IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

______________________________________________________

)

STATE OF CONNECTICUT OFFICE OF PROTECTION AND )

ADVOCACY FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

) Civil Action No.

v.

)

)

THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, PATRICIA A.

)

WILSON-COKER, in her official capacity as Commissioner of ) February 6, 2006

the Connecticut Department of Social Services, THOMAS A. )

KIRK, Jr., PhD., in his official capacity as Commissioner of the )

Connecticut Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services, )

J. ROBERT GALVIN, M.D., M.P.H., in his official capacity as )

Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Public Health, )

)

Defendants.

)

______________________________________________________)

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff, the Connecticut Office of Protection and Advocacy for Persons with

Disabilities, sues the Defendants on behalf of more than 200 individuals with mental illness in

three nursing facilities in Connecticut – Chelsea Place Care Center in Hartford, Bidwell Care

Center in Manchester, and West Rock Health Care Center, in New Haven -- as well as numerous

other individuals with mental illness who are at risk of entry into these facilities. Individuals

with mental illness are needlessly isolated, segregated, and institutionalized in these facilities, in

violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act.

Preliminary Statement

1. Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131,

12132, prohibits discrimination against individuals with disabilities. Title II requires, inter alia,

that “a public entity shall administer services, programs, and activities in the most integrated

setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.” See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (emphasis added). Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, imposes similar obligations.
2. In Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the ADA is violated when a state places people with mental illness in “unjustified isolation.” Id. at 597. The Court also held that a person with a mental illness may sue the state for failing to ensure that he or she is placed “in the most integrated setting appropriate to [his or her] needs.” and that undue institutionalization of a person with a mental illness is discrimination by reason of disability under Title II of the ADA. Id. at 587.
3. This action is brought to enforce these mandates. Rather than comply with these laws, Defendants serve Plaintiff’s constituents in “unjustified isolation” in settings that are not integrated, namely Chelsea Place Care Center (“Chelsea Place”), Bidwell Care Center (“Bidwell”), and West Rock Health Care Center (“West Rock”). In these nursing homes, individuals with mental illness are needlessly segregated and inappropriately warehoused.
4. Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock offer little or no rehabilitative treatment or discharge planning to promote integration into the community. As chronicled in articles in The New London Connecticut Day, Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock and other similar nursing facilities lack adequate staffing, psychiatric treatment, and activities and programming, and often fail to meet minimum health and safety standards. Kenton Robinson, Thousands With Psychiatric Disabilities Locked Away In Nursing Homes, THE DAY, Dec. 19, 2004, at 1; Robinson, Many Mentally Ill in State are Housed Without Proper Care, THE DAY, August 7, 2005, at 1.
5. Individuals with mental illness are left to languish in these facilities while equally
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affordable and more integrated community-based settings exist or could be made available. More integrated, community-based settings would more appropriately meet the needs of individuals with mental illness who are currently residing in these nursing facilities.
6. Individuals with mental illness are required to live in Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock solely because of the lack of community-based alternatives, such as supportive housing.1 In administering their programs, services and activities, Defendants have chosen to fund expensive institutional care in nursing homes rather than less costly care in integrated settings that would better meet these individuals’ needs. Because of Defendants’ failure to develop and fund community-based alternatives, individuals with mental illness often have nowhere to go but a nursing home. Indeed, many individuals with mental illness must choose between residence in a nursing home or homelessness.
7. Defendants have violated Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by failing to assure that their programs, activities, and services are administered to individuals with mental illness in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs. Instead, they have isolated and institutionalized individuals with mental illness at Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock in violation of Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
8. Plaintiff’s claims for violation of Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131, 12132, are asserted against the individual Defendants only. Plaintiff does not assert claims against the State of Connecticut for violation of Title II of the ADA.
1 “Supportive housing,” as used in the Complaint, refers to programs that enable individuals with mental illness to live in their own apartments or homes; these individuals receive an array of supports and services tailored to their preferences and needs.
3

9. Plaintiff’s claims for violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, are asserted against both the State of Connecticut and the individual Defendants. The only claims asserted against the State of Connecticut are claims under Section 504.
Parties 10. Plaintiff, the State of Connecticut Office of Protection and Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities (“OPA”), is an authorized protection and advocacy agency under the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act (“PAIMI”), 42 U.S.C. § 10801, et. seq. OPA is also responsible for providing protection and advocacy services to individuals with disabilities pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-7 to 11. OPA has statutory authority to pursue legal, administrative and other appropriate remedies to ensure the protection of individuals with mental illness who are or will be receiving care and treatment in the state of Connecticut. 42 U.S.C. § 10805. 11. OPA is pursuing this action to protect and advocate for the rights and interests of residents of Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock, and those at risk of entry into these facilities, who are “individuals with mental illness” as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C.§ 10802. These individuals are OPA constituents. 12. These constituents each have a significant mental illness and reside in or are at risk of entering “facilities” rendering care and treatment for mentally ill individuals, as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 10802. 13. These constituents have significant mental illnesses that substantially limit their ability to perform major life activities, such as self care, working, and interaction with others. They also have a record of such mental illnesses, and are regarded by Defendants as having such
4

mental illnesses. They are therefore individuals with disabilities for purposes of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. 42 U.S.C. § 12102, 29 U.S.C. § 705(20).
14. These constituents have each suffered injuries, or are at risk of suffering injuries, that would allow them to bring suit against Defendants in their own right.
15. Defendant, the State of Connecticut, is responsible for operating its programs, services, and activities in conformity with the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. Each individual Defendant is also responsible for operating programs, services, and activities in conformity with the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
16. Defendant Thomas A. Kirk, Jr., Ph.D. is the Commissioner of the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services (“DMHAS”). DMHAS is responsible for providing a network of effective and efficient mental health and addiction services that foster selfsufficiency, dignity and respect. As the state’s mental health authority, DMHAS operates, funds and coordinates inpatient and community-based mental health services, including residential services, for adults 18 and older. It is responsible for delivery of all state-operated or -funded mental health and addiction services. DMHAS manages the state’s behavioral health general funds, state-administered general assistance dollars, and the Community Mental Health Services block grant. It is responsible for the screening, evaluating, and monitoring of persons with a mental illness in or at risk of entry into Connecticut nursing homes. Defendant Kirk is sued in his official capacity only.
17. Defendant Patricia A. Wilson-Coker is the Commissioner of the Department of Social Services (“DSS”). DSS provides services to individuals with disabilities who need help in maintaining or achieving self-direction, self-reliance, and independent living. DSS is one of Connecticut’s largest agencies, responsible for administration of over one third of the state
5

budget, more than $4 billion. DSS is the state agency responsible for administration of the Medicaid program, the Section 8 Housing Voucher Program, and Vocational Rehabilitation Services. DSS is required to ensure that people with mental illness are appropriately screened and maintained in nursing homes. Conn. Gen. Stat. §17b-262. Defendant Wilson-Coker is sued in her official capacity only.
18. Defendant J. Robert Galvin, M.D., M.P.H., is the Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Public Health ("DPH"). DPH is the state agency responsible for regulating nursing home facilities in the Connecticut. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 19a-490, et seq. Defendant Galvin is sued in his official capacity only.
19. The State of Connecticut is a public entity subject to the requirements of Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12131. DMHAS, DSS and DPH are public entities subject to the requirements of Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12131.
20. The State of Connecticut is a recipient of federal funds subject to the requirements of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. DMHAS, DSS and DPH are recipients of federal funds subjecting them and the State of Connecticut to the requirements of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794.
Jurisdiction and Venue 21. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343. 22. Venue in the District of Connecticut is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391. 23. Declaratory and injunctive relief are sought under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq.
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Facts Individuals with Mental Illness in Nursing Homes 24. When the State of Connecticut (“state”) closed and downsized state hospitals, it failed to develop the supports and services, including residential services, that individuals with mental illness need to live in the community. FINAL REPORT OF THE MENTAL HEALTH CABINET, December 21, 2004, at 4 (“Connecticut downsized and closed state mental hospitals that tended to warehouse patients …Savings derived from closures were not reinvested to create an effective community-based mental health safety net.”). 25. As a result, many individuals with mental illness now live in nursing homes, in which they are needlessly isolated, segregated, and institutionalized. 26. More than 2,700 individuals with serious mental illness live in nursing homes in Connecticut. The majority (53%) are under the age of 65. Admissions to nursing home of individuals with serious mental illness are growing at a rate of between five and ten percent per year. FINAL REPORT OF THE MENTAL HEALTH CABINET, December 21, 2004, at 5. 27. Serving individuals with mental illness in nursing homes “is neither humane nor recovery-oriented.” FINAL REPORT OF THE MENTAL HEALTH CABINET, December 21, 2004, at 12. 28. “If community-based services are not [made] available, children and adults with mental illness will continue to fill expensive, inappropriate, and non-therapeutic settings such as …. nursing homes or simply go untreated.” FINAL REPORT OF THE MENTAL HEALTH CABINET, December 21, 2004, at Introduction by Lt. Gov. Kevin B. Sullivan, p. 2; see also id. at 12 (nursing homes “are the only option[] for many”).
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29. It costs the state approximately $50,000 to $80,000 per year for the care and treatment of an individual with mental illness in a nursing home. This is far more than it would cost the state to provide care in a more integrated, community-based setting.
30. Individuals with mental illness are frequently placed in nursing homes solely to obtain mental health care that could easily be provided in an integrated, community-based setting. Often, these individuals do not have a significant physical health problem.
31. Defendants routinely approve and fund care of individuals with mental illness in nursing homes such as Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock when such individuals are capable of receiving and would prefer receiving care in a more integrated, community-based setting.
32. Some nursing homes, including Chelsea Place and Bidwell, are locked or have locked psychiatric units. Residents cannot leave or go outside without permission. Often, an escort is required. Individuals with mental illness are placed in locked settings although there is no judicial determination that they are dangerous to themselves or others.
33. Most residents with mental illness remain in nursing homes for years because they lack the opportunity to obtain services in more integrated, community-based settings.
34. Defendants do not ensure, consistent with Olmstead, that individuals with mental illness in nursing homes have the option of being served in a more integrated, community-based setting. More than a decade after the effective date of the ADA, and more than six years after Olmstead was decided, Defendants have yet to develop or implement a comprehensive and effectively working plan that identifies individuals with mental illness who are needlessly in nursing homes and helps them move to more integrated settings.
8

35. Defendants have long been aware, through reports of state agencies, the press, and other sources, of the unnecessary isolation, segregation, and institutionalization of individuals with mental illness in nursing homes, including in locked settings.
Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock 36. Chelsea Place is a 234-bed skilled nursing facility located in Hartford. In 2002, Chelsea Place converted unit 2C into a locked, secured psychiatric unit. Approximately 22 residents with mental illness live in the locked unit. Upon information and belief, at least 25 other individuals with mental illness live in Chelsea Place. These residents may leave the building only if granted a pass. 37. Bidwell is a 156-bed skilled nursing facility located in Manchester. It is a locked facility. Both of Bidwell’s floors, each with about 75 residents, are locked. The second floor is a locked psychiatric unit. Upon information and belief, at least 85 residents of Bidwell have mental illness. 38. West Rock is a 90-bed intermediate care nursing facility in New Haven. The facility is unlocked, but is surrounded by a perimeter fence. Residents cannot leave without permission. Upon information and belief, at least 70 of the residents have mental illness. 39. Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock are institutions with characteristics similar to those of a psychiatric hospital. They place many limitations on residents’ autonomy and privacy. Residents live a highly regimented lifestyle, spending most of their days in a few rooms among a great many other individuals with disabilities. They must abide by the nursing homes’ restrictive rules and policies. 40. Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock are loud and impersonal. Announcements about meals, medications, phone calls, events, and administrative matters are constantly
9

broadcast into all rooms over an intercom system. The common areas have televisions, which are almost always on.
41. Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock provide very few recreational or other activities aimed at helping residents gain independence. Cigarettes are distributed in limited numbers and at designated times. Residents spend hours watching television in a common room or waiting for the designated smoking break. Some residents are able to attend activities outside the facility; however, at the end of the day, they return to Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock.
42. Residents of Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock have virtually no privacy. Residents are not allowed to have personal telephones. Payphones are located in the common TV rooms, hallways, or lounges, where anyone can overhear conversations. Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock have policies limiting the use of the telephone.
43. The lack of privacy makes it difficult for residents to exercise their rights. When they make phone calls, they risk having their conversation overheard by staff and other residents. Many are fearful that if an advocate calls them at the facility, staff will find out and retaliate.
44. Residents of Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock have little contact with members of the community outside the facility. Usually, trips out of the facility are conducted in groups escorted by staff. Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock all have curfews and set visiting hours. In Bidwell and Chelsea Place, residents may not have visitors in their rooms.
45. Residents of Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock have almost no control over their personal space. Most residents of Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock share a bedroom and bathroom with one to three other people. Residents are not allowed to choose their own
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roommates except under rare circumstances. There is almost no space for personal items. Residents have extremely limited control over who has access to their rooms.
46. Residents of Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock are permitted to retain only a small “personal needs allowance” from their SSI checks. This allowance is currently $57.00 a month, or a little less than $2.00 per day. The remaining amount is paid to the nursing home. A resident’s privileges may be suspended if he or she borrows, loans, buys from or sells items to other residents.
47. In Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock, residents have very limited choice over what they eat and no choice over when they eat. No foods, liquids, or gifts can be brought into the facilities without being examined by nursing staff. Meals and medication are dispensed at specific times. At Bidwell and West Rock, all the residents on a given floor must eat together; the same is true for residents of Chelsea Place’s locked unit. West Rock and Bidwell have assigned seating in the dining room; residents may not choose with whom they eat. At Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock, residents are not allowed to keep most foods in their rooms.
48. Residents of Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock receive little or no education or information about the limited community-based alternatives to nursing homes that do exist. Discharge planning is not regularly conducted. Many residents fear that if they leave the nursing home, they will become homeless.
49. Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock provide little or no rehabilitative treatment that promotes independence and integration into the community. The facilities do not provide training in symptom management, medication management, shopping, cooking, housekeeping, money management, or using transportation or community services. The facilities provide limited social work services.
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50. A contract psychiatrist visits Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock once a month.
51. Numerous DSS inspection reports of Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock have documented health, safety, and sanitation problems. Inspection reports have also documented a lack of treatment and discharge planning.
Locked Psychiatric Units in Chelsea Place and Bidwell 52. More than 100 individuals with mental illness live in locked units at Chelsea Place and Bidwell. Many have no treatment or discharge plans. Individuals often remain in locked units for years. 53. Residents of the locked units at Chelsea Place and Bidwell are subject to highly restrictive “behavior management” programs in which they earn “privileges” for compliance with institutional and staff rules. Residents’ freedom to leave the units depends largely on staff’s assessment of how well they comply with institutional rules. If they do not participate in structured activities, or if they violate a rule, such as bringing food in their rooms, they can lose “privileges.” 54. Professional standards require that behavior management programs for individuals with mental illness be individualized and rely primarily on rewards rather than punishments. The behavioral management programs at Chelsea Place and Bidwell are not individualized, rely primarily on punitive measures, and do not meet professional standards. 55. At Bidwell, residents of the locked unit are assigned to one of five “levels” or “Steps,” each with its own “privileges.” While it can take months to “earn” a higher Step, a Bidwell resident’s current Step can be reduced at any time for infractions of Bidwell’s rules. At first, all residents are assigned to Step One, the most restrictive. Residents on Step One may not
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leave Bidwell, although they can have supervised smoking breaks in the outdoor Gazebo and can participate in supervised walks. Step Two residents can leave the facility on recreation trips if accompanied by staff. Step Three residents can leave the facility with a third party, such as a family member, but only during daytime hours. Step Four residents can leave the facility overnight with a third party and be unsupervised at the outdoor Gazebo for up to one hour at a time. Step Five residents have unsupervised grounds passes, although they are subject to curfews and other restrictions. Step Five residents can also spend up to 21 nights away from the facility each year. All of these “privileges” are contingent on complying with unit rules and participating in scheduled groups or activities.
56. Residents of the locked unit at Chelsea Place are subject to a similar program, with three tiers. All new residents are placed on Tier I, the most restrictive level. Tier I residents are checked every 15 minutes, and are confined to the unit except for scheduled off-unit activities with staff. Tier I residents can smoke only during designated breaks with staff supervision. Tier II residents may leave the unit with family members, or other approved individuals, or to participate in activities with staff. Tier III residents may leave the unit unaccompanied and smoke without supervision, but staff may impose restrictions on these “privileges.”
Community-Based Services 57. Defendants do provide community-based services to many individuals with mental illness. With appropriate and individualized community-based services, those individuals are able to live with family, in their own apartment or home, or in supportive housing.
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58. Many of the individuals to whom Defendants provide community-based services have mental illnesses and functional capacities that are the same as, or are similar to, the individuals living in Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock.
59. If provided community-based services, virtually all individuals with mental illness in Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock could live with family, in their own apartment or home, or in supportive housing.
60. Many individuals with mental illness living in Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock would prefer to live with family, in their own apartment or home, or in supportive housing. Some may need education and support in order to make an informed choice.
61. Each of these options – living with family, in one’s own apartment or home, or in supportive housing – would allow individuals who are currently in Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock to live and receive services in a more integrated setting. Each of these options would afford residents much more choice, freedom, and privacy, as well as the opportunity to maintain regular family relationships and to interact with and form friendships with people who do not have disabilities.
62. In supportive housing, individuals with mental illness are not required to live solely with other individuals who have a disability. They have friends of their own choosing and have visitors and telephone conversations at the times of their choice in the privacy of their homes. They go to stores to shop for food and other necessities. They may engage in social activities of their choice. They tend to these and other daily needs to the degree they are able, with supportive services. These programs are designed to foster independence and to enable
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individuals to become as self-sufficient as possible. Unlike nursing homes, they are not institutional in character.
63. Individuals with mental illness live and receive services in Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock, primarily because there are insufficient community services, including supportive housing, to allow them to move to more integrated settings.
64. Many current residents entered Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock upon discharge from a psychiatric hospital. Upon discharge, they had nowhere else to live.
65. When individuals with mental illness are placed in Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock, opportunities for discharge, including discharge to supportive housing, are rare. There are long waiting lists for admission to supportive housing and other community-based programs that provide residential services.
66. Individuals with mental illness at Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock lack information about community-based alternatives and receive little assistance in moving to more integrated settings.
67. Residents are left to stagnate in these nursing homes. Often, they fear retaliation if they express a desire to leave.
Defendants’ Administration of Programs, Services, and Activities 68. Defendants administer one or more systems of care for individuals with mental illness. 69. Defendants administer their programs, services, and activities in a manner that supports and encourages the needless isolation, segregation, and institutionalization of individuals with mental illness.
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70. In providing services to individuals with mental illness, and in providing longterm care, Defendants have relied too heavily on nursing homes such as Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock.
71. Defendants have failed to develop and fund sufficient capacity in communitybased programs, forcing into Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock scores of individuals with mental illness who could be served and would prefer to be served in more integrated settings.
72. Providing community-based services to individuals with mental illness at Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock would not be a fundamental alteration of Defendants’ services for people with mental illness or of its long-term care services. The individuals with mental illness at Chelsea Place, Bidwell and West Rock could be served in more integrated settings at a cost equivalent to or less than Defendants’ current costs. Defendants already provide, in communitybased settings, all the types of services and supports these individuals need.
73. Each service and support currently provided to residents with mental illness at Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock could be provided in an integrated, community-based setting.
Count I Violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act Mandate to Administer Services
and Programs in the Most Integrated Setting 74. Plaintiff repeats the allegations of all of the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. This claim is brought against the individual Defendants only. 75. Plaintiff OPA’s constituents are individuals with mental illnesses. They have mental impairments that substantially limit one or more major life activity, such as self-care and
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interaction with others. They also have a record of such mental illnesses and are regarded by Defendants as having such mental illnesses.
76. Plaintiff’s constituents reside in Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock, or are at risk of entry into such nursing homes. Plaintiff’s constituents are qualified to participate in more integrated community-based programs that would meet their needs. Plaintiff’s constituents are therefore qualified individuals with disabilities within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2).
77. Serving Plaintiff’s constituents in more integrated settings can be reasonably accommodated.
78. Defendants Patricia A. Wilson-Coker, Thomas A. Kirk, Jr., and J. Robert Galvin, M.D., M.P.H., are responsible for the operation of public entities covered by Title II of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131(1)(A) and (B). Title II of the ADA prohibits Defendants from discriminating against individuals with disabilities in programs and activities. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131, 12132.
79. The United States Department of Justice has promulgated regulations under Title II of the ADA stating that “a public entity shall administer services, programs and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.” See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d). Such regulations further define “most integrated setting” as “...a setting that enables individuals with disabilities to interact with non-disabled persons to the fullest extent possible.” 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, App. A, p. 450.
80. Defendants are obligated under the ADA to administer Connecticut programs in a manner that makes services and programs available in the most integrated setting for individuals with disabilities.
81. Defendants have failed to meet this obligation. Defendants are instead requiring
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hundreds of individuals to live and receive services in Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock, although these facilities are not the most integrated settings appropriate to their needs.
Count II Violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act’s Prohibition on Using Methods of Administration that Subject Individuals with Disabilities to Discrimination 82. Plaintiff OPA repeats the allegations of all of the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. This claim is brought against the individual Defendants only. 83. Plaintiff’s constituents reside in Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock, or are at risk of entry into such nursing homes, and are qualified to participate in more integrated community-based programs that meet their needs. 84. Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131, 12132, prohibits Defendants from discriminating against individuals with disabilities. 85. Regulations implementing Title II of the ADA provide that:
a public entity may not, directly or through contractual or other arrangements, utilize criteria or other methods of administration: (i) That have the effect of subjecting qualified individuals with disabilities to discrimination on the basis of disability; [or] (ii) That have the purpose or effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the public entity’s program with respect to individuals with disabilities . . . . 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(3). 86. Defendants, however, utilize methods of administration that have the effect of subjecting individuals with mental disabilities to discrimination. Defendants continue to use methods of administration that perpetuate the use of nursing homes, rather than facilitating the receipt of services in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of Plaintiff’s
18

constituents. Such methods result in continued placement of Plaintiff’s constituents in settings that are segregated and inappropriate.
Count III Failure to Administer Services in the Most Integrated Setting Appropriate in
Violation of the Rehabilitation Act 87. Plaintiff OPA repeats the allegations of all of the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. This claim is brought against all Defendants. 88. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, provides: No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from participation in, be denied benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. 89. Defendants are recipients of Federal financial assistance. DPH, DMHAS and DSS are programs receiving Federal financial assistance. 90. Defendants Patricia A. Wilson-Coker, Thomas A. Kirk, Jr., and J. Robert Galvin, M.D., M.P.H, respectively, are responsible for the operation of DPH, DMHAS and DSS. 91. Plaintiff’s constituents who reside in Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock or are at risk of placement in such homes are qualified to participate in more integrated community-based programs that meet their needs. 92. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act requires Defendants to serve individuals with disabilities in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs. 93. Serving Plaintiff’s constituents in more integrated settings can be reasonably accommodated. 94. Defendants have violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by failing
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to administer services to Plaintiff’s constituents in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs.
Count IV Violation of the Rehabilitation Act's Prohibition on Using Methods of Administration that Subject Individuals with Disabilities to Discrimination 95. Plaintiff OPA repeats the allegations of all of the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. This claim is brought against all Defendants. 96. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 prohibits Defendants from discriminating against individuals with disabilities. 97. Regulations implementing Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provide that: a recipient may not, directly or through contractual or other arrangements, utilize criteria or methods of administration: (i) That have the effect of subjecting qualified handicapped persons to discrimination on the basis of disability; [or] (ii) That have the purpose or effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the recipient's program with respect to handicapped persons . . . . 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b). 98. Defendants are recipients of Federal financial assistance. DPH, DMHAS and DSS are programs receiving Federal financial assistance. 99. Defendants Patricia A. Wilson-Coker, Thomas A. Kirk, Jr., and J. Robert Galvin, M.D., M.P.H., respectively, are responsible for the operation of DPH, DMHAS and DSS. 100. Defendants use methods of administration that have the effect of subjecting Plaintiff’s constituents to discrimination. Defendants use methods of administration that perpetuate the use of nursing homes rather than facilitate the receipt of services in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of Plaintiff’s constituents. Such methods result in continued placement of Plaintiff’s constituents in settings that are segregated and inappropriate.
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Prayer for Relief
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests the following relief:
a. Declaratory and injunctive relief, including an order requiring that Defendants
promptly take such steps as are necessary to enable Plaintiff’s constituents to receive services in
the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs;
b. An award of prevailing party costs, including attorney fees;
c. Such other relief as the Court deems appropriate.
Dated: February 6, 2006
Respectfully submitted,
By:_________/s/_______________ NANCY B. ALISBERG Office of Protection and Advocacy For Persons with Disabilities 60B Weston Street Hartford, CT 06120 Fed. Bar. No. CT 21321 (860) 297-4397 Fax: (860) 566-8714 nancy.alisberg@po.state.ct.us
IRA A. BURNIM, DC Bar No. 406154 irab@bazelon.org KAREN A. BOWER, DC Bar No. 450888 karenb@bazelon.org MICHAEL ALLEN, DC Bar No. 409068 michaela@bazelon.org Judge David L Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law 1101 15th Street, N.W., Suite 1101 Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 467-5730 ext 132 Fax: (202) 223-0409 (motion for each to appear pro hac vice pending)
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 Case 3:06-cv-00179-AWT Document 123 Filed 09/09/08 Page 1 of 41

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

STATE OF CONNECTICUT OFFICE OF

)

PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY FOR PERSONS )

WITH DISABILITIES, SHANNON HEMMINGSEN, )

SAMUEL RIVERA, GALE YENCHA, NORMA JEAN )

DIAZ, and AGATHA JOHNSON, individually and on )

behalf of other similarly situated individuals,

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, MICHAEL P. STARKOWSKI, in his official capacity as

) )

Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Social )

Services, THOMAS A. KIRK, Jr., PhD., in his official )

capacity as Commissioner of the Connecticut

)

Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services, )

and J. ROBERT GALVIN, M.D., M.P.H., in his official )

capacity as Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Public Health,

)

)

)

Defendants.

3:06 Civ. 00179 (AWT)
Sept. 9, 2008

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT Plaintiffs the Connecticut Office of Protection and Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities (“OPA”) and Shannon Hemmingsen, Samuel Rivera, Gale Yencha, Norma Jean Diaz and Agatha Johnson (the “Individual Plaintiffs”) (collectively, OPA and the Individual Plaintiffs are referred to herein as “Plaintiffs”), sue the Defendants on behalf of approximately 200 individuals with mental illness presently residing in three nursing facilities in Connecticut – Chelsea Place Care Center in Hartford (“Chelsea Place”), Bidwell Care Center in Manchester (“Bidwell”), and West Rock Health Care Center, in New Haven (“West Rock”) – as well as numerous other individuals with mental illness who are at risk of entry into these facilities.

