Case: 1:16-cv-06862 Document #: 1 Filed: 06/30/16 Page 1 of 12 PageID #:1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

PRISON LEGAL NEWS, a project of the HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENSE CENTER,

Case No.: 16-cv-6862

Plaintiff,
v.
COUNTY OF COOK, ILLINOIS; SHERIFF THOMAS J. DART, individually and in his official capacity; NNEKA JONES TAPIA, individually and in her official capacity; DOES 1-10, in their individual and official capacities,

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 42 U.S.C. §1983 AND DAMAGES

Defendants.

I.

INTRODUCTION

1. Plaintiff, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (“PLN” or “Plaintiff”), a registered trade name

of the HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENSE CENTER, brings this action to enjoin Defendants’

censorship of PLN’s monthly journal, Prison Legal News, and other publications from Plaintiff

and other publishers sent to prisoners at the Cook County Jail (the “Jail”), in violation of the First

and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Defendants have adopted and

implemented mail policies prohibiting delivery of written speech from Plaintiff and other

speakers, failing to provide due process notice of and an opportunity to challenge the censorship,

and denying Plaintiff equal protection as required under the Constitution.

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II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 2. This action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), as this action arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (civil rights), as this action seeks redress for civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 3. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). At least one Defendant resides within this judicial district, and the events giving rise to the claims asserted herein all occurred within this judicial district. 4. Plaintiff’s claims for relief are predicated upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which authorizes actions to redress the deprivation, under color of state law, of rights, privileges and immunities secured to Plaintiff by the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and the laws of the United States. 5. This Court has jurisdiction over claims seeking declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, and Rules 57 and 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as nominal and compensatory damages, against all Defendants. 6. Plaintiff’s claim for attorneys’ fees and costs is predicated upon 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which authorizes the award of attorneys’ fees and costs to prevailing plaintiffs in actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 7. Plaintiff is informed, believes, and based thereon alleges that the individual Defendants acted as described herein with the intent to injure, vex, annoy and harass Plaintiff, and subjected Plaintiff to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of Plaintiff’s rights with the intention of causing Plaintiff injury and depriving it of its constitutional rights. 8. As a result of the foregoing, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages against the individual Defendants.
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III. PARTIES 9. Plaintiff PLN is a registered trade name of the Human Rights Defense Center (HRDC), a not-for-profit, Washington charitable corporation recognized under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code with principal offices in Lake Worth, Florida. HRDC publishes Prison Legal News, a monthly newsprint journal of prison news and analysis, as well as books concerning prisoner rights issues. HRDC also distributes other publications related to prisons, and corresponds regularly with prisoners regarding constitutional issues and potential violations of their civil rights. 10. Defendant Thomas J. Dart is currently the Sheriff of Cook County and is sued in his individual and official capacities. At all times relevant, he acted under the color of state law. Defendant Dart has ultimate responsibility for the promulgation and enforcement of all Jail staff policies and procedures and is responsible for the overall management of the Jail, including all aspects of the Jail’s mail services. 11. Defendant Nneka Jones Tapia is the Executive Director of the Cook County Jail. Defendant Tapia supervises and manages the daily operations of the Jail and mailroom staff, to include enactment and enforcement of all Jail policies, including mail. 12. Defendant Cook County is a unit of government organized and existing under the laws of the State of Illinois. Defendant County of Cook is and was at all relevant times mentioned herein, responsible for the policies, procedures, customs and practices of the Cook County Sheriff’s Department (“the Sheriff’s Department” or “the Department”) and the actions and/or inactions of its employees and agents. The Department operates the Cook County Jail (“Jail”), and is and was responsible for adopting and implementing mail policies governing incoming
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mail for prisoners at the Jail. Said policies and practices are and were the moving force behind the constitutional violations at issue herein.
13. The true names and identities of Defendants DOES 1 through 10 are presently unknown to PLN. Each of Defendants DOES 1 through 10 are or were employed by and are or were agents of Defendants when some or all of the challenged inmate mail policies and practices were adopted and/or implemented. Each of Defendants DOES 1 through 10 were personally involved in the adoption and/or implementation of the mail policies at the Jail, and/or were responsible for the hiring, screening, training, retention, supervision, discipline, counseling, and/or control of Jail staff who interpret and implement these mail policies. PLN will seek to amend this Complaint as soon as the true names and identities of Defendants DOES 1 through 10 have been ascertained.
14. At all times material to this action, the actions of all Defendants as alleged herein were taken under the authority and color of state law.
IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 15. PLN publishes and distributes a soft-cover monthly journal titled Prison Legal News: Dedicated to Protecting Human Rights, which contains news and analysis about prisons, jails and other detention facilities, prisoners’ rights, court rulings, management of prison facilities, prison conditions, and other matters pertaining to the rights and/or interests of incarcerated individuals. The monthly journal is published on newsprint and is 72-pages long. 16. PLN has thousands of subscribers in the United States and abroad, including prisoners, attorneys, journalists, public libraries, judges, and members of the general public. PLN distributes its monthly publication to prisoners and law librarians in more than 2,600
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correctional facilities located across all fifty states, including the Federal Bureau of Prisons and the Illinois Department of Corrections.
17. PLN also publishes and/or distributes approximately fifty different softcover books about the criminal justice system, legal reference books, and self-help books of interest to prisoners. These books are designed to foster a better understanding of criminal justice policies and to allow prisoners to educate themselves about related issues, such as legal research, how to write a business letter, health care issues, and similar topics.
18. The purpose of PLN, as stated in HRDC’s Articles of Incorporation, Article III, Part 6, is to educate prisoners and the public about the destructive nature of racism, sexism, and the economic and social costs of prisons to society.
19. PLN engages in core protected speech and expressive conduct on matters of public concern, such as the operation of prison facilities, prison conditions, prisoner health and safety, and prisoners’ rights. Plaintiff’s monthly journal, as described above, contains political speech and social commentary, which are core First Amendment rights and are entitled to the highest protection afforded by the U.S. Constitution.
20. For more than 25 years, the focus of PLN’s mission has been public education, advocacy and outreach on behalf of, and for the purpose of assisting, prisoners who seek legal redress for infringements of their constitutionally guaranteed and other basic human rights. PLN’s mission, if realized, has a salutary effect on public safety.
A. Defendants’ Unconstitutional Mail Policies and Practices 21. Defendants’ jail mail policy and practice bans incoming newspapers and newsprint publications.
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22. The Jail enforces this unlawful policy and practice in spite of the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly’s Order declaring the unconstitutionality of the same. See Koger v. Dart et al., 114 F. Supp. 3d 572, 584 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (“Defendants have failed to raise a genuine dispute of fact regarding whether the jail’s newspaper ban is reasonably related to institutional security. The Court therefore concludes that the jail’s policy banning newspapers is unconstitutional).
23. On information and belief, since the entry of the Order in Koger, supra, Defendants have allowed other publications into the Jail, while continuing to censor Prison Legal News because it is published in newsprint, in violation of the free speech clause to the First Amendment, the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses to the Fourteenth Amendment, and the specific holding in Koger, supra.
24. Also on information and belief, Defendants have censored softcover books sent directly from Plaintiff to prisoners at the Jail in violation of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, Defendants have censored copies of the book, Prisoners Guerilla Handbook to Correspondence Programs in the United States & Canada (“Prisoners’ Handbook”), which provides prisoners information on enrolling at accredited higher educational, vocational, and training schools. Defendants have also allowed other softcover books from publishers into the Jail, while specifically excluding the aforementioned book from Plaintiff, and books from other publishers.
