IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF omo
EASTERN DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
v.
SPITZER MANAGEMENT, INC, d/b/a SPITZER MOTOR CITY, INC.,
Defendant.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO.

)

)

)

)

)

)

COMPLAINT AND

)

JURY TRIAL DEMAND

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

NATURE OF THE ACTION

This is an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, (42 U.S.C.

§2000e, et seq), ("Title VII") and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, to correct unlawful

employment practices on the basis of national origin and to provide appropriate relief to Dean O.

Okafor, David J. Marek and similarly situated individuals who were adversely affected by such

practices. As articulated with greater particularity in Paragraph 7 below, the Commission alleges that

the Defendant, Spitzer Management, Inc. d/b/a Spitzer Motor City, Inc. ("Defendant") discriminated

on the basis of national origin against Mr. Okafor and Mr. Marek and similarly situated employees

by subjecting them to harassment and a hostile work environment. Defendant also discriminated on

the basis of national origin by constructively discharging Mr. Marek and other similarly situated employees. As a result ofthese discriminatory practices Mr. Okafor, Mr. Marek and other similarly situated employees have suffered damages including backpay losses and compensatory damages.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE I. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 451, 1331, 1337, 1343 and 1345. This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to Section 706(f) (1) and (3) ofTitle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(f)(I) and (3) ("Title VII"), and pursuant to Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,42 U.S.C. § 1981a. 2. The employment practices alleged to be unlawful were committed within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Northern District,of Ohio, Eastern Division.
PARTIES 3. Plaintiff, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "Commission"), is an Agency of the United States of America charged with the administration, interpretation and enforcement ofTitle VII and is expressly authorized to bring this action by Section 706(f) (I) and (3) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(I) and (3). 4. At all relevant times, Defendant Employer, Spitzer Management, Inc. d/b/a Spitzer Motor City, Inc., have continuously been an Ohio corporation doing business in the State of Ohio, County of Cuyahoga and City of Cleveland, and has continuously had at least 15 employees. 5. At all relevant times, Defendant Employer has continuously been an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 701 (b), (g) and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (b), (g) and (h).
2

STATEMENT OF CLAIMS 6. More than thirty days prior to the institution ofthis lawsuit, Dean O. Okafor and David J. Marek each filed a charge with the Commission alleging violations of Title VII by Defendant Employer. All conditions precedent to the institution of this lawsuit have been fulfilled. 7. Since at least December of 2005, Defendant Employer has engaged in unlawful employment practices at its facility located at 13001 Brookpark Road, Cleveland, Ohio inviolation ofSection 703(a)(l) ofTitle VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2 (a)(I). The alleged unlawful practices include, but are not limited to: a) Harassing and subjecting Mr. Okafor, a Sales Consultant, to a hostile work environment because of his national origin, Nigerian/African ethnicity by referring to him as "Nairobi Man" by making fun of his accent; by stating he "only eats what he kills," aI!d by directing demeaning comments at Mr. Okafor which were announced over the facility intercom making those comments audible to customers and employee; b) Harassing and subjecting Mr. Marek, an Auto Detailer, to a hostile work environment because ofhis national origin, Korean by referring to him as "Wax On Wax Of'; c) Subjecting other employees at the 13001 Brookpark Road facility to national origin-based harassment and a hostile work environment; d) By constructively discharging on the basis of national origin, Mr. Marek and other employees at the 13001 Brookpark Road facility; e) The harassment and hostile work environment alleged herein above were carried out by and/or were the direct result ofthe actions by Management Officials at Defendant's 1300I Brookpark Road facility;
3

f) Defendant took no action based on this discriminatory conduct even though it received complaints about the harassment and hostile work enviromnent.
8. The effect of the practices complained of in Paragraph 7 above has been to deprive Dean O. Okafor, David J. Marek and similarly situated employees ofequal employment opportunities and otherwise adversely affect their status as employees due to impermissible consideration of their respective national origins, in violation of Title VII.
9. The unlawful practices complained of above were intentional. 10. The unlawful employment practices complained ofabove were undertaken with malice and/or reckless indifference to the federally protected rights ofDean O. Okafor, David 1. Marek and a class of aggrieved individuals.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, the Commission respectfully requests that this Court: A. Grant a permanent injunction enjoining Defendant Employer, its officers, successors, assigns and all persons in active concert or participation with it, from discriminating against individuals by the implementation of practices and policies which discriminate on the basis of national origin. B. Order Defendant Employer to institute and carry out policies, practices and programs which provide equal employment opportunities for all employees without regard to their national origin and which eradicate the effects of its past and present unlawful employment practices. C. Order Defendant Employer to institute and carry out a complaint procedure which encourages employees to come forward with complaints regarding violations of Title VII and/or of its policies against discrimination, harassment and a hostile work enviromnent.
4

D. Order Defendant Employer to institute and carry out a training program which shall promote supervisor accountability imposing on all managers and supervisory personnel a duty to actively monitor their work areas to ensure compliance with Title VII and/or Defendant's policies on non-discrimination and requiring all managers and supervisors to report any incidents and/or complaints of harassment or ethnic intimidation of which they become aware to the person or department at Defendant charged with handling such complaints.
E. Order Defendant Employer to make whole Dean O. Okafor, David J. Marek and any aggrieved individuals by providing appropriate monetary reliefincluding backpay and front pay with prejudgment interest, in amounts to be determined at trial, and other affirmative relief necessary to eradicate the effects of its unlawful employment practices.
F. Order Defendant Employer to make whole Dean O. OkafoJ, David J..Marek and any aggrieved individuals, by providing compensation for past and future pecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful employment practices described in Paragraph 7 above, including but not limited to out of pocket losses.
G. Order Defendant Employer to make whole Dean O. Okafor, David J. Marek and any aggrieved individuals by providing compensation for non-pecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful practices complained of in Paragraph 7 above, including emotional pain, suffering, loss of enjoyment of life and humiliation, in amounts to be proven at trial.
H. Order Defendant Employer to pay Dean O. Okafor, David J. Marek and any aggrieved individuals punitive damages for its malicious and reckless conduct described in Paragraph 7, above, in amounts to be determined at trial.
I. Grant such further relief as the Court deems necessary and proper in the public interest. J. Award the Commission its costs in this action.
5

JURY TRIAL DEMAND
The Commission requests a jury trial on all questions of fact raised by its complaint.
Respectfully submitted,
RONALD S. COOPER
GENERAL COUNSEL
JAMES L. LEE Deputy General Counsel
GWENDOLYN YOUNG REAMS. Associate General Counsel
tJ~m~D4t:
~CNA Regional Attorney Philadelphia Distri,ct Office Philadelphia, PA 19106
Associate Regional Attorney Registration No. 0031443 larry.watson@eeoc.gov
~1bcru~
SOLVITA MCMILLAN
Senior Trial Attorney Registration No. 0040011 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Cleveland Field Office Anthony J. Celebrezze Office Building 1240 East Ninth Street Suite 3001 Cleveland, Ohio 44199 (216) 522-7676 (216) 522-7430 fax solvita.mcmilla@eeoc.gov
6

 
 IN 1'1": U/I.' ITED STATES I) ISTRICT COURT
FOR TIlE NORT HERN DlSTRICf OF 01110
EASTERt'i DIVISION

EQUAL Ei\IPLOYMENTOPPORTU~ITY

)

CO:'tIi\ I ISSION,

)

)

I'laintiff,

)

",

)

)

SPITZER MANAGDIEf\;', I1\C. and

)

SPITZER MOTOR CITY, IN C.

)

)

Ddend~nh.

)

CIVIL ACfION NO: 1,06CV02337
JUDGE ANN ALDRICH
A.\ IENDEO CO:>O IPLAIl\. A....'O J URY DEMAND

NATURE OF TIl E ACTION This is IlII action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. (42 U.s.C. §2000e, et seq), ("Title VJI") and Ti tle I ofthc Civil RighlS Act of 1991, to correct unlawful employment practices on the basis of national origin and to pro\'ide appropriate relief to Dean O. Okafor. David 1. Marek and similarl) situated individuals "00 were adversely affected by such practices. As aniculated with greater panicularity in Paragraph S below, the Commission alleges that the Spitzer Management. Inc. and Spitzer Motor City, Inc. ('"Defendants"') di5Criminated against Mr. Okafor and Mr. Marek and similarly situated employccs by subjecting them to harassment and a hostile work environment on the basis of their national origin and ethnicity. Defendant also discriminated against Mr. Marek and other simillltly situated employees by constructively discltarging them on the basis of national origin and etMcity. As a result of these
discriminatory practices Mr. Okafor. Mr. r.'on:k and other similarly situated employccs have
suffered damages incl ud ing backpay losses and compensatory damages,

.JURl s mCfION AN D VENUE I. Jurisdiction of this Coun is in,-oked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 451. 1331. 1337, 1343 and 1345. This action is authorizcd and instituted pursuant to Section 706(f) (I) and (3) of Tille VI! of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. as amended, 42 U.S.c. §2000e-5(f)(1) and (3) ("Title VIr"). and pursuant to Seetion 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. 2. The employment practices alleged to be unla"-ful were commiued with in the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division.
PART I ES 3. Plaintiff.lIIe Equal Emplo)ruent Opportunity Commission (the "Commission"), is an Agency of the United States of America charged "-lth the adminislr3tion. interpretation and enforcement of Title VII and is e)(pressly authorized to bnng this action by Section 706{f) (I) and (3) of Title VII. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e·5(f)( 1) and (3). 4. At all relevant times. Defendant Spitzer Management, Inc. has continuously been an Ohio corporation doing business in the State of Ohio. County of lA>rain and City of Elyria. and has continuously had 31 least 15 employees. 5. At all relevant times. Defendant Spitzer Motor City, Inc _. has continuously been an Ohio corporation doing business in the State of Ohio, County of Cuyahoga and City of Cleveland, and has continuously had at least 15 employees. 6. At all rele"ant times Defendant Employers. described in paragraphs 4 and 5 above. have continuously been engaged in an industry affeeting commerce "ithin the meaning of Swion 701 (b). (g) and (h) ofTitle Vll. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e (b). (g) and (h).

STATEMEl'iT OF CLA IMS
7. More than thirty days prior to the institution of this lawsuit. Dean O. Okafor and
David J. Marek each filcd a charge with the Commission alleging violations of Title VII by
Defendant Spitzer Motor City, Inc. All conditions precedent to the institution of this lawsuit have
been fulfilled.
8. Since at least December of 2005, Defendant Employers have engaged in unla",ful
employmem practices at the facility located at l3001 Brookpark Road, Cleveland. Ohio in
violation of Section 703(a)(l ) of Title VII, 42 U.S.c. §2000c-2 (a)(I). The alleged unlawful
practices include, but are not limited to:
(a) Harassing and subjecting Mr. Okafor, a Sales Consultant. to a hostile work environment because of his national origin. Nigerian/African ethnicity by referring to him as "Nairobi Man" by making fun of his accent; by stating he "only eats what he kills."' and by directing demeaning comments at Mr. Okafor which were announced over the facility intercom making those comments audible to customers and employees:
(b) Harassing and subjecting Mr. Marek. an Auto Detailcr. to a hostile work environment because of his national origin, Korean by refemng to him as
"Wax On Wax Off';
(c) Subjecting other employees at the BOOI Brookpark Road facility to national origin-based harassment and a hostile work environment:
(d) By conSU1Jctively discharging on the basis of national origin/ethnicity. Mr. Marek and other employees at the 13001 Brookpark Road facility;
(e) The harassment. hostile work environment and Title VII violations alleged herein above were carried out by andlor were the direct result of actions by management officials al Ocfendant's1300IBrookpark Road facility;
( I) Defendant Employers failed to take appropriale corrective action even though they received complaints about the harassment and hostil e work environment.
)

9.

The effect of the practices complained of in Paragraph 8(a)-(1) above has been to

deprive Dean O. Okafor. David J. Marek and similarly situated employees of equal employment

opportunities and otherwise adversely affect their status as employees due to impermissible

consideration of their respective national origins. in violation of Title VII.

10. The unlav.ful practices complained of above were intentional.

II. The unlawful employment practiccs complained of above were undenaken wilh

malice and/or reckless indiffeTl:nce to the federally protected rights of Dean O. Okafor. David 1-

Marek and a class ofaggrieved individuals.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE. the Commission respectfully requests that this Coun:

A. Grant a permanent injunction enjoining each Defendant, its officers. successors,

assigns and all persoIl5 in active concen or participation with it. from discriminating against

individuals by the implementation of practices and policies which discriminate on the basis of

nationalorigin/ethnicity.

B. Order Defendant Employers to institute and carry out policies. practices and

programs which provide equal emplo>'ment opportunities for all employees v.ithout regard to

their national origin/ethnicity and whiCh eradicate the effects of its past and present unlawful

employment practices.

C. Order Defendant Emplo>ers to institute and carry out a complaint procedure which

encourages employees to come forward v.ith complaints Tl:garding violations of Title VII and/or

of Defendants' policies against discrimination. harassment and a hostile work environment.

4

D. Order Defendant Emplo~ers to institute and carr)' out a training program which shall promote supervisor acoounlabilit} imposing on all managers and supervisory personnel a duty to actively monitor their work areas to cnsun' compliance with Title VII and/or Defendants' policies on non·discrimination and requiring all managers and supervisors to report any incidents andlor complaints of harassment or ethnic intimidation of which they become aware to the person or department charged with handling such complaints.
E. Order Defendant Employers to make whole Dean O. Okafor, David 1. Marek and an~ aggrie\'ed indh'iduals by prm'iding appropriate monetary relief including backpay and front
pay v.;th prejudgment interest. in amounts to be dctcnnined at trial, and other affirmative relief
necessary 10 eradicate the effects of its unla"ful employment praclices. F. Order Defendant Employers 10 make whole Dean O. Okafor. David J. Marek and
any aggrieved individuals. by providing compensation for past and future pecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful employment practices described in Paragraph 7 abole. including but IlOllimitoo 10 OUI ofpockct losses.
G. Order Defendant Employers 10 mue whole Dean O. Okafor. Dal'id J. Marek and any aggrieved individuals by pro\'iding compensalion for non· pecuniary 10UC$ resulting from the unlal\ ful prnctices complained of in Parngrnph 7 above. including emotional pain, suffering, loss of enjoyment oflife and humi liation. in amounts to be proven atlTi.!.
11. Order Defendanl Employers 10 pay Dean O. Okafor. David J. Marek and any
aggrieved individuals punith'e damages for illl malicious and red.:lcss conduct described in
Paragraph 7. abole. in amounlll to be determined at trial.
,

I.

Grant such further relief as the Coun deems necessary and proper in the public

imcfCst.

J.

Award the Commission its costS in this aClion .

J URY TRIAL DEMAND

The Commission rcqUC51S a jury trial on all questions of fact raised by its complaint.

Respectfully submitted,

RO~ALD S. COOPER
GENERAL COUNSEL

lAMESL LEE
Deput} General Counsel

GWENDOLYN YOUNG REAMS
Associate General Counsel Washington, D.C.

~~l::!~t.~c{f"'- -
Regional Anomey
Philadelphia District Office
Philadelphia PA 19106
£ k.>5 Jacqueline.McNair@eeoc.gov

Associate Regional Auomey

Registration No. 0031443

Larry. WalSOngeeoc.sov

~~"*"-AtfM&l;.
SOLITA A. McMILLAN

I

~

Senior Trial Attorney

SoJvitu.McMi llan'ii'woc.gO\

6

LA WR£NC£ MAYS (0038288) Senior Trial Anorney EEOC CLEVELAND FIELD OFFICE AlC Federal Building 1240 Ea,! Ninth Slreet. Room 3001 Cleveland. Ohio 44199 Tel. (216) 522-4796 Fax. (216) 522-7430 La ....Tence.Mavs0'eeoc,gov
7

 
 Case: 1:06-cv-02337-JRA Doc #: 25 Filed: 02/24/09 1 of 4. PageID #: 202

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY )

COMMISSION,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

SPITZER MANAGEMENT, INC., et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

)

)

)

Case No.: 1:06-CV-02337 1:08-CV-01326 1:08-CV-01542
JUDGE ANN ALDRICH
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Before this court is a motion to intervene [Doc. No. 23] in this matter filed by Dean Okafor

(“Okafor”) and Hakim Nuriddin (“Nuriddin”). Okafor and Nuriddin seek to intervene pursuant to

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 24(a)(1) and 24(b)(1). Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”) does not object to the intervention. Defendants Spitzer Management, Inc.,

Spitzer Motor City, Inc., and Spitzer Autoworld Cleveland, LLC (collectively “Spitzer”) have not

responded and the time for filing a response has run. For the following reasons, this court grants the

motion to intervene pursuant to Rule 24(a)(1).

I. Background

The EEOC filed three suits in this court against Spitzer in September 2006,1 May 2008,2 and

June 2008.3 The suits allege that Spitzer discriminated against some of its employees, including

1Case number 1:06-CV-2337 2Case number 1:08-CV-1326 3Case number 1:08-CV-1542

Case: 1:06-cv-02337-JRA Doc #: 25 Filed: 02/24/09 2 of 4. PageID #: 203
Okafor and Nuriddin, on the basis of national origin and ethnicity and retaliated against them for filing charges with the EEOC. Spitzer terminated Okafor on July 10, 2008 and Nuriddin on August 13, 2008. On September 22, 2008, this court consolidated the three cases.4 On that same day, Spitzer filed a civil suit against Okafor and Nuriddin in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. On December 10, 2008, the EEOC found probable cause that Okafor and Nuriddin were discharged in retaliation for filing charges of discrimination and for participating in the Title VII enforcement actions. II. Standard
Rule 24(a)(1) provides “[upon] timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene who: (1) is given an unconditional right to intervene by a federal statute . . . .” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1). Title VII of the United States Code provides that “[t]he person or persons aggrieved shall have the right to intervene in a civil action brought by the [EEOC].” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
“Whether intervention be claimed of right or as permissive, it is at once apparent, from the initial words of both Rule 24(a) and Rule 24(b), that the application must be ‘timely,’” NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 365 (1973). A determination as to the timeliness of a motion to intervene “should be evaluated in the context of all relevant circumstances.” Jansen v. City of Cincinnati, 904 F.2d 336, 340 (6th Cir. 1990). The Sixth Circuit has determined that five factors should be considered in determining timeliness:
(1) the point to which the suit has progressed; (2) the purpose for which intervention is sought; (3) the length of time preceding the application during which the proposed intervenors knew or should have known of their interest in the case; (4) the prejudice to the original parties due to the proposed intervenors' failure to promptly intervene after they knew or reasonably should have known of their interest in the case; and (5) the existence of unusual circumstances militating against or in favor of
4Case number 08-CV-02337 was designated as the lead case. -2-

Case: 1:06-cv-02337-JRA Doc #: 25 Filed: 02/24/09 3 of 4. PageID #: 204
intervention. Stupak-Thrall v. Glickman, 226 F.3d 467, 473 (2000) (quoting Jansen, 904 F.2d at 340). III. Discussion
Okafor and Nuriddin have shown that they are aggrieved persons in these lawsuits filed on their behalf by the EEOC. Therefore, Okafor and Nuriddin have a right to intervene if their motion is timely.
This court finds that Okafor and Nuriddin’s intervention is timely. The suit has not progressed significantly, as discovery is not complete, no dispostive motions have been filed, and trial is not scheduled for eight more months. Okafor and Nuriddin seek intervention for the purpose of protecting their legal rights, specifically by bringing additional claims under Ohio state law. Although the case is no longer in its nascent stage, Okafor and Nuriddin have nonetheless promptly intervened; they were fired in July and August 2008, Spitzer filed a civil suit against them in state court in September 2008, and the EEOC issued a determination on the retaliation charges in December 2008. Spitzer will not be prejudiced by Okafor and Nuriddin’s intervention because discovery is still underway, and Spitzer will be required to defend a retaliatory termination claim even if intervention is disallowed.
“The right to intervene, however, is not coextensive with the assertion of additional claims.” EEOC v. Pitt-Ohio Express, Inc., 2006 WL 2265543, No. 1:06 CV 0747, *1 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 8, 2006). Thus, this court must address the appropriate scope of Okafor and Nuriddin’s intervention and whether the complaint asserts cognizable claims for which they have standing.
Okafor and Nuriddin assert four counts in their complaint: (I) discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII; (II) discrimination and retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (III)
-3-

Case: 1:06-cv-02337-JRA Doc #: 25 Filed: 02/24/09 4 of 4. PageID #: 205

discrimination and retaliation in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 4112; and (IV) abuse of process. Counts I and II parallel the EEOC’s complaints. Counts III and IV allege state law claims. This court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 if these claims “are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). This court, therefore, must determine whether the state and federal claims “derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.” United Mine Workers of Am. V. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). This court finds that Okafor and Nuriddin’s state law claims all stem from facts relating to Spitzer’s alleged employment practices that form the basis for the federal claim under Title VII.
IV. Conclusion Accordingly, this court grants Okafor and Nuriddin’s motion to intervene. IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 24, 2009

/s/ Ann Aldrich ANN ALDRICH UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

-4-

 
 Case: 1:06-cv-02337-JRA Doc #: 28 Filed: 05/08/09 1 of 9. PageID #: 220

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
and
DEAN OKAFOR, 10085 CHEYENNE TRAIL, #202 PARMA HEIGHTS, OHIO 44130,
Plaintiff-Intervenor,
-v-
SPITZER MANAGEMENT, INC.
and
SPITZER MOTOR CITY, INC.
and
REX DAVIDSON, 13001 BROOK PARK ROAD BROOK PARK, OHIO 44142
and
MITCHELL MINCY 13001 BROOK PARK ROAD BROOK PARK, OHIO 44142
Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NOS:

)

1:08 CV 01542

)

1:08 CV 01326

)

1:06 CV 02337

)

)

AMENDED COMPLAINT OF

)

PLAINTIFF-INTERVENOR

)

)

)

(JURY TRIAL DEMANDED)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

NATURE OF THE ACTION - PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1. This is an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended [“Title VII”], the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and 42 U.S.C. §1981 (Civil Rights Act of 1870) for injunctive and declaratory relief and money damages for Defendants’ violations of the rights of Plaintiff-Intervenor to be free of discrimination, including harassment, and retaliation. Plaintiff-Intervenor also seeks relief under Chapter 4112 of the Ohio Revised

Case: 1:06-cv-02337-JRA Doc #: 28 Filed: 05/08/09 2 of 9. PageID #: 221
Code and Ohio common law.
2. Plaintiff-Intervenor has been denied terms, conditions and privileges of employment because of race, national origin, and/or in retaliation for activity protected by state and federal law.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
3. This action is instituted and authorized by under §706 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-et seq. and §102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. §1981(a), and 42 U.S.C. §1981. Supplemental state claims are brought under Ohio Revised Code §4112 and the common law of Ohio.
4. Jurisdiction of this Court to hear and determine the claims is based on 28 U.S.C. §1331 and 28 U.S.C. §1343. The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff-Intervenor’s state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1367(a).
5. A declaratory judgment is sought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§2201 and 2202, and O.R.C. §2721.02.
6. Intervention is proper, as a matter of right, pursuant to Rule 24(a)(1), FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
7. Intervention was timely sought and granted to Dean Okafor and Hakim Nurridin. This Amended Complaint is filed in accordance with the court’s Order of April 30, 2009 in case no. 1:06 CV 02337, Northern District of Ohio.
8. Venue is proper as the unlawful discrimination and employment practices alleged below were committed in the Northern District of Ohio.
PARTIES
Plaintiff and Plaintiff-Intervenor
9. Plaintiff EEOC is an agency of the United States authorized to bring a civil action under Title VII.
10. Plaintiff-Intervenor, Dean Okafor, (“Plaintiff-Intervenor Okafor” or “Okafor”) is an AfricanAmerican resident of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, who was employed by Defendants during the relevant time. Plaintiff-Intervenor Okafor filed timely charges of discrimination alleging violations of Title VII by Defendants.
11. Plaintiff-Intervenor is an aggrieved party within the meaning of Title VII; the conditions
Page 2 of 9

Case: 1:06-cv-02337-JRA Doc #: 28 Filed: 05/08/09 3 of 9. PageID #: 222
precedent to bringing and maintaining this action under Title VII have been satisfied.
12. Plaintiff-Intervenor, as an aggrieved individual, has the right to intervene pursuant to Rule24 (a)(1), FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, and §2000e-5 of Title VII.
Defendants
13 At all relevant times, Defendant Spitzer Management, Inc. has been a domestic for-profit corporation doing business in Ohio.
14 At all relevant times, Defendant Spitzer Motor City, Inc., has been a domestic for-profit corporation doing business in Ohio.
15. At all relevant times, Defendant Employers, described in paragraphs 14 and 15 above, have been employers within the meaning of Title VII and Chapter 4112 of the Ohio Revised Code, jointly employing Plaintiff-Intervenor, and acting through their managers, supervisors, employees, and other agents.
16. Defendants, Rex Davidson (“Davidson”) and Mitchell Mincy (“Mincy”), are supervisors and/or managers of Defendants, had input into, furthered, and/or participated in the acts complained of here. Davidson and Mincy are also “employers” individually in the meaning of Chapter 4112, separate and apart from the Spitzer Defendants.
17. Defendants are “persons” within the meaning of Chapter 4112 of the Ohio Revised Code.
STATEMENT OF THE CLAIM COUNT I - DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION IN VIOLATION OF TITLE VII
18. More than thirty days prior to the institution of this lawsuit, Mr. Okafor filed a charge of discrimination with the Commission alleging violations of Title VII by Defendant Spitzer Motor City, Inc. All conditions precedent to the institution of this lawsuit have been fulfilled.
19. Since at least 2005, and continuing through the present, Defendant Employers have engaged in unlawful employment practices in violation of Title VII. The alleged unlawful practices include, but are not limited to:
(a) Subjecting Plaintiff-Intervenor to different terms and conditions of employment on the basis of his race, Black, and national origin, Nigerian, and because he filed charges of discrimination against Defendants’ Spitzer Motor City, Inc. dealership, alleging discrimination and retaliation.
(b) Subjecting Mr. Okafor to a pattern of unlawful retaliation after the Commission filed suit against Defendants based upon their charges of discrimination.
Page 3 of 9

Case: 1:06-cv-02337-JRA Doc #: 28 Filed: 05/08/09 4 of 9. PageID #: 223
(c) The unlawful race discrimination and retaliation consisted of, among other things, mocking Mr. Okafor because he filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, telling employees to stay away from Mr. Okafor because he is “poison,” treating Mr. Okafor differently than other salespersons with respect to the assignment of customers, the handling of sales and commissions and unfairly singling Mr. Okafor out for disciplinary action, harassing and humiliating Mr. Okafor, and terminating both plaintiff-intervenors because they filed charges of discrimination and retaliation. Defendants failed to take prompt appropriate corrective action despite receiving notice of the unlawful harassment. (d) Filing a lawsuit in Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, Case No. CV 08 671018, against Plaintiff-Intervenor based on the charges of discrimination he filed and other protected activity in which he engaged, for the purpose of intimidating and harassing Plaintiff-Intervenor, causing him to incur legal fees and costs, and to discourage him from pursuing his legal rights. 20. The effect of the practices complained of above has been to deprive Mr. Okafor of equal employment opportunities and otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee due to impermissible consideration of race, national origin, and retaliation, in violation of Title VII. 21. The unlawful practices complained of above were intentional, carried out by and/or a direct result of the actions of Defendants and their management officials. 22. The unlawful employment practices complained of above were undertaken with malice and/or reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of Mr. Okafor.
Page 4 of 9

Case: 1:06-cv-02337-JRA Doc #: 28 Filed: 05/08/09 5 of 9. PageID #: 224
COUNT II – DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION IN VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. § 1981
23. Plaintiff-Intervenor reasserts the foregoing allegations and incorporates them by reference as if fully set forth herein.
24. All of the actions articulated above violate the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1870, embodied in 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which guarantees that all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens.
25. This statute further indicates that the phrase “make and enforce contracts" includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship. This statute protects these rights against impairment by non-governmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law.
26. These actions by Defendants were based on Plaintiff-Intervenor’s race, and/or national origin, and/or in retaliation for having participated in protected activity, all of which is in clear violation of 42 U.S.C. §1981.
27. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff-Intervenor has suffered and will continue to suffer damages including economic and non-economic compensatory losses and injuries.
28. Defendants’ conduct was willful, wanton, malicious and/or in reckless disregard of Plaintiff-Intervenor’s rights.
COUNT III - DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION IN VIOLATION OF OHIO REVISED CODE § 4112
29. Plaintiff-Intervenor reasserts the foregoing allegations and incorporates them by reference as if fully set forth herein.
30. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims asserted herein: the state claims do not raise any novel or complex issues of state law and the state claims do not predominate over the federal claims.
31. Plaintiff-Intervenor’s state law claims are so related to the claims over which this court has original jurisdiction, that they form the same case.
Page 5 of 9

Case: 1:06-cv-02337-JRA Doc #: 28 Filed: 05/08/09 6 of 9. PageID #: 225
32. By engaging in the practices described herein, Defendants aided, abetted, incited, compelled, or coerced another person in committing unlawful discriminatory practices, obstructed and prevented another person from complying with Ohio laws against discrimination, and/or attempted directly or indirectly to commit an unlawful discriminatory practice in violation of Ohio Revised Code Section 4112.
33. By engaging in the practices described herein, Defendants deprived Plaintiff-Intervenor of equal employment opportunities and otherwise adversely affected his status as an employee and applicant for employment because of race, national origin, and/or in retaliation for engaging in protected activity.
34. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff-Intervenor has suffered and will continue to suffer damages including economic and non-economic compensatory losses and injuries.
35. Defendants’ conduct was willful, wanton, malicious and/or in reckless disregard of PlaintiffIntervenor’s rights. COUNT IV - ABUSE OF PROCESS
36. Plaintiff-Intervenor reasserts the foregoing allegations and incorporate them by reference as if fully set forth herein.
37. Defendant Spitzer Motor City., Inc., filed a legal proceeding against Plaintiff-Intervenor. 38. Even if that proceeding was instituted in proper form and with probable cause, the
proceeding has been perverted to attempt to accomplish an ulterior purpose for which it was not designed, namely, to force Plaintiff-Intervenor to surrender his legal claims and/or rights; and/or to dissuade Plaintiff-Intervenor and others from engaging in protected activity; and/or opposing Defendants’ illegal discriminatory and retaliatory conduct; and/or participating in an investigation conducted by the EEOC. 39. Defendants’ institution and maintenance of a legal proceeding against the PlaintiffIntervenor was done with malice and for an improper purpose, and direct damage has resulted from the wrongful use of process.
Page 6 of 9

Case: 1:06-cv-02337-JRA Doc #: 28 Filed: 05/08/09 7 of 9. PageID #: 226
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff-Intervenor respectfully requests that the Court:
A. Declare the policies and practices of Defendants, as described herein to be unlawful and in violation of state and federal law;
B. Grant Plaintiff-Intervenor a permanent injunction, prohibiting Defendants from engaging in any policy or practice which discriminates on the basis of race, national origin, or retaliation;
C. Order Defendant Employers to make whole Mr. Okafor by providing appropriate monetary relief including back-pay and front-pay with prejudgment interest, in amounts to be determined at trial, and other affirmative relief necessary to eradicate the effects of its unlawful employment practices.
D. Order Defendant Employers to make whole Mr. Okafor, and any aggrieved individuals by providing compensation for non-pecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful practices complained of above, including emotional pain, suffering, loss of enjoyment of life and humiliation, in amounts to be proven at trial.
E. Order Defendant Employers to pay Mr. Okafor punitive damages for their malicious and reckless conduct described above, in amounts to be determined at trial.
F. Award Plaintiff-Intervenor pre and post judgment interest on all sums awarded;
G. Award Plaintiff-Intervenor the costs of this action, including costs and attorneys’ fees; and
H. Grant such other legal and equitable relief as is necessary and proper.
Respectfully submitted,
s/Amy S. Glesius AMY S. GLESIUS (0067162) The Law Office of Amy S. Glesius, LLC 5885 Landerbrook Drive, Suite 302 Cleveland, OH 44124 (216) 241-6882 FAX: (216) 373-0045 aglesius@glesiuslaw.com
Counsel for Plaintiff-Intervenor Nuriddin
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- and -
s/Cathleen Bolek CATHLEEN BOLEK (0059884) The Law Office of Cathleen Bolek, LLC 5885 Landerbrook Drive, Suite 302 Cleveland, OH 44124 (216) 464-3004 FAX: (216) 464-3043 cbolek@boleklaw.com
Counsel for Plaintiff-Intervenor Okafor

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Plaintiff-Intervenors request a jury trial on all questions of fact and claims raised by their

Complaint.

s/Amy S. Glesius One of the Attorneys

Page 8 of 9

Case: 1:06-cv-02337-JRA Doc #: 28 Filed: 05/08/09 9 of 9. PageID #: 228

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE It is hereby certified that a copy of the foregoing has been filed via the electronic filing system. Notice of filing will be performed by the Court’s electronic filing system. Parties may access the document through the electronic filing system.

