Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 1 Filed 03/05/10 Page 1 of 16 Page ID #:1

1 BARRETT S. LITT SBN 45527 PAUL J. ESTUAR SBN 167764
2 E-Mail: pestuar(a),littlaw.com
LITT, ESTUAR, fiARRISON & KITSON LLP 3 1055 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1880
Los An~eles, California 90017 4 Phone: 213) 386-3114 5 Facsimi e: (213) 380-4585

6

ROBERT MANN SBN 48293 DONALD W. COOK SBN 116666

7

E-Mail: manncook(a),earthlink.net ATTORNEYS AT LAW

o 8 3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2900 Los AnSeles, California 9001

9 Phone: 213) 252-9444

Facsimi e: (213) 252-0091

10 Attomeys.for Plaintiffs
11

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Cynthia Anderson-Barker Stile Bar No.

175764

E-Mail: ca:blaw@hotmail.com

LAW OFFICES OF CYNTHIA

ANDERSON-BARKER

3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2900

Los An~eles, California 90010 Phone: 213) 252-9444

Facsimi e: (213) 252-0091

13

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

14

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

15 MARY AMADOR and LORNA
16 MALLYO~, individually and as class representatives,
17

. 18- --

Plaintiffs,

19

vs.

20

SHERIFF LEROY D. BACA, individually and in his official capacity;

21

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES a governmental entity_;, LOS ANGLES

22

COUNTY SHERIH'S DEPARTMENT, a California public entity; SAMMY

23 JONES, indiVidually_ ana in his official capacity; TIMOTHY CORNELL,

24 individually and in his official capacity;

JOHN H. CLARK, individually and in his

25 official capacity; and DOES 1 through 10,

&VloO 1649
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
1. 42 U.S.C. §1983 2. Equal Protection 3. Cal. Const. Art. I, §91, 7, 13 4. Cal. Civ. Code §52.1 5. Statutory Duties 6. Mandatory Duties
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

26

Defendants.

27

28

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1 I. INTRODUCTION

2

1. This action concerns the manner in which inmates. are searched in Los

3 Angeles County's jails, alleging, inter alia, violations of the Fourth, Eighth and

4 Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and their corollaries under the

5 California Constitution.

6

2. The gravamen of this complaint concerns the privacy rights of inmates, who

7 are routinely subjected to strip and body cavity searches in violation of the Constitutions

8 and laws ofthe United States and the State of California.

9

3. Of particular concern is that female inmates are subjected to degrading strip

10 and body cavity searches under circumstances and conditions when male inmates are not.

11 II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

12

4. Plaintiffs present federal claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983.

13 Accordingly, federal jurisdiction in conferred upon this Court by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and

14 1343. Plaintiffs' state law claims are so related to their federal law claims that they form

15 part of the same case or controversy. Accordingly, supplemental jurisdiction over the

16 state law claims is conferred upon this Court by 28 U.S.C. §1367.

17

5. Plaintiffs' claims arise out of acts of the Los Angeles County Sheriffs

18 Department in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. Accordingly, venue is

19 proper within the Central District of California.

20 III. PARTIES

21

A. PLAINTIFFS

22

6. Plaintiffs Mary Amador and Lorna Mallyon are women who were

23 imprisoned in Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department facilities and subjected to highl

24 intrusive strip and body cavity searches.

25

B. DEFENDANTS

26

7. Defendant County of Los Angeles ("County") is a public entity organized

27 and existing under the laws of the State of California. Defendant Los Angeles Sheriffs

28 Department ("LASD") is a public entity within the meaning of California law, and is a

1

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1 County agency. These defendants are sued in their own right for a County and/or LASD

2 policy, practice or custom which caused plaintiffs' injuries in violation of one or more

3 federal constitutional guarantees, and on plaintiffs' state law claims based on respondeat

4 superior, under California Government Code §815.2 and mandatory duties under

5 California Government Code §815.6.

6

8. Defendant Leroy Baca ("Baca") is the Sheriff of Los Angeles County, and is

7 the policy maker for the LASD. He is sued in his official and individual capacities.

8

9. Defendant Sammy Jones ("Jones") is a deputy sheriff holding the rank of

9 division chief. He is the commanding officer of the LASD's Custody Operations

10 Division. He is sued in his individual and official capacities.

11

10. Defendant Timothy Cornell ("Cornell") is a deputy sheriffholding the rank

12 of captain. He is the commanding officer of the LASD's Inmate Reception Center

13 ("IRC"). IRC is the primary intake and release facility for inmates, and the transfer and

14 pickup point for inmates transferred between jail facilities and inmates returned to jail

15 after an appearance in court. Cornell is sued in his individual and official capacities.

16

11. Defendant John H. Clark ("Clark") is a deputy sheriff holding the rank of

17 captain. He is the commanding officer of the LASD's Men's Central Jail ("MCJ"). MCJ

18 houses both male and female inmates. Clark is sued in his individual and official

19 capacities.

20

12. Plaintiffs are ignorant of the true names and capacities of defendants sued

21 herein as DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, and therefore sue these defendants by such

22 fictitious names. Plaintiffs will give notice of this complaint, and of one of more DOES'

23 true names and capacities, when ascertained. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and

24 based thereon allege, that defendants DOES 1 through 5 are responsible in some manner

25 for the damages and injuries hereinafter complained of.

26

13. DOES 6 through 10 (hereinafter collectively referred to as "LASD

27 Supervisory defendants") were and are now responsible for the LASD jails and, among

28 other things, are responsible for the training, supervision, control, assignment and

2

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 1 Filed 03/05/10 Page 4 of 16 Page ID #:4

1 discipline of the sworn and civilian personnel of the LASD and County who work in,

2 operate, administer and manage the jails, and for the formulation, promulgation,

3 adoption, application, administration and enforcement of the policies, rules, regulations

4 and practices ofthe LASD jails.

5

14. Upon information and belief, plaintiffs further allege that, at all times

6 relevant herein, the LASD Supervisory defendants participated in, approved, and/or

7 ratified the unconstitutional or illegal acts complained of herein that occurred within

8 LASD jails.

9

15. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereupon allege that, at all times

10 relevant herein, the individual defendants, and each of them, were the agents, servants

11 and employees of their respective employers (defendants LASD, County) and were actin

12 at all times within the scope of their agency and employment, and with the knowledge

13 and consent of their principals and employers. At all times herein, defendants, and each

14 of them, were acting un~er the color of state law.

15 IV. CLAIMS OF CLASS REPRESENTATIVES

16

A. MARY AMADOR

17

16. Mary Amador was arrested by Los Angeles County Sheriff's personnel on o

18 about March 1, 2009. She surrendered to a Detective Corrigan in the parking lot of the

19 Century Regional Detention Facility ("CRDF"), after Detective Corrigan told her she had

20 a welfare-fraud warrant for her arrest. CRDF is commonly known and referred to as the

21 "Lynwood Jail". The detective gave Mrs. Amador a week to surrender so Mrs. Amador

22 could make arrangements for child care for her young daughter, and so she could arrange

23 bail. Mrs. Amador surrendered at 9:00 a.m. Bail had already been posted.

24

17. Mrs. Amador was strip searched about 6-7 p.m. that evening, in a group with

25 about 12 other women, outside in the cold open air, in an area bordered on one side by a

26 facility wall and entry door, on another by a solid block wall, on the third by a solid gate,

27 and on the fourth by a chain link fence shielded by a tom and shredded tarp through

28 which she could see about five male deputies on the other side. The location was

3

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 1 Filed 03/05/10 Page 5 of 16 Page ID #:5

1 apparently a driveway and/or discharge area for buses.

2

18. The ground was concrete. The women were required to completely disrobe,

3 place their street clothes on the ground, squat, spread their buttocks, lift their breasts, etc.,

4 and change into jail attire, which they picked up from the ground.

5

19. One of the women, about 60 years old, complained bitterly of the cold, and

6 cried.

7

20. Having spent most of the day with four of the women, Mrs. Amador had

8 learned that they had just been arrested and had not yet been to court. Of course, Mrs.

9 Amador had not been to cowt, either.

10

21. About an hour after having been strip searched, Mrs. Amador was released

11 on bail. A jailer told Mrs. Amador the bond had been at the jail since 9:00 am in the

12 mommg.

13

22. The day after bailing out, Mrs. Amador called the facility to complain about

14 the strip search. She left a detailed voice mail on the watch commander's extension. She

15 never heard back.

16

23. Mrs. Amador and the women were searched as a group, with each woman

17 able to, and forced to watch the other women being searched. They were forced to stand

18 naked within inches of each other as they were searched. They were forced to place their

19 clothing on the unsanitary ground. This is the same ground plaintiff and the women were

20 forced to stand on, barefoot and naked.

21

B. LORNA MALLYON

22

24. Lorna Mallyon, at the time 30 years old, was arrested on September 23,

23 2008, by Glendale police on a misdemeanor charge of violating Cal. Penal Code

24 §496D(a) (knowingly purchasing stolen vehicle). Ms. Mallyon was held in Glendale jail

25 until September 25, 2008, at which time she was arraigned on the above charge in Los

26 Angeles Superior Court (Glendale). Afterward, she was remanded to the custody of the

27 Los Angeles County Sheriff and transported to CRDF. Upon arrival at CRDF, she was

28 strip and visual body cavity searched in a group, without privacy and outside.

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1

25. On September 30, 2008, Ms. Mallyon was released from jail on her own

2 recognizance. Ultimately, the underlying criminal case on which Ms. Mallyon was held

3 was dismissed.
4 v. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

5

A. COMMONFACTUALALLEGATIONS

6

26. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that women are routinely strip searched

7 and forced to undergo visual body cavity searches in the manner described above, before

8 being arraigned.

9

27. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that women are routinely strip searched

10 and forced to undergo visual body cavity searches as described above, when they are first

11 placed in general population.

12

28. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that men are not routinely strip searched

13 and forced to undergo visual body cavity searches in the manner described above, before

14 being arraigned.

15

29. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that men are not routinely strip searched

16 and forced to undergo visual body cavity searches in the manner described above, when

17 they are first placed in general population.

18

30. On information and belief, plaintiffs allege the strip and/or visual body

19 cavity searches to which they and class members were subjected, were done pursuant to

20 defendants' policy and practice to indiscriminately search all or a large number of women

21 but not men being processed into the jail without regard to: a) The nature of their offense

22 or criminal history; b) Whether they are under an order Of release or not; c) Whether they

2~ have had contact with any persons from outside the County jail system who could

24 reasonably be believed to be a potential source of contraband or weapons; d) Whether

25 there is cause of any kind to believe they are a potential source of contraband or weapons;

26 e) Whether there is any other articulable justification for defendants' indiscriminate strip

27 and body search policy; f) Whether they are "pre-arraignment detainees," as that term is

28 used in California Penal Code §4030(b); and g) Whether there is any legitimate reason to

5

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 1 Filed 03/05/10 Page 7 of 16 Page ID #:7

1 strip search women but not men as set forth herein.

2

31. On information and belief, plaintiffs allege that defendants have a policy of

3 not limiting the persons who can see or hear or observe all or part ofthe strip and body

4 cavity searches to those who are necessary to the procedure. Thus, other inmates,

5 members of the opposite sex, dispensable jail personnel and possibly others are able to

6 see or hear some or all of the searches described above. Specifically, class members are

7 required to submit to strip searches during which other people who are not participating

8 in the search and/or are of the opposite sex, including jail staff and other inmates, are able

9 to observe the search and the class members' naked bodies. On further information and

10 belief, in many instances class members are forced to touch each other's bodies during

11 the searches in order to comply with the directions given by Sheriffs deputies.

12

32. Plaintiffs bring this action on their own behalf, and on behalf of a class of all

13 other persons similarly situated, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil

14 Procedure. The class is defined as those women who were forced to undergo the unlawful

15 strip and/or visual body cavity searches in Los Angeles County's jails (which are

16 operated, maintained and under the control of the County, the LASD and the Supervisory

17 defendants) set forth in this complaint; to wit, searches that violated the Fourth

18 Amendment or its California equivalent, or searches that violated equal protection of the

19 law due to the fact that that the policy and custom of strip searches was applied to women

20 but not men.

21

33. Due to the previous filing of Solis v. Baca, No. CV06-1135 SVW (CTx)

22 (C.D. Calif.), a case currently pending in this court, the class period goes back two years

23 prior to the filing of that case, which also alleges violation of the Fourth Amendment and

24 equal protection rights ofthose subjected to strip searches by the Los Angeles County

25 Sheriffs Department. Because the pendency of that case has tolled the statute of

26 limitations for the class members herein, the statute oflimitations in this case reaches

27 back to May 30, 2004. Plaintiffs anticipate that a motion to amend the existing Solis v.

28 Baca complaint will be filed in the near future to allege that women but not men were

6

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 1 Filed 03/05/10 Page 8 of 16 Page ID #:8

1 subjected to the strip search policy alleged herein. Plaintiffs file this complaint for 2 precautionary reasons because defendants may contend that the Solis complaint may not

3 be amended in the respects described herein.

4

34. Plaintiffs also engaged in pre-litigation settlement efforts. Specifically,

5 plaintiffs showed defendants a draft copy of this complaint and asked that defendants

6 immediately cease and desist their unlawful practices. Plaintiffs also raised this issue

7 with defendants' counsel during a meeting to discuss county strip search policies. To

8 date, and to plaintiffs' lmowledge, defendants continue to engage in the unlawful

9 practices detailed in this complaint.

10

35. On information and belief, plaintiffs allege that defendants will continue

11 their aforementioned policy and practice of unlawful strip and/or visual body cavity

12 searches unless enjoined and restrained by the court. Without injunctive relief applicable

13 to the class as a whole, the class members will suffer irreparable harm for which there is

14 no adequate remedy at law in that their constitutional and statutory rights will be

15 systematically violated.

16

B. RULE 23 PREREQUISITES

17

1. Numerosity

18

36. In accordance with F.R.Civ. P. Rule 23(a), the members of the class are so

19 numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiffs do not know the exact

20 number of class members. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that

21 there are more than 300 inmates per day who are subjected to strip and/or body cavity

22 searches as a result of defendants' policy and practice of indiscriminately subjecting

23 prisoners to strip and body cavity searches. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and 24 thereon allege that the number of persons in the proposed class is in the thousands.

25

2. Common Issues of Fact or Law

26

37. In accordance with F.R. Civ. P. Rule 23(a), there are questions offact

27 common to the class. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that the 28 common questions offact include, but are not limited to the following: (1) Whether the

7

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1 LASD routinely subjects all prisoners to strip and/or body cavity searches without there

2 being any reasonable suspicion, based on specific or articulable facts, to believe any

3 particular inmate has concealed drug(s), weapon(s) and/or any contraband on their

4 persons or intheir body cavities; (2) Whether the strip and/or body cavity searches are

5 conducted in an area of privacy so that the search cannot be observed by persons not

6 participating in the search, or whether the strip and body cavity searches are conducted in

7 areas where they may be observed by persons not participating in the searches; (3)

8 Whether the strip and/or body cavity searches are conducted in an unsanitary area,

9 infested with bacteria such as MRSA and other communicable diseases; (4) whether

10 females are subjected to strip and/or body cavity searches when males are not; (5)

11 whether females are subjected to strip and/or body cavity searches under conditions

12 which are more intrusive and less sanitary than males.

13

38. In accordance with F.R. Civ. P. Rule 23(a), there are questions oflaw

14 common to the class. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that the

15 common questions oflaw include but are not limited to the following: (1) Whether the

16 LASD may indiscriminately conduct strip and/or body cavity searches of inmates without

17 there being any reasonable suspicion, based on specific or articulable facts, to believe any

18 particular inmate has concealed drug(s), weapon(s) and/or any contraband on their

19 persons or in their body cavities; (2) Whether the LASD may conduct strip and/or body

20 cavity searches of inmates in open areas where they may be observed by persons not

21 participating in the searches; (3) Whether LASD' s policy of subjecting persons to strip

22 and/or body cavity searches violates California Penal Code §4030; (4) Whether LASD's

23 policy of subjecting persons to strip and/or body cavity searches in an area which is not

24 an "area of privacy" violates California Penal Code §4030(m); (5) Whether the conduct

25 described above violates the Fourth and/or Fourteenth Amendments, and/or California

26 Constitution Article I, §§ 1, 7, and/or 13; (6) Whether the conduct described above

27 constitutes a policy or custom of the defendants; (7) Whether any individual defendant is

28 entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims, or state law immunity on the state

8

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1 law claims, for the practices complained of herein; and (8) Whether determination of

2 damages suffered by a statistically representative sample of the class provides the basis

3 for determination of all class members' damages except those who opt out, or whether

4 category damages may appropriately be determined for the class members.

5

3. Typicality

6

39. In accordance with F.R. Civ. P. Rule 23(a), the claims ofthe representative

7 plaintiffs are typical of the class. Plaintiffs were in LASD custody when they were

8 subjected to strip and/or visual body cavity searches of inmates without there being any

9 reasonable suspicion, based on specific or articulable facts, to believe that any plaintiff

10 and class members had concealed drug(s), weapon(s) and/or any contraband in their body

11 cavities; plaintiffs were subjected to the searches in open areas where they were observed

12 by other inmates and persons not involved in the search, including sometimes members

13 ofthe opposite sex; plaintiffs were searched and forced to stand naked in unsanitary and

14 bacteria infested areas; females were subjected to strip and/or body cavity searches when

15 males were not; and females were subjected to strip and/or body cavity searches under

16 conditions which were more intrusive and less sanitary than males.

17

40. Thus, plaintiffs have the same interests and have suffered the same type of

18 damages as the class members. Plaintiffs' claims are based upon the same or similar legal

19 theories as the claims of the class members. Each class member suffered actual damages

20 as a result of being subjected to a strip and/or body cavity search. The actual damages

21 suffered by plaintiffs are similar in type and amount to the actual damages suffered by

22 each class member.

23

41. In accordance with F.R. Civ. P. Rule 23(a), the representative plaintiffs will

24 fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. The interests of the representative

25 plaintiffs are consistent with and not antagonistic to the interests of the class.

26

4. Maintenance and Superiority

27

42. In accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 23(b)(1 )(A), prosecutions of separate

28 actions by individual members of the class would create a risk that inconsistent or

9

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1 varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class would establish

2 incompatible standards of conduct for the parties opposing the class.

3

43. In accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 23(b)(1 )(B), prosecutions of separate

4 actions by individual members of the class would create a risk of adjudications with

5 respect to individual members of the class which would, as a practical matter,

6 substantially impair or impede the interests of the other members of the class to protect

7 their interests.

8

44. In accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 23(b)(2), plaintiffs are informed and

9 believe, and thereon allege that the defendants have acted on grounds generally

10 applicable to the class.

11

45. In accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 23(b)(3), the questions oflaw or fact

12 common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only

13 individual members, and this class action is superior to other available methods for the

14 fair and efficient adjudication ofthe controversy between the parties. Plaintiffs are

15 informed and believe, and thereon allege that the interest of class members in

16 individually controlling the prosecution of a separate action is low in that most class

17 members would be unable to individually prosecute any action at all. Plaintiffs are

18 informed and believe, and thereon allege that the amounts at stake for individuals are

19 such that separate suits would be impracticable in that most members of the class will not

20 be able to find counsel to represent them. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon

21 allege that it is desirable to concentrate all litigation in one forum because all of the

22 claims arise in the same location, i.e., the County of Los Angeles. It will promote judicial

23 efficiency to resolve the common questions oflaw and fact in one forum, rather than in

24 multiple courts.

25

46. Plaintiffs do not know the identities of the class members. Plaintiffs are

26 informed and believe, and thereon allege that the identities of the class members are

27 ascertainable from LASD records, in particular the LASD AJIS computer system used to

28 track and identify LASD inmates. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege

10

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1 that AJIS reflects the identities, including addresses and telephone numbers, of the

2 persons who have been held in custody by LASD; when inmates were arrested and

3 booked, taken to court, returned from court; why inmates were released; and when

4 inmates were released.

5

47. Plaintiffs know of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management

6 of this litigation that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. The class action is

7 superior to any other available means to resolve the issues raised on behalf of the class.

8 The class action will be manageable because so many different records systems exist

9 from which to ascertain the members of the class. Liability can be determined on a class-

10 wide basis. Damages can be determined on a class-wide basis using a damages matrix set

11 by a jury, or by trying the damages of a statistically valid sample of the class to a jury and

12 extrapolating those damages to the class as a whole.

13

48. In accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 23(b)(3), class members must be

14 furnished with the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual

15 notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. Plaintiffs are

16 informed and believe that LASD computer records contain a last known address for class

17 members. Plaintiffs contemplate that individual notice be given to class members at such

18 last known address by first class mail. Plaintiffs contemplate that the notice inform class

19 members of the following:

20

A. The pendency of the class action, and the issues common to the class;

21

B. The nature of the action;

22

C. Their right to 'opt out' of the action within a given time, in whic

23

event they will not be bound by a decision rendered in the class action;

24

D. Their right, if they do not 'opt out,' to be represented by their owr

25

counsel and enter an appearance in the case; otherwise, they will be represented b

26

the named plaintiffs and their counsel; and

27

E. Their right, if they do not 'opt out,' to share in any recovery in favo

28

of the class, and conversely to be bound by any judgment on the common issues

adverse to the class.

11

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1

49. Plaintiffs restate and incorporate by reference each of the foregoing and

2 ensuing paragraphs in each of the following causes of action as if each paragraph was

3 fully set forth therein.

4

COUNT ONE- 42 U.S.C. §1983 [FOURTH AMENDMENT]

5

(All Defendants)

6

50. In subjecting plaintiffs and class members to the unnecessary, demeaning,

7 and outrageous intrusive strip and body cavity search, defendants, and each of them,

8 violated plaintiffs' and class members' rights to be secure in their persons against

9 unreasonable searches and seizures as guaranteed by the Fourth and Fourteenth

10 Amendments to the United States Constitution. Therefore, plaintiffs and class members

11 are entitled to bring suit and recover damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983.

12

51. As a direct and proximate cause of the aforementioned acts, plaintiffs and

13 class members were damaged in an amount to be proven at trial.

14

COUNT TWO- 42 U.S.C. §1983 [EQUAL PROTECTION]

15

(All Defendants) ·

16

52. The unequal treatment of men and women- and the unnecessary,

17 demeaning, and outrageous intrusive strip and body cavity searches inflicted on women

18 but not men- deprived the female class members of the protections afforded by

19 provisions of the 14th Amendment Equal Protection guarantees. Therefore, the female

20 plaintiffs and class members are entitled to bring suit and recover damages pursuant to 42

21 U.S.C. §1983.

22

COUNT THREE- ARTICLE 1, §§1 AND 13 OF THE CALIFORNIA

23

CONSTITUTION [PRIVACY/FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALOGUE]

24

(All Defendants)

25

53. Plaintiffs filed a Govt. Code §910 claim for damages against the defendants

26 for the matters set forth in this complaint.

27

54. The unnecessary, demeaning, outrageous, and intrusive strip and body cavity

28 search to which plaintiffs and class members were subjected violated plaintiffs' rights not

12

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1 to be subjected to invasion of their fundamental privacy interests, as guaranteed by

2 Article I, §1 of the California Constitution; and to be secure in their persons against

3 umeasonable searches and seizures, as guaranteed by Article I, §13 of the California

4 Constitution.

5 COUNT FOUR- ARTICLE 1, §7, OF THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION

6

[EQUAL PROTECTION] (All Defendants)

7

8

55. The unequal treatment of men and women violated the female plaintiffs'

9 rights not to be denied equal protection of the law, as guaranteed by Article I, §7 of the

10 California Constitution; and to be secure in their persons against umeasonable searches

11 and seizures, as guaranteed by Article I, § 13 of the California Constitution.

12

COUNT FIVE- Cal. Civ. Code §52.1

(All Defendants)

13

14

56. The unnecessary, demeaning, and outrageous intrusive strip and/or visual

15 body cavity searches alleged herein were accomplished via threat, intimidation or

16 coercion and/or threats ofthe same.

17

57. The unnecessary, demeaning, and outrageous intrusive strip and visual body

18 cavity searches, and the unequal treatment of women, as opposed to men, deprived

19 plaintiffs and the class they represent of the protections afforded by provisions of federal

20 constitutiQnal and state constitutional and statutory law, including but not limited to

21 rights protected under the Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

22 States Constitution; Article I, §§1, 7, 13, and 17, of the California state constitution, and

23 California Penal Code § 4030. Therefore, plaintiffs and the class are entitled to bring suit

24 and recover damages pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code §52.1 (b).

25

58. As a direct and proximate cause ofthe aforementioned acts, plaintiffs and

26 class members were damaged in an amount to be proven at trial but in any event not less

27 than $4,000 per violation pursuant to the provisions of Civil Code §52(b).

28

59. The aforementioned acts of defendants directly and proximately caused

13

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 1 Filed 03/05/10 Page 15 of 16 Page ID #:15

1 plaintiffs to be deprived of their California constitutional rights as stated above, thereby

2 entitling plaintiffs and class members to recover damages proximately caused by

3 defendants' wrongful acts.

4

COUNT SIX- Violation of Statutory Dnties

5

(Penal Code § 4030)

(Against Defendants County and LASD Only)

6

7

60. The unnecessary, demeaning, outrageous, and intrusive strip and body cavit

8 searches, to which plaintiffs and the class members were subjected by defendants,

9 violated plaintiffs' and the class members' state-law protections guaranteed by California

10 Penal Code §4030.

11

61. The aforementioned acts of defendants directly and proximately caused the

12 plaintiffs and the class members to be deprived of their rights as stated above, thereby 13 entitling plaintiffs and class members to recover damages proximately caused by

14 defendants' wrongful acts, including statutory damages under Penal Code §4030.

15

COUNT SEVEN- Violation of Mandatory Duties

16

(Against Defendants County and LASD)

17

62. The Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

18 Constitution; Article I, §§ 1, 7, 13, and 17, of the California state constitution; California

19 Penal Code §4030; and California Civil Code §52.1 are enactments. Enactments form the

20 basis of a mandatory duty under California Government Code §815.6.

21

63. Any California constitutional provision is mandatory and prohibitory, per

22 Article 1, §26, of the California Constitution.

23

64. These constitutional provisions and statutes apply to all members of the

24 general public, including plaintiffs, and were all designed to prevent the kind of injuries

25 alleged herein.

26

65. Defendants did not exercise reasonable diligence in discharging their duty

27 to refrain from violating the constitutional rights of plaintiffs and class members.

28

66. As a direct and proximate cause of the aforementioned acts of defendants,

plaintiffs and class members were damaged in amounts to be determined at trial.

14

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 1 Filed 03/05/10 Page 16 of 16 Page ID #:16

1 VII. PRAYER

2

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the class members the

3 represent, request damages against each defendant as follows:

4

1. General and special damages according to proof;

5

2. Temporary, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief prohibiting

6

defendants from continuing to engage in the unlawful practices complained of herein;

7

8

3. As against the individual defendants only, punitive damages according t

9 proof;

10

4. In addition to actual damages, statutory damages as allowed by law,

11 including Penal Code §4030 and treble damages under California Civil Code §§52 an

12 52.1;

13

5. Attorneys' fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. §1988; California Civil Cod

14 §§52(b)(3), 52.1(h); California Code of Civil Procedure §1021.5, and whatever othe

15 statute or law may be applicable;

16 6. The costs of this suit and such other relief as is just and proper.

17

DATED: March 5 2010 18

LITT, ESTUAR, HARRISON & KITSON, LLP ROBERT MANN

19

DONALD COOK

20 21

LAW OFF~ OF CYNTHIA ANDERSON-BARKER
By: ~4,?¢

22

Barrett S. Litt

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

23

24

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

25

Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves individually and on behalf of the class, deman

26 a jury trial.
27 DATED: March 5, 2010 28

Barrett S. Litt Attorney for Plaintiffs

15

 
 Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 109 Filed 01/28/11 Page 1 of 29 Page ID #:1157

JAN 2 8 2011
§ ~· ~~NTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
DEPUTY <

Cynthia Anderson-Barker, SBN 175764

E-Mail: cablaw@hotmail.com LAW OFFICES OF CYNTHIA ANDERSON-

BARKER

9

3435 Wilshire Boulevar<k Suite 2900 Los An[eles, California ~oo 10

10

Phone: 213) 252-9444

Facsimi e: (213) 252-0091

11

't}

jji:~iJ--

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

14

Case No. CV-10-1649 SVW (JEMx)

15

SECOND AMENDED CLASS

16

ACTION COMPLAINT FOR

DAMAGES AND INJUNCTIVE

17

RELIEF

18

Plaintiffs,

1. 42 u.s.c. §1983

19

vs.

2. Equal Protection 3. Cal. Const. Art. I,~~ 1, 7, 13

20

SHERIFF LEROY D. BACA individually and in his official capacity;

21

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES a governmental entity; LOS ANGLES

22

COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, a California public entity; SAMMY

4. Cal. Civ. Code §51.1 5. Statutory Duties 6. Mandatory Duties
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

23 JONES, individually_ ano in his official capacity; TIMOTHY CORNELL,

24 individually and in his official capacityh· JOHN H. CLARK, individu~!Y _;:tp.d in is

25 official capacity; DENNIS BURNS,

individually and in his official capacity;

26 GERALD K. COOPER, individual!)' and

in his official capacity; DANIEL CRUZ, 27 individually ancf in h1s official capacity;

28

STACY L. LEE, individually and in her official capacity, and DOES 1 through 10,

Defendants.

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 109 Filed 01/28/11 Page 2 of 29 Page ID #:1158

1 I. INTRODUCTION

2

1. This action concerns the manner in which inmates are searched in Los

3 Angeles County's jails, alleging, inter alia, violations of the Fourth, Eighth and

4 Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and their corollaries under the

5 California Constitution.

6

2. The gravamen of this complaint concerns the privacy rights of inmates who

7 are routinely subjected to strip and body cavity searches in violation of the Constitutions

8 and laws of the United States and the State of California.

9

3. Of particular concern is that female inmates are subjected to degrading strip

10 and body cavity searches under circumstances and conditions when male inmates are not.

11 II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

12

4. Plaintiffs present federal claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983.

13 Accordingly, federal jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and

14 1343. Plaintiffs' state law claims are so related to their federal law claims that they form

15 part of the same case or controversy. Accordingly, supplemental jurisdiction over the

16 state law claims is conferred upon this Court by 28 U.S.C. §1367.

17

5. Plaintiffs' claims arise out of acts of the Los Angeles County Sheriffs

18 Department in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. Accordingly, venue is

19 proper within the Central District of California.

20 III. PARTIES

21

A. PLAINTIFFS

22

6. Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, and Evangelina

23 Madrid are women who were incarcerated in Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department

24 facilities, and who were subjected to highly intrusive strip and body cavity searches.

25

7. Plaintiffs Lora Barranca, Diana Paiz and Diane Vigil are women who are

26 currently incarcerated in Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department facilities. They have

27 been subjected, and will continue to be subjected to highly intrusive strip and body cavity

28 searches.

2

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 109 Filed 01/28/11 Page 3 of 29 Page ID #:1159

1

B. DEFENDANTS

2

8. Defendant County of Los Angeles (hereafter "County") is a public entity

3 organized and existing under the laws of the State of California. Defendant Los Angeles

4 Sheriff's Department (hereafter "LASD") is a public entity within the meaning of

5 California law, and is a County agency. These Defendants are sued in their own right for

6 a County and/or LASD policy, practice or custom which caused Plaintiffs' injuries in

7 violation of one or more federal constitutional guarantees, and on Plaintiffs' state law

8 claims based on respondeat superior under California Government Code §815.2, and

9 mandatory duties under California Government Code §815.6.

1 0

9. Defendant Leroy Baca (hereafter "Baca") is the Sheriff of Los Angeles

11 County, and is the policy maker for the LASD. He is sued in his official and individual

12 capacities.

13

10. Defendant Sammy Jones (hereafter "Jones") is a deputy sheriff holding the

14 rank of division chief. He is the commanding officer of the LASD's Custody Operations

15 Division. He is sued in his individual and official capacities.

16

11. Defendant Dennis Bums (hereafter "Bums") is a deputy sheriff holding the

17 rank of division chief. He is the commanding officer of the LASD's Custody Operations

18 Division. Bums is sued in his individual and official capacities.

19

12. Defendant Timothy Cornell (hereafter "Cornell") is a deputy sheriff holding

20 the rank of captain. He is the commanding officer of the LASD's Inmate Reception

21 Center ("IRC"). IRC is the primary intake and release facility for inmates, and the

22 transfer and pickup point for inmates transferred between jail facilities and inmates

23 returned to jail after an appearance in court. Cornell is sued in his individual and official

24 capacities.

25

13. Defendant Gerald K. Cooper (hereafter "Cooper") is a deputy sheriffholdin

26 the rank of captain. He is the commanding officer of the LASD's Inmate Reception

27 Center ("IRC"). IRC is the primary intake and release facility for inmates, the transfer

28 and pickup point for inmates transferred between jail facilities, and for inmates returned

3

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 109 Filed 01/28/11 Page 4 of 29 Page ID #:1160

1 to jail after an appearance in court. Cooper is sued in his individual and official

2 capacities.

3

14. Defendant John H. Clark (hereafter "Clark") is a deputy sheriffholding the

4 rank of captain. He is the commanding officer of the LASD's Men's Central Jail

5 ("MCJ"). Clark is sued in his individual and official capacities.

6

15. Defendant Daniel Cruz (hereafter "Cruz") is a deputy sheriff holding the

7 rank of captain. He is the commanding officer of the LASD's Men's Central Jail

8 (hereafter "MCJ"). Cruz is sued in his individual and official capacities.

9

16. Defendant Stacy L. Lee is a deputy sheriffho1ding the rank of captain. She

10 is the commanding officer of the Century Regional Detention Center (hereafter "CRDF").

11 CRDF houses female inmates. Lee is sued in her individual and official capacities.

12

17. Plaintiffs are ignorant of the true names and capacities of Defendants sued

13 herein as DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, and therefore sue these defendants by such

14 fictitious names. Plaintiffs will give notice of this complaint, and of one ofmore DOES'

15 true names and capacities, when ascertained. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and

16 based thereon allege, that Defendants DOES 1 through 5 are responsible in some manner

17 for the damages and injuries hereinafter complained of.

18

18. DOES 6 through 10 (hereinafter collectively referred to as "LASD

19 Supervisory Defendants") were and are now responsible for the LASD jails. Among

20 other duties, they are responsible for the training, supervision, control, assignment and

21 discipline ofboth sworn and civilian personnel of the LASD and County who work in,

22 operate, administer and manage tpe jails, and for the formulation, promulgation,

23 adoption, application, administration and enforcement of the policies, rules, regulations

24 and practices of the LASD jails.

25

19. Upon information and belief, Plaintiffs further allege that, at all times

26 relevant herein, the LASD Supervisory Defendants participated in, approved, and/or

27 ratified the unconstitutional or illegal acts that occurred within LASD jails which are

28 complained of herein.

4

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 109 Filed 01/28/11 Page 5 of 29 Page ID #:1161

1

20. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereupon allege that, at all times

2 relevant herein, the individual Defendants, and each of them, were the agents, servants

3 and employees of their respective employers (Defendants LASD, County) and were

4 acting at all times within the scope of their agency and employment with the knowledge

5 and consent of their principals and employers. At all times herein, Defendants, and each

6 of them, were acting under the color of state law.

7 IV. CLAIMS OF CLASS REPRESENTATIVES

8

C AfARYAMADOR

9

21. Mary Amador was arrested by Los Angeles County Sheriffs personnel on o

10 about March 1, 2009. She surrendered to a Detective Corrigan in the parking lot of the

11 Century Regional Detention Facility (hereafter "CRDF"), after Detective Corrigan told

12 advised that she had a welfare fraud warrant for her arrest. CRDF is commonly known

13 and referred to as the "Lynwood Jail". The detective gave Mrs. Amador a week to

14 surrender so that she could make arrangements for child care for her young daughter, and

15 so that she could arrange bail. Mrs. Amador surrendered at 9:00 A.M. Bail had already

16 been posted.

17

22. Mrs. Amador was strip searched at about 6-7 P.M. that evening in a group

18 with about 12 other women, outside in the open, in cold air, in an area bordered on one

19 side by a facility wall and entry door, on another by a solid block wall, on the third by a

20 solid gate, and on the fourth by a chain link fence shielded by a tom and shredded tarp.

21 She could see about five male deputies on the other side of the tom tarp. The location wa

22 apparently a driveway, and/or discharge area for buses.

23

23. The ground in the area was concrete. The women were required to

24 completely disrobe, place their street clothes on the ground, squat, spread their buttocks,

25 lift their breasts, etc., and change into jail attire which they picked up from the ground.

26

24. One of the women, about 60 years old, complained bitterly of the cold, and

27 cried.

28

5

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 109 Filed 01/28/11 Page 6 of 29 Page ID #:1162

1

25. Having spent most of the day with four of the women, Mrs. Amador had

2 learned that they had just been arrested, and had not yet been to court. Mrs. Amador had

3 not been to court, either.

4

26. About an hour after having been strip searched, Mrs. Amador was released

5 on bail. A jailer told Mrs. Amador that her bail bond had been at the jail since 9:00A.M.

6 in the morning.

7

27. The day after bailing out, Mrs. Amador called the facility to complain about

8 the strip search. She left a detailed voice mail on the watch commander's extension. She

9 has never heard back, or received any type of acknowledgement of her complaint..

10

28. Mrs. Amador and the women were searched as a group with each woman

11 able to, and forced to, watch the other women being searched. They were forced to stand 12 naked within inches of each other as they were searched. They were forced to place their

13 clothing on the unsanitary concrete. This is the same concrete Plaintiff and the women

14 were forced to stand on, barefoot and naked.

15

D. LORA BARRANCA

16

29. Lora Barranca was arrested by LASD on or about August 28, 2009. She was

17 transferred to CRDF on September 2nd or 3rct. She remains in custody, and expects to

18 remain in custody beyond the date ofher next court appearance on September 21,2010.

19

30. During the booking process, LASD strip searched/body cavity searched Ms.

20 Barranca in a large group of women, in an outdoor area used to park buses (hereafter

21 "bus stall"). The women were required to completely disrobe, place their clothes on the 22 concrete, squat, spread their buttocks, lift their breasts, etc., and change into jail attire,

23 which they picked up from the concrete.

24

31. LASD personnel at CRDF have strip searched/body cavity searched Ms.

25 Barranca on multiple occasions, including each time she returned from court, or after

26 visiting the hospital. All strip searches occurred in the bus stall, and in a group setting.

27 Ms. Barranca will likely be strip searched/body cavity searched, pursuant to LASD 28 policy, in the same manner and location when she returns from court on September 21,

2010.

6

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 109 Filed 01/28/11 Page 7 of 29 Page ID #:1163

1

32. Ms. Barranca has been strip searched in groups as large as 50 women.

2 Deputies told the women to line up on opposite walls, in two lines of 25 women. Each

3 detainee could watch the other women being searched, and in fact, could not avoid

4 watching the other women being searched. During the search, when the women are

5 naked and facing each other, they can see each other's gang tattoos. I have heard women

6 at CRDF later discuss which women had a certain kind of gang tattoo.

7

33. As the women lined up, the deputies shouted "shoulder to shoulder," forcing

8 the women to stand so close that their bodies touched at the shoulders. When the deputies

9 told Ms. Barranca to bend over for the body cavity search, her thighs also touched the

10 women adjacent to her.

11

34. The bus stall entrance is adjacent to the CRDF booking area. In Ms.

12 Barranca's experience, deputies left the entrance open. They did not take measures to

13 block the view of those being strip searched by persons inside the facility. CRDF

14 personnel, including male personnel, frequently passed the bus stall entrance and could

15 see the searches taking place. Detainees sitting in a nearby processing area could also

16 observe the strip searches.

17

35. A chain link fence comprises one wall of the bus stall. Ms. Barranca has

18 been searched in the stall when no tarps or other materials shielded her from the view of

19 persons outside the stall. The ceiling is also a chain link fence. No tarp covered the

20 ceiling when Ms. Barranca was initially booked into CRDF. When it drizzles outside,

21 women in the search area get rained on.

22

36. The bus stall is usually very cold in the late afternoon and evening, when

23 most searches take place. The floor of the bus stall is porous, grey cement. It is dirty.

24 Sometimes Ms. Barranca could observe trash lying around from previous searches. She

25 has also observed menstrual blood on the cement, ants on the ground, insects crawling up

26 the walls, and oil spots where the busses have dripped oil. Ms. Barranca was forced to

27 place her clothing on the unsanitary cement.

28

7

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 109 Filed 01/28/11 Page 8 of 29 Page ID #:1164

1

E. DIANAPAIZ

2

37. Diana Paiz was arrested on or about February 12, 2010. She was booked into

3 CRDF on approximately February 17, 2010. She remains in custody, and expects to

4 remain in custody beyond the date of her next court appearance on September 23, 2010.

5

38. LASD personnel at CRDF have strip searched/body cavity searched Ms.

6 Paiz approximately 5 times, including each time she returned from court. Each of the

7 searches occurred with a large group of women in an outdoor bus stall. The women were

8 required to completely disrobe, place their clothes on the cement, squat, spread their

9 buttocks, lift their breasts, etc., and change into jail attire which they picked up from the

10 cement. Ms. Paiz will almost certainly be strip searched/body cavity searched in the same

11 manner and location when she returns from court on September 23, 2010.

12

39. Ms. Paiz has been strip searched in groups ranging from 20 to 40 women.

13 Deputies told the women to line up on opposite walls. Each woman could watch the other

14 women being searched and, in fact, could not avoid watching the other women being

15 searched. As the women lined up, the deputies shouted "shoulder to shoulder," forcing

16 the women to stand so close that their bodies touched at the shoulders. Deputies told the

17 women to put their noses on the wall, which is visibly dirty.

18

40. The bus stall entrance is adjacent to the CRDF booking area. In Ms. Paiz's

19 experience, deputies left the entrance open and did not take measures to block the view o

20 those being searched from persons inside the facility.

21

41. The bus stall is usually cold in the late afternoon and evening, when most

22 searches take place. The concrete is dirty, and sometimes Ms. Paiz could observe trash

23 lying around from previous searches. During searches, Ms. Paiz was forced to place her

24 clothing on the unsanitary cement.

25

42. Guards routinely gave instructions using abusive and profane language.

26 After women undressed, the guards laughed at them, making jokes about the appearance

27 of their bodies and how the area smelled.

28

8

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 109 Filed 01/28/11 Page 9 of 29 Page ID #:1165

1

43. Some severely overweight or physically disabled women cannot expose thei

2 body cavities by bending over. They are subjected to an even less dignified search: the

3 guards order them to sit or lie on the bare concrete, spread their legs and raise their feet

4 off the ground.

5

F. DIANE VIGIL

6

44. Diane Vigil was arrested by LASD on or about May 9, 2010. Ms. Vigil was

7 transferred to CRDF on May 12, 2010. She remains in custody and expects to remain in

8 custody beyond the date of her next court appearance on September 28, 2010.

9

45. During the booking process, LASD strip searched/body cavity searched Ms.

10 Vigil with a large group of women, in an outdoor bus stall. The women were required to

11 completely disrobe, place their clothes on the ground, squat, spread their buttocks, lift

12 their breasts, etc., and change into jail attire, which they picked up from the cement. Ms.

13 Vigil began menstruating shortly before she arrived at CDRF for booking, though she did

14 not realize it until she pulled down her underwear for the body cavity search. She

15 requested a sanitary napkin, but was chastised for not informing them earlier. Even

16 though blood was dripping down her leg and onto the ground, she had to wait for a

17 sanitary napkin until after the body cavity search was finished.

18

46. CRDF has strip searched/body cavity searched Ms. Vigil approximately 5

19 times, including each time she returned from court. All strip searches occurred in the bus

20 stall and en masse. Ms. Vigil will almost likely be strip searched/body cavity searched in

21 the same manner and location when she returns from court on September 23, 2010.

22

47. Ms. Vigil has been strip searched in groups as large as 50 women. Deputies

23 told the women to line up on opposite walls. Each woman could watch the other women

24 being searched and, in fact, could not avoid watching the other women being searched.

25 As the women lined up, the deputies shouted "shoulder to shoulder," forcing women to

26 stand so close that their bodies touched at the shoulders.

27

48. The bus stall entrance is adjacent to the CRDF booking area. In Ms. Vigil's

28 experience, deputies left the entrance open and typically did not take measures to block

9

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 109 Filed 01/28/11 Page 10 of 29 Page ID #:1166

1 the view of those being searched from persons inside the facility. Prior to August 18,

2 2010, Ms. Vigil had never observed deputies move laundry carts in front of the doors.

3

49. The bus stall is usually cold in the late afternoon and evening, when most

4 searches take place. The cement is dirty and sometimes Ms. Vigil could observe trash

5 lying around from previous searches. She has also observed menstrual blood on the

6 cement and ants crawling on the ground.

7

50. Guards routinely gave instructions using abusive and profane language.

8

51. Some severely overweight or physically disabled women cannot expose thei

9 body cavities by bending over. They are subjected to an even less dignified search: the

10 guards order them to sit on the bare concrete, spread their legs and raise their feet off the

11 ground.

12

G. ALISA BATTISTE

13

52. Alisa Battiste was arrested by LASD deputies on January 30, 2010 and was

14 transferred directly to CRDF on January 31, 20 10, before going to court. Upon

15 processing into CRDF and each time she came back from court (about 7-8 times), she

16 was strip and visual body cavity searched outdoors, in a bus stall adjacent to the booking

17 area.

18

53. Each time she was searched, Ms. Battiste and the women being searched

19 with her were forced to stand close together, strip naked, face the women across from

20 them, lift their breasts and stomachs, open their mouths, use their fingers to spread their

21 cheeks (without an opportunity to wash their hands first), tum to face the wall, bend over,

22 use their hands to spread their buttocks and vaginas, and cough while guards looked into

23 their body cavities.

24

54. Ms. Battiste and the other women then had to lift each foot and wiggle their

25 toes. Many women would lose their balance attempting to stand on one foot and would

26 fall over, while naked, and bump into one of the naked women next to them.

27

55. If a woman was menstruating, she had to remove her soiled menstrual pad,

28 or pull out her used tampon while in the group, put it into a box, and then put the box on

10

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 109 Filed 01/28/11 Page 11 of 29 Page ID #:1167

1 the ground.

2

56. The bus stall is connected to the interior of the jail by sliding glass doors

3 which were always open during the searches. When Ms. Battiste was searched in the bus

4 stall, inmates were usually chained to the benches just inside the door. They could see

5 the searches. Sometimes it was inmates in yellow jump suits whom Ms. Battiste

6 understood to have mental problems, or were "5150". Male deputies and other jail staff

7 walking by could also see the searches. Although the door was always open, because the

8 door is made of glass guards and inmates on the other side would be able to see the

9 searches even if the door were closed.

10

57. After the searches, Ms. Battiste and the other women would put on jail

11 clothes which were placed on the ground before the women were allowed to put them on.

12 Because the searches took place outside, in a bus stall, there was often dirt, dust and

13 sometimes even ants on the clothes they picked up from the ground. The ground was

14 concrete and dirty, even stained with menstrual blood. Ms. Battiste's feet were often dirty

15 from standing bare-foot during the searches, but the deputies would sometimes not allow

16 the women to shower until the following day.

17

58. Every time Ms. Battiste was strip searched, she felt embarrassed and

18 humiliated as a woman. She felt it robbed her of her femininity, of her womanhood.

19 Every time she was strip searched, at least one woman in the group would cry, especially

20 the younger women, who felt especially embarrassed about having to expose their bodies.

21

H. FELICE CHOLEWIAK

22

59. On or about March 26, 2010, Felice Cholewiak was arrested by LAPD and

23 taken directly to CRDF. Ms. Cholewiak was strip searched upon arriving at CRDF, and

24 each time she returned from court. Each strip search was conducted outdoors in an area

25 where she has been buses parked. She estimates that she was strip searched 5 times.

26

62. On one side of this bus depot area, there is a blue tarp. The opposite wall is a

27 brick wall. These walls are approximately 15-20 feet apart. Along another wall, there is a

28 roll-up door where buses come in and out. Opposite the roll-up door is the entrance to the

11

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 109 Filed 01/28/11 Page 12 of 29 Page ID #:1168
1 bus depot strip search area. The door to this area is always open. Ms. Cholewiak has 2 never seen anything obstructing this doorway. She has seen male deputies and male 3 workers walk by the entrance to the bus depot. These males have an unobstructed view to 4 the bus depot when women are being strip searched. The floor of the depot is porous, 5 grey cement, like a sidewalk. Ms. Cholewiak has seen motor oil on the floor of the bus 6 depot. She has seen blood on the floor of the bus depot. She has seen bird poop on the

63. Before being strip searched in the bus depot area, Ms. Cholewiak was taken

9 to a holding cell. She has waited in that holding cell to be strip searched between 1 to 3 10
hours. At times it appeared that deputies are waiting for more women to arrive so that 1 1
they can strip search more women at one time. At other times it appeared that deputies 12
are waiting for shift change so that the next shift had to strip search the women. 13 During a strip search, from 60 to80 women are· taken off the buses returning from court,
14 and are lined up inside the bus depot against the blue tarp wall and the brick wall. The
15 women are divided into two lines, each line facing the other. While deputies are lining
16

the women up, they are constantly ordering them to stand "shoulder to shoulder" and to 17

18 "get closer." They are sometimes standing so close that they touch each other.

19

64. After the women are lined up, they are ordered to remove all clothing except

20 their underwear. The clothing is then searched and thrown on the ground behind them.

21 Shoes are removed along with the clothing and the women stand barefoot during the

22 searches. They are ordered to lift their feet. Ms. Cholewiak and a number of other

23 women must steady themselves by touching the wall in front of her.

24

65. Deputies then shouted "If you're bleeding and if you have anything between

25 your legs" to take out the pad or tampon. Deputies then gave the women jail issue pads

26 in boxes. Ms. Cholewiak and the women were ordered to put the used pads or tampons

27 in the boxes and put the new pads on the ground on top of their clothing. At that point,

28 they were ordered to tum around and Ms. Cholewiak could see the topless women across

12

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 109 Filed 01/28/11 Page 13 of 29 Page ID #:1169

1 from her and next to her. She could see gang tattoos on some women, and has heard

2 discussions among some of the women about the tattoos.

3

66. The women were then ordered to lift their hair, to lift their breasts and, those

4 with "excess fat" were ordered to lift their stomachs. They were then ordered to pull

5 their lips away from their gums, using the same fingers used to remove the menstrual

6 pads and tampons. Ms. Cholewiak and the women were never able to wash their hands

7 before putting them in their mouths. They were then ordered to take down their

8 underwear, spread their legs, bend over, open their vaginas with their fingers and cough

9 so deputies could inspect the vaginas with flashlights. While bending over, Ms.

10 Cholewiak was able to see the women in the line across from her also bending over.

11

67. Ms. Cholewiak and the women were then ordered to pull up their underwear,

12 put on shirts, pants and shoes, but sock and bras must go in pockets. The searches

13 average about 20 minutes, but can take much longer if women do not comply quickly.

14 Ms. Cholewiak has heard deputies yell, scream and curse at women who do not move

15 quickly enough, or those who do not speak English. She has seen deputies taunt women,

16 and make derogatory remarks within the women's hearing. Women often cry during the

17 searches.

18

68. Because the searches took place outside, sometimes as late as 10 PM, the

19 weather was very cold and Ms. Cholewiak could feel the cold wind blowing through the

20 space. Every time Ms. Cholewiak was searched, she would be disgusted and tearful. She

21 was emotionally exhausted after every search.

22

I. EVANGELINA MADRID

23

69. Evangelina Madrid's experiences with CRDF began around October 4, 2009

24 when she was first arrested by LASD and taken to CRDF. She estimates that she was

25 strip searched between 10 to 12 times upon each entry into CRDF, and each time she

26 returned from court. Except for those times when Ms. Madrid returned to CRDF from a

27 medical appointment, she was searched in an outdoor area where she has seen buses

28 parked.

13

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 109 Filed 01/28/11 Page 14 of 29 Page ID #:1170

1

70. One side of the bus depo is a chain link fence which is covered by a blue

2 tarp. The opposite wall is brick. These walls are about 15-20 feet apart. Along another

3 wall is a roll-up door where buses come in and out. Opposite the roll-up door is the

4 entrance to the bus stall from the booking area. Male deputies and workers walking by

5 the entrance to the bus depo can see the women being searched. Ms. Madrid states that

6 there is no privacy and she and the other women are completely exposed.

7

71. The floor of the bus stall is porous, grey cement, like a sidewalk. Ms.

8 Madrid has seen worms and slug-like creatures crawling on the floor, and has seen motor

9 oil on the floor as well. The ceiling of the stall is a chain link fence covered by a blue tarp

10 which sometimes flaps up and down in the wind. Ms. Madrid has been searched outside

11 in this bus area in the winter when the air feels freezing cold, the cold air blows through

12 the chain link fencing and the temperature is well below 68 degrees. Sometimes the

13 searches were done as late as 10 or 11 P.M.

14

72. Ms. Madrid was searched with 20 to 50 other women who were taken from

15 buses after court. They are lined up in the bus stall against the chain link and the brick

16 wall. After the women are lined up, they are ordered to remove all clothing except their

17 underwear. Because the women are forced to stand so close together, Ms. Madrid could

18 often smell the body odor of women who had not showered. The clothing is then

19 searched and thrown on the ground behind them. Shoes are removed along with the

20 clothing and the women stand barefoot during the searches. They were then ordered to

21 lift their hair, to lift their breasts, and to pull their lips away from their gums. Ms. Madrid

22 could see the topless bodies of the women in the line facing her. She could tell who had

23 breast implants, stretch marks, and those with gang tattoos.

24

73. Ms. Madrid and the other women were then ordered to face the wall, take

25 down their underwear, spread their legs, bend over, open their vaginas with their fingers

26 and cough. Sometimes they were ordered to cough for a long as 3 minutes while deputies

27 inspected their vaginas with flashlights. While bent over, Ms. Madrid could see the

28 women in the line facing her also bending over. These searches could take as long as 15-

14

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 109 Filed 01/28/11 Page 15 of 29 Page ID #:1171

1 20 minutes if some women were not complying.

2

74. Ms. Madrid has been strip searched when she was menstruating. She was

3 given a jail issue pad in a cardboard box, ordered to take the new pad and place it on her

4 clothing on the floor of the stall, remove the old pad and put it in the box, and throw the

5 box into the middle of the bus stall. She had to wait about 5 minutes to replace her pad,

6 and at times had to wait up to 15 minutes. Ms. Madrid stated that she prayed she

7 wouldn't bleed while waiting to replace her pad.

8

75. Ms. Madrid has heard deputies yell and curse at the women in the most

9 insulting ways. She has seen deputies grab women who were not complying and throw

10 them against the wall. She has often seen women crying during the search process.

11 Each time she was strip searched, she felt demoralized, humiliated and depressed.

12

a. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

13

76. Ms. Paiz and Ms. Barranca properly filed complaints (i.e. grievances) on

14 approximately August 6, 2010. Their complaints requested a sanitary, indoor location for

15 all strip searches, hidden from the view of anyone not directly involved in the strip each

16 (including inmates). They also requested equal treatment for men and women.

17

77. Ms. Vigil did not personally file a complaint, but, instead, submitted a

18 complaint letter through her attorneys to Captain Stacy Lee, also on August 6th. This

19 procedure was expressly authorized by defendant County of Los Angeles because

20 Michael Gennaco, chief attorney for the County's Office of Independent Review,

21 informed one of Plaintiffs' counsel that a valid means of filing an internal complaint was

22 to send a letter authored by counsel on behalf of an inmate setting forth the inmate's

23 grievance. Ms. Vigil's counsel requested CRDF to advise of any steps that must be taken

24 in order to comply with complaint exhaustion requirements from the initial complaint

25 through all appeal/review processes.

26

78. Under LASD policy, whenever possible, custody personnel must respond to

27 inmate complaints within 10 days. As of September 9, 2010, CRDF had not notified any

28 of the Plaintiffs regarding the disposition of their complaints. Without a response, they

15

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 109 Filed 01/28/11 Page 16 of 29 Page ID #:1172

1 cannot appeal or otherwise seek review. CRDF has not advised Plaintiffs of what

2 additional steps, if any, must be taken to comply with the complaint exhaustion process.

3

79. On August 20, 2010, Plaintiffs' counsel sent a letter to Captain Stacy Lee to

4 determine the status of all three complaints. Captain Lee's office has not responded to the

5 letter or to follow-up phone calls placed by Plaintiffs' attorneys.

6

80. Ms. Barranca, Ms. Paiz and Ms. Vigil have satisfied their obligation to

7 exhaust available remedies. CRDF rendered the complaint process unavailable by

8 ignoring their complaints. Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809, 812 (" ... a remedy

9 becomes 'unavailable' if prison employees do not respond to a properly filed grievance

10 or otherwise use affirmative misconduct to prevent a prisoner from exhausting."); Tuttle

11 v. Boynton, 2009 WL 2134968 (W.D. Mich. 2009) (holding that prisoner whose

12 grievance was not answered timely and whose requests for an appeal form were denied o

13 ignored had exhausted available remedies); Underwood v. Wilson, 151 F.3d 292, 295 (5th

14 Cir. 1998) (citing with approval pre-PLRA cases excusing exhaustion where irregularities

15 in the process prevented it or prison officials ignore or interfere with the prisoner's

16 efforts). 17 V. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

18

A. COMMONFACTUALALLEGATIONS

19

81. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that women are routinely strip searched

20 and forced to undergo visual body cavity searches in the manner described above, before

21 being arraigned.

22

82. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that women are routinely strip searched

23 and forced to undergo visual body cavity searches as described above, when they are first

24 placed in general population.

25

83. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that men are not routinely strip searched

26 and forced to undergo visual body cavity searches in the manner described above, before

27 being arraigned.

28

84. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that men are not routinely strip searched

16

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 109 Filed 01/28/11 Page 17 of 29 Page ID #:1173

1 and forced to undergo visual body cavity searches in the manner described above, when

2 they are first placed in general population. On information and belief, Plaintiffs allege

3 the strip and/or visual body cavity searches to which they and class members were

4 subjected, were performed pursuant to Defendants' policy and practice to

5 indiscriminately search all, or a large number of women, but not men being processed

6 into the jail without regard to: a) The nature of their offense or criminal history; b)

7 Whether they are under an order of release or not; c) Whether they have had contact with

8 any persons from outside the County jail system who could reasonably be believed to be

9 a potential source of contraband or weapons; d) Whether there is cause of any kind to

10 believe they are a potential source of contraband or weapons; e) Whether there is any

11 other articulable justification for Defendants' indiscriminate strip and body search policy;

12 f) Whether they are "pre-arraignment detainees," as that term is used in California Penal

13 Code §4030(b); and g) Whether there is any legitimate reason to strip search women, but

14 not men, as set forth herein.

15

85. On information and belief, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have a policy of

16 not limiting the persons who can see, or hear, or observe all or part of the strip and body

17 cavity searches to those who are necessary for the procedure. Thus, other inmates,

18 members of the opposite sex, dispensable jail personnel and possibly others are able to

19 see or hear some or all of the searches described above. Specifically, class members are

20 required to submit to strip searches during which other people who are not participating

21 in the search and/or are of the opposite sex, including jail staff and other inmates, are able

22 to observe the search and the class members' naked bodies. On further information and

23 belief, in many instances class members are forced to touch each other's bodies during

24 the searches in order to comply with the directions given by Sheriffs deputies.

25

86. Plaintiffs bring this action on their own behalf, and on behalf of a class of all

26 other persons similarly situated, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil

27 Procedure. The class is defined as those women who were forced to undergo the unlawful

28 strip and/or visual body cavity searches in Los Angeles County's jails which are

17

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 109 Filed 01/28/11 Page 18 of 29 Page ID #:1174

1 operated, maintained and under the control of the County, the LASD and the Supervisory

2 Defendants as set forth in this complaint; to wit, searches that violated the Fourth

3 Amendment or its California equivalent, or searches that violated equal.protection of the

4 law due to the fact that that the policy and custom of strip searches was applied to

5 women, but not to men.

6

87. Due to the previous filing of Solis v. Baca, No. CV06-1135 SVW (CTx), a

7 case currently pending in this court, the class period goes back two years prior to the

8 filing of that case, which also alleges violation of the Fourth Amendment and equal

9 protection rights of those subjected to strip searches by the Los Angeles County Sheriffs

10 Department. Because the pendency of that case has tolled the statute of limitations for the

11 class members herein, the statute oflimitations in this case reaches back to May 30, 2004.

12

88. Plaintiffs have also engaged in pre-litigation settlement efforts. Specifically,

13 Plaintiffs showed Defendants a draft copy of this complaint, and asked that Defendants

14 immediately cease and desist their unlawful practices. Plaintiffs also raised this issue

15 with Defendants' counsel during a meeting to discuss county strip search policies. To

16 date, and to Plaintiffs' knowledge, Defendants continue to engage in the unlawful

17 practices detailed in this complaint.

18

89. On information and belief, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants will continue

19 their aforementioned policy and practice of unlawful strip and/or visual body cavity

20 searches unless enjoined and restrained by the court. Without injunctive relief applicable

21 to the class as a whole, the class members will suffer irreparable harm for which there is

22 no adequate remedy at law in that their constitutional and statutory rights will be

23 systematically violated.

24

b. RULE 23 PREREQUISITES

25

i. Numerosity

26

90. In accordance with F.R.Civ. P. Rule 23(a), the members of the class are so

27 numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiffs do not know the exact

28 number of class members. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege, that

18

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 109 Filed 01/28/11 Page 19 of 29 Page ID #:1175

1 there are more than 300 inmates per day who are subjected to strip and/or body cavity

2 searches as a result of Defendants' policy and practice of indiscriminately subjecting

3 prisoners to strip and body cavity searches. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and

4 thereon allege, that the number of persons in the proposed class is in the thousands.

5

ii. Common Issues of Fact or Law

6

91. In accordance with P.R. Civ. P. Rule 23(a), there are questions of fact

7 common to the class. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege, that the

8 common questions of fact include, but are not limited to the following: (1) Whether the

9 LASD routinely subjects all prisoners to strip and/or body cavity searches without any

10 reasonable suspicion, based on specific or articulable facts, to believe any particular

11 inmate has concealed drug(s), weapon(s) and/or any contraband on their persons or in

12 their body cavities; (2) Whether the strip and/or body cavity searches are conducted in an

13 area of privacy so that the search cannot be observed by persons not participating in the

14 search, or whether the strip and body cavity searches are conducted in areas where they

15 may be observed by persons not participating in the searches; (3) Whether the strip and/o

16 body cavity searches are conducted in an unsanitary area, infested with bacteria such as

17 MRSA and other communicable diseases; (4) Whether females are subjected to strip

18 and/or body cavity searches when males are not; (5) Whether females are subjected to

19 strip and/or body cavity searches under conditions which are more intrusive and less

20 sanitary than males.