25. Furthermore, Defendants’ unlawful censorship of Prison Legal News and the Prisoner’s Handbook failed to afford Plaintiff any notice of the censorship or provide it with an opportunity to appeal in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
26. Said mail policies and practices are the moving force behind the constitutional
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violations at issue herein. 27. The accommodation of the free speech, expression, equal protection and due process
rights of Plaintiff with respect to written speech protected by the Constitution will not have any significant impact on the prison, its staff or prisoners.
28. Due to Defendants’ actions as described above, Plaintiff has suffered damages, and will continue to suffer damages, including, but not limited to: the suppression of Plaintiff’s speech; the impediment of Plaintiff’s ability to disseminate its political message; frustration of Plaintiff’s non-profit organizational mission; the loss of potential subscribers and customers; and the inability to recruit new subscribers and supporters, among other damages.
29. Defendants’ actions and inactions were and are motivated by ill motive and intent, and were and are all committed under color of law with reckless indifference to PLN’s rights.
30. Defendants, and other agents of the Jail, are responsible for or personally participated in creating and implementing these unconstitutional policies, practices, and customs, or for ratifying or adopting them. Further, Defendants are responsible for training and supervising the staff persons whose conduct has injured and continues to injure PLN.
31. Defendants’ unconstitutional policy, practices, and customs are ongoing, continue to violate PLN’s rights, and were and are the moving force behind the injuries Plaintiff suffered as a direct result of the constitutional violations. As such, PLN has no adequate remedy at law.
32. PLN is entitled to declaratory relief as well as injunctive relief prohibiting Defendants from refusing to deliver publications and correspondence from Plaintiff and other senders without any legal justification, and prohibiting Defendants from censoring mail without due process of law.
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B. Defendants’ censorship of Prison Legal News, violation of equal protection under the law, and lack of due process
33. Since March 2015, PLN has sent at least one hundred and twelve (112) issues of its monthly journal to prisoner subscribers at the Jail. On information and belief, Defendants failed to deliver each of these monthly issues to the intended recipients at the Jail.
34. PLN will continue to mail copies of Prison Legal News to subscribers imprisoned at the Jail.
35. There is no legitimate penological reason for censorship of PLN’s monthly journal. 36. On information and belief, Defendants have also instituted a policy and practice of allowing other publications into the Jail, while disallowing copies of Prison Legal News in violation of PLN’s equal protection rights. 37. Defendants also failed to provide PLN with constitutionally adequate due process notice of the censorship and a meaningful opportunity to appeal.
C. Defendants’ censorship of the Prisoners’ Handbook, violation of equal protection under the law, and lack of due process
38. Since March 2015, Defendants have censored seventeen (17) copies of the Prisoner’s Handbook sent to prisoners at the Jail. On information and belief, Defendants failed to deliver each of these copies to the intended recipients at the Jail.
39. PLN will continue to mail copies of the Prisoners’ Handbook and other softcover books to subscribers imprisoned at the Jail.
40. There is no legitimate penological reason for censorship of the Prisoners’ Handbook. 41. On information and belief, Defendants have also instituted a policy and practice of allowing softcover books sent from other publishers into the Jail, while disallowing copies of the Prisoners’ Handbook in violation of PLN’s equal protection rights.
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42. Defendants also failed to provide PLN with constitutionally adequate due process notice of the censorship and a meaningful opportunity to appeal.
IV. CLAIMS Count I – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Violation of the First Amendment (Censorship) 43. PLN realleges and incorporates the allegations of Paragraphs 1 through 42 of the Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 44. The acts described above constitute violations of Plaintiff’s rights, the rights of other publishers who have attempted to or intend to communicate with prisoners at the Jail, and the rights of the prisoners confined at the Jail, under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 45. Plaintiff has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in communicating with incarcerated individuals, a right clearly established under existing case law. 46. The conduct of Defendants was objectively unreasonable and was undertaken intentionally with malice, willfulness, and reckless indifference to the rights of others and in willful violation of a previous Order from a Judge of this Judicial District. 47. Plaintiff’s injuries and the violations of its constitutional rights were directly and proximately caused by the policies and practices of Defendants, which were and are the moving force of the violations. 48. Defendants’ acts described above have caused damages to Plaintiff, and if not enjoined, will continue to cause damage to Plaintiff. 49. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, and nominal, compensatory and punitive damages against all Defendants. Plaintiff seeks punitive damages against the individual Defendants in their individual capacities.
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Count II – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Violation of Fourteenth Amendment (Due Process) 50. PLN realleges and incorporates the allegations of Paragraphs 1 through 49 of the Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 51. The acts described above constitute violations of Plaintiff’s rights and the rights of other publishers who have attempted to or who intend to communicate with prisoners at the Jail under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 52. Because Plaintiff and others outside the jail have a liberty interest in communicating with prisoners, PLN and other senders have a right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to receive notice of and an opportunity to appeal Defendants’ decisions to censor their written speech. 53. Defendants’ policy and practice fail to provide Plaintiff and other senders with adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. 54. The conduct of Defendants was objectively unreasonable and was undertaken intentionally with malice, willfulness, and reckless indifference to the rights of others. 55. Plaintiff’s injuries and the violations of its constitutional rights were directly and proximately caused by the policies and practices of Defendants, which are and were the moving force of the violations. 56. Defendants’ acts described above have caused damages to Plaintiff, and if not enjoined, will continue to cause damage to Plaintiff. 57. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, and nominal and compensatory damages against all Defendants. Plaintiff seeks punitive damages against the individual Defendants in their individual capacities.
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Count III – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment (Equal Protection) 58. PLN realleges and incorporates the allegations of Paragraphs 1 through 57 of the Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 59. By permitting some publications on newsprint, as well as some softcover books, while specifically excluding Prison Legal News and the Prisoners’ Handbook, violated Plaintiff’s right to equal protection as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 60. Plaintiff is suffering ongoing and irreparable harm as a direct result of Defendants’ discriminatory treatment, and the harm will continue unless the conduct is enjoined by this Court. 61. Defendants’ conduct was objectively unreasonable and was undertaken intentionally with malice, willfulness, and reckless indifference to Plaintiff’s rights. 62. Plaintiff’s injuries and the violations of its constitutional rights were directly and proximately caused by the policies and practices of Defendants, which are and were the moving force of the violations. 63. Defendants’ acts described above have caused damages to Plaintiff, and if not enjoined, will continue to cause damage to Plaintiff. 64. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, and nominal and compensatory damages against all Defendants. Plaintiff seeks punitive damages against the individual Defendants in their individual capacities.
V. REQUEST FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff respectfully requests relief as follows: 65. A declaration that Defendants’ policies and practices violate the Constitution.
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66. Nominal damages for each violation of Plaintiff’s rights by the Defendants.
67. A preliminary and permanent injunction preventing Defendants from continuing to
violate the Constitution, and providing other equitable relief.
68. Compensatory damages in an amount to be proved at trial.
69. Punitive damages against the individual Defendants in an amount to be proved at
trial.
70. Costs, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and under other
applicable law.
71. Any other such relief that this Court deems just and equitable.
VI. JURY DEMAND Plaintiff, Prison Legal News, by and through its attorneys, hereby demands a trial by jury
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b) on all issues so triable.
Respectfully Submitted,
Respectfully Submitted,
/s/ Matthew Topic Jonathan Loevy Arthur Loevy Matthew Topic LOEVY & LOEVY 311 N. Aberdeen, Third Floor Chicago, IL 60607 (312) 243-5900
/s/ Lance Weber Lance Weber, Fla. Bar No.: 104550* Sabarish Neelakanta, Fla. Bar No.: 26623* Human Rights Defense Center PO Box 1151 Lake Worth, FL 33460 (561) 360-2523
*Pro Hac Vice applications to be filed
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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

