: It is otten necessary to provide at least one method for quickly killing pests when they are found in an area. For

instance, an ant nest in a wall void with insulation may require baits, but an ant nest in a hollow void may be treated with dusts or aerosol-type formulations. Effective programs should include treatments for specific voids, using:

inspection methods, rr Ihods for

example, when an ant nest is located

• dusts

eliminating pests as ih are sighted. under a carpet or cockroaches are

continued on page 78

7 6 PESTCCMTRCL :

continued from page 76
• aerosol-type sprays • baits Exclusion/Prevention: IPM programs should include preventing pest entry into an area, as well as. minimizing ideal harborage sites. Once the population is eliminated it will be important that the service focuses on long-term prevention ot pest infestations. It is often necessary to use combinations of exclusion methods. For

instance, if the account is pest free, but the adjacent facility is infested, you may need to caulk around pipes and baseboards as well as use repellent dusts and/or liquid residuals inside and around the adjoining wall in order to keep cockroaches from moving into your account.
Following are tools that can be used:
• chemical exclusion (repellent dusts or liquids)
• caulking and stuffing material (insect and rodent)

A Good Case For Pest Control.

air curtains • plastic strips for doors • screen doors • door sweeps Communication: The customer should be included as part of any solution, but they should newer be used as an excuse for unsolved pest problems. It is critical that die customer understand the length of time before results can be expected and how they can help achieve good results.
• show the customer the pest breeding sites
• provide detailed instructions on how to clean problem areas
• inform the customer as to how they can help your IPM methods (don't move equipment, don't spray around baits, etc.)
• provide printed information • follow-up on any promises to the customer
Once you have evaluated the needs of your individual programs, it will be important to compile a list of tools and pest management methods that will include a variety of solutions, such as those just discussed. Any one solution may be used for different programs. With more overlap between programs, there will be more efficient strategies and less training will be required.

This sturdy leather-bound storage case holds 12 issues of PEST CONTROL A one->:me offer for only $12.95 each, while quartzes last.
M A I order form with check or credit card informaiion to: PEST CONTROL, 750., Old Oak Boulevard, Cleveland, Ohio 44130 Or FAX completed order form to PEST CONTROL at: 1. 216. 891. 2675.

Please send me

leather-bound

storagecase|s) for just SI2.95.

METHOD OF PAYMENT

Subtotal S _ 'Shipping & Handling S .
• • S d e j Tax S. Total Enclosed S .

Z C h e c k enclosed, poyabiejo PEST CONTRCLMogazine.

Charge my: Z Visa _ MasterCard _ American Express

Account No

—

E*p. Date _

Signature (required)

.—

Dole

Nome

Summary
Integrated Pest Management is more than the use of a few token tools. It is important to keep an open mind to the methods available to you as opposed to the brand name products. Having an adequate selection of ools and proper training to make decisions are the fundamentals of IPM.
To establish effective IPM. the pest management needs of individual programs must be determined. Tools should then be selected to provide a full range of solutions for the wide variety of problems confronted. After the methods are chosen, training and learning must be a constantfocusof any company. PC

Address Cry

Stan-

' SMoanq & Hanoimq • oom.UK: aaa $2.90 otf <*tm turn St DO "ttKMMlOfCA CO. C . ZA L MN Nl. N* CH IX. a KCWI
r**o» ottow 3-4 M««I» tar c«uv«rv

Zip-

Enc Snell is a technical director at B&G Equipment Co.. Plumsteadvilie. Pa.

78 ==S" :c:;r=CL

SUCTION 19: ELECTRICAL-DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS A. POWER DISTRIBUTION I. PURPOSE
The ELECTRICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM consists o(jhreej incoming primary lines from the Potomac Electric Power Company (PEPCO) feeding four substations to transform the 13750 three phase primary voltage to an utilization level of 480/277 volt grounded wye 3 phase 4 wire system. The system is a secondary network arrangement wherein each substation has two primary entrance switches, one for each of two transformers, with each primary switch fed from a different primary line and the secondaries of the two transformers paralleled through their individual network protectors forming a system with an extremely high service reliability. J5jjic.a_Ltie._lggs of any feeder or primary transformer will not cause any loss of power and the loss of any two primary feeders or transformers at the same time cannot most only cause partial loss of power to the entire complex, and in that case only if the two primary feeders lost are feeding the same substation or if both transformers in the same substations fail.
II. ±D2F CRIPTION The three incoming primary electric services from PEPCO, enter tiie facility on the west side in an underground duct bank which passes between the north and south cell modules, and continue underground below the Male Inmates Recreation Yard and terminate in the Primary Switchgear located in the Administrative Module Basement Electrical Substation
19-1

DETENT/MN CENTER MANUALS (16A)
m

two primary feeders, one to each end of the substation. The feeders

for each substation are as follows:

SUBSTATION NORTH CELL MODULE SUBSTATION

Line #1 Line #2 Line //3

750 KVA Transformer (A) 750 KVA Transformer (B)

x
x

SOUTH CELL MODULE SUBSTATION 750 KVA Transformer (A) 750 KVA Transformer (B)

x x

ADMINISTRATIVE MODULE BASEMENT SUBSTATION

1000 KVA Transformer (A)

x

/

1000 KVA Transformer (B)

x

ADMINISTRATIVE MODULE PENTHOUSE SUBSTATION 1000 KVA Transformer (A) 1000 KVA Transformer (B)

x x

Each primary feeder to its double end' d substation is connected to the transformer through a 3-position oil selector switch having a ground, line and open position.
Transformers are non-flammable AskareL, liquid filled, air cooled with 2 - 2*5% rated KVA tap9 in the high voltage winding to allow for setting secondary above and below rated voltage of the primary system. Tap changer is operable in the de-energized position only.

19-3

Page 3 Staffing Authority

MAINTENANCE STAFF

AUTHORIZED ON 3OAP.D VACANCIES

DS-12 F a c i l i t y Manager

SW-12 B i d g . M a i n e . G e n . F o r e .

.RW-ll Maine. Mechanic

2

SW-10 Maint.Mech. Foreman 2

SW-lO E l e c t r i c i a n Foreman

SW-09 E l e c t r i c i a n Foreman 5

SW-09 Mason Foreman

SW-09 P l a s t e r Foreman. " • 2*

SW-09 Metal Worker Forerr.ar. i

SW-09 A/C E q u i r . M e c h . F c r e . 5

£nri-09 P i p e f i t t e r Foreman 5

SW-09 l a u n d r y / K i t c h e n Mech

SW-CS M e c h . P a r t s r e p a i r e r

3W-0S P a i n t Foreman

• 1

3W-CS l o c k s m i t h Foreman

2

SV-05 E l e c t r o n i c s Foreman

2S-06 Supply Technician

L

1

1

0

1

1

0

2

2

2

1

1

1

0

5

0

1

1

0

2

0

1

0

6

0

4

1

1

1

0

1

1

0

1

0

1

1

1

1

0

1

C

FORWELDINC AND CUTTING OPERATIONS OUTSIDE OF THE WELDING SHOP
CUTTING-WELDING-HOT WORK PERMIT

IMPORTANT: Precautions on reverse side must be followed.

Dal* Building A DepL Flooi & Room No
Time Started. Work Done _

Estimated Completion . Dale/Time

if Fire Occur*, Phone Security at and Activate the Building Fire Alarm Foreman Shop & Dept. Signature of Responsible Employee.
COPIES TO: „ Maintenance.
SEE OTHER SIDE

Security.

DANGER
PREVENT FIRES
DO NOT CUT, WELD, OR USE OTHER OPEN-FLAME OR SPARK-PRODUCING EQUIPMENT UNTIL THE FOLLOWING PRECAUTIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN:
The location where the work Is to be done has been personally examined.
1. Sprinklers, If provided, are operational and will not be shutdown until this work has been completed.
2. rhere are no flammable orcombustible materials In the work area. Drums, tanks, equipment, or other containers in the area previously containing such materials have been properly purged.
3. Work will be confined to the area or equipment specified In the permit
4. Floors and surroundings have been swept dean. Wood floors have been wet down or property covered with flame retardant covers.
5. Adequate portable lire extinguishers have been provided and fire hoses, If available, are accessible and operational.
& All combustibles have been located 25 feet from the work area or property covered with metal guards or flame retardant covers.
7. All floor and wall openings within 25 feet of the work area have been properly covered.
8. Aresponsibleworker has been assignedtowatch for sparks In the area and on the floors above and below.
9. Flame or spark-producing equipment to be used has been Inspected, found to be In goodrepair,and contains ail safety devices.
10. A copy of Mils pwmH will be hand carried to Security so that a patrol of the area can be made at least one hour after hot work has been completed for the day.
Date and Time of Site Inspection by Security

••

m

EQUIPMENT LIST

1. Light Meter General Electric Type 214 Light Meter, Footcandle Range 10-50, 50-250, 200-1000 fc. General Electric, Nela Park, Cleveland, OH 44112 or

Photo-meter 1, Digital Footcandle/Foot Lambert meter, Range .01-99,000 fc: Quantum Instruments, Inc., Garden City, N.Y. 11530.

2. Airflow Meter

Alnor Velometer, Jr.; Hi/Low Range 0-200 and 0-800 rpnx: Distributed by MSA Co., Pittsburgh, PA 15205 or

Kurz Air Flow Meter, Model 441S-R, Serial No. VP3541. Kurz Instruments, Inc., 2411 Garden Road, Monterey, CA 93940.

3. Noise Meter: General Radio, Model GR 1565-B-Sound Level Meter and Type 1562-Sound Level Calibrator. General Radio Company, Concord, MA 01742.

4. Smoke Tubes with Bulbs: Drager Smoke Tubes

5. pH Paper Acid-Base: pHydrion INSTA-CHEK 0-13 JUMBO. (See below.)

6. pH Paper-Chlorine: Strips; pHydrion Micro-Chlorine, Cat No. CM 240; Range (light to dark) 10-50-
100-200 ppm: Micro Essential Laboratory, Brooklyn, N.Y. 11210. 7. Temp. Dishwashing Strips: Thermolable Temperature Sensitive Tape; Range 160°F/71°C: Paper
Thermometers Co., P.O. Box 129, Greenfield, NH 03047.

8. Electrical Oulet Tester

Daniel Woodhead Model #1760 Tension Tester. Daniel Woodhead Co., 3411 Woodhead Drive, Northbrook, IL 60062.

ETCON Receptacle/GFI Tester, Cat. No. CT 101. ETCON Corp., BunRidge, IL. 60521.

9. Microwave Tester Micro-Detector, Econmetrics, P.O. Box 206, North Hollywood, CA 91' 03.

10. Smoke Detector Tester Model No. 25 S, FM approved. Home Safeguard Ind., Security Products Division, PO Box 4073, Malibu, CA. 90265.

11. Alcohol Swabs:

PDI Alcohol Prep Rad, 70% Isopropyl Alcohol: Professional Disposables, Inc., Orangeburg, NY 10962.

12. Camera: 35 mm, Flash, and Black and White Film.

13. Taylor Dial Thermometer Taylor Bi-Therm; Range 0°F - 220°F: Pre-Calibrated and Post-Calibrated using 2 quarts of water boiling - set at 212°F and with 10 oz. of water plus 10 ice cubes - set at 32°F (5 min. at roaring boil and 5 min standing with ice cubes before reading and adjusting).

14. Miscellaneous: Tape Measure (12 Ft), Plastic Bags, Scissors, Calculator, Ear Plugs, Safety Glassesgoggles/gloves, Marks-a-Lots, Hemostats.

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOB THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LEONARD CAMPBELL, et aLs., Plaintiffs, :
V.
ANDERSON McGRUDER, et aJLs., : Defendants. :

INMATES OF D.C. JAIL, gt al*., : Plaintiffs, :

V.

DELBERT JACKSON, et al^,

:

Defendants. :

C.A. No. 1462-71 (WBB)
FILED
JAN??
CLEHK. U.S. DliilRICT COURT DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
C.A. No. 75-1668 (WBB)

ORDER
On October 12, 1994, the Court ordered the parties to show cause why the Defendants should not be ordered to implement the Special Officer's Initial Remedial Plan for Mental Health Care, Med? ;al Care and Compliance Monitoring at th . District of Columbia Jail ("Initial Remedial Plan"). Briefs have been filed by the parties, and upon consideration of the Report of the Special Officer on Medical Care at the District of Columbia Jail, the Special Officer's Outline of her Findings on Mental Health Care at the District of Colunbia Jail, the Special Officer's Interim Remedial Plan Regarding Isolation of Inmates with Suspected and Diagnosed Tuberculosis, the Expert Reports on Medical and Mental
Campbell v. McGruder

JC-DC-001-069

@
Health Services at the District of Columbia Jail, the Report of the Special Officer's expert on medical diets, the Report of the Special Officer's expert on suicides, the Court's findings in its Order of March 5, 1993, the Court's findings in its April 20, 1993, Order Appointing Special Officer, the Court's findings in its Order of March 16, 1994, the Defendants' objections to the Initial Remedial Plan, the Plaintiffs' response thereto, and the record in this case, the Court finds that:
(1) the Defendants have engaged in a persistent pattern of non-compliance with material provisions of the Orders of this Court governing the delivery of medical and mental health services to prisoners confined to the District of Columbia Central Detention Facility ("D.C. Jail");
(2) the Defendants' failure to implement the Orders of this Court has caused substantial harm to the prisoners confined to the D.C. Jail;
(3) the Defendants' failure to implement the Orders of this Court has jeopardized the public health and potentially put at risk all citizens of the District of Columbia;
(4) the Court has provided the Defendants with numerous opportunities throughout the lengthy history of this case to develop and implement their own plan to remedy violations of this Court's Orders and the Defendants have failed meaningfully to avail themselves of these opportunities;
(5) the Defendants' implementation of the Special Officer's Initial Remedial Plan is necessary for the Defendants to come into

K#
compliance with the Orders of this Court, to provide medical and mental health services to prisoners confined to the D.C. Jail in a manner consistent with the United States Constitution, and to protect the public health; and
(6) neither the Defendants' assertion that the District of Columbia has not budgeted sufficient resources to the Department of Corrections to implement the Initial Remedial Plan nor any of the Defendants' other objections constitute good cause for the Initial Remedial Plan to be modified or not implemented.
It is therefore by the Court this £7 - day of January, 1995, hereby
ORDERED that the Defendants shall implement the Special Officer's Initial Remedial Plan.
It is so ordered.
William B. Bryajrf: Senior United States District Judge

Serve:
J. Patrick Hickey Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 2300 N Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20037
Jonathan M. Smith D.C. Prisoners' Legal Services Project, Inc. Suite 117 1400 20th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036
Richard S. Love Correctional Litigation Section 441 4th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20001
Grace M. Lopes Special Officer of the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia 1130 17th Street, N.W. Suite 400 Washington, D.C. 20036

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LEONARD CAMPBELL, et al. . Plaintiffs,
V. ANDERSON McGRUDER, et al.,
Defendants.

) ) C.A. No. 1 4 6 2 - 7 1 (WBB)
FILED

INMATES OF D.C. JAIL, et al. , Plaintiffs,
v.

JIA 1 1 1995
Clerk, U.S. District Court District of Columbia
j C.A. No. 75-1668 (WBB)

DELBERT JACKSON, et al..

Defendants.

FINDINGS AND ORDER APPOINTING RECEIVER
The Court, having considered the plaintiffs' Motion for the Appointment of a Receiver, the defendants' opposition thereto, the Special Officer's Report on Defendants' Compliance with the Initial Remedial Plan and the November 9, 1993 Order ("Report"), and the record in this case, the Court finds that the appointment of a receiver to ensure tae provision of medical and mental health care, and to obtain compliance with the orders of this Court, is appropriate and necessary.
Over the more than 20 year history of this litigation the Court has attempted all measures short of the appointment of a receiver to obtain the defendants' compliance with its orders. The Court finds that no other less intrusive remedial measure

Campbell v. McGruder

JC-DC-001-07

will succeed in compelling the defendants to satisfy their court-
ordered obligations.
A brief history of this case reveals that the defendants
have failed to take advantage of repeated opportunities to
satisfy the requirements of the court's orders as far back as the
1979 mental health plan.
On August 22, 1985, the parties entered into a remedial
Stipulation which required, inter alia:
Within 30 days, the Plaintiffs and the Defendants shall each respectively appoint one medical expert whose reasonable costs and fees will be paid by defendants, to review the health services delivery system at the D.C. Jail and make recommendations for improvements in a report to be submitted to the Court and the parties by Nov[ember] 1, 1985 and implemented by March 1, 1986, unless good cause is shown by either party why they should not be.
Over the next eight years the defendants were in persistent
non-compliance and on April 20, 1993, the Court appointed a
Special Officer to monitor and report on the District's efforts
to meet its court-ordered obligations. Pursuant to the Court's
Order, on September 15, 1993, the Special Officer issued the
reports of her experts on medical and mental health services at the District of Columbia Jail.1 These reports describe very
serious deficiencies in the delivery of basic services that
violate this Court's prior orders and the defendants' obligations
under the United States Constitution.
1 Expert Reports on Medical and Mental Health Services at the District of Columbia Jail (September 15, 1993).
- 2-

In response to the reports of the Special Officer's experts,
on November 9, 1993, this Court granted the plaintiffs' motion
for interim relief. The interim relief was designed to address
the most serious problems identified in the delivery of medical
and mental health services. The defendants have failed to
implement material provisions of the November 9, 1993 Order,
including the provisions that address measures to prevent the
spread of tuberculosis, and the identification and treatment of
prisoners at risk for suicide.2
On February 2, 1994, the Special Officer issued her own
report on the District's Compliance. The Special Officer found
significant problems with the delivery of health care that
violated material provisions of this Court's orders. These
violations include core provisions of Court orders designed to
improve health care at the Jail. The Special Officer concluded:
[T]he defendants have violated this Court's orders with impunity, including the Orders of March 5, 1993 and November 9, 1993 granting interim relief. Among other violations, they have failed to properly conduct sick call, failed to operate a chronic disease clinic, failed to implement a quality assurance progr jn, failed to maintain a full-time health services administrator at the Jail, failed to properly conduct intake, failed to properly provide meaningful access to specialty services, failed to appropriately and professionally respond to life threatening emergencies, failed to properly
2 In the nine months since the November 9, 1993 Order, six prisoners have committed suicide at the Jail. Based on the findings of the Special Officer's experts, many of these suicides would have been preventable had the procedures contemplated by the November 9, 1995 Order been implemented.
- 3-

provide medical diets and failed to keep their own kitchen and medical clinic clean.3
In response to the Special Officer's findings, on March 16,
1994, the defendants consented to a finding of contempt and to a
consent order that required them to implement a remedial plan'.*
The defendants admitted, as they had previously, their ongoing
violations of the Court's Orders and the need for significant
corrective action to provide medical and mental health services
which met the legal requirements od the United States
Constitution and this Court's orders. The remedial plan was to
be drafted by the Special Officer with input from the parties.
Pursuant to the Order, the remedial plan was to contain a
specific timetable to achieve compliance as well as a schedule of
automatic fines for non-compliance.
3 Special Officer's Report at 124-125.
* The March 16, 1994, Consent Order provided, inter alia:
ORDERED that the Special Officer shall, within 120 days of this Order submit a plan to cure the defendants' contempt and that will insure that the defendants render medical and mental health care in a manner consistent with the United States Constitution, and it is further
ORDERED that the Special Officer's remedial plan shall address all issues raised in her reports, the Expert Reports on Medical and Mental Health Services, as well as any additional issue that may come to the attention of the Special Officer or the Court that adversely impacts on the defendants' compliance with the Court's orders concerning the delivery of medical and mental health services at the Jail in a manner consistent with the United States Constitution.
- 4-

On May 4, 1994, the Special Officer filed an Interim
Remedial Plan that addressed the District's failure to properly
isolate prisoners with infectious tuberculosis as was required by the Court's November 9, 1993 Order.5 The Special Officer also
recommended that the District be fined up to $10,000 per day for
any future violation and $1,000 for each future false report or failure to report.6
Following the Interim Plan on tuberculosis, an initial Remedial Plan7 addressing the range of medical and mental health
issues was drafted by the Special Officer. The plan was prepared
over a several month period and after lengthy discussions with
the defendants about its contents and the time table for
implementation. The Initial Remedial Plan was filed with the
Court on October 11, 1994. According to the Special Officer,
"substantial revisions were made in order to ensure that the
defendants could meet the substantive requirements as well as the deadline requirements set forth [in the plan].11 Remedial Plan at
6. After considering objections from the defendants, on January
The Special Officer's Interim Remedi?r. Plan Regarding Isolation of Inmates with Suspected and Diagnosed Tuberculosis, May 4, 1994.
6 Id., at 13-14. As is clear from the Special Officer's Report, the defendants have ignored the requirements of the plan and their responsibilities to prisoners, the public and staff. Even the threat of significant fines has not deterred these violations.
7 Given the seriousness of the deficiencies in the defendants' system to deliver medical and mental health care, the Special Officer concluded that the remedial process must be undertaken in phases. [cite to initial remedial plan]
- 5-

27, 1995, this Court ordered the defendants to implement the
plan.
The defendants have failed to implement the Remedial Plan as
ordered. They are in non-compliance with numerous material
provisions of the plan and the Court finds that the defendants
are in contempt of court. As are described in the Special
Officer's report the defendants' non-compliance with the plan has
resulted in significant harm to prisoners and places prisoners at
unreasonable risk for injury.
On July 3, 1995, the Special Officer submitted a report
describing the defendants' refusal to comply with the orders of
this Court. The Special Officer found:
Instead of improving [since the Court ordered the implementation of the remedial plan], the medical and mental health system has deteriorated. Among other serious deficiencies, there is an absence of medical leadership; a chronic shortage of life saving supplies, medication and equipment; and a failure to provide consistent access to sick call services. The defendants have not yet implemented an effective tuberculosis control program. They have failed to conduct timely tuberculosis screening, failed to provide appropriate treatment, and failed to properly isolate inmates with suspected nd/or diagnosed tuberculosis. This substantial risk to the health of staff, inmates, and the community into which inmates are released is exacerbated by defendants' failure to practice basic infection control principles and to implement even a rudimentary housekeeping and preventive maintenance program.
Report at 2.
- 6-

mm

The evidence in the Special Officer's thoroughly documented

report is extensive, persuasive and unchallenged by the

defendants.

Therefore, it is this

day of

, 1995,

ORDERED that the plaintiffs' motion for the appointment of a

receiver is granted; and it is further

ORDERED that the Court adopts the findings contained in the

Special Officer's Report on Defendants' Compliance with the

Initial Remedial Plan and the November 9, 1993 Order as its own;

and it is further

ORDERED that a receiver will be appointed with

responsibility to implement the Remedial Plan and other orders of

this court relating to the delivery of medical and mental health

services at the District of Columbia Jail; and it is further

ORDERED that the parties and the Special Officer shall

confer regarding the selections of the receiver. If the parties

cannot agree within 30 days on the person to be appointed as a

receiver, the parties and the Special Officer shall submit

nominations to the Court and the Court will appoint the receiver;

and it is further

ORDERED that the receiver shall have the following duties

and responsibilities:

1. To correct all deficiencies in the delivery of medical

and mental health services at the Jail and to operate the program

for the delivery of medical and mental health services in a

M1 *7 M

km
manner consistent with the orders of this Court and the Constitution of the United States.
2. To implement, in coordination with the Special Officer, the Remedial Plan in accordance with this Court's January 27, 1995 Order.
3. To establish procedures and systems within the Department of Corrections in order to ensure that compliance with Court orders is maintained after the receivership has been terminated.
4. To work with the Special Officer and the parties to ensure compliance with all Court ordered obligations.
5. To report periodically to the Court, the Special Officer and the parties regarding the receiver's efforts and any obstacles encountered by the receiver to performing her or his responsibilities; and it is further
ORDERED that the receiver shall have the following powers: 1. All powers currently held by the Mayor, City Administrator, Director of the Department of Corrections, Assistant Director for Health Services and Chief Medical Officer regarding the delivery of medical and mental health services at the District of Columbia Jail. 2. The power to create, modify, abolish or transfer positions; to hire, terminate, promote, transfer, evaluate and set compensation for staff to the extent necessary to obtain compliance with this Court's orders, the cost of such activity to be borne by the defendants.
- 8-

3. The power to procure such supplies, equipment or services as are necessary to obtain compliance with this Court's orders, the cost of such procurement to be borne by the defendants.
4. The power to contract for such services as are necessary to obtain compliance with this Court's orders, the cost of such contracts to be borne by the defendants.
5. The power to hire such consultants, or to obtain such technical assistance as he or she deems necessary to perform her or his functions, the cost of such consultants or technical assistance to be borne by the defendants.
6. The power to petition the Court for such additional powers as are necessary to obtain compliance with this Court's orders; and it is further
ORDERED that within 30 days of the appointment of the receiver, the receiver, after consultation with the Special Officer and the parties, shall submit a plan to the Court that contains the procedures for the receiver to exercise these powers. These procedures shall ensure that the receiver shall not be unreasonably impeded in her or his work by District procedures, regulations or laws. If an agreement cannot be reached regarding the exercise of these powers, the parties shall submit suggested procedures to the Court; and it is further
ORDERED that the District shall provide the receiver with the following:
1. compensation at a rate to be determined by the Court;
- 9-

2. an appropriate office, and such equipment and support staff as are deemed necessary by the receiver;
3. unrestricted access to all records of the Department of Corrections deemed necessary by the receiver to perform her qr. his duties; and
4. access to all areas of the Jail; and it is further ORDERED that the defendants shall instruct all personnel that they are to cooperate with and assist the receiver in the performance of her or his duties, and it is further ORDERED that this receivership shall expire five years from the date that the receiver is appointed, unless the Court finds good cause to extend the appointment. The Court may terminate the receivership prior to the expiration of five years if the Special Officer certifies that the defendants are in compliance with all orders of this Court concerning medical and mental health services at the Jail and that management structures are in place to ensure that the there is no foreseeable risk of future non-compliance.
B. Bryant United States District
Judge
- 10 -

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

FILED

LEONARD CAMPBELL, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. ANDERSON McGRUDER, et al..

AUG - 3 1995
Clerk, U.S. District Court District of Columbia
)
) C.A. No. 1462-71 (WBB)

Defendants.
INMATES OF D.C. JAIL, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. DELBERT JACKSON, et al.,
Defendants.

) ) ))
) ) C.A. No. 75-1668 (WBB)
) ) )

ORDER Upon consideration of the Plaintiffs' Motion that the Court Adopt the Special Officer's Findings on Environmental Health and Safety at the District of Columbia Detention Facility as the Court's Findings and th t the Defendants Be Ordered to Show Cause Why They Should Not Be Held in Contempt of Court, the defendants' response thereto, the Court's findings in its April 20, 1993 Order Appointing Special Officer, and the record in this case, the Court finds that the Special Officer's findings on environmental health and safety at the District of Columbia Detention Facility are accurate and fully supported by the record.
Campbell v. McGruder

JC-DC-001-073

The Court further finds that the defendants are in non-

compliance with material provisions of the Orders of this Court

concerning the health and safety at the Jail as is detailed in

the Special Officer's Notice of Filing and the attached report of

James Balsamo.

Accordingly, it by this Court this -5 ***! day of

1995:

ORDERED that the findings of the Special Officer, which

incorporate the report of James Balsamo on environmental health

and safety at the District of Columbia Detention Facility are,

pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 53(e)(2), adopted as the findings of

this Court; and it is further

ORDERED that the defendants must show cause on or

before Au^ij

^K

1995 as to why they should not be

held in contempt of this Court.

B. Bryant / United States District Judge

 
 Campbell v. McGruder

I m ••••

••••• «••

• • • • «•• • • • • •

JC-DC-001-075 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FILED

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

AUG 2 8 1995

LEONARD CAMPBELL, et al..

*

*

Plaintiffs

*

Clerk, U.S. District Court District of Columbia

*

v.

* Civil Action NO. 1462-71(WBB)

*

ANDERSON MCGRUDER, et al. ,

Defendants *

ORDER
Upon consideration of the report of the Special Officer to the Court, Ms. Grace Lopes, that the District of Columbia Jail is facing a crisis in psychiatric staffing, and that the jail is presently left with virtually no regular psychiatric coverage, the Court finds that the present psychiatric staffing situation leaves the District of Columbia Jail with constitutionally inadequate psychiatric care for the Jail inmates. It also finds that, based on these facts and the urgent nature of this circumstance, the District's procurement and contracting guidelines will constitute a barrier to curing the above discussed constitutional violation.
Based on these findings, it is by the Court this 25th day of August, 1995,

ORDERED that the Receiver, Dr. Shansky, is given the authority to enter into, on such terms as he deems necessary, on behalf of the District, personnel service contracts with psychiatrists whom he deems qualified to staff the D.C. Jail's mental health program. This authority shall continue on an interim basis until the

V

under which the Receiver will exercise his powers are
established pursuant to the Court's July 11, 1995, Order.
United States District Judge
Copies to:
Nicholas P. Miller Assistant Corporation Counsel Office of the Corporation Counsel 441 Fourth St., N.W., 6th Floor South Washington, D.C. 20001
Patrick Hickey, Esq. Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 2300 N Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20037-1128
Jonathan M. Smith, Esq. D.C. Prisoners' Legal Services Project, Inc. 1400 20th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036
Grace M. Lopes, Esq. Special Officer 1130 - 17th Street, N.W. Suite 400 Washington, D.C. 20036

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LEONARD CAMPBELL, et al.(

)

Plaintiffs,

)

v«

)

ANDERSON McGRUDER, et al., )

Defendants

)

) INMATES OF D.C. JAIL, et a_l. , )
Plaintiffs, )
v.
DELBERT C. JACKSON, et al..
Defendants

C.A. No. 1462-71 (WBB)
FILED /
OCT - 5 1995
Clerk, U.S. District Court District of Columbia
C.A. No. 75-1688 (Cases consolidated before
Judge William B. Bryant)

ORDER Upon consideration of the motion filed by the United States seeking review of the investigative file of this Court compiled by Special Officer Grace Lopes, it is this j!T^H day of October 1995, Ordered that Special Officer Grace Lopes make available the investigative file into the death of Richard C. Johnson to representatives of the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia and the Department of Justice.

TTTLXIAM B. BRYANT UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Campbell v. McGruder
JC-DC-001-077

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LEONARD CAMPBELL, et al., Plaintiffs.
v. ANDERSON MCGRUDER, et al.,
Defendants.
INMATES OF D.C. JAIL, et al.. Plaintiffs,
v. DELBERT JACKSON, et al..
Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1462-71 (WBB)
RLED AUG 19 1997
NANCY MAYER-WHITTINGTON, CLERK US. DISTRICT COURT
Civil Action No. 75-1668 (WBB)

CONSENT ORDER

Upon consideration of plaintiffs' motion that the Special

Officer be requested to investigate violations of security related

orders at the D.C. Jail and to make a report with recommendations

for remedial action, the memoranda of points and authorities filed

in support thereof and in opposition thereto, the record here .n,
, -y
and the agreement of che parties, it is by the Court this /y'"1

day of .A"?;-' c I

1997,

ORDERED: That the Special Officer shall conduct a security

audit of the D.C. Jail, utilizing her security expert, James

Henderson. In the course of conducting the audit, Mr. Henderson

shall consult with an expert who is selected by the defendants and

who is agreeable to the Special Officer. The defendants' expert

shall be free to express his or her own opinions on the issues
illinium Campbell v. McGruder

JC-DC-001-079

&
which are subject to the audit in a report that will be made an appendix to Mr. Henderson's report.
tJTTfTEt) STATES DISTRICT JUD£E
Consent and Copies to:
Richard S. Love Assistant Corporation Counsel 441 Fourth Street, N.W., 10th Floor North Washington, D.C. 20001
Jonathan M. Smith, Esquire, D.C. Prisoners' Legal Services Project, Inc., 1400 20th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036
J. Patrick Hickey, Esquire, Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge, 2300 N. Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20037
Grace Lopes Special Officer of the Court, 1130 17th Street, N.W., Suite 400, Washington, D.C. 20036

 
 Campbell v. McGruder
JC-DC-001-001 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LEONARD CAMPBELL JOHN McILWAIN RICHARD KINARD ELIGAH HAIR SMITH

Plaintiffs,

V.
CHARLES M. RODGERS Superintendent, D.C. J a i l 200 - 1 9 t h S t r e e t Washington, D. C.

KENNETH L. HARDY Director, D.C. Department
of Corrections 614 H S t r e e t , N. W. Washington, D. C.
WALTER R. WASHINGTON Mayor and Coirimissioner of
the District of Columbia

Defendants.

Civil Action No,

COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTION, DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND OTHER APPROPRIATE RELIEF
Plaintiffs complain against the defendants as follows:

JURISDICTION
1. 'This is an action for a declaratory judgment that plaintiffs' constitutional rights are being violated by the conditions of their confinement in the District of Columbia Jail and for a permanent injunction preventing defendants

-2-

from continuing to violate plaintiff's rights, while acting

under color of law.

i

2. Jurisdiction is conferred on this court under 28

i U.S.C. §1343 providing for jurisdiction over claims arising j under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and 1985, and-vU.S .C. §2201 and 2202
ji
jl relating to declaratory judgments and the D.C. Code §11-521

conferring general equity jurisdiction on the District Court

and by the Courts' ancillary jurisdiction to hear non-federal

claims.

li
II.
THE PARTIES
3'. Plaintiffs are citizens of the United States and
of the District of Columbia and reside at the District of
Columbia Jail. They were arrested in the District of Columbia
and are charged with offenses under the District of Columbia
I Code cognizable in the United States District Court. In
I each case bond was set by a United States Magistrate or
j!
j! judge of that Court. Each plaintiff has been unable to make I I bond and is incarcerated at the D.C. Jail solely to insure
j his appearance a-t trial and for no other reason.
i

- 34. 'Plaintiffs are as follows:

Name and Docket No.

Incarcerated Since

Bond

T r i a l Date

Leonard Campbell U.S.M. D14-2021-71
John Me11wain Cr. No. 1178-71
Richard Kinard U.S.M. D14-1870-71
Elijah Hair Smith U.S.M. D14-1610-71

June 18, 1971 ,April 20, 1971 J u l y 14, 1971 May 17, 1971

$5,000 $2,500 $5,000 $10,000

Not Set July 30,1971 Not Set Not Set

-4-

5. The Plaintiffs are representative of a class within

the meaning of-Rule 23, Fed. R. Civ. P. The class consists

of all unconvicted pre-trial detainees incarcerated at the

District of Columbia Jail. The class is an on-going one

and includes pre-trial detainees who will be incarcerated

! at the D.C. Jail in the future. The class is so numerous

that joinder of all members is impracticable. The members
I
jj of the class are readily identifiable from the Defendants'
i
j records. There are questions of law and fact common to
i
I the class. The claims of the Plaintiffs are typical of the

claims of the class. The Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately

protect the interest of the class.

6. Defendant Charles R. Rodgers is Superintendant

of the District of Columbia Jail. He is sued individually

and in his official capacity.

7. • Defendant;* Kenneth L. Hardy/^ is Director of the

D.C. Department of Corrections and is responsible for the

overall administration of the D.C. Jail. He is sued

individually and in his official capacity.

^

8. Defendant, Gilbert Hahn, is Chairman of the

olumbia CityNCouncil. He is sued individually

and ihsjiis/ of f icial capacity isind as/a representative of the

city coimbsU.. Said council is tw4 legislative body of the

Distri/t of Columbia charged w/th aiiqcating monies to

the department ofN^orrectioni

|

^ . Defendant, Walter R_. Washington is Mayor and

j Commissioner of the District of Columbia. He is sued

individually and in his official capacity as chief executive

officer of the District of Columbia.

-5-
III. STATEMENT OF CLAIM A O . Plaintiffs are incarcerated at the District of Columbia Jail solely because they are unable to post bond to secure their release prior to their trials. They are !| presumed innocent and are incarcerated solely to ensure their presence at trial. \V. Plaintiffs allege, upon information and belief, that the defendants, by their intentional acts and omissions, are violating their constitutional rights in that: a. The physical conditions of plaintiffs' confinement constitute punishment in violation of the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. They are confined in cells and dormitories which in some, cases are overcrowded, but which, in any event, violate minimal architectural standards as well as American Correctional Association standards. The jail is overcrowded; the heating, ventilation and other aspects of the physical conditions all constitute a health threat. b. The inadequacy of food and the lack of jj recreational facilities constitute punishment in violation of the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. c. The lack of programs enabling plaintiffs to maintain employment, where possible, prior to trial, constitutes punishment in violation of the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. d-. Plaintiffs are denied adequate contact with the general community. The censorship of mail, limitations on visitors, lack of access of telephones, newspapers, and other means of communication violate plaintiffs First, i Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

-6-

e. Hospital and other medical services are

i

!

inadequate to ensure health and safety of plaintiffs, in

j

violation of their Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment

j

i rights.

f. ' inadequate security measures subject plaintiffs

|

to the threat and danger of assault by other inmates, thus

j

violating their rights under the Fifth, Eighth and

i

i

Fourteenth Amendments.

U

li

s&. Plaintiffs further allege that they are subject

I to confinement in the Control Cells and Treatment Segregation
ij

II Cells of the Jail in violation of their constitutional

li

.

rights in that: a. Such confinement is carried out as a disciplinary

measure without prior due process procedural safeguards and

b. The conditions of the Treatment Segregation

Cells violate plaintiffs rights under the Fifth, Eighth,

and Fourteenth Amendments.

yi. Plaintiffs further allege that they are denied

j access to legal materials and adequate access to counsel in
II
I violation of their Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment !.
! rights.

j

^A. Plaintiffs further allege that the physical conditions

j

of the jail are in violation of the District of Columbia

Housing Code.
i 4

I

^S. Defendants Rodgers, Hardy, -Mahnr, and Washington

j each within the scope of his authority, and under color of

i law, and as a matter -of. custom and practice, planned,

executed, and enforced the practices and policies constituting

the violations alleged in paragraphs

-7-
a

^Kr. All of the conditions and practices separately

j

and in the aggregate make incarceration in the D.C. Jail

;

i

more severe, punitive and restrictive than post-sentence

j

incarceration at other correctional institutions to which

plaintiffs might be sent if <ihey were convicted, notwith-

.

ij

:

'! standing that the plaintiffs are awaiting trial and

i

Ij presumed innocent.

i

yf. As a result of the conditions and practices at

I

the D.C. Jail, detainees are psychologically and physically

i

harmed and damaged. Moreover, they are induced to plead

:

II

i

j guilty to criminal charges pending against them in order

>

to avoid the conditions and practices herein described

;

i

which exist at the Jail.

;

1#. There is an actual and continuing controversy

!

requiring a declaration of the rights of the named plaintiffs i

and the members of the class. There is no adequate remedy

!

j at law.

.

'.

>9. The existence and continuation of the unconsti-

!

t

tutional practices, policies, acts and omissions alleged

j

I

herein have subjected and will continue to subject the class

j

to irreparable suffering and injury unless defendants, and

j

each of them, are enjoined by this Court from continuing

i

such practices, policies, acts and omissions and are required- ;

I to perform their respective duties according to law.

i

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

;

i

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and

\

i

all other detainees similarly situated, pray:

;

i i

1. That the Court allow this case to proceed as a

j

class action and that all members of the class be notified

\

by defendants of the pendency of this action by posting one

\

-8-

copy of the complaint and a copy of this Court's order on

this motion in a conspicuous place in each section of the

j jail and that several attorneys designated by plaintiffs'

attorneys and several attorneys designated by defendants'

attorneys be permitted to move through the jail so as to

| answer questions by members of the class.

2. That the Court order defendants to permit corrections

experts designated by plaintiffs to inspect the jail and

all of its facilities and to report to all parties and the

| Court on the results of their inspection.

3. That the Court declare that tfcrsswgh the individual

and collective effect of" their acts, practices, and omissions//

the Defendants:

a. feerVe subjected Plaintiffs and the class they

j| represent to punishment without Due Process of Law, and to
i!
'• cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the

!| Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
|l:Constitution;

I

b. Vzsfe. subjected Plaintiffs and the class they

|! represent to summary discipline without due process in

! violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments;
A:

c. i»ve deprived Plaintiffs and their class of

their constitutionally protected rights to a fair trial,

!j'guaranteed db.y itih*eveSidxetphrivaend tPhleaiFnotuirftfesenatnhd Atmheenidrmecnltas;s to
i
j the equal protection of the law to which they are entitled

under the Fourteenth Amendment;

j

e. h-ave -deprived Plaintiffs and their class of

their rights to effective assistance of counsel and to assist
I
Ii in their defense, in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth
II
II Amendments;

! fa

j

f. Jiave deprived Plaintiffs and their class

of their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments;

j

g. have, under color of law and while acting

!

in their official capacities ,• deprived plaintiffs of the

lj

rights described above in violation of Title 42 U.S. Code

i

§§1981-1985;

i

-fr>o

;

h. k-eve deprived Plaintiffs of their rights under

!

f

Housing Regulations §2306, 2307, 2404, 2202, 2206, 2301-2,

j

i

2608, 2209.

!

j

4. That a preliminary and permanent injunction be

I

issued, enjoining and restraining Defendants from engaging

\

in any of the unlawful acts, practices or omissions complained ;

i

of in this complaint.

;

i

5. That the Court order that, within 60 days,

j

Defendants submit to the Court a plan for assuring that Plaintiffs
jj

I and the class they represent are accorded all of the rights

j

lj

.

i

!! and privileges of the innocent; and that they be subjected

;

. only to such inconveniences necessary to ensure their

•

!j presence at subsequent court proceedings. More

|

.specifically, the Plaintiffs and the class they represent

I

should be assured by the plan:

i

a. that the District of Columbia Jail and the

cells and dormitories therein be kept in safe and sanitary

!

j| conditions, with proper electrical connections, plumbing,

i

heating and ventilation, and, at a minimum, that the jail's

!

conditions be maintained in accordance with the District

i

of Columbia Housing Law (Housing Regulations 2306, 2307,

j

|j 2404, 2202, 2206, 2301-02, 2608, 2209);

I

-

li

i
I
' I

-10-

b. that prisoners not be overcrowded in the D.C.

Jail and that each cell, ward, and dormitory contain no

more prisoners than the designed capacity of the cell and

cellblock.

c. that a regular\recreational and exercise

program, outside of the cells, be established and that all

prisoners be permitted outside of the jail for sufficient

periods to assure their continuous physical and mental

well-being.

d. that the isolation and punishment of prisoner

i in the treatment segregation cells be terminated;

e. that all prisoners be fed in suitable, sanitary

facilities outside of their cells and that edible food in

accordance with recognized nutritional needs be furnished;

f. that the prisoners be permitted enough showers

to ensure that they remain clean;

II

j

g. that the prisoners be furnished clean mattresses

j

j| and beds, a complete set of bedding and clothing, including

I socks and undergarments, which are cleaned and changed at

' least once weekly, adequate towels, proper cleaning equip-

ment, and other personal necessities (such as tooth paste,

| soap, etc.);

h. that prisoners be accorded essential preventive

medical practices and receive adequate and sound medical,

dental and mental health care;

and voluntair.y -w.tohrakt parnogerdaumcatbieoneasltabanldisvhoecda;tional program

j. that prisoners have continuous opportunity

|

to talk and associate with each other;

j

k. that prisoners have access to a sufficient

j

quantity and quality of books, magazines and newspapers,

j

law books and legal materials;

-11-

1. that visiting conditions be established which ensure decency, comfort, privacy of conversations, conjugal rights, and additional visiting periods;
m. that no limitations be placed on persons an

inmate may see, communicate with, and receive communication from;

n. that no censorship be exercised on incoming or outgoing mail, newspapers, books, and periodicals; that the only control on incoming mail be for inspection of contraband such as drugs or weapons; that adequate phones

be installed and the prisoners have access to them in order to make local, outgoing calls without charge; and that such phones not be wiretapped or monitored in any manner;

o. that a code of intra-jail behavior providing

'! for inmate rights be promulgated and provided to every | j prisoner upon entry into the jail;

||

p. that no discipline on inmates be inflicted

II

jl without first affording them notice, a hearing, the assistance of counsel, the confrontation of accusers, the right to

cross-examine, written records of a hearing decision, reasons
| therefor and evidence relied upon, and a hearing before i I an impartial official.

I

6. That the Court order the Defendants to implement

the plans submitted pursuant to paragraph 5. 7. That if a satisfactory plan cannot be submitted
and implemented,, the Defendants be enjoined and restrained from incarcerating or detaining any and all of the Plaintiffs

and members of the class they represent in the District of Columbia Jail and further enjoined from transferring Plaintiffs and their class to an alternative facility

-12-

unless Defendants can provide evidence satisfactory to the

court that the alternative does not suffer from the conditions

herein complained of and that it is accessible to visitors

and counsel.

^

8. That the Court enter its order permanently directing

Defendants Washington and the City Comir.issioners to appropriate

funds and to take such further steps as may be necessary and

appropriate within their powers for the implementation of

the provisions contained in paragraph (8) above.

9. That the Court appoint as an impartial advisor a

recognized expert in the field of corrections to evaluate

the plans submitted pursuant to paragraphs and to report

to the Court.

10. That during the pendency of this action and there-

| after defendants Rodgers and Hardy and each of the jail
i

! officials and guards under their direction or control be

• restrained and enjoined from any and all acts of

] punishment and reprisal with respect to the named plaintiffs

and the members of the class by reason of this action.

11. That this Court grant such damages as will compensate

Plaintiffs and the members of their class for the psychological,

physical and economic losses incurred as inmates of the

D.C. Jail.

12. That the Court retain jurisdiction over defendants

until such time a,s the. Court, is satisfied that the practices,

policies, acts and om'is'sions alleged herein no longer exist

and will not recur.

-13-
Respectfully submitted,
Norman Lefstein Sublic Defender Service 601 Indiana Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20004 628-1200
Paul Chernoff Public Defender Service 601 Indiana Avenue, N.W Washington, D.C. 20004 628-1200 ,
Jon P. Axelrod Public Defender Service '601 Indiana Avenue, N.W, Washington, D.C. 20004 628-1200
William w. Taylor, III Public Defender Service 501 Indiana Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20004 628-1200
Ronald L. Goldfarb 1616 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006 628-3266
Of Counsel-;
Thomas A. Hammond, Jr.

-14-
VBRIFICATION DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ss
PAUL CHERNOFF, being first duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that he has read the within complaint and that the items contained therein are correct to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief.
Paul Chernoff/,^-'
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME, this 16th day of July, 1971.
NOTARY PUBLIC,"D.C.

 
 C, FOR T-TO DISTINCT OF C

LEONARD CAMPBELL .TOtlTJ KclXlTAIK RICHARD X I l ^ K D ELIJAH HA IK SMITH

Piaintifi'a

CKMOES H. EODGSHS SuperinUenO.©nt# D.C J a i l 200.- lQtli S t r o a t , S. 3B. v?ociting t o n , D. C-

t Civil Action Ko. 1462-71

Director, B.C. Department of Correctiovis
614 H S t r e e t , K. v;, Washington, D. C.
KALIT^ R. T^SHIKGTCl? Mayor end CGnisiisaionca* of
tho d i s t r i c t of Columbia

P l a i n t i f f o ccwaplain p.gninat t h e defendants a s follov/s;
I.
1. This i a an a c t i o n for a d e c l a r a t o r y juficpient 'that p l s i n t i f t f j ' c o n n t i t u t i o n . i l r i g n t a aro being v i o l a t e d by tho c o n d i t i o n s of t h e i r confinement i n tins D i s t r i c t of Columbia CT^il anct for n iisrmnnent i n j u n c t i o n p r e v e n t i n g <2efoncte.nUs frc-ni c o n t i n u i n g t o v i o l a t o p l a i n t i f f s 1 r i g h t o , v;liilo acting under color of Inw.
2. J u r i t s u i c t i o n in conferred on t-iiis c o u r t a.iJcr 2S U.S.C. 5 1343 providing for j u r i s d i c t i o n e v e r clsJJ?J3 a r i s i n g undor

APPENDIX A Campbell v. McGruder

HBH

• • HB

•• • I P

JC-DC-001-002

GIV ~2 -

42 U.S.C. 5 1Q83 on2r~i9S37-end 23 TJ.S.C. § 2201 and 2202 r e l a t i n g to declaratory judgments an<3 tho D.c. Cotf.o § 11-521 conferring
o
general equity jurisdiction on th-a District Court and by the Courts' ancillary jurisdiction to hear non-federal claims.
12.

3. plaintiffs era citizens of tha United s t a t e s nnd of tha D i s t r i c t of Coltotbia aid reside at tlio District of ColuraMn J a i l , "rtiay v;aro sri-estod in tho District, of Colunbin and arc cl\arg«3d witli oiTfonGes ur*<2er tuio D i s t r i c t of coluirJoia Coco cognizable in tho united States D i s t r i c t Court. In each enss. bond was 3Ot by a united States llnyistrate or juctya of tliat Court. Each plaintiff lias boen unc-.ble to make bond ancj ia inenrceratnd a t tho
1
D.C. J a i l solely to insure h i s appaarsnea a t t r i a l and for no other ro-ocon.
4 . Plaintixfcs are r,s follovsj

ana

tncarccr-

Bond

r i c l Dit

ate3 Since

I/Gonard C^itipboll U.S.M. DM-2021-71
John "cllvvfiin o r . ?.To. 117G-71
i;ichnrd Kinard .S.K. P-14-1870-73.
S l i j p h Haix" Smith 'J.'.i.'A. Oiv-1.510-71

Juna 1G, 1971 ?.pril 20. 1971 July 14, 1971 Key 17, 1971

$5,000 Not Set $2,500 July 30, 1971 $5,000 Eot Sot ?10,0CQ Hot £

- 3-
5. Tha Plaintiffs arc representative of a clssa within the racaning of iU\l«s 23, i'ed. R. civ. i>. The claos consists of ol. unconvictcd pro-trial detainees incarcerated at the District of Colurfoia J a i l . ?ha class i s an on~<joing ono and includes -pret r i a l detainaea who will ba incarcsrated at the D.C. J a i l in the future. The class i s so numaroas tliat joinfior o^ a l l cvembera i s irapracticnblo. U'lio meinbGrs o£ tho clnna axo readily identifiable froa the IJcfendants* records. There aro quostiona of l.xw rnd foe coriEion to tha class. Tha clairaa of tlie Plaiiitifia are typical of tho claims of the class.. Yiie Plnintirfs will fairly and e<loquatoly protect t}ie intoresfcof tha class.
• 6. Dafcnclant Charles K. RoSoero i.3 Supsrintondont of tha District of Columbia J a i l . Eo is suod indiviaually and in his official capacity.
7. Def-infant Kanivsth L. Kardy i s Director of tho D.C. Dopnrtnvont or Corrections and i s responsible for ti\ci overall 3d-» rainiytration of tha D.C. J s i l . Ha is sued individually and in his official capacity.
0. nofendant, Walter K. Washington is Mayor and Coraaisnionar of tiio District of Coluabia. Ko is auod individaally and in hia official capacity as chief execafcive officer of tho Oict r i c t of
III. sfflvrar-'s.'T-C o r CI.?\IT-I 9. ?l?.intiffa aro incarcerate! at tao District of ColJbia j a i l sololy because they aro uncblo to post bond to cecure

- 4~

their relcaso prior to their trials. They arc presumed innocent

and arc incarcerated solely to ensura thair presence at trial.

10. Plaintiffs allege, upon information end belief,

that tho defendants* by thair intentional ncta ana oraicslons, are

violating thair constitutional rights in that; a. 'Sfho physical conditions of plaintiffs1 confinement

constitute punistaont in violation of the Fifth,

Eighth, ana Fourteenth ?j3!ant3racsnts. Thoy arc eon-

fined in calls and donoitories Which in Go:na cases

' are overcrowded, bat v^iic'a, in nny ©vent/ violate

miiiixaal arcait.GGtu.ral .standards ca wall as /snvarican

Correctional Association atendards. I'ho jail La

ovcrrcrov/ded; tl^.o heating* ventilation ^nd otijior as-

pects of tho physical conditions nil conatitute a

health throat.

b.« "Kio inadequacy of food and tho lack of recreational

facilities constitute puniu'noiDnt ii\ violation of tha

Fifth, Sighth# and Fourteenth AraancJras

c. 'jTao lack of jprograns onahlir»g plaintiffs to ciaiatain

cmployraenfc, whoro possible, prior to trial, coaoti-

tutos puni3liTaant in violation of tho Fifth, Eighth

and Fourteentla Ame-nSacnts,

<3. Plaintiffs aro clcniod adequate contact with the ge-n-

i oral cosiraunity. Tha censorship of nail, limitations

\J

• "

on vicsitores, lacfc of access of to^.apihonaa, news—

paparr., sncl oUIinr riV.-an;; of corEaimicaticn violato

. • p l a i n t i f f a F i r s t , Fifth, BightJi, and Fourteenth

aont r i g h t s .

- 5~

o. ltos;?£tal~andt"B'£h©r nodical services ntfo to onsura health and safety of plaintiffa, in violatioh Of their Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Tiraenctrnont righto.
f* inadequate} security nvjanuros subject plaintiffs to the threat and cSnngor of assault Jay other inmates, thuo violating thair rights under tho Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?.
IX. plaintiffs £ur£hor allege tliat thoy ar-3 subject to nfinement in tiV3 Control Cells nnd £roafcmonfc Segregation Cells of t2is J a i l ia violation of their constitutional rights in that?
a. Such confinement i s carried out P.S a disciplinary -without prior dua 'procaso procedusral nr>fe—

':

b , tho conditions oi! fcha Treatment Scgrogntion Cells

violats plaintiffs rights undar tlio Fifth, Eighth,

ar.3 Four teen til Amandrjents.

{

12. Plaintiffs e?nd tho »ca?licrs of their class are DUJD-

jojt to tliQ use of indiacrirainnta and oxcossiva force by defen-

dants, 'choir agents* and employees, which forco i s not i-elatod to

3ny Ic9'itiaaata interest of the institution na;3 which inflicts r>e-

vare baJlily injury and dwancje upon t3io plaintiffs. Farther, plain

tiffs find VhGisr class are sabjoct to excessive: force inflicted

with blackjacks and chorales! llaco not insuad by the Hopnrtraen.t of

Corrections, and which nro. importgQ into tha .^.C. jflil by <3c>fcn-

-lanta' i^qontci oTi-.2 or.iploycos sololy for the purco.^a of violating

plaintiffs* constitutional righto by inflicting pain nntl injury

upon then.

/

•

•

•

.

"

'

.

•

- 6 -

13. Plainfci£:£sL_£urt3i3r allege that thay are doniod ac-

cass to lc$al lastcriala and ndecjuatG accoss to council in violatic

of their Fifth, S-brth and Fourteenth AEtend-v.ont r i g h t s .

14. Plaintiffs further allege that tho physical condi-

tions of fcho j a i l ara in violation of tho District of Columbia

Housing Coda.

15. Defendants RocJgcrn, Karcly, and Washington each witl

in the SCOJPO of hie authority, and unclor color o£ law, and as a

matter of custom nnd practices, planned, cicscutod, an<3 enforced ths

praeticea and policies constituting the violations allcgad in parn

1 tliroagh 14.

16. All of the conditions andt praaticoa soparatoly nntl

in tha -iggrcyataa nako incarceration in tho D.C. J a i l r&oro sovore,

pmiitivQ aril r e a t r i c t i v a than pocsfc—sontonco ir.cnrcerntion tst other

correctioael institutions to v.iiich .plaintiffs might bo sont if

they waro coiiviefce<2.» notwlt^istondlnc; that tJxa p l a i n t i f f s aro av;sit

ing t r i a l and presuaeici innoconfc.

: 5

17. hB a r e s u l t of tl^.o conditions end practiced a t tha

D.C. J a i l , cj.atain.oes syo psj^holoyically cna pliysicolly hamsd sne

daraagi?.-:!. Koraowr, thay sra inr?,ucc<J to plead guilty to criminal

charges pending agaiaat thorn in order to avoid tha conditions nnd

practices herein doscribod v^hich o?:iat at fho J a i l .

13. ThsXQ i s an actual «iiil continuing controversy r e -

quiring fi declaration o£ tho rights of t3xo nactsd plnintifffi ond

tho nasibcrn of tlio clacs. 5li*>re iQ no adequate sossaoy a t law.

19. -Vac 'ojiistanco nnd continuation of tha uncoiiGtitu-

tinnal proefcices, policies, acts and oaiusiono allowed horein hav».

- 7-
subjected ynil w i l l continue to subject £ho claas t o irreparable suffering and injury unless ciafendrjifcs, cncl each of thorn, arc enjoinad by this Court £rosi continuing such practicea, policies,acts and omionions and ore required to perform their respective, duties according to
IV.
,K FOR V5HBRE3FGEB, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves end a l l other tlataincaa siaiilarly situatoci, prayi I* That the Court allow this ceoo to proceed eu a Glass nation snd thsfc a l l raciabera o£ tJw class bo notifiod by defendants o£ fclie pendency or this action by poating ©ns copy ox the complaint and a copy of this Court*.o order on. this raotion in a conapicuoos placa in each traction of tlia j a i l cad that several a t t o r neys dasignstad by plcintiffo' attorrur/s and several attorneys (3ssignr.to<3 by defenciants* attorneys bs vxiririitted to »?.ovo through tlio jstil so sa t o answer qaostions by ir.ca.bcrs ox tho claa3. 2. That tho Court or«5e» dofaadsatu to psnvtit corrcatioix exports designated by p l a i n t i f f s to inspect tho j a i l end a l l of i t s f a c i l i t i e s end t o r c r o r t t o a l l p a r t i e s and tho court on the reBulta of thoix inspection. 3. ffiiat the Court declaro that, kha individual and c o l leetiva offoct of tho acts, praoticoo, ona cais3icns of the £>G-
n. hr,sj sabjeotod Plaintiffs oau. tho clr.-jy tiicy rt--.prG- j
sent t o punictetont •without DUG Process of Law,

to cruel and unusual punishment within £ho isas of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of tho United States Constitution? b. haa subjected Plaintiffs and tho claoa they represent tofiiE.Tr-.iarydiscipline without duo process in violation of .the Siz-zth. and Fourteenth, ftraondmentej c. has deprived Plaintiffs and their class of their constitutionally protected rights to a fair trinl, guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Araen&T,ants; d. ' has daprivod /Plaintiffs and their class to tiio '3-guc protection of tho Inv; to which fcaoy aro entitled un dcr tlic Fourtcentli i^^einctBcnt; e. has deprived Plaintiffs end thoir clnsa of thciiriglitc to effective Essictonco of counsel nnd to ac aist in tliaisr defense, in violation o£ tha Sixth an
f» has deprivscl PlnintiffB ana thoir class of their rights under tha First snd Fovnrtecnai Ainend-T.onta
g» havo, under color of lav; end while acting in a official capacities, deprived plr-intiffn of tliQ ricjhto described above in violation of Title 42 U.S Code S3 1031-1905?
h. haa d.oprivcd Plaiiiuiffo of tlicir rights under Housing Uogulations 5 2305, 2307, 2404, 2202, 2205, 2 2301-2, 2S00, and 2209.
4. 'ilvit a proiininary «nd peri?.anont injunction br?. ir;sucd, enjoining and rnstrr-ining Dofonclanta frcau engaging in any

of tho unlawful acts, practices ox omissions conplninacl of in thi complaint.
5. Shafe the Court order that, within f>0 clays, DofendantD submit to tha Court a plan for assuring that Plaintiffs a» tha class they represent are accorded all of the righto ?.nd privi leges of tho innocent; zmd that they bo subjected only to each in conveniences noca3gary to ensura their presence st subsequent court proceedings. KOXQ cpocificnlly, tho Plaiiitiffs
they represent should bo assured by ifon plan: . a . that tho •District of Colusabia Jail and the colls on cloriaitorias therein bn kept in safo «?nd sanitary conditions, v/itb proper cluctrical conuection."5, plucsbing, heating1 ar-d ventilation, and, ftt a raininu that tho jail's conditions bo iBaintainctl in accorclanca witji tho District of Colur.ji)ia Housing Lav; (Eouoing Regulations 230S, 2307, 2404, 2202, 2205, 2301-02, 2608, 2203); • b. that prisoners not bs ovcrcrov/iod in tlie D.C. Jsil and that each cell, ward, an«3 clormifcory contain no Eiorfii prisoners than tho designed capacity of tho call wid collblockt c. that a regular rocrentional and cxerciso program, outoido of tha colls, bo c3tnblishod and that ail prisoners ho permitted outaido of tlio j^il for sufficient poriodo to assure their continuous physical aad iiicntai vj-oll-lioino";
cl. tliat tho isolation and puniohmont o2 prieonors in

- 10 -

the* fcraateont: segregation calls ba terminated?

©. that a l l prisoners ba fed in suitable, sanitary

f a c i l i t i e s outoida of thair cells and that a&iblc

food in accordance with recognized nutritional nooa

bo fui-Tiishadj

.

f. that tha prisoners bo permitted onough saowci-s fco

ensure that thny roavsin clesn;

g» that tlie priBonora bo Curnishad clean laattreoses an

bads, a complete sot of bedding and clothing, inclu

ing socka and itmdGrgarnianta, v;hich raro cleaned end

chango-3 at loaafc onc-3 vrockly, adequato towolrs, pro-

per cleaning equipment, snd otlior personal necessi-

t i e s (such, as tooth paoto, soap, e t c . ) ;

h . that prisoners bo r.ccordac! essential preventiva

practices and rocaivo adequate and eound

, dental and aaotal healtli caro;

i . that an educational and vocational program .md vol-

untori' v^ork progreua ba eatablishcd;

j . thntpprisonars ligvo continuous opportunity to talk

and aasocinta with each otlior;

k. that prisoners h^vo accosa to a sufficient quantity

and quality of booico, magazines and newspapers, lav;

books end legal roatorialsj

1. tl\ot visiting conditions i>2 cstabLishs<l which enauT'

daconcy, ccfaii'ort, privacy of conv^ren tior.o, conjugd

rightsj and additional visiting roriod.ii;

n. that no limitations k® placed on parsions an

DOO, ccrsraunicntG v/ith, r.nd recoivo

- 11 -

—._.

f roftiy—-——— —

n. that no censorship be exercised on incoming or out-

go'ing mail, newspapers, isooka, and periodicals; thn

-

•

th© only control on incoming a a i l ba for inspection

of contraband such as drugs or vecpnnsj fchnfc adc~

qunta phoziaa bo installed end tha prijsonors hevo ac

ccsn to thara in order to nnlvo local, outgoing colls

without chargo; rxn<X that r>uch phonos not be v?ire-

tnppad or Ksonitorcsd in any raannsr;

o. thcat a coda of xntra-jail behavior providing for Ln-

M3ta rights be promulgated and provided to every

; prisoner upon entry into tho j a i l ?

• .

.

—

Pi tJjat no disainlino on inaiatca be inflicted without

f i r n t affording thcia notice, 3 hearing, tuaa n s s i s -

tanca o£ 'counsel, tlie confrontatioii of accusers, th

right to cro3a-o::a!tdna, vnritten records of a haarin^

a.

i . •:.:••

•

decision, reasons tharofcr snd evidence relied upon and a hearing befors an irapartial.official;

Q. that defendnnta, their ngenta and cynployeen s h a l l

not employ oxcasoivc; forca upon tlio person of any

initiate; t h a t no guard or other employee shall bo

u to knep upon h i s person any voapon not Is-

or authorised by tho Ooportnusnt of Corrections

and tliat any of defendants' agenta or ert\ployoes who

uses forco upon tha person of an inntato s h a l l f i l o

a v;rittcn report, which ehall bs E QfLblic record,

with tha Superintendent or U%<i D.C. J c i l setting

- 12 -

forth—tho—tir.e,"datQ, nrv3 place of the cccvtrrenca,

tha ijrnate's nnroe and r-.C. nw-Tiber, tlva typo of fore

ube<3f the: reason for i t s ur>e, tho witnesses to i t s use, tha injuries inflicted, and the roetSical atten-

—tion received, if any,

6. That the Court order tho Defendants to implement tti

pleris subziittc;! pursuant to paragraph 5.

7. That if a satisfactory plsn cannot ho submitted ond

, tha Rofcndnnta tea enjoinsd and restrained from incar

or detaining any and oil of tiha Plaintiffs sncl n-.orabars c

tlio class they represent in the District of Coluiobia J a i l and fur

thor enjoined from tr^nnfarring Plaintiffs jind thair class to an

nltsmativo facility xinloss Daferu;1snta con provide evidenco satirj

factory to tha Court tl->at the alternative tloos not nuffer from th.

canditions harein ccraplainad of and that i t is accessible to vini

tors and counsel. :

.

.

'

S. Iliat tho Court enter itn order psrmanently d i r e c t i n /

i-

.

-

- -

f r.-eCon<3antr3 WasChington and the City Cor-TOinsibnsrs to oi^propriats

funds and to take - such furthar stops as may be noconscry &n& «p—

preprints uitliin ti:cir powers for txio j^.olerti^ntation of tho pro~

visions contained in paragraph (8) nbovo.

9. That fho' Court appoint its r.n impartial aclvioor a

rocognizecl export in the field of corrections to evaluate tha

plans cutaaitto'3 pursuant to paragraphs and to report t o tho Court

10. That Curing the pendency of this action and there-

nl'fcer, dofondnntjj r.O'ioors and 7Jar«.ly me! onsh of tlie j n i l official

and guards undar their direction or control ba reatraina«3 end

1

- 13 enjoined from nny and a l l iscta of punishment and r e p r i s a l with re epoct to tha nrrv3<5 p l a i n t i f f s nnd tha morabera of Hits class by rea eon of t h i s notion.
11. Sfiat: the Court r e t a i n jurisdiction over u n t i l auc'n tirao as tha Court i s sstinfiod tlint fcha prnctico.a,poll c i o s , nets and emissions alleged heroin no longer e x i s t and w i l l not recur.
Respectfully Gubra

2'orman I<a£ctoin Pafalic Dofondcr Jiervica 601 Inflimw Avonue, II. W. Washington, D. C. 20004 623-1200

Paul Caornoff Public rsafon<2ar Sorvico 601 laSiona Avcnuo, IT. W. VTasIiirsgton, P. C. 20004 628-1200

Jon 1-. »~>:o Pu'jlic D-ovaarlor Service 601 Indiana Avanuo, U. W.
Washington, D. C. 20004
623-1200

I !

Willisa Vi. Toyl o r . I I I

i

G01 Indiann Tivcnuo, 1J. W. Tiashir.rfton, r?. C. 20004 620-1200 "

Ron.':lcl L. G 1616 H Gtroct, K. W.
W«i3iiiiy;ten» O. G.

Of Counsalj
t :
Thorns A. KnraEusnS, J r .

•

/

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ,

LEONARD CAMPBELL, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. CHARLES M. RODGERS, et al. ,
Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1462-71

CONSENT ORDER
Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court has determined that this action shall be maintained as a class action and has entered an order to that effect. Upon consideration of the representations of counsel for the respective parties that all parties agree that the following shall obtain pending final determination of this matter on the merits, it is by the court this /O7" day of November, 1971, ORDERED:
That defendants, their agents and employees shall permit plaintiffs' counsel and agents free access to all inmates of the D. C. Jail and shall not impede or delay plaintiffs' counsel or their agents from conferring with any inmate of the D. C. Jail;

Campbell v. McGruder

JC-DC-001-003

That defendants, their sgencj ant', employees shall not take any action by use of force,' restraint, threat or transfer from the general population upon any inmate of the D. C. Jail calculated to or tending to deter their cooperation with plaintiffs' counsel in this case;
That defendants, their agents and employees shall not confine any inmate of the D. C. Jail in the treatment segregation cells or the "penthouse" cells except under emergency conditions when the safety of one or more inmates is threatened, in which event the inmate confined shall be given an immediate administrative hearing, no later than 24 hours from the beginning of the confinement, and
« sooner if possible, at which he shall be entitled to representation by counsel;
That defendants, their agents and employees shall provide one bed and mattress with adequate bedding for each inmate wherever confined except insofar as it shall constitute a danger to that inmate or to others;
That except where medical considerations require otherwise, defendants, their agents and employees shall provide food on a uniform basis for all jail inmates;
• - 2-

That defendants immediately cake steps to eliminate the extreme temperatures which exist in the various inmate quarters of the D. C. Jail;
That defendants, their agents and employees shall provide prompt and complete medical attention to each inmate wherever confined;
That defendants, their agents and employees shall transmit any requests from plaintiffs to confer with counsel in this action within one hour upon receipt thereof;
That this order shall be posted prominently in every living area in the D. C. Jail.

CONSENT:
Public Defender Service
Corporation Counsel
t

J U D G/E . ,

- 3-

 
 UNITED SPATES DISTRICT CCUPT FOR TKS DISTRICT OF COLUI-73IA

I^OKARD CAMPBELL, et al.. Plaintiffs,
v. CHARLES M. RODGERS, et al..
Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1462-71

AMENDED CONSENT ORDER

The Consent Order issued on 10 November 1971 is hereby amended this 11th day of January 1972. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court has determined that this action shall be maintained a> a class action and has entered an order to that effect. Upon consideration of the representation of counsel for the respective parties that all parties agree that the following shall obtain pending final determination of this matter on the merits, it is hereby ORDERED:
That defendants, their agents and employees shall parmit plaintiffs' counsel and agents free acceaa to .all inrsafcea of the D. C. Jail and Ehall not impede or delay plaintiffs' counsel or their agents from conferring with any inmate of the D. C. Jail;
That defendants their agents ai\d employees shall not take any action by use of force, restraint, threat o s t r r n s f e r f r o m th'; o r **;,£• ,•> 1 v e c u 1 ~ '•.'' T I tir.fjn -.»"' J r - . - r ^ of tha D. C. Jail calculated to or t..:.dLr.j to c^tcr t h e i r cccpoi-fiUiori '.-;i th p l a i n t i f f s 1 J. •:.;••. s a l i n f.-.i.i c:.r:z-
Campbell v. McGruder

JC-DC-001-005

""" '""""

"

- 2-

f ,-,-,

That defendants- their agents and employees shall not confine any inmate cf the D. C. Jail in the treatment segregation cells or the "penthouse" cells,except under emergency conditions when the safety of one or more persons is threatened, in which event the inmate confined shall be given an immediate administrative hearing., no later than 24 hours from the beginning of the confinement, and sooner if possible, at which he shall be entitled to representation;

That defendarts. their agents and employees, in

the event an inmate is confined or is to be confined

in treatment segregation or "penthouse cells" pursuant

i,«

to the above described emergency conditions, shall

inquire of the inmate the name of his attorney and shall

call the recording telephone at the Public Defender

Service at 638-0022 within one hour of the alleged

violation and report the following; inmate's name;

DCDC Number; attorney's name if known; a brief descrip-

tion of the events; the scheduled time for the hearing;

•| and the present location of the inmate.

That upon receipt of the recorded telephone

transmission pursuant to the above paragraph, the

Public Defender Service shall attempt to contact the

\ '

inmate's counsel, if known, by telephone end in the

event that counsel is unknown- unavailable, unable, or unv/iliir.g to represent the inn-ite at the hearing, trio Public Defender Service shall arrange for representation civ.her by It-gal counsel or third yor-.r lav/ suuei-nt:; from an a^prov-ci lice, and ac the oiserotica of tr.a Public Defender Service, their dc^i^nato.-.'! employees

- 3-

i
may accompany said counsel or scucent representatives

at said hearings.

That deferidancs, their agents and employees shall

provide one bed and mattress with adequate bedding for

each inmate wherever confined except insofar as it shall

constitute a danger to that inmate or to ethers;

That except where medical considerations require

otherwise, defendants, their agents and employees

shall provide food on a uniform basis for all jail

inmates;

That defendants.immediately take steps to eliminate

the extreme temperatures which exist in the various

inmate quarters of the D. C. Jail;

That defendants, their agents and employees shall

'A

provide prompt and complete medical attention to each

inmate wherever confined;

That defendants their agents and employees

shall transmit any recuests from plaintiffs to confer

with counsel in connection with this action within one

hour upon receipt thereof by calling the recording

telephone at the Public Defender Service at 638-0022.

That this order shall be posted prominently in

the following areas of the jail: each dormitory and

cellblock tier; each Maximum Security Unit in a manner

that will er.able all inmates therein to see it; each

treataant. scyrelation and penthouse call: e<ir::i icolrJ-iori

cell; each dining area; the R&D area; and the hospital.

This order chnll be replaced as required.

- 4 -

CONSENT:

JUDGE

Public Defender Service

.Corporation Counsel

 
 CT 1 0 * 7 2

roil TIIJ; J^L, ct al. ! MAGRUDLR, c t r l .

c;o>.<. ... :\
Civil Action Ko. 1-162-7.1

ORDER

It is this 13th dcy of Octobar, 1972, ORDERED:

;

1. That defendants, their agents and employees shall

1

i

ij immediately segregate from the general population all inmates of the

;

i1

•

;

';; District of Columbia Jail under 18 years of age. Such segregation shall

•!

•

•

*

j. include, but not be limited to, sleeping, dining, and recreation. •

•

!•

2. Attorneys of the Public Defender Service and others designated

; by counsel for plaintiffs shall be forthwith admitted to the District of

• • Columbia Jail for the purpose of conferring with inmates. Those

;j attorneys shall take immediate action to present to the appropriate courts •: such non-frivolous claims of each inmate as can.be heard on an emergency

j: basis, either by notifying the attorneys already appointed for the inmates,

• I or if such attorneys a r e unavailable or unwilling to take action, by

I

,. presenting the claims themselves.

'i

<

'

3. Defendants, their agents and employees, shall take no action,

nor make any threat of action, to injure or harrass any inmate because of

actions c\vising out of the disturbance at the District of Columbia. Jail on

October 11 and 12, 1972.'

4. Defendants, their agents and employees shall permit counsel

for plainLiCfs ami their designated agents to inspect pov.Tonally alL yarts o[

Campbell v. McGruder
ii

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

! LEO'-'ARD CAMPBELL, ct a l . ,

)

)

Plaintiffs

)

)

v.

)

) ANDERSON McGRUDER, et a ] . , )

) Defendants )

Civil Action No. 1462-71

SECOND AMENDED CONSENT ORDER
The Consent Order issued on November 10, 1971, and amended January 11, 1972, is hereby revoked this / H day of UUCLAjQ; , 1974. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court has determined that this action shall be maintained as a class action and has entered an order to that effect. Upon consideration of the representation of. counsel for the respective parties that all parties agree that the following provisions shall obtain pending final determination of this matter on the merits, it is hereby
ORDERED that defendants, their agents and employees shall permit plaintiffs' counsel and agents free access to all inmates of the D. C. Jail and shall not impede or delay plaintiffs' counsel or their agents from conferring with any inmate of the D. C. Jail;
That defendant*, their agente and employees shall not take any action by use of force, restraint, threat or transfer from the general population upon any inmate of the D. C. Jail calculated to or tending to deter their cooperation v/iih plaintiffs' counsel in this case.

i

Campbell v. McGruder

it

i!

JC DC-001-009

- 2-

t
That defendants, their agents and cmployccj shall not confine any [
I

inmate of Hie D. C. Jail in the treatment segregation cells or the "penthouse"!

cells c:-:ce.pt under emergency conditions when the safety of one or more per- j

sons is threatened, in which event the inmate confined shall be ;.;iven an

j

immediate administrative hearing, no later than 24 hours from the begirding

of the confinement, and sooner if possible, at which he shall be entitled to

representation;

That defendants, their agents and employees, in the event an in-

mate is confined or is to be confined in treatment segregation or "penthouse

cells" pursuant to the above described emergency conditions, shall inquire

of the inmate the name of his attorney and shall call the recording telephone

at the Georgetown Criminal Justice Clinic at 638-0022 within one hour of the

alleged violation and report the following: inmate's name; DCDC number;

attorney's name if known; a brief description of the events; the scheduled

time for the hearing; and the present location of the inmate;

That upon receipt of the telephone transmission pursuant to the

above paragraph, the Georgetown Criminal Justice Clinic shall attempt to

contact the inmate's counsel, if known, by telephone, and in the event that

counsel is unknown, unavailable, unable, or unwilling to represent the in-

mate at the hearing, the Clinic shall arrange for representation either by

legal counsel or by a third-year law student from a list approved by the

Criminal Justice Clinic, and at the discretion of the Public Defender Service,

their designated employees may accompany said counsel or student repre-

sentatives at said hearings;

 
 Campbell v. McGruder

-UA

• • • III I • • < • • • • • W H *H
JC-DC-001-011

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

PILED

CAMPBELL, et al.,

MAR 2 1

Plaintiffs,

JAMES E. DAVEY. Clerk

v. McGRUDER, et al.,

C i v i l Action No. 1462-71

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This is a class action brought by unconvicted pre-trial detainees incarcerated at the District of Columbia Jail.
Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that their constitutional rights are being violated by the conditions of their confinement, and an order enjoining defendants from continuing to violate their rights.
Uoon consideration of the evidence adduced at the trial of this matter and the representations of counsel for the parties, the court finds that the District pf Columbia Jail is overcrowded to the point where two human beings are compacted in areas which fall short of accepted minimal space requirements for occupancy by one person. No attempt was made to rebut, or even cast doubt upon the accuracy of abundant testimony from credible witnesses that
* .

/

'

•1

the overcrowding at the jail results in both physical

and psychological damage to the inmates, and ultimately

is inimical to the orderly and fair administration of

criminal justice.

The court concludes that by reason of the over-

crowding alone, plaintiffs' constitutional rights are

being violated, and that plaintiffs are entitled to

prompt relief,.and therefore ORDERS:

1. That not later than Tuesday, March 25, 1975

the defendants shall provide all counsel a list of all

District of Columbia Jail residents who are not

presently serving a sentence or awaiting sentence after

conviction. Such listing shall include' the name of the

resident, D.C.D.C. Number, court and case number, charge,

parole status, detainers, if any, date of incarceration

at the jail, amount of bail bond set, and the name,

address and telephone number of the detainee's counsel

of record;

:

.

2. That counsel for plaintiffs shall immediately

make every effort to implement the procedures governing

the release of criminal defendants prior to trial as

they relate to all members of the class.

3. That after 15 days from the date of this order

defendants shall refrain from housing any pre-trial

detainee of plaintiffs' class in any cell, room or

- 2-

- £ -

V

*\Z / 3 0 Q fl f

ssax jo

•uosaad jad aaaj aaenbs 317 UB s-j aasqq aaaqrt

 
 Campbell v. McGruder

JC-DC-001-013 ;D c

,• L. R E C E I V E D > ^ # 1975
JAMES F. DAVEY, Clerk

v.

: Civil Action :;o. 1162-71

ATCD'i'.OSON ?4-C RUDER, cl a l .

:

Defendants,

:

STII'T;LA.T;C::S REGAHPI^G D. C. BAR JAIL PRQ.TF.CT

It is her."by stipulated and agreed by the parties to this litigation,

through their respective counsel, that the following facts may be

considered by the Co.irt as evidence in this case without further proof:

1. The D. C. Bar Jail Project is an office established to pro-

vide legal services to inmates at the D. C. Jail, It is funded by

grants from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and the

District of Columbia Bar (Unified) and was established in January,

1974. Since September, 1974, the attorney in charge of this Project

has been J. William Erhardt, Esq.

2. On March 27, 1975, following the issuance of Judge Bryant's Interim Order of March 21, 1975, Mr. Erhardt requested and received

from Chief Judge Greene of the Superior Court of the District of Colum-

bia authorization to file motions for review of pretrial release conditions

on behalf of prisoners housed in the Jail because of their inability to ob-

tain ro'.ouic pending their trials in the Superior Court, Chief Jud£v Cri-cno's authorization was requested because all of these inmates had

o o\iiiri:\ oiiu r thnn Mr. Ei-hurdt \vh;i had been appointed by tkc S n'l.-cior

! .1;

Ij

] '50 )•!•• i . ;,il .'••••

• • -^ i:.;•'.'. C . > i; I

! - i . : . . ' • • : 1•• L l l v v :

i : . ; ( i l j .-

l l n ' i i " i L-1;: j u i i - . j ^ ;•• h - ' r . c j j ' - n - ! ! . ' . . 1 . , t l i o i i" i r j I s . I n ; - i . > j . ; i . ' v i m . i t ' I ) ' U ) o f 11 •• ; ; f

(•:..'• '.•'., . ' j i p l i o - i L L i f o r r ' . / v i o v / o f t . ' u O u n . l i i ; u n y o f r ' : l t : a K c i i . i d n ] v « . o . ' l y

been filcl witli 111-- Suporioi- Court.

4. In the ri-miiininp, ciiics (approximately 130) .Mr. Erhnrdt and

his staff contacted or attempted to crinl\ct tlie attorney of record to

communicate additional inforrriation concerning the inmate's eligibility for

release on conditions other than a surety bond, and to request the attorney

to pursue these remedies on behalf of his client. In approximately 18 cases,

because the attorney of record could not be contacted or refused to file bail

review motions, Mr. Erhardt filed these motions himself. Bccausa some

judges scheduled hearings on these motions without notifying Mr. Erhardt,

contacting instead the attorney .of record, Mr. Erhavdt does not know the

disposition of most of these motions. However, he is aware of at least four

individuals who were released pursuant to the bail review motions filed by

Mr. Erhardt.

5. In the approximately 110 cases where counsel of record agreed

to file bail review motions, Mr. Erhardt was not notified of the results of

thooc efforts. However, in each case the info rmation transmitted by

Mr. fCrhardt to the attorney of record was (a) information which was not

available to the Court at the time the original conditions of release wore

i
!•••.•!•, u:id (!J) i n f o r m a t i o n w h i c h in i\'.i', E r h i i i ' d t ' s vic.w enhauO'i) i'uo ^ r o s -

I

poets for obtaining release of the defendants on some condition ether them

I

",

• ••;:,<••

,'lM'v. :

ii-j'l [ • • • ' •

' '.'' '. i < • '

;•!-.•.. I ; i • • ; . • ;• • • ( • : • • . ;• I ••

,.

I ; . . " i : - . . - • . i • • ' ! • . r i ! K > . a • ! ' . M H O : ! - . • ! • . . • • . ; t i : f i i " i _ i . - v i | ! > o i - ' ; i • - • • • . ( l i ' - u , r . r '•• • . r . y

| (.'£ L'I.V folio.vin.- . • ^l-llti • .TI ;• 1 v oiiditi^m1 c:- j ylcfl: (a) M r . E r]-- ••r<lt w.ia n i b b l e

td t v u i j c i tlu: li.OLrn.y of vi-eui'd; (n.)) th«: att.orrioy of VI^COL'II would not file

a bnil r e v i e w n ;tion; o r (c) tho a t i o r r . t y o£ r e c o r d a u t h o r i z e d M r . Krivuvlt

to file t h e b a i l vcvinw m o t i o n h i m s e l f . A s of O c t o b e r 2 1 , 1975, no s u c h a u t h o r i s a t i o n lu1 :• Leon g r . i r t c d t o M r . E r h a r d t .

DATE: October , 1975
; Mcllie Nelson, Esq. Assistant Corporation Counsel District Building Washington, D. C. 20004 ,
Counsel for Defendants

6'01 Indiana Avenue, N. W. Waslungton, D. C. 20004
Counsel for Plaintiffs

 
 Campbell v. McGruder

JC-DC-001-018
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR TIE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LEONARD CAMPBELL, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. ANDERSON McGRUDER, et al.,
Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1462-71 y
F I L£D
NOV • - 1975

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER '"'"''* ?' Cn'"~<r Cle'k This case involves a class action brought by unconvicted pre-trial detainees incarcerated at the District of Columbia Jail in which plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that the condition's of their confinement violate their constitutional rights, and an order compelling defendants to discontinue the alleged violations. More specifically, plaintiffs contend that incarceration of pre-trial detainees at the District of Columbia Jail under conditions complained of constitutes cruel and unusual punishment as proscribed by the Eighth Amendment, and violates their rights to due process and equal protection of the law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

The defendants are the Mayor of the District of Columbia, the Director of the Department of Corrections and the Superintendent of the District of Colun-.bia Jail.
The basic portion of the Jail, including Cell Blocks 1 and 2, was built in 1872. In 1929 Cell Blocks 3

and 4 and the administration building were added. More recently Cell Block 4 was expended to a 4th tier. Cell Blocks 1 and 2 are maintained as maximum security units, while Cell Blocks 3 and 4 constitute the medium security facility. There are also two open dormitories, a 37-bed hospital, a library, a laundry and a culinary unit.
The normal operating capacity for the Jail is 663 inmates. This was determined by the Department of Corrections in 1973 by counting the then-available bedspace. On December 11, 1974 the population of the Jail was 988 inmates and at the time of trial, was nearing 1000.
Cell Blocks 1 and 2 are divided into east and west sides, each containing five tiers. The cells are 6 x 7 feet, 10 inches, and 9 feet high. The cells in Blocks 3 and 4 are about the same size, but are equipped with doors rather than bars. In addition, portions of the Jail are utilized for dormitory housing.
All the cells in Blocks 1 and 2 contain a toilet without toilet seat or lid and nothing partitioning it off from the rest of the cell, a sink with a cold water faucet, a small table and bench attached to the wall, and a bed -- either single or bunk-bed style. Most of the cells in this part of the jail contain a bunk-bed (one bed over another) and house two persons. It is virtually impossible for two men to move around in the cell simultaneously without interfering with each other physically. In this regard there was testimony that inmates so housed adopted a system which allowed one inmate to move around the cell every other day while, his
- 2-

cellmate stayed in bed. Twenty-two hours in such a cell constitutes a normal day for many of these inmates.
The dormitories are large rooms approximately 40 x 98 feet. At the time of the trial these rooms contained four rows of beds, two of which were of the double bunk type. Approximately eighteen inches separated the beds, and each dormitory housed from 125 to 150 men, all of whom keep their personal effects under their beds. There is also a toilet facility in each dormitory, walled off from the main room, but with no partitions between the commodes.
The dining facilities for Cell Blocks 1 and 2 are located on the ground floor and consist of approximately 20 small tables in each of the two areas. There is no partition between the cells and the dining area, and consequently toilets are in open view.
Cell Block 3 is known as the trustee facility, and Cell Block 4 houses juveniles and elderly persons. The cells in these two blocks have windows. From time to time, the cells in Block 4 contain two persons.
The Director of the Department of Corrections, Defendant Jackson, has the authority and responsibility to decide where sentenced inmates will be housed within the Department of Corrections complex, except in cases where the courts specifically designate a particular institution. A substantial number of sentenced persons are housed at the Jail. On March 10, 1975 there were 979 persons confined in the Jail. Examination of the
- 3-

records of 883 of these residents revealed that 20% (177) were sentenced convicts with no charges pending; 9.47. (83) were sentenced, but had charges pending; and 64% (565) were unsentenced. Fifty-eight sentenced persons were held pursuant to writs, parole violator warrants or orders of appellate courts.
The policy of the Department of Corrections at the time of trial, and for more than a year prior thereto, was to hold the following classes of sentenced prisoners at the Jail:
a) all misdemeanants serving sentences; b) sentenced inmates from District Court awaiting designation of a Federal Bureau of Prisons institution for service of sentence, or awaiting transportstion to such Federal institution after designation; c) sentenced inmates from Superior Court where designation to a Federal Bureau of Prisons institution has been recommended by the sentencing judge, pending action on that recommendation and transportation to the institution; d) inmates within three months of their parole eligibility date at time of sentence; e) inmates within six months of their release date at time of sentence; £) inmates on work release charged with violation of their work release conditions, pending review by the Work Release Review Board;
- 4-

g) inmates charged with parole violations, pending their preliminary parole revocation hearing;
h) sentenced inmates for whom a court orders protection and/or separation from other inmates;
i) sentenced inmates whom the Department wishes to segregate from other residents at the Lorton Complex for protective reasons;
j) sentenced inmates assigned to the "Captain's Detail" (work crew) at the Jail;
k) Inmates brought to the Jail pursuant to writs of habeas corpus aid prosequendum or ad testificanduiri
1) inmates sentenced under the Youth Corrections Act to evaluations pursuant to 18 U.S.C § 5010(e), after completion of the evaluation and pending final imposition of sentence. There is no segregation of sentenced from unsentenced residents at the District of Columbia Jail, except for unsentenced juveniles (ages 15 to 18) who are housed separately from the adult population. There is no classification program at the Jail for determining the level of security needed for unsentenced residents, notwithstanding a Departmental Order (D.O. 4090.1, dated November 19, 1973) requiring each superintendent to establish such a program. Consequently many unsentenced inmates who do not require maximum security are housed in the maximum security areas of the Jail
- 5 -

under the most stringent living conditions. Only a small percentage of Jail residents (estimated by the Superintendent of the Jail as approximately 125 inmates) require maximum security housing.
Some inmates at the Jail are assigned to a work crew known as the Captain's Detail. These may be either sentenced or unsentenced prisoners. Approximately 180 inmates are on this work crew, and they perform various jobs, e.g. kitchen help, clerks, maintenance work, etc., for which they are paid small sums, ranging from $3 to $13.50 per month. They also enjoy substantial benefits in terms of housing and other privileges which are not made available to the general population. The reason for not making these privileges generally available to all residents is to encourage inmates to apply for and work on the Detail.
Those on the Detail are housed in CB-3, mostly in individual cells which have doors rather than bars, and also have a window. Also, these inmates receive onehour social visits rather than the half-hour visits allowed to the rest of the population. In addition, inmates on Detail may receive their visitors across a table in the Rotunda, and may embrace and kiss their visitors on meeting. Inmates not on Detail are not allowed to touch their visitors, and conduct the visit by a telephone through a plexiglass barrier. There are also recreational benefits not afforded the rest of the population.
- 6-

Numerous violations of the District of Columbia Building Code, Plumbing Code, Housing Regulations, Health Regulations, Food Regulations and Fire Code exist at the District of Columbia Jail. Inspections by the various Departments are few and far between. According to the evidence, uncontradicted and inimpeached, rats, mice and roaches are in abundance.
Although Departmental Order No. 4740.1 (October 28, 1971) requires a medical examination of food handlers at least twice a month, that regulation has not been complied with. No medical examinations of civilian employee food handlers at the Jail are conducted by the medical staff of the Department of Corrections, and medical examinations of the inmate food handlers have been conducted less than once a month over the past year.
The Department of Corrections has also violated its own regulations (D.O, 2910.1, dated August 11, 1969, and D.O. 2920.1, dated January 22, 1968) concerning fire safety inspections and procedures. Although written reports of inspections of fire extinguishers at the Jail are required, no such written reports were made. At a recent serious fire in September 1974, several inmates were overcome by smoke, and more severe injuries were narrowly avoided, when fire extinguishers and other safety devices were not useable.
Many inmates at the jail display psychiatric symptoms. Some of these, designated for pretrial mental examinations, are committed to the District of Columbia
- 7-

Jail to await bedspace at St. Elizabeths Hospital. Others require psychiatric attention after returning from St. Elizabeths upon completion of examinations. In addition, some inmates who are not the subject of mental examination orders become psychiatric problems. From time to time sixty to seventy percent of the hospital beds available at the Jail are given over to psychiatric patients. The Jail medical staff does not include a psychiatrist, and the facility is not equipped to house, care for or treat psychiatric patients. Ordinary handcuffs and leg irons are used to shackle some severely disturbed inmates to their beds because appropriate restraining devices are
1/ unavailable.
Laundry services for most Jail inmates are inadequate. Except far those housed in CB-3, inmates are responsible for washing their own underclothing, but the cells in CB-1 and CB-2 have no hot water.
Frequently old mattresses, not cleaned or sterilized and stained with urine and other excreta are issued to new detainees.
The quality of life for members of the class is substantially inferior to that enjoyed by convicted prisoners housed at other facilities of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections. Inmates at Lorton Correctional Complex, for example, including some with
1/ One inmate observed was reported to be commencing his third consecutive week under such restraint.
- 8-

"maximum" security designations, live in dormitories much less crowded than those at the jail. They also have contact visits with their friends and family, and recreational facilities are better. The differences in treatment between sentenced prisoners at Lorton and pre-trial detainees at the Jail are not attributable to the needs of security or custody, but are for the most part due to the overcrowding at the Jail and the Department's decisions on the allocation of resources.
During the course of this litigation defendants have never seriously contended that the matters complained of did not exist. Rather, their position has been that since the inception of the lawsuit matters over which they h a d control have been alleviated, and that as to the remaining complaints the defendants are helpless. •<
It is true that some shortcomings have been corrected, e.g. vermin have to a large degree been exterminated, some portions have been painted, and apparently much cleaning has taken place because the horrible stench described at the trial was not in evidence during an unannounced visit in late August of this year. Also the delivery of medical services has improved because of additional personnel and a realignment of the authority of the medical staff.
The defendants complain bitterly, and with
what appears to be righteous indignation, that in these circumstances they have been accused of violating Eighth Amendment rights against cruel and unusual punishment.
- 9-

In support of the position that the cruel and unusual punishment charge is unfair, they seek much solace from the pronouncements of the Court in Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2nd Cir. 1971), and suggest that the facts in that case are similar enough to this case for the holding therein to "give the Court wise guidance". But then, in the very first six words of the description of Sostre,the defendant states: "Sostre
II
was a New York convict . . . " (emphasis added). Plaintiffs in this case are unconvicted pre-trial detainees held for the sole reason that they cannot meet the conditions set for their release pending trial.
Finding further the similarity between Sostre and the instant case, defendants point out his (Sostre's) "normal sized" cell was 6 x 8 feet -- but the defendants do not point out that Sostre was not double housed in his cell.
It could be that the Eighth Amendment claim should not lie here because of its applicability only to convicted, sentenced persons. But as to the ultimate resolution of this case, Sostre offers little help. This Court measures the claims in this case by the standards utilized by the courts in such cases as Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333 (2nd Cir. 1974)} Brenneman v. Madigan. 343 F. Supp. 128 N.D. Cal. 1972); Jones v. Wittenburg, 323 F. Supp. 93 and 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971); Hamilton v. Love,
2/ Defendants' Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Partial Summary Judgment.
2/ Sostre was serving a 30-40 year sentence for selling narco-cics.
- 10 -

328 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark. 1971). The Court in Rhem, supra, put it succinctly and in precise terms:
"The demands of equal protection of the law and of due process prohibit depriving pre-trial detainees of rights of other citizens to a greater extent than necessary to assure appearance at trial and security of the jail; and the same constitutional provisions prevent unjustifiable confinement of detainees under worse conditions than convicted prisoners . . . . . . a detainee is entitled to protection from cruel and unusual punishment as a matter of due process, and, where relevant, equal protection." Sostre, supra, was an en bane decision by the Second Circuit in 1971, Over three years later a panel decision of the same Circuit (two members of which participated in Sostre), decided Rhem, without ever mentioning Sostre. This latter case is indeed more similar in every respect to the instant case, and this Court relies heavily upon it for the wise guidance suggested by defendants.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that the conditions already described are constitutionally impermissible insofar as they apply to the plaintiff class, and should be discontinued.
By far the most flagrant and shocking encroachment on the constitutional rights of the plaintiff class is the overcrowding; and an order which directed cessation of this specific condition has already been entered. It is currently the subject of a remand procedure which the Court seeks Co implement in a separate memorandum.
Relative to the remaining conditions to be remedied the Court orders that the defendants shall:
- 11 -

1) Direct the D. C. Fire Department, the D. C. Department of Inspections and Licenses, and the D. C. Environmental Health Administration to inspect the Jail no later than November 15, 1975 to determine violations of the D. C. Fire Code, Building Code, Housing Regulations, Health Regulations, and Food Regulations. In each case, inspections will be conducted in accordance with the same standards, procedures, and evaluation methods as are used in inspecting any other building in the District of Columbia. Within ten (10) days of these inspections, the inspectors will prepare and submit to this Court and to counsel for the parties written reports of their inspections, including lists of code violations or other unsafe or unsanitary conditions, together with recommendations for remedial action. Within thirty (30) days of these inspections defendants shall report to the Court the action taken oa each deficiency.
2) Provide clean clothing (including underwear) to all residents of the D. C. Jail and clean bed linen and towels at least once a week.
3) Provide at least one hour of out-door recreation daily for each resident of the Jail.
4) Establish a classification system which will make it possible to determine a) which inmates of plaintiff class require maximum security confinement; and b) which members of class can enjoy contact visits without jeopardizing the security of the facility.
- 12 -

5) Provide medical examinations of all food handlers, inmate and civilian employees, at the Jail at least once every thirty (30) days and more often if medically required.
6) Establish the following procedures at the Jail: In the event an inmate at the Jail displays unusual behavior suggestive of possible mental illness, such behavior shall be immediately reported to the Jail medical staff. The inmate will be seen by a psychiatrist within twenty-four (24) hours. If the inmate is found to be mentally ill, he will be transferred within fortyeight (48) hours of such finding to a hospital having appropriate facilities for the care and treatment of the mentally ill.
7) Establish the following procedures governing use of restraints:
a) inmates requiring restraints will be housed only on the third floor Jail Hospital, or at D. C. General Hospital;
b) unpadded handcuffs and leg irons shall not be used under any circumstances. Medically appropriate restraints, padded or pliable to prevent injury to the inmate, may be utilized;
c) restraints may be imposed only on the specific written authorization of a medical doctor;
d) if required in an emergency situation when a doctor is rot at the Jail, a Medical Technical Assistant
- 13 -

(MTA) or a Registered Nurse may order the temporary use of restraints, subject to the receipt, by telephone or otherwise, of approval from a medical doctor within two (2) hours of the imposition of such restraints;
e) a log will be kept reflecting the use of restraints, and stating for each such use the name of the person restrained, the date and time he was placed in restraints, the name of the doctor approving the use of restraints, and the time of such approval;
f) orders by a doctor authorizing the use of restraints are valid for twenty-four (24) hours only, and if no further written order has been entered within that period, the inmate shall be released from restraints;
g) no restrained inraate shall be housed in such a manner as to permit access to him by non-restrained inmates, with the exception of inmates approved by the medical staff for employment in the hospital area.
It is further ordered that this Court retains jurisdiction for the purpose of implementation of this ORDER.

Dated: November 5", 1975.
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J U D G E/

 
 Campbell v. McGruder JC DC-001-020

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be
made before the bound volumes go to press.
States (Umtrt of
FOB THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 75-1350
LEONARD CAMPBELL, ET AL.
v. ANDERSON MCGRUDER, Superintendent, Detention
Services, ET AL., APPELLANTS

No. 75-2273
LEONARD CAMPBELL, ET AL.
v. ANDERSON MCGRUDER, Superintendent, Detention
Services, ET AL., APPELLANTS

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Columb; .
(D.C. Civil 1462-71)

Judgment entered

Argued May 26, 1976

this date

Decided March 30, 1978

Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment. The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out of time.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
Plaintiffs, a class consisting of pretrial detainees incarcerated at the District of Columbia Jail, brought an action in 1971 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against allegedly unconstitutional conditions at that facility. On March 21 and November 5, 1975, and on May 24, 1976, the District Court enjoined conditions of confinement at the Jail which it held violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Defendants, District of Columbia officials in charge of administering the Jail, appeal. Held:
1. The principles of equity, comity, federalism and abstention do not prevent a federal court from issuing relief under the circumstances of this case.
2. Whether the conditions of confinement violate plaintiffs' constitutional rights must be determined by balancing plaintiffs' liberty interests, rooted in fheir presumption of innocence, against the government's Interest in controlling crime and managing the Institution of pretrial detention in an administratively feasible manner. All conditions of confinement will be closely examined. Conditions that are likely to impair a pretrial detainee's physical or mental health must be justified by a compelling administrative necessity. So must conditions that impede a detainee's preparation of his defense (apart from the fact of confinement itself) or that are so harsh or intolerable as to induce a pretrial detainee to plead guilty, or that damage a detainee's appearance or mental alertness at trial. The duration of pretrial confinement is relevant to this balancing, but the court will not engage in balancing if the conditions of confinement are otherwise violative of the Constitution.
3. The District of Columbia Jail was overcrowded, and this overcrowding violated plaintiffs' constitutional

rights. During the pendency of this appeal, however, the

District opened a new detention facility. Although the

opening of this new facility does not moot out the case,

the orders of the District Court enjoining overcrowding

and placing numerical limits on the total number of in-

mates that could be housed at the various Jail facilities

are not affirmed. In light of the weighty local govern-

mental interests involved, the record is remanded to the

District Court for further findings concerning the ^

priety of relief.

~~i;J

4 . The order of the District Court requiring defendants to provide clean clothing to plaintiffs is affirmed.

5. Some form of recreation is necessary to prevent mental or physical harm to pretrial detainees. As for the District Court's order requiring one hour of outdoor recreation per day for each detainee, the record is remanded for further findings concerning the quality, duration and location of the necessary recreation.

6. Th<§ DUtHot Court'* order requiring defendants to establish a classification system for pretrial detainees is affirmed. The District Court's order is not interpreted as requiring contact visits.

7. As for the District Court's order requiring bif medical examination of all food handlers at the Jail, the record is remanded for clarification as to its legal and factual foundation.

8. The District Court's order requiring defendants to provide psychiatric examinations for detainees whose unusual behavior suggests possible mental illness within 24 hours of the discovery of such behavior is affirmed. Also affirmed is the requirement that any detainee found to be mentally ill be transferred to a hospital with appropriate facilities within 48 hours of such a finding.

9. The District Court's order requiring procedures in the use of physical restraints is affirmed.

 
 Campbell v. McGruder

JC-DC-001-022

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURSD FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LEONARD CAMPBELL, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. ANDERSON McGRUDER, et al.,
Defendants.

)
) Civil Action No. 1462-71 ) )

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. On April 27, 30 and May 11, 1979, this court heard evidence concerning the treatment of mentally ill residents at the District of Columbia Jail ("Jail"). Witnesses included psychiatrists from the Forensic Psychiatry Office, which operates the Ugast Center (a facility near the Jail used for short-term treatment needs); a correctional officer and the Catholic chaplain who are familiar with conditions on Southeast 3, the unit of the Jail where these residents are housed; a psychiatrist nov; in private practice who formerly was in charge of the Ugast Center and provided psychiatric services on Southeast 3; and others.
2. On May 19, 1980 the court held another hearing to allow the parties the opportunity to update the record on the treatment of mentally ill residents at the Jail. Witnesses included the Health Services Administrator for the District of Columbia Department of Corrections; the Superintendent of the Jail; and the sole psychiatric nurse now operating at the Jail.
3. Southeast 3 is a unit of 80 cells in the Jail's Central Detention Facility (the "new jail" opened during the course of this litigation). When the new jail was opened, at about the sar.e time as the Ugast Center, it was contemplated by corrections officials that Southeast 3 would serve as a follow-up unit to provide a healthier environment for mental patients who were being discharged from the Ugast Center but were returning to Jail, or

who were returning to the Jail from St. Elizabeth's Hospital. It was hoped that centralized housing of these residents would enable better health care to be provided to them.
4. The Southeast 3 unit, like all other housing units at the Jail, is under the control of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections. The day-to-day operation of the unit is controlled not by medical personnel, but by regular correctional officers with no particular training in the handling, treatment or management of mentally ill persons. In addition, the Department of Corrections has determined to keep other prisoners who are not mentally ill in the same unit, including persons held in punitive segregation for disciplinary violations; prisoners marked for "special handling" as escape risks or behavior problems; and inmates in protective custody. An inmate work crew or "detail" is used to assist in housekeeping at Southeast 3, and fights and friction between the "detail" inmates and the mentally ill residents are not uncommon. A correctional officer who had been assigned to Southeast 3 for 15 months felt that these frequent fights resulted from members of the detail crew wanting to "teach a lesson" to mentally ill patients about their bizarre, and sometimes annoying behavior.
5. Instances of bizarre behavior by mentally ill residents of Southeast 3 are routine. A log book kept in the unit by the corrections officers, and eye witness testimony, reflected at least two suicide attempts during 1979. The log also noted other instances of self-destructive behavior; residents pounding their heads or fists against the steel cell walls; inmates destroying their mattresses, ripping off all their clothes, or flooding their cells by plugging up the toilets, inmates urinating on the floor and smearing feees on the walls of their eella and en themselves; incoherent babbling, loud noises and shouting—in short, a bedlam.
-2-

6. Because there are inadequate numbers of corrections officers assigned to the unit, many of the residents are not taken out of their cells for daily recreation as required by this court's earlier orders. Instead they remain confined up to 24 hours a day. This "dead-locking" of patients is not done as seclusion might be in a mental hospital, on a doctor's order or medical finding that such treatment for a brief period might be beneficial to a disturbed or agitated patient. It is done out of necessity and indiscriminately by medically untrained corrections officers who, at periods of short staffing, cannot safely handle the men with only one guard and so do not remove them from their cells. Even when recreation is afforded, these residents (unlike those in the rest of the jail) still spend 22 hours a day confined in their cells.
7. Both the plaintiffs' and defendants' doctors provided expert psychiatric testimony that confinement in Southeast 3, and particularly in dead-lock status, was anti-therapeutic and deleterious to the mental health of the persons housed there. The corrections officers who work on that unit themselves recognized the inadvisability of keeping seriously disturbed individuals in such conditions. Admitted in evidence was a 1979 memorandum from three corrections officers on Southeast 3 to their commanding officeis listing a number of residents who, in the view of the guards, needed "immediate and thorough psychiatric attention." The guards continued: "The Housing Unit of SE-3 3oes n o t provide the necessary services needed to assure the safety, custody and welfare of these individuals. Many times our only recourse is to Lock them behind the cage doors of security cells 21-24." (Emphasis in original).
8. In addition to the stresses of the environment, another significant factor affecting the treatment of mentally ill residents of Southeast 3 is the absence of medically trained
-3-

personnel for handling and monitoring these patients. The corrections officers are admittedly not qualified to observe possible adverse reactions to medication, or the deterioration of a resident's condition. Records were introduced reflecting one particular resident who initially refused to come out of his cell to see a psychiatrist. Thereafter, because he was not a behavioral problem, he was left untreated in his cell for several additional months and when forcibly brought to a doctor was found to be experiencing an acute schizophrenic episode.
9. Delivery of medication is usually performed not by nurses, but by "Medical Technical Assistants." These assistants have never been trained for such work. The psychiatrists who work on Southeast 3 admitted that they could not be certain that medications were received. Other monitoring of drugs such as lithium carbonate seems to be inadequate at best. Medical records introduced at the hearing showed the issuance of doctor's orders for the taking of blood samples to determine serum lithium levels, (a necessary monitoring device), but no such testing was performed for months afterwards. Dr. Lee, the Jail Medical Director, testified that he would never prescribe lithium carbonate in a jail setting, because of the need for careful laboratory monitoring of this dangerous drug. Expert testimony, and evidence from the Physician's Desk Reference, a standard work, confirmed the importance of careful monitoring.
10. The Department of Corrections previously took the position in this case that the Jail was not an appropriate place for treating or holding mentally ill persons. Nevertheless, the record is clear that a substantial number of seriously ill persons are held on Southeast 3 under very stressful conditions and for long periods of time. One of the residents whose reeords were presented to the court, who had attempted and nearly succeeded in killing himself while confined in Southeast 3, was arrested in

February 1979, when he escaped from St. Elizabeth's Hospital, and at the time of the April 1979 hearings had a trial date scheduled on a misdemeanor charge in the Superior Court for August 1979.
11. The conditions of mentally ill residents at the Jail discussed above were established during hearings in April and May of 1979. Subsequent to those hearings the defendants informed the court that a task force had been set up and a plan produced to insure adequate mental health care to residents at the Jail. This "Plan for the Improvement of Mental Health Services for Inmates of the District of Columbia Adult Detention Facility" ("Plan") was filed with the court on December 26, 1979. In a Report to the Court of the same date defendants stated that "in an effort to improve services in Southeast 3 and Southwest 3, ten mental health technicians, three psychiatric nurses and eight additional correctional officers will be hired to furnish services to inmates ...."
12. The Hay 19, 1980 hearing revealed that very few of the improvements outlined in the Plan had been implemented and hardly any of the 21 personnel defendants committed themselves to hire had in fact been employed. Although there is evidence of some small movement in the direction of securing new staff on the part of the defendants, after the date when the most recent. May 1980, hearing was scheduled, the defendants' record in complying with its own promises of December 1979 and its own Plan is dismal. For example, in December 1979 the defendants assured the court that ten mental haalth technicians would b« hir»d to iirvt Southeast 3 and Southwest 3. For the past six months there have been only two half-time mental health technicians to serve the entire Jail. As a defense witness and the sole psychiatric nurse now serving the Jail stated, "We don't have enough staff to do everything we need to do."
-5-

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed this court's original order of November 5, 1975 requiring the transfer of mentally ill residents within 48 hours. Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d at 548-50 (1978) (Bazelon, C.J.). At the same time, the Court of Appeals permitted defendants in "isolated situations" constituting "exceptional cases" to submit a written report to this court noting the "special cause" for non-compliance. Id_. at 550. Since that court's March 30, 1978 ruling this court has been inundated with hundreds of such "exceptional" deviations from the 48-hour stricture. These reports detail case after case of a mentally ill resident receiving substantial amounts of psychotrophic medicine who the defendants feel is not in need of hospitalization.
Given the history of neglect at the Jail and the defendants continued protestation that they have no control over, and restricted access to, any mental health facility apart from the small, 30-bed Ugast Center, the court is disturbed by the defendants' repeated, "exceptional" conclusion that a mentally ill resident need not be hospitalized and can be adequately treated in a Jail that has seen little improvement in the treatment of the mentally ill since the inception of this case.
Hearings over the past year convince the court that the mentally ill residents of the District of Columbia Jail have yet to receive the minimum level of treatment required by the Constitution. Campbell, v. McOruder, supra. Shortaga of staffing on Southeast 3 has even resulted in the deprivation of recreation and limited freedom for mentally ill residents that other residents at the Jail routinely expect and receive. The court cannot escape the conclusion that to be mentally ill and to be transferred to Southeast 3 is to be relegated closer to oblivion than to treatment.
-6-

The court hereby reaffirms its original order requiring transfer within 48 hours of all mentally ill residents to a facility appropriate for treating such residents. The court will stay this order for 60 days. Within 60 days from the date of this order, defendants shall cease to house within the District of Columbia Jail any resident diagnosed as mentally ill, unless they have fully implemented the December 1979 "Plan for the Improvement of Mental Health Services for Inmates of the District of Columbia Adult Detention Facility," and otherwise complied with this order. Specifically, before continuing to house mentally ill residents at the D.C. Jail after a period of 60 days the defendants shall: (1) fully implement the December 1979 Plan, including hiring a minimum of ten full-time mental health technicians, three full-time psychiatric nurses and eight full-time correctional officers in addition to the normal complement of three full-time correctional officers assigned to the Southeast unit. Such personnel shall be assigned exclusvely to serve the needs of the Jail's mentally ill patients.
(2) supplement the December 1979 Plan as follows: (a) develop procedures to obtain in a timely fashion the medicnl history and records of prior hospitalization and treatment of all mentally ill residents; (b) develop procedures to insure that untrained personnel and particularly other inmates will not have access to mentally ill residents.
It is worthy of emphasis that complying with its own Plan does not in any manner relieve the defendants "from their obligations to attend promptly and appropriately to the medical needs of detainees whose incarceration prevents them from finding their own treatment." Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d at 550. Rather, this court will postpone issuing its own specific mandate while the defendants implement their Plan in an effort to bring the D.C. Jail up to the minimum standards of decency required by the

Constitution. If even a good faith implementation of the defendants' Plan fails to achieve this standard, the court will be forced to address the issue yet again, without affording the defendants the luxury of styling their own reform. Too much time has passed since the callous disregard of the welfare of mentally ill residents at the Jail became clear to all. The court will strictly enforce the 60-day time limit set above. It is therefore,
ORDERED that the defendants comply with the above mandate within 60 days.

D a t e : '. • . <-v

<— UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

-8-

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LEONARD CAMPBELL, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. ANDERSON McGRUDER, et al.,
Defendants.

C.A. No. 1462-71
FILED
JANl 41981

JAMES F. DAVEY, Clerk

The court being advised that supplemental factual material is required to inform the court and the parties of the current conditions affecting confinement of the Plaintiff Class at the Detention Facility of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants file with the court and serve on counsel for plaintiffs, within 21 days of the date of this order, affidavits of the appropriate officials of the Department of Corrections with the indicated information.

A. Population
1. The daily population of the Detention Facility, divided into male and female prisoners, and those housed in the Ugast Center, the infirmary, or the D.C. General Hospital lock ward, from July 1, 1980 through December 31, 1980;
2. Whether any estimates or projections of population of the Detention Facility r'or 1981 have been made, and the content and b»«l» o£ nueh p»pj#otton«.
3. Whether the Detention Facility has on any data since January 1, 1980, exceeded its capacity with regard to either male or female prisoners, and, if so, the number of persons over capacity, the duration of the condition, and any efforts to reduce the population;

KH)

A. The nature of any plans to expand the capacity of the Detention Facility, or to deal with increases in population beyond the present capacity of the Facility.
B. Psychiatric Care
1. Whether at any time since July 18, 1980, when defendants filed their Report to the Court, there have been less than ten full-time mental health technicians and three full-time psychiatric nurses assigned to the Mental Health Unit, and, if so, the reasons for such staffing levels and duration of such condition;
2. The number of correctional officers assigned full-time on each shift to any units housing mentally ill residents, and whether such staffing levels have fallen below those specified in this court's order of June 9, 1980;
3. The dates and nature of any training provided to staff regarding handling of mentally ill residents;
A. Whether any other residents have access to mentally ill residents, and, if so, under what conditions and with what supervision;
5. The extent to which medical history and records of prior hospitalization and treatment are obtained in a timely fashion;
6. The extent to which each objective stated in the December 1979 Plan for Improvement of Mental Health Services for Inmates of the District of Columbia Adult Detention Facility has been implamented, the reasons for any non-implementation and any plans for further implementation;
7. The nature and status of any plans or proposals to reduce or modify the level of mental health services provided to mentally ill residents of the Detention Facility, including any budget proposals made by the District of Columbia;
8. Defendants should submit copies of any Monthly Status Reports prepared after the filing of the defendants' April 30, 1980 Report to the Court.
- 2-

C. Recreation 1. The current indoor and outdoor recreation schedule for each housing unit or class of residents at the Detention Facility; 2. The nature and status of any plans or proposals to modify or reduce the current schedules.
D. Visitation 1. The current regulations and schedule regarding visiting at the Detention Facility and at the Lorton Correctional Complex; 2. The nature and status of any plans or proposals to modify or reduce the current schedules; 3. A description of any classification system currently in effect for residents of the Detention Facility.
E. Discipline 1. Copies of the Disciplinary Rules and Procedures currently in effect at the Detention Facility and the Lorton Correctional Complex.
Date: _^Lvoo*<«—-j /</,
- 3-

 
 Campbell v. McGruder

JC-DC-001-026

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COUR1 FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LEONARD CAMPBELL, et al..

Plaintiffs,

v.

: Civil Action No. 1462-71

ANDERSON McGRUDER, et al. Defendants.

FILED MAR 8 - 1982

ORDER

CLLEERRKK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT D!r.Tt?!CT OF COLUMBIA

This matter has been pending before the Court on remand

following the decision of the United States Court of Appeals

in Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1978).

Numerous hearings have been held and evidence taken concerning

the conditions of confinement at the Central Detention Facility,

the City's name for the building which replaced the old D.C.

Jail during the pendency of this litigation. While the Court

has heard testimony concerning several aspects of the conditions

of confinement at the Detention Facility, including medical

care, recreation, and visiting procedures, more recently the

testimony has focussed on the rising population and the sub-

stantial overcrowding which has resulted. Testimony on this

subject was taken during hearings on April 16 and May 8, 1981,

January 18, 1982 and March 5, 1982. This testimony has been

supplemented by written submissions from the defendants to the

Court.

On Friday, March 5, 1982, at a status call set by the

Court, counsel for th« defendant* «dvi««d th« Court and

opposing counsel that the defendants planned to initiate double-

celling of inmates at the Detention Facility by Monday, March 8,

in approximately 280 cells. This would be accomplished by

tearing out the single bed and book shelf built in to the wall

of each cell, and installing a movable bunk bed.

\
Although the Department of Corrections contended that douBle-celling was necessary for security reasons, the testimony reflected that its officials had not sought the involvement of other agencies, and that indeed available options within their own control had not yet been explored, and that the reasons advanced to justify double-celling were inconsistent and unconvincing. Thus, testimony from Department officials revealed the following:
(1) Renovation of the RCA facility at Occoquan is expected to make 100-200 spaces available for current Detention Facility residents in April 1982.
(2) There are approximately 60 spaces presently available at the Minimum Security Facility.
(3) The Detention population is increased on weekends by approximately 60 persons (known as "weekenders") who are serving sentences of imprisonment on weekends only. Although these weekenders voluntarily present themselves each Friday night and require minimal supervision, no efforts have been made to house these weekenders elsewhere, or to seek judicial deferral of the service of their sentences until additional space is available.
Were the defendants to proceed with this plan, they would improperly and needlessly deprive this Court of one option for relief sought by plaintiffs, and needlessly burden the plaintiff class. The clear testimony of defendants' own witnesses reflects that this extreme measure is not required or reasonably justifiable, and that much less stringent measures exist which afford reasonable prospects of reducing the population and eliminating the need for double-celling.
The Court i> mindful of the concept that it should daf«r to the judgment of correctional officials about matters relating to security. However such deference is not deserved when judgment has not been exercised, or if it has been exercised at all, it was exercired without regard to obvious alternatives.
- 2-

It is hereby ORDERED that defendants are prohibited until further order of this Court from confining two persons in any cell at the Central Detention Facility, and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants are to report to this Court on or before April 9, 1982 on their efforts to reduce overcrowding at that Facility.

Date:

f S£'*6"L

T JUDGE

- 3-

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LEONARD CAMPBELL, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. ANDERSON McGRUDEP, et al.,
Defendants.

C.A. No. 1462-71
FILED
Dec i v is=?

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JAMES F. DAVEY, Clerk

This Case is before the court on remand from tlie United «

States Court of Appeals, Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521 (D.C.

Cir. 1978). It concerns the conditions under which pre-trial

detainees are confined by the Department of Corrections of the

District of Columbia (the Department).

On March 8, 1982, the court issued an order prohibiting the

Department from confining two inmates in any cell at the Central

Detention Facility (Central). Central, the successor institution

to the old D.C. Jail, is the Department's principal custodial

facility for pre-trial detainees. Central is also used to house

convicted persons awaiting sentencing, sentenced felor.j awaitina

transfer to other facilities, and sentenced misdemeanants serving

their sentences. All cells at Central were designed for single

occupancy only.

On October 8, 1982, the court granted defendants' motion to

vacate the March 8, 1982 prohibition on double-celling.

term "double-celling" refers to the practice of housing two

(Continued)

Campbell v. McGruder

HHHI

SB •« • • • •!