May 8, 2009

s/Amy S. Glesius

Page 9 of 9

 
 Case: 1:06-cv-02337-JRA Doc #: 77 Filed: 04/12/10 1 of 10. PageID #: 447

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY )

COMMISSION,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

and

)

)

DEAN OKAFOR,

)

)

and

)

)

HAKIM NURIDDIN,

)

)

Plaintiff-Intervenors,

)

)

-v-

)

)

SPITZER MANAGEMENT, INC.

)

)

and

)

)

SPITZER MOTOR CITY, INC.

)

)

and

)

)

REX DAVIDSON,

)

)

and

)

)

MITCHELL MINCY

)

)

Defendants,

)

)

and

)

)

ALAN SPITZER

)

150 East Bridge Street

)

Elyria, OH 44035

)

)

New Party Defendant.

)

CIVIL ACTION NOS: 1:08 CV 01542 1:08 CV 01326 1:06 CV 02337
AMENDED COMPLAINT OF PLAINTIFF-INTERVENORS
(JURY TRIAL DEMANDED)

Case: 1:06-cv-02337-JRA Doc #: 77 Filed: 04/12/10 2 of 10. PageID #: 448
NATURE OF THE ACTION - PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 1. This is an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended ["Title VII"],
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and 42 U.S.C. §1981 (Civil Rights Act of 1870) for injunctive and declaratory relief and money damages for Defendants' violations of the rights of Plaintiff-Intervenors to be free of discrimination, including harassment, and retaliation. Plaintiff-Intervenors also seek relief under Chapter 4112 of the Ohio Revised Code and Ohio common law. 2. Plaintiff-Intervenors have been denied terms, conditions and privileges of employment because of race, national origin, and/or in retaliation for activity protected by state and federal law.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 3. This action is instituted and authorized by under §706 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-et seq. and §102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. §1981(a), and 42 U.S.C. §1981. Supplemental state claims are brought under Ohio Revised Code §4112 and the common law of Ohio. 4. Jurisdiction of this Court to hear and determine the claims is based on 28 U.S.C. §1331 and 28 U.S.C. §1343. The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff-Intervenors' state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1367(a). 5. A declaratory judgment is sought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§2201 and 2202, and O.R.C. §2721.02. 6. Intervention is proper, as a matter of right, pursuant to Rule 24(a)(1), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). 7. Intervention is timely sought.

Case: 1:06-cv-02337-JRA Doc #: 77 Filed: 04/12/10 3 of 10. PageID #: 449
8. Venue is proper as the unlawful discrimination and employment practices alleged below were committed in the Northern District of Ohio. PARTIES
9. Plaintiff EEOC is an agency of the United States authorized to bring a civil action under Title VII.
10. Plaintiff-Intervenor, Dean Okafor, ("Plaintiff-Intervenor Okafor" or "Okafor") is Nigerian and a resident of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, who was employed by Defendants during the relevant time. Plaintiff-Intervenor Okafor filed timely charges of discrimination alleging violations of Title VII by Defendants.
11. Plaintiff-Intervenor, Hakim Nuriddin, ("Plaintiff-Intervenor Nuriddin" or "Nuriddin") is an African-American resident of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, who was employed by Defendants during the relevant time. Plaintiff-Intervenor Nuriddin filed timely charges of discrimination alleging violations of Title VII by Defendants.
12. Plaintiff-Intervenors are aggrieved parties within the meaning of Title VII; the conditions precedent to bringing and maintaining this action under Title VII have been satisfied.
13. Plaintiff-Intervenors, as aggrieved individuals, have the right to intervene pursuant to Rule24 (a)(1), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and §2000e-5 of Title VII.
14. At all relevant times, Defendant Spitzer Management, Inc. has been a domestic for-profit corporation doing business in Ohio.
15. At all relevant times, Defendant Motor City, Inc., has been a domestic for-profit corporation doing business in Ohio.
16. At all relevant times, Defendant Spitzer Management, Inc. and Defendant Motor City, Inc., have been engaged in a joint enterprise and jointly employed Plaintiff-Intervenors.

Case: 1:06-cv-02337-JRA Doc #: 77 Filed: 04/12/10 4 of 10. PageID #: 450
17. At all relevant times, Defendant Employers, described in paragraphs 14 and 15 above, have been employers within the meaning of Title VII and Chapter 4112 of the Ohio Revised Code and act through their managers, supervisors, employees, and other agents.
18. Defendants, Rex Davidson ("Davidson") and Mitchell Mincy ("Mincy"), are supervisors and/or managers of Defendants, had input into, furthered, and/or participated in the acts complained of here. Davidson and Mincy are also "employers" individually in the meaning of Chapter 4112, separate and apart from the Spitzer Defendants.
19. New Party Defendant, Alan Spitzer, is the President of Defendant Motor City and Defendant Spitzer Management, Inc., and at all relevant time was a supervisor and/or manager of Defendants, who had input into, furthered, authorized, ordered, participated in and/or ratified some or all of the acts complained of here. New Party Defendant Alan Spitzer is an “employer” within the meaning of Chapter 4112.
20. Defendants are "persons" within the meaning of Chapter 4112 of the Ohio Revised Code. STATEMENT OF THE CLAIM
COUNT I - DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION IN VIOLATION OF TITLE VII
21. More than thirty days prior to the institution of this lawsuit, Mr. Nuriddin and Mr. Okafor each filed a charge of discrimination with the Commission alleging violations of Title VII by Defendant Spitzer Motor City, Inc. All conditions precedent to the institution of this lawsuit have been fulfilled.
22. Since at least 2005, and continuing through the present, Defendant Employers have engaged in unlawful employment practices in violation of Title VII. The alleged unlawful practices include, but are not limited to:

Case: 1:06-cv-02337-JRA Doc #: 77 Filed: 04/12/10 5 of 10. PageID #: 451
(a) Subjecting Mr. Nuriddin to different terms and conditions of employment on the basis of Mr. Nuriddin's race, Black, and Mr. Okafor's national origin, Nigerian, and because they filed charges of discrimination against Defendants' Spitzer Motor City, Inc. dealership, alleging discrimination and retaliation.
(b) Subjecting Mr. Okafor and Mr. Nuriddin to a pattern of unlawful retaliation after the Commission filed suit against Defendants based upon their charges of discrimination.
(c) The unlawful race discrimination and retaliation consisted of, among other things, harassing and humiliating Mr. Nuriddin, demoting Mr. Nuriddin, cutting his pay and work hours, falsely accusing Mr. Nuriddin of engaging in improper conduct in the workplace, threatening Mr. Nuriddin with discharge, mocking Mr. Okafor because he filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, telling employees to stay away from Mr. Okafor because he is "poison," treating Mr. Okafor differently than other salespersons with respect to the assignment of customers, the handling of sales and commissions and unfairly singling Mr. Okafor out for disciplinary action, harassing and humiliating Mr. Okafor, and terminating both plaintiff-intervenors because they filed charges of discrimination and retaliation. Defendants failed to take prompt appropriate corrective action despite receiving notice of the unlawful harassment.
(d) Filing a lawsuit in Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, Case No. CV 08 671018, against Plaintiff-Intervenors based on the charges of discrimination they filed and other protected activity in which they engaged, for the purpose of intimidating and harassing Plaintiff-Intervenors, causing them to incur legal fees and costs, and to discourage them from pursuing their legal rights.

Case: 1:06-cv-02337-JRA Doc #: 77 Filed: 04/12/10 6 of 10. PageID #: 452
23. The effect of the practices complained of above has been to deprive Mr. Nuriddin and Mr. Okafor of equal employment opportunities and otherwise adversely affect their status as employees due to impermissible consideration of race, national origin, and retaliation, in violation of Title VII.
24. The unlawful practices complained of above were intentional, carried out by and/or a direct result of the actions of Defendants and their management officials.
25. The unlawful employment practices complained of above were undertaken with malice and/or reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of Mr. Nuriddin and Mr. Okafor. COUNT II - DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION IN VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. § 1981
26. Plaintiff-Intervenors reassert the foregoing allegations and incorporate them by reference as if fully set forth herein.
27. All of the actions articulated above violate the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1870, embodied in 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which guarantees that all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens.
28. This statute further indicates that the phrase "make and enforce contracts" includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship. This statute protects these rights against impairment by non-governmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law.

Case: 1:06-cv-02337-JRA Doc #: 77 Filed: 04/12/10 7 of 10. PageID #: 453
29. These actions by Defendants were based on Plaintiff-Intervenors race, and/or national origin, and/or in retaliation for having participated in protected activity, all of which is in clear violation of 42 U.S.C. §1981.
30. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff-Intervenors have suffered and will continue to suffer damages including economic and non-economic compensatory losses and injuries.
31. Defendants' conduct was willful, wanton, malicious and/or in reckless disregard of Plaintiff-Intervenors rights. COUNT III - DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION IN VIOLATION OF OHIO REVISED CODE § 4112
32. Plaintiff-Intervenors reassert the foregoing allegations and incorporate them by reference as if fully set forth herein.
33. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims asserted herein: the state claims do not raise any novel or complex issues of state law and the state claims do not predominate over the federal claims.
34. Plaintiff-Intervenors state law claims are so related to the claims over which this court has original jurisdiction, that they form the same case.
35. By engaging in the practices described herein, Defendants aided, abetted, incited, compelled, or coerced another person in committing unlawful discriminatory practices, obstructed and prevented another person from complying with Ohio laws against discrimination, and/or attempted directly or indirectly to commit an unlawful discriminatory practice in violation of Ohio Revised Code Section 4112.

Case: 1:06-cv-02337-JRA Doc #: 77 Filed: 04/12/10 8 of 10. PageID #: 454
36. By engaging in the practices described herein, Defendants deprived Plaintiff-Intervenors of equal employment opportunities and otherwise adversely affected their status as employees and applicants for employment because of race, national origin, and/or in retaliation for engaging in protected activity.
37. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff-Intervenors have suffered and will continue to suffer damages including economic and non-economic compensatory losses and injuries.
38. Defendants' conduct was willful, wanton, malicious and/or in reckless disregard of PlaintiffIntervenors rights. COUNT IV - ABUSE OF PROCESS
39. Plaintiff-Intervenors reassert the foregoing allegations and incorporate them by reference as if fully set forth herein.
40. Defendant Spitzer Motor City., Inc., filed a legal proceeding against Plaintiff-Intervenors. 41. Even if that proceeding was instituted in proper form and with probable cause, the
proceeding has been perverted to attempt to accomplish an ulterior purpose for which it was not designed, namely, to force Plaintiff-Intervenors to surrender their legal claims and/or rights; and/or to dissuade Plaintiff-Intervenors and others from engaging in protected activity; and/or opposing Defendants' illegal discriminatory and retaliatory conduct; and/or participating in an investigation conducted by the EEOC. 42. Defendants' institution and maintenance of a legal proceeding against the PlaintiffIntervenors was done with malice and for an improper purpose, and direct damage has resulted from the wrongful use of process.

Case: 1:06-cv-02337-JRA Doc #: 77 Filed: 04/12/10 9 of 10. PageID #: 455
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiff-Intervenors respectfully requests that the Court: A. Declare the policies and practices of Defendants, as described herein to be unlawful
and in violation of state and federal law; B. Grant Plaintiff-Intervenors a permanent injunction, prohibiting Defendants from
engaging in any policy or practice which discriminates on the basis of race, national origin, or retaliation; C. Order Defendant Employers to make whole Mr. Nuriddin and Mr. Okafor by providing appropriate monetary relief including back-pay and front-pay with prejudgment interest, in amounts to be determined at trial, and other affirmative relief necessary to eradicate the effects of its unlawful employment practices. D. Order Defendant Employers to make whole Mr. Nuriddin and Mr. Okafor, and any aggrieved individuals by providing compensation for non-pecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful practices complained of above, including emotional pain, suffering, loss of enjoyment of life and humiliation, in amounts to be proven at trial. E. Order Defendant Employers to pay Mr. Nuriddin and Mr. Okafor punitive damages for their malicious and reckless conduct described above, in amounts to be determined at trial. F. Award Plaintiff-Intervenors pre and post judgment interest on all sums awarded. G. Award Plaintiff-Intervenors the costs of this action, including costs and attorneys' fees; and H. Grant such other legal and equitable relief as is necessary and proper.

Case: 1:06-cv-02337-JRA Doc #: 77 Filed: 04/12/10 10 of 10. PageID #: 456
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
Plaintiff-Intervenors request a jury trial on all questions of fact and claims raised by their
Complaint.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/Cathleen Bolek Cathleen Bolek (0059884) Carole a. Lohr (0072032) CATHLEEN BOLEK, LLC Monarch Centre, Suite 302 5885 Landerbrook Drive Cleveland, OH 44124 T 216.464.3004 F 566.542.0743 cbolek@boleklaw.com clohr@boleklaw.com
Counsel for Dean Okafor
- AND -
/s/Amy S. Glesius Amy S. Glesius (0067162) THE LAW OFFICE OF AMY S. GLESIUS, LLC 5885 Landerbrook Drive, Suite 302 Cleveland, OH 44124 T 216.241.6882 F 216.373.0045 aglesius@glesiuslaw.com
Counsel for Hakim Nuriddin

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

E.E.O.C., et al.,
Plaintiffs, vs. Spitzer Management, Inc., et al.,
Defendants.

)

Case No. 1:06CV2337

)

)

)

)

JUDGE JOHN R. ADAMS

)

)

)

)

)

)

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

)

AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court upon numerous motions for summary judgment by Defendants Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc., and Spitzer Autoworld Cleveland, LLC (collectively “Spitzer”). In addition, individual defendant Alan Spitzer (“Mr. Spitzer”) has moved for summary judgment. Each of the pending motions has been opposed. The Court now resolves each pending motion as detailed herein. I. Facts
While the docket is extensive in this matter, the underlying factual allegations are relatively straightforward. On September 27, 2006, the EEOC filed its complaint against Spitzer. The initial complaint and the first amended complaint alleged that Spitzer had engaged in unlawful employment practices by creating a hostile work environment based upon national origin. At that time, the amended complaint included Dean Okafor, David, Marek, and all those employees similarly situated at Spitzer. Through discovery and complaints filed by intervenors, the allegations now include claims by Okafor, Marek, Hakim Nuriddin, Alawy Alawi, and Toufic Hamdan (now known as Nick Hamdan). The complaints alleged that these various

1

Spitzer employees were referred to as: jungle bunny, monkey, gorilla, slant eye, wax on wax off, Ali Baba, and angry Muslim. The complaints allege that Marek, Alawi, and Hamdan were constructively discharged. Moreover, the complaints allege that Spitzer retaliated against Okafor and Nuriddin based upon the charges they filed with the EEOC.
Spitzer has moved for summary judgment on each claim pending before the Court through numerous motions. The EEOC, Nuriddin, and Okafor have each filed responses in opposition to the pending motions, and Spitzer has replied. Mr. Spitzer has filed his own separate motion for summary judgment which has also been fully briefed. The Court now resolves each of the pending motions.
II. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment Summary judgment is proper if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R. Civ.P. 56(a). The initial burden of showing the absence of any “genuine issues” belongs to the moving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (citing former Fed.R. Civ.P. 56(c)).
[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. (quoting former Fed.R. Civ.P. 56(c)). A fact is “material” only if its resolution will affect the outcome of the lawsuit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Determination of whether a factual issue is “genuine” requires consideration of the applicable evidentiary burdens. Id. at 252. Moreover, the Court must view a summary judgment motion “in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” U.S. v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
2

Once the moving party has satisfied its burden of proof, the burden then shifts to the non-
moving party. The non-moving party may not simply rely on its pleadings, but must “produce
evidence that results in a conflict of material fact to be resolved by a jury.” Cox v. Kentucky
Dep’t of Transp., 53 F.3d 146, 150 (6th Cir. 1995). Moreover, Fed.R. Civ.P. 56(e) states as
follows:
If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may:
…
(2) consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion; [or]
(3) grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials--including the facts considered undisputed--show that the movant is entitled to it[.]
Accordingly, summary judgment analysis asks whether a trial is necessary and therefore is
appropriate when there are no genuine issues of fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
III. Legal Analysis
A. HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT
The Sixth Circuit has previously explained the legal framework the Court must utilize in
analyzing a hostile work environment claim as follows:
Title VII offers employees protection from a “workplace [ ] permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment....” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, (1993) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). To prevail on a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must show that his work environment was both objectively and subjectively hostile. “Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment - an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive - is beyond Title VII’s purview.” Id. at 21-22; see also Jackson v. Quanex, 191 F.3d 647, 658 (6th Cir. 1999).
To evaluate an alleged hostile work environment, we look at the totality of the circumstances. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23; Bowman v. Shawnee State Univ., 220 F.3d
3

456, 463 (6th Cir. 2000). We consider “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 23; see also Williams v. GMC, 187 F.3d 553, 560-62 (6th Cir. 1999). “[C]onduct must be extreme to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of employment....” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998).
Under Title VII, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of a hostile work environment based on race, religion, or national origin by demonstrating that (1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on race, religion, or national origin; (4) the harassment unreasonably interfered with her work performance by creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) the employer is liable. Hafford v. Seidner, 183 F.3d 506, 512 (6th Cir. 1999); see also Bourini v. Bridgestone/Firestone N. Am. Tire, L.L.C., 136 Fed.Appx. 747, 750 (6th Cir. 2005) (prima facie elements are the same for claims of racial and religious discrimination).
Ejikeme v. Violet, 307 Fed. Appx. 944, 948-49 (6th Cir. 2009). Section 1981, like Title VII, is
not a “general civility code.” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998)
(discussing Title VII). “[S]imple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless
extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the ‘terms and conditions of
employment.’ ” Id. (internal citation omitted). Furthermore,
harassing comments and incidents that the plaintiff learned of second-hand may contribute to a hostile work environment and may be considered by the trier-offact. [Robinson v. Coca-Cola Enterprises, Inc.,] 2007 WL 2948869 *7 (citing Quanex, 191 F.3d at 661) (“[T]he fact that a plaintiff learns second-hand of a racially derogatory comment or joke by a fellow employee or supervisor can impact the work environment”); Wanchik v. Great Lakes Health Plan, Inc., 6 Fed.Appx. 252, 262 (6th Cir. 2001) (“crediting evidence that plaintiff heard rumors about co-workers harassing other women in assessing whether the work environment was hostile.”)
Chancellor v. Coca-Cola Enterprises, Inc., 675 F.Supp.2d 771, 791 (S.D.Ohio 2009).
“[E]vidence that may not have been explicitly accompanied by a racial or national origin slur
may still contribute to a hostile work environment. See Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647,
662 (6th Cir. 1999) (‘[E]ven though a certain action may not have been specifically racial in
4

