Case 1:05-cv-00208 Document 1 Filed 01/13/2005 Page 1 of 7

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

:::::
(/)

(~ -r:
,_C'l ·"~

CJ

:-:··:·:.'·

)

(f)
:-o<

(r-r •

w

.

:---;,
·-·

C) ::< -< ;:,

:-:-:~·
,. -~

--.J

UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

0
~sc o~ds

.v

Plaintiff,
v.
SIDLEY AUSTIN BROWN & WOOD, Defendant.

)

Civil Action No.

)

)

COMPLAINT

)

)

)

JURY DEMAND JAN l 4 2005

)

NATURE OF THE ACTION This is an action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to correct unlawful employment practices on the basis of age and to provide appropriate relief to a class of attorney employees who were adversely affected by such practices. The Commission alleges that Defendant violated the ADEA by maintaining and implementing an age-based retirement policy and by downgrading or expelling a class of attorney employees age 40 years and older on account of their age in or about October 1999.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE I. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 451, 1331, 1337, 1343 and 1345. This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to Section 7(b) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (the "ADEA''), which incorporates by reference Sections 16(c) and 17 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (the "FLSA"), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(c) and 217.

Case 1:05-cv-00208 Document 1 Filed 01/13/2005 Page 2 of 7
PARTIES 2. Plaintiff, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "Commission"), is the agency of the United States of America charged with the administration, interpretation and enforcement of the ADEA and is expressly authorized to bring this action by Section 7(b) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), as amended by Section 2 of Reorganization Plan No. I of 1978, 92 Stat. 3781, and by Public Law 98-532 (1984), 98 Stat. 2705. 3. At all relevant times, Defendant Sidley Austin Brown & Wood ("Defendant" or "Defendant Employer"), a Delaware limited liability partnership and its affiliates, which include an Illinois limited liability partnership, an English general partnership, and a New York general partnership, has been continuously doing business in the City of Chicago, State of Illinois, and has continuously had at least twenty (20) employees. 4. At all relevant times, Defendant has been an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections ll(b), (g) and (h) of the ADEA, 29 U.S. C.§§
I
630(b), (g) and (h). CONCILIATION
5. Prior to institution of this lawsuit, the Commission's representatives attempted to eliminate the unlawful employment practices alleged below and to effect voluntary compliance with the ADEA through informal methods of conciliation, conference and persuasion within the meaning of Section 7(b) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b).
STATEMENT OF CLAIMS 6. Defendant Employer has engaged in unlawful employment practices nationwide, in violation of Section 4(a) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a):
2

Case 1:05-cv-00208 Document 1 Filed 01/13/2005 Page 3 of 7

(A) In maintaining and implementing, since at least 1978, an age-based retirement policy,

Defendant Employer has discriminated against a class ofattorney employees on account oftheir age

in violation of the ADEA. The class of persons aggrieved includes Defendant Employer's attorney

employees age 40 and older who were adversely affected by the retirement policy.

(B) Defendant Employer has discriminated against a class ofattorney employees age 40 and

older by downgrading or expelling them on account of their age in or about October 1999 in

violation of the ADEA.

7. The effect of the practices complained of in paragraph 6 above has been to deprive

a class of attorney employees age 40 and older of equal employment opportunities and otherwise

adversely affect their status as employees, because of their age.

8. The unlawful employment practices complained ofin paragraphs 6 and 7 above were

and are willful within the meaning of Section 7(b) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b).

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Wherefore, the Commission respectfully requests that this Court:

A. Grant a permanent injunction enjoining Defendant Employer, its officers, successors,

assigns and all persons in active concert or participation with it, from engaging in any employment

practice which discriminates on the basis of age against individuals 40 years of age and older.

B. Order Defendant Employer to institute and carry out policies, practices and programs

which provide equal employment opportunities for individuals 40 years of age and older, and which

eradicate the effects of its past and present unlawful employment practices.

C.

Grant a judgment requiring Defendant Employer to make whole all individuals

adversely affected by the unlawful practices described above, by providing the affirmative relief

3

. ;

Case 1:05-cv-00208 Document 1 Filed 01/13/2005 Page 4 of 7

necessary to eradicate the effects of its unlawful practices, including but not limited to reinstatement and complete restoration of a class of employees over the age of 40 to the status of "partner" which they, respectively, occupied previously, or in the alternative front pay, as well as, back pay, prejudgement interest, the value of lost benefits and liquidated damages.
D. Grant such further relief as the Court deems necessary and proper in the public interest.
E. Award the Commission its costs of this action.

4

Case 1:05-cv-00208 Document 1 Filed 01/13/2005 Page 5 of 7
JURY TRIAL DEMAND The Commission requests a jury trial on all questions of fact raised by the Complaint.
Respectfully submitted, Eric Dreiband General Counsel James Lee Deputy General Counsel Gwendolyn Young Reams Associate General Counsel
n r
pervisory Tna Attorney
~-e~
Deborah L. Hamilton Laurie Elkin Trial Attorneys EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION Chicago District Office 500 West Madison Street, Suite 2800 Chicago, Illinois 60661 (312) 353-7649
5

.en-! Civil Cover SCheaeste 1:05-cv-00208 Document 1 Filed 01/13/2005 Page 6 of 7 Page 1 of2

UNITED S

!STRICT COURT

.JUDGE ZAGEL

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOI~AGISTRATE JUDGE ASHMAN

0208

This automated JS-44 conforms generally to the manual JS-44 approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974. The data is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. The information contained herein neither replaces nor supplements the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law. This form is authorized for use oJl)y in the Northern District oflJlinois.

Plaintiff(s): U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
County of Residence:

"W/"ru:rll" BROW~'&' Defendant(s):SIDLEY AUSTIN ·.;:. r.-:.ni~l

WOOD County of Residence:

JAN l 4 2005

Plaintiffs Atty:

Deborah L. Hamilton

Defendant's Atty:

Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission

500 W. Madison, Suite 2800,

Chicago, IL 60661

312-353-7649

Paul Grossman Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & WalkerLLP 515 South Flower Street, 25th Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90071 (213) 683-6203

1. U.S. Gov't Plaintiff

IlL Citizt;_nshin_QfPri_ncinal !"l!rties (Diversity Cases Only)
Plaintiff:- N/A Defendant:-N/A

IY ,J)_rjgin :

1. Original Proceeding

Y. Nature of Suit:

442 Employment

~
(/)

C) --,
u-l r--

c.:;

L. en

::::o.

~

-----"

' :U:;-)!

c--
f'

•'<--

' _::~ { :-::

... -Or-·· GO

... C.J

c-)-:-·,~

--!>

)::10:. :Ji~

0

~) ··---}
'.,

0

~c

.;c.;.o:,

rc·,, c··:-;

~

To correct unlawful employment practices on the basis of age. Section 7(b) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 616(b) (the "ADEA''), wich incorporates by reference Sections 16(c) and 17 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (the "FLSA"), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(c) and 217. YlL_R~qt!e_sted in_Co;nplaim Class Action: Yes Dollar Demand:
Jury Demand: Yes

VUL.This case lS_NOT a refiling of a previously dismissed case.

Signature: _ __J____:__b____w_ _____{___________jTf_{_AflV"'ll~---
http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/PUBLIC/Forms/autojs44.cfm

\~~
1112/jOOS

Case 1:05-cv-00208 Document 1 Filed 01/13/2005 Page 7 of 7

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COUNT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

In the Matter of

EASTERN DIVISION

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

V,
Sidley Austin Brown & Wood

MAGISTRATE JUDGE 1\S,iMAN

CaseN~6C

8, .

APPEARANCES ARE HEREBY FILED BY THE UNDERSIGNED AS ATTORNEY(S) F<9R:

UJ

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

o

-1 s.~·

;o·.--

_,

-:-~ c~

(A)

(B) o

,.c

SIGNATURE
NAME
Deborah L. Hamilton

SIGNATURE ·~ ~

•

-ffi"" ""

NAME
Laurie S. Elkin

FmM Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
STREET ADDRESS 500 West Madison, Suite 2800

FIRM Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
w s . 500 STREETAOORESS est Mad1' son, mte 2800

C!TYISTATEIZIP Chicago, IL 60661

CITY/STAT""" Chicago, IL 60661

TELEJ'HONE NUMBER
312-353-7649
E-MAIL ADDRESS

FAX NUMBER
\ 312-353-8555

TELEPHONE NUMBER
312-353-7726
E-MAIL A!)DRESS

FAX NUMBER
\ 312-353-8555

IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (SEE ITEM 4 ON REVERSE)
ARDC No. 062698941

MEMBER OF TRIAL BAR?

0 YES

NO

_ ZOO." IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (SEE ITEM 4 ON REV~!WI1,),

1 4 ARDCNo.06210523

J/-\1~

"

MEMBER OF TRIAL BAR?

YES

0

NO I?]

TRIAL ATTORNEY?

YES

NO

0

TRIAL ATTORNEY?

/YES

I?] NO 0

~--------------~--~~--------------------+-"-~_IG~N~~T=EO~A~S-LO-~~L~~~NS~EL~'~~~~~~4-A-YE~~~~o~_,N:f-~0;_~4~

...

A (C) I

I \A) /1 rJ/)// /1 /[ /l If 7

NAM/::'

M)_ Go~ur

1 r>JAME

PIRM
FIR!v" Equal Employment Opportunity Commissiof

l i«lfHen{/tckson
E ual Emplo).ment Opportunity Commission

sTREET ADDRESs 500 West Madison, Suite 2800

CITY/STATE!LIP Chicago, IL 60661

TELEPHONE NUMBER
312-886-9124
E-MAIL ADDRESS

FAX NUMBER
312-353-8555
\

\

STREET ADORE S
500 West Madison, Suite 2800

\\ CITY/STATj Chicago, IL 60661

E

ENUMBER

FAX NUMBER

312-353-8551

312-353-8555
\

E-MAIL ADDRESS

IDENTIFICATION NUMBER {SEE ITEM 4 ON REVERSE)
ARDC No. 06210804

MEMBER OF TRIAL BAR?

YES 1?1

NO

0

TRIAL ATIORNEY?

YES 1?1

NO

0

DESIGNATED AS LOCAL COUNSEL?

YES

0

NO

0

IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (SEE ITEM 4 ON REVERSE)
ARDC No. 01187589

MEMBER OF TRIAL BAR?

YES

TRJAL ATTORNEY?

YES

DESIGNATED AS LOCAl COUNSEL?

YES

0

NO

0

1?1 NO 0

0

. NO 0 (

~/

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
v.
SIDLEY AUSTIN BROWN & WOOD LLP, Defendant.

) ) ) ) ) Case No. 05 cv 0208 ) ) Judge James Zagel ) Magistrate Judge Ashman ) )

PROTECTIVE ORDER

For the reasons stated by the Court on August II and August 25, 2005, it appears that

good cause exists for entry of this Protective Order. In order to preserve and maintain the

confidentiality of certain documents and information to be produced in this litigation, the Court

hereby orders as follows:

I. CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION A. The term "Confidential Information" is defined as any of the following types of

information:

1) names of the 31 former Sidley & Austin partners who were informed of a

change to counselor senior counsel in late 1999;

2) social security numbers;

3) unlisted home address and telephone numbers;

4) financial information stating any individual information that is not

available to the public, including information regarding an individual's

participation or compensation, capital accounts, retirement payments,

loans, annuities, benefits and personal expenses.

5) Private, proprietary, or trade secret information as to which Sidley & Austin has maintained confidentiality and which is not disclosed outside Sidley & Austin, limited to these categories: (a) non-public information regarding Sidley & Austin's revenues, profits and expenses; (b) non-public information regarding compensation, chargeable and non-chargeable hours, hourly billing rates, billings, collections and realization where that information is associated with an individual who is identified by name; (c) non-pUblic information regarding the performance of individual partners and attorneys where that information is associated with an individual who is identified by name; (d) non-pUblic information regarding Sidley & Austin's strategic plans and business goals; (e) partner compensation criteria; (f) Sidley & Austin's billing policies; (g) partnership agreements and other confidential agreements between and with Sidley & Austin's partners.
B. The term "Confidential Document" refers to a document that contains any of the above types of information defined as "Confidential Information," including but not limited to memoranda, databases, compilations and discovery responses that incorporate such Confidential Information.
2

C. As used herein, "disclosure" or "to disclose" shall mean to divulge, reveal, describe, summarize, paraphrase, quote, transmit, or otherwise communicate directly or indirectly Confidential Information or compilations derived therefrom. II. RESTRICTION ON USE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
A. During the pendency of this litigation, Confidential Information shall be retained solely in the custody ofthe parties' attorneys and shall not be placed in the possession of or disclosed to any other person, except as otherwise allowed by this Order, as agreed upon by the parties, or as ordered by the Court. Confidential Information shall be utilized only for the purpose ofthis litigation (including any appeals).
B. Confidential Information protected by this Order shall not be disclosed in any manner, directly or indirectly, to any persons except as follows, provided that any such person agrees to abide by the terms and conditions of this Order by signing Exhibit A.
I) Confidential Information may be used by the parties, their attorneys, legal interns actively engaged in the conduct of this litigation, and any clerks, paralegals, secretaries, data processors and other support staff in the employ of or retained by such parties or attorneys for the purpose of this litigation.
2) No personnel files or performance-related information shall be produced or disclosed in pretrial discovery unless the individual to whom the information relates is given fourteen (14) days' notice, in the form provided in Exhibit B to this Order.
3) Confidential Information relating to performance, billings, collections, realizations, hours and partner participation/compensation may be disclosed to putative class members, deponents and fact witnesses, as 3

needed for purposes ofthis litigation in the course of pretrial discovery, provided that such persons agree to be subject to the terms of the Protective Order by signing Exhibit A. Such information may be shared only in the presence of an EEOC attorney or an attorney representing the Defendant, and no copies or other reproductions ofthis Information shall be made or retained by any putative class member, deponent or fact witness. 4) Confidential Information may be reviewed by an expert witness or consultant expressly employed or retained by counselor a party to this litigation to whom it is necessary or appropriate to disclose Confidential Information for the purpose of prosecuting or defending this litigation, provided that these persons agree to be subject to the terms of the Protective Order by signing Exhibit A. 5) The authors, addressees, copy recipients, originators of the Confidential Information or other persons (a) who have previously seen the Confidential Information; and (b) to whom it is necessary to make such disclosure in connection with the preparation for the prosecution or defense of this action provided they agree to be subject to the terms of this Protective Order by signing Exhibit A. 6) Confidential Information may be disclosed to a court reporter during the course of a deposition. C. The portion of all deposition exhibits, pleadings, discovery responses, transcripts, and other writings filed with the Court in this litigation that contain Confidential Information will be filed in a sealed envelope labeled "CONFIDENTIAL. FILED UNDER SEAL PURSUANT
4

TO PROTECTIVE ORDER." If the party filing under seal believes that some or all of the Documents or Information filed under seal should not be sealed, the party shall include a statement identifying such Documents or Information. The other party will be given the opportunity to respond to the filing party's statement prior to a Court ruling on whether, and what portion of, the filed Documents or Information shall remain under seal. A party receiving a filing under seal may object to the filing of some or all of such Documents or Information under seal by submitting a similar statement. The filing party will be given the same opportunity to respond prior to a Court ruling.
D. The parties shall make reasonable efforts to reach agreement on redacting, coding or otherwise removing Confidential Information to avoid the necessity of filing under seal or to allow documents to be unsealed. Documents may be filed under normal Court procedures if the Confidential Information listed in paragraph l.A of this Order has been redacted, coded or otherwise removed from the document.
E. Nothing shall prevent disclosure of Confidential Information beyond the terms of this Order if both parties, and any individual whose Confidential Information is to be disclosed, consent in writing to such disclosure, or ifthe Court, after notice to all affected parties, permits such disclosure.
F. If Confidential Documents are subpoenaed by a third party or requested pursuant to a request under the Freedom of Information Act, the EEOC Compliance Manual, or otherwise, the party subpoenaed or to whom the request is directed will provide the producing party ten days' notice when feasible, but no less than five days' notice prior to production to enable that party to seek a Protective Order from the Court.
5

Ill. DESIGNATION A. A document or portion of a document that a party determines in good faith to
contain Confidential Information as defined in paragraph I may be designated as Confidential by (1) stamping the word "CONFIDENTIAL" on the document, (2) otherwise indicating that it contains Confidential Information, (3) employing other means provided by this order, or (4) using any other reasonable method agreed upon by the parties.
B. A party may, on the record of a deposition or oral hearing or by written notice to opposing counsel not later than fourteen (14) days after receipt of the transcript of such deposition or oral hearing, designate any portiones) of the deposition as confidential ifthe party determines in good faith that the designated portiones) contain(s) Confidential Information as defined in paragraph 1. Until expiration ofthe above fourteen (14) day period, all transcripts will be deemed "Confidential Documents" under this Protective Order and information therein will be deemed "Confidential Information" under this Protective Order unless otherwise agreed to in writing by the parties. After expiration of this period, any portion of a transcript that has not been designated as Confidential shaH not be subject to this Protective Order.
C. If a party inadvertently fails to designate Discovery Material as Confidential Information, it may make the designation belatedly so long as it does so promptly after learning of the oversight. Counsel for the receiving parties shall take reasonably necessary steps to ensure the confidentiality ofthe Confidential Information, including reasonable efforts to secure return of the Confidential Information from individuals to whom disclosure was made but would not have been permitted by this Protective Order had the Discovery Material been originally designated as Confidential Information.
6

IV. MISCELLANEOUS A. This Order does not limit the right of any party to object to the scope of discovery
in this case. B. This Order does not constitute a determination of the admissibility or evidentiary
foundation for the documents or a waiver of any party's objections thereto. C. Within 90 days after the final completion of the litigation (including any appeals)
the parties shall return to each other or (upon request) destroy all copies of Confidential Documents, except as required by applicable law and regulations. All retained documents will remain subject to this Order.
D. The designation of documents or information as Confidential Information or as Confidential Documents shall not be construed as a waiver of any applicable privilege or other immunities from discovery (including without limitation the attorney-client privilege and the attorney work product doctrine) or as a concession by the designating party that such information is relevant or material to any issue or is otherwise discoverable.
E. This Order shall continue indefinitely during and after this litigation, unless modified or terminated by order of this Court.
F. The restrictions set forth in any of the preceding paragraphs shall not apply to Confidential Information that was, is, or becomes public knowledge in a manner other than by violation of this Order.
7

IT IS ORDERED.
Dated: SEP 0 2 2005 ,2005

Dated:

, 2005

SEP 022005

8

EXHIBIT A Statement Of Confidentiality And Agreement To Abide By Protective Order
By signing this document, I hereby certify that I have read the Protective Order issued by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, governing production and disclosure of Confidential Infonnation in EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, Case No. 05 CV 0208. I understand the Protective Order and agree to be bound by and abide by its contents. I understand that pursuant to the Protective Order, I am prohibited from disclosing the Confidential Infonnation, or any infonnation derived from the Confidential Infonnation, to anyone. I submit to the jurisdiction of the Court for purposes of enforcing the Protective Order.
Signature
Name
Date

EXHIBITB
[Date]
Re: United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission vs. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP Case No.: 05 C 0208 N.D. Ill.
Dear Counsel: At the direction of the Honorable James B. Zagel, United States District Court
Judge for the Northern District of Illinois, counsel for the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP ("Sidley") are transmitting this letter to inform you about the contents of a Protective Order that will govern discovery in the above-captioned case and the production of information, as detailed below. If you have an objection to the production of this information, you may communicate in writing directly with Judge Zagel and explain the reasons for your objection.
As you are aware from a previous letter, this case involves a Complaint filed by the EEOC on January 3, 2005 alleging that Sidley discriminated against certain former Sidley partners based on their age. Sidley has denied these allegations.
The EEOC has requested information relating to your work at Sidley, including performance-related information and your personnel file.! Performance-related information and all non-public individual financial information, including information relating to individual compensation and benefits, will be produced by Sidley pursuant to a Protective Order and treated as Confidential Information under the terms of that Order. Other information in your personnel file (if any), as redacted, will be produced by Sidley but will not be treated as confidential under
Social security numbers, unlisted telephone numbers, infonnation regarding your children, spouses, dependents or named beneficiaries and medical infonnation will be redacted from the file.

[Date] Page 2

the Protective Order. In confonnity with the Protective Order, your performance-related

infonnation will be disclosed only to the EEOC and its staff, with two exceptions.

First, during the course of discovery Confidential Infonnation may be disclosed to

putative class members, prospective witnesses and deponents for use solely in the above-

referenced litigation. Prior to disclosing any Confidential Infonnation to these individuals, they

will be required to execute a Confidentiality Agreement ("Agreement"), agreeing to be bound by

the Protective Order. The Protective Order prohibits these individuals from disclosing

Confidential Infonnation to anyone else or from making or retaining a copy of this infonnation.

Second, the infonnation may be filed with the Court or introduced into evidence

at some date in the future if deemed relevant by Judge Zagel to motions or trial issues. The

Judge has ordered that all Confidential Infonnation be filed under seal subject to his review.

If you have an objection to the disclosure of this infonnation about you to putative

class members, prospective witnesses or deponents, you must mail a written objection

("Objection") to Judge Zagel setting forth your reasons. Your Objection must be postmarked by

September 26,2005. It is not necessary that your Objection be in any particular form nor is it

necessary that you retain counsel to submit your Objection, although you may choose to do so.

If your Objection contains factual assertions, it must be subscribed as follows:

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and

correct. Executed on

. (Signature)

If you fail to file a timely Objection, you will be deemed to have waived any such Objection.

Any Objection should be mailed to The Honorable James B. Zagel, United States

District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, 219 South Dearborn Street,

Suite 2588, Chicago, Illinois 60604. Copies should also be sent to the EEOC and Sidley, as

[Date] Page 3 follows: Equal Employment Opportunity Commission at 500 W. Madison, Suite 2800, Chicago, Illinois 60661, care of Deborah Hamilton and Laurie Elkin, and Grippo & Elden at III S. Wacker, Chicago, Illinois 60606, care of Gregory C. Jones.
The Judge has barred both Sidley and the EEOC from advising you as to the appropriateness of filing an objection. If you have any questions regarding what has been requested or produced in discovery or to whom the information may be shown, however, you or your counsel may direct them to: Gregory Jones of Grippo & Elden at (312) 704-7725, and Deborah Hamilton or Laurie Elkin of the EEOC at (312) 353-7649 or (312) 353-7726.
Thank you for your attention to this matter. Very truly yours,

Gary M. Elden, on behalf of Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, LLP

John C. Hendrickson, Regional Attorney, on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
v.
SIDLEY AUSTIN BROWN & WOOD LLP.,
Defendant.