JC-DC-001-030

However, the court simultaneously placed the following conditions on the use of double-celling at Central:
(1) that additional guards be placed in each cell block in which inmates are double-celled,
(2) that no pre-trial detainee be confined in his cell for more than 12 hours in the company of another inmate, and
(3) that no pre-trial detainee be double-celled for more than 30 days.
As the court explained in its October 8 order, these preconditipns to double-celling were imposed under the mandate of Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1978), which required that pretrial detainees not be confined under conditions that "amount to punishment". _Id_. at 535.
Following the issuance of the October 8 order, plaintiffs moved the court to modify its order to provide for (a) the classification and medical screening of inmates prior to their being double-celled, (b) recordkeeping, and (c) periodic reports to the court by the Department. On November 4, 1982, a hearing was held or plaintiffs1 motion to modify, and at this hearing the court closely questioned Department officials concerning the Department's recordkeeping methods and capabilities. In light of the testimony thus elicited, as well as the argument provided by counsel, the court has concluded that the modifications sought by plaintiffs are for the most part consistent with the court's
inmates in a cell designed for single occupancy. Similarly, the term "double-cell" refers to a cell which, though designed for single occupancy, is used to house two inmates.
-2-

October 8 order and with the expert judgment of Department officials regarding the proper administration of double-celling.
Accordingly, the court will require the Department to 'develop and implement a classification procedure and to screen inmates for contagious diseases prior to housing them in doublecells or dormitories. These requirements are dictated by both common sense and the case law. See Lareau v. Hanson, 651 F.2d 96, 111 (2d Cir. 1981). They are also consistent with the Department's present procedures.
The court will further order the Department to maintain, and make available for inspection by counsel for plaintiffs on reasonable notice, records indicating the dates during which each inmate was confined in a double-cell and the hours during which inmates on each cell block containing double-cells were permitted to leave their cells. Unless accurate records are maintained
* regarding days and hours per day of double-celling, the protections against unconstitutional conditions of pre-trial confinement specified in the October 8 order will not carry prac ical significance. Moreover, the court has determined that these recordkeeping requirements are well within the Department's administrative capabilities. The court will also order the
2ln their motion plaintiffs specified that all medical screening should be performed by a physician, but at the hearing plaintiffs agreed to modify this request. Provided that a set of appropriate procedures is filed with the court, plaintiffs would not object to permitting nurses or other medically trained personnel to perform a preliminary screening during late-night intakes or under emergency conditions. These preliminary screenings would then be promptly followed by an examination by a physician.
-3-

Department to maintain careful records reqarding allegations of assaults involving inmates. As the court indicated in its October 8 order, the introduction of double-celling will inevitably expose inmates to an increased risk of assault. In permitting double-celling, the court must insist that all reasonable steps be taken to minimize the assault problem. The Department already maintains records concerning alleged assaults and stated that it has no objection to making these records available for inspection by plaintiffs' counsel through the Office of Judicial Affairs of the Department of Corrections.
Finally, the court will order the Department to file with the court, and serve upon counsel for plaintiffs, a plan to eliminate overcrowding at Central. When the Department moved the court to vacate the March 8 prohibition on double-celling, it acknowledged that double-celling could only be justified as an emergency step, and asserted that it was already moving vigorously to deal with its overcrowding crisis. The courtordered report will simply enable the Department to keep plaintiffs and the court informed of the Department's ongoing fforts in this regard.
With respect to plaintiffs' other proposed modifications,
Plaintiffs also moved the court (a) to prohibit the doublecelling of pretrial detainees until all appropriate convicted inmates had been double-celled, (b) to prohibit the doublecelling of pre-trial detainees with convicted residents except with the written consent of the pre-trial detainee, (c) to require that records of hours per day of double-celling be maintained on an individual (rather than a cell block) basis, and (d) to file monthly reports with the court concerning the administration of double-celling.
-4-

the court declines at this time to order that they be implemented. The court is keenly aware that prison officials must be given wide-ranging discretion in administering their institutions, and the court will not limit that discretion except as required by the Constitution.
For the reasons discussed above, it is hereby ORDERED that the court's order of October 8, 1982 is amended by adding the following provisions: (4) Defendants will promptly establish and file with the court a classification procedure, and each inmate will be evaluated according to this procedure prior to being housed in a double-cell or dormitory. This procedure will include an evaluation of "the inmate's prior criminal record, medical history (including any indications of mental illness), prior institutional adjustment, evidence of aggressive or assaultive conduct, and any other factors deemed relevant by the Department of Corrections. (5) No inmate shall be housed in a double-cell or dormitory until he has received a medical examination, and it has been determined that he is not suffering from any contagious disease or other condition that would create a danger to his health or safety or to the health and safety of others if he were housed in a double-cell or dormitory. In general, these medical examinations are to be conducted by a physician. However, upon submission to the court of an acceptable set of procedures for handling late-night intakes and emergency situations, defendants may authorize a nurse or other
-5-

ss
medically-trained person to perform the medical examination, so long as that preliminary examination is promptly followed by an examination by a physician.
(6) Records will be maintained by defendants, and made available for inspection by counsel for plaintiffs on reasonable notice, reflecting the dates during which each inmate was doublecelled and the hours during which inmates on each cell block containing double-cells were permitted to leave their cells.
(7) Records will be maintained by defendants, and made available for inspection by counsel for the plaintiffs on reasonable notice, reflecting any allegations of assaults involving inmates. These records will provide at a minimum the date, time, and location of the assault; the names of other parties involved; and the conclusions reached, or disciplinary actions taken, as a result of any investigation.
(8) On or before February 1, 1983, defendants will file with the court, and serve upon counsel for plaintiffs, a plan to eliminate overcrowding at the Central Detention Facility. This plan shall include a timetable for the specific steps that need to be taken to reach this q<al.

Date:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUD -6-

 
 / ' ••••
Campbell v. McGruder

JC-DC-001-032 "
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LEONARD CAMPBELL, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. ANDERSON McGRUDER, et al.,
Defendants.

JiiN 17 1983 JAMES £ DAVEY, Clerk
C.A. NO. 1462-71

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This case, which is on remand from the United States Court of Appeals, 580 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1978), involves the conditions of confinement at the Central Detention Facility ("the Jail") in the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs are a class composed of unconvicted pretrial detainees housed at the Jail. The defendants are the Superintendent of the Jail, the Director of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections ("the Department"), and the Mayor of the District of Columbia.
Plaintiffs have moved the court for h.\ order directing Marion Barry, in his official capacity as Mayor of the District of Columbia, to show cause why he should not be held in contempt for violations of this court's orders of October 8, 1982 and

1The Jail is also used to house convicted persons awaiting sentencing, sentenced felons awaiting transfer to other facilities, and sentenced misdemeanants serving their sentences. These convicted inmates are not members of the plaintiff class.

December 17, 1982. Those orders authorized the defendants to

•*

2

institute double-celling of pretrial detainees subject to

several restrictions, the most important of which limit the

double-celling of pretrial detainees to no more than 12 hours per

day and no more than 30 days.

A hearing was held on the plaintiffs' motion on May 24,

1983. Prior to the hearing, the defendants moved the court to

modify its orders of October 8 and December 17 to provide that:

(a) if the Department obtains the written consent of a pretrial

detainee, it may subject him to an additional 30 days of double-

celling following 7 days outside the double cell, and (b) the

absolute limitation of 12 hours of doable-celling per day be

reduced to 10 hours and 15 minutes, "subject to security

considerations". Defendants represented to the court that the

absolute 30-day limitation is "unmanageable," Memorandum of

Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion to Modify

Order at 6, and that the 12-hour limitation is "unduly

optimistic," _id_. at 9. Defendants acknowledged that there had

been "deviations" from these time limitations, id. at 13.

term "double-celling" describes the practice of housing two inmates in a cell designed for single occupancy. Similarly, the term "double cell" describes a cell which, though designed for single occupancy, is used to house two inmates.
•*The defendants' motion also asked that a provision in the Oct^bpr 8 order which stated that "[a]dditional guards be placed in each cell block in which inmates are double-celled," be clarified to specify that three guards be placed on each such cell block.
-2-

I. Historical Background; Overcrowding at the Jail
The problem of overcrowding is not new to this litigation. In 1971, when the complaint was filed, many pretrial detainees were double-celled at the old D.C. Jail in cells so small that cellmates could not move about in them simultaneously. These crowded conditions persisted, and in March 1975, at the time of the trial, the inmate population at the old Jail was nearly 1,000, about 50% above its rated capacity of 663. Campbell v. McGruder, 416 F. Supp. 100, 102 (D.D.C. 1975).
Following the trial, in an effort to bring conditions at the Jail within constitutional bounds, the court ordered that no pretrial detainee be confined "in any cell, room, or dormitory where there is an average of less than 48 square feet per person." Campbell v. McGruder, No. 1462-71 (D.D.C. March 21, 1975). The Court of Appeals imposed a stay, but ordered "that appellants are obligated to continue to take steps toward compliance with the substance of the March 21, 1975 order." Campbell v. McGruder, No. 75-1350 (D.C. Cir. May 2, 1975).4
The matter was remanded to this court for further hearings,

^Subsequently, the Court of Appeals ordered that its stay of the

e

March 21, 1975 order be continued "on the same terms" as in its

i

May 2, 1975 order, namely, "with the proviso that appellants are

*

obligated to continue to take steps toward compliance with the

£

substance of the March 21, Order". Campbell v. McGruder, Nos.

I*

75-1350 and 75-2273 (D.C. Cir. February 6, 1976). In 1978, the

|;

Court of Appeals again continued its stay, Campbell v. McGruder,

k

580 F.2d 521, 553 (D.C. Cir. 1978), and that stay remains in

•>

effect.

I

{

4

-3-

*•;

and at these hearings the defendants initially claimed that they * were in compliance with the 48-square-foot requirement. But it
turned out that the defendants were not in compliance with the 48-square-foot requirement and had not followed the directions of the Court of Appeals as to how they might achieve compliance with the 48-square-foot requirement. Their representations to the contrary were made in bad faith. Campbell v. McGruder, 416 F. Supp. 106, 107-08 (D.D.C. 1975). In its Memorandum Opinion of November 5, 1975, this court gave the defendants additional directions concerning how they could reduce overcrowding at the Jail. _Id_. at 109-11. in a separate opinion issued the same day, this court set standards relating to other problems at the Jail, 416 F.Supp. 100. But after describing and analyzing these problems, the court stated that "Ibjy far the most flagrant and shocking encroachment on the constitutional rights of the plaintiff class is the overcrowding," ^d_. at 105.7

directions of the Court of Appeals concerning the overcrowding problem were issued in the opinion which accompanied the May 2, 1975, order and are quoted at page 17 infra.

See pages 16-18 infra.

7To call overcrowding "the most flagrant and shocking encroachment on the constitutional rights of the plaintiff class" was to say a lot. In the early and aid 1970's, pretrial detainees were still confined at the old D.C. Jail. Conditions there were terrible—almost beyond description. Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521, 533-35 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
r

Upon arrival at the old Jail, inmates were often issued old

;

mattresses which were stained with urine and other excretia.

I

They were placed in cramped cells which were infested with rats,

?

mice, and cockroaches. An overpowering stench permeated the cell

|

blocks. Noise levels were deafening. The temperature was either

$

too hot or too cold, depending on the season and the location of

|

the cell, and the ventilation was poor. Laundry service was

i

(Continued)

!

-4-

I

m
In April 1976, the first sections of the new Jail (i.e., the
present detention facility) were opened, but because of the
rising inmate population, the Department continued to house many
inmates in the old Jail. Paced with repeated violations of the
48-square-foot requirement, forecasts of continued rises in the
inmate population, and the defendants1 failure to respond to
these forecasts, the court on May 24, 1976, placed a population
"cap" on the new Jail and the cell blocks of the old Jail which
were still in use. The court also ordered that:
[I]f compliance requires a reduction in the inmate population at either facility, and other efforts to reduce the population are not successful within 48 hours after compliance ceases, the Director of the
inadequate. Food was often served cold and sometimes contained insect parts and other foreign matter. Pood handlers were not subjected to medical examinations, as required by local regulations. Fire safety inspections were also neglected, and from time to time fires broke out within the cell blocks.
There was little for inmates to do. The old Jail had no indoor recreational facilities and only rudimentary outdoor facilities. There were few books available for the inmates, and mail was strictly censored. Inmates for the most part led lives of boredom punctuated by moments of terror. Fights, assaults, and sexual abuse were everyday occurrences. And administrative punishments ware meted out harshly and with little attention to procedural safeguards.
There was no orderly classification and separation of inmates at the old Jail. Convicted inmates were housed together with pretrial detainees. Homosexual inmates were exposed to abuse from the general inmate population. And, because bed space was often unavailable at St. Elizabeths Hospital, inaates with severe psychiatric problems were kept within the Jail. But the Jail had no psychiatrist on its medical staff and no facilities for psychiatric treatment. Disturbed patients were simply
shackled to their beds with leg irons and handcuffs. Even for
normal inmates medical care was woefully inadequate.
The overcrowding at the old Jail was offensive in and of itself. The overcrowding also seriously exacerbated the problems caused by every other deficiency at the Jail.
-5-

Department of Corrections and the Superintendent of Detention Services [are] directed to release on their own recognizance, within 48 hours of the admission to either facility of persons in excess of the numbers stated in the preceding paragraph, those pre-trial detainees held in default of the lowest amount of bail, and among those detainees held in the same amount of bail those held for the longest time, until compliance with that Order is obtained. [Campbell v. McGruder, 416 F. Supp. Ill, 117 (D.D.C. 1976).]
The May 24, 1976 Order of this court was stayed by the Court
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals stated that:
There is sufficient evidence in the record to sustain this injunction. ... We are aware, however, that the most recent evidence on this issue was received on April 30, 1976 before the full completion of the [new Jail]. ...
We therefore decline at this time to affirm the order of the District Court. Instead we remand the record to the District Court to determine if the anticipated over-crowding has in fact occurred. If the District Court finds that the defendants are in violation of the Constitution despite the full operation of the [new JailJ, it may reissue its order. On the other hand, should the court determine that the District Jail is not ov ,rcrowded and that there is no likelihoc ! of its b.ing overcrowded in the near future, it <ay decline to issue relief. ...
[E]ven if the District Court should determine on remand that defendants are presently in compliance, the court should also apprise itself of the likelihood of future infractions. If the District Court finds that there is a likelihood that the constitutional rights of the plaintiff class will be violated in the near future, the court should retain jurisdiction of the case to monitor the conditions at the Jail until it determines, in its sound discretion, that the likelihood of future violations has ceased. [Campbell, 580 F.2d at 54243.]
-6-

Pursuant to these remand instructions, this court continued

to monitor conditions at the Jail. A number of hearings were

held, and periodic reports were filed with the court by the

defendants. For a time, the Department was able to keep the

inmate population at the new Jail at, or at least close to, its

rated capacity. However, as the population rose, the logistics of

doing so became increasingly complicated. According to a report

filed by the defendants on February 17, 1981, the Department by

then had found it necessary almost every evening to bus inmates

from the Jail, where they stayed during the day, to Lorton, where

they slept. The report also indicated that on July 29, 1980, the

inmate population had peaked at 1,483—103 over the rated capacity

of 1,380. And attached to the report was a letter dated December

s

22, 1980, from the Superintendent of the Jail to the Department's

|

I

Office of Judicial Affairs which stated that "[t]fce saturation of

^

n

the Detention Facility has reached crisis proportions over the

fe

last six months."

I

On October 27, 1981, the defendants filed another report with

the cotrt. This report stated that during the latter part of 1980

and continuing into 1981, the population at the Jail "exceeded on

an increasing basis the rated cell capacity". To accommodate this

rapidly rising population, the Department had begun to set up

makeshift dormitories in the common areas of the Jail. The report

showed that in September 1981 the average daily population at the

Jail had reached 1,538. Although modest in comparison to present

population figures, the September 1981 figure indicated that the

point had been reached when such temporary solutions as shuttle-

-7-

busing would no longer be sufficent to keep the Jail within its ,rated capacity.
On December 21, 1981, the defendants filed another report. This report stated that the inmate population at the Jail had exceeded the 1,700 level on December 9, 1S81, and that large numbers of inmates were being housed in tie makeshift dormitories. As a result, many of the dayrooms at the Jail could no longer be used for inmate recreation.
On March 5, 1982, the defendants asked the court to authorize double-celling at the Jail. The court refused. Campbell v. McGruder, No. 1462-71 (D.D.C. March 8, 1912). In the court's view, the testimony given by officials of the Department showed that the defendants had not adequately considered obvious alternative means for dealing with the overcrowding problem, such as using empty beds at other of its facilities and coordinating its efforts with the judges of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. It was also clear that the Department had not given adequate thought to how it would administer double-celling, if allowed to do so.
Following the March 5 hearirj, the defendants completed their renovation program for the Occoquan I Facility, which had been previously used as the Rehabilitation Center for Alcoholics, and transferred some sentenced misdemeanants from the Jail to the Occoquan Facility. Nevertheless, the inmate population at the Jail continued to rise. In September 1982, the defendants moved the court to vacate its March order prohibiting double-celling. The court heard testimony on the motion and visited the Jail.
-8-

The defendants represented to the court that overcrowding at the Jail had reached emergency proportions. Department officials testified that one-third of the inmates were living in the makeshift dormitories and that it was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain security at the jail under those conditions. They said that the inmates could be better protected and cared for if the Department were peradtted to move inmates from the dormitories into double cells. The defendants acknowledged that double-celling was undesirable and would itself create problems. However, the Department's Acting Director testified that the Department could "take[] some of the inhumanity away from this kind of situation" by carefully matching cellmates and by giving double-celled inmates ample time out of their cells. Campbell v. McGruder, 554 F. Supp. 562, 565 (D.D.C. 1983). He emphasized that it was important to clear the beds out of the dayrooms so that the dayrooms could be returned to their intended recreational function.
In light of this testimony, particularly the Department's representation that a crisis was at hand, the court on October 8, 1982, reluctantly vacated its earlier order and permitted the defendants to institute double-celling at the Jail. However, pursuant to the constitutional requirement in Bell v. Wolfish, that pretrial detainees not be held undec conditions that "amount to punishment," 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1978), the court ordered that no pretrial detainee be double-celled for more than 12 hours in any day or for more than 30 days. The court also ordered that additional guards be placed in each cell block containing double
-9-

cells. 554 F. Supp. at 556. Following the issuance of the October 8 order, the plaintiffs
moved the court to modify the order to provide for (a) the classification and medical screening of inmates prior to their being double-celled, (b) recordkeeping, and (c) periodic reports to the court by the defendants concerning their compliance with the order and their long-range plans for dealing with the overcrowding problem. The Department protested that the proposed modifications were either unnecessary or unrealistic; but after taking testimony from Department officials, the court determined that many of the modifications were both necessary and realistic. On December 17, 1982, the coart modified the October 8 order to include the following requirements: (a) establishment and filing with the court of a classification procedure for evaluating inmates prior to their being double-celled, (b) medical screening of inmates prior to their being double-celled, (c) recordkeeping concerning dates of double-celling (on an individual basis) and hours of double-celling (on a cell block basis), and (d) filing of a report describing the defendants1 long-range plans for eliminating overcrowding at the Jail.
At the time of the December 17 order, only sentenced inmates had been double-celled pursuant to the October 8 order. The double-celling of pretrial detainees began on February 1, 1983. During the next few months, as more and more cell blocks were converted to double-celling, the court began to receive pro se complaints and petitions contending that the Department was not observing the time restrictions imposed by the court. On May 9,
-10-

1983, counsel for the plaintiffs moved tiie court for an order to show cause why the defendants should not be held in contempt for violations of the October 8 and December 17 orders. Defendants responded that there had been "substantial compliance" with the orders, but moved the court to modify the orders.

II. Findings of Fact

A hearing was held on the pending motions on May 24, 1983.

At the hearing, the court heard argument from counsel for e&jh of

the parties and received testimony from Mr. George Holland, the

Department's Assistant Director for Detention Services. The

evidence indicated that the defendants had made little effort to

.

comply with the October 8 and December 17 orders. In this regard,

;

the court makes the following findings of fact:

1. Defendants acknowledged that delayed "counts" frequently

<

prevented them from adhering to their daily schedule, which

\

provides each double-celled inmate with 12^hours out of his

t

cell. It appears, however, that the 12Vz"hottr figure is misleading

"

in that it overcounts me 1 time by ignoring the fact that

I

individual inmates eat in rotation. No inmate is actually out of

|

his cell for the full period listed on the schedule. The

figure also does not reflect the fact that on some days inmates

are forced to remain inside their cells doing clean-up work during

the "scheduled" morning recreation period. It therefore appears

jj

that even when the schedule is implemented as planned, the inmates

i;

receive less than the required 12 hours out of their cells.

2. Double-celling of pretrial detainees began on February 1,

-11-

it
1983. Accordingly, the first group of double-celled pretrial detainees ought to have been removed from their double cells no later than March 3, 1983. This was not done, nor was the court informed by the defendants that the terms of the October 8 order had been violated. The vast majority of the pretrial detainees are now double-celled. With three insignificant exceptions discussed below, none of them has been removed from double-celling at the end of the 30-day period. Instead, the defendants offered the members of the plaintiff class the choice of remaining in a double cell or being moved to makeshift dormitories. All but three of them "consented" in writing to remain in the double cells. The three who refused were promptly moved into dormitories, but after only one day they asked to be returned to the double cells. They were promptly returned.
The defendants did not inform the court until shortly before the show-cause hearing that they had instituted a policy of obtaining consent forms from class members as a means of keeping them in double cells for more than 30 days. Such a policy was not authorized by the court's orders of October 8 and December 17. It simply represents an attempt to circumvent the orders. Moreover, an essential part of the defendants' justification for instituting double-celling was to enable them to clear the dayrooms of beds so that the dayrooms could be used for inmate recreation. The court therefore expected that part of the 12 hours inmates spent out of their double cells would be spent in the dayrooms. The court also expected that, following their 30-day confinement in double cells, pretrial detainees would be placed in single cells for the
-12-

remainder of their confinement. Obviously, neither thing has Happened.
3. The court's order of December 17 provided in part that "Defendants will promptly establish and file with the court a classification procedure, and each inmate will be evaluated according to this procedure prior to being housed in a double cell or dormitory." (Emphasis added.) If this classification procedure was filed at all, it was as an attachment to the motion to modify that was filed on May 19, 1983.
4. The December 17 Order also provided that:
In general, these [pre-double-celling] medical examinations are to be conducted by a physician. However, upon submission to the court of an acceptable set of procedures for handling latenight intakes and emergency situations, defendants may authorize a nurse or other medically-trained person to perform the medical examination, so long as that preliminary examination is promptly followed by an examination by a physician. [Memorandum and Order at 5-6.]
No set of procedures for late-night intakes has been filed with the court. The court does not know if some of the required medical examinations have been performed by nurses or paramedics. If this has been done, it would constitute another violation of the order, which obviously contemplated that the court would approve the procedures prior to their being implemented.
5. The December 17 order required the defendants to maintain records concerning the dates and hours per day during which inmates are double-celled. The feasibility of maintaining the hours per day records was carefully examined during the hearing
-13-

held on November 4, 1982, to consider plaintiff's motion to ' modify. Counsel for the defendants initially contended that it
would be impossible to maintain such records. But this assertion was contradicted by the Departmental official in charge of recordkeeping at the Jail, who testified that it was possible. All that was needed, he said, was for the defendants to make sure that the guards on duty on the cell blocks maintained the existing daily log books accurately and legibly, in fact, the log books have not been maintained in a legible fashion. It is therefore impossible to determine to what extent defendants have complied with the 12-hour requirement of the October 8 order.
6. Defendants filed in timely fashion the court-ordered report concerning their long-term program for dealing with the overcrowding problem at the Jail. The report indicated that the defendants plan to convert the so-called "Occoquan II" facility for use as a detention center for 400-500 inmates. So far, funds have been allocated only for the fence which must be constructed around the existing facility. The defendants predict that the entire renovation project will not be completed until January 1986—more than 2V2 years from now. And it would not be unusual for such a project to fall behind schedule, particularly when the funding process has not been completed. As a natter of fact, it appears that unforeseen delays have already occurred since the report was filed less than five Months ago. The report also indicated that a new minimum security facility would be constructed at Lorton to house 400 minimum-custody prisoners. The projected completion date for that facility is July 1984.

m
The present population at the Jail now exceeds 2,300 and is rapidly increasing. The recent implementation of the new mandatory sentencing law in the District of Columbia suggests that the rate of increase may rise substantially in the near future. The defendants hope to have 800-900 additional spaces by January 1986. That would not even provide spaces for the present excess population at the Jail, much less the excess population which can be reasonably anticipated 2V2 years from now.
III. Discussion
A.
The defendants maintain that they "have substantially complied with the provisions of the orders regarding doublecelling of pre-trial detainees." Memorandum of Points and Authorities, supra, at 4. The court wishes that this were so. But as the court's Findings of Fact make painfully clear, the defendants implemented the court's orde s by violating them. They did not comply with either the procedural requirements, such as filing protocols and keeping records, or the substantive time restrictions.
The defendants also maintain that although they did not fully comply with the orders, they made a good faith effort to do so. But this assertion too is contradicted by the evidence produced at the May 24 hearing. Plaintiffs' exhibit #3 consists of a letter written by the Department's Acting Assistant Director for
-15-

m

m

Detention Services to the Department's Director. The letter was dated January 21, 1983—more than a week before the Department began to double-cell pretrial detainees pursuant to the October 8 order—and clearly indicated that the Department was not prepared to implement double-celling in accordance with the preconditions set by the court. Under the terms of the October 8 order, the Department was not authorized to double-cell pretrial detainees unless those preconditions were met. The Department nevertheless went ahead and instituted the double-celling.
The defendants assert that full compliance with the court's orders has been impossible. But it certainly was not impossible for the defendants to comply with the procedural requirements set by the court. And even with regard to the time restrictions on double-celling, the defendants' protestations of impossibility have little persuasiveness. As this court has repeatedly pointed out during the course of this litigation, the overcrowding problem is not simply a space problem. It stems at least as much from the defendants' persistent failure to coordinate their efforts with the other governmental agencies ?.nd authorities whose decisions determine the size of the inmate population at the Jail.
In 1975, when confronted with a similar claim that the court's orders dealing with overcrowding were unrealistic, the court responded:
The most meaningful step in the direction of compliance is to seek effective implementation of the procedures governing the release of pre-trial detainees. The defendants have had enough experience in this area to be aware of the correlation between effectuating these procedures and reduction in the Jail population. [Campbell,
-16-

416 F. Supp. at 109.]
That advice is as appropriate today as it was eight years ago. in
its 1975 opinion, the court also directed the defendants'
attention to the then-recently issued opinion of the Court of
Appeals in this case. The Court of Appeals opinion said in part:
We recognize that the matter of compliance is in many respects a question of shared responsibility. we contemplate that the Department of Corrections will, in its efforts to comply with the Court's order, seek the active consultation and cooperation of others who, although not technically parties to this action, have an important role to play in evolving the solution for the problem presented. Specifically, we contemplate that the Department and its counsel will seek the cooperation of the Chief Judges of the District Court and the Superior Court as well as the United States Attorney and the D.C. Bail Agency in an effort to explore ways to stem or divert the flow of new pretrial detainees into the jail and reduce the number of sentenced prisoners housed there. Furthermore, we presume that consultation with the designees of the Attorney General, who can e.g. expedite removal of Federal prisoners who have been sentenced, with the Mayor's Office, and other agencies of local and Federal government will permit consideration of other avenues for alleviating this temporary problem, and provide the type of cooperation necessary for a collective solution. The dimensions of the problem may require consideration of unusual remedies, perhaps even, e.g. modifications of unused barracks at service installations.
Department observes that to some extent its function is to receive men sent to the jail by others. However, the Superintendent cannot assert a duty under local law that would put him at variance with a Federal decree. [Campbell, Ho. 751350 (D.C. Cir. May 2, 1975).]
The court continues to believe that the Court of Appeals' order
"is a virtual road map which if followed is bound to lead to
-17-

compliance with the [court-imposed] requirements [concerning overcrowding]." Campbell, 416 F. Supp. at 109.
The court further believes that the Mayor of the District of Columbia, who is one of the defendants in this lawsuit, is the person best situated to initiate contacts and coordinate emergency remedial efforts among the agencies and authorities involved. He has the stature and the access to key individuals that is necessary to get the job done. It is, moreover, his constitutional duty.
The defendants have moved the court to relax the time restrictions placed on double-celling. This motion is without legal support. As the court explained in its October 8 Memorandum and Order, the 12-hour and 30-day restrictions on double-celling marked the minimal standards mandated by the Constitution. 554 F. Supp. at 565. In choosing these specific restrictions, the court applied the same criteria that the Supreme Court used in Wolfish, supra, and the Second Circuit in Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1981): facility design and age, cell size, hours per day of double-celling, and Length of pretrial detention.8 The defendants did not appeal the court's October 8 or December 17 orders and have never challenged the validity of these four criteria. In their recent submissions to the court, the defendants offered no evidence that the factual background relating to these criteria has improved since the orders were issued. The evidence produced at the May 24 hearing in fact suggested that the length of
8See Campbell, 554 F. Supp. at 563 (analyzing Wolfish and Lareau).
-18-

pretrial detention has increased since last October. Under these
circumstances, the motion to modify must be denied with respect to the time restrictions.
The defendants have also moved the court to modify the provision of the October 8 order dealing with the assignment of guards to cell blocks containing double cells. The court cannot rule on this part of the motion until it receives further information concerning the practical effect of the requested change. The evidence presently before the court does not make clear whether the requested order, which would specify that three guards be placed on each cell block containing double cells, would permit guards presently assigned to these cell blocks to be transferred to other areas of the prison, and, if so, whether the Department has considered an alternative course of simply hiring more guards. The evidence also does not make clear whether the defendants' request is premised on the court's acquiescence in the defendants' continued violations of the court-imposed time restrictions on double-celling. The court accordingly invites each of the parties to make a written submission concerning the question of staffing.
B.
This litigation has now come almost full circle. In 1971f when the complaint was filed, pretrial detainees were doublecelled; and in 1975, when the trial was held, the inmate population at the Jail exceeded the rated capacity by 50%. After
-19-

considerable prodding, the defandants succeeded in building a new

detention center and in easing the overcrowding problem. But now,

after 12 years of litigation, pretrial detainees in the District

of Columbia are once again double-celled. Moreover, the innate

population at the Jail far exceeds the over-capacity figures of

the past and is rapidly rising.

The old Jail, of course, no longer stands, but the memory of
Q
what went on there lingers. Those intolerable conditions did not

exist in some distant time and place: they were found in the

Nation's Capitol in the 1970's. The fact that the Department now

has a new detention facility cannot by itself prevent a return to

the old w a y s . ^ Overcrowding is an insidious thing. It not only

causes cramped conditions, but also diminishes the Department's

ability to provide basic safety, food, health, and recreational

services. Overcrowding can also lead to catastrophe, as the

Department's Assistant Director, Mr. George Holland, nade clear at

the May 24, 1983, hearing:

The Court:

Are you approaching the danger point

at the Jail?

Mr. Holland: I believe that when we begin to have double-celling and also repopulate your open areas, that is approaching the danger point. Because what you have done, as Your Honor indicated, is take away your recreation areas, your basketball courts, your lounges, as well as have the cells doubled. And I think you could expect when you do that an increased boredom, an increased contact—that is, closer

9see_ note 7, supra. 10Concerning the limitations of modern detention facilities, see generally W. Nagel, The New Red Barn, at 17-35 (1973).
-20-

contact between individuals—and I think when you begin to do that tempers begin to flare, and you are as close to the danger point as you can get.

The Court:

When you say danger point, what are

we talking about?

Mr. Holland: Danger point just means that you know out of your experience that when you crowd that you can expect that tempers are going to flare. When those tempers flare, they flare at each other, and they may flare at staff.

The Court:

... In ordinary language, we are

talking about rioting.

Mr. Holland: I think you could say that, Your Honor.

In light of this testimony, and the current inmate population figures, there can no longer be any doubt that conditions at the jail have reached the point of crisis. Throughout this litigation, the court has shown great patience towards the defendants. The court is aware of the obstacles that confront the Department and is mindful that prison officials must be given wide-ranging discretion in administering their facilities. But the cjurt has a duty to protect the constitutional rights of the plaintiff class, and the court must insist that its orders be obeyed.
In 1976, under similar emergency circumstances, the court stated:

All efforts to induce the defendants to put their house in order have been unavailing up to now, and it is apparent that no meaningful effort can reasonably be expected absent a strong order of the Court which makes clear that housing inmates under

-21-

unconstitutional standards must cease. [Campbell, 416 F. Supp. at 117.]
In the same spirit, the court hereby ORDERS that the defendants' motion to modify is denied with respect to the time limitations previously imposed on the doublecelling of pretrial detainees. The court FURTHER ORDERS that the defendants shall file with this court, and serve on counsel for plaintiffs, a report indicating the extent of the defendants' compliance with each of the provisions of this court's orders of October 8, 1982, and December 17, 1982. The report shall also indicate the nature of liaison activities initiated by the defendants with respect to other governmental agencies and authorities. The report shall cover the defendants' activities during the 30-day period following the issuance of this order, and shall be filed within one week after the expiration of that 30-day period. Thereafter, the defendants shall file with this court, and serve on counsel for plaintiffs, compliance reports every 30 days until further notice from this court. The court FURTHER ORDERS that the parties submit views and/or suggestions which may assist the court in determining whether a limitation should be placed on the number of inmates that can be housed at the Jail in order to protect the plaintiff class, and, if so, what that limitation should be. These pleadings shall be filed within 10 days of the issuance of this order. The court FURTHER ORDERS that the hearing on the Motion for Order to Show Cause why respondents should not be held in contempt is
-22-

•-&•;
continued to the 9th day of August 1983 at 9:30 a.m.
Z~., J
UNITED STATES DISTRICT/tfUDGE
-23-

 
 Campbell v. McGruder

• ! • • • Ill I • • •• • • • • ! Ill • • • • • • • I I I • • • • • • • •
JC-DC-001-035
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OP COLUMBIA

FILED
SEP 3 0 1983

LEONARD CAMPBELL, et al., Plaintiffs,

CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COf
DISTRICT OF CCLUMSi;

v. ANDERSON McGRUDER, et al.,

C.A. No. 1462-71

Defendants.

ORDER

Upon consideration of the court's memorandum opinion filed in the above-captioned matter on this date, it is hereby
ORDERED that: 1. Marion Barry, in his official capacity as Mayor of the District of Columbia, James Palmer, in his official capacity as Director of the Department of Corrections, and George Holland, in his official capacity as Assistant Director for Detention Services, are in civil contempt for failing to comply with this court's orders of October 8 and December 17, 198? 2. In consequence thereof, the above-named defendants are fined $50,000, to be paid in 180 days from the issuance of this order, and $1,000 for each day following the issuance of this order that the defendants are not in compliance with the court's orders. 3. If, for the duration of the 180-day period, the defendants achieve and maintain compliance with the court's orders, and produce adequate documentation to verify their

I :V".i."
compliance, they will be purged of the contempt finding and will not have to pay the $50,000 fine imposed herein. "" 4. Defendants shall pay plaintiffs' counsel the costs connected with the prosecution of this contempt proceeding, including reasonable attorney's fees, in an amount to be fixed by the court. Counsel for plaintiffs shall submit an affidavit to the court in support of such an award.
5. The defendants shall continue to file monthly compliance reports with the court. Copies of thtsse reports shall be sent to counsel for plaintiffs in the above-captioned matter, as well as to counsel for plaintiffs in Inmates v. Jackson, C.A. No. 751668.
6. A joint evidentiary hearing will be held in the abovecaptioned matter and in Inmates v. Jackson, C.A. No. 75-1668, on Tuesday, November 1, 1983 at 10:00 a.m., regarding the status and/or effects of housing in the so-called "floor space".

Date: %^L(1c,>*t3

y UNITED STATES DISTRICT J

-2-

 
 FILED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLOMBIA

LEONARD CAMPBELL, « t • ! . ,

I

$£p 3 n igpo
CLERK, U.S. D/STR.CT COURT DISTRICT OF C0LUM31A

Plaintiffs,

v. ANDERSON McGRUDER, et al.,

C.A. Ro. 1462-71

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case, which is on remand from the United States Court

of Appeals, Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1978),

involves the conditions of pretrial confinement at the Central

Jf

Detention Facility—more commonly known as the D.C. Jail ("the

|

Jail"). The defendants are the Mayor of the District of

|

Columbia, the Director of the Department of Corrections of the

|

District of Coiumiba ("the Department"), and the Superintendent

fI

of the Jail. The plaintiffs are a class composed of unconvicted

^

pretrial detainees housed at the Jail.

There can be little doubt that conditions at the Jail are in

a state of crisis. Earlier this summer the rapidly increasing

inmate population passed the 2,400 level, exceeding the rated

capacity of the Jail by more than 75%. In May of this year, Mr.

George Holland, the Department's Assistant Director for Detention

Services, testified before this court that overcrowding at the

Jail had reached the "danger point" and that rioting could be

expected. In fact, on July 22, 1983, a riot did occur, and order

was not restored until large numbers of policemen and guards arrived at the Jail armed with shotguns. Soon afterwards, under emergency circumstances, the defendants transferred about 450 convicted inmates from the Jail to the Department's penal facilities in Lorton, Virginia. This temporarily eased the population pressure at the Jail but did not address the underlying problems that gave rise to the overcrowding.
It is against this somber background that the court must now consider whether the defendants should be held in contempt for having violated the court's orders of October 8, 1982 and December 17, 1982 concerning the double-celling1 of pretrial detainees.
A. Procedural History
In its Memorandum and Order of June 27, 1983, the court discussed the history of overcrowding at the Jail and the events leading up to the issuance of the October 8, 1982 and December 17, 1982 orders. Those events fee highlighted by the following statistics, which were recently supplied to the court by the defendants:
term "double-celling" describes the practice of housing two inmates in a cell designed for single occupancy. Similarly, the term "double cell" describes a cell which, though designed for single occupancy, is used to house two inmates. 2These statistics are taken from an attachment to the Report to the Court filed by the defendants on September 2, 1983. The attachment, entitled "Detention Services Population," contains population figures (average daily population, high count, low count, and "thru-put" (total movement)) for each month from July (Continued)
-2-

Inmate Population at the Jail (Rated Capacity - 1,355)

Date

Average Daily Population

High Count

July 1980 October January, 1981 April July October January, 1982 April July September October January, 1983 April July August

1,313 1,354
1,386 1,414 1,472 1,559 1,640 1,776 1,854 2,027 2,171 2,113 2,154 2,268 1,935

1,557 1,397 1,426 1,479 1,521 1,603 1,688 1,840 1,918 2,135 2,221 2,181 2,228 2,449 2,028
;."

As these statistics show, during the past three years the

,;

t\

•?

r'-

inmate population at the Jail has steadily increased. Until

i

October 1980, the average daily population (although not the "high |

counts") remained within the rated capacity of the Jail, but since *

then the average daily count hvs exceeded the capacity on an ever

&

increasing basis. The defendants persistently failed to

anticipate and make adequate provisions to house this rising

population. By September 1982, when the population had reached

1980 until August 1983.

|

3The drop front Juiy 1983 to August 1983 is attributable to the

\t

emergency transfer of about 450 convicted inmates from the Jail

|

to the Lorton facilities. Other statistics submitted to the

£

court by the defendants indicate that since then the upward

I

spiral of the Jail population has continued: on August 11 and

—'

12, 1983, a low daily count of 1,859 was recorded, but by

£

September 1—the last day for which statistics were produced—the

count had reached 2,004.

:

-3-

*•'•• . . ; s
50% over capacity, most of the dayrooms and gymnasiums at the Jail had been converted into makeshift dormitories. This not only deprived the inmates of much-needed recreational opportunities, but also created unacceptable security risks for both guards and inmates.
To obtain temporary relief from these problems, the defendants in September 1982 moved the court to vacate its prohibition of March 8, 1982 on the use of double-celling at the Jail. According to the defendants, inmates could be more closely supervised in double cells than the makeshift dormitories, thus controlling the situation while the defendants developed a longterm approach to the overcrowding problem. The defendants acknowledged that double-celling was undesirable, since the J a i l — like virtually every other modern penal facility—was designed exclusively for single-celling. Consequently, the cells at the Jail are too small to properly accommodate two inmates and are positioned so as to make it impossible for the centrally-stationed guards to monitor what goes on within the cells. Nevertheless, the defendants viewed 3ouble-celling as a lesser evil compared to continued use of the dormitories.
Deferring to the defendants' expert judgment in this matter, the court on October 8, 1982 vacated its prohibition on doublecelling. However, in accordance with the defendants' representations concerning the factors necessary for the proper administration of double-celling and with the constitutional requirement set forth in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979), that pretrial detainees not be held under conditions that
-4-

"amount to punishment,• the court placed the following preconditions on the use of double-celling at the Jail:
(1) Additional guards [must] be placed in each cellblock in which inmates are double-celled. These guards are to make frequent inspections of the inside of the individual cells. (2) No pre-trial detainee [may] be confined in his cell for more than 12 hours in any day in the company of another inmate. (3) No pre-trial detainee [may] be double-celled for more than 30 days. [Campbell v. McGruder, 554 P. Supp. 562, 566 (D.D.C. 1982).]
Soon after the issuance of the October 8 order, the plaintiffs moved the court to modify the order to provide, among other things, for recordkeeping and filing of periodic reports concerning the defendants' compliance with the time limits on double-celling. At a hearing held on November 4, 1982, the defendants at first protested that it would be impossible for them to keep the records requested by the plaintiffs, bit this assertion was contradicted by the official in charge of records at the Jail, who tercified that logbooks could be accurately maintained if the guards were properly supervised. In light of this testimony and the necessity for verifying whether the time limits were being complied with, the court ordered the defendants to maintain records of the hours per day of double-celling (on a cellblock basis) and the total number of days of double-celling (on an individual basis). However, the court declined to order the defendants to file periodic compliance reports. Campbell v. McGruder, No. 1462-71 (D.D.C. December 17, 1982).
The defendants did not appeal either the October 8 or the
-5-

December 17 orders. And prior to placing pretrial detainees in double cells, the defendants made no effort to seek clarification or reconsideration of the orders from this court.
The double-celling of convicted inmates, who are not protected by the 12-hour and 30-day time limits, began in November 1982. It was not until February 1, 1983 that the first pretrial detainees were double-celled. During the next few months, as more and more cellblocks were converted to double-celling, the court began to receive pro se complaints and motions contending that the time limits on double-celling were being violated. On May 9, 1983, counsel for the plaintiffs moved the court for an order directing Marion Barry, in his official capacity as Mayor of the District of Columbia, to show cause why he should not be held in contempt for violations of the October 8 and December 17 orders. In response to the plaintiffs' motion, the defendants stated that there had been "substantial compliance" with the orders but moved the court to modify them. Specifically, the defendants asked that the absolute 12-hour minimum on time outside the double cell be reduced to 10 hours and 15 minutes "subject to security considerations," that double-celling be permitted for more than 30 days with the consent of the pretrial detainee, and that an additional 30 day period of double-celling be permitted after an interim of seven days outside the double cell.
On May 24, 1983, a hearing was held on the two motions. In its Memorandum and Order of June 27, 1983, the court determined that there had been significant violations of the October 8 and December 17 orders, denied the defendants' motion to modify the
-6-

- orders, and continued to August 9 the hearing on the plaintiffs' motion for an order to show cause why the defendants should not be held in contempt. At the August 9 hearing, the court received into evidence a number of documents—principally memorandums exchanged among various City officials and statistical summaries produced by the Department—and heard testimony from three officials of the Department, including Director James Palmer and Assistant Director George Holland. On the basis of this record, the court now makes the following determinations.
B. The Failure to Comply with the 30-Day Limit on Double-Celling
Since the first pretrial detainees were placed in double cells on February 1, 1983, they should have been removed from their double cells no later than March 3, 1983. But this was not done, ncr were the successive groups of pretria' detainees removed from double cells at the end of their respective 30-day periods. The court was not informed of these violations until shortly before the show-cause hearing held on May 24, 1983. By that time, most pretrial detainees at the Jail were being held in double cells—some for periods approaching four months. It was not until the latter part of July 1983 that the pretrial detainees were finally taken out of the double cells.
The defendants have attempted to justify their violations of
-7-

* -V--

the 30-day limit on double-celling by saying that the violations

were done with the "consent" of the affected inmates. This

justification is untenable. The teems of the October 8 order were

unambiguous: "It is hereby ordered that

[n]o pretrial

detainee be double-celled for more than 30 days." 554 F. Supp. at

566. It is a simple statement, without qualifications. For

linguistic reasons alone, the court cannot believe that the

defendants or their counsel in good faith could have interpreted

the order to permit inmates to waive enforcement of the 30-day

limit.

Moreover, this strained "interpretation" must be evaluated in

the context of a series of actions which, when taken together,

demonstrate that the defendants never made any real effort to

comply with the 30-day limit. First, on October 13, 1982—within

days of the issuance of the October f order—Mr. Donald Soskin,

the Department's Judicial Affairs Officer, wrote the Assistant

Corporation Counsel handling this case to ask two questions:

1. May the Department double cell ? pre-trial detainee for periods in excess of 3> days when the detainee had consented to such housing? ...

2. May the Department, after releasing a pre-trial

detainee at the expiration of 30 days (double

celled) return the detainee to a double cell status

in some reasonable time frame?

[Plaintiffs'

Exhibit 14.J

As these questions indicate, the Department's initial focus was more on how to evade the 30-day requirement than on how to comply with it. The questions also suggest that officials of the Department knew from the beginning that they probably would have
-8-

s^-J •

difficulty fulfilling the preconditions for double-celling unless

they acted promptly to reduce the population at the Jail.

Second, on November 4, 1982, before any pretrial detainees

had been double-celled, Mr. Thomas Gaydos, the Major/Operations (a

senior position at the Jail), wrote in a memorandum to the Acting

Administrator that:

.

A review of the existing plan pertaining to double bunking residents housed at the Detention Facility has been found to be unacceptable and unworkable due to the thirty day time limitation specified in the Court Order dated October 8, 1982. [Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 3.]

Nevertheless, the defendants protested against the

plaintiffs1 request that the defendants be required to keep

records and file periodic reports concerning their compliance with

the court's order. In their written opposition, the defendants

told the court that no such order was needed since the defendants

would comply:

\

The assumption implicit in this request seems to be

I

that defendants will ignore the restrictions on

I

double-celling contained in the October 8 order.

|

There is no basis for this assumption. [Opposition

*•

of Defendants to Plaintiffs' Motion to Modify Order

i

Regarding Double-Celling at 5 (emphasis added).]

The attorney who made this representation was the same attorney to whom Mr. Soskin had written a few weeks earlier.
Third, on November 4, 1983, the defendants and their counsel appeared before the court at the hearing on the plaintiffs' motion to modify the October 8 order. If the defendants had had any real questions about the meaning of the order, they should have, and

-9-

(fe
. almost certainly would have, taken the simple step of asking the court for clarification. The inference is unmistakable that no such request was made because the defendants knew that such an •interpretation" was totally at odds with the purpose and intent, as well as the language, of the October 8 order, and because the defendants wanted to be able to claim later that they were unsure about the meaning of the order. Fourth, during the next three months the defendants took few steps to deal with the overcrowding problem or to prepare to administer double-celling in accordance with the 30-day limit. Then, on February 1, 1983, despite having been told that their plan for double-celling was "unacceptable and unworkable," the defendants placed the first pretrial detainees in double cells. There can be little doubt that by early February, Director Palmer and Assistant Director Holland knew that, unless they took immediate action to prevent it, the 30-day limit would be violated on March 3. But no such action was taken, nor was the court informed of the impending violations. After March 3, this pattetn of withholding information from the court continued. The evidence strongly suggests, and the court so finds, that the defendants deliberately sought to conceal their violations of the October 8 and December 17 orders from the
court. In March 1983, when the court received several pro se motions alleging that the time limits on double-celling were being violated, counsel for the plaintiffs wrote the Department to determine the status of the inmates who had signed the motions and the accuracy of their allegations. On March 23, the Department
-10-

responded in a letter to counsel and the court that the inmates in

question were sentenced inmates not subject to the tine

restrictions on double-celling. What the defendants failed to

mention was that there were many pretrial detainees who were being

confined under the same conditions complained about in the

convicted inmates' pro se motion—conditions which violated the

court's orders.

Subsequently, on April 18, 1983, the defendants informed

plaintiffs' counsel and the court that most of the signers of a

second pro se motion were pretrial detainees. They acknowledged

that some violations of the 12-hour limit had occurred (though

they added that such violations "are largely within the control of

the residents"), but maintained a discreet silence concerning

their systematic violations of the 30-day limit.

It was not until after the plaintiffs filed their motion for

an order to show cause that the defendants finally informed the

court that pretrial detaines had not been removed from their cells

after 30 days. The court then learned that the defendants had

offered detainees the choice of remaining in a double cell or

being moved to makeshift dormitories. All but three of the

detainees "consented" in writing to remain in the double cells.

The three who refused were promptly moved into dormitories. But

after one day in the dormitories, they all asked to be returned to

the double cells and were promptly returned. However, the

defendants did not permit any of the pretrial detainees to move

!

into single cells after 30 days of double-celling — a policy

;

t

directly counter to the rationale behind the 30-day limit.

-11-

C. The Failure to Comply with the 12-Hour Limit on Double-Celling

The defendants informed the court and counsel for plaintiffs that they had implemented a schedule which permitted each doublecelled pretrial detainee to leave his cell for 12 V2 hours each day. The 12 ^ hour total included 1 ^ hours for breakfast, 1 V2 hours for lunch, and 1 V2 hours for supper. But these figures were misleading because they represented the total time spent feeding all inmates, although the long-standing practice was to feed inmates in two shifts. In reality, an individual inmate was out of his cell for only half the period listed for meals. Thus, even if the schedule was fully implemented, an individual inmate spent only two hours and 15 minutes per day out of his cell for meals, not 4 V2 hours. Consequently, his total out-of-cell time under the schedule was at the most 10 V2 hours. Mr. Holland conceded that the schedule, as presented to the court, was "misleading."
Moreover, t*K schedule was often not implemented as planned, with the result that inmates were given even less than 10 V2 hours out of their cells. This is attributable to the fact that out-ofcell recreation time cannot begin until the "count" of the inmate population is completed. As Mr. George Holland informed Mr. Donald Soskin in a memorandum dated March 23, 1983:

There have been occasions when the security count has not cleared in a timely manner or other circumstances that cause some delay in the start of

some of the out of cell activities

There have

also been numerous emergency circumstances that

-12-

have required restrictions in the out of cell limits for prolonged periods of time. [Plaintiffs' Exhibit 10.]
The defendants knew that their schedule of out-of-cell activities did not comply with the court's 12-hour limit on double-celling, yet took no steps to extend out-of-cell time. They did not inform the court of these violations or move the court to modify the 12-hour limit until after plaintiffs filed their motion for an order to show cause why defendants should not be hel2 in contempt. The requested modification was denied by this court on June 27, 1983.

D. The Failure to Comply with the Recordkeeping Requirement

The court's December 17 order required the defendants to keep

records of the dates during which each pretrial detainee was

double-celled and the hours during which inmates on each pretrial

;•;

cellblock containing double cells were permitted to leave their

?

x

cells. The feasibility of these recordkeeping requirements was

j>

established at the November 4, 1982 hearing. Nevertheless, the

[

defendants failed to maintain the logbooks in a legible fashion.

At the August 9, 1983 hearing, Mr. Holland testified that

there had been discussions concerning the adequacy of the

logbooks, but could not recall what was said. Re did remember

that at some point he had been told that the logbooks were not

being properly maintained, but could not remember when. It can be

determined, however, that by March 23, 1983 at the latest, Mr.

-13-

Holland must have known that the records were inadequate, since his memorandum of that date to Mr. Soskin (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 10) refers to a review that had been made of the logbooks. And on April 28, 1983, Mr. Holland received a memorandum from Mr. Soskin (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 13} which stated that "the Department must immediately commence to upgrade its reporting consistent with its legal obligation." Despite this warning, the defendants failed to adequately supervise the guards who were charged with keeping the logbooks.
Even as late as the August 9, 1983 hearing, problems surfaced concerning the Department's recordkeeping. At the hearing and in their Report to the Court filed on August 3, 1983, tbe defendants stated that no pretrial detainee had been double-celled since July 19, 1983, but this statement appeared to be contradicted by the daily count sheets maintained by Assistant Administrator William Long. For example, the entry for July 29, 1983 shows that while cellblock S-l is supposed to house a maximum of 53 pretrial detainees, it in fact contained 98 inmates, 15 of whom were in the "overflow floor" space. This implies that meat of the inmates on S-l were confined in double cells well after July 19.
When asked about this discrepancy, Mr. Holland said that only Mr. Long would know whether compliance with the orders had been achieved. He also said that while he receives the count sheets every day, he had not questioned Mr. Long about the discrepancy. Mr. Long, in turn, explained that the July 29 count sheet may simply indicate that some convicted persons were housed in a pretrial cellblock, but he could not state from personal knowledge
-14-

<7 •
that this was so. Regardless of whether his understanding was correct, this interchange demonstrated that even in August 1983 the defendants were still unable to assure the court that its orders were being obeyed.
E. The Failure to Fully Dtilize Existing Space
A recurrent problem in this litigation has been the Department's failure to make full use of its existing bedspace. Thus, while one facility may be terribly overcrowded, beds may remain unused at another facility. The recent example of the Minimum Security Facility is, unfortunately, typical.
The Minimum Security Facility is designed to hold only convicted inmates, but since a significant proportion—usually over half—of the residents of the Jail are convicted inmates, an obvious method for reducing overcrowding at the Jail is to transfer convicted inmates to the Department's Lorton facilities, such as the Minimum Security Facility. in its order of March 8, 1982 denying the defendants' initial tequest for authorization to double-cell, the court pointed out that there were approximately 60 unused bedspaces at the Minimum Security Facility.
However, in a Report to the Court filed on April 9, 1982, the Department insisted that those 60 spaces were not available, and
4in addition to relieving overcrowding at the Jail, the transfer of convicted inmates serves to return the Jail to its intended function as a holding facility for pretrial detainees. There are sound penological reasons for separating pretrial detainees from convicted inmates.
-15-

#8
that while the facility was slightly under capacity, the correct capacity of the Minimum Security Facility was 252, not 300. Nevertheless, in a plan to relieve overcrowding at the Jail filed with the court on February 1, 1983, the Department stated that "[t]he District of Columbia shall further promptly expand population capacities at Minimum Security (+48) and Occoquan I (+38)." The expansion of the Minimum Security Facility by 48 spaces would have raised its capacity from 252 to 300. In a memorandum dated February 8, 1983, Mr. Palmer directed Mr. Holland and Mr. James Freeman, the Assistant Director for Correctional Services, to implement this expansion in an "immediate and orderly phased manner." The "expansion" of the facility required no new construction, but simply use of existing space. On February 1, 1983, the first day that pretrial detainees were double-celled at the Jail, the Minimum Security Facility contained only 214 inmates, or 86 inmates below its full capacity. On March 3, 1983, the first day of defendants1 violation of the 30-day limit, there were 75 spaces open at the Minimum Security Facility (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 4 ) . The defendants could hr/e used these empty spaces to achieve compliance with the 30-day limit. But it vas not until July 9, 1983, after more than four months of violating the 30-day limit, that the defendants finally reached the 300-person capacity at the Minimum Security Facility.
Similar questions can be raised concerning the emergency transfer in July 1983 of about 450 convicted inmates from the Jail to the Maximum Security Facility and the Central Facility at Lorton. The court is aware that as a result of other litigation—
-16-

Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, No. 80-2136 (the Central Facility); John Doe v. District of Columbia, No. 79-1726 (the
Maximum Facility) — the Department is under pressure to reduce
overcrowding at the Lorton facilities. Nevertheless, the defendants have not explained to this court how so many spaces suddenly became available in late July and why they were not used sooner. In the absence of such explanation, the court can only assume that the transfer could have been made months earlier if the defendants had exercised reasonable diligence.
F. The Failure to Take Any Other Timely Actions
When the defendants moved the court in September 1982 for authorization to double-cell, they acknowledged that doublecelling could not offer a long-term solution to the overcrowding problem at the Jail. But they asked the court to authorize double-celling as a temporary measure which would give them additional time for implementing some program for dealing with the overcrowding.
Generally speaking, there are two means for reducing overcrowding at the Jail. One is to expand the capacity of the Department's custodial facilities. The other is to work with other governmental agencies to reduce the number of persons confined at the Jail.
The court had anticipated that the defendants would act vigorously on both these fronts, but, in fact, little or nothing was done. Consequently, almost a year of precious time was
-17-

lost. The responsibility for this costly delay cannot be placed solely on the Department of Corrections. If the problems at the Jail are to be dealt with in a meaningful fashion, adequate funds must be devoted to the task, and the activities of a number of governmental agencies must be coordinated; and such an effort, without the active leadership of the head of the City government, must fail.
Within the past few months (subsequent to the court's Memorandum and Order of June 27, 1983 and the inmate riot of July 22, 1983), the defendants apparently have at last begun to address 'the need for such a comprehensive approach. On August 3, 1983, a reform proposal entitled "Strategies for Addressing Jail and Prison Overcrowding" was issued by the Mayor's office and later presented to members of the recently-formed "Justice System Board".
The proposal establishes the following overall objectives:
A) To improve overall coordination between all elements of the system.
B) To reduce thr number of offenders requiring incarceration through greater use of alternatives at both pretrial and post conviction states in the process.
C) To enact measures that, where appropriate, reduce the length of time that certain categories of sentenced offenders spend in prison.
D) To establish reasonable capacities in correctional facilities and institute mechanisms for ensuring them. [Proposal at
14.]
The proposal goes on to say:
-18-

Systemwide strategies must be developed and implemented to meet these objectives. Successful implementation of these strategies is contingent upon, more than anything else, the successful coordination of the efforts of all elements of the criminal justice system. [_Id_. at 15.]
Among the specific "strategies" recommended in the proposal are improving coordination between police and prosecutors when large-scale arrests are planned, decriminalizing selected offenses, facilitating the sharing of information among the various criminal justice agencies, reviewing bail for reduction, release on recognizance or conditional release (including thirdparty custody), expanding use of diversion, improving treatment services for juveniles, increasing use of " pre-release centers", enacting "capping" legislation to limit the inmate population at the Department's custodial facilities, creating public service jobs for ex-offenders, increasing the capacity of the custodial facilities, and improving screening and retention of correctional officers.
This is obv ously an ambitious agenda of reform, bu: a necessary one if the constitutional questions repeatedly confronted in this litigation are to be avoided. Of particular importance is the review of bail conditions for inmates incarcerated pending trial. See Campbell v. McGruder, 416 F. Supp. 106, 109 (D.D.C. 1975) ("The most meaningful step in the direction of compliance is to seek effective implementation of the procedures governing the release of pre-trial detainees.").
It is difficult to gauge the strength of the defendants1 commitment to the overall goals and specific reforms contained in
-19-

i©
their proposal. Unfortunately, the 12-year history of this litigation is not such as to inspire unqualified optimism.5
G. The August 9, 1983 Hearing
The general outline of the actions described above—though not all the unpleasant details—were known to the court by the end of the hearing held on May 24, 1983 to consider the plaintiffs1 motion for a show-cause order and the defendants' motion for modification of the time limits on double-celling. It can be argued that the record produced in conjunction with the May 24 hearing provided a sufficient factual basis for this court to rule on the contempt motion. But this court has always refrained from using its contempt authority except when confronted with the most extreme cases of misconduct. Consistent with this longstanding policy, the court continued the contempt hearing until August 9 so as to give the defendants additional time to explain and justify their conduct. But as it turned out, the testimony and documentary evidence presented at the August 9 hearing did nothing to exonerate the defendants.
The first witness was Mr. Holland, who, in addition to his present position as Assistant Director for Detention Services,
5As the court observed some years ago, " [throughout these proceedings, when pressure was brought to bear, the impossible has become possible and compliance has been obtained, at least for a time. What has been missing, unfortunately, is a commitment to a long range, continuing effort to maximize the resources presently available to the Department and the City, and to make plans to increase those resources to meet the need." Campbell v. McGruder, 416 F. Supp. Ill, 115 (D.D.C. 1976).
-20-

served from March 1982 until January 1, 1983 as the Department's Acting Director. In both capacities, he has been responsible for alleviating the overcrowded conditions at the Jail. Mr. Holland has been a frequent witness in these proceedings, and the court has often relied on his expert testimony in assessing conditions at the Jail. But it was obvious at the August 9 hearing that Mr. Holland was nervous and uncomfortable, and his credibility was undercut by his uncharacteristic inability to remember names and
Mr. Holland acknowledged that the court's orders regarding double-celling had been knowingly violated. Be said that he believed that in early February 1983 he had informed the Director's Office that the 30-day limit would soon be violated. He said that he believed that he had also discussed the violation with the City Administrator's Office and the Corporation Counsel's Office, but could not recall when. He emphasized that he had planned to comply with the court's orders by moving the detainees out of their double cells and into the open dormitory space before the expiration of the 30-day limit, but that e had received a "direction" not to do so. However, despite being prodded by the court, he insisted that he could not remember who had issued this direction. No clarification or explanation was presented from the City Administator's Office or the Office of the Corporation Counsel.
The second witness was Mr. James Palmer, who has been the Department's Director since January 2, 1983. Like Mr. Holland, Mr. Palmer suffered from memory lapses when questioned about the
-21-

actions he took in response to the October 8 and December 17 orders. For example, Mr. Palmer at first claimed that although he had been aware in January 1983 that this court had issued an order concerning double-celling at the Jail, he had not known about "details" like the 30-day limit, until April 1983. However, when confronted with a memorandum written to him on January 21, 1983 (Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 9 ) , which discussed the difficulties anticipated by his staff in complying with the 30-day limit, Mr. Palmer admitted that, in fact, he had known of that provision in January.
Mr. Palmer made similar misstatements when questioned about the July 22 riot. In response to a leading question from the Assistant Corporation Counsel, Mr. Palmer confidently asserted that the riot had begun in a cellblock housing only sentenced inmates. But when this account was challenged by plaintiffs' counsel, Mr. Palmer seemed unsure of himself, and eventually he acknowledged that his testimony concerning the riot was based on a short written report which he had not even carefully read.
Mr. Palmer also claimed that he had thought in March 1983 that his Department had been complying with the court's orders by moving pretrial detainees into the open dormitory areas of the Jail, that Mr. Holland had so informed him, and that he did not become aware of the Department's noncompliance with the 30-day order until late April. Under the circumstances, this testimony is not persuasive; and even if taken at face value, it at best would reflect an unacceptably passive attitude toward meeting the Department*8 legal obligations.
-22-

The last witness was Mr. William Long, who has been the Assistant Administrator of Detention Services since May 9, 1983. Mr. Long, of course, could not testify concerning actions taken by officials of the Department before he assumed his position. The principal effect of his testimony was to reveal the continuing problems in the Department's recordkeeping procedures at the Jail.
The defendants produced no witnesses from the office of the Mayor or the City Administrator.
CONCLUSION
In the light of clear and convincing evidence, it appears beyond question that the actions of the defendants since the issuance of this court's orders of October 8, 1982 and December 17, 1982 constitute civil contempt. The defendants knowingly violated the 30-day limit, the 12-hour limit, and the recordkeeping requirements set by the court, and sought to conceal their violations from the court's view. The defense of substantial compliance, though asserted, has no basis in fact. Moreover, since the defendants failed to fully utilize existing cell space or to take any other timely actions to reduce overcrowding at the Jail, they cannot argue that they were unable to comply with the court's orders concerning double-celling. And, in any event, the defendants always had the option of placing the detainees in dormitories while seeking relief from the court. In
6See Defendants' Report to the Court dated August 3, 1983 at 7. -23-

fact, Mr. Holland testified that he had planned to do exactly that, but was directed to do otherwise.
This is not the first time that the defendants have violated the court's orders. See, e.g., Campbell v. McGruder, 416 F. Supp. 106, 108 (D.D.C. 1975). But what is involved now is not simply another painful instance of bureaucratic rigidity and ineptitude, but rather a policy of bad faith, of disregard for the City's legal obligations, and of deliberate violations of the inmates' constitutional rights—in short, a pattern of "contemptuous" conduct, as both lawyers and non-lawyers understand that term.
Under these circumstances, the real question is not whether the defendants should be held in contempt, but what sanction should be imposed on them in order to neutralize their insensitivity to the rights of the plaintiffs, and to stimulate future compliance with the court's orders. Otherwise, the court's orders, though designed to protect the rights of the parties, are mere empty gestures, and the plaintiffs will continue to be at the mercy of the defendants.
In accordance with these objectives, and taking into account the grave harm likely to be suffered by the plaintiff class as a result of the defendants' "contumacy," and the resources available to the defendants, see United States v. Dnited Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 256, 304 (1947), the court will impose a fine to be paid within 180 days of this order, and an additional fine for each day following the issuance of this order that the defendants are not in compliance with this court's orders concerning overcrowding at the Jail. However, the defendants may avoid these fines and purge
-24-

themselves of the contempt finding by demonstrating that they have fully complied with the court's orders during the 180-day period.
The court will also award the plaintiffs the costs, including attorney's fees, which they incurred in prosecuting the contempt motion. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finnev, 437 D.S. 678, 689-93 (1978); Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hospital, 533 P. Supp. 649, 654 (E.D. Pa. 1982). Counsel for plaintiffs should submit an appropriate affidavit in support of this award.
According to the defendants' Reports to the Court dated August 3, 1983, and September 2, 1983, the double-celling of pretrial detainees at the Jail ceased on July 19, 1983: since that date, pretrial detainees have been housed in either single cells or "floor space" (sometimes referred to as "temporary dormitories"). This would appear to be the means by which the Department intends to maintain compliance with the October 8 and December 17 orders. The plaintiffs have claimed that use of these temporary dormitories threatens to subject them to further violations of their constitutional rights, and there is some evidence in the record tending to support their claim. Accordingly, the court will schedule an evidentiary hearing to consider this matter.
The foregoing constitutes the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. An order consistent with this opinion will be
7As the court discussed at pages 14-15, supra, the accuracy of this representation is uncertain.
-25-

*•;-.'.,•>•
entered.

t*i /I

fJ

Date:

. ./u>~

UNITED STATES DISTRJCTJ

-26-

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE D OF COLUMBIA

LEONARD CAMPBELL, et al.

Plaintiffs

ANDERSON MCGRUDER, et al. Defendants

Civil Action No. 1462-71

:

:

-

r i L i L; :;"" 9~ 91'0-31*~1J

ORDER

J/\;.:::

Upon jonsideration of the oral motion of defendants rrade

during the hearing in this matter on November 17, 1983, to

modify the Memorandum and Order of June 27, 1983, to require

submission of reports at monthly intervals, rather than the

30 day intervals specified in said order, the lack of opposition

by plaintiffs' counsel, and it appearing to the Court that the

motion should be granted, it is by the Court, this 2-f day of

November, 1983,

ORDERED: That defendants shall file with the Court and serve

upon counsel for plaintiffs monthly reports as specified in the

Memorandum vnd Order of June 27, 1983. The reports shall b submitted

by the seventh day of the following month; and, it is,

FURTHER ORDERED: That the provisions of the June 27, 1983

Memorandum and Order that are inconsistent herewith be and the

same are hereby vacated.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Campbell v. McGruder

JC-DC-001-037

 
 Campbell v. McGruder
JC-DC-001-039

FILED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CLE

LEONARD CAMPBELL, et al. ,

Plaintiffs,

v.

: Civil Action No

ANDERSON McGRUDER, et al. ,

Defendants

,,
^ c: <£?•, A

INMATES OF D.C. JAIL, et al., :

Plaintiffs,

:

v.

: Civil Action No. 75-166T

DELBERT C. JACKSON, et al., :

Defendants.

:

CONSENT ORDER

As evidenced by the signatures of counsel set forth below

all parties to these actions jointly request that the Court amend

the Order of December 17, 1982, entered in the Campbell case, to

allow the administering of intake physical examinations by

Physician Assistar ;s who have graduated from a nationally iccredited

program and who are also certified by the National Commission on

Certification of Physician Assistants. This Consent Order so

provides.

Upon consideration of the representations made herein, it

is this _"> day of February, 1984:

ORDERED: That paragraph numbered (5) of the Order of

December 17, 1982 be and the same is hereby vacated and in lieu

thereof the following is inserted:

&
(5) No inmate shall be housed in double-cell or dormitory until he has received a medical examination, and it has been determined that he is not suffering from any contagious disease or other condition that would create a danger to his health or safety or to the health and safety of others if he were housed in a double-cell or dormitory.
These medical examinations are to be conducted by a Physician or by a Physician Assistant who has graduated from a nationally accredited program for the training of Physician Assistants and who has been certified by the National Commission on Certification of Physican Assistants, and under the supervision of a Physician pursuant to the procedures outlined in the attached proposed Health Services Order dated February 3, 1984.
INEZ SMITH REID Corporation Counsel, D. C.
JOHN H. SUDA Principal Deputy Corporation Counsel, D.C.
MARTIN L. GROSSMAN Deputy Corporation Counsel, D. C. Civil Division
By: MICHAEC^E. Assistant Corporation Counsel, D. C. Chief, General Litigation Section II Attorney for Defendants District Building, Rm. 314 1350 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W. Washington, D. C. 20004 727-6303
-2-

Steven Ney C/ Mary E. McClymont The National Prison Project of the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Washington, D. C. 20036 202/331-0500
J , jiPatrick 'Hickey Shitw, Pitman, Potts Trowbridge 1800 M Street, N. W. S uite 900 South Washington, D. C. 20036 202/822-1103
So Ordered:
ITED STATES
Z. -

 
 f -••
Campbell v. McGruder

JC-DC-001-041

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF. COLUMBIA

LEONARD CAMPBELL, et al. ,

:

Plaintiffs,

:

v.

:

ANDERSON McGRUDER, et al.,

:

Defendants.

:

C.A. No. 1462-71

INMATES OF D.C. JAIL, et al., :

v.

:

C.A. No. 75-1668

DELBERT C. JACKSON, et al.,

:

Defendants.

:

RECEIVED

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JUL 15 1985
JAMES F. DAVEY,

I. Background

Campbell v. McGruder, which is on remand from the Court of Appeals, 580 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1978), involves the conditions of confinement for pre-trial detainees housed at the District of Columbia's Department of Corrections Central Detention Facility— more commonly known as the D.C. Jail (the jail). The Campbell plaintiffs are a class comprised of unconvicted pre-trial detainees. The defendants are the Mayor of the District of Columbia, the Director of the Department of Corrections and the Superintendent of the jail.

The issues in Inmates v. Jackson are substantially identical to those in Campbell. Plaintiffs in Inmates complain about the same jail conditions, at issue in Campbell and request the same relief. The defendants in both cases are the same. The sole material difference is the mutually exclusive composition of the classes: the Inmates' plaintiffs comprise a class of all convicted residents of the jail, i.e., all prisoners who are not members of the plaintiff class in Campbell.
Throughout the history of these two cases numerous hearings have been held and' evidence taken regarding the conditions of confinement at the jail. While the court has heard testimony concerning several aspects of the conditions at the jail, including medical care, recreation, classification, and visiting procedures, two of the most recent hearings, in November 1983 and in October 1984, have focused on the rising jail population, the substantial overcrowding which has resulted, and the consequences of such overcrowding. The testimony has been supplemented by written submissions to the court and by deposition testimony. In addition, the court and all counsel have conducted a series of thorough on-site inspections, most recently on February 21, 1985. The court also conducted an unannounced inspection on June 3, 1985.
The evidence clearly reveals that the massive overcrowding at the jail has unacceptably diminished services that are recognized as necessities in a prison setting, and has resulted in increased violence at the institution. Plaintiffs claim that the overcrowding is responsible for conditions so acute that they
-2-

;v'' '
violate their rights under the fifth and eighth amendments, and they seek appropriate relief.
II. Findings of Fact
A. The Place and Its Population
The jail is a relatively new facility, which first opened in April 1976. Tt was initially designed to house and provide services for a maximum population of 960 prisoners. The 1980 addition of 395 cells brought the design capacity of the cellblocks up to 1,355.2 On June 30, 1985 the jail reached a record population of 2,663—96% over the design capacity of the cellblocks and 177% above the figure the administrative facilities of the jail were designed to service.
Since November 1980 not a month has passed in which the average number of residents has not surpassed these design capacities, and the population levels have persistently maintained an upward trend. The average daily monthly population
^•Official Department of Corrections' reports frequently do not specify where pre-trial detainees (the Campbell plaintiffs) or convicted inmates (the Inmates plaintiffs) are housed, or which class is involved in a particular activity. "Prisoners", -residents", and "incarcerees" are used interchangeably to describe members of both classes. 2As oriqinally constructed, the jail consisted of two separate units: a housing section, comprising 12 cellblocks with 960 single-bed cells; and an administrative section—an infirmary, kitchen, storerooms, recreation yards, library, visitation area, and offices—designed to provide services for the prisoners and the staff. This administrative section has never been expanded.
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has increased from 1,491 in 1981 to 2,116 in 1983 and 2,534 in 1985.3
B. Use of "Floor-space" Areas for Housing
The jail holds 18 cellblocks, each of which is designed to hold 80 cells. The cellblocks are in a "V" shape. Both sides of the "V" have a lower and upper tier, each of which holds 20 cells. Aisles run down the center of each tier. A glassenclosed security module or "bubble" lies at the apex of the "V"s, from which guards can look down the aisles of each tier and into the four lounges or "dayrooms", a small gymnasium, and a
small dining area. 4
On June 4, 1985 the jail housed 2,618 prisoners. Only 71% of the prisoners were housed in cells, and more than half of these were double-bunked in single cells. All told, 29% of the jail population is housed in dayrooms, aisles, gymnasiums, various holding "cages", and even a converted warehouse, none of which was ever designed as housing space.
3January 1 thru June 30, 1985. Unless otherwise indicated all population figures and
percentages are based on the Department's report to the court for June 4, 1985. On that date the jail housed 2,618 prisoners. Jail officials could specify the precise location and status of only 2,538 of the 2,618 incarcerees; they could not account for
the exact location of the remaining 80 prisoners other than to
say they were were "unassigned" or in "orientation". Pre-trial detainees accounted for 36.9% of the population, 25% of whom were awaiting trial on misdemeanors; the remaining detainees were held on felony charges. Of the inmates, 29% had been convicted of misdemeanors; 68% had been convicted of felonies; and 4% were being held for parole violations.
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These areas were principally designed to provide recreation and breathing room and to serve as safety valves for the pressures and tensions normally incident to life in a jail. With the conversion of dayrooms and other common areas from recreational outlets to housing units, the pressures have intensified, the opportunities for respite and relief have diminished, and the expected tensions and problems of incarceration have been exacerbated. The safety valves are now sealed shut.
1. "North-3 'Dorm'" — This large open storeroom is located in the two upper tiers of one cellblock. Originally designed (and formerly used solely) as a warehouse for supplies, it holds 103 unsegregated prisoners, pre-trial and convicted, violent and non-violent, in an area 3,744 square feet in size. As many as 167 prisoners have been lodged in the "dorm". This "dorm" has only four toilets and four showers. The residents sleep in double bunks. At times prisoners have slept on mattresses placed directly on the concrete floor, and blankets and newspapers have carpeted the area. The double bunks are jammed tightly together, leaving little space in which to move around. Prisoners must lie idle in their bunks or stretch out on the concrete. One of plaintiffs' expert witnesses, E. Eugene Miller, described these conditions, with considerable justification, as "absolutely incredible.... To call it a dormitory is glorifying it."
No permanent lockers or shelves are provided for prisoners to secure their personal property. Instead, residents must store these items in unsecured paper grocery bags or shoe boxes. There
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it
are no tables or chairs. Most residents eat standing up, sitting in their bunks, or on the floor. The double bunks are situated very close together and the aisles between the bunks are very narrow; consequently guards in the security bubble have no clear line of sight into most of the "dorm". The numerous blind spots permit guards to monitor only a small fraction of the warehouse area, notwithstanding the so-called patrolling of the area. Consequently, this dorm is conceded to be the most violent and dangerous housing unit in the jail.
2. Dayrooms — Each of the 18 cellblocks contains four dayrooms, each approximately 15 by 20 feet in size. The dayrooms were designed as recreational, not housing, areas. In 16 of the 18 cellblocks two of the four dayrooms are used for housing, with inmates and pre-trial detainees, felons and misdemeanants frequently living side by side. These dayrooms now hold 344 prisoners. Typically 14 residents are housed in each dayroom, providing each prisoner with 21.6 square feet of living space. At times as many as 32 prisoners have been housed in two dayrooms. These rooms have neither toilets nor sinks. They have no showers. Instead, prisoners must share the showers and toilets set aside for celled incarcerees. As in the North-3 "dorm," prisoners store their belongings in paper bags.
No guards are stationed in the dayrooms. As in the "dorm," blind spots cannot be supervised from the centrally-positioned security bubble. Privacy is completely absent. Except for his assigned bunk, a resident has no place to call his own. Even while he is sleeping a prisoner is typically surrounded by five
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other residents—one at each side, one at his head, another at his feet, and one either directly above or below him.
3. Aisles — Overcrowding has become so severe that defendants have been forced to convert passageways between rows of cells into areas for housing. The aisles of 11 of the cellblocks now hold 238 prisoners, who are double-bunked down the center of each tier. Personal property lies in open cardboard boxes, ready prey for all who amble by.
4. Mini-gymnasiums — Each cellblock contains a small gym, 29 x 29 feet. The gyms were designed to provide residents with a place to exercise the body and exorcise the built-up tensions of confinement. There are 44 prisoners housed in three gyms. One of these gyms is now designated for housing 30 "intake" prisoners. There are no toilets, sinks or showers in the gyms. There are no windows. Lighting is poor; during a recent inspection by the court, only 6 of 36 overhead fluorescent bulbs in one gym worked. There are no provisions for the storage of personal property, aside from the commonplace paper boxes.
5. Infirmary "cage" — This 'ock-up facility is located in the jail infirmary and is designed to temporarily hold prisoners waiting to be seen by medical personnel. The cage is roughly 15 feet by 23.5 feet — 352.5 square feet — in size. On weekends and evenings the cage has been used as sleeping quarters for as many as 47 prisoners at a time. The cage contains no beds or mattresses, no toilets, sink or shower, no drinking facility, no table, no chairs or other places to sit (other than the concrete floor). The prisoners assigned to the cage are not screened to
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determine if they have any communicable diseases or other medical or psychological conditions which might require that they be segregated from other prisoners. Similarly, individuals are placed in the cage without regard to whether they pose a security risk to other prisoners.
6. "Police holding" cells and "cage" — This facility houses women awaiting arraignment. The average stay is one night during the week and up to 30 hours on weekends. Although there are only six double-bunked cells in the unit, each 58.1 square feet in size, on occasion more than 20 women have been housed in this area, with cots placed in a 60 square foot "cage" or in the aisle. When the court visited the jail in February 1985, four of the six cells had filthy, uncovered foam rubber mattresses on the floor.
C. Double Celling
As we have noted, the majority of convicted inmates (924 of 1,601) are double-bunked in ce'is originally designed for single occupancy. The cells are 70 square feet in size, and are spartanly equipped with two stacked beds, a table, a chair, a combination sink and toilet, and a 24" by 42" plexiglass window. There is centrally controlled heating in the winter and air-conditioning in the summer. The cells have only average light, which often constitutes a problem for inmates assigned to the lower bunk. The windows are opaque, which reduces the natural light that might otherwise supplement the artificial
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illumination. The windows cannot be opened.
D. Time Out of Housing Units and-Average Length of Stay
All prisoners must stay in their assigned quarters for an average of 16 hours a day. They must remain locked up for even longer periods if the population count (held six times a day) does not match the master prison list, an event which recurs more frequently than not.
As of October 20, 1983 the average length of stay for convicted inmates was 125.5 days. More than 22% of the inmates had been incarcerated for longer than six months; more than 10% had been in jail for over nine months.
E. Recreation, Idleness, and Lack of Privacy
Numbers alone cannot fully convey the human consequences of housing so many people in such limited and unsuitable spaces. One of plaintiffs1 exper . witnesses, Dr. Francis L. Rundle, testified that overcrowding in one cellblock was so severe "it was almost impossible to walk between [sic] the aisles that were formed by the double bunks in the gymnasium. It was not possible, for example, to squeeze by another person in some of these spaces they were so narrow." Another of plaintiffs1 expert witnesses, E. Eugene Miller, reported that the inhabitants were "stacked like cordwood .... The overall conditions in the women's cellblock are absolutely appalling." In the North-3
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"dorm" the court observed double bunks considerably less than 3 feet apart, forcing one to walk sideways in order to pass between them.
There are virtually no activities for prisoners while they are locked up in their assigned cells or floor-space housing units. No individual radios or TVs are allowed. Double-celled inmates and floor-space residents have little room in which to move around or exercise. These conditions would not be so important if residents were permitted to spend more out-of-cell time in various activities.
The dayrooms were designed to provide prisoners with the jail equivalent of a home den. Each dayroom was intended to serve 20 prisoners. Overcrowding has now rendered nearly all the dayrooms actually or practically inaccessible, because nearly half are used as sleeping quarters and thus jammed with beds, and because many more prisoners than anticipated are forced to share the remaining number of open dayrooms. Now, instead of 80 prisoners sharing four dayrooms, in 16 of 18 cellblocks as many as 204 prisoners mus . make do with only two of such rooms. l'hus each dayroom must serve as many as five times the number of persons originally contemplated.
Defendants' most recent reports indicate that only 319 prisoners (approximately 12%) are enrolled in educational classes: reading, mathematics, typing, needlecrafts, art, commercial housekeeping, "adult basic education," "general education development", and "vocational development."
Overcrowding has greatly reduced opportunities for physical
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recreation, which are particularly needed by prisoners, Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d at 565. The oft-times poorly lit gyms, when not used to house prisoners, are too small for any sport other than a quarter-court basketball game. Moreover, the gyms are open for use only a few hours each day.
Prisoners receive a maximum of three hours of outdoor recreation per week, less than that if the weather is bad. There are two exercise yards, one for men and one for women. The larger male yard is a nearly square walled-in area approximately 36 yards long by "36 yards wide. Prisoners from three male cellblocks share the male yard at one time, forcing up to 479 prisoners to share space that contains but a single full-size basketball court, a volleyball court and one punching bag. Protective custody prisoners have no access to the yard and are allowed no outdoor recreation.
Rather than providing an opportunity for the release of tension, the overcrowded gyms and recreation yard have been transformed into another source of frustration, another arena of competition fcr limited space and equipment, and another cause for conflict and violence.
There are four telephones in each cellblock. These are used for phone calls to attorneys and family members. The phones are turned on for use during a few hours in the morning and in the evening. They are frequently broken. Large numbers of residents must share these scarce resources; fights over access to the phones are common. More residents also means more noise. Because the phones are located in the midst of the crowded dining
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?;•-••
area and adjacent to the gym and because of the noise from the TV set and from other prisoners, telephone users often cannot hear those whom they call. This was apparent on all visits to the site.
The visiting facilities are overloaded and visiting privileges have been curtailed. Jail Administrator William Long stated "visiting used to be allowed on any day, but due to overcrowding visiting is now limited to two designated days per week for each inmate." Overcrowding and delays occasioned by problems with the count have resulted in longer waits to see visitors and increased frustration, which is often taken out on the jail staff. Only non-contact visits are permitted.
Residents who want to do their own legal research face strenuous obstacles. Only 15 residents of each cellblock are permitted access to the 4,240 volume law library each week. Consequently, many prisoners are not able to do any effective research on their own behalf.
Each cellblock has a small dining area, with enough tables and benches to seat 40 prisoners. Originally, prisoners in each block were fed in two shifts, thereby permitting all 80 singlecelled prisoners in each block the opportunity to sit down for meals. Now, prepared food trays are distributed to cellblock residents at one time. With as many as 204 prisoners housed in a single block, and only 40 seats in the dining area, many
prisoners are forced to eat their meals standing up, in their
5The Department of Corrections inmates at Occoquan and federal prison inmates enjoy contact visits.
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A
bunks, or on the floor. Privacy is at a premium. No one is ever outside the
presence of other prisoners. Dr. Rundle testified that residents he interviewed "stressed that they could never be alone, even in the toilets, because the toilets tended to be either open to view or, if enclosed, in the middle of an area where there were many, many people around ...." This was apparent when we visited the jail. The facilities and services which are ordinarily contemplated as escape valves have been effectively transformed into pressure points.
F. Classification and Parole
Classification and parole (C & P) officers play a crucial role in the lives of all prisoners. As the title implies, C & P officers are charged with classifying and segregating prisoners so that conflict and violence are minimized, and with providing social services to residents to enable prisoners to qualify for parole and reintegration into the community.
Classification of prisoners, by status (convicted or pretrial), by offense (misdemeanor or felony), by medical or psychiatric condition, and by charge (violent or non-violent offense) is supposed to separate residents so that they pose the least danger to each other; with whom residents are housed is often just as important as where they are housed. Overcrowding at the jail has greatly undermined the ability of jail authorities to categorize and segregate prisoners in a timely
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t
r
fashion. For example, on June 3, 1983 then Assistant Administrator William Long wrote to Administrator Jesse Jones: "As a result of the population explosion and the increase of inexperienced new correctional officers, it has become extremely difficult to identify the extremely assaultive, and special handling type inmates returning to the institution whether from the community, [the Federal] Bureau of Prisons, or other institutions." Incoming residents are assigned to whatever floor-space "beds" are available on a catch-as-catch-can basis. Violent and non-violent prisoners, pre-trial and convicted residents, youthful first offenders and obdurate recidivists, the healthy and the sick, all live side by side in these areas, creating an extremely volatile situation and subjecting residents to a high risk of assault. Although defendants have denominated all cellblocks as either "pre-trial" or "convicted", in reality most cellblocks house both classes of prisoners. Overcrowding has obliged jail officials to house protective custody prisoners in double cells and even in open floor-space areas.
A single Classification and Parol . (C & P) officer is responsible for classifying the 40-70 new residents that arrive at the jail each day. Performing this duty accurately has become a daunting task, with speed often supplanting precision. This officer has little time to make these critical assessments and because the "intake records" that accompany each new prisoner are often incomplete, the C & P officer usually lacks the background material (the prisoner's criminal record, his past institutional behavior, and any existing medical or mental health problems)
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needed to make an informed decision. Nine other C & P officers function as social workers and are
entrusted with contacting attorneys, arranging for psychiatric referrals, and bridging the gap between a prisoner and his family and his employer. The number of C & P officers has increased only 43% during the period when the jail population has nearly doubled. Their average caseload has swollen to nearly 300. Not surprisingly, a new prisoner can spend months in jail before having his first full discussion with his C & P officer.
George E. Holland, Assistant Director of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections, acknowledged that the inordinately high caseloads prevent the C & P officers from adequately performing their assigned duties. Instead, C & P officers are often only available to prisoners in emergencies, and even then only after lengthy delays. Residents who seek the relatively secure confines of protective custody, either because they have received specific threats from other prisoners or because they have a generalized fear of jail violence, must wait weeks to see C & P officers and have their transfer requests processed.
The C & P officers are also responsible for assisting sentenced inmates in qualifying for parole. Once again, the sheer numbers of cases assigned to a single officer hampers his ability to provide effective service to individual inmates. Lack of contact with C & P officers has frequently led to delayed parole hearings. On numerous occasions inmates have remained incarcerated seven to nine months past their parole dates.
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(©;
G. Shelter and Sanitation
1. Food Service
Evidence presented at the November 1983 hearing revealed a concededly appalling situation — filthy and vermin-infested cooking facilities, unsanitary dishes, trays and utensils, inadequate storage space, and spoiling meats, fruits, and vegetables.
Defendants have made laudable and largely successful efforts to correct these problems. New equipment has been purchased and sanitation shortcomings have been reduced. Nevertheless, overcrowding and the sheer shortage of kitchen space have created problems which even the most dedicated exertions and the most modern equipment cannot solve. Thus, the kitchen, which was built to feed 960 prisoners, must now provide for nearly three times that number. It is forced to run nearly 24 hours a day. As a result, the jail's meal sc'edule is geared to the kitchen's round-the-clock operation, with the ludicrous consequence that breakfast is delivered to some prisoners as early as 2:50 in the morning.
2. Personal Hygiene
Each cell has a sink and toilet." Each tier of 20 cells has two showers. However, since the aisles, gyms, dorm, and dayrooms
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were never designed for housing purposes they were never furnished with toilets, sinks, or showers. This lack of facilities has three consequences.
First, floor-space residents are obliged to share the eight cellblock showers originally intended for use by a maximum of 80 celled residents, thereby increasing the ratio of use from one shower per ten residents to as many as one per twenty-five. Second, floor-space residents are forced to make do with what amounts to "public" toilets in cells left vacant for that purpose. Instead ot one toilet and sink for each resident, as originally designed, or one for two prisoners, as in the doublebunked cells, as many as 40 floor-space residents can be allotted to a single toilet and sink.
The final consequence is that many of the showers and most of the toilets and sinks set aside for use by floor-space incarcerees are overused, poorly maintained, filthy, and unsanitary. Many of the toilets lack toilet paper. Most show stains from urine and feces. None have toilet brushes. Few of the sinks have soap or sanitary towels.
Unsanitary conditions pervade other areas of the jail as well. Observation by plaintiffs' experts, and by the court as well, revealed dirty mattresses and bedding. Some were fouled with urine, fecal material, food and vomit. Others were in poor repair. With many more prisoners housed than ever planned for, jail authorities are forced to require more senior residents to use the dirty mattresses longer than desirable and are obliged to issue decrepit and unclean mattresses to incoming prisoners.
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H. Health Services
Systemic deficiencies pervade all aspects of the health care services provided at the jail — medical, pharmaceutical, psychiatric and dental. Dr. Robert W. Yancey, Jr., a Medical Officer at the jail who testified extensively at the November 1983 hearing, characterized the health services system as being overwhelmed by the endlessly increasing numbers of prisoners. He acknowledged that the system is so overburdened that it "is like a dam in which you are just trying to keep the water ... from coming through ...," a situation in which n[i]t is just a matter of time until it just floods everybody ...." At the time Dr. Yancey testified the average daily population was 1,979. Increased overcrowding since that time has only exacerbated the problems.
The jail infirmary was built to serve the needs of a maximum population of 960. Initially, 24 beds were provided for nonpsychiatric patient .—a ratio of 40:1. Although the population is now 177% higher than it was in 1976, since one-half of the infirmary beds are typically used by mentally ill residents, the number of beds actually available for non-psychiatric cases has been cut in half, producing a ratio of 218:1.
Dr. Yancey stated that the over-population of the jail had substantially impaired the ability of physicians and other staff to deliver prompt and adequate health care. The rise in the jail population since November 1983 has further increased the number
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of residents requiring physical examinations, x-rays, and admission to the jail infirmary, as well as the number of medications dispensed. As a result, ill and injured prisoners do not receive proper and timely treatment. According to Dr. Yancey: "With the increased population it is more difficult .... We are really stretched now. We see everything [sic] we can, but some fall through the cracks."
The increase in the jail population and the diminution in the number of beds available for medical cases has not been offset by an increase in the number of health care personnel. In fact, although the jail population has nearly tripled from January 1980 until the present the number of health care personnel has remained virtually constant. The health services system is chronically short of staff and space. In January 1980 there were 25 medical personnel at the jail: three full-time physicians, two part-time physicians, one pharmacist, two dentists, seven nurses, one physician's assistant, eight medical technical assistants, and one x-ray technician. At that time the jail population was 921; the ratio of prisoners to n.edical staff was 37:1.
Currently, there are 26 medical personnel to care for a population that is 184% larger than it was in January 1980. The ratio of prisoners to medical staff is now 101:1. Furthermore, the composition of the medical staff has changed. There are now four fewer doctors and nurses than there were in 1980. There are now only two full-time physicians (one of whom is a supervisor) and two part-time physicians. The decline in the
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number of nurses from seven to five is equally critical. Dr.
Yancey testified that "[t]hey are the glue that holds everything
together."
The shortage of medical personnel is not only acute, it is
chronic; there were too few medical staff members before
overcrowding became severe. A March 29, 1982 memorandum from Dr.
Robert E. Lee, Assistant Director of Health Services to
Department of Corrections Director Holland reported:
Explosively within the last year or less there has "been an added number of inmates^ further diluting medical services .... This increase has not had a concomitant increase in already depleted medical personnel which have never been up to the arbitrary freeze complement ....
The Public Health Survey of 1968 concluded that minimally seventy-three (73) medical personnel were necessary to carry out medical functions at that time.
One wonders what such a survey would reveal at this time with the drastic increase in both numbers and sophistication of incarcerees!l '
A November 4, 1982 letter to Director Holland from the jail's
Chief Medical Officer, Dr. Francis L. Smith, reached an identical
conclusion:
The Health Care Delivery Program is severely hampered in carrying out its responsibility to provide medical care to incarcerated persons. This condition exists because of increased demand for
6At the time the memo was written, the average daily population in the jail stood at 1,769. A year before the average daily number was 1,419. 7 A year later, Dr. Lee explained that "the original staffing of 30 was not adequate to handle an inmate population of 1,353...."
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health services on the part of inmates. In spite of a large increase in the jail population, staffing levels have remained the same and~~have caused major deficiencies in the health care delivery program .... Present medical staff members have been compelled to forego daily sick call to all residents who place their names on lists for medical attention. They are confined basically to caring for (1) new commitments, (2) referrals from correctional staff, (3) surgical conditions, and (4) emergencies. [Emphasis added.]
On March 3, 1983 Dr. Lee recommended that an additional 32 medical personnel should be hired, including one more physician (for a total of six) and eight more nurses (for a total of twelve). These warnings and requests have been ignored.
The drastic cut-back in the number of available beds, the "explosive" growth in population and the defendants' failure to provide more facilities and to hire more personnel also has had a predictable effect on staff morale. Dr. Yancey said: "You kind of wonder when you are going to get more help. Where is it going to end?" Defendants' reports indicate that medical personnel have requested more sick leave, more overtime, more annual leave, and more leave without pay. Defendants concede that this situation has made the hiring and retention of "qualified dedicated" personnel a "perpetual problem". Director James F. Palmer acknowledged that the overcrowded conditions have rendered the jail unattractive as a work site for professionals and is probably the biggest obstacle to acquiring additional medical staff.
1. Medical Care
In January 1980 sick call was available to each resident five
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©
t
times a week during daytime hours. By the time of the November 1983 hearing shortages of space and staff had forced defendants to hold sick call between 12:30 and 4:00 a.m. Nonetheless, sick call was still available to every resident on every weekday. Now sick call is again conducted during normal business hours, but is available to each prisoner only once a week. Donald R. Soskin, Health Services Administrator at the jail, reported on April 25, 1985 that "[slick call service ... continues to be marginal in effectiveness." Initial screening examinations are performed by physician's assistants, who decide whether a physician's attention is required. During evenings and weekends untrained guards are often pressed into service to make the initial determination of who will be treated and who will not. Accordingly, it is not surprising that many residents with medical complaints are never seen by a physician, and thus, as Dr. Yancey concluded, "some fall through the cracks."
Prisoners who are denied an appointment with a physician must sign up again. Weeks can pass before they are seen by a physician. Uncontroverted evidence de.ailed numerous incidents in which prisoners' complaints were ignored and treatment delayed for lengthy periods. For example, on one occasion a guard told a prisoner that the latter did not appear to be acutely ill and therefore had neither reason nor right to be sent to the infirmary and seen by a physician. Coverage is particularly thin during evenings and weekends. On occasion, the infirmary has been closed because of frequent emergency calls to the cellblocks,. The converse is also true; personnel have refused to leave the
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infirmary to provide emergency medical assistance to inmates. Thus this past March a guard lieutenant who had requested assistance for a resident was informed that none would be forthcoming—only one staff person was in the infirmary. A similar instance occurred three days later.
Even when access to the infirmary is not denied outright it is often delayed. One inmate, complaining of pains symptomatic of a heart attack, waited two and one-half weeks before being seen by a physician. Numerous other instances were reported where residents repeatedly had to sign up for sick call before they were "sick enough" to be seen by a physician.
Once prisoners have been examined and their illnesses diagnosed they frequently have to wait additional lengthy periods to receive prescribed medication or treatment. One prisoner who had been stabbed in a fight was denied medication that had been ordered by hospital surgeons. Another resident waited three weeks to receive asthma medication. A third waited three weeks to receive medication that had been prescribed by his private physician before his incarceration.
Another prisoner, who had broken his toe while working in the jail kitchen, waited more than two months for surgicallyrecommended orthopedic shoes. On another occasion a prisoner with hypertension, who had been placed on a special diet by a jail doctor, never received the ordered meals.
Prisoners in need of the services of medical specialists fare even worse. Long delays in obtaining initial appointments are commonplace. One prisoner, who was instructed by a jail physician
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, •
to schedule an appointment with a psychologist, waited seven weeks before he received an appointment. Another waited six months before recommended oral surgery was performed.
Prisoners with optometrical problems apparently go to the bottom of the list. One prisoner, whose eyeglasses had been broken during his arrest and without which he was virtually blind, was required to wait three weeks just to get his eyes examined. He was relatively fortunate; two other residents had to wait seven months before they received eyeglasses. Yet another prisoner was told by a guard captain that "it takes at least one year incarcerated before an eye exam and the prescription can be accomplished."
The medical records system is conceded to be "chaotic". Patients who are examined by physicians at the District of Columbia General Hospital must wait for the "Recommended Treatment" and laboratory reports to be reviewed and acted upon by the jail infirmary staff. According to Dr. Yancey, because of the large number of prisoners and the large volume of hospital records transmitted, these reports remain unreviewed for "weeks, months."
The distribution of medications violates generally recognized standards of medical care. Because of the shortage of pharmaceutical personnel, prescription drugs are not passed out on
weekends or evenings.8 Sometimes medical technical assistants
80n October 18, 1983, the Chief Medical Officer, Dr. John H. Seipel, in a memorandum to Dr. Lee, then Assistant Director for Health Services, reported: "(t]he continuing lack of pharmacists/pharmacy technicians makes it necessary for physicians, nurses, and unlicensed MTAs to fill and dispense medications resulting in a partial absence of control .... (continued)
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distribute a one or two week supply of medications to residents at one time. Distribution of prescriptions containing narcotics is more carefully controlled, but even these drugs, which may be required to be taken three or four times a day, and which should be dispensed in individual doses no less frequently, are passed out but once or twice a day. Dr. Yancey lamented "[t]here is no other way we can do it right now.... We have too many people."
2. Mental Health Services
Medical care at the jail is, in Dr. Yancey's words, "coming apart at the seams." Mental health services never came together in the first place. Dr. Irwin J. Papish, Associate Chief of Forensic Psychiatry, conceded that the population increases have overloaded the psychiatric facilities and services.
Instances of bizarre and self-destructive behavior by prisoners are routine. Defendants1 cellblock logbooks and other records reveal repeated suicide attempts, residents pounding their heads against cell alls, fights and assaults, setting of fires, hoarding of medicine and overdosing, destruction of mattresses and bedding, urinating on the floor, smearing feces on themselves, incessant shouting and yelling—in short, as the court described five years ago, "a bedlam." Campbell v. McGruder, C.A. No. 146271, slip op. at 2 (D.D.C. June 9, 1980).
Two cellblocks have been set aside for the treatment of
Patient.workload has increased steadily at a rate of about five percent per month over the past six months, further impacting our overloaded staff and services." (Emphasis added.)
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- -yr *
mentally ill residents. Nonetheless, population pressures have forced defendants to house some of the mentally ill among the general population, despite the court's order that the two groups should be separated. As the Corrections Mental Health Coordinator Wendell S. Plair lamented some nslip[] through the cracks."
Care of the mentally ill is further hampered by bureaucratic disputes among the mental health care staff, creating a situation plaintiffs' experts, Dr. Frank L. Rundle and Dr. Ron Sable, aptly characterized as an "administratively chaotic" "non-system." Two different groups of personnel attempt to provide mental health services to prisoners, without any coordination, and without any unified administrative or clinical authority, responsibility or supervision. This lack of coordination diminishes the quality of care provided to patients.
Dr. Henry E. Edwards, Chief of the jail Mental Health Program reported in 1982 that the overlapping lines of authority had led to^"conflicts, tensions, ... morale problems, ... confusion, inconsistencies, and at times, non-performance of, or interference with, actual program delivery to inmates." While this situation has improved somewhat over the last year, Dr. Papish acknowledged that overall conditions have not.
There are no full-time psychiatrists or psychologists to provide daily care and counseling. No mental health professionals are in the jail on evenings or weekends. Instead of full-time staff, six part-time psychiatrists provide rotating coverage of "screening clinics" held five days a week. This situation presents serious problems in the diagnosis and treatment of
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residents with mental health needs. Dr. Yancey stated that patients "can be seen by three different people and the other three [sic] not know- it .... U ] t is hard to make a judgment if you have only seen [a patient] one time ... It has [sic] problems for the patient adjusting to the physician." According to Dr. Yancey, the jail has no "psychiatrists under our control. It is a tremendous handicap for us. It is very; very bad. They are not here when we need them."
No intake psychiatric screening is performed at the time of a prisoner's commitment to the jail, despite testimony that incoming prisoners are more likely to have mental health problems than the average citizen. See Campbell v. McGruder, 416 F. Supp. 100, 104 (D.D.C. 1975). Instead, screening occurs only if a prisoner requests mental health services or manifests a condition that appears to require such services. This initial screening is carried out on an ad hoc basis and is performed by guards, unlicensed MTAs, certified physicians assistants or registered nurses, few of whom are trained to assess psychological problems. Thus prisoners with mental health problems may never be seen by mental health professionals.
The increased number of prisoners who are determined to be in need of mental health care face delays in being diagnosed and additional delays in receiving scheduled follow-up examinations. Currently, residents are required to wait up to three weeks after their placement in the special cellblocks before they are examined by a psychiatrist. A noncertified physician's assistant, who lacks training in mental health care, performs the "triage"
-27-

function of deciding when residents will be seen by a psychiatrist.
These delays are commonplace despite the fact the psychiatrists are forced to evaluate large numbers of patients in short periods of time. Although Dr. Papish asserted that he never lacked for time, it appears to the court that frequently such evaluations are largely pro forma. For example, on one recent day 33 patients were "examined" in 75 minutes.
As a result of the increased population pressures, few patients receive individualized treatment. The activities provided for residents do not even approach those provided at a typical out-patient "day-care" facility. Instead, the standard regimen calls for the prescription of psychotropic drugs. Mr. Plair "conservatively" estimated that 80% of the mentally ill residents receive daily doses of these medications—250-300 residents in all.
Although this is by far the most common "treatment" provided to the mentally ill the record is replete with examples of abuses in the dispensation and administration of such drugs. Individual residents often do not receive their prescribed medications. Staff shortages have forced entire cellblocks to go without their medications, for up to three days at a time. On some of these occasions guards have been obliged to "deadlock" entire cellblocks in order to prevent disruptions by the anguished patients.
Medications are dispensed in an extremely short period of time to the residents of the mental health cellblocks, making it very difficult to monitor the residents for possible adverse side-
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effects. To make matters worse, because of staff shortages medications are frequently prepared and dispensed by personnel who lack specialized psychopharmaceutical training.
Prisoners who are diagnosed as potentially suicidal or otherwise in need of more intensive care scarcely fare any better than those who are never evaluated and examined. "Diagnosed" residents often do not receive the treatment they need at the time they need it. Long delays are the rule. Suicide precautions, when ordered, are frequently not carried out. Because the special mental health facility is itself invariably filled beyond capacity, potential suicides are placed in the regular medical infirmary or housed in administrative segregation. Neither placement comports with generally recognized correctional or mental health standards. Tyically, 50% of the beds in the infirmary are filled with psychiatric patients, persons who require more intensive and specialized care than that facility can provide. The "treatment" potential suicides receive there is often nothing more than a steady diet of sedatives and the imposition of physic?, restraints. Compare Campbell v. McGruder, 416 F. Supp. at 104.
Tragically, but not surprisingly, there were four suicides at the jail from January 1983 to January 1984, and numerous attempted suicides since then, including three suicide attempts in one cellblock in a single recent month. Dr. Rundle and Dr. Sable testified that the two suicides that occurred in the six months preceding the November 1983 hearing could have been prevented had the prisoners received even minimally adequate mental health care
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and monitoring. The quality and organization of the jail's mental health
services does not come even close to complying with minimum professional standards.
3. Dental Care
"Prisoners generally have more extensive dental problems than the average citizen. Consequently dental care is one cf the most important medical needs of inmates." Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 576 (10th Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981). Nevertheless, "dental care" at the jail is an oxymoron. In years past a dental sick call was held daily. Dr. Yancey testified that it "had to be abandoned because there were just too many people." Now only emergency cases are treated; "routine" dental needs, the kind that would prompt a free citizen to seek the services of a dentist — examinations, cavities, tooth extractions, — are left for another day and another place. According to Dr. Yincey, non-emergency but otherwise "ser*ous" dental needs are "not being met for weeks, even months." As a consequence, prisoners must endure prolonged and severe pain. Plaintiffs, however, disputed that even emergency cases, as that term is defined by the jail medical staff — abscesses and infectious diseases requiring oral surgery — were being seen and treated as quickly as the prisoners' needs required.
The lack of even the pretense of an adequate dental care system has led to untold pain and suffering among both classes of
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prisoners.
I. Jail Violence
Overcrowding and the concomitant overburdening of facilities and services has created an atmosphere of apprehension, frustration, and hostility. It has also decreased the ability of guards to supervise the cellblocks. As a result, violence at the jail has reached alarmingly high levels. "Disciplinary" and "incident" reports of violence, compiled by defendants, reveal numerous physical assaults by prisoners on other prisoners or on the jail staff and frequent fights, sexual attacks, attempted escapes, and attempts to incite riots. In 1984, with an average daily population of 2,024, the total number of violent incidents was 1,541. Significantly, the number of violent incidents has increased at a disproportionately higher rate than the increase in the jail population, nearly two-and-a-half times faster.
In the first four months of 1984 the average daily population at the jai'.; was 1,854; for the last four months oi that year the average was 2,242 — an increase of 20.9%. During the same periods the total number of violent incidents (as reflected in the "disciplinary" or "incident" reports for assaults, attempted assaults, threats, sexual abuse, fights, escapes and escape attempts, inciting to riot, and creating a disturbance) increased from an average of 105 per month to 155 per month — a 48% jump,
q nearly two-and-a-half times the rate of increase in population.
Defendants contend that the dramatic increase in the number
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(&
of reported incidents reflects better reporting by more guards and thus does not constitute an increase disproportionate to the increase in the jail population. In an affidavit supplied to the court, Administrator Long stated: "it is my opinion that the most significant factors which produced the increase in the number of reported incidents ... were the increase in the number of officers assigned to the institution, more direct supervision of officers with emphasis on reporting, plus the increase in the number of residents housed at the institution."
The number of guards has increased approximately 11% — from an average of 498 for January through April to an average of 552 for September through December 1984. At the same time, however, the critical ratio of prisoners to guards has actually decreased from 3.7:1 for the first four months to 4.1:1 for the last four months.
The court also finds the thorough explanation provided by plaintiffs1 expert Eugene Miller more credible, illuminating and probative than defendants' self-serving speculations: Mr. Miller reported:
[A]dditional staffing is not the answer to the security problems ...; the real threats to security go beyond throwing increasing numbers of staff at the problems .... These threats include the increased levels of anxiety and tension among the inmate population brought on by cramped living conditions, lack of sufficient out-of-cell time, and a routine of continual and debilitating boredom. Given these factors, realistically staff
^These figures take on perhaps added significance when we consider that less than half of the population are incarcerated for violent offenses.
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G
increases can be expected to heighten staff response to incidents, but will do nothing to alleviate the causes of such incidents.... The new officers will be used to bolster staff observation potential, not to increase the level, variety and frequency of inmate activity. To put it bluntly, the most serious single factor currently constituting a threat to the safety of other inmates and staff is the pervasive overcrowding and its corresponding negative human impact upon the inmates, not lack of an adequate number of staff. Given that, as the level of tension escalates among the inmates, the likelihood for an increased level of assaults and more serious incidents, such as the fire-setting in the past several months, also increases dramatically.
The statistics corroborate what testimony averred — that the
jail is an increasingly hostile and dangerous place in which to
live and that the chief cause of the ever-widening violence is the
growth of the jail population and the resultant strain on
prisoners, staff, facilities, and services. As Director Holland
admitted: "you decrease the boiling point as you cut off services
that should be available to [the prisoners]." The evidence
convinces the court that the disproportionately increasing number
of violent incidents is caused by crowding too many people into
too small a space.
A disproportionate amount of violence occurs in the makeshift
open housing areas, where "violent" residents are allowed to
mingle among the "non-violent", and where the deterrent presence
of guards is most noticeably absent. Indeed, when defendants
first asked this court to temporarily authorize double-celling of
pre-trial detainees, they justified their request on the fact that
prisoners in cells can be more easily observed and more readily
controlled than prisoners in open housing areas. Campbell v.
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<• . *
McGruder, 554 F. Supp. 562, 563, 565 (D.D.C. 1982). Residents are more susceptible to gang attacks in the "floor-
space" areas, where there are more opportunities for violence, and more potential collaborators as well. The physical arrangement of these areas reduces the ability of guards to monitor the conduct of prisoners and diminishes the willingness and ability of guards to stop attacks or fights once the incidents are noticed. These areas are virtually unguardable.
Many floor-space residents told Dr. Rundle that they lived in constant fear of assaults and rape. Eugene Miller concluded that n[t]hese temporary housing quarters ... pose a significant and continuing threat to the safety of the [residents] housed in that fashion.... As long as these dormitories remain, there will be a serious actual and potential threat to the overall security of the [jail] .... [T]hey virtually constitute an assault waiting to happen." (Emphasis added.)
Furthermore, there are dangers greater than individual assaults and fights. On July 22, 1983 a riot occurred at the jail. Hundreds of prisoners engaged in armed resistance to jail authorities. Fires were set in the exercise yard and in a number of the cellblocks. There was large-scale destruction of jail and residents1 property and the staff and prisoners suffered numerous injuries. Order was not restored until large numbers of heavily armed police and guards arrived.
10This is also reflected in the number of persons in protective custody and the increased number of requests by prisoners for the same.
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<?••
(••'•••
In the month that preceded this disturbance, the jail population reached a then all-time high of 2,433. At the time of the riot jail officials identified overcrowding, and the long train of miseries that follow in its wake, as the principal causes of the riot. The jail population is now nearly 8% higher than it was at the time of the riot. Overall conditions have worsened. Health care services, substandard for a long time, have further deteriorated. There are fewer doctors, fewer nurses, and less frequent sick call. Violence has become a daily habit. During the February visit to the jail Sgt. Cynthia Coleman told the court: "We expect a riot any day now. Any day now."
Summary of Facts
The overcrowding at the jail has placed unreasonable demands on every jail resource — both in terms of the physical plant and personnel. The facility's ability to provide essential services has been seriously undermined. As a result living conditions at the jail are doubtless dangerous and uncomfortable and inmates and pre-trial detainees suffer sevei.e privations.
III. Conclusions of Law
The Supreme Court has reiterated that some discomfort, inconvenience, deprivation, and even physical danger are to be expected—and countenanced in the prison setting. Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3199 (1984); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
-35-

337, 349 (1981); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537, 542 (1979); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974). However, at the same time the Court has admonished the lower courts to be aware of their responsibility to intercede when these adverse conditions reach a point at which they strip a prisoner of constitutional protections. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3198-3200; Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 351-52; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 545; Wolff, 418 U.S. at 55556; Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 822.
A. The Eighth Amendment Standard
The Rhodes Court promulgated three alternative tests for determining whether prison conditions violate the constitutional rights of convicted inmates. The eighth amendment prohibits conditions of confinement which: (1) "involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain"; (2) are "grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime warranting imprisonment"; or (3) "alone or in combination may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities", as tested by "contemporary standard[s] of decency." 452 U.S. at 347. The determination of whether prison conditions are inconsistent with "contemporary standards" of society is to be made on the basis of "'objective factors to the maximum possible extent,'" _id_. at 346 (quoting Ruminell v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1980)).
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B. The Fifth Amendment Standard
Overcrowding at the jail directly affects pre-trial detainees as well as convicted inmates. Detainees suffer from excessive violence, inadequate medical care and numerous other indirect effects of overcrowding. Consequently, the conditions at the jail must be squared with the Due Process Clause of the fifth amendment as well as the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the eighth amendment. The standards set by the fifth amendment are even less forgiving than those established by the eighth amendment. The latter proscribes only cruel and unusual punishment; the fifth amendment bans any punishment at all. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 535 nn.16, 17, 536-37; Inqraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671-72 n.40 (1977).
Determining whether particular conditions or restrictions, singly or in the aggregate, amount to punishment requires a twostep inquiry: first, a determination of whether the purposes of the challenged conditions are "legitimate"; and second, an examination of whether *he means used to achieve these purposes are "reasonably related" to these goals. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 538-39.
C. The Eighth and Fifth Amendment Standards Applied
The living conditions created by the overcrowding at the District of Columbia Central Detention Facility violate both the eighth and fifth amendments. There are three reasons why, each of
-37-

which fully authorizes intervention by the court.
1. The Violence at the Jail Inflicts Unnecessary and Wanton Pain on Inmates and Imposes Punishment on Pre-trial Detainees.
The concept that excessive violence may offend the Constitution is in accord with the well-established duty of correctional officials to protect prisoners from excessive violence. "[P]rison administrators ... are under an obligation to guarantee the safety of the inmates themselves." Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3200. See Youngberg v. Romeo 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982). See also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-04 (1976).Xl
Some amount of jail violence may be unavoidable "due to the character of the prisoners." Martin v. White, 742 F.2d 469, 475 (8th Cir. 1984). See Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3200; Doe v. District of Columbia, 701 F.2d 948, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (MacKinnon, J.; separate statement). Isolated incidents do not equal a constitutional violation, Withers v. Levine, 615 F.2d 158, 161 (4th Cir.), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 849 (1980); "a prisoner has no right to demand the level of protection necessary to render an institution assault-free." Murphy v. United States, 653 F.2d 637,
^Indeed, it is because of the critical need to maintain prison security that correctional authorities are granted extraordinarily broad powers over incarcerated persons. See e.g., Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3194 (prison officials may search cells without probable cause; fourth amendment protections inapplicable as prisoners have no reasonable expectation of privacy); Block v. Rutherford, 104 S. Ct. 3227 (1984) (random shakedown searches of pre-trial detainees' cells in their absence are permissible; all contact visits may be banned). See also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 540 & n.3; Phillips v. Bureau of Prisons, 591 F.2d 966, 972 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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(£•
644 (D.C. Cir. 1981). A successful eighth amendment challenge on the issue of prison violence must show that
"violence and sexual assaults occur ... with sufficient frequency that the ... prisoners ... are put in reasonable fear for their safety and to reasonably apprise prison officials of the existence of the problem and the need for protective measures." [Murphy, 653 F.2d at 645 (quoting Withers, 615 F.2d at 161).]
In the cases under consideration, the evidence establishes that violence is pervasive, that the increase in the number of violent acts is disproportionate to the increase in the jail population, and that overcrowding is the direct cause of the increasing violence. The evidence also shows that the prisoners are justifiably in great fear of such violence, and that defendants are well aware of the actual violence, the potential risks of more violence, and the well-grounded fears of the residents and the staff.
Indeed, defendants' earlier request for permission to doublecell pre-trial detainees was premised on their recognition of the need to control what hitherto had been, and apparentJy is now again, unmanageable violence.
In considering defendants1 1982 motion to permit doublecelling of pre-trial detainees, this court deferred to the defendants' assessment that make-shift floorspace housing was inadequate and unsafe.
The Department offered two justifications for resorting to double-celling .... The first was that dormitories cannot be adequately patrolled and therefore pose a severe security risk.... The second justification was that double-celling would
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0
enable the Department to remove dormitory beds from dayrooms and gymnasiums and use these facilities to provide inmates with needed recreational opportunities.
In light of this testimony, the court will defer to the Department's judgment that doublecelling is a lesser evil than the continued use of make-shift dormitories.... [Campbell v. McGruder, 554 F. Supp. 562, 563, 565 (D.D.C. 1982).]
The arguments advanced by defendants were persuasive then; they remain so now. Indeed, these concessions about the undesirability of make-shift housing take on even more significance in light of the greater overcrowding and the worsened conditions at the jail.
The failure of defendants to alleviate the overcrowding and the resultant inability to protect prisoners from violence inflicts unnecessary and wanton pain and violates the eighth amendment.
In the fifth amendment context, the pervasive risk of violence and the imposition of wanton and unnecessary pain affects all prisorers at the jail, pre-trial detainees as well as convicted inmates. If the overcrowded conditions and concomitant violence are evaluated as ends in themselves, they obviously, and by definition, serve no legitimate penological purpose. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 538-40. If the overcrowding and the violence are viewed as means to a permissible end, e.g., securing a detainee's presence at trial, they still must be seen as irrationally and unnecessarily harsh and excessive. From either perspective, and by either test, conditions at the jail violate
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the fifth amendment. In sum, the jail conditions that violate eighth amendment rights of all convicted inmates a_ fortiori violate the fifth amendment rights of unconvicted pre-trial detainees. Union County Jail Inmates v. DiBuono, 713 F.2d 984, 998 (3d Cir. 1983); cert, denied sub nom., DiBuono v. Fauver, 104 S. Ct. 1600 (1984). See Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979). These constitutional violations, by themselves, entitle plaintiffs to relief.
2. The Inadequate Health Care System Inflicts Wanton and Unnecessary Pain on Inmates and Imposes Punishment on Pre-trial DetaineesT
The eighth amendment's proscription against the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain", Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, J J . ) , obligates prison officials to provide all prisoners with ready access to adequate medical care. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). "An inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met .... Such a failure may actually produce physical 'torture or a lingering death', ... or pc:in and suffering which no one suggests would serve a penological purpose." ld_. (citations omitted) (quoting In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890); see Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d at 549.
The medical care provided must be adequate, and access to this care must be readily available. _Id_« See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104-05. The health services system must be able to meet both "'the routine and emergency health care needs'" of
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residents. Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 574 (10th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981) (quoting Battle v. Anderson, 376 F. Supp. 402, 424 (E.D. Okla. 1974)). Satisfactory dental care and mental health care must also be provided. Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982); Ramos, 639 F.2d at 574. New prisoners must be appropriately screened for communicable diseases. Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96, 109 (2nd Cir. 1981).
Occasional, inadvertent, or negligent denials of adequate care, which might lead to civil liability for medical malpractice, do not become violations of the eighth amendment merely because the victims are prisoners. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 10506. "[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs" must be established in order for plaintiffs to prevail. ld_. at 106.
Deliberate indifference to the medical needs of a class of prisoners can be established either by proving repeated examples of negligent care "which disclose a pattern of conduct by the prison medical staff", Ramos, 639 F.2d at 575; Todaro v. Ward, 565 F.2d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 1977) (Kaufman, C.J.), or by showing there are "such systemic and gross deficiencies in staffing, facilities, equipment or procedures that the inmate population is effectively denied access to adequate medical care." Ramos, 639 F.2d at 575 (citing cases). See Todaro, 565 F.2d at 52; Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 272 (7th Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 104 S. Ct. 3587 (1984).
We are cognizant of the fact that the Supreme Court has cautioned the lower courts not to "assume that the opinions of
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•
experts as to desirable prison conditions suffice to establish
contemporary standards of decency", Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348 n.12,
and thus "do not establish the constitutional minima", Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 543-44 n.27. Nevertheless, in Gamble the
Court suggested that "[m]odel correctional legislation and
proposed minimum standards" could be used for guidance. 429 U.S.
at 103-04 n.8. At the very least, such proposed standards provide
some alternative to the subjective opinions of the court or the
partisan views of expert witnesses. Though the court is not bound
to defer to such proposed standards, it is not prohibited from
drawing upon whatever sensible guidelines they might offer. This
would appear to be particularly so regarding medical standards,
which courts have traditionally viewed as well deserving of
respect.
The court has consulted several of the models cited in Gamble. 1 2 While recognizing that these standards may reflect the
*2American Correctional Association, Standards for Local Detention Facilities(2d ed. 1981) Standards 2-5277, 2-5278, 25 279; American Correctional Association, Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions, (2d < d. 1981) Standards 2-4279, 24281, 2-4295; American Bar Association, Proposed Standard of Joint Committee on Legal Status of Prisoners (1981) Standard 235.2; American Bar Association, Standards for Criminal Justice; Legal Status of Prisoners (Fourth Tentative Draft 1980) Standards 23-5.l(a), 23-5.2; U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Standards for Prisons and Jails (1980) Standards 5.09, 5.19, 5.20, 5.28; American Medical Association, Standards for Health Services in Prisons (1979) Standards 143, 14b, 14b, ibb, lbl; American Public Health Association, Standards for Health Services in Correctional Institutions (1976) §§ I-, V-A, V-B, V-C; National Sheriffs1 Association, Standards for Inmates Legal Rights (1974) Right No. 3.2; National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Corrections (1973) Standard 2.6; American Law Institute, Model Penal Code, Part III on Treatment and Correction (1962), §303.4(1); Fourth United Nations' Congress on Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, Standard Minimum Rules for (continued)
-43-

<t
ideal more than the practical, it appears to the court that the medical conditions at the jail fall so far short of any one of them that they cannot be said to be consistent with any contemporary standard of decency. For example, these standards mandate that sick call be available to prisoners no less than four or five times per week, not once a week, as is the practice at the jail.
Here, the evidence discloses continuing shortcomings in staffing, intolerable delays in access to appropriate health care personnel, lack of training and lack of supervision of nonprofessional medical and psychiatric staff, haphazard and illconceived administration and organization, sloppy record keeping, "screening" improperly delegated to unqualified personnel, improper dispensation of prescription drugs, and the woeful lack of dental and psychiatric care. These deficiencies cause needless suffering and the purposeless infliction of pain without any conceivable penological justification. The evidence shows numerous incidents of gross and wanton neglect and establishes a pattern of misconduct and ma1.feasance. These serious conditions amount to deliberate indifference to the health care needs of all prisoners; they violate the eighth amendment rights of inmates and impose punishment on pre-trial detainees. Once again, these constitutional violations, standing alone, justify plenary relief.
the Treatment of Prisoners (1955) Rules 22(3), 25(1)
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Q

Q

3. The Conditions Created by Overcrowding, Taken As a Whole, "Deprive Inmates of the Minimal Civilized Measure of Life's Necessities". 3 These Conditions Also Inflict Punishment on Pre-trial Detainees.
In Rhodes, prisoners complained that double-celling confined
them too closely together and therefore violated the eighth
amendment. They also contended that the prison population was 38%
over design capacity and that this overcrowding overwhelmed the
prison's staff, services and facilities. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at
340. Although recognizing that conditions, "alone or ir combination," 4 id. at 347 (emphasis added), could violate the
Constitution, the Court held that "under [the] circumstances" in
that case they did not. _Id_. at 348.

13Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.
"It is important to recognize that various deficiencies in prison conditions 'must be considered together.' The individual conditions 'exist in combination; each affects the other; and taken together they [may] have a cumulative impact on the inmates.1 Thus, a court considering an eighth amendment challenge to conditions of confinement must examine the totality of the circumstances." Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 362-63 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 373 (E.D. Ark. 1970)), citations and footnote omitted, emphasis added). See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687, 688 (1978)—("interdependence of the conditions", "taken as a whole"); Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d at 531. "It is the totality which the Constitution regulates." Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96, 107 (2d Cir. 1981). "Various prison conditions do not exist in isolation. Rather, challenged conditions must be viewed in the light of other prison conditions that may aggravate or mitigate the effect of other challenged conditions." See also Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 274 (7th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 3587 (1984); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 474, 477 & n.9 (1983); Samoson v. King, 693 F.2d 566, 569 (5th Cir. 1982); Union County Jail Inmates v. DiBuono, 713 F.2d 984, 999-1000 (3d Cir. 1983), cert, denied sub nom., *DiBuono v. Fauver, 104 S. Ct. 1600 (1964) . _But see Hop tow it v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246-47 and n.3 (9th Cir. 1982); Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129, 1132 (9th Cir. 1981).
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In determining whether the totality of prison conditions
violates the eighth amendment, a court must evaluate the
cumulative effect upon inmates
of the condition of the physical plant (lighting, heat, plumbing, ventilation, living space, noise levels, recreation space); sanitation (control of vermin and insects, food preparation, medical facilities, lavatories and showers, clean places for eating, sleeping, and working); safety (protection from violent, deranged, diseased inmates, fire protection, emergency evacuation); inmate needs and services (clothing, nutrition, bedding, medical, dental, and mental health care, visitation time, exercise and recreation, educational and rehabilitative programming); and staffing (trained and adequate guards and other staff, avoidance of placing inmates in positions of authority over other inmates). [Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 364 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis added).]
Defendants contend that, in accord with Rhodes, plaintiffs
are not entitled to relief. They point out that the jail is a
relatively new and modern facility and that overcrowding per se is
no cause for judicial intervention. But this case is not
comparable to Rhodes, and, as a matter of fact, Rhodes cuts not in
favor of the defrndants but against them.
While it is true that the jail was built in the 1970s, and
that it is centrally air conditioned and heated, those appear to
be the only common features shared by the jail and the Southern
Ohio Correctional Facility (SOCF), the maximum security prison at
issue in Rhodes. Furthermore, even the apparent similarity of
overcrowding is characterized by a marked difference, i.e., the
rate over design capacity in Rhodes was 38%; in this case the
population is 96% over the cell capacity and 177% over the service
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capacity. In the Ohio facility all inmates were housed in cells, and although they were double celled, 75% of them had the option of spending up to 15 hours per day outside their cells in school and work programs and in outdoor recreation. The Ohio prison had eight bright, well ventilated and well equipped classrooms, and various workshops including a machine shop, shoe factory, engine repair shop, sheet metal shop, print shop and sign shop. It also had a commissary and a barbershop. The cells in the Ohio facility were equipped with individual radios. In Rhodes the dayrooms were spacious and well equipped and completely available to the prisoners. None was used for any purpose other than those originally intended.
By contrast, at the jail 29% of the jail inmates are in makeshift housing. The incarcerees at the jail have but 8 hours out-of-cell time to spend in crowded dayrooms and hallways. They enjoy only 3 hours per week of outdoor recreation. There are a few classrooms at the jail but no workshops as in the Ohio facility. At the jail, nearly half of the dayroom space has been preempted for housing, leaving the remainder to serve nearly double the intended population, thereby geometrically compounding the problem.
The library at the Ohio institution was one "superior in quality and quantity", where the 2,300 inmates had access to 25,000 volumes, including law books. Chapman v. Rhodes, 432 F. Supp. 1007, 1010 (S.D. Ohio 1977). At the jail, 2,600 prisoners have access to only 4,200 volumes. In Rhodes, "there [was] no indication whatsoever that the food facility [had] been taxed by
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the prison population." Id., at 1014. The kitchen facilities at the jail are overtaxed and operate on an around-the-clock basis. In Rhodes there were no complaints concerning unsanitary toilets, sinks and showers such as the ones we have at the jail. Apparently the classification and parole services at the Ohio prison were completely satisfactory, and that is not so at the jail. Visiting privileges and facilities had not been affected in the Ohio facility and contact visits were allowed. By contrast, at the jail visiting hours have been reduced and long delays are commmonplace for the noncontact visits which are permitted. At the Ohio facility medical and dental care was completely adequate. Sick call was held daily. Initial sick call and screening was performed by a nurse. Prescriptions were passed out daily and any backlogs for dental patients "were temporary". 434 F. Supp. at 1015-16. In sharp contrast are the systemic deficiencies in medical, dental and mental health care at the jail.
In Rhodes the Court emphasized that the plaintiffs produced no evidence that double celling caused greate" violence, and that "the number of acts of violence had increased only in proportion to the increase in population." 452 U.S. at 342-343. Finally, there were no riots or suicides. This is not the picture at the jail where the violence is widespread and disproportionately increasing to the population increase; in addition, a riot in July 1983 occurred at the jail, and there have been four suicides since that time. The obvious implication is that the figures we have in this case reflect a nexus between the gross overcrowding and the
-48-

€<
rate of violence. Obviously the conditions in Rhodes are sharply
distinguishable from those at the jail. In Rhodes the Court essentially determined that overcrowding had not adversely affected, in any substantial way, the quality of daily life of the SOCF inmates. Ever-increasing violence did not threaten their safety and poor medical care did not jeopardize their health. Under no circumstances can similar conclusions be drawn in these cases.
Viewed in the aggregate, it is clear that the serious overcrowding at the jail has created conditions which are so acute that they deny inmates the minimum of life's necessities and inflict punishment on pre-trial detainees, thus establishing plaintiffs' claims of constitutional violations.
IV. Relief
The development of intolerable overcrowding and its negative effects on persons housed in the jail were obvious and predictable early o n — a t least to this court and the Court of Appeals. In light of these predictions both this court and the Court of Appeals have oftentimes identified specific avenues by which the population pressures could be reduced, emphasized the necessity for defendants to develop a long-range, comprehensive approach to overcrowding, and warned of the legal consequences if defendants did not use their presumed expertise to rectify ongoing constitutional violations. See e.g., Campbell v. McGruder, 416 F.
-49-

Supp. 106, 108-11 (D.D.C. 1975); Campbell v. McGruder, 416 F. Supp. Ill, 114-17 (D.D.C. 1976); Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d at 538 n.35 and _id_. at 526, 542-44 (1978); Campbell v. McGruder, 554 F. Supp. at 566 (1982). Nevertheless, instead of a sustained drive against the effects of a population crisis, defendants1 efforts have been sporadic, and largely unproductive; and conditions have steadily worsened.
Time and again, defendants have requested the court to defer to their accumulated wisdom, to ?tay its hand and to give them more time. Time and again, these requests have been honored in the hope and expectation that defendants would solve these problems expeditiously and effectively. However, instead of matters improving they have deteriorated. For example, at the October 1984 hearing defendants represented to the court that the jail population, which had steadily risen over the summer months, would fall with the onset of winter. This did not happen; in fact, the opposite occurred. The court was further given to understand that a new 400 bed Department facility, which was scheduled to open in late winter, would reduce the jail population by 400. That facility has opened, and is currently 20 persons shy of its design capacity—yet the jail is still packed with record numbers.
Moreover, there has been no indication of stepped up compliance with provisions of the Bail Reform Act, despite the fact that similar efforts in the past have been successful in reducing the jail population. Similarly, there has been no indication of approaches to the parole commission, or application
-50-

to the courts that have imposed population ceilings on other Department facilities for reconsideration or modification of those orders; and there are other facilities not under court order where massive overcrowding does not exist. Nor is there any indication of thought given to utilizing the various empty buildings available to the District of Columbia government. In other words, for the most part there is no indication of anything except complacency.
This court is not eager to encroach upon the responsibilities entrusted to defendants. However, in this case, the court has "learned from repeated investigation and bitter experience that judicial intervention is indispensable if constitutional dictates-not to mention considerations of basic humanity are to be observed...." Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 354 (Brennan, J. concurring; emphasis in the original).
It appears that any effort to alleviate the specific results of overcrowding on a one by one basis is foredoomed. For example, five years ago we ordered defendants to hire additional medical staff. Campbell v. McGruder, C.A. No. 1462-71, slip op. (D.D.C. June 9, 1980). Defendants now assert their inability to hire or retain qualified professionals. This is to be expected inasmuch as the conditions of employment that flow from overcrowding already overtaxed facilities are completely unattractive to professional employees. It appears clear that when, as is the case here, constitutional violations are the direct result of, and inextricably tied to, what amounts to unattended runaway overcrowding, nothing short of an order placing a ceiling on the
-51-

population can be an effective remedy. In addition, an order that attempted to rectify each particular infirmity would ineluctably and perpetually entangle the court in the "minutiae" of jail administration, a burden we are advised to avoid. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 562.
The ceiling need not be set at the jail's design capacity of 1,355. Since double-celling is not unconstitutional per se, the total jail population can rise above the limit set when it was assumed that all prisoners must be single-celled. At the same time, even if individual cells can house twice as many prisoners as originally intended, the institution as a whole cannot. At least, it cannot, consistent with the Constitution. Thus some reasonable midpoint must be established. Fortunately, defendants have provided some guidance, albeit inadvertent, on what that point should be.
In the spring of 1983, a few months before the riot, Director James Palmer asked then Assistant Director George Holland to forward recommendations on the maximum number of people that could be safely housed at the jail. Holland replied on July 1, 1983. "Ideally", he said, "I would recommend that 1,356 be our fixed capacity." Noting, however, that defendants had "capability and experience" in dealing with larger populations, 5 Holland concluded that the jail could safely hold nearly 25% more than design capacity. Holland recommended that the fixed limit should be set at 1,694.16
15At the time Holland wrote to Palmer, the average daily jail population was 2,325. (continued)
-52-

The court will adopt Holland's expert assessment and. recommendation. The evidence confirms that the figure he proposed represents the largest number of prisoners that can be confined at the jail without inflicting cruel and unusual punishment on the residents.
In order to minimize the intrusion into the administrative concerns within the competence of jail officials, the court will order a prohibition on the intake of new residents rather than prescribe what should be done with the prisoners currently held at the jail. "A ban on intake will also serve the salutory purpose of forcing all of the various ... local agencies who either have a need to place people in confinement or the responsibility for providing detention facilities, or both, to face up to the challenge of making alternative arrangements." Badgley v. Varelas, 729 F.2d 894, 902 (2d Cir. 1984). This is also the method of implementing a ceiling specifically proposed by the Court of Appeals. Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d at 536-37 n.28.
The court is aware of the fact that local agencies which would normally e:pect to send prisoners to the jail "are entitled to some brief period of time to make alternative arrangements ...." Id. The court will therefore direct that the prohibition
Subsequent testimony by Holland which raised the tolerable limits was thoroughly impeached and had the ring of incredibility.
-53-

«
on the intake of new prisoners not take effect until 40 days after the entry of the accompanying order.
.^>^;^:. JO v^....,„/
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 1985
-54-

»•

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LEONARD CAMPBELL, et al.,

:

Plaintiffs,

:

v.

:

ANDERSON McGRUDER, et al. , • :

Defendants.

:

C.A. No. 1462-71

INMATES OF D.C. JAIL, et al. , :

v.

:

DELBERT C. JACKSON, et al.,

:

Defendants.

:

ORDER

C.A. No. 75-1668
RECEIVED JUL 1 5 1985
JAMES F. DAVEY, ClerJ-

Upon consideration of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered this date in the above captioned matter, it is by the ccurt this / ~s '- day of July 1985,
ORDERED that beginning on the 40th day after the entry of this Order the defendants, their agents or designees shall not accept at the District of Columbia Department of Corrections Central Detention Facility any new residents, whether sentenced, awaiting trial, or in any other status, until such time as the population of the facility is no more than 1,693; and after such limit has been reached defendants shall accept no persons as incarcerees if such persons will increase the population above

.,.. V
1,694. And it is FURTHER ORDERED that defendants promptly notify all agencies
that send persons for confinement at the facility of the terms and effective date of this Order.
•'*.//:• 7~: 7* , -'-—UNITED STATES DISTRICT/JUDGE
-2-

 
 E i(
Campbell v. McGruder

I N THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

.LEONARD CAMPBELL, e t a l . ,
Plaintiffs, v.
ANDERSON McGRUDER, e t a l . ,
Defendants.

1 1 1 1 1 C.A. No. 1462-71 1 1 1 1

INMATES OF D.C. JAIL, e t a l . ,
Plaintiffs, v.
DELBERT C. JACKSON, e t a l . ,
Defendants.

1
1 1 1 1 C.A. N o . 75-1668 1 1 1 1

MEMORANDUM I N SUPPORT OF JOINT MOTION TO AMEND THE STIPULATION AND ORDER OF AUGUST 2 2 , 1 9 8 5
The o r d e r o f t h i s Court dated August 22, 1985, provides t h a t
a m e d i c a l e x p e r t s h a l l be a p p o i n t e d by each o f t h e parties "to r e v i e w t h e h e a l t k s e r v i c e s d e l i v e r y s y s t e m a t t h e D.C, J a i l a n d make recommendations f o r improvements i n t h e report to be s u b m i t t e d t o t h e C o u r t a n d t h e p a r t i e s by November 1, 1 9 8 5 , a n d i m p l e m e n t e d b y March 1, 1 9 8 6 , u n l e s s good c a u s e is shown by
e i t h e r p a r t y why t h e y s h o u l d n o t b e n . The e x p e r t s h a v e now
completed t h e i r s t u d i e s and are i n t h e process o f p r e p a r i n g t h e i r
r e p o r t s , The defendants' e x p e r t , Dr. Bernard Harrison, has
r e q u e s t e d t h a t separate reports be prepared by t h e experts. P l a i n t i f f s ' e x p e r t , Dr. R o b e r t L. Cohen, s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e

experts exchange draft reports prior to submission of the reports
4
to the Court. This exchange of drafts will necessitate
additional time but hopefully will result in a work-product which
will reconcile and harmonize the recommendations of the experts
and lead to a consensus on as many items as possible. Therefore,
the parties have agreed, subject to the Court's approval, to an
enlargement of the time for submission of the final reports to
December 1, 1985.
Respectfully submitted,
Steven N* Alvin J. Bronstein ACLU National Prison Project 1616 P Street, NW Suite 340 Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 331-0500
Counsel for Plaintiffs in Inmates v. Jackson
J. Patrick Hickey John H. Mort? Douglas Hilleboe Shaw, Pittman, Potts 6
Trowbridge 1800 M Street, NW Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 822-1000
Counsel for Plaintiffs in Campbell v. McGruder

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OP COLUMBIA

LEONARD CAMPBELL, e£ al^

Plaintiffs

v.

Civil Action No. 1462-71

ANDERSON MCGRUDER, e£ al

Defendants ORDER

:""? 1 ' 1?-'

This matter is before the Court upon the request of the defendants that the Court vacate its order of June 27, 1983 as amended, relieving them of the obligation of filing monthly reports in this case. Having considered said request and the plaintiffs' concurrence, and in light of the bi-weekly reporting requirement in the stipulation entered on August 22, 1985, it is by the Court this ^'fL. day of September, 1985;
ORDERED: That the order of June 27, 1983 requiring the defendants to file monthly reports in this case be and the same is hereby vacated; and it is,
FURTHER ORDERED: That defendants shall file with the Court and serve on the parties, bi-weekly reports of its compliance with the stipulations entered on August 22, 1985.

Judge

y

United States District: Court

Campbell v. McGruder JC-DC-001-050

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LEONARD CAMPBELL, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. ANDERSON McGRUDER, et al.,
Defendants.

INMATES OF D.C. JAIL, et ail.,

Plaintiffs,

V.

j

DELBERT C. JACKSON, et al.,

Defendants.

Civil Action. No. 1462-71
ftttt)
SEP 26 1390
Civil Action No. 75-1668

ORDER Upon consideration of plaintiffs' oral motion at a status hearing before this Court on September 25, 1990, defendants' opposition thereto, and the entire record herein, it is
ORDERED that defendants shall submit a detailed report to the Court on or before October 12, 1990 stating the defendants' plans for producing constitutionally adequate health care services at the D.C. Detention facility after termination of the current contract with National Capitol Systems, Inc. Such report shall include anticipated staffing levels, shift complements, governing medical policies and procedures, individuals actually hired by position, training and orientation procedures designed

0
to integrate new employees into the system, and all other significant aspects of these plans. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that a hearing to examine the adequacy of the defendants' plans for continuation of the provision of medical services after termination of the National Capitol Systems, Inc. contract shall be scheduled for October 17, 1990 at 10:00 a.m.; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that defendants shall produce to plaintiffs the following documents by October 12, 1990:
1. Those documents requested by plaintiffs' counsel at the depositions of Mr. Benny 0. Hodges and Doctor Herman Branson;
2. All documents requested by Doctor Albert Raymond in his tour of the D.C. Detention facility, as detailed in September 14, and 19, 1990 letters from Edward Koren to Richard Love; and
3. Any and all documents in the custody or control of the defendants that have not previously been produced which refer or relate to termina ion of the current contract for the prr/ision of medical services at the facility and/or any plans for the provision of medical care at the facility after the termination of the contract.

Dated: SeptemberZ£, 1990

B. Bryant United States District Judge
-2-

Richard S. Love, Esq. Assistant Corporation Counsel 1923 Vermont Avenue N.W. Suite NLL-3 Washington, D.C. 20001 J. Patrick Hickey, Esq. Shaw, Pittman, Potts 6 Trowbridge 2300 N Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. Edward Koren, Esq. National Prison Project 1616 L Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036
Z:24OJHZ9996.9O
-3-

wo-i-oo-oa-or
japnJ90|/\i A

 
 ' '•'.,*

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LEONARD CAMPBELL, et al. . Plaintiffs, v.
ANDERSON McGRUDER, et al., Defendants.
INMATES OF D.C. JAIL, et al. . Plaintiffs, v.
DELBERT C. JACKSON, et al., Defendants.

C.A. No. 1462-71 (WBB)
C.A. No. 75-1668 (Cases consolidated before
Judge William B. Bryant)

INITIAL REMEDIAL PLAN FOR MENTAL HEALTH CARE, MEDICAL CARE AND COMPLIANCE MONITORING AT THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA JAIL
The Special Officer submits the following initial remedial plan pursuant to the March 3 6, 1994 Consent Order issued in the above-referenced matters.

I. BACKGROUND On March 16, 1994, this Court found the defendants in contempt based on the Special Officer's Report on Medical Care at
the D.C. Jail, the Special Officer's Outline of her Findings on Mental Health Care at the D.C. Jail, the Expert Reports on
Campbell v. McGruder

JC-DC-001-066

Medical and Mental Health Services at the D.C. Jail,1 the Court's findings in its Orders of March 5, 1993 and April 20, 1993, and the defendants' acknowledgement that they had been in non-compliance with numerous material provisions of the orders entered in these consolidated matters. Consent Order of March 16, 1994 at 1-2.
The March 16, 1994 Consent Order requires the Special Officer to submit a remedial plan designed to cure the defendants' contempt and to insure that inmates incarcerated at the Jail receive medical and mental health services that meet constitutional standards. Consent Order of March 16, 1994 at 2. The Consent Order mandates that the remedial plan address all issues raised in the Special Officer's reports and in the expert reports, as well as any other issues that come to the attention of the Special Officer or the Court that adversely impact on defendants' compliance with the Court's orders or adversely impact on the delivery of medical and mental health services in a manner consistent with constitutional standards. Jd. In addition, according to the terms of the Consent Order, the remedial plan must include an implementation schedule, graduated automatic fines2 for failure to meet implementation deadlines, and a compliance reporting procedure. Jd. at 2-3. The March 16,
The Special Officer's report on medical care was filed on February 2, 1994, the report on mental health care was filed on March 6, 1994, and the expert reports were filed on September 15, 1993.
2 The parties agree that the fines set forth in this plan constitute civil fines.
- 2-

1994 Consent Order also authorizes the Special Officer to file, and the defendants to implement, interim remedial plans to address conditions that should be remedied on an expedited basis.
id.3
The defendants are required to implement the remedial plan in accordance with the time-table established by the Special Officer unless either party can show good cause why the plan should not be implemented or should be modified. Id. at 3.
II. METHODOLOGY In accordance with the March 16, 1994 Consent Order, the Special Officer has consulted extensively with the defendants and their counsel, with counsel for the plaintiffs, and with her own medical and mental health experts4 in developing this remedial plan.5 In addition, with the consent of the parties, the Special Officer has also consulted with a nationally prominent expert in jail suicides, Lindsay Hayes. Mr. Hayes was retained in order to assist the Special Officer with fashioning a suicide prevention program for the Jail because of the substantial
The Specjil Officer filed an interim plan to address deficiencies in the defendants' tuberculosis isolation practices on May 4, 1994. The terms of this interim plan remain in full force and effect and are incorporated by reference herein.
The Special Officer's medical and mental health experts are Dr. Richard Belitsky (mental health), Dr. Robert Cohen (medical), and Dr. Goulda Downer (nutrition).
At her request, the parties provided the Special Officer with written proposals which have been considered by the Special Officer and her expert consultants. Copies of these submissions are attached hereto as Exs. 1A through 1G.
- 3-

increase in incidence of successful suicides and suicide attempts at the J a i l during the past 17 •onths.6
III. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
The purpose of this remedial plan is to bring the defendants into compliance with this Courtfs Orders regarding medical and
mental health care at the Jail as well as to ensure that the
delivery of these services meets minimal constitutional
requirements. In order to accoaplish these goals, four
principles have guided the development of this plan.
First, the non-compliance which this plan is designed to
address has been caused by pervasive deficiencies in the medical
and mental health delivery system which have been in evidence for
over two decades. These deficiencies have resulted in a
dysfunctional health care systen which cannot be fixed overnight.
Second, this remediation effort is predicated on a building-
block approach. This plan represents the first stage of a
remedial process. It addresses the most urgent problems and
6 Between May of 1993 and October 10, 1994 there were eight successful suicides at the D.C. Jail.
A redacted copy of Mr. Hayes1 report is attached hereto as Ex. 2. The parties have been provided with non-redacted copies of this report. At the request of the new Director of the Department of Corrections, Margaret Moore, both the Special Officer and Mr. Hayes met with Ms. Moore and many senior members of her staff to discuss the implementation of Mr. Hayes' recommendations. Ms. Moore endorsed virtually all of Mr. Hayes1 recommendations and has instructed various members of her staff to take curative action that is consistent with Mr. Hayes1 recommendations. The Special Officer is encouraged by the initiative the defendants have taken to address this problem before the issuance of an order.
-4 -

provides the foundation for the remedial effort in terms of basic
foundation elements such as staffing, the development and
implementation of policies and procedures, training, monitoring
and evaluation. Once this foundation has been established, the
Special Officer and her experts will conduct an evaluation of the
first stage of the remedial process. Thereafter, follow-up
remedial plans shall be developed in consultation with the
parties. The follow-up remedial plans will address the next
stage of the remedial process: building on the foundation, after
appropriate evaluation, in order to achieve and sustain
compliance with the Court's Orders.
Third, this plan establishes an implementation schedule
which is reasonable but firm. The plan contemplates close
collaboration between the defendants, the Special Officer and her
experts and plaintiffs' counsel. The plan will only succeed if
the defendants commit competent staff and appropriate resources
Ongoing monitoring of defendants' compliance with this Court's orders, as well as the provisions of this plan, will continue throughout this process.
8 There are many compliance violations which have not been addref ^ed in this initial remedial plan because they cannot be developed in the absence of appropriate staffing, the development of sound policies and procedures, and appropriate training of the correctional and health services staff.
9 Although this type of building block approach was not contemplated by the March 16, 1994 Consent Order, the parties have advised the Special Officer that they do not object to this approach. The defendants, however, have advised the Special Officer that although they consent to this building block approach, defendants reserve the right to object to the scope and/or content of this plan as well as the scope and/or content of any further plans that may be filed.
- 5-

to the remedial process. The defendants must monitor their own compliance with the plan and the DOC's leadership must hold staff members accountable for their work on the plan.
Fourth, the terms of this plan were negotiated with the parties. A series of substantial revisions were made in order to ensure that the defendants could meet the substantive requirements as well as the deadline requirements set forth herein.11
The Special Officer has substantial concerns about whether the DOC's central medical leadership will be able to work collaboratively within the deadline scheduled established by this plan. These concerns are based, at least in part, on the failure of the DOC's medical leadership to work within any of the deadlines that were established and extended by the Special Officer during the process of developing the tuberculosis protocol, the emergency response protrcol, and this remedial plan. For example, the Special Officer has waited for over six months for the defendants' infirmary space assessment. The defendants have allowed a succession of deadlines to lapse without providing any explanation for their dilatory conduct. Although this has not been the case with the DOC's mental health leadership, unless the medical leadership is held accountable by the DOC's executive staff, and required to perform the tasks set forth in this plan, the plan will fail.
11 Although this plan vas endorsed at the highest levels in the DOC, the Special Officer understands that the defendants may file some as yet unspecified objections to some aspects of this plan.
- 6-

IV. MENTAL HEALTH PLAN12
The initial remedial plan for mental health services focuses on three areas: suicide prevention and psychiatric emergencies, care of inmates with the most severe forms of mental illness, and basic services for the general population.
1. Organizational Structure and Staffing The mental health program at the D.C. Jail shall be restructured as set forth in this plan.13 A. Staffing14 All staff members hired pursuant to the staffing requirements set forth in this plan shall be hired under the exclusive budget authority and auspices of the D.C. Department of Corrections. Any staff member currently "detailed11 to provide mental health services at the Jail for the DOC by DHS shall become an employee of the DOC and assigned to mental health services at the Jail only if s/he meets the eligibility requirements set forth in this plan and is affirmatively selected
It is impossible to fully ,' aparate the mental health remedial plan from the medical remedial plan. In some instances, the mental health section of this plan addresses remediation efforts that are related to medical care and the converse is true with respect to the medical plan.
13 A copy of a revised organizational chart is attached as Ex. 3.
u The defendants provided the Special Officer and her expert consultant with two mental health staffing proposals. The proposals, which were helpful in fashioning the staffing requirements contained in this remedial plan, are attached hereto in Exs. 4A & 4B.
- 7-

by the DOC for one of the positions required herein. The
defendants shall, within 90 days, in consultation with the
Special Officer and her experts, develop a plan15 for
terminating within 90 days thereafter all DHS "details" to the
mental health units. 16
All persons employed in the positions that are required in
this staffing plan shall, unless indicated herein, work full-
time, in the mental health program at the District of Columbia
Jail. They shall not be subject to official or unofficial
"details".17
Within 21 days, the defendants shall identify any positions
required to be filled under this staffing plan which constitute
Because the remedial effort requires the development of written policies and procedures as a predicate for compliance, and because the defendants consistently have failed to meet Court ordered deadlines for drafting various protocols and policies, if the defendants fail to meet a drafting deadline that is set forth in this plan, the drafting of the policy, procedure, plan, or protocol at issue shall be completed by the Special Officer and imposed upon the defendants.
16 The defendants shall provide copies of all drafts of all plans, protocols, policies and procedures required under this remedial plan to plaintiffs' counsel who shall be provided with a meaningful opportunity to comment on the drafts. The policies and procedures that will be ieveloped pursuant to this remedial plan shall be filed with th'j Court. Defendants shall provide all drafts to the Special Officer, her experts, and plaintiffs' counsel sufficiently in advance of all deadlines so that all drafts can be finalized within the time-lines set forth in this plan.
17 This includes part-time and full-time details to positions inside the Jail, to positions in other DOC operated institutions, and to positions at other agencies operated by the government of the District of Columbia. Although the defendants
are not precluded from hiring part-time employees, all reasonable
efforts should be made to fill all full-time positions with fulltime staff.
- 8-

positions for which competent candidates are difficult to recruit
and shall prepare and implement a plan for recruiting candidates
to fill such positions. The plan shall include, if appropriate,
upward adjustments in pay grade in order to make salaries
competitive with other District of Columbia agencies as well as
18
other recruitment incentives.
If the defendants elect to fill any positions that are
mandated under this plan, including positions that are difficult
to recruit, with contract employees, the proposed employment
contracts shall be provided to the Special Officer and
plaintiffs' counsel for review and comment prior to the ratification of the contract.1
The failure to hire the staff required under the terms of this plan, within the time period set forth in this plan,20
shall result in fines of $200.00 per day per vacant position for
the first thirty day period of noncompliance followed by fines of
$250.00 per day per vacant position for each subsequent day of noncompliance.21 All vacancies which occur subsequent to the
18 T h e s e positions shall b e filled in accordance with t h e hiring deadlines set fo'th in this plan.
19 T h i s p l a n is n o t intended t o preclude t h e defendants from satisfying their obligations through the "privatization" of medical and mental health services if they elect to do so.
20 Defendants m a y petition t h e Court for a n additional 60 days to comply with a hiring deadline required under this plan upon a showing that the defendants have made a substantial good faith effort to fill the position within the currently imposed deadline schedule.
21 T h e total staffing required under this mental health plan is illustrated in the chart attached as Ex. 5.
- 9-

®
filing of this plan shall be filled within a maximum of 120 days. Failure to fill such vacancies within this time-line shall result in fines of $200.00 per day per vacant position for the first thirty day period of noncompliance followed by fines of $250.00 per day per vacant position for each subsequent day of noncompliance.
(i) Supervisory Staff Program Director: Effective immediately,22 the DOC shall hire a program director who shall oversee all aspects of mental health services at the Jail. The program director shall report directly to the DOC Chief Psychiatrist, Dr. Henry Edwards. The program director must have the following qualifications: an advanced professional degree in a mental health clinical profession, significant experience and training in program administration, and appropriate clinical experience. Unit Directors: Within 180 days, the DOC shall hire a unit director for each of the following units: South Two, South Three, and General Population/Intake. Each unit director shall be responsible for the oversight of unit programming and the clinical and administrative supervision of the clinical staff assigned to her/his unit. The duties of the unit director shall include, but shall not be limited to the following: the assignment of cases as well as the supervision of documentation,
22 The Special Officer understands that the DOC has "hired" a program director who has been "detailed" from the DHS. This detail must be abolished within the time-frame set forth in the preceding section of this plan.
- 10 -

clinical work and direct clinical services. The unit directors must be licensed psychologists, psychiatrists, licensed master's level social workers or licensed master's level psychiatric nurses.
Head Nurses:23 Within 180 days, the DOC shall hire a head nurse for each mental health unit as well as for general population/intake. The head nurse shall supervise the nursing staff assigned to her/his unit, oversee scheduling and assign responsibilities. The head nurse must be a licensed Registered Nurse (R.N.) with significant psychiatric nursing experience.
(ii) Non—Supervisory Staff Psychiatric Nursing Staff: Within 180 days, the defendants shall hire 17.4 experienced psychiatric nurses with training in the administration of psychotropic medications. The mental health nursing staff shall be composed of a combination of licensed R.N.'s and licensed practical nurses (L.P.N.*s) and defendants shall ensure that there is an appropriate ratio of R.N.'s to L.P.N.'s in order for the L.P.N. 's to be properly supervised. Among other responsibilities, the nurses shall be responsible for providing nursing support for the psychiatric clinics in the mental health units and the general population as
23 The Special Officer has been advised that the DOC will continue to maintain centralized psychiatric nursing leadership.
This total includes the head nurses for each mental health unit and general population/intake.
25 The nurses must have at least one year of psychiatric nursing experience in either an in-patient or out-patient setting.
- 11 -

well as for the distribution and administration of all psychotropic medications.
Clinicians: Within 180 days, the defendants shall hire 16 clinicians who shall be assigned to the mental health units, general population and intake screening. The clinical staff shall be comprised of licensed clinical psychologists, master's level social workers and master's level psychiatric nurses. Among other duties, the clinicians shall maintain an assigned caseload of patients, conduct group and individual counseling, and be responsible for charting.
Psychiatrists: Within 60 days, the defendants shall hire 2.5 licensed psychiatrists to provide psychiatric services for inmates housed on the mental health units and in the general population. Among other responsibilities, the psychiatrists shall conduct screening and medication clinics and shall be responsible for the psychiatric care of mental health patients housed in the infirmary, mental health units and general population. Four hours of on-site psychiatric coverage must be provided on weekends.
This total includes the unit directors for South Two, South Three, and General Population/Intake.
The defendants currently have 84 hours of psychiatric coverage at the Jail.
28 At least one of the psychiatrists hired pursuant to this plan shall be employed full-time at the Jail. The full-time psychiatrist may provide limited consultation regarding her/his patients who have been transferred to other DOC facilities. The other psychiatrists must be employed at the Jail for a minimum of 16 hours per week.
- 12 -

Psychiatric On-Call Coverage: The defendants shall establish psychiatric on-call coverage in order to ensure that a psychiatrist is on-call during the hours when a psychiatrist is not working at the Jail. Within 10 business days, the defendants shall present an on-call staffing plan for consideration by the Special Officer and counsel for the plaintiffs. The on-call staffing shall supplement the psychiatric staffing required under the preceding paragraph. The on-call psychiatric staffing plan shall be implemented within 15 business days. The plan shall state the number of psychiatrists that the defendants submit are required to maintain on-call psychiatric coverage for the Jail during weekends, holidays, and shifts that are not staffed by the 2.5 psychiatrists required under this plan.
The defendants shall require the on-call psychiatrist to respond immediately by telephone to a page or a telephone call and to respond in-person if indicated to all psychiatric emergencies in the mental health units, the general population, and the infirmary. The failure to implement this on-call plan for psychiatric coverage shall result in fines of $200.00 per inci lent for each incident in which a psych atrist fails to respond appropriately under this on-call plan.
Quality Assurance Monitor; Within 120 days, the defendants shall hire a quality assurance monitor for mental health services at the Jail. The monitor shall be a licensed mental health provider with a clinical mental health background and previous training and experience in quality assurance. The monitor shall
- 13 -

be responsible for quality assurance monitoring of mental health

services in both mental health units as well as in the general

population. Within 30 days of her/his employment, the Quality

Assurance Monitor shall develop an instrument for evaluating the

utilization of mental health clinicians in the intake screening

process.

Support Staff: Within 120 days, the defendants shall hire

one office assistant, two clerk typists, and one medical records

technician to support the mental health program at the Jail. One

clerk/typist shall be assigned to work full-time for the Quality

Assurance Monitor.

Correctional Staff: Effective immediately, the defendants

shall maintain the correctional officer staffing in each mental

health unit according to the following staffing plan:

Seven Day Nonsupervisorv Posts

Shift:

One

Two

Three

Posts:

3

4

4

Total: 11 posts per unit

Relief Factor: 11 x 1.74 = 19.14

Total Complement of Officers for Each Mental Health Unit: 19

All posts in the mental health units shall be deemed essential posts and shall not be vacated unless the assigned officer is relieved of her/his duties by an officer assigned to the unit for this purpose. Within 120 days, the defendants
shall, in consultation with the Special Officer and her expert
- 14 -

consultants, develop post orders for all correctional posts in each mental health unit.
B. Mental Health (i) Intake Screening: Within 190 days, one mental health
clinician shall be assigned exclusively to the health services intake screening process during the evening shift, Monday through Friday, excluding holidays. This clinician shall provide assistance to the medical staff assigned to intake with the identification of inmates at risk for suicide and mental illness and shall facilitate further evaluation of inmates deemed to be at risk. The clinician shall directly participate in the mental health aspect of the screening process. In addition, the clinician shall periodically review intake screening forms and provide immediate feedback to the medical staff who have filled out the screening forms.
The failure to assign a mental health clinician to intake screening within the time period set forth in this plan shall result in fines of $200.00 per day for the first 30 day period of noncompliance followed by fines of $250.00 per day for each subsequent day of noncompliance.
(ii) Mental Health Units; Within 210 days, the mental health units shall be staffed 24 hours per day, seven days per week. Mental health staff in the mental health units shall be deployed in accordance with a
deployment plan that shall be developed by the defendants, in
- 15 -

consultation with the Special Officer and her expert consultants, within 90 days. The failure to staff the mental health units on a 24 hour basis within 210 days shall result in fines of $250.00 for each uncovered shift.
Within 240 days, the mental health units shall provide the following services: the timely initial assessment of all new admissions to the units; the timely development of individualized treatment plans; the establishment of a reliable and competent system for the prescribing and dispensing of psychotropic medications, frequent and adequate follow-up of inmates prescribed psychotropic medications, crisis intervention, (including the ability to urgently assess inmates housed on the mental health units who are in need of emergency attention) , and an effective program of individual sessions, group sessions and case management services. The defendants shall, within 90 days, in consultation with the Special Officer and her experts, develop a plan for providing these basic services. The failure to implement this plan within 240 days shall result in fines of $200.00 per day for each day of noncompliance.
(iii) General Population: Within 240 days, the mental health program at the Jail shall provide the following services for inmates housed in the general population: mental health assessments for all referrals, including self-referrals; prescription of psychotropic medication; timely monitoring of inmates who are prescribed psychotropic medication; crisis intervention, including the availability of urgent assessment;
- 16 -

an effective individual and group therapy program; follow-up services for inmates identified during intake screening to be at risk of mental illness but not in need of housing in the mental health units.
Within 90 days, the defendants shall, in consultation with the Special Officer and her experts, develop a plan for deployment of mental health staff in the general population as well as a plan for providing the above-specified basic mental health services to general population inmates. The failure to implement this plan within 240 days shall result in fines of $200.00 per day for each day of noncompliance.
(iv) At Risk High Acuity Services; Within 30 days, the defendants shall, in consultation with the Special Officer and her experts, develop a plan to provide at risk high acuity services for all inmates housed at the Jail. The plan shall identify the staff who will provide these services on an interim basis as well as the staff who will provide these services when the mental health program is staffed up to the levels required under this plan. The failure to substantially implement the plan within 60 days shall result in fines of $200.00 per day for the first 30 days of noncompliance followed by fines of $400.00 per day for each subsequent day of noncompliance.
29 Both the medical staff and the mental health staff should participate in the formulation of this plan.
- 17 -

The plan for high acuity services shall include a procedure for rapid assessment and a protocol for the provision of acute psychiatric care. In addition, the plan shall take into account that designated rooms in the infirmary shall be used for housing and treatment of inmates who are considered to be at the highest level of risk, including inmates who are medically restrained pursuant to the requirements of the November 9, 1993 Order, inmates on constant observation status, inmates at imminent risk for suicide, inmates who are engaging in serious self-destructive behavior, and inmates who a psychiatrist determines, in the exercise of her/his clinical judgment, cannot be safely managed in the mental health unit. The plan shall include a protocol for appropriate documentation in the medical/mental health record of each patient housed in the infirmary.
2. Intake Screening A. Intake Form
Within 10 business days the defendants shall, in consultation with the Special Officer and her experts, revise the health services intake screening form. The form shall be revised in order to obtain more in-depth information regarding risk of
30 This latter category may include, but is not limited to, inmates undergoing some forms of psychotic decompensation and inmates diagnosed with complex medical/psychiatric problems that may compromise their safety.
- 18 -

m
suicide, including but not limited to significant recent loss and
future outlook.
B. intake Policy and Procedure
Within 15 business days the defendants shall, in
consultation with the Special Officer and her experts, develop a
policy and procedure for the administration of the revised health
services intake screening form. The policy and procedure shall
include a protocol for obtaining, in a timely manner, the records
of prior hospitalizations and treatments of mentally ill
prisoners. In addition, among other requirements, the policy and
procedure shall contain the following: • The intake form shall only be administered by an appropriately trained physician or a trained, licensed and certified physicians1 assistant;
• At the time of intake, the physician or physicians' assistant who administers the form may only do so in an area specified in the procedure which ensures open discussion and confidentiality;
• At the time of intake, the physician or physicians' assistant who administers the form shall be obligated to review the inmate's prior DOC medical and mental health records in order to verify the accuracy of the information provided and in order to assist in the determination of whether tt A inmate is at risk for suicide and/or mental illness;
• At the time of intake, the physician or physicians' assistant who administers the form shall be obligated to review all available records from prior psychiatric
A description of the training requirement is addressed in the next section of this plan.
- 19 -

•i '
, ! !
i ' ; j
1
",

h o s p i t a l i z a t i o n s and a l l related discharge summaries;
• If there is evidence during the intake screening which suggests that the inmate is suffering from a severe for* of mental illness that would require kousing in the mental health unit, or vhicfe suggests s/he is at risk for suicide, or if the intake screener requires assistance in developing her/his clinical assessment, she/he must immediately contact a nenber of the mental health staff who is on-site at the Jail and has been designated to assist as needed;
• At the time of intake, the on-site mental health professional shall be contacted in order to ensure that « n returnees from psychiatric hospitals are boused in the mental health units pending a prompt evaluation by a psychiatrist;
• All inmates who enter the Jail shall receive a full health services intake screening, regardless offcheirprojected length of incarceration.
The intake policy and procedure shall be implemented within
75 days. The failure to comply with the policy, except those
provisions that are dependent on a new hire, will result in
fines of $250.00 per day for each day of noncompliance.

12 The policy and procedure must addresr the issue of coll Jaoration with a mental health professional pending the full staffing of the mental health program.
33 I n m a t e s c l a s s i f i e d a s "Lorton R e c o m m i t s " m u s t b e s u b j e c t to both a medical and a mental health screening upon admission to the Jail. Procedures for screening Larton Recommits shall be developed by the defendants, in consultation with the Special Officer and h e r experts, within 45 days.
34 T h e "new h i r e " i s t h e on-site mental h e a l t h professional. Once this staff member Is assigned to the unit, these fines shall apply to all aspects of the policy related to the on-site mental health professional.
- 20 -

training. The monitoring form shall be used on an on-going basis and the raw data and analysis shall be maintained and made available to the Special Officer and counsel for the plaintiffs.
D. Participation bv Mental Health staff As set forth in Section IV.l.B.(i), above, within 190 days,
a mental health clinician (psychologist, social worker or psychiatric nurse) from the Jail*s mental health staff shall be assigned to intake screening on the weekday evening shift, excluding holidays. One clinician shall be assigned per shift and each clinician assigned to mental health services at the Jail shall rotate through this assignment.
The mental health clinician assigned to intake shall participate in the mental health portion of the intake screening. S/he shall supervise and train the non-nental health staff on all aspects of the mental health screening and shall conduct further evaluation of inmates at risk. The assignment of a mental health clinician to this position shall be evaluated by the defendants, in consultation with the Special Officer and her experts, six mox ths following the assignment of a mer.r* 1 health clinician to the intake process.
E. Quality Assurance (OR) /Intake Within 20 days intake forms shall be randomly reviewed
for thoroughness, completeness and accuracy and the results of these reviews, as well as all related back-up documentation,
- 22 -

shall be filed and made available to the Special Officer and counsel for the plaintiffs. The defendants shall review the completeness and accuracy of all intake screening forms for inmates who have been referred for an assessment of their suicidality, have made a suicide attempt, or who have been placed on suicide watch. The failure to implement this aspect of mental health quality assurance activities at the Jail within 45 days shall result in fines of $200.00 per day for the first 30 days this requirement has not been implemented and $300.00 per day for each subsequent day of noncompliance.
Within 90 days the defendants shall develop a QA monitoring form which evaluates the use of mental health clinicians in the intake process. Following the assignment of a mental health clinician to the intake process, these forms shall be used on an on-going basis and the raw data and analysis shall be maintained and made available to the Special Officer and counsel for the plaintiffs. The failure to implement this aspect of mental health quality assurance activities at the Jail within 30 days following the assignment of a mental health clinician to the intake process shall result in fi es of $200.00 per day for the first 30 days this requirement has not been implemented and $300.00 per day for each subsequent day of noncompliance.
3. Mental Health Records and Medical Records Within 10 days the defendants shall form an interdisciplinary committee comprised of representatives from the
- 23 -

Jail's medical records office as well as representatives from the
medical, mental health, and dental programs. Within 30 days
thereafter, the committee in consultation with the Special
Officer and her experts, shall develop a plan for the integration
of the medical, mental health and dental records into one single
record for each inmate.
The plan shall address both format-related and content-
related issues. The following requirements shall be included in
the plan:
• The single record shall be structured so that medications and treatments are rapidly accessible and inmate care is tracked in reverse chronological order;
• A procedure shall be included for the transfer of the record throughout the DOC system in a manner which ensures the confidentiality of the record; and
• A schedule for implementation of this requirement shall also be addressed in the plan. The schedule must be consistent with the requirement that the restructured medical record system shall be in use, and all medical records, clinical, and support staff appropriately trained, within 120 days following the filing of this remedial plan.
The failure to integrate the medical and mental health
records within 180 days shall result in fines of $100.00 per day
for each day of noncompliance.
Within 45 days the defendants shall, in consultation with
the Special Officer and her experts, develop a policy and
All staff members who have not been hired within this period shall be trained within 30 days following the commencement of their employment.
- 24 -

#
procedure governing the confidentiality of medical records. The policy and procedure must ensure that the correctional staff does not have access to confidential medical and/or mental health information, including but not limited to the actual medical/mental health record and the documents contained therein. The policy shall be implemented within 90 days and all breaches of confidentiality that constitute violations of the policy shall result in fines of $500.00 per infraction which shall be suspended. Following notice36 of a violation, the defendants shall be required to promptly investigate the reasons for the violation. Within 15 days thereafter, or such longer period as permitted by the Special Officer, the defendants shall report to plaintiffs' counsel and the Special Officer with regard to the results of the investigation. At that time the defendants shall also submit a proposed corrective action plan which shall include an implementation schedule. The corrective action plan shall be submitted by the defendants for comment by plaintiffs' counsel and for approval by the Special Officer. The failure to implement the corrective action plan, within the time-frame set forth in the plan, sha* i result in the imposition of the fine that was initially suspended.
The notice may be received from plaintiffs1 counsel, the Special Officer, or the following employees of the DOC: the compliance office staff, the warden or one of the deputy wardens of the Jail, the Assistant Director for Health Services, the Chief Medical Officer of the Jail, the Chief Psychiatrist of the DOC, the Director of the Ifantal Health Program at the Jail, the Jail's Chief Pharmacist, and the Executive Deputy Director of the DOC.
- 25 -

•;'^'
4. Mental Health Units A. Hours of Operation;
Within 10 business days the defendants, in consultation with the Special Officer and her experts, shall develop a plan to immediately increase the number of hours that the mental health units are staffed by members of the mental health staff in order to provide some expanded coverage on weekends and evenings pending the full staffing of the mental health units.37 The failure to implement this plan within 45 days shall result in fines of $200.00 per shift for each shift that is not staffed pursuant to the plan.
B. Policy and Procedure; Within 120 days the defendants shall, in consultation with
the Special Officer, her experts, and plaintiffs' counsel, develop written policies and procedures regarding the operation of the mental health units. All staff shall receive appropriate training related to the policy and a training plan, including a training schedule, shall be addressed in the policy and procedure.
The policy and procedure governing the operation of the mental health units shall include the following requirements:
(i) Admission Criteria;38
37 See also §IV.1.B. ( i i ) , above.
38 Like other aspects of this remedial plan, admission criteria for the mental health units may be subject to
(continued...) - 26 -

Only inmates in need of intermediate care services may be
housed in the mental health units. This includes, but is not
limited-to, inmates who fall under the following categories:
Inmates with persistent psychotic symptoms who would be at risk far exacerbation of their symptoms if they were housed in the general population;
Inmates with unstable mood disorders who are prone to marked mood lability or severe depression;
Inmates with severe foras of character disorders whose behavior would be significantly disruptive in the general population;
Inmates who require a higher level of supervision for their particular medication regimens;
Inmates who are identified as potential suicide risks;
Inmates for whom a court has ordered, based on a forensic screening, full competency and/or full criminal responsibility examinations;
(...continued) modification once mental health services for general population inmates are established and stabilized.
39 Following the forensic evaluation process, these inmates shall be assessed by a psychiatrist, in consultation with appropriate representatives from the Bureau of Forensic Psychiatry, in order to determine whether continued housing on a mental health unit is clinically appropriate. If a clinical determination is made that the inmate can be safely managed in the general population, s/he shall be promptly discharged from the mental health unit pursuant to all applicable discharge policies.
- 27 -

• Inmates who are returned to the Jail following psychiatric hospitalization.
(ii) adm-i gsion Form; Within 60 days, the defendants in consultation with the Special Officer and her experts, shall develop a mental health unit admission form. (iii) Initial Nursing Assessment; All inmates transferred to the mental health units shall receive an initial nursing assessment which shall be completed immediately upon entry into the mental health unit and which shall be documented on the admission form. (iv) Full Assessment; All newly admitted inmates, including returnees from psychiatric hospitals, shall receive a full assessment during the first shift that is staffed by clinical staff following their admission. The full assessment shall include completion of the admission form and evaluation of the inmate by a psychiatrist. (v) Discharge Procedure; An inmate shall not be discharged from the mental health unit until s/he is cleared for discharge by the Mental Health Program Director, or her/his designee, after a 5xnding that the inmate meets all discharge criteria. Once an inmate is cleared for discharge, s/he shall be transferred out of the mental health unit within 72 hours.
40 These inmates shall be housed on the mental health units pending prompt evaluation by a psychiatrist who shall, among other matters, fully assess the inmate's proper housing status.
- 28 -

I-

®

m

(vi) Special Status;

Except to ensure public safety or to address an emergency,

untrained personnel and other inmates shall not have access to inmates housed in the mental health units or the infirmary.41

(vii) Initial Processing Period; I

i

The processing period for new admittees to the mental health

unit shall not exceed one business day. Under no circumstances

may an inmate housed in the mental health unit be locked down for

more than one business day absent disciplinary justification,

protective custody status, or an appropriate clinical or

therapeutic reason.

(viii) Treatment Plans:

Treatment plans must be developed by the mental health

treatment team for each new admittee and filed in the inmate's

mental health record within one week of his/her admission to

the unit. They shall be reviewed by the mental health staff at

two week intervals and the reviews shall be documented in the

inmate's record. The treatment plan shall include the following:

diagnosis, treatment interventions, identity of staff assigned to

i rovide treatment, identification of spe ;ific problems being

treated, and treatment goals.

Treatment plans shall be evaluated quarterly for

appropriateness and timeliness through the quality assurance

Following the completion of the training cycle described in this remedial plan.

42 This shall become the integrated medical/mental health record.

- 29 -

process. All documentation, including raw data and analysis, shall be maintained and provided to the Special Officer, and plaintiffs' counsel.
(ix) Therapeutic Program: The therapeutic program provided in the mental health unit shall be described in the policy. The program will address, among other concerns, the special needs of the juveniles and women housed on the mental health units as well as a plan for providing all inmates housed on the units with regular access to outdoor recreation. The failure to implement the policy and procedure described above within 240 days shall result in fines of $200.00 per day for each day of noncompliance.
C. Physical Plant Within 45 days the defendants shall, in consultation with
the Special Officer and her experts, draft a plan for upgrading the physical plant in the mental health units. The plan shall include a housekeeping program, a preventative maintenance program, an extermination program, ar«d a schedule for reconfiguration of all office space in the unit in order to ensure that adequate space is provided for individual counseling, group counseling, team meetings, eating, recreation and other out-of-cell activity, and offices for the mental health staff.
The defendants shall steam clean and paint all ceilings and walls in all common areas, offices and cells located in the
- 30 -

®

m

mental health units within 75 days. The defendants shall abate

all deficiencies cited by the Department of Consumer and

Regulatory Affairs (DCRA) in all previous inspections within 60

days including deficiencies in the lighting of the cellblock

common areas as well as the lighting of individual cells. In

those situations where, despite a substantial good faith effort,

the defendants cannot abate a deficiency within 60 days, they

shall file on or before the conclusion of the 60 day period, a

corrective action plan which identifies those deficiencies that

have not been abated, the reasons why they have not been abated,

and a deadline within which each deficiency will be cured. The

corrective action plan shall also address those deficiencies for

which a waiver shall be sought from DCRA, the date the waiver

application has been or will be made, the basis for the waiver

application, and the anticipated date by which a final

determination will be made with respect to the waiver.

The failure to implement the plan to improve the physical plant

in the mental health units will result in fines of $150.00 per

day for each day of noncompliance.

5. General Population Within 190 days, three clinicians shall be exclusively assigned to provide mental health services for inmates in the general population. They shall provide coverage on both the day and evening shifts.

- 31 -

Within 75 days, the defendants, in consultation with the
Special Officer and her experts, shall draft a plan for providing
reasonable and timely access to mental health services for
inmates in the general population. The plan must include the
following:
• A deployment schedule for the clinicians assigned to the general population;
• A procedure for self-referral and for referrals from the medical, correctional, or case management staff;
• A procedure for performing general mental health assessments which must be provided within 72 hours for a routine request or referral and which must be provided at the time of request or referral for emergencies;
• A procedure for the prescription of psychotropic medications and on-going monitoring of inmates who have been prescribed psychotropic medications;
• A procedure for instituting crisis intervention, including the availability of urgent assessment;
• A follow-up program for individuals identified during intake screening as at risk for mental illness; and
• A therapeutic program of individual counseling and group sessions, including eligibility and d scharge criteria.
The failure to implement the plan to provide mental health
services for inmates in the general population shall result in
fines of $200.00 per day for each day of noncompliance.
- 32 -

6. Medication*3
The defendants shall, within 75 days, in consultation with
the Special Officer and her experts, develop a policy and
procedure regarding medications, including medications used for
the treatment of mental disorders.
The policy shall include the following requirements which
shall be implemented as set forth below pending the development
of the full policy:
• Within 14 days, except in an emergency, medication for the treatment of mental disorders shall be prescribed only by a psychiatrist. The psychiatrist shall review the inmate's medical record, including current medical condition, prior to prescribing such medication.
• Within five days, the defendants shall maintain a log identifying all inmates who have been prescribed medication for the treatment of mental disorders by name and DCDC number, the date of the prescription, the actual prescription, ant the full name, title and provider nuaber at the prescriber.
• Within 14 days the defendants shall establish a policy and procedure for addressing emergency situations where a non-psychiatric physician prescribes medication for the treatment of mental disordexs. The policy and procedure must include a mechanism for prompt no ification, review and evaluation by a psychiatrist.
• Effective immediately, all Inmates who receive anti-psychotic medications must be informed of the risk of tardive dyskinesia. This shall be documented in the medical record.
Except where specifically noted, this section is intended to address all types of medication. It is not limited to medications used to treat mental disorders.
- 33 -

Within 60 days, a l l antipsjcaotic medication may only be prescribed vita an inmate' s informed consent. Appropriate documentation s h a l l be maintained in the medical record.

Within 10 business days, pnrfnr to the administration of antipsydmtic medication, a l l inmates shall be assessed for involuntary movements and appropriate tdiinical follow-up s h a l l be undertaken. Appropriate documentation shall be maissained in the medical record.

Within 45 days, the defendants shall evaluate, according to the fttmoxmal Involuntary Movement Scale* (UBS), a l l inmates who are receiving astipsychotic medication.

Within 55 days the defendants shall develop a system t o track a l l inmates receiving antipsychotic medication in order to ensure that AIMS evaluations are cmwfnrfprt at s i x month i n t e r v a l s for a l l ixmates who receive antipsychotic medication.

• Within f i v e days, the defendants shall u t i l i z e the computerized i-****ri™j system that they have developed to track a l l inmates who have been prescribed psychstropic medication.

• Within 10 days, inmates honed In the mental

health u n i t s who have been prescribed

medication for the treatment of a psychiatric

disorder s h a l l be seen and evaluated by a

p s y c h i a t r i s t at l e a s t once per week until

s t a b i l i z e d and thereafter a minimum of once

every two weeks for continued evaluation.

With: l 60 days, inmates hoased in the general

popuxation w i l l be seen ami evaluated

according to the identical schedule unless

the psychiatrist in the exercise of her/his

c l i n i c a l judgment determinesr in those s i t u a t i o n s where the inmate has been

stabilized for a significant period, that

evaluation every 30 days i s medically

appropriate. The medical record of a l l

|

inmates subject to these evaluations shall

1

include appropriate documentation of each

encounter. A schedule of appointments shall

be maintained and annotated in order to

document whether the appointment occurred.

- 34 -

1

The schedules shall be maintained and shall be made available to the Special Officer and counsel for the plainti£fs-
Within 30 days, the defentaits shall review the charts of a l l inmates afro receive psychotropic medications in order to ensure that appropriate biocheoicaL laboratory monitoring has been canfiustad.
Within 10 days, the defenfents shall develop a policy and procedure flttica establishes a system for tracking the laboratory monitoring of a l l inmates who receive psychotropic medication. Following implementation of the tracking system, the defendants shall develop a protocol which ensures tftafc a l l inmates whose laboratory findings are abnormal, including those with snfetiBBrapeutic medication l e v e l s , are evalbiated bj a psychiatrist and clinically appropriate action i s taken and docsmeoted in the medical record.
Effective immediately, as part of the mental health quality assurance program, the defendants shall commence monitoring a l l inmates on lithium in light of the following: prescribing practices, appropriateness and timeliness of laboratory sttndies, lithium l e v e l s , adjustment of dnsaijps, and monitoring of side e f f e c t s . Monthly sports that r e f l e c t findings in eacb of these areas shall be immediately incorporated into the monthly compliance report and the defendants shall maintain a l l raw data for xeviev by the Special Officer and plaintiffs1 connsel upon demand. Within 60 days the defendants shall expand t h i s effort in order to include a* 1 inmates on Tegretol.
Within 30 days, the defendants shall develop a plan establishing an effective system for procurement of a l l necessary medications in order to ensure that an appropriate inventory of medications i s always aiailable. The plan shall include an implementation schedule. Pending the implementation of this system, the defendants shall, within five days, demonstrate to the Special Officer, her experts and p l a i n t i f f s ' counsel that they have developed a workable system for
- 35 -

emergency procurement of out-of-stock medications in order to ensure that prescribed medications are promptly administered.
• Within 45 days, all medication for the treatment of mental disorders shall be administered by licensed nurses who have received training regarding the indications, effects and side effects of these medications. The training for these nurses shall include the methodology of watch-take administration. The defendants shall maintain records documenting the training of each nurse assigned to administer psychotropic medications. These records shall include the date of training, trainer, and curriculum.
• Within 10 days, all medication for the treatment of psychiatric conditions shall be administered on a watch-take basis and in liquid form. If there are medications which are not manufactured in liquid form, such medication shall be crushed and mixed with a liquid for administration. In situations where a medication cannot be effectively crushed (such as enteric coated medications), the medication shall be administered in the form in which it is manufactured on a watchtake basis.
The failure to implement the above-described policy
requirements within the time-lines specified above shall result
in fines of $200.00 for each violation pending the implementation
of the full policy. The full policy shall be implemented within
75 days and thereafter fines in the amount of $250.00 for each
violation of the policy shall be imposed.
- 36 -

7 • Suicids Prevention A. Training;
(i) Suicide Prevention Training The defendants shall, within 45 days, in consultation with the Special Officer and her expert consultants, develop an eight hour Jail suicide prevention training program for all staff who come into contact with inmates. This training program must include instruction concerning the following: warning signs and symptoms; potential predisposing factors; high risk suicide periods; the reasons why jails are conducive to suicidal behavior; instruction in the identification of inmate behavior that may be indicative of mental illness and the procedure for reporting such behavior, liability issues, intervention techniques, and the requirements in the revised DOC suicide prevention policy described below. In addition, all staff must receive appropriate refresher training on an annual basis. The suicide prevention training must be conducted by individuals with appropriate credentials and experience. (ii) First Aid and CPR Training Effective within 30 days, the defendants shall develop a training program for both standard first aid and CPR training for all staff who come into contact with inmates. The training must
44 All training plans required under this section shall include a procedure and deadlines for training subsequently hired/assigned staff.
- 37 -

be conducted by certified instructors. All staff must receive recertification training as required.
(iii) Mental Health Training Within 60 days, the defendants, in consultation with the Special Officer and her experts, shall develop a mental health training program for all staff who come into contact with inmates. All staff assigned to the mental health units, one correctional officer per cellblock per shift, as well as all officers assigned to the infirmary post, shall receive the initial suicide prevention training, first aid training, CPR training and mental health training within 120 days. All remaining Jail staff who come into contact with inmates shall receive the initial suicide prevention training, first aid training, CPR training and aental health training within 120 days thereafter. In scheduling the training, priority must be given to staff assigned to the mental health units or other housing areas (i.e., the infirmary) in which suicidal inmates are housed. The defendants shall maintain a system for tracking suicide prevention training, CPR training ? ad first aid training, and mental health training which ensures that all staff members receive the initial, refresher and recertification training in a timely fashion. The tracking system, which shall be established within 45 days, must verify each employees1 status with respect to training.
- 38 -

*iV-'.f*
The defendants shall pay fines in the amount of $200.00 per staff member for every staff member who, absent good cause, fails to complete the suicide prevention, first aid, and CPR training within the above-stated deadline schedules. These fines shall be paid on a per diem basis for each day that each staff member has not completed the training.
B. Communication: Within 10 days, a team of correctional, medical and mental
health staff shall meet with supervisory and administrative staff in order to build a more effective working relationship. Follow-up meetings shall transpire on a regular basis. The schedule, agenda and minutes for these meetings shall be generated by the Warden in consultation with appropriate correctional, medical and mental health staff.
C. Policy and Procedure; The defendants shall, within 45 days, in consultation with
the Special Officer and her expert consultants, develop a revised suicide prevention policy. rme revised policy shall address the following areas: training; identification and screening; staff communication; housing; supervision; intervention; reporting; and follow-up/review. In addition, the revised policy shall incorporate the following requirements:
(i) Supervision: (a) Observation Levels for Inmates on Suicide Watch:
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The current observation levels contained in DOP 6080.2 shall be discontinued and replaced with the following:45
Close Observation; This observation level shall be provided for the inmate who is not actively suicidal but expresses suicidal ideation and/or has a recent prior history of selfdestructive behavior. Inmates an close observation must be housed on the mental health units or the infirmary. They must be observed by correctional staff at staggered intervals that do not exceed every 15 minutes.
Constant observation: This observation level shall be provided for the inmate who is actively suicidal. Inmates on constant observation must be housed in the infirmary and shall be observed by a staff member on a continuous and uninterrupted basis. The staff member assigned to observe this inmate shall have no other responsibilities. If an inmate requires more than eight consecutive hours of constant observation, s/he shall be transferred to an appropriate psychiatric hospital under the terms of the Court's November 9, 1993 Order.
(b) Communication of Suicide Watch Status: Within 210 days a merger of the mental health staff shall meet with all correctional staff assigned to every housing unit within which there is an inmate housed on suicide watch at the beginning of each shift. The mental health staff member shall be
45 other observation aids, such as closed circuit television, may be used as a supplement to these observation levels. Under no circumstances may they be used as a substitute for close observation or constant observation.
- 40 -

@
required to brief the correctional staff about each inmate's suicide- watch status in order to ensure that the officers are fully aware of the inmate's status.
Within 10 business days the defendants shall provide the Special Officer and plaintiffs* counsel with a plan for the communication of an inmate's suicide watch status to members of the correctional staff on a shift-to-shift basis pending the full mental health staffing of the aental health units.
(c) Supervision of Inmates Who Are Not on 8nicide Watch;
All inmates housed in the mental health units must be physically observed by the correctional staff at 15 minute intervals. Staff must document the observation as the check occurs in each housing unit log.
All inmates housed in general population and segregation units shall be physically observed by correctional staff at regular 30 minute intervals. The correctional staff must document the observation as the check occurs in each housing unit log.
Under no circi -nstances shall inmates incarcerated at the Jail, including inmates on suicide watch, be permitted to append any materials to their cell doors which obstruct the view into the cell.
If the defendants fail to comply with the above-stated supervision and documentation requirements within 90 days, they shall be required to achieve compliance within 30 additional days. If the defendants remain in noncompliance at the
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conclusion of this 30 day period they shall be required to develop within 30 additional days, in consultation with the Special Officer and her experts, a plan (including an implementation schedule) for the use and installation of electronic time clocks, or the functional equivalent, in the Jail's housing units. The time clocks shall be installed within 30 days after the plan is finalized.
(ii) Documentation for Close and Constant Observation: Staff members shall be required to document the physical observation of inmates under close observation as each check occurs. The physical observation of inmates under constant observation shall be documented at 15 minute intervals. This information must be recorded on the suicide watch flow sheet which shall be filed in the medical record at the conclusion of the suicide watch. Suicide watch flow sheets must be completed and signed by all correctional staff members who have made physical observations of an inmate on suicide watch on each shift. Each shift supervisor shall be held responsible for the security checks performed by correctional officers in order to ensure that thay are accurate and complete. The head psychiatric nurse assigned to oversee each housing unit, and or his/her designee, shall be responsible for ensuring that all forms related to the suicide prevention protocol that fall under the auspices of the medical and/or mental health staff are accurate and complete. (iii) Housing;
- 42 -

;'.:>•

@

The defendants shall, within 60 days, in consultation with

the Special Officer and her experts, develop a plan and

implementation schedule for the renovation of all cells in the

mental health units and the infiniary that shall house suicidal

inmates. The plan must incorporate tlie following requirements

which shall be implemented as specified below:

• Within 70 days all cells designated for the housing of suicidal immtes must be "suicide resistant" and free of all obvious protrusions. These cells most contain tamper-proof lighting fixtures, doors containing large panel heavy gauge lexan glass (pr equivalent gzade shatter-proof glass) and ceiling air vents that are protrusion-free. Cells that house suicidal inmates may not contain the following: electrical switches or outlets, bunks with open bottoms, towel racks on desks and sinks, radiator vents, or any other object that may constitute a readily accessible anchoring device.

• Within one year, all other cells within the Jail that are used for housing inmates, or as temporary holding cells, shall contain tamper-proof light fixtures and ceiling air vents that are protrusion free.

• Effective immediately the defendants shall cease housing or holding suicidal inmates in any of the holding areas located within the third floor medical area, including bit not limited to the locked valkway betweer the clinical side and the administrative side of the third floor, and the holding cells adjacent to the third floor control bubble.

(iv) Intervention:

Within 120 days, all housing unit officers shall be required

to respond immediately to all emergencies in the housing units

46 The panels must be large enough to permit staff a full unobstructed view of the entire cell.
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and commence life-saving measures. Correctional staff shall not wait for the arrival of medical personnel before initiating lifesaving measures.
Within 10 business days, the defendants shall, in consultation with the Special Officer and her experts, develop a plan which addresses the initial correctional response to emergencies in the housing units pending completion of the CPR and first aid training that is mandated under the terms of this plan.
Effective immediately, any staff member who discovers an inmate attempting suicide shall immediately respond, survey the scene to ensure the emergency is genuine, and alert other staff to contact the Medical Emergency Response Team (M.E.R.T) pursuant to the Emergency Response Protocol filed in this case on April 12, 1994. If the staff member has been certified in first aid and/or CPR, these measures should be initiated and maintained, if indicated, until the staff member is relieved by medical personnel.
Within 15 days, the defendants shall supply all officers assigned to the mental health units and the infirmary with handheld radios that shall be used to facilitate communication in the cellblocks and in the infirmary. All staff shall receive appropriate training in the use of the radios.
Within five business days the defendants shall survey the intercom system in each housing unit in order to determine whether the system is operational. In the event an intercom unit
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in a housing unit is not operational, the defendants shall either cure the deficiency within 10 days or issue hand-held radios to the officers assigned to the housing unit pending the renovation of the intercom system. All housing unit intercoms shall be operational within 120 days.
Within five days, the defendants shall survey the first aid kits in each housing unit in order to ensure they are properly stocked and properly mounted. All first aid kits must contain an Addis Wonder Knife. An ambu bag shall be mounted in proximity to each housing unit first aid kit. All old first aid kits must be discarded.
Within 20 days, the defendants in consultation with the Special Officer and her experts, shall develop a protocol for regularly inventorying the contents of the first aid kits. The first aid kits shall be inventoried by an appropriately trained member of the medical staff. A log book of each inventory must be maintained by the Chief Medical Officer.
Within 20 days, all correctional staff who have contact with inmates shall receive instruction in the location of the first aid kit, the purpose and use of the wonder knife, and the purpose and use of the ambu bag. All trained staff shall be required to use the wonder knife, if indicated, to cut down hanging victims, and to use the ambu bag, if indicated, in order to provide respiratory resuscitation. Within 30 days the defendants shall provide documentation to the Special Officer and plaintiffs'
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counsel which establishes that all staff have received the appropriate instruction.
Within 60 days, the defendants shall initiate training of all correctional, medical and mental health staff in the requirements of the Emergency Response Protocol filed with the Court on April 12, 1994. Records of the training shall be maintained in order to track the training status of all staff. The training program shall include the use of mock drills as well as initial and refresher training. Special consideration shall be given to the clinical training of medical personnel who shall be trained and tested on appropriate emergency medical techniques within 60 days. All training shall be completed within 75 days and the defendants shall develop a system for tracking the training status of all Jail staff. Within 90 days the defendants shall provide documentation to the Special Officer and plaintiffs' counsel which establishes that all staff have received appropriate training.
Within 30 days the defendants shall maintain a log of all medical emergencies. The log shall include a copy of Attachment A to the April 12, 1994 Emergency Response Protocol. The log shall be reviewed on a weekly basis by the Chief Medical Officer in order to determine whether there is any indication of deviations from the requirements of the protocol. All deviations shall be documented and a corrective action plan shall be instituted.
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For the first 30 days following the training, deviations from the requirements of the Emergency Response Protocol shall be fined at the rate of $250.00 per violation. Thereafter, deviations shall be fined at the rate of $500.00 per violation.
Effective immediately, the issuance of a paper gown for a suicidal inmate should be accomplished only as a last resort for periods when the inmate is engaging in self destructive behavior. Cloth gowns with zippers shall not be issued to suicidal inmates.
(v) Reporting; The defendants shall, within 30 days, in consultation with the Special Officer and her experts, develop a protocol, implementation schedule, and a form for reporting all significant suicide attempts and successful suicides.
(vi) Follow-up/Review: The defendants shall, within 45 days, in consultation with the Special Officer and her experts, develop a protocol and implementation schedule for the follow-up and review of all serious suicide attempts and successful suicides. The protocol shall address, among other things, the operation of the Suicide Investigation Committee. The Suicide investigation Committee shall be governed by the following, among other, requirements:
• The Suicide Investigation Committee shall be required to commence a full investigation of all successful suicides within one business day of their occurrence.
• The investigation must include, but shall not be limited to the following: observation of the area where the suicide or significant attempt transpired; confidential interviews with staff, inmates, and eyewitnesses; and - 47 -

review of relevant documents, records and log books. The defendants shall promptly make all records and interviewees available to the Suicide Investigation Committee.
• The final report generated by the Suicide Investigation Committee shall be completed within 30 days of a Jail suicide or significant suicide attempt and shall contain recommendations which are considered by the DOC executive staff. In the event a particular recommendation is rejected, a written record must be developed citing the reasons why the recommendation has been rejected. The recommendations must be used to generate a corrective action plan and implementation schedule.
The defendants shall, within 60 days, in consultation with
the Special Officer and her experts, develop a plan establishing
a crisis intervention team for inmates and critical incident
stress debriefings for staff.
Failure to implement the above-stated suicide prevention
policy requirements, except those related to emergency response,
within the time-lines specified above shall result in fines of
$250.00 per infraction.
8. Restraints
Within 20 days, the defends cs shall, in consultation with
the Special Officer and her expert consultants, develop a policy
and procedure which implements the requirements contained in the
November 9, 1993 Order with respect to the use of medical
restraints. All medical, mental health and correctional staff
shall be trained in the policy within 30 days thereafter.
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The defendants shall develop, within 30 days, a system for tracking the application of restraints. A restraint log shall be maintained and shall include the following information: the name and DCDC designator number of the inmate who has been restrained; the date and time that restraints were applied; the identity of the health care provider who ordered that restraints be applied and the reasons why the order was given; the precise restraint order; the terms of any modifications to the initial order; and the date and time when restraints were removed or the inmate was transferred to an appropriate psychiatric hospital facility.
Effective immediately, all violations of the November 9, 1993 Order regarding the use of restraints shall be fined at the rate of $500.00 per violation. After seven violations, all violations shall be fined at the rate of $1,000.00 per violation EXCEPT that effective immediately the defendants shall pay $3,000.00 for each instance in which an inmate is restrained in the absence of an order issued by a physician.
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9. Hoaoitalization A. Transfers pursuant to the November 9, 1993 Order
Within 3 0 days the defendants shall, with the assistance of the Special Officer and her staff, provide to counsel for plaintiffs a list of all inmates who have been transferred pursuant to paragraph one and paragraph four of the November 9, 1993 Order. The list shall be accompanied by the following information: the date and time of the evaluation which precipitated the transfer, the date and time of the transfer, the name of the facility where the inmate was transferred, the date of return, the reason for the transfer (including the diagnosis and whether the inmate was transferred pursuant to paragraph one or paragraph four of the order), whether the inmate was on pretrial status, whether the inmate was under 18 years of age at the time of transfer, and the gender of the inmate.
Within 10 days the defendants shall maintain a log of all transfers conducted pursuant to either paragraph one or paragraph four of the November 9, 1993 Order. The log shall contain all of the categories of information listed in the preceding paragraph and shall be maintained by the Program Director of the Jail's mental health program or her/his designee. The log shall be producible to the Special Officer and plaintiffs1 counsel.
Within 30 days the defendants shall deliver to the Special Officer and plaintiffs' counsel a narrative statement, signed under penalty of perjury by a supervisory official in the DOC who has personal knowledge, which specifies all steps the defendants
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have taken and plan to take to supplement their psychiatric hospitalization capacity, including but not limited to the identity of the DOC employee(s) assigned to this matter, the names and affiliations of the individual (s) who were contacted with regard to this matter, the dates of each contact, the content of each contact and the result of each contact. In addition, the defendants shall produce to the Special Officer and plaintiffs1 counsel all documents and records maintained by the DOC that are relevant to defendants' efforts to supplement the D O C s psychiatric hospitalization capacity.
Within 120 days, the defendants shall provide the Special Officer, her experts and plaintiffs' counsel with a detailed written assessment regarding the need to supplement the DOCs psychiatric hospital bed capacity for pre and post trial adult men and women as well as for pre and post trial juveniles who are held in the custody of the Department of Corrections.
Within 30 days following the issuance of the assessment described in the preceding paragraph, the defendants shall be required to demonstrate to the Special Officer and plaintiffs' counsel that chey have the actual capacity to provide for the psychiatric hospitalization of all inmates subject to hospitalization under the terms of the November 9, 1993 Order. Evidence of this capacity shall include but not be limited to contracts with appropriate psychiatric hospitals that provide psychiatric services and/or the establishment of an appropriate psychiatric hospital component in a facility operated by the
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District of Columbia. The failure to develop an adequate
psychiatric hospitalization capacity within this time-frame shall
result in the imposition of fines in the amount of $3,500.00 per
day, per inmate, for each day an inmate who is in need of
psychiatric hospitalization pursuant to the November 9, 1993
Order is not hospitalized.
B. Policy and Procedure
Within 45 days, the defendants, in consultation with the
Special Officer and her experts, shall develop a policy and
procedure implementing the requirements of paragraphs one and
four of the November 9, 1993 Order. The policy shall include a
procedure for medical clearance of the inmate, as well as the
following requirements which shall be implemented as set forth
below:
Within 10 days, in consultation with the Special Officer and her expert consultants, the defendants shall develop a form that shall be used to assess an inmate's need for hospitalization under the provisions of both paragraph one and paragraph four of the Court's November 9, 1993 Order. The assessments shall commence immediately thereafter and with respect to inmates housed on the mental health units, the following schedr Xe shall apply:
• All inmates receiving psychotropic medications shall be assessed with regard to the need for hospitalization under either paragraph one or paragraph four of the November 9, 1993 Order at the time of their weekly or bi-weekly psychiatric evaluations. An assessment form shall be completed by the
47 This requirement is not intended to preclude the use of the psychiatric consult form.
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psychiatrist conducting the evaluation and filed in the medical record.
• All inmates who are not receiving medication, but diagnosed as mentally ill and refusing medication, shall be assessed weekly and a copy of the assessment form shall be filed in the medical record.
• All inmates who have been diagnosed with a mental illness but medication has not been indicated, shall be assessed every two weeks. A copy of the assessment form shall be filed in the medical record.
Inmates who are not housed on the mental health units shall, within 60 days, also be subject to hospitalization assessments. An assessment form shall be completed by the psychiatrist conducting the evaluation and stored in the medical record. At the time of the assessment these inmates shall also be assessed with respect to the need for transfer into the mental health unit. These inmates shall be assessed according to the following schedule:
• All inmates receiving psychotropic medication shall be assessed with regard to the need for hospitalization under either paragraph one or paragraph four of the Hovember 9, 1993 Order at the time of their weekly, bi-weekly or monthly psychiatric evaluations.
• All inmates diagnosed with a mental illness shall be assessed every 30 days with regard to the need for hospitalization, the need for housing on the mental health unit, and the need for medication.
The defendants shall, in consultation /ith the Special
Officer and her experts, develop a system for scheduling all
psychiatric hospitalization assessments within 10 business days,
48 Inmates who are not receiving medication may be assessed by a mental health clinician who shall consult with a psychiatrist if appropriate.
49 See Section 6, above.
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The defendants shall be fined $150.00 per occurrence for the failure to perform an assessment as set forth above. This fine shall be suspended. Following notice50 of a violation, the defendants shall be required to promptly investigate the reasons for the violation. Within 15 days thereafter, or such longer period as permitted by the Special Officer, the defendants shall report to plaintiffs' counsel and the special Officer with regard to the results of the investigation. At that time the defendants shall also submit a proposed corrective action plan which shall include an implementation schedule. The corrective action plan shall be submitted by the defendants for comment by plaintiffs' counsel and for approval by the Special Officer. The failure to implement the corrective action plan, within the time-frame set forth in the plan, shall result in the imposition of the fine that was initially suspended.
Within 45 days a master file of all assessments conducted shall be contemporaneously maintained. The master file shall include copies of all assessment forms that are completed pursuant to this plan. The file shall be made available to the ST ecial Officer and counsel for the plain -iffs.
C. Plan For Sentenced Prisoners Who Contest Non-Emerqencv Hospitalization
The notice may be received from plaintiffs' counsel, the Special Officer, or the following employees of the DOC: the compliance office staff, the warden or one of the deputy wardens of the Jail, the Assistant Director for Health Services, the Chief Medical Officer of the Jail, the Chief Psychiatrist of the DOC, the Director of the Mental Health Program at the Jail, the Jail's Chief Pharmacist, and the Executive Deputy Director of the DOC.
- 54 -

The defendants, in consultation with the Special Officer and her expert consultants shall develop, within 30 days, a plan for the care, treatment, and monitoring of any sentenced inmate who interposes an objection to his/her non-emergency hospitalization and requests a jury trial pursuant to Superior Court Mental Health Rule 9. The failure to implement the plan within 45 days shall result in fines of $500.00 per infraction.
Effective immediately, pending the development and implementation of the plan, such inmates shall be housed on the mental health unit and have daily documented contact with a mental health clinician as well as, at a minimum, a weekly assessment by a psychiatrist with respect to whether there is a need for emergency hospitalization. Within five business days, a treatment plan shall be developed and implemented in order to address the inmate's therapeutic needs while housed on the mental health unit pending the ultimate disposition of the petition for hospitalization. The failure to comply with this interim procedure within the time-frame specified herein shall result in fines of $1,000.00 per infraction.
10. Quality Assurance Within 30 days, the defendants shall, in consultation with the Special Officer and her experts, develop a plan for implementing paragraph 18 of the November 9, 1993 Order. The plan shall require implementation at the conclusion of the 30 day period. The failure to implement the plan within 10 days
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thereafter shall result in fines of $200.00 per day for each day the plan is not implemented.
The mental health quality assurance monitor, in consultation with the Special Officer and her experts, shall develop a mental health quality assurance plan for the Jail within 60 days after the mental health quality assurance monitor commences employment. The plan shall include an implementation schedule. The mental health quality assurance plan shall be implemented in accordance with the implementation schedule set forth in. the plan. The failure to implement the mental health quality assurance plan within the time-frame specified in the plan shall result in fines of $250.00 per day for each day the plan has not been implemented.
V. MEDICAL CARE PLAN The initial remedial plan for medical care addresses staffing and other urgent compliance-related deficiencies such as deficiencies in pharmacy services, quality assurance, specialty clinic access, infirmary capacity, access to sick call, and care for inmates with HIV/AIDS. 0 ;her areas of non-compliance that are not the subject of this plan shall be addressed in subsequent remedial plans. 1. General Matters Related to Medical Staffing All persons employed in the positions that are required under this staffing plan shall, unless indicated herein, work full-time in the medical program at the District of Columbia
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#1
$200.00 per day for each day that an improperly credentialed provider works at the Jail.
All medical provider positions required under this plan, except the Chief Medical Officer, Chief Pharmacist, and Chief Nurse positions, should be considered positions that shall be filled as specified for each shift. Accordingly, within 45 days, the defendants shall, in consultation with the Special Officer and her experts, develop a plan for providing coverage on shifts where a provider may be absent due to circumstances that include but are not limited to annual leave, sick leave, and leave for continuing education.
The failure to hire the staff required under the terms of this plan, within the time period set forth in this plan, shall result in fines of $200.00 per day per vacant position for the first 30 day period of noncompliance followed by fines of $250.00 per day per vacant position for each subsequent day of noncompliance. All vacancies which occur subsequent to the filing of this plan shall be filled within 120 days. Failure to fill such vacancies wi *Jiin this time-line shall result in fines of $200.00 per day per vacant position for the first 30 day period of noncompliance followed by fines of $250.00 per day per vacant position for each subsequent day of noncompliance.
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2. Staffing Plan52

Within 180 days, the defendants shall hire the following

medical staff, who shall be deployed as indicated below:

A. Physicians

16.5 FTE's*

Deployment/ Week Days:

Days

Evenings

Fights

1 Chief 9 full-time

2 full-time 4 part-time

Deployment/ Weekends:

2 full-time

1.5 FTE's for physician coverage of at least one physician on each weekend shift.

B. Physicians' Assistants

17 FTE's

Deployment/ Week Days:

Days

Evenings

1 Chief 8 full-time

3 full-time

Deployment/ Weekends:

Nights 2 full-time

3.0 FTE's for 48 coverage deployed as 2 PA's per shift on each weekend shift.

For over six months, the Special Officer has repeatedly requested that the defendants work with her and her expert consultant on the development of this medical staffing plan. Unfortunately, although the defendants promised to provide the Special Officer wit)' staffing proposals on a number of occar ions, they failed to do so. The plan presented here was developed by the Special Officer's medical expert after consultation with various members of the Jail's medical staff. In large part, although not entirely, it is identical to "suggestions" regarding staffing that were made to the DOC executive staff by the DOC medical director. These "suggestions" are contained in a document which was forwarded to the Special Officer by plaintiffs' counsel who obtained it during the course of his participation on a task force related to correctional health care. It is noteworthy that at least one of the staffing "suggestions" directly contravenes this Court's orders regarding the deployment of the tuberculosis coordinator, k copy of the DOC medical director's "suggestions" is attached as Ex. 6.
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the services of a dental hygienist to inmates incarcerated at the Jail when such services are clinically indicated.
6. Pharmacy 1 Chief 5 Pharmacists 5 Pharmacy Technicians
H. Health Educator 1 full-time
I . jjursincr Assistants 4 full-time
J . Tliberculosis CoordiLnator53 1 full-time
K. Quality Assurance (OA) 1 full-time medical QA monitor 1 assistant
3. Pharmacy Effective immediately, the defendants shall take all appropriate steps to stabilize leadership in the Jail pharmacy. In this regard, the defendants shall, within 30 days, convert the
The tuberculosis coordinator shall receive adequate clerical support and support staff may be increased if the current staffing level proves inadequate.
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acting chief pharmacist position to a permanent chief pharmacist position.
The defendants shall, within 75 days, in consultation with the Special Officer and her experts, develop a plan to cure deficiencies in the pharmacy system in order to ensure, among other matters, that drug utilization reviews, patient profiles, daily one-on-one medication lists, and drug inventories can be obtained on a timely basis. The failure to substantially implement this plan within 150 days shall result in the imposition of fines in the amount of $200.00 per day for each day the plan has not been implemented.
Pending the implementation of the plan described in the preceding paragraph, the defendants shall, within 20 days, in consultation with the Special Officer and her experts, develop an interim system, that is not based on the Medication Administration Records (MAR's) prepared by the nursing staff, for tracking one-on-one medications, maintaining medication compliance information, and preparing the lists necessary for dispensing medications at each medication distribution time.
4. Quality Assurance (OA) The medical care quality assurance monitor, in consultation with the Special Officer and her experts, shall develop a medical care quality assurance plan for the Jail within 60 days after the medical care quality assurance monitor commences employment. The plan shall include an implementation schedule. The medical
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quality assurance plan shall be implemented in accordance with the implementation schedule set forth in the plan. The failure to implement the QA plan in accordance with the implementation schedule set forth in the plan shall result in fines of $250.oo per day for each day of noncompliance.
5. Specialty Services Within 90 days, the defendants shall, in consultation with the Special Officer and her experts, develop a plan which incorporates in substantial part the recommendations made by Dr. Robert L. Cohen in his September 15, 1993 report on medical services at the Jail. The plan, which shall include an implementation schedule, must ensure that all inmates receive timely access to specialty medical services. Defendants shall pay fines of $1000.00 per day for each day that they are in noncompliance with the plan. Within 60 days, the defendants shall, in consultation with the Special Officer and her experts, develop a plan to renovate the holding cells at D.C. General Hospital In order to ensure that inmates do not remain shackled in the holding cells and/or shackled to the benches in the vestibule area while awaiting appointments in the clinics or in the emergency room. The plan shall include an implementation schedule and shall address the expansion of the holding area as well as the construction of security vestibules with handcuffs ports at the entrance to each of the holding cells. The failure to implement the renovation
- 63 -

plan within the time-line set forth therein shall result in fines of $500.00 per day for each day the plan is not implemented.
6. Infirmary Care Within 30 days the defendants shall provide to the Special Officer and plaintiffs1 counsel a full assessment of the DOC's infirmary space capability. The assessment shall include the average daily census of all infirmaries, including the handicapped unit at the Correctional Treatment Facility (CTF) , operated by the Department of Corrections since January l, 1992. The failure to provide this assessment within 30 days shall result in fines of $1,000.00 per day for each day the assessment is not provided.54 Within 75 days the defendants shall, in consultation with the Special Officer and her experts, develop a plan for the provision of infirmary care for inmates incarcerated at the Jail. The plan shall also address the use that shall be made of the current Jail infirmary facilities. The plan shall be implemented within 105 days. The failure to implement the infirmary care plan within 105 days shall result in f5 »es in the amount of
The Special Officer requested this assessment from the defendants in March of 1994. It has not yet been received. The assessment is necessary in order to evaluate whether defendants1 proposal for permanently closing the infirmary at the Jail should be endorsed. Pending the resolution of the infirmary issue, the Special Officer cannot meaningfully address through the remedial process the deficiencies in medical treatment and medical office space that continue to compromise the quality of care at the Jail.
- 64 -

©

m

$250.00 per inmate per day for each day an inmate is not admitted

into an infirmary when such admission is medically indicated.

7. Sic* call The defendants shall, within 30 days, in consultation with the Special Officer and her experts, develop a policy and procedure related to the operation of sick call at the Jail. The policy shall incorporate in substantial part the recommendations made by Dr. Robert L. Cohen in his September 15, 1993 report on medical services at the D.C. Jail. The policy shall be implemented within 45 days. The defendants shall pay fines in the amount of $250.00 per infraction for each violation of the sick call policy.

The defendants shall, within 75 days, in consultation with the Special Officer and her experts, develop a plan for the appropriate care and treatment of inmates with HIV/AIDS. The plan shall incorporate in substantial part the recommendations made by Dr. Robert L. Cohen in his September 15, 1993 report on medical services at the D.C. Jiil. The plan shall be implemented in accordance with an implementation schedule that is developed as part of the plan. The defendants shall pay fines in the amount of $250.00 per inmate per day that each inmate is not treated in accordance with the plan.

9. Intake screening

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Within 20 days the defendants shall, in consultation with the Special Officer and plaintiffs' counsel, develop a policy and procedure regarding the timely processing of inmates from the Reception and Diagnostic area at the Jail to the Medical Intake area at the Jail.
10. Therapeutic Diets Within 90 days the defendants shall, in consultation with the Special Officer and her experts, develop a therapeutic diet plan for the Jail. The plan shall address staffing and include an implementation schedule. The failure to substantially comply with the plan shall result in fines of $500.00 per day for each day of noncompliance. Within 20 days, the defendants shall develop a policy and procedure which ensures that inmates who are insulin-dependent receive their meals within 30 to 60 minutes after receiving their dosages of insulin. 11. Intake and sick call Procedures for
Inmates with Special Needs Within 75 days the defendants shall, in consultation with the Special Officer and her experts, develop a policy and procedure for facilitating the medical and mental health intake processing, as well as sick call care, of all inmates at the Jail who are not native english speakers, or who have speech and/or hearing impairments.
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V I . COMPLIANCE MOKITOPTKG 8YBTOM
A. Btaffincr: Within 120 days the defendants shall hire an additional
compliance monitor who shall be assigned exclusively to monitoring and reporting on the defendants1 compliance with the Orders that have been issued in this case. The necessity for this additional compliance monitor assigned to this case on a full-time basis shall be evaluated by the parties, in consultation with the Special Officer, within 180 days from the date the second monitor commences her/his employment.
Within 90 days the defendants shall hire an office clerk/typist who shall provide support services to the compliance monitors.
B. office Space and Equipment: Within 30 days the defendants shall identify suitable office
space at the Jail for both compliance monitors and the office clerk/typist. The office space must include adequate filing space.
The compliance monitors shall be provided with such office equipment as is necessary for the proper performance of their duties, including but not limited to office furniture, telephones, offices supplies, appropriate computer hardware and
Indeed, as set forth in Ex. 7, the defendants have proposed the employment of an additional monitor for the Jail.
- 67 -

**».• software, and facsimile equipment. They shall also be provided with a £ull library of all applicable medical, mental health and environmental standards as well as a full library of the Orders, expert reports, DCRA reports, and the reports of the Special Officer that have been issued in this case. The compliance monitors shall be required to familiarize themselves with these documents within 60 days following the commencement of their employment.
C. Trainina: The defendants shall, within 90 days, in consultation with
the Special Officer and plaintiffs' counsel, develop a compliance training curriculum for the compliance monitors and their clerk. Both monitors and the clerk shall be trained within 30 days following the commencement of the employment of the second monitor. The training curriculum shall include the substantive legal requirements in this case, all applicable environmental, medical and mental health standards, as well as the methodologies for compliance ronitoring.
D. Job Descriptions: The defendants, in consultation with the Special officer and
plaintiffs' counsel, shall, within 20 days, finalize the job descriptions for the compliance monitor positions. The compliance monitors and their cleric shall not be subject to stigmatization or retaliatory action for properly performing
- 68 -

fe-
their duties and shall work directly under the authority and auspices of the Director of the Department of Corrections.
VII. REPORTING
The defendants shall continue to file monthly compliance reports and to report all violations of the Court's Orders within 48 hours and as required under the terms of the November 9, 1993 Order. The failure to comply with these reporting requirements shall be fined at the rate of $250.00 per violation except that the defendants shall be fined at the rate of $1,000.00 per violation for each instance of grossly negligent and knowingly false or misleading reporting. These fines shall be suspended. Following notice57 of a violation, the defendants shall be required to promptly investigate the reasons for the violation. Within 15 days thereafter, or such longer period as permitted by the Special Officer, the defendants shall report to plaintiffs' counsel and the Special Officer with regard to the results of the investigation. At that time the defendants shall also submit a proposed corrective action plan which shall include an implementation schedule. The corrective a c ion plan shall be
56 The reporting fines in the interim tuberculosis plan shall remain in full force and effect.
57 The notice may be received from plaintiffs' counsel, the Special Officer, or the following employees of the DOC: the compliance office staff, the warden or one of the deputy wardens of the Jail, the Assistant Director for Health Services, the Chief Medical Officer of the Jail, the Chief Psychiatrist of the DOC, the Director of the Mental Health Program at the Jail, the Jail's Chief Pharmacist, and the Executive Deputy Director of the DOC.
- 69 -

t
submitted by the defendants for comment by plaintiffs' counsel and for/ approval by the Special Officer. The failure to implement the corrective action plan, within the time-frame set forth in the plan, shall result in the imposition of the fine that was initially suspended.
Within 90 days, the defendants, in consultation with the Special Officer and plaintiffs' counsel, shall develop a written policy and procedure for the reporting of violations as well as for the monthly compliance reports.
Within 120 days, the defendants in consultation with the Special Officer and plaintiffs' counsel shall develop a revised monthly compliance report form. The revised report must be certified under penalty of perjury by each person designated to fill out each section of the report. The reports must be reviewed and their accuracy certified under penalty of perjury by the Warden and the compliance monitors.
* *** At the conclusion of a 10 month period, the Special Officer and her experts will fully audit the defendants1 compliance with the initial remedial plan and work with thf defendants on developing any appropriate modifications to the plan. Some adjustments in staffing, as well as adjustments in other areas, may be warranted. Given the fact that the defendants have been in noncompliance with this Court's orders for over two decades, and given the gravity of the deficiencies in medical and mental
- 70 -

health care at the Jail, if the defendants fail to implement the
terms of this remedial plan, and persist in their violations of
the interim tuberculosis isolation plan, the Special Officer
will be left with only one reasonable alternative to recommend to
the Court: the appointment of receiver to manage medical and
mental health care at the D.C. Jail. The Special Officer and her
experts will continue to work closely with the defendants in an
effort to avoid such an outcome.
Grace M. Lopes Bar No. 358650 Special Officer of the Court 1130 - 17th Street, N.W. Suite 400 Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 778-1168
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing draft report was hand-delivered on the lHf\ day of OthJ^i/V. 1994 to the following:
Richard Love, Esq. Chief, Correctional Litigation 441 - 4th Street, NW Sixth Floor South
J. Patrick Hickey, Esq. Shaw, Pittman, Potts &
Trowbridge 2300 N Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20037
Jonathan Smith, Esq. D.C. Prisoners' Legal Services, Inc. 1400 - 20th Street, N.W. Suite 117 Washington, D.C. 20036

Exhibit l A 1 B 1 C 1 D 1 E 1 F 1 6 2
3 4 A
4 B 5 6 7

EXHIBIT LIST
Description
Plaintiffs' March 28, 1994 Letter Regarding Interim Mental Health Remedial Plan Plaintiffs' Proposed Remedial Plan Regarding Mental Health Care Plaintiffs' April 20, 1994 Letter Regarding Quality Assurance Plaintiffs' Proposed Remedial Plan Regarding Medical Care Defendants' Proposed Remedial Plan Regarding Medical and Mental Health Care Defendants' Second Submission Regarding Proposed Mental Health Remedial Plan Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Proposed Remedial Plan Regarding Mental Health Care Lindsay Hayes* Report Regarding Suicide Prevention at the Central Detention Facility - July 13, 1994 Organizational Chart for Mental Health Defendants' December 6, 1993 Letter Regarding Mental Health Staffing Defendants' Proposed Mental Health Staffing Plan Mental Health Staffing Requirements Defendants' Proposed Medical Staffing Plan Defendants' Draft Operational Plan Regarding Compliance Monitoring Remedial Plan

 
 f ~, . . ,
~IIIIIIIJ~JgJJDJ~~I!I"IIIIII~11

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LEONARD CAMPBELL, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

·

v.

ANDERSON McGRUDER, et al.,

Defendants.

·

C.A. No. 1462-71

INMATES OF D.C. JAIL, et al.,

v.

· ·

DELBERT C. JACKSON, et al.,

·

Defendants.

ORDER

C.A. No. 75-1668
RECEIVED
JUL 15 1985
JAMES F. DAVEY, CIeri'

Upon consideration of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered this date in the above captioned matter, it is by the court this 17:'; day Jf July 1985,
ORD,ERED that beginning on the 40th day after the entry of this Order the defendants, their agents or designees shall not accept at the District of Columbia Department of Corrections Central Detention Facility any new residents, whether sentenced, awaiting trial, or in any other status, until such time as the population of the facility is no more than 1,693, and after such limit has been reached defendants shall accept no persons as incarcerees if such persons will increase the population above

1,69.4. . And it is
FURTHER ORDERED that defendants promptly notify all agencies that send persons for confinement at the facility of the terms and effective date of this Order.

' - / _ ~,--- ,,/tC -, 'I , ,r 'I. ' _

I f /;'i';;:; ' , , ? " / ;i

- '~-tnHTED STATES DISTRICT /JUDGE

-2-

. ,

.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LEONARD CAMPBELL, et al.,

Plaintiffs, v.

·

ANDERSON McGRUDER, et al.,

Defendants.

· ·

C.A. No. 1462-71

·· INMATES OF D.C. JAIL, et al.,

v.

·

C.A. No. 75-1668

DELBERT C. JACKSON, et al.,

Defendants.

RECEIVED

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JUL 151985
JAMES F. DAVEY, Clary

I. Background

Campbell v. McGruder, which is on remand from the Court of Appeals, 580 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1978), involves tre conditions of confinement for pre-trial detainees housed at lhe District of Columbia's Department of Corrections Central Detention Facility-more commonly known as the D.C. Jail (the jail). The Campbell plaintiffs are a class comprised of unconvicted pre-trial detainees. The defendants are the Mayor of the District of Columbia, the Director of the Department of Corrections and the Superintendent of the jail.

-----------------------------------------------------------._---

. .:-'~
( ..
., .... ,
The issues in Inmates v. Jackson are substantially identical to those in Campbell. Plaintiffs in Inmates complain about the same jail conditions at issue in Campbell and request the same relief. The defendants in both cases are the same. The sole material difference is the mutually exclusive composition of the classes: the Inmates' plaintiffs comprise a class of all convicted residents of the jail, i.e., all prisoners who are not members of the plaintiff class in Campbell.
Throughout the history of these two cases numerous hearings have been held and evidence taken regarding the conditions of confinement at the jail. While the court has heard testimony concerning several aspects of the conditions at. the jail, including medical care, recreation, classification, and visiting procedures, two of the most recent hearings, in November 1983 and in October 1984, have focused on the rising jail populatior" the substantial overcrowding which has resulted, and the consequences of such overcrowding. The testimony has been supplemented by written submissions to the court and by deposition testimony. In addition, the court and all counsel have conducted a series of thorol,tgh on-site inspections, most recently C 1 February 21, 1985. The court also conducted an unannounced inspection on June 3, 1985.
The evidence clearly reveals that the massive overcrowding at the jail has unacceptably diminished services that are recognized as necessities in a prison setting, and has resulted in increased violence at the institution. Plaintiffs claim that the overcrowding is responsible for conditions so acute that they
-2-

violate their rights under the fifth and eighth amendments, and ~hey seek appropriate relief.
II. Findings of Fact
A. The Place and Its Population
The jail is a relatively new facility, which first opened in April 1976. It was initially designed to house and provide
services for a maximum population of 9~O prisoners. l The 1980
addition of 395 cells brought the design capacity of the cellblocks up to 1,355. 2 On June 30, 1985 the jail reached a record population of 2,663--96% over the design capacity of the cellblocks and 177% above the figure the administrative facilities of the jail were designed to service.
Since November 1980 not a month has passed in which the average number of residents has not surpassed these design capacities, and the population levels have persistently maintained an upward trend. The average daily monthly population

lOfficlal Department of Corrections' reports frequently do not

specify where pre-trial detainees (the Campbell plaintiffs) or

convicted inmates class is involved

(the in a

Inmates plaintiffs) particular activity_

a

r ew Phroius os ende,r s owr,

which

wresidents", and "incarcerees w are used interchangeably to

describe members of both classes.

2AS originally constructed, the jail consisted of two separate units: a housing section, comprising 12 cellblocks with 960
single-bed cells; and an administrative section--an infirmary, kitchen, storerooms, recreation yards, library, visitation area, and offices--designed to provide services for the prisoners and
the staff. This administrative section has never been expanded.

-3-

has increased from 1,491 in 1981 to 2,116 in 1983 and 2,534 in 41985.3

B. Use of ·Floor-space" Areas for Housing

The jail holds 18 cellblocks, each of which is designed to

hold 80 cells. The cellblocks are in a ·V· shape. Both sides of

·v· the

have a lower and upper tier, each of which holds 20

cells. Aisles run down the center of each tier. A glass-

enclosed security module or ·bubble· lies at the apex of the

·V·s, from which guards can look down the aisles of each tier and

into the four lounges or ·dayrooms·, a small gymnasium, and a

small dining area. On June 4, 1985 the jail housed 2,618 prisoners. 4 Only 71%

of the prisoners were housed in cells, and more than half of

these were double-bunked in single cells. All told, 29% of the

jail population is housed in dayrooms, aisles, gymnasiums,

various holding ·cages·, and even a converted warehouse, none of

which was ever designed as housing space.

3January 1 thru June 30, 1985.
4Unless otherwise indicated all population figures and percentages are based on the Department's report to the court for June 4, 1985. On that date the jail housed 2,618 prisoners. Jail officials could specify the precise location and status of only 2,538 of the 2,618 incarcereesi they could not account for the exact location of the remaining 80 prisoners other than to say they were were ·unassigned· or in ·orientation·. Pre-trial detainees accounted for 36.9% of the population, 25% of whom were awaiting trial on misdemeanors: the remaining detainees were held on felony charges. Of the inmates, 29% had been convicted of misdemeanors; 68% had been convicted of felonies~ and 4% were being held for parole violations.
-4-

These areas were principally designed to provide recreation and breathing room and to serve as safety valves for the pressures and tensions normally incident to life in a jail. With , the conversion of dayrooms and other common areas from recreational outlets to housing units, the pressures have intensified, the opportunities for respite and relief have diminished, and the expected tensions and problems of incarceration have been exacerbated. The safety valves are now sealed shut.
1. WNorth-3 'Dorm'w -- This large open storeroom is located in the two upper tiers of one cellblock. Originally designed (and formerly used solely) as a warehouse for supplies, it holds 103 unsegregated prisoners, pre-trial and convicted, violent and non-violent, in an area 3,744 square feet in size. As many as 167 prisoners have been lodged in the "dorm". This "dorm" has only four toilets and four showers. The residents sleep in double bunks. At times prisoners have slept on mattresses placed directly on the concrete floor, and blankets and newspapers have carpeted the area. The double bunks are jammed tightly together, leaving little space in which to move around. Prisoners must lie idle ~n their bunks or stretch out on the concrete. One of plaintiffs' expert witnesses, E. Eugene Miller, described these conditions, with considerable justification, as "absolutely incredible •••• To call it a dormitory is glorifying it."
No permanent lockers or shelves are provided for prisoners to secure their personal property. Instead, residents must store these items in unsecured paper grocery bags or shoe boxes. There
-5-

are no tables or chairs. Most residents eat standing up, sitting in their bunks, or on the floor. The double bunks are situated very close together and the aisles between the bunks are very narrOW1 consequently guards in the security bubble have no clear line of sight into most of the "dorm". The numerous blind spots permit guards to monitor only a small fraction of the warehouse area, notwithstanding the so-called patrolling of the area. Consequently, this dorm is conceded to be the most violent and dangerous housing unit in the jail.
2. Dayrooms -- Each of the 18 cellblocks contains foue dayrooms, each approximately 15 by 20 feet in size. The dayrooms were designed as recreational, not housing, areas. In 16 of the 18 cellblocks two of the four dayrooms are used for housing, wit~ inmates and pre-trial detainees, felons and misdemeanants frequently living side by side. These dayrooms .now hold 344 prisoners. Typically 14 residents are housed in each dayroom, providing each prisoner with 21.6 square feet of living space. At times as many as 32 prisoners have been housed in two dayrooms. These rooms have neither toilets nor sinks. They have no showers. Instead, prisoners must share the showers and toilets set aside for celled incarcerees. As in the North-3 "dorm," prisoners store their belongings in paper bags.
No guards are stationed in the dayrooms. As in the "dorm," blind spots cannot be supervised from the centrally-positioned security bubble. Privacy is completely absent. Except for his assigned bunk, a resident has no place to call his own. Even while he is sleeping a prisoner is typically surrounded by five
-6-

other residents--one at each side, one at his head, another at • his feet, and one either directly above or below him.
3. Aisles -- Overcrowding 'has become so severe that defendants have been forced to convert passageways between rows of cells into areas for housing. The aisles of 11 of the cellblocks now hold 238 prisoners, who are double-bunked down the center of each tier. Personal property lies in open cardboard boxes, ready prey for all who amble by.
4. Mini-gymnasiums -- Each cellblock contains a small gym, 29 x 29 feet. T~e gyms were designed to provide residents with a place to exercise the body and exorcise the built-up tensions of confinement. There are 44 prisoners housed in three gyms. One of these gyms is now designated for housing 30 Rintake R prisoners. There are no toilets, sinks or showers in the gyms. There are no windows. Lighting is poor: during a recent inspection by the court, only 6 of 36 overhead fluorescent bulbs in one gym worked. There are no provisions for the storage of personal property, aside from the commonplace paper boxes.
5. Infirmary Rcage R -- This lock-up facility is located in the jail infirmary md is designed to temporarily hold pris(",1ers waiting to be seen by medical personnel. The cage is roughly 15 feet by 23.5 feet -- 352.5 square feet in size. On weekends and evenings the cage has been used as sleeping quarters for as many as 47 prisoners at a time. The cage contains no beds or mattresses, no toilets, sink or shower, no drinking facility, no table, no chairs or other places to sit (other than the concrete floor). The prisoners assigned to the cage are not screened to
-7-

determine if they have any communicable diseases or other medical • or psychological conditions which might require that they be
segregated from other prisoners. Similarly, individuals are placed in the cage without regard to whether they pose a security risk to other prisoners.
6. "Police holding" cells and "cage" -- This facility houses women awaiting arraignment. The average stay is one night during the week and up to 30 hours on weekends. Although there are only six double-bunked cells in the unit, each 58.1 square feet in size, on occasion more than 20 women have been housed in this area, with cots placed in a 60 square foot "cage" or in the aisle. When the court visited the jail in February 1985, four of the six cells had filthy, uncovered foam rubber mattresses on the floor.
C. Double CeIling
As we have noted, the majority of convicted inmates (924 of 1,601) are double-bunked in cells originally designed for single occupancy. The cells are 70 square feet in size, (nd are spartanly equipped with two stacked beds, a table, a chair, a combination sink and toilet, and a 24" by 42" plexiglass window. There is centrally controlled heating in the winter ann air-conditioning in the summer. The cells have only average light, which often constitutes a problem for inmates assigned to the lower bunk. The windows are opaque, which reduces the natural light that might otherwise supplement the artificial
-8-

illumination. The windows cannot be opened.
D. Time Out of Housing Units and Average Length of Stay
All prisoners must stay in their assigned quarters for an average of 16 hours a day. They must remain locked up for even longer periods if the population count (held six times a day) does not match the master prison list, an event which recurs more frequently than not.
As of October 20, 1983 the average length of stay for convicted inmates was 125.5 days. More than 22' of the inmates had been incarcerated for longer than six months1 more than 10' had been in jail for over nine months.
E. Recreation, Idleness, and Lack of Privacy
Numbers alone cannot fully convey the human consequences of housing so many people in such limited and unsuitable spaces. One of plaintiffs' expert witnesses, Dr. Francis L. Rundle, testified that overcrowding in one cellblock wa, so severe "it was almost impossible to walk between [sic] the aisles that were formed by the double bunks in the gymnasium. It was not possible, for example, to squeeze by another person in some of these spaces they were so narrow." Another of plaintiffs' expert witnesses, E. Eugene Miller, reported that the inhabitants were "stacked like cordwood •••• The overall conditions in the women's cellblock are absolutely appalling." In the North-3
-9-

. "dorm" the court observed double bunks considerably less than 3
feet apart, forcing one to walk sideways in order to pass between them.
There are virtually no activities for prisoners while they are locked up in their assigned cells or floor-space housing units. No individual radios or TVs are allowed. Double-celled inmates and floor-space residents have little room in which to move around or exercise. These conditions would not be so important if residents were permitted to spend more out-of-cell time in various activities.
The dayrooms were designed to provide prisoners with the jail equivalent of a home den. Each dayroom was intended to serve 20 prisoners. Overcrowding has now rendered nearly all the dayrooms actually or practically inaccessible, because nearly half are used as sleeping quarters and thus jammed with beds, and because many more prisoners than anticipated are forced to share the remaining number of open dayrooms. Now, instead of 80 prisoners sharing four dayrooms, in 16 of 18 cellblocks as many .. s 204 prisoners must make do with only ~ wo of such rooms. Thus each dayroom must serve as many as five times the number of persons originally contemplated.
Defendants' most recent reports indicate that only 319 prisoners (approximately 12%) are enrolled in educational classes: reading, mathematics, typing, needlecrafts, art, commercial housekeeping, "adult basic education," "general education development", and "vocational development."
Overcrowding has greatly reduced opportunities for physical
-10~

recreation, which are particularly needed by prisoners, Campbell 4 v. McGruder, 580 F.2d at 565. The oft-times poorly lit gyms,
when not used to house prisoners, are too small for any sport other than a quarter-court basketball game. Moreover, the gyms are open for use only a few hours each day.
Prisoners receive a maximum of three hours of outdoor recreation per week, less than that if the weather is bad. There are two exercise yards, one for men and one for women. The larger male yard is a nearly square walled-in area approximately 36 yards long by 36 yards wide. Prisoners from three male cellblocks share the male yard at one time, forcing up to 479 prisoners to share space that contains but a single full-size basketball court, a volleyball court and one punching bagProtective custody prisoners have no access to the yard and are allowed no outdoor recreation.
Rather than providing an opportunity for the release of tension, the overcrowded gyms and recreation yard have been transformed into another source of frustration, another arena of competition for limited space and equipment, and another cause for conflict and violence.
There are four telephones in each cellblock. These are used for phone calls to attorneys and family members. The phones are turned on for use during a few hours in the morning and in the evening. They are frequently broken. Large numbers of residents must share these scarce resources~ fights over access to the phones are common. More residents also means more noise. Because the phones are located in the midst of the crowded dining
-11-

area and adjacent to the gym and because of the noise from the TV
. set and from other prisoners, telephone users often cannot hear
those whom they call. This was apparent on all visits to the site.
The visiting facilities are overloaded and visiting privileges have been curtailed. Jail Administrator William Long stated "visiting used to be allowed on any day, but due to overcrowding visiting is now limited to two designated days per week for each inmate." Overcrowding and delays occasioned by problems with the count have resulted in longer waits to see visitors and increased frustration, which is often taken out on the jail staff. Only non-contact visits are p~rmitted.5
Residents who want to do their own legal research face strenuous obstacles. Only 15 residents of each cellblock are permitted access to the 4,240 volume law library each week. Consequently, many prisoners are not able to do any effective research on their own behalf.
Each cellblock has a small dining area, with enough tables and benches to seat 40 prisoners. Originally, prisoners in each block were fed in two shifts, thereby permitting all 80 singlecelled prisoners in each block the opportunity to sit down for meals. Now, prepared food trays are distributed to cellblock residents at one time. With as many as 204 prisoners housed in a single block, and only 40 seats in the dining area, many prisoners are forced to eat their meals standing up, in their
5The Department of Corrections inmates at Occoquan and federal prison inmates enjoy contact visits.
-12-

bunks, or on the floor. Privacy is at a premium. No one is ever outside the
presence of other prisoners. Or. Rundle testified that residents he interviewed "stressed that they could never be alone, even in the toilets, because the toilets tended to be either open to view or, if enclosed, in the middle of an area where there were many, many people around •••• " This was apparent when we visited the jail. The facilities and services which are ordinarily contemplated as escape valves have been effectively transformed into pressure points.
F. Classification and Parole
Classification and parole (C , P) officers playa crucial role in the lives of all prisoners. As the title implies, C & P officers are charged with classifying and segregating prisoners so that conflict and violence are minimized, and with providing social services to residents to enable prisoners to qualify for parole and reintegration into the community.
Classification of prisoners, by status (convicted or pretrial), by offense (misdemeanor or felony), by medical or psychiatric condition, and by charge (violent or non-violent offense) is supposed to separate residents so that they pose the least danger to each other: with whom residents are housed is often just as important as where they are housed. Overcrowding at the jail has greatly undermined the ability of jail authorities to categorize and segregate prisoners in a timely
-13-

fashion. For example, on June 3, 1983 then Assistant
.. Administrator William Long wrote to Administrator Jesse Jones:
"As a result of the population explosion and the increase of inexperienced new correctional officers, it has become extremely difficult to identify the extremely assaultive, and special handling type inmates returning to the institution whether from the community, {the Federal] Bureau of Prisons, or other institutions." Incoming residents are assigned to whatever floor-space "beds" are available on a catch-as-catch-can basis. Violent and non-violent prisoners, pre-trial and convicted residents, youthful first offenders and obdurate recidivists, the healthy and the sick, all live side by side in these areas, creating an extremely volatile situation and subjecting reside~ts to a high risk of assault. Although defendants have denominated all cellblocks as either "pre-trial" or "convicted", in reality most cellblocks house both classes of prisoners. Overcrowding has obliged jail officials to house protective custody prisoners in double cells and even in open floor-space areas.
A single Classification and Parole (C , P) officer is responsible for classifying the 40-70 new residents that arrive at the jail each day. Performing this duty accurately has become a daunting task, with speed often supplanting precision. This officer has little time to make these critical assessments and because the "intake records" that accompany each new prisoner are often incomplete, the C , P officer usually lacks the background material (the prisoner's criminal record, his past institutional behavior, and any existing medical or mental health problems)
-14-

needed to make an informed decision. Nine other C , P officers function as social workers and are
entrusted with contacting attorneys, arranging for psychiatric referrals, and bridging the gap between a prisoner and his family and his employer. The number of C , P officers has increased only 43% during the period when the jail population has nearly doubled. Their average caseload has swollen to nearly 300. Not surprisingly, a new prisoner can spend months in jail before having his first full discussion with his C , P officer.
George E. Holland, Assistant Director of the District of columbia Department of Corrections, acknowledged that the inordinately high caseloads prevent the C , P officers from adequately performing their assigned duties. Instead, C , P officers are often only available to prisoners in emergencies, and even then only after lengthy delays. Residents who seek the relatively secure confines of protective custody, either because they have received specific threats from other prisoners or because they have a generalized fear of jail violence, must wait weeks to see C , P officers and have their transfer requests • processe(~
The C , P officers are also responsible for assisting sentenced inmates in qualifying for parole. Once again, the sheer numbers of cases assigned to a single officer hampers his ability to provide effective service to individual inmates. Lack of contact with C , P officers has frequently led to delayed parole hearings. On numerous occasions inmates have remained incarcerated seven to nine months past their parole dates.
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G. Shelter and Sanitation
1. Food Service
Evidence presented at the November 1983 hearing revealed a concededly appalling situation -- filthy and vermin-infested cooking facilities, unsanitary dishes, trays and utensils, inadequate storage space, and spoiling meats, fruits, and vegetables.
Defendants have made laudable and largely successful efforts to correct these problems. New equipment has been purchased and sanitation shortcomings have been reduced. Nevertheless, overcrowding and the sheer shortage of kitchen space have created problems which even the most dedicated exertions and the most modern equipment cannot solve. Thus, the kitchen, which was built to feed 960 prisoners, must now provide for nearly three times that number. It is forced to run nearly 24 hours a day. As a result, the jail's meal schedule is geared to the kitchen's rJund-the-clock operation, with the ludic~ous consequence that breakfast is delivered to some prisoners as early as 2:50 in the morning_
2. Personal Hygiene
Each cell has a sink and toilet. Each tier of 20 cells has two showers. However, since the aisles, gyms, dorm, and dayrooms
-16-

were never designed for housing purposes they were never furnished with toilets, sinks, or showers. This lack of facilities has three consequences.
First, floor-space residents are obliged to share the eight cellblock showers originally intended for use by a maximum of 80 celled residents, thereby increasing the ratio of use from one shower per ten residents to as many as one per twenty-five. Second, floor-space residents are forced to make do with what amounts to npublic" toilets in cells left vacant for that purpose. Instead of one toilet and sink for each resident, as originally designed, or one for two prisoners, as in the doublebunked cells, as many as 40 floor-space residents can be allotted to a single toilet and sink.
The final consequence is that many of the showers and most of the toilets and sinks set aside for use by floor-space incarcerees are overused, poorly maintained, filthy, and unsanitary. Many of the toilets lack toilet paper. Most show stains from urine and feces. None have toilet brushes. Few of the sinks have soap or sanitary towels.
Unsanitary conditions pervade oth(:r areas of the jail as well. Observation by plaintiffs' experts, and by the court as well, revealed dirty mattresses and bedding. Some were fouled with urine, fecal material, food and vomit. Others were in poor repair. With many more prisoners housed than ever planned for, jail authorities are forced to require more senior residents to use the dirty mattresses longer than desirable and are obliged to issue decrepit and unclean mattresses to incoming prisoners.
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..

H. Health Services

Systemic deficiencies pervade all aspects of the health care services provided at the jail -- medical, pharmaceutical, psychiatric and dental. Dr. Robert W. Yancey, Jr., a Medical Officer at the jail who testified extensively at the November 1983 hearing, characterized the health services system as being overwhelmed by the endlessly increasing numbers of prisoners. He acknowledged that the system is so overburdened that it ·is like a dam in which you are just trying to keep the water ••• from coming through ••• ,. a situation in which "lilt is just a matter of time until it just floods everybody •••• • At the time Dr. Yancey testified the average daily population was 1,979. Increased overcrowding since that time has only exacerbated the problems.
The jail infirmary was built to serve the needs of a maximum population of 960. Initially, 24 beds were provided for nonpsychiatric patients--a ratio of 40:1. Although the population is now 177% higher than it was if1 1976, since one-half of the infirmary beds are typically used by mentally ill residents, the number of beds actually available for non-psychiatric cases has been cut in half, producing a ratio of 218:1.
Dr. Yancey stated that the over-population of the jail had substantially impaired the ability of physicians and other staff to deliver prompt and adequate health care. The rise in the jail population since November 1983 has further increased the number

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of residents requirinq physical examinations, x-rays, and • admission to the jail infirmary, as well as the number of medications dispensed. As a result, ill and injured prisoners do not receive proper and timely treatment. According to Or. Yancey: "With the increased population it is more difficult •••• We are really stretched now. We see everythinq [sic1 we can, but some fall through the cracks."
The increase in the jail population and the diminution in the number of beds available for medical cases has not been offset by an increase in the number of health care personnel. In fact, althouqh the jail population has nearly tripled from January 1980 until the present the number of health care personnel has remained virtually constant. The health services system is chronically short of staff and space. In January 1980 there were 2S medical personnel at the jail: three full-time physicians, two part-time physicians, one pharmacist, two dentists, seven nurses, one physician's assistant, eight medical technical assistants, and one x-ray technician. At that time the jail population was 921; the r.atio of prisoners to medical staff was 37: 1.
Currently, there are 26 medical personnel to care for a population that is 184' larqer than it was in January 1980. The ratio of prisoners to medical staff is now 101:1. Furthermore, the composition of the medical staff has changed. There are now four fewer doctors and nurses than there were in 1980. There are now only two full-time physicians (one of whom is a supervisor) and two part-time physicians. The decline in the
-19-

number of nurses from seven to five is equally critical. Or • • Yancey testified that -[t]hey are the glue that holds everything
together.The shortage of medical personnel is not only acute, it is
chronic~ there were too few medical staff members before overcrowding became severe. A March 29, 1982 memorandum from Or. Robert E. Lee, Assistant Director of Health Services to Department of Corrections Director Holland reported:

Explosively wi~hin the last yea¥ ~r less there has been an added number of inmates 6 further diluting medical services •••• This increase has not had a concomitant increase in already depleted medical personnel which have never been up to the arbitrary freeze complement ••••
The Public Health Survey of 1968 concluded that minimally seventy-three (73) medical personnel were necessary to carry out medical functions at that time.
One wonders what such a survey would reveal at this time with the drastic increase tOn both numbers and sophistication of incarcerees! L7

A November 4, 1982 letter to Director Holland from the jail's Chief Medical Officer, Dr. Francis L. Smith, reached an identical conclusion:

The Health Care Delivery Program is severely

hampered in carrying out its responsibility to

rovide medical care to incarcerated ersons. This

con ltlon eXlsts ecause 0 lncrease

for

6At the time the memo was written, the average daily population in the jail stood at 1,769. A year before the average daily number was 1,419. 7A year later, Dr. Lee explained that -the original staffing of 30 was not adequate to handle an inmate population of 1,353 •••• "
-20-

health services on the part of inmates. In spite

.

of alar e increase in the 'ail 0 ulation, sta 1ng eve save remalne t e same an ave

caused ma'or deficiencies in the health care

de lVery program •••• Present medical sta f

members have been compelled to fore~o daily sick

call to all residents who place thelr names on

lists for medical attention. They are confined

basically to caring for (1) new commitments, (2)

~eferrals from correctional staff, (3) surgical

conditions, and (4) emergencies. [Emphasis added.]