PRISON LEGAL NEWS, a project of

)

the HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENSE CENTER, )

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

)

COUNTY OF COOK, ILLINOIS, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

Case No. 16-cv-6862 Judge Joan B. Gottschall

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff operates a not-for-profit organization called the Human Rights Defense Center

and publishes both a monthly journal called Prison Legal News and an informational handbook

called Prisoners’ Guerilla Handbook to Correspondence Programs in the United States &

Canada (“Prisoners’ Handbook”). Defendants are County of Cook, Illinois, which operates the

Cook County Jail (“CCJ”); Thomas Dart, the Sheriff of Illinois; and Nneka Jones Tapia, the

executive director of CCJ. Plaintiff claims that it sent approximately 112 issues of Prison Legal

News and at least 12 copies of Prisoners’ Handbook to CCJ since March 2015, only to have

them improperly “censored” by defendants. Before the court is plaintiff’s motion for a

preliminary injunction [6]. Plaintiff seeks a declaration that defendants’ mailroom policies and

practices at CCJ violate its First Amendment, due process and equal protection rights under the

United States Constitution, and requests that defendants be enjoined from applying CCJ’s

mailroom policies and practices in an unconstitutional manner.

I. Background Plaintiff publishes and distributes a monthly journal, Prison Legal News, which contains
correctional facility, criminal justice, and legal news affecting prisoners. This publication, along with plaintiff’s softcover book, Prisoner’s Handbook, is distributed to some 2,600 correctional facilities around the country—although CCJ is not one of them. CCJ has adopted a mailroom policy, General Order No. 14.10 (effective July 27, 2007), which provides that “[n]o inmate is permitted to receive subscriptions to magazines or periodical publications” unless they are sent directly to the inmate by a “person” not in custody.1 Pl.’s Reply, Dkt. 35, Exh. A, ¶ III(L); Exh. B, (II)(1). Paperback books are permitted, up to three per mailing, but may be rejected “due to legitimate security concerns or inappropriate content,” in which case the inmate will be notified by means of a “Notice of Mail Return” receipt. Id. The general order also provides that incoming “correspondence” may be rejected for a number of reasons, including when the item contains “information regarding the manufacture of explosives, weapons, or drugs,” “threats or details of criminal activity,” or has “content intended to assist in disrupting the orderly operation of” CCJ. Id., ¶ III(H). Returned mail and packages will be stamped “return to sender” and an entry will be made in the “Mail Return” logbook. Id.
General Order 14.10 was amended on October 9, 2015 by means of a General Order bearing the number 24.14.10.0 Ch. 1. Dkt. 35, Exh. B. This updated general order allowed inmates to “have access to daily editions of newspapers in divisional recreation rooms and/or divisional law libraries.” Id., Exh. A, ¶ II (5). However, Prison Legal News is not one of the permitted newspapers; in fact, only USA Today is made available to detainees in common areas and law libraries. The updated 2015 general order also did not alter the inability of prisoners to receive subscriptions or periodicals directly from publishers. This restriction remains in place.
1 “Person” appears to exclude publishers.
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CCJ instituted another mail room policy change in September 2016 that purportedly
made Prison Legal News available to inmates in common areas and/or the law libraries, or
possibly by subscription. The parties disagree as to the scope and effect of this mailroom policy
change: the policy change has not been reduced to paper or formalized in any fashion, but
instead was instituted via oral directive. Further, as will be discussed below, defendants
themselves seem to be unclear about the exact nature of the oral policy change. At the very least,
they have not made its nature clear to the court.
According to plaintiff, CCJ’s current mailroom policy means that Prison Legal News and
Prisoner’s Handbook are not being delivered to their intended recipients. Plaintiff argues that
the censorship of its various publications was done without notification and without an opportunity to appeal, in violation of its Constitutional due process rights.2 Plaintiff further
argues that the CCJ mailroom policy permits an improper censorship of speech in violation of
the First Amendment. Finally, plaintiff contends that defendants’ policy of selectively allowing
newspapers into CCJ’s common areas and law libraries is a violation of its right to equal protection of the laws.3
Defendants argue that plaintiff’s lawsuit is improper because it does not seek to further a
basic goal of preliminary injunctions—maintaining the status quo pending a further
determination of the parties’ rights—but instead “seeks to overturn the status quo and force CCJ
2 Plaintiff does not explain what it means by “censored.” Plaintiff repeatedly asserts that it received no notification from defendants regarding defendants’ refusal to accept plaintiff’s publications, yet somehow plaintiff learned that the documents were not being delivered. Neither party explains the situation. The court is left to infer that defendants notified the affected inmates and then simply threw out plaintiff’s materials; however, this might not be accurate. 3 Plaintiff does not develop this argument in either of its briefs, and the court is therefore unable to evaluate it. The plaintiff also raises a new argument in its reply brief that the court likewise is unwilling to address due to inadequate briefing—that plaintiff has standing to protect the constitutional rights of other publishers whose First Amendment rights also are threatened by defendants’ restrictive policies. See Dkt. 35, at 5.
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to change its policy before a further determination of the parties’ rights.” Defs.’ Resp., Dkt. 25 at 2. Defendants maintain that this case is not about vindicating detainees’ right to access of newspapers and books (as detainees at CCJ already have access to these items) but instead is a “challenge [to] whether CCJ can establish reasonable regulations governing the flow of thousands of pieces of mail to thousands of detainees, many of whom may wish to misuse seemingly innocuous materials in order to injure other detainees.” Id. Defendants also point out that they have agreed to make Prison Legal News available to detainees in the law library and recreational areas—a concession they argue “strongly call[s] into question the need for a preliminary injunction” and renders plaintiff’s complaint moot. Id.
Plaintiff’s reply memorandum argues that any recent changes to CCJ’s mail procedures policy have been instituted pursuant to oral changes that have not been reduced to writing, and that, contrary to defendants’ assertions in their response, Prison Legal News has not been made available in common areas or law libraries. Dkt. 35 at 2. Specifically, plaintiff points to the deposition testimony of Daniel Korso, Deputy Chief of Staff at the Cook County Department of Corrections, and his explanation of the September 2016 oral directive:
Q: Can you explain the contents of the oral directive about inmate monthly periodical subscriptions that took effect in September of 2016? A: Sure. Cook County Department of Corrections are [sic] now allowing monthly subscriptions to periodicals, so long as the majority or substantial portion of that periodical has to do with legal, criminal justice or prison-related information. Assuming that it does, and it is on a pre-approved – or it is pre-approved by our Executive Director, inmates are as stated allowed to subscribe and receive the subscription. ---------Q: Do you know which monthly periodicals inmates have been receiving copies of under the September oral directive? A: Yes. Q: Which ones?
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A: One of which I know of, which is Prison Legal News.
Q: Are you aware of any others?
A: I am not. ---------Q: And the oral directive that you have been describing, am I correct that the jail intends to reduce that to a formal written policy such as a general order? ---------A: At some point, yes. ---------Q: So the criteria of [sic] pertaining to legal issues or prison issues, is that criteria documented anywhere?
A. No.
Q: Okay. So that has only been communicated to staff orally, is that correct?
A. To my knowledge, yes. ---------Q. The oral directive that we were talking about that applies at least to [Prison Legal News] as of September, 2016 is different from the policy for newspapers where newspapers are kept only in certain locations and not in cells, is that correct?
A. Yes. ---------Q. And do you know which newspapers the jail subscribes to?
A. USA Today.
Q. Are there any others?
A. Not to my knowledge. ---------Q. Okay. And am I correct that at no time has Cook County Jail made Prison Legal News available to inmates in any common areas through a subscription maintained by Cook County Jail?
A. Not to my knowledge.
Dkt. 35, Exh. C., at 20-40. Based on this testimony, plaintiff argues that the 2016 oral directive
appears to have been implemented specifically in response to this lawsuit, that it is insufficiently
explained and identified, and that it does not cure the unconstitutionality of defendants’ current
mailroom policy.
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II. Preliminary Legal Issues The parties have raised two issues that require attention before the court can turn to the
First Amendment and due process claims: mootness and estoppel. The court addresses each in turn.
A. Mootness Defendants assert that plaintiff’s cause of action is moot because they have made Prison Legal News available in CCJ law libraries and recreational areas. In response, and as noted above, plaintiff highlights the testimony of Daniel Korso indicating that Prison Legal News has not been made available in libraries and common areas (although the possibility exists, based again on Mr. Korso’s testimony, that it is available by inmate subscription). Plaintiff also focuses on the fact that defendants have not reduced the oral directive to writing, suggesting that defendants’ actions are intended only as a response to this lawsuit and do not effectively moot the cause of action. The court accordingly examines the issue of defendants’ alleged cessation of conduct and the effect of any cessation upon plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction. It is well-established that a court’s power to grant injunctive relief “only survives if such relief actually is needed.” Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 882 (7th Cir. 2009). Injunctive relief is mooted when “there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated.” Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. Jones, 192 F.3d 742, 747 (7th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). Voluntary cessation of conduct does not usually moot a claim for injunctive relief. Lipton v. Chattem, Inc., 289 F.R.D. 456, 461 (N.D. Ill. 2013); see also Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000) (a defendant’s voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not necessarily moot a case); Vincent v. City Colleges of Chicago, 485 F.3d 919, 925 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[v]oluntary cessation of unlawful activity does not moot every
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request for prospective relief”) (citations omitted). To truly establish that a case is moot, and therefore subject to dismissal as a matter of right, a defendant must overcome a heavy burden. The defendant must show “that it is absolutely clear that allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 190. This high burden of proof is necessary to prevent a defendant from voluntarily ceasing the offending conduct as a strategic decision to prevent an adverse ruling, only to continue the conduct later, once the coast is clear. See Chicago United Indus. Ltd. v. City of Chicago, 445 F.3d 940, 947 (7th Cir. 2006).
Defendants in this case have not met this high burden. Although they contend in their response brief that Prison Legal News is available in the libraries and recreation rooms, the deposition testimony of Mr. Korso contradicts this assertion and actually describes something quite different: that inmate subscriptions of Prison Legal News are allowed with pre-approval, but that the only newspaper inmates may receive in the common areas and law libraries remains USA Today. The court is struck by the inconsistent nature of defendants’ assertions, and also by defendants’ failure to formally memorialize the very policy changes they now want the court to accept as true. The court cannot ascertain the exact terms of any 2016 mailroom policy changes and therefore cannot conclude that it is “absolutely clear” the allegedly wrongful behavior will not reoccur. The matter before the court is not moot.
B. Estoppel Plaintiff argues that defendants are estopped from litigating the constitutionality of their ban on newspapers. In support of this argument, plaintiff points to Koger v. Dart, 114 F. Supp. 3d 572, 584 (N.D. Ill. 2015). In Koger, a CCJ inmate sued Cook County and Sheriff Thomas Dart, alleging that the jail’s absolute ban on newspapers was unconstitutional under the First Amendment. The court agreed, finding that although the absolute ban on newspapers was
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rationally related to jail security, a complete ban was an exaggerated response to the jail’s security concerns, and that there existed “obvious, easy alternatives to an outright ban.” Id. at 584. For instance, the jail could decide to purchase only national or international newspapers, which would be less likely to contain information about local gang activity, or the jail could review each incoming issue for content problems. Id. at 583.
Plaintiff’s argument that CCJ should be “collaterally estopped from re-litigating the constitutionality” of the ban on newspapers because of Koger is misplaced. The Koger court specifically noted that the question before it was the constitutionality of a total ban on newspapers. It was not asked to resolve inmates’ “right to subscribe to newspapers or read a broad variety of newspapers.” Koger, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 583 n. 3. CCJ’s current newspaper policy allows USA Today in the common areas, and this result is in keeping with Koger’s proscription against a complete newspaper ban.4 Perhaps what plaintiff is trying to argue is that it finds defendants’ current one-newspaper policy too restrictive—but this is a separate argument from the one it is making: that defendants are collaterally estopped from relitigating the constitutionality of a newspaper print ban. Plaintiff paints with too broad a brush. This argument is rejected. III. Preliminary Injunction
The court turns now to plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction. A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). To determine whether a particular circumstance justifies the remedy of a preliminary injunction,
4 According to the declaration of Daniel Korso, 60 copies of USA Today are delivered to CCJ daily, Monday through Friday, and are then dispersed to recreational areas. Korso Aff., Dkt. 25, Exh. 1. The only exception to this is in the maximum security facility, in which case the newspapers are accessible to inmates in the law library. Id.
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the court must analyze the facts of the case in two distinct phases: a threshold phase and a balancing phase. Girl Scouts of Manitou Council, Inc. v. Girl Scouts of America, Inc., 549 F.3d 1079, 1086 (7th Cir. 2008). In the threshold phase, the moving party must satisfy each of three requirements: “First, that absent a preliminary injunction, it will suffer irreparable harm in the interim period prior to final resolution of its claims.” Id. “Second, that traditional legal remedies would be inadequate.” Id. “And third, that its claim has some likelihood of succeeding on the merits.” Id. If the court determines that the moving party has failed to demonstrate any one of these three threshold requirements, it must deny the injunction. Id. (citations omitted); see also Ty, Inc. v. Jones Group, Inc., 237 F.3d 891, 895 (7th Cir. 2001); Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 11 (7th Cir. 1992). Only once the moving party has passed this initial threshold analysis does the court then proceed to the balancing phase of the analysis. Girl Scouts, 549 F.3d at 1086.
In First Amendment cases, special attention is given to the first factor—the likelihood of success on the merits—because in these cases, the likelihood of success on the merits will often be the determining factor. See American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 589 (7th Cir. 2012). This is so because the “loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality opinion). Further, the “quantification of injury is difficult and damages are therefore not an adequate remedy.” Flower Cab Co. v. Petitte, 685 F.2d 192, 195 (7th Cir. 1982). Moreover, if the plaintiff is able to establish a likelihood of success on the merits, the balance of harms normally tips in favor of granting preliminary injunctive relief because “injunctions protecting First Amendment freedoms are always in the public interest.” Christian Legal Soc'y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 859 (7th Cir. 2006).
9