21

92. In accordance with P.R. Civ. P. Rule 23(a), there are questions oflaw

22 common to the class. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and, thereon allege, that the

23 common questions oflaw include but are not limited to the following: (1) Whether the

24 LASD may indiscriminately conduct strip and/or body cavity searches of inmates without

25 there being any reasonable suspicion, based on specific or articulable facts, to believe any

26 particular inmate has concealed drug(s), weapon(s) and/or any contraband on their

27 persons or in their body cavities; (2) Whether the LASD may conduct strip and/or body

28 cavity searches of inmates in open areas where they may be observed by persons not

19

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 109 Filed 01/28/11 Page 20 of 29 Page ID #:1176

1 participating in the searches; (3) Whether LASD's policy of subjecting persons to strip

2 and/or body cavity searches violates California Penal Code §4030; (4) Whether LASD's

3 policy of subjecting persons to strip and/or body cavity searches in an area which is not

4 an "area of privacy" violates California Penal Code §4030(m); (5) Whether the conduct

5 described above violates the Fourth and/or Fourteenth Amendments, and/or California

6 Constitution Article I,§§ 1, 7, and/or 13; (6) Whether the conduct described above

7 constitutes a policy or custom of Defendants; (7) Whether any individual Defendant is

8 entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims, or state law immunity on the state

9 law claims, for the practices complained of herein; and (8) Whether determination of

10 damages suffered by a statistically representative sample of the class provides the basis

11 for determination of all class members' damages except those who opt out, or whether

12 category damages may appropriately be determined for the class members.

13

iii. Typicality

14

93. In accordance with F.R. Civ. P. Rule 23(a), the claims of the representative

15 Plaintiffs are typical of the class. Plaintiffs were in LASD custody when they were

16 subjected to strip and/or visual body cavity searches of inmates without any reasonable

17 suspicion, based on specific or articulable facts, to believe that any Plaintiff and class

18 members had concealed drug(s), weapon(s) and/or any contraband in their body cavities;

19 Plaintiffs were subjected to the searches in open areas where they were observed by other

20 inmates and persons not involved in the search, including sometimes members of the

21 opposite sex; Plaintiffs were searched and forced to stand naked in unsanitary and

22 bacteria infested areas; females were subjected to strip and/or body cavity searches when

23 males were not; and females were subjected to strip and/or body cavity searches under

24 conditions which were more intrusive and less sanitary than males.

25

94. Thus, Plaintiffs have the same interests and have suffered the same type of

26 damages as the class members. Plaintiffs' claims are based upon the same or similar legal

27 theories as the claims of the class m~mbers. Each class member suffered actual damages

28 as a result of being subjected to a strip and/or body cavity search. The actual damages

20

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 109 Filed 01/28/11 Page 21 of 29 Page ID #:1177

1 suffered by Plaintiffs are similar in type and amount to the actual damages suffered by

2 each class member.

3

95. In accordance with F.R. Civ. P. Rule 23(a), the representative Plaintiffs will

4 fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. The interests of the representative

5 Plaintiffs are consistent with and not antagonistic to the interests of the class.

6

iv. Maintenance and Superiority

7

96. In accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 23(b)(1 )(A), prosecutions of separate

8 actions by individual members of the class would create a risk that inconsistent or

9 varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class would establish

10 incompatible standards of conduct for the parties opposing the class.

11

97. In accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 23(b)(1)(B), prosecutions of separate

12 actions by individual members of the class would create a risk of adjudications with

13 respect to individual members of the class which would, as a practical matter,

14 substantially impair or impede the interests of the other members of the class to protect

15 their interests.

16

98. In accordance with Fed.R.Civ~P. Rule 23(b)(2), Plaintiffs are informed and

17 believe, and thereon allege that Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to

18 the class.

19

99. In accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 23(b)(3), the questions oflaw or fact

20 common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only

21 individual members, and this class action is superior to other available methods for the

22 fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy between the parties. Plaintiffs are

23 informed and believe, and thereon allege, that the interests of class members in

24 individually controlling the prosecution of a separate action is low in that most class

25 members would be unable to individually prosecute any action at all. Plaintiffs are

26 informed and believe, and thereon allege that the amounts at stake for individuals are

27 such that separate suits would be impracticable in that most members of the class will not

28 be able to find counsel to represent them. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon

21

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 109 Filed 01/28/11 Page 22 of 29 Page ID #:1178

1 allege, that it is desirable to concentrate all litigation in one forum because all of the

2 claims arise in the same location, i.e., the County of Los Angeles. It will promote judicial

3 efficiency to resolve the common questions of law and fact in one forum rather than in

4 multiple courts.

5

100. Plaintiffs do not know the identities of the class members. Plaintiffs are

6 informed and believe, and thereon allege, that the identities of the class members are

7 ascertainable from LASD records, in particular the LASD AJIS computer system used to

8 track and identify LASD inmates. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege,

9 that AJIS reflects the identities, including addresses and telephone numbers, of the

10 persons who have been held in custody by LASD; when inmates were arrested and

11 booked, taken to court, returned from court; why inmates were released; and when

12 inmates were released.

13

101. Plaintiffs know of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management

14 of this litigation that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. The class action is

15 superior to any other available means to resolve the issues raised on behalf of the class.

16 The class action will be manageable because so many different records systems exist

17 from which to ascertain the members of the class. Liability can be determined on a class-

18 wide basis. Damages can be determined on a class-wide basis using a damages matrix set

19 by a jury, or by trying the damages of a statistically valid sample of the class to a jury and

20 extrapolating those damages to the class as a whole.

21

102. In accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 23(b)(3), class members must be

22 furnished with the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual

23 notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. Plaintiffs are

24 informed and believe that LASD computer records contain a last known address for class

25 members. Plaintiffs contemplate that individual notice be given to class members at such

26 last known address by first class mail. Plaintiffs contemplate that the notice inform class

27 members of the following:

28

A. The pendency of the class action, and the issues common to the class;

22

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 109 Filed 01/28/11 Page 23 of 29 Page ID #:1179

1

B. The nature of the action;

2

c. Their right to 'opt out' of the action within a given time, in which

3

event they will not be bound by a decision rendered in the class

4

action;

5

D. Their right, if they do not 'opt out,' to be represented by their own

6

counsel and enter an appearance in the case; otherwise, they will be

7

represented by the named Plaintiffs and their counsel; and

8

E. Their right, if they do not 'opt out,' to share in any recovery in favor

9

of the class, and conversely to be bound by any judgment on the

10

common issues, adverse to the class.

11

103. Plaintiffs restate and incorporate by reference each of the foregoing and

12 ensuing paragraphs in each of the following causes of action as if each paragraph was

13 fully set forth therein.

14

COUNT ONE- 42 U.S.C. §1983 [FOURTH AMENDMENT]

15

(All Defendants)

16 104. In subjecting Plaintiffs and class members to the unnecessary, demeaning,
17 and outrageous intrusive strip and body cavity search, Defendants, and each of them,
18 violated Plaintiffs' and class members' rights to be secure in their persons against
19 unreasonable searches and seizures as guaranteed by the Fourth and Fourteenth
20
Amendments to the United States Constitution. Therefore, Plaintiffs and class members 21
are entitled to bring suit and recover damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983.
22
105. The aforementioned acts of Defendants proximately caused Plaintiffs to be 23
deprived of their rights as stated above, thereby entitling Plaintiffs and the class to 24
damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 25
106. Plaintiffs Lora Barranca, Diana Paiz and Diane Vigil remain incarcerated at
26
CRDF, and will remain incarcerated beyond their upcoming court appearances. Because
27 CRDF will require them to submit to strip searches/body cavity searches upon returning
28

23

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 109 Filed 01/28/11 Page 24 of 29 Page ID #:1180

1 from court, they will continue to suffer deprivations of their rights and, therefore, seek

2 injunctive relief on behalf of themselves and the class of similarly situated individuals.

3

4

COUNT TWO- 42 U.S.C. §1983 [EQUAL PROTECTION]

(All Defendants)

5

6

107. The unequal treatment of men and women - and the unnecessary,

7 demeaning, and outrageous intrusive strip and body cavity searches inflicted on women

8 but not men - deprived the female class members of the protections afforded by

9 provisions of the 14th Amendment Equal Protection guarantees. Therefore, the female
o1 Plaintiffs and class members are entitled to bring suit and recover damages pursuant to 42

11 U.S.C. § 1983.

12

108. The aforementioned acts of Defendants proximately caused Plaintiffs to be

13 deprived of their rights as stated above, thereby entitling Plaintiffs and the class to

14 damages in an amount to be proven at trial.

15

109. Plaintiffs Lora Barranca, Diana Paiz and Diane Vigil remain incarcerated at

16 CRDF and will remain incarcerated beyond their upcoming court appearances. Because

17 CRDF will require them to submit to strip searches/body cavity searches upon returning

18 from court, they will continue to suffer deprivations of their rights and therefore seek

19 injunctive relief on behalf of themselves and the class of similarly situated individuals.

20

COUNT THREE- ARTICLE 1, §§1 AND 13 OF THE CALIFORNIA

CONSTITUTION [PRIVACY/FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALOGUE]

21

(All Defendants)

22

23

110. Plaintiffs filed a Govt. Code §910 claim for damages against Defendants for

24 the matters set forth in this complaint, thereby making it unnecessary for the newly added

25 named Plaintiffs to file individual §910 claims.

26

111. The unnecessary, demeaning, outrageous, and intrusive strip and body cavit

27 search to which Plaintiffs and class members were subjected violated Plaintiffs' rights no

28 to be subjected to invasion of their fundamental privacy interests, as guaranteed by

24

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 109 Filed 01/28/11 Page 25 of 29 Page ID #:1181

1 Article I, §1 of the California Constitution; and to be secure in their persons against

2 unreasonable searches and seizures, as guaranteed by Article I, §13 of the California

3 Constitution.

4

112. The aforementioned acts of Defendants proximately caused Plaintiffs to be

5 deprived of their rights as stated above, thereby entitling Plaintiffs and the class to

6 damages in an amount to be proven at trial.

7

113. Plaintiffs Lora Barranca, Diana Paiz and Diane Vigil remain incarcerated at

8 CRDF, and will remain incarcerated beyond their upcoming court appearances. Because

9 CRDF will require them to submit to strip searches/body cavity searches upon returning

10 from court, they will continue to suffer deprivations of their rights and, therefore, seek

11 injunctive relief on behalf of themselves and the class of similarly situated individuals.

12

13

COUNT FOUR- ARTICLE 1, §7, OF THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION [EQUAL PROTECTION]

14

(All Defendants)

15 114. The unequal treatment of men and women violated the female Plaintiffs'
16 rights not to be denied equal protection of the law, as guaranteed by Article I, §7 of the
17 California Constitution, and to be secure in their persons against unreasonable searches
18 and seizures as guaranteed by Article I,§ 13 of the California Constitution.
19 115. The aforementioned acts of Defendants proximately caused Plaintiffs to be
20
deprived of their rights as stated above, thereby entitling Plaintiffs and the class to 21
damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 22
116. Plaintiffs Lora Barranca, Diana Paiz and Diane Vigil remain incarcerated at 23
CRDF, and will remain incarcerated beyond their upcoming court appearances. Because 24
CRDF will require them to submit to strip searches/body cavity searches upon returning

28
25

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 109 Filed 01/28/11 Page 26 of 29 Page ID #:1182

1

117. The unnecessary, demeaning, and outrageous intrusive strip and/or visual

2 body cavity searches alleged herein were accomplished via threat, intimidation or

3 coercion and/or threats of the same.

4

118. The unnecessary, demeaning, and outrageous intrusive strip and visual body

5 cavity searches, and the unequal treatment of women as opposed to men, deprived

6 Plaintiffs and the class they represent of the protections afforded by provisions of federal

7 constitutional and state constitutional and statutory law including, but not limited to

8 rights protected under the Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

9 States Constitution; Article I,§§ 1, 7, 13, and 17, of the California state constitution, and

10 California Penal Code §4030. Therefore, Plaintiffs and the class are entitled to bring suit

11 and recover damages pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code §52.1 (b).

12

119. As a direct and proximate cause of the aforementioned acts, Plaintiffs and

13 class members were damaged in an amount to be proven at trial but in any event not less

14 than $4,000 per violation pursuant to the provisions of Civil Code §52(b).

15

120. The aforementioned acts of Defendants directly and proximately caused

16 Plaintiffs to be deprived of their California constitutional rights as stated above, thereby

17 entitling Plaintiffs and class members to recover damages proximately caused by

18 Defendants' wrongful acts.

19

121. Plaintiffs Lora Barranca, Diana Paiz and Diane Vigil remain incarcerated at

20 CRDF, and will remain incarcerated beyond their upcoming court appearances. Because

21 CRDF will require them to submit to strip searches/body cavity searches upon returning

22 from court, they will continue to suffer deprivations of their rights and therefore seek

23 injunctive relief on behalf of themselves and the class of similarly situated individuals.

24

COUNT SIX- Violation of Statutory Duties

25

(Penal Code §4030) (Against Defendants County and LASD Only)

26

27

122. The unnecessary, demeaning, outrageous, and intrusive strip and body cavi

28 searches, to which Plaintiffs and the class members were subjected by Defendants,

26

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 109 Filed 01/28/11 Page 27 of 29 Page ID #:1183

1 violated Plaintiffs' and the class members' state-law protections guaranteed by California

2 Penal Code §4030. The aforementioned acts of Defendants directly and proximately
3 caused the Plaintiffs and the class members to be deprived of their rights as stated above,
4 thereby entitling Plaintiffs and class members to recover damages proximately caused by 5
Defendants' wrongful acts, including statutory damages under Penal Code §4030. 6
123. Plaintiffs Lora Barranca, Diana Paiz and Diane Vigil remain incarcerated at 7
CRDF, and will remain incarcerated beyond their upcoming court appearances. Because 8
CRDF will require them to submit to strip searches/body cavity searches upon returning 9
from court, they will continue to suffer deprivations of their rights and, therefore, seek 10
injunctive relief on behalf of themselves and the class of similarly situated individuals. 11

12

COUNT SEVEN- Violation of Mandatory Duties

13

(Against Defendants County and LASD)

14

124. The Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

15 Constitution; Article I, §§1, 7, 13, and 17, ofthe California state constitution; California

16 Penal Code §4030; and California Civil Code §52.1 are enactments. Enactments form the

17 basis of a mandatory duty under California Government Code §815 .6.

18

125. Any California constitutional provision is mandatory and prohibitory, per

19 Article 1, §26, of the California Constitution.

20

126. These constitutional provisions and statutes apply to all members of the

21 general public, including Plaintiffs, and were all designed to prevent the kind of injuries

22 alleged herein.

23

127. Defendants did not exercise reasonable diligence in discharging their duty

128. As a direct and proximate cause of the aforementioned acts of Defendants, 26 Plaintiffs and class members were damaged in amounts to be determined at trial. 27 Ill 28

27

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 109 Filed 01/28/11 Page 28 of 29 Page ID #:1184

1

APPROPRIATENESS OF EQUITABLE RELIEF

2

129. Plaintiffs Barranca, Paiz and Vigil remain incarcerated at CRDF and will be

3 required to attend at least one court appearance before they are released from custody.

4 Upon returning from court, these Plaintiffs will be strip searched/body cavity searched 5 under the conditions described above.

6

130. CRDF's continuing practice of strip searching/body cavity searching female

7 inmates en masse, in an unsanitary, non-private, outdoor area violates Plaintiffs'

8 constitutional rights, and causes continuing, sweeping and irreparable harm to Plaintiffs

9 Barranca, Paiz and Vigil.

1 0

131. Because no adequate remedy at law exists for the injuries alleged herein,

11 Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief under both federal and state law.

12

13 VII. PRAYER

14

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the class members the

15 represent, request damages against each defendant as follows:

16

1. General and special damages according to proof;

17

2. Temporary, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief prohibiting

18 Defendants from continuing to engage in the unlawful practices complained of herein;

19

3. As against the individual Defendants only, punitive damages according t

20 proof;
21 4.
22

In addition to actual damages, statutory damages as allowed by law,

23 including Penal Code §4030 and treble damages under California Civil Code §§52 and

24 52.1;

25

5. Attorneys' fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. §1988; California Civil Code

26 §§52(b)(3), 52.l(h); California Code of Civil Procedure §1021.5, and whatever other

27 statute or law may be applicable; 28

28

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 109 Filed 01/28/11 Page 29 of 29 Page ID #:1185

1

6. The costs of this suit and such other relief as is just and proper.

2

3 DATED: January 6, 2011 4 5 6 7 8 9

LITT, ESTUAR & KITSON, LLP
ROBERT MANN
DONALD COOK LAW OFFICES OF CYNT~:71~ARKER
'_P_f ~ By: _Is/ Barrett s/ Litt,_ ______
Barrett S. Litt Attorneys for Plaintiffs

10

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

11

Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves individually and on behalf of the class, deman

:!12 a jury trial. DATED: January 6, 2011

g Is/ Barrett S. L/i?~-...<4/ .;/' ~-

Barrett S. Litt

15

Attorney for Plaintiffs

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

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28

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 Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 170 Filed 12/19/12 Page 1 of 7 Page ID #:1715
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. 2:10-CV-1649-SVW-JEM

Title

Mary Amador, et al. v. Leroy D. Baca, et al.

Date December 19, 2012

JS-5

Present: The Honorable STEPHEN V. WILSON, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

Paul M. Cruz Deputy Clerk

N/A Court Reporter / Recorder

Tape No.

Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs:

Attorneys Present for Defendants:

Proceedings:

N/A

N/A

IN CHAMBERS ORDER Re MOTION TO DISMISS [121]

I. INTRODUCTION
On January 28, 2011, Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Lora Barranca, Diana Paiz, and Diane Vigil (“Plaintiffs”) filed their Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) against Defendants County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (“LASD”), Sherriff Leroy Baca, and seven LASD Deputies, alleging two violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983—one for violations of the Fourth Amendment and the other for violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendent—and various related state law claims, each arising out of strip-search policies allegedly in place at LASD’s Century Regional Detention Facility (“CRDF”) located in Lynwood, California. (Dckt. 109).1 On December 27, 2011, after receiving briefing from the parties, the Court moved this action to its inactive calendar, pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington, 132 S.Ct. 1510 (2012). At that time, there were two motions pending before this Court: Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification (Dckt. 59) and Defendants’ motion to dismiss the SAC (Dckt. 121).

1 Defendants opposed Plaintiff’s motion to amend; after holding a hearing on the matter, the Court granted the motion. (Dckt. 113). The SAC is the operative complaint.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. 2:10-CV-1649-SVW-JEM

Title

Mary Amador, et al. v. Leroy D. Baca, et al.

Date December 19, 2012

The Supreme Court handed down its decision in Florence, providing considerable guidance to the instant case. The Court therefore finds that this matter is ready to proceed, and hereby MOVES this action to its active calendar.
Moreover, for the reasons explained in this Order, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment causes of action and BIFURCATES the state-law claims. The Court will rule on the motion for class certification after ruling on motions for summary judgment. Finally, the Court ORDERS the parties to appear for a status conference on January 7, 2013 at 3:00 p.m.
II. MOTION TO DISMISS: EXHAUSTION UNDER THE PLRA
Defendants’ motion Plaintiffs’ federal claims is based solely on their argument that six of the seven plaintiffs—Battiste, Cholewiak, Madrid, Barranca, Paiz, and Vigil—are barred from bringing their claims in this Court because they failed to properly exhaust their claims within the prison as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). For the reasons explained below, the PLRA does not bar any of the named plaintiffs from bringing suit.
A. Plaintiff Amador
The PLRA provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). However, it is “clear from the express language of the [PLRA] that [the statute’s exhaustion requirement applies] only to ‘prisoners.’” Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)). Thus, only those individuals who are prisoners “at the time they file suit must comply with the [PLRA’s] exhaustion requirement[.]” Talamantes v. Leyva, 575 F.3d 1021, 1024 (9th Cir. 2009). Individuals who have been released from prison altogether need not exhaust their claims within the available administrative avenues before pressing them in a federal court. Id.; accord Norton v. City of Marietta, 432 F.3d 1145, 1149-51(10th Cir. 2005) (per curiam); Nerness v. Johnson, 401 F.3d 874, 876 (8th Cir. 2005); Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 210 (3d Cir. 2002).
The PLRA defines a prisoner as “any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h) (emphasis added); see also Page, 201 F.3d at 1139 (“[T]o fall within the definition of ‘prisoner,’ the individual in question must be currently detained as a result of accusation, conviction, or

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. 2:10-CV-1649-SVW-JEM

Title

Mary Amador, et al. v. Leroy D. Baca, et al.

Date December 19, 2012

sentence for a criminal offense.”) (emphasis added). Defendants do not dispute that Amador was not a “prisoner” within the meaning of the PLRA at the time the initial complaint filed on March 5, 2010. Thus, Amador was not required to exhaust her claims within the administrative avenues available at CRDF before bringing her claims in this Court.

B. Plaintiffs Battiste, Cholewiak, and Madrid

Plaintiffs Battiste, Cholewiak, and Madrid were added to this action when Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint on January 13, 2011, joining Amador as additional representative plaintiffs for the Rule 23(b)(3) damages class. It is undisputed that Battiste, Cholewiak, and Madrid were not in prison (at CRDF or elsewhere) when they were added to this action on January 13, 2011. Defendants contend, however, that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to them because they were “prisoners” when the initial complaint was filed on March 5, 2010.

The Court has found only one case that has considered the question of whether plaintiffs subsequently added to a suit must have exhausted their claims at the time an initial complaint was filed. In Riggs v. Valdez, the Court held that the PLRA required newly added plaintiffs to have exhausted their claims by the time they were added to the complaint, not at the time the initial complaint was filed. No. 1:09-CV-010-BLW, 2010 WL 4117085, at *5 (D. Idaho Oct. 18, 2010). Noting that the purpose of the PLRA was, in part, to “reduce the quantity and increase the quality of prisoner lawsuits,” the Court reasoned that

If prisoners cannot amend with newly exhausted claims and are instead directed to start a new action, the quantity of prison condition lawsuits would be increased, not decreased, and the quality of each of those piecemeal lawsuits would likely tack in a negative direction. Or, if the cases are consolidated, the same practical result is achieved as amendment but with the added time and expense of starting a new proceeding. Applying Defendants’ position to this case would presumably have required the filing of a different complaint under a new case number that could then be consolidated, which would waste time and resources.

Id.; see also Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Beyond doubt, Congress enacted § 1997e(a) to reduce the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits . . . .”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

The same reasoning applies here. Defendants do not dispute that Battiste, Cholewiak, and Madrid were not in prison on the date they were added to this action. They could have filed their own action in this Court on that date, which would have then been consolidated with the current action,

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. 2:10-CV-1649-SVW-JEM

Title

Mary Amador, et al. v. Leroy D. Baca, et al.

Date December 19, 2012

wasting time and resources. Thus, because Battiste, Cholewiak, and Madrid were not in prison on the date they were added to this action, the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement did not apply to them. See also Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1007 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that an inmate may amend a complaint to add new claims exhausted after the date on which the original complaint was filed but before the date the amended complaint was submitted); Barnes v. Briley, 420 F.3d 673, 678 (7th Cir. 2006) (“The filing of the amended complaint was the functional equivalent of filing a new complaint . . . and it was only at that time that it became necessary to have exhausted all of the administrative remedies . . . .”).
C. Plaintiffs Barranca, Paiz, and Vigil
Plaintiffs Barranca, Paiz, and Vigil were added to this action when Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint on September 10, 2010, joining Amador as representative plaintiffs for the Rule 23(b)(3) damages class, and as representatives plaintiffs for a new class requesting injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2). It is undisputed that Barranca, Paiz, and Vigil were in custody when they were added to this action on September 10, 2010.2 Defendants contend that they did not exhaust their claims pursuant to the PLRA.
“There is no question that exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA and that unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007); see also Albino v. Baca, 697 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that the PLRA requires “exhaustion of the correctional facilities’ administrative remedies.”). Exhaustion serves two purposes: first, it gives an administrative agency the “‘opportunity to correct its own mistakes with respect to the programs it administers before it is haled into federal court[.]’” Albino, 697 F.3d 1023 (quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89 (2006)). Second, “‘exhaustion promotes efficiency. Claims generally can be resolved much more quickly and economically in proceedings before an agency than in litigation in federal court.’” Albino, 697 F.3d 1023 (quoting Woodford, 548 U.S. at 89). A prisoner must “‘complete the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules, including deadlines, as a precondition to bringing suit in federal court.’” Marella v. Terhune, 568 F.3d 1024, 1027 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Woodford, 548 U.S. at 88). “The level of detail necessary in a grievance to comply with the grievance procedures will vary from system to system and claim to claim, but it is the prison's requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Akhtar v. Mesa, 11-16629, 2012 WL 5383038 (9th Cir. Nov. 5, 2012) (quoting Jones, 549 U.S. at 218).

2 As discussed above, see supra Part II.B, the relevant date is whether these plaintiffs exhausted their claims by the time they were added to the complaint on September 10, 2010.
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Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 170 Filed 12/19/12 Page 5 of 7 Page ID #:1719
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. 2:10-CV-1649-SVW-JEM

Title

Mary Amador, et al. v. Leroy D. Baca, et al.

Date December 19, 2012

Exhaustion under the PLRA is an affirmative defense, and the “‘burden of establishing nonexhaustion therefore falls on defendants.’” Albino, 697 F.3d 1023 (quoting Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2003)). To meet their burden, Defendants must show 1) that a grievance procedure existed and 2) that plaintiffs did not exhaust the grievance procedure. Id.; see also Valoff, 422 F.3d at 936-37 (“As we have concluded that there can be no ‘absence of exhaustion’ unless some relief remains ‘available,’ a defendant must demonstrate that pertinent relief remained available, whether at unexhausted levels of the grievance process or through awaiting the results of the relief already granted as a result of that process.”). Relevant evidence demonstrating that a grievance procedure existed includes “statutes, regulations, and other official directives that explain the scope of the administrative review process; documentary or testimonial evidence from prison officials who administer the review process; and information provided to the prisoner concerning the operation of the grievance procedure in this case . . . .” Valoff, 422 F.3d at 937; see also Albino, 697 F.3d at 1032 (noting that a defendant had met his burden of demonstrating that grievance procedures were available by attaching a manual that described the procedure).
In determining whether or not a defendant has met its burden, “the court may look beyond the pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact.” Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119-20; see also Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1376-77 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that a court must decide facts on a motion for failure to exhaust and noting that “[r]equiring jury trials to resolve factual disputes over the preliminary issue of exhaustion would be a novel innovation for a matter in abatement and would unnecessarily undermine Congress’s intent in enacting the PLRA's exhaustion requirement: that is, to reduce the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits”) (internal citations, quotation marks, and footnotes omitted).
Defendants have not met their burden. They have failed to provide a single “statute, regulation, or other official directive” that explains the scope of the administrative review process at CRDF. Instead, they rely upon the declarations of Deputy Janette Leo, a LASD deputy assigned to the Legal Unit at CRDF, and Deputy Janet Barragan, a LASD operations deputy assigned to CRDF. In their declarations, both deputies described the grievance procedures at CRDF after stating that they are “familiar with the administrative remedies procedure for inmates . . . at CRDF.” However, their depositions demonstrate that they have little, if any, familiarity with the procedures: Deputy Leo admits that she had “no responsibility” for processing inmate complaints; rather, submitted complaints were handled by the “watch commander.” Leo Dep. 19:4-19:9; 25:2-25:8. Deputy Leo’s only involvement in the complaint process came when prisoners made requests “pertaining towards legal,” such as requests for the use of the law library, legal forms, or information on the status of certain court orders. Leo Dep.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. 2:10-CV-1649-SVW-JEM

Title

Mary Amador, et al. v. Leroy D. Baca, et al.

Date December 19, 2012

24:12-24:25. 3 Deputy Barragan is even less involved in handling prisoner complaints: her primary job was to oversee staffing at CRDF and deal with personnel (i.e. staff) logistics and operations. Barragan Dep. 11:15-11:18. She had no direct responsibility for resolving administrative complaints; on occasion, she was asked by her supervisor to resolve an inmate complaint. Barragan Dep. 14:15-15:15. In short, although their declarations say that they are familiar with the administrative remedies procedure at CRDF, the deputies’ depositions demonstrate that they are not. Indeed, Deputy Leo explicitly testified that she was not aware of any written policies, rules or regulations regarding the process of inmate complaints. Leo Dep. 26:18-27:25. Deputy Barragan makes a vague reference to an unspecified unit order that she claims describes the procedure for filing a complaint, but no such order was provided by Defendants. Barragan Dep. 16:7-17:19.
Defendants argue that the declarations were submitted for the purpose of “establishing that there were no records of complaints by certain Plaintiffs in any of LASD’s computer databases in which complaints are logged or stored.” According to Defendants, the deputies are familiar with the method of reviewing LASD files and databases for records of administrative complaints and retrieving such records; and when they searched the files and databases they found no complaints from Plaintiffs Barranca, Paiz, and Vigil related to the strip-searches at issue. According to Defendants, “an exhaustive knowledge of the administrative remedy procedure is not necessary” for this purpose. Defendants’ argument highlights their evidentiary shortcoming: although the deputies may be qualified to run a search of the database system, they are, by Defendants’ own admission, not qualified to testify what, if any, procedures are in place at CRDF for processing inmate complaints. Defendants had an affirmative duty to bring forth evidence that a grievance procedure existed, and evidence that a complaint was not in a database fails to do so.
The only other evidence that Defendants provide to demonstrate that a grievance procedure is in place at CRDF is a copy of the complaint form allegedly provided to inmates, including one filled out by Plaintiff Barranca that was in the LASD database. See Ex. A to the Decl. of Janettee Leo. This form does nothing more than demonstrate that the form exists and that it was in the database: it does not demonstrate that there is a procedure in place for providing the forms to inmates, collecting them, and responding to complaints. In short, Defendants have failed to meet their burden of demonstrating that a grievance procedure existed. Cf. Albino, 697 F.3d at 1032 (noting that a defendant had met his burden of demonstrating that grievance procedures were available by attaching a manual that described the

3 Deputy Leo’s role at CRDF is limited to handling civil claims or lawsuits filed against the LASD—dealing primarily with complaints and court orders that come from an inmate’s attorney, not from inmates themselves. Leo Dep. 15:22-18:2.
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Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 170 Filed 12/19/12 Page 7 of 7 Page ID #:1721
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. 2:10-CV-1649-SVW-JEM

Title

Mary Amador, et al. v. Leroy D. Baca, et al.

Date December 19, 2012

procedure); see also Johnson v. Testman, 380 F.3d 691, 697 (2d Cir. 2004) (remanding to consider whether the regulations covering the grievance procedures were “sufficiently confusing so that a prisoner ... might reasonably have believed that he could raise his claim against [the defendant] as part of his defense in disciplinary proceedings”); Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 113 (3d Cir. 2002) (relying on directives given by prison officials to the inmate regarding the grievance procedure because “ ‘[a]vailable’ means ‘capable of use; at hand,’ and if prison officials inform the prisoner that he cannot file a grievance, the formal grievance proceeding ... was never ‘available’ ... within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e”).
Because Defendants have failed to meet their burden of demonstrating that grievance procedures existed at CRDF, their non-exhaustion defense fails. Thus, the motion to dismiss Plaintiffs Barranaca, Paiz, and Vigil for failure to exhaust is DENIED.
III. CLASS CERTIFICATION
Under Rule 23, the Court must determine whether to certify the action as a class action “[a]t an early practicable time after a person sues or is sued as a class representative.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A). However, where “it is more practicable to do so and where the parties will not suffer significant prejudice—the district court has discretion to rule on a motion for summary judgment before it decides the certification issue.” Wright v. Schock, 742 F.2d 541, 544-45 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Arnold v. Arizona Dept. of Pub. Safety, 233 F.R.D. 537, 541 (D. Ariz. 2005) (noting that Congress amended Rule 23 to require class certification “at an early practicable time” to account for the “judicial practice of ruling on pretrial motions, including motions for summary judgment, before determining whether to certify a class”). Because Plaintiff’s motion for class certification will be substantially clarified by a motion for summary judgment, the Court will rule on the motion after considering the parties’ motions for summary judgment.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court hereby MOVES this case to its active calendar. Furthermore, for the reasons explained in this Order, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment causes of action and BIFURCATES the state-law claims, to be tried at a later date. The Court will rule on the motion for class certification after ruling on motions for summary judgment. Finally, the Court ORDERS the parties to appear for a status conference on January 7, 2013 at 1:30 p.m.

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 Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 173 Filed 01/09/13 Page 1 of 2 Page ID #:1728
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. 2:10-cv-1649-SVW-JEM

Title

Mary Amador, et al. v. Leroy D. Baca, et al.

Date January 9, 2013

Present: The Honorable STEPHEN V. WILSON, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

Paul M. Cruz Deputy Clerk

N/A Court Reporter / Recorder

Tape No.

Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs:

Attorneys Present for Defendants:

N/A

N/A

Proceedings:

IN CHAMBERS ORDER Re MOTION TO COMPEL and MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

At this Court’s January 7, 2013 status conference, Plaintiffs requested that this Court grant a motion to compel production of various files and data in Defendants’ possession reflecting the identity of prisoners, and number of female prisoners, held in the Los Angeles Sheriff Department’s custody at the Sherriff’s Century Regional Detention Facility between September 23, 2006, through the present. The Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Requests for Production; Defendants shall have until January 25, 2013 to turn over the requested production.

Plaintiffs also requested that the Court re-consider its decision to defer ruling on their pending motion for class certification until after consideration of summary judgment, noting that “many critical facts appear to be in dispute.” However, the pending motion for class certification was filed before the Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (2011), which clarified that upon consideration of a motion for class certification, district courts are “required to resolve any factual disputes necessary to determine whether there was a common pattern and practice that could affect the class as a whole.” Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 983 (9th Cir. 2011). Therefore, the Plaintiffs are ORDERED to re-file their motion for class certification in light of Dukes and any evidence they have or will obtain during discovery, in accordance with the following briefing schedule:

Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification ……………………………………. April 15, 2013

Defendant’s Response ………………………………………………………... April 22, 2013

Plaintiff’s Reply ………………………………………………………………. April 29, 2013

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. 2:10-cv-1649-SVW-JEM

Title

Mary Amador, et al. v. Leroy D. Baca, et al.

Date January 9, 2013

Hearing on this matter is set for May 13, 2013 at 1:30 p.m.

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 Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 232 Filed 03/12/14 Page 1 of 34 Page ID #:4713

1

2

3

4

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

11 MARY AMADOR, et al.,

)

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Plaintiffs,

) )

13

)

v.

)

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) SHERIFF LEROY D. BACA, et al., )

15

Defendants.

) )

16

) )

17

)

Case No. CV 10-1649 SVW (JEM)
ORDER RE: MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION [193]

18 I. INTRODUCTION

19

Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) seeks injunctive relief and

20 monetary damages for allegedly unconstitutional strip search procedures at

21 defendants’ Century Regional Detention Facility (“CRDF”) in Lynwood, 22 California. (Dkt. 109.) Plaintiffs move for certification of an injunctive relief

23 class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) of all “present or future 24 women inmates of the LA County Jail who, upon their admission or return to

25 CRDF from outside of CRDF, are being or will be strip/visual body cavity 26 searched in a group, with other inmates, in an outside bus stall.” Plaintiffs also

27 request certification of a similarly defined damages class under Rule 23(b)(3) of 28 all women who have been subjected to this strip-search procedure.

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1 II. LEGAL STANDARD

2

“[A]n essential prerequisite of an action under Rule 23 is that there must be

3 a ‘class’.” Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal

4 Practice and Procedure § 1760, at 134 (3d ed. 2005). “A class definition should

5 be precise, objective, and presently ascertainable.” O’Connor v. Boeing N. Am.,

6 Inc., 184 F.R.D. 311, 319 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (citation and internal quotation marks

7 omitted); accord Keegan v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 284 F.R.D. 504 (C.D. Cal.

8 2012). However, “the class does not have to be so ascertainable that every

9 member can be identified at the commencement of the action.” Wright, Miller &

10 Kane § 1760, at 136. Rather, “[i]f the general outlines of the membership of the

11 class are determinable at the outset of the litigation, a class will be deemed to

12 exist.” Id. at 136-37. A class is “sufficiently defined and ascertainable if it is

13 administratively feasible for the court to determine whether a particular individual

14 is a member.” Keegan, 284 F.R.D. at 521 (citation and internal quotation marks

15 omitted).

16

To obtain certification of their proposed classes, plaintiffs bear the burden

17 of establishing each of the four requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

18 23(a), together with at least one of the requirements of Rule 23(b). Ellis v. Costco

19 Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 979-80 (9th Cir. 2011).

20

The four Rule 23(a) requirements are numerosity, commonality, typicality,

21 and adequacy, i.e., (1) the class is so large that joinder of all the members under

22 Rule 19 is impracticable; (2) there are one or more questions of law or fact

23 common to the class; (3) the named parties’ claims are typical of the class; and (4)

24 the class representatives will fairly and adequately protect the interests of other

25 members of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a); Ellis, 657 F.3d at 980. The Court

26 must perform “a rigorous analysis [to ensure] that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a)

27 have been satisfied.” Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011)

28 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff must prove that the

2

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1 proposed class presents common questions of law or fact. Id. at 2550-51. In other

2 words, the class members’ claims “must depend upon a common contention . . . of

3 such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution — which means that

4 determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the

5 validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Id. at 2551.

6

Plaintiffs seek certification of an injunctive relief class and a damages class.

7 An action for classwide injunctive relief is authorized by Rule 23(b)(2) if “the

8 party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply

9 generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory

10 relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).

11 Certification of a subsection (b)(2) class “is appropriate only where the primary

12 relief sought is declaratory or injunctive.” Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc.,

13 253 F.3d 1180, 1195 (9th Cir. 2001), amended by 273 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 2001).

14 Certification of a damages class under subsection (b)(3) requires a different

15 analysis. The plaintiffs must establish that (1) “questions of law or fact common

16 to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual

17 members,” and (2) “a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly

18 and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).

19 III. DISCUSSION

20

A. Class Definition

21

Plaintiffs propose a damages class of “women in the custody of LA County

22 Jail who, upon their admission or return to CRDF from outside of CRDF, until the

23 time the practice stops or a date set for the verdict cutoff in this case, were

24 strip/visual body cavity searched in a group, with other inmates, in an outside bus

25 stall.” (Dkt 193 at 2.) They propose a similarly defined class for the injunctive

26 relief claim. These are clearly defined and readily ascertainable classes. It is

27 undisputed that membership in the damages class can be determined from CRDF

28 prison records. Cf. Keegan, 284 F.R.D. at 521-22 (class was ascertainable where

3

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1 membership could be verified by readily available documentation).

2

B. Rule 23(a) Requirements

3

Plaintiffs have the burden of demonstrating that their proposed classes meet

4 Rule 23(a)’s four requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and

5 adequacy. Zinser, 253 F.3d at 1186. Defendants do not dispute numerosity. They

6 dispute the adequacy of the named plaintiffs to represent the proposed injunctive

7 class, but do not dispute the adequacy of the proposed representatives of the

8 damages class. Defendants’ main argument against certifying both classes is that

9 plaintiffs have not demonstrated that there is a “common question of law or fact”

10 sufficient to satisfy Rule 23(a)’s commonality and typicality requirements.

11

1. Commonality & Typicality

12

Plaintiffs assert that the common question of law or fact in this case is

13 “whether Defendants had a custom, pattern and practice of routinely strip

14 searching inmates returning from outside the jail under unconstitutional

15 conditions.” (Dkt 207: Reply at 12.) However, “it is insufficient to merely allege

16 any common question . . . .” Ellis, 657 F.3d at 981; Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2251

17 (“[A]ny competently crafted class complaint literally raises common questions.”)

18 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The concept of “unconstitutional

19 conditions” potentially encompasses many disparate conditions. “Thus stated, the

20 common question is too broad.” Parsons v. Ryan, 289 F.R.D. 513, 516 (D. Ariz.

21 2013) (class of all Arizona prisoners receiving medical care proposed common

22 question to be “whether Defendants are deliberately indifferent to their health and

23 safety in violation of the Eighth Amendment”).

24

Wal-Mart established that simply formulating a common question is not

25 enough to satisfy Rule 23(a). Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2251. Instead,

26 “[c]ommonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members have

27 suffered the same injury.” Id. (emphasis added, citation and internal quotation

28 marks omitted). The fact that the class members may have “all suffered a violation

4

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1 of the same provision of law” — such as the Fourth Amendment right to be free of

2 unreasonable searches or the Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel or

3 unusual punishments — does not necessarily mean that all the class members’

4 claims “depend upon a common contention . . . of such a nature that it is capable

5 of classwide resolution . . . .” Id. Different strip searches could violate the Fourth

6 Amendment in different ways. Cf. id. at 2551 (Title VII “can be violated in many

7 ways . . . [so] the mere claim by employees of the same company that they have

8 suffered a Title VII injury . . . gives no cause to believe that all their claims can

9 productively be litigated at once.”). Nevertheless, not all questions of fact and law

10 must be common to satisfy Rule 23(a)(2). Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d

11 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998). “The existence of shared legal issues with divergent

12 factual predicates is sufficient, as is a common core of salient facts coupled with

13 disparate legal remedies within the class.” Id.(emphasis added); accord Meyer v.

14 Portfolio Recovery Assocs, 707 F.3d 1036, 1041-42 (9th Cir. 2012) (reiterating

15 Hanlon in light of Wal-Mart), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2361 (2013).

16

Wal-Mart makes clear, however, that whatever divergent factual predicates

17 may underlie individual class members’ claims must be sufficiently similar that

18 “[t]he common contention must be ‘capable of classwide resolution — which

19 means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central

20 to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.’” Meyer, 707 F.3d at 1041-

21 42 (quoting Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551). “What matters to class certification is

22 not the raising of common questions — even in droves — but, rather the capacity

23 of a classwide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution

24 of the litigation.” Wang v. Chinese Daily News, Inc., 737 F.3d 538, 543 (9th Cir.

25 2013) (quoting Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2251). Accordingly, when considering a

26 motion for class certification, the Court must “‘determine whether there was a

27 common pattern and practice that could affect the class as a whole.’” Id. at 544

28 (quoting Ellis, 657 F.3d at 983). In the present case, that question is whether the

5

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1 conditions experienced by all the class members during the strip searches were

2 substantially the same, so that the issue of the constitutionality of these conditions

3 can be resolved “in one stroke.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551.

4

Assessing commonality frequently requires an examination of the merits of

5 a plaintiff’s claims. Id, at 2551-52; Ellis, 657 F.3d at 981-82. Here, the issue of

6 commonality and typicality overlaps with plaintiffs’ claims about the manner in

7 which new or returning inmates were strip searched at CRDF. Wal-Mart

8 described two ways in which a plaintiff might be able to establish that her own

9 injury from a defendant’s behavior is shared by “‘a class of persons who have

10 suffered the same injury.’” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2553 (quoting General Tel.

11 Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157-58 (1982)). First, if the defendant

12 routinely applied a particular procedure to every potential class member, then the

13 legality of that procedure would present a common question under Rule 23(a).

14 Second, in the absence of a routine procedure, a plaintiff can establish

15 commonality by presenting “significant proof” that the defendant behaved in

16 accordance with a “general policy” that was illegal. Id. Regardless of the method

17 of proof employed, “[i]f there is no evidence that the entire class was subject to the

18 same allegedly [unlawful practice or policy], there is no question common to the

19 class.” Ellis, 657 F.3d at 983.

20

As described below, there is substantial evidence that all strip searches as

21 CRDF are conducted according to a standard procedure under conditions that in

22 many respects are the same for all inmates, while at the same time there are

23 numerous variations in individual inmates’ experiences of being strip searched.

24 Thus, commonality has been established as to some of the conditions that plaintiffs

25 claim contribute to the unconstitutionality of the manner in which the strip

26 searches are performed, but it has not been established as to all of the purportedly

27 relevant conditions.

28

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1

(a) Common Conditions During Strip Searches

2

Many aspects of the strip search are undisputed. Women who enter and exit

3 CRDF are strip searched in Bus Bay 3, at least when the temperature in the area is

4 above 68 degrees Fahrenheit. Buses carrying inmates enter the bay through a

5 metal garage door that is rolled down while the searches are performed. However,

6 the wall opposite this garage door is shared with CRDF’s reception center; a large

7 mechanical door provides access between Bus Bay 3 and the reception center.

8 During strip searches, this door often remains open, blocked only by large laundry

9 carts. Instead of a roof, the top of the bay is a chain link fence that is currently

10 covered by a tarp. One side of the bay is cinderblock; the other side is currently

11 partially covered by wood panels (which extend high enough to block the view

12 from the adjacent bus bay), with tarps hanging above these panels that cover a

13 portion of the side of the bay. The floor is porous gray cement.

14

There is also little dispute about the strip search procedure. The women are

15 strip-searched in groups of up to sixty people. They are not permitted to speak

16 during the searches unless instructed to. They are told not to look in any direction

17 except forward. At the beginning of each strip search, a group of fully clothed

18 inmates is escorted in a straight line into Bus Bay 3 and told to stand with their left

19 shoulders against the cinderblock wall. They are then told to face the wall, and

20 stand “shoulder to shoulder.”1 Inmates are instructed to place any personal

21 belongings that they have on their person — e.g., court papers and toiletries — in

22 their hands behind their backs. Deputies then search this property for contraband

23 and place it on the floor behind each inmate. Inmates are then instructed to

24 remove their outer garments — shoes, socks, pants, and shirts — and hold them

25

26 1 Defendants argue that, under Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department (LASD) policy, 27 the inmates are required to stand with space between them so that their shoulders do
28 not touch. Plaintiffs have submitted declarations stating that inmates often stand close enough to touch shoulders or hips.

7

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1 behind their backs. Deputies search these items for contraband and place them on

2 the ground behind each inmate with her personal property. Inmates are then told

3 to lift the back of their hair, so that deputies can see their hair and neckline.

4

Inmates are then told to turn around towards the deputies and run their

5 fingers along the bands of their underwear and bras. Inmates with large folds of

6 skin or large breasts are told to lift them so that deputies can confirm that no

7 contraband is tucked underneath. Inmates are also told to open their mouths and

8 roll their tongues around so that deputies can confirm that there is no contraband

9 inside. At this point, inmates are told to turn back towards the wall, facing away

10 from the deputies. They are instructed to lower their underwear to their knees.

11 They are then required to bend over and look back through their legs, spread their

12 body openings, and cough, so that each deputy can visually inspect their body

13 cavities. Next, they are ordered to reach behind their bodies and use their hands to

14 spread apart their buttocks and their labia. After each inmate is inspected, she is

15 told to get dressed, gather her belongings, and stand in line with her shoulder to

16 the wall while waiting to be escorted into CRDF.

17

The women are instructed to line up on both sides of Bus Bay 3, so that

18 while facing the interior, they are in plain view of each other. Moreover, when

19 they are told to bend over and look through their legs and manipulate their

20 buttocks and labia, they cannot avoid seeing the women across from them doing

21 the same thing. Defendants do not dispute plaintiffs’ assertion that inmates are

22 often lined up against the walls across from one another, and plaintiffs concede

23 that this does not always occur.

24

Nor do the parties dispute how CRDF searches menstruating women. After

25 all the women have stripped down to their underwear, those who are menstruating

26 are told to raise their hands; those who do are distributed boxes containing clean

27 sanitary napkins and told to remove the napkin from the box and place it on their

28 pile of clothing. Inmates must then remove their soiled tampon or pad, place it in

8

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1 the empty box, and throw the box on the ground or into a trash bag. Inmates must

2 then wait until the genital search process is complete before they may replace the

3 soiled pad or tampon with the clean one.2 During this time, inmates often bleed on

4 themselves or on the ground in view of the deputies and other inmates. While it is

5 obvious that not all members of the proposed class were subjected to a visual body

6 cavity search while they were menstruating, these factual disparities relate more to

7 the question of preponderance and damages under Rule 23(b)(3) than to the

8 question of whether the defendants’ standard protocol for conducting the searches

9 is unconstitutional. Cf. Mazza v. American Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581, 589

10 (9th Cir. 2012) (where different car buyers saw different advertisements,

11 individual questions regarding materiality of omissions related to issue of

12 preponderance under Rule 23(b)(3), not commonality under Rule 23(a)(2));

13 Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1019 (“All questions of fact and law need not be common to

14 satisfy the rule.).

15

(b) Uncommon Conditions During Strip Searches

16

In contrast to the common procedures described above, there are several

17 alleged conditions of the strip searches as to which plaintiffs have failed to

18 provide significant proof that they form a part of defendants’ routine pattern and

19 practice. First, plaintiffs argue that the floor of Bus Bay 3 is kept in a filthy

20 condition — that the floor upon which inmates must stand barefoot is covered

21 with bodily fluids, oil spots, bird droppings, and insects. The only proof offered in

22 support of this contention are 168 declarations from former CRDF inmates, many

23 of which describe the condition of the floor as “sticky” and “scummy,” oil-stained,

24
25 2 Although defendants dispute the amount of time that any woman must stand 26 naked without a tampon or sanitary napkin in place, they do not dispute that the
strip search procedures require women to remove their pad, then bend over, and 27 wait for a guard to inspect them as part of the entire group. Defendants do not 28 contend that menstruating women are searched immediately after being given a
clean sanitary napkin.

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1 and covered with insects. In opposition, defendants provide declarations from

2 seven deputies who have been assigned to CRDF and are familiar with the policies

3 and procedures in place there. These deputies state that, after each strip search in

4 Bus Bay 3, the entire bay is cleaned, trash is picked up, and disinfectants are

5 applied. They further state that the floor is bleached and sanitized with “various

6 disinfectants and specialized cleaning agents that are designed to eliminate and

7 prevent viral infestations.”

8

In light of these declarations, plaintiffs’ 168 declarations fall short of the

9 “significant proof” required to show that defendants had a pattern and practice of

10 strip searching CRDF inmates on an unsanitary floor. Plaintiffs seek to certify a

11 class that would number “in the tens of thousands.” (Mot. at 22.) Even if the class

12 were as small as 10,000 inmates, plaintiffs’ declarations would represent just 1.7%

13 of the class.3 Of greater significance than the ratio of declarations to class

14 members, however, is the absence of any evidence tending to indicate that the

15 declarations submitted in support of class certification is a statistically reliable

16 indicator of a regular practice at CRDF. Plaintiffs have submitted no evidence that

17 their declarants were selected according to a statistically valid sampling procedure,

18 and no evidence concerning the level of confidence with which extrapolations to

19 the entire class can be drawn. Cf. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2556 (contrasting

20 plaintiffs’ inadequate statistical showing with case in which pattern of

21 discrimination was shown by affidavits of 12.5% of class drawn from

22

23 3 The Court does not intend to suggest that there is some threshold ratio that must
24 be reached to provide “substantial proof” of a common practice. The Supreme
25 Court did not address the contours of the “substantial proof” requirement in Wal-
26 Mart, and did not imply that proponents of class certification must produce declarations from a majority of the members of a large class, or any particular
27 percentage of them. See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2556 (citing Teamsters v. United
28 States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) as example of case in which affidavits from 12.5% of employees was sufficient to establish company-wide discriminatory practice).

10

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1 representative cross-section). Moreover, not all of the declarations state that the

2 floor was unsanitary, further undermining plaintiffs’ contention that defendants

3 had a policy and practice of strip-searching individuals on an unsanitary floor. Cf.

4 id. (“Even if every single one of these accounts [in plaintiffs’ affidavits concerning

5 235 Wal-Mart stores] is true, that would not demonstrate that the entire company

6 [with 3,400 stores] operates under a general policy of discrimination . . . .”)

7 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

8

Similarly, plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of providing

9 “significant proof” that defendants had a pattern and practice of subjecting inmates

10 to demeaning and abusive language during strip searches, allowing inmates to be

11 seen by people inside the CRDF facility (including male employees), or requiring

12 inmates to insert their fingers into their mouths after touching other body cavities.

13 With respect to these alleged conditions of the searches, plaintiffs rely entirely on

14 the 168 declarations. Although approximately 75% of the declarations include

15 these allegations, the other 25% do not.4 In contrast to this somewhat inconsistent

16 evidence, the deputies’ declarations state that the search process is “specifically

17 designed so that inmates first touch their heads and upper bodies before they touch

18 the lower portions of their bodies,” and written LASD policy provides that

19 searches are “not to be used to inflict physical stress or punishment on inmates,”

20 and “shall be performed in a respectful manner.”

21

There is significant variation among the declarations alleging that deputies

22 used abusive or demeaning language. Many declarations describe deputies using

23 obscene words in the course of giving otherwise presumptively legitimate

24

25 4 The Court’s review of the 26 narrative declarations (Exs. 700-726) and the 142
26 declarations verifying questionnaires (Exs. 800-942) indicates that 121 declarants
27 referred to the use of obscene or abusive language, 126 declarants said that people
28 outside the bus bay could see in, and 121 declarants described touching their mouths after touching other body cavities.

11

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1 commands, but do not allege that deputies made demeaning comments about

2 inmates’ anatomy or appearance. (See, e.g., Ex. 702 ¶ 4 (“During the search,

3 deputies are using the word ‘fuck’ frequently and other swear words.”); Ex. 714

4 ¶ 10 (“The guards routinely gave instructions using abusive and profane

5 language.”); Ex. 808-003; Ex. 894-007; Ex. 911-008.) Other declarations,

6 however, assert not only that deputies laced their commands with profanity, but

7 that they “laughed [at naked inmates], making jokes about the appearance of their

8 bodies and how the area smelled.” (Ex. 713 ¶ 7; see, e.g., Ex. 704 ¶¶ 25-27; Ex.

9 717 ¶ 7; Ex. 720 ¶ 9; Ex. 723 ¶ 18; Ex. 724 ¶¶ 15-16; Ex. 726 ¶ 7.) The deputies

10 acknowledge that CRDF staff sometimes “use very direct, stern statements to

11 inmates during the search process,” but assert they usually do so because an

12 inmate is not following instructions, or because they need to conduct the searches

13 quickly. They claim that making demeaning statements during strip searches is

14 contrary to LASD policy and “would expose the offending employees to discipline

15 by the Department.”

16

Even assuming that plaintiffs’ declarations are accurate and representative,

17 it is evident that deputies speak to inmates in various different ways, including

18 giving direct orders without using objectionable language, using profanity when

19 giving otherwise legitimate commands, and making demeaning comments to

20 specific individuals in a deliberately humilating manner. (See Ex. 700 ¶ 29 (“I am

21 fearful of getting a deputy who is in a bad mood.”); Ex. 898-08 (listing seven

22 deputies present during strip searches and claiming two of them made comments);

23 Ex. 901-009 (“[A]fter going in and out so often you get used to it and just comply

24 to breeze through it without any problems from the deputies.”); see also Ex. 700

25 ¶ 27 (describing multiple deputies simultaneously screaming at inmates to comply

26 with search “so that no one can hear what any of the deputies are saying”). Thus,

27 it cannot be concluded that generalized “verbal abuse” alleged by plaintiffs forms

28 a part of the regular conditions common to all searches at CRDF. Cf. Gonzalez v.

12

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1 Millard Mall Services, Inc., 281 F.R.D. 455, 462 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (plaintiff

2 employees failed to show common policy in entire company where individual

3 plant managers exercised discretion in setting employees’ schedules). Moreover,

4 determining whether deputies’ language contributed to the unconstitutionality of

5 the manner in which the searches were conducted could depend on whether

6 deputies were simply swearing while barking commands or were instead aiming

7 humiliating remarks at inmates. Therefore, the question of whether “verbal abuse”

8 contributes to the unconstitutionality of the standard search procedure at CRDF

9 does not present a “common contention . . . capable of classwide resolution.”

10 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551.

11

Nor have plaintiffs met their burden of providing significant proof that

12 defendants had a pattern and practice of failing to provide accommodations to

13 inmates with physical disabilities. Only 24% of plaintiffs’ declarations describe

14 failures to accommodate the needs of disabled inmates.5 In contrast, the deputies’

15 declarations state that disabled inmates “are accommodated on a case by case

16 basis, depending upon the individual abilities and needs of the inmate.” This is to

17 be expected. Cf. Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir.

18 1999) (reasonableness of disability accomodation “requires a fact-specific,

19 individualized inquiry”).

20

For these reasons, the Court finds that while there is evidence that the entire

21 class was subject to the same allegedly unlawful practice or policy during the

22 searches in certain respects, the entire class was not subject to the same conditions

23 with respect to the cleanliness of the floor, verbal abuse, outside viewers, the order

24 in which body cavities were probed, and the accommodation of disabilities. These

25 latter complaints do not present a “question common to the class.” Ellis, 657 F.3d

26 at 983; cf. Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Public Schools, 668 F.3d 481, 497-98 (7th Cir.

27
28 5 Forty-one of plaintiffs’ 168 declarations described failures to accomodate women with disabilities.

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1 2012) (While the generic question of whether a school district fulfilled its

2 obligations to accommodate disabled children “is surely a part of both children’s

3 claims, it must be answered separately for each child based on individualized

4 questions of fact and law, and the answers are unique to each child’s particular

5 situation.”).

6

2. Adequacy of Representatives for Injunctive Relief Class

7

Defendants argue that a Rule 23(b)(2) class cannot be certified because the

8 proposed representative plaintiffs for this class (Barranca, Vigil, and Paiz) lack

9 standing to pursue injunctive relief. It is undisputed that these three plaintiffs

10 were housed in CRDF at the time plaintiffs moved to amend the complaint to add

11 their claims for injunctive relief, a motion that was granted. (See Dkts 43, 51, 56.)

12 Defendants argue, however, that because they are no longer housed at CRDF, they

13 face no imminent threat of future injury from the allegedly unconstitutional search

14 procedures, and so lack Article III standing. This argument is foreclosed by

15 County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1992). The Court must

16 determine “whether the elements of Article III standing . . . were satisfied at the

17 time the complaint was filed.” Haro v. Sebelius, __ F.3d __, 2014 WL 21353, at

18 *6 (9th Cir. Jan. 2, 2014) (citing McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 51). When the first

19 amended complaint was filed, “plaintiffs’ injury was at that moment capable of

20 being redressed through injunctive relief.” McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 51. “[T]hat

21 the claims of the named plaintiffs have since been rendered moot” does not

22 deprive the Court of jurisdiction, and does not render the proposed representatives

23 of the injunctive relief class inadequate. Id. at 51-52; Pitts v. Terrible Herbst, Inc.,

24 653 F.3d 1081, 1092 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[I]f the district court certifies the class,

25 certification relates back to the filing of the complaint. Once the class has been

26 certified, the case may continue despite full satisfaction of the named plaintiff’s

27 individual claim because [relief for] the named plaintiff fails to satisfy the

28 demands of the class.”)

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1

C. Rule 23(b) Requirements

2

In addition to demonstrating that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been

3 met, plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that at least one requirement of Rule

4 23(b) has been met. Here, plaintiffs seek certification under both Rule 23(b)(2)

5 and Rule 23(b)(3).

6

1. Injunctive Relief Class

7

Under Rule 23(b)(2), a class action “may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is

8 satisfied and if . . . the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on

9 grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or

10 corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.”

11 Fed. R. Civ. P. 2(b)(2). The rule was designed, among other things, “to permit the

12 prosecution of civil rights actions.” Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1047 (9th

13 Cir. 1998). “Class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is appropriate only where the

14 primary relief sought is declaratory or injunctive.” Ellis, 657 F.3d at 986 (citations

15 and internal quotation marks omitted).

16

Defendants do not dispute that the common procedures described above

17 apply generally to the class. To this extent, therefore, plaintiffs have satisfied their

18 burden under Rule 23(b)(2). Cf. Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105, 1126 (9th

19 Cir. 2010) (certification under Rule 23(b)(2) proper where the “proposed members

20 of the class each challenge [INS] practice of prolonged detention of detainees

21 without providing a bond hearing and seek as relief a bond hearing with the

22 burden placed on the government”); Walters, 145 F.3d at 1047 (certification under

23 Rule 23(b)(2) proper where plaintiffs challenged constitutionality of INS

24 procedures in document fraud cases and “[t]he forms and procedures in question

25 were used by the INS in document fraud cases on a nationwide basis”).

26 Accordingly, the Court will certify plaintiff’s proposed injunctive class and

27 determine whether the common conditions of the strip searches conducted at

28

15

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1 CRDF render those searches unconstitutional.6

2

2. Damages Class

3

To obtain certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3), plaintiffs must

4 demonstrate that “the questions of law or fact common to class members

5 predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a

6 class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently

7 adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The rule “provides a

8 non-exhaustive list of factors to consider in determining superiority.” Local Joint

9 Exec. Bd. of Culinary/Bartender Trust Fund v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc., 244 F.3d

10 1152, 1163 (9th Cir. 2001). These factors are:

11

(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the

12

prosecution or defense of separate actions

13

(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the

controversy already begun by or against class members;

14

(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the

15

litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and

16

(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.

17 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Here, the principle issue is the difficulty of managing the

18 proposed class members’ claims for emotional damages resulting from the

19 allegedly unconstitutional searches they experienced.

20

The questions of law and fact common to the determination of whether

21 defendants are liable to the proposed class members for constitutional violations,

22 based on the shared characteristics of the searches identified above, clearly

23 predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. The issue of

24

25 6 The common conditions are those described in Part II(B)(1)(a) of this order, and
26 exclude the cleanliness of the floor, deputies’ language, whether inmates were seen
27 from outside the bus bay, occasions in which the order in which body cavities were
28 probed departed from standard procedure, and whether inmates with disabilities received reasonable accommodations.

16

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1 liability is readily resolved “in one stroke” for the reasons just discussed in

2 connection with the injunctive relief class. But the proposed class members’

3 claims also include damages allegedly caused by the federal constitutional

4 violations. (See SAC ¶¶ 104-105, 107-108, p.28.) The Supreme Court has made

5 clear that the value of these damages cannot be determined in the abstract, but

6 must be based on “proof of actual injury.” Memphis Community School Dist. v.

7 Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 (1986). This is because “[t]he basic purpose of a

8 § 1983 damages award should be to compensate persons for injuries caused by the

9 deprivation of constitutional rights.” Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978).

10 “[D]amages for violations of constitutional rights are determined according to

11 principles derived from the common law of torts.” Cummings v. Connell, 402

12 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2005). Thus, compensatory damages for constitutional

13 torts “may include not only out-of-pocket loss and other monetary harms, but also

14 such injuries as impairment of reputation, personal humiliation, and mental

15 anguish and suffering.” Stachura, 477 U.S.at 307 (citation and internal quotation

16 marks omitted); Carey, 435 U.S. at 263-64 (recognizing possibility of emotional

17 distress damages for constitutional torts).