On March 3, 1983 Dr. Lee recommended that an additional 32 medical personnel should be hired, including one more physician. (for a total of six) and eight more nurses (for a total of twelve). These warnings and requests have been ignored.
The drastic cut-back in the number of available beds, the -explosive- growth in population and the defendants' failure to provide more facilities and to hire more personnel also has had a predictable effect on staff morale. Dr. Yancey said: -You kind of wonder Whf"il you are going to get more help. Where is it going to end?- Defendants' reports indicate that medical personnel have requested more sick leave, more overtime, more annual leave, and more leave without pay. Defendants concede that this situation has made the hiring and retention of -qualified dedicatedpersonnel a ·perpetual problema. Director James F. Palu4r acknowledged that the overcrowded conditions have rendered the jail unattractive as a work site for professionals and is probably the biggest obstacle to acquiring additional medical staff.

1. Medical Care

In January 1980 sick call was available to each resident five -21-

times a week during daytime hours. By the time of the November .. 1983 hearing shortages of space and staff had forced defendants to
hold sick call between 12:30 and 4:00 a.m. Nonetheless, sick call was still available to every resident on every weekday. Now sick call is again conducted during normal business hours, but is available to each prisoner only once a week. Donald R. Soskin, Health Services Administrator at the jail, reported on April 25,
\
1985 that "[slick call service ••• continues to be marginal in effectiveness." Initial screening examinations are performed by physician's assistants, who decide whether a physician's attention is required. During evenings and weekends untrained guards are often pressed into service to make the initial determination of who will be treated and who will not. Accordingly, it is not surprising that many residents with medical complaints are never seen by a physician, and thus, as Or. Yancey concluded, "some fall through the cracks."
Prisoners who are denied an appointment with a physician must sign up again. Weeks can pass before they are seen by a physician. Uncontroverted evidence detailed numerous incidents in which prisoners' complaints were ignored and treecment delayed for lengthy periods. For example, on one occasion a guard told a prisoner that the latter did not appear to be acutely ill and therefore had neither reason nor right to be sent to the infirmary and seen by a physician. Coverage is particularly thin during evenings and weekends. On occasion, the infirmary has been closed because of frequent emergency calls to the cellblocks. The converse is also true: personnel have refused to leave the
-22-

infirmary to provide emergency medical assistance to inmates. • Thus this past March a guard lieutenant who had requested
assistance for a resident was informed that none would be forthcoming--only one staff person was in the infirmary. A similar instance occurred three days later.
Even when access to the infirmary is not denied outright it is often delayed. One inmate, complaining of pains symptomatic of a heart attack, waited two and one-half weeks before being seen by a physician. Numerous other instances were reported where residents repeatedly had to sign up for sick ~all before they were "sick enough" to be seen by a physician.
Once prisoners have been examined and their illnesses diagnosed they frequently have to wait additional lengthy periods to receive prescribed medication or treatment. One prisoner who had been stabbed in a fight was denied medication that had been ordered by hospital surgeons. Another resident waited three weeks to receive asthma medication. A third waited three weeks to receive medication that had been prescribed by his private physicia~ before his incarceration.
AnJther prisoner, who had broken his toe while working in the jail.kitchen, waited more than two months for surgicallyrecommended orthopedic shoes. On another occasion a prisoner with hypertension, who had been placed on a special diet by a jail doctor, never received the ordered meals.
Prisoners in need of the services of medical specialists fare even worse. Long delays in obtaining initial appointments are commonplace. One prisoner, who was instructed by a jail physician
-23-

. to schedule an appointment with a psychologist, waited seven weeks
before he received an appointment. Another waited six months before recommended oral surgery was performed.
Prisoners with optometrical problems apparently go to the bottom of the list. One prisoner, whose eyeglasses had been broken during his arrest and without which he was virtually blind, was required to wait three weeks just to get his eyes examined. He was relatively fortunate: two other residents had to wait seven months before they received eyeglasses. Yet another prisoner was told by a guard captain that "it takes at least one year incarcerated before an eye exam and the prescription can be accomplished."
The medical records system is conceded to be "chaotic". Patients who are examined by physicians at the District of Columbia General Hospital must wait for the "Recommended Treatment" and laboratory reports to be reviewed and acted upon by the jail infirmary staff. According to Dr. Yancey, because of the large number of prisoners and the large volume of hospital records trarsmitted, these reports remain unreviewed for "weeks, months."
The distribution of medications violates generally recognized standards of medical care. Because of the shortage of pharmaceutical personnel, prescription drugs are not passed out on weekends or evenl. ngs. 8 sometimes medical technical assistants
80n October 18, 1983, the Chief Medical Officer, Dr. John H. Seipel, in a memorandum to Dr. Lee, then Assistant Director for Health Services, reported: "[tlhe continuing lack of pharmacists/pharmacy technicians makes it necessary for physicians, nurses, and unlicensed MTAs to fill and dispense medications resulting in a partial absence of control •••• (continued)
-24-

distribute a one or two week supply of medications to residents at
.
one time. Distribution of prescriptions containing narcotics is more carefully controlled, but even these drugs, which may be required to be taken three or four times a day, and which should be dispensed in individual doses no less frequently, are passed out but once or twice a day. Dr. Yancey lamented "[tJhere is no other way we can do it right now •••• We have too many people."
2. Mental Health Services
Medical care at the jail is, in Dr. Yancey's words, "coming apart at the seams." Mental health services never came together in the first place. Dr. Irwin J. Papish, Associate Chief of Forensic Psychiatry, conceded that the population increases have overloaded the psychiatric facilities and ser7ices.
Instances of bizarre and self-destructive behavior by prisoners are routine. Defendants' cellblock logbooks and other records reveal repeated suicide attempts, residents pounding their heads against cell walls, fights and assaults, setting of fires, hoarding of medicine and overdosing, destruction of mattresses and bedding, urinating on the floor, smearing feces on themselves, incessant shouting and yelling--in short, as the court described five years ago, "a bedlam." Campbell v. McGruder, C.A. No. 146271, slip OPe at 2 (D. D.C. June 9, 1980).
Two cellblocks have been set aside for the treatment of
Patient workload has increased steadily at a rate of about five percent per month over the past six months, further impacting our overloaded staff and services," (Emphasis added.)
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mentally ill residents. Nonetheless, population pressures have • forced defendants to house some of the mentally ill among the
general population, despite the court's order that the two groups should be separated. As the Corrections Mental Health Coordinator Wendell S. Plair lamented some ·slip[] through the cracks.·
Care of the mentally ill is further hampered by bureaucratic disputes among the mental health care staff, creating a situation plaintiffs' experts, Or. Frank L. Rundle and Or. Ron Sable, aptly characterized as an ·administratively chaotic· ·non-system." Two different groups of personnel attempt to provide mental health services to prisoners, without any coordination, and without any unified administrative or clinical authority, responsibility or supervision. This lack of coordination diminishes the quality of care provided to patients.
Or. Henry E. Edwards, Chief of the jail Mental Health Program reported in 1982 that the overlapping lines of authority had led to "conflicts, tensions, ••• morale problems, ••• confusion, inconsistencies, and at times, non-performance of, or interference with, actual program delivery to inmates." While this situation has improved somewhat over the last year, Or. Papish acknowledged that overall conditions have not.
There are no full-time psychiatrists or psychologists to provide daily care and counseling. No mental health professionals are in the jail on evenings or weekends. Instead of full-time staff, six part-time psychiatrists provide rotating coverage of ·screening clinics· held five days a week. This situation presents serious problems in the diagnosis and treatment of
-26-

residents with mental health needs. Dr. Yancey stated that • patients "can be seen by three different people and the other
three [sic] not know it •••• [I]t is hard to make a judgment if you have only seen [a patient] one time ••• It bas {sic] problems for the patient adjusting to the physician." According to Dr. Yancey, the jail has no "psychiatrists under our control. It is a tremendous handicap for us. It is very, very bad. They are not here when we need them."
No intake psychiatric screening is performed at the time of a prisoner's commitment to the jail, despite testimony that inco~ing prisoners are more likely to have mental health problems than the average citizen. See Campbell v. McGruder, 416 F. Supp. 100, 104 (D.D.C. 1975). Instead, screening occurs only if a prisoner requests mental health services or manifests a condition that appears to require such services. This initial screening is
carried out on an ad h2£ basis and is performed by guards,
unlicensed MTAs, certified physicians assistants or registered nurses, few of whom are trained to assess psychological problems. Thus prisoners with mental health problems may never be seen by mental health pro~essionals.
,The increased number of prisoners who are determined to be in need of mental health care face delays in being diagnosed and additional delays in receiving scheduled follow-up examinations. Currently, residents are required to wait up to three weeks after their placement in the special cellblocks before they are examined by a psychiatrist. A noncertified physician's assistant, who lacks training in mental health care, performs the "triage"
-27-

function of deciding when residents will be seen by a .. psychiatrist.
These delays are commonplace despite the fact the psychiatrists are forced to evaluate large numbers of patients in short periods of time. Although Dr. Pap ish asserted that he never lacked for time, it appears to the court that frequently such evaluations are largely pro forma. For example, on one recent day 33 patients were "examined" in 7S minutes.
As a result of the increased population pressures, few patients ,:eceive individualized treatment. The al""tivities provided for residents do not even approach those provided at a typical out-patient "day-care- facility. Instead, the standard regimen calls for the prescription of psychotropic drugs. Mr. Plair "conservatively" estimated that 80% of the mentally ill residents receive daily doses of these medications--2S0-300 residents in all.
Although this is by far the most common "treatment" provided to the mentally ill the record is replete with examples of abuses in the dispensation and administration of such drugs. Individual residents often do not receive their prescribed medications. Staff shortages have forced entire cellblocks to go without their medications, for up to three days at a time. On some of these occasions guards have been obliged to "deadlock" entire cellblocks in order to prevent disruptions by the anguished patients.
Medications are dispensed in an extremely short period of time to the residents of the mental health cellblocks, making it very difficult to monitor the residents for possible adverse side-
-28-

effects. To make matters worse, because of staff shortages ·medications are frequently prepared and dispensed by personnel who lack specialized psychopharmaceutical training.
Prisoners who are diagnosed as potentially suicidal or otherwise in need of more intensive care scarcely fare any better than those who are never evaluated and examined. "Diagnosed" residents often do not receive the treatment they need at the time they need it. Long delays are the rule. Suicide precautions, when ordered, are frequently not carried out. Because the special mental health facility is itself invariably fiJ 1.ed beyond capacity, potential suicides are placed in the regular medical infirmary or housed in administrative segregation. Neither placement comports with generally recognized correctional or mental health standards. Tyically, 50% of the beds in the infirmary are filled with psychiatric patients, persons who require more intensive and specialized care than that facility can provide. The "treatment" potential suicides receive there is often nothing more than a steady diet of sedatives and the imposition of physical restraints. Compare Campbell v. McGruder, 416 F. SU?p. at 104.
Tragically, but not surprisingly, there were four suicides at the jail from January 1983 to January 1984, and numerous attempted suicides since then, including three suicide attempts in one cellblock in a single recent month. Dr. Rundle and Dr. Sable testified that the two suicides that occurred in the six months preceding the November 1983 hearing could have been prevented had the prisoners received even minimally adequate mental health care
-29-

and moni toring •
..
The quality and organization of the jail's mental health services does not come even close to complying with minimum professional standards.
3. Dental Care
"Prisoners generally have more extensive dental problems than the average citizen. Consequently dental care is one of the most important medical needs of inmates." ~amos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 576 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981). Nevertheless, "dental care" at the jail is an oxymoron. In years past a dental sick call was held daily. Dr. Yancey testified t~at it "had to be abandoned because there were just too many people." Now only emergency cases are treated; "routine" dental needs, the kind that would prompt a free citizen to seek the services of a dentist -- examinations, cavities, tooth extractions, -- are left for another day and another place. According to Dr. Yancey, non-emergency but otherwise "serious" Gental needs are "not being met for week!, even months." As a consequence, prisoners must endure prolonged and severe pain. Plaintiffs, however, disputed that even emergency cases, as that term is defined by the jail medical staff -- abscesses and infectious diseases requiring oral surgery -- were being seen and treated as quickly as the prisoners' needs required.
The lack of even the pretense of an adequate dental care system has led to untold pain and suffering among both classes of
-30-

prisoners •
.
I. Jail Violence
Overcrowding and the concomitant overburdening of facilities and services has created an atmosphere of apprehension, frustration, and hostility. It has also decreased the ability of guards to supervise the cellblocks. As a result, violence at the jail has reached alarmingly high levels. "Disciplinary" and "incident" reports of violence, co~~iled by defendants, reveal numerous physical assaults by prisoners on other prisoners or on the jail staff and frequent fights, sexual attacks, attempted escapes, and attempts to incite riots. In 1984, with an average daily population of 2,024, the total number of violent incidents was 1,541. Significantly, the number of violent incidents has increased at a disproportionately higher rate than the increase in the jail population, nearly two-and-a-half times faster.
In the first four months of 1984 the average daily population at the jail was 1,854; for the last four months of that year the average was 2,242 -- an increase of 2U.9%. During the same periods the total number of violent incidents (as reflected in the "disciplinary" or "incident" reports for assaults, attempted assaults, threats, sexual abuse, fights, escapes and escape attempts, inciting to riot, and creating a disturbance) increased from an average of 105 per month to 155 per month -- a 48% jump, nearly two-and-a-half times the rate of increase in population. 9
Defendants contend that the dramatic increase in the number
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of reported incidents reflects better reporting by more guards and thus does not constitute an increase disproportionate to the increase in the jail population. In an affidavit supplied to the court, Administrator Long stated: "it is my opinion that the most significant factors which produced the increase in the number of reported incidents ••• were the increase in the number of officers assigned to the institution, more direct supervision of officers with emphasis on reporting, plus the increase in the number of residents housed at the institution."
The number of guards has increased approximately 11% from an average of 498 for January through April to an average of 552 for September through December 1984. At the same time, however, the critical ratio of prisoners to guards has actually decreased from 3.7:1 for the first four months to 4.1:1 for the last four months.
The court also finds the thorough explanation provided by plaintiffs' expert Eugene Miller more credible, illuminating and probative than defendants' self-serving speculations: Mr. Miller reported:
[A]dditional staffing is not the answer to the security problems ••• ; the real threats to security gO beyond throwing increasing numbers of staff at the problems •••• These threats include the increased levels of anxiety and tension among the inmate population brought on by cramped living conditions, lack of sufficient out-of-cell time, and a routine of continual and debilitating boredom. Given these factors, realistically staff
9These figures take on perhaps added significance when we consider that less than half of the population are incarcerated for violent offenses.
-32-

increases can be expected to heighten staff
response to incidents, but will do nothing to
alleviate the causes of such incidents •••• The new officers will be used to bolster staff observation potential, not to increase the level, variety and
frequency of inmate activity. To put it bluntly, the most serious single factor currently constituting a threat to the safety of other
inmates and staff is the pervasive overcrowding and its corresponding negative human impact upon the inmates, not lack of an adequate number of staff.
Given that, as the level of tension escalates among the inmates, the likelihood for an increased level of assaults and more ~erious incidents, such as the
fire-setting in the past several months, also increases dramatically.

The statistics corroborate what testimony averred -- that the

jail is an increasingly hostile and dangerous place in which to

live and that the chief cause of the ever-widening violence is the

growth of the jail population and the resultant strain on

prisoners, staff, facilities, and services. As Oirector Holland

admitted: ·you decrease the boiling point as you cut off services

that should be available to [the prisoners].- The evidence

convinces the court that the disproportionately increasing number

of violent incidents is caused by crowding too many people into

too small a space.

A disproportionate a-:lount of violence occurs in the makeshitt

open ,housing areas, where -violent- residents are allowed to

, i
!

mingle among the -non-violent", and where the deterrent presence

1

of guards is most noticeably absent. Indeed, when defendants

first asked this court to temporarily authorize double-ceIling of

pre-trial detainees, they justified their request on the fact that

prisoners in cells can be more easily observed and more readily
,.
controlled than prisoners in open housing areas. Campbell v.

-33-

A'f.~)
\~~~f;
McGruder, 554 F. Supp. 562, 563, 565 (D.D.C. 1982) •
..
Residents are more susceptible to gang attacks in the -floorspace- areas, where there are more opportunities for violence, and more potential collaborators as well. The physical arrangement of these areas reduces the ability of guards to monitor the conduct of prisoners and diminishes the willingness and ability of guards to stop attacks or fights once the incidents are noticed. These areas are virtually unguardable.
Many floor-space residents told Dr. Rundle that they lived in
constant fear of assaults and rape. lO Eugene Miller cc~cluded
that "[tJhese temporary ho~sing quarters ••• pose a significant and continuing threat to the safety of the [residents} housed in that fashion •••• As long as these dormitories remain, there will be a serious actual and potential threat to the overall security of the [jail] •.•• [T]hey virtually constitute an assault waiting to happen." (Emphasis added.)
Furthermore, there are dangers greater than individual assaults and fights. On July 22, 1983 a riot occurred at the jail. Hundreds of prisoners engaged in armed resistance to jail authorities. Fir~s were set in the exercise yard and in number of the cellblocks. There was large-scale destruction of jail and residents' property and the staff and prisoners suffered numerous injuries. Order was not restored until large numbers of heavily armed police and guards arrived.
lOThis is also reflected in the number of persons in protective custody and the increased number of requests by prisoners for the same.
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In the month that preceded this disturbance, the jail population reached a then all-time high of 2,433. At the time of the riot jail officials identified overcrowding, and the long t~ain of miseries that follow in its wake, as the principal causes of the riot. The jail population is now nearly 8% higher than it was at the time of the riot. Overall conditions have worsened. Health care services, substandard for a long time, have further deteriorated. There are fewer doctors, fewer nurses, and less frequent sick call. Violence has become a daily habit. During the February visit to the jail Sgt. Cynthia Coleman told the court: "We expect a riot any day now. Any day now."
Summary of Facts
The overcrowcing at the jail has placed unreasonable demands on every jail resource -- both in terms of the physical plant and personnel. The facility's ability to provide essential services has been seriously undermined. As a result living conditions at the jail are doubtless dangerous and uncomfortable and inmates and pre-trial deta .nees suffer severe privations.
III. Conclusions of Law
The Supreme Court has reiterated that some discomfort, inconvenience, deprivation, and even physical danger are to be expected--and countenanced in the prison setting. Hudson v. Palmer, 104 5. Ct. 3194, 3199 (1984)~ Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
-35-

337, 349 (1981), Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537, 542 (1979): Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 u.S. 539, 555 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974). However, at the same time the Court has admonished the lower courts to be aware of their responsibility to intercede when these adverse conditions reach a point at which they strip a prisoner of constitutional
protections. Hudson, 104 s. Ct. at 3198-3200; Rhodes, 452 U.S. at
351-52; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 545; Wolff, 418 U.S. at 55556; Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 822.
A. The Eighth Amendment Standard
The Rhodes Court promulgated three alternative tests for determining whether prison conditions violate the constitutional rights of convicted inmates. The eighth amendment prohibits conditions of confinement which: (1) "involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain"; (2) are "grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime warranting imprisonment", or (3) "alone or in combination may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized I'!"Jasure of life's necessities", as testef by "contemporary standard(s} of decency." 452 U.S. at 347. The determination of whether prison conditions are inconsistent with "contemporary standards" of society is to be made on the basis of "'objective factors to the maximum possible extent,'" ide at 346 (quoting Rummell v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1980».
-36-

(.
, ~. \,
B. The Fifth Amendment Standard
..
overcrowding at the jail directly affects pre-trial detainees as well as convicted inmates. Detainees suffer from excessive violence, inadequate medical care and numerous other indirect effects of overcrowding. Consequently, the conditions at the jail must be squared with the Due Process Clause of the fifth amendment as well as the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the eighth amendment. The standards set by the fifth amendment are even less forgiving than those established by the eighth amendment. The latter proscribes only cruel and unusual punishment: the fifth amendment bans any punishment at all. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 535 nn.16, 17, 536-37: Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671-72 n.40 (1977).
Determining whether particular conditions or restrictions, singly or in the aggregate, amount to punishment requires a twostep inquiry: first, a determination of whether the purposes of the challenged conditions are ftlegitimateft1 and second, an examin~tion of whether the means used to achie?e these purposes are ·~easonably related ft to these goals. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 538-39.
C. The Eighth and Fifth Amendment Standards Applied
The living conditions created by the overcrowding at the District of Columbia Central Detention Facility violate both the eighth ann fifth amendments. There are three reasons why, each of
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which fully authorizes intervention by the court.
1. The Violence at the Jail Inflicts Unnecessary and Wanton Pain on Inmates and Imeoses Punishment on Pre-trial Detainees.
The concept that excessive violence may offend the Constitution is in accord with the well-established duty of correctional officials to protect prisoners from excessive violence. "[Plrison administrators ••• are under an obligation to guarantee the safety of the inmates themselves." Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3200. See Youngberg v. Romeo 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982). See also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-04 (1976).11
Some amount of jail violence may be unavoidable "due to the character of the prisoners." Martin v. White, 742 F.2d 469, 475 (8th Cir. 1984). See Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3200: Doe v. District of Columbia, 701 F.2d 948, 951 (D.C. Cir. !983) (MacKinnon, J.; separate statement). Isolated incidents do not equal a constitutional violation, Withers v. Levine, 615 F.2d 158, 161 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 849 (1980): "a prisoner has no right to demand the level of protection necessary to render an institution assault-free." Murphy v. United States, 653 F.2d 637,
llIndeed, it is because of the critical need to maintain prison security that correctional authorities are granted extraordinarily broad powers over incarcerated persons. See e.g., Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3194 (prison officials may search cells without probable cause: fourth amendment protections inapplicable as prisoners have no reasonable expectation of privacy): Block v. Rutherford, 104 S. Ct. 3227 (1984) (random shakedown searches of pre-trial detainees' cells in their absence are permissible: all contact visits may be banned). See also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 540 , n.3; Phillips v. Bureau of
Prisons, 591 F.2d 966, 972 (D.C. Cir. 197').
-38-

644 (D.C. Cir. 1981). A successful eighth amendment challenge on
the.. issue of prison violence must show that

... "violence and sexual assaults occur ••• with

sufficient frequency that the ••• prisoners

are

put in reasonable fear for their safety and to

reasonably apprise prison officials of the

existence of the problem and the need for

protective measures." [Murphy, 653 F.2d at .645

(quoting Withers, 615 F.2d at 161).]

In the cases under consideration, the evidence establishes that violence is pervasive, that the increase in the number of violent acts is disproportionate ~? the increase in the jail population, and that overcrowding is the direct cause of the increasing violence. The evidence also shows that the prisoners are justifiably in great fear of such violence, and that defendants are well aware of the actual violence, the potential risks of more violence, and the well-grounded fears of the residents and the staff.
Indeed, defendants' earlier request for permission to doublecell pre-trial detainees was premised on their recognition of the need to control what hitherto had been, and apparently is now again, unmanageable violence.
In considering defendants' 1982 motion to permit doublecelling of pre-trial detainees, this court deferred to the defendants' assessment that make-shift floorspace housing was inadequate and unsafe.

The Department offered two justifications for
resorting to double-celling •••• The first was that dormitories cannot be adequately patrolled and therefore pose a severe security risk •••• The second justification was that double-ceIling would

-39-

... ." ~"",
l<t:,~,
enable the Department to remove dormitory beds from dayrooms and gymnasiums and use these facilities to • provide inmates with needed recreational opportunities.
• • • •
In light of this testimony, the court will defer to the Department's judgment that doubleceIling is a lesser evil than the continued use of make-shift dormitories.... {Campbell v. McGruder, 554 F. Supp. 562, 563, 565 (D.D.C. 1982).]
The arguments advanced by defendants were persuasive then: they remain so now. Indeed, these concessions about the undesirability of make-shift housing take on even more significance in light of the greater overcrowding and the worsened conditions at the jail.
The failure of defendants to alleviate the overcrowding and the resultant inability to protect prisoners from violence inflicts unnecessary and wanton pain and violates the eighth amendment.
In the fifth amendment context, the pervasive risk of violence and the imposition of wanton and unnecessary pain affects all prisoners at the jail, pre-trial detainees as well as convicted inmates. If the overcrowded conditions and concomitant violence are evaluated as ends in themselves, they obviously, and
- by definition, serve no legitimate penological purpose. See Bell
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 538-40. If the overcrowding and the violence are viewed as means to a permissible end, e.g., securing a detainee's presence at trial, they still must be seen as irrationally and unnecessarily harsh and excessive. From either perspective, and by either test, conditions at the jail violate
-40-

r ' _\"
't~ .~,~'. ',:'\:

'.~,"'':' " .

the fifth amendment. In sum, the jail conditions that violate ei~hth amendment rights of all convicted inmates ~ fortiori violate the fifth amendment rights of unconvicted pre-trial detainees. Union County Jail Inmates v. DiBuono, 713 F.2d 984, 998 (3d Cir. 1983); cert. denied sub ~., DiBuono v. Fauver, 104 S. Ct. 1600 (1984). See Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979). These constitutional violations, by themselves, entitle plaintiffs to relief.

2. The Inadequate Health Care System Inflicts
Wanton and Unnecessary Pain on Inmates and Imposes Punlshment on Pre-trlal Detainees.

The eighth amendment's proscription against the wunnecessary and wanton infliction of pain·, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.), obligates prison officials to provide all prisoners with ready access to adequate medical care. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). ftAn inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met •••• Such a failure may actually produce physical 'torture or a lingering~eath', ••• or pain and suffering which 10 one sugg~sts would serve a penological purpose. w Id. (citations omitted) (quoting In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890); see Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d at 549.
The medical care provided must be adequate, and access to this care must be readily available. Id. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104-05. The health services system must be able to meet both ·'the routine and emergency health care needs'· of

-41-

residents. Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 574 (10th Cir. 1980), ¢ert denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981) (quoting Battle v. Anderson, 376 F. Supp. 402, 424 (E.D. Okla. 1974». Satisfactory dental care and mental health care must also be provided. Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982): Ramos, 639 F.2d at 574. New prisoners must be appropriately screened for communicable diseases. Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96, 109 (2nd Cir. 1981).
Occasional, inadvertent, or negligent denials of adequate care, which might lead to civil liability for medical malpractice, do not become vivlations of the eighth amendment merely hecause the victims are prisoners. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 10506. R[D}eliberate indifference to serious medical needs" must be established in order for plaintiffs to prevail. Id. at 106.
Deliberate indifference to the medical needs of a class of prisoners can be established either by proving repeated examples of negligent care "which disclose a pattern of conduct by the prison medical staff-, Ramos, 639 F.2d at 5751 Todaro v. Ward, 565 F.2d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 1977) (Kaufman, C.J.), or by showing there are "such systemic and gross deficiencies in staffing, facilities, equipment or proce~ures that the inmate population is effe tively denied access to adequate medical care.- Ramos, 639 F.2d at 575 (citing cases). ~ Todaro, 565 F.2d at 521 Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 272 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3587 (1984).
We are cognizant of the fact that the Supreme Court has cautioned the lower courts not to -assume that the opinions of
-42-

experts as to desirable prison conditions suffice to establish
contemporary standards of decency", Rhodes, 452 u.s. at 348 n.12,
and thus "do not establish the constitutional minima", Sell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 543-44 n.27. Nevertheless, in Gamble the
Court suggested that "[m]odel correctional legislation and
proposed minimum standards" could be used for guidance. 429 U.S.
at 103-04 n.8. At the very least, such proposed standards provide
some alternative to the subjective opinions of the court or the
partisan views of expert witnesses. Though the court is not bound
to defer to such proposed standards, it is not pr~hibited from
drawing upon whatever sensible guidelines they might offer. This
would appear to be particularly so regarding medical standards,
which courts have traditionally viewed as well deserving of
respect.
The court has consulted several of the models cited in Gamble. l2 While recognizing that these standards may reflect the
l2Amer ican Correctional Association, Standards for Local Detention Facilities(2d ed. 1981) Standards 2-5277, 2-5278, 25279; Americ2n Correctional Association, Standards for Adult
Correctiona' Institutions, (2d ed. 1981) Standards 2-4279, 2-
4281, 2-429j-: American Sar Association, Proposed St'.ndard of Joint Committee on Legal Status of Prisoners (l§al} Standard 235.2; Ame~ican Bar Association, Standards for Criminal Justice: Legal Status of Prisoners (Fourth Tentative Draft 1980) Standards 23-S.I(a), 23-5.2: U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Standards
for Prisons and Jails (1980) Standards 5.09, 5.19, 5.20, 5.28:
American Medical Association, Standards for Health Services in Prisons (1979) Standards 143, 145, 146, ISS, 161: American Public Health Association, Standards for Health Services in Correctional Institutions (1976) SS 1-, V-A, V-S, V-C; National Sheriffs' Association, Standards for Inmates Le~al Rights (1974) Right No. 3.2: National Advisory Commission on rimlnal Justice Standards and Goals, Corrections (1973) Standard 2.6: American Law Institute, Model Penal Code, Part IlIon Treatment and Correction (1962), S303.4(1): Fourth United Nations' Congress on Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, Standard Minimum Rules for (continued)
-43-

· -
1', " ' ,.~
~~,.:.
ideal more than the practical, it appears to the court that the medical conditions at the jail fall so far short of anyone of them that they cannot be said to'be consistent with any contemporary standard of decency. For example, these standards mandate that sick call be available to prisoners no less than four or five times per week, not once a week, as is the practice at the jail.
Here, the evidence discloses continuing shortcomings in staffing, intolerable delays in access to appropriate health care personnel, lack of training and lack of supervision of nonprofessional medical and psychiatric staff, haphazard and i11conceived administration and organization, sloppy record keeping, "screening" improperly delegated to unqualified personnel, improper dispensation of prescription drugs, and the woeful lack of dental and psychiatric care. These deficiencies cause needless suffering and the purposeless infliction of pain without any conceivable penological justificati?n. The evidence shows numerous incidents of gross and wanton neglect and establishes a pattern of misconduct and malfeasance. These serious conditions amount ~o deliberate indifference to the health care needs of all prisoners1 they violate the eighth amendment rights of inmates and impose punishment on pre-trial detainees. Once again, these constitutional violations, standing alone, justify plenary relief.
the Treatment of Prisoners (1955) Rules 22(3), 25(1).
-44-

3.
In Rhodes, prisoners complained that double-celling confined
them too closely together and therefore violated the eighth
amendment. They also contended that the prison population was 38%
over design capacity and that this overcrowding overwhelmed the
prison's staff, services and facilities. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at
340. Although recognizing that conditions, "alone or in combination,"14 ide at 347 (emphasis added), could violate the
Constitution, the Court held that "under (the] circumstances" in
that case they did not. Id. at 348.
l3Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.
l4"It is important to recognize that various deficiencies in prison conditions 'must be considered together.' The individual conditions 'exist in combination: each affects the other: and taken together they [may] have a cumulative impact on the inmates.' Thus, a court considering an eighth amendment challenge to conditions of confinement must examine the totality of the circumstances." Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 362-63 (Brennan, J., co~curring in judgment) (quoting Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 3~1, 373 (E.C. Ark. 1970)), citations and footnote omitted, e~phasis added). See Hutto v. Finne~, 4J~ U.S. 678, 687, 688 (1978)--("interdependence of the con itions", "taken as a whole"); Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d at 531. "It is the totalit~ which the Constitution regulates." Lareau v. Manson,
651 F.2 96, 107 (2d Cir. 1981). "Various prison conditions do
not exist in isolation. Rather, challenged conditions must be viewed in the light of other prison conditions that may aggravate or mitigate the effect of other challenged conditions." See also Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 274 (7th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 3587 (1984); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 474, 477 , n.9 (1983); Sampson v. King, 693 F.2d 566, 569 (5th Cir. 1982); Union County Jal1 Inmates v. DiBuono, 713 F.2d 984, 999-1000 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom., DiBuono v. Fauver, 104 S. Ct. 1600 (1984). But see Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246-47 and n.3 (9th Cir. ~2): Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129, 1132 (9th Cir. 1981).
-45-

In determining whether the totality of prison conditions
vlolates the eighth amendment, a court must evaluate the cumulative effect upon inmates
of the condition of the physical plant {lighting, heat, plumbing, ventilation, living space, noise levels, recreation space)1 sanitation {control of vermin and insects, food preparation, medical facilities, lavatories and showers, clean places for eating, sleeping, and working) 1 safety (protection from violent, deranged, diseased inmates, fire protection, emergency evacuation); inmate needs and services (clothing, nutrition, bedding, medical, dental, and mental health care, visitation time, .exercise and recreation, educational and rehabilitative programming); and staffing (trained and adequate guards and other staff, avoidance of placing inmates in positions of
authority over other inmates). [Rhodes, 452 u.s.
at 364 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis added).]
Defendants contend that, in accord with Rhodes, plaintiffs are not entitled to relief. They pOint out that the jail is a
relatively new and modern facility and that overcrowding per se is
no cause for judicial intervention. But this case is not comparable to Rhodes, and, as a matter of fact, Rhodes cuts not in favor of the defendants but against them.
While it is true that the jail was built in the 1970s, and that it is centrally air conditioned and heated, those appear to
be the only common features shared by the jail and the Southern
Ohio Correctional Facility (SOCF), the maximum security prison at issue in Rhodes. Furthermore, even the apparent similarity of overcrowding is characterized by a marked difference, i.e., the
rate over design capacity in Rhodes was 38., in this case the population is 96. over the cell capacity and 177. over the service
-46-

. " ," " ' .'

'" ~
. ~,

..,. ~;"

r

~

t~

capacity. In the Ohio facility all inmates were housed in cells,

.and although they were double celled, 75% of them had the option

of spending up to 15 hours per day outside their cells in school

and work programs and in outdoor recreation. The Ohio prison had

eight bright, well ventilated and well equipped classrooms, and

various workshops including a machine shop, shoe factory, engine

repair shop, sheet metal shop, print shop and sign shop. It also

had a commissary and a barbershop. The cells in the Ohio facility

were equipped with individual radios. In Rhodes the dayrooms were

spacious and well equipped and completely available to the

prisoners. None was used for any purpose other than those

originally intended.

By contrast, at the jail 29' of the jail inmates are in

makeshift housing. The incarcerees at the jail have but 8 hours

out-of-cell time to spend in crowded dayrooms and hallways. They

enjoy only 3 hours per week of outdoor recreation. There are a

few classrooms at the jail but no workshops as in the Ohio

facility. At the jail, nearly half of the dayroom space has been

preempted for housing, leaving the remainder to serve nearly

double the intended population thereby geometrically compounding

the problem.

The library at the Ohio institution was one ·superior in

quality and quantity·, where the 2,300 inmates had access to

25,000 volumes, including law books. Chapman v. Rhodes, 432 F.

Supp. 1007, 1010 (S.D. Ohio 1977). At the jail, 2,600 prisoners

have access to only 4,200 volumes. In Rhodes, "there [was] no

indication whatsoever that the food facility [had] been taxed by

-47-

the prison population." Id., at 1014. The kitchen facilities at the jail are overtaxed and operate on an around-the-clock basis. In Rhodes there were no complaints concerning unsanitary toilets, sinks and showers such as the ones we have at the jail. Apparently the classification and parole services at the Ohio prison were completely satisfactory, and that is not so at the jail. Visiting privileges and facilities had not been affected in the Ohio facility and contact visits were allowed. By contrast, at the jail visiting hours have been reduced and long delays are commmonplace for the non~ontact visits which are permitted. At the Ohio facility medical and dental care was completely adequate. Sick call was held daily. Initial sick call and screening was performed by a nurse. Prescriptions were passed out daily and any backlogs for dental patients "were temporary". 434 F. Supp. at 1015-16. In sharp contrast are the systemic deficiencies in medical, dental and mental health care at the jail.
In Rhodes the Court emphasized that the plaintiffs produced no evidence that double celling caused greater violence, and that "the number of acts of violence had increased only in proportion to the. increase in population." 452 U.S. at 342-343. Finally, there were no riots or suicides. This is not the picture at the jail where the violence is widespread and disproportionately increasing to the population increaseJ in addition, a riot in July 1983 occurred at the jail, and there have been four suicides since that time. The obvious implication is that the figures we have in this case reflect a nexus between the gross overcrowding and the
-48-

rate of violence •
. Obviously the conditions in Rhodes are sharply
distinguishable from those at the jail. In Rhodes the Court essentially determined that overcrowding had not adversely affected, in any substantial way, the quality of daily life of the SOCF inmates. Ever-increasing violence did not threaten their safety and poor medical care did not jeopardize their health. Under no circumstances can similar conclusions be drawn in these cases.
Viewed in th£ aggregate, it is clear that the seriou~ overcrowding at the jail has created conditions which are so acute that they deny inmates the minimum of life's necessities and inflict punishment on pre-trial detainees, thus establishing plaintiffs' claims of constitutional violations.
IV. Relief
The development of intolerable overcrowding and its negative effects on persons housed in the jail were obvious and predictable early on--at least tr' this court and the Court of Appeals. n light of these predictions both this court and the Court of Appeals have oftentimes identified specific avenues by which the population pressures could be reduced, emphasized the necessity for defendants to develop a long-range, comprehensive approach to overcrowding, and warned of the legal consequences if defendants did not use their presumed expertise to rectify ongoing constitutional violations. ~ e.g., Campbell v. McGruder, 416 F.
-49-

Supp. 106, 108-11 (D.D.C. 1975); Campbell v. McGruder, 416 F•
.
Supp. Ill, 114-17 (D.D.C. 1976); Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d at 538 n.35 and~. at 526, 542-44 (1978); Campbell v. McGruder, 554 'F. Supp. at 566 (1982). Nevertheless, instead of a sustained drive against the effects of a population crisis, defendants' efforts have been sporadic, and largely unproductive; and conditions have steadily worsened.
Time and again, defendants have requested the court to defer to their accumulated wisdom, to stay its hand and to give them more time. Time and again, these requests have been hvnored in the hope and expectation that defendants would solve these problems expeditiously and effectively. However, instead of matters improving they have deteriorated. For example, at the October 1984 hearing defendants represented to the court that the jail population, which had steadily risen over the summer months, would fall with the onset of winter. This did not happen; in fact, the opposite occurred. The court was further given to understand that a new 400 bed Department facility, which was scheduled to open in late winter, would reduce the jail population by 400. That fc.cility has opened, and is currently '20 p,~rsons shy of its design capacity--yet the jail is still packed with record numbers.
Moreover, there has been no indication of stepped up compliance with provisions of the Bail Reform Act, despite the fact that similar efforts in the past have been successful in reducing the jail population. Similarly, there has been no indication of approaches to the parole commission, or application
-50-

to the courts that have imposed population ceilings on other Qepartment facilities for reconsideration or modification of those orders; and there are other facilities not under court order where massive overcrowding does not exist. Nor is there any indication of thought given to utilizing the various empty buildings available to the District of Columbia government. In other words, for the most part there is no indication of anything except complacency.
This court is not eager to encroach upon the responsibilities entrust.ed to defendants. However, in this case, the court has "learned from repeated investigation and bitter experience that judicial intervention is indispensable if constitutional dictates-not to mention considerations of basic humanity are to be observed •.•. " Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 354 (Brennan, J. concurring; emphasis in the original).
It appears that any effort to alleviate the specific results of overcrowding on a one by one basis is foredoomed. For example, five years ago we ordered defendants to hire additional medical staff. Campbell v. McGruder, C.A. No. 1462-71, slip op. (D.D.C. June 9, }980). Defendants now assert their inab'lity to hire or retain qualified professionals. This is to be expected inasmuch as the conditions of employment that flow from overcrowding already overtaxed facilities are completely unattractive to professional employees. It appears clear that when, as is the case here, constitutional violations are the direct result of, and inextricably tied to, what amounts to unattended runaway overcrowding, nothing short of an order placing a ceiling on the
-51-

population can be an effective remedy. In addition, an order that
.
attempted to rectify each particular infirmity would ineluctably and perpetually entangle the court in the "minutiae" of jail administration, a burden we are advised to avoid. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 562.
The ceiling need not be set at the jail's design capacity of 1,355. Since double-ceIling is not unconstitutional per se, the total jail population can rise above the limit set when it was assumed that all prisoners must be single-celled. At the same time, even if individual cells can house t~ice as many prisoners as originally intended, the institution as a whole cannot. At
I
least, it cannot, consistent with the Constitution. Thus some reasonable midpoint must be established. Fortunately, defendants have provided some guidance, albeit inadvertent, on what that point should be.
In the spring of 1983, a few months before the riot, Director James Palmer asked then Assistant Director George Holland to forward recommendations on the maximum number of people that could be sa~ely housed at the jail. Holland replied on July 1, 1983. "Ideally", he said, "I would recommend that .,356 be our fixed capacity.- Noting, however, that defendants had "capability and experience- in dealing with larger populations,15 Holland concluded that the jail could safely hold nearly 25% more than design capacity. Holland recommended that the fixed limit should be set at 1,694. 16
l5At the time Holland wrote to Palmer, the average daily jail population was 2,325. (continued)
-52-

, ,
~he court will adopt Holland's expert assessment and recommendation. The evidence confirms that the figure he proposed represents the largest number of prisoners that can be confined at the jail without inflicting cruel and unusual punishment on the residents.
In order to minimize the intrusion into the administrative concerns within the competence of jail officials, the court will order a prohibition on the intake of new residents rather than prescribe what should be done with the prisoners currently held at the jail. "A ban on intake will also serve the salutory purpose of forcing all of the various ••• local agencies who either have a need to place people in confinement or the responsibility for providing detention facilities, or both, to face up to the challenge of making alternative arrangements." Badgley v. Varelas, 729 F.2d 894, 902 (2d Cir. 1984). This is also the method of implementing a ceiling specifically proposed by the Court of Appeals. Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d at 536-37 n.28.
The court is aware of the fact that local agencies which would normally expect to send prisoners to the jail "are entitled to some ,brief period of time to make al eernative arrangements
.... " Id. The court will therefore direct that the prohibition
l6subsequent testimony by Holland which raised the tolerable limits was thoroughly impeached and had the ring of incredibility.
-53-

on the intake of new prisoners not take effect until 40 day~ after
t.he entry of the accompanying order.

July 13 , 1985

....-,., :~ ...t..-~' .
" - ' .' /.' "'< _ ...

)'-;; .:

I.-'~~..

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

'"

-54-

 
 Carnobell v. McGruder

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 ltnit.eik ~tttf~s Q!oltrf of j\pp~nl$

•

FOR THE OISTr!ICi OF COLLiM'3IA CIRCUIT

No. 75-1350
Leonard Campbell, et al.,

Septem ber Term, 19 74
Civil Action 1462-71

v.

Anderson McGruder, Superintendent Detention Services, et al.,
Appellant

Before: Bazeloll, Chief Judge; Leventhal and ~~C£. 1G.~t Judges

o R D E R

CLERK

On consideration of appellants' motions for stay and for summary reversal of the District Courtts interim order of March
21, 1975, the responses thereto, the supplemental pleadings filed in response to this courtts order of April 4, 1975, and the oral argwnent held on April 25, 1975, it is

ORDERED by ~he Co~rt that the temporary stay issued April
4, 1975, is continued in effect to permit an orderly remand procedure modified however to make it clear that appellants are oblig2.ted to continue to take steps toward compliance with the subst~nce of the Yarch 21, 1975 order. I~ is

FCRTHEU ORDERED by the Court that the record in this case is remanded to the District Court for the report and proceedings
described in the attached memorandum.

Appellants t motion for permanent stay and summary revsl1 sal remain under consideration pending the outcome of the remand proceedings.

Per Curiam

II

.

This challenge to conditions of inmate life at the

D.C. Jail has been in litigation since July, 1971. Trial

in the matter was held between ~larch 4 and 13, 1975. At

the conslusion of testimony, the District Court ordered the

parties to submit proposals f~r interim relief. Following a

hearing on March 19, the District Court entered on March

21 the order under review in which he found "that by reason

of the overcrowding alone, plaintiffs' constitutional rights

are being violated." The order concluded:

"3. That after 15 days from the date of this order defendants shall refrain from housing any pretrial detainee of plaintiffs'
class in any cell, room or dormitory where there is an average of less than 48 square
feet per !/ person. tt...

Alleging impossibility, the defendants petitioned the District Court for an extension of the deadline for compliance.

-II .

The his

District Court has characterized the order applies as "people who were in

class to which D.C. Jail held

as pretrial detainees with no other charges fending against

them and not sentenced on any other charges and whoj

can't make bail." (April 1, 1975 hearing Tr. at 55).

- - --~--E - .. -
-2-

After a hearing on April 1, this relief was denied on

•

•

April 3. The appellants filed motions for stay and summary

reversal in this court on. April 4, the appellees responded

and the same day (hours before the deadline), this court

entered a temporary stay to afford it an opportunity to give

consideration to these motions. On April 8, this court

ordered oral argument on these motions and invited further

memoranda from the parties. Upon consideration of the pleadings,

memoranda and the argument, held April 25, the court is

continuing in effect the temporary stay, holding the motions

for permanent stay and summary reversal in abeyance, and

remanding the record for further proceedings designed to

clarify the central question of the feasibility of compliance

with the District Court's Yarch 21 order.

Appellants focus on the practicality of compliance,

alleging that it is impossible to abate the violation in the

brief period accorded them. The appellees contest this,

advancing a number of ways in which compliance could be had.

The Court of A,'peals is obviously not the ideal forum for

the resolution of this factual dispute. The Department of

Corrections has taken several steps in the direction of

compliance and the District Court is better equipped to

evaluate the success of these efforts and explore further

measures to alleviate the overcrowding problem.

J

#

The District Court's stress on the need for expeditious

• and meaning•ful relief is appropriate, but we think it

necessary that further attention be given by all involved

to the specifics of compliance. ~e accordingly remand the

record for proceedings focused on the practical aspects of

compliance.

The Department of Corrections shall file with the

District Court as soon as possible (but no later than two

weeks from the date of entry of this order) a report and

a plan. The report shall describe in detail steps the

Department has already taken, alone or in conjunction with

others, toward alleviation of overcrowding among the plain-

tiff class. The report will also list in detail, further

actions or problems available to bring about compliance,

and the time needed or other conditions precedent to their

employment.

We recognize that the matter of compliance is in many

respects a question of shared responsibility.21 We contem-

plate that the Department of Corrections will, in its efforts

to compl~ with the Court's order, seek the activ~ consulta-

tion and cooperation of others who, although not technically

parties to this action, have an important role to play in

evolving the solution for the problem presented. Specifically,

we contemplate that the Department and its counsel will seek

2/ The Department observes that to some extent its function
1s to rece i ve men sen t to the j ail by others.. However, the Superintendent cannot assert a duty under local law that would put him at variance with a Federnl decree.

-4-
".. the coopera~ion of the Chief Judges of the District Court
and the Superior Court as well as the United States Attorney and the D.C. Bail Agency in an effort to explore ways to stem or divert the flow of new pretrial detainees into the jail and reduce the number of sentenced prisoners housed there. Furthermore, we presume that consultation with the designees of the Attorney General, who can e.g. expedite removal of Federal prisoners who have been sentenced, with the Mayor's Office, and other agencies of local and Federal government will permit consideration of other avenues for alleviating this temporary problem, and provide the type of cooperation necessary for a collective solution. The dimensions of the problem may require consideration of unusual remedies, perhaps even, e.g. modifications of unused barracks at service installations.
Following the submission of the detailed report by the Department of Corrections, the District Court, having held such proceedings as it deems necessary, shall make specific fir :lings concerning the degree to which co' ,pliance has to that point been had, and to the extent that further steps are needed, detailed findings concerning further courses to be pursued.
We reiterate th~t while the remand proceedings are being conducted in the District Court, the appellants remain obligated to take steps' toward compliance with the substance o f tlIe " h ~arc 21 order • A'ppellants' motions for permanent st;l\.-

-5-
.. and summary reversal will pend in this court during the
remand proceedings and our consideration of the record as enlarged on remand.
So ordered.
...

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LEONARD CAMPBELL, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

C.A. No. 1462-71

ANDERSON McGRUDER, et al., Defendant ••

F I LED
SEP 151982

ORDER

CLERK, U.s. DISTRICT COURT
DI~T~ICT OF COLUMIIA

Pursuant to this court's order of November 5, 1976 requiring

defendants to develop a classification system for deciding which

inmates, if any, could have contact visits without jeopardizing

security, defendants have informed the court that no inmates may

receive contact visits. The ban on contact visits at the D.C.

Jail satisfies the constitutional standards articulated in ~

v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). For the reasons stated in this

court's memorandum of September~, 1982, plaintiffs' prayer

for contact visits is DENIED.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

./
F I LED

LEONARD CAMPBELL, et al.,

SEP 151982

Plaintiffs, ·v.

CLERK. U.s. DISTRICT COUI CJ~TItICT Of COLUMBIA
C.A. No. 1462-71

ANDERSON McGRUDER, et al.,

......... .... .D..e.f.e.n.d.a.n.ts..• .... .... .. ...... ....... ..... ... .... .....

INMATES, D.C. JAIL, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

C.A. No. 75-1668

DELBERT JACKSON, et al.,

......... .....D..e.f.e.n.d.a.n.ts..• .... ..... .... ... ...... .. ... ... ..........

LANA PHOEBE GARNES, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

PATRICIA P. TAYLOR, et al.,

.. Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

I

.'

C.A. No. 159-72

Pretrial and post-trial detainees at the District of

Columbia Jail and the Women's Detention Center do not enjoy

'V,,", .on'••' Yi."s--v'.'"

whiah 'her mav '.Yah 'h.'r 'rien',

and relative., unhampered by gl ••• or bars. The det.inees have

challenged the contact visit ban in three related l.wluita--

Campbell v. McGruder, C.!. No. 1462-71; Inmatp.s, District of Columbia Jail v. Jackson, C.A. No. 75-1668, and Garnes v. Taylor, C.A. No. 159-72. The court has, in the course of adjudicating these lawsuits, either ordered or contemplated ordering defendant jail officials to permit contact visits at the D.C. Jail and the Women's Detention Center. In this memorandum, the court reviews the current ban on contact visits in light of the standards set forth in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), and finds that the ban is constitutional.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The contact visits issue in the three jail cases under the court's jurisdiction is procedurally complex.
The contact visits issue arose initially in Campbell v. McGruder, a suit brought ,by unconvicted pretrial detainees at the District of Columbia Jail. In that case, the court o~dered defendants to -(e]stablish a classification system which will make it possible to determine ••• which members of class can enjoy contact visits without jeopardizing the security of the facility.-~ Campbell v. McGruder, 416 F. Supp. 100, 105 (D.D.C. November ~,.. 1976). The court's order was premised on the general due process principle that -the liberty of pretrial detainees ••• , to whom a presumption of innocence attaches, may not be more ••v.rely elleu••ertae' \ftaft t • •D.olY'.~Y ft••••••r~ .er tfte security of the institution.- Cameb.ll, Clarification on Remand, June 4, 1976 at 1. The Campbell order wa. appealed to the Court
-2-

 
 UNITED ST/iTES DISTRICT COURT
rott TUB Dis'irnxcT oy C

ARCHIE R. STOKES WILLIAM II. GALLOWAY District of Columbia Jail 200 19th Street, S.E. Washington, D.C.
Plaintiffs,
v.
CHARLES M. RODGERS Superintendent, D.C. Jail 200 19th Street, S.E. Washington, D.C.
KENNETH L. HARDY Director, D.C. Department
of Corrections 614 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C.
WALTER R. WASHINGTON Mayor and Commissioner of
the District of Columbia
Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1462-71

COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTION, DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND OTHER APPROPRIATE jV/:LJEF
Plaintiffs complain against the defendants as follows:
I. JURISDI£TION
1. This is an action for a declaratory judgment that plaintiffs' constitutional rights are being violated by the conditions of thair confinement in the District of Columbia Jail and for a permanent injunction preventing defendants

Stokes v. Rodgers JC-DC-004-001

_ 2 —
from continuing to violate plaintiff's righto, while asfeiny under color of lav/.
2. Jurisdiction is conferred on this court under 28 U.S.C. §13 43 providing for jurisdiction over claims arising under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and 1985, and U.S.C. §2201 and 2202 relating to declaratory judgment?; and the D.C. Code §11-521 conferring general equity jurisdiction on the District Court and by the Court's ancillary jurisdiction to hear non-federal claims.
II. THE PARTIES 3. Plaintiffs are citizens of tha United States and of the District of Columbia and reside at the District of Columbia Jail. They were arrested in tha District of Coluifibia and are charged with offenses under" the District of Columbia Code cognizable in the United States District Court. In each case bond was set by a United States Magistrate or judge of that Court. Each plaintiff has been unable to make bond and is incarcerated at the D.C. Jail solely to insure his appearance at trial and for no other reason. 4. Plaintiff Calloway has been incarcerated since July 15, 197.1, and is presently held undiT $10,000 bond. Magistrate's Docket 15-2406-VlCr. No trial date has baen set. Plaintiff Stokes has been incarcerated sinceJune 23, 1971, undar $5,000 bond. Magistrate's Docket 15-2157-71. No trial date has been set. 5. The Plaintiffs are representative of a class within the meaning of Rule 23, Fed. R. Civ. P. The class consists of all!., umjonvictea pre-trial detainees i':;carcf-:rntp.d at the

•- 3—
'''• of Columbia Jail. Tho alnns ir; an on-going one
<iiid iUl
'•'ides p r e - t r i a l detainees who w i l l be incarcerated <U yu..
''*C. Jail in the future. The class is so numerous
-''''•ider of all members is impracticable. The members
"lass are readily identifiable from the Defendants'
'' There are questions of lav.' and. fact common to "1(li. The claims of the Plaintiffs are typical of II,..' C ] . "'•tin of the class. The Plaintiffs will fairly and
" ''l.y protect the interest of the class. '''< Dsetfreincdtanotf CChoalrulmebsiaH.JaRiold.yerHse iiss Ssuupeedriinntdeinvdiednutally ''K' s o f f i c i a l Ccipaci.ty.
•'"'(1 in 1 Defendant, Kenneth I,. Hardy, is Director of the
D ' C . 1), '•'''•rtmant of Corrections and is responsible for the
ov<,rai , • administration of the D.C. Jail. He is sued
'''''Mlly and in his official capacity'.
Defendant, Walter R. VJashington. is Mayor and
""'K'ner of the District of Columbia, He is sued
•'•'ii'Ji v i ii,
M\lly and in his official capacity as chief executive
o )• (• j c r .
^ £ the District of Colurabia.
III.
STATEMENT OF CLAIM 1 Plaintiffs are incarcerated at che District of
'* Jail solely because they are unc.blc to post band 'l>v their release prior to their trials. They are J'""^ innocent and are incarcerated solely to ensure
''''•'•sence at trial.

o :o
10. Plaintiffs allege, upon information and belief, that the defendants, by thsir intentional acts and omissions, are violating their constitutional rights in that:
a. The physical conditions of plaintiffs' confinement constitute punishment in violation of the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. They are confined in cells and dormitories which in some cases are overcrowded, but which, in any event, violate minimal architectural standards as well an Junsrican Correctional Association standards. The jail is overcrowded; the heating, ventilation and other aspects of the physical conditions all constitute a health threat.
b. The inadequacy of food and the laclt of recreational facilities constitute punishment in violation of the Fif;th, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
c. The lack of programs enabling plaintiffs to maintain employment, where possible, prior to trial, constitutes punishment in violation of the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
d. Plaintiffs are denied adequate contact with the general community. The censorship of mail, limitations on visitors, lack of access of telephones, newspapers, and other means of communication violate plaintiffs First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
e. Hospital and other medical services are inadequate to ensure health and safety of plaintiffs, in violation of their Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
f. Inadequate security measurer, subject plaintiffs to tho threat and danger of assault by other innate::;, thus violating their rights under tho Fifth, Eighth and Pourv.oonth An ;!.nd;nentc .

11. Plaintiffs further allege that they are subject l.o confinement in the Control Cells and Treatment Segregation •'ells of the Jail in violation of their constitutional 1ights in that:
a. Such confinement is carried out as a 'tisciplinary measure without prior due process procedural •safeguards and
b. The conditions of the Trailtinent Segregation ('G11G violate plei.intif fs rights under the Fifth, Eighth, '•ud Fourteenth Amendments.
12. Plaintiffs further allege that they are denied "ccess to legal materials and adequate access to counsel in violation of their Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth 'smendment rights.
13. Plaintiffs further allege that the physical "onditions of the jail are in violation of the District '>£ Columbia Housing Code.
14. Defendants Rodgers, Hardy and Washington each Within the scope of his authority, and under color of lav/"nd as a matter of custom and practice, enforced and "dministared the practices and policies constituting the Violations alleged in paragraphs 11, .12, 13, and 14.
15. All of the conditions and practices separately 'uid in the aggregate make incarceration in the D.C. O'ail "iore severe, punitive and restrictive than post-sentence Incarceration at other correctional institutions to v.'hich I'laintiffs might be sent if they were convicted, notv;ith~ 'i Landing that the plciintiffs are awaiti'V; trial and

'••)
16. As a resu.lt of the conditions and practices at the D.C. Jail, detainees arc psychologically and physically harmed and damaged. Moreover, they are induced to plead guilty to criminal charges ponding against them in order to avoid the conditions and practices herein described which exist at the Jail.
17. There is an actual and continuing controversy requiring a declaration of the rights of the names; plaintiffs and the members of the class. There is no adequate remedy at law.
18. The existence and continuation of the unconstitutional practices, policies, acts and omissions alleged herein have subjected and will continue to subject the class to irreparable suffering and injury unless defendants, and each of them, are enjoined by this Court: from continuing such practices, policies, acts and omissions and are required to perform their respective duties according to law.
XV PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, on behalf of: themselves and all other detainees similarly sitvmted, pray: 1. That the Court allow this case to proceed cis a class action and that all members of the: class be notified by defendants of the pendency of this action by posting one ,copy of the complaint in a conspicuous place in each section of the jail and that several attorneys designated by plaintiffs' attorneys and several attorneys designated by defendants' attorneys be permitted to move through t'.'ie jail so as to ansv.'ar questions by members of the cia;;::. ,

—7—
2. That the Court order defendants to permit corrections experts designated by plaintiffs to inspect the jail and all of its facilities and to report to all parties and the Court on the results of their inspection.
3. That the Court declare that the individual and collective effect of their acts, practices, and omissions, the Defendants:
a. has subjected Plaintiffs and the class they represent to punishment without Due Process of Lav/, and to cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States • Constitution;
b. has subjected Plaintiffs and the class they represent to summary discipline without due process in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments;
c. lias deprived Plaintiffs and their class of their constitutionally protected rights to a fair trial,
V
guaranteed by the Sixth and the Fourteenth Amendments; d. has deprived Plaintiffs and their class to
the equal protection of the lav; to which they are entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment;
e. has deprived Plaintiffs and their class of their rights to effective, assistance of counsel and to assist in their defense, in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments;
f. has deprived. Plaintiffs and their class of their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments;
g. has, under color of law and as a result of action by dofenc"U;nts in their official capacities, deprived plaintiffs o£ tho rights described above in violation of Title 42 U.S. Code SS.19U.1--1SB5;

o
h. has deprived Plaintiffs on their rights under Housing Regulations §2306, 2307, 2404, 2202, 2206, 2301-2, 2608, 2209.
4. That a permanent injunction be issued, enjoining and restraining Defendants from engaging in any of the unlawful acts, practices, or omissions complained of in this complaint.
5. That the Court order, that, within 60 days, Defendants submit to the Court a plan for assuring that Plaintiffs and. the class they represent are accorded all of the rights and privileges of the innocent; and that' they be subjected only to such inconveniences necessary to ensure their presence at subsequent court proceedings. Kore specifically, the Plaintiffs and the class they represent should be assured by the plan:
a. that the District of Columbia Jail and the cells and dormitories therein be kept in safe and sanitary conditions, with proper electrical connections, plumbing, heating and ventilation, and, at a minimum, that the jail's conditions be maintained in accordance with the District of Columbia. Housing Lav; (Housing Regulations 230G, 2307, 2404, 2202, 2206, 2301-02, 2608, 2209);
b. that prisoners not be overcrowded in the D.C. Jail and that each cell, ward, and dormitory contain no inore. prisoners than the designed capacity of the cell and 'cel.lblock.
c. that a regular recreational and exercise progrcim, outside of the cells, be. established and that pri.GO.ncrs be permitted outside of the jail for sufficient periods to asjLuire their continuous phycical and riicntal well-being.

d. that the isolation and punishment of prisoner in the treatment segregation cells be terminated;

e. that all prisoners be fed in suitable, sanitary

facilities outside of their cells and that edible food in

accordance with recognized nutritional needs be furnished;

f. that the prisoners be permitted enough showers

to ensure that they remain clean;

g. that the prisoners be furnished clean mattresses

and beds,, a complete set of bedding and clothing, including

socks and undergarments, which are cleaned and changed at

least once weekly, adequate towels, proper cleaning equip-

ment, and other personal necessities (such as tooth paste,

soap, etc.);

h. that prisoners be accorded, essential preventive

medical practices cind receive adequate and sound madical,.

dental and mental health care;

i. that an educational and vocational program

y

• •

and voluntary work program be established;

j. that prisoners have continuous opportunity

to tall; and associate with each other;

k. that prisoners have access to a sufficient

quantity and quality of books, magazines and newspapers,

law books and legal materials;

1. that visiting conditions i>o established which

ensure decency, comfort, privacy of conversations, conjugal

•rights, and additional visiting periods;

m. that no limitations be plrced on persons an

inmate may see, communicate with, and receive communication

from;

n. that no censorship be exercised on incontiny

or outgoing iaa.il, newspapers, books, anc', periodicals; that

the only control on inc.oJr.iny mail bo fov: inspection of

-10-
contraband such 33 drugs or weapons; thr,•".; adequate phonou be installed and the prisoners have access to them in order to make local, outgoing calls without churge; and that such phones not be wiretapped or monitored ir. any manner;
o. that a code of intra~ja.il behavior providing for inmate rights be promulgated and provided to every prisoner upon entry into the jail;
p. that no discipline on inmates be inflicted without first affording them notice, a hearing, the assistance of counsel, the confrontation of accusers, the. right to cross-examine, written records of a hearing decision, reasons therefor and evidence relied upon, and a hearing before an impartial official.
6. That the Court order the Defendants to implement the plans submitted pursuant to paragraph 5.
7. That if a satisfactory plan cannot be submitted and implemented, the Defendants be enjoined and restrained from incarcerating or detaining any and all of the Plaintiffs and members of the class they represent in the District of Columbia Jail and further enjoined from transferring Plaintiffs and their class to an alternative facility unless Defendants can provide evidence satisfactory to the Court that the alternative does not suffar from the conditions herein complained of and that, it is accessible to visitors and counsel.
0. That the Court enter its order permanently directing Defendant Washington to allocate funds r.ad to take such further steps as may be necessary cind appropriate within his pov:ers for the implementation of trr provisions contained in paragraph (5) above.

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 District of Columbia live database - Docket Report

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U.S. District Court District of Columbia (Washington, DC) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:71-cv-01462-WBB-WBB

APPEAL

CAMPBELL, et al v. MCGRUDER, et al Assigned to: Judge William B. Bryant Referred to: Judge William B. Bryant Demand: $0 Cause: 28:2201 Declaratory Judgement Special Master GRACE M. LOPES TERMINATED: 11/12/1997 Special Master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER Special Officer of the Court
Plaintiff LEONARD CAMPBELL

Date Filed: 07/21/1971 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 550 Prisoner: Civil Rights Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Karen M Schneider 1130 17th Street, NW Suite 400 Washington, DC 20036 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Eric Robert Lotke 253 North Columbus Street Arlington, VA 22203-2648 (202) 276-9046 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Hickey SHAW PITTMAN 2300 N Street, NW Washington, DC 20037 (202) 663-8103 Fax: 202-663-8007 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Mark Smith PUBLIC JUSTICE CENTER 500 East Lexington Street Baltimore, MD 21202-3559 (410) 625-9409 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Plaintiff JOHN MCILWAIN
Plaintiff RICHARD KINARD
Plaintiff ELIGAH HAIR SMITH

represented by Benjamin M. Dean SHAW PITTMAN, LLP 2300 N Street, NW Washington, DC 20037-1128 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric Robert Lotke (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Hickey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Mark Smith (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by Benjamin M. Dean (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric Robert Lotke (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Hickey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Mark Smith (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by Benjamin M. Dean (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric Robert Lotke

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Plaintiff ARCHIE R. STOKES
Plaintiff WILLIAM H. CALLOWAY

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Hickey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Mark Smith (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by Benjamin M. Dean (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric Robert Lotke (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Hickey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Mark Smith (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by Benjamin M. Dean (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric Robert Lotke (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Hickey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Mark Smith

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V.
Defendant
SUPERINTENDENT ANDERSON MCGRUDER

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by Edward Schwab OFFICE OF CORPORATION COUNSEL, D.C. 441 Fourth Street, NW Room 6S105 Washington, DC 20001-4600 (202) 727-6252 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jacques Philippe Lerner OFFICE OF CORPORATION COUNSEL, D.C. 441 Fourth Street, NW 6th Floor, South Washington, DC 20001-4600 (202) 724-6646 Email: jacques.lerner@dc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nicholas Patrick Miller COUNCIL ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 113 North Washington Street Suite 181 Rockville, MD 20850 (301) 758-9312 Fax: 301-294-8909 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard Stuart Love OFFICE OF CORPORATION COUNSEL, D.C. 441 Fourth Street, NW 6th Floor Washington, DC 20001-4600 (202) 727-6295 Email: richard.love@dc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert C. Utiger

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Defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON

Office of the Corporation Counsel 441 Fourth Street, NW Suite 600S Washington, DC 20001 (202) 724-6532 Fax: (202) 727-0431 Email: robert.utiger@dc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Edward Schwab (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jacques Philippe Lerner (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nicholas Patrick Miller (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard Stuart Love (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert C. Utiger (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 09/18/1992
09/28/1992 10/13/1992 10/26/1992

#

Docket Text

----- ALL DOCKET ENTRIES PRIOR TO 9/18/92 WILL BE FOUND ON THE MANUAL DOCKET SHEETS ------ (ks) (Entered: 09/18/1992)

1 REPORT by defendants to the Court (188th) pursuant to Order of 8/22/85; Attachments (5) (ks) (Entered: 09/29/1992)

2 REPORT by defendants to the Court (189th), pursuant to Order filed 8/22/85; Attachments (5) (ks) (Entered: 10/14/1992)

3 REPORT by defendants to the Court (190th) pursuant to Order of 8/22/85; Attachments (6) (ks) (Entered: 10/27/1992)

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11/09/1992 11/23/1992 12/07/1992 12/23/1992
12/28/1992 12/28/1992 01/04/1993 01/05/1993 01/14/1993
01/21/1993 02/01/1993 02/08/1993 02/12/1993
02/12/1993
02/16/1993 02/17/1993
02/25/1993

4 REPORT by defendants to the Court (191st); Attachments (5) (ks) (Entered: 11/10/1992)
5 REPORT by defendants to the Court (191th) pursuant to Order entered on 8/22/85; Attachments (5) (ks) (Entered: 11/24/1992)
6 REPORT by defendants to the Court (192nd) pursuant to Order entered on 8/22/85; Attachments (5) (ks) (Entered: 12/08/1992)
7 MOTION filed by defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER, defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON to extend time to 1/5/93 to file their 193d biweekly report (ajr) (Entered: 12/28/1992)
8 NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION by plaintiff(s) of Carolyn Groom (ks) (Entered: 12/29/1992)
9 NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION by plaintiff(s) of William Hall, M.D. (ks) (Entered: 12/29/1992)
10 REPORT by defendants to the Court (193rd and 194th) pursuant to Order entered 8/22/85; Attachments (6) (bulky) (ks) (Entered: 01/05/1993)
Text not available. (Entered: 01/06/1993)
11 MOTION filed by defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER, defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON to extend time to 1/21/93 to fiel their 195th biweekly report to the Court (ajr) (Entered: 01/15/1993)
12 REPORT by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON to the Court; attachments. (bm) (Entered: 01/22/1993)
13 REPORT by defendants of the Court (196th) pursuant to Order entered on 8/22/85; Attachments (6) (ks) (Entered: 02/02/1993)
14 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 2/16/93 to file their 197th Bi-Weekly report to the court (ks) (Entered: 02/09/1993)
15 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 2/16/93 to file their 197th Bi-Weekly report to the court [14-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER (N) (ks) (Entered: 02/17/1993)
16 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 1/21/93 to file their 195th bi-weekly report to the Court [11-1] by DELBERT C. JACKSON, ANDERSON MCGRUDER (N) (ks) (Entered: 02/17/1993)
17 REPORT by defendants to the Court (197th) pursuant to Court's Order of 8/22/85; Attachments (5) (ks) (Entered: 02/17/1993)
18 MOTION filed by plaintiffs for leave to file Memorandum in support of their motion for Order to show cause why defendants should not be held in contempt in excess of the 45 page limit ; EXHIBIT (MOTION-and two black notebooks of exhibits) (ks) (Entered: 02/19/1993)
19 MOTION filed by defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER, defendant

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03/01/1993 03/02/1993 03/04/1993 03/05/1993 03/15/1993 03/29/1993 04/01/1993 04/01/1993 04/02/1993 04/06/1993 04/08/1993
04/08/1993 04/12/1993 04/13/1993 04/20/1993

DELBERT C. JACKSON to extend time to 4/1/93 to respond to plaintiffs' motion for an order to show cause why defendants should not be held in contempt of court (ajr) (Entered: 02/26/1993)
20 REPORT by defendants to the Court (198th) pursuant to Court's Order of 8/22/85; Attachments (5) (ks) (Entered: 03/02/1993)
STATUS HEARING before Judge William B. Bryant : Reporter: C. Gansle (lin) (Entered: 03/02/1993)
21 RESPONSE by defendants in opposition to plaintiffs' proposed Order (ks) (Entered: 03/05/1993)
22 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : that defendants to file a response to plainitffs' motion for an Order to show cause, and a Report to the Court due by 4/1/93 (N) (ks) (Entered: 03/08/1993)
23 REPORT by defendants ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON to the Court pursuant to Order filed 8/22/85, (199th); Attachments (5) (ks) (Entered: 03/16/1993)
24 REPORT by defendants (200th) to the Court pursuant to Court's Order of 8/22/85; Attachments (5) (bulky) (ks) (Entered: 03/30/1993)
25 DECLARATION IN RESPONSE by defendants to Court's Order of 4/1/93 [22-2] (ks) (Entered: 04/02/1993)
26 RESPONSE by defendants in opposition to plaintiff's motion for an order to show cause why defendants should not be held in contempt of Court (ks) (Entered: 04/02/1993)
27 REPLY by plaintiff to response to their motion for an order to whow cause why defendants should not be held in conempt of Court; Attachments (ks) (Entered: 04/05/1993)
MOTION HEARING before Judge William B. Bryant begun and respited until 4/8/93 at 10:00 a.m. Reporter: W. McAllister (lin) (Entered: 04/06/1993)
MOTION HEARING before Judge William B. Bryant; motion of plaintiffs for appointment of Special Master heard and granted; parties to submit proposed orders by 3:00 on 4/13/93 Reporter: W. McAllister (lin) (Entered: 04/08/1993)
28 RESPONSE by defendants in opposition to plaintiffs' proposed Order (ks) (Entered: 04/09/1993)
29 REPORT by defendants to the Court (201st) pursuant to Order entered 8/22/85; Attachments (4) (ks) (Entered: 04/13/1993)
STATUS HEARING before Judge William B. Bryant : Reporter: C. Gansle (lin) (Entered: 04/14/1993)
30 ORDER APPOINTING SPECIAL OFFICER by Judge William B. Bryant : (N) (lin) (Entered: 04/21/1993)

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04/20/1993 04/20/1993 04/26/1993 05/07/1993 05/07/1993 05/10/1993 05/11/1993 05/11/1993 05/11/1993
05/14/1993
05/21/1993 05/21/1993 05/24/1993

31 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion for leave to file Memorandum in support of their motion for Order to show cause why defendants should not be held in contempt in excess of the 45 page limit [18-1] by plaintiffs (N) (ks) (Entered: 04/22/1993)
32 MEMORANDUM by plaintiffs in support of their motion for Order directing defendant's to show cause; Exhibits (95) (two black notebooks) (ks) (Entered: 04/23/1993)
33 REPORT TO THE COURT by defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER, defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON; attachments (5) bulky (ks) (Entered: 04/27/1993)
34 NOTICE OF FILING by plaintiffs of attached original letter dated 4/26/93; Attachment (1) (ks) (Entered: 05/10/1993)
35 NOTICE OF FILING by plaintiffs of attached original letter dated 5/4/93; Attachment (1) (ks) (Entered: 05/10/1993)
36 REPORT by defendants to the Court (203rd), pursuant to Order of 8/22/85; Attachments (8) (ks) (Entered: 05/11/1993)
37 ERRATA by defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER, defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON to their Report to the Court filed 5/10/93; Attachment (ks) (Entered: 05/12/1993)
38 MOTION filed by Special Officer Grace M. Lopes for order for compensation ; Exhibits (4) (ks) (Entered: 05/12/1993)
39 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant, and JUdge June L. Green : granting motion for order for compensation [38-1]; Ordered that the Clerk of Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $19,251.22 for her services and expenses and Dr. Ronald Shanksy's expenses; that the DC shall pay $19,251.22 to the Clerk of Court in order to replenish the $20,000.00 fund acccount by 5/21/93; Ordered that the Clerk of Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $11,718.33 for the services and expenses of her investigative assistant and expert consultant; and that the DC shall pay $11,718.33 to the Clerk of Court in order to replenish the Crestar Savings Account by 5/21/93 (N) (ks) (Entered: 05/12/1993)
40 CONSENT AGREEMENT by plaintiff, defendant: parties agree to extend the timeframe for negotiations regarding the enhanced reporting format until 7/27/93 to enable counsel an opportunity to review the reports, or parties to submit proposed reporting formes to the Court on 7/27/93, APPROVED (fiat) JUDGE WILLIAM B. BRYANT (N) (ks) (Entered: 05/19/1993)
41 TRANSCRIPT of Hearing filed for date of 4/6/93. Reporter: W. McAllister (lin) (Entered: 05/24/1993)
Text not available. (Entered: 05/24/1993)
42 REPORT by defendants ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON to the Court (204th ) pursuant to Court Order entered

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06/07/1993 06/08/1993
06/08/1993 06/08/1993 06/10/1993
06/18/1993 06/21/1993 06/22/1993 07/06/1993 07/19/1993 08/02/1993 08/05/1993

8/22/85; Attachments (8) (ks) (Entered: 05/25/1993)
43 TRANSCRIPT filed of Status Conference for dates of 4/13/93. Reporter: Carrie Gansle (ks) (Entered: 06/08/1993)
44 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant and Judge June L. Green : granting motion for order for compensation [38-1]; that the Clerk of Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $17,356.32 for her services and expenses and the sum of $20,244.46 for the services and expenses of her investigative assistants and her expert consultant; and Ordered that the DC pay $17,356.32 to the Clerk in order to replenish the $20,000.00 fund account by 6/21/93 and pay $20,244.46 to the Clerk in order to replenish the Crestar Savings Account by 6/21/93 (N) (ks) (Entered: 06/08/1993)
45 REPORT by defendants to the Court (205th) pursuant to Court's Order of 8/22/85; Attachments (3) (ks) (Entered: 06/10/1993)
46 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 6/8/93 to file their 205th bi-weekly Report to the Court (ks) (Entered: 06/10/1993)
47 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 6/8/93 to file their 205th bi-weekly Report to the Court [46-1] by DELBERT C. JACKSON, ANDERSON MCGRUDER (N) (ks) (Entered: 06/10/1993)
48 MOTION filed by the Special Officer to extend time to 9/15/93 to file the reports and recommendations of her medical and mental health experts (ks) (Entered: 06/21/1993)
49 REPORT by defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER, defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON to the Court (206th) pursuant to Court's Order of 8/22/85; Attachments (8) (bulky) (ks) (Entered: 06/22/1993)
50 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 9/15/93 to file the reports and recommendations of her medical and mental health experts [48-1] (N) (ks) (Entered: 06/24/1993)
51 REPORT by defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER, defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON to the Court (207nd) pursuant to Court's Order of 8/22/85; Attachments (8) (ks) (Entered: 07/07/1993)
52 REPORT by defendants to the Court (208nd) pursuant to Court Order of 8/22/85; Attachments (8) (bulky) (ks) (Entered: 07/20/1993)
53 REPORT TO THE COURT by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER (209th) pursuant to order entered on 8/22/85; attachments(8) (lin) (Entered: 08/03/1993)
54 STIPULATED ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : that parties agree to extend the timeframe for negotiations regarding the enhanced reporting format until 10/15/93 to enable counsel an opportunity to review the reports, if agreement on a reporting format is not reached by 10/15/93, parties shall submit proposed reporting forms to the Court on that date, and consistent with the 4/20/93 Order, the Court shall mandate the form

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08/16/1993 08/27/1993 09/08/1993 09/08/1993
09/13/1993 09/15/1993 09/17/1993 09/21/1993 09/21/1993
09/27/1993 09/30/1993

of future reporting (N) (ks) (Entered: 08/05/1993)
55 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to file their 210th BiWeekly Report to the Court on 9/8/93 (ks) (Entered: 08/17/1993)
56 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to file their 210th Bi-Weekly Report to the Court on 9/8/93 [55-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (ks) (Entered: 08/30/1993)
57 REPORT by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER to the Court (210th and 211th) pursuant to Court's Order of 8/22/85; Attachments (8) (bulky) (ks) (Entered: 09/09/1993)
58 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : that the Clerk of the Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $10,605.00 for the services and expenses of Ms. Coykendall, Mr. Roche and Dr. Downer; tht the District of Columbia shall pay $10,605.00 to the Clerk of the Court in order to replenish the $20,000.00 fund account by 9/22/93; that the Clerk of the Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $25,790.39 for her services and expenses and Dr. Belitsky's services and expenses; that the District of Columbia shall pay $25,790.39 to the Clerk of the Court in order to replenish the Crestar Savings Account by 9/22/93 (N) (ks) (Entered: 09/09/1993)
59 REPORT by defendants to the Court (212th) pursuant to Order entered on 8/22/85; Attachments (8) (ks) (Entered: 09/14/1993)
60 NOTICE OF FILING by the Special Officer of filing expert Reports and recommendations concerning medical and mental health services at the District of Columiba Jail; Attachments (bulky) (ks) (Entered: 09/16/1993)
61 MOTION filed by defendants DELBERT C. JACKSON, ANDERSON MCGRUDER for adoption of consent Order regarding attorney's fees (ks) (Entered: 09/20/1993)
62 ERRATA by defendants to the September 15, 1993 Report of Dr. Robert L. Cohen (ks) (Entered: 09/22/1993)
63 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion for adoption of consent Order regarding attorney's fees [61-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON; that the District of Columbia shall pay Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trobridge the sum of three hundred and forty-five thousand dollars ($345,000.00) in full settlement of fees and costs associated with this civil action during the above referenced period of time (N) (ks) (Entered: 09/22/1993)
64 REPORT by defendants to the Court (213th) pursuant to Order entered on 8/22/85; Attachments (8) (bulky) (ks) (Entered: 09/28/1993)
65 MOTION filed by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER to extend time to 10/21/93 to respond to plaintiffs' expert reports on medical and mental health services at the

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10/06/1993 10/06/1993 10/08/1993 10/12/1993 10/12/1993 10/14/1993
10/14/1993 10/14/1993 10/15/1993 10/21/1993 10/21/1993

District of Columbia Jail (ks) (Entered: 10/01/1993)
66 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 10/21/93 to respond to plaintiffs' expert reports on medical and mental health services at the District of Columbia Jail [65-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (ks) (Entered: 10/06/1993)
67 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants of replacement order (ks) (Entered: 10/07/1993)
68 MOTION filed by plaintiffs for interim relief, an expedited briefing schedule and an early hearing date (ks) (Entered: 10/12/1993)
69 MOTION filed by Special Master for compensation , Exhibit (6) (lpp) (Entered: 10/13/1993)
70 REPORT by defendants to the Court (214th) pursuant to Court's Order entered on 8/22/85; Attachments (8) (ks) (Entered: 10/13/1993)
71 ORDER by Judge June L. Green : granting motion for compensation [691]; the clerk of the Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $16,943.16 for her services and expenses and Dr. Downer's services and expenses; this payment shall be drawn from the $20,000.00 fund account established by previous orders of this Court; the District of Columbia shall pay $16,943.16 to the Clerk of the Court in order to replenish the $20,000.00 fund account by the 20/22/93; the Clerk of the Court will pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $35,767.75 for the services and expenses of Ms. Lee Ware Coykendall, Mr. Timothy Roche, Dr. Robert L. Cohen and Dr. Richard Belitsky; this payment shall be drawn from the Crestar Savings Account established by previous order of this Court; the District of Columbia shall pay $35,767.75 to the Clerk of the Court in order to replenish the Crestar Savings Account by the 10/22/93 (N) (lpp) (Entered: 10/15/1993)
72 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 10/21/93 to respond to plaintiffs' expert reports on medical and mental health services at the District of Columbia Jail [65-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (ks) (Entered: 10/21/1993)
ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant: that notice of filing by defendants to attached proposed Order to replace the Order is, So Ordered (fiat) (N) (ks) (Entered: 10/21/1993)
73 MOTION filed by the Special Officer to extend time to file her Report concerning Medical and Mental Health Services at the District of Columbia Jail (Counsel for the Special Officer: Grace M. Lopes, 113017th St., N.W., Suite 400, Washington, D.C. 20036, (202) 778-1168) (ks) (Entered: 10/21/1993)
74 RESPONSE by defendants in opposition to motion for interim relief, an expedited briefing schedule and an early hearing date [68-1] by LEONARD CAMPBELL . (ks) (Entered: 10/22/1993)
75 RESPONSE by defendants to the experts' reports on Medical and Mental

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10/25/1993 10/27/1993 10/28/1993
10/28/1993 10/28/1993
11/05/1993 11/08/1993 11/08/1993 11/08/1993 11/09/1993 11/09/1993
11/17/1993 11/18/1993

Health Services at the District of Columbia Jail [68-1] by LEONARD CAMPBELL; Exhibits (24) (bulky) (ks) (Entered: 10/22/1993)
76 REPORT by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER (215th) pursuant to Order entered on 8/22/95; Attachments (8) (ks) (Entered: 10/26/1993)
77 NOTICE OF FILING by the Special Officer of Recommendations concerning interim relief; Attachments (3) (ks) (Entered: 11/01/1993)
78 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to file her Report concerning Medical and Mental Health Services at the District of Columbia Jail to fifteen days following the filing of the defendants' report [73-1] (N) (ks) (Entered: 11/01/1993)
79 STIPULATION filed and fiated by Judge William B. Bryant regarding consent agreement. (N) (ks) (Entered: 11/01/1993)
MOTION HEARING before Judge William B. Bryant granted motion for interim relief, an expedited briefing schedule and an early hearing date [68-1] by LEONARD CAMPBELL; order to be issued Reporter: T. Sorensen (lin) (Entered: 11/02/1993)
80 MOTION filed by the Special Officer to extend time to 11/23/93 to file their report concerning medical and mental health services (ks) (Entered: 11/08/1993)
81 REPORT by defendants to the Court (216th), pursuant to Order entered on 8/22/85; Attachments (8) (ks) (Entered: 11/09/1993)
82 MOTION filed by Special Master Grace Lopes for compensation , Exhibit (2) (lpp) (Entered: 11/09/1993)
83 RESPONSE by plaintiffs in opposition to plaintiffs' proposed Orde for interim relief (ks) (Entered: 11/09/1993)
84 ORDER granting motion of plaintiffs for interim relief by Judge William B. Bryant; EXHIBIT (1) : (N) (lin) (Entered: 11/10/1993)
85 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion for compensation [82-1]; directing Clerk of Court to pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $18,687.90 from the $20,000.00 fund account, established by previous orders, for services and expenses; directing D.C. to pay $18,687.90 to Clerk of Court by 11/19/93; directing Clerk of Court to pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $13,502.97 from the Crestar Savings Account, established by previous orders, for services and expenses of Ms. Coykendall and Mr. Roche; directing D.C. to pay $13,502.97 to Clerk of Court by 11/19/93 (N) (ab) (Entered: 11/10/1993)
86 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 12/23/93 to file their report concerning medical and mental health services [80-1] (N) (lin) (Entered: 11/19/1993)
87 MOTION filed by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant

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11/18/1993 11/22/1993 11/22/1993 11/23/1993
12/01/1993 12/02/1993 12/02/1993 12/03/1993 12/06/1993 12/07/1993 12/07/1993 12/07/1993 12/09/1993
12/14/1993

ANDERSON MCGRUDER to amend order [84-1] (lin) (Entered: 11/19/1993)
STATUS HEARING before Judge William B. Bryant; parties to report to Court within 24 hours re: status of discovery : Reporter: V. Marshall (lin) (Entered: 11/19/1993)
88 Text not available. (Entered: 11/23/1993)
89 REPORT by defendants to the Court (217th) pursuant to Order of 8/22/85; Attachments (8) (ks) (Entered: 11/23/1993)
90 MOTION filed by defendants DELBERT C. JACKSON, and ANDERSON MCGRUDER to extend time to 12/3/93 for the defendants to transfer the three remaining inmates identified by Dr. Edwards as in need of hospital care. (bm) (Entered: 11/24/1993)
91 NOTICE by defendants to the Court (ks) (Entered: 12/02/1993)
92 NOTICE OF FILING by plaintiffs of proposed order clarifying counsel and Special Officer access to Medical and Mental Health Records; Exhibit (1) (ks) (Entered: 12/03/1993)
93 NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION of David Powell, Ph.D. by plaintiff. (ks) (Entered: 12/03/1993)
94 MOTION filed by defendants for protective order ; Attachment (1) (ks) (Entered: 12/06/1993)
95 MOTION filed by defendants DELBERT C. JACKSON, ANDERSON MCGRUDER to extend time to 12/7/93 to file their 218th bi-weekly report to the Court (ks) (Entered: 12/07/1993)
96 REPORT by defendants to the Court (218th) pursuant to Order entered on 8/22/85; Attachments (8) (bulky) (ks) (Entered: 12/08/1993)
97 REPLY by defendants to response to motion for protective order [94-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (ks) (Entered: 12/08/1993)
98 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time for parties to implement paragraphs (12) and (14) of the Order for a period of 14 days (ks) (Entered: 12/08/1993)
99 NOTICE OF APPEAL by defendant from order [84-1] , entered on: 11/10/93; Government - No Fee; Copies mailed to Richard Love, J. Patrick Hickey, Jonathan M. Smith and Grece M. Lopes, as Special Officer (ks) (Entered: 12/15/1993)
100 MEMORANDUM by plaintiffs in opposition to motion for protective order to stay discovery [94-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON; and in further opposition to defendants' motion for protective Order to limit use of discovery materials; Exhibits (4) (ks) (Entered: 12/15/1993)

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12/15/1993 12/15/1993 12/15/1993 12/15/1993
12/16/1993 12/16/1993 12/17/1993 12/17/1993 12/17/1993
12/20/1993 12/21/1993

TRANSMITTED PRELIMINARY RECORD on appeal [99-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON to U.S. Court of Appeals (ks) (Entered: 12/15/1993)
MOTION HEARING before Judge William B. Bryant by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON motion for protective order [94-1] taken under advisement Reporter: K. Moomey (lin) (Entered: 12/16/1993)
101 MOTION filed by special officer for compensation (pm) (Entered: 12/17/1993)
102 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion by special officer for compensation [101-1], directing that the Clerk of Court pay Grace Lopez $15,491.21 for services and expenses and DC shall pay $15,491.21 to the Clerk of Court to replenish the fund account. The Clerk of Court shall pay Grace Lopez $12,941.00 for services and expenses of Ms. Coykendall, Ms. Schneider, Dr. Cohen, Dr. Downer and Mr. Roche and DC shall pay $12,941.00 to the Clerk of Court to replenish the Crestar Savings Account by 12/31/93 (N) (pm) Modified on 12/17/1993 (Entered: 12/17/1993)
103 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time for parties to implement paragraphs (12) and (14) of the Order for a period of 14 days [98-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (lin) (Entered: 12/17/1993)
104 CONSENT by defendant, plaintiff(s) to file redacted copies of certain documents filed as part of 217th Bi-weekly report to court; APPROVED (lin) Modified on 12/20/1993 (Entered: 12/20/1993)
106 ORDER CLARIFYING COUNSEL AND SPECIAL OFFICER ACCESS TO MEDICAL AND MENTAL HEALTH RECORDS by Judge William B. Bryant : (N) (lin) (Entered: 12/21/1993)
107 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : denying motion for protective order [94-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (lin) (Entered: 12/21/1993)
108 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : denying motion for protective order [88-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON; directing that certain materials responsive to plaintiff's document requests be made available to plaintiffs' counsel within 2 days (N) (lin) (Entered: 12/21/1993)
105 REPORT TO THE COURT by defendants DELBERT C. JACKSON, and ANDERSON MCGRUDER; attachments 1,2,3,4,6,6A,7,8. (bm) (Entered: 12/21/1993)
109 MOTION filed by defendants DELBERT C. JACKSON, and ANDERSON MCGRUDER to extend time for a period of 21 days within which the defendants must implement paragraphs 12 and 14 of the Court Order of 11/9/93. (bm) (Entered: 12/22/1993)

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12/21/1993 12/21/1993 12/22/1993 12/22/1993 12/22/1993 12/22/1993 12/22/1993 12/23/1993 12/23/1993 01/03/1994
01/04/1994 01/05/1994 01/05/1994
01/05/1994 01/05/1994
01/07/1994 01/10/1994

110 CONSENT ORDER by defendant, plaintiff(s) to modification of 12/17/93 order (lin) (Entered: 12/23/1993)
111 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant re: privacy interests at St. Elizabeth's hospital : (N) (lin) (Entered: 12/23/1993)
REMARK Substitution of certain redacted pages of 217th report to court made pursuant to consent order of 12/16/93 (lin) (Entered: 12/22/1993)
112 MOTION filed by special officer to extend time to 1/24/94 to file report (lin) (Entered: 12/23/1993)
113 NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION of Elizabeth Teegarten by plaintiff (s). (lin) (Entered: 12/23/1993)
114 NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION of Guido Zanni by plaintiff(s).; EXHIBIT (lin) (Entered: 12/23/1993)
115 NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION of David Powell by plaintiff(s). EXHIBIT (lin) (Entered: 12/23/1993)
116 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants of redacted copies of the "Chronic Desease Clinic" list; Attachment (1) (ks) (Entered: 12/27/1993)
117 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants of the addendum to exhibit 6 of the 219th Report to the Court; Attachment (1) (ks) (Entered: 12/27/1993)
118 MOTION filed by defendants DELBERT C. JACKSON, and ANDERSON MCGRUDER to extend time to 1/7/94 to file their 220th Bi-Weekly Report to the Court (bm) (Entered: 01/04/1994)
USCA # 93-7241 assigned for appeal [99-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (ks) (Entered: 01/05/1994)
119 RESPONSE by plaintiff(s) in opposition to defendants' motion for protective order. (lin) (Entered: 01/05/1994)
120 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 1/7/94 to file their 220th Bi-Weekly Report to the Court [118-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (lin) (Entered: 01/05/1994)
121 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 1/24/94 to file report [112-1] (N) (lin) (Entered: 01/05/1994)
122 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time for a period of 21 days within which the defendants must implement paragraphs 12 and 14 of the Court Order of 11/9/93. [109-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (lin) (Entered: 01/05/1994)
123 STATUS REPORT by defendants to the Court (220th) pursuant to Order entered on 8/22/85; Attachments (8) (bulky) (ks) (Entered: 01/10/1994)
129 MOTION filed by Special Officer for compensation ; Exhibits (4) (ks)

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01/11/1994
01/12/1994 01/14/1994 01/19/1994 01/19/1994 01/21/1994 01/21/1994 01/21/1994 01/24/1994 01/25/1994 01/25/1994
01/25/1994 01/28/1994

(Entered: 01/21/1994)
124 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant and Judge June L. Green : that the Clerk of the Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $14,618.30 for her services and expenses and Dr. Robert L. Cohen's services and expenses; that DC shall pay $14,618.30 to the Clerk of the Court in order to replenish the $20,000.00 fund account by 1/25/94; that the Clerk of Court pay Grace M. Opes the sum of $10,820.50 for the services and expenses of Ms. Schneider and Mr. Roche; and that DC shall pay $10,820.50 to the Clerk of Court in order to replenish the Crestar Savings Account by 1/25/94 (N) (ks) (Entered: 01/11/1994)
125 REQUEST by plaintiffs for entry upon land (ks) (Entered: 01/13/1994)
126 CONSENT AGREEMENT extending time frame for negotiations regarding enhanced reporting format to 4/15/94 by defendant, plaintiff(s) (lin) (Entered: 01/14/1994)
127 MOTION filed by plaintiffs for Tara M. Flynn to appear pro hac vice ; affidavit of Tara M. Flynn. (bm) (Entered: 01/21/1994)
128 MOTION filed by plaintiffs for Teresa L. Diaz to appear pro hac vice ; affidavit of Teresa L. Diaz. (bm) (Entered: 01/21/1994)
130 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 2/18/94 for the defendants to implement paragraphs (12) and (14) of the Order (ks) (Entered: 01/24/1994)
131 REPORT by defendants DELBERT C. JACKSON, ANDERSON MCGRUDER to the Court pursuant to Order entered on 8/22/85; Attachments (8) (bulky) (ks) (Entered: 01/24/1994)
132 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants, plaintiffs of consent agreement to file redacted copies; Attachment (1) (ks) (Entered: 01/25/1994)
133 MOTION filed by the Speical Officer to extend time to 1/31/94 to file her report conserning Medical and Mental Health Services at the D.C. Jail (ks) (Entered: 01/25/1994)
134 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion for Tara M. Flynn to appear pro hac vice [127-1] by plaintiff(s) (N) (lin) (Entered: 01/26/1994)
136 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 2/18/94 for the defendants to implement paragraphs (12) and (14) of the Order [130-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (lin) (Entered: 01/26/1994)
137 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 1/31/94 to file her report concerning Medical and Mental Health Services at the D.C. Jail [133-1] (N) (lin) (Entered: 01/26/1994)
138 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 1/31/94 for the defendants to transfer the two inmates identified on 1/14/94, to be in need

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01/31/1994 01/31/1994 01/31/1994 02/01/1994 02/02/1994 02/02/1994
02/02/1994
02/02/1994 02/14/1994 02/15/1994 02/15/1994 02/16/1994
02/16/1994

of hospitalization pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Court's 11/9/93 Order (ks) (Entered: 01/29/1994)
139 MOTION filed by the Special Officer to extend time to 2/28/94 to file her Reports concerning Medical and mental Health Services at the District of Columbia Jail (ks) (Entered: 01/31/1994)
140 REPORT by defendants to the Court (222nd) pursuant to Order entered on 8/22/85; Attachments (8) (ks) (Entered: 02/01/1994)
141 REQUEST (amended) by plaintiffs for entry upon land (ks) (Entered: 02/01/1994)
142 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants, plaintiffs of consent agreement to file redacted copies; Attachment (ks) (Entered: 02/02/1994)
143 STATUS REPORT by the Special Officer on Medical care at the District of Columbia Jail; Appendix (2); Exhibits (100) (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 02/03/1994)
144 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 2/3/94 for the Special Officer to file their report on medical care; and to 2/28/94 to file her Reports concerning Medical and mental Health Services at the District of Columbia Jail [139-1] (N) (ks) (Entered: 02/03/1994)
145 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 1/31/94 for the defendants to transfer the two inmates identified on 1/14/94, to be in need of hospitalization pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Court's 11/9/93 Order [138-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (ks) (Entered: 02/03/1994)
ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant approving consent agreement by all parties to file redacted copies (fiat) (N) (ks) (Entered: 02/03/1994)
146 MOTION filed by defendants DELBERT C. JACKSON, and ANDERSON MCGRUDER to extend time to 2/15/94 to file their 2230th bi-weekly report to the court. (bm) (Entered: 02/15/1994)
147 REPORT by defendants to the Court (223rd) pursuant to Order entered 8/22/85; Attachments (8) (ks) (Entered: 02/16/1994)
148 MOTION filed by the Special Officer, Grace M. Lopes for compensation ; Exhibits (3) (ks) (Entered: 02/16/1994)
149 MOTION filed by plaintiffs that the Court adopt the Special Officer's Report on Medical CAre at the District of Columbia Jail as the Court's Findings and that the defendants be held in contempt of Court (ks) (Entered: 02/16/1994)
152 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant and June L. Green : granting motion for compensation [148-1]; that the Clerk of Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $15,646.00 for the services and expenses of Mr. Roche and Ms. Schneider; and that the Clerk of Court pay Grace M. Lopes the

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02/17/1994 02/18/1994 02/23/1994 02/24/1994 02/24/1994
02/24/1994
02/28/1994 03/01/1994
03/01/1994 03/01/1994 03/02/1994
03/08/1994 03/14/1994 03/14/1994

sum of $21,193.29 for the services and expenses of Special Officer Lopes (Original filed in CA 71-1462) (N) (ks) (Entered: 02/22/1994)
150 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 2/25/94 to respond to Special Officer's Report on medical care at the District of Columbia Jail (ks) (Entered: 02/18/1994)
151 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 3/4/94 develop and implement the TB and Emergency response protocolsgranting interim relief at the D.C. Jail (ks) (Entered: 02/22/1994)
153 TRANSCRIPT filed of motion hearing for dates of 10/28/93. Reporter: Theresa Sorensen (ks) (Entered: 02/24/1994)
154 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : approving consent agreement to file redacted copies (N) (lin) (Entered: 02/28/1994)
155 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 2/15/94 to file their 2230th bi-weekly report to the court. [146-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (lin) (Entered: 02/28/1994)
156 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 2/25/94 to respond to Special Officer's Report on medical care at the District of Columbia Jail [150-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (lin) (Entered: 02/28/1994)
157 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 3/1/94 to file their 224th bi-weekly report to the Court (ks) (Entered: 03/01/1994)
158 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 3/1/94 to file their 224th bi-weekly report to the Court [157-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (lin) (Entered: 03/01/1994)
159 CONSENT ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : motion hearing set for 10:00 3/16/94 ; (N) (lin) (Entered: 03/01/1994)
160 REPORT TO THE COURT (#224) by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER; attachments (8). (BULKY PLEADING) (bm) (Entered: 03/02/1994)
161 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 3/4/94 for the defendants to implement paragraphs (12) and (14) of the Order of 11/9/93 [130-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (ks) (Entered: 03/04/1994)
162 TRANSCRIPT filed for date of 3/2/93. Reporter: Carrie L. Gansle (bm) (Entered: 03/09/1994)
163 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 4/11/94 for defendants to implement paragraphs (12) and (14) of the November 9, 1993 Order (ks) (Entered: 03/15/1994)
164 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 3/15/94 to file their 225th

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03/14/1994 03/14/1994 03/15/1994 03/15/1994
03/16/1994 03/16/1994 03/18/1994 03/21/1994 03/21/1994
03/22/1994 03/24/1994

bi-weekly report to the Court (ks) (Entered: 03/15/1994)
165 MOTION filed by defendants to amend the 9/9/85 Order requiring biweekly reports and 11/9/93 Order granting interim relief (ks) (Entered: 03/15/1994)
168 MOTION filed by the Special Officer for compensation ; Exhibits (3) (Original filed in CA 79-1726) (ks) Modified on 03/18/1994 (Entered: 03/18/1994)
166 REPORT by defendants to the Court (225th) pursuant to Order entered on 8/22/85; Attachments (8) (ks) (Entered: 03/16/1994)
170 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant and Judge June L. Green : granting motion for compensation [168-1]; that the Clerk of Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $17,747.00 for her services and expenses; and that the Clerk of the Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $16,320.44 for the services and expenses of Mr. Roche, Ms. Schneider, and Dr. Robert L. Cohen (N) (ks) (Entered: 03/21/1994)
STATUS HEARING before Judge William B. Bryant :; Order to be presented Reporter: G. Williams (lin) (Entered: 03/16/1994)
167 CONSENT ORDER re: implementation of remedial plan by Judge William B. Bryant : (N) (lin) (Entered: 03/16/1994)
169 RESPONSE by plaintiffs in opposition to motion to extend time to 3/4/94 develop and implement the TB and Emergency response protocolsgranting interim relief at the D.C. Jail [151-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON . (ks) (Entered: 03/21/1994)
171 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 3/15/94 to file their 225th bi-weekly report to the Court [164-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (lin) Modified on 03/30/1994 (Entered: 03/22/1994)
172 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to amend the 9/9/85 Order requiring bi-weekly reports and 11/9/93 Order granting interim relief [165-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON; directing that the required time period for filing the compliance reports be extended from bi-weekly to monthly (N) (lin) Modified on 03/30/1994 (Entered: 03/22/1994)
173 REPLY by defendants to response to motion to extend time to 3/4/94 develop and implement the TB and Emergency response protocolsgranting interim relief at the D.C. Jail [151-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (ks) (Entered: 03/23/1994)
174 SURREPLY by plaintiff to defendant's reply to plaintiff's response to motion to extend time to 3/4/94 develop and implement the TB and Emergency response protocolsgranting interim relief at the D.C. Jail [151-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (ks) (Entered: 03/25/1994)

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03/28/1994
03/28/1994 04/04/1994 04/12/1994 04/12/1994 04/12/1994
04/13/1994 04/13/1994 04/13/1994 04/19/1994 04/19/1994 04/21/1994

175 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 4/11/94 for defendants to implement paragraphs (12) and (14) of the November 9, 1993 Order [163-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (lin) Modified on 03/29/1994 (Entered: 03/29/1994)
176 REPORT by defendants to the Court (226th) pursuant to Order of 8/22/85; Attachments (8) BULKY PLEADING (tth) Modified on 03/29/1994 (Entered: 03/29/1994)
177 REQUEST by plaintiffs to defendants for production of documents (ks) (Entered: 04/05/1994)
178 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 4/12/94 to file their 227th bi-weekly report to the Court, nunc pro tunc ; EXHIBIT (227TH BIWEEKLY REPORT) (ks) (Entered: 04/13/1994)
179 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants of completed drafts of the Emergency Response and Tuberculosis Protocols to be implemented by the defendants according to the November 9, 1993 Order of the Court; Attachments (ks) (Entered: 04/13/1994)
180 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant and Judge June L. Green : granting motion for compensation [129-1]; that the Clerk of the Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $18,840.33 for her services and expenses, and that the District of Columbia shall pay $18,840.33 to the Clerk of the Court in order to replenish the $20,000.00 fund account by 4/26/94; and that the Clerk of the Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $17,090.91 for the services and expenses of Mr. Roche, Ms. Schneider, and Mr. James Henderson, and that the District of Columbia shall pay $17,090.91 to the Clerk of the Court in order to replenish the Crestar Savings Account by 4/26/94 (N) (ks) Modified on 04/13/1994 (Entered: 04/13/1994)
181 MOTION filed by the Special Officer Grace M. Lopes for compensation ; Exhibits (ks) (Entered: 04/14/1994)
182 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 4/12/94 to file their 227th bi-weekly report to the Court, nunc pro tunc [178-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (lin) (Entered: 04/14/1994)
189 REPORT by defendants to the Court (227th) pursuant to Order entered on 8/22/85; Attachments (8) (ks) (Entered: 05/03/1994)
183 MOTION filed by defendants DELBERT C. JACKSON, ANDERSON MCGRUDER to amend order dated 11/9/93 [84-1] granting interim relief ; Attachment (1); Declarations (2) (ks) (Entered: 04/20/1994)
184 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 5/2/94 to hire a TB Coordinator (ks) (Entered: 04/20/1994)
185 CONSENT AGREEMENT by defendant, plaintiff(s) re form of reports to court (lin) (Entered: 04/21/1994)

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04/25/1994 04/25/1994 04/26/1994 05/04/1994 05/05/1994 05/06/1994 05/06/1994 05/09/1994 05/10/1994 05/10/1994
05/17/1994 05/19/1994
06/06/1994

186 STATUS REPORT by defendants to the Court (228th) pursuant to Order of 8/22/85; Attachments (8) (ks) (Entered: 04/26/1994)
187 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants of corrected copy of the data sheet; Attachments (ks) (Entered: 04/26/1994)
188 MOTION filed by defendants DELBERT C. JACKSON, ANDERSON MCGRUDER for protective order ; Attachments (ks) (Entered: 04/28/1994)
190 NOTICE OF FILING by Special Officer GRACE M. LOPES of interim remedial plan regarding isolation of inmates with suspected and diagnosed tuberculosis; Exhibits (9) (ks) (Entered: 05/05/1994)
191 RESPONSE by plaintiff to motion for protective order [188-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (ks) (Entered: 05/06/1994)
192 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff in opposition to motion for protective order [188-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (ks) (Entered: 05/06/1994)
193 MOTION filed by plaintiffs to compel discovery , and for sanctions for failing to comply with their obligation to serve opposing counsel with pleadings ; Exhibits (7) (ks) (Entered: 05/06/1994)
195 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 5/2/94 to hire a tuberculosis Coordinator [184-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (ks) (Entered: 05/12/1994)
194 ERRATA by Special Officer GRACE M. LOPES correcting error in their Interim Remedial Plan regarding Isolation of Inmates with suspected and diagnosed tuberculosis; Attachment (1) (ks) (Entered: 05/10/1994)
MOTION HEARING before Judge William B. Bryant granted motion to compel discovery [193-1] by plaintiff(s) certain documents due to be filed by defendant by 5/20/94 Reporter: C. Gansle (lin) Modified on 05/12/1994 (Entered: 05/12/1994)
196 MOTION filed by Special Officer GRACE M. LOPES for Compensation ; Exhibit (1) (ks) (Entered: 05/18/1994)
197 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant and Judge June L. Green : granting motion for Compensation [196-1] by GRACE M. LOPES; directing the Clerk of the Court to pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $16,357.43 for her services and expenses; further Ordered that the Clerk of the Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $19,760.28 for the services and expenses of Mr. Roche, Ms. Schneider, and Dr. Robert L. Cohen (N) (ks) Modified on 05/20/1994 (Entered: 05/20/1994)
198 MOTION filed by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER to extend time to 6/8/94 to file their monthly Report to the Court. (tth) (Entered: 06/07/1994)

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06/08/1994 06/10/1994 06/14/1994
06/30/1994 06/30/1994 07/06/1994 07/06/1994 07/06/1994
07/07/1994
07/07/1994 07/15/1994 07/25/1994

199 REPORT by defendants to the Court (229th) pursuant to Court's Order entered on 8/22/85; Attachments (8) (bulky) (ks) (Entered: 06/09/1994)
200 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 6/8/94 to file their monthly Report to the Court. [198-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (ks) (Entered: 06/10/1994)
201 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion for Compensation [196-1] by GRACE M. LOPES; that the Clerk of Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $20,329.52 for her services and expenses; and that the Clerk of the Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $20,671.94 for the services and expenses of Mr. Roche, Ms. Schneider, and Mr. Hayes (See Order for details) (N) (ks) (Entered: 06/22/1994)
202 MOTION filed by defendants, plaintiffs, unknown for adoption of consent order regarding attorneys' fees. (tth) (Entered: 07/01/1994)
203 MOTION filed by Special Officer GRACE M. LOPES to extend time to 8/31/94 to file her Remedial Plan concerning Medical and Mental Health Services at the District of Columbia Jail (ks) (Entered: 07/05/1994)
204 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 7/6/94 to file their monthly Report to the Court (ks) (Entered: 07/06/1994)
205 REPORT TO THE COURT (230th) by defendants DELBERT C. JACKSON and ANDERSON MCGRUDER; attachments (9) BULKY PLEADING (bm) (Entered: 07/07/1994)
209 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant and Judge June L. Green : that the Clerk of the Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $18,407.63 for her services and expenses as well as Dr. Downer's services and expenses; and that the Clerk of the Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $27,315.26 for the services and expenses of Mr. Roche, Ms. Schneider, Dr. Belitsky, and Dr. Cohen (N) (ks) (Entered: 07/15/1994)
206 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant: directing the District of Columbia shall pay SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE the sum of two hundred and forty seven thousand five hundred and eighty seven dollars ($247,587.00) in full settlement of fees and costs associated with this civil action during the period of time 5/31/93 up to and including 5/31/94. (N) (bm) (Entered: 07/08/1994)
207 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 8/31/94 to file her Remedial Plan concerning Medical and Mental Health Services at the District of Columbia Jail [203-1] by GRACE M. LOPES (N) (bm) (Entered: 07/08/1994)
208 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 7/6/94 to file their monthly Report to the Court [204-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (ks) (Entered: 07/15/1994)
210 NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION of Defendant by plaintiffs. (ks) (Entered: 07/26/1994)

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08/04/1994 08/05/1994 08/09/1994 08/09/1994
08/09/1994 08/18/1994 08/24/1994
08/31/1994 09/02/1994 09/08/1994 09/09/1994 09/09/1994
09/09/1994 09/13/1994

212 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 8/8/94 to file their monthly Report to the Court (ks) (Entered: 08/09/1994)
211 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 8/9/94 to file their 230th bi-weekly report to the court (ks) (Entered: 08/08/1994)
213 REPORT by defendants to the Court; Attachments (8) (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 08/10/1994)
215 ORDER (Copy) by Judge William B. Bryant and Judge June L. Green : that the Clerk of the Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum $19,511.02 for her services and expenses as well as Ms. Schneider's services and expenses; and that the Clerk of Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $21,880.43 for the services and expenses of Mr. Roche, Mr. Hayes and Mr. Henderson (Original filed in CA 79-1726) (N) (ks) (Entered: 08/19/1994)
219 MOTION filed Special Master Grace Lopes for compensation , Exhibits (5) (lpp) (Entered: 09/07/1994)
214 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 8/8/94 to file their monthly Report to the Court [212-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (ks) (Entered: 08/19/1994)
216 NOTICE OF FILING by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER of the revised intake screening form currently being used at the D.C. Jail on all new inmate intakes to substitute for the form included as an Attachment to the November 9, 1993, Order of the Court; Attachment (1). (tth) (Entered: 08/25/1994)
217 MOTION filed by Special Officer GRACE M. LOPES to extend time to 9/20/94 to file the Remedial Plan for Medical and Mental Health Services at the District of Columbia Jail (ks) (Entered: 09/01/1994)
218 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 9/7/94 to file their monthly report to the Court (ks) (Entered: 09/07/1994)
220 REPORT by defendants to the Court (233rd) pursuant to Court Order filed 8/22/85; Attachments (8) (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 09/09/1994)
221 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 9/7/94 to file their monthly report to the Court [218-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (ks) (Entered: 09/12/1994)
223 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 9/20/94 to file the Remedial Plan for Medical and Mental Health Services at the District of Columbia Jail [217-1] by GRACE M. LOPES (N) (ks) (Entered: 09/20/1994)
225 MOTION (Copy) filed by Special Officer GRACE M. LOPES for order for compensation ; Exhibits (4) (Original filed in CA 79-1726) (ks) (Entered: 09/22/1994)
234 COPY OF ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant and Judge June L.

