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U.S. District Court District of Wyoming (Casper) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:17-cv-00124-SWS

Blanchard v. Wyoming Department of Corrections Director et al Assigned to: Honorable Scott W Skavdahl Referred to: Honorable Kelly H Rankin Case in other court: USCA, 18-08020 Cause: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

Date Filed: 07/18/2017 Date Terminated: 02/21/2018 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 550 Prisoner: Civil Rights Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Plaintiff
Taylor S Blanchard individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated

represented by John H Robinson ROBINSON STELTING WELCH BRAMLET LLC 172 Center Street, Suite 202 PO Box 3189 Jackson, WY 83001 307-733-7703 Fax: 307-201-5546 Email: john@rsw-law.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen L Pevar AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 765 Asylum Avenue Hartford, CT 06105 860/570-9830 Fax: 860/570-9840 Email: spevar@aclu.org LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marci Anne Crank Bramlet ROBINSON STELTING WELCH BRAMLET LLC 259 South Center Street Suite 307 Casper, WY 82601

V.
Defendant
Wyoming Department of Corrections Director in his official capacity also known as Robert Lampert

307-235-8777 Email: marci@rsw-law.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Ewa C Dawson WYOMING ATTORNEY GENERAL 2320 Capital Avenue Cheyenne, WY 82002 307/777-7083 Email: ewa.dawson@wyo.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel E White WYOMING ATTORNEY GENERAL 2424 Pioneer Avenue Cheyenne, WY 82002 307/777-7495 Fax: 307/777-8920 Email: heather.hunter@wyo.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Justin Ashkhan Daraie LONG REIMER WINEGAR BEPPLER LLP 270 West Pearl, Suite 103 PO Box 3070 Jackson, WY 83001 307/734-1908 Fax: 307/ 733-3752 Email: jdaraie@lrw-law.com TERMINATED: 08/29/2019
Rachel M Berkness WYOMING ATTORNEY GENERAL 2424 Pioneer Avenue Cheyenne, WY 82002 307/777-7083 Email: heather.hunter@wyo.gov TERMINATED: 01/30/2019

Defendant
Wyoming Womens Center Warden in his official capacity also known as Rick Catron

represented by Ewa C Dawson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel E White (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Justin Ashkhan Daraie (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/29/2019
Rachel M Berkness (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/30/2019

Date Filed 07/18/2017
07/18/2017 07/20/2017 07/20/2017 07/26/2017
07/26/2017

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF( 2 summons(es) issued) ( Filing fee $400 receipt #CAS1924.), filed by Taylor S Blanchard. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet) (Court Staff, stbd) Modified on 8/22/2017 (Court Staff, stbd). (Entered: 07/19/2017)
2 NOTICE of complexity by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard ; this case is noncomplex. (Court Staff, stbd) (Entered: 07/19/2017)
3 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by Taylor S Blanchard. Wyoming Department of Corrections Director answer due 9/18/2017 (Robinson, John) (Entered: 07/20/2017)
4 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by Taylor S Blanchard. Wyoming Womens Center Warden answer due 9/18/2017 (Robinson, John) (Entered: 07/20/2017)
5 MOTION REFERRED TO Judge Kelly H Rankin. MOTION for Stephen L. Pevar to appear pro hac vice; Check not tendered; filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard, Defendants Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Proposed Order)(Robinson, John) Modified text on 7/26/2017 (Court Staff, stbd). (Entered: 07/26/2017)
FINANCIAL ENTRY: Payment of $100 received from American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Inc.; Check No. 80643 as to Stephen L. Pevar Receipt No. CAS0001927 (Court Staff, stbd) (Entered: 07/26/2017)

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08/16/2017 08/17/2017 08/17/2017 08/29/2017
08/29/2017 08/29/2017

6 ORDER by the Honorable Kelly H Rankin granting 5 Motion to appear pro hac vice admitting Stephen L Pevar for Taylor S Blanchard (Court Staff, szs) (Entered: 07/31/2017)
FINANCIAL ENTRY: Payment of $100 received for Pro Hac Vice fee for Stephan Pevar. CAS001927. (Court Staff, skmg) (Entered: 09/05/2017)
7 MOTION to Expedite Discovery filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Pevar, Stephen) Modified on 8/15/2017 (Court Staff, sal). (Entered: 08/15/2017)
8 MEMORANDUM in Support of 7 Motion for Order filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Plaintiffs' Proposed Discovery) (Pevar, Stephen) (Entered: 08/15/2017)
9 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Justin Ashkhan Daraie on behalf of Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden (Daraie, Justin) (Entered: 08/16/2017)
10 MOTION REFERRED TO Judge Kelly H Rankin. MOTION for Rachel M. Berkness to appear pro hac vice; Check tendered; filed by Defendants Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Rachel M. Berkness, # 2 Proposed Order)(Daraie, Justin) (Entered: 08/16/2017)
11 ORDER Denying 10 Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice or Rachel M. Berkness for Failure to Comply with Local rule by the Honorable Kelly H. Rankin(Court Staff, szf) (Entered: 08/16/2017)
12 MOTION to Certify Class filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Pevar, Stephen) (Entered: 08/17/2017)
13 MEMORANDUM in Support of 12 Motion to Certify Class filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Pevar, Stephen) (Entered: 08/17/2017)
14 OPPOSITION to 7 MOTION to Expedite Discovery, filed by Defendants Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden. (Attachments: # 1 Ex. A - Affidavit of Steve Lindly, # 2 Ex. B Affidavit of Carl Voigtsberger) (Daraie, Justin) Modified link on 9/4/2017 (Court Staff, sds). (Entered: 08/29/2017)
15 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Defendants Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden. (Daraie, Justin) (Entered: 08/29/2017)
16 MEMORANDUM in Support of 15 Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden. (Attachments: # 1 Ex. A - Email, # 2 Affidavit of Steve Lindly, # 3 Affidavit of Anna Skeen, # 4 Affidavit of Katie Steber, # 5 Affidavit of Carl Voigtsberger, # 6 Affidavit of CJ Young) (Daraie, Justin) (Entered: 08/29/2017)

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09/18/2017 09/18/2017 09/19/2017 09/19/2017

17 OPPOSITION to 12 Motion to Certify filed by Defendants Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden. (Attachments: # 1 Ex. A - Lindly Affidavit, # 2 Ex. B - Voigtsberger Affidavit) (Daraie, Justin) Modified on 11/6/2017 (Court Staff, sds). Modified link on 11/16/2017 (Court Staff, sjlg). (Entered: 08/31/2017)
18 MOTION for Extension of Time (Dispositive) requesting extension of Reply & Response to Motions filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Robinson, John) Modified on 11/6/2017 (Court Staff, sds). (Entered: 09/01/2017)
19 Amended MOTION for Extension of Time (Dispositive) requesting extension of Reply & Response to Motion filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Robinson, John) Modified on 11/6/2017 (Court Staff, sds). (Entered: 09/01/2017)
20 REPLY BRIEF re 7 Motion for Order to Expedite Discovery filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Pevar, Stephen) (Entered: 09/05/2017)
21 (TEXT-ONLY) ORDER by the Honorable Scott W Skavdahl granting 19 Motion for Extension of Deadlines. Plaintiff's Reply on 12 Motion to Certify Class is due September 14, 2017; Plaintiff's Response to 15 Motion to Dismiss is due September 19, 2017. (Court Staff, skaa) (Entered: 09/06/2017)
22 REPLY BRIEF re 12 Motion to Certify Class filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Pevar, Stephen) Modified on 9/18/2017 (Court Staff, scat). (Entered: 09/08/2017)
23 DISREGARD FILED IN ERROR MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages regarding Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Proposed Order for Additional Pages)(Pevar, Stephen) Modified on 9/18/2017 (Court Staff, scat). (Entered: 09/18/2017)
24 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to 15 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Pevar, Stephen) (Additional attachment(s) added on 9/18/2017: # 1 Declaration Taylor Blanchard, # 2 Declaration John Robinson) (Court Staff, scat). (Entered: 09/18/2017)
25 MOTION REFERRED TO Judge Kelly H Rankin. MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages regarding Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Proposed Order)(Pevar, Stephen) (Entered: 09/18/2017)
26 ORDER by the Honorable Kelly H. Rankin granting 25 Plaintiffs' Motion to File Excess Pages in a Memorandum responding to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. (Court Staff, sms) (Entered: 09/19/2017)
27 MOTION REFERRED TO Judge Kelly H Rankin. MOTION for Extension of Time (Non-Dispositive) requesting extension of Reply to

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10/09/2017 10/12/2017

Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 24) filed by Defendants Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Daraie, Justin) Modified on 9/20/2017 (Court Staff, szf). (Entered: 09/19/2017)
28 REQUEST for hearing on Pending Motions by Defendants Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Daraie, Justin) (Entered: 09/19/2017)
Motions No Longer Referred: 27 MOTION for Extension of Time (NonDispositive) requesting extension of Reply to Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 24) (Court Staff, szf) (Entered: 09/20/2017)
29 ORDER by the Honorable Scott W Skavdahl granting 27 Motion for Extension of Time until Monday, October 2, 2017 to file responsive pleading. (Court Staff, scat) Modified on 9/21/2017 (Court Staff, sds). (Entered: 09/20/2017)
30 REPLY to 24 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion, Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden. (Attachments: # 1 Ex. A Abbott Affidavit, # 2 Ex. B - Steber Declaration, # 3 Ex. C - Taylor Affidavit, # 4 Ex. D - Harris Affidavit, # 5 Ex. E - Buzzfeed Article) (Daraie, Justin) Modified on 10/4/2017 to remove incorrect document link. (Court Staff, skb). (Entered: 10/02/2017)
31 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Pevar, Stephen) (Entered: 10/03/2017)
32 MEMORANDUM in Support of 31 Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Second Declaration of Plaintiff Blanchard) (Pevar, Stephen) (Entered: 10/03/2017)
33 NOTICE of Hearing: Hearing on (1) Plaintiff's Motion to Expedite Discovery 7 and (2) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 15 set for 10/18/2017 01:15 PM in Casper Courtroom No. 2 (Room No. 204) before Honorable Scott W Skavdahl. (Court Staff, skb) (Entered: 10/03/2017)
34 OBJECTION to 30 REPLY to 24 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Pevar, Stephen) Modified on 10/11/2017 (Court Staff, scat). (Entered: 10/09/2017)
35 SIGNED DECLARATION OF TAYLOR S BLANCHARD in regards to 24 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion, filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Robinson, John) Modified text on 10/13/2017 (Court Staff, stbd). Modified on 10/16/2017 to remove duplicate text (Court Staff, skb). (Entered: 10/12/2017)

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36 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Daniel E White on behalf of Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden (White, Daniel) (Entered: 10/13/2017)
37 RESPONSE to 34 Objection to Defendants' Reply Brief filed by Defendants Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden. (White, Daniel) (Entered: 10/13/2017)
NOTICE to Counsel: Counsel need to Review and comply with the limitations under U.S.D.C. Local Rule 7.1 regarding the limitations on the filing of reply and supplemental briefs where a hearing has been scheduled. Have a good weekend. (Skavdahl, Scott) (Entered: 10/13/2017)
38 COUNSEL'S DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF RULE 56(d) REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY in regards to 7 Motion to Expedite Discovery by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Pevar, Stephen) Modified text on 10/16/2017 (Court Staff, stbd). Modified on 10/24/2017 to add full title of linked motion (Court Staff, skb). (Entered: 10/15/2017)
39 OPPOSITION to 31 Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Defendants Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden. (Daraie, Justin) Modified on 10/20/2017 to correct document link. (Court Staff, skb). (Entered: 10/17/2017)
40 MOTION REFERRED TO Judge Kelly H Rankin. MOTION to Amend/Correct 1 Complaint Leave to File First Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Proposed Order)(Robinson, John) Modified on 10/18/2017 (Court Staff, szf). Modified on 10/19/2017 to correct abbreviations in text (Court Staff, skb). (Entered: 10/17/2017)
Motions No Longer Referred: 40 MOTION to Amend/Correct 1 Complaint Leave to File 1st Amd Complaint (Court Staff, szf) (Entered: 10/18/2017)
41 Minute ORDER and Minute Entry. Proceedings held before Honorable Scott W Skavdahl: taking under advisement 31 Motion for Preliminary Injunction; granting 40 MOTION to Amend/Correct 1 Complaint; denying without prejudice 7 Motion for Order; taking under advisement 12 Motion to Certify Class; denying as moot 15 Motion to Dismiss ; Motion Hearing held on 10/18/2017. (Court Reporter Anne Bowline.) (Court Staff, scat) (Entered: 10/18/2017)
42 NOTICE of Initial Pretrial Conference: Initial Pretrial Conference set for 11/7/2017 10:00 AM in Judge Rankin Chambers (Room No. 2204) before Honorable Kelly H. Rankin. All parties should appear by telephone, with Plaintiff's counsel initiating the call, through a conference call operator, and connecting to the Court at 307/433-2180. Parties are advised to have their calendars on hand to assist with scheduling. (Court Staff, szf) (Entered: 10/18/2017)

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11/06/2017 11/07/2017

43 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF against Defendant Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden, filed by Taylor S Blanchard. (Court Staff, stbd) (Entered: 10/19/2017)
44 DOCKETED INCORRECTLY - COUNSEL TO REFILE MEMORANDUM in Support of 31 Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Robinson, John) Modified on 10/19/2017 (Court Staff, stbd). (Entered: 10/19/2017)
45 Second AFFIDAVIT of Taylor Blanchard re 32 Memorandum in Support of Motion filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Robinson, John) (Entered: 10/20/2017)
46 MOTION REFERRED TO Judge Kelly H Rankin. MOTION for Extension of Time (Non-Dispositive) requesting extension of Deadline for Reply Brief filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Pevar, Stephen) (Entered: 10/20/2017)
47 ORDER by the Honorable Kelly H. Rankin granting 46 Motion for Extension of Time. Plaintiffs shall file their Reply Brief to Defendants' Opposition to the Motion for Preliminary Injunction 39 on or before October 27, 2017. (Court Staff, sms) (Entered: 10/23/2017)
48 REPLY BRIEF to 31 Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Pevar, Stephen) Modified on 10/27/2017 to insert link (Court Staff, skb). (Entered: 10/27/2017)
49 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Defendants Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden. (Daraie, Justin) (Entered: 11/02/2017)
50 MEMORANDUM in Support of 49 Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden. (Attachments: # 1 Morman v. Campbell Co., 632 Fed. Appx 927 (unpublished)) (Daraie, Justin) (Entered: 11/02/2017)
51 REPORT of Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Pevar, Stephen) Modified on 11/6/2017 to remove non-public non-public setting (Court Staff, skb). (Entered: 11/03/2017)
52 MOTION REFERRED TO Judge Kelly H Rankin. MOTION for Protective Order filed by Defendants Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden. (Attachments: # 1 Ex. A Notice of Depositions, # 2 Proposed Order)(Daraie, Justin) (Entered: 11/03/2017)
53 RESPONSE in Opposition re 52 MOTION for Protective Order filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Pevar, Stephen) (Entered: 11/06/2017)
54 (TEXT-ONLY) ORDER by the Honorable Kelly H. Rankin. Following the discussion at the Initial Pretrial Conference, held on November 7, 2017,

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the Court DENIED Defendant's Motion for a Protective Order 52 and ordered discovery to proceed in the case. The scheduled depositions will proceed as planned.(Court Staff, sms) (Entered: 11/07/2017)
55 (TEXT-ONLY) ORDER by the Honorable Kelly H. Rankin. The Court held the Initial Pretrial Conference with the parties on November 7, 2017. The parties requested extensions to file their Response and Reply to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 49 . The Court, finding good cause, ordered Plaintiff to file their Response to the Motion to Dismiss on or before November 20, 2017 and Defendant to file their Reply on or before December 4, 2017.(Court Staff, sms) (Entered: 11/07/2017)
56 INITIAL PRETRIAL ORDERby the Honorable Kelly H. Rankin. Motions filing deadline 5/29/2018. Motion response deadline 6/12/2018. Dispositive Motions Hearing set for 6/27/2018 01:00 PM in Casper Courtroom No. 2 (Room No. 204) before Honorable Scott W Skavdahl. Other Fact Witness Deadline 4/13/2018 Expert Witness Designation-Plaintiff deadline 2/12/2018. Expert Witness DesignationDefendant deadline 3/14/2018. Discovery due by 5/29/2018. Stipulation Deadline 7/3/2018. Motion in Limine deadline 7/3/2018. Motions in Limine Response Deadline 7/10/2018. Final Pretrial Conference set for 7/24/2018 01:00 PM in Casper Courtroom No. 2 (Room No. 204) before Honorable Scott W Skavdahl. Bench Trial (7 Days/Stacked #2) set for 8/6/2018 09:00 AM in Casper Courtroom No. 2 (Room No. 204) before Honorable Scott W Skavdahl.(Court Staff, szf) (Entered: 11/07/2017)
57 ORDER by the Honorable Scott W Skavdahl denying 31 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (Court Staff, skb) (Entered: 11/09/2017)
58 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION by the Honorable Scott W Skavdahl re 12 Motion to Certify Class. (Court Staff, stbd) (Entered: 11/13/2017)
59 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to 49 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Pevar, Stephen) (Entered: 11/20/2017)
60 REPLY to 59 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint filed by Defendants Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden. (Daraie, Justin) (Entered: 12/04/2017)
61 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Rachel Berkness on behalf of Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden (Court Staff, sjlg) (Entered: 12/12/2017)
62 MOTION to Dismiss 43 First Amended Complaint filed by Defendants Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden. (Daraie, Justin) Modified to add document link on 1/5/2018 (Court Staff, skb). (Entered: 12/28/2017)

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63 MEMORANDUM in Support of 62 Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden. (Attachments: # 1 Voigtsberger Affidavit) (Daraie, Justin) (Entered: 12/28/2017)
64 ORDER denying 49 Motion to Dismiss by the Honorable Scott W Skavdahl (Court Staff, scat) (Entered: 01/03/2018)
65 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to 62 MOTION to Dismiss First Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Pevar, Stephen) (Entered: 01/08/2018)
66 AFFIDAVIT of Stephen L. Pevar filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Deposition of Anna Skeen, # 2 Exhibit Deposition of Carl Voigtsberger) (Pevar, Stephen) (Entered: 01/08/2018)
67 MOTION REFERRED TO Judge Kelly H Rankin. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Second Amended Complaint, # 2 Proposed Order)(Pevar, Stephen) Modified text/event on 1/16/2018 (Court Staff, stbd). Modified on 1/18/2018 (Court Staff, skb). (Entered: 01/16/2018)
68 MEMORANDUM in Support of 67 Motion to Amend/Correct filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Pevar, Stephen) (Entered: 01/16/2018)
69 REPLY to 65 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint as Moot filed by Defendants Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Steve Lindly, # 2 Affidavit of Neicole Molden, # 3 KC v Townsend, Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint 09CV12 (Doc. 80), # 4 KC v Townsend, Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint 09CV12 (Doc. 87)) (Berkness, Rachel) (Entered: 01/16/2018)
70 MOTION for Reconsideration , filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Pevar, Stephen) (Entered: 01/25/2018)
71 AFFIDAVIT of John Robinson re 70 MOTION for Reconsideration , filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Pevar, Stephen) (Entered: 01/25/2018)
72 AFFIDAVIT of Stephen Pevar re 70 MOTION for Reconsideration , filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Pevar, Stephen) (Entered: 01/25/2018)
73 OPPOSITION to 67 Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint filed by Defendants Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden. (Attachments: # 1 Hunsaker v. Alexander Unpulished Case, # 2 Lee v. Benuelos Unpublised Case, # 3 Ruppert v. Aragon Unpublished Case) (Berkness, Rachel) Modified on 1/31/2018 to correct link (Court Staff, skb). (Entered: 01/30/2018)
74 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Marci Anne Crank Bramlet on behalf of Taylor S Blanchard (Bramlet, Marci) (Entered: 02/02/2018)

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75 MOTION REFERRED TO Judge Kelly H Rankin. MOTION for Extension of Time (Non-Dispositive) requesting extension of Deadline to Reply to Response filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Proposed Order)(Robinson, John) (Entered: 02/02/2018)
76 ORDER by the Honorable Kelly H Rankin granting 75 Motion for Extension of Time and Excess Pages. It is ordered that the deadline for Plaintiff to file her reply brief shall be up to and including February 20, 2018. It is further ordered that Plaintiff's reply brief may exceed the five page limit, but shall not exceed ten pages. (Court Staff, sjgc) Modified text on 2/5/2018 (Court Staff, sjlg). (Entered: 02/05/2018)
77 RESPONSE to 70 Motion for Reconsideration filed by Defendants Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Rachel Berkness, # 2 Unpublished Case Jimenez v Stone) (Berkness, Rachel) (Entered: 02/08/2018)
78 MOTION REFERRED TO Judge Kelly H Rankin. Joint MOTION for Extension of Time for Expert Designation filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Robinson, John) Modified on 2/9/2018 (Court Staff, skb). (Entered: 02/09/2018)
79 ORDER by the Honorable Kelly H. Rankin granting 78 Motion for Extension of Time. Expert Witness Designation-Plaintiff deadline 3/14/2018. Expert Witness Designation-Defendant deadline 4/13/2018.(Court Staff, sms) (Entered: 02/12/2018)
80 MOTION REFERRED TO Judge Kelly H Rankin. MOTION for Order Ext of Time filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Robinson, John) (Entered: 02/20/2018)
81 REPLY to 73 Opposition, filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Declaration of Arika Wallace) (Pevar, Stephen) (Entered: 02/20/2018)
82 ORDER by the Honorable Scott W Skavdahl granting 62 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint; and denying 70 Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration. It is ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED.(Court Staff, skb) (Entered: 02/20/2018)
83 JUDGMENT in favor of Defendants against Plaintiff. by the Honorable Scott W Skavdahl. It is hereby ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED.(Court Staff, skb) (Attachment: # 1 Bill of Costs) (Court Staff, skb). Modified on 2/21/2018 (Court Staff, skb). (Entered: 02/21/2018)
84 FILED IN ERROR - COUNSEL TO REFILE - NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 82 Order granting 62 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint and denying 70 Plaintiff's Motion for

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Reconsideration filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Pevar, Stephen) Modified at the request of Counsel on 3/8/2018 (Court Staff, stbd). (Entered: 03/08/2018)
85 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 82 Order granting 62 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint and denying 70 Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration and 83 Judgment filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Pevar, Stephen) Modified text on 3/8/2018 (Court Staff, stbd). Modified text on 3/12/2018 (Court Staff, stbd). (Entered: 03/08/2018)
86 Preliminary Record of appeal sent to USCA and counsel re 85 Notice of Appeal, The procedures and appeals packet may be obtained from our website at www.wyd.uscourts.gov (Attachments: # 1 Preliminary Record on Appeal Including Notice of Appeal) (Court Staff, stbd) (Entered: 03/08/2018)
87 Appeal Number 18-8020 received from USCA for 85 Notice of Appeal, filed by Taylor S Blanchard. Docketing statement due 03/22/2018 for Taylor S. Blanchard. Transcript order form due 03/22/2018 for Taylor S. Blanchard. Fee is due by 04/09/2018 for Taylor S. Blanchard. Notice of appearance due on 03/22/2018 for Taylor S. Blanchard, Rick Carton, and Robert Lampert. (Court Staff, stbd) (Entered: 03/08/2018)
USCA Appeal Fees received $505 receipt number CHY028472 re 85 Notice of Appeal filed by Taylor S Blanchard (Court Staff, sal) (Entered: 04/11/2018)
88 TRANSCRIPT REQUEST (No Transcripts Necessary) by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard re 85 Notice of Appeal,. (Pevar, Stephen) (Entered: 03/26/2018)
89 (TEXT-ONLY) APPEAL ORDER from USCA as to 85 Notice of Appeal, filed by Taylor S Blanchard Record on appeal/Notice due 4/2/2018 (Court Staff, stbd) (Entered: 03/26/2018)
90 Transcript Letter transmitted to USCA re 85 Notice of Appeal; No transcripts have been ordered for this appeal. For purpose of appeal, the record is now ready. (Court Staff, stbd) (Entered: 03/28/2018)
91 Appeal Remark re 85 Notice of Appeal; Appellant's brief and appendix due on 05/07/2018 for Taylor S. Blanchard. (Court Staff, stbd) (Entered: 03/28/2018)
92 MOTION REFERRED TO Judge Kelly H Rankin. MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney filed by Defendants Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Berkness, Rachel) (Entered: 01/30/2019)

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93 ORDER by the Honorable Kelly H Rankin granting 92 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Rachel M Berkness terminated (Court Staff, sjgc) (Entered: 01/30/2019)
94 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Ewa C Dawson on behalf of Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden (Dawson, Ewa) (Entered: 08/27/2019)
95 MOTION REFERRED TO Judge Kelly H Rankin. MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney filed by Defendants Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Daraie, Justin) (Entered: 08/29/2019)
96 ORDER by the Honorable Kelly H Rankin granting 95 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Justin Ashkhan Daraie terminated. (Court Staff, sjh) (Entered: 08/29/2019)
97 MANDATE of USCA AFFIRMING 82 Order on Motion to Dismiss, Order on Motion for Reconsideration, 83 Judgment, re 85 Notice of Appeal (Attorney), filed by Taylor S Blanchard. (Attachments: # 1 Order & Judgment) (Court Staff, stbd) (Entered: 09/25/2020)

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 Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 1 Filed 07/18/17 Page 1 of 40

JOHN H. ROBINSON WSB #6-2828
JAMIESON&ROBINSON,LLC
185 West Broadway Suite 101 P.O. Box 4285 Jackson, Wyoming 83001 (307) 733-7703
STEPHEN L. PEVAR
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION
765 Asylum Avenue Hartford, Connecticut 06105 (860) 570-9830 (pro hoc vice admission pending)
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

US r11 fll,]
2011 3U1

i’fl
lB Pi

-.
1:29

I

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING

TAYLOR S. BLANCHARD, individually)

and on behalf of all other persons

)

similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

vs.

)

)

ROBERT LAMPERT and

)

RICK CATRON, in their

)

official capacities,

)

Defendants.

)

Civil Action No. )) -(, ii— 12 cf—5

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF PLAINTIFF Taylor Blanchard, by and through the undersigned counsel, individually and on behalfof other similarly situated individuals, states and alleges the Ibilowing.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The Wyoming Youthful Oflènder Act, Wvo.REv.STAT. § 7-13-1003, provides that the
Wyoming Department of Corrections shall establish a youthful offender program (also known as
Blanchard, ci a! v. Lampert. ci aL — Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Page 1q11!
pj ‘/&/, e4soo9’v

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 1 Filed 07/18/17 Page 2 of 40
the “boot camp” program) for all persons incarcerated in any state penal institution who are serving a sentence of imprisonment for any offense other than a felony punishable by death or life imprisonment, who are under the age of twenty-Five years old, and who have not previously
served a term of incarceration at any state or federal adult penal institution. The Youthful
Offender Act is gender neutral.’ The Youthful Offender Act mandates that the participants of the youthful offender program be separated from the general prisoner population, and shall emphasize work and physical activity as a major element of the program. Id.
On May 8, 2017, the Ninth Judicial District Court, the Hon. Marvin Tyler presiding, sentenced Taylor Blanchard — a female — to a term of incarceration of 6-10 years, with a recommendation that she be given the opportunity to participate in the Wyoming Youthful Offender, or “boot camp” program. See Ex. 1. Transcript of Probation Revocation Hearing; State v. Blanchard, Crim. No. 1016, at 18-19; Ex. 2, Order Upon Probation Revocation/Disposition Hearing. As the sentencing court noted, Wyoming does not have a boot camp for women — only for men. Ex. 1. at 14. As such. and despite the district court’s sentence and recommendation. Ms. Blanchard (and all other women similarly situated) will never have the same opportunity as men to learn the skills offered in the program and to be released as early as the boot camp program allows. This violates her, and other women’s, Equal Protection guarantees and must be rectified so women prisoners under the jurisdiction and custody of the WDOC have the same opportunities to participate in the boot camp program as similarly situated men.
Even though the act does contain the word “he,” it is gender neutral pursuant to Wyo.Rev.Stat. § 8-1-103.
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Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 1 Filed 07/18/17 Page 3 of 40
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
I. This action seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, the courl has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (3) and (4).
2. Venue is appropriate in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 139 1(b).
CLASS ACTION 3. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all present and Ibture female prisoners under the age of twenty-live and in the custody of the Wyoming Department of Corrections and/or the Wyoming \•“omen’s Center who are or will be otherwise eligible to participate in Wyoming’s boot camp program, but who have been or will be denied participation due to their gender, or not considered by WDOC due to their gender. 4. Taylor Blanchard proposes to be a class representative fin the class described in the preceding paragraph pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 23(a). (b)(l) and (b)(2) for purposes of obtaining declaratory and injunctive relict:
5. This action satisfies all four requirements of Rule 23(a) in that (I) the class is so
numerous that joinder is impractical; (2) there are questions of law and fact common to the class regarding discrimination against each member of the class on the basis of her gender: (3) the claims of Ms. Blanchard are typical of the claims of the class, to wit: that Defendants are
regularly and routinely discriminating against women prisoners in the custody of the WDOC
and WWC on the basis of their gender by not permitting them the same opportunity as men to participate in Wyoming’s Youthful Offender program: and (4) plaintiffs’ counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
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Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 1 Filed 07/18/17 Page 4 of 40
DEFENDANTS 6. Defendant Robert Lampcrt is a citizen and resident of Wyoming. At all times material to this action, Mr. Lampert has been the Director of the WDOC. As such, he is the agency oflicial ultimately responsible tinder Wyoming state law for the operation and administration of the Wyoming Women’s Center (WWC) and has a duty and obligation under Wyoming state law as well as the Equal Protection Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, to ensure. among other things. that female prisoners at the WWC are not discriminated against on the basis of their gender. 7. Defendant Rick Catron is a citizen of Wyoming. At all times material to this action, Mr. Catron has been the Warden of the WWC. As such, he has a duty and obligation under Wyoming state law as well as the Equal Protection Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, to ensure, among other things, that female prisoners at the WWC are not discriminated against on the basis of their gender. 8. All acts and omissions of the defendants set forth herein were done under color of state law and were performed or omitted during the scope of their employment. 9. Both defendants are sued in their official capacities only.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 10. The Wyoming Legislature enacted Wyoming’s Youthful Offender Act in 1987. WYO.REV.STAT. §7-13-1001. e seq. The act is gender-neutral pursuant to WYo.REv.STAT. §81-103. II. The Act mandates that the WDOC shall establish a youthful offender program (“boot camp”) for all persons incarcerated in am’ state penal institution who are serving a sentence of imprisonment for any offense other than a felony punishable by death or life
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Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 1 Filed 07/18/17 Page 5 of 40
imprisonment, who are under the age of twenty-five years old, and who have not previously served a term of incarceration at any state or federal adult penal institution.
12. Plaintiff and the class she proposes to represent are eligible to participate in the boot camp program.
13. Plaintiff’s sentencing judge recognized her eligibility to participate in Wyoming’s Youthful Offender program and in his sentencing order gave her the same recommendation that she be allowed the opportunity to participate in the program as if she were male.
14. On information and belief, the WDOC provides virtually all male prisoners with a similar Youthful Offender program recommendation the opportunity to attend and complete the Youthful Offender program for men in Newcastle, Wyoming.
15. The Youthful Offender program for men offers several structured opportunities for male prisoners to help them rehabilitate and succeed as productive members of society upon release.
16. On information and belieI the Youthful Offender program for men is a highly structured program for first-time, male offenders. The men must have been adjudicated as an adult, not have atlained the age of 25 at the time of sentencing. and the sentencing judge must have recommended placement in the boot camp program.
17. On information and beliel the basic program is 120 days and comprises four phases. The routine day begins at 4:00 a.m. and ends at 9:00 p.m. During each day three hours are devoted to physical activity. Cognitive restructuring and educational programs are the key components. Work ethic instruction is given through a teamwork concept, as various work details are conducted throughout each day.
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Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 1 Filed 07/18/17 Page 6 of 40
18. On information and beliel upon completion of the program a successful “hooter” must receive a sentence modification from the court. Generally, the graduates will release to straight probation, Intensive Super-vision Program (ISP), or to one of the adult community corrections centers.
19. On information and belielç the Wyoming Boot Camp began expansion in March
of 1999. A total of$l,l 11,000 was received through Federal grants with a state match of 10%
of these funds. The new boot camp facility was occupied on May 19, 2000, increasing the population from 30 to a maximum of 56. The new facility comprises 12,000 square feet of housing, programming, education, medical and office space.
20. On information and belief, the Youthful Offender program for men is designed to protect the public by incarcerating young. first-time, male offenders in a program of short term, intense incarceration in a disciplined setting designed to train young offenders to cope with the complexities of modem life in a crime-free environment.
21. On information and belief, the WDOC attempts to attain the goal for men in the Wyoming Youthful Offender program by diverting selected youthful offenders from institutional settings earlier than would have otherwise been possible. thus reducing the total term of incarceration. The WDOC provides programming opportunities to assist male prisoners with cognitive restructuring and basic skills training in areas of social adjustment.
22. On information and belief, the Youthful Offender program for men demonstrates
to the male participants, in a logical progression of thought, that they are responsible for their behavior and have the means at their disposal to change their criminal behaviors.
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Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 1 Filed 07/18/17 Page 7 of 40
23. On information and belief, the Youlhlbl Oflènder program for men provides a program of physical training which will result in elevated self esteem which will increase each individual’s perception of self-worth.
24. On information and belief: the Youthful Offender program for men provides appropriate information and materials to participants to assist them in their search for gainful employment.
25. On information and belieC the Youthful Offender program for men provides a Boot Camp program that emulates the military service including close order drill and rigid dress code as a means of developing self-discipline and promoting the development of esprit de corps and teamwork.
26. On information and belief the Youthful Offender program for men selects, trains and provides staff’ who, by their actions, would serve as an example to young offenders and in so doing, influence behavior by reflecting the positive benefits of law-abiding behavior.
27. On information and belief, in order to be inducted into the Youthful Offender program for men, the male prisoners must meet the statutory requirements and have a recommendation for placement from his sentencing judge.
28. On information and belief, the Youthful Offender program for men has programming components including, but not limited to. grieving, anger control, stress management, goal-setting, reality clarification, thinking errors, parenting, rational emotive training, relapse prevention, individual programming and therapy when needed, and drug and alcohol programming.
29. On information and belief, the Youthfbl Offender program for men includes an educational program, which includes but is not limited to, G.E.D. instruction and certification,
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Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 1 Filed 07/18/17 Page 8 of 40
seven-habits, computer keyboarding, choices, coping skills, life skills, job skills training, drug education and family day.
30. On information and belief, the Youthful Offender program for men conducts a
parent day for the parents and family of graduating Boot Camp inmates. 31. On information and belief, the Youthful OfThnder program fbr men places
emphasis and focus on identifying the behaviors that got the male prisoner in trouble in the first place and ways to avoid feeding into the negative thought patterns and behaviors.
32. Wyoming does not have a Youthful Offender program for women. 33. Because Wyoming does not have a Youthful Offender or boot camp program for women, the women in the custody of the WDOC and WWC are denied the opportunities provided to men in their WDOC boot camp program and described in the foregoing paragraphs. This denial of opportunities to rehabilitate and receive an early release is based entirely upon their gender as women. 34. For Plaintiff speci flcally, because Wyoming does not have a Youthful Offender or boot camp program for women, she is being denied the opportunities provided to men in their WDOC boot camp program and described in the foregoing paragraphs. 35. For Plaintiff specitically. because she is being denied the opportunity to participate in and complete a bootcamp program. she will serve at least an additional 3-4 years in prison than she would have if she were allowed to participate and complete the program. 36. Upon arrival at the WWC, Plaintiff asked Plaintiff’s caseworker (Ms. Williams) whether Ms. Blanchard would be given the opportunity to participate in a Youthful Offender program. 37. Ms. Williams advised that such a program was unavailable for women.
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Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 1 Filed 07/18/17 Page 9 of 40
38. Plaintiff also asked Ms. Williams how she could file a grievance to allow her to participate.
39. Ms. Williams advised that such a complaint was not a grievable issue, and that she would have to take it up with “the courts.”
40. On June 29, 2017, Plaintiff filed a grievance asking to be given the opportunity to participate in a Youthful Offender program. specifically writing: “1 understand that I have been classified as minimum custody rather than under the Youthful Offenders Act (boot camp program). I also understand that Wyoming DOC is not going to consider me for boot camp due to Wyoming not placing women in boot camps.” The grievance requested that Ms. Blanchard receive “a boot camp classification within the state of Wyoming as my Judge had recommended for my sentencing.” Ex. 3, Inmate Grievance Form/WDOC Form #321
41. . The following day as noted by a handwritten note at the bottom of page 1 of Ex. 3, a WWC employee, Ms. Carpenter, advised Plaintiff Blanehard that her Grievance was
“rejected” because “Classification Decisions ar [sicl non-grievable.” Id.
42. Plaintiff has fully exhausted her administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act.
43. Additionally, Plaintiffs counsel spoke with a Deputy Attorney General representing the WDOC. Plaintiffs counsel asked if the WDOC would give Ms. Blanchard the opportunity to participate in a Youthful Offender program by sending her to another state with such a program.
44. The Deputy Attorney General advised that Ms. Blanchard would not be given such an opportunity and instead would have to seek relief from her sentencing judge. or serve her 6-10 year sentence at the WWC. Id.
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Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 1 Filed 07/18/17 Page 10 of 40

CLAIM FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF PURSUANT TO RULE 23, FED.R.CIV.P., 28 U.S.C. S 2201, 2202 AND 42 U.S.C. 1983

45. Based upon the facts set forth above. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive

relief on her own behalf and on behalf of all persons similarly situated, enjoining Defendants in

their official capacities (and all persons acting under their command) from refusing to give

women prisoners the same opportunity to participate in the Youthful Offender or boot camp

program as provided to male prisoners in the custody of the WDOC d/or WWC.