No. 05 C 0208 Judge James B. Zagel

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER In July 2000, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) opened a direct investigation into Defendant Sidley Austin Brown & Wood’s (“Sidley”) compliance with the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) in connection with a downgrading of 32 of its partners and a change in its mandatory retirement age. Specifically, Sidley told 32 partners that they had to either accept a downgrade in their status from partner to counsel or senior counsel, or leave the firm. At the same time, Sidley reduced its mandatory retirement age from 65 to a sliding scale between 60-65. The EEOC commenced its work after it was widely reported by the media in late 1999 that the status of Sidley’s older partners had been changed to create opportunity for younger lawyers at the firm and after the EEOC received a confidential complaint from one of the affected partners. On July 5, 2000, the EEOC notified Sidley of the investigation in a letter that included a designated charge number and was accompanied by a Request For Information. After receiving only partial responses from Sidley, the EEOC served it with a subpoena. This

ultimately led to an enforcement action before Judge Lefkow and an appeal to the Seventh Circuit. After receiving documents provided in accordance with the courts’ orders and after completion of its investigation, the EEOC issued a Letter of Determination finding reasonable cause to believe that Sidley had violated the ADEA by downgrading certain partners on account of their age and by maintaining a mandatory retirement age. On September 29, 2004, after conciliation discussions between the parties proved unsuccessful, the EEOC issued to Sidley a Notice of Failure of Conciliation, and on January 13, 2005, filed this lawsuit seeking monetary damages and injunctive relief.
Sidley is now seeking partial summary judgment on the EEOC’s claims involving individual relief. Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322-323 (1986). The question presented in Sidley’s motion – whether the EEOC may pursue individual relief for persons who failed to file charges under the ADEA and are now barred from bringing their own individual suits – is a purely legal one, requiring that I determine whether EEOC v. North Gibson Sch. Corp., 266 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2001) was overruled by EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
In North Gibson, the Seventh Circuit held that the EEOC could not recover individual relief under the ADEA if none of the alleged victims had filed timely charges of discrimination. 266 F.3d at 619-20. In that case, five of the seven claimants represented by the EEOC had not filed any ADEA charges and the remaining two had made untimely filings. The North Gibson decision was based on the premise that when the EEOC pursues an individual claim under the ADEA, it “steps into the shoes of the individual” and becomes that individual’s representative.
2

Id. at 615. This privity, as the courts have put it, is created by the ADEA’s distinctive enforcement scheme wherein the right of the individual to bring an ADEA action is terminated upon the commencement of such an action by the EEOC. Id. The Court of Appeals reasoned that since the EEOC was acting in a representative capacity, it should not be able to seek monetary relief on behalf of an individual who had no right to relief, as there were no “shoes” into which the EEOC could step. Id. at 615. Because each of the seven suits would have been procedurally barred, the Court of Appeals held that the EEOC could not seek monetary relief on behalf of those individuals. Id. at 616. In its opinion, the Court of Appeals explicitly differentiated the EEOC’s right to seek such individual relief from the EEOC’s right to seek injunctive relief, stating that “[w]hen the EEOC sues on its own behalf to obtain an injunction that prohibits discrimination, it promotes the public interest because its ‘interests are broader than those of the individuals injured by discrimination.’” Id. (quoting EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 10 F.3d 1286, 1291 (7th Cir. 1993)).
If there were no question concerning the ongoing validity of North Gibson, the individual relief sought by the EEOC in this case would certainly be barred. Here, the EEOC received a confidential request for an investigation but never an ADEA charge. Since the time for such charges has long since expired, none of the 32 Sidley partners affected by the change in retirement policies would be entitled to seek relief from this or any other court, and I would be compelled to grant Sidley’s motion.
There is, however, the Supreme Court’s decision in Waffle House. In that case, the Supreme Court held that the EEOC could seek monetary relief for individuals whose claims were barred because each had signed a mandatory arbitration agreement with his or her employer.
3

Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 295. The Court found that the Americans With Disabilities Act
(“ADA”) made “the EEOC the master of its own case” and “confer[red] on the agency the
authority to evaluate the strength of the public interest at stake.” Id. at 291. The Court further
found that “it is the public agency’s province – not that of the court – to determine whether
public resources should be committed to the recovery of victim-specific relief.” Id. at 291-92.
The Court emphasized that the EEOC may seek “to vindicate a public interest...even when it
pursues entirely victim-specific relief.” Id. at 296. With this reasoning, the Court put an end to
the distinction recognized in earlier cases, like North Gibson, between the EEOC’s ability to seek
individual monetary relief and its ability to seek injunctive relief. In this way, the Court makes it
clear that the EEOC’s right to bring suit seeking individual monetary relief goes beyond that of
the individual and reaches the territory of public interest, thereby allowing the EEOC to seek
relief for individuals, like the affected Sidley partners in this case, who could not, for any variety
of reasons, do so themselves.
Sidley, of course, argues that the Waffle House decision is applicable to only those cases
in which the EEOC is seeking monetary relief on behalf of individuals who are subject to arbitration agreements.1 This notion is dispelled by the Seventh Circuit’s decision in EEOC v.
1 Sidley also contends that Waffle House does not apply to the ADEA because its enforcement scheme is distinct from that of the ADA. I find this reading of Waffle House to be particularly strained in light of the Seventh Circuit’s decision in EEOC v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis., 288 F.3d 296 (7th Cir. 2002). As discussed herein, in BOR, the Court of Appeals applied Waffle House to a case brought by the EEOC under the ADEA, clearly demonstrating that the rationale is applicable to ADEA cases. BOR, 288 F.3d at 300. The language in the Waffle House decision also indicates that it would be applicable to the ADEA. Waffle House discusses the province of the EEOC over discrimination cases during the first 180 days after a complaint is filed with the agency. The Court notes that during this 180-day period, the EEOC has full control of the complaint’s litigation. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 292. Within that period, an employee must obtain a right-to-sue letter before bringing a complaint in court and if, during
4

Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis., 288 F.3d 296 (7th Cir. 2002). In BOR, the Court of Appeals applied the reasoning developed in Waffle House to a case involving sovereign immunity – an area of law wholly unrelated to arbitration agreements. In determining the EEOC had an independent right to sue the state of Wisconsin (and therefore the board of regents of the University of Wisconsin), the Court of Appeals relied heavily on the language from Waffle House stating that the EEOC was “the master of its own case” and could seek “to vindicate a public interest, not simply provide make-whole relief for the employee, even when it pursues entirely victim-specific relief.” Id. at 300 (quoting Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 296). The Court of Appeals found this reasoning to forestall any argument that the EEOC was merely “standing in the shoes of the individuals” or was “acting in privity with them as their representative.” Id. at 299-300.
Yet, Sidley urges me to base my opinion on exactly the same kind of privity logic that failed to persuade the courts in Waffle House and BOR. Sidley argues that I should deny the EEOC the right to seek individual monetary relief on behalf of the affected Sidley partners because the partners themselves have no right to sue. I disagree. Waffle House makes clear that EEOC’s ability to seek monetary relief on behalf of individuals is derived from its own statutory rights to advance the public’s interest and is unrelated to any individual’s right. I find it clear enough from the holdings in both Waffle House and BOR that the privity arguments seen in North Gibson are no longer applicable and that Waffle House does in fact overrule that decision.
that time, the EEOC decides to pursue its own suit, the individual has no independent cause of action. Id. This period creates an enforcement scheme much like that of the ADEA in which the EEOC’s ADEA suit trumps any suit filed by an individual.
5

In BOR, the Seventh Circuit did contemplate curtailing the EEOC’s public interest based rights when there is another compelling, countervailing interest at issue. 288 F.3d at 300. As the Court notes, it would have to be more important than the right to arbitration or sovereign immunity. Id. Sidley contends that allowing the EEOC to seek monetary relief for individuals who are barred from doing so themselves because they have failed to file charges within the statutorily allowed period contravenes an employer’s interest in reasonably speedy resolution of discrimination claims, an interest that underlies all of our discrimination statutes. Sidley claims that allowing the EEOC to revive untimely claims obliterates the otherwise strictly enforced statutes of limitations associated with Title VII, ADA, and ADEA cases. While, in the abstract, Sidley’s argument does carry some weight, in the context of this case, it does not have much force. The EEOC began investigating Sidley’s retirement practices approximately seven months after the changes to its policies, brought about in late 1999, were widely broadcast in the media and after receiving a confidential complaint. On July 5, 2000, the EEOC notified Sidley of the investigation with a letter that was accompanied by a document request. Over the next two years, the EEOC and Sidley battled over that document production. In July 2004, the EEOC completed its investigation and sent a Letter of Determination to Sidley stating that it had found reasonable cause to believe Sidley’s retirement policies violated the ADEA. After engaging in unsuccessful conciliation discussions, the EEOC filed this suit on January 13, 2005.
Throughout, these proceedings have been of great interest not only to Sidley but also to most other large law firms across the country. It would be difficult for Sidley to argue that the EEOC’s suit has come as a surprise or that the EEOC’s claims concerning their new retirement policy are somehow stale or that it had no reasonable opportunity for a speedy resolution of this
6

matter. This is almost certainly why Sidley focuses on the possibility that the EEOC might bring their retirement policies dating back to 1978 into the suit. This argument, however, should really be directed toward determining the relevant class of individuals who may be properly represented by the EEOC in this suit. There may come a time when it is appropriate for me to set some temporal limits on the class of persons who may be represented in this case. But, that time is not now. The possibility that the individual claims of some partners affected by Sidley’s longstanding retirement policies may be too remote for this case does not justify throwing out all the individual claims of partners affected by Sidley’s newly implemented retirement plan. Accordingly, I find that concerns over bringing stale claims do not override the EEOC’s right to advance the interests of the public by seeking individual relief for at least some individuals in this case.
Sidley’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

DATE: June 9, 2005

ENTER:
James B. Zagel _______________________________
James B. Zagel United States District Judge

7

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 2.5
Eastern Division

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP

Plaintiff,

Case No.: 1:05−cv−00208 Hon. James B. Zagel

Defendant.

NOTIFICATION OF DOCKET ENTRY

This docket entry was made by the Clerk on Thursday, July 13, 2006:
MINUTE entry before Judge James B. Zagel :Motion hearing held on 7/13/2006. MOTION by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to compel Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) deposition [77] is granted in part and denied in part. Status hearing set for 9/28/2006 at 10:00 AM.(drw, )

ATTENTION: This notice is being sent pursuant to Rule 77(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or Rule 49(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. It was generated by CM/ECF, the automated docketing system used to maintain the civil and criminal dockets of this District. If a minute order or other document is enclosed, please refer to it for additional information.
For scheduled events, motion practices, recent opinions and other information, visit our web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov.

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT )

OPPORTUNTTY COMMISSION,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

) Case No. 05 C 0208

v.

)

) Judge James Zage1

SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP,

)

)

Defendant.

)

)

PROTECTIVE ORDER GOVERNING SUBSEOUENT EMPLOYMENT INFORMATION AND DOCUMENTS For the reasons stated by the Court on October 6, 2006, and November 21, 2006, it appears that good cause exists for the entry of this Protective Order. In order to preserve and maintain the confidentiality of certain documents and information to be produced with respect to former Sidley Austin LLP ("Sidley") partners who were informed of a change to counselor senior counsel in late 1999 or on whose behalf the EEOC is seeking relief in this litigation ("Former Partners"), the Court hereby orders as follows: I. DEFINITIONS A. The term "Confidential Subsequent Employment Information" is defined as any of the following types of information:
I) Any equity or ownership interest that any Former Partner holds or has held in a law firms after his or her partner status at Sidley ended ("Subsequent Firms");

2) Hours any Fonner Partner has billed and/or charged to clients while affiliated with a Subsequent Firm;
3) Revenues generated from billings to clients any Fonner Partner originated, is responsible for, or for which a Former Partner is credited for purposes or determining the Former Partner's compensation;
4) Business any Fonner Partner has generated and clients any Fonner Partner has retained since leaving Sidley;
5) Business development efforts any Former Partner has engaged in since leaving Sidley;
6) Tenns, conditions, duties, and/or responsibilities of any non-Sidley employment or sel f-employment held by any Fonner Partner after October 1999; or
7) Any other private, proprietary, or trade secret information pertaining to a Former Partner's employment or self-employment after October 1999.
B. The term "Confidential Subsequent Employment Document" refers to a document that contains any of the above types of information defined as "Confidential Subsequent Employment Information," including but not limited to memoranda, databases, compilations and discovery responses that disclose such Confidential Subsequent Employment Information.
C. As used herein, "disclosure" or "to disclose" shall mean to divulge, reveal, describe, summarize, paraphrase, quote, transmit, or otherwise directly communicate Confidential Subsequent Employment Information.
2

II. RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF CONFIDENTIAL SUBSEQUENT EMPLOYMENT INFORMATION A. For purposes of production to Sidley, Former Partners shall produce one copy of a
Confidential Subsequent Employment Document to the EEOC. B. The EEOC shall designate a document that it or a Former Partner determines in
good faith to contain Confidential Subsequent Employment Information by (I) stamping the words "CONFIDENTIAL SUBSEQUENT EMPLOYMENT DOCUMENT" on the document, or (2) using any other reasonable method agreed upon by the parties.
C. If a party inadvertently fails to designate discovery material as Confidential Subsequent Employment Information, it may make the designation belatedly so long as it does so promptly after learning of the oversight. Counsel for the receiving parties shall take reasonably necessary steps to ensure the confidentiality ofthe Confidential Subsequent Employment Information, including reasonable efforts to secure return of the Confidential Information from individuals to whom disclosure was made but would not have been permitted by this Order had the Discovery Material been originally designated as Confidential Subsequent Employment Information.
D. A party designating all or a portion of a document or record of a deposition or oral
hearing Confidential ("Designated Material"), shall contemporaneously identify the subparagraph(s) of the definition of "Confidential Subsequent Employment Information" (identified by paragraph and any subparagraph of § l.A) that support the designation. If the Designated Material is a record of a deposition or oral hearing and the designating party has determined that more than one paragraph or subparagraph of § LA supports the designation, the designating party shall identify the portion(s) of the Designated Material to which each paragraph or subparagraph of § l.A applies.
3

E. Sidley's outside counsel, Grippo & Elden LLC; Sidley's damages experts; the EEOC; and the EEOC's damages experts may each make one copy of Confidential Subsequent Employment Documents for use as permitted by this Order.
F. The EEOC and Sidley may each designate one attorney and one legal assistant and one damages expert and one assistant (collectively "Designees") who shaH be permitted to view the Confidential Subsequent Employment Documents, provided that any such Designee has agreed to abide by the terms and conditions of this Order by signing Exhibit A. No Designee shall be a current or former employee or current or former partner of Sidley Austin LLP or of its predecessor entities. Each party shall file a statement of designation with the Court, using the form attached as Exhibit B to this Order.
G. Through the conclusion of trial in this matter, counsel for the parties shall store Confidential Subsequent Employment Documents in a locked file accessible only to Designees and those permitted by § II.H to have access to Confidential Subsequent Employment Information.
H. Tn preparation for, and during the deposition of any Former Partner, Confidential Subsequent Employment Information and Documents may be shared with the EEOC and Sidley counsel taking or defending the deposition, as well as any private counsel retained by that Former Partner to assist or advise him or her in cOllllection with this action. One copy of a Confidential Subsequent Employment Document may be made for use as a deposition exhibit. However, prior to using any Confidential Subsequent Employment Document as an exhibit at a deposition, the parties shall confer in good faith to attempt to limit the disclosure of Confidential Subsequent Employment Information, including by redaction or a stipulation as to the relevant factual information contained in the document.
4

I. Prior to the introduction of any Confidential Subsequent Employment Documents
n.R at a deposition, all persons except for Designees, those permitted by § to have access to
Confidential Subsequent Employment Information, and the court reporter shall be excluded from the deposition. A party may, on the record during a deposition, instruct the court reporter to mark any deposition transcript pages that the party in good faith believes contain Confidential Subsequent Employment Information as "Confidential Subsequent Employment Information." For purposes of this Order, deposition transcript pages so marked will be considered a Confidential Subsequent Employment Document.
J. At the conclusion of a trial in this matter, the parties shall file the Confidential Subsequent Employment Documents under seal with the Court, pursuant to Local Rule 26.2.
K. Within 90 days after the final completion of the litigation (including any appeals), the parties shall destroy Confidential Subsequent Employment Documents filed under seal with (he Court or, upon request of the producer, return the Confidential Subsequent Employment Documents to the producer, except as required by applicable law and regulation.
L. Confidential Subsequent Employment Information shall be disclosed or used only for the purpose ofthis litigation (including any appeals) and to the extent necessary to prosecute or defend this action.
M. Confidential Subsequent Employment Information associated with a Former Partner may be disclosed to any private attorney retained by that Former Partner to provide legal advice or assistance to the Former Partner in connection with this action.
N. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Order, no Confidential Subsequent Employment Information shall be disclosed to any current or former partner, employee, or contractor of Sidley Austin, LLP, or of its predecessor entities.
5

O. Notwithstanding any other provision ofthis Order, a Former Partner's right, if any, to disclose or authorize the disclosure of the Former Partner's own Confidential Subsequent Employment Information to any person or persons is not limited by this Order.
P. Any portion of a deposition exhibit, pleading, discovery response, transcript, or other writing filed with the Court in this litigation that contains Confidential Subsequent Employment Information shall be filed as a restricted document, pursuant to Local Rule 26.2, in a sealed envelope labeled "CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED DOCUMENT FILED PURSUANT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER." Ifthe party filing such a restricted document believes that some or all of the Documents or Information contained in the filed restricted document should not be restricted, the party shall include a statement identifying such Documents or Infonnation. The other party will be given the opportunity to respond to the filing party's statement prior to a Court ruling on whether, and what portion of, the filed Documents or Infonnation shall remain restricted. A party receiving a restricted filing may object to the filing of some or all of such Documents or Infonnation as a restricted document by submitting a similar statement. The filing party will be given the same opportunity to respond prior to a Court mling.
Q. The parties shall make reasonable efforts to reach agreement on redacting, coding or otherwise removing Confidential Subsequent Employment Information to avoid the necessity of filing restricted documents or to allow documents to be unrestricted. Documents may be filed under nonnal Court procedures if the Confidential Suhsequent Employment Information listed in Paragraph I.A of this Order has been redacted, coded or otherwise removed from the document.
6

III. SPECIAL PROVISION RELATING TO TAX RETURNS Pursuant to this Court's October 6,2006 ruling, Former Partners shall produce copies of
their income tax returns as sought by Sidley's subpoenas. Such tax returns may be shared with Sidley's outside counsel, Grippo & Elden LLC, counsel to the EEOC, and damages experts engaged by Sidley or by the EEOC in connection with this action. The returns may not be shared with any current or former employee or current or former partner of Sidley Austin LLP or of its predecessor entities, except that the amount of income reflected in such tax returns may be disclosed to Sidley client representatives who serve as in"house counsel for this litigation. IV. MISCELLANEOUS
A. This Order does not limit the right of any party to object to the scope of discovery in the case.
B. This Order does not constitute a determination ofthe admissibility or evidentiary foundation for the documents or a waiver of any party's objections thereto.
C. Within 90 days after the final completion of the litigation (including any appeals) all copies of Confidential Subsequent Employment Documents shall be returned to the person who disclosed them or (with that person's consent) destroyed. except as required by applicable law and regulations. Any documents not so returned and not destroyed will remain subject to this Order.
D. The designation of documents or information as Confidential Subsequent Employment Information or as Confidential Subsequent Employment Documents shall not be construed as a waiver of any applicable privilege or other immunities from discovery (including without limitation the attorney-client privilege and the attorney work product doctrine) or as a
7

concession by the designating party that such information is relevant or material to any issue or is otherwise discoverable.
E. This Order shall continue indefinitely during and after this litigation, unless modi fied or terminated by order of this Court.
F. The restrictions set forth in any of the preceding paragraphs shall not apply to Confidential Subsequent Employment Tnformation that was, is, or becomes public knowledge in a marmer other than by violation of this Order.
TT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: _J_AN--.-:;:.,2--",-5--"-20",-,,O~7_

United States District Judge

8

EXHIBIT A Statement of Confidentiality And Agreement To Abide By Protective Order By signing this document, I hereby certify that I have read the Protective Order Governing Subsequent Employment Information and Documents ("Order") issued by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, governing production and disclosure of certain documents related to the subsequent employment of former Sidley Austin, LLP partners in EEOC Y. Sidley Austin, Case No. 05 CV 0208. I understand the Order and agree to be bound by and abide by its contents. I understand that pursuant to the Order, I am prohibited from disclosing Confidential Subsequent Employment Information to anyone. I submit to the jurisdiction of the Court for purposes of enforcing the Order.
Signature
Name
Date

•

EXHIBITB

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
v. SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP,
Defendant.

) ) ) ) ) Case No. 05 C 0208 ) ) Judge James Zagel ) ) ) )

DESIGNATION OF PERSON(S) WITH ACCESS TO SUBSEQUENT EMPLOYMENT DOCUMENTS

Pursuant to Section lLF of the Protective Order Governing Subsequent Employment

Documents, entered on _ _ _ _ _ _" [PARTY NAME] hereby designates the following

individuals as persons authorized to view Confidential Subsequent Employment Information:

Designated Attorney:
[Attorney Name] [Firm Name] [Business Address and Phone]
Designated Expert:
[Expert Name] [Exper! Firm Name] [Expert Business Address and Phone]

Designated Legal Assistant:
[Legal Assistant Name] [Firm Name] [Business Address and Phone]
Designated Expert Assistant:
[Expert Assistant Name] [Expert Assistant Firm Name] [Expert Assistant Business Address and Phone]

 
 Case 1:05-cv-00208 Document 176 Filed 10/04/2007 Page 1 of 15

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT

)

OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

) Case No. 05 cv 0208

v.

)

) Judge James B. Zagel

SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP,

)

)

Defendant.