nature, it may contribute to the plaintiff’s proof of a hostile work environment if it would not have occurred but for the fact [of the plaintiff’s protected status].’).” Calderon v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 300 Fed. Appx. 362, 369 (6th Cir. 2008).
1. Claims of Alawy Alawi Alawi claims that he was subjected to a hostile work environment based on his national
origin while he worked at Spitzer Motor City. Alawi asserts that his Yemeni heritage subjected him to numerous comments from his general manager, James Dombrowski. The Court finds that the conduct alleged by Alawi does not meet the severe and pervasive standard necessary to support a claim for hostile work environment.
In support of his claim, Alawi alleges that Dombrowski called him to the sales tower, over the intercom, using the phrase “Ali Baba to the sales tower, Ali Baba to the sales tower, please.” Doc. 122 at 30. Dombrowski does not deny referring to Alawi as Ali Baba. Doc. 111 at 45. While Ali Baba is a fictional character from ancient Arabic literature, the character has no direct links to Yemen. However, there is no question in the Court’s view that the slang term was utilized based upon Alawi’s national origin. The fact that Dombrowski may have been ignorant of its origin or ignorant of Middle Eastern geography does not somehow protect his conduct. Alawi also claims to have overheard Dombrowski refer to Okafor as “Nairobi man” and that he overhead Dombrowski refer to Marek as “wax on, wax off.”
In support of his claim, Alawi relies heavily on El-Hakem v. BJY Inc., 415 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2005). The facts of El-Hakem were as follows:
Although Young’s conduct may not have been especially severe, there was unrefuted evidence of its frequency and pervasiveness. The jury heard testimony that Young continued to use the name “Manny” over El-Hakem’s repeated objections. El-Hakem first objected to Young’s use of “Manny” in a marketing meeting. Despite El-Hakem’s objection, Young insisted on calling him “Manny” in a subsequent telephone conversation and e-mail. Approximately one month
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later, El-Hakem proposed in an e-mail that Young use Hakem, his last name, if he found Mamdouh difficult to pronounce. Rather than call him Hakem, Young suggested in his reply e-mail that El-Hakem be called “Hank.” El-Hakem objected again. Despite El-Hakem’s continued objections, Young persisted in calling ElHakem “Manny” once a week in the Monday marketing meeting for approximately two months, and in e-mails at least twice a month thereafter. The conduct continued for almost a year, from May, 1999 to April, 2000. Because these incidents were frequent and consistent rather than isolated, a reasonable juror could conclude that El-Hakem’s work environment was hostile. Id. at 1073-74. As detailed above, the key to finding a hostile work environment in El-Hakem was the frequency and pervasiveness of the offending conduct. The frequency and pervasiveness of the conduct herein is unknown. In his deposition, Alawi indicated that “[a]t times he was, you know, he would make racial remarks towards certain salesmen such as Dean Okafor.” Alawi also indicated that Dombrowski would summon him to the sales tower with the “Ali Baba to the tower” comment. While the EEOC’s brief in opposition contends that a “reasonable jury could find Dombrowski’s repeated use of the name Ali Baba” created a hostile work environment, its citation to the record again only references Alawi’s vague account that he objected whenever the term was used. The Court agrees with the analysis set forth in El-Hakem in many aspects. Like the repeated use of an “American” name in El-Hakem, the repeated use of Ali Baba is not severe conduct. It is no doubt offensive and demonstrative of ignorance, but it does approach the level of racial epithets that have been deemed severe. Furthermore, the Court agrees that less severe language may still support a hostile work environment when used frequently and pervasively in the work place. However, the record does not contain evidence of the frequency and pervasiveness of the use of this language. Instead, the record only indicates that over a several month period, the term was used more than once -- whether it was used once a day, once a week,
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or three times over five months is unknown. Accordingly, the record contains insufficient evidence to generate a genuine issue of fact on Alawi’s claim of a hostile work environment.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court has also considered Alawi’s testimony that he overheard comments made to Okafor and Marek. The Court also acknowledges that these overheard comments may contribute to a hostile work environment. However, Alawi’s testimony regarding these comments is similarly vague. He cannot recount the frequency of these comments and could only recall in vague terms the specific words utilized by Dombrowski. Accordingly, these terms similarly offer little support for Alawi’s claim of a hostile work environment.
Alawi’s claim of constructive discharge also fails. To demonstrate constructive discharge, Alawi must show that 1) “the employer ... deliberately create[d] intolerable working conditions, as perceived by a reasonable person,” and 2) the employer did so “with the intention of forcing the employee to quit....” Moore v. KUKA Welding Sys., 171 F.3d 1073, 1080 (6th Cir. 1999).1 With regard to the first prong, this Court must consider
the following factors relevant, singly or in combination: (1) demotion; (2) reduction in salary; (3) reduction in job responsibilities; (4) reassignment to menial or degrading work; (5) reassignment to work under a younger supervisor; (6) badgering, harassment, or humiliation by the employer calculated to encourage the employee’s resignation; or (7) offers of early retirement or continued employment on terms less favorable than the employee’s former status. Logan v. Denny’s, 259 F.3d 558, 569 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting and adopting Brown v. Bunge Corp., 207 F.3d 776, 782 (5th Cir. 2000)). The Supreme Court has explained that constructive discharge requires a showing beyond that of a hostile working environment: “Beyond that, we hold, to establish ‘constructive discharge,’ the plaintiff must make a further showing: She must
1 As the EEOC properly argues, this “intent” prong has effectively been lessened by the holding in Suders.
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show that the abusive working environment became so intolerable that her resignation qualified as a fitting response.” Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 134 (2004).
Alawi cannot satisfy this test. Alawi does not contend that his work place became so intolerable that he was required to resign. Rather, he admits that he quit working because Dombrowski was rude to his wife. Alawi’s wife was waiting for her car to be serviced and Dombrowski allegedly approached her and told her to “get the fuck out of here.” Again, while this conduct was rude and offensive, it does not approach the level necessary to support a claim of constructive discharge. Accordingly, Spitzer’s motion for summary judgment on Alawi’s claims is well taken.
2. Claims of David Marek Marek’s claims are similar to those raised by Alawi and also arise from his employment
at Spitzer Motor City. Marek raises claims of hostile work environment based on his national origin (Korean) and constructive discharge. The record evidence provided by Marek is more specific with regard to frequency and pervasiveness. As such, the record does not support summary judgment on Marek’s hostile work environment claim.
Marek was hired by Chris Johnson, Dombrowski’s predecessor, as a sales associate on May 12, 2005. Within a few months, Marek requested to be moved to an Auto Detailer/Porter position, asserting that the sales position was not a good fit for him. His request was immediately fulfilled and he began work as an auto detailer.
Before analyzing the comments made to Marek, the Court must note that the comments made by Dombrowski that Marek was not aware of cannot directly contribute to this hostile work environment claim. For example, Kevin Szatala testified that Dombrowski referred to Marek as “slant eye” and “rice rat.” There is no evidence before the Court that Marek was aware
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of these comments. However, as will be addressed below, the comments do serve to add context and meaning to the comments that were made directly to Marek.
Marek testified about comments that Dombrowski made to him as follows. Dombrowski would approach him in the service area and state, “What’s up, Mr. Chinaman?” Doc. 117 at 40. Dombrowski would also state, “Chop chop, hurry up,” and “wax on, wax off” to Marek. Marek indicated that he was unaware of similar comments being made to other detailers. Marek also testified that Dombrowski would make some form of these comments every time he came back to Marek’s working area and that Dombrowski came back to his area on a daily basis. Thus, the record indicates that Marek was subjected to these comments daily (five to six days a week) for numerous months.
Spitzer contends that Marek cannot satisfy three elements of his prima facie case: 1) that the harassment was based on Marek’s national origin, 2) that he cannot demonstrate that the harassment was severe and pervasive, and 3) employer liability. The Court will individually review each of these contentions.
Spitzer first asserts that the comments were not directed at Marek’s national origin. For example, Spitzer asserts that Marek is Korean, so the comment “What’s up, Mr. Chinaman” could not be directed at his national origin. Similarly, Spitzer contends that the “wax on wax off” comment was directed toward the actual duties that Marek had to perform as an auto detailer. Spitzer’s contentions here border on frivolous.
First, Marek and a co-worker, Kevin Szatala, both testified that Dombrowski mocked Marek’s accent. More specifically, Marek testified in his deposition that Dombrowski mocked his accent while utilizing the phrase “wax on wax off.” Therefore, any suggestion that such a phrase was solely used to direct Marek toward his work duties is unsupported by the record.
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Second, Dombrowski’s repeated references to “Chinaman” were clearly directed at Marek’s Asian origin.2 Again, the fact that Dombrowski was ignorant of the particular country of
Marek’s origin does not provide a defense to his comments, nor does it support an argument that
the comments were not based on national origin. Furthermore, Dombrowski’s “slant eye” and
“rice rat” comments, while not made in Marek’s presence, only serve to support a finding that
Dombrowski’s comments were premised upon Marek’s Asian heritage.
There also remains a genuine issue of material fact surrounding whether the conduct was
severe or pervasive. In a case involving similar types of comments, the Ninth Circuit found no
hostile work environment. In so holding, the Court noted as follows:
We think the actions of Manatt’s co-workers generally fall into the “simple teasing” and “offhand comments” category of non-actionable discrimination. Manatt overheard jokes in which the phrase “China man” was used. And she overheard a reference to China and communism. But on only a couple of occasions did Manatt’s co-workers or supervisor direct their racially insensitive “humor” at Manatt. One such instance occurred when Barbara Green and Vincent Correia ridiculed Manatt for mispronouncing “Lima.” Another instance occurred when Green and Correia, upon seeing Manatt, pulled their eyes back with their fingers in an attempt to imitate or mock the appearance of Asians.
Manatt v. Bank of America, NA, 339 F.3d 792, 798 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). Unlike the
claim in Manatt, the facts herein indicate that Dombrowski’s comments were nearly always
directed at Marek – often with no other individual present. Moreover, these were not isolated
incidents that occurred every so often. Marek testified that he endured the comments on a daily
basis for months on end.
At this point, the Court notes that “the required showing of severity or seriousness of the
harassing conduct varies inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct.”
Wanchik v. Great Lakes Health Plan, Inc., 6 Fed. Appx. 252, 263 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting
2 Similarly, Szatala testified that Dombrowski made comments to Marek like: “You’re not pulling a rickshaw, let’s get the car going” and “When did you get out of the rice paddies?” Doc. 120 at 52-54.
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Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991)). Thus, while Dombrowski’s comments were not physically threatening or particularly severe, they were frequent and pervasive. As such, a genuine issue of fact remains on this issue for a jury to decide.
Finally, Spitzer contends that Marek cannot demonstrate employer liability on his claim. In this regard, Spitzer contends that Marek cannot demonstrate constructive discharge and also argues that even if constructive discharge could be shown, the Faragher/Ellerth defense would justify summary judgment. The Court again reviews each contention individually.
With respect to constructive discharge, the Court finds that an issue of fact remains. Marek was daily subjected to offensive comments related to his national origin. For months, Marek endured the comments. However, Marek quit following a confrontation with a coworker, Walter Andrews. As this confrontation was unrelated to Marek’s national origin, Spitzer contends that his constructive discharge claim must fail. The Court disagrees.
As noted above, in evaluating a constructive discharge claim, the Court must determine whether Marek’s resignation was a “fitting response” to Dombrowski’s harassment. The facts herein compel submitting this issue to a jury. Another employee, Greg Kramer, informed Marek after the Andrews’ incident that he could quit or that Dombrowski would fire him. Faced with appearing before his harasser for possible discipline or quitting, Marek’s resignation was a fitting response. The mere fact that he was capable of enduring the harassment up until that potential confrontation does not make the response any less reasonable.
Finally, Spitzer contends that Marek cannot demonstrate employer liability because Spitzer was never given the opportunity to remedy the harassment. In that regard, Faragher and Ellerth are instructive.
An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or
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successively higher) authority over the employee. When no tangible employment action is taken, a defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(c). The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise. While proof that an employer had promulgated an antiharassment policy with complaint procedure is not necessary in every instance as a matter of law, the need for a stated policy suitable to the employment circumstances may appropriately be addressed in any case when litigating the first element of the defense. And while proof that an employee failed to fulfill the corresponding obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to showing an unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure provided by the employer, a demonstration of such failure will normally suffice to satisfy the employer's burden under the second element of the defense.
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 525 U.S. 775, 807-08 (1998). “No affirmative defense is
available, however, when the supervisor’s harassment culminates in a tangible employment
action, such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment.” Id. at 808 (citing Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 525 U.S. 742, 762-63 (1998). A constructive discharge case, like this
one, may or may not involve an “official act” constituting a “tangible employment action”
preceding the victim’s resignation. See Suders, 542 U.S. 129.
The EEOC contends that Spitzer cannot avail itself of this defense because
Dombrowski’s official acts led to Marek’s constructive discharge.
The Supreme Court, in resolving “the disagreement among the Circuits on whether a constructive discharge brought about by supervisor harassment ranks as a tangible employment action and therefore precludes assertion of the affirmative defense articulated in Ellerth and [Faragher],” has stated that a constructive discharge is not a “tangible employment action” in sexual harassment cases when the discharge is not precipitated by an official act of the company. Penn. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 140–41, 148–49 (2004) (holding the Faragher/Ellerth defense remains available to employers in constructive discharge cases “unless the plaintiff quit in reasonable response to an adverse action officially changing her employment status or situation”); see also Plautz v. Potter, 156 F. App’x 812, 819 (6th Cir. 2005) (stating that Suders held a “constructive discharge, while a potential liability-incurring employment action
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for the employer, is not a ‘tangible employment action’ in sexual harassment cases”).
Parton v. Smoky Mountain Knife Works, Inc., 2011 WL 4036959, at *10 (E.D.Tenn. Sept. 12,
2011). With regard to the availability of this defense, the Court agrees with Spitzer that it is
available. Like the conduct discussed in Suders, Dombrowski’s conduct “was exceedingly
unofficial and involved no direct exercise of company authority; indeed, it was exactly the kind
of wholly unauthorized conduct for which the affirmative defense was designed[.]” Suders, 542
U.S. at 150 (quotation and citation omitted).
However, the record is clear that there remain genuine issues of material fact on both
prongs of Spitzer’s defense. First, there exist issues of fact regarding whether Spitzer took
reasonable care to prevent harassment. Second, there exist issues of fact over whether Marek
was unreasonable in declining to pursue those avenues of relief.
There is no dispute that Spitzer had some form of an anti-harassment policy. That policy
states in relevant part as follows:
If you have been the victim of any type of discrimination or harassment of any kind by an associate or manager of this company including, but not limited to, discrimination or harassment based on your sex, age, race, religion, national origin, medical condition, disability, color, or sexual orientation or if you are aware that another associate or manager has been or is now the victim of discrimination or harassment you are to notify the general manager or business manager immediately. If you prefer to notify someone outside of this company you may notify the office of Spitzer Management, Inc. by contacting Alan Spitzer, Anthony Giardini, Larry Ward or Neta Kizzer by telephone … or by mail[.]
Doc. 133-3 at 1. Spitzer contends that the policy was readily available, provided to its
employees, frequently updated, and posted throughout its dealerships.
Despite these contentions, summary judgment is inappropriate on this defense for myriad
reasons. First, Marek contends that he never received the above-quoted policy. Second, the
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record is replete with instances wherein the policy was not followed. As detailed above, Alawi was harassed by his general manager over the loudspeaker at the dealership. Other managers, however, did not report this harassment as required by the policy. Numerous other Spitzer employees and managers witnessed the harassment of many of the plaintiffs herein and none took steps to report it to Spitzer Management or to anyone for that matter. Moreover, as will be detailed below, Okafor in fact reported his harassment to Spitzer Management. That report did little or nothing to slow Dombrowski’s harassment and ultimately Okafor’s complaints led to him being sued by Spitzer. Accordingly, there exists a question of fact over whether Spitzer exercised reasonable care to prevent harassment. As such, summary judgment on Spitzer’s Farragher/Ellerth affirmative defense is not justified.
3. Claims of Toufic (Nick) Hamdan Unlike Alawi and Marek, Hamdan worked at Spitzer Autoworld Cleveland. However,
similar to Marek and Alawi, Hamdan raises claims of hostile work environment and constructive discharge. The Court now reviews those contentions.
Hamdan was hired by Spitzer in January of 2005. He was born in Lebanon, and despite derogatory comments referring to him as an “angry Muslim,” Hamdan is not Muslim. During the time frame at issue, Hamdan worked under general manager Mike Procaccini.
Hamdan ultimately left his employment with Spitzer in September of 2007. When asked why he left, Hamdan responded:
Very simple. It was things that were being said about my origin, national origin or whatever, being called extremist, terrorist, uncivilized, Habibi, Habib. Those things. Write pretty much graffiti on the wall that were actually, you know, drawn out of a stick figure with a towel on his head, magic carpet sales with my name literally written on the board. …
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That stick figure right next to it would have my name next to it and right next to it I’d be the salesman selling magic carpets. Doc. 126 at 33-34. Hamdan also claims he heard from another employee that Procaccini referred to him as an angry Muslim. When asked how often Procaccini made offensive comments, Hamdan responded “[t]hroughout the week, throughout the day, throughout the month[.]” Doc. 126 at 42. In addition, the record demonstrates that the general sales manager at that location, Rex Davidson, asked a young woman, in Hamdan’s presence, whether she had ever ridden on a magic carpet. Doc. 126 at 44-45. Hamdan also testified that the graffiti remained on the sales board from March of 2007 through the time he quit in September. At one point, the graffiti depicted a stick figure with a turban and “the stick figure had a penis and then I – then the penis referred to [Hamdan] sucking on it.” Doc. 126 at 56. Hamdan would routinely erase such graffiti, but it would always reappear. Hamdan also swore that upon seeing the graffiti, the managers, Davidson and Procaccini, laughed and took no disciplinary action against anyone. When Hamdan informed Procaccini that he did not like the way that Procaccini spoke about people of Middle Eastern decent, Procaccini merely responded “They’re uncivilized.” Doc. 126 at 47. Hamdan also recounted an event during which Davidson pretended to play a flute, while another Spitzer employer, Ron Baker, pretended to be snake – in essence, the two acted out a snake charmer’s performance. On his final day of employment, Hamdan was signing insurance paperwork. Following signing one document, another Spitzer employee, Ron Baker, asked him “What is that, Habibi writing?” Doc. 126 at 43. Initially, the Court agrees with Spitzer’s argument that Hamdan cannot pursue a “perceived religion” claim. However, as Hamdan’s national origin claims subsume all of the alleged derogatory comments, the effect of Spitzer’s argument is minimal.
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Spitzer also contends that Hamdan was not subjected to severe and pervasive harassment.
The Court finds that the record creates a genuine issue of material fact surrounding this issue. In
a factually similar case, the Sixth Circuit explained as follows:
It is, however, a question of fact whether a reasonable person would view the Detroit comments as creating a hostile work environment. Kevin G. told Hussain that he should dress as Osama bin Laden for Halloween. Additionally, Hussain states in his first affidavit that Wegert and other staff repeatedly called him Taliban and, in the second, says it was on a near daily basis. Just as world events diminished the harassing nature of Patrick’s comment, here they increase the severity of these comments. Furthermore, the “Taliban” comments were made either repeatedly or on a near daily basis. This frequency would allow a reasonable person to conclude that the comments were intended to or did create a hostile work environment. Moreover, Hussain claims that he complained to Wegert about calling him Taliban, but he did not stop. Thus, there is at least a question of fact whether a reasonable person would conclude that Wegert’s comments were intended to create a hostile work environment.
Hussain v. Highgate Hotels, Inc., 126 Fed. Appx. 256, 268-69 (6th Cir. 2005). Similar to the
plaintiff in Hussain, Hamdan claimed that comments were made to or about him or Middle
Easterners on nearly a daily basis. Also similar to Hussain, Hamdan indicated his disgust for
these comments and no corrective action was taken by anyone at Spitzer. Other Courts have
reached similar results:
In this case, the basis for Alamjamili’s hostile environment claim is (a) the fact that all other Iranian–American employees were also forced out by Berglund; (b) the fact that Khalil Pezeshcan was victimized by ethnically-charged comments and favoritism when he returned to Berglund in 2008; and (c) the pervasive comments and nicknames directed at Alamjamili from several co-workers, including one of his supervisors, Paul Reburn, and several of his colleagues: Don Musgrove, Johnny Flanagan, and others. (Alamjamili Dep. at 41.) Alamjamili claims that, especially after the events of September 11, 2001, several of his colleagues constantly referred to him as “Chemical Ali,” “Camel Jockey,” “Little Terrorist,” or “Little Mexican,” while others frequently queried where he had parked his camel. (Alamjamili Dep. at 153–163.)
Although Berglund claims that these derisive epithets are insufficiently severe or pervasive, the court cannot concur. Several other courts have found that similar circumstances could support a hostile environment claim. In E.E.O.C. v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 521 F.3d 306 (4th Cir. 2008), for example, the Court held that the
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plaintiff suffered severe and pervasive religious discrimination when several coworkers, including one supervisor, repeatedly called him “Taliban” and “towel head,” questioned his allegiance to the United States, mocked his kufi and beard and observance of prayers, and made several anti-Muslim comments in the plaintiffs presence. Id. at 316–17. A similar result was reached in Amirmokri v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 60 F.3d 1126 (4th Cir. 1995), where the Court held that the alleged harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive when an Iranian plaintiff was called “names like ‘the local terrorist,’ a ‘camel jockey’ and ‘the Emir of Waldorf” on an almost daily basis. Id. at 1131. Likewise, the Court in E.E.O.C. v. WC & M Enterprises, Inc., 496 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 2007), held that the alleged harassment was severe and pervasive where the plaintiff’s co-employees engaged in a long-term pattern of ridicule and repeatedly called plaintiff “Taliban” and “an Arab,” told him to “go back where he came from,” and stated that he was acting like a “Muslim extremist.” Id. at 400–01.
Here, given that Alamjamili was allegedly subjected to these derogatory comments from numerous co-workers, including his direct supervisor, almost daily for a period of several years, the court can only conclude that he has adequately shown that the harassment he suffered was objectively severe and pervasive.
Alamjamili v. Berglund Chevrolet, Inc., 2011 WL 1479101, at *13-14 (W.D.Va. Apr. 18, 2011).
Like the plaintiffs in the above matters, Hamdan was subjected to nearly daily comments about
his national origin. In addition to hearing the terms extremist, terrorist, and uncivilized on a
routine basis, Hamdan was also subjected to mocking graffiti on a daily basis – graffiti that was
both insulting to his national origin and sexually degrading. Upon witnessing this graffiti,
Hamdan’s supervisors laughed and made no effort to even erase it from view. With this record,
a question of fact remains over whether the conduct was severe or pervasive.
Similar to the analysis performed above on Marek’s claim of constructive discharge, a
question of fact remains on Hamdan’s claim of constructive discharge. Like Marek, Hamdan
was subjected to daily derogatory remarks and disparaging graffiti. Like Marek, Hamdan
endured this conduct for numerous months. Hamdan then finally resigned when Baker mocked
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his handwriting by asking, “What is this, Habibi writing?”3 Moreover, Spitzer’s attempts to isolate each instance are unavailing. The fact that Baker made only a few stray remarks and the fact that Davidson made only a few stray remarks cannot be looked at in a vacuum. The Court is required to examine the totality of the circumstances. Reviewing all the conduct that was directed at Hamdan, there exists a genuine issue of fact over whether his resignation was a fitting response that was a foreseeable consequence of his employer’s action.
Moreover, there similarly exists a genuine issue of material fact with respect to Spitzer’s Farragher/Ellerth defense. For the same reasons detailed above on Marek’s claim, Spitzer is not entitled to summary judgment on its affirmative defenses. The same failure of managers and employees to follow Spitzer’s alleged anti-harassment policies existed at Spitzer AutoWorld and Motor City. Accordingly, summary judgment on this affirmative defense is not supported by the record.
4. Claims of Hakim Nuriddin The pleadings, briefing, and supporting materials in this matter consist of thousands of
pages. Despite those facts, it is unclear what precisely Nuriddin is claiming in his intervenor complaint. Spitzer’s motion for summary judgment and the opposition only serve to demonstrate that the parties themselves are also uncertain of the claims raised by Nuriddin. Unlike the above plaintiffs, Nuriddin does not appear to raise a hostile work environment claim. Instead, Nuriddin seems to assert a straightforward race discrimination claim.
It is well-established that the burden is on the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-254 (1981). A plaintiff can establish a prima facie case by showing that i) he
3 Again here, Spitzer’s claim that the use of this term is not offensive or insulting borders on frivolous. Spitzer contends that since Habibi can be translated to “my love,” the comment could not be offensive. First, it is a virtual certainty that Baker did not know that translation. Second, it is even more certain that the comment was not one made out of friendship, but instead a comment meant to mock Hamdan’s national origin.
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was a member of a protected class; ii) he was discharged; iii) he was qualified for the position; and iv) he was replaced by a person outside the protected class. See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. A plaintiff can also establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing, in addition to the first three elements, that a comparable non-protected person was treated better. See Mitchell v. Toledo Hospital, 964 F.2d 577, 582-83 (6th Cir. 1992). If a plaintiff claims race discrimination on the basis of such “disparate treatment”, he must produce evidence which establishes: i) that he was a member of a protected class; and ii) that for the same or similar conduct he was treated differently from similarly situated, non-minority employees. Id.; Davis v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 858 F.2d 347-348 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1110 (1989). A plaintiff always bears the ultimate burden of proving racial discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
Smith v. Reno, 89 F.3d 835, at *2 (6th Cir. 1996) (table decision).
Setting aside the issue of whether Nuriddin’s race claims are timely,4 the Court finds that
summary judgment is appropriate on these claims. In his opposition brief, Nuriddin claims that
he has demonstrated that he was treated differently than similarly situated, non-minority
employees. Moreover, Nuriddin details the incidents that he claims demonstrate this disparate
treatment. Nuriddin asserts as follows:
White employees were permitted to park their cars in the garage, while Mr. Nuriddin was not. Mr. Davidson was not fired, suspended or placed on probation when he screamed “mother f-cker” in Hakim Nuriddin’s face; rather, Mr. Nuriddin was reprimanded for the incident. Tracy Graham, a Caucasian who was known to have a temper and who often swore at managers and raised her voice at managers, was never disciplined for doing so. Szatala p. 85. She was not terminated when she told Larry Ward to “go s-ck a c-ck,” or “kiss her -ss,” or to “f-ck off.” Szatala p. 73. Instead, Nuriddin was terminated when they argued. The majority of this discipline was implemented with the active participation of Rex Davidson, who was known to call other non-white employees “niggers.”
Doc. 187 at 50-51. While Nuriddin’s opposition brief spans 68 pages, there is no analysis tied to
the above factual allegations. There is no argument to demonstrate that any of the identified
employees – the unnamed employees regarding parking, Graham, and Ward – were similarly
situated to Nuriddin. Accordingly, the record does not support a finding that Nuriddin’s prima
4 It appears to the Court that the EEOC timely initiated suit and that Nuriddin timely intervened. However, the Court need not resolve that issue to resolve Nuriddin’s discrimination claims.
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facie case has been satisfied. As such, summary judgment on his discrimination claim is appropriate.
5. Claims of Dean Okafor Okafor raises claims similar to Alawi, Marek, and Hamdan, asserting he was subjected to
a hostile work environment. Okafor claims that he was harassed based upon a combination of his Nigerian national origin and his African American race. The Court finds that Spitzer’s motion for summary judgment on this claim is not well taken.
Similar to Marek, Okafor was forced to endure nearly daily comments from Dombrowski. Examples of Dombrowski’s comments include:
● Asking Okafor, “What’s for lunch, Dean, hyena? ● Referring to Okafor as a “jungle bunny, tromping through the great outdoors” ● Referencing Africans as “being ancient and still [like] cavemen” ● Referring to Okafor as a monkey, a gorilla, “Nairobi man,” and pygmy ● Asking Okafor when Africans “got out their grass skirt and started wearing clothes” ● Asking Okafor if he has “still got the spear hanging up on his mantel” ● Informing others that Okafor “doesn’t eat nothing unless he kills it first” ● Speaking to Okafor about “chasing gazelles in the Homeland” Okafor also testified that Dombrowski routinely mocked his accent. Unlike several of the other plaintiffs, Okafor reported this misconduct to Spitzer Management. However, Okafor only took this step when his reports of this conduct to other managers, namely Peyton Lycans, resulted in Okafor being told that Dombrowski was simply trying to befriend him. Initially, Okafor spoke with Larry Ward at Spitzer Management. Similar to Lycans, Ward informed Okafor that Dombrowski meant no harm. Okafor pressed on with his reports of
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the harassment and was eventually placed in contact with Anthony Giardini. At that time, Giardini was Spitzer Management’s chief operating officer and was transitioning to its General Counsel. According to Okafor, Giardini informed Okafor that he was “thin skinned,” “overreacting,” and that if it were Giardini’s decision, Okafor would have been fired. Doc. 118 at 111-12.
Consistent with the Court’s analysis of Marek’s claim of a hostile work environment and Hamdan’s similar claim, Okafor’s claim presents genuine issues of material fact that must be presented to a jury. Like Marek and Hamdan, Okafor was subjected to degrading comments on nearly a daily basis by a supervisor. Despite his repeated protests and following the chain of command suggested by Spitzer’s policies, Okafor was afforded no relief. Accordingly, there exists a genuine issue of material fact with regard to whether Okafor was subjected to a hostile work environment.
Okafor also presented evidence that Dombrowski interfered with his sales, causing a loss in his income. However, the Court need not resolve whether this was a tangible employment action. Assuming there was no such action would allow Spitzer to raise its Farragher/Ellerth defense. Based upon the Court’s analysis above, this defense does not warrant summary judgment. Accordingly, Okafor’s hostile work environment claim survives.
B. RETALIATION Okafor and Nuriddin also raise claims of retaliation. The Sixth Circuit has explained the standard to apply in such a case as follows: A plaintiff must now prove that: (1) she engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) this exercise of protected rights was known to defendant; (3) defendant thereafter took adverse employment action against the plaintiff, or the plaintiff was subjected to severe or pervasive retaliatory harassment by a supervisor; and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action or harassment. See Canitia v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 903
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F.2d 1064, 1066 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984 (1990) (outlining previous standard for prima facie Title VII retaliatory harassment case). If and when a plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden of production of evidence shifts to the employer to “articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for its actions. Ibid. (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). The plaintiff, who bears the burden of persuasion throughout the entire process, then must demonstrate “that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision.” Ibid. (quoting Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)). The employer may also prove an affirmative defense to retaliatory harassment by a supervisor by demonstrating: “(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any ... harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities provided by the employer to avoid harm otherwise.” Ellerth, 118 S.Ct. at 2270.
Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784, 792-93 (6th Cir. 2000) (emphasis in
original).
1. Okafor’s Claim of Retaliation
There is no dispute that Okafor engaged in protected conduct and that Spitzer was aware
of that conduct. Spitzer, however, contends that the record is clear that Okafor cannot
demonstrate an adverse employment action and a casual connection between that action and any
protected activity.
Okafor identifies three adverse employment actions: 1) in October of 2006, Okafor was
suspended for one day, 2) on March 31, 2007, Okafor was suspended for two days and told to
avoid contact with customers, and 3) on July 10, 2008, Okafor was terminated. Upon the Court’s
review of the record as detailed below, there is sufficient evidence for a jury to consider Okafor’s
claims that these constitute adverse employment actions.
With regard to the October of 2006 incident, the record reflects that the EEOC notified
Spitzer on September 13, 2006 that Okafor’s charge would be referred for possible litigation. On
September 27, 2006, the EEOC initiated this action. Roughly one month later, Davidson
counseled Okafor about the notice required to take time away from work. Okafor asserts that the
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exchange involved his need to take time off to care for his ailing mother and that Davidson responded: “I never heard of anybody come from overseas with a swollen knee like her.” Doc. 118 at 58. When Okafor inquired whether Davidson was mocking his mother, Davidson responded: “You know what, I’m not going to put up with fucking shit. I know you’re nothing but trouble.” Doc. 118 at 58. The Court agrees that the direct inference to be drawn from Davidson’s comments is that Davidson was aware of Okafor’s EEOC complaint and subsequent litigation. This inference is only further bolstered by Okafor’s EEOC complaint about this incident and Spitzer’s response to that charge. In his complaint, Okafor specifically noted that during the exchange, he informed Davidson of his intent to file a formal complaint. In its determination, the EEOC explained Spitzer’s response to this allegation as follows: “Further, Respondent [Spitzer] states that the Charging Party became belligerent and threatened to file EEOC charges against his manager. According to Respondent, only after Charging Party made the aforementioned statement did the General Sales Manager [Davidson] send Charging Party home for the remainder of the day.” Doc. 174-2 at 1. Accordingly, the record contains significant, direct evidence of a retaliatory animus.
The March 31, 2007 incident, however, stands on more tenuous ground. In that regard, Okafor was suspended based upon customer complaints. To support a causal connection, Okafor appears to rely on two factors. First, he relies upon the temporal proximity between this punishment and Nuriddin’s EEOC charge. Second, Okafor contends that Spitzer believe that Nuriddin and Okafor were working together with regard to their EEOC complaints. In essence, Okafor wants to stack inferences in order to find a retaliatory animus with regard to this incident. This stacking of inferences is not permissible. Accordingly, with respect to this incident, Spitzer
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has properly demonstrated that no causal connection exists between protected activity and this discipline.
Finally, the Court must examine Okafor’s termination on July 10, 2008. On June 26, 2008, the EEOC had filed suit against Spitzer, asserting claims on behalf of Okafor and Nuriddin. Four days later, the Cleveland Plain Dealer published an article about the lawsuit. On roughly that same day, July 1, 2008, Davidson summoned Okafor to his office and informed him that he “was no good, poisoned the sales force and had bad mouthed the dealership.” Doc. 173-9 at 1. Nine days later, Okafor was terminated for an alleged violation of the sexual harassment policy.
Spitzer’s response to all of these incidents seems to be grounded in its belief that it had legitimate reasons for all of Okafor’s discipline. With respect to the first incident, the fact that Davidson and Spitzer effectively admitted that Okafor was not sent home until he threatened to complain to the EEOC, any assertion by Spitzer that the discipline was legitimate rings hollow. With respect to Okafor’s termination, the Court finds that Spitzer has presented sufficient evidence to meet its burden of demonstrating a legitimate reason for the termination. Spitzer presented evidence that Okafor grabbed a female co-worker’s arm and told her that she looked like a stewardess. Spitzer also presented evidence that Okafor was less-than-cooperative with his supervisor after the incident, leading to his termination for sexual harassment. Accordingly, the Court must review whether Okafor has demonstrated an issue of fact over whether that reason was pretextual.
The record supports submitting the matter of pretext to a jury. The Sixth Circuit has noted that there are three methods for Okafor to meet his burden of demonstrating pretext.
To make a submissible case on the credibility of his employer's explanation, the plaintiff is required to show by a preponderance of the evidence either 1) that the
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proffered reasons had no basis in fact; 2) that the proffered reasons did not actually motivate his discharge; or 3) that they were insufficient to motivate discharge. Tinker v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 127 F.3d 519, 522 (6th Cir. 1997) (citation and quotation omitted). The EEOC has adequately demonstrated that the complaining parties, Michael Blackmur and Esther Kim, were close friends of the decision-maker, Davidson. While these facts cast doubt on the veracity of the statements of Blackmur and Kim, the Court need not doubt their credibility in order to send this matter to a jury. If the Spitzer witnesses are believed, Okafor grabbed Kim’s arm and told her that she looked like a stewardess. Blackmur reported the incident, and if he is believed, Okafor responded by calling Blackmur a “motherfucker” and “spoke Nigerian to Blackmur with an intimidating tone and threatening body language.” Doc. 137 at 9 (Spitzer motion for summary judgment). Spitzer then ordered Okafor to apologize. When Okafor declined to apologize, he was terminated. Based upon the totality of the evidence before this Court, there exist several questions of fact surrounding the issue of pretext. First, assuming the truth of all of Spitzer’s witnesses, there exists a question of whether Okafor’s conduct justified his termination. Based upon all the other reported conduct of Dombrowski and Procaccini that led to no discipline, it is highly unlikely that Okafor’s conduct was severe enough to warrant termination. In fact, the record contains evidence that Davidson screamed “motherfucker” at Nuriddin and received no discipline. Similarly, a close review of Spitzer’s policy does not readily demonstrate how Okafor’s conduct toward Kim was in violation of a sexual harassment policy. As such, the Court finds sufficient issues of fact regarding pretext remain to submit this matter to a jury.
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2. Nuriddin’s Claim of Retaliation Nuriddin’s retaliation claim rests upon his argument that he presented evidence of an
“ongoing campaign of retaliation.” Doc. 187 at 46. In so doing, however, Nuriddin makes little effort to demonstrate the adverse employment actions that support his claim and to demonstrate the causal connection between his protected activity and those employment actions. It is clear from the record that many of the instances identified by Nuriddin are not adverse employment actions. For example, Nuriddin was written up on March 19, 2007. He, however, suffered no loss in wages or any other punishment for that write up. As such, it was not an adverse employment action.
The Court does find that Nuriddin’s reduction in hours would constitute an adverse employment action. Additionally, Spitzer does not dispute that Nuriddin’s termination constituted an adverse employment action. In that respect, the record also demonstrates that Spitzer has proffered legitimate business reasons for both the reduction in hours and the termination -- namely, that the hours were reduced because the service department would no longer operate on Saturdays and that Nurridin was terminated for an angry encounter with his supervisor. Accordingly, the Court must review whether there exists a question of fact regarding whether those reasons are pretextual.
With respect to Nuriddin’s reduction in hours, the Court finds no issue of fact remains. Spitzer offered evidence, through Nuriddin’s own deposition, that his hours were altered because Spitzer’s service department would be closed on Saturdays. In the past, Nuriddin had taken Fridays off, so Spitzer offered Nuriddin the opportunity to work Fridays to continue his 40 hour work week. Due to religious considerations, Nuriddin declined to work Fridays and therefore his weekly hours were reduced to 32. Nuriddin’s sole response to these facts appears to rely upon
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the temporal proximity between his third charge with the EEOC and this reduction in hours. However, given the undisputed fact that Nuriddin could have maintained his schedule if he was willing to work a different day during the week, the temporal proximity standing alone is simply insufficient to create an issue of fact regarding pretext.
Nuriddin’s termination, however, requires an independent analysis. Spitzer contends that Nuriddin was termination for an altercation with his supervisor, Tracy Graham. According to Spitzer, the two had a heated argument that was witnessed by another supervisor, Mitchell Mincy. Graham then later called Mincy stating that she was scared, shaking, almost in tears, and frightened of Nuriddin. The next day, Mincy terminated Nuriddin.
Nuriddin asserts that the reasons for his termination were pretextual and relies upon numerous inconsistencies to support his claim. First, in answers to interrogatories, Spitzer claimed that Davidson made the decision to terminate Nuriddin. Later, Spitzer asserted that solely Mincy made the decision. In addition, on August 14, 2008, Mincy filled out and signed an employee termination report and indicated that Nuriddin was fired for “insubordination with manager.” Doc. 187-4. However, in discovery requests in this matter, Spitzer contends that Nuriddin was terminated for violating its anti-harassment policies. Nuriddin is correct that precedent suggests that these changing facts support submitting the matter to a jury.
In Tinker, the Sixth Circuit found an issue of fact on the issue of pretext and explained its reasoning as follows:
Sears contends that Cassar made the decision to fire Tinker, and that his stated reason for the decision is the only relevant testimony. However, Fricker’s statements indicate that he may have played a role in the decision to terminate Tinker’s employment, and his reasoning for recommending this action is entirely different from Cassar's. The inconsistency of these statements by the different managers considering the Anthony Green incident, and Tinker’s role in that incident, creates two important questions of material fact: who was actually responsible for the decision to fire Tinker, and what was the reason that caused
27

that decision maker to decide that Tinker should be fired? These inconsistencies demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding Sears's proffered reason for Tinker’s termination. Tinker, 127 F.3d at 523. Thus, the discrepancies noted above, standing alone, support submitting the issue of pretext to a jury. The Court also believes that an issue of fact exists regarding whether Nuriddin’s conduct was sufficient to warrant his termination. Mincy personally observed the conduct. At that time, he did not intervene, nor did he immediately discipline Nuriddin. Furthermore, when meeting with Nuriddin the next morning, Mincy admitted that he “had no intentions of letting him go at the beginning of the meeting.” Doc. 114 at 30. Mincy’s assertions that he ultimately terminated Nuriddin because of Graham’s expression that she remained fearful of him and could not work with him are also suspect. Mincy was aware of Graham’s feelings prior to the meeting and still began the meeting with no intention of firing Nuriddin. Accordingly, there exist significant issues of fact surrounding whether Nuriddin’s termination was pretextual. This aspect of Nuriddin’s retaliation claim must be submitted to a jury. C. SPITZER’S LAWSUIT Nuriddin and Okafor also raise a claim of abuse of process and a retaliation claim based upon a lawsuit that Spitzer filed against them following their termination. The Court now examines those claims. Under Ohio law, an abuse of process claim contains the following elements: “(1) that a legal proceeding has been set in motion in proper form and with probable cause; (2) that the proceeding has been perverted to attempt to accomplish an ulterior purpose for which it was not designed; and (3) that direct damage has resulted from the wrongful use of process.” Yaklevich v. Kemp, Schaeffer & Rowe Co., L.P.A., 626 N.E.2d 115, paragraph one of syllabus (Ohio 1994).
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Simply stated, “abuse of process occurs where someone attempts to achieve through use of the court that which the court is itself powerless to order.” Robb v. Chagrin Lagoons Yacht Club, Inc. 662 N.E.2d 9, 14 (Ohio 1996).
In its motion for summary judgment, Spitzer contends that it sought only to halt the slanderous and defamatory statements being made by Nuriddin and Okafor. Accordingly, Spitzer contends that it never sought to achieve any remedy that was beyond the court’s authority to issue. At a minimum, a question of fact remains whether Spitzer sought to stop this activity or to completely silence Nuriddin and Okafor, a remedy far beyond the authority of the court. In his deposition, Giardini stated that the lawsuit was filed to stop Nuriddin and Okafor from “telling members of the community and perhaps even customers that the management team there and the ownership of that dealership would discriminate against them, would treat them unfairly, or would do some harm to them in the future.” Doc. 110 at 99. Furthermore, given that Spitzer could have vindicated its position through already pending litigation filed by the EEOC – that is, demonstrate the alleged falsity of these accusations, it lends support to a finding that the lawsuit against Nuriddin and Okafor personally was meant to silence their ongoing, protected speech.
For similar reasons, Nuriddin and Okafor’s retaliation claim based upon the lawsuit must proceed to a jury trial. As the Ohio Supreme Court has recognized that 1) the filing of a lawsuit may be an adverse action, and 2) that former employees are covered under Ohio’s anti-retaliation laws, this claim is plausible on its face. See Green-Burger v. Temesi, 879 N.E.2d 174 (Ohio 2007). As there exists a question of fact over Spitzer’s motivation for filing the suit, the Court finds that this aspect of the retaliation claims by Nuriddin and Okafor must be submitted to a jury.
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D. ALAN SPITZER Alan Spitzer has filed his own motion for summary judgment, asserting that there is no basis for finding him individually liable. Spitzer argues at length that there is no basis to pierce the corporate veil in this matter. In response, Nuriddin and Okafor assert that they do not seek to pierce the corporate veil, rather they seek to hold Mr. Spitzer for his own discriminatory acts. Specifically, Okafor and Nuriddin assert that Mr. Spitzer authorized the retaliatory lawsuit against them, and Nuriddin appears to asset that Mr. Spitzer had input into personnel decisions. Initially, the Court notes that the record is clear Mr. Spitzer was not personally involved in the discipline or termination of any of the plaintiffs. While he may have engaged in discussions about those individuals, there is no evidence of any kind to suggest that he provided direction or input into the discipline process of any plaintiff. Accordingly, he cannot be found personally liable under that theory. Mr. Spitzer’s personal liability hinges upon the assertion that he authorized the lawsuit discussed above that was filed against Nuriddin and Okafor. The support for this contention comes from Giardini deposition. The following took place during that deposition: Q Who made the decision to file a lawsuit against Dean Okafor and Hakim Nuriddin? A My client. Q Which client? A Alan Spitzer. Q Alan Spitzer himself personally authorized the filing of that lawsuit? A He did as president of Spitzer Motor City, that’s correct. Q Okay. But you had a conversation directly with Alan Spitzer about bringing the lawsuit against Dean Okafor and Hakim Nuriddin and Al Spitzer himself authorized the filing of the lawsuit?
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A Of course. Doc. 110 at 85-86. Okafor and Nurridin contend that Ohio law allows for liability to extend to Mr. Spitzer for his personal involvement in authorizing the lawsuit.
The Court agrees that Ohio law provides for this liability. Furthermore, Mr. Spitzer offered no reply brief to suggest any rationale that would absolve him from liability. For example, there is nothing in the record to suggest that a Board of Director’s decision or some other form of authorization was required to initiate the lawsuit. As such, as the record stands, Mr. Spitzer personally authorized the lawsuit. As the Court noted above, there remain questions of fact surrounding the motivation for filing that lawsuit. Accordingly, Mr. Spitzer’s motion for summary judgment must be denied.
IV. Conclusion Defendants’ motions for summary judgment are resolved as detailed herein. To the extent
that Defendants’ also sought summary judgment on solely the issue of punitive damages, that motion is DENIED. A jury will ultimately determine the proper remedy in this matter, and Spitzer is of course free to revisit this issue during Rule 50 motion practice during trial.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 30, 2012

__/s/ John R. Adams________________________ JOHN R. ADAMS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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 Case: 1:06-cv-02337-JRA Doc #: 321 Filed: 01/23/13 1 of 2. PageID #: 6445

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

E.E.O.C., et al. Plaintiffs,
vs. Spitzer Management, Inc., et al.,
Defendants.

) CASE NO. 1:06CV2337 ) ) JUDGE JOHN R. ADAMS ) ) ) ) ORDER ) ) ) )

Trial commenced in this matter on January 14, 2013. During the course of trial, Plaintiffs

objected to certain exhibits being offered by Defendants, asserting that fax headers had been

removed from the documents. Thereafter, the Court ordered Defendants to produce originals of

any and all documents provided in discovery to allow Plaintiffs to compare those originals with

the documents they actually received during discovery. Through that process, the Court learned

two important facts: 1) Defendants had not maintained the originals of all of their documents,

even those being utilized as exhibits at trial, and 2) Plaintiffs had not received some of the

documents despite proper discovery requests.

Based upon these facts, Plaintiffs made an oral motion for a mistrial on January 22, 2013.