18

Defendants oppose plaintiffs’ motion to certify a class under Rule 23(b)(3)

19 on the ground that individualized damages assessments would substantially

20 predominate over the common question of whether the strip searches were

21 unconstitutional. “While the black letter rule is that individual damage

22 calculations generally do not defeat a finding that common issues predominate, in

23 particular cases, courts may examine whether individualized damage concerns are

24 unusually pertinent or unique.” 2 William B. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class

25 Actions § 4:54, at 208-209 (5th ed. 2012). It is no accident that this statement of

26 the rule refers to “calculations.” See Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1259-

27 60 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Particularly where damages can be computed according to

28 some formula, statistical analysis, or other easy or essentially mechanical methods,

17

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1 the fact that damages must be calculated on an individual basis is no impediment 2 to class certification.”) (footnotes omitted). In the Ninth Circuit, the rule finds its 3 original formulation in Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), a 4 securities fraud case. In affirming certification of a class of stock purchasers 5 allegedly harmed by misrepresentations about the company’s financial condition, 6 the Court of Appeals observed that “[t]he amount of damages is invariably an 7 individual question and does not defeat class action treatment.” Id. at 905. The 8 court explained that if the plaintiffs prevailed on their claims, “the amount of price 9 inflation [caused by the defendants’ misrepresentations] during the period can be 10 charted and the process of computing individual damages will be virtually a 11 mechanical task.” Id. (emphasis added). Subsequent opinions applying the 12 Blackie rule typically involve damages that can be calculated using a formula that 13 mechanically produces a numerical result on the basis of a limited set of precise 14 data for each class member. See, e.g., Abdullah v. U.S. Security Assocs., Inc., 731 15 F.3d 952, 966-67 (9th Cir. 2013) (Rejecting defendant’s predominance argument 16 because “[i]n light of [defendant’s time records], it would not be difficult to 17 determine [defendant’s] liability to individual plaintiffs [for failure to provide 18 meal breaks], nor would it be overly-burdensome to calculate damages.”); Leyva v. 19 Medline Industries Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 514 (9th Cir. 2013) (Defendant’s 20 “computerized payroll and time-keeping database would enable the court to 21 accurately calculate damages and related penalties for each claim . . . [so that] 22 damages could feasibly and efficiently be calculated once the common liability 23 questions are adjudicated.”); Arthur Young & Co. v. U. S. Dist. Court, 549 F.2d 24 686, 696 (9th Cir. 1997) (After investment fraud claims are tried, “all that will 25 remain is to determine the amount invested and the interest bought by each 26 claimant, then compute damages for each claimant.”); cf. Yokoyama v. Midland 27 Nat. Life Ins. Co., 594 F.3d 1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Damage calculations will 28 doubtless have to be made under Hawaii’s consumer protection laws” based on
18

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1 annuity purchasers’ ages and the financial characteristics of the annuity, but

2 “because the district court interpreted Hawaii law to require subjective reliance, it

3 [incorrectly] concluded that the damages calculation involved highly

4 individualized and fact-specific determinations.”)

5

Apparently recognizing that assessing class members’ actual damages (or

6 “special damages”) would be a highly individualized process, plaintiffs state that

7 they “are not proposing class wide special damages.” (Reply at 16.) Instead,

8 plaintiffs propose two alternative ways to adjudicate damages. Their preferred

9 solution would be award “general” or “presumed” damages to the class members.

10 In the alternative, plaintiffs suggest that certification of the class could be limited

11 to the issue of liability only, leaving individual damages determinations to

12 subsequent proceedings. (Reply at 36.)

13

(a) Presumed Damages

14

Plaintiffs appeal to “the well-recognized rule that presumed or general

15 damages (as opposed to special damages) may be compensated without individual

16 inquiry.” (Mot. at 36.) They argue that general damages “are a long recognized

17 tool for compensating for a harm to dignity that is inherent in certain constitutional

18 violations.” (Id.) Plaintiffs cite as examples two district court decisions certifying

19 damages classes for allegedly unconstitutional strip searches. See Barnes v.

20 District of Columbia, 278 F.R.D. 14 (D.D.C. 2011); In re Nassau County Strip

21 Search Cases, No. 99-CV-3126 (DRH), 2008 WL 850268 (E.D.N.Y. March 27,

22 2008). These courts ruled that juries could hear testimony from a small subset of

23 the class in order to determine general damages for every class member. See

24 Barnes, 278 F.R.D. at 20 (“By ‘general’ damages, the Court means the injury to

25 human dignity that is presumed when a person is strip searched or overdetained.”);

26 Nassau County Cases, 2008 WL 850268, at *6 (“There is no reason that a jury in

27 this case, hearing the procedures used by Defendants for strip searches together

28 with the testimony of a number of class members as to the circumstance of actual

19

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1 searches, could not determine an amount of general damages awardable to each

2 member of the class.”).

3

Plaintiffs are correct that the concept of presumed damages has an ancient

4 pedigree, but incorrect in concluding that its use is justified in class actions for

5 § 1983 claims. The common law drew a distinction between the “general

6 damages” and the “special damages” caused by a legal wrong. See, e.g.,

7 Vanderslice v. Newton, 4 N.Y. 130, 132 (1850). “Those which necessarily result

8 from the injury are termed general damages,” in contrast to special damages,

9 which “are the natural, although not the necessary result of the injury.” Id.

10 Because general damages were presumed to result from the legal wrong, they did

11 not need to be “specially” pleaded or proved. Hogue-Kellogg Co. v. Baker, 47

12 Cal. App. 247, 250-51 (1920). General damages were common in defamation

13 actions, where it was held that “a plaintiff is entitled to general damages as

14 compensation for those injuries which the law presumes must naturally and

15 necessarily result from [a libelous] publication.” New York Evening Post Co. v.

16 Chaloner, 265 F. 204, 220 (2d Cir. 1920).

17

More recently, however, the Supreme Court labeled the common law of

18 defamation “an oddity of tort law, for it allows recovery of purportedly

19 compensatory damages without evidence of actual loss.” Gertz v. Robert Welch,

20 Inc., 418 U.S. 345, 349 (1974). The Court has neither ratified nor rejected the

21 concept of presumed damages in § 1983 actions, but has placed limits on their 22 use.7 In Carey v. Piphus, the Court considered whether plaintiffs could recover

23 substantial nonpunitive damages in a § 1983 action solely on the ground that their

24

25 7 The term “presumed damages” is employed in this order because the term
26 “general damages” has developed a broader and vaguer meaning. See, e.g., State
27 Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425-26 (2003) (referring to all
28 compensatory damages in contrast to punitive damages); Phelps v. Stostad, 16 Cal. 4th 23, 27-28 (1997) (referring to compensation for any non-economic injuries).

20

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1 right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment was violated, without

2 having to prove any actual injury. Carey, 435 U.S. at 252. The plaintiffs were

3 students who had been summarily suspended from school. The defendants did not

4 dispute that the plaintiffs were denied due process, but argued that unless the

5 plaintiffs could prove an actual injury resulting from the constitutional violation,

6 they were entitled “at most to nominal damages.” Id. at 251 n.5 & 254. The

7 Supreme Court agreed. It explained that “damages awards under § 1983 should be

8 governed by the principle of compensation” drawn from tort law. Id. at 258.

9 Recognizing that the common law of torts will in some cases “parallel closely the

10 interests protected by particular constitutional right” — and in other cases fail to

11 do so — the Court held that “the rules governing compensation for injuries caused

12 by the deprivation of constitutional rights should be tailored to the interests

13 protected by the particular right in question . . . .” Id. at 259. The Court rejected

14 the argument that “injury fairly may be ‘presumed’ to flow from every denial of

15 procedural due process.” Id. at 261. It concluded that the policy considerations

16 supporting the presumption of injury in defamation actions under the common law

17 do not apply to deprivations of procedural due process. Id. at 262-63.

18

In Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, the Supreme Court

19 considered the trial of a § 1983 claim in which the jurors were told to award

20 damages based on the “value you place on [the] Constitutional right which you

21 find was denied . . . .” Stachura, 477 U.S. at 303. The Court reaffirmed its

22 holding in Carey that ordinarily, damages in a § 1983 case are designed to provide

23 compensation for the injury caused to the plaintiff by the defendant’s violation of

24 a constitutional right. Id. at 305-308. Thus, “the abstract value of a constitutional

25 right may not form the basis for § 1983 damages.” Id. at 308. It made no

26 difference that the right at issue in Stachura was the substantive right to freedom

27 of speech under the First Amendment, in contrast to the procedural right at issue in

28 Carey. Id. at 309. “[W]hatever the constitutional basis for § 1983 liability, such

21

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1 damages must always be designed to compensate injuries caused by the

2 constitutional deprivation.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

3 The Court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the instruction legitimately

4 authorized a form of “presumed damages,” observing that “[p]resumed damages

5 are a substitute for ordinary compensatory damages, not a supplement for an award

6 that fully compensates the alleged injury.” Id. at 310.

7

In Stachura, the Court left open the possibility that “[w]hen a plaintiff seeks

8 compensation for an injury that is likely to have occurred but difficult to establish,

9 some form of presumed damages may possibly be appropriate.” Id. at 310-11

10 (citing defamation suits). “In those circumstances, presumed damages may

11 roughly approximate the harm that the plaintiff suffered and thereby compensate

12 for harms that may be impossible to measure.” Id. at 311. For example, older

13 cases in which damages were awarded for violations of the right to vote appeared

14 to involve “an award of presumed damages for a nonmonetary harm that cannot

15 easily be quantified.” Id. at 311 n.14 (citing Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536

16 (1927) and Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939)). Nevertheless, the validity of

17 presumed damages was not litigated in those cases. See Lane, 307 U.S. at 269-71;

18 Nixon, 273 U.S. at 539-40. Stachura even casts some doubt on “the wisdom of

19 these decisions in the context of the changing scope of compensatory damages

20 over the course of this century . . . .” Id.

21

Nor has the Ninth Circuit decided whether presumed damages are

22 appropriate in § 1983 cases. In Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911 (9th Cir. 1996), a

23 wrongful death action based on a police shooting, the jury was instructed that it

24 could award compensatory damages based on proof of the plaintiff’s actual injury,

25 or, if it found insufficient evidence of actual injury, it should award nominal

26 damages based solely on the constitutional violation. Id. at 921. The jury

27 awarded nominal damages, and on appeal the plaintiff argued that the jury should

28 have been given the option to award presumed damages. Id. In rejecting this

22

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1 argument, the Court of Appeals cited Carey for the general proposition that

2 “[p]resumed damages are appropriate when there is a great likelihood of injury

3 coupled with great difficulty in proving damages.” Id. at 921 (citing Carey, 435

4 U.S. at 264). Trevino was not such a case, however. Because the plaintiff “ably

5 presented evidence and argued to the jury she was entitled to compensatory

6 damages for emotional and economic harm, . . . a presumed damages instruction

7 was not mandated.” Id. at 922.

8

Nominal damages are an alternative way to “vindicat[e] deprivations of

9 certain ‘absolute’ rights that are not shown to have caused actual injury . . . .”

10 Carey, 435 U.S. at 266. “When a plaintiff alleges violation of a constitutional

11 right, the Supreme Court has held that, even if compensatory damages are

12 unavailable because the plaintiff has sustained no actual injury — such as an

13 economic loss, damage to his reputation, or emotional distress — nominal

14 damages are nonetheless available in order to ‘make the deprivation of such right

15 actionable’ and to thereby acknowledge the ‘importance to organized society that

16 the right be scrupulously observed.’” Jacobs v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d

17 419, 426 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Carey, 435 U.S. at 266) (internal brackets

18 omitted). Nominal damages are different from presumed damages, however,

19 because they do not compensate the plaintiff for an actual injury. See Hazle v.

20 Crofoot, 727 F.3d 983, 992-93 (9th Cir. 2013) (nominal damage awards provide

21 insufficient compensation “for unlawful conduct resulting in the loss of liberty.”).8

22

Unlike the Ninth Circuit, the Second Circuit has explicitly sanctioned the

23 use of presumed damages as compensation for constitutional torts. See Kerman v.

24 City of New York, 374 F.3d 93, 130 (2d Cir. 2004). In Kerman, the plaintiff’s

25 Fourth Amendment rights were violated when he was handcuffed and detained for

26 psychiatric evaluation, but the jury only awarded him nominal damages. The

27

28 8 Plaintiffs have not asked for nominal damages. (See SAC at 28.)

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1 Court of Appeals held that “where the jury has found a constitutional violation and

2 there is no genuine dispute that the violation resulted in some injury to plaintiff,

3 the plaintiff is entitled to an award of compensatory damages as a matter of law.”

4 Id. at 124. In this case, the jury should have been instructed “that if the jury found

5 that [the defendant] detained Kerman and sent him to the hospital without

6 probable cause, which necessarily curtailed Kerman’s liberty, Kerman was,

7 independently of his claims of physical, mental, emotional, or economic injury,

8 entitled to be compensated for that loss of liberty.” Id. at 128 (emphasis added).

9

The Ninth Circuit’s recent opinion in Hazle v. Crofoot cited portions of

10 Kerman with approval, but did not address Kerman’s theory that juries in § 1983

11 cases should be instructed that they may award presumed damages for

12 constitutional violations. See Hazle, 727 F.3d at 992-93. In Hazle, the plaintiff

13 sued his parole agent and other state officials for violating his First Amendment

14 rights when they revoked his parole and sent him back to prison for refusing to

15 participate in a religion-based drug treatment program. Id. at 986-87. The trial

16 court found liability as matter of law and held a two-day jury trial on damages.

17 Hazel based his claim for compensatory damages on evidence of his emotional

18 distress and loss of liberty from being reincarcerated. Id. at 989. The jury

19 awarded zero damages. The Court of Appeals explained that the jury’s verdict

20 was invalid “in light of proof of actual injury: Hazle’s unlawful imprisonment

21 because of his exercise of his First Amendment rights.” Id. at 992. The court

22 quoted Kerman for the proposition that “‘where the jury has found a constitutional

23 violation and there is no genuine dispute that the violation resulted in some

24 [actual] injury to plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to an award of compensatory

25 damages as a matter of law.’” Id. at 992 (adding “[actual]” to the quotation from

26 Kerman, 374 F.3d at 124). It was unnecessary to address Kerman’s theory of

27 presumed damages, however, because Hazel had so obviously been injured by the

28 violation of his religious freedom: he was incarcerated for being an atheist. For

24

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1 example, Hazel introduced evidence about prison conditions. Id. at 989. Thus,

2 Hazel involved a concrete and ascertainable injury, not “an injury that is likely to

3 have occurred but difficult to establish, [for which] some form of presumed

4 damages may possibly be appropriate.” Stachura, 477 U.S. at 310-11.

5

As in Hazel, if the individual plaintiffs’ claims in this case were tried

6 separately, it would not be necessary to employ the concept of “presumed

7 damages.” If a plaintiff successfully established that the manner in which she was

8 searched was unconstitutionally “invasiv[e]” or “abusive,” Florence v. Board of

9 Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1523 (2012), then

10 the jury would have concrete evidence about how that particular search was

11 conducted. The jury could then assess compensatory damages on the basis of this

12 evidence together with the plaintiff’s testimony about her physical or emotional

13 injuries. See, e.g., Hazle, 727 F.3d at 989-92; Trevino, 99 F.3d at 921-22.

14 Plaintiffs’ declarations demonstrate that there is no need to presume injury,

15 because the declarants explicitly describe the emotional, physical, and mental

16 anguish they suffered.9 Under these circumstances, it would be inappropriate to

17 instruct a jury that it could award “presumed damages” to “roughly approximate

18 the harm that the plaintiff suffered and thereby compensate for harms that may be

19 impossible to measure.” Stachura, 477 U.S. at 311 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs’

20 injuries are not “difficult to establish.” Id. This is not a case, therefore, in which

21 “some form of presumed damages may possibly be appropriate.” Id.; Trevino, 99

22

23 9 See, e.g., Ex. 802 (“I’m very angry after every search . . . headache . . .
24 embarrassed.”); Ex. 814 (“[I felt] sick to my stomach.”); Ex. 816 (“I felt
25 disrespected.”); Ex. 839 (“Most times I buried my feelings. I became numb to
26 seeing naked bodies all the time . . . . But the one time when the cop talked about my vagina . . . was so hurtful.”); Ex. 868 (“I cried a lot.”); Ex. 874 (“I just wanted to
27 die. I’m suicidal and would rather be dead than to be treated like that.”); Ex. 900
28 (“[I] felt dirty and that I was not worth anything.”); Ex. 933 (“I always end up with tears in my eyes . . . [and] I get nightmares.”).

25

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1 F.3d at 921; accord Norwood v. Bain, 143 F.3d 843, 856 (4th Cir. 1998) (No need

2 for presumed damages in class action where “[t]here was no inherent difficulty in

3 proving any economic or physical or emotional harm that may have resulted [from

4 the illegal search of the plaintiffs’ personal property] or in quantifying the amount

5 of that harm under established damages law.”), affirmed in relevant part on reh’g

6 en banc, 166 F.3d 243 (4th Cir. 1999); Baumgardner v. H.U.D., 960 F.2d 572,

7 581-83 (6th Cir. 1992) (no need to presume damages where plaintiff presented

8 evidence of emotional distress); Lewis v. Harrison Sch. Dist. No. 1, 805 F.2d 310,

9 317-18 (8th Cir. 1986) (“Any door left open [for presumed damage awards] by

10 [Stachura] is not for plaintiffs like Lewis, whose damages are readily

11 measurable.”)

12

Despite the availability of evidence of actual injuries, plaintiffs propose to

13 recover only presumed damages and forego any classwide claims for “special

14 damages.” (Reply at 16.) If a fixed value could be assigned to the injuries

15 resulting from every unconstitutionally abusive strip search, then common

16 questions surely would predominate over individual questions. To obtain class

17 certification, therefore, plaintiffs would impose an artificial homogeneity on the

18 complex facts. This is Rule 23 in reverse. Instead of asking whether common

19 questions predominate over individual ones so that a class action would be

20 superior to individual litigation, as required by Rule 23(b)(3), plaintiffs assume

21 that a class action is superior, and then frame the question of damages so that it

22 smooths over all factual variation, thereby eliminating individual questions from

23 the predominance inquiry. Cf. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2559 (named plaintiffs’

24 decision not to seek compensatory damages “place[d] at risk potentially valid

25 claims for monetary relief” and “made it more likely that monetary relief would

26 not ‘predominate’ [over injunctive relief]” for purposes of certification under Rule

27 23(b)(2)).

28

Plaintiffs further propose that if this case does not settle after certification of

26

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1 a damages class, then “general damages would be tried class wide, and individual

2 plaintiffs could file for individual damages if they so choose.” (Reply at 16-17.)

3 This would unfairly expose defendants to duplicative damage awards, and

4 violate the rule that “[p]resumed damages are a substitute for ordinary

5 compensatory damages, not a supplement for an award that fully compensates the

6 alleged injury.” Stachura, 477 U.S. at at 310. This flawed proposal reveals the

7 problem inherent in plaintiffs’ argument for certification of a damages class. If the

8 “presumed damages” uniformly awarded for every unconstitutional search would

9 be inadequate compensation for the actual injuries suffered by all class members,

10 then individual questions about damages would remain unresolved following

11 resolution of the classwide issues. This confirms that on the issue of damages for

12 the physical and emotional pain and suffering caused by the strip searches

13 conducted at CRDF, common questions do not in fact predominate over individual

14 questions.

15

The two district court decisions cited by plaintiffs are not persuasive. The

16 Nassau County Strip Search Cases, which predated Florence, concerned a blanket

17 strip search policy at a county jail. The plaintiffs claimed a common “injury to

18 human dignity” from the allegedly unconstitutional visual body cavity searches.10

19 See Nassau County Cases, 2008 WL 850268, at *1, 3. The claims were not

20 predicated on particular facts about the conditions under which the searches were

21 conducted. See In re Nassau County Strip Search Cases, 742 F. Supp. 2d. 304,

22 322 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (subsequent proceedings). Because the district court was in

23 the Second Circuit, it relied on Kerman to conclude that a presumed damages

24 award was warranted for the “dignitary harm” caused by the searches. Nassau

25

26 10 The New York district court recently reversed its finding of liability under 27 § 1983 for the blanket search policy in light of Florence. In re Nassau County Strip
28 Search Cases, __ F. Supp. 2d. __, 2013 WL 3805659, at *12-13 (E.D.N.Y. July 18, 2013).

27

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1 County Cases, 2008 WL 850268, at *4-6. The court observed that prior judicial

2 opinions describing “‘the violative quality of unlawful strip searches were offered

3 without specific references to the plaintiffs’ testimony about their experiences;

4 rather, the courts spoke to the common nature of the harm caused by strip

5 searches.’” Id. at *6 (quoting plaintiff’s argument with approval). The court then

6 extended this reasoning to class actions, relying on a Second Circuit case

7 approving of class-wide monetary relief for a Rule 23(b)(2) class in an

8 employment discrimination lawsuit. Id. at 6 (citing Robinson v. Metro-North, 267

9 F.3d 147, 161 n.6 (2d Cir. 2001)). This precedent is no longer valid. See Wal-

10 Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2560 (disapproving of “Trial by Formula” because defendant

11 was “entitled to individualized determinations of each employee’s eligibility for

12 backpay”); Jermyn v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 276 F.R.D. 167, 173 (discussing Wal-

13 Mart’s abrogation of Robinson).

14

Likewise, the District of Columbia court’s decision in Barnes pre-dates both

15 Florence and Wal-Mart, and makes similar assumptions about the propriety of

16 presumed damages for constitutional torts. See Barnes, 278 F.R.D. at 20 (“By

17 ‘general’ damages, the Court means the injury to human dignity that is presumed

18 when a person is strip searched . . . .”). Recognizing that class treatment was

19 inappropriate for the plaintiffs’ separate claims for special damages including

20 emotional distress, the court limited certification to the issue of general damages.

21 Id. at 22 (Because not all members of class “will have been impacted in the same

22 way, because of differences in those experiences as well as differences in class

23 members’ backgrounds and personal characteristics, questions affecting individual

24 members of the class will necessarily predominate over any questions of law or

25 fact common to the class.”)

26

This is a case about the manner and conditions under which otherwise

27 presumptively valid strip searches were conducted. If the searches were

28 conducted in a manner that violates the Constitution, then presumed damages

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1 would not be an adequate substitute for the class members’ compensatory

2 damages, which could readily be established on an individual basis through

3 testimony. For this reason, plaintiffs have failed to establish that a class should be

4 certified under Rule 23(b)(3) for the purpose of determining liability and damages.

5

(a) Certification Solely on Issue of Liability

6

As an alternative, plaintiffs suggest that the Court could certify a Rule

7 12(b)(3) class solely on the issue of liability, leaving individual damage

8 determinations to subsequent separate proceedings. Federal Rule of Civil

9 Procedure 23(c)(4) provides: “When appropriate, an action may be brought or

10 maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues.” The Supreme

11 Court has yet to decide whether this provision permits a court to certify a class

12 under Rule 23(b)(3) only on particular issues. Professor Rubenstein has observed

13 that “courts and commentators are sharply split on when issue certification is

14 proper under Rule 23(c)(4).” 2 Rubenstein § 4:91, at 381-82 (footnote omitted).

15 The Fifth Circuit has rejected the use of the rule to “manufacture predominance”

16 where it is otherwise absent. Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745

17 n.1 (5th Cir. 1996). “Reading rule 23(c)(4) as allowing a court to sever issues

18 until the remaining common issue predominates over the remaining individual

19 issues would eviscerate the predominance requirement of rule 23(b)(3); the result

20 would be automatic certification in every case where there is a common issue, a

21 result that could not have been intended.” Id. But the Second Circuit has argued

22 that “the Fifth Circuit’s view renders subsection (c)(4) virtually null . . . .” In re

23 Nassau County Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 226 (2d Cir. 2006). The Second

24 Circuit therefore takes the opposite position, holding that “a court may employ

25 subsection (c)(4) to certify a class as to liability regardless of whether the claim as

26 a whole satisfies Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement.” Id. at 227.

27

Professor Rubenstein reports that the Ninth Circuit is the only other circuit

28 to have take an explicit position on the viability of “issue classes.” 2 Rubenstein

29

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1 § 4:91, at 382 (citing Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th

2 Cir. 1996)). In Valentino, the Court of Appeals reversed a district court’s

3 certification of a nationwide class of people who had used an anti-epilepsy drug.

4 The court found the certification order “brief and conclusory,” observing that it

5 was “entered with the express hope on the part of the district judge of encouraging

6 settlement . . . .” Id. at 1234. The record did not show that “some key

7 requirements of Rule 23 have been satisfied,” namely, typicality, adequacy, and

8 commonality. Id. In describing the commonality requirement, the Court of

9 Appeals cited its 1982 opinion in In re Dalkon Shield IUD Products Liab. Litig.,

10 693 F.2d 847, 856 (9th Cir. 1982). In that opinion, which also denied certification

11 of a nationwide class in a products liability action, the Court of Appeals observed

12 in the course of describing the superiority requirement that “[a] trial court can

13 sever and try only certain issues on a class basis under Rule 23(c)(4)(A).” Id. at

14 856. Citing this statement and the views of commentators, Valentino explained:

15

Even if the common questions do not predominate over the

16

individual questions so that class certification of the entire

action is warranted, Rule 23 authorizes the district court in

17

appropriate cases to isolate the common issues under Rule

23(c)(4)(A) and proceed with class treatment of these particular

18

issues.

19 Valentino, 97 F.3d at 1234. The court did not explain which cases might be

20 “appropriate cases” for severance of particular issues. It was unnecessary to

21 address this question in view of the numerous “deficiencies in this certification

22 [order].” See id. at 1234-35. The Court of Appeals concluded that “the district

23 court abused its discretion by certifying particular issues for class adjudication.”

24 Id. at 1234.

25

In view of the context in which Valentino described “issue classes” — in an

26 opinion ultimately rejecting the district court’s certification order for a variety of

27 reasons — Professor Rubenstein observes that the Ninth Circuit’s description of

28 the role of Rule 23(c)(4) is dicta. 2 Rubenstein § 4:91, at 381 n.5. Even as dicta,

30

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1 however, the panel’s endorsement of the use of issue classes is instructive to a

2 district court in this circuit. See Barapind v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744, 750-51 (9th

3 Cir. 2005) (en banc); Cetacean Community v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir.

4 2004) (“The line [between dicta and holdings] is not always easy to draw,

5 however, for ‘where a panel confronts an issue germane to the eventual resolution

6 of the case, and resolves it after reasoned consideration in a published opinion,

7 that ruling becomes the law of the circuit, regardless of whether doing so is

8 necessary in some strict logical sense.’”) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 256

9 F.3d 895, 914 (9th Cir. 2001) (Kozinski, J., concurring)). Other Ninth Circuit

10 panels have subsequently endorsed “using Rule 23(c)(4) to certify specific issues

11 under the Rule 23(b)(2) standard.” Sepulveda v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 464 Fed.

12 Appx. 636, 637 (9th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (observing that in previous order

13 remanding case to district court “we instructed the district court to reconsider, in

14 the alternative, using Rule 23(c)(4) . . . .”); see also Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores,

15 Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 620 n.43 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“Relying on Rule 23(c)(4),

16 our own precedent also generally allows class treatment of common issues even

17 when not all issues may be treated on a class basis.”) (citing Valentino and the

18 Second Circuit’s opinion in the Nassau County strip search cases), reversed on

19 other grounds by Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. 2541.

20

Assuming that in the Ninth Circuit, the Second Circuit’s endorsement of

21 issue classes will prevail over the Fifth Circuit’s contrary view, plaintiffs

22 nevertheless have failed to satisfy their burden of demonstrating that a class action

23 on the issue of liability alone will be “superior to other available methods for fairly

24 and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); Valentino,

25 97 F.3d at 1234-35 (“A class action is the superior method for managing litigation

26 if no realistic alternative exists.” ). In this case, separate trials are a realistic and

27 superior alternative to a class that is limited to the issue of liability. In separate

28 trials, each plaintiff would be able to present evidence not just about the

31

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1 conditions common to all searches at CRDF, but about the individual

2 characteristics of the searches she personally experienced, including evidence of

3 unsanitary conditions or search methods, whether she had a disability and whether

4 it was accommodated, whether men outside the bus bay saw her, and whether

5 deputies were physically abusive or used demeaning language. Thus, at an

6 individual trial, there would potentially be more evidence supporting the

7 plaintiff’s contention that the searches she endured were conducted in an

8 unconstitutionally invasive or abusive manner than there would be if the liability

9 determination were based solely on the common conditions of the searches. There

10 would also be more evidence supporting emotional distress damages.

11

In contrast, certification of a class on the issue of liability alone would entail

12 first holding a trial on whether the common characteristics of the searches renders

13 them unconstitutional, and then, if the Court found liability, proceeding with

14 potentially thousands of jury trials. At each such trial, evidence concerning the

15 uncommon conditions experienced by the plaintiff would be inadmissible, since

16 the question of liability would already have been established on the basis of the

17 common evidence. The only question for the jury would be the extent of the class

18 member’s damages that are attributable to those unconstitutional common

19 conditions. Emotional distress resulting from abusive behavior or demeaning

20 language by deputies, for example, would not be recoverable, since the sporadic

21 occurrence of these acts contrary to LASD policy would not have been a part of

22 the factual basis for the prior classwide finding of liability. With issue

23 certification, therefore, both the evidence of liability and the evidence of damages

24 would be more limited than in separate trials.

25

Plaintiffs have submitted neither evidence nor argument indicating that the

26 potential recoveries available to class members in individual lawsuits are

27 insufficient to create an incentive to litigate their claims. A plaintiff in a § 1983

28 case is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees even if the jury awards only nominal

32

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1 damages for the constitutional violation. 42 U.S.C. § 1988; Farrar v. Hobby, 506

2 U.S. 103, 112 (1992); Cummings v. Connell, 402 F.3d 936, 946 (9th Cir. 2005).

3 Moreover, under count five of the complaint, each plaintiff would be entitled to “a

4 maximum of three times the amount of actual damage but in no case less than four

5 thousand dollars ($4,000), and any attorney’s fees that may be determined by the

6 court in addition thereto . . . .” Cal. Civil Code § 52(a); (see SAC ¶¶ 117-21).

7

In view of the need for individual trials on damages regardless of whether

8 an issue class on liability is certified, it appears that “the time saved by a class

9 action” would be “relatively insignificant” in this case. Dalkon Shield, 693 F.2d at

10 856. In contrast, with individual lawsuits, “[a] few verdicts followed by

11 settlements might be equally efficacious.” Id.

12

The parties briefed the issue of superiority on the assumption that all of

13 plaintiffs’ allegations about the conditions of the strip searches would be part of

14 the common question for classwide resolution. For this reason, the parties have

15 not addressed the different question of whether a class action on liability only

16 (where the issue to be resolved is limited to the common conditions of all CRDF

17 strip searches) would be superior to individual actions (in which all of plaintiffs’

18 allegations about the searches could be litigated regardless of whether the

19 conditions of every search are uniform). Accordingly, plaintiffs will be given an

20 opportunity to argue that even with the common question framed more narrowly

21 than they originally proposed, a class action on the issue of liability alone would

22 be superior to individual litigation.

23 IV. ORDER

24

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ motion for class certification is hereby

25 GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as follows:

26

(1) Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), the Court certifies

27 a class of all present or future women inmates of the Los Angeles County Jail

28 who, upon their admission or return to the Century Regional Detention Facility

33

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1 from outside of the facility, are being or will be subjected to a visual body cavity

2 search in a group with other inmates in an outside bus stall.

3

(2) In all other respects, plaintiffs’ motion for class certification is DENIED

4 without prejudice to a motion to certify a Rule 23(b)(3) class on the issue of

5 liability only based on a showing of superiority.

6

(3) The parties shall appear for a status conference on March 31, 2014, at

7 1:30 p.m. to discuss setting a trial date for the injunctive class claims. However, if

8 plaintiffs intend to file a renewed motion for certification of a damages class on

9 the issue of liability, they shall so notify the Clerk in writing not later than March

10 27, 2014, and the status conference will be vacated.

11

(4) A renewed motion to certify a damages class on the issue of liability

12 pursuant to Rule 23(c)(4), if any, shall be filed not later than April 14, 2014, and

13 noticed for hearing in accordance with Local Rule 6-1. Any such motion shall

14 address the question of superiority but need not address the other requirements for

15 certifying an issue class.

16

IT IS SO ORDERED.

17

18 Dated: March 12, 2014

19

STEPHEN V. WILSON

20

United States District Judge

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

34

 
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Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 263 Filed 12/18/14 Page 2 of 17 Page ID #:5932

1 subjected to a visual body cavity search in a group with other inmates in an outside

2 bus stall.” Id. at 637-38.

3

The Court, however, rejected a class encompassing uncommon conditions:

4 the cleanliness of the floor, verbal abuse, outside viewers, the order in which body

5 cavities were probed, and the accommodation of disabilities. Id. at 629 & n.6.

6 Plaintiffs failed to adduce significant proof that Defendants had a pattern and

7 practice of searching all putative class members under these conditions — indeed,

8 the Court’s analysis revealed that only a very small number were searched under

9 these conditions. Id. at 626-29.2 Furthermore, the Court declined to certify a

10 damages class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) because each case

11 would require individualized proof of damages, which undermined the class

12 format’s superiority. Id. at 629-35. The Court also denied a liability issue class

13 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(4) on the same grounds — but it

14 invited a renewed motion on this issue. Id. at 635-38.

15

Plaintiffs’ renewed motion was a bit more than the Court bargained for. In

16 essence, it was a polite request for reconsideration. Plaintiffs proposed an

17 injunctive class including:

18

Women in the custody of LA County Jail who, upon their admission

19

or return to CRDF from outside CRDF, until the time the practice

20

stops or a date set for the verdict cutoff in this case, were strip/visual

21

body cavity searched in a group, with other inmates, in an outside bus

22

stall, including whether there was (a) substandard sanitation policies

23

(or lack thereof) and/or practices with regard to searches conducted in

24

the bus bay which threatened the health and safety of inmates trip

25

searched in the bus bay, (b) a pattern and practice and culture of

26

27 2 28

Plaintiffs also submitted additional declarations from putative class members evidencing additional searches conducted with certain “uncommon” characteristics. (Dkt. 247, Decl. of Lindsey Battle). But these declarations still admit large variation among the nonuniform conditions during the searches at issue.

2

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1

deputy harassment and/or abuse during bus bay strip searches, (c) a

2

pattern and practice of searching inmates in unreasonably cold air

3

temperatures and/or precipitation, and/or (d) a policy (or lack thereof)

4

and/or pattern and practice of failing to consistently protect the privacy

5

of inmates being strip searched.

6 This broader class definition hinged on a new (or renewed) theory of commonality.

7 They argued that the CRDF’s cumulative policies — including those related to the

8 uncommon conditions (sanitation, deputy abuse, cold weather, and privacy) —

9 increased every inmate’s exposure to the risk of harm through the spread of

10 disease, which satisfied commonality. In the alternative, Plaintiffs argued that any

11 of these enumerated conditions could constitute a subclass. Plaintiffs also renewed

12 their request for a liability issue class along the same bounds as their proposed

13 injunctive class.

14

Discussion

15

Plaintiffs’ motion raises three issues: first, whether the injunctive class

16 should be expanded; if not, whether a subclass for each uncommon condition is

17 appropriate; last, whether a liability issue class is appropriate.

18 I. Legal Standards

19

“Even after a certification order is entered, the judge remains free to modify

20 it in the light of subsequent developments in the litigation.” General Telephone

21 Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.

22 23(c)(1)).

23

For a class to exist, it must be subject to “precise, objective, and presently

24 ascertainable” definition. O’Connor v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 184 F.R.D. 311, 319

25 (C.D. Cal. 1998). Moreover, any putative class must meet Federal Rule of Civil

26 Procedure 23(a)’s familiar requirements: numerosity, commonality, typicality, and

27 adequacy.

28

A class seeking injunctive relief must satisfy Federal Rule of Civil

3

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 263 Filed 12/18/14 Page 4 of 17 Page ID #:5934

1 Procedure 23(b)(2). Such a class is appropriate if “the party opposing the class has

2 acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final

3 injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the

4 class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).

5

A class seeking damages is subject to a different standard. Under Federal

6 Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), Plaintiffs must establish predominance and

7 superiority. Courts consider:

8

(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the

9

prosecution or defense of separate actions;

10

(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy

11

already begun by or against class members;

12

(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of

13

the claims in the particular forum; and

14

(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.

15 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). This list of factors, however, is non-exhaustive. Local

16 Joint Exec. Bd. of Culinary/Bartender Trust Fund v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc., 244

17 F.3d 1152, 1163 (9th Cir. 2001).

18

When appropriate, the Court may also certify a class as to a particular issue.

19 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). Although “courts and commentators are sharply split on

20 when issue certification is proper,” the Ninth Circuit endorses 23(c)(4) liability

21 classes. 2 William Rubenstein, et al., Newberg on Class Actions § 4:91 381-82

22 (citing Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 1996)); see also

23 Jiminez v. Allstate Ins. Co.,765 F.3d 1161, 1166-69 (9th Cir. 2014).

24

A court may also create subclasses, each of which is treated as a class and

25 subject to the same requirements as one. Betts v. Reliable Collection Agency, Ltd.,

26 659 F.2d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 1981).

27 II. Expanded Class Definition

28

A. A Class Including the Uncommon Conditions Lacks Commonality

4

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1

“[I]n a civil-rights suit, . . . commonality is satisfied where the lawsuit

2 challenges a system-wide practice or policy that affects all of the putative class

3 members.” Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 868 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing LaDuke

4 v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir. 1985), abrogated on other grounds by Johnson

5 v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 504-05 (2005)). What it means for a policy or practice

6 to “affect” a class member must be divined in light of Wal-Mart, which requires

7 the possibility of common answers, not the presence of common questions. Wal-

8 Mart v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011). In the search for a question yielding

9 a common answer, the Court must peel back the pleadings and examine the

10 underlying legal merits. See id. at 2551-52; Jimenez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 765 F.3d

11 1161, 1165 (9th Cir. 2014). For example, in Wal-Mart — a Title VII

12 discrimination case — the ultimate question was “why was I disfavored.” 131 S.

13 Ct. at 2252. Here, Plaintiffs appeal to the Fourth Amendment, so the question is

14 “was I searched unreasonably.” See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118

15 (2001) (“The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.”).

16 Consequently, Plaintiffs’ proffered bases of commonality must be germane to “the

17 scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the

18 justification for initiating it, [or] the place in which it is conducted” — the

19 considerations courts assess when probing reasonableness under the Fourth

20 Amendment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979); see also United States v.

21 Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941, 947 (9th Cir. 2007) (observing that the basic Fourth

22 Amendment analysis balances the intrusiveness of a search against the

23 government’s justification).

24

The uncommon conditions’ deleterious effect on commonality is apparent.

25 The uncommon conditions introduce significant variation among the challenged

26 searches. Without venturing too far down the path of tautology, Fourth

27 Amendment analyses, which turn on the circumstances of individual searches, will

28 differ when the circumstances of each search are decidedly different — the

5

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1 unmanageable dissimilarity injected by the uncommon would make the quest for a

2 common Fourth Amendment answer quixotic. Therefore, the Court cannot certify

3 a class including the uncommon conditions.3

4

A counterfactual is illustrative. If the Court certified the class Plaintiffs

5 propose, resolution of the case would not create common answers for all the class

6 members. For example, it could be unreasonable to search an inmate when the

7 floor was covered in vermin and filth, the air was frigid, and the deputies yelled

8 and jeered. At the same time, it could be reasonable to search an inmate when the

9 floor was clean, the air temperate, and the deputies polite. However, the proposed

10 class would not allow the Court to distinguish between the two, even though the

11 class would contain those subject to both kinds of searches. And because it would

12 not allow the Court to differentiate among the different groups of inmates, the

13 answers produced by class-wide resolution would not help answer the ultimate

14 question — was I searched unreasonably — for all class members.

15

Judge Mordue reached an analogous conclusion in Mothersell v. City of

16 Syracuse, 289 F.R.D. 389 (N.D.N.Y. 2013). In Mothersell, the plaintiffs sought to

17 certify a class of those strip-searched pursuant to “all-persons-present” clauses in

18 search warrants. Id. at 390. However, the record showed that officers strip-

19 searched many putative class-members because they had probable cause to do so.

20 Id. at 395. Therefore, “[t]he evidence fail[ed] to show that people who otherwise

21 [met] the class definition — that is, people who were strip searched during the

22 execution of an all-persons-present warrant during the class period — were strip

23 searched based on the existence of the all-persons-present clause, rather than on the

24 facts known to the officers at the time of each search.” Id. In essence, Mothersell

25 found that a difference in the justifications for the searches destroyed commonality.

26 See id. Here, the disparities exist in the manner of the searches. But both

27

28 3

This analysis merely mirrors the Court’s prior order. Amador, 299 F.R.D. at 626-28.

6

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 263 Filed 12/18/14 Page 7 of 17 Page ID #:5937

1 considerations are part of Fourth Amendment analyses. Bell, 441 U.S. at 559.

2 And, therefore, the wide variation in the manner of the searches introduced by the

3 uncommon conditions preclude commonality, just as the differences in justification

4 prevented Judge Mordue from finding commonality in Mothersell.

5

Hence, the expanded class suggested by Plaintiffs fails to satisfy Federal

6 Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) because — in the context of the Fourth Amendment

7 claims at issue in this case — it lacks commonality among its putative members.

8 See 1 Joseph McLaughlin, McLaughlin on Class Actions § 4:7 (11th ed. 2014)

9 (“Wal-Mart will bar certification of proposed classes where adjudication of the

10 claims will necessitate significant and time-consuming individualized liability

11 inquiries which undermine the fairness and efficiency of a class-wide

12 determination.”).

13

B. The Increased Risk of Harm Stemming from Some Class

14

Members’ Searches Does Not Establish Commonality Among All

15

Class Members

16

Plaintiffs, however, push their argument one step further. They submit that

17 even though the individual searches were dissimilar, the departmental policies

18 pertaining to searches in filthy or intemperate conditions affected each inmate,

19 even if that particular inmate was not searched under those circumstances.4 That

20 is, Plaintiffs submit that CRDF policies empowered deputies to search some

21 women under filthy or intemperate conditions. These searches increased those

22 women’s risk of falling ill. And, as a result, the deputies exposed all class

23 members to an increased risk of harm by way of contagious disease. Therefore, a

24 CRDF policy “affected” all class members, satisfying commonality. This

25 argument is flawed. As already discussed, the uncommon conditions do not

26

27 4 28

Only weather and sanitation are discussed in this section. Plaintiffs’ risk-of-harm theory is premised on the spread of disease. They have not adduced sufficient proof that verbal abuse or privacy concerns increase the risk of contagious disease among inmates. Thus, by their own reasoning, those conditions are unrelated to the theory of commonality.

7

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1 “affect” each class member in a manner relevant to the Fourth Amendment. This

2 inappositeness is the result of Plaintiffs’ attempt to import an Eighth Amendment

3 doctrine into a Fourth Amendment case — the equivalent of trying to put a square

4 peg through a round hole.

5

Plaintiffs’ reliance on the risk-of-harm theory stems from a misreading of

6 the case law. As discussed above, there is no place for this reasoning in a Fourth

7 Amendment analysis. The Fourth Amendment examines a search’s intrusiveness;

8 another inmate’s noncontemporaneous search has no bearing on one’s own Fourth

9 Amendment rights5 — and Plaintiffs have furnished no authority that it does. In

10 short, Plaintiffs’ risk-of-harm theory does not fit the Fourth Amendment’s

11 paradigm.

12

In arguing the contrary, Plaintiffs’ rely on the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision

13 in Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 2014). In Parsons, the Ninth Circuit

14 endorsed the risk-of-harm theory because it was part of the prima facie claim

15 brought under the Eighth Amendment — the relevant provision in that case. See

16 Parsons, 765 F.3d at 677. To be specific, there are four elements in an Eighth

17 Amendment deliberate indifference claim: (1) an existing policy or practice creates

18 an unreasonable risk of harm; (2) the supervisor was aware that the unreasonable

19 risk was created; (3) the supervisor was indifferent to that risk; and (4) the injury

20 resulted from the policy or practice. Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118 (3d

21 Cir. 1989). Thus, a deliberate indifference claim is premised on government

22 apathy to unsafe conditions — regardless of whether a “tragic event” has occurred

23 — so it is possible to enjoin a policy before the actual harm manifests. Farmer v.

24 Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993);

25

26 5 27 28

If one is searched in a manner that might harm him or her, he or she has a cognizable Fourth Amendment injury. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 666 F.3d 877, 885 (4th Cir. 2011). However, someone that falls ill from another who fell ill due to an unsanitary search was not, herself, searched unreasonably. Therefore, the risk-of-harm theory cannot bind together a Fourth Amendment class featuring significantly different search conditions.

8

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1 see also Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1925 n.3 (2011) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S.

2 at 834); Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1151 n.5 (9th Cir. 2010).

3 Consequently, “polices and practices that expose inmates to a substantial risk of

4 serious harm” can be integral to an Eighth Amendment claim, and, therefore, form

5 the common basis for a class action. Parsons, 754 F.3d at 677 (9th Cir. 2014); see

6 also Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1925 n.3. However, as explained above, the Fourth

7 Amendment admits no analogous considerations. The focus is on each individual’s

8 search — the risk of harm derived from another’s asynchronous search does not fit

9 into the analysis.

10

Indeed, at least one other court also found Parsons inapposite outside the

11 setting of the Eighth Amendment. In re WellPoint, Inc. Out-of-Network UCR

12 Rates Litig., No. MDL 09-2074 PSG (FFMx), 2014 WL 6888549, at *11 n.10

13 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2014). And two more decisions kept the risk-of-harm theory

14 separate from a search’s unreasonableness when considering both Fourth and

15 Eighth Amendment claims. See Martin v. Sullivan, No. 06-cv-00906, 2011 WL

16 754886, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2011); Jackson v. CDCR, No. 07-cv-01414, 2009

17 WL 256967, at *4-5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2009).

18

Plaintiffs rely on three cases to challenge the Court’s interpretation of

19 Parsons and rejection of the risk-of-harm theory in this case: DG ex rel. Stricklin v.

20 Devaughn, 594 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 2010), Kenneth R. ex rel. Tri-Cnty. CAP,

21 Inc./GS v. Hassan, 293 F.R.D. 254 (D.N.H. 2013), and Karen L. ex rel. Jane L. v.

22 Physicians Health Servs., Inc., 202 F.R.D. 94 (D. Conn. 2001). According to

23 them, these cases show that Parsons should not be limited to its circumstances;

24 rather, the risk-of-harm theory it endorsed is generally applicable in commonality

25 analyses. However, like Parsons, Devaughn and Kenneth R. involved claims

26 where the risk-of-harm was part of the underlying legal violation. Moreover,

27 Karen L. is outdated after Wal-Mart.

28

Devaughn ratifies the risk-of-harm theory no more than Parsons. In

9

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 263 Filed 12/18/14 Page 10 of 17 Page ID #:5940

1 Devaughn, caseworkers “routinely fail[ed] to comply with [the] policy of requiring

2 caseworkers to visit monitor children’s safety and placement.” 594 F.3d at 1195.

3 These routine failures “allegedly exposed [plaintiffs] to the same unreasonable risk

4 of harm.” Id. at 1195-97. The common question was “whether [OK]DHS’s

5 policies or practices violate class members’ right to be reasonably free from harm

6 and imminent risk of harm while in state custody.” Id. at 1193. But, like Parsons,

7 the risk of harm posed a common question because it was an element of the

8 underlying legal claim. Id. at 1196 (“[C]hildren in state custody have a

9 constitutional [substantive due process] right to be reasonably safe from harm.”

10 (citing Yvonne L. v. New Mexico Dep’t of Human Serv., 959 F.2d 883, 892 (10th

11 Cir. 1992)). Indeed, all the cases cited by the Devaughn court in supporting the

12 risk-of-harm theory’s viability centered on the peculiar nature of child-welfare.

13 See id. at 1196-97. As did the authority cited in the Devaughn plaintiffs’ appellate

14 brief. See Appellees’ Resp. in Opp. to Appellants’ Opening Br. at 16-27. In this

15 case, however, Plaintiffs have not shown that the risk of harm from another’s

16 noncontemporaneous search is part of a cognizable Fourth Amendment case.

17

Likewise, a New Hampshire District Court certified a class when “the

18 State’s policies and practices . . . created a systemic deficiency in the availability of

19 community-based mental health care services” because all class members suffered

20 the same harm: “a serious risk of unnecessary institutionalizaion.” Kenneth R., 293

21 F.R.D. at 267. That case involved a federal regulation: 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d). Id.

22 at 259. And, once again, a risk of harm was part of a valid theory of liability under

23 that particular regulation. See id. at 267 n.4 (“[T]he cases seem to indicate, at least

24 by implication, that no individualized inquires need be made to determine whether

25 a systemic condition places class members at serious risk of unnecessary

26 institutionalization; instead, the inquiry can properly turn on systemwide proof.”).

27 Both parties endorsed this interpretation of the regulation. Id. Accordingly, like

28 Devaughn and Parsons, the court premised certification on the risk-of-harm theory

10

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1 because it was tenable under the regulation.

2

Last, Karen L. — which predates Wal-Mart by over a decade — is no longer

3 persuasive. There, the court certified a class of plaintiffs who received health care

4 from a Medicaid insurer because

5

each potential class member [was] at risk of suffering the same harms

6

alleged by the named plaintiffs: denials of coverage without proper

7

notification; lack of adequate hearing rights to challenge denials, and

8

the inability to apply for and receive prescription drugs without delay.

9

. . . [T]he fact that each plaintiff ‘has his or her own circumstances’

10

does not preclude certification where plaintiffs ‘are challenging

11

conditions and practices under a unitary regime.’ . . . [T]he plaintiffs

12

share the common circumstance of being enrolled in the PHS medical

13

plan, and as such, they are subject to the violations of state and federal

14

law alleged by the plaintiffs.

15 Karen L. ex rel. Jane L. v. Physicians Health Servs., Inc., 202 F.R.D. 94, 96, 100-

16 01 (D. Conn. 2001). This shared predicament generated the common legal issues:

17 “whether notice and denial procedures of PHS violate Medicaid statutes, due

18 process, and state law, and whether the Commissioner has committed similar

19 violations based upon its contract with PHS.” Id. at 100. These issues, however,

20 resemble the questions Wal-Mart deemed insufficient. See 131 S. Ct. at 2551

21 (“suffer[ing] a violation of the same provision of law” is not a common question);

22 M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 675 F.3d 832, 841 (5th Cir. 2012) (finding

23 “various allegations of ‘systemic deficiencies’ in the State’s administration of its

24 [conservatorship of children]” insufficient to raise common questions of fact or

25 law). Thus, the Court does not find Karen L. persuasive.

26

In sum, Plaintiffs’ authority is unconvincing. Parsons, Devaughn, and

27 Kenneth R. are confined to their classes’ particular legal claims. And Karen L.

28 must defer to Wal-Mart. Consequently, the risk-of-harm theory cannot function as

11

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 263 Filed 12/18/14 Page 12 of 17 Page ID #:5942

1 the “glue” binding this putative class’s issues together. See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct.

2 at 2552.6

3 III. Sub-Classes

4

Even though expansion of the class is improper, sub-class certification may

5 be appropriate. “[C]ertification of subclasses must satisfy all the elements of the

6 same standard required of certification of the class as a whole.” Walker v. Life Ins.

7 Co. of the Sw., CV 10-9198 JVS RNBX, 2012 WL 7170602, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Nov.

8 9, 2012); accord Betts, 659 F.2d at 1005. Here, the Court would append the

9 subclasses to the injunctive class, so the subclasses must meet the requirements of

10 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2). See, e.g., Foster v. City of Oakland,

11 Nos. C 05-3110 MHP et al., 2009 WL 88433, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2009).

12 There are four proposed subclasses: abuse, privacy, sanitation, and weather. They

13 are defined as:

14

1. Women who were present during, experienced or threatened by abuse.

15

2. Women who were present when lack of privacy existed, or were

16

threatened with the prospect of such condition.

17

3. Women who were personally exposed to, observed or whose health or

18

safety was threatened by, unsanitary conditions (which include bodily

19

fluids, trash, sanitary napkins, feces, vomit, bird droppings or feathers,

20

dead birds, exposure to rodents and vermin, and noticeably dirty or

21

sticky floors).

22

4. Women who were exposed to extreme weather (hot, cold, rain) or

23

whose health or safety was threatened by virtue of the policy or

24

practice.

25 Two are too nebulous to ascertain. The proposed sanitation subclass fails to satisfy

26 commonality. A subclass for inclement weather conditions, however, meets

27

28 6

This determination, however, does not disturb the Court’s prior decision certifying an injunctive class. It only denies Plaintiffs’ request to expand the injunctive class.

12

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 263 Filed 12/18/14 Page 13 of 17 Page ID #:5943

1 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23’s certification requirements.

2

A. Abuse Subclass

3

The Court already declined to certify an abuse subclass. There is no reason

4 to revisit that conclusion.

5

B. Privacy Subclass

6

There are two fatal defects in the privacy subclass. First, the subclass cannot

7 be defined adequately. Second, the method of identification is clumsy and

8 ineffective.

9

The plaintiffs seek to define this subclass as “those who were present when

10 lack of privacy existed, or were threatened with the prospect of such conditions.”

11 (Dkt. 236, Pl. Renewed Mot., 17:1-3). That definition is vague and conclusory.

12 There are no objective criteria for the Court to define the limits of the class. See

13 Guido v. L'Oreal, USA, Inc., No. 11-cv-1067, 2013 WL 3353857, at *18 (C.D. Cal.

14 July 1, 2013) (“The requirement of an ascertainable class is met as long as the class

15 can be defined through objective criteria.”).

16

Moreover, plaintiffs seek to rely on self-identification. Plaintiffs argue that

17 self-identification is appropriate if the subclass’s definition “is sufficiently precise

18 for potential members to determine whether they belong to the class.” (Dkt. 253,

19 Pl. Reply for Renewed Mot., 13:22-24). Putative class members would self-

20 identify “as having been searched when the bus bay was not blocked to the view of

21 outsiders.” (Dkt. 253, Pl. Reply for Renewed Mot., 15:2-3). That is not

22 sufficiently precise — it is inherently subjective, and there are numerous

23 ambiguities (e.g., how unobstructed must the view of the bus bay been?). See

24 O’Connor, 184 F.R.D. at 319 (“Class definition should be precise, objective and

25 presently ascertainable.” (citing Manual for Complex Litigation, Third § 30.14, at

26 217 (1995))).

27

C. Sanitation Subclass

28

Plaintiffs’ sanitation subclass would include any inmate claiming the bus

13

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 263 Filed 12/18/14 Page 14 of 17 Page ID #:5944

1 bay contained “one of the following conditions: bird feathers, bird feces, flies,

2 bodily fluids on the ground during the search process, puddles of water on the

3 ground (from rain) or trash left behind from previous searches.” (Dkt. 236, Pl.

4 Reply for Renewed Mot. 15:7-12). This subclass would suffer from significant

5 commonality issues. The multifarious considerations would ensure a wide range of

6 experiences: one plaintiff might have been searched when a single piece of litter

7 was in the bus bay, another in a puddle of dried menstrual blood against a wall

8 covered in animal feces while surrounded by dead vermin. Moreover, there is no

9 evidence of a unifying policy touching on the enumerated sanitation issues. Thus,

10 the proposed subclass embraces too broad a range of circumstances — at least as

11 plaintiffs currently define it — to present a single question capable of resolution.

12 See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551.

13

D. Weather Subclass

14

A subclass based on weather, however, is objectively ascertainable. The

15 subclass would be based on searches conducted in temperatures at or less than

16 sixty-eight degrees. The temperature can be independently verified by

17 meteorological data, and the putative members would only need to indicate how

18 many times they were searched and how many of those searches were conducted

19 indoors. Similarly, self-identification can determine whether it was raining during

20 one’s search. These objective criteria are straightforward and well-suited for self-

21 identification. See Forcellati v. Hyland’s Inc., No. 12-cv-1983, 2014 WL 1410264

22 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2014) (self-identification based on whether plaintiff purchased

23 defendant’s medicine); McCrary v. Elations Co., No. 130cv099242, 2014 WL

24 1779243 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2014) (self-identification based on whether plaintiff

25 purchased defendant’s supplement); Zeisel v. Diamond Foods, Inc., No. C 10-

26 01192, 2011 WL 2221113 (N.D. Cal. June 7, 2011) (self-identification based on

27

28

14

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 263 Filed 12/18/14 Page 15 of 17 Page ID #:5945

1 whether plaintiff purchased specially branded nuts).7

2 IV. Liability Issue Class

3

The final question is whether to certify a Rule 23(c)(4) liability issue class

4 along the same parameters as the Rule 23(b)(2) class (and subclass). Under

5 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(4), the issue class must meet the same

6 requirements as it would under either 23(b)(1), (b)(2), or (b)(3). See Valentino, 97

7 F.3d at 1234. Because the proposed issue class is part of Plaintiffs’ pursuit of

8 damages, the issue class must meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil

9 Procedure 23(b)(3). After the Court’s last order, the only remaining issue is

10 superiority.

11

A. Individual Incentive To Litigate

12

The first issue is whether plaintiffs would have an individual incentive to

13 litigate their claims. See, e.g., Butler v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 727 F.3d 796, 798

14 (7th Cir. 2013). Although the Court recognizes the potential for bias, it credits Mr.

15 Litt’s declaration. (Dkt. 237, Decl. of Barrett Litt). The potential reward is too

16 small to entice many attorneys to pursue these cases, leaving many plaintiffs

17 without a viable remedy.

18

B. Judicial Efficiency

19

Judicial efficiency is more contested. The Court recognizes some merit in

20 all the efficiency interests proffered by the plaintiffs. Some time will be saved

21 without individualized Monell showings. The risk of inconsistent verdicts is real

22 (although the threat always exists). Individual trials could overwhelm counsel and

23 the court, even though most cases would likely settle after a few were litigated.

24 And certification would facilitate global resolution. The Court, however, knew of

25 these efficiencies when it issued its last order. It is not the facts that have changed

26 — rather, the law has done so. Recent cases persuade the Court that it previously

27

28 7

Defendants do not challenge certification on any other ground. The Court is satisfied that the other requirements are met.

15

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 263 Filed 12/18/14 Page 16 of 17 Page ID #:5946

1 demanded too strong an efficiency showing, and a liability class is appropriate

2 under the circumstances.

3

Most pertinent to this case is the Ninth Circuit’s recent endorsement of

4 liability issue classes: “[s]o long as the plaintiffs were harmed by the same

5 conduct, disparities in how or by how much they were harmed did not defeat class

6 certification.” Jimenez, 765 F.3d at 1168.

7

Moreover, Jimenez found Judge Stranch’s opinion in In re Whirlpool, 722

8 F.3d 838 (6th Cir. 2013) and Judge Posner’s opinion in Butler v. Sears Roebuck

9 and Co., 727 F.3d 796 (7th Cir. 2013), “compelling.” Jimenez, 765 F.3d at 1168.

10 Butler was particularly emphatic in its approval of liability issue classes:

11

It would drive a stake through the heart of the class action device, in

12

cases in which damages were sought rather than an injunction or a

13

declaratory judgment, to require that every member of the class have

14

identical damages. If the issues of liability are genuinely common

15

issues, and the damages of individual class members can be readily

16

determine in individual hearings, in settlement negotiations, or by

17

creation of subclasses, the fact that damages are not identical across all

18

class members should not preclude class certification.

19 727 F.3d at 801; see also McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,

20 Inc., 672 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2012).8

21

The sum of these cases indicates that the Court was too demanding in its

22 previous order. The Ninth Circuit — and respected jurists across the country —

23 have energetically endorsed the concept. And such enthusiastic embrace compels

24 reconsideration in this case. This case may involve individualized damages

25 calculations. Even so, the efficiency of a single liability determination regarding

26

27 8 28

Although the parties have not addressed the notice issue that accompanies a damages class, there is no indication that a notice and opt-out procedure would be infeasible under the circumstances. See In re Whirlpool, 722 F.3d at 861 (“[A]ny class member who wishes to control his or her own litigation may opt out of the class under Rule 23(c)(2)(B)(v).”).

16

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 263 Filed 12/18/14 Page 17 of 17 Page ID #:5947

1 the common procedures used by CRDF deputies is sufficient for Federal Rule of

2 Civil Procedure 23(c)(4). The Court is therefore convinced that an issue class

3 should be certified along the same parameters as the Federal Rule of Civil

4 Procedure 23(b)(2) class.

5

Conclusion

6

For the foregoing reasons, the Court:

7

1. DENIES Plaintiffs’ renewed motion to expand the scope of the

8

injunctive class.

9

2. GRANTS Plaintiffs’ renewed motion certify a weather subclass but

10

DENIES Plaintiffs’ renewed motion to certify all other subclasses.

11

3. GRANTS Plaintiffs’ renewed motion to certify an issue class for the

12

purpose of liability along the same parameters as the injunctive class

13

and subclass.

14

15

IT IS SO ORDERED.

16

17 Dated: December 18, 2014

18

STEPHEN V. WILSON

19

United States District Judge

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

 
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Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 327 Filed 11/18/16 Page 2 of 8 Page ID #:11918

1 II. CLASS DEFINITION

2

A significant policy change occurred in July, 2011, that creates a substantial distinction

3 between the women searched from March, 2008–July, 2011, and from July, 2011–January 1, 2015. In July, 2011, some guards stopped the common policy of searching both lines of inmates

4 simultaneously. Dkt. 321 at 17. This Court believes whether the lines were searched

simultaneously or one-at-a-time creates a critically different analysis for liability. The Court does 5 not find Plaintiff’s proposed class structure satisfactory because it overlaps these time periods

6

despite the change in conditions. Thus, this Court will certify two distinct classes: (1) March, 2008 – July, 2011 “Simultaneous search class”, (2) July, 2011 – January 1, 2015 “One-line-at-a-

7 time search class”.

8

A. CLASS #1: SIMULTANEOUS SEARCH CLASS, MARCH, 2008–JULY,

2011 9

10

The events common to this class are that two lines of women were searched in Bus Bay #3, against opposite walls, and directed to face each other. The groups ranged upwards of 60

11 women. They were told to undress and a guard would search their exposed top half, including underneath breasts, armpits, and rolls of fat. During this time, the female on the opposite wall

12 was facing forward, viewing the search occurring. Similarly, each female had to watch while this

search was done to the person across from them and be exposed to that female’s private body 13 parts. There was also nothing preventing the women from viewing searches to their left and

14 right.