)

CONSENT DECREE This Consent Decree (the "Decree") is made and entered into between Plaintiff United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter referred to as the "Commission" or "EEOC") and Defendant Sidley Austin LLP (hereinafter, together with predecessor entities, referred to as "Sidley") (EEOC and Sidley being collectively referred to herein as "the Parties"). On January 13, 2005, EEOC initiated this action by filing its Complaint against Sidley. EEOC's Complaint alleged that Sidley violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of J967, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §621 et seq. ("ADEA"), by implementing and maintaining an age-based retirement policy and by expelling from its partnership, on account of their age, certain partners age 40 and older. Sidley filed an Answer denying any violation of the ADEA. The Parties have engaged in comprehensive settlement negotiations in a cooperative and good faith effort to resolve this matter and have agreed that this action

1

Case 1:05-cv-00208 Document 176 Filed 10/04/2007 Page 2 of 15
should be finally resolved by entry of this Decree, and enter into this Decree to settle and resolve all allegations that were raised or could have been raised in this action.
Findings Having carefully examined the terms and provisions of this Decree, and based on the pleadings, record, and stipulations of the Parties, the Court finds the following: a. This Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this action and of the
Parties. b. The terms of this Decree are adequate, fair, reasonable and just. The
rights of EEOC, the individuals on whose behalf EEOC has sought relief, Sidley, and the public interest are adequately protected by this Decree. c. This Decree conforms with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the ADEA and is not in derogation of the rights or privileges of any person. The entry of this Decree will further the objectives of the ADEA and will be in the best interests of the Parties and the public. d. This Decree shall not constitute an adjudication or a finding on the merits of the EEOC's allegations or an admission by Sidley of those allegations or any violation of the ADEA.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT:
1. Coverage Of Partners Under ADEA Under This Decree For purposes of resolution of this matter, Sidley agrees that each person for whom EEOC has sought relief in this matter was an employee for the purposes of the ADEA as of the dates when Sidley made and carried out the decision to remove him or her from the
2

, - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _...,..,-_....
Case 1:05-cv-00208 Document 176 Filed 10/04/2007

Page 3 of 15

status of partner, and that in any proceeding to enforce this Decree, Sidley will not assert as a defense that a partner is not or was not an employee for the purposes of the ADEA.
2. Resolution Of All Allegations The Parties agree that EEOC has had a full opportunity to investigate the Practices that are the subj ect of its Complaint in this action; that EEOC has identified all partners that it alleges to have been adversely affected by those Practices; and that it will take no further action, other than requiring compliance with this Decree, to pursue monetary or nonmonetary relief for any partner allegedly affected by those Practices prior to the Effective Date of this Decree. For purposes ofthis paragraph 2, "Practices" means any act, policy, or practice by Sidley which allegedly affected the status or compensation of a partner adversely and which was allegedly motivated by that partner's age. 3. Injunctive Relief For the term of the Decree, Sidley, acting through its Executive Committee or otherwise, shall refrain from the following: A. Terminating, expelling, retiring, reducing the compensation of, or otherwise adversely changing the partnership status of a partner because of age; B. Maintaining any formal or informal policy or practice requiring retirement as a partner, or requiring permission to continue as a partner, once the partner has reached a certain age or age range; C. With the intent to bring about the departure or change in partnership status of a partner because of age, requesting or suggesting the retirement or change in partnership status of a partner in such fashion that a reasonable person in the partner's position would believe that a refusal is likely to bring adverse consequences;

3

Case 1:05-cv-00208 Document 176 Filed 10/04/2007 Page 4 of 15
D. Requiring partners to cease their service on any firm committee (except the Executive or Management Committees), or as a practice group head, because of age;
E. Taking any action, or maintaining any policy or practice, with the purpose ofretaliating against any person because the person (i) has made any formal or informal complaint about, or has taken any action to oppose, any of the conduct alleged by EEOC in this case to violate the ADEA, or any of the conduct which is prohibited by this Decree; (ii) has testified during, or assisted or cooperated in any manner with, EEOC's investigation prior to its filing this action or during prosecution of the action itself; (iii) has been identified as a possible witness in this action; or (iv) has sought and/or received any relief or has exercised any other right under this Decree.
4. Monetary Relief A. Sidley shall pay the sum oftwenty,seven million five hundred thousand dollars ($27,500,000) (hereinafter "Settlement Fund"), to be distributed to "Eligible Claimants" (as that term is defined in paragraph 4B, below), in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph. B. EEOC, in the exercise of its discretion and without participation from Sidley, has determined how the Settlement Fund shall be distributed to individuals on whose behalf EEOC has sought monetary relief in this action. Those individuals and the amounts each is to receive are identified on Exhibit A to be filed under seal with the Court. Each individual from whom EEOC actually receives an executed Release Form (attached as Exhibit B) within 60 calendar days after the entry of this Decree shall be deemed an "Eligible Claimant." Additionally, in the case of one deceased individual
4

Case 1:05-cv-00208 Document 176 Filed 10/04/2007 Page 5 of 15
with no known next of kin, the organization to which that individual bequeathed his estate, identified in Exhibit A, is hereby deemed an "Eligible Claimant."
C. Sidley shall make payments to Eligible Claimants from the Settlement Fund by issuing and sending (or causing to be issued and sent) to each Eligible Claimant a check in the amount set forth opposite the Eligible Claimant's name on Exhibit A, less deductions (if any) required by law, on or before the tenth business day after Sidley receives from EEOC a Release Form executed by the Eligible Claimant. Such checks shall be sent to Eligible Claimants by Certified Mail or overnight courier service, and Sidley shall submit a copy of each such check to EEOC contemporaneously.
D. If an individual identified in Exhibit A fails to return an executed Release Form to EEOC within sixty (60) calendar days after entry of this Decree, or if, after good faith and diligent efforts EEOC is unable to obtain an executed Release Form from such individual, EEOC shall notify Sidley in writing that the amount set forth opposite the name of that individual in Exhibit A shall be deemed unclaimed ("Unclaimed Amount"), and that individual shall be precluded from any future recovery in this action. No later than one hundred twenty (120) days after entry ofthis Decree, EEOC shaH advise Sidley of the total of Unclaimed Amounts. Sidley shall thereupon issue and send to EEOC's Regional Attorney, Chicago District, by Certified Mail or overnight courier service, a check payable to the United States Treasury in the amount of the total Unclaimed Amounts.
E. There shall be no reversion of any part of the Settlement Fund to Sidley. 5. Record Retention A. For the term of the Decree, Sidley shall preserve documents and records
5

Case 1:05-cv-00208 Document 176 Filed 10/04/2007 Page 6 of 15
(in hard copy and electronic form) in such a manner that the following documents and records remain available relating to any partner who withdraws, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, from the partnership at a time when he is 40 years of age or older: (i) documents and records from the five years preceding withdrawal sufficient to show the partner's hours, billings, realization, and compensation for that period; (ii) documents and records reflecting any formal or informal evaluations by any committee, practice group head, or Executive Committee member of the performance or productivity of the partner; (iii) documents and records relating to any decision by Sidley to request or require the partner's departure or otherwise adversely to affect the partner's status as a Sidley partner; and (iv) documents discussing the reasons for the partner's departure or potential departure.
B. for the term of the Decree, Sidley shall also maintain all documents (in hard copy and electronic form) relating to any complaint of violation of Paragraph 3 of this Decree.
C. EEOC shall be provided upon request with any of the documents and records maintained pursuant to this paragraph S, as well as information about the substance and implementation of Sidley's ongoing training programs.
6. Compliance and Dispute Resolution Procedures A. Only EEOC shall have standing to seek relief from the Court for alleged violations of this Decree. Prior to EEOC's seeking relieffor conduct that, ifproved, would violate paragraph 3 of this Decree, the Parties shall follow the procedures of this paragraph 6. B. During the term of this Decree, a Sidley partner may complain of conduct
6

Case 1:05-cv-00208 Document 176 Filed 10/04/2007 Page 7 of 15
that, if proved, would violate paragraph 3A, 38, 3C, or 3D of this Decree, and any person may complain of conduct that, if proved, would violate paragraph 3E of this Decree. The Parties hereby designate Abner 1. Mikva ("Mikva") to receive and investigate such complaints. Mikva shall deal with any such complaint as follows:
(I) Mikva shall keep in confidence the fact of the complainant's complaining to him and any information received from the complainant until such time, if any, as the complainant requests Mikva to make the complaint known to Sidley. If the complainant does not so request within an amount of time deemed appropriate by Mikva, Mikva shall make no additional investigation of the matter. If the complainant so requests, the complainant shall state his or her complaint in writing, and that complaint shall be provided to Sidley, with a copy to EEOC on a confidential basis. Mikva shall thereupon conduct such further investigation of the complaint as he deems appropriate. Sidley will provide Mikva with such documents and records as Mikva reasonably requests relating to the complaint and will allow Mikva to interview persons at Sidley with knowledge of relevant facts. Mikva shall treat all documents and information gathered in the course of his duties under this Decree as confidential. After performing this investigation, Mikva shall determine whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the Decree has been violated. If Mikva determines that there are not such reasonable grounds, he shall so advise the complainant, Sidley, and EEOC, and thereafter EEOC shall take no action to pursue relief for the complainant under this Decree or otherwise.
(2) If Mikva concludes that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the Decree has been violated, he shall attempt to resolve the matter by agreement between Sidley and complainant. Ifno such resolution is achieved, Mikva shall submit a
7

Case 1:05-cv-00208 Document 176 Filed 10/04/2007 Page 8 of 15
conlldential report to Sidley, with a copy to EEOC on a confidential basis, summarizing the results of his investigation and giving his recommendation as to what action, if any, Sidley andlor the complainant should take to resolve the matter. A copy of the recommendation contained in that report shall be provided to the complainant. Sidley thereupon may agree to accept and to implement this recommendation, in which case EEOC shall take no action to pursue relief as to the matter under this Decree or otherwise. If Sidley declines to accept and to implement Mikva's recommendation, EEOC, in its discretion, may apply to the Court for relief it deems appropriate.
C. Nothing in this paragraph 6 shall be deemed to prevent a person from presenting his complaint directly to Sidley and seeking to resolve the matter without the intervention of Mikva. However, no such prior presentation to Sidley shall be required as a condition of the person consulting with Mikva or having Mikva investigate the matter.
D. Sidley shall compensate Mikva for work performed under this Decree at his regular hourly rate or upon such other terms as may be agreed between them, and shall reimburse Mikva for expenses reasonably incurred. Those expenses may include reasonable compensation paid by Mikva to persons retained by Mikva who are necessary to assist him with his duties under this Decree.
E. EEOC shall have the power to investigate possible violations of this Decree other than violations that are alleged by complainants pursuant to paragraph 6B. Sidley will cooperate with any such investigation. If EEOC after such investigation concludes that Sidley has failed to comply with any provision of this Decree, it shall notify Sidley in writing of such alleged noncompliance. The Parties shall inform Mikva
8

_-_ _ __ .- ... _.. ..... ..... _.. _ . _ - - - - - - - - - - _ . ...._....._ - - -
Case 1:05-cv-00208 Document 176 Filed 10/04/2007 Page 9 of 15
ofthe dispute, who shall attempt to assist the Parties in resolving it. If the Parties have not resolved the dispute by agreement within 30 business days, EEOC may apply to the Court for appropriate relief. In the event that, upon the expiration date of this Decree, a dispute is pending pursuant to this paragraph 6, then the term of this Decree shall be extended, with respect to the issue in dispute only, until such time as such dispute is resolved by the Parties or the Court.
F. No later than October 1,2008, and again no later than December 1,2009, Mikva shall submit a report to EEOC, with a copy to Sidley, regarding his activities for the period of the Decree, including a summary, without naming the complainants, of all complaints submitted under the Decree and the resolution of those complaints.
G. In the event that Mikva becomes unable to serve during the term of the Decree, EEOC shall propose a replacement to Sidley. If the Parties agree on a replacement, they shall jointly identify the replacement to the Court. If the Parties are unable to agree on a replacement, the Court shall designate a replacement, giving due consideration to the recommendations of the Parties.
7. Distribution of Decree A. Within two (2) weeks after entry of this Decree, Sidley shall provide a copy of the Decree, without Exhibits, to each partner. With respect to any individual who becomes a partner during the term of this Decree, Sidley shall provide a copy of the Decree, without Exhibits, within two (2) weeks of that individual becoming a Partner. B. Within two (2) weeks after entry of this Decree, Sidley shall post, in each of its offices, the notice attached as Exhibit C. 8. Construction Of Decree A. Nothing in this Decree shall be construed as preventing Sidley from
9

Case 1:05-cv-00208 Document 176 Filed 10/04/2007 Page 10 of 15
requesting or requiring the departure, change of partnership status, or reduction in compensation of one or more partners, or discussing retirement with, offering retirement to, or negotiating the terms of retirement with, one or more partners, because of a partner's inadequate or lessened performance, productivity, or contribution to the firm, the need or desirability of a reduction in force, or any other legitimate business reason, so long as none of the above actions is taken with intent to discriminate on the basis of age.
B. Nothing in this Decree shall be construed as preventing Sidley from setting expectations for partner performance and contributions that increase with the
partner's length of service with the firm, so long as no such expectations are set or acted
upon with intent to discriminate on the basis of age. 9. Effective Date And Term of Consent Decree The Effective Date of thi s Decree shall be the date the Court approves and enters
it. The term of this Decree shall be from the Effective Date through and including December 31, 2009. During that time, this Court shall retain jurisdiction over this matter and the Parties for purposes of enforcing compliance with the Decree, including issuing such orders as may be required to effectuate its purposes.
10. Protective Orders The Parties shall continue to be bound by the Protective Orders, as heretofore or hereafter amended, entered in this litigation, and the obligations of those Protective Orders shall survive the expiration ofthis Decree. The two reports submitted by Mikva pursuant to paragraph 6F of this Decree shall not be subject to those Protective Orders. Upon expiration of this Decree, the Parties shall return to each other or (upon request)
10

Case 1:05-cv-00208 Document 176 Filed 10/04/2007 Page 11 of 15

destroy all copies of Confidential Documents produced by the other party, except as

required by applicable law and regulation.

ll. Costs and Attorney's Fees

Neither party shall seek reimbursement from the other party for any litigation

costs or attorney's fees incurred in this litigation or during the administration of this

Decree.

12. Notices

Except as is otherwise provided for in this Decree, all notifications, reports and

communications to the Parties required under this Decree shall be made in writing and

shall be sufficient if hand-delivered or sent in a confidential manner by overnight courier

service to the following persons only:

For EEOC:
John C. Hendrickson, Esq. Regional Attorney EEOC 500 W. Madison St., Suite 2800 Chicago, Illinois 60661

For Sidley: William F. Conlon, Esq. Sidley Austin LLP One South Dearborn Street Chicago, IL 60603

Either party may change such address by written notice to the other party, setting

forth a new address for this purpose. Notwithstanding the provisions for notification

contained in this paragraph, the Parties may send each other such notifications, reports

and communications in a confidential manner by facsimile or e-mail transmission.

13. Successors and Assigns

The terms of this Decree are and shall be binding on the present and future

Partners, agents, successors and assigns of Sidley.

14. Severllnce

If any provision(s) of the Decree are found to be unlawful, only such provision(s)

11

Case 1:05-cv-00208 Document 176 Filed 10/04/2007 Page 12 of 15 shall be severed. and the remainder of the Decree shall remain in full force and effect.
15. Choice of Law. Any dispute arising under this Decree is to be resolved under federal law, and any action to seek judicial enforcement of this Decree shall be sought in the Northern District of Illinois. 16. Entireties And Amendments This Decree constitutes the complete agreement between EEOC and Sidley with respect to thc matters referred to herein. No waiver, modification or amendment of any provision of this Decree shall be effective unless made in writing, approved by the Parties and approved or ordered by the Court.
12

Case 1:05-cv-00208 Document 176 Filed 10/04/2007
Agreed to in fonn and content:
FOR THE PLAINTIFF, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION:
By: RONALD S. COOPER General Counsel
JAMES LEE Deputy General Counsel
T OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Page 13 of 15

'--h~.s,~
By: Laurie S. Elkin T'

$U!~d~ry..:·ffial Attorney

Trial Attorney

---..~:~~~~~..":::~LJIL.~~':::::----__ Dated: O"+<>~(1k 4, ZODT

By: Deborah 1. Hamilton

Trial Attorney

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
500 West Madison Street, Suite 2800 Chicago, Illinois 60661 (312) 353-8551

FOR THE DEFENDANT,
SIDL&@'[~'

By: 'homas A. Cole Chair, Executive Committee
By: Chari: W.'Dougfas Chair, Management Committee

Dated: ,,~ tit u.o 7

~ of~2007. SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED this po day

Case 1:05-cv-00208 Document 176 Filed 10/04/2007 Page 14 of 15

EXHIBITB RELEASE AGREEMENT

In consideration for $

paid to me by Sidley Austin LLP, in connection

with the resolution of EEOC v. Sidley Austin LLP, Case No. 05 cv 0208 in the United

States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, I waive my right to recover for

any claims of age discrimination that I had against Sidley Austin LLP and any

predecessor or affiliated entities prior to the date of this release and that were included in

the claims alleged in EEOC's complaint in that lawsuit.

Date:

14

Case 1:05-cv-00208 Document 176 Filed 10/04/2007 Page 15 of 15
EXHIBITC NOTICE
This Notice is being posted pursuant to a Consent Decree entered by the federal court in EEOC v, Sidley Austin LLP, Case No, 05 CV 0208, resolving a lawsuit filed by the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") against Sidley Austin LLP ("Sidley"), In its suit, EEOC alleged that Sidley violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended, 29 U,S.C. § 621 et seq. ("ADEA"), by implementing and maintaining an age-based retirement policy and by expelling from its partnership, on account of their age, certain partners age 40 and older. Sidley filed an Answer denying the EEOC's allegations. The parties have settled this case by entering into a Consent Decree, The Decree does not represent a finding on the merits or an admission of EEOC's allegations. The Decree will remain in effect until December 31, 2009. Sidley is required by the Decree to distribute a copy of the Decree to each partner, including persons who become partners after entry of the Decree, In addition to providing monetary reliefto certain individuals on whose behalf EEOC sought relief, the Decree requires Sidley to refrain from taking certain specified actions as to any partner. The Decree also contains a provision requiring Sidley to refrain from taking any retaliatory actions. This provision is applicable to any person, not just Sidley partners, The Decree provides a detailed dispute resolution procedure for considering and resolving complaints of violation of the Decree. If you believe that the Decree has been violated, you may obtain details of the dispute resolution procedure and information on how to file a complaint by contacting William F. Conlon, Esq. at Sidley, whose telephone number is 312-853-7384, or by contacting Abner J. Mikva (whom the parties have designated to perform certain duties under the dispute resolution procedure), whose telephone number is 312-655-0555.
15

 
 406 F.Supp.2d 991 (2005)
UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v.
SIDLEY AUSTIN BROWN & WOOD LLP., Defendant.
No. 05 C 0208.
United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.
December 20, 2005.
992 *992 Deborah Lois Hamilton, Gregory M. Gochanour, John C. Hendrickson, Justin Mulaire, Laurie S. Elkin, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.
Gary Michael Elden, Amanda Helen McMurtrie, Gregory Campbell Jones, John E. Bucheit, Lynn Hagman Murray, Maile H. Solis, Grippo & Elden, Chicago, IL, Paul Grossman, Robert S. Span, Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ZAGEL, District Judge.
In July 2000, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") opened a direct investigation into Defendant Sidley Austin Brown & Wood's ("Sidley") compliance with the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") in connection with a downgrading of 32 of its partners and a change in its mandatory retirement age. Specifically, Sidley told 32 partners that they had to either accept a downgrade in their status, from partner to counsel or senior counsel, or leave the firm. At the same time, Sidley lowered its mandatory retirement age from 65 to a sliding scale between 60-65.
The EEOC commenced its work after it was widely reported by the media in late 1999 that the status of Sidley's older partners had been changed to create more opportunities for younger lawyers at the firm, and after the EEOC received a confidential complaint from one of the affected partners. On July 5, 2000, the EEOC notified Sidley of the investigation in a letter that included a designated charge number and was accompanied by a Request For Information. After receiving only partial responses from Sidley, the EEOC served it with a subpoena. This ultimately led to an enforcement action before Judge Lefkow and an appeal to the Seventh Circuit. After receiving documents provided in accordance with the courts' orders and after completion of its investigation, the EEOC issued a Letter of Determination finding reasonable cause to believe that Sidley had violated the ADEA by downgrading certain partners on account of their age and by maintaining a mandatory retirement age. On September 29, 2004, after conciliation discussions between the parties proved unsuccessful, the EEOC issued a Notice of Failure of Conciliation to Sidley, and filed this lawsuit on January 13, 2005, seeking monetary damages and injunctive relief.
Sidley is now seeking partial summary judgment on the EEOC's claims involving individual relief for the affected partners. Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is 993 entitled to judgment as a *993 matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The question presented in Sidley's motion 0907 whether the EEOC may pursue individual relief for persons who failed to file charges under the ADEA and are now barred from bringing their own individual suits 0907 is a purely legal one, requiring that I determine whether EEOC v. North Gibson Sch. Corp., 266 F.3d 607 (7th Cir.2001), was overruled by EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 122 S.Ct. 754, 151 L.Ed.2d 755 (2002).
In North Gibson, the Seventh Circuit held that the EEOC could not recover individual relief under the ADEA if none of the alleged victims had filed a timely charge of discrimination. 266 F.3d at 619-20. In that case, five of the seven claimants represented by the EEOC had not filed ADEA charges, and the remaining two had made untimely filings. The North Gibson decision was based on the premise that when the EEOC pursues an individual

claim under the ADEA, it "steps into the shoes of the individual" and becomes that individual's representative. Id. at 615. This privity, as the courts have put it, is created by the ADEA's distinctive enforcement scheme, wherein the right of the individual to bring an ADEA action is terminated upon the commencement of such an action by the EEOC. Id. The Court of Appeals reasoned that, because the EEOC was acting in a representative capacity, it should not be able to seek monetary relief on behalf of an individual who had no right to relief, as there were no "shoes" into which the EEOC could step. Id. Since each of the seven suits would have been procedurally barred, the Court of Appeals held that the EEOC could not seek monetary relief on behalf of those individuals. Id. at 616. In its opinion, the Court of Appeals explicitly differentiated the EEOC's right to seek such individual relief from the EEOC's right to seek injunctive relief, stating that "[w]hen the EEOC sues on its own behalf to obtain an injunction that prohibits discrimination, it promotes the public interest because its `interests are broader than those of the individuals injured by discrimination.'" Id. (quoting EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 10 F.3d 1286, 1291 (7th Cir.1993)).
If there were no question concerning the ongoing validity of North Gibson, the individual relief sought by the EEOC in this case would certainly be barred. Here, the EEOC received a confidential request for an investigation but no ADEA charges. Since the time for such charges has long since expired, none of the 32 Sidley partners affected by the change in retirement policies would be entitled to seek relief from this or any other court, and I would be compelled to grant Sidley's motion.
A question about the validity of North Gibson, however, is raised by the Supreme Court's decision in Waffle House. In that case, the Supreme Court held that the EEOC could seek monetary relief for individuals whose claims were barred because each had signed a mandatory arbitration agreement with his or her employer. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 295, 122 S.Ct. 754. The Court found that the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA") made "the EEOC the master of its own case" and "confer[red] on the agency the authority to evaluate the strength of the public interest at stake." Id. at 291, 122 S.Ct. 754. The Court further found that "it is the public agency's province 0907 not that of the court 0907 to determine whether public resources should be committed to the recovery of victim-specific relief." Id. at 291-92, 122 S.Ct. 754. The Court emphasized that the EEOC may seek "to vindicate a public interest . . . even when it pursues entirely victim-specific relief." Id. at 296, 122 S.Ct. 754. With this 994 reasoning, the Court put an end to the distinction recognized in *994 earlier cases, like North Gibson, between the EEOC's ability to seek individual monetary relief and its ability to seek injunctive relief. In this way, the Court makes it clear that the EEOC's right to bring suit seeking individual monetary relief goes beyond that of the individual and reaches the territory of public interest, thereby allowing the EEOC to seek relief for individuals, such as the affected Sidley partners in this case, who could not, for a variety of reasons, do so themselves.
Sidley, of course, argues that the Waffle House decision is applicable to only those cases in which the EEOC is seeking monetary relief on behalf of individuals who are subject to arbitration agreements.[1] This notion is dispelled by the Seventh Circuit's decision in EEOC v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis., 288 F.3d 296 (7th Cir.2002). In BOR, the Court of Appeals applied the reasoning developed in Waffle House to a case involving sovereign immunity 0907 an area of law wholly unrelated to arbitration agreements. In determining that the EEOC had an independent right to sue the state of Wisconsin (and therefore the Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin), the Court of Appeals relied heavily on the language from Waffle House stating that the EEOC was "the master of its own case" and could seek "to vindicate a public interest, not simply provide make-whole relief for the employee, even when it pursues entirely victim-specific relief." Id. at 300, 122 S.Ct. 754 (quoting Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 296, 122 S.Ct. 754). The Court of Appeals found that this reasoning forestalled any argument that the EEOC was merely "standing in the shoes of the individuals" or was "acting in privity with them as their representative." Id. at 299-300, 122 S.Ct. 754.
Yet, Sidley urges me to base my opinion on exactly the same kind of privity logic that failed to persuade the courts in Waffle House and BOR. Sidley argues that I should deny the EEOC the right to seek individual monetary relief on behalf of the affected Sidley partners because the partners themselves have no right to sue. I disagree. Waffle House makes clear that EEOC's ability to seek monetary relief on behalf of individuals is derived from its own statutory rights to advance the public's interest and is unrelated to any individual's right. I find it clear enough from the holdings in both Waffle House and BOR that the privity arguments seen in North Gibson are no longer applicable and that Waffle House does, in fact, overrule that decision.