46. Defendants should be ordered. among other things, to provide women with the

same opportunity to participate in and complete a Youthful Offender program as men prisoners,

either a program operated by the WDOC in Wyoming or a similar program operated in another

state.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully prays that this Honorable Court will:

1. Accept jurisdiction in this case.

2. Recognize the important equal protection problem concerning the difference between

the manner in which the Defendants and WDOC/WWC administer Wyoming’s

Youthful Offender Act recommendations to men and women prisoners.

3. Certify the class as proposed.

4. Appoint Plaintiff as the Class Representative.

5. Recognize Plaintiff’s counsel as class counsel.

6.

Grant Plaintiff and the Class declaratory relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and

2202, declaring that Defendants violated and are violating Plaintiff’s equal protection

rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

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Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 1 Filed 07/18/17 Page 11 of 40
7. Issue preliminary and permanent injunctive relief on behalf of PlaintifiBlanchard and on behalf of’ the class of women she represents pursuant to Rule 65 of’ the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, ordering Defendants to immediately take all necessary and proper actions to ensure that present and future women prisoners in the custody of WDOC and/or WWC with recommendations for Youthful Offender program participation or who are otherwise eligible to participate in the program under the language of the statute be granted the same opportunity as men to participate in a Youthful Offender program in Wyoming, or similar program in another state.
8. Grant such additional and further relief including an award of attorney’s fees and costs, as the Court may deem just and proper under the circumstances.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18th day of July, 2017.
JOHN H. ROBINSON, WSPA6. 6-a28 JAMIESON & RoBINSON, LLC P.O. Box 4285 Jackson. Wyoming 83001 (307) 733-7703 robinsn@vcn.com STEPHEN L. PEVAR
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION
765 Asylum Avenue Hartford, Connecticut 06105 (860) 570-9830 spevar’aclu.org Pro Hoc Vice application/admission pending
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Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 1 Filed 07/18/17 Page 12 of 40
1

1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

2

WITHIN AND FOR SUBLETTE COUNTY, WYOMING

3

4 THE STATE OF WYOMING,

5

Plaintiff,

6 vs.

) Criminal No. 1016

7 TAYLOR STEPHANIE BLANCHARD,

B

Defenoant. )

‘—I— •
cO°

9

PROBATION REVOCATION DISPOSITION

10

May 8, 2017

Monday

11

12

PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD BEFORE THE HONORABLE MARVIN TYLER

JUDGE IN AND FOR THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

13

COUNTY OF SUBLETTE, STATE OF WYOMING

14
APPEARANCES 15

16

17

CLAYTON KAINER, Subiette County and Prosecuting Attorney,

18

P.O. Box 1010, Pinedale, Wyoming, appearing on behalf of

the State of Wyoming.

19

20

21

22 JOHN LaBUDA, Public Defender’s Office, P.O. Box 1240,
Pinedale, Wyoming, appearing on behalf of the Defendant. 23

24

25 WHEREUPON, the following proceedings were had:

EXHIBIT
I

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 1 Filed 07/18/17 Page 13 of 40
2

1

PRCCEEDINGS

2

COURT: Good morning. Court is in session on May 8,

20:32:06

3 2017. My name is Mary Tyler, I’m a district court judge

10:32:11

4 conducting this hearing in the matter of the State of Wyoming 10:32:11

5 versus Taylor Stephanie Blanchard. This is Case Number

10:32:13

6 2016—1016.

10:32:16

7

I’ll note for the Record the presence of counsel for the 30:32:21

8 State, counsel for the Defendant, and the Defendant is

10:32:23

9 present in court.

10:32:26

10

Are you under the influer.ce of any drugs, alcohol Ot

10:32:2’

11 medications today affecting your ability to understand what 10:32:29

12 we’re doing in court?

10:32:31

13

DEFENDANT: No, your Honor.

10:32:32

14

COURT: Do you have any sort of a mental illness, mental 10:32:33

15 defect, brain damage, intellectual disability, learning

10:32:37

16 disability, physical ailment or physical injury that would

10:32:40

17 prevent you from understanding what’s happening in court?

10:32:43

18

DEFENDANT: No.

10:32:45

19

COURT: Are you satisfied with your attorney’s

10:32:40

20 representation of you?

10:32:45

21

DEFENDANT: Yes.

l0:32:4

22

COURT: And you’ve admitted to violatir.g your probation, 10:22:50

23 as a result you have a right to be represented by an attorney 10:32:55

24 and the right to appeai any errors of law committed by the 25 Court. Do you have any questions about those rights?

10:32:56 10:33:02

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 1 Filed 07/18/17 Page 14 of 40
3

1

DEFENDANT: No, your Honor.

10:33:04

2

CoURT: If at any time during this hearing you have a

13:33:04

3 question about your rights or how they apply to what we’re

10:33:07

4 discussing, would you get my attention so that they may be

10:33:10

5 eKplained to you?

10:33:12

6

DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

10:33:13

7

COURT: We’re here for a disposition hearing, I believe, 10:33:15

8 since the Court accepted the Defendant’s admission about

10:33:19

9 violating terms and conditions of probation. The hearing at 10:33:22

1D which the Defendant admitted tc violating probation occurred 10:33:40

11 on April 11th and the Order Upon Initial Probation Revocation 10:32:44

12 Hearing was filed or. April 13th. Am I correct, ‘lr. Kainer? IC:33:43

13

MR. rc;INER: Your Honor, I just looked at that order, it 10:34:65

14 doesn’t state that the factual basis was provided and that

10:34:16

15 the Court had found a material, willful violation of

10:34:16

16 conditions, but looking through my notes that is what we did 10:34:20

17 at that hearing, there was a factual basis provided and the 10:34:25

18 Court did find a material and willful violation of conditions 10:34:20

19 and then a disposition hearing was set for a later time. I 10:34:33

20 don’t think there was any discussion, based cn my notes, as 10:34:36

21 to whether or not at that time the Defendant’s probatior. was 10:34:39

22 revoked.

10:34:43

23

MR. LaBUDA: Agreed.

10:34:45

24

COURT: Okay. Thank you. My nctes reflect that the

10:34:51

25 court accepted the Defendant ‘a admission, had the Defendant 10:34:55

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 1 Filed 07/18/17 Page 15 of 40
4

1 under oath describe what occurred about violating a term of 10:33:01
2 probation and the admission was accepted by the Court, but I 10:35:06

3 don’t think I adjudicated anything at that point and deferred 30:35:12

4 disposition until there was an opportunity for the Defendant 10:35:17

5 and counsel to investigate some options. That’s what my

10:35:20

6 notes reflect. Mr. Kainer, does the State have a

10:35:27

7 recommendation on a disposition?

10:35:36

B

MR. KAINER: Yes, your Honor. May it please the Court, 10:35:39

9 Counsel.

10:35:42

10

MR. LaBUDA: Counsel.

10:35:42

11

MR. KAINER: Your Honor, the State in this matter would 10:35:43

12 ask that the Defendant’s probation be revoked and that the

10:35:45

13 suspended portion of the sentence be entered, that the

10:35:40

14 Defendant receive credit for a total of 315 days which would 10:35:52

15 include the original 267 days that was on the judgment and

10:35:57

16 sentence. The State is asking for this based upon the

10:36:02

17 history of this case. Looking through the file, we have a

10:36:07

15 multitude of violations of the bond orders set by this Court, 10:36:14

19 set by the circuit court, we have the Defendant being given 10:36:20

20 the opportunity of probation with a pretty hefty sentence

10:36:24

21 hanging over her head and her failure in treatment and the

10:36:30

22 State is just concerned that there would be no probation

10:36:36

23 conditions which this Court could set forth which would

10:36:42

24 result in the Defendant’s successful completion of probation. 10:36:49

25

COURT: Thank you. r. LaBuda, do you want to address 10:36:59

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 1 Filed 07/18/17 Page 16 of 40
5

1 the Court on a disposition?

10:37:01

2

MR. LaBUDA: Yes, sir. Thank you. May it please the

10:37:03

3 Court.

10:37:06

4

COURT: Counsel.

:0:37:06

5

MR. LaBUDA: Counsel.

10:37:09

6

MR. KAINER: Counsel.

10:37:08

7

MR. LaBUDA: Your Honor, just one side issue before I

10:37:09

5 make my argument. We would ask the Court to consider credit 10:37:14

9 for tine at the treatment center in Rock Springs from October 10:37:18

10 10th to March 20th. Mr. Kainer’s argument actually is pretty 10:37:23

11 good because my client, Taylor Blanchard, female, went to the 10:37:31

12 treatment center in Rock Springs, didn’t do well, we don’t

10:37:42

13 have any ISP here in Sublette County and so Mr. Kainer is

10:37:45

14 saying I don’t think she would do good on probation, that she 10:37:49

15 needs some structure, that she needs some discipline, and so 10:37:53

16 what we would ask for —— because I think he is correct and I 10:37:58

17 think at her age I don’t think —— and her criminal record I 10:38:02

18 don’t think sitting her in a prison for six to 10 years is

10:38:11

19 appropriate. What we would ask for, and probably the first 10:38:14

20 time this Court has heard this, we would ask for and desire a 10:30:18

21 recommendation for the Youthful Offender Program or Boot

10:30:24

22 Camp. I realize my client is female. Normally, from what we 10:38:29

23 have probably all seen, boys get to go to Boot Camp, boys

10:30:34

24 that don’t have -— haven’t been doing wall on probation, that 10:38:39

25 need sor.e structure, have five to 10, six to 10, and we ask 10:39:44

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 1 Filed 07/18/17 Page 17 of 40
6

1

for Boot Camp and they go and sometimes that works out well. 10:38:49

2

If you look at the statute cor.cerning the Youthful Offender

10:38:52

3 Program, I think the last tine I looked at it over the

10:38:57

4 weekend it said the word “ho” in it once which is with the

20:39:00

5

gender neutral statute he means he or she. It doesn’t say —— 10:39:06

6 wher. the Court would read off and say, “Taylor, are you under 10:39:22

7

25? Taylor, have you ever been to a federal or state penal

10:39:16

8

institute?” you don’t ask, “Are you male or are you female?” 10:39:19

9 And so in a way if the Court, and I’m trying to say this

10:39:22

10 nicely, if the Court doesn’t give a recorsnendation of

:0:39:25

11 Youthful Offender/Boot Camp then is the Court violating my

10:35:36

12 client’s rights under the equal protection clause and the due 10:39:40

13 process clause of the Wyoming Constitution or the United

10:39:45

14 States Constitution or is it violating the statute when the 10:39:50

15 statute is just —— when combined with the gender neutral

i 0:29:54

16 statute says he. Again, it doesn’t say, “Are you under 25? 20:39:58

17 Are you male?” So I think if we look at the statute first I 10:40:02

18 think it’s applicable, and if one was to say, “Well, I don’t 10,40:04

19 think it’s applicable because only boys go there,” well, I

10:40:05

20 think that’s unconstitutional.

10:40:13

21

COURT: So what if I give a recommendation?

10:40:15

22

MR. LaBUDA: Then as you stated earlier in the Court

10:40:7

23 bearing that we just had prior, you stated that you’re the

10:40:26

24 judicial branch and they’re the executive branch and you

10:4024

25 can’t tell them what to do, you can recommend it, and that’s 10:40:27

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 1 Filed 07/18/17 Page 18 of 40
7

1 all I ask. Thank you.

10:40:30

2

COURT: Thank you. Is there anyone who wants to address 10:40:32

3 the Court on behalf of the Defendant before I give the

10:40:30

4 Defendant an opportunity to do so? Ms. Hixson, go ahead.

10:40:40

S Would you come to the podium, please.

10:40:44

6

MS. HIZSON: Thank you1 your Honor.

10:40:54

7

COURT: Go ahead.

10:40:56

S

MS. HIXSOM: Good morning. I just want to say a few

10:41:00

9 brief things about Taylor’s history just to make sure that

10:41:02

1D the Court is aware of the, you know, events in this person’s 10:4) :05

11 life that have brought her to this point. So this is Taylor 10:41:11

12 Blanchard and she is 23 years old, still very young in my

10:41:16

13 book. I think I met her when she was —— I met her first when 10:41:20

14 she was an older teenager and at that time she had —— I’m not 10:41:27

15 completely clear on the facts, but she had come to Wyoming

10:41:34

16 and was trying to live with her father who she had not had

10:41:37

17 the opportunity to live with for years and she was already

10:41:40

18 having some behavioral problems. And her father is a good

10:41:46

19 man and really loves her, but it was very difficult for him 10:41:49

20 to tolerate just sort of some of the independence she

10:41:66

21 developed, you know, not good independence at that point

12:42:00

22 because she was still pretty young. And I don’t remember how 10:42:05

23 that episode of treatment ended exactly, whether they moved 10:42:08

24 or Taylor just left the area to live somewhere else, I’m not 10:42:11

25 sure, but, you know, unfortunately it was unfinished

10:42:16

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 1 Filed 07/18/17 Page 19 of 40
8

1 business. And, you know, her dad would just often get very 10:42:19

2 —— he was like a very strict guy which she needed on the one 10:42:23

3 hand, but I think there was some lacking in reconnecting of 10:42:29

4 daughter and father at that time. So in the meantime I

10:42:31

S didn’t know what all had happened for Taylor, but I just want 10:42:36

6 to kind of recap her history from childhood as I know it or 10:42:41

7 understand it. She was four years old when she was —— and

10:42:44

8 I’m not exactly sure of the reason, but she was moved from

10:42:53

9 California to Canada where she ended up living with her

10:42:55

10 mother and her father was still in California- And Taylor

10:43:00

11 says that she believes that her father tried many times to

10,43:06

12 see her over that time, but that her mother wouldn’t allow

10:43:11

13 it. Her mother is a severe drug addict and has been for a

13:43:15

14 long time. When Taylor was around 12 she said to me that she 1c:43:2G

15 started to go out and help her mother get drugs and in

10:43:29

16 explaining to me why she would do this she said, “I loved my 10:43:36

17 mother so I had to do it for her” and it sort of left me to 10:43:39

18 kind of guess at it because we didn’t have a lot of time to 10:43:44

19 talk about that, you know, but I imagine that, again, here is 10:43:47

20 a child who is Drobably feeling like the love of her parents 10:43:50

21 is very conditional and this is all she had and she is off in 10:43:57

22 a foreian country away from, you know, the rest of her family 10:44:01

23 and that’s all she had to count on. I can also imagine maybe 10:44:05

24 a child of 12 thInking, you know, my mother is going to get 10:44:10

25

arrested and soze day she is just going to go out to get

10:44,14

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 1 Filed 07/18/17 Page 20 of 40
9

I drugs and I’m never going to see her again so she decided

10:44,20

2 somehow it was safer for her to do that. In addition at some 10:44:22

3 point while this was going on —— and again I wasn’t

10:44:26

4 completely clear, but some man somewhere along the way, I

10:44:29

S don’t know if it was someone she was going to get the drugs 10:44:34

6 from, sexually abused her and I think it was something that 10:44:35

7 she didn’t really tell anyone about at that tine. And, you 10:44:38

8 know, I don’t know exactly what age it was that she returned 10:44:43

9 to the United States, but that was at least eight to 10 years 10:44:48

10 of being kept away from her father and then she returned here 10:44:55

11 and was with her father for that time that I know of.

iO:44:59

12 somewhere in there she, you know, struck out on her own, I

10:45:04

13 guess I would say, and took up with lots of different older 10:45:08

14 people and some of them, as I think the prosecutor and your 10:45:12

15 Honor know, were men and it looks to me that Taylor has this 10:45:17

16 recent pattern of just not being able to keep herself from

10:45:27

17 contacting one or more of these males that she sort of felt 13:45:30

18 like, you know, they took her under their wing. She doesn’t 10:45:34

19 deny for a minute being involved with drugs and with bringing 10:45:38

20 drugs into the county, you know, she is not trying to tell us 10:45:42

21 she is an angel. I think, you knew, what I assess her at is 10:45:45

22 a very lost child with probably a bigger man addiction than 10:45:51

23 she has drug addiction and when I looked at —— and again I

10:45:56

24 understand I nay not be fully aware of everything, but it

10:46:01

25 looks like the violations and contempts that she has

10:46:04

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 1 Filed 07/18/17 Page 21 of 40
10

1 committed during this time were mostly about making contact 10:46:08

2 with one or more of these men in her life and I —— my sense 10:46:12

3 or my understanding is that during this treatment program,

10:46:19

4

which she entered in October and was removed from in March,

:0:46:21

S that she was doing well, that she had made it through phase 10:46:26

6 three of a four phase program. She has discussed with me a 10:46:31

7 lot of different types of work that she did down there and

10:46:35

8

I’m familiar with the type of work they assign and how they 10:46:38

9 run the program and I think it’s a vory good program, but I 10:46:42

10 do think that unfortunately —— I’m not sure how much

10:46:45

11 treatment they provide for the very specific problem that

10:46:50

12 Taylor has of just sort of not being able to feel separated 10:46:55

13 from these sort of significant others in her life and so

1C:46:59

14 somewhere towards the end of that program she passed a note 10:47:06

15 to a male. And again, I may have a limited understanding of 10:47:09

16 all the things she did wrong down there, thats my

10:47:12

17 understanding of it, and was therefore removed from the

10:47:14

18 program. I, I hope and wish there is some sort of Boot Camp 10:47:19

19 that would be available to a 23—year—old female because, you 10:47:26

20 know, that would be great for her to be able to go somewhere 10:47:29

21 in a highly disciplined and structured environment. I would 10:47:32

22 hope then after that she would still return and continue with 10:47:36

23 the type of treatment that we can provide her here in

10:47:41

24 Sublette County because I’m not familiar with what type of

10:47:46

25 treatment she might get in a Boot Camp program or some

13:47:e

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 1 Filed 07/18/17 Page 22 of 40
11

1 equivalent if it was round. I, I believe that Taylor could 10,47:52

2 succeed, I mean she could be asked to finish a residential

30:47:58

3 program. I don’t know that the one in Rock Springs would

10:48:02

4 take her back, they have strict rules about those things. I 10:48:04

5 think she could successfully complete the treatment court

10:48:10

6 program here in Sublette County. We understand this other

13:48:13

7 sort of mental health behavioral problem that she has and we 10:48:16

8 are ready, willing and able and frequently treat people for 10:48:20

9 more than just substance abuse at the same time because

10:48:27

10 that’s a typical problem for people and this emotional

10:49:33

11 abandonment type of problem is extremely common and I’m more 10:48:33

12 than qualified te help somebody with that. So I guess, your 10:40:28

13 Honor, I just want to ask that this very young person be

10:48:42

14 given a chance. And I understand the probation she was

10:48:51

15 offered previously were chances, she wasn’t ready for them I 10:48:53

16 guess is what I would say, and I see Taylor Bianchard who

:0:49:02

17 appears to be tore understanding of what that difficulty is 10:49:08

18 and more ready and willing to address that. So I thank you 10:49:12

19 for listening to me this morning.

10:49:10

20

COURT: Thank you. Is there anyone else who wants to

10:49:21

21 address the Court? Good morning.

10:49:25

22

MS. ANDERSON: Good morning. I’m the Reverend Jarni

10:49:28

23 Anderson, I’ve been visiting with Taylor regularly at both

10:42:37

24 times she has been a resident inmate at the jail. I agree

10:49:42

25 with the assessment by counselor Sarah HixsOn and I am very 10:49:46

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 1 Filed 07/18/17 Page 23 of 40
12

1 heartened to hear that Counselor LaBuda has proposed a Boot 10:49:56

2 Camp because I stand here appalled to think that a 23 year

10:50:01

3 old would be benefitted by six to 10 years in a penitentiary 10:50:07

4 and t am heartbroken that most of our penal codes are

io,so:io

5 punitive rather than rehabilitative, so if there is any

10:50:16

6 rehabilitation that can be offered to Taylor I appeal to the 10:50:21

7 judge to consider it and I am really happy to hear a

10:50:24

B recommendation that maybe we push the envelope a little bit 10:50:29

9 for finding solutions for young women that have had a really 10:50:32

10 hard time to this point in her life. And I too see changes 10:50:30

11 in Taylor from visiting her previous to her probation

10:50:42

12 sentence in Rock Springs to the month and a half I’ve been

10:50:46

13 visiting her now and I do think she is aware that the issue 10:50:48

14 is not drugs, its a lot of emotional issues, and I’m filled 10:50:52

15 with hope for her but not serving time in a penitentiary.

10:50:58

16 Thank you.

10:51:05

17

COURT: Thank you. Anyone else want to address the

10:51:06

18 Court? Taylor, I want to tell you that I’ve reviewed

10:51:13

19 everything from basically the start of the filing of the

10:51:24

20 charges in January of 2016, every document, every pleading, 10:51:30

21 everything that’s in the court files up through today. This 10:51:34

22 includes a letter that is dated April 11, 2017, that you

10:51:39

23 wrote to my attention, I did review that. I’m trying to see 10:51:45

24 the date- April 23rd. I guess it takes a while for the

10:51:55

25 mail. I’ve had you in court a number of times as you know. 10:52:05

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 1 Filed 07/18/17 Page 24 of 40
13

1 I think somewhere along the way I discussed with you the lack 10:52:12

2 of options, because of things that you did or didn’t do you 10:52:21

3 were taking away options that I had, but we landed on this

10:52:27

4 probation term that principally was aimed at providing you

10:52:33

5 with getting treatment to try and get a hold on issues

10:52:41

6 involving substances and whatever else you could get some

10:52:47

7 benefit from in a rather clo5ed environment, in other words, 10:52:52

8 it was an in—patient treatment program in a fairly highly—

10:53:02

9 structured environment, I think, and I believed that you

10:53:06

10 would have benefitted ircnensely upon being successful in

10:53:13

11 completing that program. The probation term required you to 10:53:21

12 be successful; you weren’t successful. It seems like the

10:53:26

13 reason for your termination was not necessarily related to

10:53:29

14 the reasons that you were admitted into that treatment

10:53:36

15 program for directly, but I also believe I told you I’m not 10:53:41

16 going to have a mini trial on what happened in treatment if 10:53:SC

17 you were not successful, I only cared about whether you were 10:53:53

18 successful or whether you were unsuccessful although I do

10:53:56

19 understand the description of the events that led to the

10:53:59

20 termination. My understanding of the TC prcgram in Rock

10:54:07

21 Springs it’s a very difficult, structured program, but that 10:54:14

22 was, frankly, ore of the very reascr,s that it was selected as 10:54:11

23 cart of somethir.g we expected you to be able to accomplish. 10:54:22

24

Mr. taauda and Mr. Kainer have basically outlined the

i0:S429

25 problem that I face in this case and I just want to tell you 13:54:35

I

—

I

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 1 Filed 07/18/17 Page 25 of 40
14

1 about that. I imposed an imprisonment sentence of six to 10 10:54:39

2 years with the Department of Corrections less 267 days off

10:54:44

3 the maximum and r.inimum term of that imprisonment sentence on 10:54:48

4 October 20th of last year. I did act require payment of a

10:54:53

5 fine and I did not suspend any sort of a fine because the

10:55:00

6 imprisonment sentence pretty much spoke for itself. In

10:55:08

7 placing you on probation we were in a situation where that or 10:55:13

B prison were the only two options available to you and to many 10:55:20

9 people in Sublette County especially if they’re female. We 10:55:26

10 have no intensive supervised probation program, in other

10:55:31

11 words, there’s more supervisionand more monitoring and less 10:55:39

12 freedom to those that may be given intensive supervised

10:55:45

13 probation through the Department of Corrections Probation and 10:55:53

14 Parole Office, we do not have that available in Sublette

11:55:52

15 County. Teton County does, Uinta County does, Sweetwater

10:55:54

16 County does, Fremont County does, we don’t. To my knowledge 10:56:00

17 there are no ACC programs or halfway houses that accept women 10:56,06

18 in Wyoming, but there are three for men. In my understanding 10:56:15

19 the Department of Corrections has no Boot Camp or Youthful

10:56:21

20 Offender Program for women, but there is a Youthful Offender 10:56:26

21 or Boot Canp urocram for men through the Department of

10:56:21

22 Corrections in New Castle. As Nr. LaBuda somewhat explained, 10:56:34

23 I am in the judicial branch of government, the Department of 10:56:42

24 corrections is in the executive branch of government, one

10:56:45

25 branch of government cannot tell the other branch what to do 10:56:51

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 1 Filed 07/18/17 Page 26 of 40
15

1 or not do, I can only give recommendations, it’s up to the

10:56:54

2 other branch of government to act or reject those

10:56:59

3 recommendations as they will. They’re in charge of operating 10:57:02

4 their own branch, I can’t do anything about that. So all I 10:57:06

5 can do is give recorrsnendatons, that involves whether it’s

13:57:10

6 Youthful Offender Program with the defendant, whether it’s an 10:57:16

7 Acc placement, whether it’s treatment programs that are

10:57:20

8 available to the Department of Corrections. I can’t tell

10:57:24

9 them to admit anyone, I can only recommend that they do so, 10:57:27

10 and I can only recommend to the defendant that the defendant 10:57:30

11 take advantage of any opportunities that the Department of

10:57:34

12 corrections gives. So those are my options, Ms. Blanchard, 10:57:30

13 I’m left with the options of putting you back on probation

10:57:49

14 with no ISP, no other way to devote particular supervision

10:57:56

15 and monitoring for things that may be beneficial to OU

10:58:34

16 overall, or to consider reimposing the imprisonment sentence 10:58:38

17 that was suspended that placed you on probation. And Hr.

10:58:15

18 Lasuda has asked me to consider giving a Boot Camp or

10:58:21

19 Youthful Offender ?rograc recommendation even though my

10:58:25

20 belief is it cannot be acted on by the Department of

10:58:30

21 Corrections because they don’t offer such a program to women, 10:58:33

22 so that’s where I’m left. I’ve had many times considered if 10:58:37

23 there are any other options that would be available I’d sure 10:58:53

24 like to have those options with any defendant that appears in 10:50:56

25 my court, but with you taking away options by your conduct

10:59:01

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 1 Filed 07/18/17 Page 27 of 40
16

1 and with so few options being available we’re just down to

10:59:08

2 one or two. I wanted to tell you that, I think I’ve already 10:59:17

3 told you that in tho past, but I wanted to tell you that to 10:59:21

4 make sure you understand where things sit particularly in

10:59:24

5 light of the recommendation by your attorney as to a

10:59:27

6 disposition. You would have a chance to address the Court, 10:59:30

7 you can say anything you want to tell me that you think I

10:59:34

S should do or consider, you don’t have to say anything if you 10:59:37

9 don’t want to, it’s entirely up to you. If you have anything 10:59:41

10 you can just remain seated there and speak into the

10:59:44

11 microphone so that you can talk loud enough that I can hear 10:59:46

12 you. Do you have anything?

10:59:52

13

DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. If there’s no option for 10:59:53

14 the Boot Camp and I don’t want to continue this any further, 10:59:55

15 if that’s what the answer is going to be for the imprisonment 11:00:00

16 then I really have no choice for that if that’s your final

11:00:03

17 option. I’m not asking or pleading for another chance, I’m 11:00:08

18 just asking you to understand my past and just —— but I do

11:00:13

19 see that prison is the easy way out because I get to sleep, 11:00:22

20 like I wake up and I can go back to sleep, I can pretty much 11:00:25

21 lay down and do whatever I want all day, but the probation is 11:00:30

22 where I had to work and work hard for my life. I made

11:00:32

23 genuine changes within myself and my attitude and criminal

11:00:41

24 activities. I didn’t push myself far enough like I should

11:00:45

25 have. It’s just, like I said, I’m not pleading or asking for 11:00:50

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 1 Filed 07/18/17 Page 28 of 40
17

1 another chance, I’m just asking for you to understand my

11:00:56

2 past.

11:00:59

3

COURT: All right. Thank you. I find that because the 11:01:09

4 Defendant violated a tern of probation, which was a material 11:01:12

5 term of probation requiring that she successfully complete a 11:01:17

6 treatment program consistent with the ASI evaluation

11:01:21

7 recommendation, the Defendants probation should be revoked. 11:01:26

S This is for a material breach of the terms of the probation, 11:01:32

9 it does not involve the mere payment or nonpayment of money. 11:01:36

10 This is one of the main reasons that the Court considered

11:01:40

11 giving the Defendant probation in the first place which is a 11:01:43

12 privilege, not a right, as opposed to imposing an

11:01:49

13 imprisonment sentence. I’ve explained on the Record the lack 11:01:51

14 of options that the Court had at the time of original

11:01:55

15 sentencing and the lack of options particularly the Court has 11:31:59

16 now. There really is no other consideration for the Court to 11:02:04

17 have at this point other than to impose the imprisonment

11:02:11

18 sentence that was suspended that placed the Defendant on

11:02:17

19 probation on this felony charge of Conspiracy to Commit a

11:02:20

20 controlled Substance Offense, that was an imprisonment

11:02:23

21 sentence of not more than 10 years not less than six years

11:02:27

22 with the Department of Corrections with originally 267 days 11:02:30

23 off the maximum and minimum term of that imprisonment

11:02:34

24 sentence. The State has notified the Court that counting the 11:02:39

25 time that the Defendant has been in custody would be 315

11:02:44

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 1 Filed 07/18/17 Page 29 of 40
18

1 days, in other words, 267 original days plus the additional 11:02:49

2 time that the Defendant has been in custody on the probation 11:02:54

3 revocation matter is 315 days. Mr. LaBuda asked the Court to 11:02:57

4 give consideration to credit the Defendant with the time that 11:03:02

S she was in the TC program. If I calculated that would be 161 11:03:07

6 days. Does that sound correct? Taylor, does that sound

11:03:15

7 right? I have from October 21st to March 20th. My math

11:03:21

S skills are not——

11:03:27

g

MR. LaBUDA: No, I think that is correct.

11:03:29

10

COURT: I’ll give the Defendant 476 days credit off the 11:03:33

11 maximum and mininum term of the imprisonment sentence.

11,03:37

12 Taylor, you’re age 23?

13:03:42

13

DEFENDANT: (Nods head.)

11:03:44

COURT: Yes?

11:33:44

15

DEFENDANT: Yes, yes, your Honor.

11:03:45

16

COURT: You’ve never been to prison, state or federal

11:03:46

17 prison for anything before?

11:03:50

18

DEFENDANT: No, your Honor.

11:03:51

19

CURT: I find that you qualify for the Youthful

11:03:52

20 Offender Program, the Boot Camp program. I give the

11:03:58

21 Department of Corrections my recommendation you be admitted 11:03:58

22 to a Boot Camp or Youthful Offender Program. Again, can’t 11:04:01

23 tell them what to do, I just give my recommendation. I also 11:04:07

24 give the Department of Corrections my recor.mendation that the 11,34:10 25 Defendant be admitted to any treatment programs that might be 11:04:13

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 1 Filed 07/18/17 Page 30 of 40
19

1 available to assist her within the Departmcnt of Corrections. 11:04:16

2 I find that she is still in need of substance abuse treatment 11:04:21

3 inasmuch as she was not successful in completing the TC

11:04:26

4 program in Reck Springs. Any original costs, fees,

11:04:31

5 assessments and all that sort are thing that were originally 11:04:39

6 imposed the Defendant is still required to pay those. Mr.

11:04:41

7 LaBuda, what is the Public Defender reimbursement?

11:04:45

S

MR. LaBUDA: $750.

11:04:47

9

COURT: I find that the reimbursement amount is

11:04:49

10 appropriate; the Defendant is not going to be able to pay

11:04:52

11 that in light of this disposition. Any bail or bond that has 11:04:54

12 been posted by or on behalf of the Defendant the obligor is 11:05:09

13 exonerated and the clerk of court shall forthwith release any 11:05:11

14 bail or bond to the obligor. I’ll talk to you about your

11:05:15

15 rights on appeal and release of your attorney in a moment,

11:05:24

16 Ms. Blanchard, but let me see if there’s anything else I need 11:05:29

17 to address in the way of findings, conclusions or other

11:05:31

18 matters before we go there. Anything for the State, Mr.

11:05:34

19 Kainer?

11:05:40

20

MR. KAINER: No, your Honor.

11:05:40

21

COURT: Anything for the Defendant, Mr. LaBuda?

11:05:46

22

MR. LaBUDA: No, sir. Thank you.

11:05:46

23

COURT: I want to tell you about your rights of appeal. 11:05:50

24 Mr. Kaincr, would your office prepare a disposition order?

11:05:53

25

MR. KAINER: We will, your Honor.