15

After the search of the upper part of the body, the visual body cavity (“vbc”) inspection

occurred. In this inspection, the women were instructed to remove their underwear, turn around,

16 bend at the waist, and look through their legs during this search. The women were ordered to

manually spread their labia to expose their vaginal opening. Both lines did this at the same time, 17 so that the women would view the female across from them in the same position, with their

18 genitals exposed.

19

When the women undressed, the clothes were placed directly on the ground. The women

were barefoot on a porous, concrete slab.

20

1. Weather Subclass 21

22

This subclass will include women in class #1 who were also subjected to temperatures of

77 degrees or lower.

23
2. Menstruation Subclass 24

This subclass will include women in class #1 who were menstruating at the time the 25 search occurred. There were additional policies targeted towards menstruating women: in front

26 of the group they would be ordered to (1) self-identify that they were currently menstruating, (2) remove their tampon or sanitary pad, and (3) insert a new one.

27

28
2

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1

B. CLASS #2: ONE-LINE-AT-A-TIME SEARCH CLASS, JULY, 2011 –

2

JANUARY 1, 2015

3

The events common to this class are that two lines of women were searched in Bus Bay

#3, against opposite walls, and directed to face the wall. The group size was limited to 24 women

4 at a time (except for the subclass, noted below). Then, one line at a time would face forward and

undress. Opposite them would be a female facing the wall so that no female would directly view 5 the female across from them—except their backside. There was nothing preventing the women

6 from viewing searches to their left and right.

7

The search itself was essentially the same (checking underneath breasts, armpits, and

rolls of fat). The vbc inspection was also one line at a time and otherwise essentially the same

8 (women were told to face the wall, bend at the waist, manually spread their labia, and look

between their legs). During the vbc inspection the women would not be viewing the female 9 across from them in the same position, rather the female across from them would be facing the

10 wall.

11

The women placed their clothes on tables (except for the subclass, noted below). They

were barefoot on a porous, concrete slab.

12

1. Clothes and Group Size Subclass 13

14

Women in class #2 who were searched between July 2011 – March 2013 had the following common conditions between them: (1) searched in groups upwards of 60, and (2)

15 clothes were put directly on the floor.

16

2. Weather Subclass

17

This subclass will include women in class #2 who were also subjected to temperatures of

18 77 degrees or lower.

19

3. Menstruation Subclass

20

This subclass will include women in class #2 who were menstruating at the time the

search occurred. There were additional policies targeted towards menstruating women: in front 21 of the group they would be ordered to (1) self-identify that they were currently menstruating, (2)

22 remove their tampon or sanitary pad, and (3) insert a new one.

23 III.LEGAL STANDARD

24

A party seeking class certification must satisfy two requirements. See Zinser v. Accufix

Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001), amended by 273 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 25 2001). First, the moving party must show that the proposed class meets four criteria: (1) the

26 members of the proposed class must be so numerous that joinder of all claims would be impracticable (“numerosity”); (2) there must be questions of law and fact common to the class

27 (“commonality”); (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties must be typical of the

28
3

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 327 Filed 11/18/16 Page 4 of 8 Page ID #:11920

1 claims or defenses of absent class members (“typicality”); and (4) the representative parties must 2 fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class (“adequacy”). Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).

3

Second, the moving party must demonstrate that the Class fulfills the conditions of at

least one of the three subdivisions of Rule 23(b). To qualify for certification under Rule 23(b)(3)

4 this subsection, a class must satisfy two conditions: (1) common questions of law or fact must

“predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,” and (2) class resolution 5 must be “superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the

6

controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). “The party seeking certification bears the burden of showing that each of the four requirements of Rule 23(a) and at least one requirement of Rule

7 23(b) have been met.” Zinser, 253 F.3d at 1186.

8

When appropriate, the Court may also certify a class as to a particular issue. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 23(c)(4). Although “courts and commentators are sharply split on when issue certification is 9 proper,” the Ninth Circuit endorses 23(c)(4) liability classes. 2 William Rubenstein, et al.,

10

Newberg on Class Actions § 4:91 381-82 (citing Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 1996)); see also Jiminez v. Allstate Ins. Co.,765 F.3d 1161, 1166-69 (9th Cir. 2014). A

11 court may also create subclasses, each of which is treated as a class and subject to the same requirements as one. Betts v. Reliable Collection Agency, Ltd., 659 F.2d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir.

12 1981).

13

A party seeking to certify a class may not merely rest on his pleadings. Rather, “[a] party

14

seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with the Rule—that is, he must be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties, common

15 questions of law or fact, etc.” Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011)

(emphasis added). Thus, a trial court is expected to engage in “rigorous analysis” to determine if

16 the moving party has discharged its burden. Wal–Mart, 564 U.S. at 350–51 (internal citations

omitted). This analysis often “will entail some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff’s 17 underlying claim.” Id. at 351.

18 IV. DISCUSSION
19 A. RULE 23(a) REQUIREMENTS
20
The Defendants do not dispute the elements of numerosity, typicality, and adequacy. As 21 for commonality, the parties dispute whether certain aspects of the search are sufficiently 22 common among all class members.

23

1. Numerosity

24

The exact number of the class is unknown, but is estimated to be in the tens of thousands.

See dkt. 284-34, Kriegler Declaration. This Court agrees that a class which expands seven years 25 in which hundreds of women were strip searched each month constitutes a class “so numerous

26 that joinder of all members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).

27

2. Typicality

28
4

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1

“[R]epresentative claims are ‘typical’ if they are reasonably co-extensive with those of

2

absent class members; they need not be substantially identical.” Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 1998). The named Plaintiffs are typical representatives of Class #1

3 since they were searched between March, 2008 – July, 2011 and were subjected to the same policies that the class is challenging. Furthermore, at least one of the named Plaintiffs is typical

4 of each subclass. See, e.g., dkt. 284-42, Cholewiak Decl. ¶ 24 (searched while menstruating), dkt.

284-52, Madrid Decl. ¶¶ 17, 22 (searched while menstruating; searched in cold conditions). 5

6

The Court recognizes that by creating two primary classes the Plaintiffs are left without a named representative of Class #2, or any of those subclasses, since none of the named Plaintiffs

7 state in their declaration that they were searched between July, 2011 – January 1, 2015. See attachments to dkt. 284. Thus, this Court will allow Plaintiffs fourteen (14) days to amend the

8 pleadings to cure this defect and add name Plaintiffs to represent this class if able.

9

3. Adequacy

10

“The Ninth Circuit has held that representation is ‘adequate’ when counsel for the class is

11 qualified and competent, the representative's interests are not antagonistic to the interests of absent class members, and it is unlikely that the action is collusive.” Fragala v. 500.com, 2015

12 WL 12513580, *9 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (citing In re Northern Dist. Of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD

Prod. Liab. Litig., 693 F. 2d 847, 855 (9th Cir. 1982)). Further, “the class representative must 13 have a sufficient interest in the outcome of the case to ensure vigorous advocacy.” Fragala, 2015

14 WL 12513580 at *9 (citing Riordan v. Smith Barney, 113 F.R.D. 60, 64 (N.D. Ill. 1986)).

15

Defendants do not contest the adequacy of the named Plaintiffs or Plaintiffs’ counsel. The

Court finds that the named Plaintiffs have sufficiently participated in these proceedings and have

16 shown a willingness for vigorous advocacy. Further, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ counsel is

qualified, competent, and adequate to represent the class and has already shown a willingness to 17 do so vigorously over the past six years. There are no interests antagonistic to absent class

18 members.

19

As stated above, the Court recognizes there are no adequate named Plaintiffs for Class

#2, or corresponding subclasses, and reiterate that the Plaintiffs have an opportunity to amend the

20 pleadings accordingly.

21

4. Commonality

22 “[I]n a civil-rights suit, . . . commonality is satisfied where the lawsuit challenges a
23 system-wide practice or policy that affects all of the putative class members.” Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 868 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir.
24 1985), abrogated on other grounds by Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 504-05 (2005)).

25

Several of the elements included in the class definitions above have previously been

26 found by this Court to satisfy the commonality requirements. The standard policy of the search was common to all class members: they would be placed in groups, ordered to line up, and strip

27 searched without any individual privacy. This was the policy of the CRDF and thus commonality

is satisfied.

28

5

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1

2

Some aspects, however, are in dispute. Plaintiffs again ask this Court to include “outdoor conditions” in the class definition, which is simply a relabeling of their previously dismissed

3 request to include unsanitary conditions. This Court does not find the existence of birds, bird feathers, ants, or bus fumes to be common enough to be included in the class. Plaintiffs argue

4 that whether an inmate “personally experienced insects or birds during a given search goes to

injury and damages, not liability for a class wide practice.” Dkt. 321 at 24. This is incorrect. The 5 jury question is whether the policies common to each search were unreasonable. This inquiry

6

takes into account the totality of circumstances. Thus, a jury could find that the common policies set forth in the class definition are constitutional, but that an individual female breathing in bus

7 fumes (or being subjected to ants and birds) makes that individual’s search unconstitutional. Since each element not included in a common policy could affect liability, there would be no

8 common answer to “was my search unreasonable?” if these elements were included in the class

definition. 9

10

Similarly, the policies towards menstruating women do not apply to the class as a whole. Plaintiffs rely on Torres v. Mercer Canyons Inc., 835 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2016). In that case a

11 farm operator withheld information from employees on the availability and pay rate of H-2A work in violation of migrant workers protection laws. Id. at 1130. Defendants argued there was

12 no commonality because some workers would not have benefited from this information and thus

were not injured by the policy. Id. at 1136. The Ninth Circuit held this does not defeat 13 commonality because they were all subjected to the same policy, despite the variance in injury.

14

Id. This case is distinguishable from Torres. The issue is not just that some women were uninjured from the policies surrounding menstruation, but that non-menstruating women were

15 never even subjected to this policy. If a female was not menstruating they did not remove their tampon/sanitary pad and replace it. This is not just an issue of injury or damages, but goes

16 straight to liability. A reasonable jury could find that the group strip searches were constitutional

in general, but that the extra policies applied to menstruating women make their searches 17 unconstitutional. Thus, again, there would be no common answer to the question “was my search

18 unreasonable?” However, each woman who was searched while menstruating was subjected to the same policies and thus would have a common answer to a common question. Thus, this Court
19 certifies a subclass for these women.1

20

Lastly, there is a subclass for women who experienced temperature at or below 77

degrees Fahrenheit—the temperature requested by Plaintiffs.2 See dkt. 321 at 18. If further

21 evidence comes forth suggesting a different temperature is more appropriate, the Plaintiffs can

22 petition the Court to amend the class definition accordingly. However, the Court does not believe it would be manageable to present evidence to a jury of the deleterious effects of several

23 different temperatures and let them decide which temperature, if any, is too cold to conduct a

reasonable strip search. One temperature will be given to the jury and the jury can return a

24 common answer for all women searched below that temperature of whether it was unreasonably

cold or not. 25

26
1 Further, the Court is satisfied that women can self-identify via an affidavit as menstruating during the time of the
27 search, as did the named Plaintiffs in this case.
2 As is true with any issue, Defendants may be able to introduce evidence that the weather on any given day cannot
28 be reliably ascertained. The Court does not decide on that issue here.
6

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1

B. RULE 23(b)(3) REQUIREMENTS

2

To certify a class under Rule 23(b)(3) the Plaintiff must show that common questions of

3 fact or law predominate over individual issues, and that a class action is the superior method to adjudicate the controversy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).

4 1. Predominance
5

6

“The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry asks the court to make a global determination of whether common questions prevail over individualized ones.” Torres, 835 F.3d 1125 at 1134.

7 “[A] common question is one where the same evidence will suffice for each member to make a prima facie showing [or] the issue is susceptible to generalized, class-wide proof.” Id. (internal

8 citations and quotation marks omitted). Further, “more important questions apt to drive the

resolution of the litigation are given more weight in the predominance analysis over 9 individualized questions which are of considerably less significance to the claims of the class.”

10 Id.

11

This Court finds the question of whether the underlying CRDF policies of strip searching

female inmates in groups and without individualized privacy to be the predominant inquiry for

12 purposes of the Rule 23(c)(4) Damages Class. While individual differences in search conditions

occurred, such as the use of vulgar language by prison guards, unsanitary conditions, etc. The 13 gravamen of the class claim is that the policies—targeted against the entire class—are

14

unconstitutional. Defendants argue that the Court “would be required to make an individualized inquiry into the search-related circumstances of ever class member to determine the merits of

15 each claim.” Dkt. 323 at 21. This is incorrect. As a class certified under Rule 23(c)(4), all that will need to occur is a description of the policies common to each class, as set forth above, and

16 then the jury can provide a common answer that would apply to each class member as to whether

these policies were reasonable. 17

18

2. Superiority

19

To establish superiority, the Court must consider:

20

(A) the class members' interests in individually controlling the prosecution or

defense of separate actions;

21

(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already

22

begun by or against class members;

(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in

23

the particular forum; and

(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.

24

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A)–(D). These factors are non-exhaustive. Local Joint Exec. Bd. 25 of Culinary/Bartender Trust Fund v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc., 244 F.3d 1152, 1163 (9th

26 Cir. 2001). Defendants have put forth no argument that individual class members would have an interest in prosecuting this case through separate actions. The Court sees no

27 reason for this to be the case, and believes the class members would benefit from class
treatment. Further, there is no known current litigation already pending by class members 28
7

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 327 Filed 11/18/16 Page 8 of 8 Page ID #:11924

1 on this issue. Concentrating the litigation in this particular forum is highly desirable as all

the relevant events took place within the Central District of California. Lastly, though 2 managing a class of this size and with several subclasses will not be easy, it will also not

3

be unduly difficult. All of the subclasses include additional elements that may make the search less reasonable, however if a fact-finder finds the elements common to each

4 primary class to already create a constitutional violation then none of the subclasses need to be litigated on the issue of liability. Similarly, the direction of litigation is manageable:

5 the least problematic policies common to each primary class will be litigated first, and

then only if such policies are not found to give rise to a constitutional violation will the 6 additional common elements of each subclass be introduced and litigated.

7 Defendants present arguments against superiority that are wholly irrelevant to this
8 case. They state a Trial by Formula would trample Defendants’ right to due process and a fair trial. Dkt. 323 at 26. There will be no Trial by Formula—Plaintiffs themselves reject
9 this idea. Dkt. 325 at 14. It has already been addressed that this is a Rule 23(c)(4)
damages class on the issue of liability, and that if Plaintiffs are successful there will be 10 individual damage calculations. Dkt. 262 at 16–17.

11 C. RULE 23(c)(4) REQUIREMENTS
12 This Court has previously held that “the efficiency of a single liability determination
13 regarding the common procedures used by DRDF deputies is sufficient for Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(4). Dkt. 262 at 17. The Court sees no reason, and Defendants provide none, to
14 reconsider this determination.

15 V. CONCLUSION
16 In certifying the class, the Court cannot reach the merits of these constitutional claims.
17 See Edwards v. First American Corp., 798 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2015). Some, or all, of
these allegations may not survive summary judgment. At this point, the Court merely finds that 18 they satisfy the requirements for class certification. For the foregoing reasons, the Court:

19 1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s renewed motion for certification under Rule 23(c)(4) and

20

certifies Class #1 and Class #2, with subclasses, as described above.

2. GRANTS Plaintiffs fourteen (14) days to amend the pleadings in order to cure the

21

defect of having no named Plaintiff to represent Class #2.

22 IT IS SO ORDERED
23

24 Date: November 18, 2016
25

26

___________________________________

27

HON. STEPHEN V. WILSON

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

8

 
 Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 334 Filed 12/19/16 Page 1 of 31 Page ID #:12001

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 334 Filed 12/19/16 Page 2 of 31 Page ID #:12002

1 I. INTRODUCTION

2

1. This action concerns the manner in which inmates are searched in Los

3 Angeles County’s jails, alleging, inter alia, violations of the Fourth, Eighth and

4 Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and their corollaries under the

5 California Constitution.

6

2. The gravamen of this complaint concerns the privacy rights of inmates who

7 are routinely subjected to strip and body cavity searches in violation of the Constitutions

8 and laws of the United States and the State of California.

9

3. Of particular concern is that female inmates are subjected to degrading strip

10 and body cavity searches under circumstances and conditions when male inmates are not.

11 II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

12

4. Plaintiffs present federal claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983.

13 Accordingly, federal jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by 28 U.S.C. §§1331 and

14 1343. Plaintiffs’ state law claims are so related to their federal law claims that they form

15 part of the same case or controversy. Accordingly, supplemental jurisdiction over the

16 state law claims is conferred upon this Court by 28 U.S.C. §1367.

17

5. Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of acts of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s

18 Department in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. Accordingly, venue is

19 proper within the Central District of California.

20 III. PARTIES

21

A. PLAINTIFFS

22

6. Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina

23 Madrid, Myeshia Williams and Nancy Briseño are women who were incarcerated in Los

24 Angeles County Sheriff’s Department facilities, and who were subjected to highly

25 intrusive strip and body cavity searches.

26

7. Plaintiffs Lora Barranca, Diana Paiz and Diane Vigil are women who, at the

27 time of filing the Second Amended Complaint, were incarcerated in Los Angeles County 28

1

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 334 Filed 12/19/16 Page 3 of 31 Page ID #:12003

1 Sheriff’s Department facilities. They have been subjected, and will continue to be

2 subjected to highly intrusive strip and body cavity searches.

3

B. DEFENDANTS

4

8. Defendant County of Los Angeles (hereafter “County”) is a public entity

5 organized and existing under the laws of the State of California. Defendant Los Angeles

6 Sheriff’s Department (hereafter “LASD”) is a public entity within the meaning of

7 California law, and is a County agency. These Defendants are sued in their own right for

8 a County and/or LASD policy, practice or custom which caused Plaintiffs’ injuries in

9 violation of one or more federal constitutional guarantees, and on Plaintiffs’ state law

10 claims based on respondeat superior under California Government Code §815.2, and

11 mandatory duties under California Government Code §815.6.

12

9. Defendant Leroy Baca (hereafter “Baca”) is the Sheriff of Los Angeles

13 County, and is the policy maker for the LASD. He is sued in his official and individual

14 capacities.

15

10. Defendant Sammy Jones (hereafter “Jones”) is a deputy sheriff holding the

16 rank of division chief. He is the commanding officer of the LASD’s Custody Operations

17 Division. He is sued in his individual and official capacities.

18

11. Defendant Dennis Burns (hereafter “Burns”) is a deputy sheriff holding the

19 rank of division chief. He is the commanding officer of the LASD’s Custody Operations

20 Division. Burns is sued in his individual and official capacities.

21

12. Defendant Timothy Cornell (hereafter “Cornell”) is a deputy sheriff holding

22 the rank of captain. He is the commanding officer of the LASD’s Inmate Reception

23 Center (“IRC”). IRC is the primary intake and release facility for inmates, and the

24 transfer and pickup point for inmates transferred between jail facilities and inmates

25 returned to jail after an appearance in court. Cornell is sued in his individual and official

26 capacities.

27

13. Defendant Gerald K. Cooper (hereafter “Cooper”) is a deputy sheriff holding

28 the rank of captain. He is the commanding officer of the LASD’s Inmate Reception

2

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 334 Filed 12/19/16 Page 4 of 31 Page ID #:12004

1 Center (“IRC”). IRC is the primary intake and release facility for inmates, the transfer

2 and pickup point for inmates transferred between jail facilities, and for inmates returned

3 to jail after an appearance in court. Cooper is sued in his individual and official

4 capacities.

5

14. Defendant John H. Clark (hereafter “Clark”) is a deputy sheriff holding the

6 rank of captain. He is the commanding officer of the LASD’s Men’s Central Jail

7 (“MCJ”). Clark is sued in his individual and official capacities.

8

15. Defendant Daniel Cruz (hereafter “Cruz”) is a deputy sheriff holding the

9 rank of captain. He is the commanding officer of the LASD’s Men’s Central Jail

10 (hereafter “MCJ”). Cruz is sued in his individual and official capacities.

11

16. Defendant Stacy L. Lee is a deputy sheriff holding the rank of captain. She

12 is the commanding officer of the Century Regional Detention Center (hereafter “CRDF”).

13 CRDF houses female inmates. Lee is sued in her individual and official capacities.

14

17. Plaintiffs are ignorant of the true names and capacities of Defendants sued

15 herein as DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, and therefore sue these defendants by such

16 fictitious names. Plaintiffs will give notice of this complaint, and of one of more DOES’

17 true names and capacities, when ascertained. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and

18 based thereon allege, that Defendants DOES 1 through 5 are responsible in some manner

19 for the damages and injuries hereinafter complained of.

20

18. DOES 6 through 10 (hereinafter collectively referred to as “LASD

21 Supervisory Defendants”) were and are now responsible for the LASD jails. Among

22 other duties, they are responsible for the training, supervision, control, assignment and

23 discipline of both sworn and civilian personnel of the LASD and County who work in,

24 operate, administer and manage the jails, and for the formulation, promulgation,

25 adoption, application, administration and enforcement of the policies, rules, regulations

26 and practices of the LASD jails.

27

28

3

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1

19. Upon information and belief, Plaintiffs further allege that, at all times

2 relevant herein, the LASD Supervisory Defendants participated in, approved, and/or

3 ratified the unconstitutional or illegal acts that occurred within LASD jails which are

4 complained of herein.

5

20. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereupon allege that, at all times

6 relevant herein, the individual Defendants, and each of them, were the agents, servants

7 and employees of their respective employers (Defendants LASD, County) and were

8 acting at all times within the scope of their agency and employment with the knowledge

9 and consent of their principals and employers. At all times herein, Defendants, and each

10 of them, were acting under the color of state law.

11 IV. CLAIMS OF CLASS REPRESENTATIVES

12

A. MARY AMADOR

13

21. Mary Amador was arrested by Los Angeles County Sheriff’s personnel on or

14 about March 1, 2009. She surrendered to a Detective Corrigan in the parking lot of the

15 Century Regional Detention Facility (hereafter “CRDF”), after Detective Corrigan told

16 advised that she had a welfare fraud warrant for her arrest. CRDF is commonly known

17 and referred to as the “Lynwood Jail”. The detective gave Mrs. Amador a week to

18 surrender so that she could make arrangements for child care for her young daughter, and

19 so that she could arrange bail. Mrs. Amador surrendered at 9:00 A.M. Bail had already

20 been posted.

21

22. Mrs. Amador was strip searched at about 6-7 P.M. that evening in a group

22 with about 12 other women, outside in the open, in cold air, in an area bordered on one

23 side by a facility wall and entry door, on another by a solid block wall, on the third by a

24 solid gate, and on the fourth by a chain link fence shielded by a torn and shredded tarp.

25 She could see about five male deputies on the other side of the torn tarp. The location was

26 apparently a driveway, and/or discharge area for buses.

27

28

4

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1

23. The ground in the area was concrete. The women were required to

2 completely disrobe, place their street clothes on the ground, squat, spread their buttocks,

3 lift their breasts, etc., and change into jail attire which they picked up from the ground.

4

24. One of the women, about 60 years old, complained bitterly of the cold, and

5 cried.

6

25. Having spent most of the day with four of the women, Mrs. Amador had

7 learned that they had just been arrested, and had not yet been to court. Mrs. Amador had

8 not been to court, either.

9

26. About an hour after having been strip searched, Mrs. Amador was released

10 on bail. A jailer told Mrs. Amador that her bail bond had been at the jail since 9:00 A.M.

11 in the morning.

12

27. The day after bailing out, Mrs. Amador called the facility to complain about

13 the strip search. She left a detailed voice mail on the watch commander’s extension. She

14 has never heard back, or received any type of acknowledgement of her complaint..

15

28. Mrs. Amador and the women were searched as a group with each woman

16 able to, and forced to, watch the other women being searched. They were forced to stand

17 naked within inches of each other as they were searched. They were forced to place their

18 clothing on the unsanitary concrete. This is the same concrete Plaintiff and the women

19 were forced to stand on, barefoot and naked.

20

B. LORA BARRANCA

21

29. Lora Barranca was arrested by LASD on or about August 28, 2009. She was

22 transferred to CRDF on September 2nd or 3rd. She remains in custody, and expects to

23 remain in custody beyond the date of her next court appearance on September 21, 2010.

24

30. During the booking process, LASD strip searched/body cavity searched Ms.

25 Barranca in a large group of women, in an outdoor area used to park buses (hereafter

26 “bus stall”). The women were required to completely disrobe, place their clothes on the

27 concrete, squat, spread their buttocks, lift their breasts, etc., and change into jail attire,

28 which they picked up from the concrete.

5

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 334 Filed 12/19/16 Page 7 of 31 Page ID #:12007

1

31. LASD personnel at CRDF have strip searched/body cavity searched Ms.

2 Barranca on multiple occasions, including each time she returned from court, or after

3 visiting the hospital. All strip searches occurred in the bus stall, and in a group setting.

4 Ms. Barranca will likely be strip searched/body cavity searched, pursuant to LASD

5 policy, in the same manner and location when she returns from court on September 21,

6 2010.

7

32. Ms. Barranca has been strip searched in groups as large as 50 women.

8 Deputies told the women to line up on opposite walls, in two lines of 25 women. Each

9 detainee could watch the other women being searched, and in fact, could not avoid

10 watching the other women being searched. During the search, when the women are

11 naked and facing each other, they can see each other’s gang tattoos. I have heard women

12 at CRDF later discuss which women had a certain kind of gang tattoo.

13

33. As the women lined up, the deputies shouted “shoulder to shoulder,” forcing

14 the women to stand so close that their bodies touched at the shoulders. When the deputies

15 told Ms. Barranca to bend over for the body cavity search, her thighs also touched the

16 women adjacent to her.

17

34. The bus stall entrance is adjacent to the CRDF booking area. In Ms.

18 Barranca’s experience, deputies left the entrance open. They did not take measures to

19 block the view of those being strip searched by persons inside the facility. CRDF

20 personnel, including male personnel, frequently passed the bus stall entrance and could

21 see the searches taking place. Detainees sitting in a nearby processing area could also

22 observe the strip searches.

23

35. A chain link fence comprises one wall of the bus stall. Ms. Barranca has

24 been searched in the stall when no tarps or other materials shielded her from the view of

25 persons outside the stall. The ceiling is also a chain link fence. No tarp covered the

26 ceiling when Ms. Barranca was initially booked into CRDF. When it drizzles outside,

27 women in the search area get rained on.

28

6

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1

36. The bus stall is usually very cold in the late afternoon and evening, when

2 most searches take place. The floor of the bus stall is porous, grey cement. It is dirty.

3 Sometimes Ms. Barranca could observe trash lying around from previous searches. She

4 has also observed menstrual blood on the cement, ants on the ground, insects crawling up

5 the walls, and oil spots where the busses have dripped oil. Ms. Barranca was forced to

6 place her clothing on the unsanitary cement.

7

C. DIANA PAIZ

8

37. Diana Paiz was arrested on or about February 12, 2010. She was booked into

9 CRDF on approximately February 17, 2010. She remains in custody, and expects to

10 remain in custody beyond the date of her next court appearance on September 23, 2010.

11

38. LASD personnel at CRDF have strip searched/body cavity searched Ms.

12 Paiz approximately 5 times, including each time she returned from court. Each of the

13 searches occurred with a large group of women in an outdoor bus stall. The women were

14 required to completely disrobe, place their clothes on the cement, squat, spread their

15 buttocks, lift their breasts, etc., and change into jail attire which they picked up from the

16 cement. Ms. Paiz will almost certainly be strip searched/body cavity searched in the same

17 manner and location when she returns from court on September 23, 2010.

18

39. Ms. Paiz has been strip searched in groups ranging from 20 to 40 women.

19 Deputies told the women to line up on opposite walls. Each woman could watch the other

20 women being searched and, in fact, could not avoid watching the other women being

21 searched. As the women lined up, the deputies shouted “shoulder to shoulder,” forcing

22 the women to stand so close that their bodies touched at the shoulders. Deputies told the

23 women to put their noses on the wall, which is visibly dirty.

24

40. The bus stall entrance is adjacent to the CRDF booking area. In Ms. Paiz’s

25 experience, deputies left the entrance open and did not take measures to block the view of

26 those being searched from persons inside the facility.

27

41. The bus stall is usually cold in the late afternoon and evening, when most

28 searches take place. The concrete is dirty, and sometimes Ms. Paiz could observe trash

7

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 334 Filed 12/19/16 Page 9 of 31 Page ID #:12009

1 lying around from previous searches. During searches, Ms. Paiz was forced to place her

2 clothing on the unsanitary cement.

3

42. Guards routinely gave instructions using abusive and profane language.

4 After women undressed, the guards laughed at them, making jokes about the appearance

5 of their bodies and how the area smelled.

6

43. Some severely overweight or physically disabled women cannot expose their

7 body cavities by bending over. They are subjected to an even less dignified search: the

8 guards order them to sit or lie on the bare concrete, spread their legs and raise their feet

9 off the ground.

10

D. DIANE VIGIL

11

44. Diane Vigil was arrested by LASD on or about May 9, 2010. Ms. Vigil was

12 transferred to CRDF on May 12, 2010. She remains in custody and expects to remain in

13 custody beyond the date of her next court appearance on September 28, 2010.

14

45. During the booking process, LASD strip searched/body cavity searched Ms.

15 Vigil with a large group of women, in an outdoor bus stall. The women were required to

16 completely disrobe, place their clothes on the ground, squat, spread their buttocks, lift

17 their breasts, etc., and change into jail attire, which they picked up from the cement. Ms.

18 Vigil began menstruating shortly before she arrived at CDRF for booking, though she did

19 not realize it until she pulled down her underwear for the body cavity search. She

20 requested a sanitary napkin, but was chastised for not informing them earlier. Even

21 though blood was dripping down her leg and onto the ground, she had to wait for a

22 sanitary napkin until after the body cavity search was finished.

23

46. CRDF has strip searched/body cavity searched Ms. Vigil approximately 5

24 times, including each time she returned from court. All strip searches occurred in the bus

25 stall and en masse. Ms. Vigil will almost likely be strip searched/body cavity searched in

26 the same manner and location when she returns from court on September 23, 2010.

27

47. Ms. Vigil has been strip searched in groups as large as 50 women. Deputies

28 told the women to line up on opposite walls. Each woman could watch the other women

8

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 334 Filed 12/19/16 Page 10 of 31 Page ID #:12010

1 being searched and, in fact, could not avoid watching the other women being searched.

2 As the women lined up, the deputies shouted “shoulder to shoulder,” forcing women to

3 stand so close that their bodies touched at the shoulders.

4

48. The bus stall entrance is adjacent to the CRDF booking area. In Ms. Vigil’s

5 experience, deputies left the entrance open and typically did not take measures to block

6 the view of those being searched from persons inside the facility. Prior to August 18,

7 2010, Ms. Vigil had never observed deputies move laundry carts in front of the doors.

8

49. The bus stall is usually cold in the late afternoon and evening, when most

9 searches take place. The cement is dirty and sometimes Ms. Vigil could observe trash

10 lying around from previous searches. She has also observed menstrual blood on the

11 cement and ants crawling on the ground.

12

50. Guards routinely gave instructions using abusive and profane language.

13

51. Some severely overweight or physically disabled women cannot expose their

14 body cavities by bending over. They are subjected to an even less dignified search: the

15 guards order them to sit on the bare concrete, spread their legs and raise their feet off the

16 ground.

17

E. ALISA BATTISTE

18

52. Alisa Battiste was arrested by LASD deputies on January 30, 2010 and was

19 transferred directly to CRDF on January 31, 2010, before going to court. Upon

20 processing into CRDF and each time she came back from court (about 7-8 times), she

21 was strip and visual body cavity searched outdoors, in a bus stall adjacent to the booking

22 area.

23

53. Each time she was searched, Ms. Battiste and the women being searched

24 with her were forced to stand close together, strip naked, face the women across from

25 them, lift their breasts and stomachs, open their mouths, use their fingers to spread their

26 cheeks (without an opportunity to wash their hands first), turn to face the wall, bend over,

27 use their hands to spread their buttocks and vaginas, and cough while guards looked into

28 their body cavities.

9

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1

54. Ms. Battiste and the other women then had to lift each foot and wiggle their

2 toes. Many women would lose their balance attempting to stand on one foot and would

3 fall over, while naked, and bump into one of the naked women next to them.

4

55. If a woman was menstruating, she had to remove her soiled menstrual pad,

5 or pull out her used tampon while in the group, put it into a box, and then put the box on

6 the ground.

7

56. The bus stall is connected to the interior of the jail by sliding glass doors

8 which were always open during the searches. When Ms. Battiste was searched in the bus

9 stall, inmates were usually chained to the benches just inside the door. They could see

10 the searches. Sometimes it was inmates in yellow jump suits whom Ms. Battiste

11 understood to have mental problems, or were “5150”. Male deputies and other jail staff

12 walking by could also see the searches. Although the door was always open, because the

13 door is made of glass guards and inmates on the other side would be able to see the

14 searches even if the door were closed.

15

57. After the searches, Ms. Battiste and the other women would put on jail

16 clothes which were placed on the ground before the women were allowed to put them on.

17 Because the searches took place outside, in a bus stall, there was often dirt, dust and

18 sometimes even ants on the clothes they picked up from the ground. The ground was

19 concrete and dirty, even stained with menstrual blood. Ms. Battiste’s feet were often dirty

20 from standing bare-foot during the searches, but the deputies would sometimes not allow

21 the women to shower until the following day.

22

58. Every time Ms. Battiste was strip searched, she felt embarrassed and

23 humiliated as a woman. She felt it robbed her of her femininity, of her womanhood.

24 Every time she was strip searched, at least one woman in the group would cry, especially

25 the younger women, who felt especially embarrassed about having to expose their bodies.

26

F. FELICE CHOLEWIAK

27

59. On or about March 26, 2010, Felice Cholewiak was arrested by LAPD and

28 taken directly to CRDF. Ms. Cholewiak was strip searched upon arriving at CRDF, and

10

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 334 Filed 12/19/16 Page 12 of 31 Page ID #:12012

1 each time she returned from court. Each strip search was conducted outdoors in an area

2 where she has been buses parked. She estimates that she was strip searched 5 times.

3

62. On one side of this bus depot area, there is a blue tarp. The opposite wall is a

4 brick wall. These walls are approximately 15-20 feet apart. Along another wall, there is a

5 roll-up door where buses come in and out. Opposite the roll-up door is the entrance to the

6 bus depot strip search area. The door to this area is always open. Ms. Cholewiak has

7 never seen anything obstructing this doorway. She has seen male deputies and male

8 workers walk by the entrance to the bus depot. These males have an unobstructed view to

9 the bus depot when women are being strip searched. The floor of the depot is porous,

10 grey cement, like a sidewalk. Ms. Cholewiak has seen motor oil on the floor of the bus

11 depot. She has seen blood on the floor of the bus depot. She has seen bird poop on the

12

floor of the bus depot, and bird feathers in the bus depot. 13

14

63. Before being strip searched in the bus depot area, Ms. Cholewiak was taken

15 to a holding cell. She has waited in that holding cell to be strip searched between 1 to 3

16 hours. At times it appeared that deputies are waiting for more women to arrive so that

they can strip search more women at one time. At other times it appeared that deputies 17

18 are waiting for shift change so that the next shift had to strip search the women.

During a strip search, from 60 to80 women are taken off the buses returning from court, 19

20 and are lined up inside the bus depot against the blue tarp wall and the brick wall. The

21 women are divided into two lines, each line facing the other. While deputies are lining

22 the women up, they are constantly ordering them to stand "shoulder to shoulder" and to

23 "get closer." They are sometimes standing so close that they touch each other.

24

64. After the women are lined up, they are ordered to remove all clothing except

25 their underwear. The clothing is then searched and thrown on the ground behind them.

26 Shoes are removed along with the clothing and the women stand barefoot during the

27 searches. They are ordered to lift their feet. Ms. Cholewiak and a number of other

28 women must steady themselves by touching the wall in front of her.

11

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1

65. Deputies then shouted “If you’re bleeding and if you have anything between

2 your legs” to take out the pad or tampon. Deputies then gave the women jail issue pads

3 in boxes. Ms. Cholewiak and the women were ordered to put the used pads or tampons

4 in the boxes and put the new pads on the ground on top of their clothing. At that point,

5 they were ordered to turn around and Ms. Cholewiak could see the topless women across

6 from her and next to her. She could see gang tattoos on some women, and has heard

7 discussions among some of the women about the tattoos.

8

66. The women were then ordered to lift their hair, to lift their breasts and, those

9 with “excess fat” were ordered to lift their stomachs. They were then ordered to pull

10 their lips away from their gums, using the same fingers used to remove the menstrual

11 pads and tampons. Ms. Cholewiak and the women were never able to wash their hands

12 before putting them in their mouths. They were then ordered to take down their

13 underwear, spread their legs, bend over, open their vaginas with their fingers and cough

14 so deputies could inspect the vaginas with flashlights. While bending over, Ms.

15 Cholewiak was able to see the women in the line across from her also bending over.

16

67. Ms. Cholewiak and the women were then ordered to pull up their underwear,

17 put on shirts, pants and shoes, but sock and bras must go in pockets. The searches

18 average about 20 minutes, but can take much longer if women do not comply quickly.

19 Ms. Cholewiak has heard deputies yell, scream and curse at women who do not move

20 quickly enough, or those who do not speak English. She has seen deputies taunt women,

21 and make derogatory remarks within the women’s hearing. Women often cry during the

22 searches.

23

68. Because the searches took place outside, sometimes as late as 10 PM, the

24 weather was very cold and Ms. Cholewiak could feel the cold wind blowing through the

25 space. Every time Ms. Cholewiak was searched, she would be disgusted and tearful. She

26 was emotionally exhausted after every search.

27

28

12

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1

G. EVANGELINA MADRID

2

69. Evangelina Madrid’s experiences with CRDF began around October 4, 2009

3 when she was first arrested by LASD and taken to CRDF. She estimates that she was

4 strip searched between 10 to 12 times upon each entry into CRDF, and each time she

5 returned from court. Except for those times when Ms. Madrid returned to CRDF from a

6 medical appointment, she was searched in an outdoor area where she has seen buses

7 parked.

8

70. One side of the bus depo is a chain link fence which is covered by a blue

9 tarp. The opposite wall is brick. These walls are about 15-20 feet apart. Along another

10 wall is a roll-up door where buses come in and out. Opposite the roll-up door is the

11 entrance to the bus stall from the booking area. Male deputies and workers walking by

12 the entrance to the bus depo can see the women being searched. Ms. Madrid states that

13 there is no privacy and she and the other women are completely exposed.

14

71. The floor of the bus stall is porous, grey cement, like a sidewalk. Ms.

15 Madrid has seen worms and slug-like creatures crawling on the floor, and has seen motor

16 oil on the floor as well. The ceiling of the stall is a chain link fence covered by a blue tarp

17 which sometimes flaps up and down in the wind. Ms. Madrid has been searched outside

18 in this bus area in the winter when the air feels freezing cold, the cold air blows through

19 the chain link fencing and the temperature is well below 68 degrees. Sometimes the

20 searches were done as late as 10 or 11 P.M.

21

72. Ms. Madrid was searched with 20 to 50 other women who were taken from

22 buses after court. They are lined up in the bus stall against the chain link and the brick

23 wall. After the women are lined up, they are ordered to remove all clothing except their

24 underwear. Because the women are forced to stand so close together, Ms. Madrid could

25 often smell the body odor of women who had not showered. The clothing is then

26 searched and thrown on the ground behind them. Shoes are removed along with the

27 clothing and the women stand barefoot during the searches. They were then ordered to

28 lift their hair, to lift their breasts, and to pull their lips away from their gums. Ms. Madrid

13

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1 could see the topless bodies of the women in the line facing her. She could tell who had

2 breast implants, stretch marks, and those with gang tattoos.

3

73. Ms. Madrid and the other women were then ordered to face the wall, take

4 down their underwear, spread their legs, bend over, open their vaginas with their fingers

5 and cough. Sometimes they were ordered to cough for a long as 3 minutes while deputies

6 inspected their vaginas with flashlights. While bent over, Ms. Madrid could see the

7 women in the line facing her also bending over. These searches could take as long as 15-

8 20 minutes if some women were not complying.

9

74. Ms. Madrid has been strip searched when she was menstruating. She was

10 given a jail issue pad in a cardboard box, ordered to take the new pad and place it on her

11 clothing on the floor of the stall, remove the old pad and put it in the box, and throw the

12 box into the middle of the bus stall. She had to wait about 5 minutes to replace her pad,

13 and at times had to wait up to 15 minutes. Ms. Madrid stated that she prayed she

14 wouldn’t bleed while waiting to replace her pad.

15

75. Ms. Madrid has heard deputies yell and curse at the women in the most

16 insulting ways. She has seen deputies grab women who were not complying and throw

17 them against the wall. She has often seen women crying during the search process.

18 Each time she was strip searched, she felt demoralized, humiliated and depressed.

19

H. MYESHIA WILLIAMS

20

76. Myeshia Williams incarcerated at CRDF between January 2010 and October

21 2011. During this time period, Ms. Williams was strip searched/visual body cavity

22 searched each time she returned from court and medical appointments. Ms. Williams

23 returned to CRDF, and was strip searched/visual body cavity searched, approximately 6

24 times after June 30, 2011.

25

77. With few exceptions, searches occurred in an outdoor area used to park

26 buses. Because the search area is outdoors, it was usually very cold and almost always

27 cold when the searches were conducted at night. She was searched outside when the

28 temperature was below 77 degrees. The outdoor search area was not sealed to insects or

14

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 334 Filed 12/19/16 Page 16 of 31 Page ID #:12016

1 birds. On at least several occasions, she observed ants, spiders and gnats in the search

2 area. She also observed bird droppings on the ground.

3

78. Most searches occurred in large groups, of approximately 40 inmates. At the

4 beginning of the search, inmates were ordered to line up along the walls of the bus bay,

5 remove all clothing except for underwear and submit to an inspection of their feet and

6 hair. Deputies then ordered the inmates to face the center of the room and lift their arms,

7 breasts and stomach, in the presence of the group. Deputies also inspected their mouths

8 by requiring inmates to run their fingers between their lips and gums. Deputies then

9 ordered inmates to submit to a visual body cavity inspection. Ms. Williams was required

10 to face the wall, pull down her underwear, spread her legs, bend at the waist and reach

11 around her body to spread apart her labia to permit an inspection of her vagina.

12

79. Ms. Williams has been searched while she was menstruating, including at

13 least one occasion after June 30, 2011. When menstruating, she was ordered to identify

14 herself by raising her hand, remove her soiled tampon or pad in the presence of the group,

15 submit to a visual body cavity inspection while bleeding, and wait until the completion of

16 the search before replacing her feminine hygiene products.

17

80. The bus garage was maintained in filthy condition. Ms. Williams observed

18 trash not cleaned up from previous searches. During some searches, she observed blood,

19 vomit or urine on the floor.

20

I. NANCY BRISEÑO

21

81. Nancy Briseño was incarcerated at CRDF from approximately November

22 2011 through approximately March 2012. She was strip searched/visual body cavity

23 searched each time she returned to CRDF from court. Ms. Briseño was searched

24 approximately 14 times after June 30, 2011.

25

82. With few exceptions, searches occurred in an outdoor area used to park

26 buses. Ms. Briseño was searched in temperatures that felt very cold, well below 77

27 degrees. On one occasion, Ms. Briseño was searched while it was raining. Rain water fell

28

15

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 334 Filed 12/19/16 Page 17 of 31 Page ID #:12017

1 through the tarps and onto inmates’ bodies. The outdoor search area was not sealed to

2 birds or insects. Ms. Briseño observed flies in the bus bay.

3

83. Most searches occurred in large groups of as many as 50 inmates. At the

4 beginning of the search, inmates were ordered to line up along the walls of the bus bay,

5 remove all clothing except for underwear and submit to an inspection of their feet and

6 hair. Deputies then ordered the inmates to face the center of the room and lift their arms,

7 breasts and stomach, in the presence of the group. Deputies also inspected their mouths

8 by requiring inmates to run their fingers between their lips and gums. Deputies then

9 ordered inmates to submit to a visual body cavity inspection. Ms. Briseño was required to

10 face the wall, pull down her underwear, spread her legs, bend at the waist and reach

11 around her body to spread apart her labia to permit an inspection of her vagina.

12

84. Ms. Briseño has been searched while she was menstruating. When

13 menstruating, she was ordered to identify herself by raising her hand, remove her soiled

14 tampon or pad in the presence of the group, submit to a visual body cavity inspection

15 while bleeding, and wait until the completion of the search before replacing her feminine

16 hygiene products. On one occasion, Ms. Briseño observed a menstruating woman expel a

17 blood clot onto the floor during the strip search.

18

85. The bus garage was not maintained in clean condition. Ms. Briseño observed

19 soiled sanitary napkins on the floor, left behind from previous searches. She also

20 observed blood on the ground.

21

J. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

22

86. Ms. Paiz and Ms. Barranca properly filed complaints (i.e. grievances) on

23 approximately August 6, 2010. Their complaints requested a sanitary, indoor location for

24 all strip searches, hidden from the view of anyone not directly involved in the strip each

25 (including inmates). They also requested equal treatment for men and women.

26

87. Ms. Vigil did not personally file a complaint, but, instead, submitted a

27 complaint letter through her attorneys to Captain Stacy Lee, also on August 6th. This

28

16

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 334 Filed 12/19/16 Page 18 of 31 Page ID #:12018

1 procedure was expressly authorized by defendant County of Los Angeles because

2 Michael Gennaco, chief attorney for the County’s Office of Independent Review,

3 informed one of Plaintiffs’ counsel that a valid means of filing an internal complaint was

4 to send a letter authored by counsel on behalf of an inmate setting forth the inmate’s

5 grievance. Ms. Vigil’s counsel requested CRDF to advise of any steps that must be taken

6 in order to comply with complaint exhaustion requirements from the initial complaint

7 through all appeal/review processes.

8

88. Under LASD policy, whenever possible, custody personnel must respond to

9 inmate complaints within 10 days. As of September 9, 2010, CRDF had not notified any

10 of the Plaintiffs regarding the disposition of their complaints. Without a response, they

11 cannot appeal or otherwise seek review. CRDF has not advised Plaintiffs of what

12 additional steps, if any, must be taken to comply with the complaint exhaustion process.

13

89. On August 20, 2010, Plaintiffs’ counsel sent a letter to Captain Stacy Lee to

14 determine the status of all three complaints. Captain Lee’s office has not responded to the

15 letter or to follow-up phone calls placed by Plaintiffs’ attorneys.

16

90. Ms. Barranca, Ms. Paiz and Ms. Vigil have satisfied their obligation to

17 exhaust available remedies. CRDF rendered the complaint process unavailable by

18 ignoring their complaints. Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809, 812 (“…a remedy

19 becomes ‘unavailable’ if prison employees do not respond to a properly filed grievance

20 or otherwise use affirmative misconduct to prevent a prisoner from exhausting.”); Tuttle

21 v. Boynton, 2009 WL 2134968 (W.D. Mich. 2009) (holding that prisoner whose

22 grievance was not answered timely and whose requests for an appeal form were denied or 23 ignored had exhausted available remedies); Underwood v. Wilson, 151 F.3d 292, 295 (5th

24 Cir. 1998) (citing with approval pre-PLRA cases excusing exhaustion where irregularities

25 in the process prevented it or prison officials ignore or interfere with the prisoner’s

26 efforts).

27

28

17

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 334 Filed 12/19/16 Page 19 of 31 Page ID #:12019

1 V. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

2

A. COMMON FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

3

91. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that women are routinely strip searched

4 and forced to undergo visual body cavity searches in the manner described above, before

5 being arraigned.

6

92. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that women are routinely strip searched

7 and forced to undergo visual body cavity searches as described above, when they are first

8 placed in general population.

9

93. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that men are not routinely strip searched

10 and forced to undergo visual body cavity searches in the manner described above, before

11 being arraigned.

12

94. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that men are not routinely strip searched

13 and forced to undergo visual body cavity searches in the manner described above, when

14 they are first placed in general population. On information and belief, Plaintiffs allege

15 the strip and/or visual body cavity searches to which they and class members were

16 subjected, were performed pursuant to Defendants’ policy and practice to

17 indiscriminately search all, or a large number of women, but not men being processed

18 into the jail without regard to: a) The nature of their offense or criminal history; b)

19 Whether they are under an order of release or not; c) Whether they have had contact with

20 any persons from outside the County jail system who could reasonably be believed to be

21 a potential source of contraband or weapons; d) Whether there is cause of any kind to

22 believe they are a potential source of contraband or weapons; e) Whether there is any

23 other articulable justification for Defendants’ indiscriminate strip and body search policy;

24 f) Whether they are “pre-arraignment detainees,” as that term is used in California Penal

25 Code §4030(b); and g) Whether there is any legitimate reason to strip search women, but

26 not men, as set forth herein.

27

95. On information and belief, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have a policy of

28 not limiting the persons who can see, or hear, or observe all or part of the strip and body

18

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 334 Filed 12/19/16 Page 20 of 31 Page ID #:12020

1 cavity searches to those who are necessary for the procedure. Thus, other inmates,

2 members of the opposite sex, dispensable jail personnel and possibly others are able to

3 see or hear some or all of the searches described above. Specifically, class members are

4 required to submit to strip searches during which other people who are not participating

5 in the search and/or are of the opposite sex, including jail staff and other inmates, are able

6 to observe the search and the class members’ naked bodies. On further information and

7 belief, in many instances class members are forced to touch each other’s bodies during

8 the searches in order to comply with the directions given by Sheriff’s deputies.

9

96. Plaintiffs bring this action on their own behalf, and on behalf of a class of all

10 other persons similarly situated, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil

11 Procedure. The class is defined as those women who were forced to undergo the unlawful

12 strip and/or visual body cavity searches in Los Angeles County’s jails which are

13 operated, maintained and under the control of the County, the LASD and the Supervisory

14 Defendants as set forth in this complaint; to wit, searches that violated the Fourth

15 Amendment or its California equivalent, or searches that violated equal protection of the

16 law due to the fact that that the policy and custom of strip searches was applied to

17 women, but not to men.

18

97. Due to the previous filing of Solis v. Baca, No. CV06-1135 SVW (CTx), a

19 case currently pending in this court, the class period goes back two years prior to the

20 filing of that case, which also alleges violation of the Fourth Amendment and equal

21 protection rights of those subjected to strip searches by the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s

22 Department. Because the pendency of that case has tolled the statute of limitations for the

23 class members herein, the statute of limitations in this case reaches back to May 30, 2004.

24

98. Plaintiffs have also engaged in pre-litigation settlement efforts. Specifically,

25 Plaintiffs showed Defendants a draft copy of this complaint, and asked that Defendants

26 immediately cease and desist their unlawful practices. Plaintiffs also raised this issue

27 with Defendants’ counsel during a meeting to discuss county strip search policies. To

28 date, and to Plaintiffs’ knowledge, Defendants continue to engage in the unlawful

19

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 334 Filed 12/19/16 Page 21 of 31 Page ID #:12021

1 practices detailed in this complaint.

2

a. RULE 23 PREREQUISITES

3

i. Numerosity

4

99. In accordance with F.R.Civ. P. Rule 23(a), the members of the class are so

5 numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiffs do not know the exact

6 number of class members. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege, that

7 there are more than 300 inmates per day who are subjected to strip and/or body cavity

8 searches as a result of Defendants’ policy and practice of indiscriminately subjecting

9 prisoners to strip and body cavity searches. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and

10 thereon allege, that the number of persons in the proposed class is in the thousands.

11

ii. Common Issues of Fact or Law

12

100. In accordance with F.R. Civ. P. Rule 23(a), there are questions of fact

13 common to the class. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege, that the

14 common questions of fact include, but are not limited to the following: (1) Whether the

15 LASD routinely subjects all prisoners to strip and/or body cavity searches without any

16 reasonable suspicion, based on specific or articulable facts, to believe any particular

17 inmate has concealed drug(s), weapon(s) and/or any contraband on their persons or in

18 their body cavities; (2) Whether the strip and/or body cavity searches are conducted in an

19 area of privacy so that the search cannot be observed by persons not participating in the

20 search, or whether the strip and body cavity searches are conducted in areas where they

21 may be observed by persons not participating in the searches; (3) Whether the strip and/or

22 body cavity searches are conducted in an unsanitary area, infested with bacteria such as

23 MRSA and other communicable diseases; (4) Whether females are subjected to strip

24 and/or body cavity searches when males are not; (5) Whether females are subjected to

25 strip and/or body cavity searches under conditions which are more intrusive and less

26 sanitary than males.

27

28

20

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1

101. In accordance with F.R. Civ. P. Rule 23(a), there are questions of law

2 common to the class. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and, thereon allege, that the

3 common questions of law include but are not limited to the following: (1) Whether the

4 LASD may indiscriminately conduct strip and/or body cavity searches of inmates without

5 there being any reasonable suspicion, based on specific or articulable facts, to believe any

6 particular inmate has concealed drug(s), weapon(s) and/or any contraband on their

7 persons or in their body cavities; (2) Whether the LASD may conduct strip and/or body

8 cavity searches of inmates in open areas where they may be observed by persons not

9 participating in the searches; (3) Whether LASD’s policy of subjecting persons to strip

10 and/or body cavity searches violates California Penal Code §4030; (4) Whether LASD’s

11 policy of subjecting persons to strip and/or body cavity searches in an area which is not

12 an “area of privacy” violates California Penal Code §4030(m); (5) Whether the conduct

13 described above violates the Fourth and/or Fourteenth Amendments, and/or California

14 Constitution Article I, §§1, 7, and/or 13; (6) Whether the conduct described above

15 constitutes a policy or custom of Defendants; (7) Whether any individual Defendant is

16 entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims, or state law immunity on the state

17 law claims, for the practices complained of herein; and (8) Whether determination of

18 damages suffered by a statistically representative sample of the class provides the basis

19 for determination of all class members’ damages except those who opt out, or whether

20 category damages may appropriately be determined for the class members.

21

iii. Typicality

22

102. In accordance with F.R. Civ. P. Rule 23(a), the claims of the representative

23 Plaintiffs are typical of the class. Plaintiffs were in LASD custody when they were

24 subjected to strip and/or visual body cavity searches of inmates without any reasonable

25 suspicion, based on specific or articulable facts, to believe that any Plaintiff and class

26 members had concealed drug(s), weapon(s) and/or any contraband in their body cavities;

27 Plaintiffs were subjected to the searches in open areas where they were observed by other

28 inmates and persons not involved in the search, including sometimes members of the

21

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 334 Filed 12/19/16 Page 23 of 31 Page ID #:12023

1 opposite sex; Plaintiffs were searched and forced to stand naked in unsanitary and

2 bacteria infested areas; females were subjected to strip and/or body cavity searches when

3 males were not; and females were subjected to strip and/or body cavity searches under

4 conditions which were more intrusive and less sanitary than males.

5

103. Thus, Plaintiffs have the same interests and have suffered the same type of

6 damages as the class members. Plaintiffs’ claims are based upon the same or similar legal

7 theories as the claims of the class members. Each class member suffered actual damages

8 as a result of being subjected to a strip and/or body cavity search. The actual damages

9 suffered by Plaintiffs are similar in type and amount to the actual damages suffered by

10 each class member.

11

104. In accordance with F.R. Civ. P. Rule 23(a), the representative Plaintiffs will

12 fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. The interests of the representative

13 Plaintiffs are consistent with and not antagonistic to the interests of the class.

14

iv. Maintenance and Superiority

15

105. In accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 23(b)(1)(A), prosecutions of separate

16 actions by individual members of the class would create a risk that inconsistent or

17 varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class would establish

18 incompatible standards of conduct for the parties opposing the class.

19

106. In accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 23(b)(1)(B), prosecutions of separate

20 actions by individual members of the class would create a risk of adjudications with

21 respect to individual members of the class which would, as a practical matter,

22 substantially impair or impede the interests of the other members of the class to protect

23 their interests.

24

107. In accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 23(b)(2), Plaintiffs are informed and

25 believe, and thereon allege that Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to

26 the class.

27

108. In accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 23(b)(3), the questions of law or fact

28 common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only

22

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 334 Filed 12/19/16 Page 24 of 31 Page ID #:12024

1 individual members, and this class action is superior to other available methods for the

2 fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy between the parties. Plaintiffs are

3 informed and believe, and thereon allege, that the interests of class members in

4 individually controlling the prosecution of a separate action is low in that most class

5 members would be unable to individually prosecute any action at all. Plaintiffs are

6 informed and believe, and thereon allege that the amounts at stake for individuals are

7 such that separate suits would be impracticable in that most members of the class will not

8 be able to find counsel to represent them. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon

9 allege, that it is desirable to concentrate all litigation in one forum because all of the

10 claims arise in the same location, i.e., the County of Los Angeles. It will promote judicial

11 efficiency to resolve the common questions of law and fact in one forum rather than in

12 multiple courts.

13

109. Plaintiffs do not know the identities of the class members. Plaintiffs are

14 informed and believe, and thereon allege, that the identities of the class members are

15 ascertainable from LASD records, in particular the LASD AJIS computer system used to

16 track and identify LASD inmates. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege,

17 that AJIS reflects the identities, including addresses and telephone numbers, of the

18 persons who have been held in custody by LASD; when inmates were arrested and

19 booked, taken to court, returned from court; why inmates were released; and when

20 inmates were released.

21

110. Plaintiffs know of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management

22 of this litigation that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. The class action is

23 superior to any other available means to resolve the issues raised on behalf of the class.

24 The class action will be manageable because so many different records systems exist

25 from which to ascertain the members of the class. Liability can be determined on a class-

26 wide basis. Damages can be determined on a class-wide basis using a damages matrix set

27 by a jury, or by trying the damages of a statistically valid sample of the class to a jury and

28 extrapolating those damages to the class as a whole.

23

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 334 Filed 12/19/16 Page 25 of 31 Page ID #:12025

1

111. In accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 23(b)(3), class members must be

2 furnished with the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual

3 notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. Plaintiffs are

4 informed and believe that LASD computer records contain a last known address for class

5 members. Plaintiffs contemplate that individual notice be given to class members at such

6 last known address by first class mail. Plaintiffs contemplate that the notice inform class

7 members of the following:

8

A. The pendency of the class action, and the issues common to the class;

9

B. The nature of the action;

10

C. Their right to ‘opt out’ of the action within a given time, in which

11

event they will not be bound by a decision rendered in the class

12

action;

13

D. Their right, if they do not ‘opt out,’ to be represented by their own

14

counsel and enter an appearance in the case; otherwise, they will be

15

represented by the named Plaintiffs and their counsel; and

16

E. Their right, if they do not ‘opt out,’ to share in any recovery in favor

17

of the class, and conversely to be bound by any judgment on the

18

common issues, adverse to the class.

19

112. Plaintiffs restate and incorporate by reference each of the foregoing and

20 ensuing paragraphs in each of the following causes of action as if each paragraph was

21 fully set forth therein.

22

COUNT ONE – 42 U.S.C. §1983 [FOURTH AMENDMENT]

23

(All Defendants)

24 113. In subjecting Plaintiffs and class members to the unnecessary, demeaning,
25 and outrageous intrusive strip and body cavity search, Defendants, and each of them,
26 violated Plaintiffs’ and class members’ rights to be secure in their persons against
27 unreasonable searches and seizures as guaranteed by the Fourth and Fourteenth
28

24

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 334 Filed 12/19/16 Page 26 of 31 Page ID #:12026

1 Amendments to the United States Constitution. Therefore, Plaintiffs and class members

2 are entitled to bring suit and recover damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983.

3

114. The aforementioned acts of Defendants proximately caused Plaintiffs to be

4 deprived of their rights as stated above, thereby entitling Plaintiffs and the class to

5 damages in an amount to be proven at trial.

6

115. Plaintiffs Lora Barranca, Diana Paiz and Diane Vigil remain incarcerated at

7 CRDF, and will remain incarcerated beyond their upcoming court appearances. Because

8 CRDF will require them to submit to strip searches/body cavity searches upon returning

9 from court, they will continue to suffer deprivations of their rights and, therefore, seek

10 injunctive relief on behalf of themselves and the class of similarly situated individuals.

11

COUNT TWO – 42 U.S.C. §1983 [EQUAL PROTECTION]

12

(All Defendants)

13

14

116. The unequal treatment of men and women – and the unnecessary,

15 demeaning, and outrageous intrusive strip and body cavity searches inflicted on women

but not men – deprived the female class members of the protections afforded by 16
provisions of the 14th Amendment Equal Protection guarantees. Therefore, the female 17

18 Plaintiffs and class members are entitled to bring suit and recover damages pursuant to 42

U.S.C. §1983. 19

20

117. The aforementioned acts of Defendants proximately caused Plaintiffs to be

deprived of their rights as stated above, thereby entitling Plaintiffs and the class to 21

22 damages in an amount to be proven at trial.

118. Plaintiffs Lora Barranca, Diana Paiz and Diane Vigil remain incarcerated at 23

24 CRDF and will remain incarcerated beyond their upcoming court appearances. Because

CRDF will require them to submit to strip searches/body cavity searches upon returning 25

26 from court, they will continue to suffer deprivations of their rights and therefore seek

27 injunctive relief on behalf of themselves and the class of similarly situated individuals.

COUNT THREE – ARTICLE 1, §§1 AND 13 OF THE CALIFORNIA

28

CONSTITUTION [PRIVACY/FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALOGUE]

25

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 334 Filed 12/19/16 Page 27 of 31 Page ID #:12027

1

(All Defendants)

2 119. Plaintiffs filed a Govt. Code §910 claim for damages against Defendants for

3 the matters set forth in this complaint, thereby making it unnecessary for the newly added

4 named Plaintiffs to file individual §910 claims.

5 120. The unnecessary, demeaning, outrageous, and intrusive strip and body cavity

6 search to which Plaintiffs and class members were subjected violated Plaintiffs’ rights not

7 to be subjected to invasion of their fundamental privacy interests, as guaranteed by

8 Article I, §1 of the California Constitution; and to be secure in their persons against

9 unreasonable searches and seizures, as guaranteed by Article I, §13 of the California

10 Constitution.

11 121. The aforementioned acts of Defendants proximately caused Plaintiffs to be

12 deprived of their rights as stated above, thereby entitling Plaintiffs and the class to

13 damages in an amount to be proven at trial.

14

122. Plaintiffs Lora Barranca, Diana Paiz and Diane Vigil remain incarcerated at

15 CRDF, and will remain incarcerated beyond their upcoming court appearances. Because

16

CRDF will require them to submit to strip searches/body cavity searches upon returning 17

18 from court, they will continue to suffer deprivations of their rights and, therefore, seek

19 injunctive relief on behalf of themselves and the class of similarly situated individuals.