The Court then allowed Plaintiffs the duration of that day to fully examine the documents that

had just been provided to them at roughly 8 a.m. on January 22. The parties returned on January

23, 2013, and the Court allowed for an hour of argument from both parties. The Court also noted

that at roughly 11 p.m. the prior evening, Plaintiffs had formally moved for default judgment

based upon the failure to provide proper discovery. Plaintiffs’ motion included the fact that at

Case: 1:06-cv-02337-JRA Doc #: 321 Filed: 01/23/13 2 of 2. PageID #: 6446

roughly 4 p.m. on January 22, 2013, they received additional documents from Defendants – documents that were requested as early as 2010 and never produced.
Upon hearing all of the parties’ arguments, the Court orally granted the motion to mistrial. The Court also set a briefing schedule as follows:
Plaintiffs shall have seven days to file a motion for fees and costs and provide all of the supporting documentation for said motion. Plaintiffs may also use these seven days to file any supplement they desire in support of the motion for default judgment. Defendants shall have seven days to oppose the motion for fees. Moreover, Defendants shall have 14 days from the date of filing to oppose the motion for default judgment. It is the Court’s intention that the parties consolidate briefing on these issues. Accordingly, each side shall be allocated 30 pages to address these issues. If more pages are necessary, the parties must move for leave and explain with specificity the need for additional pages.
Within 4 days of Defendants’ response, Plaintiffs may file any reply. Absent leave of court, the reply shall not exceed 10 pages.
Once briefing is complete, the Court will place in writing its formal analysis of the need for the mistrial in this matter, along with addressing the parties’ arguments on the proper additional sanction, if any, that should be imposed in this matter.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 23, 2013

/s/ John R. Adams_________________ Judge John R. Adams UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, et al.,
Plaintiffs, vs.
Spitzer Management, Inc., et al., Defendants.

) CASE NOS. 1:06CV2337 (Lead Case) ) 1:08CV1326, 1:08CV1542, 1:09CV255 ) ) ) JUDGE JOHN R. ADAMS ) ) ) ) ORDER ) ) (Resolves Docs. 320, 326, 327, 331)

Pending before the Court are numerous motions filed by the parties following the declaration of a mistrial in this matter on January 23, 2013. Plaintiffs EEOC, Nurridin, and Okafor have moved for default judgment (Doc. 320) and sought attorney fees and costs (Docs. 326, 327). Defendants have sought leave (Doc. 331) to file instanter a supplement to their opposition to the motion for fees. The motion for leave is GRANTED. The supplemental opposition will be considered herein.
The motion for default judgment is DENIED. The motions for attorney fees and costs are GRANTED as detailed herein.
I. Facts The initial complaint in this matter was filed on September 27, 2006. As discovery
progressed, Plaintiff intervenors Nurridin and Okafor sought and received permission to file their own complaints which were consolidated with the complaint filed by the EEOC. The matter moved forward slowly with discovery before the previously-assigned district judge and motion practice eventually began in late 2010. On March 30, 2012, the Court resolved the pending motions for summary judgment, leaving numerous claims to be decided at trial. On January 14,

2013, a jury was empanelled in this matter. Opening statements and witness testimony then began on January 15, 2013.
After roughly one week of witness testimony, an issue regarding Defendants’ exhibits was raised by Plaintiffs. Specifically, Plaintiffs indicated that internal fax headers had been removed from certain witness statements that Defendants were using during cross-examination. Plaintiffs asserted that these fax headers were material to the exhibits because the exhibits were witness statements that had no other information on them that would suggest the time period during which they were produced. When questioned about the omission of these headers, Defendants’ counsel had no explanation for the Court. Attorneys Griffith and Cook and party representative Giardini1 could only speculate as to how Defendants’ exhibits came to be different than those provided to Plaintiffs during discovery. After a night to contemplate the matter, Defendants’ counsel indicated that the fax headers were removed as a part of “cleaning” the exhibits for trial purposes. Counsel was specific that this was a common practice and had been performed on all of the exhibits. Counsel also indicated that they could not provide this simple answer to the Court the prior day, despite numerous opportunities, because the Court’s inquiry had made them nervous.
The inability of counsel to provide such an answer gave the Court pause and caused it to consider a method by which Plaintiffs could be ensured that no other exhibits had been altered – whether inadvertently or not. As a result, the Court ordered that Defendants immediately produce the originals of every document that had been produced during discovery. The Court found that, at a minimum, this disclosure was necessary to place to rest any future issues
1 It is important to note that from 2006 until March of 2010, Giardini was counsel of record for the Spitzer defendants. Furthermore, for at least those five years, Giardini was an assistant secretary and Director for Spitzer Management, Inc.
2

regarding the alteration of exhibits, purposeful or not. However, far from resolving the issues that arose from altering the proffered exhibits, the order to produce originals created much larger, more serious issues for the Court to resolve.
Upon returning to court, defense counsel described the “herculean” efforts that were undertaken to find the original documents. These efforts entailed reviewing documents at numerous Spitzer car dealerships across the area. Despite ongoing litigation, Defendants had apparently made no efforts to segregate the items that were properly responsive to discovery. This fact could also conceivably explain why Defendants’ in-trial production resulted in numerous documents being produced that had never been previously produced in more than six years of litigation. Of course, simple neglect would be the kindest interpretation available for Defendants’ conduct. In reality, in less than 24 hours following the Court’s demand to produce documents, Defendants were suddenly able to locate and produce documents directly responsive to years-old discovery requests. The Court must now determine what sanction, if any, in addition to a mistrial, is appropriate in this matter.
II. Legal Standard Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(A), “[a] district judge holds a
variety of [discovery] sanctions in his arsenal, the most severe of which is the power to issue a default judgment.” Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Mack, 270 F. App'x 372, 376 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Bass v. Jostens, Inc., 71 F.3d 237, 241 (6th Cir. 1995) (“a district court may sanction parties who fail to comply with its orders in a variety of ways, including dismissal of the lawsuit.”); Regional Refuse Sys., Inc. v. Inland Reclamation Co., 842 F.2d 150, 154 (6th Cir. 1988) (“Dismissal of an action for failure to cooperate in discovery is a sanction of last resort.”).
Sanctions that the court may impose for discovery violations include—in ascending order of harshness—an order directing the noncompliant party to
3

provide further discovery; shifting of costs, including attorneys’ fees, incurred by the other parties in connection with the discovery violation; imposing fines payable to the court on the culpable party or its attorneys; an instruction informing the jury of the discovery breach; an order precluding the noncompliant party from using particular pieces of evidence that were withheld during discovery in connection with motions or at trial; an order establishing particular facts, issues, claims, or defenses related to the discovery abuse against the noncompliant party; or the entry of a default judgment, dismissal, or declaration of a mistrial (“terminating sanctions”). RFMAS Inc. v. So, 271 F.R.D. 13, 22 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (footnotes omitted). Additionally, a court may sanction an attorney under § 1927 for conduct that “so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously.” 28 U.S.C. § 1927; see also Rentz v. Dynasty Apparel Indus., 556 F.3d 389, 395–96 (6th Cir. 2009). Section 1927 sanctions are appropriate when counsel “objectively falls short of the obligations owed by a member of the bar to the court and which, as a result, causes additional expense to the opposing party. The purpose is to deter dilatory litigation practices and to punish aggressive tactics that far exceed zealous advocacy.” Red Carpet Studios Div. of Source Advantage, Ltd., 465 F.3d at 646 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). An award of fees under § 1927 requires a showing of more than negligence or incompetence but less than subjective bad faith. Hall, 595 F.3d at 276; see also Dixon v. Clem, 492 F.3d 665, 679 (6th Cir. 2007). Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit has articulated four factors for this Court to consider in determining whether the most severe sanction, default judgment or dismissal, is appropriate: “‘(1) whether the party’s failure is due to willfulness, bad faith, or fault; (2) whether the adversary was prejudiced by the dismissed party’s conduct; (3) whether the dismissed party was warned that failure to cooperate could lead to dismissal; and (4) whether less drastic sanctions were imposed or considered before dismissal was ordered.” Universal Health Group v. Allstate Ins. Co., 703 F.3d 953, 956 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Reyes, 307 F.3d 451, 458
4

(6th Cir. 2002)). “Although no one factor is dispositive, dismissal is proper if the record demonstrates delay or contumacious conduct.” id., i.e., conduct that is “‘perverse in resisting authority’ and ‘stubbornly disobedient.’” Schafer v. City of Defiance Police Dept., 529 F.3d 731, 737 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 497 (1986)).
III. Analysis In order to determine the proper sanction in this matter, the Court must analyze the
evidence that was withheld. The Court must also take into account Defendants’ explanation for its failure to produce, along with any prejudice stemming from the non-production.
1. Blackmur personnel file First, Defendants failed to produce the personnel file of former employee, Michael
Blackmur. Defendants contend that little to no prejudice stemmed from this non-production. In contrast, Plaintiffs contend that they were deprived of the ability to properly prepare for the deposition and trial testimony of Blackmur without this file. In support, Plaintiffs highlight that Blackmur testified that he left Spitzer in the winter of 2009 and that his departure was amicable. In contrast, Blackmur’s personnel file indicates that his employment ended roughly nine days after his involvement in Plaintiff Okafor’s termination. The personnel file notes that Blackmur was coded as “ineligible for rehire.” Despite this notation, Blackmur was later re-hired by Spitzer. As Plaintiffs would argue, this re-hiring took place during the same timeframe that Plaintiffs Nurridin and Okafor sought to intervene in this matter.
Based upon the above, it is clear that Plaintiffs would argue that Blackmur’s testimony was biased, as he was rehired by Spitzer during the litigation, despite notes in his personnel file that indicated that he would not be eligible to be rehired. In any event, it is undisputed that Plaintiffs were unable to explore this line of questioning during deposition or trial because of
5

Defendants’ failure to timely produce the file during discovery. Furthermore, to date, there has been no reasonable explanation for the failure to produce this file. While Defendants have alleged that they made extraordinary efforts once the Court ordered that all originals be produced, their efforts appear to be nothing more than reviewing the records at each of the Spitzer dealerships. These “extraordinary” efforts are precisely what were required from Spitzer from the very first discovery request made in this matter.
2. Kim personnel file Defendants also failed to produce the entire personnel file for Esther Kim. The Kim file
indicated there had been a recommendation that Spitzer have a follow-up discussion with Kim about recognizing and reporting sexual harassment – that recommendation coming roughly nine months prior to Kim’s interaction with Plaintiff Okafor that led her to alleged harassment. For unknown reasons, this document was not in Kim’s file when it was produced during discovery. As a result, Plaintiffs were precluded from engaging in discovery to determine whether any follow-up was done with Kim, who conducted that follow up, and what was discussed. However, the Court has had the opportunity to hear evidence regarding the alleged “sexual harassment” incident, and the assertion that the conduct was indeed sexual harassment is weak, at best. Effectively, on one isolated occasion, Okafor brushed Kim’s arm while stating that he thought she was dressed like a uniformed stewardess or flight attendant. Based upon those facts, the jump to Kim alleging sexual harassment certainly leaves open the question of what prior advice Spitzer had given her about spotting and reporting such harassment. Once again, however, Plaintiffs were deprived of the opportunity to even engage in that line of questioning due to Spitzer’s failure to produce this document.
6

3. Bury file Defendants also failed to produce a personnel file that has been referred to as the Bury
file. Defendants contend that this file was compiled after Okafor’s termination in response to his claim for unemployment. In response, Plaintiffs assert that at least one Spitzer employee, Rex Davidson, testified that Spitzer was “keeping a file” on Okafor. Plaintiffs contend that the file maintained by employee Thomas Bury was just that file, noting that there were numerous documents in the file that contained disparaging remarks about Okafor.
Two things are certain regarding the Bury file – it contains highly relevant information and Spitzer has offered no reasonable explanation for failing to produce it during discovery. Assuming that Spitzer’s version of the file is true, the information compiled to defend against Okafor’s claim of unemployment would certainly be directly tied to his work performance and any related complaints. All such information would be highly relevant to Okafor’s claims in this litigation.
4. Nuriddin’s file During trial, Plaintiffs also received for the first time documents that were apparently
within Plaintiff Nuriddin’s personnel file. While Nuriddin’s file was provided during discovery, when the Court ordered that the entire original file be produced, numerous, previously-unseen documents were produced. For example, there was an employee verification form noting that Nuriddin was a “very good employee” and reliable. Another information request in May of 2002 indicated that Nuriddin was an “excellent” employee. Spitzer once again seeks to downplay the value of this evidence by indicating that these were simple responses to outside requests for information about Nuriddin’s employment. In a vacuum this may be true. However, during trial, Spitzer took great pains to demonstrate to the jury that Spitzer had every right to question
7

Nuriddin’s conduct and truthfulness based on alleged prior bad acts in the workplace. At that point in time, there is little question that had these documents been produced during discovery, Spitzer would not have pursued this line of questioning or these documents would have been utilized to rehabilitate Nuriddin in the eyes of the jury. In any event, Spitzer’s failure to produce them once again deprived Plaintiffs of the ability to investigate and utilize these documents during pretrial motion practice and trial.
5. Pena notes During May of 2006, Attorney Pena was performing work in Giardini’s law firm and was
assigned to investigate Okafor’s complaint. Pena admits that she took notes of a conversation she had with Dombrowski and took notes of interviews she performed with 12 other Spitzer employees. Pena claims that she later converted her handwritten notes to typed statements. Those typed statements were later signed by the employees. Pena also asserts that “the written statements which [she] prepared accurately and to the best of [her] recollection at the time completely reflected the statements given to [her] by those employees[.]” It is undisputed that Pena’s handwritten notes were not provided before trial. Spitzer, however, contends that no prejudice stems from this non-production because the undated, typed statements were provided. It is these undated statements that Spitzer altered by removing fax headers and caused the initial concerns for the Court.
As Plaintiff’s have highlighted, the typed statement from employee Wayne Andrews reads: “I have worked with Jim Dombrowski for two years and have never heard a racist comment from him. Jim usually makes the other employees tone down their comments.” In contrast, Pena’s notes indicate that Andrews witnessed Dombrowski page Okafor with a “Nairobi accent.” In her notes, Pena commented as follows on that statement: “BAD for US.”
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At a minimum, Andrews’ typed statement is not all inclusive of his verbal interview.2 Instead, it is apparent that only the most favorable points of Andrews’ statement were included in the typed statement that was ultimately provided. Once again, without these notes, Plaintiffs could not effectively engage in discovery related to Andrews and Pena. Moreover, Spitzer again has failed to offer any reasonable explanation for its failure to produce the notes.
6. Giardini’s notes From the Court’s review, the most glaring failure to disclose documents involves the
notes taken by General Counsel and at one time trial counsel for Spitzer, Anthony Giardini.3 Time and again throughout discovery in this matter, Giardini and others indicated that discrimination complaints were investigated and that Giardini had taken notes during many of the interviews in these investigations. However, when the notes were requested over and over and over again during discovery, none were produced. For that matter, when Plaintiffs’ counsel requested them during Giardini’s deposition, the response from Giardini and counsel bordered on both mockery and condescension.
In that respect, Plaintiffs’ counsel inquired during Giardini’s deposition as follows: Q. And have you brought with you any documents that were created by you or maintained by you as part of that investigation? A. I haven’t brought any documents with me beyond what I had previously turned over to either the EEOC or to Chris, to Mr. Cook. Q. Are there documents responsive to number one of the duces tecum that are going to be provided today as part of the duces tecum?
2 The Court acknowledges that the Andrews’ notes do contain the seemingly-in-conflict statement that Andrews had never heard Dombrowski make a racist comment. 3 In addition to general counsel, assistant secretary, and Director, Alan Spitzer testified that Giardini at one point in time was the Chief Operating Officer for Spitzer Management.
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Mr. Cook: No. And I can explain that a little bit. First of all, I think that the documents have already been provided. I don’t believe that there are any documents that have not been provided to [Plaintiffs] throughout discovery. Giardini then affirmed that he believed that all documents that were responsive to the discovery requests had been provided. Giardini was then questioned about whether he took notes during his investigation. Q. Did you personally create any notes as part of your investigation of any of the allegations involved in this case? A. I’m sure I did. I’m sure I made notes. Q. And what did you do with those notes? A. I would have put them in the file at Spitzer Management. I know I didn’t take them with me, and I don’t have them in my office. Q. And is it your understanding that those notes have been produced? A. If they exist, they would have been produced, correct. Attorney Scully was present throughout this line of questioning during the deposition. Later on in his deposition, Giardini became combative when asked about a conversation that he had with employee Gilbert Tirado. At that juncture of the deposition, Giardini concedes that he took notes of a conversation with Tirado, a conversation in which Tirado allegedly told Giardini that Okafor and Nuriddin were complaining to other employees about discrimination. When asked why those notes were not produced, Giardini responded, “Because you didn’t ask for them.” Given the nature of the retaliation claims raised by Plaintiffs and their discovery requests, there is no reasonable, conceivable method for reaching the conclusion that the documents had not been requested. Instead, such an answer merely foreshadowed that Giardini and Spitzer would produce only those documents they wanted to produce and only at a time that was convenient for them.
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In May of 2010, Attorney Cook responded to still another request that the notes be produced as follows:
Regarding your Request For Production No. 7, I believe Mr. Giardini thoroughly addressed the issue of his notes and correspondence in his deposition. I believe his testimony was that he did not retain these documents. Again, we cannot produce that which we do not have. I can represent to you that I now have the entire file regarding this case and that no such “notes” exist. Attorney Cook’s response that “no such ‘notes’ exist” is rather curious given Giardini’s response that he was certain that he had taken notes and was simply unsure of their current location. Furthermore, given Attorney Scully’s admission, discussed below, it is clear that Attorney Cook did not have the “entire” file at the time of his response – either by virtue of failing to properly inquire or worse. In a later deposition of Giardini, the issue of his notes was yet again front and center. When asked whether he took notes regarding a statement from Ollie Wells, he responded, “I’m sure I probably did. I don’t know that I have them anymore.” That statement in and of itself is cause for concern as any such notes would have been subject to a litigation hold at the time of their creation. When asked whether the notes still existed, Giardini stated “They may exist, but I don’t know where they’re at.” Once again, Attorney Scully sat through this entire line of questioning. Near the end of this second deposition, Attorney Cook raised issues with the time being spent on the deposition. When counsel for the EEOC indicated that she had many questions left to ask, Attorney Cook suggested she should have interrupted co-counsel to preserve more time. At that time, EEOC counsel stated “I have not had an opportunity to review the 600 documents that were delivered yesterday.” Rather than being apologetic for such a tardy production of documents, Attorney Scully noted “You’d still be in the same boat if you had.” Giardini
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followed with the comment: “A deeper boat.” In hindsight, it is not surprising that Giardini and Scully were so confident that the new documents were not damaging to their defense. As has become clear, any damaging documents were simply withheld.
Perhaps what is most egregious about the failure to produce the handwritten notes is the admission by counsel, William Scully, that the notes had been in his possession throughout all of the document requests. According to Scully, he received documents from Giardini on September 5, 2008, copied the documents, and returned the originals to Giardini on September 17, 2008. Scully also admits that he attended both of Giardini’s depositions, even speaking as quoted above about the late production of documents. He overheard question after question posed to Giardini about the whereabouts of his notes. He heard Giardini state that if the notes existed, they would have been in a file at Spitzer Management, the entity Scully was representing. His defense to non-disclosure is as follows: “I had no involvement in the written discovery process. I did not identify or produce any documents pursuant to requests of the plaintiffs. I had no involvement in any discovery disputes.” It is entirely unclear to the Court how this somehow absolves Scully from his obligations as a lawyer. He admittedly entered his appearance in this matter on behalf of Spitzer Management. He received documents from a witness in the matter. He retained those documents. The fact that he or his co-counsel in the matter chose to have one set of attorneys respond to discovery did not somehow eliminate his ethical responsibility to review his file and provide responsive documents. Effectively, Scully’s affidavit establishes that he had responsive documents in his possession at every stage they were requested, but he simply failed to ever review those documents to determine if they should be provided.4
4 The Court would note that Attorney Scully was present every day during trial and apparently still never reviewed his files until the Court ordered full disclosure of all documents. At that point, he apparently “remembered” receiving files from Giardini.
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Scully’s affidavit also establishes another troubling fact. According to his affidavit, Scully returned the originals of the documents he received from Giardini to Giardini on September 17, 2008. Even after the Court’s order to produce all documents, the originals of these documents have never surfaced. This is problematic for several reasons. First and foremost, Defendants have relied heavily on the Farragher-Ellerth defense in this matter, alleging that they had a proper system in place to combat harassment and discrimination. The heart of that defense would necessarily center around how Spitzer responded to and investigated complaints of harassment and discrimination. Yet, somehow, the handwritten notes of general counsel disappeared, well after this litigation had commenced.
Even in opposition to the current motion for default judgment, Giardini continues to state that he does “not know what happened” to the notes of his meeting with Okafor. He, however, is quick to point out that any box that was returned to him from Scully would have been immediately turned over to Attorney Cook. In other words, Giardini has sworn that he turned his notes over to Attorney Cook and Attorney Scully has sworn that he has had possession of a copy of those notes for years. Yet, the notes were not produced before trial, despite repeated requests by counsel and despite their high evidentiary value to the entirety of the proceedings.
Like many of the documents described above, it is difficult to quantify the prejudice to Plaintiffs from the failure to disclose these notes. The notes include alleged comments of a discriminatory nature that were directed at Okafor, but not otherwise documented in this litigation. But perhaps more central to the claims herein, they contain statements to “pull sales record[s]” for Okafor and to “Document sales of Dean.”
As with all of the documents that Defendants failed to produce, they insist that these notes carry minimal value to Plaintiffs’ claim. They contend that all sales were tracked for all
13

employees. Again, however, they attempt to strip away all context when making such an assertion. Okafor has consistently maintained that Spitzer retaliated against him for making continuous complaints about harassment and discrimination. While Spitzer would like one to believe that the notes of its counsel are meaningless, a jury could quite easily conclude that they are evidence of such retaliation. It is not a far leap to conclude that the notes instruct employees to more closely scrutinize Okafor because of his complaints. For that matter, the Court would note that if it was the common, across-the-board practice to monitor the sales of all employees, there would be no reason for general counsel to make a note to ensure that such monitoring was being done on Okafor.
Furthermore, while the Court will reserve deciding the issue of an adverse instruction until re-trial in this matter, it is certainly possible that given the failure of the originals of these documents to be retained, a jury may be instructed to draw an adverse inference. Such an inference, coupled with the comments in these notes, could strongly support a claim of retaliation.
Additionally, Spitzer again ignores that Giardini’s notes do not solely affect Okafor’s claims. Spitzer’s primary defense relies upon a finding that it had an effective system in place to report and combat discrimination. If a jury finds that the primary cog in that system, Giardini, is prone to retaliate against those making complaints, the heart of Spitzer’s defense is suddenly non-existent. Accordingly, withholding these notes resulted in significant prejudice to all remaining Plaintiffs.
Furthermore, any evidence bearing on Giardini’s credibility or possible bias would be highly relevant to all of the claims raised by Plaintiffs. As can be seen by a review of Alan Spitzer’s deposition, nearly the entirety of the investigation and any decisions related to it were
14

run through Giardini. Time and again during his deposition, Alan Spitzer deferred to Giardini or indicated that the information would only be known to Giardini. Alan Spitzer candidly admits that “Mr. Giardini would be the person to answer [that line of questioning] because [Alan Spitzer] was relying on him to do the investigation and deal with the EEOC.” Doc. 128 at 71. At other times, Alan Spitzer responded: “I would have to ask Mr. Giardini that because he handled it, so I don’t know.” Doc. 128 at 89; “Mr. Giardini would have to answer that.” Doc. 128 at 93; and “So you relied on Mr. Giardini for everything in this case? A. More or less, yes.” Doc. 128 at 93 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the withholding of Giardini’s notes clearly resulted in substantial prejudice to all the plaintiffs in this action.
IV. Sanction Based upon the above, there is no question that Defendants and their counsel engaged in
sanctionable conduct. The failure to produce material, relevant documents for years is inexcusable. The fact that these documents were able to located in roughly 24 hours following the threat of Court sanction only serves to demonstrate how woefully inadequate Defendants’ initial search for responsive documents was at the time of the requests. By engaging in this conduct, Defendants and their counsel clearly violated the dictates of Rule 37 and fell well short of the obligations of the bar to the Court. As a result of the conduct, Plaintiffs’ counsel was deprived of the opportunity to engage in meaningful discovery depositions of Blackmur, Kim, and Giardini, at a minimum. Further, Plaintiffs’ counsel could not possibly properly prepare for trial without all this information – information that could clearly alter the entire landscape of these proceedings and the legal theories pursued during trial.
Due to Defendants’ failures, the Court was left with no choice but to declare a mistrial in this matter. No mechanism existed to undo the prejudice caused to Plaintiffs. While Defendants
15

asserted that trial could simply be broken for additional discovery and witnesses could be recalled, it is impossible to conceive of how to inform a jury of these irregularities without undue prejudice to Plaintiffs. There is no doubt that such a break and the recalling of witnesses would appear to be some form of incompetence of Plaintiffs’ counsel, when the truth would remain that the delay was the sole result of misconduct or negligence by Defendants and/or their counsel.
In candor, the Court has strongly considered default judgment in this matter. There is certainly a lingering question over how much evidence may never be produced due to either Defendants’ negligence or malfeasance. However, the Court was also able to witness the testimony of numerous Plaintiffs during the trial in this matter, and default judgment may in fact be a windfall for some if it were granted in total. Instead, the Court finds that an award of attorney fees will serve as a proper sanction. In that manner, Plaintiffs’ counsel will be made somewhat whole for all of the time that was essentially wasted in conducting discovery and trying this matter without all the facts that should have been made known to them.
The Court has carefully reviewed the fee and cost requests submitted by counsel. In that regard, the Court finds the fees to more-than-reasonable. For example, counsel for the EEOC seeks only fees for the ninety days leading up to and including trial. The EEOC does not seek fees for all of the discovery and depositions that were rendered largely meaningless by Defendants’ misconduct. The Court also finds that the rate requested by the EEOC, $350 per hour, is reasonable for this market, and that the hours requested, 140 hours, are substantially lower than the Court anticipated for preparation and trial of this matter over a three-month period. Accordingly, the EEOC is awarded fees and costs in the amount of $49,000.
The Court has also reviewed the affidavits of Attorneys Bolek, Besser, Glesius, and Royer. Similar to the EEOC, Attorney Glesius seeks fees at a rate of $350 per hour and $250 per
16

hour for fees occurred in 2010. Once again, the Court finds these hourly rates to be well within the range of reasonable. Unlike the EEOC, Glesius seeks fees dating back to 2010. As detailed above, the misconduct in this matter dates back to at least 2008. Accordingly, the Court finds that the time frame of the fee request is reasonable. Finally, the Court finds that the total hours expended by Glesius over these years, roughly 330 hours, is also well within reason given the scope and duration of this litigation. Similarly, Glesius’ one-time co-counsel, Attorney Christine Royer, seeks fees at a rate of $200 per hour for just under 110 hours. Likewise, the Court finds that the rate and the number of expended hours were reasonable. Accordingly, Plaintiff Nuriddin is awarded attorney fees in the amount of $115,395.
Attorney Matthew Besser seeks fees at $250 per hour for 115.9 hours working for Plaintiff Okafor. Similarly, Attorney Cathleen Bolek seeks fees at $350 per hour for 342.7 hours. Bolek also asserts that in total she has spent more than 570 hours on the matter and that the 342.7 hours were devoted to depositions, discovery disputes, trial preparation and trial. Once more, the Court finds that the number of hours expended and the hourly rate are reasonable for both Bolek and Besser. Accordingly, Plaintiff Okafor is awarded attorney fees in the amount of $148,920.
The Court intends that these fees will be levied against all defense counsel, including Attorney Giardini and Attorney Scully. Moreover, the award will be joint and several with each of the corporate Spitzer Defendants. As Giardini initially wore both hats, as management for Spitzer and its attorney of record, the Court cannot draw a firm line between the conduct of counsel and the parties. Moreover, it is clear from the record that even once he became solely a party representative, Giardini made no efforts to locate documents that were responsive to discovery, nor does it appear that his counsel made such efforts. The inability of counsel and the
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Spitzer corporate entities to comply with their discovery obligations has effectively set this case

back to its starting point. As a result, trial proceedings and for that matter, motion practice was

rendered largely meaningless. Plaintiffs must now engage in new discovery, again with no

guarantee that all documents have been produced, and the matter must again be tried.

Accordingly, the matter will be set for a status conference. At that time, the Court will set the

scope of future discovery. The costs and fees associated with that discovery will also be borne

entirely by the corporate Defendants and their counsel.

Finally, the Court will hold in abeyance any ruling on whether the pro hac vice status of

Attorney Griffith should be revoked.

A status conference is hereby scheduled for June 5, 2013 at 1:30 p.m.. ALL

COUNSEL AND PARTIES SHALL ATTEND. At that time, the parties should be prepared

to discuss 1) any possible resolution of this matter, 2) the scope of any discovery before retrial,

and 3) dates for a new final pretrial and trial.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: May 22, 2013

/s/ John R. Adams Judge John R. Adams UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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 Case: 1:06-cv-02337-JRA Doc #: 353 Filed: 09/12/13 1 of 12. PageID #: 7030

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT

)

OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs,

)

v.

)

)

SPITZER MANAGEMENT, INC., et al., )

)

Defendants.

)

Consolidated Case No. 1:06-CV-02337 JUDGE JOHN R. ADAMS

CONSENT DECREE

INTRODUCTION

In this consolidated Action the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the

“Commission” or “EEOC”) sued Defendants Spitzer Management, Inc. (“Spitzer Management”),

Spitzer Motor City, Inc. (“Spitzer Motor City”), and Spitzer Autoworld Cleveland, LLC.

(“Spitzer Autoworld”), for violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended

(“Title VII”). More specifically, the EEOC sued Defendants because the EEOC determined that

Defendants subjected their employees to a hostile work environment based on race, national

origin, and religion. Further, the EEOC determined that Defendants were unlawfully retaliating

against employees Hakim Nuriddin and Dean Okafor. The alleged unlawful retaliation included,

but was not limited to, Defendant Spitzer Motor City filing lawsuits against Nuriddin and Okafor

because they complained about Defendants’ discriminatory practices. Nuriddin and Okafor

(hereinafter “Plaintiff-Intervenors”) are also parties to this Action, having been granted

permission to intervene by court order.

In the interest of resolving this matter, and as a result of having engaged in

comprehensive negotiations, the EEOC, Plaintiff-Intervenors, and Defendants Spitzer

Case: 1:06-cv-02337-JRA Doc #: 353 Filed: 09/12/13 2 of 12. PageID #: 7031
Management, Spitzer Autoworld, and Spitzer Motor City (the “Parties”) have agreed that this action should be finally resolved by entry of this Decree.
This Consent Decree is entered into by all of the aforementioned Parties. This Decree shall be final and binding upon Defendants Spitzer Autoworld, Spitzer Motor City, Spitzer Management, their directors, officers, agents, employees, successors or assigns and all persons in active concert or participation with them, (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Defendants”).
The EEOC, Plaintiff-Intervenors, and Defendants agree to the entry of this Decree, which resolves claims raised in Civil Action Nos. 1:06-cv-02337, 1:08-cv-1326, and 1:08-cv-01542. Nothing in this Decree shall be construed to limit EEOC’s authority to process, investigate, or litigate any Charge of Discrimination, or other allegation, which has been, or may be, filed against Defendants or any other entity. By entering into this Decree, Defendants state that they have not admitted liability but desire to terminate this litigation and conform to the training requirements of the EEOC.
ORDER Upon consent of the parties to this action, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that: 1. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this action. 2. This Decree shall remain in full force and effect for five (5) years from the date on which the Court executed this Decree. 3. Defendants are enjoined from engaging in any employment practice which constitutes unlawful discrimination under Title VII, including subjecting employees to a hostile work environment on the basis of race, national origin, and/or religion.

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4. Defendants are enjoined from engaging in any employment practices which retaliate in any manner against any person because that person engaged in any protected activity.
5. Defendants shall not divulge, directly or indirectly, except as required by law, or in response to a lawful subpoena or other legal process, to any employer or potential employer of Toufic Hamdan, David Marek, Hakim Nuriddin, or Dean Okafor, any of the facts or circumstances related to events relating to any of the foregoing individuals’ participation in this litigation or its resolution.
6. Defendants shall comply fully with all provisions of Title VII. 7. Defendants shall provide a notice and copy of this Decree to any successors, assigns, subsidiaries, affiliates, purchasers, and to any other corporation or other entity into which Defendants may merge or consolidate, and to any other corporation or entity that purchases or acquires Defendants.
MONETARY RELIEF 8. Defendants will pay monetary relief in the total amount of $100,000.00 to satisfy claims asserted by EEOC on behalf of Charging Parties Toufic Hamdan and David Marek. The foregoing amount shall be paid in two separate payments in the amount of $50,000.00 each. The first $50,000.00 payment shall be due within fifteen days of the date upon which the Court approves and enters the parties' Consent Decree. The second $50,000.00 payment shall be made on or before October 15, 2013. Additional monetary relief paid by Defendants for claims that EEOC brought on behalf of Plaintiff-Intervenors Hakim Nurridin and Dean Okafor shall be provided directly to counsel for Plaintiff-Intervenors Nurridin and Okafor. Further, counsel for Plaintiff-Intervenors will advise Defendants with regard to all matters pertaining to the distribution of monetary relief to Plaintiff-Intervenors.