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Individuals with mental illness are needlessly isolated, segregated, and institutionalized in these facilities, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act.
Preliminary Statement 1. Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131 and 12132, prohibits discrimination against individuals with disabilities. Title II requires, inter alia, that “a public entity shall administer services, programs, and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.” See 8 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (emphasis added). Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, imposes similar obligations. 2. In Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999), the United States Supreme Court held that the ADA is violated when a state places people with mental illness in “unjustified isolation.” Id. at 597. The Court also held that a person with a mental illness may sue the state for failing to ensure that he or she is placed “in the most integrated setting appropriate to [his or her] needs” and that undue institutionalization of a person with a mental illness is discrimination by reason of disability under Title II of the ADA. Id. at 587. 3. This action is brought to enforce these mandates. Rather than comply with these laws, Defendants serve OPA’s constituents and the Individual Plaintiffs in “unjustified isolation” in settings that are not integrated, namely Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock. In these nursing homes, individuals with mental illness are needlessly segregated, inappropriately warehoused, and left without safeguards to ensure that they are discharged when appropriate. 4. Chelsea Place, Bidwell, West Rock, and other similar nursing facilities in Connecticut offer residents little or no rehabilitative treatment or discharge planning to promote integration into the community. As chronicled in articles in The New London Connecticut Day,
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Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock and other similar nursing facilities lack adequate staffing, psychiatric treatment, and activities and programming, and often fail to meet minimum health and safety standards. Kenton Robinson, Thousands With Psychiatric Disabilities Locked Away In Nursing Homes, THE DAY, Dec. 19, 2004, at 1; Robinson, Many Mentally Ill in State are Housed Without Proper Care, THE DAY, August 7, 2005, at 1.
5. Individuals with mental illness are left to languish in these facilities while equally affordable and more integrated community-based settings exist or could be made available. More integrated, community-based settings would more appropriately meet the needs of individuals with mental illness who are currently residing in these nursing facilities.
6. Individuals with mental illness are required to live in Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock solely because of the lack of community-based alternatives, such as supportive housing.1 In administering their programs, services and activities, Defendants have chosen to fund expensive institutional care in nursing homes rather than less costly care in integrated settings that would better meet these individuals’ needs. Because of Defendants’ failure to develop and fund community-based alternatives, individuals with mental illness often have nowhere to go but a nursing home. Indeed, many individuals with mental illness must choose between residence in a nursing home or homelessness.
7. On May 4, 2008, the Hartford Courant reported that “Connecticut is losing out on millions of dollars in Medicaid revenue because of its continued over-reliance on nursing homes to house the mentally ill.” Colin Poitras, Mental Health Policy Costs State Medicaid Funds, THE HARTFORD COURANT, May 4, 2008. Specifically, the article stated that “Connecticut lost
1 “Supportive housing,” as used in the Complaint, refers to programs that enable individuals with mental illness to live in their own apartments or homes. These individuals receive an array of supports and services tailored to their preferences and needs.
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$1 million in federal Medicaid reimbursement in 2007 and is expected to lose as much as $6.5 million this fiscal year because the number of clients admitted for mental health reasons at several nursing homes exceeded 50 percent of the home’s total population.” Furthermore, “[t]he nursing homes where young mentally ill residents currently exceed 50 percent of the population are the Bidwell Care Center in Manchester and the West Rock Health Care Center in New Haven.”
8. Defendants have violated Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by failing to assure that their programs, activities, and services are administered to individuals with mental illness in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs, and by failing to periodically review and reassess each individual’s need for nursing home care. Instead, individuals with mental illness are isolated and institutionalized at Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock in violation of Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, often for years on end.
9. Plaintiffs’ claims for violation of Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131 and 12132 are asserted against the individual Defendants only. Plaintiffs do not assert claims against the State of Connecticut for violation of Title II of the ADA.
10. Plaintiffs’ claims for violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, are asserted against both the State of Connecticut and the individual Defendants. The only claims asserted against the State of Connecticut are claims under Section 504.
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Parties Plaintiffs OPA 11. OPA is an authorized protection and advocacy agency under the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act (“PAIMI”), 42 U.S.C. § 10801, et. seq. OPA is also responsible for providing protection and advocacy services to individuals with disabilities pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-7 to 11. OPA has statutory authority to pursue legal, administrative and other appropriate remedies to ensure the protection of individuals with mental illness who are or will be receiving care and treatment in the State of Connecticut. 42 U.S.C. § 10805. 12. OPA is pursuing this action to protect and advocate for the rights and interests of residents of Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock, and those at risk of entry into these facilities, who are “individuals with mental illness” as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 10802. These individuals are OPA constituents, and are the direct and primary beneficiaries of OPA’s activities, including the prosecution of this litigation. 13. OPA’s constituents each have a significant mental illness and reside in or are at risk of entering “facilities” rendering care and treatment for mentally ill individuals, as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 10802. 14. OPA’s constituents have significant mental illnesses that substantially limit their ability to perform major life activities, such as self care, working, and interaction with others. They also have a record of such mental illnesses, and are regarded by Defendants as having such mental illnesses. They are therefore individuals with disabilities for purposes of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. 42 U.S.C. § 12102, 29 U.S.C. § 705(20).
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15. OPA’s constituents have each suffered injuries, or are at risk of suffering injuries, that would allow them to bring suit against Defendants in their own right.
16. OPA’s constituents possess the means to participate in, significantly influence and help guide OPA’s priorities and activities. As required under 42 U.S.C. § 10805(a)(6), OPA has established a “PAIMI Advisory Council” (the “Council”) which, according to the statute, “will advise the system on policies and priorities to be carried out in protecting and advocating the rights of individuals with mental illness.” Pursuant to the By-laws of the Council, its purpose is to:
a. Advise PAIMI program staff and the governing authority of the State Office of Protection and Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities on policies and priorities to be carried out in protecting and advocating for the rights of individuals with mental illness;
b. Complete a section of the annual PAIMI program performance report that describes the activities of the Council and its assessment of the operation and quality of services of the PAIMI program;
c. Work with the governing authority of the State Office of Protection and Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities and the PAIMI program members jointly to develop the annual statement of objectives and priorities for the PAIMI program; and
d. Obtain public input into the policies and priorities of the PAIMI program. 17. As required by statute, the Council must be comprised of at least 60 percent primary mental health consumers or family members of such individuals, with the chairperson being an individual who has received or is receiving mental health services or a family member of such an individual. 42 U.S.C. § 10805(a)(6)(B)-(C). Additional members of the Council “shall include attorneys, mental health professionals, individuals from the public who are knowledgeable about mental illness, a provider of mental health services, individuals who have received or are receiving mental health services, and family members of such individuals.” 42 U.S.C. § 10805(a)(6)(B).
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18. The Council is currently comprised of ten members, nine of whom (90%) are consumers of mental health services in the State of Connecticut. The Council is currently seeking additional members. The members of the Council also include family members of individuals with mental illness, an attorney representing individuals with mental illness in the public mental health system, an educator of individuals with mental illness, several graduates of Advocacy Unlimited, Inc. (a statewide agency operated and controlled by persons in recovery from psychiatric disabilities that provides, among other things, extensive educational training to persons with, or in recovery from, psychiatric disabilities), and a social worker who provides support services for homeless individuals with mental health needs in the State of Connecticut. According to the Council’s By-laws, each member of the Council “must have a commitment to promoting the legal and civil rights of persons with mental illness and advocating for their personal choices.”
19. The Council considers, nominates, and appoints its own members, including its chairperson. OPA’s Executive Director does not control or take part in the election of new members to the Council. Members may be removed only upon recommendation by the Council to the Executive Director. The Council’s By-laws provide that new members to the Council “shall be diverse, including people of color, recipients or former recipients of mental health services, people who have physical disabilities, and people from different geographic locations in the state.”
20. The Council holds official meetings once every other month to discuss, evaluate and implement OPA’s policies, priorities, procedures and activities. OPA’s Executive Director, PAIMI Program Director, and Managing Attorney typically attend these meetings. The Executive Director provides a report at the meetings of the Council concerning all matters of
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OPA’s activities. The Council also receives reports on proposed and ongoing litigation from OPA’s Managing Attorney, receives reports from the PAIMI Program Director on various issues concerning OPA’s activities, and receives presentations and/or training from various thirdparties, including representatives from the National Disability Rights Network, the Connecticut Urban Legal Initiative, and various State governmental agencies.
21. The Council, in conjunction with the Executive Director, establishes OPA’s PAIMI priorities for each fiscal year. To establish the PAIMI priorities, the Council holds public meetings throughout the State, in which persons with mental illness have the ability to provide input to the Council concerning issues that are important to them. The Council then votes on and approves the PAIMI priorities, which are made available to the public on OPA’s website and are subject to ongoing public comment. The Executive Director has never vetoed a priority established by the Council.
22. In 2007, the Council approved the “PAIMI Priorities,” which included, inter alia, OPA’s goal to “educate residents with psychiatric disabilities in long term care facilities such as: residential care homes and skilled nursing homes, about their rights and services and self advocacy.” One of the objectives of this goal was to provide outreach and advocacy to residents in locked behavioral health units in skilled nursing facilities.
23. The Council has also approved the “2007 Summary of Priorities,” which set forth, inter alia, the following goals:
a. Protect rights, identify barriers, and increase awareness of benefits related to community inclusion of people with disabilities;
b. Educate policymakers regarding barriers to living and working in communities by participating in legislative and administrative forums and hearings, and preparing written analyses and personal stories for inclusion in reports;
c. Safeguard the rights of persons with disabilities living in institutions or at risk of institutionalization; 8
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d. Advocate for the rights of people with mental retardation and mental illness who are incarcerated or are at risk of incarceration;
e. Conduct outreach to residents of long term care facilities; f. Identify and selectively join coalitions and organizations addressing the unavailability
of affordable, accessible housing for people with disabilities and families; and g. Learn about different supportive housing models and options. 24. The Council is also empowered to review OPA’s PAIMI budget and significant proposed expenditures, including budgets for litigation and funds earmarked for contracts entered into under PAIMI. Prior to making any significant financial commitment of PAIMI funds, OPA consults the Council. The Council receives quarterly expenditure reports from the Executive Director, and may question OPA’s expenditures or proposed expenditures at any time. 25. The chairperson of the Council also sits on the State Advocacy Board, which, according to the statute, “shall advise the executive director of the Office of Protection and Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities on matters relating to advocacy policy, client service priorities and issues affecting persons with disabilities.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-9. Two current members of the State Advocacy Board are individuals with mental illness, including one individual who resides in a nursing home and was previously confined to a locked unit. The State Advocacy Board provides recommendations concerning both OPA’s policies and priorities as a whole and the PAIMI priorities to OPA’s Executive Director. 26. OPA has established a direct grievance procedure pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 10805(a)(9), whereby persons with disabilities or their representatives or family members may file a written grievance with OPA where (1) there is a disagreement about the decision of OPA not to provide assistance or advocacy services; (2) there is dissatisfaction regarding the quality or extent of services provided; (3) there is a belief that OPA failed to fulfill its legal obligations; or (4) there is a belief that OPA has discriminated in the provision of its services on the basis of
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disability, race, or another prohibited basis. The grievance procedure is designed “to assure that individuals with mental illness have full access to the services of the system.” 42 U.S.C. § 10805(a)(9). The Council makes the final decision regarding the appropriate response to grievances filed with OPA, and has the power to overrule the initial determinations made by the PAIMI Program Director, the Managing Attorney, and OPA’s Executive Director.
27. The above allegations demonstrate that OPA’s constituents have the power to participate in and exert significant influence over OPA’s policies, priorities and activities. OPA provides the means by which these constituents “express their collective views and protect their collective interests.” Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 345 (1977). OPA is therefore the functional equivalent of a traditional membership organization, and OPA’s constituents possess sufficient indicia of membership in OPA so as to support OPA’s associational standing to sue on their behalf.
Shannon Hemmingsen 28. Plaintiff Shannon Hemmingsen, age 27 (born August 21, 1981), is a constituent of OPA who has mental illness, as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 10802, including borderline personality disorder, attention deficit disorder, and depression. 29. Ms. Hemmingsen has resided in Chelsea Place since approximately November 2004. She was admitted to Chelsea Place from the Institute of Living in Hartford, Connecticut. 30. Ms. Hemmingsen is ambulatory and very high functioning, active, and alert. She is a high school graduate. Prior to her admission to Chelsea Place, she worked at Stop & Shop and at Dunkin Donuts. 31. Ms. Hemmingsen does not have significant physical health needs or require skilled nursing care in an institutional setting, and has demonstrated skills and abilities to enable
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her to succeed in the community, including handling her own finances, and cooking her own meals. Her recent progress notes provide that she is “self-responsible.”
32. Ms. Hemmingsen has many outside interests and actively pursues opportunities relating to these interests. For example, Ms. Hemmingsen is involved in the church at Chelsea Place and participates in and voluntarily assists with numerous group activities at Chelsea Place.
33. Ms. Hemmingsen is able to take public transportation independently and successfully engages in activities in the community that are of interest to her, including attending films, shopping at local stores, and using the local library.
34. Ms. Hemmingsen wishes to leave Chelsea Place and to live in a more integrated community setting, in order to accelerate her rehabilitation and to lead a more independent life.
35. Throughout her residency in Chelsea Place, Ms. Hemmingsen has expressed her desire to live in a home in the community that is not institutional. Facility records indicate her desire to live more independently. Her recent medical records and progress notes reflect that she is a candidate for placement in an integrated community setting and housing options and availability are being “explored.”
36. Ms. Hemmingsen could live in the community if she were provided with the types of home and community-based supports and services currently provided in Connecticut.
37. Defendants, however, have failed to fund and provide adequate and appropriate, non-institutional placements in the community for Ms. Hemmingsen, and have taken no action to provide Ms. Hemmingsen the reasonable accommodations that would make a more integrated, noninstitutional community placement possible.
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Samuel Rivera 38. Plaintiff Samuel Rivera, age 42 (born August 5, 1966), is a constituent of OPA who has mental illness, as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 10802, including major depression with psychotic features. 39. People with this disorder are routinely served in integrated community settings. 40. Mr. Rivera has resided in Chelsea Place for approximately two years. He was homeless before being admitted to Chelsea Place. 41. Mr. Rivera is ambulatory with a cane and is active. He has full off-grounds privileges at Chelsea Place. 42. Mr. Rivera does not have significant physical health needs or require skilled nursing care in an institutional setting, and has demonstrated skills and abilities to enable him to succeed in the community, including initiating activities and setting his own goals. He is independent in all of his activities of daily living. 43. Mr. Rivera has many outside interests and would like the opportunity to explore them in the community. In Chelsea Place, he participates in exercise, reading, and horticulture activities. 44. Throughout his residency in Chelsea Place, Mr. Rivera has expressed his desire to live in a home in the community that is not institutional. 45. Mr. Rivera could live in an integrated, non-institutional setting if he was provided with the types of home and community-based supports and services currently provided in Connecticut. 46. Defendants have failed to provide Mr. Rivera with community-based services and have also failed to provide meaningful, adequate, and periodic assessments of Mr. Rivera’s potential for placement in the most integrated community setting available.
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47. Despite his demonstrated skills that would enable Mr. Rivera to succeed in more independent living, Defendants have failed to provide opportunities for him to lead a more independent and more productive life.
48. Defendants have failed to fund adequate and appropriate, noninstitutional community residential placements for Mr. Rivera, and have taken no action to provide Mr. Rivera the reasonable accommodations that would make a noninstitutional placement possible.
Gale Yencha 49. Plaintiff Gale Yencha, age 59 (born June 26, 1949), is a constituent of OPA who has mental illness, as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 10802, including major depression. People with this disorder are routinely served in integrated community settings. 50. Ms. Yencha has resided in Bidwell since approximately September 2006. Prior to her admission to Bidwell, she lived with her mother. 51. Ms. Yencha is ambulatory using a rolling walker and high functioning, active, and alert. She is a high school graduate. She previously worked for 20 years as a nurse’s aide in Rockville Hospital and has a certificate for private duty nursing. 52. Ms. Yencha does not have significant physical health needs or require skilled nursing care in an institutional setting, and has demonstrated skills and abilities to enable her to succeed in the community, including cooking her own meals and taking public transportation independently. 53. Ms. Yencha has many outside interests and actively pursues opportunities relating to these interests. For example, she engages in the news & coffee group, religious services, pet therapy, music, and is a member of the resident council.
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54. Ms. Yencha wishes to leave Bidwell and to live in a more integrated community setting with a roommate, in order to accelerate her rehabilitation and to lead a more independent life.
55. Throughout her residency in Bidwell, Ms. Yencha has expressed her desire to live in a home in the community that is not institutional. Facility records indicate her desire to live more independently. Although Bidwell’s administrator has suggested she go to a rest home, she would prefer to live in an apartment of her own in the community. Recent medical records and progress notes reflect that Bidwell does not have a discharge plan for Ms. Yencha.
56. Ms. Yencha could live in the community if she were provided with the types of home and community-based supports and services currently provided in Connecticut.
57. Defendants have failed to ensure adequate discharge planning for Ms. Yencha, even though she has demonstrated skills that would enable her to succeed in more independent living, and have failed to provide opportunities for her to lead a more independent and productive life.
58. Defendants have failed to provide Ms. Yencha with community-based services and have also failed to provide meaningful, adequate, and periodic assessments of Ms. Yencha’s potential for placement in the most integrated community setting available.
59. Defendants, however, have failed to fund and provide adequate and appropriate, noninstitutional placements in the community for Ms. Yencha, and have taken no action to provide Ms. Yencha the reasonable accommodations that would make a more integrated, noninstitutional community placement possible.
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Norma Jean Diaz 60. Plaintiff Norma Jean Diaz, age 61 (born December 21, 1946), is a constituent of OPA who has mental illness, as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 10802, including major depression, anxiety and post traumatic stress disorder. 61. People with these disorders are routinely served in integrated community settings. 62. Ms. Diaz has resided in Bidwell since approximately December 2006. 63. Ms. Diaz has expressed her desire to live in an apartment in the community that is not institutional. Her medical records reflect her desire to live in the community in an apartment with her son. 64. Ms. Diaz does not have significant physical health needs or require skilled nursing care, and is qualified to reside in an existing, less restrictive community-based setting. She has demonstrated skills and abilities that will enable her to succeed in the community, including doing her own laundry, shopping and cooking her own meals. 65. Throughout her residency at Bidwell, Ms. Diaz has engaged in numerous independent and group activities, including shopping and other trips outside the facility, walking, gardening, spiritual and religious activities, music, reading and writing, and also participates in the daily “news and coffee” group at Bidwell. Ms. Diaz’s medical records indicate that she independently chooses her own leisure activities, establishes her own goals, and is responsible for herself. Ms. Diaz is also permitted independent leaves of absence within the community. 66. Defendants have failed to provide Ms. Diaz with community-based services and have also failed to provide meaningful, adequate, and periodic assessments of Ms. Diaz potential for placement in the most integrated community setting available.
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67. Defendants have failed to fund and provide adequate and appropriate, noninstitutional placements in the community for Ms. Diaz, and have taken no action to provide Ms. Diaz the reasonable accommodations that would make a noninstitutional placement possible.
Agatha Johnson 68. Plaintiff Agatha Johnson is age 57 (born June 29, 1951) is a constituent of OPA. According to her patient records, Ms. Johnson has mental illness, as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 10802, including schizophrenia and depression. 69. People with these disorders are routinely served in integrated community settings. 70. Ms. Johnson has resided in West Rock since November 2003. 71. Prior to her admission to West Rock, Ms. Johnson lived in an apartment and received case management services from Cornerstone. She has also lived in a group home and received community-based services provided by Defendant DMHAS. 72. Ms. Johnson previously worked at Easter Seals for one year and at the Cabro Cheese Company. 73. Ms. Johnson is ambulatory and active and is able to take public transportation independently. She has had independent privileges for more than one year. Ms. Johnson travels into the community for shopping and to visit friends. She manages her own money and would like to work again. 74. Ms. Johnson attends resident council meetings. 75. Throughout her residency in West Rock, Ms. Johnson has expressed her desire to live in a home in the community that is not institutional. 76. Ms. Johnson does not have significant physical health needs or require skilled nursing care in an institutional setting.
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77. Defendants have failed to provide Ms. Johnson with community-based services and have also failed to provide meaningful, adequate, and periodic assessments of Ms. Johnson’s potential for placement in the most integrated community setting available.
78. Despite her demonstrated skills that would enable Ms. Johnson to succeed in more independent living, Defendants have failed to provide opportunities for her to lead a more independent and more productive life.
79. Defendants have failed to fund adequate and appropriate, noninstitutional community residential placements for Ms. Johnson, and have taken no action to provide Ms. Johnson the reasonable accommodations that would make a noninstitutional placement possible.
Defendants 80. Defendant, the State of Connecticut, is responsible for operating its programs, services, and activities in conformity with the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. Each individual Defendant is also responsible for operating programs, services, and activities in conformity with the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. 81. Defendant Thomas A. Kirk, Jr., Ph.D. is the Commissioner of the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services (“DMHAS”). DMHAS is responsible for providing a network of effective and efficient mental health and addiction services that foster selfsufficiency, dignity and respect. As the State’s mental health authority, DMHAS operates, funds and coordinates inpatient and community-based mental health services, including residential services, for adults 18 and older. It is responsible for delivery of all state-operated or statefunded mental health and addiction services. DMHAS manages the State’s behavioral health general funds, state-administered general assistance dollars, and the Community Mental Health Services block grant. It is responsible for the screening, evaluating, and monitoring of persons
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with a mental illness who reside in, or are at risk of entry into Connecticut nursing homes. DMHAS is responsible for contacting the nursing home administrator of any new admission with mental illness within fourteen days of admission concerning the individual’s status and discharge, and must protect, to the fullest extent possible, the existing housing of any DMHAS client. Public Act No. 08-184, Sec. 576(b). Defendant Kirk is sued in his official capacity only.
82. Defendant Michael P. Starkowski is the Commissioner of the Department of Social Services (“DSS”). DSS provides services to individuals with disabilities who need help in maintaining or achieving self-direction, self-reliance, and independent living. DSS is one of Connecticut’s largest agencies, responsible for administration of over one third of the state budget, more than $4 billion. DSS is the state agency responsible for administration of the Medicaid program, the Section 8 Housing Voucher Program, and Vocational Rehabilitation Services. DSS is required to ensure that people with mental illness are appropriately screened and maintained in nursing homes. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17b-262. Defendant Starkowski is sued in his official capacity only.
83. Defendant J. Robert Galvin, M.D., M.P.H., is the Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Public Health (“DPH”). DPH is the state agency responsible for regulatory oversight of health care facilities and services in Connecticut, and the licensing and regulation of long term care and nursing facilities. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 19a-490, et seq. As part of a comprehensive health care system, DPH determines the number of nursing home beds available, and determines whether nursing facilities are in compliance with federal and state statutes and regulations governing the quality of care and rights of residents in nursing homes. Those laws include the prohibition on admission or continuing confinement of individuals who
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do not have skilled nursing needs, the unjustified use of locked units, the failure to ensure treatment services are provided, and the failure to do proper discharge planning. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. §§ 483.1 et seq.; Public Act No. 08-184, Sec. 57(a); DPH Public Health Code 19-13D8t(b)(3)(A). To ensure enforcement of these laws, DPH conducts annual unannounced surveys of each nursing home and investigates complaints regarding violations of residents’ rights. If a survey or complaint investigation finds that a nursing home is not providing care in compliance with the law, DPH is empowered to seek remedies that include a directed plan of correction, directed in-service training, temporary management, state monitoring, denial of payment for new admissions, civil money penalties, and closure of the facility and transfer of residents. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 488.303; see also Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 19a-535. Defendant Galvin is sued in his official capacity only.
84. The State of Connecticut is a public entity subject to the requirements of Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12131. DMHAS, DSS and DPH are public entities subject to the requirements of Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12131.
85. The State of Connecticut is a recipient of federal funds subject to the requirements of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. DMHAS, DSS and DPH are recipients of federal funds subjecting them and the State of Connecticut to the requirements of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794.
Jurisdiction and Venue 86. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343. 87. Venue in the District of Connecticut is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391. 88. Declaratory and injunctive relief are sought under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq.
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Facts Individuals with Mental Illness in Nursing Homes 89. When the State of Connecticut closed and downsized state hospitals, it failed to develop the supports and services, including residential services that individuals with mental illness need to live in the community. FINAL REPORT OF THE MENTAL HEALTH CABINET, December 21, 2004, at 4 (“Connecticut downsized and closed state mental hospitals that tended to warehouse patients ... Savings derived from closures were not reinvested to create an effective community-based mental health safety net.”). 90. As a result, many individuals with mental illness now live in nursing homes, in which they are needlessly isolated, segregated, and institutionalized. 91. More than 2,700 individuals with serious mental illness live in nursing homes in Connecticut. The majority (53%) are under the age of 65. Admissions of individuals with serious mental illness to nursing homes are growing at a rate of between five and ten percent per year. FINAL REPORT OF THE MENTAL HEALTH CABINET, December 21, 2004, at 5. 92. Serving individuals with mental illness in nursing homes “is neither humane nor recovery-oriented.” FINAL REPORT OF THE MENTAL HEALTH CABINET, December 21, 2004, at 12. 93. “If community-based services are not [made] available, children and adults with mental illness will continue to fill expensive, inappropriate, and non-therapeutic settings such as .... nursing homes or simply go untreated.” FINAL REPORT OF THE MENTAL HEALTH CABINET, December 21, 2004, at Introduction by Lt. Gov. Kevin B. Sullivan, p. 2; see also id. at 12 (nursing homes “are the only option[] for many.”). 94. It costs the State approximately $50,000 to $80,000 per year for the care and treatment of an individual with mental illness in a nursing home. This is far more than it would cost the State to provide care in a more integrated, community-based setting.
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95. Individuals with mental illness are frequently placed in nursing homes solely to obtain mental health care that could easily be provided in an integrated, community-based setting. Often, these individuals do not have a significant physical health problem.
96. Defendants have failed to adequately assess and identify the long-term care needs of Plaintiffs and the Class they represent and to determine whether those needs could be appropriately met in integrated, community-based settings. Moreover, Defendants have failed to inform Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class members of the availability of alternatives to nursing home care and have denied them the right to choose home and community-based services instead of institutional care. DPH Public Health Code 19-13-D8t(d)(1).
97. Defendants routinely approve and fund care of individuals with mental illness in nursing homes such as Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock when such individuals are capable of receiving and would prefer receiving care in a more integrated, community-based setting.
98. Some nursing homes, including Chelsea Place and Bidwell, are locked or have locked psychiatric units. Residents cannot leave or go outside without permission. Often, an escort is required. Individuals with mental illness are placed in locked settings although there is no judicial determination that they are dangerous to themselves or others.
99. Most residents with mental illness remain in nursing homes for years because they lack the opportunity to obtain services in more integrated, community-based settings.
100. Despite the authority and legal obligation to do so, DPH does not effectively enforce the federal and state laws designed to ensure that nursing homes comply with the conditions of participation in Medicare and Medicaid, including the conditions relating to residents’ rights and quality of care. DPH does not effectively use the many remedies within its
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power to ensure that nursing homes abide by the laws prohibiting the admission of individuals without skilled nursing needs, the unjustified use of locked units, or the lack of proper discharge planning. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. §§ 483.1 et seq.; 42 C.F.R. § 488.303; DPH Public Health Code 19-13-D8t(b)(3)(A); DPH Public Health Code 19-13-D8t(d)(1), (o)(2)(I), (o)(2)(P), and (p); Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 19a-535 and 19a-523.
101. Defendants do not ensure, consistent with Olmstead, that individuals with mental illness in nursing homes have the option of being served in a more integrated, community-based setting. More than a decade after the effective date of the ADA, and more than six years after Olmstead was decided, Defendants have yet to develop or implement a comprehensive and effective working plan that identifies individuals with mental illness who are needlessly in nursing homes and helps them move to more integrated settings.
102. Defendants have long been aware, through reports of state agencies, the press, and other sources, of the unnecessary isolation, segregation, and institutionalization of individuals with mental illness in nursing homes, including in locked settings.
Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock 103. Chelsea Place is a 234-bed skilled nursing facility located in Hartford. In 2002, Chelsea Place converted unit 2C into a locked, secured psychiatric unit. Approximately 22 residents with mental illness live in the locked unit. Upon information and belief, at least 25 other individuals with mental illness live in Chelsea Place. These residents may leave the building only if granted a pass. 104. Bidwell (also known as Touchpoints Rehabilitation and Wellness Center, LLC) is a 156-bed skilled nursing facility located in Manchester. It is a locked facility. Both of Bidwell’s floors, each with about 75 residents, are locked. The second floor is a locked
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psychiatric unit. Upon information and belief, at least 85 residents of Bidwell have mental illness. Following an annual review by nurses from DSS, the State was required to designated Bidwell an Institution for Mental Disease (“IMD”) since August 2007 because more than 50% of Bidwell’s residents have mental illness. The IMD designation means that the federal government does not provide federal Medicaid reimbursement for any services provided to individuals over age 21 and under age 65. 42 C.F.R. § 1936(d)(i). The State is therefore foregoing the federal Medicaid reimbursement for Bidwell and bears all of the costs for treatment and care of individuals with mental illness who reside in Bidwell. However, rather than reduce its census, Bidwell has requested to reconfigure the facility to admit more residents with short term medical rehabilitation needs.
105. West Rock (also known as New Haven Health Care Inc.) is a 90-bed intermediate care nursing facility in New Haven. The facility is unlocked, but is surrounded by a perimeter fence. Residents cannot leave without permission. Upon information and belief, at least 70 of the residents have mental illness. Following an annual review by nurses from DSS, the State was required to designate West Rock as an IMD since November 2007 because more than 50% of West Rock’s residents have mental illness. The State is therefore foregoing the federal Medicaid reimbursement for West Rock and bears all of the costs for treatment and care of individuals with mental illness who reside in West Rock.
106. In fiscal year 2007, the State lost more than $1 million in federal Medicaid reimbursement because Bidwell and West Rock were designated as IMD’s. In the first six months of 2008, the State has lost approximately $3.4 million in federal Medicaid reimbursement for these two facilities. Upon information and belief, all new admissions to Bidwell and West Rock must be pre-authorized by the DSS Medicaid unit.
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107. Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock are institutions with characteristics similar to those of a psychiatric hospital. The State has identified each of these facilities as “institutional” facilities. See MFP Rebalancing Demonstration Operational Project, Appendix G. They place many limitations on residents’ autonomy and privacy. Residents live a highly regimented lifestyle, spending most of their days in a few rooms among a great many other individuals with disabilities. They must abide by the nursing homes’ restrictive rules and policies.
108. Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock are loud and impersonal. Announcements about meals, medications, phone calls, events, and administrative matters are constantly broadcast into all rooms over an intercom system. The common areas have televisions, which are almost always on.
109. Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock provide very few recreational or other activities aimed at helping residents gain independence. Cigarettes are distributed in limited numbers and at designated times. Residents spend hours watching television in a common room or waiting for the designated smoking break. Some residents are able to attend activities outside the facility; however, at the end of the day, they return to Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock.
110. Residents of Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock have virtually no privacy. Residents are not allowed to have personal telephones. Payphones are located in the common TV rooms, hallways, or lounges, where anyone can overhear conversations. Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock have policies limiting the use of the telephone.
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111. The lack of privacy makes it difficult for residents to exercise their rights. When they make phone calls, they risk having their conversation overheard by staff and other residents. Many are fearful that if an advocate calls them at the facility, staff will find out and retaliate.
112. Residents of Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock have little contact with members of the community outside the facility. Usually, trips out of the facility are conducted in groups escorted by staff. Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock all have curfews and set visiting hours. In Bidwell and Chelsea Place, residents may not have visitors in their rooms.
113. Residents of Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock have almost no control over their personal space. Most residents of Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock share a bedroom and bathroom with one to three other people. Residents are not allowed to choose their own roommates except under rare circumstances. There is almost no space for personal items. Residents have extremely limited control over who has access to their rooms.
114. Residents of Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock are permitted to retain only a small “personal needs allowance” from their SSI checks. This allowance is currently $57.00 a month, or a little less than $2.00 per day. The remaining amount is paid to the nursing home. A resident’s privileges may be suspended if he or she borrows, loans, buys from or sells items to other residents.
115. In Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock, residents have very limited choice over what they eat and no choice over when they eat. No foods, liquids, or gifts can be brought into the facilities without being examined by nursing staff. Meals and medication are dispensed at specific times. At Bidwell and West Rock, all the residents on a given floor must eat together; the same is true for residents of Chelsea Place’s locked unit. West Rock and Bidwell have
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assigned seating in the dining room; residents may not choose with whom they eat. At Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock, residents are not allowed to keep most foods in their rooms.
116. Residents of Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock receive little or no education or information about the limited community-based alternatives to nursing homes that do exist. Discharge planning is not regularly conducted. Many residents fear that if they leave the nursing home, they will become homeless.
117. Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock provide little or no rehabilitative treatment that promotes independence and integration into the community. The facilities do not provide training in symptom management, medication management, shopping, cooking, housekeeping, money management, or using transportation or community-based services. The facilities provide limited social work services.
118. A contract psychiatrist visits Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock once a month.
119. Numerous DSS inspection reports of Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock have documented health, safety, and sanitation problems. Inspection reports have also documented a lack of treatment and discharge planning.
Locked Psychiatric Units in Chelsea Place and Bidwell 120. More than 100 individuals with mental illness live in locked units at Chelsea Place and Bidwell. Many have no treatment or discharge plans. Individuals often remain in locked units for years. 121. Residents of the locked units at Chelsea Place and Bidwell are subject to highly restrictive “behavior management” programs in which they earn “privileges” for compliance with institutional and staff rules. Residents’ freedom to leave the units depends largely on staff’s
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assessment of how well they comply with institutional rules. If they do not participate in structured activities, or if they violate a rule, such as bringing food in their rooms, they can lose “privileges.”
122. Professional standards require that behavior management programs for individuals with mental illness be individualized and rely primarily on rewards rather than punishments. The behavioral management programs at Chelsea Place and Bidwell are not individualized, rely primarily on punitive measures, and do not meet professional standards.
123. At Bidwell, residents of the locked unit are assigned to one of five “levels” or “Steps,” each with its own “privileges.” While it can take months to “earn” a higher Step, a Bidwell resident’s current Step can be reduced at any time for infractions of Bidwell’s rules. At first, all residents are assigned to Step One, the most restrictive. Residents on Step One may not leave Bidwell, although they can have supervised smoking breaks in the outdoor Gazebo and can participate in supervised walks. Step Two residents can leave the facility on recreation trips if accompanied by staff. Step Three residents can leave the facility with a third party, such as a family member, but only during daytime hours. Step Four residents can leave the facility overnight with a third party and be unsupervised at the outdoor Gazebo for up to one hour at a time. Step Five residents have unsupervised grounds passes, although they are subject to curfews and other restrictions. Step Five residents can also spend up to 21 nights away from the facility each year. All of these “privileges” are contingent on complying with unit rules and participating in scheduled groups or activities.
124. Residents of the locked unit at Chelsea Place are subject to a similar program, with three tiers. All new residents are placed on Tier I, the most restrictive level. Tier I residents are checked every 15 minutes, and are confined to the unit except for scheduled off-unit
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activities with staff. Tier I residents can smoke only during designated breaks with staff supervision. Tier II residents may leave the unit with family members, or other approved individuals, or to participate in activities with staff. Tier III residents may leave the unit unaccompanied and smoke without supervision, but staff may impose restrictions on these “privileges.”
Community-Based Services 125. Defendants do provide community-based services to many individuals with mental illness. With appropriate and individualized community-based services, those individuals are able to live with family, in their own apartment or home, or in supportive housing. 126. Many of the individuals to whom Defendants provide community-based services have mental illnesses and functional capacities that are the same as, or are similar to, the individuals living in Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock. 127. If provided community-based services, virtually all individuals with mental illness in Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock could live with family, in their own apartment or home, or in supportive housing. 128. Many individuals with mental illness living in Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock would prefer to live with family, in their own apartment or home, or in supportive housing. Some may need education and support in order to make an informed choice. 129. Each of these options – living with family, in one’s own apartment or home, or in supportive housing – would allow individuals who are currently in Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock to live and receive services in a more integrated setting. Each of these options would afford residents much more choice, freedom, and privacy, as well as the opportunity to maintain
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regular family relationships and to interact with and form friendships with people who do not have disabilities.
130. In supportive housing, individuals with mental illness are not required to live solely with other individuals who have a disability. They have friends of their own choosing and have visitors and telephone conversations at the times of their choice in the privacy of their homes. They go to stores to shop for food and other necessities. They may engage in social activities of their choice. They tend to these and other daily needs to the degree they are able, with supportive services. These programs are designed to foster independence and to enable individuals to become as self-sufficient as possible. Unlike nursing homes, they are not institutional in character.
131. Individuals with mental illness continue to live and receive services in Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock due to inappropriate placement at the facilities, failure to implement discharge planning, and, primarily because there are insufficient community-based services, including supportive housing, to allow them to move to more integrated settings.
132. Many current residents entered Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock upon discharge from a psychiatric hospital. Upon discharge, they had nowhere else to live.
133. When individuals with mental illness are placed in Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock, opportunities for discharge, including discharge to supportive housing, are rare. There are long waiting lists for admission to supportive housing and other community-based programs that provide residential services.
134. Individuals with mental illness at Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock lack information about community-based alternatives and receive little assistance in moving to more integrated settings.
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135. Residents are left to stagnate in these nursing homes. Often, they fear retaliation if they express a desire to leave.
Defendants’ Administration of Programs, Services, and Activities 136. Defendants administer one or more systems of care for individuals with mental illness. 137. Defendants administer their programs, services, and activities, and/or fail to enforce state regulations, in a manner that supports and encourages the needless isolation, segregation, and institutionalization of individuals with mental illness. 138. In providing services to individuals with mental illness, and in providing longterm care, Defendants have relied too heavily on nursing homes such as Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock. 139. Defendants have failed to develop and fund sufficient capacity in communitybased programs, forcing into Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock scores of individuals with mental illness who could be served, and would prefer to be served, in more integrated settings. 140. Providing community-based services to individuals with mental illness at Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock would not be a fundamental alteration of Defendants’ services for people with mental illness or of its long-term care services. The individuals with mental illness at Chelsea Place, Bidwell and West Rock could be served in more integrated settings at a cost equivalent to or less than Defendants’ current costs. Defendants already provide, in communitybased settings, all the types of services and supports these individuals need. 141. Each service and support currently provided to residents with mental illness at Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock could be provided in an integrated, community-based setting.
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Class Allegations 142. The Individual Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) on behalf of all individuals with mental illness, as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 10802, presently residing in Chelsea Place, Bidwell and West Rock, who, with appropriate supports and services, could live in the community. The Individual Plaintiffs are members of the Class they seek to represent. 143. This action is brought and may properly be maintained as a class action pursuant to the provisions of FRCP 23(a)(1)-(4) and 23(b)(1)-(3). The Individual Plaintiffs seek certification of the Class described in the paragraph immediately above. 144. The Individual Plaintiffs are informed and believe that the Class is comprised of hundreds of current residents of Chelsea Place, Bidwell and West Rock and are so numerous that joinder of individual members herein is impracticable. 145. Questions of law and fact are common to the members of the Class. Common questions of fact and law include: a. Whether Defendants have violated the integration provisions of Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and/or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794; b. Whether Defendants are administering services, programs, and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of individuals with mental illness residing in Chelsea Place, Bidwell and West Rock; c. Whether Defendants have subjected individuals with mental illness to unjustified isolation by placing them in Chelsea Place, Bidwell and West Rock; d. Whether Defendants have failed to offer sufficient rehabilitative treatment or discharge planning to promote the integration of individuals with mental illness residing in Chelsea Place, Bidwell and West Rock into more integrated, community-based settings;
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e. Whether Defendants have allowed individuals with mental illness to languish in Chelsea Place, Bidwell and West Rock while equally affordable and more integrated community-based settings exist or could be made available;
f. Whether Defendants have failed to develop, fund and/or effectively utilize existing community-based programs so that individuals with mental illness residing in Chelsea Place, Bidwell and West Rock may be placed in more integrated, community-based settings;
g. Whether Defendants have unlawfully excluded individuals with mental illness residing in Chelsea Place, Bidwell and West Rock from participating in community-based services;
h. Whether Defendants have failed to establish and/or implement a comprehensive, effectively working plan to place individuals with mental illness residing in Chelsea Place, Bidwell and West Rock into more integrated, community-based settings;
i. Whether Defendants have a reasonably-paced waiting list not controlled by Defendants’ efforts to keep Chelsea Place, Bidwell and West Rock fully populated, in which individuals with mental illness residing in Chelsea Place, Bidwell and West Rock may be placed into more integrated, community-based settings;
j. Whether Defendants have failed to effectively participate in Medicaid waiver programs to fund community-based programs; and
k. Whether Plaintiffs’ request for community-based services can be reasonably accommodated by Defendants.
146. The claims of the Individual Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the Plaintiff Class members. The Individual Plaintiffs and all members of the Plaintiff Class have been similarly affected by Defendants’ common course of conduct. Claims of all Class members
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Case 3:06-cv-00179-AWT Document 123 Filed 09/09/08 Page 33 of 41 depend on a showing of Defendants’ common course of conduct, which gives Individual Plaintiffs, individually and as class representatives, the right to relief sought by this complaint.
147. There is no conflict as between the Individual Plaintiffs and other members of the Class who they seek to represent with respect to this action, or with respect to the claims for relief set forth herein.
148. The Individual Plaintiffs are able to and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class.
149. A class action is superior to other available methods for fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
150. Certification of the Plaintiff Class is appropriate under FRCP 23(b)(1), (2) and/or (3).
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Count I Violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act Mandate to Administer Services and Programs in the Most Integrated Setting
151. Plaintiffs repeat the allegations of all of the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. This claim is brought against the individual Defendants only.
152. Plaintiff OPA’s constituents, the Individual Plaintiffs, and the Class are individuals with mental illnesses. They have mental impairments that substantially limit one or more major life activity, such as self-care and interaction with others. They also have a record of such mental illnesses and are regarded by Defendants as having such mental illnesses.
153. The Individual Plaintiffs and the Class presently reside in Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock, and OPA’s constituents presently reside in, or are at risk of entry in Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock. Plaintiff OPA’s constituents, the Individual Plaintiffs, and the Class are qualified to participate in more integrated community-based programs that would meet their needs. Plaintiff OPA’s constituents, the Individual Plaintiffs, and the Class are therefore qualified individuals with disabilities within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1213 1(2).
154. Serving Plaintiff OPA’s constituents, the Individual Plaintiffs, and the Class in more integrated settings can be reasonably accommodated.
155. Defendants Michael P. Starkowski, Thomas A. Kirk, Jr., PhD., and J. Robert Galvin, M.D., M.P.H., are responsible for the operation of public entities covered by Title II of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1213 1(1)(A) and (B). Title II of the ADA prohibits Defendants from discriminating against individuals with disabilities in programs and activities. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131, 12132.
156. The United States Department of Justice has promulgated regulations under Title II of the ADA stating that “a public entity shall administer services, programs and activities in
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the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.” See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d). Such regulations further define “most integrated setting” as “...a setting that enables individuals with disabilities to interact with non-disabled persons to the fullest extent possible.” 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, App. A, p. 450.
157. Defendants are obligated under the ADA to administer Connecticut programs in a manner that makes services and programs available in the most integrated setting for individuals with disabilities.
158. Defendants have failed to meet this obligation. Defendants are instead requiring hundreds of individuals to live and receive services in Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock, although these facilities are not the most integrated settings appropriate to their needs. Defendants are also failing to require that the facilities review and re-evaluate individuals’ needs as appropriate.
Count II Violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act’s Prohibition on Using Methods of
Administration that Subject Individuals with Disabilities to Discrimination
159. Plaintiffs repeat the allegations of all of the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. This claim is brought against the individual Defendants only.
160. The Individual Plaintiffs and the Class presently reside in Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock, and OPA’s constituents presently reside in, or are at risk of entry in Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock. Plaintiff OPA’s constituents, the Individual Plaintiffs, and the Class are qualified to participate in more integrated community-based programs that meet their needs.
161. Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131, 12132, prohibits Defendants from discriminating against individuals with disabilities.
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162. Regulations implementing Title II of the ADA provide that:
a public entity may not, directly or through contractual or other arrangements, utilize criteria or other methods of administration: (i) That have the effect of subjecting qualified individuals with disabilities to discrimination on the basis of disability; [or] (ii) That have the purpose or effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the public entity’s program with respect to individuals with disabilities . . . . 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(3). 163. Defendants, however, utilize methods of administration that have the effect of
subjecting individuals with mental disabilities to discrimination. Defendants continue to use
methods of administration that perpetuate the use of nursing homes, rather than facilitating the
receipt of services in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of Plaintiff OPA’s
constituents, the Individual Plaintiffs, and the Class. Such methods result in continued placement
of Plaintiff OPA’s constituents, the Individual Plaintiffs, and the Class in settings that are
segregated and inappropriate.
Count III
Failure to Administer Services in the Most Integrated Setting Appropriate in Violation of the Rehabilitation Act
164. Plaintiffs repeat the allegations of all of the above paragraphs as if fully set forth
herein. This claim is brought against all Defendants.
165. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, provides:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from participation in, be denied benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. 166. Defendants are recipients of Federal financial assistance. DPH, DMHAS and
DSS are programs receiving Federal financial assistance.
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167. Defendants Michael P. Starkowski, Thomas A. Kirk, Jr., PhD., and J. Robert Galvin, M.D., M.P.H, respectively, are responsible for the operation of DSS, DMHAS and DPH.
168. Plaintiff OPA’s constituents, the Individual Plaintiffs, and the Class who reside in Chelsea Place, Bidwell, and West Rock are qualified to participate in more integrated community-based programs that meet their needs.
169. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act requires Defendants to serve individuals with disabilities in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs.
170. Serving Plaintiff OPA’s constituents, the Individual Plaintiffs, and the Class in more integrated settings can be reasonably accommodated.
171. Defendants have violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by failing to administer services to Plaintiff OPA’s constituents, the Individual Plaintiffs, and the Class in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs. Defendants also fail to require that the facilities accept only individuals with skilled nursing needs, and to review and reevaluate individuals’ needs as appropriate and provide discharge planning.
Count IV Violation of the Rehabilitation Act’s Prohibition on Using Methods of Administration that Subject Individuals with Disabilities to Discrimination
172. Plaintiffs repeat the allegations of all of the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. This claim is brought against all Defendants.
173. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 prohibits Defendants from discriminating against individuals with disabilities.
174. Regulations implementing Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provide that: a recipient may not, directly or through contractual or other arrangements, utilize criteria or methods of administration: (i) That have the effect of subjecting qualified handicapped persons to 37
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discrimination on the basis of disability; [or] (ii) That have the purpose or effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the recipient’s program with respect to handicapped persons . . . . 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b). 175. Defendants are recipients of Federal financial assistance. DPH, DMHAS and DSS are programs receiving Federal financial assistance. 176. Defendants Michael P. Starkowski, Thomas A. Kirk, Jr., PhD., and J. Robert Galvin, M.D., M.P.H., respectively, are responsible for the operation of DSS, DMHAS and DPH. 177. Defendants use methods of administration that have the effect of subjecting Plaintiff OPA’s constituents, the Individual Plaintiffs, and the Class to discrimination. Defendants use methods of administration that perpetuate the use of nursing homes rather than facilitate the receipt of services in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of Plaintiff OPA’s constituents, the Individual Plaintiffs, and the Class. Such methods result in continued placement of Plaintiff OPA’s constituents, the Individual Plaintiffs, and the Class in settings that are segregated and inappropriate.
Prayer for Relief WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request the following relief: a. Certifying this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; b. Designating Individual Plaintiffs as class representatives and counsel for Individual Plaintiffs as counsel for the Class; c. Declaratory and injunctive relief, including an order requiring that Defendants promptly take such steps as are necessary to enable Plaintiff OPA’s constituents, the Individual
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Plaintiffs, and the Class to receive services in the most integrated setting appropriate to their
needs;
d. An award of prevailing party costs, including attorney fees; and
e. Such other relief as the Court deems appropriate.
Respectfully submitted,
STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
By: /s/ Kenneth Pasquale Kenneth Pasquale, Esq. Fed. Bar No. CT 20043 kpasquale@stroock.com Joseph E. Strauss, Esq. Fed. Bar No. CT 23035 jstrauss@stroock.com Danielle Alfonzo Walsman, Esq. Fed. Bar. No. PHV095 dwalsman@stroock.com 180 Maiden Lane New York, New York 10038 Telephone: (212) 806-5400 Facsimile: (212) 806-6006
-and-
BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW
Ira A. Burnim, Esq. Fed. Bar No. PHV0893 irab@bazelon.org Karen A. Bower, Esq. Fed. Bar No. PHV0892 karenb@bazelon.org 1101 15th Street, N.W., Suite 1212 Washington, D.C. 20005 Telephone: (202) 467-5730 Facsimile: (202) 223-0409
-and-
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OFFICE OF PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES
Nancy B. Alisberg, Esq. Fed. Bar No. CT 21321 nancy.alisberg@po.state.ct.us 60B Weston Street Hartford, CT 06120 Telephone: (860) 297-4300 Facsimile: (860) 566-8714
-andRELMAN & ASSOCIATES Michael Allen Fed. Bar No. PHV0891 mallen@relmanlaw.com 1225 Nineteenth Street, NW Washington, DC 20036-2456 Telephone: (202) 728-1888 Facsimile: (202) 728-0848 Counsel for State of Connecticut Office of Protection and Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities and the Individual Plaintiffs
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Case 3:06-cv-00179-AWT Document 123 Filed 09/09/08 Page 41 of 41 CERTIFICATION
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing First Amended Complaint was filed electronically and served by mail on anyone unable to accept electronic filing on September 9, 2008. Notice of this filing will be sent by e-mail to all parties by operation of the Court’s electronic filing system or by mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing as indicated on the notice of Electronic Filing. Parties may access this filing through the Court’s system.
By: _/s/___________________________ Nancy B. Alisberg
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 Case 3:06-cv-00179-AWT Document 188 Filed 06/25/10 Page 1 of 4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