20 COUNT FOUR – ARTICLE 1, §7, OF THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION [EQUAL PROTECTION]

21

(All Defendants)

22 123. The unequal treatment of men and women violated the female Plaintiffs’
23 rights not to be denied equal protection of the law, as guaranteed by Article I, §7 of the
24
California Constitution, and to be secure in their persons against unreasonable searches 25
and seizures as guaranteed by Article I, § 13 of the California Constitution. 26
124. The aforementioned acts of Defendants proximately caused Plaintiffs to be 27
deprived of their rights as stated above, thereby entitling Plaintiffs and the class to 28
damages in an amount to be proven at trial.

26

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 334 Filed 12/19/16 Page 28 of 31 Page ID #:12028

1

125. Plaintiffs Lora Barranca, Diana Paiz and Diane Vigil remain incarcerated at

2 CRDF, and will remain incarcerated beyond their upcoming court appearances. Because

3 CRDF will require them to submit to strip searches/body cavity searches upon returning

4 from court, they will continue to suffer deprivations of their rights and, therefore, seek

5 injunctive relief on behalf of themselves and the class of similarly situated individuals.

6

COUNT FIVE - Cal. Civ. Code §52.1

7

(All Defendants)

8

126. The unnecessary, demeaning, and outrageous intrusive strip and/or visual

9 body cavity searches alleged herein were accomplished via threat, intimidation or

10 coercion and/or threats of the same.

11

127. The unnecessary, demeaning, and outrageous intrusive strip and visual body

12 cavity searches, and the unequal treatment of women as opposed to men, deprived

13 Plaintiffs and the class they represent of the protections afforded by provisions of federal

14 constitutional and state constitutional and statutory law including, but not limited to

15 rights protected under the Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

16 States Constitution; Article I, §§1, 7, 13, and 17, of the California state constitution, and

17 California Penal Code §4030. Therefore, Plaintiffs and the class are entitled to bring suit

18 and recover damages pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code §52.1(b).

19

128. As a direct and proximate cause of the aforementioned acts, Plaintiffs and

20 class members were damaged in an amount to be proven at trial but in any event not less

21 than $4,000 per violation pursuant to the provisions of Civil Code §52(b).

22

129. The aforementioned acts of Defendants directly and proximately caused

23 Plaintiffs to be deprived of their California constitutional rights as stated above, thereby

24 entitling Plaintiffs and class members to recover damages proximately caused by

25 Defendants’ wrongful acts.

26

130. Plaintiffs Lora Barranca, Diana Paiz and Diane Vigil remain incarcerated at

27 CRDF, and will remain incarcerated beyond their upcoming court appearances. Because

28 CRDF will require them to submit to strip searches/body cavity searches upon returning

27

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 334 Filed 12/19/16 Page 29 of 31 Page ID #:12029

1 from court, they will continue to suffer deprivations of their rights and therefore seek

2 injunctive relief on behalf of themselves and the class of similarly situated individuals.

3

COUNT SIX – Violation of Statutory Duties

4

(Penal Code §4030)

(Against Defendants County and LASD Only)

5

6

131. The unnecessary, demeaning, outrageous, and intrusive strip and body cavity

7 searches, to which Plaintiffs and the class members were subjected by Defendants,

8 violated Plaintiffs’ and the class members’ state-law protections guaranteed by California

9 Penal Code §4030. The aforementioned acts of Defendants directly and proximately

10 caused the Plaintiffs and the class members to be deprived of their rights as stated above,

11 thereby entitling Plaintiffs and class members to recover damages proximately caused by

12 Defendants’ wrongful acts, including statutory damages under Penal Code §4030.

13 132. Plaintiffs Lora Barranca, Diana Paiz and Diane Vigil remain incarcerated at

14 CRDF, and will remain incarcerated beyond their upcoming court appearances. Because

15 CRDF will require them to submit to strip searches/body cavity searches upon returning

16 from court, they will continue to suffer deprivations of their rights and, therefore, seek

17 injunctive relief on behalf of themselves and the class of similarly situated individuals.

18 COUNT SEVEN – Violation of Mandatory Duties

19

(Against Defendants County and LASD)

20

133. The Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 21

22 Constitution; Article I, §§1, 7, 13, and 17, of the California state constitution; California

23 Penal Code §4030; and California Civil Code §52.1 are enactments. Enactments form the

24 basis of a mandatory duty under California Government Code §815.6.

25

134. Any California constitutional provision is mandatory and prohibitory, per

26 Article 1, §26, of the California Constitution.

27

135. These constitutional provisions and statutes apply to all members of the

general public, including Plaintiffs, and were all designed to prevent the kind of injuries 28

alleged herein.

28

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 334 Filed 12/19/16 Page 30 of 31 Page ID #:12030

1

136. Defendants did not exercise reasonable diligence in discharging their duty

2 to refrain from violating the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs and class members.

3

137. As a direct and proximate cause of the aforementioned acts of Defendants,

4 Plaintiffs and class members were damaged in amounts to be determined at trial.

5 VII. PRAYER

6

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the class members they

7 represent, request damages against each defendant as follows:

8

1. General and special damages according to proof;

9 2.
10 proof;
11

As against the individual Defendants only, punitive damages according to

12

3. In addition to actual damages, statutory damages as allowed by law,

13 including Penal Code §4030 and treble damages under California Civil Code §§52 and

14 52.1;

15

4. Attorneys’ fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. §1988; California Civil Code

16 §§52(b)(3), 52.1(h); California Code of Civil Procedure §1021.5, and whatever other

17 statute or law may be applicable. (Although a claim for injunctive relief is not included in
18 this Amended Complaint, it was in the previous ones. At the time Plaintiffs filed their 19
non-opposition to summary judgment on the grounds of mootness for injunctive relief, 20
they specifically reserved the right to move for catalyst attorneys’ fees on state law 21 22 injunctive relief claims because they maintain this lawsuit was a substantial factor 23 contributing to defendants’ action. Thus, a claim for such catalyst fees is included in this
24 amended complaint, and a motion, and evidence in support thereof, will be brought at the

25 appropriate time.).

26

5. The costs of this suit and such other relief as is just and proper.

27

28 DATED: December 15, 2016 KAYE, McLANE, BEDNARSKI & LITT, LLP DONALD COOK 29

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 334 Filed 12/19/16 Page 31 of 31 Page ID #:12031

1

LAW OFFICES OF CYNTHIA ANDERSON-BARKER

2 By: _/s/ Barrett S. Litt____________________

3

Barrett S. Litt

4

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

5

6

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

7

Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves individually and on behalf of the class, demand

8 a jury trial. 9 DATED: December 15, 2016 10
11

By: __/s/ Barrett S. Litt_______________
Barrett S. Litt Attorney for Plaintiffs

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

30

 
 Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 361 Filed 06/07/17 Page 1 of 18 Page ID #:13864
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 10-01649-SVW-JEM

Title

Mary Amador v. Leroy D . Baca, et al.

Date Jlme 7, 2017

Present: The Honorable STEPHEN V. WILSON, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

Paul M. Cmz Deputy Clerk

NIA Comi Rep01ter I Recorder

Attom eys Present for Plaintiffs:

Attomeys Present for Defendants:

N/A

N/A

Proceedings:

IN CHAMBERS ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS ' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS ' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [343] [346]

I. INTRODUCTION
Seven years ago, Plaintiffs filed this class action complaint alleging that Defendants instigated unconstitutional strip search polices at Centmy Regional Detention Facility ("CRDF") in Lynwood, Califomia. On November 18, 2016, this Comt granted Plaintiffs' renewed motion for class ce1tification. Dkt. 327. The class period nms from March 1, 2008 to Janua1y 1, 2015. See id. On December 19, 2016, Plaintiffs filed the operative Fomth Amended Complaint. Dkt. 334. On March 10, 2017, the patties filed cross motions for sUlillnaty judgment as to Plaintiffs 42 U.S .C. § 1983 claim that Defendants violated the Fourth Amendment rights of female inmates who were strip searched at Bus Bay #3 . Dkts. 343, 346.
Plaintiffs do not challenge Defendants ' right to institute a blanket strip search policy against inmates without individualized suspicion, since that issue has long been settled by th e Supreme Comi. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S . 520, 559 (1979). Plaintiffs ru·gue that the conditions of the seru·ch, executed with out penological justification, give rise to their § 1983 claim. Further, though the class ce1tification order separates Plaintiffs into two classes and multiple subclasses, Plaintiffs ru·gue that the "core

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 10-01649-SVW-JEM

Title

Mary Amador v. Leroy D . Baca, et al.

Date Jlme 7, 2017

conditions" common to eve1y class establishes their claim. The Comi agrees, and GRANTS Plaintiffs motion for summruy judgment. 1 Accordingly, the Comi DENIES Defendants' motion on these grounds. Defendants also moved for smnmruy judgment against the individual and official capacity claims against individual defendants. The Comi GRANTS Defendants ' motion for smnmruy judgment on claims against individual defendants.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2
Since 2006, the Los Angeles Cmmty Sheriffs Depruiment ("LASD") primru·ily housed th e female inmates at CRDF. Inmates who ru·e transp01ied to court are subject to a visual body cavity ("VBC") search upon their retum to CRDF. The vast majority of these searches occmTed at Bus Bay #3 . These seru·ches were conducted in groups of at least twenty inmates, and sometimes exceeding f01iy.
Though pruticulru· details of any given strip search may vruy, LASD issued a strip seru·ch script in 2013 which the pruiies agree describe common elements of the seru·ch from 2008 to 2015. See dkt. 345-1 , exh. H; dkt. 284-32, exh. 312.1.3 The guards instructed the inmates to disrobe down to their panties, and place their clothes and personal items on a table in front of them. The inmates then lifted their aiiDS above th eir head, lifted th eir breasts, and ran th eir fingers through the waistline of their unde1wear. They were th en told to drop their lmdeiweru· to their knees and leave them there, and to open their belly buttons and lift their stomach and any skin folds. They were then told to lift their lmdeiwear and tmn armmd to face the wall.
1 The Court notes that the "core conditions" ofthe search are common to both classes and all subclasses. Therefore, members of a subclass that may have experienced even harsher conditions, due to cold weather, menstruation while being searched, larger group size, or other factors, were all subject to the core conditions and thus the sununary judgment order applies to subclasses without needing to consider the additional allegations ofthe subclasses. 2 Unless othetwise noted, the Court' s statement of facts is taken from the undisputed statements in the patties' sepat·ate statements of material facts. See dkts. 350, 354. Ifthe Cowt states a fact was not disputed but the subject of an objection, the Cowt ovetrules the objection. 3 The Court notes that the script includes reference to several changes that LASD made throughout the years, such as painting squru·es on the floor and installing tables for imnates to put their clothes on, and thus is not indicative of evety female imnate's experience. However, the Cowt fmds these differences inconsequential to the liability analysis.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 10-01649-SVW-JEM

Title

Mary Amador v. Leroy D. Baca, et al.

Date Jlme 7, 2017

At this point the guards asked if any inmates were on her period. If so, they were instm cted to remove th eir tampon or pad and were given a new pad, but told not to put it on. The guards then ordered th e following:
[P]ull down your undetwear, take a half step back, spread your feet wide, and bend at your waist, not at your knees. Reach behind with your hands, spread open your vagina lips, and cough. Look between your legs so you can see when we tell you to get up. Cough until you are told to get up. When you are told to get up, face the wall and put your hands behind your back. You should not be talking or looking around.
Dkt. 345-1 , exh. H; dkt. 284-32, exh. 312.1. Inmates who requested a pad were then told they could put it on. The guards then searched the clothing on the table, and then the inmates got dressed and exited.
The patties do dispute the extent to which the inmates viewed each other during this search. See dkt. 350 ~ 41. The Comi accepts Defendants ' factual contentions that inmates were "not forced to watch other women", dkt. 345-3, exh. " X" (Cholewiak Depo.) at 398:8-1 6, and that the deputies stood in the middle of the room between the two lines patiially obstm cting the view. Defendants produce no evidence, however, that rebuts Plaintiffs' common sense assertion that the inmates could not avoid seeing each oth er's bru·e bodies.4
The layout of Bus Bay #3 and the amount of individuals searched at a time changed throughout the yeru·s. The Comi finds some of these changes important to th e analysis:
• In April, 2013, 24 nmnbered squares were painted on the floor Bus Bay #3.
4 Defendants' argwnent that inmates were "instlucted" not to look at each other is misplaced. First, as a factual matter, this does not contradict the assertion that inmates did see each other's bare bodies both dwing the initial disrobing and dming the VBC inspection, and thus that assertion remains nndisputed. See Young v. County ofCook, 616 F.Supp.2d 834, 850 n. 9 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (finding that no reasonable fact fmder could infer that a group of inmates being snip searched without privacy screens could avoid observing other inmates' naked bodies). Second, as a legal matter, the bmden is not on the irunates to fix their gaze in a constitutionally approp1-iate manner. Rather, the bmden is on the Defendants to secme the irunates' p1-ivacy- unless there a penological pwpose or other justification for not doing so.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 10-01649-SVW-JEM

Title

Mary Amador v. Leroy D. Baca, et al.

Date Jlme 7, 2017

• On July 20, 2013, CDRF implemented a written policy limiting strip searches to a maximum of 24 inmates at a time.
• In October, 2014, a body scanner machine was installed for pmposes of searching inmates. Since that time, only inmates who refuse to be body-scanned are su·ip searched.
• 24 privacy cmiains were installed in Febmmy, 2015.
The pmiicular strip search at issue, a VBC, is considered to be more invasive than a strip search that does not include a body cavity inspection. Fmi her, a VBC in which the female inmate is told to manually spread her vagina for inspection ("labia lift") is more invasive than the altem ative "squat-and-cough" procedm e. It is undisputed that the sem·ch conducted by LASD is not th e standm·d practice used by oth er conectional facilities. See dkt. 350 ~~ 113, 116 (Defendants object but do not dispute). Plaintiffs expeti, Wendy Still, is not awm·e of any other jail that conducts this type of invasive search in a group setting without individualized privacy (regardless of whether the jail uses the "labia lift" or "squat-and-cough" procedm e). !d. ~ 117 (Defendants object but do not dispute).5
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Sunnnaty judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving pmiy is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving patiy bears the initial
5 Defendants' objections to these last tv.ro points is that "con·ectional practices of another institution are i.ITelevant to a detennination ofwhether the strip search procedmes at CRDF, specifically, were constitutional." Dkt. 350 ~~ 116, 117. As discussed fmiher below, the question is not simply whether or not the strip search "infringes" the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs, but also whether the infringing elements ofthe search are reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 547 ("[E]ven when an institutional restriction infringes a specific constitutional guarantee ... the practice must be evaluated in the light of the central objective ofprison administration, safeguarding institutional secmity."); see also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) ("[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests."). Comts have consistently found the practice of other institutions to be relevant under the second inquily (whether the infringing element is reasonably related to a valid penological purpose). See Mon·tson v. Hall, 261 F .3d 896, 905 (9th Cir. 2001); see also, dkt. 356, Pl. Reply, at n. 4 (collecting cases).
The Comt futther notes that Defendants' objections to Wendy Still are targeted towards her lack ofpersonal knowledge of CRDF. See dkt. 355, Def. Reply, at 10. Defendants do not object to her knowledge of standard practices at other conectional facilities. Fmiher, Defendants have not challenged Still's qualifications as an expe1t and have not requested a Daubert hearing.

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Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 361 Filed 06/07/17 Page 5 of 18 Page ID #:13868
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 10-01649-SVW-JEM

Title

Mary Amador v. Leroy D. Baca, et al.

Date Jlme 7, 2017

responsibility of informing the comi of the basis of its motion, and identifying those p01iions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to inten ogatories, admissions, or affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a triable issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). In detennining a motion for summruy judgment, all reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S . 242, 255 (1986). A genuine issue exists if"the evidence is such that a reasonable jmy could return a verdict for the nonmoving pruiy," and material facts ru·e those "that might affect the outcome of the suit under the goveming law." !d. at 248. However, no genuine issue of fact exists "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving pruiy." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
IV. APPLICABLE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. Turn er v. S afley
In Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), the Supreme Comi considered the constitutionality of several inmate regulations promulgated by the Missouri Division of Con ections. The Comi began by describing "the principles that necessru·ily frame our analysis of prisoners' constitutional claims." !d. at 84. Among other things, the Court observed:
[C]omis are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and refonn. . . . [T]he problems of prisons in America ru·e complex and intractable, and, more to the point, they ru·e not readily susceptible of resolution by decree. Rmming a prison is an inordinately difficult undertaking that requires expertise, planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiru·ly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of govemment. . . . Where a state penal system is involved, federal courts have, as we indicated in Mruiinez, additional reason to accord deference to the appropriate prison authorities.
!d. (intemal citations and quotation marks omitted). Fmihe1more:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 10-01649-SVW-JEM

Title

Mary Amador v. Leroy D . Baca, et al.

Date Jlme 7, 2017

[J]udgments regarding prison security are peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of conections officials, and, in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations, comis should ordinarily defer to their expe1i judgment in such matters.
!d. at 86 (intem al citations and quotation marks omitted).
In light of th ese guiding principles, the Comi held that "when a prison regulation impinges on inmates ' constitutional rights, th e regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." !d. at 89. Specifically, the Turner Comi listed four factors in detennining the reasonableness of the regulation at issue. "First, there must be a valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and th e legitimate govemmental interest put f01ward to justify it." !d. at 89 (intemal quotation marks omitted). Second, courts should consider "whether there are altemative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates." !d. at 90. "A third consideration is the impact accommodation of the asse1ied constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally." !d. "Finally, the absence of ready altematives is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison regulation. By the same token, the existence of obvious, easy altematives may be evidence that the regulation is not reasonable, but is an 'exaggerated response' to prison concem s." Id. 6
B. Bell v. Wolfish
In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S . 520 (1979), the Supreme Comi held that conducting a visual body cavity search of all inmates who had a conta.ct visit with visitors, without probable cause to believe the inmates were concealing contraban d, was constitutional. In its decision, the Court set f01ih th e applicable legal framework that must be applied where, as here, an inmate challenges a strip-search policy lmder the Fomih Amendment:
6 The Cowt cautioned that " [t]his is not a ' least restrictive altemative' test: prison officials do not have to set up and then shoot down eve1y conceivable altemative method of accommodating the claimant's constitutional complaint. But if an inmate claimant can point to an altemative that fully accommodates the prisoner' s rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests, a cowt may consider that as evidence that the regulation does not satisfy the reasonable relationship standard." Turner, 482 U.S. at 90-9 1 (intemal citations omitted).

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 10-01649-SVW-JEM

Title

Mary Amador v. Leroy D . Baca, et al.

Date Jlme 7, 2017

The test of reasonableness lmder the Fomih Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application. In each case it requires a balancing ofthe need for the prut icular search against the invasion of personal rights that the seru·ch entails. Comis must consider the scope of the pruticulru· intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.
!d. at 559. The Comi concluded that VBC inspections could be conducted with less than probable cause, but specifically reaffmned that such seru·ches "must be conducted in a reasonable mrumer." !d. at 560.
C. Bull v. City & County ofSan Francisco and Florence v. Bd. ofChosen Freeholders
In Bull v. City & County ofSan Francisco , 595 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010) (en bane), an en bane panel of the Ninth Circuit held that the VBC inspection of pre-anaignment anestees, without any individualized reasonable suspicion that they were concealing conu·aband, was constitutional.
The comi reasoned that " [b]ecause the pmpose of the seru·ch policy at issue was to fmiher institutional secmity goals within a detention facility, the principles ruticulated in Bell v. Wolfish [cite] , and Turner v. Safley [cite], govem om analysis." !d. at 971. The comt fmther noted that " [a]lthoughBell continues to provide definitive guidance for analyzing detention-facility strip searches under the Fomth Amendment, Turner v. Safley is also relevant to om analysis." !d. at 973. The comi emphasized the substantial deference that must be given to prison officials in this context, reiterating that
even if we "disagree[] with the judgment of [conections] officials about the extent of the secmity interests affected and the means required to fmt her those interests," Bell, 441 U.S. at 554, we may not engage in "an impermissible substitution of [om] view on the proper adminisu·ation of [a conections facility] for that of the experienced adminisu·ators of that facility." Block, 468 U.S. at 589.
!d. at 975. Under this deferential standat·d, the comi found that the suspicionless VBC inspection of inmates was constitutional under both Bell and Turner. Sh01tly after the Ninth Circuit's decision in Bull, the Supreme Comi reached essentially the same result in Florence v. Bd. ofChosen Freeholders , 566 U.S.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 10-01649-SVW-JEM

Title

Mary Amador v. Leroy D . Baca, et al.

Date Jlme 7, 2017

318 (2012), upholding the constitutionality of visual body cavity searches, without reasonable suspicion, of inmates entering the general population of a jail. In so holding, the Comi reaffmned the deference owed to conections officials in this context:
In addressing this type of constitutional claim comis must defer to the judgment of con ectional officials unless the record contains substantial evidence showing their policies are an mmecessruy or lmjustified response to problems ofjail security.
!d. at 322- 23. However, the Comi acknowledged that "there may be legitimate concems" about the manner in which strip searches ru·e conducted, but found that " [t]hese issues ru·e not implicated on the facts of this case". See id. at 339.
V. ANALYSIS
The Bell Comi put f01ih four factors to analyze the reasonableness of a pruiiculru· search: "Comis must consider [A] the scope of the patiicular intrusion, [B] the manner in which it is conducted, [C] the justification for initiating it, and [D] the place in which it is conducted." Bell, 441 U.S. at 559. The factors in Turner ru·e also relevant to the analysis. See Bull595 F.3d at 973. Thus, th e Court will also consider wheth er there is a "valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate govemmental interest put f01wru·d to justify it"; "the impact accornmodation of the asseried constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally"; and "the absence [or existence] of ready altematives." Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
A. The Scope of the Intrusion
The VBC inspections in this case involved no touching by jail personnel and were only conducted by female conectional officers. Similar strip seru·ches have been held constitutionally permissible by the Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court. See, e.g., Florence, 566 U.S . 318 (2012); Bull, 595 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010) (en bane). The Court notes, however, that Florence specifically dealt with a "squat-and-cough" inspection. See Florence, 566 U.S. at 324. It is not cleru· what type of inspection was at issue in Bull, likely because the district comi decided that the details ofthe su·ip search were inconsequential to the analysis of wheth er a blanket su·ip seru·ch policy without individualized suspicion was constitutional. See Bull v. City

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 10-01649-SVW-JEM

Title

Mary Amador v. Leroy D . Baca, et al.

Date Jlme 7, 2017

& Cty. ofSan Francisco, No. C 03-01840 CRB, 2006 WL 449148, at *1 n. 2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2006) (noting a "spectnnn of possible search practices" but fmding "the distinctions ... of searches make no difference in the analysis."). The Supreme Court in Bell briefly described the procedure for males, but was more ambiguous as to the procedure for females. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 558 n. 39 ("If the inmate is a male, he must lift his genitals and bend over to spread his buttocks for visual inspection. The vaginal and anal cavities of female inmates also are visually inspected.").
As Defendants point out, th e search at issue here seems similar to Bell and further similar to the search this Court reviewed in Solis v. Baca, Case No. CV 06-1135 SCW(CTx) ("Solis"). Defendants note that this more invasive f01m of a VBC inspection did not change the constitutional analysis in those cases. The Comt agrees that the difference between the "labia lift" and "squat-and-cough" searches is not constitutionally significant on its own; however, when accessing the overall reasonableness, this difference should be taken into accmmt. As this Court ftnther notes, Defendants provide no reason why they used a "labia lift" procedure instead of "squat-and-cough" and do not dispute that the "labia lift" is not standard practice at conectional facilities. The Comt must consider, under Turner, the existence of ready altematives and the impact to the Defendants in instituting these altematives. Here, the "squat-and-cough" was undeniably a ready altemative and undeniably less invasive, and Defendants fail to provide any reason for failing to use this approach and fail to state any negative impact that would result from this altemative.
The scope of the intrusion of the VBC inspection at issue is an imp01tant factor, even if it is constitutionally pe1missible under ce1tain conditions. Thus, this factor alone may not render the search unconstitutional, but the use of a highly invasive search is inte1twined with the other factors in an overall reasonableness analysis.
B. The Manner in Which it is Conducted
Plaintiffs do not argue that VBC inspections are per se unconstitutional. Nor do they argue that group sti·ip searches are per se unconstitutional. Rather, the Plaintiffs ' claims rely on the manner in which these pruticular VBC inspections were conducted- pruticulru·ly the intmsiveness of the seru·ch combined with the group setting and the lack of individualized privacy. Plaintiffs ru·gue the pruticulru· manner of this seru·ch was unconstitutionally invasive for th e following reasons:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 10-01649-SVW-JEM

Title

Mary Amador v. Leroy D. Baca, et al.

Date Jlme 7, 2017

• Inmates would face th e wall, oodress down to their oode1wear, and then be ordered to tum and face th e center with their bare breasts exposed.
• In view of the group, they would raise their anns and lift their breasts. • They would then lower their lmde1wear to their knees and lift their stomachs and rolls of fat. • The inmates were then ordered to face the wall, bend at the waist, reach behind their bodies,
pull apati their labia, and cough. Specifically, the script for the search memorialized in July 2013 reflects that inmates were told to "spread open your vagina lips." • They were ordered to look between their legs, not at the wall, so that they could see when an officer signaled them to stand up. • Fmiher, Plaintiffs argue the intrusiveness is heightened by the lack of privacy, and argue a readily available altemative could have easily accommodated the constitutional en ors with little burden on Defendants.
Before the Comi analyzes whether the manner of these patiiculm· searches were reasonable, the Comi notes that Defendants ' arguments in this regard miss the point.
Defendants extensively m·gue that the initiation of the sem·ch at issue was reasonable to combat the known contr·aband problems in jail. However, Plaintiffs concede that it is constitutionally permissible to conduct suspicionless str·ip sem·ches of all detainees retmning to the prison facility. Thus, Defendants ' reliance on cases that merely hold group strip searches m·e not per se ooconstitutional, or that a patiicular group search--dissimilm· to the search in this case-was not ooconstitutional, m·e oopersuasive to this Comi's inquiiy . See, e.g. , Powell v. Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298, 1313 (11th Cii·. 2008) (fmding constitutional a blanket policy of non-body cavity group str·ip sem·ches that were "no more intrusive on privacy interests than those upheld in the Bell case"); Green v. Portillo, 2015 WL 5092679, at *4-5 (D. Nev. August 27, 2015) (finding group strip searches of culinmy workers constitutional by defening to prison officials' judgment that they did not have enough officers to conduct private searches and because employment in th e culinmy was volootaiy); Wagner v. Thomas, 608 F.Supp. 1095, 1103-04 (N.D. Tex. 1095) (fmding group str·ip sem·ch constitutional due to: (1) "severe security risks in attempting to conduct individual str·ip-searches"; (2) the random searches would be rendered useless ooless all inmates are removed from theii· cells simultaneously; and (3) the comi fmmd the searches were conducted in the "most effective and

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 10-01649-SVW-JEM

Title

Mary Amador v. Leroy D. Baca, et al.

Date Jlme 7, 2017

efficient" manner); Fernandez v. Rapone, 926 F. Supp. 255, 262 (D. Mass. 1996) (finding group su·ip searches constitutional due to, in prui, "the fact that it is the policy and practice at the institution for an officer to comply with an inmate's request to be seru·ched alone."). Defendants' strip seru·ch policy is distinguishable from all these cases.
The cases Defendants rely on are both distinguishable, and bely Defendants' contention that Plaintiffs' "ready altemative" arguments are a red hening. Several of these cases at least pruiially base their decision in analyzing the proffered ready altem atives, and ultimately rejecting them for vru·ious reasons. See Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 701 (9th Cir. 1997) (in finding defendants protected by qualified immlmity, the comi rej ected plaintiffs proffered altemative of a "m ore private location" due to officer safety concems and the potential for prisoners to "discard contraband on the way to the separate area"); Elliott v. Lynn, 38 F.3d 188, 192 (5th Cir. 1994) (in upholding constitutionality of emergency jail-wide su·ip seru·ch, the court found that plaintiffs proffered altemative of individual seru·ches in private ru·eas would have been " exu·emely time consmning" when applied to "3,000 individuals" and "would have defeated the purpose of the swift institution-wide shakedown"); Franklin v. Lockhart, 883 F.2d 654, 65657 (8th Cir. 1989) (upholding constitutionality of group VBC searches due to "security concems" of plaintiffs proffered altematives, including testimony that prisoners could dispose of conu·aband on the way to private locations and that p01iable screens would block the view of security cameras-and specifically noting that its holding is "limited to the facts established in this case and should not be read to constitute a crut e blanche approval of all VBC seru·ches").7 Thus, despite Defendants' objections, it is in
7 Defendants also cite to three S.D .N .Y. cases with questionable persuasive value. See Montgome1y v. Hall, 2013 WL 1982920 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2013) report and recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 3816706 (S.D . N.Y. July 22, 2013); Smith v. City of New York, No. 2015 WL 3929621 (S.D.N.Y . June 17, 2015); Israel v. City ofNew York, 2012 WL 4762082 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). These opinions are conclusmy and involve judgments against pro se plaintiffs. In Smith the court granted Defendants j udgment on the pleadings because the plaintiff failed to "allege facts suggesting that the search did not serve a legitimate penological purpose." 2015 WL 3929621, at *2. In Israel, the court granted defendant's unopposed motion for surmnary judgment fmding the initiation of the strip searches constitutional without analyzing the manner in which they were conducted. 2012 WL 4762082. In Montgome1y , the court refused to analyze plaintiffs argument that privacy partitions were a readily available altemative by explaining that "the constitutionality of a strip search is not negated by the presence ofother inmates and employees of the facility." 2013 WL 1982920, at *4. Inexplicably, the court' s opinion never cited to Turner and thus unsmprisingly failed to analyze "the impact accommodation ofthe asse1ted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation ofprison resour-ces generally"; and "the absence [or existence] of ready altematives." Turner, 482 U .S. at 89. Similarly, Defendants rely on Gipson 11. Wilkinson, No. 1:10-CV-00524, 2015 WL 4395031 (W.D . La. July 16,

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 10-01649-SVW-JEM

Title

Mary Amador v. Leroy D. Baca, et al.

Date Jlme 7, 2017

fact a mandat01y inquny for the Comito consider the impact of accommodations that secme constitutional rights, and the absence or existence of ready altematives.8
1. " Ready Alternatives" and the Impact of Accommodation
In Young v. County ofCook, 616 F.Supp.2d 834 (N.D. Ill. 2009), a case ve1y similar to the case before this Comi, plaintiffs alleged that their Fomih and Fomieenth Amendment rights were violated while they were detained at Cook County Jail. !d. at 837. Male plaintiffs were altematively subject to a "bend-and-spread" search, in which they would bend over and spread then· buttocks, or a "squat-and-cough" search. !d. at 839. They were searched in large groups without individualized privacy. !d. at 840-41.9 Similar to the case before this Comi, the Young plaintiffs likewise "concede(d) that it is proper for (Cook County Jail] to conduct strip searches ... in groups. (However,] (t]hey challenge the manner in which those groups searches were conducted." !d. at 850. The Young comi concluded that
(B]efore the privacy screens were installed ... (the strip searches] were unreasonable and violated the Fomth Amendment as a matter oflaw. Dming that period, the class members, who were undergoing one of the most intmsive types of searches the government may permissibly conduct, were subjected to conditions that greatly enhanced their discomf01i and hmniliation. They were herded together with dozens of other men and forced to strip and bend over or squat in front of a large group, with less than a foot of space between th em.
!d. at 851.

2015) . The comt granted judgment against a prose plaintiffwho challenged his strip search in a group by a homosexual male guard. Id at *4. The court did not cite Turner nor consider proffered altematives. 8 IfDefendants meant to argue that the search itselfdoes not impinge on Plaintiffs ' constitutional rights and therefore does not
trigger Turner analysis, this argmnent can be easily dismissed. " [T]he Fomih Amendment does apply to the invasion ofbodily privacy in prisons." Bull, 595 F.3d at 974-75 (citing Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 332 (9th Cir. 1988)). 9 Female detainees, however, were searched in cubicles that provided privacy, and always through the "squat-and-cough"
approach. Young, 616 F.Supp.2d at 840.

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Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 361 Filed 06/07/17 Page 13 of 18 Page ID #:13876
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 10-01649-SVW-JEM

Title

Mary Amador v. Leroy D . Baca, et al.

Date Jlme 7, 2017

Plaintiffs here also argue that privacy screens should have been installed in Bus Bay #3. They argue that, accepting the search itself served a penological pmpose, depriving Plaintiffs of individualized privacy dming "one ofthe most intmsive types of searches th e govem ment may pen nissibly conduct", see id. , did not serve a penological pmpose nor would it have been too bm densome to accommodate. Ultimately, Plaintiff argues that failme to provide such a simple accommodation, with no justification, is conclusive evidence that the manner of the strip search was unconstitutional as a matter of law.10
The reasons that Defendants offer for not installing privacy cmtains sooner can be summarized as follows:
• Installing these curtains did not become feasible until the department installed a body scanner in October, 2014, because use ofthe body scanner greatly reduced the number of inmates being strip searched at any given time. Dkt. 345, Gutienez Decl., ~ 23.11
• Privacy cmtains obstm cted a guard 's view of inmates. !d. • The search procedm e, as implemented without privacy cmtains, was the most "cost-effective"
method of conducting strip searches. !d. at~ 24. • The search procedme, as implemented with out privacy cmtains, posed "the least ammmt of
safety concems" without compromising the effectiveness of th e search. !d.

10 As an initial matter, this case is distinguishable from the Cowt's previous decision in Solis . In Solis, plaintiffs likewise offered pattitions or cwtains as a ready altemative to ameliorate privacy concems. The Cowt rejected this, citing defendants' response that partitions would cause safety issues and be logistically impractical due to cost concems and the fact they would impede the flow oftraffic through the conidor in which the search was conducted. None ofthese concems are present here. It is undisputed that installing the cwtains costs the Defendants less than $8,000, and that the installation was "simple." See dkt. 350 ~~ 141-43 (noting Defendants' " dispute" on other grounds). Fwiher, unlike Solis, the Bus Bay was primarily used to search inmates and thus Defendants do not argue the cwtains impede a normal flow of traffic or are otherv.•ise incompatible with the space. Lastly, Defendants point to no "safety concems" with the use ofprivacy cwtains- but instead only conclus01y state, for the first time in their opposition papers via a single paragraph in a declaration by Cmdr. GutietTez, that they considered "safety concems" when instituting their overall search procedme. 11 Defendants provide no explanation- fmancial or logistic- why the body scanner itself could not have been installed earlier. See dkt. 284-38, Still Decl. ~58, exh. 605 (noting that Cook County prisons installed body scanners in 2011) . However, this issue was not briefed by the patties and thus will not be relied on by this Cowt.

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Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 361 Filed 06/07/17 Page 14 of 18 Page ID #:13877
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 10-01649-SVW-JEM

Title

Mary Amador v. Leroy D. Baca, et al.

Date Jlme 7, 2017

2. Analysis
Prison officials are oodoubtedly afforded great deference in their determinations ofhow to conduct su·ip searches th at serve a legitimate penological pmpose. See Bull, 595 F.3d at 977; Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. However, this deference is not absolute. Walker v. Sumner, 917 F.2d 382, 385 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[D]eference does not mean abdication."). Therefore, comi s can reject weak justifications when compared to the significant constitutional rights at issue. See, e.g. , Jordan v. Gardener, 986 F.2d 1521, 1530 (9th Cir. 1993) (in finding that cross-gender clothed pat-down searches violated the Eighth Amendment, the comi rejected excuses that males needed to perfon n the search to avoid intem1pting looch periods of female guards. The concmTing opinion analyzed the case ooder the Fourth Amendment and applied Turner deference, yet nonetheless foood a constitutional violation and rejected defendants ' weak justifications, see id. at 1536, 1538).12 Fmi her, comis must reject contradict01y evidence, illogical proclamations, and proffered justifications oosupported by evidence. See, e.g. , Hrdlicka v. Reniff, 631 F.3d 1044, 1054-55 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting a "marked contrast" between the "general statements" offered to show a valid penological pmpose and the "weak" an d "contradict01y" evidence offered to supp01i those statements);13 see also Young, 616 F.Supp.2d at 852 (finding defendants ' argmnent that privacy pruiitions were not feasible was "oodennined" by their later installation an d "use[] without problems"). This case involves all of the above.
Defendant's main contention is that installing privacy cmiains was not feasible ootil th ey installed the body scrumer since prior to the body scanner they had to seru·ch many more women at any given time and thus could not provide cmiains for all of them in the same ammmt of space, as it would have been more difficult to monitor evety woman and would have taken longer. There are several issues with this excuse. The first and most imp01iant issue with this proffered justification is the fact that Defendants began seru·ching inmates in groups of24 over a yeru· before the body scrumer was installed. See dkt. 345 , De La Tone Decl. ~ 13 (stating that from July 2013 onwru·d " [o]nly 24 inmates could be seru·ched at one time."). For over a year, between July 2013 and October 2014, evety search was conducted with only 24
12 The fact that the Jordan majority rested its decision on the Eighth Amendment helps Plaintiffs ' argmnent, since an Eighth Amendment violation is more difficult to establish than a Fourth Amendment violation. 13 The Cowt notes that Hrdlicka dealt with a constitutional claim under the First Amendment. However, this Comt fmds no reason why Hrdlicka ' s analysis of Turner in rejecting weak and contradictory justifications would be different in the Fowi h Amendment context.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 10-01649-SVW-JEM

Title

Mary Amador v. Leroy D. Baca, et al.

Date Jlme 7, 2017

women present an d without a body scanner. Thus, Defendants ' own evidence shows that they could- and did- search only 24 inmates at a time before the body scanners were installed. By definition, it was feasible. Defendants do not attempt to explain this discrepancy and give no reason why the privacy cmiains could not have been installed at least as early as July 2013.14 Further, ifreducing the search group size to 24 women without a body scanner was less efficient and took more time, Defendants should have evidence from July 2013 to October 2014 to show this Comi that searches took longer. Yet, Defendants produce no evidence that the searches during this time took longer, were difficult to manage, were unsafe, or were othe1wise problematic. See Young, 616 F.Supp.2d at 852. The Comi recognizes that it should give great deference to the justifications of prison officials. However, accepting this contradict01y justification would create a mle of absolute deference, which no comis has fmmd appropriate. See, e.g., Hrdlicka, 631 F.3d at 1054-55 (rejecting general justifications that relied on contradict01y evidence) . Deference should be given to "inf01med" decisions. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. Plaintiffs contend that Defendants failed to even consider privacy curtains until recently. See, e.g. , dkt. 284-22, Cmdr. Gutien ez Dep., exh. 180, 146:2- 25 ("if th at th ought [of privacy cmiains] would have come up 20 years ago we wouldn't probably be here today."). Defendants do not specifically state when they first considered adding cmiains, but instead simply declare "[t]he installation of such cmiains, prior to the installation ofthe body-scanner, was not a viable option." See dkt. 276, Hausser Decl., ~ 16. Accepting that Defendants considered and rejected privacy cmiains, there is no basis on which this Court can fmd th e decision was "inf01med" and thus the Comi cannot be deferential to this decision.
The explan ation that these cmiains would obstruct the guard 's view of inmates is also lmfounded. Privacy cmiains have been used for over two years prior to this summa1y judgment motion. Yet, Defendants provide no real world evidence th at th e cmiains have unreasonably obsti11cted the guard's view of inmates. See dkt. 284-22, Cmdr. Gutien ez Dep., exh. 180, 153:4-20 ("Q: ... [I]n your personal opinion, if you had a ratio of three to one an d you had had the curtains installed, it would have gone fine ... A: I think that an attentive, observant employee is definitely going to be able to do a good job."). Again, the Comi cannot give deference to a single conclus01y explan ation accompanied with no evidence or explanation of potential consequences.
14 The Cowt also notes that Defendants give no reason why they did not reduce the search group size to 24 women from the begimling ofthe class period.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 10-01649-SVW-JEM

Title

Mary Amador v. Leroy D. Baca, et al.

Date Jlme 7, 2017

The excuse that the search as implemented was the most "cost-effective" is belied by the fact that
installing curtains costs lmder $8,000. See dkt. 350 mf 141-43 (noting Defendants' "dispute" on other
grounds) . Certainly it was $8,000 cheaper to not install privacy cmiains, yet this is the epitome of a weak justification when compared to th e significant constitutional rights at issue. See, e.g., Jordan , 986 F.2d at 1530. The excuse that the search, before installing cmiains, provided the least amount of safety concems is also lmaccompanied with evidence or explanation as to the consequences. There is no evidence that in the two years since cmiains have been implemented there has been any safety concems. See Young, 616 F.Supp.2d at 852.15
The heali of Defendants ' defense cannot be that accommodating Plaintiffs' constitutional rights was not feasible or impractical. They did it. It was feasible. The question, then, is whether Defendants were ignorant of the need to provide such accommodations. However, Defendants cannot reasonably argue that they were lmaware of the obvious altemative ofprivacy cmiains. See, e.g. , dkt. 284-22, Cmdr. Gutienez Dep., exh. 180, 146:2- 25 ("if that thought [of privacy curtains] would have come up 20 years ago we wouldn't probably be here today."). The issue ofprivacy pruiitions was initially plead and litigated in Solis, a case which involved the same Defendants, same defense counsel, and same plaintiff's cmmsel. See Solis , Case No. CV 06-1135 SCW(CTx), dkt. 76 at~~ 70, 72- 73 (this document, filed in 2008, discusses other Califomia jails that use either prutitions or cmiains to provide privacy to inmates being strip seru·ched). Thus, Defendants were well awru·e of this altemative. See also Still Decl. , ~ 61 (acknowledging that the Federal Bureau of Prisons installed privacy pruiitions in all of its prisons in 1987); Young, 616 F.Supp.2d at 852 (finding in 2009 that the nonuse of privacy screens during strip searches without justification was a Fomih Amendment violation). This is not a case where the required accommodation was extraordinruy or unreasonable. In this case, the accommodation was obvious, cheap, and "simple", see dkt. 350 ~ 143, and Defendants knew it was a ready altemative at least as fru· back as 2008- two yeru·s before this case was filed.
15 Fwther belying Defendants' contention that privacy cmtains were nnfeasible is the fact that Plaintiffs' expe1t, Wendy Still, is nnaware ofany other jail that conducts invasive strip search without individualized privacy. See dkt. 350 ~ 117. Defendants also do not cite another jail that does so. As noted, see supra n. 5, this fact is relevant to the Comt's analysis as to whether Defendants' actions served a penological purpose or were othe1wise justified. Though LASD may have had unique obstacles that prevented them from confonning to the standard practices of other jails, Defendants do not provide evidence that these obstacles existed or that CRDF is nnique.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 10-01649-SVW-JEM

Title

Mary Amador v. Leroy D. Baca, et al.

Date Jlme 7, 2017

C. The Justification for Initiating the Search
Plaintiffs essentially do not dispute that Defendants are within th eir right to initiate these searches. Plaintiffs do provide evidence, however, that there is minimal justification for the invasive VBC search. See dkt. 156 ~~ 153-59 (noting that Plaintiffs are supervised at all times when at court, are only out of handcuffs when in a holding tank, go through pat down searches at the comt, and othe1w ise have minimal contact with th e public). However, this Comt accepts Defendants ' justification that the searches are necessruy to combat the contraband problem in LASD. See dkt. 345, Gutienez Decl., ~~ 5, 7, 16-21 , 24; see also, An oyo Decl., ~ 13; Diaz Decl., ~ 13; Estrada Decl. , ~ 13; Hausser Decl., ~ 13; Ponce Decl., ~ 13; Shambaugh Decl., ~ 13; Vru·gas Decl., ~ 13.
D. The Place in Which it is Conducted
The conditions of Bus Bay #3 ru·e greatly disputed by the parties. Since the Court is granting sunnna1y judgment as to the core conditions, see supra n. 1, the Comt can accept- for pmposes of this summa1y judgment order only-that Bus Bay #3 was a suitable location for the searches.
E. Totality of the Circumstances
Based on the totality of the circmnstances, the Comt concludes that Plaintiffs' Fomt h Amendment rights were violated. This conclusion is based on the invasiveness of the search (i.e. use of the "labia lift" despite less intmsive altematives), which is one of the most invasive procedures conducted in penological institutions, the group setting of th e seru·ch, in which inmates could not avoid viewing each other, the lack of privacy within that group setting, and-most imp01tantly-the lack of a penological pmpose or inf01med justification for not providing individualized privacy. There is substantial evidence in the record that the manner of the search was an "unnecessruy [and] unjustified response to problems of jail security." Florence, 566 U.S . at 322- 23.
F. Conclusion
There is no question that Defendants had the right to conduct a VBC search on Plaintiffs. However, under Turner, Defendants must j ustify their refusal to adopt ready altematives. They have not

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 10-01649-SVW-JEM

Title

Mary Amador v. Leroy D. Baca, et al.

Date Jlme 7, 2017

produced any evidence explaining why they conducted these searches, in this fashion, for seven years. To the contnuy, the evidence shows that what Defendants claim was not feasible, was in fact feasible, available, and inexpensive. Since there were readily available altematives, with minimal costs of accommodation, on this record the Comi GRANTS summary judgment in Plaintiffs' favor.
VI. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Plaintiffs' complaint also named eight individual defendants in their personal and official capacity who are cunent or f01mer high-ranking LASD officials. Defendants moved for summaty judgment against these claims arguing that the official capacity claims are duplicative of the Monell claim against the Cmmty, see Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S . 159, 165-67 (1985) (official capacity suit against an individual defendant is to be treated as a suit against the employing public entity), and that the individual claims should be dismissed due to qualified immlmity.
Plaintiff did not oppose either of these arguments. The Comi finds a suit against individual defendants in their official capacity for damages is duplicative of a Monell claim, and thus GRANTS summruy judgment against these claims. See id. ; see also Paeste v. Gov't ofGuam, 798 F.3d 1228, 12356 (9th Cir. 2015) (reiterating that individuals sued in their official-capacity for damages, as opposed to injlmctive relief, ru·e not "persons" within the meaning of § 1983).
As to the individual capacity claims, the complaint makes no allegations as to the actions these individual defendants engaged in. Defendants state, and Plaintiffs do not dispute, that the individual defendants did not conduct any of the lmconstitutional seru·ches themselves. As to their role in creating the seru·ch policy, there ru·e no allegations as to which defendant created or implemented any aspect of the policy or even which time period these defendants maintained their high-ranking positions within LASD. Thus, the Comi cannot discem any individual activity in which any of these defendants would be personally liable, and therefore GRANTS smrunruy judgment in their favor.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS summruy judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on its Fourth Amendment claim and GRANTS smnmruy judgment in favor of the individual Defendants.

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 Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 387-2 Filed 07/16/19 Page 1 of 31 Page ID #:14022
Exhibit A

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 387-2 Filed 07/16/19 Page 2 of 31 Page ID #:14023

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARY AMADOR, et al.,

Case No. CV 10-01649 SVW (JEMx)

Plaintiffs,

[Honorable Stephen V. Wilson]

vs.

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, et al.,

Defendants.

Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Myeshia Williams, and Nancy Briseño (individually and on behalf of the classes previously certified in this case (see, Doc. No. 327) (collectively “Plaintiffs”) and Defendants County of Los Angeles (“the County”), the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, its prior Sheriff, Leroy Baca, and Sammy Jones, Timothy Cornell, John H. Clark, Stacey Lee, Dennis Burns, Gerald K. Cooper and Daniel Cruz (collectively “Defendants”), by and through their respective counsel, hereby submit the following Settlement Agreement (“Settlement Agreement”). Plaintiffs and Defendants are referred to collectively herein as “the Parties.”
1
AMADOR CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 387-2 Filed 07/16/19 Page 3 of 31 Page ID #:14024
I. RECITALS Plaintiffs are former inmates at the Century Regional Detention Facility (“CRDF”), a jail facility operated by the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (“LASD”), which houses female convicted inmates and pretrial detainees. Plaintiffs filed this action in the United States District Court for the Central District of California (“Court”) on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly situated inmates on March 5, 2010. Plaintiffs alleged various violations of the Federal and State Constitutions, of 42 U.S.C. §1983, and California Civil Code §52.1 associated with the LASD’s strip/visual body cavity search practices at CRDF during the class period. The District Court, after multiple hearings and several class certification orders that went through a number of iterations, certified the class on November 18, 2016. See, Doc No. 327 (Order Granting Renewed Motion For Class Certification). The certification was for liability only under Fed.R.Civ.P Rule (c)(4). On June 6, 2017, the District Court granted summary judgment on liability issues to the Plaintiff class on their claim for Monell liability under the Fourth Amendment, and dismissed claims against the individual Defendants, finding qualified immunity applied. . See, Doc No. 361. The District Court’s liability summary judgment ruling found it unnecessary to address changed conditions at CRDF because the searches violated the Fourth Amendment for the whole Class Damages Period. The changes in conditions are nonetheless factored into this Settlement. Subsequently, the Parties entered into a protracted arm’s length mediation process with the assistance of Retired United States District Judge George King, including three in-person mediation sessions with Judge King and numerous telephonic sessions (both the Parties separately with Judge King and among the Parties and Judge King). The Parties have reached a proposed Settlement subject to the approval of the Court. It is understood and agreed that this Settlement is the compromise of
2
AMADOR CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 387-2 Filed 07/16/19 Page 4 of 31 Page ID #:14025
disputed claims by the Named Plaintiffs and Class Members, and that the payments made are not to be construed as an admission of liability by any of the Defendants. The Defendants deny liability, preserve all defenses they have asserted or could present in these proceedings or any future appeal, and intend merely to avoid the expense of further litigation.
In summary, this Settlement provides for dismissal of this case with prejudice in exchange for a non-reversionary Class Fund of $53 Million, from which costs of administration, litigation costs and attorney’s fees will be paid, and the remainder of which would be distributed to Class Members who make viable claims subject to certain requirements for a minimum number of claims made (or a portion of funds would go to cy pres distributions as defined herein).
As a form of indirect compensation to absent Class Members, up to $3 million of the Class Fund will be used to fund contracts between the County of Los Angeles, on the one hand, the Moss Group and the Center for Gender and Justice (“CGJ”), on the other hand (the “Moss/CGJ Contracts”). Both organizations have significant experience in assisting local, state, and national correctional agencies in the development of gender-responsive and trauma-informed practices, programming, and services. The purpose of the contracts shall be to help develop a strengthened model of gender-responsive policy and operational practice at all LASD facilities that house female inmates (including CRDF and Twin Towers), while enhancing the culture of safety and respect for both staff and the inmate population. The contracts will include preliminary assessment/evaluation, and may also include the provision of expertise, leadership, technical assistance, and services in the following areas: system analysis/operations, policy review and development, strategic planning, program development/inmate services, training/culture, and ongoing assessment. The Moss/CGJ contracts shall be secured in furtherance of the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors’ effort to facilitate the design and implementation of gender-responsive systems within the Los Angeles County criminal justice system, as reflected in the Board of Supervisors’ February 2019
3
AMADOR CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

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motion titled “Building a Gender-Responsive Criminal Justice System.” II. DEFINITIONS
The listed terms used throughout this Settlement Agreement are intended to have the following meanings:
1. “Administrator” means the Class Administrator, as agreed upon (or to be agreed upon) by the Parties and appointed by the Court to review and determine the validity and amount of claims submitted by a Settlement Class Member (“SCM”) (as defined herein), according to the procedures set forth herein.
2. The “Bar Date” is the date by which any Class Member who wishes to receive payment pursuant to the Settlement Agreement and therefore is a Settlement Class Member (“SCM”) as defined below must file his/her Proof of Claim and Release Form, file objections to this Settlement Agreement, or request to be excluded from the class (opt-out). The Bar Date shall be calculated as the close of business on the 150th day after the last day of mailing of the Class Notice (or, for those whose initial notice is by email and text message, the day that they were to be sent such electronic notice in lieu of regular mail, as provided in Section X), which is up to occur within two consecutive business days from beginning to end, as is addressed in ¶ 39, i.e., the Administrator must mail all notices within a two day period).
3. “Class Counsel” herein refers to Barrett S. Litt and Lindsay Battles of KAYE, McLANE, BEDNARSKI & LITT.
4. “Class Counsel Attorney’s Fees” refers to the amount awarded by the Court as Class Counsel’s attorney’s fees in this case, to be approved by the Court upon motion by Class Counsel.
5. “Class Counsel Litigation Costs” refers to the amount of costs awarded by the Court upon motion by Class Counsel.
6. The “Class Fund” refers to the amount of $53 Million as damages compensation to the Class, to be paid by Defendants to the Administrator,
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and out of which the costs of Administration, Plaintiffs’ counsel expert/consulting, litigation and mediation fees, incentive awards and compensation to Class Members will be paid. 7. The “Class Damages Period” refers to the period between March 5, 2008 (two years before the filing of the complaint) and January 1, 2015 (the date scanners or privacy partitions were available for all CRDF strip searches). 8. A “Class Member” means any member of the certified Damages Classes. Although the Court certified two damages classes, one from March 2008 through June 30, 2011, and one from July 1, 2011 through January 1, 2015 (because scanners were then being used for all strip searches unless the inmate requested a strip search in its place), for purposes of this settlement and because summary judgment was granted to both classes, the Damages Class is defined for settlement purposes as “any female inmate at CRDF inmate who, upon their admission or return to CRDF, were visual body cavity searched in groups, without individual privacy between March 5 2008 (two years before the filing of the complaint) and January 1, 2015.” 9. The “Class Notice” means the notice to be sent to Class Members regarding this Settlement, in a form substantially similar to that attached hereto as Exhibit B, or as otherwise approved by the Court, and such other summary notice to be published in accordance with the terms of this Settlement Agreement. 10. The “Class Member List” is a list of Class Members. It is based solely on the records of the LASD. Only persons appearing on that list qualify as Class Members. 11. The “Database” is the information provided in electronic form to the Administrator which information has been compiled from the electronic records of the LASD, as filtered to identify those meeting the class definition by the Parties’ experts.
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12. The “Defendants” are the County of Los Angeles, the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, its prior Sheriff Leroy Baca, Sammy Jones, Timothy Cornell, John H. Clark, Stacey Lee, Dennis Burns, Gerald K. Cooper and Daniel Cruz.
13. The “Effective Date” is the date on which the District Court issues an Order granting final approval of the Settlement Agreement, except that if any objections to the settlement were submitted to the Court, the Effective Date is the date of the final resolution of any appeal of the Final Approval of this Settlement Agreement, or if no such appeal is filed, the expiration of the deadline for filing a Notice of Appeal.
14. The “Fairness Hearing” is the hearing on the fairness of this Settlement, which date will be set by the Court.
15. The “Final Order of Approval and Settlement” is the Order finally approving the settlement, entered by the Court (which may also be referred to herein as “Final Order”).
16. The “Lawsuit” refers to the action styled Amador et al. v. Baca et al., Case No. CV 10-01649 SVW (JEMx)..
17. The “Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs” is Class Counsel's application for Attorneys' Fees and Costs.
18. The “Named Plaintiffs” or “Class Representatives” refers to the plaintiffs named in the Fourth Amended Complaint to this suit, who are Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Nancy Briseño, Felice Cholewiak (Vargas), Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil and Myeshia Williams. While Lora Barranca, Diana Paiz and Diane Vigil were named solely as injunctive relief plaintiffs under §1983, they were damages plaintiffs under state law and Class Members. For purposes of this Settlement, no distinction is made between or among the Named Plaintiffs.
19. “Preliminary Approval” is the Court's determination that the Settlement is within the range of possible approval and therefore that Class Notice should
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be sent to Class Members and a Fairness Hearing should be set by the Court. 20. The “Preliminary Approval Order” is an order entered by the Court preliminarily approving the Settlement, after which Class Notice, the opportunity to object and Opt Out, and entry of a Final Order of Approval and Settlement would occur. 21. An “Opt-Out” is any Class Member who files a timely request for exclusion, pursuant to the terms of this Settlement Agreement, to be excluded from the Settlement Class. (If used as a verb, it refers to the process of filing such exclusion.) 22. The “Proof of Claim Form” means the Proof of Claim and Release Form required to be used in order to make a claim for payment under this Settlement. A copy of the proposed Proof of Claim Form is attached as Exhibit C. The pre-prepared Claim forms shall be bar coded to link with the Class Member’s Database information and shall contain the damages to which the Class Member is entitled if s/he were to receive the full damages provided for in this agreement. 23. “Released Person” means the Defendants and their affiliates, subsidiaries, predecessors, successors, and/or assigns, together with all past, present and future officials, employees, representatives, attorneys, outside counsel, and/or agents of Los Angeles County. “Released Person” also includes any and all insurance carriers, and/or their representatives and attorneys, for the Released Persons. 24. “Remainder” refers to the amount in the Class Fund after payment of Class Counsel’s Attorney Fees, Class Counsel’s Litigation Costs, mediation costs, and the Moss/CGJ Contracts. The “Minimum Remainder” is a figure used for purposes of determining whether cy pres payments are made and is based on the estimate of the maximum fees to be sought (1/3 of the $53 Million Fund), estimated litigation and class administration costs ($1.5
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Million), and the Moss/CGJ Contracts (maximum $3 Million); thus the Minimum Remainder is estimated to amount to $30,883,000, which the Parties agree to round up to $31,000,000. 25. The “Settlement” refers to this agreement. 26. A “Settlement Class Member” (“SCM”) means any Class Member as defined above (whether or not she files a Timely Claim form), including representatives, successors and assigns, who does not file a valid and timely Request for Exclusion as provided for in this Settlement Agreement. 27. The “Settlement Fund” is the fund established by the Administrator with funds transferred from Defendants from which the damages to the Class Representatives and Class Members will be paid. The Defendants will pay all moneys they are obligated to pay under the Preliminary Approval Order, and the settlement approved by the Court, if any, into the Settlement Fund. 28. “Strip Search” means a search conducted by LASD personnel on a Class Member (as defined above) in which the person was required to remove her clothing, including underwear, in the presence of a corrections officer and/or expose her breasts, genitals or body cavities for a visual inspection. All persons appearing on the Class Member List were subjected to a strip search as defined herein. 29. A “Timely Claim” is one filed a) within the 150-day window provided by the notice to be sent to the class, and b) to the extent the Court approves, late claims (i.e., claims filed after the Class Notice period) that are filed prior to the Final Approval Hearing.
III. DISCLAIMER OF LIABILITY 1. The Parties acknowledge and agree that all undertakings and agreements contained in this Settlement Agreement have been agreed to solely for the purpose of finally compromising all questions, disputes and issues between them relating to the litigation. This Settlement Agreement and any proceedings taken pursuant hereto shall not in any event be construed as, interpreted as, or
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deemed to be evidence of an admission or concession by either party for any purpose, or deemed to constitute a waiver of any legal position or any defenses or other rights which the Parties might otherwise assert in any context. Neither this Settlement Agreement nor any provision contained therein, nor any documents related hereto, nor any negotiations, statements or testimony taken in connection herewith may be offered or received as evidence, or used for any other purpose, or in any suit, action or legal proceeding which either of them have or in the future may have with any other person, as an admission or concession of liability or wrongdoing on the part of either party, except in connection with any action or legal proceeding to enforce this Settlement Agreement. The Parties have reached this Settlement through arms-length negotiations and to avoid the costs and delays of further disputes, litigation and negotiations among them and after extensive negotiations with an independent mediator, subject to approval by the Court. This Settlement Agreement has been entered into without any concession of liability or non-liability whatsoever and has no precedential or evidentiary value whatsoever. IV. FINANCIAL TERMS OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND CLASS
DAMAGES ALLOCATION FORMULA 2. The Class Fund is the amount of $53,000,000. The class administration costs shall be paid out of that fund, as will any incentive awards to the Class Representatives as approved by the Court. (Class Counsel’s Litigation Costs will be addressed in Class Counsel’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs.) The Remainder of the Class Fund shall be distributed to the Class Members (including Named Plaintiffs/Class Representatives) under the formula terms provided in this Agreement. 3. Subject to approval of the Court at the hearing regarding the Final Order of Approval and Settlement, the following incentive awards shall be paid to the Named Plaintiffs (in addition to the share of the Class Fund to which they are entitled as Class Members). Class Counsel represent that they have no prior agreement with any Named Plaintiff to seek such awards, nor do they have any
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commitment to propose them. They are proposed at the initiative of Class Counsel

and are intended to reflect Named Plaintiffs’ commitment to, and active assistance

in advancing, this Lawsuit since it was filed in 2010:

NAME Mary Amador Lora Barranca Alisa Battiste

INCENTIVE AWARD $10,000 $10,000 $10,000

Nancy Briseño

$10,000

Felice (Cholewiak) Vargas

$10,000

Evangelina Madrid

$10,000

Diana Paiz

$10,000

Diane Vigil

$10,000

Myeshia Williams

$10,000

TOTAL

$90,000

4. It is not currently possible to determine the amount of the Remainder

before the hearing regarding the Final Order of Approval and Settlement, where the

final amount of Class Counsel’s Attorney’s Fees and Costs awards, class

administration costs, and the Moss/CGJ Contracts will be determined.

5. The formula for distribution of the Remainder has been developed by

Class Counsel and, if approved by the Court, will be summarized in the Class

Notice to be sent to Class Members. The formula is designed to account for the fact

that the alleged severity of challenged conditions varied depending on the time

period the Strip Search occurred (with the most intrusive conditions before July

2011 and least intrusive conditions after February 2014 when the bus bay became

enclosed and had heating), the number of Strip Searches an inmate experienced and

the weather conditions when the Strip Search occurred.

6. To briefly summarize, Class Counsel’s assessment of these variations

in conditions, which are factored into the class damages allocation formula, are as

follows:

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TIME PERIOD
2/26/2014 – 1/31/2015
(Core Conditions Applicable to All Class Members Regardless of Time Period)

CONDITIONS
Conditions:
(1) female inmates required to participate in group Strip Searches in which the labia lift procedure was used;
(2) female inmates required to publicly identify if they were menstruating, remove feminine hygiene products in view of other inmates; and
(3) female inmates required to expose their naked body – including bare pubic region and bare breasts – in the presence of a group.
(4) inmates searched in groups of 24 inmates (or more, see below).

4/1/2013 – 2/25/2014

Conditions:

7/1/2011 – 3/30/20131

• All above conditions plus
• Group Strip Searches occurred in a converted bus garage with a chain link fence roof with a tarp on it and no heaters.
Conditions:

3/5/2008 – 6/30/2011

• All above conditions plus
• Inmates searched in groups larger than 24 inmates
• Inmates required to put clothing directly on the ground.
Conditions:

• All above conditions plus
• Deputies simultaneously searched both lines of female inmates so that inmates were directly viewing each other during the Strip

1 This subclass was because LASD reduced its class sizes to a maximum of 25 and installed tables on which clothes could be placed in April 2013.
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TIME PERIOD

Search.