A. Reasonable Likelihood of Success on the Merits: First Amendment Claim To determine the likelihood of plaintiff’s success on the merits, the court first analyzes plaintiff’s claim that defendants’ ban on inmates receiving subscriptions to magazines or periodical publications directly from the publisher, and its ban on newspapers other than USA Today, violates its First Amendment rights. The Seventh Circuit has held that prisoners generally have a constitutionally-protected interest in their incoming and outgoing mail correspondence. See Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 685 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 782 (7th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted)). This right also applies to persons outside the prison who have an interest in corresponding with prison inmates. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 408 (1989) (reaffirming that “publishers who wish to communicate with those who, through subscription, willingly seek their point of view have a legitimate First Amendment interest in access to prisoners”); Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 783 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding that non-prisoners have a First Amendment right to correspond with prisoners, and that “the government’s unjustifiable interference with correspondence violates the First Amendment rights of both the recipient and the sender”). Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiff in this case has a First Amendment interest in sending correspondence to prison inmates at CCJ. That being said, prison officials may impose restrictions on prisoner correspondence that are “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). Such legitimate penological interests might include crime deterrence, prisoner rehabilitation, and protecting the safety of prison guards and inmates. See Singer v. Raemisch, 593 F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 2010) (affirming summary judgment in favor of prison officials who restricted role-playing game that mimicked the organization of gangs); May v. Libby, 256 Fed. Appx. 825 (7th Cir. 2007) (affirming grant of judgment as a matter of law for prison officials
10

who confiscated inmate’s internal grievance form against the prison because it was not unreasonable to perceive letter as a threat). In Turner, the Supreme Court set forth four factors that courts may weigh in assessing the validity of a prison’s regulation: (1) whether there is a “valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it”; (2) whether the inmates have access to “alternative means” of exercising the restricted right; (3) the “impact [an] accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally”; and (4) whether the regulation is an “exaggerated response to prison concerns.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–91 (internal citations omitted). The burden of persuasion is on the plaintiff to disprove the validity of a regulation, Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003) (citations omitted), although defendants must still articulate their legitimate governmental interest in the regulation. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. For their part, courts are to accord “substantial deference to the professional judgment of prison administrators, who bear a significant responsibility for defining the legitimate goals of a corrections system and for determining the most appropriate means to accomplish them.” Overton, 539 U.S. at 132 .
1. Rational Relationship to Legitimate Penological Interests The first Turner factor requires “a valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (citations omitted). Defendants note that CCJ’s current mailroom policy is not a blanket ban. Instead, the current policy allows detainees to receive three soft cover books or 10 newspaper clippings per mailing. Plus, USA Today is allowed in common areas and/or the law library. Detainees may receive magazines and periodicals from persons outside the correctional facility, although not directly from the publisher. All mail to detainees is subject to scrutiny and anything
11

deemed unacceptable based on security concerns or inappropriate content (as determined by CCJ) may be rejected, at which time the inmate and sender will receive notification of the rejection.5 The mailroom policy also limits the number of books a detainee may keep in his cell. Dkt. 25, at 12-13; Dkt. 35, Exhs. A, B. Defendants provide a number of rationales for these restrictions: (1) newspapers and books are highly flammable and can be used to start fires; (2) they can cause sanitation problems (inmates can use them to clog toilets); (3) they can be used to hide weapons and contraband, including drugs; (4) they can be used to send coded messages; and (5) they can be used to cover windows of cells, thus obscuring the guards’ ability to monitor the inmates. Defendants also note that allowing inmates to possess large quantities of items, such as books, can lead to theft and disputes regarding property. Dkt. 25, at 11.
At this preliminary stage of this case, the court finds that the reasons offered by defendants are, at least on their face, rationally related to prison security. See Koger, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 580 (finding each of defendants’ asserted rationales to be rationally related to prison security, including that newspapers are flammable and can cause sanitation problems); Overton, 539 U.S. at 133 (rationales tied to maintaining jail security are legitimate penological goals). Although plaintiff contests the validity of these assertions by arguing that “the materials at issue present no legitimate security threat to the Jail and should not be selectively censored because it [sic] is published on newsprint,” Pl.’s Mem., Dkt. 7, at 6, this is a conclusory statement that does little to illuminate how the concerns are ill-founded.
5 General Order No. 14.10, III(H)(2)-(3) specifically provides that “[r]eturned mail and packages will be stamped (return to sender) and documented in the ‘Mail Return’ logbook . . . . The ‘Mail Return’ logbook is separate from the other logbooks maintained by the mailroom. After logging the information, the mailroom employee will notify the inmate of the returned mail by sending a ‘Notice of Mail Return’ form with the regularly scheduled mail deliveries.” The court finds it perplexing that neither party specifically references or discusses this mailroom return policy and the procedures mentioned therein. See Dkt. 35, Exh. A.
12

That being said, further inquiry and discovery may shed new light on these rationales.
For instance, the court questions defendants’ rationale that allowing plaintiff’s publications into
CCJ would increase safety and sanitations concerns. In Koger, the court observed that “because
the jail already limits inmate possessions to a property box, allowing newspapers would not increase the amount of such material in circulation.”6 Koger, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 582. Neither
party in this case discusses the existence of property boxes at CCJ, but the court finds it unlikely
that the jail has gotten rid of them since July 2015, when the Koger decision was issued.
Accordingly, and assuming the property boxes are still issued to CCJ inmates, defendants’
argument that allowing additional newspapers into the jail creates the likelihood of sanitation and
security concerns seems somewhat specious and creates the impression that a ban on plaintiff’s
products is perhaps a content restriction—which would be highly suspect under the First
Amendment. But in view of the parties’ failure to discuss property boxes or even to demonstrate
the accuracy of Daniel Korso’s testimony that inmates are receiving plaintiff’s products, the
court at this point finds that the first Turner factor weighs in favor of defendants.
2. Availability of Alternative Avenues for Exercise of Asserted Speech
The second Turner factor questions whether “other avenues remain available for the
exercise of the asserted right.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 90 (citations omitted). Alternative means
need not be ideal; rather, they need only be available. Overton, 539 U.S. at 127.
Defendants argue that inmates have a number of other avenues to exercise their right to
speech; for instance, USA Today is available in the common areas. Further, inmates have access
6 The Koger court noted that CCJ “imposes a strict limit on how much property an inmate may possess at any given time” by issuing each inmate a property box measuring 21 inches long, 8.5 inches deep, and 15.5 inches wide. Koger, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 576. Inmates were allowed to possess “paper bags, notepaper, drawing pads, books, and magazines (including magazines made from the same material as newspapers), envelopes, legal materials, greeting cards, playing cards, religious texts, letters and photos sent from outside the jail, toilet paper, extra undergarments, and bedding,”—provided these possessions fit within the contours of the box. Id. The Koger court considered very relevant the existence of the property box and failed to see how allowing newspapers at CCJ would increase the amount of materials circulating around the jail. Id. at 581-82.
13

to television and can check out up to two books from the public library. See Affidavit of John Mueller, Dkt. 25, Exh. 3. However, whether the inmates have other alternative avenues of free speech is not the issue before the court. Rather, the question here is whether plaintiff has other avenues to exercise its First Amendment right to correspond with inmates. And the answer is no. The only viable means of communication between plaintiff and the inmate population is through plaintiff’s publications. Plaintiff cannot be expected to communicate via telephone, email, or in person. As plaintiff has no other viable way to communicate with inmates other than through the mail, this Turner factor weighs in plaintiff’s favor.7
3. Impact of Communication on Guards, Prisoners, and the Allocation of Prison Resources
The third Turner factor evaluates “the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. “This third factor weighs most heavily when accommodation of an asserted right will have a significant ripple effect on fellow inmates or prison staff.” Prison Legal News v. County of San Diego, No. 14-cv-05304 JRC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126856, *22 (W.D. Wa. Sept. 10, 2014) (internal citations omitted).
Defendants argue that accommodating plaintiff’s demand to allow its publications at CCJ “would dramatically impact the work of CCJ staff, and increase dangers for CCJ staff and other inmates.” Dkt. 25 at 13. Defendants point out that a limitation on the quantity of reading materials is directly related to security concerns, as well as aimed at limiting the burden on prison staff. For instance, allowing personal subscriptions to magazines and other publications could “exponentially” increase the volume of paper in the mailroom and burden the staff, whose
7 As noted above in the discussion regarding mootness, defendants’ failure to memorialize its new policy regarding Prison Legal News at CCJ, as well as the contradictory evidence they present in their response brief, leaves this court unable —for purposes of the second Turner factor—to consider the likelihood that the publication may well be available at CCJ.
14

job it is to maintain a secure, sanitary, and functional jail environment. Id. at 14. Defendants offer the Affidavit of Daniel Moreci, First Assistant Executive Director at the Cook County Department of Corrections, who states that on any given day, over 1,000 pieces of mail arrive at CCJ, and each piece is subjected to a dog sniff search and a staff search that involves going through each page of books, magazines, and letters to inspect for contraband. Id., Exh. 2.
Plaintiff responds to these assertions by noting that since 1990, Prison Legal News has been delivered to hundreds of thousands of prisoners nationwide, and that it is unaware of any security threats that have been created by the delivery of the publications. Plaintiff offers the declaration of Paul Wright, the founder and editor of Prison Legal News, who asserts that he has never heard of his publications ever interfering with a correctional facility’s penological interests. Dkt. 7, Exh. A, at 4-5.
In Koger, the CCJ raised arguments similar to those proffered by defendants in this case: for instance, the dangers posed by the flammability of newspapers and the ability of inmates to fashion newspapers into weapons. Koger, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 580. However, while the court agreed that these were legitimate concerns, it also found that allowing newspaper into the jail would have “a de minimis impact” on the jail’s security concerns. Id. at 582. Prisoners already were limited as to the quantity of paper products allowed in their cells to the size of a storage box intended for these possessions. When the box is full, the prisoner is not allowed anything more. Id. But the court also noted that the potential impact of problems associated with waste disposal and inmate violence was unclear, and so it deferred on these points to the prison officials. Id. at 583. Ultimately, the court ruled that this Turner factor favored the plaintiff.
In this case, the court reluctantly concludes that the third Turner factor weighs in defendants’ favor. The burden of persuasion is on plaintiff to disprove the validity of a
15