--------------------------------------------x

STATE OF CONNECTICUT OFFICE OF PROTECTION :

AND ADVOCACY FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, :

SHANNON HEMMINGSEN, SAMUEL RIVERA, GALE

:

YENCHA, NORMA JEAN DIAZ, and AGATHA

:

JOHNSON, individually and on behalf of

:

other similarly situated individuals,

:

Plaintiffs,

:

:

v.

:

:

THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, MICHAEL P.

:

STARKOWSKI, in his official capacity as

:

Commissioner of the Connecticut Department :

of Social Services, THOMAS A. KIRK, Jr.,

:

PhD., in his official capacity as

:

Commissioner of the Connecticut Department :

of Mental Health and Addiction Services,

:

and J. ROBERT GALVIN, M.D., M.P.H., in his :

official capacity as Commissioner of the

:

Connecticut Department of Public Health,

:

Defendants.

:

--------------------------------------------x

Civil Case No. 3:06CV00179(AWT)

ORDER RE MOTION TO AMEND

For the reasons set forth below, the defendants’ Motion to Amend

Decision Denying Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) Motions to

Dismiss to Add the Certification of the District Judge that the

Decision Involves Controlling Questions of Law as to which there is

Substantial Ground for Difference of Opinion Where Allowance of an

Immediate Interlocutory Appeal May Materially Advance the Ultimate

Termination of the Litigation (Doc. No. 176) is hereby DENIED.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292, the court can certify an order for

interlocutory appeal if it is “of the opinion that such order [1]

involves a controlling question of law[, 2] as to which there is

substantial ground for difference of opinion and [3] that an immediate

appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination

of the litigation . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

Case 3:06-cv-00179-AWT Document 188 Filed 06/25/10 Page 2 of 4
The first issue as to which the defendants seek a certification for interlocutory appeal is whether OPA has standing to sue. The defendants argue that this issue presents a controlling question of law because it goes to the subject matter jurisdiction of the court to entertain the action. However, regardless of whether the defendants’ position on OPA’s standing is correct, the Individual Plaintiffs will continue to prosecute this action on their own behalf and on behalf of the class certified by the court, so the defendants have not identified an issue that is controlling. For the same reason, an immediate appeal on this issue will not materially advance the ultimate termination of this litigation. In re The City of New York, - - F.3d - -, 2010 WL 2294134, *6 (2d Cir. Jan. 9, 2010)(“The certification of an interlocutory appeal under that statute, which is entirely a matter of discretion for the District Court, is appropriate only when ‘an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.’” (citation omitted.)).
The second issue as to which the defendants seek a certification for interlocutory appeal is whether the First Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges facts demonstrating that each of the defendants violated the plaintiffs’ rights under the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and whether the complaint asserts a claim upon which relief can be granted. The defendants disagree with the court’s conclusion that, under the applicable legal standards, the plaintiffs have set forth factual allegations sufficient to state a claim based on the integration mandate, to state a methods of administration claim, and to demonstrate that the defendants harmed them. “It is a
2

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basic tenet of federal law to delay appellate review until a final judgment has been entered. [See] Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 475, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 2461, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978).” Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda Ltd., 101 F.3d 863, 865 (2d Cir. 1996).
As a general matter, rulings on the sufficiency of pleadings are not appropriate for interlocutory review. Decisions on the pleadings may be appropriate for interlocutory review when they present difficult questions of substantive law, rather than the technical sufficiency of the pleadings, but here the sufficiency of the pleadings is exactly the issue. In re Pall Corp., No. 07-CV-3359(JS)(ARL), 2009 WL 4282081, *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2009) (citations omitted). Here there is no difficult question of substantive law presented. While the defendants point to the fact that because their arguments attack subject matter jurisdiction, reversal of the court’s decision would terminate the litigation, “it continues to be true that only exceptional circumstances [will] justify a departure from the basic policy of postponing appellate review until after the entry of a final judgment.” Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 921 F,2d 21, 25 (2d Cir. 1990)(quotation mark omitted.) No exceptional circumstances are present here. As to each of the issues, the defendants express concern about the precedential impact of the court’s order. However, the court has not granted relief to the plaintiffs. The court only determined that the plaintiffs can proceed with their claims. A review of the claims raised in this case based on a full record after dispositive motions or trial is preferable in terms of allowing the Court of Appeals to conduct a through review of the issues and also in terms of avoiding the possibility of a reversal with a remand that allows for
3

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repleading. See, e.g., Gottesman v. General Motors Corporation, 268 F.2d 194, 196 (2d Cir. 1959)(“[A] reversal at most could lead only to a remand for repleading, with possibilities of further interlocutory appeals thereafter.”).
Thus, the court is not of the opinion that either of the orders that are the subject of the defendants’ motion meets the criteria in § 1292(b).
It is so ordered. Dated this 25th day of June, 2010 at Hartford, Connecticut.
/s/AWT Alvin W. Thompson United States District Judge
4

 
 Case 3:06-cv-00179-AWT Document 174 Filed 03/31/10 Page 1 of 42

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

----------------------------------------x

STATE OF CONNECTICUT OFFICE OF

:

PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY FOR PERSONS

:

WITH DISABILITIES, SHANNON HEMMINGSEN, :

SAMUEL RIVERA, GALE YENCHA, NORMA JEAN :

DIAZ, and AGATHA JOHNSON, individually :

and on behalf of other similarly

:

situated individuals,

:

:

Plaintiff,

:

:

v.

:

:

THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, MICHAEL P. :

STARKOWSKI, in his official capacity as :

Commissioner of the Connecticut

:

Department of Social Services, THOMAS A.:

KIRK, Jr., PhD., in his official

:

capacity as Commissioner of the

:

Connecticut Department of Mental

:

Health and Addiction Services, and J. :

ROBERT GALVIN, M.D., M.P.H., in his

:

official capacity as Commissioner of :

the Connecticut Department of Public :

Health,

:

:

Defendants.

:

----------------------------------------x

Civil Case No. 3:06CV00179(AWT)

RULINGS ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION OF CLASS The State of Connecticut Office of Protection and Advocacy for Persons With Disabilities (“OPA”) and Shannon Hemmingsen, Samuel Rivera, Gale Yencha, Norma Jean Diaz, and Agatha Johnson (the “Individual Plaintiffs”) bring this action on behalf of more than 200 individuals with mental illness who reside in three nursing facilities in Connecticut, and on behalf of individuals with mental illness who are at risk of entry into those

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facilities, against defendants the State of Connecticut; Michael P. Starkowski, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Social Services; Thomas A. Kirk, Jr., Ph.D., in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services; and J. Robert Galvin, M.D., M.P.H., in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Public Health. The plaintiffs have moved to certify a class of individuals consisting of those who:
(1) have a mental illness or have a record of such an illness or have been regarded as having such an illness and therefore have a disability within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); (2) with appropriate supports and service, could live in the community; and (3) are institutionalized in either Chelsea Place Care Center in Hartford (“Chelsea Place”), Bidwell Care Center in Manchester (“Bidwell”), or West Rock Health Care Center in New Haven (“West Rock”)(collectively, the “Nursing Homes”), or are at risk of entry into these facilities. (Motion to Certify Class (Doc. No. 129)(“Pls. Class Mot.”) at 2.) The defendants have filed two motions to dismiss, asserting in their 12(b)(6) motion that the plaintiffs have failed to state claims upon which relief can be granted, and asserting in their 12(b)(1) motion that no plaintiff has standing to assert any of the claims. For the reasons set forth below, the defendants’ motions to dismiss are being denied and the plaintiffs’ motion to certify class is being denied to the extent that the plaintiffs
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seek to have Agatha Johnson named as a class representative and granted in all other respects.
I. BACKGROUND OPA is an authorized protection and advocacy agency as provided for by the Protection and Advocacy for Mentally Ill Individuals Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 10801, et seq. (“PAMII”). PAMII grants OPA the authority to “pursue administrative, legal, and other appropriate remedies to ensure the protection of individuals with mental illness who are receiving care and treatment in the State. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 10805(a)(1)(B). Congress enacted PAMII in 1986 “to ensure that the rights of individuals with mental illness are protected” and “to assist States to establish and operate a protection and advocacy system for individuals with mental illness which will . . . protect and advocate the rights of such individuals through activities to ensure the enforcement of the Constitution and Federal and State statutes. . . .” 42 U.S.C. §§ 10801(b)(1), 10801(b)(2)(A). A Board of Protection and Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities (the “Advocacy Board”) was established by the Connecticut legislature. The advocacy board shall advise the executive director of the Office of Protection and Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities on matters relating to advocacy policy, client service priorities and issues affecting persons with disabilities. Said advocacy board shall consist of fifteen members appointed by the Governor and be comprised of ten persons with disabilities or a parent or guardian of a person with a disability, at least four of
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whom shall represent developmentally disabled persons, and five persons who are knowledgeable in the problems of persons with disabilities including the state Americans with Disabilities Act coordinator and the chairperson for the Advisory Board of the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Program. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-9. OPA was established pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-10. Pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-10, the operations of OPA are administered by the executive director of that office. The executive director may “adopt regulations . . . subject to the approval of [the Advocacy Board] . . .” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-10. In addition, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 10805(a)(6), OPA has established a PAMII advisory council (the “Advisory Council”) which “will advise the system on policies and priorities to be carried out in protecting and advocating the rights of individuals with mental illness . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 10805(a)(6). Nine of the ten Advisory Council members are consumers of mental health services in Connecticut. As part of its official duties, the Advisory Council holds public meetings throughout the state, reviews budgets and significant proposed expenditures, and receives quarterly reports from the Executive Director. The plaintiffs’ factual contentions include the following: Among other things, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have systematically failed to provide the Proposed Class with services in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs, and instead have kept them needlessly segregated, inappropriately warehoused, and left without safeguards to ensure that they are discharged from the Nursing Homes when appropriate. Defendants have also
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systematically failed to inform the Proposed Class of their right to community services, and failed to provide services with reasonable promptness. Defendants have failed to enact policies or practices that assure that their services are administered to Plaintiffs in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs . . . (Pls. Class Mot. at 2.) The First Amended Complaint contains the following claims: in Count I, as to the individual defendants only, for violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (the “ADA”), mandate to administer services and programs in the most integrated setting appropriate; in Count II, as to the individual defendants only, for violation of the ADA’s prohibition on using methods of administration that subject individuals with disabilities to discrimination; in Count III, as to all defendants, for failure to administer services in the most integrated setting appropriate in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (the “Rehabilitation Act”); and in Count IV, as to all defendants, for violation of the Rehabilitation Act’s prohibition on using methods of administration that subject individuals with disabilities to discrimination. The plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief that would require the defendants to promptly take such steps as are necessary to enable members of the putative class to receive services in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs. OPA alleges that its constituents have each suffered injuries that would allow them to bring suit against the defendants in their own right.
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II. MOTION TO DISMISS - - Rule 12(b)(6) A. Legal Standard When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and must draw inferences in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). Although a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. (citations omitted). The plaintiff must plead “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 1974. “The function of a motion to dismiss is ‘merely to assess the legal feasibility of the complaint, not to assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered in support thereof.’” Mytych v. May Dept. Store Co., 34 F. Supp. 2d 130, 131 (D. Conn. 1999), quoting Ryder Energy Distribution v. Merrill Lynch Commodities, Inc., 748 F.2d 774, 779 (2d Cir. 1984). “The issue on a motion to dismiss is not whether the plaintiff will prevail, but whether
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the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence to support his claims.” United States v. Yale New Haven Hosp., 727 F. Supp. 784, 786 (D. Conn. 1990) (citing Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 232).
In its review of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court may consider “only the facts alleged in the pleadings, documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the pleadings and matters of which judicial notice may be taken.” Samuels v. Air Transport Local 504, 992 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1993).
B. Discussion The defendants argue that the plaintiffs have failed to allege that the Individual Plaintiffs have been excluded from or denied participation in any program, service, or activity administered by the defendants because of their mental illness, or allege that they have been discriminated against or been the subject of an improper “method of administration” in any program, service or activity administered by the defendants. (Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 140)(“Defs. 12(b)(6) Br.”) at 10.) The ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. To
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establish a violation of the ADA, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that (1) they are “qualified individuals” with a disability; (2) that the defendants are subject to the ADA; and (3) that plaintiffs were denied the opportunity to participate in or benefit from defendants’ services, programs, or activities, or were otherwise discriminated against by defendants, by reason of plaintiffs’ disabilities.
Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 272 (2d Cir. 2003). The standards for the ADA “are generally the same as those required under section 504 of [the Rehabilitation Act for] federally assisted programs and activities.” Id. In enacting the ADA, Congress found that “historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2).
1. Integration Mandate Pursuant to the grant of authority in 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a), the Attorney General issued a regulation requiring a “public entity [to] administer . . . programs . . . in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d). “[T]he most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities” is a setting that “enables individuals with disabilities to interact with nondisabled persons to the fullest extent possible.” 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, App.
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A, p. 450 (1998). See also 29 U.S.C. § 794 and 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(d).
In Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999), the Supreme Court held that “[u]njustified [institutional] isolation . . . is properly regarded as discrimination based on disability.” Id., at 597. The Court reasoned that “institutional placement of persons who can handle and benefit from community settings perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons so isolated are incapable or unworthy of participating in community life” and that “confinement in an institution severely diminishes the everyday life activities of individuals, including family relations, social contacts, work options, economic independence, educational advancement, and cultural enrichment.” Id. at 600-01. See also Joseph S. v. Hogan, 561 F. Supp. 2d 280, 290 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)(“Thus, unnecessary segregation of individuals with mental illness is discrimination per se and a violation of the ADA; no demonstration of differential treatment between individuals with mental illness and those without is required.”). The Court concluded that “States are required to provide community-based treatment for persons with mental disabilities when the State’s treatment professionals determine that such placement is appropriate, the affected persons do not oppose such treatment, and the placement can be reasonably accommodated, taking into account the resources available to the State and the
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needs of others with mental disabilities.” Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 607.
The defendants characterize Counts I and III as seeking a remedy “requiring the defendants to prevent institutionalization, to create community-based alternatives, and to place plaintiffs in such alternatives.” (Defs. 12(b)(6) Br. at 15)(internal quotation marks omitted). The defendants argue that they are under no obligation to deinstitutionalize the plaintiffs. As to that point, they are correct. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 603 n.14 (“We do not in this opinion hold that the ADA imposes on the States a ‘standard of care’ for whatever medical services they render, or that the ADA requires States to ‘provide a certain level of benefits to individuals with disabilities.’”); Rodriguez v. City of New York 197 F.3d 611, 619 (2d Cir. 1999)(“Olmstead does not, therefore, stand for the proposition that states must provide disabled individuals with the opportunity to remain out of institutions.”). See also Flight v. Gloeckler, 68 F.3d 61, 64 (2d Cir. 1995)(“challenges to the allocation of resources among the disabled under the Rehabilitation Act are disfavored.”).
However, the plaintiffs do not request in the First Amended Complaint that the Individual Plaintiffs receive a certain level of care, but rather that the defendants cease using methods of administration that subject individuals with disabilities to discrimination and, instead, administer their programs and
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services in a manner that leads to the most integrated setting appropriate for each putative class member’s needs. Shannon Hemmingsen, one of the Individual Plaintiffs, avers that she was never given applications to fill out for other places to live. Samuel Rivera, another Individual Plaintiff, attests that “I am not aware that I ever had a discharge plan before I became a plaintiff in this lawsuit, and as far as I am aware, I was never evaluated for my ability to live in the community before the people from [the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services] came to see me,” which was a time after he had become involved in this lawsuit. (Affidavit of Samuel Rivera (Doc. No. 152) at ¶¶ 9-10.)
The defendants point to the fact that the three Nursing Homes, at which the Individual Plaintiffs reside, are privately operated and administered and do not constitute programs, services, or activities that are provided by a public entity defendant. They cite language from the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act referencing a public entity. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (“no qualified individual with a disability shall . . . be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity”)(emphasis added). However, the integration mandate requires defendants to “administer services, programs, and activities in the most
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integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified
individuals with disabilities.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d); Martin v.
Taft, 222 F. Supp. 2d 940, 981 (S.D.Ohio 2002). Following the
logic of the defendants’ argument, if Connecticut could structure
a mental health system that ensured its consumers resided in
privately-run facilities, it could avoid its legal obligations in
this area altogether. But Olmstead made clear that the actions
of the state that led to a denial of integrated settings could
serve as the basis for an ADA claim. Olmstead emphasized that
“under Title II of the ADA, States are required to provide
community-based treatment for persons with mental disabilities”
when appropriate. Id., at 607. It is the defendants’ conduct in
the administration of state programs that makes them proper
parties here. See Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, 598 F.
Supp. 2d 289 (E.D.N.Y. 2009):
It is immaterial that DAI’s constituents are receiving mental health services in privately operated facilities. Public entities are required under the ADA to “administer services, programs, and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (emphasis added). Discrimination, in the form of unjustified segregation of individuals with disabilities in institutions, is thus prohibited in the administration of state programs. The statutory and regulatory framework governing the administration, funding, and oversight of New York’s mental health services-including the allocation of State resources for the housing programs at issue here-involves ‘administration’ on the part of Defendants. The State cannot evade its obligation to comply with the ADA by using private entities to deliver some of those services.
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Id. at 317-18. 2. Methods of Administration
The defendants argue that Counts II and IV, which allege that the defendants have engaged in methods of administration that have the effect of subjecting individuals with mental disabilities to discrimination in violation of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, should be dismissed because the First Amended Complaint lacks the specifics that are required to state a plausible methods of administration claim, and that the First Amended Complaint further fails to allege claims upon which relief can be granted by not identifying any policy, practice, criteria, or methods of administration that are employed in such programs. The defendants further argue that the plaintiffs have made their allegations in the “broadest possible conclusory fashion”. (Defendants’ Reply Brief in Support of Their Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 158)(“Defs. 12(b)(6) Reply”) at 7.)
The ADA’s and the Rehabilitation Act’s prohibition on discriminatory methods of administration, 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(3) and 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(b)(3), respectively, provides that a public entity (or, under the Rehabilitation Act, an entity that receives federal financial assistance) may not utilize methods of administration that (1) subject disabled individuals “to discrimination on the basis of disability” or (2)
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have the “purpose or effect of defeating or substantially impairing the accomplishment of the objectives” of the program or activity with respect to individuals with disabilities. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.130(b)(3), 45.51(b)(3).
The defendants cite to M.K. v. Sergi, 554 F. Supp. 2d 175 (D. Conn. 2008), where the court observed at the summary judgment stage that the plaintiffs had “not produced any evidence that DCF employed ‘criteria or methods of administration’ that had the purpose or effect of substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of its program.” Id. at 199. Here however, at the motion to dismiss stage, the plaintiffs have alleged, inter alia, that:
Defendants have failed to adequately assess and identify the long-term care needs of Plaintiffs and the Class they represent and to determine whether those needs could be appropriately met in integrated, community-based settings. Moreover, Defendants have failed to inform Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class members of the availability of alternatives to nursing home care and have denied them the right to choose home and communitybased services instead of institutional care. (First Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 123)(“Compl.”) at ¶ 96.) Thus, the plaintiffs have adequately alleged a plausible methods of administration claim.
3. Definition of Disability The defendants argue that the plaintiffs have failed to allege facts demonstrating that the Individual Plaintiffs have a disability within the meaning of the ADA and the Rehabilitation
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Act. In the ADA, that term means “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). The Rehabilitation Act utilizes the same definition for a “handicapped individual,” 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B), and Congress intended to apply the same definition. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998).
The defendants contend that the First Amended Complaint should be dismissed because the plaintiffs do not allege that the Individual Plaintiffs’ mental illnesses limit their major life activities. However, a review of the First Amended Complaint shows that this allegation has been made. (See Compl. at ¶ 14 (“OPA’s constituents have significant mental illnesses that substantially limit their ability to perform major life activities, such as self care, working, and interaction with others.”), and at ¶ 152 (“Plaintiff OPA’s constituents, the Individual Plaintiffs, and the Class are individuals with mental illnesses. They have mental impairments that substantially limit one or more major life activity, such as self-care and interaction with others. They also have a record of such mental illnesses and are regarded by Defendants as having such mental illnesses.”).) The defendants argue that the allegations in the First Amended Complaint that address this point either apply to OPA’s constituents generally, and not specifically to the
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Individual Plaintiffs, or constitute characterizations that “are precisely the sort of conclusory allegations that need not be accepted as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss” (Defs. 12(b)(6) Reply at 20)(emphasis in original). The court disagrees. Particularly in the context of the other factual allegations in the First Amended Complaint with respect to the Individual Plaintiffs, the plaintiffs’ have included in the First Amended Complaint allegations that are plausible in their face with respect to this element of their claims.
Accordingly, this motion to dismiss is being denied. III. MOTION TO DISMISS - - Rule 12(b)(1) A. Legal Standard At the motion to dismiss stage, “standing allegations need not be crafted with precise detail, nor must the plaintiff prove his allegations of injury.” Bauer v. Beneman, 352 F.3d 625, 631 (2d Cir. 2003). “[T]he standards for reviewing dismissals granted under 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) are identical.” Moore v. PaineWebber Inc., 189 F.3d 165, 169 n.3 (2d Cir. 1999). “Because standing is challenged on the basis of the pleadings, we accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party.” Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council of Buffalo, New York and Vicinity v. Downtown Dev., Inc., 448 F.3d 138, 144 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation omitted).
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B. Discussion In order for a plaintiff to have Article III standing, there must be: “(1) an injury in fact, (2) a causal relationship between the injury and the challenged conduct, and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” United Food & Com. Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 551 (1996). OPA alleges injuries suffered by its constituents, and not by itself. Thus, it relies on the doctrine of associational standing to satisfy the requirement that there be an injury in fact. Under that doctrine, an association may “sue to redress its members’ injuries, even without a showing of injury to the association itself. . . .” Id. at 552. The defendants contend that OPA does not have standing to sue, and that, in addition, the Individual Plaintiffs lack standing to assert the claims raised in the First Amended Complaint.
1. OPA’s Associational Standing The test for associational standing has three prongs: “(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Id. at 553 (quoting Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm’n., 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)). The
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Supreme Court has explained that the first two factors of the
Hunt test are required by the Constitution and the third prong is
a “judicially self-imposed limit on the exercise of federal
jurisdiction.” Brown Group, 517 U.S. at 556 (citations and
alterations omitted).
In Hunt, the Supreme Court considered whether the Washington
State Apple Advertising Commission (the “Commission”) had
standing to bring suit on behalf of that State’s apple growers
and dealers. The defendants argued that the Commission lacked
standing to do so because it was a state agency that did not have
any members, and thus had not suffered a concrete injury as
required by Article III. The Supreme Court disagreed:
The Commission, while admittedly a state agency, for all practical purposes, performs the functions of a traditional trade association representing the Washington apple industry. As previously noted, its purpose is the protection and promotion of the Washington apple industry; and, in the pursuit of that end, it has engaged in advertising, market research and analysis, public education campaigns, and scientific research. It thus serves a specialized segment of the State’s economic community, which is the primary beneficiary of its activities, including the prosecution of this kind of litigation.
Moreover, while the apple growers and dealers are not ‘members’ of the Commission in the traditional trade association sense, they possess all of the indicia of membership in an organization. They alone elect the members of the Commission; they alone may serve on the Commission; they alone finance its activities, including the costs of this lawsuit, through assessments levied upon them. In a very real sense, therefore, the Commission represents the State's growers and dealers and provides the means by which they express their collective views and protect their collective interests.
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Id. at 344-345. In Paragraphs 16 to 26 of the First Amended Complaint, the
plaintiffs set forth detailed factual allegations concerning OPA’s relationship with its constituents. Based on those allegations, the plaintiffs then allege:
The above allegations demonstrate that OPA’s constituents have the power to participate in and exert significant influence over OPA’s policies, priorities and activities. OPA provides the means by which these constituents “express their collective views and protect their collective interests.” Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 345 (1977). OPA is therefore the functional equivalent of a traditional membership organization, and OPA’s constituents possess sufficient indicia of membership in OPA so as to support OPA’s associational standing to sue on their behalf. (Compl. ¶ 27.) The defendants disagree. In Oregon Advocacy Center v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2003), the defendants challenged the standing of a PAMII protection and advocacy organization to bring suit on behalf of mentally incapacitated criminal defendants on the grounds that “individuals with mental illness do not actually control the plaintiff’s activities and finances.” Id. at 1110 (quotation and alteration omitted). In reaching the conclusion that the organization had associational standing, the court concluded, first, that the organization was the functional equivalent of a voluntary membership organization, and second, that the organization’s constituents possessed indica of membership that resulted in the organization having a personal stake in the
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outcome of the controversy. As to the organization being the functional equivalent of a voluntary membership organization, the court concluded that OAC was the functional equivalent of such a voluntary membership organization because it “serves a specialized segment of Oregon’s community: the disabled in general, including the mentally ill, and more specifically, incapacitated criminal defendants. These groups are the primary beneficiaries of OAC’s activities, ‘including the prosecution of this kind of litigation.’” Id. (quoting Hunt, 432 U.S. at 344). As to the indicia of membership possessed by OAC’s constituents, the court acknowledged that OAC lacked some of the indicia of membership possessed by the plaintiff in Hunt, noting that “OAC is funded primarily by the federal government, and not by its constituents. . . . OAC’s constituents are not the only ones who choose the leadership of the OAC, and they are not the only ones that may serve on OAC’s leadership bodies.” Id. at 1111. But the court concluded:
Nevertheless, OAC’s constituents do possess many indicia of membership—enough to satisfy the purposes that undergird the concept of associational standing: that the organization is sufficiently identified with and subject to the influence of those it seeks to represent as to have a “personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.” See Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 261, 97 S. Ct. 555 (internal quotation marks omitted). Id. As part of its analysis of the indicia of membership possessed by the organization’s constituents, the court took note
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of the provisions of PAMII which provide for the involvement of
individuals with mental illness and their family members in the
direction and control of a protection and advocacy organization:
[T]he governing board of an organization like OAC, “shall be composed of . . . members . . . who broadly represent or are knowledgeable about the needs of the clients served by the system,” where such members are defined to include “individuals who have received or are receiving mental health services and family members of such individuals.” 42 U.S.C. § 10805(c)(1)(B). Also, a protection and advocacy system such as OAC must:
establish an advisory council . . . which shall include individuals who have received or are receiving mental health services, and family members of such individuals, and at least 60 percent the membership of which shall be comprised of individuals who have received or are receiving mental health services or who are family members of such individuals; and . . . which shall be chaired by an individual who has received or who is receiving mental health services or is a family member of such an individual.
Id. § 10805(a)(6)(B-C). Furthermore, PAMII provides that a system such as OAC shall “establish a grievance procedure for clients or prospective clients of the system to assure that individuals with mental illness have full access to the services of the system and . . . to assure that the system is operating in compliance with the provisions” of PAMII. Id. § 10805(a)(9).
Id. (quotation omitted). It was clear, however, taking into
account these provisions of PAMII was only one factor in the
court’s analysis because it stated that “[a]lthough we agree that
PAMII is relevant to OAC’s standing, it cannot override
constitutional standing requirements.” Id., at 1109.
The court took note of the fact that “people with
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disabilities constitute a majority of OAC’s board of directors and that individuals who had received or were receiving mental health services, or family members of such individuals, compose more than 60 percent of the advisory council for OAC’s PAMIIfunded program.” Id., at 1112. Based on the foregoing, the court concluded that “[t]ogether, these circumstances suggest that, [m]uch like members of a traditional association, the constituents of the Advocacy Center possess the means to influence the priorities and activities the Advocacy Center undertakes.” Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).
The analysis in Mink was in accord with that in Doe v. Stincer, 175 F.3d 879 (11th Cir. 1999). In that case, the court held that a PAMII protection and advocacy organization had associational standing to bring suit on behalf of its constituents under the analysis in Hunt. First, the court observed:
To begin with, as in Hunt, Congress designated the Advocacy Center, like other protection and advocacy systems, to “serve[ ] a specialized segment of the . . . community which is the primary beneficiary of its activities, including prosecution of this kind of litigation.” Stincer, 175 F.3d at 886. In addition, with respect to the constituents possessing the indicia of membership, the court set forth the following analysis: Further, under PAMII, individuals with mental illness possess “the indicia of membership in an organization.” In PAMII, Congress directed that multi-member governing
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boards of protection and advocacy organizations such as the Advocacy Center must be composed of “members who broadly represent or are knowledgeable about the needs of clients served by the system” and must “include individuals who have received or are receiving mental health services and family members of such individuals.” 42 U.S.C. § 10805(c)(1)(B); see also 42 C.F.R. § 51.22(b)(2). Moreover, protection and advocacy organizations must have advisory councils, sixty percent of whose membership as well as the chair of the council must be “comprised of individuals who have received or are receiving mental health services or who are family members of such individuals.” § 10805(a)(6)(B), (C); 42 C.F.R. § 51.23(b)(1), (2). Additionally, PAMII provides that a protection and advocacy organization must afford the public with an opportunity to comment on the priorities and activities of the protection and advocacy system and must establish a grievance procedure for clients and prospective clients “to assure that individuals with mental illness have full access to the services of the system” and “that the eligible system is operating in compliance with [PAMII].” § 10805(a)(8), (9); 42 C.F.R. §§ 51.24, 51.25.
Id. (citation omitted). Based on the foregoing, the court
concluded that “[m]uch like members of a traditional association,
the constituents of the Advocacy Center possess the means to
influence the priorities and activities the Advocacy Center
undertakes.” Id. In so holding, the court declined to follow
the reasoning in Ass’n of Retarded Citizens v. Dallas County
Mental Health and Retardation Center Bd. of Trustees, 19 F. 3d
241 (5th Cir. 1994), where the court concluded that a federally
funded organization authorized to protect and advocate for the
rights of disabled individuals “bears no relationship to
traditional membership groups because most of its
‘clients’—handicapped and disabled people — are unable to
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participate in and guide the organization’s efforts.” Id. at 244.
Here, with respect to the requirement that OPA be the functional equivalent of a voluntary membership organization, the analysis in Mink and Stincer is directly on point. The court adopts that analysis.
The additional requirement is that OPA’s constituents possess indicia of membership such that OPA is sufficiently identified with and subject to influence of those constituents so as to have a personal stake in the outcome of this case. In Stincer, the court placed weight on the requirements under PAMII with respect to the composition of multi-member governing boards, the requirements under PAMII for the composition of advisory councils, the requirement that the organization afford the public with an opportunity to comment on its priorities and activities, and the requirement that the organization establish a grievance procedure for clients and prospective clients. The analysis in Mink was substantially the same.
Here, most of the same elements are present. The exception is the fact that Stincer and Mink placed weight on the requirements under PAMII with respect to the composition of multi-member governing boards. Here, the Connecticut legislature opted to adopt a structure that did not include a multi-member governing board like the boards of directors in Stincer and Mink.
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Thus, as opposed to a board of directors and an advisory council, as was the situation in Stincer and Mink, Connecticut has the Advocacy Board, OPA, the operations of which are administered by it’s executive director, and the Advisory Council. The requirements for the composition of the Advocacy Board, set forth in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-9, are consistent with the requirements for a multi-member governing board in a public system, which are set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 10805(c)(1)(B)(i) (“The governing board shall be composed of . . . members . . . who broadly represent or are knowledgeable about the needs of the clients served by the system . . .”). In addition, although the Advocacy Board is not characterized as a board of the directors and it’s role is to advise the executive director of OPA, by statute the Advocacy Board exercises oversight of OPA with respect to the adoption of regulations by the executive director of OPA. This is a significant oversight function. Also, it is significant that, by statute, the chairperson of the Advisory Council is a member of the Advocacy Board. Thus, the presence and role of the Advocacy Board provides a means for constituents of OPA to influence the priorities and activities that OPA undertakes, even though the Advocacy Board is not a board of directors.
In addition, while the Advisory Council possesses all of the
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attributes required by PAMII,1 there are at least two attributes
of the Advisory Council that suggest that it has means in
addition to those specified by statute to influence the
priorities and activities of OPA. First, “[t]he Council
considers, nominates, and appoints its own members, including its
chairperson. OPA’s Executive Director does not control or take
part in the election of new members to the Council. Members may
be removed only upon recommendation by the Council to the
Executive Director.” (Compl. ¶ 19.) Thus, OPA does not control
the Advisory Council. Second, the Advisory Council is the final
decision-maker with respect to grievances filed by persons with
disabilities or their representatives or family members.
OPA has established a direct grievance procedure pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 10805(a)(9), whereby persons with disabilities or their representatives or family members may file a written grievance with OPA where (1) there is
1The court notes that many of the functions performed by the Advisory Council are ones that are specified by statute. For example, in Paragraph 16 of the First Amended Complaint, there is a reference to the by-laws of the Advisory Council, which provide that the Advisory Council’s purpose includes advising PAMII program staff and the governing authority, which is a specified function under 42 U.S.C. § 10805(a)(6)(A); completing a section of the annual PAMII program performance report, which is a specified function under 42 U.S.C. § 10805(a)(7); and jointly developing the annual statement of objectives and priorities of the PAMII program, which is a specified function under 42 U.S.C. § 10805(a)(2)(B). While the performance of these functions serves to make the point that the Advisory Council performs the functions it is expected to under the statutory scheme for PAMII, the performance of these functions does not compensate for the absence of a multi-member governing board when one is trying to assess the degree to which OPA’s constituents have the means to influence its priorities and activities.
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a disagreement about the decision of OPA not to provide assistance or advocacy services; (2) there is dissatisfaction regarding the quality or extent of services provided; (3) there is a belief that OPA failed to fulfill its legal obligations; or (4) there is a belief that OPA has discriminated in the provision of its services on the basis of disability, race, or another prohibited basis. The grievance procedure is designed “to assure that individuals with mental illness have full access to the services of the system.” 42 U.S.C. § 10805(a)(9). The Council makes the final decision regarding the appropriate response to grievances filed with OPA, and has the power to overrule the initial determinations made by the PAIMI Program Director, the Managing Attorney, and OPA’s Executive Director.
(Compl. ¶ 26.) The Advisory Council’s authority with respect to
grievances is an important and very effective means of
influencing the priorities and activities of OPA.
Based on the combination of the presence and role of the
Advocacy Board, the influence of the Advisory Council beyond that
required by statute, and the existence of the statutorily
specified functions of the Advisory Council, together with the
requirements that there be an opportunity for public comment and
a grievance procedure for clients and prospective clients, the
court concludes that the constituents of OPA have the means to
influence the priorities and activities of OPA in a meaningful
way to such an extent that OPA is sufficiently identified with
and subject to the influence of its constituents so as to have a
personal stake in the outcome of this case. See Laflamme v. New
Horizons, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 378, 397 (D. Conn. 2009)(“The
greater weight of authority, particularly within this circuit,
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establishes that organizations like OPA routinely are found to fit within the requirements for associational standing under Hunt.”).
The defendants also argue that Congress did not authorize PAMII organizations to sue on behalf of a group of their constituents, as opposed to suing on behalf of specific individuals. Courts have generally rejected this argument. In Brown v. Stone, 66 F. Supp. 2d. 412 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), the court analyzed the statutory language of 42 U.S.C. § 10801(b) and concluded that Congress intended for PAMII organizations to have standing to bring suit on behalf of “an identifiable group of individuals.” Id. at 425. See also Trautz v. Weisman, 846 F. Supp. 1160, 1162 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (concluding that the statute “clearly confers . . . the right to pursue legal remedies for the protection of mentally ill individuals.”).
2. Standing of Individual Plaintiffs To have standing to sue, the Individual Plaintiffs must allege facts demonstrating: (1) an injury in fact; (2) a causal relationship between the injury and the challenged conduct, and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. See Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. at 551. The defendants contend that the Individual Plaintiffs fail to allege that they suffered an injury in fact that was caused by the actions of the defendants because they did not actually apply
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for community based services nor identify which programs they were denied access to, and thus the Individual Plaintiffs’ claims are based on their mere residence in one of the three Nursing Homes. These arguments echo the defendants’ arguments in support of the 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Construing the plaintiffs’ claims as the court construes them in Part II.B., supra, the Individual Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that they suffered an injury in fact that was caused by the actions of the defendants.
The defendants also contend that the plaintiffs are basing their claims against the Commissioner of the Department of Public Health (“DPH”) on DPH’s alleged failure to use its regulatory authority against third parties for the benefit of the Individual Plaintiffs, but have not shown that DPH is a substantial factor in the third parties’ actions. This argument was raised in Paterson, where the court noted:
[I]t is clear that Defendants are required by State law to determine the settings in which New York provides and funds mental health services. Defendants do so by controlling the State’s funding for services in various settings, including adult homes and supported housing, and effectively control how many adults receive services in any particular setting. This is more than a “general obligation to provide services,” as Defendants contend. While State officials do not require anyone to be in an adult home, Defendants plan, fund and administer the State's existing service system such that more than 12,000 adults are receiving the State's services in adult homes. Paterson, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 319. Substantially the same
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analysis applies here.
Accordingly, this motion to dismiss is being denied.
IV. MOTION TO CERTIFY CLASS
A. Legal Standard
To maintain a class action, the plaintiffs must satisfy the
requirements of Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure – - numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy
of representation - - and show that the putative class falls
within one of the three categories in Rule 23(b). See Fed. R.
Civ. Proc. 23; In re IPO Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 33 (2d Cir.
2006). The plaintiffs bring this putative class action pursuant
to Rule 23(b)(2). In evaluating a motion for class
certification:
(1) a district judge may certify a class only after making determinations that each of the Rule 23 requirements has been met; (2) such determinations can be made only if the judge resolves factual disputes relevant to each Rule 23 requirement and finds that whatever underlying facts are relevant to a particular Rule 23 requirement have been established and is persuaded to rule, based on the relevant facts and the applicable legal standard, that the requirement is met; (3) the obligation to make such determinations is not lessened by overlap between a Rule 23 requirement and a merits issue, even a merits issue that is identical with a Rule 23 requirement; (4) in making such determinations, a district judge should not assess any aspect of the merits unrelated to a Rule 23 requirement; and (5) a district judge has ample discretion to circumscribe both the extent of discovery concerning Rule 23 requirements and the extent of a hearing to determine whether such requirements are met in order to assure that a class certification motion does not become a pretext for a partial trial of the merits.
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Id. at 41. The party seeking certification has the burden of
demonstrating that all of the requirements of Rule 23 are satisfied. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613-14 (1997). A certified class may be decertified or modified at later stages. Woe by Woe v. Cuomo, 729 F.2d 96, 107 (2d Cir. 1984). Finally, “the district judge must receive enough evidence, by affidavits, documents, or testimony, to be satisfied that each Rule 23 requirement has been met.” In re IPO Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d at 41.
B. Discussion 1. Implicit Requirements
“There are implicit requirements for the existence of an identifiable class and for the named representatives being members of the proposed class.” 5 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 23.20 (3d. ed. 2009).
"[T]he requirement that there be a class will not be deemed satisfied unless the description of it is sufficiently definite so that it is administratively feasible for the court to determine whether a particular individual is a member.” 7A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1760, at 140 (3d ed. 2005); see In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 880 F.2d 709, 728 (4th Cir. 1989)(“Though not specified in the Rule, establishment of a class action
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implicitly requires both that there be an identifiable class and that the plaintiff or plaintiffs be a member of such class”), abrogated on other grounds, Amchem Products, Inc., 521 U.S. at 591. “An identifiable class exists if its members can be ascertained by reference to objective criteria.” In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether ("MTBE") Products Liability Litigation, 209 F.R.D. 323, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
The defendants argue that the proposed class definition does not adequately define a definitive class because it incorrectly assumes that all individuals in the Nursing Homes who “have a mental illness or have record of such an illness or have been regarded as having such an illness,” by definition, have a “disability” within the meaning of the ADA. (Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion For Class Certification (Doc. No. 144)(“Defs. Class Opp.”) at 5.) This, they suggest, would lead to an unwieldly case-by-case determination. The defendants also object that the proposed class definition of mental illness is unduly broad and “bears absolutely no relationship” to the defendants’ obligations, making it “impossible to determine which individuals are members of the proposed class.” (Defs. Class Opp. at 6.) However, the class is explicitly defined to include individuals whose mental illnesses constitute disabilities as defined by the ADA. Thus, the members of the class can be identified by reference to the
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objective criteria. In addition, the requested relief is not community placement for each putative class member but rather cessation of current methods of administration and, instead, administration of programs and services in a manner that is consonant with Olmstead. In rejecting a similar challenge, the court in Ligas v. Maram, No. 05 C 4331, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10856 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 2006), noted:
In essence, the plaintiffs are willing to have the defendants make these determinations based on reasonable assessments from their own state treatment professionals in accordance with [Olmstead]. Because the defendants would be evaluating based on their own criteria whether a potential class member would meet the state's requirements and thus the class definition, [the] court could order the defendants to engage in individual determinations should any relief be granted and not do so itself. Id. at 17. The court finds defendants’ other objections similarly unpersuasive. The defendants argue that there has not been an explicit definition of an “appropriate support and service” (Defs. Class Opp. at 8), but this is clearly a reference to their obligations under Olmstead. The defendants also argue that the third prong of the class definition, which includes individuals who are “at risk of entry” into state facilities, lacks adequate standards to allow feasible class membership determinations. But again, this would be problematical only if the requested relief were community placement for each putative class member, as opposed to adoption of process that is consonant with Olmstead.
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The defendants argue that OPA and the Individual Plaintiffs do not have standing, but the court has addressed those arguments in the context of the defendants’ 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss. The defendants also point to certain facts that suggest that Individual Plaintiffs’ claims may be or become moot. However, “[i]t is well settled that a defendant’s voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs .(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
As to plaintiffs Norma Jean Diaz and Agatha Johnson, the defendants argue that they are not appropriate representatives because they have resisted or rejected efforts at community placement, which pre-date the filing of the First Amended Complaint. With respect to Diaz, the defendants’ argument is effectively rebutted by her affidavit. However, the defendants’ argument with respect to Johnson is supported by the affidavit of Laurel Reagan, and no affidavit of Johnson has been submitted in rebuttal. Therefore, the court concludes, on this record, that Agatha Johnson would not be an appropriate representative.
2. Rule 23(a) Requirements The potential class must satisfy the four requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a): (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact
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common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Additionally, with respect to Rule 23(b), the plaintiffs seek to maintain the class action under Rule 23(b)(2), which requires that “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 23(b)(2).
a. Numerosity The plaintiffs seek to represent a class they believe likely exceeds 200 members, and they have produced evidence that 95 individuals qualify as potential class members. “While there is no predetermined number of plaintiffs necessary to certify a class, courts generally have found a class consisting of 40 or more members to be sufficient.” Collins v. Olin Corp., 248 F.R.D. 95, 101 (D. Conn. 2008)(citing cases). “Courts have not required evidence of exact class size or identity of class members to satisfy the numerosity requirement.” Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931, 935 (2d Cir. 1993). The defendants argue that the plaintiffs’ proposed number is speculative, but the exact number of potential plaintiffs is unknown absent discovery. When the exact number of eligible
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persons is within the defendant’s control, as it is here, “[i]t is permissible for the plaintiffs to rely on reasonable inferences drawn from the available facts.” German v. Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 885 F. Supp. 537, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citation omitted).
b. Common Questions of Law and Fact “The commonality requirement is met if plaintiffs’ grievances share a common question of law or of fact.” Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372, 376 (2d Cir. 1997). Minor factual differences will not preclude class certification if there is a common question of law. Monaco v. Stone, 187 F.R.D. 50, 61 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)(citation omitted). The court agrees with the plaintiffs that they have identified multiple issues of law and fact common to the entire proposed class with respect to the alleged failure of the methods of administration used by the defendants and the alleged failure to administer programs in the most integrated setting appropriate, including: Defendants’ failure to establish and/or implement a comprehensive, effectively working plan to provide services in the most integrated setting appropriate to the proposed class’s needs, segregation of the proposed class in the Nursing Homes, failure to inform the proposed class of their right to integrated communitybased services, and failure to evaluate the proposed class for readiness for community placement. (Plaintiffs’ Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Certification of Class (Doc. No. 146)(“Pls. Class
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Reply”) at 5.) c. Typicality
“The commonality and typicality requirements tend to merge into one another, so that similar considerations animate analysis of Rules 23(a)(2) and (3).” Marisol A., 126 F.3d at 376. “Rule 23(a)(3) is satisfied when each class member’s claim arises from the same course of events, and each class member makes similar legal arguments to prove the defendant's liability.” In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 960 F.2d 285, 291 (2d Cir. 1992). Among the relevant considerations are “whether other members of the class have the same or similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct not special or unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether other class members have been injured by the same course of conduct.” In re NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust Litig., 169 F.R.D. 493, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
The defendants argue that because all the members of the putative class are not all eligible to participate in the same program, the plaintiffs have not shown how they might have been injured from the same course of events. However, the “same course of events” relevant for purposes of this case is being discriminated against on the basis of a mental illness by virtue of the defendants’ failure to administer their programs and services in a manner that leads to the most integrated setting appropriate for each putative class members’ needs. See, e.g.,
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Colbert v. Blagojevich, No. 07 C 4737, 2008 WL 4442597, *7 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2008)(“Like the class members, the named plaintiffs have an interest in requiring the defendants to establish a policy of informing them about the option of community placement and providing community placement to those who are eligible.”).
The defendants also contend that no Individual Plaintiff has claimed an injury as the result of actions by the DPH. However, the plaintiffs have claimed, inter alia, a failure to ensure that adequate discharge takes place in the facilities as a result of actions and inaction on the part of DPH.
d. Adequacy “A plaintiff can show that it adequately represents the interests of the class, pursuant to Rule 23(a)(4), if it appears that plaintiff’s interests are not antagonistic to those of the class it seeks to represent and plaintiff's counsel is qualified to conduct the litigation.” In re Flight Safety Technologies, Inc. Sec. Litig., 231 F.R.D. 124, 128 (D. Conn. 2005). As to the first point, the defendants suggest that it has not been demonstrated by the plaintiffs that the Individual Plaintiffs can fulfill their obligations to be knowledgeable about the claims that are being asserted and to supervise class counsel. However, based on the allegations in the First Amended Complaint and the subsequently filed affidavits, the court is satisfied
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that the Individual Plaintiffs understand their role. (See, e.g., Affidavit of Shannon Hemmingsen (Doc. No. 147) ¶ 15 (“I am also aware that I am representing other individuals in this lawsuit.”).)
The defendants also argue that Rivera should not be a class representative because of an arrest. The court, having reviewed his affidavit, disagrees. See, e.g., German v. Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 168 F.R.D. 145, 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)(“[M]ost courts have rejected challenges to adequacy based on allegations that plaintiffs backgrounds were alleged to include ‘unrelated unsavory, unethical, or even illegal conduct.’”).
The defendants argue that the eligibility of the Individual Plaintiffs and other members of the putative class for existing programs differs, so there is a potential for a conflict of interest in light of the competition for the state’s limited resources. However, the First Amended Complaint alleges that community-based care is less costly than care provided in and by the facilities. (See Compl. ¶¶ 6, 94.) At this point, the conflict of interest is too speculative to be given material weight. See E.E.O.C. v. Local 638, No. 71 Civ. 2877(RLC), 2004 WL 2414013, *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2004)(finding that “Local 28's protestations of financial hardship remain merely speculative and are insufficient to defeat a motion for class certification”).
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e. Rule 23(b)(2) Under Rule 23(b)(2), it must be established that “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Id. “The entire purpose behind Rule 23(b)(2) is to resolve disputes concerning the existence of a policy and practice of discrimination against a broad class of individuals.” Messier v. Southbury Training School, 183 F.R.D. 350, 357 (D. Conn. 1998); Jeanine B. by Blondis v. Thompson, 877 F. Supp. 1268, 1288 (E.D. Wis. 1995)(“[c]ivil rights cases seeking broad declaratory or injunctive relief for a large and amorphous class . . . fall squarely into the category” of 23(b)(2) actions); Advisory Committee Note to Subdivision (b)(2) ( “Illustrative are various actions . . . where a party is charged with discriminating unlawfully against a class, usually one whose members are incapable of specific enumeration.”). The defendants’ objections are based on a mischaracterization of the First Amended Complaint as alleging that the plaintiffs are entitled to community-based alternatives. However, as discussed above, this is not the gravamen of their complaint. Rather, the plaintiffs are seeking to require the defendants to cease using methods of administration that subject individuals with disabilities to discrimination, and, instead, to
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administer their programs and services in a manner that leads to the most integrated setting appropriate for each putative class member’s needs. For that reason, the court finds the defendants’ arguments unpersuasive and concludes that at issue in this case is the existence of an alleged policy and practice of discrimination against a broad class of individuals.
For the reasons set forth above, the court finds that the plaintiffs have satisfied the requirements of Rule 23(a) with respect to numerosity, common questions of law and fact, typicality and adequacy (except with respect to Agatha Johnson), and that the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2) are also satisfied. Accordingly, the motion for class certification is being granted in part and denied in part; the motion is being denied to the extent that it requests that Agatha Johnson be named as a class representative and is being granted in all other respects.
V. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted (Doc. No. 140) is hereby DENIED; Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint For Lack of Jurisdiction Since Plaintiffs Lack Standing to Assert the Claims that are Raised Herein (Doc. No. 141) is hereby DENIED; and the Motion For Certification of Class (Doc. No. 129) is hereby GRANTED in part
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Case 3:06-cv-00179-AWT Document 174 Filed 03/31/10 Page 42 of 42 and DENIED in part.
It is so ordered. Dated this 31st day of March, 2010 at Hartford, Connecticut.
/s/AWT Alvin W. Thompson United States District Judge
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 Case 3:06-cv-00179-AWT Document 303-11 Filed 06/17/14 Page 1 of 39
Exhibit A