CONDITIONS

7. Based on the above considerations, Class Counsel have devised a

distribution model in which Class Members are compensated based on the number

of Strip Searches they endured, with searches weighted based on the time period in

which they occurred (which, in turn, corresponds to the severity of conditions).

Each Strip Search is assigned a point-value which will translate to a per-diem dollar

value at the time of distribution. Class Members receive the designated number of

points based on the number of Strip Searches in each category.

8. The chart below shows the categories, conditions associated with each

category, and points assigned to each category.

Time Period 3/8/2008 – 6/30/2011
7/1/2011 – 3/31/2013

Points Per Strip Search 100
90

4/1/2013 – 2/25/2014

80

2/26/2014 – 1/31/2015

70

9. The distribution model also provides an additional 10-points for any Strip Search conducted at a temperature of 70 degrees or less.
10. The per-search points are assigned to each Class Member, up to their 50th search. The “50-search cap” applies to less than .04% of the Class. This cap is to ensure that outliers who have outsized claims do not distort the meaningfulness of the recovery to the remaining Class Members. (Such outliers would be entitled to opt out and pursue their own claims if they so choose.)
11. That Class Member’s point total is the sum of all their assigned points. The final distribution will be based on the total points for each Class Member who filed claims, divided by individual points assigned to each claiming Class Member.

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(If, for example, there is a total of 1,000,000 points for the aggregated Timely Claims, and Class Member “X” had a total of 200 points, Class Member “X” would receive .02% (or .0002) of the Remainder; if the Remainder is the Minimum Remainder of $31 Million, that Class Members would receive $6,200). These figures are purely hypothetical and should not be considered as reflective of any likely award. Because it is anticipated that not all Class Members will make Timely Claims, and this is a non-reversionary fund (except as provided in Section VI, below, for cy pres payments in the event of a low claim rate, which the Parties do not anticipate), a claiming Class Member’s share of the Remainder will be determined based on that Class Member’s share of the total points for Class Members who made Timely Claims.
12. No Class Member who filed a Timely Claim will receive less than $200 (the minimum will be at least $200 but may be adjusted upwards) subject to the limit of the Class Funds available in the Remainder. The minimum provision is designed to ensure that all Class Members who submit Timely Claims receive some recovery.
13. None of the Class Fund shall revert to the County. Accordingly, as explained above, the money per Class Member making a Timely Claim will increase proportionately to the extent that fewer Class Members make a claim.
14. Class Counsel intend to submit a separate Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs to be heard at the hearing regarding a Final Order of Approval and Settlement, to be analyzed under the standards for an award of fees and costs to a prevailing plaintiff under the percentage of the fund doctrine. While the motion will seek a percentage of the Class Fund as a fee award, subsumed within that request will be any statutory attorney’s fee to which Class Counsel would be entitled under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 or Cal. Civil Code § 52.1(h). The Class Notice will advise Class Members of Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs and their right to object to it.
15. The LASD represents that to the best of its knowledge, it has provided all the electronic data in its possession, which it is legally authorized to produce,
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regarding Class Members necessary to both identify and contact Class Members. The LASD shall provide to the Administrator, to the extent that such information has not already been provided, any such additional information in its possession which it is legally authorized to produce. Such information shall include date of birth, social security number (SSN), driver’s license/state ID number, and most recent contact information (address, phone and any other available contact information). In addition, LASD shall provide to the Administrator and Class Counsel the data from the Automated Justice Information System (“AJIS”) Released-to-Agency field indicating whether a Class Member was released to the custody of another law enforcement agency. This information may only be used to reach out to Class Members to ensure they receive the Class Notice and are aware of how to file a claim pursuant to this Agreement. LASD will make a written request to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), which request will include a list of Class Members who were transferred to CDCR from LASD custody, and request that CDCR: (1) advise the Administrator of where and how the Class Notice to those Class Members still in CDCR physical custody should be sent; and (2) provide the Administrator with the most recent contact information in CDCR’s records (including records in the Division of Adult Parole Operations, where applicable) for each Class Members who is no longer in CDCR physical custody. When making the foregoing request to CDCR, LASD will provide to CDCR any individualized identifying information in its possession that it is legally authorized to include that could assist CDCR in identifying Class Members.
If CDCR provides a response, LASD will then advise Class Counsel of CDCR’s response, and if CDCR either fails to respond or refuses to provide assistance, Class Counsel may seek Court assistance in securing the cooperation of CDCR to effectuate service of the Class Notice and to obtain the most up to date contact information for Class Members. Neither the County nor the LASD will have any further obligation with respect to efforts to obtain contact information for
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Class Members from CDCR beyond the efforts described above, except that it will engage in any reasonable follow-up requested by CDCR. LASD will likewise have no further obligation to assist with securing cooperation regarding the provision of Class Notice to Class Members still in CDCR custody.
Nothing in this agreement precludes Plaintiffs from seeking a court order authorizing the LASD to provide CII and FBI numbers directly to CDCR as part of efforts to identify Class Members and provide Class Notice to individuals who were previously transferred to CDCR. Should Plaintiffs file such a motion, they will serve the Attorney General of the State of California and the Federal Bureau of Investigation with the motion in order to provide each with the opportunity to be heard. Plaintiffs will not seek access to such records for themselves or for the Administrator.
V. RELEASES AND OTHER SETTLEMENT TERMS 16. The Parties enter into this Agreement solely for the purposes of this Settlement and implementation of the Settlement. If the Settlement fails to be approved or otherwise fails consummation, then this Settlement Agreement is hereby withdrawn. 17. An SCM who complies with the requirements set forth in this Settlement Agreement and files a Timely Claim form will be paid specified sums determined by the distribution process set forth above, which payment shall be in full satisfaction of all claims of that SCM. 18. The Settlement Agreement, as of the Effective Date, resolves in full all claims against the Released Persons by all of the SCMs, including the Named Plaintiffs, involving violations of law or constitutional rights, including, without limitation, their equal protection rights under federal and California law, their rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California Civil Code § 52.1, any other rights under any other federal, state or local law, regulation, duty, or obligation, or any other legal theory, action or cause of action, which arise from the class-wide factual allegations alleged in the Fourth Amended Complaint, which is the operative
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pleading in this matter ( “Covered Claims”). 19. When the Settlement Agreement is final, as of the Effective Date, all
SCMs, including the Named Plaintiffs, waive all rights to any and all claims relating to damages or reimbursement of any kind for the Covered Claims. This waiver and release shall include a full release and waiver of unknown rights regarding the Covered Claims that may exist as of the Effective Date.
20. As of the Effective Date, the SCMs, including the Named Plaintiffs, hereby waive any and all rights to pursue, initiate, prosecute, or commence any action or proceeding before any court, administrative agency or other tribunal, or to file any complaint regarding acts or omissions by the Released Persons with respect to the Covered Claims during the class period; and further, as it relates to this waiver or Release, expressly waive the provisions of California Civil Code § 1542, which provides that “a general release does not extend to claims which the creditor does not know or suspect to exist in his or her favor at the time of executing the release, which if known by him or her must have materially affected his or her settlement with the debtor.”
21. This Settlement Agreement, together with its exhibits, contains all the terms and conditions agreed upon by the Parties regarding the subject matter of the instant proceeding, and no oral agreement entered into at any time nor any written agreement entered into prior to the execution of this Settlement Agreement shall be deemed to exist, or to bind the Parties, or to vary the terms and conditions contained herein, except as expressly provided herein.
22. Each SCM shall be deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court.
23. This Settlement Agreement is subject to and conditioned on entry by the Court of a Final Order of Approval and Settlement and the issuance of the final order of dismissal by the Court, providing the specified relief as set forth below, which relief shall be pursuant to the terms and conditions of this Settlement Agreement and the Parties’ performance of their continuing rights and obligations
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hereunder. The Final Order of Approval and Settlement shall be deemed final on the Effective Date. Such Final Order of Approval and Settlement shall:
a. Dismiss with prejudice all claims in the action as to the Released Persons including all claims for monetary damages, declaratory relief and injunctive relief, each side to bear its own costs and fees except as otherwise provided for in this Settlement Agreement;
b. Order that all SCMs are enjoined from asserting against any Released Person any and all claims that any SCM had, has or may have in the future based on the Covered Claims;
c. Release each Released Person from the claims that any SCM has, had or may have in the future against such Released Person arising out of the Covered Claims;
d. Determine that this Settlement Agreement is entered into in good faith, is reasonable, fair and adequate, and in the best interest of the Class; and
e. Reserve the Court’s continuing and exclusive jurisdiction over the Parties to this Settlement Agreement, including Defendants and SCMs, to administer, supervise, construe and enforce the Settlement Agreement in accordance with its terms for the mutual benefit of all Parties.
24. The Parties will take all necessary and appropriate steps to obtain preliminary and final approvals of the Settlement Agreement, and dismissal of the action with prejudice, all Parties bearing their own fees and costs unless otherwise set forth in this Settlement Agreement. If the Court gives final approval of this Settlement Agreement, and if there is an appeal from such decision, the Parties will defend the Settlement Agreement. VI. CY PRES DISTRIBUTION IN THE EVENT OF A LOW CLAIM RATE
25. In order to ensure that Class Members do not receive a windfall because there are relatively few claims filed, the Parties agree that, if the total claims do not amount to the Minimum Remainder based on the following formula, the difference between those aggregated claims and Minimum Remainder will go to
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the organizations identified in ¶ 30. The formula to determine whether such cy pres

payments are to be made (referred to as the “Cy Pres Formula” shall be as follows:

CY PRES FORMULA

# SEARCHES

AMOUNT

1-3

$5,000

4-6

$10,000

7-10

$15,000

11+

$20,000

26. Thus, by way of example only, if the Minimum Remainder is $31 Million, 4000 Class Members filed claims (which the Parties agree is likely a low claim rate), and the average of their claims based on the Cy Pres Formula amounted to $9000 per claimant, the total would be $36,000,000, and no cy pres distribution would apply. In contrast, if 3000 people filed claims based on the same average $9000 per claimant and same $31 Million Minimum Remainder, then $4,000,000 (the difference between the $31 Million Minimum Remainder and the $27,000,000 claimed amount based on the Cy Pres Formula), would go to the Cy Pres Fund.
27. The foregoing formula only applies in the event that the total claims do not amount to the Minimum Remainder based on the Cy Pres Formula. Otherwise, the allocation formula set out in Section IV, above, applies.
28. The Cy Pres funds will not be returned to the County’s general fund but will instead be provided to non-profit organizations or programs which provide gender-responsive services to female inmates in LASD custody. At the time that it is determined that any Cy Pres funds are to be distributed, counsel for the Parties in this case and the LA County Board of Supervisors will work in good faith to identify the organizations or programs to receive those funds. If they cannot agree, the Parties will separately brief the Court, and the Court will determine the organizations and/or programs to which the Cy Pres funds will be paid.
VII. RESOLUTION AND PAYMENT OF CLAIMS 29. Defendants agree to the division of funds between Incentive Awards
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and the Remainder as proposed by Class Counsel subject to the approval of the Court.
VIII. CLASS COUNSEL FEES 30. Class Counsel will file a Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs on a percentage of the fund basis, and the payment of said fees and costs is subject to Court approval. Class Counsel will not seek more than 1/3 of the $53 Million Class Fund as the amount of attorney’s fees requested; Class Counsel may seek less but may not seek more. (This 1/3 cap is separate from Class Counsel’s costs, i.e., Class Counsel may request up to 1/3 of the Class Fund plus costs.)
IX. CLASS ADMINISTRATOR 31. Counsel for the Parties will jointly agree on the selection of the Class Administrator and, if they cannot so agree, will submit their suggestions to the Court and the Court will determine the Administrator. The Parties understand the importance of a rapid process for choosing the Class Administrator and are committed to reaching a joint selection as soon as practicable. 32. The Administrator shall be responsible for taking any steps deemed appropriate and necessary by Class Counsel to notify the Class Members of their rights to file claims, and to assist them in doing so. Class Notice shall be issued electronically by email and text message (for all Class Members whose email addresses and mobile phone numbers can be and have been obtained) by the date set in the Preliminary Approval Order for the initial mailing of Class Notice. On that same date, Class Notice shall be provided by regular mail for all Class Members for whom an email address and mobile phone number have not been obtained, for all incarcerated Class Members. 33. For those Class Members whose initial Class Notice was sent by the combination of email and text message who have not responded by filing either a claim or an Opt Out within 30 days, they will be sent by regular mail the Class Notice previously provided to the other Class Members whose Class Notice was sent by regular mail, along with a statement that they were sent by email and text
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message a Class Notice as well, and this is being sent to ensure that they have seen the Class Notice. (See, ¶ 40 for elaboration.)
34. The Administrator’s duty shall include the use of normal and customary means to search for a Class Member’s email addresses, mobile phone numbers and last known mailing addresses, including the use of a postal database and other specialized databases, when mail is returned. As indicated above, the Administrator shall initially send electronic copies of the Class Notice to any inmates for whom email addresses and mobile telephone numbers are ascertainable and at the same time send a hardcopy version and claim form to any Class Member whose email and mobile phone numbers are not ascertainable, as well as any Class Members who are currently incarcerated in California State prisons. (The Administrator is responsible for making reasonable efforts to determine Class Members who are now incarcerated in California state prisons). The Administrator will also propose economically viable and likely productive forms of notice through the use of social media and online advertising.
35. Beginning when it is first retained after the Court approves its appointment, the Administrator will begin to obtain as many Class Member email addresses and mobile phone numbers as reasonably possible. Before the filing of the Motion for Preliminary Approval, the Administrator will advise the Parties and the Court of when the Administrator believes it can reasonably obtain available Class Member email addresses, phone numbers and mailing addresses, and the date for mailing the Class Notice shall be set with that time in mind.
36. Notice shall proceed as follows: 1) Initial Class Notice shall commence with email and text notices for all Class Members whose email addresses and/or mobile phone numbers are ascertainable (assuming both are ascertainable, Class Members will receive two forms of electronic notice; if either the email address or mobile phone number cannot be obtained, the notice will be sent via the
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available means). 2) On the same day, notice by regular mail shall be sent to all Class
Members for whom either an email address or mobile phone number or both could not be ascertained. This means that all Class Members will receive the Class Notice by either (1) email and text; or (2) regular mail plus either email or text (assuming one of the two is available); or (3) regular mail only (for those whose email and mobile phone numbers cannot be located). 3) Thirty days after the initial issuance of Class Notice, the Administrator will send notice by regular mail to all Class Members who were initially notified only by electronic means only (those who received notice by email and text) and who have not yet submitted claim forms along with the explanation that they were sent such electronic notice but this notice is being sent as well because they did not file a claim or exclude themselves from the settlement. 4) Throughout the notice period, the Administrator shall continue to send email and text notice if and when it learns additional email addresses/phone numbers for Class Members. 5) Where Class Notice is sent by email or text, the Class Administrator will periodically remind Class Members through email/text blasts to file claims. (If possible, procedures shall be implemented to remove Class Members from email/text blasts who have submitted claims). 37. The Administrator shall complete the initial Class Notice within two consecutive business days. The second day of such mailing is the first day of the period for calculating the “Bar Date” (defined previously). That mailing shall occur as soon as practicable after the settlement has been Preliminarily Approved and no later than the date set by the Court.
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38. The Class Notice shall describe the particulars of the case, provide the class definition, provide information for claimants to contact the Administrator for a claim form, notify Class Members of establishment of a case website, and contain other usual and customary information. The proposed Class Notice is attached to this Settlement Agreement as Exhibit B.
39. The Administrator will include in its bid a line item for the cost of obtaining from CDCR the identities of Class Members in CDCR custody to whom Class Notice should be sent at their CDCR housing location.
40. The Parties discussed and presently do not intend to publish Class Notice in local newspapers because experience has shown that such notice is of little value in notifying Class Members. Instead, mail, email and text notice will be supplemented through summary publication in Prison Legal News (a publication widely distributed to inmates throughout the country); and through selective social media/online outreach directly targeting Class Members’ Facebook and/or Instagram accounts.
41. If specifically requested by Plaintiffs’ counsel, the Defendants will seek to obtain the cooperation of CDCR (subject to the limitations set forth in Paragraph 15), and the Los Angeles County Probation Department to assist in locating Class Members, including, where Defendants believe legally permissible, providing more recent contact information for Class Members. The LASD will advise on its website of the existence of this Settlement and place a link on the website to connect viewers to the Administrator’s website. The LASD will also post physical copies of the Class Notice (Exhibit “B”) in CRDF Reception and Day Rooms.
42. The request for bid to potential Administrators included requests for all such potential activities as well as suggestions for other ways of reaching potential Class Members. That request for bid also requested economically viable proposals for means by which Class Members can receive payment through electronic means rather than by check. There will also be requests to nonprofits that
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address criminal justice reform, reentry or programs for former inmates to provide notice on their websites and to their mailing lists.
X. CLASS ADMINISTRATION FOR PROOF OF CLAIM FORMS AND PAYMENT SCHEDULE
43. The Administrator shall be responsible for providing and receiving Proof of Claim Forms in paper and electronic format. The Administrator shall determine Class Membership and the amount of monies due each timely claiming Class Member based on the formula contained in Section IV.
44. A Proof of Claim Form shall be deemed timely submitted under subsection (a) of Definition # 29 (Timely Claim) when received by the Administrator, or postmarked, on or before the Bar Date. Facsimile or electronic mail filings are acceptable and timely so long as they clearly indicate the case on which the claim is filed and are received on or before the Bar Date.
45. If a Class Member submits a Claim Form that is deficient in some respect, the Administrator shall provide written notice by First Class Mail and a 30day time limit to provide a proper Claim Form, which notice shall inform the Class Member of what she must do in order to submit a proper claim. Failure to cure the deficiency within the 30-day time limit will bar any further rights for consideration of eligibility to make a valid claim. So long as the original claim is received on or before the Bar Date, it shall be considered timely under sub-section (a) of Definition # 30 (Timely Claim) if any deficiency is cured within 30 days of the mailing of a notice of deficiency.
46. Claim Forms received after the Bar Date shall be rejected. The Administrator will notify claimants of the rejection of untimely Claims.
47. The $53 Million payment shall be made in three equal installments, the first of which shall be made 30 days after the Effective Date, the second of which shall be made twelve months after the first payment, and the third of which shall be made twelve months after the second payment.
48. The costs of Class Administration through the Final Order of Approval
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and Settlement and the first round of distribution of checks will be taken from the first payment; 1/3 of the costs of the Moss/CGJ Contracts shall be taken (or held for that purpose by the Administrator) from each payment.
49. For each payment, 1/3 of the total Attorney’s Fees and Costs awarded by the Court to Class Counsel shall be paid into the KMBL Client Trust Account and the remaining funds shall be paid to the Class Administrator for distribution under the terms of this Agreement.
50. The Class Administrator shall take its accrued and reasonably projected costs of administration for that round from the second and third round of payments.
51. In addition to the first round of payment to qualifying Class Members, the Administrator will advise them of the estimated time of payments to be made in the second and third rounds and advise Class Members to keep them apprised of any address changes.
52. The Administrator shall make the first round of payments to SCMs who have filed Timely Claims as ultimately determined by the Court in accordance with this Settlement Agreement within a reasonable time not to exceed 90 days after the Effective Date.
53. If a check to an SCM is not cashed within three months of its mailing, the Administrator shall hold the funds for nine additional months, during which time it shall make reasonable efforts to contact the person to whom the uncashed check was written to make arrangements for its cashing or reissuance. The Administrator shall not make any payment to any SCM until all claims have been submitted to the Administrator pursuant to the terms of this Settlement Agreement.
54. Any SCM funds not cashed within one year of a check’s initial mailing shall be voided, and those funds (“Uncashed Funds”) shall held for the next round of payments. Where an SCM’s check was not cashed within that one year period, that SCM shall be eliminated as a qualifying Class Member, and that SCM’s past and future funds shall become part of the fund for future distribution to Class
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Members, and allocated to the remaining SCM’s during the next round of payments

according to the Class Damages Allocation Formula contained in Section IV.

55. Uncashed funds remaining in the Class Fund one year after the third

round of payments shall be given as a donation to the Cy Pres Fund (see ¶ 30), to

be allocated equally among the qualifying organizations/ programs.

XI.

EXCLUSION FROM SETTLEMENT CLASS—OPT OUTS

56. Any Class Member who wishes to be excluded from this Settlement

must submit a request to be excluded from the class, a process defined herein as

“Opt-Out.” The request for exclusion must be delivered to the Administrator, or

postmarked, on or before the Bar Date or as the Court may otherwise direct.

57. Although Named Plaintiffs are entitled to Opt-Out of the Settlement,

Plaintiffs’ counsel has conferred with each of them, and they all approve of and

support the settlement, and have advised that they do not intend to Opt-Out.

58. Each Class Member who chooses to Opt-Out from or object to this

Settlement shall be deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court with

respect to his/her claim.

59. Any Class Member who does not Opt-Out as set forth in this

Settlement Agreement, shall be deemed conclusively to have become an SCM and

to be bound by the Settlement Agreement and all subsequent proceedings, orders

and judgments herein, regardless of whether s/he files a claim form.

60. Any Class Member who exercises an Opt-Out shall not share in any

monetary benefits provided by this Settlement Agreement.

61. The Administrator will periodically report to Defendants’ counsel and

Class Counsel regarding all Opt-Outs received and will determine and report to

counsel the total number of Opt-Outs no later than 10 days after the Bar Date.

62. If the total number of Opt-Outs exceeds 250 individuals, Defendants,

in their sole discretion, may rescind this Settlement Agreement. In exercising this

right of rescission, Defendants shall provide the Administrator and Class Counsel

with written notice of rescission within 20 days after receipt of the Administrator’s
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report providing the total number of Opt-Outs. In the event Defendants exercise the right of rescission in accordance with this paragraph, any funds paid or deposited pursuant to this Settlement Agreement shall be returned to Defendants within 10 days of the rescission, less any expenses, fees and costs incurred by the Administrator. Rescission shall return the Case to active litigation status.
XII. APPROVALS REQUIRED 63. The Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors has approved the terms of this Settlement although, after Final Approval, it will have to finally approve the Final Order of Approval and Settlement.
XIII. DISPUTE RESOLUTION 64. In the event of any disputes regarding implementation of the Settlement Agreement as set forth herein, they shall be resolved by the Court.
XIV. THE MOSS/CGJ CONTRACTS 65. Plaintiffs and Class Counsel agree that the Moss/CGJ Contracts constitute Subsequent Remedial Measures in response to the events underlying this litigation pursuant to Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (and similar statue statutes like California Evidence Code § 1151). Plaintiffs and Class Counsel also agree that any reports generated by the Moss Group or CGJ pursuant to contracts entered into under the terms of this Settlement Agreement are statements of those entities and do not constitute party statements of Los Angeles County or the LASD within the meaning of Rule 801 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (and similar statue statutes like California Evidence Code § 1220).
66. The initial reports prepared by the Moss Group or CGJ paid for by funds provided under this Settlement Agreement will be provided to the Board of Supervisors and to Class Counsel. Class Counsel will also receive copies of the non-privileged portions of follow up reports back to the Board about the Moss Group/CGJ Reports or Contracts by any County agencies. All such reports provided to Class Counsel shall be confidential and will not be publicized or disclosed to any other party, except to the extent they have been made public by the Board.
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67. Any reports prepared by the Moss Group or CGJ are their analyses and recommendations. Nothing in this Agreement requires that they be accepted or implemented by Defendants, who reserve the right to decline to implement any recommendation made in the Moss/CGJ Contracts for any reasons.
XV. INTEGRATION 68. This Settlement Agreement supersedes all prior communications regarding the matters contained herein between the Parties or their representatives. This Settlement Agreement is an integrated agreement and contains the entire agreement regarding the matters herein between the Parties, and no representations, warranties or promises have been made or relied on by any party hereto other than as set forth herein. This Settlement Agreement was drafted by counsel for the Parties hereto, and there shall be no presumption or construction against any party. XVI. FAIRNESS HEARING AND FINAL ORDER OF APPROVAL 69. Before this Settlement Agreement becomes final and binding on the Parties, the Court shall hold a Fairness Hearing to determine whether to enter the Final Order of Approval and Settlement. A proposed Final Order of Approval and Settlement shall be submitted to the Court incorporating the terms of this Settlement Agreement and addressing related information such as Objections and Opt-Outs.
XVII. NO THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES INTENDED 70. This Settlement Agreement does not and is not intended to create any rights with respect to any third Parties, except as otherwise provided herein.
XVIII. COUNTERPARTS 71. This Settlement Agreement may be signed in counterparts.

DATED: July 15, 2019

KAYE, MCLANE, BEDNARSKI & LITT

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DATED: _________________

By: _________________________ Barrett S. Litt
By: _________________________ Lindsay Battles
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
GLASER WEIL
By: _________________________ Andrew Baum
Attorneys for Defendants

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By: _________________________ Barrett S. Litt

DATED: _J_u_ly_1_5_,_2_0_1_9_______

By: _________________________ Lindsay Battles
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
GLASER WEIL
By: _________________________ Andrew Baum
Attorneys for Defendants

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LIST OF EXHIBITS TO SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

Exhibit B Exhibit C

Class Notice Proof of Claim and Release Form

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 Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 394 Filed 09/23/19 Page 1 of 13 Page ID #:14099
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No. CV 10-01649 SVW

Date 9/23/2019

Title

Mary Amador, et al., v. Sheriff Leroy D. Baca, etc., et al.,

Present: The Honorable STEPHEN V. WILSON, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

Paul M. Cruz Deputy Clerk

N/A Court Reporter / Recorder

Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs:

Attorneys Present for Defendants:

Proceedings:

N/A

N/A

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT [387]

“[A] court's goal in distributing class action damages is to get as much of the money to the class members in as simple a manner as possible.” Newberg on Class Actions, § 12:26 (5th ed.). Because this settlement agreement fails to achieve that primary goal, the Court is forced to DENY preliminary approval.
I. Introduction and Factual Background
Lead Plaintiffs Mary Amador et al. represent a class of female inmates of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (“LASD”) who contend that highly invasive body cavity inspections conducted during the relevant class period (March 5, 2008 to January 1, 2015) violated their Fourth Amendment rights. Dkt. 387 pg. 1. After certification of several classes and sub-classes, Dkt. 327, this Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment on June 7, 2017. Dkt. 361. Following a prolonged period of negotiation and mediation, the parties made this Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement. Dkt. 387.
The full Settlement Agreement requires LASD to pay a total of $53 million dollars into a Class Fund over a period of three years. Dkt. 387-2, pg. 3 (“the Settlement Agreement”). The proposed distribution of funds includes:
 Incentive awards to nine named plaintiffs of $10,000 each.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No. CV 10-01649 SVW

Date 9/23/2019

Title

Mary Amador, et al., v. Sheriff Leroy D. Baca, etc., et al.,

 Up to $3 million in Class Funds to finance contracts between the County of Los Angeles and several private nonprofit and for-profit entities (the Moss Group and the Center for Gender and Justice) that seek to “develop a strengthened model of gender-responsive policy and operational practice at all LASD facilities that house female inmates.”
 Third-party class settlement administration costs by the chosen administrator, JND Legal Administration, estimated at up to $464,000 (dependent on the total claims rate within the class).
 A provision giving Plaintiff’s counsel the right to apply for attorney’s fees of up to one-third of the Class Fund as well as litigation costs, with final approval over any award of attorney’s fees at the Court’s discretion.
 The remainder of the Class Fund to be distributed to class members under a points-based allocation formula.
Because the Class includes an estimated 93,000 to 94,000 individuals, Plaintiff’s counsel anticipates that only 20% of the potential class will submit claims. Dkt. 387, pg. 12-13. Notice will be provided through text messages, email, social networking accounts, first-class mail, notices in Prison Legal News, and various other methods. Dkt. 387-2, pg. 21-22. The average claim, given Plaintiff’s predicted claims rate, would be roughly $1500 per class member. Dkt. 387, pg. 13.
The Class Fund is non-reversionary but includes a remainder cy pres mechanism, allegedly intended to prevent accrual of “windfall” payments to class members. Id. at 6. This cy pres mechanism utilizes a secondary damages formula, applied solely for determination of a whether a cy pres payment to a non-profit organization should be made. Id. It uses a sliding scale that calculates a maximum damages pool allotted to the class as a whole based on the actual claims rate after notice is mailed out to potential class members. Id. Defendants also have the right to withdraw from the settlement if more than 250 class members choose to opt out of the class. Id.
II. Legal Standard
A district court holds a unique role in the approval of a class action settlement, serving as a fiduciary to the absent class members. See Rodriguez v. West Publishing Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 968 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Newberg, at § 13:40, fn. 4. Judicial approval of a joint, unopposed class settlement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No. CV 10-01649 SVW

Date 9/23/2019

Title

Mary Amador, et al., v. Sheriff Leroy D. Baca, etc., et al.,

occurs in the absence of the traditional adversarial process, and thus requires the court to “adopt the role of a skeptical client” in scrutinizing the settlement terms. Manual for Complex Litigation, Fourth, § 21.61. A district court “may not simply rubber stamp stipulated settlements”, even at the preliminary approval stage. Kakani v. Oracle Corp., 2007 WL 1793774, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 2007); see also Ehrheart v. Verizon Wireless, 609 F.3d 590, 603 (3rd Cir. 2010).
2018 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) have added specificity to the previously murky standard for preliminary judicial approval of a class settlement. See Cotter v Lyft, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 3d 930, 935 (N.D. Cal. 2016). In particular, FRCP Rule 23(e)(1)(B) has been amended to clarify appropriate procedure for preliminary approval by a court, requiring a district court to permit notice to be given to the class (i.e. granting preliminary approval) only following a sufficient showing that the court “will likely be able to” (1) approve the proposal under Rule 23(e)(2), and (2) certify the class for the purposes of judgment.
Thus, proper analysis at the preliminary approval stage requires inquiry into the same factors relevant to a final approval of a class settlement— that the settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate” when considering the specific sub-factors provided in 23(e)(2). If it falls within the “range of reasonableness” relative to each of these factors (to integrate relevant pre-amendment Ninth Circuit caselaw into this analysis) the court should issue preliminary approval. Cotter v. Lyft, at 935. These subfactors include (A) adequate representation by class representatives and class counsel, (B) a proposal that was negotiated at arm’s length, (C) adequate relief provided to the class, and (D) that the proposal treats class members equitably relative to each other.
III. Analysis
This Court previously certified several classes and sub-classes for damages under Rule 23(c)(4) Dkt. 327. Therefore the second requirement of 23(e)(1)(b), that the Court will be likely to “certify the class for purposes of judgment on the proposal,” has already been satisfied by the prior course of proceedings. Therefore, the only live issue for analysis here is whether the Court determines that given these proposed terms, it is also likely to approve the final class settlement under 23(e)(2).

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No. CV 10-01649 SVW

Date 9/23/2019

Title

Mary Amador, et al., v. Sheriff Leroy D. Baca, etc., et al.,

a. Adequate representation by class counsel and class representatives.
“Adequate representation” for purposes of Rule 23(e)(2)(A) generally focuses inquiry on the nature and amount of discovery, as well as the overall performance of counsel representing the class during the course of litigation. Newberg, at § 13:49.
Kaye, McLane, Bednarski & Litt, LLP (“Class Counsel”) has represented this class since 2010 and litigated vigorously in the years since, winning class certification and a Motion for Summary Judgment in the process. Dkt. 327, Dkt. 261. Class Counsel has litigated public interest and civil rights cases since 1984 and has specialized in civil rights class actions, including several specifically tied to strip search constitutional violations. Dkt. 388, Declaration of Barrett Litt, ¶¶ 2-3, 13. Class Counsel has performed extensive discovery, deposed a variety of LASD personnel, and settlement discussions began in this case only after multiple rounds of certification and decertification with regard to injunctive and damages relief. Id. at ¶ 5. Class Counsel also devoted significant effort to contacting potential class members immediately prior to reaching settlement agreement with Defendants in order to ensure an adequate claims rate and to provide leverage for an alternative piecemeal litigation strategy if settlement talks break down. Id. at ¶ 16.
On this record and given the wider range of latitude afforded this analysis for preliminary approval, the Court finds no issue with adequate representation of either counsel or class representatives that would bar preliminary approval.
b. Proposed settlement negotiated at arm’s length.
Rule 23(e)(2)(B) directs inquiry at the relationship between the parties in order to root out potentially collusive settlements that benefit the plaintiffs’ lawyers at the class’s expense. Newberg, at § 13:50. Ninth Circuit district courts (prior to the 2018 amendment to the rules) generally gave an “initial presumption of fairness” to settlements negotiated at arm’s length. Corson v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 2016 WL 1375838, at *7 (C.D. Cal. April 4, 2016); Mora v. Cal West Ag Services, Inc., 2018 WL 3201764, at *8 (E.D. Cal. 2018).
The parties reached a settlement agreement here following three full days of in-person settlement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No. CV 10-01649 SVW

Date 9/23/2019

Title

Mary Amador, et al., v. Sheriff Leroy D. Baca, etc., et al.,

conferences before the Hon. George H. King (Ret.). Id. at 3. As discussed above, these settlement negotiations followed a lengthy litigation process prior to the Summary Judgment order by this Court that prompted settlement negotiations. Given Class Counsel’s experience, use of an impartial mediator, and very substantial pre-settlement litigation, the Court views this element as sufficiently satisfied for purposes of preliminary approval.
c. Relief provided for the class is adequate
Rule 23(e)(2)(C)’s requirement of adequate relief directs a court to consider, (i) the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal; (ii) the effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing relief to the class, including the method of processing class-member claims; (iii) the terms of any proposed award of attorney's fees, including timing of payment; and (iv) any agreement required to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3). The Advisory Committee notes to Rule 23 recommend forecasting the likely range of classwide recoveries and comparing these results to the settlement figure. FRCP 23(e)(2) n. 2018. The Ninth Circuit has directed inquiry on this factor towards whether “the settlement taken as a whole” demonstrates that the class’s interests drove the ultimate outcome of negotiations. Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 960 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1027 (9th Cir. 1998)).
At this preliminary stage, the Court is not yet required to rule on any proposed award of attorney’s fees and no “side agreements” under Rule 23(e)(3) have been identified within the full Settlement Agreement provided to the Court. Dkt. 387-2. Thus elements (iii) and (iv) are not relevant here to the Court’s analysis at the preliminary approval stage.
The settlement agreement calls for a $53 million settlement split between nearly 100,000 potential class members (after costs and attorney’s fees). Dkt. 387. Class Counsel cites in its declarations to a variety of class action settlement with roughly comparable facts and class sizes, which resulted in settlements ranging from $55 million to $33 million, although actual payout rates were far lower in some cases. Dkt. 388, Litt Declaration, pg. 5. Class Counsel also contends that the estimated dollar figure per-claim, $1500, would be at the “high end” of strip search class recoveries. Id. at 4.
Class Counsel acknowledges that while individual members of the class might possibly win five

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No. CV 10-01649 SVW

Date 9/23/2019

Title

Mary Amador, et al., v. Sheriff Leroy D. Baca, etc., et al.,

or even six figure judgments in individual actions, this Court’s prior ruling certifying the subclasses under Rule 23(c)(4) precluded class-wide damages calculations, meaning recovery would otherwise be largely limited by class member’s ability and willingness to mount individualized trials on damages. Dkt. 327, pg. 8. Additionally, the “opt-out” provision described above and detailed in the full settlement order would permit individual members with strong claims to pursue greater compensation through individual jury trials on damages. Dkt. 387-2, pg. 7. Finally, Supreme Court precedent during the course of this litigation has pared back constitutional claims regarding jail strip searches generally, restricting the range of continued litigation in this area. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cty. of Burlington, 566 U.S. 318, 341, (2012).
Given the size of the class here, the average recovery, and the ability of up to 250 class members with more substantial claims to opt-out of the settlement, the Court would generally be inclined to approve the broad terms of the settlement. However, the proposal to earmark up to $3 million of the settlement to contracts between private parties and Los Angeles County, thereby reducing the recovery of each member of the class, creates grave concerns for this Court which prevent it from granting preliminary approval of the settlement.
i. If the $3 million payment is cy pres, it is an unprecedent use of such a mechanism.
Cy pres is a medieval equitable doctrine that has evolved in the modern era into the primary method for disposing of unclaimed class action funds, on logic that this constitutes a “next best” use of funds through an indirect benefit realized by charitable action. Newberg, at § 12:32. In more controversial cases, courts have approved “full” cy pres charitable distributions (without any distribution directly to class members) in contexts where the classes are vast and injuries comparatively small, such that attempted distribution be cost-prohibitive.1 Newberg, at § 12:26 fn. 16 (collecting cases). In justifying use of cy pres, courts have emphasized the advantage of indirect benefit conferred by charitable action enabled by funds as an alternative to making additional “windfall” payments to class
1 Classically considered appropriate in contexts where the postage required to mail a settlement check would exceed the permember recovery. Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1037 (9th Cir. 2011). Cf. Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 784 (7th Cir. 2004) (rejecting the parties' contention that "each member would receive an amount smaller than the cost of postage").

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No. CV 10-01649 SVW

Date 9/23/2019

Title

Mary Amador, et al., v. Sheriff Leroy D. Baca, etc., et al.,

members whose claims have already been fully settled. Newberg, at § 12:32; Hughes v. Kore of Indiana Enterprise, Inc., 731 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2013).’
Alternatives to cy pres exist, primarily pro rata distribution of unclaimed funds to existing class members who submitted claims. The American Law Institute (ALI) issued a 2010 report taking the position that class settlement should “presumptively provide for further distributions to participating class members unless the amounts involved are too small to make individual distributions economically viable or other specific reasons exist that would make such further distributions impossible or unfair.” Newberg, at § 12:30 (quoting American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation § 3.07, cmt. b (2010)).
The Ninth Circuit has approved of cy pres for both unclaimed funds and full cy pres distribution to charities. In re Easysaver Rewards Litigation, 906 F.3d 747, 760 (9th Cir. 2018); Nachsin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1037 (9th Cir. 2011); Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Arizona Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1990); Lane v. Facebook Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 819-20 (9th Cir. 2012). Review of a cy pres remedy included in a class action requires that the remedy “account[s] for the nature of the plaintiffs' lawsuit, the objectives of the underlying statutes, and the interests of the silent class members....” Nachsin, at 1036. But endorsement of traditional cy pres in the Ninth Circuit has generally focused on class settlements where the harm to class members was generally fully reimbursed for any claimants, and thus additional recovery could plausibly be considered a “windfall” to participating members. Easysaver, at 761.
Here, the settlement agreement does not expressly label the $2-$3 million in planned contracts the Moss Group and the Center for Gender and Justice as cy pres, unlike the proposed remainder cy pres provision that mandates payments to an unnamed nonprofit in the event of a low claims rate. Dkt. 387-2, pp. 3, 18. However it does label this payment as “indirect compensation to absent class members”, language evocative of the purpose behind a cy pres mechanism in most cases. Id. at 3. In addition, these contractual payments are intended “to help develop a strengthened model of gender-responsive policy and operational practice at all LASD facilities that house female inmates (including CRDF and Twin Towers), while enhancing the culture of safety and respect for both staff and the inmate population.” Id. Under the Ninth Circuit standard, this would appear to suggest intent to have the payments treated as cy pres, given the nature of plaintiff’s lawsuit and the goal of encouraging respectful, safe practices by

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No. CV 10-01649 SVW

Date 9/23/2019

Title

Mary Amador, et al., v. Sheriff Leroy D. Baca, etc., et al.,

LASD.
But as discussed above, cy pres primarily exists as a method of distributing unclaimed funds. Here, the contractual payments would be set aside in advance of claim filing by class members and excluded from the Class Fund to be distributed according to the points-based formula provided. Dkt. 387-2 pp. 6-7. This represents a substantial extension of the traditional use of the cy pres mechanism, one that the Court does not feel is justified in these circumstances.
Moreover, this Court believes that the Ninth Circuit’s approval of cy pres in “windfall” cases is clearly distinguishable from the facts of this settlement. Every member of this class has had their constitutional rights violated on at least one occasion, and it is unclear that any dollar amount, much less an additional $3 million split between thousands of class members, could plausibly constitute a “windfall.” More concretely, cases like In re Easysaver involved consumer classes, where damages could be readily calculated and participating class members had truly been fully compensated. Id. at 761. Similarly, full charitable cy pres in scenarios with small settlement figures and enormous classes are a far cry from this proposed settlement, which has a minimum recovery of $200, easily justifying the expense of full distribution. Dkt. 387-2, pg. 13.
To the extent that these payments are considered cy pres, the Court finds reduction of the Class Fund in advance of any distribution to claiming class members to be unfair to members of the class, and accordingly it cannot constitute “adequate relief” for purposes of preliminary approval under Rule 23(e)(1)(B) and (e)(2). Thus, preliminary approval on the basis that this Court is “likely” to issue final approval on these terms is impossible.
ii. If the $3 million is not cy pres, it represents a reduction in recovery to the class members to combat issues that both sides claim have already been abated.
At an earlier time in this case’s history, the Plaintiffs included a claim for injunctive relief to improve the conditions in which the strip searches were conducted. Dkt. 387, fn. 2. In 2015, LASD added privacy curtains and body scanners to the search area, and Plaintiffs dropped their claim for injunctive relief. Id. If both Parties feel that additional resources are necessary to continue to promote

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No. CV 10-01649 SVW

Date 9/23/2019

Title

Mary Amador, et al., v. Sheriff Leroy D. Baca, etc., et al.,

changes in gender-responsive policing by LASD, they have other avenues available to them. Plaintiffs can bring an additional suit regarding current policies implemented by LASD. LASD itself can seek additional funds from the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, perhaps as part of their recent initiative addressing “Building a Gender-Responsive Criminal Justice System.” Dkt. 387, pg. 4. Either of those solutions could be accomplished without shortchanging recovery of this class for constitutional violations in order to enact these future policy changes.
The Parties might argue that these payments do not constitute cy pres, but instead are a nonmonetary form of compensation made to all class members. Indeed, at the August 19, 2019 motion hearing regarding preliminary approval, the Parties indicate that these payments were primarily intended to benefit absent class members who were not able to participate in the recovery and are statistically more likely than the population as a whole to enter LASD custody in the future. The Court is unconvinced that such benefits stemming from improvements in future LASD policing conduct are sufficiently connected to this class collectively to justify reducing the overall Class Fund by almost 10% (given the calculations described in the Settlement Agreement) after attorney’s fees and costs are deducted. Dkt. 387-2, pp. 7-8.
As above, even if these payments do not constitute cy pres, the Court concludes that the settlement agreement as presented does not give “adequate relief” to class members, and thus cannot give preliminary approval to the settlement as proposed.
iii. The proposed remainder cy pres mechanism is unlikely to be utilized but may present a future challenge to final approval.
As referenced above, the settlement agreement has an additional cy pres mechanism that only takes effect if the claims rate by class members is very low. Dkt. 387-2, pp. 17-18. These calculations are dependent on the distribution of claimants with regard to the number of searches they experienced while in LASD custody during the Class Period. Id. The table appears below:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No. CV 10-01649 SVW

Date 9/23/2019

Title

Mary Amador, et al., v. Sheriff Leroy D. Baca, etc., et al.,

Under the remainder calculation, each claim submitted will be allotted a $5k-$20k figure based on the total number of searches endured by each class member. Id. Then, the final Class Fund will have the total dollar figure of all actual claims submitted under this calculation formula deducted from it, and any remainder will be donated to a nonprofit to be specified in the future. Id. The stated purpose of this additional cy pres mechanism is to ensure Class Members “do not receive a windfall” in the event of an unusually low claims rate.2
Because the formula incorporates a relatively high claim maximum for even single searches, a remainder cy pres distribution to charity is unlikely unless the claims rate is much lower than predicted. To borrow an example from the Settlement Agreement, if only 4,000 class members submit claims (a claims rate of less than 5%) and the average claim is given a value of $9,000 (meaning that the majority of claims are by class members with 1-3 or 4-6 claimed searches), the Class total under the formula would equal $36 million and no cy pres payment would be made. Id. at 18.
Class Counsel stated in their declaration that they anticipate a claims rate of approximately 20% based on their experience in prior strip search class action settlements. Litt Declaration, ¶ 9. Given Class Counsel’s substantial experience in this area, and their declaration under penalty of perjury to this effect, the Court takes the view that the actual claims rate will be at least reasonably close to their estimate. To
2 It should be noted however that although the cy pres formula operates as a “cap” to the extent that it governs how much of the Class Fund is actually distributed to Class Members as a whole, it does not actually govern individual claim values. Instead, the more complicated points-based formula based on the dates of LASD searches (intended to correspond to the invasiveness of the searches at different points in time) would be used to allocate pro rata shares of the final Class Fund. Dkt. 387-2, pg. 12.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No. CV 10-01649 SVW

Date 9/23/2019

Title

Mary Amador, et al., v. Sheriff Leroy D. Baca, etc., et al.,

illustrate how low the claims rate would have to be for the cy pres remainder formula to take effect, if Class Counsel was off by 50% (i.e. a claims rate of 10% rather than 20%) and each claimant fell into the lowest possible category (1-3 searches), the formula would still result in no additional cy pres distribution because the class would total ~$47 million in claims. Class Counsel’s estimate would have to be off very substantially (below 6-7% rather than 20%), and all claims would need to be in the lowest possible category to present the possibility of a substantial cy pres distribution to a future nonprofit.
On similar logic to the analysis above in parts (i) and (ii), this Court is inclined to think that any cy pres distribution intended to prevent windfall payments is wholly inappropriate in the context of a class consisting of individuals who have suffered constitutional violations. It is not clear to the Court that a payment of even $5000 to an individual who has suffered an invasive body cavity search in public view could rightly be considered a “windfall”. Thus, if the effect of this provision was to deprive the class members of a substantial portion of the Class Fund because the claims rate was unexpectedly quite low, the Court would be unlikely to approve such a settlement.
However, it appears likely given Class Counsel’s declaration and experience that the claims rate will not be so low, and the preliminary approval standard only requires the Court to determine that it is “likely to” grant final approval under Rule 23(e)(2). In addition, Class Counsel note that they have been in pre-settlement contact with hundreds of class members who experienced many unconstitutional strip searches, increasing the likelihood that a substantial portion of total claimants will fall into the highest ($20,000) bracket for remainder cy pres calculation purposes. Dkt. 388, pg. 6. Because the Court deems the claims rate likely to exceed that necessary to avoid a remainder cy pres distribution, it does not find it necessary to deny preliminary approval on this basis. However, it does reserve the right upon motion for final approval, to review the actual claims rate and the actual distribution of the Class Fund under the same “fair, reasonable, and adequate” standard.
d. Proposal treats class members equitably.
Analysis of the intra-class equity of a proposed class settlement under Rule 23(e)(2) requires inquiry into how class members are treated relative to differences in their claims, any incentive payments made to lead plaintiffs, and how the scope of release granted by the settlement affects different categories of class members. FRCP 23(e)(2), advisory committee’s note to 2018 amendment.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No. CV 10-01649 SVW

Date 9/23/2019

Title

Mary Amador, et al., v. Sheriff Leroy D. Baca, etc., et al.,

Courts in the Ninth Circuit have generally closely scrutinized settlement agreements that treat class members disparately. Ferrington v. McAfee, Inc., 2012 WL 1156399, at *8 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1027 (9th Cir. 1998).
Incentive payments of $10,000 to $25,000 for lead plaintiffs in multi-million dollar class settlements have been summarily approved in a variety of cases. Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., 2007 WL 221862, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Jan.26, 2007) (approving payments of $25,000 to each named plaintiff); In re: Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litig., No. 1917, 2016 WL 153265, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2016) ($25,000 for each of ten class representatives in $127.45 million settlement); Chu v. Wells Fargo Investments, LLC, 2011 WL 672645, *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2011) ($10,000 to two plaintiff representatives involved in case for five years and $4,000 to three representative plaintiffs participating in case for two years, from a $6.9 million settlement fund).
Here, the points-based distribution formula means that class members will have differing recoveries, but the formula will be applied neutrally and has a clear rationale. The distribution formula developed in the course of mediation by the Parties is based on the changing conditions and level of privacy across the multi-year class period. Dkt. 387-2, pg. 10. It gives increasing point totals for searches endured under worse conditions during earlier periods in the class. Id. at 11. Beyond the sliding scale for invasiveness of searches, class members also receive proportionate recoveries based on the total number of searches they have endured because their recovery is based on their proportionate share of the total points awarded to the class. Id. Given that this Court previously determined that each search during the period constituted a discrete constitutional violation, the Court finds it likely at this preliminary stage that the distribution formula constitutes a reasonable approximation of elative damages of for class members across the different periods available.
The settlement agreement calls for incentive payments of $10,000 to nine different lead plaintiffs, for a total of $90,000. These payments, individually and in total, are appropriate given the overall settlement of $53 million. As the Parties note, the need for lead plaintiffs in custody to request prior injunctive relief, to represent individual subclasses created by this Court, and the need for lead plaintiffs to disclose intimate details to support their claims all support the reasonableness of incentive payments and the total number of lead plaintiffs, which are not disproportionate given an expected average claim of $1500 for unnamed class members. Dkt. 387, pg. 11.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No. CV 10-01649 SVW

Date 9/23/2019

Title

Mary Amador, et al., v. Sheriff Leroy D. Baca, etc., et al.,

The scope of the Settlement Agreement extends to all violations of law or constitutional rights arising from the class-wide factual allegations alleged in the Fourth Amended Complaint. Id. at 15-17. In the Ninth Circuit, courts give preclusive effect only to new claims arising from an “identical factual predicate” to the claims in the class settlement. Hesse v. Sprint Corp., 598 F.3d 581, 590 (9th Cir. 2010). Because the Class Period and factual allegations in the Fourth Amended Complaint are detailed and specific in this case, and the scope of the release directly references the underlying complaint, the Court finds the scope of release here appropriate under that standard. Dkt. 334. Additionally, the Opt-Out Clause discussed previously prevents application of the release to any class members who seek to be excluded. Id. at 25.
IV. Conclusion
The motion for preliminary approval is DENIED. If the parties wish to present another agreement for preliminary approval that is otherwise consistent with this opinion, the motion must be filed by no later than November 1, 2019.

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 Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 395-2 Filed 10/31/19 Page 1 of 30 Page ID #:14147
Exhibit B

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 395-2 Filed 10/31/19 Page 2 of 30 Page ID #:14148

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARY AMADOR, et al.,

Case No. CV 10-01649 SVW (JEMx)

Plaintiffs,

[Honorable Stephen V. Wilson]

vs.

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, et al.,

Defendants.

Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Myeshia Williams, and Nancy Briseño (individually and on behalf of the classes previously certified in this case (see, Doc. No. 327) (collectively “Plaintiffs”) and Defendants County of Los Angeles (“the County”), the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, its prior Sheriff, Leroy Baca, and Sammy Jones, Timothy Cornell, John H. Clark, Stacey Lee, Dennis Burns, Gerald K. Cooper and Daniel Cruz (collectively “Defendants”), by and through their respective counsel, hereby submit the following Settlement Agreement (“Settlement Agreement”). Plaintiffs and Defendants are referred to collectively herein as “the Parties.”
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I. RECITALS Plaintiffs are former inmates at the Century Regional Detention Facility (“CRDF”), a jail facility operated by the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (“LASD”), which houses female convicted inmates and pretrial detainees. Plaintiffs filed this action in the United States District Court for the Central District of California (“Court”) on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly situated inmates on March 5, 2010. Plaintiffs alleged various violations of the Federal and State Constitutions, of 42 U.S.C. §1983, and California Civil Code §52.1 associated with the LASD’s strip/visual body cavity search practices at CRDF during the class period. The District Court, after multiple hearings and several class certification orders that went through a number of iterations, certified the class on November 18, 2016. See, Doc No. 327 (Order Granting Renewed Motion For Class Certification). The certification was for liability only under Fed.R.Civ.P Rule (c)(4). On June 6, 2017, the District Court granted summary judgment on liability issues to the Plaintiff class on their claim for Monell liability under the Fourth Amendment, and dismissed claims against the individual Defendants, finding qualified immunity applied. . See, Doc No. 361. The District Court’s liability summary judgment ruling found it unnecessary to address changed conditions at CRDF because the searches violated the Fourth Amendment for the whole Class Damages Period. The changes in conditions are nonetheless factored into this Settlement. Subsequently, the Parties entered into a protracted arm’s length mediation process with the assistance of Retired United States District Judge George King, including three in-person mediation sessions with Judge King and numerous telephonic sessions (both the Parties separately with Judge King and among the Parties and Judge King). The Parties have reached a proposed Settlement subject to the approval of the Court. It is understood and agreed that this Settlement is the compromise of
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disputed claims by the Named Plaintiffs and Class Members, and that the payments made are not to be construed as an admission of liability by any of the Defendants. The Defendants deny liability, preserve all defenses they have asserted or could present in these proceedings or any future appeal, and intend merely to avoid the expense of further litigation.
In summary, this Settlement provides for dismissal of this case with prejudice in exchange for a non-reversionary Class Fund of $53 Million, from which costs of administration, litigation costs and attorney’s fees will be paid, and the remainder of which would be distributed to Class Members who make viable claims subject to certain requirements for a minimum number of claims made (or a portion of funds would go to cy pres distributions as defined herein).
As a form of indirect compensation to absent Class Members, up to $3 million of the Class Fund will be used to fund contracts between the County of Los Angeles, on the one hand, the Moss Group and the Center for Gender and Justice (“CGJ”), on the other hand (the “Moss/CGJ Contracts”). Both organizations have significant experience in assisting local, state, and national correctional agencies in the development of gender-responsive and trauma-informed practices, programming, and services. The purpose of the contracts shall be to help develop a strengthened model of gender-responsive policy and operational practice at all LASD facilities that house female inmates (including CRDF and Twin Towers), while enhancing the culture of safety and respect for both staff and the inmate population. The contracts will include preliminary assessment/evaluation, and may also include the provision of expertise, leadership, technical assistance, and services in the following areas: system analysis/operations, policy review and development, strategic planning, program development/inmate services, training/culture, and ongoing assessment. The Moss/CGJ contracts shall be secured in furtherance of the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors’ effort to facilitate the design and implementation of gender-responsive systems within the Los Angeles County criminal justice system, as reflected in the Board of Supervisors’ February 2019
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motion titled “Building a Gender-Responsive Criminal Justice System.” II. DEFINITIONS
The listed terms used throughout this Settlement Agreement are intended to have the following meanings:
1. “Administrator” means the Class Administrator, as agreed upon (or to be agreed upon) by the Parties and appointed by the Court to review and determine the validity and amount of claims submitted by a Settlement Class Member (“SCM”) (as defined herein), according to the procedures set forth herein.
2. The “Bar Date” is the date by which any Class Member who wishes to receive payment pursuant to the Settlement Agreement and therefore is a Settlement Class Member (“SCM”) as defined below must file his/her Proof of Claim and Release Form, file objections to this Settlement Agreement, or request to be excluded from the class (opt-out). The Bar Date shall be calculated as the close of business on the 150th day after the last day of mailing of the Class Notice (or, for those whose initial notice is by email and text message, the day that they were to be sent such electronic notice in lieu of regular mail, as provided in Section X), which is up to occur within two consecutive business days from beginning to end, as is addressed in ¶ 39, i.e., the Administrator must mail all notices within a two day period).
3. “Class Counsel” herein refers to Barrett S. Litt and Lindsay Battles of KAYE, McLANE, BEDNARSKI & LITT.
4. “Class Counsel Attorney’s Fees” refers to the amount awarded by the Court as Class Counsel’s attorney’s fees in this case, to be approved by the Court upon motion by Class Counsel.
5. “Class Counsel Litigation Costs” refers to the amount of costs awarded by the Court upon motion by Class Counsel.
6. The “Class Fund” refers to the amount of $53 Million as damages compensation to the Class, to be paid by Defendants to the Administrator,
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and out of which the costs of Administration, Plaintiffs’ counsel expert/consulting, litigation and mediation fees, incentive awards and compensation to Class Members will be paid. 7. The “Class Damages Period” refers to the period between March 5, 2008 (two years before the filing of the complaint) and January 1, 2015 (the date scanners or privacy partitions were available for all CRDF strip searches). 8. A “Class Member” means any member of the certified Damages Classes. Although the Court certified two damages classes, one from March 2008 through June 30, 2011, and one from July 1, 2011 through January 1, 2015 (because scanners were then being used for all strip searches unless the inmate requested a strip search in its place), for purposes of this settlement and because summary judgment was granted to both classes, the Damages Class is defined for settlement purposes as “any female inmate at CRDF inmate who, upon their admission or return to CRDF, were visual body cavity searched in groups, without individual privacy between March 5 2008 (two years before the filing of the complaint) and January 1, 2015.” 9. The “Class Notice” means the notice to be sent to Class Members regarding this Settlement, in a form substantially similar to that attached hereto as Exhibit B, or as otherwise approved by the Court, and such other summary notice to be published in accordance with the terms of this Settlement Agreement. 10. The “Class Member List” is a list of Class Members. It is based solely on the records of the LASD. Only persons appearing on that list qualify as Class Members. 11. The “Database” is the information provided in electronic form to the Administrator which information has been compiled from the electronic records of the LASD, as filtered to identify those meeting the class definition by the Parties’ experts.
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12. The “Defendants” are the County of Los Angeles, the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, its prior Sheriff Leroy Baca, Sammy Jones, Timothy Cornell, John H. Clark, Stacey Lee, Dennis Burns, Gerald K. Cooper and Daniel Cruz.
13. The “Effective Date” is the date on which the District Court issues an Order granting final approval of the Settlement Agreement, except that if any objections to the settlement were submitted to the Court, the Effective Date is the date of the final resolution of any appeal of the Final Approval of this Settlement Agreement, or if no such appeal is filed, the expiration of the deadline for filing a Notice of Appeal.
14. The “Fairness Hearing” is the hearing on the fairness of this Settlement, which date will be set by the Court.
15. The “Final Order of Approval and Settlement” is the Order finally approving the settlement, entered by the Court (which may also be referred to herein as “Final Order”).
16. The “Lawsuit” refers to the action styled Amador et al. v. Baca et al., Case No. CV 10-01649 SVW (JEMx)..
17. The “Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs” is Class Counsel's application for Attorneys' Fees and Costs.
18. The “Named Plaintiffs” or “Class Representatives” refers to the plaintiffs named in the Fourth Amended Complaint to this suit, who are Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Nancy Briseño, Felice Cholewiak (Vargas), Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil and Myeshia Williams. While Lora Barranca, Diana Paiz and Diane Vigil were named solely as injunctive relief plaintiffs under §1983, they were damages plaintiffs under state law and Class Members. For purposes of this Settlement, no distinction is made between or among the Named Plaintiffs.
19. “Preliminary Approval” is the Court's determination that the Settlement is within the range of possible approval and therefore that Class Notice should
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be sent to Class Members and a Fairness Hearing should be set by the Court. 20. The “Preliminary Approval Order” is an order entered by the Court preliminarily approving the Settlement, after which Class Notice, the opportunity to object and Opt Out, and entry of a Final Order of Approval and Settlement would occur. 21. An “Opt-Out” is any Class Member who files a timely request for exclusion, pursuant to the terms of this Settlement Agreement, to be excluded from the Settlement Class. (If used as a verb, it refers to the process of filing such exclusion.) 22. The “Proof of Claim Form” means the Proof of Claim and Release Form required to be used in order to make a claim for payment under this Settlement. A copy of the proposed Proof of Claim Form is attached as Exhibit C. The pre-prepared Claim forms shall be bar coded to link with the Class Member’s Database information and shall contain the damages to which the Class Member is entitled if s/he were to receive the full damages provided for in this agreement. 23. “Released Person” means the Defendants and their affiliates, subsidiaries, predecessors, successors, and/or assigns, together with all past, present and future officials, employees, representatives, attorneys, outside counsel, and/or agents of Los Angeles County. “Released Person” also includes any and all insurance carriers, and/or their representatives and attorneys, for the Released Persons. 24. “Remainder” refers to the amount in the Class Fund after payment of Class Counsel’s Attorney Fees, Class Counsel’s Litigation Costs, and mediation costs, and the Moss/CGJ Contracts. The “Minimum Remainder” is a figure used for purposes of determining whether cy pres payments are made and is based on the estimate of the maximum fees to be sought (1/3 of the $53 Million Fund), and estimated litigation and class administration costs ($1.5
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Million), and the Moss/CGJ Contracts (maximum $3 Million); thus the Minimum Remainder is estimated to amount to $330,883,000, which the Parties agree to round up to $341,000,000. 25. The “Settlement” refers to this agreement. 26. A “Settlement Class Member” (“SCM”) means any Class Member as defined above (whether or not she files a Timely Claim form), including representatives, successors and assigns, who does not file a valid and timely Request for Exclusion as provided for in this Settlement Agreement. 27. The “Settlement Fund” is the fund established by the Administrator with funds transferred from Defendants from which the damages to the Class Representatives and Class Members will be paid. The Defendants will pay all moneys they are obligated to pay under the Preliminary Approval Order, and the settlement approved by the Court, if any, into the Settlement Fund. 28. “Strip Search” means a search conducted by LASD personnel on a Class Member (as defined above) in which the person was required to remove her clothing, including underwear, in the presence of a corrections officer and/or expose her breasts, genitals or body cavities for a visual inspection. All persons appearing on the Class Member List were subjected to a strip search as defined herein. 29. A “Timely Claim” is one filed a) within the 150-day window provided by the notice to be sent to the class, and b) to the extent the Court approves, late claims (i.e., claims filed after the Class Notice period) that are filed prior to the Final Approval Hearing.
III. DISCLAIMER OF LIABILITY 1. The Parties acknowledge and agree that all undertakings and agreements contained in this Settlement Agreement have been agreed to solely for the purpose of finally compromising all questions, disputes and issues between them relating to the litigation. This Settlement Agreement and any proceedings taken pursuant hereto shall not in any event be construed as, interpreted as, or
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deemed to be evidence of an admission or concession by either party for any purpose, or deemed to constitute a waiver of any legal position or any defenses or other rights which the Parties might otherwise assert in any context. Neither this Settlement Agreement nor any provision contained therein, nor any documents related hereto, nor any negotiations, statements or testimony taken in connection herewith may be offered or received as evidence, or used for any other purpose, or in any suit, action or legal proceeding which either of them have or in the future may have with any other person, as an admission or concession of liability or wrongdoing on the part of either party, except in connection with any action or legal proceeding to enforce this Settlement Agreement. The Parties have reached this Settlement through arms-length negotiations and to avoid the costs and delays of further disputes, litigation and negotiations among them and after extensive negotiations with an independent mediator, subject to approval by the Court. This Settlement Agreement has been entered into without any concession of liability or non-liability whatsoever and has no precedential or evidentiary value whatsoever. IV. FINANCIAL TERMS OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND CLASS
DAMAGES ALLOCATION FORMULA 2. The Class Fund is the amount of $53,000,000. The class administration costs shall be paid out of that fund, as will any incentive awards to the Class Representatives as approved by the Court. (Class Counsel’s Litigation Costs will be addressed in Class Counsel’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs.) The Remainder of the Class Fund shall be distributed to the Class Members (including Named Plaintiffs/Class Representatives) under the formula terms provided in this Agreement. 3. Subject to approval of the Court at the hearing regarding the Final Order of Approval and Settlement, the following incentive awards shall be paid to the Named Plaintiffs (in addition to the share of the Class Fund to which they are entitled as Class Members). Class Counsel represent that they have no prior agreement with any Named Plaintiff to seek such awards, nor do they have any
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commitment to propose them. They are proposed at the initiative of Class Counsel

and are intended to reflect Named Plaintiffs’ commitment to, and active assistance

in advancing, this Lawsuit since it was filed in 2010:

NAME Mary Amador

INCENTIVE AWARD $10,000

Lora Barranca

$10,000

Alisa Battiste Nancy Briseño Felice (Cholewiak) Vargas

$10,000 $10,000 $10,000

Evangelina Madrid

$10,000

Diana Paiz Diane Vigil Myeshia Williams
TOTAL

$10,000 $10,000 $10,000 $90,000

4. It is not currently possible to determine the amount of the Remainder

before the hearing regarding the Final Order of Approval and Settlement, where the

final amount of Class Counsel’s Attorney’s Fees and Costs awards, and class

administration costs , and the Moss/CGJ Contracts will be determined.