regulation. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003) (citations omitted). Courts are to
accord “substantial deference to the professional judgment of prison administrators, who bear a
significant responsibility for defining the legitimate goals of a corrections system and for
determining the most appropriate means to accomplish them.” Id. at 132. Defendants have
offered reasons for limiting the influx of mail into CCJ that the court finds facially legitimate.
However, the court recognizes the potential validity of plaintiff’s contention that “correctional
facilities often use restrictive mail policies as a pretext to keep out publications and
correspondence that administrators do not want to distribute to prisoners.” Decl. of Paul Wright,
Dkt. 7, Exh. A, at 5. The court already has discussed the property boxes and how their use to
limit inmate possessions potentially undercuts defendants’ contention that plaintiff’s publications
would overwhelm the mailroom and stress the guards and other employees. This certainly is
something to explore through discovery. At this point in the litigation, however, plaintiff has not met its burden of persuasion in disproving the validity of the regulations.8
4. Existence of Easy and Obvious Alternatives
The fourth Turner factor requires this court to examine “whether the existence of easy
and obvious alternatives indicates that the regulation is an exaggerated response by prison
officials.” Prison Legal News v. Cook, 238 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001). This factor need
not require the adoption of the least restrictive alternative; however, courts may consider “an
alternative that fully accommodates the [asserted] rights at de minimis cost to valid penological
8 Footnote 1 of plaintiff’s memorandum states that when the plaintiff presents evidence that refutes a “‘common-sense connection’ between a legitimate objective and a prison policy, the defendant ‘must present enough counter-evidence to show that the connection is not so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational.’” Dkt. 7 at 5 n.1 The court takes note of the line of cases holding that prison administrators cannot avoid judicial scrutiny by providing “reflexive, rote assertions,” Shimer v. Washington, 100 F.3d 506, 509 (7th Cir. 1996), but finds that plaintiff has not come forward at this juncture with sufficient specific evidence or argument requiring defendant to then provide counterevidence. Plaintiff’s briefing suffers from conclusory statements that do not go the extra mile to connect claims with specific policy and procedure.
16

interests as evidence that the policy unreasonably infringes upon First Amendment rights.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 91.
On this point, plaintiff states that “[t]he fact that more than 2,600 correctional facilities nationwide accept PLN’s publication each month strongly suggests that the Defendants’ censorship is an exaggerated response.” Dkt. 7 at 9. Defendants respond that newspapers are allowed in common areas (actually, just one newspaper—USA Today). Further, defendants argue that its mailroom policy is not an exaggerated response but is a legitimate policy aimed at mitigating CCJ’s need to manage safety and sanitation concerns by limiting the amount of paper and reading materials inmates may keep in their cells.
The court notes once again that defendants seek to use the alleged availability of Prison Legal News at CCJ as an argument in their favor, yet the exact nature of defendants’ action in this regard is unclear due to the conflicting evidence presented on this point and by the fact that the directive to allow Prison Legal News at CCJ remains an oral one. However, the fact that defendants have indicated a willingness to provide Prison Legal News in some capacity at the jail indicates the existence of an easy and obvious alternative to any prior refusal to make this publication available. The court also finds persuasive the fact that Prison Legal News is widely available in penal institutions across the country–a point defendants do not contest. Clearly, many other institutions have found a way to integrate Prison Legal News into their facilities. The court thus finds that an easy and obvious alternative exists to an outright ban on plaintiff’s publications in the form of placement of the newspaper and handbook in common rooms and law libraries. See Koger, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 584 (finding a reasonable alternative would be permitting newspapers in libraries and day room, but not individual cells). Alternatively, if it is true, as Daniel Korso testified, that Prison Legal News is allowed to be received directly by
17

inmates who have subscriptions, and that this is consistent with CCJ’s rules about the volume of paper inmates are allowed to keep in their cells, then a different, easy alternative to the “censorship” of Prison Legal News is obvious and available. Defendants basically have admitted as much. The fourth Turner factor weighs in plaintiff’s favor.
In sum, the court’s reasoning reveals that two of the Turner factors favor plaintiff, and two factors favor defendants. This leaves the court to consider whether two out of four factors equate with a “reasonable likelihood of success on the merits.” In this particular case, the court thinks not. The burden of persuasion is on plaintiff to disprove the validity of a regulation, but plaintiff has not taken much time to analyze and discuss the specific mailroom regulations, or provide details regarding the process underlying its own mailings to CCJ, or even provide information regarding how it knows that its publications have been rejected. Furthermore, plaintiff does not reject defendants’ allegations that they are delivering Prison Legal News in some capacity to CCJ. Admittedly the record on this point is confusing, but what stands out to the court is the uncontested assertion that plaintiff’s publication is somehow being made available to CCJ inmates. Finally, the court takes stock of the Third Circuit’s comments in DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 59 (3d Cir. 2000), where it noted that “Turner does contemplate a judgment by the court regarding the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct under all of the circumstances reflected in the record,” but it “does not call for placing each factor in one of two columns and tallying a numerical result.” Indeed, in that case, the appellate court was faced with a similar situation involving a division of Turner factors between the parties, and it resolved the matter by remanding the case back to the district court to allow the parties to more fully develop the record and inquire more deeply into relevant issues. Id. at 59-60. This court feels similarly—that the parties need to more fully develop the record and inquire more deeply into
18

the issues underlying defendants’ mailroom policies and procedures, and the actual status of Prison Legal News at CCJ, before the court can reasonably resolve the First Amendment issues presented here.
B. Reasonable Likelihood of Success on the Merits: Due Process Claim Plaintiff also claims that it has a due process right to have “[a]n opportunity to be heard” in order to “challenge censorship decisions based on the rationales employed at the time of the censorship, as well as a chance to assist subscribers in filing challenges to such violations within the correctional grievance system.” Dkt. 7, at 10. Plaintiff also claims that defendants did not provide notice when they intercepted plaintiff’s various publications. Id. at 11. Defendants reject plaintiff’s suggestion that the media has a due process right to a notice when mail is withheld. Even so, defendants claim that it has a “policy and practice . . . to provide written notifications to individual inmates and senders when mailings and/or their contents are confiscated or withheld.” Dkt. 25 at 16. Defendants further contend that while plaintiff alleges that it has not received any notification from them, plaintiff in turn has not provided them with “any identifiers of particular inmate recipients or mailings that are at issue in this case.” Id. It is well established that “[t]he fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.” Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914). In the context of prison correspondence, the Supreme Court held in Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 417-18 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Thornburg v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989), that “the decision to censor or withhold delivery of a particular letter must be accompanied by minimum procedural safeguards. The interest of prisoners and their correspondents in uncensored communication by letter, grounded as it is in the First Amendment, is plainly a ‘liberty’ interest within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment even though qualified of necessity by the circumstance of
19

imprisonment.” The Court in Procunier agreed with the minimal procedural safeguards identified by the lower court, including: (1) notifying the intended recipient-inmate; (2) giving the author of the publication a reasonable opportunity to protest the decision; and (3) referring complaints about the decision to a prison official other than the person who originally disapproved the correspondence. Id. at 418–19. Following Procunier, numerous circuits have held that publishers have due process rights when a prison rejects their publications. See, e.g., Jacklovich v. Simmons, 392 F.3d 420, 433 (10th Cir. 2004); Prison Legal News v. Cook , 238 F.3d 1145, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 2001); Montcalm Publishing Co. v. Beck, 80 F.3d 105, 109 (4th Cir. 1996); Martin v. Kelley, 803 F.2d 236, 243-44 (6th Cir. 1986).
In this case, the court is handicapped by the parties’ incomplete briefing. Both parties devote only a single page of their respective briefs to the topic of due process. Plaintiff hardly elaborates upon specific aspects of defendants’ mailroom policy or practice that it finds objectionable, and provides no specific details regarding the rejection/censorship of its publications in this case. Defendants likewise do not refer in any great detail to their rejection and notification policies and procedures or provide any detailed information about what happens when a piece of mail is rejected, either generally or specifically in this case. Defendants have not discussed their Mail Return logbook, for instance, which the court finds troublesome. See footnote 5, infra.
Despite the thinness of the parties’ arguments, the court nevertheless is persuaded that plaintiff has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of its due process claim. Legal precedent supports plaintiff’s right to receive some basic form of notification upon defendants’ rejection of its publications. What such a notification must look like is not before the court, but certainly it allows plaintiff to know that its material was rejected and the reason for
20

the rejection. The facts in this case suggest a likelihood that plaintiff received no notification of any kind, and defendants do not persuade the court otherwise.
C. Irreparable Harm/Adequate Monetary Relief Having analyzed plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits of its First Amendment and due process claims, the court looks next to whether plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if preliminary relief is denied, and whether there exists an adequate remedy at law. The court is mindful of established caselaw stating that the loss of First Amendment freedoms, even for very limited periods of time, constitutes irreparable injury that is difficult to quantify and thus legal damages are an inadequate remedy. See Elrod, 427 U.S. at 373. However, as previously discussed, plaintiff has not fully convinced the court, at this juncture anyway, that its First Amendment claims will prevail. Additionally, plaintiff’s main argument related to irreparability—that Prison Legal News must be delivered to detainees quickly, lest the news become stale or irrelevant—is severely undermined by the fact that plaintiff waited over a year to file its complaint following the first alleged instance of censorship. As defendants point out, plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction was filed on July 1, 2016, yet plaintiff alleges that defendants have been engaging in impermissible censorship since March 2015. Delays in pursuing an injunction are highly relevant to the claim of irreparable harm. See, e.g.,Ty, Inc. v. Jones Group, Inc., 237 F.3d 891, 903 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Delay in pursuing a preliminary injunction may raise questions regarding the plaintiff’s claim that he or she will suffer irreparable harm if a preliminary injunction is not entered.”); Preston v. Bd. of Trustees of Chicago State Univ., 120 F. Supp. 3d 801, 806 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (plaintiff’s unexplained 17-month delay in pursuing a preliminary injunction regarding his alleged loss of First Amendment freedoms undermined the severity of these purported harms);
21

