Case 1:13-cv-00497 Document 1 Filed 08/07/13 Page 1 of 55 PageID #: 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

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RAJU MEGANATHAN,

:

SARAVANACHLEVAN

:

NARAYANASAMY, SARAVANAN

:

RAMASAMY, MARUTHAMUTHU

:

MAYAVU,

:

:

Plaintiffs,

:

:

-against-

:

:

SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL L.L.C., SIGNAL :

INTERNATIONAL, INC., SIGNAL

:

INTERNATIONAL TEXAS, G.P., SIGNAL :

INTERNATIONAL TEXAS, L.P., MALVERN :

C. BURNETT, GULF COAST

:

IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER, L.L.C.,

:

LAW OFFICES OF MALVERN C.

:

BURNETT, A.P.C., MICHAEL POL,

:

GLOBAL RESOURCES, INC., SACHIN

:

DEWAN, and DEWAN CONSULTANTS

:

PVT. LTD. (a/k/a MEDTECH

:

CONSULTANTS),

:

Civil Action No. 1:13-cv-00497 Complaint

: Defendants.

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COMPLAINT

1. Plaintiffs are part of a group of approximately 590 Indian men who were trafficked into the United States in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina through the federal government’s H-2B guest worker program to provide labor and services to Defendants Signal International, L.L.C., Signal International, Inc., Signal International Texas, L.P. and Signal International Texas, G.P. (collectively, “Signal” or the “Signal Defendants”). Recruited to perform welding, pipefitting, and other marine-fabrication work, Plaintiffs were subjected to forced labor and other abuses at Signal’s operations in Orange, Texas and Pascagoula,

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Mississippi. 2. Plaintiffs bring this action to recover damages from Defendant Signal, as well as
Signal’s recruiters and agents operating in India and the United States. Defendants exploited and defrauded Plaintiffs by recruiting them to work in the United States and effectuating a broad scheme of psychological coercion, threats of serious harm and threatened abuse of the legal process to procure and maintain Plaintiffs’ labor for the benefit of Signal. Plaintiffs were further defrauded out of thousands of dollars in recruitment fees under the false promise that they would receive long-term work and permanent residency in the United States.
3. Enticed by promises of relatively high wages (at $19 USD per hour, plus overtime pay), as well as permanent residency, Plaintiffs relinquished stable employment opportunities in Singapore and India and borrowed substantial amounts of money to take advantage of seemingly promising opportunities in the United States. Signal’s labor recruiters demanded between $10,000 and $20,000 USD in application fees, causing Plaintiffs to incur significant debts, post their families’ property as collateral, and jeopardize their financial security.
4. Defendants’ main recruiting agent in India, Dewan Consultants, held Plaintiffs’ passports and visas and threatened, coerced, and defrauded Plaintiffs into paying extraordinary fees for recruitment, immigration processing, and travel. This threatening, coercive, and fraudulent activity induced Plaintiffs into entering the United States to work for Signal. Defendants further caused Plaintiffs to believe that if Plaintiffs did not work for Signal under the auspices of temporary H-2B guestworker visas, Plaintiffs would suffer abuse or threatened abuse of the legal process, physical restraint, and/or other serious harm.
5. As seasonal guest workers, Plaintiffs were ineligible for permanent residency, which the Signal Defendants knew but fraudulently concealed from Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs,
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however, believed what they were told by the Recruiter Defendants in India—that they could obtain permanent residency for themselves and for their families in the United States through working for Signal. These false promises, collection of exorbitant recruiting fees, and strongarm tactics of Defendants Signal and/or its agents were, upon information and belief, authorized by Defendant Signal, which knew of these facts from the first Indian H-2B workers to arrive at its facilities in the United States as early as October 2006. Rather than taking any corrective measures to remedy the recruiting scheme perpetrated by the Recruiter Defendants in India, Defendant Signal ratified and perpetuated the scheme by continuing to facilitate the transportation of further waves of Indian H-2B workers, including Plaintiffs.
6. Prior to arriving in the United States, Plaintiffs had been told that they could live in apartments or houses. This, however, was a far cry from the facilities in which they were required to live when they arrived in the United States—overcrowded, unhygienic, and diseaseridden work camps resembling prisons. Defendant Signal’s armed guards surrounded the work camps at all hours and regularly searched Plaintiffs upon their entry and exit. Moreover, Plaintiffs were shocked to discover that they would be required to surrender roughly $1,050 USD per month to live in such conditions. When Plaintiffs asked about alternative housing, the Signal Defendants used economic coercion to force them to stay. As the Signal Defendants explained, if Plaintiffs were to move out of the work camps and reside elsewhere, Signal still would deduct approximately $1,050 USD per month from their paychecks for housing costs. Since Plaintiffs could not afford to rent alternative housing and pay what would amount to double-rent, they had no choice but to remain in Signal’s labor camps and endure deplorable living conditions. Plaintiffs never knowingly agreed to this fixed, monthly payment regardless of whether or not they lived in these labor camps, and they would not have agreed to it had they understood this.
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7. Defendant Signal also deceived Plaintiffs about their visa status repeatedly, threatened that Plaintiffs could be deported at any moment, and perpetuated a campaign of psychological abuse, coercion, and fraud calculated to render Plaintiffs afraid, intimidated, and unable to leave Signal’s employ. Deeply indebted, fearful, isolated, and unfamiliar with their rights under United States law, Plaintiffs were compelled to continue working for Signal and regularly feared deportation after learning that their temporary visas had expired.
8. In sum, Defendants, individually and jointly, conspired and schemed to target Plaintiffs as Indian laborers, knowing that they would be enticed by good pay and false promises of permanent residency, to lure them into the United States. Furthermore, each Defendant, individually and through a collaborative enterprise premised upon fraud, mistreated Plaintiffs and deprived them of any benefit of a fair bargain.
9. As a result of these abuses, Plaintiffs are entitled to relief from Defendants under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (“TVPRA”), the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) and common law theories of fraud, negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 10. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction), 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (civil trafficking) and 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (RICO). 11. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over causes of action based on state law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, as the state law claims arise out of the same nucleus of operative facts that support the federal claims. 12. Venue in the Eastern District of Texas is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 in that a substantial portion of the communications, transactions, events or omissions underlying
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Plaintiffs’ claims occurred in and around the vicinity of Orange, Texas, within this judicial district. Venue also is proper because a majority of the Plaintiffs named in this Complaint reside and work within this judicial district.
13. Declaratory relief is sought under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 et seq. PARTIES Plaintiffs
14. All Plaintiffs are Indian nationals, of Indian race and ethnicity and former H-2B guest workers who were recruited from India by Defendants in or about 2006 and worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas, and Pascagoula, Mississippi, facilities after arriving in the United States. Plaintiffs each paid the Defendants the equivalent of between $10,000 and $20,000 USD in “recruitment fees” based on the false promise that Defendants would assist them in applying for and receiving permanent U.S. residency (commonly referred to as obtaining “green cards”). Plaintiffs were each subjected to discriminatory, dangerous, and abusive treatment upon arriving at Signal.
15. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs were “persons” within the meaning of that term as defined by RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3).
16. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs were engaged in interstate commerce and/or were involved in the production of goods for sale in interstate commerce.
17. Plaintiffs were former putative class members in the Civil Action styled Kurian David, et. al. v. Signal Int’l, LLC, et. al., 2:08-cv-01220-SM-DEK, which currently is pending in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. On January 4, 2012, class certification in that case was denied, thus allowing Plaintiffs to file individual actions.
18. Plaintiff Raju Meganathan (“Meganathan”) was recruited in or about May of 2006
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and arrived in the United States on or about December 11, 2006. 19. Plaintiff Saravanachlevan Narayanasamy (“Narayanasamy”) was recruited in or
about November of 2006 and arrived in the United States on or about January 24, 2007. 20. Plaintiff Saravanan Ramasamy (“Ramasamy”) was recruited in or about
November of 2006 and arrived in the United States on or about January 31, 2007. 21. Plaintiff Maruthamuthu Mayavu (“Mayavu”) was recruited in or about May of
2006 and arrived in the United States on or about November 19, 2006. Defendants
Employer/Signal Defendants 22. Defendant Signal International, L.L.C., is a corporation organized under the laws of Delaware and is a provider of marine and fabrication services in the Gulf Coast region, with operations in Orange, Texas, Pascagoula, Mississippi, and Mobile, Alabama. At all relevant times, Signal International, L.L.C. acted as an agent and/or alter ego of Signal International, Inc., and engaged in all of the conduct discussed herein with the knowledge and consent of Signal International, Inc. 23. Defendant Signal International, Inc., a company organized under the laws of Delaware, was formed in 2007 as the holding company of Signal International, L.L.C. and the other Signal entities named below. 24. Defendant Signal International Texas, G.P., is a Texas general partnership owned by or affiliated with Signal International, L.L.C., which, upon information and belief, was the direct employer of Plaintiffs while they worked in Signal’s Orange, Texas and Pascagoula, Mississippi facilities. 25. Defendant Signal International Texas, L.P., is a Texas limited partnership, which, upon information and belief, is co-owned by Signal International Texas, G.P. (approximately one
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percent) and by Signal International, L.L.C. (approximately 99 percent). 26. All four Signal entities are referred to herein collectively as “Signal” or the
“Signal Defendants.” Recruiter Defendants
27. Defendant Global Resources, Inc. (“Global Resources”) is or was a corporation organized under the laws of Mississippi and engaged in the business of recruiting workers from India for employment in the United States. Global Resources has or had during the relevant time period substantial business contacts in or around Orange, Texas.
28. Defendant Michael Pol (“Pol”) is or was the President of Global Resources and, upon information and belief, resides in Mississippi. Pol has substantial business contacts in or around Orange, Texas. Defendants Pol and Global Resources are alter egos. Pol and Global Resources will be referred to collectively as “Pol,” unless a distinction is drawn between them.
29. Defendant Dewan Consultants Pvt. Ltd. (a/k/a Medtech Consultants) (“Dewan Consultants”) is a private limited liability company organized under the laws of India. In 2004, Dewan Consultants contracted with Defendant Global Resources and Defendant Malvern C. Burnett—through Defendant Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C.—to identify and recruit Indian workers for employment in the United States via the enticement of permanent residency visas. Dewan Consultants has substantial business contacts in or around Orange, Texas.
30. Defendant Sachin Dewan (“Dewan”) is the Director of Dewan Consultants. Dewan resides in India and has substantial business contacts in or around Orange, Texas. Dewan and Dewan Consultants will be referred to collectively below as “Dewan,” unless a distinction is drawn between them.
31. Upon information and belief, Defendants Dewan and Dewan Consultants have
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authorized and utilized Defendants Pol and Global Resources and the Facilitator Defendants described below to act as their United States-based operators and/or agents.
32. Upon information and belief, Defendants Pol and Global Resources and the Facilitator Defendants described below have authorized and utilized Defendants Dewan and Dewan Consultants to act as their India-based operators and/or agents.
33. Upon information and belief, Defendants Dewan, Dewan Consultants, Pol and Global Resources and the Facilitator Defendants described below conspired together with respect to the recruitment, contracting and provision of Plaintiffs for labor or services at Signal’s Orange, Texas, and Pascagoula, Mississippi, facilities.
34. Defendants Pol and Global Resources and the Facilitator Defendants described below utilized Defendants Dewan and Dewan Consultants to conduct and carry out their shared business interests and activities in India. Among other things, upon information and belief, Defendants Pol and Global Resources have shared offices with Defendants Dewan and Dewan Consultants in India.
35. Upon information and belief, Defendants Dewan and Dewan Consultants have utilized Defendants Pol and Global Resources and the Facilitator Defendants described below to conduct and to effectuate their shared business interests of luring and trafficking Indian laborers into the United States.
36. Throughout this Complaint, Plaintiffs refer to Defendants Dewan, Dewan Consultants, Pol and Global Resources, collectively as the “Recruiter Defendants.”
Facilitator Defendants 37. Defendant Malvern C. Burnett (“Burnett”) is an attorney who, upon information and belief, resides in and maintains offices in New Orleans, Louisiana, and has substantial business contacts in Texas. Burnett performed much of the legal work necessary to bring
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Plaintiffs and other Indian workers to the United States on H-2B visas. 38. Defendant Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C. (“Burnett Law Offices”) is
a professional law corporation organized under the laws of Louisiana and located in New Orleans, Louisiana, with substantial business contacts in Texas. Upon information and belief, Defendant Burnett serves as its sole registered agent, member and/or corporate officer.
39. Defendant Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C. (“Gulf Coast Immigration”) is a limited liability corporation organized under the laws of Louisiana and located in New Orleans, Louisiana, with substantial business contacts in Texas. Upon information and belief, Defendant Burnett serves as its sole registered agent, member and/or corporate officer. Burnett, the Burnett Law Offices and Gulf Coast Immigration operated as a joint venture and/or alter egos and will be referred to collectively below as the “Facilitator Defendants,” unless a distinction is drawn between them.
All Defendants 40. At all relevant times, Defendants Dewan, Dewan Consultants, Pol, Global Resources, Burnett, Burnett Law Offices and Gulf Coast Immigration acted as agents of Defendant Signal for the purpose of recruiting, obtaining, contracting with, transporting and/or providing Plaintiffs for labor or services in Signal’s Orange, Texas, and Pascagoula, Mississippi, facilities. 41. All Defendants acted together in a joint enterprise to commit the wrongful actions described herein. 42. The actions of the Recruiter Defendants and the Facilitator Defendants described herein were performed within the scope of their agency to Signal. 43. Individually and through their agents, associates, attorneys and/or employees, all Defendants have significant contacts in or around Orange, Texas.
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44. At all relevant times, Defendants were “persons” within the meaning of that term as defined by RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3).
45. Upon information and belief, Defendants have been engaged in contacts with Plaintiffs, including recruiting, obtaining, labor contracting, providing immigration-related services to, transporting, harboring and providing and/or employing Plaintiffs.
46. At all relevant times, Defendants engaged in interstate commerce or in the production of goods for interstate commerce.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS The Recruitment Process
47. Throughout the spring, summer, and fall of 2006, Defendant Dewan Consultants placed advertisements in various Indian-language newspapers offering opportunities for welders and fitters to immigrate permanently to the United States under the auspices of Defendant Signal, which it described as “a leading marine and fabrication company in Mississippi and Texas.”
48. Defendant Dewan Consultants’ advertisements and other recruiting efforts were undertaken on behalf of, at the direction of, and/or in coordination and consultation with Defendant Signal.
49. The advertisements placed by Defendant Dewan Consultants promised that qualified candidates could obtain green cards and thereby legally and permanently immigrate to the United States with their families. The advertisements encouraged interested parties to travel to various locations throughout India to obtain additional information about the prospect of employment with Signal in the United States.
50. Upon information and belief, prior to conducting these informational sessions, Defendant Dewan Consultants, Defendant Signal, Defendant Pol and Defendant Burnett
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conferred by phone, mail, fax and/or e-mail to organize, plan and coordinate the substantive content of the informational sessions. In the meantime, Defendant Dewan Consultants communicated with interested workers, including each of Plaintiffs, through telephone conversations, faxes and other written documents, informing them that in exchange for a recruitment fee, they and their families would be able to obtain permanent legal residence within the United States.
51. Through these communications, Defendant Dewan Consultants, personally and/or through its agents, representatives, and/or employees, represented to Plaintiffs that Defendant Signal was a stable and reputable U.S. company offering lawful and ample employment opportunities, that working under an H-2B visa for Signal was not inconsistent with applying for permanent immigration status sponsored by Signal, and that Signal would obtain for Plaintiffs work-authorized green cards enabling Plaintiffs to permanently and legally reside in the United States with their families.
52. Upon information and belief, at informational meetings and in telephone conversations, faxes, and other written documents transmitted in late 2006, Defendant Dewan Consultants, personally and/or through their agents, employees and/or representatives, told Plaintiffs that the green card process, once commenced, would be completed by June 31, 2007.
53. In these communications with Plaintiffs, Defendant Dewan Consultants further promised to act diligently and to do everything necessary to obtain green cards for Plaintiffs within the promised timelines.
54. Defendant Dewan Consultants, Defendant Signal, Defendant Pol and Defendant Burnett induced Plaintiffs to enter into employment agreements by falsely promising to help Plaintiffs obtain green cards. In actuality, Defendants lacked the intent to diligently pursue
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Plaintiffs’ green card applications. They also lacked any basis whatsoever for representing, inter alia, that the companies and/or entities that purportedly were sponsoring Plaintiffs’ applications were financially solvent and had reliable and stable employment opportunities to provide Plaintiffs, that green card applications sponsored by those companies would be valid and bona fide under U.S. immigration law, and that any applications were likely to be successfully completed and approved within the promised timelines.
55. In the second half of 2006, Defendant Dewan Consultants told Plaintiffs that if they successfully completed three phases of employment screening, they would be hired by Defendant Signal and ultimately would be given green cards for permanent residency in the United States.
56. The three-phase screening process required: (i) timely payment of a registration fee; (ii) successful completion of a consulate interview with the United States Consular Office; and (iii) passing a labor skills test administered by Defendant Signal and Defendant Dewan Consultants.
Recruitment of Raju Meganathan 57. At the time the Recruiter Defendants’ advertisements appeared in local newspapers, Plaintiff Meganathan was employed in Chennai, India, where he worked as a welder. Plaintiff Meganathan was informed of the advertisement from a friend in India and attended the informatory meeting described in the advertisement. 58. Defendant Dewan Consultants instructed Plaintiff Meganathan that to apply for employment with Signal, he would be required to pay a registration fee of 760,000 Indian rupees (approximately $16,826 USD) that could be paid in installments and would be divided amongst the Recruiter Defendants and Facilitator Defendants. Defendant Dewan Consultants informed Plaintiff Meganathan that this large sum of money amounted to a registration fee that would
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enable Defendants Burnett and Pol to obtain a green card for him, which would enable his permanent residency within the United States.
59. Plaintiff Meganathan was later told by Defendant Dewan Consultants that the registration fee would be reduced to 600,000 rupees (approximately $13,398 USD). Defendant Dewan Consultants instructed Plaintiff Meganathan that his first installment would be due after paying 2,000 rupees (approximately $44 USD) for skills testing. Plaintiff Meganathan was told further that his first installment was to be made in separate checks payable to Defendant Burnett and Defendant Pol, each in the amount of $1,428.57 USD and a cash payment of $1,461 USD to Defendant Dewan for a total of $4,318.04 USD.
60. In addition to the first installment, Plaintiff Meganathan was told that he would be required to pay 5,300 rupees (approximately $117 USD) in processing fees for the U.S. consulate and 2,000 rupees (approximately $44 USD) for a medical exam in Chennai. Plaintiff Meganathan was told further that his last installment was to be made in separate checks payable to Defendant Burnett and Defendant Pol, each in the amount of $2,442 USD, as well as a cash payment of $3,542 USD to Defendant Dewan for a total of $8,426 USD.
61. In addition to paying the recruiting fees, Plaintiff Meganathan also provided paperwork and his passport to Defendant Dewan Consultants. Defendant Dewan Consultants informed Plaintiff Meganathan that it needed each of these items to schedule Plaintiff Meganathan’s consular interview.
62. In reasonable reliance upon Defendant Dewan Consultants’ explicit and repeated promises that he would receive a green card in exchange for paying the required recruiting fees, which would enable him and his family to obtain permanent residency, Plaintiff Meganathan undertook considerable economic, social, familial, and personal sacrifices to obtain the funds
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necessary to cover the fees. Plaintiff Meganathan and his family are of modest means and were forced to borrow most of the money needed to pay his registration fee from lenders, who charged significant interest rates.
63. Defendant Dewan Consultants further told Plaintiff Meganathan that he would not get his passport back until he came to Mumbai, India, and paid the rest of the registration fees. Plaintiff Meganathan’s conversation with Defendant Dewan Consultants caused him to reasonably believe that his passport would not be returned if he failed to make the remaining payments.
Recruitment of Saravanachlevan Narayanasamy 64. At the time that Defendant Dewan Consultants issued its advertisements for work in the United States, Plaintiff Narayanasamy worked in Singapore as a pipefiter. Plaintiff Narayanasamy was informed of Defendant Dewan Consultants’ advertisement from a friend in India. 65. Though Plaintiff Narayanasamy’s employment contract in Singapore was several years from expiring, he returned to India to pursue the opportunity to work at Signal in the United States. 66. Plaintiff Narayanasamy contacted Dewan Consultants by telephone in November 2006 and was instructed to travel to Chennai, India, to attend an informational meeting hosted by Dewan Consultants. 67. Defendant Dewan Consultants instructed Plaintiff Narayanasamy that to apply for employment with Signal, he would be required to pay a registration fee that could be paid in installments and would be divided among the Recruiter Defendants and Facilitator Defendants. Defendant Dewan Consultants instructed Plaintiff Narayanasamy to pay an initial installment of 35,000 rupees (approximately $782 USD), payable to Dewan Consultants, prior to participating
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in skills testing and being interviewed by the United States Consular Office. Plaintiff Narayanasamy made the payment as directed.
68. Plaintiff Narayanasamy was told further that he would also be required to pay an additional $10,746 USD to Defendants Burnett and Pol. This amount was to be divided equally and issued in two separate checks (each in the amount of $5,373 USD) made payable to Defendants Burnett and Pol. Defendant Dewan Consultants informed Plaintiff Narayanasamy that this large sum of money amounted to a registration fee that would enable Defendants Burnett and Pol to obtain a green card for Plaintiff Narayanasamy leading to his permanent residency within the United States. Indeed, the checks that Plaintiff Narayanasamy issued to Defendants Burnett and Pol each stated in the memo line “Processing Fee for Green Card.”
69. In addition to paying the recruiting fees, Plaintiff Narayanasamy also provided paperwork and his passport to Defendant Dewan Consultants. Dewan Consultants informed Plaintiff Narayanasamy that it needed these items to schedule Plaintiff Narayanasamy’s consular interview.
70. In reasonable reliance upon Defendant Dewan Consultants’ explicit and repeated promises that he would receive a green card in exchange for paying the required recruiting fees, which would subsequently provide his family with a path to permanent residency, Plaintiff Narayanasamy undertook considerable economic, social, familial and personal sacrifices to obtain the funds necessary to cover the fees. Plaintiff Narayanasamy and his family are of modest means and were forced to borrow most of the money needed to pay his registration fee from lenders charging significant interest.
71. Shortly after making the first half of the two installment payments totaling $10,746 USD to Defendants Burnett and Pol, Plaintiff Narayanasamy contacted Defendant
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Dewan Consultants via telephone to express doubts about his ability to make the remaining payment and to seek the return of his passport.
72. A representative of Defendant Dewan Consultants refused to return Plaintiff Narayanasamy’s passport and, instead, coaxed him into remaining in the recruiting process by assuring him that he could “take his time” to assemble the money necessary to pay the second installment of his recruiting fee.
73. Plaintiff Narayanasamy’s conversation with Defendant Dewan Consultants caused him to reasonably believe that his passport would not be returned if he failed to make the remaining payments.
Recruitment of Saravanan Ramasamy 74. At the time Defendant Dewan Consultants’ advertisements appeared in local newspapers, Plaintiff Ramasamy worked in Singapore as a pipefitter. Plaintiff Ramasamy was informed of the advertisements by a friend living in India. 75. Though Plaintiff Ramasamy’s employment contract in Singapore was several years from expiring, the prospect of working in the United States with Signal was too enticing not to pursue. Plaintiff Ramasamy quit his job in Singapore and returned home to India to seek employment through Defendant Dewan Consultants.. 76. In November of 2006, after returning home to India, another friend of Plaintiff Ramasamy’s told him that Defendant Dewan Consultants was hosting an informational meeting in Chennai, India. 77. Plaintiff Ramasamy arrived at the meeting in Chennai and found himself in a waiting room crowded with dozens of other men also seeking employment and a better life in the United States. Plaintiff Ramasamy waited in line for several hours before he met with a representative from Defendant Dewan Consultants.
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78. Defendant Dewan Consultants instructed Plaintiff Ramasamy that to apply for employment with Signal, he would be required to pay a registration fee that would be paid in installments and divided amongst the Recruiter Defendants and Facilitator Defendants. Defendant Dewan Consultants instructed Plaintiff Ramasamy that he must pay an initial installment of 35,000 rupees (approximately $794 USD) prior to participating in skills testing and being interviewed by the United States Consular Office, payable to Dewan Consultants. Plaintiff Ramasamy made the payment as directed.
79. After paying the initial installment, Plaintiff Ramasamy was required to pay an admission fee of 2,000 rupees (approximately $35 USD) in order to participate in the mandatory skills testing conducted by Defendant Dewan Consultants and Defendant Signal.
80. In subsequent meetings with Defendant Dewan Consultants, Plaintiff Ramasamy was told that he would also be required to pay an additional $10,746 USD to Defendants Burnett and Pol. This amount was to be divided equally and issued in two separate checks (each in the amount of $5,373 USD) made payable to Defendants Burnett and Pol. Defendant Dewan Consultants did not inform Plaintiff Ramasamy of the specific purpose of the payments, but he was instructed to write “Processing Fee for Green Card” on the memo line of the checks issued to Defendants Burnett and Pol.
81. In reasonable reliance upon Defendant Dewan Consultants’ explicit and repeated promises that he would receive a green card in exchange for paying the required recruiting fees, providing him and his family with a path to permanent residency in the United States, Plaintiff Ramasamy undertook considerable economic, social, familial and personal sacrifices to obtain the funds necessary to cover the fees. Plaintiff Ramasamy’s parents, convinced by Defendant Dewan Consultants’ promises to their son of a generous salary and opportunity in the United
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States, paid most of the registration fee by pawning their land, home, jewelry and other personal belongings. The remainder of the fee was paid through a private loan from an acquaintance of Plaintiff Ramasamy.
82. Plaintiff Ramasamy made all of the payments mandated by Defendant Dewan Consultants. Despite Plaintiff Ramasamy’s requests, the Dewan Defendants refused to give him a receipt for any of the payments that he made.
83. In addition to paying the recruiting fees, Plaintiff Ramasamy also submitted paperwork and his passport to Defendant Dewan Consultants. Defendant Dewan Consultants informed Plaintiff Ramasamy that they needed these items to schedule Plaintiff Ramasamy’s interview at the United States Consular Office.
84. Though the United States Consulate returned Plaintiff Ramasamy’s passport to the Dewan Defendants shortly after his successful completion of the consular interview, Defendant Dewan refused Plaintiff Ramasamy’s request to return his passport, stating that it was “best” if Defendant Dewan Consultants held onto his passport. Plaintiff Ramasamy reasonably believed that he had no choice other than to make the payments required by the Recruiter Defendants and to travel to the United States to work for Defendant Signal. In fact, Defendant Dewan Consultants did not return his passport until after he paid the final installment of his registration fee—mere hours before his departure for the United States.
Recruitment of Maruthamuthu Mayavu 85. Plaintiff Mayavu first heard about the job opportunity with Defendant Signal after seeing an advertisement in a Tamil newspaper in early 2006. Friends in India also told him about the job opportunity. Plaintiff Mayavu was working in Tamil Nadu, India, as a pipefitter at the time he saw the advertisement. 86. Plaintiff Mayavu called the phone number in the advertisement and spoke to an
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employee of Defendant Dewan Consultants, who directed him to attend a May 2006 informational meeting in Chennai, India, to learn more about the work opportunity.
87. Plaintiff Mayavu attended the May 2006 meeting and was told by Defendant Dewan Consultants that he would have to pay 600,000 rupees (approximately $13,284 USD) in recruitment and visa processing fees, after which he would be cleared for a job with Defendant Signal and would be eligible for a green card and permanent residency in the United States. Plaintiff Mayavu was also told that his wage with Defendant Signal would be $22-25 USD per hour.
88. After this meeting, Plaintiff Mayavu attended a skills test in Chennai, India, in June 2006 which was held by employees of Defendant Dewan Consultants and Defendant Signal. Plaintiff Mayavu took and passed a written pipefitting test and was told to attend another meeting in Chennai, India, to make a down payment of 20,000 rupees (approximately $443 USD).
89. In June 2006, Plaintiff Mayavu received a letter from Defendant Dewan Consultants informing him that he had been selected for employment with Defendant Signal and that the “company shall proceed with your H2B Visa & Employment Based Permanent Residence Visa for United States of America.” The letter also instructed Plaintiff Mayavu to obtain two demand drafts for 66,700 rupees (approximately $1,430 USD) in the names of Defendants Burnett and Pol, respectively. Dated August 10, 2006, the memo line of these checks read “visa.”
90. Defendant Dewan Consultants informed Plaintiff Mayavu that he would not be granted an interview at the United States Consular Office until the full 600,000 rupees was paid. In reasonable reliance upon Defendant Dewan Consultants’ repeated promises that he would
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receive a green card in exchange for paying the required recruiting fees, Plaintiff Mayavu undertook considerable economic, social, familial, and personal sacrifices to obtain the necessary funds. Because Plaintiff Mayavu and his family are of modest means, he had to borrow from multiple sources to cover the registration payments. Plaintiff Mayavu had to pawn his family’s land and his wife’s jewelry and borrow from a friend in order to cover the total cost. Interest rates for these loans were as high as three percent.
91. Plaintiff Mayavu attended another meeting with Defendant Dewan Consultants at the Park Hotel in Chennai, India, in August 2006. He was informed that he would have free room and board at Signal’s worksite in the United States and that the company would process his green card application after ten months of work. He was also told by Defendant Dewan Consultants that he would have to pay an additional 4,200 rupees ($93 USD) in visa fees before his interview.
92. Before Plaintiff Mayavu’s November 2006 U.S. Consulate interview, he met with Defendant Dewan Consultants for interview preparations. Defendant Dewan Consultants instructed him to tell the consulate official that he intended to return to India on July 31, 2007. Defendant Dewan Consultants also told Plaintiff Mayavu to be sure that he did not mention the 600,000 rupees in recruitment fees that he had paid them. Plaintiff Mayavu’s passport was retained by the consulate official after the interview.
93. After the consulate interview, Plaintiff Mayavu again met with Defendant Dewan Consultants, who told him that he would be cleared for a U.S. visa, but that his passport had been retained and that he would not receive it back until he had made all his payments, which included another two demand drafts for $2,442 USD written out to Defendants Burnett and Pol. On November 18, 2006, Plaintiff Mayavu travelled to Mumbai, India, with these demand drafts in
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hand. The memo line of these checks, dated November 16, 2006, read “employment based PR visa for USA.”
94. At this last meeting in Mumbai, Defendant Dewan Consultants gave Plaintiff Mayavu paperwork to sign for his forthcoming employment with Signal. The paperwork was all in English and Plaintiff Mayavu was only briefly told in his native tongue, Tamil, about the general contents of the documents. He boarded a flight for the United States the next day, November 19, 2006.
Successful Completion of the Consulate Interview 95. Plaintiffs were informed by Defendant Dewan Consultants that they needed to obtain H-2B visas to work for Signal. 96. The H-2B guest worker program permits U.S. employers to import foreign workers on short-term temporary visas to meet labor needs when employers attest that they cannot obtain U.S. workers to perform the jobs that are available. 97. H-2B visas, unlike green cards, are non-immigrant visas, are only valid for work with the specific employer listed on the visa and do not provide portable and/or transferable employment authorization for the bearer of the visa. 98. Each of Plaintiffs was informed that obtaining H-2B visas would not interfere with their green card applications. 99. In order to secure H-2B visas, Plaintiffs were required to be interviewed by United States Consular officers within Indian cities. 100. These consular interviews necessitated that Plaintiffs pay the costs of travel from their homes and/or current places of employment to Chennai, India. 101. Defendant Dewan Consultants, acting as Defendant Signal’s agents, required that Plaintiffs meet with them in these Indian cities prior to attending their consular interviews.
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102. Prior to these meetings, upon information and belief, Defendant Dewan Consultants, Defendant Burnett and Defendant Pol discussed with Defendant Signal by e-mail, telephone, and/or in-person communications the topics to be discussed and the instructions to be given to Plaintiffs at these meetings.
103. At these pre-interview meetings, Defendant Dewan Consultants ensured that Plaintiffs were up-to-date on paying the fee installments required by their green card contracts.
104. Defendant Dewan Consultants required Plaintiffs to sign documents permitting Defendant Dewan to receive their visa-stamped passports from the consulate on behalf of each Plaintiff.
105. Defendant Dewan Consultants also instructed Plaintiffs as to what each should say during their consular interviews.
106. In particular, Defendant Dewan Consultants instructed Plaintiffs to not disclose the fact that they had paid a fee to Defendant Dewan Consultants for the processing of their green cards.
107. Defendant Dewan Consultants told Plaintiffs that if they did not follow these instructions regarding the interviews, Plaintiffs would not receive their visas and would forfeit all installments previously paid to Defendants, in addition to losing their opportunity to immigrate permanently to the United States.
108. In late 2006, after making their first installment payment, Plaintiffs were instructed by Defendant Dewan Consultants to report to the U.S. Consulate Office for interviews as a prerequisite to obtaining H-2B visas.
109. Plaintiffs completed their consular interviews, and were informed that they had been awarded H-2B visas.
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110. During Plaintiffs’ consular interviews, the Consular officials were in possession of Plaintiffs’ passports.
111. Once Plaintiffs’ visas were approved, Consular officials sent their passports, with H-2B visas affixed, directly to Defendant Dewan Consultants.
112. After receiving word that Plaintiffs’ visas had been approved, Defendant Dewan Consultants made travel arrangements for Plaintiffs’ trips to the United States.
113. In late May and early June of 2006, the Facilitator Defendants filed with the Mississippi Department of Employment Security, the Texas Workforce Commission, and the United States Department of Labor—by mail, electronic transmission and/or fax—the completed forms ETA 750 and attachments seeking permission to import and hire 590 foreign guestworkers under the auspices of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b), attendant regulations 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(6) and 20 C.F.R. § 655.3 and associated administrative letters and/or guidance (commonly known as “the H-2B guestworker program”) on behalf of Defendant Signal.
114. Knowing that Signal’s labor need was projected to be for at least two to three years, the Facilitator Defendants and Defendant Signal stated in these applications to the state workforce commissions and forms ETA 750 that Signal would employ workers from the period of October 1, 2006 to July 31, 2007. These applications were furnished with signatures by Signal executives swearing, under penalty of perjury, to the veracity of the information in these applications.
115. Defendant Signal sought these workers to perform various jobs essential to its marine fabrication services business, including welding and pipefitting.
116. Defendant Signal stated in the ETA 750 forms that its need for H-2B guestworkers was “peak load and a one-time occurrence” and that “the temporary workers will
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work for the length of the prescribed dates of need, will be paid in accordance with the prevailing wage and will return to their home country at the end of employment.”
117. In the ETA 750 forms, Defendant Signal named the Facilitator Defendants as its agents for the purposes of preparing and submitting these applications to import H-2B guestworkers. The Facilitator Defendants prepared and submitted these applications on behalf of Signal.
118. At the time of filing the ETA 750 forms and attachments with the Mississippi Department of Employment Security, the Texas Workforce Commission, and the United States Department of Labor, Defendant Signal and the Facilitator Defendants knew that Signal projected the labor need that it sought to fill with foreign workers to be for at least two to three years.
119. At or around the time Defendant Signal and Facilitator Defendants filed the ETA 750 forms in May and June 2006, they repeatedly communicated by telephone, mail, e-mail, and/or fax to direct and coordinate recruitment of Indian workers to fill the anticipated H-2B guestworker jobs. Upon information and belief, Defendant Signal and/or Facilitator Defendants repeatedly communicated with Recruiter Defendants by telephone, mail, e-mail, and/or fax to direct and coordinate recruitment of Indian workers to fill the anticipated H-2B guestworker jobs.
120. Upon information and belief, in the course of telephone, fax, e-mail and/or mail communications occurring in the second half of 2006, Defendant Signal authorized Defendant Dewan Consultants to act as its agent in India for the purposes of recruiting Indian welders and pipefitters to fill the anticipated H-2B guestworker jobs at Signal’s facilities in Texas and Mississippi.
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121. Upon information and belief, in the course of these communications, Defendant Signal further authorized Recruiter Defendants and Facilitator Defendants to represent that Signal would assume sponsorship of the pending and as-yet unsuccessful green card applications on behalf of, among others, Plaintiffs Narayanasamy, Ramasmay, Mayavu and Meganathan.
122. Defendant Signal authorized its agents to make these representations even though it knew or had reason to know that such visa extensions and green card applications would not be bona fide and valid under United States immigration law. Moreover, Defendant Signal authorized its agents to make these misrepresentations even though it did not have the intention at that time to apply for such visa extensions and/or green cards on behalf of all of the Indian H2B workers, including Plaintiffs.
123. Plaintiffs would not have paid the exorbitant fees charged by Defendant Dewan Consultants for travel, green cards, visas and work opportunities had they known that Defendants’ promises and representations were false.
The Labor Skills Test 124. At various times during the spring, summer and fall of 2006, employees of Defendant Signal traveled to various locations in India and tested the pipefitting skills of Plaintiffs Narayanasamy, Ramasamy, Mayavu and Meganathan in anticipation of employing them in the United States. 125. Plaintiffs paid the costs necessary to travel to the facilities where these tests were held. 126. Plaintiffs Ramasamy and Meganathan were required to pay a 2,000-rupee admission fee for the skills test. 127. Plaintiffs attended and passed these tests, which were overseen and graded by Defendant Signal’s and/or Defendant Dewan’s agents, employees and/or representatives.
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128. Upon information and belief, prior to attending these meetings and testing sessions, Defendant Dewan Consultants, Defendant Signal, Defendant Pol and Defendant Burnett communicated in the second half of 2006 by phone, mail, fax and or e-mail to organize, plan, and coordinate the logistics and substantive content of these testing sessions. Preparations for Departure from India and Arrival at Signal Operations in the United States
129. On or about July 20, 2006, and August 17, 2006, the United States Department of Labor approved Signal’s labor certification applications for 590 H-2B workers for the period of October 1, 2006, through July 31, 2007.
130. In approving these labor certification applications, the United States Department of Labor relied upon the accuracy of the applications’ stated 10-month period of labor need.
131. Upon information and belief, the Department of Labor is prohibited by its internal guidelines to grant labor certification applications without relying upon the application’s statement of temporary labor need.
132. In late August and early September 2006, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (“USCIS”) approved Signal’s H-2B visa petitions for 590 H-2B workers for the period of October 1, 2006, through July 31, 2007.
133. In approving these visa petitions, the USCIS relied upon the accuracy of the petitions’ stated 10-month period of labor need and the representation that Defendant Signal’s need was based on a one-time, peak-load temporary demand.
134. The USCIS must, according to regulation, rely upon the stated period of the petitioner’s labor need. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(6)(ii)(B).
135. Defendant Signal, the Facilitator Defendants and the Recruiter Defendants knew that the stated period of need in Signal’s applications for labor certifications and for H-2B visas were inconsistent with Signal’s projected actual labor need. Therefore, Defendants knew that
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each of these statements made to the government was false. 136. The Recruiter Defendants and the Facilitator Defendants used the H-2B visas that
were obtained from the U.S. Government—on the basis of false statements by Defendant Signal and the Facilitator Defendants—to elicit payments of the second and/or third installment from Plaintiffs.
137. Plaintiffs entered the United States on H-2B guestworker visas, issued by the U.S. Government on the basis of false statements by Defendant Signal, the Facilitator Defendants and the Recruiter Defendants, in late 2006 and early 2007 for the purposes of working for Defendant Signal at its Pascagoula, Mississippi, and Orange, Texas, facilities.
138. Around the time of USCIS’s visa approval, Plaintiffs made necessary preparations for travel to the United States on their H-2B visas for purposes of working for Signal. These preparations included and were not limited to: (i) paying to obtain necessary travel and legal documents; (ii) making payments to the U.S. Consulate, Recruiter Defendants, and Facilitator Defendants for mandatory H-2B visa and consular processing fees; (iii) attending H-2B visa interviews; and (iv) paying Recruiter Defendants for travel arrangements.
139. Once Plaintiffs’ H-2B visas were formally approved and all Plaintiffs passed their labor skills tests, Defendant Dewan Consultants made arrangements for their personal travel to the United States.
140. Before Plaintiffs could leave for the United States, however, they were required to attend final meetings in Defendant Dewan Consultants’ office in Mumbai, India.
141. These meetings took place mere hours before Plaintiffs Narayanasamy, Ramasamy, Mayavu and Meganathan were scheduled to depart to the United States. At this time, Defendant Dewan Consultants’ office was teeming with anxious fellow Indian workers
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awaiting departure to the United States. 142. At these meetings, Defendant Dewan Consultants collected final installment
payments required by Plaintiffs’ agreement with Defendant Dewan Consultants. 143. Defendant Dewan Consultants refused to return Plaintiffs’ passports, which were
in Defendant Dewan’s possession since after Plaintiffs’ H-2B visas were approved by U.S. Consular officials, until after Plaintiffs had paid the final installments and signed the mandatory paperwork.
144. Knowing that Plaintiff Narayanasamy only had a few hours to make his scheduled flight to the United States, Defendant Dewan Consultants demanded that Plaintiff Narayanasamy quickly sign mandatory documents, written only in English, without providing him an opportunity to review and understand their contents.
145. Without possession of their passports and within this intentionally rushed and hostile atmosphere, Plaintiffs had no reasonable opportunity to review, understand, negotiate, and/or make any changes to the documents presented to them. Moreover, all the paperwork was in English. Only after all remaining installments were paid and all paperwork was signed were Plaintiffs told, in their native tongues, the general contents of the documents. Plaintiffs speak only basic conversational English and could not read or understand the complex Englishlanguage documents that were provided to them.
146. Plaintiffs felt compelled to agree to Signal’s terms, despite the fact that they were unable to comprehend the terms to which they were agreeing, in part because they understood that Signal would pay them at a rate of $19 USD per hour for 40 hours per week, plus time-anda-half (approximately $28.5 USD per hour) for overtime of up to 20 additional hours per week. Since Plaintiffs did not understand that that $1,050 USD would be deducted from their salary per
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month for housing costs, or that they would be required to endure unhygienic and prison-like living conditions, they believed that the salary, along with eventual green cards, promised to them by Signal outweighed the fact that they understood very little information concerning the nature of their employment at the time.
147. Based on Defendant Dewan Consultants’ threatening and coercive behavior during these pre-departure meetings in Mumbai, and based upon the extraordinary and increasing levels of debt that they had incurred to pay the Defendants Dewan Consultants, Burnett, and Pol for their green-card and H-2B visa arrangements, Plaintiffs reasonably believed that they had no choice other than to make the required payments and to travel to the United States to work for Defendant Signal.
148. At the time of Plaintiffs’ hiring and departure, Defendant Signal was staffing Indian workers at its facilities in Pascagoula, Mississippi, and Orange, Texas.
149. Plaintiff Ramasamy was given a choice of working either at Signal’s Pascagoula facility or its Orange facility before departing, and he selected the Orange facility.
150. Plaintiff Ramasamy flew to Houston, Texas, with approximately 20 other workers on January 31, 2007, via layovers in London and New York.
151. Plaintiff Narayanasamy flew to Houston, Texas, on January 24, 2007, without knowing his assigned Signal facility.
152. Plaintiff Meganathan flew to Houston, Texas, with approximately 30 other workers on December 11, 2006, via layovers in New York and Atlanta.
153. Plaintiff Mayavu flew to Mobile, Alabama, with other Indian workers on November 19, 2006, via layovers in New York and Atlanta.
154. Upon arrival in Houston, Texas, and Mobile, Alabama, Plaintiffs were greeted by
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representatives from Defendant Signal. 155. The representatives divided the workers into two groups and assigned them to two
separate buses. One bus departed for Pascagoula, Mississippi, while the other departed for Orange, Texas.
156. When Plaintiff Narayanasamy arrived in Houston and was sorted by the Signal representatives, he learned for the first time that he had been assigned to the facility in Orange.
Conditions at the Signal Facilities in Orange, Texas The Camp Was “Like a Prison”
157. Defendant Signal’s labor camps were located in isolated, industrial areas miles removed from shopping areas, places of worship, or residential communities. The camps were enclosed by fences and accessible to Plaintiffs only by a single, guarded entrance.
158. At certain times during the week, an eight-passenger van made round-trip voyages to Wal-Mart. However, Defendant Signal required the van to be completely full before departure. Therefore, Plaintiffs had no practical ability to travel outside of the camp at will.
159. The gates at the labor camp were constantly monitored by security guards who were retained by Defendant Signal. Upon information and belief, some or all of these guards may have been obtained by Defendant Signal through Swetman Security Service, Inc. (“Swetman Security”), a private security company based in Mississippi.
160. Signal’s security guards monitored Plaintiffs’ arrival and departure from the facility by requiring them to show their employee identification badges and recording the times at which Plaintiffs entered and exited the camps. If an employee lost his identification badge, he was not allowed to leave the camp.
161. Signal’s security guards also searched Plaintiffs’ packages and bags when they entered the camps.
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162. Defendant Signal’s personnel and/or security guards also conducted surprise searches of the cramped and overcrowded bunkhouse trailers, which included searches of Plaintiffs’ personal belongings.
163. Upon information and belief, Defendant Signal’s security guards were present only to protect Defendant Signal, not to protect Plaintiffs. This was readily apparent to Plaintiffs.
164. Except on certain rare occasions, Plaintiffs were not permitted to receive visitors in the labor camps at any time.
Disease and Malnutrition 165. Up to 24 men were housed in each bunkhouse and made to sleep in two-tiered bunk beds. The bunk beds were so tightly packed in the bunkhouses that it was difficult for workers to move about in the narrow passageways between the bunks. 166. The tightly-packed bunks also facilitated the spread of disease, causing Plaintiff Narayanasamy and his bunkmates to become sick on multiple occasions. 167. The bunkhouses also had insufficient toilet and bathing facilities for 24 men, resulting in very long lines for the bathrooms before and after work shifts. 168. Privacy in the bunks was non-existent. Plaintiffs often experienced extreme difficulty with sleeping due to the constant noise that resulted from workers entering and leaving the bunks at different times for different work shifts throughout the day and night. 169. Plaintiffs took their meals in Defendant Signal’s mess halls, which were only open during limited hours. Due to unhygienic kitchen conditions, Plaintiffs’ coworkers frequently became ill, sometimes requiring hospitalization. 170. Plaintiff Meganathan lost a significant amount of weight due to the food offered at Signal’s mess hall. Like many Indians, Plaintiff Meganathan had strict, religious dietary
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restrictions that prevented him from eating pork, which made up the majority of dinners at the Signal camp.
171. Plaintiffs routinely went without dietary necessities such as daily servings of fruits and vegetables, as a result of scarce resources in the kitchen.
Signal Charged Each of Plaintiffs Approximately $1,050 USD Each Month to Live in Inhumane Conditions
172. Defendant Signal deducted labor-camp fees of approximately $35 USD per day (or $245 USD per week, or approximately $1,050 USD per month) from Plaintiffs’ paychecks for the substandard living accommodations and meals that Plaintiffs endured.
173. Plaintiffs netted very little money after Defendant Signal made its deductions from Plaintiffs’ paychecks for housing and meals.
174. Plaintiffs did not understand that housing and meal expenses would be deducted from their salary until they received their first paychecks. Plaintiffs never knowingly authorized these deductions.
175. Eventually, despite the fear of being punished for doing so, Plaintiffs complained and asked to live outside of the labor camps. Defendant Signal initially refused their request and subsequently told the workers that if they tried to live outside the camps, Signal still would deduct the full labor-camp fees from Plaintiffs’ wages. As a result, Plaintiffs, still burdened by the debt they had incurred to pay the fees associated with their green card contracts, reasonably felt that they had no choice other than to continue living in the Signal camps. Plaintiffs Experienced Other Discrimination by Signal and its Employees Due to Their Race,
Ethnicity, Religion, and Alienage 176. Defendant Signal only housed Indian H-2B workers, like Plaintiffs, in its labor camps, which were referred to by Signal employees and management as the “reservation(s).” Upon information and belief, workers of non-Indian descent were neither required nor allowed to
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live in and/or pay for living accommodations at Defendant Signal’s labor camps. 177. Defendant Signal subjected Plaintiffs to skills testing and re-testing and
persistently threatened Plaintiffs with on-the-job discipline, layoffs, and periods without work and pay. Plaintiffs also were exposed to a work environment in which they were forced to endure a lack of safety precautions, unfavorable job assignments, evaluation processes, and other adverse employment actions to which non-Indian and U.S. citizen workers were not similarly subjected.
178. Plaintiff Meganathan was terminated on June 20, 2007, because he received an average performance rating of “5” on a performance evaluation to which he was never told he would be subjected while still in India. Upon information and belief, these sudden “performance evaluations” were implemented by Signal—after Plaintiffs arrived in the United States and began working—as a pretext to cutting its workforce to avoid fulfilling its promise to Plaintiffs to help them obtain green cards. Although a rating of “6” would have been a passing score, Plaintiff Meganathan’s average was lowered to a “5” because he received a rating of “2” for safety. Plaintiff Meganathan disagrees with Defendant Signal’s performance rating and believes that the score was not objective, and was, at least to some degree, discriminatory.
179. Signal personnel and management regularly threatened Plaintiffs and other H-2B workers that if they did not continue working for Signal, or did not work according to Signal’s rigid terms, Plaintiffs and other Indian H-2B workers would be deported back to India.
180. Signal personnel and management also told Plaintiffs that if they ventured outside of the labor camp they were likely to be “shot for their money.”
181. Signal personnel and management further told Plaintiffs that if they left the labor camp and encountered trouble with law enforcement, they would likely be deported, and that
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Defendant Signal would be unable to assist them. 182. In the isolated and guarded atmosphere of the labor camps, grappling with the
crushing debts they had incurred to come to the United States, and fearful of the perceived dangers that existed outside of their fenced-in housing site, Plaintiffs reasonably felt that Signal’s statements were threatening and felt forced to live in the bunkhouses and continue working for Signal, despite terrible living and working conditions.
183. Plaintiffs’ continuing dependence upon Defendant Signal for their present and future immigration status and their continuing high levels of indebtedness, along with the prisonlike living conditions that they had been exposed to at Signal’s Orange and Pascagoula facilities, reasonably caused Plaintiffs to fear serious harm and/or abuse of the legal process if they were to leave Signal’s employ.
184. Under these circumstances, Plaintiffs reasonably felt like they had no choice but to continue working for Signal under these conditions.
The Defendants’ False Promise to Help Plaintiffs Get Green Cards Comes to Light 185. At various times relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims, Defendant Signal refused to
confirm whether valid H-2B visa extensions had, in fact, been obtained for Plaintiffs. This coerced Plaintiffs to continue working for Signal in the hope that Signal would finally resolve their uncertain immigration statuses.
186. On multiple occasions, Plaintiffs asked the Orange camp manager, who was known as “Ravi,” about the statuses of their green cards. Ravi, an agent of Defendant Signal, always told Plaintiffs that they had to wait without giving them any further updates or information.
187. Since first contracting with Defendants in India, Plaintiffs have yet to receive from Defendants the green cards that Defendants promised them. Despite clear contractual
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provisions requiring them to do so, Defendant Dewan Consultants, Defendant Pol, Defendant Burnett and Defendant Signal have refused to refund any of the Plaintiffs’ money, which was paid to Defendants for the express purpose of processing and obtaining green cards and visas for Plaintiffs, as Defendants had promised.
Conditions at the Signal Facilities in Pascagoula, Mississippi 188. Plaintiff Mayavu began work in Pascagoula in November 2006. 189. As Defendant Signal had done in Orange, Texas, it constructed a cramped, unhygienic, and remote labor camp in Pascagoula, Mississippi, specifically to house Plaintiffs and other similarly-situated Indian H-2B Signal workers. 190. Similar to Plaintiffs’ thoughts upon arrival at Defendant Signal’s Orange, Texas, camp, Plaintiff Mayavu’s first impression of the Pascagoula labor camp was that it more closely resembled a place to house animals rather than humans. 191. Upon entering the trailer “bunkhouses,” Plaintiff Mayavu was shocked to discover that he would be housed in cramped bunkhouses overflowing with dozens of fellow Indian H-2B workers. 192. Plaintiff Mayavu had never been forced to share living quarters with more than three or four other people at a time, even in India, and he was dismayed about how his new life in the United States was starting. 193. Similar to Defendant Signal’s Orange, Texas, labor camp, the bunk beds in the trailers were packed so close together at the Pascagoula camp that it was difficult for the Indian workers living there to move, let alone have any privacy. 194. Due to multiple work shifts, workers were constantly entering and exiting the crowded bunkhouses, making it extremely difficult for Plaintiff Mayavu to sleep at any time of
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day or night. Unhygienic, Disease-Ridden Living Conditions
195. Given the close quarters and the lack of adequate toilet and shower facilities, the trailers were highly unsanitary, and sickness, infection and disease spread rampantly. Similar to conditions at the Orange labor camp, dozens of men were forced to share only four showers and two toilets, and often waited in long lines to use these facilities.
196. Plaintiff Mayavu developed a groin infection due to the unhygienic conditions at the Pascagoula labor camp. He was forced to pay doctors’ fees out-of-pocket because Defendant Signal provided insufficient healthcare coverage.
197. Plaintiff Mayavu took meals in Defendant Signal’s mess halls, which were only open during limited hours. Due to unhygienic kitchen conditions, Plaintiffs frequently became ill, sometimes requiring hospitalization. Like many Indians, Plaintiff Mayavu is a vegetarian and often found that Signal’s meal options did not accommodate his dietary needs. On one occasion, he was hospitalized for severe diarrhea resulting from the food served by Defendant Signal.
Armed Guards, Deportation Threats, and Forced Detention 198. Similar to the facilities at the Orange labor camp, the Pascagoula camp included on-site security guards retained by Defendant Signal. 199. Plaintiff Mayavu was constantly monitored by these guards, who closely observed his arrival and departure. Plaintiff Mayavu was required to show his employee identification badge each and every time he entered Signal’s Pascagoula camp. 200. Upon information and belief, Defendant Signal’s security guards were there to protect Defendant Signal, not to protect Plaintiff Mayavu or any of the other Indian workers. 201. Signal personnel and management regularly threatened Plaintiff Mayavu and other Indian H-2B workers that if they did not continue working for Signal, and did not work
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according to Signal’s terms, they would immediately be fired and/or deported back to India. 202. On one occasion, Plaintiff Mayavu was hospitalized after an allergic reaction to
smoke at the jobsite, causing him to take a day off from work to recover. Plaintiff Mayavu’s foreman threatened to fire him for this time away from the job.
203. Plaintiff Mayavu took these threats seriously, in part because of a frightening incident in March 2007 when armed guards stormed into the trailers looking for five fellow H2B Indian workers who were particularly vocal in complaining about the living conditions and who demanded answers to immigration questions. One worker, Sabulal, often voiced all the Indian H-2B workers’ complaints, including those of Plaintiff Mayavu, when he repeatedly asked about visa extensions and green cards.
204. At 5:00 a.m. one morning, Plaintiff Mayavu watched these armed guards round up Sabulal and four other Indian H-2B workers and lock them up before preparing to fire and deport them. Realizing that he was about to be deported back to India, Sabulal attempted to commit suicide by slitting his wrists. Plaintiff Mayavu saw blood all over the facility and witnessed Sabulal being taken away in an ambulance.
The Defendants’ False Promise to Help Plaintiff Mayavu Get A Green Card Comes to Light
205. Though Plaintiff Mayavu felt helpless and scared before the incident with Sabulal, he was outright terrified afterwards. Nevertheless, he did not know what other choice he had other than to continue to work for Signal, especially considering his significant debt and his belief that Defendant Signal would do what it promised and obtain a green card for him. Plaintiff Mayavu remarked that he had so much debt that he felt like a slave while he was working for Signal.
206. Plaintiff Mayavu’s continued dependence upon Defendant Signal for his present
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and future immigration status and his continued high levels of indebtedness reasonably led him to fear abuse of the legal process, including, but not limited to, deportation, if he tried to leave Signal’s employ. Moreover, after the incident with Sabulal, Plaintiff Mayavu also began to reasonably fear serious bodily harm if he attempted to leave Signal’s employ.
207. Plaintiff Mayavu had no idea how to get another job in the United States, nor did he understand how changing jobs might affect his immigration status.
208. Under these circumstances, Plaintiff Mayavu reasonably believed that he had no choice other than to continue working for Signal.
209. At various times relevant to Plaintiff Mayavu’s claims, Defendant Signal refused to confirm whether a valid H-2B visa extension had, in fact, been obtained for him. This coerced him to continue working for Signal in the hope that Signal would finally resolve his uncertain immigration status.
210. The Pascagoula camp manager, “Rhonda,” an employee and agent of Defendant Signal, often ignored Plaintiff Mayavu’s inquiries about his immigration status and immigration documents.
211. After completing approximately 16 months at the Pascagoula facility, Plaintiff Mayavu and several other Indian H-2B workers finally realized that Signal would not be offering them the promised green cards. Knowing this, and knowing they would face severe financial and personal consequences for doing so, Plaintiff Mayavu and other Indian H-2B workers decided to quit rather than endure another day of abuses at the hands of Signal.
212. Plaintiff Mayavu never received from Defendants the green card that Defendants promised him. Despite clear contractual provisions requiring them to do so, Defendant Dewan Consultants, Defendant Pol, Defendant Burnett and Defendant Signal have not refunded any of
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Plaintiff Mayavu’s money, which was paid to Defendants for the express purpose or processing and obtaining a green card and visa for him, as Defendants had promised.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF THE TRAFFICKING VICTIMS PROTECTION REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2003 Violation of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (“TVPRA”),
18 U.S.C. §§ 1584, 1589, 1590, 1592, 1594, 1595 All Defendants
213. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
214. Plaintiffs bring these claims against the Signal Defendants, Recruiter Defendants, and Facilitator Defendants.
Authority for Civil Action 215. Plaintiffs are victims of violations of the following sections of Title 18, Chapter 77 of the United States Code: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1584, 1589, 1590, 1592 and 1594(a) and (b). 216. As set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 1595, Plaintiffs may bring a civil action against the perpetrators of these violations and “whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a venture which that person knew or should have known has engaged in a violation” of these provisions. 217. Signal Defendants, Recruiter Defendants, and Facilitator Defendants are perpetrators of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1584, 1589, 1590, 1592 and 1594(a) and (b). 218. Recruiter Defendants and Facilitator Defendants knowingly benefited, financially or by receiving things and/or services of value, from participation in a venture which each Defendant knew or should have known constituted violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1584, 1589, 1590, 1592, 1594(a) and (b).
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Forced Labor (18 U.S.C. § 1589) 219. Signal Defendants, Recruiter Defendants, and Facilitator Defendants attempted to and did subject Plaintiffs to forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589. 220. Signal Defendants, Recruiter Defendants, and Facilitator Defendants knowingly attempted to and did threaten Plaintiffs with serious harm in order to obtain the labor and services of Plaintiffs in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)(2). 221. Signal Defendants, Recruiter Defendants, and Facilitator Defendants knowingly attempted to and did obtain the labor and services of Plaintiffs using a scheme, plan, or pattern that, in the totality of the circumstances, was intended to coerce and did, in fact, coerce Plaintiffs to believe that they would suffer serious harm if they were to leave the employ of Defendant Signal in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)(4). 222. As set forth more fully above, the Signal, Recruiter, and Facilitator Defendants’ scheme to bring Plaintiffs to the United States, to isolate Plaintiffs in deplorable living conditions, to limit Plaintiffs’ outside contacts, to exaggerate the dangers “lurking outside” of Defendant Signal’s housing site, to threaten deportation, to withhold from Plaintiffs information about their immigration statuses, to force Plaintiffs to assume an unreasonable amount of financial debt without details about the job opportunity or terms of the employment contract with Defendant Signal, to maintain Plaintiffs’ debt, to cause serious harm to Plaintiffs’ co-workers, and to unlawfully discriminate against Plaintiffs in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, was designed to convince Plaintiffs that they would suffer serious harm, both physical and nonphysical, if they were to leave the employ of Defendant Signal or even to leave Defendant Signal’s housing facilities. 223. Signal Defendants, Recruiter Defendants, and Facilitator Defendants retaliated
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against Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ co-workers for attempts to exercise their legal rights, threatened Plaintiffs with deportation, and deceived Plaintiffs about their immigration statuses in a manner that constitutes an abuse of law or the legal process under 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)(3).
224. Signal Defendants, Recruiter Defendants, and Facilitator Defendants knowingly benefited financially from participation in a venture that they knew or should have known was engaged in these acts.
Sale into Involuntary Servitude (18 U.S.C. § 1584) 225. Signal Defendants, Recruiter Defendants, and Facilitator Defendants knowingly and willfully held Plaintiffs to involuntary servitude, as defined by the 22 U.S.C. §§ 7102(6)(a) and (b), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1584. 226. In violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1590, Signal Defendants, Recruiter Defendants, and Facilitator Defendants knowingly recruited, transported, harbored and/or obtained Plaintiffs for labor or services in furtherance of these Defendants’ violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1584. 227. Signal Defendants, the Recruiter Defendants, and the Facilitator Defendants knowingly benefited financially from participation in a venture which they knew, or should have known, was engaged in these acts. Unlawful Conduct with Respect to Documents in Furtherance of Trafficking, Peonage, Slavery, Involuntary Servitude or Forced Labor (18 U.S.C. § 1592) 228. Signal Defendants, the Recruiter Defendants, and the Facilitator Defendants knowingly removed, confiscated, and possessed Plaintiffs’ passports and visa papers in the course of a violation of and/or with intent to violate 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589 and 1594(a). 229. Signal Defendants, Recruiter Defendants, and Facilitator Defendants knowingly benefited financially from their participation in a venture which they knew, or should have known, was engaged in these acts.
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Trafficking with Respect to Peonage, Slavery, Involuntary Servitude, or Forced Labor (18 U.S.C. § 1590)
230. Signal Defendants, Recruiter Defendants, and Facilitator Defendants knowingly recruited, transported, harbored, provided and/or obtained Plaintiffs so as to obtain their labor and services in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1584, 1589, 1592, and 1594(a) and (b).
231. Signal Defendants, Recruiter Defendants, and Facilitator Defendants knowingly aided and abetted one another in a scheme to recruit, transport, harbor, provide and/or obtain Plaintiffs for labor and services in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1584, 1589, 1592 and 1594(a) and (b).
232. Signal Defendants, Recruiter Defendants, and Facilitator Defendants knowingly benefited financially from participation in a venture which they knew, or should have known, was engaged in these acts.
Attempt and/or Conspiracy to Violate 18 U.S.C. §§ 1584, 1589, 1590, 1592 (18 U.S.C. §§ 1594(a), (b))
233. Signal Defendants, Recruiter Defendants, and Facilitator Defendants attempted and/or conspired to violate 18 U.S.C. §§ 1584, 1589, 1590, and 1592 in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1594(b) and/or (b).
234. Signal Defendants, Recruiter Defendants, and Facilitator Defendants knowingly benefitted financially from participation in a venture which they knew, or should have known, was engaged in these acts.
Damages 235. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of Signal Defendants, Recruiter Defendants, and Facilitator Defendants, Plaintiffs have suffered injuries to their persons and property, as well as other damages.
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236. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover compensatory and punitive damages in an amount to be proven at trial, including attorneys’ fees.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT Violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”),
18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c) and 1962(d) All Defendants
237. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
238. Plaintiffs’ allegations contained in Exhibit 1, appended to this Complaint, are incorporated herein by reference.
239. Plaintiffs’ claims under RICO, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68, are brought against all Defendants.
240. Plaintiffs are “persons” with standing to sue within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
241. Each of Defendants is a “RICO person” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1).
242. All Defendants and the United States Consular offices in India constitute an association-in-fact, and therefore an enterprise (the “RICO Enterprise I”), within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).
243. Recruiter Defendants, Facilitator Defendants, and Signal Defendants are an association-in-fact, and therefore an enterprise (the “RICO Enterprise II”), within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).
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The RICO Enterprises RICO Enterprise I
244. At all relevant times, RICO Enterprise I was an ongoing business relationship among all Defendants and the United States Consular officers in India, with the common purpose of recruiting, transporting, providing, processing, and obtaining foreign workers to work in shipyards in the United States, including in Signal’s facility in Orange, Texas.
245. At all relevant times, RICO Enterprise I was engaged in interstate commerce in that its activities and transactions relating to the international and interstate movement of workers affected interstate commerce and frequently required travel and communications across state and international borders.
246. At all relevant times, the members of RICO Enterprise I functioned as a continuing unit.
247. At all relevant times, Defendants conducted, participated in, and conspired to conduct or participate in, the affairs of RICO Enterprise I through a pattern of numerous acts of racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), related by their common goal to recruit, obtain, transport, process, and provide workers through the use of fraudulent promises, exorbitant fees, forced labor, and trafficking.
248. Specifically, Defendants conducted or participated in and conspired to conduct the affairs of RICO Enterprise I by engaging in the following predicate acts of racketeering activity under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1):
a. Involuntary servitude in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1584; b. Forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589; c. Trafficking persons with respect to modern day slavery, involuntary servitude, and forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1590;
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d. Unlawful document-related practices in furtherance of trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1592(a);