In BOR, the Seventh Circuit did contemplate curtailing the EEOC's public interest based rights when there is 995 another compelling, countervailing interest at issue. *995 288 F.3d at 300. As the Court notes, it would have to be
more important than the right to arbitration or sovereign immunity. Id. Sidley contends that allowing the EEOC to seek monetary relief for individuals who are barred from doing so themselves, since they have failed to file charges within the statutorily allowed period, contravenes an employer's interest in a reasonably speedy resolution of discrimination claims, an interest which underlies all of our discrimination statutes. Sidley claims that allowing the EEOC to revive untimely claims obliterates the otherwise strictly enforced statutes of limitations associated with Title VII, ADA and ADEA cases. In the abstract, Sidley's argument does carry some weight, but in the context of this case it does not have much force. The EEOC began investigating Sidley's retirement practices approximately seven months after the changes to its policies, enacted in late 1999, were widely broadcast in the media and after receiving a confidential complaint. On July 5, 2000, the EEOC notified Sidley of the investigation with a letter that was accompanied by a document request. Over the next two years, the EEOC and Sidley battled over that document production. In July 2004, the EEOC completed its investigation and sent a Letter of Determination to Sidley stating that it had found reasonable cause to believe that Sidley's retirement policies violated the ADEA. After engaging in unsuccessful conciliation discussions, the EEOC filed this suit on January 13, 2005.
Throughout, these proceedings have been of great interest not only to Sidley, but also to most other large law firms across the country. It would be difficult for Sidley to argue that the EEOC's suit has come as a surprise, that the EEOC's claims concerning their new retirement policy are somehow stale, or that it had no reasonable opportunity for a speedy resolution of this matter. This is almost certainly why Sidley focuses on the possibility that the EEOC might bring their retirement policies dating back to 1978 into the suit. This argument, however, should really be directed toward determining the relevant class of individuals who may be properly represented by the EEOC in this suit. There may come a time when it is appropriate for me to set some temporal limits on the class of persons who may be represented in this case. But, that time is not now. The possibility that the individual claims of some partners affected by Sidley's longstanding retirement policies may be too remote for this case does not justify throwing out all the individual claims of partners affected by Sidley's newly implemented retirement plan. Accordingly, I find that concerns over bringing stale claims do not override the EEOC's right to advance the interests of the public by seeking individual relief for at least some individuals in this case.
Motion for Reconsideration and Certification for Interlocutory Review.
Sidley argues against my conclusion. It's two-part argument is worth consideration. The first reason Sidley gives for changing my decision is the rule that a District Court must follow the precedent of the Court of Appeals until the Court of Appeals specifically overrules that precedent. The Supreme Court has stated that all inferior courts must follow its clear precedent no matter how much its own later opinions have demolished the rationale for that precedent. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484, 109 S.Ct. 1917, 104 L.Ed.2d 526 (1989). Doubts about the reach of Rodriguez arose in the aftermath of the Supreme Court's evisceration of the sentencing guidelines in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 996 403 (2004). See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. *996 2004) (majority and dissenting opinions). The doubts have been wiped away by the Court's comments in Eberhart v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 403, 407, 163 L.Ed.2d 14, 21 (2005).
Sidley cites two Seventh Circuit opinions setting forth my obligation to "follow the decisions of [the Seventh Circuit] whether or not [I] agree." Reiser v. Residential Funding Corp., 380 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir.2004). See also, Denohoe v. Consol. Operating & Prod. Corp., 30 F.3d 907, 910 (7th Cir.1994) (must follow precedent not expressly overruled).
Donohoe is not the best case to illustrate this proposition, because it was deeply intertwined with the doctrine of law of that particular case and may have been concerned with the notion of a trial judge's ability to depart from an appellate opinion in the same case or, in military terms, to disobey the direct order of a superior. Reiser is a better case for Sidley but it does not carry the day. There, the District Judge had disregarded a Court of Appeals precedent construing state law for the reason that an Illinois Appellate Court had reached an opposite conclusion on the point. The Court of Appeals reasoning is instructive.

A decision by a state's supreme court terminates the authoritative force of our decisions interpreting state law, for under Erie our task in diversity litigation is to predict what the state's highest court will do. Once the state's highest court acts, the need for prediction is past. But decisions of intermediate state courts lack similar force; they, too, are just prognostications. They could in principle persuade us to reconsider and overrule our precedent; assuredly they do not themselves liberate district judges from the force of our decisions.
Reiser, 380 F.3d at 1029.
A proper reading of this language means that the District Judge is free to disregard circuit precedent that is contrary to the rule pronounced by the court possessing final authority to decide that particular question of law. Here, the Supreme Court of the United States has final authority to decide this particular question of law. If its decision conflicts with the circuit precedent, I would be ignoring the dictates of the "hierarchical system" in which we operate. A district judge should not wait for a signal from the Court of Appeals before following the Supreme Court's rulings.
I do not think Sidley argues to the contrary. Its argument is that I am not free to disregard circuit precedent on the grounds that it has been implicitly overruled. I agree that ignoring circuit precedent because the rationale for that precedent has been eroded to its vanishing point is problematic. Rationales are not holdings and, even when the stated rationale has been shredded, it does not mean that the holding may not be justified by a different rationale.
It is, though, sometimes difficult to decide whether a Supreme Court decision is an implicit overruling. There are few who would urge that a legal rule can only be voided by expressly stating the rule, citing the prior cases and announcing they are overruled. In my view the question to ask is whether the holding (not the rationale) of the Supreme Court can be squared with the holding (not the rationale) of the Court of Appeals 0907 whether any real distinction between the two holdings can be found without the intellectual contortions commonly (and perhaps unfairly) attributed to John Duns Scotus.
I adhere to my decision. It was the holding of the Supreme Court that caused me to find that North Gibson did not 997 control this case. The Court held it was the EEOC's province to vindicate a public *997 interest by pursuing
monetary damages for an individual even when the individual could not or did not make the claim themselves (subject to limitations not yet relevant here). The claim that Waffle House applied only to the cases where individuals were bound by arbitration agreements seems to me to be the sort of "rationale" based argument disapproved in earlier cases. What might be left of the defendant's argument is disapproved by the holding in Board of Regents.
Sidley's last remaining argument is that North Gibson is still good law because in Waffle House, the Supreme Court specifically tells us that EEOC v. U.S. Steel Corp., 921 F.2d 489 (3rd Cir.1990), is still good law. When mentioning that decision, the Court stated that, "[i]t is true . . . that [the employee's] conduct may have the effect of limiting the relief that the EEOC may obtain in court." Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 296, 122 S.Ct. 754. It then cited U.S. Steel as holding that, "individuals who litigated their own claims were precluded by res judicata from obtaining individual relief in a subsequent EEOC action based on the same claims." Id. at 297, 122 S.Ct. 754. In considering both the context and language of the Supreme Court in discussing U.S. Steel, I do not read it as precluding the EEOC from proceeding to litigate on the merits of whether an individual merits relief. The Court's actual concern and reason for citing U.S. Steel is most clearly expressed in the last words of the relevant paragraph. "As we have noted, it `goes without saying that the courts can and should preclude double recovery by an individual.'" Id. (internal citations omitted). In the end, Sidley may be right about the survival of North Gibson, but the Supreme Court's treatment of U.S. Steel is not persuasive on that point. Double recovery is not at issue in this case.
The request to certify the question for interlocutory review is more difficult to answer, and not because there is little chance I could be wrong. Another judge of this Court has already reached the contrary conclusion, which shows that the issue is fairly contestable. It is a question of controlling law.
The standard at issue is whether early appellate resolution will speed up the litigation. See Ahrenholz v. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill., 219 F.3d 674, 675 (7th Cir.2000). Sidley argues that the discovery process in this

case would be vastly simplified if it did not have to deal with questions of individual relief. While this might ordinarily be true, it is untrue here. The case before me presents fairly novel claims whose resolution might significantly affect the way professional firms using partnership forms conduct their internal affairs. In other words, this is an important question for a broad range of institutions beyond the one which is litigating here. The problems to be addressed are described in EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 701-07 (7th Cir.2002).
The early judicial airing out of this issue generally, and in this case specifically, will require extensive discovery of how individuals were treated and why. Without a lot of detail, the merits of a broad legal theory rarely applied in this context will be difficult to discern. When the criteria for a decision are well established then less discovery will be required, or so I have noted in the cases before me.
The better argument for certification lies in the nature of the trial that would be conducted. If all that is at stake is injunctive relief, the volume of evidence that would need to be introduced would shrink. To show a pattern of age 998 discrimination, the parties can rely on representative *998 cases.[2] There will be no need to calculate the exact economic consequences for each individual. There will be fewer concerns with preserving the anonymity of the individuals said to be damaged by defendant 0907 an interest that both sides recognize as valid. In short, to establish whether Sidley is covered under the ADEA and whether it violated the law would take far less trial and trial preparation time. So, too, would the determination, if the EEOC makes its case, of what forward looking remedies ought to be imposed on defendant. Early resolution of the viability of North Gibson would, in my judgment, speed up the litigation. This is especially true here because the discovery can be ongoing while the interlocutory appeal is heard. There will, therefore, be nothing to delay preparation for trial. A ruling in defendant's favor would speed the litigation.[3]
I grant the motion for certification and direct defendant to prepare for review by Court and the EEOC a proposed order containing the question or questions to be certified.
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED initially and on reconsideration. Defendant's Motion of Certification for Interlocutory Appeal is GRANTED.
[1] Sidley also contends that Waffle House does not apply to the ADEA because its enforcement scheme is distinct from that of the ADA. I find this reading of Waffle House to be particularly strained in light of the Seventh Circuit's decision in EEOC v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis., 288 F.3d 296 (7th Cir.2002). As discussed herein, in BOR, the Court of Appeals applied Waffle House to a case brought by the EEOC under the ADEA, clearly demonstrating that the rationale is applicable to ADEA cases. 288 F.3d at 300. The language in the Waffle House decision also indicates that it would be applicable to the ADEA. Waffle House discusses the province of the EEOC over discrimination cases during the first 180 days after a complaint is filed with the agency. The Court notes that during this 180-day period, the EEOC has full control of the complaint's litigation. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 291, 122 S.Ct. 754. Within that period, an employee must obtain a right-to-sue letter before bringing a complaint in court and if, during that time, the EEOC decides to pursue its own suit, the individual has no independent cause of action. Id. This period creates an enforcement scheme much like that of the ADEA in which the EEOC's ADEA suit trumps any suit filed by an individual.
[2] I do not mean to suggest that this is the complete universe of evidence that may be needed. I refer only to the quantity of evidence required as to the individuals whose treatment by defendant is at issue.
[3] Even if the defendant loses the appeal, a ruling might still slightly speed up the trial. It will spare the parties what I expect to be a long series of objections and arguments over the precise ambit of relevant evidence.
Save trees - read court opinions online on Google Scholar.

 
 Case: 1:05-cv-00208 Document #: 56 Filed: 02/21/06 Page 1 of 4 PageID #:801

No. 06-8002
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPoRTUNITY CoMMISSION,
Plaintiff-Appellee, v.

SIDLEY AUSTINLLP,

Defendant-Appellant.

Application for Leave to Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Dlinois, Eastern Division.
No. 05 C 0208-Jameo B. Zagel, Judge.
SUBM!TI'ED FEBRUARY 7, 2006-DECIDED FEBRUARY 17,2006

Before POSNER, EASTERBROOK, and WOOD, Circuit Judges.
POSNER, Circuit Judge. In 1999, Sidley & Austin (as it then was) demoted 32 ofits equity partners to "counsel" or "senior counsel." The EEOC began an investigation to determine whether the demotions might have violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. After we upheld the district court's rebuff of Sidley's effort to derail the investigation, EEOC v. Sidley Austin Broum & Wood, 315 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 2002), the Commission filed an ADEA suit against Sidley. Sidley asks us to entertain, as recom-

Case: 1:05-cv-00208 Document #: 56 Filed: 02/21/06 Page 2 of 4 PageID #:802

2

No. 06-8002

mended by the district judge, an interlocutory appeal from the judge's denial of Sidley's motion for partial summary judgment. The appeal would require us to decide whether the judge was correct to rule that the EEOC may obtain monetary relief on behalf of individuals who, having failed to file timely administrative charges under the ADEA, are barred from bringing their own suits. The question satisfies the criteria in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) for an interlocutory appeal and since it has been fully briefed we can proceed to answer it.
The identical question received the opposite answer in EEOC v. North Gibson School Corp., 266 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2001), but that decision is no longer good law. It was scuttled by the Supreme Court in EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002), which held that the EEOC's claim for monetary relief for a victim of an alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act was not barred by the fact that the victim had agreed to arbitrate any disputes arising out of his employment. The reason there was no bar was not that the arbitration clause was unenforceable but that the Commission was not bound by it because its enforcement authority is not derivative of the legal rights of individuals even when it is seeking to make them whole. Similarly, the Commission is not bound by the failure of the Sidley ex-partners to exhaust their remedies; the Commissian had no duty to exhaust.
Sidley seeks to distinguish Waffle House from the present case on the basis of the following sentence in the Court's opinion: "It is true, as respondent and its amici have argued, that Baker's conduct [Baker was the victim of the alleged violation of the ADA] may have the effect of limiting the relief that the EEOC may obtain in court." 534 U.S. at 296. But the remainder of the paragraph makes

Case: 1:05-cv-00208 Document #: 56 Filed: 02/21/06 Page 3 of 4 PageID #:803

No. 06-8002

3

clear that the Coutt was talking about something quite different from a procedutal forfeiture. "If, for example, [Baker] had failed to mitigate his damages, or had accepted a monetary settlement, any recovery by the EEOC would be limited accordingly. As we have noted, it 'goes without saying that the courts can and should preclude double recovery by an individual.'" Id. at 296-97 (citations omitted). Similarly, had Baker sued and lost, the employer might have been able to interpose the judgment as a bar to the EEOC's obtaining money for Baker, by virtue of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. EEOC v. U.S. Steel Corp., 921 F.2d 489 (3d Cir. 1990). Even though (this is the doctrinal heart of Waffle House) the EEOC is not in privity with the victims for whom it seeks relief, it does not follow that they must be permitted to take two bites from the same apple.
For all we know, some of the ex-partners may have received settlements from Sidley and others may have failed to mitigate their damages. Suppose all have received settlements that have fully compensated them for the alleged violations of the age discrimination law. Then the EEOC could obtain no monetary relief on their behalf. But this was not the basis for Sidley's motion for partial summary judgment. The basis was a ground that Waffle House rejects, as we and other coutts have already recognized in related contexts. EEOC v. Caterpillar, Inc., 409 F.3d 831, 833 (7th Cir. 2005); EEOC v. Board of Regents, 288 F.3d 296, 300 (7th Cir. 2002); EEOC v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 383 F.3d 1280, 1292-94 (11th Cir. 2004), and cases cited there.
AFFIRMED.

Case: 1:05-cv-00208 Document #: 56 Filed: 02/21/06 Page 4 of 4 PageID #:804

4 A true Copy:
Teste:

No. 06-8002
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

USCA-02-C-0072-2-17-06

 
 U.S. E.E.O.C. v. Sidley Austin LLP., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
2007 WL 1246450 United States District Court,
N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.
UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v.
SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP., Defendant.
No. 05 C 0208. | April 27, 2007. | As Amended May 9, 2007.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Deborah Lois Hamilton, Gregory M. Gochanour, John C. Hendrickson, Justin Mulaire, Laurie S. Elkin, United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.
Gary Michael Elden, Amanda Helen McMurtrie, Gregory Campbell Jones, John E. Bucheit, Laura K. McNally, Lynn Hagman Murray, Maile H. Solis, Matthew Alan Bills, Michael Peter Conway, Grippo & Elden LLC, Michael S. Gulland, Jenner & Block LLP, Chicago, IL, Paul Grossman, Robert S. Span, Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
JAMES B. ZAGEL, United States District Judge.
*1 This case is being litigated under an unusual degree of uncertainty on the part of the EEOC and an unusual degree of difficulty for Defendant Sidley Austin. The EEOC knows well how to prosecute claims of employment discrimination, and members of Defendant partnership and its lawyers know how to defend against such claims. This case, however, is not typical.
The EEOC does not yet know the common parameters for cases in which they claim that a partner may be deemed an employee of a partnership. Sidley, operating under the assumption that it was not subject to federal anti-discrimination statutes when it decided to “discontinue” (my attempt at a neutral word) partnership status for some of its partners, may not have documented its decisions as a corporation of similar size might have done. Assuming that EEOC proves its case, the law has not addressed whether the precise nature and extent of discrimination will have a bearing on whether this partnership, as opposed to partnerships in general, is liable. Apart from this, the people that the EEOC represents are highly compensated attorneys whose job performance may be difficult to measure in comparison to others. While numerical measurements play an increasing role in judging partners at firms like Sidley, some intangible qualities remain too difficult to quantify. The EEOC is alleging that a single quantifiable factor-age-played a significant role in the decisions. Therefore, it must make its case in the face of traditional notions that a lawyer’s worth to the firm cannot be expressed in a number. This problem alone might explain the hostility toward, or the lack of interest in, the EEOC’s lawsuit by the discontinued partners who could benefit financially from an EEOC victory.
The net effect of this has been a discovery process which has high stakes for both parties. Each side is motivated by the desire to pin the other side down on every fact and theory it might offer. I do not fault either party for the many interrogatories and the voluminous answers. However, Discovery is nearing an important deadline. There are remaining disputes. Underlying many of these disputes is a profound difference in perspective.
The EEOC contends that Sidley engaged in a unitary act in executing a plan to alter its partners’ status, much like a corporation that decides it needs a reduction in force and evaluates everyone to see who goes. Sidley says this belief is plain wrong. Its Momentum Plan and its revision of retirement age provisions were not unitary, but rather independent actions
1