11:05:56

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 1 Filed 07/18/17 Page 31 of 40
20

1

COURT: His office is going to prepare a disposition

11:00:58

2 order which is a written document that summarizes what

11:06:01

3 happened at this hearing. That will be given to Mr. LaBuda 11:06:05

4 for his approval, he will eventually get it to roe, I’ll sign 11:06:07

5 that order and it will be given to the clerk of the district 11:06:11

€ court. She’ll put a file stamp on the first page of that

11:06:14

7 order, that file stamp will have a date and it’s an important 11:06:17

8 thing if you want to appeal your probation revocation, your 11:06:23

9 disposition or both or any errors of law committed by the

11:06:26

10 Court in handling your case. You would have 30 days from the 1::C6:31

11 date that’s on that order to file a notice of appeal in

11:06:36

12 writing with the clerk of the district court. You must

11:06:38

13 otherwise comply with the Wyoming Rules of Appellate

11:06:42

14 Procedure. Those require that you also do one of two things, 11:06:44

15 you either pay the filing fee for the appeal or to request

11:06:50

16 that you be allowed to appeal at no cost to you because you 11:06:57

17 cannot afford to pay the costs. If you make the request to 11:07:00

18 have your appeal processed at no cost to you you must submit 11:07:04

19 a current financial affidavit with your notice of appeal and 11:07:08

20 your written request to have your appeal processed for free. 11:07:12

21 I’ll lock that over, if I find you qualify you would be given 11:07:17

22 what’s called in forma pauperis status, that will allow you 11:07:20

23 to appeal at no cost to you, it would also allow you to have 11:07:24

24 an attorney appointed to represent you on the appcal at no

11:07:27

25 cost to you. You can ask the clerk of district court to file 11:07:30

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 1 Filed 07/18/17 Page 32 of 40
21

1 the notice of appeal for you, instead of you doing it you can 11:07:35

2 ask the clerk to do it. You should make that request to the 11:37:38

3 clerk in writing and you should make that request very early 11:07:41

4 because the clerk has the same 30 days that you do. If it’s 11:07:45

5 in writing you can document when you made the request in

11:07:43

E showing that it s early. If you or the clerk are late in

:1:07:53

7 filing the notice of appeal it nay cause problems on the

11:07:56

S appeal, the Supreme Court may not hear it, they may have some 11:07:59

9 trouble processing the appeal, it’s just something you don’t 11:08:06

10 want to have to go through so it’s important to make sure

11:08:08

11 that your notice of appeal, whether you do it or the clerk

11:08:12

12 does it, is made within that 30 days. The clerk —— if you

11:08:17

13 ask the clerk to make the notice of appeal for you the clerk 11:08:20

14 cannot pay the filing fee or request the in forum pauperis

11:00:23

15 status for you, you have to do those things yourself, one of 11:06:26

16 those two things, okay?

11:06:31

17

DEFENDANT: Okay.

11:08:33

18

COURT: Do you have ar.y questions about your appeal

11:08:32

19 rights?

11:06:26

20

DEFENDANT: No, your Honor.

11:08:36

21

COURT: On the earlier of and automatically the 30 days 11:08:36

22 passing for you to file a notice of appeal or you actually

11:08:44

23 filing a notice of appeal within that 30 days, Mr. LaBuda and 11:08:48

24 the Public Defender program would be relieved from further

11:08:53

25 responsibility of representing you in this case, it’s an
I

11:09:56
I

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 1 Filed 07/18/17 Page 33 of 40
22

1 automatic thing. Do you have any questions about that?

11:00:59

2

DEFENDANT: No, your Honor.

11:09:01

3

COURT: Mr. LaBuda, any additional advisements I need to 11:09:02

4 give to the Defendant?

11:09:05

S

MR. LaBUDA: No, sir.

11:09:06

6

CoURT: Anything else before we adjourn?

11:09:06

7

MR. KAINER: Nothing from the State, your Honor.

11:09:09

B

COURT: Anything for the Defendant?

11:09:11

9

MR. LaBUDA: No, sir.

11:09:16

10

COURT: Taylor, I wish you success. You might want to 11:09:16

11 talk to Mr. LaBida abcut some other option that might be

11:09:17

12 available to you after today. I wish there were viable

11:01:21

13 options that I had for you, other people who are similarly

11:09:27

14 situated, but unfortunately that’s where we are in the State 11:09:35

15 of Wyoming today. You’ll be remanded to the custody of the 11:09:39

16 Sublette County Sheriff’s Office until your custody is taken 11:09:43

17 by the Wyoming Department of Correctior.s. This matter is

16 adjourned.

19

(The hearing was concluded.)

20

11:09:46 11:09:49

21

22

23

24 25

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 1 Filed 07/18/17 Page 34 of 40
23

1

CERTIFICATE OF THE REPORTER

2 STATE OF WYOMING
3
COUNTY OF SUSLETTE 4

) ss

5

:, JEANNIE GEBES, RPR, official court reoorter and

6 Notary Public, hereby certify that I was authorized to and

7 did record in stenotype the foregoing pages, numbered 1—23,

B inclusive.

9

I further certify that I am not an agent, attorney

10 or counsel for any of the parties hereto, nor am I interested

11 in the outcome thereof.

12

Dated this 13th day of July 2017.

13

14

15

ES, RPR

16

icial Court Reporter

17

My Comission Expires:

18

4

smc o’

19

‘““‘

20

21

22

23

24 25

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 1 Filed 07/18/17 Page 35 of 40

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SUBLETrE, STATE OF WYOMING
THE STATE OF WYOMING, Plaintiff,

-vs-

Criminal No. 1016

TAYWR STEPHANIE BLANCHARD, Defendant.

ORDER UPON PROBATION REVOCATION DISPOSITION HEARING

DATE OF HEARING: JUDGE: COURT REPORTER: PROSECUTOR: DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY:

May 8, 2017 Marvin L Tyler Jeannie Gebes Clayton Kainer John P. LaBuda

ALED
-
OA.Z3No BY

COUNT I

OFFENSE: STATUTE:

Conspiracy to Commit Controlled Substance Offense
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-303(a), § 35-7-1042, § 35-7-1031(a)(i)

CLASS;

FELONY

DATE OF OFFENSE: PLEA/ACTION:

December, 2014 - March, 2015 GUILTY

DATE OF SENTENCING HEARING: October 4, 2016

ADJUDICATION OF PROBATION REVOCATION: ADMISSION BY DEFENDANT TO WIU.FUL

PROBATION VIOlATION — PROBATION

REVOKED, SENTENCE IMPOSED, BOOT

CAMP RECOMMENDATION

PROBATION REVOCATION DISPOSITION:

IMPRISONMENT:

SIX (6) YEARS TO TEN (10) YEARS AT Wyoming Department

of Corrections, NOT SUSPENDED, Recommendation for

treatment as a Youthful Offender pursuant to W.S. §7-131003

CREDIT FOR PRESENTENCE

CONFINEMENT;

476 DAYS OFF MINIMUM-MAXIMUM TERM OF

IMPRISONMENT

PUBLIC DEFENDER:

$750.00— Not Ordered to Pay

THIS MATTER came before the Court for a Disposition Hearing upon the State’s Verified Petition for Revocation of Probation on the above date. The hearing was conducted in open Court in accordance with Rule 39 of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure, and in accordance with Wyoming law.
The Court addressed the Defendant in open court and finds that: Defendant was not under the Influence of any drug, alcohol, or medication affecting Defendant’s ability to understand and meaningfully participate in the proceeding; Defendant had no mental defect, brain damage, intellectual disability, learning disability, physical injury or physical ailment which might affect Defendant’s ability to understand the proceeding.
The Court determined that the Defendant was represented with counsel with whom Defendant had conferred prior to the disposition hearing, and the Defendant expressed that Defendant was satisfied with Defendant’s counsel’s representation. The Court finds that Defendant’s attorney was competent and effectively assisted Defendant throughout the
disposition hearing.

Order Upon Probation novocotian Ospasitlon Hearing Page 1

EXHIBIT

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 1 Filed 07/18/17 Page 36 of 40
Defendant acknowledged that Defendant had entered an “ADMISSION” to the probation revocation allegations as set forth in the State’s Verified Petition for Revocation of Probation and such “ADMISSION” was made voluntarily, willingly, knowingly, under no Improper inducement, threat, farce or coercion, after Defendant considered Defendant’s constitutional rights and after Defendant understood that such rights would be waived by entering such a plea to the allegations, this was, nonetheless, what Defendant wished to do in answer to the allegations; a sufficient factual basis exists supporting the “ADMISSION” entered by Defendant, the “ADMISSION” entered by Defendant was accepted by the Court; and, the Defendant acknowledged that there had been no unnecessary delay in the imposition of a disposition upon Defendant.
The Court afforded the attorney for the State the opportunity to present any testimony, arguments and recommendations. The Court afforded the attorney for the Defendant to present any testimony, arguments, recommendations and to speak on behalf of the Defendant. The Court then addressed the Defendant personally and Defendant was given the opportunity to present information in mitigation of the disposition.
The Court then found that Defendant had willfully violated the terms of Defendant’s probation. The Court found that the conditions of probation which were willfully violated by Defendant were material violations and did not involve the payment of money. The Court then enumerated all factors and considerations in setting the disposition.
BASED UPON THE FOREGOING, and the Court being duly advised in the premises, and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant willfully violated the terms and conditions of Defendant’s probation as set forth in the State’s Verified Petition for Revocation of Probation;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant’s probation be, and it is hereby, REVOKED.
Re-imposing probation, as well as other options available the Court in setting the disposition in the case were considered by the Court and, under the facts and circumstances, the Court finds that RE-INSTATING PROBATION ISINAPPROPRIATE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT DEFENDANT IS HEREBY, SENTENCED AS FOLLOWS:
Imprisonment/Jail Defendant shall be imprisoned to no less than six (6) years, nor more than ten (10) years in the custody and control of the Wyoming Department of Corrections to be incarcerated in a State penal institution or other facility under contract or agreement with the Wyoming Department of Corrections; Defendant is given credit for 476 days off of the minimum and maximum imprisonment sentence herein for presentence confinement; This imprisonment sentence is NOTsuspended; The Court finds that Defendant meets the requirements of W.S. §7-13-1003 and the Court recommends that Defendant shall be treated as a Youthful Offender under W.S. §7-131003;
Substance Abuse Treatment The Court deems Defendant to be in need of substance abuse treatment and the Defendant is a qualified offender under the Addicted Offender Accountability Act. The Court gives its recommendation that Defendant be admitted into the Intensive Treatment Unit or any other beneficial programs offered by the Department of Corrections.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Public Defender’s Office and John P. LaBuda, Assistant Public Defender, be, and they are hereby, relieved from further responsibility and the representation of the Defendant in the above-captioned matter after the appropriate time has passed to file a Notice of Appeal; and,
IT IS FURThER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that, pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 46(g), if bail has been posted in this matter, the obligor is hereby exonerated and the Clerk of Court shall forthwith release said bail to the obligor.
Order Upon Probotion Revocation Disposition Hearing Page2 of 3

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 1 Filed 07/18/17 Page 37 of 40

THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that you, TAYLOR STEPHANIE BLANCHARD, are hereby remanded to the custody of the Wyoming Department of Corrections for placement into the appropriate facility commensurate to your sentence and correctional classification.

Pursuant to Rule 32 of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure, Defendant was notified of Defendant’s right to appeal this Order to a higher Court. Defendant was advised that a Notice of Appeal must be filed within thirty (30) days (WRAP Rule 2.01) of entry of this Order; that if Defendant is unable to pay the cost of an appeal, Defendant may apply for the right to have appointed counsel and to proceed without paying filing fees; and that if Defendant so requests, the Clerk of Court shall prepare and serve a Notice of Appeal on Defendant’s behalf.

DATED this

day of May, 2027.

Approved as to Form:

Judge

Attorney for State Attorney for Defendant

Order Upon Probotlon Revocation Olsposltlon Hearing
Page 3 of 3

Case 30fl872025 1:17-5Uc3LvE-TT0Z0CO1U2NT4Y -AS1OWPJ45SY

Document 1

Filed 07/18/17 Page 38 of 40

O&37:58p.m. 35—08—2317

7(8

ThEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED. ADjUDGED AND DECREED, that you, TAYLOR STEPHANIE SLANCHARD, are hereby remanded to the custody of the Wyoming Department of Corrections
for placement into the appropriate facility commensurate to your sentence and correctional
classification.

Pursuant to Rule 32 of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure, Defendant was notified of Defendant’s right to appeal this Order to a higher Court. Defendant was advised that a Notice of Appeal must be flied within thirty (30) days (WRAP Rule 2.01) of entry of this Order; that if Defendant is unable to pay the cost of an appeal, Defendant may apply for the right to have appointed counsel and to proceed wIthout paying filing fees; and that if Defendant so requests, the Clerk of Court shall prepare and serve a Notice of Appeal on Defendant’s behalf.

J......... DATED thIs

day of May, 2017.

Approved asto Form:

—

cZ

ft

0/ Attorney for State

Attorney $fendant

sJtts1Th
Order Upon Pmbatfan Revocation bisposirfan Headng
Page 3 of3
Received Time M&y. 8. 2011 4:49PM Nm. 9450

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 1 Filed 07/18/17 Page 39 of 40

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Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 1 Filed 07/18/17 Page 40 of 40
(I

H

J WYOMING

WDOC Form #321.1

DEPARTMENT OF

-

-- CORRECTIONS

bRETURNED GRIEVANCE

I

NOTIFJCATIGI

ageYoff
LasL Revised: 12/02/16

-

-

RETURNED GRIEVANCE NOTIFICATION

INMATE NAME: Blanchard, Taylor WDOC# 2922

INST1TUTIONY” DATE: 06/30/2017

Your grievance is being returned in accordan.e with WDOC Policy and Procedure #3.100, Inmate Communication and Grievance Procedure for the reason(s) marked below.

U No attempt to resolve at the lowest level (See WDOC P&P #3.100 § IV,D)
C Not submitted within 30 days of the incident (See WDOC P&P #3.100 § IV.H,Iãii)
0 The 30 days starts when from the Lime when you reasonable knew or should have known that the erlevable incident occurred.
o Contains inappropriate language/threats (See WDOC P&P #3.100 § W,D,2,iii) o Incomplete information about incident being grieved (Sec WDOC P&P #3.100 IV,II,I,ii.a)
C Not on approved form (See WDOC forms #321 or 4322)
o Exceeds space authorized (See WDOC P&P #3.100 § JV,H,I,iv)
C Attempts to grieve more than 1 issue/decisionlstaff action (See WOOC P&P #3.100 § IV,E, I ,vi)
C Already submitted grievance on this issue (Sec WOOC P&P #3.100 § IV,El,xii) C May not submit for another person1group (See WDOC P&P #3.100 § FV,E3,ii) C Exceeds limits for 3 a week or 8 a month. (Sec WDOC P&P 113.100 § IV,E,t,x)
Non-grievable issues: (See WOOC P&P #3.100 § IV,E,5) o Adoption or modification of faith group or religious practice. o Classification decisions. o Disciplinary actions.
o Issue is part of pending litigation.
o Failure of staff to respond within timelines.
o Involves non-WDOC agency or outside of WDOC control. o Does not personally affect grievant. o STG affiliation validation. C Appeal submitted prior to submitting grievance (See WDOC form #321) C Appeal submitted prior to initial grievance response 0 Issue must be grieved with WHFAVHCC/WSP/\%’\VC/WMCI___
Notes on Grievance Return
Inmate Blanchard. Your 321 Grievance is being rejected for the following:

1) Classification decisions ar non-grievable.

WDOC Staff Signature:

Printed Name:

Ms Carpenter

Note: The return of the grievance does not extend the 30 day time frame.

WyOMING DEPAIITMEriT OF CORRECYIONS (934 Wyolt Drive. Suiie IOU. Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002
TELEPIIONE (307) 777-7208 FAx (307) 777-7476 ‘WERSITE http://corrections.wy.gov/

 
 Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 43 Filed 10/19/17 Page 1 of 53

JOHN H.ROBINSON WSB # 6-2828
Jamieson & Robinson,LLC 185 West Broadway-Suite 101
P.O. Box 4285
Jackson, Wyoming 83001 (307)733-7703
STEPHEN L.PEVAR(pro hoc vice)
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
765 Asylum Avenue
Hartford, Connecticut 06105
(860)570-9830
Attorneys for PlaintifTs

filed
I'.S. '^!3Tr::CT
L'iSTKICT Ijj-' .vV::,n'j
19 m 9:77
S'iEpha:: ri/
'-'■-lii.'i.d

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING

TAYLOR S. BLANCHARD, individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated,

Civil Action No. 17-CV-I24-S

PlaintifTs,

vs.
ROBERT LAMPERT and RICK CATRON, in their
official capacities,

Defendants.

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
PLAINTIFF Taylor Blanchard, by and through the undersigned counsel, individually and on behalf of other similarly situated individuals, states and alleges the following.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The Wyoming Youthful Offender Act, Wyo.Rev.Stat. § 7-I3-I001 et seq., provides that the Wyoming Department of Corrections ("WDOC") shall establish a youthful offender
Blanchard, et al v. Lamperl, et al. - Complaintfor Declaratory and Injunciive Relief Page 1 of 13

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 43 Filed 10/19/17 Page 2 of 53
program (also known as the "boot camp" program) for all persons incarcerated in any slate penal institution who are serving a sentence of imprisonment for any ofTense other than a felony punishable by death or life imprisonment, who are under the age of twenty-five years old, and who have not previously served a term of incarceration at any stale or federal adult penal institution. The Youthful Offender Act is gender neutral.' The Youthful Offender Act mandates that the participants of the youthful offender program be separated from the general prisoner population, and shall emphasize work and physical activity as a major element of the program.
Id.
On May 8, 2017, the Ninth Judicial District Court, the Hon. Marvin Tyler presiding, sentenced Taylor Blanchard - a female - to a term of incarceration of 6-10 years, with a recommendation that she be given the opportunity to participate in the Wyoming Youthful Offender program. See Ex. I, Transcript of Probation Revocation Hearing; State v. Blanchard Grim. No. 1016, at 18-19; Ex.2,Order Upon Probation Revocation/Disposition Hearing. As the sentencing court noted, Wyoming does not have a boot camp for women - only for men. Ex. 1, at 14. As such, and despite the district court's sentence and recommendation, at the lime this matter was originally filed it appeared that Ms. Blanchard (and all other women similarly situated) would never have the same opportunity as men to learn the skills offered in the program and to be released as early as the boot camp program allows. Subsequent to the filing of the original complaint, the WDOC had Ms. Blanchard transported to Florida for her to participate in a boot camp program there. She was sent there in a van that transported her to Ocala, Florida for the better part of a week. She spent each night in a different county Jail, and was in shackles every day while being transported. She cried herself to sleep each night. No one told her where
'Even though the act does contain the word "he." it is gender neutral pursuant to Wyo.Rev.Stat.§8-1-103.
Blanchard, el a!v. Lamperl. el al.- Complaintfor Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Page 2of13

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 43 Filed 10/19/17 Page 3 of 53
she was going. No man has ever been subjected to such a transport to participate in Wyoming's boot camp program. Additionally,the Florida program appears to be inferior to Wyoming's boot camp program. Thus, Ms. Blanchard is still not getting the same opportunity as Wyoming's male prisoners to learn the skills offered in the Wyoming program. Additionally, a number of women at the Wyoming Women's Center ("WWC") who were eligible to participate in Wyoming's boot camp program remain in custody serving their full prison sentence. All of this violates Ms. Blanchard's, and the other women's, Equal Protection guarantees and must be rectified so women prisoners under the jurisdiction and custody of the WDOC have the same opportunities to participate in Wyoming' boot camp program as similarly situated men.
.nJRISDICTlON AND VENUE
1. This action seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, the court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)and(4).
2. Venue is appropriate in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). 3. Plaintiff Taylor Blanchard is currently serving a sentence of 6-10 years for a felony conviction in Sublctte County, Wyoming. After being transported to WWC in Lusk, Wyoming,she was classified as minimum security and placed in the general population. 4. Plaintiff requested via prison grievance that she be afforded the opportunity to participate in Wyoming's Youthful Offender, or boot camp program, in accordance with her sentencing judge's recommendation because she is qualified under Wyoming's Youthful
Offender Act.
5. Plaintiff was advised that her request was "non-grievable" because it is a "classification decision" and that she had to take up the issue with the "courts."
Blanchard,el al w Lamperi. el al. - Complainifor Declaraiory andInjuncUve Relief Page i ofIS

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 43 Filed 10/19/17 Page 4 of 53
6. Subsequently, on August 16, 2017, WDOC had Plaintiff transported to Florida to participate in a boot camp program there, where she remains today.
CLASS ACTION
7. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all present and future female prisoners under the age of twenty-five and in the custody of the Wyoming Department of Corrections and/or the Wyoming Women's Center who are or will be otherwise eligible to participate in Wyoming's boot camp program, but who have been or will be denied participation due to their gender, or not considered by WDOC due to their gender.
8. Taylor Blanchard proposes to be a class representative for the class described in the preceding paragraph pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 23(a),(b)(1) and (b)(2) for purposes of obtaining declaratory and injunctive relief.
9. This action satisfies all four requirements of Rule 23(a) in that(1)the class is so numerous thatjoinder is impractical;(2)there are questions oflaw and fact common to the class regarding discrimination against each member of the class on the basis of her gender;(3) the claims of Ms. Blanchard are typical of the elaims of the class, to wit; that Defendants are regularly and routinely discriminating against women prisoners in the custody of the WDOC and WWC on the basis of their gender by not permitting them the same opportunity as men to participate in Wyoming's Youthful Offender program; and(4)plaintiffs' counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests ofthe class.
DEFENDANTS
10. Defendant Robert Lampert is a citizen and resident of Wyoming. At all times material to this action, Mr. Lampert has been the Director of the WDOC. As such, he is the agency official ultimately responsible under Wyoming state law for the operation and
Blanchard,et al v. Lampert, el al.- Complaintfor Declaratory andInjunctive Relief Page 4of13

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 43 Filed 10/19/17 Page 5 of 53
administration of the Wyoming Women's Center(WWC)and has a duty and obligation under Wyoming state law as well as the Equal Protection Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, to ensure, among other things, that female prisoners under the jurisdiction of WDOC are not discriminated against on the basis oftheir gender.
11. Defendant Rick Catron is a citizen of Wyoming. At all times material to this action, Mr. Catron has been the Warden of the WWC. As such, he has a duty and obligation under Wyoming state law as well as the Equal Protection Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, to ensure, among other things, that female prisoners at the WWC are not discriminated against on the basis oftheir gender.
12. All acts and omissions of the defendants set forth herein were done under color of
state law and were performed or omitted during the scope of their employment. 13. Both defendants are sued in their official capacities only.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
14. The Wyoming Legislature enacted Wyoming's Youthful Offender Act in 1987. Wyo.Rev.Stat. §7-13-1001, et seq. The act is gender-neutral pursuant to Wyo.Rev.Stat. §8-
1-103.
15. The Act mandates that the WDOC shall establish a youthful offender program ("boot camp") for all persons incarcerated in any state penal institution who are serving a sentence of imprisonment for any offense other than a felony punishable by death or life
imprisonment, who are under the age of twenty-five years old, and who have not previously
served a terra of incarceration at any state or federal adult penal institution. 16. Plaintiff and the class she proposes to represent are siatutorily eligible to
participate in the boot camp program. Defendants, however, have arbitrarily and capriciously
Blanchard. el al v. Lampert. et al.- Complaintfor Declaratory andInjmctive Relief Page 5 of13

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 43 Filed 10/19/17 Page 6 of 53
added by adminislrative rule another criteria for eligibility: the offender must be recommended for the boot camp program by his/her sentencing court.
17. Plaintifrs sentencing judge recognized her eligibility to participate in Wyoming's Youthful Offender program and in his sentencing order recommended that she be allowed into the program.
18. On information and belief, the WDOC provides virtually all male prisoners with a similar Youthful Offender program recommendation the opportunity to attend and complete the Youthful Offender program for men in Newcastle, Wyoming.
19. Defendants' Youthful Offender program for men offers several structured opportunities for male prisoners to help them rehabilitate and succeed as productive members of society upon release and is a highly structured program.
20. The basic program lasts six to twelve months and comprises four phases. The routine day begins at 4:00 a.m. and ends at 9:00 p.m. During each day three hours are devoted to physical activity. Cognitive restructuring and educational programs are the key components. Work ethic instruction is given through a teamwork concept, as various work details are conducted throughout each day.
21. On information and belief, upon completion of the program a successful "hooter" has to ask for a sentence modification from the sentencing court if the "booter" wishes to have the completion of program result in an earlier release than that ordered in the original judgment and sentence. Generally, the graduates will release to straight probation. Intensive Supervision Program (ISP),or to one ofthe adult community corrections centers.
22. On information and belief, WDOC made a decision soon after the Youthful Offender Act was passed in 1987 to build a male-only facility, ignoring the fact that women
Blanchard. et al v. Lampert, el al.-Complaintfor Declaratory and Injiinctive Relief Page 6 of13

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 43 Filed 10/19/17 Page 7 of 53
have an equal right to attend the program. A facility was opened in Newcastle for 30 men. In 1999, with a federal grant of $1,111,000 matched by 10% of state funds, the facility was expended to 56 men. The current facility comprises 12,000 square feet of housing, programming,education, medical and office space.
23. On information and belief, the Youthlul Offender program for men is designed to protect the public by incarcerating young, first-time, male offenders in a program of short term, intense incarceration in a disciplined setting designed to train young offenders to cope with the complexities of modem life in a crime-free environment. WDOC attempts to attain that goal by diverting selected youthful offenders from institutional settings earlier than would have otherwise been possible, thus reducing the total term of incarceration.
24. On information and belief, the Youthful Offender program for men demonstrates to the male participants, in a logical progression of thought, that they are responsible for their behavior and have the means at their disposal to change their criminal behaviors. The program places emphasis and focus on identifying the behaviors that got the male prisoner in trouble in the first place and ways to avoid those behaviors in the future.
25. On information and belief, the Youthful Offender program for men provides a program of physical training which will result in elevated self-esteem which will increase each individual's perception of self-worth. It also provides appropriate information and materials to participants to assist them in their search for gainful employment.
26. On information and belief, the Youthful OiTender program for men provides a boot camp program that emulates the military service including close order drill and rigid dress code as a means of developing self-discipline and promoting the development of esprit de corps
and teamwork.
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Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 43 Filed 10/19/17 Page 8 of 53
27. On information and belief, the Youthful Offender program for men selects, trains and provides staff who, by their actions, would serve as an example to young offenders and in so doing,influence behavior by reflecting the positive benefits oflaw-abiding behavior.
28. On information and belief, the Youthful Offender program for men has programming components including, but not limited to, grieving, anger control, stress management, goal-setting, reality clarification, thinking errors, parenting, rational emotive training, relapse prevention, individual programming and therapy when needed, and drug and alcohol programming. The program includes education, such as G.E.D. instruction and certification, seven-habits, computer keyboarding, choices, coping skills, life skills, job skills training, drug education, and family day.
29. On information and belief, the Youthful Offender program for men conducts a parent day for the parents and family ofgraduating boot camp participants.
30. WDOC does not have a Youthful Offender program for women. 31. Because WDOC does not have a Youthful Offender program for women, the women in the custody of the WDOC are denied the opportunities provided to men in their WDOC boot camp program and described in the foregoing paragraphs. This denial of opportunities to rehabilitate and receive an early release is based entirely on their gender. 32. Upon arrival at the WWC,Plaintiff and her counsel asked Plaintiffs counselor (Ms. Williams) whether Ms. Blanchard would be given the opportunity to participate in a Youthful Offender program. 33. Plaintiff's counselor advised that such a program was unavailable for women.
34. Plaintiff and her counsel also asked Plaintiffs counselor how she could file a
grievance to allow her to participate.
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Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 43 Filed 10/19/17 Page 9 of 53
35. Plaintiffs counselor advised that such a complaint was not a grievable issue, and that she would have to lake it up with '"the courts."
36. On June 29,2017,Plaintifffiled a grievance asking to be given the opportunity to participate in a Youthful Offender program, specifically writing: "I understand that I have been classified as minimum custody rather than under the Youthful Offenders Act (boot camp program). I also understand that Wyoming DOC is not going to consider me for boot camp due to Wyoming not placing women in boot camps." The grievance requested that Ms. Blanchard receive "a boot camp classification within the state of Wyoming as my Judge had recommended for my sentencing." Ex. 3,Inmate Grievance Form/WDOC Form #321.
37. The following day as noted by a handwritten note at the bottom of page I of Ex. 3, a WWC employee, Ms. Carpenter, advised PlaintilT Blanchard that her Grievance was "rejected" and then typed on page 2:"Classification Decisions are [5/c] non-grievable." Jd.
38. Plaintiff has fully exhausted her administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act.
39. Additionally, PlaintitTs counsel spoke with a Deputy Attorney General representing the WDOC. Plaintiffs counsel asked if the WDOC would give Ms. Blanchard the opportunity to participate in a Youthful Offender program by sending her to another state with such a program.
40. The Deputy Attorney General advised that Ms. Blanchard would not be given such an opportunity and instead would have to seek relief from her sentencing judge, or serve her 6-10 year sentence at the WWC. Id.
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Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 43 Filed 10/19/17 Page 10 of 53
41. On August 16, 2017 the WDOC had Ms. Blanchard transponed to Ocala, Florida for participation in a boot camp style program administered by the Florida Department of
Corrections.
42. Prior to Ms. Blanchard's transport, she was not instructed nor advised where she was going, or thai she was going to participate in a boot camp program.
43. She was transported over the majority of one week, with her hands and ankles shackled approximately 12 hours each day,spending each night in a differentjail.
44. No male prisoner of the WDOC has ever been subjected to similar transportation conditions when being transported to Wyoming's male-only boot camp.
45. In Florida, Ms. Blanchard is presently participating in the Florida Department of Corrections' Basic Training Program, described in the Affidavit of Amanda Taylor, attached
hereto as Exhibit 4, and the exhibits thereto.
46. The Florida program is inferior to Wyoming's boot camp program for men, in that it provides fewer rehabilitative services and programming than that provided to the men in Wyoming's male-only boot camp.
47. At present, there are numerous women in the custody of the WDOC who were eligible to participate in Wyoming's boot camp program at the time oftheir sentencing, but who were not given the opportunity to do so because of their gender. These women, and future women so eligible, are entitled to receive the same opportunity as male prisoners to participate in Wyoming's boot camp program.
48. WDOC officials were aware during the past 30 years that women were not given the opportunity for participation in Wyoming's boot camp program. They knew, for instance.
Blanchard, el al v. Lampert, el al - Complaintfor Declaratory and Injtinciive Relief Page 10of13

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 43 Filed 10/19/17 Page 11 of 53
that there was no in-state boot camp facility for women and that they had never accepted a woman into the program.
49. Yet, Defendants took no steps to promote or facilitate the admission of women
into Wyoming's boot camp program. Among the things that Defendants could have done, but
did not do, to promote and facilitate the admission of women into the program are(a)construct an in-state facility for women as WDOC did for men,(b) publicly announce that women were welcome into the program,(c) notify the state public defenders that women were welcome into the program,(d) notify sentencing courts that women were welcome into the program, and (e) eliminate the requirement that offenders be recommended for the program and instead determine admission using gender-neutral criteria.
50. Instead of taking affirmative steps to promote and facilitate the admission of women into Wyoming's boot camp program, Defendants turned a blind eye to persistent gender discrimination in the operation of the program, thereby shirking their duty to operate this program in a gender-neutral manner.
51. It appears that Defendants intend to operate a gender-discriminatory boot camp program in the future, in that men will be permitted to attend the in-state facility in Newcastle but women will be shipped to out-of-state programs, even programs that arc inferior to Wyoming's program for men.
52. In pleadings filed with the Court, Defendants claim that on July 18, 2017, when this lawsuit was filed, WDOC employees were attempting to locate a bed for Ms. Blanchard In a boot camp program. However,(a) there was no assurance that any such bed would be found, and (b)there was no assurance that any bed that was found would be in a program comparable to the program available for men at Newcastle.
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Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 43 Filed 10/19/17 Page 12 of 53
CLAIM FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF PURSUANT TO RULE 23. FED.R.CIV.P..28 U.S.C.8S 2201.2202 AND 42 U.S.C.S 1983
53. Based upon the facts set forth above. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive reliefon her own behalfand on behalfofall persons similarly situated, enjoining Defendants in their official capacities (and all persons acting under their command) from refusing to give women prisoners the same opportunity to participate in Wyoming's Youthful Offender or boot camp program as provided to male prisoners in the custody ofthe WDOC.
54. Defendants should be ordered, among other things, to provide women with the same opportunity to participate in and complete Wyoming's Youthful Ofiender program as men prisoners, and to send women to an out-of-state program only if men are sent to out-of-state programs on a comparable and equitable basis, that is, such out-of-state placement should not be based on gender but rather on gender-neutral principles.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE,Plaintiff respectfully prays that this Honorable Court will: 1. Acceptjurisdiction in this case. 2. Certify the class as proposed. 3. Appoint Plaintiff as the Class Representative. 4. Recognize PlalntifTs counsel as class counsel. 5. Grant Plaintiff and the Class declaratory relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and
2202, declaring that Defendants violated and are violating Plaintiffs equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by discriminating against women in the operation of Wyoming's boot camp program. 6. Issue preliminary and permanent injunctive reliefon behalfofPlaintiff Blanchard and on behalf of the class of women she represents pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal
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Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 43 Filed 10/19/17 Page 13 of 53
Rules of Civil Procedure, ordering Defendants to immediately take all necessary and proper actions to ensure that present and future women prisoners in the custody of WDOC will be granted the opportunity to participate in an in-state boot camp program comparable to the men's program at Newcastle, or in an out-of-state program provided that placement is gender-neutral, that is, men and women are sent to out-of-staie programs based on gender-neutral criteria. This requested relief necessarily requires that Defendants identify those women presently in WDOC custody who were eligible to participate in boot camp at the time of their sentencing and to admit them into Wyoming's boot camp program based on gender neutral criteria that does not require that they be recommended for the program by their sentencing court. 7. Grant such additional and further relief, including an award of attorney's fees and costs, as the Court may deem just and proper under the circumstances. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17th day ofOctober 2017.
JOHN H. ROBINSON, WSB No.6-2828 Jamieson & Robinson,LLC
P.O. Box 4285
Jackson, Wyoming 83001 (307)733-7703 robinsn@vcn.com
STEPHEN L. PEVAR American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
765 Asylum Avenue
Hartford. Connecticut 06105
(860)570-9830
pevaraclu@aoi.com
Pro Hoc Vice
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Blanchard. el al v. Lampert, e!al.-Complain!for Declarator}'andInjunctive Relief Page IS of13

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 43 Filed 10/19/17 Page 14 of 53
Civil Action No. 17-CV-124-S
United States District Court,District of Wyoming
TAYLOR S. BLANCHARD,Individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated
versus
ROBERT LAMPERT and RICK CATRON, in their official capacities
EXHIBIT TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 43 Filed 10/19/17 Page 15 of 53

1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

2

WITHIN AND FOR SUBLETTE COUNTY, WYOMING

3

4 THE STATE OF WY<»JING,

5

Plaintiff,

6 vs.
7 TAYLOR STEPHANIE BLANCHARD,

Criminal No. 1016

8

Defendant.

9

PROBATION REVOCATION DISPOSITION

10

May 8, 2017

Monday

11

12

PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD BEFORE THE HONORABLE MARVIN TYLER

JUDGE IN AND FOR THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

13

COUNTY OF SUBLETTE, STATE OF WYOMING

14 APPEARANCES
15

16

17

CLAYTON KAINER, Sublette County and Prosecuting Attorney,

18

P.O. Box 1010, Pinedale, Wyoming, appearing on behalf of

the State of Wyoming.

19

20

21
22 JOHN LaBODA, Public Defender's Office, P.O. Box 1240, Pinedale, Wyoming, appearing on behalf of the Defendant.
23

24

25
WHEREUPON, the following proceedings were had;

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 43 Filed 10/19/17 Page 16 of 53

1

PROCEEDINGS

2

COURT: Good morning. Court is in session on May 8,

3 2017. My name is Marv Tyler, I'm a district court judge

10:32:06 10:32:11

4 conducting tnis hearing in the matter of the State of Wyoming 10:32:11

5 versus Taylor Stephanie Blanchard. This is Case Number

10:32:13

6 2016-1016.

10:32:19

7

I'll note for the Record the presence of counsel for the 10:32:21

State, counsel for the Defendant, and the Defendant is

10:32:23

present in court.

10:32:26

10

Are you under the influence of any drugs, alcohol or

10:32:21

11 medications today affecting your ability to understand what 10:32:29

12 we're doing in court?

10:32:31

13

DEFENDANT: No, your Honor.