e. Mail fraud to further their unlawful scheme in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341; and

f. 1343.

Wire fraud to further their unlawful scheme in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

249. Defendants’ engagement in the above-listed predicate acts in the conduct of

affairs of RICO Enterprise I resulted in the individual financial gain of each Defendant at the

expense of business, property, and personal injury to Plaintiffs.

RICO Enterprise II

250. At all relevant times, RICO Enterprise II was an ongoing business relationship

among Defendants with the common purpose of selling United States green cards, visas, and

work opportunities to Indian workers to convince such workers to pay fees and to travel to the

United States to work for companies, including Defendant Signal.

251. At all relevant times, the members of RICO Enterprise II operated as a continuing

unit.

252. At all relevant times, RICO Enterprise II was engaged in interstate commerce in

that its activities and transactions relating to the sale of United States green cards, visas, and job

opportunities affected interstate commerce.

253. At all relevant times, Defendants conducted or participated in, and conspired to

conduct or participate in, the affairs of RICO Enterprise II through a pattern of numerous acts of

racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), related by

their common goal to sell United States green cards and work opportunities to Indian workers for

the purposes of furnishing such workers for employment at Signal’s operations.

254. Specifically, Defendants conducted or participated in the affairs of RICO

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Enterprise II by engaging in the following predicate acts of racketeering activity under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1):
a. Involuntary servitude in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1584; b. Forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589; c. Trafficking persons with respect to modern day slavery, involuntary servitude, and forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1590; d. Mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341; and e. Wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. 255. Defendants’ engagement in the above-listed predicate acts in the conduct of affairs of RICO Enterprise II resulted in the individual financial gain of each Defendant at the expense of business, property, and personal injury to Plaintiffs.
Predicate Acts Document Servitude: 18 U.S.C. § 1592 256. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs and Exhibit 1, Defendants, through RICO Enterprises I and II, knowingly and intentionally confiscated and possessed Plaintiffs’ visa and immigration documents in violation of the TVPRA. 257. Defendants, through Enterprises I and II, willfully, knowingly, and intentionally committed and conspired to commit multiple predicate acts of document servitude in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1592 and as set forth in Plaintiffs’ First Claim for Relief. Mail and Wire Fraud: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343 258. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs and in Exhibit 1, Defendants, through RICO Enterprises I and II, intentionally made and conspired to make false promises regarding green cards and other benefits in a scheme calculated to defraud Plaintiffs out of large sums of money.
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259. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs and in Exhibit 1, Defendants, through RICO Enterprises I and II, made and conspired to make false statements related to applications submitted to the U.S. Government for H-2B visas and false promises to Plaintiffs regarding green cards and other benefits in a scheme calculated to defraud Plaintiffs out of large sums of money.
260. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs and in Exhibit 1, Defendants, through RICO Enterprises I and II, used the mails and wire communications, including communications via telephone, fax, internet and e-mail, on numerous occasions to further these fraudulent schemes.
261. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs and in Exhibit 1, Plaintiffs reasonably relied on these false statements made by Defendants through RICO Enterprises I and II, and Plaintiffs suffered injury as a result of such reliance and Defendants’ ensuing conduct.
262. These willful, knowing and intentional acts constitute mail and wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343.
Pattern of Related Racketeering Acts 263. Defendants engaged in the racketeering activity and commission of predicate acts described in this Complaint repeatedly, beginning in 2003 and continuing at least through January 2009 with respect to approximately 590 Indian workers. 264. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs and in Exhibit 1, Defendants have committed at least two acts of racketeering activities in the past 10 years. 265. Upon information and belief, Defendant Signal sought new Indian temporary workers for employment at Signal who were potentially subject to similar racketeering activities. 266. Defendants, through RICO Enterprises I and II, implemented the racketeering acts
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described in this Complaint to conduct their regular business activities. 267. Defendants’ racketeering acts have or had similar purposes: to profit from the
fraudulent recruitment and forced labor of Plaintiffs and other Indian workers, and to recruit, obtain, provide and maintain a consistent, submissive, isolated, and compliant Indian H-2B Worker labor force at Signal’s operations.
268. Defendants’ acts yielded similar results and caused similar injuries to Plaintiffs, including payment of high fees, assumption of significant interest-bearing debt, loss of real and personal property, lost work opportunities, lost or unpaid wages, and related legal fees.
269. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs and in Exhibit 1, Defendants’ racketeering acts have or had similar participants: Recruiter Defendants, Facilitator Defendants, and Defendant Signal.
270. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs and in Exhibit I, Defendants, through RICO Enterprises I and II, directed their racketeering activities at similar victims: Indian workers who responded to Recruiter Defendants in search of promised green cards, economic opportunity, and stable employment in the United States.
271. Defendants’ acts have or had similar methods of commission, such as common recruitment tactics, relatively consistent practices with respect to collecting payments from Plaintiffs and other Indian workers, and the use of similar employment practices and policies with respect to Plaintiffs and other Indian workers.
Injury 272. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ willful, knowing, and intentional acts discussed in this section, Plaintiffs have suffered injuries to their persons and property including, but not limited to: exorbitant fees paid by Plaintiffs for green cards, visas, and other
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immigration and recruitment-related services; interest on debts assumed by Plaintiffs to pay such fees; losses of personal and real property incurred in reliance on Defendants’ fraudulent acts; lost and unpaid wages, lost employment opportunities, and other pecuniary losses to real or personal property.
273. Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of damages in an amount to be determined at trial, including treble damages and attorneys’ fees and costs associated with this action.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF FRAUD
All Defendants 274. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs. 275. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, Defendants, individually and through their agents, employees and/or representatives, knowingly and/or recklessly made materially false and untrue statements and representations to Plaintiffs regarding the nature and terms and conditions of applications and opportunities for immigration status and employment in the United States. 276. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, Defendants, individually and through their agents, employees and/or representatives, knowingly and/or recklessly failed to disclose material facts to Plaintiffs regarding the nature and terms and conditions of applications and opportunities for immigration status and employment in the United States. 277. Defendants and/or their agents, employees and/or representatives made these false statements with the intention that they induce Plaintiffs to pay the exorbitant fees requested by Recruiter Defendants and/or Facilitator Defendants and cause Plaintiffs to leave their homes and jobs in India and Singapore to travel to the United States to work for Defendant Signal.
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278. In reasonable reliance upon Defendants’ material misrepresentations regarding green cards and employment opportunities, Plaintiffs paid large sums of money to Dewan Consultants and/or Recruiter Defendants and/or Facilitator Defendants.
279. In reliance or reasonable reliance upon Defendants’ material misrepresentations regarding green cards and employment opportunities, Plaintiffs sold and pawned personal and real property, took out interest-bearing loans, broke their existing employment contracts, and surrendered other employment opportunities in India.
280. In reliance or reasonable reliance upon Defendants’ material misrepresentations regarding green cards and employment opportunities, Plaintiffs left their homes and jobs in India and Singapore to travel to the United States to work for Defendant Signal.
281. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ negligent actions, Plaintiffs have been injured.
282. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover compensatory and punitive damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
All Defendants 283. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs. 284. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, Defendants, individually and through their agents, employees, and/or representatives, supplied materially false information to Plaintiffs regarding the nature and terms and conditions of applications and opportunities for immigration status and employment in the United States. 285. Defendants supplied this information negligently, without exercising reasonable
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care in communicating the information. Defendants had no reason to believe their representations about green cards and employment opportunities were true.
286. Defendants and/or their agents, employees, and/or representatives made these false statements with the intention that they induce Plaintiffs to pay the exorbitant fees requested by Recruiter Defendants and/or Facilitator Defendants and cause Plaintiffs to leave their homes and jobs in India and Singapore to travel to the United States to work for Defendant Signal.
287. Plaintiffs were entitled to rely upon Defendants’ representations. 288. In reliance or reasonable reliance upon Defendants’ material misrepresentations regarding green cards and employment opportunities, Plaintiffs paid large sums of money to Dewan Consultants and/or Recruiter Defendants and/or Facilitator Defendants. 289. In reliance or reasonable reliance upon Defendants’ material misrepresentations regarding green cards and employment opportunities, Plaintiffs sold and pawned personal and real property, took out interest-bearing loans, broke their existing employment contracts, and surrendered other employment opportunities in India. 290. In reliance or reasonable reliance upon Defendants’ material misrepresentations regarding green cards and employment opportunities, Plaintiffs left their homes and jobs in India and Singapore to travel to the United States to work for Defendant Signal. 291. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ negligent actions, Plaintiffs have been injured. 292. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover compensatory and punitive damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
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FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF BREACH OF CONTRACT All Defendants
293. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
294. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, Defendants, individually and through their agents, employees and/or representatives, offered to obtain permanent residence and immigration status for Plaintiffs in the United States within 18 to 24 months as well as steady work opportunities in the United States with Defendant Signal in exchange for (i) Plaintiffs’ payment of exorbitant fees to Defendants and their employees, agents and/or representatives, and (ii) Plaintiffs’ agreement to work for Defendant Signal.
295. Plaintiffs accepted Defendants’ offers, paid the agreed upon fees and performed the agreed-upon work.
296. Defendants breached their contracts with Plaintiffs by failing to comply with their binding promises regarding permanent residence and immigration status.
297. In reliance upon these agreements, Plaintiffs paid large sums of money, incurred substantial debts, broke their existing employment contracts, surrendered other employment opportunities, and incurred other financial losses.
298. As a direct result of Defendants’ breach, Plaintiffs have suffered damages. 299. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover compensatory damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
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SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
All Defendants 300. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 301. Defendants Signal International, L.L.C. and Signal International, Inc., are and function as, the alter egos of Signal International Texas, G.P. and Signal International Texas, L.P. 302. Defendant Global Resources is, and functions as, the alter ego of Defendant Pol. 303. Defendant Dewan Consultants is, and functions as, the alter ego of Defendant Dewan. 304. Defendants Burnett Law Offices and Gulf Coast Immigration are, and function as, the alter ego of Defendant Burnett. 305. A real and actual controversy exists between Plaintiffs and Defendants, which is justiciable in character and concerns the trafficking of Plaintiffs, breach of contract, fraud and negligent misrepresentation. Plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 declaring the alter egos referenced above. 306. A declaratory judgment is necessary to preserve the rights of the Plaintiffs who were victims of Defendants.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request the following relief: a. Declaratory relief; b. Compensatory relief, including prejudgment interest; c. Punitive damages;
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d. Treble damages as authorized by RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c); e. An award of reasonable Plaintiffs’ costs, including attorneys’ fees and costs; f. A finding of alter ego between Signal International Texas, G.P., and Signal International Texas, L.P.; g. A finding of alter ego between Signal International Texas, L.P., and Signal International, L.L.C.; h. A finding that Signal International, Inc., is the successor in interest to Signal International, L.L.C., or in the alternative, a finding of alter ego between Signal International, L.L.C., and Signal International, Inc.; i. A finding of alter ego among Malvern C. Burnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., and Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C.; j. A finding of alter ego between Global Resources, Inc., and Michael Pol; k. A finding of alter ego between Sachin Dewan and Dewan Consultants Pvt. Ltd.; and l. Such additional and further relief as the Court may deem proper and just.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL Pursuant to Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs demand trial by jury in this action of all issues so triable.
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Dated: August 7, 2013

Respectfully submitted, DLA PIPER LLP (US)

Timothy H. Birnbaum, pro hac vice to be filed New York Bar No . 4681276
John B. Dodson Texas Bar No. 24072069
1251 Avenue of the Americas 27th Floor New York, NY 10020-1104 Tel. 212.335.4500 Fax. 212.335.4501
Attorneys for Plain/iff!,'

55

 
 Case 1:13-cv-00497-MAC-ZJH Document 38 Filed 07/03/14 Page 1 of 14 PageID #: 684

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BEAUMONT DIVISION

RAJU MEGANATHAN et al.

'

'

v.

'

'

SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL L.L.C. et al '

1:13-CV-497

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This case is assigned to the Honorable Marcia A. Crone, United States District Judge, and is

referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for all pretrial matters pursuant to a

Referral Order. (Doc. No. 2.) Pending before the undersigned is the “Motion to Dismiss

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2)” filed by Malvern C. Burnett, the Law Offices of Malvern C.

Burnett, A.P.C., and Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C (hereinafter referred to

interchangeably as “Burnett” and “the Burnett Defendants”). (Doc. No. 10.) The undersigned

has considered the pending motion and the corresponding response (Doc. No. 20). The Burnett

Defendants’ motion should be denied because: 1) the court has personal jurisdiction over the

Burnett Defendants because the RICO statute provides for nationwide service of process; and 2)

the court has specific personal jurisdiction over the Burnett Defendants given the number of

alleged tortious acts committed by the Defendants that injured the Plaintiffs within Texas.

I. Background

A. Procedural Background

On March 7, 2008, twelve individuals who were allegedly trafficked into the United States

filed a putative class action against the Defendants in the Eastern District of Louisiana asserting trafficking, RICO, civil rights, and state law contract and fraud claims.1 See David v. Signal Int’l,

1. The Plaintiffs presumably still have FLSA claims pending in the Eastern District of Louisiana. (Doc. No. 24, p. 6.)

Case 1:13-cv-00497-MAC-ZJH Document 38 Filed 07/03/14 Page 2 of 14 PageID #: 685
LLC, Civ. A. No. 08-1220 (E.D. La.). That Court denied class certification;2 and, as a result of this ruling, the Plaintiffs in the instant action filed suit in this District, where they were allegedly subjected to deplorable working conditions at a Signal facility in Orange, Texas.3 (Doc. No. 1.) On August 7, 2013, the Plaintiffs filed their complaint in this court against the Burnett Defendants, Signal International, L.L.C., Signal International, Inc., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P. (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Signal”), Michael Pol, Global Resources, Inc., Sachin Dewan and Dewan Consultants Pvt. Ltd. (Id.) Subsequently, the Burnett Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). (Doc. No. 10.) B. Factual Background
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, approximately 590 men, including the Plaintiffs, were allegedly trafficked into the United States through the federal government’s H-2B guest worker program to provide labor and services to the Signal Defendants. (Doc. No. 1, p. 1.) The Plaintiffs claim they were lured to work for Signal through the fraudulent promise of legal and permanent work-based immigration to the United States for themselves and their families. (Id., p. 2.) Subsequently, after coming to the United States, the Plaintiffs were allegedly subjected to forced labor and other serious abuses at Signal operations in Orange, Texas and Pascagoula, Mississippi. (Id., p. 3.) The Burnett Defendants consist of Malvern C. Burnett and his two corporations: Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C. and the Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C. The Plaintiffs accuse Burnett of conspiring with Signal and other Defendants to
2. David v. Signal Int’l, LLC, Civ. A. No. 08-1220, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114247, at *129 (E.D. La. Jan. 3, 2012).
3 . Maruthamuthu Mayavu is the only Plaintiff in this lawsuit who worked in Signal’s Pascagoula, Mississippi facility as opposed to their Orange, Texas facility. Curiously, the Defendants did not move to dismiss on that basis.
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recruit Indian welders and pipefitters to fill anticipated H-2B guest worker jobs at Signal’s operations with false promises of permanent residency in the United States for the workers and their families. (Id.)
II. Jurisdiction The Burnett Defendants move to dismiss the instant case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), alleging that this court lacks personal jurisdiction over them. (Doc. No. 10.) Rule 12(b)(2) requires a court to dismiss a claim if it does not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Grynberg v. BP P.L.C., 855 F. Supp. 2d 625, 638 (S.D. Tex. 2012); see FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2). “When a court rules on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction without holding an evidentiary hearing, the party asserting jurisdiction is required to present facts sufficient to constitute a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction to satisfy its burden.” Duke Energy Int’l, L.L.C. v. Napoli, 748 F. Supp. 2d 656, 678 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (citing Central Freight Lines Inc. v. APA Transport Corp., 322 F.3d 376, 380 (5th Cir. 2003); Alpine View Co. v. Atlas Copco A.B., 205 F.3d 208, 214 (5th Cir. 2000)). “[O]n a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, uncontroverted allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint must be taken as true, and conflicts between the facts contained in the parties’ affidavits must be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor for purposes of determining whether a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction exists.” Bullion v. Gillespie, 895 F.2d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 1990). A. Nationwide Service of Process under the RICO Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1965(b) In their complaint, the Plaintiffs allege RICO claims against all of the Defendants, including the Burnett Defendants. (Doc. No. 1.) A federal court obtains personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit based upon a federal statute if that statute provides for nationwide service of process and the defendant has had minimum contacts with the United States. Busch v.
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Buchman, Buchman & O’Brien, Law Firm, 11 F.3d 1255, 1258 (5th Cir. 1994). The Burnett
Defendants have minimum contacts with the United States. (See Doc. No. 10, Exh. 1, Affidavit
of Malvern Burnett.) Thus, the next issue to be decided is whether the RICO statute provides
nationwide service of process.
Title 18 U.S.C. § 1965 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Any civil action or proceeding under this chapter against any person may be instituted in the district court of the United States for any district in which such person resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs. (b) In any action under section 1964 [the civil RICO remedies] of this chapter in any district court of the United States in which it is shown that the ends of justice require that other parties residing in any other district be brought before the court, the court may cause such parties to be summoned, and process for that purpose may be served in any judicial district of the United States by the marshal thereof.
While the Fifth Circuit has not yet ruled on this issue, it appears all of the district courts in
this Circuit have interpreted § 1965(b) to confer nationwide jurisdiction in a RICO action over
nonresident defendants if the plaintiff can establish personal jurisdiction over at least one
defendant under § 1965(a). Allstate Ins. Co. v. Plambeck, No. 3-08-cv-0388-M, 2009 WL
347423, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2009) (citing Rolls–Royce Corp. v. Heros, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d
765, 778-79 (N.D. Tex. 2008); Oblio Telecom, Inc. v. Patel, No. 3–08–cv–0279–L, 2008 WL
4936488, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 18, 2008)); see also Hawkins v. Upjohn Co., 890 F. Supp. 601,
606 (E.D. Tex. 1994); Paolino v. Argyll Equities, L.L.C., 401 F. Supp. 2d 712, 719 (W.D. Tex.
2005); cf. Flores v. Koster, No. 3:11-cv-0726-M-BH, 2013 WL 4874117, at *4 (N.D. Tex. June
28, 2013). Furthermore, the majority of circuit courts have determined that § 1965(b) confers
nationwide service of process in RICO cases. See Allstate Ins. Co., 2009 WL 347423, at *3 n.2
(collecting cases). Accordingly, the undersigned will follow the majority rule that § 1965(b) of
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the RICO statute provides for nationwide service of process if the plaintiff can establish personal
jurisdiction over at least one defendant under § 1965(a). That is easily met here. In the instant
case, it is clear that Defendant Signal transacts its affairs in this forum as they have a facility in Orange, Texas.4
Having decided § 1965(b) provides nationwide service of process, the last inquiry is
whether the “ends of justice require” the Burnett Defendants, who reside and conduct business in
the Eastern District of Louisiana and Southern District of Mississippi, be brought before the court
in the Eastern District of Texas. See 18 U.S.C. § 1965(b) (“In any action under section 1964 of
this chapter in any district court of the United States in which it is shown that the ends of justice
require that other parties residing in any other district be brought before the court, the court may
cause such parties to be summoned . . . .”). “[T]he ‘ends of justice’ is a flexible concept uniquely
tailored to the facts of each case.” Cory v. Aztec Steel Building, Inc., 468 F.3d 1226, 1232 (10th
Cir. 2006). The Fifth Circuit has not implemented any legal test as to what exact set of facts meet
“the ends of justice” requirement. See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Byd:Sign, Inc., No. 6:05-cv-456,
2006 WL 2822151, at *9 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2006). While courts have used somewhat differing
tests, the two considerations that are used most frequently are 1) whether no other district court
4. In the conclusion of Burnett’s motion to dismiss, for the first time, Burnett states “he was not served pursuant to the nationwide service of process provisions of RICO.” (Doc. No. 10, p. 7.) However, Burnett does not further explain this assertion nor provide any legal support for it. While Burnett does not specifically state it in his motion, presumably the Plaintiffs effected service on Burnett by utilizing the waiver provisions of Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Joseph et al. v. Signal et al., 1:13-cv-324 (Doc. No. 50, p. 2). While it is true that a waiver of service does not waive an objection to personal jurisdiction, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(5), it certainly does not serve to eliminate a party’s ability to obtain personal jurisdiction over a defendant through a nationwide service of process provision.
Burnett also argues that even if § 1965(b) provides for nationwide service of process, “the requirements of the constitution and due process must still be fulfilled.” (Doc. No. 10, p. 2.) This argument is somewhat irrelevant. Due process concerns are subsumed when a federal court exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit based upon a federal statute providing for nationwide service of process and the defendant has minimum contacts with the United States. Busch, 11 F.3d at 1258.
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would have personal jurisdiction over all of the alleged RICO conspirators,5 and 2) judicial economy.6
The “ends of justice” require the Burnett Defendants to answer in this forum because numerous defendants reside in different states, and there is likely no alternative forum in which jurisdiction would be proper as to all defendants.7 Also, for reasons of judicial economy, the “ends of justice” should also require the Burnett Defendants to litigate this suit in Texas. There are currently four plaintiffs in this case and over eighty in the four companion cases in which the Burnett Defendants are parties.8 Most of these same plaintiffs already have pending FLSA claims in the Eastern District of Louisiana stemming from the same allegations. (Doc. No. 24, p. 6.) Approximately ninety plaintiffs will be trying this case here in Texas against the defendants that have not sought or may be denied their request to transfer venue. Therefore, if the Burnett Defendants were dismissed from this case, most of the plaintiffs in this and the companion cases would be litigating their FLSA claims against Signal in Louisiana; all of the plaintiffs would be litigating their RICO, federal law and state law claims against the remaining defendants here; and then potentially those same RICO, federal law and state law claims against only the Burnett Defendants would be litigated in an entirely different forum. 9 That would be contrary to
5. Butcher’s Union Local No. 498 v. SDC Investment, Inc., 788 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 1986). 6. Farmers Bank of State of Del. v. Bell Mortg. Corp., 577 F. Supp. 34, 35 (D.C. Del. 1978). 7. The various Signal Defendants have operations in Texas, Mississippi and Alabama and are organized under the laws of Delaware; Defendant Michael Pol is a Mississippi resident; Defendant Global Resources, Inc. is organized under the laws of Mississippi; Defendant Sachin Dewan is a resident of India while Defendant Dewan Consultants is organized under the laws of India; Defendant Malvern Burnett is a Louisiana resident who practices law in Louisiana and Mississippi; and Defendants Law Office of Malvern Burnett, A.P.C. and Gulf Coast Immigration Center are corporations organized under the laws of Louisiana. The Plaintiffs generally aver that most, if not all, of the Defendants have “substantial business contacts in Texas.” (Doc. No. 1.) 8. See 1:13-cv-323; 1:13-cv-324; 1:13-cv-499; 1:13-cv-498. 9. The Burnett Defendants do not say which forum they would be subject to personal jurisdiction.
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Congress’ intent for the “ends of justice” provision which enables plaintiffs to bring all members of a nationwide RICO conspiracy before a court in a single trial. Butcher’s Union, 788 F.2d 535, 539. The undersigned also notes that it would be impractical to require the four Plaintiffs in this case and roughly ninety plaintiffs in the companion cases to travel to a different forum all for the sake of the Burnett Defendants, who consist of a single attorney and two companies Burnett describes as “inactive” located in a contiguous state. (Doc. No. 10, Exh. 1, p. 3.)
The Burnett Defendants argue that given the conclusory allegations against them in the complaint, the “ends of justice” do not require they be brought before this court. (Doc. No. 10, p. 5-6.) They argue the Plaintiffs have failed to plead enough facts in their complaint to show the Burnett Defendants engaged in a conspiracy or a scheme to defraud or commit illegal acts subjecting them to the personal jurisdiction of this court. (Id.) These are not relevant considerations when deciding whether “the ends of justice” require the Burnett Defendants to be brought to Texas. Questions of whether the complaint sufficiently pleads violations of the RICO statute should not be raised in a motion under Rule 12(b)(2) challenging personal jurisdiction. See Allstate Ins. Co., 2009 WL 347423, at *4. In fact, it is already the subject of another motion to dismiss filed by the Burnett Defendants. (Doc. No. 11.) B. The Burnett Defendants are also subject to specific personal jurisdiction in this District
Although this court has personal jurisdiction over the Burnett Defendants due to the nationwide service provisions of the RICO statute, this court also has specific personal jurisdiction over the Burnett Defendants. Absent a statute that permits nationwide service of process, when a suit is based on a federal statute, the court looks to the long-arm statute of the state in which it sits to determine whether a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction. Omni Capital Intern., Ltd. Rudolf Wolff & Co., Ltd., 484 U.S. 97, 105 (1987). The Texas long-arm statute confers
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jurisdiction to the limits of the federal constitution. Companion Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Palermo, 723 F.3d 557, 559 (5th Cir. 2013). Therefore, the undersigned’s focus is whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction offends or satisfies constitutional requirements of due process.
In order to satisfy due process, the Burnett Defendants must have “certain minimum contacts with [Texas] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Parker v. Pro W. Contractors, L.L.C., No. 13-30142, 2013 WL 3534082, at *1 (5th Cir. July 15, 2013) (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). “The minimum contacts requirement is satisfied by either: (1) contacts that give rise to general personal jurisdiction or (2) contacts that give rise to specific personal jurisdiction.” Id. (citing Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir. 1994)). Because the Plaintiffs do not argue minimum contacts are satisfied through general personal jurisdiction, the undersigned will focus only on whether the Burnett Defendants have sufficient contacts that give rise to specific personal jurisdiction.
“Specific jurisdiction is proper where the defendant has ‘purposefully directed his activities at residents of the forum, and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities.’” Parker, 2013 WL 3534082, at *1 (5th Cir. July 15, 2013) (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985)); see also Electrosource, Inc. v. Horizon Battery Techs. Ltd., 176 F.3d 867, 871 (5th Cir. 1999) (litigation must arise out of or relate to activities purposefully directed at residents of the forum). “The constitutional requirement for specific jurisdiction is that the defendant has ‘minimum contacts’ with the forum state such that imposing a judgment would not ‘offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”’ Stroman Realty, Inc. v. Wercinski, 513 F.3d 476, 484 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Office of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S.
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310, 316 (1945)).
The complaint (Doc. No. 1) raises these allegations against the Burnett Defendants:
At all relevant times, the Burnett Defendants acted as agents of Defendant Signal for the purpose of recruiting, obtaining, contracting with, transporting and/or providing Plaintiffs for labor or services in Signal’s Orange, Texas, and Pascagoula, Mississippi, facilities. During this process, Burnett represented to the Plaintiffs that 1) Defendant Signal was a stable and reputable U.S. company offering lawful and ample employment opportunities; 2) working under an H-2B visa for Signal was not inconsistent with applying for permanent immigration status sponsored by Signal; and 3) Signal would obtain work-authorized green cards for the Plaintiffs, enabling them to permanently and legally reside in the United States with their families. In actuality, the Defendants lacked the intent to diligently pursue the Plaintiffs’ green card applications. They also lacked any basis whatsoever for representing, inter alia, that 1) the companies and/or entities that purportedly were sponsoring Plaintiffs’ applications were financially solvent and had reliable and stable employment opportunities to provide the Plaintiffs; 2) green card applications sponsored by those companies would be valid and bona fide under U.S. immigration law; and 3) any applications were likely to be successfully completed and approved within the promised timelines.
All of the Plaintiffs undertook considerable economic, social, familial, and personal sacrifices to obtain the funds necessary to cover the fees paid to all of the Defendants involved in the recruitment process, including Burnett. Since first contracting with the Defendants in India, the Plaintiffs have yet to receive the green cards that the Defendants promised them. Despite clear contractual provisions requiring them to do so, Burnett has refused to refund any of the Plaintiffs’ money, which was paid to them for the express purpose of processing and obtaining green cards and visas for the Plaintiffs.
In late May and early June of 2006, the Burnett Defendants filed with the Texas Workforce Commission the completed forms ETA 750 and attachments seeking permission to import and hire 590 foreign guest workers under the auspices of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b), attendant regulations 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(6) and 20 C.F.R. § 655.3 and associated administrative letters and/or guidance (commonly known as “the H-2B guest worker program”) on behalf of Signal. Burnett knew Signal projected the labor need that it sought to fill with foreign workers to be for at least two to three years. However, in these applications, they only stated that they would employ the workers from October 1, 2006 to July 31,
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2007. Furthermore, they stated that “the temporary workers will work for the length of the prescribed dates of need, will be paid in accordance with the prevailing wage and will return to their home country at the end of employment.” The Plaintiffs entered the United States on H-2B guest worker visas, issued by the U.S. Government on the basis of false statements in late 2006 and early 2007 for the purposes of working for Defendant Signal at its Pascagoula, Mississippi, and Orange, Texas, facilities.
In the isolated and guarded atmosphere of the labor camps, grappling with the crushing debts they had incurred to come to the United States, and fearful of the perceived dangers that existed outside of their fenced-in housing site, the Plaintiffs reasonably felt forced to live in the bunkhouses and continue working for Signal, despite terrible living and working conditions. Plaintiffs’ continuing dependence upon Signal for their present and future immigration status and their continuing high levels of indebtedness, along with the prison-like living conditions that they had been exposed to, reasonably caused the Plaintiffs to fear serious harm and/or abuse of the legal process if they were to leave Signal’s employ. Under these circumstances, Plaintiffs reasonably felt like they had no choice but to continue working for Signal under these conditions.
In sum, Defendants, individually and jointly, conspired and schemed to target Plaintiffs as Indian laborers, knowing that they would be enticed by good pay and false promises of permanent residency, to lure them into the United States. Furthermore, each Defendant, individually and through a collaborative enterprise premised upon fraud, mistreated Plaintiffs and deprived them of any benefit of a fair bargain.
First, the Plaintiffs have clearly satisfied the minimum contacts requirement by alleging the
Burnett Defendants supplied false information to the Texas Workforce Commission in the
documents Burnett filed to gain permission for the Plaintiffs to travel to the United States and to
work for Signal. Burnett also admits visiting Signal’s Texas facility once or possibly twice to
consult with Signal’s plant manager about the overall status and employment of “the
non-immigrant workers who had been initially deployed to Signal’s facility in Texas.” (Doc. No.
10, Exh. 1.) Furthermore, the Plaintiffs have also satisfied the minimum contacts requirement by
alleging the Burnett Defendants committed acts outside of Texas that caused tortious injuries
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within Texas. The Fifth Circuit has held that sufficient minimum contacts are established “[w]hen a nonresident defendant commits a tort within the state, or an act outside the state that causes tortious injury within the state.” Guidry v. United States Tobacco Co., 188 F.3d 619, 628 (5th Cir. 1999) (collecting cases). “Even an act done outside the state that has consequences or effects within the state will suffice as a basis for jurisdiction in a suit arising from those consequences if the effects are seriously harmful and were intended or highly likely to follow from the nonresident defendant’s conduct.” Id. (collecting cases). An individual injured in Texas “need not go to [another jurisdiction] to seek redress from persons who, though remaining in other states, intentionally, knowingly and recklessly caused severe physical, emotional and economic injuries to the plaintiffs and others” in Texas. Id. at 630. Taking the allegations in the Plaintiffs’ complaint as true, and resolving all factual conflicts in their favor, the court finds the Plaintiffs have established the Burnett Defendants have sufficient minimum contacts with Texas because the alleged tortious acts committed by the Burnett Defendants, even if most were committed outside of Texas, caused tortious injuries within Texas. The Burnett Defendants, who allegedly conspired with Signal to lure the Plaintiffs to Orange, Texas with false promises, cannot credibly argue that they could not reasonably have anticipated being sued in this District.
Finally, it will not “offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” for this court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the Burnett Defendants. The Fifth Circuit has used the following test to assess the reasonableness of a court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction: “(1) the burden upon the nonresident defendant to litigate in that forum; (2) the forum state’s interests in the matter; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in securing relief; (4) the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and (5) the several states’ shared interest in furthering substantive social policies.” Stroman Realty, Inc. v. Wercinski, 513 F.3d
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476, 487 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987)). First, the Burnett Defendants will not face a large burden in litigating the instant case in this District, because the Burnett Defendants, who consist of a single attorney and two “inactive” companies, are located in Louisiana, which is contiguous to Texas. Second, the forum state, Texas, does have an interest in the matter because the Plaintiffs were allegedly injured while working at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility. Third, keeping the Burnett Defendants claims in this District will provide the most efficient resolution of this case. Notwithstanding their status as putative class members, the Plaintiffs have already moved their case once from a different federal district court after their motion for class certification was denied. David v. Signal Int’l, LLC, Civ. A. No. 08-1220, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114247, at *129 (E.D. La. Jan. 3, 2012). The most expeditious option at this point would be to continue this case in this District. Finally, the Burnett Defendants have not pointed out any clashes between the substantive social policies of Texas and any other potential forum state in regards to this case. There is no reason to believe that the State of Texas and the other potential forum state have different levels of interest in or conflicting views on the social issues pervading this case. Taking these factors into consideration, the undersigned finds that traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice will not be offended by exercising personal jurisdiction over the Burnett Defendants.
In summary, the undersigned finds the Plaintiffs have presented sufficient facts to establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction over the Defendants because the RICO statute provides for nationwide service of process. In the alternative, the undersigned also finds the Plaintiffs have established a prima facie case that this court has personal jurisdiction over the Burnett Defendants by showing 1) the Burnett Defendants have sufficient minimum contacts with Texas; and 2) it will not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice for this court to exercise personal
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jurisdiction over the Burnett Defendants. IV. Recommendation
For the reasons stated above, the “Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) of Malvern C. Burnett, the Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C., and Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C, and Memorandum in Support” (Doc. No. 10) should be DENIED.
V. Objections Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c) (Supp. IV 2011), each party to this action has the right to file objections to this report and recommendation. Objections to this report must (1) be in writing, (2) specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which the party objects, and (3) be served and filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this report. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); FED R. CIV. P. 72(b)(2). A party who objects to this report is entitled to a de novo determination by the United States District Judge of those proposed findings and recommendations to which a specific objection is timely made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); FED R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3). A party’s failure to file specific, written objections to the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in this report, within fourteen (14) days of being served with a copy of this report, bars that party from: (1) entitlement to de novo review by the United States District Judge of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, see Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276– 77 (5th Cir. 1988), and (2) appellate review, except on grounds of plain error, of any such findings
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Case 1:13-cv-00497-MAC-ZJH Document 38 Filed 07/03/14 Page 14 of 14 PageID #: 697 of fact and conclusions of law accepted by the United States District Judge, see Douglass v. United Serv. Auto. Ass’n., 79 F.3d 1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996). SIGNED this 2nd day of July, 2014. _________________________ Zack Hawthorn United States Magistrate Judge
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 Case 1:13-cv-00497-MAC-ZJH Document 44 Filed 07/16/14 Page 1 of 9 PageID #: 758