U.S. E.E.O.C. v. Sidley Austin LLP., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
having a common effect on the issue of partnership discontinuation, and, unlike a reduction in force, there was no quantitative goal that had to be met.
I have no way to determine if either side is right about this. Both parties are entitled to pursue discovery which would validate its own theory of the case. To the extent that either side objects on the grounds that their opponents basic premise is wrong, I am not likely to sustain discovery objections.
I. Defendant’s Motion to Compel Responses to Interrogatory and Document Requests (Third Set) *2 Interrogatory 1. The EEOC must either state what it believes Defendant’s retirement policy was at all relevant times, or to state that it is unable to do so and give its reasons for that inability. It must identify those partners who were, to its knowledge, exempted for some period from mandatory retirement. The EEOC must also identify those partners it believes were nominally subjected to a retirement policy. By providing such a list, the EEOC is not claiming or conceding that a retirement policy by itself, or in part, was the cause of the discontinuation of a partner’s status. Documents related to these responses shall also be produced.1
Interrogatory 2. The EEOC is not required to set forth its evidence of age discrimination on a partner-by-partner basis. Its case rests on the idea that Sidley wished to divest itself of older partners. I infer that it will contend that the individualized review was implemented solely to decide whom to exempt from the anti-age policy. Sidley will respond by vouching for the legitimacy of an individual review process which never relied on prohibited age considerations. Sidley wants to acquire the rebuttal evidence that the EEOC will offer to show pretext. Rebuttal evidence is hard to deal with in discovery because the opponent has not yet offered a detailed defense. The EEOC may choose to offer proof of pretext in many cases, but not all of them, and argue that a fact finder should conclude the entire enterprise was pretextual even if some of the discontinuations may have been justified, and the partner would have been discontinued even if the process was honest.2
I am ordering EEOC to respond to Sidley’s related request that it list the parts of Sidley’s written justifications which are factually incorrect, wherever it is feasible to do so. Answering this portion of Interrogatory 2 will help define the facts in contention. The EEOC can tell Sidley whether it disputes a statement that a partner’s billable hours have fallen to the degree Sidley claimed. I used the phrase “wherever it is feasible” to indicate that the EEOC may not be able to identify its position with respect to conclusions such as whether a partner lacked “intensity.” If so, I think it is understandable. To the extent the EEOC knows whether it disputes assertions about any of the stated criteria, it should answer the interrogatory.
I am satisfied with the EEOC’s proposed date for production of some of the material it concedes it must produce.
The EEOC must state the damages it will claim for each former partner, but it does not need to respond to the interrogatory asking for evidence it will offer in rebuttal to a defense of failure to mitigate.
To the extent they deal with conduct of the same sort alleged by Sidley as a basis for discontinuation a partner’s status, the EEOC must produce documents it has with respect to a former partner’s performance in his of her subsequent employment.
*3 The EEOC must provide a log of all former Sidley partners with whom it has communicated regarding this litigation and, if applicable, to note those whose communications with the EEOC are claimed to be privileged.
II. Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Production of Client Complaint Information and Cross Motion to Identify Comparators. One element of the neutral reasons Sidley offered for its actions is that some of the partners were subject to complaints by clients. So, the EEOC wants to see how other partners that were the supbject of client complaints were treated. Sidley does not disputed that the EEOC is entitled to some of these, it disputes the ambit of the request.
Sidley wants the EEOC to identify the comparators so that it would not need to produce all of its client complaint records. The EEOC says that it cannot identify all the comparators until it sees the complaints. Both arguments have some force. If there are no complaints about a particular partner who was not discontinued, then to the extent the EEOC wishes to show that younger partners were forgiven for complaints while older partners were not, that partner is useless to the EEOC. To identify a comparator, the EEOC has to know about whom there were complaints. Sidley, on the other hand, says that the EEOC does not need to know about the treatment of partners who could not be comparators as a matter of law (which includes some of
2

U.S. E.E.O.C. v. Sidley Austin LLP., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
those already designated by the EEOC).
Sidley wants to know which of its partners will be used by the EEOC as its comparables, and argues that the EEOC is only entitled to discovery about those partners but is asking for material about those who cannot be “comparators.”
Our Court of Appeals holds that comparators in age cases should be about ten years younger, do the same work and be treated better than the plaintiffs. Balderston v. Fairbanks Morse Engine Div., 328 F.3d 309, 321-22 (7th Cir.2003). Sidley contends that many of the employees about whom the EEOC has requested information are much closer than ten years in age. With respect to doing the same work, some partners are in international offices where the work is focused on building an office and a practice more than on billable hours. Moreover, attorneys in different practice areas often do different work. Hourly billings are a common denominator for domestic partners, but the comparators should only include those with similar or lower hours than the discontinued partners.3 Sidley believes that it might have to produce the client data for those who fit within its definition of comparators, but it has an objection to that as well.
Of the thirty-two discontinued partners, only six were cited for client complaints, and the complaint was only a major factor in one of those cases. Sidley argues that evidence of inconsistent treatment of those six would not tend to prove the “pattern and practice” case the EEOC says it will pursue.
The EEOC argues that Sidley did not engage in a typical evaluation of whether one or a few partners ought to retain partner status, so the conventional calculus used in employment cases is not a very good method to reach a correct decision. It alleges that Sidley wanted to rid itself of older partners and used a firm-wide evaluation as a way to do so. The EEOC wants to prove this by showing that the criterion of client complaints was used so inconsistently that it cannot serve as a neutral justification for the partnership decisions. More importantly, it might lead to a conclusion that Sidley was not truthful in its account of what it did, and falsity in one instance can lead to an inference of falsity in others. The EEOC may well intend to prove that other criteria were not honestly applied show that the entire process was rife with deception. To do this requires an examination of the entire process used for both the comparators as well as the non-comparators. The EEOC argues that Sidley chose to evaluate on a firm-wide basis, and the consequence of that choice is to invite investigation of the whole process and not as it applied only to comparators-a good argument in principle.
*4 Clients have always complained about their lawyers. The increasing cost of legal services probably raises client expectations, engendering more complaints. True or false, and reasonable or not, complaints must be evaluated by a firm. Even the most unfair complaint may require some form of reparation if it is from a very important client.
A law firm could operate on the premise that the customer is always right and slam any partner who draws a complaint. It could also take the opposite tack, or any position in between. It cannot use client complaints as a cover for age discrimination. If a neutral policy or practice for weighing client complaints in the evaluations was followed, that process would likely defeat the claim of pretext, even if required an exquisite level of nuance. Yet my reading of Sidley’s justification paper (explaining why it discontinued some partners) does not support an inference that there is a consistent policy on this matter.
It may be that a well-established firm like Sidley, which has a very wide practice, has had an established way of dealing with partners against whom complaints and malpractice claims are made. At the least, the EEOC is entitled to investigate whether this is true. However, such an investigation might not require production of the entire corpus of complaints that the EEOC has demanded.
The more difficult question here is the argument that client complaint discovery is not relevant, particularly in light of the ground on which the EEOC has chosen to stand. In a routine case, the use of a particular pretext to get rid of one worker might be evidence of willingness to use a different pretext against another worker. Here the EEOC says that Sidley engaged in a firm-wide housecleaning that rid them of thirty-two partners. If client complaints were a convenient pretext, one could argue that its use would be far more common. When a single grand scheme is alleged, the relatively rare use of a single device does not do much, if anything, to prove there was a grand scheme.
I do not have enough information to decide the question on this point. I do not know how many of the discontinued partners were subject to client complaints, which would be important information.4 Since I have raised some considerations not addressed in the briefs, I will ask counsel to consider whether they have any interest in further exploring the issue. For now, the motion to compel discovery of client complaints against partners who do not fall within the traditional definition of comparators is denied without prejudice.
3

U.S. E.E.O.C. v. Sidley Austin LLP., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
III. The EEOC’s Motion to Compel Response to Interrogatories (Tenth Set) The EEOC served interrogatories identifying a specific neutral reason offered by Sidley for its actions toward its discontinued partners and another one directed to a failure to mitigate damages defense.
Interrogatory 1. One discontinued partner was cited for being a target of a malpractice claim for which a substantial sum was paid in settlement. The EEOC asks for information about all malpractice claims against partners and their effects on the partner in question. On its face, this asks for too much, because it includes claims for which no substantial payment was made in resolution of the matter. I order Sidley to answer the interrogatory to the extent it asks for information about claims for which substantial payments were made.5 For the same reasons I gave in discussing the request for client complaints, I reject Sidley’s objection that this interrogatory response should be limited to partners who would fit the conventional definition of comparators.
*5 The motion to compel an answer in Interrogatory 2 is denied as premature. Interrogatory 3 asks for other examples of partners whom Sidley believed to have submitted questionable expenses and accounted for time improperly. Interrogatory 4 seeks other examples of partners who had obtained client billings “from another attorney who had left the firm.” Interrogatory 5 calls for examples of other partners who had been removed as group heads.
I order Sidley to respond to Interrogatory 5. Removal of a group head is a specific act. The apparent significance of the act makes it suitable to use in an analysis of whether Sidley is truthful about its reasons. By comparison, some bad expenses and time reports and billings from another attorney may involve broad amounts and not be worth discovering. The issue could benefit from some further development. Sidley may be able to quantify these elements of decision making. It may have already done so. It would not advance resolution of this case to discover that there were instances of bad reports or inherited billings of relatively small amounts if Sidley claims that the amounts attributed to the discontinued partners were much, much larger. On this record, I deny the motion to compel response to interrogatories 3 and 4.
I reach the same result with respect to Interrogatory 6. Producing a list of all partners who were either partially or fully dependent on others for legal work is unhelpful. If the interrogatory is meant to ask for other partners who were entirely dependent on others for their legal work, it might have bearing on this case. However,it would still only be arguably relevant to the two of the discontinued partners who are characterized as essentially competent and fully dependent on others. Even those partners had declining hourly billings as well. For the reasons I expressed earlier, factors which only affect a small number of the discontinued partners have doubtful probative value to a case tried under the EEOC’s theory. Finally, reading Sidley’s justifications, it seems clear to me that working on matters for another lawyer was not a crucial or particularly meaningful element in the evaluations. It is not worth the expense of discovery to pursue the matter. I deny the motion to compel a response to Interrogatory 6.
I grant the motion to compel a response to only that part of Interrogatory 7 that calls for the identity of all partners who worked on the matter which is the subject of the interrogatory.
IV. The EEOC’s Motion to Extend the Close of Discovery There are two important dates coming soon: identification of the EEOC’s proposed comparators on May 16, 2006, and the close of fact discovery on July 16, 2007. The EEOC wants more time because some of the crucial information it needed-the basis for the decisions to discontinue the thirty-two partners-was not produced until February, March and April this year. It seeks to extend the deadlines by about thirteen weeks.
I have said that one difficulty in this case is that in 1999, Sidley cannot be deemed to have known that the law invoked here would apply to it. The timing of the productions it made in the past three months are not to be condemned. But that does not mean that the EEOC must pay a price for Sidley’s legitimate difficulties. Also, the EEOC’s claim that there was a large scale unitary course of conduct resulting in age discrimination requires the evidence of many witnesses.
*6 Having examined the course of discovery, I find that an extension of discovery is warranted. June 22, 2007 is the new date for identification of comparators and August 20, 2007 is the new date for completion of fact discovery.
Absent significant, unforeseeable circumstances, no further extensions of these two dates will be granted to Plaintiff.
4

U.S. E.E.O.C. v. Sidley Austin LLP., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

Parallel Citations

89 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 42,819

Footnotes

1

Anywhere in this opinion that I order interrogatories to be answered, I am also ordering production of the related documents.

2

If this were to occur, it could limit damages, but would not defeat liability.

3

There is no dispute that partners from a large firm which merged with Sidley later on are not appropriate comparators.

4

EEOC would be entitled to use client complaints directed toward partners who were about ten years younger and did the same

work in order to prove a specific partner was the victim of discrimination, but the issue I address here is directed to the EEOC’s

demand for discovery of client complaints about partners who do not fit within the standard definition of comparables.

5

The discovery request here bears somewhat of a resemblance to a request for client complaints, which I might grant if its potential

probative value can be shown. Generalized client complaints (falling short of allegations of malpractice) may be very widespread

and include trivial matters. Comparisons amongst such complaints will be difficult or impossible to make, leaving aside the

difficulty in determining whether a particular complaint is valid. In contrast, malpractice claims for which money was paid are

likely to be few, and their significance to the partnership decision is indisputable.

5

 
 Case: 1:05-cv-208 As of: 04/07/2018 01:04 PM CDT 1 of 14
ASHMAN,PROTO,TERMED
United States District Court Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.2.1 (Chicago)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:05−cv−00208

EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown. Assigned to: Honorable James B. Zagel Demand: $0 Cause: 29:201 Fair Labor Standards Act
Plaintiff
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Date Filed: 01/13/2005 Date Terminated: 10/04/2007 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Plaintiff
represented by Deborah Lois Hamilton Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 500 W. Madison Street 2000 Chicago, IL 60661 (312) 869−8110 Email: deborah.hamilton@eeoc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gregory M. Gochanour United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 500 West Madison Street Suite 2000 Chicago, IL 60661 (312) 869−8100 Email: gregory.gochanour@eeoc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John C. Hendrickson Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 500 West Madison Street Suite 2000 Chicago, IL 60661 (312) 869−8099 Email: john.hendrickson@eeoc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Justin Mulaire U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 500 W. Madison St., Ste. 2000 Chicago, IL 60661 312−869−8045 Email: justin.mulaire@eeoc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laurie S. Elkin Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 500 W. Madison Street 2800 Chicago, IL 60661 (312) 353−7259 Email: laurie.elkin@eeoc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:05-cv-208 As of: 04/07/2018 01:04 PM CDT 2 of 14

V. Defendant Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP

represented by Gary Michael Elden Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP 111 South Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 704−7700 Email: docket@shb.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amanda Helen McMurtrie Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP (Chicago) 111 South Wacker Drive Suite 5100 Chicago, IL 60606
Email: docket@grippoelden.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth S. Elmore Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP (Chicago) 111 South Wacker Drive Suite 5100 Chicago, IL 60606
Email: docket@grippoelden.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gregory Campbell Jones Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP (Chicago) 111 South Wacker Drive Suite 5100 Chicago, IL 60606
Email: docket@grippoelden.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John E. Bucheit Roeser Bucheit & Graham LLC Two North Riverside Plaza Suite 1850 Chicago, IL 60606 312.621.0302 Email: jbucheit@rbglegal.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laura K McNally Loeb & Loeb LLP 321 N. Clark Street, Suite 2300 Chicago, IL 60654 (312) 464−3155 Email: lmcnally@loeb.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lynn Hagman Murray Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP 111 South Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 704−7700 Email: docket@shb.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:05-cv-208 As of: 04/07/2018 01:04 PM CDT 3 of 14
Maile H. Solis Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP (Chicago) 111 South Wacker Drive Suite 5100 Chicago, IL 60606
Email: docket@grippoelden.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew A. Bills Barack Ferrazzano Kirschbaum & Nagelberg LLP 200 W Madison St. Ste. 3900 Chicago, IL 60606 312−984−3100 Email: matthew.bills@bfkn.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Peter Conway Jones Day 77 West Wacker Dr. Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 704−7700 Email: mconway@jonesday.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael S Gulland Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP (Chicago) 111 South Wacker Drive Suite 5100 Chicago, IL 60606
Email: docket@grippoelden.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul Grossman Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker 515 S. Flower Street 25th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90071 (213) 683−6000 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert S Span Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker 515 S. Flower Street 25th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90071 (213) 683−6000

Date Filed 01/13/2005
01/31/2005 03/14/2005

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT; Jury demand − Civil cover sheet − Appearance(s) of John C. Hendrickson, Gregory M. Gochanour, Laurie S. Elkin, Deborah Lois Hamilton as attorney(s) for plaintiff (No summons(es) issued.) (Documents: 1−1 through 1−3) (cem) (Entered: 01/14/2005)
2 WAIVER OF SERVICE returned executed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP waiver sent on 1/13/2005, answer due 3/14/2005. (gcy, ) (Entered: 02/03/2005)
3 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP by Gregory Campbell Jones, Lynn Hagman Murray, Gary Michael Elden. (gcy, )

Case: 1:05-cv-208 As of: 04/07/2018 01:04 PM CDT 4 of 14

03/14/2005 03/15/2005 03/15/2005 04/19/2005 04/19/2005
04/19/2005 04/19/2005
04/21/2005 04/21/2005
04/27/2005 04/27/2005 04/27/2005 05/10/2005 05/10/2005 05/10/2005 05/24/2005

(Entered: 03/16/2005)
4 ANSWER to Complaint by Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP.(gcy, ) (Entered: 03/16/2005)
5 APPLICATION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice on behalf of Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP, Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP by Paul Grossman; Order entered granting leave by James B. Zagel. Filing fee $ 100 paid, receipt number 10920675 (gcy, ) (Entered: 03/28/2005)
6 APPLICATION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice on behalf of Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP, Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP by Robert S Span; Order entered granting leave by James B. Zagel. Filing fee $ 100 paid, receipt number 10420675 (gcy, ) (Entered: 03/28/2005)
7 MOTION by Defendant for leave to file defendant's motion for partial summary judgment on claims for individual relief and to file overlength brief (gma, ). Modified on 11/13/2006 (las, ). (Entered: 04/20/2005)
8 NOTICE of Motion by Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP for presentment of MOTION by Defendant for leave to file defendant's motion for partial summary judgment on claims for individual relief and to file overlength brief 7 before Honorable James B. Zagel on 4/21/2005 at 10:15 AM. (gma, ) . Modified on 11/13/2006 (las, ). (Entered: 04/20/2005)
9 JOINT MOTION by Plaintiff, Defendant for leave to file parties' joint report on compliance with Rules 16(B) and 26(F) and their proposals on case management and a discovery plan (gma, ) . Modified on 11/13/2006 (las, ). (Entered: 04/20/2005)
10 NOTICE of Motion by plaintiff, defendant for presentment of JOINT MOTION by Plaintiff, Defendant for leave to file parties' joint report on compliance with Rules 16(B) and 26(F) and their proposals on case management and a discovery plan 9 before Honorable James B. Zagel on 4/21/2005 at 10:15 AM. (gma, ) . Modified on 11/13/2006 (las, ). (Entered: 04/20/2005)
11 MINUTE entry before Judge James B. Zagel dated 4/21/05: Motion hearing held. Parties motion for leave to file parties' joint report on compliance with Rules 16(B) and 26(F), and their proposals on case management (9) is granted. Judicial staff mailed notice (gl, ) (Entered: 04/21/2005)
12 MINUTE entry before Judge James B. Zagel dated 4/21/05: Motion hearing held. Defendant's motion for leave to file defendant's motion for partial summary judgment on claims for individual relief (7) and to file overlength brief (7) is granted. Plaintiff is granted leave to file oversized response to defendant's motion for partial summary judgment. Plaintiff is to respond to defendant's motion for partial summary judgment on or before 5/10/05. Defendant is to reply by 5/24/05. Ruling on defendant's motion for partial summary judgment is set for 6/9/05 at 10:15 a.m. Judicial staff mailed notice (gl, ) (Entered: 04/21/2005)
13 LOCAL RULE 56.1 Statement of undisputed facts by defendant. (gcy, ) (Entered: 05/02/2005)
14 MEMORANDUM by defendant in Support of of its motion for partial summary judgment on claims for individual relief. (gcy, ) (Entered: 05/02/2005)
15 MOTION by Defendant Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP for partial summary judgment on claims for individual relief. (gcy, ) (Entered: 05/02/2005)
16 RESPONSE by Plaintiff EEOC to defendant's Local Rule 56.1 statement of undisputed facts.(gcy, ) (Entered: 05/19/2005)
17 BRIEF by EEOC in Opposition to defendant's motion for partial summary judgment on claims for individual relief. (gcy, ) (Entered: 05/19/2005)
18 LOCAL RULE 56.1 Statement of undisputed facts by plaintiff EEOC. (gcy, ) (Entered: 05/19/2005)
19 RESPONSE by Defendant Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP to plaintiff's Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) statement of undisputed facts. (gcy, ) (Entered: 05/27/2005)

Case: 1:05-cv-208 As of: 04/07/2018 01:04 PM CDT 5 of 14

05/24/2005 06/09/2005
06/14/2005 06/14/2005
06/16/2005
06/20/2005 07/19/2005 07/19/2005 07/21/2005
07/28/2005 08/04/2005 08/09/2005 08/09/2005
08/11/2005 08/18/2005 08/18/2005 08/23/2005

20 REPLY by Defendant Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP in support of motion for partial summary judgment. (gcy, ) (Entered: 05/27/2005)
23 MINUTE entry before Judge James B. Zagel : Status hearing held on 6/9/2005. MOTION by Defendant Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP for partial summary judgment 15 is denied. Status hearing set for 7/21/2005 at 10:00 AM. Judicial staff mailed notice (drw, ) (Entered: 06/15/2005)
21 MOTION by Defendant for limited reconsideration or, in the alternative, certification for interlocutory review (gma, ) (Entered: 06/14/2005)
22 NOTICE of Motion by Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP for presentment of MOTION by Defendant for limited reconsideration or, in the alternative, certification for interlocutory review 21 before Honorable James B. Zagel on 6/16/2005 at 10:15 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 06/14/2005)
25 MINUTE entry before Judge James B. Zagel : MOTION by Defendant Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLPMOTION by Defendant Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP for reconsideration 21 is withdrawn, in the alternative, for certification for interlocutory review is denied, both for the reasons stated in open court. No notice (drw, ) (Entered: 06/23/2005)
24 NOTICE by Gary Michael Elden, Gregory Campbell Jones, Lynn Hagman Murray of Change of Address. (gcy, ) (Entered: 06/23/2005)
26 MOTION by Plaintiff to compel and for entry of protective order (gma, ) (Entered: 07/20/2005)
27 NOTICE of Motion by Deborah Lois Hamilton for presentment of MOTION by Plaintiff to compel and for entry of protective order 26 before Honorable James B. Zagel on 7/21/2005 at 10:15 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 07/20/2005)
29 MINUTE entry before Judge James B. Zagel : Status hearing held on 7/21/2005. Set deadlines/hearing as to motion to compel, motion for protective order 26 : Responses due by 7/28/2005 Replies due by 8/1/2005. Ruling on motion before Honorable James B. Zagel on 8/11/2005 at 12:00 PM. No notice (drw, ) (Entered: 08/05/2005)
28 RESPONSE by Defendant Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP in opposition to the EECO's motion to compel production (Exhibits). (Poor Quality Original − Paper Document on File). (gcy, ) (Entered: 08/01/2005)
30 REPLY by Plaintiff EEOC in support of EEOC's motion to compel production and for entry of a protective order. (gcy, ) (Entered: 08/08/2005)
31 MOTION by Defendant Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP for leave to file sur−reply (Attachments: # 1 Sur−reply)(gma, ) (Entered: 08/09/2005)
32 NOTICE of Motion by Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP for presentment of MOTION by Defendant Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP for leave to file sur−reply 31 before Honorable James B. Zagel on 8/11/2005 at 10:15 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 08/09/2005)
37 MINUTE entry before Judge James B. Zagel : MOTION by Defendant Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP for leave to file 31 sur−reply is granted. Telephoned notice (drw, ) (Entered: 08/29/2005)
33 Submission regarding procedure for objecting to production of personnel files by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Exhibits); Notice. (jmp, ) (Entered: 08/22/2005)
36 SUBMISSION regarding Notification of alleged class members and proposed protective order by Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP. (gcy, ) (Entered: 08/23/2005)
34 MOTION by Defendant Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP for leave to file Objections to EEOC's Submission (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service# 2 Exhibit A − Sidley Austin Brown & Wood's Objections to EEOC's Submission Regarding Notification of Individuals)(Solis, Maile) (Entered: 08/23/2005)