10:32:32

14

COURT: Do you have any sort of a mental illness, mental 10:32:33

15 defect, brain damage, intellectual disability, learning 16 disability, physical ailment or physical injury that would

10:32:31 10:32:40

n prevent you from understanding what's happening in court?

10:32:43

IB

DEFENDANT: No.

10:32:45

19

COURT: Are you satisfied with your attorney's

10:32:46

20 representation of you?

10:32:48

21

DEFENDANT: Yes.

10:32:49

22

COURT: And you've admitted to violating your probation, 10:32:50

23 as a result you have a right to be represented by an attorney 10:32:55

24 and Che righc to appeal any errors of law committed by Che

10:32:58

25 Court. Do you have any questions about those rights?

10:33:02

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 43 Filed 10/19/17 Page 17 of 53

1

DEFENDANT: No, your Honor.

10:33:04

2

COURT: If at any time during this hearing you have a

3 question about your rights or how they apply to what we're

l.Q;33:04 10:33:07

4 discussing, would you get my attention so that they may be 10:33:10

5 explained to you?

10:33:12

6

DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

10:33:13

7

COURT; We're here for a disposition hearing, I believe, 10:33:15

8 since the Court accepted the Defendant's admission about

10:33:19

9 violating terms and conditions of probation. The hearing at 10:33:22

10 which the Defendant admitted to violating probation occurred 10:33:40

11 on April 11th and the Order Upon Initial Probation Revocation 10:33:44

12 Hearing was filed on April 13th. Am I correct, Mr. Kainer? 10:33:49

13

MR. KAINER: Your Honor, 1 just looked at that order, it 10:34:05

14 doesn't state that the factual basis was provided and that

10:34:08

15 the Court had found a material, willful violation of

10:34:16

16 conditions, but looking through my notes that is what we did 10:34:20

17 at that hearing, there was a factual basis provided and the 10:34:25

18 Court did find a material and willful violation of conditions 10:34:28
19 and then a disposition hearing was set for a later time. I 10:34:33

20 don't think there was any discussion, based on my notes, as 10:34:36

21 to whether or not at that time the Defendant's probation was 10:34:39

22 revoked.

10:34:43

23

MR. LaBUDA: Agreed.

10:34:45

24

COURT: Okay. Thank you. My notes reflect that the

10:34:51

25 Court accepted the Defendant's admission, had the Defendant 10:34:55

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 43 Filed 10/19/17 Page 18 of 53

1 under oath describe what occurred about violating a term of 10:35:01

2 probation and the admission was accepted by the Court, but I 10:35:06

3 don't think 1 adjudicated anything at that point and deferred 10:35:12

4 disposition until there was an opportunity for the Defendant 10:35:17

5 and counsel to investigate some options. That's what my

10:35:20

6 notes reflect. Mr. Kainer, does the State have a

10:35:27

7 recommendation on a disposition?

10:35:36

8

MR. KAINER: Yes, your Honor. Hay it please the Court, 10:35:39

9 Counsel.

10:35:42

10

MR. LaBUOA: Counsel.

10:35:42

11

MR. KAINER: Your Honor, the State in this matter would 10:35:43

12 ask that the Defendant's probation be revoked and that the

10:35:45

13 suspended portion of the sentence be entered, that the

10:35:49

14 Defendant receive credit for a total of 315 days which would 10:35:52

15 include the original 267 days that was on the judgment and 10:35:57

16 sentence. The State is asking for this based upon the

10:36:02

17 history of this case. Looking through the file, we have a

10:36:07

18 multitude of violations of the bond orders set by this Court, 10:36:14

19 set by the circuit court, we have the Defendant being given 10:36:20

20 the opportunity of probation with a pretty hefty sentence

10:36:24

21 hanging over her head and her failure in treatment and the

10:36:30

22 State is just concerned that there would be no probation

10:36:36

23 conditions which this Court could set forth which would

10:36:42

24 result in the Defendant's successful completion of probation. 10:36:49

25

COURT; Thank you. Mr. LaBuda, do you want to address 10:36:59

.

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 43 Filed 10/19/17 Page 19 of 53

1 the Court on a disposition?

10:37:01

2

MR. LaBUDA: Yes, sir. Thank you. May it please the

10:37:03

3 Court.

10:37:06

4

COURT: Counsel.

10:37:06

5

MR. LaBUDA: Counsel.

10:37:08

6

MR. KAINER: Counsel.

10:37:08

7

MR. LaBUDA: Your Honor, just one side issue before 1

10:37:08

8 make my argument. He would ask the Court to consider credit 10:37:14

9 for time at the treatment center in Rock Springs from October 10:37:18

10 10th to March 20th. Mr. Kainer's argument actually is pretty 10:37:23

11 good because my client, Taylor Blanchard, female, went to the 10:37:31

12 treatment center in Rock Springs, didn't do well, we don't

10:37:42

13 have any IS? here in Sublette County and so Mr. Kainer is

10:37:45

14 saying I don't think she would do good on probation, that she 10:37:49

15 needs some structure, that she needs some discipline, and so 10:31:53

16 what we would ask for — because I think he is correct and I 10:37:58

17 think at her age I don't think — and her criminal record I 10:38:02

18 don't think sitting her in a prison for six to 10 years is

10:38:11

19 appropriate. What we would ask for, and probably the first 10:33:14

20 time this Court has heard this, we would ask for and desire a 10:38:18

21 recommendation for the Youthful Offender Program or Boot

10:38:24

22 Camp. I realize my client is female. Normally, from what we 10:38:29

23 have probably all seen, boys get to go to Boot Camp, boys

10:38:34

24 that don't have — haven't been doing well on probation, that 10:38:38

25 need some structure, have five to 10, six to 10, and we ask 10:38:44

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 43 Filed 10/19/17 Page 20 of 53

1 for Boot Camp and they go and sometimes that works out well. 10:38:49
2 If you look at the statute concerning Che Youthful Offender 10:3B;S2

3 Program, I think the last time I looked at it over the

10:38:57

4 weekend it said the word "he" in it once which is with the

10:39:00

5 gender neutral statute he means he or she. It doesn't say — 10:39:06

6 when the Court would read off and say, "Taylor, are you under 10:39:12

7 25? Taylor, have you ever been to a federal or state penal 10:39:16

8 institute?" you don't ask, "Are you male or are you female?" 10:39:19

9 And so in a way if the Court, and I'm trying to say this

10:39:22

10 nicely, if the Court doesn't give a recommendation of

10:39:29

11 Youthful Offender/Boot Camp then is the Court violating my 10:39:36

12 client's rights under the equal protection clause and the due 10:39:40

13 process clause of the Wyoming Constitution or the United

10:39:45

14 States Constitution or is it violating the statute when the 10:39:50

15 statute is just — when combined with the gender neutral

10:39:54

16 statute says he. Again, it doesn't say, "Are you under 25? 10:39:58

17 Are you male?" So I think if we look at the statute first I 10:40:02

18 think it's applicable, and if one was to say, "Well, I don't 10:40:04

19 think it's applicable because only boys go there," well, I 10:40:06

20 think that's unconstitutional.

10:40:13

21

COURT: So what if I give a recommendation?

10:40:15

22

MR. LaBUClA: Then as you stated earlier in the Court

10:40:17

23 hearing that we just had prior, you stated that you're the 10:40:20

24 judicial branch and they're the executive branch and you

10:40:24

25 can't tell them what to do, you can recommend it, and that's 10:40:27

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 43 Filed 10/19/17 Page 21 of 53

1 all I ask. Thank you.

10:40:30

2

COURT: Thank you. Is there anyone who wants to address 10:40:32

3 the Court on behalf of the Defendant before I give the

10:40:39

4 Defendant an opportunity to do sol Ms. Hixson, go ahead.

10:40:40

5 Would you come to the podium, please.

6

MS. HIXSON: Thank you, your Honor.

10:40:44 10:40:04

7

COURT: Go ahead.

8

MS. HIXSON: Good morning. I just want to say a few

9 brief things about Taylor's history just to make sure that

10:40:56 10:41:00 10:41:02

10 the Court is aware of the, you know, events in this person's 10:41:05

11 life that have brought her to this point. So this is Taylor 10:41:11

12 Blanchard and she is 23 years old, still very young in my

10:41:16

13 book. I think I met her when she was — I met her first when 10:41:20

14 she was an older teenager and at that time she had — I'm not 10:41:27

15 completely clear on the facts, but she had come to Wyoming

10:41:34

16 and was trying to live with her father who she had not had ,10:41:37

17 the opportunity to live with for years and she was already

10:41:40

18 having some behavioral problems. And her father is a good

10:41:46

19 man and really loves her, but it was very difficult for him 10:41:49

20 to tolerate just sort of some of the independence she

10:41:56

21 developed, you know, not good independence at that point

10:42:00

22 because she was still pretty young. And I don't remember how 10:42:05

23 that episode of treatment ended exactly, whether they moved 10:42:08

24 or Taylor just left the area to live somewhere else, I'm not 10:42:11

25 sure, but, you know, unfortunately it was unfinished

10:42:16

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 43 Filed 10/19/17 Page 22 of 53

1 business. And, you know, her dad would just often get very 10:42:19

2 — he was like a very strict guy which she needed on the one 10:42:23

3 hand, but I think there was some lacking in reconnecting of 1Q:42;2B

4 daughter and father at that time. So in the meantime I

10:42:31

5 didn't know what all had happened for Taylor, but I just want 10:42:38

6 to kind of recap her history from childhood as I know it or 10:42:41

7 understand it. She was four years old when she was — and

10:42:44

8 I'm not exactly sure of the reason, but she was moved from

10:42:53

9 California to Canada where she ended up living with her

10:42:55

10 mother and her father was still in California. And Taylor

10:43:00

11 says that she believes that her father tried many times to

10:43:05

12 see her over that time, but that her mother wouldn't allow

10:43:11

13 it. Her mother is a severe drug addict and has been for a

10:43:15

14 long time. When Taylor was around 12 she said to me that she 10:43:20

15 started to go out and help her mother get drugs and in

10:43:29

16 explaining to me why she would do this she said, "I loved my 10:43:36

17 mother so I had to do it for her" and it sort of left me to 10:42:39

18 kind of guess at it because we didn't have a lot of time to 10:43:44

19 talk about that, you know, but I imagine that, again, here is 10:43:47 20 a child who is probably feeling like the love of her parents 10:43:50

21 is very conditional and this is all she had and she is off in 10:43:57

22 a foreign country away from, you know, the rest of her family 10:44-.01

23 and that's all she had to count on. I can also imagine maybe 10:44:05

24 a child of 12 thinking, you know, my mother is going to get 10:44:10

25 arrested and some day she is just going to go out to get

10:44:14

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 43 Filed 10/19/17 Page 23 of 53

1 drugs and I'm never going to see her again so she decided

10:44:20

2 somehow it was safer for her to do that. In addition at some 10:44:22

3 point while this was going on — and again I wasn't

10:44:26

4 completely clear, but some man somewhere along the way, I

10:44:29

5 don't know if it was someone she was going to get the drugs 10:44:34

6 from, sexually abused her and I think it was something that 10:44:35

7 she didn't really tell anyone about at that time. And, you 10:44:38

8 know, I don't know exactly what age it was that she returned 10:44:43

9 to the United States, but that was at least eight to 10 years 10:44:48

10 of being kept away from her father and then she returned here 10:44:55

11 and was with her father for that time that I know of. 12 Somewhere in there she, you know, struck out on her own, I

10:44:59 10:45:04

13 guess 1 would say, and took up with lots of different older 10:45:08

14 people and some of them, as I think the prosecutor and your 10:45:12

15 Honor know, were men and it looks to me that Taylor has this 10:45:17

16 recent pattern of just not being able to keep herself from 10:45:27

17 contacting one or more of these males that she sort of felt 10:45:30

18 like, you know, they took her under their wing. She doesn't 10:45:34

19 deny for a minute being involved with drugs and with bringing 10:45:39

20 drugs into the county, you know, she is not trying to tell us 10:45:42

21 she is an angel. I think, you know, what I assess her at is 10:45:46

22 a very lost child with probably a bigger man addiction than 10:45:51

23 she has drug addiction and when 1 looked at — and again I

10:45:56

24 understand I may not be fully aware of everything, but it

10:46:01

25 looks like the violations and contempts that she has

10:46:04

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 43 Filed 10/19/17 Page 24 of 53
10

1 committed during this time were mostly about making contact 10:46:08 2 with one or more of these men in her life and I — my sense 10:46:12

3 or my understanding is that during this treatment program, 10:46:18

4 which she entered in October and was removed from in March, 10:46:21

5 that she was doing well, that she had made it through phase 10:46:26

6 three of a four phase program. She has discussed with me a 10:46:31

■? lot of different types of work that she did down there and

10:46:35

8 I'm familiar with the type of work they assign and how they 10:46:38

9 run the program and I think it's a very good program, but I 10:46:42

10 do think that unfortunately — I'm not sure how much

10:46:45

11 treatment they provide for the very specific problem that

10:46:50

12 Taylor has of just sort of not being able to feel separated 10:46:55

13 from these sort of significant others in her life and so

10:46:59

14 somewhere towards the end of that program she passed a note 10:40:06

15 to a male. And again, I may have a limited understanding of 10:41:09

16 all the things she did wrong down there, that's my

10:41:12

17 understanding of it, and was therefore removed from the

10:41:14

18 program. I, I hope and wish there is some sort of Boot Camp 10:41:19

19 that would be available to a 23-year-old female because, you 10:41:26

20 know, that would be great for her to be able to go somewhere 10:47:29

21 in a highly disciplined and structured environment. I would 10:47:32

22 hope then after that she would still return and continue with 10:47:36

23 the type of treatment that we can provide her here in

10:47:41

24 Sublette County because I'm not familiar with what type of

10:47:46

25 treatment she might get in a Boot Camp program or some

10:41:48

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 43 Filed 10/19/17 Page 25 of 53
11

1 equivalent if it was found. I, I believe that Taylor could 10:<7:51

2 succeed, I mean she could be asked to finish a residential io:47:58

3 program. I don't know that the one in Rock Springs would

10:48:02

4 take her back, they have strict rules about those things. I io:4B;0«

5 think she could successfully complete the treatment court

iO:48:io

6 program here in Sublette County. We understand this other i0:«8!i3

7 sort of mental health behavioral problem that she has and we i0!48!i«

8 are ready, willing and able and frequently treat people for 10:48:20

9 more than just substance abuse at the same time because

io:48:2i

10 that's a typical problem for people and this emotional

I0:48i30

11 abandonment type of problem is extremely common and I'm more io:48:33

12 than qualified to help somebody with that. So I guess, your i0:48;38

13 Honor, I just want to ask that this very young person be

io:48:42

14 given a chance. And I understand the probation she was

10:48:S1

15 offered previously were chances, she wasn't ready for them I 10:48:53

16 guess is what I would say, and I see Taylor Blanchard who

10:49:02

17 appears to be more understanding of what that difficulty is 10:48:08

18 and more ready and willing to address that. So I thank you 10;49:12

19 for listening to me this morning.

10:49:18

20

COURT: Thank you. Is there anyone else who wants to i0:49:2i

21 address the Court? Good morning.

io:49:25

22

MS. ANDERSON: Good morning. I'm the Reverend Jami

10:49:28

23 Anderson, I've been visiting with Taylor regularly at both 10:49;37

24 times she has been a resident inmate at the jail. I agree io:49:42
25 with the assessment by counselor Sarah Hixson and I am very I0:49r46

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 43 Filed 10/19/17 Page 26 of 53
12

1 heartened to hear that Counselor LaBuda has proposed a Boot ao:49:^6

2 Camp because I stand here appalled to think that a 23 year io:50:oi

3 old would be benefitted by six to 10 years in a penitentiary 10:50:0''

4 and I am heartbroken that most of our penal codes are

10:50: lo

5 punitive rather than rehabilitative, so if there is any

10:50:16

€ rehabilitation that can be offered to Taylor I appeal to the i0:sa:2i

7 judge to consider it and I am really happy to hear a

10:S0:24

8 recommendation that maybe we push the envelope a little bit 10:50:29

9 for finding solutions for young women that have had a really iO:50t32

10 hard time to this point in her life. And I too see changes i0:50:3e

11 in Taylor from visiting her previous to her probation

10:50:42

12 sentence in Rock Springs to the month and a half I've been 10:S0:46

13 visiting her now and I do think she is aware that the issue io:50:4a

14 is not drugs, it's a lot of emotional issues, and I'm filled io:50:S2

15 with hope for her but not serving time in a penitentiary.

io;50:59

16 Thank you.

i0:5i:05

17

COURT: Thank you. Anyone else want to address the

10:51:06

18 Court? Taylor, I want to tell you that I've reviewed

10;51:13

19 everything from basically the start of the filing of the

iO;5i;24

20 charges in January of 2016, every document, every pleading, io:5i:30

21 everything that's in the court files up through today. This io:5i:34

22 includes a letter that is dated April 11, 2017, that you

io:5i:39

23 wrote to my attention, I did review that. I'm trying to see i0:5i:45

24 the date. April 23rd. I guess it takes a while for the

iO:5i:S5

25 mail. I've had you in court a number of times as you know. 10:52:05

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 43 Filed 10/19/17 Page 27 of 53
13

1 I think somewhere along the way I discussed with you the lack 10:52:12

2 of options, because of things that you did or didn't do you 10:52:21

3 were taking away options that I had, but we landed on this 10:52:27

4 probation term that principally was aimed at providing you 10:52:33

5 with getting treatment to try and get a hold on issues

10:52:41

6 involving substances and whatever else you could get some

.10:52:47

7 benefit from in a rather closed environment, in other words, 10:52:52

8 it was an in-patient treatment program in a fairly highly-

10:53:02

9 structured environment, I think, and I believed that you

10:53:06

10 would have benefitted immensely upon being successful in

10:53:13

11 completing that program. The probation term required you to 10:53:21

12 be successful; you weren't successful. It seems like the

10:53:26

13 reason for your termination was not necessarily related to

10:53:29

14 the reasons that you were admitted into that treatment

10:53:36

15 program for directly, but I also believe I told you I'm not 10:53:41

16 going to have a mini trial on what happened in treatment if 10:53:50

17 you were not successful, I only cared about whether you were 10:53:53

13 successful or whether you were unsuccessful although I do

10:53:56

19 understand the description of the events that led to the

10:53:59

20 termination. My understanding of the TC program in Rock

10:54:07

21 Springs it's a very difficult, structured program, but that 10:S4:1<

22 was, frankly, one of the very reasons that it was selected as 10:54:17 23 part of something we expected you to be able to accomplish. 10:54:22

24

Mr. LaBuda and Mr. Kainer have basically outlined the

10:64:29

25 problem that I face in this case and I just want to tell you 10>54:3S

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 43 Filed 10/19/17 Page 28 of 53
14

1 about that. I Imposed an imprisonment sentence of six to 10 10:54:3» 2 years with the Department of Corrections leas 267 days off 10:54:44 3 the maximum and minimum term of that imprisonment sentence on 10:54:46

4 October 20th of last year. I did not require payment of a

10:54:53

5 fine and X did not suspend any sort of a fine because the

10:55:00

6 imprisonment sentence pretty much spoke for itself. In

10:55:06

7 placing you on probation we were in a situation where that or 10:55:13

8 prison were the only two options available to you and to many 10:55:20

9 people in Sublette County especially if they're female. We 10:55:2«

10 have no intensive supervised probation program, in other

10:55:31

11 words, there's more supervision"and more monitoring and less 10:55:39

12 freedom to those that may be given intensive supervised

10:55:45

13 probation through the Department of Corrections Probation and 10:55:50

14 Parole Office, we do not have that available in Sublette

10:55:52

15 County. Teton County does, Uinta County does, Sweetwater

10:55:54

16 County does, Fremont County does, we don't. To my knowledge 10:56:00

17 there are no ACC programs or halfway houses that accept women 10:56:06

18 in Wyoming, but there are three for men. In my understanding 10:56:15

19 the Department of Corrections has no Boot Camp or Youthful 10:56:21

20 Offender Program for women, but there is a Youthful Offender 10:56:26

21 or Boot Camp program Cor men through the Department of

10:56:3'.

22 Corrections in New Castle. As Mr. LaBuda somewhat explained, 10:56:34

23 I am in the judicial branch of government, the Department of 10:56:42

24 Corrections is in the executive branch of government, one

10:56:45

25 branch of government cannot tell the other branch what to do 10:56:51

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 43 Filed 10/19/17 Page 29 of 53
IS

1 or not do, I can only give recommendations, it's up to the 10;5«:S4

2 other branch of government to act or reject those

10:56:^9

3 recommendations as they will. They're in charge of operating 10:5T:02

4 their own branch, I can't do anything about that. So all I 10:ST:06

5 can do is give recommendations, that involves whether it's 10:57:10

6 Youthful Offender Program with the defendant, whether it's an 10:57:1«

7 ACC placement, whether it's treatment programs that are

10:51:20

8 available to the Department of Corrections. I can't tell

10:51:24

8 them to admit anyone, I can only recommend that they do so, 10:51:21 10 and I can only recommend to the defendant that the defendant 10:51:30

11 take advantage of any opportunities that the Department of

10:51:34

12 Corrections gives. So those are my options, Ms. Blanchard, 10:51:38

13 I'm left with the options of putting you back on probation

10:51:49

14 with no ISP, no other way to devote particular supervision 10:51:56

15 and monitoring for things that may be beneficial to you

10:56:04

16 overall, or to consider reimposing the imprisonment sentence 10:56:08

17 that was suspended that placed you on probation. And Mr.

10:58:15

IB LaBuda has asked me to consider giving a Boot Camp or

10:58:21

19 Youthful Offender Program recommendation even though my

10:58:25

20 belief is it cannot be acted on by the Department of

10:58:30

21 Corrections because they don't offer such a program to women, 10:58:33

22 so that's where I'm left. I've had many times considered if 10:58:31

23 there are any other options that would be available I'd sure 10:58:53

24 like to have those options with any defendant that appears in 10:58:56

25 my court, but with you taking away options by your conduct

10:59:01

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 43 Filed 10/19/17 Page 30 of 53
16

1 and with so few options being available we're just down to

10:59:08

2 one or two. I wanted to tell you that, I think I've already 10:59:17

3 told you that in the past, but I wanted to tell you that to 10:59:21

4 make sure you understand where things sit particularly in

10:59:24

5 light of the recommendation by your attorney as to a

10:59:27

6 disposition. You would have a chance to address the Court, 10:59:30

7 you can say anything you want to tell me that you think I

10:59:34

8 should do or consider, you don't have to say anything if you 10:59:37

9 don't want to, it's entirely up to you. If you have anything 10:59:41

10 you can just remain seated there and speak into the

10:59:44

11 microphone so that you can talk loud enough that I can hear 10:59:46

12 you. Do you have anything?

10:59:52

13

DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. If there's no option for 10:59:53

14 the Boot Camp and 1 don't want to continue this any further, 10:59:55

15 if that's what the answer is going to be for the imprisonment 11:00:00

16 then I really have no choice for that if that's your final 11:00:03

17 option. I'm not asking or pleading for another chance, I'm 11:00:08

18 just asking you to understand my past and just — but I do 11:00:13

19 see that prison is the easy way out because I get to sleep, 11:00:22

20 like 1 wake up and I can go back to sleep, I can pretty much 11:00:25 21 lay down and do whatever I want all day, but the probation is 11:00:30

22 where I had to work and work hard for my life. 1 made

11:00:32

23 genuine changes within myself and my attitude and criminal 11:00:41

24 activities. I didn't push myself far enough like I should

11:00:45

25 have. It's just, like I said, I'm not pleading or asking for 11:00:50

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 43 Filed 10/19/17 Page 31 of 53
17

1 another chance, I'm just asking for you to understand my

11:00:56

2 past.

11:00:59

3

COURT: All right. Thank you. 1 find that because the 11:01:09

4 Defendant violated a term of probation, which was a material 11:01:12

5 term of probation requiting that she successfully complete a 11:01:11

6 treatment program consistent with the ASl evaluation

11:01:21

7 recommendation, the Defendant's probation should be revoked. 11:01:26

8 This is for a material breach of the terms of the probation, 11:01:32 9 it does not involve the mere payment or nonpayment of money. 11:01:36

10 This is one of the main reasons that the Court considered

11:01:40

11 giving the Defendant probation in the first place which is a 11:01:43

12 privilege, not a right, as opposed to imposing an

11:01:48

13 imprisonment sentence. I've explained on the Record the lack 11:01:51

14 of options chat the Court had at the time of original

11:01:55

15 sentencing and the lack of options particularly the Court has 11:01:59

16 now. There really is no other consideration for the Court to 11:02:04

17 have at this point other than to impose the imprisonment

11:02:11

18 sentence that was suspended that placed the Defendant on

11:02:11

19 probation on this felony charge of Conspiracy to Commit a

11:02:20

20 Controlled Substance Offense, Chat was an imprisonment

11:02:23

21 sentence of not more than 10 years not less than six years

11:02:21

22 with the Department of Corrections with originally 267 days 11:02:30

23 off the maximum and minimum term of that imprisonment

11:02:34

24 sentence. The State has notified the Court chat counting the 11:02:39

25 time that the Defendant has been in custody would be 315

11:02:44

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 43 Filed 10/19/17 Page 32 of 53
18

1 days, in other words, 267 original days plus the additional ii:02:49

2 time that the Defendant has been in custody on the probation iii02!54

3 revocation matter is 315 days. Mr. LaBuda asked the Court to ii:02:S7

4 give consideration to credit the Defendant with the time that iirossoz

5 she was in the TO program. If I calculated that would be 161 ii:03:07

6 days. Does that sound correct? Taylor, does that sound

ii:03:i5

7 right? I have from October 21st to March 20th. My math

ii;03:2i

8 skills are not—

ii:03:27

9

MR. LaBODA: No, I think that is correct.

ii:03:29

10

COURT: I'll give the Defendant 476 days credit off the ii!03!33

11 maximum and minimum term of the imprisonment sentence.

ii:03:37

12 Taylor, you're age 23?

11:03:42

13

DEFENDANT: (Nods head.)

11:03:44

14

COURT: Yes?

11:03:44

15

DEFENDANT: Yes, yes, your Honor.

u:03:4s

16

COURT: You've never been to prison, state or federal ii:03:46

17 prison for anything before?

n:03:50

18

DEFENDANT: No, your Honor.

11:03:51

19

COURT: I find that you qualify for the Youthful

ii:03:S2

20 Offender Program, the Boot Camp program. I give the

11:03:58

21 Department of Corrections my recommendation you be admitted ii:03:S8

22 to a Boot Camp or Youthful Offender Program. Again, I can't ii:04:0i 23 cell them what to do, I just give my recommendation. I also ii:04:07

24 give the Department of Corrections my recommendation that the ii!04!io 25 Defendant be admitted to any treatment programs that might be ii:04:i3

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 43 Filed 10/19/17 Page 33 of 53
19

1 available to asaist her within the Department of Corrections. 11:04:16

2 I find that she is still in need of substance abuse treatment U:04i21

3 inasmuch as she was not successful in completing the TO

11:04:26

4 program in Rock Springs. Any original costs, fees,

11:04:31

5 assessments and all that sort are thing that were originally 11:04:39

6 imposed the Defendant is still required to pay those. Mr. 11:04:41

7 LaSuda, what is the Public Defender reimbursement?

11:04:45

B

MR. LaBUDA: $750.

11:04:47

9

COURT: I find that the reimbursement amount is

11:04:49

10 appropriate; the Defendant is not going to be able to pay

11:04:52

11 that in light of this disposition. Any bail or bond that has 11:04:54

12 been posted by or on behalf of the Defendant the obligor is 11:05:09

13 exonerated and the clerk of court shall forthwith release any 11:05:11

14 bail or bond to the obligor. I'll talk to you about your

11:05:15

15 rights on appeal and release of your attorney in a moment,

11:05:24

16 Ms. Blanchard, but let me see if there's anything else I need Ur05:2B

17 to address in the way of findings, conclusions or other

11:05:31

18 matters before we go there. Anything for the State, Mr.

11:05:34

19 Kainer?

11:05:40

20

MR. KAINER: No, your Honor.

11:05:40

21

COURT: Anything for the Defendant, Mr. LaBuda?

11:05:46

22

MR. LaBUDA: No, sir. Thank you.

11:05:40

23

COURT: I want to tell you about your rights of appeal. 11:05:50

24 Mr. Kainer, would your office prepare a disposition order?

11:05:53

25

MR. KAINER: We will, your Honor.

11:05:56

L

J

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 43 Filed 10/19/17 Page 34 of 53
20

1

COURT: His office is going to prepare a disposition

11:05:58

2 order which is a written document that summarizes what

11:06:01

3 happened at this hearing. That will be given to Mr. LaBuda 11:06:05

4 for his approval, he will eventually get it to me, I'll sign 11:06:07

5 that order and it will be given to the clerk of the district 11:06:11

6 court. She'll put a file stamp on the first page of that

U;06:H

7 order, that file stamp will have a date and it's an important 11:06:17

3 thing if you want to appeal your probation revocation, your 11:06:23

9 disposition or both or any errors of law committed by the

11:06:26

10 Court in handling your case. You would have 30 days from the 11:06:31

11 date that's on that order to file a notice of appeal in

11:06:36

12 writing with the clerk of the district court. You must

11:06:38

13 otherwise comply with the Wyoming Rules of Appellate

11:06:42

14 Procedure. Those require that you also do one of two things, 11:06:44

15 you either pay the filing fee for the appeal or to request 11:06:50

16 that you be allowed to appeal at no cost to you because you 11:06:57

17 cannot afford to pay the costs. If you make the request to 11:07:00

18 have your appeal processed at no cost to you you must submit 11:07:04

19 a current financial affidavit with your notice of appeal and 11:07:08 20 your written request to have your appeal processed for free. ll!07;12

21 I'll look that over, if I find you qualify you would be given 11:07:17

22 what's called in forma pauperis status, that will allow you 11:07:20

23 to appeal at no cost to you, it would also allow you to have 11:07:24

24 an attorney appointed to represent you on the appeal at no

11:07:27

25 cost to you. You can ask the clerk of district court to file 11:07:30

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 43 Filed 10/19/17 Page 35 of 53
21

1 the notice of appeal for you, instead of you doing it you can ll:07:3S

2 ask the clerk to do it. You should make that request to the 11:07:38

3 clerk in writing and you should make that request very early 11:07:41

4 because the clerk has the same 30 days that you do. If it's 11:07:45

5 in writing you can document when you made the request in 6 showing that it's early. If you or the clerk are late in

11:07:49 11:07:53

7 filing the notice of appeal it may cause problems on the

11:07:56

8 appeal, the Supreme Court may not hear it, they may have some 11:07:59

9 trouble processing the appeal, it's just something you don't 11:03:06

10 want to have to go through so it's important to make sure

11:08:09

11 that your notice of appeal, whether you do it or the clerk

11:08:12

12 does it, is made within that 30 days. The clerk — if you

11:08:17

13 ask the clerk to make the notice of appeal for you the clerk 11:08:20

14 cannot pay the filing fee or request the in forma pauperis

11:08:23

15 status for you, you have to do those things yourself, one of 11:08:26

16 those two things, okay?

11:08:31

17

DEFENDANT: Okay.

11:08:33

18

COURT: Do you have any questions about your appeal

11:08:33

19 rights?

11:08:36

20

DEFENDANT: No, your Honor.

11:08:36

21

COURT: On the earlier of and automatically the 30 days 11;08;36

22 passing for you to file a notice of appeal or you actually

11:08:44

23 filing a notice of appeal within that 30 days, Mr. LaBuda and 11:08:48

24 the Fublic Defender program would be relieved from further

11:08:53

25 responsibility of representing you in this ease, it's an

11:08:56

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 43 Filed 10/19/17 Page 36 of 53
22

1 automatic thing. Do you have any questions about that?

11:0B:S9

2

DErENDANT: No, your Honor.

11:09:01

3

COURT: Mr. LaBuda, any additional advisements I need to 11:09:02

4 give to the Defendant?

11:09:05

5

MR. LaBUDA: No, sir.

11:09:06

6

COURT: Anything else before we adjourn?

11:09:06

1

MR. KAINER: Nothing from the State, your Honor.

11:09:09

8

COURT: Anything for the Defendant?

11:09:11

9

MR. LaBUDA: No, sir.

11:09:16

10

COURT: Taylor, I wish you success. You might want to 11:09:16

11 talk to Mr. LaBuda about some other option that might be

11:09:17

12 available to you after today. I wish there were viable

11:09:21

13 options that I had for you, other people who are similarly

11:09:27

14 situated, but unfortunately that's where we are in the State 11:09:35

15 of Wyoming today. You'll be remanded to the custody of the 11:09:39

16 Sublette County Sheriff's Office until your custody is taken 11:09:43

17 by the Wyoming Department of Corrections. This matter is 18 adjourned.

11:09:46 11:09:49

19

(The hearing was concluded.)

20

21

22

23

24

25

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 43 Filed 10/19/17 Page 37 of 53
23

CERTIFICATE OF THE REPORTER

2 STATS OF WYOMING
3 COUNTY OF SUBLETTE
4

] SS )

5

I, JEAMNIE GEBES, RPR, official court reporter and

6 Notary Public, hereby certify that I was authorized to and 7 did record in stenotype the foregoing pages, numbered 1-23,

8 inclusive.

9

I further certify that I am not an agent, attorney

10 or counsel for any of the parties hereto, nor am I interested

11 in the outcome thereof.

12

Dated this 13th day of July 2017.

13

14

15

—

^NIE GEBES, RPR

16

ilfticial Court Reporter

17

My Commission Expires:

S

;

20

21

22

23

24

25

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 43 Filed 10/19/17 Page 38 of 53
Civil Action No. 17-CV-124-S
United States District Court,District of Wyoming
TAYLOR S.BLANCHARD,Individually and on behalfofall other persons similarly situated
versus
ROBERT LAMPERT and RICK CATRON,
in their official capacities
EXHIBIT TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 43 Filed 10/19/17 Page 39 of 53

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SUBLETTE,STATE OF WYOMING

THE STATE OF WYOMING,

■N

Plaintiff,

•vs-
TAYLOR STEPHANIE BIANCHARD, Defendant.

Criminal No. 1016
y

ORDER UPON PROBATION REVOCATION DISPOSITION HEARING

DATE OF HEARING: JUDGE: COURT REPORTER: PROSECUTOR: DEFENDANTS ATTORNEY:

May 8,2017 Marvin L Tyler
Jeannie Gebes
Clayton Kainer
John P. laBuda

MAY 10^017
(•f'Boli^Ts&iWSKISSWEifi'

COUNT I OFFENSE: STATUTE:

Conspiracy to Commit Controlled Substance Offense Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-l-303{3), § 35-7-1042, §35-7-1031(a)[i)

CLASS; DATE OF OFFENSE:
PLEA/AaiON:
DATE OF SENTENCING HEARING:

FELONY
December, 2014 - March, 2015
GUILTY
October 4, 201S

ADJUDICATION OF PROBATION REVOCATION:

ADMISSION BY DEFENDANT TO WILLFUL

PROBATION VIOLATION - PROBATION
REVOKED, SENTENCE IMPOSED, BOOT

CAMP RECOMMENDATION

PROBATION REVOCATION DISPOSITION:

IMPRISONMENT:

SIX (6) YEARS TO TEN (10) YEARS AT Wyoming Department

of Corrections, NOT SUSPENDED, Recommendation for

treatment as a Youthful Offender pursuant to W.S. §7-13-

1003

CREDIT FOR PRESENTENCE

CONFINEMENT;

476 DAYS OFF MINIMUM-MAXIMUM TERM OF

PUBLIC DEFENDER;

IMPRISONMENT
S750.00 - Not Ordered to Pay

THIS MATTER came before the Court for a Disposition Hearing upon the Slate's Verified Petition for Revocation of Probation on the above date. The hearing was conducted in open Court in accordance with Rule 39 of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure, and In accordance with Wyoming law.
The Court addressed the Defendant in open court and finds that: Defendant was not under the influence of any drug, alcohol, or medication affecting Defendant's ability to understand and meaningfully participate in the proceeding; Defendant had no mental defect, brain damage, intellectual disability, learning disability, physical injury or physical ailment which might affect Defendant's ability to understand the proceeding.
The Court determined that the Defendant was represented with counsel with whom Defendant had conferred prior to the disposition hearing, and the Defendant expressed that Defendant was satisfied with Defendant's counsel's representation. The Court finds that Defendant's attorney was competent and effectively assisted Defendant throughout the disposition hearing.