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BEAUMONT DIVISION

SRINIVASA RAO KAMBALA et al.

§

§

v.

§

§

SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL L.L.C. et al. §

NO. 1:13-CV-498

SATHEESH MARIMUTHU et al.

§

§

v.

§

§

SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL L.L.C. et al. §

NO. 1:13-CV-499

RAJU MEGANATHAN et al.

§

§

v.

§

§

SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL L.L.C. et al §

No. 1:13-CV-497

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO TRANSFER Pending before the court is a “Motion for Stay Pendente Lite and for Transfer Pursuant to First Filed Rule” (Doc. No. 14) filed by Signal International, L.L.C., Signal International, Inc., Signal International Texas, G.P., and Signal International Texas, L.P. (“the Signal Defendants”), and a “Motion to Transfer Venue and Memorandum in Support” (Doc. No. 31) filed by Malvern C. Burnett, the Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C., and Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C (“the Burnett Defendants”). These two motions are also pending before the court in related cases. See Marimuthu et. al v. Signal International L.L.C. et al., 1:13-cv-499 (Doc. Nos. 23, 36); Meganathan et al. v. Signal International L.L.C. et al., 1:13-cv-497 (Doc. Nos. 17, 12). Because

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these motions and corresponding responses are for all intents and purposes the same, the undersigned’s decision and reasoning on the motions pending in the instant suit will apply to the corresponding motions filed in Marimuthu and Meganathan as well. Id.
Having considered the pending motions and the corresponding responses, the court denies the Signal and Burnett Defendants’ motions to transfer pursuant to the first-to-file rule because there is not a substantial overlap between the instant suit and Kurian David et al. v. Signal, Int’l, L.L.C. et al., the first filed suit. See Civ. A. No. 08-1220 (E.D. La.).
I. Background A. Procedural Background
On March 7, 2008, twelve individuals who were allegedly trafficked into the United States filed a putative class action against the Defendants in the Eastern District of Louisiana asserting trafficking, RICO, civil rights, and state law contract and fraud claims.1 See David v. Signal Int’l, LLC, Civ. A. No. 08-1220 (E.D. La.). That Court denied class certification;2 and, as a result of this ruling, the Plaintiffs in the instant action filed suit in this District, where they were allegedly subjected to deplorable working conditions at a Signal facility in Orange, Texas.3 (Doc. No. 39.) On August 7, 2013, the Plaintiffs filed their complaint in this court against the Burnett Defendants, the Signal Defendants, Michael Pol, Global Resources, Inc., Sachin Dewan, Dewan Consultants
1. The Plaintiffs presumably still have FLSA claims pending in the Eastern District of Louisiana. (Doc. No. 21, p. 10.)
2. David v. Signal Int’l, LLC, Civ. A. No. 08-1220, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114247, at *129 (E.D. La. Jan. 3, 2012).
3. Srinivasa Rao Gonna is the only Plaintiff in this lawsuit who worked in Signal’s Pascagoula, Mississippi facility as opposed to their Orange, Texas facility.
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Pvt. Ltd., Indo-Ameri Soft L.L.C., Kurella Rao, J&M Associates of Mississippi, Inc., J&M Marine & Industrial, L.L.C., and Billy R. Wilks. The Plaintiffs allege that some or all of the Defendants violated the following federal statutes: 1) The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003; 2) Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; 3) The Civil Rights act of 1866; and 4) The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871. (Id.) In addition, the Plaintiffs bring state law fraud, negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract claims against all of the Defendants. (Id.) B. Factual Background
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, approximately 590 men, including the Plaintiffs, were allegedly trafficked into the United States through the federal government’s H-2B guest worker program to provide labor and services to the Signal Defendants. (Doc. No. 39, p. 2.) The Plaintiffs claim they were lured to work for Signal through the fraudulent promise of legal and permanent work-based immigration to the United States for themselves and their families. (Id., p. 4.) Subsequently, after coming to the United States, the Plaintiffs were allegedly denied employment or were subjected to forced labor and other serious abuses at Signal operations in Orange, Texas and Pascagoula, Mississippi. (Id., p. 5.)
II. Jurisdiction The Plaintiffs seek recovery pursuant to several federal statutes. For actions brought under these statutory provisions, the court has subject-matter jurisdiction predicated upon federal question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331; 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). For the state law causes of action, the court has subject-matter jurisdiction predicated upon supplemental jurisdiction. See
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28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Venue is proper because the events giving rise to the above claims occurred within the confines of this District. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
III. First to File Rule The Signal and Burnett Defendants move to transfer the instant case to the Eastern District of Louisiana pursuant to the First-Filed Doctrine. (Doc. Nos. 14, 31.) “Under the first-to-file rule, when related cases are pending before two federal courts, the court in which the case was last filed may refuse to hear it if the issues raised by the cases substantially overlap.” Int’l Fid. Ins. Co. v. Sweet Little Mexico Corp., 665 F.3d 671, 677 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Cadle Co. v. Whataburger of Alice, Inc., 174 F.3d 599, 603 (5th Cir. 1999)). “The first-to-file rule is a discretionary doctrine.” Jones v. Xerox Commercial Solutions, LLC, CIV. A. No. H-13-0650, 2013 WL 3245957, at *2 (S.D. Tex. June 26, 2013) (quoting Cadle Co., 174 F.3d at 603). The rule is utilized “to avoid the waste of duplication, to avoid rulings which may trench upon the authority of sister courts, and to avoid piecemeal resolution of issues that call for a uniform result.” Save Power Ltd. v. Syntek Fin. Corp., 121 F.3d 947, 950 (5th Cir. 1997). The party wishing to transfer the case has the burden to prove that transfer is warranted. Jones, 2013 WL 3245957, at *2 (citing Sanofi–Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Novo Nordisk, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d 772, 777 n. 5 (E.D. Tex. 2009); VCode Holdings, Inc. v. Cognex Corp., No. 2:07–cv–138, 2007 WL 2238054, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2007); Buckalew v. Celanese, LTD., No. G–05–315, 2005 WL 2266619, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2005)). “In deciding whether to apply the first-to-file rule, the Court must resolve two questions: (1) are the two pending actions so duplicative or do they involve such substantially similar issues
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that one court should decide the subject matter of both actions, and if so, (2) which of the two courts should take the case.” Datamize, Inc. v. Fid. Brokerage Servs., LLC, 2:03-CV-321-DF, 2004 WL 1683171, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 2004) (citing Texas Instruments v. Micron Semiconductor, 815 F. Supp. 994, 997 (E.D. Tex. 1993)). “The first-to-file rule does not require that cases be identical, but merely that there is a substantial overlap in issues and parties.” White v. Peco Foods, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 2d 339, 342 (S.D. Miss. 2008).
IV. Analysis The Defendants argue there is substantial overlap between the instant case and the first filed case, David. (Doc. Nos. 14, 31.) While there are similarities in the two cases, the undersigned finds that the two cases do not involve such substantially similar parties and issues that one court should decide the subject matter of both actions. A. Parties There is some overlap between the parties in David and the instant case, but it is not substantial. While all of the Plaintiffs in the instant suit are also plaintiffs in David, as explained below, they are only asserting FLSA claims in David, which they do not assert here.4 (Doc. No. 21, p. 10.) Conversely, none of the David plaintiffs asserting non-FLSA claims are parties in the instant case. (Id., p. 8) The David defendants and the Defendants in this suit are not completely identical, but for purposes of this analysis, the court finds that the difference is insignificant. While the first-to-file rule does not require identical parties, see Save Power Ltd., 121 F.3d at 950,
4. Even if the Plaintiffs in this case were at one point putative class members in the David class action litigation, they were never parties since the class was never certified. See Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2379 (2011) (holding that it is erroneous to believe a nonnamed class member is a party to class action litigation before the class is certified, or if certification is ultimately denied).
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“the fact that the parties are different cuts against an argument for substantial overlap.” Jones, 2013 WL 3245957, at *4. B. Claims
Although the first-to-file rule also does not require the issues to completely overlap, “the cases should be more than merely related to support a motion to transfer when venue is otherwise appropriate.” Buckalew v. Celanese, Ltd., CIV. A. No. G-05-315, 2005 WL 2266619, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2005). The instant suit and David are related to the extent that all of the claims asserted in this suit are also asserted by the different David Plaintiffs. However, there is not substantial overlap among the claims in both suits. As the District Court established in its opinion denying the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification in David, each of the Plaintiffs’ claims require individualized proof as it pertains to that particular Plaintiff. David v. Signal Int’l, LLC, Civ. A. No. 08-1220, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114247, at *129 (E.D. La. Jan. 3, 2012). Thus, not only are each of the individual plaintiffs’ forced labor, trafficking, RICO and civil rights claims different from one another in this suit, as explained below, they are entirely different from their pending FLSA claims in David. Therefore, the issues presented by the Plaintiffs here cannot be resolved in the David suit. W. Gulf Mar. Ass’n v. ILA Deep Sea Local 24, S. Atl. & Gulf Coast Dist. of ILA, AFL-CIO, 751 F.2d 721, 729 (5th Cir. 1985) (“. . . a district court may dismiss an action where the issues presented can be resolved in an earlier-filed action pending in another district court.”).
Page 6 of 9

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1. Forced Labor and Trafficking The success of each Plaintiff’s forced labor and trafficking claims is dependent on individualized factors. The question in a forced labor case is “whether Defendants’ coercive conduct was such that it could overcome the will of the victim so as to make him render his labor involuntary.” David, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114247 at 77. “This question cannot be answered via generalized class-wide proof but rather must be answered individually based upon individualized proof.” Id. Similarly, with trafficking, “individual issues will play a significant part” because involuntary servitude is an essential element of the claim. Id. at 80-81. 2. RICO Claims The success of each Plaintiff’s RICO claim is also based on each individual’s experience because the Plaintiff will be “required to prove that the [Defendants] committed the predicate acts upon which they rely for the pattern of racketeering activity.” Id. at 92. As stated above, proof of the predicate acts of trafficking and forced labor are “all premised on coercion” and “cannot be made without resort to individualized proof.” Id. Additionally, in order to prove the fraud-based predicate acts, each Plaintiff will “have to prove first-party reliance on the alleged fraud that was directed at them,” because “the question of individual reliance [is] paramount to resolving whether Plaintiffs’ injuries were caused by a RICO violation.” Id. at 105-06. 3. Civil Rights Claims The Plaintiffs are suing the Signal Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for violating their rights to “enjoy and benefit from non-discriminatory employment relationships” with the Signal Defendants. (Doc. No. 39, p. 62.) In order to obtain compensatory damages under this claim, as
Page 7 of 9

Case 1:13-cv-00497-MAC-ZJH Document 44 Filed 07/16/14 Page 8 of 9 PageID #: 765
sought by the Plaintiffs, each “Plaintiff must prove actual injury to himself and that injury must be attributable to (caused by) the Defendant’s disparate treatment.” David, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114247, at *119. For this reason, the outcome of each Plaintiff’s case will vary based on their individualized experience.
4. Violations of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 The Plaintiffs allege that the Burnett Defendants violated the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1971 by violating their right to be free from “forced labor, involuntary servitude, and trafficking in persons.” (Doc. No. 39, p. 64.) Forced labor, involuntary servitude, and trafficking all include an element of coercion, which requires an individualized analysis of each Plaintiff’s situation, as stated above. David, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114247, at *128. As one can easily discern, none of the above causes of action involve substantially similar issues to the Plaintiffs’ FLSA claims pending in David, which include claims of violating the federally mandated minimum wage laws. The proof required for the FLSA claims and the remedies sought are distinct from the proof and remedies at issue in the instant matter. Given that there is not a substantial overlap of the claims between the David litigation and this case, and with the exception of the Plaintiffs’ FLSA claims in David, none of the Plaintiffs in the instant suit and David overlap, the court’s denial of the Burnett Defendants’ motion to transfer will not result in “piecemeal resolution of issues that call for a uniform result.” Save Power Ltd. v. Syntek Fin. Corp., 121 F.3d 947, 950 (5th Cir. 1997).
Page 8 of 9

Case 1:13-cv-00497-MAC-ZJH Document 44 Filed 07/16/14 Page 9 of 9 PageID #: 766 V. Conclusion
The court finds that the instant suit does not substantially overlap with the first-filed suit, David. Accordingly, the Signal Defendants’ “Motion for Stay Pendente Lite and for Transfer Pursuant to First Filed Rule” (Doc. No. 14), and the Burnett Defendants’ “Motion to Transfer Venue and Memorandum in Support” (Doc. No. 31) are DENIED. As discussed previously, these same motions filed in related cases—Marimuthu et. al v. Signal International L.L.C. et al., 1:13-cv-499 (Doc. Nos. 23, 36); Meganathan et al. v. Signal International L.L.C. et al., 1:13-cv-497 (Doc. Nos. 17, 12)—are also DENIED for the same reasons.
SIGNED this 16th day of July, 2014.
_________________________ Zack Hawthorn United States Magistrate Judge
Page 9 of 9

 
 Case 1:13-cv-00497-MAC-ZJH Document 47 Filed 07/29/14 Page 1 of 9 PageID #: 784

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BEAUMONT DIVISION

RAJU MEGANATHAN et al.

'

'

v.

'

'

SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL L.L.C. et al '

1:13-CV-497

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION DENYING DEFENDANT SIGNAL’S MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. NO. 16)

This case is assigned to the Honorable Marcia Crone, United States District Judge, and is

referred to the undersigned United States magistrate judge to conduct all pretrial proceedings.

(Doc. No. 2.) Before the undersigned magistrate judge is the “Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)” (Doc. No. 16) filed by Defendants Signal International, L.L.C., Signal

International, Inc., Signal International Texas, G.P., and Signal International Texas, L.P.

(hereinafter collectively referred to as “Signal”). Because the Plaintiffs have pleaded enough

factual content to draw the reasonable inference that the alleged pendent state law claims

occurred in Texas Signal’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 16) should be denied.

I. Background

A. Procedural Background

On March 7, 2008, twelve individuals who were allegedly trafficked into the United

States filed a putative class action against the Defendants in the Eastern District of Louisiana

asserting trafficking, RICO, civil rights, and state law contract and fraud claims. See David v. Signal Int’l, LLC, Civ. A. No. 08-1220 (E.D. La.). That Court denied class certification;1 and, as

a result of this ruling, the Plaintiffs in the instant action filed suit in this District, where they were

1. David v. Signal Int’l, LLC, Civ. A. No. 08-1220, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114247, at *129 (E.D. La. Jan. 3, 2012).
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allegedly subjected to deplorable working conditions at a Signal facility in Orange, Texas.2 (Doc. No. 1.) On August 7, 2013, the Plaintiffs filed their complaint in this court against the Signal Defendants, Malvern C. Burnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C., Michael Pol, Global Resources, Inc., Sachin Dewan and Dewan Consultants Pvt. Ltd. (Id.) B. Factual Background
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, approximately 590 men, including the Plaintiffs, were allegedly trafficked into the United States through the federal government’s H-2B guest worker program to provide labor and services to the Signal Defendants. (Doc. No. 1, p. 1.) The Plaintiffs claim they were lured to work for Signal through the fraudulent promise of legal and permanent work-based immigration to the United States for themselves and their families. (Id., p. 2.) Subsequently, after coming to the United States, the Plaintiffs were allegedly subjected to forced labor and other serious abuses at Signal operations in Orange, Texas and Pascagoula, Mississippi. (Id., p. 3.)
II. Jurisdiction The Plaintiffs seek recovery pursuant to several federal statutes. For actions brought under these statutory provisions, the court has subject-matter jurisdiction predicated upon federal question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331; 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). For the state law causes of action, the court has subject-matter jurisdiction predicated upon supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Venue is proper because the events giving rise to the above claims occurred within the confines of this District. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
2 . Maruthamuthu Mayavu is the only Plaintiff in this lawsuit who worked in Signal’s Pascagoula, Mississippi facility as opposed to their Orange, Texas facility. The Defendants did not move to dismiss on that basis.
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III. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes dismissal of a complaint that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss “is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted.” Harrington v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 563 F.3d 141, 147 (5th Cir. 2009). When a court analyzes a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it “accepts ‘all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’” In re Katrina Beaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)). A court should grant such a motion only when the complaint fails to contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
IV. Analysis Signal moves to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ pendent state law claims of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. No. 16, p. 1.) Signal argues the “state law claims are implausible because the Complaint alleges that the facts from which they originate occurred abroad;” and, therefore, “the contention that these claims are governed by state law is dubious.” (Id.) In addition, although not entirely clear, Signal also seems to contend that the complaint should be dismissed because the Plaintiffs failed to meaningfully engage in a choice-of-law analysis in order to determine which, if any, state’s law applies. (Id., p. 9.)
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The Plaintiffs respond that their complaint adequately alleges facts that their state law
claims occurred in Texas and that Texas law applies to their claims. (Doc. No. 23.) Specifically,
the Plaintiffs argue the complaint makes clear that the tortious actions originated, were
performed, and continued to occur in Texas, specifically at the Texas Labor Camp located in
Orange, Texas. (Id., p. 5.) The Plaintiffs allege that while recruiters working on Signal’s behalf
initially lured and defrauded the Plaintiffs abroad, Signal ratified the recruiters’ actions by
continuing to defraud the Plaintiffs upon their arrival in Texas. (Id.) Lastly, the Plaintiffs argue
that a fact intensive choice of law analysis is premature given the sufficient facts that plausibly
support the events centered around the Texas Labor Camp. (Id., p. 4.)
1. State Law Claims that are “Extraterritorial in Nature”
Signal’s argument that the complaint should be dismissed because the claims in question
are “predicated on representations, statements and communications that took place in India” is
without merit. (Doc. No. Id, p. 1.) The complaint is replete with allegations that Signal
committed the state law torts in Texas. The following is a summary of the Plaintiffs’ complaint
(Doc. No. 1):
Defendant Dewan Consultants, Defendant Signal, Defendant Pol and Defendant Burnett induced Plaintiffs to enter into employment agreements by falsely promising to help Plaintiffs obtain green cards. In actuality, the Defendants lacked the intent to diligently pursue the Plaintiffs’ green card applications. They also lacked any basis whatsoever for representing, inter alia, that 1) the companies and/or entities that purportedly were sponsoring Plaintiffs’ applications were financially solvent and had reliable and stable employment opportunities to provide the Plaintiffs; 2) green card applications sponsored by those companies would be valid and bona fide under U.S. immigration law; and 3) any applications were likely to be successfully completed and approved within the promised timelines.
Once at the Texas Labor Camp, Signal ratified the actions of the recruiters, breached its obligations and defrauded the Plaintiffs regarding their immigration status. Defendant Signal
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subjected Plaintiffs to skills testing and re-testing and persistently threatened Plaintiffs with on-the-job discipline, layoffs, and periods without work and pay. Plaintiffs also were exposed to a work environment in which they were forced to endure a lack of safety precautions, unfavorable job assignments, evaluation processes, and other adverse employment actions to which nonIndian and U.S. citizen workers were not similarly subjected. Furthermore, at various times relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims, Defendant Signal refused to confirm whether valid H-2B visa extensions had, in fact, been obtained for Plaintiffs. This coerced Plaintiffs to continue working for Signal in the hope that Signal would finally resolve their uncertain immigration statuses. On multiple occasions, Plaintiffs asked the Orange camp manager, who was known as “Ravi,” about the statuses of their green cards. Ravi, an agent of Defendant Signal, always told Plaintiffs that they had to wait without giving them any further updates or information. Since first contracting with the Defendants in India, the Plaintiffs have yet to receive the green cards that the Defendants promised them. Despite clear contractual provisions requiring them to do so, Defendant Dewan Consultants, Defendant Pol, Defendant Burnett and Defendant Signal have refused to refund any of the Plaintiffs’ money, which was paid to Defendants for the express purpose of processing and obtaining green cards and visas for Plaintiffs, as Defendants had promised.
In the RICO fraud chart attached to their complaint as Exhibit 1, the Plaintiffs also allege
the following occurred after the Plaintiffs arrived in the United States:
Defendant Signal told Plaintiff Meganathan and his coworkers that their visas and green cards were being processed during an in-person meeting at Signal’s Texas facility. Subsequently, Signal told Meganathan that all of the workers were going to be evaluated and scored and that not everyone would be receiving visa extensions when their visas expired. The scoring was not explained, but only workers who scored higher than “six” would receive an extension.
Defendant Signal informed Plaintiff Narayanasamy that it wished to extend his H-2B visa through May 31, 2008, and that it had authorized Defendant Malvern C. Burnett to initiate the process. After Plaintiff Narayanasamy’s visa expired, he inquired as to actions that were being taken to secure his legal immigration status. Again, Defendant Signal assured Narayanasamy that his visa situation would be addressed. Narayanasamy never received any notification that he had received his green card or that his H2B visa was renewed.
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At periodic Signal camp meetings, Defendant Malvern C. Burnett told Plaintiff Mayavu and his co-workers repeatedly not to worry about their green cards. Defendant Burnett also represented that he was applying for H-2B visa extensions for Plaintiff Mayavu and for others. Subsequently, Plaintiff Mayavu and his co-workers inquired about extensions to their soon to expire H-2B visas. Defendant Signal and Defendant Burnett informed them that they were still on track to receive extensions.
On several occasions in 2007 Plaintiff Ramasamy inquired about his green card status to Defendant Signal. Defendant Signal repeatedly told Plaintiff Ramasamy that the situation would be addressed. After Plaintiff Ramasamy’s visa was allowed to expire, he inquired about the action being undertaken to secure his legal immigration status. Defendant Signal assured Ramasamy the situation would be addressed.
When deciding a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must consider these facts as true.
In re Katrina Beaches Litig., 495 F.3d at 205. From these allegations, the Plaintiffs have clearly
pleaded enough factual content to draw the reasonable inference that the alleged pendent state
law claims of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract occurred in Texas.3
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 at 678. Even if the complaint alleges Signal’s actions and the Plaintiffs’
injuries occurred in Texas and India, Signal has not cited to any persuasive authority that this
subjects the Plaintiffs’ entire complaint to a 12(b)(6) dismissal. In fact, district courts have the
power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over foreign law claims that form part of the same
case or controversy. In re BP p.l.c. Sec. Litig., 843 F. Supp. 2d 712, 799 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (citing
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)).
2. Choice of Law Analysis
Next, Signal argues the complaint is defective because it does not address the factors that
would convince the court that Texas state law applies through a choice of law analysis. (Id.) A
3. Signal briefly mentions that the complaint likely alleges the Plaintiffs incurred their damages in India, which “militates in favor of the conclusion that the applicable law is not state law.” (Doc. No. 16, p. 23.) However, as detailed in the complaint, the Plaintiffs not only suffered damages in India, but also Texas. Signal allegedly continued to mislead, defraud and breach their contractual duties to the Plaintiffs once they were in Texas. (Doc. No. 1.)
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court has discretion to exercise jurisdiction over state-law claims when federal question jurisdiction is proper and the state-law claims derive from a common nucleus of operative facts. Arena v. Graybar Elec. Co., Inc., 669 F.3d 214, 221 (5th Cir. 2012); 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Federal courts apply the forum state’s conflict-of-law rules to determine what law governs the state-law claims. Bailey v. Shell Western E&P, Inc., 609 F.3d 710, 722 (5th Cir. 2010), citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). Texas courts first determine whether there is a conflict between Texas law and another potentially applicable law. Id. (citation omitted.) If there is no such conflict, a choice-of-law analysis is unnecessary. Id. (citing SAVA gumarska in kemijska industria d.d. v. Advanced Polymer Sciences, Inc., 128 S.W.3d 304, 314 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2004, no pet.)). But, where there is a conflict of laws, Texas follows the “most significant relationship” test of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. Id. (citing Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Nishika Ltd., 953 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1997)).
Signal does not dispute the court has proper federal question jurisdiction over the pendent state-law claims. Signal argues the complaint is subject to dismissal because it does not explain why Texas law applies over Indian law. (Doc. No. 16, p. 8-9.) Signal does not cite, and the undersigned cannot find, any binding Fifth Circuit authority for a 12(b)(6) dismissal because the complaint fails to plead the particular state’s law at issue for the pendent state law claims. Nevertheless, Signal has not shown there is even a conflict of laws between Texas and Indian law.4 Without such a showing, a choice-of-law analysis is unnecessary. Even if a choice-of-law
4. Signal appears to argue that this court should dismiss the instant case because of the “foreign nature” of the claims. However, none of the cases cited by Signal are applicable to the instant case in which Signal allegedly committed torts within Texas that injured the Plaintiffs within Texas. See e.g. Boureslan v. Aramco, Arabian Am. Oil Co., 892 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1990) (An American citizen brought a Title VII suit, alleging that while he was working in Saudi Arabia the American corporation which employed him discriminated against him because of his race, religion and national origin.); Coca-Cola Co. v. Harmar Bottling Co., 218 S.W.3d 671, 680-81 (Tex. 2006) (“It is an especially sensitive matter for a jurisdiction to extend its laws governing economic competition beyond its borders.”); E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) (A United States citizen brought a Title VII action against a United States employer, alleging that while he was working abroad, the employer discriminated
7

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analysis were required, there is no authority for dismissing a complaint under 12(b)(6) for failing to analyze in the complaint which state law controls under the “most significant relationship” test promulgated in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. In any event, Signal’s choice-oflaw argument is without merit. As discussed previously, the Plaintiffs have pled sufficient facts to draw the reasonable inference that Signal’s alleged misconduct occurred in Texas, thereby invoking Texas law to govern the state causes of action.
V. Recommendation For the reasons stated above, Signal’s “Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)” (Doc. No. 16) should be denied.
VI. Objections Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c) (Supp. IV 2011), each party to this action has the right to file objections to this report and recommendation. Objections to this report must (1) be in writing, (2) specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which the party objects, and (3) be served and filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this report. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); Fed R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). A party who objects to this report is entitled to a de novo determination by the United States District Judge of those proposed findings and recommendations to which a specific objection is timely made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); Fed R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). A party’s failure to file specific, written objections to the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in this report, within fourteen (14) days of being served with a copy of this report, bars that party from: (1) entitlement to de novo review by the United States District Judge of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, see Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276–77 (5th Cir. 1988), and (2) appellate review, except on grounds of plain error, of any
against him because of his race, religion, and national origin.).
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Case 1:13-cv-00497-MAC-ZJH Document 47 Filed 07/29/14 Page 9 of 9 PageID #: 792 such findings of fact and conclusions of law accepted by the United States District Judge, see Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996). SIGNED this 29th day of July, 2014. _________________________ Zack Hawthorn United States Magistrate Judge
9

 
 Case 1:13-cv-00497-MAC-ZJH Document 49 Filed 08/04/14 Page 1 of 13 PageID #: 799

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BEAUMONT DIVISION

RAJU MEGANATHAN et al.

'

'

v.

'

'

SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL L.L.C. et al '

1:13-CV-497

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION DENYING THE BURNETT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. NO. 11)

This case is assigned to the Honorable Marcia A. Crone, United States District Judge, and is referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for all pretrial matters pursuant to a Referral Order. (Doc. No. 2.) Before the undersigned is a “Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)” filed by Malvern C. Burnett, the Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C., and Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C (hereinafter referred to interchangeably as “Burnett” and “the Burnett Defendants”). (Doc. No. 11.) The undersigned has considered the pending motion and the corresponding response (Doc. No. 21). The Burnett Defendants’ motion should be denied because the Plaintiffs have sufficiently stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, and a motion for summary judgment is the proper vehicle to prove the Plaintiffs state law claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
I. Background A. Procedural Background
On March 7, 2008, twelve individuals who were allegedly trafficked into the United States filed a putative class action against the Defendants in the Eastern District of Louisiana. See David v. Signal Int’l, LLC, Civ. A. No. 08-1220 (E.D. La.). That Court denied class