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09/15/1994 09/20/1994 09/29/1994
10/05/1994 10/07/1994 10/07/1994 10/11/1994 10/12/1994
10/14/1994 10/18/1994 10/21/1994

Green : granting motion for order for compensation [225-1] by GRACE M. LOPES; that the Clerk of Curt pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $17,030.13 for the services and expenses of Mr. Roche, Ms. Schneider, and Mr. Hayes; and that the Clerk of the Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $29,844.38 for the services and expenses of Ms. Lopes and Dr. Robert L. Cohen (Original filed in CA 79-1726) (N) (ks) (Entered: 10/24/1994)
222 INTERROGATORIES filed by plaintiffs to defendants (ks) (Entered: 09/16/1994)
224 MOTION filed by Special Officer GRACE M. LOPES to extend time to 10/11/94 to file the remedial Plan for Medical and Mental Health Services at the District of Columbia Jail (ks) (Entered: 09/21/1994)
226 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 10/11/94 to file the remedial Plan for Medical and Mental Health Services at the District of Columbia Jail [224-1] by GRACE M. LOPES (N) (ks) (Entered: 09/29/1994)
227 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 10/7/94 to file their monthly report to the court (ks) (Entered: 10/06/1994)
228 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 10/7/94 to file their monthly report to the court [227-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (ks) (Entered: 10/07/1994)
229 REPORT by defendants to the Court (234th) pursuant to Court's Order of 8/22/85; Attachments (8) (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 10/11/1994)
230 NOTICE OF FILING by GRACE M. LOPES of notification of filing report on Mental Health Care; (2 Volumes 1; and 2 Volumes 2) (Four volumes altogether-Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 10/12/1994)
231 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : that the parties shall file their objections or proposed modifications to the Special Officer's Remedial Plan due by 10/24/94 ; and setting a hearing on 11/1/94 at 10:30 on why the Remedial Plan should not be implemented or should be modified (Copy filed in CA 75-1668) (N) (ks) (Entered: 10/13/1994)
232 MOTION filed by Special Officer GRACE M. LOPES for protective order ; Exhibits (5) (ks) (Entered: 10/17/1994)
233 MOTION filed by Special Master Grace M. Lopes, for compensation , Exhibits (7) (lpp) (Entered: 10/19/1994)
235 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant and Judge June L. Green : granting motion for compensation [233-1]; that the Clerk of Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $19,265.15 for her services and expenses; and that the Clerk of the Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $32,408.21 for the services and expenses of Mr. Roche, Ms. Schneider, Mr. hayes, Dr. Belitsky, Mr. BAlsamo and Mr. Henderson (N) (ks) (Entered: 10/24/1994)

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10/24/1994 10/24/1994 10/26/1994 10/28/1994 10/28/1994 10/31/1994 10/31/1994 11/01/1994 11/07/1994 11/07/1994 11/09/1994 11/14/1994 11/14/1994 11/16/1994
11/18/1994

236 RESPONSE by plaintiffs to Court's order of 10/12/94 [231-2]; Attachment (1) (ks) (Entered: 10/26/1994)
237 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 10/26/94 to submit its objections to the Special Officer's Remedial Plan (ks) (Entered: 10/27/1994)
238 OBJECTIONS by defendants to the Special Officer's initial remedial plan; Exhibit (1) (ks) (Entered: 10/27/1994)
239 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants of Exhibit A. referenced in defendant's objections to the Special Officer's Initial Remedial Plan; Exhibit (1) (ks) (Entered: 10/31/1994)
240 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff CLINTON ELDRIDGE, in CA 93-491, in opposition to motion for protective order [232-1] by GRACE M. LOPES; Attachment (1) (ks) (Entered: 10/31/1994)
241 NOTICE OF FILING by Special Officer GRACE M. LOPES of notification of filing reports; Attachments (bulky) (ks) (Entered: 11/03/1994)
242 REPLY by plaintiff to response to objections to the Special Officer's initial remedial plan [238-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON; Exhibit (1) (ks) (Entered: 11/03/1994)
STATUS HEARING before Judge William B. Bryant : Reporter: Carrie Gansle (mon) (Entered: 11/01/1994)
243 REPORT by defendants (235th) to the Court, pursuant to the Order entered on 8/22/85; Attachments (8) (bulky) (ks) (Entered: 11/08/1994)
244 RESPONSE by defendants in opposition to motion for protective order [232-1] by GRACE M. LOPES . (ks) (Entered: 11/08/1994)
245 REPLY by Special Officer GRACE M. LOPES to response to motion for protective order [232-1] by GRACE M. LOPES; Exhibit (1) (ks) (Entered: 11/10/1994)
246 MOTION filed Grace M. Lopes, Special Master for Compensation, Affidavit (1), Exhibits (6) (lpp) (Entered: 11/15/1994)
247 MOTION filed by Special Master GRACE M. LOPES for compensation ; Exhibits (5) (ks) (Entered: 11/16/1994)
248 COPY OF ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant and Judge June L. Green : granting motion for compensation [247-1] by GRACE M. LOPES; that the Clerk of the Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $10,725.23 for her services and expenses as well as the services and expenses of Mr. Hayes and Mr. Henderson ; and that the Clerk of the Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $13,508.01 for the services and expenses of Mr. Roche and Ms. Schneider (Original filed in CA 79-1726) (N) (ks) (Entered: 11/17/1994)
251 REPLY by plaintiffs to response to motion for protective order [232-1]

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11/21/1994 11/21/1994 11/23/1994 12/05/1994 12/06/1994
12/07/1994 12/12/1994 12/13/1994
12/13/1994 12/16/1994 12/16/1994 12/20/1994

by GRACE M. LOPES; Exhibits (2) (ks) (Entered: 11/23/1994)
249 MOTION filed by defendants for adoption of consent order regarding attorney's fees (ks) (Entered: 11/22/1994)
250 REPLY by plaintiffs to response to motion for protective order [232-1] by GRACE M. LOPES; Exhibits (2) (ks) (Entered: 11/22/1994)
252 MOTION filed by plaintiffs for leave to file a surreply in support of plaintiff's opposition to Special Officer's motion for a protective order ; EXHIBIT (MEMORANDUM IN SURREPLY) (ks) (Entered: 11/25/1994)
253 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 12/7/94 to file their monthly report to the Court (ks) (Entered: 12/06/1994)
254 CONSENT ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : that the District of Columbia shall pay Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge the sum of twenty three thousand six hundred and seven dollars and eleven cents ($23,607.11) in full settlement of fees and costs associated with this civil action during the period of time from 6/1/94, up to 8/31/94 (N) (ks) (Entered: 12/06/1994)
255 REPORT by defendants to the Court (236th), pursuant to Order filed 8/22/85; Attachments (8) (bulky) (ks) (Entered: 12/08/1994)
256 MOTION filed by Special Officer GRACE M. LOPES for Compensation ; Exhibits (4) (ks) (Entered: 12/14/1994)
257 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant and Judge June L. Green : granting motion for Compensation [256-1] by GRACE M. LOPES; that the Clerk of the Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $19,671.13 for her services and expenses as well as for the services and expenses of Mr. Roche, Mr. Henderson and Mr. Balsamo; and that the District of Columbia shall pay $19,671.13 to the Clerk of the court in order to replenish the $20,000.00 fund account by the 12/27/94; that the Clerk of the Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $21,711.86 for the services and expenses of Ms. Schneider, Mr. Hayes and the law firm of Zuckerman, Spaeder, Goldstein, Taylor and Kolker; and that the District of Columbia shall pay $21,711.86 to the Clerk of the Court in order to replenish the Crestar Savings Account by 12/27/94 (N) (ks) (Entered: 12/14/1994)
258 NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION of John Thomas by plaintiffs. (bm) (Entered: 12/14/1994)
259 NOTICE OF FILING by Special Master GRACE M. LOPES; Environmental Health and Safety Survey. (bm) (Entered: 12/20/1994)
262 MOTION filed by Special Officer GRACE M. LOPES for leave to file expert reports under seal ; EXHIBIT (REPORTS LODGED UNDER SEAL) (ks) (Entered: 12/30/1994)
260 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 12/7/94 to file their monthly report to the Court [253-1] by ANDERSON

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12/21/1994
12/21/1994 01/03/1995 01/03/1995
01/05/1995 01/09/1995 01/10/1995 01/17/1995 01/18/1995 01/19/1995 01/19/1995 01/19/1995

MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (bm) (Entered: 12/20/1994)
261 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant: granting Special Officer's motion for leave to file expert reports under seal; directing the Clerk of Court shall take all steps necessary to ensure that the 1994 reports prepared by James D. Henderson that are related to correctional officer staffing and security at the D.C. Jail are filed under seal (N) (bm) (Entered: 12/22/1994)
263 NOTICE OF FILING by Special Officer GRACE M. LOPES of Reports (2) prepared by James D. Henderson - FILED UNDER SEAL IN ROOM 1800) (ks) (Entered: 12/30/1994)
268 MOTION filed by plaintiffs that the Court adopt the Special Officer's Findings on Security and Officer Staffing at the District of Columbia Detention Facility as the Court's Findings (ks) (Entered: 01/19/1995)
269 MOTION filed by plaintiffs that the Court adopt the Special Officer's findings on Environmental Health and Safety at the District of Columbia Detention Facility as the Court's findings and that the defendants be Ordered to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of Court ; Attachments (ks) (Entered: 01/19/1995)
264 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 1/9/95 to file thier monthly report to the Court (ks) (Entered: 01/06/1995)
265 REPORT by defendants (237th) to the Court pursuant to Court Order of 8/22/85; Attachments (9) (bulky) (ks) (Entered: 01/10/1995)
266 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 1/9/95 to file thier monthly report to the Court [264-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (ks) (Entered: 01/11/1995)
267 MOTION filed by Special Master Grace M. Lopes, for compensation, Exhibits (5) (lpp) (Entered: 01/19/1995)
396 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 1/24/96 to file the budget for the office of the receiver [392-1] by GRACE M. LOPES (N) (dot) (Entered: 01/19/1996)
270 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 2/6/95 to respond to plaintiffs' motion that the Court adopt the Special Officer's Findings on environmental Health and Safety and to show cause (ks) (Entered: 01/23/1995)
271 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 2/6/95 to respond to plaintiffs' motion that the Court adopt the Special Officer's Findings on Security and Officer staffing (ks) (Entered: 01/23/1995)
272 ORDER (original) by Judge William B. Bryant and Judge June L. Green : granting motion for compensation [267-1]; that the Clerk of the court pay Grace M. Lpes the sum of $18,936.67 for her services and expenses as well as the services and expenses of Mr. Roche and Ms. Schneider, and that this payment be drawn from the $20,000.00 fund

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01/27/1995 01/27/1995
01/27/1995
01/31/1995 02/06/1995 02/06/1995
02/06/1995 02/07/1995 02/10/1995 02/13/1995

account established by previous orders of this Court; and that the Clerk of the Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $4,427.91 for the services and expenses of Mr. Hayes and Dr. Shansky; and that this payment be drawn from the Crestar Savings Account established by previous orders of this Court; and that if the defendants have failed to reimburse the $20,000.00 fund and the Crestar Savings Account as required by the Courts' 12/13/94 Order, the Clerk of the Court shall pay Grace M. Lopes, exclusively from the Inmates of Modular Facility savings account established by previous orders of the Court, the sum of $23,364.58 which represents compensation for the services and expenses of Special Officer Lopes, Mr. Roche, Ms. Schneider, Mr. Hayes, and Dr. Shansky (N) (ks) (Entered: 01/26/1995)
273 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : that the defendants shall implement the Special Officer's Initial Remedial Plan. (N) (dot) (Entered: 01/27/1995)
274 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 2/6/95 to respond to plaintiffs' motion that the Court adopt the Special Officer's Findings on Security and Officer staffing [271-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON; response to motion(s) due by 2/6/95. (N) (dot) (Entered: 01/30/1995)
275 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 2/6/95 to respond to plaintiffs' motion that the Court adopt the Special Officer's Findings on environmental Health and Safety and to show cause [270-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (dot) (Entered: 01/30/1995)
326 MOTION filed by plaintiffs to compel discovery (ks) (Entered: 05/22/1995)
276 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 2/13/95 to respond to plaintiff's motion that the Court adopt the Special Officer's Findings on Security and Officer Staffing (ks) (Entered: 02/07/1995)
277 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 2/13/95 to respond to plaintiff's motion that the Court adopt the Special Officer's findings on Environmental Health and Safety and to show cause (ks) (Entered: 02/07/1995)
278 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 2/7/95 to file their monthly report to the Court (ks) (Entered: 02/07/1995)
279 REPORT by defendants to the Court (238th) pursuant to Court's Order of 8/22/85; Attachments (9) (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 02/08/1995)
280 MOTION filed by defendants for adoption of consent order regarding attorney's fees (ks) (Entered: 02/13/1995)
281 RESPONSE by defendants in opposition to motion that the Court adopt the Special Officer's findings on Environmental Health and Safety at the District of Columbia Detention Facility as the Court's findings [269-1] by

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02/13/1995 02/14/1995 02/14/1995 02/14/1995
02/16/1995 02/16/1995
02/16/1995 02/16/1995 02/16/1995 02/22/1995

plaintiffs. (blj) (Entered: 02/14/1995)
282 RESPONSE by defendant in opposition to motion that the Court adopt the Special Officer's Findings on Security and Officer Staffing at the District of Columbia Detention Facility as the Court's Findings [268-1] by plaintiffs. (blj) (Entered: 02/14/1995)
283 MOTION filed Grace M. Lopes for compensation, Exhibit (6) (lpp) (Entered: 02/15/1995)
284 MOTION (consent) filed by defendants to extend time to 2/24/95 to respond to plaintiff's motion to compel discovery (ks) (Entered: 02/16/1995)
300 ORDER (Copy) by Judge William B. Bryant and Judge June L. Green : granting motion for compensation [283-1]; that the Clerk of the Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $17,590.90 for her services and expenses as well as the services and expenses of Mr. Lindsay Hayes; and that the Clerk of the court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $27,768.40 for the services and expenses of Mr. Roche, Ms. Schneider, Mr. Henerson, and the law firm of Zuckerman, Spaeder, Goldstein, Taylor and Kolker. (Original filed in CA 79-1726) (N) (ks) (Entered: 03/13/1995)
285 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 2/7/95 to file their monthly report to the Court [278-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (dot) (Entered: 02/16/1995)
286 CONSENT ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion for adoption of consent order regarding attorney's fees [280-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON; that the District of Columbia shall pay Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge the sum of thirty eight thousand dollars ($38,000.00) in full settlement of fees and costs associated with this civil action during the above-referenced period of time. (N) (dot) (Entered: 02/16/1995)
287 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 2/13/95 to respond to plaintiff's motion that the Court adopt the Special Officer's findings on Environmental Health and Safety and to show cause [277-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (dot) (Entered: 02/16/1995)
288 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 2/13/95 to respond to plaintiff's motion that the Court adopt the Special Officer's Findings on Security and Officer Staffing [276-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (dot) (Entered: 02/16/1995)
289 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 2/24/95 to respond to plaintiff's motion to compel discovery [284-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (dot) (Entered: 02/16/1995)
314 CERTIFIED COPY of order filed in USCA dated 2/13/95, on appeal [99-

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02/23/1995
02/23/1995
02/24/1995 02/27/1995
02/28/1995
03/01/1995 03/02/1995
03/03/1995 03/06/1995 03/07/1995 03/08/1995 03/08/1995 03/16/1995

1] , dismissing appeal . USCA # 93-7241 (cjp) (Entered: 04/25/1995)
290 REPLY by plaintiffs to response to motion that the Court adopt the Special Officer's findings on Environmental Health and Safety at the District of Columbia Detention Facility as the Court's findings and that the defendants be Ordered to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of Court [269-1] by plaintiffs (ks) (Entered: 02/24/1995)
291 REPLY by plaintiffs to response to motion that the Court adopt the Special Officer's Findings on Security and Officer Staffing at the District of Columbia Detention Facility as the Court's Findings [268-1] by plaintiffs (ks) (Entered: 02/24/1995)
292 MOTION (consent) filed by defendants to extend time to 3/10/95 to respond to plaintiff's motion to compel discovery (ks) (Entered: 02/27/1995)
296 NOTICE OF APPEAL by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER from order [273-1] , entered on: 1/27/95; Government-no fee; Copies mailed to Jonathan M. Smith, J. Patrick Hickey, and Grace Lopes (ks) (Entered: 03/03/1995)
293 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 3/10/95 to respond to plaintiff's motion to compel discovery [292-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON; response to motion(s) due by 3/10/95. (N) (dot) (Entered: 02/28/1995)
294 TRANSCRIPT filed of hearing for date of 11/1/94. Reporter: Carrie Gansle (ks) (Entered: 03/03/1995)
295 MEMORANDUM by plaintiffs in support of motion that the Court adopt the Special Officer's Findings on Security and Officer Staffing at the District of Columbia Detention Facility as the Court's Findings [268-1] by plaintiffs; Attachments (ks) (Entered: 03/03/1995)
TRANSMITTED PRELIMINARY RECORD on appeal [296-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON to U.S. Court of Appeals (ks) (Entered: 03/03/1995)
297 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 3/8/95 to file their monthly report to the Court (ks) (Entered: 03/07/1995)
USCA # 95-7047 assigned for appeal [296-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (ks) (Entered: 03/08/1995)
298 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 3/8/95 to file their monthly report to the Court [297-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (dot) (Entered: 03/08/1995)
299 REPORT by defendants to the Court (239th) pursuant to Court's Order of 8/22/95; Attachments (8) (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 03/09/1995)
302 MOTION filed by special Officer GRACE M. LOPES for compensation ; Exhibits (6) (ks) (Entered: 03/28/1995)

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03/17/1995 03/29/1995 04/05/1995 04/07/1995 04/07/1995 04/10/1995 04/12/1995 04/12/1995
04/18/1995 04/19/1995 04/20/1995 04/21/1995 04/25/1995

301 REPLY by plaintiffs to response to motion to compel discovery [268-1] by plaintiffs; Exhibits (2) (ks) (Entered: 03/28/1995)
303 MOTION filed by plaintiffs for appointment of a receiver ; Exhibits (8) (ks) (Entered: 03/30/1995)
304 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 4/7/95 to file their monthly report to the Court (ks) (Entered: 04/06/1995)
305 REPORT by defendants to the Court (240th) pursuant to Order entered 8/22/85; Attachments (9) (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 04/10/1995)
306 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 4/7/95 to file their monthly report to the Court [304-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (dot) (Entered: 04/10/1995)
307 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 4/20/95 to respond to plaintiff's motion for appointment of a receiver (ks) (Entered: 04/11/1995)
308 MOTION filed by the Special Officer GRACE M. LOPES for Compensation ; Exhibits (7) (ks) (Entered: 04/14/1995)
309 ORDER (Copy) by Judge William B. Bryant and June L. Green : granting motion for Compensation [308-1] by GRACE M. LOPES; that the Clerk of the Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $58,814.40 which represents compensation for the services and expenses of Special Oficer Lopes, Mr. Roche, Ms. Schneider, Dr. Cohen, Dr. Belitsky, Dr. Shansky, and Mr. Hayes; and that the DC shall pay $58,814.40 to the Clerk of the Court in order to replenish the Inmates of the Modular Facility savings account by 4/26/95 (See Order for details) (Original filed in CA 79-1726) (N) (ks) (Entered: 04/14/1995)
310 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 4/20/95 to respond to plaintiff's motion for appointment of a receiver [307-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON; response to due by 4/20/95. (N) (dot) (Entered: 04/18/1995)
311 MOTION filed by defendants for protective order denying the plaintiffs' request to depose Michael Rogers, and Margaret A. Moore (ks) (Entered: 04/20/1995)
312 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 4/25/95 to respond to plaintiff's motion for appointment of a receiver (ks) (Entered: 04/21/1995)
313 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 4/25/95 to respond to plaintiff's motion for appointment of a receiver [312-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON; response to motion(s) due by 4/25/95. (N) (dot) (Entered: 04/21/1995)
315 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant :that plaintiffs shall file their response to defendants' motion for a protective order; response to motion due 5/5/95 (N) (dot) (Entered: 04/25/1995)

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04/25/1995 05/05/1995 05/05/1995 05/09/1995 05/11/1995 05/12/1995
05/12/1995 05/15/1995 05/16/1995 05/16/1995
05/22/1995

316 RESPONSE by defendants in opposition to motion for appointment of a receiver [303-1] by plaintiffs; Attachments (ks) (Entered: 04/26/1995)
317 REPLY by plaintiffs to response to motion for appointment of a receiver [303-1] by plaintiffs; exhibits (9) (dot) (Entered: 05/08/1995)
318 RESPONSE by plaintiffs in opposition to motion for protective order denying the plaintiffs' request to depose Michael Rogers, and Margaret A. Moore [311-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON; exhibits (7). (dot) (Entered: 05/08/1995)
319 REPORT by defendants to the Court (241th) pursuant to Court Order of 8/22/85; Attachments (9) (bulky) (ks) (Entered: 05/10/1995)
320 TRANSCRIPT filed of hearing for date of 3/16/94. Reporter: Gloria Williams (ks) (Entered: 05/11/1995)
321 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : denying motion for protective order denying the plaintiffs' request to depose Michael Rogers, and Margaret A. Moore [311-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON; that the defendants make Ms. Moore and Mr. Rogers available for deposition within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Order, at a date and time to be agreed upon by counsel. (N) (dot) (Entered: 05/15/1995)
322 REPLY by defendants to response to motion for protective order [188-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (ks) (Entered: 05/15/1995)
323 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants, and plaintiffs of Stipulation of the parties consent to the filing of corrected copy of the plaintiffs' opposition to defendant's motion for a protective order; Exhibits (3) (ks) (Entered: 05/16/1995)
324 MOTION (copy) filed by the Special Master GRACE M. LOPES for compensation ; Exhibits (6) (Original filed in CA 79-1726) (ks) (Entered: 05/22/1995)
325 ORDER (Copy) by Judge William B. Bryant and Judge June L. Green : granting motion for compensation [324-1] by GRACE M. LOPES; that the Clerk of the Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $19,303.30 for her services and expenses; and that the Clerk of the Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $18,435.81 for the services and expenses of Mr. Roche, Ms. Schneider, Mr. Hayes, Mr. Henderson and Dr. Shansky (Original filed in CA 79-1726) (N) (ks) (Entered: 05/22/1995)
327 ORDER (consent) by Judge William B. Bryant : that the District of Columbia shall pay Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge the sum of THIRTY SEVEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($37,500.00) in full settlement of fees and costs associated with this civil action during the above-referenced period of time. This amount shall bear interest at the rate established by 28 USC 1961 from the forty-fifth (45th) day following the entry of this Order. (N) (dot) (Entered: 05/22/1995)

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05/23/1995 06/05/1995 06/09/1995 06/13/1995 06/13/1995 06/14/1995 06/14/1995
07/03/1995 07/05/1995 07/07/1995 07/10/1995 07/11/1995 07/11/1995
07/14/1995

328 TRANSCRIPT filed of motions hearing for date(s) of 12/15/93. Reporter: Katherine Moomey, Miller Reporting Company (ks) (Entered: 05/24/1995)
329 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 6/9/95 to file their monthly report to the Court (ks) (Entered: 06/06/1995)
330 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 6/13/95 to file their monthly report to the Court (ks) (Entered: 06/15/1995)
331 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 6/13/95 to file their monthly report to the Court [330-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (dot) (Entered: 06/15/1995)
332 REPORT by defendants to the Court (242th) pursuant to Order entered on 8/22/95; Attachments (9) (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 06/16/1995)
333 MOTION filed by Special Officer GRACE M. LOPES for order for compensation; Exhibits (4) (ks) (Entered: 06/23/1995)
336 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion for compensation [333-1] by GRACE M. LOPES; that the Clerk of Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $54,738.97 which represents compensation for the services and expenses of Special Officer Lopes, Mr. Roche, Ms. Schneider, and Dr. Shansky (N) (ks) (Entered: 07/14/1995)
334 STATUS REPORT by Special Officer GRACE M. LOPES on defendants' compliance with the Initial Remedial Plan and the November 9, 1993 Order; exhibits (93) 9 volumes (dot) (Entered: 07/03/1995)
335 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 7/10/95 to file their monthly Report to the Court (ks) (Entered: 07/06/1995)
338 MEMORANDUM by plaintiffs in support of Special Officer's Recommendation that court Appoint a Reciver; Exhibits (15) (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 07/19/1995)
339 REPORT by defendants to the Court (243rd) pursuant to Courts Order of 8/22/85; Attachments (7) (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 07/19/1995)
MOTION HEARING before Judge William B. Bryant; granting plaintiff's motion for appointment of a Receiver; Reporter: Gwen A. Schlemmer, Miller Reporting Co. (ks) (Entered: 07/19/1995)
340 FINDINGS AND ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting plaintiffs' motion for the appointment of a receiver; and that the court adopts the findings contained in the Special Officer's Report on defendants' compliance with the Initial Remedial Plan and the 11/9/93 Order as its own (See Findings and Order for details) (N) (ks) (Entered: 07/19/1995)
337 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS filed for date(s) of 7/11/95. Reporter: Gwen A. Schlemmer with Miller Reporting Co. (ks) (Entered: 07/17/1995)

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07/18/1995 07/18/1995
07/24/1995 08/02/1995 08/02/1995 08/03/1995 08/03/1995
08/03/1995
08/04/1995 08/10/1995

341 MOTION filed by Special Officer GRACE M. LOPES for compensation ; Exhibits(4) (ted) (Entered: 07/20/1995)
342 ORDER (copy) by Judge June L. Green and Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion for compensation [341-1] by GRACE M. LOPES; that the Clerk of the Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $32,649.63 which represents compensation for the Special Officer's fee and Ms. Schneider's fee and expenses; and that the Clerk of the Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $17,377.90 which represents compensation for Mr. Roche's fee and expenses and the Special Officer's expenses; and that the Clerk of the Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $15,356.51 which represents compensation for Dr. Shansky's fee and expenses (N) (ks) (Entered: 07/21/1995)
DEPOSIT in the sum of $54,738.97 by D.C. Government into the Registry of the Court pursuant to Order filed 7/16/95 (ks) (Entered: 07/25/1995)
343 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant :that Ronald M. Shansky, M.D., is appointed Receiver, effective August 21, 1995. The Receiver shall be paid at the rate of $175 per hour with a monthly ceiling of $16,500. (N) (dot) (Entered: 08/02/1995)
344 NOTICE OF FILING by unknown GRACE M. LOPES correspondence from the Special Officer to the Court and to counsel for the parties; attachments. (dot) (Entered: 08/04/1995)
345 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to compel discovery [326-1] by plaintiffs; the defendants shall respond to the plaintiffs' outstanding request for production of documents within 10 days. (N) (dot) (Entered: 08/04/1995)
346 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion that the Court adopt the Special Officer's Findings on Security and Officer Staffing at the District of Columbia Detention Facility as the Court's Findings [2681] by plaintiffs; that the Special Officer's findings concerning security and officer staffing at the District of Columbia Detention Facility that are contained in her 12/16/94 Notice of Filing are, pursuant to FRCP 53(e) (2), adopted as the findings of this Court. (N) (dot) (Entered: 08/04/1995)
347 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion that the Court adopt the Special Officer's findings on Environmental Health and Safety at the District of Columbia Detention Facility as the Court's findings and that the defendants be Ordered to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of Court [269-1] by plaintiffs; that the defendants must show cause on or before 8/28/95 as to why they should not be held in contempt of this Court. (N) (dot) (Entered: 08/04/1995)
348 MOTION filed by defendants DELBERT C. JACKSON, and ANDERSON MCGRUDER to extend time to 8/11/95 to file their monthly report to the Court (bm) (Entered: 08/07/1995)
349 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to

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08/10/1995 08/11/1995 08/11/1995 08/11/1995
08/14/1995 08/14/1995 08/14/1995
08/21/1995 08/28/1995
08/29/1995 08/31/1995

8/11/95 to file their monthly report to the Court [348-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON; Report due by 8/11/95. (N) (dot) (Entered: 08/10/1995)
350 NOTICE OF APPEAL by defendants from order [340-1] , entered on: 7/19/95; no fee - Government; Copies mailed to Jonathan Smith, J. Patrick Hickey and Grace Lopes (ks) (Entered: 08/11/1995)
TRANSMITTED PRELIMINARY RECORD on appeal [350-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON to U.S. Court of Appeals (ks) (Entered: 08/11/1995)
351 MOTION filed by Special Officer GRACE M. LOPES for compensation ; Exhibits(7) (ted) (Entered: 08/14/1995)
358 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant and Judge June L. Green : granting motion for compensation [351-1] by GRACE M. LOPES; that the Clerk of the Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $17,027.35 which represents compensation for the services and expenses of Special Officer Lopes and Ms. LaMarre; and that the Clerk of the Court shall pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $32,449.82 which represents compensation for the services and expenses of Mr. Roche, Ms. Schneider, Mr. Hayes, Dr. Cohen and Dr. Shansky (N) (ks) (Entered: 09/21/1995)
352 REQUEST by defendants to extend time to 8/11/95, nunc pro tunc, to file their Monthly Report ; EXHIBIT (REPORT TO THE COURT) (ks) (Entered: 08/15/1995)
359 MOTION filed by Special Master GRACE M. LOPES to modify the 8/11/95 Order (ks) (Entered: 09/21/1995)
360 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant and Judge June L. Green : granting motion to modify the 8/11/95 Order [359-1] by GRACE M. LOPES; that the Clerk of the Court shall pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $49,477.17 which represents compensation for the services and expenses of the Special Officer, Mr. Roche, Ms. Schneider, Mr. Hayes, Dr. Cohen, Ms. LaMarre and Dr. Shansky (N) (ks) (Entered: 09/21/1995)
361 NOTICE OF FILING by the Special Officer GRACE M. LOPES of revised recommendations concerning Officer staffing at the District of Columbia Jail; Appendix (ks) (Entered: 09/21/1995)
353 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant: giving the Receiver, Dr. Shansky, the authority to enter into, on such terms as deems necessary, on behalf of the District, personnel service contracts with psychiatrists who he deems qualified to staff the D.C. Jail's mental health program. This authority shall continue on an interim basis until the procedures under which the Receiver will exercise his powers are established pursuant to the Court's 7/11/95 Order. (N) (bm) (Entered: 08/28/1995)
USCA # 95-7203 assigned for appeal [350-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (ks) (Entered: 08/30/1995)
362 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 9/28/95 to file a response

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09/01/1995 09/06/1995 09/06/1995 09/07/1995 09/07/1995 09/08/1995 09/12/1995 09/13/1995
09/13/1995 09/14/1995 09/20/1995 09/22/1995 09/26/1995

to the Court's 8/3/95, Order to show cause (ks) (Entered: 09/21/1995)
363 MOTION filed by Speical Officer GRACE M. LOPES to extend time to 9/15/95 to file the plan required by the 7/11/95 Order (ks) (Entered: 09/21/1995)
354 TRANSCRIPT filed of motion hearing for date(s) of 5/10/94. Reporter: Carrie Gansle (ks) (Entered: 09/06/1995)
364 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 9/11/95 to file their monthly Report to the Court (ks) (Entered: 09/21/1995)
365 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 9/11/95 to file their monthly Report to the Court [364-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (ks) (Entered: 09/21/1995)
367 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 9/15/95 to file the plan required by the 7/11/95 Order [363-1] by GRACE M. LOPES (N) (ks) (Entered: 09/28/1995)
355 REPORT by defendants (245th) to the Court, pursuant to Court Order entered on 8/22/85; Attachments (6) (bulky) (ks) (Entered: 09/11/1995)
356 MOTION filed by Special Officer GRACE M. LOPES for compensation ; Exhibits(5) (ted) (Entered: 09/13/1995)
368 ORDER (Copy) by Judge William B. Bryant and Judge Judge June L. Green : granting motion for compensation [356-1] by GRACE M. LOPES; that the Clerk of the Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $31,387.72 which represents compensation for the services and expenses of Special Officer Lopes and Mr. Roche; and that the Clerk of the Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $17,126.69 which represents compensation for the services and expenses of Ms. Schneider, Dr. Belitsky and Mr. Hayes (Original filed in CA 79-1726) (N) (ks) (Entered: 09/28/1995)
369 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 9/28/95 to file a response to the Court's 8/3/95, Order to show cause [362-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (ks) (Entered: 09/28/1995)
370 MOTION filed by Special Officer GRACE M. LOPES to extend time to 9/22/95 to file the Receiver's Plan, required by the 7/11/95 Order (ks) (Entered: 09/28/1995)
357 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting the Special Officer's motion for filing the Receiver's plan for the exercise of his powers to 9/22/95. (N) (dot) (Entered: 09/21/1995)
371 JOINT MOTION by defendant, plaintiff, and Special Master to adopt Order, shich specifies the procedures for exercising the Receiver's powers (ks) (Entered: 09/28/1995)
366 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : regarding procedures for the

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09/27/1995 09/28/1995 09/28/1995 10/02/1995 10/05/1995
10/05/1995
10/05/1995
10/05/1995 10/05/1995 10/17/1995 10/19/1995

receiver to exercise powers. (see order for details) (N) (dot) (Entered: 09/26/1995)
372 REPORT by Special Officer GRACE M. LOPES re: updated report on environmental Health and Safety at the D.C. Jail; Appendix (4) (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 09/28/1995)
373 REQUEST by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER to extend time to 10/2/95 to file a response to the Court's 8/3/95 Order to show cause (ks) (Entered: 09/29/1995)
374 MOTION filed by the United States of America to review the investigative files of Special Officer Grace Lopes (ks) (Entered: 09/29/1995)
375 RESPONSE by defendants to order to show cause filed 8/3/95 on Environmental issues [347-1]; Attachment (1) (bulky) (ks) (Entered: 10/03/1995)
376 ORDER (consent) by Judge William B. Bryant : that the District of Columbia shall pay Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge the sum of Ones Hundred Twelve Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($112,500.00) in full settlement of fees and costs associated with this civil action during the above-referenced period of time. This amount shall bear interest at the rate established by 28 USC 1961 from the forty-fifth (45th) day following the entry of this Order. (N) (dot) (Entered: 10/05/1995)
377 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 10/2/95 to file a response to the Court's 8/3/95 Order to show cause [3731] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON; motion(s), pleading or other document due by 10/2/95. (N) (dot) (Entered: 10/05/1995)
378 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to review the investigative files of Special Officer Grace Lopes [374-1] regarding the death of Richard C. Johnson to representatives of the United States Attoreney's Office for the District of Columbia and the Department of Justice. (N) (dot) (Entered: 10/05/1995)
379 REPORT by defendants to the Court (246th) pursuant to Court's Order of 8/22/85; Attachments (7) (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 10/06/1995)
380 CERTIFIED COPY of order filed in USCA dated 10/3/95, on appeal [296-1] , dismissing appeal . USCA # 95-7047 (cjp) (Entered: 10/16/1995)
381 RESPONSE by plaintiffs to response to order to show cause why defendants should not be held in contempt of Court and motion to adopt the Special Officer's 9/26/95 Findings by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON; Exhibits (2) (ks) (Entered: 10/18/1995)
382 ORDER (Copy) by Judge William B. Bryant and Judge June L. Green : granting Special Master's motion for compensation; and that the Clerk of the Court pay Grace m. Lopes the sum of $38,890.19 which represents

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11/06/1995 11/13/1995 11/13/1995 11/14/1995
12/06/1995 12/07/1995 12/07/1995 12/13/1995 12/13/1995
01/05/1996 01/11/1996 01/17/1996

compensation for the services and expenses of Special Officer Lopes, Mr. Roche, Ms. Schneider, and Dr. Cohen (Original filed in CA79-1726) (N) (ks) (Entered: 11/01/1995)
383 REPORT by defendants to the Court (247th) pursuant to Court's Order entered on 8/22/85; Attachments (2) Bulky (ks) (Entered: 11/07/1995)
384 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants of supplement to their Monthly (247th) Status Report; Attachments (7) (bulky) (ks) (Entered: 11/14/1995)
385 MOTION filed by Special Officer GRACE M. LOPES for compensatio ; Exhibits (5) (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 11/15/1995)
386 ORDER (Original) by Judge William B. Bryant and Judge June L. Green : granting motion for compensation [385-1] by GRACE M. LOPES; that the Clerk of the Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $29,112.66 which represents compensation for the services and expenses of Special Officer Lopes, Mr. Roche, and Ms. Schneider; and that the Clerk of the Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $9,473.02 which represnets compensation for the services and expenses of Ms. Fisher and Mr. Henderson (N) (ks) (Entered: 11/21/1995)
387 REQUEST by defendants to extend time to 12/6/95, nunc pro tunc, to file their monthly report ; EXHIBIT (REPORT TO THE COURT) (ks) (Entered: 12/07/1995)
388 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 12/6/95, nunc pro tunc, to file their monthly report [387-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (ks) (Entered: 12/07/1995)
389 REPORT by defendants to the Court (248th) pursuant to Court Order of 8/22/85; Attachments (6) (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 12/07/1995)
390 MOTION filed by Special Master GRACE M. LOPES for compensation ; Exhibits (3) (ks) (Entered: 12/15/1995)
391 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant and Judge June L. Green : granting motion for compensation [390-1] by GRACE M. LOPES; that the Clerk of the Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $39,042.52 which represents compensation for the services and expenses of Special Officer Lopes, Ms. Schneider, and Ms. Fisher (N) (ks) (Entered: 12/15/1995)
392 MOTION filed by unknown GRACE M. LOPES to extend time to 1/24/96 to file the budget for the office of the receiver (blj) (Entered: 01/11/1996)
393 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 1/17/96 to file their monthly Report to the Court (ks) (Entered: 01/16/1996)
394 STATUS REPORT by defendants to the Court pursuant to Court's Order of 8/22/85; Attachments (5) (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 01/18/1996)

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01/17/1996 01/17/1996 01/18/1996 01/24/1996 01/29/1996 01/30/1996 01/30/1996
02/05/1996 02/05/1996 02/06/1996 02/06/1996

397 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant and Judge June L. Green : granting Special Officer's motion to increase compensation rate for Special Assistant; that Ms. Schneider's compensation rate shall be increased to $60.00 per hour. (N) (ks) (Entered: 01/23/1996)
398 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant and Judge June L. Green : granting Special Officer's motion for compensation; and that the Clerk of the Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $29,979.04 which represents compensation for the services and expenses of Special Officer Lopes, Ms. Schneider, Ms. Fisher, and Ms. Lytle. (N) (ks) (Entered: 01/23/1996)
395 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 1/17/96 to file their monthly Report to the Court [393-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (dot) (Entered: 01/19/1996)
399 MOTION (consent) filed by defendants to extend time to 3/7/96 to file the Budget for the Office of the Receiver and the Operating Budget (ks) (Entered: 01/25/1996)
400 MOTION filed by defendants for an order to facilitate the payment of the Receiver's February 1996 Costs and Expenses (ks) (Entered: 01/30/1996)
401 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 3/7/96 to file the Budget for the Office of the Receiver and the Operating Budget [399-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (dot) (Entered: 01/31/1996)
402 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion for an order to facilitate the payment of the Receiver's February 1996 Costs and Expenses [400-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON; that by 2/5/96, defendant DC will issue checks made payable to the Receiver, Ronald Shansky, M.D. for the purposes and amounts listed: bi-weekly payroo $237,629.30, bi-weekly payroll $237,629.30, equipment, medications and supplies $233,020.00 and receiver's Office $31,413.23; that the parties shall attempt to reach by 4/9/96, an agreement to facilitate payment of the Receiver's March 1996 costs and expenses pending finalization and approval of his annual budget; failing which the parties may apply to the court for an order resolving this issue; that the above-referenced funds shall be subject to audit as referenced in this Court's Order of 9/26/95. (N) (dot) (Entered: 01/31/1996)
403 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 2/6/96 to make available to the Receiver funds to facilitate payment of costs and expenses expected to be incurred during February 1996 (ks) (Entered: 02/06/1996)
404 REPORT by defendants to the Court (250th), pursuant to Court order entered 8/22/85; Attachments (3) (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 02/06/1996)
405 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants of withdrawing their motion to extend time filed on 2/5/96 (ks) (Entered: 02/07/1996)
406 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 2/16/96 within which it must make available to the Receiver funds to facilitate payment of costs

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02/07/1996 02/07/1996
02/16/1996 02/20/1996 02/21/1996
02/22/1996 02/22/1996

and expenses expected to be incurred during the first half of February 1996 (ks) (Entered: 02/07/1996)
407 CONSENT ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : that the District of Columiba shall pay Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge the sum of Sixteen Thousand Dollars ($16,000.00) in full settlement of fees and costs associated with this civil action during the above-referenced period of time. This amount shall bear interest at the rate established by 28 USC 1961 from the forty-fifth (45th) day following the entry of this Order. (N) (dot) (Entered: 02/07/1996)
408 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion [406-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON; that the time to make available to the Receiver the funds needed to cover costs and expenses expected to be incurred during the first half of February 1996 ($385,552.533) is extended up to and including 2/6/96; that the atime to make available to the Receiver the funds needed to cover costs and expenses expected to be incurred during the second half of February 1996 ($354,139.30) is extended up to and including 2/16/96. (N) (dot) (Entered: 02/07/1996)
409 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 2/20/96 in which to make available to the Receiver funds to facilitate payment of costs and expenses expected to be incurred during the second half of February 1996 ; Attachment (1) (ks) (Entered: 02/20/1996)
411 MOTION filed by defendants for order to facilitate the payment of the Receiver's March 1996 costs and expenses (ks) (Entered: 02/22/1996)
410 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant: the Clerk of Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $18,921.87 which represents compensation for the services and expenses of Special Officer Lopes; this check shall be drawn from the $20,000 Fund established by previous orders of the Court; the District of Columbia shall pay $18,921.87 to the Clerk of the Court in order to replenish the $20,000 Fund by 3/5/96; the Clerk of the Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $25,330.50 which represents compensation for the services and expenses of Ms. Schneider, Ms. Fisher, Ms. Lytle, Mr. Roche and Dr. Belitsky; this check shall be drawn from the Inmates of Modular account established by previous order of the Court; the District of Columbia shall pay $25,330.50 to the Clerk of the Court in order to replenish the Inmates of Modular account by the 3/5/96. (N) (bm) (Entered: 02/21/1996)
412 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 2/20/96 in which to make available to the Receiver funds to facilitate payment of costs and expenses expected to be incurred during the second half of February 1996 [409-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (dot) (Entered: 02/22/1996)
413 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion for order to facilitate the payment of the Receiver's March 1996 costs and expenses [411-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON; that

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02/26/1996 03/05/1996 03/06/1996 03/07/1996 03/12/1996 03/13/1996
03/15/1996

by 3/4/96, defendant District of Columbia will issue a check made payable to Ronald Shansky, M.D. in the amount of three hundred thirty four thousand, forty two dollars and fifty three cents ($334,042.53); that by 3/12/96, defendant District of Columbia will issue a check made payable to Ronald Shansky, M.D. in the amount of three hundred and two thousand, six hundred and twenty nine dollars and thirty cents ($302,629.30); that by 3/22/96, defendant District of Columbia will issue a check made payable to Ronald Shansky, M.D. in the amount of two hundred and thirty seven thousand, six hundred and twenty nine dollars and thirty cents ($302,629.30); that the above-referenced funds shall be subject to audit as referenced in this Court's Order of 9/26/95. (N) (dot) (Entered: 02/22/1996)
DEPOSIT in the sum of $29,979.04 into the Registry of the Court by District of Columbia pursuant to Order of 1/17/96. (ks) (Entered: 02/27/1996)
414 REPORT by defendants to the Court pursuant to Court's Order of 8/22/85; Attachments (4) (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 03/06/1996)
415 MOTION filed by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER to extend time to 3/15/96 to file the Budget for the Office of the Receiver and the Operating Budget (ks) (Entered: 03/07/1996)
416 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 3/15/96 to file the Budget for the Office of the Receiver and the Operating Budget [415-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (dot) (Entered: 03/07/1996)
417 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 3/18/96 in which it must make available to the Receiver funds to facilitate payment of costs and expenses expected to be incurred during the latter part of March 1996 (ks) (Entered: 03/13/1996)
418 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 3/18/96 in which it must make available to the Receiver funds to facilitate payment of costs and expenses expected to be incurred during the latter part of March 1996 [417-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON; that the time for the District to make available to the Receiver the funds previously required by the court's 2/22/96, order is extended and modified as set forth herein; that by 3/18/96, defendant DC shall make available to the Receiver, Ronald Shansky, M.D., funds in the amount of three hundred and two thousand, six hundred and twenty nine dollars and thirty cents ($302,629.30); that by 4/1/96, defendant DC shall make available to the Receiver, Ronald Shansky, M.D., funds in the amount of two hundred and thirty seven thousand, sixhundred and twenty nine dollars and thirty cents ($237,629.30; that the above-referenced funds shall be subject to audit as referenced in this Court's Order of 9/26/95. (N) (dot) (Entered: 03/14/1996)
419 NOTICE OF FILING by special master GRACE M. LOPES of budget

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03/18/1996 03/20/1996
03/26/1996 03/28/1996 03/28/1996
03/28/1996 03/28/1996
04/01/1996 04/01/1996 04/01/1996 04/03/1996

for the Office of the Receiver of Medical and mental Health Services for the District of Columbia Central Detention Facility; Budget (ks) (Entered: 03/18/1996)
453 MOTION filed by special master GRACE M. LOPES for compensation ; exhibits (7) (JMF) (Entered: 06/06/1996)
420 ORDER (Copy) by Judge William B. Bryant and Judge June L. Green : granting motion for compensation [302-1] by GRACE M. LOPES; and that the Clerk of the Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $22,098.03 which represents compensation for the services and expenses of Special Officer Lopes, Mr. Roche and Mr. Brown; and that the Clerk of the Court pay Grace m. Lopes the sum of $33,686.64 which represents compensation for the services and expenses of Ms. Schneider, Ms. Fisher, Ms. Lytle, and Mr. Henderson (Original filed in CA79-1726) (See Order for details) (N) (ks) Modified on 03/22/1996 (Entered: 03/22/1996)
421 REPORT by Special Master GRACE M. LOPES to the Court; Exhibits (18) (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 03/27/1996)
STATUS HEARING before Judge William B. Bryant : order to show cause to be issued on Warden of D.C. Jail; show cause hearing set for 4/1/96 at 10:00 a.m.; Reporter: Kay Moomey (dot) (Entered: 03/28/1996)
422 CONSENT ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : that the District of Columbia shall pay Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Torowbridge the sum of Thirty-Six Thousand Dollars ($36,000.00) in full settlement of fees and costs associated with this civil action during the above-referenced period of time. This amount shall bear interest at the rate established by 28:1961 from the forty-fifth (45th) day following the entry of this Order. (N) (dot) Modified on 03/28/1996 (Entered: 03/28/1996)
SCHEDULING NOTICE: show cause hearing set for 10:00 4/1/96; before Judge William B. Bryant. (dot) (Entered: 03/28/1996)
423 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : to show cause why William Plaut should not be held in civil contempt of this Court's Orders issued in this case, in connection with the establishment and operation of the SouthOne housing unit at the District of Columbia Jail from approximately February 23, 1996 to date [423-1]; that William Plaut to appear on 4/1/96 at 10:00 a.m. (N) (dot) (Entered: 03/29/1996)
SHOW CAUSE HEARING before Judge William B. Bryant, begun and continued to 4/9/96 at 10:00 a.m.; reporter: William McAllister (dot) (Entered: 04/01/1996)
SCHEDULING NOTICE: show cause hearing set for 10:00 4/9/96; before Judge William B. Bryant. (dot) (Entered: 04/01/1996)
424 ERRATA by Special Master GRACE M. LOPES to her March 26, 1996 Report (ks) (Entered: 04/02/1996)
425 MOTION (consent) filed by defendants to extend time to 4/12/96 within which it may raise objections to the Receiver's proposed budget (ks)

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04/04/1996 04/05/1996 04/05/1996 04/08/1996 04/08/1996 04/09/1996
04/09/1996 04/09/1996 04/11/1996 04/11/1996 04/12/1996 04/12/1996

(Entered: 04/04/1996)
426 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 4/12/96 within which it may raise objections to the Receiver's proposed budget [425-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (dot) (Entered: 04/04/1996)
427 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 4/12/96 to file their monthly Report to the Court (ks) (Entered: 04/08/1996)
428 MOTION (consent) filed by defendant for order to facilitate the payment of the Receiver's April 1996 costs and expenses (ks) (Entered: 04/08/1996)
429 TRANSCRIPT filed for date of 4/1/96. Reporter: William D. McAllister (bm) (Entered: 04/09/1996)
431 CERTIFIED COPY of order filed in USCA dated 4/2/96, on appeal [3501] , dismissing appeal . USCA # 95-7203 (cjp) (Entered: 04/09/1996)
430 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion for order to facilitate the payment of the Receiver's April 1996 costs and expenses [428-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON; that by 4/12/96, defendant District of Columbia will issue a check made payable to Ronald Shansky, M.D. in the amount of three hundred fifty thousand dollars ($350,000.00) or will wire said amount to the Receiver's bank account no later than 4/15/96; that by 4/26/96, defendant District of Columbia will issue a check made payable to Ronald Shansky, M.D. in the amount of four hundred fifty four thousand, nine hundred and seventy one dollars ($454,971.00) or will wire said amount to the Receiver's bank account no later than 4/29/96; that the above-referenced funds shall be subject to audit as referenced in this Court's Order of 9/26/95. (N) (dot) (Entered: 04/09/1996)
432 NOTICE OF FILING by special master GRACE M. LOPES of exhibits to their 3/26/96 Report to the Court; Exhibits (ks) (Entered: 04/10/1996)
STATUS HEARING before Judge William B. Bryant :taken under advistement; Reporter: Santa Zizzo a.m., William McAllister p.m. (dot) (Entered: 04/11/1996)
433 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 4/12/96 to file their monthly Report to the Court [427-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (dot) (Entered: 04/11/1996)
434 RESPONSE by defendants to plaintiffs' Proposed Findings and Order (ks) (Entered: 04/12/1996)
436 OBJECTIONS by defendants to the proposed Budget [432-1] by GRACE M. LOPES (ks) (Entered: 04/16/1996)
437 REPORT by defendants to the court (253rd) purusant to Court's order of 8/22/85; Attachments (4) (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 04/16/1996)

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04/15/1996 04/16/1996 04/22/1996 04/23/1996
04/26/1996 04/29/1996 05/01/1996 05/02/1996 05/06/1996 05/07/1996

435 NOTICE OF FILING by special master GRACE M. LOPES of the final version of Mr. Henderson's report; Attachment (ks) (Entered: 04/16/1996)
438 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants of a corrrected copy of their (253rd) Monthly Report; Attachment (ks) (Entered: 04/17/1996)
446 MOTION filed by special master GRACE M. LOPES for compensation ; exhibits (6) (JMF) (Entered: 05/08/1996)
439 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant and Judge June L. Green : granting Special Officer Lopes motion for compensation; Ordered that the Clerk of the Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $32,827.30 which represents compensation for the services and expenses of Special Officer Lopes, Ms. Fisher, Mr. Roche and Ms. Lytle (Delaney, Siegel and Zorn); and that the Clerk of the Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $23,266.01 which represents compensation for the services and expenses of Ms. Schneider and Mr. Henderson. (N) (ks) (Entered: 04/26/1996)
440 RESPONSE by Dr. Ronald Shansky, Receiver for Medical and Mental Health Services to objections [436-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON; attachments. (bm) (Entered: 04/29/1996)
441 EMERGENCY MOTION filed by plaintiffs for the Court appointment of Grace M. Lopes as an expert witness under Federal Rule of evidence 706 ; Attachment (blj) (Entered: 04/30/1996)
442 NOTICE OF FILING by plaintiffs of a revised proposed Order to their emergency motion for the Court appointment of Grace M. Lopes as an expert witness (ks) (Entered: 05/02/1996)
MOTION HEARING before Judge William B. Bryant Reporter: William McAllister (dot) (Entered: 05/02/1996)
443 REPORT by defendants to the Court (254th), pursuant to Court's Order entered on 8/22/85; Exhibits (4) (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 05/07/1996)
444 CONSENT ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : that the Receiver's request that defendants provide him with additional funding for fiscal year 1996 in the total amount of $5,065,927.00, as needed to facilitate the delivery of medical and mental health services at the D.C. Detention Facility in compliance with the United States Constitution and this Court's orders be and hereby is granted; this amount is to be provided to the Receiver, Ronald Shansky, M.D., in five monthly payments, with the first payment of $1,013,185.04 (1/5 of the total amount) to be made available by check no later than Friday, May 10, 1996 or by a wire transfer no later than Tuesday, May 14, 1996. The four subsequent payments shall be for $1,013,185.04 less the difference between the sum of the immediately preceeding two bi-weekly payrolls and $552,000.00. The four subsequent payments to the Receiver are to be made by check on June 7 or by wire transfer on June 10, 1996; by check on July 5 or by wire transfer on July 8, 1996; by check on August 2 or by wire transfer on August 5, 1996; by check on August 30 or by wire transfer on

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05/07/1996 05/16/1996 05/20/1996 05/21/1996
05/31/1996 05/31/1996 06/05/1996 06/06/1996
06/06/1996 06/11/1996
06/11/1996

September 2, 1996; that no sooner than 50 days but no later than 75 days from the date of this Order, the Receiver shall be available to meet with defendants in order to determine whether there are any funds budgeted for non-personal services which are not likely to be spent prior to the end of the fiscal year and which can, therefore, be credited to reduce the amount of defendants remaining payments; that the funds shall be subject to audit as referenced in this Court's Order of September 26, 1995. (N) (dot) Modified on 05/07/1996 (Entered: 05/07/1996)
445 JOINT MOTION filed by defendants to adopt Consent Order (ks) (Entered: 05/08/1996)
447 TRANSCRIPT filed of motions hearing for date(s) of 5/2/96. Reporter: William Mc Allister (ks) (Entered: 05/17/1996)
448 MOTION filed by special master GRACE M. LOPES for compensation ; exhibits (4) (JMF) (Entered: 05/24/1996)
449 ORDER by Judges William B. Bryant and June L. Green : granting motion for compensation [448-1] by GRACE M. LOPES; directing the Clerk of the Court to pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $42,171.74 for services and expenses of Special Office Lopes, Ms. Schneider, Ms. Fisher and Ms. Lytle; directing that the check be drawn from the Crestar savings account established by previous order of the Court; directing the District of Columbia to pay $42,171.74 to the Clerk of the Court to replenish the Crestar savings account by June 3, 1996. (N) (bjl) (Entered: 05/29/1996)
450 TRANSCRIPT filed of hearing for date(s) of 4/9/96. Reporter: Santa Zizzo (ks) (Entered: 06/03/1996)
451 TRANSCRIPT filed of hearing for date(s) of 4/9/96. (Afternoon session) Mc Allister (ks) (Entered: 06/03/1996)
452 TRANSCRIPT filed of status hearing for date(s) of 3/28/96. Reporter: Katherine Moomey, Miller Reporting Co. (ks) (Entered: 06/06/1996)
454 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants DELBERT C. JACKSON, ANDERSON MCGRUDER the two hundred fifty-fifth (255th) report for the period of 5/5/96 through 6/5/96; attachments (4) (bulky) (blj) (Entered: 06/07/1996)
455 MOTION filed by defendants DELBERT C. JACKSON, ANDERSON MCGRUDER to extend time nunc pro tunc to 6/6/96 to file their monthly report (blj) Modified on 06/10/1996 (Entered: 06/10/1996)
456 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time nunc pro tunc to 6/6/96 to file their monthly report [455-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (dot) (Entered: 06/12/1996)
457 ORDER (consent) by Judge William B. Bryant : that the District of Columbia shall pay Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge the sum of Forty-Six Thousand Dollars ($46,000.00) in full settlement of fees and

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06/14/1996
06/17/1996 06/19/1996 06/20/1996 06/20/1996
06/21/1996
06/27/1996
06/27/1996 06/28/1996 07/02/1996

costs associated with this civil action during the above-referenced period of time. This amount shall bear interest at the rate established by 28 USC 1961 from the forty-fifth (45th) day following the entry of this Order. (N) (dot) (Entered: 06/12/1996)
458 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : evidentiary hearing set for 11:00 6/20/96; that the Director of the D.C. Department of Corrections, Margaret Moore, and the Deputy Director of the D.C. Department of Corrections, John Thomas, also appear before the Court on that date and at that time. (N) (dot) (Entered: 06/14/1996)
459 MOTION filed by defendants for clarification regarding Court's Order of 6/14/96 (ks) (Entered: 06/18/1996)
461 MOTION filed by special master GRACE M. LOPES for compensation ; exhibits (5) (JMF) (Entered: 06/25/1996)
EVIDENTIARY HEARING before Judge William B. Bryant : defendants' exhibit 1 Reporter: Ben Leesman (dot) Modified on 06/20/1996 (Entered: 06/20/1996)
462 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant and Judge June L. Green : granting motion for compensation [461-1] by GRACE M. LOPES; that the Clerk of the Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $41,946.70 which represents compensation for the services and expenses of Special Officer Lopes, Ms. Schneider, Ms. Fisher, Dr. Cohen and Mr. Henderson. (N) (ks) (Entered: 06/28/1996)
460 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : that the Special Officer of the Court shall review the main entry logs for the D.C. Jail for the period October 1, 1995 through the present; that the Special Officer shall report to the Court all instances of the appearances in the main entry log of the Director of the D.C. Department of Corrections, Margaret Moore, and the Executive Deputy Director of the Department, John Thomas. (N) (dot) (Entered: 06/21/1996)
463 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant and Judge June L. Green : granting motion for compensation by Special Officer Lopes; that the Clerk of the Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $44,033.90 which represents compensation for the services and expenses of Special Officer Lopes, Ms. Schneider, Ms. Fisher, Ms. Lytle and Dr. Belitsky. (N) (ks) (Entered: 06/28/1996)
464 MOTION filed by special master GRACE M. LOPES for compensation ; exhibits (5) (JMF) (Entered: 06/28/1996)
465 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION by Grace Lopes regarding appearances of the director and executive deputy director at the DC Jail, Exhibit (2) (lpp) (Entered: 07/01/1996)
466 NOTICE OF FILING by receiver RONALD SHANSKY monthly activity report for Medical and Mental Health Services at the District of Columbia Central Dentention Facility, 2/1/96 through 2/29/96;

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07/02/1996
07/02/1996
07/03/1996 07/09/1996 07/09/1996 08/05/1996 08/07/1996 08/08/1996 08/08/1996
08/08/1996 09/05/1996 09/10/1996 09/11/1996

attachments (blj) Modified on 07/03/1996 (Entered: 07/03/1996)
467 NOTICE OF FILING by receiver RONALD SHANSKY monthly activity report for Medical and Mental Health services at the District of Columbia Central Dentention Facility, 3/1/96 through 3/31/96; attachments (blj) (Entered: 07/03/1996)
468 NOTICE OF FILING by receiver RONALD SHANSKY monthly activity report for Medical and Mental Health Services at the District of Columbia Central Detention Facility, 4/1/96 through 4/30/96; attachments (blj) (Entered: 07/03/1996)
469 MOTION filed by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER to extend time to 7/9/96 to file their monthly report to the Court. (dot) (Entered: 07/05/1996)
470 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 7/9/96 to file their monthly report to the Court. [469-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (dot) (Entered: 07/09/1996)
471 REPORT by defendants to the Court (256), pursuant to Court's Order of 8/22/85; Attachments (4) (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 07/10/1996)
472 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 8/9/96 to file their monthly Report to the Court (ks) (Entered: 08/06/1996)
473 REPORT by defendants to the Court (257th) pursuant to Court's Order entered on 8/22/85; Attachments (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 08/08/1996)
474 MOTION filed by special master GRACE M. LOPES for compensation ; exhibits (4) (JMF) (Entered: 08/08/1996)
475 ORDER by Judge June L. Green & Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion for compensation [474-1] by GRACE M. LOPES; directing the Clerk of the Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $36,938.29 which represents compensation for the services and expenses of Special Officer Lopes, Ms Scheider, Ms. Fisher, Mr. Roche and Ms. Lytle; directing that this check be drawn from the Crestar savings account established by previous orders of the Court; directing that the District of Columbia pay $36,938.29 to the Clerk of the Court in order to replenish the Crestar savings account by 8/22/96. (N) (jeb) (Entered: 08/08/1996)
476 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 8/9/96 to file their monthly Report to the Court [472-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (dot) (Entered: 08/08/1996)
477 REPORT by defendants to the Court pursuant to Order entered 8/22/85; Attachments (4) (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 09/06/1996)
479 MOTION filed by special master GRACE M. LOPES for compensation ; exhibits (5) (JMF) (Entered: 09/12/1996)
478 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $40,622.03 to Grace Lopes which represents

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09/19/1996
09/19/1996
09/23/1996 09/23/1996 09/24/1996 09/24/1996 09/30/1996 10/03/1996
10/07/1996 10/08/1996 10/16/1996 10/16/1996

compensation and expenses for Special Officer Lopes, Ms. Schneider, Ms. Fisher, Ms. Lytle and Mr. Roche; directing that this check be drawn from the Inmates of Modular account; directing the District of Columbia to pay $40,622.03 to the Clerk of the Copurt to replenish the Inmates of Modular account by 9/26/96. (N) (bjl) (Entered: 09/11/1996)
480 ACTIVITY REPORT by receiver RONALD SHANSKY for Medical and Mental Health Services at the District of Columbia Central Detention Facility, 5/1/96 through 5/31/96 pursuant to Court's order; Attachments (ks) (Entered: 09/20/1996)
481 ACTIVITY REPORT by receiver RONALD SHANSKY for Medical and Mental Health Services at the District of Columbia Central Detention Facility, 6/1/96 through 6/30/96 pursuant to Court's Order; Attachments. (ks) (Entered: 09/20/1996)
482 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for receiver RONALD SHANSKY by George Wesley Miller (ks) (Entered: 09/24/1996)
483 MOTION filed by receiver RONALD SHANSKY for approval of the Receivership Budget for Fiscal year 1997 ; Attachment (ks) (Entered: 09/24/1996)
484 AMENDED motion for approval of the Receivership Budget for Fiscal year 1997 [483-1] by RONALD SHANSKY; Attachment (1). (ks) (Entered: 09/25/1996)
485 NOTICE OF FILING by receiver RONALD SHANSKY of advising the court of the amended motion of the receiver. (ks) (Entered: 09/25/1996)
486 MOTION filed by defendant for order to facilitate the payment of the Receiver's October 1996 Costs and Expenses (ks) (Entered: 10/01/1996)
487 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion for order to facilitate the payment of the Receiver's October 1996 Costs and Expenses [486-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON; that by 10/15/96, defendant DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA will issue a check made payable to Ronald Shansky, M.D. in the amount of $1,063,915.08; that the above-referenced funds shall be subject to audit as referenced in this Court's Order of September 26, 1995. (N) (dot) (Entered: 10/04/1996)
488 OBJECTIONS by defendants to the Receiver's Porposed Budget, filed pursuant to Court's Order of 9/26/96. (ks) (Entered: 10/08/1996)
489 REPORT by defendants to the Court pursuant to Order entered on 8/22/85; Attachments (4) (bulky) (ks) (Entered: 10/08/1996)
490 MOTION filed by Special Master for compensation; Exhibits A-E. (bjl) (Entered: 10/17/1996)
491 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion for compensation; [490-1] (N) (bjl) (Entered: 10/17/1996)

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10/18/1996 10/21/1996 10/23/1996 10/31/1996 10/31/1996 11/01/1996 11/05/1996 11/06/1996 11/06/1996 11/07/1996
11/07/1996

492 REPLY by receiver RONALD SHANSKY to response to amended motion for approval of the receivership budget for fiscal Year 1997 [4841] (ks) (Entered: 10/21/1996)
SCHEDULING NOTICE: motion hearing set for 10:00 11/6/96; before Judge William B. Bryant. (dot) (Entered: 10/22/1996)
493 NOTICE OF FILING by plaintiffs of comments on defendant's objections to the proposed Receiver's Budget (ks) (Entered: 10/24/1996)
494 ACTIVITY REPORT by receiver RONALD SHANSKY for Medical and Mental Health Services at the District of Columbia Central Detention Facility, 8/1/96 through 8/31/96; Attachments. (ks) (Entered: 11/01/1996)
495 ACTIVITY REPORT by receiver RONALD SHANSKY for Medical and Mental Health Services at the District of Columbia Central Detension Facility, 7/1/96 through 7/31/96; Attachments. (ks) (Entered: 11/01/1996)
496 NOTICE by special master GRACE M. LOPES of recommendations regarding the motion for approval of the receivership budget for fiscal year 1997. (ks) (Entered: 11/04/1996)
497 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 11/8/96 to file their monthly Report to the court. (ks) (Entered: 11/06/1996)
503 MOTION filed by special master GRACE M. LOPES for compensation (JMF) (Entered: 11/14/1996)
STATUS HEARING before Judge William B. Bryant : Reporter: Chris Bitsko (dot) (Entered: 11/27/1996)
498 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting amend/amended motion [484-1], and the Fiscal Year 1997 Receivership budget of sixteen million, two hundred and twenty three thousand, four hundred and fifteen dollars ($16,223,415) be and hereby is approved; the money already paid to the Receivership in Fiscal Year 1997 (($1,063,915.08) and those costs in the Receivership budget which are paid directly by the District of Columbia Department of Corrections ($2,056,434) are credited against the total approved budget referenced above; that the remaining amount ($13,103,065.91) is to be paid to Ronald Shansky, M.D. in eleven monthly payments of $1,191,187.81; the first payment to be issued by 11/18/96, the remaining payments to follow every thirty days; that prior to the preparation of the amount due in August 1997, the Receiver shall be available to meet with defendants in order to determine whether there are any budgeted funds which are not likely to be spent prior to the end of the fiscal year and which can, therefore, be credited to reduce the amount of defendants' remaining payments; that the above-referenced funds shall be subject to audit as referenced in this Court's Order of 9/26/95. (N) (dot) (Entered: 11/07/1996)
499 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 11/8/96 to file their monthly Report to the court. [497-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (dot) (Entered: 11/07/1996)

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11/07/1996 11/07/1996
11/13/1996 11/26/1996 12/05/1996
12/06/1996 12/09/1996 12/09/1996 12/11/1996 01/06/1997 01/07/1997 01/08/1997

500 REPORT by defendants to the Court pursuant to Order entered on 8/22/85; Attachments (4) (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 11/08/1996)
501 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant directing the Clerk of the Court to pay Grace Lopes the sum of $51,675.11 which represents compensation for the services and expenses of Special Officer Lopes, Ms. Schneider, Ms. Fisher and Dr. Belitsky; directing that this check be drawn from the Crestar savings account; directing that the District to pay to the Clerk of the Court the sum of $51,675.11 to replenish the Crestar account. : (N) (bjl) (Entered: 11/08/1996)
502 TRANSCRIPT filed of Trial for date(s) of 11/6/96. Reporter: Thomas C. Bitsko, Miller Reporting Company. (ks) (Entered: 11/14/1996)
504 ACTIVITY REPORT by receiver RONALD SHANSKY for Medical and Mental Health Services at the District of Columbia Central Detention Facility, 9/1/96 through 9/30/96; Attachments (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 11/27/1996)
505 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant granting the motion of Grace Lopes for compensation; directing the Clerk of the Court ti oat Grace Lopes the sum of $42,633.39 for services and expenses of the Special Officer Lopes, Ms. Schneider and Ms. Fisher; directing that this check be drawn from the Crestar Savings Account; directing the District of Columbia pay $42,663.39 to the Clerk of the Court in order to replenish the Crestar Savings Account. : (N) (bjl) (Entered: 12/06/1996)
506 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 12/9/96 to file their monthly report to the Court. (ks) (Entered: 12/09/1996)
507 REPORT by defendants to the Court (261st) pursuant to Order entered 8/22/85; Attachments (4). (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 12/10/1996)
508 NOTICE OF FILING by receiver RONALD SHANSKY of supplement to September 1996 Activity Report for Medical and mental Health Services at the District of Columbia Central Detention Facility; Attachments (ks) (Entered: 12/10/1996)
509 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 12/9/96 to file their monthly report to the Court. [506-1] by DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (dot) (Entered: 12/11/1996)
510 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 1/10/97 to file their monthly Report to the Court. (ks) (Entered: 01/07/1997)
511 MOTION filed by special master GRACE M. LOPES for compensation ; exhibits (1) (JMF) (Entered: 01/08/1997)
512 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : for compensation [511-1]; Clerk of Court shall pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $34,240.39 which represents compensation for the services and expenses of Special Officer Lopes, Ms. Schneider, Ms. Fisher and Delaney, Siegel, Zorn and Associates, Inc.; check shall be drawn from the Inmates of Modular account; District of Columbia shall pay $34,240.39 to the Clerk of Court

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01/10/1997 01/10/1997 01/31/1997 02/06/1997 02/10/1997
02/10/1997 02/13/1997 02/13/1997 02/13/1997 02/27/1997 03/05/1997 03/05/1997

in order to replenish the Inmates of Modular account by 1/22/97 (N) (dbw) (Entered: 01/09/1997)
513 REPORT by defendants of the Court (262nd), pursuant to Court's Order entered on 8/22/85. (ks) (Entered: 01/13/1997)
514 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 1/10/97 to file their monthly Report to the Court. [510-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (dot) (Entered: 01/13/1997)
515 ACTIVITY REPORT by receiver RONALD SHANSKY for Medical and Mental Health Services at the District of Columbia Central Detention Facility, 10/1/96 through 10/31/96; Attachments. (ks) (Entered: 02/03/1997)
516 MOTION filed by special master GRACE M. LOPES for compensation ; exhibits (6) (JMF) (Entered: 02/10/1997)
517 ORDER by Judge June L. Green for Judge Willialm B. Bryant : Clerk of Court shall pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $54,530.83 which represents compensation for services and expenses of Special Officer Lopes, Ms. Schneider, Ms. Fisher, Jr.Roche, Mr. Henderson and Dr. Downer [5161]; check shall be drawn from Crestar savings account established by previous orders of the Court; District of Columbia shall pay $54,530.83 to Clerk of Court in order to replenish the Crestar savings account by 2/25/97 (N) (dbw) (Entered: 02/10/1997)
518 MOTION filed by defendants for leave to file, nunc pro tunc, their monthly report to the Court ; EXHIBIT (REPORT TO THE COURT) (ks) (Entered: 02/11/1997)
519 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion for leave to file, nunc pro tunc, their monthly report to the Court [518-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (ks) (Entered: 02/13/1997)
520 REPORT by defendants to the Court (263rd) pursuant to Order of 3/22/85. (ks) (Entered: 02/13/1997)
521 ACTIVITY REPORT by receiver RONALD SHANSKY for Medical and Mental Health Services at the District of Columbia Central Detention Facility, 11/1/96 through 11/30/96; Attachments. (ks) (Entered: 02/13/1997)
DEPOSIT by District of Columbia in the sum of $54,530.83 into the Registry of the Court. (ks) (Entered: 02/28/1997)
522 MOTION filed by special master GRACE M. LOPES for compensation ; exhibits (3) (JMF) (Entered: 03/06/1997)
523 REPORT by defendants (264th) to the Court for the period of 2/5/97 through 3/5/97, pursuant to Court's Order of 8/22/85; Attachments (4) (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 03/06/1997)

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03/07/1997
03/13/1997 03/17/1997
03/24/1997 03/24/1997 03/27/1997 03/27/1997 04/07/1997 04/08/1997
04/08/1997

524 ORDER by Judge June L. Green and Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion for compensation [522-1] by GRACE M. LOPES; directing the Clerk of the Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $28,819.33 which represents compensation for the services and expenses of Special Officer Lopes, Ms. Schneider, and Ms. Fisher; directing the District of Columbia pay $28,819.33 to the Clerk of the Court in order to replenish the Crestar savings account due by 3/20/97. (N) (jeb) (Entered: 03/07/1997)
525 MOTION filed by receiver RONALD SHANSKY to amend the Receiver's Fiscal year 1997 Budget. (ks) (Entered: 03/14/1997)
526 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to amend the Receiver's Fiscal year 1997 Budget. [525-1] by RONALD SHANSKY; that the Receiver's Fiscal Year1997 budget, as approved by this Court's Order of 11/7/96, is amended and increased in the total amount of $98.061.08; that the budget increase shall be effectuated by increasing the monthly payment to Ronald Shansky, M.D., referenced in this Court's Order of 11/7/96, by $16,343.51 commencing with April 1997 payment and continuing through the September 1997 payment; and that the abovereferenced funds shall be subject to audit as referenced in this Court's Order of 9/26/95. (N) (ks) (Entered: 03/18/1997)
527 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants of attachments to their Report to the Court (262nd) that was filed on 1/10/97; Attachments (4). (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 03/25/1997)
528 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants of attachments to their Report to the Court (263rd) filed on 2/10/97; Attachments (4). (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 03/25/1997)
529 NOTICE OF FILING by special master GRACE M. LOPES of the monthly activity report for December 1996 pursuant to court order; attachments (bulky) (blj) (Entered: 03/28/1997)
530 MOTION filed by plaintiffs that the Special Officer be requested to investigate violations of security related orders at the D.C. jail and to make a report with recommendations for remedial action (blj) (Entered: 03/28/1997)
531 MOTION filed by special master GRACE M. LOPES for compensation ; exhibits (4) (JMF) (Entered: 04/08/1997)
532 ORDER by Judge June L. Green and Judge William B. Bryant : [531-1] directing Clerk of the Court to pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $44,689.82 which represents compensation for the services and expenses of Special Officer Lopes, Ms. Schneider, Ms. Fisher, and Dr. Belitsky; check shall be drawn from the Inmates of Modular account established by previous orders of the Court; DC shall pay $44,689.82 to Clerk of Court in order to replenish the Inmates of Modular account by 4/23/97 (N) (dbw) (Entered: 04/08/1997)
533 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 5/11/97, nunc pro tunc, to file their monthly Report to the Court. (ks) (Entered: 04/09/1997)

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04/10/1997 04/11/1997 04/15/1997 04/15/1997
04/21/1997 04/24/1997 05/01/1997 05/06/1997 05/06/1997
05/06/1997 05/07/1997 05/09/1997

534 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 4/21/97 to respond to plaintiffs' motion that the Special Officer be requested to investigate violations of security related Orders at the D.C. Jail and to make a report with recommendations for remedial action. (ks) (Entered: 04/11/1997)
535 REPORT (265th) by defendants to the Court pursuant to Order entered on 8/22/85; Attachments (4). (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 04/14/1997)
536 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 4/11/97, nunc pro tunc, to file their monthly Report to the Court. [533-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (ks) (Entered: 04/16/1997)
537 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 4/21/97 to respond to plaintiffs' motion that the Special Officer be requested to investigate violations of security related Orders at the D.C. Jail and to make a report with recommendations for remedial action. [534-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (ks) (Entered: 04/16/1997)
538 RESPONSE by defendants in opposition to motion that the Special Officer be requested to investigate violations of security related orders at the D.C. jail and to make a report with recommendations for remedial action [530-1] by plaintiffs. (ks) (Entered: 04/22/1997)
539 ACTIVITY REPORT by receiver RONALD SHANSKY for Medical and Mental Health Services at the District of Columbia Central Detention Facility, 1/1/97 through 1/31/97; Attachments. (ks) (Entered: 04/25/1997)
540 REPLY by plaintiffs to response to motion that the Special Officer be requested to investigate violations of security related orders at the D.C. jail and to make a report with recommendations for remedial action [5301] by plaintiffs. (ks) (Entered: 05/02/1997)
541 REPORT by defendants (266th) to the Court pursuant to Order filed 8/22/85; Attachments (4). (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 05/07/1997)
542 ORDER by Judge June L. Green and Judge William B. Bryant : directing Clerk of Court to pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $45,947.95 which represents compensation for the services and expenses of Special Officer Lopes, Ms. Schneider, Ms. Fisher, Mr. Roche, Dr. Cohen and Dr. Downer; check shall be drawn from Crestar savings account established by previous orders of the Court; District of Columbia shall pay $45,947.95 to Clerk of Court in order to replenish Crestar savings account by 5/23/97 (N) (dbw) (Entered: 05/07/1997)
543 MOTION filed by special master GRACE M. LOPES for compensation ; exhibits (4) (JMF) (Entered: 05/07/1997)
544 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants of the Unit Breadkown attachment to the Report to the Court (266th) filed on 5/6/97; Attachment (1). (ks) (Entered: 05/08/1997)
545 MOTION filed by plaintiffs for award of attorneys' fees against

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05/09/1997 05/13/1997
05/21/1997 05/23/1997 05/27/1997 06/02/1997 06/03/1997
06/04/1997 06/06/1997

DELBERT C. JACKSON, ANDERSON MCGRUDER ; Exhibits (9). (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 05/12/1997)
546 MOTION filed by special master GRACE M. LOPES to substitute corrected order for compensation filed May 06, 1997 , and to vacate order filed on May 06, 1997 (JMF) (Entered: 05/12/1997)
547 COPY of ORDER by Judge June L. Green and William B. Bryant : granting motion to substitute corrected order for compensation filed May 06, 1997 [546-1] by GRACE M. LOPES, granting motion to vacate order filed on May 06, 1997 [546-2] by GRACE M. LOPES; directing the Clerk of the Court to pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $45,947.95 which represents compensation for the services and expenses of Special Officer Lopes, Ms. Schneider, Ms. Fisher, Dr. Cohen and Dr. Downer; directing that this check shall be drawn from the Crestar savings account established by previous orders of the Court; directing the District of Columbia to pay $45,947.95 to the Clerk of the Court in order to replenish the Crestar savings account by 5/23/97. (N) (jeb) (Entered: 05/13/1997)
548 ACTIVITY REPORT by receiver RONALD SHANSKY for Medical and Mental Health Services at the District of Columbia central detention facility 2/1/97 through 2/28/97; Attachments. (ks) (Entered: 05/22/1997)
549 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 6/6/97 to file an opposition to plaintiff's motion for award of attorney's fees and expenses. (ks) (Entered: 05/27/1997)
550 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 6/6/97 to file an opposition to plaintiff's motion for award of attorney's fees and expenses. [549-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (ks) (Entered: 05/27/1997)
551 MOTION filed by special master GRACE M. LOPES for compensation ; exhibits (3) (JMF) (Entered: 06/02/1997)
552 ORDER by Judge June L. Green and Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion for compensation [551-1] by GRACE M. LOPES; directing the Clerk of the Court to pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $37,641.67 which represents compensation for the services and expenses of Special Officer Lopes, Ms. Schneider and Ms. Fisher; directing that this check be drawn from the Inmates of Modular Account established by pervious orders of the Court; directing the defendant DC pay $37,641.67 to the Clerk of the Court in order to replenish the Inmates of Modular Account by 6/18/97. (N) (jeb) (Entered: 06/03/1997)
Text not available. (Entered: 06/05/1997)
553 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants DELBERT C. JACKSON, ANDERSON MCGRUDER report to the court the 267th report covers the period of 5/5/97 through 6/5/97; attachments (4) (bulky) (blj) (Entered: 06/09/1997)

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06/11/1997 06/11/1997 06/12/1997 07/03/1997 07/07/1997 07/08/1997 07/09/1997
07/09/1997 07/10/1997 07/10/1997

SCHEDULING NOTICE: motion hearing set for 2:30 7/16/97 ; before Judge William B. Bryant . (ks) (Entered: 06/11/1997)
554 ACTIVITY REPORT by receiver RONALD SHANSKY for Medical and Mental Health Services at the District of Columbia Central Detention Facility, 3/1/97 through 3/31/97; Report. (ks) (Entered: 06/12/1997)
555 REPLY by plaintiff to response to motion for award of attorneys' fees and expenses against DELBERT C. JACKSON, ANDERSON MCGRUDER [545-1] by WILLIAM H. CALLOWAY; attachments (2) (bm) (Entered: 06/13/1997)
557 MOTION filed by plaintiffs for leave to file report of special Officer concerning the murder of Quan Harris under seal. (ks) (Entered: 07/08/1997)
556 SUPPLEMENT by plaintiffs to motion for award of attorneys' fees against DELBERT C. JACKSON, ANDERSON MCGRUDER [545-1] by WILLIAM H. CALLOWAY (ks) (Entered: 07/08/1997)
558 REPORT by defendants to the Court, filed pursuant to Court's Order of 8/22/85; Attachments (4). (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 07/09/1997)
559 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant and Judge June L. Green: granting motion for compensation [479-1] by GRACE M. LOPES, granting motion for compensation [464-1] by GRACE M. LOPES, granting motion for compensation [446-1] by GRACE M. LOPES, granting motion for compensation [453-1] by GRACE M. LOPES; directing the Clerk of the Court to pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $19,125.66 which represents compensation for the services and expenses of Special Officer Lopes; this check shall be drawn from the Crestar savings account established by previous orders of the Court; directing the Clerk of the Court to pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $19,264.10 which represents compensation for the services and expenses of Ms. Schneider, Ms. Fisher, Dr. Downer and Mr. Henderson; this check shall be drawn from the Twenty-Thousand Dollar Fund established by previous orders of the Court; directing the District of Columbia to pay $19,125.66 to the Clerk of the Court in order to replenish the Crestar savings account and pay $19,264.10 to the Clerk of the Court in order to replenish the TwentyThousand Dollar Fund, by 7/25/97. (N)(mlp) Modified on 07/10/1997 (Entered: 07/09/1997)
560 MOTION filed by special master GRACE M. LOPES for compensation ; exhibits (5) (JMF) (Entered: 07/10/1997)
561 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion for leave to file report of special Officer concerning the murder of Quan Harris under seal. [557-1] by WILLIAM H. CALLOWAY (N) (ks) (Entered: 07/10/1997)
562 NOTICE OF FILING by receiver RONALD SHANSKY of the activity report for Medical and Mental Health Services at the District of Columbia Centeral Detention Facility, 4/1/97 through 4/30/97 pursuant to

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07/15/1997 07/16/1997 08/06/1997 08/06/1997 08/11/1997 08/11/1997
08/14/1997 08/19/1997 08/19/1997 08/19/1997
08/21/1997

court's order; attachments (blj) (Entered: 07/11/1997)
SCHEDULING NOTICE: motion hearing set for 2:30 8/19/97 ; before Judge William B. Bryant in courtroom 16 on the sixth floor. (blj) (Entered: 07/15/1997)
563 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM by defendants in opposition to motion for award of attorneys' fees against DELBERT C. JACKSON, ANDERSON MCGRUDER [545-1] by WILLIAM H. CALLOWAY; Exhibit (1). (ks) (Entered: 07/17/1997)
564 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants DELBERT C. JACKSON, ANDERSON MCGRUDER report to the Court pursuant to the court's order dated 8/22/95; attachments (4) (bulky) (blj) (Entered: 08/07/1997)
565 MOTION filed by plaintiffs for an award of attorneys fees against defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON ; Attachment (1) (blj) (Entered: 08/07/1997)
566 MOTION filed by special master GRACE M. LOPES for compensation ; exhibits (6) (JMF) (Entered: 08/12/1997)
567 ORDER (Copy) by Judge William B. Bryant and June L. Green : granting motion for compensation [566-1] by GRACE M. LOPES; that the Clerk of the Court pay Grace M. Lopes the sum of $46,084.76 which represents compensation for the services and expenses of Special Officer Lopes, Ms. Schneider, Ms. Fisher, Dr. Cohen, Dr. Belitsky, and Mr. Henderson; and that the District of Columbia shall pay $46,084.75 to the Clerk of the Court in order to replenish the Crestar savings account by 9/2/97. (Original filed in CA 79-1726) (N) (ks) (Entered: 08/14/1997)
568 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF by plaintiffs on pending motion to order the defendants to show cause; Attachments. (ks) (Entered: 08/14/1997)
MOTION HEARING before Judge William B. Bryant taken under advisement by plaintiffs motion for an award of attorneys fees against defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON [565-1] Reporter: Dennis Dinkel (ks) (Entered: 08/20/1997)
569 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendants by Jacques Philippe Lerner (ks) (Entered: 08/20/1997)
570 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion that the Special Officer be requested to investigate violations of security related orders at the D.C. jail and to make a report with recommendations for remedial action [530-1] by plaintiffs; in the course of conducting the audit, Mr. Henderson shall consult with an expert who is selected by the defendants and who is agreeable to the Special Officer. The defendants' expert shall be free to express his or her own opinions on the issues which are subject to the audit in a report that will be made an appendix to Mr. Henderson's report. (N) (ks) (Entered: 08/20/1997)
571 RESPONSE by defendant in opposition to motion for an award of attorneys fees against defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON [565-1] by

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08/21/1997 08/25/1997 08/25/1997 09/03/1997 09/04/1997
09/08/1997 09/08/1997 10/03/1997 10/06/1997
10/07/1997 10/08/1997 10/10/1997

plaintiffs; Exhibits (2). (ks) (Entered: 08/22/1997)
572 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to provide further brifing on the application of the prison litigation Reform Act ; Exhibits (2). (ks) (Entered: 08/22/1997)
573 TRANSCRIPT filed of Motions hearing for date(s) of 8/19/97. Reporter: Dennis A. Dinkel (ks) (Entered: 08/26/1997)
574 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM by plaintiff in support of motion for an award of attorneys fees against defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON [565-1] by plaintiffs. (ks) (Entered: 08/26/1997)
575 MOTION filed by special master GRACE M. LOPES for compensation ; exhibits (4) (JMF) (Entered: 09/04/1997)
576 ORDER by Judge June L. Green and Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion for compensation [575-1] by GRACE M. LOPES; directing the Clerk of the Court to pay to Grace M. Lopes the sum of $37,212.70 which represents compensation for the services and expenses of Special Officer Lopes, Ms. Schneider, Ms. Fisher and Mr. Roche; directing that this check be drawn from the Inmates of Modular Facility savings acount established by previous orders of the Court; directing the District of Columbia to pay $37,212.70 to the Clerk of the court in order to replenish the Inmates of Modular Facility Savings Account due by 9/18/97. (N) (jeb) (Entered: 09/08/1997)
577 REPORT by defendants to the Court (270th), pursuant to Court's Order of 8/22/85; Attachments (4). (bulky) (ks) (Entered: 09/09/1997)
578 ACTIVITY REPORT by receiver RONALD SHANSKY for Medical and Mental Health Services at the District of Columbia Central Detention Facility, 5/1/97 through 5/31/97. (ks) (Entered: 09/09/1997)
579 ACTIVITY REPORT by receiver RONALD SHANSKY for Medical and Mental Health Services at the District of Columbia Central Detention Facility, 6/1/97 through 6/30/97; Attachments. (ks) (Entered: 10/06/1997)
580 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion of the Receiver for an Order to Facilitate the Payment of his October 1997 costs and Expenses; that by 10/20/97, defendant DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA will issue a check made payable to Ronald Shansky, M.D. in the amount of $1,245,832.83; that the above-referenced funds shall be subject to audit as referenced in this Court's Order of 9/25/95. (N) (dot) (Entered: 10/06/1997)
581 REPORT by defendants to the Court (271st), filed pursuant to Court's Order entered on 3/22/85; Attachments (4). (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 10/08/1997)
582 MOTION filed by special master GRACE M. LOPES for compensation ; exhibits (3) (JMF) (Entered: 10/09/1997)
583 MOTION filed by Special Officer GRACE M. LOPES to release Report

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10/16/1997
10/28/1997 10/29/1997 10/29/1997 10/29/1997
10/31/1997 11/05/1997 11/06/1997
11/06/1997 11/06/1997

to Kathryn Monaco and Alan Henry (ks) (Entered: 10/14/1997)
584 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to release Report to Kathryn Monaco and Alan Henry [583-1] by GRACE M. LOPES; that the Special Officer is authorized to release James D. Henderson's 1994 staffing report directly to Kathryn Monaco and Alan Henry; that Ms. Monaco and Mr. Henry shall not release the report to non-parties to the above-captioned cases. (N) (dot) (Entered: 10/16/1997)
588 MOTION filed by receiver RONALD SHANSKY for an order to facilitate the payment of his November 1997 costs and expenses. (ks) (Entered: 10/29/1997)
585 MEMORANDUM by Judge William B. Bryant (N) (dot) (Entered: 10/29/1997)
586 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion for award of attorneys' fees against DELBERT C. JACKSON, ANDERSON MCGRUDER [545-1] by WILLIAM H. CALLOWAY; that the plaintiffs are awarded attorneys' fees and expenses in the amount of $101,567.26. (N) (dot) (Entered: 10/29/1997)
587 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion of the Receiver for an Order to Facilitate the Payment of his November 1997 Costs and Expenses; that by 11/18/97, defendant DC will issue a check made payable to Ronald Shansky, M.D. in the amount of $1,245,832.83; that the above-referenced funds shall be subject to audit as referenced in this Court's Order of 9/25/95. (N) (dot) (Entered: 10/29/1997)
589 JOINT MOTION by defendants, and plaintiffs for entry of consent Orders modifying appointment of Special Officer. (ks) (Entered: 11/04/1997)
590 NOTICE OF FILING by special master GRACE M. LOPES of final accounting; exhibits (4) (JMF) (Entered: 11/06/1997)
591 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting joint motion for entry of consent Orders modifying appointment of Special Officer. [589-1] by plaintiff, defendant; that, effective 11/1/97, the Court's Order Appointing Special Officer of 4/20/93, is modified to provide that the duties previously assigned to Grace M. Lopes are assigned to Karen M. Schneider. The foregoing Order otherwise shall continue in full force and effect. Ms. Schneider is authorized to consult with and seek assistance from Ms. Lopes with regard to any matter within the scope of the Special Officer's duties. (N) (dot) (Entered: 11/06/1997)
592 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion for an award of attorneys fees against defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON [565-1] by plaintiff; that the plaintiffs are awarded attorneys' fees and expenses in the amount of $132,592.00. (N) (dot) (Entered: 11/07/1997)
593 MOTION filed by defendants DELBERT C. JACKSON, ANDERSON MCGRUDER nunc pro tunc, to extend time to 11/10/97 to file their

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11/10/1997 11/12/1997 11/13/1997
11/14/1997 11/26/1997 12/02/1997 12/03/1997
12/03/1997 12/03/1997 12/05/1997 12/05/1997

monthly report to the court (blj) (Entered: 11/07/1997)
594 REPORT by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER to the Court, pursuant to Order filed 8/22/85; Attachments (4). (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 11/12/1997)
595 MOTION filed by special master for compensation ; exhibits (5) (JMF) (Entered: 11/13/1997)
597 ORDER (Copy) by Judge William B. Bryant and Judge June L. Green : granting motion for compensation [595-1] by KAREN M. SCHNEIDER; that the Clerk of Court pay Special Officer Karen M. Schneider the sum of $39,652.04 which represents compensation for the services and expenses of Ms. Lopes, Ms. Schneider and Mr. Roche; and that the Clerk of the Court pay Special Officer Karen M. Schneider the sum of $5,931.24 which represents underpayment by the defendants in prior motions for compensation. (Original filed in CA79-1726) (N) (ks) (Entered: 11/17/1997)
596 ACTIVITY REPORT by receiver RONALD SHANSKY for Medical and Mental Health Services at the District of Columbia Central Detention Facility, 7/1/97 throught 7/31/97; Attachments. (ks) (Entered: 11/17/1997)
598 ACTIVITY REPORT by receiver RONALD SHANSKY for Medical and Mental Health Services at the District of Columbia Central Detention Facility, 8/1/97 through 8/31/97. (ks) (Entered: 11/28/1997)
599 MOTION filed by receiver RONALD SHANSKY for order to facilitate the payment of his December 1997 costs and expenses. (ks) (Entered: 12/03/1997)
600 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion for order to facilitate the payment of his December 1997 costs and expenses. [599-1] by RONALD SHANSKY; by 12/18/97, defendant DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA will issue a check made payable to Ronald Shansky, M.D. in the amount of $1,245,832.83; the above-referenced funds shall be subject to audit as referenced in this Court's Order of 9/25/95. (N) (dot) (Entered: 12/03/1997)
601 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 12/29/97 for filing Notice of Appeal ; Affidvait (1); EXHIBIT (NOTICE OF APPEAL) (ks) (Entered: 12/04/1997)
607 NOTICE OF APPEAL by defendants from order [592-1], order [586-1] , entered on: 10/29/97 and 11/7/97; No fees paid; Copies mailed to J. Patrick Hickey and Jonathan M. Smith. (ks) Modified on 01/22/1998 (Entered: 12/17/1997)
602 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants DELBERT C. JACKSON, ANDERSON MCGRUDER report to the court pursuant to stipulation and order of 8/22/85; attachments (3) (bulky) (blj) (Entered: 12/08/1997)
603 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER for

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12/08/1997 12/08/1997
12/10/1997 12/17/1997
12/17/1997 12/19/1997 12/22/1997 12/24/1997 12/30/1997 01/05/1998 01/06/1998

conpensation ; exhibits (5) (JMF) (Entered: 12/08/1997)
604 STATEMENT filed by plaintiff, regarding: non-opposition to defendants' motion to extend time for filing notice of appeal. (blj) (Entered: 12/09/1997)
608 ORDER (COPY) by Judge William B. Bryant and June L. Green : granting motion for conpensation [603-1] by KAREN M. SCHNEIDER; that the Clerk of the Court pay Special Officer Karen M. Schneider the sum of $42,988.11 which represents compensation for the services and expenses of Ms. Schneider, Ms. Lopes, Mr. Roche, Mr. Henderson and Dr. Downer. (Original filed in CA 79-1726) (N) (ks) (Entered: 12/18/1997)
605 ACTIVITY REPORT by receiver RONALD SHANSKY for Medical and Mental Health Services at the District of Columbia Central Detention Facility, 9/1/97 through 9/30/97; Attachments. (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 12/11/1997)
606 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 12/29/97 for filing Notice of Appeal [601-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON; that the time for defendants to file an appeal from the order filed in this case on 10/29/97, is extended for thirty (30) days or until ten (10) days from the date of this Order, whichever is later. (N) (dot) (Entered: 12/17/1997)
TRANSMITTED PRELIMINARY RECORD on appeal [607-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON to U.S. Court of Appeals (ks) (Entered: 12/17/1997)
609 NOTICE OF APPEAL by defendants DELBERT C. JACKSON, ANDERSON MCGRUDER from order [586-1] , entered on: 10/29/97; no fees paid; copies mailed to Jonathan Smith, George Miller and James Hickey. (blj) (Entered: 12/22/1997)
TRANSMITTED PRELIMINARY RECORD on appeal [609-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON to U.S. Court of Appeals (blj) (Entered: 12/22/1997)
610 MOTION filed by receiver RONALD SHANSKY for order to facilitate the payment of his January 1998 Costs and Expenses. (ks) (Entered: 12/29/1997)
USCA # 97-7235 assigned for appeal [609-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (ks) Modified on 06/01/1999 (Entered: 12/31/1997)
USCA # 97-7236 assigned for appeal [609-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (ks) (Entered: 01/05/1998)
611 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion for order to facilitate the payment of his January 1998 Costs and Expenses. [610-1] by RONALD SHANSKY; that by 1/20/98, defendant DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA will issue a check made payable to RONALD SHANSKY,

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01/07/1998 01/08/1998 01/09/1998 01/12/1998
01/12/1998 01/15/1998 01/22/1998 01/27/1998 02/02/1998 02/04/1998 02/05/1998 02/06/1998

M.D. in the amount of $1,245,832.83; that the above-referenced funds shall be subject to audit as referenced in this Court's Order of 9/25/95. (N) (dot) (Entered: 01/06/1998)
612 REPORT by defendants to the Court pursuant to Order filed 8/22/85; Attachments (4). (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 01/08/1998)
613 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER for compensation ; exhibits (9) (JMF) (Entered: 01/09/1998)
614 NOTICE OF FILING by receiver RONALD SHANSKY of the Fiscal Year 1998 Budget for the Office of the Receiver for Medical and Mental Health Services for the District of Columbia Central Detention Facility; Report. (ks) (Entered: 01/12/1998)
615 ORDER (Copy) by Judge William B. Bryant and Judge June L. Green : granting motion for compensation [613-1] by KAREN M. SCHNEIDER; that the Clerk of the Court pay Special Officer Karen M. Schneider the sum of $57,271.81 which represents compensation for the services and expenses of Ms. Schneider, Ms. Lopes, Mr. roche, Mr. Czerniak, Dr. Cohen, Mr. Phillips, Mr. O'Brien and Mr. Henderson; and that the District of Columbia shall pay $57,271.81 to the Clerk of the Court in order to replenish the Inmates of Modular account by 2/6/98. (Original filed in CA 79-1726) (N) (ks) (Entered: 01/13/1998)
616 ACTIVITY REPORT by receiver RONALD SHANSKY for Medical and Mental Health Services at the District of Columbia Central Detention Facility, 10/1/97 throught 10/31/97; Attachments. (ks) (Entered: 01/13/1998)
617 MOTION filed by receiver RONALD SHANSKY for approval of the Receivership Budget for Fiscal Year 1998. (ks) (Entered: 01/16/1998)
CORRECTED TRANSMITTED PRELIMINARY RECORD on appeal [607-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON to U.S. Court of Appeals (ks) (Entered: 01/22/1998)
618 OBJECTIONS by defendant to motion for approval of the Receivership Budget for Fiscal Year 1998. [617-1] by RONALD SHANSKY; Attachments. (ks) (Entered: 01/28/1998)
USCA # 97-7236 assigned for appeal [607-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (ks) (Entered: 02/03/1998)
619 REPLY by receiver RONALD SHANSKY to objections to the Receiver's proposed budget [618-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON . (ks) (Entered: 02/05/1998)
620 REPORT by defendants to the Court (275th), pursuant to Court's Order of 8/22/85; Attachments (3). (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 02/06/1998)
621 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER for compensation ; exhibits (11) (JMF) (Entered: 02/09/1998)

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02/11/1998
02/12/1998 02/13/1998 02/18/1998 02/19/1998 02/24/1998
03/06/1998 03/10/1998

624 ORDER (Copy) by Judge William B. Bryant and Judge June L. Green : granting motion for compensation [621-1] by KAREN M. SCHNEIDER; that the Clerk of the court pay Special Officer Karen M. Schneider the sum of $75,058.19 which represents compensation for the services and expenses of Ms. Schneider, Ms. Lopes, Mr. Roche, Mr. Sandalow, Dr. Downer, Dr. Belitsky, Mr. Henderson, Mr. O'Brien, Mr. Phillips, Mr. Maupin and Mr. Hackle. (Original filed in CA 79-1726) (N) (ks) (Entered: 02/23/1998)
622 REPLY by plaintiffs to objections to the Receiver's proposed budget [618-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON . (ks) (Entered: 02/13/1998)
623 STATEMENT filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER of Recommendations regarding the motion for approval of the receivership budget for Fiscal Year 1998. (ks) (Entered: 02/17/1998)
SCHEDULING NOTICE: motion hearing set for 2:30 2/19/98; before Judge William B. Bryant Courtroom 16, Sixth Floor. (dot) (Entered: 02/18/1998)
MOTION HEARING before Judge William B. Bryant Reporter: William McAllister (dot) (Entered: 03/05/1998)
625 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion for approval of the Receivership Budget for Fiscal Year 1998. [617-1] by RONALD SHANSKY, and the Fiscal Year 1998 Receivership budget of fourteen million, eight hundred and twenty seven thousand, two hundred and forty three dollars ($14,827,243) is approved; the money already paid to the Receivership in Fiscal Year 1998 ($,983,331.32) and those costs in the Receivership budget which are paid directly by the District of Columbia Department of Corrections ($405,579) are credited against the total approved budget referenced above; that the remaining amount ($9,438,332.68) is to be paid to Ronald Shansky, M.D. in eight monthly payments of $1,179,791.59; the first payment (for February 1998) to be issued by 3/12/98, the second payment to be made by 3/26/98, and the remaining payments for April through September 1998 to be made by the eighteenth day of the month; that prior to the preparation of the amount due in August 1998, the Receiver shall be available to meet with defendants in order to determine whether there are any budgeted funds which are not likely to be spent prior to the end of the fiscal year and which can, therefore, be credited to reduce the amount of defendants' remaining payments; that the above-referenced funds shall be subject to audit as freferenced in this Court's Order of 9/26/95. (N) (dot) (Entered: 02/24/1998)
626 REPORT by defendants to the Court (276st) filed pursuant to Court's Order entered 8/22/85; Attachments (4) (Bulky). (ks) (Entered: 03/09/1998)
627 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER for compensation ; exhibits (10) (JMF) (Entered: 03/11/1998)

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03/11/1998 03/12/1998
03/18/1998 03/20/1998 03/20/1998 04/02/1998 04/03/1998 04/06/1998 04/10/1998 04/17/1998 04/29/1998 05/06/1998

DEPOSIT in the sum of $75,058.19 by the District of Columbia into the Registry of the Court pursuant to Court's Order filed 2/11/98. (ks) (Entered: 03/12/1998)
628 ORDER (Copy) by Judge William B. Bryant and Judge June L. Green : granting motion for compensation [627-1] by KAREN M. SCHNEIDER; that the Clerk of the Court pay Special Officer Karen M. Schneider the sum of $44,151.12 which represents compnsation for the services and expenses of Ms. Schneider, Ms. Lopes, Mr. Roche, Ms. Sandalow and Ms. Banks; and that the Clerk of the Court pay Special Officer Karen M. Schneider the sum of $53,086.66 which represents compensation for the services and expenses of Mr. Henderson, Mr. O'Brien, Mr. Phillips and Mr. Maupin. (Original Order filed in CA 79-1726) (N) (ks) (Entered: 03/18/1998)
629 ACTIVITY REPORT by receiver RONALD SHANSKY for Medical and Mental Health Services at the District of Columbia Central Detention Facility, 11/1/97 through 11/30/97; Attachments. (ks) (Entered: 03/19/1998)
630 MOTION filed by plaintiffs for award of attorney's fees and expenses ; Attachments. (ks) (Entered: 03/23/1998)
631 ACTIVITY REPORT by receiver RONALD SHANSKY for Medical and Mental Health Services at the District of Columbia Central Detention Facility, 12/1/97 throught 12/31/97; Attachments. (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 03/23/1998)
632 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER for compensation ; exhibits (8) (JMF) (Entered: 04/03/1998)
633 RESPONSE by defendants in opposition to motion for award of attorney's fees and expenses [630-1] by WILLIAM H. CALLOWAY; Exhibits (2). (ks) (Entered: 04/06/1998)
634 REPORT by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER to the Court, filed pursuant to Court's Order of 8/22/85; Attachments (2). (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 04/07/1998)
635 REPLY by plaintiffs to response to motion for award of attorney's fees and expenses [630-1] by WILLIAM H. CALLOWAY (ks) (Entered: 04/13/1998)
636 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : staying motion for award of attorney's fees and expenses [630-1] pending a decision by the Court of Appeals in 97-7236. (N) (dot) (Entered: 04/17/1998)
637 ACTIVITY REPORT by receiver RONALD SHANSKY for Medical and Mental Health Services at the District of Columbia Central Detention Facility, 1/1/98 through 1/31/98; Attachments. (ks) (Entered: 04/30/1998)
638 REPORT by defendants (278th) to the Court pursuant to Order entered 8/22/85; Attachments (4). (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 05/07/1998)

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05/07/1998 06/03/1998 06/05/1998 06/05/1998
06/08/1998 06/09/1998 06/12/1998 07/02/1998 07/07/1998 07/07/1998
07/10/1998

639 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER for compensation ; exhibits (7) (JMF) (Entered: 05/08/1998)
642 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER for compensation ; exhibits (7) (JMF) (Entered: 06/09/1998)
640 MOTION filed by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER to extend time to 6/12/98 to file their Monthly Report to the Court. (ks) (Entered: 06/08/1998)
644 ORDER by Aubrey E. Robinson, Jr. for Judges June L. Green and Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion for compensation [642-1] by KAREN M. SCHNEIDER; directing the Clerk of the court to pay Special Officer Karen M. Schneider the sum of $62,717.28 which represents compensation for the services and expenses of Ms. Schneider, Ms. Lopes, Mr. Wiley, Ms. Sandalow, Mr. Maupin and KPMG, Peat Marwick; directing the defendant DC to pay $62,717.28 to the Clerk of the Court in order to replenish the Crestar Savings Account by 6/26/98. (N) (jeb) (Entered: 06/10/1998)
641 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 6/12/98 to file their Monthly Report to the Court. [640-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (dot) (Entered: 06/08/1998)
643 ACTIVITY REPORT by receiver RONALD SHANSKY for Medical and Mental Health Services at the District of Columbia Central Detention Facility, 2/1/98 through 2/28/98; Attachment (1). (ks) (Entered: 06/10/1998)
645 REPORT by defendants to the Court (279th), pursuant to Order filed 8/22/85; Attachments (4). (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 06/15/1998)
646 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER for compensation ; exhibits (8) (JMF) (Entered: 07/06/1998)
647 NOTICE OF FILING by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER Report to the Court; attachments (4). (dot) (Entered: 07/13/1998)
652 ORDER (Copy) by Judge William B. Bryant and Judge June L. Green : granting motion for compensation [646-1] by KAREN M. SCHNEIDER; that the Clerk of the Court pay Special Officer Karen M. Schneider the sum of $52,049.61 which represents compensation for the services and expenses of Ms. Schneider, Ms. Lopes, Mr. Wiley, Ms. Sandalow, Dr. Belitsky, and Mr. Maupin; and that the District of Columbia Shall pay $52,049.61 to the Clerk of the Court in order to replenish the Crestar Savings Account by 7/20/98. (Original filed in CA 79-1726) (N) (ks) (Entered: 08/21/1998)
648 ACTIVITY REPORT by receiver RONALD SHANSKY for Medical and Mental Health Services at the District of Columbia Central Detention Facility, 3/1/98 through 3/31/98; Attachments. (Bulky) (ks) (Entered:

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08/06/1998 08/07/1998 08/10/1998 08/10/1998 08/11/1998
08/26/1998 09/02/1998 09/03/1998 09/08/1998 09/08/1998
09/10/1998

07/29/1998)
654 MOTION filed by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER to extend time to 8/10/98 to file their monthly Report to the Court (ks) (Entered: 08/21/1998)
649 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER for compensation ; exhibits (7) (JMF) (Entered: 08/10/1998)
650 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting defendants' motion for enlargement of time to file their monthly report to the court; monthly report due 8/10/98. (N) (dot) (Entered: 08/12/1998)
651 NOTICE OF FILING by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER the Report to the Court; attachments (4). (dot) (Entered: 08/12/1998)
653 ORDER (Copy) by Judge William B. Bryant and Judge June L. Green : granting motion for compensation [649-1] by KAREN M. SCHNEIDER; that the Clerk of the Court pay Special Officer Karen M. Schneider the sum of $52,685.03 which represents compensation for the services and expenses of Ms. Schneider, Ms. Lopes, Mr. Wiley, Ms. Sandalow, Mr. Henderson and Mr. Maupin; and that the District of Columbia shall pay $52,685.03 to the Clerk of the Court in order to replenish the Crestar Savings Account by 8/25/98. (Original filed in CA 79-1726) (N) (ks) (Entered: 08/21/1998)
655 ACTIVITY REPORT by receiver RONALD SHANSKY for Medical and Mental Health Services at the District of Columbia Central Detention Facility, 4/1/98 through 4/30/98; Attachments. (ks) (Entered: 08/27/1998)
656 MOTION (consent) filed by receiver RONALD SHANSKY for order re Collective Bargaining Agreement ; Exhibits (3). (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 09/03/1998)
658 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER for compensation ; exhibits (7) (JMF) (Entered: 09/09/1998)
657 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion for order re Collective Bargaining Agreement [656-1] by RONALD SHANSKY; setting directives for the Receiver and the D.C. Department of Corrections (See Order for details) (N) (ks) (Entered: 09/08/1998)
662 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant and Judge June L. Green : granting motion for compensation [649-1] by KAREN M. SCHNEIDER; that the Clerk of the Court pay Special Officer Karen M. Schneider the sum of $38,455.70 which represents compensation for the services and expenses of Ms. Schneider, Ms. Lopes, Mr. Wiley, Ms. Sandalow, Mr. O'Brien and Mr. Maupin; and that DC shall pay $38,455.70 to the Clerk of the Court in order to replenish the Crestar. (Original filed in CA 79-1726) (N) (ks) (Entered: 09/21/1998)
659 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : amending the Court's Order of 2/24/98 and defendant DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA shall issue a check

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09/10/1998
09/10/1998 09/21/1998 09/30/1998 10/05/1998 10/06/1998 10/07/1998
10/30/1998 11/04/1998 11/06/1998

made payable to Ronald Shansky, M.D. in the amount of $1,551,739 by 9/25/98; the above-referenced funds shall be subject to audit as referenced in this Court's Order of 9/26/95. (N) (dot) (Entered: 09/10/1998)
660 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : that by 10/9/98, defendant DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA shall issue a check made payable to Ronald Shansky, M.D. in the amount of $1,071,225; the above referenced funds shall be subject to audit as referenced in this Court's Order of 9/26/95. (N) (dot) (Entered: 09/10/1998)
661 REPORT by defendants to the Court (282nd) for the periord of 8/5/98 through 9/5/98, filed pursuant to Court Order entered 8/22/85; Attachments (4). (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 09/14/1998)
663 ACTIVITY REPORT by receiver RONALD SHANSKY for Medical and Mental Health Services at the District of Columbia Central Detention Facility, 5/1/98 through 5/31/98; Attachments. (ks) (Entered: 09/22/1998)
664 STATUS REPORT by receiver RONALD SHANSKY for Medical and Mental Health Services from 6/1/98 through 6/30/98 (st) (Entered: 10/01/1998)
665 STATUS REPORT by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER for the period of 9/5/98 through 10/5/98 (bulky) (st) (Entered: 10/06/1998)
666 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER for compensation ; exhibits (6) (JMF) (Entered: 10/07/1998)
668 ORDER (Copy) by Judge William B. Bryant and Judge June L. Green : granting motion for compensation [666-1] by KAREN M. SCHNEIDER; that the Clerk of the Court pay Special Officer Karen M. Scheider the sum of $54,905.77 which respresents compensation for the services and expenses of Ms. Schneider, Ms. Lopes, Mr. Wiley, Ms. Sandalow, Mr. Maupin and KPMG Peat Marwick, LLP. (Original filed in CA 79-1726) (N) (zz) (Entered: 11/04/1998)
667 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : directing that by 11/16/98, the deft DC shall issue a check payable to Ronald Shansky, M.D. in the amount of $1,071,225 ; and these funds shall be subject to audit as reference in this court's order of 9/26/95 (N) (jaw) (Entered: 10/30/1998)
669 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER for compensation ; exhibits (6) (jf) (Entered: 11/05/1998)
670 ORDER (copy) by Judges William B. Bryant and June L. Green: granting motion for compensation [669-1] by KAREN M. SCHNEIDER; directing the Clerk of the Court to pay Special Officer Karen M. Schneider $40,495.45; this chech shall be drawn from the Crestar Savigs account; D.C. shall pay $40,495.45 to the Clerk of the Court in order to replenish the Crestar Savings account by 11/24/98. (N) (Original filed in C.A. 80-2136) (mlp) (Entered: 11/06/1998)

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11/06/1998 12/04/1998 12/07/1998
12/07/1998 12/09/1998
12/09/1998 12/10/1998 01/06/1999
01/07/1999 01/07/1999 01/11/1999
01/12/1999

671 STATUS REPORT by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER; attachments (3) (jf) (Entered: 11/09/1998)
672 CERTIFIED COPY of judgment filed in USCA dated 10/30/98, on appeal [609-1], appeal [607-1] , reversing the judgment of USDC , and remanding for further proceedings. OPINION USCA # 97-7234 & 977236 (cjp) (Entered: 12/04/1998)
673 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : directing that by 12/18/98 deft DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA shall issue a check payable to Ronald Shansky, MD in the amount of $1,071,225.00 ; and these funds shall be subject to audit as referenced in this Court's order of 9/26/95 (N) (jaw) (Entered: 12/07/1998)
674 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER for compensation ; exhibits (7) (tw) (Entered: 12/08/1998)
675 ORDER by Judges William B. Bryant and June L. Green: granting motion for compensation [674-1] by KAREN M. SCHNEIDER; directing Clerk of Court to pay Special Officer Karen M. Schneider $39,726.72 for compensation; check is to be drawn from the Crestar Savings account established by previous orders of the Court; D.C. is to pay $39,726.72 to the Clerk of Court in order to replenish the Crestar Savings account. (N) (mlp) (Entered: 12/09/1998)
676 STATUS REPORT (information for the 285th report) by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER; Attachments. (lkn) (Entered: 12/10/1998)
677 NOTICE OF FILING by receiver RONALD SHANSKY of report of independent auditors; Attachments. (lkn) (Entered: 12/11/1998)
678 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : directing that by 01/22/99, defendant District of Columbia shall issue a check made payable to Ronald Shansky, M.D. in the amount of $1,071,225.00; directing that the $1,071,225.00 shall be subject to audit as referenced in this Court's Order of 09/26/95. (N) (gew) (Entered: 01/06/1999)
679 JOINT MOTION by defendant for order resolving undisputed portion of plaintiffs' claim for attorneys' fees and costs from time period May 01, 1996 up to and including 10/31/98 (jf) (Entered: 01/11/1999)
683 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER for compensation (jf) (Entered: 01/14/1999)
680 ORDER by Judges William B. Bryant and June L. Green: granting motion by Special Officer Karen M. Schneider for compensation; directing the Clerk of the Court to pay Ms. Schneider $56,400.99; this check shall be drawn from the Crestar Savings account established by previous orders; D.C. shall pay $56,400.99 to the Clerk of the Court in order to replenish the Crestar Savings account. (N) (mlp) (Entered: 01/12/1999)
681 REPORT TO THE COURT by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON,

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01/13/1999
02/02/1999 02/05/1999
02/10/1999 02/11/1999 03/03/1999 03/04/1999
03/09/1999 03/15/1999

defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER ; exhibits (3) (bjsp) (Entered: 01/13/1999)
682 CONSENT ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting joint motion for order resolving undisputed portion of plaintiffs' claim for attorneys' fees and costs from time period May 01, 1996 up to and including 10/31/98 [679-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON; directing that District of Columbia shall pay Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge the sum of $62,708.57 in settlement of the undisputed portion of pltfs' claim for fees and costs for the period 5/1/96 to 10/31/98 (N) (jaw) (Entered: 01/14/1999)
684 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER for compensation ; exhibits (6) (jf) (Entered: 02/03/1999)
685 ORDER by Judges June L. Green and William B. Bryant: granting motion for compensation [684-1] by KAREN M. SCHNEIDER; directing the Clerk of Court to pay Ms. Schneider the sum of $34,563.11 for compensation; the check is to be drawn from the Crestar Savings account established by previous orders of the Court; D.C. is to pay $34,563.11 to the Clerk of the Court in order to replenish the Crestar Savings account by 2/19/99. (N) (mlp) (Entered: 02/05/1999)
686 STATUS REPORT by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER; Attachment. (lkn) (Entered: 02/11/1999)
687 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : directing that by 2/26/99, deft. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA shall issue a check made payable to Ronald Shansky, M.D. in the amount of $1,071,225; and these funds shall be subject to audit as referenced in this Court's order of 9/25/95 (N) (jaw) (Entered: 02/12/1999)
688 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER for compensation ; exhibits (8) (jf) (Entered: 03/03/1999)
689 ORDER by Judge June L. Green and Judge June L. Green for Judge William B. Bryant: granting motion for compensation [688-1] by KAREN M. SCHNEIDER; Clerk of the Court to pay Special Officer Karen M. Schneider the sum of $51,455.80 as compensation for services and expenses; the check is to be drawn from the Crestar Savings account established by previous orders of the Court; D.C. shall pay $51,455.80 to the Clerk of the Court in order to replenish the Crestar Savings account by 3/22/99. (N) (mlp) (Entered: 03/05/1999)
690 STATUS REPORT by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER; attachments (3) (jf) (Entered: 03/10/1999)
691 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : directing that by 3/26/99, deft DC shall issue a check made payable to Ronald Shansky, MD in the amount of $1,071.225 ; and that these funds shall be subject to audit as referenced in this Court's order of 9/26/95 (N) (jaw) (Entered: 03/15/1999)

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04/02/1999 04/06/1999
04/06/1999
04/13/1999 05/06/1999 05/06/1999 05/07/1999 05/10/1999
06/02/1999 06/03/1999

693 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER for compensation ; exhibits (6) (jf) (Entered: 04/06/1999)
692 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant for Judge June L. Green : that the Clerk of the Court pay Special Officer Karen M. Schneider the sum of $42,232.77, which represents compensation for the services and expenses of Ms. Schneider, Ms. Lopes, Mr. Wiley, Ms. Sandlow and Mr. Maupin; that this check shall be drawn from the Crestar Savings account established by previous orders of the Court; that the District of Columbia shall pay $42.232.77, to the Clerk of the Court in order to replenish the Crestar Savings account by the 21st day of April, 1999 (N) (lkn) (Entered: 04/06/1999)
694 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : directing that by 4/26/99, deft. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA shall issue a check made payable to Ronald Shansky, M.D. in the amount of $1,071.225; and these funds shall be subject to audit as referenced in this Court's order of 9/26/95 (N) (jaw) (Entered: 04/07/1999)
695 STATUS REPORT, regarding 288th report, by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER; Attachments (3). (lkn) (Entered: 04/14/1999)
696 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : directing that by 5/26/99, deft. DC shall issue a check made payable to Ronald Shansky, M.D. in the amount of $1,071,225; and that these funds shall be subject to audit as referenced in this Court's order of 9/26/95 (N) (jaw) (Entered: 05/07/1999)
697 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER for compensation ; exhibits (8) (jf) (Entered: 05/07/1999)
698 STATUS REPORT by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER; exhibits (3) (jf) (Entered: 05/10/1999)
699 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant and by Judge William B. Bryant for Judge June L. Green: granting motion for compensation [697-1] by KAREN M. SCHNEIDER; Clerk to pay Ms. Schneider $59,180.00 for services and expenses, this check is to be drawn from the Crestar Savings account established by previous orders of the Court, D.C. to pay $59,180.00 to the Clerk of the Court in order to replenish the Crestar Savings account by 5/25/99. (N) (mlp) (Entered: 05/11/1999)
700 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER for compensation ; exhibits (7) (jf) (Entered: 06/03/1999)
701 ORDER by Judges William B. Bryant and June L. Green: granting motion for compensation [700-1] by KAREN M. SCHNEIDER; Clerk of the Court is to pay Special Officer Schneider the sum of $41,830.61 which represents compensation for the services and expenses; this check shall be drawn from the Crestar Savings account established by previous orders of the Court; D.C. is to pay $41,830.61 to the Clerk of the Court in order to replenish the Crestar Savings account by 6/17/99. (N) (mlp) (Entered: 06/03/1999)

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06/08/1999
06/08/1999 07/07/1999 07/07/1999
07/09/1999 07/27/1999 08/03/1999
08/03/1999 08/06/1999 09/02/1999 09/07/1999

702 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : directing that by 6/28/99, deft. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA shall issue a check made payable to Ronald Shansky, M.D. in the amount of $1,071,225; and that these funds shall be subject to audit referenced in this Court's order of 9/26/95 (N) (jaw) (Entered: 06/09/1999)
703 STATUS REPORT by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER for the period of May 5, 1999 thru June 5, 1999 (jf) (Entered: 06/10/1999)
704 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER for compensation ; exhibits (4) (tb) (Entered: 07/08/1999)
705 ORDER by Judges William B. Bryant and June L. Green: granting motion for compensation [704-1] by KAREN M. SCHNEIDER; directing Clerk of the Court to pay Special Officer Karen M. Schneider the sum of $36,731.99 which represents compensation for the services and expenses; this check is to be drawn from the Crestar Savings account established by previous orders of the Court; D.C. is to pay $36,731.99 to the Clerk of the Court in order to replenish the Crestar Savings account by 7/22/99. (N) (mlp) (Entered: 07/08/1999)
706 STATUS REPORT (No. 291)by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER; Attachments. (lkn) (Entered: 07/13/1999)
707 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : directing that by 8/6/99, deft DC shall issue a check made payable to Ronald Shansky, M.D. in the amount of $1,071,222; and these funds shall be subject to audit as referenced in this Court's order of 9/26/95 (N) (jaw) (Entered: 07/27/1999)
708 ORDER by Judges William B. Bryant and June L. Green: granting motion for compensation; directing Clerk of the Court to pay Special Officer Karen M. Schneider the sum of $29,598.98 for compensation for services and expenses; check is to be drawn from the Crestar Savings account established by previous orders of the Court; D.C. shall pay $29,598.98 to the Clerk in order to replenish the Crestar Savings account by 8/19/99. (N) (mlp) (Entered: 08/04/1999)
709 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER for compensation ; exhibits (5) (jf) (Entered: 08/04/1999)
710 STATUS REPORT by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER for the period of 7/5/99 - 8/5/99. (jf) (Entered: 08/10/1999)
713 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER for compensation ; exhibits (5) (jf) (Entered: 09/13/1999)
711 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant and Judge June L. Green : granting motion for compensation [709-1] by KAREN M. SCHNEIDER; directing Clerk of Court to pay special master the sum of $31,827.22 (N) (jf) (Entered: 09/08/1999)

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09/09/1999
09/15/1999 09/24/1999 09/27/1999
10/05/1999 10/06/1999
10/08/1999 10/25/1999
11/02/1999 11/02/1999

712 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : directing that by 9/27/99, deft DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA shall issue a check made payable to Ronald Shansky, M.D. in the amount of $1,938.213.70; and these funds shall be subject to audit as referenced in this Court's order of 9/26/95 (N) (jaw) (Entered: 09/09/1999)
714 NOTICE RE: report number two hundred ninety-three by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER; attachment (1) (tb) (Entered: 09/16/1999)
715 MOTION filed by defendants for adoption of consent order regarding attorneys' fees (jf) (Entered: 09/27/1999)
716 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion for adoption of consent order regarding attorneys' fees [715-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON; directing that the District of Columbia shall pay Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge the sum of $14,428.51 in settlement of pltfs' claim for fees and costs associated with this action from 11/1/98 through 6/30/99 (N) (jaw) (Entered: 09/28/1999)
717 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER for compensation ; exhibits (5) (jf) (Entered: 10/06/1999)
718 ORDER by Judges June L. Green and William B. Bryant: granting motions for compensation [717-1] [713-1] by KAREN M. SCHNEIDER; directing Clerk of Court to pay Special Officer Schneider sum of $44,769.98 as compensation for services and expenses; this check is to be drawn from the Crestar Savings account established by previous orders of the Court; D.C. is to pay $44,769.98 to Clerk of the Court in order to replenish the Crestar Savings account by 10/22/99. (N) (mlp) (Entered: 10/07/1999)
719 STATUS REPORT by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER (Information for report number 294) (lkn) (Entered: 10/12/1999)
720 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : directing that by 11/1/99, deft. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA shall issue a check made payable to Ronald Shansky, M.D. in the amount of $982,725; and directing that these funds shall be subject to the audit as referenced in this Court's order of 9/26/95 (N) (jaw) (Entered: 10/25/1999)
721 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER for compensation ; exhibits (4) (jf) (Entered: 11/03/1999)
722 ORDER by Judges William B. Bryant and June L. Green: granting motion for compensation [721-1] by KAREN M. SCHNEIDER; directing Clerk of the Court to pay Special Officer Schneider the sum of $33,768.04 for compensation; this check shall be drawn from the Crestar Savings account established by previous orders of the Court; D.C. shall pay $33,768.04 to the Clerk of the Court in order to replenish the Crestar Savings account by 11/23/99. (N) (mlp) (Entered: 11/03/1999)

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11/05/1999 11/08/1999 11/09/1999 11/09/1999
11/12/1999
11/12/1999 11/12/1999 11/12/1999
11/17/1999
12/02/1999

723 MOTION filed by plaintiff to reduce time for defendants to respond to plaintiff's request for production of documents ; exhibits (4) (jf) (Entered: 11/09/1999)
724 STATUS REPORT (No. 295) by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER; Attachments (2). (lkn) (Entered: 11/09/1999)
725 MOTION filed by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER for protective order (tb) (Entered: 11/10/1999)
726 RESPONSE by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER in opposition to motion to reduce time for defendants to respond to plaintiff's request for production of documents [723-1] by JOHN MCILWAIN, RICHARD KINARD, ELIGAH HAIR SMITH, ARCHIE R. STOKES, WILLIAM H. CALLOWAY . (tb) (Entered: 11/10/1999)
727 RESPONSE by plaintiff WILLIAM H. CALLOWAY, plaintiff ARCHIE R. STOKES, plaintiff ELIGAH HAIR SMITH, plaintiff RICHARD KINARD, plaintiff JOHN MCILWAIN, plaintiff LEONARD CAMPBELL in opposition to motion for protective order [725-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON . (lkn) (Entered: 11/15/1999)
728 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : denying motion for protective order [725-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (jaw) (Entered: 11/16/1999)
729 RESPONSE by plaintiff WILLIAM H. CALLOWAY, plaintiff ARCHIE R. STOKES, plaintiff ELIGAH HAIR SMITH, plaintiff RICHARD KINARD, plaintiff JOHN MCILWAIN, plaintiff LEONARD CAMPBELL in opposition to defendants' motion for a protective order. (lkn) (Entered: 11/17/1999)
730 MOTION filed by plaintiff WILLIAM H. CALLOWAY, plaintiff ARCHIE R. STOKES, plaintiff ELIGAH HAIR SMITH, plaintiff RICHARD KINARD, plaintiff JOHN MCILWAIN, plaintiff LEONARD CAMPBELL to substitute pages in plaintiffs' opposition to defendants' motion for a protective order ;Attachments (2). (lkn) (Entered: 11/17/1999)
731 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant: upon being informed that the Receiver has proposed a budget payment for fiscal year 2000 (FY 00) of $11,792,700.00; directing that by 11/30/99, deft. D.C. shall issue a check made payable to Ronald Shansky, M.D. in the amount of $982,725.00; the above-referenced funds shall be subject to audit as referenced in this Court's 9/25/95 Order. (N) (mlp) (Entered: 11/18/1999)
732 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER for compensation ; exhibits (4) (jf) (Entered: 12/05/1999)

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12/07/1999
12/09/1999 12/16/1999 01/05/2000
01/13/2000 01/18/2000 02/07/2000 02/09/2000 02/23/2000 03/06/2000

733 ORDER by Judges William B. Bryant and June L. Green: granting motion for compensation [732-1] by KAREN M. SCHNEIDER; directing the Clerk of the Court to pay Special Officer Schneider the sum of $33,148.35 which represents compensation; check shall be drawn from the Crestar Savings account established by previous orders of the Court; D.C. shall pay $33,148.35 to the Clerk of the Court in order to replenish the Crestar Savings account by 12/21/99. (N) (mlp) (Entered: 12/08/1999)
734 STATUS REPORT (No. 295) by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER; Attachment (1) (tth) (Entered: 12/10/1999)
735 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : directing that by 12/30/99, deft. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA shall issue a check made payable to Ronald Shansky, M.D. in the amount of $982,75; and that these funds shall be subject to audit as referenced in this Court's order of 9/26/99 (N) (jaw) (Entered: 12/16/1999)
736 ORDER by Judge June L. Green and Judge June L. Green for Judge William B. Bryant: granting motion by Special Officer Karen M. Schneider for compensation; directing Clerk of Court to pay her $29,500.40 for services and expenses; check shall be drawn from Crestar Savings account established by previous orders of the Court; D.C. shall pay $29,500.40 to the Clerk of the Court in order to replenish the Crestar Savings account by 1/20/00. (N) (mlp) (Entered: 01/10/2000)
737 REPORT TO THE COURT by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER; Attachments (3) (tth) (Entered: 01/14/2000)
738 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : directing that by 1/31/00, deft DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA shall issue a check made payable to Ronald Shansky, M.D. in the amount of $982,725; and these funds shall be subject to audit as referenced in this Court's order of 9/26/95 (N) (jaw) (Entered: 01/18/2000)
739 ORDER by Judge June L. Green and William B. Bryant: granting the motion of Special Karen M. Schneider for compensation. (N) (jeb) (Entered: 02/07/2000)
740 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : directing that by 2/25/00 the deft DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA to issue a check payable to Ronald Shansky, M.D. in the amount of $982,725; and these funds are subject to audit as referenced in this Court's order of 9/26/95 (N) (jaw) Modified on 02/10/2000 (Entered: 02/10/2000)
741 STATUS REPORT by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER; Attachments (3) (tth) (Entered: 02/25/2000)
742 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion of Karen Schneider for compensation; directing that the Clerk of the Court pay Special Officer Karen M. Schneider the sum of $33,793.69 for