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9. The EEOC will determine what portion of the $ 100,000.00 in monetary relief to be paid to Hamdan and Marek will constitute back pay, non-economic compensatory damages, and interest. Defendants shall deduct from amounts the EEOC designates as back pay all federal, state and local income tax and Social Security withholding or other statutory amounts normally deducted from wages and shall issue IRS W-2 Forms for such payments. Defendants shall deduct nothing from amounts the EEOC designated as non-economic compensatory damages, punitive damages, and/or interest.
10. Payments made pursuant to this Decree with respect to the Hamdan and Marek shall be mailed to them by Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested, at addresses provided by the EEOC. Defendants shall also send appropriate IRS Forms, as set forth in Paragraph 9, to the EEOC’s Claimants at the addresses provided by the EEOC. At the same time Defendants issue payment and/or IRS Forms to Hamdan and Marek, Defendants shall also mail copies of the payments and IRS Forms to the EEOC. Such copies shall be mailed to Solvita A. McMillan, and Jeffrey Stern, Trial Attorneys, EEOC Cleveland Field Office, 1240 East 9th Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44199.
11. Should any check mailed to Hamdan or Marek be returned as undelivered, Defendants shall notify the EEOC immediately in writing and shall provide the EEOC with the envelope in which the check was mailed to the Claimant, along with any explanation(s) provided by the postal authorities. Defendants shall remain liable for any such undelivered payment, but after notifying the EEOC in accordance with this paragraph, may tender any such undelivered payment to Solvita A. McMillan, and Jeffrey Stern Trial Attorneys, EEOC Cleveland Field Office, 1240 East 9th Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44199.

Case: 1:06-cv-02337-JRA Doc #: 353 Filed: 09/12/13 5 of 12. PageID #: 7034
12. Upon Defendants’ failure to make payment in accordance with this Decree, Defendants shall be in default and interest shall accrue on the balance of the amounts owing pursuant to this Decree from the date of default to the time of payment at the IRS penalty rate applicable during the period of default.
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION AND ANTI-HARASSMENT POLICIES AND COMPLAINT PROCEDURES
13. Defendants shall adopt, implement, and effectively enforce written policies (“Defendants’ Policies”) prohibiting and preventing employment discrimination, including policies prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, religion, and retaliation. Such Policies shall also provide an effective complaint process concerning complaints of discrimination and the prevention of discrimination.
14. Defendants’ Policies identified in Paragraph 13 shall be distributed to all employees no later than thirty (30) days after the Court executes this Decree. Defendants shall distribute the Policies by requiring one of its management personnel to deliver the Policies, in person, directly to each worker. Defendants shall discuss the Policies with each individual and shall specifically explain to each individual that Defendants’ Policies prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, religion, and retaliation. Defendants shall also encourage employees to oppose and report unlawful discrimination and shall advise employees that Defendants prohibit retaliation against any worker who reports discrimination, opposes discrimination, or participates in any manner in an investigation of alleged discrimination.
15. Defendants shall distribute the Policies identified in Paragraph 13 to all newly hired individuals, and those who begin performing work for Defendants at a future date, on the first day that individual begins to perform work for Defendants. Defendants shall discuss the Policies with each new worker as set forth in Paragraph 14.

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16. Defendants shall retain complete records reflecting the date on which its Policies were provided to each worker, confirming that the Policies were discussed and explained to each worker, and identifying the person who provided the Policies to each worker and otherwise complied with Paragraphs 14 and 15.
17. Defendants shall ensure that their Policies are provided and explained to each worker in his or her native language, should any worker so request.
18. Defendants shall distribute their Policies to each worker in paper form. Providing notice to workers that Policies are available for review in electronic form, or that they are otherwise available at a central location, is insufficient and does not comply with this Decree.
19. No later than forty-five (45) days after the Court executes this Decree, Defendants shall provide the EEOC with written certification that Defendants have complied fully with Paragraphs 13 through 18 of this Decree.
20. On an annual basis, Defendants will send to the EEOC a complete copy of all of their Policies prohibiting discrimination, harassment, and retaliation, for the duration of this consent decree.
TRAINING 21. For the duration of this Decree, Defendants shall provide live training to all of their employees, supervisors, and managers, including managers employed at Defendants’ Elyria, Ohio headquarters office, with regard to enforcing the following: Defendants’ Policies; rights and obligations arising under Title VII with an emphasis on defining, complaining about, and preventing unlawful harassment and prohibiting retaliation; instruction on how to keep Defendants’ workplaces free from discrimination; and education about what constitutes unlawful retaliation. During each such training session, Defendants shall advise each attendee that

Case: 1:06-cv-02337-JRA Doc #: 353 Filed: 09/12/13 7 of 12. PageID #: 7036
Defendants encourage workers to oppose and complain about all forms of unlawful
discrimination and retaliation. Defendants shall state during each training session that
Defendants will not retaliate against any person who participates in any manner whatsoever in
opposing discrimination, making a discrimination complaint, and/or participating in an
investigation of discrimination. Additionally, such training shall be conducted as follows:
a. training sessions shall be conducted every twelve (12) months and shall include the redistribution of Defendants’ Policies to all attendees;
b. a member of Defendants’ upper management shall attend each entire training session and shall, during each session, orally reaffirm Defendants’ commitment to prevent and stop all discrimination in the workplace and explain the consequences for engaging in unlawful discrimination or retaliation;
c. the first training session shall take place within sixty (60) days from the entry of this Decree and, thereafter, additional sessions shall be conducted every twelve (12) months for the duration of this Decree;
d. each training session shall last a minimum of two (2) hours, one (1) hour of which shall be devoted solely to the definition of unlawful harassment, Defendants’ commitment to stop and prevent such harassment, the means by which workers may complain pursuant to Defendants’ Policies, and Defendants’ prohibition against retaliation;
e. each training session shall be recorded by videotape at Defendants’ expense and a copy of each videotaped training, which shall identify the date when the session was provided, shall be provided to the EEOC within five (5) calendar days of each training session;
f. each training session shall be conducted by a third-party trainer to which the EEOC agrees, at Defendants’ expense, to be identified by Defendants within ten (10) days of the Court’s approval and entry of this Decree; and
g. Defendants shall ensure that training is provided to each worker in his or her native language, should any worker so request.
22. Defendants shall provide the EEOC with copies of all pamphlets, brochures,
outlines or other written materials to be provided to training session attendees no later than ten
(10) calendar days before each training session.

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23. No later than thirty (30) calendar days before each training session, Defendants shall, in writing, advise EEOC Trial Attorneys Solvita A. McMillan, and Jeffrey Stern of the date, time, and location of the next scheduled training session. The EEOC may, in its discretion, attend each training session.
24. Defendants shall notify EEOC Trial Attorneys Solvita A. McMillan and Jeffrey Stern, in writing, within five (5) calendar days after each training session that the session has occurred and that the session fully complied with this Decree. Such notification shall also include: (i) the date, location, and duration of the training session; (ii) a list of attendees, which shall include the name and position of each person in attendance; and (iii) a list of all current employees, including temporary employees, as of the date of the training.
MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTABILITY 25. Defendants shall promote management and supervisor accountability concerning discrimination based on race, national origin, and religion, and concerning unlawful retaliation by: a. providing mandatory annual anti-discrimination training to all of its supervisory
and managerial personnel; b. disciplining, up to and including discharge, any supervisor or manager who
violates Defendants’ Policies or who violates Title VII; c. imposing on all managers and supervisory personnel a duty to ensure compliance
with Defendants’ Policies and with Title VII; and d. requiring all managers and supervisors to report to Defendants’ upper
management any suspected incidents of discrimination or retaliation and/or any complaints about such matters.
REPORTING 26. Every three (3) months during the course of the Decree, Defendants shall send to the EEOC a report identifying each complaint of any suspected incident of discrimination,

Case: 1:06-cv-02337-JRA Doc #: 353 Filed: 09/12/13 9 of 12. PageID #: 7038
harassment/hostile work environment, and/or retaliation during the previous three (3) months. The report shall include all such suspected incidents even if such incidents were not the subject of a complaint. With each report, Defendants shall also provide to the EEOC copies of all written complaints about discrimination, harassment/hostile work environment, and/or retaliation made during the previous three (3) months, including all attachments (or other tangible item) concerning the complaint. If a complaint is made orally, Defendants shall provide the EEOC with a complete summary of each such complaint. Further, each report shall include: the date each complaint was made; the name, job title, address, and home telephone number/s of each complainant and witness; a description of any investigation conducted by Defendants; and any action Defendants took in response to each complaint.
27. Defendants’ reports described herein shall also include Defendants’ certification that the Notice required to be posted by this Decree remained posted, as required, during the entire previous three (3) months.
28. During the course of this Decree, Defendants shall make available for interview all persons whom the EEOC identifies (whether by name, job title, or work location) and all persons whom Defendants interviewed in response to each written or oral complaint made during the course of the Decree. Further, Defendants shall permit the EEOC to enter Defendants’ premises for the purpose of interviewing any person whom EEOC identifies (whether by name, job title, or work location).
29. Nothing contained in this Decree shall be construed to limit any obligation Defendants may otherwise have under Title VII or any other law or regulation.

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POSTING OF NOTICE 30. Within ten (10) calendar days after the Court executes this Decree, Defendants shall post 8 x 11 sized laminated copies of the Notice attached as Attachment A at all of Defendants’ dealerships in locations easily accessible to all employees. Publishing of the Notice in electronic form in a forum available to workers is not sufficient and will not constitute compliance with this Paragraph. The Notice shall remain posted for five (5) years from the date the Court executes this Decree. Defendants shall provide a copy of the Notice and an indication of the date and location(s) of its posting(s), in writing, to EEOC Trial Attorneys Solvita A. McMillan and Jeffrey Stern no later than five (5) calendar days after such Notices have been posted. Defendants shall permit an EEOC representative to enter Defendants’ premises for purposes of verifying compliance with this Paragraph at any time during normal business hours. Defendants shall take all reasonable steps to ensure that the posting(s) are/is not altered, defaced or covered by any other material. Should the posted Notice(s) become defaced, removed, marred, or otherwise illegible, Defendants agrees to post a legible copy in the manner described herein.
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 31. Defendants will satisfy the $49,000.00 in monetary sanctions awarded to the EEOC pursuant to the Court's May 22, 2013 Order by making payment in full to the U.S. Treasury on or before March 31, 2014. The foregoing extension of time to make the sanctions payment is subject to the Court's approval. 32. This Consent Decree shall be filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio and shall continue to be in effect for a period of five (5) years after the Court executes the Decree.

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33. The Court retains jurisdiction over this case in order to enforce the terms of the

Consent Decree.

ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANTS SPITZER AUTOWORLD, LLC. SPITZER MOTOR CITY, INC. SPITZER MANAGEMENT, INC.

ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFFF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
DEBRA LAWRENCE REGIONAL ATTORNEY

KATE NORTHRUP SUPERVISORY TRIAL ATTORNEY

/s/ D. Christopher Cook D. CHRISTOPHER COOK (0061073) 520 Broadway 3rd Floor Lorain, Ohio 44052 Tel: (440) 246-2665 Fax: (440)246-2670 cooklaw@centurytel.net FOR THE SPITZER DEFENDANTS

/s/ Solvita A. McMillan SOLVITA A. MCMILLAN (0040011) Trial Attorney EEOC Cleveland Field Office AJC Federal Building 1240 East 9th Street, Room 3001 Cleveland, Ohio 44199 Tel: (216)522-7676 Fax: (216)522-7430 solvita.mcmillan@eeoc.gov

date: September 12, 2013

APPROVED AND ENTERED
__s_/J_o_h_n__R_._A_d_a_m__s__________________________ JUDGE JOHN R. ADAMS UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case: 1:06-cv-02337-JRA Doc #: 353 Filed: 09/12/13 12 of 12. PageID #: 7041
ATTACHMENT A NOTICE TO ALL SPITZER ORGANIZATION EMPLOYEES
This Notice is posted pursuant to a Consent Decree entered by the United States District Court, Northern District of Ohio in EEOC, et al. v. Spitzer Management, Inc., et al., Case No. 1:06-cv-02337, concerning lawsuits filed by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) against various Spitzer organization entities (“Spitzer”).
In the lawsuits, the EEOC alleged that Spitzer discriminated against its employees based on race, national origin, and religion and alleged that Spitzer retaliated against employees who complained about discrimination or otherwise engaged in protected conduct.
Title VII is a federal law that prohibits employers from discriminating based on race, color, sex, religion or national origin. Title VII also prohibits retaliation against employees or applicants who exercise their rights under Title VII. For example, an employer cannot retaliate against an employee who complains about employment practices that he or she believes are discriminatory, who files a Charge of Discrimination, or who testifies and/or participates in an internal investigation or in an EEOC investigation. The EEOC investigates charges of unlawful employment discrimination. The EEOC has authority to bring lawsuits in federal court to enforce Title VII.
Spitzer, the EEOC, and individuals who intervened in the lawsuits have entered into a Consent Decree which provides, among other things, that: (1) Spitzer will pay in excess of $ 100,000,00 in monetary relief to discrimination victims; (2) Spitzer will adopt and vigorously enforce policies prohibiting discrimination and will create effective procedures for employees to report discrimination; (3) Spitzer will not discriminate based on race, color, sex, religion, or national origin; (4) Spitzer will not retaliate against any person because he or she engaged in protected activity; and (5) Spitzer will train all employees concerning its policies prohibiting discrimination and concerning federal anti-discrimination laws.
If you believe you have been discriminated against, you may contact the EEOC at (216) 522-7455. The EEOC charges no fees and has employees who speak languages other than English. This Notice must remain posted for five (5) years from the date below and must not be altered, defaced or covered by any other material. Any questions about this Notice or compliance with its terms may be directed to Solvita A. McMillan, and Jeffrey Stern, Trial Attorneys, EEOC Cleveland Field Office, AJC Federal Office Building, 1240 East Ninth Street, Suite 3001, Cleveland, Ohio 44199.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
Dated:
______________________________ [INSERT NAME AND JOB TITLE] On behalf of SPITZER

 
 Case: 1:06-cv-2337 As of: 05/30/2018 09:27 PM EDT 1 of 32
Cat03,Complex,Lead,Limbert,Termed
U.S. District Court Northern District of Ohio (Cleveland) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:06−cv−02337−JRA

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Spitzer Management, Inc. Assigned to: Judge John R. Adams Cause: 28:451 Employment Discrimination
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 09/27/2006 Date Terminated: 10/03/2013 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Plaintiff

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission TERMINATED: 09/12/2013

represented by Jacqueline H. McNair U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission − Philadelphia Ste. 1300 801 Market Street Philadelphia, PA 19107 215−440−2666 Fax: 215−440−2674 Email: jacqueline.mcnair@eeoc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Solvita A. McMillan 17904 Lake Road Lakewood, OH 44107 216−228−8622 Email: scottsolvita@gmail.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

C. Larry Watson U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission − Cleveland 3001 AJC Federal Bldg. 1240 East Ninth Street Cleveland, OH 44199 216−522−7455 Fax: 216−522−7430 Email: larry.watson@eeoc.gov TERMINATED: 02/03/2010

Donna L. Williams−Alexander U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission − Cleveland 3001 AJC Federal Bldg. 1240 East Ninth Street Cleveland, OH 44199 216−522−7454 Fax: 216−522−7430 Email: Donna.Williams−Alexander@eeoc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Judith A. O'Boyle U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission − Philadelphia Ste. 1300 801 Market Street Philadelphia, PA 19107 215−440−2669 Fax: 215−440−2848 Email: judith.oboyle@eeoc.gov

Case: 1:06-cv-2337 As of: 05/30/2018 09:27 PM EDT 2 of 32

TERMINATED: 02/03/2010

Lawrence Mays 3rd Floor 3751 Prospect Avenue East Cleveland, OH 44115 216−658−6870 Fax: 216−658−8971 Email: Lawrence.Mays@lmayslaw.com TERMINATED: 02/03/2010

M. Jean Clickner U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission − Pittsburgh Ste. 1112 1000 Liberty Avenue Pittsburgh, PA 15222 412−395−5843 Fax: 412−395−5749 Email: jean.clickner@eeoc.gov TERMINATED: 05/13/2009

Plaintiff/Intervenor
Dean Okafor TERMINATED: 08/02/2013

represented by Cathleen M. Bolek Bolek Besser Glesius 302 Monarch Centre 5885 Landerbrook Drive Cleveland, OH 44124 216−464−3004 Fax: 866−542−0743 Email: CBolek@Bolekbesser.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amy S. Glesius Bolek Besser Glesius 302 Monarch Centre 5885 Landerbrook Drive Cleveland, OH 44124 216−464−3004 Fax: 866−542−0743 Email: aglesius@bolekbesser.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carole A. Lohr Bolek Besser Glesius 302 Monarch Centre 5885 Landerbrook Drive Cleveland, OH 44124 216−464−3004 Fax: 866−542−0743 Email: clohr@boleklaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew D. Besser Bolek Besser Glesius 302 Monarch Centre 5885 Landerbrook Drive Cleveland, OH 44124 216−464−3004 Fax: 866−542−0743 Email: mbesser@bolekbesser.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:06-cv-2337 As of: 05/30/2018 09:27 PM EDT 3 of 32

Plaintiff/Intervenor
Hakim Nurridin Plaintiff in consoidated case 1:09cv255

represented by Amy S. Glesius (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christina M. Royer Elfvin, Klingshirn, Royer & Torch Ste. 530 4700 Rockside Road Independence, OH 44131 216−382−2500 Fax: 216−381−0250 Email: chris@ekrtlaw.com TERMINATED: 02/01/2010

V. Defendant Spitzer Management, Inc. doing business as Spitzer Motor City, Inc
Defendant Spitzer Motor City, Inc.

represented by D. Christopher Cook Giardini, Poplar & Mason − Lorain 3rd Floor 520 Broadway Avenue Lorain, OH 44052 440−246−2665 Fax: 440−246−2670 Email: cooklaw@centurytel.net LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia G. Griffith Ford & Harrison − Atlanta Ste. 1900 271 Seventeenth Street, NW Atlanta, GA 30363 404−888−3800 Fax: 404−888−3863 Email: pgriffith@fordharrison.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Anthony B. Giardini Giardini, Poplar & Mason − Lorain 3rd Floor 520 Broadway Avenue Lorain, OH 44052 440−984−7012 Fax: 440−246−2670 Email: abglaw@yahoo.com TERMINATED: 03/01/2010
William F. Scully , Jr. Coakley Lammert Ste. 1314 1100 Superior Avenue, E Cleveland, OH 44114 216−278−7100 Fax: 216−777−1131 Email: bill@coakleylammert.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by

Case: 1:06-cv-2337 As of: 05/30/2018 09:27 PM EDT 4 of 32

D. Christopher Cook (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia G. Griffith (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Anthony B. Giardini (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/01/2010

Defendant Rex Davidson

represented by D. Christopher Cook (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia G. Griffith (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Anthony B. Giardini (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/01/2010

Defendant Mitchell Mincy

represented by D. Christopher Cook (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia G. Griffith (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Anthony B. Giardini (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/01/2010

Defendant Alan Spitzer

represented by D. Christopher Cook (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia G. Griffith (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Anthony B. Giardini (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/01/2010

Defendant
Spitzer Autoworld Cleveland, LLC. Defendant in consolidated case

represented by D. Christopher Cook (See above for address)

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1:08cv1326

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia G. Griffith (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Special Master David Rosenblum Cohen

represented by David Rosenblum Cohen Law Office of David R. Cohen Ste. 300 24400 Chagrin Blvd. Cleveland, OH 44122 216−831−0001 Fax: 866−357−3535 Email: david@davidrcohen.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 09/27/2006
09/27/2006 09/27/2006 09/27/2006 11/14/2006 11/30/2006 12/01/2006
01/16/2007 01/18/2007 01/19/2007 01/19/2007
06/15/2007

# Docket Text
1 Complaint with jury demand against Spitzer Management, Inc.dba Spitzer Motor City, Inc. ( Filing fee 350 receipt number EXEMPT.). Filed by United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet)(McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 09/27/2006)
Judge Ann Aldrich assigned to case. (C, BA) (Entered: 09/27/2006)
Random Assignment of Magistrate Judge pursuant to Local Rule 3.1. In the event of a referral, case will be assigned to Magistrate Judge Hemann. (C, BA) (Entered: 09/27/2006)
2 Magistrate Consent Form issued to counsel. (C, BA) (Entered: 09/27/2006)
3 Waiver of Summons by Anythony B. Giardini as attorney for Spitzer Management returned. Waiver mailed on 10/2/06 filed by all plaintiffs (McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 11/14/2006)
4 Answer to Complaint (Related Doc # 1 ) filed by Spitzer Management, Inc.. (Giardini, Anthony) (Entered: 11/30/2006)
5 Case Management Conference Scheduling Order with case management conference to be held on 1/19/2007 at 11:30 AM at Chambers 17B before Hon. Ann Aldrich.. Signed by Judge Ann Aldrich on 12/1/06. (Attachments: # 1 Position Statement)(K, V) (Entered: 12/01/2006)
6 Report of Parties' Planning Meeting. Parties do not consent to this case being assigned to the magistrate judge. filed by all parties. (McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 01/16/2007)
7 Motion to attend Case Management Conference by telephone filed by Spitzer Management, Inc.. (Giardini, Anthony) (Entered: 01/18/2007)
Order [non−document]granting defendants's motion to attend Conference set for 1−19−07 by telephone (Related Doc # 7 ). Signed by Judge Ann Aldrich on 1−19−07.(K,V) (Entered: 01/19/2007)
8 Minutes of proceedings.Case Management ConferencePlan Order. Conference held on 1−19−07 before Judge Ann Aldrich. Case is on the Complex track. Discovery due by 12/31/2008.,Parties to be Joined and Pleading Amendments due by 6/29/2007,,Dispositive Motions due by 5/1/2009,,Jury Trial set for 9/28/2009 09:00 AM in Courtroom 17B before Hon. Ann Aldrich. (Court Reporter none.) (K,V) (Entered: 01/19/2007)
9 Attorney Appearance for Lawrence Mays, Senior Trial Attorney, EEOC by Solvita A. McMillan filed by on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

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06/25/2007
07/02/2007 08/10/2007 08/10/2007 11/29/2007 03/04/2008
08/29/2008 09/03/2008 09/19/2008 09/22/2008
11/14/2008 01/08/2009 01/15/2009
01/16/2009 01/16/2009 01/28/2009 01/30/2009

(McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 06/15/2007)
10 Motion for leave to File Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, with Memorandum in Support filed by all plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Official Custodian of Records# 2 Declaration of Teresa Personen# 3 Amended Complaint and Jury Demand)(Mays, Lawrence) Modified text on 6/28/2007 (C, Br). (Entered: 06/25/2007)
11 Notice of Service by Defendant of Discovery on Plaintiff filed by all defendants (Giardini, Anthony) Modified wording of text on 7/10/2007 (C, Br). (Entered: 07/02/2007)
Order [non−document]granting Plaintiff's motion for leave to file amended complaint (Related Doc # 10 ). Judge Ann Aldrich(K,V) (Entered: 08/10/2007)
12 Amended complaint with jury demand against Spitzer Management, Inc.. Filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (K,V) Modified docket text on 8/14/2007 (R, N). (Entered: 08/10/2007)
13 Subpoena Returned Executed; served upon James L. Dombrowski by Personal on 11/28/07 filed on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 11/29/2007)
Pursuant to General Order 2008−06, and in order to facilitate the efficient and timely administration of justice, Magistrate Judge Patricia A. Hemann (who retired effective February 29, 2008) is withdrawn and Magistrate Judge Gregory A. White is assigned. Random Assignment of Magistrate Judge pursuant to Local Rule 3.1. In the event of a referral, case will be assigned to Magistrate Judge White. (K,K) (Entered: 03/04/2008)
14 Joint Motion to consolidate cases filed by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 08/29/2008)
Order [non−document]denying as moot Motion to consolidate cases (Related Doc # 14 ). Judge Ann Aldrich(K,V) (Entered: 09/03/2008)
15 Joint Motion to consolidate cases 1:06CV2337 and 1:08CV01542 filed by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 09/19/2008)
16 Marginal Entry Order Granting re 15 Joint Motion to consolidate case 1:06CV2337 as the lead case with 1:08cv1326 and 1:08CV01542 filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Judge Ann Aldrich on 9/22/08. (E,P) Modified text on 9/22/2008 (E,P). (Entered: 09/22/2008)
17 Attorney Appearance by Judith A. O'Boyle filed by on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (O'Boyle, Judith) (Entered: 11/14/2008)
18 Attorney Appearance by D. Christopher Cook filed by on behalf of all defendants. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 01/08/2009)
19 Subpoena Returned Executed; served upon T.J. Maxx Department Store; Serpentini Chevrolet, formerly Royal Chevrolet; Bally Total Fitness; Schwebel Bread; Cracker Barrel by certified mail, return receipt requested on 1/10/09 filed on behalf of all defendants (Cook, D.) (Entered: 01/15/2009)
20 Subpoena Returned Executed; served upon Manpower Personnel Services; Main Street Grill; Holiday Inn Select by certified mail, return receipt requested on 1/12/09 filed on behalf of all defendants (Cook, D.) (Entered: 01/16/2009)
21 Subpoena Returned Executed; served upon Vector Marketing; Best Buy; UPS; Brandywine by certified mail, return receipt requested on 1/13/09 filed on behalf of all defendants (Cook, D.) (Entered: 01/16/2009)
22 Subpoena Returned Executed; served upon Adecco Personnel Services by certified mail return receipt requested on 01/22/09 filed on behalf of all defendants (Cook, D.) (Entered: 01/28/2009)
23 Motion to intervene as a party and Memorandum in Support filed by Dean Okafor and Hakim Nuriddin. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2−1, # 3 Exhibit 2−2, # 4 Exhibit 2−3, # 5 Exhibit 3, # 6 Exhibit 4, # 7 Exhibit 5, # 8 Exhibit 6−1, # 9 Exhibit

Case: 1:06-cv-2337 As of: 05/30/2018 09:27 PM EDT 7 of 32

02/09/2009 02/24/2009 03/12/2009 03/16/2009 03/18/2009
05/08/2009 05/12/2009 06/05/2009 06/10/2009 06/10/2009 06/10/2009 06/10/2009 06/10/2009 09/10/2009 09/10/2009

6−2, # 10 Exhibit 7)(Glesius, Amy) Modified filers on 2/2/2009 (B,IE). (Entered: 01/30/2009)
24 Attorney Appearance by M. Jean Clickner filed by on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (E,P) (Entered: 02/09/2009)
25 Memorandum and Order granting motion to intervene as to parties Dean Okafor and Hakim Nuriddin as intervening plaintiffs (Related Doc # 23 ). Judge Ann Aldrich on 2−24−09.(K,V) (Entered: 02/24/2009)
26 Intervenor's complaint, filed by Dean Okafor, Hakim Nurridin. (Glesius, Amy) (Entered: 03/12/2009)
27 Joint Motion for extension of Non−Expert and Expert Discovery until September 30, 2009 and November 16, 2009 filed by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 03/16/2009)
Order [non−document]granting (27) joint motion to extend deadlines and trial date. non−expert discovery due 9/30/09; expert discovery due by 11/16/2009; Dispositive Motions due by 1/8/2010; Jury Trial reset for 5/3/2010 09:00 AM in Courtroom 17B before Judge Ann Aldrich. Associated Cases: 1:06−cv−02337−AA, 1:08−cv−01326−AA, 1:08−cv−01542−AA. Approved by Judge Ann Aldrich(K,V) (Entered: 03/18/2009)
28 Amended Intervenor's complaint with jury demand adding new party defendants Rex Davidson and Mitchell Mincy, filed by Dean Okafor, Hakim Nurridin. (Glesius, Amy) Modified text on 5/13/2009 (B,B). (Entered: 05/08/2009)
29 Notice of withdrawal of counsel filed by M. Jean Clickner on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Associated Cases: 1:06−cv−02337−AA, 1:08−cv−01326−AA, 1:08−cv−01542−AA(Clickner, M.) Modified text on 5/13/2009 (B,B). (Entered: 05/12/2009)
30 Combined Answer to 28 Intervenor's complaint filed by Rex Davidson, Mitchell Mincy, Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc.. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 06/05/2009)
31 Attorney Appearance filed by Christina M. Royer on behalf of Hakim Nurridin. Associated Cases: 1:06−cv−02337−AA, 1:08−cv−01326−AA, 1:08−cv−01542−AA(Royer, Christina) Modified text on 6/10/2009 (B,B). (Entered: 06/10/2009)
32 Waiver of Service Returned Executed by Hakim Nurridin. Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc., Rex Davidson, Mitchell Mincy waivers sent on 5/8/2009, answers due 7/7/2009. filed on behalf of Hakim Nurridin (Royer, Christina) Modified text on 6/10/2009 (B,B). (Entered: 06/10/2009)
33 FILING ERROR: Waiver of Service Returned Executed by Hakim Nurridin. Rex Davidson waiver sent on 5/8/2009, answer due 7/7/2009. filed on behalf of Hakim Nurridin (Royer, Christina) Modified text on 6/10/2009 (B,B). (Duplicate entry, please see Document #32) (Entered: 06/10/2009)
34 FILING ERROR: Waiver of Service Returned Executed by Hakim Nurridin. Mitchell Mincy waiver sent on 5/8/2009, answer due 7/7/2009. filed on behalf of Hakim Nurridin (Royer, Christina) Modified text on 6/10/2009 (B,B). (Triplicate entry, please see Document #32) (Entered: 06/10/2009)
35 FILING ERROR: Waiver of Service Returned Executed by Hakim Nurridin. Spitzer Motor City, Inc. waiver sent on 5/8/2009, answer due 7/7/2009. filed on behalf of Hakim Nurridin (Royer, Christina) Modified text on 6/10/2009 (B,B). (Quadruplicate entry, please see Document #32) (Entered: 06/10/2009)
36 Motion for extension of non−exert discovery until 11/30/2009, Motion for leave to Plead filed by Rex Davidson, Mitchell Mincy, Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc.. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 09/10/2009)
37 Defendants' Combined Answer to Complaint to Case No. 1:09cv00255 Consolidated Herein filed by Rex Davidson, Mitchell Mincy, Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc.. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 09/10/2009)

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09/11/2009
11/24/2009 11/25/2009 12/07/2009 12/08/2009 12/21/2009 12/21/2009 12/28/2009
12/28/2009
12/28/2009
01/05/2010
01/22/2010 01/25/2010 01/29/2010