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Case 1:13-cv-00497-MAC-ZJH Document 49 Filed 08/04/14 Page 2 of 13 PageID #: 800
certification;1 and, as a result of this ruling, the Plaintiffs in the instant action filed suit in this District, where they were allegedly subjected to deplorable working conditions at a Signal’s Orange, Texas and Pascagoula, Mississippi facilities. (Doc. No. 1.) On August 7, 2013, the Plaintiffs filed their complaint in this court against the Burnett Defendants, Signal International, L.L.C., Signal International, Inc., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P. (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Signal”), Michael Pol, Global Resources, Inc., Sachin Dewan and Dewan Consultants Pvt. Ltd. (Id.) Subsequently, the Burnett Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. No. 11.) B. Factual Background
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, approximately 590 men, including the Plaintiffs, were allegedly trafficked into the United States through the federal government’s H-2B guest worker program to provide labor and services to the Signal Defendants. (Doc. No. 1, p. 1.) The Plaintiffs claim they were lured to work for Signal through the fraudulent promise of legal and permanent work-based immigration to the United States for themselves and their families. (Id., p. 2.) Subsequently, after coming to the United States, the Plaintiffs were allegedly subjected to forced labor and other serious abuses at Signal operations in Orange, Texas and Pascagoula, Mississippi. (Id., p. 3.)
The Burnett Defendants consist of Malvern C. Burnett and his two corporations: Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C. and the Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C. The Plaintiffs accuse Burnett of conspiring with Signal and other Defendants to recruit Indian welders and pipefitters to fill anticipated H-2B guest worker jobs at Signal’s operations with
1. David v. Signal Int’l, LLC, Civ. A. No. 08-1220, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114247, at *129 (E.D. La. Jan. 3, 2012).
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Case 1:13-cv-00497-MAC-ZJH Document 49 Filed 08/04/14 Page 3 of 13 PageID #: 801
false promises of permanent residency in the United States for the workers and their families. (Id.)
II. Jurisdiction The Plaintiffs seek recovery pursuant to several federal statutes. For actions brought under these statutory provisions, the court has subject-matter jurisdiction predicated upon federal question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331; 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). For the state law causes of action, the court has subject-matter jurisdiction predicated upon supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Venue is proper because the events giving rise to the above claims occurred within the confines of this District. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
III. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes dismissal of a complaint that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss “is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted.” Harrington v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 563 F.3d 141, 147 (5th Cir. 2009). When a court analyzes a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it “accepts ‘all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’” In re Katrina Beaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)). A court should grant such a motion only when the complaint fails to contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
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IV. Analysis The Plaintiffs allege Burnett violated the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (“TVPRA”) and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). (Doc. No. 1); see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1584-1595; §§ 1962(c) and 1962(d). The Plaintiffs have also asserted state law claims of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract against Burnett. (Id.) First, Burnett argues the Plaintiffs have failed to provide sufficient facts to state any claim. (Doc. No. 11.) Second, Burnett asserts the Plaintiffs’ state law claims are barred by the statute of limitations. (Id.) A. Failure to State a Claim under Rule 12(b)(6) 1. Insufficient Facts Burnett generally argues the Plaintiffs failed to state more than mere conclusions and recitals of statutory language without any basis in fact in their complaint. In particular, Burnett argues that the Plaintiffs did not provide any facts showing Burnett engaged in illegal activity. In addition, Burnett argues that each of the Plaintiffs’ federal claims “has as its linchpin” the false concept “that threats of deportation satisfy the definition of involuntary servitude.” (Doc. No. 11, p. 2.) First, the undersigned finds, contrary to Burnett’s assertion, that the Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged facts that allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that Burnett is liable for the alleged misconduct. In their complaint the Plaintiffs allege the following:
At all relevant times, the Burnett Defendants acted as agents of Defendant Signal for the purpose of recruiting, obtaining, contracting with, transporting and/or providing Plaintiffs for labor or services in Signal’s Orange, Texas, and Pascagoula, Mississippi, facilities. During this process, the Burnett Defendants induced Plaintiffs to enter into employment agreements by falsely promising to help them secure green cards. In actuality, the Defendants lacked the intent to diligently pursue the Plaintiffs’
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green card applications. They also lacked any basis whatsoever for representing, inter alia, that 1) the companies and/or entities that purportedly were sponsoring Plaintiffs’ applications were financially solvent and had reliable and stable employment opportunities to provide the Plaintiffs; 2) green card applications sponsored by those companies would be valid and bona fide under U.S. immigration law; and 3) any applications were likely to be successfully completed and approved within the promised timelines.
All of the Plaintiffs undertook considerable economic, social, familial, and personal sacrifices to obtain the funds necessary to cover the fees paid to all of the Defendants involved in the recruitment process, including Burnett. Since first contracting with the Defendants in India, the Plaintiffs have yet to receive the green cards that the Defendants promised them. Despite clear contractual provisions requiring them to do so, Burnett has refused to refund any of the Plaintiffs’ money, which was paid to them for the express purpose of processing and obtaining green cards and visas for the Plaintiffs.
In late May and early June of 2006, the Burnett Defendants filed with the Texas Workforce Commission the completed forms ETA 750 and attachments seeking permission to import and hire 590 foreign guest workers under the auspices of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b), attendant regulations 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(6) and 20 C.F.R. § 655.3 and associated administrative letters and/or guidance (commonly known as “the H-2B guest worker program”) on behalf of Signal. Burnett knew Signal projected the labor need that it sought to fill with foreign workers to be for at least two to three years. However, in these applications, they only stated that they would employ the workers from October 1, 2006 to July 31, 2007. Furthermore, they stated that “the temporary workers will work for the length of the prescribed dates of need, will be paid in accordance with the prevailing wage and will return to their home country at the end of employment.” The Plaintiffs entered the United States on H-2B guest worker visas, issued by the U.S. Government on the basis of false statements in late 2006 and early 2007 for the purposes of working for Defendant Signal at its Pascagoula, Mississippi, and Orange, Texas, facilities.
In sum, Defendants, individually and jointly, conspired and schemed to target Plaintiffs as Indian laborers, knowing that they would be enticed by good pay and false promises of permanent residency, to lure them into the United States. Furthermore, each Defendant, individually and through a collaborative enterprise premised upon fraud, mistreated Plaintiffs and deprived them of any benefit of a fair bargain.
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In the RICO fraud chart attached to their complaint as Exhibit 1, the Plaintiffs also allege the following occurred after the Plaintiffs arrived in the United States:
At periodic Signal camp meetings, Defendant Malvern C. Burnett told Plaintiff Mayavu and his co-workers repeatedly not to worry about their green cards. Defendant Burnett also represented that he was applying for H-2B visa extensions for Plaintiff Mayavu and for others. Subsequently, Plaintiff Mayavu and his co-workers inquired about extensions to their soon to expire H-2B visas. Defendant Signal and Defendant Burnett informed them that they were still on track to receive extensions, although they never received them. The Plaintiffs have clearly alleged the Burnett Defendants were “key participants” in an “elaborate human trafficking scheme.” (Doc. No. 21, p. 9.) In their motion to dismiss, the Burnett Defendants argue that these facts are merely “occurrences and actions that are consistent with any attorney representing his or her clients.” (Doc. No. 11, p. 3.) However, the Plaintiffs have provided facts describing Burnett’s acts that are entirely inconsistent with a “normal” attorney-client relationship. As stated above, Burnett allegedly made false promises to the Plaintiffs to lure them into working for Signal. Burnett also required the Plaintiffs to pay him exorbitant fees for his services, and then refused to refund the Plaintiffs’ money when he failed to perform as promised. (Doc. No. 1, p. 24.) Furthermore, the Plaintiffs have provided sufficient facts to support their argument that Burnett is liable for fraud and negligent misrepresentation. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), “a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.” As detailed above, Burnett made several promises to the Plaintiffs that he allegedly knew to be untrue: 1) the companies and/or entities that purportedly were sponsoring Plaintiffs’ applications were financially solvent and had reliable and stable employment opportunities to
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provide the Plaintiffs; 2) green card applications sponsored by those companies would be valid and bona fide under U.S. immigration law; and 3) any applications were likely to be successfully completed and approved within the promised timelines. (Doc. No. 1, p. 12.) In reliance on Burnett’s promises, the Plaintiffs “relinquished stable employment opportunities in Singapore and India and borrowed substantial amounts of money” to work at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility. (Id., p. 2.)
The Plaintiffs have also provided sufficient facts alleging that Burnett conspired with Signal. More than once, in their complaint and the RICO chart attached to the complaint as Exhibit 1, the Plaintiffs allege that the Burnett Defendants worked with the Recruiter Defendants and Signal to carry out this scheme. The Plaintiffs identify letters and phone conversations showing the Defendants conspired to: 1) recruit the Plaintiffs with false promises of permanent residency for themselves and their families; and 2) keep the Plaintiffs from protesting their mistreatment and leaving Signal’s employ.
Finally, Burnett generally states the Plaintiffs failed to allege facts to support their breach of contract claim. (Doc. No. 11, p. 5.) However, the Plaintiffs allege they entered into contracts with Burnett under which they would pay fees to Burnett in exchange for his promise to provide them with lawful employment and work-authorized green cards enabling them to permanently and legally reside in the United States with their families. (Doc. No. 1.) Burnett allegedly breached this contract by not fulfilling those promises and refusing to refund the fees the Plaintiffs paid him. (Id., pp. 34-35.)
2. Involuntary Servitude The Burnett Defendants also argue that “each of the federal causes of action has as its linchpin the concept that threats of deportation satisfies the definition of involuntary servitude,”
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and “as a matter of law, the threat of deportation does not satisfy a determination of involuntary servitude.” (Doc. No. 11, p. 2.) The Burnett Defendants do not elaborate on how each of the Plaintiffs’ claims is based on the premise that threats of deportation satisfy the definition of involuntary servitude.
Nonetheless, the case cited by Burnett in support of his assertion is easily distinguished from the instant case. In Zavala v. Wal Mart Stores, the plaintiffs were “seeking compensation for unpaid overtime and certification of a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), civil damages under RICO, and damages for false imprisonment.” Zavala v. Wal Mart Stores Inc., 691 F.3d 527, 530 (3d Cir. 2012). The plaintiffs supported their RICO and false imprisonment claims on the theory that the defendants forced them into working by threatening to report their immigration status to the authorities. Id. at 533. The Court stated that “absent some special circumstances, threats of deportation are insufficient to constitute involuntary servitude.” Id. at 541. However, unlike the instant case, in Zavala, Wal-Mart did not contract directly with the plaintiffs; the plaintiffs did not work exclusively for Wal-Mart and “often switched jobs, freely moving to different employers in different cities;” and the plaintiffs were not housed in labor camps. Id. In fact, the Zavala court asserted that “[m]odern day examples of involuntary servitude have been limited to labor camps, isolated religious sects, or forced confinement.” Id. at 540. In the instant case, the Plaintiffs allege they were housed in “overcrowded, unhygienic, and disease-ridden work camps resembling prisons” (Doc. No. 1, p. 3.) The “labor camps” were allegedly “located in an isolated industrial area miles removed from shopping, places of worship, public transportation or residential communities.” (Id., p. 30.)
Furthermore, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Kozminski that “the
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vulnerabilities of the victim are relevant in determining whether the physical or legal coercion or
threats thereof could plausibly have compelled the victim to serve” involuntarily. United States
v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988). The Court further held that “a trial court could
properly find that evidence of . . . extremely poor working conditions is relevant to corroborate
disputed evidence regarding the use or threatened use of physical or legal coercion . . . .” Id.
Therefore, a court must consider all of the relevant circumstances when determining whether the
Plaintiffs were forced to serve involuntarily. In their complaint, the Plaintiffs allege the
following:
The camps were enclosed by fences and accessible to Plaintiffs only by a single, guarded entrance. The gates at the labor camp were constantly monitored by security guards who were retained by Signal. Upon information and belief, some or all of these guards may have been obtained by Signal through Swetman Security Service, Inc. (“Swetman Security”), a private security company based in Mississippi. Signal’s security guards monitored Plaintiffs’ arrival and departure from the facility by requiring them to show their employee identification badges and recording the times at which Plaintiffs entered and exited the camps. If an employee lost his identification badge, he was not allowed to leave the camp. Signal’s security guards also searched Plaintiffs’ packages and bags when they entered the camps. Except on certain rare occasions, Plaintiffs were not permitted to receive visitors in the labor camps at any time.
Up to 24 men were housed in each bunkhouse and made to sleep in two-tiered bunk beds. The bunk beds were so tightly packed in the bunkhouses that it was difficult for workers to move about in the narrow passageways between the bunks. The bunkhouses also had insufficient toilet and bathing facilities for 24 men, resulting in very long lines for the bathrooms before and after work shifts. Privacy in the bunks was non-existent. Plaintiffs often experienced extreme difficulty with sleeping due to the constant noise that resulted from workers entering and leaving the bunks at different times for different work shifts throughout the day and night.
Plaintiffs took their meals in Defendant Signal’s mess halls, which were only open during limited hours. Due to unhygienic kitchen conditions, Plaintiffs’ coworkers frequently became ill, sometimes requiring hospitalization. Plaintiffs routinely went
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without dietary necessities such as daily servings of fruits and vegetables, as a result of scarce resources in the kitchen.
Plaintiffs also were exposed to a work environment in which they were forced to endure a lack of safety precautions, unfavorable job assignments, evaluation processes, and other adverse employment actions to which non-Indian and U.S. citizen workers were not similarly subjected.
In the isolated and guarded atmosphere of the labor camps, grappling with the crushing debts they had incurred to come to the United States, and fearful of the perceived dangers that existed outside of their fenced-in housing site, Plaintiffs reasonably felt that Signal’s statements were threatening and felt forced to live in the bunkhouses and continue working for Signal, despite terrible living and working conditions.
In light of these allegations, the undersigned finds the Plaintiffs have stated a plausible
claim of involuntary servitude. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the court deny
the Burnet Defendants’ motion to dismiss on the basis that the Plaintiffs failed to state a plausible
claim.
B. Statute of Limitations The Burnett Defendants also assert that the Plaintiffs’ pendent state law claims are time
barred by the statute of limitations. Burnett argues the statute of limitations on the state law
claims began to run, at the latest, when the David case was filed on March 7, 2008. Burnett submits that because the plaintiffs were putative class members in David, they were “necessarily aware of all the facts” that would trigger the running of the statute of limitations. (Doc. No. 11,
p. 7.) Although Burnett does not catalogue the statute of limitations for each pendent state law
claim under Texas law, he claims they would expire, at the latest, in four years—2012. The
complaint in the instant case was filed in 2013. Burnett also argues the federal class action filed
in the David court, which was not certified, did not toll the running of the statute of limitations
on the state law claims. In response, the Plaintiffs argue the David Court explicitly tolled the statute of limitations on all of the Plaintiffs’ state law claims. (Doc. No. 21, p. 18.) In the
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alternative, they argue Texas law supports the tolling of the statute of limitations as to all purported members of a class upon the filing of the class action. (Id., p. 13.)
The David complaint was filed on March 7, 2008. (Doc. No. 11, Exh. 2.) United States District Judge Zainey, upon the consent of Signal and the Burnett Defendants, entered an order tolling the statute of limitations for the absent class members’ (who are the Plaintiffs in this case) state law claims for 120 days until after the court’s final ruling on class certification. Order, Kurian David et al. v. Signal International, L.L.C., et al., No. 2:08-cv-1220 (E.D. La. Jan. 20, 2011) (Doc. No. 982). Judge Zainey entered an order denying class certification on January 4, 2012, making the expiration of the tolling period May 3, 2012. Order and Reasons, David, No. 2:08-cv-1220 (Doc. No. 1117). The case was subsequently transferred to United States District Judge Susie Morgan. Order Reassigning Case, David, No. 2:08-cv-1220 (Doc. No. 1157). Over Signal’s objection, Judge Morgan further tolled the statute of limitations for the Plaintiffs’ claims until August 28, 2013. Order and Reasons, David, No. 2:08-cv-1220 (Doc. No. 1379). However, pursuant to Burnett’s request, Judge Morgan clarified that prior order by stating it only tolled the limitations period for the federal law claims, not any state law claims. Order and Reasons, David, No. 2:08-cv-1220 (Doc. No. 1417).
For a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court is typically not to look beyond the complaint. However, a court may consider attachments to briefing regarding a motion to dismiss if the documents are referenced in the complaint, central to the complaint, referenced by the parties, and their authenticity is not in dispute. See Walch v. Adjutant Gen. Dep’t, 533 F.3d 289, 293– 94 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007)); Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2004). Those are the only documents the undersigned should consider in deciding the motion to dismiss as it
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concerns the limitations issue—not the various court orders entered by the New Orleans district courts tolling state statutes of limitations for the pendent state law claims.2
Nevertheless, even if the undersigned were to consider and apply Judge Zainey’s tolling order from the date the David complaint was filed until its expiration, the undersigned would still need to go outside the pleadings to intelligently determine the appropriate accrual date for the various state law claims and what effect the tolling period from Judge Zainey’s order has on the timeliness of the pendent state law claims filed in the instant complaint.3 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d), “if on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56, and all parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present material that is pertinent to the motion.” Accordingly, to the extent the Burnett Defendants believe the Plaintiffs’ state law claims are still barred by the statute of limitations in light of Judge Zainey’s tolling order, that is a matter best addressed in a motion for summary judgment, after the parties have had an opportunity for full discovery and the court can consider evidence outside the pleadings.
V. Recommendation For the reasons stated above, the Burnett Defendants’ “Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)” (Doc. No. 11) should be denied, subject to reconsideration in a motion
2. Burnett did not address the tolling orders entered by the David court, and the Plaintiffs only mentioned Judge Morgan’s initial order tolling the statute of limitations for the state law claims, not the order clarifying that the previous order only applied to the federal law claims. It should be noted that Burnett filed the instant motion after Judge Zainey’s and Judge Morgan’s tolling orders, but before Judge Morgan’s order clarifying the previous order was entered on October 14, 2013. However, the Plaintiffs filed their response on November 15, 2013, after the clarification order was entered.
3. Burnett cites Bell v. Showa Denko K.K., 899 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. App. 1995) in support of his argument that Texas courts hold the filing of a proposed federal class action does not toll the limitations period on pendent state law claims. See also Newby v. Enron Corp., 542 F.3d 463 (5th Cir. 2008). In those cases, it does not appear the Defendants consented to the tolling of the statute of limitations, as the Burnett Defendants did here, at least for the period of time reflected in Judge Zainey’s order. As such, those cases appear to be inapposite.
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for summary judgment that the state law claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
VI. Objections Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c) (Supp. IV 2011), each party to this action has the right to file objections to this report and recommendation. Objections to this report must (1) be in writing, (2) specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which the party objects, and (3) be served and filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this report. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); Fed R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). A party who objects to this report is entitled to a de novo determination by the United States District Judge of those proposed findings and recommendations to which a specific objection is timely made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); Fed R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). A party’s failure to file specific, written objections to the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in this report, within fourteen (14) days of being served with a copy of this report, bars that party from: (1) entitlement to de novo review by the United States District Judge of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, see Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276–77 (5th Cir. 1988), and (2) appellate review, except on grounds of plain error, of any such findings of fact and conclusions of law accepted by the United States District Judge, see Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996).
SIGNED this 31st day of July, 2014.
_________________________ Zack Hawthorn United States Magistrate Judge
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 Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 1 of 49 EXHIBIT 1
Plan Support Agreement
OU7438168.4

-------------------------------------------------,
Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 2 of 49
AMENDED AND RESTATED PLAN SUPPORT AGREEMENT
This AMENDED AND RESTATED PLAN SUPPORT AGREEMENT (together with all exhibits and attachments hereto, as amended, supplemented or otherwise modified from time to time in accordance with the terms hereof, this "Agreement"), dated as of August 25, 2015, is entered into, on their own behalf and not on behalf of any other party (except as noted with respect to Signal International Incorporated), by and among (a) Signal International, Inc. ("SI Inc."), on behalfofitselfand its direct and indirect subsidiaries (collectively, the "Company"); (b) the Teachers' Retirement System of Alabama (the "TRSA") and the Employees' Retirement System of Alabama (the "ERSA" and together with the TRSA, the "RSA''); (c) the Litigation Claimants (as defined below) signatories hereto (the "Supporting Litigation Claimants"), and (d) the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the "Committee") appointed in the Chapter II Cases (defined below).
The Company, the RSA, the Supporting Litigation Claimants, the Committee and any subsequent person or entity that becomes a party hereto in accordance with the terms hereof are referred to herein as the "Parties" and individually as a "£ru:!y." The RSA, Supporting Litigation Claimants, and the Committee are collectively referred to herein as the "Supporting Parties". For the avoidance of any doubt, each of the undersigned counsel for the Supporting Litigation Claimants has executed this Agreement solely on behalf of the Supporting Litigation Claimants and not in its own capacity. The undersigned counsel is not, and shall not be deemed to be, a Party and shall not have any obligation under this Agreement. Any obligations of the Supporting Litigation Claimants under this Agreement are those of the Supporting Litigation Claimants.
Capitalized terms not defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed to such terms in the Plan Term Sheet (as defined below). Notwithstanding anything hereio to the contrary, this Agreement shall not be binding upon the Company until the PSA Order (as defined below) is entered. Votes on a plan shall not be solicited from any of the Supporting Parties until a Disclosure Statement (as defined below) is approved by the Bankruptcy Court (as defined below).
PRELIMINARY STATEMENTS
WHEREAS, as of the date hereof, the RSA (in such capacity, the "Secured Lenders") owns or controls, in the aggregate, 100% of the amounts outstanding (the "First Lien Debt") under that certain Credit Agreement, dated as ofJanuary 31, 2014, (as amended and restated, restated, supplemented or otherwise modified from time to time, the "Credit Agreement") by and among SI Inc., as borrower, Signal International, LLC ("SI LLC"), Signal Ship Repair, LLC ("SSR"), Signal International Texas GP, LLC ("SI GP") and Signal International Texas, L.P. ("SI Texas"), as guarantors, the Secured Lenders party thereto, and the Administrative Agent (as defined below);
WHEREAS, the TRSA, as administrative agent under the Credit Agreement (in such capacity, the "Administrative Agent"), has agreed to (i) consent to the Company's post-petition use of its cash collateral and (ii) provide post-petition DIP financing in the approximate aggregate principal amount of $91 million (consisting of a roll-up of the entire First Lien Debt plus $20 million of new money) (the "DIP Facilitv");
WHEREAS, there are approximately 475 former employees and recruits (together with any and all similarly situated plaintiffs, the "H-2B Workers") of the Company hired and/or recruited
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through the United States H-2B immigration program who, along with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, have asserted or may assert certain legal and equitable claims against the Company which claims the Company denies;
WHEREAS, certain of the H-2B Workers and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (together with any H-2B Workers that assert subsequent claims, the "Litigation Claimants") have commenced litigation currently pending against the Company and, on May II, 2015, five of those Litigation Claimants obtained judgment against the Company in the amount of$12,258,600 (plus prejudgment interest and post-judgment interest, fees costs and expenses) in David v. Signal International LLC (Case No. 08-1220) in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana;
WHEREAS, the Supporting Litigation Claimants have threatened on behalf of themselves certain legal and equitable actions against the Company, certain representatives of the Company, and the RSA (as Secured Lenders);
WHEREAS, prior to the Petition Date (defined below), the Company, the RSA, and the Supporting Litigation Claimants engaged in negotiations in an effort to settle all issues and claims among themselves (the "Settlement") and to implement a financial restructuring (the "Restructuring") of the Company, each consistent with the terms and conditions set forth in an original Plan Support Agreement dated July 12, 2015, and in the term sheet attached thereto as Exhibit A (the "Original Plan Support Agreement");
WHEREAS, on July 12,2015 (the "Petition Date"), following the execution of the Original Plan Support Agreement by the Company, the RSA, and the Supporting Litigation Claimants, the Company commenced voluntary cases (the "Chapter II Cases") under chapter II of title II ofthe United States Code, II U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (as amended, the "Bankruptcy Code") in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the "Bankruptcy Court");
WHEREAS, the Original Plan Support Agreement has been previously amended to revise certain deadlines set forth therein;
WHEREAS, subsequent to the Petition Date, the Company, the RSA, and the Supporting Litigation Claimants engaged in discussions with the Committee regarding certain informal objections (the "Informal Objections") that the Committee raised regarding the: (x) Debtors' Motion for Interim and Final Orders (i) Authorizing Pas/petition Financing, (ii) Granting Liens and Providing Superpriority Administrative Expense Claims, (iii) Authorizing Use ofCash Collateral, (iv) Granting Adequate Protection to Prepetition, (v) Modifying the Automatic Stay and (vi) Scheduling a Final Hearing [D.!. I I}; (y) Debtors' Motion for Entry ofan Order Authorizing the Debtors to Assume the Plan Support Agreement [D.I. 112}, and (z) Debtors:Motionfor Entry of (i) an Order (a) Approving Sales and Bidding Procedures in Connection with Sale ofAssets ofthe Debtors, (b) Approving Bid Protections, (c) Approving Form and Manner ofNotice, (d) Scheduling the Auction and Sale Hearing, (e) Authorizing Procedures Governing Assumption and Assignment ofCertain ExecuJory Contracts and Unexpired Leases, and (j) Granting Related Relief; and (ii) an Order (a) Approving Purchase Agreement, (b) Authorizing Sale Free and Clear ofAll Liens, Claims, Encumbrances, and Other Interests, and (c) Granting Related Relief[D.I. 120);
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WHEREAS, in order to resolve the Informal Objections, the Supporting Parties agreed to, among other things, certain revisions to the Original Plan Support Agreement, as set forth in this Agreement and Plan Term Sheet attached hereto as Exhibit A;
WHEREAS, in order to implement the Settlement and Restructuring, the Company has agreed, on the terms and conditions set forth herein, to use reasonable best efforts to consummate the Settlement and Restructuring through the Plan (as defined below);
WHEREAS, the RSA and the Supporting Litigation Claimants are prepared to commit, on the terms and subject to the conditions of this Agreement, and to the extent legally permissible, to, if and when solicited in accordance with applicable bankruptcy law, vote to accept the Plan and support its confirmation;
WHEREAS, the Committee is prepared to commit, on the terms and subject to the conditions of this Agreement, and to the extent legally permissible, to recommend that holders of Claims against the Debtors vote to accept the Plan, and support its confirmation;
WHEREAS, the Plan Term Sheet is t~e product of arm's-length, good-faith negotiations among the Parties and their respective professionals and sets forth the material terms and conditions of the Settlement and Restructuring, as supplemented by the terms and conditions of this Agreement;
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the promises and the mutual covenants and agreements set forth herein, and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the Parties, intending to be legally bound, agree as follows:
1. Plan Term Sheet. The principal terms and conditions of the Settlement and Restructuring are set
forth in the Plan Term Sheet and shall be incorporated by the Company in the Plan.
2. Certain Definitions. As used in this Agreement, the following terms have the following meanings:
(a) "Alternative Transaction" means any plan, proposal or offer of dissolution, winding up, liquidation, reorganization, merger, consolidation, business combination, joint venture, partnership, sale of assets or restructuring of the Company, other than as described herein and in the Plan Term Sheet.
(b) "Claims" means all claims as such term is defined in section 101(5) of the Bankruptcy Code, and individually referred to as a "Claim."
(c) "Confirmation Order" means an order of the Bankruptcy Court confirming the Plan pursuant to section 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code.
(d) "Disclosure Statement" means the disclosure statement for the Plan, as amended, supplemented or otherwise modified from time to time subject to the terms of this Agreement, that is prepared and distributed in accordance with, among other things, sections 1125, 1126(b), and 1145 of the Bankruptcy Code, Rule 3018 ofthe Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and other applicable law.
(e) "Disclosure Statement Order" means an order of the Bankruptcy Court approving the Disclosure Statement and the Solicitation, which order shall be materially consistent with this Agreement.
(f) "Effective Date" means the effective date of the confirmed Plan.
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(g) "First Lien Debt" means any and all Claims arising under the Credit Agreement and the other Loan Documents (as defined in the Credit Agreement).
(h) "H-2B Claims" means any and all legal or equitable Claims or causes of action of any nature or description whatsoever, whether known or unknown, and whether the same have previously been asserted, could previously have been asserted, or could in the future be asserted by or on behalf of any H2B Worker against the Company or RSA.
(i) "Plan" means the chapter ll plan for the Company, as amended, supplemented or otherwise modified from time to time subject to, and consistent in all material respects with, the terms of this Agreement and the Plan Term Sheet, that is prepared and distributed in accordance with, among other things, sections 1125, 1126(b), and 1145 of the Bankruptcy Code, Rule 3018 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and other applicable law.
Gl "Plan Documents" means the Plan, the Disclosure Statement, the Disclosure Statement Order, the
related solicitation materials, the Confirmation Order, the PSA Assumption Motion, the PSA Order, and each other agreement, instrument, pleading, order or certificate or other related document utilized to implement the Plan, including any exhibits, amendments, modifications or supplements made from time to time thereto but in each case excluding the Plan Supplement Documents (as defined below).
(k) "Plan Supplement Documents" means the Plan Supplement (as defined in the Plan), and such other definitive documentation relating to the Company as is necessary to consummate the Restructuring and the transactions contemplated hereby or thereby.
(I) "Plan Support Effective Date" means the date upon which this Agreement becomes effective and binding on the Parties in accordance with the provisions of Section 13 hereof.
(m) "Plan Support Period" means the period commencing on the Plan Support Effective Date and ending on the earlier of (i) the Effective Date and (ii) the date on which this Agreement is terminated in accordance with Section 8 hereof.
(n) "PSA Assumption Motion" means the motion and proposed form of order to be filed by the Company with the Bankruptcy Court within five (5) business days after the Petition Date seeking the approval and assumption of this Agreement pursuant to section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code and granting related relief.
(o) "PSA Order" means an order ofthe Bankruptcy Court approving the PSA Assumption Motion.
(p) "Requisite H-2B Workers" means (i) a majority in number of the H-2B Workers voting on the Plan and (ii) two-thirds (2/3) of the aggregate amount of the H-2B Claims voting on the Plan.
(q) "Restructuring Documents" means the Plan Documents, the motions and orders, the Plan Supplement Documents, and each other agreement, instrument, pleading, order, instrument or certificate or other related document utilized to implement the Restructuring, or the transactions contemplated hereby or thereby, and to obtain confirmation of the Plan.
(r) "RSA's Advisors" means (i) Burr & Forman LLP, as legal counsel to the RSA, (ii) Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell LLP, as Delaware legal counsel to the RSA, and (iii) Houlihan Lokey Capital, as financial advisor to the RSA.
(s) "Solicitation" means the solicitation of votes in connection with the Plan pursuant to sections 1125 and 1126 of the Bankruptcy Code.
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(t) "Termination Events" means the events oftermination listed in section 8 hereof, with each event individually referred to herein as a "Termination Event".
(u) "Westport Loan" has the meaning set forth in the Plan Term Sheet.
3. Condition Precedent. It is a condition precedent to the effectiveness of this Agreement that there is no payment default under the Westport Loan (determined without giving effect to any alleged waiver by the Company or any other party), without giving effect to any alleged waiver by the Company or any other party, as of the Petition Date (which condition may be waived by the Supporting Litigation Claimants in their sole discretion). If this condition is not satisfied, this Agreement shall be void and of no effect.
4. Means for Effectuating the Settlement and Restructuring. The Company shall seek to effectuate the Settlement and Restructuring through the confirmation and consummation of the Plan in accordance with this Agreement and the Plan Term Sheet.
5. Preparation of Restructuring Documents. The Company shall, in consultation with the RSA's Advisors and the Supporting Litigation Claimants through their advisors, prepare all of the Restructuring Documents necessary for the Company to obtain confirmation and consummation ofthe Plan in a form reasonably acceptable to the RSA, the Supporting Litigation Claimants through their advisors, and the Committee, provided any Plan shall provide the Company and RSA with a full release of all H-2B Claims, including any and all derivative claims by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
6. Agreements ofthe Company.
(a) Affirmative Covenants. The Company, jointly and severally, agrees that for the duration of the Plan Support Period, subject to the terms and conditions hereof (including, without limitation, the Fiduciary Out provided for in Section 25 of this Agreement) and except as otherwise consented to in writing by the RSA, the Supporting Litigation Claimants, and the Committee, the Company shall do, and shall cause to be done, the following:
(i) (A) complete the preparation, as soon as reasonably practicable after the Plan Support Effective Date, of each ofthe Plan, the Disclosure Statement and the other Restructuring Documents (including, without limitation, all motions, applications, orders, agreements and other documents, each of which, for the avoidance of doubt, shall contain terms and conditions materially consistent with this Agreement and acceptable to the Supporting Parties), (B) provide the Restructuring Documents or any documents relating to post-petition financing or cash collateral to, and afford reasonable opportunity of comment and review of such documents by, the RSA's Advisors, the Supporting Litigation Claimants through their advisors, and counsel to the Committee, no less than three (3) business days in advance of any filing, execution, distribution or use (as applicable) thereof and (C) consult with the RSA's Advisors, the Supporting Litigation Claimants through their advisors, and the Committee in good faith and with reasonable and ample notice regarding the form and substance of any of such documents in advance of the filing, execution, distribution or use (as applicable) thereof;
(ii) file the Plan and Disclosure Statement with the Bankruptcy Court by September 4, 2015;
(iii) prepare and file with the Bankruptcy Court statements of financial affairs and required schedules under chapter II of the Bankruptcy Code for the Company no later than August II, 2015;
(iv) (A) support, and take all reasonable actions necessary to facilitate, the implementation and consummation of the Settlement and Restructuring (including, but not limited to, the timely
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preparation, filing and approval of the Restructuring Documents, the Solicitation and confirmation of the Plan and the consummation of the Restructuring) in accordance with this Agreement; (B) take all reasonable actions necessary to oppose in good faith any objection to the Settlement, the Restructuring, and/or the Restructuring Documents; and (C) not take any action that is inconsistent with, or that would be reasonably expected to prevent, interfere with, delay or impede the implementation or consummation of the Settlement and Restructuring;
(v) obtain final approval of the DIP financing by the Bankruptcy Court as soon as reasonably practicable but in no event later than September 10, 2015;
(vi) obtain entry of the PSA Order by the Bankruptcy Court as soon as reasonably practicable but in no event later than the earlier of (a) the date of entry of an order by the Bankruptcy Court granting final relief with respect to the DIP Facility; or (b) September I, 2015;
(vii) obtain entry of the Bid Procedures Order by the Bankruptcy Court no later than September I, 2015, which Bid Procedures Order must contain a requirement that, in order to participate in the Auction, each bidder must agree to abide by the terms of the Westport Participation Agreement (as defined in the Plan Term Sheet);
(viii) obtain entry of the Disclosure Statement Order no later than October 9, 20 15;
(ix) commence Solicitation no later than 5 business days after entry of the Disclosure Statement Order by the Bankruptcy Court;
(x) hold the Auction no later than October 23, 2015;
(xi) obtain entry of the Sale Approval Order and Confirmation Order by the Bankruptcy Court no later than November 24, 2015;
(xii) the effective date of the Plan and the closing on the sale shall have occurred no later than 20 days after the Bankruptcy Court's entry of the Confirmation Order;
(xiii) prior to the Confirmation Hearing, commence avoidance actions against Max Specialty Insurance Company to avoid any avoidable liens;
(xiv) timely file a formal written objection to and contest in good faith any motion filed with the Bankruptcy Court by any party seeking the entry of an order (A) directing the appointment of an examiner with expanded powers or a trustee, (B) converting the Chapter II Cases to cases under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code or (C) dismissing the Chapter II Cases;
(xv) timely file a formal written objection to and contest in good faith any motion filed with the Bankruptcy Court by any party seeking the entry of an order modifying or terminating the Company's exclusive right to file and/or solicit acceptances of a chapter II plan;
(xvi) (A) support and take any and all actions necessary, appropriate or reasonably requested by the Supporting Parties to facilitate the Settlement and Restructuring, including the solicitation, confirmation, and consummation of the Plan, (B) not take any action that is inconsistent with, or that would delay or impede the Restructuring, including, without limitation, Solicitation, confirmation, or consummation of the Plan and (C) perform its obligations under this Agreement in accordance with its terms and as set forth in the Plan;
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(xvii) operate the business of the Company in the ordinary course (giving effect to the existence of the Chapter 11 Cases);
(xviii) keep the Supporting Parties regularly informed about the operations of the Company and the status of the Westport Loan and provide the Supporting Parties any information that is reasonably requested regarding the Company or the Westport Loan (including all reports, compliance certificates, and any other documents or information required to be delivered pursuant to the terms of the Westport Documents);
(xix) promptly notify the Supporting Parties in writing of any governmental or third party complaints, litigations, investigations, or hearings (or communications indicating that the same may be contemplated or threatened) against the Company or of any related correspondence received;
(xx) comply in all material respects with applicable laws (including making or obtaining all required consents and/or appropriate filings or registrations with, notifications to, or authorizations, consents or approvals of any regulatory or governmental authority, and paying all taxes as they become due and payable);
(xxi) maintain the good standing (or equivalent status under the laws of its incorporation or organization) under the laws of the state or other jurisdiction of the Company and the Company's affiliates in which they are incorporated or organized; and
(xxii) use reasonable best efforts to obtain any and all required governmental, regulatory and/or third party approvals necessary or required for the implementation or consummation of the Restructuring or the approval by the Bankruptcy Court of the Restructuring Documents.
(b) Negative Covenants. The Company agrees that for the duration of the Plan Support Period, subject to the terms and conditions hereof (including, without limitation, the Fiduciary Out provided for in Section 25 of this Agreement) and except as otherwise consented to in writing by the RSA, the Supporting Litigation Claimants, and the Committee, the Company shall not, directly or indirectly, do or permit to occur any of the following:
(i) seek, solicit, propose, support, make an agreement to, or take steps or actions that are reasonably likely or intended to result in the submission of an Alternative Transaction, including without limitation, the dismissal or conversion of the Chapter II Cases;
(ii) modify the Plan, in whole or in part, in a manner that is inconsistent with any material aspect of this Agreement;
(iii) withdraw or revoke the Plan or publicly announce its intention not to pursue the Plan;
(iv) take any action or file any motion, pleading or other Restructuring Document with the Bankruptcy Court (including any modifications or amendments thereof) that is inconsistent with any material aspect of this Agreement, the Plan Term Sheet or any other Restructuring Document and is not otherwise reasonably satisfactory in all respects to the RSA, the Supporting Litigation Claimants through their advisors, and the Committee;
(v) commence an avoidance action or other legal proceeding that challenges the validity, enforceability, or priority of the First Lien Debt and/or the H-2B Claims;
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(vi) other than as required by this Agreement or the Plan, amend their respective certificates or articles of incorporation, bylaws or comparable organizational documents;
(vii) (A) merge with or into, or consolidate or amalgamate with, any other person, (B) permit any other person to merge with or into, or consolidate or amalgamate with, it, or (C) purchase, lease or otherwise acquire (in one transaction or a series of transactions) all or any substantial part of the assets of any other person;
(viii) change materially their respective financial or tax accounting methods, except insofar as may be required by a change in generally accepted accounting principles in the U.S. or applicable law, or revalue any of its material assets;
(ix) (A) hire, after the date hereof, any officer, (B) enter into, adopt or amend any employment agreements or any management compensation or incentive plans, or increase in any manner the compensation or benefits (including severance) of any director, officer or management level employee of the Company;
(x) pay any post-petition trade payable or other post-petition expense prior to the date such trade payable or expense is due and payable, except to the extent in the ordinary course of business consistent with past practice;
(xi) incur or suffer to exist any indebtedness or any guarantee of any indebtedness of any person, except (A) indebtedness and guarantees existing and outstanding immediately prior to the date hereof and (B) trade payables, and liabilities arising and incurred in the ordinary course of business consistent with past practices;
(xii) (A) purchase or acquire any indebtedness, debt securities or equity securities of any person, or (B) make any loans or advances to, or investments in, any person, other than in the ordinary cotiTSe of business;
(xiii) incur any liens or security interests, except any liens or security interests or otherwise arising by operation of law in the ordinary course of business; or
(xiv) pursue, consent to, or encourage any claim or cause of action against the Supporting Litigation Claimants, the RSA or their respective representatives.
(c) Automatic Stay. The RSA and the Supporting Litigation Claimants are authorized to take any actions necessary to effectuate the termination of this Agreement in accordance with its terms notwithstanding section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code or any other applicable law and no cure period contained in this Agreement shall be extended pursuant to sections I05, I08 or 365 of the Bankruptcy Code or any other applicable law without the prior written consent of the RSA and the Supporting Litigation Claimants through their advisors.
7. Agreements of the Supporting Parties.
(a) Support of Settlement and Restructuring. Each of the Supporting Parties agrees that, for the duration of the Plan Support Period, subject to the terms and conditions hereof, such Supporting Party shall:
(i) support, and take all reasonable actions necessary to facilitate the implementation and consummation of, the Restructuring (including, but not limited to, the Company's entry into a commitment or agreement with respect to debtor-in-possession financing or the use of cash collateral, the
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Bankruptcy Court's approval of the Restructuring Documents, the Solicitation and confirmation of the Plan and the consummation of the Restructuring pursuant to the Plan so long as each of the foregoing is not inconsistent with this Agreement); provide~ however, that the Supporting Litigation Claimants shall not be required to take any affirmative action under this Agreement or any provision thereof other than to vote in favor of the Plan as described in clause 7(a)(ii) below or vote against an Alternative Transaction as described in clause 7(a)(iv) below;
(ii) (A) subject to the receipt by the Supporting Parties, as applicable, of the Disclosure Statement approved by the Disclosure Statement Order, timely vote, or cause to be voted, as applicable, Claims to accept the Plan by delivering duly executed and completed ballots accepting the Plan on a timely basis following commencement of the Solicitation, pursuant to the terms of the Disclosure Statement Order and not opt out of or object to the releases provided for in the Plan, and (B) not change or withdraw such votes (or cause or direct such votes to be changed or withdrawn).
(iii) with respect to the Committee, recommend that holders of Claims vote to accept the Plan on a timely basis following commencement of the Solicitation and otherwise support confirmation of the Plan;
(iv) not (A) directly or indirectly seek, propose, support, assist, solicit, or vote for any Alternative Transaction, (B) support or encourage the termination or modification of the Company's exclusive period for the filing of a chapter II plan or the Company's exclusive period to solicit a chapter II plan, or (C) take any other action, including but not limited to initiating any legal proceedings or enforcing rights as a holder of Claims, that is inconsistent with this Agreement or the Restructuring Documents, or that would prevent, interfere with, delay or impede the implementation or consummation of the Restructuring (including, but not limited to, the Bankruptcy Court's approval of the Restructuring Documents, the Solicitation and confirmation of the Plan and the consummation ofthe Restructuring pursuant to the Plan); and
(v) subject to the receipt of a disclosure statement and other solicitation materials approved by the Bankruptcy Court pursuant to Section 1125 of the Bankruptcy Code, the RSA and the Supporting Litigation Claimants shall timely vote or cause to be voted their Claims against any Alternative Transaction;
provide~ however, that, except for legal fees incurred in furtherance of seeking approval and enforcement of this Agreement, nothing in this Section 7(a) shall require any Supporting Party to incur any expenses (other than de minimis), liabilities or other obligations, or agree to any commitments, undertakings, concessions, indemnities or other arrangements that could result in expenses (other than de minimis), liabilities or other obligations to any such Supporting Party; provided further, that under no circumstance shall the RSA, the Supporting Litigation Claimants, or the Committee be obligated to support or be prohibited from objecting to any Plan, Restructuring Documents, settlement, or any other aspect of the Chapter II Cases which does not fully dispose of all H-2B Claims to the RSA's, Supporting Litigation Claimants', or Committee's reasonable satisfaction, as applicable; and, provided further, notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, nothing in this Agreement shall require any member of the Committee to take any action, or to refrain from taking any action, to the extent that taking such action or refraining from taking such action would be inconsistent with such Committee member's fiduciary obligations under applicable law.
(b) Rights of Supporting Parties Unaffected. Nothing contained herein shall limit (iXA) the ability of any of the Supporting Parties to consult with other Supporting Parties or the Company or advisors or (B) the rights of the Supporting Parties under any applicable bankruptcy, insolvency, foreclosure or similar proceeding, including, without limitation, appearing as a party in interest in any matter to be adjudicated
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in order to be heard concerning any matter arising in the Chapter II Cases, in each case, so long as such consultation or appearance is not inconsistent with the Supporting Parties' obligations hereunder or under the terms of the Plan and is not intended or reasonably likely to materially delay or prevent confirmation or the consummation of the Restructuring (including, but not limited to, the Bankruptcy Court's approval of the Restructuring Documents, the Solicitation and confirmation of the Plan); (ii) limit the ability of the Secured Lenders to enter into any transactions in connection with the First Lien Debt, subject to the terms hereof; or (iii) any right of the Secured Lenders under (x) the Credit Agreement and (y) any other applicable agreement, instrument or document that gives rise to a Claim of the Secured Lenders.
(c) Additional Claims. To the extent any Supporting Party, as applicable, (i) acquires additional Claims, or (ii) holds or acquires any other claims against or equity interests in the Company, such Supporting Party agrees that any such Claims, or other claims or equity interests shall be subject to this Agreement including the obligations with respect to Claims set forth in Section 7(a) hereof. For the avoidance of doubt, if any Supporting Party transfers or assigns any claims against or equity interests in the Company, this Agreement shall be binding on such transferee or assignee in all respects as if a Supporting Party to this Agreement.

8. Termination of Agreement.

(a) Supporting Parties' Termination Events. Upon written notice from a Supporting Party delivered in accordance with Section 22 hereof (with a copy of such written notice delivered to all Parties), at any time (X) after the receipt by a Supporting Party of a Fiduciary Out Notice or (Y) the occurrence of, and during the continuation of, any of the following events, in each case, unless waived in writing by the Supporting Party (each, a "Suooorting Party Termination Event"), the respective Supporting Party may terminate this Agreement with respect to all Parties, and no failure or delay by the Supporting Party in exercising its right to terminate this Agreement shall operate as a waiver thereof or limit in any way such termination right:

(i)

the breach in any material respect by the Company of any of its obligations, undertakings,

representations, warranties or covenants of the Company set forth in this Agreement, including under

Sections 6(a), 6(b) or II of this Agreement, and such breach remains uncured for a period of three (3)

business days from the receipt of written notice ofsuch breach from the Supporting Party;

(ii) at 5:00p.m. prevailing Eastern Time on the first business day after the failure of the Company to satisfy any of the milestones set forth in Subsections (ii), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), or (x) of Section 6(a) hereof, provided that such failure is not the result of a material breach by any of the
Supporting Party of the terms of this Agreement; and provided fm:!!!IT, that the Company shall have three
(3) business days from receipt ofa written notice from a Supporting Party to cure the failure to satisfy such milestones in a manner that does not prevent or diminish in a material way compliance with the terms of this Agreement;

(iii) the issuance by any governmental authority, including any regulatory authority, or court ofcompetent jurisdiction, ofany ruling, judgment or order preventing the consummation ofa material portion of the Restructuring;

(iv) the Plan is amended or otherwise modified so as to be inconsistent with this Agreement or modified so as to have a material impact on a Supporting Party;

(v) the Bankruptcy Court grants relief that is materially inconsistent with this Agreement or the Plan (in each case, with such amendments and modifications as have been effected in accordance with the terms hereof);
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(vi) the Bankruptcy Court enters an order (A) directing the appointment of an examiner with expanded powers or a chapter II trustee, (B) converting the Chapter II Cases to cases under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, (C) dismissing the Chapter II Cases, (D) terminating exclusivity under section 1121 of the Bankruptcy Code, (E) making a finding of fraud, dishonesty or misconduct by any executive, manager, officer or director of the Company, regarding or relating to the Company;
(vii) upon the withdrawal, waiver, amendment or modification by the Company ofthe Plan or any of the Restructuring Documents or the filing of a pleading seeking to withdraw, waive, amend or modifY any term or condition of the Plan or any of the Restructuring Documents, which withdrawal, waiver, amendment, modification or filing is materially inconsistent with this Agreement, the Plan or the Restructuring Documents (in each case, as this Agreement, Plan and the Restructuring Documents may be amended from time to time in accordance with the terms hereof) or is materially adverse to the RSA, the Supporting Litigation Claimants, or the Committee, or, if the Company files any motion or pleading with the Bankruptcy Court that is not consistent with this Agreement, the Plan or the Restructuring Documents (in each case, as this Agreement, the Plan or the Restructuring Documents may be amended from time to time in accordance with the terms hereof) in a material substantive respect, and such motion or pleading has not been withdrawn prior to the earlier of(A) three (3) business days after the Company receives written notice from the RSA, the Supporting Litigation Claimants, or the Committee that such motion or pleading is inconsistent with this Agreement or the Restructuring Documents, as applicable and (B) the entry of an order of the Bankruptcy Court approving such motion;
(viii) the Company seeks, solicits, proposes, supports, or makes an agreement to, or takes steps or actions that are reasonably likely or intended to result in the submission of an Alternative Transaction;
(ix) the failure to satisfY any material condition to effectiveness set forth in the Plan by the deadlines set forth in such Plan, except as such conditions may be waived by the Company and the Supporting Parties;
(x) a payment default under the Westport Loan (determined without giving effect to any alleged waiver by the Company or any other party) (which occurrence or continuance, as the case may be, is a Supporting Party Termination Event solely with respect to the Supporting Litigation Claimants and may be waived by the Supporting Litigation Claimants in their sole discretion);
(xi) the denial of either interim or final authority for DIP financing from the RSA, denial of the PSA Order, the Bid Procedures Order, the Disclosure Statement Order, Sale Approval Order, or Confirmation Order; and
(xii) the occurrence of any Event of Default under, and as defined in, the DIP Facility.
Notwithstanding the above, upon written notice delivered in accordance with Section 22 to all of the Parties either (x) the RSA, (y) the Supporting Litigation Claimants, or (z) the Committee may terminate this Agreement as to themselves upon the occurrence of the events in Sections 8(a)(ii) or if any of the Plan Documents, motions and orders, the Plan Supplement Documents and the other Restructuring Documents is not materially consistent with the treatment of such Party as set forth in this Agreement, the Plan or the Disclosure Statement. Moreover, upon written notice delivered in accordance with Section 22 to all of the Parties, the RSA, the Supporting Litigation Claimants, or the Committee, as applicable, may terminate this Agreement upon the filing by the Company of a motion to convert or dismiss the Chapter II Cases or the assertion of any claims against the RSA or the Supporting Litigation Claimants, as applicable. The termination by the RSA, the Supporting Litigation Claimants, or the Committee as
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contemplated in this paragraph, shall be a Supporting Party Termination Event and the Supporting Party shall have a right to terminate this Agreement with respect to all Parties.