Order Upon Probation Revocation Disposition Hearing
Page 1 of 3

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 43 Filed 10/19/17 Page 40 of 53
Defendant acknowledged that Defendant had entered an "ADMISSION" to the probation revocation allegations as set forth in the State's Verified Petition for Revocation of Probation and such "ADMISSION" was made voluntarily, willingly, knowingly, under no improper inducement, threat, force or coercion, after Defendant considered Defendant's constitutional rights and after Defendant understood that such rights would be waived by entering such a plea to the allegations,this was, nonetheless, what Defendant wshed to do in answer to the allegations; a sufficient factual basis exists supporting the "ADMISSION" entered by Defendant, the "ADMISSION" entered by Defendant was accepted by the Court: and, the Defendant acknowledged that there had been no unnecessary delay in the imposition of a
disposition upon Defendant. The Court afforded the attorney for the State the opportunity to present any testimony,
arguments and recommendations. The Court afforded the attorney for the Defendant to present any testimony, arguments, recommendations and to speak on behalf of the Defendant. The Court then addressed the Defendant personally and Defendant was given the opportunity
to present information in mitigation ofthe disposition. The Court then found that Defendant had wiiifully violated the terms of Defendant's
probation. The Court found that the conditions of probation which were willfully violated by Defendant were material violations and did not involve the payment of money. The Court then enumerated all factors and considerations In setting the disposition.
BASED UPON THE FOREGOING, and the Court being duly advised in the premises, and good cause appearing,
FT IS HEREBY ORDERED,ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant willfully violated the terms and conditions of Defendant's probation as set forth in the State's Verified Petition for Revocation of Probation;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED,ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant's probation be,and it is hereby,REVOKED.
Re-Imposing probation, as well as other options available the Court in setting the disposition In the case were considered by the Court and, under the facts and circumstances,
the Court finds that RE-INSTATING PROBATION IS INAPPROPRIATE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT DEFENDANT IS HEREBY,
SENTENCED AS FOLLOWS:
Imprisonment/Jail Defendant shall be imprisoned to no less than six(6)years, nor more than ten(10) years in the custody and control of the Wyoming Department of Corrections to be incarcerated in a State penal institution or other facility under contract or agreement with the Wyoming Department of Correaions; Defendant is given credit for 476 days off of the minimum and maximum imprisonment sentence herein for presentence confinement; This imprisonment sentence is NOT suspended; The Court finds that Defendant meets the requirements of W.S. §7-13-1003 and the Court recommends that Defendant shall be treated as a Youthful Offender under W.S. §7-13-
1003;
Substance Abuse Treatment
The Court deems Defendant to be in need of substance abuse treatment and the
Defendant is a qualified offender under the Addicted Offender Accountability Act. The Court gives its recommendation that Defendant be admitted into the intensive
Treatment Unit or any other beneficial programs offered by the Department of Corrections.
rr IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Public Defender's Office and John P. LaBuda, Assistant Public Defender, be, and they are hereby, relieved from further responsibility and the representation of the Defendant In the above-captioned matter after the appropriate time has passed to file a Notice of Appeal; and,
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED,ADJUDGED AND DECREED that, pursuantto W.R.Cr.P. 46(g),if bail has been posted in this matter, the obligor is hereby exonerated and the Clerk of Court
shall forthwith release said ball to the obligor.
Order Upon Probation Revoetrtlon Disposition Hearing
Page3o/3

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 43 Filed 10/19/17 Page 41 of 53

THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that you, TAYLOR STEPHANIE BLANCHARD, are hereby remanded to the custody of the Wyoming Department of Corrections for placement into the appropriate facility commensurate to your sentence and correctional
classification.

Pursuant to Rule 32 of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure, Defendant was

notified of Defendant's right to appeal this Order to a higher Court. Defendant was advised

that a Notice of Appeal must be filed within thirty (30) days(WRAP Rule 2.01) of entry of this

Order; that if Defendant is unable to pay the cost of an appeal. Defendant may apply for the right to have appointed counsel and to proceed without paying filing fees; and that If Defendant so requests, the Clerk of Court shall prepare and serve a Notice of Appeal on

Defendant's behalf.

n

DATED this ijfyn^day of May,2017.

Approved as to Form:

istrict Co,^ Judge

Attorney for State Attorney for Defendant

Order Upon Pmbot/on Revoeatton Disposltton Hearing
foge3of3

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 43 Filed 10/19/17 Page 42 of 53

3073C72025

SUBIFTTE COUrfTY ATTORNEy

WrnStp.m. 0S-«-2QI7

7/8

THEREFORE,fT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED,that you,TAYLOR STEPHANIE BLANCHARD,are hereby remanded to the custody ofthe Wyoming Department of Corrections
for placement into the appropriate facility commensurate to your sentence and correctional
classlficatlan.
Pursuant to Rule 32 of the Wyoming Rules ;of Criminal Procedure, Defendant was notified of Defendant's right to appeal this Order to a higher Court. Defendant was advised that a Notice of Appeal must be filed within thirty(30) days(WRAP Rule 2.01] of entry of this
Order; that if Defendant is unable to pay the cost of an appeal, Defendant may apply for the right to have appointed counsel and to proceed without paying filing fees; and that IF Defendant so requests, the Clerft of Court shall prepare and serve a Notice of Appeal on
Defendant's behalf.
DATED this W day ofMay,2017.

Approved as to Form; Attorney forState
Attorney foji^ffendant

istrict Cou

sf'ette

OrtlerUpon FrotaOon Revocation Disposition Hearing Page 3 of3

Received Tim May. B. 2017 4:49PM No. 9450

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 43 Filed 10/19/17 Page 43 of 53
Civil Action No. 17-CV-124-S
United States District Court,District of Wyoming
TAYLOR S.BLANCHARD,Individually and on behalfofall other persons similarly situated
versus
ROBERT LAMPERT and RICK CATRON, in their official capacities
EXHIBIT TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 43 Filed 10/19/17 Page 44 of 53

Wyoming Department of
Corrections

WDOC Form #321
Inmate Grievance Form

Page 1 of2
Last Revised:02/12/07

Inmate Name:
Institution; I

Inmate Grievance Form

Q Check here if this is an EMERGENCY Grievance

^

WDOC #

Unit/Cell:
Ti^e: TF;TLi^v^

When completing this form,you may provide up to two(2)additional pages if necessary.

Summary of(he incident or occurrence giving rise(o the grievance or reason for the grievance:

^ V

A\v:iEV \ VvC^jr \y?OY\

-VWvi ixtnAcv- -VWo

1

w^er^-V^Y-i 4Vvai VJ\| ^Ooc.>s

nn^ ^ric!\v>.- I

wigL V>-in\c lq hnn\ r^yvnp.T-

A\A4? Va^Wp.

Summarize your attempts to informally resolve the issue(e.g. verbal discussions,submission ofInmate
cCommmmuunniiccaatnioonn rFoorrmm,,eitcc..j)
WW. ^^) \x}iUi?Ik)S (_!-Q<;e u3cv\ie-'V

I request the following grievance resolution or remedy:

r/re'voP.

b<^o\-r-sai^^p

Mas

YViCj

VViA Pf rr>wiwsevNSgf\ ~(W vwvJ^ Aev) VancC/g.

Inmate Signature:

A4A
Administrative Use
Grievance
Number:

W\OMiN(;DkpvrtmkntofCorreci toss* 1934 Wyott Drive,Suite 100•Cheyenne. Wyoming 82002
Tf.i fpiionf nn7"» 777-7208• Fax f307i 777-7846• Websitf.htlD://corrections.wv.EOV

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 43 Filed 10/19/17 Page 45 of 53

Wyoming Department of
Corrections

WDOC Form #321.1
RETURNED GRIEVANCE NOTIFICATION

Page 1 of 1
Last Revised: 12/02/16

RETURNED GRIEVANCE NOTIFICATION

INMATE NAME:Blancliard,Taylor WDOC#2922

INSTITUTION WWC DATE: 06/30/2017

Your grievance is being returned in accordance witb WDOC Policy and Procedure #3.100, Inmate Communication and Grievance Procedure for the reason(s) marked below.

□ No attempt to resolve at the lowest level (See WDOC P&P Wi. 100 § IV,D) □ Not submitted within 30 days of the incident (Sec wdoc p&p W.loo § JV,n.i,iii)
O The 30 days starts when from the lime when you reasonable knew or should have known that the grievable incident occurred.
□ Contains inappropriate language/threats (See WDOC P&P #3.100 § lv,D.2,iii) □ Incomplete information about incident being grieved (See WDOC P&P #3.100 § lV.H,l,ii.a) □ Not on approved form (See WDOC forms #321 or #322) □ Exceeds space authorized (See WDOC P&P #3.100 ij Iv.H.l.iv) □ Attempts to grieve more than 1 issue/decision/staff action (See WDOC P&P #3.100 §
IV.E.l.vi)
□ Already submitted grievance on this issue (Sec WDOC P&P #3.I00§ iv,E,],xii) □ May not submit for another person/group (See WDOC P&P #3.100 § IV.F.,3,ii) □ Exceeds limits for 3 a week or 8 a month. (See WDOC P&P #3.100 § lV,E,l.x) B Non-grievable issues: (See WDOC P&P #3.100 § IV,E,5)
o Adoption or modification of faith group or religious practice.
o Classification decisions.
o Disciplinary actions. o Issue is part of pending litigation. o Failure of staff to respond within timelines. o Involves non-WDOC agency or outside of WDOC control. o Does not personally affect grievant.
o STG affiliation validation.
□ Appeal submitted prior to submitting grievance (Sec WDOC form #321) D Appeal submitted prior to initial grievance response □ Issue must be grieved with WHFAVHCC/WSP.WWC/WMCI
Notes on Grievance Return Inmate Blanchard. Your 321 Grievance is being rejected for the following:

1) Classification decisions ar non-erievable.

WDOC Staff Signature:f 'a ^. .sd, , . >

Printed Name:

carpenief

Date; 06/30/2017

Note: The return of the grievance does not extend the 30 day time frame.

Wyoming Department OF Corrections* 1934 Wyolt Drive, Suite 100 • Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002 Telephone (307) 777-7208 • Fax (30?) 777-7476 • Website htipi/Vcorrections.wy.gov/

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 43 Filed 10/19/17 Page 46 of 53
Civil Action No. 17-CV-124-S
United States District Court, District of Wyoming
TAYLOR S. BLANCHARD,Individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated
versus
ROBERT LAMPERT and RICK CATRON,
in their official capacities
EXHIBIT TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Ccassee1i::1i7/--ccvv--0u0u1i2i4!4-S-bWWiS3 DDoccuummenit 433U-3Filie-dii1ea0i/1u9/U/127/i/PaPgaeg4e7ioofr5i3

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF Vy^OMlNG

TAYLOR S. BLANCHARD,individually, and on behalfofall other persons similarly situated.

Plaintiff,

vs.

Case No. 17-CV-124-S

ROBERT LAMPERT and RICK CATRON,in their official
capacities.

Defendants.

AFFIDAVIT OF AMANDA TAYLOR
1, Amanda Taylor, being first duly sworn,do depose and state as follows: 1. 1 am a resident of Jefferson County, Florida and over the age of twenty-one(21)
years.
2. I am not suffering from any disease, defect, or condition that would impair or limit my ability to swear to or affirm the tnith ofthe matters asserted herein.
3. I am the Correctional Services Consultant for Reception & Youthful Offender Services at iJie Florida Department ofCorrections and have persona!knowledge ofcertain events that are the subject of this lawsuit.

CCaassee1l::1177-c-vc-v0-00102142-4S-WSWSS DDoccuummentt4330-3FileFidle1d01/109//0127/17PaPgaeg4e82ooff573

4. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and accurate copy of the Florida Department of Corrections pamphlet describing Florida's Basic Training Program, in which Taylor Blanchard is a current participant.
5, Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and accurate table showing the recidivism rates ofwomen who have completed Florida's Basic Training Program h'om 2001 to 2016. This table was last updated May 30,2017.

DATED this

day ofOctober,2017.

Amanda Taylo

STATE OF FLORIDA COUNTY OF LEON

) )SS. )

The foregoing Affidavit of Amanda Taylor was subscribed and sworn to before me
by Amanda Taylor this Si day ofOctober,2017.

Witness my hand and official seal.

My ^Commission Expires:

yfCifcL
N^ftaiv Public
j.cuFm3(
.*MYwCpOtHaMgIfStSDIMOrHiIaFfF20B7.6M9i?74

Cuaassee1i:;1±7/--ccvv--0u0ui1<2i44--Si>WwiS> Duooccuummeenntu4u3-jFilie-dii1ea0±/1u9/u/1z7/i/PaKgaeg4e9doofr5/3
EXHIBIT A

CCaasseel1::17--ccvv--0000112244-S-SWWS DDooccuummeenntt 3403-3FiFleidle1d01/01/90/12/717PaPgaeg50 of 53

EiigibiHty/Criteria
Inmates must be sentenced pursuant to Chapter958,F.S.,Youthful Offenders;or
Designated as such by the department pursuant to Chapter 958,F.S.(Selected First time offenders,age 24 or under serving 10 years or less and not a capital
or life felon.)
All department designated youthful offenders must be eligible for control release pursuant to section 947.146 F.S.
Basic training program candidates
cannot:
• Have physical limitations that would preclude participation in the strenuous physical regimen.
• Have psychologicallimitations that would preclude participation in an intensive regimented program.
• Be classified higher than minimum or community custody.
Note: Those inmates convicted ofa
sexual offense or escape typically are not eligible for a reduction in custody to minimum or community.

Forfurther information,
contact:
Florida Department of
Corrections
Bureau of Security
Operations
Reception & Youthful
Offender Services
501 South Calhoun Street
Tallahassee,PL 32399-2500
Phone:(850)717-3555
Inspiring success by transforming one life ata
time.

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS
Rick Scott, Governor
Julie L Jones, Secretary

CCaasseel1::17--ccvv--0000112244-S-SWWSS DDooccuummeenntt 3403-3FiFleidle1d01/01/90/21/717PaPgaege515ooff573

Introduction
The BasicTraining Program(BTP)is authorized by the Florida Legislature under
section 958.045,F.S.The male BTP,Sumter Basic Training Unit(Sumter BTU),is located on the grounds ofSumter Correctional Institution, in Bushnell, Florida, and the
female BTP,referred to as CAMP(Corrections Alternative Military Program)Jones,is
located at Lowell Correctional Institution in
Ocala, Florida.
Identification & Placement Potential candidates for the BTP are
identified by Reception & Youthful Offender
Services.
Reception & Youthful Offender Services will notify the sentencing courtofeiigibili^ and request the court's approval to place the
inmate in the BTP.
Ifthe court approves,and the inmate remains eligible,the inmate may be placed In the BTP for a minimum 120 days.
If performance is satisfactory and the inmate is expected to complete the program,the Department will notify the court. The court will typically issue a prospective order modifying sentence and placing the inmate on community supervision.This prospective order is valid only i/the inmate successfully completes the program.
If the inmate's performance is unsatisfactory, or ifs/he fails to complete the program,s/he is removed from the program and serves the
remaining term of their incarceration.

Program Components The BTP includes the following components: Physical training that consists ofstrenuous
exercise designed to develop optimum physical conditioning. Militaiy drill and ceremony consisting of marching drills, compliance with a rigid code of dress and appearance and the use of military courtesy in speech and actions. Work assignments consisting of manual labor that are of a productive nature. Academic and vocational programming based
on assessed needs of the individual inmate
and program availability. Personal development counseling which includes training in decision-making and development ofsocial adjustmentskills. Self-betterment programming. Pre-release counseling regarding the inmate's adjustment to society.
Program Phases The BTP is divided into the following phases: Phase I consists ofa period ofintense military regimen requiring a minimum ofsixty(60) days active participation.
Phase II consists ofeducational programming and personal development training provided within a quasi-military environment for a period oftime not to exceed the length of sentence imposed by the sentencing court An inmate will be required to participate successfullyin Phase II ofthe program for a
minimum ofsixty(60)days. The length oftime that an inmate will participate in Phases 1 and 11 combined will be no less than 120 days.
Each inmate will be required to participate in the BTP in a satisfactory manner for a minimum of 120 days in order to successfully complete the BTP.

At the successful conclusion of Phase II an
inmate's sentence is typically restructured
and the inmate is released to community
supervision;however,completion ofthe BTP
could result in other measures in accordance
with sections 958.045(5)-(6), F.S.
Guiding Principles Divert selected youthful offenders from long periods ofincarceration.
Cooperation and coordination between the Department of Corrections and the Florida Judicial System.
Provide opportunities for educational
enhancement
Provide opportunities for persona! growth
within a structured environment.
Provide the inmate with the opportunity to become involved in the decision-making process concerning his/her future.
Instill confidence,self-respect,and pride in accomplishments.
Place responsibility directly on the inmate for successful completion ofthe program.
Promote the development ofself-discipline through a military model oftreatment
Facilitate after-care placement and follow-up through community-based supervision.

CCaassee1l::1177-c-vc-v0-00102142-4S-WSWSS DDooccuummentt 4330-3FileFidle1d01/109//0127/17PaPgaeg5e26oof f573
EXHIBIT B

CCaassee1l::1177-c-vc-v0-00102142-4S-WSWSS DDooccuummeenntt 4330-3FileFidle1d01/109/0/127/17PaPgaeg5e37ooff573

Florida Basic Training Program
Female Graduate Recidivism Rates

Release Year
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total

Number Of
Graduates 57 54 30 27 25 22 17 20 25 16 11 23 30 31 34 33 455

Percent Re-Incarcerated

36.8% 37.0% 33.3% 37.0% 44.0% 27.3% 23.5% 20.0% 32.0% 18.8% 27.3% 21.7% 30.0% 29.0% 11.8% 12.1% 28.8%

 
 Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 57 Filed 11/09/17 Page 1 of 17

il.S.D!ST^TCOfT^

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTST^'f.1 ' ^

-

2811HOV -9

FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING

,u^$. CLERK

CASi

TAYLOR S. BLANCHARD.
Plaintiff,
vs.
WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS DIRECTOR,
WYOMING WOMENS CENTER
WARDEN,

Case No. 17-CV-0124

Defendants.

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

This matter conies before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (ECF No. 31.) Defendants filed an opposition to the motion (ECF No. 39) and the Court took the matter under advisement during a hearing on a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 41.) Plaintiff has since filed a reply brief (ECF No. 48.) Having considered the briefs and evidence, and being otherwise fiilly advised, the Court finds and concludes a preliminary injunction should be denied.

BACKGROUND
This case arises out of an equal protection claim for Defendants alleged failure to give Ms. Blanchard "the same opportunity to participate in Wyoming's Youthful Offender or boot camp program as provided to male prisoners in the custody of the WDOC." (ECF No. 48 at 2) {citing ECF No. I at 10 and ECF No. 40 at 12.) The

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 57 Filed 11/09/17 Page 2 of 17
preliminary injunction requests Ms. Blanchard be granted prompt relief to prevent further harm. (ECF No. 32 at 3.)
Plaintiff, Taylor S. Blanchard, was originally charged in Wyoming state court with a conspiracy to commit a controlled substance offense in January, 2016. (PL's Amend. Comp. Ex. 1) (ECF No. 43 at 31). Blanchard was sentenced to a term of incarceration for six to ten years, but her sentence was suspended and she was placed on probation. {Id)
On April 11, 2017, Ms. Blanchard, appeared before a Wyoming State District Court Judge, the Honorable Marv Tyler. (Id, at 17.) At the hearing, Blanchard admitted to violating the terms of her probation. (Jd,) On May 8, 2017, Ms. Blanchard appeared before Judge Tyler for sentencing. {Id. at 15.) Blanchard's counsel requested she be given an opportunity to participate in a boot camp program. {Id. at 19.) Defense Counsel noted it is likely the first time that such a request had been made for a female defendant. {Id.)
"And so in a way if the Court, and I'm trying to say this nicely, if the Court doesn't give a recommendation of Youthful Offender/Boot Camp then is the Court violating my client's rights under the equal protection clause and the due process clause of the Wyoming Constitution or the United States Constitution or is it violating the statute when the statute is just - when combined with the gender neutral statute says he." {Id. at 20.) Judge Tyler gave the Department of Corrections his "recommendation [she be] admitted into a Boot Camp or Youthful Offender Program." {Id. at 32.) On July 18, Blanchard filed a "Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (ECF No. 1) and has since filed an "Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (ECF No. 43). Blanchard alleges "[b]ecause WDOC does not have a Youthful

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 57 Filed 11/09/17 Page 3 of 17
Offender program for women, the women in the custody of the WDOC are denied the opportunities provided to men in their WDOC boot camp program." {Id. at 8.)
Blanchard requests declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, 28 USC §§2201, 2202 and 42 USC §1983. {Id. at 12.) In particular, "enjoining Defendants...from refusing to give women prisoners the same opportunity to participate in Wyoming's Youthful Offender or boot camp program as provided to male prisoners in the custody of the WDOC." {Id.) Blanchard requests this Court order
Defendants, "among other things, to provide women with the same opportunity to participate in and complete Wyoming's Youthful Offender program as men prisoners, and to send women to an out-of-state program only if men are sent to out-of-state programs on a comparable and equitable basis, that is, such out-of-state placement should not be based on gender but rather gender-neutral principles." {Id.)
On June 14, 2017, WDOC became aware that Ms. Blanchard had received a boot
camp recommendation. (ECF No. 16 at 5.) WDOC then began contacting states looking for a female boot camp program. {Id.) On August 1, 2017, WDOC sent Blanchard's "packets" to three states for a final decision of her eligibility. {Id.) On August 8, 2017, Florida Department of Corrections responded and accepted Blanchard's transfer. {Id.) Blanchard was transferred to the Florida Department of Corrections to join the upcoming cycle of its boot camp program. {Id.)
On October 3, 2017, Ms, Blanchard filed a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 31). Blanchard argues in her brief that her transfer to the Florida Department of Corrections boot camp program violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
3

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 57 Filed 11/09/17 Page 4 of 17
Amendment in two respects. (ECF No. 32 at 2.) First, unlike men who participate in Wyoming's boot camp program, women are sent out-of-state. {Id.) Second, the Florida boot camp program is inferior to the Wyoming program. {Id.) Ms. Blanchard requests transfer from the Florida boot camp program into the Wyoming boot camp program. {Id. at 19.) Blanchard also requests the Court give her "credit for time spent in the Florida program." {Id.) Finally, Blanchard requests defendants be required to submit a proposed remedial plan, subject to approval by the Court. {Id.)
LEGAL ANALYSIS
A, Preliminary Injunction Standard A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary equitable remedy. Westar Energy,
Inc. V. Lake, 552 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th Cir. 2009). As such, "the right to relief must be clear and unequivocal." SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 936 F.2d 1096, 1098 (10th Cir. 1991). The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to "preserve the relative positions of the parties imtil a trial on the merits can be held." Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 101 S. Ct. 1830, 68 L.Ed.2d 175 (1981). Ordinarily, for a preliminary injunction to issue, the moving party must establish four elements:
(1) a substantial likelihood that [she] will ultimately succeed on the merits of its suit; (2) [she] is likely to be irreparably injured without an injunction; (3) this threatened harm outweighs the harm a preliminary injunction may pose to the opposing party; and, (4) the injunction, if issued, will not adversely affect the public interest. Flood V. ClearOne Commc'ns, Inc., 618 F.3d 1110, 1117 (10th Cir. 2010) {citing Gen. Motors Corp. v. Urban Gorilla, LLC, 500 F.3d 1222, 1226 (10th Cir. 2007)).
4

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 57 Filed 11/09/17 Page 5 of 17
Where the motion for preliminary injunction is a "disfavored injunction," the
standard is subjected to a heightened scrutiny. 0 Centra Espirita Beneflciente Uniao Do
Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 973, 1002 (10th Cir.2004) affd and remanded sub nom.
Gonzales v. O Centra Espirita Beneflciente Uniaa da Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211, 163
L.Ed.2d 1017 (2006). There are three types of disfavored preliminary injunctions that
require heightened scrutiny:
(1) preliminary injunctions that aher the status quo; (2) mandatory preliminary injunctions; and (3) preliminary injunctions that afford the
movant all the relief that it could recover at the conclusion of a full trial on
the merits. When a preliminary injunction falls into one of these categories, it must be more closely scrutinized to assure that the exigencies of the case support the granting of a remedy that is extraordinary even in the normal course. A district court may not grant a preliminary injunction unless the moving party makes a strong showing both with regard to the likelihood of success on the merits and with regard to the balance of harms.
Awad V. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1125 (10th Cir. 2012) (internal cites omitted).
Additionally, federal courts must move with caution when called upon to deal with
even serious violations of the law by local prison officials. The Supreme Court observed
in Missauri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651, 1663, 109 L.Ed.2d 31 (1990), "one of the most
important considerations governing the exercise of equitable power is a proper respect for
the integrity and function of local government institutions." Prison management is
fundamentally governed by legislative and executive branches of government. The
Supreme Court noted,
[T]he problems of prisons in America are complex and intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree. Most require expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of government. For all of those reasons, courts are

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 57 Filed 11/09/17 Page 6 of 17
ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform. Judicial recognition of that fact reflects no more than a healthy sense of realism. Rhodes v. Chapman, 101 S. Ct. 2392, 2401 n. 16, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981) (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 94 S. Ct. 1800, 1807, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974)). See also Bell v. Wolfish, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 1879, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) ("the operation of our correctional facilities is peculiarly the province of the Legislative and Executive Branches of our Government, not the Judicial"); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 93 S. Ct. 1827, 1837, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) ("It is difficuh to imagine an activity in which a State has a stronger interest, or one that is more intricately bound up with state laws, regulations, and procedures, than the administration of its prisons."). B. Equal Protection Standard In assessing Plaintiffs likelihood of success on the merits, the Court must determine the appropriate standard to assess Plaintiffs equal protection claim. Ms. Blanchard contends the standard for equal protection claims based on gender is heightened scrutiny. (ECF No. 32 at 12.) Defendants argue the appropriate standard in prisoner cases is whether the regulation at issue is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. (ECF No. 32 at 9.) The Equal Protection Clause is violated when the government discriminates between similarly-situated individuals. Meek v. Jordan, 534 F. App'x 762, 764 (10th Cir. 2013) {citing Penrod v. Zavaras, 94 F.3d 1399, 1406 (10th Cir.1996)). Parties seeking to
defend gender-based government action must demonstrate an "exceedingly persuasive
justification" for that actioa United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2274, 135 L. Ed.
6

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 57 Filed 11/09/17 Page 7 of 17
2d 735 (1996); see also Concrete Works of Colorado, Inc. v. City & Cty. ofDenver, 321 F.3d 950, 959 (10th Cir. 2003) (applying intermediate scrutiny to gender-based policy measures).
However, the level of scrutiny as well as the burden of persuasion changes when a prisoner brings an equal protection claim. See Overton v. Bazzetta, 123 S. Ct. 2162, 2167, 156 L. Ed. 2d 162 (2003) ("Many of the liberties and privileges enjoyed by other citizens must be surrendered by the prisoner."). When a prisoner makes a constitutional claim, the initial question should be whether the prisoner possesses the right at issue at all, or whether instead the prisoner has been divested of the right as a condition of his conviction and confinement. See Id. at 2162; Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (C.A.6 1944). "When a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Turner v. Sqfley, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 2261, 96 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1987). The Supreme Court explains "prison administrators ..., and not the courts, [are] to make the difficult judgments concerning institutional operations." Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2261-2262 (citing Jones, 97 S. Ct. at 2539). Moreover, the burden is not on the State to prove the validity of prison regulations but on the prisoner to disprove it. Overton, 123 S. Ct. at 2168 {citing Jones, 97 S. Ct. at 2532). Consequently, the standard in United States v. Virginia is necessarily juxtaposed with the standard outlined in Turner.
Under Turner, the Supreme Court provided several relevant factors to determine reasonableness of a prison regulation. First, there must be a "valid, rational connection" between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to
7

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 57 Filed 11/09/17 Page 8 of 17
justify it. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2262 (citing Block v, Rutherford, 104 S. Ct. 3228, 3232, 82 L. Ed. 2d 438 (1984)). Second, the court should determine whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates granting a "measure ofjudicial deference owed to corrections officials ... in gauging the validity of the regulation." Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2262 (citing Pell v. Procunier, 94 S. Ct. 2800, 2806, 41 L. Ed. 2d 495 (1974)). Third, the court should consider the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison's limited resources generally. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2262. Finally, the existence of obvious, easy alternatives may be evidence that the regulation is not reasonable, but an "exaggerated response" to prison concerns. Id.
The Tenth Circuit has applied the Turner factors in determining various questions of prisoners' constitutional rights. See Searles v. Dechant, 393 F.3d 1126, 1131 (10th Cir. 2004) (applying Turner's reasonableness standard in assessing plaintiffs claim prison officials violated his right to free exercise of religion); Frazier v. Dubois, 922 F.2d 560, 562 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1248 (5th Cir.1989)) ("Although Turner addresses prison rules and regulations, we see no reason why the Turner principle should not apply to other prison actions, such as the transfer here."); and Doe V. Heil, 533 F. App'x 831, 839 (10th Cir. 2013) (applying Turner standard in Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination claim, and Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim for a violation of a "cognizable liberty interest"). The Tenth Circuit also applied Turner in a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection gender discrimination claim. See Dunn v. McCotter, 25 F.3d 1056 (10th Cir. 1994) (prison
8

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 57 Filed 11/09/17 Page 9 of 17
officials were not required to enforce the same grooming policy that applied to males and not female inmates under Turner), Additionally, the Turner analysis has been used to determine the appropriateness of a preliminary injunction. See Beerheide v. Suthers, 286 F.3d 1179, 1185 (10th Cir. 2002) {''[Turner] requires courts, on a case-by-case basis, to look closely at the facts of a particular case and the specific regulations and interests of the prison system in determining whether prisoner's constitutional rights may be curtailed.").
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff is seeking a preliminary injunction that alters the status quo, is mandatory
in nature, and affords her all the relief that she could recover at the conclusion of a full
trial on the merits. See Awad, 670 F.3d at 1125. Consequently, the Court may only grant a preliminary injunction if the plaintiff makes a strong showing with regard to the
likelihood of success on the merits. At this time, the Court identifies the issue Plaintiff
must show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits to be whether sending Ms. Blanchard to an out of state boot camp program is a violation of her equal protection rights where Wyoming operates a men's boot camp but not a women's, thus necessitating
her out of state transfer.
The Court believes this case should ultimately be examined under the Turner reasonableness standard. The Tenth Circuit has applied Turner in both prisoner transfer
and gender equal protection cases. However, even under Plaintiffs heightened scrutiny
analysis, the Court would find the same result. Plaintiff has not met her elevated burden

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 57 Filed 11/09/17 Page 10 of 17
of making a strong showing with regard to likelihood of success on the merits, nor has she shown a likelihood of irreparable injury if a preliminary injunction is not granted. A, Substantial Likelihood ofSuccess on the Merits
It should be noted at the outset that participation in the Wyoming boot camp program is not a liberty interest prisoners are entitled to. See Ellett v. State, 883 P.2d 940, 941 (Wyo. 1994) (holding appellant's denial for participation the Youthful Offender Program due to a medical injury does not violate the equal protection clause of the Wyoming and United States Constitutions); see also United States v. Gaskin, 145 F.3d 1347 (10th Cir. 1998) (affirming lower courts holding that plaintiff was not *entitled to placement in a boot camp' even though he was originally placed in a boot camp with the possibility of a sentence reduction upon successful completion); see also United States v. Morgan, No. CRIM. A. 94-10097-01, 1996 WL 473858, at *1 (D. Kan. June 26, 1996) (holding a judge's reconunendation for placement in a boot camp program does not undercut Bureau of Prisons exclusive authority regarding inmate placement).
However, Ms. Blanchard claims she has been subjected to different treatment with regard to boot camp placement because of her suspect class. Namely, because she is a woman she has been sent to an inferior boot camp program. (ECF No. 40 at 2.) Plaintiff provides the Court three arguments why she is likely to succeed on the merits,
(1) for the past thirty years, WDOC has actively facilitated and promoted the entry of men into the boot camp program - even constructing a facility exclusively for men - while doing nothing to facilitate or promote the entry of women; (2) when Taylor Blanchard entered the program. Defendants sent her out-of-state, a disability no man ever suffers; and (3) the program in which Ms. Blanchard was placed is inferior to Wyoming's program for
men.
10

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 57 Filed 11/09/17 Page 11 of 17
(ECF No. 32 at 11-12.) Plaintiffs motion relies on a district court case West v. Virginia Dep't of Corr,
where the court held a female plaintiffs denial of participation in the state Boot Camp Incarceration Program because of her gender violated equal protection. (ECF 48 at 5-6) West V. Virginia Dep't of Corr., 847 F. Supp. 402, 408 (W.D. Va. 1994). The Virginia boot camp statute set out eligibility requirements that did not require plaintiff to be a male. West, 847 F. Supp. at 404. However, plaintiff was denied admission into the boot camp program because of her gender. Id. The court ultimately granted sunmiary judgment for plaintiff, holding "defendants acted unconstitutionally in providing a favorable sentencing option for male prisoners, where none was available for female prisoners." Id. at 408.
However, this case is distinguishable from Ms. Blanchard both procedurally and factually. The case is procedurally different, because the court was ruling on cross motions for summary judgment after parties stipulated the material facts were undisputed and the matter was ready to be decided on the merits. Id. at 404. At this preliminary injunction stage, the Court does not have undisputed material facts. Instead the Court has a complaint, an amended complaint, several motions, and has yet to receive Defendants' answer. Nevertheless, this Court is asked to grant a highly disfavored motion for preliminary injunction.
Factually the cases are different because the plaintiff in West was denied any ability to participate in any boot camp program (in Virginia or elsewhere) and receive a potential sentence reduction. The West "court agrees that whether this grant of
11

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 57 Filed 11/09/17 Page 12 of 17
discretionary authority could permit the DOC to establish a boot camp-type program for men and not for women presents a close question. However, when an extremely favorable sentencing alternative is provided to one class of inmates and not another, and when that classification is based solely on the inmates' gender, the line is crossed." fVest, 847 F. Supp. at 408. The close question identified in the fVest case is significantly narrower here. Ms. Blanchard has already received a boot camp placement and has the potential to receive a sentence reduction. (See ECF Nos. 16, 24, 30, 32, 34, 37, 39.) Therefore, the decision in fVest is materially distinguishable to this case. Ms. Blanchard has not been barred from an extremely favorable sentencing alternative based solely on her gender.
Plaintiffs reply brief asserts "the only question this Court must resolve is whether these women have been afforded a comparable opportunity to participate in and benefit from Wyoming's BCP. 77ie answer to that question will become manifestly clear at trial" (ECF No. 40 at 5) (emphasis added). However, Plaintiff cannot base her motion for a preliminary injunction, on evidence she plans to make manifestly clear at trial. The evidence must be clear now. See SCFCILC, Inc., 936 F.2d at 1098 (10th Cir.1991) ("As a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, the right to relief must be clear and unequivocal.") The Supreme Court has observed "that a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion." Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972, 117 S.Ct. 1865, 138 L.Ed.2d 162 (1997) (per curiam) (quotation omitted).
12