Case: 1:05-cv-208 As of: 04/07/2018 01:04 PM CDT 6 of 14

08/23/2005 08/25/2005
09/01/2005 09/01/2005 09/02/2005 09/02/2005 10/07/2005 10/11/2005 10/18/2005
11/02/2005 11/07/2005 11/18/2005 11/18/2005 12/20/2005
12/20/2005 12/23/2005 12/23/2005

35 NOTICE of Motion by Maile H. Solis for presentment of motion for leave to file, 34 before Honorable James B. Zagel on 8/25/2005 at 10:15 AM. (Solis, Maile) (Entered: 08/23/2005)
39 MINUTE entry before Judge James B. Zagel : Motion hearing held on 8/25/2005 regarding motion for leave to file. MOTION by Defendant Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP for leave to file Objections to EEOC's Submission is granted part and denied in part for the reasons stated in open court. Status hearing set for 9/1/2005 at 10:00 AM. No notice, advised in open court. (drw, ) (Entered: 09/16/2005)
38 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP by Maile H. Solis (Solis, Maile) (Entered: 09/01/2005)
40 MINUTE entry before Judge James B. Zagel : Status hearing held on 9/1/2005. Status hearing set for 10/11/2005 at 10:00 AM. No notice, advised in open court (drw, ) (Entered: 09/21/2005)
41 MINUTE entry before Judge James B. Zagel : Enter Protective Order. No notices required. (gcy, ) (Entered: 09/23/2005)
42 PROTECTIVE Order Signed by Judge James B. Zagel on 9/2/2005:(gcy, ) (Entered: 09/23/2005)
44 SEALED DOCUMENT by defendant: Status report regarding individual objections and renewed request for reconsideration (RESTRICTED) (vmj, ) (Entered: 10/12/2005)
43 MINUTE entry before Judge James B. Zagel : Status hearing held on 10/11/2005. Objections received taken under advisement. Status hearing set for 10/18/2005 at 10:00 AM. (drw, ) (Entered: 10/11/2005)
45 MINUTE entry before Judge James B. Zagel : Status hearing held on 10/18/2005. MOTION by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to compel and for protective order 26 is granted in part and denied in part. Objections 2 thur 7 are overruled. Objection 1 is sustained. Hearing regarding objection 1 is set for 11/9/2005 at 11:00 a.m. Status hearing set for 11/9/2005 at 11:00 AM. (drw, ) (Entered: 10/19/2005)
46 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission by Justin Mulaire (Mulaire, Justin) (Entered: 11/02/2005)
47 RESPONSE in opposition to Defendant's Renewed Request for Reconsideration or Certification for Interlocutory Appeal (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Hamilton, Deborah) (Entered: 11/07/2005)
48 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP by John E. Bucheit (Bucheit, John) (Entered: 11/18/2005)
49 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP by Amanda Helen McMurtrie (McMurtrie, Amanda) (Entered: 11/18/2005)
50 MINUTE entry before Judge James B. Zagel : The motion for certification is granted. Defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied initially and on reconsideration. Defendant's motion for certification for interlocutory appeal is granted. Mailed notice (drw, ) (Entered: 12/20/2005)
51 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by Judge James B. Zagel on 12/20/2005:Mailed notice(drw, ) (Entered: 12/20/2005)
52 MINUTE entry before Judge James B. Zagel : Enter order of certification for interlocutory appeal of the denial of the motion for partial summary judgment. Mailed notice (rmm, ) (Entered: 12/28/2005)
53 ORDER requested by court regarding certification for interlocutory appeal of the court's denial of defendant's motion for partial summary judgment. Signed by Judge James B. Zagel on 12/20/2005:Mailed notice(rmm, ) Modified on 2/17/2006 (vcf, ). (Entered: 12/28/2005)

Case: 1:05-cv-208 As of: 04/07/2018 01:04 PM CDT 7 of 14

12/29/2005 02/21/2006 02/21/2006 03/13/2006 03/13/2006 03/13/2006 04/03/2006 04/03/2006
04/03/2006 04/05/2006 04/05/2006
04/05/2006 06/05/2006
06/05/2006 06/05/2006 06/05/2006
06/05/2006 06/09/2006 06/12/2006

54 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following dates: 11/9/2005; Before the Honorable James B. Zagel (rmm, ) (Entered: 12/30/2005)
55 LETTER from United States Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit dated 2/17/2006. (rmm, ) (Entered: 02/23/2006)
56 OPINION from the USCA for the 7th Circuit; Submitted 2/7/2006; Decided 2/17/2006 in USCA case no. 06−8002. (rmm, ) (Entered: 02/23/2006)
57 OPINION from the USCA for the 7th Circuit; Submitted 2/7/2006; Decided 2/17/2006 in USCA case no. 06−8002 (rmm, ) (Entered: 03/16/2006)
58 LETTER from the USCA retaining the record on appeal in USCA no. 06−8002. (jmm, ) (Entered: 03/20/2006)
59 MANDATE received by the 7th Circuit; Case no 06−8002: The judgment of the District Court is affirmed, with costs, in accordance with the decision of this court entered on this date. (jmm, ) (Entered: 03/20/2006)
60 MOTION by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for order deeming matters admitted, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 36 (Mulaire, Justin) (Entered: 04/03/2006)
61 MEMORANDUM by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in Support of motion for miscellaneous relief 60 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit EEOC's requests to admit# 2 Exhibit Sidley's responses to EEOC's requests to admit)(Mulaire, Justin) (Entered: 04/03/2006)
62 NOTICE of Motion by Justin Mulaire for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 60 before Honorable James B. Zagel on 4/6/2006 at 10:15 AM. (Mulaire, Justin) (Entered: 04/03/2006)
63 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP by Michael Peter Conway (Conway, Michael) (Entered: 04/05/2006)
64 MEMORANDUM by Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP in Opposition to motion for miscellaneous relief 60 Sidley's Opposition to the EEOC's Motion to Determine the Sufficiency of Responses to Requests to Admit Facts (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Amended and Supplemental Responses)(Solis, Maile) (Entered: 04/05/2006)
65 EXHIBIT by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission regarding memorandum in support of motion 61 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit C to document #61# 2 Exhibit D to document #61)(Mulaire, Justin) (Entered: 04/05/2006)
66 MOTION by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to disqualify counsel from representing one non−party witness (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B (stricken pursuant to minute order dated 6/5/06)# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D)(Mulaire, Justin) Modified on 6/6/2006 (mb, ). (Entered: 06/05/2006)
67 MEMORANDUM by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in Support of motion to disqualify counsel 66 (Mulaire, Justin) (Entered: 06/05/2006)
68 NOTICE of Motion by Justin Mulaire for presentment of motion to disqualify counsel 66 before Honorable James B. Zagel on 6/13/2006 at 10:15 AM. (Mulaire, Justin) (Entered: 06/05/2006)
69 EXHIBIT by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Exhibit B (corrected) regarding MOTION by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to disqualify counsel from representing one non−party witness 66 (Mulaire, Justin) (Entered: 06/05/2006)
70 MINUTE entry before Judge James B. Zagel : The Clerk of Court is directed to strike attachment 2 to document number 66 as erroneously filed. Mailed notice (mb, ) (Entered: 06/06/2006)
71 RESPONSE by Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP to MOTION by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to disqualify counsel from representing one non−party witness 66 (Conway, Michael) (Entered: 06/09/2006)
72 MINUTE entry before Judge James B. Zagel : MOTION by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to disqualify counsel from representing one

Case: 1:05-cv-208 As of: 04/07/2018 01:04 PM CDT 8 of 14

06/15/2006 06/15/2006 06/20/2006
06/20/2006 06/20/2006 07/10/2006 07/10/2006 07/10/2006 07/12/2006
07/12/2006 07/12/2006 07/13/2006 07/20/2006 09/05/2006
09/05/2006 09/15/2006

non−party witness 66 is denied as moot. Telephoned notice (drw, ) (Entered: 06/12/2006)
73 MOTION by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to amend/correct Protective Order (agreed motion) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, proposed Amended Protective Order# 2 Exhibit B, original Protective Order)(Mulaire, Justin) (Entered: 06/15/2006)
74 NOTICE of Motion by Justin Mulaire for presentment of motion to amend/correct 73 before Honorable James B. Zagel on 6/20/2006 at 10:15 AM. (Mulaire, Justin) (Entered: 06/15/2006)
75 MINUTE entry before Judge James B. Zagel : Motion hearing held on 6/20/2006 regarding motion to amend/correct 73 . MOTION by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to amend/correct protective order 73 is granted. Amended protective order to be submitted to the court for signature. Mailed notice (drw, ) (Entered: 06/21/2006)
76 AMENDED PROTECTIVE Order Signed by Judge James B. Zagel on 6/20/2006.Mailed notice(mb, ) (Entered: 06/23/2006)
83 MINUTE entry before Judge James B. Zagel : Enter Amended Protective Order. (For further detail see order.) Telephoned notice (hp, ) (Entered: 07/20/2006)
77 MOTION by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to compel Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) deposition (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Hamilton, Deborah) (Entered: 07/10/2006)
78 NOTICE of Motion by Deborah Lois Hamilton for presentment of motion to compel 77 before Honorable James B. Zagel on 7/13/2006 at 10:15 AM. (Hamilton, Deborah) (Entered: 07/10/2006)
79 SEALED DOCUMENT (RESTRICTED) (mb, ) (Entered: 07/12/2006)
80 RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF EEOC'S MOTION TO COMPEL A FED. R. CIV. P. 30(B)(6) DEPOSITION REGARDING THE REASONS SIDLEY PARTNERS WERE CHANGED IN STATUS FROM "PARTNER" TO "SENIOR COUNSEL" OR "COUNSEL" (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 through 5)(Solis, Maile) (Entered: 07/12/2006)
81 CERTIFICATE by Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP of Service (mb, ) (Entered: 07/14/2006)
82 SEALED DOCUMENT Exhibits 1, 2 and 3 to Defendant Sidley Austin LLP's Response to Plaintiff EEOC's Motion to Compel a Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) Deposition Regarding the reasons Sidley Partners Were Changed in Status From "Partner" to "Senior Counsel" or "Counsel". (RESTRICTED) (mb, ) (Entered: 07/14/2006)
85 MINUTE entry before Judge James B. Zagel : Motion hearing held on 7/13/2006. MOTION by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to compel Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) deposition 77 is granted in part and denied in part. Status hearing set for 9/28/2006 at 10:00 AM. (drw, ) (Entered: 07/31/2006)
84 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP by Matthew Alan Bills (Bills, Matthew) (Entered: 07/20/2006)
86 MOTION by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to compel Deponent William White to Answer Questions Regarding his conversations with Sidley Management and for completion of his deposition (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit Exhibit G)(Hamilton, Deborah) (Entered: 09/05/2006)
87 NOTICE of Motion by Deborah Lois Hamilton for presentment of motion to compel, 86 before Honorable James B. Zagel on 9/19/2006 at 10:15 AM. (Hamilton, Deborah) (Entered: 09/05/2006)
88 RESPONSE by Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP to MOTION by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to compel Deponent William White to Answer

Case: 1:05-cv-208 As of: 04/07/2018 01:04 PM CDT 9 of 14

09/15/2006 09/15/2006 09/15/2006 09/15/2006 09/18/2006
09/19/2006
09/25/2006
09/25/2006 09/27/2006
10/04/2006 10/06/2006 11/10/2006 11/10/2006 11/13/2006

Questions Regarding his conversations with Sidley Management and for completion of his deposition 86 (Conway, Michael) (Entered: 09/15/2006)
89 MOTION by Defendant Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP to compel RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES, COMPLIANCE WITH SUBPOENAS, AND SUPPLEMENTATION OF DEFICIENT DISCOVERY RESPONSES (Murray, Lynn) (Entered: 09/15/2006)
90 MEMORANDUM by Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP in Support of motion to compel 89 RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES, COMPLIANCE WITH SUBPOENAS, AND SUPPLEMENTATION OF DEFICIENT DISCOVERY RESPONSES (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−M)(Murray, Lynn) (Entered: 09/15/2006)
91 NOTICE of Motion by Lynn Hagman Murray for presentment of motion to compel 89 before Honorable James B. Zagel on 9/19/2006 at 10:15 AM. (Murray, Lynn) (Entered: 09/15/2006)
92 SEALED DOCUMENT by Defendant (RESTRICTED) (mb, ) (Entered: 09/18/2006)
93 REPLY by Equal Employment Opportunity Commissionin Support of MOTION by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to compel Deponent William White to Answer Questions Regarding his conversations with Sidley Management and for completion of his deposition 86 Notice of EEOC's Agreement to Dismiss as Moot and Without Prejudice EEOC's Motion to Compel Deponent William White to Answer Questions Regarding his Conversations with Sidley Management and for Completion of His Deposition (Hamilton, Deborah) (Entered: 09/18/2006)
94 MINUTE entry before Judge James B. Zagel : Motion hearing held on 9/19/2006. MOTION by Defendant Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP to compel RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES, COMPLIANCE WITH SUBPOENAS, AND SUPPLEMENTATION OF DEFICIENT DISCOVERY RESPONSES 89 response due by 9/25/2006. MOTION by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to compel deponent William White to answer questions regarding his conversations with Sidley Management and for completion of his deposition 86 is withdrawn without prejudice. Mailed notice (drw, ) (Entered: 09/19/2006)
95 RESPONSE by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in Opposition to MOTION by Defendant Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP to compel RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES, COMPLIANCE WITH SUBPOENAS, AND SUPPLEMENTATION OF DEFICIENT DISCOVERY RESPONSES 89 (Mulaire, Justin) (Entered: 09/25/2006)
97 SEALED DOCUMENT. (RESTRICTED) (mb, ) (Entered: 09/28/2006)
96 REPLY by Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLPin Support of MOTION by Defendant Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP to compel RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES, COMPLIANCE WITH SUBPOENAS, AND SUPPLEMENTATION OF DEFICIENT DISCOVERY RESPONSES 89 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 and 2)(Murray, Lynn) (Entered: 09/27/2006)
98 MINUTE entry before Judge James B. Zagel : Status hearing set for 10/6/2006 at 10:30 AM. Mailed notice (drw, ) (Entered: 10/04/2006)
99 MINUTE entry before Judge James B. Zagel : Status hearing held on 10/6/2006. Motion to compel 89 is granted in part and denied in part for the reasons stated in open court. Status hearing set for 11/14/2006 at 12:00 PM. Mailed notice (drw, ) (Entered: 10/12/2006)
100 MOTION by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for discovery schedule (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, proposed scheduling order# 2 Exhibit B, chart)(Mulaire, Justin) (Entered: 11/10/2006)
101 NOTICE of Motion by Justin Mulaire for presentment of motion for discovery 100 before Honorable James B. Zagel on 11/14/2006 at 12:00 PM. (Mulaire, Justin) (Entered: 11/10/2006)
102 RESPONSE by Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP to MOTION by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for discovery schedule 100 and Cross−Motion

Case: 1:05-cv-208 As of: 04/07/2018 01:04 PM CDT 10 of 14

11/13/2006 11/13/2006 11/17/2006 11/17/2006 11/17/2006 11/20/2006
11/20/2006 11/20/2006 11/20/2006 11/20/2006 11/21/2006 01/23/2007 01/23/2007
01/23/2007 01/24/2007

for Entry of Scheduling Order (Conway, Michael) (Entered: 11/13/2006)
103 MOTION by Defendant Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP for order Defendant's Response to EEOC's Motion for Entry of Scheduling Order and Cross−Motion for Entry of Scheduling Order (Conway, Michael) (Entered: 11/13/2006)
104 NOTICE of Motion by Michael Peter Conway for presentment of motion for order 103 before Honorable James B. Zagel on 11/14/2006 at 12:00 PM. (Conway, Michael) (Entered: 11/13/2006)
105 MOTION by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for protective order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, filed under seal only# 2 Exhibit 2, Transcript of October 6, 2006 hearing# 3 Exhibit 3, filed under seal only# 4 Exhibit 4, filed under seal only# 5 Exhibit 5, filed under seal only)(Mulaire, Justin) (Entered: 11/17/2006)
106 NOTICE of Motion by Justin Mulaire for presentment of motion for protective order, 105 before Honorable James B. Zagel on 11/21/2006 at 10:15 AM. (Mulaire, Justin) (Entered: 11/17/2006)
112 SEALED DOCUMENT. Exhibit B to Defendant's Motion for Enforcement of Ruling Regarding Production of Certain Documents; Notice (RESTRICTED) (mb, ) (Entered: 11/22/2006)
107 MOTION by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for protective order governing subsequent employment information and documents (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, proposed Protective Order Governing Subsequent Employment Information and Documents# 2 Exhibit B, October 6, 2006 Transcript of Proceedings)(Mulaire, Justin) (Entered: 11/20/2006)
108 NOTICE of Motion by Justin Mulaire for presentment of motion for protective order, 107 before Honorable James B. Zagel on 11/21/2006 at 10:15 AM. (Mulaire, Justin) (Entered: 11/20/2006)
109 RESPONSE by Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP in Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for protective order 105 (Solis, Maile) (Entered: 11/20/2006)
110 MEMORANDUM by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Enforcement of Ruling Regarding Production of Certain Documents (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Transcript of Proceedings)(Mulaire, Justin) (Entered: 11/20/2006)
111 SEALED DOCUMENT. Exhibits A and D to Defendant's Opposition to EEOC's Motion for Protective Order; Notice (RESTRICTED) (mb, ) (Entered: 11/21/2006)
113 SEALED DOCUMENT. (RESTRICTED) (mb, ) (Entered: 11/22/2006)
114 MOTION by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to compel production of client complaint information or to preclude reliance thereon (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 (filed under seal)# 2 Exhibit 2 (filed under seal)# 3 Exhibit 3 (filed under seal))(Mulaire, Justin) (Entered: 01/23/2007)
115 MOTION by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to compel disclosure of legal advice rendered to the firm by a former partner (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 (filed under seal)# 2 Exhibit 2 (filed under seal)# 3 Exhibit 3 (filed under seal)# 4 Exhibit 4 (filed under seal)# 5 Exhibit 5 (filed under seal))(Mulaire, Justin) (Entered: 01/23/2007)
116 NOTICE of Motion by Justin Mulaire for presentment of motion to compel, 114 , motion to compel, 115 before Honorable James B. Zagel on 1/25/2007 at 10:15 AM. (Mulaire, Justin) (Entered: 01/23/2007)
117 RESPONSE by Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP to MOTION by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to compel disclosure of legal advice rendered to the firm by a former partner 115 , MOTION by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to compel production of client complaint information or to preclude reliance thereon 114 SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP'S REQUEST FOR A BRIEFING SCHEDULE ON THE EEOC'S PENDING MOTIONS (Solis, Maile) (Entered: 01/24/2007)

Case: 1:05-cv-208 As of: 04/07/2018 01:04 PM CDT 11 of 14

01/25/2007 01/25/2007 01/25/2007 01/25/2007 02/15/2007
02/15/2007 03/02/2007 03/02/2007
03/02/2007 03/02/2007
03/02/2007
03/08/2007 03/09/2007 03/09/2007 03/19/2007
03/19/2007 03/21/2007

118 EXHIBITS 1−3 to Plaintiff EEOC's Motion to Compel Production of Client Complaint Information or to Preclude Reliance Thereon by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (RESTRICTED)(mb, ) (Entered: 01/26/2007)
119 EXHIBITS 1−5 to Plaintiff EEOC's Motion to Compel Disclosure of Legal Advice Rendered to the Firm by a Former Partner by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (RESTRICTED)(mb, ) (Entered: 01/26/2007)
120 MINUTE entry before Judge James B. Zagel : Enter protective order governing subsequent employment information and documents.Mailed notice (mb, ) (Entered: 01/29/2007)
121 PROTECTIVE Order governing subsequent employment information and documents Signed by Judge James B. Zagel on 1/25/2007.(mb, ) (Entered: 01/29/2007)
122 RESPONSE by Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLPin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to compel production of client complaint information or to preclude reliance thereon 114 SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP'S MEMORANDUM (A) ON COMPARATORS AND (B) OPPOSING EEOC MOTION REGARDING CLIENT COMPLAINTS (Solis, Maile) (Entered: 02/15/2007)
123 EXHIBITS C, G, H, K and M to Memorandum (A) on Comparators and (B) Opposing EEOC Motion Regarding Client Complaints by Defendant Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP; Notice (RESTRICTED) (mb, ) (Entered: 02/16/2007)
124 MOTION by Defendant Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP to compel RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES AND DOCUMENT PRODUCTION REQUESTS (Solis, Maile) (Entered: 03/02/2007)
125 MEMORANDUM by Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP in support of motion to compel 124 RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES AND DOCUMENT PRODUCTION REQUESTS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A through P)(Solis, Maile) (Entered: 03/02/2007)
126 NOTICE of Motion by Maile H. Solis for presentment of motion to compel 124 before Honorable James B. Zagel on 3/9/2007 at 12:00 PM. (Solis, Maile) (Entered: 03/02/2007)
127 MEMORANDUM by Defendant Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP in support of its motion to compel responses to interrogatories and document production requests 124 with Exhibits A,B,G,H,I,J,K and M. (RESTRICTED). (Document not scanned). (ar, ) (Entered: 03/05/2007)
128 NOTICE of filing by Defendant Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP regarding Defendant's memorandum in support of motion to compel responses to interrogatories and document production requests 127 and Exhibits A,B,G,H,I,J, K and M 125 . (vkd, ) (Entered: 03/06/2007)
129 SEALED DOCUMENT by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (RESTRICTED) (mb, ) (Entered: 03/09/2007)
130 MINUTE entry before Judge James B. Zagel :Status hearing held on 3/9/2007. Motion to compel 124 is granted in part and denied in part. Status hearing set for 4/10/2007 at 12:00 PM.Mailed notice(drw, ) (Entered: 03/14/2007)
131 MINUTE entry before Judge James B. Zagel :Status hearing held on 3/9/2007. Status hearing set for 4/10/2007 at 10:00 AM.Mailed notice (drw, ) (Entered: 03/14/2007)
132 SUR−REPLY by Defendant Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP to reply 129 SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP'S SUR−REPLY IN RESPONSE TO EEOC'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF CLIENT COMPLAINT INFORMATION OR TO PRECLUDE RELIANCE THEREON (Murray, Lynn) (Entered: 03/19/2007)
133 SUR−REPLY by Defendant Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP ; Notice of Filing (RESTRICTED) (eav, ) (Entered: 03/20/2007)
134 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP by Laura K McNally (McNally, Laura) (Entered: 03/21/2007)