(b) Company Termination Events. The Company may terminate this Agreement as to all Parties, upon written notice (the "Company Termination Notice") delivered in accordance with Section 22 hereof, upon the occurrence of any of the following events, unless waived in writing by the Company:

(i)

the breach in any material respect by the RSA, the Supporting Litigation Claimants, or

the Committee ofany of the covenants, obligations, representations or warranties under this Agreement,

which breach remains uncured for a period ofthree (3) business days from the receipt ofthe Company

Termination Notice;

(ii) the failure of the Requisite H-2B Workers to affirmatively vote in favor of the Plan;
(iii) the issuance by any govermnental authority, including any regulatory authority or court ofcompetent jurisdiction, of any ruling, judgment or order enjoining the consummation ofa material portion of the Restructuring;

(iv) the entry by the Bankruptcy Court of an order (A) directing the appointment ofan examiner with expanded powers or a chapter II trustee, (B) converting the Chapter II Cases to cases under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, or (C) dismissing the Chapter II Cases;

(v) the failure to confirm the Plan due to the failure of the class of the H-2B Workers to meet the requirements set forth in section 1126(c) ofthe Bankruptcy Code or due to the Bankruptcy Court otherwise denying confirmation of the Plan; or

(vi) the entry of a final, non-appealable judgment or order declaring this Agreement or any material portion hereof to be unenforceable or preventing consummation of the Plan or the Restructuring or any material portion thereof by any governmental authority, including the Bankruptcy Court, or any other regulatory authority or court of competent jurisdiction.

(c) Mutual Termination. This Agreement, and the obligations ofall Parties hereunder, may be terminated by mutual written agreement among the Company, the RSA, the Supporting Litigation Claimants, and the
Committee.

(d) Effect of Termination. Upon the termination of this Agreement in accordance with this Section 8, and except as provided in Section 16 herein, this Agreement shall forthwith become void and of no further force or effect and each Party shall, except as otherwise expressly provided in this Agreement, be immediately released from its liabilities, obligations, commitments, undertakings and agreements under or related to this Agreement and shall have all the rights and remedies that it would have had and shall be entitled to take all actions, whether with respect to the Restructuring or otherwise, that it would have been entitled to take had it not entered into this Agreement, including all rights and remedies available to it under applicable law, the Credit Agreement and any ancillary documents or agreements thereto; provided, however, that in no event shall any such termination relieve a Party hereto from (i) liability for its breach or non-performance of its obligations hereunder prior to the date of such termination and (ii) obligations under this Agreement which by their terms expressly survive termination ofthis Agreement. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, any of the Termination Events may be waived in accordance with the procedures established by Section 12 hereof, in which case the Termination Event so waived shall be deemed not to have occurred, this Agreement shall be deemed to continue in full force and effect, and the rights and obligations of the Parties hereto shall be restored, subject to any modification set forth in such waiver. If this Agreement has been terminated in accordance with this
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Agreement at a time when pennission of the Bankruptcy Court shall be required for a Supporting Party to change or withdraw (or cause to change or withdraw) its vote, as applicable, to accept the Plan, the Company shall not oppose any attempt by such Supporting Party to change or withdraw (or cause to change or withdraw) such vote at such time.
9. Good Faith Cooperation; Further Assurances; Acknowledgement.
The Parties shall cooperate with each other in good faith and shall coordinate their activities (to the extent practicable and subject to the tenns hereof) in respect of(a) all matters concerning the implementation of the Settlement and Restructuring and (b) the pursuit and support of the Settlement and Restructuring (including confirmation of the Plan). Furthermore, subject to the tenns hereof, each of the Parties shall take such action as may be reasonably necessary and appropriate to carry out the purposes and intent of this Agreement, including making and filing any required governmental or regulatory filings and voting any claims against or securities of the Company in favor of the Plan (provided that, except for legal fees incurred in furtherance of seeking approval and enforcement of this Agreement, none of the Supporting Parties shall be required to incur any expenses, liabilities or other obligations in connection therewith other than de minimis), and shall refrain from taking any action that would frustrate the purposes and intent of this Agreement. This Agreement is not, and shall not be deemed, a solicitation for consents of a chapter 11 plan or reorganization or a solicitation to tender or exchange any securities. The acceptance of the Plan by the Supporting Parties, as applicable, will not be solicited until the Supporting Parties have received the Disclosure Statement and related ballot(s), as approved by the Bankruptcy Court.
10. Restructuring Documents.
Each Party hereby covenants and agrees, subject to the proviso contained in section 7(a)(i) hereof, (i) to negotiate in good faith the Restructuring Documents each of which shall, to the extent applicable (A) contain the same tenns as, and be otherwise consistent with, this Agreement (as this Agreement may be amended from time to time in accordance with the tenns hereof) in all respects and (B) be in form and substance acceptable to the Parties to the extent required herein and section 6(a), and (ii) to execute (to the extent such Party is a party thereto) and otherwise support the Restructuring Documents, as applicable. For the avoidance of doubt, each Party agrees to (a) act in good faith and use commercially reasonable efforts to support and complete successfully the implementation of the Plan and the Restructuring in accordance with the tenns of this Agreement, (b) do all things reasonably necessary and appropriate in furtherance of consummating the Restructuring in accordance with, and within the time frames contemplated by, this Agreement, and (c) not take any actions inconsistent with this Agreement or the Restructuring Documents.
11. Representations and Warranties.
(a) Each Party, severally (and not jointly), represents and warrants to the other Parties that the following statements are true, correct and complete as of the date hereof:
(i) If the Party is an entity, such Party is validly existing and in good standing under the laws of its jurisdiction of incorporation or organization, and has all requisite corporate, partnership, limited liability company or similar authority to enter into this Agreement and carry out the transactions contemplated under this Agreement and the Plan and perfonn its obligations contemplated under this Agreement and the Plim, and the execution and delivery of this Agreement and the perfonnance of such
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Party's obligations under this Agreement and the Plan have been duly authorized by all necessary corporate, limited liability company, partnership or other similar action on its part;
(ii) If the Party is an entity, the execution, delivery and performance by such Party of this Agreement does not and will not (A) violate any provision of law, rule or regulation applicable to it or any of its subsidiaries or its charter or bylaws (or other similar governing documents) or those of any of its subsidiaries, or (B) with respect to the Company, conflict with, result in a breach ofor constitute (with due notice or lapse of time or both) a default under any contractual obligation to which it or any of its subsidiaries or affiliates is a party, or to which its or any of its subsidiaries' or affiliates' assets are bound, other than breaches that arise from the filing of the Chapter II Cases;
(iii) If the Party is an entity, the execution, delivery and performance by such Party of this Agreement and the consummation of the Restructuring does not and will not require any registration or filing with, consent, authorization or approval of, or notice to, or other action to, with or by, any federal, state or governmental authority or regulatory body except such filings as may be necessary or required under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended or any rule or regulation promulgated thereunder, "blue sky" laws, the Bankruptcy Code or by the Bankruptcy Court in connection with the Chapter I 1 Cases, the Plan and the Disclosure Statement; and
(iv) subject to the provisions of sections 1125 and 1126 of the Bankruptcy Code, this Agreement is the legally valid and binding obligation of such Party, enforceable in accordance with its terms, except as enforcement may be limited by bankruptcy, insolvency, reorganization, moratorium or other similar laws relating to or limiting creditors' rights generally or by equitable principles relating to enforceability or a ruling of the Bankruptcy Court.
(b) Each Party has such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters of this type, or has been adequately advised by competent counsel, and is capable ofevaluating the merits and risks of entering into this Agreement and of making an informed decision, and has conducted, or has had its counsel conduct, an independent review and analysis of the business and affairs of the Company that it considers sufficient and reasonable for purposes of entering into-this Agreement.
12. Amendments and Waivers.
Any provision of this Agreement, including the exhibits attached hereto, may be amended or waived if, and only if, such amendment or waiver is in writing and is signed, in the case of an amendment, by the Company, the RSA, the Supporting Litigation Claimants, or the Committee, or in the case of_a waiver, by the Party against whom the waiver is to be effective. Any amendment to this Agreement made in accordance with this section 12 shall become effective and binding upon all Parties whether or not such Party consented to such amendment; provided, however that no amendment shall be effective against any Secured Lender, any Supporting Litigation Claimant, or the Committee if such amendment materially adversely impacts such Party with respect to Restructuring as compared to that contemplated by this Agreement unless consented to in writing by such adversely affected Party.
No failure or delay by any party in exercising any right or privilege hereunder shall operate as a waiver thereof, nor shall any single or partial exercise thereof preclude any other or further exercise thereof or the exercise of any other right, power or privilege. A Supporting Parties' Termination Event may not be waived except in a writing signed by the Supporting Party adversely affected. Any waiver of any condition, term or provision to this Agreement must be in writing signed by the Parties entitled to
waive such condition, tenn or provision.
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13. Effectiveness.
Subject to section 3 herein, this Agreement shall become effective and binding upon the Parties when counterpart signature pages to this Agreement have been executed and delivered by the Company, the Administrative Agent, TRSA, ERSA, a majority in number and two-thirds in amount of the Litigation Claimants (individually or by counsel), and the Committee. With respect to any party that becomes a Party to this Agreement by executing and delivering a signature page to this Agreement after the Plan Support Effective Date, this Agreement shall become effective vis-a-vis such party on the date such signature page is delivered to the Company.
14. GOVERNING LAW; JURISDICTION; WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL.
THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE GOVERNED BY AND CONSTRUED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INTERNAL LAWS OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE, WITHOUT REGARD TO ANY CONFLICTS OF LAW PROVISIONS WHICH WOULD REQUIRE THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW OF ANY OTHER JURISDICTION. BY ITS EXECUTION AND DELIVERY OF THIS AGREEMENT, EACH OF THE PARTIES HEREBY IRREVOCABLY AND UNCONDITIONALLY AGREES THAT ANY LEGAL ACTION, SUIT, DISPUTE OR PROCEEDING ARISING UNDER, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE BROUGHT IN THE FEDERAL OR STATE COURTS OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION LOCATED IN THE STATE AND COUNTY OF DELAWARE OR IN THE BANKRUPTCY COURT (FOR SO LONG AS THE COMPANY IS SUBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE BANKRUPTCY COURT) AND EACH OF THE PARTIES HERETO IRREVOCABLY ACCEPTS AND SUBMITS ITSELF TO THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF SUCH COURTS, GENERALLY AND UNCONDITIONALLY, AND WAIVES ANY OBJECTIONS AS TO VENUE OR INCONVENIENT FORUM. EACH PARTY HERETO IRREVOCABLY WAIVES ANY AND ALL RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY IN ANY LEGAL PROCEEDING ARISING OUT OF OR RELATING TO THIS AGREEMENT OR THE TRANSACTIONS CONTEMPLATED HEREBY. NOTWITHSTANDING THE FOREGOING CONSENT TO JURISDICTION, SO LONG AS THE BANKRUPTCY COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CHAPTER II CASES, EACH OF THE PARTIES AGREES THAT THE BANKRUPTCY COURT SHALL HAVE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION WITH RESPECT TO ANY MATTER UNDER OR ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THIS AGREEMENT, AND HEREBY SUBMITS TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE BANKRUPTCY COURT.
Nothing in this Agreement shall constitute a waiver by any Party of any (i) right to have final orders in any and all non-core matters entered only after de novo review by a United States District Judge; (ii) right to trial by jury in any proceeding as to any and all matters so triable therein, or in any case, controversy or proceeding related hereto, whether or not such jury trial right is pursuant to statute or the United States Constitution; (iii) right to have the reference withdrawn by the United States District Court in any matter or proceeding subject to mandatory or discretionary withdrawal; or (iv) other rights, claims, actions, defenses, setoffs, recoupments or other matters to which any Litigation Claimant is entitled under any agreements or at law or in equity or under the United States Constitution. All of the above rights are expressly reserved and preserved without exception and with no purpose of conceding jurisdiction in any way by this filing or by any other participation in this matter.
01:17611641.6
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Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 17 of 49
15. Soecific Performance/Remedies.
It is understood and agreed by the Parties that money damages would not be a sufficient remedy for any breach of this Agreement by any Party and each non-breaching Party shall be entitled to specific performance and injunctive relief as a remedy of any such breach, in addition to any other remedy to which such non-breaching Party may be entitled, at law or in equity, without the necessity of proving the inadequacy of money damages as a remedy, including an order of the Bankruptcy Court requiring any Party to comply promptly with any of its obligations hereunder, and no remedy other than specific performance shall be available to the non-breaching Party. Each Party agrees to waive any requirement for the securing or posting of a bond in connection with such remedy.
16. Survival.
Notwithstanding the termination of this Agreement pursuant to section 8 hereof, the agreements and obligations of the Parties in this section 16 and sections 8(d), II, 12, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25 and 26 hereof (and any defined terms used in any such section) shall survive such termination and shall continue in full force and effect in accordance with the terms hereof.
17. Headings.
The headings of the sections, paragraphs and subsections of this Agreement are inserted for convenience only and shall not affect the interpretation hereof or, for any purpose, be deemed a part of this Agreement.
18. Successors and Assigns; Severability; Several Obligations.
(a) This Agreement is intended to bind and inure to the benefit of the Parties and their respective successors, assigns, heirs, executors, administrators and representatives. If any provision of this Agreement, or the application of any such provision to any person or circumstance, shall be held invalid or unenforceable in whole or in part, such invalidity or unenforceability shall attach only to such provision or part thereof and the remaining part of such provision hereof and this Agreement shall continue in full force and effect so long as the economic or legal substance of the Settlement and Restructuring contemplated hereby are not affected in any marmer materially adverse to any Party. Upon any such determination of invalidity, the Parties shall negotiate in good faith to modifY this Agreement so as to effect the original intent of the Parties as closely as possible in a reasonably acceptable marmer in order that the Settlement and Restructuring contemplated hereby is consummated as originally contemplated to the greatest extent possible.
(b) The agreements, representations and obligations of each of the Supporting Parties under this Agreement are, in all respects, several and not joint and several.
19. No Third-Partv Beneficiaries.
Unless expressly stated herein, this Agreement shall be solely for the benefit ofthe Parties and no other person or entity shall be a third-party beneficiary hereof or have any rights hereunder.
01:17611641.6
16

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 18 of 49

20. Prior Negotiations; Entire Agreement.

This Agreement, including the exhibits and schedules hereto (including the Plan Term Sheet) constitutes the entire agreement of the Parties, and supersedes all other prior negotiations (oral or written), with respect to the subject matter hereof, provided, however, that the Parties acknowledge that any confidentiality agreements (if any) heretofore executed between the Company and any Supporting Party shall continue in full force and effect.
21. Counterparts.

This Agreement may be executed in several counterparts, each of which shall be deemed to be an original, and all of which together shall be deemed to be one and the same agreement. Execution copies of this Agreement may be delivered by facsimile, electronic mail or otherwise, which shall be deemed to be an original for the purposes of this section 21.
22. Notices.

All notices hereunder shall be deemed given if in writing, in the English language, and delivered by electronic mail to the following addresses (or at such other electronic mail addresses as shall be specified by like notice):
Signal International, Inc. and its subsidiaries RSA Battle House Tower II North Water Street Suite 16250 Mobile, Alabama 36602 Telephone: (251) 544-2623 Facsimile: (251) 544-2643 Attention: Cbris Cunningham, CFO Email: ccunningham@signalint.com
with a copy to:

OU7611641.6

Hogan Lovells US, LLP 875 Third Avenue New York, New York 10022 Telephone: (212) 918-3000 Facsimile: (212) 918-3100 Attention: Christopher R. Donoho III Email: cbristopher.donoho@hoganlovells.com
And a copy to:
Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, LLP Rodney Square 1000 North King Street Wilmington, DE 19801 Telephone: (302) 571-6600 Facsimile: (302) 571-1253 Attention: M. Blake Cleary
17

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 19 of 49
Email: mbcleary@ycst.com
The Committee
Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones 919 North Market Street, 17th Floor Wilmington, DE 1980 I Attention: Bradford J. Sandler Email: bsandler@ps~law.com
Fredrikson & Byron P.A., plaintiffs' counsel in Marimuthu v. Signal Int'l, LLC Sten-Erik Hoidal: shoidal@fredlaw.com Steven R. Kinsella: skinsella@ftedlaw.com Lousene M. Hoppe: lhoppe@fredlaw.com
Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, plaintiffs' counsel in Samuel v. Signal Int'l, LLC Shane G. Ramsey: sramsey@kilpatricktownsend.com
Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP, plaintiffs' counsel in Joseph v. Signal Int'l, LLC John H. Fleming: john.fleming@sutherland.com Bryan M. Ward: bryan.ward@sutherland.com
DLA Piper LLP, plaintiffs' counsel in Meganathan v. Signal lnt'l, LLC Timothy H. Birnbaum: timothy.birnbaum@dlapiper.com
Equal Justice Center, plaintiffs' counsel in Kambala v. Signal lnt'l, LLC Christopher J. Willett: cwillett@equaljusticecenter.org
SPLC I Crowell & Moring LLP I Nussbaum Law Group, P.C., plaintiffs' counsel in David v. Signal lnt'l, LLC Alan Howard: ahoward@crowell.com Leslie A. Davis: ldavis@crowell.com Meredith Stewart: meredith.stewart@splcenter.org Daniel Werner: daniel.werner@splcenter.org Hugh D. Sandler: hsandler@nussbaumpc.com
Latham & Watkins LLP, plaintiffs' counsel in Achari v. Signal Int'l, LLC Daniel D. Adams: daniel.adams@lw.com Mark A. Broude: mark.broude@lw.com David F. McEihoe: david.mcelhoe@lw.com Rabel Kohn: rachel.kohn@lw.com
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, plaintiffs' counsel in Cbakkiyattil v. Signal Int'l, LLC Eben P. Colby: eben.colby@skadden.com David M. Turetsky: david.turetsky@skadden.com Anthony W. Clark: anthony.clark@skadden.com Jason M. Liberi: jason.liberi@skadden.com
0117611641.6
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Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 20 of 49
McDermott Will & Emery LLP, plaintiffs' counsel in Krishnakutty v. Signal Int'l, LLC Nathan F. Coco: ncoco@mwe.com
Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP, plaintiffs' counsel in Devassy v. Signal Int'l, LLC Christopher Rheinheimer: crheinheimer@manatt.com Stephen T. Raptis: sraptis@manatt.com
Covington & Burling LLP, plaintiffs' counsel in Singh v. Signal Int'l, LLC Jose E. Arvelo: jarvelo@cov.com
Kaye Scholer LLP, plaintiffs' counsel in Thomas v. Signal lot'!, LLC Michael Bullerman: michael.bullerman@kayescholer.com Tricia M. Beckles: tricia.beckles@kayescholer.com
The Retirement Systems of Alabama 20 I South Union Street Montgomery, AL 36130 Attn: M. Hunter Harrell: Hunter.Harrell@rsa-al.gov Attn: Leura Canary: Leura.Canary@rsa-al.gov Telephone: (334) 517-7109 Facsimile: (334) 517-7099
with a copy to:
Burr & Forman LLP Derek F. Meek, Esq. 420 North 20th Street, Suite 3400 Birmingham, AL 35203 Telephone: (205) 458-5471 Facsimile: (205) 244-5679 Email: dmeek@burr.com
Any notice shall be effective upon confirmation of the electronic mail transmission.
23. Reservation of Rights; No Admission; Common Interest Privilege; Tolling ofClaims.
Except as expressly provided in this Agreement and in any amendment among the Parties, nothing herein is intended to, or does, in any manner waive, limit, impair or restrict the ability of each of the Parties to protect and preserve its rights, remedies and interests, including without limitation, its claims against any of the other Parties (or their respective affiliates or subsidiaries) or its full participation in the Chapter II Cases. Except as expressly provided in this Agreement and in any amendment among the Parties, if the transactions contemplated by the Settlement and Restructuring are not consununated, or if this Agreement is terminated for any reason, the Parties fully reserve any and all of their rights, remedies, and Claims. This Agreement and the Plan are part of a proposed settlement of matters that could otherwise be the subject of litigation claims among the Parties. Pursuant to Rule 408 of the Federal Rule of Evidence, any applicable state rules of evidence and any other applicable law, foreign or domestic, this Agreement, the Restructuring Documents and all negotiations relating thereto shall not be admissible into evidence in any proceeding other than a proceeding to enforce the terms of this
01:176116416
19

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 21 of 49
Agreement or the applicable Restructuring Documents. This Agreement and the Restructuring Documents shall in no event be construed as or be deemed to be evidence of an admission or concession on the part of any Party of any claim or fault or liability or damages whatsoever. Each of the Parties denies any and all wrongdoing or liability of any kind and does not concede any infirmity in the claims or defenses which it has asserted or could assert. The parties hereto intend to establish and have established a common interest privilege with respect to the subject matter of and communications regarding or relating to this Agreement and the documents and transactions contemplated by this Agreement. Each of the Parties agrees that the running of the statutes oflimitations or doctrines oflaches applicable to all claims that any Party may be entitled to take or bring in order to enforce its rights and remedies, if any, against any other Party at law or equity is, to the fullest extent permitted by law, tolled and suspended during the Plan Support Period.
24. Prevailing Partv.
If any Party brings an action or proceeding against any other Party based upon a breach by such Party of its obligations hereunder, the prevailing Party shall be entitled to the reimbursement of all reasonable fees and expenses incurred, including reasonable attorneys', accountants' and financial advisors fees in connection with such action or proceeding, from the non-prevailing Party.
25. Fiduciarv Duties.
(a) The Company shall notifY the Supporting Parties in writing as promptly as practicable after receipt by the Company or its representatives or agents of any proposal or offer from any person or entity to effect a restructuring of the Company, any Alternative Transaction or a transaction in conflict with the Restructuring or any request for confidential information relating to the Company, which notice shall indicate the identity of the person or entity making the proposal, offer, or request and the material terms of any such proposal, offer, or request to the extent permitted by applicable law.
(b) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, nothing in this Agreement shall require the Company, or any of its respective directors or officers (in such Person's capacity as a director or officer) to take any action, or to refrain from taking any action, to the extent that taking such action or refraining from taking such action would be inconsistent with such Person's fiduciary obligations under applicable law (the rights of the Company and its respective directors and officers under this section 25(b), the "Fiduciary Out"); provided that the Company shall promptly notifY the Secured Lenders, the Supporting Litigation Claimants, and the Committee if any such action is taken, or refrained from being taken, that would otherwise be in violation of this Agreement (a "Fiduciary Out Notice").
(c) None of the Supporting Parties shall have any fiduciary duty or other duties or responsibilities in any kind or form to each other, the Company, or any of the Company's creditors or other stakeholders as a result of this Agreement or the transactions contemplated hereby. Each ofthe Supporting Parties has negotiated this Agreement on its own behalf and not on behalf of any other party. Except as expressly provided in this Agreement, there are no commitments among or between the Supporting Parties. Further, the Parties agree that, except as set forth in the Plan, and/or any Plan Supplement Documents, or the Disclosure Statement, this Agreement does not constitute a commitment to, nor shall it obligate any of the Parties to, provide any new financing or credit support.
01:17611641.6
20

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 22 of 49
26. Representation by Counsel.
Each Party acknowledges that it has been represented by, or provided a reasonable period of time to obtain access to and advice by, counsel with this Agreement and the Settlement and Restructuring contemplated herein. Accordingly, any rule of law or any legal decision that would provide any Party with a defense to the enforcement of the terms of this Agreement against such Party based upon lack of legal counsel shall have no application and is expressly waived.
27. Independent Analysis.
Each of the Parties hereby confirms that it has made its own decision to execute this Agreement based upon its own independent assessment of documents and information available to it, as it has deemed appropriate.
28. Publicity.
Each Party shall not (a) use the name of any other Party in any press release or other publication (which excludes court pleadings, case name and litigation references, and communications with interested parties in connection with the Chapter II Cases) without such other Party's prior written consent, such consent not to be unreasonably withheld, or (b) disclose to any person the principal amount or percentage of its Claims held by any other Party; provided, however, that nothing herein shall limit the right of any Party to discuss litigation relating to the H-2B Claims in any publication or to use the Company names in connection with such discussion; provided, further, that no such discussion or publication shall include use of the names or acronyms "Teachers' Retirement System of Alabama", "TRSA", "Employee's Retirement System of Alabama", "ERSA", "Retirement Systems of Alabama" or "RSA", or identify by name any officer, director or employee thereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Supporting Parties consent to the disclosure by the Supporting Parties in the Restructuring Documents, motions and orders, as applicable, or as otherwise required by law or regulation, of the execution, terms and contents ofthis Agreement. Nothing contained herein shall be deemed to waive, amend or modify the terms of any confidentiality or non-disclosure agreement between the Company and any Supporting Party.
29. Rule oflnterpretation.
Notwithstanding anything contained herein to the contrary, it is the intent of the Parties that all references to votes or voting in this Agreement be interpreted to include votes or voting on a chapter II plan under the Bankruptcy Code. Time is of the essence in the performance of the obligations of each of the Parties. The words "hereof," "herein" and "hereunder" and words of like import used in this Agreement shall refer to this Agreement as a whole and not to any particular provision of this Agreement. References to any Articles, Sections, exhibits, annexes, and schedules are to such Articles, Sections, exhibits, annexes, and schedules of this Agreement unless otherwise specified. All exhibits and schedules annexed hereto or referred to herein (including any exhibits, schedules or attachments thereto) are hereby incorporated in and made a part ofthis Agreement as if set forth in full herein. Any singular term in this Agreement shall be deemed to include the plural, and any plural term the singular. Whenever the words "include," "includes" or "including" are used in this Agreement, they shall be deemed to be followed by the words "without limitation," whether or not they are in fact followed by those words or words of like import. "Writing," "written" and comparable terms refer to printing, typing and other means of reproducing words (including electronic media) in a visible form. Any reference to "business day" means
01:17611641.6
21

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 23 of 49
any day, other than a Saturday, a Sunday or any other day on which banks located in New York, New York are closed for business as a result of federal, state or local holiday and any other reference to day means a calendar day.
[THE REMAINDER OF THIS PAGE Is INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK[
01:17611641.6
22

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 24 of 49
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties hereto have caused this Agreement to be executed and delivered by their respective duly authorized officers or agents, solely in their respective capacity as officers or agents ofthe undersigned and not in any other capacity, as of the date first set forth above.
Signal International, Inc., on behalfofitself and each ofits direct and indirect subsidiaries

01:1761l64L5

[Signature Page to Plan Support Agreement]

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 25 of 49
TEACHERS' RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF ALABAMA, as Secured Lender and Administrative Agent By:
M. Hunter Harrell Director of Private Placements EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF ALABAMA, as Secured Lender By:
[Signature Page to Plan Support Agreement] ~

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 26 of 49
Harvinder Singh Antony Antony Valiyaparaml>il Srinivasa Rao Kambala Biju Kunjupanickan Mabendran Periyasamy Annadurai Ruthirapathi Nesamony Wilson Robi Pradeep Kumar Srinivasa Rao Gonna Amandeep Singh Kang Saravanan Arunachalam Chandra Sekhar Dwadasi Rama Harbans Singh Ponniab Muthu Kumar Malkiab Paul Abdulla Keepurath Maideen Francis Sequira Unnikrishna Pilla Balakrishna Pillai Ramana Palika Ragukumar Chinnian as Supporting Litigation Claimants by their attorney
By:1~ Name: Kayvon Sabourian Title: Attorney Firm: Equal Justice Center

~-- ~--------------------------------------------------
Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 27 of 49

Varghese Kurisinkal Devassy,

George Chacko Edavazhic,l(al,

Prasad Kunju Kunju,

Ampattu Varughese Mathew,

Antony Sajan Oottuparambil-Michael,

Sivan Raghavan,

Vijayan Nair Sankara-Pillai,

Ani! Scaria,

Mandeep Singh,

John Malakaran Thomas,

Saju Christy Vallarian,

""""'"' """"::?1 IsaacWilson Vazhikudilil,
Benny Yohannan,
~atto"Q

by U..ir

By:

~ ..

'

Name: Stephen Raptis

Title: Attorney

Finn: Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 28 of 49
Pravin Kumar Singh, and Radhakrishnan Nair Mangalathu Malayil Vasukuttan, as Supporting Litigation Claimants by their allom~ey
By: N:-I0:-0'S"d''.AriTiV~~C7i'O-''-;--!'=----­
Title: Attorney for Pravin Kumar Singh and Radhakrishnan Nair Mangalalhu Malayil Vasukuttan Firm: Covington & Burling LLP

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 29 of 49

George Kutty Puthiya Parampil Thomas,

Ravi Thammina, Zakir Husain Ghulam

Husain, Joshy Kaiprampattu Joseph,

Reghunadhan Palachuvattilputhenpura

Narayanannair, Sivakumar Ramakrishnan

Nair, Antoney Tharayil Xavier, Yacob

Thachil Varghese, Davis Antony, Gogy

Joseph, Mathew Jackson, Philip

Pindakadavil George, Sunny Cherian,

Krishnan Thankappan Assari, Venkatarao

Buridi, Sarma Venkata Satyanarayana Bhiri,

Maheshwara Rao Molletti, Bhaskararao

Nimmadala, Ganapathi Rao Akkireddi,

Satyanarayana Vangapandu, Srinu Kalla,

Baiju Paul, Rajan Pazhambalakode, Babu

Karippai Ouseph, Subranarayana Karuppiah,

David Raju Tuloori, Saji Chettiyara Baby,

Joseph Thomas Kanjiraparambil, Shanoj

Joseph, Kantibhai Khemabhai Prajapati

as Supporting Litigation Claimants by t

attorney~·

.

.:::::;?

By: ' ~ /?« C4

Benjamin Partner Kaye Scholer LLP 250 West 55th Street New York, NY 10019-9710 Tel: (212) 836-8000 Fax (212) 836-8689

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 30 of 49

RAJU MEGANATIIAN, SARAVANAN RAMASAMY, SARAVANACHELVAN NARAYANASAMY, MARUTHAMUTHU MAYAVU, as Supporting Litigation Claim(lnts by their attorney

Fl: By: 1-;'....;.i1·

H ' jJ; "' h:(,o,l=f.

Timothy H. Bi baum

DLA Piper LLP (US)

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 31 of 49
Pradeep Chembil Raman, John Abraham Kalampukatt, Gopalakrishnan Unniampathu Vettical Nair, Davis Mathai Meledan, Thomas Baby Madakkameprathu, Francis Kottackal Ouseph, Sudheeran Panayamthatta, Telson Joseph Pazhampilly, Ajith Chellayyan Swarnamma, Thomas Varghese Vattakkattu, Purayil Arjunan Padinhare, Shawkat Ali Shaikh, Anthony Marian, Jaison Antony Thekkumpuram, Shaju Olangattu Mathew, Roy Punakkattu George, Arunkumar Shaw Narayan Shaw, George Paily Paulose Chakkiyattil, Sukumar Moses Dokka, Jeegan Joseph Cheruthalakal Michael, Shajan Varghese, Prakash Kuttiyil Chandrasekharan Nair, Chandrasekhara Pillai Rajesh Chemmanappilly, Jacob Mathew, Shibu Thankachan, Sreekumar Janardhanan Pillai, Subash Chandra Shukla, Radhakrishnan Kakkathiruthi, as Supporting Litigation Claimants by their attorney
By:~~,:;;~~~~~,;;:::::::::__ _
Name: Eben P. Colby Title: Partner Firm: Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher, &
FlomLLP

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 32 of 49
Joy Joseph Attayil Sreedharan Babu Vasavan Babu Philip Baby Kiran Mohan Bald Bijay Kumar Biswas George Arackal Devassy Varghese Kannampuzha Devassy John Charuvila George Omanakuttan Govindan [Kakkanthara] Iju James Gijo John Biju Mukrukkattu Joseph Francis Joseph Paulose Chirackal Airookaran Joseph Varghese Kainikkeril [Yohannan] Suresh Kakkoth Sojan Paul Kaliyadan Eswara R. K.anithi Krishnan Kannayan Suresh Kumar Pillai Kavalamkuzhi Vavachan Mathai Koottalil Varghese Kunjachan Pankajakshan Madhavan Babu Lal Mali George Kutty Vadakkekoottu Mathew Ramachandran Murugaiyan Shogy Vezhaparambil Ousephkutty Sebastian George Pananjikal Haridas SankaraPanicker Varghese Pappachan Joseph Bohan Peruvelil Prabhakaran Balakrishna Pillai Kannankutty Ponnan Biju Potrayil Viswamithran Raghavan Subburaj Rengasamy Melvin Joseph Rodrigues RaviRowthu Jagannadha Rao Saragadam Lakhbir Singh Smje Pmsad Tamang Abraham Varghese Joy Kallachiyil Varkey Kunhikrishn Kaniyamkulam Veetil Krishnan Venugopal

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 33 of 49 as Supporting Litigation Claimants by their attorney
r Cl Asbill & Brennan LLP 1114 Avenue of the Americas The Grace Building, Floor 40 New York, NY 10036 Tel: 212-389-5016 Email: kara.ford@sutherland.com Attorneyfor Plaintifft
•

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 34 of 49

Sabu Puthukkuttumel Veede Krishnakutty and Thampy Putham Parambil Edicula, respectively

as Supporting Litigation Claimants by their

J'M attorn(v, .._

A

By:~--<1~W~_V _ V_'_ _ _ __

Name: Nathan F. Coco

Title: Partner

Finn: McDennott Will & Emery LLP

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 35 of 49

KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON, LLP II 00 Peachtree Street, Suite 2800 Atlanta, GA 30309-4528 Telephone: (404) 815-6500 Facsimile: (404)-815-6555 bdorris@kilpatricktownsend.com

Aby Karickathara Raju, Atha Mohammad Abdul, Belthazar Peter, Biju Perumpilly George, Chandran Shaju Thanissery, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Johny Mandy Mathai, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Krishna Gonthina, Lohithakshan Madampet, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Raju Divakaran, Reji Samuel, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Sumesh Porambathuparambil Subramanian
as Supporting Litigation Claimants by their attorney
William E. Dorris Georgia Bar No. 225987
Attorneyfor Plaintiffs

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 36 of 49
KURIAN DAVID, SONY VASUDEVAN SULEKHA, PALANYANDI THANGAMANI, MURUGANANTHAM KANDHASAMY, HEMANT KHUTTAN, PADAVEETTIYIL ISSAC ANDREWS, KECHURU DHANANJAYA, SABULAL VIJAYAN, KRISHAN KUMAR, JACOB JOSEPH KADDAKKARAPPALL Y, KULDEEP SINGH, and THANASEKAR CHELLAPPAN
as Supporting Litigation Claimants by their attorney
By:!=~~~~~::~=~::::= Daniel Werner Senior Supervising Attorney Southern Poverty Law Center 1989 College Ave., NE Atlanta, GA 30317

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 37 of 49
Balamurugan Marimuthu, Moorthy Nadhamuni, Muralidharan Arumugam, Muruganandam Arumugam, Rajendran Sappani, Rajendran Subramani, Sammanasunathan Siluvaimuthu, Satheesh Kannan Marimuthu, and Satyanarayana Ellapu as Supporting Litigation Claimants by their al/orney
By: ~:;oiill Name: Title: Attorney Firm: Fredrikson & Byron P.A.

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 38 of 49

Varghese Varkey Abraham,

Lakshmanan Ponnayan Achari,

Subhashithan Bahuleyan,

Kodakeril Baby Biji,

Xavier Disoliyan,

Rajankunju Geevarghese,

Jomon George,

Shaiju Vadakkal George,

Pnaveen Kulathum Muriyi Gopalakrishnan,

Mouleswararao Guntamukkala,

Eldose !sac,

Raveendranathan Mookaparambil !tty,

Joy Jacob,

Biju John,

Shibu Joseph,

Thansilas Joseph,

Kulath Somanathan Kalayam,

Sunilkumar Marottikkal Kuttan,

Bhaskaran Sreedharan Kutty,

Parshottam Ramchandra Mangani,

Prakash Moses Kanagiah Manonmoni,

Adharsan Manuel,

Jacob Mazhukkattu Mathew,

Johny Mathew,

Nandhakumar Naglll'l!i,

Shaji Veluthalakuzhiyil Nanoo,

Mangalan Chandrasekharan Pillai,

Radhakrishna Pillai Sivarama Pillai,

Aby Molathu Poulose,

Justin Poulose,

Appunni Arul Prakash,

Nibu Raju,

Sreenivasarao RaPutby,

Balwinder Singh,

Ranjit Singh,

Savinder Singh,

Shanmugam Subramanian,

Ninan John Tharakan,

Kittayi Sunil Kumar Therattil,

Moni Panikulangara Thomas.

Thenooran Kumaran Unnikrishnan,

Benny Chittilappilly Vareed,

George PulikkCJI!U'IIIllbil Varghese,

Estate ofKuliyanlckal Paily Varghese,

Benny Kattukariyil Varkey,

Shahi Vijayan, and

John Yohannan

as Supporting Litigation Claimants by their

~s attorney

•

Title: Associate
Firm: Latham & Watkins LLP [Signature Page to Amended Plan Support Agreement]

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 39 of 49
Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Signal International, Inc. et al. By its coWJsel
By: lsi Bradford J. Sandler Bradford J. Sandler Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones

01:17611641.6

[Signature Page to Plan Support Agreement]

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 40 of 49
EXHffiiTA PLAN TERM SHEET
OLI7611641.5

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 41 of 49

THIS TERM SHEET DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A SOLICITATION OF VOTES FOR A PLAN OF REORGANIZATION FOR PURPOSES OF SECTIONS 1125 AND 1126 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE OR AN OFFER OR SOLICITATION OF AN OFFER WITH RESPECT TO ANY SECURITIES. SUCH OFFERS OR SOLICITATIONS MAY ONLY BE MADE IN COMPLIANCE WITH ALL APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE AND/OR SECURITIES LAWS AND AFfER PUBLICATION AND DELIVERY OF THE PLAN AND DISCLOSURE STATEMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE PLAN.

SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL, INC., ET AL.

CIIAPTER ll PLAN TERM SHEET

This non-binding term sheet (the "Term Sheet") describes the material terms of a proposed chapter 11 plan of

reorganization (the "Plan·~ for Signa/International, Inc. ("Sf Inc. ·~ and its subsidiaries. This Term Sheet does not

constitute a contractual commitment ofany party but merely represents the proposed terms for a restructuring ofthe

Debtors' (as defined below) capital structure and obligations and is subject in all respects to the negotiation,

execution and delivery ofdefinitive documentation, including entry into an acceptable plan support agreement (the

"PSA "PSA

·~ between the Debtors Creditor Parties·~. This

and certain of their Term Sheet does not

creditors include a

or potential creditors party hereto description ofall the relevant terms

(collectively, the and conditions of

the restructuring contemplated herein.

This Term Sheet shall not constitute a commitment to exchange any debt, /end funds to any ofthe Debtors (defined below}, vote in a certain way or otherwise negotiate or engage in the transactions contemplated herein.

This Term Sheet is strictly confidential and may not be shared with anyone other than its intended recipients. It is proffered in the nature of a settlement proposal in fortherance of settlement discussions and is intended to be entitled to the protections ofRule 408 ofthe Federal Rules ofEvidence and all other applicable statutes or doctrines protecting the use or disclosure ofconfidential information and iriformation exchanged in the context ofsettlement discussions.

SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS

Transaction Ovenriew Proposed Debtors:

Signal International, Inc., Signal Ship Repair, LLC, Signal International, LLC, Signal International Texas GP, LLC, and Signal International Texas, L.P. (collectively, the "Debtors"), in chapter II
cases to be filed in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the "Bankruptcy Court").