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03/08/2000 03/15/2000 03/16/2000
03/30/2000
04/06/2000 04/10/2000
04/11/2000 04/12/2000 04/12/2000 04/24/2000

compensation for the services & expenses of Ms. Schneider, Mr. Wiley, and Ms. Julianelle; directing that the check be drawn from the Crestar Savings Account established by previous orders of the Court; and directing that the DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA by 3/21/00 shall pay $33,793.69 to the Clerk of the Court in order to replenish the Crestar Savings account (N) (jaw) (Entered: 03/07/2000)
743 REPORT TO THE COURT by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER ; attachments (2) (bjsp) (Entered: 03/09/2000)
744 STATUS REPORT by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER on the D.C. Jail receivership for medical and mental healt services; attachments (4) (tw) (Entered: 03/16/2000)
745 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : directing that by 3/27/00, deft DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA shall issue a check made payable to Ronald Shansky, M.D. in the amount of $1,043,740.44; and that these funds shall be subject to the audit as referenced in this Court's order of 9/26/95 (N) (jaw) (Entered: 03/17/2000)
746 NOTICE OF FILING by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER submitting a memorandum from the Warden at the D.C. Jail that informed undersigned counsel that the Jail has not been in complainace with the Court's August 22, 1985 Order from Sunday morning, March 26, through Thursday, March 30, 2000; Attachment (1) (tth) (Entered: 04/03/2000)
747 ORDER by Judge June L. Green & William B. Bryant granting motion of Special Master for services and expenses : (N) (jeb) (Entered: 04/06/2000)
748 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : directing that by 4/21/00 deft DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA shall issue a check made payable to Ronald Shansky, M.D. in the amount of $1,046,856.50; and that the above reference funds shall be subject to audit as referenced in this Court's order of 9/26/95 (N) (jaw) (Entered: 04/11/2000)
749 MOTION filed by defendant to modify order of 08/22/85 (jf) (Entered: 04/12/2000)
750 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to modify order of 08/22/85 [749-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (jaw) (Entered: 04/13/2000)
751 REPORT TO THE COURT by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER covering the period of March 5, 2000, through April 5, 2000.; Attachments (3) (tth) (Entered: 04/13/2000)
752 STATEMENT filed by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER , regarding: withdrawal of motion to reduce the population at the DC Jail filed on 4/21/00 (bjsp) (Entered: 04/25/2000)

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04/26/2000 04/26/2000
04/27/2000 05/03/2000 05/05/2000 05/11/2000
05/11/2000 06/05/2000 06/06/2000
06/09/2000 06/12/2000 06/14/2000 06/14/2000

753 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 4/26/00 within which defendants must reduce the population at the DC Jail ; (FIAT), J. (bjsp) (Entered: 04/27/2000)
754 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL of motion to extend time to 4/26/00 within which defendants must reduce the population at the DC Jail [7531] by DELBERT C. JACKSON (FIAT) BRYANT, J. (bjsp) (Entered: 04/27/2000)
755 ERRATA by defendants to the Court RE: the filing of an amended report to the Court (bjsp) (Entered: 04/28/2000)
756 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER for compensation ; Exhibits (4) (tth) (Entered: 05/05/2000)
757 ORDER by Judge June L. Green and Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion for compensation [756-1] by KAREN M. SCHNEIDER (N) (jeb) Modified on 05/05/2000 (Entered: 05/05/2000)
758 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : directing that by 5/22/00, deft DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA shall issue a check made payable to Ronald Shansky, M.D. in the amount of $1,046.856.50; and directing that above referenced funds shall be subject to audit as referenced in this Court's order of 9/26/95 (N) (jaw) (Entered: 05/12/2000)
759 REPORT TO THE COURT by defendants ; attachments (3) (bjsp) (Entered: 05/12/2000)
761 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER for compensation ; Exhibits (4) (tth) (Entered: 06/08/2000)
760 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion for compensation ; directing Clerk of the Court to pay Special Officer Karen M. Schneider the sum of $32,477.15 as compensation for services of Karen Schneider, Ed Wiley, III, and Patricia Julianelle; and directing that DC shall pay $32,477.15 to the Clerk of the Court by 6/21/00 to replenish the account (N) (jaw) (Entered: 06/08/2000)
762 STATUS REPORT by defendant for periods of 05/05/00 through 06/05/00. (jf) (Entered: 06/12/2000)
763 MOTION filed by receiver RONALD SHANSKY for authority to incur certain costs (cjp) (Entered: 06/15/2000)
764 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion for authority to incur certain costs [763-1] by RONALD SHANSKY (N) (jaw) (Entered: 06/19/2000)
765 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : directing that by 6/23/00, deft DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA shall issue a check made payable to Ronald Shansky, M.D. in the amount of $1,046,856.50; and that these funds shall be subject to audit as reference in this Court's order of 9/26/95 (N) (jaw) (Entered: 06/19/2000)

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06/23/2000 06/28/2000
07/06/2000 07/07/2000
07/12/2000 07/17/2000
08/03/2000
08/04/2000 08/04/2000 08/07/2000 08/09/2000 08/11/2000

766 MOTION filed by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER for adoption of consent order regarding attorneys' fees (ab) (Entered: 06/26/2000)
767 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion for adoption of consent order regarding attorneys' fees [766-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON; directing that the DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA shall pay Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge the sum of $48,645 in settlement of pltfs' claims for fees and costs associated with this case from 7/1/99 through 1/31/00 (N) (jaw) (Entered: 06/28/2000)
768 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER for compensation for services, and expenses of Ms. Schneider, Mr. Wiley and ms. Julianelle ; Exhibits (4) (tth) (Entered: 07/11/2000)
769 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion for compensation for services, and expenses of Ms. Schneider, Mr. Wiley and ms. Julianelle [768-1] by KAREN M. SCHNEIDER; and directing that the DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA shall pay $38,004.99 to Clerk of the Court to replenish the Crestar Savings account (N) (jaw) (Entered: 07/12/2000)
770 REPORT TO THE COURT by defendants; exhibits (3) (bjsp) (Entered: 07/13/2000)
771 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : directing that by 7/24/00, deft DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA shall issue a check made payable to Ronald Shansky, M.D. in the amount of $1,046,856.50 ; and directing that the above-referenced funds shall be subject to audit as referenced in this Court's order of 9/26/95 (N) (jaw) (Entered: 07/17/2000)
772 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : directing that by 8/21/00, deft DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA shall issue a check made payable to Ronald Shansky, M.D. in the amount of $1,046,856.50 ; and that the abovereference funds shall be subject to audit as referenced in this Court order of 9/26/95 (N) (jaw) (Entered: 08/04/2000)
773 MOTION filed by defendant to terminate the receivership and the underlying order entered relative to medical and mental health services ; exhibits (2) (jf) (Entered: 08/08/2000)
774 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER by Robert Utiger (jf) (Entered: 08/08/2000)
SCHEDULING NOTICE: motion hearing on motion of deft to terminate receivership set for 2:30 9/18/00 ; before Judge William B. Bryant in courtroom 16 on 6th (jaw) (Entered: 08/07/2000)
775 ORDER by Judge June L. Green and Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion for compensation(N) (jaw) (Entered: 08/11/2000)
776 REPORT TO THE COURT by defendants; attachments (3) (bjsp) (Entered: 08/14/2000)

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08/18/2000 08/22/2000 09/01/2000 09/05/2000
09/07/2000
09/12/2000 09/12/2000 09/15/2000 09/18/2000

777 MOTION (CONSENT) filed by plaintiffs to extend time to 9/5/00 to file plaintiffs' motion in response to the defendants' motion to terminate the receivership and underlying orders entered relative to medical and mental health services (bjsp) (Entered: 08/21/2000)
778 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time to 9/5/00 to file plaintiffs' motion in to the defendants' motion to terminate the receivership and underlying orders entered relative to medical and mental health services [777-1] by WILLIAM H. CALLOWAY response to motion(s) due by 9/5/00 ; (N) (jaw) (Entered: 08/23/2000)
779 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : directing that by 09/15/00, defendant DISRICT OF COLUMBIA shall issue a check made payable to Ronald Shansky, M.D. in the amount of $1,046,856.50 ; directing that the above referenced funds shall be subject to audit as referenced in this Court's order of 09/26/95 (N) (tb) (Entered: 09/05/2000)
780 RESPONSE by plaintiff WILLIAM H. CALLOWAY, plaintiff ARCHIE R. STOKES, plaintiff ELIGAH HAIR SMITH, plaintiff RICHARD KINARD, plaintiff JOHN MCILWAIN, plaintiff LEONARD CAMPBELL in opposition to motion to terminate the receivership and the underlying order entered relative to medical and mental health services [773-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON; exhibits (5) (cjp) (Entered: 09/06/2000)
781 ORDER (copy) by Judge William B. Bryant and Judge June L. Green : granting motion for compensation and that the Clerk of the Court pay Special Officer Karen M. Schneider the sum of $42,358.67 which represents compensation for the services and expenses of Ms. Schneider, Mr. Wiley, Ms. Julianelle and Dr. Greifinger; that the District of Columbia shall pay $42,358.67 to the Clerk of the Court in order to replenish the Crestar Savings account by 9/22/00. (Original filed in CA 80-2136) (N) (ks) Modified on 09/07/2000 (Entered: 09/07/2000)
782 REPORT TO THE COURT by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER ; exhibits (3) (bjsp) (Entered: 09/13/2000)
783 REPLY by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER to plaintiffs' opposition to motion to terminate the receivership and the underlying order entered relative to medical and mental health services [773-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON ; exhibit (1) (bjsp) Modified on 09/13/2000 (Entered: 09/13/2000)
784 FINAL REPORT by receiver RONALD SHANSKY; exhibits (2) (cjp) (Entered: 09/18/2000)
MOTION HEARING before Judge William B. Bryant taken under advisement by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON motion to terminate the receivership and the underlying order entered relative to medical and mental health services [773-1]; oral motion to admit Benjamin M. Dean pro hac vice, heard and granted; Reporter: Bill

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09/18/2000 09/18/2000
09/27/2000 09/28/2000
10/04/2000
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MacAllister (tb) (Entered: 09/18/2000)
785 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for plaintiffs by Eric Robert Lotke (tb) (Entered: 09/18/2000)
786 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to terminate the receivership and the underlying order entered relative to medical and mental health services [773-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON; terminating the findings and order appointing receiver entered on 07/11/95; terminating requirements relative to medical and mental health services set forth in previously filed order entered (N) (tb) Modified on 09/19/2000 (Entered: 09/19/2000)
788 MOTION (CONSENT) filed by defendants and plaintiffs to enter proposed consent order (tth) (Entered: 09/29/2000)
787 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : That the remaining balance in the Receiver's accounts be tranferred to the Speical Officer of the Court, Karen Schneider; and that the Special Officer will deposit these funds into a construction account and use these funds solely for construction, architectural, construction management or other expenses that have been approved by the defendants for the completion of this renovation project; the Special Officer will return an funds not expended to the defendants; and that after the renovation project is completed, the Special Officer will file with the Court a final accounting of the funds transferred from the Receiver's accounts and the expenditures made. (N) (ks) (Entered: 09/29/2000)
789 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to enter proposed consent order [788-1] by plaintiffs, defendant; that the Clerk of the Court pay Special Officer Karen M. Schneider the sum of $57,645.03 which represents compensation for the services and expenses of Ms. Schneider, Mr. Wiley, ms. Julianelle and Mr. Becker; and that the District of Columbia shall pay $57,645.03 to the Clerk of the Court in order to replenish the Crestar Savings account by 10/20/00. (N) (ks) (Entered: 10/04/2000)
790 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for plaintiff WILLIAM H. CALLOWAY, plaintiff ARCHIE R. STOKES, plaintiff ELIGAH HAIR SMITH, plaintiff RICHARD KINARD, plaintiff JOHN MCILWAIN, plaintiff LEONARD CAMPBELL by Benjamin M. Dean (bjsp) (Entered: 10/06/2000)
791 TRANSCRIPT filed for date(s) of 09/18/00. Reporter: William D. McAllister (jf) (Entered: 10/17/2000)
792 REPORT TO THE COURT by defendants; attachments (bjsp) (Entered: 10/23/2000)
793 ORDER (Copy) by Judge William B. Bryant and Judge June L. Green : granting motion for compensation; that the Clerk of the Court pay Special Officer Karen M. Schneider the sum of $43,472.36 which represents compensation for the services and expenses of Ms. Schneider,

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11/09/2000 11/14/2000 11/16/2000
12/07/2000
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02/01/2001 02/09/2001 02/13/2001

Mr. Wiley and Ms. Julianelle; and that the District of Columbia shall pay $43,472.36 to the Clerk of the Court in order to replenish the Crestar Savings account by 11/22/00 (Original filed in CA 80-2136) (N) (ks) (Entered: 11/09/2000)
794 REPORT TO THE COURT by defendants; exhibits (3) (bjsp) (Entered: 11/14/2000)
795 MOTION filed by defendants DELBERT C. JACKSON, and ANDERSON MCGRUDER for adoption of consent order regarding attorney's fees (ag) (Entered: 11/16/2000)
796 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant: directing defendant District of Columbia to pay, Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge in the sum of twenty-four thousand, nine hundred and eighty-six dollars and fifty-seven (24,986.57) for plaintiff's claim fees and costs (N) (tb) (Entered: 11/16/2000)
798 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant and Judge June L. Green : granting motion for compensation; that the Clerk of the Court pay Special Officer Karen M. Schneider the sum of $27,894.70 which represents compensation for the services and expenses of Ms. Schneider, Mr. Wiley and Ms. Julianelle; and that this check shall be drawn from the Crestar Savings account established by previous orders of the Court; and that DC shall pay $27,894.70 to the Clerk of the Court in order to replenish the Crestar Savings account by 12/22/00. (N) (ks) (Entered: 12/19/2000)
797 REPORT TO THE COURT by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER ; attachments (3) (bjsp) (Entered: 12/13/2000)
799 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER for compensation for the services, and expenses of Ms. Schneider, Mr. Wiley and Ms. Julianelle ; Exhibits (4) (tth) (Entered: 01/08/2001)
800 STATUS REPORT by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER regarding information for report number Three Hundred and Nine. This report covers the period of December 5, 2000, through January 5, 2001; Attachments (3) (tth) (Entered: 01/22/2001)
801 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER for compensation for the services, and expenses of Ms. Schneider, Mr. Wiley, Ms. Julianelle and Dr. Shansky ; Exhibits (5) (tth) (Entered: 02/14/2001)
802 STATUS REPORT by defendant containing information for report number Three Hundred and Ten; attachments (jf) (Entered: 02/15/2001)
803 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants to the Court stating that the Special Officer and counsel has been in compliance with the Court's 8/22/85 order , as amended by the Court's order of 9/18/00 (bjsp) (Entered: 03/01/2001)

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03/01/2001 03/16/2001 03/20/2001 04/03/2001 04/04/2001
04/05/2001
04/23/2001 05/11/2001 05/18/2001 06/12/2001 07/03/2001 07/11/2001 08/02/2001 08/06/2001 08/24/2001

804 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER for compensation (bjsp) (Entered: 03/13/2001)
805 STATUS REPORT for the period of February 5, 2001 through March 5, 2001 defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER; attachments (3) (cas) (Entered: 03/22/2001)
806 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants to the Court's order requesting infomration related to this case be filed. (bjsp) (Entered: 03/23/2001)
807 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER for order granting special officer for compensation ; exhibits (3) (bjsp) (Entered: 04/05/2001)
809 MOTION filed by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER, plaintiff WILLIAM H. CALLOWAY, plaintiff ARCHIE R. STOKES, plaintiff ELIGAH HAIR SMITH, plaintiff RICHARD KINARD, plaintiff JOHN MCILWAIN, plaintiff LEONARD CAMPBELL, special master GRACE M. LOPES, receiver RONALD SHANSKY, special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER for adoption of consent order regarding attorney's fees (cas) (Entered: 04/09/2001)
808 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant the District of Columiba shall pay ShawPittman the sum of eleven thousand, six hundred and thirty-seven dollars and fifty six cents (11,637.56 in settlement of plaintiff's claim for fees and costs from October 1, 2000 through February 28, 2001: (N) (tb) (Entered: 04/06/2001)
810 STATUS REPORT (312) by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON; attachments (3) (bm) (Entered: 04/24/2001)
811 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER for order granting Special Officer for compensation ; exhibits (3) (bjsp) (Entered: 05/14/2001)
812 REPORT to the COURT of Judge William B. Bryant; attachment's (3) (cas) (Entered: 05/21/2001)
813 REPORT TO THE COURT (cas) (Entered: 06/14/2001)
814 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER for compensation ; attachments (3) (bm) (Entered: 07/10/2001)
815 Report to the Court; attachment's (1) (cas) (Entered: 07/16/2001)
816 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER for compensation for services and expenses of Ms. Schneider and Mr. Wiley ; Exhibits (3) (tth) Modified on 08/03/2001 (Entered: 08/03/2001)
817 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion for compensation for services and expenses of Ms. Schneider and Mr. Wiley [816-1] by KAREN M. SCHNEIDER (N) (lin) (Entered: 08/07/2001)
818 REPORT TO COURT by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON;

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09/04/2001 10/05/2001 10/25/2001
11/02/2001 11/05/2001 11/07/2001
11/13/2001 11/13/2001 11/15/2001
11/15/2001 11/15/2001 11/29/2001
12/14/2001

attachment's (cas) (Entered: 08/27/2001)
819 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER for order granting request for compensation ; exhibits (3) (bjsp) (Entered: 09/10/2001)
DEPOSIT by defendants in the amount of $23,634.42 into the registry of the court pursuant to order filed 8/6/01. (nmr) (Entered: 10/09/2001)
820 NOTICE OF FILING by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER to the Court RE: the filing of an attached independent audit of the receivership for medical and mental health services at the DC Jail; attachments (bjsp) (Entered: 10/26/2001)
821 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER for compensation ; exhibits (3) (bjsp) (Entered: 11/05/2001)
822 MOTION filed by defendants, plaintiffs for adoption of consent order regarding attorneys' fees (nmr) (Entered: 11/06/2001)
823 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant upon agreement of parties, the District of Columbia shall pay ShawPittman the sum of eighteen thousand, four hundred dollars (18,400) in settlement of plaintiff's claim for fees and costs associated with this action from March 1, 2001 through August 31, 2001 : (N) (tb) (Entered: 11/08/2001)
824 MOTION filed by defendants to terminate the population limitation (cjp) (Entered: 11/14/2001)
825 MOTION filed by defendants to immediately stay the population limitation ; attachment (1) (cjp) (Entered: 11/14/2001)
826 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to immediately stay the population limitation [825-1] by DELBERT C. JACKSON; population limitation imposed in court's order July 13 and August 22, 1985 is stayed until December 21, 2001 (N) (tb) (Entered: 11/16/2001)
MOTION HEARING before Judge William B. Bryant granting unopposed motion to stay; Reporter: Dennis Dinkel (tb) (Entered: 11/19/2001)
827 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL of motion to terminate the population limitation [824-1] by DELBERT C. JACKSON (cjp) (Entered: 11/19/2001)
828 RESPONSE by plaintiffs WILLIAM H. CALLOWAY, ARCHIE R. STOKES, ELIGAH HAIR SMITH, RICHARD KINARD, JOHN MCILWAIN, and LEONARD CAMPBELL in opposition to Applicant's Motion for Intervention Regarding Capacity and Condition Orders; Exhibits (1) (ag) Modified on 12/03/2001 (Entered: 12/03/2001)
829 REPLY by proposed intervenor Fraternal Order of Police/Department of Corrections Labor Committee to response in opposition to motion for permissive intervention. (nmr) (Entered: 12/17/2001)

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12/21/2001 02/06/2002 02/15/2002 03/01/2002 03/04/2002 03/05/2002
03/06/2002 03/25/2002 04/30/2002 05/03/2002 06/07/2002 06/07/2002

830 STATEMENT filed by defendants to the Court RE: that the defendants have reduced the population at the Central Detention Facility per the Court's order directing the defendants to do this (bjsp) (Entered: 12/28/2001)
831 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants DELBERT C. JACKSON, and ANDERSON MCGRUDER; memorandum dated 2/5/02 from Gregory E. Jackson, General Counsel, Department of Corrections (bm) (Entered: 02/07/2002)
832 NOTICE by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER informing the court that, Special Officer and plaintiffs that the jail has been unable to comply with the court's 8/22/85 order. (td) (Entered: 02/22/2002)
834 MOTION (consent) filed by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER to stay the population limitaiton. (td) (Entered: 03/05/2002)
836 MOTION filed by defendants DELBERT C. JACKSON, and ANDERSON MCGRUDER for adoption of consent order regarding attorneys' fees (bm) (Entered: 03/07/2002)
833 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant: granting motion to immediately stay the population limitation [825-1] by DELBERT C. JACKSON; the population limitation imposed by the Court Orders of 7/13/85 and 8/22/85 be and hereby are stayed until 5/3/02. (N) (dam) (Entered: 03/05/2002)
835 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant: that the District of Columbia shall pay ShawPittman the sum of $16,740.00 in settlement of plaintiffs' claim for fees and costs associated with the civil action from 9/1/01 through 1/31/02. (N) (dam) (Entered: 03/06/2002)
837 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant: denying applecant's motion to intervene regarding capacity and condition orders (N) (dam) (Entered: 03/25/2002)
838 MOTION (consent) filed by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER to extend the stay of the population limitation to 6/7/02. (td) (Entered: 05/02/2002)
839 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant: granting motion to extend the stay of the population limitation to 6/7/02. [838-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (dam) (Entered: 05/03/2002)
840 MOTION (consent) filed by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER to extend the stay of the population limitation. (td) (Entered: 06/10/2002)
843 MOTION filed by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER to terminate the population limitation (dam) (Entered: 06/27/2002)

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06/13/2002 06/21/2002 06/24/2002
09/06/2002 10/10/2002 11/04/2002 11/05/2002 11/12/2002
12/04/2002 12/20/2002 01/03/2003
01/08/2003 02/03/2003

841 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant: granting motion to extend the stay of the population limitation until further order of the court. [840-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (dam) (Entered: 06/13/2002)
842 RESPONSE by plaintiffs to motion to terminate the population limitation. (mpt) (Entered: 06/24/2002)
844 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant: granting motion to terminate the population limitation [843-1]; the population limitation on the D.C. Jail imposed by this Court be and hereby is terminated; the referenced Court orders imposing a population limitation be and hereby are vacated. (N) (dam) (Entered: 06/27/2002)
845 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER for compensation ; exhibits (3) (mpt) (Entered: 09/09/2002)
846 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER for compensation ; attachments (3) (bm) (Entered: 10/11/2002)
847 MOTION filed by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER for adoption of consent order regarding attorneys' fees. (td) (Entered: 11/08/2002)
848 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER for compensation ; attachments (3) (td) (Entered: 11/08/2002)
849 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion for adoption of consent order regarding attorneys' fees [847-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON; the District of Columbia shall pay Shaw Pittman the sum of $23,600 in settlement of plaintiffs' claim for fees and costs associated with this civil action from 2/1/02 through 9/30/02 (N) (adc) (Entered: 11/13/2002)
853 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER for compensation ; exhibits (3) (td) (Entered: 01/13/2003)
850 MOTION filed by District of Columbia's defendants to terminate the Orders ; attachments (3) (bm) (Entered: 12/23/2002)
851 MOTION filed by plaintiffs to extend time within which to respond to defendants' motion to terminate , for order requiring the court's special officer to investigate, assess, and report on defendants' new environmental tracking system , and postponement of automatic stay. (td) (Entered: 01/07/2003)
852 RESPONSE by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER to plaintiffs' motion to extend time [8511] ,investigation by special officer [851-2] and postponement of automatic stay [851-3]. (td) (Entered: 01/09/2003)
854 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER for compensation ; attachment (3) (bm) (Entered: 02/05/2003)

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02/03/2003 02/05/2003
02/21/2003 02/27/2003 03/03/2003 03/03/2003 03/04/2003 03/04/2003
03/05/2003 03/07/2003 03/11/2003 03/14/2003

855 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to extend time within which to respond to defendants' motion to terminate [851-1] by plaintiffs (N) (adc) (Entered: 02/05/2003)
856 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion for compensation [854-1] by KAREN M. SCHNEIDER; the Clerk of the Court shall pay Special Officer Karen Schneider the sum of $27,704.89 which represents compensation for the services and expenses of Ms. Schneider and Mr. Wiley; this check shall be drawn from the Crestar Savings Account; the District of Columbia shall pay $27,704.89 to the Clerk of the Court in order to replenish the Crestar Savings Account by 2/19/03 (N) (adc) (Entered: 02/05/2003)
857 MOTION filed by defendants DELBERT C. JACKSON, and ANDERSON MCGRUDER to reduce time for defendants to respond to plaintiffs' request for production of documents ; attachments (6) (bm) (Entered: 02/24/2003)
862 RESPONSE by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER in opposition to plaintiff's motion to reduce time for defendants to respond to plaintiffs' request for production of documents [857-1]. (td) (Entered: 03/10/2003)
860 RESPONSE by plaintiffs in opposition to motion to terminate [850-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON . (bm) (Entered: 03/07/2003)
861 MOTION filed by plaintiffs for hearing (bm) (Entered: 03/07/2003)
858 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting plaintiffs request for a hearing on defendants' motion to terminate and granting plaintiffs' request for a hearing;status hearing set for 10:00 3/18/03 (N) (adc) (Entered: 03/06/2003)
859 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : denying plaintiffs' motion to order defendants to respond to their request for production of documents by 3/7/03; defendants shall respond to plaintiffs' request for production of documents no later than the close of business on 3/10/03 (N) (adc) (Entered: 03/06/2003)
SCHEDULING NOTICE: status hearing set for 10:00 3/18/03 ; before Judge William B. Bryant Courtroom #16, Sixth Floor. (adc) (Entered: 03/05/2003)
863 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by KAREN M. SCHNEIDER regarding issues related to environmental conditions at the D.C. Jail, pursuant to Order of 2/3/03; Exhibits (53); Volumes (2). (nmr) (Entered: 03/11/2003)
864 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER for order granting compensation ; Exhibits (2) (nmr) (Entered: 03/12/2003)
865 REPLY by defendants to response in opposition to motion to terminate the Orders [850-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C.

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03/17/2003 03/18/2003
03/21/2003
04/02/2003 04/07/2003 04/16/2003 04/21/2003 04/24/2003 05/15/2003 05/19/2003
05/20/2003 05/23/2003 05/23/2003 05/28/2003

JACKSON; Exhibits (5) (nmr) (Entered: 03/17/2003)
866 HEARING BRIEFS by plaintiffs; exhibits (3) (mpt) (Entered: 03/18/2003)
MOTION HEARING before Judge William B. Bryant; witnesses: Karen Schneider, Tomas Marquez, and Odie Washington; parties to submit joint proposed order settling case; Reporter: Jon Hunley (tb) (Entered: 03/18/2003)
867 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to terminate the Orders [850-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON; final request for compensation due no later than 5/30/03; plaintiff's may file remaining claim for attorneys' fees and costs with the Court no later than 5/15/03; upon the filing and approval of the Special Officer's final accounting and compensation request these cases shall be dismissed with prejudice (N) (adc) (Entered: 03/24/2003)
868 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER for order for compensation ; Exhibits (3) (nmr) (Entered: 04/03/2003)
DEPOSIT by District of Columbia of $28,696.03 into the Court's registry. (td) (Entered: 04/08/2003)
869 NOTICE OF APPEAL by plaintiff from order [867-1] , entered on: 3/24/03; $105.00 fee paid; Copy mailed to parties. (td) (Entered: 04/21/2003)
TRANSMITTED PRELIMINARY RECORD on appeal [869-1] by plaintiffsssss to U.S. Court of Appeals (td) (Entered: 04/21/2003)
USCA # 03-7045 assigned for appeal [869-1] by plaintiffsssss (td) (Entered: 05/08/2003)
870 MOTION filed by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON, defendant ANDERSON MCGRUDER for adoption of consent order regarding attorneys' fees. (td) (Entered: 05/19/2003)
872 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion for adoption of consent order regarding attorneys' fees [870-1] by ANDERSON MCGRUDER, DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (adc) (Entered: 05/23/2003)
871 TRANSCRIPT filed for date of 3/18/03 Status Hearing Reporter: Jon Hundley (Miller Reporting Company) (bm) (Entered: 05/22/2003)
873 STATUS REPORT by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER final accounting of the construction account; exhibits (2) (td) (Entered: 05/27/2003)
874 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER to approve accounting ; exhibits (2) (td) (Entered: 05/27/2003)
875 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER to approve acounting ; final accounting of her operating account; attachments (4)

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(bm) (Entered: 05/29/2003)
876 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion to approve accounting [874-1] by KAREN M. SCHNEIDER (N) (adc) (Entered: 05/29/2003)
877 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER to approve accounting ; and final accounting of the Twenty Thousand Dollar Account; attachments (3) (bm) (Entered: 06/04/2003)
878 MOTION filed by special master KAREN M. SCHNEIDER for compensation ; attachments (3) (bm) (Entered: 06/04/2003)
879 MOTION filed by defendant DELBERT C. JACKSON for order of dismissal of cases with prejudice ( 71-1462 & 75-1668) (jf) (Entered: 07/16/2003)
880 ORDER by Judge William B. Bryant : granting motion for order of dismissal of cases with prejudice ( 71-1462 & 75-1668) [879-1] by DELBERT C. JACKSON (N) (adc) (Entered: 07/24/2003)
881 NOTICE OF APPEAL by plaintiff from order [880-1] , entered on: 7/24/03. Copies sent to all parties. $105.00 appeals fee paid. (bjsp) (Entered: 08/07/2003)
TRANSMITTED PRELIMINARY RECORD on appeal [881-1] by WILLIAM H. CALLOWAY, at al to U.S. Court of Appeals (bjsp) (Entered: 08/07/2003)
USCA # 03 7102 assigned for appeal [881-1] by WILLIAM H. CALLOWAY (bjsp) (Entered: 08/08/2003)
882 MANDATE of USCA affirming the District Court's decision as to [869] Notice of Appeal filed by LEONARD CAMPBELL, JOHN MCILWAIN, RICHARD KINARD, ELIGAH HAIR SMITH, ARCHIE R. STOKES, WILLIAM H. CALLOWAY, [881] Notice of Appeal filed by WILLIAM H. CALLOWAY ; USCA #'S 03-7102 & 03-7045 (cp, ) (Entered: 03/11/2004)

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 BEYOND COMMUNITY STANDARDS AND A CONSTITUTIONAL LEVEL OF CARE? A REVIEW OF SERVICES, COSTS, AND STAFFING LEVELS AT THE CORRECTIONS MEDICAL RECEIVER FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA JAIL

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JUNE 30, 2000
Serial No. 106–229
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house http://www.house.gov/reform

72–581 DTP

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 2001

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York STEPHEN HORN, California JOHN L. MICA, Florida THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia DAVID M. MCINTOSH, Indiana MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South
Carolina BOB BARR, Georgia DAN MILLER, Florida ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas LEE TERRY, Nebraska JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois GREG WALDEN, Oregon DOUG OSE, California PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin HELEN CHENOWETH-HAGE, Idaho DAVID VITTER, Louisiana

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California TOM LANTOS, California ROBERT E. WISE, JR., West Virginia MAJOR R. OWENS, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
DC CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts JIM TURNER, Texas THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine HAROLD E. FORD, JR., Tennessee JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
——— BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
(Independent)

KEVIN BINGER, Staff Director DANIEL R. MOLL, Deputy Staff Director DAVID A. KASS, Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian
ROBERT A. BRIGGS, Clerk PHIL SCHILIRO, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman

CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland STEPHEN HORN, California JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington, DC
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

EX OFFICIO

DAN BURTON, Indiana

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

MELISSA WOJCIAK, Staff Director HOWIE DENIS, Professional Staff Member VICTORIA PROCTOR, Professional Staff Member
JENNY MAYER, Clerk JON BOUKER, Minority Counsel

(II)

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C O N T E N T S
Page
Hearing held on Juen 30, 2000 ............................................................................... 1 Statement of:
Ekstrand, Laurie, Director of Administration of Justice Issues, General Government Division, U.S. General Accounting Office; Ronald Shansky, M.D., corrections medical receiver; Karen Schneider, special officer for the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia; Erik Christian, deputy mayor for public health and justice; and John Clark, District of Columbia Corrections trustee, accompanied by Odie Washington, director, District of Columbia Department of Corrections ........................ 20
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by: Christian, Erik, deputy mayor for public health and justice, prepared statement of ................................................................................................... 120 Clark, John, District of Columbia Corrections trustee, prepared statement of ..................................................................................................................... 128 Davis, Hon. Thomas M., a Representative in Congress from the State of Virginia, prepared statement of .............................................................. 4 Ekstrand, Laurie, Director of Administration of Justice Issues, General Government Division, U.S. General Accounting Office, prepared statement of ........................................................................................................... 23 Morella, Hon. Constance A., a Representative in Congress from the State of Maryland, prepared statement of ............................................................ 15 Norton, Hon. Eleanor Holmes, a Delegate in Congress from the District of Columbia, prepared statement of ............................................................ 11 Schneider, Karen, special officer for the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, prepared statement of .................................................... 45 Shansky, Ronald, M.D., corrections medical receiver, prepared statement of ..................................................................................................................... 35
(III)
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BEYOND COMMUNITY STANDARDS AND A CONSTITUTIONAL LEVEL OF CARE? A REVIEW OF SERVICES, COSTS, AND STAFFING LEVELS AT THE CORRECTIONS MEDICAL RECEIVER FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA JAIL
FRIDAY, JUNE 30, 2000
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Thomas M. Davis III (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Davis, Morella, Horn, and Norton. Staff present: Melissa Wojciak, staff director; Howie Denis and Victoria Procter, professional staff members; David Marin, communications director/counsel; Jenny Mayer, clerk; Jon Bouker, minority counsel; and Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk. Mr. DAVIS. Good morning and welcome. Today’s hearing is the second in a series of oversight hearings examining the status of the D.C. agencies overseen by the court-appointed receivers. Currently, there are three agencies that are still in receivership, the Commission on Mental Health Services, the Corrections Medical Receiver for the District of Columbia Jail, and the Child and Family Services. Concerns about the delivery of services and managerial and financial practices in these agencies persists. The fourth agency in receivership is the District of Columbia Housing Authority, which has successfully recovered from mismanagement and is ready to be returned to the D.C. government’s administration. Today the subcommittee is focused on the corrections medical receiver in the D.C. jail. The receiver was appointed 5 years ago by the U.S. district court in order to address Constitutional violations in the delivery of health care at the jail. It is scheduled to end in September 2000. The subcommittee wants to examine the status of D.C.’s progress in meeting its court-ordered obligations so the jail may be returned to the city’s jurisdiction. Rampant problems in the D.C. jail were enumerated in two class action lawsuits filed in the city in the early 1970’s, in Campbell v.
(1)
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2
McGruder and Inmates of D.C. Jail v. Jackson were filed on behalf of pretrial detainees and sentenced inmates.
The plaintiffs’ charged that the conditions and treatment of inmates in jail were unconstitutional. The two suits were consolidated and senior U.S. Judge William B. Bryant presided over them for nearly 30 years.
The time line highlights key court actions and events concerning the D.C. jail. Through the years, Judge Bryant has issued orders requiring the D.C. government to rectify problems with the jail’s medical services. Despite assurances from the city that the necessary changes would be implemented, nothing materialized. Instead, the D.C. jail left the medical services program to languish at below-Constitutional levels.
In April 1993, finding the D.C. government in persistent noncompliance with his orders, Judge Bryant appointed a special officer to monitor and report on the city’s progress on meeting its court-ordered obligations. The city, however, continued to ignore the orders and the deficiencies in the jail’s medical services delivery persisted.
The jail’s suicide rate was out of control. In addition, the jail lacked an effective program to prevent the spread of infectious tuberculosis.
On January 5, 1995, the court ordered the implementation of the initial remedial plan. It was designed by the special officer after extensive consultation with the plaintiffs and the defendants and the special officer’s own medical and mental health experts. The plan addressed the most immediate and egregious problems with the delivery of medical services at the jail. It also provided the framework for major long-term changes to policies and procedures, staffing, and organizational structure. The initial remedial plan was never implemented. In fact, on June 5, 1995, 5 months to the day after the District was ordered to implement the remedial plan, inmate Richard C. Johnson died. Mr. Johnson was an aged patient in the jail’s infirmary who had been neglected for several days by the medical staff. His death highlighted the city’s failure to address the severe deficiencies in the delivery of medical services at the jail.
Citing the physical danger that the D.C. government’s continued blatant violation of the court’s previous order was tragically causing, Judge Bryant placed the jail’s medical and mental health services under court-supervised receivership. The receiver was ordered to implement the initial remedial plan.
The D.C. jail medical services have improved significantly under the receiver, Dr. Ronald Shansky. Dr. Shansky’s tenure has brought the jail remedial changes to increase the level of medical and mental health services to a Constitutionally acceptable level.
In addition, the D.C. jail’s tuberculosis epidemic has been controlled, HIV/AIDS cases are identified and treated, and qualified medical staff have been hired to improve the delivery of care.
The receiver has successfully implemented a suicide prevention program to identify potentially suicidal inmates and provide them with the necessary prevention treatment.
Despite these improvements in the delivery of health care, it is disturbing that the receiver is leaving the D.C. jail with exorbitant
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3
medical costs per inmate and high staffing levels. In both cases, the figures far exceed the national average.
The court order creating the receivership essentially gives the receiver carte blanche to spend the District’s money freely, without regard to sound financial practices and accountability to the D.C. government. Of course, it is important to provide a Constitutional level of medical and mental health services to D.C. jail inmates, but should the D.C. jail receivership accomplish this by spending at least two to three times the national average per inmate per day? Can a city emerging from bankruptcy really sustain this kind of expenditure?
In addition, the receiver issued a request for proposal for a 1year contract to manage the medical services at the jail once the receivership ends in September 2000. The contract was awarded to individuals who were employed by the receiver at the time the proposal was submitted, raising the specter of impropriety in the receiver’s procurement process. The benefit of the RFP is questionable, since it requests bids that would maintain the same services at the jail and therefore the same cost, thereby perpetuating the already high costs that were expended under the receivership.
D.C. government can’t afford these inflated costs and D.C. taxpayers shouldn’t be forced to foot the bill if there are other costeffective alternatives.
Today we will be looking at what reforms, if any, still need to be enacted to comply with the judge’s order. Additionally, the hearing will focus on what resources are needed to maintain the reforms which have already been instituted and to enact any additional reforms required for compliance with the court order so that the jail may return to the city’s jurisdiction.
We will hear from GAO. We will hear from Dr. Shansky; the receiver, John Clark; the corrections trustee; Erik Christian, the deputy mayor for public safety and justice. Karen Schneider, the special officer appointed by the U.S. district court, who refused to testify, requiring this subcommittee to issue its first ever subpoena mandating her appearance.
I would now yield to Delegate Norton for any opening statement she wishes to make, and then we will move right on to the witnesses.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Thomas M. Davis follows:]
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Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I very much appreciate your initiative in calling this hearing and the way in which you have worked with me on this matter, in particular.
Over a period of many years, the District of Columbia lost control over four agencies, but only after the courts had seen their orders violated for years. Judicial patience had justifiably run out. Medical services at the D.C. jail before us today were replete with violations and with inhumane conditions. Respect for even minimal levels of Constitutional rights compelled the action Judge William B. Bryant, a distinguished judge of the U.S. district court here, took to relieve the District of control of the medical function at the jail in 1995.
Chairman Tom Davis and I, and the subcommittee, began our oversight of receiverships only in the wake of a precipitating event in one of the receiverships for which none of the actors, including the receiver, had any explanation or took responsibility, the death of an infant, Brianna Blackmond, committed to the care of the Child and Family Services Agency, under a receivership of the U.S. district court.
Shortly after the infant died, Chairman Davis asked me to join him in requesting GAO investigations of all the outstanding receiverships in order to assure that accountability problems had not developed in the absence of regular public oversight to which city agencies in the District are subjected today.
The Chair then commenced this series of hearings on the three receiverships that are still active, all of which have been subject to serious criticisms. Our own preliminary investigation has not been reassuring. We could not find evidence of significant use by our receivers of best practices of the kind required of District and Federal agencies, such as management and fiscal audits; procurement practices that foster fair and open competition; cost controls that reflect generally acceptable national or regional standards; or even Antideficiency Act requirements universally applicable to government agencies to prevent overspending of funds that are not authorized and available.
With the chairman, I then introduced H.R. 3995, the District of Columbia Receivership Accountability Act. The House passed H.R. 3995 unanimously, and the bill will be marked up by the Senate Governmental Affairs committee shortly.
Even before the GAO reports were in, it is clear that, at a minimum, receivers, their court monitors, and special officers who stand in the shoes of agency heads and their supervisors must operate at least at the standards required of those who have been ousted from control of the agencies involved. The agencies were removed from District control to achieve improvements and higher levels of accountability, beginning with the receivers and their supervisors, who, by definition, are setting the example for the District as to how the agencies are to be run in the future.
All of the receivership agencies originally had severe operational and service problems, but the concerns that remain differ. The jail medical receivership now before us has shown sufficient operational improvements to be scheduled to expire in August 2000, at the end of 5 years, pursuant to the court order establishing the receivership. However, the cost associated with these improvements
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would be astonishing to taxpayers and to any public official charged with responsibility for taxpayer funds.
The GAO investigation Chairman Davis and I have requested is ongoing and unfinished, but three outside experts who looked at the results have raised serious questions concerning cost and procurement practices.
First, and most recently, the D.C. Board of Contract Appeals found that challengers to the receivers’ RFP had not met the heavy burden necessary to divest the contract under D.C. law, even though the receivers’ own employees, while still employed by the receiver, had been awarded the contract to provide future services.
What was significant was the unusually strong language of the board, which wrote, ‘‘While the receiver asserts that he took steps that no offer was unfairly advantaged or disadvantaged, and, in particular, the procurement was designed to encourage outside companies, as well as employee-formed groups to participate, such actions are not apparent.’’
Second, the corrections trustee, a former assistant director for community corrections of the U.S. Bureau of Prisons, the largest in the country, has been charged by this subcommittee with assisting the entire corrections system with systemic management and financial reforms prior to the expiration of his tenure.
In meetings with the receiver and the special officer, the corrections trustee repeatedly objected to the costs of the receivership and the RFP but was successful only in getting the cost lowered from $16 million to $12.5 million, a cost nearly three times the national average for medical services at jails in this country.
Third, Faiver, Campau and Associates, reputable experts in the area of corrections health care, were commissioned by the corrections trustee to analyze the potential cost resulting from the RFP and winning bid. These experts found that the RFP issued by the receiver ‘‘incorporates an administrative structure akin to that often found in a fairly large State corrections system rather than in a moderately sized jail.’’
These experts concluded that ‘‘Nowhere in the country are we aware of a facility of comparable size that has such a top echelon of staff who are not significantly involved in direct patient care.’’
Confronted with cost figures so substantially above those found nationally and in similarly situated regional jurisdictions, and with sharply critical evaluations by outside experts, an explanation is necessary. This hearing is being held to give the receiver and the special officer the opportunity to respond and other witnesses the opportunity to elaborate and be questioned. Thus far, the only response regarding these costs we are aware of from the receivership are a letter from the special officer sent after I wrote to her about our concern, followed by a visit by the special officers receiver, and District correctional officials to my office for a meeting.
In her letter, the special officer justifiably and appropriately warns of the difficulty of doing cost comparisons, but even so concedes that, using the available data, the costs of the contract issued by the receiver is almost twice the national average cited in the applicable surveys.
She then cites the high administrative service cost which she asserts would not be found in the budgets of other jurisdictions. She
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10 also cites modifications that would reduce these costs to $12.92 per inmate per day, although that amount is still nearly twice the national average.
I am in full agreement concerning all the problems associated with analyzing the data involved; however, today local governments and especially the District of Columbia, fresh from insolvency, no longer authorize the expenditure of taxpayer funds without even an attempt to justify costs in comparison to others with similar responsibilities.
In the District, health care, in particular, requires our best effort at such attempts because more than 60,000 D.C. residents have no health insurance. Their health care continues to impose an enormous price on them, personally, on the health care indicators of residents, and on the D.C. government. A D.C. resident should not have to go to jail to get adequate health care and jail should not afford health care that far exceeds what is available to the average resident with and without insurance.
The District government, which stands to inherit the costs of the jail medical receivership, has the task of meeting both Constitutional standards for the health care of people charged with crime and the health needs of ordinary citizens, most of whom are from families who work every day but must look to the District to design a way for them to meet basic health care needs.
Ultimately, the District must take its responsibilities for both these sets of its residents more seriously than the city has in the past.
I look forward to hearing today’s witnesses and to approaching the issues before us as problems that can be solved with sufficient satisfaction to all concerned.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. DAVIS. Thank you very much. [The prepared statement of Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton follows:]
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Mr. DAVIS. Thank you very much. We have been joined by the vice chairman of this committee, Mrs. Morella, who will make a brief statement, as well. Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you, Chairman Davis. I appreciate Ranking Member Norton for calling this very important hearing today to examine the status of the receivership of the District of Columbia’s jail’s medical and mental health services. I am hopeful that this examination will help to enlighten us about how best to deliver this service out of receivership and return it to the control of the D.C. government. Since Dr. Ronald Shansky was appointed the corrections medical receiver for the D.C. jail 5 years ago, much of the crisis has been averted. I am encouraged that many of the problems that were faced by the receiver have been successfully addressed. When the receivership ends in September, the goal will have been met for attaining for the inmates a Constitutional level of health care. Recognition and treatment of depressed and unstable inmates has turned around a dismal situation in the rates of suicide in the jail, the tuberculosis epidemic has been brought under control, and HIV and AIDS cases are identified and treated. Dr. Shansky has brought in qualified medical staff and the level of care provided to the inmates has been greatly improved. I am obviously very concerned, though, that the solution to the dire issues that face the jail can be sustained by the District. Are there alternative staffing solutions and resources that can be applied to this situation to sustain the improvements that have been made under the receiver’s care? This level of care has been accomplished with medical costs and staffing levels that far exceed the national average. The receiver has not been held to sound financial practices and has not been accountable to the District government for its budget. I am further concerned that the request for proposal, the RFP, for a 1-year contract to manage the medical services at the jail once the receiver ends in September 2000, has resulted in a contract being awarded that maintains the staffing levels and medical costs endured under the receivership. If there is a more cost-effective solution, then that needs to be further explored. And so I hope this hearing today addresses these concerns and that, from what we learn, a suitable long-term solution may be received. Though the manner of care has improved over the past 5 years in the D.C. jail, it is imperative that the jail be able to sustain a Constitutional level of services to the inmate. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and yield back. Mr. DAVIS. Thank you very much. [The prepared statement of Hon. Constance A. Morella follows:]
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Mr. DAVIS. I want to call now our panel of witnesses and supporting witnesses to testify: Ms. Laurie Ekstrand, the Director of Administration of Justice Issues of the U.S. General Accounting Office; Ronald Shansky, M.D., the receiver; Ms. Karen Schneider, the Special Officer for the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia; Erik Christian, the deputy mayor for public safety and justice; and Mr. Odie Washington, director, District of Columbia Department of Corrections as a supporting witness; and, of course, John Clark, District of Columbia Corrections trustee.
As you know, it is the policy of our committee that all witnesses and supporting witnesses be sworn before they can testify, so if you would rise and raise your right hands.
[Witnesses sworn.] Mr. DAVIS. Thank you very much. To afford sufficient time for questions, if you’d try to limit yourself, we’ve read the testimony that has been submitted. We were here until 3 a.m., so we didn’t have anything else to do. It doesn’t always get read, but in this case it did. All written statements are going to be made part of the permanent record, so if you would try to dwell on the highlights that will give us time for questions and we can get you out of here earlier, as well. I’ll begin starting with Ms. Ekstrand and then move to Dr. Shansky, Ms. Schneider, Mr. Christian, and then Mr. Clark.
STATEMENTS OF LAURIE EKSTRAND, DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE ISSUES, GENERAL GOVERNMENT DIVISION, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE; RONALD SHANSKY, M.D., CORRECTIONS MEDICAL RECEIVER; KAREN SCHNEIDER, SPECIAL OFFICER FOR THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; ERIK CHRISTIAN, DEPUTY MAYOR FOR PUBLIC HEALTH AND JUSTICE; AND JOHN CLARK, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CORRECTIONS TRUSTEE, ACCOMPANIED BY ODIE WASHINGTON, DIRECTOR, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
Ms. EKSTRAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very pleased to be here today to discuss several issues concerning the District of Columbia receivership contract for medical and mental health services at the D.C. jail. Without further ado, let me get right to the four issues that we were asked to review. The first one is cost. Our comparison of budget data for medical services at the D.C. jail and comparable facilities in Baltimore City and Prince George’s County indicated that D.C. jail’s per capita costs are higher. Indeed, the officials to whom we spoke during our review agreed that D.C. jail provided certain medical services and had staffing levels that exceed those of other facilities. Of course, this drives cost. In relationship to staffing, the inmate-to-staff ratios, as reported by the Office of the Corrections Trustee, is 13-to-1 at the D.C. jail, 74-to-1 in Baltimore, and 48-to–1 in Prince George’s County. The fact that the D.C. jail provides fully staffed pharmacy and both mental and dental services onsite, whereas Baltimore and
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Prince George’s County do not, provides some context for understanding some of the differences in the inmate-to-staff ratios.
Most of the officials to whom we spoke cited the court-ordered remedial plan as the primary reason why the D.C. jail provides enhanced medical services and has higher staffing levels than other jurisdictions. The trustee, however—and I’m sure he will address this himself—feels that adequate medical services could be provided with fewer staff and at lower cost.
The next issue you asked us to review concerned acceptable levels of care for jail inmates. We found that there is no single threshold that determines what an acceptable level of medical services is at the jail. According to experts, this is the case because the acceptable level is related to the medical circumstances and situations that need to be addressed. It can also be a function of specific constraints such as court orders placed on a specific jail facility.
Accreditation standards have been developed by several organizations, including the National Commission on Correctional Health Care. These standards define minimum recommended medical service requirements for jail to voluntarily obtain accreditation. When a facility seeks accreditation, experts review a broad range of factors related to the health of inmates and facility-related issues to make a decision concerning accreditation based on the application of standards to the specific jail setting. The standards then cannot be used as a simple check list to assess whether a facility provides an acceptable level of medical care.
You also asked us to look at the effects of the contracting process on medical service costs. As you know, the current contract maintains the level of medical services and staffing at the levels already in place at the D.C. jail, but the current contract can be modified at any time. In addition, it can be re-competed at its current or scaled-back levels of service and staffing when the base year ends in March 2001.
The solicitation that resulted in the current contract requested that offerors submit proposals that would maintain existing levels of service and staffing. These were referred to as comparison proposals.
According to officials we spoke to, the District sought to maintain existing levels of service to ensure that the receivership is successfully terminated in August 2000, and control of the jail is returned to the District. The solicitation also encouraged offerors to submit alternative proposals for providing health services differently or more economically than they were currently provided.
The Evaluation Committee rated all of the proposals and determined that none of the alternate proposals provided specific enough information to ensure that they would maintain the same level of medical services as would the comparison proposals; thus, the final recommendation of the committee was to endorse a comparison proposal. The committee’s recommendation was sent to the receiver, who selected the contractor.
Finally, let me turn to the issue of whether the failure of the receiver’s employees to resign from their positions prior to being awarded the contract violates D.C. law or regulations.
Under District personnel regulations, a District employee may make an offer on a contract, but generally cannot be awarded the
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22 contract while still in D.C. employment status. The firm that was awarded the contract to provide medical services at the D.C. jail was constituted of employees working for the receiver, not for the District government, thus they were not subject to these provisions of District law.
We would note that the D.C. Contract Appeals Board ruled in May 2000, on a protest by a losing offeror to this procurement. The protestor asserted that the receiver showed bias in favor of the awardee, which was a company formed by the incumbent medical director. The issue of employees’ failure to resign prior to the award was not raised in this protest. The Board denied the protest, finding that there was not proof of bias sufficient to challenge the award; however, the Board noted that certain of the receiver’s actions gave an appearance not conducive to confidence in the fairness of the procurement.
This concludes my oral statement, and I would be glad to answer any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Ekstrand follows:]
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Mr. DAVIS. Dr. Shansky. Dr. SHANSKY. I, too, would like to indicate I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you, and I will try to be brief. I have submitted my written statement to you, as you indicated. At the time the receivership was created, I was contacted, and only after several phone calls reluctantly agreed to accept the responsibility. One of the reasons I agreed was that the District wanted me to assume that responsibility. When I took over in September 1995, the jail was a very chaotic place. In fact, it was in some ways very frightening, not just to me but to the medical staff and to the officer staff, especially, and to the inmates. Numerous officers came to me indicating that they were concerned that if they got injured or something happened there would be no response. As a result of my concerns and my overwhelming sense of responsibility, I chose to stay in the jail. I took a cell and I stayed there in order to make sure that nobody died. Over the course of the next couple years, slowly but surely we were able to recruit a staff that was able to provide services consistent with my mandate, which was the previous court orders. The entire process that I have been involved in has been a collaborative one with the District. This has not been a receivership that has in any way forced anything down the throat of the District. Quite the opposite. The District wanted me to assume this responsibility. I took it. I never felt this was my program or the court’s program, it’s the District’s program. I am a temporary housekeeper trying to put things in order. The District indicated to me that it wanted to maintain services after I departed through a procurement process with a contractor. I agreed to do a procurement and drafted an RFP in complete collaboration with corporation counsel’s office, the Department of Corrections, plaintiffs, special officers, and with input from the trustee’s office. In fact, this RFP was about 6 months in the drafting, with comments included in it from probably a total of 10 or 12 different individuals, most of whom were lawyers. The procurement selection process we were very careful about. We wanted to make sure that the evaluation was a fair and objective one. As a result, a committee was put together completely independent of me. I had no say on who sat on that committee. I had no say in who they selected to assist them in their evaluation process. My only suggestion was that that committee, when it was created, have a majority of District Department of Corrections appointed people. The committee met. The RFP—the proposals were evaluated, and ultimately a not-for-profit group created by employees was selected. I did my own evaluation and I concurred. This was the lowest bidder. For many reasons we thought that this would guarantee the best value for the dollars spent. With regard to is the District getting its bang for its buck, which is a very legitimate question, the process is set up, first of all, so that, literally beginning now, the District can begin negotiating with the vendor on a second year, and if it chooses to reduce some services, eliminate some services, change how it wants the services staffed, it is able to do that.
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34 With a not-for-profit vendor, the unexpended moneys will be returned to the District, just as I returned them over the previous 5 years. We have always come in under budget, and I have every reason to believe that this contract will also come in under budget. With regard to the issue of employees being able to submit a proposal, that somehow it is unfair, every procurement that I am familiar with, once you are in the second round of procurements, has an incumbent, and that incumbent is never excluded from participating because they currently have the contract. That’s not the way contracting is done. This group, because it was a first time for them, was at certain disadvantages in terms of their skills at writing proposals, etc. The particular group that was selected partnered with an experienced for-profit company to handle fiscal management. I believe that the District and I believe the Department of Corrections believes that the District has gotten the best value it could out of its procurement process, and I look forward to the termination of my receivership, hopefully within the next 60 days, so I can get on to other things in my life, but also so that the District can then assume direct responsibility and make whatever modifications, changes it wishes to based on changes in disease, based on changes in responsibilities. For instance, the sentenced felons are supposed to be going to the Bureau of Prisons. When that happens one of the two mental health units will be able to close down and there will be a substantial savings of at least a half a million to $1 million. All of that is in process. When all of the prison inmates are ultimately sent to the Bureau of Prisons, there may be additional changes just based on that reality. So I have no doubt in my mind that over the next several years the budget and per capita costs of this particular contract are going to diminish significantly. I thank you for your time. Mr. DAVIS. Thank you very much. [The prepared statement of Dr. Shansky follows:]
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Mr. DAVIS. Ms. Schneider. Ms. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Norton, and other Members, my name is Karen Schneider. I hold the position of the special officer, which is the special master, as that term is used in Federal rule of civil procedure 53. Judge William Bryant of the U.S. district court for the District of Columbia appointed my predecessor, Grace Lopes, to the position of special officer in 1993 for the purpose of assisting the court in the consolidated action captioned Campbell v. McGruder and Inmates of D.C. Jail v. Jackson. In Campbell, Judge Bryant had issued orders governing conditions and practices of confinement and care at the District of Columbia Jail. I was substituted as special officer in November 1997. Judge Bryant’s order appointing a special officer in Campbell found that the District of Columbia had a long history of noncompliance with court orders regarding medical and mental health care at the D.C. jail, and that a special officer was necessary in order to assist the court to assure future compliance. I ask that Judge Bryant’s order appointing a special officer be made part of the record. The responsibilities, powers, and limitations of the special officer in Campbell are detailed in this order. The special officer is a judicial officer whose principal responsibilities are to monitor and facilitate the District of Columbia’s compliance with the remedial orders of the court and to report and make recommendations to the court regarding compliance. The order authorizes the special officer to informally confer with the parties on compliance issues and to attempt to fashion compromises among the parties, much as a judge might seek to mediate or settle disputes among parties. The order authorizes the special officer to conduct hearings and to submit proposed findings of fact and recommendations to the court. Following her appointment in April 1993, the special officer, with the assistance of experts, evaluated the medical and mental health services at the D.C. jail, and in September 1993, issued a report regarding the compliance of those services with the court’s earlier orders. In March 1994, the court, relying on the special officer’s report, found the District in contempt. In January 1995, the court ordered the District to implement a remedial plan. On July 11, 1995, when the District continued in its state of noncompliance, the court ordered the appointment of a receiver to correct the deficiencies in the delivery of medical and mental health services at the jail. I ask that that order be made part of the record. Mr. DAVIS. Without objection, that will be made a part of the record. Ms. SCHNEIDER. The court’s order detailed the history of the District’s noncompliance and states that over the more than 20 years of this litigation the court has attempted all measures, short of the appointment of a receiver, to obtain the defendant’s compliance with its orders. The court finds that no other less-intrusive remedial measures will succeed in compelling the defendants to satisfy their court-ordered obligations. The July 11, 1995, order provides that the receivership shall expire 5 years from the date the receiver is appointed unless the
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court finds good cause to extend the appointment. The court also reserved the discretion to terminate the receivership at an earlier date if the special officer certified that the defendants are in compliance with all the orders of the court concerning medical and mental health services at the jail, and that management structures are in place to assure that there is no foreseeable risk of noncompliance.
In August 1995, Judge Bryant appointed Ronald Shansky, and in September Judge Bryant entered a detailed order regarding the procedures for the receivership’s exercise of power. I also ask that that order be included in the record. That order has governed the receivership over the last 5 years, and unless the receivership is extended by the court it will expire within 2 months of this hearing.
Since Dr. Shansky is a witness before this subcommittee, he is available to detail the specific activities in exercising the powers given by the court.
I understand that this subcommittee is interested in the contract awarded by the receiver to the Center for Correctional Health and Policy Studies for the provision of health care services at the D.C. jail.
My March 15, 2000, report to Judge Bryant regarding the receivership sets forth the process which led to the development of a request for proposal for that contract and the selection of the vendor for the award of that contract. I ask that that report be made part of the record.
I understand that the members of the subcommittee wish to ask me questions. I previously have informed the subcommittee that there are constraints on the comments I can make which are imposed by the Code of Judicial Conduct for U.S. Judges. That code very clearly states that it is applicable to special masters like me. Decisions of the U.S. court of Appeals for the District of Columbia circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court, and other courts also have determined that a special master is a judicial officer and that there are limits on what judicial officers can say about a pending case.
As I am sure this subcommittee knows, in most circumstances a judge would violate the ethical cannons of the Code of Conduct if she makes public comment about a case that is still pending before her. One of the reasons for that rule is that a judge’s comments might suggest some pre-judgment or the appearance of pre-judgment of an issue that may later come before the judge for decision in the case.
Since the Campbell case is still pending and I may be called upon to address issues in that case in the future, I may not be at liberty to answer all of the questions that are addressed to me. My counsel has submitted a letter to the subcommittee staff in which he elaborates on the legal authority imposing those restrictions on me. I ask that the letter be made part of the record.
However, I will try, to the best of my ability, within those legal constraints, to be responsive and answer the subcommittee’s questions.
Thank you. Mr. DAVIS. Thank you very much. [The prepared statement of Ms. Schneider follows:]
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Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Christian. Mr. CHRISTIAN. Thank you. Good morning. My name is Erik Christian, the Mayor’s deputy for public safety and justice. Good morning, Chairman Davis, Delegate Norton, Congresswoman Morella, and Congressman Horn. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today on the status of the current reform efforts undertaken by the D.C. Department of Corrections to improve medical and mental health services at the D.C. jail. In the first 15 months of the Williams administration, the District government has made great strides in instituting improvements to introduce accountability for each and every agency and employee in order to transform the government into one that is responsive to its citizens. This approach has already shown promising results in the first year and will continue to drive changes in years to come. When Mayor Williams took office, the management challenges the administrator inherited were daunting. Accountability for the District work force was rare, if not nonexistent. A deeply entrenched culture existed that was resistant to change, and, as we all know, there was infrastructure decimated by deferred maintenance and disinvestment and technology needs that were grossly inadequate. Now, the mental and medical health delivery system was no different. It was in need of repair. In fact, medical and mental health services, as well as other conditions at the D.C. jail, have been under court supervision for over 25 years. More recently, in 1993, a medical expert retained pursuant to court order to conduct an investigation and report on medical services at the D.C. jail concluded, ‘‘The quality of medical services is deplorable, the physical condition of the medical area horrible, and the infirmary is a disgrace.’’ At the same time, significant deficiencies were also found by a mental health expert retained pursuant to the court’s order to investigate and report on mental health services. These reports led to the development of a remedial plan the defendants were ordered to implement in January 1995. Unable to implement the remedial plan, U.S. District Judge Bryant, on July 11th, entered an order appointing a receiver to run medical and mental health services at the jail. In its order appointing a receiver, the court found that the District had violated the court’s order and, among other violations, they had failed to properly conduct sick call, failed to operate a chronic disease clinic, failed to implement a quality assurance program, failed to maintain a full-time health services administrator at the jail, failed to properly conduct intake, failed to properly provide meaningful access to specialty services, failed to appropriately and professionally respond to life-threatening emergencies, failed to properly provide medical guides, and failed to keep their own kitchen and medical clinic clean. Moreover, the population the District is serving at the jail has a high rate of HIV/AIDS, a high rate of tuberculosis and other infectious and chronic illnesses such as hypertension, heart disease, epilepsy, diabetes, and asthma, and a significant percentage of inmates requiring treatment for preexisting injuries such as prior
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gunshot wounds and chronic disabilities. Moreover, the jail had experienced a rash of suicides, and there is a high percentage of inmates who suffer a series of mental health problems.
But what is the solution for these problems? The solution is to instate the same solid management practices that this administration is applying to other troubled areas.
Throughout his campaign for Mayor, Mayor Anthony Williams repeated the mantra, ‘‘One government, good government, and self government.’’ These six simple words comprised his vision for the city. One government is a government where all functions that have been placed by the courts under the control of a receiver are returned to the control of this government under the Mayor’s leadership an with oversight of the District’s City Council. This administration is working to create one government and commit it to terminating court-imposed receiverships. Good government is an efficient and effective government. Good government facilitates the goal of one government and will ensure that the city can and does provide human and proper treatment to its jail population; that it complies with the law; and that a structure is instituted that not only makes sure that we end this receivership but assures that we do not in the future revert back into receiverships in the dictates of the court order.
This government is committed to exploring all ways to maximize efficiency and effectiveness. If this contract or any government contract of service is not efficient or effective, we will work to correct, modify, or replace it.
The District wants to work with the Congress, the GAO, and the court to identify ways to continue to reduce costs while maintaining the improved quality of health services required by the law and recommended by correctional health experts to address the unique medical and mental health needs of our population.
Ending receivership is a clear priority of this administration. As this administration continues to apply the principles of good government, we must be successful in our efforts to bring this receivership and all receiverships back under the authority of a Mayor with oversight from the District City Council.
The District is one city and our citizens deserve a unified government. This city deserves the democracy and home rule that receiverships prevent. We need to continue to perform at this high level so that we, as the District government, can demonstrate that we can provide all of our citizens, even those that are incarcerated, the highest and finest level of professional services at competitive rates.
Plain and simple, we need to return to one unified municipal government in the District under the leadership of officials that are accountable to our voters. By returning District agencies that are currently under receivership back to local control, democracy will be driving government here in the Nation’s capital.
Thank you, Mr. Davis and committee members. Mr. DAVIS. Thank you very much. [The prepared statement of Mr. Christian follows:]
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Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Clark. Mr. CLARK. Good morning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Norton, members of the committee. It is a privilege to appear before the committee today at this important hearing. Of course, I have submitted a detailed statement and I will try to just briefly summarize that here. It is not any secret that for 21⁄2 years I have been very concerned on behalf of the District about the exorbitant costs of the receiver’s operation. I’ve made my views known to all the appropriate parties and tried to work to resolve matters. I have not been particularly successful. So what are my concerns? To summarize, when I assumed this new position I was charged, Mr. Chairman, and directed by various authorities in the District and the Congress, including this committee, to take seriously my role of financial oversight in protecting the funds provided for corrections operations both by the District government and the Congress. I assure you I’ve taken that charge very seriously. Therefore, I was stunned when I first visited the jail and reviewed its budget in the fall of 1997 and compared it to my experience as a warden of a similar facility, a Federal facility in Miami about three-quarters the size, and also my experience as Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons for 6 years, where I had policy oversight for all BOP urban jails. In short, the receiver had about 150 FTEs, compared to about 33 at my facility in Miami, and a $16 million budget compared to the equivalent of about a $4 million budget at my similar facility. Further, I was puzzled that when national averages for correctional health care are consistently reported at about $7.50 a day per inmate, it had cost in the District’s jail in excess of $20 a day. As I show in my testimony, in my written testimony, on the chart on page 6, if this contract runs its full length, the price to the District of the receiver’s tenure and the follow-on contract that he has awarded will be over $120 million versus the national average for that period of about $45 million. So the question now arises as to whether it is useful or fair to make comparisons of the receiver’s costs and staffing to other jails. Some have said that we cannot make such comparisons. I assert that of course we can, although certainly it is important to make proper allowances for unique variables. Every manager, whether in private business or public management, has to subject themselves to comparisons. We have to be held accountable to explain differences and discrepancies. That is particularly true in the face of such differences as we face here, which are not, Mr. Chairman, differences at the margins but are an order of magnitude problem. The District simply cannot afford such extravagance. I’m not here to question that the receiver has remedied the former crisis and has installed at the jail a Constitutional level of care for the prisoners, but at what cost to the District? Apart from the past 5 years, my other concerns, primary concerns, at least, are that the District is now stuck with an expensive contract in the amount of $68 million over the next 5 years unless some action is taken.
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The RFP, further, is not performance based, requiring the vendor to supply a certain level of service and care, giving only lip service to cost containment in certain narrative statements. But, where it counts, in the evaluation factors delineated in the RFP, de minimis value was given to cost containment.
I would refer the committee to table five on page 13 of my testimony, which is reproduced from the RFP. As one could see, the total weight of price is listed at 26 percent of the total score. Itself, a low weight but not unprecedented.
However, on closer inspection it is clear that element A, overall price, was only one of five elements scored in the price category, worth approximately 5 to 10 percent of the total score of the bid proposal, to be given little more weight than such vague elements as rational budget, salary structure, and fringe benefits or budget presentation. In other words, the lowest price could easily be more than counterbalanced by a much higher bid—just in this price category—which was simply more rational or showed a better package of benefits or was presented more attractively.
In my extensive experience overseeing Federal Government contracts, price is price. Here the issue was totally blurred.
Where it counted, the real message was that price is not that critical, and so the message went out. Everyone wanted to please the receiver, and to do that a rich staffing level was expected.
The message was heard by the bidders in the form of $12 to $14 million bids for a 1,650 bed operation. The well, indeed, had been poisoned against mainstream price and staffing bids.
In fact, to allow for a true comparison to contracts awarded by other jurisdictions, about $2.5 million should be added to the receiver’s contract cost to account for outside medical expenses covered by other contracts but here borne by the DOC. Therefore, making a true comparative cost figure for medical services at the jail, it’s about $15.2 million. But getting away from averages and rates to more recent comparable examples of actual contracts for medical services, I think Mrs. Morella would be interested to know that in Baltimore and in the Baltimore Detention Center—and several surrounding Maryland facilities, a contract was procured recently for all the services, all-inclusive services for those facilities, for 6,500 inmates, for $19 million. That’s $19 million for four times the number of prisoners that here in the District we are paying $15 million to provide services.
Again, this week in the clips I noticed in Delaware a contract was awarded for more than 6,000 prisoners for $14.2 million. Again, the same money for four times the number of prisoners.
A final example I’d give, in a recent report, another report by GAO in April noted that the Federal Bureau of Prisons, in its only private contract award in a facility—actually, several facilities together in Texas—awarded a contract for $10 million for 5,400 prisoners. That’s several million dollars less for three times the number of prisoners.
Compared with the jail, these are differences in the order of magnitude of three or four times, not at the margins.
I am not asserting that these jurisdictions are identical to the District’s needs or that we should be among the cheapest in the country, but we should be somewhere near the mainstream.
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127 Finally, everyone has to be concerned, in my estimation, that the receiver did not voluntarily recuse himself from being the sole procurement official in what turned out to be a $68 million award, particularly when it became clear that his professional associates and employees were forming a group to bid. Now, I’ve never objected that the employee group was bidding, but I did strongly suggest that the entire procurement be turned over to the D.C. Office of Contracts and Procurement. This was declined by the receiver and the special officer—in my estimation a violation of the most fundamental principles of public contracting, the perception of a fair and level playing field. In summary, a wonderful opportunity has been missed for the District over these past 5 years, as the receiver’s legacy leaves no appropriate or usable template for the future of medical services at the jail. I’m afraid that the city must start from scratch to rebuild this mishandled jail medical services operation. Since we cannot change the past, in my estimation the District must immediately, since the clock is ticking, begin the development of a new procurement process to replace the current contract at the first option date next March. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the committee’s questions. Mr. DAVIS. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Clark follows:]
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Mr. DAVIS. We’ll have a number of them. I’m going to start, I think, with Mr. Horn, who has another commitment. He has come in. We’ll start the questions with him.
Let me just make one comment. I think, Dr. Shansky, my impression, just sitting here and listening to everything, is you were brought into a very, very tough job and you turned the place around in terms of meeting the criteria and everything else. You are a doctor. I mean, you’re not a manager. That’s not your job, and so on. And when it came to the bid, you wanted to make sure you could get some people in place that knew how to do the job and they were bidding. If they got it, great. If they didn’t, at least you knew you had somebody competent. That’s my take on it, and that’s appropriate.
Now, I think you had some cost problems that go beyond what you perceived or what your expertise is, and that’s always the difficulty when courts take over these is that courts are not managers, they are not administrators, and as we get ready to transition we’ve got some tough questions to ask.
That’s my perspective on it, if it makes you feel better. Ms. NORTON. Would the gentleman yield on that point? Mr. DAVIS. I’d be happy to. Ms. NORTON. I think the chairman makes an important point. If we are showing concern—and this is before we get to our colleagues who are going to ask questions, because I want to simply make a point and not ask a question. In a real sense, we in the Congress are confronted with the same problem when it comes to HMO and managed care, and one of the reasons that doctors have lost control of medical services is that if, in fact, you turn over the bank to them, they will exercise the best of their professional judgment, and what has happened as a result is all of us who are not in jail are now in HMOs and managed care precisely because we are trying to press costs down, and we’ve taken these costs from medical judgment, alone, and that turns out apparently not to have been the case here. Mr. DAVIS. I’m going to yield to Mr. Horn for questions. Mr. HORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope I haven’t disrupted the committee too much, but I have two questions, and I’d be particularly interested in all of your views on this. To what extent in the D.C. jail do we have literacy education? That’s one. To what extent do we have appropriate mental health services in the jail and when they are out of jail in the community? Can you just give me a thumbnail of what you experts have looked at there—literacy and mental health. Ms. EKSTRAND. Sir, I’m afraid I can’t answer the question about literacy because it was outside the scope of what we were asked to look at. In terms of mental health, they do have onsite facilities at the jail for mental health care. Mr. HORN. Well, how good it is? I think Dr. Shansky is probably the expert, isn’t he, on this? Ms. EKSTRAND. I’m sure that he is more expert than I am. Mr. HORN. Well, Dr. Shansky, I think you are the expert. What is the answer to it?
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Dr. SHANSKY. First of all, with regard to literacy, there are literacy problems, but I am—and we have a health educator who works with the inmates trying to teach them at different levels of literacy skills how to take responsibility for their own health.
I think the Director of Corrections would be better able to comment on literacy, overall.
With regard to mental health, the D.C. jail is a unique facility in the country. The D.C. system is a combined prison and jail system. There are only five jurisdictions that I am aware of that are combined prison and jails under one single Department of Corrections.
The District, long before I came, decided to put its only inpatient mental health services at the D.C. jail, so if you were an inmate and became unstable you got transferred to the inpatient unit at the D.C. jail, and when I came on board not only were there a lot of legitimately mentally ill people, but there are also individuals who would manipulate in seriously destructive ways, maybe to come from Lorton, VA, into the District.
We had to put together a program that identified mental illness at intake, and we’ve done that successfully. I am pleased to report we’ve had no successful suicides in over a year-and-a-half, compared to, before I took over, an average of a successful suicide every other month.
Mr. HORN. Can I ask how many unsuccessful suicides you had? Dr. SHANSKY. Actually, the number of serious attempts has been dramatically reduced. Those instances are pretty occasional now. The thing that you need to remember is—— Mr. DAVIS. Dr. Shansky, let me just stop you. Mr. Horn health as got to leave, but what we’d like you to do is provide this for the record, because I think he’d like to have this on the record and I think it is an important piece of information. Dr. SHANSKY. The thing that you need to be aware of is, as you are aware, the mental health program for the District is also under receivership. There are many people who are released from jail who, were they to be maintained adequately in an outpatient program in the community, would not, in all likelihood, come into the jurisdiction of the criminal justice system. In fact, my staff have participated with others in an effort to create a mental health court that will divert some of these individuals away from incarceration, provided that they maintain their therapeutic program that has been prescribed by the appropriate professionals. There is no question, because we service the prison system, also, that the number of mentally ill inmates, seriously mentally ill inmates at the jail is dramatically higher than anywhere else in the country. We know that when the Federal Bureau of Prisons ultimately takes responsibility for all of the sentenced felons the number of seriously mentally ill inmates in the jail is going to dramatically go down, because we have a substantial number of inmates who are in the mental health units at the jail who are sentenced felons. In fact, we proposed early on that if the chronically mentally ill who were stable and were sentenced felons were to be transferred to the Bureau of Prisons—and at one point they had agreed to take
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them 2 years ago—that would result in an immediate reduction in cost of between a half a million and $1 million.
We know that by the end of 2001 all of the sentenced felons will be the responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, and clearly the contract situation we’ve created allows the District to negotiate with its vendor literally at will to reduce staffing levels in services provided based on the population needs that it is responsible for at any given point in time.
Mr. DAVIS. Thank you. Does anyone else want to address that? [No response.] Mr. DAVIS. Let me ask Ms. Schneider a question. You received a letter inviting you to testify. You refused. You stated that to do so would be a violation to the Code of Judicial Conduct. After consultation with the U.S. House of Representatives Office of the General Counsel, the subcommittee concluded that you were not prohibited from testifying at this hearing. We made it abundantly clear to you that we really had no intention of influencing any judicial proceedings or discussing any quasijudicial functions you could exercise in your role as special officer. We repeatedly offered to meet with you to dispel any concerns you had about testifying. Finally, on Monday your attorneys came to this subcommittee for what we thought was to be a meeting in good faith. It turned out to be anything but that. Present at the meeting were the House general counsel, the majority and minority counsel for the Committee on Government Reform, subcommittee counsel, and majority and minority subcommittee staff. They agreed that your presence at this hearing was imperative. Your attorneys were uncooperative, and therefore this subcommittee issued its first subpoena in the 6-years that I have chaired this, mandating your appearance today. You know how hard it is to get Mr. Waxman and Mr. Burton to agree on a subpoena. Ms. Schneider, you’ve gone to incredible lengths to avoid this hearing, and yet it has come to my attention that during the 2weeks since you received the invitation letter you have been consulting with the media. From the subcommittee’s conversations with you, we couldn’t ascertain what your relationship to the receiver is, but in this article in the Post today you have been quoted as saying that Shansky has not been a Lone Ranger. How could you talk to the media and yet say you couldn’t talk to Congress? Ms. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Chairman, I first must say that my concerns about publicly commenting on this matter relate to my belief that I am bound as a judicial officer to the Code of Judicial Conduct. I did not talk to the press about that. That is apparently taken from a letter that I wrote to Mr. Odie Washington. I have made no comments to the press and have never spoken to the press about this matter due to my concerns about the Code of Judicial Conduct and my publicly speaking. I do not want to be in a position to compromise this litigation. This litigation is almost 30 years old. I may be called upon by the judge or by the parties to make recommendations to the judge. It
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will compromise my ability to do that to comment publicly about the merits of this case.
Mr. DAVIS. So you are testifying here under oath that you have not spoken to any Post reporters about this?
Ms. SCHNEIDER. I have not spoken to the Post reporter. I did not state that comment to the Post reporter. I was contacted by a Washington Post reporter and I informed him that I could not discuss the matter with him.
Mr. DAVIS. So let me just understand this. The only comment you made to the Post reporter was that you couldn’t discuss this matter with him?
Ms. SCHNEIDER. That’s correct. Mr. DAVIS. OK. Thank you. Ms. Norton. Ms. NORTON. Dr. Shansky, you have repeatedly noted that one of the problems with the—that you encountered in the D.C. jail necessitating greater expenditures is that there are problems relating to the medical condition of these inmates greater than in other jurisdictions. What is your evidence that the District jail inmates are sicker than inmates in New York, Baltimore, L.A., and other large cities in the United States? Dr. SHANSKY. Well, for instance, just to take one example, HIV’s seral prevalence. The District’s seral prevalence rate is about 10 percent, 9 to 10 percent at last survey. New York is similar—actually, a little higher. Baltimore’s I’m not familiar with. L.A. County is substantially lower. Ms. NORTON. What is it in Chicago? Dr. SHANSKY. Chicago, it is about 1 to 2 percent. Ms. NORTON. That’s HIV/AIDS? Dr. SHANSKY. That’s correct. That’s just one. Ms. NORTON. You know, we have a somewhat higher HIV/AIDS rate than some other cities, but your testimony is that you have evidence that the costs that were required in D.C. are so much greater because the inmates are substantially sicker than they are in other large American cities. Dr. SHANSKY. What my statement is that the reasons for the increase in cost are multifactorial. Epidemiology of disease and prevalence of disease is just one factor. Another factor is the decision by the District to house all of its acutely mentally ill, even from the prison system, at the D.C. jail. Had it chosen not to do that—— Ms. NORTON. If you took the acutely mentally ill out, what would be the cost of this contract? Dr. SHANSKY. The mental health program, as described, that would probably reduce the program by a couple million. Ms. NORTON. You have testified—well, let me ask you concerning your testimony. The contract that has been let, is a contract that could last as long as 5 years? Dr. SHANSKY. Well, it is a 1-year contract with a possibility of four option years, each of which is to be negotiated between the Department of Corrections, the city administration really, and the vendor. And, as I indicated, the city is the appropriate jurisdiction, I think, to determine what kinds of services, what types of services should be needed.
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As I indicated, we know that when the Bureau of Prisons takes all the sentenced felons the whole mental health program is going to be dramatically scaled down. Even if that is done in the middle of the year, the Department can renegotiate with a vendor and change in the middle of the year the staffing and other expenditures that are in the contract.
So we set it up flexibly enough so that the Department and the city administration will taper the services and expenditures to its perceived needs.
Ms. NORTON. Indeed, that is certainly the case. One of the reasons why collaboration with Mr. Clark was important—and you seem to have been willing to collaborate with the District, which seems to have been willing to do anything you said—but one of the reasons that collaboration with Mr. Clark was necessary is precisely the kind of transition that you speak of with respect to mental health.
For example, if you were to take the couple of million dollars out, you’d still be left with the cost of these services twice the national average, but if the point was to collaborate because we are in transition, I can’t understand why an objective observer who comes from the Bureau of Prisons would have been somebody you didn’t even want to hear nor did Ms. Schneider apparently want to hear, because it is hard to detect any oversight by her of you.
Dr. SHANSKY. Let me—— Ms. NORTON. So if there is no oversight by her, and Clark comes in as somebody charged by us and a Presidential appointee to look at management and financial reform, I cannot understand why the District of Columbia and Ms. Schneider and you, Dr. Shansky, wouldn’t have used that opportunity, an opportunity that comes precisely from the Congress, to try to collaborate and perhaps go back to the court with a revised notion of what might be necessary here. Dr. SHANSKY. Let me correct the record. Neither the District nor the special officer of the court have done everything that I wanted. That is not the way the process has worked. We have negotiated from day one how to implement, how to design services, how to create the proper program that the District wants. It has been a very fair and open and candid series of discussions we’ve had over 5 years. I did not get everything. Everything is not done exactly the way I wanted. I realized from the beginning this is not my program, it is the District’s program, and I have worked very closely—— Ms. NORTON. Dr. Shansky, you gave us no indication until you’ve just spoken of how those negotiations resulted in your getting less than you wanted. Would you care to give some examples? Dr. SHANSKY. Initially we talked about providing certain kinds of services in certain ways when we proposed the budget, based on what the remedial plan required. There were different interpretations. We participated with the corporation counsel’s office, and the budgets each year, in essence, were negotiated around what needed to be required. Each year the process took place. And, as you can see, each year the budget was scaled back, and each year we returned moneys to the District.
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Ms. NORTON. How did the budget go down from $16 million to $12 million? Was that a voluntary act on your part? Did you cut back on your part by yourself in your own judgment?
Dr. SHANSKY. It was a collaborative effort between myself, the corporation counsel’s office, the Department of Corrections, special officer, and plaintiffs.
Ms. NORTON. Mr. Clark, what role did you play in that process? Mr. CLARK. Well, as I mentioned, when I first came in I was quite stunned by this level, although I think, you know, to be fair to Dr. Shansky, the $16 million level in 1997 included $1.5 million or an extensive amount of a 1-year grant, I think, money from the Marshals for some equipment and some other factors there, so I think his true budget was somewhere in the $14.5 million range that year. But, on the other hand, there hadn’t been that much of a reduction, and I don’t know why he made decisions. But I know that when I came in and learned of this, I started to raise serious concerns with both him and particularly with Ms. Schneider and with the District, and I think that had some significant influence on lowering that budget. Ms. NORTON. Dr. Shansky and Ms. Schneider have indicated that the District can always contract for services for a lower amount. This receivership for 5 years was supposed to be returned to the District so that the District could take it off the shelf and run it, and if that is not the case then I don’t understand what a receivership is about. Dr. SHANSKY. Just to set the record straight, that is the case. Ms. NORTON. All right, but—— Dr. SHANSKY. At the end of August—— Ms. NORTON. But when this matter goes before the City Council of the District of Columbia I can guarantee you that it will be very hard to justify this level of cost, given the other pressures on the D.C. government. Both of you have indicated that the District is free to reduce the cost. This, of course, will take some considerable re-engineering to make sure that the new contract takes into account the very quality concerns that resulted in the District being ousted from jurisdiction, while at the same time meeting the District’s budget requirements. This is precisely the expertise that the D.C. government lacks, and I submit that Mr. Washington clearly lacks now when he says, ‘‘We’re getting all we paid for,’’ and clearly shows no indication that he wants to reduce these costs at all. He loves these costs. He loves this contract. So I don’t understand why, after 5 years, you are giving the District back a contract that almost surely will have to be re-engineered, unless the Mayor of the District of Columbia is willing to pay considerably more for jail costs than he has shown a willingness to pay above the national average for costs for other residents. I do not understand how you have spent your time, if it is to say, ‘‘You can take what I’ve done, throw it out, re-engineer it, and bring the cost down.’’ Why do we need you in the first place? Dr. SHANSKY. I believe that—— Ms. NORTON. That was your job, to——
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Dr. SHANSKY. Let me just indicate—— Ms. NORTON [continuing]. Give us back a cost-efficient—— Dr. SHANSKY. Let me just indicate I believe I was needed in order to save lives, and I tried to do that, and I believe I was successful. With regard to the competence of the city administration, I have every confidence that they have the expertise, the know-how, and the commitment to tailor a program based on their perception, the city’s perception of what needs and what services should be provided. I have every confidence in them, and I will so report that to the judge. Ms. NORTON. Well, of course you have confidence. One of the reasons I would have confidence in them is they’re getting a re-engineered program, a program that has been fixed. It is hard for us to understand how you can fix a program that leaves us this for out of the range of average services. Mr. Chairman, I will pass and come back. Mr. DAVIS. Thank you very much. Mrs. Morella. Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you. I’d like to first of all direct a question to Ms. Ekstrand—and this was picked up by Mr. Clark—the differences, the disparity with regard to Baltimore, Prince George’s County, and the District of Columbia. Could you tell me, from the GAO study, what are the differences in the kinds of medical services and problems that you found in Baltimore and Prince George’s County compared to the District? Ms. EKSTRAND. We do know that there is 24-hour-a-day pharmacy onsite at the D.C. jail and that is not the case in Baltimore City, not the case in Prince George’s County. We did also focus on mental health services, and again mental health services are enhanced in D.C. compared to Prince George’s County and Baltimore City. We did not have the opportunity in the time we had to do this review to go through item-by-item to make that comparison, but those are two of the larger items. Mrs. MORELLA. Are you kind of in that statement sort of justifying the fact that the District of Columbia costs that much more, the pharmacy and the mental health? Ms. EKSTRAND. Well, I’m just making the point that the enhanced services and enhanced staff means that it costs more money. We did not have the opportunity in the few weeks that we looked at this program to determine whether there were other aspects that affected costs, such as efficiency or salary levels. Those were outside the scope of what we could look at since the end of May. But at least we were able to identify some factors, and those factors had to do with enhanced services. Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you. Let me ask Mr. Clark to pick up on that. With all the experience that you have had with the Federal system and in Miami, do you see—I know the difference is, like, four times the difference in terms of price, and we know it is basically because it is staffing, but can you see an equation between the kinds of services provided and the cost? Does that make up for it?
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And then I’m curious. Has anybody looked at, like, recidivism rates? I mean, can you show something for this difference?
Mr. Clark, would you like to comment? And then if anyone else would like to comment?
Mr. CLARK. Well, two or three points. I think everybody would agree that one difference, one legitimate difference, is the service provided to the sentenced felons, which is a group which will go to the Federal Bureau of Prisons within the next year or so. I think Dr. Shansky, while he noted that the total mental health cost may be $2 million, I think he testified a couple of times that when the felons go that would reduce the cost by a half a million to possibly $1 million. I wouldn’t argue with that. Other than that, I don’t see any—the services that the inmates are being provided in Baltimore, whether it is pharmacy, mental health, or all the other services, meet Constitutional standards. They meet accreditation standards. They’ve all been accredited in those facilities. So the total package of services I don’t think is a problem in those facilities in Baltimore or in many other places around the country. And I’d like to make what I think is an important distinction. Higher staffing levels do not equate directly to improved services. At a certain point you reach a point of diminishing returns, and adding more staff members on the evening shift or adding additional nurses, pharmacists, or whatever, does not significantly improve the services. So once you’ve met a basic level, adding additional staff has marginal benefits, in my estimation. Mrs. MORELLA. I have kind of confirmation of what you are saying, and that is a quote from a company, Faiver, Campau and Associates, ‘‘Nowhere in the country are we aware of a facility of comparable size that has such a top echelon of staff who are not also significantly involved in direct patient care.’’ That’s quite a—— Dr. SHANSKY. Congresswoman Morella, could I respond to that? Mrs. MORELLA. Of course, Dr. Shansky. Dr. SHANSKY. That particular consultation, which was solicited by the trustee, was done purely by paper. There was no interviewing. In fact, that particular consultation was completely inaccurate. All of the staff, virtually all of the staff that he refers to as being 100 percent administrative are spending a significant percentage, 50 percent or more of their time, providing direct services. So it isn’t the case that these people are purely doing administrative functions. He never found that out because he never interviewed anybody. Mrs. MORELLA. Have you—recognizing all of that, do you feel— and knowing that you have made some reductions, putting this all together, do you feel you could reduce the number of staff? Dr. SHANSKY. It is my view—— Mrs. MORELLA. And enhance efficiency. Dr. SHANSKY. It is my view—right now we are in the process of completing the renovation, so efficiencies just physically are difficult. That should be finished by the end of October. And it is my view that, in fact, there can be some reductions, and we’ve already talked about it with the vendor. The District has talked about it. And I have every expectation that for the next contract there will be significant reductions in expenditures.
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But I believe those are the District’s decisions, and I have attempted to take, to a great extent, besides taking leadership from the court, also from the District because it is ultimately their program.
Mrs. MORELLA. We have a Government Performance and Results Act, you know, where we require our agencies and say, ‘‘OK, now what have you accomplished, not so much what your mission is and what your modus operandi are.’’ It seems to me that the system could certainly use a Performance and Results Act requirement.
Dr. SHANSKY. We have built exactly those performance measures into this request for proposal. It is the first one that I am aware of—and I was responsible for issuing request for proposals for 12 years for the Illinois State prison system, the first system ever to privatize. The reality is that we have put in performance measures, not just ensuring that certain processes are completed, like intake processing, but that the degree of control of chronic illnesses is such that morbidity and hospitalization are prevented. All of that is built into this RFP. It is unquestionably performance based.
Mrs. MORELLA. OK. I know my time has elapsed, and I thank you.
Mr. DAVIS. Let me try to put a perspective. I would much rather be here talking now about overstaffing and high salaries than I would a situation that we couldn’t correct. I just put that in perspective.
This looked like an impossible situation at the time you took it over and you turned that around, so that is understood and that is good.
But, for those of us that have to operate within the confines of government, which is transparent, which has limited salaries and everything else, you know, this violates all the rules, and it violates all of the traditional rules of government because we were not—you didn’t have political oversight. You had oversight from a judiciary branch. And that’s where you go back into the political spectrum and it goes back to the city that is not ready to transition, and that’s why we are asking these questions.
Dr. SHANSKY. I believe it is ready for transition. The contract is in the midst of its first year. The Department can, beginning to work right now with the vendor, restructure or shift or move or——
Mr. DAVIS. It’s a lot more ready to transition now than it was when you took it over. No question about it.
Dr. SHANSKY. There’s no question. Mr. DAVIS. So I’d put that in perspective. Dr. SHANSKY. There is no question about that. Mr. DAVIS. But I think you would concede and I think Mr. Clark and the GAO and others who have testified make it very clear that the payment for what were getting is very, very high by any normal governmental standard. Dr. SHANSKY. And the District has the opportunity to make decisions about what it wants to pay for and what value it is getting for the dollar. Mr. DAVIS. Of course. Dr. SHANSKY. And that’s why I think this is a perfect situation in terms of the closure of this receivership within the next——
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Mr. DAVIS. And that’s why we are holding the hearing. We need to understand that, and if the city had these costs in every part of its government and couldn’t afford it, it would be a lot better run city, but that’s a different issue.
I’m just trying to put it in perspective, and you don’t need to be overly defensive, but I just—and I can understand why you are that way. The main mission was accomplished, and it looked almost impossible when you took it over.
My wife is a doctor, too, so I understand. She’s tighter on finances than I am, but I just want to put that in perspective for you.
Now, let me ask a few questions here for Ms. Schneider. What are the major duties you perform on a regular basis as the special officer? Ms. SCHNEIDER. My duties as a special officer is to ensure the compliance of the court’s orders. That can be done through mediation with the parties on various issues, through observing and reporting to the court, and making recommendations. Mr. DAVIS. When you look at your priorities, cost has not been at the top in terms of trying to do it within the restrained budget. You’re really looking at turning this around and—— Ms. SCHNEIDER. Well, my mandate is precisely to ensure that the court orders that are in existence are followed, and that is by the order that appoints me. It requires me to ensure that those orders are followed. Mr. DAVIS. OK. So the court orders, no staffing levels are required? That’s a judgment call that you would make? Ms. SCHNEIDER. There were staffing levels required in the initial remedial plan, and there has been a process in this litigation where those staffing levels have been reduced each year through negotiations with the party and a budget that was submitted to Judge Bryant each year for consideration. Mr. DAVIS. But did you ever make any comparisons to other jurisdictions’ costs and services while the plan was being worked out among the parties, for example? Ms. SCHNEIDER. Well, my mandate was to ensure that the court order, as it existed, was followed. Mr. DAVIS. All right. Now, I think I understand how we got to where we are, and I don’t know that anybody is culpable or anything, I just want to try to understand that cost was really the kind of last thing you’d look at as you try to work your way through a very, very difficult situation when you took this over, and I can appreciate that. The corrections trustee reports that you appointed the receiver as the sole appeal authority on the procurement over his very own decision. Can you explain that decision? Ms. SCHNEIDER. Excuse me, that was not my decision to appoint the receiver as the sole—— Mr. DAVIS. Whose decision was that? Dr. SHANSKY. When we drafted the RFP, we had discussion with counsel on a variety of things. One of the issues that came up was to what extent we could parallel, if you will, D.C. procurement law. Now, the reality is D.C. procurement law refers to and is applicable to D.C. agencies. I was clearly not a D.C. agency head, so,
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strictly speaking, D.C. procurement law wasn’t applicable to a procurement that I was going to do, and I couldn’t, in my procurement, somehow require the chief of procurement to be responsible. I had to accept that responsibility myself.
Mr. DAVIS. And your argument now is, as the city transitions they can renegotiate.
Dr. SHANSKY. Yes. Exactly. Mr. DAVIS. Then that makes my next question for Mr. Christian and Mr. Washington. What mechanisms do you have in place to renegotiate the contract and control costs at this point? Mr. WASHINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Davis. First of all, I want to simply say that I, like many in the District, love the services that are currently being provided, but we all have a problem with cost, as has been the case for the last 5 years, but I have been impressed by the fact that the cost continues to go down every year and I am convinced that costs will continue to go down. The best way to do that is to return control of medical services and mental health services back to the District, where we will be able to negotiate specific services and further reduce the cost. I am confident the that District of Columbia will be able to do that. Mr. DAVIS. If you don’t do that, don’t come running to Congress. You’ll have to go somewhere else to find the money. I’ll let you make that argument with the Mayor, but I think that’s—and that’s really the bottom line at the end of the day. Mr. WASHINGTON. And clearly that is understood, Mr. Chairman. Mr. DAVIS. Do you have any mechanisms in place right now? Can you give us any idea where you might be headed on that, what cost controls you put in effect, what some of the services are being provided that you might not be able to provide, or anything? Mr. WASHINGTON. Well, one of the things that we will be doing is to hire our own medical expert to oversee the contract. That will be our person to evaluate the services that are being provided and to determine what services can be reduced. That is a position that will be established. Mr. DAVIS. I’ll tell you what. Instead of putting you on the spot today with that, maybe you can get back with the committee and talk to us as you transition about what some of your thoughts are with specificity. Would that be amenable? Mr. WASHINGTON. Yes. Mr. DAVIS. I think that would be helpful to us. Mr. Christian, do you have anything to add on that? Mr. CHRISTIAN. Again, Mr. Chairman and Council members, we are trying to maintain the quality of services that have already been provided at the most efficient and effective manner, so we would be looking at that contract during this period and when it expires. Mr. DAVIS. Why don’t you try, let’s say in the next—within 10 days could you get us back something in terms of your thoughts on transitioning this back to something that is affordable? I would just say one thing: the city—I mean, not you, personally—you weren’t probably with the city then—but the city had this thing really messed up. It has been fixed from a services point of view, but now we have to contain costs, and we are just eager to
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understand how you are going to do that, how you are going to get there, because if these costs continue it just doesn’t mesh with the culture of this city or any other city when you take a look at the other staffing ratios. So we want to see how we make this transition.
If I have to put an emphasis anywhere, it is on making sure the city isn’t sued again and that we are fulfilling our Constitutional obligations, so you have to do that. You can pick and choose, and I think you have a better system here than you have in Baltimore or you have in Prince George’s or the others, but you are paying a lot more for it, too, and what that balance is, we’re just eager to know what your thoughts are on that. That’s all I’m trying to get at.
Let me now yield to my ranking member, Ms. Norton, for a few more questions.
Ms. NORTON. Mr. Christian and Mr. Washington, you are aware that, as this hearing is going on, the Appropriation Committee is having a hearing in which it is looking precisely into whether or not the District is not only improving its services but is improving the management of those services. The Appropriation Committee is very much in sympathy with what this committee is doing and has made that known.
Are you prepared, when the appropriation comes before the Appropriation Committee next year, to come forward with a contract with these costs in it?
I ask that of you, Mr. Washington, because you said to the Washington Post, ‘‘I think we are getting what we are paying for,’’ therefore I don’t see any inclination on your part even to begin to reduce costs, and so must assume that when you go before next year’s appropriation you will not be recommending to the Mayor that any changes be made. Therefore it would be the Appropriation Committee or the Council that would have to do the oversight here.
Mr. WASHINGTON. Well, actually, Congresswoman Norton, I think it would be just the opposite. I think we will very much be prepared to discuss cost reductions.
One of my primary concerns, as a relatively new director of this department, is to ensure that the D.C. Department of Corrections does not revert back to 30 years of neglect in our department. We have a wonderful opportunity to get from under a 30-year court mandate and oversight of the D.C. Department of Corrections and return control to——
Ms. NORTON. When this program comes back, who will be the officer who has control over it?
Mr. WASHINGTON. Well, the Director of the Department of Corrections will be responsible for medical and mental health services.
Ms. NORTON. That’s you, isn’t it? Mr. WASHINGTON. That’s correct. Ms. NORTON. And you want control over this and you want it back from the receiver? Mr. WASHINGTON. Absolutely. Ms. NORTON. So you have been cooperating with the receiver in order to make sure that you, in fact, get this program back. Mr. WASHINGTON. Yes. I think the quickest way to reduce cost is to return control to the Department of Corrections and negotiate
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future contracts. I think we have a good level of services. That’s important to ensure that we do not have continued court oversight, and further reduce costs.
Ms. NORTON. Dr. Shansky and you have said the same thing. That’s a dangerous thing to say to this Congress. You know, the chairman and I have kept this matter before this committee. In doing so, we have made sure that we focus not on the courts. Neither of us believe it is inappropriate for courts to take over functions that are in the shape these functions are in, but there are many who disagree with us. To the extent that there is testimony before the Congress that courts don’t have any obligation to contain costs when trying to reform matters in receiverships, you endanger the whole notion of court receiverships and non-interference by the Congress of the United States. I think you should be told that.
This matter could just as easily be in the Judiciary Committee, and if it were there would be a very different kind of hearing. Indeed, the Congress has already intervened into receiverships. You do not help those of us who believe that the courts, particularly with respect to jails and to prisons, have done a service to the country in taking over such systems. You do not do a service when you say that it is quite all right for the receivers to rack up any costs they want to and then give it back to the people who couldn’t manage in the first place to bring down the cost, and that is what I am hearing from you, Mr. Washington, and that is what I’m hearing from the two receivership officers.
Dr. SHANSKY. Let me correct what may be a misperception on your part. My mandate was to put the program together and to save lives, but it was also to be fiscally responsible. We have been audited. We will be audited again at the end of the receivership. The audits were court mandated and arranged by the city. We negotiated and discussed each budget, literally at times every position and every service. We have returned money to the District each year that was unspent. I don’t think that is a record of someone who feels that a receiver has no responsibility to look at cost factors. Quite the contrary. We have been sensitive to the cost concerns, and I think the District has also been sensitive, as has the special officer.
Ms. NORTON. Dr. Shansky, it was precisely because there was no audit of the kind that D.C. agencies are required to engage in and only a two-page audit spreadsheet presented that this House unanimously passed a bill requiring that full-scale audits be done not after the receiver is through but on an annual basis while there is a receiver so that the receiver is not held to a standard less than the agency who has given up the function would be held.
Dr. SHANSKY. Once again let me correct the record. The audit that was to be performed was determined by the city it was supposed to be done under the existing city contract by a firm, Peat Marwick, which was doing all the city agencies. I had no say in determining how that audit was done, who was doing it, or what it consisted of.
Ms. NORTON. Just a moment. Did not the court require an audit? Dr. SHANSKY. Yes. That’s correct. Ms. NORTON. Ms. Schneider. Ms. SCHNEIDER. That’s correct.
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Ms. NORTON. Did you regard that as the kind of audit that was satisfactory?
Ms. SCHNEIDER. There was a court order requirement for the audit, and the audit was——
Ms. NORTON. Do you know what an audit is, Ms. Schneider? Do you know the kind of audit that District agencies, in fact, routinely have to go through?
Ms. SCHNEIDER. This was an audit that was done. It was organized by the city, by the agency that was doing the city audits.
Ms. NORTON. Mr. Washington, are you aware of the kind of audit—who organized it? Who was the officer? Was it Mr. Washington?
Dr. SHANSKY. I believe this preceded Mr. Washington. Ms. NORTON. Are you aware of the kind of audits that the new auditor requires when he does an audit of D.C. agencies? Dr. SHANSKY. I wasn’t made aware—— Ms. NORTON. Do you think that this is representative of the kind of audit that agencies should go through? Dr. SHANSKY. Let me indicate, after approximately 2 weeks of providing all financial records, all invoices, all bank statements, etc.—and, again, this was an audit arranged by the city by the contractor with a contract to audit city agencies—no one was more disappointed than we were to get, for the cost of that audit, which I’m told was about $40,000, that two-or three-page statement, believe me. Ms. NORTON. Again, I’m not sure what Ms. Schneider’s job is, but obviously the District wants to get out of the receivership. The District apparently felt it had no stake in the kind of audit these agencies have to go through. I repeat, I am concerned if the District now has to figure out how to reduce these costs, because the District is going to have to, in fact, design an RFP that meets quality concerns and also the cost concerns that the Council and the Mayor will raise. When I look at the number of physicians, no matter how we get into this contract, questions are raised that any public official— you, Mr. Christian; you, Mr. Washington; you, Ms. Schneider; you, Mr. Shansky; and certainly the GAO—should have wanted to question. For example, 15 doctors serving something over 1,600 inmates here, five serving something over 3,000 inmates in Baltimore—— Dr. SHANSKY. Those figures, by the way, are inaccurate. We do not have 15 physicians, and I’m not sure—— Ms. NORTON. How many do you now have? Dr. SHANSKY. We have—— Ms. NORTON. You obviously had it at one point. How many do you have now? Dr. SHANSKY. We have, I believe, nine. Ms. NORTON. Compared to five for more than twice as many in Baltimore, three times as many as these now—— Dr. SHANSKY. Again, you are quoting figures from a report in which the data was demonstrated to be inaccurate. Now, it is very hard to have a discussion—— Ms. NORTON. Give me the accurate data. I’m giving you the data you told me. It was nine. Prince George’s, same size as D.C.——
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Dr. SHANSKY. Again, inaccurate data. Ms. NORTON [continuing]. One M.D. for 78 compared with one for 15 here. What are your figures now? Dr. SHANSKY. When we talked with the officials at these agencies, they told us, first of all, in the Baltimore contract they said the numbers were part of an overall contract and it was very difficult for them to attribute the costs related to the jail part of that contract. Ms. NORTON. I’m just asking you about doctors now. Dr. SHANSKY. I don’t recall the specifics of the doctors, but—— Ms. NORTON. I’m just saying that Prince George’s, which is the same size as we are, the same kind of population, one doctor for 78 inmates compared with one for 15 inmates here, and we’re supposed to say, ‘‘That’s fine. The quality has improved, so don’t ask any more questions.’’ Mr. DAVIS. Let me recognize Mrs. Morella. Mrs. MORELLA. Picking up on our discussion today, I notice another difference probably among many of the correctional institutions in health care is the on-and offsite staffing, and I note in your testimony, Dr. Shansky, you mentioned that the offsite consists of, like, a physician and a nurse at D.C. hospital. Dr. SHANSKY. Yes. Mrs. MORELLA. I’m wondering whether this—and I’m going to get to you in a minute, Mr. Clark, whether this occurs in other hospitals, too. But it was interesting, as I was re-reading your statement, where you indicated that they are there also to make sure that they don’t stay there too long, to control. And I was thinking of the problems that patients have with HMOs, you know, where you’ve got a gatekeeper that says, ‘‘You can only stay 3 days,’’ or whatever it may be. That’s the same kind of thing you’re doing. Would you like to just comment on how effective you think it is having a—— Dr. SHANSKY. That’s a very legitimate concern. We added this, because when I came on board—and all of the Lorton facility, as well as the jail and the Correctional Treatment Facility use D.C. General as its main resource. One of the things that I found was corrections patients admitted to D.C. General were distributed among a variety of house officers, most of whom had their major focus on their non-incarcerated patients, and so the concern wasn’t that people were being sent out too quickly, as might be the case with an HMO, but they were literally forgotten or neglected and allowed to stay way, way too long. We talked to the District. The District felt that it would be a cost-effective investment to make sure that we had one doctor in control of all of the patients admitted to D.C. General from Lorton, from CTF, as well as the jail. There is no question we dramatically reduced the length of stay because our doctor focuses on those patients and gets them out in as timely a manner as possible. Now, when the prisons close down the city may decide, because there are fewer patients in the hospital, maybe it doesn’t want to support that service. But, given the number of admissions from all of the Department of Corrections facilities, it made sense to put a
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doctor in charge of that care, and therefore reduce the length of stay.
This was particularly important because the D.C. General Hospital became a public benefits corporation and began billing the Department of Corrections. Up until that time, which was roughly 1998, there was no transfer of funds, as far as I understood. But when they began doing that we talked with the Department, and the Department said, ‘‘Yes, we don’t want to be paying for unnecessary services, for people who are just laying around after they’ve received maximum hospital benefit.’’ It was on that basis that we instituted this program.
Mrs. MORELLA. Mr. Clark, would you like to comment on whether this is being done any other place and what you think about the efficiency? I mean, it is a pretty convincing case if you are reducing the time and you are watching them.
And then I would like to also ask you about this pharmacy. Have you found that there are other places where—I mean, is it common to have a pharmacy connected with a jail of that size? And then would it be better to—I mean, more cost effective to have a contract with a vendor for that kind of service? I don’t know much about it.
Mr. CLARK. Three issues, I guess, Mrs. Morella. The first one: I generally agree with Dr. Shansky on the advisability of having a physician or—well, principally a physician— whose loyalty or whose concern is primarily directed to the Department of Corrections providing some oversight to those cases at D.C. General or any of the other outside hospitals. On the other hand, I have a significant problem, as I mention in my written testimony, with the way the RFP, the second RFP was restructured to remove the responsibility for outside medical from the vendor so that the incentive, which had been built in and which is common in these contracts everywhere, as far as I can tell—and within the last few days we’ve contacted eight or nine States who contract out all or part of their services, and they all require the vendor who is providing the jail or prison health care to also be responsible for the outside medical care. If you don’t do that, you reduce the incentive or there is a reverse incentive in terms of providing the treatment in-house. And there is almost an incentive on marginal cases to move that case to the local hospital when then it becomes an expense to the Department of Corrections. That was our experience in the Federal system under contract facilities, and we went to total outside contracts, first with a catastrophic limit of $5,000 or $10,000, and then I know more recently they have removed that catastrophic limit. So I have, as I have testified in my written statement, a major concern that it was not in the economic interest of the District to remove that responsibility from the vendor. Your next question was about the pharmacy. It is not uncommon to have in-house pharmacy operations. I think in these contracts that is more of a market question. In other words, you ask to have a certain level of pharmacy services provided, and in some cases it is done more on an operation, in-house operation, sometimes more on a regional kind of a basis.
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Again, the problem that I have with the requirements in this contract are not that it is in-house; it is that they have, in my estimation, much exceeded the numbers of staff who are commonly needed to run a pharmacy in a correctional facility.
I forget your third question, ma’am. Dr. SHANSKY. Could I respond on the—I think it needs edification, the offsite service responsibility. The usual arrangement that I have seen is where you build in some sort of risk sharing, as alluded to by Mr. Clark, with the vendor. We had every intention of doing that, and we intended to negotiate with the selected vendor the conditions of that risk sharing. Some time in the fall of 1999 we were informed by corporation counsel’s office that, if we were to want this contract to be assigned to the District, we could not engage in those kinds of discussions with a vendor at the time of selection, so that we were locked into whatever was in the RFP if we’re going to leave this in, No. 1. No. 2, the vendors came up with per diem rates in their proposals that were, in fact, not as good as the per diem rate that the District had at that time, so we felt this was not in the district’s interest. The other thing is that the vendor’s proposals were very divergent. One vendor was very low on the outpatient side, very high on the inpatient side. Another vendor was very low on the inpatient side, very high on the outpatient side. None of them justified their numbers. We felt the wisest thing to do, particularly since we had a doctor in place and that doctor controls both admissions and discharges, so the risks that Mr. Clark is alluding to are taken care of by our having our person in control of those patients, which isn’t the case with most contracts with correctional facilities, and on that basis we felt the wise thing to do, the thing that was most prudent, was to take the offsite services out in the first year and then, for the second year, the Department of Corrections and the Mayor and the director of Corrections could, if they chose to, negotiate the kind of risk-sharing and offsite responsibilities that they felt were in the District’s best interest. That’s why we made those decisions. Mr. CLARK. I’d like to respond to that. One of the issues here is on this performance-based contracting and whether or not there was an incentive built into the contracting for the bidders to be innovative and creative. In this area, a couple of the bidders bid significantly below the District’s cost, one of them way below. I would call that innovation or creativity. In this case, Dr. Shansky chooses to say that the companies were confused and somehow didn’t understand. Well, these companies bid on these contracts all over the country. They understand. They knew what they were doing. And for some reason—again, I’ve got a chart, I think, that compares the bids on page 16 of my testimony that makes that point. Dr. SHANSKY. Let me respond that the numbers were not justified. There was no basis for the numbers. Mr. DAVIS. Dr. Shansky, let Mr. Clark finish before you interject, OK? Dr. SHANSKY. OK.
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Mr. CLARK. Again, I think this is another example where creativity and innovation were removed or not rewarded, and whether or not the receiver in his role as the procurement official, understood or felt that the background development of how these numbers came to be may have been justified, the company bid, in one case, was $1.3 million, which was about half the District’s estimated cost.
When you bid, if the bid is accepted, then you are going to have to live with that, and to me that’s innovation. It’s not confusion.
Dr. SHANSKY. Let me just indicate we selected the lowest bidder, No. 1. Within the finance category, lowest bid was considered the determining factor, and that was the largest single factor of any of the factors considered.
With regard to the offsite services, had we been able to negotiate with a vendor at the time of selection, we would have stuck with it. When we were told by corporation counsel contract lawyers that we could not do that, we felt it was potentially dangerous for the District to enter into a contract based on numbers that had no justification.
What we didn’t want was a vendor not hospitalizing people in order to meet the bottom line, which was inappropriate, that they had proposed and the District suffer the consequences of that sort of gatekeeping.
Mrs. MORELLA. Dr. Shansky, I just want to say that I think that this hearing has brought together a lot of the issues that have been smoldering, and I hope that what will happen is not only we will continue to be updated as we move along and get out of the receivership but that there will be some compromises worked out so that, you know, I think some of the things we’ve said and that we’ve listened to could be worked out, so I guess in that sense of moving ahead for the correction system and the accountability and all, this has been a great meeting.
I yield back the remainder of my nothing time. Mr. DAVIS. Mrs. Morella, thank you. Let me make a couple of comments, and then I’m going to—I mean, I think we get the gist of what has happened. I think everybody has had their say here and we understand. What concerns me now looking ahead is, is the city ready for prime time? Are they ready to take this over, because I’ve seen very little oversight from the city during this time except that they are eager to take back the control, and, frankly, I’m not sure I am comfortable with that. Mr. Clark, what is your judgment on that? Is the city—can they innovate these—have they shown the oversight initiatives and the like that show they have any understanding of how they can reduce these costs and maintain a level of service that will be acceptable Constitutionally? Mr. CLARK. Well, I know that Director Washington is working to step into the—to have the Department step into the role of oversight of the contract, but what I—and I guess this is partly why I got into the uncomfortable position that—— Mr. DAVIS. Let me just interject, obviously they can spend what they are spending and it will be fine, but that has other ramifications city-wide at this point.
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Mr. CLARK. Absolutely. I mean, this is money that could be spent for schools or police or pot holes.
Mr. DAVIS. Well, you have people that are working two jobs trying to support kids that have no medical care, and the people who are in jail are getting much, much better care, and if that is the city’s priority, but I don’t think it is.
Mr. CLARK. I think what I found when I came in almost 3 years ago was that the city felt impotent in the face of this receivership. This is what—this was the sense that I got from the Department of Corrections director and other officials there, and, frankly, from the corporation counsel. That in the face of this long suit and so on, which had many legitimate aspects, obviously, they didn’t feel that they could stand up to the receiver on these issues, and that’s, frankly, why I, in my independent position, felt that I had to.
Mr. DAVIS. Frankly, I don’t think they could have stood up to him. I don’t think they had the knowledge and I don’t think they had the background or they had the competence to do it, and if you look at what had happened, you know, to this previously when they had it and took a look at what was happening around the rest of the city and the priorities, the city had to develop it. I understand that. I mean, it cost a lot of money to turn this around, probably more than if we had been a little more cost conscious. We could have done this a little cheaper. But we are here where we are today and we have something we are not worried about in terms of meeting the Constitutionality test and the like.
The difficulty now is, from a budgetary point of view, making this transition, and I am, frankly, concerned about the city’s—I’ve asked them for some guidelines and they are going to send union something within 10 days, and the proof of the pudding is in the eating. I hope we see something of a substantive nature.
But that’s our concern. Let me just say that if you think this hearing is tough, you want to go see Mr. Istook and the appropriators. I guarantee you—Ms. Norton is not going to be there. She’s your friend. I think at the end of the day she wants this thing to work out. You just won’t get the money, and then we could be right back to where we were. We want to get this stuff solved here at the authorization level, and the way you do that is you show us a plan, you show us it is not going to be the same program you have today because you are not going to have the money, but we just want to see it. I just don’t get the sense here that we are ready to do that as a city.
Mr. CLARK. No. I think the focus—I mean, I think, unfortunately, you are right. The focus within the Department has been to be ready to take over the oversight of the contract, but I don’t know that there is—that anybody—again, and this feeling of sort of impotence, that anyone has felt that they were in a position to start trying to re-engineer this receivership’s operation.
Mr. DAVIS. Well, just for—— Ms. NORTON. Mr. Chairman, could I just comment on just that point? Mr. DAVIS. Sure. Ms. NORTON. The lost opportunity here, it seems to me, why the committee and the President and the Congress insinuated Mr. Clark into the matter was that there was a management and fi-
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nancial expert, so that you had, on the one hand, a doctor, and the doctor’s job is to deal with patients, you had a receiver, a monitor. She also isn’t in the management business, and we understood that. And we were clear, and I have been clear with Mr. Washington that the way to round this out was to take this expert who had the second-highest position in the BOP and make a synergy and it could all have worked.
What is most disturbing to me, Mr. Chairman, is that somehow or the other an adversarial relationship developed there and his suggestions were considered not to be relevant, and therefore your question as to whether the District prepared to do it is an important one because Mr. Clark’s tenure is running out and I’m not sure who then is to be the expert, except that the city is going to have to hire some experts. Mr. Washington has already said they’re going to have to hire a physician to help them monitor it, whereas I wanted something off the shelf, because we sure paid a lot for what we are getting back here.
Mr. DAVIS. And I don’t want to dwell on what we paid. I think we have been through that. We don’t need to beat a dead horse.
The bottom line is we took an agency here that was in awful shape, terrible shape, and that at least has turned around. Fundamentally, that’s what the task was. That’s what the court wanted to do. I just don’t think we need to go back on all the money that was spent and those kind of issues. I don’t think that serves any purpose except transitioning now. The city has to have a little bit more than just taking it over, and ‘‘we think we can do it.’’ They’ve got to show some vision. They need to show some accountability. That’s what we’re going to be waiting to see, and we’re going to watch it very closely.
Ms. Norton. Ms. NORTON. Well, I just want to be clear that what the chairman said about the appropriation hearing—and I mentioned it before—is a shot across the bow. There is no question that if the Council gets these costs there will be many questions raised, and the time to deal with them is now. Mr. Shansky, what is your current position? Dr. SHANSKY. With regard to the District? Ms. NORTON. No. Your full-time position? Dr. SHANSKY. I consult on correctional health care around the country, both—— Ms. NORTON. What was your professional position before that? Dr. SHANSKY. I was the Medical Director of the Illinois prison system. Ms. NORTON. I asked because I thought that was your position. I certainly regard you as an expert, and I certainly accept the notion that these services have been reformed and meet Constitutional standards. I would hate to think that they hadn’t at this point. Apparently, appropriate services or similar services are being provided in the State of Illinois Correction Department, at only 63 percent of the national average, $4.80, compared to $7.68. I can’t understand why some of that expertise, where in Illinois you are below the national average, wasn’t brought to bear here in the District of Columbia so that we not only got it fixed but got it fixed
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at costs comparable to what apparently you have contributed to in Illinois.
Dr. SHANSKY. The Illinois numbers you are referring to are our prison system. This is a jail. The services designed to be provided at this jail are unique in terms of certain responsibilities. We have brought the budget down and it is now in a position where the Department and the city administration will tailor it in any way it chooses. And the fact is that I had 12 years of opportunity to work with the Illinois Department of Corrections and create the system that I left there.
Ms. NORTON. And you had 5 years here. And if we took mental health services out, for example, we are still left with twice the national average.
The outside experts said, ‘‘Nowhere in the country are we aware of a facility of comparable size that has such a top echelon of staff who are not also significantly involved in direct patient care. With these salaries, with a medical director of $192,857, the Mayor should resign and take this job,’’ on down. And these salaries are very high.
Dr. SHANSKY. Those are not salaries. That’s salary plus fringe. Ms. NORTON. We say salary plus fringe. Dr. SHANSKY. You just said salaries. Ms. NORTON. Well, it says salary plus fringe. Dr. SHANSKY. OK. thank you. Ms. NORTON. The point is that they are compared, however, with facilities of comparable size. I point this out only to say, and certainly to say to Mr. Christian and Mr. Washington, if I’m pointing this out to the receiver, you can bet your bottom—I don’t know if you speak for the Mayor. Do you, Mr. Washington, when you say you are satisfied with this contract? Mr. WASHINGTON. I’m satisfied with the services that have been provided for the D.C. Department of Corrections to remediate a 30year court oversight. Ms. NORTON. Yes. I—— Mr. WASHINGTON. I’m confident that—— Ms. NORTON. This is not about that, sir. We’re not doing an oversight hearing on the services, and we haven’t questioned the quality of the services. The City Council is not going to be asking you about the services. They’re going to be asking you about the cost of the services. I’m asking if you are speaking for the Mayor when you say you are satisfied with the cost of the services, not the quality of the services. No question has been raised about the quality of the services. Mr. WASHINGTON. I’ve never said I was satisfied with the cost of the service. I’m satisfied with the services. I believe very strongly that the costs will continue to go down, and I also feel very strongly that—— Ms. NORTON. Are they automatically going to go down? What are you going to do to bring the cost down? Mr. WASHINGTON. We are going to evaluate all the services that have been provided. We will have staffing positions, and I will provide a plan to this committee to show exactly how the Department
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of Corrections will be prepared to take over this contract and further reduce costs.
Mr. DAVIS. Let me just say in the next 10 days you are going to give us an outline. It doesn’t need to be detailed, but just kind of a path.
Ms. NORTON. That would be very helpful. Mr. DAVIS. I don’t know how you want to do that. Ms. NORTON. That will be very helpful. Mr. DAVIS. And rather than try to sit here and go off the top of your head, we’d rather have you go back and do something that is a little reflective and send it back. Ms. NORTON. My concern, Mr. Chairman, is that these costs will go down. Costs never go down. You’ve got to make costs go down. Costs always go up, Mr. Washington. Making costs go down or maintaining quality is an art, and it is going to take real craftsmanship to do that, given the level of cost here. Mr. Shansky, I note that your own requirement will be that the contractor of these very same services you have designed now go forward and get accreditation. Why did you not get accreditation, since you’ve had them for 5 years? Dr. SHANSKY. First of all, I sit on the board of the National Commission on Correctional Health Care. Ms. NORTON. You can recuse yourself, just as you could have with respect to the procurement. Dr. SHANSKY. Would you like my answer? Ms. NORTON. Don’t tell me it is because you sit on the board. Is there a reason other than a reason that you could have easily been released from why you didn’t ask for accreditation to be—so that you could have handed us back fully accredited services. Dr. SHANSKY. Would you like an answer? Mr. DAVIS. Yes. Give us the reason why you didn’t get it. Dr. SHANSKY. The reason why we didn’t go for accreditation was very simple: the accreditation process, when we talked with the District, was something that the District wanted to do and to take responsibility for. An accreditation of a receiver program has nothing to do with whether the program run by the District is accredited, and we decided jointly with the District to wait for that accreditation process until the District had responsibility, and that’s why it was written into the contract as well as the RFP that by the end of the contract year the vendor would achieve accreditation. Am I confident that we could have achieved accreditation? Unquestionably. I have also been a surveyor for the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations and have surveyed 20 of the Federal Bureau of Prison facilities. I know how to achieve accreditation. I don’t think it proves much when I achieve accreditation. Ms. NORTON. Well, one thing it might prove is that we really do have a level of services that anybody can have confidence in. I think you should be given the opportunity to reply to the way in which the Board of Contract Appeals regarded the procurement. Apparently the D.C. Contract Appeal Board says, ‘‘There appears to be little question that, in accordance with generally accepted government procurement practice, the initial late proposal of the
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bidder, the person who was successful, was improperly handled. The proper procedure would have been to hold the proposal unopened, apparently because it was late.’’
They also say that you restricted access by other bidders to your current employees, even though they had information that should have been made available to all offerors. That’s from the Appeals Board. They say you gave no basis for your statement that the proposal of your employees was dispatched in time, and they go on to say the record is clear that the proposal was not dispatched at a reasonable time.
‘‘Regardless of the correctness of the decision, the failure of the receiver to make a written finding supported by a record as to his reasons for considering a late proposal gives the appearance of impropriety.’’
I think it is only fair that you be allowed to respond to that. Dr. SHANSKY. Thank you. First of all, I put into the RFP a time deadline to ensure that no vendor would be advantaged by having more time to work on their proposal. When I was informed by my consultant that one proposal was received late, I asked the circumstances. I was told that the vendor had arranged to fly—deliver the proposal to Atlanta, where the proposals were to be received. The vendor’s roughly noon flight was canceled, was delayed, then the next one was canceled. They put the proposal on Delta Dash. The electrical storms in Atlanta then knocked out the computers, so Delta Dash couldn’t find it for 6 hours. To me that seemed like no situation in which any vendor was advantaged. The proposal was finished well in advance for delivery several hours in advance of the deadline. I also felt that it was in the District’s interest to have three proposals considered rather than two. I was advised later on that, according to CAB decisions, any deadline can be extended, even in the event of a late proposal, if it is for the purpose of expanding the scope of competition and especially where the number of proposals is small and where there is no unfair advantage. I felt all of those things obtained. The reality is we ended up, because we had to amend the contract because the offsite service situation was a problem and was not going to be in the District’s interest, we ended up amending the RFP anyway and sending out a new one. All vendors had a completely fair and open process. Look, the reality is one of the vendors, the vendor who protested, in fact, had my CFO working with them, so they had a person who knew more about my finances and salaries than any of the vendors. That’s No. 1. So, in terms of them being disadvantaged, it’s just not true. Second of all, all of the salaries and budgets were available. They’re filed with the court. Anyone had access to them. The third thing is some of the other vendors proposed leadership people that were similar to the or the same as the group who had actually ultimately won the contract. We provided more data with regard to services, types, utilization, costs, etc., than in any RFP I’ve ever seen. This was as open and competitive a process—and remember, the committee that did the evaluation and made the rec-
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ommendation was not created by me. I had no say in who was appointed and I had no contact with that committee during their deliberations. So the recommendation came completely independent of anything that I had to do with it.
Ms. NORTON. At bottom finally let me say I think the fact that the costs found in this contract are out of line with any comparisons that we have been able to come up with or anyone else has been able to come up with and no cost comparisons were made by you, if, in fact, even with the difficulty of making such comparisons, such attempts had been made, I believe that we probably would not be sitting here today, because we have fully accepted the notion that it is very, very difficult to make those comparisons. What we cannot accept is that no attempt should be made; that attempts have to be made by other agencies of the District of Columbia, but not by the Department of Corrections when it comes to the D.C. jail.
I was particularly interested to read in Mr. Clark’s testimony that he had offered to provide examples of RFPs from the BOP— and here I am looking at page 11 of his testimony—awarding a similar medical service contract for its four-prison complex in Beaumont, TX, at a rate of under $6 a day, and the offer was declined. You see, that is what we cannot understand. I don’t know why you, Mr. Shansky, or you, Ms. Schneider——
Dr. SHANSKY. I never received such an offer. Ms. NORTON. Well, it is in his testimony. Dr. SHANSKY. Well, he can testify, but I never—— Ms. NORTON. He said the offer was declined. Dr. SHANSKY [continuing]. Received such an offer. Ms. NORTON. What do you have to say to that, Mr. Clark? At bottom, this is my concern: that nobody looked to see what anybody else was doing, not necessarily that you cost more. Dr. SHANSKY. I have looked at prisons and jails in between 30 and 40 States, between 100 and 200 facilities. There is no one with more experience looking at facilities and issuing RFPs in the country than me. Ms. NORTON. And we haven’t found a single one at the cost you have left the District with. Now, Mr. Clark, you say the offer was declined. What does that mean? Mr. CLARK. This was an offer that I made in the course of meetings during the 6-months that was referred to in the preparation and detailing of the RFP, I think going back to some time in 1998, in meetings with a number of the parties in that process that was mentioned. Ms. NORTON. Clearly what we didn’t have here was the kind of collegial relationship you say you had with the District government. We needed it with you to do that. I really am tough, but I’m tough because it is better for me to be tough than the folks you all are going to meet next year, and because I think that this still can be done. I want to say first, as one whose former life was as a Constitutional lawyer, spent her early years doing nothing but writing briefs to Courts of Appeals and to the Supreme Court on cases not unlike the case before us, that I do not want to be misunderstood
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as to the job you had before you or the lack of respect I have for the District of Columbia for what it took to finally get this thing under control, and that they, themselves, did not get it under control and it took outside experts to do so.
I believe that the District is ready to receive this function back, but I don’t believe it because of anything I’ve heard from Mr. Washington or Mr. Christian here today. I believe it because I know the way the Mayor is right-sizing the rest of the government. I know that in some detail. I have seen what he has required of his department heads. I know that, in taking this back, he will put on the task experts that will, in fact, right-size this while keeping the quality necessary. I say that because there is precedent for his doing it.
At the same time, I must say that I regret that the city will have to spend money on the cost control, and cost efficiency aspects of the medical jail receivership. This should have been part and parcel of what the medical receiver gave us back. I hold not only Dr. Shansky responsible for that. It is hard to hold him entirely responsible because he acted the way that doctors always act. I hold Ms. Schneider responsible for that, since she was to mediate. When she saw that Mr. Clark, an outside expert who didn’t have a dime in this dollar except he was commissioned by us to make sure that this was cost efficient, it was your job as the mediator, a role you have defined for yourself, to bring Mr. Clark sufficiently into this so that there would be cost controls, to help Mr. Washington and Mr. Christian understand that this was not a stick-up, that they had to do whatever Shansky said or else they didn’t get it back, and to do for Dr. Shansky what managers are having to do for doctors all over the country. It is very painful, but unless we do it this way what we will say is that those who already have health care can eat up all the health care dollars and those such as the residents of the District that the Mayor is going to have to get health care for simply get left out in the cold.
Yes, I think you are ready, but I think you are ready largely because of the management structure of the D.C. government, not because of anything I’ve heard here today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Ms. Norton. We have 10 days to hear from you, Mr. Washington and Mr. Christian. Anyone want to add anything? I don’t want anybody to feel they didn’t get the last word, if they wanted to make a comment. [No response.] Mr. DAVIS. I’m going to enter into the record a briefing, a memo distributed to the subcommittee members. We’ll hold the record open for 2 weeks from this date, for those who might want to forward any other submissions for possible inclusion. I want to again thank all the witnesses for taking the time to come today and for your dedication to this. These proceedings are closed. [Whereupon, at 12:27 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] [Additional information submitted for the hearing record follows:]
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 416 F.Supp. 100 (1975)
Leonard CAMPBELL et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Anderson McGRUDER et al., Defendants.
Civ. A. No. 1462-71.
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
November 5, 1975.
101 *101 J. Patrick Hickey, Public Defender Service, Washington, D. C., for plaintiffs.
Thomas R. Nedrich, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Washington, D. C., for defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
BRYANT, District Judge.
This case involves a class action brought by unconvicted pre-trial detainees incarcerated at the District of Columbia Jail in which plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that the conditions of their confinement violate their constitutional rights, and an order compelling defendants to discontinue the alleged violations. More specifically, plaintiffs contend that incarceration of pre-trial detainees at the District of Columbia Jail under conditions complained of constitutes cruel and unusual punishment as proscribed by the Eighth Amendment, and violates their rights to due process and equal protection of the law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The defendants are the Mayor of the District of Columbia, the Director of the Department of Corrections and the Superintendent of the District of Columbia Jail.
The basic portion of the Jail, including Cell Blocks 1 and 2, was built in 1872. In 1929 Cell Blocks 3 and 4 and the administration building were added. More recently Cell Block 4 was expended to a 4th tier. Cell Blocks 1 and 2 102 are maintained as maximum *102 security units, while Cell Blocks 3 and 4 constitute the medium security facility. There are also two open dormitories, a 37-bed hospital, a library, a laundry and a culinary unit.
The normal operating capacity for the Jail is 663 inmates. This was determined by the Department of Corrections in 1973 by counting the then-available bedspace. On December 11, 1974 the population of the Jail was 988 inmates and at the time of trial, was nearing 1000.
Cell Blocks 1 and 2 are divided into east and west sides, each containing five tiers. The cells are 6 × 7 feet, 10 inches, and 9 feet high. The cells in Blocks 3 and 4 are about the same size, but are equipped with doors rather than bars. In addition, portions of the Jail are utilized for dormitory housing.
All the cells in Blocks 1 and 2 contain a toilet without toilet seat or lid and nothing partitioning it off from the rest of the cell, a sink with a cold water faucet, a small table and bench attached to the wall, and a bed 0907 either single or bunk-bed style. Most of the cells in this part of the jail contain a bunk-bed (one bed over another) and house two persons. It is virtually impossible for two men to move around in the cell simultaneously without interfering with each other physically. In this regard there was testimony that inmates so housed adopted a system which allowed one inmate to move around the cell every other day while his cellmate stayed in bed. Twenty-two hours in such a cell constitutes a normal day for many of these inmates.
The dormitories are large rooms approximately 40 × 98 feet. At the time of the trial these rooms contained four rows of beds, two of which were of the double bunk type. Approximately eighteen inches separated the beds, and each dormitory housed from 125 to 150 men, all of whom keep their personal effects under their beds. There is also a toilet facility in each dormitory, walled off from the main room, but with no partitions between the commodes.