Order [non−document] granting 36 Motion for leave and 36 Motion to Extend Deadlines as follows: Non−expert discovery due 11/30/09, Expert discovery due 1/15/10, and Dispositive Motions due by 3/8/2010. Jury Trial reset for 7/12/2010 at 01:30 PM in Courtroom 17B before Judge Ann Aldrich. Approved by Judge Ann Aldrich on 9/11/09.(K,K) (Entered: 09/11/2009)
38 Joint Motion to Approve Stipulation Regarding Discovery filed by Rex Davidson, Mitchell Mincy, Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc., Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Hakim Nurridin, Dean Okafor. (McMillan, Solvita) Modified text 11/25/2009 (K,K). (Entered: 11/24/2009)
Order [non−document] granting Motion to Approve Stipulation Regarding Discovery (Related Doc # 38) in case 1:06−cv−02337−AA. Approved by Judge Ann Aldrich on 11/25/09. Associated Cases: 1:08−cv−01326−AA and 1:08−cv−01542−AA.(K,K) (Entered: 11/25/2009)
39 Notice to take Deposition of Toufic Hamdan on December 11, 2009 filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 12/07/2009)
40 Attorney Appearance of Carole Lohr filed by Cathleen M. Bolek on behalf of Dean Okafor. (Bolek, Cathleen) Modified text on 12/8/2009 (B,B). (Entered: 12/08/2009)
41 Notice of Service of Defendants' Answers to Plaintiff, EEOC's First Set of Interrogatories on 12/21/2009 filed by Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc.. (Cook, D.) Modified text on 12/23/2009 (B,B). (Entered: 12/21/2009)
42 Unsigned Notice of Service of Defendants' Answers to Plaintiff, Hakim Nuriddin's First Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents on 12/21/2009 filed by Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc.. (Cook, D.) Modified text on 12/23/2009 (B,B). (Entered: 12/21/2009)
43 Notice of Service of First Set of Combined Interrogatories, Requests for Admissions and Requests for Production of Documents upon Plaintiff EEOC on 12/28/2009 filed by Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc., and non−party Spitzer Autoworld Cleveland, LLC. (Cook, D.) Modified text on 12/30/2009 (B,B). (Entered: 12/28/2009)
44 Notice of Service of First Set of Combined Interrogatories, Requests for Admissions and Requests for Production of Documents upon Intervening Plaintiff, Dean Okafor on 12/28/2009 filed by Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc., and non−party Spitzer Autoworld Cleveland, LLC. (Cook, D.) Modified text on 12/30/2009 (B,B). (Entered: 12/28/2009)
45 Notice of Service of First Set of Combined Interrogatories, Requests for Admissions and Requests for Production of Documents upon Intervening Plaintiff Hakim Nuriddin on 12/28/2009 filed by Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc., and non−party Spitzer Autoworld Cleveland, LLC. (Cook, D.) Modified text on 12/30/2009 (B,B). (Entered: 12/28/2009)
46 Subpoenas returned executed; servied upon Alawy Alawi by regular mail on 12/15/2009, Michael Blackmur, Robert Rex Davidson, and Tracy Graham by priority mail on 12/15/2009, Michael Procaccini and Kevin Szatala by priority mail on 12/18/2009 filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (McMillan, Solvita) Modified text on 1/6/2010 (B,B). (Entered: 01/05/2010)
47 Notice of Service of employment files of Alawy Ali, Kevin Szatala, Ester Kim, and Mitch Mincey on 1/22/2010 filed by Spitzer Management, Inc.. Associated Cases: 1:06−cv−02337−AA, 1:08−cv−01326−AA, 1:08−cv−01542−AA(Cook, D.) Modified text on 1/25/2010 (B,B). (Entered: 01/22/2010)
48 Notice of Service Objections and Responses to Requests for Admissions on 1/25/2010 filed by Dean Okafor. Associated Cases: 1:06−cv−02337−AA, 1:08−cv−01326−AA, 1:08−cv−01542−AA(Lohr, Carole); by (s/Cathleen Bolek) Modified text on 1/26/2010 (B,B). (Entered: 01/25/2010)
49 Motion by Christina M. Royer to withdraw as attorney filed by Intervenor Hakim Nurridin. Associated Cases: 1:06−cv−02337−AA, 1:08−cv−01326−AA, 1:08−cv−01542−AA(Royer, Christina) Modified text on 1/29/2010 (B,B). (Entered:

Case: 1:06-cv-2337 As of: 05/30/2018 09:27 PM EDT 9 of 32

02/01/2010 02/03/2010 02/05/2010 02/10/2010 02/11/2010 02/15/2010 02/15/2010 02/16/2010
02/16/2010
02/23/2010 02/25/2010 02/25/2010 03/01/2010 03/05/2010

01/29/2010)
Order [non−document] granting Motion to withdraw as attorney, attorney Christina M. Royer removed from case. (Related Doc # 49 ). Approved by Judge Ann Aldrich on 2/1/10.(K,K) (Entered: 02/01/2010)
50 Notice of Withdrawal of Appearance of Counsel filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Associated Cases: 1:06−cv−02337−AA, 1:08−cv−01326−AA, 1:08−cv−01542−AA(McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 02/03/2010)
51 Notice to take Deposition of Anthony B. Giardini, Esq. on February 26, 2010 at 9:30 am filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Associated Cases: 1:06−cv−02337−AA, 1:08−cv−01326−AA, 1:08−cv−01542−AA(McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 02/05/2010)
52 Notice of Service of the employment file of Rex Davidson on 2/11/2010 filed by Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc.. (Cook, D.) Modified text on 2/12/2010 (B,B). (Entered: 02/10/2010)
53 Joint Motion to continue Discovery filed by Rex Davidson, Mitchell Mincy, Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc., Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Hakim Nurridin, Dean Okafor. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 02/11/2010)
54 Motion for extension of Dispositive Motion deadline until April 16, 2010 filed by Rex Davidson, Mitchell Mincy, Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc.. (Cook, D.) Modified text on 2/16/2010 (B,B). (Entered: 02/15/2010)
55 Motion for attorney Patricia Griffith to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0647−3956996, filed by Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate Good Standing)(Cook, D.) (Entered: 02/15/2010)
Order [non−document]granting Motion for appearance pro hac vice by attorney Patricia G. Griffith for Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc. Judge Ann Aldrich (Related Doc # 55 ) Associated Cases: 1:06−cv−02337−AA, 1:08−cv−01326−AA, 1:08−cv−01542−AA(K,V) Modified text on 2/17/2010 (B,B). (Entered: 02/16/2010)
Order [non−document]granting Motion to continue (Related Doc # 53 ); granting 54 Motion to Extend Deadlines; in case 1:06−cv−02337−AA Discovery due by 3/12/2010. Dispositive Motions due by 4/16/2010,Associated Cases: 1:06−cv−02337−AA, 1:08−cv−01326−AA, 1:08−cv−01542−AA(K,V)Judge Ann Aldrich (Entered: 02/16/2010)
56 Subpoena Returned Executed; served upon Anthony B. Giardini by Regular U.S. Mail on 02/04/2010 filed on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Associated Cases: 1:06−cv−02337−AA, 1:08−cv−01326−AA, 1:08−cv−01542−AA(McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 02/23/2010)
57 Motion for partial protective order or, alternatively, to quash filed by Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Subpoena)(Giardini, Anthony); by (s/Patricia G. Griffith) Modified text on 3/5/2010 (B,B). (Entered: 02/25/2010)
58 Motion by Anthony B. Giardini to withdraw as attorney for Defendants filed by Rex Davidson, Mitchell Mincy, Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc.. (Giardini, Anthony) (Entered: 02/25/2010)
Order [non−document] granting Motion to withdraw as attorney, attorney Anthony B. Giardini removed from case. (Related Doc # 58 ). Approved by Judge Ann Aldrich on 3/1/10.(K,K) (Entered: 03/01/2010)
59 Motion for leave to file Amended Complaint filed by Hakim Nurridin, Dean Okafor. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A Notice of Charge, # 2 Exhibit B Notice of Charge, # 3 Exhibit C Complaint, # 4 Exhibit D Discovery Response, # 5 Exhibit E Transcript, # 6 Exhibit F Amended Complaint)(Bolek, Cathleen) Modified text on 3/10/2010 (B,B). (Entered: 03/05/2010)

Case: 1:06-cv-2337 As of: 05/30/2018 09:27 PM EDT 10 of 32

03/08/2010 03/10/2010
03/10/2010
03/12/2010 03/12/2010 03/15/2010
03/16/2010 03/16/2010 03/16/2010 03/16/2010 03/17/2010
03/17/2010 03/18/2010 03/18/2010 03/19/2010

60 Motion for a 10 day leave until 3/17/2010 to Respond to Plaintiff Intervenors Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint filed by Rex Davidson, Mitchell Mincy, Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc.. (Cook, D.) Modified text on 3/10/2010 (B,B). (Entered: 03/08/2010)
Order [non−document]granting Defendants' motion for leave to respond to plaintiff−intervenors' motion for leave to file amended complaint until 3/17/2010 (Related Doc # 60 ) Associated Cases: 1:06−cv−02337−AA, 1:08−cv−01326−AA, 1:08−cv−01542, 09−cv−00255. Judge Ann Aldrich(K,V) Modified text on 3/10/2010 (B,B). (Entered: 03/10/2010)
61 Unopposed Motion for extension of Time to File Memorandum in Opposition to Spitzer Defendants' Motion for Partial Protective Order, or, Alternatively, to Quash until March 19, 2010 filed by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Associated Cases: 1:06−cv−02337−AA, 1:08−cv−01326−AA, 1:08−cv−01542−AA, 1:09−cv−00255−AA(McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 03/10/2010)
Order [non−document]granting 61 Plaintiff's unopposed motion to extend deadlines until 3/19/10 for filing opposition to Spitzer Defendants' motion for partial protective order or to quash. Judge Ann Aldrich (K,V) Modified text on 3/12/2010 (B,B). (Entered: 03/12/2010)
62 FILING ERROR. Attorney to re−file Motion. Motion for conference/hearing filed by Intervenor Hakim Nurridin. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Correspondence of 12−31−2009, # 2 Exhibit Correspondence of 1−25−2010, # 3 Exhibit Correspondence of 2−16−2010)(Glesius, Amy) Modified on 3/15/2010 (B,R). (Entered: 03/12/2010)
63 Motion for discovery conference (re−filed Document No. 62) filed by Intervenor Hakim Nurridin. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Correspondence of December 31, 2009, # 2 Exhibit Correspondence of January 25, 2010, # 3 Exhibit Correspondence of February 16, 2010)(Glesius, Amy) Modified text on 3/16/2010 (B,B). (Entered: 03/15/2010)
Order [non−document] granting Motion for discovery conference (Related Doc # 63 ). This issue will be referred to Magistrate Judge Greg White for resolution. Judge Ann Aldrich(K,V) Modified text on 3/23/2010 (B,IE). (Entered: 03/16/2010)
64 Order referring case to Magistrate Judge Greg White to conduct a discovery conference. Judge Ann Aldrich on 3/16/2010. (K,V) (Entered: 03/16/2010)
Notice of Hearing [non−document]. In−person Discovery Dispute Conference set for 3/19/2010 at 10:00 a.m. in Chambers 11B before Magistrate Judge Greg White. Counsel shall be prepared to discuss all outstanding discovery issues. (Related document(s) 63 , 64 ) (S,S) (Entered: 03/16/2010)
Notice of Hearing [non−document]. Discovery Dispute Conference rescheduled (upon request of counsel) for 3/19/2010 at 1:00 p.m. in Chambers 11B before Magistrate Judge Greg White. (S,S) (Entered: 03/16/2010)
65 Address Change Notice filed by Patricia G. Griffith on behalf of non−party Spitzer Autoworld Cleveland, LLC., Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc.. Associated Cases: 1:06−cv−02337−AA, 1:08−cv−01326−AA, 1:08−cv−01542−AA, 1:09−cv−00255−AA(Griffith, Patricia) Modified text on 3/18/2010 (B,B). (Entered: 03/17/2010)
66 Response to 59 Hakim Nurridin's and Dean Okafor's Motion for leave to file Amended Complaint filed by Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc.. (Griffith, Patricia) Modified text on 3/18/2010 (B,B). (Entered: 03/17/2010)
67 Notice of Service of Discovery Responses on 3/18/2010 filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) Modified text on 3/19/2010 (B,B). (Entered: 03/18/2010)
68 Notice of Service of Discovery Responses filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 03/18/2010)
69 Joint Opposition to 57 Motion for protective order or, alternatively, to quash, filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Hakim Nurridin, Dean Okafor. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F)(Bolek, Cathleen) Modified text on 3/19/2010 (B,B). (Entered:

Case: 1:06-cv-2337 As of: 05/30/2018 09:27 PM EDT 11 of 32

03/22/2010 03/24/2010
03/24/2010
03/24/2010 04/01/2010 04/05/2010 04/08/2010 04/08/2010 04/08/2010 04/09/2010
04/12/2010
05/06/2010 05/06/2010 05/06/2010

03/19/2010)
70 Minutes of proceedings before Magistrate Judge Greg White. Discovery Dispute Conference held on 3/19/2010. (Court Reporter: none.) (Time: 3 hrs., 45 mins.) (S,S) (Entered: 03/22/2010)
71 Joint Motion for extension of Discovery cut−off until May, 7, 2010 and Dispositive Motion cut−off until May 28, 2010 filed by Rex Davidson, Mitchell Mincy, Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc., Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Hakim Nurridin, Dean Okafor. (Cook, D.) Modified text on 3/24/2010 (B,B). (Entered: 03/24/2010)
Order [non−document] granting 71 motion to extend deadlines in Case No. 1:06cv2337; Discovery due by 5/7/2010. Dispositive Motions due by 5/28/2010, responses by 6/18/20 and replies if any, by 6/25/2010. Jury Trial reset for 9/27/2010 at 01:00 PM in Courtroom 17B before Judge Ann Aldrich. Approved by Judge Ann Aldrich on 3−24−2010.Associated Cases: 1:06−cv−02337−AA, 1:08−cv−01326−AA, 1:08−cv−01542−AA, 1:09−cv−00255−AA(K,V) Modified text and links on 3/24/2010 (B,B). (Entered: 03/24/2010)
72 Motion to Amend Defendants' Response to Plaintiff−Intervenors' Motion to Amend Complaint filed by Rex Davidson, Mitchell Mincy, Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc.. (Cook, D.) Modified text on 4/1/2010 (B,B). (Entered: 03/24/2010)
Order [non−document]granting motion for order to amend defendants' response to plaintiff−intervenors' motion to amend complaint(Related Doc # 72 ), Judge Ann Aldrich (K,V) (Entered: 04/01/2010)
73 Notice of Service of First Supplemental Discovery Documents on 4/5/2010 filed by Spitzer Management, Spitzer Motor City, Inc., an d non−party Spitzer Autoworld Cleveland, LLC. (Cook, D.) Modified text on 4/6/2010 (B,B). (Entered: 04/05/2010)
74 Memorandum Opinion and Order denying motion for a protective order or, alternatively, to quash filed by defendants Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc., Rex Davidson, and Mitchell Mincy (collectively, Spitzer). (Related Doc # 57 ) Judge Ann Aldrich on 4−8−2010.(K,V) (Entered: 04/08/2010)
75 Memorandum Opinion and Order (Related Doc # 59 )that Okafor and Nuriddins motion to amend the complaint is granted. Judge Ann Aldrich on 4−8−2010.Associated Cases: 1:06−cv−02337−AA, 1:08−cv−01326−AA, 1:08−cv−01542−AA, 1:09−cv−00255−AA(K,V) (Entered: 04/08/2010)
Remark−ERROR in docketing. The motion for protective is still active and has not been ruled upon and is not denied at this time. Associated Cases: 1:08−cv−01326−AA, 1:06−cv−02337−AA, 1:08−cv−01542−AA, 1:09−cv−00255−AA (K,V) (Entered: 04/08/2010)
76 Amended Memorandum Opinion and Order denying Spitzer Management, Inc.'s, Spitzer, Spitzer Motor City, Inc.'s motion for partial protective order re 57 . Judge Ann Aldrich on 4−9−2010. Associated Cases: 1:06−cv−02337−AA, 1:08−cv−01326−AA, 1:08−cv−01542−AA, 1:09−cv−00255−AA(K,V) Modified text on 4/9/2010 (B,B). (Entered: 04/09/2010)
77 Amended complaint with jury demand against All Defendants and adding new party defendant(s) Alan Spitzer. Filed by Dean Okafor, Hakim Nurridin. Associated Cases: 1:08−cv−01542−AA, 1:06−cv−02337−AA, 1:08−cv−01326−AA, 1:09−cv−00255−AA (Bolek, Cathleen) Modified text on 4/12/2010 (B,B). (Entered: 04/12/2010)
Pursuant to General Order 2010−12. This case is returned to the Clerk for random reassignment. Judge James G. Carr on 5/3/10. (C,BA) (Entered: 05/06/2010)
Judge John R. Adams assigned to case. Judge Ann Aldrich terminated. (C,BA) (Entered: 05/06/2010)
Random Assignment of Magistrate Judge pursuant to Local Rule 3.1. In the event of a referral, case will be assigned to Magistrate Judge Limbert. (C,BA) (Entered: 05/07/2010)

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05/18/2010 05/18/2010 05/18/2010 05/19/2010
05/20/2010 05/20/2010 05/21/2010
05/21/2010 05/25/2010 05/25/2010 05/27/2010 05/27/2010 05/28/2010 06/09/2010 06/16/2010 06/16/2010

78 Notice of Telephone Conference set for 6/3/2010 at 03:00 PM in to be held telephonically before Judge John R. Adams. Plaintiff to initiate the conference call to the court. (K,C) (Entered: 05/18/2010)
79 Notice of Service of Supplemental Discovery Responses filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 05/18/2010)
80 Motion to stay Dispositive Briefing Schedule Pending Telephone Conference Set for June 3, 2010 filed by Rex Davidson, Mitchell Mincy, Alan Spitzer, Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc.. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 05/18/2010)
81 FILING ERROR− filer notified to refile with complete case caption information. Waiver of Service Returned Executed by Hakim Nurridin, Dean Okafor. Alan Spitzer waiver sent on 4/12/2010, answer due 6/11/2010. Filed on behalf of Hakim Nurridin; Dean Okafor Associated Cases: 1:06−cv−02337−JRA, 1:08−cv−01326−JRA, 1:08−cv−01542−JRA, 1:09−cv−00255−JRA(Bolek, Cathleen) Modified text on 5/20/2010 (R,Sh). (Entered: 05/19/2010)
82 Notice of Telephone Conference. Telephone Conference set for 5/21/2010 at 10:30 AM in Courtroom 575 before Judge John R. Adams. Plaintiff's counsel in the lead case should originate the conference call to the court. Parties are excused from attending. (K,C) (Entered: 05/20/2010)
83 Notice of Service of Plaintiff/Intervenor Okafor's Responses to Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents filed by Dean Okafor. Associated Cases: 1:06−cv−02337−JRA, 1:08−cv−01326−JRA, 1:08−cv−01542−JRA, 1:09−cv−00255−JRA(Bolek, Cathleen) (Entered: 05/20/2010)
84 Minute Order of Telephone Conference held on 5/21/2010. The Court GRANTS Defendants motion to stay the briefing schedule for dispositive motions in this matter. Discovery due by 6/21/2010. Absent extraordinary circumstances, that deadline will not be extended. The previously scheduled telephone conference set for June 3, 2010 is hereby CANCELED. Status Conference set for 6/28/2010 at 10:30 AM in Courtroom 575 before Judge John R. Adams. Parties are instructed that all future filings in these matters shall be made solely in lead case number 1:06CV2337. Please see order for additional details. Time: 1 hour, Court reporter (none). Judge John R. Adams on 5/21/2010. (R,Sh) (Entered: 05/21/2010)
85 Waiver of Service Returned Executed by Alan Spitzer filed on behalf of Hakim Nurridin, Dean Okafor (Bolek, Cathleen) Modified text on 5/24/2010 (R,Sh). (Entered: 05/21/2010)
86 Deposition of Anthony B. Giardini taken on 2−26−10 filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 05/25/2010)
87 Notice of Service of Supplemental Discovery Responses filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 05/25/2010)
88 Motion to dismiss Plaintiff−Intervenor's Amended Complaint Against New Party Defendant Alan Spitzer and Memorandum in Support Thereof filed by Rex Davidson, Mitchell Mincy, Alan Spitzer, Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Journal Entry)(Cook, D.) (Entered: 05/27/2010)
89 Notice of Service filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 05/27/2010)
90 Notice of Service of Abbreviated, Supplemental Initial Disclosures filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 05/28/2010)
91 Notice of Service of Supplemental Discovery Responses (June 9, 2010) filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 06/09/2010)
92 Attorney Appearance by Donna L. Williams−Alexander filed by on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Williams−Alexander, Donna) (Entered: 06/16/2010)
93 Subpoena Returned Executed; served upon TALX Employer Services by UPS on 6/7/2010 filed on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 06/16/2010)

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06/16/2010 06/16/2010 06/16/2010 06/16/2010 06/17/2010
06/23/2010
06/28/2010 07/02/2010 07/02/2010
07/02/2010 07/06/2010
07/07/2010
07/15/2010 07/15/2010 07/16/2010 07/16/2010 07/23/2010

94 Subpoena Returned Executed; served upon Radachi and Company by UPS on 6/3/2010 filed on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 06/16/2010)
95 Subpoena Returned Executed; served upon TALX UC eXpress by UPS on 6/3/2010 filed on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 06/16/2010)
96 Notice to take Deposition of Hakim Nuriddin (unsigned) on June 18, 2010 filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) Modified text on 6/17/2010 (R,Sh). (Entered: 06/16/2010)
97 Notice to take Deposition of Dean Okafor (unsigned) on June 18, 2010 filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) Modified text on 6/17/2010 (R,Sh). (Entered: 06/16/2010)
98 Motion to quash Subpoena: Alternate Motion for Protective Order filed by Rex Davidson, Mitchell Mincy, Alan Spitzer, Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Subpoena to Produce Documents)(Cook, D.) (Entered: 06/17/2010)
99 Opposition to 88 Motion to dismiss Plaintiff−Intervenor's Amended Complaint Against New Party Defendant Alan Spitzer and Memorandum in Support Thereof filed by Hakim Nurridin, Dean Okafor. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Order Granting Leave to File Amended Complaint)(Bolek, Cathleen) (Entered: 06/23/2010)
Minutes of proceedings [non−document] before Judge John R. Adams.Status Conference held on 6/28/10. (Court Reporter: Caroline Mahnke.)Time: 90 Mins. (K,C) (Entered: 06/29/2010)
100 Non−Appeal Transcript Order Form for proceedings held on 6/28/10 before Judge Adams, Court Reporter: Caroline Mahnke. Requested completion date: 7/16/10 filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 07/02/2010)
101 Reply to response to 88 Motion to dismiss Plaintiff−Intervenor's Amended Complaint Against New Party Defendant Alan Spitzer and Memorandum in Support Thereof filed by Defendants, Sur−Reply to Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to 88 Motion to dismiss Plaintiff−Intervenor's Amended Complaint Against New Party Defendant Alan Spitzer and Memorandum in Support Thereof filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 07/02/2010)
102 Proposed Order filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 07/02/2010)
103 Order granting Defendants' Motion to quash (Related Doc # 98) in case 1:06−cv−02337−JRA. Further, all outstanding discovery issues shall be concluded by 7/30/10. Dispositive motions are due by 9/7/10. Judge John R. Adams on 7/6/10.Associated Cases: 1:06−cv−02337−JRA, 1:08−cv−01326−JRA, 1:08−cv−01542−JRA, 1:09−cv−00255−JRA(L, J) (Entered: 07/06/2010)
104 Trial Order setting a Pretrial Conference for 2/25/2011 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 575 before Judge John R. Adams. Jury Trial set for 3/7/2011 at 09:00 AM in Courtroom 575 before Judge John R. Adams. See order for addiitonal deadlines. Judge John R. Adams on 7/7/10. (K,C) (Entered: 07/07/2010)
105 Deposition of Hakim Nuriddin taken on 6−18−10 filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 07/15/2010)
106 Deposition of Dean Okafor taken on 6−18−10 filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 07/15/2010)
107 Notice of Service of Supplemental Discovery Responses Pursuant to Court Order of July 6, 2010 (Doc. 103) filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 07/16/2010)
108 Notice of Service of Deposition Transcripts of Intervening Plaintiffs in Support of Separate Defendant Alan Spitzer's Motion to Dismiss filed by Alan Spitzer. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 07/16/2010)
109 Transcript of Status Hearing held on June 28, 2010 before Judge John R. Adams. To obtain a bound copy of this transcript please contact court reporter Caroline Mahnke at 330−252−6021. [27 pages] Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of

Case: 1:06-cv-2337 As of: 05/30/2018 09:27 PM EDT 14 of 32

09/07/2010 09/07/2010 09/07/2010 09/07/2010 09/07/2010 09/07/2010 09/07/2010
09/07/2010
09/07/2010 09/07/2010 09/07/2010 09/07/2010 09/07/2010 09/07/2010 09/07/2010 09/07/2010 09/07/2010 09/07/2010
09/07/2010 09/07/2010

Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Parties requesting that privacy information be redacted must file a notice of intent to redact with the court by 7/30/2010. Redaction Request due 8/13/2010. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/23/2010. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/21/2010. Related document(s) 100 . (M,Ca) (Entered: 07/23/2010)
110 Deposition of Anthony B. Giardini taken on February 26, 2010 filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 09/07/2010)
111 Deposition of James Dombrowski taken on November 30, 2007 filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 09/07/2010)
112 Deposition of Greg Kramer taken on August 8, 2008 filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 09/07/2010)
113 Deposition of Payton Lycans taken on November 30, 2007 filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 09/07/2010)
114 Deposition of Mitchell Mincy taken on January 14, 2010 filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 09/07/2010)
115 Deposition of Tracy Graham taken on January 20, 2010 filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 09/07/2010)
116 Deposition of Christopher Johnson taken on August 8, 2008 filed by Rex Davidson, Mitchell Mincy, Alan Spitzer, Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc.. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 09/07/2010)
117 Deposition of David Marek taken on Octover 19, 2007 filed by Rex Davidson, Mitchell Mincy, Alan Spitzer, Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc.. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 09/07/2010)
118 Deposition of Dean Okafer taken on October 19, 2007 filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 09/07/2010)
119 Deposition of Esther Kim taken on February 11, 2010 filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 09/07/2010)
120 Deposition of Kevin Szatala taken on January 21, 2010 filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 09/07/2010)
121 Deposition of Michael Procaccini taken on February 24, 2010 filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 09/07/2010)
122 Deposition of Alawy Alawi taken on January 22, 2010 filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 09/07/2010)
123 Deposition of Hakim Nuriddin taken on January 13, 2010 filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 09/07/2010)
124 Deposition of Anthony B. Giardini Part 1 taken on June 10, 2010 filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 09/07/2010)
125 Deposition of Anthony B. Giardini Part 2 taken on June 10, 2010 filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 09/07/2010)
126 Deposition of Toufic Hamdan taken on December 11, 2009 filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 09/07/2010)
127 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to claims for punitive damages asserted by EEOC and intervenors−plaintiffs filed by Rex Davidson, Mitchell Mincy, Alan Spitzer, Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc. (Cook, D.) Modified text on 9/8/2010 (R,Sh). (Entered: 09/07/2010)
128 Deposition of Alan Spitzer taken on June 19, 2010 filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 09/07/2010)
129 Deposition of Michael Blackmur taken on January 15, 2010 filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 09/07/2010)

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09/07/2010 09/07/2010 09/07/2010 09/07/2010 09/07/2010
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09/17/2010 09/17/2010 09/17/2010

130 Notice of Filing of Affidavit of Anthony B. Giardini filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 09/07/2010)
131 Notice of Filing of Deposition Transcripts in Support of Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 09/07/2010)
132 Motion for summary judgment as to Alawy Alawi's Claims filed by Rex Davidson, Mitchell Mincy, Alan Spitzer, Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Cook, D.) (Entered: 09/07/2010)
133 Motion for summary judgment as to David Marek's Claims filed by Rex Davidson, Mitchell Mincy, Alan Spitzer, Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E)(Cook, D.) (Entered: 09/07/2010)
134 FILING ERROR− Wrong document uploaded, filer refiling. Motion for summary judgment as to Toufic Hamdan's Claims filed by Rex Davidson, Mitchell Mincy, Alan Spitzer, Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E)(Cook, D.) Modified text and terminated associated motion on 9/8/2010 (R,Sh). (Entered: 09/07/2010)
135 Motion for summary judgment as to Hakim Nuriddin's Claims filed by Rex Davidson, Mitchell Mincy, Alan Spitzer, Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H)(Cook, D.) (Entered: 09/07/2010)
136 Motion for summary judgment With Brief in Support filed by Defendant Alan Spitzer. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E)(Cook, D.) (Entered: 09/07/2010)
137 Motion for summary judgment as to Dean Okafor's Claims filed by Rex Davidson, Mitchell Mincy, Alan Spitzer, Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D)(Cook, D.) (Entered: 09/07/2010)
138 Deposition of Rex Davidson taken January 6, 2010 filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) Modified text on 9/8/2010 (R,Sh). (Entered: 09/07/2010)
139 Motion for summary judgment as to Hamdan's Claims filed by Rex Davidson, Mitchell Mincy, Alan Spitzer, Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc.. Related document(s) 134 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit 1, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D)(Cook, D.) (Entered: 09/08/2010)
140 Motion for leave to Re−File Five Amended Summary Judgment Motions Instanter in Order to Comply with Loc. Fed. R 7.1(f) filed by Rex Davidson, Mitchell Mincy, Alan Spitzer, Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc.. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 09/17/2010)
141 Amended Motion for summary judgment as to Hakim Nuriddin's Claims filed by Rex Davidson, Mitchell Mincy, Alan Spitzer, Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc.. Related document(s) 135 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H)(Cook, D.) (Entered: 09/17/2010)
142 Amended Motion for summary judgment as to Dean Okafor's Claims filed by Rex Davidson, Mitchell Mincy, Alan Spitzer, Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc.. Related document(s) 137 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D)(Cook, D.) (Entered: 09/17/2010)
143 Amended Motion for summary judgment as to Alawy Alawi's Claims filed by Rex Davidson, Mitchell Mincy, Alan Spitzer, Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc.. Related document(s) 132 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Cook, D.) (Entered: 09/17/2010)
144 Amended Motion for summary judgment as to David Marek's Claims filed by Rex Davidson, Mitchell Mincy, Alan Spitzer, Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc.. Related document(s) 133 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E)(Cook, D.) (Entered: 09/17/2010)

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145 Amended Motion for summary judgment as to Nick Hamdan's Claims filed by Rex Davidson, Mitchell Mincy, Alan Spitzer, Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc.. Related document(s) 139 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit 1, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D)(Cook, D.) (Entered: 09/17/2010)
146 Order granting Defendant's Motion for leave (Related Doc # 140 ) to refile their amended motions for summary judgment. Further, briefing for the motions is hereby consolidated. See order for details. Judge John R. Adams on 9/17/10.(L, J) (Entered: 09/17/2010)
147 Stipulation of Plaintiff−Intervenors and Defendants to Admissibility of documents for motions for summary judgment filed by Dean Okafor. Associated Cases: 1:06−cv−02337−JRA, 1:08−cv−01326−JRA, 1:08−cv−01542−JRA, 1:09−cv−00255−JRA(Lohr, Carole) Modified text on 10/12/2010 (H,KR). (Entered: 10/11/2010)
148 (Duplicate Filing) Stipulation of Plaintiff−Intervenors and Defendants to Admissibility of documents for motions for summary judgment filed by Dean Okafor. Associated Cases: 1:06−cv−02337−JRA, 1:08−cv−01326−JRA, 1:08−cv−01542−JRA, 1:09−cv−00255−JRA(Lohr, Carole) Modified text and added duplicate filing on 10/12/2010. Attorney was notified regarding duplicate filing (H,KR). (Entered: 10/11/2010)
149 Unopposed Motion to extend date for each plaintiff to file a single response brief from October 18, 2010 until October 26, 2010 filed by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Related document(s)(146 in 1:06−cv−02337−JRA). Associated Cases: 1:06−cv−02337−JRA, 1:08−cv−01326−JRA, 1:08−cv−01542−JRA, 1:09−cv−00255−JRA(McMillan, Solvita) Modified text on 10/15/2010 (P,G). (Entered: 10/14/2010)
150 Order granting (149) Motion to Extend Deadlines; in case 1:06−cv−02337−JRA; granting (31) Motion to Extend Deadlines; in case 1:08−cv−01326−JRA; granting (30) Motion to Extend Deadlines; in case 1:08−cv−01542−JRA; granting (25) Motion to Extend Deadlines; in case 1:09−cv−00255−JRA until Tuesday, October 26, 2010. Judge John R. Adams on 10/15/10. Associated Cases: 1:06−cv−02337−JRA, 1:08−cv−01326−JRA, 1:08−cv−01542−JRA, 1:09−cv−00255−JRA (R,Sh) Modified text on 10/18/2010 (M,TL). (Entered: 10/15/2010)
151 Order that this case is consolidated with cases 1:08CV1326, 1:08CV1542, and 1:09CV255. This matter serving as the lead case. All filings pertaining to any of these cases shall only be filed in Lead Case #1:06CV2337. Cases 1:08CV1326, 1:08CV1542, and 1:09CV255 shall be closed. Judge John R. Adams on 10/20/10. (K,C) (Entered: 10/20/2010)
152 Affidavit of Alawy Alawi (Exhibit 1) and office diagram (Exhibit 2) to 122 Deposition of Alawy Alawi filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Related document 122 . (McMillan, Solvita) Modified text on 10/22/2010 (M,TL). (Entered: 10/21/2010)
153 Witness Statement (Exhibit 1), police report (Exhibit 2) to 129 Deposition of Michael Blackmur filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Related document 129 . (Attachments: # 1 Witness statements (Ex.3) (McMillan, Solvita) Modified text on 10/22/2010 (M,TL). (Entered: 10/21/2010)
154 Incident report (Ex.1), Incident report (Ex.2), Repair order (Ex.3), drawing (Ex.4), notice of resignation letter (Ex.5), employee letter (Ex.6), myspace postings (Ex.7) and Affidavit of Tracy Graham (Ex.8) to 115 Deposition of Tracy Graham filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Related document 115 . (McMillan, Solvita) Modified text on 10/22/2010 (M,TL). (Entered: 10/21/2010)
155 Response to 1st Set of Interrogatories (Ex.1) ; Response to 2nd Request for Production (Ex.2); Memo to associates (Ex.3); Spitzer's Complaint (Ex.4); Nuriddin letter to Procaccini (Ex.5); Incident Report re Nuriddin & Davidson (Ex.6); 2/27/07 Davidson statement (Ex.7); 2/28/07 Garst statement (Ex.8); 3/19/07 Procaccini statement Ex.9); 5/14/07 Notice of Charge (Ex.10); EEOC Charge 532−2007−01600 (Ex.11); EEOC Charge 532−2007−01881 (Ex.12); Procaccini Statement re customer complaint (Ex. 13); 11/6/06 Procaccini incident report (Ex. 14); EEOC Charge 532−2007−00088 (Ex.15); Graffiti photo "Magic Carpet Sales" Ex.16) to 121 Trasncript of Michael