Chapter 11 Plan:
Debt and Claims to be Restructured:

The Debtors will propose the Plan that implements all of the tenns set forth in this Tenn Sheet.
(a) $75 million in principal plus all other amounts outstanding evidenced by (i) a $50,250,000 Tenn Loan Note held by the Teacher's Retirement System of Alabama (the "TRSA" and such note, the "TRSA Note") and (ii) a $24,750,000 Tenn Loan Note held by the Employees' Retirement System of Alabama (the "ERSA" and such note, the "ERSA Note", and together with the TRSA Note, the "Senior Notes"), both subject to the terms and conditions of that certain Credit Agreement dated as of January 31, 2014 (as may be amended, modified, supplement and extended from time to time, the "Credit Agreement") between SI Inc., as Borrower, and TRSA, as

01:17602622.5

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 42 of 49

Post-Petition Financing Sale oftbe Assets; Closing
01:17602622.5

Administrative Agent and Collateral Agent (such debt, the "First Lien Debt"),
(b) Claims pursuant to a pre-petition judgment against the Debtors in the approximate estimated amount of$15 million entered in favor of 5 former workers of the Debtors (the "Judgment Claims").
(c) Claims pursuant to a pre-petition judgment against the Debtors in the approximate estimated amount of $4 million entered in favor of Max Specialty Insurance Company ("Max Specialty").
(d) All potential, threatened or pending claims against the Debtors by approximately 500 former employees and recruits of the Debtors hired and/or recruited by the Debtors througb the United States H-2B immigration program arising out of or related to such employment or recruitment, which are contingent, unliquidated and disputed (collectively with the Judgment Claims, the "Litigation Claims" and the holders thereof, the "Litigation Claimants"). For plan purposes only, the Litigation Claims shall be estimated in the total aggregate amount of no less than $200 million.
(e) General unsecured claims, other than the Max Specialty judgment, totaling approximately $3 .I million or such other amount as the Bankruptcy Court may determine such that the Litigation Claims constitute no less than 95% of all unsecured claims..
The TRSA shall (i) consent to the Debtors' post-petition use of its cash collateral and (ii) provide post-petition DIP fmancing in the amount of up to $20 million plus a roll-up of the First Lien Debt (the "DIP Facility"); provided that if the Bankruptcy Court has not granted the PSA Order (as defined in the PSA) prior to final relief being granted by the Bankruptcy Court with respect to the DIP Facility, the Litigation Claimants shall be entitled to object to such final relief and/or terminate the PSA.
a) As part of the Plan, the Debtors shall sell substantially all of their assets at an auction (the "Auction") pursuant to court approved bid procedures (the "Bid Procedures"). The TRSA and ERSA shall serve as the stalking horse bidder (the "Stalking Horse Bidder") and be entitled to credit bid all amounts outstanding under the DIP Facility (the "Stalking Horse Credit Bid").
b) The Bid Procedures shall require any "Qualified Bid" (to be defined in the Bid Procedures) to, among other things, include cash proceeds sufficient to: (i) provide for payment of all outstanding obligations of the First Lien Debt and the DIP Facility in full on the Effective Date (the "Secured Debt Cash Obligations"); (ii) provide for a break-up fee not exceeding $1 million to the Stalking Horse Bidder; provided that the Bankruptcy Court's authorization of a break-up fee in any form or amount shall not be a condition precedent to the effectiveness of the PSA; (iii) fund a distribution payment to the general unsecured creditors, including Max Specialty (the "GUC Payment Amounf' and together with the Secured Debt Cash Obligations and Break-Up Fee, the "Plan Cash Amount"); and (iv) overbid
2

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 43 of 49

Estate Avoidance Actions
Treatment of Claims Administrative Expense Claims (including 503(b)(9) Claims}: Priority Tax Claims: Other Priority Claims: First Lien Debt:
0117602622.5

the Plan Cash Amount by no less than $1 million (the "Required Overbid", and together with the Plan Cash Amount, the "Minimum Qualified Bid").
c) The party submitting the higbest or otherwise best Minimum Qualified Bid at the Auction shall be selected as the prevailing bidder (the "Prevailing Bidder''), subject to approval by order of the Bankruptcy Court (the "Sale Approval Order") at the hearing on confirmation of the Plan.
d) The Prevailing Bidder shall take all purchased assets free and clear of all liens, claims and encumbrances.
e) The closing shall occur within 20 days following conftrmation of the Plan by the Bankruptcy Court.
The Prevailing Bidder shall purchase the estates' causes of action, including any avoidance actions (the "Acquired Avoidance Actions") under the Bankruptcy Code, and covenant to not sue on the Acquired Avoidance Actions except as set forth below. For the avoidance of doubt, the Prevailing Bidder shall agree to waive and release any and all causes of action against the Released Parties (as defined below).
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, within a reasonably prompt time, the Debtors or the Prevailing Bidder shall commence an avoidance action against Max Specialty to avoid any avoidable liens against the assets ofthe Debtors.
Payable in full in cash on the effective date of the Plan (the "Effective Date") or on such other terms as agreed between the Debtors and the holder thereof, subject to the reasonable consent of the Prevailing Bidder.
Unclassified -Non-Voting
Payable in full in cash on the Effective Date of the Plan or on such other terms as agreed between the Debtors and the holder thereof, subject to the reasonable consent of the Prevailing Bidder.
Unclassified -Non-Voting
Payable in full in cash on the Effective Date or on such other .terms as agreed between the Debtors and the holder thereof, subject to the reasonable consent ofthe Prevailing Bidder.
Unimpaired -Deemed to Accept
On the Effective Date, the Senior Notes shall each be cancelled, and on account of the allowed claim of the TRSA in respect of the First Lien Debt, the TRSA, as administrative agent, shall either (i) acquire substantially all of the Debtors' assets as the Prevailing Bidder at the Auction or (ii) be paid in full, in cash, the total amount under the DIP Facility (including the roll-up of the First Lien Debt) by the
3

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 44 of 49

Other Secured Claims: Litigation Claims:
OLI7602622.5

Prevailing Bidder at the Auction.
Potentially Impaired - Entitled to Vote
On the Effective Date, all allowed secured claims ("Other Secured Claims") shall be either paid in full in cash, receive delivery of collateral securing any such claim and payment of any interest requested under section 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, or be treated on such other terms as agreed between the Debtors and the holder thereof, subject to the reasonable consent ofthe Prevailing Bidder.
Unimpaired- Not Entitled to Vote.
On the Effective Date of the Plan, the claims of the Litigation Claimants shall be deemed allowed in full, and shall be deemed to have been settled as herein provided.
The Debtors shall establish a settlement trust (which form shall be satisfactory to the Southern Poverty Law Center) in respect of the claims of the Litigation Claimants (the "Litigation Settlement Trust"). On the Effective Date, the Prevailing Bidder will receive, free and clear of liens, claims or encumbrances (including, without limitation, the pre-petition liens of TRSA and ERSA) other than the participating interest of the Litigation Settlement Trust described below, all right, title and interest of the Debtors in and to certain purchase money indebtedness currently owing to Signal International Texas, LP, by Westport Orange Shipyard, LLC, in the principal amount of up to $29,894,469 (the "Westport Loan"), together with all instruments or documents evidencing, securing. governing or otherwise pertaining to the Westport Loan (the "Westport Documents"). The Westport Loan and the Westport Documents will be transferred to the Prevailing Bidder subject to a continuing participation interest in favor of the Litigation Settlement Trust, which shall be governed by a loan participation agreement (the "Westnort Participation Agreement"), in form and content reasonably acceptable to the Litigation Settlement Trust and the Prevailing Bidder (collectively, the "Westoort Participants"). For the avoidance of doubt, upon the Effective Date of the Plan, TRSA, ERSA and the Collateral Agent under the Credit Agreement will execute any documents necessary to effect a release and discharge of their respective Hens, encumbrances and security interests on the Westport facility.
The Westport Participation shall provide that each Westport Participant share on a pro rata basis in all proceeds derived from the Westport Loan (including scheduled payments of principal and interest, prepayments, proceeds of enforcement or proceeds of liquidation of collateral) as follows:
• The Litigation Settlement Trust shall receive a 66.9% participating interest, and the Prevailing Bidder shall receive a 33.1% participating interest, in and to the Westport Loan and the Westport Loan Documents. The participating interests described above are referred to herein as each Westport Participant's ''Sharing Ratio".
4

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 45 of 49

OLI7602622.5

• If the Westport Loan is prepaid in full, in accordance with its terms, prior to its scheduled maturity date, and the application of the Litigation Settlement Trust's Sharing Ratio to such prepayment results in an aggregate recovecy of less than $20 million by the Litigation Settlement Trust, then the Litigation Settlement Trust shall be entitled to receive additional proceeds from such prepayment in an amount sufficient to increase its aggregate recovery from the Westport Loan to $20 million.
• The maximum aggregate amount payable to the Litigation Settlement Trust by virtue of its Sharing Ratio shall for all purposes be capped at $22 million. Upon receipt of said amount by the Litigation Settlement Trust, all further payments or other recoveries with respect to the Westport Loan will be payable solely to the Prevailing Bidder.
Pursuant to the Westport Participation Agreement, if TRSA, ERSA or an affiliate or designee thereof is the Prevailing Bidder, TRSA and ERSA will be responsible for the collection and distribution of the proceeds ofthe Westport Loan and, if necessary, the enforcement thereof, for the ratable benefit of the Westport Participants. All outof-pocket costs and expenses reasonably and actually incurred by TRSA and ERSA in connection with the administration of the Westport Loan shall be payable from proceeds thereof prior to any distribution to the Westport Participants in accordance with their respective Sharing Ratios.
Pursuant to the Westport Participation Agreement, if none of TRSA, ERSA or an affiliate or designee thereofis the Prevailing Bidder, the Litigation Settlement Trust will be responsible for the collection and distribution of the proceeds of the Westport Loan and, if necessary, the enforcement thereof, for the ratable benefil of the Westport Participants. All out-of-pocket costs and expenses reasonably and actually incurred by the Litigation Settlement Trust in connection with the administration of the Westport Loan shall be payable from proceeds thereof prior to any distribution to the Westport Participants in accordance with their respective Sharing Ratios.
All internal costs and expenses incurred in connection with the administration of the Litigation Settlement Trust following the Effective Date shall be borne solely by the Litigation Settlement Trust.
Any payments of principal received by any of the Debtors, TRSA or ERSA on account of the Westport Loan from June 30, 2015 through the Effective Date of the Plan, shall be held in trust for the benefit of the Westport Participants and will be distributed to the Westport Participants on the Effective Date in accordance with their respective Sharing Ratios.
Any payments of interest received by any of the Debtors, TRSA or ERSA on account of the Westport Loan from November 5, 2015 through the Effective Date of the Plan, shall be held in trust for the benefit of the Westport Participants and will be distributed to the
5

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 46 of 49

General Unsecured Claims:
OL17602622.5

Westport Participants on the Effective Date in accordance with their respective Sharing Ratios.
Any cash bid arnounts in excess of the Plan Cash Amount (such amount the "Sale Ovemayment") made on the Effective Date and not subject to a valid and perfected lien shall be paid as follows:
• First, to the Litigation Settlement Trust to reduce, on a dollarw for-dollar basis, its participating interest in the Westport Loan (not to exceed a total of $20 million). In such event, the Sharing Ratio of the Litigation Settlement Trust shall be recalculated to account for all sums received from such Sale Overpayment. If the Sale Overpayment is in an amount adequate to result in the immediate payment of the sum of $20 million to the Litigation Settlement Trust, then the Westport Loan will be transferred to the Prevailing Bidder not subject to a continuing participation interest by any party.
• Second, any Sale Overpayment greater than $20 million paid to the Litigation Settlement Trust as set fortb above (such amount the "Excess Sale Overpayment") will be shared as follows: 22.5% of the Excess Sale Overpayment shall be paid to holders of General Unsecured Claims (as defined below), not subject to dilution by the Litigation Claimants, and 77.5% of the Excess Sale Overpayment shall be paid to Litigation Claimants, not subject to dilution by the holders of General Unsecured Claims, provided, that at such time as the holders of General Unsecured Claims (other than the Litigation Claims) have received payment in full of the allowed amount of their claims, 100% of any remaining Excess Sale Overpayment shall be paid to the Litigation Claimants.
For the avoidance of doubt, the Litigation Settlement Trust shall not receive any guarantee or other credit support as to the Westport Loan from the Prevailing Bidder, the Debtors or any PSA Creditor Party.
The trustee of the Litigation Settlement Trust will be selected by the Southern Poverty Law Center and will be responsible for establishing a claims allowance and allocation process with respect to distributions under the Litigation Settlement Trust.
Impaired - Entitled to Vote
In consideration for the purchase of the Acquired Avoidance Actions purchased in connection with the sale of substantially all of the Debtors' assets, on the Effective Date, each holder of an allowed general unsecured claim, other than the Litigation Claimants, shall receive, on account of its claim (each, a "General Unsecured Claim"), its pro rata share (determined without taking the Litigation Claimants into account) of GUC Payment Amount and its pro rata share ofthat portion ofthe Excess Sale Overpayment allocated to the holders of General Unsecured Claims as set fortb above.
The GUC Payment Amount shall be an aggregate amount equal to the lesser of (i) $900,000, or (ii) an amount equal to fifteen percent (15%) of the total amount of all allowed General Unsecured Claims
6

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 47 of 49

Intercompany Claims: Equity Interests: General Provisions Allowance ofClaims:
Incorporation: Release and Related Provisions Exculpations: Releases:
0 I: 17602622.5

which remain outstanding after all assumption and cure has been implemented with respect thereto.
Impaired - Entitled to Vote
All intercompany claims between and among SI Inc. and its direct and indirect subsidiary Debtors shall be released and discharged on the Effective Date of the Plan. There shall be no distributions on account oflntercompany Claims.
Impaired- Entitled to Vote
All rights of existing holders of shares of stock, options, warrants and common equity interests in SI Inc. shall be extinguished as of the Effective Date, and owners thereof shall receive no distribution on account of such stock, options, warrants and equity interests.
Impaired- Deemed to Reject
The Debtors and the PSA Creditor Parties stipulate to and shall not challenge in any respect the approval of the DIP Facility, including the roll-up ofthe First Lien Debt.
The trustee of the Litigation Settlement Trust shall be solely responsible for determining the mechanism for distribution of the Trust assets to the Litigation Claimants.
The Debtors reserve the right to challenge the amount, validity or extent of all claims against the Debtors other than the claims of the PSA Creditor Parties.
Each of the Debtors shall remain incorporated in the State of Delaware.
Subject to Bankruptcy Court approval, the Plan Participants and the Committee and its advisors and Related Parties, shall be exculpated from liability for their actions in connection with the chapter II cases, with customary carve-outs for gross negligence and willful misconduct
Subject to Bankruptcy Court approval, the Plan shall provide that the Released Parties (as defmed below), be released from liability for all Released Claims (as defined below).
"Released Parties" shall mean (i) the Plan Participants, (ii) the Related Parties of the Plan Participants, and (iii) the Related Parties of any Related Parties of the Plan Participants.
"Plan Participants" shall mean (i) the Debtors, (ii) the PSA Creditor Parties, (iii) the Litigation Claimants, (iv) the Litigation Settlement Trust, and (v) the holders of all H-2B Claims (as defined in the PSA).
"Related Parties" shall mean, with respect to any person or entity,
7

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 48 of 49

Director and Officer Indemnification:
lfljunction:
Conditions to Closing
01: 17602622.5

any past, present or future representative, controlling person, officer, director, agent, attorney, advisor, employee, subsidiary or affiliate, shareholder, partner (general or limited), member, manager, equity holder, trustee, executor, predecessor in interest, successor or assign of any such person or entity.
"Case Professionals" shall mean the attorneys, accountants, consultants, financial advisors and other third party professionals who have represented the Plan Participants in connection with the negotiation and implementation of the Plan and the Plan Documents, each as defined in the PSA.
"Released Claims" shall mean (i) any and all claims or causes of action, other than Retained Claims, by or among the Released Parties and (ii) any and all claims or causes of action that the Committee, but not the Committee's members, may otherwise be entitled to assert against the Released Parties, both relating to any prepetition date acts or omissions, whether known or unknown, pertaining to the business activities and operations ofthe Debtors, the debts, liabilities, obligations and assets of the Debtors, the ownership, management, direction or control ofthe Debtors, prosecution ofthe Litigation Claims, settlement efforts and negotiations related to the Litigation Claims, negotiation of and entry into this Agreement (including all exhibits and addenda hereto), or any transactions or communications among the Released Parties with respect to any of the foregoing.
"Retained Claims'~ shall mean the following claims or causes of action held by certain of the Plan Participants, which shall be retained by such Plan Participants and shall not be Released Claims: (i) the claims or causes of action ofthe Litigation Claimants against Malvern C. Burnett, Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C., Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Sachin Dewan, and Dewan Consultants Pvt. Ltd. (a/k/al Medtech Consultants), and (ii) the claims or causes of action of any Plan Participant against its own Related Parties, other than the Released Related Party Claims.
"Released Related Partv Claims" means any claims or causes of action against (i) the officers, directors, shareholders or other equity holders of the Debtors, or (ii) the Case Professionals, all of which shall be Released Claims and shall not be Retained Claims.
Director and officer insurance will continue in place for the directors and officers of all of the Debtors during the chapter II cases on existing terms. The Debtors shall be permitted to purchase tail coverage for current and former directors and office~ subject to funding availability under the DIP Facility.
Ordinary and customary injunction provisions shall be included in the Plan.
ll1is restructuring and all compromises herein shall be subject to (i) commencement of the Chapter I I cases, (ii) the absence of any payment default under the Westport Loan (determined without giving effect to any alleged waiver by the Debtors or any other party), (iii) after approval of a disclosure statement as containing
8

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 49 of 49

Aoology by the Debtors

adequate information, solicitation of votes approving the Plan, (iv) the execution of definitive documentation mutually acceptable to, and signed on to by, the parties to the PSA, each in their sole discretion, (v) the entry of an order confirming the Plan, which order is not subject to a stay of execution and otherwise final according to its terms and under applicable law, (vi) all actions, documents and agreements necessary to implement the Plan shall have been effected or executed and, to the extent required, filed with the applicable governmental units in accordance with applicable laws, and (vii) the Debtors shall have received all authorizations, consents, regulatory approvals, rulings, letters, no~action letters, opinions or documents that are determined by the Debtors or the PSA Creditor Parties to be necessary to implement the Plan and that are required by law, regulation or order.
Within 2 weeks from the entry of the PSA Order the Debtors shall issue a formal letter of apology to the Litigation Claimants for the Debtors' conduct that gave rise to the Litigation Claims, such letter to be in form and substance reasonably satisfactory to the Litigation Claimants through their advisors. For the avoidance of doubt, such letter of apology shall for all purposes be deemed a Restructuring Document under the PSA, and shall be subject to the effect of Section 23 of the PSA.

0 I: 17602622.5
9

 
 Case 1:13-cv-00497-MAC-ZJH Document 102 Filed 06/17/15 Page 1 of 5 PageID #: 3209

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BEAUMONT DIVISION

RAJU MEGANATHAN, et al.

'

'

v.

'

'

SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL L.L.C., et al. '

1:13-CV-497

ORDER SEVERING AND TRANSFERRING SIGNAL’S CROSS-CLAIMS TO THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

This case is assigned to the Honorable Marcia Crone, United States District Judge, and is

referred to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for all pretrial matters. (Doc. No. 2.)

Per the ―first-to-file‖ rule, and in the interests of judicial economy, the undersigned finds that

Signal‘s cross-claims should be severed from the main action and transferred to the Eastern

District of Louisiana.

I. Background

On March 7, 2008, a putative class action was filed in the Eastern District of Louisiana on

behalf of over five hundred plaintiffs who were allegedly victims of human trafficking. (See Doc.

No. 1, David v. Signal Int‘l, L.L.C., No. 2:08-1220 (E.D. La. March 7, 2008)). The court in

David denied class certification (as to all claims except the plaintiffs‘ FLSA claims), which caused

the putative class members to file suit in the district where their injuries allegedly occurred. The

Plaintiffs in this case filed suit in the Eastern District of Texas because they claim to have suffered

their injuries at a Signal facility in Orange, Texas.

Like in David, the Plaintiffs in this case sued numerous defendants. (See Doc. No. 1);

(See also Doc. No. 1, David v. Signal Int‘l, L.L.C., No. 2:08-1220 (E.D. La. March 7, 2008))

(naming twelve defendants). For convenience, the Plaintiffs grouped the Defendants into three

categories: ―Signal‖ (collectively, Signal International, L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P.,

Case 1:13-cv-00497-MAC-ZJH Document 102 Filed 06/17/15 Page 2 of 5 PageID #: 3210
Signal International Texas, L.P., and Signal International, Inc.), ―Recruiter Defendants,‖ (collectively, Global Resources, Inc., Michael Pol, Dewan Consultants Pvt., Ltd., and Sachin Dewan), and ―Facilitator Defendants‖ (collectively, Malvern C. Burnett, Malvern C. Burnett A.P.C., and the Gulf Coast Immigration Center, L.L.C). Also common to both cases are cross-claims Signal filed against these defendants. (Doc. No. 61, pp. 55–75.); (Doc. No. 60, David v. Signal, Int‘l, L.L.C., No. 2:08-1220 (E.D. La. May 9, 2008)). 1 Signal filed its cross-claims in the David case in 2008, and filed its cross-claims in this case in 2014. The cross-claims in David were recently tried, and a jury returned a verdict in favor of the cross-defendants on each claim. (Doc. No. 2387, David v. Signal, Int‘l, L.L.C., No. 2:08-1220 (E.D. La. April 27, 2015)).
In addition to this case, there are four other cases pending in the Eastern District of Texas involving these same Defendants and the same allegations of trafficking. Signal filed cross-claims in those cases as well. In two of those cases—Samuel and Joseph—Burnett moved to have Signal‘s cross-claims transferred to the Eastern District of Texas under the ―first-to-file‖ rule. The undersigned granted Burnett‘s motion, and no objections were filed.
II. Analysis ―Under the first-to-file rule, when related cases are pending before two federal courts, the court in which the case was last filed may refuse to hear it if the issues raised by the cases substantially overlap.‖ Int‘l Fid. Ins. Co. v. Sweet Little Mex. Corp., 665 F.3d 671, 677 (5th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). ―In such a case, the district court in which the later action was filed may dismiss, stay, or transfer the suit in order to avoid duplicative litigation and enforce the principle of comity.‖ Carter v. Dep‘t of Veterans Affairs, 228 F. App‘x 399, 402 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
1. In this case, Signal claims that is has suspended its cross-claims against defendant Michael Pol (Doc. No. 61, p. 55 n. 1), and in David, Signal‘s claims against him have been dismissed. (Doc. No. 1976, David v. Signal, Inl‘t, L.L.C., No. 2:08-1220 (E.D. La. Dec. 5, 2014)).
2

Case 1:13-cv-00497-MAC-ZJH Document 102 Filed 06/17/15 Page 3 of 5 PageID #: 3211
―In deciding whether to apply the first-to-file rule, the Court must resolve two questions: (1) are the two pending actions so duplicative or do they involve such substantially similar issues that one court should decide the subject matter of both actions, and if so, (2) which of the two courts should take the case.‖ Datamize, Inc. v. Fid. Brokerage Servs., LLC, 2:03-CV-321-DF, 2004 WL 1683171, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 2004) (Folsom, J.) (citing Tex. Instruments v. Micron Semiconductor, 815 F. Supp. 994, 997 (E.D. Tex. 1993)). ―Only the first issue is for the second-filed court to decide, however, for in this circuit, ‗[o]nce the likelihood of a substantial overlap between the two suits ha[s] been demonstrated, it [is] no longer up to the [second filed court] to resolve the question of whether both should be allowed to proceed.‘‖ Nabors Drilling USA, L.P. v. Markow, Walker, P.A., 451 F. Supp. 2d 843, 845 (S.D. Miss. 2006) (alteration in original) (quoting Cadle Co. v. Whataburger of Alice, Inc., 174 F.3d 599, 605–06 (5th Cir. 1999)). The application or propriety of transfer under the first-to-file rule may be raised sua sponte. Strukmyer, L.L.C. v. Infinite Fin. Solutions, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-3798, 2013 WL 6388563, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 2013); Walker Grp., Inc. v. First Layer Comm‘ns, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 2d 456, 460–61 (M.D.N.C. 2004).
The undersigned finds that the first prong of the first-to-file rule is satisfied here. Signal‘s cross-claims in David are not just similar or related to the ones in this case—they are virtually identical. White v. Peco Foods, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 2d 339, 342 (S.D. Miss. 2008) (―The first-to-file rule does not require that cases be identical, but merely that there is a substantial overlap in issues and parties.‖). First, the only difference in the parties between the two cases is that Signal sued an additional three Defendants in David (the ―Labor Broker Defendants‖) who are not parties to this action.2 Compare (Doc. No. 61) with (Doc. No. 60, David v. Signal, Int‘l,
2. Signal also filed a third-party claim against Zito Companies, L.L.C. that was dismissed. (Doc. No. 391, David v. Signal, Int‘l, L.L.C., No. 2:08-1220 (E.D. La. April 7, 2009)).
3

Case 1:13-cv-00497-MAC-ZJH Document 102 Filed 06/17/15 Page 4 of 5 PageID #: 3212
L.L.C., No. 2:08-1220 (E.D. La. May 9, 2008)); see also Save Power Ltd. v. Syntek Fin. Corp., 121 F.3d 947, 951 (5th Cir. 1997) (―Complete identity of parties is not required for dismissal or transfer of a case filed subsequently to a substantially related action.‖). It is also worth noting that Signal‘s cross-claims are in no way impacted by the difference in the make-up of the plaintiffs in each case.
Second, Signal asserted nearly identical cross-claims in each case. The only variation is that Signal asserted a claim for tortious interference with contract in David that it did not include here. In addition, beyond just pleading the same causes of action against the same defendants, resolution of Signal‘s cross-claims involves the same facts and raises the same issues in both cases. In contrast, the undersigned denied Signal‘s and Burnett‘s requests to transfer the Plaintiffs‘ claims to the Eastern District of Louisiana in part because the Plaintiffs in this case worked at a different facility than the plaintiffs in David, and as such, the proof and facts for the claims would differ between the two cases. (Doc. No. 44.) This is not the case for Signal‘s cross-claims. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that there is substantial overlap between Signal‘s cross-claims in this case and those in David.
Therefore, the proper course of action is to either transfer, stay, or dismiss Signal‘s cross-claims. The undersigned perceives no benefit to merely staying these claims. In fact, Signal‘s cross-claims were recently tried in David, and the parties are now arguing about the preclusive effect of that judgment. In the interest of judicial economy, one court should decide these claims and any related ancillary issues.
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Accordingly, the most efficient manner of resolving these claims is to transfer them. But, in order to transfer just Signal‘s cross-claims, as opposed the entire case (including the Plaintiffs‘ claims), Signal‘s cross-claims must first be severed from the main case. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21, a ―trial court has broad discretion to sever issues to be tried before it.‖ Brunet v. United Gas Pipeline Co., 15 F.3d 500, 505 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 21); see also United States v. O‘Neil, 709 F.2d 361, 366 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting that under Rule 21 a district court properly severed a party‘s counterclaims). The undersigned has authority under Rule 21 to sever Signal‘s cross-claims even though no party has requested such relief. See Brunet, 15 F.3d at 505; United States v. Nat‘l R.R. Passenger Corp., No. CIV.A 86-1094, 2004 WL 1335723, at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 15, 2004) (―Thus, while neither party has asked this Court to sever, Rule 21 permits a court to sever claims sua sponte.‖).
III. Conclusion For the reasons discussed above, it is ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to sever from this action Signal‘s cross-claims against cross-defendants Malvern C. Burnett, Sachin Dewan, Dewan Consultants Pvt., Ltd., Global Resources, Inc. Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C. and Michael Pol; and it is further ORDERED the Clerk of Court shall TRANSFER Signal‘s cross-claims against Malvern C. Burnett, Sachin Dewan, Dewan Consultants Pvt., Ltd., Global Resources, Inc. Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C. and Michael Pol to the Eastern District of Louisiana.
SIGNED this 17th day of June, 2015.
_________________________ 5 Zack Hawthorn
United States Magistrate Judge

 
 Case 1:13-cv-00497-MAC-ZJH Document 103 Filed 06/26/15 Page 1 of 35 PageID #: 3214

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BEAUMONT DIVISION

RAJU MEGANATHAN, et al.

'

'

v.

'

'

SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL L.L.C., et al. '

1:13-CV-497

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON THE PARTIES’ MOTIONS TO EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY This case is assigned to the Honorable Marcia Crone, United States District Judge, and is referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for pretrial proceedings pursuant to a referral order entered on August 8, 2013. (Doc. No. 2.) Pending before the undersigned are eight motions to exclude and/or limit expert testimony. The Plaintiffs moved to exclude the following experts: Ron McAlear, Ronald L. Signorino, Enrique Gonzalez, Dr. Louise Shelley, and Dr. Kevin Fox Gotham. (Doc. Nos. 70, 71, 72, 73, 77.) Defendants Signal International, L.L.C., Signal International, Inc., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P. (collectively, ―Signal‖) moved to exclude the Plaintiffs‘ experts Clyde Payne, Florence Burke, and Amy Mowl. (Doc. Nos. 68, 69, 76.) Because the motions all relate to the same operative facts, apply the same law, and at times relate to one another, the undersigned will address all the pending motions in one order.
I. BACKGROUND In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, approximately 590 men, including the four Plaintiffs in this case, were allegedly trafficked into the United States to provide labor for Signal‘s operations. (Doc. No. 1, pp. 1–4.) The Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants ―conspired and schemed to target Plaintiffs as Indian laborers, knowing that they would be enticed by good pay and false promises of permanent residency, to lure them in to the United States.‖ (Id. at p.