Case: 1:05-cv-208 As of: 04/07/2018 01:04 PM CDT 12 of 14

03/21/2007 03/21/2007 03/21/2007 03/23/2007
03/23/2007
03/23/2007 03/23/2007 03/23/2007 03/26/2007 03/26/2007
03/28/2007 03/28/2007 03/28/2007 03/29/2007 03/30/2007 03/30/2007 04/05/2007

135 NOTICE by Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP re attorney appearance 134 of Laura K. McNally (McNally, Laura) (Entered: 03/21/2007)
136 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP by Michael S Gulland (Gulland, Michael) (Entered: 03/21/2007)
137 NOTICE by Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP re attorney appearance 136 of Michael S. Gulland (Gulland, Michael) (Entered: 03/21/2007)
138 MOTION by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to compel interrogatory responses (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Supplemental Amended Exhibit D (under seal only)# 2 Exhibit B, Sidley Responses to EEOC's 10th Set of Interrogatories (under seal only))(Mulaire, Justin) (Entered: 03/23/2007)
139 REPLY by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to memorandum in support of motion 125 (MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES AND DOCUMENT PRODUCTION REQUESTS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A (under seal)# 2 Exhibit B, Transcript of October 6, 2006 hearing)(Mulaire, Justin) (Entered: 03/23/2007)
140 NOTICE of Motion by Justin Mulaire for presentment of motion to compel, 138 before Honorable James B. Zagel on 4/10/2007 at 10:00 AM. (Mulaire, Justin) (Entered: 03/23/2007)
142 MOTION by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to compel Interrogatory Responses. (RESTRICTED) (Document Not Scanned) (gej, ) (Entered: 03/26/2007)
143 MEMORANDUM by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in Opposition to Defendant's motion to compel responses to interrogatories and document production requests. (RESTRICTED) (Document Not Scanned) (gej, ) (Entered: 03/26/2007)
141 SUR−REPLY by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Elkin, Laurie) (Entered: 03/26/2007)
144 EXHIBIT A by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to EEOC's sur−reply in Support of EEOC's Motion to Compel Production of Client Complaint Information or to Preclude Reliance Thereon 141 (RESTRICTED)(rp, ) (Entered: 03/27/2007)
145 MOTION by Defendant Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP for order AGREED ORDER REGARDING WAIVER OF THE ATTORNEY−CLIENT PRIVILEGE AS TO CERTAIN COMMUNICATIONS (Bills, Matthew) (Entered: 03/28/2007)
146 NOTICE OF MOTION FOR ENTRY OF AGREED ORDER NOTICE of Motion by Matthew Alan Bills for presentment of motion for order 145 before Honorable James B. Zagel on 4/10/2007 at 10:00 AM. (Bills, Matthew) (Entered: 03/28/2007)
148 EXHIBIT A to Sidley Austin LLP's motion for entry of agreed order regarding waiver of the attorney−client privilege as to certain communications. (RESTRICTED).(gcy, ) (Entered: 03/30/2007)
147 MINUTE entry before Judge James B. Zagel :Motion for order deeming matters admitted 60 is denied as moot.Mailed notice (drw, ) (Entered: 03/29/2007)
149 REPLY by Defendant Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP to reply, 139 , memorandum in support of motion 125 TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES AND DOCUMENT PRODUCTION REQUESTS (Solis, Maile) (Entered: 03/30/2007)
150 SEALED DOCUMENT − REPLY and Exhibits 1 and 2 by Defendant in support of motion to compel responses to interrogatories and document production requests 149 ; Notice of filing (Document not sealed.) (RESTRICTED) (hp, ) (Entered: 04/02/2007)
151 RESPONSE by Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLPin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to compel interrogatory responses 138 DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO EEOC'S MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO EEOC'S TENTH SET OF INTERROGATORIES (Solis, Maile) (Entered: 04/05/2007)

Case: 1:05-cv-208 As of: 04/07/2018 01:04 PM CDT 13 of 14

04/05/2007
04/05/2007
04/05/2007 04/05/2007 04/05/2007 04/06/2007
04/06/2007 04/06/2007 04/06/2007 04/06/2007 04/10/2007 04/10/2007 04/12/2007 04/27/2007 04/27/2007

152 MEMORANDUM by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in support of motion to compel, 114 (SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF EEOC's MOTION TO COMPEL CLIENT COMPLAINT INFORMATION) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Moates deposition transcript (under seal only))(Mulaire, Justin) (Entered: 04/05/2007)
153 MOTION by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for extension of time to complete discovery and other pre−trial deadlines (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, sampling of recently produced documents (under seal only)# 2 Exhibit B, EEOC's First Set of Document Production Requests (under seal only)# 3 Exhibit C, recently produced document referencing retirement policy and age# 4 Exhibit D, letter from Defendant's counsel to EEOC)(Mulaire, Justin) (Entered: 04/05/2007)
154 NOTICE of Motion by Justin Mulaire for presentment of motion for extension of time to complete discovery, 153 before Honorable James B. Zagel on 4/10/2007 at 10:00 AM. (Mulaire, Justin) (Entered: 04/05/2007)
156 OPPOSITION by Defendant to EEOC's motion to oompel responses to EEOC's tenth set of interrogatories and Exhibit A thereto. (Document not scanned). (RESTRICTED). (ar, ) Modified on 4/9/2007 (ar, ). (Entered: 04/09/2007)
158 NOTICE of under seal filing by Defendant regarding its opposition 156 to EEOC's motion to compel responses to EEOC's tenth set of interrogatories and Exhibit A thereo. (ar, ) Modified on 4/9/2007 (ar, ). (Entered: 04/09/2007)
155 RESPONSE by Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLPin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for extension of time to complete discovery and other pre−trial deadlines 153 SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP'S OPPOSITION TO THE EEOC'S MOTION FOR AN EXTENSION OF DISCOVERY SCHEDULE (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A through I)(Solis, Maile) (Entered: 04/06/2007)
157 OPPOSITION by Defendant to the EEOC's motion for an extension of discovery schedule and Exhibits D,E,F, and H thereto 153 . (Document not scanned). (RESTRICTED). (ar, ) Modified on 4/9/2007 (ar, ). (Entered: 04/09/2007)
159 NOTICE of under seal filing by Defendant regarding its opposition 157 to the EEOC's motion for an extension of discovery schedule and Exhibits D, E, F and H thereto. (ar, ) (Entered: 04/09/2007)
160 SEALED DOCUMENT − MOTION by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for extension of discovery schedule (Document not scanned.) (RESTRICTED) (hp, ) (Entered: 04/10/2007)
161 SEALED DOCUMENT − SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANUM by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in support of EEOC's Motion to compel client complaint information 143 , 152 (Document not scanned.) (RESTRICTED) (hp, ) (Entered: 04/10/2007)
162 MINUTE entry before Judge James B. Zagel :Enter agreed order regarding waiver of the attorney−client privilege as to certain communications. Mailed notice (rp, ) (Entered: 04/20/2007)
163 AGREED ORDER REGARDING WAIVER OF THE ATTORNEY−CLIENT PRIVILEGE AS TO CERTAIN COMMUNICATIONS Signed by Judge James B. Zagel on 4/10/2007.(rp, ) (Entered: 04/20/2007)
169 AGREED Order Regarding Waiver of the Attorney−Client Privilege as to Certain Communications, signed by Judge James B. Zagel on 4/12/2007. Mailed notice (ar, ). Modified on 5/14/2007 (ar, ). (Entered: 05/14/2007)
164 MINUTE entry before Judge James B. Zagel :Motion to compel 114 is granted in part and denied in part. Motion to compel 138 is granted in part and denied in part. Motion to compel 142 is granted in part and denied in part. Motion for extension of time to complete discovery 153 is granted. Mailed notice (drw, ) (Entered: 04/27/2007)
165 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order ruling on motions to compel [114, 138, 142] and motion to extend discovery 153 . Signed on 4/27/2007:Mailed notice(drw, ) (Entered: 04/27/2007)

Case: 1:05-cv-208 As of: 04/07/2018 01:04 PM CDT 14 of 14

05/08/2007
05/08/2007 05/09/2007 05/10/2007 05/17/2007 09/24/2007 09/25/2007 09/28/2007
10/04/2007 10/04/2007 01/09/2008 05/14/2008
05/28/2008 05/29/2008

166 MOTION by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Defendant Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP to amend/correct Protective Order Governing Subsequent Employment Information and Documents (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B)(Solis, Maile) (Entered: 05/08/2007)
167 NOTICE of Motion by Maile H. Solis for presentment of motion to amend/correct, 166 before Honorable James B. Zagel on 5/10/2007 at 10:15 AM. (Solis, Maile) (Entered: 05/08/2007)
168 AMENDED MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order regarding discovery. Signed on 5/9/2007:Mailed notice(drw, ) (Entered: 05/09/2007)
171 MINUTE entry before Judge James B. Zagel :Motion to amend/correct 166 is granted. Mailed notice (drw, ) (Entered: 05/30/2007)
170 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP by Elizabeth S. Elmore (Elmore, Elizabeth) (Entered: 05/17/2007)
172 MINUTE entry before Judge James B. Zagel : Status hearing set for 9/26/2007 at 11:30 AM.Mailed notice (drw, ) (Entered: 09/24/2007)
173 MINUTE entry before Judge James B. Zagel :Status hearing set for 9/26/2007 is stricken.Mailed notice (drw, ) (Entered: 09/25/2007)
174 MINUTE entry before Judge James B. Zagel :Motion for discovery 100 is stricken; Motion for order 103 is stricken; Motion for protective order 105 is stricken; Motion for protective order 107 is stricken; Motion to compel 115 is stricken; Motion for extension of time to complete discovery 160 is stricken. Motions administratively terminated: Mailed notice (drw, ) (Entered: 09/28/2007)
175 MINUTE entry before Judge James B. Zagel : Enter Consent decree.Civil case terminated. mailed notice (vcf, ) (Entered: 10/05/2007)
176 CONSENT DECREE Signed by Judge James B. Zagel on 10/4/2007.(vcf, ) (Entered: 10/05/2007)
177 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following dates: 4/10/2007; Before the Honorable James B. Zagel. (Document not scanned). (gmr, ) (Entered: 01/10/2008)
178 MINUTE entry before Judge Honorable James B. Zagel:The sealed/restricted documents in this case are eligible for unsealing pursuant to Local Rule 26.2e or for destruction. However, due to the ambiguous language in the protective orders, clarification of the protective orders as to whether or not these documents should be unsealed or destroyed is needed. The filing parties are directed to notify the court in writing by 6/4/2008 of their respective positions. The court will enter an appropriate order on or by 6/18/2008.Mailed notice (drw, ) (Entered: 05/14/2008)
179 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to text entry,, 178 EEOC's Response to the Honorable Judge Zagel's Request for Clarification of the Protective Order (Hamilton, Deborah) (Entered: 05/28/2008)
180 RESPONSE by Defendant Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP to text entry,, 178 TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE ZAGELS REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE PROTECTIVE ORDER (Elmore, Elizabeth) (Entered: 05/29/2008)

 
 USCA7 Docket Sheet for 06-8002

http://pacer.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/dktrpt.pl?CASENUM=06-8002&p...

General Docket
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Court of Appeals Docket #: 06-8002 Nsuit: 0 Sidley Austin LLP v. EEOC Appeal from: United States District Court

Filed: 1/5/06

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Lower court information:

District: 0752-1 : Ordering Judge: James B. Zagel, Judge Date Filed: **/**/** Date order/judgment: **/**/** Date NOA filed: **/**/** - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Fee status: null

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Prior cases:
None Current cases:
None

Docket as of March 13, 2006 11:03 pm

Page 1

06-8002 Sidley Austin LLP v. EEOC

SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP Petitioner

John E. Bucheit FAX 312/558-1195 312/704-7700 [COR LD NTC ret] GRIPPO & ELDEN 111 S. Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 USA

v.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Respondent

Jennifer S. Goldstein FAX 202/663-7090 202/663-4733 Room 7806 [COR LD NTC ret] EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 1801 L Street N.W. Washington, DC 20507 USA

Docket as of March 13, 2006 11:03 pm

Page 2

06-8002 Sidley Austin LLP v. EEOC
IN RE: SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, Petitioner
Docket as of March 13, 2006 11:03 pm

Page 3

1 of 3

5/29/2007 2:27 PM

USCA7 Docket Sheet for 06-8002

http://pacer.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/dktrpt.pl?CASENUM=06-8002&p...

06-8002 Sidley Austin LLP v. EEOC

1/5/06

Petition for Permission to appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1292(b) docketed. [06-8002] [0-0] (05 C 208) (amyd)

1/5/06

Disclosure Statement filed by John E. Bucheit for Petitioner Sidley Austin Brown. [06-8002] [1940856-1] (amyd)

1/10/06

Filed motion by Respondent EEOC to extend time to file response to petition for permission to appeal. [1941645-1] [06-8002] (hard)

1/10/06

Filed letter from attorney John E. Bucheit for Petitioner Sidley Austin Brown re: Typographical error in Petition for Permission to Appeal. [1940856-1] [06-8002] (jame)

1/13/06

ORDER issued GRANTING motion to extend time to file response. [1941645-1] LAB [06-8002] Response due 1/31/06 for EEOC. (jenn)

1/31/06

Filed Respondent EEOC response in opposition to Petitioner Sidley Austin Brown Petition or Permission to Appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b). [06-8002] [1940856-1] (hard)

2/6/06

Amended disclosure statement filed by John E. Bucheit for Petitioner Sidley Austin Brown. [06-8002] [1940856-1] (kell)

2/6/06

Filed motion by Petitioner Sidley Austin Brown to file reply to in support of petition for permission to appeal. [1952954-1] 4c Reply in Support of Petition tendered. [06-8002] (jenn)

2/7/06

ORDER issued GRANTING motion for leave to file reply in support of petition for permission to appeal. The clerk of this court shall file INSTANTER the tendered reply. [1952954-1] JKL [06-8002] (jenn)

2/7/06

Filed Petitioner Sidley Austin Brown reply in support of petition for permission to appeal, per order. [06-8002] [1940856-1] (jenn)

2/17/06

Filed opinion of the court by Judge Posner. The question satisfies the criteria in 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(b) for an interlocutory appeal and since it has been fully briefed we can proceed to answer it. AFFIRMED. Circuit Judge Richard A. Posner, Circuit Judge Frank H. Easterbrook, Circuit Judge Diane P. Wood. [06-8002] [1940856-1] (amyd)

2/17/06

ORDER: Final judgment filed per opinion. With costs: y. [06-8002] [1955915-1] (amyd)

3/13/06

MANDATE ISSUED. No record to be returned. [06-8002] [1940856-1] (cove)

Docket as of March 13, 2006 11:03 pm

Page 4

PACER Service Center

Transaction Receipt

05/29/2007 15:29:29

PACER Login: hs0328

Client Code:

eeoc

2 of 3

5/29/2007 2:27 PM

USCA7 Docket Sheet for 06-8002

http://pacer.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/dktrpt.pl?CASENUM=06-8002&p...

Description:

dkt report

Billable Pages: 4

Case Number:
Cost:

06-8002 0.32

3 of 3

5/29/2007 2:27 PM

 
 All EEOC Age Bias Claims Against Sidley Austin To Go Forward, Feder...

http://www.eeoc.gov/press/2-17-06.html

The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE FEBRUARY 17, 2006

CONTACT: TTY:

John C. Hendrickson EEOC Regional Attorney (312) 353-8551 (312) 353-2421

Laurie Elkin EEOC Trial Attorney (312) 353-7726

ALL EEOC AGE BIAS CLAIMS AGAINST SIDLEY & AUSTIN TO GO FORWARD, FEDERAL APPEALS COURT RULES

Unanimous 7th Circuit Says EEOC Has Enforcement Authority To Obtain Money for Expelled Partners
CHICAGO - The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit, sitting in Chicago, ruled this morning that the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has authority to obtain monetary relief for partners expelled from the giant international Chicago law firm of Sidley Austin (formerly known as "Sidley & Austin" and "Sidley Austin Brown & Wood") because of their age. (EEOC v. Sidley Austin, 7th Cir. No. 06-8002, decision below affirmed February 17, 2006.)
Today's unanimous ruling, written by Circuit Judge Richard Posner and joined in by Circuit Judges Frank H. Easterbrook and Diane P. Wood, came in response to a Sidley application to appeal from a lower federal court ruling by District Judge James B. Zagel which denied, for a second time, summary judgement and held that the EEOC could obtain monetary relief for "partners" expelled on account of their age or forced to retire. (EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, N.D. Ill. No. 05 C 0208, filed January 13, 2006.)
In holding that EEOC may obtain monetary relief in the case as well as injunctions, Judge Posner ruled that the U.S. Supreme Court's 2002 landmark decision in EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc. (534 U.S. 279) was controlling, writing that an earlier North Gibson School Corporation decision on which Sidley relied "is no longer good law [and] was scuttled by the Supreme Court in EEOC v. Waffle House . . . which held that the EEOC's claim for monetary relief for a victim of an alleged violation . . . was not barred . . ." The Seventh Circuit continued, "The reason there was no bar was . . . because [the EEOC's] enforcement authority is not derivative of the legal rights of individuals even when it is seeking to make them whole."
Sidley Austin Brown & Wood is the law firm which resulted from the merger of Sidley & Austin and New York-based Brown & Wood in May 2001. It recently changed its name to Sidley Austin LLP.
The EEOC lawsuit is a "class" age discrimination case brought, first, with respect to 31 former Sidley & Austin partners who were involuntarily downgraded and expelled from the partnership in October 1999 on account of their age, and, second, with respect to other partners who were involuntarily retired from Sidley & Austin since 1978 on account of their age, pursuant to a mandatory retirement policy. The ADEA prohibits employers with 20 or more employees from making employment decisions affecting employees over 40, including decisions regarding the termination of employment, on the basis of age. The ADEA also prohibits such employers from utilizing policies or rules which require employees over 40 to retire when they reach a particular age.
"Sidley's arguments about monetary relief and other remedies in this case have always been non-starters which cannot survive what the Supreme Court had to say in Waffle House," said EEOC Regional Attorney John Hendrickson. "Judge Zagel ruled twice in our favor on this issue. Now the 7th Circuit, which very seldom takes any kind of interlocutory appeal, has reached out and taken the appeal and affirmed Judge Zagel on all counts. So one of Sidley's last major defenses has been authoritatively and completely struck down there's nothing left of it. Now we can turn our full attention to the task of assuring that the jury requires Sidley to respond to the discrimination claims against it with significant and meaningful monetary and other relief."
Today's U.S. Court of Appeals decision by Judge Posner was the fifth significant decision in the history of the case, all of which have been in favor of the EEOC. Judge Zagel's District Court decision, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals today, was entered December 20, 2005. (Case citation: 97 BNA Fair Employment Practices Cases 211.) Zagel had also ruled in favor of the EEOC on the identical issue on June 9, 2005 (Case citation: 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12196.) During the EEOC administrative investigation which predated the suit, Sidley refused to comply with an agency subpoena and forced the EEOC to seek court enforcement. The EEOC's position was upheld by the Federal District Court in Chicago in February 2002 (EEOC v. Sidley & Austin, N.D. Illinois No. 01 C 9635 [2/11/2002; District Judge Joan Humphrey Lefkow], 2002 WL 206485, 88 Fair Empl.

1 of 2

5/29/2007 2:33 PM

All EEOC Age Bias Claims Against Sidley Austin To Go Forward, Feder...

http://www.eeoc.gov/press/2-17-06.html

Prac. Cas. (BNA) 64.) Thereafter, Sidley elected to appeal, but the District Court decision was upheld in respects material to the EEOC. In an October 24, 2002 opinion written by7th Circuit Judge Posner, Sidley was ordered to comply in significant part with the EEOC subpoena. (Case citation: EEOC v. Sidley & Austin, 315 F.3d 696 [7th Cir. 2002].)
In addition to Regional Attorney Hendrickson, EEOC has been represented by Supervisory Trial Attorney Gregory Gochanour and Trial Attorneys Deborah Hamilton, Laurie Elkin, and Justin Mulaire of the Chicago District Office. In the 7th Circuit, Deputy General Counsel James L. Lee, Acting Associate General Counsel Vincent J. Blackwood, Assistant General Counsel Carolyn L. Wheeler, and Appellate Attorney Jennifer S. Goldstein were on the brief for the EEOC.
On its Internet web site (www.sidley.com), Sidley & Austin describes itself as "a signif-icant legal power in the international arena," with "about 1,500 lawyers practicing on three continents." The firm has offices in Chicago, Dallas, Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco, Washington, Beijing, Brussels, Geneva, Hong Kong, London, Shanghai, Singapore and Tokyo.
The EEOC is responsible for enforcing the nation's laws prohibiting discrimination in employment based on race, color, sex (including sexual harassment and pregnancy), religion, national origin, age, disability, and retaliation. Further information about the Commission is available on its web site at www.eeoc.gov.
This page was last modified on February 17, 2006.