Tarvin v. Bd. of Educ.,No. 09–655-GPM, 2010 WL 1444862, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 9, 2010) (“[T]he fact that Plaintiffs waited over three months to file their Motion for Preliminary Injunction, belies their argument that they were suffering the loss of First Amendment freedoms.”).
Plaintiff’s unexplained 15-month delay in seeking a preliminary injunction is troublesome given plaintiff’s request for immediacy from this court. Perhaps the explanation for the delay lies in the fact that plaintiff waited a few months to see whether CCJ’s rejection of its publications would be an ongoing problem. Perhaps the explanation lies in the fact that plaintiff is a small organization with limited staff. Plaintiff does not say. Yet the declaration of Paul Wright, founder and editor of Prison Legal News, states that “since publication began twentyfive years ago, I have carefully monitored all instances in which a jail or prison refused to deliver mail from Prison Legal News.” Dkt. 7, Exh. A. Taking this statement as true, Mr. Wright actively monitors the delivery of Prison Legal News in penal institutions across the country and thus by his own admission should have been well aware that Prison Legal News was being “censored” by CCJ for over a year prior to the filing of plaintiff’s motion. The unexplained fact that plaintiff waited so long to file its preliminary injunction motion cuts against the claim that it will suffer irreparable injury in the absence of a preliminary injunction.
The Seventh Circuit made clear in Goodman v. Illinois Dep't of Fin. & Prof'l Regulation, 430 F.3d 432, 438 (7th Cir. 2005) that “[i]n order to prevail in a First Amendment case, the plaintiff must first show that protected speech is being restricted.” The plaintiff has not made this showing. The plaintiff has raised legitimate concerns regarding the manner in which defendants treat plaintiff’s publications, but even after highlighting the weaknesses of defendants’ proffered rationales regarding its current mailroom policy, and giving plaintiff the
22

benefit of doubt, the fact remains that plaintiff has not satisfied the threshold determinations needed for the granting of a preliminary injunction. The court simply cannot be certain at this juncture that protected speech is being restricted. Figuring out exactly what is happening at CCJ with respect to Prison Legal News and the Prisoner’s Handbook should be a high priority in discovery. But in the final analysis, a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief. The court cannot grant this extraordinary relief on such an indeterminate factual record.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction [6] is denied.

Date: November 21, 2016

/s/______________ Joan B. Gottschall United States District Judge

23

 
 Case: 1:16-cv-06862 Document #: 85 Filed: 06/25/19 Page 1 of 4 PageID #:469

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

PRISON LEGAL NEWS, a project of the HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENSE CENTER,

Case No.: 16-cv-6862

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF COOK, ILLINOIS; SHERIFF THOMAS J. DART, individually and in his official capacity; NNEKA JONES TAPIA, individually and in her official capacity; DOES 1-10, in their individual and official capacities,

Defendants.

STIPULATION AND ORDER TO DISMISS IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED by and between the undersigned counsel for the Plaintiff and Defendants, and the Court, after first being duly advised in the premises, orders as follows: I. On June 30, 2016, Plaintiff filed suit in the above-captioned matter seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, damages, and attorneys' fees and costs against the named Defendants. The complaint alleged an unlawful policy, practice and custom regarding censorship of books mailed from Plaintiff and other book distributors to prisoners in custody at the Cook County Jail, in violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The complaint also alleged violations of Plaintiffs right to due process of law consisting of Defendants' failure to give notice of each instance of censorship and concomitant failure to provide Plaintiff an opportunity to appeal each censorship decision in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Case: 1:16-cv-06862 Document #: 85 Filed: 06/25/19 Page 2 of 4 PageID #:469
2. The Defendants denied all liability and allegations of censorship. However, in order to put an end to this litigation and to avoid unnecessary expense and the uncertainties of future litigation regarding the Plaintiff's claims, the parties have agreed to the terms and conditions contained in a separate Settlement Agreement re: Injunctive Relief & Damages and a separate Settlement Agreement Re: Attorneys' Fees & Costs ("collectively Settlement Agreements").
3. Pursuant to these Settlement Agreements, the parties agreed, and the Court so orders, that Defendant Thomas J. Dart, his agents, assigns, employees, deputies and successors, will establish, implement and enforce policies and procedures that will ensure delivery of Human Rights Defense Center Publications as appropriate, and/or provide notification and opportunity to appeal rejected publications, and payment of attorneys' fees and costs, as more fully set forth in these Agreements.
4. The parties to this Stipulation and Order to Dismiss agree that the provisions herein fully and fairly accommodate the interests of the parties hereto, that the Court should adopt and approve this agreement, and that this Stipulation and Order to Dismiss is a full and final judgment between the parties.
5. The parties agree, and the Court finds, that this case concerns the alleged First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of a publisher, and is therefore not a case concerning prison conditions as defined in the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996. The Court further finds that the relief herein ordered is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the alleged harm to Plaintiff, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm.
2

Case: 1:16-cv-06862 Document #: 85 Filed: 06/25/19 Page 3 of 4 PageID #:469
6. The case is dismissed without prejudice only to the extent necessary to allow this court to enforce the terms of the settlement. The dismissal without prejudice under this paragraph automatically converts to a dismissal with prejudice effective June 27, 2022.
7. This Court hereby Orders that the parties shall comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement re: Injunctive Relief and Damages entered into on December 3, 2018 and the Settlement Agreement Re: Attorneys' Fees and Costs entered into on April 24, 2019, and incorporated by reference into this Order as if fully set forth.
8. By consent of the parties, the Court shall retain jurisdiction for the purpose of enforcing the terms of this Order and the Settlement Agreement for three years from the date of the entry of this order. To avoid unnecessary expense and the Court's resources, the Parties agree that no allegation of a violation of any term of the Settlement Agreement shall be filed with or otherwise brought to the Court until notice is provided to the alleged violating party of the alleged violation and that party is given 14 calendar days to explain, cure or otherwise correct the alleged violation. Notice shall be provided to: Plaintiff: Paul Wright, Executive Director; Human Rights Defense Center, P.O. Box 1151, Lake Worth, FL 33460. Defendant: Nicholas Scouffas, General Counsel, Sheriffs Office of Cook County, 50 W. Washington, Room 704, Chicago, IL 60602.
9. Except as provided above, the case is dismissed with prejudice.
3

Case: 1:16-cv-06862 Document #: 85 Filed: 06/25/19 Page 4 of 4 PageID #:469

WHEREFORE, having fully read and considered the provisions set forth above, Plaintiff and Defendants having ~tipulated and agreed to the above terms and conditions, and the court having approved the entry ofthis Stipulation and Order, IT IS SO ORDERED.

~ay Dated this

of June, 2019.

Stipulated and Agreed to:

Sa~~h)~f¢eiakanta
,·'rPiaintiff
.
?' '

4

 
 Case: 1:16-cv-6862 As of: 10/17/2019 10:44 PM CDT 1 of 9
TERMED,VALDEZ
United States District Court Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.3.1 (Chicago)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:16−cv−06862

Prison Legal News v. County Of Cook et al Assigned to: Honorable Joan B. Gottschall Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff Prison Legal News a project of the Human Rights Defense Center

Date Filed: 06/30/2016 Date Terminated: 06/25/2019 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Arthur R. Loevy Loevy & Loevy 311 North Aberdeen 3rd Floor Chicago, IL 60607 (312)243−5900 Email: arthur@loevy.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Lucas Marshall Human Rights Defense Center P.O. Box 1151 Lake Worth, FL 33460 (561) 360−2523 Email: dmarshall@humanrightsdefensecenter.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan I. Loevy Loevy & Loevy 311 N. Aberdeen 3rd FL Chicago, IL 60607 (312)243−5900 Email: jon@loevy.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua Hart Burday Loevy & Loevy 311 N. Aberdeen, Third Floor Chicago, IL 60607 (312) 243−5900 Email: joshb@loevy.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lance Theodore Weber Dan Newlin & Partners 7335 Sand Lake Road Suite 300 Orlando, FL 32819 603−903−3410 Email: lance.weber@newlinlaw.com TERMINATED: 01/17/2017
Sabarish Perambur Neelakanta Human Rights Defense Center P.O. Box 1151 Lake Worth, FL 33460 (561) 360−2523 Email: sneelakanta@hrdc−law.org PRO HAC VICE

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ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew Vincent Topic Loevy & Loevy 311 N. Aberdeen Third Floor Chicago, IL 60607 312−243−5900 Email: matt@loevy.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant County of Cook, Illinois
Defendant Thomas J Dart Sheriff, individually and in his official capacity
Defendant Nneka Jones Tapia individually and in her official capacity

represented by John Power Cook County State's Attorney's Office Richard J. Daley Center, Fifth Floor Chicago, IL 60602 312−603−4370 Email: John.Power@cookcountyil.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Anthony E. Zecchin Hale Law LLC 53 West Jackson Blvd. Suite 330 Chicago, IL 60604 (312) 870−6933 Email: azecchin@ahalelaw.com TERMINATED: 12/11/2018
Megan Kelly McGrath Cook County State's Attorney Office 500 Richard J. Daley Center Chicago, IL 60604 (312) 603−5967 Email: megan.mcgrath@cookcountyil.gov TERMINATED: 12/11/2018
represented by John Power (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Anthony E. Zecchin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/11/2018
Megan Kelly McGrath (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/11/2018
represented by John Power (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Anthony E. Zecchin (See above for address)

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Defendant
Does 1−10 in their individual and official capacities

TERMINATED: 12/11/2018
Megan Kelly McGrath (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/11/2018

Date Filed 06/30/2016 06/30/2016 06/30/2016 06/30/2016 06/30/2016 06/30/2016 07/01/2016 07/01/2016 07/01/2016 07/01/2016 07/11/2016
07/11/2016 07/12/2016