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4.) They also claim that they were forced to live in ―overcrowded, unhygienic, and diseaseridden work camps resembling prisons‖ and felt compelled to continue working for Signal due to fears of ―deportation after learning that their temporary visas had expired‖ and the significant debts they incurred in their homeland. (Id. at pp. 3–4.)
A putative class action was filed in the Eastern District of Louisiana on behalf of all the workers who had allegedly been trafficked to the United States to work at Signal‘s facilities in Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi. (See Doc. 1, David v. Signal Int‘l, L.L.C., 2:08-cv-1220 (March 7, 2008)). The court in David denied class certification, which caused the individual class members to file suit where their alleged injuries occurred. See David v. Signal Int‘l, L.L.C., No 08-1220, 2012 WL 10759668, at *37 (E.D. La. Jan. 4, 2012). The Plaintiffs in this case worked at Signal‘s facility in Orange, Texas, which is within this judicial district.
The Plaintiffs allege that some or all of the Defendants violated the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003 and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations. (Doc. No. 1, pp. 39–54.) In addition, the Plaintiffs assert causes of action for state law fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract against all of the Defendants. (Id. at pp. 49– 52.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD The admission or exclusion of expert testimony is a matter within the discretion of the district court. Kuhmo Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999); Huss v. Gayden, 571 F.3d 442, 452 (5th Cir. 2009). Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
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methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. FED. R. EVID. 702; accord Kuhmo Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152; Daubert v. Merrel Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993). The proponent of the proffered expert testimony ―has the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the pertinent admissibility requirements are met.‖ United States v. Fullwood, 342 F.3d 409, 412 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing FED. R. EVID. 104(a)). The district court is to consider several criteria in determining whether an expert‘s opinion is admissible. First, whether the proffered expert is qualified to testify because of his knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education. United States v. Cooks, 589 F.3d 173, 179 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing FED. R. EVID. 702); Wilson v. Woods, 163 F.3d 935, 937 (5th Cir. 1999). ―[T]o qualify as an expert, ‗the witness must have such knowledge or experience in [his] field or calling as to make it appear that his opinion or inference will probably aid the trier in his search for truth.‘‖ United States v. Hicks, 389 F.3d 514, 524 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Bourgeois, 950 F.2d 980, 987 (5th Cir. 1992)) (internal quotations omitted). Second, whether the proffered expert‘s testimony is reliable. See Kuhmo Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152. The court possesses considerable flexibility in assessing the reliability of expert testimony. Id. at 141; Stolt Achievement, Ltd. v. Dredge B. E. Lindholm, 447 F.3d 360, 366 (5th Cir. 2006). While the Daubert factors are the most common benchmark, the court should consider all relevant factors, and is not required to analyze the Daubert factors in every case. Stolt Achievement, Ltd, 447 F.3d at 366 (citing Kuhmo Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 149). The overarching goal ―is to make certain that an expert . . . employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.‖ Kuhmo Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152. ―The [c]ourt‘s role is that of a gatekeeper only, limited to determining
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admissibility, not credibility of the evidence.‖ Knox v. Ferrer, No. 5:07-CV-6, 2008 WL 4411326, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 22, 2008) (citing Pipitone v. Biomatrix, Inc., 288 F.3d 239, 244 (5th Cir. 2002)). This role requires a court to make ―a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.‖ Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–93. The court should approach this task ―with proper deference to the jury‘s role as the arbiter of disputes between conflicting opinions.‖ United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land, 80 F.3d 1074, 1077 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Viterbo v. Dow Chem Co., 826 F.2d 420, 422 (5th Cir. 1987)) (internal quotations omitted).
The court‘s assessment of admissibility is not intended to replace the adversarial system, which should highlight weak evidence. Primrose Operating Co. v. Nat‘l Am. Ins. Co., 382 F.3d 546, 562 (5th Cir. 2004). ―Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.‖ Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596. ―The Daubert analysis should not supplant trial on the merits.‖ Mathis v. Exxon Corp., 302 F.3d 448, 461 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Pipitone, 288 F.3d at 250).
Finally, the court must determine that the proffered expert testimony is relevant. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (stating that expert testimony is admissible only if it ―will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue‖). Evidence is relevant if it ―has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.‖ FED. R. EVID. 401.
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III. ANALYSIS A. Plaintiffs‘ ―Motion to Exclude the Testimony and Strike the Expert Report of Ron
McAlear‖ (Doc. No. 70) Signal retained Ronald J. McAlear (―McAlear‖) ―for the purpose of providing information and guidance on Shipyard normal and customary practices . . . .‖ (Doc. No. 70, Ex. 4, p. 1.)1 McAlear is an engineer, holds a master‘s degree from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and has spent his career working in all facets of the shipbuilding industry, including at the management level. (Id. at pp. 9–11.) Though difficult to discern precisely what McAlear‘s opinions are, it appears that he concludes that Signal ―applies the normal and customary industry practices‖ in several areas, including: safety, quality, the environment, the use of I.D. badges, and the issuance of personal protective equipment. (Id. at p. 7.) The Plaintiffs seek to exclude McAlear as an expert on the grounds that: (1) he is not qualified to testify as an expert on safety; (2) his opinions are irrelevant; (3) his opinions are not based on sufficient or reliable facts or data; and (4) his methodology is flawed. (Doc. No. 70-1, pp. 11–14.)
a. Scope of McAlear’s opinions Before discussing the Plaintiffs‘ specific arguments, it necessary to clarify the scope McAlear‘s opinions. The Plaintiffs argue that McAlear is not qualified to offer any opinions ―on any subject that might be relevant,‖ and specifically point to the fact that McAlear admitted he was not an expert on safety. (Doc. No. 70-1, p. 16.) Signal counters that McAlear will opine ―that Signal‘s conduct as a marine fabricator and employer was customary, ordinary and within industry standards in its day to day employment of the Plaintiffs in this case.‖ (Doc. No. 79, p.
1. The Plaintiffs attach two versions of McAlear‘s report. One dated July 29, 2014 (Exhibit 4) and one dated August 27, 2014 (Exhibit 1). While both reports appear to be similar, the August Report is longer and more robust. The Plaintiffs acknowledge that this report was timely served in this case. (Doc. No. 70-1, p. 2, n. 2.) Accordingly, this will be considered the operative report for this case.
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1.) Signal, however, clarifies that McAlear is not being offered ―as a safety expert.‖ (Id.) In fact, Signal concedes that he is not an expert on safety. However, at times, McAlear opines that Signal‘s facilities were in fact safe. For example, he states, ―Signal has operated one of the safest shipyards in the Industry‖ and that Signal‘s ―safety record is evident when you compare the historical safety performance ratings from 2003 to 2013.‖ (Doc. No. 70, Ex. 1, p. 25.) McAlear goes so far as to call Signal‘s safety record ―exemplary.‖ (Id.) Such opinions go beyond merely discussing what is customary in the industry.
As a preliminary matter, the undersigned finds that McAlear‘s opinions on safety are inadmissible for two reasons. First, McAlear admits that he is ―not an expert in safety.‖ (Doc. No. 70, Ex. 3, 131:12.) Therefore, he is not qualified to render such opinions. Second, he has not examined sufficient information nor applied a reliable or meaningful principle to reach these particular conclusions. Rendering an opinion that Signal‘s safety record is ―exemplary‖ would require considering and balancing Signal‘s safety record against that of other companies or against identifiable industry standards. McAlear undertook no such analysis. Conversely, to opine generally that Signal‘s practices are consistent with industry customs only requires being familiar with the industry and being familiar with Signal‘s practices.
Accordingly, McAlear‘s opinions are limited to those relating to customary practices within the marine fabrication industry, and he may not opine as to whether Signal‘s facilities were in fact safe.
b. McAlear is qualified to testify about industry customs The Plaintiffs argue that McAlear‘s report should be excluded because he admitted that he is not an expert on safety, and therefore, not qualified to testify as an expert. (Doc. No. 70-1, p. 12.) However, as discussed above, the Plaintiffs‘ characterization of McAlear‘s opinions is
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too narrow. He is not just opining on whether Signal is a safe company or about its safety record. Rather, he discusses general industry customs and Signal‘s practices measured against those customs. Given McAlear‘s ―[o]ver 40 years of experience in all aspects of the Marine Industry,‖ including experience in managing and running shipyards, his practical work experience qualifies him as an expert about general practices in the industry. (Doc. No. 70, Ex. 1, App. A); see also Martin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-268, 201l WL 6399690, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 20, 2011) (finding that an expert‘s twenty-four years of work experience qualified him to testify as an expert); Satcher v. Honda Motor Co., 52 F.3d 1311, 1317–18 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that the district court did not err in finding an expert qualified to testify based on his experience).
c. McAlear’s opinions are relevant The Plaintiffs claim that McAlear‘s report should be struck because ―[g]eneral standards and practices in the industry and Signal‘s shipyard safety practices are not relevant to‖ any of their claims. (Doc. No. 70-1, p. 12.) In response, Signal asserts that due to the Plaintiffs‘ factual allegations about the use of I.D. badges and unsafe working conditions, McAlear‘s opinions about general industry practices are relevant. (Doc. No. 79, pp. 2–4.) Signal is correct—the Plaintiffs‘ complaint makes numerous references to the conditions of employment imposed by Signal. For example, the Plaintiffs‘ complaint discusses the testing and re-testing by Signal, the fact that Signal charged the Plaintiffs for job-related tool kits, the use of I.D. badges, and general working conditions. (See Doc. No. 1, pp. 25–30.) Expert testimony is admissible if it will ―help the trier of fact to understand the evidence . . . .‖ See FED. R. CIV. 702. To the extent that the Plaintiffs criticize certain conditions of their employment and complain that they were working in substandard conditions,
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expert testimony claiming that these are customary practices is relevant. Moreover, a potential juror is unlikely to be familiar with customary shipyard practices, and as such, expert testimony will assist the jury on this topic. In other words, it would be unfairly prejudicial to Signal to allow the Plaintiffs to discuss the working conditions they faced at Signal and attempt to cast these conditions in a negative light, without allowing Signal the ability to at least offer testimony that shows some of these conditions are standard within in the industry. Accordingly, McAlear‘s testimony meets the helpfulness requirement of Rule 702. See U.S. v. Tucker, 345 F.3d 320, 327 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting that the relevance inquiry centers on ―whether expert testimony proffered in the case is sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute‖) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591).2
d. McAlear’s opinions are based on sufficient facts and data Next, the Plaintiffs contend that McAlear‘s report should be struck because he based his opinions on documents found on Signal‘s website. (Doc. No. 70-1, p. 13); (Doc. No. 91, p. 3) (―McAlear‘s blind reliance on internet sources is alarming and discredits Signal‘s opposition that Mr. McAlear‘s sources were sufficient.‖). Stated another way, McAlear did not consider a sufficient amount of information from a reliable source. This type of challenge goes to the weight of his testimony, not its admissibility. See 14.38 Acres of Land, 80 F.3d at 1077 (―As a general rule, questions relating to the bases and sources of an expert‘s opinion affect the weight to be assigned that opinion rather than its admissibility and should be left for the jury‘s consideration.‖). Moreover, a review of Appendix B to McAlear‘s report illustrates that McAlear reviewed materials beyond just those available on Signal‘s website. (Doc. No. 70, Ex. 1, App. B.) He reviewed ISO certifications, deposition excerpts, and even conducted an
2. The Plaintiffs also argue that McAlear‘s opinions about industry customs are not relevant to their § 1981 claim. (Doc. No. 91, pp. 2–3.) The Plaintiffs, however, have not asserted such a claim in this case. (Doc. No. 1.)
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―informal survey‖ on tools and protective gear. (Doc. No. 70, Ex. 1, pp. 12–13.) Accordingly, the undersigned finds that McAlear has reviewed enough information to opine on whether Signal‘s practices meet industry norms. To the extent that the Plaintiffs wish to challenge the bases for McAlear‘s opinions, they can do so on cross-examination.
e. McAlear’s opinions are the product of reliable principles and/or methods The Plaintiffs state that McAlear has met none of the Daubert factors. (Doc. No. 70, pp. 14–15.) The relevant inquiry, however, is not whether any or all of the Daubert factors are met, but rather, whether there is any reasonable criteria on which the expert based his opinion. See Stolt Achievement, Ltd., 447 F.3d at 366; see also Huck v. City of Beaumont, 147 F. Supp. 2d 565, 568 (E.D. Tex. 2001) (Cobb, J.) (―[T]he Daubert inquiry is always fact-specific, and . . . the Daubert factors may not all apply.‖). Here, McAlear balanced his expertise about industry customs against sufficient information about Signal‘s practices to reach the conclusion that Signal‘s practices as to quality, the environment, the use of I.D. badges, and the issuance of personal protective equipment are ―normal and customary‖ within the industry. (Doc. No. 70, Ex. 1, p. 28.) This type of analysis is sufficient to support McAlear‘s opinions.
f. Conclusion For the reasons stated above, the undersigned GRANTS IN PART the Plaintiffs‘ ―Motion to Exclude the Testimony and Strike the Expert Report of Ron McAlear‖ (Doc. No. 70). McAlear may testify about general industry practices and opine on whether Signal‘s practices are consistent with these customs. McAlear, however, may not opine that Signal is a safe company or has an ―exemplary safety record.‖
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B. The Plaintiffs‘ ―Motion to Exclude the Testimony and Strike the Expert Report of Kevin Fox Gotham‖ (Doc. 77) Signal designated Kevin Fox Gotham, Ph.D. (―Dr. Gotham‖), a professor of sociology at
Tulane University, to ―evaluate the availability of housing in the Gulf Coast region in . . . Orange County[,] Texas in the aftermath of hurricanes Katrina and Rita.‖ (Doc. 84, p. 2.) He offers six opinions that touch on the lack of available housing in the aftermath of hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the impacts that this had on businesses to recruit workers, and why Signal built the ―man camps.‖ (Doc. 77, Ex. A.)
The Plaintiffs claim that Dr. Gotham‘s report should be struck because it is (1) irrelevant and (2) based on insufficient facts and data. The Plaintiffs also argue that Dr. Gotham‘s report should be limited to the four opinions that were contained in the report that was served in this case, as opposed to the six opinions served in David (a parallel case decided in the Eastern District of Louisiana).
a. Dr. Gotham’s last two opinions should not be struck for failing to serve them3 Exhibit A to the Plaintiffs‘ motion contains three reports by Dr. Gotham. The first report was signed (and presumably served) on July 29, 2014 and contains four opinions. The second report, which contains the case style for David v. Signal Int’l, is dated August 28, 2014 and contains six opinions. The third report is dated December 5, 2014 and contains the case style Equal Employment Opportunity Commission et al. v. Signal Int’l. This report also contains six opinions. The Plaintiffs seek to limit any opinions given by Dr. Gotham to those contained in
3. The decision whether to allow a late filed expert report—which is essentially why the Plaintiffs seek to limit Dr. Gotham‘s opinions—involves determining whether to amend the scheduling order. This inquiry involves a four-factor test. See Geiserman, 893 F.2d at 790–91. In contrast, determining whether Dr. Gotham‘s opinions are admissible, is a different inquiry. Therefore, the undersigned finds it necessary to first consider whether these opinions are properly part of this case, before determining whether they are admissible. As will be discussed below, opinions E and F are struck from this case.
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the July 29 report.4 Signal does not address which report it contends is the operative report for this case.
Starting with the latest drafted report—the EEOC Report—it is dated after the deadline for designating experts. (See Doc. No. 30) (requiring Defendants to designate experts witnesses by November 28, 2014). Signal has not moved to extend the deadline or untimely serve this report. Moreover, Dr. Gotham was deposed on October 6, 2014. Therefore, the Plaintiffs would not have had the ability to question Dr. Gotham about the particulars of the EEOC Report. Therefore, if Signal intends on claiming that this is the operative report, it must seek leave to file an untimely expert report.
As to the David Report, even if not formally served, it is evident that the Plaintiffs had the opportunity to depose Dr. Gotham regarding all six opinions contained in the David Report. It also appears that the Plaintiffs had this report in advance of his deposition, and there is nothing in the record demonstrating that the Plaintiffs‘ deposition preparation as to all six opinions was hindered. Moreover, while Dr. Gotham testified that he does not plan to amend his report, his deposition testimony is clear that he plans to offer six opinions in this case. (Doc. No. 77, Ex. B, 156:6–159:4.) Therefore, there is no unfair surprise. Lastly, the deadline for serving expert reports was November 28, 2014. (Doc. No. 30.) Assuming that the David Report was served in this case on August 28, 2014—the date it was signed—it would be timely.
Accordingly, because the Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate how they were prejudiced by this report, the undersigned will consider the David Report as the operative report in this case. Reliance Ins. Co., 110 F.3d at 257–58 (applying the four factor test articulated in Geiserman).
4. Specifically, the Plaintiffs seek to exclude two opinions that were added to the David Report, but the Plaintiffs make no mention of the EEOC Report, which appears to be somewhat different.
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b. Dr. Gotham’s opinions are relevant5 The Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Gotham‘s first three opinions regarding the impacts of Hurricanes Rita and Katrina on the Gulf South are ―so pedestrian that courts have taken judicial notice of it.‖ (Doc. No. 77-1, p. 8) (citing two cases taking judicial notice of the damage caused by Hurricane Katrina). Therefore, according the Plaintiffs, Gotham‘s opinions fail to meet the helpfulness standard of Federal Rule of Evidence 702(a). (Id. at pp. 8–9.) Signal responds by arguing that Dr. Gotham‘s report is helpful because it provides context that ―will assist the Court and the jury in determining the nexus between Signal‘s logic, intentions, and actions.‖ (Doc. No 84, p. 6.) To meet the first prong of Rule 702, ―the expert‘s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge [must] help the trier of fact understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.‖ FED. R. CIV. P. 702(a). The Plaintiffs claim that there is no need for expert testimony on the fact that hurricanes Rita and Katrina destroyed housing on the Gulf Coast. Dr. Gotham‘s opinions, however, go beyond this one basic idea. For example, he also opines on the ―problems that . . . businesses faced in attracting skilled labor in the context of widespread housing damage in the months and years after Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita.‖ (Doc. 84, p. 5); (see also Doc. 77, Ex. A, pp. 23–27) (discussing the correlation between the lack of available housing and the difficulty in attracting workers). Moreover, the extent of the housing shortage may be beyond the knowledge of a layperson. While some jurors may still remember what life was like after the hurricanes, it is plausible that a juror may have only recently moved to the area and lacks such familiarity. In addition, these hurricanes occurred nearly ten years ago—it is possible
5. The Plaintiffs moved to exclude Dr. Gotham‘s report in its entirety, but did not move in the alternative to strike opinion B, which addresses the impacts that Hurricane Katrina had on Mississippi. Moreover, interspersed with Dr. Gotham‘s other opinions is a discussion of the Mississippi area, which was the location of another Signal facility. The undersigned questions whether a discussion of the Mississippi region is relevant to this case.
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that memories have faded. Accordingly, information regarding the housing market and the impact that it had on attracting workers to the area is helpful, and as such, meets Rule 702(a).
Furthermore, contested factual issues include why Signal allegedly forced the Plaintiffs to live in the ―man camps‖ and why Signal needed to use an immigrant labor force. The state of the housing market is arguably relevant to these issues. Therefore, by offering a big picture perspective on what the housing market was like during the relevant period, Dr. Gotham‘s testimony is helpful. In short, if the Plaintiffs are going to claim that there was no need for Signal to build the ―man camps,‖ then testimony on the state of the housing market is relevant.
c. Sufficient facts and data Dr. Gotham‘s opinions can be broken into two general categories: (1) general opinions about the impacts of the hurricanes (opinions A through D) and (2) opinions about Signal‘s actions (opinions E and F). The Plaintiffs seek to exclude Dr. Gotham‘s opinion ―related to the availability of adequate housing for Signal workers, apparently in the Orange, Texas, area.‖ (Doc. No. 77-1, p. 9.) As to Dr. Gotham‘s general testimony, he relies on sufficient facts and data to reach general conclusions about the state of the housing market and the difficulty in attracting workers to disaster areas. While the utility of such testimony is questionable, as discussed above, it meets the admissibility requirements of the Federal Rules of Evidence. In addition, while the Plaintiffs fault him for not considering the data on a granular enough level (i.e. examining specific vacancy rates), he considered sufficient data to conclude that the housing markets were negatively impacted by the hurricanes. Dr. Gotham‘s more specific opinions, however, should be excluded. As for opinion E, Dr. Gotham has not reviewed enough specific information about housing availability in close
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proximity to Signal‘s facility in Orange, Texas to reach the conclusion that ―Signal built on-site facilities to address an acute housing shortage for workers.‖ (Doc. 77, Ex. A, p. 34); (see also id. at p. 37) (―[I]t is my opinion that the dearth of housing availability in Orange County, Texas . . . created major obstacles for businesses in these areas to attract and keep the labor necessary for business and community recovery efforts.‖). To reach such a specific opinion he would need to look at the housing market in an area in close proximity to Signal‘s facility in Orange, Texas. Dr. Gotham has undertaken no such analysis. He did not consider specific data in a narrowly defined region, and even classifies his report as considering ―the state of the housing market in general during the years after the disaster.‖ (Id., Ex. B, 68:12–14.) Dr. Gotham‘s opinions that housing was impacted by the hurricanes, without something specific to the area in question or without facts showing what housing was actually available near Signal‘s facility, will not support this opinion. Moreover, the specific data upon which Dr. Gotham relies focuses on the Mississippi region, not on Texas. (Id., Ex. A, pp. 37–38.)
As for Opinion F, this opinion is improper because it is not helpful and usurps the role of the jury. Dr. Gotham is attempting to pass judgment on the propriety of Signal‘s actions as they relate to the ―man camp.‖ For example, he states that ―Signal did not force or coerce the workers to stay in the on-site facility‖ (Id. at p. 42); that ―no plaintiff was ever required to live in the onsite housing facilities . . . .‖ (Id. at p. 41); and that the housing facility benefited the Plaintiffs. (Id. at p. 41–42.) The jury, informed about the state of housing market generally and other testimony, can determine whether Signal actually had no other choice but to build the ―man camps‖ or that the Plaintiffs benefited from them.
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d. Conclusion For the reasons stated above, the Plaintiffs‘ ―Motion to Exclude the Testimony and Strike the Expert Report of Kevin Fox Gotham‖ (Doc. 77) is GRANTED IN PART. Dr. Gotham may opine about the state of housing in the areas impacted by the hurricanes and the correlation between available housing and attracting skilled workers. However, opinions E and F are struck, and he may not opine as to whether there was ―an acute‖ housing shortage in Orange, Texas, why Signal built the ―man camp,‖ whether the Plaintiffs were required or coerced into living at the ―man camp,‖ or whether the ―man camp‖ actually benefited the Plaintiffs. C. Signal‘s ―Motion to Exclude the Opinion Testimony of Clyde Payne‖ (Doc. No. 68) The Plaintiffs retained Clyde P. Payne (―Payne‖) to ―evaluate the applicability of, and Signal‘s compliance or non-compliance with, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration‘s [―OSHA‖] standards and regulations for temporary labor camps.‖ (Doc. No. 68, Ex. A, p. 1.) Payne holds a master‘s degree in Environmental Science and has been a Certified Industrial Hygienist since 1983. Id. In addition, Payne was OSHA‘s Area Director of the Jackson, Mississippi office for over twenty-two years. Id. Signal moves to exclude Payne on two grounds: (1) his opinions about OSHA are irrelevant and (2) they consist of impermissible legal conclusions.
a. Payne’s opinions are irrelevant Signal argues that the ―Plaintiffs never alleged an OSHA violation in their original complaint against Defendants,‖ and, as such, Payne‘s opinions are ―irrelevant to the instant matter.‖ (Doc. No. 98, p. 2); (see also Doc. No. 2132, David v. Signal In‘t, L.L.C., 2:08-cv-1220 (E.D. La. Jan. 11, 2015) (striking both parties‘ OSHA experts partly because whether OSHA was violated had ―no bearing whatsoever on any of the remaining claims or defenses‖)). Plaintiffs
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respond and argue that Payne‘s testimony is relevant because it supports their claims of discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and fraud.6 (Doc. No. 87, p. 4.) They also argue that Payne‘s opinions are relevant because they highlight the substandard conditions in the ―man camps.‖ (Id. at 4–9.)
To be admissible, an expert‘s opinions must ―help the trier of fact [] understand the evidence or [] determine a fact in issue.‖ FED. R. EVID. 702. Payne‘s opinions, however, do neither. No cause of action is dependent on Signal‘s non-compliance with OSHA, and the Plaintiffs fail to explain how alleged violations of OSHA support their fraud claim. Ultimately, it is the Plaintiffs‘ burden to demonstrate why their expert‘s opinion is admissible.
Moreover, whether certain OSHA regulations were violated will not assist the jury in understanding the evidence. Here, the Plaintiffs‘ own testimony (if believed) regarding the conditions at the ―man camps‖ is more than sufficient for them to prove their trafficking, RICO, and other state-law claims. For example, Payne opines that 29 C.F.R. § 1910.142(d)(9) was violated because Signal failed to provide adequate toilet paper. (Doc. No. 68, Ex. A, p. 20.) A lay juror knows what constitutes adequate toilet facilities and, because no cause of action hinges on a violation of this statute, jurors can easily ascertain from their own experiences whether the facilities provided by Signal were adequate. In short, expert testimony is not needed to assist the jurors in evaluating the evidence regarding the living conditions at the ―man camps.‖
Lastly, the undersigned recognizes that, at first blush, this ruling is in conflict with the undersigned‘s allowance of Payne‘s testimony in Joseph and Samuel. In those cases, however, Signal did not move to strike Payne. (See Doc. No. 222, pp. 12–14, Joseph v. Signal Int‘l, L.L.C., 1:13-cv-324 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 12, 2015)). Accordingly, the undersigned found that the opinion of Virginia Miles, Signal‘s OSHA expert, as to whether certain OSHA regulations may
6. The Plaintiffs have not asserted a § 1981 claim.
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or may not apply met the helpfulness prong of Rule 702. In evaluating whether Miles‘s opinions were helpful, it had to be assumed that Payne‘s opinions on the various ways in which Signal violated OSHA would be offered. As the undersigned noted: ―If the Plaintiffs are going to elicit testimony from an expert that Signal failed to comply with certain OSHA regulations, then Miles‘s opinion, which merely offers a conflicting view on whether these regulations applied, is relevant.‖ (Id.) Here, the analysis and result is different because Signal moved to strike the Plaintiffs‘ OSHA expert.
b. Payne’s opinions consist of legal conclusions Not only are Payne‘s opinions unhelpful, they largely consist of impermissible legal conclusions. In fact, Payne offers two layers of legal conclusions. First, he finds that OSHA‘s regulations on Temporary Labor Camps apply to the ―man camps.‖ (Doc. No. 68, Ex. A, p. 7) (―My opinion is that OSHA‘s Temporary Labor Camp standards apply to Signal‘s housing camp at Orange, Texas.‖). Second, he opines that certain regulations were violated. For example, he opines: ―[T]he requirements of 29 C.F.R. 1910.142(a)(2) and 29 C.F.R. 1910.142(b)(2) for providing adequate size of housing and sleeping areas for the H-2B Workers were not followed and a violation existed.‖ (Doc. No. 68, Ex. B, p. 19); (see also id. at p. 18) (―[I]t is my opinion that Signal‘s Man Camp violated at least seven different Subsections of 29 C.F.R. § 1910 and the general duty clause of the Act.‖). The undersigned agrees with Signal and finds that whether OSHA applies and whether certain sections were violated are legal conclusions. The Plaintiffs argue that these are not legal conclusions because ―Payne‘s use of OSHA standards is not to convince the jury that Signal violated OSHA, rather it is to show the jury that Signal‘s housing was substandard.‖ (Doc. No. 87, pp. 4–5.) Payne, however, is opining that Signal‘s conduct was a violation of the law—this is the very essence of a legal conclusion.
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While no cause of action hinges on whether Signal complied with OSHA (which is why Payne‘s
testimony is irrelevant) that does not mean his opinions that certain laws were violated are not legal conclusions. In contrast, in Joseph and Samuel, Signal‘s OSHA expert merely opined that
there was nothing definitive that these regulations applied. Thus, she stopped short of reaching
an actual legal conclusion. Payne, however, goes much further and instructs the jury on what
law applied and whether it was violated.
c. Conclusion For the reasons stated above, Signal‘s ―Motion to Exclude the Opinion Testimony of Clyde Payne‖ (Doc. No. 68) is GRANTED. D. Plaintiffs‘ ―Motion to Exclude the Testimony and Strike the Report of Ronald L. Signorino‖ (Doc. No. 71) The Plaintiffs move to strike Signal‘s OSHA expert Ronald L. Signorino (―Signorino‖). (Doc. No. 71.) Having struck the Plaintiffs‘ OSHA expert Clyde Payne, Signorino‘s opinions,
which were merely offered as a rebuttal, are now irrelevant. In fact, Signal even concedes that it
only retained Signorino out of an abundance of caution to oppose any potential testimony by Payne. (Doc. No. 81, p. 14) (―Signorino was retained needlessly, as was Mr. Payne.‖). Accordingly, the Plaintiffs‘ motion is GRANTED.
E. Signal‘s ―Motion in Limine to Exclude/Limit Testimony of Florence Burke‖ (Doc. No. 69)7 Florence Burke (―Burke‖) is the Plaintiffs‘ expert on human trafficking. She offers
opinions on the ―common features‖ of known human trafficking cases, and concludes that these
7. The Plaintiffs claim that Signal did not comply with the District‘s meet and confer requirement prior to filing any of its motions. (See Doc. No. 85, p. 5 n. 1.); see also Local Rule 7(h). The Plaintiffs acknowledge that the parties conferred regarding expert motions, but claim that all that was discussed were the Plaintiffs‘ motions, and Signal did not indicate that it was intending on filing any motions. Signal‘s counsel responded with a sworn affidavit stating that parties conferred as to Signal‘s motions as well. (Doc. No. 97, Ex. A.) The undersigned takes meet and confer requirement seriously. In many instances, it can avoid disputes altogether or at least greatly narrow the issues. Here, because Signal‘s counsel has sworn under oath that Signal‘s motions to exclude expert testimony were discussed, the undersigned will assume that to be true.
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Plaintiffs were in fact victims of human trafficking. (See Doc. No. 69, Ex. B.) Signal argues that Burke‘s report should be struck for four reasons: (1) her report contains legal conclusions; (2) her opinions are unreliable; (3) she is not qualified to render an opinion regarding the Plaintiffs‘ mental state; and (4) she misrepresents her qualifications. (Id.)
a. Permissible scope of expert testimony on human trafficking Courts have reached varied conclusions on whether expert testimony on human trafficking is admissible. Compare Elat v. Ngoubene, 993 F. Supp. 2d 497, 514 (D. Md. 2014) (allowing some testimony about human trafficking) with (Doc. No. 2038, David v. Signal Int‘l, L.L.C., No. 2:08-cv-1220 (E.D. La. Dec. 30, 2014) (striking all expert testimony on human trafficking)). The issue is that in this context, it is difficult to delineate between an opinion that is merely a legal conclusion (i.e., that 18 U.S.C. § 1590 was violated) and testimony that educates the jury and may be helpful. While Federal Rule of Evidence 704 ―abolish[ed] the per se rule against testimony regarding ultimate issues of fact . . . [it] does not open the door to all opinions.‖ See Owen v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 698 F.2d 236, 241–42 (5th Cir. 1983). ―The Advisory Committee notes make it clear that questions which would merely allow the witness to tell the jury what result to reach are not permitted. Nor is the rule intended to allow a witness to give legal conclusions.‖ Id. ―The line between a permissible opinion on an ultimate issue and an impermissible legal conclusion is not always easy to discern.‖ United States v. McIver, 470 F.3d 550, 562 (4th Cir. 2006). In delineating the proper of scope of expert testimony on human trafficking, the undersigned must guard against two things. First, an expert must not be allowed to instruct the jury on what the legal elements of human trafficking are (i.e., what is needed to prove a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1590)—that is the court‘s job. Second, an expert must be prevented from telling
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the jury what conclusion to reach as to whether the Plaintiffs were victims of human trafficking—that is for the jury to decide. Therefore, the issue is how to delineate between a general discussion of human trafficking, which may help the jury better understand the complexities of human trafficking and is therefore admissible, and reaching a conclusion as to whether these Plaintiffs were victims of human trafficking, which would usurp the role of the jury. This difficulty is further compounded by the fact that the term ―human trafficking‖ has both a legal and a colloquial meaning, further blurring the line between permissible and impermissible testimony.
The undersigned finds the appropriate balance to be as follows: Burke may testify about ―human trafficking in general,‖ which includes discussing the general features of human trafficking schemes, but she may not offer an opinion on whether these Plaintiffs were victims of human trafficking. This will allow Burke to educate and inform the jury on the subtleties of human trafficking, which meets the helpfulness requirement of Rule 702, without directly offering a legal conclusion. FED. R. CIV. P. 702(a) (requiring that an expert‘s specialized knowledge ―help the trier of fact to understand the evidence‖). Moreover, allowing Burke to apply the facts of this case to her general standards would be tantamount to her telling the jury what conclusion to reach. See also Elat, 993 F. Supp. 2d at 514 (striking portions of Burke‘s testimony, but allowing her to testify generally about ―the patterns of coercion and threats that are typically present in situations involving the exploitation of foreign workers‖ and other general topics relating to human trafficking).
Two examples of the scope of permissible and impermissible testimony may be helpful. First, the portion of Burke‘s report where she offers background on human trafficking and discusses ―common features of trafficking situations‖ is permissible because it is purely
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informative. (Doc. No. 69, Ex. B, p. 11.) However, Burke cannot take the next logical step and conclude that there was trafficking in this case or opine on how the Plaintiffs were affected. For example, she states:
Having considered Plaintiffs‘ accounts of their trafficking experiences, it is my opinion that many of the trafficking factors identified above were present in Defendants‘ conduct towards them and operated to create a psychologically coercive environment in which a reasonable worker in the Plaintiffs‘ situation would have felt compelled to continue working for Signal. (Id. at p. 13.) This is nothing more than her evaluating the facts and reaching a conclusion that there was trafficking—such an analysis is within the province of the jury. Second, Burke discusses in general terms how victims of human trafficking are often made a set promises about what their working conditions will be like, but in reality, the conditions tend to be significantly worse. (Id. at p. 19.) This is within the scope of permissible testimony. Burke, however, crosses the line by stating: ―the Plaintiffs in this case believe they were deceived and betrayed in terms of their employment conditions, living conditions, net wages, opportunity to work, overtime hours, and immigration status.‖ (Id. at p. 20.) The jury, after hearing the facts, can evaluate whether the Plaintiffs were deceived. The above examples are not the only places where Burke‘s opinions go too far. However, because her report is so intertwined with permissible and impermissible opinions, the undersigned will not attempt to state on a paragraph-by-paragraph (or sentence-by-sentence basis) what is excluded from Burke‘s report. The limitation that she may only opine about the characteristics of human trafficking in general, and not whether there was trafficking in this case, should suffice.
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b. Signal’s other arguments Signal also raises several other arguments as to why Burke‘s testimony should be excluded or limited. First, Signal argues that Burke misrepresented two of her qualifications, and therefore should be struck. (Doc. No. 69, pp. 2–3.) The undersigned disagrees. A review of her experience and training shows Burke has extensive experience working with victims of human trafficking and is qualified to testify as an expert on human trafficking. (See id., Ex. B, pp. 1–5.) Whether the school where she obtained her Ph.D. in clinical psychology is accredited by the American Psychological Association, or whether her license to be a family counselor in California is still valid, does not impact whether she is qualified as an expert on trafficking. To the extent that Signal believes that these alleged misstatements affect the weight the jury should ascribe to her testimony, it can raise such issues on cross-examination. Next, Signal argues that Burke‘s report is unreliable because her interview process is flawed and that opinions based on Plaintiffs‘ statements are inadmissible. (Doc. No. 69, pp. 6– 9.) Because Burke is precluded from reaching an opinion on the issue of whether the Plaintiffs were victims of human trafficking, or evaluating the facts of this case as they relate to human trafficking, Signal‘s argument is now moot. (Id. at p. 9.) Likewise, Signal‘s argument that Burke is not competent to ―reach a final diagnosis‖ is no longer at issue, since she will not be testifying as to how these Plaintiffs were impacted. Lastly, Signal argues that Burke ―lacks a familiarity with her materials cited.‖ (Id. at pp. 3–4.) Signal claims that in previous versions of Burke‘s report, drafted for use in David, she cited a work that was subsequently removed. Burke‘s deposition is clear, however, that she did not find it helpful. This, however, is not a reason to strike Burke‘s report. If Signal believes that this change casts doubt Burke‘s credibility, Signal may raise this issue on cross-examination.
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c. Conclusion Signal‘s ―Motion in Limine to Exclude/Limit Testimony of Florence Burke‖ (Doc. No. 69) is GRANTED IN PART. Burke‘s opinions shall be limited to those related to general characteristics of human trafficking schemes, and Burke is precluded from testifying whether these Plaintiffs were victims of human trafficking or in what ways the facts of this case are similar to other known cases of human trafficking. F. Plaintiffs‘ ―Motion to Exclude Testimony and Strike the Expert Report of Dr. Louise Shelley‖ (Doc. No. 73) Signal designated Louise Shelley, Ph.D. (―Dr. Shelley‖) to testify as an expert on ―human trafficking and related organized crime.‖ (Doc. No. 88, p. 1.) Dr. Shelley received her Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of Pennsylvania and is currently a professor at the School of Public Policy at George Mason University. Her forty-five page report leads to one ultimate conclusion: ―Signal was not engaged in human trafficking at any stage of the process with the H2B workers, either at recruitment, on their arrival in the United States or in their employ.‖ (Doc. No. 73, Ex. C, p. 44.)8 The Plaintiffs seek to exclude Dr. Shelley‘s report, arguing that: (1) her report contains numerous legal conclusions; (2) her methodology is not valid; (3) her testimony is not helpful; and (4) she impermissibly assesses the witnesses‘ credibility. (Doc. No. 73-1.)
a. Dr. Shelley’s report contains impermissible legal conclusions The Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Shelley‘s report should be struck because it is ―replete with legal conclusions‖ and ―[t]hese conclusions fall far outside the scope of permissible expert
8. The Plaintiffs note that two reports were served on them and attach both reports. It is not clear from the face of either report which one was meant to be the operative report in this case. Moreover, the Plaintiffs make no argument as to why one report is the operative report for this case over the other. It appears that the more robust report is the one attached at Exhibit C to the Plaintiffs‘ briefing. Accordingly, for clarity, this will be considered the operative report.
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testimony . . . .‖ (Doc. No. 73-1, p. 7.) The Plaintiffs first argue that Dr. Shelley offers numerous legal conclusions about human trafficking. For the same reasons that the Plaintiffs‘ human trafficking expert report was limited, Dr. Shelley‘s report must also be limited. Therefore, Dr. Shelley‘s opinions are subject to the same limitation discussed above: Dr. Shelley may only discuss the general characteristics of human trafficking, but may not opine as to whether these Plaintiffs were in fact victims of human trafficking.
In addition, the Plaintiffs move to exclude five other alleged legal conclusions reached by Dr. Shelley. At the outset, because Dr. Shelley‘s testimony is limited to only a discussion about human trafficking generally, much of this part of the Plaintiffs‘ motion is now moot. However, for clarity, the undersigned will address the Plaintiffs‘ arguments. First, the Plaintiffs‘ argue that Dr. Shelley applies a more restrictive definition of human trafficking and forced labor, and therefore, her conclusion that the ―Plaintiffs are not victims of human trafficking‖ is invalid and should be struck. Because Dr. Shelley cannot reach this opinion, the Plaintiffs‘ argument is moot.9 Next, the Plaintiffs claim that Dr. Shelley offers an opinion on a ―non-existent‖ debt bondage claim. A part of her report does address debt bondage. (Doc. 73, Ex. C, pp. 11–12) (―[T]here was no debt bondage in this case under either the American or UN definition.‖). Debt bondage has a specific legal definition, and differs from the Plaintiffs‘ claim that the financial debts they incurred forced them to continue working for Signal. See 22 U.S.C. §7102(5) (defining debt bondage as ―the status or condition of a debtor arising from a pledge by the debtor of his or her personal services or those of a person under his control as a security for debt‖). The
9. The undersigned, however, reserves judgment on whether Dr. Shelley‘s references to forms of trafficking that are not at issue would cause jury confusion. The Plaintiffs‘ did not raise this argument. They only argued that it would be improper for Dr. Shelley to reach a conclusion that these Plaintiffs were in fact victims of human trafficking. On this point, the undersigned agrees. However, to the extent that Dr. Shelley seeks to discuss trafficking in general, and applies other standards, such as the United Nations definition, this may in fact be confusing the jury, but the Plaintiffs did not raise this argument.
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Plaintiffs have not made a claim of debt bondage. Accordingly, because Dr. Shelley‘s opinion regarding debt bondage does not relate to any cause of action or issue in this case, it is inadmissible. See Roman, 691 F.3d at 694.
Third, Dr. Shelley claims that ―Signal was exempt from OSHA standards for the housing of its H2-B workers . . . .‖ (Doc. No. 73, Ex. C, p. 28.) Dr. Shelley is not qualified to offer an opinion on the applicability of OSHA, therefore, this opinion is struck. Fourth, the Plaintiffs seek to strike an opinion reached based on a letter issued by the United States Department of Justice Special Counsel for Immigration Related Unfair Labor Practices. She opines that because the government found that Signal had not engaged in any unfair immigration related employment practices, and this necessarily includes coercion, there could be no trafficking. The Plaintiffs argue that this letter did not address Signal‘s actions and does not support a conclusion that the Plaintiffs were not trafficked. Because Dr. Shelley may only testify about human trafficking generally, and may not opine as to whether there was trafficking in this case, there is no need for her to discuss this letter. Therefore, her opinions based on this letter are struck. Lastly, the Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Shelley offers opinions on the law of agency. According to the Plaintiffs, the numerous references that she makes regarding Signal‘s role in the allegedly false promises made to the Plaintiffs is tantamount to an opinion on agency. The undersigned disagrees—Dr. Shelley does not offer any opinions on agency law. However, as will be discussed below, such comments on the evidence are not helpful, and therefore, are struck from her report.
b. Helpful to the jury The Plaintiffs raise two reasons for why Dr. Shelley‘s opinions are not helpful, and therefore, inadmissible. First, they argue that Dr. Shelley‘s opinions ―largely parrot Signal‘s
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theory of the case . . . .‖ (Doc. No. 73-1 p. 14.) This is a fair characterization of much of Dr. Shelley‘s report. Large portions of her report read more like an opening statement than an expert report. For example, she ―opines‖ that: ―Signal did not obtain workers for its facilities in Texas and Mississippi through the use of force, fraud, or coercion‖ (Doc. No. 73, Ex. C, p. 9); ―Burnett might have engaged in deceptive promises, but as the chronology presented by the plaintiffs in the third amended complaint [demonstrates], Signal was not a part of any deceptive promises‖ (Id. at p. 18); ―Signal did not promise the workers green cards, nor did they learn that this promise had been made by the recruiters until after the workers arrived at Signal[‘s] facilities‖ (Id. at p. 19); ―The Indian H2B workers did not have their passports or visas confiscated‖ (Id. at p. 38); and ―[i]n reviewing the thousands of Signal emails, I saw nothing in them reflecting any effort to economize on the workers or to shortchange them.‖ (Id. at p. 41.) These are just a few examples of many.
Because Dr. Shelley‘s opinions are limited to those related to the general characteristics of trafficking, such commentary on what the evidence establishes will not be allowed. To the extent that Dr. Shelley is going to opine that the facts of Chellen v. John Pickle Co., No. 02-cv85 (N.D. Okla. 2002) is consistent with other known or recognized cases of human trafficking, this is permissible. The fact that Chellen is not referred to in the pleadings or was a case brought prior to the passage of 18 U.S.C. § 1595 does not mean that Dr. Shelley cannot use this case in discussing the general characteristics of human trafficking.
c. Reliability and methodology The Plaintiffs next argue, ―[f]or many of her opinions, Dr. Shelley asks this Court to make ‗scientifically unsupported leaps of faith in the causal chain‘‖ (Doc. No. 73-1, p. 11) (quoting Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1202 (11th Cir. 2012)). The Plaintiffs
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identify two particular instances. First, they claim that Dr. Shelley supports her opinion that there was no trafficking in this case by erroneously drawing a conclusion from a report done by the Texas Task Force on Human Trafficking. (Doc. No. 73-1, p. 11.) Again, because Dr. Shelley will only be allowed to opine about the general characteristics of human trafficking, and not whether there was trafficking in this case, she will be precluded from drawing this conclusion.
The Plaintiffs next argue that Dr. Shelley opines that the food at the ―man camp‖ was ―adequate in quantity and was nutritional,‖ and she reached this opinion by ―eating at a commercial restaurant run by the caterers in New Orleans more than six years after the last Indian H-2B worker ate at the ‗man camp.‘‖ (Doc. No. 73-1, p. 12.) This is not the type of rigorous analysis that is required of an expert. Moreover, the quality of food at a restaurant in New Orleans, years later, is in no way indicative of the quality of food at the ―man camps.‖ Therefore, such an ―opinion‖ is improper. These are just two examples; Dr. Shelley offers numerous ―opinions‖ that are reached through a less than rigorous analysis.10 Because her testimony is limited to discussing the general features of human trafficking schemes, these portions of her report are no longer in the case. However, because her report is replete with these types of remarks, the undersigned reiterates that any testimony given by Dr. Shelley at trial must meet the requirements of Rule 702.
10. Dr. Shelley also opined, ―[e]xamining Slides 1, 2, and 3 of Signal‘s safety performance reveals that is has an extremely low rate of accidents.‖ (Doc. No. 73, Ex. C, p. 35.) As discussed above, reaching such a conclusion requires balancing Signal‘s safety record against identifiable standards. See infra III.A.b. Dr. Shelley has not done this. Likewise, she opines that: ―I saw a photo of Khuttan‘s welding test as compared to those of others and he was clearly an individual with inadequate or an absence of welding experience previously.‖ (Doc. No. 73, Ex. C, pp. 22–23.) Dr. Shelley is no way qualified to discuss the contents of a welding test, nor does she discuss how she reached the opinion that this Plaintiff had inadequate skills.
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d. Dr. Shelley improperly assesses the witnesses’ credibility The Plaintiffs also seek to strike portions of Dr. Shelley‘s report where she assesses the credibility of the witnesses. (Doc. No. 73-1, pp. 15–16.) Signal responds that Dr. Shelley is not passing on the witnesses‘ credibility, but rather, merely elucidating the bases for her opinions. The undersigned is not persuaded. (Doc. No. 88, p. 16.) Dr. Shelley spends several pages of her report evaluating the Plaintiffs‘ testimony. For example, she states that ―Kurian David‘s T-visa application is full of incorrect statements‖ (Doc. No. 73, Ex. C, p. 21); ―Hemant Khuttan‘s declaration raises many questions as to its veracity and the validity of his complaints‖ (Id. at 22); and she notes an alleged contradiction in Sony Vadusevan-Sulekha‘s statement by stating that ―the problem with his statement is that Signal never had any pictures of housing or residential facilities on its website. This is a fantasy not reality.‖ (Id. at p. 23.) The jury, without the assistance of Dr. Shelley, can evaluate whether the Plaintiffs are being truthful. Accordingly, such opinions are improper.
e. Conclusion Much of Dr. Shelley‘s report consists of impermissible legal conclusions, advocacy, assessment of the witnesses‘ credibility, and unreliable and unfounded opinions. However, Dr. Shelley does devote a few paragraphs of her report to discussing the elements of human trafficking generally, and she even opines that the Plaintiffs‘ expert does not identify all elements that are ―central to labor trafficking.‖ (Doc. No. 73, Ex. C, p. 35.) This portion of Dr. Shelley‘s report is acceptable; the remainder of Dr. Shelley‘s report is not. Therefore, for the reasons stated above, the Plaintiffs‘ ―Motion to Exclude the Testimony and Strike the Expert Report of Dr. Louise Shelley‖ (Doc. No. 73) is GRANTED IN PART. Dr. Shelley‘s testimony is limited to a discussion of the general elements and characteristics of
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human trafficking. She, however, may not opine on whether these Plaintiffs were victims of human trafficking, the credibility of the Plaintiffs, or offer her assessment of the facts of this case.
G. The Plaintiffs‘ ―Motion to Limit the Testimony of Enrique Gonzalez, III‖ (Doc. No. 72) Signal‘s expert, Enrique Gonzalez (―Gonzalez‖), an immigration lawyer, prepared a
report addressing ―various immigration issues.‖ (Doc. No. 80, Ex. A, p. 1.)11 The Plaintiffs moved to strike Gonzalez‘s opinion II and six other ―stray remarks.‖ (Doc. No. 72-1, pp. 4–7.) Signal responded by arguing that Gonzalez was not ―retained to provide an opinion on plaintiffs‘ conduct in this case and concedes that he will not testify at trial to any individual plaintiffs‘ conduct, nor that of any plaintiffs collectively.‖ (Doc. No. 80, p. 1.) Signal, however, claims that Gonzalez‘s opinion II is ―essential for the development of [his] subsequent opinions regarding Burnett.‖ (Id. at pp. 1–2.)
a. Due to the severance and transfer of Signal’s cross-claims, Gonzalez’s Opinion II is no longer relevant
The Plaintiffs move to strike Gonzalez‘s Opinion II, which is: ―Foreign nationals [seeking an H-2B visa] are considered to have committed immigration fraud if they deliberately conceal their intent to remain permanently in the United States from a U.S. consular or immigration officer.‖ (Id. at p. 20.) There is no cause of action in this case that centers on whether the Plaintiffs committed immigration fraud. While Signal may argue that the Plaintiffs in fact concealed their true intent, there is no need for expert testimony opining as to whether this amounts to immigration fraud. Moreover, the undersigned is persuaded that such testimony from
11. The Plaintiffs attached three versions of Gonzalez‘s report, but do not argue that one version is the operative report for this case. (Doc. No. 72, Ex. A.) In turn, Signal attaches the report that appears to be drafted specifically for this case. (Doc. No. 80, Ex. A.) Accordingly, unless otherwise stated, any citations to Gonzalez‘s report are to this version.
29

Case 1:13-cv-00497-MAC-ZJH Document 103 Filed 06/26/15 Page 30 of 35 PageID #: 3243
an expert could easily be construed by a jury that these Plaintiffs in fact committed immigration fraud, and therefore, has significant potential to confuse the jury.
Signal‘s primary argument that Opinion II should not be struck is that it is ―essential for the development of Gonzalez‘s subsequent opinions regarding Burnett.‖ (Doc. No. 80, pp. 1–2.) These subsequent opinions relate to Signal‘s cross-claims against Burnett that have been transferred to the Eastern District of Louisiana and, as such, are no longer a part of this case.12 Accordingly, the undersigned strikes Opinion II because it is irrelevant.
b. Other “stray remarks” are inadmissible The Plaintiffs also move to exclude six other ―stray remarks‖ that they claim are aimed at them and are impermissible. Two examples are illustrative. First, Gonzalez states: ―The intent by the foreign nationals and other companies was for the workers to remain in the U.S. permanently.‖ (Doc. No. 80, Ex. A, p. 12.) Second, by ―counseling foreign nationals to lie to immigration officers about their intent to remain in the U.S., Mr. Burnett, as well as the foreign nationals, knowingly committed immigration fraud.‖ (Id. at p. 13.) It appears that Gonzalez is inferring that the Plaintiffs committed these acts, even though Gonzalez unequivocally testified that he is not offering any opinions on the Plaintiffs‘ conduct. (Doc. No. 72, Ex. B, 191:6–13.) There is simply no other way to interpret his assertion that ―the foreign nationals‖ (i.e., the Plaintiffs) ―knowingly committed immigration fraud‖ by allegedly lying about their intent. Therefore, to prevent any unnecessary confusion that Gonzalez is opining about the Plaintiffs‘ conduct, these remarks are struck.
12. No party moved to exclude Gonzalez‘s Opinions III-V. Therefore, the undersigned expresses no opinion on whether these opinions meet Rule 702‘s ―helpfulness‖ requirement.
30

Case 1:13-cv-00497-MAC-ZJH Document 103 Filed 06/26/15 Page 31 of 35 PageID #: 3244
c. Conclusion The Plaintiffs‘ ―Motion to Limit the Testimony of Enrique Gonzalez, III‖ (Doc. No. 72) is GRANTED. Gonzalez‘s Opinion II and the six ―stray remarks‖ identified by the Plaintiffs are struck. H. Signal‘s ―Motion in Limine to Exclude/Limit Testimony of Amy Mowl‖ (Doc. No. 76) Signal moves to exclude or limit the testimony of the Plaintiffs‘ expert, Amy Mowl. (Doc. No. 76.) Mowl is an economist, and is currently on the faculty of the Institute for Financial Management and Research Business School in Chennai, India. The Plaintiffs designated Mowl to provide ―a culturally specific, socio-economic context to assist the jury in understanding the nature of the debts incurred by Plaintiffs in India to pay hefty recruitment fees charged by Defendants.‖ (Doc. No. 86, p. 1.) Signal seeks to exclude or limit Mowl‘s testimony on three grounds: (1) she makes impermissible credibility determinations; (2) her testimony regarding suicide must be limited; and (3) ―Mowl uses insufficient information and unreliable principles or methods in forming her opinions.‖ (Doc. No. 76.)
a. Credibility Determination Signal argues that Mowl passes on the credibility of the Plaintiffs‘ statements, and that her ―opinions impermissibly regurgitate[] the Plaintiffs‘ testimony stamped with the imprimatur of her expertise.‖ (Doc. No. 76, p. 5.) The undersigned disagrees with Signal‘s characterization of Mowl‘s approach. Mowl testified that she received sworn statements made by the Plaintiffs, and because they were sworn, assumed they were true. (Id., Ex. B, 46:19–47:16.) In addition, when questioned about whether she examined the truthfulness of the Plaintiffs‘ statements, she said she did not because they were consistent with what she knows about Indian finance products. (Id.) This is not the same as opining that the statements are in fact true.
31

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Signal attempts to argue that Mowl‘s opinions are similar to ones that were struck in Elat v. Ngoubene. (Doc. No. 76, p. 5.) In Elat, the expert weighed two competing sets of facts, and concluded that the plaintiff‘s version of the facts was more credible than the defendants‘. Elat, 993 F. Supp. 2d at 513–14 (noting that the expert‘s ―evaluation of the truthfulness of Plaintiff‘s version of the underlying events as compared to Defendants‘ is little different from the way that juries themselves determine credibility from conflicting testimony‖). The expert then used the plaintiff‘s version of the facts as the basis for her opinion. Id. Mowl did not undertake such an analysis. She merely took the plaintiffs‘ statements at face value and felt she could because they were consistent with what she expected based on her experience. This is the same as forming an opinion based on documents produced in discovery.
b. Testimony regarding suicide13 To illustrate the effect that debts can have on people in India, Mowl discusses a recent wave of suicides by Indian farm workers. (Doc. No. 76, Ex. A, pp. 15–18.) Signal seeks to exclude this part of Mowl‘s report on two grounds. First, Signal argues that her sources are faulty. Mowl‘s sources were Indian newspapers. Signal has pointed to no reason why the reliability or truthfulness of these sources should be doubted. Moreover, this type of challenge goes to the weight that the fact finder should ascribe to the opinions, not their admissibility. See 14.38 Acres of Land, 80 F.3d at 1077 (―As a general rule, questions relating to the bases and sources of an expert‘s opinion affect the weight to be assigned that opinion rather than its admissibility and should be left for the jury‘s consideration.‖). Second, Signal claims that Mowl has not offered any form of ―peer-reviewed or other authoritative source‖ showing that suicide rates amongst the farming community are relevant or 13. Signal did not argue that such testimony may be unfairly prejudicial. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
32

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similar to those amongst the non-farming community. (Doc. No. 76, p. 6); see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–93 (noting that one of the indicia of reliability is whether the expert‘s theory or technique has been subject to peer review). While courts have struck expert testimony when there is too large of an analytic gap, the undersigned does not find that such a gap exists here. See also Pipitone, 288 F.3d at 244 (discussing that ―the factors identified in Daubert may or may not pertinent in assessing reliability‖). Mowl does not need to show a direct correlation between farm worker and non-farm worker suicide rates to draw an analogy. Furthermore, Signal has pointed to no studies that Mowl has ignored, and the undersigned finds it unlikely that such studies have ever been conducted.
c. Sufficiency of information and reliability of principles Signal next argues that Mowl has not reviewed sufficient information. Signal faults her for ―not consider[ing] the pay data produced by Signal as part of its ESI productions,‖ ―failing to request any banking records,‖ and not reviewing the deposition of Sachin Dewan. (Doc. No. 76, pp. 6–7.) The undersigned‘s role, however, is to ensure that expert testimony is ―based on sufficient facts or data‖—not to ensure that an expert left no stone unturned. FED. R. EVID. 702. Here, after reviewing her report, the undersigned finds that Mowl has met this threshold. Mowl lists over forty sources that she considered in drafting her report. Also, a review of her deposition shows that she had cogent reasons for choosing not to review certain sources. Furthermore, an argument that an expert ―did not review sufficient facts and data goes to the weight of [its] opinion, to be brought out in cross-examination and resolved by the jury, not to admissibility.‖ Suzion Wind Energy Corp. v. Shippers Stevedoring Co., 662 F. Supp. 2d 623, 667 (S.D. Tex. 2009).
33

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d. Conclusion
Accordingly, Signal‘s ―Motion in Limine to Exclude/Limit Testimony of Amy Mowl‖
(Doc. No. 76) is DENIED.
IV. Conclusion
The undersigned finds as follows:
 The Plaintiffs‘ ―Motion to Exclude the Testimony and Strike the Expert Report of Ronald J. McAlear‖ (Doc. No. 70) is GRANTED IN PART. McAlear may testify about general industry practices and opine as to whether Signal‘s practices are consistent with these customs. However, McAlear may not opine that Signal is a safe company or has an ―exemplary safety record‖;
 The Plaintiffs‘ ―Motion to Exclude the Testimony and Strike the Expert Report of Kevin Fox Gotham‖ (Doc. 77) is GRANTED IN PART. Dr. Gotham may opine about the state of housing in the Gulf Coast region in general and the correlation between available housing and attracting skilled workers (opinions A through D). However, opinions E and F are struck, and he may not opine as to whether there was ―an acute‖ housing shortage in Orange, Texas, why Signal built the ―man camp,‖ whether the Plaintiffs were required or coerced into living at the ―man camp,‖ or whether the ―man camp‖ actually benefited the Plaintiffs;
 Signal‘s ―Motion to Exclude the Opinion Testimony of Clyde Payne‖ (Doc. No. 68) is GRANTED;
 The Plaintiffs‘ ―Motion to Exclude the Testimony and Strike the Report of Ronald L. Signorino‖ (Doc. No. 71) is GRANTED;
 Signal‘s ―Motion in Limine to Exclude/Limit Testimony of Florence Burke‖ (Doc. No. 69) is GRANTED IN PART. Burke‘s opinions shall be limited to those related to general characteristics of human trafficking schemes, and Burke is precluded from testifying as to whether these Plaintiffs were victims of human trafficking or in what ways the facts of this case are similar to other known cases of human trafficking;
 The Plaintiffs‘ ―Motion to Exclude the Testimony and Strike the Expert Report of Dr. Louise Shelley‖ (Doc. No. 73) is GRANTED IN PART. Dr. Shelley‘s testimony is limited to a discussion of the general elements and characteristics of human trafficking, and she may not opine on whether these Plaintiffs were victims of human trafficking, the credibility of the Plaintiffs, or offer her assessment of the facts of this case;
34

Case 1:13-cv-00497-MAC-ZJH Document 103 Filed 06/26/15 Page 35 of 35 PageID #: 3248  The Plaintiffs‘ ―Motion to Limit the Testimony of Enrique Gonzalez, III‖ (Doc. No. 72) is GRANTED. Opinion II and the six other identified ―stray remarks‖ identified by the Plaintiffs are struck;  Signal‘s ―Motion in Limine to Exclude/Limit Testimony of Amy Mowl‖ (Doc. No. 76) is DENIED. SIGNED this 26th day of June, 2015. _________________________ Zack Hawthorn United States Magistrate Judge
35

 
 Case 1:13-cv-00497-MAC-ZJH Document 109 Filed 11/08/16 Page 1 of 5 PageID #: 3362

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS BEAUMONT DIVISION

*

RAJU MEGANATHAN, et al.,

*

Plaintiffs

*

*

v.

*

*

SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL, L.L.C., et al., *

Defendants

*

*

Civil Action No. 1:13-cv-00497-MAC-ZJH

STATUS REPORT

Plaintiffs and Signal International, LLC, and certain of its affiliates (the “Signal

Entities”), in accordance with the Court’s Order Staying Case Pursuant to Bankruptcy [Dkt. No.

335] requiring the parties to file a notice informing the Court of the status of the Signal

bankruptcy proceedings, hereby file this Status Report as of November 8, 2016.

As noted in Plaintiffs’ and the Signal Entities’ prior notice, the Signal Entities filed

voluntary petitions for relief under Chapter 11 of Title 11 of the United States Code on July 12, 2015. In re Signal Int’l, Inc, et al., No. 15-11498 (Bankr. D. Del. July 12, 2015).1 Prior to the

Signal Entities’ bankruptcy filings, the Plaintiffs, the Signal Entities, and certain other civil

plaintiffs entered into a certain plan support agreement (the “PSA”), which contemplates, among

other things, a settlement of the Plaintiffs’ claims against the Signal Entities through a

consensual chapter 11 plan proposed by the Signal Entities. On November 24, 2015, the

Bankruptcy Court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Confirming

1 The other entities are: Signal Ship Repair, LLC (Case No. 15-11499), Signal Int’l, LLC (Case No. 15-11500), Signal Int’l Texas GP, LLC (Case No. 15-11501), and Signal Int’l Texas, L.P. (Case No. 15-11502). By the bankruptcy court’s order, all five cases are being jointly administered with the Signal Int’l, Inc. case. In re Signal Int’l, Inc., No. 15-11498 (Bankr. D. Del. July 14, 2015), ECF No. 55.

EAST\136497739.1

Case 1:13-cv-00497-MAC-ZJH Document 109 Filed 11/08/16 Page 2 of 5 PageID #: 3363
Debtors’ First Amended Joint Plan of Liquidation Pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code [ECF No. 555] (the “Confirmation Order”), confirming the Signal Entities’ plan of liquidation, which implemented the plan support agreement among the Plaintiffs, the Signal Entities and certain other parties, for the settlement of, inter alia, the Plaintiffs’ claims against the relevant Signal Entities. Pursuant to the Plan, a litigation trust (the “Signal Litigation Trust”) has been created for the distribution of the settlement proceeds. That process remains ongoing, as the Signal Litigation Trust distributed Trust Claim Forms in February and the Plaintiffs have submitted their claim forms.
The Plan became effective on December 14, 2015. As of that date, pursuant to the Confirmation Order, “any suit, legal action, or other proceeding … in any forum in the United States that is released, stayed, or enjoined pursuant to Article XI of the Plan against or affecting any Released Party [the Signal Entities], shall be stayed, enjoined or otherwise prohibited from continuation as to any Released Party.” (Confirmation Order at 25.)
In light of Signal Entities’ ongoing bankruptcy cases, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the stay remain in effect. This report has been approved by counsel for all parties. The parties will file a further status update in 120 days.
Respectfully submitted, this 8th day of November, 2016.
EAST\136497739.1 2

Case 1:13-cv-00497-MAC-ZJH Document 109 Filed 11/08/16 Page 3 of 5 PageID #: 3364

Respectfully submitted, this 8th day of November, 2016.