The dining facilities for Cell Blocks 1 and 2 are located on the ground floor and consist of approximately 20 small tables in each of the two areas. There is no partition between the cells and the dining area, and consequently toilets are in open view.

Cell Block 3 is known as the trustee facility, and Cell Block 4 houses juveniles and elderly persons. The cells in these two blocks have windows. From time to time, the cells in Block 4 contain two persons.

The Director of the Department of Corrections, Defendant Jackson, has the authority and responsibility to decide where sentenced inmates will be housed within the Department of Corrections complex, except in cases where the courts specifically designate a particular institution. A substantial number of sentenced persons are housed at the Jail. On March 10, 1975 there were 979 persons confined in the Jail. Examination of the records of 883 of these residents revealed that 20% (177) were sentenced convicts with no charges pending; 9.4% (83) were sentenced, but had charges pending; and 64% (565) were unsentenced. Fifty-eight sentenced persons were held pursuant to writs, parole violator warrants or orders of appellate courts.

The policy of the Department of Corrections at the time of trial, and for more than a year prior thereto, was to hold the following classes of sentenced prisoners at the Jail:

a) all misdemeanants serving sentences;

b) sentenced inmates from District Court awaiting designation of a Federal Bureau of Prisons institution for service of sentence, or awaiting transportation to such Federal institution after designation;

c) sentenced inmates from Superior Court where designation to a Federal Bureau of Prisons institution has been recommended by the sentencing judge, pending action on that recommendation and transportation to the institution;

d) inmates within three months of their parole eligibility date at time of sentence;

e) inmates within six months of their release date at time of sentence;

103

*103 f) inmates on work release charged with violation of their work release conditions, pending

review by the Work Release Review Board;

g) inmates charged with parole violations, pending their preliminary parole revocation hearing;

h) sentenced inmates for whom a court orders protection and/or separation from other inmates;

i) sentenced inmates whom the Department wishes to segregate from other residents at the Lorton Complex for protective reasons;

j) sentenced inmates assigned to the "Captain's Detail" (work crew) at the Jail;

k) inmates brought to the Jail pursuant to writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum or ad testificandum;

l) inmates sentenced under the Youth Corrections Act to evaluations pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 5010 (e), after completion of the evaluation and pending final imposition of sentence.

There is no segregation of sentenced from unsentenced residents at the District of Columbia Jail, except for unsentenced juveniles (ages 15 to 18) who are housed separately from the adult population.

There is no classification program at the Jail for determining the level of security needed for unsentenced residents, notwithstanding a Departmental Order (D.O. 4090.1, dated November 19, 1973) requiring each superintendent to establish such a program. Consequently many unsentenced inmates who do not require maximum security are housed in the maximum security areas of the Jail under the most stringent living conditions. Only a small percentage of Jail residents (estimated by the Superintendent of the Jail as approximately 125 inmates) require maximum security housing.

Some inmates at the Jail are assigned to a work crew known as the Captain's Detail. These may be either sentenced or unsentenced prisoners. Approximately 180 inmates are on this work crew, and they perform various jobs, e. g. kitchen help, clerks, maintenance work, etc., for which they are paid small sums, ranging from $3 to $13.50 per month. They also enjoy substantial benefits in terms of housing and other privileges which are not made available to the general population. The reason for not making these privileges generally available to all residents is to encourage inmates to apply for and work on the Detail.
Those on the Detail are housed in CB-3, mostly in individual cells which have doors rather than bars, and also have a window. Also, these inmates receive one-hour social visits rather than the half-hour visits allowed to the rest of the population. In addition, inmates on Detail may receive their visitors across a table in the Rotunda, and may embrace and kiss their visitors on meeting. Inmates not on Detail are not allowed to touch their visitors, and conduct the visit by a telephone through a plexiglass barrier. There are also recreational benefits not afforded the rest of the population.
Numerous violations of the District of Columbia Building Code, Plumbing Code, Housing Regulations, Health Regulations, Food Regulations and Fire Code exist at the District of Columbia Jail. Inspections by the various Departments are few and far between. According to the evidence, uncontradicted and unimpeached, rats, mice and roaches are in abundance.
Although Departmental Order No. 4740.1 (October 28, 1971) requires a medical examination of food handlers at least twice a month, that regulation has not been complied with. No medical examinations of civilian employee food handlers at the Jail are conducted by the medical staff of the Department of Corrections, and medical examinations of the inmate food handlers have been conducted less than once a month over the past year.
The Department of Corrections has also violated its own regulations (D.O. 2910.1, dated August 11, 1969, and D.O. 2920.1, dated January 22, 1968) concerning fire safety inspections and procedures. Although written reports 104 of inspections of fire *104 extinguishers at the Jail are required, no such written reports were made. At a recent serious fire in September 1974, several inmates were overcome by smoke, and more severe injuries were narrowly avoided, when fire extinguishers and other safety devices were not usable.
Many inmates at the jail display psychiatric symptoms. Some of these, designated for pretrial mental examinations, are committed to the District of Columbia Jail to await bedspace at St. Elizabeths Hospital. Others require psychiatric attention after returning from St. Elizabeths upon completion of examinations. In addition, some inmates who are not the subject of mental examination orders become psychiatric problems. From time to time sixty to seventy percent of the hospital beds available at the Jail are given over to psychiatric patients. The Jail medical staff does not include a psychiatrist, and the facility is not equipped to house, care for or treat psychiatric patients. Ordinary handcuffs and leg irons are used to shackle some severely disturbed inmates to their beds because appropriate restraining devices are unavailable.[1]
Laundry services for most Jail inmates are inadequate. Except for those housed in CB-3, inmates are responsible for washing their own underclothing, but the cells in CB-1 and CB-2 have no hot water.
Frequently old mattresses, not cleaned or sterilized and stained with urine and other excreta are issued to new detainees.
The quality of life for members of the class is substantially inferior to that enjoyed by convicted prisoners housed at other facilities of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections. Inmates at Lorton Correctional Complex, for example, including some with "maximum" security designations, live in dormitories much less crowded than those at the Jail. They also have contact visits with their friends and family, and recreational facilities are better. The differences in treatment between sentenced prisoners at Lorton and pre-trial detainees at the Jail are not attributable to the needs of security or custody, but are for the most part due to the overcrowding at the Jail and the Department's decisions on the allocation of resources.
During the course of this litigation defendants have never seriously contended that the matters complained of did not exist. Rather, their position has been that since the inception of the lawsuit matters over which they had control have been alleviated, and that as to the remaining complaints the defendants are helpless.

It is true that some shortcomings have been corrected, e. g. vermin have to a large degree been exterminated, some portions have been painted, and apparently much cleaning has taken place because the horrible stench described at the trial was not in evidence during an unannounced visit in late August of this year. Also the delivery of medical services has improved because of additional personnel and a realignment of the authority of the medical staff.
The defendants complain bitterly, and with what appears to be righteous indignation, that in these circumstances they have been accused of violating Eighth Amendment rights against cruel and unusual punishment. In support of the position that the cruel and unusual punishment charge is unfair, they seek much solace from the pronouncements of the Court in Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2nd Cir. 1971), and suggest that the facts in that case are similar enough to this case for the holding therein to "give the Court wise guidance".[2] But then, in the very first six words of the description of Sostre, the defendants state: "Sostre was a New York convict 105 . . ." (emphasis added).[3] Plaintiffs in this case are unconvicted pre-trial detainees held for *105 the sole reason that they cannot meet the conditions set for their release pending trial.
Finding further the similarity between Sostre and the instant case, defendants point out his (Sostre's) "normal sized" cell was 6 × 8 feet 0907 but the defendants do not point out that Sostre was not double housed in his cell.
It could be that the Eighth Amendment claim should not lie here because of its applicability only to convicted, sentenced persons. But as to the ultimate resolution of this case, Sostre offers little help. This Court measures the claims in this case by the standards utilized by the courts in such cases as Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333 (2nd Cir. 1974); Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F.Supp. 128 (N.D.Cal.1972); Jones v. Wittenburg, 323 F.Supp. 93 and 330 F.Supp. 707 (N.D.Ohio 1971); Hamilton v. Love, 328 F.Supp. 1182 (E.D.Ark.1971). The Court in Rhem, supra, put it succinctly and in precise terms:
"The demands of equal protection of the law and of due process prohibit depriving pre-trial detainees of rights of other citizens to a greater extent than necessary to assure appearance at trial and security of the jail; and the same constitutional provisions prevent unjustifiable confinement of detainees under worse conditions than convicted prisoners . . . a detainee is entitled to protection from cruel and unusual punishment as a matter of due process, and, where relevant, equal protection."
Sostre, supra, was an en banc decision by the Second Circuit in 1971. Over three years later a panel decision of the same Circuit (two members of which participated in Sostre), decided Rhem, without ever mentioning Sostre. This latter case is indeed more similar in every respect to the instant case, and this Court relies heavily upon it for the wise guidance suggested by defendants.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that the conditions already described are constitutionally impermissible insofar as they apply to the plaintiff class, and should be discontinued.
By far the most flagrant and shocking encroachment on the constitutional rights of the plaintiff class is the overcrowding; and an order which directed cessation of this specific condition has already been entered. It is currently the subject of a remand procedure which the Court seeks to implement in a separate memorandum.
Relative to the remaining conditions to be remedied the Court orders that the defendants shall:
1) Direct the D. C. Fire Department, the D. C. Department of Inspections and Licenses, and the D. C. Environmental Health Administration to inspect the Jail no later than November 15, 1975 to determine violations of the D. C. Fire Code, Building Code, Housing Regulations, Health Regulations, and Food Regulations. In each case, inspections will be conducted in accordance with the same standards, procedures, and evaluation methods as are used in inspecting any other building in the District of Columbia. Within ten (10) days of these inspections, the inspectors will prepare and submit to this Court and to counsel for the parties written reports of their inspections, including lists of code violations or other unsafe or unsanitary conditions, together with recommendations for remedial action. Within thirty (30) days of these inspections defendants shall report to the Court the action taken on each deficiency.

2) Provide clean clothing (including underwear) to all residents of the D. C. Jail and clean bed linen and towels at least once a week.
3) Provide at least one hour of out-door recreation daily for each resident of the Jail.
4) Establish a classification system which will make it possible to determine a) which inmates of plaintiff class require maximum security confinement; and b) which members of class can enjoy contact visits without jeopardizing the security of the facility.
106 5) Provide medical examinations of all food handlers, inmate and civilian employees, *106 at the Jail at least once every thirty (30) days and more often if medically required.
6) Establish the following procedures at the Jail: In the event an inmate displays unusual behavior suggestive of possible mental illness, such behavior shall be immediately reported to the medical staff. The inmate will be seen by a psychiatrist within twenty-four (24) hours. If the inmate is found to be mentally ill, he will be transferred within forty-eight (48) hours of such finding to a hospital having appropriate facilities for the care and treatment of the mentally ill; and
7) Establish the following procedures governing use of restraints:
a) inmates requiring restraints will be housed only in a hospital setting, and not with the general population;
b) unpadded handcuffs and leg irons shall not be used under any circumstances. Medically appropriate restraints, padded or pliable to prevent injury to the inmate, may be utilized;
c) restraints may be imposed only on the specific written authorization of a medical doctor;
d) if required in an emergency situation when a doctor is present, a Medical Technical Assistant (MTA) or a Registered Nurse may order the temporary use of restraints, subject to the receipt, by telephone or otherwise, of approval from a medical doctor within two (2) hours of the imposition of such restraints;
e) a log will be kept reflecting the use of restraints, and stating for each such use the name of the person restrained, the date and time he was placed in restraints, the name of the doctor approving the use of restraints, and the time of such approval;
f) orders by a doctor authorizing the use of restraints are valid for twenty-four (24) hours only, and if no further written order has been entered within that period, the inmate shall be released from restraints;
g) no restrained inmate shall be housed in such a manner as to permit access to him by non-restrained inmates, with the exception of inmates approved by the medical staff for employment in the hospital area.
It is further ordered that this Court retains jurisdiction for the purpose of implementation of this ORDER.
[1] One inmate observed was reported to be commencing his third consecutive week under such restraint.
[2] Defendants' Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Partial Summary Judgment.
[3] Sostre was serving a 30-40 year sentence for selling narcotics.
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 554 F.Supp. 562 (1982)
Leonard CAMPBELL, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Anderson McGRUDER, et al., Defendants.
Civ. A. No. 1462-71.
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
October 8, 1982.
J. Patrick Hickey, Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge, Washington, D.C., for plaintiffs.
Edward E. Schwab, Asst. Corp. Counsel for the Dist. of Columbia, Washington, D.C., for defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
BRYANT, District Judge.
A.
This case is before the court on remand from the United States Court of Appeals. Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir.1978). It concerns the conditions under which inmates are confined by the Department of Corrections of the District of Columbia (the Department). The plaintiffs in this case are all pre-trial detainees. Most of them are housed at the Department's Central Detention Facility (Central), which is also used for convicted persons awaiting sentencing, for sentenced felons awaiting transfer to other facilities, and for sentenced misdemeanants serving their sentence.
On September 22, 1982, the Department moved the court to vacate its order of March 8, 1982. That order in pertinent part prohibited the Department from confining more than one person in any cell at Central. On September 22, 1982, the court heard arguments on the motion to vacate. Prior to that hearing, the court visited Central.
The Department conceded that confining two inmates in a cell designed for one person (double-celling) is 563 undesirable from the standpoint of both prison management and inmate well-being. But the Department *563
asked the court to permit double-celling as a temporary measure to relieve overcrowding at Central. Central was designed to hold 1,359 inmates. At the present time, the inmate population at Central exceeds 2,000 and is growing at an average rate of over nine inmates per week. To cope with this overcrowding, the Department has set up makeshift dormitories in some of the day rooms and gymnasiums at Central. Almost one-third of the inmates are currently living in these dormitories.
The Department offered two justifications for resorting to double-celling at Central. The first was that dormitories cannot be adequately patrolled and therefore pose a severe security risk. Though reliable statistics were not produced at the hearing, the Department asserted that the level of inmate assaults has increased at Central due to the use of dormitories. The second justification was that double-celling would enable the Department to remove dormitory beds from dayrooms and gymnasiums and use these facilities to provide inmates with needed recreational opportunities.
The Department acknowledged that the introduction of double-celling at Central would itself create problems. These include the need for special security arrangements to enable guards to oversee activities within the cells, the need for the proper matching of cellmates, and the need for removal of the existing single beds, which are welded to the cell walls. The Department also acknowledged that hostility and resentment might develop between inmates forced to share cells and those permitted to remain in single cells. More generally, the Department

agreed that double-celling places a heavy burden on inmates. Despite these acknowledged problems, the Department failed to provide the court with specific plans for how it proposed to administer double-celling at Central.
B.
The constitutional standards regarding the confinement of pre-trial detainees were set down by the Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1978). The basic requirement, mandated by the Due Process Clause, is that pre-trial detainees must not be subjected to conditions that "amount to punishment". Id. at 535, 99 S.Ct. at 1872. The Court held that double-celling does not by itself amount to punishment:
We disagree with both the District Court and the Court of Appeals that there is some sort of "one man, one cell" principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. While confining a given number of people in a given amount of space in such a manner as to cause them to endure genuine privations and hardship over an extended period of time might raise serious questions under the Due Process Clause as to whether those conditions amounted to punishment, nothing even approaching such hardship is shown by this record. [Id. at 542, 99 S.Ct. at 1875-76 (footnote omitted).]
As the above-quoted paragraph indicates, whether double-celling amounts to punishment in a particular case is a question of degree which must be determined according to the facts of each case. Wolfish dealt with conditions at the Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC) in New York City. In reaching the conclusion that double-celling of pre-trial detainees was permissible at MCC, the Court focused on four factors: (1) that MCC was a modern facility built according to the most progressive architectural designs, (2) that each cell contained about 75 square feet of floor space, (3) that the detainees were confined in their cells only from 11 p.m. to 6:30 a.m., and (4) that nearly all the detainees were released within 60 days.
The importance of these four factors0907facility design and age, cell size, hours per day of double-celling, and length of pre-trial detention0907was underscored by the recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals in 564 Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96 (2d Cir.1981).[1] In scrutinizing the conditions of *564 confinement at the Hartford Community Correctional Center (HCCC), the Court of Appeals closely tracked the factual inquiry used in Wolfish. The court found that HCCC, like MCC, was a modern facility, but one built according to traditional architectural models. Cells at HCCC contained 60 to 65 square feet of floor space, 10 to 15 square feet less than those at MCC. At HCCC, unlike MCC, inmates often spent most of their day confined in their cells, in some cases as much as 23 hours per day. Moreover, due to the conversion of common areas into dormitories, inmates at HCCC had few recreational opportunities. The statistics regarding length of detention at HCCC presented a mixed picture. Over 73% of the inmates were confined for periods of less than 30 days, but at any one time more than 67% had been confined for periods in excess of 60 days. The court also noted that HCCC suffered from a number of problems not present in Wolfish. These included the conversion of dayrooms into crowded dormitories (the so-called "fishtank"), the mixing of sick and healthy inmates, and the use of floor mattresses to double up single cells.
On this record, the Second Circuit ruled that double-celling of pre-trial detainees was permissible at HCCC. But given the greater hardships imposed on pre-trial detainees at HCCC as compared with MCC, the court placed a number of conditions on the use of double-celling. The "fishtank," the intermingling of healthy and sick inmates, and the use of floor mattresses were all prohibited. Furthermore, the administrators of HCCC were prohibited from double-celling pre-trial detainees for more than 15 days.[2] To go beyond that limit, the court concluded, would involve "unacceptable punishment." Id. at 105.[3]

C.
Guided by the criteria used in Wolfish and Lareau, the court now turns to the question of whether double-celling may be used at Central, and, if so, under what conditions. Central is a modern facility, having been opened as a replacement facility for the old D.C. Jail during the course of this litigation. Like HCCC and unlike MCC, it is designed along traditional lines. In each cell block, a centrally located guard is stationed under a bubble. From this vantage point, the guard commands a clear view of the corridors of the cell block and a partial view of the dayrooms and gymnasium. Significantly, however, the guard cannot see into the individual cells. The size of the cells at Central is 70 square feet, more than at HCCC, but less than at MCC. Unlike the inmates at MCC, the inmates at Central presently spend at least 17 hours of each day confined in their cells. If, as not infrequently happens, the daily "count" is delayed, inmates spend even longer periods of time in their cells, and apparently the Department has given no thought to reducing these hours if allowed to go to double-celling. The Department was unable to produce accurate information regarding the average length of detention for pre-trial detainees at Central, but the uncontroverted evidence produced by the plaintiffs was that the average time between arrest and 565 verdict or dismissal is 220 days (about seven *565 months) for those charged with felonies and 109 days (nearly four months) for those charged with misdemeanors. There does not appear to be a significant variation in these statistics according to whether the defendants are free on bond or held in detention.
In deciding whether double-celling may be used at Central, the court is mindful that prison administrators must be given wide-ranging discretion in dealing with the security problems of their institutions. At the same time, the court recognizes its constitutional responsibility to ensure that pretrial detainees are not confined under conditions amounting to punishment. Fortunately, in the present case the court is not called upon to choose between the expert advice of prison administrators and the mandate of the Due Process Clause. Like the courts in Wolfish and Lareau, the Department has concluded that the destructive potential of double-celling can be brought within acceptable limits if detainees are not double-celled for long periods of time and if otherwise favorable conditions are maintained at the jail.
The Department's acting director testified that he "would rather not see that [double-celling] happening" because "each individual person would like to have his territory, even though he is in jail". The acting director further testified that double-celling "doesn't necessarily have to be [dehumanizing] if you try to handle it well .... When you are talking about classifying people, ... you make the best match of people in the various cells ... and give them time out of the cells and recreation and all the things that we are supposed to be doing that we are not doing.... That takes some of the inhumanity away from this kind of situation." At other points in his testimony, the acting director acknowledged that to properly administer double-celling would require the use of additional guards to patrol the cell blocks. He also emphasized that double-celling ought to be used as a temporary measure only.
In light of this testimony, the court will defer to the Department's judgment that double-celling is a lesser evil than the continued use of makeshift dormitories at Central. The court will also defer to the Department's judgment concerning the factors that are necessary to the proper administration of double-celling. In order to protect inmates from being assaulted while locked in their cells, the court will require that additional guards be placed in each cell block in which inmates are double-celled. These guards will patrol the cell block corridors on a frequent enough basis to closely monitor activities within the individual cells. The total number of guards on duty in the cell blocks must exceed that presently employed to patrol the cells and dormitories.
To make specific the Department's recommendation that inmates be given adequate time out of their cells, the court will require that no inmate be double-celled for more than 12 hours per day. A detainee may be confined in his cell for more than 12 hours per day, but only if his cellmate is removed from the cell for a sufficient length of time to reduce the total hours of joint confinement to less than 12 hours in any day. Furthermore, in line with the decisions reached in Wolfish and Lareau, the court will order that no pre-trial detainee be double-celled for more than 30 days. In Wolfish, nearly all the detainees were released within 60 days. In Lareau, the court imposed a 15-day limit on the double-celling of pre-trial detainees. On the basis of the salient factors already discussed, the court finds that conditions at Central are somewhat better than at HCCC, but worse than at MCC. The 30-day limit reflects Central's intermediate position on this continuum.

These preconditions to double-celling are imposed in order that pre-trial detainees not be unlawfully confined under conditions amounting to punishment. They mark minimal standards, and merely meeting them should not give rise to satisfaction or complacency.
It is clear from the testimony that the Department views the use of double-celling with considerable misgivings. In 566 this negative *566 judgment the Department is joined by virtually all expert opinion in the field. The reason for this
unanimous condemnation of double-celling is that, unless administered under optimal conditions, it poses a substantial risk of dehumanizing and punishing the inmates. It was in order to avoid this risk that Central, along with almost every other modern jail, was designed to accommodate only one person in each cell.
The imposition of double-celling will inevitably place new pressure on the individual inmates at Central and on the institution as a whole. The court's restrictions on the use of double-celling will act as relief valves to bleed off some of this pressure. But the court notes in passing that foreseeable increases in the inmate population at Central will soon close off these relief valves. As the percentage of double-cells at Central increases, it will become more and more difficult for the Department to rotate detainees out of the double-cells within 30 days. Similarly, as the number of prisoners using the dayrooms, gymnasiums, and other common areas grows, it will become more difficult for the Department to separate cellmates for 12 hours a day. As the pressure mounts, the Department will once again find itself confronted with an overcrowding crisis. As a matter of fact, it appears that the time is fast approaching when the Department will be unable to comply with any constitutional standard. This could lead to results that none of us want to even contemplate.
At an earlier point in this litigation, this court observed that: "... More energy is devoted to pointing up excuses than to creative efforts to deal effectively with a problem which obviously is here and is not going away of its own accord0907the new Jail notwithstanding." Campbell v. McGruder, 416 F.Supp. 111, 114-115 (D.C.1976). Though well aware of the difficulties faced by the Department and the local government, the court continues to believe that these difficulties can be surmounted with long-range planning and continual monitoring of the shifts in inmate population. The question of pre-trial detainees is an important aspect of the criminal justice system. Those responsible for the orderly administration of that system cannot afford to expend all their ingenuity and effort on measures which foreseeably exacerbate the problem of pre-trial detainees. Some of that creative energy must be reserved for improving conditions of confinement and for reducing the numbers of people confined pending trial0907thus avoiding the constitutional issues confronted here. This will require an innovative and aggressive approach.
But it is possible, and there really is no alternative.
It is hereby ORDERED that the portion of the court's order of March 8, 1982 prohibiting the double-celling of pretrial detainees is vacated, and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that:
(1) Additional guards be placed in each cell block in which inmates are double-celled. These guards are to make frequent inspections of the inside of the individual cells.
(2) No pre-trial detainee be confined in his cell for more than 12 hours in any day in the company of another inmate.
(3) No pre-trial detainee be double-celled for more than 30 days.
[1] Further support concerning the importance of these factors is provided by other circuits which have scrutinized conditions of pre-trial confinement in light of Bell v. Wolfish. Littlefield v. Deland, 641 F.2d 729 (10th Cir.1981); Lock v. Jenkins, 641 F.2d 488 (7th Cir.1981); Campbell v. Cauthron, 623 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1980); Jordan v. Wolke, 615 F.2d 749 (7th Cir.1980). None of these cases, however, provides as close a parallel to the conditions at Central as does Lareau v. Manson.
[2] The Court of Appeals indicated that it would permit HCCC administrators to exceed the 15-day limit by two or three days in the case of detainees certain to be released within that time.

[3] Judge Friendly, who dissented from the part of the court's decision which placed a 30-day limit on the doublecelling of convicted inmates, concurred with the limitations placed on the double-celling of pre-trial detainees. In his discussion of double-celling, Judge Friendly noted that the harmful effects of this practice could be reduced if the time cellmates spent in their cell was arranged so that each inmate had the cell to himself during part of the day. Id. at 114 n. 7.
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 416 F.Supp. 106 (1975)
Leonard CAMPBELL et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Anderson McGRUDER et al., Defendants.
Civ. A. No. 1462-71.
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
November 5, 1975.
107 *107 J. Patrick Hickey, Public Defender Service, Washington, D. C., for plaintiffs.
Thomas R. Nedrich, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Washington, D. C., for defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
BRYANT, District Judge.
Pursuant to the directions of our Circuit Court of Appeals as contained in its remand order, this Court has held hearings pointed to determining the degree to which compliance has been had with its interim order of March 21, 1975 relative to the housing of pretrial detainees at the District of Columbia Jail. Also pursuant to the order, the defendants are directed to take specific steps which appear to be feasible, and likely to solve the problem of space. The results of these proceedings and the supplemental directions to the defendants are as follows:
Following issuance of the Order by the United States Court of Appeals on May 2, 1975, the District of Columbia Department of Corrections filed with this Court on May 16, 1975, a report indicating that it was then in compliance with the requirement of this Court's Interim Order of March 21, 1975, that no member of plaintiff class be housed in an area less than 48 square feet at the District of Columbia Jail. Compliance with this Order was achieved notwithstanding earlier testimony by Mr. Jackson, the Director of the Department, on April 1, 1975, that the Department had "reached the ultimate" in its efforts to comply with the Order, and the arguments of the Department in the Court of Appeals on April 25 that compliance with the Order was impossible.
As of May 15, 1975, the population of the Jail was 751, and twenty of those persons, all sentenced individuals, were being held in less than 48 square feet per man. All other persons at the Jail had at least 48 square feet each.
Following a request by plaintiffs' counsel, this Court held a further hearing on August 7, 1975, to investigate reports that the defendants were at that time not complying with the 48 square feet requirement. The population at the Jail on August 4 was 882 persons, 584 unsentenced, 255 sentenced and 43 being held on writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum or ad testificandum, or in connection with a pending appeal.
Of the 584 unsentenced individuals present at the Jail on August 4, a study by the defendants revealed that nearly two-thirds of them (63%) had been held at the Jail longer than thirty days, and more than 20% had been held at the Jail in excess of four months.
On August 7, approximately 175-200 unsentenced individuals were being double-housed in cells measuring approximately six feet by eight feet. At the same time, a substantial number of the sentenced prisoners were either housed alone in the same size cell, or were housed in dormitory facilities where they enjoyed at least 48 square feet per man.
108 At the August 7 hearing, Charles M. Rodgers, the Assistant Director of Operations *108 of the Department of Corrections, and the man specifically charged by the Director with the responsibility for compliance with this Court's Order of March 21, admitted that although he was familiar with that Order and with the Order issued by the United States Court of Appeals on May 2, 1975, he had nevertheless made no efforts to consult with the

Chief Judges of the two trial courts in this jurisdiction, nor with the District of Columbia Bail Agency, as contemplated by the order of the Court of Appeals. Similarly, although the Department's report filed with this Court on May 16 stated that the Department would convert recreation space at the Jail to afford additional housing, Mr. Rodgers admitted that he had no intent to do so, and had no such intent at the time the report was filed with the Court.
As of August 7, no system had been established by the Department to determine whether or not the Jail was complying with the 48-square feet requirement; no consultation with the courts had been undertaken to attempt to expedite the sentencing of convicted individuals being held at the Jail awaiting sentencing; and, although this Court's Order applied only to pre-conviction detainees, no effort had been made to identify that class of persons as distinguished from those already convicted but awaiting sentencing.
During the course of the August 7 hearing, at the suggestion of this Court's Deputy Clerk, a simple method of identifying the plaintiff class was suggested to officials of the Department. This "reform", which involved a minor change in the Superior Court and District Court Clerks' offices' method of processing commitment papers, was subsequently put into effect, and as of August 18, the Jail has been able to identify the plaintiff class.
While some efforts were made by lower-level Department employees to reduce the population of the Jail, these efforts did not have a substantial impact on the crowding problem.
At the conclusion of the August 7 hearing, the Court scheduled another hearing for August 15. At the latter hearing, the Court and counsel were joined by a representative of the Mayor's Office, as well as Department of Corrections officials. At the hearing, the Court was advised that the capacity of the Jail to house residents in 48 square feet had been increased, by two methods: (a) the capacity had been recomputed to include lavatory and hallway space in some housing areas, so that although no physical changes had been made to the structure of the Jail, the Department now felt that a larger number of persons could be housed in the same space as before without violating their right to 48 square feet per man; (b) "emergency funds" in excess of $10,000 had been made available by the Mayor's Office, which would enable the Jail to convert an area not previously used for housing to a dormitory. The Court was assured by the defendants that the Jail would be able to hold 951 individuals, allotting each at least 48 square feet, and that this would enable the Jail to be in compliance as of August 15. In addition, the Department represented that some movable housing units, known as "demountables", were available to the District Government, and that these also could be used if necessary. Finally, defendants assured the Court that notice would be given if the Jail's population increased to the extent that the 48 square feet rule was not being complied with.
Shortly after the August 15 hearing, the Court, accompanied by counsel for both sides, made an unannounced inspection of the Jail, and toured most of the housing units. The Court saw and spoke with inmates housed in Cell Block 2, where two men were confined in single cells, and confirmed the testimony adduced at trial on the physical aspects of overcrowding at the Jail.
On October 14, the Court was notified by defendants' counsel that the Jail was no longer complying with the space requirement, and had been out of compliance since September 16. A hearing was held on October 16, at 109 which three employees of the Jail (Ronald Harbin, Records Office Supervisor; *109 Officer Roy Grillo, the recently appointed "compliance officer" charged with monitoring compliance with the space requirement; and Mr. Aubrey Kearney, the Administrator of the Jail) testified about compliance with the Order. Neither Mr. Rodgers nor Mr. Jackson, nor any representative of the City Government testified. No plan to bring the Jail back into compliance was presented, nor was there any evidence of good faith efforts by defendants to find solutions to the problem.
Statistical evidence presented reflected that, on September 8, 1975 (when the Jail was in compliance) there were 610 members of the plaintiff class at the Jail. In the following weeks, while there was some variation in this number, reaching a high of 621 on October 14, there has been a marked increase in the number of sentenced inmates at the Jail (170 on September 8, 225 on October 14).
Also there has been an increase in the number of persons awaiting trial, i. e. members of plaintiff class, with the proportion of detainees on surety bonds also on the increase.

Apart from converting other space to a new dormitory at the Jail, the Department and the city have made no substantial efforts to comply with the Order of this Court since its issuance in March; and there is no evidence of any contemplated effort to either reduce the population at the Jail or to provide additional space.
More significantly, the effort to comply with the Court of Appeals' May 2, 1975 Order is not a vigorous one. That Order is a virtual road map which if followed is bound to lead to compliance with the space requirements.
The most meaningful step in the direction of compliance is to seek effective implementation of the procedures governing the release of pre-trial detainees. The defendants have had enough experience in this area to be aware of the correlation between effectuating these procedures and reduction in the Jail population. Back on October 13, 1973, this Court issued an interim Order in this case, the second paragraph of which reads:
Attorneys of the Public Defender Service and others designated by counsel for plaintiffs shall be forthwith admitted to the District of Columbia Jail for the purpose of conferring with inmates. Those attorneys shall take immediate action to present to the appropriate courts such non-frivolous claims of each inmate as can be heard on an emergency basis, either by notifying the attorneys already appointed for the inmates, or if such attorneys are unavailable or unwilling to take action, by presenting the claims themselves.
During the ensuing week, ending October 21, 1972, the number of persons Released in Court and Jail (a category which includes for the most part persons released on bail) made a dramatic jump to 103 persons from an average weekly figure far below that number.
Then again, within a week after this Court's March 21, 1975 Order, the Chief Judge of the District of Columbia Superior Court called a meeting which included representatives from the offices of the United States Attorney, the Corporation Counsel, and the Director of the District of Columbia Bail Agency. As a result of that meeting, Chief Judge Greene authorized J. William Erhardt, Esquire, the attorney in charge of the District of Columbia Bar Jail Project, to file motions for review of pre-trial release conditions on behalf of prisoners who were unable to obtain release pending their trials in the Superior Court. At the same time the Chief Judge specially assigned two judges to hear the motions.
Mr. Erhardt's effort in this regard consisted of contacting the attorney of record to communicate additional information concerning the inmate's eligibility for release on conditions other than a surety bond, and to request the attorney to seek his client's release under the provisions of the statute. In approximately 18 cases, because 110 the attorney of record could not be contacted or refused to file bail review motions, Mr. *110 Erhardt filed these motions himself, and as a result at least four detainees were released. In approximately 110 cases where counsel of record agreed to file bail review motions on the basis of information transmitted to them by Mr. Erhardt, the result was that many more were released. At any rate, once again the Released In Court and At Jail category showed a substantial increase in numbers for the weeks ending April 5th and April 12th, far in excess of the average figures, and with the reduction in population the defendants were able to report that they were within the space requirements of the March 21, 1975 Order.
In their May 16, 1975 report to this Court pursuant to the Court of Appeals Order the defendants mention the meeting called by Chief Judge Greene (but neglect to mention that it was sua sponte, and not pursuant to any request by them). The defendants must try to reinstate the late March, 1975 arrangement, not merely for three weeks, as was the case then, but on a basis regular enough to achieve the rate of release demonstrated by Mr. Erhardt permanently. The defendants are further reminded that the city is obligated to make it possible for the Bail Agency to be adequately staffed,[1] to enable it to comply with the provisions of 23 D.C.Code § 1303(h)(6), which require monitoring of the pre-trial detainee population on a regular basis.[2]
The defendants claim to have moved as many persons as possible out of the Jail, but this does not appear to be the fact. During the August hearing it developed that defendants actually did not know the status of its population, and Mr. McGruder indicated that it would be "fruitful" if he could determine who among the "unsentenced" category were in fact convicted. At the time the Court's impression was that persons already convicted of felonies could in fact be sent to Lorton while awaiting sentence. But it now develops that the defendants feel bound by a

form drawn by the Clerk's office which states that persons convicted are committed to the "Asylum and Jail". It appears feasible that if the form so binds the defendants (and the Court does not concede that it has that effect), some step should be taken to revise it. There is no compelling reason why convicted felons must remain at the Jail pending sentence.

The defendants do not appear to have taken advantage of applicable statutes. The local code (24 D.C.Code § 425) provides:

All prisoners convicted in the District of Columbia for any offense, including violations of municipal

regulations and ordinances and Acts of Congress in the nature of municipal regulations and

ordinances, shall be committed, for their terms of imprisonment, and to such types of institutions

as the court may direct, to the custody of the Attorney General of the United States or his

authorized representative, who shall designate the places of confinements where the sentences of

all such persons shall be served. The Attorney General may designate any available, suitable, and

111

appropriate institutions, whether maintained by the District of Columbia Government, the federal

*111 government, or otherwise, or whether within or without the District of Columbia. The Attorney

General is also authorized to order the transfer of any such person from one institution to another

if, in his judgment, it shall be for the well-being of the prisoner or relieve overcrowding or

unhealthful conditions in the institution where such prisoner is confined, . . . (emphasis supplied)

The representations made relative to the U.S. Marshal and the inquiries made of the military authorities fall short of a direct request to the Attorney General to exercise his powers in this regard.

It would appear that the U.S. Marshal should be requested to move prisoners designated for other institutions in less time than three or four weeks.

Also, demountable housing units could be utilized at the Jail, the Lorton Complex, or elsewhere.

Finally, it is clear that the current problem facing the defendants is not likely to go away with the coming of the new jail facility, and continuous efforts are necessary to orchestrate the cooperative efforts necessary to effectively manage this aspect of the criminal justice process. This obviously requires the existence of a "Compliance Officer", but not on the level currently envisioned by defendants. For this purpose the defendants should designate a ranking official with the ongoing responsibility and authority to maintain effective liaison with the agencies necessarily involved if the detention facility is to be properly managed.

[1] The Director of the Agency testified that he was understaffed and therefore unable to comply with the law.
[2] After nearly two hundred years this nation has recognized that the unnecessary jailing of persons merely accused of criminal conduct 0907 regardless of the conditions of their confinement 0907 is incompatible with our ideals of ordered liberty. This awareness has resulted in the Bail Reform legislation and to some extent in the Criminal Justice Act, providing for compensated counsel to represent indigent defendants. Both measures apply to the District of Columbia, and the defendants are obligated to take all steps necessary to assure their effectiveness.
The effectiveness of those measures is obviously heavily dependent upon the quality of the services rendered by defense attorneys in such cases. The District of Columbia, which pays both for these services and for the custody of pre-trial detainees not released on bail, cannot afford to be unconcerned with the ineffective assistance of counsel reflected by the dramatic rise in releases in the two above-described instances in which the rights of such detainees were pursued by or through the initiative of outside counsel.

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 416 F.Supp. 111 (1976)
Leonard CAMPBELL et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Anderson McGRUDER et al., Defendants.
Civ. A. No. 1462-71.
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
May 24, 1976.
112 *112 J. Patrick Hickey, Public Defender Service, Washington, D. C., for plaintiffs.
Thomas R. Nedrich, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Washington, D. C., for defendants.
PROCEEDINGS ON REMAND
BRYANT, District Judge.
I. Overcrowding.
On January 12, 1976, the United States Court of Appeals heard argument on cross-motions for summary affirmance and summary reversal of this Court's Interim Order of March 21, 1975, prohibiting overcrowding and for vacation of the stay of that Order entered by the Court of Appeals on April 4, 1975 and continued in effect since that time. According to the memorandum filed by the Court of Appeals, it was represented to the Court on that date that the Jail was then in compliance with the 48 square-feet per man requirement of this Court's original order and that there would be 240 spaces available for occupancy at the New Detention Facility by February 28, 1976 and another 240 by April 1, affording the prospect that further violations of plaintiffs' constitutional rights by overcrowding would not recur in the near future. ("Plaintiffs" is used herein to refer to both convicted and unconvicted residents. There are no significant differences in the manner in which they are treated by defendants.)
In mid-January, 1976, notwithstanding the above-mentioned representations, the D. C. Jail was again out of compliance with the 48 square-feet requirement and continued in that status into late April, 1976. Following a visit (unannounced) by this Court to the Jail on April 7, an order was issued setting the matter for hearing, held on April 29-30. It appears that compliance with the order was again achieved within days of the April 29 hearing. No prompt notice of the earlier overcrowding was given by the defendants to the Court or to counsel for plaintiffs.
During most of the period from mid-January to mid-April, more than 200 persons at a time were held in violation of this Court's March 1975 order, most of them double-housed in the 136 one-man cells in Cell Block 2, in the oldest and most dilapidated part of the Jail. Although some efforts were made to rotate these individuals into other housing locations at the Jail where, although 48 square feet was not available, there would be at least some ability to move about, the overcrowding of all parts of the Jail increased until this was no longer possible, with the result that some persons spent more than a month double-housed in CB-2.
Since January, 1976, the population of Detention Services has continued to rise. For male residents, the average daily population from February 8 through April 17, 1976 was 1080, but the population has gone as high as 1148 on particular days. (Although the Department continually changes its view of the capacity of the Jail at 48 square feet per man, the Court finds that 850 spaces was the capacity beyond which conditions at the Jail violate plaintiffs' constitutional rights. This total includes 272 cells in CB-1 and CB-2, currently vacant and unsafe for further use.)

During the aforementioned ten-week period, 2868 men were admitted to the Jail, approximately 60% categorized by the Department of Corrections as "New Admissions" and approximately 40% as "Recommits." The vast 113 majority of New Admissions (approximately 80%), according to records of the Department, are persons *113 committed to custody by the courts, either in lieu of bond while awaiting trial or pursuant to a sentence of incarceration. Approximately 90-95% of the New Admissions committed by the courts are committed in lieu of bond. (In addition to those committed by the courts, the other groups included in the New Admissions category are illegal aliens arrested by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, persons committed by order of the United States Marshal, and persons held on writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum or ad testificandum.)
Perhaps more significant is the fact that of those New Admissions who were received from the courts, 90-95% of whom (as previously stated) were in a pre-trial status, approximately half were persons charged with misdemeanor offenses, confined in lieu of bail. While the weekly summaries prepared by the Department of Corrections of admissions during this ten-week period include persons charged with robbery, homicide, burglary and other serious felonies, the number of persons committed as a result of charges for such relatively minor offenses as tampering with an auto, attempted petit larceny, destroying property, etc. is striking. Indeed, during the ten-week period studied, 140 individuals were committed for traffic offenses.
For those persons held at the Jail awaiting Superior Court trials, approximately twelve weeks intervene between initial arraignment and trial if the charge is a misdemeanor. If the defendant is charged with a felony, more than seven weeks will elapse between arrest and indictment, followed by eight to ten weeks before conviction, acquittal or dismissal, and an additional four weeks for sentencing for those who are convicted.
The "Recommit" category, the source of approximately 40% of the admissions to the Jail, are all sentenced individuals who are held at the Jail almost exclusively because of the administrative decisions and priorities of the Department of Corrections. (A small number in this class is held because of specific court order, usually founded on concern for the individual's safety if housed at the Lorton Correctional Complex.) No reasons, apart from the Department's and the City's funding priorities, exist to justify or require continued housing of most of these individuals at the Jail.
In early April, 1976, the first inmates were housed in the New Detention Facility (NDF) of the Department of Corrections. The NDF consists of two "modules" for housing inmates, the North Module and the South Module. Each module has 480 one-man cells, arranged in six cell blocks of 80 cells each. The total capacity of NDF will be 960 inmates. Three cell blocks in the North Module were turned over by the builder to the Department about the first week of March. Following inspections and "shakedown" procedures, the first inmates were moved in during the first week of April, and have continued to move in since that time as cells became available. On April 29, 1976, there were slightly over 300 men in the NDF, with the Department predicting a population there of 450-480 by the end of the first week of May.
The District's Department of General Services supervises the performance by the builder of the construction contract for NDF, and a representative of that Department testified that the South Module (480 cells) would be available for "joint occupancy" about June 30, 1976. "Joint occupancy" refers to a period when both the builder and the Department of Corrections are working at the site, inspecting the construction and repairing defects. Inmates will not be housed at the South Module during the "joint occupancy" period. In light of the experience with the North Module, it may well be August before the first inmates move into the South Module, and the end of the summer before the full complement of 960 spaces are available for housing inmates.
As of April 30, there were 1243 males housed in Detention Services (865 at the old Jail, 378 at the NDF). Because the NDF, even if it were available today, is inadequate to house the male prisoners, the Department 114 plans to continue to use a portion of the facilities at the old Jail. Department *114 officials testified that they will utilize Cell Blocks 3 and 4 of the Jail, which have a capacity of 376 under the 48 square-foot standard. It is also possible that the Dormitory facilities at the old Jail (capacity 201) will be used, but the prospects for sufficient staff to operate the Dormitory facilities are not good. If sufficient staff is unavailable, inmates will be crowded into Cell Blocks 3 and 4. Indeed, no firm assurances of necessary staff to operate even the NDF to its designed capacity are available, since the budget containing those positions has not yet been approved by the Congress. Moreover,

reductions in the proposed budget have required that the Department utilize inmate labor ("Captain's Detail") to operate the NDF, although some Corrections officials view such a practice as undesirable.
The cells in CB-1 and CB-2 at the Jail (total 272 cells) will not be used because of their extreme condition of deterioration and structural damage to that part of the Jail which renders them unsafe. Economical repair is not feasible. Funds have been reprogrammed by the Department of Corrections to seal off CB-1, CB-2 and the Rotunda visiting area from the remainder of the Jail. Funding to renovate CB-3 and CB-4 to bring them into compliance with minimal housing standards has not been approved, and, if approved, will be hampered by the high population which prevents vacating those cell blocks for the renovation period.
The Women's Detention Center is also substantially overcrowded, and the Department plans to house women in the NDF. While a final decision concerning the number of women to be housed at NDF has not been made, at least 80 and perhaps as many as 160 women will be housed there. This has the obvious effect of reducing the male capacity of NDF to 800-880. Assuming that only 80 spaces are reserved for female prisoners at NDF, the male capacity of Detention Services, when NDF is fully operational, will be 1256 (880 at NDF and 376 at the old Jail). If 160 spaces at NDF are used for women, the male capacity is 1176. On April 30, the male population was 1243. On the same date, 138 women were crowded into the Women's Detention Center (capacity 0907 50).
The Department of Corrections has experienced difficulties in attempting to project future populations for Detention Services, in part because of its inability to know the future arrest rates of the Metropolitan Police and the bail-setting policies of the courts. Statistical predictions which have been made in the past by the Department's Office of Planning have consistently underestimated, by nearly one-third, the actual Detention Services population. Using those same methods and data base, the Department in the fall of 1975 projected a Detention Services population (including women) rising to 1300 for spring, 1977. In fact, that projection has already been exceeded in April, 1976 (1243 males + 138 females = 1381). In addition, several witnesses, including the Department's Director, expect that the rising population trend, evident in the first four months of 1976, will continue at least throughout this year, and the prior experience of these officials has also shown a tendency for the population to increase during the summer months just ahead. If this trend and past experience continue to hold true, and all indications are that they will, the unmistakable conclusion is that notwithstanding the opening of the NDF, the Jail facilities will continue to be overcrowded, and plaintiffs will continue to be housed in violation of their constitutional rights and elemental standards of human decency.
Notwithstanding the present crisis and the appalling prospects of a worsening situation, there has been no planning for dealing with this problem by the City or the Department. Rather, the tedious history of this litigation reflects only occasional and sporadic efforts, usually when a court proceeding has been scheduled, followed by almost total inactivity once the matter is no longer before the Court as a crisis situation. (See, e. g., the discussion of the "demountable" housing units, infra.) Mr. Jackson, the Department's Director, expressed concern 115 in November 1975 about whether "the required *115 aggressive and productive action" had been taken by his staff to alleviate overcrowding. He designated yet another individual to monitor the Department's efforts, but the defendants did not present either the testimony of this individual or any evidence concerning his efforts at the April 29-30 hearings. At those hearings, as in earlier proceedings, it became evident that more energy is devoted to pointing up excuses than to creative efforts to deal effectively with a problem which obviously is here and is not going away of its own accord 0907 the new Jail notwithstanding.
This Court's skepticism concerning the Department's protestations of the impossibility of compliance urged on this Court and the Court of Appeals almost from the moment the original order of March 21, 1975 was entered, has been confirmed and heightened by the events of the intervening year. Throughout these proceedings, when pressure was brought to bear, the impossible has become possible and compliance has been obtained, at least for a time. What has been missing, unfortunately, is a commitment to a long-range, continuing effort to maximize the resources presently available to the Department and the City, and to make plans to increase those resources to meet the need.
The Court and counsel for the plaintiffs cannot be aware of all the alternatives open to the Department and the City, and orders to date have left to the latter parties the methods of complying with the Court's mandate. For example, the availability of cell blocks, unused though in need of repair, at the Department of Human Resources' facility for alcoholics at Occoquan (adjacent to the Corrections Department's Minimum Security facility) was not

known to the Court or counsel in March, 1975 when the Department's Director said compliance was impossible. Their existence was, however, known to Corrections officials. In November, 1975 a request was made, and promptly granted, for transfer of those facilities from the Department of Human Resources to the Department of Corrections. However, at the time of the April 29 hearing, the renovation work (to be performed by the Department) had not begun and was not yet scheduled. Other alternatives, suggested to and recognized by the Department, and some of which were the subject of promises by the Department to pursue their utilization, have not been pursued, though they remain open as options.
A. Lorton Youth Centers 1 and 2, the subject of population limits imposed by Judge Gesell, contain additional adequate housing space. Despite assurances to the contrary, no approach has been made to Judge Gesell to seek his authorization to increase the population limits. Instead, persons who have been held at the Youth Centers for diagnostic studies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 5010(e) are returned to the Jail, increasing the population there, to avoid violation of the population limits set by Judge Gesell.
B. During the period following completion of § 5010(e) studies in Youth Act cases, and prior to the imposition of sentence, defendants are held at the D. C. Jail. The Department claims that holding these defendants at the Adult Facility at Lorton, where some of them will ultimately be sentenced to serve their time, would be inappropriate since the Adult Facility houses sentenced adult felons and is not certified by the Attorney General as a Youth Facility. Of course, the D. C. Jail is likewise not certified as a Youth Facility, and it also houses sentenced adult felons. Even under the dubious construction that § 5010(e) commitment orders authorize holding defendants at the Jail but not at the Adult Facility, no effort has been made to request judges to authorize (at least for those for whom Youth Act sentences are not recommended) holding these persons at the Adult Facility.
C. The Minimum Security Facility at Lorton continues to operate, as it has throughout this litigation, under capacity. Notwithstanding the fact that it houses almost exclusively persons serving felony sentences (including 116 homicides and other serious crimes), the Department contends that the absence of a fence around the facility *116 makes it inappropriate for housing sentenced misdemeanants because of "security" considerations. The facility was previously used for sentenced misdemeanants, and several Jail officials have testified that they know of no reason why these defendants should not again be housed there. Defendant McGruder recommended several years ago that misdemeanants be transferred to Lorton to alleviate the overcrowding at the Jail. In sum, the evidence simply does not support the Department's claim that holding sentenced misdemeanants at the Jail is necessary for "security" reasons.
D. Some misdemeanants are sentenced by judges to serve their time in the Department's Community Correctional Centers (sometimes called "half-way houses"), but, if this sentence is not imposed, the Department has the authority (D.C.Code § 24-462) to recommend such a sentence to the court. While the Department has made about six such recommendations per month over the past ten months (about half of which were accepted by the courts), they do not make such recommendations for all misdemeanants. Excluded are those with short sentences, because the Department views the length of the sentence as inadequate to "process" such a recommendation. Finally, if the Department, presumably confident that half-way house confinement will not unduly endanger the community, recommends such confinement but the recommendation is rejected by the court, the Department assumes that the defendants thereby become unsuitable for confinement in Fairfax County at the Minimum Security facility.
E. In February, 1976, the Department wrote to the United States Marshal concerning the removal from the Jail of parole violators under the supervision of the United States Parole Board. (A similar letter was written in April, 1975.) One month later the Parole Board responded, revealing that some of the individuals involved had been designated to Federal Bureau of Prisons institutions as far back as October, 1975, but were still awaiting transportation. No other correspondence or any substantial efforts to speed up this process were shown.
F. In August, 1975, the Department had available and considered the use of "demountable" housing units, temporary housing facilities owned by the District of Columbia. Instead, the Department decided to renovate a dormitory area at the Jail. (Here again, funds for renovation which were "unavailable" in May became available in August, through an executive decision of the City.) When the population again began to rise, however, no further efforts were made to obtain or utilize demountables, although some have been used at Lorton for office facilities. Several other state corrections departments have increased their housing capacities through use of these units,

obtained either free or at minimal cost from agencies of the United States, including the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. Such units are still available to the City.
G. The Department contends that 18 U.S.C. § 4083 prevents the housing of convicted misdemeanants at the Maximum Security or Central Facilities at Lorton, because the latter institutions are "penitentiaries" within the meaning of that section. Whether such a provision might be superseded by the authorization in D.C.Code § 24-425 and regulations thereunder authorizing the Director of the Department to transfer prisoners "to relieve overcrowding," the U.S.C. provision clearly does not prohibit such a transfer with the misdemeanant's consent. The Department does not, however, request such consent, but continues to hold all sentenced misdemeanants at the Jail.
H. Some defendants are sentenced by judges to serve sentences of confinement on weekends only. In April, 1975, the Department wrote to these judges requesting permission to transfer such inmates to half-way houses to relieve overcrowding at the Jail. Although this effort was generally successful, no similar efforts have been made since that time.
117 *117 I. Some defendants sentenced by Superior Court judges are recommended by those judges for designation to a Federal Bureau of Prisons institution for service of sentence. Such recommendations are not binding, and are usually rejected by the Bureau, in which event the inmate serves his time at Lorton. Nevertheless, the Department continues to hold sentenced Superior Court felons at the Jail while awaiting the Bureau of Prisons' response to the recommendation.
J. No substantial efforts have been made by the Department to locate alternative housing facilities within the District of Columbia or at the Lorton Complex. The Department's view apparently is that no existing facility is adequate (including vacant spaces previously used for housing such as Junior Village or Bolling Air Force Base) because the buildings are not built as jails and therefore "security" would prevent utilization of such facilities. Mr. McGruder, the former superintendent of the Jail, felt that only a small proportion of the Jail population with which he was so familiar required maximum security custody, and the notion that many of the sentenced misdemeanants, whose presence adds substantially to the overcrowding at the Jail, cannot safely be held in less secure facilities has never been satisfactorily explained by the Department. (One "explanation," that nearly all sentenced misdemeanants have pending felony charges or outstanding detainers, has been eliminated by the Department's records reflecting that less than half the sentenced misdemeanants fall into these categories.) In addition, additional space is available at the Central Facility at Lorton, where some maximum security ("close custody") inmates live in dormitories with more than 80 square feet per man.
The above-listed alternatives, as well as others, make clear that the defendants have failed to take reasonable and obvious steps to alleviate overcrowding. While these steps may not be sufficient to eliminate completely the likelihood of further constitutional violations, they would, if taken, reduce that prospect for a while and increase the capacity of the inmate population which the defendants can constitutionally confine.
All efforts to induce the defendants to put their house in order have been unavailing up to now, and it is apparent that no meaningful effort can reasonably be expected absent a strong order of the Court which makes clear that housing inmates under unconstitutional conditions must cease. Such an order should be designed to sensitize the defendants to the fact that their overcrowding crisis point which requires immediate action is when they go one inmate over capacity, rather than when the Court is made aware of widespread overcrowding and orders a hearing.
Accordingly, this Court believes that the defendants should be enjoined from housing after June 1, 1976 more than 960 persons at the New Detention Facility, 215 persons in Cell Block 4, 161 persons in Cell Block 3, 110 persons in Dormitory 1, and 91 persons in Dormitory 2 at the old Jail. In addition, after July 1, 1976 no persons should be housed in Cell Blocks 1 and 2 at the old Jail.
Finally, it is the opinion of the Court that the order should also contain the proviso that if compliance requires a reduction in the inmate population at either facility, and other efforts to reduce the population are not successful within 48 hours after compliance ceases, the Director of the Department of Corrections and the Superintendent of

Detention Services be directed to release on their own recognizance, within 48 hours of the admission to either facility of persons in excess of the numbers stated in the preceding paragraph, those pre-trial detainees held in default of the lowest amount of bail, and among those detainees held in the same amount of bail those held for the longest time, until compliance with that Order is obtained; provided that if the Board of Judges of the Superior Court, or the Chief Judge thereof, specify a different method of selecting the persons to be released, the defendants shall be governed accordingly. The Court would also order that the defendants submit to the Court 118 and serve on opposing *118 counsel within 45 days their plan to reduce the population and/or increase the facilities available to house committed persons so that future overcrowding may be avoided.
II. Recreation.
On April 29 and 30, 1976, the Court heard evidence concerning recreation for maximum security prisoners at both the new and old District of Columbia Jails. In response to the mandate of the Court of Appeals, the Court finds as follows:
1) No evidence was presented to the Court as to any dangers or risks involved in providing outside recreation to maximum security prisoners. In fact, at least two of defendants' agents testified that outside recreation for maximum security prisoners was possible. George Holland, administrator of the new jail, testified that recreation for maximum security prisoners was not a security problem but a matter of developing the appropriate schedules.
2) Moreover there was no evidence presented which would indicate that defendants do not have the personnel or facilities to provide outdoor exercise to prisoners held in maximum security.
3) On the average there are 136 prisoners on deadlock at the District of Columbia Jail. Of that number Department of Corrections officials estimate that 60 to 65 percent are pre-trial prisoners, five to ten percent are convicted prisoners awaiting sentencing, and 25 to 35 percent are sentenced prisoners. Department of Corrections officials also estimate that 20 percent of the prisoners held in deadlock are there by court order, 70 percent are there for their own protection, five percent are there at the prosecuting attorney's request, and one to ten percent are there as a result of disciplinary procedures instituted by the jail officials.
4) On the average, pre-trial maximum security prisoners who are charged with felonies in Superior Court spend eight to ten weeks in jail prior to their trial, and an average of four weeks between conviction and sentencing. Prisoners charged with felonies and tried in District Court spend an average of eight to ten weeks between conviction and sentencing. Prisoners charged with misdemeanors and tried in Superior Court stay in jail an average of twelve weeks prior to trial and two weeks between conviction and sentencing. (These statistics are based on court records and are applicable to all prisoners.) The Department of Corrections is unable to determine how long sentenced prisoners remain in maximum security.
5) Prisoners in orientation at Lorton get outside recreation three times a day three days a week and twice a day two days a week.
6) Maximum security prisoners at Lorton receive one hour of outdoor exercise five days a week.
7) At the old Jail maximum security prisoners are not receiving any outdoor exercise.
8) Juveniles at the District of Columbia Jail now receive one hour of outdoor exercise daily. This new practice will continue to be the policy in the future.
9) The new jail has facilities for both indoor and outdoor exercise for all prisoners. Maximum security prisoners at the new jail are presently getting one-half hour of indoor exercise daily. The administrator of the new jail is presently developing recreation plans for the new jail and intends to give maximum security prisoners at that facility outdoor exercise.
Accordingly, it is by the Court this 24th day of May, 1976,
ORDERED that, there being no just reason for delay, the Clerk enter partial final judgment pursuant to F.R.C.P. 54(b); that a certified copy of this Memorandum and Order, constituting the Court's findings of fact and

conclusions of law, be forthwith transmitted to the United States Court of Appeals as a supplemental record on appeal; and that this Court retain jurisdiction for the purpose of implementation of this ORDER. Dated: May 24, 1976.
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 580 F.2d 521 (1978)
Leonard CAMPBELL et al. v.
Anderson McGRUDER, Superintendent, Detention Services, et al., Appellants (two cases).
Nos. 75-1350 and 75-2273.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued May 26, 1976. Decided March 30, 1978.
522*522 523*523 524*524 David P. Sutton, Asst. Corp. Counsel for the District of Columbia, Washington, D. C., with whom John R. Risher, Jr., Corp. Counsel, Louis P. Robbins, Principal Asst. Corp. Counsel and Richard W. Barton, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Washington, D. C., were on the brief for appellants. Thomas R. Nedrich, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Washington, D. C., also argued for appellants.
J. Patrick Hickey, Washington, D. C., for appellees.
Before BAZELON, Chief Judge, and LEVENTHAL and MACKINNON, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by BAZELON, Chief Judge.
Opinion filed by MACKINNON, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part and concurring in part.
BAZELON, Chief Judge:
Plaintiffs, a class consisting of pretrial detainees incarcerated at the District of Columbia Jail,[1] brought this action in 1971 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against allegedly unconstitutional conditions at that facility. Following trial, the District Court entered an interim order on March 21, 1975, requiring the defendant city officials, inter alia, to cease housing pretrial detainees in any space smaller than 48 square feet per inmate within 15 days. On November 5, 1975, the District Court issued an order setting requirements for seven additional facets of the Jail's administration.[2] A second order concerning overcrowding was issued on May 24, 1976.[3] It sets limits on the total number of inmates that could be housed at the Jail and established a procedure for reducing the inmate population should those limits be exceeded. The defendants appeal from these orders on a variety of grounds.
I. COMITY AND ABSTENTION
At the outset, appellants claim that "the doctrines of comity and abstention preclude the federal courts of the District of Columbia from making class-based rulings concerned with the asserted rights of prisoners at the D.C. Jail . . . against whom criminal prosecutions are

pending in the District of Columbia Superior Court." Brief for appellants at 1. More specifically, appellants argue that abstention is appropriate here because (1) federal courts generally should refrain from using their injunctive powers to interfere with the administration of local government, especially with prisons; (2) the local Superior Court should be given an initial opportunity to hear appellees' claims; and (3) the District Court's 525*525 order requiring defendants to reduce the prison population when overcrowding occurs might interfere with subsequent criminal proceedings in the Superior Court.
As we have stated before, "[i]t may well be that the abstention doctrine is rooted in federalism interests which — with all their historic underpinnings, the tension between federal powers and state sovereignty, and the concern for local political autonomy — make the abstention doctrine inapposite in the unique District."[4] But even assuming that this doctrine applies fully to the federal courts' relations with the D.C. Superior Court, the present case falls into none of the three traditional categories of abstention.
First, this is not a case "in which the federal constitutional issue might be mooted or `presented in a different posture' by a state court determination of pertinent state law." Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 256, 88 S.Ct. 391, 400, 19 L.Ed.2d 444 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Here, there is no inadequately defined local law whose further interpretation might obviate consideration of the federal constitutional issue.[5]
Nor is this a case "where there have been presented difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in the case . . . at bar." Colorado River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 1244, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). The prime example of this category of abstention is Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 63 S.Ct. 1098, 87 L.Ed. 1424 (1943), where the exercise of federal jurisdiction threatened systematic disruption of complex state policies developed via the review of state Railroad Commission orders by state courts experienced in that particular area of local regulation. Here, the local courts have been assigned no special review function over the administration of the D.C. Jail, nor is any widespread disruption of a unified scheme of local regulation threatened by the exercise of federal jurisdiction. Although prudence and comity may recommend the involvement of the local judiciary in correcting unconstitutional conditions at the Jail after plaintiffs' claims have been adjudicated, there is no basis — neither in the nature of the legal issues presented here nor in the expertise of the local courts in local law — for insisting that only local courts decide the questions of federal constitutional law involved in this case. The mere fact that a federal claim brought in federal court might instead have been brought in state court does not justify abstention. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 98 S.Ct. 673, 677 n.5, 54 L.Ed.2d 618 (1978); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974); Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern R. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 361, 71 S.Ct. 762, 95 L.Ed. 1002 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Finally, this case does not fall into the third category of abstention, which "is appropriate where, absent bad faith, harassment, or a patently invalid state statute, federal jurisdiction has been invoked for the purpose of restraining state criminal proceedings, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971); Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157, 63 S.Ct. 877, 87 L.Ed. 1324 (1943), state nuisance proceedings antecedent to a criminal prosecution, which are directed at obtaining the closure of places exhibiting

obscene films, Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975); or collection 526*526 of state taxes, Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 63 S.Ct. 1070, 87 L.Ed. 1407 (1943)." Colorado River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. at 816, 96 S.Ct. at 1246 (footnotes omitted). The District Court has enjoined no proceeding in the Superior Court, nor is there any pending litigation there in which appellees could raise their claims.[6] It is not enough that the remedy ordered by the federal court might have some effect on proceedings in the Superior Court.[7]
Appellants rely heavily on Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976), for the proposition that federal courts should refrain from issuing injunctions "against those in charge of an executive branch of an agency of state or local governments . . . ." Id. at 380, 96 S.Ct. at 608. But the teaching of Rizzo is not so broad. That case actually holds that a federal court should refrain from assuming a comprehensive supervisory role via its injunctive powers over broad areas of local government for the purpose of preventing speculative and probably only sporadic future misconduct by local officials toward an imprecise class of potential victims, especially when that misconduct is not part of a pattern of persistent and deliberate official policy. The case at bar stands in clear contrast to the situation in Rizzo. Here, the constitutional violations are alleged to have actually affected the entire, clearly defined plaintiff class and to have stemmed from continuing policies of the Department of Corrections, so that only injunctive relief classwide in scope can effectively end the multiple and continuing wrongs.[8]
Although we do not read Rizzo as requiring total abstention, we are not insensitive to its more general admonition against excessive intervention in local government. A federal court must practice special restraint in the exercise of its injunctive powers in this area, presuming that local officials will comply with the law in good faith and leaving them as much room as possible to devise their own methods of compliance. However, a federal court may not shave the requirements of the Constitution to fit the desires of local officials, nor should it continue to accord these defendants special deference in the fashioning of relief when the presumption of good faith has proved misplaced.
In short, although we are bound to respect the prerogatives of the local government, both judicial and executive, we conclude that abstention is inappropriate in this case. As Justice Powell stated in Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405-06, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1807, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974):
527*527 [C]ourts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform. Judicial recognition of that fact reflects no more than a healthy sense of realism. Moreover, where state penal institutions are involved, federal courts have a further reason for deference to the appropriate prison authorities.
But a policy of judicial restraint cannot encompass any failure to take cognizance of valid constitutional claims whether arising in a federal or state institution. When a prison regulation or practice offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal courts will discharge their duty to protect constitutional rights.[9]
Confronted with constitutional violations, other circuits have upheld federal injunctions aimed at state and local correctional systems, thereby expressly or implicitly finding

abstention improper. See Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 391-93 (10th Cir. 1977); Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206, 1212 (5th Cir. 1977); Costello v. Wainwright, 539 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (upholding refusal to abstain but ordering 3-judge court), reversed on other grounds, 430 U.S. 325, 97 S.Ct. 1191, 51 L.Ed.2d 372 (1977) (reversing and remanding on issue of 3-judge court), on remand, 553 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc) (panel opinion otherwise reinstated); McRedmond v. Wilson, 533 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1976); Inmates of San Diego County Jail v. Duffy, 528 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1975); Detainees of Brooklyn House of Detention for Men v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1975); Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974), on subsequent appeal, 527 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1975); Taylor v. Sterrett, 499 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 983, 95 S.Ct. 1414, 43 L.Ed.2d 665 (1975), on subsequent appeal 527 F.2d 856 (5th Cir. 1976); Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Hall v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 419 U.S. 977, 95 S.Ct. 239, 42 L.Ed.2d 189 (1974), on subsequent appeal, 518 F.2d 1241 (1st Cir. 1975); Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD
Our inquiry must begin with the premise that the pretrial detainees who fill the District of Columbia Jail are presumed innocent. They are unconvicted of any crime. Strictly speaking, therefore the District has no authority to "punish" them at all. Over two hundred years ago Blackstone said of this "dubious interval" between commitment and trial:
Upon the whole, if the offense be not bailable, or the party cannot find bail, he is to be committed to the county goal by the mittimus of the justice . . .; there to abide till delivered by due course of law . . . . But this imprisonment, as has been said, is only for safe custody, and not for punishment: therefore, in this dubious interval between the commitment and the trial, a prisoner ought to be used with the utmost humanity, and neither be loaded with needless fetters, or subjected to other hardships than such as are absolutely requisite for the purpose of confinement only . . .
4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries* 300.
Despite the presumption of innocence, our common law and constitutional heritage has refused to abjure the institution of pretrial detention. The standards by which the constitutionality of conditions of pretrial confinement are to be measured are thus rooted in paradox. No simple or even clear tests can grow from such crevices of constitutional logic. The standards we evolve must acknowledge and account for 528*528 numerous competing and conflicting interests. They must be guided, however, by the end set out by Blackstone, that the pretrial detainee "be used with the utmost humanity."
Basic to our analysis is the interest of the government in "enforcing the law in the community's protection." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949). "[T]he State's duty to control crime," Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112, 95 S.Ct. 854, 862, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975), justifies in the first instance the institution of pretrial detention. To imprison a person prior to trial, the government must meet constitutional[10] and statutory[11] standards. The government's primary purpose is the

confinement of the detainee to ensure his presence at trial. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit has held that,
as a matter of due process, pre-trial detainees may suffer no more restrictions than are reasonably necessary to ensure their presence at trial. While the decisions that have interpreted the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause may be valuable by analogy as defining that which may never be imposed on any inmate, whether convicted prisoner or pre-trial detainee, a more stringent standard controls the treatment by the state of pre-trial detainees. Since they are convicted of no crime for which they may presently be punished, the state must justify any conditions of their confinement solely on the basis of ensuring their presence at trial. Any restriction or condition that is not reasonably related to this sole stated purpose of confinement would deprive a detainee of liberty or property without due process, in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Duran v. Elrod, 542 F.2d 998, 999-1000 (7th Cir. 1976).[12]
529*529 If the government could confine or otherwise infringe the liberty of detainees only to the extent necessary to ensure their presence at trial, house arrest would in the end be the only constitutionally justified form of detention. Since this would render pretrial detention a virtual impossibility and thus frustrate the government's interest in protecting the safety of the community, we must acknowledge as an aspect of that interest the government's ability to manage the institution of pretrial detention in an administratively feasible manner. The government may thus use jails as places of confinement and may make the everyday administrative decisions necessary to run them. The justifications for these decisions cannot be logically deduced from any single goal, such as the need to maintain the security of the jail, since they ultimately derive from the basic necessity of managing the jail itself.[13] The myriad of prosaic details involved in that enterprise — the choice of menus, the assignment of cells, the scheduling of recreation and other events — take on a life independent of the primary justifications of the confinement.
Standing against these government interests is the liberty interest of the pretrial detainee. The detainee is not in the position of the convicted prisoner who has been "constitutionally deprived of his liberty to the extent that the State may confine him and to subject him to the rules of its prison system." Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 2538, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976). See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 840, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The liberty interest of the pretrial detainee is rooted in the presumption of innocence. There is no doubt that pretrial detainees do have the protection of this presumption. See McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 273, 93 S.Ct. 1055, 35 L.Ed.2d 282 (1973); Pugh v. Rainwater, 557 F.2d 1189, 1191-92, 1197 (5th Cir.), petition for rehearing en banc granted, 562 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1977); Detainees of Brooklyn House of Detention for Men v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d 392, 397 (2d Cir. 1975). To construe this presumption as "largely irrelevant to . . . pretrial confinement," dissenting op. at ___ of 188 U.S.App.D.C., at 568 of 580 F.2d, is, we believe, profoundly to misconstrue it. The presumption of innocence is a shield that prevents "the infliction of punishment prior to conviction." Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4, 72 S.Ct. 1, 3, 96 L.Ed. 3 (1951).[14]
530*530 The pretrial detainee does not suffer the stigma associated with conviction,[15] but otherwise it is difficult to distinguish pretrial incarceration from punishment. See Pugh v.

Rainwater, 557 F.2d 1189, 1198 (5th Cir.), petition for rehearing en banc granted, 562 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1977). For example, federal statute requires the Attorney General to give any convicted person "credit toward service of his sentence for any days spent in custody in connection with the offense or acts for which sentence was imposed." 18 U.S.C. § 3568. Since all prisoners convicted in the District of Columbia are committed for the term of their imprisonment to the custody of the Attorney General, 24 D.C.Code § 425, should any of the plaintiffs in this case be convicted and sentenced, they will receive credit for their time in the D.C. Jail. The equivalence between pre- and post-trial incarceration is further recognized by the settled doctrine requiring "time a defendant spends in jail before sentence because he is unable to raise bond [to be] credited if he is later sentenced to a maximum term." Hook v. Arizona, 496 F.2d 1172, 1174 (9th Cir. 1974). See Corley v. Cardwell, 544 F.2d 349 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1048, 97 S.Ct. 757, 50 L.Ed.2d 763 (1977); Durkin v. Davis, 538 F.2d 1037 (4th Cir. 1976); Parker v. Estelle, 498 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963, 95 S.Ct. 1951, 44 L.Ed.2d 450 (1975).[16]
Not only is pretrial detention itself indistinguishable from punishment, each additional restriction required by the jail environment contributes to the severity of that punishment. Nearly every stricture of the jail's regimen will prevent the pretrial detainee from doing what he would be otherwise free to do. The very conditions of confinement are additional deprivations of liberty. They are also punishment, Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 321-22, 18 L.Ed. 356 (1867); Brown v. Wilemon, 139 F.2d 730, 732 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Wilemon v. Bowles, 322 U.S. 748, 64 S.Ct. 1151, 88 L.Ed. 1579 (1944), and, as the restrictions of the jail accumulate, the detainees's punishment becomes more severe.
To conclude that the conditions of pretrial imprisonment are virtually indistinguishable from those of punishment is only to restate the paradox of pretrial detention. 531*531 The hard fact is that the presumption of innocence is in this context qualified by the need of the state to protect the safety of the community. The constitutionality of the conditions of pretrial confinement can thus be measured only by balancing against this governmental need the liberty interests of the pretrial detainee. Although in this balancing process there can unfortunately be no bright lines, there are several important guideposts that will inform our consideration.
First, although infringements on liberties not deemed fundamental might not in general be subject to the strictest scrutiny, see Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 244, 248, 96 S.Ct. 1440, 47 L.Ed.2d 708 (1976); East Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ. of East Hartford, 562 F.2d 838 at 861 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc), each deprivation of the jail environment renders pretrial detention more severe as punishment and thus further violates the presumed innocence of the pretrial detainee. The presumption of innocence is "constitutionally rooted," Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100, 104, 93 S.Ct. 354, 34 L.Ed.2d 335 (1972); it is "axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law." Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453, 15 S.Ct. 394, 403, 39 L.Ed. 481 (1895). We cannot permit this vital presumption to be eaten away by the cumulative conditions of pretrial detention. Therefore each restriction of the jail regimen must be carefully examined to determine if it is justified by substantial necessities of jail administration. To evaluate these necessities we will look to the needs of the state to

produce the detainee for trial, to maintain the security of the jail, or generally to sustain the institution of pretrial detention at a feasible cost.
Second, the presumption of innocence requires that, to as great an extent as practically possible, the pretrial detainee leave jail no worse off than he entered it. Even with respect to convicted prisoners, the state acquires the responsibilities of a caretaker upon incarceration. "[P]risoners are guaranteed the provision of life's basic necessities for the period of their confinement. Constitutional doctrine has absorbed the common law view that `[i]t is but just that the public be required to care for the prisoner, who cannot, by reason of the deprivation of his liberty, care for himself.' Spicer v. Williamson, 191 N.C. 487, 490, 132 S.E. 291, 293 (1926). Federal courts, though reluctant to intervene in the daily operation of penal institutions, have required those institutions to provide adequate food, clothing and shelter for their charges." Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 46-47 (4th Cir. 1977). See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976); Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194, 201 (8th Cir. 1974). The presumption of innocence requires that these caretaking responsibilities be even greater with respect to pretrial detainees. Therefore, conditions of confinement that are likely to impair a detainee's mental or physical health should be subjected to the closest scrutiny and can be justified only by the most compelling necessity.
Third, pretrial detention occurs in the important interval directly preceding trial. The conditions of pretrial confinement cannot be permitted negatively to affect the outcome of the criminal process. There is disturbing evidence, however, that "the defendant at liberty pending trial stands a better chance of not being convicted or, if convicted, of not receiving a prison sentence." Ares, Rankin & Sturz, The Manhattan Bail Project: An Interim Report on the Use of Pre-Trial Parole, 38 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 67, 86 (1963). See McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 281-83, 93 S.Ct. 1055, 35 L.Ed.2d 282 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Vera Institute of Justice, Programs in Criminal Justice Reform: Ten-Year Report 1961-1971, at 31 (1972). There is reason to believe that this disparity cannot be accounted for by a defendant's "prior record, bail amount, type of counsel, family integration [or] employment stability," Rankin, The Effect of Pretrial Detention, 39 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 641, 655 (1964), nor by "the seriousness of the charge, prior criminal record, [or] weight of the evidence." 532*532 Money Bail as a Denial of Equal Protection, Memorandum submitted by the Legal Aid Society of the City of New York in Bellamy v. Judges and Justices, 41 A.D.2d 196, 342 N.Y.S.2d 137, aff'd, 32 N.Y.2d 886, 346 N.Y.S.2d 812, 300 N.E.2d 153 (1973) in A. Goldstein and L. Orland, Criminal Procedure 451-52 (1974).[17] There are various explanations offered for this disparity. For one thing, "[t]he limitations imposed by incarceration hamper preparation of the defense . . . ." President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Courts 38 (1967). For another, pretrial detainees plead guilty more often than bailed defendants. Note, A Study of the Administration of Bail in New York City, 106 U.Pa.L.Rev. 693, 726 (1958). It has been suggested that this is due to a defendant's knowledge "that, at worst, a guilty plea will result in his transfer to prison, where conditions are generally less cramped and uncomfortable than in the jails." Note, The Jailed Pro Se Defendant and the Right to Prepare a Defense, 86 Yale L.J. 292, 307 n. 66 (1976). Conditions of confinement that impede a defendant's preparation of his defense (apart, of course, from the fact of confinement itself), or that are so harsh or intolerable as to induce him to plead guilty, or that damage his appearance or

mental alertness at trial,[18] are constitutionally suspect and can be justified only by the most compelling necessity.
Fourth, the responsibilities of the jail increase as the period of the detainee's incarceration grows longer. Conditions that might be tolerable for ten days, might be unacceptable if imposed for a month or longer.
Finally, we will not engage in balancing to determine the constitutionality of conditions of pretrial confinement if they are otherwise violative of the Constitution. For example, conditions of confinement could breach the standards of the Eighth Amendment. Although, strictly speaking, "Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate only after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions," Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n. 40, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 1412, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977), we join the Second Circuit in holding that "a detainee is entitled to protection from cruel and unusual punishment as a matter of due process . . . ." Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333, 337 (2d Cir. 1974).[19] The conditions of confinement of pretrial detainees in a jail could also violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if, without adequate justification, they are more restrictive than the conditions of confinement of convicted prisoners in a penitentiary.[20] However, differences in the 533*533 conditions of the two institutions would not, on their face, be sufficient to establish a constitutional violation, since such differences might be attributable to the distinct nature and functions of the two institutions. See McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270-73, 93 S.Ct. 1055, 35 L.Ed.2d 282 (1973).
Applying this variable standard, our task is to review the finding of the District Court that various practices and conditions at the D.C. Jail violated the constitutional rights of pretrial detainees. The constitutional standard employed by the District Court, however, was somewhat ambiguous.[21] There are therefore three questions before us: (1) Are the factual findings of the District Court as to conditions at the Jail clearly erroneous? If not, we must accept them. (2) If these factual findings stand, do they provide a predicate for the lower court's determination that there has been a denial of constitutional rights? (3) If yes, should the District Court have granted the particular relief it did?
As a framework for the consideration of these questions, we turn first to a description of the District of Columbia Jail.
III. A DESCRIPTION OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA JAIL
The District of Columbia Jail houses both pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners. The population varies but during this litigation, well over 50% of those admitted to the Jail have been in pretrial status, half charged with misdemeanor offenses and held in lieu of bond.[22] Detainees average 8 534*534 to 12 weeks in the Jail awaiting trial. Those who are convicted average another 2 to 4 weeks between trial and sentencing. In August 1976, the District Court found that 20 percent of the unsentenced inmates had been there more than 4 months.[23]

Conditions at the D.C. Jail have changed considerably over the course of this 7-year litigation. At the time of trial in March 1975, members of plaintiffs' class were housed at the old Jail facility. The main structure, including Cellblocks 1 and 2, was built in 1872. Cellblocks 3 and 4 as well as an administrative building were added in 1929. In addition, the old Jail has two open dormitories, a 37-bed hospital, a library, a laundry, and a kitchen.
Individual cells are approximately 6 feet wide by 8 feet long by 9 feet high, and at the time of trial often housed two men. They contain an uncovered toilet, a sink, a small table and bench attached to the wall, and a single or bunk bed. Only cells in Cellblocks 3 and 4 have windows or hot water. The dormitories are large rooms approximately 40 by 98 feet, housing 125 to 150 men at the time of trial and containing four rows of beds. Each dormitory also has a toilet facility walled off from the main room but without partitions between commodes. Personal effects are kept under the beds.
At the time of trial, new arrivals were not being given security classifications, despite a Departmental Order requiring each superintendent to establish a program for doing so. D.O. 4090.1, dated November 9, 1973. Most new arrivals were assigned to Cellblocks 1 and 2, which were maximum security units. The District Court found that because of this system, "many unsentenced inmates who do not require maximum security are housed in the maximum security areas of the Jail under the most stringent living conditions. Only a small percentage of Jail residents (estimated by the Superintendent of the Jail as approximately 125 inmates) require maximum security housing." 416 F.Supp. at 103. Cellblock 3 housed inmates assigned to the Captain's Detail, which performed many of the Jail's maintenance and culinary chores. Cellblock 4 housed juveniles and elderly persons.
Although clothing was and is issued to new arrivals, the District Court found laundry services to be "inadequate." Except for members of the Captain's Detail in Cellblock 3, inmates at the time of trial had to wash their own underclothing. Those without hot water often did this while taking showers. Moreover, detainees often were given "old mattresses, not cleaned or sterilized and stained with urine and other excreta." Id. at 104.
There was evidence at trial that the old Jail was constantly noisy from the start of the day at 5:30 a. m. until lights out at 10:00 or 11:00 p. m. This noise came from radios and televisions over which the inmates had no control, as well as from the prisoners themselves. The hard concrete and steel surfaces, and the arrangement of cells stacked four high, did little to deaden the din.
Plaintiffs also complained of the lack of adequate medical attention. Following a consent order on November 10, 1972 requiring the defendants to provide prompt medical care to all inmates needing it,[24] plaintiffs 535*535 periodically filed motions to show cause why the defendants should not be held in contempt for failing to comply with this order. These motions were supported by dozens of affidavits from prisoners alleging gross neglect of their serious medical problems.[25] Plaintiffs also offered uncontradicted evidence of serious infestations of rats, mice and cockroaches, as well as general uncleanliness causing obnoxious odors. By November 1975, however, the District Court found that "vermin have to a large degree been exterminated, some portions [of the Jail] have been painted, and apparently much cleaning has taken place because the horrible stench described at the trial was not in evidence during an unannounced visit in late August of this year. Also the

delivery of medical services has improved because of additional personnel and a realignment of the authority of the medical staff." 416 F.Supp. at 104.
At the time of trial, most inmates at the Jail were allowed three half-hour social visits per week, conducted via telephone through plexiglass barriers, in addition to unlimited contact visits with their attorneys. Members of the Captain's Detail were granted three hour-long social visits, at which they could embrace and kiss their visitors upon meeting. The District Court found that the Captain's Detail inmates were afforded these and other privileges "to encourage inmates to apply for and work on the Detail." Id. at 103.
At the time of trial, inmates were granted two hours of outdoor recreation six days a week, except for those who were hospitalized, were working on the Detail, or were held in maximum security. Limited indoor recreation was also available to most inmates. Maximum security inmates at the old Jail were held in their cells on "deadlock" except for showers and "tier recreation" (30 minutes a day of walking on the corridor).
The brief foregoing description fails to convey the extent of degradation and discomfort imposed upon residents of the D.C. Jail, as revealed in the testimony of the many trial witnesses who visited the old facility. The flavor of their testimony appears in the statement of Robert Ardrey, a noted anthropologist and author, who described conditions there as "beyond the tolerable level of human existence" and "something that has been designed to produce monsters." Trial Tr. 445, 422. Dr. Karl Menninger stated that "everything done to a man committed to a place like the D.C. Jail appears to be done to make him suffer." Trial Tr. 249. Defendant Delbert Jackson, Director of the Department of Corrections, admitted that the Jail was "not really fit for human habitation."
Physical conditions improved for some inmates with the opening of the New Detention Facility (NDF) in April 1976. Each 7-feet-by-10-feet cell there is equipped with a bed, table, chair, toilet, and sink with hot and cold water, as well as a plexiglass window 24 inches by 42 inches. Each cellblock of 80 cells is air conditioned and has its own 536*536 indoor recreation area, two day rooms, and a separate dining area. The entire facility has two indoor recreation yards and a visiting room equipped with telephones and plexiglass barriers. The defendants have announced that all recreation at the new facility will occur indoors, and that no contact visits will be permitted except with attorneys. Maximum security inmates at the new Jail are subject to virtually the same regimen as at the old Jail, except that their indoor recreation takes place in a recreation room rather than on the tier corridor. Some type of classification system has also been instituted.[26]
Even with the NDF, the Department of Corrections has been forced to continue using parts of the old facility. In accordance with the Department's own plans, Cellblocks 1 and 2 were ordered closed by the District Court last summer because of severe deterioration, leaving Cellblocks 3 and 4 and two dormitories to house the overflow from the new facility. There is no indication in the record that policies or conditions at the old Jail have changed or will change significantly with the opening of the NDF, although plans have been made to renovate Cellblocks 3 and 4 if funds can be found.
IV. OVERCROWDING

A. The Findings of the District Court
The District Court stated that "[b]y far the most flagrant and shocking encroachment on the constitutional rights of the plaintiff class is the overcrowding . . . ." 416 F.Supp. at 105. There were four findings implicit in the court's conclusion.
First, the District Court found, on the basis of uncontested testimony, that overcrowding was likely to impair the mental and physical health of the detainees. In its Order of March 21, 1975, the court noted that "No attempt was made to rebut, or even cast doubt upon the accuracy of abundant testimony from credible witnesses that the overcrowding at the jail results in both physical and psychological damage to the inmates . . . ." Joint Appendix (J.A. at 100-01). The defendants have never challenged the substantive validity of this finding, and other courts have reached the same conclusion.[27] We see no reason to disturb it.
Second, the District Court found that this harm would not be alleviated unless each pretrial detainee was accorded at least 48 square feet of space.[28] This finding was 537*537 based upon substantial, uncontradicted testimony,[29] and the defendants have never challenged its substantive validity. We therefore affirm it.
Third, using the 48 square foot yardstick, the District Court found that the District Jail was substantially overcrowded. On March 21, 1975, the court found "that the District of Columbia Jail is overcrowded to the point where two human beings are compacted in areas which fall short of accepted minimal space requirements for occupancy by one person." J.A. at 100. At trial Anderson McGruder, Superintendent of Detention Services for the Department of Corrections, testified that the rated capacity of the Jail was 608, and that its present population was 976. The overflow was double-celled. Trial Tr. at 996-99. Although on May 16, 1975, the District of Columbia Department of Corrections filed a report with the District Court indicating that no member of the plaintiff class was housed in an area less than 48 square feet,[30] on August 7 the District Court found that "approximately 175-200 unsentenced individuals were being double-housed in cells measuring approximately six by eight feet." 416 F.Supp. at 107.[31]
The District Court was assured that defendants would be in compliance with the 538*538 48 square foot requirement by August 15,[32] and that defendants would provide notice to the court should the space requirement again be violated. 416 F.Supp. at 108. On October 14, the court was notified by defendants' counsel that the Jail was no longer in compliance with the space requirement, and had been out of compliance since September 16.
On January 12, 1976, appellants advised this court that they were presently in compliance with the space requirement.[33] However, on April 7, 1976, the District Court made an unannounced visit to the Jail, and at hearings on April 29-30 it found that "[d]uring most of the period from mid-January to mid-April, more than 200 persons at a time were held in violation of this Court's March 1975 order, most of them double-housed in the 136 one-man cells in Cell Block 2, in the oldest and most dilapidated part of the Jail." 416 F.Supp. at 112.[34] The defendants failed to provide "prompt notice" of this overcrowding to the District Court.

Faced with this substantial record, we have no difficulty in affirming the District Court's finding that the District of Columbia Jail has been seriously overcrowded.
Finally, to sustain the conclusion that the overcrowding of the Jail violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights, we must determine if this overcrowding can be justified by a compelling administrative necessity. On April 25, 1975, appellants represented to us that compliance with the District Court's space requirements was "impossible." We therefore remanded the record to the District Court "for further proceedings designed to clarify the central question of the 539*539 feasibility of compliance . . . ."[35] On November 5 and again on May 24, 1976, the District Court found not only that compliance was feasible, but that
Apart from converting other space to a new dormitory at the Jail, the Department and the city have made no substantial efforts to comply with the Order of this Court since its issuance in March; and there is no evidence of any contemplated effort to either reduce the population at the Jail or to provide additional space. (Emphasis added.)
416 F.Supp. at 109.[36]
The defendants have repeatedly argued that overcrowding is the result of policies of other persons than themselves — judges, who commit pretrial detainees to the Jail; the U.S. Attorney, who bears responsibility for removing some sentenced offenders; and Congress, which must appropriate funds for new construction. However, the District Court found, and the history of this litigation clearly substantiates, that the defendants have not drawn upon their substantial powers and resources to influence the flow of pretrial detainees into the Jail,[37] 540*540 the movement of sentenced inmates out of the Jail,[38] and the development of additional housing space.[39] The court concluded that "the defendants have failed to take reasonable and obvious steps to alleviate overcrowding." 416 F.Supp. at 117. As for defendants' claim that they are bound by financial constraints, we join our sister Circuits in holding that while such considerations may be relevant, they can by no means be determinative. See Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 395-96, 400 (10th Cir. 1977); Detainees of Brooklyn House of Detention for Men v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d 392, 399 (2d Cir. 1975); Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333, 341-42 (2d Cir. 1974); Finney v. Arkansas Board of Correction, 505 F.2d 194, 201 (8th Cir. 1974); Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1319-20 (5th Cir. 1974); Rozecki v. Gaughan, 459 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1972).
On this detailed record we affirm the District Court's conclusion that overcrowding in the District Jail is not justified by any compelling administrative necessity. We therefore approve the court's holding that this overcrowding violated the constitutional rights of the plaintiff class.
B. The Question of Mootness
The present posture of the case requires us to determine if events have mooted the justifications for the District Court's order. It is, of course, clear that "an action for an injunction does not become moot merely because the conduct complained of has terminated . . . ." Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 810, 94 S.Ct. 2191, 2198, 40 L.Ed.2d 566 (1974). "A case might become moot if subsequent events made it absolutely clear that the allegedly 541*541 wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur," but the

test is "a stringent one" and defendants carry a "heavy burden of persuasion." United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, Inc., 393 U.S. 199, 203, 89 S.Ct. 361, 364, 21 L.Ed.2d 344 (1968). See Rabinowitz v. Board of Jr. College Dist. No. 508, 507 F.2d 1255, 1256 (7th Cir. 1974). The decision whether defendants' illegal conduct is likely to recur lies in the equitable discretion of the District Court. "The chancellor's decision is based on all the circumstances; his discretion is necessarily broad and a strong showing of abuse must be made to reverse it. To be considered are the bona fides of the expressed intent to comply, the effectiveness of the discontinuance and, in some cases, the character of the past violations." United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633, 73 S.Ct. 894, 898, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953). See Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 324 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950, 92 S.Ct. 2045, 32 L.Ed.2d 338 (1972).
In this case, the district judge offered the following observations after five years of litigation:
Notwithstanding the present crisis and the appalling prospects of a worsening situation, there has been no planning for dealing with this problem by the City or the Department. Rather, the tedious history of this litigation reflects only occasional and sporadic efforts, usually when a court proceeding has been scheduled, followed by almost total inactivity once the matter is no longer before the Court as a crisis situation. . . . [M]ore energy is devoted to pointing up excuses than to creative efforts to deal effectively with a problem which obviously is here and is not going away of its own accord — the new Jail notwithstanding.
This Court's skepticism concerning the Department's protestations of the impossibility of compliance urged on this Court and the Court of Appeals almost from the moment the original order of March 21, 1975 was entered, has been confirmed and heightened by the events of the intervening year. Throughout these proceedings, when pressure was brought to bear, the impossible has become possible and compliance has been obtained, at least for a time. What has been missing, unfortunately, is a commitment to a long-range, continuing effort to maximize the resources presently available to the Department and the City, and to make plans to increase those resources to meet the need.
416 F.Supp. at 114-15. Given the history of defendants' grudging resistance, the ineffectiveness of their previous efforts at compliance, and the "flagrant and shocking" character of their past violations, the District Court was fully justified in concluding that this case was not moot. As the Supreme Court has stated:
When defendants are shown to have settled into a continuing practice . . courts will not assume that it has been abandoned without clear proof. Local 167 [of International Brotherhood of Teamsters] v. United States, 291 U.S. 293, 298, 54 S.Ct. 396, 398, 78 L.Ed. 804. It is the duty of the courts to beware of efforts to defeat injunctive relief by protestations of repentance and reform, especially when abandonment seems timed to anticipate suit, and there is probability of resumption. Cf. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 445, 40 S.Ct. 293, 297, 64 L.Ed. 343.
United States v. Oregon State Medical Society, 343 U.S. 326, 333, 72 S.Ct. 690, 695, 96 L.Ed. 978 (1952).

It is argued, however, that the opening of the NDF has so fundamentally altered the situation that the future likelihood of overcrowding "is conjectural at best" and equitable relief is therefore "hardly justified."[40] Brief for appellants at 23. The District Court considered this question in its April 1976 hearings. George Holland, Superintendent of Detention Services for the Department of Corrections, testified that there was a "strong possibility" that overcrowding would continue even after 542*542 the opening of the New Detention Facility if "the rate of arrests and convictions continue." Tr. 29 Apr. 1976, at 7576. Based on figures supplied by the defendants the District Court found that: (1) after Cellblocks 1 and 2 are closed, the old Jail can continue housing 376 inmates in Cellblocks 3 and 4, plus 201 more in dormitory areas if sufficient staff are available;[41] (2) the NDF can house 800 or 880 male inmates, depending upon whether one or two cellblocks are devoted to housing women from the overcrowded Women's Detention Facility; and (3) based on the underestimating of previous projections, far more than the 1300 inmates projected for spring 1977 would be held at the Jail by that time.[42] The District Court was thus led to "the unmistakable conclusion . . . that notwithstanding the opening of the NDF, the Jail facilities will continue to be overcrowded, and plaintiffs will continue to be housed in violation of their constitutional rights and elemental standards of human decency." 416 F.Supp. at 114.
We hold, therefore, that there is sufficient evidence in the record to sustain the District Court's conclusion that the opening of the NDF did not moot out this case.
C. The Question of Remedy
On May 24, 1976, the District Court issued a second order to alleviate overcrowding conditions. The court stated that "[a]ll efforts to induce the defendants to put their house in order have been unavailing up to now, and it is apparent that no meaningful effort can reasonably be expected absent a strong order of the Court which makes clear that housing inmates under unconstitutional conditions must cease." 416 F.Supp. at 117. The court thereupon enjoined defendants from housing after June 1, 1976 more than 577 persons at the old Jail (215 persons in Cellblock 4, 161 in Cellblock 3, 110 in Dormitory 1, and 91 in Dormitory 2). Further, since the defendants had stipulated that the New Detention Facility was "designed to house a maximum of 960 inmates," J.A. at 94, the court enjoined them from housing after June 1, 1976 more than 960 persons at the NDF.[43]
There is sufficient evidence in the record to sustain this injunction. The dissent simply distorts the record in the course of its animadversions concerning the lack of support for the District Court's finding of the capacity of the new Jail and the District Court's refusal to consider testimony as to the NDF's ultimate capacity. The reality is that the maximum capacity of the new Jail was set at 960 by the stipulation of defense counsel and by the testimony of defendants' own witness,[44] and the possibility of stretching that capacity through makeshift arrangements 543*543 was omitted from consideration by the District Court at the request of defense counsel.[45]
We are aware, however, that the most recent evidence on this issue was received on April 30, 1976 before the full completion of the NDF. The District Court could now readily determine whether the harms projected over a year and a half ago have in fact materialized. We are also sensitive to the weighty local governmental interests involved. "It is familiar doctrine that the extent to which a court of equity may grant or withhold its aid, and the

manner of moulding its remedies, may be affected by the public interest involved." United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183, 194, 59 S.Ct. 795, 801, 83 L.Ed. 1211 (1939). See Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 552, 57 S.Ct. 592, 81 L.Ed. 789 (1937).
We therefore decline at this time to affirm the order of the District Court. Instead we remand the record to the District Court to determine if the anticipated overcrowding has in fact occurred. If the District Court finds that the defendants are in violation of the Constitution despite the full operation of the NDF, it may reissue its order. On the other hand, should the court determine that the District Jail is not overcrowded and that there is no likelihood of its being overcrowded in the near future, it may decline to issue relief.
The protracted record in this case, however, amply demonstrates that defendants' compliance with the space requirements of the District Court's order in the past has been only intermittent. Although the Jail's population has grown steadily — from 700 in 1973, to 1380 in the spring of 1976 — the Jail's population changes daily and fluctuates widely by seasons. The defendants have achieved compliance only sporadically and occasionally, "usually," as the District Court stated, "when a court proceeding has been scheduled." On August 7, 1975, for example, defendants advised the District Court that they would be in compliance by August 15, yet on October 16, the District Court was notified that defendants had been out of compliance since September 16. On January 12, 1976, defendants represented to this court that they were presently in compliance, yet on April 29-30 the District Court found that defendants had been seriously out of compliance from mid-January to mid-April.
Therefore, even if the District Court should determine on remand that defendants are presently in compliance, the court should also apprise itself of the likelihood of future infractions. If the District Court finds that there is a likelihood that the constitutional rights of the plaintiff class will be violated in the near future, the court should retain jurisdiction of the case to monitor the conditions at the Jail until it determines, in its sound discretion, that the likelihood of future violations has ceased. 544*544 See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30, 64 S.Ct. 587, 88 L.Ed. 754 (1944); Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 290 (5th Cir. 1977); Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 536-38 (8th Cir. 1975); Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1321-22 (5th Cir. 1974). Such a procedure will relieve plaintiffs of the considerable burden and delay of initiating new proceedings.
To prevent any possible misunderstanding, we note that any disposition on this matter by the District Court will be appealable on the basis of the record and findings below.
V. THE ORDER OF NOVEMBER 5, 1975
On November 5, 1975, the District Court issued an order concerning seven aspects of the administration of the Jail. 416 F.Supp. at 105-06. The order was addressed to policies of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections that are applicable to both the old and new jails. There is thus no question of mootness.[46] Defendants challenge paragraphs 2 through 7 of that order on appeal.[47]

A. Clean Clothing
Paragraph 2 requires defendants to "[p]rovide clean clothing (including underwear) to all residents of the D.C. Jail and clean bed linen and towels at least once a week."
Defendants do not dispute that pretrial detainees are entitled to regular changes of clean clothes and linen. Instead, defendants oppose paragraph 2's linen requirement on the ground that they have "generally adhered to a policy of providing [bed linen and towels] on a weekly basis," and so "this aspect of the court's order presents no case or controversy affording a predicate for equitable relief." Brief for appellants at 39. However, the trial court heard uncontested testimony that inmates had not been provided with pillow cases until just before plaintiffs' expert witnesses toured the Jail; the linen was then not reissued after its collection for laundering. Trial Tr. 675-76. Thus, there is support in the record for the trial judge's determination that a court order covering linen is necessary despite the defendants' "general policy."
As for the remainder of paragraph 2, defendants do not dispute the necessity of providing inmates with a weekly change of outer garments, but they do oppose the order as it pertains to underclothes inasmuch as inmates can launder these small items in their cells. As long as inmates have access to hot water and detergent, we see no constitutional violation in defendants' contemplation that the inmates will arrange their own cleaning of underclothing.
B. Outdoor Recreation
Paragraph 3 requires the defendants to "[p]rovide at least one hour of out-door recreation daily for each resident of the Jail."[48]
545*545 We note, first, that although there was sufficient evidence before the District Court to sustain the conclusion that the absence of recreation would be likely to impair the mental or physical health of the pretrial detainees, see, e. g., Trial Tr. at 225; cf. Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F.Supp. 594, 611, 627 (S.D.N.Y.), affirmed and remanded, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974); there was no evidence about the necessity for outdoor recreation. The District Court may have had in mind the absence of indoor facilities at the old Jail for vigorous physical exercise. J.A. at 297-302. In that case, however, paragraph 3 ought to have been addressed to the quality of recreation defendants should be required to make available, rather than to its location. At the NDF, for example, indoor recreation facilities include a mini-gymnasium where inmates can play basketball and handball. 29 Apr. Tr. at 110. On the other hand, the District Court may have had in mind the salutary effects of exposure to fresh air and sunshine. Other courts seem to have come to this conclusion,[49] but there is insufficient evidence on this record to sustain it.[50] On 546*546 remand, the District Court should determine the quality and kind of recreational opportunities that must be afforded members of the plaintiff class in order to protect their mental and physical health. This will depend upon what other recreational opportunities are available at a particular facility, and it may be affected by temporal factors such as the duration of a detainee's pretrial incarceration.

Second, we note that the record indicates that, with the exception of those inmates who were hospitalized, were working on the Captain's Detail, or were being held in maximum security, inmates of the old Jail received two hours of outdoor recreation six days a week. J.A. at 296-303. As the parties agree that paragraph 3 should not cover the first two categories, the order is overbroad as applied to the inmates of the old Jail, since violations were found only with respect to pretrial detainees held in maximum security.
The appellants now contend that since all pretrial maximum security inmates have been transferred to the NDF, paragraph 3 is moot. Supplemental memorandum of appellants, July 1, 1976, at 7-9. Unlike appellants, however, we read the District Court's order to apply to inmates of both the old and new jails. Recreation at the NDF does not comply with the standards of paragraph 3: Inmates at the NDF were scheduled to receive one hour of indoor recreation per day, while maximum security inmates at the NDF were to receive one half hour of indoor recreation per day. 29 Apr. Tr. at 103.
Appellants also contend that the recreational opportunities afforded pretrial detainees held in maximum security are merely a matter of the "classification process," and therefore immune from judicial scrutiny. Brief for appellants at 37. We reject this contention, and emphasize that a pretrial detainee is presumed innocent even if he is detained under maximum security conditions. The state cannot escape its caretaking responsibilities by means of administrative security classifications. Although the state may legitimately vary the conditions of confinement for maximum security inmates, it may not use security classifications as a license to harm pretrial detainees.
We therefore approve the finding of the District Court that the opportunity for some form of recreation is necessary to protect the mental and physical health of all pretrial detainees, and we remand the record for a determination of the quality, duration and location of this recreation.[51]
C. A Classification System
Paragraph 4 requires the defendants to "[e]stablish a classification system which will make it possible to determine a) which inmates of plaintiff class require maximum security confinement; and b) which members of [this] class can enjoy contact visits without jeopardizing the security of the facility."[52] Virtually ignoring part (a) of 547*547 this paragraph,[53] the defendants argue to this court that a classification system for contact visits cannot be devised because the "temporary nature of a pretrial detainee's confinement at the D.C. Jail, in contrast to the more permanent nature of the committed inmate's confinement, simply does not logically lend itself to the classification of both inmate and his visitors, and takes on separate and distinct security considerations sufficient to accord greater administrative leeway." Brief for appellants at 33.
However, defendants' position is contradicted by their own actions and statements. On November 19, 1973, defendants issued Departmental Order 4090.1, requiring each superintendent to establish a classification system for determining the level of security needed for unsentenced residents of the Jail. And in a memorandum subsequently filed in this action, defendants stated: "there is presently a classification system whereby certain persons are designated for maximum security confinement for such reasons as danger to

self or others, and a system whereby determinations are made as to which persons confined at the Jail may be accorded contact visits without jeopardizing security. The two, however, are not synonymous."[54] In light of this and other evidence,[55] we can hardly credit defendants' claims that a classification system for contact visits cannot be devised.
Reading the District Court's order as requiring not only a classification system but also contact visits themselves, the defendants further argue that such visits are not required by law and that various practical considerations prevent compliance. As we have noted previously, we do not interpret the District Court's order as mandating contact visits at this time.[56] Moreover, we interpret the District Court's order as permitting flexibility in determining which members of the plaintiff class can have contact visits without jeopardizing security. It may be that defendants will conclude that (a) there are (some) maximum security detainees who can have contact visits without jeopardizing security; or (b) that there are persons who present a substantial 548*548 threat in terms of contact visits even though they are not classified as "maximum security" detainees; or both. The classification system ultimately developed will involve the exercise of defendants' discretion, although this discretion will not be immune from judicial scrutiny if constitutional rights are violated. Should the classification scheme finally presented by the defendants preclude all contact visits, the District Court will have to determine if a total prohibition on such visits will be likely to impair the physical or mental health of the detainees, especially for extended periods of pretrial confinement.[57] If and when the District Court orders contact visits, we will be able to evaluate the particular strains placed on the jail administration by such an order in light of the presumed innocence of the pretrial detainees.
Accordingly, we affirm paragraph 4 insofar as it requires the defendants to devise a classification scheme for maximum security assignments and contact visits. Our affirmance permits the District Court to proceed with the fashioning of an order on the subject of contact visits, if it is so advised; such an order, of course, will be subject to later appeal.[58]
D. Health Inspections of Food Handlers
Paragraph 5 requires the defendants to "[p]rovide medical examinations of all food handlers, inmate and civilian employees, at the Jail a least once every thirty (30) days and more often if medically required."
Although the trial record clearly substantiates that the kitchen facility at the old Jail has had many hygienic problems, Trial Tr. 26-50, 514-21, 555, the foundation for this order concerning the kitchen personnel is not clear to us. To establish a constitutional violation, plaintiffs must first prove that defendants' failure to require monthly inspections has injured or is likely to impair the mental or physical health of the pretrial detainees. The trial record does not appear to show this. There is some indication, however, that paragraph 5 was not intended to remedy a constitutional violation, but was included in the November 5 order to force defendants to heed their own regulation, D.O. No. 4740.1, which requires medical examinations for food handlers twice a month. If so, we believe the trial court should have articulated the basis for jurisdiction and for enforcing the District's administrative regulations against itself. Assuming that the regulations have the force of law, and that pendent jurisdiction provides a basis for an order, it would still seem necessary to show that there

had been violations or threatened violations as a predicate for injunctive relief. Accordingly, we remand the record for clarification of the factual and legal foundation for this paragraph.
E. Transfer of Mentally Ill Inmates
Paragraph 6 requires the defendants to "[e]stablish the following procedures at the Jail: In the event an inmate at the Jail displays unusual behavior suggestive of possible mental illness, such behavior shall be immediately reported to the medical staff. The inmate will be seen by a psychiatrist within twenty-four (24) hours. If the inmate is found to be mentally ill, he will be transferred within forty-eight (48) hours of 549*549 such finding to a hospital having appropriate facilities for the care and treatment of the mentally ill."[59] This order rested on the following finding of fact:
Many inmates at the jail display psychiatric symptoms. Some of these, designated for pretrial mental examinations, are committed to the District of Columbia Jail to await bedspace at St. Elizabeths Hospital. Others require psychiatric attention after returning from St. Elizabeths upon completion of examinations. In addition, some inmates who are not the subject of mental examination orders become psychiatric problems. From time to time sixty to seventy percent of the hospital beds available at the Jail are given over to psychiatric patients. The Jail medical staff does not include a psychiatrist, and the facility is not equipped to house, care for or treat psychiatric patients. Ordinary handcuffs and leg irons are used to shackle some severely disturbed inmates to their beds because appropriate restraining devices are unavailable. (One inmate observed was reported to be commencing his third consecutive week under such restraint. [footnote by District Court])
416 F.Supp. at 104.
Defendants concede that "mentally ill inmates belong in a hospital facility and not in a jail."[60] Brief for appellants at 42.
The Health Services Coordinator for the Department of Corrections stated at trial: "It is felt by the Director of the Department of Corrections, by the Assistant Director and by me that we have no facilities of any kind to care for a psychiatric patient within the Department of Corrections." Trial Tr. 1104. Although he agreed that no person with mental problems should be housed at the D.C. Jail, he stated that the jail staff is forced to accept such persons anyway. Some are there by court order awaiting transfer to St. Elizabeths. Others are held there after being found competent for trial (though perhaps insane) at St. Elizabeths. Still others are under no court order, but are identified as possibly mentally ill by the jail staff. These inmates are referred for diagnosis and treatment, but because this process involves long delays and the Jail has no staff psychiatrist, severe problems arise.
As many courts have recognized, "An individual incarcerated . . . becomes both vulnerable and dependent upon the state to provide certain simple and basic human needs. . . . [W]here the circumstances are clearly sufficient to indicate the need of medical attention for injury or illness, the denial of such aid constitutes the deprivation of constitutional due process." Fitzke v. Shappell, 468 F.2d 1072, 1076 (6th Cir. 1972), cited with approval in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 n.11, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). See also Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857 (6th Cir. 1976); Runnels v. Rosendale, 499 F.2d 733 (9th

Cir. 1974); Dillard v. Pitchess, 399 F.Supp. 1225 (C.D.Cal.1975); Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F.Supp. 676 (D.Mass.1973), aff'd, 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. 550*550 Hall v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 419 U.S. 977, 95 S.Ct. 239, 42 L.Ed.2d 189 (1974).
Without challenging this underlying legal principle, defendants initially argued that the 48hour requirement is too inflexible[61] and that compliance is impossible. They contended that "the only such facility currently available is St. Elizabeths Hospital [to which] District officials can transfer no inmates . . . without the advance authorization of the United States." Brief for appellants at 42. More recently, however, defendants have informed us of the construction "on the grounds of the District of Columbia General Hospital [of] a 30-bed psychiatric facility which, it is hoped, will `relieve * * * the backlog of those cases awaiting transfer to St. Elizabeths Hospital.'" Supplemental memorandum of appellants, July 1, 1976, at 3. If at some point this new facility should prove generally inadequate for complying with the District Court's order, the defendants should seek review of that order in the lower court at that time. In such event, we would expect the District Court to make specific findings addressed to the feasibility of transferring mentally ill detainees to government or private hospitals, or of providing suitable care at the Jail by the development of services presently unavailable, as a predicate to reaffirming or modifying its general transfer plan. We stress that although defendants' asserted lack of authority to transfer inmates to St. Elizabeths may bear on their ability to provide outside hospital care within 48 hours, it cannot excuse defendants from their obligations to attend promptly and appropriately to the medical needs of detainees whose incarceration prevents them from finding their own treatment. It is also conceivable that isolated situations may arise where transfer within 48 hours is not feasible or where a detainee found to be mentally ill may not be in immediate need of hospital treatment. Allowing for such exceptional cases, we modify paragraph 6 to require defendants to submit a written report to the District Court whenever they have special cause to deviate from that order as now written. Such report should give the reasons for deviation and the exact time within which compliance will be achieved; a second report should then be submitted when transfer has actually been effected.[62]
F. Restraints
Paragraph 7 requires defendants to "[e]stablish the following procedures governing use of restraints:
a) inmates requiring restraints will be housed only on the third floor Jail Hospital, or at D.C. General Hospital;
b) unpadded handcuffs and leg irons shall not be used under any circumstances. Medically appropriate restraints, padded 551*551 or pliable to prevent injury to the inmate, may be utilized;
c) restraints may be imposed only on the specific written authorization of a medical doctor;
d) if required in an emergency situation when a doctor is not at the Jail, a Medical Technical Assistant (MTA) or a Registered Nurse may order the temporary use of restraints, subject to

the receipt, by telephone or otherwise, of approval from a medical doctor within two (2) hours of the imposition of such restraints;
e) a log will be kept reflecting the use of restraints, and stating for each such use the name of the person restrained, the date and time he was placed in restraints, the name of the doctor approving the use of restraints, and the time of such approval;
f) orders by a doctor authorizing the use of restraints are valid for twenty-four (24) hours only, and if no further written order has been entered within that period, the inmate shall be released from restraints;
g) no restrained inmate shall be housed in such a manner as to permit access to him by non-restrained inmates, with the exception of inmates approved by the medical staff for employment in the hospital area."
(The order as it appears at 416 F.Supp. 106 does not reflect the wording of the order as it appears on the Docket of the District Court.) Although paragraph 7 is not explicit, we construe it to apply only to the restraint of those pretrial detainees displaying unusual behavior suggestive of possible mental illness.
Defendants essentially concede that such extraordinary restraints on the liberty of pretrial detainees require special and continuing justification of a medical nature, and must be carefully supervised so that they become neither unnecessary nor harmful. Defendants' position is that they already follow these procedures in most respects. In a nutshell, their argument is that "in the absence of any proof establishing abusive or arbitrary practices by appellants as to the use of restraints, it is submitted that the court below has ... unwarrantedly ursurped [sic] the prison management function...." Brief for appellants at 46. However, as noted in the preceding section, the District Court specifically found that "[o]rdinary handcuffs and leg irons are used to shackle some severely disturbed inmates to their beds because appropriate restraining devices are unavailable," and personally observed one inmate commencing his third consecutive week under such restraint. See also Trial Tr. 753. According to testimony at trial, restraints are not supposed to be used without a doctor's authorization, Trial Tr. 1144-45, but this rule applies only to inmates restrained in the Jail hospital. No evidence was offered indicating that present restraint procedures include the log requirements or time restraints of the District Court's order. Hence, apart from defendants' assertions on appeal, we have no basis to conclude that the lower court's findings are clearly erroneous or that its order is superfluous.
We do note, however, that the order as written is deficient in several minor respects. First, it refers only to the old Jail; second, it fails to allow for the temporary restraint of an inmate until a doctor, MTA or nurse can be summoned. In affirming paragraph 7, we do not foreclose modifications by the District Court to cover these omissions.
V. CONCLUSION
The life of pretrial detainees at the District of Columbia Jail has been marked by deprivation, neglect and degradation. Contrary to the repeated assertions of the dissent, the opening of the New Detention Facility does not moot the case, for the danger of future violations

continues to exist, and, in any event, many of plaintiffs' claims arise from the defendants' continuing policies.
Addressing the more egregious hardships imposed on plaintiffs, the District Court's various findings and orders as affirmed assure to each detainee a right to minimum 552*552 space of his own, a regular change of linen and outer clothing, daily recreation, a rational security classification to prevent excessively harsh confinement and possibly to prepare the way for contact visits, prompt psychiatric care, and carefully regulated use of restraints. These provisions are so essential to decent custodial care and so clearly justified by the 6-year history of this litigation that we cannot conceive how they could ever be considered unwarranted intrusions into the prerogatives of local government—unless those prerogatives translate into total immunity from federal judicial review.
The constitutional standard we have announced today requires the District Court to evaluate the requirements of jail administration. We see no alternative if the rights of pretrial detainees are to be respected. Nevertheless, we are keenly aware of the wisdom of Justice Powell's advice that "courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration ...." Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1807, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974). Blackstone observed centuries ago that "what [is] requisite must ... often be left to the discretion of the jailors." Blackstone went on, however, to complain that jailors "are frequently a merciless race of men, and, by being conversant in scenes of misery, steeled against any tender sensation." 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries * 300. We deeply hope that the intervening years have disproved the causes of Blackstone's complaint,[63] for ultimately it is only with the whole-hearted cooperation of jail administrators that the constitutional rights of pretrial detainees can be protected. That cooperation would be most meaningfully expressed if the defendants in this case were to promulgate rules or regulations incorporating the constitutional standards we have enunciated and creating regular procedures whereby pretrial detainees can complain on the record of alleged infringements of their constitutional rights.[64] In this way the defendants can in the first instance bring their own considerable expertise to bear. Not only will such procedures obviate in a great number of instances the necessity of involving the federal judiciary,[65] but if resort 553*553 to a federal court is required the administrative record produced will "assist in the disposition of any resulting litigation." Rouse v. Cameron, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 366, 371 n. 22, 373 F.2d 451, 456 n. 22 (1966). See Dixon v. Jacobs, 138 U.S.App.D.C. 319, 327, 427 F.2d 589, 597 (1970). Furthermore, such procedures will enable jail administrators to "correct their own mistakes, thereby minimizing the number of times they must defend, in court, a decision they really do not support." Bazelon, The Impact of the Courts on Public Administration, 52 Ind.L.J. 101, 105 (1976).[66] The cumulative effect of such procedures will be to lead the Department of Corrections carefully and self-consciously to consider the constitutionality of the conditions of confinement at the District of Columbia Jail.[67]
The record is remanded for clarification of paragraph 5 and further consideration of paragraphs 3 and 4 of the November 5, 1975, order. We continue our stay of the District Court's order of March 21, 1975 and stay its second order of May 24, 1976, and we remand the record for further consideration of appropriate relief. Except as modified in the foregoing opinion, the orders of the District Court are otherwise affirmed, and the temporary stays of this court are vacated.