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT filed by Prison Legal News; Jury Demand. Filing fee $ 400, receipt number 0752−12104855.(Topic, Matthew) (Entered: 06/30/2016)
2 CIVIL Cover Sheet (Topic, Matthew) (Entered: 06/30/2016)
CASE ASSIGNED to the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall. Designated as Magistrate Judge the Honorable Maria Valdez. (daj, ) (Entered: 06/30/2016)
SUMMONS Issued as to Defendants County Of Cook, Thomas J Dart, Nneka Jones Tapia (pg, ) (Entered: 06/30/2016)
3 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Prison Legal News by Jonathan I. Loevy (Loevy, Jonathan) (Entered: 06/30/2016)
4 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Prison Legal News by Arthur R. Loevy (Loevy, Arthur) (Entered: 06/30/2016)
5 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Prison Legal News as to All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Summons Returned Executed (Sheriff Dart), # 2 Summons Returned Executed (Nneka Tapia))(Topic, Matthew) (Entered: 07/01/2016)
6 MOTION by Plaintiff Prison Legal News for preliminary injunction (Topic, Matthew) (Entered: 07/01/2016)
7 MEMORANDUM by Prison Legal News in support of motion for preliminary injunction 6 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Declaration of Paul Wright)(Topic, Matthew) (Entered: 07/01/2016)
8 NOTICE of Motion by Matthew Vincent Topic for presentment of motion for preliminary injunction 6 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 7/15/2016 at 09:30 AM. (Topic, Matthew) (Entered: 07/01/2016)
9 ORDER: Status hearing set for 9/23/2016 at 11:00 AM in Courtroom 2325. If, by the date of the scheduled status hearing, defendant has not been served, plaintiff should call the courtroom deputy (312−435−5641) to request a new status date. No status hearing should be held until all defendants have been served. Plaintiff is directed to advise the defendants of the status hearing forthwith. Pursuant to LR 5.2(f), a stapled and/or bound paper copy of all electronically filed pleadings, including the complaint, must be delivered to chambers (2356) within one business day of filing. Noncompliance with LR 5.2(f) will result in the imposition of a $200.00 fine payable to the Clerk of the Court, 219 South Dearborn Street, 20th Floor, Chicago, Illinois 60604. Parties are directed to discuss settlement and whether they consent to proceed before the Magistrate Judge. They are further directed to meet and confer regarding a proposed discovery plan. See Judge Gottschall's civil case management packet regarding pretrial case management procedures at: http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov. Signed by the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 7/11/2016. Mailed notice(mjc, ) (Entered: 07/11/2016)
10 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Motion hearing set for 7/15/16 at 9:30 a.m. is reset to 7/15/16 at 11:00 a.m. (TIME CHANGE ONLY). Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 07/11/2016)
11 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants County of Cook, Illinois, Thomas J Dart, Nneka Jones Tapia by John Power (Power, John) (Entered: 07/12/2016)

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07/12/2016 07/14/2016 07/14/2016
07/15/2016 07/18/2016 08/03/2016 08/03/2016 08/03/2016 08/04/2016 08/05/2016 08/09/2016 08/09/2016
08/10/2016 08/12/2016 08/30/2016 09/01/2016 09/01/2016 09/07/2016
10/11/2016

12 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants County of Cook, Illinois, Thomas J Dart, Nneka Jones Tapia by Anthony E. Zecchin (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 07/12/2016)
13 [Proposed] Agreed Order by Prison Legal News (Topic, Matthew) (Entered: 07/14/2016)
14 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction 6 is briefed as follows: response due by 8/5/16; reply due 8/26/16. Defendants' answer is due by 8/5/16. Motion hearing set for 7/15/16 is stricken; no appearance required. Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 07/14/2016)
15 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Filing fee $ 50, receipt number 0752−12152975. (Weber, Lance) (Entered: 07/15/2016)
16 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Attorney Lance T. Weber's application to appear pro hac vice 15 on behalf of the plaintiff is granted. Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 07/18/2016)
17 MOTION by Defendants County of Cook, Illinois, Thomas J Dart, Nneka Jones Tapia for extension of time to file response/reply (Power, John) (Entered: 08/03/2016)
18 NOTICE of Motion by John Power for presentment of motion for extension of time to file response/reply 17 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 8/10/2016 at 11:00 AM. (Power, John) (Entered: 08/03/2016)
19 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants County of Cook, Illinois, Thomas J Dart, Nneka Jones Tapia by Megan Kelly McGrath (McGrath, Megan) (Entered: 08/03/2016)
20 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Prison Legal News to motion for extension of time to file response/reply 17 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Topic, Matthew) (Entered: 08/04/2016)
21 ANSWER to Complaint with Jury Demand by County of Cook, Illinois, Thomas J Dart, Nneka Jones Tapia (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Power, John) (Entered: 08/05/2016)
22 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Prison Legal News by Joshua Hart Burday (Burday, Joshua) (Entered: 08/09/2016)
23 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Defendants' motion for an extension of time to respond 17 is granted. Response due 8/12/16; reply due 9/2/16. Motion hearing set for 8/10/16 is stricken; no appearance required. Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 08/09/2016)
24 NOTICE by Joshua Hart Burday of Change of Address (Burday, Joshua) (Entered: 08/10/2016)
25 RESPONSE by County of Cook, Illinois, Thomas J Dart, Nneka Jones Tapiain Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff Prison Legal News for preliminary injunction 6 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex. 1−3)(McGrath, Megan) (Entered: 08/12/2016)
26 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: The status hearing set for 9/23/16 at 11:00 a.m. is reset to 9/23/16 at 9:30 a.m. (TIME CHANGE ONLY).Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 08/30/2016)
27 MOTION by Plaintiff Prison Legal News to Modify Briefing Schedule to Conduct Discovery (Topic, Matthew) (Entered: 09/01/2016)
28 NOTICE of Motion by Matthew Vincent Topic for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 27 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 9/7/2016 at 09:30 AM. (Topic, Matthew) (Entered: 09/01/2016)
29 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Motion hearing held. Plaintiff's motion to modify briefing schedule and conduct limited discovery 27 is granted. Plaintiff's reply brief is to be filed by 10/12/16. Status hearing set for 11/9/16 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 09/08/2016)
30 MOTION by Plaintiff Prison Legal News to set a briefing schedule Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion to Modify Briefing Schedule (Topic, Matthew) (Entered:

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10/13/2016 10/17/2016 10/17/2016
10/20/2016
10/26/2016 11/07/2016 11/21/2016 11/21/2016 11/21/2016 12/09/2016
12/12/2016 12/28/2016 01/11/2017 01/17/2017
02/08/2017 03/10/2017

10/11/2016)
31 NOTICE of Motion by Matthew Vincent Topic for presentment of motion by filer to set a briefing schedule 30 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 10/21/2016 at 09:30 AM. (Topic, Matthew) (Entered: 10/13/2016)
32 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: The status hearing set for 10/21/16 at 9:30 a.m. is stricken and reset to 10/21/16 at 10:00 a.m. (TIME CHANGE ONLY). Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 10/17/2016)
33 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: The court's order ECF No, 32 is amended as follows: The motion hearing set for 10/21/16 at 9:30 a.m. is stricken and reset to 10/21/16 at 10:00 a.m. (TIME CHANGE ONLY). Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 10/17/2016)
34 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Plaintiff's unopposed motion to modify briefing schedule 30 is granted. Plaintiff's reply brief is to be filed by 10/26/16. Motion hearing set for 10/21/16 is stricken; no appearance required. Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 10/20/2016)
35 REPLY by Plaintiff Prison Legal News in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D)(Topic, Matthew) (Entered: 10/26/2016)
36 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: The status hearing set for 11/9/16 is stricken. The court will set furthers dates as necessary when it rules on the motion for preliminary injunction. Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 11/07/2016)
37 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction 6 is denied. Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 11/21/2016)
38 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 11/21/2016. Mailed notice(mjc, ) (Entered: 11/21/2016)
39 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Status hearing set for 12/9/16 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 11/21/2016)
40 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Status hearing held. Counsel informed the court that they are exploring settlement and ask that discovery be placed on hold for 60 days. Status set for 2/8/17 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 12/09/2016)
41 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: The court's order, ECF No. 40 , is amended as follows. Discovery is placed on hold until 2/7/17.Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 12/12/2016)
42 MOTION by Plaintiff Prison Legal News to withdraw attorney Lance Weber as counsel of record (Weber, Lance) (Entered: 12/28/2016)
43 NOTICE of Motion by Matthew Vincent Topic for presentment of motion to withdraw 42 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 1/18/2017 at 09:30 AM. (Topic, Matthew) (Entered: 01/11/2017)
44 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Motion to withdraw 42 is granted. Attorney Lance Weber may withdraw his appearance on behalf of the plaintiff. Motion hearing set for 1/18/17 is stricken; no appearance required. Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 01/17/2017)
45 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Status hearing held. Parties informed the court that they are discussing settlement. Status hearing set for 3/10/17 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 02/08/2017)
46 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Status hearing held. Counsel for both parties discussed efforts taken to date regarding settlement. Counsel for Plaintiff indicated a desire for private mediation. The court suggested a referral to the magistrate judge for a settlement conference. Counsel will discuss this with their respective clients and will call the court if they wish to proceed with a referral. Status set for 4/12/2017 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice (vcf, ) (Entered: 03/10/2017)

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03/30/2017 03/30/2017 03/31/2017
04/12/2017
05/04/2017 05/05/2017 07/11/2017 07/12/2017 08/03/2017 08/31/2017 09/28/2017