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Procaccini filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Related document(s) 121 . (McMillan, Solvita) Modified text on 10/25/2010 (M,TL). (Entered: 10/22/2010)
156 Exhibit 1 (Davidson deposition subpoena) to 138 Deposition of Rex Davidson filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Related document 138 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 2 (policy), # 2 Exhibit 3 (incident report); Exhibit 4 (wage increase form), # 3 Exhibit 5 (Nuriddin district court complaint), # 4 Exhibit 6 (Answer to 1:09cv00255), # 5 Exhibit 7 (Answer to Nuriddin's Interrogatories and Request for Production), # 6 Exhibit 8 (Nurridin police report), # 7 Exhibit 9 (Nurridin statement), # 8 Exhibit 10 (Nuriddin EEOC charge #810); Exhibit 11 (incident report re Nuriddin); Exhibit 12 (Nuriddin EEOC charge #1153); Exhibit 13 (Nuriddin EEOC charge #1600); Exhibit 14 (Nuriddin termination report), # 9 Exhibit 15 (Common Pleas Complaint), # 10 Exhibit 16 (Davidson affidavit), # 11 Exhibit 17 (incident report); Exhibit 18 (incident report); Exhibit 19 (Hamdan EEOC charge #88);Exhibit 20 (Graffiti), # 12 Exhibit 21 (intake questionnaire), # 13 Exhibit 22 (Graffiti))(McMillan, Solvita) Modified text on 10/26/2010 (M,TL). (Entered: 10/25/2010)
157 Exhibit 1 (Esther Kim personnel file) to 119 Deposition of Esther Kim filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Related document 119 . (McMillan, Solvita) Modified text on 10/26/2010 (M,TL). (Entered: 10/25/2010)
158 Exhibit 1 (affidavit of Kevin Szatala) and Exhibit 2 (policy) to 120 Deposition of Kevin Szatala filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Related document(s) 120 . (McMillan, Solvita) Modified text on 10/26/2010 (M,TL). (Entered: 10/25/2010)
159 Exhibit A (letter of H. Nuriddin) to 123 Deposition of Hakim Nuriddin on 1/13/10 filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Related document(s) 123 . (McMillan, Solvita) Modified text on 10/26/2010 (M,TL). (Entered: 10/25/2010)
160 Exhibit A (Amended Complaint) to 105 6/18/10 Deposition of Hakim Nuriddin filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Related document(s) 105 . (McMillan, Solvita) Modified text on 10/26/2010 (M,TL). (Entered: 10/25/2010)
161 Exhibit 1 (floor plan), Exhibit 2 (report), Exhibit 3 (statement), Exhibit 4 (unemployment questionnaire) to 114 Deposition of Mitch Mincey filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Related document 114 . (McMillan, Solvita) Modified text on 10/26/2010 (M,TL). (Entered: 10/25/2010)
162 Exhibit 1 (Graffiti) to 126 Deposition of Toufic Hamdan filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Related document 126 . (McMillan, Solvita) Modified text on 10/26/2010 (M,TL). (Entered: 10/25/2010)
163 Exhibit 1 (Giardini Deposition Subpoena) and Exhibit 2 (Chrysler bankruptcy) to 110 Deposition of Anthony Giardini filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Related document(s) 110 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 3 (employee list), Exhibit 4 (supervisor list), Exhibit 5 (Ward statement), Exhibit 6 (Okafor intake questionnaire), Exhibit 7 (Okafor EEOC charge #555, Exhibit 8 (Marek intake quesitonnaire), Exhibit 9 (Marek EEOC charge #817), Exhibit 10 (notice), Exhibit 11 (Clark statement), Exhibit 12 (Clark affidavit), Exhibit 13 (Dombrowski statement), Exhibit 14 (Szatala affidavit), # 2 Exhibit 15 (Alawi affidavit), Exhibit 16 (Okafor Determination), Exhibit 17 (Marek Determination), Exhibit 18 (notes), Exhibit 19 (EEOC Complaint), Exhibit 20 (Hamdan EEOC charge #88), Exhibit 21 (Pedone statement), Exhibit 22 (doctor note), Exhibit 23 (EEOC memo), Exhibit 24 (Okafor EEOC charge #157), Exhibit 25 (Davidson statement))(McMillan, Solvita) Modified text on 10/26/2010 (M,TL). (Entered: 10/25/2010)
164 Exhibit 26 (Spitzer List of Directors/Officers) to [124} and 125 Deposition of Anthony Giardini filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Related document(s) 125 , 124 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 28 (policy), Exhibit 29 (interview w/Nurridin), Exhibit 30 (Answer to Nurridin's interrogatories and request for production),, # 2 Exhibit 31 (Nuriddin termination report), Exhibit 32 (response to charge), Exhibit 33 (Nuriddin EEOC charge #810), Exhibit 34 (Nuriddin statement), Exhibit 35 (notice of charge), Exhibit 36 (Nuriddin EEOC charge #1600), Exhibit 37 (notice of charge), Exhibit 38 (Okafor EEOC chcarge #157), Exhibit 39 (Giardini letter to EEOC), Charge 40 (Giardini letter to EEOC), # 3 Exhibit 41 (Common Pleas Complaint), Exhibit 42 (Nuriddin EEOC Determination), Exhibit 43 (Hamdan EEOC

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Determination), Exhibit 44 (Okafor EEOC Determination), Exhibit 45 (Okafor EEOC Determination), Exhibit 46 (Nuriddin EEOC Determination), Exhibit 47 (Nuriddin EEOC Determination), Exhibit 48 (Nuriddin EEOC Determination), # 4 Exhibit 49 (Gonzales statement), Exhibit 51 (emails), Exhibit 52 (emails), # 5 Exhibit 53 (Response to EEOC's interrogatories), Exhibit 54 (Response to EEOC's 2nd Request for Production))(McMillan, Solvita) Modified text on 10/26/2010 (M,TL). (Entered: 10/25/2010)
165 Exhibit 1 (EEOC answer to Def. interrogatories and request to produce) and Exhibit 2 (certificate of service) to 128 Deposition of Alan Spitzer filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Related document(s) 128 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 3 (EEOC Determinations), # 2 Exhibit 4 (newspaper article), Exhibit 5 (Common Pleas Complaint), Exhibit 6 (Nuriddin letter), Exhibit 7 (news article), # 3 Exhibit 12 (Giardini response to charge), Exhibit 13 (Giardini Response to Charge), Exhibit 14 (Giardini letter to EEOC), Exhibit 15 (wage increase form), Exhibit 16 (vacation form), Exhibit 17 (Diane Dodge email), Exhibit 18 (Giardini email); Exhibit 19 (User ID requst form), Exhibit 20 (Spitzer memo); Exhibit 21 (memo re policy), Exhibit 22 (policy) (McMillan, Solvita) Modified text on 10/26/2010 (M,TL). (Entered: 10/25/2010)
166 Opposition to 142 Amended Motion for summary judgment as to Dean Okafor's Claims filed by Dean Okafor. (Bolek, Cathleen) (Entered: 10/25/2010)
167 Index to Appendix(Appendix 1−3) in support of Memorandum in opposition to Defendants' 142 Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 166 . (Attachments: # 1 Appendix 1. Alawi Deposition Excerpts, # 2 Appendix 2. Balckmur Deposition Excerpts, # 3 Appendix 3. Davidson Deposition Excerpts)(Lohr, Carole) Modified text and created link on 10/27/2010 (S,HR). Modified text and created link on 10/27/2010 (S,HR). (Entered: 10/26/2010)
168 Index to Appendix (Appendix 4−6) in support of Memorandum in opposition to Defendants' 142 Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 166 . (Attachments: # 1 Appendix 4. Dombrowski Deposition Excerpts, # 2 Appendix 5. Giardini Deposition Excerpts, # 3 Appendix 6. Graham Deposition Excerpts)(Lohr, Carole) Modified text and created link on 10/27/2010 (S,HR). (Entered: 10/26/2010)
169 Index to Appendix (Appendix 7−10) in support of Memorandum in opposition to Defendants' 142 Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 166 . (Attachments: # 1 Appendix 7. Hamdan Deposition Excerpts, # 2 Appendix 8. Johnson Deposition Excerpts, # 3 Appendix 9. Kramer Deposition Excerpts, # 4 Appendix 10. Lycans Deposition Excerpts)(Lohr, Carole) Modified text and created link on 10/27/2010 (S,HR). (Entered: 10/26/2010)
170 Index to Appendix (Appendix 10−13) in support of Memorandum in opposition to Defendants' 142 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 166 . (Attachments: # 1 Appendix 10. Lycans Deposition Excerpts, # 2 Appendix 11. Marek Deposition Excerpts, # 3 Appendix 12. Mincey Deposition Excerpts, # 4 Appendix 13. Nuriddin Deposition Excerpts)(Lohr, Carole) Modified text and created link on 10/27/2010 (S,HR). (Entered: 10/26/2010)
171 Index to Appendix (Appendix 14−16) in support of Memorandum in opposition to Defendants' 142 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 166 . (Attachments: # 1 Appendix 14. Okafor I Deposition Excerpts, # 2 Appendix 15. Okafor II Deposition Excerpts, # 3 Appendix 16. Procaccini Deposition Excerpts)(Lohr, Carole) Modified text and created link on 10/27/2010 (S,HR). (Entered: 10/26/2010)
172 Index to Appendix (Appendix 17−19) in support of Memorandum in opposition to Defendants' 142 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 166 . (Attachments: # 1 Appendix 17. Spitzer Deposition Excerpts, # 2 Appendix 18. Szatala Deposition Excerpts, # 3 Appendix 19. Deposition Exhibit Alawi, # 4 Appendix 19. Deposition Exhibit 5 Giardini, # 5 Appendix 19. Deposition Exhibit A Nuriddin, # 6 Appendix 19. Deposition Exhibit 20,21,22 Spitzer)(Lohr, Carole) Modified text and created link on 10/27/2010 (S,HR). (Entered: 10/26/2010)

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173 Index to Appendix (Appendix 20−29) in support of Memorandum in opposition to Defendants' 142 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 166 . (Attachments: # 1 Appendix 20. Charge of Disc. 532−2006−00555, # 2 Appendix 21. Charge of Disc. 532−2007−00088, # 3 Appendix 22. Charge of Disc. 532−2007−00157, # 4 Appendix 23. Charge of Disc. 532−2007−00810, # 5 Appendix 24. Charge of Disc. 532−2007−01004, # 6 Appendix 25. Charge of Disc. 532−2007−01153, # 7 Appendix 26. Charge of Disc. 532−2007−01600, # 8 Appendix 27. Charge of Disc. 532−2007−01881, # 9 Appendix 28. Charge of Disc. 532−2008−01714, # 10 Appendix 29. Charge of Disc. 532−2008−01949)(Lohr, Carole) Modified text and created link on 10/27/2010 (S,HR). (Entered: 10/26/2010)
174 Index to Appendix (Appendix 30−36) in support of Memorandum in opposition to Defendants' 142 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 166 . (Attachments: # 1 Appendix 30. Determination by EEOC Charge 532−2006−00555, # 2 Appendix 31. Determination by EEOC Charge 532−2007−00157, # 3 Appendix 32. Determination by EEOC Charge 532−2007−01153, # 4 Appendix 33. Determination by EEOC Charge 532−2007, # 5 Appendix 34. Determination by EEOC Charge 532−2007−01600, # 6 Appendix 35. Determination by EEOC Charge 532−2007−01881, # 7 Appendix 36. Determination by EEOC Charge 532−2008−01949)(Lohr, Carole) Modified text and created link on 10/27/2010 (S,HR). (Entered: 10/26/2010)
175 Index to Appendix (Appendix 37−42) in support of Memorandum in opposition to Defendants' 142 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 166 . (Attachments: # 1 Appendix 37. Notice of Charge 532−2007−00810, # 2 Appendix 38. Notice of Charge 532−2007−01004, # 3 Appendix 39. Notice of Charge 532−2007−01153, # 4 Appendix 40. Notice of Charge 532−2008−01949, # 5 Appendix 41.Notice of Charge 532−2007−01881, # 6 Appendix 42. Dismissal and Notice of Rights Charge 532−2007−00810)(Lohr, Carole) Modified text and created link on 10/27/2010 (S,HR). (Entered: 10/26/2010)
176 Index to Appendix (Appendix 43−45) in support of Memorandum in opposition to Defendants' 142 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 166 . (Attachments: # 1 Appendix 43. EEOC Intake, EEOC−HN−III−00008, # 2 Appendix 44. EEOC Intake, EEOC−HN−III−00013−00016, # 3 Appendix 45. EEOC Intake, EEOC−HN−III−000020−000023)(Lohr, Carole) Modified text and created link on 10/27/2010 (S,HR). (Entered: 10/26/2010)
177 Index to Appendix (Appendix 46−49) in support of Memorandum in opposition to Defendants' 142 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 166 . (Attachments: # 1 Appendix 46. Complaint Case No. 1:06−CV−02337−JRA, # 2 Appendix 47. Complaint Case No. 1:08−CV−01542, # 3 Appendix 48. Complaint Case No. CV 08 671018 Cuy. Cty. Court, # 4 Appendix 49. Def. Amended MSJ Okakfor)(Lohr, Carole) Modified text and created link on 10/27/2010 (S,HR). (Entered: 10/26/2010)
178 Index to Appendix (Appendix 50−52) in support of Memorandum in opposition to Defendants' 142 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 166 . (Attachments: # 1 Appendix 50. EEOC Answer to Int. and Request for Prod, # 2 Appendix 51. Def. Answer to Nuriddin Int. No.4, # 3 Appendix 52. Def. Answer to Nuriddin Int. No.12)(Lohr, Carole) Modified text and created link on 10/27/2010 (S,HR). (Entered: 10/26/2010)
179 Index to Appendix (Appendix 53−55) in support of Memorandum in opposition to Defendants' 142 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 166 . (Attachments: # 1 Appendix 53. Affidavit of Davidson, # 2 Appendix 54. Affidavit of Tirado, # 3 Appendix 55. Affidavit of Graham)(Lohr, Carole) Modified text and created link on 10/27/2010 (S,HR). (Entered: 10/26/2010)
180 Index to Appendix (Appendix 56−59) in support of Memorandum in opposition to Defendants' 142 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 166 . (Attachments: # 1 Appendix 56. Unsworn Statement Blackmur, # 2 Appendix 57. Unsworn Statement Ward, # 3 Appendix 58. Unsworn Statement Nuriddin, # 4 Appendix 59. Unsworn Statement Davidson)(Lohr, Carole) Modified text and created link on 10/27/2010 (S,HR). (Entered: 10/26/2010)

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181 Index to Appendix (Appendix 60) in support of Memorandum in opposition to Defendants' 142 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 166 . (Attachments: # 1 Appendix 60. Sworn Declaration Obojski, # 2 Appendix 60. Sworn Declaration Okafor)(Lohr, Carole) Modified text and created link on 10/27/2010 (S,HR). (Entered: 10/26/2010)
182 Index to Appendix (Appendix 61−64) in support of Memorandum in opposition to Defendants' 142 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 166 . (Attachments: # 1 Appendix 61. Letter from EEOC to Giardini 09−13−06, # 2 Appendix 62. Letter from EEOC to Spitzer 10−18−06, # 3 Appendix 63. Letter from Giardini 04−17−07, # 4 Appendix 64. Letter from Giardini with "statement" 04−17−07)(Lohr, Carole) Modified text and created link on 10/27/2010 (S,HR). (Entered: 10/26/2010)
183 Index to Appendix (Appendix 65−69) in support of Memorandum in opposition to Defendants' 142 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 166 . (Attachments: # 1 Appendix 65. Letter from EEOC to Giardini 04−19−07, # 2 Appendix 66. Letter from Nuriddin to Sintic 04−24−07, # 3 Appendix 67. Letter from EEOC to Giardini 06−13−07, # 4 Appendix 68. Sintic Memo 06−20−07, # 5 Appendix 69. Letter from Giardini to EEOC 08−07−07)(Lohr, Carole) Modified text and created link on 10/27/2010 (S,HR). (Entered: 10/26/2010)
184 Index to Appendix (Appendix 70−72) in support of Memorandum in opposition to Defendants' 142 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 166 . (Attachments: # 1 Appendix 70. Letter from Giardini to EEOC 08−22−07, # 2 Appendix 71. Letter from EEOC to Giardini 09−18−07, # 3 Appendix 72. Letter from EEOC to Giardini 10−12−07)(Lohr, Carole) Modified text and created link on 10/27/2010 (S,HR). (Entered: 10/26/2010)
185 Index to Appendix (Appendix 73−76) in support of Memorandum in opposition to Defendants' 142 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 166 . (Attachments: # 1 Appendix 73. Downs v. AOL Time Warner, # 2 Appendix 74. Grubbs v. Pontotoc County Hospital, # 3 Appendix 75. Robinso v. CCE, Inc, # 4 Appendix 76. Cyrus v. Hyundai Motor MIG)(Lohr, Carole) Modified text and created link on 10/27/2010 (S,HR). (Entered: 10/26/2010)
186 Index to Appendix (Appendix 77−80) in support of Memorandum in opposition to Defendants' 142 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by all plaintiffs. Related document(s) 166 . (Attachments: # 1 Appendix 77. Jain v. International Truck Engine Corp, # 2 Appendix 78. Langadinos v. Appalachin Sch of Law, # 3 Appendix 79. Armstrong v. Whirlpool Corp, # 4 Appendix 80. Poletsky v. CMLW Enterprises)(Lohr, Carole) Modified text and created link on 10/27/2010 (S,HR). (Entered: 10/26/2010)
187 Opposition to 141 Amended Motion for summary judgment as to Hakim Nuriddin's Claims, 127 Motion for partial summary judgment as to claims for punitive damages asserted by EEOC and intervenors−plaintiffs, 136 Motion for summary judgment With Brief in Support filed by Hakim Nurridin. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Deft. Discovery Responses, # 2 Exhibit 3−19 discipline, # 3 Exhibit 8−6−07 notice of charge, # 4 Exhibit 8−14−08 termination report)(Glesius, Amy) (Entered: 10/26/2010)
188 Opposition to 143 , 141 , 144 , 145 , 142 Amended Motions for summary judgment and 127 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (McMillan, Solvita) Modified on 10/27/2010 to create link (P,G). Modified text on 10/28/2010 (M,TL). (Entered: 10/27/2010)
189 Reply Brief to Okafor, Nurridin & EEOC's Memorandum in Opposition filed by All Defendants. Related document(s) 166 , 187 , 188 . (Cook, D.) (Entered: 11/15/2010)
190 Notice of Superceding Decision and Supplemental Case Law filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 11/18/2010)
191 Order and Notice of Oral Argument. Oral Argument is set for 12/6/2010 at 01:00 PM in Courtroom 575 before Judge John R. Adams. Please read order carefully for instruction on procedure. Each side will be allowed thirty (30)minutes for oral argument. Judge John R. Adams on 11/18/10. (R,Sh) (Entered: 11/18/2010)

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12/07/2010 12/08/2010 12/08/2010 12/08/2010 12/08/2010 12/08/2010 12/13/2010 01/03/2011 01/07/2011

192 Motion to continue Oral Argument filed by Rex Davidson, Mitchell Mincy, Alan Spitzer, Spitzer Autoworld Cleveland, LLC., Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Trial Order and Docket Sheet)(Cook, D.) (Entered: 11/23/2010)
193 Marginal Entry Order granting Defendant Spitzer Management, Inc.'s Motion to continue Oral Argument hearing (Related Doc # 192 ). Oral Argument set for 12/16/2010 at 02:30 PM in Courtroom 575 before Judge John R. Adams. The dates for parties filing their certificates shall be computed from this new argument date. Judge John R. Adams on 11/24/10.(R,Sh) (Entered: 11/24/2010)
194 Motion to excuse Individual Defendants, Mitch Mincy & Rex Davidson, from appearing at summary disposition oral argument filed by Rex Davidson, Mitchell Mincy, Alan Spitzer, Spitzer Autoworld Cleveland, LLC., Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc. (Cook, D.) Modified text on 11/29/2010 (M,TL). (Entered: 11/24/2010)
195 Marginal Entry Order granting Defendants' Motion to excuse (Related Doc # 194 ) the appearance of Mitch Mincy and Rex Davidson at oral argument on the pending motions for summary judgment. Judge John R. Adams on 11/29/10.(L, J) (Entered: 11/29/2010)
196 Order Oral Argument RESET for 12/13/2010 at 02:30 PM in Courtroom 575 before Judge John R. Adams. All parties are hereby excused from attendance. Deadlines for filing the certificates detailed in the original scheduling order shall be modified to correspond with the December 13, 2010 date of argument. Judge John R. Adams on 11/29/10. (R,Sh) (Entered: 11/29/2010)
197 Motion for leave to file two, two−page certifcates − one for the corporate defendants and one for Alan Spitzer: and Motion to split time filed by Rex Davidson, Mitchell Mincy, Alan Spitzer, Spitzer Autoworld Cleveland, LLC., Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Certificate for Oral Arguments for Motions for Summary Judgment as to Corporate Defendants, # 2 Exhibit B − Certificate for Oral Arguments for Motions for Summary Judgment as to Alan Spitzer)(Cook, D.) Modified text on 12/7/2010 (S,HR). (Entered: 12/06/2010)
198 Marginal Entry Order granting Defendants' Motion for leave (Related Doc # 197 ) to file two (2) certificates. The certificates are deemed filed. Judge John R. Adams on 12/7/10.(L, J) (Entered: 12/07/2010)
199 Certification for Oral Argument on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Dean Okafor. (Bolek, Cathleen) Modified text on 12/9/2010 (M,TL). (Entered: 12/08/2010)
200 Notice of Efforts to Comply with the Court's Order and Motion T for Leave to file certificate of primary authorities filed by all Plaintiffs. (Bolek, Cathleen) Modified text on 12/9/2010 (M,TL). (Entered: 12/08/2010)
201 Notice of Filing EEOC's Oral Argument Certificate filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 12/08/2010)
202 Notice of Filing Nuriddin's Certification of Genuine Issues of Material Fact filed by Hakim Nurridin. Related document(s) 197 .(Glesius, Amy) (Entered: 12/08/2010)
203 Notice of Filing Nuriddin's Certification of Genuine Issues of Material Fact Regarding Alan Spitzer's Liability filed by Hakim Nurridin. Related document(s) 197 .(Glesius, Amy) (Entered: 12/08/2010)
204 Order rescheduling the Oral Argument for 1/6/2011 at 02:30 PM in Courtroom 575 before Judge John R. Adams. All parties continued to be excused from attendance. Judge John R. Adams on 12/13/10. (R,Sh) Modified text on 12/14/2010 (M,TL). (Entered: 12/13/2010)
205 Address Change Notice by Amy S. Glesius filed by on behalf of Hakim Nurridin. (Glesius, Amy) (Entered: 01/03/2011)
Minutes of proceedings [non−document] before Judge John R. Adams.Oral Argument held on 1/6/11 (Court Reporter: Caroline Mahnke.)Time: 1 hour 32 minutes. (R,Sh) (Entered: 01/07/2011)

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01/12/2011
03/16/2011 03/22/2011 08/10/2011 08/11/2011 08/19/2011 02/08/2012 03/06/2012 03/30/2012 04/10/2012 04/19/2012 05/22/2012 07/05/2012
07/09/2012 07/10/2012 07/11/2012

206 Order. The Final Pretrial scheduled for February 25, 2011 at 10:00 a.m. and the Trial scheduled for March 7, 2011 at 9:00 a.m. in this matter are hereby CONTINUED. Following resolution of the pending motions for summary judgment, the Court will reschedule those dates. Judge John R. Adams on 1/12/11. (R,Sh) (Entered: 01/12/2011)
207 Marginal Entry Order denying without prejudice Defendant Alan Spitzer's Motion to dismiss (Related Doc # 88 ). The Court will review the arguments contained therein when it rules upon the pending motions for summary judgment. Judge John R. Adams on 3/16/11.(L, J) (Entered: 03/16/2011)
208 Stipulated Statement of Facts filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Hakim Nurridin, Spitzer Autoworld Cleveland, LLC., Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4)(Glesius, Amy) (Entered: 03/22/2011)
209 Motion for Trial date and Trial Order filed by Hakim Nurridin, Dean Okafor. Associated Cases: 1:06−cv−02337−JRA, 1:08−cv−01326−JRA, 1:08−cv−01542−JRA, 1:09−cv−00255−JRA(Glesius, Amy) Modified on 8/12/2011 (R,Sh). (Entered: 08/10/2011)
210 Response to 209 Motion Order Setting Trial Date filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 08/11/2011)
211 Order denying Plaintiff's Motion for an order (Related Doc # 209 ) scheduling a trial date in this matter. Judge John R. Adams on 8/19/11.(L, J) (Entered: 08/19/2011)
212 Notice of Filing Supplemental Authority filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 EEOC v Racine)(Bolek, Cathleen) (Entered: 02/08/2012)
213 Order setting a Status Conference for 7/10/2012 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 575 before Judge John R. Adams. All parties and counsel to attend. If necessary, the Court may convert this status to a final pretrial. Judge John R. Adams on 3/6/12. (L, J) (Entered: 03/06/2012)
214 Memorandum of Opinion and Order resolving each of Defendants' pending Motions for summary judgment (Related Docs # 127 , 136 , 141 , 142 , 143 , 144 , and 145 ). See order for more specific details. Judge John R. Adams on 3/30/12.(L, J) (Entered: 03/30/2012)
215 Order that the parties are hereby ordered to confer with one another and propose three (3) trial dates for this matter. The proposal should also include corresponding pretrial dates for each proposed trial date. See order for additional details. Judge John R. Adams on 4/10/12. (L, J) (Entered: 04/10/2012)
216 Notice of Filing Joint Trial Proposal Pursuant to Court's Order of April 10, 2012 filed by All Parties. Related document(s) 215 .(Bolek, Cathleen) (Entered: 04/19/2012)
217 Trial Order: Jury Trial set for 1/14/2013 before Judge John R. Adams at 9:00 AM in Courtroom 575. Final Pretrial Conference before Judge John R. Adams set for 12/10/2012 at 11:00 AM in Courtroom 575. Judge John R. Adams on 05/22/2012. (M,TL) (Entered: 05/22/2012)
218 Motion to allow Out−of−State Counsel, Patricia Griffith, to Appear by Phone and to Excuse Individual Defendants Mincy & Dsvidson for Status Conference filed by Rex Davidson, Mitchell Mincy, Alan Spitzer, Spitzer Autoworld Cleveland, LLC., Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc. (Cook, D.) Modified text on 7/6/2012 (M,TL). (Entered: 07/05/2012)
219 Marginal Entry Order granting Defendants' Motion to excuse appearance (Related Doc # 218 ) of out of state counsel. Counsel shall remain available by phone. Judge John R. Adams on 7/9/12.(L,J) (Entered: 07/09/2012)
Minutes of proceedings [non−document] before Judge John R. Adams.Status Conference held on 7/10/12. (Court Reporter: Caroline Mahnke.)Time: 1 Hr. 20 Mins. (K,C) (Entered: 07/10/2012)
220 Non−Appeal Transcript Order Form for proceedings held on 7−10−12 before Judge Adams, Court Reporter: Mahnke. Requested completion date: Ordinary filed by All

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07/17/2012
07/18/2012 07/27/2012
08/01/2012 11/05/2012 11/12/2012 11/19/2012 12/06/2012 12/07/2012 12/07/2012 12/07/2012 12/07/2012 12/07/2012 12/10/2012 12/14/2012 12/14/2012 12/14/2012 12/14/2012

Defendants. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 07/11/2012)
221 Joint Motion for a 14 day extension of Time to File Motion to Disqualify Pending Parties' Efforts at Resolution filed by Rex Davidson, Mitchell Mincy, Alan Spitzer, Spitzer Autoworld Cleveland, LLC., Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc., Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Hakim Nurridin, Dean Okafor. (Bolek, Cathleen) Modified text on 7/18/2012 (P, S). (Entered: 07/17/2012)
222 Marginal Entry Order granting 221 the parties' joint Motion to Extend the deadline for Plaintiffs to move disqualify defense counsel from participating as trial counsel. Judge John R. Adams on 7/18/12.(L,J) (Entered: 07/18/2012)
223 Transcript of Status Conference held on July 10, 2012 before Judge John R. Adams. To obtain a bound copy of this transcript please contact court reporter Caroline Mahnke at 330−252−6021. [46 pages] Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Parties requesting that privacy information be redacted must file a notice of intent to redact with the court by 8/3/2012. Redaction Request due 8/17/2012. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/27/2012. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/25/2012. Related document(s) 220 . (M,Ca) (Entered: 07/27/2012)
224 Joint Proposed Stipulations of Fact filed by all Parties. (Bolek, Cathleen) Modified text on 8/2/2012 (M,TL). (Entered: 08/01/2012)
225 Motion in limine To Exclude Irrelevant, Unfairly Prejudicial Character Evidence filed by Plaintiff/Intervenor Dean Okafor. (Bolek, Cathleen) (Entered: 11/05/2012)
226 Opposition to 225 Motion in limine filed by all Defendants. (Cook, D.) Modified on 11/13/2012 (M,TL). (Entered: 11/12/2012)
227 Reply in support of 225 Motion in limine to Exclude Irrelevant, Unfairly Prejudicial Character Evidence filed by Dean Okafor. (Bolek, Cathleen) Modified text on 11/20/2012 (H,KR). (Entered: 11/19/2012)
228 Order detailing the required conduct of counsel during the upcoming trial in this matter. Judge John R. Adams on 12/6/12. (L,J) (Entered: 12/06/2012)
229 Joint Proposed Jury Instructions filed by All Defendants. (Griffith, Patricia) (Entered: 12/07/2012)
230 Proposed Jury Instructions filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 12/07/2012)
231 Proposed Verdict Form for Nick Hamdan filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) Modified text on 12/10/2012 (M,TL). (Entered: 12/07/2012)
232 Proposed Jury Instructions filed by All Plaintiffs. (McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 12/07/2012)
233 Proposed Verdict Form filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed by EEOC and Dean Okafor. (Bolek, Cathleen) Modified text on 12/10/2012 (M,TL). (Entered: 12/07/2012)
Minutes of proceedings[non−document] before Judge John R. Adams.Final Pretrial Conference held on 12/10/12. (Court Reporter: Lori Callahan.)Time: 1 Hr. 20 Mins. (K,C) (Entered: 12/11/2012)
234 Trial Brief filed by Dean Okafor. (Bolek, Cathleen) (Entered: 12/14/2012)
235 Proposed Witness List filed by Dean Okafor. (Bolek, Cathleen) Modified text on 12/18/2012 (S,HR). (Entered: 12/14/2012)
236 Proposed Exhibit List filed by Dean Okafor. (Bolek, Cathleen) Modified text on 12/18/2012 (S,HR). (Entered: 12/14/2012)
237 Joint Proposed Voir Dire of EEOC, Okafor and Nuriddin, with Proposed Jury Questionnaire attached filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Plaintiffs' Joint Jury Questionnaire)(Bolek, Cathleen) (Entered: 12/14/2012)

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12/14/2012 12/14/2012 12/14/2012 12/14/2012 12/17/2012 12/17/2012 12/17/2012 12/17/2012
12/17/2012 12/21/2012 12/21/2012 12/22/2012
12/24/2012 12/24/2012 12/24/2012 12/24/2012
12/28/2012
12/28/2012