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 57 Filed 11/09/17 Page 13 of 17
Ms. Blanchard does present arguments that disparities exists between the boot camp programs' length of time, location, and programming. These allegations are predominately supported by Ms. Blanchard's declarations. Although the Court does not believe Ms. Blanchard's allegations have risen to the clear showing required for a preliminary injunction, it will briefly address each allegation in turn.
First, Plaintiff argues the difference in length of time violates her equal protection right. (ECF No. 32 at 5.) The Court finds a shorter boot camp term does not, on its face, violate equal protection. Plaintiff has not alleged any actual harm fi-om a shorter program. To the contrary, a shorter program would appear to aid the Plaintiff in receiving a quicker sentence modification. Sentence modifications can be awarded at the judge's discretion for a successful completion of the boot camp program. Therefore, if anything, a shorter boot camp term could increase the likelihood of successful completion and allow for the possibility of a quicker sentence reduction. Plaintiff has failed to allege a factual basis for why a shorter program, outside of being shorter, violates her equal protection.
Second, Plaintiff argues the boot camp location violates equal protection because men are not sent out of state. (ECF No. 32 at 15.) Again, the Court finds that prisoner placement does not, on its face, violate equal protection. Plaintiff acknowledges that prisons have authority to place individuals in out-of-state facilities. {Jd. at 5.) However, she argues the placement cannot be based solely on gender grounds, ijd.) Interestingly, Plaintiffs initial complaint sought relief by being placed in a boot camp in "another state." (ECF No. 1 at 10.) Plaintiffs amended complaint continues to seek placement in an out of state program, albeit only if men also are sent. (ECF No. 40 at 13.) However,
13

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 57 Filed 11/09/17 Page 14 of 17
these placement decisions are the very decisions made by prison administrators. See Meachum v. Fano, 96 S. Ct. 2532, 2538, 49 L. Ed. 2d 451 (1976). Furthermore, separation of men and women in prison is constitutional. Women Prisoners ofD.C. Dep't of Corr. V. D.C., 93 F.3d 910, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1996) {citing Pitts v. Thornburgh, 866 F.2d 1450 (D.C.Cir.l989)) ("As an initial matter, we note that the segregation of inmates by sex is unquestionably constitutional.").
Third, Plaintiff argues the disparate programing at each boot camp violates her equal protection. (ECF No. 32 at 5.) However, when Defendants argue identical progranmiing is not required under the equal protection clause. Plaintiff attempts to shift the focus away from programs and back to placement. Plaintiffs reply states she is not challenging the number and type of programs offered, but rather opportunity to attend boot camp. (ECF No. 48 at 5.) However, this appears to be contradictory to what Ms. Blanchard alleges in her motion for preliminary injunction. Blanchard argues her motion should be granted because "she was placed into an inferior program" (ECF No. 32 at 2), and "men in Wyoming's program receive more training and programming - up to three times as much—as Ms. Blanchard will receive" {Id. at 5), and finally "Ms. Blanchard is suffering irreparable harm because ... she was placed into a program inferior to
Wyoming's program for men." {Id. at 11.) Although, some of this information will likely become clearer as discovery proceeds, it is unclear at this time. This Court cannot grant a disfavored preliminary injunction that interferes with the administration of prison facilities, without clearer evidence of disparate treatment based on gender.
14

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 57 Filed 11/09/17 Page 15 of 17
B. Irreparable Injury Plaintiff argues a constitutional violation presumptively results in irreparable
harm. Ms. Blanchard claims her Fourteenth Amendment right is being violated because of her transfer to the Florida boot camp program. (ECF No. 32 at 14.) The Court does not disagree that generally a violation of constitutional rights presumptively results in irreparable harm. See Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 963 (10th Cir.2001) (quoting llA Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2948.1 (2d ed.l995)). However, Plaintiff has yet to present a strong showing of a violation of her constitutional rights. See Guzzo v. Mead, No. 14-CV-200-SWS, 2014 WL 5317797, at *5 (D. Wyo. Oct. 17, 2014). Additionally, Ms. Blanchard has failed to show her constitutional right to relief is clear and unequivocal. See SCFCILC, Inc., 936
F.2datl098.
While Ms. Blanchard's denial of admission into a Wyoming (located) boot camp program solely because of gender could constitute a harm, at this point in time that harm is speculative. See Sassman v. Brown, 73 F. Supp. 3d 1241, 1251 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (despite Plaintiffs likelihood to succeed on merits of equal protection claim any alleged harm merely speculative). Ms. Blanchard has been placed in a boot camp program and, if completed, will have the same opportunity for sentence reduction as a Wyoming male participant. Although Ms. Blanchard's current placement in the Florida program may prove to be inferior to the Wyoming boot camp program that has yet to be established. Nonetheless, Ms. Blanchard can seek a sentence reduction if she successful completes the
program. 15

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 57 Filed 11/09/17 Page 16 of 17
Plaintiff contends in her motion for preliminary injunction she is suffering other injuries due to Defendants' discriminatory administration of the boot camp program. (ECF 40 at 14.) Plaintiff alleges she was harmed by being transported in shackles over a series of days to Florida. {Id,) Ms. Blanchard states she was "scared and anxious and felt helpless" and "lonely and distressed being so far from home." {Id.) Additionally she was upset and disgusted about being forced to leave Wyoming. {Id.)
However, these alleged irreparable injuries are not unique to Plaintiff and alleged gender discrimination. Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court recognizes, prisoners do not retain many of the liberties and privileges enjoyed by other citizens. See Overton, 123 S. Ct. at 2167. This must necessarily encompass certain feelings of anxiousness and distress. All prisoners will face certain uncomfortableness with incarceration, which can include being constrained by shackles during transportation. See Covalt v. Inmate Servs. Corp., No. 15-CV-685-LTB, 2015 WL 2207700, at *5 (D. Colo. May 8, 2015), affd, 658 F. App'x 367 (10th Cir. 2016) ("While no doubt uncomfortable, the requirement that prisoners travel in shackles protects not only the guards but the other prisoners as well.") Moreover, if the Court granted Plaintiffs motion she would again be subject to transportation back to Wyoming.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has not met the heightened scrutiny required to receive a disfavored preliminary injunction. Ms. Blanchard has not made a strong showing with regard to the likelihood of success on the merits nor has she clearly shown an irreparable injury.
16

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 57 Filed 11/09/17 Page 17 of 17 Noting the absence of these two factors, the Court declines to address the remaining factors for a preliminary injunction. It is hereby
ORDERED Plaintiffs Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 31) is
Denied.
Dated this / day of November, 2017.
c6tt W. Skavdahl
United States District Judge
17

 
 Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 58 Filed 11/13/17 Page 1 of 13

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

.rjLEip^ -n'

FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING

iOHMPV 13 PH 2=55
';a'Y:o.::l£rk
LAASrLR

TAYLOR S. BLANCHARD,

Plaintiff,
vs.
WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS DIRECTOR,
WYOMING WOMENS CENTER
WARDEN,

Case No. I7-CV-0I24

Defendants.

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion to Certify Class.(ECF No. 12.) Defendants filed an opposition to the motion (ECF No. 17) and Plaintiff has since filed a reply brief(ECF No. 22). Having considered the briefs and evidence, and being otherwise fully advised, the Court finds and concludes Plaintiffs motion for class
certification should be denied. BACKGROUND
This case arises out of an equal protection claim brought by Ms. Blanchard on behalf of herself and other women who were allegedly denied boot camp by the Wyoming Department of Corrections(WDOC)due to their gender.(ECF No. 13 at 2.) Plaintiffseeks class certification pursuant to Rule 23(a)and(b)(2)ofthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.(ECF No. 13.)

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 58 Filed 11/13/17 Page 2 of 13
On July 18, Ms. Blanchard filed a "Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (EOF No. 1) and has since filed an "Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief(ECF No.43). Ms. Blanchard alleges "[bjecause WDOC does not have a Youthful Offender program for women, the women in the custody of the WDOC are denied... opportunities to rehabilitate and receive an early release [] based entirely on their gender." {Id. at 8.)
Blanchard requests declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 USC §§2201, 2202 and 42 USC §1983. {Id. at 12.) In particular, "enjoining Defendants...from refusing to give women prisoners the same opportunity to participate in Wyoming's Youthful Offender or boot camp program as provided to male prisoners in the custody of the WDOC." {Id.) Blanchard requests this Court order Defendants, "among other things, to provide women with the same opportunity to participate in and complete Wyoming's Youthful Offender program as men prisoners, and to send women to an out-of-state program only if men are sent to outof-state programs on a comparable and equitable basis, that is, such out-of-state placement should not be based on gender but rather gender-neutral principles." {Id.)
On June 14, 2017, WDOC became aware that Ms. Blanchard had received a boot
camp recommendation from her sentencingjudge.(ECF No. 16 at 5.) WDOC then began contacting states looking for a female boot camp program. {Id) On August 1, 2017, WDOC sent Blanchard's "packets" to three states for a final decision of her eligibility. {Id.) On August 8, 2017, Florida Department of Corrections responded and accepted

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 58 Filed 11/13/17 Page 3 of 13
Blanchard's transfer. (Id) Blanchard was transferred to the Florida Department of Corrections tojoin the upcoming cycle ofits boot camp program.{Id.)
Due to these factual changes, this Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend her complaint. Defendant's motion to dismiss for want ofstanding was deemed to be mooted.
(ECF No. 40.) Plaintiff is no longer alleging denial of a placement in a boot camp program, but is challenging under equal protection the policy of sending women out of
state to an alleged inferior program.{Id) On August 17, 2017, Plaintiff filed her Motion to Certify Class. As noted above,
Plaintiff has since amended her complaint. The Court notes Ms. Blanchard is the first
woman who has ever received a judicial recommendation to allow a boot camp
placement.{See ECF Nos. 16, 17,22,24,32).
LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Wyoming's Youthful Offender Program -"Boot Camp" The Youthful Offender Program is governed by Wyoming Statutes §§ 7-13-1001
through 7-I3-I003. Wyoming's Youthful Offender Program is commonly referred to by the courts as "boot camp."See Counts v. State,2008 WY 156, 197 P.3d 1280,n. 1 (Wyo.
2008). The boot camp program is designed to provide first time offenders a short term
intense incarceration in a disciplined setting.(ECF No.43 at 7.) The boot camp program includes separation of program participants from the general inmate population and an
emphasis on work and physical activity. Wyo.Stat.§ 7-13-1003(c)(i)and (ii).

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 58 Filed 11/13/17 Page 4 of 13
Participation in the boot camp is a matter of grace and not ofright. Wyo.Stat.§
7-13-1003(d); see also United States v. Gaskin, 145 F.3d 1347 (lOth Cir. 1998)
(affirming lower court's holding that plaintiff was not 'entitled to placement in a boot
camp' even though he was originally placed in a boot camp with the possibility of a
sentence reduction upon successful completion). To be eligible for boot camp placement,
an individual must meet the eligibility requirements adopted by the WDOC and;
(!)[be] serving a sentence of imprisonment at a state penal institution for any offense other than a felony punishable by death or life imprisonment; (ii)Has not attained the age oftwenty-five(25) years; (iii) Has not previously served a term ofincarceration at any state or federal adult penal institution.
Wyo.Stat.§ 7-13-1003(b)(i)-(iii).
In compliance with this enabling legislation, the WDOC created a program and
adopted eligibility requirements. WDOC Policy and Procedure #4.104 "Youthful
Inmates". The WDOC rules outline the requirements for eligibility in the boot camp
program:
(i) The inmate shall be sentenced to a term ofimprisonment in a state penal institution for an offense other than a felony punishable by death or life
imprisonment;
(ii) The inmate shall not have attained the age of twenty-five (25) at the
time ofsentencing; (iii) The inmate shall not have previously served a tenn of incarceration at a state or federal adult penal institution;
(iv) The inmate shall be recommended to the program by the judge adjudicating his case and the recommendation shall be reflected in writing in the Judgment and Sentence ofthe court; and (v) The inmate shall meet any other condition specified by WDOC for participation in the program.
WDOC Policy and Procedure #4.104(1V)(B)(2).

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 58 Filed 11/13/17 Page 5 of 13
Both prosecution and defense counsel have the opportunity to recommend boot camp to the sentencing judge. However, even with a recoimnendation from counsel the judge is not bound to pass along a recommendation for boot camp to the WDOC. See Duke V. State, 209 P.3d 563, 567(Wyo.2009)(affirming sentencing court's rejection of the state's recommendation the defendant be allowed to participate in the boot camp program). Moreover, even with a recommendation from a sentencing judge, the ultimate decision of a boot camp placement rests with the warden. See Wilson v. State, 68 P.3d 1181, 1186 (Wyo. 2003) (asking defendant "do you understand that [the court] can recommend if I wish that you go to the boot camp, but the final decision on that is the warden's at the prison?").
Even when an inmate receives a recommendation from a judge, and is otherwise statutorily eligible for boot camp, they still may not be placed in boot camp.(ECF No. 17-1) (Lindly Aff. Tf 5.) An inmate may still be denied placement by WDOC due to mental and physical health reasons.(ECF No. 16-4)(Steber Aff. T| 16); see also Ellett v. State, 883 P.2d 940, 941 (Wyo. 1994)(holding appellant's denial for participation the Youthful Offender Program due to a medical injury did not violate the equal protection clause of the Wyoming and United States Constitutions). Additionally,"[ajpproval of an inmate's participation in the program may be revoked by the department at any time if the inmate fails to comply with program requirements." Wyo.Stat.§ 7-13-1003(d). Finally, the imnate has no right to appeal the denial of participation in the program. Id.
Once an individual has successfully completed boot camp they may request a reduction in their sentence. Wvo. SXAT. § 7-13-1002(a)(i). Inmates must make an
5

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 58 Filed 11/13/17 Page 6 of 13
application to the court within one year from the date he or she began serving a sentence of incarceration at a state penal institution. Wyo. STAT. § 7-13-1002(a)(ii). However, inmates who successfully complete boot camp are not statutorily guaranteed a sentence reduction. See EUett, 883 P.2d at 944(holding the district court has discretion to reduce the inmate's sentence or to decline any sentence reduction)."The Youthful Offender Act is capable of only one interpretation: the sentencing court has discretion to reduce the sentence of an applicant upon completion of boot camp; and that discretion allows a reduction in sentence which could include probation, but could also include a number of other possibilities." Mendoza v. State, 368 P.3d 886, 892(Wyo. 2016). Successful boot camp completion is just one of the factors the court may weigh in favor of sentence
reduction. Id.
B. FederalRule ofCivilProcedure 23- Class Certification Parties seeking class certification must demonstrate: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable [numerosity]; (2)there are questions oflaw or fact common to the class[commonality]; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses ofthe class[typicality]; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests ofthe class[adequacy].
Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a). "In determining the propriety of a class action, the question is not whether the
plaintiff or plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or will prevail on the merits, but rather whether the requirements ofRule 23 are met." Anderson v. City ofAlbuquerque,690 F.2d 796, 799 (10th Cir.1982)(quotation omitted); see also Eisen v, Carlisle & Jacquelin,94
6

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 58 Filed 11/13/17 Page 7 of 13
S. Ct. 2140,40 L.Ed.2d 732(1974)("[NJothing in either the language or history ofRule
23 ... gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits ofa suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class action.").
Additionally,the proposed class must satisfy at least one ofthe three requirements listed in Rule 23(b). Under Rule 23(b)(2) class treatment is allowed when "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that fmal injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole." The Supreme Court held the key to a (b)(2) class is "the indivisible nature of the injunctive or declaratory remedy warranted—the notion that the conduct is such that it can be enjoined or declared unlawful only as to all ofthe class members or as to none of them." Wal-Mart Stores. Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557, 180 L. Ed. 2d 374(2011)(citing Nagareda, 84 N.Y.U.L.Rev., at 132). "In other words. Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when a single injunction or declaratory judgment would provide relief to
each member of the class." Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2557.
The party seeking to certify a class bears the burden of proving each of the requirements of Rule 23 are met. See Reed v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 1307, 1309 (10th Cir. 1988). The district court must engage in its own "rigorous analysis" of whether "the prerequisites of Rule 23(a)have been satisfied."Shook v. ElPaso Cty.,386 F.3d 963,968 (10th Cir. 2004)(citing Gen. Tel. Co. ofthe S.W. v. Falcon, 102 S. Ct. 2364,72 L.Ed.2d 740(1982)). Class certification will be denied, upon the failure ofthe class representative
to meet any one of the prerequisites of the rule. Milonas v. Williams, 691 F.2d 931, 938
(10th Cir. 1982).

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 58 Filed 11/13/17 Page 8 of 13
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff seeks to invoke a class action consisting of"all present and future female prisoners under the age oftwenty-five and in the custody of the Wyoming Department of Corrections and/or the Wyoming Women's Center who are or will be otherwise eligible to participate in Wyoming's boot camp program, but who have been or will be denied participation due to their gender, or not considered by WDOC due to their gender."(ECF
No. 13 at 2-3.) A party seeking class action certification must demonstrate, under a strict burden
of proof, that all of the requirements of 23(a) are clearly met. Rex v. Owens ex tel. State of Okl, 585 F.2d 432, 435 (10th Cir. 1978) (citing Albertson's Inc. v. Amalgamated Sugar Co.,503 F.2d 459(10th Cir. 1974). Plaintiffhas failed to meet this burden.
A. Numerosity Plaintiff argues the numerosity requirement under Fed. R. Civ. P (23)(a)(l) is met
for two reasons. First, Plaintiff alleges "there are at least fifty women at WWC who are members of the class, that is, they were under 25 at the time of sentencing and were denied access to a boot camp program solely due to their gender."(ECF No 13 at 5.) Second, Plaintiff alleges "numerosity is satisfied in this case because the class includes persons who will become members in the future." (Id. at 6.) However, under Tenth Circuit precedent the issue considered under the numerosity component is not a question of numbers, but whether the nature of tlie action, size of the individual claims, and the location of the members of the class are such that it would make joinder impracticable.
8

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 58 Filed 11/13/17 Page 9 of 13
See Colorado Cross Disability Coalition v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 765 F.3d 1205, 1214-15(10th Cir. 2014). In this case it does not.
"The burden is on the plaintiffs seeking to represent a class to establish that the class is so numerous as to make joinder impracticable." Peterson v. Okla City Housing Auth., 545 F.2d 1270, 1273 (10th Cir. 1976). Plaintiff alleges at least fifty women at WWC qualify as class members, arguing that number is more than adequate to satisfy numerosity and citing to cases with a presumption of numerosity. Plaintiff cites multiple cases outside of the Tenth Circuit where the court has "presumed" numerosity at a specific number.See Consol. Rail Corp. v. Town ofHyde Park,47 F.3d 473,483(2d Cir. 1995)("numerosity is presumed at a level of forty members"); Jones v. Diamond, 519 F.2d 1090, 1100 n.l8 (5th Cir. 1975), affd en banc, 636 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1981) (approving class offorty-eightJail inmates).
However, Plaintiffs reliance on decisions from the Fifth and Second Circuit is
misplaced. The Tenth Circuit has never adopted a specific number to support a presumption that joinder is impracticable. Trevizo v. Adams,455 F.3d 1155, 1162 (10th Cir. 2006). To the contrary,the Tenth Circuit has held "the numerosity requirement is not "a question of numbers.'" Colorado Cross Disability Coalition, supra at 1215. There is
"no set fonnula to determine if the class is so numerous that it should be so certified."
Rex, 585 F.2d at 436. The Tenth Circuit continues to hold numerosity is a fact-specific inquiry, and grants district courts wide latitude in making such determinations. See Vallario v. Vandehey, 554 F.3d 1259, 1264 (10th Cir. 2009). Additionally, the Tenth Circuit case cited by Plaintiff did not create a presumption of numerosity but left the
9

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 58 Filed 11/13/17 Page 10 of 13
conclusion of numerosity to the sound discretion of the trial court. Milonas, 691 F.2d at 938 (citing Rex, 585 F.2d at 436)("[tjhis determination, however, is a matter within the
sound discretion of the trial court and the trial court's conclusions as to whether the class
representative has demonstrated that the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation requirements have been met 'will not be disturbed absent a showing ofabuse ofthat discretion.'").
Although a putative class of fifty members would not be insignificant, it is not such "an overwhelming number as to be prohibitive ofjoinder." Trevizo, 455 F.3d at 1162 (holding the district court did not error in concluding 84 class members were not prohibitive ofjoinder). Furthermore, the numerosity requirement is not "a question of numbers." Horn v. Associated Wiiolesale Grocers, Inc., 555 F.2d 270, 275 (10th Cir.1977). The Tenth Circuit identified several factors underlying the impracticability issue, including the nature ofthe action, the size ofthe individual claims, and the location of the members of the class or the property that is the subject matter of the dispute. Colorado Cross Disability Coalition, supra at 1215 (citing 7A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Marry Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1762, at 206-07 (3d ed.2005) (footnote omitted)). In the Colorado Cross Disability Coalition case, the Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's finding of numerosity in a class action against Hollister stores. Colorado Cross Disability Coalition, supra at 1215. It was undisputed that porches were present at nearly 250 Hollister stores spanning 40 states, and potentially affecting millions of Americans having a disability. Id. Joining all of these
10

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 58 Filed 11/13/17 Page 11 of 13
people into one suit, who shop at one of the 250 stores across 40 states, would be impracticable. Id.
However, that is not the case before this Court. The potential class members are not strewn about the country or even the state and are easily identifiable and reside at or may reside at WWC. Thus, Plaintiff should have no problem locating the remaining individuals for joinder. Potential class members will be easily discemable in discovery and locatable since they have all received sentencing in a Wyoming state court and would be serving time at Wyoming's only women's correctional facility.
Plaintiffs second argument alleges future class members may exist which results
In the class being fluid. Although the Court agrees that future class members may exist,
this fact is not dispositive of the issue. In Decoteau v. Roemisch, the Colorado district court was determining whether the denial of access to outdoor exercise for plaintiffs in administrative segregation constituted an Eighth Amendment Violation. See Decoteau v, Raemisch, 304 F.R.D. 683 (D. Colo. 2014). To establish numerosity for class certification, the plaintiffs submitted evidence showing at least 500 inmates were in administrative segregation. Id. at 687. Additionally, plaintiffs alleged the class definition
was fluid because it called for the addition of new inmates transferred to CSP. Id. The
district court found the fluid nature of the class further demonstrated the impracticability
ofjoinder. Id. At first blush this case appears similar; it is a prisoner case seeking class
certification for a constitutional violation. However, in this case the initial class size is alleged to be only 50. Additionally, not all females transferring or incoming to the WWC
11

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 58 Filed 11/13/17 Page 12 of 13
would qualify to participate in the boot camp program under state law. The only additional members of the class would need to be first time women offenders, under the age of 25, who have not committed a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment, have received a judicial recommendation, and are otherwise deemed fit to participate in the program. When looking at the factual allegations from both parties, it is clear the number of any additional women to join would be small, easily identifiable and reachable. When considering the relatively small number of women Plaintiff has initially alleged are part of the class, the Court does not fmd the small number of additional parties would render joinder impracticable, particularly given the ease of identification and their central location. Plaintiff has not alleged any additional reasons why joinder would be impracticable in this case.
After conducting rigorous analysis of Rule 23 requirements, it is clear Plaintiff cannot meet her burden to establish the numerosity requirement for class certification and her motion must be denied. See Trevizo,455 F.3d at 1163. A Plaintiff is required to prove that each of the elements of class certification are satisfied. Shook, 386 F.3d at 968. Having found that Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the numerosity requirement this Court
need not address the additional elements.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has failed to show that joinder would be impracticable and thus failed to satisfy the numerosity requirement. Since the absence of any single element bars class certification, the Court declines to address the remaining elements. It is hereby
12

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 58 Filed 11/13/17 Page 13 of 13
ORDERED PlaintifTs Afo//o« to Certify Class(ECF No. 12)is Denied.
Dated this />^2d^ay ofNovember,2017.
Scott W. Skavdahl
United States District Judge
13

 
 Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 64 Filed 01/03/18 Page 1 of 12

FILED
US.DlSTRiCT COURT IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF WYOHiHG

FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING

2018 JAN-3 PH h28
STErHAi-i liARRlS, CLERK
CASPER

TAYLOR S BLANCHARD,

Plaintiff,
vs.
WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS DIRECTOR,and
WYOMING WOMENS CENTER
WARDEN,

Case No. 17-CV-0124-SWS

Defendants.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS'MOTION TO DISMISS

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs
first amended complaint(ECF No.49). Defendants initially filed a motion to dismiss the original complaint (ECF No. 15) on August 29, 2017. The Court denied Defendants' motion without prejudice as moot after allowing Plaintiffto amend her complaint.(ECF No. 41.) The Court also denied Defendants' motion for a temporary restraining order pending the outcome of this motion(ECF No. 54) and granted an extension of time for Plaintiff and Defendants to reply to the motion (ECF No. 56). Plaintiff has responded (ECF No. 59) and Defendants have since replied (ECF No. 60). The Court having reviewed the motion and memorandums, and otherwise being fully informed, fmds and
concludes Defendants' motion to dismiss should be denied.

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 64 Filed 01/03/18 Page 2 of 12
background' This case arises out of an equal protection claim for Defendants' alleged failure to give Ms. Blanchard the same opportunity to participate in Wyoming's Youthful Offender ("boot camp")program as provided to male prisoners in the custody ofthe WDOC.(ECF No. 43 at 12.) On July 18, Blanchard filed a "Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (ECF No. 1) and has since filed an "Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief(ECF No.43). The Wyoming boot camp program was enacted for all persons incarcerated in any state penal institution who are serving a sentence of imprisonment for any offense other than a felony punishable by death or life imprisonment, who are under the age oftwentyfive years old, who have not previously served a term of incarceration at any state or federal adult institution, and who have received a recommendation for boot camp from their sentencing court. {Id, at 5-6.) The boot camp facility built in Newcastle, Wyoming, can hold up to 56 boot camp participants("booters").{Id. at 7.) The program is designed to provide young first time offenders a disciplined, shortterm, intense period of incarceration. {Id) The boot camp program emulates military service including close order drill and a rigid dress code as a means of developing selfdiscipline and promoting the development of espirit de corps and teamwork. {Id. at 7.) The program provides physical training to develop self-esteem and self-worth. {Id)
'The Court assumes all factual allegations in the complaint as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,1959,173
L. Ed. 2d 868(2009){"Twombly does not require a court at the motion-to-dismiss stage to consider whether the factual allegations are probably true. We made it clear, on the contrary, that a court must take the allegations as true, no matter how skeptical the court may be.")(internal citation omitted).

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 64 Filed 01/03/18 Page 3 of 12
WDOC staff serve as examples to booters by reflecting the positive benefits of lawabiding behavior.{Id. at 8.)
The boot camp program demonstrates in a logical progression of thought that booters are responsible for their conduct and have the means at their disposal to change their criminal behavior. {Id. at 7.) Booters are also provided with information and materials to assist them in their search for gainful employment. {Id) The program includes education, such as GED instruction and certification, seven-habits, computer keyboarding, coping skills, life skills,job skills training, and drug education. {Id. at 8.) Various additional programming includes grieving, anger control, stress management, goal setting, reality clarification, thinking errors, parenting, rational emotive training, relapse prevention,individual programming,therapy, and drug and alcohol programming. {Id) Finally, boot camp includes a parent day for the parents and family of graduating booters. {Id)
Blanchard meets the statutory requirements to be eligible for placement in the Wyoming Youthful Offender program. {Id. at 5.) She was sentenced to a term of incarceration of 6-10 years, with a recommendation she be given the opportunity to participate in the Wyoming Youthful Offender program.{Id. at 2.)Blanchard's complaint alleges "virtually all male prisoners with a similar Youthful Offender program recommendation" are given the opportunity to attend and complete the boot camp in Newcastle, Wyoming.{Id. at 6). However,"[b]ecause WDOC does not have a Youthful Offender program for women, the women in the custody of the WDOC are denied the opportunities provided to men in their WDOC boot camp program." {Id. at 8.) Blanchard

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 64 Filed 01/03/18 Page 4 of 12
asserts "[t]liis denial of opportunities to rehabilitate and receive an early release is based entirely on[]gender."(Id)
On August 16, 2017, Blanchard was transferred to a Florida boot camp program instead ofthe Wyoming boot camp.(Id. at 10.) Blanchard argues the "Florida program is inferior to Wyoming's boot camp program for men, in that it provides fewer rehabilitative services and programming than that provided to the men in Wyoming's male-only boot camp."(Id. at 10.) While men are sent to Newcastle,"women will be shipped to out-of-state programs, even programs that are inferior to Wyoming's program for men." (Id. at 11.) Blanchard is currently participating in the Florida boot camp program.(Id. at 4.)
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a pleading contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." A short and plain statement ofa claim does not require detailed factual allegations, but demands more than an unadorned "the defendant unlawfully harmed me" accusation. Ashcroft v. Iqbal^ 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868(2009)(citing F.R.C.P. 8(a)(2)) The purpose of the pleading requirement is to "give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests," Bell Atl Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964, 167 L. Ed.2d 929(2007)(citing Conley v. Gibson,78 S. Ct. 99,2 L.Ed.2d 80(1957)). All wellpleaded factual allegations in a complaint are accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Alvarado v. KOB-TV, LLC, 493 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 64 Filed 01/03/18 Page 5 of 12
Cir. 2007). Further, the court is to make all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor. Timpanogos Tribe v. Conway,286 F.3d 1195, 1204(10th Cir.2002).
To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face; a claim has "facial plausibility" when plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw a reasonable inference that defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6); Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 at 868. A complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations but must provide the "grounds" of plaintiffs "entitlement to relief," which requires more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1964 (internal citations omitted). "While the 12(b)(6) standard does not require that [a plaintiff] establish a prima facie case in her complaint, the elements of each alleged cause of action help to determine whether [she] has set forth a plausible claim"Khalik v. United Air Lines^ 671 F.3d 1188,1192(10th Cir.2012).
To plead a claim for a violation of equal protection, a complaint must set forth facts fi-om which a court can plausibly infer that a government entity treated the plaintiff differently than other similarly situated individuals. See City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 105 S. Ct. 3249,3270,87 L. Ed. 2d 313(1985);see also Brown v. Montoya^ 662 F.3d 1152, 1172-73 (10th Cir. 2011)("to assert a viable equal protection claim, plaintiffs must fust make a threshold showing that they were treated differently from others who were similarly situated to them")(internal citation omitted).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a court must dismiss any claim over which it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(1). Motions to
5

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 64 Filed 01/03/18 Page 6 of 12
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction take two forms: facial and factual attacks. Holt V. U.S., 46 F.3d 1000, 1002-03 (10th Cir. 1995). A facial attack questions the sufficiency of the Complaint while a factual attack challenges the facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction depends. Id. "When reviewing a factual attack on subject matter jurisdiction, a district court may not presume the truthfulness of the Complaint's factual allegations."Id. at 1003.
The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing standing. Lujan V. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,561 (1992). A plaintiff must establish:"(1) an injury in fact that is both concrete and particularized as well as actual or imminent;(2) a causal relationship between the injury and the challenged conduct; and (3) a likelihood that the injury would be redressed by a favorable decision." Protocols, LLC v. Leavitt, 549 F.3d 1294, 1298 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Failure to satisfy any element is fatal to the action as a whole.(Id.)
DISCUSSION
Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs first amended complaint is brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (6).(ECF No. 49 at 1.) Defendants argue PlaintifF never established standing to bring her claim, and her amended complaint fails to state an equal protection claim under the pleading requirements of Twombly and Iqbal. Although it would typically address the jurisdictional matter first, the Court will initially address the argument for failure to state a claim under 12(b)(6) because it features factual assertions needed to address Defendants' 12(b)(1) motion.
6

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 64 Filed 01/03/18 Page 7 of 12
A, Failure to State a Claim:12(b)(6) Defendants' contend Blanchard has failed to plead sufficient facts to establish an
equal protection claim.(ECF No. 50 at 14.) First, Defendants argue Blanchard has not produced sufficient evidence to show that she is similarly situated to men attending the Wyoming boot camp program. {Id. at 16.) Second, Defendants argue Blanchard has not plausibly alleged Florida's boot camp program is inferior to Wyoming's. {Id. at 19.) Although Plaintiff could have more carefully crafted her amended complaint, the Court
believes Blanchard has pled sufficient facts to plausibly infer Defendants have treated her
differently than similarly situated individuals. Additionally, Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to give the Defendants fair notice ofthe claim and the grounds upon which it rests.
Defendants' motion conflates the heightened standard required for a motion for
^
summary judgment with the standard for a motion to dismiss. To be fair, the Court can only evaluate the plausibility ofBlanchard's claim by considering the prima facie case of
sex discrimination she would need to prove in court. See Merman v. Campbell Cty.
Mem'l Hasp.,632 F. App'x 927,933 (10th Cir. 2015)(unpublished). Plaintiff"need not
set forth a prima facie case" to survive a motion to dismiss, but her complaint "must allege facts that make such a claim at least plausible." Id. Therefore, at the motion to
dismiss stage, Blanchard must allege facts that make an equal protection claim at least
plausible. For an equal protection claim to be plausible there must be some facts showing
^ Defendants' motion relies in great part on case law discussing equal protection claims dismissed in the context of summaryjudgment.See e.g. Morman v. Campbell Cty. Mem'lHosp.,632 F. App'x 927,933(10th Cir. 2015);Marsh
V. Newton, 1998 U.S. App.LEXIS 1346(10^ Cir. 1998); Women Prisoners ofD.C. Dep't ofCorr. v. D.C.,93 F.3d
910(D.C. Cir. 1996). While these cases contain the correct evidentiary standard for summaryjudgment,this burden is not extended into motions to dismiss. See Bradley By & Through King v. United States, No. 16-1435-EFM-TJJ, 2017 WL 4310224, at *1 (D. Kan. Sept. 28, 2017)("the standard governing a motion to dismiss is drastically different from the standard governing a motion for summaryjudgment.").