Case 3:06-cv-00179-AWT Document 303-11 Filed 06/17/14 Page 2 of 39

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

--------------------------------------------------------------------- x

STATE OF CONNECTICUT OFFICE OF

:

PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY FOR PERSONS :

WITH DISABILITIES, SHANNON HEMMINGSEN, :

SAMUEL RIVERA, GALE YENCHA, NORMA JEAN :

DIAZ, and AGATHA JOHNSON, individually and on :

behalf of similarly situated individuals,

:

Plaintiffs, : Civil Case No.

:

v.

: 3:06 Civ. 00179 (AWT)

:

THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, MICHAEL P.

:

STARKOWSI, in his official capacity as Commissioner :

of the Connecticut Department of Social Services,

:

PATRICIA REHMER, MSN, in her official capacity as :

Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Mental :

Health and Addiction Services, J. ROBERT GALVIN, :

M.D., M.P.H., in his official capacity as Commissioner :

of the Connecticut Department of Public Health,

:

:

Defendants. :

--------------------------------------------------------------------- x

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

This Settlement Agreement is entered into by and between the State of Connecticut

Office of Protection and Advocacy For Persons With Disabilities (“OPA”), Shannon

Hemmingsen, Samuel Rivera, Gale Yencha and Norma Jean Diaz, individually and on behalf of

other similarly situated individuals (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”), and the State of Connecticut,

the Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Social Services (“DSS”), the Commissioner

of the Connecticut Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services (“DMHAS”) and the Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Public Health (“DPH”)1 (the Plaintiffs and

Defendants are collectively referred to as the “Parties”).

1 Defendants shall mean the Department of Social Services and Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services for the purposes of implementing and complying with the requirements of this Settlement Agreement.

Case 3:06-cv-00179-AWT Document 303-11 Filed 06/17/14 Page 3 of 39
WHEREAS: 1. On or about September 9, 2008, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint
(the “Complaint”) against Defendants, seeking, inter alia, declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendants to remedy alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12101, et seq. (the “ADA”) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §794 (the “Claims”). 2. By order dated March 31, 2010, the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut (Thompson, D.J.) (the “Court”), inter alia, granted in part Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification and certified a class of individuals who: i) have a mental illness or have a record of such an illness or have been
regarded as having such an illness and therefore have a disability within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); ii) with appropriate supports and services, could live in the community; and iii) are institutionalized in either Chelsea Place Care Center in Hartford (“Chelsea Place”), Bidwell Care Center in Manchester (“Bidwell”) or West Rock Health Care Center in New Haven (“West Rock”), or are at risk of entry into these facilities. 3. Chelsea Place and Bidwell are collectively referred to in this Settlement Agreement as the “Nursing Homes.” West Rock is no longer operating and is therefore not a subject to the requirements of this Settlement Agreement. 4. Defendants answered the First Amended Complaint and each Defendant denied that it violated the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
2

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5. Counsel for the Parties engaged in arms’ length negotiations to resolve the Claims asserted by Plaintiffs and now agree to settle the Claims in order to avoid the expense, risks and uncertainty of further litigation.
6. Plaintiffs and their counsel have concluded that the terms of this Settlement Agreement are fair, reasonable and adequate to the Plaintiffs and the Settlement Class (as defined below), and in the Settlement Class’ best interests, and have agreed to settle the Claims against Defendants and to use their best efforts to effectuate the settlement pursuant to the terms and provisions of this Settlement Agreement.
NOW THEREFORE, it is hereby STIPULATED AND AGREED, by and among the Parties, through their respective undersigned attorneys, subject to Court approval pursuant to Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in consideration of the benefits to the Parties and the Settlement Class as set forth in this Settlement Agreement, that all Claims against all Defendants shall be compromised, settled, released and dismissed, upon and subject to the following terms and conditions:
I. Jurisdiction This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as a case arising under the laws of the United States and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a) for actions under laws providing for the protection of civil rights.
II. Definitions As used in this Settlement Agreement, the following terms shall have the following meanings:
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A. “Class Members” means the persons who, as of the date of approval of this Settlement Agreement by the Court or at any time during the Settlement Period, meet the definition of “Settlement Class” set forth below.
B. “Community-Based Services” means services and supports provided in Connecticut that assist individuals with serious mental illness to live in the community. Such services and supports include, but are not limited to Assertive Community Treatment (“ACT”), Crisis Services, and Supported Employment. Such services shall be limited to those that are funded under the Money Follows the Person program, the Mental Health Waiver and the state-funded services listed in Exhibit A within the limitations on the amount and scope of such services under such programs, including any cost-effectiveness tests on eligibility in such programs, and as determined to be appropriate and necessary to meet the Class Member’s needs by the state officials and contractors charged with determining the plan of care for such individuals under said programs utilizing a person-centered planning process.
C. “Community-Based Setting” means the most integrated setting appropriate for each Class Member, where the setting is designed (i) to promote independence in daily living, full participation in society, economic selfsufficiency, the ability to interact with non-disabled persons to the fullest extent possible; and (ii), as determined by the Defendants’ officials who are responsible for administering the applicable programs of Community-
4

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Based Services, to meet the needs of the Class Member and enable him or her to receive Community-Based Services in a setting that is safe and appropriate given his or her needs. Community-Based Settings may also include independent housing with the Class Member’s family or friends. D. “Community Service Provider” means a provider authorized by the appropriate Defendants for payment of State funds for the provision of Community-Based Services. E. “Housing Services” shall mean the provision to eligible Class Members of financial subsidies to secure leasing of apartments or homes in the most integrated setting appropriate for each Class Member. Community-Based Services provided under the Money Follows the Person program, the Mental Health Waiver, and state-funded programs listed in Exhibit A are not provided by providers of housing secured by Housing Services subsidies. F. “Settlement Class” shall mean individuals who: i) have a diagnosis of Serious Mental Illness, as defined in 42 C.F.R.
§ 483.102, ii) are eligible for and will or have applied for Medicaid-funded
services, iii) have not been admitted to a Nursing Home for treatment under
Medicare and discharged within 120 days of admission, iv) have no source of payment other than Medicaid for the cost of their
care at the Nursing Home,
5

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v) who, with appropriate support and services, could live in the community, and
vi) are institutionalized in either of the Nursing Homes as of the date on which the Court so orders a final Order approving this Settlement Agreement, or who are admitted in either of the Nursing Homes during the Settlement Period (as defined below).
G. “Settlement Period” shall mean the period that is four years from the date on which the Court so orders a final Order approving this Settlement Agreement (the “Effective Date”) unless modified to an earlier or later date in accord with the provisions of this agreement.
H. “Supported Employment” shall mean intensive, ongoing supports that enable Class Members, for whom competitive employment at or above the minimum wage is unlikely absent the provision of supports, and who, because of their disabilities, need supports, to perform in a regular work setting. Such supports may include the development and implementation of a plan for assuring appropriate consumer community integration and the provision of both supportive counseling and problem-focused interventions in whatever setting is required to enable consumers to manage the symptoms of their illness. Services provided at the worksite must be focused on assisting the individual to manage the symptoms of mental illness, and not to learning job tasks. These interventions will fall primarily in the areas of achieving the required level of concentration and
6

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III. 1.

task orientation, and facilitating the establishment and maintenance of effective communications with employers, supervisors and co-workers. Defendants’ Obligations The Parties agree that the following requirements of this Settlement Agreement shall be used by the Parties, the Remedial Expert and the Court to assess and determine Defendants’ compliance with this Settlement Agreement. The Defendants shall implement these requirements within the time frames set forth herein. Placement in Community-Based Settings A. Subject to the timeframes set herein, during the Settlement Period, Defendants shall ensure that (1) all Class Members who are determined by Defendants as both eligible for Community-Based Services, and to live in Community-Based Settings have been afforded such services in such settings, subject to their informed choice to remain in the Nursing Home or receive Community Based Services in another setting, and (2) no individual (i) who meets the definition of Class Member set forth herein except for being institutionalized at one of the Nursing Homes, (ii) who is eligible for nursing home level of care, (iii) who Defendants have previously deemed eligible for Community-Based Services and (iv) who has not undergone a change of condition after said determination of eligibility, is admitted in one of the Nursing Homes unless, after being fully informed, he or she declines the opportunity to receive such services in a Community-Based Setting.

7

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i) Defendants shall make their best efforts to ensure that within twelve (12) months after the Effective Date, and shall ensure that in no instance longer than eighteen (18) months after the Effective Date (the “Time Periods”), all Class Members who reside at the Nursing Homes on the Effective Date who have exercised informed choice to receive Community-Based Services in a Community-Based Setting within the Time Periods and whom DMHAS and DSS have determined eligible for such services and to move to such settings, shall have been afforded such services in such settings.
ii) Where a Class Member who resided at the Nursing Homes on the Effective Date who has been deemed eligible for CommunityBased Services in a Community-Based Setting by DMHAS and DSS first exercises his or her informed choice to receive Community-Based Services in a Community-Based Setting less than 180 days before the end of the Time Period, Defendants shall make their best efforts to afford the Class Member such services in such settings before the end of the Time Period, but in any event no longer than 180 days from when the individual exercised his or her informed choice, except that when physical plant modifications are necessary to provide a Community Based Setting, an additional 20 days shall be allowed to afford such services.
8

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iii) Defendants shall ensure that any Class Members admitted after the Effective Date whom DMHAS and DSS have determined eligible to receive Community Based Services in a Community-Based Setting and who have exercised informed choice to receive such services shall have been afforded such services in a CommunityBased setting within one year of their admission to the Nursing Home. When a Class Member admitted after the Effective Date whom DMHAS and DSS have determined eligible to receive Community Based Services in a Community-Based Setting first exercises his or her informed choice to receive Community-Based Services in a Community-Based Setting less than 180 days before the end of the year after his or her admission, Defendants shall use their best efforts to afford the Class Member such services in such settings before the end of the year, but in any event no longer than 180 days from when the individual exercised his or her informed choice except that when physical plant modifications are necessary to provide a Community Based Setting, an additional 20 days shall be allowed to afford such services.
iv) A Class Member who clearly and knowingly refuses to receive Community-Based Services in a Community-Based Setting shall remain a Class Member during the Settlement Period during which time he/she will retain all Class Member protections and
9

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opportunities for Community-Based Services in a CommunityBased Setting provided herein. v) In the event a Class Member retracts his or her informed choice to receive Community-Based Services in a Community-Based Setting less than 90 days before (a) the end of the Time Period set forth in i) and ii) above, or (b) the end of the year after his or her admission as set forth in iii) above the requirements in this paragraph III. 1 A. addressing the time for Defendants to afford such services shall cease to apply. B. Where a Class Member has a conservator authorized under Connecticut law to determine the type and location of services to be provided to the Class Member, the decision of the Conservator shall be utilized. Nothing herein shall preclude the parties or a Class Member from seeking remedies regarding the decision of a Conservator from the Probate Court as authorized under applicable law.
C. All Class Members whom DMHAS and DSS have determined eligible to receive Community-Based Services in a Community-Based Setting and who have exercised informed choice to receive such services shall be afforded Housing Services based upon the application of eligibility rules governing the receipt of Housing Services as determined by the state officials who are responsible for determining eligibility to receive such services. The receipt of Community-Based Services by an otherwise
10

Case 3:06-cv-00179-AWT Document 303-11 Filed 06/17/14 Page 12 of 39
eligible Class Member shall not be discontinued or reduced solely because of a change in housing location. 2. Education A. Within thirty (30) days of the Effective Date, the Defendants shall begin to conduct at the Nursing Homes education activities for Class Members whom DMHAS and DSS have determined eligible to receive CommunityBased Services in a Community-Based Setting which provide opportunities for information/education regarding and exposure to Community-Based Services and Community-Based Settings. In conducting such education activities, Defendants shall, among other things: i) Explain fully the benefits and financial aspects of Community-
Based Services and Community-Based Settings including apartment and home settings that may be secured through Housing Services subsidies; ii) Facilitate, and accompany Class Members on, visits to Community-Based Settings including apartment and home settings that may be secured through Housing Services subsidies; iii) Assess Class Members’ interest in Community-Based Settings including apartment and home settings that may be secured through Housing Services subsidies; iv) Explore and address the concerns of any Class Member who declines the opportunity to move to a Community-Based Setting or
11

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are ambivalent about such a move, despite being qualified for a Community-Based Setting; v) Review Class Members’ housing preferences quarterly; and vi) Identify the Community-Based Services each eligible individual needs to transition to a Community-Based Setting. vii) Inform conservators of class members of their obligation to comply with and the content of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-656(b). B. Defendants shall require that when their employees and contractors discuss housing options with Class Members, they include information about the option of apartment and home settings that may be secured with Housing Services subsidies, its benefits, and the Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”), rental subsidy, and other income they will receive while receiving Housing Services. 3. Class Members’ Decision to Remain in Nursing Home A. If a Class Member whom DMHAS and DSS have determined eligible to receive Community-Based Services in a Community-Based Setting decides that he or she does not wish to live in a Community-Based Setting, the identity of such Class Member and the reasons underlying the Class Member’s decision shall be disclosed to OPA. Defendants shall make good faith efforts to address the reasons identified by the Class Member for remaining in the nursing home that are within their programmatic control, however, an informed decision by the Class Member or, where authorized under Connecticut law a conservator, that the Class Member
12

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will remain in the Nursing Home shall be respected. When a Class Member’s conservator either refuses to allow an eligibility determination or the opportunity for the receipt of Community-Based Services in a Community-Based Setting, Defendants will notify the conservator in writing of the requirements of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-656(b). Nothing herein shall preclude the Parties or a Class Member from seeking remedies regarding the decision of a conservator from the Probate Court as authorized under applicable law. i) In making a decision not to live in a Community-Based Setting, the
Class Member must: 1) have an opportunity to express his/her preferences; 2) be informed of a recommended Community-Based Setting
in a manner that reflects the Class Member’s ability to understand and communicate information; and 3) be provided the opportunity to visit and observe Community-Based Settings of the type recommended. ii) For a Class Member who refuses to move to a Community-Based Setting, Defendants shall ensure that appropriate employees or contractor staff continue to discuss and recommend CommunityBased Settings, with the Class Member. In addition, Defendants shall continue to facilitate, and accompany Class Members who wish to do so, on visits to Community-Based Settings, including
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apartment and home settings that may be secured with Housing Services subsidies. iii) A Class Member who clearly and knowingly refuses placement in a Community-Based Setting shall remain a Class Member during the Settlement Period during which time he/she will retain all Class Member protections and opportunities for placement in a Community-Based Setting provided herein. 4. Eligibility A. A Class Member shall be eligible to participate in Community-Based Services in a Community-Based Setting, as defined in section II, based upon the application of eligibility rules governing participation in the Money Follows the Person program, the Mental Health Waiver Program, Housing Services, or the state-funded programs listed in Exhibit A, referenced therein as determined by the state officials who are responsible for determining eligibility to participate in such programs utilizing a person-centered planning process. Defendants will ensure that each Class Member is afforded the opportunity to have his or her eligibility for Community-Based Services in a Community-Based Setting determined, and, if deemed eligible as provided herein, the opportunity to receive Community-Based Services in a Community-Based Setting, through a person-centered planning process. Utilization of the person centered planning process established in the programs that constitute Community Based Services as defined in Section II. B. shall satisfy the requirements
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of this section. Eligibility determinations will be conducted at a pace sufficient to permit Class Members to be afforded Community-Based Services in Community-Based Settings within the Time Periods set forth in Section III.1.A. B. Through the person-centered planning process, Defendants shall identify the most integrated setting that is appropriate for the individual, subject to the individual’s informed choice of alternative housing. The planning process shall first consider whether, with Community-Based Services, Class Members can live in a Community-Based Setting. Defendants’ staff will not recommend an alternative other than an apartment or home setting to be secured through Housing Services subsidies, or a home otherwise owned or leased by the Class Member (“Own Home”) or the Class Member’s family member (“Family Home”), unless it first determines that one of these settings is not the most integrated setting appropriate. Each eligible Class Member shall be afforded Housing Services to support the housing identified in their person centered planning process. C. Pursuant to paragraph 6 below, the Remedial Expert will review cases in which Defendants find Class Members ineligible for Community-Based Services in Community-Based Settings under this paragraph, and will review Defendants’ determinations regarding which Community-Based Setting is appropriate for an individual Class Member. If the Remedial Expert concludes that Defendants’ staff recommended an alternative other than an apartment or home setting secured with Housing Services
15