So ordered.
MacKINNON, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part and concurring in part:
In 1969 the Congress responded to requests from the District of Columbia and made the first appropriation for the survey which was required as the first step leading to the replacement and improvement of the old D.C. Jail facilities through the building of a new jail primarily for the housing of pretrial detainees.[1] Some time thereafter in 1971, while the planning and design of the new jail to rectify housing conditions was in progress, several pretrial detainees at the old D.C. Jail brought this action.
I. THE COMPLAINT
Their complaint, filed July 21, 1971, sought (1) a declaratory judgment that the constitutional rights of the pretrial detainee plaintiffs were being violated by the "conditions" of their confinement in the "District of Columbia Jail" and (2) a permanent injunction against the responsible District of Columbia officials[2] from continuing to violate 554*554 plaintiffs' alleged constitutional rights (Par. 1). Plaintiffs also assert that they are representative of a class of "unconvicted pretrial detainees incarcerated at the District of Columbia Jail ... [and] pretrial detainees who will be incarcerated at the D.C. jail in the future" (Par. 5). The "jail" referred to was the only jail then in existence—but now the new jail has been built and is in use and the use of the oldest half of the old jail, Cellblocks 1 and 2, has been discontinued.
This litigation was directed at the old jail, as were practically all of the hearings thereon. Since then the situation has changed very substantially by the completion of the new jail with minimum capacity for 960 inmates in air conditioned comfort. Thus the situation complained of by appellants has practically disappeared and no complaint has been directed against the present facilities. The case is thus moot for all practical purposes and should be dismissed. Instead, however, the majority seek to gnaw on an old bone.
The majority opinion contends that the case is not moot— arguing:
The [District Court] order was addressed to policies of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections that are applicable to both the old and new jails. There is thus no question of mootness. (Maj. op., p. ___ of 188 U.S.App.D.C., p. 544 of 580 F.2d, emphasis added)
The suit was not directed ... at the physical stones of the old Jail . . but at the policies through which [the] defendants operated the Jail facilities. (Extract from n. 46, Maj. op.)
The court's assertion is facially fallacious. Merely addressing an order to policies at a jail that was not the subject of the litigation, and concerning which no adequate record has been made as to its policies, is an insufficient base to support the court's order. The lawsuit did not involve the new jail and the testimony of record as to the old jail is insufficient to support the court's order insofar as the new jail is concerned. While the same people administer and operate the new jail as did the old one (Maj. op., fn. 46), this is fundamentally irrelevant since with the opening of the new jail the factual circumstances on which the District Court relied, no longer exist. It is a gross distortion of the jurisdiction conferred on the court by the lawsuit to attempt to expand the court's jurisdiction to include

the new jail by ignoring the uncontroverted fact that the complaint was addressed only to conditions at the old jail and that the policies of the defendants that were the subject of controversy were inextricably intertwined and practically controlled by the structural limitations of the physical features of those facilities. Stone walls may not a prison make, but when a prison does have stone walls it is rather difficult to overcome their restrictive effect— even by a court order.
The complaint also alleges, inter alia, that plaintiffs are incarcerated solely because they are unable to post bond, that they are presumed innocent, that they are incarcerated solely to ensure their presence at trial and that the "physical conditions of [their] confinement constitute unconstitutional punishment" because they are "overcrowded" in cells that violate "minimal architectural standards and the jail is overcrowded and its heating, ventilation and other aspects of the physical condition ... constitute a health threat" (Par. 10). Plaintiffs also complain of inadequate food, recreation facilities, programs and contact with the general community. Included in the latter allegation is an objection to censorship of mail, limitation on visitors, lack of access to telephones, newspapers and other means of communications which it is asserted violate their "First, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights." Hospital and medical services are alleged to be inadequate as are the "security measures," i. e., protection from other prisoners. Through the foregoing allegations, and by others, plaintiffs assert practically all the possible prisoner complaints, including the charge that each complaint constituted a constitutional violation.
Finally, it is alleged that all these conditions of confinement are additionally unconstitutional, 555*555 because they are more severe than post-sentence punishment that plaintiffs might receive at other correctional institutions to which they might be sent (this includes Lorton Reformatory also administered by the District of Columbia), and that as "pretrial detainees" they should not be subjected to such confinement because they are awaiting trial and presumed innocent (Par. 15).
Their prayer for relief seeks a determination that their constitutional rights have been violated, that a permanent injunction issue against a continuation of such practices and omissions and that the D.C. authorities be required to submit a plan as a future guarantee against continuation of the alleged practices and conditions so complained of. Specifically demanded, among other relief, was the establishment of "a regular recreational ... program," "an educational ... vocational . . and voluntary work program," "that prisoners have continuous opportunity to talk and associate with each other," "that prisoners have access to a sufficient quantity and quality of books, magazines, and newspapers, law books and legal materials,"[3] "that visiting conditions ... ensure . . privacy of conversations, conjugal rights, and additional visiting periods," and "that no limitations be placed on persons an inmate may see, communicate with, and receive communications from."
Hearings before the trial court were conducted from March 4 to March 13, 1975 and covered 1372 pages of record testimony all dealing with operations at the old jail. A great many of appellants' demands were denied, by the trial court, for obvious reasons, but some were granted. The majority opinion affirms the District Court in part but remands the record in material respects.
II. THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE LITIGATION

From the allegations of the complaint it is obvious that "conditions" in the old jail were the subject matter of plaintiffs' complaint. The suit was filed in July 1971 and that was the detention facility then being used by the District of Columbia and it was the situs of plaintiffs' incarceration. The hearings before the trial judge were also directed to "conditions" at that jail. Some of its principal features are described in the majority opinion.
III. THE APPEAL
The District of Columbia defendants, who administer the jail facilities that the government has provided for the District of Columbia, appeal from the orders of the District Court of (1) March 21, 1975, (2) November 5, 1975, and (3) May 24, 1976. In response to appellants' contentions the majority opinion concludes:
1. The jail conditions which the District Court finds objectionable serve no legitimate purpose of detention.
2. The opening of the New Detention Facility does not moot the case.
3. Each pretrial detainee is entitled to (a) a cell with a minimum of 48 square feet, (b) a regular change of linen and outer clothing, (c) some form of recreation each day, (d) a security classification to prevent harsh confinement and possibly to prepare the way for contact visits, (e) prompt psychiatric care, (f) court regulated use of restraints. (Maj. op., p. ___ of 188 U.S.App.D.C., pp. 551-552 of 580 F.2d).
556*556 4. The record is remanded for the District Court to consider whether the new jail, up to this point not the subject of this lawsuit, is overcrowded, and, if so, to order relief which may include the release of inmates from the jail.
As stated above, this lawsuit, started in 1971, was directed at conditions in the old jail. All the hearings before the trial court were directed at operation of the old jail and following completion of the original hearings the court order of March 21, 1975 was directed to operating conditions at the old jail. The principal complaint was directed against conditions in Cellblocks 1 and 2 which had been built in 1872. Cellblocks 3 and 4, completed in 1929, were in a different category.
All the time this lawsuit was pending, and for at least a year and a half before it was started, the D.C. authorities were attempting to correct the conditions here complained of by taking the necessary steps to obtain the erection of a new modern jail—adjacent to the old facilities. The new jail, with normal capacity for 960 inmates, was originally scheduled to be completed in January 1976 (Tr. Apr. 29, 1976, p. 158). Defendants in some of their representations to the court relied on this scheduled completion date. When the builders did not meet the anticipated date, the defendants were unable to comply on schedule with their plans for improving the conditions of incarceration by the scheduled transfer of upwards of a thousand prisoners and the closing of cellblocks 1 and 2. This delay led to some wrangling with the plaintiffs and the court. The delay in completion of the new jail was due to the contractors and their work force and was beyond the control of defendants, It is unseemly to take defendants to task for these delays in the construction schedule and I dissent from the

apparent finding that defendants were guilty of "illegal conduct." Maj. op., p. ___ of 188 U.S.App.D.C., p. 541 of 580 F.2d.
The overcrowding of the old jail was not the primary fault of defendants. It was caused by the frequency of the apprehension of offenders by police and by the actions and orders of prosecutors, jurors, judges (including federal judges) and the Congress—all unpredictable and uncontrollable by defendants. Thus, while the defendants administered the jail they did not control its population. In this respect they were the handmaidens of the judges, magistrates and law enforcement personnel, police, FBI, Secret Service and the United States Attorney. Pretrial detainees were confined in the jail pursuant to arrest warrants and other court orders. Thus, much of the criticism directed at the defendant D.C. authorities over the excessive jail population was directed at people whose responsibility for causing that situation was very minimal if it existed at all. In the last analysis it was Congress that was required to appropriate the necessary money and the size of the appropriation it provided determined the size and capacity of the new jail. If present facilities are inadequate it is Congress that must eventually take action to correct the situation. The strident tones directed at the D.C. defendants should be softened because of their limited responsibility and their limited ability to rectify the situation. Whipping them in public does not get the job done. The defects in the proposals suggested by the District Court, discussed on pages 2023 infra, are self-evident proof that something more may eventually be needed if the problem escalates.
IV. THE COURT HEARINGS
On the plaintiffs' complaint extensive hearings were held covering the operational facts at the old jail. On March 21, 1975, the court filed a memorandum and order declaring plaintiffs' constitutional rights were being violated and directed defendants to comply with all aspects of the order no later than fifteen days from that date. Such time limit obviously did not address itself to practical realities.
Thereafter a hearing was held on April 29 and 30, 1976 primarily on the issue of possible current overcrowding. During this hearing a few references were made to the situation that was developing with the completion of the new jail.
557*557 At that time some inmates in the old jail were being transferred to the new jail (Tr. April 29, 1976, 8) but transfers to the full capacity of the new jail were not completed until after its official completion date of August 10, 1976 (Tr. Apr. 29, 1976, 45).
The only hearing since the completion of the new jail was held on October 18, 1976 on the subject of "contact visits" (Tr. Oct. 18, 1976, pp. 1-6). Thus, no hearing has been held since the new jail came into use on the "conditions" of housing pretrial detainees under the presently existing circumstances. The new jail now has a normal capacity for 960 inmates and "with cellblocks 1 and 2 ... [closed since the] summer [of 1976]" (Maj. op. p. ___ of 188 U.S.App.D.C., p. 536 of 580 F.2d), the principal source for the complaint against the quality of housing conditions (as opposed to quantity) has been removed. It follows that, with the new jail being the principal source for housing inmates, the old record is stale and does not present substantial evidence sufficient to support the application of the court's order to the new and radically changed presently existing "conditions"—concerning which no evidence

has been adduced. The case involving, as it did, the old jail is thus moot—the conditions to which the plaintiffs' complaint and the trial court's hearings were addressed, no longer exist. The factual record in this case does not address the present operating conditions in the jails to which it is addressed. The order is thus not supported by substantial evidence and has become moot.
During the April 29, 1976 hearing before the trial court some concern was expressed over the status of the case involving the old jail because the Court of Appeals had pointed out that "the new jail is about to open." At that time the trial court indicated it thought that statistics with respect to the old jail would be sufficient, by merely adding the normal capacity of the new jail, to support an injunction directing the operation of the new jail, and cellblocks 3 and 4 in the future. With such a material change in the housing of prisoners, as was occasioned by adding the most modern air conditioned accommodations for 960 inmates, the trial court rationally could not reach the conclusion it did. The factual record of the hearings did not address the situation in which the new jail became the principal detention facility. The court rationalized with plaintiffs' counsel as to this deficiency in the trial record:
THE COURT: You can load the record with what has happened.... [I]f it were not for what had happened, we wouldn't be here, right? .... And that is about the only thing we can make a record on. [This recognizes that a record could not be made against the new conditions]. You and I know when we get the testimony here that the prognosis is fairly gloomy. You and I know that they are overcrowded now [? see later comment], but I suspect that we don't have to delve into the business of projections. [They should have looked at the new conditions in toto if they wanted to issue an order directed to new conditions. The failure "to delve into the business of projections" is a fatal error by the standards even of the majority opinion because the court did not consider "whether defendants' illegal conduct is likely to recur ..." [Maj. op. p. ___ of 188 U.S.App.D.C., p. 541 of 580 F.2d] and cases there cited].
I guess we will nail down the capacity, right, and establish the fact that it has been overpopulated, and I suspect that ultimately you will ask me to fashion some relief that will prohibit it?
MR. HICKEY: That is correct.
THE COURT: It doesn't make any difference about the projections [involving the new jail] if that is so. [But the District Court could not determine whether "the allegedly wrongful behavior could ... reasonably be expected to recur" [Maj. op., p. ___ of 188 U.S.App.D.C., p. 541 of 580 F.2d] unless it went into the "business of projections," which it did not do].
MR. HICKEY: I guess what I am thinking about is the Court of Appeals' language in the last stay order when they 558*558 said that the new jail is about to open.. [This obviously was a disturbing thought to counsel, as it should have been to the Court].
This may be a bridge we don't have to cross. They are in compliance today [this is a contradiction of the prior statement that "they are overcrowded now."], so we will continue the stay of the overcrowding order [which was addressed to the old jail].
THE COURT: It seems to me, as you say, the subject matter of the lawsuit is the category of the people.

MR. HICKEY: That is correct.
THE COURT: Inmates wherever they are. [Actually the subject was inmate "conditions" at the old jail].
So, if that is so, then I can deal with the old facility and the new facility as a composite. [Without taking evidence]. It doesn't make any difference whether they are in the new facility or the Armory or wherever they are. [In other words that the court has a continuing ability because there was a lawsuit directed at "conditions" in the old jail to thereafter deal with all D.C. prisoners wherever they are. Such wholesale expansion of the court's authority on a stale complaint and a stale record is unwarranted].
It seems to me I deal with it in terms of other people. And if that is so, it seems to me we can avoid what Mr. Nedrich [the Assistant U.S. Attorney] is talking about. Do you understand what I am saying to you?
MR. NEDRICH: Yes.
THE COURT: You and Miss Crisman talk about that, and the three of you talk about that. I think that is feasible.
I agree what [sic] what you are saying. We went into that before, you know.
I though [sic] we might have some leeway. I thought we might have, you know, but there is no head space.
I think we can get enough record to satisfy the Court of Appeals with what has happened up to now and what glimpse we get into what is going to happen tomorrow. We don't have to unveil them all if he thinks somebody with anxiety and and [sic] neurosis is going to fill up the new jail.
Tr. Apr. 29, 1976, pp. 165-67 (emphasis added).
It is apparent from this colloquy that the underlying theory, subsequently announced by the court in its order, was that if the capacity of the old jail was established and such facility had been overpopulated, and there was a "gloomy prognosis," the court, just by taking a "glimpse ... into what is going to happen tomorrow" (emphasis added) with the new jail, and without "delving into the business of projections," could decree the population limits of cellblocks 3 and 4 and the dormitories, merely add the normal capacity of the new jail and, without any further testimony showing any present, or projecting any future adverse effects from the operations and conditions of the facilities with the new jail, issue an injunction for the future against the entire detention center, new jail and all. The majority find that the "forecast" of the trial court, based on no more substantial evidence than a mere "glimpse," constitutes "sufficient evidence in the record to sustain" the injunction, p. ___ of 188 U.S.App.D.C., p. 542 of 580 F.2d. The "forecast" and the "glimpse" however, without hearings and substantial evidence to indicate that past conditions will continue into the future, merely add up to nothing more than speculation and conjecture and therefore the majority remand the record on the injunction phase of the case to the District Court to determine "if the anticipated overcrowding has in fact occurred." Maj. op., p. ___ of 188 U.S.App.D.C., p. 543 of 580 F.2d.

In sum, the District Court by refusing to delve into "projections" not only did not look into the future, it did not even look at the present conditions. It rested its case on the past and ignored the new jail completely except to tack on its normal capacity to the capacity of the restrained units and fix that as a limit. The difficulty with such conclusion is that the "if" is too speculative, 559*559 particularly when the District Court refused to consider any testimony as to the ultimate capacity of the new jail if some of the available areas were converted to dormitories. When the trial court, in the colloquy set forth at page ___ of 188 U.S.App.D.C., p. 560 of 580 F.2d infra (Tr. Apr. 20, 1976, p. 96) said to the United States Attorney: "You don't want to advertise the top figure [maximum capacity for the new jail at 1700 people] no matter what it is"; and the United States Attorney answered affirmatively: "Right"; and the court stated: "I am not interested in advertising it either ..." (Emphasis added); at that point the court indicated it was "not interested" in hearing any testimony as to the maximum capacity of the new jail. Cf. Maj. op., n. 45. It should have been if it intended to include the new jail in its injunction and adjudicate the capacity of the new jail that was not based on any substantial evidence as to its maximum capacity. The court thus never made a supportable finding as to the exact capacity of the new jail or to "conditions" there. This is a fatal defect in its order.
Since there is no evidence here covering the actual handling of 960 prisoners with the new jail in full operation, with Cellblocks 1 and 2 closed, or as to the maximum capacity of the new jail, the trial court's order in respect thereto is clearly erroneous. The trial court made the same error that was made by the trial courts in Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976) and in O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974). In Rizzo the Court opinion quoted the following from O'Shea:
In O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974) ... the Court concluded that "[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief, however, if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects." Id., at 495-496, 94 S.Ct. [669] at 676. The Court further recognized that while "past wrongs are evidence bearing on whether there is a real and immediate threat of repeated injury," the attempt to anticipate under what circumstances the respondents there would be made to appear in the future before petitioners "takes us into the area of speculation and conjecture." Id., at 496-497, 94 S.Ct. 669.
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. at 372-373, 96 S.Ct. at 605. (emphasis added). On the foregoing reasoning the Supreme Court held the record indicated that "the individual respondents ... lacked the requisite `personal stake in the outcome,' Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962), i. e., [of] the order overhauling police disciplinary procedures." 423 U.S. at 373, 96 S.Ct. at 605. The majority do not satisfactorily distinguish Rizzo. Maj. op., pp. ___ - ___ of 188 U.S.App.D.C., p. 526 of 580 F.2d.
A mere threat of future injury is insufficient to avoid mootness. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 507, 81 S.Ct. 1752, 6 L.Ed.2d 989 (1961); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89-90, 67 S.Ct. 556, 91 L.Ed. 754 (1947); see also, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 318, 349, 94 S.Ct. 1704, 40 L.Ed.2d 164 (1974); SEC v. Medical Committee for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403, 406-407, 92 S.Ct. 577, 30 L.Ed.2d 560 (1972). The majority's warning that we should "beware of efforts to defeat injunctive relief by protestations of repentence and reform" (Maj. op., p. ___ of 188 U.S.App.D.C., p. 541 of 580 F.2d quoting United States

v. Oregon State Medical Society, 343 U.S. 326, 333, 72 S.Ct. 690, 96 L.Ed. 978 (1952)), has no application here in view of the substantial change in circumstances occasioned by the completion of the construction and opening of the new jail, which was on the drawing boards even before this lawsuit was initiated. The new jail is an actuality not a promise.
While the controversy set forth in appellants' complaint is clearly moot, the majority are insistent upon extending the court's jurisdiction to assume complete control over the present situation and thereby more or less take over the management of the new jail on a continuing basis. That is not the lawsuit that was the subject of the court's hearings, and I see no justification for it. 560*560 However, on remand, the District Court will be required to take evidence on the maximum possible capacity of the new jail and will be able, if the complaint is amended to include present conditions, to examine the defendants' actual record of performance in the first two years of operating the new jail—evidence far stronger than mere "protestations of repentence and reform" unaccompanied by any identifiable actions or changes in circumstances.
The transcript reference quoted above makes it clear that the district court considered that the "past wrongs" were sufficient, without any substantial investigation of the presently changed situation, to support an injunction against future operations. In thus relying on past wrongs and not delving into the business of projections the court relied upon speculation and conjecture, instead of substantial evidence, and in so doing it is submitted it issued a judgment that is clearly erroneous.
V. POTENTIAL ADDITIONAL INMATE CAPACITY
At the hearing on April 29, 1976, counsel for the District of Columbia defendants stated:
If we were pushed to the wall [with the new jail] we think we could hold 1700 people and still comply with Your Honor's order and not double house. We could put ... bunk beds in the ... [recreation facility] and house 30 to 40 men in each of the 12 [recreation facilities]. Now, we are talking about 400 more spaces.[4]
Tr. April 29, 1976, pp. 95-97. The trial court did not inquire further into this potential capacity. It should have, even though the court and the defendants seemed to have some reluctance against "advertising" it.
THE COURT: You don't want to advertise the top figure no matter what it is.
MR. NEDRICH: Right.
THE COURT: I am not interested in advertising it either ...
(Tr. April 29, 1976, 96). At this stage of the hearing it is not evident that the United States Attorney was aware that the court intended to include the new jail in its injunction without taking testimony thereon. This is evident from the following statement of the U.S. Attorney:

MR. NEDRICH: ... I don't think your Honor would issue an order saying, "Everything is fine now, but I am going to order you in the event something goes wrong six months from now to do this."
It doesn't take that much effort to move men around and put bunks in, but don't tell the world that is what we are going to do.
(Tr. April 29, 1976, 99-100, emphasis added). The reference to bunks clearly indicates that using bunks for overflow inmates was clearly contemplated. That the court was going to include the new jail in the order in the manner it did developed later (Id., Tr. April 29, 1976, 165-67). However, if the court intended to fix a limit on the number of prisoners that could be housed in the new jail it was required to determine the "top figure." The 1537 figure set by the order of May 24, 1976[5] did not consider evidence 561*561 as to the maximum potential capacity of the Detention Center with the new jail and no testimony was ever taken thereon or as to conditions and operations at the new jail. Thus, because the District Court did not consider the full facts of the situation to which it addressed its order, it is clearly erroneous.
The majority opinion in footnote 44 quotes a portion of testimony that in passing referred to the maximum designed capacity (Tr. April 29, 1976, 97) of the new facility and then relies upon that isolated question and answer as a substitute for full inquiry into the maximum potential capacity of the new jail—which it is not. It is clear from the record that the trial court recognized that it was not. It is also crystal clear that the trial court did not desire to have a hearing on the maximum potential capacity of the new facility. This is self-evident from the court's statement shortly after the colloquy quoted by the majority opinion in footnote 44:
THE COURT: ... I don't know whether I am making myself clear to you or not, but for instance, I don't want to get involved in dealing with the new facility and what is going to happen there ...
(Tr. April 29, 1976, 98, emphasis added). No statement could more clearly demonstrate, after the testimony the majority relies upon (n. 44), that the trial court recognized that the statement as to the maximum design capacity of the new facility did not constitute adequate inquiry into what the maximum potential capacity would be found to be if the court was "to get involved in dealing with the new facility." It is this void in the present record, whereby the court refused "to get involved in dealing with new facility" as it should have, if it intended to base its order on the maximum potential capacity, that renders the present record inadequate. This inadequacy requires the court "to get involved" and determine the maximum potential capacity, and the operating conditions that justify judicial intervention, if it intends to include the new facility in its injunction. Actually, however, since the lawsuit did not apply to the new facility, in my view there is no basis for getting involved in the lengthy hearing on the operation of the new facility that would be necessary in order to justify the extension of the court's injunction to cover the new facility.
The foregoing is a further indication that the trial court is basing its conclusion on a stale record that ignores the materially altered factual situation that resulted when cellblocks 1

and 2 of the old jail were closed and new normal accommodations for almost a thousand inmates were added by the completion of the new jail.
I see no need for a further remand on the question of overcrowding and inmate capacity. Since there is no showing that there are any existing violations, I would hold that the opening of the new jail, and the closing of the older parts of the old jail, have rendered this controversy moot. The plaintiffs have not alleged that there exist any unconstitutional conditions of confinement in the new jail, conditions which are substantially different from those in the old jail to which this entire litigation has heretofore been addressed. Judicial intervention into jail operations is justified only in extraordinary circumstances. Such circumstances have not even been alleged—much less explored in thorough evidentiary hearings or proven—with respect to the new jail, which was constructed for the purpose of alleviating many of the conditions in the old jail of which these plaintiffs first complained after the new jail was in progress.
VI. ATTEMPTS TO ALLEVIATE OVERCROWDING
The trial court found in its Proceedings on Remand, filed May 24, 1976 "that the defendants have failed to take reasonable and obvious steps to alleviate overcrowding" and on that basis indicated that an 562*562 injunction should issue enjoining them from housing after June 1, 1976 "more than[:]
960 persons at the New Detention Facility . . .
215 in Cellblock 4 . . .[6]
161 in Cellblock 3 . . .[7]
110 persons in Dormitory 1 . . .
91 persons in Dormitory 2 at the old jail.[8]
(R. 166, p. 14). There is no justification for including the new jail in any injunction. There is no substantial evidence to support the court issuing a managerial injunction to control the operations of a facility that had never been shown to have been operated improperly and concerning which the court had never conducted any hearing on its operations. In fact, it had not been placed into full operation so the court could not have taken testimony on its operations. The court properly could not base an injunction regulating its future operations on pure surmise and speculation. There is no basis for including the new jail in an injunction just because Cellblocks 1 and 2[9] (now demolished) were antiquated and there had been prior overcrowding at the old jail. Also, there is no basis for limiting the population of the new jail to 960, without a hearing as to whether more inmates might properly be housed as suggested by counsel at the hearing.
In addition, while it does not completely defeat the court's ability to issue an injunction limiting the jail population in the old jail, the justification is undercut by the several alternative steps that the court stated were "reasonable and obvious to alleviate overcrowding." (R. 166, p. 14). While these steps, suggested by the trial court, might be "obvious" to consider, it is not "reasonable" to conclude that they would materially reduce

the jail population. The trial court "suggested" 10 "alternatives" (A to J) which it characterized "remain open as options." (R. 166, pp. 9-14). Are they reasonable options? Consider them seriatim:
A. Lorton Youth Centers 1 and 2 has its population controlled by an order of Judge Gesell. Suggestion: get Judge Gesell to increase the population limits. Impractical.
B. Confine youth offenders at Lorton while they are being evaluated as to their eligibility for a youth correction sentence. It is illegal to confine youth offenders in an adult facility or in an institution not certified by the Attorney General as a Youth Facility. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5011, 5012.[10] To suggest that youth offenders should be taken from a jail and confined in a penitentiary while they are awaiting sentence is too extreme to even consider. It flies into the face of the entire Youth Corrections Act.
C. Confine persons serving misdemeanor sentences in the minimum security facility at Lorton. This was rejected because of insufficient security at such facility in Lorton. This involves a judgment factor by the administrators which should be respected by the court. Those guilty only of misdemeanors 563*563 should not be imprisoned with felons—or be placed in maximum security prisons such as Lorton.
D. Misdemeanor sentences to the jail by judges should be changed to specify "half-way houses." The sentencing judges know the available facilities and presumably sentence with all the alternatives in mind—including half-way houses. This suggestion would limit the sentencing judges' choice of alternative dispositions on a basis which should be irrelevant to the judges' decisions on sentencing.
E. Speed up transportation by U.S. Marshals of parole violators temporarily confined at jail. This should be done as expeditiously as possible, if it is not, but doing so would not substantially affect the jail population.
F. Install "demountable" housing units, i. e., trailers. The administrators previously considered these and concluded they were unsatisfactory.
G. Obtain the "consent" of those convicted of misdemeanors to confine them at Lorton penitentiary. Such consents would obviously be few. And there is no validity in the suggestion that 24 D.C.Code § 425, which allows for transfers of those convicted of D.C. offenses, would supersede 18 U.S.C. § 4083, which provides that misdemeanor sentences "shall not be served in a penitentiary without the consent of the defendant." The federal statute is supreme, and it applies to "[p]ersons convicted of offenses against the United States." Id., supra. This includes those convicted of District of Columbia offenses. Beard v. Bennett, 72 U.S.App.D.C. 269, 270, 114 F.2d 578, 579 (1940) (Rutledge, J.).
H. Obtain the consent of judges for those sentenced to serve weekend sentences to serve them in half-way houses. This had some prior success and could be repeated, but its effect would be minimal.
I. Transfer to Lorton those convicted prisoners that the sentencing judge recommended serve their sentences in a federal penitentiary, to stay at Lorton until the Attorney General

acts on the recommendations. This has some elements, of feasibility, but no sentenced prisoners are transferred to Lorton or any other institution until the Attorney General designates the place of confinement, and it is doubtful that they would make two designations.
J. Locate other space. The trial court's opinion states, "no substantial efforts have been made by the Department to locate alternative housing facilities within the District of Columbia or at the Lorton Complex." (R. 166, p. 13). This statement is contradicted by statements made at the various oral arguments of this case. At that time other facilities, even outside D.C. and Lorton were discussed. This suggestion has great facial merit but is of little practicality because in the long run it is permanent space that they assert is needed. Getting substantial additional jail facilities is a major undertaking. It should be pursued vigorously, but in light of the present situation, the failure to walk in step with the court's suggestion does not authorize an injunction without convincing proof that the present jail facilities, new jail and Cell-blocks 3 and 4, will be operated in an unconstitutional manner.
Many of the foregoing suggestions are laden with another objection—6 out of the 10 suggestions bring in the use of Lorton Reformatory which, in some instances would not be legally permissible, and the defendants state it also is overcrowded. In addition judicial notice is taken of the decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, issued on June 30, 1976 in Civil Action No. 75-392A, Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County, Virginia v. Edward H. Levi [Attorney General] et al., which finds, inter alia, that "overcrowding" at Lorton is a problem and that there are "insufficient personnel" to adequately supervise the number of inmates presently confined, even though "defendants convicted of federal ... offenses ... are no longer incarcerated [there] ..." When this court's judgment is added to Judge Gesell's order of a similar nature addressed to Lorton youth facilities, it is obvious that other courts block the trial court's suggestions. Therefore, 564*564 the several suggestions that Lorton can help out seem not to be well taken. In view of this interplay between the D.C. Jail and the Fairfax County Board, it seems that the court's order in this case to deny the request of the Fairfax Board to intervene in this case was ill-advised. Intervention was requested on March 25, 1975 (R. 119A). No question is raised presently about this, but it seems clear that the intervention of the Fairfax Board would have permitted a better consideration of all the relevant facts.
On the foregoing analysis I disagree with the assertion that pursuing the above alternatives would obviate the problem. Maj. op., n.7.
VII. THE RELEASE OF PRISONERS
The District Court entered the following order directing the automatic release of prisoners in the event the population limit of 1,537 inmates, based mainly on the stale hearing, is exceeded:
ORDER ... if compliance requires a reduction in the inmate population at either facility, and other efforts to reduce the population are not successful within 48 hours after compliance ceases, the Director of the Department of Corrections and the Superintendent of Detention Services be directed to release on their own recognizance, within 48 hours of the admission to either facility of persons in excess of the numbers stated in the preceding paragraph,

those pre-trial detainees held in default of the lowest amount of bail, and among those detainees held in the same amount of bail those held for the longest time, until compliance with that Order is obtained; provided that if the Board of Judges of the Superior Court, or the Chief Judge thereof, specify a different method of selecting the persons to be released, the defendants shall be governed accordingly.
District Court Order of May 24, 1976, pp. 14-15; Campbell v. McGruder, 416 F.Supp. 111, 117 (D.D.C.1976); and see Maj. op., n.43.
This order, directed to future operations, as it is, is not based on substantial evidence and I concur in what I construe is the refusal of the majority to affirm this order. Maj. op. p. ___ of 188 U.S.App.D.C., p. 543 of 580 F.2d. In directing the "release on their own recognizance," of prisoners in excess of the limit fixed by its order, the District Court is in effect exercising habeas corpus jurisdiction in futuro without any court consideration. In most instances this would involve D.C. prisoners and this might exceed its jurisdiction. Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 97 S.Ct. 1224, 51 L.Ed.2d 411 (1977).
Recognizing the disparity that exists between judges in setting bail, it is also my view that release should not be automatically based on the amount of bail. Rather, if such a situation should ever arise, on motion of the United States Attorney it should be brought to the attention of the judges of the court whose prisoners are to be released. The present order wholly ignores United States judges. The release of prisoners who are incarcerated because they cannot meet the ultra liberal release provisions of the Bail Reform Act should not be ordered on a perfunctory basis. If the drastic remedy of release was to be applied, the proper court should consider the alternative of releasing some of those serving misdemeanor sentences who are nearing their expiration date. Under the operation of the very liberal D.C. Bail Act, a pretrial detainee who is confined in the jail is most likely apt to have committed a very serious crime and to be a serious risk to the community. Such people should not automatically be released. It is also submitted that the comparative severity of the crime with which low bail detainees are charged should be a factor to be considered in releasing prisoners. Finally, it almost goes without saying that Superior Court judges of the District of Columbia should not pass on the release of prisoners confined pursuant to judgments of conviction and orders of United States District Court.
VIII. RECREATION
The majority affirms the District Court's finding that the opportunity for some form 565*565 of recreation must be provided to all inmates. It vacates the District Court's order requiring that this be outdoor recreation, but remands "for a determination of the quality, duration and location of this recreation." I see no problem with respect to recreation, and therefore no need or justification for the court to become involved with the question at all at this time.
The Department of Corrections is not opposed to proper outside recreation. What the District Court's order is referring to is not ordinary physical recreation, but more frequently than not means just "hanging out in the rec. [recreation] yard—just walking around or just playing basketball freely" (Tr. Apr. 29, 1976, pp. 104-105). However, the new jail has 16 adequate recreational areas inside the detention facility and only two outside recreational areas. This is a jail not a penitentiary or reformatory. If the responsible authorities decide to

establish recreational programs inside the jail that is within the supervisory power which inheres in their responsibility to manage the institution. Those administering the new jail would prefer to use the outdoor recreational facilities for planned recreational events— organized teams, etc. (Tr. Apr. 29, 1976, p. 105). They also may come to some more extensive outdoor recreation in the future. Juveniles presently receive daily outdoor exercise, and the trial court found that plans for outdoor exercise were being developed. Maj. op., n.48. This is an instance where we should follow Justice Powell's admonition in Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405-06, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1807, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974):
[C]ourts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform. Judicial recognition of that fact reflects no more than a healthy sense of realism. Moreover, where state penal institutions are involved, federal courts have a further reason for deference to the appropriate prison authorities.
But a policy of judicial restraint cannot encompass any failure to take cognizance of valid constitutional claims whether arising in a federal or state institution. When a prison regulation or practice offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal courts will discharge their duty to protect constitutional rights.
The defendants provide the opportunity for recreation. Since that is so, I do not see the justification for our intervening in this matter at all. The "quality, duration, and location" of jail recreation is to my mind a matter for the determination of the jail authorities over which judicial supervision is unnecessary—no inadequacy being shown. I therefore would vacate the District Court's order in this respect and would not remand for further consideration of this issue.
No fundamental constitutional guarantee is violated by establishing for jail inmates a program of one hour of indoor recreation daily instead of outdoor idling. As a matter of fact one hour of indoor recreation in air conditioned facilities may be far superior to outside, socalled recreation—summer and winter. It must also be remembered that we are dealing here only with pretrial detainees. Those who are in some correctional institution to serve an extended term have some right and special need for exercise that is not shared by pretrial detainees. Inmates in jail are there for shorter periods and are less in need of exercise. The assurance of one hour indoor exercise for those in jail awaiting trial is very reasonable and certainly more than most jails provide for pretrial detainees.
IX. THE CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM AND CONTACT VISITS
The order of the District Court of November 5, 1975 directs the D.C. defendants to:
4. Establish a classification system which will make it possible to determine a) which inmates of plaintiff class require maximum security confinement; and b) which members of class can enjoy contact visits without jeopardizing the security of the facility. (p. 12). (Emphasis added).

If a classification system for pretrial detainees could determine that jails would be 566*566 easy to administer, maybe the majority can suggest the system it has in mind. Insofar as requiring a classification system is concerned, this court once affirmed an order of the District Court requiring prison officials to grant press interviews of inmates on the basis of a classification system of individual inmates on the ground that, under the First Amendment, any blanket prohibition of such interviews was prohibited. The Supreme Court, however, reversed, holding that an even-handed blanket prohibition equally applicable to all inmates did nothing more than limit a manner of communication, was "entitled to great deference," and, as such, did not unconstitutionally encroach on inmate rights. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 844-49, 94 S.Ct. 2811, 41 L.Ed.2d 514 (1974). See also Pell v. Procunier, supra, 417 U.S. at 823-26, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 41 L.Ed.2d 495.
The majority "do not interpret [the foregoing] order [of the District Court] as mandating contact visits at this time" (Maj. op., p. ___ of 188 U.S.App.D.C., p. 547 of 580 F.2d, emphasis added). Therefore the majority defers ruling on the validity of ordering them, remands this part of the court's order and affirms the order "insofar as it requires the defendants to devise a classification system for maximum security assignments and contact visits ... [that will permit] the District Court to proceed with the fashioning of an order on the subject of contact visits if it is so advised; such an order, of course, will be subject to later appeal." Maj. op., p. ___ of 188 U.S.App.D.C., p. 548 of 580 F.2d (emphasis added).
The procedure ordered is most strange. It is contradictory and, while disclaiming judgment, is almost suggestive. The majority affirms an order directing defendant to classify prisoners for "maximum security ... and contact visits" (emphasis added) and at the same time states that it does not interpret the District Court's order, which it affirms, as requiring contact visits. Actually it operates in reverse of the normal order. From my examination, there is no foundation in the record to support an order directing defendants to prepare a classification system for contact visits until a record is made supporting the necessity and validity of ordering contact visits. Therefore, until the necessary predicate is proved, I would conclude there is no necessity for the defendants preparing any classification system for contact visits. The same goes for maximum security classification—which is part of the contact visit issue in the mind of the majority—but so far as this case is concerned I fail to see how the plaintiffs have shown any standing to raise that issue. Just because there may have been some overcrowding in the past does not authorize a prisoner to attack everything in the management of a jail. At this time there is no necessity to discuss the validity of ordering contact visits, but I will deal with them if they are ordered.
What is involved in this issue of contact visits is that, pursuant to the considered judgment of the D.C. officials, the new jail, for security reasons, has been constructed so that there will be no contact visits except between prisoners and their lawyers and religious emissaries.[11] This is a decision that is clearly within the legal power and discretion of the jail authorities, and in my opinion on the record to date they were most wise in deciding the matter as they did.
It was the "contact visit" portion of the trial court's original order, affirmed by two judges of this panel, that has been stayed by our Circuit Justice. A reading of the transcripts in United States v. Gorham et al., 173 U.S.App.D.C. 139, 523 F.2d 1088 (1975) and United States v. Bridgeman et 567*567 al., 173 U.S.App.D.C. 150, 523 F.2d 1099 (1975), cert. denied, 425

U.S. 961, 96 S.Ct. 1744, 48 L.Ed.2d 206 (1976), involving the recent riots and mass jail breaks at the D.C. Jail, reveals some of the recognized evils of "contact visits." Such visits were the principal means used by the conspirators to cause both the riots and the escapes which ensued. Both the riot and the escapes occurred after planned "contact visits" to the principal conspirators. United States v. Wilkerson, 179 U.S.App.D.C. 15, 548 F.2d 970 (1976) and United States v. Gorham, 175 U.S.App.D.C. 363, 535 F.2d 1325 (April 1, 1976 Order and Memorandum) (hostages held by jail prisoners at cellblock in U.S. Court House, Washington, D.C.), were also recent cases where a contraband gun was obtained in some manner by two defendants confined in the D.C. Jail. The gun was subsequently used to obtain other weapons and terrorize hostages for several days.
It is generally recognized that weapons, hacksaw blades, knives, files, etc., which constitute an obvious means of breaching "security," are not the only hazards or abuses that result from "contact visits." One need only focus on the threats to security of the jail that result from breaches of its administrative regulations by prisoners importing other articles contrary to administrative regulations. Security at a jail cannot be easily assured by searches for weapons of those making contact visits or by running visitors through a metal detection screen. Security can be just as much violated by a breach of the administrative regulations when visitors making contact visits import drugs, money and other articles of value to inmates. Possession of drugs and money is a violation of jail regulations, and both can be and are used to effect escape, purchase weapons and otherwise interfere, through bribery, in the proper administration of a jail or other penal institution.
The expressed theory of the trial court is thus incorrect, and I vigorously dissent therefrom, that "none of the marijuana constitutes any real threat to the security of the institution" (Tr. October 18, 1976, 183) and that "the fact that some items of contraband get into the institution is [not] sufficient justification for walling off the institution from the type of visits that other people have found to be [beneficial]." This bespeaks an ignorance of actual D.C. Jail conditions—known to all. (Id., 171-72). When the risk to the security of the institution and others was brought up in opposition to this line of reasoning by the District Court, the judge replied: "... other people are taking a chance. You take a chance when you walk down the street." (Id., 172). The theory of the trial court, now affirmed on a temporary partial basis by the majority, but subject to further appeal (an odd disposition) is that the District Court can interpose its will and compel the jail authorities to risk the security of the jail, its inmates and the public even though the jail authorities, with good reason, based on experience and common practice, have decided that such risk is undesirable and unnecessary and that this risk is justified because people take risks when they "walk down the street." I submit that the two situations are not comparable. That citizens are subject to some risks when walking on the streets of Washington is no justification for increasing that risk by further action that might hazard the security of inmates in the jail and the general public. In my view that decision is within the lawful authority of the jail administrators to make, and since their decision is rational and based on substantial evidence it should be sustained. On this record the courts lack power to overrule the jail administrators.
After three major jail incidents within one year (one massive jail break and two hostage incidents), when the circumstances of those armed riots, etc., are analyzed, it cannot be denied that better security is needed at the jail. Drugs are difficult to detect in many visitors who may be allowed contact visits and the detection of money and valuables is not always

considered too important by some. If contact visits are allowed there is no foolproof method to stop the introduction of contraband drugs. (Tr. Oct. 18, 1976, 69, 122, 138-39). Detection also requires considerable manpower and 568*568 appropriations which may not be fully available from Congress. Thus, the problem is not solely confined to discovering guns and other direct threats to jail security. Money and drugs can buy guns and weapons.
It is also fallacious to consider the problem as though the sole consideration were that the detainees were presumed to be innocent. Discussing the "presumption of innocence" with respect to an accused person whom the court or magistrate, in accordance with the Constitution and statute, has determined must be confined because he is a danger to the community or there is no reasonable assurance that he will not flee, raises an issue that is largely irrelevant to his pretrial confinement. While the presumption of innocence is an active factor weighing on whether he should be released or not, once that presumption is rebutted by competent evidence and it is determined that he must be confined, the effect of the presumption is largely in repose until the time of trial, given of course that the nature of his confinement must be reasonably accommodated to mere confinement and not ordinarily to involve solitary confinement, prohibition of visitors, hard labor, etc.[12] To say that pretrial detainees have the protection of the presumption is not to say that the dangerous characteristics of pretrial detainees are to be ignored in their confinement.
The majority opinion in n.14 attempts to deny this fact but ends up merely with a strong plea for a liberal bail policy which for some time has been established law and policy in the District of Columbia. It is this bail policy that has placed only the most dangerous prisoners in the D.C. Jail. It is hard to conceive a more liberal bail policy than the presently existing one. In fact, the public and some Congressmen have begun to complain of its extreme liberality. Under the existing Bail Reform Act of the District of Columbia (23 D.C.Code § 1324), accused persons who should not be detained in jail pretrial are not detained.
The majority attempt to divert the effect of this fact by asserting that nearly all the plaintiff unconvicted predetainees are jailed because "they cannot afford bail." Maj. op., n.14. This is a myopic appraisal of the situation. It fails to see that they are jailed because they cannot afford bail in the amount fixed. And the amount varies with the magnitude of the crime, the danger to the community posed by the accused and the strength of the evidence against him. Under the law in the District of Columbia a 569*569 person who is arrested and charged with a criminal offense:
... at his appearance before a judicial officer, [is] ordered released pending trial on his personal recognizance or upon the execution of an unsecured appearance bond in an amount specified by the judicial officer, unless the officer determines, in the exercise of his discretion, that such a release will not reasonably assure the ... appearance of the person as required or the safety of any other person or the community.
23 D.C.Code § 1321(a). If such determination is made, the magistrate must then consider outside custody, travel restrictions and only if these are not considered to be sufficient is bail required. In reaching its conclusions the court or magistrate must consider the following factors:

(b) In determining which conditions of release, if any, will reasonably assure the appearance of a person as required or the safety of any other person or the community, the judicial officer shall, on the basis of available information, take into account such matters as the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of the evidence against such person, his family ties, employment, financial resources, character and mental conditions, past conduct, length of residence in the community, record of convictions, and any record of appearance at court proceedings, flight to avoid prosecution, or failure to appear at court proceedings.
23 D.C.Code § 1321(b) (emphasis added).
Naturally, when these statutory standards are applied to offenders charged with very serious crimes or who have substantial records of prior convictions, or who are apt to flee the jurisdiction, and against whom the evidence of guilt is strong, a substantial amount of bail must be fixed. This results in the District of Columbia, with its very substantial load of serious crimes, in a number of situations where substantial bail must be fixed or else permit such persons to roam free in the community and hazard the populace. The majority attempts to paint this situation as one of discrimination against the poor because they are poor. That conclusion, however, is not supported by the statistics. It is a fact that few persons who are well to do commit armed robberies. So the most liberal Bail Act in the nation cannot actually be faulted in application; but of course if the theory expressed by the majority opinion is followed practically no person charged with crime would be detained until after his conviction was finally affirmed by the Supreme Court. That is an unreasonable position and misconstrues the Constitution which permits dangerous criminals to be confined prior to trial—though our Bail Act has substantially reduced this protection and in some instances obliterated it.
In the application of the Bail Reform Act in the District it is common knowledge, and proved by some of our cases, that many accused persons who have been released have subsequently committed very serious crimes while released, proving they should not have been released to prey upon the community. But they were, and the Act so provides. It leans in favor of releasing the accused. Apparently the majority are even dissatisfied with this.
Thus, those remaining pretrial detainees who are confined in jail, and who are the subjects of this litigation are those who, for the most part, it has already been determined are individuals (1) whose appearance at trial would not be reasonably assured if they were released, or whose release would not (2) "reasonably assure the safety of any other person or the community." In other words the individuals who are in jail are those that the judicial process has already determined are likely to flee the jurisdiction or constitute a dangerous threat to some person or to the community.
It thus appears that the population of the jail is already the result of classification by the bail standards. They have been classified by the magistrates and courts. The inmates who are required by the Bail Act to 570*570 be confined are no less dangerous when they are confined. Therefore the jail authorities should not be required, against their judgment, to order contact visits for any group of prisoners that have failed to qualify for release under the very liberal Bail Reform Act of the District of Columbia.

If those responsible for administering the D.C. Jail decide in the interest of better security to run a jail with no contact visits, it is my opinion that such decision is within their competence to make. Since this opinion was written the First Circuit has reached a similar conclusion. Feeley v. Sampson, No. 76-1508, 570 F.2d 364 at 372-373 (1st Cir. January 18, 1978). Recent events have proved that better security is needed at the jail and that contact visits were one of the causes of serious riots and mass jail breaks. Eliminating social contact visits would not be in any way discriminatory, and if the jail is properly constructed so that the risk of official contact visits could be reduced to the bare minimum, that would be a safer way to run the jail than the way the old jail was operated.
However, to my mind the decision is for the executive branch of government, and not for the courts. With the recent unsatisfactory jail incidents, two directly traceable to contact visits, the courts are in no position to second guess the present judgment of the D.C. correctional administrators in desiring tighter security, and the record here does not justify judicial intervention to override the judgment of the local officials. That they chose to tighten their security is commendable. Experience has demonstrated that it needs tightening. In these recent incidents, the jail authorities have found that just one small gun smuggled into the jail can put those in the jail in possession of a whole arsenal of guns and ammunition, and we know from the court records in those cases that contact visits were the cause of some of them. The status of the remand on contact visits thus does not bode well for the future.
All of the foregoing has some bearing on the "security" considerations to be evaluated in the matter. I am not unmindful of the decisions in some of the other districts dealing with this problem. Each one has a local flavor but the District of Columbia has its own special problems, too. We have our own Bail Act which is very liberal and we have our own special local crime problem which has some very serious offenders, and it has not been shown to my satisfaction that it is a violation of inmates' constitutional rights to run a jail in a reasonably secure manner that affords some protection to the public against riots, mass jail breaks and against private citizens being taken hostage.
X. TRANSFER OF INMATES WITH PSYCHIATRIC SYMPTOMS
As for the regulations requiring the treatment and transfer of pretrial detainees with psychiatric symptoms, I agree that they must be given medical attention, but I do not think an order of this court is necessary, and in any order that was issued I would not set a dogmatic 48-hour time limit, which cannot be other than arbitrary. I would also permit a medical doctor or a psychiatrist to see a potential patient within the 24-hour period. Cf. Maj. op., p. ___ of 188 U.S.App.D.C., p. 548 of 580 F.2d. Medical problems of individuals are not conducive to arbitrary handling by mandatory general orders of a court. The problem is difficult enough for doctors, even after personal examinations. Some potential patients require immediate attention and with others it can be deferred a substantial period of time. If I were to set a standard I would fix it at "within a reasonable period" after a finding of mental illness. This would require some patients to be transferred sooner than 48 hours, and for some the transfer could be delayed longer. The necessity for transfer depends upon the condition of the inmate, the availability of facilities, and the nature of the confinement or treatment he requires, and it is not within the province or ability of the judiciary to 571*571

fix an arbitrary time limit that will be proper for all cases. The District has an absolute obligation to an inmate in its custody to furnish medical assistance within a reasonable period after it learns of the necessity therefor, and beyond so stating, I would not impose any fixed time limit. I would not release a mentally ill person if some arbitrary time limit cannot be met.
In my view it is also wholly unnecessary and improper for this court to order a continuing monitoring of medical transfers by requiring a "written report" to the District Court whenever the jail authorities have special cause to deviate from the 48-hour rule. Our attention has not been called to sufficient conduct by defendants that would justify such court intrusion into the exercise of their administrative responsibilities. As with the possibility of future overcrowding the facts do not present a case of sufficient "immediacy and relevancy" to justify declaratory and injunctive relief. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 109, 89 S.Ct. 956, 22 L.Ed.2d 113 (1969). The district court and the majority are overlooking the fact that primarily they have only judicial and not managerial power. They too quickly assume the latter.
XI. CLEAN CLOTHING
As for the order on clean clothing and restraints, the defendants generally conform to the standards stated in the order of the trial court. Therefore, I do not find substantial evidence that defendants have engaged in unconstitutional conduct with respect to such matters, or are likely to do so in the future, and hence I consider the order and the affirmance thereof to exceed the court's jurisdiction.
XII. MISCELLANEOUS
There are a few isolated statements in the majority opinion that should not go unanswered.
A. It is incorrect for the District Court to assert that "there has been no planning for dealing with this problem by the City or the Department." Quoted at Maj. op., p. ___ of 188 U.S.App.D.C., p. 541 of 580 F.2d. Such statement is incorrect. The City and the Department, as early as 1969, and possibly sooner (long before this lawsuit was ever started), began planning to acquire adequate jail facilities. See n.1. The City has also considered the Court's suggested alternatives and cooperated with them to the extent that they were viable. The trouble is most of the court's suggestions were unworkable. See text at ___ - ___ of 188 U.S.App.D.C., at 532-534 of 580 F.2d supra. It is also incorrect to characterize defendants' activities as "resistance." The trouble is the District Court and the majority are attempting to make a whipping boy out of a small group of defendants who have only a limited capacity to deal with the problem. Of course jail capacity should be adequate, but there is no factual showing in this record that present jail capacity and conditions are not presently adequate. No amount of repeating unsubstantiated assertions can supply this deficiency in the record.
B. How it is relevant to this controversy escapes me but the majority assert that those who are released prior to trial "[stand] a better chance of not being convicted or, if convicted, of not receiving a prison sentence." Maj. op., p. ___ of 188 U.S.App.D.C., p. 531 of 580 F.2d.

If that is a correct statement there is nothing remarkable or even noteworthy about it. That is exactly as it should be. The most serious offenders with the strongest evidence against them, with the most serious records, are the persons who are less frequently released and more frequently convicted and sentenced to prison for substantial terms. This is evidence that the standards of the Bail Act are being applied correctly.
C. Footnotes 20 and 21 of the majority opinion assert that pretrial detainees cannot be detained under "`worse conditions than convicted prisoners' within the same penal 572*572 system." Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333, 336 (2d Cir.1974) is cited for the stated proposition. It has some defects. Most prison systems of any size have institutions where prisoners are allowed varying degrees of security and liberty depending on the nature of the prisoner's offense, the duration of his sentence, the time remaining to serve, his prior record and his personal propensities. Thus, there are maximum security institutions, minimal security institutions and facilities where even great freedom is afforded the inmates—even half-way houses where convicted persons are free on their own part of the time. It is absurd to contend, much less hold, that pretrial detainees must be afforded the greatest amount of liberty afforded any convicted person. The "Son of Sam" in jail, prior to trial, should not be given a weekend furlough just because some inmate in prison received one.
Moreover, jail inmates are largely an unknown quantity. Jail officials know comparatively little about the backgrounds and propensity for violence or escape of each inmate. On the other hand, most convicted prisoners have undergone some type of diagnostic or classification procedure upon entry into the prison system, which gives the prison authorities some indication of which inmates will likely be able to handle relatively greater liberty without difficulty and with minimal danger to the public. Jail authorities, inherently unable to obtain equivalent information given the short-term nature of most jail detention, cannot reasonably be expected to give the undifferentiated mass of jail inmates the same degree of liberty accorded to those convicted prisoners deemed most trustworthy.
RESTRAINTS
I concur in that portion of the majority opinion which confines its references concerning the use of restraints on patients to those who are or appear to be, mentally ill. Thus, the prohibition against "unpadded" handcuffs would not prevent the use of normal handcuffs on normal prisoners in circumstances where unpadded handcuffs are normally applied.
CONCLUSION
Appellants have stated that if their position is not affirmed on this appeal they intend to petition the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the case.
The majority have decided part of the case and remanded the record on several very important issues to the trial court for further consideration, including contact visits, recreation, medical examination, and overcrowding and inmate capacity. This fragmentation of the case into two parts places appellants in an awkward position with respect to any petition for certiorari as it might compel their seeking a piecemeal review. In the light of appellants' request, and of the importance that contact visits be considered in the light of all

the other issues, and on the full record, it is suggested, and I would so order, that a stay be granted as to the matters presently decided, until the district court rules on contact visits and the other remanded issues and our decision thereon becomes final. The trial court can act expeditiously on contact visits and the other issues. As I construe the stay orders of the majority this is what is intended thereby.
To the foregoing extent I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority.
[1] Although D.C. statutes provide a number of grounds for committing pretrial detainees to the D.C. Jail, the vast majority are committed in lieu of bond. See note 12 infra. For a comprehensive breakdown of the Jail's population, see notes 22, 31, 34 and 48 infra.
[2] See 416 F.Supp. 100, 106 (D.D.C.1975).
[3] See 416 F.Supp. 111 (D.D.C.1976).
[4] Sullivan v. Murphy, 156 U.S.App.D.C. 28, 52 n.35, 478 F.2d 938, 962 n.35, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880, 94 S.Ct. 162, 38 L.Ed.2d 125 (1973). Cf. Palmore v. Superior Court of Dist. of Columbia, 169 U.S.App.D.C. 323, 515 F.2d 1294 (1975), judgment vacated and remanded for further consideration in light of Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976), 429 U.S. 915, 97 S.Ct. 305, 50 L.Ed.2d 280 (1976).
[5] The Supreme Court has made clear "that the opportunity to avoid decision of a constitutional question does not alone justify abstention by a federal court. . . . Indeed, the presence of a federal basis for jurisdiction may raise the level of justification needed for abstention." Colorado River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 815 n.21, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 1245, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976) (citations omitted).
[6] Contrary to appellants' assertions, plaintiffs could not raise as a defense to the criminal charges pending against them in Superior Court the unconstitutionality of the conditions of their confinement. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 108 n.9, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975).
[7] Only one aspect of the District Court's order could conceivably affect criminal proceedings pending against appellees in the Superior Court. Having given protracted attention to ways of enlarging the Jail's capacity and moving convicted inmates to other facilities, the District Court directed that if overcrowding nevertheless persisted, the appellants should release pretrial detainees beginning with those "held in default of the lowest amount of bail." See note 43 infra. If appellants seriously pursue the alternatives specified by the District Court, there should be no need to resort to this course of action. But even if release of detainees should become necessary, the risk of disruption to Superior Court proceedings seems slight. The District Court's order provides for the release of those who would have been released pending trial but for their ability to make bail. See note 12 infra. Moreover, the District Court specified that the manner of releasing detainees in the event of overcrowding may be revised by the judges of the Superior Court, thus allowing for minimization of disruption to their proceedings. See note 43 infra.
[8] Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975). In that case, pretrial detainees challenged the Florida practice of detaining suspects arrested for noncapital crimes solely on the basis of an information filed by a state prosecutor. Holding that the Fourth Amendment required the state to provide a judicial determination of probable cause before or after arrest, the Supreme Court stated that the "District Court correctly held that the respondents' claim for relief was not barred by the equitable restrictions on federal intervention in state prosecutions . . . ." Id. at 108 n.9, 95 S.Ct. at 860.
[9] Pretrial detainees generally retain more rights than convicted prisoners. See pp. ___-___ of 188 U.S.App.D.C., p. 529 of 580 F.2d infra. Hence, the federal courts' "duty to protect constitutional rights" conceivably may justify more intrusive relief with pretrial detainees than with sentenced inmates. See Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183, 190 (5th Cir. 1971), modified in other respects, 456 F.2d 835, (5th Cir), cert. denied sub nom. Nosser v. Bradley, 409 U.S. 848, 93 S.Ct. 53, 34 L.Ed.2d 89 (1972).
[10] The constitutional standard that must be satisfied before pretrial detention is permitted is the same as that for arrest — "probable cause to believe the suspect has committed a crime." Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 120, 95

S.Ct. 854, 866, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975). Also, of course, pretrial detention may not violate a detainee's "right to bail." Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4, 72 S.Ct. 1, 96 L.Ed. 3 (1951).
[11] Under D.C. law, several categories of suspects may be detained by court order pending trial:
First, a person accused of a noncapital offense who (a) is unable to meet financial conditions of release imposed by a judicial officer to "assure the appearance of the person as required" or (b) is unable to meet nonfinancial conditions imposed for "the safety of any other person or the community." 23 D.C.Code § 1321.
Second, a person accused of certain "dangerous crimes" if the Government certifies that no condition or combination of conditions could be imposed that would "reasonably assure the safety of the community." 23 D.C.Code § 1322(a)(1).
Third, a person who is charged with certain crimes of violence and has a history of such crimes and is found likely to endanger others despite the imposition of conditions. 23 D.C.Code § 1322(a)(2).
Fourth, a person charged with any offense, "if such person, for the purpose of obstructing or attempting to obstruct justice, threatens, injures, intimidates, or attempts to threaten, injure, or intimidate any prospective witness or juror," and if such person is found to endanger others despite the imposition of conditions. 23 D.C.Code § 1322(a)(3).
Fifth, a person charged with any offense who is on probation, parole, or mandatory release pending completion of sentence in any jurisdiction if such person "may flee or pose a danger to any other person or the community if released." 23 D.C.Code § 1322(e).
Sixth, a person charged with a crime of violence who is suspected of being, or found to be, an addict. 23 D.C.Code § 1323.
Seventh, a person charged with a capitol offense who is found likely to flee or pose a danger to others despite the imposition of conditions. 23 D.C.Code § 1325.
[12] We note, however, that in the District of Columbia the government has additional interests in pretrial confinement, such as ensuring the safety of the community or the integrity of the judicial process. See note 11 supra; Cf. Blunt v. United States, 322 A.2d 579 (D.C.App.1974).
Pretrial imprisonment for purposes other than inability to make bail, however, is relatively rare, and, as the Third Circuit has pointed out, "the only legitimate state interest in the detention of an accused who cannot raise bail is in guaranteeing his presence at trial." United States ex rel. Tyrrell v. Speaker, 535 F.2d 823, 827 (3d Cir. 1976). See 23 D.C.Code § 1321(a): "No financial condition may be imposed to assure the safety of any other person or the community."
In the instant case, the District Court found that for the spring of 1976, 90 to 95% of those detained by order of court were held in lieu of bond, the remainder consisting mostly of those sentenced to incarceration at the Jail. See note 22 infra. (And approximately half of these 90-95% were persons charged with misdemeanor offenses. See note 34 infra.) At the time of trial, the Jail held 565 unsentenced inmates. Of these, 83 were detained on no bond because they had been convicted and were awaiting sentencing; 3 were held in default of $100,000 or more bond; 11 were held on bond of $50,000 to $99,000; 180 were held on bond of $5,000 to $49,000; and 288 were held on bond of $4,900 or less. Trial Tr. 1070.
[13] See Detainees of Brooklyn House of Detention for Men v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d 392, 397 (2d Cir. 1975):
Pretrial detainees are no more than defendants waiting for trial, entitled to the presumption of innocence, a speedy trial and all the rights of bailees and other ordinary citizens except those necessary to assure their presence at trial and the security of the prison. In providing for their detention, correctional institutions must be more than mere depositories for human baggage and any deprivation or restriction of the detainees' rights beyond those which are necessary for confinement alone, must be justified by a compelling necessity.
See Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333, 336 (2d Cir. 1974).

[14] There are important reasons why the presumption of innocence should continue to protect a defendant held in pretrial detention. The presumption rests in the first instance on the possibility of mistake inhering in the process of arrest and prosecution. To protect the community from crime, government may arrest a person on a showing of probable cause and incarcerate him until trial for various reasons set by statute. But as the Supreme Court has noted, "[i]n dealing with probable cause . . . we deal with probabilities." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1310, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949). Persons may be detained on evidence less than necessary to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt "[b]ecause many situations which confront officers in the course of executing their duties are more or less ambiguous" and "room must be allowed for some mistakes on their part." Id. at 176, 69 S.Ct. at 1311. Despite the oversight of a neutral judicial officer, the chance of error persists because the determination of probable cause need not be made in an adversary proceeding with the safeguards of appointed counsel and crossexamination of witnesses. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 122-23, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975); 23 D.C.Code § 561(a)(1). Although the dissent argues that "[u]nder the existing Bail Reform Act of the District of Columbia (D.C.Code § 23-1324), accused persons who should not be detained in jail pretrial are not detained," dissenting op. at ___ of 188 U.S.App.D.C., at 568 of 580 F.2d, we feel constrained to point out that the record demonstrates that nearly all of the unconvicted pretrial detainees who constitute the plaintiffs in this case are in jail for the reason that they cannot afford bail. See note 12 supra.
Finally, it is important to note that if the presumption of innocence is to be respected by judge and jury in the courtroom, it must be treated as an article of faith by all of society outside the courtroom as well. Without widespread acceptance of the presumption of innocence, we have less hope that juries will not take indictments as sufficient proof of guilt and that acquittals will wash the taint from the reputation of the mistakenly accused.
[15] Even without the stigma of conviction, however, pretrial detention may permanently damage the detainee's reputation.
[16] The rule rests on the Supreme Court's holding in Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970), that a prisoner may not be confined for more than the maximum period of imprisonment provided by statute because he fails to pay a fine by reason of indigency. Although Williams rested on an equal protection rationale, it first had to adopt the premise that default imprisonment was in fact "a part of the punishment" exacted by statute. Id. at 240, 243-44, 90 S.Ct. 2018. The doctrine that the total of pre- and post-trial imprisonment cannot exceed the statutory maximum implicitly must adopt the same premise.
A number of circuits, however, have begun to expand the doctrine, some by crediting pretrial detention although the total period of pre- and post-trial incarceration does not exceed the maximum possible sentence, see Faye v. Gray, 541 F.2d 665 (7th Cir. 1976); King v. Wyrick, 516 F.2d 321 (8th Cir. 1975), others by crediting pretrial detention for non-bailable offenses. See Vickers v. Haynes, 539 F.2d 1005 (4th Cir. 1976).
[17] The memorandum was based upon a statistical study of 857 defendants. The study found that:
Those who stay in jail for lack of bail money are much more often convicted and, when convicted, go to prison more often and get much longer prison sentences than those who make bail. More significantly, however, even when factors which are specified in the Criminal Procedure Law as relevant to bail and which might be thought to affect the outcome — such as the seriousness of the charge, prior criminal record, weight of the evidence, amount of bail, community ties and employment history — are held constant, there is still a large disparity in results between the detained and the released. The study shows that pre-trial detention itself causes the detained to be more often convicted and to be sentenced more severely than the released.
[18] For an example of such a condition, see Dillard v. Pitchess, 399 F.Supp. 1225, 1236 (C.D.Cal. 1975).
[19] This is in accordance with the directive of the Supreme Court that, "Where the State seeks to impose punishment without . . . an adjudication [of guilt], the pertinent constitutional guarantee is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 1413, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977). It also preserves the essential insight that pretrial incarceration is virtually indistinguishable from post-trial imprisonment, cf. id. at 669-71, 97 S.Ct. 1401, and therefore that the same constitutional standards should apply to both as a measurement of cruel and unusual punishment.
[20] The Second Circuit has held that equal protection forbids "unjustifiable confinement of detainees under worse conditions than convicted prisoners" within the same penal system. Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333, 336 (2d Cir. 1974).

[21] The court stated:
This Court measures the claims in this case by the standards utilized by the courts in such cases as Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333 (2nd Cir. 1974); Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F.Supp. 128 (N.D.Cal.1972); Jones v. Wittenburg, 323 F.Supp. 93 (D.C.) and 330 F.Supp. 707 (N.D.Ohio 1971); Hamilton v. Love, 328 F.Supp. 1182 (E.D.Ark.1971). The Court in Rhem, supra, put it succinctly and in precise terms:
"The demands of equal protection of the law and of due process prohibit depriving pre-trial detainees of rights of other citizens to a greater extent than necessary to assure appearance at trial and security of the jail; and the same constitutional provisions prevent unjustifiable confinement of detainees under worse conditions than convicted prisoners . . . a detainee is entitled to protection from cruel and unusual punishment as a matter of due process, and, where relevant, equal protection."
416 F.Supp. 100, 105.
[22] The District Court found that the following rough breakdown applied to the 2868 prisoners admitted to the Jail during the 10-week period from mid-January to mid-April 1976:
New Admissions
(60% of total) ______________________________________ (1720)
Committed by courts (80% of New Admissions) ___________________________ (1376)
Committed by courts in lieu of bond (90-95% of those committed by courts) ____________________________ (1238-1307)
Committed by courts pursuant to sentence of incarceration (5-10% of those committed by courts) _____________________________________ (69-138)
Committed by Immigration and Naturalization Service, by U.S. Marshal, or on writs of habeas corpus (20% of New Admissions) _________________________ (344)
Recommits
(40% of total) ____________________________________ (1147)
All recommits are sentenced and held at the Jail because of the administrative decisions and priorities of the Department of Corrections.
These figures are based on the approximate percentages given in the District Court's May 24, 1976 memorandum. See 416 F.Supp. at 112-13.
The District Court found that at the time of trial, the defendants held the following categories of sentenced inmates at the Jail:
a) all misdemeanants serving sentences;

b) sentenced inmates from District Court awaiting designation of a Federal Bureau of Prisons institution for service of sentence, or awaiting transportation to such Federal institution after designation;
c) sentenced inmates from Superior Court where designation to a Federal Bureau of Prisons institution has been recommended by the sentencing judge, pending action on that recommendation and transportation to the institution;
d) inmates within three months of their parole eligibility date at time of sentence;
e) inmates within six months of their release date at time of sentence;
f) inmates on work release charged with violation of their work release conditions, pending review by the Work Release Review Board;
g) inmates charged with parole violations, pending their preliminary parole revocation hearing;
h) sentenced inmates for whom a court orders protection and/or separation from other inmates;
i) sentenced inmates whom the Department wishes to segregate from other residents at the Lorton Complex for protective reasons;
j) sentenced inmates assigned to the "Captain's Detail" (work crew) at the Jail;
k) inmates brought to the Jail pursuant to writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum or ad testificandum;
l) inmates sentenced under the Youth Corrections Act to evaluations pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 5010(e), after completion of the evaluation and pending final imposition of sentence.
416 F.Supp. at 102-03.
[23] See note 31 infra.
[24] This consent order, which was amended on January 11, 1972 and on April 17, 1974, also provided that (1) defendants would not impede plaintiffs' counsel from conferring with them; (2) defendants would not retaliate against plaintiffs; (3) defendants would not use segregation cells except under emergency conditions and with an immediate hearing after notification of the inmate's attorney; (4) defendants would provide a bed and mattress to each inmate; (5) defendants would provide food on a uniform basis to all inmates except for medical reasons; (6) defendants would take steps to reduce the extremes of temperature in various parts of the Jail; and (7) defendants would immediately relay inmates' requests to see their attorneys.
[25] The docket indicates that plaintiffs filed motions to show cause why defendants should not be held in contempt for violation of the consent order on April 27, 1972, on October 17, 1972, and on November 15, 1972. The first motion resulted in a hearing, for which the docket notes: "Finding: violations of order of January 11, 1972, by defendants." The second and third motions were denied by the District Court.
In addition, the trial transcript contains extensive testimony about the deficiencies of the Jail's medical services, including criticisms from the Jail's doctor and the Chairman of the Prison Health Committee of the D.C. Medical Society. Trial Tr. 776-809, 908-17. Several witnesses attributed these deficiencies to the administrative structure of the medical department. Trial Tr. 939-60.
[26] See note 55 infra.
[27] See, e. g., Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388 (10th Cir. 1977) (ordering defendants to reduce overcrowding in correctional facilities); Detainees of Brooklyn House of Detention for Men v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d 392, 398-99 (2d Cir. 1975) (ordering defendants to cease double-celling detainees, if necessary by releasing them); Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Hall v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 419 U.S. 977, 95 S.Ct. 239, 42 L.Ed.2d 189 (1974) (ordering state Commissioner of Corrections to transfer detainees out

of overcrowded county jail); Costello v. Wainwright, 397 F.Supp. 20 (M.D.Fla.1975) (ordering release of convicted prisoners to bring state prison system down to capacity levels), aff'd, 525 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir.), remanded for 3-judge court, 539 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc), reversed and remanded on issue of 3-judge court, 430 U.S. 325, 97 S.Ct. 1191, 51 L.Ed.2d 372 (1977), on remand, 553 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc) (panel opinion otherwise reinstated).
Like the District Court in this case, these and other courts have recognized that overcrowding and double-celling are often prime causes of the tension, sexual assaults, denial of privacy, inadequate supervision and medical care, and the many other indignities and constitutional violations that characterize so many jails and prisons.
[28] Paragraph 3 of the District Court's order of March 21, 1975, provided that "after 15 days from the date of this order defendants shall refrain from housing any pre-trial detainee of plaintiffs' class in any cell, room or dormitory where there is an average of less than 48 square feet per person." J.A. at 101-02. On April 4 we stayed paragraph 3 of the District Court's order "for the purpose of maintaining the status quo while the matter is under consideration . . . ." Oral arguments were held on April 25. Appellants alleged that it was "impossible to abate the violation in the brief period accorded them." Memorandum Opinion, May 2, 1975, at 2. On May 2, we continued in effect the temporary stay of April 4 ("modified however to make clear that appellants are obligated to continue to take steps toward compliance with the substance of the March 21, 1975 order"), and remanded the record "for further proceedings designed to clarify the central question of the feasibility of compliance . . . ." Id.
In a Memorandum Opinion dated November 5, 1975, the District Court rejected appellants' defense that compliance was infeasible. 416 F.Supp. 106. On December 23, appellees moved to vacate the April 4 stay. However, at oral arguments on January 12, 1976, appellants represented to this court that the Jail was presently in compliance with the March 21 order. Memorandum Opinion, Feb. 6, 1976, at 2. We therefore declined to vacate our stay (as modified by our May 2 order). We stated, however, that:
If overcrowding should recur, notwithstanding the District's best efforts and representations in this court, plaintiffs may again seek vacation of the stay. At that time the parties should first proceed in District Court, and should address, and the District Court should make a record and specific findings on, the following issues:
(1) the extent of overcrowding, (2) the District's attempt to avoid and to alleviate the overcrowding, (3) suggestions for what further actions the District should take, including the seeking out of alternative facilities, and (4) specifically, whether the jail's officials should be ordered not to accept new inmates.
The proceeding can then be returned to this court for consideration whether to vacate or modify the stay.
[29] The trial court heard uncontradicted testimony from Donald Conway, Director of Research at the American Institute of Architects, comparing this 48 square feet requirement with various groups' space requirements. The LEAA standard was 70 square feet per single-celled inmate, the U. S. Bureau of Prisons allotted 80 to 100 square feet, and the Army required 70 square feet for indefinite confinement or 55 square feet for confinement up to 14 days. Trial Tr. at 287-88. The Chief of Facilities Development for the Federal Bureau of Prisons testified that without 50 square feet of space for an inmate to move about in (excluding the space occupied by furniture), the cell cannot be considered safe, fit for habitation, or conducive to achieving penological objectives. Id. at 879-82. He also testified that more space would be needed in a detention facility than in a prison, assuming the detainees spent more time in their cells. Id. at 894. See id. at 113-14. At Cellblocks 1 and 2, cells were each 48 square feet. See id. at 1229. See Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206, 1214-15 (5th Cir. 1977).
[30] On April 25, the Department of Corrections had represented to this court that compliance with the 48 square foot requirement was "impossible." See note 28 supra. Delbert Jackson, Director of the Department, had testified before the District Court on April 1 that the Department had "reached the ultimate" in its efforts to comply with the March 21 order. 416 F.Supp. at 107.
[31] At the same time, a "substantial number" of the sentenced prisoners were either housed alone in a 6-feet-by-8feet cell or were housed in a dormitory where they had at least 48 square feet each. 416 F.Supp. 107. The defendants' May 16 report had promised that all unsentenced detainees would be given single-cell housing or 48 square feet of dormitory space ahead of any sentenced inmates.
On August 4, 1975, the total population of the Jail was 882. Of these, 584 were unsentenced, 225 were sentenced, and 43 were held on writs of habeas corpus or in connection with a pending appeal. Of the 584 unsentenced inmates,

a study by the defendants revealed that 63% had been held at the Jail longer than 30 days and more than 20% had been held their longer than four months. 416 F.Supp. at 107.
[32] The court was advised that the Jail's capacity had been increased by two methods: "(a) the capacity had been recomputed to include lavatory and hallway space in some housing areas, so that although no physical changes had been made to the structure of the Jail, the Department now felt that a larger number of persons could be housed in the same space as before without violating their right to 48 square feet per man; (b) `emergency funds' in excess of $10,000 had been made available by the Mayor's Office, which would enable the Jail to convert an area not previously used for housing to a dormitory." 416 F.Supp. at 108.
[33] See note 28 supra.
[34] The court made the following findings about the Jail's population:
During the aforementioned ten-week period, 2868 men were admitted to the Jail, approximately 60% categorized by the Department of Corrections as "New Admissions" and approximately 40% as "Recommits." The vast majority of New Admissions (approximately 80%), according to records of the Department, are persons committed to custody by the courts, either in lieu of bond while awaiting trial or pursuant to a sentence of incarceration. Approximately 90-95% of the New Admissions committed by the courts are committed in lieu of bond. . . .
Perhaps more significant is the fact that of those New Admissions who were received from the courts, 90-95% of whom (as previously stated) were in a pre-trial status, approximately half were persons charged with misdemeanor offenses, confined in lieu of bail. While the weekly summaries prepared by the Department of Corrections of admissions during this ten-week period include persons charged with robbery, homicide, burglary and other serious felonies, the number of persons committed as a result of charges for such relatively minor offenses as tampering with an auto, attempted petit larceny, destroying property, etc. is striking. Indeed, during the ten-week period studied, 140 individuals were committed for traffic offenses.
For those persons held at the Jail awaiting Superior Court trials, approximately twelve weeks intervene between initial arraignment and trial if the charge is a misdemeanor. If the defendant is charged with a felony, more than seven weeks will elapse between arrest and indictment, followed by eight to ten weeks before conviction, acquittal or dismissal, and an additional four weeks for sentencing for those who are convicted.
The "Recommit" category, the source of approximately 40% of the admissions to the Jail, are all sentenced individuals who are held at the Jail almost exclusively because of the administrative decisions and priorities of the Department of Corrections. (A small number in this class is held because of specific court order, usually founded on concern for the individual's safety if housed at the Lorton Correctional Complex.) No reasons, apart from the Department's and the City's funding priorities, exist to justify or require continued housing of most of these individuals at the Jail.
416 F.Supp. at 112-13. The court found that as of April 30, there were 1243 males housed in the Jail.
[35] See notes 28 & 30, pp. ___-___ of 188 U.S.App.D.C., pp. 536-537 of 580 F.2d supra. We suggested possible avenues of compliance:
[W]e contemplate that the Department and its counsel will seek the cooperation of the Chief Judges of the District Court and the Superior Court as well as the United States Attorney and the D.C. Bail Agency in an effort to explore ways to stem or divert the flow of new pretrial detainees into the jail and reduce the number of sentenced prisoners housed there. Furthermore, we presume that consultations with the designees of the Attorney General, who can e. g. expedite removal of Federal prisoners who have been sentenced, with the Mayor's Office, and other agencies of local and Federal government will permit consideration of other avenues for alleviating this temporary problem, and provide the type of cooperation necessary for a collective solution. The dimensions of the problem may require consideration of unusual remedies, perhaps even, e. g., modifications of unused barracks at service installations.
[36] The court cited the following evidence of the defendants' lack of effort:
At the August 7 hearing, Charles M. Rodgers, the Assistant Director of Operations of the Department of Corrections, and the man specifically charged by the Director with the responsibility for compliance with this Court's Order of

March 21, admitted that although he was familiar with that Order and with the Order issued by the United States Court of Appeals on May 2, 1975, he had nevertheless made no efforts to consult with the Chief Judges of the two trial courts in this jurisdiction, nor with the District of Columbia Bail Agency, as contemplated by the order of the Court of Appeals. Similarly, although the Department's report filed with this Court on May 16 stated that the Department would convert recreation space at the Jail to afford additional housing, Mr. Rodgers admitted that he had no intent to do so, and had no such intent at the time the report was filed with the Court.
As of August 7, no system had been established by the Department to determine whether or not the Jail was complying with the 48-square feet requirement; no consultation with the courts had been undertaken to attempt to expedite the sentencing of convicted individuals being held at the Jail awaiting sentencing; and, although this Court's Order applied only to pre-conviction detainees, no effort had been made to identify that class of persons as distinguished from those already convicted but awaiting sentencing.
During the course of the August 7 hearing, at the suggestion of this Court's Deputy Clerk, a simple method of identifying the plaintiff class was suggested to officials of the Department. This "reform," which involved a minor change in the Superior Court and District Court Clerks' offices' method of processing commitment papers, was subsequently put into effect, and as of August 18, the Jail has been able to identify the plaintiff class.
While some efforts were made by lower-level Department employees to reduce the population of the Jail, these efforts did not have a substantial impact on the crowding problem.
416 F.Supp. at 107-08.
[37] In its November 5 memorandum, the District Court cited the substantial success of two previous efforts to obtain the release of pretrial detainees largely through the filing of bond review motions, but then criticized the City for failing to maintain these sporadic efforts on a regular basis. The Court also noted that the City had allowed the Bail Agency to become understaffed, thereby preventing it from monitoring the pretrial detainee population as required by 23 D.C.Code § 1303(h)(6). 416 F.Supp. at 109-10.
[38] According to the parties' stipulation, "Delbert C. Jackson, Director, District of Columbia Department of Corrections, has the authority to determine where a sentenced inmate will be held within the Department of Corrections, except in cases where a court specifically orders an inmate held in a specific institution."
In its November 5 memorandum, 416 F.Supp. at 106, the court cited several examples of the defendants' failure to expedite the transfer of sentenced inmates out of the Jail, including (1) their lack of a system for separating "unsentenced" inmates into "pretrial" and "convicted-but-unsentenced" categories ("there is no compelling reason why convicted felons must remain at the Jail pending sentence"); (2) their failure to ask the Attorney General to exercise his authority under 24 D.C.Code § 425 "to order the transfer of any [convicted prisoner committed to his custody] from one institution to another if, in his judgment, it shall . . . relieve overcrowding or unhealthful conditions in the institution where such prisoner is confined"; and (3) their failure to urge the U.S. Marshal to move prisoners designated for other institutions in less time than three or four weeks.
In its May 24, 1976 Memorandum, 416 F.Supp. at 115-17, the District Court listed additional alternatives not pursued by the defendants, including (1) requesting Judge Gesell to modify the population limits he imposed on Lorton Youth Centers 1 and 2, so that persons who are sent there for diagnostic studies under 18 U.S.C. § 5010(e) may be kept there afterwards rather than being returned to the Jail; (2) requesting judges to authorize that persons whose § 5010(e) studies do not recommend Youth Act sentences be held at the Lorton Adult Facility pending imposition of sentence; (3) housing sentenced misdemeanants at the under-capacity Minimum Security Facility at Lorton instead of at the Jail for serving of their sentences; (4) recommending that more misdemeanants serve their sentences in the Department's Community, Correctional Centers per 24 D.C.Code § 462; (5) following up on requests to the Parole Board and U.S. Marshal to remove parole violators held at the Jail; (6) seeking the consent of misdemeanants to allow their transfer from the Jail to the Maximum Security or Central Facilities at Lorton; (7) continuing to request judges to permit "weekend prisoners" to serve their time in halfway houses; and (8) ceasing to hold sentenced Superior Court felons at the Jail while awaiting the Bureau of Prisons' response to a recommendation for a federal prison assignment.
[39] In its November 1975 and May 1976 memoranda, the court found that the Department had failed to use portable housing units available to the City and used successfully by other state prison systems. The court also noted that "no substantial efforts have been made by the Department to locate alternative housing facilities within the District of

Columbia or at the Lorton Complex." In response to the defendants' contention that security could not be assured at such facilities, the Court recited that the former superintendent of the Jail had admitted that very few Jail inmates required maximum security. "[T]he notion that many of the sentenced misdemeanants, whose presence adds substantially to the overcrowding at the Jail, cannot safely be held in less secure facilities has never been satisfactorily explained by the Department." 416 F.Supp. at 117.
[40] For a description of the NDF, see p. ___ of 188 U.S.App.D.C., pp. 535-536 of 580 F.2d supra.
[41] In its May 24, 1976 memorandum, the court stated: "[T]he prospects for sufficient staff to operate the Dormitory facilities are not good. If sufficient staff is unavailable, inmates will be crowded into Cell Blocks 3 and 4." 416 F.Supp. at 114.
The defendants have also proposed to renovate the 36-cell facility formerly used for alcoholics at Occoquan, although that work was still unscheduled as of the April 29 hearing.
[42] Tr. 30 Apr. 1976, at 263-64. Leroy Anderson, Chief of the Office of Planning and Programming Analysis, testified that these projections were "consistently 29 per cent under actual." Id. at 262.
[43] The order also provided that if overcrowding recurred, defendants were to release "those pre-trial detainees held in default of the lowest amount of bail, and among those detainees held in the same amount of bail those held for the longest time, until compliance with [the May 24] Order is obtained . . . ." Attached is the proviso that "if the Board of Judges of the Superior Court, or the Chief Judge thereof, specify a different method of selecting the persons to be released, the defendants shall be governed accordingly." 416 F.Supp. at 117. Chief Judge Greene of the Superior Court had already taken special steps to facilitate compliance with the District Court's March 1975 order. See Chief Judge Greene's Memorandum to the Judges, dated March 25, 1975, ordering expedited consideration of bail review motions.
[44] George Holland, the Superintendent of Detention Services for the District, and defendants' own witness, testified that 960 was the maximum capacity of the new facility:
THE COURT: Now, when you run over capacity, you can't have them in the jail, can you? You can't have them in the new jail. As I gather it, you are situated so that when you get to 960, you have a full house.
THE WITNESS: We have a full house. And when I get to approximately 400 or 500 in the old facility, I have a full house.
At that point the question of what to do — where to put them is an unanswered question.
THE COURT: You don't entertain any notion of putting them in that new facility, do you?
THE WITNESS: Putting what in the new facility?
THE COURT: Anybody beyond 960.
THE WITNESS: No, sir. We don't. There would be no space.
Tr. 29 Apr. 1976, at 94.
[45] Defense counsel's restraint arose out of a concern that, although the capacity of the NDF could be increased substantially "[i]f we were pushed to the wall," if the maximum capacity was announced "certain . . . forces in this city which, if they learn about the maximum capacity figures with the old and new facilities combined, might very well try to push it over that as well." "Some people," defense counsel continued, "want to have more people committed to jail pretrial and what have you, and are just looking for an excuse to say, `Well, they have the space now. Let's get them in there.'" Tr. 29 Apr. 1976, at 95. Defense counsel's observations led to the exchange cited by the dissent:
THE COURT: You don't want to advertise the top figure no matter what it is.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Right.
THE COURT: I am not interested in advertising it either . . .
Dissenting op. at ___ of 188 U.S.App.D.C., at 560 of 580 F.2d.
[46] We emphasize that the defendants in this lawsuit are, as the dissent recognizes, those persons "who administer the jail facilities that the government has provided for the District of Columbia . . . ." Dissenting op. at ___ of 188 U.S.App.D.C., at 555 of 580 F.2d. The suit was not directed, as the dissent seems to imply, at the physical stones of the old Jail, id. at ___ of 188 U.S.App.D.C., at 554 of 580 F.2d, but at the policies through which these defendants operated the Jail facilities.
[47] The first paragraph of the order required various health and safety inspections per D.C.Code provisions and Jail regulations. This part of the order has already been carried out and is not challenged by defendants on appeal.
[48] On February 6, 1976, we temporarily stayed paragraph 3 in its application to medical patients, work crew, and maximum security inmates. Finding the parties in agreement that paragraph 3 was not intended to cover the first two categories, we remanded the record for further examination of the feasibility of outdoor recreation for maximum security inmates. The District Court then held hearings on April 29 and 30, after which it issued the following conclusions:
1) No evidence was presented to the Court as to any dangers or risks involved in providing outside recreation to maximum security prisoners. In fact, at least two of defendants' agents testified that outside recreation for maximum security prisoners was possible. George Holland, administrator of the new jail, testified that recreation for maximum security prisoners was not a security problem but a matter of developing the appropriate schedules.
2) Moreover there was no evidence presented which would indicate that defendants do not have the personnel or facilities to provide outdoor exercise to prisoners held in maximum security.
3) On the average there are 136 prisoners on deadlock at the District of Columbia Jail. Of that number Department of Corrections officials estimate that 60 to 65 percent are pre-trial prisoners, five to ten percent are convicted prisoners awaiting sentencing, and 25 to 35 percent are sentenced prisoners. Department of Corrections officials also estimate that 20 percent of the prisoners held in deadlock are there by court order, 70 percent are there for their own protection, five percent are there at the prosecuting attorney's request, and one to ten percent are there as a result of disciplinary procedures instituted by the jail officials.
4) On the average, pre-trial maximum security prisoners who are charged with felonies in Superior Court spend eight to ten weeks in jail prior to their trial, and an average of four weeks between conviction and sentencing. Prisoners charged with felonies and tried in District Court spend an average of eight to ten weeks between conviction and sentencing. Prisoners charged with misdemeanors and tried in Superior Court stay in jail an average of twelve weeks prior to trial and two weeks between conviction and sentencing. (These statistics are based on court records and are applicable to all prisoners.) The Department of Corrections is unable to determine how long sentenced prisoners remain in maximum security.
5) Prisoners in orientation at Lorton get outside recreation three times a day three days a week and twice a day two days a week.
6) Maximum security prisoners at Lorton receive one hour of outdoor exercise five days a week.
7) At the old Jail maximum security prisoners are not receiving any outdoor exercise.
8) Juveniles at the District of Columbia Jail now receive one hour of outdoor exercise daily. This new practice will continue to be the policy in the future.
9) The new jail has facilities for both indoor and outdoor exercise for all prisoners. Maximum security prisoners at the new jail are presently getting one-half hour of indoor exercise daily. The administrator of the new jail is presently

developing recreation plans for the new jail and intends to give maximum security prisoners at that facility outdoor exercise.
416 F.Supp. at 118.
[49] See e. g., Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d 741, 749-51 (5th Cir. 1977); Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F.Supp. 594, 627 (S.D.N.Y.), affirmed and remanded, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974); Alberti v. Sheriff of Harris County, 406 F.Supp. 649, 677 (S.D.Tex.1975); Sinclair v. Henderson, 331 F.Supp. 1123, 1129-31 (E.D.La.1971); Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F.Supp. 707, 717 (N.D.Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
[50] The District Court also may have been relying upon an equal protection rationale. Convicted inmates at Lorton are provided outdoor recreation. See note 48 supra. Whether this difference constitutes a violation of equal protection, however, depends upon a careful analysis of the disparate functions and purposes of the two institutions, see McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270-73, 93 S.Ct. 1055, 35 L.Ed.2d 282 (1973), an analysis we cannot perform given the present state of the record. The District Court found only that:
The quality of life for members of the class is substantially inferior to that enjoyed by convicted prisoners housed at other facilities of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections. . . . The differences in treatment between sentenced prisoners at Lorton and pre-trial detainees at the Jail are not attributable to the needs of security or custody, but are for the most part due to the overcrowding at the Jail and the Department's decisions on the allocation of resources.
416 F.Supp. at 104. The court did not inquire, for example, whether the difference was attributable to the rehabilitative functions of the penitentiary at Lorton.
[51] The quality, duration and location of recreation constitutionally required must of course be determined with reference to the administrative necessities of the Jail. The District Court determined that the provision of outdoor recreational opportunities for maximum security prisoners "was not a security problem," and that "there was no evidence presented which would indicate that defendants do not have the personnel or facilities to provide outdoor exercise to prisoners held in maximum security." See note 48 supra. The court made no findings, however, about the administrative complexities surrounding the quality and duration of possible recreational opportunities, nor about whether administrative necessity prohibited the provision of outdoor recreation to prisoners not held in maximum security. On remand the court should clarify these issues.
[52] After the District Court issued its November 1975 order, the defendants sought a stay from this court on the ground that plexiglass barriers were about to be installed in the visiting room of the new facility. On February 6, 1976, we denied defendants' motion, stating:
Installation of plexiglass at the new jail does not violate the order as written. Should the order be extended to require contact visits at the new jail, the expenses associated with a later dismantling of the plexiglass system previously installed there could not rise to the level of irreparable injury.
Both parties indicated interest in early resolution of contact visits. If they join in a willingness to submit that issue on the merits, we will entertain a motion to sever that issue from the rest of the case and to handle the appeal on an expedited basis after the filing of supplemental briefs on that point.
No such agreement among the parties was ever reached. Shortly thereafter, Chief Justice Burger stayed this paragraph pending final resolution of this issue by the Court of Appeals. Defendants then proceeded to install the plexiglass partitions at the new Jail.
Later, at the April 29, 1976 hearing, an official of the Department testified that the rotunda at the old Jail was too dilapidated to be repaired and that the visiting area of the old Jail would be moved "into the record section in the administrative wing of the old jail." Tr. 57. The Department's plans at that time called for installation of plexiglass barriers to prevent contact visiting.
[53] The need for a classification system for maximum security designations is explained at pages ___-___ of 188 U.S.App.D.C., at page 534 of 580 F.2d, supra.

[54] The reference to contact visits here is somewhat ambiguous. Arguably, it refers only to the classification of inmates for the Captain's Detail. At trial, Anderson, McGruder, Superintendent of Detention Services, testified that contact visits were allowed for Captain's Detail prisoners as an inducement. He stated that with these inmates, the jail staff was willing to take a "calculated risk," but that he had made no attempt up until then to determine whether other inmates justified the same risk. Trial Tr. 1024-25(A).
[55] At the April 29, 1976 hearing, a Department official testified that prior to being transferred to the new facility, inmates had already been given security classifications at the old Jail. Tr. 89. When asked the basis for these classifications and the selection of inmates to be transferred first, the witness replied: "We used a computer printout and looked at the offenses that the man had, and the time they had to serve. Medical condition was another thing we looked at and the emotional stability, and the general knowledge that the staff had of those men and the conditions that existed in terms of overcrowding." Tr. 67.
[56] See note 52 supra.
[57] Other courts that have considered the question have found the elemental human right of physical contact with one's family and friends — the embracing of a loved one, the holding of a child — to outweigh any unavoidable threat to institutional security. See, e. g., Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d 741, 748-49 (5th Cir. 1977); Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333, 338-39 (2d Cir. 1974); 527 F.2d 1041, 1043 (2d Cir. 1975); Detainees of Brooklyn House of Detention v. Malcolm, 421 F.Supp. 832 (E.D.N.Y.1976); Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F.Supp. 676, 690 (D.Mass.1973), aff'd, 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Hall v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 419 U.S. 977, 95 S.Ct. 239, 42 L.Ed.2d 189 (1974); Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F.Supp. 707, 717 (N.D.Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972). But see Feeley v. Sampson, No. 76-1508, 570 F.2d 364 at 372373 (1st Cir. 1978).
[58] Because of our disposition of this aspect of the District Court's order, we deny appellees and appellants permission to file supplemental memoranda on the question of the necessity of contact visits.
[59] On December 23, 1975, the District Court modified paragraph 6 to make clear that transfer of sentenced inmates to the hospital must meet the requirements of D.C.Code § 24-302. The court added the following notation:
Defendants shall comply with the requirements of 24 D.C.Code § 302, as modified by Matthews v. Hardy, 137 U.S.App.D.C. 39, 420 F.2d 607, in effecting the involuntary transfer of a sentenced prisoner under this paragraph.
After the Court of Appeals refused to stay this paragraph, Chief Justice Burger temporarily stayed it pending completion of this appeal.
[60] At trial, plaintiffs' counsel read from the medical records of two inmates who had committed suicide at the Jail. One was charged with a traffic violation and was being held at the Jail in protective custody until space was available at St. Elizabeths. After waiting three days for transfer, he hanged himself. The other was recommended for immediate transfer to St. Elizabeths. Seven days later he was still at the Jail and hanged himself. Counsel indicated that these were only two examples of inmates known to have psychiatric disorders who had committed suicide. See Trial Tr. 982-88. In addition, excerpts from inmates' medical records were read at trial, indicating that seriously disturbed detainees are regularly held at the Jail for weeks before and/or after their examination at St. Elizabeths. Trial Tr. 90407, 1037-41. See also Trial Tr. 933-39.
[61] Defendants do not oppose the requirement that an apparently ill patient be seen by a psychiatrist within 24 hours; they object only to the 48-hour transfer requirement.
[62] Defendants also argue that transfer of a prisoner from one place of detention to another falls "within the traditional core of habeas corpus," and therefore "any related relief must at least be initially sought on the local judicial level as an essential prerequisite to the exercise of federal jurisdiction . . . [under] D.C.Code, 1973 § 11921(a)(3)(A)(iii), and § 16-1901." Brief for appellants at 24-25. Defendants rely on Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973), which holds that claims going to the fact or duration of imprisonment, as opposed to the conditions of imprisonment, have as their sole federal remedy habeas corpus with its attendant requirement of exhaustion of state remedies. Defendants also cite cases from the Fifth Circuit holding that habeas lies when prisoners seek transfer from places of more punitive to less punitive conditions of confinement (e. g., from solitary confinement to general incarceration) because this transfer goes to "the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment." see, e. g., Krist v. Ricketts, 504 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1974). Whatever our views on the type of transfers

addressed by the Fifth Circuit, we believe that transfers to a nonpunishment mental health unit of the D.C. correctional system involve "conditions of confinement" rather than "[the very] fact or duration of . . . physical imprisonment," and thus do not come solely within the category of habeas corpus, although habeas may afford alternative relief for inmates challenging this condition of their confinement. See 411 U.S. at 499, 93 S.Ct. 1827. Accordingly, exhaustion of remedies in Superior Court is not required as a prerequisite to federal relief.
[63] We must with some sadness, however, note the conclusion of a recent decision which, after surveying the "legion" of recent cases concerned with the conditions of pretrial detention, observed that conditions were "barbaric": "[W]e cannot escape awareness that conditions in many pretrial detention centers have shocked the conscience of courts across the nation." Pugh v. Rainwater, 557 F.2d 1189, 1191-93 & n. 6 (5th Cir.), petition for reconsideration en banc granted, 562 F.2d 362 (5th Cir.1977).
[64] As Chief Justice Burger has observed in a speech to the National Conference of Christians and Jews (Nov. 16, 1972):
This, in essence, is what every penal institution must have—the means of having complaints reach decision-making sources through established channels so that the valid grievances can be remedied and spurious grievances exposed.
quoted in J. Keating, Jr., V. McArthur, M. Lewis, K. Sebelius, and L. Singer, Grievance Mechanisms in Correctional Institutions 4 (Law Enforcement Assistance Administration 1975). The tentative draft of the ABA's Criminal Justice Section Project on Standards Relating to the Legal Status of Prisoners states unambiguously that "Prisoners should be guaranteed effective exercise of the right to petition for redress of grievances." See 14 Am.Crim.L.Rev. at 569-89 (1977). For a survey of grievance procedures presently in operation, see Comptroller General of the United States, Grievance Mechanisms in State Correctional Institutions and Large-City Jails, June 17, 1977 (B-171019).
[65] A recent study of the ward grievance procedures at the California Youth Authority found that, of a total of 1,496 grievances filed between September 1973 and April 1975, "only 28 grievances, 2 percent of the total, needed outside arbitration to produce a settlement." National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Controlled Confrontation: The Ward Grievance Procedure of the California Youth Authority 5, 11 (1976). See Keating, The Justice Model Applied: A New Way to Handle the Complaints of California Youth Authority Awards, 10 Loy.L.A.L.Rev. 126, 147 (1976):
As of early 1976, the percentage of cases appealed to outside review had fallen to one percent. The type of issue submitted to arbitration has varied widely, running from a dispute over medical care provided to an individual grievant to one ward's claim of a constitutional right to display politically unpopular paraphernalia in his room. As of March 1, 1976, not a single disposition of a grievance under the procedure had been taken to either a state or federal court. (Footnotes omitted.)
[66] For example, a study of the ward grievance procedures of the California Youth Authority found that "in 69.2 percent of grievances submitted, the relief requested by the grievant was granted in whole or in part." Keating, supra note 65, at 147. See M. Keating, Jr., Improved Grievance Procedures: A Technical Assistance Manual 245 (Center for Community Justice 1976).
Grievance procedures will also help to defuse the potential for violence within the jail. See, e. g. National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals 57 (1973):
A formal procedure to insure that offenders' grievances are fairly resolved should alleviate much of the existing tension within institutions.... Peaceful avenues for redress of grievances are a prerequisite if violent means are to be avoided. Thus all correctional agencies have not only a responsibility but an institutional interest in maintaining procedures that are, and appear to offenders to be, designed to resolve their complaints fairly.
[67] As one authority on prison grievance procedures has put it, "There are ... administrative payoffs in a properly functioning grievance mechanism. It is an ideal means of bringing clarity and rationality to policies which, under the scrutiny of a grievance mechanism, must daily be explained, justified, eliminated, modified, or replaced. `Customs' and `traditions' are exposed as such and can be either eliminated or made into evenly enforced policy." J. Keating, Prison Grievance Mechanisms: A Manual 18 (The Center for Community Justice 1977).

[1] S.Rep. No. 559 on H.R. 14916, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., December 3, 1969, p. 49 in the "Capital Outlay" appropriations of the District of Columbia Appropriations Bill there was included "$150,000 in survey funds for a new jail ..."

[2] Defendants were (1) the Superintendent of the D.C. Jail, (2) the Director, D.C. Department of Corrections and (3) the Mayor and Commissioners of the District of Columbia. All were sued individually and in their official capacity (Par. 6, 7, 8).

[3] Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977), holds that prison authorities in a correctional institution must provide prisoners with access to law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law in order to guarantee their constitutional rights of "access to the courts." Accord, Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15, 92 S.Ct. 250, 30 L.Ed.2d 142 (1971), aff'g, Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F.Supp. 105 (N.D.Cal.1970). While there are substantial differences between the legal status of prisoners in a jail and those in a correctional institution that might lead to less of a demand for law libraries in jails, the demand for law libraries by pretrial detainees, being based on their right of "access to the courts," is answered insofar as the D.C. Jail is concerned by the availability in all cases of adequate assistance from persons trained in law.

[4] New Detention Center 960 Hospital spaces 75 Penthouse 10 Cellblocks 3 & 4 650 _____ Total 1,695

More comfortable accommodations in Cellblocks 3 & 4 would be 480, leaving a total of 1,525. The extra 400 would provide for 2,095 and 1,925 respectively.

[5] The trial court considered that defendants should be enjoined from housing after June 1, 1976 more than the following:

New Detention Facility Cellblock 4 Cellblock 3 Dormitory 1 (Old Jail) Dormitory 2 (Old Jail)

960 215 161 110
91 _____ Total 1,537

[6] The findings also indicated: "In addition, after June 1, 1976 no persons should be housed in Cellblocks 1 and 2 at the Old Jail." (R. 166, p. 14).

[7] That Cellblocks 3 and 4 were found to furnish satisfactory accommodations for 376 inmates indicates that conditions in those cellblocks were satisfactory.

[8] Id.

[9] See text Maj. op. pp. ___ - ___ of 188 U.S.App.D.C., pp. 533-536 of 580 F.2d.

[10] The relevant statutes provide:

Committed youth offenders not conditionally released shall undergo treatment in institutions of maximum security, medium security, or minimum security types, including training schools, hospitals, farms, forestry and other camps, and other agencies that will provide the essential varieties of treatment. The Director shall from time to time designate, set aside, and adapt institutions and agencies under the control of the Department of Justice for treatment. Insofar as practical, such institutions and agencies shall be used only for treatment of committed youth offenders, and such youth offenders shall be segregated from other offenders, and classes of committed youth offenders shall be segregated according to their needs for treatment.

18 U.S.C. § 5011.

No youth offender shall be committed to the Attorney General under this chapter until the Director shall certify that proper and adequate treatment facilities and personnel have been provided.

18 U.S.C. § 5012.
[11] The new jail has two types of facilities for visitors, namely, small cubicles, or rooms, designed to provide for attorney-client visits on a face-to-face basis in complete privacy, and booths to accommodate general visitors. These booths, which are air conditioned, will separate visitor from inmate via a clear partition, and will require communication by telephone line. No inmate at the new facility, regardless of classification or whether he is assigned to a work detail, will be able to have general contact visits. (Tr. December 30, 1975, 4; A. 480) (Appellants' Br. p. 29).
[12] The majority opinion at page ___ of 188 U.S.App.D.C., p. 529 of 580 F.2d in characterizing the foregoing comments on the presumption of innocence fails to consider the complete comment. Mr. Justice White in Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 458-59, 15 S.Ct. 394, 404, 39 L.Ed. 481 (1895) described "the presumption of innocence [as] a conclusion drawn by the law in favor of the citizen, by virtue whereof, when brought to trial upon a criminal charge, he must be acquitted, unless he is proven to be guilty." Its most frequent application occurs in criminal trials. Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100, 93 S.Ct. 354, 34 L.Ed.2d 335 (1972); Coffin v. United States, supra. The majority apparently considers that pretrial detention violates the presumed innocence of the pretrial detainee. Maj. op., p. ___ of 188 U.S.App.D.C., p. 530 of 580 F.2d. This is an incorrect appraisal of the extent of the right. The presumption is a rebuttable one, not absolute. The force of the presumption just does not prevail over the evidence upon which pretrial confinement may be ordered. Thus no "paradox" exists when the limitations of the presumption are understood. It is also incorrect to infer from the fact that presentence incarceration is credited upon federal sentences that such credit exists as a right flowing from the presumption of innocence. Maj. op., p. ___ of 188 U.S.App.D.C., p. 530 of 580 F.2d. The source is entirely statutory, 18 U.S.C. § 3568, and such credit is not constitutionally required. McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 93 S.Ct. 1055, 35 L.Ed.2d 282 (1973).
Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall (71 U.S.) 277, 321-22, 18 L.Ed. 356 (1866), and Brown v. Wilemon, 139 F.2d 730, 732 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 748, 64 S.Ct. 1151, 88 L.Ed. 1579 (1944) cited at page ___ of 188 U.S.App.D.C., at page 530 of 580 F.2d of the majority opinion, are wholly irrelevant to this case. They both consider whether denying a person the right to operate his business or practice his profession is "punishment," and merely note in passing that deprivation of liberty is a form of "punishment." They contribute nothing to the inquiry before us.

 
 Campbell v. McGruder, 86 Fed.Appx. 426 (2004)
86 Fed.Appx. 426 This case was not selected for publication in the
Federal Reporter. Not for Publication in West’s Federal Reporter See
Fed. Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 generally governing citation of judicial decisions issued on or
after Jan. 1, 2007. See also District of Columbia Rules 32.1, 36. (Find CTADC Rule 32.1 and Find
CTADC Rule 36) United States Court of Appeals,
District of Columbia Circuit.
Leonard CAMPBELL, et al., Appellants, v.
Anderson MCGRUDER, Superintendent, et al., Appellees.
No. 03-7045. | Jan. 23, 2004.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. (Nos. 71-cv01462 and 75cv01668).
Attorneys and Law Firms
J. Patrick Hickey, Jonathan Walter Gannon, Shaw Pittman, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Mary Larkin Wilson, Assistant Corporation Counsel, Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel, Edward Eugene Schwab, Assistant Corporation Counsel, Office of Corporation Counsel (Appellate Division), Washington, DC, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before HENDERSON, GARLAND, Circuit Judges, and WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion
JUDGMENT
PER CURIAM.

Consolidated with 03-7048, 03-7102 and 03-7103 These cases were heard on the record from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and on the briefs and arguments of counsel. It is
ORDERED that the judgment from which these appeals have been taken be affirmed. The district court correctly terminated all injunctive relief related to the District of Columbia Central Detention Facility pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2), because the appellants, detainees in the facility, failed to demonstrate a “current and ongoing” constitutional violation as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(3). As the district court observed, the conditions about which the appellants now complain do not approach the objective threshold for finding a constitutional violation under the Eighth Amendment, see Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (“conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm”); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981) (conditions that “deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities”); Women Prisoners of the D.C. Dep’t of Corr. v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910, 928 (D.C.Cir.1996) ( “conditions that are so ‘soul-chilling’ ” and “grossly wanting” (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 354, 101 S.Ct. 2392 (Brennan, J., concurring))); Inmates of Occoquan v. Barry, 844 F.2d 828, 836-839 (D.C.Cir.1988) ( “conditions of unspeakable inhumanity”); nor have they shown that prison officials are “reckless[ly]” or “deliberate[ly] indifferent” to the welfare of inmates. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838-842, 114 S.Ct. 1970.
Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any timely petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc. See Fed. R.App. P. 41(b); D.C.Cir. Rule 41.
Parallel Citations
2004 WL 180423 (C.A.D.C.)
	  

1

 
 Campbell v. McGruder, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1987)
1987 WL 8724 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. United States District Court, District of Columbia.
LEONARD CAMPBELL, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
ANDERSON McGRUDER, et al., Defendants. INMATES OF D.C. JAIL, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DELBERT C. JACKSON, et al., Defendants.
No. 1462–71. | March 11, 1987.
Opinion
ORDER
BRYANT, Senior District Judge.
*1 Upon consideration of plaintiffs’ Motion for Contempt, defendants’ response, and the evidence and testimony presented to this court on February 17, 1987, and all the evidence, reports and records in this case, it is hereby
ORDERED that:
1. Marion Barry, in his official capacity as Mayor of the District of Columbia, and Hallem Williams, in his official capacity as Director of the Department of Corrections, are in civil contempt for failure to comply with this court’s Orders of July 13 and August 22, 1985, and the Stipulation of the Parties to Reduce the Population at the D.C. Jail (‘Stipulation’), signed August 22, 1985. These defendants have violated paragraphs 5 (regarding the increase in Halfway House capacity), 8 (regarding classification), and 11 (regarding the reduction of minimum sentences) of the Stipulation. Defendants have admitted in a Supplemental Report filed with this court on November 14, 1986, to failure to report to the court vacancies in the staffing required by paragraph 12 of the Stipulation (relating to improvement of mental health services) and have admitted to substantial non-compliance with paragraph 4 of the Stipulation (relating to making a parole determination of parole eligible residents 10 days prior to their parole eligibility dates).
2. In consequence thereof, the above-named defendants are fined $50,000 to be paid in 60 days from the issuance of this Order, but if the defendants and their officers, agents, servants, employees and attorneys achieve and maintain compliance with the court’s Orders, produce

adequate documentation to verify their compliance, and implement the following procedures and perform the following actions designed to ensure their compliance, they will be purged of the contempt finding and will not have to pay the $50,000 fine imposed herein:
I. Halfway Houses On May 1, 1987, and July 1, 1987, defendants will file Special Reports to the court, and serve these reports on plaintiffs’ counsel, detailing defendants’ efforts to increase Halfway House capacity to 736, as is mandated by the Stipulation. These Special Reports are to be reviewed, certified and signed by either the Mayor or Deputy Mayor for City Administration of the District of Columbia. These Special Reports may, at the defendants’ discretion, be filed under seal.
II. Parole On April 1, 1987, and the first of each month thereafter, defendants will file sworn certifications by the Chairperson of the Board of Parole, the Administrator of the Jail, and the Director of the Department of Corrections, that procedures are in effect, fully implemented and monitored, to ensure that no resident of the District of Columbia Jail who is sentenced at least 45 days in advance of his parole eligibility (‘p.e.’) date is denied a parole determination at least 10 days in advance of his p.e. date. Residents will not be denied a parole determination at least 10 days before their parole eligibility date because a progress report or presentence investigative report is not at the Parole Board 45 days in advance of their p.e. dates or because the resident was transferred from one facility to another within the Department of Corrections system at the time of their hearing. *2 This court recognizes that some residents at the Jail cannot be heard 10 days in advance of their p.e. dates because, after receiving credit for time that they have already served at the Jail, their p.e. dates are already within 10 days of their sentencing dates. Defendants will file sworn certificates by the Chairperson of the Board of Parole that these residents have had a parole determination by the Board within 45 days of their sentencing date.
Defendants are ordered on three occasions to be selected by plaintiffs’ counsel to provide to plaintiffs’ counsel full access to all records, data and information, on 24 hours notice by telephone, to confirm that the procedures are operating to ensure compliance with paragraph four of the Stipulation.
Defendants will move expeditiously to automate the data essential to the parole process.
1

Campbell v. McGruder, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1987)
III. Classification Defendants shall design, plan and implement an internal and institutional classification program, focusing on the pretrial detention population, the sentenced misdemeanor population and every other category of the sentenced prisoner population at the District of Columbia Jail that is not subject to the system-wide classification program now being devised by the Department. The design and plan shall be submitted to the court for approval by April 15, 1987. Implementation for the purposes of this Order shall be defined as actual assignment and placement of detainees and sentenced prisoners in housing facilities appropriate to their security and programmatic needs.
IV. Reductions in Minimum Sentences Within 30 days of this Order defendants must have the Chief Classification and Parole (‘C&P’) Officer at each of the institutions in the Department of Corrections certify under oath that the procedures outlined in the November 13, 1986 memorandum from Benny O. Hodges, Acting Assistant Director, to all the Administrators of the institutions within the Department of Corrections, have been implemented. Specifically, ‘Minimum Sentence Reduction Applications’ need to be placed in areas easily accessible to the residents; that is, in C&P offices, law libraries, dorm rooms, etc. As the forms are completed by the residents, conferences between the C&P officers and the residents should then be arranged. If the conference reveals that the resident is a good candidate for a reduction in minimum sentence, then the C&P officer will move expeditiously to take all steps necessary to recommend the resident for a minimum

sentence reduction. If the conference reveals that the resident is not, at that time, a good candidate, then the C&P officer should document and describe to the resident the steps the resident needs to take before he will be considered for a minimum sentence reduction. A future conference date should also be established by the C&P officer at that time. A monthly log similar to the one attached to the November 13, 1986 memorandum should be kept by each C&P officer, and be available for inspection by plaintiffs’ counsel.
*3 4. Defendants shall continue to file bi-weekly compliance reports with the court. These compliance reports will describe in detail defendants’ progress toward compliance with this Order and with this court’s Order issued August 22, 1985.
5. Upon finding that paragraph 8 of the Stipulation has not produced an effective system-wide classification program for the Department of Corrections, it is hereby ordered that further relief is granted to the plaintiffs and it is hereby further ordered that the defendants implement their system-wide classification program by September 15, 1987. The definition of implementation for the purposes of this Order is noted above in paragraph 2(III).
6. If defendants have failed to conform to one or more of the Orders expressed above, in the prescribed time period, a $50,000 fine will be automatically imposed.
7. Defendants shall pay plaintiffs’ counsel the costs associated with the prosecution of this contempt proceeding, including reasonable attorney’s fees.
	  

2