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 64 Filed 01/03/18 Page 8 of 12
she is similarly situated and has received differential treatment. See Marsh v. Newton, No.97-2157, 1998 U.S. App.LEXIS 1346,*8-9(10th Cir. 1998).
In Marsh v. Newton, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment against the plaintiff on her equal protection claim. Id. ("Plaintiffs general allegations that male inmates receive better opportunities and more favorable
treatment in New Mexico facilities than female inmates are insufficient to survive
summary judgment^)(emphasis added). To survive summary judgement, the plaintiff must assert evidence establishing that the particular male inmates to which she refers are similarly situated to herself. Id. at *9. Specifically the court's "analysis requires consideration of a number of factors, including the size of the prison populations in the facilities to be compared, the average length of sentences the inmates are serving, the inmates' security classifications, the types of crimes for which the inmates have been incarcerated, and any special characteristics." Id. {citing Keevan v. Smith, 100 F.3d 644, 648(8th Cir, 1996));see also Women Prisoners ofD.C. Dep't ofCorr. v. D.C.,93 F.3d 910,924-25(D.C. Cir. 1996).
However, in Marsh, the plaintiff never specified which male inmates she was similarly situated to, nor did she submit any evidence comparing the relevant factors. Id. at *9-10. Consequently, this case is distinguishable both in procedural posture as well as the factual allegations.
In this case, the Court is not considering a motion for summary judgment but a motion to dismiss. Moreover, Blanchard's complaint does specify which inmates she is similarly situated with and provides some evidence for consideration of the relevant
8

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 64 Filed 01/03/18 Page 9 of 12
factors. Plaintiff asserts she is similarly situated with statutorily eligible males. The complaint outlines the eligibility requirements for boot camp under the statute.(ECF No. 43 at 5). To be statutorily eligible to participate in the Wyoming boot camp program offenders must be serving a sentence of imprisonment for an offense other than a felony punishable by death or life imprisonment, be under the age of 25, receive a sentencing recommendation from a judge, and not have previously served a term of incarceration at an adult facility. {Id) Conveniently, the statutory requirements for boot camp eligibility are encompassed by some of the relevant factors the Court would consider at trial or sixmmary judgment to determine whether she is truly similarly situated. Although Plaintiffs complaint is far from factually exhaustive in comparing herself to males who are similarly situated, she has alleged enough factual allegations to nudge her claim from conceivable to plausible. See Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1190(10th Cir. 2012){citing Twombly,550 U.S. at 570).
Additionally, Plaintiff has made more than just a general allegation that male inmates receive better opportunities and more favorable treatment than female inmates. See Marsh, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 1346, at *8-9. Plaintiff alleges nearly all men with a boot camp recommendation are sent to the Newcastle Youthful Offenders camp in Wyoming.(ECF No. 43 at 6.) However, since there is no boot camp for women within the state, women are sent to out ofstate camps,like Florida.{Id. at 10.)The difference in boot camp placement is a factual allegation that Plaintiff has been treated differently than similarly-situated males. At this stage of the proceedings the question is not whether this differential treatment is sufficient to ultimately prevail on her equal protection claim,
9

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 64 Filed 01/03/18 Page 10 of 12
rather it is whether Plaintiffs Complaint makes a sufficient"threshold showing that[she] [was] treated differently from others who were similarly situated," Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299,1312(10th Cir. 1998)(internal citation omitted).It does. B, Failure to Establish Standing to Sue:12(b)(1)
Defendants awkwardly argue Plaintiff lacked standing to bring her initial
complaint.^(EOF No.50 at 2.) Additionally, Defendants argue a plaintiff may not allege
new injuries in an attempt to save a complaint that lacked standing from the outset. {Id. at 7.) They contend Plaintiff submitted two new allegations in her amended complaint in an attempt to retroactively create standing. {Id. at 7.) The fust new issue being the fact Blanchard was transferred out of state, and the second that the Florida program is inferior. {Id) The Court agrees that standing is a jurisdictional matter but finds Defendants' arguments unpersuasive.
In her original complaint,Plaintiffalleged a violation ofequal protection "because Wyoming does not have a Youthful Offender or boot camp program for women, she is being denied the opportunities provided to men in their WDOC boot camp program." (ECF No. 1 at 8.) Plaintiffs amended complaint alleges the same differential treatment "[b]ecause WDOC does not have a Youthful Offender program for women,the women in custody of the WDOC are denied the opportunities provided to men in their WDOC boot camp program."(ECF No. 43 at 8). Blanchard's fust amended complaint does not raise claims arising out of a subject matter different from what was set forth in the original
^ Defendants' motion also argues no class member has standing to claim they have been denied the opportunity to participate in a boot camp program.(ECF No.50 at 12-14.) However,the Court need not discuss these arguments because the Court has previously denied Plaintiff's motion for class certification.(ECF No.58.)
10

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 64 Filed 01/03/18 Page 11 of 12
complaint. While it is true that Plaintiffs initial complaint did not factually allege she was being placed in the Florida boot camp program or that the program was inferior,
there is no evidence Plaintiff knew or could have known that her transfer to Florida
would occur.(Id. at 8-9.) Her failure to initially plead facts that did not take place by the time she filed her original complaint does not invalidate her equal protection claim.
In this case, Blanchard set forth initial factual allegations that she, as a female, has been treated differently than other males she is similarly situated to. The Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend her complaint after she was transferred to the Florida boot camp program. However, Plaintiffs amended complaint continues to allege the same subject matter and claim—^that solely because of her female gender she was denied opportunities provided to men in their WDOC boot camp program. See Childers v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1 ofBryan Cty., State of Oki, 676 F.2d 1338, 1343 (10th Cir. 1982)(reversing a district court's refusal to allow an amendment because the subject matter of the amendment was already in the complaint). The Court does not, and need not simply assume Plaintiff has standing. See Colo. Outfitters Ass'n v. Hickenlooper, 823 F. 3d 537, 544 (10th Cir. 2016). Her initial and amended complaints both allege she, due to her gender, was suffering an injury because she was denied the opportunities provided to men who get to attend the Youthful Offender boot camp program in Newcastle, Wyoming. Blanchard alleged this injury was the result of defendants not operating a program for women and the Court could redress her injury by a favorable decision. The Court acknowledges that Plaintiff has a continuing burden to establish standing. See U.S. Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty,445 U.S.388,396-97(1980).
11

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 64 Filed 01/03/18 Page 12 of 12
Plaintiff has alleged from the beginning that her equal protection rights have been violated because Wyoming does not operate a boot camp program for women, this allegation does not change whether she is sitting in Wyoming Women's Center or in a boot camp program in Florida. The issue here is not whether Plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether a real case in controversy exists and whether Plaintiffs amended complaint contains sufficient factual allegations to state a plausible claim for relief. Consequently, the Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient factual assertions in her complaint to state a plausible claim and establish standing.
CONCLUSION
The Court finds that Defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1)must be denied. Therefore,it is hereby
ORDERED Defendants' motion to dismiss(ECF No.49)is denied.
Dated this ^ day ofJanuary,2018.
Scott W.Skavdahl
United States District Judge
12

 
 Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 82 Filed 02/20/18 Page 1 of 15

FlLhTJ
U.S. niSTRICT COURT
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ':t

FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING.

PH i:o^
-:A ; r:-sui(i3= CLERK

TAYLOR S. BLANCHARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Robert Lampert, WYOMING
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
DIRECTOR, in his official capacity, and Rick Catron, WYOMING WOMEN'S
CENTER WARDEN, in his official capacity,

Case No. 1:17-CV-0124-SWS

Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint as Moot (ECF No. 62) and Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider (ECF No. 70). Plaintiff has brought an equal protection challenge to Wyoming's youthful offender program ("boot camp" program), asserting that the Florida program in v^^hich she was ultimately placed is inferior to the boot camp available to male inmates in Newcastle, Wyoming, and that the transport to that out-of-state program was traumatic. (First Am. Compl. ("FAC") at 2-3) (ECF No. 43). Plaintiff seeks an injunction ordering that she be "granted the opportunity to participate in an in-state boot camp program comparable to the men's program at Newcastle, or in an out-of-state program provided that placement is gender-neutral[.]" Id. at 13.

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 82 Filed 02/20/18 Page 2 of 15
Background
Plaintiff graduated from Florida's boot camp program on January 19, 2018. (Voigtsberger Aff. Ex. A-2) (ECF No. 63-1). On December 21, 2017, the Florida Department of Corrections had recommended Plaintiff for probation upon her, at that time expected, successful completion of the program, and the Wyoming Department of Corrections concurred. Id. Exs. A-2, A-3. With the aid of Plaintiffs counsel here, a sentence modification request was submitted to her sentencing judge. Id. Exs. A-1, A-2, A-3. On January 5, 2018, Plaintiffs sentencing judge entered an order modifying her sentence, ordering that Plaintiff be released to probation upon her successful completion of the Florida boot camp program. (Lindly Aff. Ex. A-2) (ECF No. 69-1). Accordingly, Plaintiff has been placed on supervised probation for a period of five years. Id. at 14.
In support of their motion to dismiss. Defendants argue Plaintiffs action is moot because this Court does not have the power to grant her any effectual relief regardless of the merits of her claim. Plaintiff does not really contest that her claim has become moot, instead arguing that the mootness of her action is cured by her motion to amend her complaint to add new plaintiffs, which was filed after Defendants filed the present motion to dismiss and is now pending before the Magistrate Judge. {See Mot. for Leave to File Sec. Am. Compl.) (ECF No. 67). Plaintiff wants to name additional plaintiffs who will seek the identical remedy sought by Plaintiff: the opportunity to participate in Wyoming's boot camp program on the same basis as men, and an order preventing Defendants from sending them out of state unless men and women are sent out of state on a gender-neutral basis. (PL's Opp'n Br. at 5-6) (ECF No. 65).
2

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 82 Filed 02/20/18 Page 3 of 15
Plaintiffalso requests the Court reconsider its Order denying her earlier motion for class certification. (See ECF No. 58.) In support, Plaintiff does not assert the Court erred in denying class certification; rather, Plaintiff contends actions by defense counsel unfairly fhistrated her ability to timely identify any additional women for joinder in this lawsuit prior to Ms. Blanchard's claim becoming moot. In response. Defendants argue reconsideration is unwarranted because: first, there was no wrongdoing on the part of defense counsel; and second, reconsidering class certification would not result in the new inmates' joinder as their claims are distinct from Ms. Blanchard's and no injustice will
occur by requiring them to file their own lawsuit.
Discussion
"The doctrine of mootness is grounded in Article Ill's limitation on the jurisdiction of federal courts to 'cases and controversies.'" Ind v. Colo. Dep't of Corr., 801 F.3d 1209, 1213 (10th Cir. 2015) (citing U.S. Const, art. Ill, § 2, cL 1). To demonstrate standing under Article III, a plaintiff must show: "(1) an injury in fact; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the challenged action; and (3) a likelihood that a favorable decision will redress the injuryT Id. (emphasis in Ind) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The jurisdictional requirement of a live case or controversy exists at all stages of federal proceedings. "[I]t is therefore not enough that the dispute was alive when the suit was filed; the parties must continue to have a personal stake in the outcome." Id, A case becomes moot, then, "when a plaintiff no longer suffers actual injury that can be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." Id (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint seeks injunctive relief ordering Defendants to provide her with the opportunity to participate in Wyoming's boot camp program. (FAC at 12-13; PL's Opp'n Br. at 3.) However, Wyoming's boot camp program is for inmates who "ha[ve] not previously served a term of incarceration at any state or federal adult penal institution." Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-1003(b)(iii). Plaintiff is no longer a first-time offender and is therefore no longer eligible to participate in the boot camp program. Plaintiffs amended complaint does not seek redress for her allegations regarding out-ofstate placement or placement into an "inferior" boot camp program. Accordingly, this Court can no longer grant effective relief, so Plaintiffs case has become moot. See
Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151, 1165 (10th Cir. 2016) ("If an intervening circumstance
deprives the plaintiff of a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit, at any point during litigation, the action can no longer proceed and must be dismissed as moot.") (quoting Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 669 (2016)).
Plaintiff argues Defendants' motion to dismiss based on mootness was premature because it was filed before she actually graduated from Florida's boot camp program and, even if the Court rules on the motion after her graduation, Defendants' motion should be denied because "anticipatory motions are not supported by precedent and should not be encouraged." (PL's Opp'n Br. at 4.) Neither is Plaintiffs proposition supported by precedent - or at least Plaintiff fails to cite any such authority in her brief. Defendants' motion to dismiss was filed one week after the Florida Department of Corrections recommended Plaintiff be placed on probation upon her expected completion of the program. Regardless, Plaintiff will have "served a term of incarceration" whether she
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graduated from Florida's program or not. Had she failed to successfully complete the program in those final few weeks, she would not have been eligible for re-entry to Wyoming's boot camp program. (See Lindly Aff H 5.) Thus, the timing of Defendants' motion to dismiss does not require its denial.
Plaintiff also argues that the filing of her second amended complaint, adding additional plaintiffs, will prevent the case from becoming moot. Plaintiff asserts "a motion for leave to amend a complaint must always be adjudicated before a motion to dismiss whenever the amended complaint could cure the grounds on which dismissal is sought." (PL's Opp'n Br. at 7.) The lone case Plaintiff cites as authority for this point, however, did not involve the jurisdictional issue of mootness. See Childers v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 1 of Bryan Cty., 676 F.2d 1338 (10th Cir. 1982). Instead, Childers addressed a plaintiffs request to add a claim on behalf of the same plaintiff, not to add a party, and the subject matter of the proposed amendment was akeady alleged in the original complaint. Id. at 1343. The appellate court held that, because the motion to dismiss was granted upon grounds that would have been eliminated by the proposed
amendment, the denial of leave to amend was an abuse of discretion. Id. But once a live
controversy ceases to exist, as here, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the lawsuit. See Ind, 801 F.3d at 1213 ("Mootness is a threshold issue because the existence of a live case or controversy is a constitutional prerequisite to federal court jurisdiction."); Fox v. Bd. of Trustees ofState Univ. ofNew York, 42 F.3d 135, 144 (2nd Cir. 1994) (plaintiffs may not "avoid dismissal by amending their complaint to add

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 82 Filed 02/20/18 Page 6 of 15
additional [] plaintiffs" since "once a case is moot, it is no longer justiciable in federal court and must be dismissed").
Finally, in response to Defendants' motion to dismiss, Plaintiff argues her amendment to add parties should be granted to protect her claim from mootness because her claim is "capable of repetition, yet evading review;" in other words. Plaintiffs equal protection claim was "destined to expire upon her graduation from boot camp, a period far too short for that claim to be fully adjudicated in the district court and on appeal." (PL's Opp'n Br. at 6.) To be sure, a court should not dismiss a case as moot under certain circumstances, one being where "the issue is deemed a wrong capable of repetition yet evading review." Ind, 801 F.3d at 1213. However, "[t]hat exception applies only in exceptional situations, where (1) the challenged action [is] in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there [is] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party [will] be subject to the same action again." Kingdomware Technologies, Inc. v. U.S., 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1976 (2016) (internal quotations marks omitted) (emphasis added). As explained above, Ms. Blanchard is ineligible to participate in Wyoming's boot camp in the future, so this exception does not apply to save her claim.
In a last ditch effort to save her claim from the mootness doctrine. Plaintiff asks the Court to reconsider its earlier denial of class certification. "As a general rule, a suit brought as a class action must be dismissed for mootness when the personal claims of the named plaintiffs are satisfied and no class has been properly certified." Reed v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 779, 785 (10th Cir. 1985). "Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has applied the
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mootness doctrine less strictly in the class action context." Clark v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 590 F.3d 1134, 1138 (10th Cir. 2009). Citing a law review article, the Tenth Circuit has noted the Supreme Court has "repeatedly treated personal stake mootness as a discretionary doctrine, under which courts can dismiss or not as they deem appropriate in view of certain prudential considerations." Lucero v. Bureau of Collection Recovery, Inc., 639 F.3d 1239, 1249 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Matthew I. Hall, The Partially Prudential Doctrine of Mootness, 11 Geo. WASH. L. Rev. 562, 608 (2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Circumstances where courts have recognized exceptions to the mootness doctrine in the class action context include: the mooting of a named plaintiffs claim after class certification; the mooting of the named plaintiffs claim during the pendency of an appeal challenging the district court's improper denial of class certification; and a defendant's offer to fully settle the named plaintiffs claim, over the plaintiffs objection, after the
district court denies class certification. See Clark, 590 F.3d at 1138. The Supreme Court has also suggested two situations in which a class may
be certified despite the mooting of the named plaintiffs claim prior to the district court's certification decision: (1) when the plaintiffs claim is " *capable of repetition, yet evading review,' " and (2) when the plaintiffs claim is "inherently transitory [such] that the trial court will not have even enough time to rule on a motion for class certification before the proposed representative's individual interest expires." Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 398400, 100 S. Ct. 1202 (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110 n. 11, 95 S. Ct. 854,43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975)). Clark, 590 F.3d at 1139 (emphasis in original). Additionally, some courts have recognized an exception where "the defendant makes a full offer of judgment - thereby mooting the named plaintiffs claims - at so early a point in the litigation that the named
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plaintiff could not have been expected to file a class certification motion." Id. (citing Weiss V. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337 (3rd Cir. 2004)). See also Lucero, 639 F.3d at 1250 ("[W]e hold that a named plaintiff in a proposed class action for monetary relief may proceed to seek timely class certification where an unaccepted offer of judgment is tendered in satisfaction of the plaintiffs individual claim before the court can reasonably be expected to rule on the class certification motion."). "But where the plaintiff has had ample time to file the class certification motion, district courts adhere to the general rule that the mooting of a named plaintiffs claim prior to class certification moots the entire case." C/arA:,590F.3datll39.
None of the foregoing circumstances exist in this case. Plaintiffs claim became moot after this Court's denial of class certification. Plaintiff had "ample time to file" her class certification motion, and this Court had "enough time to rule" on the motion before Plaintiffs claim became moot. See id.\ see also K.C. v. Townsend, No. 6:09-CV-012-C, at 7 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2009) {Order) ("Even the broadest possible readings of the class action exceptions are limited to providing a plaintiff a reasonable opportunity to pursue class certification, an opportunity that [plaintiff] has had ample opportunity to explore."). Indeed, Plaintiff acknowledges the Court's decision to deny class certification is "wellreasoned" and she offers no legal basis to reconsider it. Nor does this case involve a
defendant's offer to fully settle a claim for monetary relief'
' Plaintiffcites four cases wherein district courts purportedly granted class certification "to avoid precisely the
predicament Ms. Blanchard now faces in her case." (Mot. to Reconsider at 8.) However, each of these cases is, in actuality, either not on point or distinguishable from Ms. Blanchard's. See U.S. ex rel. Green v. Peters, 153 F.R.D. 615 (N.D. 111. 1994) (granting class certification, but no indication mootness doctrine an issue); Andre H. by Lula H. V. Ambach, 104 F.R.D. 606, 613 n.l 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (class certification granted prior to named plaintiffs claim
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In K.C. V. Townsend, a case similar to Ms. Blanchard's, the Texas federal district court likewise denied class certification in an action challenging certain correctional practices and procedures used in a youth prison exclusively for females. Id. at 2-3. Subsequent to the court's denial of the third motion to certify a class, the named plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend her complaint adding two persons who were still confined in the prison facility, attaching the proposed amended complaint along with another proposed motion to certify a class. Id. at 3. The next day, that named plaintiff was released from custody, and defendants then filed a motion to dismiss based on mootness of the named plaintiffs claims. Id. While recognizing the existence of exceptions to the mootness doctrine in the class action context, the court determined none of them applied in that case because the named plaintiff had more than a reasonable opportunity to certify a class. Id. at 4-7. The court further determined that the plaintiff was "precluded from arguing her motion to amend unless there is an exception to the mootness doctrine that is applicable to [her] personally.. .. [Plaintiff] has failed to prove that her claims, as opposed to the claims of the class in general, are actually capable of repetition[.]" Id. at 12-13. This Court finds, as did the Texas district court, that absent the applicability of an exception to the mootness doctrine. Plaintiff is precluded fi^om arguing the merits of her motion to amend because her claims are moot. Even more problematic here. Plaintiff filed her motion to amend after her claim had effectively become moot. See Fox, 42 F.3d at 144 ("district court did not abuse its discretion in
becoming moot); Arthur v. Starrett City Assocs., 98 F.R.D. 500, 508 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (class certification granted prior to named plaintiffs' claims becoming moot); McKenzie v. Crotty, 738 F. Supp. 1287, 1290 (D.S.D. 1990) (granting class certification dating back to the date the complaint was filed in jail litigation where the claim of the named plaintiff became moot before court could reasonably have ruled on the certification issue).

Case 1:17-cv-00124-SWS Document 82 Filed 02/20/18 Page 10 of 15
denying [pjlaintiffs permission to amend their complaint [to add additional plaintiffs]
after the case had become moot"); Lans v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 112, 117 (D.D.C. 1999) (denying leave to file an amended complaint to add new plaintiffs where the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over original plaintiffs action, and where the new plaintiff remained free to bring a new suit).
Still, Plaintiff urges the Court to grant her equitable relief because she "did everything in her power to avoid a dismissal of her case on grounds of mootness," but was allegedly thwarted by the "extreme lengths" to which defense counsel went to frustrate her ability to join women in a timely manner. (PL's Mot. to Reconsider at 3, 9.) However, Plaintiffs characterization of defense counsel's actions is misleading and disingenuous. Approximately one month after filing her complaint and prior to the answer due date. Plaintiff filed a motion for expedited discovery. (ECF No. 7.) One of the proposed interrogatories asked Defendants to identify all of the women at WWC who were otherwise eligible to participate in Wyoming's boot camp program. (ECF No. 8-1 at 4, Interrog. No. 10.) Defendants raised timely and legitimate objections to the request for expedited discovery. (ECF No. 14.) During a hearing held before the Court on October 18, 2017, the undersigned judge denied without prejudice the motion for expedited discovery and, contrary to Plaintiffs assertion that "the Court indicated [] the parties should begin discovery," the case was referred to the magistrate judge for an initial pretrial conference. (See ECF No. 41.) During the initial pretrial conference held on November 7, 2017, the magistrate judge ordered discovery to proceed. (ECF No. 54.) Plaintiff served written discovery on Defendants that same day (Berkness Decl. Ex. A-1)
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(ECF No. 77-1 at 6), and Defendants timely responded to the discovery requests within 30 days, per Court rules. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(2).
Plaintiffs discovery asked Defendants to identify inmates who met certain criteria for prospective joinder. In response, Defendants provided the names of all 260 women incarcerated at WWC and advised Plaintiff the inmates could be researched using DOC's publicly available Offender Locator to help determine which inmates to select for possible joinder. Plaintiff suggests Defendants' response was designed to cause delay and required "days of investigation" by Plaintiffs counsel to identify 35 women who appeared to be eligible to participate in Wyoming's boot camp program. However, defense counsel's reasoning for simply providing the names of all 260 women incarcerated at WWC is not without merit: none of the women had received the required recommendation from a sentencing judge, and defense counsel "wanted to avoid supplanting its own judgment for Plaintiffs regarding the viability of certain inmates as potential plaintiffs." (Opp'n to Mot. for Reconsideration at 4.)
Plaintiff further complains Defendants improperly frustrated her efforts to have face-to-face meetings with the 35 women she identified for potential joinder to her case. The Court disagrees. Defense counsel's concerns regarding Plaintiffs desire to meet with the 35 inmates at the prison were justified, as such a meeting appears at odds with the Rule of Professional Conduct 7.3, which prohibits in-person solicitation. The defense relayed its position and concerns to Plaintiffs counsel (Berkness Decl. Ex. A-3), who in response cited In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978), as exempting ACLU attorneys from anti-solicitation rules (Berkness Decl. Ex. A-4).
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Plaintiffs counsel followed up with another email on December 1, 2017, purporting to cite a case "directly on point" regarding Plaintiffs counsel's desire to meet with the 35 inmates. {Id, Ex. A-5.) The case cited is Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1983). In his email. Plaintiffs counsel quoted the following passage from the Jean
case:
More particularly we sustain plaintiff HRC's purely legal claim of a right to solicit clients in detention. . . . [I]f Button and Primus mean anything they permit legal counsel to inform individuals of their legal rights when counsel does so as an exercise of political speech unaccompanied by expectation of
remuneration.
Id. at 1508-09 (phrase omitted by Plaintiffs counsel). Plaintiffs counsel insisted "organizations like the ACLU have a First Amendment right to meet with prisoners." (Berkness Decl. Ex. A-5.) However, troubling to defense counsel at the time, and now the Court, is that Plaintiffs counsel omitted a key phrase from the Jean passage: ''Although this solicitation may not permit individual face-to-face encounter, if Button and Primus mean anything . . . ." Jean, 711 F.2d at 1508 (emphasis added). Thus, defense counsel was rightftilly unconvinced the case law allowed Plaintiffs counsel to engage in a face-to-face meeting with the 35 inmates.
Plaintiff also asserts Defendants improperly required her counsel to follow particular procedures not previously or otherwise required for visitation with prisoners before arranging the requested meeting with the 35 inmates. However, Plaintiff fails to recognize the distinction here - Plaintiffs counsel was attempting to meet with prisoners with whom he had no existing attorney-client relationship. Defense counsel repeatedly advised Plaintiffs counsel the DOC would allow visitation per its normal policies and
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that the visitation policy they were attempting to invoke only applied if they had an attorney/client relationship with the inmates with whom they wanted to meet. (Berkness Decl. 7-8 & Ex. A-6.) Because Plaintiffs counsel was not attempting to visit existing clients, and instead attempting to solicit new clients through face-to-face meetings, there was nothing improper about Defendants requiring counsel to follow the normal visitation
policies and ultimately directing all communications with DOC through defense counsel.^
Defense counsel's concern regarding Plaintiffs counsel's attempts to engage in face-toface solicitation of potential plaintiffs was justifiable.
The Court sees no basis to reconsider its denial of class certification. If the 15
inmates constitute all those who met the statutory requirements for boot camp at the time of their sentencings, joinder has proven to be practicable, and a class of 15 is too low to
warrant certification. Further, Blanchard's claims differ from the other inmates' claims
because Blanchard claims that, unlike male offenders recommended for boot camp, she was sent out of state to Florida's inferior program. The new inmates, by contrast, would claim alleged constitutional violations prevented them from seeking boot-camp recommendations in the first place. (PL's Proposed Sec. Am. Compl. at 3-7) (ECF No. 67-1). Moreover, Ms. Blanchard's mootness has ended her ability to request class certification for these other inmates. See Clark, supra at 1139 ("the mooting of a named plaintiffs claim prior to class certification moots the entire case"); D.R. v. Mitchell, 645 F.2d 852, 854 (10th Cir. 1981) ("Because the class was never properly identified by the
^Plaintiffs counsel ultimately sent written communication to the women atWWC, including a Retainer Agreement,
which presvunably resulted in identification of the fifteen women Plaintiff seeks to add as plaintiffs. See Pevar Decl. 15 (ECF No. 72).
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district judge, there is no party before this court who can maintain the remaining constitutional challenge."). And finally, there is minimal prejudice in requiring the proposed plaintiffs to file a new lawsuit, and those inmates may even be in a better position by not being burdened with Plaintiff having exhausted the allowable
interrogatories and half of the allotted depositions.
Conclusion
The Court is not in the business of engineering cases or controversies, or of certifying a class action for the convenience of counsel. Because Plaintiffs claim is now moot, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and the case must be dismissed. Plaintiff has failed to show the applicability of any exception to the mootness doctrine or
the general rule that the mooting of a named plaintiffs claim in the absence of, or prior to, class certification moots the entire case. To the extent this Court may have discretion to reconsider and certify a class relating back to the filing of Plaintiffs complaint, it declines to do so and finds no other basis to reconsider the denial of class certification.^ THEREFORE, it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended
Complaint as Moot (ECF No. 62) is GRANTED; it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider (ECF No. 70) is DENIED, and Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 67) is
DENIED; and it is further
^The Court recognizes that briefing isnot complete with respect to Plaintiffs motion for leave to file a second
amended complaint andPlaintiffs motion to reconsider thedenial of class certification, in thatPlaintiffs reply briefs have not yet beenfiled. However, in light of theCourt'sreasons for dismissal of this action as explained
herein, any further briefing by Plaintiff would be immaterial to the Court's decision.
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ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED.

Dated this

day of February, 2018.

"Scott W. Skavdahl
United States District Judge

15

 
 Create an Alert for This Case on RECAP

BENCH,CLOSED,TERMED

U.S. District Court District of Wyoming (Casper) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:17-cv-00124-SWS

Blanchard v. Wyoming Department of Corrections Director et al Assigned to: Honorable Scott W Skavdahl Referred to: Honorable Kelly H Rankin Case in other court: USCA, 18-08020 Cause: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

Date Filed: 07/18/2017 Date Terminated: 02/21/2018 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 550 Prisoner: Civil Rights Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Plaintiff
Taylor S Blanchard individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated

represented by John H Robinson ROBINSON STELTING WELCH BRAMLET LLC 172 Center Street, Suite 202 PO Box 3189 Jackson, WY 83001 307-733-7703 Fax: 307-201-5546 Email: john@rsw-law.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen L Pevar AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 765 Asylum Avenue Hartford, CT 06105 860/570-9830 Fax: 860/570-9840 Email: spevar@aclu.org LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marci Anne Crank Bramlet ROBINSON STELTING WELCH BRAMLET LLC

V.
Defendant
Wyoming Department of Corrections Director in his official capacity also known as Robert Lampert

259 South Center Street Suite 307 Casper, WY 82601 307-235-8777 Email: marci@rsw-law.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Ewa C Dawson WYOMING ATTORNEY GENERAL 2320 Capital Avenue Cheyenne, WY 82002 307/777-7083 Email: ewa.dawson@wyo.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel E White WYOMING ATTORNEY GENERAL 2424 Pioneer Avenue Cheyenne, WY 82002 307/777-7495 Fax: 307/777-8920 Email: heather.hunter@wyo.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Justin Ashkhan Daraie LONG REIMER WINEGAR BEPPLER LLP 270 West Pearl, Suite 103 PO Box 3070 Jackson, WY 83001 307/734-1908 Fax: 307/ 733-3752 Email: jdaraie@lrw-law.com TERMINATED: 08/29/2019
Rachel M Berkness WYOMING ATTORNEY GENERAL 2424 Pioneer Avenue Cheyenne, WY 82002

Defendant
Wyoming Womens Center Warden in his official capacity also known as Rick Catron

307/777-7083 Email: heather.hunter@wyo.gov TERMINATED: 01/30/2019
represented by Ewa C Dawson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel E White (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Justin Ashkhan Daraie (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/29/2019
Rachel M Berkness (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/30/2019

Date Filed 07/18/2017
07/18/2017 07/20/2017 07/20/2017 07/26/2017

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF( 2 summons(es) issued) ( Filing fee $400 receipt #CAS1924.), filed by Taylor S Blanchard. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet) (Court Staff, stbd) Modified on 8/22/2017 (Court Staff, stbd). (Entered: 07/19/2017)
2 NOTICE of complexity by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard ; this case is noncomplex. (Court Staff, stbd) (Entered: 07/19/2017)
3 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by Taylor S Blanchard. Wyoming Department of Corrections Director answer due 9/18/2017 (Robinson, John) (Entered: 07/20/2017)
4 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by Taylor S Blanchard. Wyoming Womens Center Warden answer due 9/18/2017 (Robinson, John) (Entered: 07/20/2017)
5 MOTION REFERRED TO Judge Kelly H Rankin. MOTION for Stephen L. Pevar to appear pro hac vice; Check not tendered; filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard, Defendants Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Proposed Order)(Robinson, John) Modified text on 7/26/2017 (Court Staff, stbd). (Entered: 07/26/2017)

07/26/2017 07/31/2017 07/31/2017 08/15/2017 08/15/2017 08/16/2017 08/16/2017
08/16/2017 08/17/2017 08/17/2017 08/29/2017
08/29/2017 08/29/2017

FINANCIAL ENTRY: Payment of $100 received from American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Inc.; Check No. 80643 as to Stephen L. Pevar Receipt No. CAS0001927 (Court Staff, stbd) (Entered: 07/26/2017)
6 ORDER by the Honorable Kelly H Rankin granting 5 Motion to appear pro hac vice admitting Stephen L Pevar for Taylor S Blanchard (Court Staff, szs) (Entered: 07/31/2017)
FINANCIAL ENTRY: Payment of $100 received for Pro Hac Vice fee for Stephan Pevar. CAS001927. (Court Staff, skmg) (Entered: 09/05/2017)
7 MOTION to Expedite Discovery filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Pevar, Stephen) Modified on 8/15/2017 (Court Staff, sal). (Entered: 08/15/2017)
8 MEMORANDUM in Support of 7 Motion for Order filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Plaintiffs' Proposed Discovery) (Pevar, Stephen) (Entered: 08/15/2017)
9 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Justin Ashkhan Daraie on behalf of Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden (Daraie, Justin) (Entered: 08/16/2017)
10 MOTION REFERRED TO Judge Kelly H Rankin. MOTION for Rachel M. Berkness to appear pro hac vice; Check tendered; filed by Defendants Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Rachel M. Berkness, # 2 Proposed Order)(Daraie, Justin) (Entered: 08/16/2017)
11 ORDER Denying 10 Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice or Rachel M. Berkness for Failure to Comply with Local rule by the Honorable Kelly H. Rankin(Court Staff, szf) (Entered: 08/16/2017)
12 MOTION to Certify Class filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Pevar, Stephen) (Entered: 08/17/2017)
13 MEMORANDUM in Support of 12 Motion to Certify Class filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Pevar, Stephen) (Entered: 08/17/2017)
14 OPPOSITION to 7 MOTION to Expedite Discovery, filed by Defendants Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden. (Attachments: # 1 Ex. A - Affidavit of Steve Lindly, # 2 Ex. B Affidavit of Carl Voigtsberger) (Daraie, Justin) Modified link on 9/4/2017 (Court Staff, sds). (Entered: 08/29/2017)
15 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Defendants Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden. (Daraie, Justin) (Entered: 08/29/2017)
16 MEMORANDUM in Support of 15 Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden. (Attachments: # 1 Ex. A - Email, # 2 Affidavit of Steve Lindly,

08/31/2017
09/01/2017 09/01/2017 09/05/2017 09/06/2017
09/08/2017 09/18/2017
09/18/2017 09/18/2017

# 3 Affidavit of Anna Skeen, # 4 Affidavit of Katie Steber, # 5 Affidavit of Carl Voigtsberger, # 6 Affidavit of CJ Young) (Daraie, Justin) (Entered: 08/29/2017)
17 OPPOSITION to 12 Motion to Certify filed by Defendants Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden. (Attachments: # 1 Ex. A - Lindly Affidavit, # 2 Ex. B - Voigtsberger Affidavit) (Daraie, Justin) Modified on 11/6/2017 (Court Staff, sds). Modified link on 11/16/2017 (Court Staff, sjlg). (Entered: 08/31/2017)
18 MOTION for Extension of Time (Dispositive) requesting extension of Reply & Response to Motions filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Robinson, John) Modified on 11/6/2017 (Court Staff, sds). (Entered: 09/01/2017)
19 Amended MOTION for Extension of Time (Dispositive) requesting extension of Reply & Response to Motion filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Robinson, John) Modified on 11/6/2017 (Court Staff, sds). (Entered: 09/01/2017)
20 REPLY BRIEF re 7 Motion for Order to Expedite Discovery filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Pevar, Stephen) (Entered: 09/05/2017)
21 (TEXT-ONLY) ORDER by the Honorable Scott W Skavdahl granting 19 Motion for Extension of Deadlines. Plaintiff's Reply on 12 Motion to Certify Class is due September 14, 2017; Plaintiff's Response to 15 Motion to Dismiss is due September 19, 2017. (Court Staff, skaa) (Entered: 09/06/2017)
22 REPLY BRIEF re 12 Motion to Certify Class filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Pevar, Stephen) Modified on 9/18/2017 (Court Staff, scat). (Entered: 09/08/2017)
23 DISREGARD FILED IN ERROR MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages regarding Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Proposed Order for Additional Pages)(Pevar, Stephen) Modified on 9/18/2017 (Court Staff, scat). (Entered: 09/18/2017)
24 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to 15 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Pevar, Stephen) (Additional attachment(s) added on 9/18/2017: # 1 Declaration Taylor Blanchard, # 2 Declaration John Robinson) (Court Staff, scat). (Entered: 09/18/2017)
25 MOTION REFERRED TO Judge Kelly H Rankin. MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages regarding Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Proposed Order)(Pevar, Stephen) (Entered: 09/18/2017)

09/19/2017 09/19/2017
09/19/2017 09/19/2017 09/20/2017 10/02/2017
10/03/2017 10/03/2017 10/03/2017
10/09/2017 10/12/2017