/s/ Timothy H. Birnbaum Timothy H. Birnbaum (pro hac vice) Michael D. Hynes (pro hac vice)
DLA PIPER LLP (US) 1251 Avenue of the Americas New York, New York 10020-1104 Telephone: (212) 335-4618 Facsimile: (917) 778-8618 timothy.birnbaum@dlapiper.com michael.hynes@dlapiper.com
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS

/s/ Erin Casey Hangartner (w/exp. permission) Erin Casey Hangartner (La. Bar No. 24768) Alan Dean Weinberger (La. Bar No. 13331) Elham R. Rabbani (La. Bar No. 33322) Brian C. Roux (La. Bar No. 35298) Lance R. Rydberg (La. Bar No. 02089) Mitchell P. Hasenkampf (La. Ba No. 32870) Robert L. Keller III (La. Bar No. 35188) Lauren Masur Davis (La. Bar No. 34669)
HANGARTNER RYDBERG & TERRELL, LLC 701 Poydras Street, Suite 310 New Orleans, Louisiana 70139 Telephone: (504) 522-5690 Facsimile: (504) 522-5689 ehangartner@hanrylaw.com aweinberger@hanrylaw.com erabbani@hanrylaw.com broux@hanrylaw.com lrydberg@hanrylaw.com mhasenkampf@hanrylaw.com rkeller@hanrylaw.com lmasur@hanrylaw.com

and

Patricia A. Bollman (La. Bar No. 17563) James L. Cornblatt (pro hac vice)

PATRICIA A. BOLLMAN, A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION 3636 S. I-10 Service Road W., Suite 200 Metairie, Louisiana 70001 Telephone: (504) 218-5887 Facsimile: (504) 304-0890 patricia@bollmanfirm.com cornblatt25@gmail.com

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL, L.L.C., SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL, INC., SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL TEXAS, G.P., and SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL TEXAS, L.P.

EAST\136497739.1 3

Case 1:13-cv-00497-MAC-ZJH Document 109 Filed 11/08/16 Page 4 of 5 PageID #: 3365 /s/ Timothy W. Cerniglia (w/exp. permission) Timothy W. Cerniglia (Tex. Bar 00789930) TIMOTHY W. CERNIGLIA, PLC 1521 St. Charles Avenue New Orleans, Louisiana 70130 Telephone: (504) 586-0555 Facsimile: (504) 586-0550 tcerniglia@cerniglialaw.pro ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS MALVERN C. BURNETT, THE LAW OFFICES OF MALVERN C. BURNETT, A.P.C., and THE GULF COAST IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER, LLC
EAST\136497739.1 4

Case 1:13-cv-00497-MAC-ZJH Document 109 Filed 11/08/16 Page 5 of 5 PageID #: 3366

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on November 8, 2016, I electronically filed the foregoing Status
Report with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will automatically send e-mail
notification of such filing to all ECF participants.
I further certify that on November 8, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document upon the below-named Defendants by depositing a copy of same in the U.S.
Mail, with sufficient postage thereon to insure delivery, and properly addressed as follows:
Michael Pol Global Resources, Inc. c/o William P. Wessler, Esq. William P. Wessler, Attorney at Law 1624 24th Avenue Gulfport, MS 39501-2969 Mr. Billy Wilks 9136 Heather Lane Moss Point, MS 39562

DLA Piper LLP (US) 1251 Avenue of the Americas New York, New York 10020-1104 Telephone: (212) 335-4618 Facsimile: (917)-778-8618 timothy.birnbaum@dlapiper.com

By: s/ Timothy H. Birnbaum Timothy H. Birnbaum
Attorney for Plaintiffs

EAST\136497739.1 5

 
 Case: 1:13-cv-497 As of: 11/06/2017 12:39 PM CST 1 of 23
CASREF,JURY,PROTECTIVE−ORDER,STAYED
U.S. District Court [LIVE] Eastern District of TEXAS (Beaumont) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:13−cv−00497−MAC−ZJH

Meganathan et al v. Signal International L.L.C. et al Assigned to: Judge Marcia A. Crone Referred to: Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn Related Cases: 1:13−cv−00323−MAC−ZJH
1:13−cv−00324−RC−ZJH Cause: 18:1964 Racketeering (RICO) Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 08/07/2013 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 890 Other Statutory Actions Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Raju Meganathan

represented by Joshua Samuel Sohn DLA Piper LLP (US) − NY 1251 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10020 212.335.4500 Fax: 212.335.4501 Email: joshua.sohn@dlapiper.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael D Hynes DLA Piper LLP (US) − NY 1251 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10020 212.335.4942 Fax: 212.884.8642 Email: michael.hynes@dlapiper.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brett David Solberg DLA Piper USA LLP−Houston 1000 Louisiana Suite 2800 Houston, TX 77002−5005 713−425−8482 Fax: 713−425−8401 Email: brett.solberg@dlapiper.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Timothy H Birnbaum DLA Piper LLP (US) − NY 1251 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10020 212/335−4500 Fax: 212/335−4501 Email: timothy.birnbaum@dlapiper.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John Blake Dodson DLA Piper LLP (US) − NY 1251 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10020 212−335−4577 Fax: 917−778−8577 Email: john.dodson@dlapiper.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

Case: 1:13-cv-497 As of: 11/06/2017 12:39 PM CST 2 of 23

Saravanachlevan Narayanasamy

represented by Joshua Samuel Sohn (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael D Hynes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brett David Solberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Timothy H Birnbaum (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John Blake Dodson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Saravanan Ramasamy

represented by Joshua Samuel Sohn (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael D Hynes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brett David Solberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Timothy H Birnbaum (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John Blake Dodson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Maruthamuthu Mayavu

represented by Joshua Samuel Sohn (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael D Hynes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brett David Solberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Timothy H Birnbaum (See above for address)

Case: 1:13-cv-497 As of: 11/06/2017 12:39 PM CST 3 of 23
PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John Blake Dodson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Signal International L.L.C.

represented by Jonathan Marc Herman Middleberg Riddle & Gianna − Dallas 717 North Harwood Suite 2400 Dallas, TX 75201 214/220−6326 Fax: 214/220−2785 Email: jherman@midrid.com TERMINATED: 04/04/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alan Dean Weinberger Hangartner, Rydberg, Terrell & Hart, LLC One Shell Square 701 Poydras Street, Suite 310 New Orleans, LA 70139 504.522.5690 Email: aweinberger@hanrylaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brian Christopher Roux Hangartner, Rydberg, Terrell & Hart, LLC One Shell Square 701 Poydras Street, Suite 310 New Orleans, LA 70139 504.522.5690 Fax: 504.522.5689 Email: broux@hanrylaw.com TERMINATED: 11/29/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elham R Rabbani Hangartner, Rydberg, Terrell & Hart, LLC One Shell Square 701 Poydras Street, Suite 310 New Orleans, LA 70139 (504) 522−5690 Fax: (504) 522−5689 Email: erabbani@hanrylaw.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Erin Casey Hangartner Hangartner, Rydberg, Terrell & Hart, LLC One Shell Square 701 Poydras Street, Suite 310 New Orleans, LA 70139 (504) 522−5690 Fax: (504) 522−5689 Email: ehangartner@hanrylaw.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-497 As of: 11/06/2017 12:39 PM CST 4 of 23
Hal D Ungar Hangartner, Rydberg, Terrell & Hart, LLC One Shell Square 701 Poydras Street, Suite 310 New Orleans, LA 70139 (504) 522−5690 Fax: (504) 522−5689 Email: hungar@hanrylaw.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James L Cornblatt Patricia A Bollman, APLC 3636 S Interstate 10 Service Rd W Metarie, LA 70001 504.218.5887 Email: jcornblatt25@gmail.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kevin Patrick Maney Hangartner, Rydberg, Terrell & Hart, LLC One Shell Square 701 Poydras Street, Suite 310 New Orleans, LA 70139 504.522.5690 Fax: 504.522.5689 Email: kmaney@hanrylaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lance R Rydberg Hangartner, Rydberg, Terrell & Hart, LLC One Shell Square 701 Poydras Street, Suite 310 New Orleans, LA 70139 504.522.5690 Fax: 504.522.5689 Email: lrydberg@hanrylaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren Masur Davis Hangartner, Rydberg, Terrell & Hart, LLC One Shell Square 701 Poydras Street, Suite 310 New Orleans, LA 70139 504.522.5690 Fax: 504.522.5689 Email: lmasur@hanrylaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mitchell P Hasenkampf Hangartner, Rydberg, Terrell & Hart, LLC One Shell Square 701 Poydras Street, Suite 310 New Orleans, LA 70139 504.522.5690 Fax: 504.522.5689 Email: mhasenkampf@hanrylaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Bollman Patricia A Bollman, APLC PO Box 13707 New Orleans, LA 70185 504.218.5887 Fax: 504.304.0890

Case: 1:13-cv-497 As of: 11/06/2017 12:39 PM CST 5 of 23

Email: patricia@bollmanfirm.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert L Keller , II Hangartner, Rydberg, Terrell & Hart, LLC One Shell Square 701 Poydras Street, Suite 310 New Orleans, LA 70139 504.522.5690 Fax: 504.522.5689 Email: rkeller@hanrylaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Signal International, Inc.

represented by Jonathan Marc Herman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/04/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alan Dean Weinberger (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brian Christopher Roux (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/29/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elham R Rabbani (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Erin Casey Hangartner (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Hal D Ungar (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James L Cornblatt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kevin Patrick Maney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lance R Rydberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren Masur Davis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mitchell P Hasenkampf (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-497 As of: 11/06/2017 12:39 PM CST 6 of 23

Patricia Bollman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert L Keller , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Signal International Texas, G.P.

represented by Jonathan Marc Herman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/04/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alan Dean Weinberger (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brian Christopher Roux (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/29/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elham R Rabbani (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Erin Casey Hangartner (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Hal D Ungar (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James L Cornblatt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kevin Patrick Maney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lance R Rydberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren Masur Davis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mitchell P Hasenkampf (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Bollman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert L Keller , II

Case: 1:13-cv-497 As of: 11/06/2017 12:39 PM CST 7 of 23

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Signal International Texas, L.P.

represented by Jonathan Marc Herman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/04/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alan Dean Weinberger (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brian Christopher Roux (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/29/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elham R Rabbani (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Erin Casey Hangartner (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Hal D Ungar (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James L Cornblatt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kevin Patrick Maney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lance R Rydberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren Masur Davis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mitchell P Hasenkampf (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Bollman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert L Keller , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Malvern C. Burnett

represented by

Case: 1:13-cv-497 As of: 11/06/2017 12:39 PM CST 8 of 23

Timothy W Cerniglia Timothy W. Cerniglia, PLC 1521 St Charles Ave New Orleans, LA 70130 504−586−0555 Fax: 504−586−0550 Email: tcerniglia@cerniglialaw.pro LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C.

represented by Timothy W Cerniglia (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C.

represented by Timothy W Cerniglia (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Michael Pol

Defendant Global Resources, Inc.

Defendant Sachin Dewan

Defendant
Dewan Consultants Pvt. Ltd. also known as Medtech Consultants

Cross Claimant Signal International Texas, G.P.

represented by Jonathan Marc Herman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/04/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alan Dean Weinberger (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brian Christopher Roux (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/29/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elham R Rabbani (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Erin Casey Hangartner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Hal D Ungar

Case: 1:13-cv-497 As of: 11/06/2017 12:39 PM CST 9 of 23

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James L Cornblatt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kevin Patrick Maney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lance R Rydberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren Masur Davis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mitchell P Hasenkampf (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Bollman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert L Keller , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cross Claimant Signal International, Inc.

represented by Jonathan Marc Herman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/04/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alan Dean Weinberger (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brian Christopher Roux (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/29/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elham R Rabbani (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Erin Casey Hangartner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Hal D Ungar (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James L Cornblatt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kevin Patrick Maney

Case: 1:13-cv-497 As of: 11/06/2017 12:39 PM CST 10 of 23

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lance R Rydberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren Masur Davis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mitchell P Hasenkampf (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Bollman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert L Keller , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cross Claimant Signal International L.L.C.

represented by Jonathan Marc Herman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/04/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alan Dean Weinberger (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brian Christopher Roux (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/29/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elham R Rabbani (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Erin Casey Hangartner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Hal D Ungar (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James L Cornblatt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kevin Patrick Maney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lance R Rydberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren Masur Davis

Case: 1:13-cv-497 As of: 11/06/2017 12:39 PM CST 11 of 23

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mitchell P Hasenkampf (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Bollman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert L Keller , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cross Claimant Signal International Texas, L.P.

represented by Jonathan Marc Herman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/04/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alan Dean Weinberger (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brian Christopher Roux (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/29/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elham R Rabbani (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Erin Casey Hangartner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Hal D Ungar (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James L Cornblatt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kevin Patrick Maney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lance R Rydberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren Masur Davis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mitchell P Hasenkampf (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Bollman

Case: 1:13-cv-497 As of: 11/06/2017 12:39 PM CST 12 of 23
(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert L Keller , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Cross Defendant Malvern C. Burnett TERMINATED: 06/17/2015
Cross Defendant Sachin Dewan TERMINATED: 06/17/2015
Cross Defendant Dewan Consultants Pvt. Ltd. TERMINATED: 06/17/2015
Cross Defendant Global Resources, Inc. TERMINATED: 06/17/2015
Cross Defendant Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C. TERMINATED: 06/17/2015
Cross Defendant Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C. TERMINATED: 06/17/2015
Cross Defendant Michael Pol TERMINATED: 06/17/2015

represented by Timothy W Cerniglia (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Timothy W Cerniglia (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Timothy W Cerniglia (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 08/07/2013
08/07/2013 08/07/2013 08/08/2013

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against All Defendants ( Filing fee $ 400 receipt number 0540−4255184.), filed by Raju Meganathan, Saravanan Ramasamy, Maruthamuthu Mayavu, Saravanachlevan Narayanasamy. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − RICO Fraud Chart, # 2 Civil Cover Sheet)(Dodson, John) (Entered: 08/07/2013)
Case Assigned to Judge Marcia A. Crone. (aam, ) (Entered: 08/08/2013)
DEMAND for Trial by Jury by Maruthamuthu Mayavu, Raju Meganathan, Saravanachlevan Narayanasamy and Saravanan Ramasamy. (aam, ) (Entered: 08/08/2013)
In accordance with the provisions of 28 USC Section 636(c), you are hereby notified that a U.S. Magistrate Judge of this district court is available to conduct any or all proceedings in this case including a jury or non−jury trial and to order the entry of a

Case: 1:13-cv-497 As of: 11/06/2017 12:39 PM CST 13 of 23

08/08/2013 08/12/2013 08/14/2013 08/20/2013 09/09/2013 09/09/2013 09/09/2013 09/09/2013 09/09/2013 09/10/2013
09/10/2013
09/10/2013

final judgment. The form Consent to Proceed Before Magistrate Judge is available on our website. All signed consent forms, excluding pro se parties, should be filed electronically using the event Notice of Consent to Proceed Before Magistrate Judge. (aam, ) (Entered: 08/08/2013)
2 ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn to conduct all pretrial proceedings. Signed by Judge Marcia A. Crone on 8/8/13. (mrp, ) (Entered: 08/09/2013)
3 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Timothy H Birnbaum on behalf of Maruthamuthu Mayavu, Raju Meganathan, Saravanachlevan Narayanasamy, Saravanan Ramasamy. Filing fee paid in the amount of $ 100.00, receipt no. 0540−4263112. (dlc, ) (Entered: 08/13/2013)
4 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Joshua Samuel Sohn on behalf of All Plaintiffs. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4265921. (Sohn, Joshua) (Entered: 08/14/2013)
5 SUMMONS Issued as to Malvern C. Burnett, Global Resources, Inc., Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C., Michael Pol, Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., and Signal International, Inc. and emailed to plas' atty for service (aam, ) (Entered: 08/20/2013)
6 ***STRICKEN PER STANDING ORDER MC−12. PLEASE IGNORE.*** Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Responsive Pleadings by Signal International L.L.C.. (Herman, Jonathan) Modified on 9/9/2013 (bjc, ). (Entered: 09/09/2013)
7 ***STRICKEN PER STANDING ORDER MC−12. PLEASE IGNORE.*** Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Responsive Pleadings by Signal International Texas, G.P.. (Herman, Jonathan) Modified on 9/9/2013 (bjc, ). (Entered: 09/09/2013)
8 ***STRICKEN PER STANDING ORDER MC−12. PLEASE IGNORE.*** Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Responsive Pleadings by Signal International Texas, L.P.. (Herman, Jonathan) Modified on 9/9/2013 (bjc, ). (Entered: 09/09/2013)
9 ***STRICKEN PER STANDING ORDER MC−12. PLEASE IGNORE.*** Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Responsive Pleadings by Signal International, Inc.. (Herman, Jonathan) Modified on 9/9/2013 (bjc, ). (Entered: 09/09/2013)
***Documents 6,7,8 and 9 have been stricken in violation of Standing Order MC−12. Attorney has been notified and will file motions for extension of time.***
(bjc) (Entered: 09/09/2013)
10 MOTION to Dismiss pursuant to FRCP 12(B)(2) by Malvern C. Burnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Affidavit, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Cerniglia, Timothy) Modified on 9/10/2013 (bjc, ). (Entered: 09/10/2013)
11 MOTION to Dismiss pursuant to FRCP 12(B)(6) by Malvern C. Burnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 2 − La. Complaint, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Cerniglia, Timothy) Modified on 9/10/2013 (bjc, ). (Entered: 09/10/2013)
12 MOTION to Change Venue by Malvern C. Burnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Venue Motion, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Cerniglia, Timothy) (Entered: 09/10/2013)

Case: 1:13-cv-497 As of: 11/06/2017 12:39 PM CST 14 of 23

09/11/2013 09/11/2013 09/20/2013
09/20/2013

13 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Responsive Pleadings by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Herman, Jonathan) (Entered: 09/11/2013)
ORAL ORDER granting 13 Motion for Extension of Time to File. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 9/11/13. (zjh1) (Entered: 09/11/2013)
14 ***FILED IN ERROR. PLEASE IGNORE.*** Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Defendant Burnett's Motions to Dismiss and to Transfer Venue, and Anticipated Motions by Defendant Signal by Maruthamuthu Mayavu, Raju Meganathan, Saravanachlevan Narayanasamy, Saravanan Ramasamy. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Sohn, Joshua) Modified on 9/20/2013 (bjc, ). (Entered: 09/20/2013)
***FILED IN ERROR. Document # 14, motion for extension of time. No certificate of service. PLEASE IGNORE. Atty will refile.***

10/11/2013 10/11/2013 10/11/2013
10/15/2013 11/12/2013 11/12/2013 11/15/2013 11/15/2013 11/15/2013

(bjc) (Entered: 09/20/2013)
15 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply in Opposition to Defendant Burnett's Motions to Dismiss and to Transfer Venue, and Anticipated Motions by Defendant Signal by Maruthamuthu Mayavu, Raju Meganathan, Saravanachlevan Narayanasamy, Saravanan Ramasamy. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Sohn, Joshua) (Entered: 10/11/2013)
16 First MOTION to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. Responses due by 10/25/2013 (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss)(Herman, Jonathan) (Entered: 10/11/2013)
17 First MOTION to Change Venue Pursuant to First−Filed Rule by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Southern Poverty Law Center. # 2 Exhibit Consent to Sue. # 3 Proposed Order (Herman, Jonathan) Modified on 10/15/2013 (mrp, ). (Entered: 10/11/2013)
ORAL ORDER granting 15 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 10/15/13. (zjh1) (Entered: 10/15/2013)
18 ORDER to Conduct Rule 26(f) Conference with a proposed Scheduling Order. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 11/12/13. (mrp, ) (Entered: 11/13/2013)
19 ADVISORY ORDER. This case is assigned for trial to Judge Marcia A. Crone, and is referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for pretrial proceedings. Judge Crone's procedures and rules of practice govern this action unless the parties consent to proceed before the Magistrate Judge. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 11/12/13. (mrp, ) (Entered: 11/13/2013)
20 RESPONSE in Opposition re 10 MOTION to Dismiss pursuant to FRCP 12(B)(2) of Burnett Defendants filed by Maruthamuthu Mayavu, Raju Meganathan, Saravanachlevan Narayanasamy, Saravanan Ramasamy. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Sohn, Joshua) (Entered: 11/15/2013)
21 RESPONSE in Opposition re 11 MOTION to Dismiss pursuant to FRCP 12(B)(6) of Legal Facilitator Defendants filed by Maruthamuthu Mayavu, Raju Meganathan, Saravanachlevan Narayanasamy, Saravanan Ramasamy. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Sohn, Joshua) (Entered: 11/15/2013)
22 RESPONSE in Opposition re 12 MOTION to Change Venue of Burnett Defendants filed by Maruthamuthu Mayavu, Raju Meganathan, Saravanachlevan Narayanasamy, Saravanan Ramasamy. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Sohn, Joshua) (Entered: 11/15/2013)

Case: 1:13-cv-497 As of: 11/06/2017 12:39 PM CST 15 of 23

11/15/2013 11/15/2013 11/18/2013 11/18/2013 01/02/2014 01/13/2014 01/13/2014 01/30/2014 02/13/2014 02/18/2014
04/03/2014 04/04/2014 04/22/2014 05/23/2014 05/23/2014 05/23/2014

23 RESPONSE in Opposition re 16 First MOTION to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) of Signal Defendants filed by Maruthamuthu Mayavu, Raju Meganathan, Saravanachlevan Narayanasamy, Saravanan Ramasamy. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Sohn, Joshua) (Entered: 11/15/2013)
24 RESPONSE in Opposition re 17 First MOTION to Change Venue Pursuant to First−Filed Rule of Signal Defendants filed by Maruthamuthu Mayavu, Raju Meganathan, Saravanachlevan Narayanasamy, Saravanan Ramasamy. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Sohn, Joshua) (Entered: 11/15/2013)
25 PROTECTIVE ORDER. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 11/18/13. (mrp, ) (Entered: 11/18/2013)
26 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Erin Casey Hangartner on behalf of Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4408224. (Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 11/18/2013)
27 NOTICE of Change of Address by Erin Casey Hangartner (Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 01/02/2014)
28 REPORT of Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Complaint)(Sohn, Joshua) (Entered: 01/13/2014)
NOTICE of Hearing: Scheduling Conference set for 1/28/2014 10:00 AM in Ctrm 4 (Beaumont) before Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn. (ttp, ) (Entered: 01/13/2014)
NOTICE of Hearing: Telephonic Scheduling Conference set for 2/13/2014 10:30 AM before Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn. (ttp, ) (Entered: 01/30/2014)
29 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn: Scheduling Conference held on 2/13/2014. (DCR Op: Piper, T.) (ttp, ) (Entered: 02/18/2014)
30 SCHEDULING ORDER: Docket call is set for 8/7/15 at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom #3 before Judge Marcia A. Crone. Case will be set for Final Pretrial Conference and Trial at the docket call. Amended Pleadings due by 5/12/2014. Discovery due by 12/15/2014. Motions due by 1/15/2015. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 2/18/14. (mrp, ) (Entered: 02/18/2014)
31 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney Jonathan M. Herman and Middleberg Riddle Group by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Herman, Jonathan) (Entered: 04/03/2014)
ORAL ORDER granting 31 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Jonathan Marc Herman terminated. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 4/4/14. (zjh1) (Entered: 04/04/2014)
32 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Brian Christopher Roux on behalf of Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4624088. (Roux, Brian) (Entered: 04/22/2014)
33 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Elham R Rabbani on behalf of Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4672798. (Rabbani, Elham) (Entered: 05/23/2014)
34 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Hal D Ungar on behalf of Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4672872. (Ungar, Hal) (Entered: 05/23/2014)
35 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Alan Dean Weinberger on behalf of Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4672882. (Weinberger, Alan) (Entered: 05/23/2014)

Case: 1:13-cv-497 As of: 11/06/2017 12:39 PM CST 16 of 23

05/23/2014 07/02/2014
07/03/2014 07/03/2014
07/08/2014 07/11/2014 07/14/2014 07/16/2014 07/16/2014 07/17/2014 07/21/2014 07/29/2014 07/29/2014 07/31/2014

36 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Patricia Bollman on behalf of Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4672901. (Bollman, Patricia) (Entered: 05/23/2014)
37 Unopposed MOTION for Entry of Consent Orders Regarding Discovery by Maruthamuthu Mayavu, Raju Meganathan, Saravanachlevan Narayanasamy, Saravanan Ramasamy. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Consent Order Regarding Protocols for the Production of Electronically Stored Information, # 2 Text of Proposed Order Consent Supplemental Protective Order, # 3 Text of Proposed Order Consent Clawback Order, # 4 Text of Proposed Order Consent Order Regarding Use of Discovery from Related Cases)(Sohn, Joshua) (Entered: 07/02/2014)
ORAL ORDER granting 37 Motion. This oral order will act as a signature on the consent orders. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 7−3−2014. (Hawthorn, Zack) (Entered: 07/03/2014)
38 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF U. S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE that the 10 MOTION to Dismiss should be denied. In summary, the undersigned finds the Plaintiffs have presented sufficient facts to establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction over the Defendants because the RICO statute provides for nationwide service of process. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 7/2/14. (mrp, ) (Entered: 07/03/2014)
39 OBJECTION to 38 Report and Recommendation by Malvern C. Burnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C. (Cerniglia, Timothy) Modified on 7/11/2014 (bjc, ). (Entered: 07/08/2014)
40 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Lance R Rydberg on behalf of Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4740872. (Rydberg, Lance) (Entered: 07/11/2014)
41 OBJECTION to 38 Report and Recommendations by Malvern C. Burnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C.. (Cerniglia, Timothy) (Entered: 07/14/2014)
42 ADVISORY ORDER CONCERNING PAGE LIMITATIONS FOR APPEALS OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE DECISIONS. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 7/15/14. (mrp, ) (Entered: 07/16/2014)
44 ORDER denying 12 and 17 Defendants' Motions to Change Venue. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 7/16/14. (mrp, ) (Entered: 07/17/2014)
43 APPEAL OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE DECISION to District Court by Malvern C. Burnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Cerniglia, Timothy) (Entered: 07/17/2014)
45 RESPONSE in Opposition to 41 Objection to 38 Report and Recommendation on Motion to Dismiss by Maruthamuthu Mayavu, Raju Meganathan, Saravanachlevan Narayanasamy, Saravanan Ramasamy. (Sohn, Joshua) Modified on 7/22/2014 (tkd, ). (Entered: 07/21/2014)
46 MOTION for Reconsideration re 44 Order by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Hangartner, Erin) Modified on 7/30/2014 (mrp, ). (Entered: 07/29/2014)
47 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION DENYING 16 First MOTION to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 7/29/14. (mrp, ) (Entered: 07/30/2014)
48 RESPONSE to 43 Appeal of Magistrate Judge Decision to District Court to Deny Burnett Defendants' Motion to Transfer by Maruthamuthu Mayavu, Raju Meganathan,

Case: 1:13-cv-497 As of: 11/06/2017 12:39 PM CST 17 of 23

08/04/2014 08/12/2014 09/09/2014 09/09/2014
09/09/2014 09/12/2014 09/12/2014 09/12/2014 09/12/2014 09/15/2014 09/15/2014 10/20/2014 10/20/2014 10/21/2014

Saravanachlevan Narayanasamy, Saravanan Ramasamy. (Sohn, Joshua) (Entered: 07/31/2014)
49 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION DENYING 11 MOTION to Dismiss. The Burnett Defendants' Motion should be denied, subject to reconsideration in a motion for summary judgment that the state law claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 7/31/14. (mrp, ) (Entered: 08/04/2014)
50 RESPONSE in Opposition re 46 MOTION for Reconsideration re 44 Order filed by Maruthamuthu Mayavu, Raju Meganathan, Saravanachlevan Narayanasamy, Saravanan Ramasamy. (Sohn, Joshua) (Entered: 08/12/2014)
51 ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF U. S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE that 16 Motion to Dismiss filed by Signal International Texas, G.P., et al., is denied. Signed by Judge Marcia A. Crone on 9/9/14. (mrp, ) (Entered: 09/09/2014)
52 ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF U. S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE that the 11 Motion to Dismiss, filed by Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Malvern C. Burnett, Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C. is denied. Signed by Judge Marcia A. Crone on 9/9/14. (mrp, ) (Entered: 09/09/2014)
53 ORDER Adopting Report and Recommendation of U. S. Magistrate Judge # 47 that Motion to Dismiss # 16 is denied. Signed by Judge Marcia A. Crone on 9/9/14. (mrp, ) (Entered: 09/09/2014)
***Document # 10 Motion to Dismiss denied by Order Adopting R&R # 51 ***
(mrp, ) (Entered: 09/12/2014)
54 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Kevin Patrick Maney on behalf of Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4832465. (Maney, Kevin) (Entered: 09/12/2014)
55 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Robert L Keller, II on behalf of Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4832940. (Keller, Robert) (Entered: 09/12/2014)
56 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by James L Cornblatt on behalf of Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4833648. (Cornblatt, James) (Entered: 09/12/2014)
57 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Mitchell P Hasenkampf on behalf of Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4834369. (Hasenkampf, Mitchell) (Entered: 09/15/2014)
58 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Lauren Masur Davis on behalf of Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4835117. (Davis, Lauren) (Entered: 09/15/2014)
59 ORDER denying 46 Motion for Reconsideration of Magistrate's Decision. Signed by Judge Marcia A. Crone on 10/20/2014. (bjc) (Entered: 10/20/2014)
60 ORDERED that Burnett's "Appeal of Magistrate Judges Order, or Alternatively Objection to Magistrates Report and Recommendation to Deny Motion to Transfer Venue (Doc. No. 43) is denied. Signed by Judge Marcia A. Crone on 10/20/2014. (bjc) (Entered: 10/20/2014)
61 ANSWER to 1 Complaint, , CROSSCLAIM against Malvern C. Burnett, Sachin Dewan, Dewan Consultants Pvt. Ltd., Global Resources, Inc., Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C., Michael Pol by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International L.L.C.,

Case: 1:13-cv-497 As of: 11/06/2017 12:39 PM CST 18 of 23

10/22/2014
10/23/2014 10/23/2014 11/07/2014 11/07/2014 12/05/2014 12/17/2014
01/05/2015 01/15/2015 01/15/2015
01/15/2015

Signal International Texas, L.P.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Answer to RICO Fraud Chart)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 10/21/2014)
In accordance with the provisions of 28 USC Section 636(c), you are hereby notified that a U.S. Magistrate Judge of this district court is available to conduct any or all proceedings in this case including a jury or non−jury trial and to order the entry of a final judgment. The form Consent to Proceed Before Magistrate Judge is available on our website. All signed consent forms, excluding pro se parties, should be filed electronically using the event Notice Regarding Consent to Proceed Before Magistrate Judge. (bjc, ) (Entered: 10/22/2014)
62 Unopposed MOTION /to extend deadlines for parties to designate expert witnesses and provide expert reports by Maruthamuthu Mayavu, Raju Meganathan, Saravanachlevan Narayanasamy, Saravanan Ramasamy. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Willett, Christopher) Modified on 10/23/2014 (bjc, ). (Entered: 10/23/2014)
ORAL ORDER granting 62 Motion for Extension of Time to Designate Expert Witnesses and Provide Expert Reports. Plaintiffs shall designate expert witnesses by November 4, 2014, and Defendants shall designate expert witnesses by December 5, 2014. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 10−23−2014. (Entered: 10/23/2014)
63 ANSWER to 1 Complaint, by Malvern C. Burnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C..(Cerniglia, Timothy) (Entered: 11/07/2014)
64 ANSWER to 61 Answer to Complaint, Crossclaim,, by Malvern C. Burnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C..(Cerniglia, Timothy) (Entered: 11/07/2014)
65 NOTICE by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc. of Expert Witness Disclosure (Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 12/05/2014)
66 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery (Extend Discovery Deadlines and the Motion Cut−Off) by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 12/17/2014)
67 RESPONSE in Opposition re 66 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery (Extend Discovery Deadlines and the Motion Cut−Off) filed by Maruthamuthu Mayavu, Raju Meganathan, Saravanachlevan Narayanasamy, Saravanan Ramasamy. (Birnbaum, Timothy) (Entered: 01/05/2015)
68 MOTION in Limine to Exclude the Opinion Testimony of Clyde Payne by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 01/15/2015)
69 MOTION in Limine to Exclude/Limit the Testimony of Florence Burke by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 01/15/2015)
70 MOTION to Exclude the Testimony and Strike the Report of Ron McAlear by Maruthamuthu Mayavu, Raju Meganathan, Saravanachlevan Narayanasamy,

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01/15/2015 01/15/2015 01/15/2015 01/15/2015 01/15/2015 01/15/2015 01/15/2015

Saravanan Ramasamy. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum of Law, # 2 Declaration, # 3 Exhibit 1, # 4 Exhibit 2, # 5 Exhibit 3, # 6 Exhibit 4, # 7 Text of Proposed Order)(Birnbaum, Timothy) (Entered: 01/15/2015)
71 MOTION to Exclude the Testimony and Strike the Report of Ronald L. Signorino by Maruthamuthu Mayavu, Raju Meganathan, Saravanachlevan Narayanasamy, Saravanan Ramasamy. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum of Law, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit 3, # 5 Exhibit 4, # 6 Declaration, # 7 Text of Proposed Order)(Birnbaum, Timothy) (Entered: 01/15/2015)
72 MOTION to Exclude the Testimony and Strike the Report of Enrique Gonzalez, III by Maruthamuthu Mayavu, Raju Meganathan, Saravanachlevan Narayanasamy, Saravanan Ramasamy. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum of Law, # 2 Declaration, # 3 Exhibit A, # 4 Exhibit B, # 5 Text of Proposed Order)(Birnbaum, Timothy) (Entered: 01/15/2015)
73 MOTION to Exclude the Testimony and Strike the Report of Dr. Louise Shelley by Maruthamuthu Mayavu, Raju Meganathan, Saravanachlevan Narayanasamy, Saravanan Ramasamy. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum of Law, # 2 Declaration, # 3 Exhibit A, # 4 Exhibit B, # 5 Exhibit C, # 6 Exhibit D, # 7 Text of Proposed Order)(Birnbaum, Timothy) (Entered: 01/15/2015)
74 MOTION to Exclude the Testimony and Strike the Report of Virginia Miles by Maruthamuthu Mayavu, Raju Meganathan, Saravanachlevan Narayanasamy, Saravanan Ramasamy. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum of Law, # 2 Declaration, # 3 Exhibit A, # 4 Text of Proposed Order)(Birnbaum, Timothy) (Entered: 01/15/2015)
75 MOTION to Exclude Testimony and Strike the Expert Report of Donald H. Strobel by Maruthamuthu Mayavu, Raju Meganathan, Saravanachlevan Narayanasamy, Saravanan Ramasamy. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum of Law, # 2 Declaration, # 3 Exhibit A, # 4 Exhibit B, # 5 Text of Proposed Order)(Birnbaum, Timothy) (Entered: 01/15/2015)
76 MOTION in Limine to Exclude/Limit the Testimony of Amy Mowl by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Hangartner, Erin) (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/16/2015: # 3 Text of Proposed Order) (mrp, ). (Entered: 01/15/2015)
77 MOTION to Exclude the Testimony and Strike the Report of Dr. Kevin Fox Gotham by Maruthamuthu Mayavu, Raju Meganathan, Saravanachlevan Narayanasamy,

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01/16/2015 01/29/2015 01/29/2015 01/29/2015 01/30/2015 01/30/2015
01/30/2015 02/02/2015

Saravanan Ramasamy. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum, # 2 Declaration, # 3 Exhibit A, # 4 Exhibit B, # 5 Exhibit C, # 6 Text of Proposed Order)(Birnbaum, Timothy) (Entered: 01/15/2015)
78 REPLY to Response to Motion re 66 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery (Extend Discovery Deadlines and the Motion Cut−Off) Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition to Signals' Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery filed by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 01/16/2015)
79 RESPONSE in Opposition re 70 MOTION to Exclude the Testimony and Strike the Report of Ron McAlear filed by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 01/29/2015)
80 RESPONSE in Opposition re 72 MOTION to Exclude the Testimony and Strike the Report of Enrique Gonzalez, III filed by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Expert Report of Gonzalez, # 2 Exhibit B − relevant portions of Gonzalez depo, # 3 Exhibit C − Speaking Engagements of Gonzalez)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 01/29/2015)
81 RESPONSE in Opposition re 71 MOTION to Exclude the Testimony and Strike the Report of Ronald L. Signorino filed by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 01/29/2015)
82 ORDER granting 66 Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery. Discovery shall be completed by 4/1/15 and Motion cut−off is 4/15/15. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 1/30/15. (mrp, ) (Entered: 01/30/2015)
83 ***FILED IN ERROR WITH INCORRECT EXHIBITS; SEE CORRECTED DOC # 84 ***
RESPONSE in Opposition re 77 MOTION to Exclude the Testimony and Strike the Report of Dr. Kevin Fox Gotham filed by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Relevant portions of depo of Richard Marler, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Relevant portions of depo of Lisa Spears, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Info considered by Kevin Gotham, # 4 Exhibit 4 − CV of Kevin Gotham, # 5 Exhibit 5 Revelant portions of depo of KevinGotham)(Hangartner, Erin) Modified on 2/3/2015 (mrp, ). (Entered: 01/30/2015)
84 RESPONSE in Opposition re 77 MOTION to Exclude the Testimony and Strike the Report of Dr. Kevin Fox Gotham filed by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − David (−8−1220) Order Doc 2197, # 2 Exhibit 2 − 6−15−2014 Depo of Richard Marler, p. 76−78, # 3 Exhibit 3 − 6−13−14 depo of Lisa Spears, p. 426−428)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 01/30/2015)
85 RESPONSE in Opposition re 69 MOTION in Limine to Exclude/Limit the Testimony of Florence Burke filed by Maruthamuthu Mayavu, Raju Meganathan, Saravanachlevan Narayanasamy, Saravanan Ramasamy. (Attachments:

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02/02/2015 02/02/2015 02/02/2015
02/04/2015 02/09/2015 02/09/2015 02/09/2015 02/11/2015 02/11/2015 02/12/2015 02/12/2015

# 1 Exhibit A)(Birnbaum, Timothy) (Entered: 02/02/2015)
86 RESPONSE in Opposition re 76 MOTION in Limine to Exclude/Limit the Testimony of Amy Mowl filed by Maruthamuthu Mayavu, Raju Meganathan, Saravanachlevan Narayanasamy, Saravanan Ramasamy. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Birnbaum, Timothy) (Entered: 02/02/2015)
87 RESPONSE in Opposition re 68 MOTION in Limine to Exclude the Opinion Testimony of Clyde Payne filed by Maruthamuthu Mayavu, Raju Meganathan, Saravanachlevan Narayanasamy, Saravanan Ramasamy. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3)(Birnbaum, Timothy) (Entered: 02/02/2015)
88 RESPONSE in Opposition re 73 MOTION to Exclude the Testimony and Strike the Report of Dr. Louise Shelley filed by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit a, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K, # 12 Exhibit L)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 02/02/2015)
89 Consent MOTION to Withdraw Expert Witnesses Virginia Miles and Donald Strobel by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 02/04/2015)
90 REPLY to Response to Motion re 72 MOTION to Exclude the Testimony and Strike the Report of Enrique Gonzalez, III filed by Maruthamuthu Mayavu, Raju Meganathan, Saravanachlevan Narayanasamy, Saravanan Ramasamy. (Birnbaum, Timothy) (Entered: 02/09/2015)
91 REPLY to Response to Motion re 70 MOTION to Exclude the Testimony and Strike the Report of Ron McAlear filed by Maruthamuthu Mayavu, Raju Meganathan, Saravanachlevan Narayanasamy, Saravanan Ramasamy. (Birnbaum, Timothy) (Entered: 02/09/2015)
92 REPLY to Response to Motion re 71 MOTION to Exclude the Testimony and Strike the Report of Ronald L. Signorino filed by Maruthamuthu Mayavu, Raju Meganathan, Saravanachlevan Narayanasamy, Saravanan Ramasamy. (Birnbaum, Timothy) (Entered: 02/09/2015)
93 REPLY to Response to Motion re 77 MOTION to Exclude the Testimony and Strike the Report of Dr. Kevin Fox Gotham filed by Maruthamuthu Mayavu, Raju Meganathan, Saravanachlevan Narayanasamy, Saravanan Ramasamy. (Birnbaum, Timothy) (Entered: 02/11/2015)
94 AFFIDAVIT in Support re 77 MOTION to Exclude the Testimony and Strike the Report of Dr. Kevin Fox Gotham filed by Maruthamuthu Mayavu, Raju Meganathan, Saravanachlevan Narayanasamy, Saravanan Ramasamy. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit D)(Birnbaum, Timothy) (Entered: 02/11/2015)
95 REPLY to Response to Motion re 73 MOTION to Exclude the Testimony and Strike the Report of Dr. Louise Shelley filed by Maruthamuthu Mayavu, Raju Meganathan, Saravanachlevan Narayanasamy, Saravanan Ramasamy. (Birnbaum, Timothy) (Entered: 02/12/2015)
96 REPLY to Response to Motion re 76 MOTION in Limine to Exclude/Limit the Testimony of Amy Mowl filed by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P.. (Attachments:

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02/12/2015 02/12/2015 02/13/2015 03/11/2015 03/11/2015 06/17/2015
06/26/2015 06/29/2015 07/01/2015
07/02/2015 07/13/2015
07/14/2015

# 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 02/12/2015)
97 REPLY to Response to Motion re 69 MOTION in Limine to Exclude/Limit the Testimony of Florence Burke filed by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 02/12/2015)
98 REPLY to Response to Motion re 68 MOTION in Limine to Exclude the Opinion Testimony of Clyde Payne filed by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 02/12/2015)
99 ORDER denying as moot 74 and 75 Motions to Exclude; and granting 89 Motion to Withdraw the Expert Report and Testimony of Donald Strobel and Virginia Miles. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 2/13/15. (mrp, ) (Entered: 02/17/2015)
100 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Michael D Hynes on behalf of All Plaintiffs. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−5093943. (Hynes, Michael) (Entered: 03/11/2015)
101 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Brett David Solberg on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Solberg, Brett) (Entered: 03/11/2015)
102 ORDER Severing and Transferring Signal's Cross−Claims against cross−defendants Malvern C. Burnett, Sachin Dewan, Dewan Consultants Pvt., Ltd., Global Resources, Inc. Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C. and Michael Pol. It is ordered that the Clerk of Court shall transfer these claims to the Eastern District of Louisiana. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 6/17/15. (mrp, ) (Entered: 06/18/2015)
103 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON THE PARTIES' MOTIONS TO EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY granting 68 Motion in Limine; granting in part 69 Motion in Limine; granting in part 70 Motion ; granting 71 Motion ; granting 72 Motion ; granting in part 73 Motion ; denying 76 Motion in Limine; granting in part 77 Motion. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 6/26/15. (mrp, ) (Entered: 06/26/2015)
Case transferred from Texas Eastern has been opened in the Eastern District of Louisiana as case 2:15cv2296, filed on 6/24/15. (mrp, ) (Entered: 07/02/2015)
104 Unopposed MOTION to Amend/Correct 30 Scheduling Order, by Maruthamuthu Mayavu, Raju Meganathan, Saravanachlevan Narayanasamy, Saravanan Ramasamy. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit "A" Declaration of William E. Dorris, # 2 Exhibit "B" Declaration of Daniel Werner, # 3 Exhibit "C" Declaration of Sten−Erik Hoidal, # 4 Exhibit "D" Declaration of Timothy H. Birnbaum)(Birnbaum, Timothy) (Entered: 07/01/2015)
105 ORDER granting 104 Motion to Amend Scheduling Order. Docket call is set for 11/13/15 at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom #3 before Judge Marcia A. Crone. The case will be set for Final Pretrial Conference and Trial at the docket call.Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 7/2/15. (mrp, ) (Entered: 07/02/2015)
106 NOTICE by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc. (Suggestion of Bankruptcy) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−1, # 2 Exhibit A−2, # 3 Exhibit A−3, # 4 Exhibit A−4, # 5 Exhibit A−5)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 07/13/2015)
107 ORDER STAYING CASE PURSUANT TO BANKRUPTCY. It is ordered that the parties shall file a notice every 120 days, informing the court of the status of the bankruptcy proceedings. Signed by Judge Marcia A. Crone on 7/14/15. (mrp, )

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(Entered: 07/15/2015)
108 NOTICE by Raju Meganathan providing Status Report in Bankruptcy proceedings. (Birnbaum, Timothy) (Entered: 11/12/2015)
109 STATUS REPORT on behalf of all parties by Raju Meganathan. (Birnbaum, Timothy) (Entered: 11/08/2016)
110 Ex Parte MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney Brian C. Roux by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 11/16/2016)
ORAL ORDER granting 110 Defendants' Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Brian Christopher Roux terminated. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 11/29/2016. (zjh1) (Entered: 11/29/2016)