47 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Upon agreement of the parties, pursuant to ECF No. 46 , this matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Valdez for a settlement conference. Status hearing set for 4/12/17 is stricken. Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 03/30/2017)
48 Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1, this case is hereby referred to the calendar of Honorable Maria Valdez for the purpose of holding proceedings related to: settlement conference.(mjc, )Mailed notice. (Entered: 03/30/2017)
49 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Maria Valdez:This case has been referred to Judge Valdez to conduct a settlement conference. The parties are ordered to appear for status on 4/12/17 at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 1041 to set a settlement conference date. The Parties are further directed to consult with their respective clients before the status date to determine the dates of unavailability for a settlement conference that may be set within the next eight to twelve weeks. Because of the volume of settlement conferences conducted by Judge Valdez, once a settlement conference date has been agreed upon, no continuance will be granted without a motion showing extreme hardship. Mailed notice (lp, ) (Entered: 03/31/2017)
50 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Maria Valdez: Magistrate Judge status hearing held on 4/12/17. This case is set to 7/11/2017 at 2:00 p.m. in Courtroom 1041 for settlement conference. Judge Valdez requires full compliance with the Court's Standing Order on Settlement Conference found on Judge Valdez's website available at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov, or the parties can contact courtroom deputy, Lisa Provine, at (312)408−5135 for a copy. Failure to comply with the provisions of the Court's Standing Order may result in the unilateral cancellation of the settlement conference by the Court. Absent leave from the Court, cancellation will result if the Plaintiff fails to submit to chambers copies of the settlement letters four days prior to the settlement conference. Because of the volume of settlement conferences conducted by Judge Valdez, once a settlement conference date has been agreed upon, no continuance will be granted without a motion showing extreme hardship. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 04/12/2017)
51 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Filing fee $ 50, receipt number 0752−13139558. (Marshall, Daniel) (Entered: 05/04/2017)
52 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Attorney Daniel Lucas' application to appear pro hac vice on behalf of the plaintiff 51 is granted. Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 05/05/2017)
53 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Maria Valdez: Settlement conference held. Information is exchanged. Status hearing on settlement progress set for August 3, at 10:00 AM before Judge Valdez.Mailed notice (lp, ) (Entered: 07/12/2017)
54 CERTIFICATE of Service by Daniel Lucas Marshall on behalf of Prison Legal News (Marshall, Daniel) (Entered: 07/12/2017)
55 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Maria Valdez: Magistrate Judge status hearing held on 8/3/17 and continued to 8/31/17 at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice (lp, ) (Entered: 08/03/2017)
56 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Maria Valdez:Magistrate Judge status hearing held on 8/31/17 and continued to 9/28/17 at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice (lp, ) (Entered: 08/31/2017)
57 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Maria Valdez: Magistrate Judge status hearing held on 9/28/17. Case is set to 1/11/18 at 2:00 p.m. in Courtroom 1041 for settlement conference. Judge Valdez requires full compliance with the Court's Standing Order on Settlement Conference found on Judge Valdez's website available at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov, or the parties can contact courtroom deputy, Lisa Provine, at (312)408−5135 for a copy. Failure to comply with the provisions of the Court's Standing Order may result in the unilateral cancellation of the settlement conference by the Court. Absent leave from the Court, cancellation will result if the Plaintiff fails to submit to chambers copies of the settlement letters 21 business days prior to the settlement conference. Because of the volume of settlement conferences conducted by Judge Valdez, once a settlement conference date has been agreed upon, no continuance will be granted without a motion showing extreme hardship. Mailed notice (lp, ) (Entered: 09/28/2017)

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10/03/2017 10/11/2017 01/11/2018 01/12/2018 01/24/2018
06/06/2018 07/13/2018
09/05/2018
10/24/2018
11/28/2018 12/10/2018 12/10/2018 12/11/2018 12/12/2018

58 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Filing fee $ 50, receipt number 0752−13645070. (Neelakanta, Sabarish) (Entered: 10/03/2017)
59 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Attorney Sabarish P. Neelakanta's application to appear pro hac vice on behalf of the plaintiff 58 is granted. Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 10/11/2017)
60 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Maria Valdez: Continued settlement conference held on 1/11/18. No settlement was reached. All matters relating to the referral of this action having been resolved, the case is returned to the assigned judge. Mailed notice (lp, ) (Entered: 01/11/2018)
61 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: In light of the referral's termination, a status hearing is set for 1/24/18 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 01/12/2018)
62 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Status hearing held. Parties informed the court that settlement discussions were unsuccessful. Parties' agreed discovery schedule is as follows. The parties shall exchange initial Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures by 2/9/18. Fact discovery cutoff is 8/31/18. Status hearing set for 6/29/18 at 9:30 a.m. The parties should be prepared to discuss the timing of any expert discovery at the next status hearing. Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 01/24/2018)
63 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: On the court's own motion, the status hearing set for 6/29/18 is stricken and reset to 7/13/18 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 06/06/2018)
64 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Status hearing held. Counsel informed the court that written discovery is complete. Depositions are ongoing. Counsel for plaintiff informed the court that defendants made an offer of judgment on 7/12/18 and that the offer is being considered. Discussion held scheduling depositions in time to meet the 8/31/18 deadline to complete fact discovery. No party requested an extension of the deadline. Status hearing is set for 9/5/18 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 07/13/2018)
65 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Status hearing held. Counsel for plaintiff only appeared. Counsel reported that the parties are finalizing their settlement documents. Status hearing is set for 10/24/18 at 9:30 a.m. If a stipulation to dismiss is filed prior to the next status hearing, no appearance will be necessary. Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 09/06/2018)
66 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Status hearing held on 10/24/2018. Only counsel for defendant appeared. Counsel reported that the case has settled, and the parties are finalizing the settlement documents. Status hearing set for 11/30/18 at 9:30 a.m. If the parties need additional time to finalize the settlement, they should call the courtroom deputy prior to the status hearing. Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 10/25/2018)
67 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: On the court's own motion, the status hearing set for 11/30/18 66 is stricken and reset to 12/12/18 at 9:30 a.m.Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 11/28/2018)
68 MOTION by Attorney Anthony E. Zecchin, Megan McGrath to withdraw as attorney for County of Cook, Illinois, Thomas J Dart, Nneka Jones Tapia. No party information provided (Power, John) (Entered: 12/10/2018)
69 NOTICE of Motion by John Power for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney 68 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 12/12/2018 at 09:30 AM. (Power, John) (Entered: 12/10/2018)
70 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Motion to withdraw as counsel 68 is granted. Attorney Megan Kelly McGrath and Anthony E. Zecchin may withdraw their appearances on behalf of the defendants. The status hearing set for 12/12/18 shall stand. Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 12/11/2018)
71 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Status hearing held on 12/12/2018. The parties informed the court that their settlement agreement calls for the submission of their fee dispute to the court. As discussed in open court, plaintiff's

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01/23/2019 01/23/2019 01/24/2019
02/11/2019 02/11/2019 02/14/2019
02/19/2019 03/08/2019 03/08/2019 03/11/2019
04/12/2019 05/09/2019 06/25/2019

motion for fees is briefed as follows: motion is due by 1/28/19; defendant's response due 2/25/19; reply due 3/11/19. The court will rule by mail. Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 12/13/2018)
72 MOTION by Plaintiff Prison Legal News for extension of time Joint Motion for Extension of Time (Topic, Matthew) (Entered: 01/23/2019)
73 NOTICE of Motion by Matthew Vincent Topic for presentment of extension of time 72 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 1/30/2019 at 09:30 AM. (Topic, Matthew) (Entered: 01/23/2019)
74 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: The parties' unopposed motion for extension of time to brief the anticipated motion for attorneys' fees 72 is granted. The motion hearing set for 1/30/19 is stricken; no appearance required. The briefing schedule for plaintiff's anticipated motion for fees is enlarged as follows: motion is due by 2/11/19; defendant's response due 3/11/19; reply due 3/25/19. Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 01/24/2019)
75 MOTION by Defendants County of Cook, Illinois, Thomas J Dart for extension of time to file fee petition (Power, John) (Entered: 02/11/2019)
76 NOTICE of Motion by John Power for presentment of motion for extension of time to file 75 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 2/15/2019 at 09:30 AM. (Power, John) (Entered: 02/11/2019)
77 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Defendants' unopposed motion for extension of time to brief the anticipated motion for attorneys' fees 75 is granted. The motion hearing set for 2/15/19 is stricken; no appearance required. The briefing schedule for plaintiff's anticipated motion for fees is enlarged as follows: motion is due by 2/19/19; defendant's response due 3/18/19; reply due 4/1/19. If the parties agree that a referral to the magistrate judge would aid their settlement discussions, they should advise the courtroom deputy at (312) 435−5641. Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 02/14/2019)
78 MOTION by Plaintiff Prison Legal News for attorney fees (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Matt Topic, # 2 Declaration of Sabarish Neelakanta, # 3 Exhibit Joint Statement on Fees)(Neelakanta, Sabarish) (Entered: 02/19/2019)
79 MOTION by Defendants County of Cook, Illinois, Thomas J Dart, Nneka Jones Tapia to stay Briefing of Fee Petition (Power, John) (Entered: 03/08/2019)
80 NOTICE of Motion by John Power for presentment of motion to stay 79 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 3/13/2019 at 09:30 AM. (Power, John) (Entered: 03/08/2019)
81 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Based on the parties' representation that they have agreed in principle to settle their dispute over costs and fees, their joint motion 79 to stay briefing schedule on plaintiff's fee petition 78 is granted. The fee petition 78 is entered and continued to 4/12/19 at 9:30 a.m. If the parties agree that additional time is needed to finalize the settlement conference, they should advise the courtroom deputy, and no appearance will be required. The motion hearing set for 3/13/19 is stricken; no appearance required. Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 03/11/2019)
82 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Motion hearing held. Discussion held on retaining jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement. For the reasons stated in open court, the case is continued to 5/10/19 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 04/12/2019)
83 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: The parties' joint motion to stay briefing on fee petition 79 is granted. A status hearing is set for 6/26/19 at 9:30 a.m. No appearance is required on 5/10/19. Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 05/09/2019)
84 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Enter stipulation and order to dismiss. In accordance with the order, this case is dismissed without prejudice only to the extent necessary to allow this court to enforce the terms of the settlement. The dismissal without prejudice automatically converts to a dismissal with prejudice

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06/25/2019

effective June 27, 2022. Plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees 78 is denied as moot. The status hearing set for 6/26/19 is stricken. See order for further details. Civil case terminated. Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 06/25/2019)
85 STIPULATION and Order to Dismiss Signed by the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 6/25/2019. Mailed notice(mjc, ) (Entered: 06/25/2019)