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subsidies, or the Class Member’s Own Home or Family Home, without first determining that one of these settings is not the most integrated setting appropriate, the Remedial Expert will consult with Defendants’ staff and may, if necessary, require a redetermination of the decision. Class Members retain their right to individually seek administrative remedies as provided under state law for denial of eligibility for Community Based Services in Community-Based Settings. 5. Defendants’ Additional Obligations DMHAS shall during the Settlement Period continue provide the services of the Nursing Home Diversion and Transition Program, as described in Exhibit A, for Class Members. 6. The Remedial Expert and Dispute Resolution A. The Parties agree to the appointment of Kevin Martone as the Remedial Expert under this Settlement Agreement. The Remedial Expert shall serve during the Settlement Period, and shall undertake the tasks described herein. The Remedial Expert shall have the duties and responsibilities set forth in this section. B. Parties Meetings. The Remedial Expert shall convene and chair parties meetings and disseminate a written summary of each meeting. The summary shall include action steps and agreements of the parties including timeframes for follow-up activities. During the first year after the Effective Date, meetings shall be held monthly and quarterly thereafter, but may be scheduled at greater intervals at the Remedial Expert’s
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discretion. The Remedial Expert shall also assist Defendants at their request in developing reporting protocols, class member data and formats for updating the parties on settlement agreement activities. C. Evaluation of Compliance: The Remedial Expert shall independently review the Defendants’ compliance with this Agreement. The Remedial Expert shall also attend and observe a reasonable number of personcentered planning meetings to evaluate the effectiveness of the decisionmaking process and deliberations about the compliance with the obligations set forth in Section III of this Settlement Agreement. D. Written Reports. The Remedial Expert shall provide quarterly reports on each of the areas addressed in the obligations set forth in Section III of this Settlement Agreement. Reports shall describe progress in each area, barriers to implementation, and recommendations to address cited problems. These reports will be distributed to the parties and to the Court. It would be expected that these reports would also be presented and discussed at the parties' meetings. Defendants shall be responsible to respond to the issues and recommendations offered by the Remedial Expert. E. Dispute Resolution. The Remedial Expert will respond to complaints concerning compliance with the obligations set forth in Section III of this Settlement Agreement. In conjunction with the meetings with the parties, the Remedial Expert will assist the parties in dispute resolutions through written proposals to correct the cited area of concern and mediation. In
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the event disputes are not resolvable in the Remedial Expert’s judgment, the Remedial Expert will memorialize the issues with proposed recommendations to the parties. F. Training and Education. The Remedial Expert shall assist Defendants in developing education and information activities and its implementation as required under the benchmarks. G. Family. The Remedial Expert shall be available to meet directly with the families, guardians or conservators, and advocates regarding community services, community transition recommendations, and the requirements of the Settlement Agreement. H. Community Transition. The Remedial Expert shall review and evaluate all individual community transition plans for their thoroughness, appropriateness and established timetables. The Remedial Expert may also conduct site visits to Community-Based Settings after a Class Member's move. I. Budget: The Remedial Expert shall be compensated by the Defendants in accordance with a contract/agreement, and a budget negotiated by the Defendants and the Remedial Expert, which shall include and be based upon the scope of work called for in the Settlement Agreement, and shall provide for the performance of all of the work required by the role of the Remedial Expert under this Settlement Agreement. The contract/agreement shall address the entire time period for which the Remedial Expert may be retained under this Settlement Agreement, and
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the Remedial Expert may submit proposed modifications to the budget to the Defendants annually based upon the scope of work. The Remedial Expert’s fees and expenses shall not exceed $600,283 for the Settlement Period unless said period is extended by the Court in accord with Section IV, paragraph 5 of this Settlement Agreement. J. Access. The Remedial Expert shall have access to all documents and data relating to class members and to the Defendants’ performance of their obligations under this Agreement in possession of the Defendants, Defendants’ agents, contractors, evaluators, and providers necessary to perform his functions, including access to the class members themselves, their conservators, advocates and their programs. The Remedial Expert shall also be free to meet with any of the Parties or their agents on an informal basis to discuss issues relating to settlement agreement activities. All rules, regulations, policies, plans, guidelines, directives, instructions, protocols and other material utilized by Defendants to implement this Settlement Agreement shall be made available to the Remedial Expert. The Parties shall jointly move the Court for an order to the Nursing Homes to allow access by the Remedial Expert and the Parties to class member medical records in possession of the Nursing Homes. The Remedial Expert shall be subject to the protective order entered into by the Court. K. Replacement of the Expert. In the event Mr. Martone cannot or will not continue to serve as the Remedial Expert for any reason, the Parties shall
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attempt to agree on a successor Remedial Expert with relevant experience; in the event that they are unable to reach agreement, the Parties will attempt to agree on candidates for Remedial Expert and shall submit the list of candidates to the Court for appointment. The Defendants will use the same methods and procedures for contracting with a replacement remedial expert as set forth herein. L. Court Enforcement. This Agreement shall be subject to the approval of the Court, and. if so approved, shall be entered as a court order. This Agreement and any obligations thereunder shall be enforceable only as follows: i) Plaintiffs shall notify in writing Defendants and the Remedial
Expert of any alleged substantial noncompliance with this Agreement and may request a meeting with the Remedial Expert for the purpose of attempting to resolve the problems identified by the Plaintiffs regarding the Defendants' alleged substantial noncompliance. The Remedial Expert shall attempt to resolve disputes with the parties and allow the Defendants an opportunity to address the issue before certifying the matter to the court in accordance with the procedures set forth herein. As a part of said pre-certification dispute resolution process, Remedial Expert may make recommendations which exceed the requirements of the Settlement Agreement, however, such suggestions are not enforceable against the Defendants.
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ii) Should the Parties fail to resolve, through said informal means, the substantial noncompliance identified by the Plaintiffs, then only the following process (hereinafter Compliance Process) shall be utilized. Plaintiffs shall identify the alleged substantial noncompliance unresolved by the Remedial Expert with this Agreement in a written Petition sent to the Remedial Expert and the Defendants who shall respond in writing within three weeks of its receipt. The Remedial Expert may meet further with the parties or other persons, shall in writing make findings and render a compliance determination and as appropriate issue recommendations for compliance with timelines for compliance. As part of the Compliance Process, the Remedial Expert may not recommend actions by the Defendants that exceed the obligations imposed by this Settlement Agreement. The compliance determinations of the Remedial Expert are final except that Defendants retain the right to challenge before the Court any recommendation or compliance determination that Defendants believe exceed the obligations imposed by this Settlement Agreement.
iii) The Remedial Expert shall make a determination within thirty (30) days of the submission of the written statements or other compliance efforts of the Defendants. If Defendants fail in the written opinion of the Remedial Expert to fully implement the
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recommendations for compliance issued by the Remedial Expert,

Plaintiffs may request in writing that the Remedial Expert certify

compliance issues to the Court which shall be granted in the sole

discretion of the Remedial Expert. Upon such certification,

Plaintiffs may file a motion with the Court seeking a judicial

determination that Defendants are not complying with the

Agreement and an order to the Defendants to comply with

recommendations of the Remedial Expert. Defendants shall have

the right to present to the Court their response to the Plaintiffs’

petition and respond to the recommendations of the Remedial

Expert including submission of a request for modification of the

Remedial Expert’s recommendations.

IV.

Miscellaneous Provisions

1. Settlement Period

A. This Settlement Agreement and the Defendants’ obligations hereunder shall

remain in effect during the Settlement Period.

B. When in the judgment of the Remedial Expert, the Defendants have fully

implemented and accomplished each and every benchmark within the timelines

specified, the Remedial Expert shall report to the Court and certify to the Court

that Defendants are in compliance. Defendants may then petition for termination

of the Settlement Period if such certification has been filed prior to its expiration.

C. The Court shall retain jurisdiction to assure compliance with this Settlement

Agreement until the conclusion of the Settlement Period, at which time its

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jurisdiction shall terminate unless extended as provided under section IV, paragraph 5 infra. 2. Any modification of this Settlement Agreement shall be executed, in writing, by the Parties, shall be filed with the Court, and shall not be effective until the Court enters an Order approving the modified agreement. 3. This Settlement Agreement shall be applicable to, and binding upon, all Parties, their employees, agents, representatives, assigns, and their successors in office. 4. Nothing in the Agreement shall be construed as an acknowledgment, admission, concession, or evidence of liability by any of the Parties regarding any of the Claims, and this Settlement Agreement may not be used as evidence of liability in this or any other civil or criminal proceeding. 5. Only after exhausting the dispute resolution process provided by the Remedial Expert, Plaintiffs may move to extend the Court’s jurisdiction, which motion shall be granted if the Plaintiffs show by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendants are not in substantial compliance with the Settlement Agreement. Plaintiffs shall not file such a motion unless the Remedial Expert has also found after completion of the dispute resolution process that Defendants are not in substantial compliance with the Settlement Agreement. 6. Attorneys Fees In full settlement of all attorneys’ fees, costs and other expenses incurred in connection with this litigation, Defendants shall pay, subject to Court review and approval pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 23, the amount of $1,300,000 (“Agreed Attorney Fees”) to Plaintiffs’ counsel. In consideration of the payment of the Agreed Attorney Fees, the plaintiffs, in
23

Case 3:06-cv-00179-AWT Document 303-11 Filed 06/17/14 Page 25 of 39
their own capacity and as class representatives, and their counsel on behalf themselves and class members, their heirs, successors and assigns, do herewith release and forever discharge the defendants, State of Connecticut, all agencies of the State of Connecticut, and all other present or former officers, agents and employees of the State of Connecticut, their heirs, successors and assigns, in both their official and individual capacities, and the State of Connecticut itself, from all actions, causes of action, suits, claims, controversies, damages and demands of every nature and kind, regarding attorney's fees, costs and expenses, which they, their heirs, successors and assigns ever had, now have or hereafter can, shall or may have for, upon, or by reason arising from this litigation including, but not limited to, any attorney fees and costs incurred before and after the date that this Settlement Agreement is approved by the Court, including attorney fees, costs and expenses incurred from monitoring activities or other participation in work of or interaction with the Remedial Expert, except for fees or costs arising from judicial enforcement where the Court makes a finding of substantial noncompliance by the defendants pursuant to Section III, paragraph 6 L and Section IV, paragraph 5 of this Settlement Agreement. The release of liability set forth in this paragraph for attorney fees, costs and expenses relating to this litigation includes, but is not limited to, all causes of action as have been or may, in the future, be brought in the federal courts, the courts of the State of Connecticut, before the Claims Commissioner pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-141 et seq., or in any other forum asserting rights to attorney fees, costs and expenses arising under the statutes and laws of the United States, and/or the statutes and laws of the State of Connecticut, and such causes of action as may be available under the common law.
24

Case 3:06-cv-00179-AWT Document 303-11 Filed 06/17/14 Page 26 of 39
7. Costs of Notices The cost of all notices that may be ordered by the Court consistent with the terms of this Settlement Agreement shall be borne by Defendants.
8. Modification This Settlement Agreement may not be modified or amended, nor may any of its provisions be waived, except by a writing signed by all Parties hereto or their successorsin-interest.
9. Headings The headings herein are used for the purpose of convenience only and are not meant to have legal effect.
10. Integrated Agreement This Settlement Agreement constitutes the entire agreement among the Parties concerning the Settlement and no representations, warranties, or inducements have been made by any Party hereto concerning this Settlement Agreement and its exhibits other than those contained and memorialized in this Settlement Agreement.
11. Counterparts This Settlement Agreement may be executed in one or more counterparts. All executed counterparts and each of them shall be deemed to be one and the same instrument.
12. Choice of Law The construction, interpretation, operation, effect and validity of this Settlement Agreement, and all documents necessary to effectuate it, shall be governed by the internal laws of the State of Connecticut without regard to conflicts of laws, except to the extent that federal law requires that federal law govern.
25

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Case 3:06-cv-00179-AWT Document 303-11 Filed 06/17/14 Page 30 of 39
BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW
Ira A. Burnim, Esq. Lewis Bossing, Esq. Fed. Bar No. PHV0893 irab@bazelon.org 1101 15th Street, N.W., Suite 1212 Washington, D.C. 20005 Telephone: (202) 467-5730 Facsimile: (202) 223-0409
-and-
OFFICE OF PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES
BY: -----------------Nancy B. Alisberg, Esq. Fed. Bar No. CT 21321 nancy.alisberg@ct.gov 60B Weston Street Hartford, CT 06120 Telephone: (860) 297-4300 Facsimile: (860) 566-8714
~~
RELMAN & ASSOCIATES Michael Allen Fed. Bar No. PHV0891 mallen@relmanlaw.com 1225 Nineteenth Street, NW Washington, DC 20036-2456 Telephone: (202) 728-1888 Facsimile: (202) 728-0848
Co-Counselfor Plaintiffs
27

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Case 3:06-cv-00179-AWT Document 303-11 Filed 06/17/14 Page 32 of 39

Case 3:06-cv-00179-AWT Document 303-11 Filed 06/17/14 Page 33 of 39
EXHIBIT A: STATE FUNDED SERVICES AND PROGRAMS
The following program and service descriptions are provided in accord with the provisions of the Settlement Agreement. The statutes, regulations, policies and procedures for each program and service govern eligibility and scope of services determinations and shall govern to the extent there is a conflict with these descriptions.
DMHAS works with a network of 13 state-operated and private nonprofit funded Local Mental Health Authorities (LMHAs) to provide treatment and support at the community level. LMHAs are responsible for service coordination, care and case management, linkages with other agencies for service needs such as housing and entitlements, program development and management, utilization review and quality management, information system management, and community relations.
State-Operated: - Southwestern CT Mental Health System –Bridgeport and Stamford - Western CT Mental Health Network –Danbury, Torrington, and Waterbury - Capitol Region Mental Health Center –Hartford - River Valley Service –Middletown - CT Mental Health Center –New Haven - Southeastern Mental Health Authority –Norwich
Private Non Privates: - Community Health Resources –Enfield, Manchester, and Windsor - United Services –Willimantic - Rushford –Meriden and Middletown - Community Mental Health Affiliates –New Britain - Intercommunity –East Hartford - Bridges –Milford - BH Care –Branford and Ansonia
DMHAS PROGRAMS:  Assertive Community Treatment (ACT) is a recovery focused, high intensity, community based service for individuals discharged from multiple or extended stays in hospitals, or who are difficult to engage in treatment. The service utilizes an interdisciplinary team to provide intensive, integrated, rehabilitative community support, crisis, and treatment interventions/services that are available 24-hours/7 days a week. ACT includes a comprehensive array of rehabilitative services integrated with medical care, most of which is provided in non-office settings by a mobile multidisciplinary team. The team provides community support services interwoven with treatment and rehabilitative services and regularly scheduled team meetings. Connecticut currently has four (4) designated ACT Teams: 1) Community Health Resources in Manchester, CT; 2) Community Mental Health Affiliates in New Britain, CT; 3) Gilead in Middletown, CT; and 4) Southeastern Mental Health Authority in Norwich, CT. An additional five ACT teams are in the process of being established during 2014.

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ACT-like, high intensity services are available in other geographic areas where Community Support Services, Mobile Crisis Teams, and other community resources are lined to ensure individuals receive adequate and appropriate services and supports, as needed.
 Mobile Crisis Services that assess and treat adults and families in acute emotional crisis in order to stabilize their condition and prevent hospitalization when possible and to arrange for further treatment when necessary. These services are available 24-hours-a-day, 7-days-a-week, emergency mental health workers rapidly assess and treat individuals and families through face-to-face and hotline telephone contacts. These services emphasize reducing suicide risk, risk of harm to others, and likelihood of hospitalization. Emergency services are provided in crisis intervention centers, in general hospital emergency departments, walk-in clinics or by mobile crisis teams. Crisis intervention centers also include short-term crisis and respite beds.
 Outpatient Services to improve or maintain the psychological functioning of adults who require ongoing clinical treatment through individual or group and family therapy and medication support when necessary. Treatment helps to improve or sustain the level of functioning of adults who might otherwise require hospitalization. Services include traditional outpatient services, intake and evaluation, medication management, and intensive outpatient.
 Mental Health Residential Treatment Services offer a variety of housing opportunities including group homes, community residences, and supervised housing programs. These services, which vary in intensity with the independence of the living environment, include supervision, counseling and follow-up to assure that individuals receive needed community support and psychiatric services. Intensive Mental Health Residential Treatment is highly structured and rehabilitative, with twenty-four (24) hour staff supervision, and a length of stay of six (6) to twelve (12) months. This level of care is typically for individuals who are coming directly out of CT Valley Hospital. Admission to the Intensive Mental Health Residential Treatment program comes through a stateoperated inpatient facility. Mental Health Group Homes are designed to assist individuals with serious and persistent mental illnesses to achieve their highest degree of independent functioning and recovery. Access to mental health group home rehabilitative services is provided to those recipients whose mental illness is so serious and disabling as to require care in a group home setting. Necessary rehabilitative services are provided by the group home to individuals who have significant skill deficits in the areas of self-care, illness management, and independent living as a result of the psychiatric disability and who require a nonhospital, 24/7 supervised community-based residence. Rehabilitative services are provided in a structured recovery environment, with on-site staffing twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week.

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 Substance Abuse Residential Services provide 24 hour programming and containment that relies on a community setting or residential milieu as an effective tool for acquiring recovery skills and basic life skills. The program is designed to effect fundamental personal change for clients who have significant social and psychological problems. Substance use is not the only treatment focus and programs take into account individual client behavior, emotions, attitudes, family, culture, trauma, gender, lifestyle, and overall health.
 Housing Supports to promote the recovery of individuals by ensuring that recovery-oriented support services are available to support individuals through their recovery process. These services include supervised and supported housing, the PILOTS Supportive Housing program, and the federally funded Shelter Plus Care program. The Supportive Housing Development is a public/private collaborative effort to foster the development of long-term solutions to the housing and services needs of families and individuals coping with psychiatric disabilities and/or chemical dependency who are facing homelessness. This is accomplished through the leasing of existing scattered site housing and the development of new housing units. The goal of the initiative is the creation of supportive housing units within Connecticut that link individuals and families with targeted employment and service supports. Community-based providers will develop identified housing needs, using approaches that work for both clients and communities.
 Intensive Substance Abuse Residential Treatment is defined as medically necessary, residential behavioral health services for individuals with substance dependencies delivered in a 24 hour facility. The Contractor shall provide substance use disorder services to individuals with substance use disorders who require an intensive rehabilitation program. The anticipated length of stay for individuals utilizing Intensive Residential Treatment is usually thirty (30) days.
 Transitional Housing, otherwise known as Halfway Houses, are residential programs for people with substance use disorders who have completed some type of residential treatment and are in need of minimal support for maintaining their recovery. The length of stay is general 1-3 months and the focus is finding permanent housing and employment.
 Substance Abuse Long term Care is the longest type of residential treatment and is appropriate for someone coming out of detox and/or who hasn’t been in a Long Term Care program before and who needs a long term length of stay. These are generally people who have a long history of addiction and relapses and who have never been able to maintain any period of sobriety. The program is generally 6-9 months long.

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 Community Support Program assist adults with severe psychiatric disorders or co-occurring severe psychiatric and substance use disorders in achieving and maintaining rehabilitative, sobriety and recovery goals. These services address the mental health/substance abuse treatment needs of individuals as well as provide financial, social, educational, vocational, residential and other treatment and support needs of the individuals. CSP services focus on building and maintaining a therapeutic relationship with the individual while delivering rehabilitative, skill building interventions and activities, facilitating connections to the individual’s community recovery supports and emphasizing the individual’s choices, goals and recovery path.
 Vocational/Rehabilitation services and support include vocational counseling an assessment, the development of specific occupational skills, job seeking and retention training, assistance with job search, self-esteem building, life planning, and relapse prevention. In accordance with individual needs, recovery-oriented rehabilitation services provided may include life management, daily living and interpersonal skills. Employment Services are a set of services that develop opportunities in paid part or full time positions at comparable wages for similar positions within the general labor market, such positions are available to any qualified individual, and are not set aside or reserved for individuals with disabilities. Employment Services program funded by DMHAS and maintain compliance with the Department’s fidelity standards.
 Access to Recovery (ATR) III is a presidential initiative which provides vouchers to adults with substance use disorders to help pay for a range of community-based clinical treatment and recovery support services. The goals of the program are (1) Facilitate genuine individual choice and promote multiple pathways to recovery through the development and implementation of a substance use treatment and recovery support service voucher system; (2) Expand access to a comprehensive array of clinical substance use treatment and recovery support services, including those provided through faith-based organizations; and (3) Ensure each client receives an assessment for the appropriate level of services. All services are designed to assist recipients remain engaged in their recovery while promoting independence, employment, self-sufficiency, and stability.
 Nursing Home Diversion and Transition Program is a program to ensure that nursing home placements for DMHAS clients (or DMHAS-eligible clients) are necessary, appropriate, and safe. Preadmission Screening Resident Review (PASRR) is an integral part of the program. The program focuses on two specific goals: (1) Reducing inappropriate admissions of DMHAS clients to nursing homes; and (2) Transitioning nursing home residents with a mental illness back to the community with support services. To accomplish these goals, DMHAS funds eight Nurse Clinicians, as well as three Case Managers, who work directly with

Case 3:06-cv-00179-AWT Document 303-11 Filed 06/17/14 Page 37 of 39
community providers, nursing home staff, and hospital discharge planners (inpatient and emergency room). Additionally, there is ongoing collaboration with the state’s Money Follows the Person Demonstration Project and the Mental Health Waiver .
 SSI/SSDI Outreach, Access and Recovery (SOAR) SSI/SSDI Outreach, Access and Recovery (SOAR) is designed to serve adults who are homeless or at risk of homelessness and who have mental illness, cooccurring mental health and substance abuse disorders and/or other serious health conditions. SOAR is an approach that helps states increase access to mainstream benefits for people who are homeless or at risk of homelessness through: o Strategic Planning Meeting(s) to establish collaboration among key state and/or local stakeholders and to develop an action plan for implementing the SOAR approach (e.g. SSA and Disability Determination Services (DDS); State Mental Health Agency and Department of Corrections leadership; and community homeless, health and behavioral health providers). o Training of case managers using Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration’s (SAMHSA), Stepping Stones to Recovery curriculum that includes a step-by-step explanation of an improved SSI/SSDI application process. A Train-the-Trainer program allows for expansion and sustainability.
 Medication Assisted Treatment This program includes evidence-based approaches proven to assist certain individuals to initiate and/or sustain their recovery. This program allows for clients to direct their own care and define their own goals and recovery path.
 Senior Outreach Substance Abuse Services provide consultations and education, outreach, home visits, nursing home visits, and age-specific weekly substance abuse group therapy to Older Adults throughout the state.
 Screening, Brief Intervention and Referral to Treatment (SBIRT) is a program that provides health screeners in 9 FQHCs who provide routine screening with validated instruments; Brief intervention using manualguided procedures recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO); Brief treatment protocols modeled on a CSAT clinical trial; Differential assessment utilizing standardized diagnostic instruments; and Referral to treatment based on ASAM (2001) criteria. To date 18,254 individuals have been served, with 2,054 receiving Brief Intervention services.

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 Integrated Dual Diagnosis Treatment model and Co-occurring Diagnosis Initiative in which all 13 LMHAs have implemented the Integrated Dual Disorders Treatment model with increasing fidelity levels and positive treatment outcomes of less substance use and fewer mental health symptoms reported.
 The General Assistance Behavioral Health Program (GA BHP) Intensive Case Management (ICM), Alternatives to Hospitalization (ATH), and Opioid Agonist Treatment Protocol (OATP) provides intensive case management services to high utilizers.
 Trauma Initiative The primary goal of the Trauma Initiative is to deliver behavioral health care that is sensitive and responsive to the needs of men and women who have experienced psychological trauma. Training and professional development with clinicians and clinical case managers in the DMHAS system of care is preparing them to provide screening, education, and treatment groups. Trauma services are being developed based on the guiding principle that treatment must be informed by a sound scientific, clinical, culturally relevant, and humanistic understanding of the impact and impairment caused by traumatic stress.
 Peer Bridger Model – in development This program is to serve individuals with mental health disorders or cooccurring mental health and substance use disorders who are involved with the Probate Court System and have a history of difficulty using traditional tools and services available in the current behavioral health system to gain a stable and fruitful lifestyle in the community. The Peer Bridger Program will consist of highly trained staff persons who have lived experience of severe and persistent mental health disorders or cooccurring mental health and substance use disorders. These individuals will make themselves available as peer supporters to persons with mental health disorders/co-occurring mental health and substance use disorders who have been designated as having an ongoing relationship with or who are at risk of having an ongoing relationship with CT Probate Courts. A request for the offering of this service to an individual may come from an individual, LMHA, hospital or from the Probate Court. A relationship is offered and built based on mutual support, respect and shared backgrounds and perspectives. As the relationship evolves, the Peer Support Specialist and the individual who is offered the service will spend time together in the community sharing their world view, hopes and dreams, challenges and frustrations and support each other in the creation of a more satisfying and stable life.
 Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) (aka Melissa’s Project) DMHAS supports the GAL program which provides case management to

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individuals age eighteen or older who have serious and persistent psychiatric disorders, or co-occurring psychiatric and substance use disorders who are medically indigent. Case management services are a set of services provided to individuals with routine or intermittent lowintensity support needs, including health issues, for the purpose of assisting the individuals to access and use community resources and supports. This service assists individuals in achieving the optimal quality of life, allowing them to live successfully in the community.

 
 Case 3:06-cv-00179-AWT Document 310 Filed 07/02/14 Page 1 of 4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

---------------------------------------------------------------------- x

:

STATE OF CONNECTICUT OFFICE OF

:

PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY FOR PERSONS :

WITH DISABILITIES, SHANNON HEMMINGSEN, :

SAMUEL RIVERA, GALE YENCHA, NORMA JEAN :

DIAZ, and AGATHA JOHNSON, individually and on :

behalf of similarly situated individuals,

:

:

Plaintiffs,

: Civil Case No.

:

v.

: 3:06 Civ. 00179 (AWT)

:

THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, MICHAEL P.

:

STARKOWSI, in his official capacity as Commissioner of :

the Connecticut Department of Social Services,

:

PATRICIA REHMER, MSN, in her official capacity as :

Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Mental :

Health and Addiction Services, and J. ROBERT

:

GALVIN, M.D., M.P.H., in his official capacity as

:

Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Public :

Health,

:

:

Defendants.

:

:

---------------------------------------------------------------------- x

FINAL ORDER APPROVING CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT

WHEREAS, On February 6, 2006, the State of Connecticut Office of Protection and Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities (“OPA”) filed an initial complaint in the above-captioned case, no. 06 Civ. 00719, against the State of Connecticut (the “State”) and the State’s Commissioners of the Department of Social Services, the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services, and the Department of Public Health (collectively, “Defendants”); and
WHEREAS, on September 9, 2008, named Plaintiffs Shannon Hemmingsen, Samuel Rivera, Norma Jean Diaz, Gale Yencha, and Agatha Johnson joined OPA and filed their First Amended Complaint (the operative “Complaint”) individually and on behalf of a putative class of over two hundred individuals with mental illness who either reside in certain nursing homes in Connecticut or are at risk of entering these homes (collectively, “Plaintiffs”); and

-1-

Case 3:06-cv-00179-AWT Document 310 Filed 07/02/14 Page 2 of 4
WHEREAS, the Complaint alleges that Defendants administer a system in which putative class members reside in segregated nursing home settings despite their ability to live in more integrated settings, and that this constitutes discrimination under federal law pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Supreme Court’s integration mandate in Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999); and
WHEREAS, Plaintiffs allege violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq., and seek declaratory and injunctive relief that would require Defendants to determine promptly which putative class members are eligible for more integrated settings and to transition such class members residing in the nursing homes at issue to the most integrated setting appropriate; and
WHEREAS, Defendants deny any wrongdoing or liability arising from Plaintiffs’ allegations; and
WHEREAS, on March 31, 2010, this Court granted, in part, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Certification of Class and certified a class of individuals who:
(1) have a mental illness or have a record of such an illness or have been regarded as having such an illness and therefore have a disability within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2);
(2) with appropriate supports and services, could live in the community; and
(3) are institutionalized in either Chelsea Place Care Center in Hartford (“Chelsea Place”), Bidwell Care Center in Manchester (“Bidwell”) or West Rock Health Care Center in New Haven (“West Rock”) (collectively, the “Nursing Homes”), or are at risk of entry into these facilities; and WHEREAS, this Court certified as class representatives all named individual Plaintiffs except for Agatha Johnson; and WHEREAS, after this Court issued its opinion certifying the class, West Rock closed and Bidwell changed its name to Touchpoints at Manchester; accordingly, the Nursing Homes at issue in this action are Chelsea Place and Touchpoints at Manchester; and WHEREAS, Plaintiffs and Defendants engaged in arms’-length negotiations to resolve the issues raised in this litigation and now desire to settle this action, without admitting any fault
-2-

Case 3:06-cv-00179-AWT Document 310 Filed 07/02/14 Page 3 of 4
or liability, in order to avoid the expenses, risks, delays, disruptions, and uncertainties of further litigation, and Plaintiffs and Defendants believe that the best interests of the parties will be advanced by settlement of this action, the terms of which are attached hereto as Exhibit A (the “Settlement Agreement”); and
WHEREAS, the Settlement Class, as defined in the Settlement Agreement, means individuals who:
(i) have a diagnosis of Serious Mental Illness, as defined in 42 C.F.R. § 483.102, (ii) are eligible for and will or have applied for Medicaid-funded services,
(iii) have not been admitted to either of the Nursing Homes for treatment under Medicare and discharged within 120 days of admission,
(iv) have no source of payment other than Medicaid for the cost of their care at the Nursing Home,
(v) who, with appropriate support and services, could live in the community, and
(vi) are institutionalized in either of the Nursing Homes as of the date on which the Court enters this final order approving the Settlement Agreement, or who are admitted to either of the Nursing Homes during the Settlement Period; and
WHEREAS, on April 30, 2014, this Court preliminarily approved the Settlement Agreement, directed notice to the class, and scheduled a fairness hearing; and
WHEREAS, Plaintiffs and Defendants complied with their respective notice obligations, and the class was adequately notified of the Settlement Agreement and fairness hearing; and
WHEREAS, on July 1, 2014, the Court held a fairness hearing with respect to the Settlement Agreement.
WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: (1) Pursuant to Rule 23(e)-(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and based upon a full consideration of the following:
(A) the terms of the Settlement Agreement; (B) the documents submitted to the Court in support of the Settlement Agreement, including: (i) the Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Final Approval of the Class Action Settlement and an Award of the Agreed Upon
-3-

Case 3:06-cv-00179-AWT Document 310 Filed 07/02/14 Page 4 of 4
Attorneys’ Fees; (ii) the Declaration of Nancy B. Alisberg in Support of Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, dated June 17, 2014, and all exhibits attached thereto; (iii) the Declaration of Kenneth Pasquale in Support of Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, dated June 17, 2014, and all exhibits attached thereto; (iv) the Declaration of Todd Rubin in Support of Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, dated June 17, 2014, and all exhibits attached thereto; (v) Defendants’ Supplemental Filing in Support of the Joint Motion for the Approval of the Proposed Settlement Agreement, including the Affidavits of Barbara Geller and Dawn Lambert, dated June 17, 2014, and all exhibits attached thereto; and (vi) class counsel’s in camera submission of its time records; and
(C) the comments elicited and the arguments of counsel presented at the fairness hearing, THE COURT HEREBY FINDS:
(i) that the proposed Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate; and
(ii) that the agreed upon attorneys’ fees are fair and reasonable. (2) The Settlement Agreement is hereby approved. (3) Class counsel is hereby awarded $1,300,000 in attorneys’ fees. (4) The Court shall retain jurisdiction to enforce the Settlement Agreement until the conclusion of the Settlement Period, which is defined in the Settlement Agreement as the period that is four years from the date on which the Court enters this final order approving the Settlement Agreement unless modified to an earlier or later date in accordance with the provisions of that agreement. It is so ordered. Signed this 2nd day of July 2014 at Hartford, Connecticut.
/s/ Alvin W. Thompson United States District Judge
-4-

 
 Case 3:06-cv-00179-AWT Document 361 Filed 06/25/18 Page 1 of 5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

DISABILITY RIGHTS CONNECTICUT, INC., SHANNON :

HEMMINGSEN, SAMUEL RIVERA, GALE YENCHA,

:

NORMA JEAN DIAZ, and AGATHA JOHNSON, individually :

and on behalf of similarly situated individuals,

:

:

Plaintiffs, :

:

v.

:

:

THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, MICHAEL P.