Return to Home Page

2 of 2

5/29/2007 2:33 PM

 
 Court Rejects Sidley & Austin's Attempt to Avoid Money Damages in ...

http://www.eeoc.gov/press/6-9-05.html

The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE June 9, 2005

CONTACT:

Gregory Gochanour Supervisory Trial Attorney (312) 886-9124
Laurie Elkin Trial Attorney (312) 353-7726
Deborah Hamilton Trial Attorney (312) 353-7649

COURT REJECTS SIDLEY & AUSTIN'S ATTEMPT TO AVOID MONEY DAMAGES IN EEOC AGE BIAS SUIT
Commission's Authority Confirmed in High Profile Case to Seek Individual Relief for Former Law Firm Partners Demoted and Mandatorily Retired
CHICAGO – The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois today issued a written opinion by Judge James Zagel decisively rejecting the attempt of international law firm Sidley & Austin to avoid any possible liability for individual relief in a closely watched age discrimination lawsuit by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
In the ongoing litigation, the EEOC asserts that Sidley violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) by downgrading a group of law firm partners to "senior counsel" or "counsel" status in the fall of 1999 and by maintaining a mandatory retirement age for partners. EEOC's court-filed complaint seeks monetary damages and reinstatement for these partners. The EEOC's lawsuit was originally filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in Chicago on January 13, 2005. The parties are now engaged in the discovery process, and a trial date has not yet been set.
"Today's decision is a complete rejection of Sidley's attempt to avoid the possibility of payment of monetary damages or other individual relief if it is found liable," said EEOC Trial Attorney Laurie Elkin, who is working on the government's case. "But it is more than that, it is confirmation that in any case brought by the EEOC, the Commission is empowered to seek relief for the victims of discrimination – whether or not the victims could seek relief on their own behalf."
In the EEOC's case against Sidley, the agency's Chicago District Office began its investigation into Sidley & Austin's compliance with the ADEA not as a result of a Charge of Discrimination filed by an individual but after Sidley & Austin made statements to the news media that it had demoted partners to create opportunity for younger lawyers and referenced its mandatory retirement age.
In its motion, Sidley argued that because none of the individual partners filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC, and therefore could not themselves file an action in court for individual relief, the EEOC could not seek monetary relief on their behalf.
Relying on Supreme Court precedent, Judge Zagel, said: "The EEOC's right to bring suit seeking individual relief goes beyond that of the individual and reaches the territory of public interest, thereby allowing EEOC to seek relief for individuals, like the affected Sidley partners in this case, who could not, for any variety of reasons, do so themselves."
EEOC Chicago Regional Attorney John C. Hendrickson, who is lead counsel for the government in the case, said: "Sidley's motion was the legal equivalent of a ‘Hail Mary' pass in football – one that is thrown at the end of a game to avoid a loss, and has little chance of success. There really was no legal basis for Sidley's argument that the EEOC's litigation authority is the same as an individual's litigation authority under the federal anti-discrimination laws."
Hendrickson continued: ""We are very pleased that Judge Zagel recognized the EEOC's unique role in protecting the public interest by pursuing claims for individual relief and that we will be able to continue to pursue our claims for money damages and reinstatement on behalf of partners affected by Sidley's discriminatory practices."
EEOC Trial Attorney Deborah Hamilton, who is also working on the case, said, "The Commission will now proceed vigorously in this case, with the assurance that if the suit is successful, the affected individuals will be made whole via monetary relief."
EEOC Supervisory Trial Attorney, Gregory Gochanour noted, "Today's decision is part of a pattern of case law that has developed in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in EEOC v. Wafflehouse. This line of cases holds that the EEOC's ability to bring claims for relief is not dependent on whether an affected individual could bring a claim for relief."
The EEOC is the federal government agency responsible for enforcing the nation's anti-discrimination laws in employment based on race, color, sex, religion, national origin, retaliation, age and disability. Further information about the agency is available on its web site at www.eeoc.gov.
This page was last modified on June 9, 2005.

Return to Home Page

1 of 1

5/29/2007 2:34 PM

 
 Federal Court Rules Again: All EEOC Claims Against Sidley Austin for...

http://www.eeoc.gov/press/12-21-05.html

The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE December 20, 2005

CONTACT: TTY:

John C. Hendrickson Regional Attorney (312) 353-8551 (312) 353-2421

Gregory Gochanour Supervisory Trial Attorney (312) 886-9124

Deborah Hamilton Trial Attorney (312) 353-7649

FEDERAL COURT RULES AGAIN: ALL EEOC CLAIMS AGAINST SIDLEY & AUSTIN FOR AGE BIAS WILL GO FORWARD

Judge Says EEOC Ability to Seek Money for Expelled Partners is Derived from Public Interest
CHICAGO - U.S. District Judge James B. Zagel today, for the second time, denied a request of Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, the giant Chicago-based international law firm, that the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) be barred from obtaining monetary relief in the agency's class age discrimination lawsuit for attorneys expelled from the firm partnership.
Today's ruling came in response to a Sidley motion asking the Court to reconsider and reverse its June 9, 2005, ruling denying the firm's motion for summary judgement and holding that the EEOC could obtain monetary relief for "partners" expelled on account of their age or forced to retire (EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, N.D. Ill. No. 05 C 0208, filed January 13, 2005).
In holding that the EEOC may obtain monetary relief in the case as well as injunctions, Judge Zagel ruled that the U.S. Supreme Court's 2002 landmark decision in EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc. (534 U.S. 279) was controlling, writing: "Waffle House makes clear that EEOC's ability to seek monetary relief on behalf of individuals is derived from its own statutory rights to advance the public's interest and is unrelated to any individual's right."
The EEOC lawsuit is a "class" age discrimination case brought, first, with respect to 31 former Sidley & Austin partners who were involuntarily downgraded and expelled from the partnership in October 1999 on account of their age; and, second, with respect to other partners who were involuntarily retired from Sidley & Austin since 1978 on account of their age pursuant to a mandatory retirement policy. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) prohibits employers with 20 or more employees from making employment decisions, including decisions regarding the termination of employment, on the basis of age (over 40). The ADEA also prohibits such employers from utilizing policies or rules which require employees to retire when they reach a particular age (over 40).
The EEOC regional attorney in Chicago, John Hendrickson, said, "Our view has always been that Sidley's arguments about remedies in this case just cannot survive what the Supreme Court had to say in Waffle House. Judge Zagel has now ruled twice in our favor on this issue, so we think the writing is on the wall. At the end of the day, Sidley partners who fell to age discrimination are going to be receiving significant monetary relief from the jury."
Today's U.S. District Court decision entered by Judge Zagel was the fourth significant decision in the history of the case, all in favor of the EEOC. Zagel had ruled in favor of the EEOC on the same issue. During the EEOC administrative investigation which predated the suit, Sidley refused to comply with an agency subpoena and forced the EEOC to seek court enforcement. EEOC's position was upheld by the District Court in Chicago in February 2002 (EEOC v. Sidley & Austin, N.D. Illinois No. 01 C 9635 2/11/2002; District Judge Joan Humphrey Lefkow). Thereafter, Sidley elected to appeal, but the District Court decision was upheld in respects material to the EEOC. In an October 24, 2002, opinion written by U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Richard A. Posner, Sidley was ordered to comply in significant part with the EEOC subpoena (EEOC v. Sidley & Austin, 315 F.3d 696, 7th Cir. 2002).
Judge Zagel also ruled today, in response to a Sidley request, that he would certify his decision for appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, if Sidley wished to pursue an appeal and submits "a proposed order containing the question or questions to be certified. EEOC's Hendrickson said, "We certainly are not going to attempt to predict whether Sidley will in fact attempt an appeal. We do think, however, that with or without an appeal the result is going to remain the same."
Sidley Austin Brown & Wood is the law firm which resulted from the merger of Sidley & Austin and New York-based Brown & Wood in May 2001. According to its web site (www.sidley.com), Sidley & Austin describes itself as "a significant legal power in the international arena," with "about 1,500 lawyers practicing on three continents." The firm has offices in Chicago, Dallas, Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco, Washington, D.C., Beijing, Brussels, Geneva,

1 of 2

5/29/2007 2:39 PM

Federal Court Rules Again: All EEOC Claims Against Sidley Austin for...

http://www.eeoc.gov/press/12-21-05.html

Hong Kong, London, Shanghai, Singapore and Tokyo.
In addition to enforcing the ADEA, the EEOC enforces Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex (including sexual harassment or pregnancy) or national origin and protects employees who complain about such offenses from retaliation; the Equal Pay Act of 1963, which prohibits gender-based wage discrimination; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which prohibits employment discrimination against people with disabilities in the federal sector; Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, which prohibits employment discrimination against people with disabilities in the private sector and state and local governments; and sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Further information about the Commission is available on the agency's web site at www.eeoc.gov.
This page was last modified on December 21, 2005.

Return to Home Page

2 of 2

5/29/2007 2:39 PM

 
 U.S. Supreme Court Denial of Review Ends Sidley & Austin Bid to Avo...

http://www.eeoc.gov/press/10-2-06a.html

The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Monday, Oct. 2, 2006

CONTACT: John C. Hendrickson Regional Attorney (312) 353-8551
Gregory Gochanour Supervisory Trial Attorney (312) 886-9124

U.S. SUPREME COURT DENIAL OF REVIEW ENDS SIDLEY & AUSTIN BID TO AVOID MONETARY RELIEF ISSUE IN
AGE BIAS CASE

High Court Denies Sidley's Petition for Certiorari and Seventh Circuit Decision Confirming EEOC's Ability to Seek Money, Reinstatement for Affected Partners Is Left Standing
WASHINGTON - In a closely watched case brought by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against the international law firm of Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, the U.S. Supreme Court today issued a written order denying Sidley's petition for high court review of the EEOC's ability to pursue monetary damages and other individual victim-specific relief in EEOC's ongoing age discrimination suit against the firm. (EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, N.D. Illinois No. 05 C 0208.)
Today's decision by the Court to deny Sidley's request for review means that the question of EEOC's ability to seek such relief will continue to be governed by the Feb. 17, 2006, decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for Seventh Circuit on the issue. In that decision, the Seventh Circuit confirmed the EEOC's authority to seek individual relief such as money and reinstatement for partners who were downgraded from partner status by the firm in 1999 and others forced out because of an age-based retirement policy. (EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP, 406 F.Supp.2d 991 (N.D. Ill. 2005), 437 F.3d 695 (7th Cir. 2006), cert denied No. 05-1481 549 U.S. ___ (10/2/2006).)
"The Supreme Court's decision denying Sidley's request for review follows a pattern of Sidley's every attempt to avoid potential monetary liability being unequivocally rejected by the courts at every turn," said John Hendrickson, EEOC Regional Attorney in Chicago.
"Although the Supreme Court did not address the ultimate merits of the question," Hendrickson added, "the Court's decision to deny Sidley's request for review leaves the Seventh Circuit decision in our case standing as the controlling law for the duration of this case through a jury verdict, and there's not a shadow of a doubt about what that law is the EEOC can pursue monetary and other victim specific relief on behalf of the ousted Sidley partners."
In the ongoing litigation, the EEOC asserts that Sidley violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) by downgrading a group of law firm partners to "senior counsel" or "counsel" status in the fall of 1999 and by maintaining an age-based retirement policy for partners. EEOC's lawsuit seeks monetary damages and reinstatement for these partners. The EEOC's case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in Chicago on January 13, 2005, and the case is pending before U.S. District Judge James Zagel.
The EEOC's case against Sidley arose out of an investigation by the Chicago District Office into Sidley & Austin's compliance with the ADEA. The investigation did not follow a formal Charge of Discrimination filed by an individual, but began after the agency received a confidential complaint from within the firm and Sidley's management itself made statements to the media that partners had been downgraded to create opportunities for younger lawyers and also referenced the firm's age-based retirement policy.
Sidley first pressed its position against individual relief (including monetary damages) with the District Court, arguing that because none of the individual partners filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC, and therefore could not themselves file an action in court for individual relief, the EEOC could not seek monetary relief with respect to them. Like the Seventh Circuit, Judge Zagel twice rejected that position, first in June 2005 and then again in December 2005.
Relying on Supreme Court precedent, Judge Zagel said: "The EEOC's right to bring suit seeking individual

1 of 2

5/29/2007 2:40 PM

U.S. Supreme Court Denial of Review Ends Sidley & Austin Bid to Avo...

http://www.eeoc.gov/press/10-2-06a.html

relief goes beyond that of the individual and reaches the territory of public interest, thereby allowing EEOC to seek relief for individuals, like the affected Sidley partners in this case, who could not, for any variety of reasons, do so themselves." EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, LLP, 406 F. Supp. 2d 991, 994 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
Judge Zagel did not delay the case while Sidley's request for review of his decision was pending with the Seventh Circuit or the Supreme Court, so discovery has been ongoing. Twenty- seven of the 32 partners who were downgraded from partnership status in the fall of 1999 have asked to be represented by the EEOC in the litigation.
Today's decision follows other significant developments in the case including Sidley's counsel's resignation from its representation of the firm's former financial director, William White, who signed an Oct. 21, 1999, letter to the Social Security Administration stating "it is the general policy of Sidley & Austin not to permit a partner to continue as a partner commencing the first of the year following the year age 65 is reached." In a motion filed with the District Court, the EEOC argued that the representation created a conflict of interest because Sidley and its counsel had previously taken the position that Sidley had never maintained an age-based retirement policy.
In addition to Hendrickson, the EEOC is being represented in the District Court by Supervisory Trial Attorney Gregory Gochanour and Trial Attorneys Deborah Hamilton, Laurie Elkin, and Justin Mulaire, all of the agency's Chicago District Office. Sidley & Austin is represented by Grippo & Elden of Chicago.
Jennifer Goldstein and Carolyn Wheeler of the EEOC's Office of General Counsel Appellate Services in Washington represented the agency before the Seventh Circuit. The Solicitor General of the United States represented the EEOC in the Supreme Court. Carter Phillips of Sidley's Washington, D.C. office was on the brief for the law firm in the Supreme Court.
The EEOC is the federal government agency responsible for enforcing the nation's anti- discrimination laws in employment based on race, color, sex, religion, national origin, retaliation, age and disability. Further information about the agency is available on its web site at www.eeoc.gov.
This page was last modified on October 2, 2006.

Return to Home Page

2 of 2

5/29/2007 2:40 PM

 
 EEOC Charges Sidley & Austin With Age Discrimination

http://www.eeoc.gov/press/1-13-05.html

The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE January 13, 2005

CONTACT:

John C. Hendrickson Regional Attorney (312) 353-8551 TTY: (312) 353-2421

Deborah Hamilton Trial Attorney (312) 353-7649

Laurie Elkin Trial Attorney (312) 353-7726

EEOC Charges Sidley & Austin With Age Discrimination

Federal Agency Says Chicago-Based International Law Firm Chose Attorneys for Expulsion Because of Their Age
CHICAGO - The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed a lawsuit in federal court here today alleging that Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, the giant Chicago-based international law firm, violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) when it selected "partners" for expulsion from the firm on account of their age or forced them to retire. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood is the law firm which resulted from the merger of Sidley & Austin and New York- based Brown & Wood in May 2001.
The EEOC case is a "class" age discrimination case brought, first, with respect to 31 former Sidley & Austin partners who were involuntarily downgraded and expelled from the partnership in October of 1999 on account of their age, and, second, with respect to other partners who were involuntarily retired from Sidley & Austin since 1978 on account of their age pursuant to a mandatory retirement policy. The ADEA prohibits employers with 20 or more employees from making employment decisions, including decisions regarding the termination of employment, on the basis of age (over 40). The ADEA also prohibits such employers from utilizing policies or rules which require employees to retire when they reach a particular age (over 40).
Eric Dreiband, General Counsel of the EEOC, said, "The Age Discrimination in Employment Act makes it unlawful for employers to discriminate against any individual with respect to employment because of such individual's age. The United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission determined that Sidley, Austin, Brown & Wood violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Commission looks forward to proving its case to a jury."
Today's lawsuit grew out of an EEOC administrative investigation managed by John P. Rowe, Director of EEOC's Chicago District Office. Sidley & Austin was given notice of the investigation in July 2000. Although there was media coverage of the October 1999 changes at Sidley & Austin, the EEOC matter did not come into public view until Sidley & Austin refused to honor an EEOC subpoena, and the agency took the firm to court to enforce the subpoena.
EEOC's position was upheld by the District Court in Chicago in February 2002. (Case citation: EEOC v. Sidley & Austin, N.D. Illinois No. 01 C 9635 (2/11/2002; District Judge Joan Humphrey Lefkow), 2002 WL 206485, 88 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 64.) Thereafter, Sidley & Austin elected to appeal, but the District Court decision was upheld in respects material to the EEOC. In an October 24, 2002, opinion written by U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Richard A. Posner, Sidley was ordered to comply in significant part with the EEOC subpoena. (Case citation: EEOC v. Sidley & Austin, 315 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 2002).)
In July 2004, Chicago District Director Rowe made an administrative determination that there was reasonable cause to believe that Sidley & Austin has violated the ADEA in connection with the October 1999 expulsions and downgrades and in implementing its mandatory retirement policy since 1978. Thereafter, the EEOC and Sidley engaged months of discussions in an attempt to resolve the case through conciliation without litigation. However, those negotiations proved futile.
EEOC's Regional Attorney in Chicago, John C. Hendrickson, said that in resisting the EEOC investigation and in forcing the EEOC to obtain judicial enforcement of its subpoena, "Sidley's unwavering position has been that the matters involving how the law firm dealt with those it referred to as 'partners' and whether it

1 of 2

5/29/2007 2:39 PM

EEOC Charges Sidley & Austin With Age Discrimination

http://www.eeoc.gov/press/1-13-05.html

engaged in discrimination were simply way beyond the reach of the ADEA and EEOC." However, according to Hendrickson, the EEOC administrative investigation revealed that, "except for a very few controlling partners at the very top, Sidley's lawyers appeared to be ordinary employees not unlike their colleagues at parallel levels in the business community and, therefore, covered by the ADEA."
Hendrickson said, "Whatever titles Sidley had decided to give these lawyers partner, counsel, or otherwise our investigation indicated that they had no voice or control in governance of the firm and that they could be and were fired just like any other employees without notice and without the vote or consent of their fellow attorneys. A small self-perpetuating group of managers at the top ran everything, and that was it end of story."
"Of course," added EEOC Trial Attorney Deborah Hamilton, "having the power to fire an employee does not mean that a law firm or any other covered employer can do so because of the employee's age, if the employee is over 40. That is a violation of the ADEA and that the making of unlawful age-based selections for termination is precisely what EEOC is targeting in this lawsuit."
The lawsuit filed was filed today in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, located in Chicago. It is captioned EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, and is Civil Action No. 05 C 0208. The case has been initially assigned to U.S. District Judge James B. Zagel.
On its Internet web site (www.sidley.com), Sidley & Austin describes itself as "a significant legal power in the international arena," with "about 1500 lawyers practicing on three continents." The firm has offices in Chicago, Dallas, Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco, Washington, D.C., Beijing, Brussels, Geneva, Hong Kong, London, Shanghai, Singapore and Tokyo.
In addition to enforcing the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, which protects workers age 40 and older from discrimination based on age, EEOC enforces Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex (including sexual harassment or pregnancy) or national origin and protects employees who complain about such offenses from retaliation; the Equal Pay Act of 1963, which prohibits gender-based wage discrimination; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which prohibits employment discrimination against people with disabilities in the federal sector; Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, which prohibits employment discrimination against people with disabilities in the private sector and state and local governments; and sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Further information about the Commission is available on the agency's web site at www.eeoc.gov.
This page was last modified on January 13, 2005.

Return to Home Page

2 of 2

5/29/2007 2:39 PM

 
 $27.5 Million Consent Decree Resolves EEOC Age Bias Suit Against Sidley Austin

Page 1 of 2

The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE OCTOBER 5, 2007

CONTACT

JOHN HENDRICKSON

REGIONAL ATTORNEY

TRIAL ATTORNEY

(312) 353-8551

TTY: (312) 353-2421

DEBORAH HAMILTON TRIAL ATTORNEY (312) 353-8551

$27.5 MILLION CONSENT DECREE RESOLVES EEOC AGE BIAS SUIT AGAINST SIDLEY AUSTIN
Law Firm Partners Brought Within Protection of Federal Law Against Employment Discrimination
CHICAGO – The international law firm of Sidley Austin LLP will pay $27.5 million to 32 former partners who the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleged were forced out of the partnership because of their age, under a consent decree approved by a federal judge. (EEOC v. Sidley Austin LLP, N.D. Illinois No. 05 C 0208.)
The EEOC brought the suit in 2005 under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). A major issue in the case was whether partners in the law firm were protected as employees under the ADEA. The decree was signed by Federal District Judge James B. Zagel of the Northern District of Illinois yesterday afternoon, October 4, 2007, and entered on the court’s docket this morning. The decree provides that “Sidley agrees that each person for whom EEOC has sought relief in this matter was an employee with the meaning of the ADEA.”
The consent decree also includes an injunction that bars the law firm from “terminating, expelling, retiring, reducing the compensation of or otherwise adversely changing the partnership status of a partner because of age” or “maintaining any formal or informal policy or practice requiring retirement as a partner or requiring permission to continue as a partner once the partner has reached a certain age.”
Ronald S. Cooper, General Counsel of the EEOC, said, “This case has been closely followed by the legal community as well as by professional services providers generally. It shows that EEOC will not shrink from pursuing meritorious claims of employment discrimination wherever they are found. Neither the relative status of the protected group members nor the resources and sophistication of the employer were dispositive here.”
Cooper added, “The demographic changes in America assure that we will see more opportunities for age discrimination to occur. Therefore, it is increasingly important that all employers understand the impact of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act on their operations and that we re-emphasize its important protections for older workers.”
The $27.5 million will be paid by Sidley Austin to 32 former partners of the firm for whom the EEOC sought relief because they either were expelled from the partnership in connection with an October 1999 reorganization or retired under the firm’s agebased retirement policy.
The amounts of the individual payments to the former partners were submitted under seal and approved by the court. The average of all the payments to partners under the decree will be $859,375. The highest payment to any former partner will be $1,835,510, and the lowest payment $122,169. The median payment (the value in the middle of all payments) is $875,572.
During the term of the decree, which expires Dec. 31, 2009, Abner Mikva, retired Federal Court of Appeals Judge and former Member of Congress and White House Counsel, will deal with any complaints received from Sidley partners and report to the EEOC.
The EEOC litigation team has been headed by John Hendrickson, Regional Attorney for the Chicago District, and includes Supervisory Trial Attorney Gregory Gochanour and Trial Attorneys Deborah Hamilton, Laurie Elkin, and Justin Mulaire. Proceedings in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit were handled by Carolyn Wheeler and Jennifer Goldstein of the EEOC Office of General Counsel’s Appellate Services.
Hendrickson said, “The EEOC v. Sidley Austin litigation has always been a high priority for both our agency and the law firm, and the litigation has reflected that—tough, determined, professional. The litigation has yielded a number of important legal decisions, ensuring the protection of professionals from discriminatory employment actions and ratifying the authority of EEOC to investigate and obtain relief for victims of age discrimination on its own initiative.”

http://www.eeoc.gov/press/10-5-07.html

1/14/2009

$27.5 Million Consent Decree Resolves EEOC Age Bias Suit Against Sidley Austin

Page 2 of 2

Hendrickson added, “The public has benefited because the EEOC and Sidley were able to sit down and talk with each other and craft a workable resolution in a complex lawsuit. That doesn’t always happen. Not all employers are resolved to deal with tough issues and to get on with business. Sidley was so resolved, and today’s decree reflects its determination to get this case behind it and to address a situation which the EEOC believed required its attention.” George Galland, Jr. of the Chicago law firm of Miner Barnhill & Galland acted as a mediator in the case and facilitated the parties’ negotiations. The EEOC enforces federal laws prohibiting discrimination in employment. Further information about the Commission is available on its web site at www.eeoc.gov
This page was last modified on October 9, 2007.
Return to Home Page

http://www.eeoc.gov/press/10-5-07.html

1/14/2009