26 ORDER by the Honorable Kelly H. Rankin granting 25 Plaintiffs' Motion to File Excess Pages in a Memorandum responding to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. (Court Staff, sms) (Entered: 09/19/2017)
27 MOTION REFERRED TO Judge Kelly H Rankin. MOTION for Extension of Time (Non-Dispositive) requesting extension of Reply to Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 24) filed by Defendants Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Daraie, Justin) Modified on 9/20/2017 (Court Staff, szf). (Entered: 09/19/2017)
28 REQUEST for hearing on Pending Motions by Defendants Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Daraie, Justin) (Entered: 09/19/2017)
Motions No Longer Referred: 27 MOTION for Extension of Time (NonDispositive) requesting extension of Reply to Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 24) (Court Staff, szf) (Entered: 09/20/2017)
29 ORDER by the Honorable Scott W Skavdahl granting 27 Motion for Extension of Time until Monday, October 2, 2017 to file responsive pleading. (Court Staff, scat) Modified on 9/21/2017 (Court Staff, sds). (Entered: 09/20/2017)
30 REPLY to 24 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion, Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden. (Attachments: # 1 Ex. A Abbott Affidavit, # 2 Ex. B - Steber Declaration, # 3 Ex. C - Taylor Affidavit, # 4 Ex. D - Harris Affidavit, # 5 Ex. E - Buzzfeed Article) (Daraie, Justin) Modified on 10/4/2017 to remove incorrect document link. (Court Staff, skb). (Entered: 10/02/2017)
31 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Pevar, Stephen) (Entered: 10/03/2017)
32 MEMORANDUM in Support of 31 Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Second Declaration of Plaintiff Blanchard) (Pevar, Stephen) (Entered: 10/03/2017)
33 NOTICE of Hearing: Hearing on (1) Plaintiff's Motion to Expedite Discovery 7 and (2) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 15 set for 10/18/2017 01:15 PM in Casper Courtroom No. 2 (Room No. 204) before Honorable Scott W Skavdahl. (Court Staff, skb) (Entered: 10/03/2017)
34 OBJECTION to 30 REPLY to 24 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Pevar, Stephen) Modified on 10/11/2017 (Court Staff, scat). (Entered: 10/09/2017)
35 SIGNED DECLARATION OF TAYLOR S BLANCHARD in regards to 24 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion, filed by Plaintiff Taylor S

10/13/2017 10/13/2017 10/13/2017 10/15/2017 10/17/2017 10/17/2017
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Blanchard. (Robinson, John) Modified text on 10/13/2017 (Court Staff, stbd). Modified on 10/16/2017 to remove duplicate text (Court Staff, skb). (Entered: 10/12/2017)
36 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Daniel E White on behalf of Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden (White, Daniel) (Entered: 10/13/2017)
37 RESPONSE to 34 Objection to Defendants' Reply Brief filed by Defendants Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden. (White, Daniel) (Entered: 10/13/2017)
NOTICE to Counsel: Counsel need to Review and comply with the limitations under U.S.D.C. Local Rule 7.1 regarding the limitations on the filing of reply and supplemental briefs where a hearing has been scheduled. Have a good weekend. (Skavdahl, Scott) (Entered: 10/13/2017)
38 COUNSEL'S DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF RULE 56(d) REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY in regards to 7 Motion to Expedite Discovery by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Pevar, Stephen) Modified text on 10/16/2017 (Court Staff, stbd). Modified on 10/24/2017 to add full title of linked motion (Court Staff, skb). (Entered: 10/15/2017)
39 OPPOSITION to 31 Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Defendants Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden. (Daraie, Justin) Modified on 10/20/2017 to correct document link. (Court Staff, skb). (Entered: 10/17/2017)
40 MOTION REFERRED TO Judge Kelly H Rankin. MOTION to Amend/Correct 1 Complaint Leave to File First Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Proposed Order)(Robinson, John) Modified on 10/18/2017 (Court Staff, szf). Modified on 10/19/2017 to correct abbreviations in text (Court Staff, skb). (Entered: 10/17/2017)
Motions No Longer Referred: 40 MOTION to Amend/Correct 1 Complaint Leave to File 1st Amd Complaint (Court Staff, szf) (Entered: 10/18/2017)
41 Minute ORDER and Minute Entry. Proceedings held before Honorable Scott W Skavdahl: taking under advisement 31 Motion for Preliminary Injunction; granting 40 MOTION to Amend/Correct 1 Complaint; denying without prejudice 7 Motion for Order; taking under advisement 12 Motion to Certify Class; denying as moot 15 Motion to Dismiss ; Motion Hearing held on 10/18/2017. (Court Reporter Anne Bowline.) (Court Staff, scat) (Entered: 10/18/2017)
42 NOTICE of Initial Pretrial Conference: Initial Pretrial Conference set for 11/7/2017 10:00 AM in Judge Rankin Chambers (Room No. 2204) before Honorable Kelly H. Rankin. All parties should appear by telephone, with Plaintiff's counsel initiating the call, through a

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conference call operator, and connecting to the Court at 307/433-2180. Parties are advised to have their calendars on hand to assist with scheduling. (Court Staff, szf) (Entered: 10/18/2017)
43 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF against Defendant Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden, filed by Taylor S Blanchard. (Court Staff, stbd) (Entered: 10/19/2017)
44 DOCKETED INCORRECTLY - COUNSEL TO REFILE MEMORANDUM in Support of 31 Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Robinson, John) Modified on 10/19/2017 (Court Staff, stbd). (Entered: 10/19/2017)
45 Second AFFIDAVIT of Taylor Blanchard re 32 Memorandum in Support of Motion filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Robinson, John) (Entered: 10/20/2017)
46 MOTION REFERRED TO Judge Kelly H Rankin. MOTION for Extension of Time (Non-Dispositive) requesting extension of Deadline for Reply Brief filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Pevar, Stephen) (Entered: 10/20/2017)
47 ORDER by the Honorable Kelly H. Rankin granting 46 Motion for Extension of Time. Plaintiffs shall file their Reply Brief to Defendants' Opposition to the Motion for Preliminary Injunction 39 on or before October 27, 2017. (Court Staff, sms) (Entered: 10/23/2017)
48 REPLY BRIEF to 31 Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Pevar, Stephen) Modified on 10/27/2017 to insert link (Court Staff, skb). (Entered: 10/27/2017)
49 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Defendants Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden. (Daraie, Justin) (Entered: 11/02/2017)
50 MEMORANDUM in Support of 49 Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden. (Attachments: # 1 Morman v. Campbell Co., 632 Fed. Appx 927 (unpublished)) (Daraie, Justin) (Entered: 11/02/2017)
51 REPORT of Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Pevar, Stephen) Modified on 11/6/2017 to remove non-public non-public setting (Court Staff, skb). (Entered: 11/03/2017)
52 MOTION REFERRED TO Judge Kelly H Rankin. MOTION for Protective Order filed by Defendants Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden. (Attachments: # 1 Ex. A Notice of Depositions, # 2 Proposed Order)(Daraie, Justin) (Entered: 11/03/2017)

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11/09/2017 11/13/2017 11/20/2017 12/04/2017 12/12/2017

53 RESPONSE in Opposition re 52 MOTION for Protective Order filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Pevar, Stephen) (Entered: 11/06/2017)
54 (TEXT-ONLY) ORDER by the Honorable Kelly H. Rankin. Following the discussion at the Initial Pretrial Conference, held on November 7, 2017, the Court DENIED Defendant's Motion for a Protective Order 52 and ordered discovery to proceed in the case. The scheduled depositions will proceed as planned.(Court Staff, sms) (Entered: 11/07/2017)
55 (TEXT-ONLY) ORDER by the Honorable Kelly H. Rankin. The Court held the Initial Pretrial Conference with the parties on November 7, 2017. The parties requested extensions to file their Response and Reply to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 49 . The Court, finding good cause, ordered Plaintiff to file their Response to the Motion to Dismiss on or before November 20, 2017 and Defendant to file their Reply on or before December 4, 2017.(Court Staff, sms) (Entered: 11/07/2017)
56 INITIAL PRETRIAL ORDERby the Honorable Kelly H. Rankin. Motions filing deadline 5/29/2018. Motion response deadline 6/12/2018. Dispositive Motions Hearing set for 6/27/2018 01:00 PM in Casper Courtroom No. 2 (Room No. 204) before Honorable Scott W Skavdahl. Other Fact Witness Deadline 4/13/2018 Expert Witness Designation-Plaintiff deadline 2/12/2018. Expert Witness DesignationDefendant deadline 3/14/2018. Discovery due by 5/29/2018. Stipulation Deadline 7/3/2018. Motion in Limine deadline 7/3/2018. Motions in Limine Response Deadline 7/10/2018. Final Pretrial Conference set for 7/24/2018 01:00 PM in Casper Courtroom No. 2 (Room No. 204) before Honorable Scott W Skavdahl. Bench Trial (7 Days/Stacked #2) set for 8/6/2018 09:00 AM in Casper Courtroom No. 2 (Room No. 204) before Honorable Scott W Skavdahl.(Court Staff, szf) (Entered: 11/07/2017)
57 ORDER by the Honorable Scott W Skavdahl denying 31 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (Court Staff, skb) (Entered: 11/09/2017)
58 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION by the Honorable Scott W Skavdahl re 12 Motion to Certify Class. (Court Staff, stbd) (Entered: 11/13/2017)
59 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to 49 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Pevar, Stephen) (Entered: 11/20/2017)
60 REPLY to 59 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint filed by Defendants Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden. (Daraie, Justin) (Entered: 12/04/2017)
61 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Rachel Berkness on behalf of Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden (Court Staff, sjlg) (Entered: 12/12/2017)

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62 MOTION to Dismiss 43 First Amended Complaint filed by Defendants Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden. (Daraie, Justin) Modified to add document link on 1/5/2018 (Court Staff, skb). (Entered: 12/28/2017)
63 MEMORANDUM in Support of 62 Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden. (Attachments: # 1 Voigtsberger Affidavit) (Daraie, Justin) (Entered: 12/28/2017)
64 ORDER denying 49 Motion to Dismiss by the Honorable Scott W Skavdahl (Court Staff, scat) (Entered: 01/03/2018)
65 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to 62 MOTION to Dismiss First Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Pevar, Stephen) (Entered: 01/08/2018)
66 AFFIDAVIT of Stephen L. Pevar filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Deposition of Anna Skeen, # 2 Exhibit Deposition of Carl Voigtsberger) (Pevar, Stephen) (Entered: 01/08/2018)
67 MOTION REFERRED TO Judge Kelly H Rankin. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Second Amended Complaint, # 2 Proposed Order)(Pevar, Stephen) Modified text/event on 1/16/2018 (Court Staff, stbd). Modified on 1/18/2018 (Court Staff, skb). (Entered: 01/16/2018)
68 MEMORANDUM in Support of 67 Motion to Amend/Correct filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Pevar, Stephen) (Entered: 01/16/2018)
69 REPLY to 65 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint as Moot filed by Defendants Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Steve Lindly, # 2 Affidavit of Neicole Molden, # 3 KC v Townsend, Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint 09CV12 (Doc. 80), # 4 KC v Townsend, Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint 09CV12 (Doc. 87)) (Berkness, Rachel) (Entered: 01/16/2018)
70 MOTION for Reconsideration , filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Pevar, Stephen) (Entered: 01/25/2018)
71 AFFIDAVIT of John Robinson re 70 MOTION for Reconsideration , filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Pevar, Stephen) (Entered: 01/25/2018)
72 AFFIDAVIT of Stephen Pevar re 70 MOTION for Reconsideration , filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Pevar, Stephen) (Entered: 01/25/2018)
73 OPPOSITION to 67 Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint filed by Defendants Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden. (Attachments: # 1 Hunsaker v. Alexander Unpulished Case, # 2 Lee v. Benuelos Unpublised Case,

02/02/2018 02/02/2018
02/05/2018
02/08/2018
02/09/2018 02/12/2018 02/20/2018 02/20/2018 02/20/2018 02/21/2018

# 3 Ruppert v. Aragon Unpublished Case) (Berkness, Rachel) Modified on 1/31/2018 to correct link (Court Staff, skb). (Entered: 01/30/2018)
74 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Marci Anne Crank Bramlet on behalf of Taylor S Blanchard (Bramlet, Marci) (Entered: 02/02/2018)
75 MOTION REFERRED TO Judge Kelly H Rankin. MOTION for Extension of Time (Non-Dispositive) requesting extension of Deadline to Reply to Response filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Proposed Order)(Robinson, John) (Entered: 02/02/2018)
76 ORDER by the Honorable Kelly H Rankin granting 75 Motion for Extension of Time and Excess Pages. It is ordered that the deadline for Plaintiff to file her reply brief shall be up to and including February 20, 2018. It is further ordered that Plaintiff's reply brief may exceed the five page limit, but shall not exceed ten pages. (Court Staff, sjgc) Modified text on 2/5/2018 (Court Staff, sjlg). (Entered: 02/05/2018)
77 RESPONSE to 70 Motion for Reconsideration filed by Defendants Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Rachel Berkness, # 2 Unpublished Case Jimenez v Stone) (Berkness, Rachel) (Entered: 02/08/2018)
78 MOTION REFERRED TO Judge Kelly H Rankin. Joint MOTION for Extension of Time for Expert Designation filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Robinson, John) Modified on 2/9/2018 (Court Staff, skb). (Entered: 02/09/2018)
79 ORDER by the Honorable Kelly H. Rankin granting 78 Motion for Extension of Time. Expert Witness Designation-Plaintiff deadline 3/14/2018. Expert Witness Designation-Defendant deadline 4/13/2018.(Court Staff, sms) (Entered: 02/12/2018)
80 MOTION REFERRED TO Judge Kelly H Rankin. MOTION for Order Ext of Time filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Robinson, John) (Entered: 02/20/2018)
81 REPLY to 73 Opposition, filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Declaration of Arika Wallace) (Pevar, Stephen) (Entered: 02/20/2018)
82 ORDER by the Honorable Scott W Skavdahl granting 62 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint; and denying 70 Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration. It is ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED.(Court Staff, skb) (Entered: 02/20/2018)
83 JUDGMENT in favor of Defendants against Plaintiff. by the Honorable Scott W Skavdahl. It is hereby ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED.(Court Staff, skb) (Attachment: # 1 Bill of Costs) (Court

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Staff, skb). Modified on 2/21/2018 (Court Staff, skb). (Entered: 02/21/2018)
84 FILED IN ERROR - COUNSEL TO REFILE - NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 82 Order granting 62 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint and denying 70 Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Pevar, Stephen) Modified at the request of Counsel on 3/8/2018 (Court Staff, stbd). (Entered: 03/08/2018)
85 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 82 Order granting 62 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint and denying 70 Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration and 83 Judgment filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard filed by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard. (Pevar, Stephen) Modified text on 3/8/2018 (Court Staff, stbd). Modified text on 3/12/2018 (Court Staff, stbd). (Entered: 03/08/2018)
86 Preliminary Record of appeal sent to USCA and counsel re 85 Notice of Appeal, The procedures and appeals packet may be obtained from our website at www.wyd.uscourts.gov (Attachments: # 1 Preliminary Record on Appeal Including Notice of Appeal) (Court Staff, stbd) (Entered: 03/08/2018)
87 Appeal Number 18-8020 received from USCA for 85 Notice of Appeal, filed by Taylor S Blanchard. Docketing statement due 03/22/2018 for Taylor S. Blanchard. Transcript order form due 03/22/2018 for Taylor S. Blanchard. Fee is due by 04/09/2018 for Taylor S. Blanchard. Notice of appearance due on 03/22/2018 for Taylor S. Blanchard, Rick Carton, and Robert Lampert. (Court Staff, stbd) (Entered: 03/08/2018)
USCA Appeal Fees received $505 receipt number CHY028472 re 85 Notice of Appeal filed by Taylor S Blanchard (Court Staff, sal) (Entered: 04/11/2018)
88 TRANSCRIPT REQUEST (No Transcripts Necessary) by Plaintiff Taylor S Blanchard re 85 Notice of Appeal,. (Pevar, Stephen) (Entered: 03/26/2018)
89 (TEXT-ONLY) APPEAL ORDER from USCA as to 85 Notice of Appeal, filed by Taylor S Blanchard Record on appeal/Notice due 4/2/2018 (Court Staff, stbd) (Entered: 03/26/2018)
90 Transcript Letter transmitted to USCA re 85 Notice of Appeal; No transcripts have been ordered for this appeal. For purpose of appeal, the record is now ready. (Court Staff, stbd) (Entered: 03/28/2018)
91 Appeal Remark re 85 Notice of Appeal; Appellant's brief and appendix due on 05/07/2018 for Taylor S. Blanchard. (Court Staff, stbd) (Entered: 03/28/2018)

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92 MOTION REFERRED TO Judge Kelly H Rankin. MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney filed by Defendants Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Berkness, Rachel) (Entered: 01/30/2019)
93 ORDER by the Honorable Kelly H Rankin granting 92 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Rachel M Berkness terminated (Court Staff, sjgc) (Entered: 01/30/2019)
94 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Ewa C Dawson on behalf of Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden (Dawson, Ewa) (Entered: 08/27/2019)
95 MOTION REFERRED TO Judge Kelly H Rankin. MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney filed by Defendants Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, Wyoming Womens Center Warden. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Daraie, Justin) (Entered: 08/29/2019)
96 ORDER by the Honorable Kelly H Rankin granting 95 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Justin Ashkhan Daraie terminated. (Court Staff, sjh) (Entered: 08/29/2019)
97 MANDATE of USCA AFFIRMING 82 Order on Motion to Dismiss, Order on Motion for Reconsideration, 83 Judgment, re 85 Notice of Appeal (Attorney), filed by Taylor S Blanchard. (Attachments: # 1 Order & Judgment) (Court Staff, stbd) (Entered: 09/25/2020)

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 Blanchard v. Lampert, 822 Fed.Appx. 811 (2020)

822 Fed.Appx. 811 This case was not selected for publication in West’s
Federal Reporter. See Fed. Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 generally governing citation of judicial decisions issued on or after Jan. 1, 2007. See also U.S.Ct. of App. 10th Cir.
Rule 32.1. United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
Taylor S. BLANCHARD, Plaintiff - Appellant, v.
Robert LAMPERT, Wyoming Department of Corrections Director, in his official capacity; Rick Catron, Wyoming Women’s Center Warden, in his
official capacity, Defendants - Appellees.
No. 18-8020 |
FILED August 3, 2020
Synopsis Background: Youthful offender brought cause of action challenging her placement in Florida boot camp, as allegedly not providing her with same opportunities for drug rehabilitation that she would otherwise have enjoyed. Following her graduation from boot camp and denial of offender’s motion for certification of plaintiff class, the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, No. 1:17-CV-00124, Scott W. Skavdahl, Chief Judge, 2018 WL 4760520, dismissed action as moot and denied offender’s motion for reconsideration, and she appealed.
The Court of Appeals held that argument that youthful offender sought to raise for first time on appeal, as to why her graduation from Florida boot camp had not mooted her lawsuit, was not preserved and could not be considered.
Affirmed.
Procedural Posture(s): On Appeal; Motion to Dismiss; Motion for Reconsideration.
*812 (D.C. No. 1:17-CV-00124-SWS) (D. Wyoming)
1

Attorneys and Law Firms
Stephen L. Pevar, American Civil Liberties Union, Hartford, CT, John H. Robinson, Robinson Stelting Welch Bramlet, Jackson, WY, for Plaintiff - Appellant
Ewa C. Dawson, Daniel E. White, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Wyoming, Cheyenne, WY, for Defendants - Appellees Before HOLMES and CARSON, Circuit Judges.1
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Joel M. Carson III, Circuit Judge
The Constitution limits federal judicial power to “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. Once a plaintiff no longer suffers from an actual injury that a court can redress by a favorable decision, her case is moot, and the district court must dismiss it for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Today we decide whether the civil action Plaintiff Taylor S. Blanchard filed in the United States District Court *813 for the District of Wyoming became moot upon her release from a Florida boot camp program. In the end, we agree with the district court that, when it dismissed the case as moot, Plaintiff had not presented the court with a redressable claim. Plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary are either unpersuasive or unpreserved. Thus, exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I.
In 1987, the Wyoming legislature passed the Youthful Offender Act, Wyo. Rev. Stat. § 7-13-1001, et seq., which established a program for first-time criminal offenders under the age of twenty-five. Instead of incarceration at a traditional prison, eligible individuals can attend an intense, six-month “boot camp” program that provides instruction, training, and programming. If an individual successfully completes the program, the sentencing judge may amend the sentence and place the individual on

Blanchard v. Lampert, 822 Fed.Appx. 811 (2020)
probation. Under the statute, the Wyoming Department of Corrections administers the program.
When the state district court sentenced her, Plaintiff, who is female, was a first-time criminal offender under the age of twenty-five who qualified for the boot camp program. And before she appeared for sentencing, no Wyoming trial judge had ever recommended placement of a female offender in the boot camp program.2 Based on her criminal offense, a Wyoming state trial judge sentenced Plaintiff to a lengthy six- to ten-year term of incarceration. But at her request, the state trial judge recommended that Plaintiff enter the boot camp program—a recommendation that could allow Plaintiff, upon successful completion, to serve only a probation sentence.
Although the state trial judge recommended boot camp, the Wyoming Department of Corrections incarcerated Plaintiff in the Wyoming Women’s Center in Lusk, Wyoming. Plaintiff filed a grievance asking for the opportunity to participate in boot camp. A prison employee rejected the grievance, stating that classification decisions “are non-grievable.”
Plaintiff then filed this lawsuit, alleging Robert Lampert, the Director of the Wyoming Department of Corrections, and Rick Catron, the Warden of the Wyoming Women’s Center, violated her right to equal protection by denying her access to the boot camp program based on her sex. In her complaint, Plaintiff asked for “the same opportunity to participate in and complete a Youthful Offender program as men prisoners, either a program operated by the [Wyoming Department of Corrections] in Wyoming or a similar program operated in another state.”
One month after Plaintiff filed her complaint and consistent with the relief she sought in her lawsuit, the Wyoming Department of Corrections transferred Plaintiff to a four-month boot camp program for women in Florida—a development Plaintiff described as “much-welcomed.”
Shortly after she arrived in Florida, Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint. In that pleading, Plaintiff generally alleged that the Florida program was inferior to Wyoming’s boot camp program because it provides fewer rehabilitative services and programming than that provided to the men in Wyoming’s male-only boot camp.3 And, even though she originally *814 sought placement “in a similar program operated in another state,” Plaintiff moved the goal post in her First Amended Complaint by
2

seeking an injunction prohibiting officials from sending her to another state unless they likewise sent men to out-of-state boot camps.4 In her words, Plaintiff sought:
[T]he same opportunity to participate in and complete Wyoming’s Youthful Offender program as men prisoners, and to send women to an out-of-state program only if men are sent to out-of-state programs on a comparable and equitable basis, that is, such out-of-state placement should not be based on gender but rather on gender-neutral principles.
After Plaintiff substantially completed the Florida boot camp and her graduation became imminent, Defendants moved to dismiss the First Amended Complaint based on mootness. Defendants argued that Plaintiff’s case would become moot once she graduated from boot camp because she would no longer be a first-time offender and thus would be statutorily ineligible to participate in a boot camp for first-time offenders in Wyoming. As a result, Defendants reasoned that the district court could no longer provide redress for her allegations.
In response to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff contended that the court should grant her leave to add additional plaintiffs so her case could survive Defendants’ mootness challenge.5 Plaintiff explained that “[t]he purpose of the [Second Amended Complaint] is to add fifteen women as named plaintiffs ... [who] suffered the identical injury that Ms. Blanchard suffered.” Plaintiff conceded that her “Fourteenth Amendment claim was destined to expire upon her graduation from boot camp, a period far too short for that claim to be fully adjudicated in the district court and on appeal.” She therefore asked the district court to grant her not-yet-filed motion for leave to file a second amended complaint so she could add parties.
Three days before her boot camp graduation, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. In that motion, Plaintiff maintained that the Second Amended Complaint sought “merely to add new Plaintiffs to the existing lawsuit, and does not add a new claim.”6 She argued that she filed her motion in sufficient time to join additional Plaintiffs prior to her case becoming moot.

Blanchard v. Lampert, 822 Fed.Appx. 811 (2020)
On January 19, 2018, Plaintiff graduated from boot camp in Florida. After receiving notice that she successfully completed the *815 Florida boot camp program, the state trial judge modified her lengthy six- to ten-year prison sentence to a five-year term of probation, thus ending Plaintiff’s period of boot camp incarceration.
The district court then dismissed Plaintiff’s case on mootness grounds and denied Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. The district court based its decision on the relief Plaintiff requested in her First Amended Complaint: an injunction ordering Defendants to place her in Wyoming’s boot camp program. Because Plaintiff had served her time and successfully completed a boot camp program, the district court determined that it could no longer grant Plaintiff effective relief. Plaintiff appealed.
II.
We begin our analysis by looking to the Constitution. Without a “Case” or “Controversy,” we lack the power to act. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. This “case-or-controversy limitation underpins both standing and mootness jurisprudence.” Rhodes v. Judiscak, 676 F.3d 931, 933 (10th Cir. 2012). When a plaintiff no longer suffers from an actual injury that the district court can redress by a favorable judicial decision, her case becomes moot. Id.
In her briefing, Plaintiff challenges the district court’s conclusion that her graduation rendered her equal protection claim moot. On appeal, she argues that she did not receive drug treatment in the Florida boot camp unlike males in Wyoming’s boot camp. Plaintiff alleges that her claims are not moot because even after her discharge, the district court could have ordered that Defendants give her two more months of boot camp or place her in drug treatment equivalent to that afforded to male boot camp inmates. We reject Plaintiff’s appellate arguments for the reasons discussed below.
We first address Plaintiff’s argument that her claims are not moot because the district court could have ordered Defendants to incarcerate her in boot camp for another two months—a period equivalent to that served by males in Wyoming’s boot camp program. At oral argument, Plaintiff’s counsel conceded that she did not seek additional incarceration in boot camp as a remedy in this
3

case. Thus, we will not disturb the district court’s order dismissing her case based on that theory. United States v. Edgerton, 438 F.3d 1043, 1047 n.3 (10th Cir. 2006) (explaining that we will not reach a conceded argument).
Her second argument meets the same fate, but for a different reason. On appeal, Plaintiff asserts that her claims are not moot because, after her release, the district court could have granted her partial relief by ordering that Defendants provide her with drug treatment equivalent to that received by males in Wyoming boot camp. But Plaintiff raises this argument for the first time on appeal. And where “a plaintiff pursues a new legal theory for the first time on appeal, that new theory suffers the distinct disadvantage of starting at least a few paces back from the block.” Richison v. Ernest Group, Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1127 (10th Cir. 2011). “If the theory was intentionally relinquished or abandoned in the district court, we usually deem it waived and refuse to consider it.” Id. “By contrast, if the theory simply wasn’t raised before the district court, we usually hold it forfeited.” Id.
In her original Complaint, Plaintiff requested the opportunity to participate in a boot camp program in Wyoming “or a similar program operated in another state.” But after Defendants provided the relief she sought by sending her to boot camp in Florida, Plaintiff changed theories *816 and filed a First Amended Complaint.7 In her First Amended Complaint, the operative pleading in this appeal, Plaintiff sought assurance that present and future women prisoners in Wyoming will be able to participate in an in-state boot camp program comparable to the men’s program. Plaintiff also generally alleged in one paragraph that Wyoming should only send women to out-of-state programs if men are also sent to out-of-state programs and that the Florida program is inferior to the men’s Wyoming program.
In her First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff specifically requested that the district court:
Issue preliminary and permanent injunctive relief on behalf of Plaintiff Blanchard and on behalf of the class of women she represents ... ordering Defendants to immediately take all necessary and proper actions to ensure that present and future women prisoners in the custody of WDOC will be

Blanchard v. Lampert, 822 Fed.Appx. 811 (2020)
granted the opportunity to participate in an in-state boot camp program comparable to the men’s program at Newcastle, or in an out-of-state program provided that placement is gender neutral, that is, men and women are sent to out-of-state programs based on gender-neutral criteria.
But as soon as officials discharged her from Florida boot camp, Plaintiff was no longer a first-time offender, making her ineligible to participate in the boot camp program going forward. And the district court denied class certification, which Plaintiff does not challenge on appeal. She therefore cannot avoid mootness on the ground that she brings suit on behalf of other female plaintiffs.
Now, Plaintiff posits a new theory for the first time on appeal. She argues that a live dispute exists because Defendants could still provide her with drug treatment comparable to the drug treatment men receive in the Wyoming boot camp program. The idea Plaintiff advances, however, stems from a request for new and different relief, not merely a new argument in support of the same relief.
Although Plaintiff’s new theory of a partial remedy is more consistent with the facts of the case, she never raised this argument in response to Defendants’ motion to dismiss so that the district court could consider it. The only time Plaintiff arguably raised this argument below was in her reply brief on her motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. And not only did Plaintiff raise the argument in a reply brief directed to a motion other than the motion to dismiss being considered on appeal, she also filed it on the same day the district court dismissed the case. We therefore conclude that Plaintiff failed to adequately preserve the issue for appeal.8 See FDIC v. Noel, 177 F.3d 911, 915-16 (10th Cir. 1999) (concluding that a party may not raise an argument for the first time in a reply brief to the district court because doing so precludes a response by the non-movant and prevents *817 reasoned consideration by the district court).
In fact, Plaintiff’s original argument below merely requested that the district court allow her to add additional plaintiffs. Indeed, Plaintiff conceded her case was
4

“destined” to be moot following her release from boot camp in both her response to the motion to dismiss and in her motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. She asserted that to save her lawsuit, the district court needed to add plaintiffs.9 And it was not until her opening brief in this appeal that Plaintiff developed the argument that her case still presented a live controversy because Defendants could provide her with equivalent drug treatment.10 See Campbell v. Ackerman, 903 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 2018) (“Our jurisprudence simply does not allow a litigant to switch horses in mid-stream”). Plaintiff’s failure to raise her new theory appears unintentional and therefore amounts to forfeiture. But because she raised her argument for the first time on appeal, she cannot “prevail unless [she] can successfully run the gauntlet created by our rigorous plain-error standard of review.” United States v. Rosales-Miranda, 755 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir. 2014).
Plaintiff, however, did not argue for plain error in her brief, even in the alternative. Rather, she contends we can review her claim de novo because it is a new argument directed to a previously raised issue. Her argument for de novo review fails, however, as the Court’s “long-standing practice has been to review newly raised (but not waived) legal arguments under what substantively amounts to (and what we have more recently described as) the plain error standard.” Richison, 634 F.3d at 1128 (emphasis added). To be sure, “[a]ffording plenary appellate review to newly raised legal theories would do much to undermine this adversarial and appellate order.” Id. at 1130.11
Plaintiff has not tried to show how her new legal theory satisfies the plain error standard. “And the failure to do so—the failure to argue for plain error and its *818 application on appeal—surely marks the end of the road for an argument for reversal not first presented to the district court.” Id. at 1131. In her response to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Plaintiff did not argue that she had a live claim because Defendants afforded her only partial relief. And she did not seek to cure her failure by asking the district court to reconsider its order dismissing her case as moot. She cannot now revisit that decision on appeal without at least satisfying the plain error standard of review, which she has failed to do.
III.
Ultimately, we agree with the district court’s conclusion

Blanchard v. Lampert, 822 Fed.Appx. 811 (2020)

that it could no longer grant Plaintiff effective relief under

the First Amended Complaint. When the district court

The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.12

dismissed her case, Plaintiff had completed her term of

incarceration, which caused her to be statutorily ineligible for placement in Wyoming’s boot camp program. Thus,

All Citations

the district court could not grant her the relief she sought, which, as prayed for in her First Amended Complaint,

822 Fed.Appx. 811

necessarily required it to order Defendants to further

incarcerate her in a Wyoming boot camp.

Footnotes

1

While the late Honorable Monroe G. McKay was assigned to, and participated in the oral argument of, this matter

before his death on March 28, 2020, his vote was not counted. Yovino v. Rizo, ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 706, 710, 203

L.Ed.2d 38 (2019) (federal court may not count the vote of a judge who dies before a decision is issued). “The

practice of this court permits the remaining two panel judges if in agreement to act as a quorum in resolving the

appeal.” United States v. Wiles, 106 F.3d 1516, 1516 n.* (10th Cir. 1997); see also 28 U.S.C. § 46(d) (noting circuit

court may adopt procedures permitting disposition of an appeal where remaining quorum of panel agrees on the

disposition). The remaining panel members have acted as a quorum with respect to this Order and Judgment.

*

This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and

collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th

Cir. R. 32.1.

2

Although the record is not clear on this point, Plaintiff was perhaps the first female offender to ever request

placement in Wyoming’s boot camp program.

3

As becomes relevant below, the Florida boot camp was two months shorter than the Wyoming boot camp and

allegedly provided no drug treatment to inmates. The First Amended Complaint, however, did not seek redress for

these two alleged deficiencies in the Florida program.

4

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint purported to be on behalf of a class of plaintiffs, with Plaintiff acting as their

class representative. The district court denied Plaintiff’s request to certify a class—a decision Plaintiff does not

appeal.

5

Defendants argued to the district court that the First Amended Complaint did not seek redress for her allegations

regarding out-of-state placement or placement into an “inferior” boot camp program. Plaintiff did not dispute that

statement in her response to Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

6

In a reply brief filed the same day the district court dismissed the case as moot, Plaintiff sought to recant her

concession in her motion to file a second amended complaint that the case would become moot upon her

graduation. Plaintiff stated: “Admittedly, the brief Ms. Blanchard filed in support of her motion to amend states that

her individual claim will likely become moot on January 19, 2018 when Ms. Blanchard graduates from Boot Camp.

That statement was ill-advised and is now recanted.” Plaintiff never tried to recant any such statements or take a

different position in response to the motion to dismiss upon which the district court ruled.

7

Although Plaintiff’s original complaint sought placement out of state, at oral argument counsel informed the Court

that “[a]t the time ... it never occurred to me that they might respond by sending her to an out-of-state prison.”

5

Blanchard v. Lampert, 822 Fed.Appx. 811 (2020)

8

Plaintiff’s position that the panel should consider her new theories “rest[s] on a misconception of the nature of

appellate review.” Ball v. United States, No. 19-1161, 967 F.3d 1072 (10th Cir. July 31, 2020). “The proceedings in

district court are not just a rehearsal, a dry run, for the ultimate performance on appeal, where the parties can

discard what did not work below and introduce new scenes for a new audience.” Id. “We review the case litigated

below, not the case fleshed out for the first time on appeal.” Id.

9

Plaintiff makes no allegation and the record contains no evidence that she argued to the state sentencing court that

she had to complete boot camp before it could modify her sentence. Nor did she ask that court, or the district court

for that matter, to provide her additional incarceration in boot camp or drug treatment equivalent to what men

receive in Wyoming. She sought to prevent dismissal in the district court exclusively upon her position that she

needed to add additional plaintiffs to prevent her claims from becoming moot. Thus, Plaintiff’s failure to make such

arguments to the state sentencing court or the district court further demonstrates that her position on appeal is a

new one.

10 Besides being unpreserved, Plaintiff’s eleventh-hour argument is problematic for other reasons. At oral argument, the parties informed the panel for the first time that the Wyoming Department of Corrections is providing Plaintiff with drug treatment. So Plaintiff’s argument, to the extent that it assumes that she never received drug treatment, is admittedly false. And Plaintiff has never argued that the drug treatment she is now receiving is not equivalent to the drug treatment that males receive in Wyoming’s boot camp.

11 Our job is “to correct errors made by the district court in assessing legal theories presented to it, not to serve as a ‘second-shot forum.’ ” Id. (quoting Tele-Communications, Inc. v. C.I.R., 104 F.3d 1229, 1233 (10th Cir. 1997)). Our reluctance “to command do-overs” in the district court explains why we treat arguments for affirming the district court differently than arguments for reversing it. Id. Although “we may affirm on any basis supported by the record, even if it requires ruling on arguments not reached by the district court or even presented to us on appeal,” the same is not true for reversing the district court. Id. “If a newly raised legal theory is entitled to appellate review at all—if it wasn’t waived before the district court—it may form a basis for reversal only if the appellant can satisfy the plain error standard of review.” Id.

12 Plaintiff moved to supplement the record on appeal to include the deposition of Scott Abbott. We GRANT Plaintiff’s motion.

6