:

STARKOWSI, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the :

Connecticut Department of Social Services, PATRICIA

:

REHMER, MSN, in her official capacity as Commissioner of the :

Connecticut Department of Mental Health and Addiction

:

Services, J. ROBERT GALVIN, M.D., M.P.H., in his official :

capacity as Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of :

Public Health,

:

Defendants. :

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Civil Case No. 3:06 Civ. 00179 (AWT)

CONSENT ORDER MODIFYING SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

WHEREAS, the Parties1 entered into a Settlement Agreement [ECF 303-11], which was approved by order of this Court on July 2, 2014 [ECF 310]; and
WHEREAS, the Settlement Agreement provides, inter alia, that the terms of the Settlement Agreement and Defendants’ obligations thereunder will remain in effect during the Settlement Period, i.e., the date that is four years from the date on which the Court so orders a final Order approving the Settlement Agreement (July 2, 2018); and

1 Capitalized terms not defined herein have the meanings set forth in the Settlement Agreement.

Case 3:06-cv-00179-AWT Document 361 Filed 06/25/18 Page 2 of 5
WHEREAS, pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, Defendants agreed, inter alia, to “ensure that (i) all Class Members who are determined by Defendants as both eligible for Community-Based Services, and to live in Community-Based Settings have been afforded such services in such settings, subject to their informed choice to remain in the Nursing Home or receive Community Based Services in another setting…”; and
WHEREAS, in or about January 2017, Defendants became aware of certain individuals who may have been Class Members of whom Defendants were previously unaware (the “New Class Members”) who, accordingly, did not directly receive the specific protections afforded by the Settlement Agreement until such time as they were identified as potential Class Members; and
WHEREAS, there are a certain number of New Class Members to whom the terms of the Settlement Agreement would apply; and
WHEREAS, Defendants do not believe and dispute whether the delayed identification of the New Class Members constitutes a failure to comply with the provisions of the Settlement Agreement; and
WHEREAS, a dispute therefore exists between the Parties regarding the Defendants’ obligations under the Settlement Agreement to the New Class Members; and
WHEREAS, the Parties desire to resolve all disputes concerning the New Class Members in order to avoid the expense, risks and uncertainty of pursuing remedies under the Settlement Agreement and of potential litigation.
NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby stipulated and agreed by and among the Parties, and ordered by the Court, as follows:
1. The Settlement Agreement is expressly modified, pursuant to Section IV(2), solely as set forth in this Consent Order.
2

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2. The Remedial Expert, in consultation with the Parties, has determined the identity of the New Class Members, whom the Parties agree shall be sole subjects of the provisions of this Consent Order and whose names and locations are set forth in a side letter signed by the Parties and the Remedial Expert (hereinafter the “New Class Members Letter”), which is not being filed with the Court in order to preserve confidentiality of the New Class Members’ personal and medical information.
3. The New Class Members Letter also sets forth the Parties’ and Remedial Expert's agreement as to the period of time for each New Class Member that the Settlement Agreement shall be extended in accord with this Consent Order, said periods ranging from six months to eighteen months from the end of the Settlement Period as set forth in the Settlement Agreement (hereinafter the "Extended Settlement Period").
4. For the sake of clarity, any extension of the Settlement Period provided under this Consent Order does not apply to any Class Member or any other person not listed in the New Class Members Letter and, except as set forth herein, the Settlement Agreement will terminate pursuant to its terms on July 2, 2018 as to such Class Members and persons.
5. Defendants agree to satisfy their obligations set forth in the Settlement Agreement to the benefit of the New Class Members listed in the New Class Members Letter during each New Class Member's Extended Settlement Period.
6. In regards to solely the New Class Members listed in the New Class Members Letter, the provisions set forth in Section 6 of the Settlement Agreement (concerning the Remedial Expert and Dispute Resolution) shall continue in effect during the Extended Settlement Period.
7. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in set forth in Section III, A.,1.(i) and (iii) of the Settlement Agreement, the Defendants shall ensure that any New Class Member listed
3

Case 3:06-cv-00179-AWT Document 361 Filed 06/25/18 Page 4 of 5
in the New Class Members Letter whom DMHAS and DSS have determined is eligible to receive Community Based Services in a Community-Based Setting and who has exercised informed choice to receive such services shall have been afforded such services in a Community Based setting within six (6) months of the determination of such eligibility or exercise of such informed consent whichever is later in time (hereinafter the "Placement Deadline"). In the event said New Class Member retracts his or her informed choice to receive Community-Based Services in a Community-Based Setting less than 90 days before the Placement Deadline, said deadline shall cease to apply. The Extended Settlement Period shall not be further extended because a New Class Member's Placement Deadline occurs after the end of the New Class Member's Extended Settlement Period.
8. The Parties agree with the Remedial Expert's certification (attached hereto as Exhibit A), submitted in accord with Section IV, 1, B. of the Settlement Agreement that, except as to the New Class Members listed in the New Class Members Letter, the Defendants have fully implemented and accomplished each and every benchmark within the timelines specified and are in compliance with the Settlement Agreement as to all other Class Members.
9. Plaintiffs specifically acknowledge in accord with Section IV, 6 of the Settlement Agreement that no claim for attorney's fees and/or costs can be asserted arising from any efforts related to or arising from the entry of this Consent Order.
10. The Settlement Agreement remains in effect subject to its express terms only to the extent as expressly set forth in this Consent Order and subject to the modifications set forth herein.
4

Case 3:06-cv-00179-AWT Document 361 Filed 06/25/18 Page 5 of 5 It is so ordered. Signed this 25th day of June, 2018 at Hartford, Connecticut.
___________/s/AWT___________ Alvin W. Thompson
United States District Judge
5

 
 CLOSED,DFM,EFILE,MOTREF,PJO,REFCNF,STAYED
U.S. District Court District of Connecticut (New Haven) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:06−cv−00179−AWT

State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities v. State of CT Dept of Social Svcs Assigned to: Judge Alvin W. Thompson Referred to: Judge Donna F. Martinez (Settlement) Cause: No cause code entered
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 02/06/2006 Date Terminated: 07/02/2014 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities TERMINATED: 08/11/2017

represented by Andrew S. Penn Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law−DC 1101 15th Street, N.W., Suite 1212 Washington, DC 20005 202−467−5730 Ext 117 Fax: 202−223−0409 Email: andrewp@bazelon.org TERMINATED: 08/24/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Danielle A. Walsman Stroock & Lavan, LLP−NY 180 Maiden Lane New York, NY 10038−4982 212−806−5400 Fax: 212−806−6006 Email: dwalsman@stroock.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ira A. Burnim Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law−DC 1101 15th Street, N.W., Suite 1212 Washington, DC 20005 202−467−5730 x129 Fax: 202−223−0409 Email: irab@bazelon.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph E. Strauss Stroock & Stroock & Lavan 180 Maiden Lane New York, NY 10038−4982 212−806−5400 Fax: 212−806−6006 Email: jstrauss@stroock.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karen A. Bower Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law−DC 1101 15th Street, N.W., Suite 1212 Washington, DC 20005 202−467−5730 x132 Fax: 202−223−0409

Email: karenb@bazelon.org TERMINATED: 02/24/2011 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ken Pasquale Stroock & Lavan, LLP−NY 180 Maiden Lane New York, NY 10038−4982 212−806−5400 Fax: 212−806−6006 Email: kpasquale@stroock.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kevin J. Curnin Stroock & Lavan, LLP−NY 180 Maiden Lane New York, NY 10038−4982 212−806−5400 Fax: 212−806−6006 Email: kcurnin@stroock.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lewis Bossing Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law−DC 1101 15th Street, N.W., Suite 1212 Washington, DC 20005 202−467−5730 Fax: 202−223−0409 Email: lewisb@bazelon.org LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Gerhart Allen Relman, Dane & Colfax, PLLC−DC 1225 19th Street., NW Suite 600 Washington, DC 20036 202−728−1888 Fax: 202−728−0848 Email: mallen@relmanlaw.com TERMINATED: 10/31/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nancy B. Alisberg Disability Rights Connecticut 846 Wethersfield Avenue Hartford, CT 06114 860−990−0175 Fax: 860−296−0055 Email: nancy.alisberg@disrightsct.org TERMINATED: 06/30/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ajaz Fiazuddin State of Connecticut Office of Protection & Advocacy 60B Weston Street

Plaintiff Disability Rights Connecticut, Inc.
V. Defendant State of CT Dept of Social Services Patricia Wilson−Coker, Comm., /O

Hartford, CT 06120 860−297−4388 Fax: 860−566−8714 TERMINATED: 04/11/2008 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jennifer Arnett Stroock & Stroock & Levan, LLP−NY 180 Maiden Lane New York, NY 10038−4982 212−806−5400 Email: jarnett@stroock.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jill Krauss Stroock & Stroock & Levan, LLP−NY 180 Maiden Lane New York, NY 10038−4982 212−806−5400 Email: jkrauss@stroock.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Catherine E. Cushman Disability Rights Connecticut 846 Wethersfield Avenue Hartford, CT 06114 860−297−4300 Email: catherine.cushman@disrightsct.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nancy B. Alisberg (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/30/2018 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Hugh Barber Attorney General's Office Health & Human Services 55 Elm St., Po Box 120 Hartford, CT 06141−0120 860−808−5210 Fax: 860−808−5385 Email: hugh.barber@ct.gov TERMINATED: 05/14/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel R. Shapiro Attorney General's Office 55 Elm St., PO Box 120 Hartford, CT 06141−0120 860−808−5210 Fax: 860−808−5385 Email: Daniel.Shapiro@ct.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Henry A. Salton Attorney General's Office Health & Human Services

Defendant
State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs Thomas A. Kirk, Jr., PhD Comm., I/O

55 Elm St., Po Box 120 Hartford, CT 06101 860−808−5318 Email: Henry.Salton@ct.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jacqueline S. Hoell Office of the Attorney General − Elm Htfd 55 Elm Street P.O. Box 120 Hartford, CT 06141−0120 860−808−5210 Fax: 860−808−5385 Email: Jacqueline.Hoell@ct.gov TERMINATED: 05/14/2018 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas J. Ring Attorney General's Office 55 Elm St., Po Box 120 Hartford, CT 06101 860−808−5318 Email: thomas.ring@po.state.ct.us TERMINATED: 11/06/2009 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jacqueline S. Hoell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY
Rosemary Miller McGovern Attorney General's Office −Elm Htfd 55 Elm Street P.O. Box 120 Hartford, CT 06141 860−808−5210 Email: rosemary.mcgovern@ct.gov TERMINATED: 04/15/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas J. Ring Attorney General's Office Health & Human Services 55 Elm St., Po Box 120 Hartford, CT 06101 860−808−5318 Email: thomas.ring@po.state.ct.us TERMINATED: 11/06/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel R. Shapiro (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Henry A. Salton (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Hugh Barber (See above for address)

Defendant State of CT Dept of Pub Health J. Robert Galvin, MD, MPH, Comm., I/O
Defendant State of Connecticut

TERMINATED: 05/14/2018 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel R. Shapiro (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Henry A. Salton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Hugh Barber (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2018 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jacqueline S. Hoell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2018 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas J. Ring (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/06/2009 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jacqueline S. Hoell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard J. Lynch Attorney General's Office Health & Human Services 55 Elm St., Po Box 120 Hartford, CT 06101 860−808−5210 Fax: 860−808−5385 Email: richard.lynch@ct.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel R. Shapiro (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Henry A. Salton (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Hugh Barber (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/2018 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas J. Ring (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/06/2009 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant West Rock Health Care Center TERMINATED: 07/03/2007
Amicus United States of America
Witness Attorney Jonathan M. Bidwell Care Center, LLC and Chelsea Place Care Center, LLC Bidwell Care Center, LLC and Chelsea Place Care Center, LLC Witness Bidwell Care Center, LLC and Chelsea Place Care Center, LLC Bidwell Care Center, LLC and Chelsea Place Care Center, LLC

represented by Bernard Anthony Pellegrino Pellegrino Law Firm 475 Whitney Ave. New Haven, CT 06511 203−787−2225 Fax: 203−777−2096 Email: bp@pellegrinolawfirm.com TERMINATED: 07/03/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Amanda Maisels U.S. Department Of Justice − 950 Penn DC − CIV DIV 950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. Northwest Building, 7th Floor Washington, DC 20530 202−305−8454 Fax: 202−616−6862 Email: Amanda.maisels@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Anne F. Thidemann U.S. Attorney's Office−BPT 1000 Lafayette Blvd., 10th Floor Bridgeport, CT 06604 203−696−3045 Fax: 203−579−5575 Email: anne.thidemann@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren M. Nash U.S. Attorney's Office−NH 157 Church St., 25th Floor New Haven, CT 06510 203−821−3700 Fax: 203−773−5373 Email: lauren.nash@usdoj.gov TERMINATED: 02/29/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jonathan M. Starble Starble & Harris Avon Park South One Darling Dr. Avon, CT 06001 860−678−7775 Fax: 860−678−8887 Email: jstarble@starbleharris.com

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 02/06/2006 02/06/2006 02/06/2006 02/06/2006
02/06/2006
02/06/2006 02/06/2006 02/10/2006
02/10/2006
02/10/2006
02/10/2006
02/15/2006
02/15/2006 02/21/2006
02/22/2006

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against State of Connecticut Dept of Soc Svcs ( Filing fee $ 250 receipt number H018502.), filed by State of Connecticut Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities.(Grady, B.) (Entered: 02/06/2006)
2 Order on Pretrial Deadlines: Motions to Dismiss due on 05/06/06. Amended Pleadings due by 4/7/2006. Discovery due by 8/8/2006. Dispositive Motions due by 9/7/2006. Signed by Clerk on 02/06/06. (Grady, B.) (Entered: 02/06/2006)
Summons Issued as to State of Connecticut Dept of Soc Svcs. (Grady, B.) (Entered: 02/06/2006)
3 MOTION for admission of Michael Allen pro hac vice. Filing Fee $25.00. Receipt Number HH018503. by State of Connecticut Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Michael Allen)(Grady, B.) (Entered: 02/06/2006)
4 MOTION for admission of Karen Bower pro hac vice. Filing Fee $25.00. Receipt Number H018503. by State of Connecticut Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Karen Bower)(Grady, B.) (Entered: 02/06/2006)
5 MOTION for admission of Ira Burnim. Filing Fee $25.00. Receipt Number H018503. by State of Connecticut Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Ira A. Burnim)(Grady, B.) (Entered: 02/06/2006)
25 NOTICE of Appearance by Jacqueline S. Hoell, Richard J. Lynch on behalf of State of Connecticut (Grady, B.) (Entered: 02/28/2006)
6 MOTION for admission of Attorney Kevin J. Curnin pro hac vice. Filing Fee $25.00., Receipt Number H018585 by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Kevin J. Curnin)(Grady, B.) (Entered: 02/10/2006)
7 MOTION for admission of Attorney Kenneth Pasquale pro hac vice. Filing Fee $25.00. Receipt Number H018585, by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Kenneth Pasquale)(Grady, B.) (Entered: 02/10/2006)
8 MOTION for admission of Attorney Joseph E. Strauss. Filing Fee $25.00. Receipt Number H018585, by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Joseph E. Strauss)(Grady, B.) (Entered: 02/10/2006)
9 MOTION for admission of Attorney Danielle Alfonzo Walsman. Filing Fee $25.00. Receipt Number H018585, by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Daniel Alfonzo Walsman)(Grady, B.) (Entered: 02/10/2006)
10 ORDER granting 3 Motion to Appear, granting 4 Motion to Appear, granting 5 Motion to Appear, granting 6 Motion to Appear, granting 7 Motion to Appear, granting 8 Motion to Appear, granting 9 Motion to Appear. All, absent objection. Signed by Judge Christopher F. Droney on 2/15/06. (Droney, Christopher) (Entered: 02/15/2006)
11 NOTICE of Appearance by Henry A. Salton on behalf of State of CT Dept of Pub Health (Grady, B.) (Entered: 02/16/2006)
12 ORDER ELECTRONIC NOTICE RE; ELECTRONIC FILING OF CASE. THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE THE COURT SHALL ISSUE. Signed by Judge Christopher F. Droney on 2/21/06. (Attachments: # E FILE ORDER(1))(Sunbury, B.) (Entered: 02/21/2006)
13 SUMMONS Returned Executed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs served

02/22/2006
02/22/2006 02/22/2006 02/22/2006 02/23/2006 02/23/2006 02/23/2006 02/23/2006 02/27/2006
02/27/2006 02/27/2006 02/27/2006 03/02/2006 03/02/2006 03/02/2006 03/06/2006 03/06/2006 03/06/2006 03/06/2006 03/07/2006

on 2/10/2006, answer due 3/2/2006. (Grady, B.) (Entered: 02/22/2006)
14 SUMMONS Returned Executed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. State of CT Dept of Social Services served on 2/10/2006, answer due 3/2/2006. (Grady, B.) Additional attachment(s) added on 2/22/2006 (Grady, B.). (Entered: 02/22/2006)
15 SUMMONS Returned Executed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. State of CT Dept of Pub Health served on 2/10/2006, answer due 3/2/2006. (Grady, B.) (Entered: 02/22/2006)
16 SUMMONS Returned Executed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Grady, B.) (Entered: 02/22/2006)
Docket Entry Correction: Document 14 Summons Returned Executed has been modified to replace the PDF (Grady, B.) (Entered: 02/22/2006)
17 NOTICE of Appearance by Joseph E. Strauss on behalf of State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities (Grady, B.) (Entered: 02/23/2006)
18 NOTICE of Appearance by Kevin J. Curnin on behalf of State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities (Grady, B.) (Entered: 02/23/2006)
19 NOTICE of Appearance by Ken Pasquale on behalf of State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities (Grady, B.) (Entered: 02/23/2006)
20 NOTICE of Appearance by Danielle A. Walsman on behalf of State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities (Grady, B.) (Entered: 02/23/2006)
21 NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC ORDER: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE THE COURT WILL ISSUE. − − − ORDER granting 7 Stipulated Motion for Extension of Time until 2/23/06 to answer the Complaint. Signed by Judge Christopher F. Droney on 2/27/06. (Newcomb, P.) (Entered: 02/27/2006)
22 Docket Entry Correction − Please disregard 21 , This was Entered in Error. Docket entry made to wrong case. (Newcomb, P.) (Entered: 02/27/2006)
23 NOTICE of Appearance by Thomas J. Ring on behalf of State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs (Grady, B.) (Entered: 02/28/2006)
24 NOTICE of Appearance by Hugh Barber on behalf of State of CT Dept of Social Services (Grady, B.) (Entered: 02/28/2006)
26 MOTION for Extension of Time until 03/22/06 to respond to the Complaint by State of CT Dept of Social Services, State of Connecticut. (Grady, B.) (Entered: 03/03/2006)
27 ORDER: Ordered accordingly 26 MOTION for Extension of Time until 03/22/06 to respond to the Complaint. Signed by Clerk on 03/03/06. (Grady, B.) (Entered: 03/03/2006)
Answer deadline updated for State of CT Dept of Pub Health to 3/22/2006. (Grady, B.) (Entered: 03/07/2006)
28 NOTICE of Appearance by Daniel R. Shapiro on behalf of State of CT Dept of Pub Health (Grady, B.) (Entered: 03/06/2006)
29 NOTICE of Appearance by Ira A. Burnim on behalf of State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities (Grady, B.) (Entered: 03/06/2006)
30 NOTICE of Appearance by Michael Allen on behalf of State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities (Grady, B.) (Entered: 03/06/2006)
31 NOTICE of Appearance by Karen A. Bower on behalf of State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities (Grady, B.) (Entered: 03/06/2006)
32 NOTICE of Appearance by Daniel R. Shapiro on behalf of State of Connecticut (Grady, B.) (Entered: 03/07/2006)

03/07/2006 03/16/2006
03/16/2006 03/21/2006
03/22/2006
03/22/2006
04/06/2006 04/10/2006 04/10/2006 04/10/2006 04/13/2006 04/17/2006 04/19/2006 04/19/2006 04/20/2006
04/25/2006
04/25/2006

33 MOTION for Extension of Time until 04/07/06 to hold the discovery planning conference by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Grady, B.) (Entered: 03/07/2006)
34 NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC ORDER: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE THE COURT WILL ISSUE. − − − ORDER granting 33 Motion for Extension of Time until 4/7/06 to hold discovery planning conference. Signed by Judge Christopher F. Droney on 3/16/06. (Newcomb, P.) (Entered: 03/16/2006)
Set Deadline: Rule 26 Meeting Report due by 4/7/2006. (Grady, B.) (Entered: 03/17/2006)
35 MOTION for Extension of Time until 4/21/06 to file a response to 1 Complaint by State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs, State of CT Dept of Pub Health, State of CT Dept of Social Services, State of Connecticut. (D'Onofrio, B.) (Entered: 03/21/2006)
36 NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC ORDER: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE THE COURT WILL ISSUE. − − − ORDER granting 35 Motion for Extension of Time until 4/21/06 to file a response to 1 Complaint. Signed by Judge Christopher F. Droney on 3/22/06. (Newcomb, P.) (Entered: 03/22/2006)
Answer deadline updated for State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs to 4/21/2006; State of CT Dept of Pub Health to 4/21/2006; State of CT Dept of Social Services to 4/21/2006; State of Connecticut to 4/21/2006. (D'Onofrio, B.) (Entered: 03/22/2006)
37 ELECTRONIC CASE ORDER: Signed by Judge Christopher F. Droney on 04/06/06. (Grady, B.) (Entered: 04/06/2006)
38 Letter from Kenneth Pasquale dated 04/07/06, re: Court's Recusal (Grady, B.) (Entered: 04/11/2006)
39 ENDORSEMENT ORDER: The Clerk shall docket this 38 Letter. Signed by Judge Christopher F. Droney on 04/10/06. (Grady, B.) (Entered: 04/11/2006)
40 ORDER OF TRANSFER. Case reassigned to Judge Alvin W. Thompson for all further proceedings. Signed by Judge Christopher F. Droney on 4/10/06. (D'Onofrio, B.) (Entered: 04/12/2006)
41 ELECTRONIC FILING ORDER. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 4/13/06.(Mata, E.) (Entered: 04/13/2006)
42 REPORT of Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 04/17/2006)
43 Third MOTION for Extension of Time Uncontested by State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs, State of CT Dept of Pub Health, State of CT Dept of Social Services, State of Connecticut. (Shapiro, Daniel) (Entered: 04/19/2006)
44 ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Donna F. Martinez for a conference to discuss pre−trial scheduling. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 04/19/06. (Grady, B.) (Entered: 04/19/2006)
45 NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR & ORDER: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE THE COURT WILL ISSUE. A telephonic status conference has been scheduled with the undersigned for May 9, 2006 at 10:00 a.m. to discuss pre−trial scheduling. Counsel for the plaintiff shall initiate the call to chambers at (860)240−3605 with counsel for all parties on the line. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 4/20/06. (Nielsen, J.) (Entered: 04/20/2006)
46 ELECTRONIC ORDER: The Defendants' Uncontested Third Motion for Extension of Time (Doc. No. 43 ) to file "motions addressed to the Complaint" is hereby GRANTED, absent objection and nunc pro tunc, to and including May 5, 2006. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 4/25/06. (Mata, E.) (Entered: 04/25/2006)
Answer deadline updated for State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs to 5/5/2006; State of CT Dept of Pub Health to 5/5/2006; State of CT Dept of Social Services to 5/5/2006; State of Connecticut to 5/5/2006. (Grady, B.) (Entered: 04/25/2006)

05/01/2006 05/05/2006
05/05/2006 05/05/2006 05/05/2006 05/09/2006 05/10/2006
05/15/2006
05/15/2006 05/17/2006
05/17/2006 05/23/2006
05/23/2006 06/07/2006 06/09/2006 06/09/2006
06/09/2006

47 NOTICE of Appearance by Ajaz Fiazuddin on behalf of State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities (Fiazuddin, Ajaz) (Entered: 05/01/2006)
48 First MOTION to Dismiss by State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs, State of CT Dept of Pub Health, State of CT Dept of Social Services, State of Connecticut.Responses due by 5/26/2006 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support)(Hoell, Jacqueline) (Entered: 05/05/2006)
49 NOTICE of Appearance by Daniel R. Shapiro on behalf of State of CT Dept of Pub Health (Grady, B.) (Entered: 05/05/2006)
50 NOTICE of Appearance by Daniel R. Shapiro on behalf of State of CT Dept of Pub Health (Shapiro, Daniel) (Entered: 05/05/2006)
51 MOTION to Dismiss by State of CT Dept of Pub Health.Responses due by 5/26/2006 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support)(Shapiro, Daniel) (Entered: 05/05/2006)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Donna F. Martinez : Telephonic Status Conference held on 5/9/2006. Time 20 minutes (Wood, R.) (Entered: 05/10/2006)
52 First MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 51 MOTION to Dismiss, 48 First MOTION to Dismiss until June 9, 2006 by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Fiazuddin, Ajaz) (Entered: 05/10/2006)
53 ELECTRONIC ORDER: Plaintiff's First Motion for Extension of Time (Doc. No. 52 ) to oppose the defendant's motions to dismiss (Doc. Nos. 51 and 48 ) are hereby GRANTED, absent objection, to and including June 9, 2006. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 5/15/06. (Mata, E.) (Entered: 05/15/2006)
Reset Deadlines as to 51 MOTION to Dismiss, 48 First MOTION to Dismiss. Responses due by 6/9/2006 (Grady, B.) (Entered: 05/16/2006)
54 NOTICE OF E−FILED ORDER: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE THE COURT WILL ISSUE. COUNSEL ARE DIRECTED TO THE ATTACHED SCHEDULING ORDER. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 5/17/06. (Nielsen, J.) (Entered: 05/17/2006)
Set Deadlines: Amended Pleadings due by 9/11/2006. Discovery due by 2/15/2006. Dispositive Motions due by 5/15/2008. Joint Trial Memorandum due by 6/16/2008. (Grady, B.) (Entered: 05/18/2006)
55 NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR & ORDER: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE THE COURT WILL ISSUE. A telephonic status conference has been scheduled with the undersigned for September 12, 2006 at 9:30 a.m. Counsel for the plaintiffs shall initiate the call to chambers at (860)240−3605 with counsel for all parties on the line. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 5/23/06. (Nielsen, J.) (Entered: 05/23/2006)
Set Deadline: Telephonic Status Conference set for 9/12/2006 09:30 AM before Judge Donna F. Martinez. (Grady, B.) (Entered: 05/26/2006)
56 NOTICE of Appearance by Michael Allen on behalf of State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities (Allen, Michael) (Entered: 06/07/2006)
57 Memorandum in Opposition re 48 First MOTION to Dismiss filed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 06/09/2006)
58 Plaintiff's Memorandum In Opposition To Defendant J. Robert Galvin, M.D., M.P.H.'s Motion To Dismiss Pursuant To Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) re 51 MOTION to Dismiss filed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) Modified on 6/12/2006 to remove text (Grady, B.). (Entered: 06/09/2006)
59 AFFIDAVIT / Declaration In Support Of Plaintiff's Opposition To Defendant J. Robert Galvin, M.D., M.P.H.'s Motion To Dismiss Pursuant To Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) filed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 06/09/2006)

06/09/2006 06/14/2006 06/15/2006 06/23/2006 06/23/2006 07/17/2006
07/20/2006 09/12/2006
09/12/2006 11/14/2006
11/14/2006 01/12/2007 01/26/2007 01/26/2007

60 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Plaintiff's Memorandum In Opposition and Declaration served on Thomas J. Ring, Hugh Barber, Henry A. Salton and Daniel Shapiro on 6/9/2006, filed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 06/09/2006)
61 First MOTION for Extension of Time until July 19, 2006 response to discovery by State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs, State of CT Dept of Pub Health, State of CT Dept of Social Services, State of Connecticut. (Ring, Thomas) (Entered: 06/14/2006)
62 ELECTRONIC ORDER: The Defendants' Uncontested Initial Motion for Extension of Time (Doc. No. 61 ) to respond to the plaintiff's document production request is hereby GRANTED, absent objection, to and including July 19, 2006. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 6/15/06. (Mata, E.) (Entered: 06/15/2006)
63 REPLY to Response to 48 First MOTION to Dismiss filed by State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs, State of CT Dept of Pub Health, State of CT Dept of Social Services, State of Connecticut. (Hoell, Jacqueline) (Entered: 06/23/2006)
64 REPLY to Response to 51 MOTION to Dismiss filed by State of CT Dept of Pub Health. (Shapiro, Daniel) (Entered: 06/23/2006)
65 Second MOTION for Extension of Time until August 3, 2006 Uncontested to respond to Plaintiff's First Request for the Production of Documents to all Defendants dated May 15, 2006 by State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs, State of CT Dept of Pub Health, State of CT Dept of Social Services, State of Connecticut. (Shapiro, Daniel) (Entered: 07/17/2006)
66 ELECTRONIC ORDER: Defendants' Uncontested Second Motion for Extension of Time (Doc. No. 65 ) is hereby GRANTED, absent objection and nunc pro tunc, to and including August 3, 2006. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 7/20/06. (Mata, E.) (Entered: 07/20/2006)
67 Telephonic conference held regarding settlement. Counsel report that the parties are making progress toward a resolution of the case. A follow up telephonic conference shall be held on 11/14/06 at 10 am. The plaintiff shall initiate the call to chambers with all counsel on the line. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 9/12/06. (Martinez, Donna) (Entered: 09/12/2006)
Set Deadline: Telephonic Conference set for 11/14/2006 10:00 AM before Judge Donna F. Martinez. (Grady, B.) (Entered: 09/13/2006)
68 Telephonic Settlement Conference held on 11/14/2006. Counsel shall submit to the chambers of the undersigned a joint written report on the status of their efforts to resolve the case on February 1, 2007. If at anytime in the future, the parties agree that they would benefit from an in−person settlement conference, they may request such a conference by contacting the chambers of the undersigned. 20 minutes (Martinez, Donna) Modified on 11/14/2006 to correct the date (Grady, B.). (Entered: 11/14/2006)
Set Deadline: Joint written report on the status of their efforts to resolve the case due by 2/1/2007. (Grady, B.) (Entered: 11/14/2006)
69 MOTION for Order requiring plaintiff to answer 50 interrogatories per defendant Order by State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs, State of CT Dept of Pub Health, State of CT Dept of Social Services, State of Connecticut. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support)(Shapiro, Daniel) (Entered: 01/12/2007)
70 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 69 MOTION for Order requiring plaintiff to answer 50 interrogatories per defendant Order until February 16, 2007 by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Fiazuddin, Ajaz) (Entered: 01/26/2007)
71 ELECTRONIC ORDER: Defendant's Motion for Order Requiring Plaintiff to Answer Fifty (50) Interrogatories per Defendant (Doc. No. 69 ) is hereby REFERRED to Magistrate Judge Donna F. Martinez. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 1/26/07. (Bock, M.) (Entered: 01/26/2007)

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ORDER REFERRING MOTION: 69 MOTION for Order requiring plaintiff to answer 50 interrogatories per defendant Order to Magistrate Judge Donna F. Martinez. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 01/26/07. Motions referred to Donna F. Martinez(Grady, B.) (Entered: 01/30/2007)
72 ELECTRONIC ORDER: The Plaintiff's First Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Defendants' Motion for Order Requiring Plaintiff to Answer Fifty (50) Interrogatories Per Defendant (Doc. No. 70 ) is hereby REFERRED to Magistrate Judge Donna F. Martinez. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 1/29/07. (Bock, M.) (Entered: 01/29/2007)
73 NOTICE OF E−FILED ORDER: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE THE COURT WILL ISSUE. The plaintiff's 70 Motion for Extension of Time is granted. Plaintiff's deadline to respond to the 69 Motion for Order Requiring Plaintiff to Answer Fifty Interrogatories Per Defendant shall be February 16, 2007. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 1/31/07. (Turner, M.) (Entered: 01/31/2007)
Reset Deadlines as to 69 MOTION for Order requiring plaintiff to answer 50 interrogatories per defendant Order. Responses due by 2/16/2007 (Grady, B.) (Entered: 02/01/2007)
74 Second MOTION for Extension of Time until March 16, 2007 respond to plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories to all Defendants by State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs, State of CT Dept of Pub Health, State of CT Dept of Social Services, State of Connecticut. (Shapiro, Daniel) Text modified on 2/20/2007 (Grady, B.). (Entered: 02/16/2007)
75 AFFIDAVIT re 69 MOTION for Order requiring plaintiff to answer 50 interrogatories per defendant Order (Declaration) Signed By Kenneth Pasquale filed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B part 1# 3 Exhibit B Part 2)(Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 02/16/2007)
76 Memorandum in Opposition re 69 MOTION for Order requiring plaintiff to answer 50 interrogatories per defendant Order filed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 02/16/2007)
77 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities re 76 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion, 75 Affidavit, (Declaration of Kenneth Pasquale) (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 02/16/2007)
78 Memorandum in Opposition re 74 Second MOTION for Extension of Time until March 16, 2007 respond to plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories to all Defendants Set Deadlines/Hearings filed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 02/21/2007)
79 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities re 78 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion, (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 02/21/2007)
80 ELECTRONIC ORDER: Defendant's Motion for Extension of Time (Doc. No. 74 ) is hereby GRANTED, over objection. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 2/24/07. (S−Blackburn, M.) (Entered: 02/24/2007)
81 MOTION to Compel by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities.Responses due by 4/23/2007 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Declaration of Kenneth Pasquale# 2 Memorandum in Support # 3 Exhibit Certificate of Service)(Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 04/02/2007)
82 ELECTRONIC ORDER: Plaintiff's Motion to Compel (Doc. No. 81 ) is hereby REFERRED to Magistrate Judge Donna F. Martinez. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 4/3/07. (S−Blackburn, M.) (Entered: 04/03/2007)
83 Memorandum in Opposition re 81 MOTION to Compel filed by Jonathan M. Bidwell Care Center, LLC and Chelsea Place Care Center, LLC, Bidwell Care Center, LLC and Chelsea Place Care Center, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 & 2)(Starble, Jonathan) (Entered: 04/23/2007)

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84 MOTION to Compel by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities.Responses due by 5/21/2007 (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Of Danielle Walsman# 2 Exhibit A# 3 Exhibit B# 4 Exhibit C)(Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 04/30/2007)
85 Memorandum in Support re 84 MOTION to Compel filed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 04/30/2007)
86 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 04/30/2007)
87 AFFIDAVIT re 81 MOTION to Compel : Affidavit Of Nancy B. Alisberg In Support Of Plaintiff's Motion For An Order To Compel The Production Of Documents Pursuant To Subpoenas To Non−Party Witnesses filed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 05/01/2007)
88 AFFIDAVIT re 81 MOTION to Compel : Affidavit Of Danielle A.Walsman In Support Of Plaintiffs Motion For An Order To Compel The Production Of Documents Pursuant To Subpoenas To Non−Party Witnesses filed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 05/01/2007)
89 Memorandum in Support re 81 MOTION to Compel : Reply Memorandum Of Law In Further Support Of Plaintiff's Motion For An Order To Compel The Production Of Documents Pursuant To Subpoenas To Non−Party Witnesses filed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 05/01/2007)
90 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities re 87 Affidavit, 88 Affidavit, 89 Memorandum in Support of Motion, (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 05/01/2007)
91 ELECTRONIC ORDER: The plaintiff's Notice of Motion to Compel (Doc. No. 84 ) is hereby REFERRED to Magistrate Judge Donna F. Martinez. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 5/2/07.(Bock, M.) (Entered: 05/02/2007)
92 ORDER. Oral Argument on the Defendants' 69 Motion for Order, the plaintiff's 81 Motion to Compel and the plaintiff's 84 Motion to Compel is scheduled for 5/30/07 at 10 a.m. in the East Courtroom, 450 Main St., Hartford, CT before the undersigned. ALL PERSONS ENTERING THE COURTHOUSE MUST PRESENT PHOTO IDENTIFICATION. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 5/11/07. (Turner, M.) (Entered: 05/11/2007)
Reset Deadlines as to 69 MOTION for Order, 81 MOTION to Compel, 84 MOTION to Compel. Oral Argument set for 5/30/2007 10:00 AM before Judge Donna F. Martinez. (Grady, B.) (Entered: 05/14/2007)
93 Memorandum in Opposition to 69 MOTION for Order requiring plaintiff to answer 50 interrogatories per defendant Order, 81 MOTION to Compel, 84 MOTION to Compel filed by West Rock Health Care Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Objections to Subpoenas)(Grady, B.) (Entered: 05/16/2007)
94 ORDER. Pursuant to the requests of Attorneys Starble and Strauss, the oral argument previously scheduled for May 30, 2007 is rescheduled to June 6, 2007 at 3:00 p.m. in the East Courtroom, 450 Main St., Hartford, CT before the undersigned. ALL PERSONS ENTERING THE COURTHOUSE MUST PRESENT PHOTO IDENTIFICATION. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 5/21/07. (Turner, M.) (Entered: 05/21/2007)
Reset Deadlines as to 69 MOTION for Order requiring plaintiff to answer 50 interrogatories per defendant, 81 MOTION to Compel, 84 MOTION to Compel. Motion Hearing set for 6/6/2007 03:00 PM before Judge Donna F. Martinez. (Grady, B.) (Entered: 05/22/2007)
95 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time Of Deadlines Relating To Discovery by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Attachments:

06/05/2007 06/06/2007 06/07/2007 06/07/2007
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# 1 Exhibit A)(Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 06/05/2007)
96 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities re 95 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time Of Deadlines Relating To Discovery (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 06/05/2007)
97 Minute Entry. Motion Hearing held on 6/6/2007 before Judge Donna F. Martinez : taking under advisement 69 Motion for Order; taking under advisement 81 Motion to Compel; taking under advisement 84 Motion to Compel; 50 minutes(Court Reporter S. Bowles.) (Pesta, J.) (Entered: 06/06/2007)
98 ORDER. The defendants' 69 Motion for Order Requiring Plaintiff to Answer Fifty Interrogatories per Defendant is withdrawn without prejudice pursuant to the parties' agreement, as stated on the record during oral argument on June 6, 2007. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 6/7/07. (Turner, M.) (Entered: 06/07/2007)
99 ELECTRONIC ORDER: The plaintiffs' Consensual Motion to Modify Scheduling Order (Doc. No. 95 ) is hereby GRANTED. Discovery shall be completed by September 15, 2008, with intermediate deadlines as indicated in the motion. Dispositive motions shall be filed no later than December 15, 2008. A Trial Memorandum Order will be issued once the dispositive motions deadline has passed. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 6/7/07. (Bock, M.) (Entered: 06/07/2007)
Set Deadlines: Discovery due by 9/15/2008., Dispositive Motions due by 12/15/2008. (Grady, B.) (Entered: 06/07/2007)
100 ORDER denying plaintiff's 81 Motion to Compel and 84 Motion to Compel without prejudice to refiling after a ruling on the pending motions to dismiss. See attached ruling. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 7/3/07. (Turner, M.) (Entered: 07/03/2007)
101 MOTION for Reconsideration re 100 Order on Motion to Compel, by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities.Responses due by 8/2/2007 (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 07/12/2007)
102 Memorandum in Support re 101 MOTION for Reconsideration re 100 Order on Motion to Compel, filed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 07/12/2007)
103 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities re 101 MOTION for Reconsideration re 100 Order on Motion to Compel,, 102 Memorandum in Support of Motion (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 07/12/2007)
104 ELECTRONIC ORDER: The plaintiff's Notice of Motion (Doc. No. 101 ) for reconsideration of Magistrate Judge Martinez's July 3, 2007 order denying the plaintiff's motions to compel is hereby REFERRED to Magistrate Judge Donna F. Martinez. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 7/16/07. (Bock, M.) (Entered: 07/16/2007)
NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL WILL RECEIVE. ALL PERSONS ENTERING THE COURTHOUSE MUST PRESENT PHOTO IDENTIFICATION. Oral Argument/Hearing on Motion to Dismiss (doc. #48) set for 8/30/2007 at 09:30 AM in the South Courtroom, 450 Main Street, Hartford, CT, before Judge Alvin W. Thompson. (Smith, S.) (Entered: 07/30/2007)
ENTERED IN ERROR . . . Reset Deadline as to 48 First MOTION to Dismiss. Responses due by 8/30/2007 (Grady, B.) Text modified on 8/2/2007 (Grady, B.). (Entered: 08/01/2007)
Set Deadline as to 48 First MOTION to Dismiss. Motion Hearing set for 8/30/2007 09:30 AM before Judge Alvin W. Thompson. (Grady, B.) (Entered: 08/02/2007)
105 Memorandum in Opposition re 101 MOTION for Reconsideration re 100 Order on Motion to Compel, filed by Bidwell Care Center, LLC and Chelsea Place Care Center, LLC. (Starble, Jonathan) (Entered: 08/02/2007)