238 Joint Combined Exhibit List filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Hakim Nurridin, Dean Okafor. (Glesius, Amy) Modified text on 12/18/2012 (S,HR). (Entered: 12/14/2012)
239 Trial Brief filed by Hakim Nurridin. (Glesius, Amy) (Entered: 12/14/2012)
240 Trial Brief filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 12/14/2012)
241 Joint Combined Witness List filed by All Plaintiffs. (McMillan, Solvita) Modified text on 12/18/2012 (S,HR). (Entered: 12/14/2012)
242 Joint Exhibit List filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 12/17/2012)
243 Joint Witness List filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 12/17/2012)
244 Joint Proposed Confidential Juror Questionnaire filed by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Confidential Juror Questionnaire)(Cook, D.) Modified text on 12/18/2012 (S,HR). (Entered: 12/17/2012)
245 Joint Motion in limine to exclude evidence filed by Rex Davidson, Mitchell Mincy, Alan Spitzer, Spitzer Autoworld Cleveland, LLC., Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc. (Cook, D.) Modified text on 12/18/2012 (S,HR). (Entered: 12/17/2012)
246 Trial Brief filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 12/17/2012)
247 Expedited Non−Appeal Transcript Order Form for proceedings held on 12/10/12 before Judge Adams, Court Reporter: Callahan. Requested completion date: ASAP filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 12/21/2012)
248 First Amended Joint Proposed Jury Instructions filed by All Parties. (McMillan, Solvita) Modified text on 12/26/2012 (M,TL). (Entered: 12/21/2012)
249 Defendants' First Amended Proposed Jury Instructions filed by Rex Davidson, Mitchell Mincy, Alan Spitzer, Spitzer Autoworld Cleveland, LLC., Spitzer Management, Inc. and Spitzer Motor City, Inc. (Griffith, Patricia) Modified text and filers on 12/26/2012 (M,TL). (Entered: 12/22/2012)
250 Proposed Jury Instructions filed by Dean Okafor. (Bolek, Cathleen) (Entered: 12/24/2012)
251 Proposed Jury Interrogatories filed by Dean Okafor. (Bolek, Cathleen) (Entered: 12/24/2012)
252 Additional Proposed Jury Instructions ,Interrogatories, and Verdict Forms filed by Hakim Nurridin. (Glesius, Amy) Modified text on 12/26/2012 (M,TL). (Entered: 12/24/2012)
253 First Amended Proposed Jury Instructions and Verdict Form Regarding Title VII Claims filed by all Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Revision Plaintiffs' First Amended Joint Proposed Jury Instructions Title VII, # 2 Revision Plaintiffs' First Amended Joint Proposed Verdict Form Title VII)(McMillan, Solvita) Modified text on 12/26/2012 (M,TL). (Entered: 12/24/2012)
254 Transcript of Final Pretrial held on 12/10/12 before Judge John R. Adams. To obtain a bound copy of this transcript please contact court reporter Lori A. Callahan at 330−252−6022. [56 pages] Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Parties requesting that privacy information be redacted must file a notice of intent to redact with the court by 1/4/2013. Redaction Request due 1/18/2013. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 1/28/2013. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 3/28/2013. Related document(s) 247 . (C,L) (Entered: 12/28/2012)
255 Order that each side will be given 28 hours/1680 minutes to put on their case. Time will count against a particular side for any time that counsel for that side is conducting either direct or cross examination. When 75% of a side's time has been used, the Court will entertain a motion for an increase of time, such increase being no more than 20% of the time initially allocated. Motions will be granted only for good cause

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12/28/2012 12/28/2012 12/28/2012 12/30/2012
12/31/2012 12/31/2012 12/31/2012 12/31/2012 12/31/2012 12/31/2012 12/31/2012 01/04/2013 01/04/2013
01/04/2013 01/04/2013

shown.Time is allocated per side, Plaintiffs and Defendants, it is not allocated per party. The parties on each side of this lawsuit are responsible for any allocation among themselves. Judge John R. Adams on 12/28/12. (L,J) (Entered: 12/28/2012)
256 Opposition to 245 Joint Motion in limine to exclude evidence filed by Hakim Nurridin. (Glesius, Amy) (Entered: 12/28/2012)
257 Combined Motion to strike and Memorandum in Opposition to 245 Defendants' late filed Motion in limine filed by Dean Okafor. (Bolek, Cathleen) Modified text on 1/2/2013 (M,TL). (Entered: 12/28/2012)
258 Response to 245 Joint Motion in limine to exclude evidence filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 12/28/2012)
259 Joint Motion to strike undisclosed Defense Witnesses filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Hakim Nurridin and Dean Okafor. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 Email of December 19, 2012, # 2 Exhibit 2 Email of December 29, 2012)(Bolek, Cathleen) Modified filers and text on 1/2/2013 (M,TL). (Entered: 12/30/2012)
260 Defendants' Objections to Plaintiffs' Joint Combined Exhibit List filed by All Defendants. Related document 238 . (Griffith, Patricia) Modified on 1/2/2013 (M,TL). (Entered: 12/31/2012)
261 Objections to Plaintiff−Intervenor Dean Okafor's Proposed Exhibit List filed by All Defendants. Related document 236 . (Griffith, Patricia) Modified text on 1/2/2013 (M,TL). (Entered: 12/31/2012)
262 Objections to 238 Hakim Nuriddin's Exhibit List filed by all Defendants. (Griffith, Patricia) Modified text and added link on 1/2/2013 (M,TL). (Entered: 12/31/2012)
263 Objections to Dean Okafor's Proposed Witness List filed by All Defendants. Related document 235 . (Griffith, Patricia) Modified text on 1/2/2013 (M,TL). (Entered: 12/31/2012)
264 Objections to Plaintiffs' Joint Combined Witness List filed by All Defendants. Related document 241 . (Griffith, Patricia) Modified text on 1/2/2013 (M,TL). (Entered: 12/31/2012)
265 Objection to Defendants' Proposed Witness and Exhibit Lists filed by Hakim Nurridin. Related document(s) 243 , 242 . (Glesius, Amy) (Entered: 12/31/2012)
266 Opposition to Trial Exhibits Identified in Defendants' 242 Joint Exhibit List filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (McMillan, Solvita) Modified text and added link on 1/2/2013 (M,TL). (Entered: 12/31/2012)
267 Notice of Service of Subpoenas for Production from Non−Parties, Voith Industrial Services Company, Indian Hills Healthcare Group, Inc., MotorCars, Inc., Quality Star Motors, LLC, and Sterling Collison Centers, Inc. filed by All Defendants. (Griffith, Patricia) (Entered: 01/04/2013)
268 Joint Motion for sanctions for Withholding Documents by All Plaintiffs filed by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 Defendants' Response to EEOCs First Requests for Production, # 2 Exhibit 2 Defendants' Response to EEOC's Second Requests for Production, # 3 Exhibit 3 Defendants' Response to Okafor's First Set of Discovery Reqeusts, # 4 Exhibit 4 Order of District Court, # 5 Exhibit 5 Letter of May 5, 2010, # 6 Exhibit 6 Letter of May 28, 2010, # 7 Exhibit 7 Email of December 30, 2012, # 8 Exhibit 8 Email of December 30, 2012, # 9 Exhibit 9 Email of December 30, 2012, # 10 Exhibit 10 Email of January 2, 2013, # 11 Exhibit 11 Email of January 3, 2013)(Bolek, Cathleen) (Entered: 01/04/2013)
269 Joint Preliminary Statement filed by All Defendants. (Griffith, Patricia) Modified text on 1/7/2013 (S,He). (Entered: 01/04/2013)
270 Stipulated Facts filed by All Defendants. (Griffith, Patricia) Modified text on 1/7/2013 (S,He). (Entered: 01/04/2013)

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01/04/2013 01/06/2013 01/07/2013 01/08/2013 01/08/2013
01/08/2013 01/09/2013 01/09/2013 01/10/2013 01/10/2013 01/10/2013
01/10/2013 01/11/2013
01/11/2013

271 Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding Non−jury Issues filed by All Plaintiffs. (McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 01/04/2013)
272 Motion for protective order and to Quash Discovery Subpoena filed by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 7−23−10StatHearingTranP10−15, # 2 Exhibit EEOC−v−FoxNewsDecision, # 3 Exhibit EEOC−v−ProtectiveGroupDecision)(McMillan, Solvita). Added motion to quash on 1/7/2013 (S,He). (Entered: 01/06/2013)
273 Notice of Service of of Subpoenas for Production from Non−Parties filed by All Defendants. (Griffith, Patricia) (Entered: 01/07/2013)
274 Notice of Service of Subpoena for Production from Non−Party filed by All Defendants. (Griffith, Patricia) (Entered: 01/08/2013)
275 Response to 268 Joint Motion for sanctions for Withholding Documents by All Plaintiffs filed by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Plaintiff−Intervenor Nuriddin's Opposition to Defendants' Proposed Witness and Exhibit List, # 2 Exhibit Plaintiffs EEOC's Opposition to Trial Exhibits Identified in Defendants' Joint Exhibit List, # 3 Exhibit Defendants' Answers to Plainitff EEOC's First Request for Production of Documents, # 4 Exhibit Email of January 6, 2013, # 5 Exhibit Emails of December 31, 2012, # 6 Exhibit Email of January 6, 2013, # 7 Exhibit Notice of Service of Supplemental Discovery Responses (June 9, 2010))(Cook, D.) (Entered: 01/08/2013)
276 Response to 272 Motion for a protective order and to Quash Discovery Subpoena filed by all Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Deposition Excerpts of Toufic Hamdan, # 2 Exhibit Deposition Excerpts of Hakim Nuriddin, # 3 Exhibit Email Chain)(Cook, D.) Modified text on 1/9/2013 (M,TL). (Entered: 01/08/2013)
277 Notice of Service of Supplemental Financial Information filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 01/09/2013)
278 Supplement Authority in Support of Defendants' 276 Response to Plaintiffs' 272 Motion for a protective order and to quash discovery subpoenas, filed by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Email of January 4, 2013, # 2 Exhibit Email of December 12, 2012)(Cook, D.) Modified text and added link on 1/11/2013 (M,TL). (Entered: 01/09/2013)
279 Marginal Entry Order denying Plaintiffs' Motion for protective order and Motion to quash (Related Doc # 272 ). The Court reserves the right to address the admissibility of any evidence obtained at a later date during trial. Judge John R. Adams on 1/10/13.(L,J) (Entered: 01/10/2013)
280 Objection to Plaintiffs Notice of Intent to Use Demonstrative Exhibits filed by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Emails of January 10, 2013, # 2 Exhibit Abridged Transcript of Final Pre−Trial) (Cook, D.) (Entered: 01/10/2013)
281 Subpoena Returned Executed; served upon 1) Voith Industrial Services Company; 2) Indian Hills Healthcare Group, Inc., Nursing Homes; MotorCars, Inc., MotorCars Honda; 4) Quality Star Motors, LLC; 5) Sterling Collision Centers, Inc.; 6) Boston Mills/Brandywine Ski Resort; 7) CBOCS; and 8) Courtesy Imports, and Valley Automall by hand delivered on 1) Voith − 1/4/2013; 2) Indian Hills − 1/4/13; 3) MotorCars − 1/4/13; 4) Quality Star Motors − 1/4/13; 5) Sterling Collision − 1/4/13; 6) Boston Mills − 1/7/13; 7) CBOCS − 1/8/13; and 8) Courtesy Imports − 1/8/13 filed on behalf of All Defendants (Griffith, Patricia) (Entered: 01/10/2013)
282 Response to Defendants' Objection to Notice of Intent to Use Demonstratives filed by Dean Okafor. Related document(s) 280 .(Bolek, Cathleen) (Entered: 01/10/2013)
283 FILING ERROR − INCOMPLETE DOCUMENTS FILED − ATTORNEY NOTIFIED TO REFILE Subpoena Returned Executed; served upon Blackmur, Johnson, Kim, Kramer, Lycans, Obojski, Procaccini, Sampson, Szatala, Yonke by Process Server on 12/17/2012 filed on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (McMillan, Solvita) Modified on 1/14/2013 (M,TL). (Entered: 01/11/2013)
284 Order granting in part and denying in part Plainitffs' Motion in limine (Related Doc # 225 ); denying Defendants' Motion in limine (Related Doc # 245 ); granting Plaintiffs'

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01/12/2013 01/12/2013
01/14/2013
01/15/2013
01/16/2013
01/16/2013 01/16/2013 01/16/2013
01/17/2013 01/17/2013 01/17/2013 01/17/2013 01/17/2013 01/17/2013 01/17/2013

Motion to strike (Related Doc # 259 ); denying Plaintiffs' Motion for sanctions (Related Doc # 268 ); sustaining Defendants' objections to the production of demonstrative exhibits. See order for specific rulings. Judge John R. Adams on 1/11/13.(L,J) (Entered: 01/11/2013)
285 Attorney Appearance by Matthew D. Besser filed by on behalf of Dean Okafor. (Besser, Matthew) (Entered: 01/12/2013)
286 Joint Motion in limine to Exclude Defendants' Proposed Untimely Evidence filed by Plaintiff/Intervenor Dean Okafor, Plaintiff/Intervenor Hakim Nuriddin and EEOC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A Email of January 4, 2013)(Bolek, Cathleen) Modified filers and text on 1/14/2013 (M,TL). (Entered: 01/12/2013)
Minutes of proceedings [non−document] before Judge John R. Adams.Jury Trial began on 1/14/2013; Voir dire commenced; Jury of 10 seated. Jury Trial continued to 1/15/2013 at 09:15 AM in Courtroom 575 before Judge John R. Adams. (Court Reporter: Lori Callahan.)Time: 6 Hrs. (K,C) (Entered: 01/15/2013)
Minutes of proceedings [non−document] before Judge John R. Adams.Jury Trial held on 1/15/13; Opening statements, Plaintiff began to present case. Jury Trial continued to 1/16/2013 at 09:00 AM in Courtroom 575 before Judge John R. Adams. (Court Reporter: Lori Callahan.)Time: 7 Hrs. (K,C) (Entered: 01/16/2013)
287 Order regarding the amount of time used during January 15, 2013 trial proceedings. Plaintiffs have 1573 minutes remaining, and Defendants have 1654 minutes remaining as of the end of January 15, 2013. Judge John R. Adams on 1/16/13. (L,J) (Entered: 01/16/2013)
Set Deadlines and Hearings Jury Trial set for 1/18/2012 at 09:00 AM in Courtroom 575 before Judge John R. Adams. (K,C) (Entered: 01/16/2013)
Set Deadlines and Hearings Jury Trial set for 1/17/2013 at 09:00 AM in Courtroom 575 before Judge John R. Adams. (K,C) (Entered: 01/16/2013)
Minutes of proceedings [non−document] before Judge John R. Adams.Jury Trial held on 1/16/13; Plaintiff continued to present case. Jury trial continued to 1/17/2013 at 09:00 AM in Courtroom 575 before Judge John R. Adams. (Court Reporter: Lori Callahan.)Time: 6 Hrs. 30 Mins. (K,C) (Entered: 01/17/2013)
288 Subpoena Returned Executed; served upon Tracy Graham by Process Server on 01/15/2013 filed on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 01/17/2013)
289 Subpoena Returned Executed; served upon David Marek by Process Server on 01/12/2013 filed on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 01/17/2013)
290 Subpoena Returned Executed; served upon John Koladka by Process Server on 01/12/2013 filed on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 01/17/2013)
291 Subpoena Returned Executed; served upon Patricia Sintic by Process Server on 01/09/2013 filed on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 01/17/2013)
292 Subpoena Returned Unexecuted; service attempted upon Dean Okafor by Process Server attempted on 01/09/2013 filed on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 01/17/2013)
293 Subpoena Returned Executed; served upon Jessica Lahecka by Process Server on 01/09/2013 filed on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 01/17/2013)
294 Subpoena Returned Executed; served upon James Dombrowski by Process Server on 01/09/2013 filed on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Attachments: # 1 Revision Amendment submitted to reflect the address of service.)(McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 01/17/2013)

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01/17/2013 01/17/2013 01/17/2013 01/17/2013 01/17/2013 01/17/2013 01/17/2013 01/17/2013 01/17/2013 01/17/2013 01/17/2013 01/17/2013 01/17/2013 01/17/2013 01/17/2013 01/17/2013 01/18/2013

295 Subpoena Returned Executed; served upon Edward Caraballo by Process Server on 01/09/2013 filed on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 01/17/2013)
296 Subpoena Returned Executed; served upon Robert Burdue by Process Server on 01/09/2013 filed on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 01/17/2013)
297 Subpoena Returned Executed; served upon Alawy Alawi by Process Server on 01/09/2013 filed on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 01/17/2013)
298 Subpoena Returned Executed; served upon Michael Blackmur by Process Server on 12/17/2012 filed on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 01/17/2013)
299 Subpoena Returned Executed; served upon Christopher Anthony Johnson by Process Server on 12/17/2012 filed on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 01/17/2013)
300 Subpoena Returned Executed; served upon Esther Kim by Process Server on 12/17/2012 filed on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 01/17/2013)
301 Subpoena Returned Unexecuted; service attempted upon John Koladka by Process Server attempted on 12/17/2012 filed on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 01/17/2013)
302 Subpoena Returned Executed; served upon Greg Kramer by Process Server on 12/17/2012 filed on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 01/17/2013)
303 Subpoena Returned Executed; served upon Payton Lycans by Process Server on 12/17/2012 filed on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 01/17/2013)
304 Subpoena Returned Executed; served upon Rosemary Obojski by Process Server on 12/17/2012 filed on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 01/17/2013)
305 Order that Plaintiffs have 1361 minutes remaining as of the end of January 16, 2013. Defendants have 1545 minutes remaining as of the end of January 16, 2013. Judge John R. Adams on 1/17/13. (L,J) (Entered: 01/17/2013)
306 Subpoena Returned Executed; served upon Mike Procaccini by Process Server on 12/17/2012 filed on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 01/17/2013)
307 Subpoena Returned Executed; served upon Arnold Joseph Sampson by Process Server on 12/17/2012 filed on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 01/17/2013)
308 Subpoena Returned Executed; served upon Kevin Szatala by Process Server on 12/17/2012 filed on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 01/17/2013)
309 Subpoena Returned Executed; served upon Mark Yonke by Process Server on 12/17/2012 filed on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 01/17/2013)
310 Response to the Court's Inquiry Into Defendants' Exhibits 12−16 filed by all Defendants. Related document 91 . (Griffith, Patricia) Modified text and added link on 1/23/2013 (M,TL). (Entered: 01/17/2013)
311 Joint Response to Defendants' 310 Response to the Court's Inquiry into Defendants' Exhibits 12−16 filed by Dean Okafor, EEOC and Hakim Nurridin. (Bolek, Cathleen) Modified text and filers and added link on 1/23/2013 (M,TL). (Entered: 01/18/2013)

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01/18/2013 01/18/2013 01/18/2013 01/18/2013 01/21/2013 01/21/2013 01/21/2013 01/22/2013 01/22/2013 01/22/2013 01/22/2013 01/23/2013 01/23/2013 01/24/2013 01/25/2013

312 Order regarding time used during trial. Plaintiffs have 1220 minutes remaining as of the end of January 17, 2013. Defendants have 1519 minutes remaining as of the end of January 17, 2013. Judge John R. Adams on 1/18/13. (L,J) (Entered: 01/18/2013)
313 Order that jurors should be provided lunch at the court's expense on 1/18/13. The jurors are sequestered during the lunch break. Judge John R. Adams on 1/18/13. (K,C) (Entered: 01/18/2013)
314 Minutes of proceedings [non−document] before Judge John R. Adams.Jury Trial held on 1/17/13; Plaintiff continued to present case; Jury trial continued to 1/18/2013 at 09:30 AM in Courtroom 575 before Judge John R. Adams. (Court Reporter: Lori Callahan.)Time: 4 Hrs. (K,C) (Entered: 01/18/2013)
Minutes of proceedings[non−document] before Judge John R. Adams.Jury Trial held on 1/18/13. Plaintiff continued to present case. Jury trial continued to 1/22/13 at 9:00 a.m. (Court Reporter: Lori Callahan.)Time: 6 Hrs. 45 Mins. (K,C) (Entered: 01/24/2013)
315 Motion to Bar Defendants from Recalling Witnesses not Identified filed by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Hakim Nurridin, Dean Okafor. (Glesius, Amy) Modified text on 1/23/2013 (M,TL). (Entered: 01/21/2013)
316 Response to 315 Motion to Bar Defendants from Calling Witnesses Not Identified filed by all Defendants. (Cook, D.) Modified text on 1/23/2013 (M,TL). (Entered: 01/21/2013)
317 Affidavit of Attorney Lindsey Poprocki filed by all Defendants. Document unsigned. (Cook, D.) Modified text and emailed attorney on 1/23/2013 (M,TL). (Entered: 01/21/2013)
318 Order regarding time used in trial on 1/18/13. Plaintiffs have 1044 minutes remaining as of the end of January 18, 2013. Defendants have 1416 minutes remaining as of the end of January 18, 2013. Judge John R. Adams on 1/22/13. (L,J) (Entered: 01/22/2013)
319 Subpoena Returned Executed; served upon Christopher Johnson by Process Server on 1/18/13 filed on behalf of All Defendants (Griffith, Patricia) (Entered: 01/22/2013)
Minutes of proceedings [non−document] before Judge John R. Adams. Jury Trial held on 1/22/2013, adjourned at 10:30 a.m. Jury Trial continued to 1/23/2013 at 08:30 AM in Courtroom 575 before Judge John R. Adams. (Court Reporter: C. Mahnke.)Time: 2 hours. (M,TL) (Entered: 01/22/2013)
320 Motion for default judgment filed by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Hakim Nurridin, Dean Okafor. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit May 20, 2010 Letter, # 2 Exhibit May 28, 2010 Letter, # 3 Exhibit Jan 22, 2013 email)(Bolek, Cathleen) (Entered: 01/22/2013)
321 Order declaring a mistrial and setting a briefing schedule for further motion practice. See order for details. Judge John R. Adams on 1/23/13. (L,J) (Entered: 01/23/2013)
Minutes of proceedings[non−document] before Judge John R. Adams. Jury trial commenced on 1/23/13 without jurors present; The Court ruled a mistrial. Jurors contacted at home and released. Jury Trial completed on 1/23/2013 (Court Reporter: Caroline Mahnke.)Time: 1 Hr. (K,C) (Entered: 01/24/2013)
322 Expedited Non−Appeal Transcript Order Form for proceedings held on January 23, 2013 before Judge Adams, Court Reporter: Mahnke. Requested completion date: ASAP filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 01/24/2013)
323 Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Mistrial held on January 23, 2013 before Judge John R. Adams. To obtain a bound copy of this transcript please contact court reporter Caroline Mahnke at 330−252−6021. [43 pages] Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Parties requesting that privacy information be redacted must file a notice of intent to redact with the court by 2/1/2013. Redaction Request due 2/15/2013. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/25/2013. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/25/2013. Related document(s) 322 . (M,Ca) (Entered: 01/25/2013)

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01/25/2013 01/29/2013 01/30/2013
01/30/2013 02/01/2013 02/05/2013 02/06/2013 02/08/2013
02/09/2013

324 Non−Appeal Transcript Order Form for proceedings held on 1/23/2013 before Judge Adams, Court Reporter: Caroline Mahnke. Requested completion date: 1/25/2013 filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 01/25/2013)
325 Notice of Submission of Affidavit filed by Spitzer Management, Inc.. (Scully, William) (Entered: 01/29/2013)
326 Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's 320 Motion for default judgment and Motion for attorneys fees and costs filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Hakim Nurridin, Dean Okafor. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A Notice of Change, # 2 Exhibit B Letter of Anthony Giardin, # 3 Exhibit C Letter of Cathleen Bolek, # 4 Exhibit D Letter of D. Chris Cook, # 5 Exhibit E Email of D. Chris Cook, # 6 Exhibit F Spitzer Answer to Nuriddin's Discovery, # 7 Exhibit G Kim Driving Record, # 8 Exhibit H Spitzer Answer to Okafor's Discovery, # 9 Exhibit I Email from A Glesius to Chris Cook dated May 12, 2010, # 10 Exhibit J Email from A Glesius to Chris Cook dated May 19, 2010, # 11 Exhibit K Employment Verification dated March 13, 2002, # 12 Exhibit L Nuriddin's Employment Status dated May 2, 2002, # 13 Exhibit M Request for Verification of Employment for Nuriddin dated March 10, 2004, # 14 Exhibit N Sir Evan's Document, # 15 Exhibit O Veracity Questionnaire, # 16 Exhibit P Advertisement, # 17 Exhibit Q Email of Mr. Cook dated April 2, 2010, # 18 Exhibit R Emails, # 19 Exhibit S Spitzer Response to EEOC Discovery, # 20 Affidavit Barnard Declaration, # 21 Affidavit Bolek Declaration, # 22 Affidavit Buck Declaration, # 23 Affidavit Glesius Declaration, # 24 Affidavit Royer Declaration, # 25 Affidavit Besser Declaration)(Bolek, Cathleen) Modified text on 1/31/2013 (M,TL). (Entered: 01/30/2013)
327 Motion for costs and fees filed by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Declaration in Support of Fees, # 2 Affidavit Declaration in Support of Costs)(McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 01/30/2013)
328 Witness List of witnesses who testified during trial January 15−18, 2013. (R,Sh) (Entered: 02/01/2013)
329 Notice of Filing of Amended Declaration of Counsel for Plaintiff−Intervenor Nuriddin filed by Hakim Nurridin. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Royer amended declaration)Related document(s) 326 , 320 .(Glesius, Amy) (Entered: 02/05/2013)
330 Response in Opposition to 326 Supplemental Motion for default judgment and 320 Motion for default judgment filed by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Email from Attorney Glesius dated December 12, 2012, # 2 Exhibit Invoices regarding Service of Subpoenas, # 3 Exhibit Email from Attorney Bolek dated December 11, 2012)(Cook, D.) Modified text on 2/7/2013 (M,TL). (Entered: 02/06/2013)
331 Motion for leave Instanter to Supplement Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Joint Motion for Default and Sanctions: Notice of Proffer of Exhibits and Testimony filed by Rex Davidson, Mitchell Mincy, Alan Spitzer, Spitzer Autoworld Cleveland, LLC., Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc.. Related document(s) 330 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Plaintiffs' Trial Exhbits 3−33 through 3−37, # 2 Exhibit Defendants' Trial Exhibits 1012−1016, # 3 Exhibit Affidavit of Attorney Lindsey Poprocki, # 4 Exhibit Investigative Notes, # 5 Exhibit Affidavit of Magistrate Michelle Pena, # 6 Exhibit Affidavit of Attorney Anthony Giardini, # 7 Exhibit Esther Kim documents, # 8 Exhibit Tracy Graham documents, # 9 Exhibit Mike Blackmur document, # 10 Exhibit Hakim Nuriddin documents, # 11STRICKEN per Order, re 334 Exhibit Dean Okafor documents, # 12 Exhibit Affidavit of Tom Bury)(Cook, D.) Modified text on 2/11/2013 (M,TL). Modified to add stricken language on 2/20/2013 (R,Sh). (Entered: 02/08/2013)
332 Motion to Withdraw and Strike from the Record Three Unredacted Exhibits from Defendants' 331 Supplemental Response filed 2/8/13 − Doc #331 and Substitute Redacted Exhibits filed by Rex Davidson, Mitchell Mincy, Alan Spitzer, Spitzer Autoworld Cleveland, LLC., Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Redacted Okafor Documents − 11C, 11D, and 11E)(Griffith, Patricia) Modified text and added link on 2/11/2013 (M,TL). (Entered: 02/09/2013)

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02/10/2013
02/20/2013 02/21/2013 05/22/2013
05/22/2013 05/22/2013 05/23/2013 05/28/2013 05/28/2013 05/29/2013 06/04/2013 06/05/2013 06/05/2013 06/12/2013 07/25/2013

333 Joint Reply to 330 response, in support of 320 Motion for default judgment , filed by Dean Okafor, Hakim Nuriddin and EEOC. Related documents 326 , 331 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 Statement of Wayne Andrews, # 2 Exhibit 2 Email Exchange of February 9, 2013, # 3 Exhibit 3 Letter to Mr. Giardini of October 10, 2007, # 4 Exhibit 4 Bury File)(Bolek, Cathleen) Modified text and filers and added link on 2/11/2013 (M,TL). (Entered: 02/10/2013)
334 Marginal Entry Order granting Defendants' Motion to Strike document (Related Doc # 332 ). Document 331−11 is hereby STRICKEN. Counsel may refile the entire exhibit, properly redacted. Judge John R. Adams on 2/20/13.(R,Sh) (Entered: 02/20/2013)
335 Defendants' Notice of Filing Redacted Exhibits Pursuant to the Court's 334 Order of 2/20/13 filed by all Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Redacted Exhibit 11) Related document 331 .(Cook, D.) Modified text and added link on 2/22/2013 (M,TL). (Entered: 02/21/2013)
336 Order denying Plaintiffs' Motions for default judgment (Related Docs # 320 326 ); granting Plaintiffs' motions for fees and costs (Related Docs # 326 327 ); granting Defendants' Motion for leave to file a supplemental opposition(Related Doc # 331 ). Status Conference set for 6/5/2013 at 01:30 PM in Courtroom 575 before Judge John R. Adams. All counsel and parties shall attend. See order for further details. Judge John R. Adams on 5/22/13.(L,J) (Entered: 05/22/2013)
337 Marginal Entry Order denying as moot Plaintiffs' Motion in limine (Related Doc # 286 ) to exclude untimely produced evidence. Judge John R. Adams on 5/22/13.(L,J) (Entered: 05/22/2013)
338 Marginal Entry Order denying as moot Plaintiffs' Motion for order (Related Doc # 315 ) barring the recalling of witnesses. Judge John R. Adams on 5/22/13.(L,J) (Entered: 05/22/2013)
339 Motion for Corrected Order Pursuant to Rule 60(A) filed by Plaintiff/Intervenor Hakim Nurridin. Related document 336 . (Glesius, Amy) Modified text on 5/24/2013 (M,TL). (Entered: 05/23/2013)
340 Marginal Entry Order granting Plaintiff Nuriddin's Motion for order (Related Doc # 339 ) correcting the award of attorney fees. The Court's mathematical error in Doc. 336 is hereby corrected and Plaintiff Nuriddin is awarded attorney fees in the total amount of $130,415. Judge John R. Adams on 5/28/13.(L,J) (Entered: 05/28/2013)
341 Motion for leave to Allow EEOC Agency Representative to Attend Status Conference by Telephone filed by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 05/28/2013)
342 Marginal Entry Order granting Plaintiff EEOC's Motion to excuse (Related Doc # 341 ) the appearance of its representative at the status conference. Judge John R. Adams on 5/29/13.(L,J) (Entered: 05/29/2013)
343 Motion to excuse Individual Defendants, Mitch Mincy & Rex Davidson filed by Rex Davidson, Mitchell Mincy, Alan Spitzer, Spitzer Autoworld Cleveland, LLC., Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc.. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 06/04/2013)
344 Marginal Entry Order granting Defendants' Motion to excuse (Related Doc # 343 ) the appearance of Defendants Mincy and Davidson at the status conference. Judge John R. Adams on 6/5/13.(L,J) (Entered: 06/05/2013)
Minutes of proceedings [non−document] before Judge John R. Adams. Status Conference held on 06/05/2013. (Court Reporter: Lori Callahan.) Time: 2 hours. (M,TL) (Entered: 06/06/2013)
345 Order appointing David Rosenblum Cohen as Special Master to oversee the discovery necessary for retrial. Judge John R. Adams on 6/12/13. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit)(K,C) (Entered: 06/12/2013)
346 Joint Motion for extension of time until September 9, 2013 to File Proposed Consent Decree filed by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 07/25/2013)

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07/29/2013 07/31/2013 08/01/2013 08/02/2013
08/08/2013 08/12/2013 09/09/2013 09/12/2013 10/02/2013 10/03/2013

347 Marginal Entry Order granting 346 the parties' joint Motion for Extension of Time to file a consent decree. NO FURTHER EXTENSIONS beyond the 9/9/13 deadline will be entertained. Judge John R. Adams on 7/29/13.(L,J) (Entered: 07/29/2013)
348 Order setting a hearing to be held on 8/7/2013 at 01:30 PM in Courtroom 575. Counsel for defendants may attend by phone. Judge John R. Adams on 7/31/13. (K,C) (Entered: 07/31/2013)
349 Proposed Stipulation of Dismissal of Claims of Dean Okafor filed by Dean Okafor, Alan Spitzer, Spitzer Autoworld Cleveland, LLC., Spitzer Management, Inc., Spitzer Motor City, Inc.. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 08/01/2013)
350 Marginal Order dismissing all claims of Plaintiff/Intervenor Dean Okafor, with prejudice. All costs shall be taxed to the Defendants. The Court retains jurisdiction over this matter in the event it becomes necessary for any party to seek to enforce the settlement reached in this matter. Related document 349 . Judge John R. Adams on 8/2/2013. (R,Sh) Modified to add marginal on 8/5/2013 (H,KR). (Entered: 08/02/2013)
Minutes of proceedings [non−document] before Judge John R. Adams. Status Conference held on 08/07/2013. (Court Reporter: Caroline Mahnke.)Time: 3 hours 50 minutes. (M,TL) Modified text on 8/12/2013 (P, S). (Entered: 08/08/2013)
351 Order filed under seal. Judge John R. Adams on 8/12/13. (K,C) (Entered: 08/12/2013)
352 Proposed Consent Decree filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 09/09/2013)
353 Consent Decree. Judge John R. Adams on 9/12/13. (K,C) (Entered: 09/12/2013)
354 Proposed Stipulation of Claims of Hakim Nuriddin filed by All Defendants. (Cook, D.) (Entered: 10/02/2013)
355 Stipulation and Order dismissing all claims of Hakim Nuriddin with prejudice. All costs taxed to Defendants. The Court retains jurisdiction. Judge John R. Adams on 10/3/13. (K,C) (Entered: 10/03/2013)