5. The formula for distribution of the Remainder has been developed by

Class Counsel and, if approved by the Court, will be summarized in the Class

Notice to be sent to Class Members. The formula is designed to account for the fact

that the alleged severity of challenged conditions varied depending on the time

period the Strip Search occurred (with the most intrusive conditions before July

2011 and least intrusive conditions after February 2014 when the bus bay became

enclosed and had heating), the number of Strip Searches an inmate experienced and

the weather conditions when the Strip Search occurred.

6. To briefly summarize, Class Counsel’s assessment of these variations

in conditions, which are factored into the class damages allocation formula, are as

follows:

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TIME PERIOD

CONDITIONS

2/26/2014 – 1/31/2015

Conditions:

(Core Conditions Applicable to All Class Members Regardless of Time Period)

(1) female inmates required to participate in group Strip Searches in which the labia lift procedure was used;
(2) female inmates required to publicly identify if they were menstruating, remove feminine hygiene products in view of other inmates; and
(3) female inmates required to expose their naked body – including bare pubic region and bare breasts – in the presence of a group.
(4) inmates searched in groups of 24 inmates (or more, see below).

4/1/2013 – 2/25/2014

Conditions:

7/1/2011 – 3/30/20131

 All above conditions
plus  Group Strip Searches occurred in a converted bus garage with a chain link fence roof with a tarp on it and no heaters.
Conditions:

3/5/2008 – 6/30/2011

 All above conditions
plus  Inmates searched in groups larger than 24 inmates  Inmates required to put clothing directly on the ground.
Conditions:

 All above conditions
plus  Deputies simultaneously searched both lines of female inmates so that inmates were directly viewing each other during the Strip

1 This subclass was because LASD reduced its class sizes to a maximum of 25 and installed tables on which clothes could be placed in April 2013.
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TIME PERIOD

Search.

CONDITIONS

7. Based on the above considerations, Class Counsel have devised a

distribution model in which Class Members are compensated based on the number

of Strip Searches they endured, with searches weighted based on the time period in

which they occurred (which, in turn, corresponds to the severity of conditions).

Each Strip Search is assigned a point-value which will translate to a per-diem dollar

value at the time of distribution. Class Members receive the designated number of

points based on the number of Strip Searches in each category.

8. The chart below shows the categories, conditions associated with each

category, and points assigned to each category.

Time Period 3/8/2008 – 6/30/2011
7/1/2011 – 3/31/2013

Points Per Strip Search 100
90

4/1/2013 – 2/25/2014

80

2/26/2014 – 1/31/2015

70

9. The distribution model also provides an additional 10-points for any Strip Search conducted at a temperature of 70 degrees or less.
10. The per-search points are assigned to each Class Member, up to their 50th search. The “50-search cap” applies to less than .04% of the Class. This cap is to ensure that outliers who have outsized claims do not distort the meaningfulness of the recovery to the remaining Class Members. (Such outliers would be entitled to opt out and pursue their own claims if they so choose.)
11. That Class Member’s point total is the sum of all their assigned points. The final distribution will be based on the total points for each Class Member who filed claims, divided by individual points assigned to each claiming Class Member.

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(If, for example, there is a total of 1,000,000 points for the aggregated Timely Claims, and Class Member “X” had a total of 200 points, Class Member “X” would receive .02% (or .0002) of the Remainder; if the Remainder is the Minimum Remainder of $31 Million, that Class Members would receive $6,200). These figures are purely hypothetical and should not be considered as reflective of any likely award. Because it is anticipated that not all Class Members will make Timely Claims, and this is a non-reversionary fund (except as provided in Section VI, below, for cy pres payments in the event of a low claim rate, which the Parties do not anticipate), a claiming Class Member’s share of the Remainder will be determined based on that Class Member’s share of the total points for Class Members who made Timely Claims.
12. No Class Member who filed a Timely Claim will receive less than $200 (the minimum will be at least $200 but may be adjusted upwards) subject to the limit of the Class Funds available in the Remainder. The minimum provision is designed to ensure that all Class Members who submit Timely Claims receive some recovery.
13. None of the Class Fund shall revert to the County. Accordingly, as explained above, the money per Class Member making a Timely Claim will increase proportionately to the extent that fewer Class Members make a claim.
14. Class Counsel intend to submit a separate Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs to be heard at the hearing regarding a Final Order of Approval and Settlement, to be analyzed under the standards for an award of fees and costs to a prevailing plaintiff under the percentage of the fund doctrine. While the motion will seek a percentage of the Class Fund as a fee award, subsumed within that request will be any statutory attorney’s fee to which Class Counsel would be entitled under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 or Cal. Civil Code § 52.1(h). The Class Notice will advise Class Members of Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs and their right to object to it.
15. The LASD represents that to the best of its knowledge, it has provided all the electronic data in its possession, which it is legally authorized to produce,
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regarding Class Members necessary to both identify and contact Class Members. The LASD shall provide to the Administrator, to the extent that such information has not already been provided, any such additional information in its possession which it is legally authorized to produce. Such information shall include date of birth, social security number (SSN), driver’s license/state ID number, and most recent contact information (address, phone and any other available contact information). In addition, LASD shall provide to the Administrator and Class Counsel the data from the Automated Justice Information System (“AJIS”) Released-to-Agency field indicating whether a Class Member was released to the custody of another law enforcement agency. This information may only be used to reach out to Class Members to ensure they receive the Class Notice and are aware of how to file a claim pursuant to this Agreement. LASD will make a written request to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), which request will include a list of Class Members who were transferred to CDCR from LASD custody, and request that CDCR: (1) advise the Administrator of where and how the Class Notice to those Class Members still in CDCR physical custody should be sent; and (2) provide the Administrator with the most recent contact information in CDCR’s records (including records in the Division of Adult Parole Operations, where applicable) for each Class Members who is no longer in CDCR physical custody. When making the foregoing request to CDCR, LASD will provide to CDCR any individualized identifying information in its possession that it is legally authorized to include that could assist CDCR in identifying Class Members.
If CDCR provides a response, LASD will then advise Class Counsel of CDCR’s response, and if CDCR either fails to respond or refuses to provide assistance, Class Counsel may seek Court assistance in securing the cooperation of CDCR to effectuate service of the Class Notice and to obtain the most up to date contact information for Class Members. Neither the County nor the LASD will have any further obligation with respect to efforts to obtain contact information for
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Class Members from CDCR beyond the efforts described above, except that it will engage in any reasonable follow-up requested by CDCR. LASD will likewise have no further obligation to assist with securing cooperation regarding the provision of Class Notice to Class Members still in CDCR custody.
Nothing in this agreement precludes Plaintiffs from seeking a court order authorizing the LASD to provide CII and FBI numbers directly to CDCR as part of efforts to identify Class Members and provide Class Notice to individuals who were previously transferred to CDCR. Should Plaintiffs file such a motion, they will serve the Attorney General of the State of California and the Federal Bureau of Investigation with the motion in order to provide each with the opportunity to be heard. Plaintiffs will not seek access to such records for themselves or for the Administrator.
V. RELEASES AND OTHER SETTLEMENT TERMS 16. The Parties enter into this Agreement solely for the purposes of this Settlement and implementation of the Settlement. If the Settlement fails to be approved or otherwise fails consummation, then this Settlement Agreement is hereby withdrawn. 17. An SCM who complies with the requirements set forth in this Settlement Agreement and files a Timely Claim form will be paid specified sums determined by the distribution process set forth above, which payment shall be in full satisfaction of all claims of that SCM. 18. The Settlement Agreement, as of the Effective Date, resolves in full all claims against the Released Persons by all of the SCMs, including the Named Plaintiffs, involving violations of law or constitutional rights, including, without limitation, their equal protection rights under federal and California law, their rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California Civil Code § 52.1, any other rights under any other federal, state or local law, regulation, duty, or obligation, or any other legal theory, action or cause of action, which arise from the class-wide factual allegations alleged in the Fourth Amended Complaint, which is the operative
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pleading in this matter ( “Covered Claims”). 19. When the Settlement Agreement is final, as of the Effective Date, all
SCMs, including the Named Plaintiffs, waive all rights to any and all claims relating to damages or reimbursement of any kind for the Covered Claims. This waiver and release shall include a full release and waiver of unknown rights regarding the Covered Claims that may exist as of the Effective Date.
20. As of the Effective Date, the SCMs, including the Named Plaintiffs, hereby waive any and all rights to pursue, initiate, prosecute, or commence any action or proceeding before any court, administrative agency or other tribunal, or to file any complaint regarding acts or omissions by the Released Persons with respect to the Covered Claims during the class period; and further, as it relates to this waiver or Release, expressly waive the provisions of California Civil Code § 1542, which provides that “a general release does not extend to claims which the creditor does not know or suspect to exist in his or her favor at the time of executing the release, which if known by him or her must have materially affected his or her settlement with the debtor.”
21. This Settlement Agreement, together with its exhibits, contains all the terms and conditions agreed upon by the Parties regarding the subject matter of the instant proceeding, and no oral agreement entered into at any time nor any written agreement entered into prior to the execution of this Settlement Agreement shall be deemed to exist, or to bind the Parties, or to vary the terms and conditions contained herein, except as expressly provided herein.
22. Each SCM shall be deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court.
23. This Settlement Agreement is subject to and conditioned on entry by the Court of a Final Order of Approval and Settlement and the issuance of the final order of dismissal by the Court, providing the specified relief as set forth below, which relief shall be pursuant to the terms and conditions of this Settlement Agreement and the Parties’ performance of their continuing rights and obligations
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hereunder. The Final Order of Approval and Settlement shall be deemed final on the Effective Date. Such Final Order of Approval and Settlement shall:
a. Dismiss with prejudice all claims in the action as to the Released Persons including all claims for monetary damages, declaratory relief and injunctive relief, each side to bear its own costs and fees except as otherwise provided for in this Settlement Agreement;
b. Order that all SCMs are enjoined from asserting against any Released Person any and all claims that any SCM had, has or may have in the future based on the Covered Claims;
c. Release each Released Person from the claims that any SCM has, had or may have in the future against such Released Person arising out of the Covered Claims;
d. Determine that this Settlement Agreement is entered into in good faith, is reasonable, fair and adequate, and in the best interest of the Class; and
e. Reserve the Court’s continuing and exclusive jurisdiction over the Parties to this Settlement Agreement, including Defendants and SCMs, to administer, supervise, construe and enforce the Settlement Agreement in accordance with its terms for the mutual benefit of all Parties.
24. The Parties will take all necessary and appropriate steps to obtain preliminary and final approvals of the Settlement Agreement, and dismissal of the action with prejudice, all Parties bearing their own fees and costs unless otherwise set forth in this Settlement Agreement. If the Court gives final approval of this Settlement Agreement, and if there is an appeal from such decision, the Parties will defend the Settlement Agreement. VI. CY PRES DISTRIBUTION IN THE EVENT OF A LOW CLAIM RATE
25. In order to ensure that Class Members do not receive a windfall because there are relatively few claims filed, the Parties agree that, if the total claims do not amount to the Minimum Remainder based on the following formula, the difference between those aggregated claims and Minimum Remainder will go to
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the organizations identified in ¶ 30. The formula to determine whether such cy pres

payments are to be made (referred to as the “Cy Pres Formula” shall be as follows:

CY PRES FORMULA

# SEARCHES 1-3 4-6 7-10

AMOUNT $5,000 $10,000 $15,000

11+

$20,000

26. Thus, by way of example only, if the Minimum Remainder is $31 Million, 4000 Class Members filed claims (which the Parties agree is likely a low claim rate), and the average of their claims based on the Cy Pres Formula amounted to $9000 per claimant, the total would be $36,000,000, and no cy pres distribution would apply. In contrast, if 3000 people filed claims based on the same average $9000 per claimant and same $31 Million Minimum Remainder, then $4,000,000 (the difference between the $31 Million Minimum Remainder and the $27,000,000 claimed amount based on the Cy Pres Formula), would go to the Cy Pres Fund.
27. The foregoing formula only applies in the event that the total claims do not amount to the Minimum Remainder based on the Cy Pres Formula. Otherwise, the allocation formula set out in Section IV, above, applies.
28. The Cy Pres funds will not be returned to the County’s general fund but will instead be provided to non-profit organizations or programs which provide gender-responsive services to female inmates in LASD custody. At the time that it is determined that any Cy Pres funds are to be distributed, counsel for the Parties in this case and the LA County Board of Supervisors will work in good faith to identify the organizations or programs to receive those funds. If they cannot agree, the Parties will separately brief the Court, and the Court will determine the organizations and/or programs to which the Cy Pres funds will be paid.
VII. RESOLUTION AND PAYMENT OF CLAIMS 29. Defendants agree to the division of funds between Incentive Awards
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and the Remainder as proposed by Class Counsel subject to the approval of the Court.
VIII. CLASS COUNSEL FEES 30. Class Counsel will file a Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs on a percentage of the fund basis, and the payment of said fees and costs is subject to Court approval. Class Counsel will not seek more than 1/3 of the $53 Million Class Fund as the amount of attorney’s fees requested; Class Counsel may seek less but may not seek more. (This 1/3 cap is separate from Class Counsel’s costs, i.e., Class Counsel may request up to 1/3 of the Class Fund plus costs.)
IX. CLASS ADMINISTRATOR 31. Counsel for the Parties will jointly agree on the selection of the Class Administrator and, if they cannot so agree, will submit their suggestions to the Court and the Court will determine the Administrator. The Parties understand the importance of a rapid process for choosing the Class Administrator and are committed to reaching a joint selection as soon as practicable. 32. The Administrator shall be responsible for taking any steps deemed appropriate and necessary by Class Counsel to notify the Class Members of their rights to file claims, and to assist them in doing so. Class Notice shall be issued electronically by email and text message (for all Class Members whose email addresses and mobile phone numbers can be and have been obtained) by the date set in the Preliminary Approval Order for the initial mailing of Class Notice. On that same date, Class Notice shall be provided by regular mail for all Class Members for whom an email address and mobile phone number have not been obtained, for all incarcerated Class Members. 33. For those Class Members whose initial Class Notice was sent by the combination of email and text message who have not responded by filing either a claim or an Opt Out within 30 days, they will be sent by regular mail the Class Notice previously provided to the other Class Members whose Class Notice was sent by regular mail, along with a statement that they were sent by email and text
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message a Class Notice as well, and this is being sent to ensure that they have seen the Class Notice. (See, ¶ 40 for elaboration.)
34. The Administrator’s duty shall include the use of normal and customary means to search for a Class Member’s email addresses, mobile phone numbers and last known mailing addresses, including the use of a postal database and other specialized databases, when mail is returned. As indicated above, the Administrator shall initially send electronic copies of the Class Notice to any inmates for whom email addresses and mobile telephone numbers are ascertainable and at the same time send a hardcopy version and claim form to any Class Member whose email and mobile phone numbers are not ascertainable, as well as any Class Members who are currently incarcerated in California State prisons. (The Administrator is responsible for making reasonable efforts to determine Class Members who are now incarcerated in California state prisons). The Administrator will also propose economically viable and likely productive forms of notice through the use of social media and online advertising.
35. Beginning when it is first retained after the Court approves its appointment, the Administrator will begin to obtain as many Class Member email addresses and mobile phone numbers as reasonably possible. Before the filing of the Motion for Preliminary Approval, the Administrator will advise the Parties and the Court of when the Administrator believes it can reasonably obtain available Class Member email addresses, phone numbers and mailing addresses, and the date for mailing the Class Notice shall be set with that time in mind.
36. Notice shall proceed as follows: 1) Initial Class Notice shall commence with email and text notices for all Class Members whose email addresses and/or mobile phone numbers are ascertainable (assuming both are ascertainable, Class Members will receive two forms of electronic notice; if either the email address or mobile phone number cannot be obtained, the notice will be sent via the
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available means). 2) On the same day, notice by regular mail shall be sent to all Class
Members for whom either an email address or mobile phone number or both could not be ascertained. This means that all Class Members will receive the Class Notice by either (1) email and text; or (2) regular mail plus either email or text (assuming one of the two is available); or (3) regular mail only (for those whose email and mobile phone numbers cannot be located). 3) Thirty days after the initial issuance of Class Notice, the Administrator will send notice by regular mail to all Class Members who were initially notified only by electronic means only (those who received notice by email and text) and who have not yet submitted claim forms along with the explanation that they were sent such electronic notice but this notice is being sent as well because they did not file a claim or exclude themselves from the settlement. 4) Throughout the notice period, the Administrator shall continue to send email and text notice if and when it learns additional email addresses/phone numbers for Class Members. 5) Where Class Notice is sent by email or text, the Class Administrator will periodically remind Class Members through email/text blasts to file claims. (If possible, procedures shall be implemented to remove Class Members from email/text blasts who have submitted claims). 37. The Administrator shall complete the initial Class Notice within two consecutive business days. The second day of such mailing is the first day of the period for calculating the “Bar Date” (defined previously). That mailing shall occur as soon as practicable after the settlement has been Preliminarily Approved and no later than the date set by the Court.
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38. The Class Notice shall describe the particulars of the case, provide the class definition, provide information for claimants to contact the Administrator for a claim form, notify Class Members of establishment of a case website, and contain other usual and customary information. The proposed Class Notice is attached to this Settlement Agreement as Exhibit B.
39. The Administrator will include in its bid a line item for the cost of obtaining from CDCR the identities of Class Members in CDCR custody to whom Class Notice should be sent at their CDCR housing location.
40. The Parties discussed and presently do not intend to publish Class Notice in local newspapers because experience has shown that such notice is of little value in notifying Class Members. Instead, mail, email and text notice will be supplemented through summary publication in Prison Legal News (a publication widely distributed to inmates throughout the country); and through selective social media/online outreach directly targeting Class Members’ Facebook and/or Instagram accounts.
41. If specifically requested by Plaintiffs’ counsel, the Defendants will seek to obtain the cooperation of CDCR (subject to the limitations set forth in Paragraph 15), and the Los Angeles County Probation Department to assist in locating Class Members, including, where Defendants believe legally permissible, providing more recent contact information for Class Members. The LASD will advise on its website of the existence of this Settlement and place a link on the website to connect viewers to the Administrator’s website. The LASD will also post physical copies of the Class Notice (Exhibit “B”) in CRDF Reception and Day Rooms.
42. The request for bid to potential Administrators included requests for all such potential activities as well as suggestions for other ways of reaching potential Class Members. That request for bid also requested economically viable proposals for means by which Class Members can receive payment through electronic means rather than by check. There will also be requests to nonprofits that
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address criminal justice reform, reentry or programs for former inmates to provide notice on their websites and to their mailing lists.
X. CLASS ADMINISTRATION FOR PROOF OF CLAIM FORMS AND PAYMENT SCHEDULE
43. The Administrator shall be responsible for providing and receiving Proof of Claim Forms in paper and electronic format. The Administrator shall determine Class Membership and the amount of monies due each timely claiming Class Member based on the formula contained in Section IV.
44. A Proof of Claim Form shall be deemed timely submitted under subsection (a) of Definition # 29 (Timely Claim) when received by the Administrator, or postmarked, on or before the Bar Date. Facsimile or electronic mail filings are acceptable and timely so long as they clearly indicate the case on which the claim is filed and are received on or before the Bar Date.
45. If a Class Member submits a Claim Form that is deficient in some respect, the Administrator shall provide written notice by First Class Mail and a 30day time limit to provide a proper Claim Form, which notice shall inform the Class Member of what she must do in order to submit a proper claim. Failure to cure the deficiency within the 30-day time limit will bar any further rights for consideration of eligibility to make a valid claim. So long as the original claim is received on or before the Bar Date, it shall be considered timely under sub-section (a) of Definition # 30 (Timely Claim) if any deficiency is cured within 30 days of the mailing of a notice of deficiency.
46. Claim Forms received after the Bar Date shall be rejected. The Administrator will notify claimants of the rejection of untimely Claims.
47. The $53 Million payment shall be made in three equal installments, the first of which shall be made 30 days after the Effective Date, the second of which shall be made twelve months after the first payment, and the third of which shall be made twelve months after the second payment.
48. The costs of Class Administration through the Final Order of Approval
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and Settlement and the first round of distribution of checks will be taken from the first payment; 1/3 of the costs of the Moss/CGJ Contracts shall be taken (or held for that purpose by the Administrator) from each payment.
49. For each payment, 1/3 of the total Attorney’s Fees and Costs awarded by the Court to Class Counsel shall be paid into the KMBL Client Trust Account and the remaining funds shall be paid to the Class Administrator for distribution under the terms of this Agreement.
50. The Class Administrator shall take its accrued and reasonably projected costs of administration for that round from the second and third round of payments.
51. In addition to the first round of payment to qualifying Class Members, the Administrator will advise them of the estimated time of payments to be made in the second and third rounds and advise Class Members to keep them apprised of any address changes.
52. The Administrator shall make the first round of payments to SCMs who have filed Timely Claims as ultimately determined by the Court in accordance with this Settlement Agreement within a reasonable time not to exceed 90 days after the Effective Date.
53. If a check to an SCM is not cashed within three months of its mailing, the Administrator shall hold the funds for nine additional months, during which time it shall make reasonable efforts to contact the person to whom the uncashed check was written to make arrangements for its cashing or reissuance. The Administrator shall not make any payment to any SCM until all claims have been submitted to the Administrator pursuant to the terms of this Settlement Agreement.
54. Any SCM funds not cashed within one year of a check’s initial mailing shall be voided, and those funds (“Uncashed Funds”) shall held for the next round of payments. Where an SCM’s check was not cashed within that one year period, that SCM shall be eliminated as a qualifying Class Member, and that SCM’s past and future funds shall become part of the fund for future distribution to Class
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Members, and allocated to the remaining SCM’s during the next round of payments

according to the Class Damages Allocation Formula contained in Section IV.

55. Uncashed funds remaining in the Class Fund one year after the third

round of payments shall be given as a donation to the Cy Pres Fund (see ¶ 30), to

be allocated equally among the qualifying organizations/ programs.

XI.

EXCLUSION FROM SETTLEMENT CLASS—OPT OUTS

56. Any Class Member who wishes to be excluded from this Settlement

must submit a request to be excluded from the class, a process defined herein as

“Opt-Out.” The request for exclusion must be delivered to the Administrator, or

postmarked, on or before the Bar Date or as the Court may otherwise direct.

57. Although Named Plaintiffs are entitled to Opt-Out of the Settlement,

Plaintiffs’ counsel has conferred with each of them, and they all approve of and

support the settlement, and have advised that they do not intend to Opt-Out.

58. Each Class Member who chooses to Opt-Out from or object to this

Settlement shall be deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court with

respect to his/her claim.

59. Any Class Member who does not Opt-Out as set forth in this

Settlement Agreement, shall be deemed conclusively to have become an SCM and

to be bound by the Settlement Agreement and all subsequent proceedings, orders

and judgments herein, regardless of whether s/he files a claim form.

60. Any Class Member who exercises an Opt-Out shall not share in any

monetary benefits provided by this Settlement Agreement.

61. The Administrator will periodically report to Defendants’ counsel and

Class Counsel regarding all Opt-Outs received and will determine and report to

counsel the total number of Opt-Outs no later than 10 days after the Bar Date.

62. If the total number of Opt-Outs exceeds 250 individuals, Defendants,

in their sole discretion, may rescind this Settlement Agreement. In exercising this

right of rescission, Defendants shall provide the Administrator and Class Counsel

with written notice of rescission within 20 days after receipt of the Administrator’s
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report providing the total number of Opt-Outs. In the event Defendants exercise the right of rescission in accordance with this paragraph, any funds paid or deposited pursuant to this Settlement Agreement shall be returned to Defendants within 10 days of the rescission, less any expenses, fees and costs incurred by the Administrator. Rescission shall return the Case to active litigation status.
XII. APPROVALS REQUIRED 63. The Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors has approved the terms of this Settlement although, after Final Approval, it will have to finally approve the Final Order of Approval and Settlement.
XIII. DISPUTE RESOLUTION 64. In the event of any disputes regarding implementation of the Settlement Agreement as set forth herein, they shall be resolved by the Court.
XIV. THE MOSS/CGJ CONTRACTS 65. Plaintiffs and Class Counsel agree that the Moss/CGJ Contracts constitute Subsequent Remedial Measures in response to the events underlying this litigation pursuant to Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (and similar statue statutes like California Evidence Code § 1151). Plaintiffs and Class Counsel also agree that any reports generated by the Moss Group or CGJ pursuant to contracts entered into under the terms of this Settlement Agreement are statements of those entities and do not constitute party statements of Los Angeles County or the LASD within the meaning of Rule 801 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (and similar statue statutes like California Evidence Code § 1220).
66. The initial reports prepared by the Moss Group or CGJ paid for by funds provided under this Settlement Agreement will be provided to the Board of Supervisors and to Class Counsel. Class Counsel will also receive copies of the non-privileged portions of follow up reports back to the Board about the Moss Group/CGJ Reports or Contracts by any County agencies. All such reports provided to Class Counsel shall be confidential and will not be publicized or disclosed to any other party, except to the extent they have been made public by the Board.
26
AMADOR CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 395-2 Filed 10/31/19 Page 28 of 30 Page ID #:14174
67. Any reports prepared by the Moss Group or CGJ are their analyses and recommendations. Nothing in this Agreement requires that they be accepted or implemented by Defendants, who reserve the right to decline to implement any recommendation made in the Moss/CGJ Contracts for any reasons.
XV.XIV. INTEGRATION 68.65.This Settlement Agreement supersedes all prior communications regarding the matters contained herein between the Parties or their representatives. This Settlement Agreement is an integrated agreement and contains the entire agreement regarding the matters herein between the Parties, and no representations, warranties or promises have been made or relied on by any party hereto other than as set forth herein. This Settlement Agreement was drafted by counsel for the Parties hereto, and there shall be no presumption or construction against any party. XVI.XV. FAIRNESS HEARING AND FINAL ORDER OF APPROVAL 69.66.Before this Settlement Agreement becomes final and binding on the Parties, the Court shall hold a Fairness Hearing to determine whether to enter the Final Order of Approval and Settlement. A proposed Final Order of Approval and Settlement shall be submitted to the Court incorporating the terms of this Settlement Agreement and addressing related information such as Objections and Opt-Outs.
XVII.XVI. NO THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES INTENDED 70.67. This Settlement Agreement does not and is not intended to create any rights with respect to any third Parties, except as otherwise provided herein.
XVIII.XVII. COUNTERPARTS 71.68.This Settlement Agreement may be signed in counterparts.

DATED: _________________

KAYE, MCLANE, BEDNARSKI & LITT

27
AMADOR CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 395-2 Filed 10/31/19 Page 29 of 30 Page ID #:14175
By: _________________________ Barrett S. Litt

DATED: _________________

By: _________________________ Lindsay Battles
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
GLASER WEIL
By: _________________________ Andrew Baum
Attorneys for Defendants

28
AMADOR CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 395-2 Filed 10/31/19 Page 30 of 30 Page ID #:14176

LIST OF EXHIBITS TO SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

Exhibit B Exhibit C

Class Notice Proof of Claim and Release Form

29
AMADOR CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

 
 Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 399 Filed 11/07/19 Page 1 of 12 Page ID #:14371

Fi!ED

1

CIEP.K, U.S. DISTR'.CT CURT

2
NOV - 7 2019

3

CE~~iTiZAL DISTRICT OF CAIIFORI~IIA

4

BY

DEPUTY

5

6

7

8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10

1 1 MARY AMADOR,et al.,

Case No.CV 10-01649 SVW(JEMx)

12

Plaintiffs,

13 vs.
14
15 SHERIFF LEROY D.BACA,etc., et al.,

16 Defendants.
17

[Honorable Stephen V. Wilson]

CORRECTED [P

"ED

AMENDED]PRELIMINARY

APPROVAL ORDER;EXHIBITS

Date: Time: Place:

December 2,2019 1:30 P.M. Courtroom l0A

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 399 Filed 11/07/19 Page 2 of 12 Page ID #:14372

1

The parties have submitted thisjoint Preliminary Approval Order ofthe

2 Class Settlement for the Court's review,including the following exhibits: the

3 Executed,Revised Settlement Agreement(E~ibit A hereto)(the "Revised

4 Settlement Agreement"),the Red-Lined Draft Revised Settlement Agreement

5 (E~ibit B hereto),the amended Class Notice(E~ibit C hereto),the Claim Form

6 (E~ibit D hereto),and the Class Administrator bid(E~ibit E hereto). Counsel for

7 the parties, who signed the Revised Settlement Agreement,represent that their

8 respective clients have approved the settlement.

9

The Named Plaintiffs/Class Representatives are Mary Amador,Lora

10 Barranca, Diana Paiz,Diane Vigil, Alisa Battiste,Felice Cholewiak,Evangeline

1 1 Madrid, Myeshia Williams, and Nancy Briseno. Plaintiffs are former(or current at

12 the time ofthe filing ofthe complaint)inmates ofthe Los Angeles Sheriff's

13 Department's("LASD")women'sjail known as Century Regional Detention

14 Facility (hereafter"CRDF").Plaintiffs contended that the LASD routinely

15 subjected female inmates to highly invasive body cavity inspections, in large

16 groups(often over 40 women), without individual privacy, and despite the absence

17 ofa penologicaljustification and the ready availability ofalternatives, in violation

18 ofthe Fourth Amendment. The Court granted summaryjudgment on liability. See

19 Dkt. 361. The Defendants are the County ofLos Angeles,the Los Angeles County

20 Sheriff's Department,former Los Angeles County SheriffLeroy Baca, and various

21 individual members ofthe LASD.

22

While Defendants continue to dispute the validity ofPlaintiffs' allegations,

23 the parties have agreed to enter into this Settlement Agreement to avoid the mutual

24 risks oflitigation.

25

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT:

26 I.

PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT

27

1. This Order incorporates by reference the definitions in the Settlement

28 Agreement, a copy of which is attached to this Order as E~ibit A,and also

1

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 399 Filed 11/07/19 Page 3 of 12 Page ID #:14373

1 incorporates E~ibits C through E to this Order(which are described above). All

2 terms defined therein shall have the same meaning in this Order.

3

2. The Settlement Agreement, as revised, is hereby preliminarily

4 approved,subject to further consideration thereofat the Fairness Hearing provided

5 for below. The Court finds that the non-reversionary class settlement fund of

6 $53,000,000 and its proposed allocation, and the other provisions contained within

7 the Settlement Agreement,are within the range ofwhat would constitute a fair,

8 reasonable, and adequate settlement in the best interests ofthe Class as a whole,

9 and that the terms ofthe Settlement Agreement otherwise satisfy the Federal Rules

10 ofCivil Procedure 23(e)and due process requirements.

1 1 II.
12

DEADLINES FOR NOTICE,FILING OBJECTIONS AND OPTOUTS,AND DATE OF FAIRNESS(FINAL APPROVAL)HEARING

13

3. The Court has set the following dates for purposes ofthis class action:

14

(a)Final class identifying information,to the extent not already provided,

15

will be provided to Class Administrator JND Legal Administration no

16

later than Monday,December 2,2019;

17

(b)Friday,December 6,2019: Class member website shall be updated to

18

reflect preliminary approval order and to permit class members to

19

submit claims online;

20

(c)Monday,January 6,2020(or earlier): First round ofclass notice: first-

21

class mail to all class members except those for whom the Claims

22

Administrator has both an email address and mobile phone number

23

(in which case the class member will receive notice by mail and text);

24

(d)Monday,January 6,2020(or earlier): summary publication in Prison

25

Legal News(a publication widely distributed to inmates throughout

26

the country) and begin selective social media online outreach directly

27

targeting class members' Facebook and/or Instagram accounts;

28

(e)Monday,January 6,2020(or earlier): signage posted at CRDF and

2

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 399 Filed 11/07/19 Page 4 of 12 Page ID #:14374

1

Twin Towers advising inmates ofsettlement and how to make a

2

claim; claim forms available to all detainees at these facilities;

3

(~ Thursday,February 6,2020: Notice by regular mail to all class

4

members who were initially notified by electronic means only (those

5

who received notice by email and text) and who have not yet

6

submitted claim forms along with the explanation that they were sent

7

such electronic notice but this notice is being sent as well because

8

they did not file a claim or exclude themselves from the settlement;

9

(g)Thursday,February 6,2020: The Class Administrator will begin

10

periodically reminding class members through email/text blasts to file

11

claims;

12

(h)Monday,February 10,2020:Filing ofPlaintiffs' Motion for Award of

13

Attorneys' Fees and Costs;

14

(i) Thursday, June 4, 2020: Deadline to file Class Members' Objections

15

to any aspect ofthe Settlement(including Plaintiffs' Motion for

16

Award ofAttorneys' Fees and Costs): Must be postmarked or

17

received by that date;

18

(j) Thursday,June 4,2020: Deadline to opt-out: Must be postmarked or

19

received by that date;

20

(k)Thursday,June 4,2020: Deadline to file class claims: Must be

21

postmarked or received by that date;

22

(1) Monday,July 6,2020: Deadline to file Opposition or Reply to

23

Objections (including to objections to award of attorneys' fees and

24
COStS~;

25

(m)Monday,July 6,2020: Deadline to file proposed final approval order

26

and motion for final approval of settlement;

27

(n)Monday,July 20,2020: Final Approval hearing.

28

4. In the event that the class notice process does not by January 6,2020,

3

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 399 Filed 11/07/19 Page 5 of 12 Page ID #:14375

1 as provided above,the subsequent dates contained herein will be deferred for the

2 number ofadditional days before such notice occurs without the need for

3 additional Court approval. However,the Court must approve any change ofthe

4 date ofthe Final Approval Hearing.

5

5. Ifthe number ofOpt Outs amounts to 250 or more,Defendants shall

6 have the option ofwithdrawing from the settlement.

7

6. The Parties have identified exclusively from Los Angeles County Jail

8 records Damages Class Members based on who was housed at CRDF and the

9 times and days they were strip/visual body cavity searched during the damages

10 period. Only persons so identified are Damages Class members.

11

7. The "Class Damages Period" refers to the period between March 5,

12 2008(two years before the filing ofthe complaint)and January 1, 2015(the date

13 scanners or privacy partitions were available for all CRDF strip searches).

14 III. SETTLEMENT TERMS.

15

8. In summary,the settlement's basic terms,as they relate to Damages

16 Class Members,are that Defendants will provide payment ofa total ofFifty-Three

17 Million dollars($53,000,000)equally spread over athree-year period into a Class

18 Fund. From that amount,the following awards will be made,subject to court

19 approval:

20

a. Incentive awards to the 9 Named Plaintiffs in the amount of$10,000 each

21

(for a total of$90,000).

22

b. Payment ofthe third-party class settlement administration costs to the

23

chosen class administrator, JND Legal Administration, estimated at a

24

maximum ofapproximately $464,000 for a claims rate ofup to 33%

25

(which, based on counsel's experience in Jail cases, is substantially

26

higher than the expected claims rate.) However, depending on the

27

response rate to the notice, Plaintiffs' counsel may request that JND do

28

greater outreach, which would increase the cost.

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 399 Filed 11/07/19 Page 6 of 12 Page ID #:14376

1

c. Plaintiffs will file a motion for attorney's fees and costs to be approved

2

by the court. The settlement agreement provides that Plaintiffs' counsel

3

may request up to 1/3 ofthe class fund but not more,plus reimbursement

4

oflitigation costs. The final determination ofthe appropriate attorneys'

5

fee will be made by the Court.

6

d. The remainder ofthe Class Fund(estimated as a minimum ofslightly

7

under $34 Million)shall be distributed to the class members(including

8

Named Plaintiffs/Class Representatives) under a formula contained in

9

¶¶5-13 ofthe Settlement Agreement(Exhibit A to the proposed

10

Preliminary Approval Order), particularly ¶7.

11

9. The distribution formula awards a certain number ofpoints for each

12 strip/visual body cavity search. The number ofpoints per search ranges between

13 70 — 100, based on the time period in which the search occurred. The points vary

14 according to time period because the invasiveness ofthe search conditions varied

15 over time, with the worst conditions occurring prior to July 2011. Each search

16 conducted at a temperature of70 degrees or less receives an additional 10-points.

17 The per-search points are assigned to each class member,up to their 50th search.l

18 This cap is to ensure that outliers who have outsized claims do not distort the

19 meaningfulness ofthe recovery to the remaining class members.(Such outliers

20 would be entitled to opt out and pursue their own claims ifthey so chose.)

21

10. Once the claims period closes, the claims administrator will calculate

22 the total points for each class member and total points for all claiming class

23 members who submitted timely claims. Each class member's recovery will be

24 determined based on that class member's percentage ofthe total points for all class

25 members.

26

1 1. Despite the foregoing, no class member who qualifies for payment

27 will receive less than a total of$200.(This minimum payment amount would

28 I The "50-search cap" applies to less than .04% ofthe class. 5

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 399 Filed 11/07/19 Page 7 of 12 Page ID #:14377

1 apply only in the event ofan unexpectedly high claims rate).

2

12. The Class Fund is non-reversionary. However,to ensure that there is

3 not a windfall to claiming class members in the event ofa very low claims rate,

4 there will be a donation to cypres organizations to be agreed on to the extent that

5 the total value ofclaims is less than the agreed upon"Minimum Remainder" of

6 $31 Million. The value ofthe claims for purposes ofthis provision is based on the

7 following chart. The Court has reservations about this provision that will be

8 addressed, ifnecessary, at the Final Approval Hearing and in the Final Approval

9 Order.

10

CY PRES FORMULA

11

# SEARCHES

AMOUNT

1-3
12
4-6

13

7-10

$5,000 $10,000 $15,000

14

1 l+

$20,000

IV.
15

CLASS ADMINISTRATOR

13. The Court approves the retention ofJND Legal Administration
16

("JND")as Class Administrator,to administer the distribution ofthe Class and
17

Settlement Notice and publication ofthe Class and Settlement Notice, and to
18

distribute the proceeds ofthe settlement to all eligible Class Members pursuant to
19

the Plan set out in the Settlement Agreement(E~ibit A)should the Court grant
20

final approval. E~ibitE(the Class Administrator bid)includes the qualifications 21

ofJND,which establishes to the Court's satisfaction the qualifications ofJND to
22

act as the Class Administrator.
23

14. The Class Administrator shall preserve all written communications
24

from Class Members in response to the Class and Settlement Notice at least until
25

December 31,2023,or pursuant to further order ofthe Court. All written
26

communications received by the Class Administrator from Class Members relating
27

28 to the Settlement Agreement shall be available at all reasonable times for

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 399 Filed 11/07/19 Page 8 of 12 Page ID #:14378

1 inspection and copying by Counsel for the Parties, and copies shall be regularly

2 provided to Counsel for the Parties.

3

15. The Class Administrator shall be compensated from the Class

4 Damages Fund for its services in connection with notice and administration and

5 for the costs ofgiving mailed and published notice, and the other services it

6 performs, pursuant to such orders as the Court may enter from time to time.

7

16. Within two weeks after this Preliminary Approval Order is signed by

8 the Court,the County ofLos Angeles shall deposit or cause to be deposited into an

9 account designated by the Class Administrator by check sent by overnight mail an

10 amount ofsame day available funds equal to the amount requested by the Class

11 Administrator to cover the costs ofnotice as provided herein, and will provide

12 additional funds for its administrative work pursuant to the terms ofits accepted

13 bid, a copy ofwhich is attached as E~ibit E.Prior to entry ofthe Final Order of

14 Approval ofSettlement,the Class Administrator will not accrue any costs not

15 itemized in E~ibit E unless agreed to by the Plaintiffs' counsel and approved by

16 the Court. Ifthe Court does not enter the Final Order ofApproval and Settlement,

17 then all such funds paid to the Class Administrator,to the extent they are available

18 after payment ofall accrued class administration expenses,shall be returned to

19 Defendants.

20

17. Ifthis settlement does not go through for any reason,a new settlement

21 is not reached,the case goes to trial, and Plaintiffs are not successful in their

22 prosecution ofthe case,Defendants shall not seek reimbursement from Plaintiffs

23 ofclass administration funds paid under this settlement.

24 V.

CLASS COUNSEL

25

18. Barrett S. Litt and Lindsay Battles ofKaye,McLane,Bednarski &Litt

26 are hereby confirmed as counsel for the Class Representatives and the Class

27 ("Class Counsel")

28

19. Class Counsel are authorized to act on behalfofthe Class with respect

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 399 Filed 11/07/19 Page 9 of 12 Page ID #:14379

1 to all acts or consents required by or which may be given pursuant to the

2 Settlement, and such other acts reasonably necessary to consummate the

3 Settlement.

4 VI.

CLASS AND SETTLEMENT NOTICE

5

20. Class Counsel shall provide the Class and Settlement Notice to the

6 Class Administrator for distribution according to the schedule set forth above.

7 Such notice shall be in substantially the form as proposed in the amended class

8 notice,(E~ibit C to this order)and shall be communicated as provided in ¶ 3(b)

9 and(c)above(providing for both text message,email and regular mail notice);

10 returned mail shall be subject to follow up mailings after appropriate searches of

11 the available databases. No notice by publication shall be required because such

12 notice has not proven effective at reaching class members,and the resources are

13 better spent on attempting to reach class members through electronic email and

14 other means ofelectronic outreach. See revisions to F.R.Civ.P 23(c)(2)(B)

15 effective December 2019(acknowledging that notice"may be by ... electronic

16 means, or other appropriate means" in addition to or in lieu ofUnited States

17 mail).

18

21. Defendants represent that they have already provided the name,

19 address, social security number,date of birth, driver's license information, and any

20 other identifying information ofDamages Class Members,to Plaintiffs' counsel,

21 who will transmit it to the Class Administrator. Such information shall be

22 confidential and may not be disclosed to anyone except counsel ofrecord,the

23 Class Administrator, and designated representatives ofDefendants. Should the

24 Defendants discover at any time any additional information containing relevant

25 class information,they shall promptly provide it to Plaintiffs' counsel and the

26 Class Administrator.

27

22. At least seven days before the Fairness Hearing, Class Counsel and/or

28 the Class Administrator shall serve and file a sworn statement by the Class

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 399 Filed 11/07/19 Page 10 of 12 Page ID #:14380

1 Administrator attesting to compliance with the provisions ofthis Order governing

2 Class and Settlement Notice. This shall include a list of all people who have opted 3 out ofthe class.

4

23. The Court approves the amended Class and Settlement Notice

5 attached as Exhibit C.

6

24. The Court approves the Claim Form attached as Exhibit D.

7

25. The Court approves the Class Administrator Bid attached as E~ibit

8 E.

9

26. The Court finds that the notice required by the foregoing provisions of

10 this Order is the best notice practicable under the circumstances and shall

1 1 constitute due and sufficient notice ofthe Settlement and the Fairness Hearing to

12 all Class Members and other persons affected by and/or entitled to participate in

13 the settlement,in full compliance with the notice requirements ofRule 23 Federal

14 Rules of Civil Procedure and due process.

15 VII. THE FAIRNESS HEARING(FINAL APPROVAL HEARING)

16

27. A Fairness Hearing shall be held on July 20,2020,to consider:(a)the

17 fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy ofthe Settlement;(b)whether a Final

18 Order ofApproval and Settlement should be entered in its current or some

19 modified form; and(c)the application by Class Counsel for attorneys' fees and

20 expenses(the "Fee Motion").

21

28. At least two weeks prior to the Fairness Hearing, Plaintiffs shall

22 submit a proposed Final Approval Order, which shall be approved by Defendants.

23 That proposed order will contain the final provisions the Parties seek the Court to

24 finally approve and the Parties' proposed court orders related to any objections

25 that have been filed. It will not be necessary to file a separate motion for final

26 approval.

27

29. The date and time ofthe Fairness Hearing shall be set forth in the

28 Class and Settlement Notice but shall be subject to adjournment by the Court

]G

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 399 Filed 11/07/19 Page 11 of 12 Page ID #:14381

1 without further notice to the Class Members other than that which may be posted

2 at the Court and on the Court's web site.

3

30. Any Class Member who objects to the approval ofthe Settlement

4 Agreement,the Fee Motion,the Named Plaintiffs' incentive awards or the

5 proposed allocation ofdamages among class members may appear at the Fairness

6 Hearing and show cause why any one ofthe foregoing should not be approved as

7 fair, reasonable, and adequate,and why the Final Order ofApproval and

8 Settlement should not be entered, except that no such Class Member may appear at 9 the Fairness Hearing unless the Class Member,no later than June 4,2020[the date

10 to file objections to the Settlement](a)files with the Clerk ofthe Court a notice of 1 1 such person's intention to appear, a statement that indicates the basis and grounds

12 for such person's objection to the Settlement Agreement,the Fee Petition,the

13 Named Plaintiffs' incentive awards or the proposed allocation ofdamages among

14 class members,and all documentation,papers, or briefs in support ofsuch

15 objection; and by the same date(b)serves upon all Counsel to the Parties(as listed

16 in the Class Notice), either in person or by mail, copies ofsuch notice ofintention

17 to appear,statement ofobjections and all documentation, papers, or briefs that

18 such person files with the Court. The required documentation shall include the

19 information requested on the Claim Form.Final determination ofwhether any

20 such objector is a Class Member who has standing to object shall be determined

21 solely from the Defendants' records,from which the list ofClass Members has

22 been compiled.In the absence ofthe timely filing and timely service ofthe notice

23 ofintention to appear and all other materials required by this paragraph, any

24 objection shall be deemed untimely and denied.

25

31. Pending final approval ofthe Settlement Agreement,no Class

26 Member shall, either directly, representatively, or in any other capacity,

27 commence,prosecute against any Defendant or participate in any action or

28 proceeding in any court or tribunal asserting any ofthe matters, claims, or causes

10

Case 2:10-cv-01649-SVW-JEM Document 399 Filed 11/07/19 Page 12 of 12 Page ID #:14382

1 ofaction that are to be released by the Settlement Agreement upon final approval.

2

32. In the event offinal approval ofthe Settlement Agreement, all

3 Damages Class Members(except those who have opted out)shall be forever

4 enjoined and barred from asserting any ofthe matters, claims or causes ofaction

5 released by the Settlement Agreement, and all such Class Members shall be 6 deemed to have forever released any and all such matters, claims and causes of

7 action as provided for in the Settlement Agreement.

8 VIII. OTHER PROVISIONS

9

33. The Court approves the parties' plan to use text messages to both

10 issue class notice and reminder messages for those class members for whom the

11 Claims Administrator is able to locate mobile phone numbers.In sending notice

12 and reminders via text, recipients shall have the ability to "unsubscribe"

13 themselves from further messages.

14

34. To the extent not otherwise specifically addressed in this Order,

15 Defendants and Class Counsel shall comply with the provisions ofthe Settlement

16 Agreement.

17

35. In the event the Settlement is not finally approved or is otherwise

18 terminated in accordance with the provisions ofthe Settlement Agreement,the 19 Settlement and all proceedings had in connection therewith shall be null and void,

20 except insofar as expressly provided to the contrary in the Settlement Agreement,

21 and without prejudice to the status duo ante rights ofPlaintiffs, Defendants, and

22 Class Members.
23

~~,

24 DATED:
25 26

STE V. WILSON LTNI D STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

27

28

11

 
 (JEMx),DISCOVERY,PROTORD,RELATED−G,REOPENED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA (Western Division − Los Angeles)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:10−cv−01649−SVW−JEM

Mary Amador et al v. Leroy D. Baca et al Assigned to: Judge Stephen V. Wilson Referred to: Magistrate Judge John E. McDermott Related Case: 2:06−cv−01135−SVW−CT Cause: 28:1983 Civil Rights
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 03/05/2010 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Mary Amador individually and as class representatives

represented by Barrett S Litt Kaye McLane Bednarski and Litt LLP 234 Colorado Boulevard Suite 230 Pasadena, CA 91101 626−844−7660 Fax: 626−844−7670 Email: blitt@kmbllaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Colleen Flynn Law Office of Colleen Flynn 3435 Wilshire Boulevard Suite 2910 Los Angeles, CA 90010 213−252−9444 Fax: 213−252−0091 Email: cflynnlaw@yahoo.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cynthia M Anderson−Barker Cynthia M Anderson−Barker Law Offices 3435 Wilshire Boulevard Suite 2910 Los Angeles, CA 90010 213−381−3246 Fax: 213−252−0091 Email: cablaw@hotmail.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donald Webster Cook Donald W Cook Attorney at Law 3435 Wilshire Boulevard Suite 2910 Los Angeles, CA 90010 213−252−9444 Fax: 213−252−0091 Email: manncook@earthlink.net ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lindsay Battles Kaye McLane Bednarski and Litt LLP 975 East Green Street Pasadena, CA 91106 626−844−7660 Fax: 626−844−7670 Email: lbattles@kmbllaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Paul J Estuar Litt Estuar and Kitson LLP 1055 Wilshire Boulevard Suite 1880 Los Angeles, CA 90017 213−386−3114 Fax: 213−380−4585

Plaintiff Lorna Mallyon individually and as class representatives TERMINATED: 01/28/2011
Plaintiff Alisa Battiste individually and as class representatives

TERMINATED: 09/05/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Frederick Mann Mann and Cook 3435 Wilshire Boulevard Suite 2910 Los Angeles, CA 90010 213−252−9444 Fax: 213−252−0091 Email: manncook@earthlink.net ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barrett S Litt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Colleen Flynn (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cynthia M Anderson−Barker (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald Webster Cook (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lindsay Battles (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul J Estuar (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/05/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Frederick Mann (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barrett S Litt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cynthia M Anderson−Barker (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald Webster Cook (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lindsay Battles (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul J Estuar (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/05/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Felice Cholewiak individually and as class representatives
Plaintiff Diane Vigil individually and as class representatives
Plaintiff Evangelina Madrid Individually and as class representatives

Robert Frederick Mann (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barrett S Litt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cynthia M Anderson−Barker (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald Webster Cook (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lindsay Battles (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul J Estuar (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/05/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Frederick Mann (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barrett S Litt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cynthia M Anderson−Barker (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald Webster Cook (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lindsay Battles (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul J Estuar (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/05/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Frederick Mann (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barrett S Litt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cynthia M Anderson−Barker (See above for address)

Plaintiff Lora Barranca individually and as class representatives
Plaintiff Diana Paiz individually and as class representatives

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald Webster Cook (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lindsay Battles (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul J Estuar (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/05/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Frederick Mann (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barrett S Litt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cynthia M Anderson−Barker (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald Webster Cook (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lindsay Battles (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul J Estuar (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/05/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Frederick Mann (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barrett S Litt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cynthia M Anderson−Barker (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald Webster Cook (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lindsay Battles (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul J Estuar (See above for address)

Plaintiff Myeshia Williams individually and as class representatives
Plaintiff Nancy Briseno individually and as class representatives
V. Defendant Sherifff Leroy D. Baca individually

TERMINATED: 09/05/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Frederick Mann (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barrett S Litt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cynthia M Anderson−Barker (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald Webster Cook (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lindsay Battles (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barrett S Litt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cynthia M Anderson−Barker (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald Webster Cook (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lindsay Battles (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Andrew I Baum Glaser Weil Fink Howard Avchen and Shapiro LLP 10250 Constellation Boulevard 19th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90067 310−553−3000 Fax: 310−556−2920 Email: abaum@glaserweil.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Lee Lawrence Beach Allen and Choi PC 100 West Broadway Suite 1200 Glendale, CA 91210−1219 818−545−1925 Fax: 818−545−1937 Email: dlee@lbaclaw.com TERMINATED: 09/02/2015

Defendant Sheriff Leroy D. Baca in his official capacity
Defendant County of Los Angeles a governmental entity

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David D Lawrence Lawrence Beach Allen and Choi PC 100 West Broadway Suite 1200 Glendale, CA 91210−1219 818−545−1925 Fax: 818−545−1937 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jin S Choi Lawrence Beach Allen and Choi PC 100 West Broadway Suite 1200 Glendale, CA 91210−1219 818−545−1925 Fax: 818−545−1937 Email: jchoi@lbaclaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Justin W Clark Lawrence Beach Allen and Choi PC 100 West Broadway Suite 1200 Glendale, CA 91210−1219 818−545−1925 Fax: 818−545−1937 Email: jclark@lbaclaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul B Beach Lawrence Beach Allen and Choi PC 100 West Broadway Suite 1200 Glendale, CA 91210−1219 818−545−1925 Fax: 818−545−1937 Email: pbeach@lbaclaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David D Lawrence (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jin S Choi (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Justin W Clark (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul B Beach (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Andrew I Baum (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Lee (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department a California public entity
Defendant Sammy Jones individually Defendant Sammy Jones in his official capacity Defendant Timothy Cornell individually

David D Lawrence (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jin S Choi (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Justin W Clark (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul B Beach (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Andrew I Baum (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Lee (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David D Lawrence (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jin S Choi (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Justin W Clark (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul B Beach (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Andrew I Baum (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Lee (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David D Lawrence (See above for address)

Defendant Timothy Cornell in his official capacity
Defendant John H. Clark individually
Defendant John H. Clark in his official capacity

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jin S Choi (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Justin W Clark (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul B Beach (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David D Lawrence (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jin S Choi (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Justin W Clark (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul B Beach (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David D Lawrence (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jin S Choi (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Justin W Clark (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul B Beach (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Andrew I Baum (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Lee (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David D Lawrence (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jin S Choi

Defendant Does 1 through 10 Defendant Dennis Burns individually
Defendant Dennis Burns in his official capacity
Defendant Gerald K Cooper individually

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Justin W Clark (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul B Beach (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Andrew I Baum (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jin S Choi (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Justin W Clark (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul B Beach Lawrence Beach Allen and Choi PC 100 West Broadway Suite 1200 Glendale, CA 91210−1219 818−545−1925 Fax: 818−545−1937 Email: pbeach@lbaclaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jin S Choi (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Justin W Clark (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul B Beach (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jin S Choi (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Justin W Clark (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul B Beach (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Gerald K Cooper in his official capacity
Defendant Daniel Cruz individually
Defendant Daniel Cruz in his official capacity
Defendant Stacy L Lee indivdiually

represented by Andrew I Baum (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jin S Choi (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Justin W Clark (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul B Beach (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jin S Choi (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Justin W Clark (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul B Beach (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Andrew I Baum (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jin S Choi (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Justin W Clark (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul B Beach (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Andrew I Baum (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jin S Choi (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Justin W Clark (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul B Beach (See above for address)

Defendant Stacy L Lee in her official capacity
Defendant Yvonne Cruz
Defendant Luz Medina
Claimant Joyce Lucero
Claimant Jessica Vega
Objector Lecia L Shorter
Objector Darla Ray Jones

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jin S Choi (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Justin W Clark (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul B Beach (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Yvonne Cruz 4734 E 57th St Apt B Maywood, CA 90270−4000 PRO SE
represented by Gilberto Figueroa Merced PO Box 1321 Mayaguez, PR 00681−1321 787−831−6460 Fax: 787−833−0026 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Joyce Lucero 9163 Mills Ave Montclair, CA 91763 PRO SE
represented by Jessica Vega CDC WF6975 PO Box 1508 Chowchilla, CA 93610 PRO SE
represented by Lecia L Shorter 287 South Robertson Boulevard Suite 291 Beverly Hills, CA 90211 310−869−5835 Email: leciashorter@yahoo.com PRO SE
represented by Darla Ray Jones CDC WE7503 California Institution for Women − CIW Wilson B 929L 16756 Chino−Corona Road Corona, CA 92880 PRO SE

Date Filed 03/05/2010
03/05/2010
03/05/2010 03/05/2010 03/23/2010 03/24/2010 04/05/2010
04/05/2010
04/06/2010
04/06/2010 04/06/2010 04/14/2010

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against Defendants Leroy D. Baca(individually), Leroy D. Baca(in his official capacity), John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Timothy Cornell(individually), Timothy Cornell(in his official capacity), County of Los Angeles, Does 1 through 10, Sammy Jones(individually), Sammy Jones(in his official capacity), Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. Case assigned to Judge Consuelo B. Marshall for all further proceedings. Discovery referred to Magistrate Judge Rosalyn M. Chapman.(Filing fee $ 350: PAID.) Jury Demanded., filed by plaintiffs Lorna Mallyon, Mary Amador.(ghap) (Additional attachment(s) added on 3/10/2010: # 1 Summons) (ds). (Additional attachment(s) added on 3/10/2010: # 2 Notice of Assignment, # 3 Civil Cover Sheet) (ds). (Entered: 03/08/2010)
21 DAY Summons Issued re Complaint − (Discovery) 1 as to Defendants Leroy D. Baca(individually), Leroy D. Baca(in his official capacity), John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Timothy Cornell(individually), Timothy Cornell(in his official capacity), County of Los Angeles, Does, Sammy Jones(individually), Sammy Jones(in his official capacity), Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (ghap) (Entered: 03/08/2010)
2 CERTIFICATION AND NOTICE of Interested Parties filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lorna Mallyon. (ghap) (ds). (Entered: 03/08/2010)
3 NOTICE of Related Case(s) filed by plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lorna Mallyon. Related Case(s): CV 06−1135 SVW (CTx). (ghap) (ds). (Entered: 03/08/2010)
4 ORDER RE TRANSFER PURSUANT TO GENERAL ORDER 08−05 −Related Case− filed. Related Case No: CV 06−01135 SVW (CTx). Case transferred from Judge Consuelo B. Marshall to Judge Stephen V. Wilson for all further proceedings. The case number will now reflect the initials of the transferee Judge CV 10−01649 SVW (RC).Signed by Judge Stephen V. Wilson (rn) (Entered: 03/23/2010)
5 NEW CASE ORDER by Judge Stephen V. Wilson, (pj) (Entered: 03/24/2010)
6 PROOF OF SERVICE Executed by Plaintiff Mary Amador, upon Defendant Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department served on 3/18/2010, answer due 4/8/2010. Service of the Summons and Complaint were executed upon Cathelyn Camacho, Authorized Agent in compliance with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by service on a domestic corporation, unincorporated association, or public entity. Original Summons returned. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 04/05/2010)
7 PROOF OF SERVICE Executed by Plaintiff Mary Amador, upon Defendant Leroy D. Baca(individually) served on 3/18/2010, answer due 4/8/2010; Leroy D. Baca(in his official capacity) served on 3/18/2010, answer due 4/8/2010. Service of the Summons and Complaint were executed upon Cathelyn Comacho, Authorized Agent in compliance with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by personal service. Original Summons returned. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 04/05/2010)
8 PROOF OF SERVICE Executed by Plaintiff Mary Amador, upon Defendant Timothy Cornell(individually) served on 3/19/2010, answer due 4/9/2010; Timothy Cornell(in his official capacity) served on 3/19/2010, answer due 4/9/2010. Service of the Summons and Complaint were executed upon Gary Morgan, Authorized Agent in compliance with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by personal service. Original Summons returned. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 04/06/2010)
9 PROOF OF SERVICE Executed by Plaintiff Mary Amador, upon Defendant John H. Clark served on 3/19/2010, answer due 4/9/2010; John H. Clark served on 3/19/2010, answer due 4/9/2010. Service of the Summons and Complaint were executed upon Sgt. Brossoit, Authorized Agent in compliance with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by personal service. Original Summons returned. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 04/06/2010)
10 Summons Returned Unexecuted filed by Plaintiff Mary Amador. as to Sammy Jones(individually), Sammy Jones(in his official capacity). (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 04/06/2010)
11 FIRST STIPULATION Extending Time to Answer the complaint as to filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca(individually), Leroy D. Baca(in his official capacity), Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department.(Beach, Paul) (Entered: 04/14/2010)

04/14/2010 04/14/2010
04/14/2010 04/16/2010
04/16/2010 04/16/2010 04/30/2010 04/30/2010 05/03/2010 05/12/2010 05/14/2010 06/14/2010
06/21/2010