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106 Memorandum in Support re 101 MOTION for Reconsideration re 100 Order on Motion to Compel, Reply Memorandum Of Law In Further Support Of Plaintiff's Motion For Reconsideration Of July 3, 2007 Order filed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 08/09/2007)
107 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities re 106 Memorandum in Support of Motion, Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Plaintiff's Motion For Reconsideration Of July 3, 2007 Order (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 08/09/2007)
108 First MOTION for Leave to File Supplemental Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support # 2 Affidavit # 3 Exhibit Mental Disability Law Clinic v. Carpinello)(Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 08/16/2007)
109 ORDER: The plaintiff's Request for Leave to File Supplemental Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (Doc. No. 108 ) is hereby GRANTED. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 8/17/07. (Bock, M.) (Entered: 08/17/2007)
110 MOTION for Reconsideration re 109 Order on Motion for Leave to File, Supplemental Brief by State of Connecticut, State of CT Dept of Social Services, State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addition Svcs, State of CT Dept of Pub Health. Responses due by 9/10/2007 (Barber, Hugh) Text modified on 8/21/2007 to add filers (Grady, B.). (Entered: 08/20/2007)
111 Memorandum in Support re 110 MOTION for Reconsideration re 109 Order on Motion for Leave to File, Supplemental Brief filed by State of Connecticut, State of CT Dept of Social Services, State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addition Svcs, State of CT Dept of Pub Health. (Barber, Hugh) Text modified on 8/21/2007 to add filers (Grady, B.). (Entered: 08/20/2007)
112 Minute Entry for proceeding held before Judge Alvin W. Thompson: Motion Hearing held on 8/30/2007 re 48 First Motion to Dismiss filed by State of CT Dept of Social Services, State of Connecticut, State of CT Dept of Pub Health, State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs. Total Time: 2 hours and 55 minutes(Court Reporter Huntington) (Smith, S.) (Entered: 09/04/2007)
113 ORDER granting 48 Motion to Dismiss without prejudice to the filing of an amended complaint. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 8/30/07. (Smith, S.) (Entered: 09/04/2007)
114 ORDER granting 110 Motion for Reconsideration, vacating 109 Order on Motion for Leave to File, denying 108 First MOTION for Leave to File Supplemental Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 09/07/07. (Grady, B.) (Entered: 09/11/2007)
115 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on 08/30/07 before Judge Alvin W. Thompson. Court Reporter: Diana Huntington. (S−Grady, B.) (Entered: 09/12/2007)
116 Minute Entry for proceeding held before Judge Alvin W. Thompson: Telephonic Status Conference held on 9/12/2007. 10 minutes (off the record) (Smith, S.) (Entered: 09/18/2007)
117 ORAL ORDER granting 51 Motion to Dismiss, without prejudice to the filing of an amended complaint, made by Judge Alvin W. Thompson at a telephonic status conference on 9/12/07. (Smith, S.) Modified on 9/19/2007 (Smith, S.). (Entered: 09/18/2007)
118 ORDER. The plaintiff's 101 Motion for Reconsideration is denied as moot in light of the court's rulings on the motions to dismiss. (See docs. #113, 115, 117.) Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 9/20/07. (Turner, M.) (Entered: 09/20/2007)
119 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on 09/12/07 before Judge Alvin W. Thompson. Court Reporter: Corinna F. Thompson. (Grady, B.) (Entered: 11/08/2007)

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120 MOTION for Ajaz Fiazuddin to Withdraw as Attorney by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 04/07/2008)
121 ORDER: The Motion to Withdraw as Attorney (Doc. No. 120 ) is hereby GRANTED for Attorney Ajaz Fiazuddin. It is so ordered. Attorney Ajaz Fiazuddin terminated. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 4/8/08. (Smith, S.) (Entered: 04/11/2008)
122 Minute Entry for proceeding held before Judge Alvin W. Thompson: Telephonic Status Conference held on 5/20/2008. 5 minutes (off the record) (Smith, S.) (Entered: 07/15/2008)
NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL WILL RECEIVE. ALL PERSONS ENTERING THE COURTHOUSE MUST PRESENT PHOTO IDENTIFICATION. Status Conference set for 9/9/2008 at 02:00 PM in the South Courtroom, 450 Main Street, Hartford, CT before Judge Alvin W. Thompson. (Smith, S.) (Entered: 08/28/2008)
123 AMENDED COMPLAINT First against State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs, State of CT Dept of Pub Health, State of CT Dept of Social Services, State of Connecticut, filed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities.(Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 09/09/2008)
125 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Alvin W. Thompson: Status Conference held on 9/9/2008. Total Time: 1 hour and 20 minutes (Court Reporter Huntington) (Smith, S.) (Entered: 09/17/2008)
124 MOTION for admission of Attorney Andrew S. Penn pro hac vice. Filing Fee $25.00, Receipt Number H026461 by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Grady, B.) (Entered: 09/17/2008)
126 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Alvin W. Thompson: Telephonic Status Conference held on 9/19/2008. The defendants shall file the motions to dismiss re the First Amended Complaint within 60 days. The plaintiffs shall file oppositions within 60 days. The defendants shall file replies within 30 days. 7 minutes (Court Reporter Huntington) (Smith, S.) (Entered: 09/23/2008)
Docket Entry re 126 Status Conference on 9/19/08: Motions to Dismiss First Amended Complaint are due by 11/19/08. (Smith, S.) (Entered: 09/23/2008)
127 ORDER: The Motion for Admission of Andrew S. Penn Pro Hac Vice 124 is hereby GRANTED. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 10/3/08. (Smith, S.) (Entered: 10/06/2008)
128 NOTICE of Appearance by Andrew S. Penn on behalf of State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities (Penn, Andrew) (Entered: 10/07/2008)
129 MOTION to Certify Class by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities.Responses due by 11/7/2008 (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 10/17/2008)
130 AFFIDAVIT re 129 MOTION to Certify Class Signed By Nancy B. Alisberg filed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 10/17/2008)
131 AFFIDAVIT re 129 MOTION to Certify Class Signed By Kenneth Pasquale filed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 10/17/2008)
132 AFFIDAVIT re 129 MOTION to Certify Class Signed By Michael Allen filed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 10/17/2008)
133 AFFIDAVIT re 129 MOTION to Certify Class Signed By Karen Bower filed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 10/17/2008)
134 Memorandum in Support re 129 MOTION to Certify Class filed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered:

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10/17/2008)
135 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities re 130 Affidavit, 131 Affidavit, 129 MOTION to Certify Class, 133 Affidavit, 134 Memorandum in Support of Motion, 132 Affidavit (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 10/17/2008)
136 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 129 MOTION to Certify Class until 45 days after ruling on all Motions to Dismiss by State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs, State of CT Dept of Pub Health, State of CT Dept of Social Services, State of Connecticut. (Hoell, Jacqueline) (Entered: 11/05/2008)
137 RESPONSE to 136 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 129 MOTION to Certify Class until 45 days after ruling on all Motions to Dismiss filed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) Modified on 11/7/2008 to correct text (Grady, B.). (Entered: 11/06/2008)
138 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on September 9, 2008 before Judge Alvin W. Thompson. Court Reporter: Diana Huntington. Type of Hearing: Status Conference. NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. The policy is located on our website at www.ctd.uscourts.gov. Redaction Request due 12/1/2008. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/11/2008. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/8/2009. (Huntington, D.) (Entered: 11/10/2008)
139 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on September 19, 2008 before Judge Alvin W. Thompson. Court Reporter: Diana Huntington. Type of Hearing: Telephonic Status Conference. NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. The policy is located on our website at www.ctd.uscourts.gov. Redaction Request due 12/1/2008. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/11/2008. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/8/2009. (Huntington, D.) (Entered: 11/10/2008)
143 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Alvin W. Thompson: Telephonic Status Conference held on 11/18/2008 to discuss briefing of class certification motion. 20 minutes (Court Reporter Huntington) (Smith, S.) (Entered: 11/24/2008)
140 MOTION to Dismiss Rule 12(b)(6) Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted by State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs, State of CT Dept of Pub Health, State of CT Dept of Social Services, State of Connecticut.Responses due by 12/10/2008 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss)(Barber, Hugh) Modified on 11/24/2008 to correct text (Grady, B.). (Entered: 11/19/2008)
141 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Rule 12(b)(1) Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint by State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs, State of CT Dept of Pub Health, State of CT Dept of Social Services, State of Connecticut.Responses due by 12/10/2008 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss All Claims That Are Asserted Due To Plaintiffs' Lack of Standing)(Barber, Hugh) Modified on 11/24/2008 to correct text (Grady, B.). (Entered: 11/19/2008)
142 ORDER: The Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply 136 as to the Motion for Certification of Class 129 is hereby GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The defendants shall file their papers in opposition to the plaintiffs' Motion for Certification of Class by December 11, 2008. The plaintiffs may file a reply brief by January 8, 2009. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 11/21/2008. (Jones, S.) (Entered: 11/21/2008)
Set/Reset Deadline as to 129 MOTION to Certify Class. Responses due by 12/11/2008. (Smith, S.) (Entered: 11/24/2008)

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144 Memorandum in Opposition re 129 MOTION to Certify Class filed by State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs, State of CT Dept of Pub Health, State of CT Dept of Social Services, State of Connecticut. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Judy Williams, # 2 Affidavit of David Parrella, # 3 Affidavit of Dawn Lambert, # 4 Affidavit Kathy Bruni, # 5 Affidavit of Laurel Reagan)(Barber, Hugh) (Entered: 12/11/2008)
145 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages In Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum In Further Support Of Their Motion For Class Certification by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
146 REPLY to Response to 129 MOTION to Certify Class filed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 01/08/2009)
147 AFFIDAVIT re 146 Reply to Response to Motion Signed By Shannon Hemmingsen filed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 01/08/2009)
148 AFFIDAVIT re 146 Reply to Response to Motion Signed By Susan Werboff filed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 01/08/2009)
149 AFFIDAVIT re 146 Reply to Response to Motion Signed By Alicia Woodsby filed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 01/08/2009)
150 AFFIDAVIT re 146 Reply to Response to Motion Signed By Gale Yencha filed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 01/08/2009)
151 AFFIDAVIT re 146 Reply to Response to Motion Signed By Norma Jean Diaz filed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 01/08/2009)
152 AFFIDAVIT re 146 Reply to Response to Motion Signed By Samuel Rivera filed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 01/08/2009)
153 ORDER: The Motion to Exceed Page Limit for Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Further Support of Their Motion for Class Certification 145 if hereby GRANTED. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 1/8/09. (Smith, S.) (Entered: 01/09/2009)
154 Memorandum in Opposition re 141 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Rule 12b1 Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Rule 12b1 Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Rule 12b1 Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint filed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Lewis v. New Mexico)(Alisberg, Nancy) Modified on 1/22/2009 to edit text (Ferguson, L.). (Entered: 01/20/2009)
155 Memorandum in Opposition re 140 MOTION to Dismiss Rule 12b6 Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted MOTION to Dismiss Rule 12b6 Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted filed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) Modified on 1/22/2009 to edit text (Ferguson, L.). Modified on 1/22/2009 to edit text (Ferguson, L.). (Entered: 01/20/2009)
156 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs, State of CT Dept of Pub Health, State of CT Dept of Social Services, State of Connecticut. (Hoell, Jacqueline) (Entered: 02/19/2009)
157 REPLY to Response to 141 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Rule 12(b)(1) Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Rule 12(b)(1) Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Rule 12(b)(1) Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint filed by

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State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs, State of CT Dept of Pub Health, State of CT Dept of Social Services, State of Connecticut. (Hoell, Jacqueline) (Entered: 02/19/2009)
158 REPLY to Response to 140 MOTION to Dismiss Rule 12(b)(6) Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted MOTION to Dismiss Rule 12(b)(6) Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted filed by State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs, State of CT Dept of Pub Health, State of CT Dept of Social Services, State of Connecticut. (Hoell, Jacqueline) (Entered: 02/19/2009)
159 ORDER: Defendants' Motion to Exceed Page Limitations in Their Reply Briefs in Support of Their Rule 12(B)(1) and Rule 12(B)(6) Motions to Dismiss 156 is hereby GRANTED. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 2/23/09. (Smith, S.) (Entered: 02/24/2009)
160 First NOTICE OF ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities re 141 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Rule 12(b)(1) Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Rule 12(b)(1) Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Rule 12(b)(1) Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, 140 MOTION to Dismiss Rule 12(b)(6) Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted MOTION to Dismiss Rule 12(b)(6) Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted filed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit DAI v. Paterson)(Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 02/24/2009)
161 Second NOTICE OF ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities re 141 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Rule 12(b)(1) Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Rule 12(b)(1) Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Rule 12(b)(1) Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint filed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Laflamme v. NHV)(Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 04/01/2009)
162 First RESPONSE Plaintiff's Notice of Supplemental Authority filed by State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs, State of CT Dept of Pub Health, State of CT Dept of Social Services, State of Connecticut. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Pertinent Excerpts)(Barber, Hugh) Modified on 4/8/2009 to remove plaintiff as a filer (Grady, B.). (Entered: 04/08/2009)
163 OBJECTION re 161 Notice of Additional Authority,, filed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E)(Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 04/14/2009)
164 First NOTICE OF ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY by State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs, State of CT Dept of Pub Health, State of CT Dept of Social Services, State of Connecticut filed by State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs, State of CT Dept of Pub Health, State of CT Dept of Social Services, State of Connecticut. (Barber, Hugh) (Entered: 05/27/2009)
165 Third NOTICE OF ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities re 141 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Rule 12(b)(1) Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint filed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Alisberg, Nancy) Modified on 7/31/2009 to remove text (Grady, B.). (Entered: 07/30/2009)
166 NOTICE OF ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities re 155 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion,, filed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 10/02/2009)
167 NOTICE of Appearance by Jacqueline S. Hoell on behalf of State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs (Hoell, Jacqueline) (Entered: 11/02/2009)

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168 MOTION for AAG Thomas J. Ring to Withdraw as Attorney by State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs. (Hoell, Jacqueline) (Entered: 11/02/2009)
169 ORDER: The Motion for AAG Thomas J. Ring to Withdraw (Doc. No. 168 ) is hereby GRANTED, absent objection. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 11/06/2009. (Jean−Louis, C) (Entered: 11/06/2009)
170 Amicus Curiae APPEARANCE entered by Lauren M. Nash on behalf of United States of America. (Nash, Lauren) (Entered: 11/25/2009)
171 MOTION for Leave to Appear As Amicus Curiae by United States of America. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Text of Proposed Order, # 3 Exhibit Proposed Amicus Brief)(Nash, Lauren) (Entered: 11/25/2009)
172 NOTICE of Appearance by Amanda Maisels on behalf of United States of America (Maisels, Amanda) (Entered: 12/14/2009)
173 ORDER: The Motion for Leave to Appear as Amicus Curiae by United States of America 171 is hereby GRANTED. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 03/31/2010. (Jean−Louis, C) (Entered: 03/31/2010)
174 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 129 Motion to Certify Class; denying 140 Motion to Dismiss; denying 141 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 03/31/2010. (Jean−Louis, C) (Entered: 03/31/2010)
175 NOTICE to Counsel. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 04/01/2010. (Jean−Louis, C) (Entered: 04/01/2010)
NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL PARTIES WILL RECEIVE. ALL PERSONS ENTERING THE COURTHOUSE MUST PRESENT PHOTO IDENTIFICATION. Telephonic Status Conference set for 4/26/2010 at 01:00 PM, to discuss notice to counsel 175 , before Judge Alvin W. Thompson. Counsel shall initiate the call to chambers at (860) 240−3224 with opposing counsel on the line. (Smith, S.) (Entered: 04/06/2010)
176 First MOTION to Amend/Correct 174 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion to Dismiss, Order on Motion to Dismiss/Lack of Jurisdiction To Add the Certification of the District Judge that the Decision Involves Controlling Questions of Law Where Allowance of an Immediate Interlocutory Appeal May Materially Advance the Ultimate Termination of the Litigation by State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs, State of CT Dept of Pub Health, State of CT Dept of Social Services, State of Connecticut.Responses due by 4/30/2010 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Barber, Hugh) (Entered: 04/09/2010)
177 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Alvin W. Thompson: Telephonic Status Conference held on 4/26/2010. Time: 25 minutes (Court Reporter Huntington)(Smith, S.) (Entered: 04/27/2010)
178 NOTICE by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities re 177 Status Conference : Letter Of K.Pasquale In Response To Judge Thompson's Request Made During The Conference Call Of April 26, 2010 Regarding Defendants' Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiffs' Motion For Class Certification (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 04/29/2010)
179 Memorandum in Opposition re 176 First MOTION to Amend/Correct 174 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion to Dismiss, Order on Motion to Dismiss/Lack of Jurisdiction To Add the Certification of the District Judge that the Decision Involves Controlling Questions of Law WFirst MOTION to Amend/Correct 174 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion to Dismiss, Order on Motion to Dismiss/Lack of Jurisdiction To Add the Certification of the District Judge that the Decision Involves Controlling Questions of Law WFirst MOTION to Amend/Correct 174 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion to Dismiss, Order on Motion to Dismiss/Lack of Jurisdiction To Add the Certification of the District Judge that the Decision Involves Controlling Questions of Law W filed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 04/30/2010)

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180 ANSWER to 123 Amended Complaint, with Affirmative Defenses and Special Defenses by State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs, State of CT Dept of Pub Health, State of CT Dept of Social Services, State of Connecticut.(Hoell, Jacqueline) (Entered: 05/06/2010)
181 − ENTERED IN ERROR − NOTICE by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities : Letter Of K. Pasquale in Response to Defendant's Letter to the Court of April 29,2010 (Alisberg, Nancy) Modified on 5/17/2010 (Ferguson, L.). (Entered: 05/06/2010)
182 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Attorney Jennifer Arnett. Filing Fee $25. Receipt Number H030944, by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Jennifer Arnett)(Ferguson, L.) (Entered: 05/25/2010)
183 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Attorney Jill Krauss. Filing Fee $25. Receipt Number H030943, by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Jill Krauss)(Ferguson, L.) (Entered: 05/25/2010)
184 ORDER granting 182 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Attorney Jennifer Arnett; granting 183 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Attorney Jill Krauss. Signed by Clerk on 5/25/10. (Ferguson, L.) (Entered: 05/25/2010)
NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL WILL RECEIVE. Telephonic Status Conference set for 6/22/2010 at 10:30 AM before Judge Alvin W. Thompson. Plaintiff's counsel shall initiate the call to chambers at (860) 240−3224 with opposing counsel on the line. (Smith, S.) (Entered: 06/16/2010)
185 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Alvin W. Thompson: Telephonic Status Conference held on 6/22/2010 re scheduling order, appointment of class counsel and motion to amend decision. 10 minutes (Court Reporter Huntington)(Smith, S.) (Entered: 06/23/2010)
186 ORDER re Appointment of Class Counsel. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 06/25/2010. (Jean−Louis, C) (Entered: 06/25/2010)
187 SCHEDULING ORDER. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 06/25/2010. (Jean−Louis, C) (Entered: 06/25/2010)
188 ORDER denying 176 Motion to Amend/Correct. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 06/25/2010. (Jean−Louis, C) (Entered: 06/25/2010)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Discovery due by 2/15/2012 Dispositive Motions due by 5/15/2012 Trial Brief due by 6/18/2012 (Bauer, J.) (Entered: 07/02/2010)
189 MOTION for Andrew S. Penn to Withdraw as Attorney For Plaintiffs by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) . (Entered: 08/20/2010)
190 ORDER: The Motion to Withdraw Appearance 189 , filed by Andrew S. Penn, is hereby GRANTED. It is so ordered. Attorney Andrew S. Penn terminated. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 8/23/10. (Smith, S.) (Entered: 08/24/2010)
192 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Alvin W. Thompson: Telephonic Status Conference held on 8/25/2010. Total time: 51 minutes (off the record)(Smith, S.) (Entered: 08/26/2010)
191 MEMORANDUM of Oral Decision. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 08/26/2010. (Jean−Louis, C) (Entered: 08/26/2010)
193 PROPOSED ORDER Concerning Confidential Information by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 10/07/2010)
194 ORDER: The Stipulation and Protective Order Concerning Confidential Information (Doc. No. 193 ) is hereby APPROVED. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 10/14/2010. (Jean−Louis, C) (Entered: 10/14/2010)

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195 NOTICE of Appearance by Anne F. Thidemann on behalf of United States of America (Thidemann, Anne) (Entered: 10/18/2010)
196 STIPULATION AND PROTECTIVE ORDER CONCERNING CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 10/18/10. (Ferguson, L.) (Entered: 10/19/2010)
197 MOTION for Protective Order by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities.Responses due by 11/16/2010 (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 10/26/2010)
198 AFFIDAVIT re 197 MOTION for Protective Order : Declaration Of K. Pasquale In Support Of Motion For Entry Of An Amended Protective Order Signed By Kenneth Pasquale filed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E)(Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 10/26/2010)
199 Memorandum in Support re 197 MOTION for Protective Order filed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 10/26/2010)
200 OBJECTION re 197 MOTION for Protective Order filed by State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs, State of CT Dept of Pub Health, State of CT Dept of Social Services, State of Connecticut. (Salton, Henry) (Entered: 11/16/2010)
201 REPLY to Response to 197 MOTION for Protective Order : Reply Memorandum Of Law In Further Support Of Plaintiffs' Motion For Entry Of An Amended Protective Order Concerning Confidential Information filed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 11/30/2010)
202 NOTICE of Appearance by Rosemary Miller McGovern on behalf of State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs Commissioner Patricia Rehmer, MSN (McGovern, Rosemary) (Entered: 12/02/2010)
203 MOTION to Compel The Production Of Documents Pursuant To The Subpoenas To The Nursing Homes And Requiring The Nursing Homes To Provide Plaintiffs With Unrestricted Access To Members Of The Certified Class And Other Nursing Home Residents by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities.Responses due by 12/24/2010 (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 12/03/2010)
204 AFFIDAVIT re 203 MOTION to Compel The Production Of Documents Pursuant To The Subpoenas To The Nursing Homes And Requiring The Nursing Homes To Provide Plaintiffs With Unrestricted Access To Members Of The Certified Class And Other Nursing Home Residents Signed By Jill Krauss filed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 12/03/2010)
205 AFFIDAVIT re 203 MOTION to Compel The Production Of Documents Pursuant To The Subpoenas To The Nursing Homes And Requiring The Nursing Homes To Provide Plaintiffs With Unrestricted Access To Members Of The Certified Class And Other Nursing Home Residents Signed By Nancy Alisberg filed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 12/03/2010)
206 Memorandum in Support re 203 MOTION to Compel The Production Of Documents Pursuant To The Subpoenas To The Nursing Homes And Requiring The Nursing Homes To Provide Plaintiffs With Unrestricted Access To Members Of The Certified Class And Other Nursing Home Residents filed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 12/03/2010)
207 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 203 MOTION to Compel The Production Of Documents Pursuant To The Subpoenas To The Nursing Homes And Requiring The Nursing Homes To Provide Plaintiffs With Unrestricted Access To Members Of The Certified Class And Other Nursing Home Residents until 01/03/2011 by Bidwell Care Center, LLC and Chelsea Place Care Center, LLC. (Starble, Jonathan) (Entered: 12/22/2010)
208 ORDER: The Consented−To Motion for Extension of Time (Doc. No. 207 ) is hereby GRANTED, absent objection, to January 3, 2011. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge

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Alvin W. Thompson on 12/23/2010. (Jean−Louis, C) (Entered: 12/23/2010)
209 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 203 MOTION to Compel The Production Of Documents Pursuant To The Subpoenas To The Nursing Homes And Requiring The Nursing Homes To Provide Plaintiffs With Unrestricted Access To Members Of The Certified Class And Other Nursing Home Residents until 01/06/2011 by Bidwell Care Center, LLC and Chelsea Place Care Center, LLC. (Starble, Jonathan) (Entered: 12/30/2010)
210 ORDER: The Consented−To Motion for Extension of Time (Doc. No. 209 ) is hereby GRANTED, absent objection, to January 6, 2011. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 01/05/2011. (Jean−Louis, C) (Entered: 01/05/2011)
Reset Deadline as to 203 MOTION to Compel the Production of Documents Pursuant to the Subpoenas to the Nursing Homes and Requiring the Nursing Homes to Provide Plaintiffs with Unrestricted Access to Members of the Certified Class and Other Nursing Home Residents. Responses due by 1/6/2011. (Smith, S.) (Entered: 01/05/2011)
211 MOTION for Protective Order and Sanctions by Bidwell Care Center, LLC and Chelsea Place Care Center, LLC.Responses due by 1/27/2011 (Starble, Jonathan). Added MOTION for Sanctions on 1/7/2011 (Ferguson, L.). (Entered: 01/06/2011)
212 Memorandum in Opposition re 203 MOTION to Compel The Production Of Documents Pursuant To The Subpoenas To The Nursing Homes And Requiring The Nursing Homes To Provide Plaintiffs With Unrestricted Access To Members Of The Certified Class And Other Nursing Home Residents, 211 MOTION for Protective Order and Sanctions filed by Bidwell Care Center, LLC and Chelsea Place Care Center, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Starble, Jonathan) (Entered: 01/06/2011)
213 Memorandum in Support re 211 MOTION for Protective Order and MOTION for Sanctions filed by Bidwell Care Center, LLC and Chelsea Place Care Center, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Ferguson, L.) (Entered: 01/07/2011)
214 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 203 MOTION to Compel The Production Of Documents Pursuant To The Subpoenas To The Nursing Homes And Requiring The Nursing Homes To Provide Plaintiffs With Unrestricted Access To Members Of The Certified Class And Other Nursing Home Residents until February 3, 2011 by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 01/07/2011)
Set Deadline as to 203 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents Pursuant to the Subpoenas to the Nursing Homes and Requiring the Nursing Homes to Provide Plaintiffs with Unrestricted Access to Members of the Certified Class and Other Nursing Home Residents. Responses due by 2/3/2011. (Smith, S.) (Entered: 01/20/2011)
215 ORDER: The Consented−to Motion for Extension of Time 214 is hereby GRANTED, to February 3, 2011. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 1/10/11. (Smith, S.) (Entered: 01/11/2011)
216 Supplemental AFFIDAVIT re 213 Memorandum in Support of Motion (Exhibits 11−12) filed by Bidwell Care Center, LLC and Chelsea Place Care Center, LLC. (Starble, Jonathan) (Entered: 01/25/2011)
217 Supplemental AFFIDAVIT re 212 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion, (Exhibits 11−12) filed by Bidwell Care Center, LLC and Chelsea Place Care Center, LLC. (Starble, Jonathan) (Entered: 01/25/2011)
218 AFFIDAVIT re 203 MOTION to Compel The Production Of Documents Pursuant To The Subpoenas To The Nursing Homes And Requiring The Nursing Homes To Provide Plaintiffs With Unrestricted Access To Members Of The Certified Class And Other Nursing Home Residents, 211 MOTION for Protective Order and Sanctions MOTION for Sanctions : Declaration Of Karen Bower In Opposition To The Nursing Homes' Motion For Protective Order And Sanctions And In Further Support Of Plaintiffs' Motion To Compel Signed By Karen Bower filed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 02/03/2011)

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219 Memorandum in Support re 203 MOTION to Compel The Production Of Documents Pursuant To The Subpoenas To The Nursing Homes And Requiring The Nursing Homes To Provide Plaintiffs With Unrestricted Access To Members Of The Certified Class And Other Nursing Home Residents, 211 MOTION for Protective Order and Sanctions MOTION for Sanctions : Plaintiffs' Memorandum Of Law In Opposition To The Nursing Homes' Motion For Protective Order And Sanctions And In Reply To The Nursing Homes' Opposition To Plaintiffs' Motion For An Order To Compel Production Of Documents And For Unrestricted Access To Members Of The Certfied Class And Other Nursing Home Residents filed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 02/03/2011)
220 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities re 219 Memorandum in Support of Motion,,, 218 Affidavit,, (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 02/03/2011)
221 MOTION for Karen Bower to Withdraw as Attorney for the Plaintiffs by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 02/18/2011)
222 ORDER: The Motion to Withdraw Appearance 221 , filed by Karen A. Bower, is hereby GRANTED. It is so ordered. Attorney Karen A. Bower terminated. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 2/24/11. (Smith, S.) (Entered: 02/24/2011)
223 Memorandum in Opposition re 203 MOTION to Compel The Production Of Documents Pursuant To The Subpoenas To The Nursing Homes And Requiring The Nursing Homes To Provide Plaintiffs With Unrestricted Access To Members Of The Certified Class And Other Nursing Home Residents, 211 MOTION for Protective Order and Sanctions MOTION for Sanctions filed by State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs, State of CT Dept of Pub Health, State of CT Dept of Social Services, State of Connecticut. (Barber, Hugh) (Entered: 03/01/2011)
224 MOTION to Amend/Correct 174 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion to Dismiss, Order on Motion to Dismiss/Lack of Jurisdiction by State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs, State of CT Dept of Pub Health, State of CT Dept of Social Services, State of Connecticut.Responses due by 3/22/2011 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Affidavit)(Barber, Hugh) (Entered: 03/01/2011)
225 MOTION to Strike 223 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion,, by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities.Responses due by 3/23/2011 (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 03/02/2011)
226 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities re 225 MOTION to Strike 223 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion,, (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 03/02/2011)
227 Memorandum in Opposition re 225 MOTION to Strike 223 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion,, filed by State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs, State of CT Dept of Pub Health, State of CT Dept of Social Services, State of Connecticut. (Barber, Hugh) (Entered: 03/10/2011)
NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL WILL RECEIVE. ALL PERSONS ENTERING THE COURTHOUSE MUST PRESENT PHOTO IDENTIFICATION. Status Conference set for 3/11/2011 at 02:00 PM in the South Courtroom, 450 Main Street, Hartford, CT before James R. Hawkins II, ParaJudicial Officer. Counsel should report to the South Courtroom. (Smith, S.) (Entered: 03/10/2011)
231 Minute Entry for proceedings held before James R. Hawkins II, ParaJudicial Officer: Status Conference held on 3/11/2011. Pending motions and discovery disputes were discussed. Plaintiff will respond to defendant's motion to amend the class. Total Time: 3 hours (off the record)(Smith, S.) (Entered: 03/23/2011)
228 AMENDMENT to Scheduling Order (Doc. No. 187 ). Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 3/18/2011. (Jean−Louis, C) (Entered: 03/18/2011)
229 Memorandum in Opposition re 224 MOTION to Amend/Correct 174 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion to Dismiss, Order on Motion to Dismiss/Lack of Jurisdiction MOTION to Amend/Correct 174 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order

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on Motion to Dismiss, Order on Motion to Dismiss/Lack of Jurisdiction filed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 03/22/2011)
230 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities re 229 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion, (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 03/22/2011)
NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL WILL RECEIVE. ALL PERSONS ENTERING THE COURTHOUSE MUST PRESENT PHOTO IDENTIFICATION. Status Conference set for 4/15/2011 at 02:00 PM, 450 Main Street, Hartford, CT before James R. Hawkins II, ParaJudicial Officer. Counsel should report to the South Chambers, Suite 240, for room assignment. (Smith, S.) (Entered: 03/23/2011)
232 Joint MOTION to Stay re 228 Order by State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs, State of CT Dept of Pub Health, State of CT Dept of Social Services, State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities, State of Connecticut.Responses due by 4/22/2011 (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Salton, Henry) (Entered: 04/01/2011)
233 ORDER: The Joint Motion for a Stay (Doc. No. 232 ) is hereby GRANTED. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 4/6/2011. (Jean−Louis, C) (Entered: 04/06/2011)
234 ORDER STAYING CASE. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 4/6/2011. (Jean−Louis, C) (Entered: 04/06/2011)
NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL WILL RECEIVE. Telephonic Status Conference set for 4/29/2011 at 02:00 PM before James R. Hawkins II, ParaJudicial Officer. Plaintiff's counsel will make arrangements for a dial−in conference call. (Smith, S.) (Entered: 04/12/2011)
NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL WILL RECEIVE. Telephonic Status Conference set for 5/26/2011 at 02:00 PM before James R. Hawkins II, ParaJudicial Officer. Plaintiff's counsel will make arrangements for a dial−in conference call. (Smith, S.) (Entered: 04/12/2011)
NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL PARTIES WILL RECEIVE. Telephonic Status Conference set for 6/1/2011 at 02:00 PM, before James R. Hawkins II, ParaJudicial Officer. Counsel for the plaintiff shall make arrangements for a dial−in call. (Smith, S.) (Entered: 05/26/2011)
235 Joint MOTION to Stay by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities, State of CT, Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs, Dept of Public Health, Dept of Social Services. Responses due by 6/22/2011 (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Alisberg, Nancy) Modified on 6/2/2011 to include additional filers (Ferguson, L.). (Entered: 06/01/2011)
Docket Entry Correction re 235 Joint MOTION to Stay: modified to include additional filers (Ferguson, L.) (Entered: 06/02/2011)
236 ORDER: The Joint Motion for a Stay (Doc. No. 235 ) is hereby GRANTED. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 6/2/2011. (Jean−Louis, C) (Entered: 06/02/2011)
237 ORDER STAYING CASE to July 1, 2011. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 6/2/2011. (Jean−Louis, C) (Entered: 06/02/2011)
NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL WILL RECEIVE. Telephonic Status Conference set for 6/29/2011 at 02:00 PM before James R. Hawkins II, ParaJudicial Officer. Counsel for the plaintiff shall make arrangements for a dial−in call with Mr. Hawkins. (Smith, S.) (Entered: 06/03/2011)
238 Joint MOTION to Stay by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities, State of Ct Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs, State of CT Dept of Pub Health, State of CT Deptof Social Services, State of CT. Responses due by 7/20/2011 (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Alisberg, Nancy) Modified on

06/29/2011
06/30/2011 06/30/2011 06/30/2011
07/05/2011 07/11/2011 08/03/2011 08/10/2011 08/10/2011 08/17/2011 09/09/2011 09/13/2011 09/14/2011

7/11/2011 to include additional filers (Ferguson, L.). (Entered: 06/29/2011)
242 Minute Entry for proceedings held before James R. Hawkins II, ParaJudicial Officer: Status Conference held on 6/29/2011. The parties will request a continuation of the stay (to review draft settlement proposal) until 8/5/11. There will be a further telephonic status conference on 7/29/11 at 2:00pm. 15 minutes (off the record)(Smith, S.) Modified on 7/7/2011 to reflect conference held with PJO Hawkins. (Jean−Louis, C). (Entered: 07/05/2011)
239 ORDER: Joint Motion for a Stay (Doc. No. 238 ) is hereby GRANTED. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 6/30/2011. (Jean−Louis, C) (Entered: 06/30/2011)
240 ORDER STAYING CASE. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 6/30/2011. (Jean−Louis, C) (Entered: 06/30/2011)
241 ORDER: Motion for Entry of an Amended Protective Order Concerning Confidential Information (Doc. No. 197 ), Motion to Compel (Doc. No. 203 ), Nursing Homes' Motion for Protective Order and Sanctions (Doc. No. 211 ), State Defendants' Motion to Amend Definition of Certified Class (Doc. No. 224 ) and Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike (Doc. No. 225 ) are hereby DENIED without prejudice to renewal in the event the parties are unable to negotiate a settlement in this action. See Order Staying Case (Doc. No. 240 ). It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 6/30/2011. (Jean−Louis, C) (Entered: 06/30/2011)
NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL WILL RECEIVE. Telephonic Settlement Conference set for 7/29/2011 at 02:00 PM before James R. Hawkins II, ParaJudicial Officer. Counsel for the plaintiff shall make arrangements for a dial−in call with Mr. Hawkins. (Smith, S.) (Entered: 07/05/2011)
Docket Entry Correction re 238 Joint MOTION to Stay: modified to include additional filers (Ferguson, L.) (Entered: 07/11/2011)
243 Joint MOTION to Stay by State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs, State of CT Dept of Pub Health, State of CT Dept of Social Services, State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities, State of Connecticut.Responses due by 8/24/2011 (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 08/03/2011)
244 ORDER: Joint Motion for a Stay (Doc. No. 243 ) is hereby GRANTED. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 8/10/2011. (Jean−Louis, C) (Entered: 08/10/2011)
245 ORDER STAYING CASE. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 8/10/2011. (Jean−Louis, C) (Entered: 08/10/2011)
NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL WILL RECEIVE. Telephonic Status Conference set for 9/9/2011 at 02:00 PM before James R. Hawkins II, ParaJudicial Officer. Counsel for the plaintiff shall make arrangements for a dial−in call with Mr. Hawkins. (Smith, S.) (Entered: 08/17/2011)
247 Minute Entry for proceedings held before James R. Hawkins II, ParaJudicial Officer: Status Conference held on 9/9/2011. There will be a further telephonic status conference on 10/13/11 to discuss possible settlement proposal. The parties will jointly file a motion to extend the stay until 10/17/11. 15 minutes (off the record)(Smith, S.) (Entered: 09/14/2011)
246 Joint MOTION to Stay by State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs, State of CT Dept of Pub Health, State of CT Dept of Social Services, State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities, State of Connecticut.Responses due by 10/4/2011 (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 09/13/2011)
NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL WILL RECEIVE. Telephonic Status Conference set for 10/13/2011 at 10:00 AM before James R. Hawkins II, ParaJudicial Officer. Counsel for the plaintiff shall make arrangements for a dial−in call with Mr. Hawkins. (Smith, S.) (Entered: 09/14/2011)

09/15/2011 09/16/2011 09/19/2011 09/26/2011
11/09/2011
11/14/2011 11/17/2011 12/14/2011 12/28/2011 12/28/2011 02/23/2012
02/24/2012 02/28/2012 02/29/2012 03/01/2012

248 ORDER: Joint Motion for a Stay (Doc. No. 246 ) is hereby GRANTED. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 09/15/2011. (Giering, A) (Entered: 09/15/2011)
249 ORDER STAYING CASE. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 9/15/11. (Ferguson, L.) (Entered: 09/16/2011)
NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL WILL RECEIVE. Telephonic Status Conference set for 10/11/2011 at 10:00 AM before James R. Hawkins II, ParaJudicial Officer. Counsel for the plaintiff shall make arrangements for a dial−in call with Mr. Hawkins. (Smith, S.) (Entered: 09/19/2011)
NOTICE OF CORRECTED E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL WILL RECEIVE. Telephonic Status Conference set for 10/13/2011 (not 10/11) at 10:00 AM before James R. Hawkins II, ParaJudicial Officer. Counsel for the plaintiff shall make arrangements for a dial−in call with Mr. Hawkins. (Smith, S.) (Entered: 09/26/2011)
250 Joint MOTION to Stay And For Approval Of Scheduling Order by State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs, State of CT Dept of Pub Health, State of CT Dept of Social Services, State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities, State of Connecticut.Responses due by 11/30/2011 (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Alisberg, Nancy). Added MOTION for approval of Scheduling Order on 11/10/2011 (Ferguson, L.). Modified on 11/10/2011 (Ferguson, L.). (Entered: 11/09/2011)
251 ORDER: Joint Motion For a Stay and Approval of Scheduling Order (Doc. No. 250 ) is hereby GRANTED. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 11/14/2011. (Giering, A) (Entered: 11/14/2011)
252 STIPULATION AND ORDER EXTENDING STAY. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 11/4/11. (Ferguson, L.) (Entered: 11/18/2011)
253 Minute Entry for proceedings held before James Hawkins, ParaJudicial Officer: Telephonic Status Conference held on 12/14/2011. Time: 15 minutes (off the record)(Smith, S.) (Entered: 12/27/2011)
NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL WILL RECEIVE. Telephonic Status Conference set for 1/18/2012 at 02:00 PM before James R. Hawkins II, ParaJudicial Officer. Counsel for the plaintiff shall make arrangements for a dial−in call with Mr. Hawkins. (Smith, S.) (Entered: 12/28/2011)
NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL WILL RECEIVE. Telephonic Status Conference set for 2/23/2012 at 02:00 PM before James R. Hawkins II, ParaJudicial Officer. Counsel for the plaintiff shall make arrangements for a dial−in call with Mr. Hawkins. (Smith, S.) (Entered: 12/28/2011)
254 Joint MOTION to Stay and Approval of Scheduling Order by State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs, State of CT Dept of Pub Health, State of CT Dept of Social Services, State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities, State of Connecticut.Responses due by 3/15/2012 (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 02/23/2012)
255 ORDER granting Joint Motion For a Stay and Approval of Scheduling Order (Doc. No. 254 ). Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 02/24/2012. (Giering, A) (Entered: 02/24/2012)
256 MOTION for Lauren M. Nash to Withdraw as Attorney by United States of America. (Nash, Lauren) (Entered: 02/28/2012)
257 ORDER: Motion to Withdraw Appearance (Doc. No. 256 ), as to Lauren N. Nash, is hereby GRANTED. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 02/29/2012. (Giering, A) (Entered: 02/29/2012)
258 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Attorney Lewis Bossing. Filing Fee $25.00. Receipt Number CTXH00002667, by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Lewis Bossing)(Ferguson, L.) (Entered: 03/09/2012)

03/09/2012 03/15/2012 05/23/2012
05/24/2012 05/25/2012 05/25/2012
08/08/2012 09/19/2012 09/19/2012 09/25/2012 09/27/2012 10/12/2012 11/07/2012
11/08/2012

259 ORDER granting 258 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Attorney Lewis Bossing. Certificate of Good Standing due by 5/8/2012. Signed by Clerk on 3/9/12. (Ferguson, L.) (Entered: 03/09/2012)
260 Minute Entry for proceedings held before James R. Hawkins II, ParaJudicial Officer: Telephonic Status Conference held on 3/15/2012. Another status conference will be held next month. Time: 5 minutes (off the record) (Smith, S.) (Entered: 03/23/2012)
261 Joint MOTION to Stay and Approval of Scheduling Order by Bidwell Care Center, LLC and Chelsea Place Care Center, LLC, Jonathan M. Bidwell Care Center, LLC and Chelsea Place Care Center, LLC, State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs, State of CT Dept of Pub Health, State of CT Dept of Social Services, State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities, State of Connecticut.Responses due by 6/13/2012 (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Stipulation and Order Extending Stay)(Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 05/23/2012)
262 ORDER granting Joint Motion For a Stay and Approval of Scheduling Order (Doc. No. 261 ). Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 05/24/2012. (Giering, A) (Additional attachment(s) added on 5/25/2012: # 1 REPLACEMENT PDF) (LaLone, L.). (Entered: 05/24/2012)
263 Docket Entry Correction re 262 Order on Motion to Stay and Approval of Scheduling Order corrected. REPLACEMENT PDF: corrected signature. (LaLone, L.) (Entered: 05/25/2012)
264 NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL/THE PARTIES WILL RECEIVE. Telephonic Status Conference set for 6/15/2012 at 02:00 PM before James R. Hawkins II, ParaJudicial Officer. Counsel for the plaintiff shall make arrangements for a dial−in call with Mr. Hawkins. (LaLone, L.) (Entered: 05/25/2012)
265 NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL WILL RECEIVE. Telephonic Status Conference set for 8/17/2012 at 02:00 PM, before James R. Hawkins II, ParaJudicial Officer. Counsel for plaintiff shall make arrangments for a dial−in call with Mr. Hawkins. (Smith, S.) (Entered: 08/08/2012)
266 ORDER REFERRING CASE to PJO James R. Hawkins, II. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 9/18/12. (Smith, S.) (Entered: 09/19/2012)
267 NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL WILL RECEIVE. Telephone Status Conference set for 10/12/2012 at 01:00 PM before James R. Hawkins, II, ParaJudicial Officer. Counsel for plaintiff shall make arrangements for a dial−in call with Mr. Hawkins. (Smith, S.) (Entered: 09/19/2012)
268 PROPOSED ORDER Extending Stay On Consent by State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs, State of CT Dept of Pub Health, State of CT Dept of Social Services, State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities, State of Connecticut. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 09/25/2012)
269 CONSENT ORDER EXTENDING STAY. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 9/27/12. (Ferguson, L.) (Entered: 10/01/2012)
270 Minute Entry. Proceedings held before James R. Hawkins II, ParaJudicial Officer: Status Conference held on 10/12/2012 regarding the proposed settlement. 10 minutes (off the record)(Smith, S.) (Entered: 10/15/2012)
271 NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL WILL RECEIVE. ALL PERSONS ENTERING THE COURTHOUSE MUST PRESENT PHOTO IDENTIFICATION. Settlement Conference set for 11/16/2012 at 10:00 AM, 450 Main Street, Hartford, CT before James R. Hawkins II, ParaJudicial Officer. The parties must be present and fully authorized to settle all issues. See attached instructions for further information. Counsel should report to the South Chambers, Suite 240, for room assignment. (Smith, S.) (Entered: 11/07/2012)
272 PROPOSED ORDER : Consent Order Extending Stay by State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs, State of CT Dept of Pub Health, State of CT Dept of Social Services, State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities, State of Connecticut. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 11/08/2012)

11/14/2012 12/12/2012 01/18/2013 01/29/2013 01/30/2013 02/14/2013 02/20/2013 04/11/2013
04/12/2013 04/12/2013 05/02/2013 05/06/2013 06/28/2013 07/01/2013 08/30/2013 09/25/2013

273 NOTICE re 271 Calendar Entry: Settlement Conference set for 11/16/12 before PJO James R. Hawkins II is hereby CANCELLED. (Smith, S.) (Entered: 11/14/2012)
274 CONSENT ORDER EXTENDING STAY. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 12/11/12. (Ferguson, L.) (Entered: 12/12/2012)
275 Minute Entry for proceedings held before James R. Hawkins II, ParaJudicial Officer: Status Conference held on 1/18/2013. Time: 15 minutes (off the record)(Smith, S.) (Entered: 01/28/2013)
276 PROPOSED ORDER : Consent Order Extending Stay by State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs, State of CT Dept of Pub Health, State of CT Dept of Social Services, State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities, State of Connecticut. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 01/29/2013)
277 CONSENT ORDER EXTENDING STAY. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 1/30/13.(Ferguson, L.) (Entered: 01/31/2013)
278 Minute Entry for proceedings held before James R. Hawkins II, ParaJudicial Officer: Telephonic Status Conference held on 2/14/2013. There will be a further telephonic status conference on 3/21/2013. 10 minutes (off the record)(Smith, S.) (Entered: 02/15/2013)
279 NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL WILL RECEIVE. Telephonic Status Conference set for 3/21/2013 at 01:00 PM, before James R. Hawkins II, ParaJudicial Officer. Counsel shall make arrangements for a dial−in call with Mr. Hawkins. (Smith, S.) (Entered: 02/20/2013)
280 Minute Entry for proceedings held before James R. Hawkins II, ParaJudicial Officer: Status Conference held on 4/11/2013. The parties will file a motion to extend the stay to 6/28/13. Future telephonic status conferences are scheduled for 5/9/13 at 1:00pm and 6/6/13 at 1:00pm. Time: 15 minutes (off the record)(Smith, S.) (Entered: 04/12/2013)
281 NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL WILL RECEIVE. Telephonic Status Conference set for 5/9/2013 at 01:00 PM, before James R. Hawkins II, ParaJudicial Officer. Counsel shall make arrangements for a dial−in call with Mr. Hawkins. (Smith, S.) (Entered: 04/12/2013)
282 NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL WILL RECEIVE. Telephonic Status Conference set for 6/6/2013 at 01:00 PM before James R. Hawkins II, ParaJudicial Officer. Counsel shall make arrangements for a dial−in call with Mr. Hawkins. (Smith, S.) (Entered: 04/12/2013)
283 PROPOSED ORDER re 277 Order Consent Order Extending Stay by State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs, State of CT Dept of Pub Health, State of CT Dept of Social Services, State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities, State of Connecticut. (Salton, Henry) (Entered: 05/02/2013)
284 CONSENT ORDER EXTENDING STAY until June 28, 2013, unless amended by further order of the court. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 5/6/2013. (Smith, S.) (Entered: 05/10/2013)
285 PROPOSED ORDER : Consent Order Extending Stay by State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs, State of CT Dept of Pub Health, State of CT Dept of Social Services, State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities, State of Connecticut. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 06/28/2013)
286 ORDER EXTENDING STAY OF CASE to August 30, 2013. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 7/1/2013.(Smith, S.) (Entered: 07/01/2013)
287 PROPOSED ORDER : Consent Order Extending Stay by State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs, State of CT Dept of Pub Health, State of CT Dept of Social Services, State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities, State of Connecticut. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 08/30/2013)
288 CONSENT ORDER EXTENDING STAY OF CASE. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 9/24/13.(Ferguson, L.) (Additional attachment(s) added on 10/2/2013: # 1 REPLACEMENT PDF) (Ferguson, L.).

10/02/2013 10/03/2013 11/13/2013 11/15/2013 12/02/2013 12/03/2013
12/17/2013 01/24/2014 04/11/2014
04/11/2014
04/30/2014 05/01/2014

Modified on 10/2/2013 to correct pdf (Ferguson, L.). (Entered: 09/27/2013)
289 Docket Entry Correction re 288 CONSENT ORDER EXTENDING STAY OF CASE: REPLACEMENT PDF; an incorrect pdf was uploaded in error (Ferguson, L.) (Entered: 10/02/2013)
290 Minute Entry for proceedings held before James R. Hawkins, ParaJudicial Officer: Telephonic Status Conference held on 10/3/2013. There will be a further telephonic status conference on 10/29/13. Time: 15 minutes (off the record)(Smith, S.) (Entered: 10/28/2013)
292 Minute Entry for proceedings held before James R. Hawkins II, ParaJudicial Officer: Telephonic Status Conference held on 11/13/2013. There will be a further status conference on 12/1/13 at 2:00pm. Time: 20 minutes (off the record)(Smith, S.) (Entered: 11/21/2013)
291 NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL WILL RECEIVE.ALL PERSONS ENTERING THE COURTHOUSE MUST PRESENT PHOTO IDENTIFICATION. Telephonic Status Conference set for 12/2/2013 at 02:00 PM before PJO Hawkins.(Wang, M.) (Entered: 11/15/2013)
293 Minute Entry for proceedings held before James R. Hawkins II, ParaJudicial Officer: Telephonic Status Conference held on 12/2/2013. If needed, a further status conference has been scheduled for 12/17/2013 at 11:00am. Time: 15 minutes (off the record)(Smith, S.) (Entered: 12/03/2013)
294 NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL WILL RECEIVE. ALL PERSONS ENTERING THE COURTHOUSE MUST PRESENT PHOTO IDENTIFICATION. Telephonic Status Conference is set for 12/17/2013 at 11:00 AM, before James R. Hawkins II, ParaJudicial Officer. Counsel will make arrangements for a dial−in call with Mr. Hawkins. (Smith, S.) (Entered: 12/03/2013)
295 Minute Entry for proceedings held before James R. Hawkins II, ParaJudicial Officer: Telephonic Status Conference held on 12/17/2013. Time: 10 minutes (off the record)(Smith, S.) (Entered: 12/18/2013)
296 NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL WILL RECEIVE. Telephonic Status Conference set for 1/31/2014 at 11:00 AM before PJO Hawkins. Attorney Pasquale will set up the call.(Wang, M.) (Entered: 01/24/2014)
297 MOTION (1) Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, (2) Approval of the Proposed Notice Plan, and (3) Setting a Schedule for a Fairness Hearing and Final Approval of the Settlement by Bidwell Care Center, LLC and Chelsea Place Care Center, LLC, Jonathan M. Bidwell Care Center, LLC and Chelsea Place Care Center, LLC, State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities, West Rock Health Care Center.Responses due by 5/2/2014 (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit A to Proposed Order, # 3 Exhibit B to Proposed Order, # 4 Exhibit C to Proposed Order)(Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 04/11/2014)
298 Memorandum in Support re 297 MOTION (1) Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, (2) Approval of the Proposed Notice Plan, and (3) Setting a Schedule for a Fairness Hearing and Final Approval of the Settlement filed by Bidwell Care Center, LLC and Chelsea Place Care Center, LLC, Jonathan M. Bidwell Care Center, LLC and Chelsea Place Care Center, LLC, State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities, West Rock Health Care Center. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 04/11/2014)
299 ORDER REGARDING NOTIFICATION OF PROPOSED CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 4/30/14. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Ferguson, L.) (Entered: 04/30/2014)
300 NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL WILL RECEIVE.ALL PERSONS ENTERING THE COURTHOUSE MUST PRESENT PHOTO IDENTIFICATION. Fairness Hearing set for 7/1/2014 at 11:00 AM in the South Courtroom, 450 Main St., Hartford, CT before Judge Alvin W.

06/11/2014 06/17/2014
06/17/2014
06/17/2014 06/19/2014 06/30/2014 07/01/2014 07/01/2014 07/02/2014 07/02/2014 07/02/2014 07/09/2014

Thompson. (Wang, M.) (Entered: 05/01/2014)
301 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Alvin W. Thompson: TelephonicStatus Conference held on 6/11/2014 re class members. Time: 1 hour.(Court Reporter C. Thompson.) (Wang, M.) (Entered: 06/11/2014)
302 NOTICE by State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs, State of CT Dept of Pub Health, State of CT Dept of Social Services, State of Connecticut re 297 MOTION (1) Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, (2) Approval of the Proposed Notice Plan, and (3) Setting a Schedule for a Fairness Hearing and Final Approval of the Settlement Defendants' Supplemental Filing in Support (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Barbara Geller, # 2 Affidavit Dawn Lambert)(Salton, Henry) (Entered: 06/17/2014)
303 MOTION for Settlement Of Class Action On A Final Basis And Awarding Plaintiffs' Counsel The Agreed Upon Attorneys' Fees by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration Of Nancy B. Alisberg, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F, # 8 Exhibit G, # 9 Exhibit H, # 10 Declaration Of Kenneth Pasquale, # 11 Exhibit A, # 12 Exhibit B, # 13 Declaration Of Todd Rubin, # 14 Exhibit A)(Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 06/17/2014)
304 Memorandum in Support re 303 MOTION for Settlement Of Class Action On A Final Basis And Awarding Plaintiffs' Counsel The Agreed Upon Attorneys' Fees filed by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 06/17/2014)
305 NOTICE by State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs, State of CT Dept of Pub Health, State of CT Dept of Social Services, State of Connecticut re 299 Order Defendant's Certification of Class Notice (Salton, Henry) (Entered: 06/19/2014)
306 ORDER: Defendants' Certification of Notice (Doc. No. 305 ) is hereby APPROVED. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 6/30/2014.(Wang, M.) (Entered: 06/30/2014)
307 NOTICE by Bidwell Care Center, LLC and Chelsea Place Care Center, LLC re Certification of Notice and Cooperation (Starble, Jonathan) (Entered: 07/01/2014)
311 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Alvin W. Thompson: Fairness Hearing held on 7/1/2014. MOTION for Settlement of Class Action on a Final Basis and Awarding Plaintiffs' Counsel the Agreed Upon Attorneys' Fees 303 granted. Time: 40 minutes (Court Reporter Thompson)(Smith, S.) (Entered: 07/02/2014)
308 ORDER: Nursing Homes' Statement Regarding Notice and Cooperation with Settlement Agreement (Doc. No. 307 ) is hereby APPROVED. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 7/1/2014.(Wang, M.) (Entered: 07/02/2014)
309 ORDER: Joint Motion for an Order (1) Preliminarily Approving the Class Action Settlement, (2) Approving the Proposed Notice Plan, and (3) Setting a Schedule for a Fairness Hearing and Final Approval of the Settlement (Doc. No. 297 ) is hereby GRANTED, nunc pro tunc, to April 30, 2014 (see Doc. No. 299 ). It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 7/2/2014. (Wang, M.) (Entered: 07/02/2014)
310 ORDER: Motion for an Order (1) Approving the Class Action Settlement on a Final Basis and (2) Awarding Plaintiffs' Counsel the Agreed Upon Attorneys' Fees (Doc. No. 303 ) is hereby GRANTED. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 7/2/2014. (Wang, M.) (Additional attachment(s) added on 3/19/2015: # 1 Exhibit A) (Ferguson, L.). (Entered: 07/02/2014)
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS SURVEY: The following link to the confidential survey requires you to log into CM/ECF for SECURITY purposes. Once in CM/ECF you will be prompted for the case number. Although you are receiving this survey through CM/ECF, it is hosted on an independent website called SurveyMonkey. Once in SurveyMonkey, the survey is located in a secure account. The survey is not docketed and it is not sent directly to the judge. To ensure anonymity, completed surveys are held up to 90 days before they are sent to the judge for review. We hope you will take this opportunity to participate, please click on this link:

08/06/2014
10/28/2014 10/31/2014 11/24/2014 12/01/2014 03/19/2015 04/06/2015 04/07/2015 04/15/2015 07/28/2015 08/13/2015 11/12/2015

https://ecf.ctd.uscourts.gov/cgi−bin/Dispatch.pl?survey (Smith, S.) (Entered: 07/09/2014)
312 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings: Type of Hearing: Fairness Hearing held on July 1, 2014 before Judge Alvin W. Thompson. Court Reporter: Corinna F. Thompson. IMPORTANT NOTICE − REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: To remove personal identifier information from the transcript, a party must electronically file a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction with the Clerk's Office within seven (7) calendar days of this date. If no such Notice is filed, the court will assume redaction of personal identifiers is not necessary and the transcript will be made available through PACER without redaction 90 days from today's date. The transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. The policy governing the redaction of personal information is located on the court website at www.ctd.uscourts.gov. Redaction Request due 8/27/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/6/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/4/2014. (Thompson, C.) (Entered: 08/06/2014)
313 First MOTION for Michael Allen to Withdraw as Attorney by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Allen, Michael) (Entered: 10/28/2014)
314 ORDER: Motion to Withdraw Appearance (Doc. No. 313 ) is hereby GRANTED. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 10/31/2014. (Wang, M.) (Entered: 10/31/2014)
315 PROPOSED ORDER : Consent Order Allowing Access By Remedial Expert To Class Members And Their Respective Medical Records In The Possession Of The Nursing Homes by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 11/24/2014)
316 ORDER ALLOWING ACCESS BY REMEDIAL EXPERT TO CLASS MEMBERS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE MEDICAL RECORDS IN THE POSSESSION OF THE NURSING HOMES. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 12/1/2014.(Wang, M.) (Entered: 12/01/2014)
317 Docket Entry Correction re 310 ORDER: Motion for an Order (1) Approving the Class Action Settlement on a Final Basis and (2) Awarding Plaintiffs' Counsel the Agreed Upon Attorneys' Fees: modified to include Exhibit A (Ferguson, L.) (Entered: 03/19/2015)
318 STATUS REPORT : First Quarterly Report of the Remedial Expert, October 1, 2014 − December 31, 2014 by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 04/06/2015)
319 MOTION for Rosemary M. McGovern to Withdraw as Attorney by State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs. (McGovern, Rosemary) (Entered: 04/07/2015)
320 ORDER: The Motion to Withdraw Appearance (Doc. No. 319 ) is hereby GRANTED. The Clerk shall terminate the appearance of Rosemary M. McGovern. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 4/15/2015. (Koehler, S) (Entered: 04/15/2015)
321 STATUS REPORT Second Quarterly Report of the Remedial Expert, January 1, 2015 − March 31, 2015 by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 07/28/2015)
322 ORDER: Second Quarterly Report of the Remedial Expert (Doc. No. 321 ) is hereby APPROVED. The court has been informed that in the first sentence of the first paragraph under the Conclusion section, the word "plaintiffs" should be replaced with "State." It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 8/13/2015. (Wang, M.) (Entered: 08/13/2015)
323 STATUS REPORT Third Quarterly Report of Remedial Expert Ken Maritone for the period of April 1, 2015 − June 30, 2015 (dated November 12, 2015) by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 11/12/2015)

11/24/2015 01/27/2016 02/18/2016 05/09/2016 06/22/2016 08/12/2016 10/28/2016 11/30/2016 11/30/2016 01/04/2017 01/20/2017 04/03/2017 04/25/2017 08/02/2017 08/08/2017
08/08/2017

324 ORDER: The Third Quarterly Report of the Remedial Expert (Doc. No. 323 ) is hereby APPROVED. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 11/24/15. (Mata, E.) (Entered: 11/24/2015)
325 STATUS REPORT Fourth Quarterly Report of the Remedial Expert by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 01/27/2016)
326 ORDER: The Fourth Quarterly Report of the Remedial Expert (Doc. No. 325 ) is hereby APPROVED. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 2/18/16. (Mata, E.) (Entered: 02/18/2016)
327 STATUS REPORT Fifth Quarterly Report Of The Remedial Expert For The Period October 1, 2015 − December 31, 2015 by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 05/09/2016)
328 ORDER: The Fifth Quarterly Report of the Remedial Expert (Doc. No. 327 ) is hereby APPROVED. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 6/22/16.(Mata, E.) (Entered: 06/22/2016)
329 STATUS REPORT /Sixth Quarterly Report for the Remedial Expert for the Period January 1, 2016 − March 31, 2016. by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 08/12/2016)
330 STATUS REPORT Seventh Quarterly Report of the Remedial Expert for the period of April 1, 2016 − June 30, 2016 by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 10/28/2016)
331 ORDER: The Sixth Quarterly Report of the Remedial Expert (Doc. No. 327 ) is hereby APPROVED nunc pro tunc. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 11/30/16.(Mata, E.) (Entered: 11/30/2016)
332 ORDER: The Seventh Quarterly Report of the Remedial Expert (Doc. No. 330 ) is hereby APPROVED. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 11/30/16. (Mata, E.) (Entered: 11/30/2016)
333 Eighth STATUS REPORT Eighth Quarterly Report of the Remedial Expert July 1, 2016 − September 30, 2016 by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 01/04/2017)
334 ORDER: The Eighth Quarterly Report of the Remedial Expert (Doc. No. 333 ) is hereby APPROVED. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 1/20/17. (Mata, E.) (Entered: 01/20/2017)
335 Ninth STATUS REPORT /Ninth Quarterly Report of the Remedial Expert October 1, 2016 − December 31, 2016 by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 04/03/2017)
336 ORDER: The Ninth Quarterly Report of the Remedial Expert (Doc. No. 335 ) is hereby APPROVED. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 4/25/17. (Mata, E.) (Entered: 04/25/2017)
337 Tenth STATUS REPORT /Tenth Quarterly Report of the Remedial Expert January 1, 2017 − March, 31, 2017 by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 08/02/2017)
338 Consent MOTION to Substitute Party /Unopposed Motion for Substitution of Disability Rights Connecticut, Inc. as Plaintiff in place of State of Connecticut Office of Protection and Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 08/08/2017)
339 MOTION to Substitute Party /Notice of Unopposed Motion for Substitution of Disability Rights Connecticut, Inc. as Plaintiff in place of State of Connecticut Office of Protection and Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities by State of CT Ofc of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 08/08/2017)

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09/20/2017
10/10/2017 10/10/2017 10/11/2017 10/18/2017 10/30/2017 01/30/2018 02/02/2018 04/10/2018 05/04/2018

340 ORDER: The plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Substitution of Disability Rights Connecticut, Inc. as Plaintiff (Doc. No. 338 ) is hereby GRANTED. The Clerk shall substitute Disability Rights Connecticut, Inc. as plaintiff in place of State of Connecticut Office of Protection and Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 8/11/17. (Mata, E.) (Entered: 08/11/2017)
341 ORDER: The Tenth Quarterly Report of the Remedial Expert from January 1, 2017 to March 31, 2017 refers to two attachments (Doc. No. 337 at 4), a letter to the State sent February 8, 2017 and the State response dated March 10, 2017, but the attachments were not filed. Counsel should either provide chambers with these attachments or supplement the filing. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 9/1/17. (Mata, E.) (Entered: 09/01/2017)
342 Tenth STATUS REPORT /Tenth Quarterly Report of the Remedial Expert January 1, 2017 − March 31, 2017 with attachments by Disability Rights Connecticut, Inc.. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 09/01/2017)
343 NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL/THE PARTIES WILL RECEIVE. Telephonic Conference Call regarding The Tenth Quarterly Report of the Remedial Expert from January 1, 2017 to March 31, 2017 set for 10/3/2017 at 3:00 PM before Judge Alvin W. Thompson. The parties shall coordinate and initiate the call to chambers at (860) 240−3224. (Mata, E.) (Entered: 09/20/2017)
344 NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL/THE PARTIES WILL RECEIVE. Telephonic Conference Call regarding The Tenth Quarterly Report of the Remedial Expert from January 1, 2017 to March 31, 2017 RESET FROM 10/3/2017 at 3:00 PM OVER TO 10/10/2017 at 4:45 PM before Judge Alvin W. Thompson. The parties shall coordinate and initiate the call to chambers at (860) 240−3224. (Mata, E.) (Entered: 09/20/2017)
345 RESPONSE re 342 Status Report by Bidwell Care Center, LLC and Chelsea Place Care Center, LLC. (Starble, Jonathan) (Entered: 10/10/2017)
346 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Alvin W. Thompson: Conference Call held on 10/10/2017 regarding The Tenth Quarterly Report of the Remedial Expert from January 1, 2017 to March 31, 2017. (Time: 14 minutes)(Court Reporter: C. Thompson)(Mata, E.) (Entered: 10/11/2017)
347 ORDER: The Tenth Quarterly Report of the Remedial Expert (Doc. No. 342 ) is hereby APPROVED. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 10/11/17. (Mata, E.) (Entered: 10/11/2017)
348 STATUS REPORT (Eleventh) Quarterly Report of the Remedial Expert for the Period of April 1, 2017 to June 30, 2017 by Disability Rights Connecticut, Inc.. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 10/18/2017)
349 ORDER: The Eleventh Quarterly Report of the Remedial Expert (Doc. No. 348 ) is hereby APPROVED. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 10/27/17. (Mata, E.) (Entered: 10/30/2017)
350 STATUS REPORT (Twelfth) Quarterly Report of the Remedial Expert for the Periord of July 1, 2017 to September 30, 2017 by Disability Rights Connecticut, Inc.. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 01/30/2018)
351 ORDER: The Twelfth Quarterly Report of the Remedial Expert (Doc. No. 350 ) is hereby APPROVED. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 2/2/18. (Mata, E.) (Entered: 02/02/2018)
352 STATUS REPORT (Thirteenth) Quarterly Report of the Remedial Expert for the Period of October 1, 2017 to December 31, 2017 by Disability Rights Connecticut, Inc.. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 04/10/2018)
353 ORDER: The Thirteenth Quarterly Report of the Remedial Expert (Doc. No. 352 ) is hereby APPROVED. By May 14, 2018 the parties shall file a report on the status of their discussions regarding how to handle the "new Class Members". Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 5/4/18. (Mata, E.) (Entered: 05/04/2018)

05/04/2018 05/10/2018 05/10/2018
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06/25/2018 06/26/2018 06/27/2018 06/30/2018 10/24/2018 11/01/2018
02/15/2019 02/21/2019

Set Deadlines: Status Report due by 5/14/2018 (Ferguson, L.) (Entered: 05/04/2018)
354 NOTICE of Appearance by Henry A. Salton on behalf of State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs, State of CT Dept of Social Services, State of Connecticut (Salton, Henry) (Entered: 05/10/2018)
355 MOTION for Hugh Barber, Jacqueline S. Hoell, Thomas J. Ring, Rosemary Miller McGovern to Withdraw as Attorney by State of CT Dept of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs, State of CT Dept of Pub Health, State of CT Dept of Social Services, State of Connecticut. (Salton, Henry) (Entered: 05/10/2018)
356 ORDER: The Motion to Withdraw Counsel (Doc. No. 355 ) is hereby GRANTED. Attorneys Hugh Barber and Jacqueline S. Hoell withdrawn. Attorney Thomas J. Ring withdrawn on 11/06/09. Attorney Rosemary Miller McGovern withdrawn on 04/15/15. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 5/14/18. (Mata, E.) (Entered: 05/14/2018)
357 STATUS REPORT − PARTIES JOINT REPORT TO THE COURT CONCERNING THIRTEENTH QUARTERLY REPORT OF THE REMEDIAL EXPERT by Disability Rights Connecticut, Inc.. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 05/14/2018)
358 ORDER: The Parties' Joint Report to the Court Concerning Thirteenth Quarterly Report of the Remedial Expert (Doc. No. 357 ) is hereby APPROVED. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 5/16/18. (Mata, E.) (Entered: 05/16/2018)
359 Joint MOTION for Settlement /Joint Motion for Approval of Consent Order Modifying Settlement Agreement by Disability Rights Connecticut, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Consent Order Modifying Settlement Agreement, # 2 Exhibit A to Proposed Consent Order Modifying Settlement Agreement)(Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 06/12/2018)
360 STATUS REPORT − Fourteenth Quarterly Report of the Remedial Expert January 1, 2018 − March 31, 2018 by Disability Rights Connecticut, Inc.. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 06/18/2018)
361 ORDER: The parties' Joint Motion for Approval of Consent Order Modifying Settlement Agreement (Doc. No. 359 ) is hereby GRANTED. The CONSENT ORDER MODIFYING SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT is attached. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 6/25/18. (Mata, E.) (Entered: 06/25/2018)
362 ORDER: The Parties' Joint Report to the Court Concerning Fourteenth Quarterly Report of the Remedial Expert (Doc. No. 360 ) is hereby APPROVED. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 6/25/18. (Mata, E.) (Entered: 06/25/2018)
363 NOTICE of Appearance by Catherine E. Cushman on behalf of Disability Rights Connecticut, Inc. (Cushman, Catherine) (Entered: 06/26/2018)
364 First MOTION for Nancy B. Alisberg to Withdraw as Attorney for Disability Rights Connecticut by Disability Rights Connecticut, Inc.. (Alisberg, Nancy) (Entered: 06/27/2018)
365 ORDER: The Motion to Withdraw Appearance (Doc. No. 364 ) is hereby GRANTED. The appearance of Attorney Nancy B. Alisberg is terminated. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 6/30/2018. (Ly, T.) (Entered: 07/08/2018)
366 STATUS REPORT Fifteenth Quarterly Report of the Remedial Expert April 1, 2018 − July 2, 2018 by Disability Rights Connecticut, Inc.. (Cushman, Catherine) (Entered: 10/24/2018)
367 ORDER: The Fifteenth Quarterly Report of the Remedial Expert April 1, 2018 − July 2, 2018 (ECF No. 366 ) filed by Disability Rights Connecticut, Inc., is hereby APPROVED. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 11/1/18. (Mata, E.) (Entered: 11/01/2018)
368 NOTICE by Disability Rights Connecticut, Inc. Final Sixteenth Quarterly Report of the Remedial Expert (Cushman, Catherine) (Entered: 02/15/2019)
369 ORDER: The Sixteenth Quarterly Report of the Remedial Expert (ECF No. 368 ) is hereby APPROVED. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 2/21/19. (Mata, E.) (Entered: 02/21/2019)