12 NOTICE of Interested Parties filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca(individually), Leroy D. Baca(in his official capacity), Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, identifying Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Sheriff Leroy D. Baca, Captain John H. Clark, and Timothy Cornell. (Beach, Paul) (Entered: 04/14/2010)
13 FIRST STIPULATION Extending Time to Answer the complaint as to Timothy Cornell(individually) answer now due 4/30/2010; John H. Clark answer now due 4/30/2010; Timothy Cornell(in his official capacity) answer now due 4/30/2010; John H. Clark answer now due 4/30/2010, filed by Defendants Timothy Cornell(individually); John H. Clark; Timothy Cornell(in his official capacity); John H. Clark.(Beach, Paul) (Entered: 04/14/2010)
14 NOTICE of Interested Parties filed by Defendants John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Timothy Cornell(individually), Timothy Cornell(in his official capacity), identifying Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Sheriff Leroy D. Baca, Captain John H. Clark, and Timothy Cornell. (Beach, Paul) (Entered: 04/14/2010)
15 PROOF OF SERVICE Executed by Plaintiff Lorna Mallyon, Mary Amador, upon Defendant County of Los Angeles served on 3/18/2010, answer due 4/8/2010. Service of the Summons and Complaint were executed upon Gilffer Valle, Authorized Agent in compliance with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by service on a domestic corporation, unincorporated association, or public entity. Original Summons returned. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 04/16/2010)
16 FIRST STIPULATION Extending Time to Answer the complaint as to County of Los Angeles answer now due 4/30/2010, filed by Defendant County of Los Angeles.(Beach, Paul) (Entered: 04/16/2010)
17 NOTICE of Interested Parties filed by Defendant County of Los Angeles, identifying County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Sheriff Leroy D. Baca, Captain John H. Clark, and Timothy Cornell. (Beach, Paul) (Entered: 04/16/2010)
18 ANSWER to Complaint − (Discovery), Complaint − (Discovery), Complaint − (Discovery), Complaint − (Discovery) 1 JURY DEMAND. filed by DEFENDANTS Leroy D. Baca(individually), John H. Clark, Timothy Cornell(individually), County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department.(Lee, Daniel) (Entered: 04/30/2010)
19 CERTIFICATE of Interested Parties filed by DEFENDANTS Leroy D. Baca(individually), John H. Clark, Timothy Cornell(individually), County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, (Lee, Daniel) (Entered: 04/30/2010)
20 ORDER RE: STATUS CONFERENCE by Judge Stephen V. Wilson, Status Conference set for 6/7/2010 03:00 PM before Judge Stephen V. Wilson. See Order for specific details. (im) (Entered: 05/03/2010)
21 Joint STIPULATION to Continue Status Conference from June 7 to June 14 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lorna Mallyon. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 05/12/2010)
22 ORDER by Judge Stephen V. Wilson, having reviewed the Stipulation to Continue 21 , Status Conference currently set for 6/7/10 at 3:00 pm is hereby continued to 6/14/2010 01:30 PM. (ir) (Entered: 05/14/2010)
23 MINUTES: DEFENDANTS' FURTHER MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, ALTERNATIVELY SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF INDIVIDUAL ISSUES 121 (Fld 04/12/10); DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 66 (fld 01/18/08); PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO AMEND FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 136 (fld 05/14/10); NEW CASE STATUS CONFERENCE: Hearing held. The motions are submitted. Order to issue.Judge Stephen V. Wilson Court Reporter: Margaret Babykin. (ir) (Entered: 06/18/2010)
24 EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME to File Motion for Class Certification filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lorna Mallyon. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit "A", # 2 Proposed Order)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 06/21/2010)

06/21/2010 06/22/2010 06/22/2010 06/22/2010 06/24/2010
07/02/2010 07/26/2010 07/27/2010 07/27/2010
07/27/2010

25 DECLARATION of Paul J. Estuar re EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME to File Motion for Class Certification 24 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lorna Mallyon. (Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 06/21/2010)
26 CIVIL TRIAL PREPARATION ORDER by Judge Stephen V. Wilson: Jury Trial set for 1/18/2011 9:00 AM before Judge Stephen V. Wilson. Pretrial Conference set for 1/10/2011 3:30 PM before Judge Stephen V. Wilson. Counsel preparing for trial before this Court shall comply with this Order. Non−compliance will be subject to sanctions. (im) (Entered: 06/22/2010)
27 MINUTES OF IN CHAMBERS ORDER SETTING TRIAL & PRETRIAL DATES held before Judge Stephen V. Wilson: The Court sets the following dates, in the above−entitled matter: Jury Trial set for 1/18/2011 9:00 AM, Pretrial Conference set for 1/10/2011 3:30 PM before Judge Stephen V. Wilson. (im) (Entered: 06/22/2010)
28 Opposition to re: EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME to File Motion for Class Certification 24 filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, John H. Clark, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Beach, Paul) (Entered: 06/22/2010)
29 NOTICE of Change of Attorney Information for attorney Jin S Choi counsel for Defendants Leroy D. Baca, John H. Clark, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. Adding Jin S. Choi as attorney as counsel of record for Defendants County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Sheriff Leroy D. Baca, Captain John H. Clark, and Timothy Cornell for the reason indicated in the G−06 Notice. Filed by Defendants County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Sheriff Leroy D. Baca, Captain John H. Clark, and Timothy Cornell (Choi, Jin) (Entered: 06/24/2010)
30 ORDER by Judge Stephen V. Wilson: It Is Hereby Ordered that Plaintiffs be relieved of the requirement to file a class certification motion within 90 days of service of the Complaint under Local Rule 23−3. It Is Further Ordered that Plaintiffs have ninety (90) days from the date of this Order to file a Motion for Class Certification. Re: 24 Ex Parte Application for Enlargement of Time to File Motion for Class Certification. (mg) (Entered: 07/02/2010)
31 EX PARTE APPLICATION to Compel Deposition of Lindsay Lohan Plaintiffs Ex Parte Application for Order Permitting the Taking of Prisoner Lindsay Lohans Deposition While Incarcerated; Declarations of Donald W. Cook, Mary Amador and Jane Does; Memorandum of Points Authorities filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lorna Mallyon. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Granting Leave to Depose Witness Lindsay Lohan While Incarcerated)(Cook, Donald) (Entered: 07/26/2010)
32 OPPOSITION re: EX PARTE APPLICATION to Compel Deposition of Lindsay Lohan Plaintiffs Ex Parte Application for Order Permitting the Taking of Prisoner Lindsay Lohans Deposition While Incarcerated; Declarations of Donald W. Cook, Mary Amador and Jane Does; Memorand 31 filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, Leroy D. Baca, John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Timothy Cornell, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Beach, Paul) (Entered: 07/27/2010)
33 PROOF OF SERVICE OF PLAINTIFFS EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR ORDER PERMITTING THE TAKING OF PRISONER LINDSAY LOHANS DEPOSITION WHILE INCARCERATED OF SERVICE filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lorna Mallyon, re EX PARTE APPLICATION to Compel Deposition of Lindsay Lohan Plaintiffs Ex Parte Application for Order Permitting the Taking of Prisoner Lindsay Lohans Deposition While Incarcerated; Declarations of Donald W. Cook, Mary Amador and Jane Does; Memorand 31 served on 7/26/10. (Cook, Donald) (Entered: 07/27/2010)
34 PROOF OF SERVICE OF DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER PERMITTING THE DEPOSITION OF NON−PARTY INMATE LINDSAY LOHAN re EX PARTE APPLICATION to Compel Deposition of Lindsay Lohan Plaintiffs Ex Parte Application for Order Permitting the Taking of Prisoner Lindsay Lohans Deposition While Incarcerated; Declarations of Donald W. Cook, Mary Amador and Jane Does; Memorand 31 filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, Leroy D. Baca, John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Timothy

07/27/2010 07/27/2010 07/28/2010 07/29/2010 07/29/2010 07/30/2010
08/27/2010 08/30/2010
09/10/2010 09/10/2010

Cornell, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Beach, Paul) (Entered: 07/27/2010)
35 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF EX PARTE APPLICATION to Compel Deposition of Lindsay Lohan Plaintiffs Ex Parte Application for Order Permitting the Taking of Prisoner Lindsay Lohans Deposition While Incarcerated; Declarations of Donald W. Cook, Mary Amador and Jane Does; Memorand 31 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lorna Mallyon. (Cook, Donald) (Entered: 07/27/2010)
36 MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS): ORDER by Magistrate Judge Rosalyn M. Chapman: denying 31 Ex Parte Application to Compel Deposition and Order Denying Without Prejudice Defendants' Request for Sanctions. See minute order for details. (jy) (Entered: 07/27/2010)
37 EX PARTE APPLICATION for Reconsideration re Order on Ex Parte Application to Compel Deposition 36 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lorna Mallyon. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Granting Reconsideration of 7/27/10 Discovery Order and Permitting the Taking of Prisoner Lindsay Lohans Deposition While Incarcerated)(Cook, Donald) (Entered: 07/28/2010)
38 Opposition re: EX PARTE APPLICATION for Reconsideration re Order on Ex Parte Application to Compel Deposition 36 EX PARTE APPLICATION for Reconsideration re Order on Ex Parte Application to Compel Deposition 36 37 filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, Leroy D. Baca, John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Timothy Cornell, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Beach, Paul) (Entered: 07/29/2010)
39 REPLY to Defendants Opposition to Ex Parte Application for Reconsideration of Magistrate Judge Chapmans 7/27/10 Discovery Order −− See EX PARTE APPLICATION for Reconsideration re Order on Ex Parte Application to Compel Deposition 36 EX PARTE APPLICATION for Reconsideration re Order on Ex Parte Application to Compel Deposition 36 37 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lorna Mallyon. (Cook, Donald) (Entered: 07/29/2010)
40 IN CHAMBERS ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE CHAPMAN'S 07/27/10 DISCOVERY ORDER by Judge Stephen V. Wilson: denying 37 Ex Parte Application for Reconsideration. The Court agrees that Plaintiffs have not shown that they will suffer irreparable prejudice if they follow the usual discovery procedures for obtaining Lohan's deposition, even if that means seeking a deposition after Lohan has been released from prison. Thus, Plaintiffs' Ex Parte Application for Reconsideration is DENIED. (rs) (Entered: 07/30/2010)
41 NOTICE of CHANGE IN FIRM NAME filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lorna Mallyon. (Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 08/27/2010)
42 NOTICE TO FILER OF DEFICIENCIES in Electronically Filed Documents RE: Notice (Other) 41 . The following error(s) was found: Incorrect event selected. The correct event is: Change of Address under NOTICES. In response to this notice the court may order (1) an amended or correct document to be filed (2) the document stricken or (3) take other action as the court deems appropriate. You need not take any action in response to this notice unless and until the court directs you to do so. (pj) (Entered: 08/30/2010)
43 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Amend Complaint − (Discovery), Complaint − (Discovery), Complaint − (Discovery), Complaint − (Discovery) 1 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lorna Mallyon. Motion set for hearing on 10/18/2010 at 01:30 PM before Judge Stephen V. Wilson. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Proposed First Amended Complaint)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 09/10/2010)
44 DECLARATION of Barrett S. Litt In Support of MOTION to Amend Complaint − (Discovery), Complaint − (Discovery), Complaint − (Discovery), Complaint − (Discovery) 1 MOTION to Amend Complaint − (Discovery), Complaint − (Discovery), Complaint − (Discovery), Complaint − (Discovery) 1 43 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lorna Mallyon. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 09/10/2010)

09/10/2010 09/20/2010 09/20/2010 09/21/2010 09/22/2010 09/23/2010
09/27/2010
10/07/2010 10/12/2010 10/12/2010 10/12/2010

45 NOTICE OF LODGING filed re MOTION to Amend Complaint − (Discovery), Complaint − (Discovery), Complaint − (Discovery), Complaint − (Discovery) 1 MOTION to Amend Complaint − (Discovery), Complaint − (Discovery), Complaint − (Discovery), Complaint − (Discovery) 1 43 (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 09/10/2010)
46 EX PARTE APPLICATION to Continue Date to File Class Certification Motion and Related Dates from 9/30/10 to 11/1/10 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lorna Mallyon. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−PMK Deposition Notice, # 2 Proposed Order)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 09/20/2010)
47 DECLARATION of Barrett S. Litt In Support of Ex Parte Application to Continue Dates EX PARTE APPLICATION to Continue Date to File Class Certification Motion and Related Dates from 9/30/10 to 11/1/10 46 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lorna Mallyon. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 09/20/2010)
48 OPPOSITION re: EX PARTE APPLICATION to Continue Date to File Class Certification Motion and Related Dates from 9/30/10 to 11/1/10 46 filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, Leroy D. Baca, John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Timothy Cornell, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Beach, Paul) (Entered: 09/21/2010)
49 RESPONSE IN SUPPORT of EX PARTE APPLICATION to Continue Date to File Class Certification Motion and Related Dates from 9/30/10 to 11/1/10 46 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lorna Mallyon. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration In Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Ex Parte Application)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 09/22/2010)
50 ORDER PLAINTIFFS' EX PARTEAPPLICATION TO CONTINUE THE DATE TO FILE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION, TO VACATE THE CURRENT TRIAL DATE OF JANUARY 10,2011, AND TO SET A STATUS CONFERENCE by Judge Stephen V. Wilson: The trial date currently scheduled for January 10,2011 is hereby VACATED; Plaintiffs' motion for class certification shall be filed on October 22, 2010 (see attached for further information) 46 (pj) (Entered: 09/24/2010)
51 OPPOSITION re: MOTION to Amend Complaint − (Discovery), Complaint − (Discovery), Complaint − (Discovery), Complaint − (Discovery) 1 MOTION to Amend Complaint − (Discovery), Complaint − (Discovery), Complaint − (Discovery), Complaint − (Discovery) 1 43 filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, Leroy D. Baca, John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Timothy Cornell, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Beach, Paul) (Entered: 09/27/2010)
52 STIPULATION for Order For Release of CCHRS Reports filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lorna Mallyon. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Mann, Robert) (Entered: 10/07/2010)
53 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Strike Defendants' Evidence in Support of Opposition to Motion to Amend Complaint Objection/Opposition (Motion related), Objection/Opposition (Motion related) 51 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lorna Mallyon. Motion set for hearing on 10/18/2010 at 01:30 PM before Judge Stephen V. Wilson. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 10/12/2010)
54 NOTICE OF LODGING filed re MOTION to Strike Defendants' Evidence in Support of Opposition to Motion to Amend Complaint Objection/Opposition (Motion related), Objection/Opposition (Motion related) 51 MOTION to Strike Defendants' Evidence in Support of Opposition to Motion to Amend Complaint Objection/Opposition (Motion related), Objection/Opposition (Motion related) 51 53 (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 10/12/2010)
55 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Rosalyn M. Chapman, re Stipulation for Order 52 Upon the parties stipulation and good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that within five business days of entry of this Order, Defendant County of Los Angeles will cause reports from the database referred to in the parties stipulation to be generated for Plaintiffs and provided to counsel for Plaintiffs. (jy) (Entered: 10/12/2010)

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56 MINUTES OF 1. MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT 43 01/18/11)2. MOTION to Strike Defendants' Evidence in Support of Opposition toMotion to Amend Complaint 54 43 53 Motion Hearing held before Judge Stephen V. Wilson:Hearing held. The motion to amend is granted.Court Reporter: Deborah Gackle. (pj) (Entered: 10/19/2010)
57 SUPPLEMENT to MOTION to Amend Complaint − (Discovery), Complaint − (Discovery), Complaint − (Discovery), Complaint − (Discovery) 1 MOTION to Amend Complaint − (Discovery), Complaint − (Discovery), Complaint − (Discovery), Complaint − (Discovery) 1 43 Supplemental Memorandum re Date Amended Complaint Should Be Deemed Filed filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lorna Mallyon. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 10/19/2010)
58 NOTICE OF ERRATA filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lorna Mallyon. correcting Supplement(Motion related), Supplement(Motion related) 57 Errata Correcting Date Amended Complaint Should be Deemed Filed (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum Amended Supplemental Memorandum, # 2 Proposed Order Amended)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 10/20/2010)
59 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Certify Class filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lorna Mallyon. Motion set for hearing on 12/6/2012 at 01:30 PM before Judge Stephen V. Wilson. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 10/22/2010)
60 DECLARATION of Dr. Brian Kriegler In Support Of MOTION to Certify Class 59 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lorna Mallyon. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 10/22/2010)
61 DECLARATION of Cynthia Anderson−Barker In Support Of MOTION to Certify Class 59 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lorna Mallyon. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 10/22/2010)
62 DECLARATION of Robert Mann In Support Of MOTION to Certify Class 59 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lorna Mallyon. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 10/22/2010)
63 DECLARATION of Donald W. Cook In Support Of MOTION to Certify Class 59 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lorna Mallyon. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 10/22/2010)
64 STATEMENT of Class Representatives in Support of MOTION to Certify Class 59 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lorna Mallyon. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 10/22/2010)
65 NOTICE OF LODGING filed re MOTION to Certify Class 59 (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 10/22/2010)
66 DECLARATION of Barrett S. Litt In Support Of MOTION to Certify Class 59 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lorna Mallyon. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 107, # 3 Exhibit 109, # 4 Exhibit 110, # 5 Exhibit 111, # 6 Exhibit 112, # 7 Exhibit 113, # 8 Exhibit 114, # 9 Exhibit 115)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 10/22/2010)
67 NOTICE TO FILER OF DEFICIENCIES in Electronically Filed Documents RE: MOTION to Certify Class 59 . The following error(s) was found: Language in Notice is incomplete. In response to this notice the court may order (1) an amended or correct document to be filed (2) the document stricken or (3) take other action as the court deems appropriate. You need not take any action in response to this notice unless and until the court directs you to do so. (vh) (Entered: 10/25/2010)
68 OBJECTION opposition to re: MOTION to Certify Class 59 Evidentiary Objections to Plaintiffs' 23 Inmate Declarations and Declarations of Brian Kriegler and Barrett S. Litt filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, John H. Clark, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Beach, Paul) (Entered: 11/08/2010)
69 OPPOSITION opposition to re: MOTION to Certify Class 59 filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, John H. Clark, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Beach, Paul) (Entered: 11/08/2010)
70 STIPULATION for Order Authorizing Depositions of In−Custody Plaintiffs Lora Barranca, Diana Paiz and Diane Vigil filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca(individually), John H. Clark, Timothy Cornell(individually), County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Beach, Paul) (Entered: 11/11/2010)

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71 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Rosalyn M. Chapman, re Stipulation for Order, 70 ; All Parties having stipulated and good cause appearing:IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 30(a)(2), Defendants may take the depositions of Plaintiffs Lora Barranca, Diana Paiz, and Diane Vigil while they are incarcerated.IT IS SO ORDERED. (jy) (Entered: 11/15/2010)
72 REPLY In Opposition to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Class Certification Motion filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lorna Mallyon. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 11/22/2010)
73 DECLARATION of Lindsay Battles In Support of MOTION to Certify Class 59 and Plaintiffs' Reply Brief to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Class Certification Motion filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lorna Mallyon. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 11/22/2010)
74 DECLARATION of Barrett S. Litt In Support Of MOTION to Certify Class 59 and in Support of Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lorna Mallyon. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 116)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 11/22/2010)
75 OPPOSITION Response to Defendants' Evidentiary Objections filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lorna Mallyon. (Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 11/22/2010)
76 MINUTES OF Status Conference Motion to Certify Class filed by plaintiffs 59 held before Judge Stephen V. Wilson: Status Conference held. Defendants' Motion in Limine is due by December 23, 2010. A response to the motion is due two weeks later and the hearing on the motion is set for January 10, 2011, at 1:30 p.m. Court will issue order with a trial date.Court Reporter: Deborah Gackle. (bp) (Entered: 12/10/2010)
77 STIPULATION for Order for Release of CHEERS Reports filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lorna Mallyon. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order for Release of CHEERS Reports)(Flynn, Colleen) (Entered: 12/14/2010)
78 NOTICE OF REASSIGNMENT OF CASE due to Unavailability of Judicial Officer filed. The previously assigned Magistrate Judge is no longer available. Pursuant to directive of the Chief Magistrate Judge and in accordance with the rules of this Court, the case has been returned to the Clerk for reassignment. This case has been reassigned to Magistrate Judge John E. McDermott for any discovery and/or post−judgment matters that may be referred. Case number will now read CV 10−01649 SVW (JEMx). (rn) (Entered: 12/15/2010)
79 ORDER FOR RELEASE OF CHEERS REPORTS by Magistrate Judge John E. McDermott re Stipulation for Order 77 . IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that within five business days of entry of this Order, Defendant County of Los Angeles will generate reports from the Los Angeles County Consolidated Criminal History System ("CHEERS Reports") for Plaintiffs Lora Barranca, Diana Paiz, and Diane Vigil and provide them to counsel for Plaintiffs. (san) (Entered: 12/20/2010)
80 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION IN LIMINE to Preclude Evidence Pursuant to Prison Litigation Reform Act filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca(individually), John H. Clark, Timothy Cornell(individually), County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. Motion set for hearing on 1/10/2011 at 01:30 AM before Judge Stephen V. Wilson.(Lawrence, David) (Entered: 12/23/2010)
81 NOTICE OF ERRATA filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, John H. Clark, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. correcting MOTION IN LIMINE to Preclude Evidence Pursuant to Prison Litigation Reform Act 80 (Beach, Paul) (Entered: 12/27/2010)
82 NOTICE OF LODGING filed Reporter's Transcript of December 6, 2010 Hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification re MOTION IN LIMINE to Preclude Evidence Pursuant to Prison Litigation Reform Act 80 (Beach, Paul) (Entered: 12/28/2010)
83 MINUTE ORDER IN CHAMBERS re MOTION IN LIMINE RE PRECLUSION OF EVIDENCE PURSUANT TO PLRA by Judge Stephen V. Wilson: re: 80 . The Court, on its own motion, continues the hearing on the motion listed above from January 10, 2011 to January 13, 2011 at 10:00 a.m. The filing deadline for Plaintiffs' responsive

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brief remains as presently scheduled. The pretrial conference is VACATED. Further scheduling in this matter can be addressed at the January 13, 2011 hearing. (im) (Entered: 01/05/2011)
84 TRANSCRIPT for proceedings held on 12/6/2010 2:20 pm. Court Reporter: Deborah K. Gackle, phone number (213) 620−1149. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Electronic Court Recorder before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through COURT REPORTER DEBORAH K. GACKLE or PACER. Notice of Intent to Redact due within 7 days of this date. Redaction Request due 1/26/2011. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/5/2011. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/5/2011. (Gackle, Deborah) (Entered: 01/05/2011)
85 NOTICE OF FILING TRANSCRIPT filed for proceedings 12/6/2010 2:20 pm (Gackle, Deborah) (Entered: 01/05/2011)
86 Opposition to Defendants' MIL Re PLRA Opposition re: MOTION IN LIMINE to Preclude Evidence Pursuant to Prison Litigation Reform Act 80 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lorna Mallyon. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 01/06/2011)
87 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Strike Sections IV and V of Defendants' MIL re PLRA filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lorna Mallyon. Motion set for hearing on 1/13/2011 at 10:00 AM before Judge Stephen V. Wilson. (Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 01/06/2011)
88 NOTICE OF LODGING filed re MOTION to Strike Sections IV and V of Defendants' MIL re PLRA 87 (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Re Motion to Strike)(Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 01/07/2011)
89 Opposition re: MOTION to Strike Sections IV and V of Defendants' MIL re PLRA 87 filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, John H. Clark, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Beach, Paul) (Entered: 01/10/2011)
90 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lorna Mallyon. Motion set for hearing on 2/1/2011 at 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge John E. McDermott. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Further Response to Requests for Production)(Cook, Donald) (Entered: 01/11/2011)
91 JOINT STIPULATION to MOTION to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production 90 Local Rule 37−2 Stipulation re Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production; Declarations of Counsel; Exhibits filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lorna Mallyon. (Cook, Donald) (Entered: 01/11/2011)
92 SUPPLEMENT to MOTION to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production 90 Plaintiffs Notice of Errata Re: Motion to Compel Joint Stipulation (document 91) filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lorna Mallyon. (Cook, Donald) (Entered: 01/12/2011)
93 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Amend Complaint MOTION to Amend Complaint − (Discovery), Complaint − (Discovery), Complaint − (Discovery), Complaint − (Discovery) 1 MOTION to Amend Complaint − (Discovery), Complaint − (Discovery), Complaint − (Discovery), Complaint − (Discovery) 1 43 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lorna Mallyon. Motion set for hearing on 2/14/2011 at 01:30 PM before Judge Stephen V. Wilson. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Second Amended Complaint)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 01/13/2011)
94 DECLARATION of Barrett S. Litt In Support of Motion for Second Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lorna Mallyon. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 01/13/2011)
95 NOTICE OF LODGING filed (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Re 2nd Amended Complaint)(Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 01/13/2011)
96 NOTICE OF ERRATA filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lorna Mallyon. correcting Motion to Amend Complaint (Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 01/13/2011)

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97 MINUTES OF 1. MOTION IN LIMINE to Preclude Evidence Pursuant to Prison Litigation Reform Act filed by Defendants 80 2. MOTION to Strike Sections IV and V of Defendants' MIL re PLRA filed by Plaintiffs 87 held before Judge Stephen V. Wilson: Due to plaintiffs counsels failure to appear, the hearing is aborted. The Court to consider sanctions. Court Reporter: Deborah Gackle. (im) (Entered: 01/14/2011)
98 DECLARATION of Barrett S. Litt Re Failure to Appear for January 13 Hearing, Request for New Hearing Date filed by Plaintiff Mary Amador. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 01/18/2011)
99 SUPPLEMENT to MOTION to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production 90 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lorna Mallyon. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Dr. Brian Kriegler in Support of Plaintiffs' Supplemental Brief in Support of Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production)(Cook, Donald) (Entered: 01/18/2011)
100 MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER by Judge Stephen V. Wilson: Proceedings: 1) MOTION IN LIMINE to Preclude Evidence Pursuant to Prison Litigation Reform Act 80 ; 2) MOTION to Strike Sections IV and V of Defendants' MIL re PLRA 87 . The hearing on the motions listed above is reset for Wednesday, 1/26/11 at 1:30 p.m. (mg) (Entered: 01/18/2011)
101 SUPPLEMENT to MOTION to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production 90 Supplemental Memorandum of Law Pursuant to Local Rule 37−2.3 filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, John H. Clark, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Lee, Daniel) (Entered: 01/18/2011)
102 MEMORANDUM of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants' Submission Re: the Court's Condsideration of Sanctions Re: Motion Hearing, 97 (Lawrence, David) (Entered: 01/20/2011)
103 REPLY filed by Plaintiff Mary Amador to Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support (non−motion) 102 Reply to Defendants' Memo re Sanctions (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 01/24/2011)
104 OPPOSITION TOPLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, John H. Clark, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Beach, Paul) (Entered: 01/24/2011)
105 MINUTE (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER VACATING HEARING RE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION SET FOR FEBRUARY 1, 2011 by Magistrate Judge John E. McDermott: The hearing set for February 1, 2011 re Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production is hereby vacated. Pursuant to Rule 78 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 7−15, the Court finds this matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. The matter will be taken under advisement, and the parties will be notified of the Courts decision in writing. (es) (Entered: 01/25/2011)
110 MINUTES OF 1. MOTION IN LIMINE to Preclude Evidence Pursuant to Prison Litigation Reform Act filed by Defendants 80 2. MOTION to Strike Sections IV and V of Defendants' MIL re PLRA filedby Plaintiffs [87 held before Judge Stephen V. Wilson: The hearing held. The plaintiff is granted leave, up to and including Monday, January 31, 2011, to file a second amended complaint. Defendant shall, within one week investigate and verify whether the new named plaintiffs can appropriately represent the putative class. The motions are submitted. Order to issue. Court Reporter: Deborah Gackle. (pj) (Entered: 02/03/2011)
106 MINUTE ORDER IN CHAMBERS by Magistrate Judge John E. McDermott re: Plaintiff's MOTION to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production 90 . As of this date there has been no ruling on Plaintiff Mary Amador's Motion for Class Certification. If the Motion is denied, there would not appear to be any reason to compel the production of documents sought. Thus, this Court sees no reason to rule on the pending Motion to Compel at this time. [See Order for details.] (san) (Entered: 01/28/2011)
109 SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT against Defendants Leroy D. Baca(individually), Leroy D. Baca(in his official capacity), John H. Clark, John H.

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Clark, Timothy Cornell(individually), Timothy Cornell(in his official capacity), County of Los Angeles, Does, Sammy Jones(in his official capacity), Sammy Jones(individually), Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Dennis Burns, Dennis Burns, Gerald K Cooper, Gerald K Cooper, Daniel Cruz, Daniel Cruz, Stacy L Lee, Stacy L Lee amending Complaint − (Discovery), Complaint − (Discovery), Complaint − (Discovery), Complaint − (Discovery) 1 ,filed by plaintiffs Mary Amador, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Diane Vigil, Evangelina Madrid, Lora Barranca, Diana Paiz (pj) (Additional attachment(s) added on 2/7/2011: # 1 21 day summons issued as to 2nd AC) (pj). (Entered: 02/03/2011)
107 AMENDED DOCUMENT filed by Plaintiff Mary Amador. Amendment to Order on Motion to Amend/Correct, Order on Motion to Strike, Motion Hearing,,, 56 SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 01/31/2011)
108 NOTICE OF DOCUMENT DISCREPANCIES AND ORDER by Judge Stephen V. Wilson ORDERING Second amended complaint submitted by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lorna Mallyon received on 1/28/11 to be filed and processed; filed date to be the date the document was stamped Received but not Filed with the Clerk. (pj) (Entered: 02/01/2011)
21 DAY Summons Issued Second Amended Complaint,, 109 as to defendants Leroy D. Baca(individually), Leroy D. Baca(in his official capacity), Dennis Burns(individually ), Dennis Burns(in his official capacity ), John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper(in his official capacity), Gerald K Cooper(individually ), Timothy Cornell(individually), Timothy Cornell(in his official capacity), County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz(in his official capacity), Daniel Cruz(individually ), Does, Sammy Jones(in his official capacity), Sammy Jones(individually), Stacy L Lee(individually), Stacy L Lee(in her official capacity), Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (pj) (Entered: 02/07/2011)
111 RESPONSE filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, John H. Clark, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department TO COURT ORDER ENTERED ON JANUARY 26, 2011. (Beach, Paul) (Entered: 02/07/2011)
112 NOTICE of Change of Attorney Information for attorney David Duane Lawrence counsel for Defendants Leroy D. Baca, John H. Clark, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. Adding David D Lawrence as attorney as counsel of record for Defendants County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Sheriff Leroy D. Baca, Captain John H. Clark, and Timothy Cornell for the reason indicated in the G−06 Notice. Filed by Defendants County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Sheriff Leroy D. Baca, Captain John H. Clark, and Timothy Cornell (Lawrence, David) (Entered: 02/08/2011)
113 IN CHAMBERS ORDER re MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT 93 by Judge Stephen V. Wilson. As indicated at the January 26, 2011 hearing, Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend the Complaint is GRANTED. The Second Amended Complaint is the operative complaint. The motion hearing scheduled for February 14, 2011 is VACATED. (rs) (Entered: 02/10/2011)
114 STIPULATION for Order TO PRODUCE CHEERS REPORTS filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca(individually), John H. Clark, Timothy Cornell(individually), County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Beach, Paul) (Entered: 02/11/2011)
115 PROOF OF SERVICE Executed by Plaintiff Mary Amador, upon Defendant Dennis Burns(individually ) served on 2/4/2011, answer due 2/25/2011; Dennis Burns(in his official capacity ) served on 2/4/2011, answer due 2/25/2011. Service of the Summons and Complaint were executed upon Lt. Mark McCorkle, authorized agent to accept service of process in compliance with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by personal service. Original Summons returned. Summons and First Amended Complaint; Summons and Second Amended Complaint served. (Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 02/15/2011)
116 PROOF OF SERVICE Executed by Plaintiff Mary Amador, upon Defendant Gerald K Cooper(in his official capacity) served on 2/4/2011, answer due 2/25/2011; Gerald K Cooper(individually ) served on 2/4/2011, answer due 2/25/2011. Service of the

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Summons and Complaint were executed upon Sgt. D. Geopforth, authorized agent to accept service of process in compliance with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by personal service. Original Summons returned. Summons and First Amended Complaint; Summons and Second Amended Complaint served. (Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 02/15/2011)
117 PROOF OF SERVICE Executed by Plaintiff Mary Amador, upon Defendant John H. Clark served on 2/4/2011, answer due 2/25/2011; John H. Clark served on 2/4/2011, answer due 2/25/2011. Service of the Summons and Complaint were executed upon Lt. Mike Alerich, authorized agent to accept service of process in compliance with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by personal service. Original Summons returned. Summons and First Amended Complaint; Summons and Second Amended Complaint served. (Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 02/15/2011)
118 PROOF OF SERVICE Executed by Plaintiff Mary Amador, upon Defendant Stacy L Lee(indivdiually) served on 2/7/2011, answer due 2/28/2011; Stacy L Lee(in her official capacity) served on 2/7/2011, answer due 2/28/2011. Service of the Summons and Complaint were executed upon Sgt. David Haney, authorized agent to accept service of process in compliance with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by personal service. Original Summons returned. Summons and First Amended Complaint; Summons and Second Amended Complaint served. (Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 02/15/2011)
119 ORDER For Release of Cheers Reports by Magistrate Judge John E. McDermott, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that within five business days of service of this entered Order, Defendant County of Los Angeles will generate reports from the Los Angeles County Consolidated Criminal History System ("CHEERS Reports") for Plaintiffs Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, and Evangelina Madrid and provide them to counsel for Plaintiffs. 114 (es) (Entered: 02/17/2011)
120 PROOF OF SERVICE Executed by Plaintiff Mary Amador, upon Defendant Daniel Cruz(in his official capacity) served on 2/11/2011, answer due 3/4/2011; Daniel Cruz(individually ) served on 2/11/2011, answer due 3/4/2011. Service of the Summons and Complaint were executed upon Natasha Ramerez, authorized agent to accept proof of service in compliance with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by personal service. Original Summons returned. Summons and First Amended Complaint; Summons and Second Amended Complaint served. (Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 02/17/2011)
121 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca(individually), Dennis Burns(in his official capacity ), John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper(in his official capacity), Timothy Cornell(individually), County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz(in his official capacity), Stacy L Lee(indivdiually), Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. Motion set for hearing on 3/28/2011 at 01:30 PM before Judge Stephen V. Wilson. (Choi, Jin) (Entered: 02/28/2011)
122 DECLARATION of Deputy Janet Barragan in Support of MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint 121 (Amended Declaration) filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, Dennis Burns, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz, Stacy L Lee, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Choi, Jin) (Entered: 03/01/2011)
123 Opposition Opposition to Motion to Dismiss re: MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint 121 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 03/07/2011)
124 DECLARATION of Lindsay Battles In Support of Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint 121 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 03/07/2011)
125 DECLARATION of Barrett S. Litt In Support of Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint 121 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak,

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Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 122−Deposition Pages of Mark Skaggs)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 03/07/2011)
126 REPLY in Support of MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint 121 filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, Dennis Burns, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz, Stacy L Lee, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Choi, Jin) (Entered: 03/14/2011)
127 MINUTE ORDER IN CHAMBERS RE MOTION to Amend Complaint file by Plaintiffs by Judge Stephen V. Wilson: re: 121 . The Court takes the motion under submission. Order to issue. The March 28, 2011 hearing is vacated. (im) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
128 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Compel Deposition of Plaintiff Diana Paiz filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca(individually), Dennis Burns(individually ), John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper(in his official capacity), Timothy Cornell(individually), County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz(in his official capacity), Stacy L Lee(indivdiually), Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. Motion set for hearing on 5/3/2011 at 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge John E. McDermott. (Attachments: # 1 Local Rule 37−2 Joint Stipulation re Defendants' Motion to Compel the Deposition of Plaintiff Diana Paiz)(Choi, Jin) (Entered: 04/12/2011)
129 MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS): ORDER RE DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COMPEL THE DEPOSITION OF PLAINTIFF DIANA PAIZ (Docket #128) by Magistrate Judge John E. McDermott: Before the Court is a Motion to Compel the Deposition of Plaintiff Diana Paiz brought by Los Angeles County Defendants ("County"). The Court DENIES the County's Motion without prejudice. 128 Therefore, the Court orders the hearing set for May 3 on Defendants' Motion to Compel vacated. The parties are to provide the Court with a Joint Status Report within 60 days of this date. See attached order for further details. (es) (Entered: 04/25/2011)
130 EX PARTE APPLICATION to Strike Declarations of Janet Barragan and Janette Leo re Declaration (Motion related), Declaration (Motion related) 122 , MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint 121 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 05/31/2011)
131 DECLARATION of Paul J. Estuar In Support Of EX PARTE APPLICATION to Strike Declarations of Janet Barragan and Janette Leo re Declaration (Motion related), Declaration (Motion related) 122 , MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint 121 EX PARTE APPLICATION to Strike Declarations of Janet Barragan and Janette Leo re Declaration (Motion related), Declaration (Motion related) 122 , MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint 121 130 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Relevant pages of Barragan deposition, # 2 Exhibit Relevant pages of Leo deposition)(Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 05/31/2011)
132 Defendants' Opposition re: EX PARTE APPLICATION to Strike Declarations of Janet Barragan and Janette Leo re Declaration (Motion related), Declaration (Motion related) 122 , MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint 121 EX PARTE APPLICATION to Strike Declarations of Janet Barragan and Janette Leo re Declaration (Motion related), Declaration (Motion related) 122 , MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint 121 130 filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, John H. Clark, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Choi, Jin) (Entered: 06/01/2011)
133 STATUS REPORT Joint Report re Diana Paiz per Court Order of 4/25/11 filed by Plaintiff Mary Amador. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Lindsay Battles)(Battles, Lindsay) (Entered: 06/24/2011)
134 TRANSCRIPT for proceedings held on 1/26/11 1:30 pm. Court Reporter : Deborah K. Gackle, phone number (213) 620−1149. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Electronic Court Recorder before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through DEBORAHGACKLE.COM or PACER. Notice of Intent to Redact due within 7 days of this date. Redaction Request due 9/5/2011. Redacted Transcript Deadline set

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for 9/15/2011. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/13/2011. (Gackle, Deborah) (Entered: 08/15/2011)
135 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Leave to Conduct Additional Depositions filed by Plaintiff Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid. Motion set for hearing on 9/20/2011 at 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge John E. McDermott. (Attachments: # 1 Supplement Joint Stipulation re Leave to Conduct Additional Depositions)(Estuar, Paul) Modified on 10/4/2011 (es). (Entered: 08/24/2011)
136 DECLARATION of Lindsay Battles In Support Of MOTION for Leave to Conduct Additional Depositions 135 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid. (Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 08/24/2011)
137 NOTICE OF LODGING filed re MOTION for Leave to Conduct Additional Depositions 135 (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 08/24/2011)
138 SUPPLEMENT to MOTION for Leave to Conduct Additional Depositions 135 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Lindsay Battles in Support)(Battles, Lindsay) (Entered: 09/06/2011)
139 EXHIBIT 130−Relevant pages of hearing transcript to MOTION for Leave to Conduct Additional Depositions 135 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. (Battles, Lindsay) (Entered: 09/06/2011)
140 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to MOTION for Leave to Conduct Additional Depositions 135 SUPPLEMENTAL filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, John H. Clark, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Choi, Jin) (Entered: 09/06/2011)
141 Amendment to MOTION for Leave to Conduct Additional Depositions 135 AMENDED SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 130−Relevant Pages of Hearing Transcript, # 2 Declaration of Lindsay Battles)(Battles, Lindsay) (Entered: 09/07/2011)
142 ORDER VACATING HEARING RE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO CONDUCT ADDITIONAL DEPOSITIONS SET FOR SEPTEMBER 20, 2011 (Docket No.135.) by United States Magistrate Judge John E. McDermott, vacating 135 . The hearing set for September 20, 2011 re Plaintiffs Motion For Leave To Conduct Additional Depositions is hereby vacated. The matter will be taken under advisement, and the parties will be notified of the Courts decision in writing. (gr) (Entered: 09/15/2011)
143 MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER RE: PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO CONDUCT ADDITIONAL DEPOSITIONS (Docket #135) by Magistrate Judge John E. McDermott: Plaintiffs' Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part without prejudice. 135 See attached order for details. (es) (Entered: 10/04/2011)
144 NOTICE OF FILING TRANSCRIPT filed for proceedings 1/26/2011 1:30 pm (Gackle, Deborah) (Entered: 10/11/2011)
145 MINUTES IN CHAMBERS ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE by Judge Stephen V. Wilson. The motions and related briefing currently before the Court rely, in part, on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Bull v. City and County of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). On review, it appears that the Supreme Court's decision in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington, et al., No. 10−945, which is currently pending before the Supreme Court, potentially could affect the viability of Bull and its application to this case. Accordingly, the Court believes that in the interests of judicial efficiency, this case should be stayed pending the Supreme Court's decision in Florence. If any party disagrees with the Court's assessment, that party is hereby ORDERED to file a supplemental brief with the Court, of no more than five (5) pages in length, within ten (10) days of the date of this order. (lom) (Entered: 10/14/2011)

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146 Brief in Opposition to Stay BRIEF filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. regarding Minutes of In Chambers Order/Directive − no proceeding held,,, 145 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 103, # 2 Exhibit 104, # 3 Exhibit 131, # 4 Exhibit 132)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 10/21/2011)
147 RESPONSE filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, John H. Clark, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Departmentto Brief (non−motion non−appeal), Brief (non−motion non−appeal) 146 (Choi, Jin) (Entered: 10/24/2011)
148 MINUTE ORDER IN CHAMBERS re: ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 145 by Judge Stephen V. Wilson:The Court hereby notified the parties that it will not render any further substantive decisions in this case until Florence is decided by the Supreme Court. (bp) (Entered: 11/03/2011)
149 MINUTE IN CHAMBERS ORDER MOVING CASE TO THE INACTIVE CALENDAR by Judge Stephen V. Wilson: On 10/28/2011, the Court issued an order advising the parties that, "The Court hereby notified the parties that it will not render any further substantive decisions in this case until Florence is decided by the Supreme Court." Therefore, the case is moved to the Court's inactive calendar. The parties are ordered to inform the Court, in writing, when the Florence case is decided and request that this case be restored to the active calendar. (Made JS−6. Case Terminated.) (jp) (Entered: 12/27/2011)
150 NOTICE of Decision: Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. (Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 04/03/2012)
151 NOTICE of Decision: Supreme Court's Decision in Florence filed by defendants Leroy D. Baca(individually), Leroy D. Baca(in his official capacity), Dennis Burns(individually ), Dennis Burns(in his official capacity ), John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper(in his official capacity), Gerald K Cooper(individually ), Timothy Cornell(individually), Timothy Cornell(in his official capacity), County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz(in his official capacity), Daniel Cruz(individually ), Stacy L Lee(indivdiually), Stacy L Lee(in her official capacity), Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Choi, Jin) (Entered: 04/03/2012)
152 IN CHAMBERS ORDER re Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington, et al., 566 U.S. __ (2012) by Judge Stephen V. Wilson. The Court is in receipt of the parties' respective notices 150 151 that the Supreme Court has rendered its decision in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington, et al., 566 U.S. __ (2012), 2012 WL 1069092. The Court ORDERS the parties to submit a brief of no more than eight (8) pages in length regarding the impact of the Florence decision on this action. This brief shall be filed with the Court no later than Friday, April 13, 2012. (kti) (Entered: 04/04/2012)
153 RESPONSE filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, Dennis Burns, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz, Stacy L Lee, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Departmentto Minutes of In Chambers Order/Directive − no proceeding held,, 152 REGARDING THE IMPACT OF THE FLORENCE DECISION ON THIS ACTION (Beach, Paul) (Entered: 04/13/2012)
154 BRIEF filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. Re Impact of Florence Decision (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Amicus Brief of Sister Bernie Galvin, et al.)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 04/13/2012)
155 NOTICE of Change of Attorney Information for attorney Robert Frederick Mann counsel for Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Lorna Mallyon, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. Changing Address (suite number only) to Suite 2910. Filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, et al. (Mann, Robert) (Entered: 08/24/2012)
156 REQUEST for Hearing as to Status Conference filed by Plaintiffs Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Lorna Mallyon, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. Request set for hearing on 9/10/2012 at 01:30 PM before Magistrate Judge John E. McDermott. (Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 09/06/2012)

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157 NOTICE OF ERRATA filed by Plaintiffs Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Lorna Mallyon, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. correcting REQUEST for Hearing as to Status Conference 156 Status Conference requested before Judge Wilson on 9/10/12 at 1:30 P.M. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Request for Status Conference)(Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 09/06/2012)
158 NOTICE of Change of address by Cynthia M Anderson−Barker attorney for Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Lorna Mallyon, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. Changing attorneys address to Suite 2910. Filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Lorna Mallyon, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. (Anderson−Barker, Cynthia) (Entered: 09/07/2012)
159 TEXT ONLY ENTRY−IN CHAMBERS re: REQUEST for Hearing as to Status Conference 156 : The request is GRANTED. The matter is set for a Status Conference on 9/10/2012 at 1:30 PM before Judge Stephen V. Wilson. THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY.(pc) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 09/07/2012)
160 MINUTES OF FURTHERStatus Conference held before Judge Stephen V. Wilson: Conference held. The Court orders plaintiff to inform the Court of whether it plans on pursuing its Equal Protection Claim, which this Court bifurcated from Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim in its June 17, 2010 order (Dckt. 149, at 29 n.8). The matter is submitted. Order to issue. Court Reporter: Deborah Gackle. (pj) (Entered: 09/14/2012)
161 JOINT STIPULATION to MOTION for Leave to Conduct Additional Depositions 135 Requesting Clarification of Time for Inmate Depositions filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. (Battles, Lindsay) (Entered: 10/01/2012)
162 NOTICE OF MOTION re MOTION for Leave to Conduct Additional Depositions 135 and Clarification Regarding Length of Time for Inmate Depositions filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. Motion set for hearing on 10/30/2012 at 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge John E. McDermott. (Battles, Lindsay) (Entered: 10/01/2012)
163 NOTICE OF MOTION re MOTION for Leave to Conduct Additional Depositions 135 Amended Notice filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. Motion set for hearing on 11/6/2012 at 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge John E. McDermott. (Battles, Lindsay) (Entered: 10/02/2012)
164 SUPPLEMENT to MOTION for Leave to Conduct Additional Depositions 135 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. (Battles, Lindsay) (Entered: 10/23/2012)
165 SUPPLEMENT to MOTION to Certify Class 59 Supplemental Authority filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. (Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 10/24/2012)
166 SCHEDULING NOTICE NOTICE by Magistrate Judge John E. McDermott previously scheduled for 11/06/2012 10:00 a.m. has been terminated. THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY.(san) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 10/25/2012)
167 DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION re MOTION to Certify Class 59 filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, Dennis Burns, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz, Stacy L Lee, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Beach, Paul) (Entered: 10/25/2012)
168 MINUTE ORDER IN CHAMBERS by Magistrate Judge John E. McDermott. Order re: Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Conduct Additional Depositions 165 , 143 .Before the Court is Plaintiffs Motion for Clarification or Modification of this Court's October 3, 2011 Order granting 15 additional depositions of inmates beyond the presumptive 10 deposition limit set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2)(A)(1). The Court limited the

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length of the additional depositions to two hours. See Order for details.] (san) (Entered: 10/25/2012)
169 REPLY Reply to Defendants' Response to Supplemental Authority filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. (Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 11/01/2012)
170 MINUTE ORDER (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER Re: MOTION to Dismiss 121 by Judge Stephen V. Wilson: The Court hereby MOVES this case to its active calendar. Furthermore, for the reasons explained in this Order, the Court DENIES Defendants' motion to dismiss as to Plaintiff's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment causes of action and BIFURCATES the state−law claims, to be tried at a later date. The Court will rule on the motion for class certification after ruling on motions for summary judgment. Finally, the Court ORDERS the parties to appear for a status conference on January 7, 2013 at 1:30 p.m. (PLEASE REVIEW DOCUMENT FOR FULL AND COMPLETE DETAILS) RE: ORDER REOPENING CASE (Made JS−5, Case reopened), (Status Conference set for 1/7/2013 AT 01:30 PM before Judge Stephen V. Wilson.) (lw) (Entered: 12/20/2012)
171 STATEMENT Re Status Conference filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 01/03/2013)
172 MINUTES OF Status Conference held before Judge Stephen V. Wilson. Conference held. Plaintiffs counsel advises the Court of their intention to file a motion for preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs counsel requests reconsideration on the Courts ruling on class certification. The request is submitted. Order to issue. Court Reporter: Deborah Gackle. (kti) (Entered: 01/09/2013)
173 MINUTE ORDER IN CHAMBERS Re MOTION TO COMPEL 90 and MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION 59 by Judge Stephen V. Wilson. The Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiffs' Requests for Production; Defendants shall have until January 25, 2013 to turn over the requested production. The Plaintiffs are ORDERED to re−file their motion for class certification in light of Dukes and any evidence they have or will obtain during discovery, in accordance with the following briefing schedule: Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification − April 15, 2013; Defendant's Response − April 22, 2013; Plaintiff's Reply − April 29, 2013. Hearing on this matter is set for May 13, 2013 at 1:30 p.m. (lom) (Entered: 01/10/2013)
174 EX PARTE APPLICATION for Relief from THE COURT'S JANUARY 9, 2013 ORDER filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca(individually), Leroy D. Baca(in his official capacity), Dennis Burns(individually ), Dennis Burns(in his official capacity ), John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper(in his official capacity), Gerald K Cooper(individually ), Timothy Cornell(individually), Timothy Cornell(in his official capacity), County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz(in his official capacity), Daniel Cruz(individually ), Stacy L Lee(indivdiually), Stacy L Lee(in her official capacity), Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Beach, Paul) (Entered: 01/23/2013)
175 REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE re EX PARTE APPLICATION for Relief from THE COURT'S JANUARY 9, 2013 ORDER 174 filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca(individually), Leroy D. Baca(in his official capacity), Dennis Burns(individually ), Dennis Burns(in his official capacity ), John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper(in his official capacity), Gerald K Cooper(individually ), Timothy Cornell(individually), Timothy Cornell(in his official capacity), County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz(in his official capacity), Daniel Cruz(individually ), Stacy L Lee(indivdiually), Stacy L Lee(in her official capacity), Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibits B−F)(Beach, Paul) (Entered: 01/23/2013)
176 OPPOSITION to EX PARTE APPLICATION for Relief from THE COURT'S JANUARY 9, 2013 ORDER 174 Plaintiffs Preliminary Opposition to Defendants Ex Parte Application (Doc. 174); Declaration of Donald W. Cook filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. (Cook, Donald) (Entered: 01/24/2013)

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177 REPLY in support of EX PARTE APPLICATION for Relief from THE COURT'S JANUARY 9, 2013 ORDER 174 filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, Leroy D. Baca, Dennis Burns, Dennis Burns, John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper, Gerald K Cooper, Timothy Cornell, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz, Daniel Cruz, Stacy L Lee, Stacy L Lee, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Beach, Paul) (Entered: 01/24/2013)
178 ORDER ORDER Re EX PARTE APPLICATION 174 by Judge Stephen V. Wilson: With this consideration in mind, theCourt temporarily GRANTS the ex parte application for relief from its January 25, 2013 deadline, but ORDERS counsel from each side to meet and confer to discuss a protective order that would allow Plaintiffs to access the information they need to locate potential class members while protecting those members personal private information, and to submit the protective order to the Court, no later than February 13, 2013. The parties should also discuss and attempt to come to an agreement as to how long the production of the requested information will reasonably take, and indicate in their stipulation when the requested information, under protective order, can be disclosed by 174 . (pj) (Entered: 01/29/2013)
179 NOTICE of Change of Attorney Information for attorney Barrett S Litt counsel for Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz. Changing firm name to Kaye, McLane, Bednarski & Litt. Changing e−mail to blitt@kmbllaw.com. Filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 02/04/2013)
180 NOTICE of Change of Attorney Information for attorney Lindsay Brooke Battles counsel for Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. Changing firm name to Kaye, McLane, Bednarski & Litt. Changing e−mail to lbattles@kmbllaw.com. Filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador (Battles, Lindsay) (Entered: 02/04/2013)
181 MEMORANDUM of Points and Authorities in Support filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca(individually), Leroy D. Baca(in his official capacity), Dennis Burns(individually ), Dennis Burns(in his official capacity ), John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper(in his official capacity), Gerald K Cooper(individually ), Timothy Cornell(individually), Timothy Cornell(in his official capacity), County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz(in his official capacity), Daniel Cruz(individually ), Stacy L Lee(indivdiually), Stacy L Lee(in her official capacity), Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. IN SUPPORT OF THEIR PROPOSED PROTECTIVE ORDER (Attachments: # 1 [Proposed] Protective Order)(Beach, Paul) (Entered: 02/13/2013)
182 Plaintiffs' Memo Re Protective Order filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Draft of Proposed Protective Order)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 02/13/2013)
183 DECLARATION of Lindsay Battles re Miscellaneous Document 182 In Support of Plaintiff's Memo re Protective Order filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 02/13/2013)
184 DECLARATION of Donald W. Cook re Miscellaneous Document 182 Declaration of Donald W. Cook in Support of Plaintiffs Proposed Protective Order filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. (Cook, Donald) (Entered: 02/14/2013)
185 MINUTE ORDER IN CHAMBERS PROTECTIVE ORDER by Judge Stephen V. Wilson: Thus, the Court enters the attached protective order, and further Defendants to turn over the files and data in their possession reflecting the identity of prisoners and number of female prisoners, held in the Los Angeles Sheriff Departments custody at the Sheriffs Century Regional Detention Facility between September 23, 2006 through the present no later than March 1, 2013. Further discovery requestsincluding those relevant to the question of class certificationshould be directed to the Magistrate Judge. (pj) (Entered: 02/15/2013)
186 PROTECTIVE ORDER by Judge Stephen V. Wilson (pj) (Entered: 02/15/2013)

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187 EX PARTE APPLICATION to Continue filing date for class certification motion, opposing and reply papers from 4/15/13 (motion filing date) to 60 days after 4/15/13 Re: Minutes of In Chambers Order/Directive − no proceeding held,, 173 Plaintiffs Ex Parte Application for 60 Day Extension for Filling Motion for Class Certification and Continuance of Hearing Date on Class Certification; Declaration of Donald W. Cook filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Granting Extension on Filing Class Certification Motion and Motion Hearing Date)(Cook, Donald) (Entered: 03/19/2013)
188 OPPOSITION re: EX PARTE APPLICATION to Continue filing date for class certification motion, opposing and reply papers from 4/15/13 (motion filing date) to 60 days after 4/15/13 Re: Minutes of In Chambers Order/Directive − no proceeding held,, 173 Plaintiff 187 filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, Leroy D. Baca, Dennis Burns, Dennis Burns, John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper, Gerald K Cooper, Timothy Cornell, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz, Daniel Cruz, Stacy L Lee, Stacy L Lee, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Beach, Paul) (Entered: 03/20/2013)
190 ORDER GRANTING EXTENSION ON FILING CLASS CERTIFICATION MOTION AND MOTION HEARING DATE by Judge Stephen V. Wilson: 187 New filing date for class certification motion (old date 4/15/13):June 10, 2013New filing date for defendants response (old date 4/22/13): June 17, 2013New filing date for Plaintiffs reply (old date 4/29/13): June 24, 2013New hearing date (old date 5/13/13): July 8, 2013 at 1:30 p.m. (pj) (Entered: 03/22/2013)
189 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF EX PARTE APPLICATION to Continue filing date for class certification motion, opposing and reply papers from 4/15/13 (motion filing date) to 60 days after 4/15/13 Re: Minutes of In Chambers Order/Directive − no proceeding held,, 173 Plaintiff 187 Plaintiffs Reply to Defendants Opposition to Ex Parte Application, filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. (Cook, Donald) (Entered: 03/21/2013)
191 Joint STIPULATION to Exceed Page Limitation as to Motion for Class Certification filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 05/30/2013)
192 ORDER RE: OVERLONG BRIEFS AND BRIEFING SCHEDULE REGARDING PLAINTIFFS SECOND MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION by Judge Stephen V. Wilson, re Stipulation to Exceed Page Limitation 191 Having considered and approved the parties stipulation, it is hereby ORDERED: 1. Plaintiffs shall be permitted to file a moving brief not to exceed 40 pages;2. Defendants shall be permitted to file an opposition brief not to exceed 40 pages; 3. The deadline for Defendants to file their opposition brief shall be continuedby 14 days, from June 17, 2013 to July 1, 2013; 4. The deadline for Plaintiffs to file their reply brief shall be continued to July 8, 2013; 5. The hearing date shall be continued to July 22, 2013 at 1:30 p.m. (pj) (Entered: 06/04/2013)
193 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Certify Class filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. Motion set for hearing on 7/22/2013 at 01:30 PM before Judge Stephen V. Wilson. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 06/10/2013)
194 DECLARATION of Barrett S. Litt In Support Of MOTION to Certify Class 193 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 06/10/2013)
195 DECLARATION of Dr. Brian Kriegler In Support Of MOTION to Certify Class 193 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 06/10/2013)
196 NOTICE of Manual Filing filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil of Exhibits. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 06/10/2013)

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197 DECLARATION of Lindsay Battles In Support Of MOTION to Certify Class 193 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 06/10/2013)
198 APPLICATION for Leave to File Certain Exhibits Under Seal filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 06/10/2013)
200 DECLARATION of BARRETT S LITT RE MANUEL FILING OF EXHIBITS IN SUPPORT MOTION to Certify Class 193 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. (Attachments: # 1 Part 1 2 of 3, # 2 Part 1 3 of 3, # 3 Part 2 1 of 3, # 4 Part 2 2 of 3, # 5 Part 2 3 of 3, # 6 Part 3 1 of 2, # 7 Part 3 2 of 2, # 8 Part 4 1 of 2, # 9 Part 4 2 of 2)(pj) (Entered: 06/13/2013)
201 APPLICATION to file UNDER SEAL Exhibits 800−942 supporting Plaintiffs' motion for class certification; filed concurrently with motion for class certification filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. Lodged Proposed Order. (pj) (Entered: 06/14/2013)
199 NOTICE of Manual Filing filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil of Under Seal Exhibits. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 06/12/2013)
202 ORDER GRANTING PERMISSION TO FILE CERTAIN DOCUMENTS UNDER SEAL by Judge Stephen V. Wilson: Having considered Plaintiffs' application to file Exhibits 800−942 under seal, IT IS SO ORDERED. That Plaintiff's application is hereby granted, 201 (bp) (Entered: 06/18/2013)
203 SEALED DOCUMENT− PLAINTIFFS' UNDER SEAL EXHIBITS 800−942 (Confidential and Privileged Declarations of Plaintiffs) (Attachments: Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5, Part 6, Part 7, Part 8, Part 9, Part 10, Part 11, Part 12, Part 13, Part 14, Part 15, Part 16, Part 17, Part 18, Part 19, Part 20, Part 21, Part 22)(mat) (Entered: 06/20/2013)
204 Opposition re: MOTION to Certify Class 193 filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, Leroy D. Baca, Dennis Burns, Dennis Burns, John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper, Gerald K Cooper, Timothy Cornell, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz, Daniel Cruz, Stacy L Lee, Stacy L Lee, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Beach, Paul) (Entered: 07/01/2013)
205 DECLARATION of Justin W. Clark, et al. in opposition to MOTION to Certify Class 193 filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, Leroy D. Baca, Dennis Burns, Dennis Burns, John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper, Gerald K Cooper, Timothy Cornell, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz, Daniel Cruz, Stacy L Lee, Stacy L Lee, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Beach, Paul) (Entered: 07/01/2013)
206 Evidentiary Objections in opposition re: MOTION to Certify Class 193 filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, Leroy D. Baca, Dennis Burns, Dennis Burns, John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper, Gerald K Cooper, Timothy Cornell, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz, Daniel Cruz, Stacy L Lee, Stacy L Lee, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Beach, Paul) (Entered: 07/01/2013)
207 REPLY Reply in Opposition to Defendants' Opposition to Class Certification filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 07/08/2013)
208 DECLARATION of Barrett S. Litt In Support of Plaintiffs' Reply MOTION to Certify Class 193 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 07/08/2013)
209 DECLARATION of Dr. Brian Kriegler In Support of Plaintiffs' Reply MOTION to Certify Class 193 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 07/08/2013)

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210 REPORT OF WENDY STILL re MOTION to Certify Class 193 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 07/08/2013)
211 HAVERTY KUPERS REPORT re MOTION to Certify Class 193 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 07/08/2013)
212 DECLARATION of Lindsay Battles Re Defs Evidentiary Objections MOTION to Certify Class 193 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 07/08/2013)
213 RESPONSE IN SUPPORT of Plaintiffs' Evidentiary Submission filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 07/08/2013)
214 Ojection to Defs Evidentiary Submission in opposition to re: MOTION to Certify Class 193 filed by Plaintiffs Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 07/08/2013)
215 NOTICE OF ERRATA filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. correcting MOTION to Certify Class 193 (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 07/08/2013)
216 NOTICE OF ERRATA filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. correcting MOTION to Certify Class 193 (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 07/08/2013)
217 OBJECTIONS AND REQUEST TO STRIKE DECLARATIONS, EXHIBITS, AND NEW TRIAL PLAN SUBMITTED BY PLAINTIFFS FOR THE FIRST TIME ON REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION re: MOTION to Certify Class 193 filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, Dennis Burns, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz, Stacy L Lee, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Beach, Paul) (Entered: 07/17/2013)
218 Notice of Appearance or Withdrawal of Counsel: for attorney Justin W Clark counsel for Defendants Leroy D. Baca, Dennis Burns, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz, Stacy L Lee, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. Filed by DEFENDANTS County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Sheriff Leroy D. Baca, Captain John H. Clark, Timothy Cornell, Dennis Burns, Gerald K. Cooper, Daniel Cruz, and Stacy L. Lee. (Clark, Justin) (Entered: 07/17/2013)
219 SCHEDULING NOTICE re: MOTION to Certify Class 193 : The Court, on its own motion continues the hearing previously scheduled for 07/22/2013 at 1:30 PM to 8/5/2013 at 01:30 PM before Judge Stephen V. Wilson. THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY.(pc) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 07/18/2013)
220 NOTICE OF ERRATA filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. correcting Declaration (Motion related), 209 Regarding Supplemental Declaration of Dr. Brian Kriegler (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 07/18/2013)
221 REPLY In Opposition To Defendants' Motion to Strike Certain Materials Filed ByPlaintiffs filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 07/23/2013)
222 DECLARATION of Lindsay Battles In Support of Reply to Defendants' Motion to Strike MOTION to Certify Class 193 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 07/23/2013)
223 REPLY MOTION to Certify Class 193 DEFENDANTS REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS OBJECTIONS AND REQUEST TO STRIKE DECLARATIONS, EXHIBITS, AND NEW TRIAL PLAN SUBMITTED BY

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PLAINTIFFS FOR THE FIRST TIME ON REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, Dennis Burns, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz, Stacy L Lee, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Beach, Paul) (Entered: 07/24/2013)
224 MINUTE ORDER IN CHAMBERS by Judge Stephen V. Wilson. In preparation for their motion for class certification, Plaintiffs requested an Order requiring Defendants to turn over their records of inmates admitted to CRDF during the Class Period, so that Plaintiffs could collect information pertaining to the strip searches that took place at CRDF. In support of their motion for class certification, Plaintiffs submitted 170 questionnaires filled out by CRDF inmates, describing various conditions of confinement. Plaintiffs counsel are ORDERED to file a declaration, under penalty of perjury, of the total number of questionnaires they received from CRDF inmates during discovery no later than Friday, August 9, 2013. (kti) (Entered: 08/05/2013)
226 MINUTES OF Motion to Certify Class Action 193 Hearing held before Judge Stephen V. Wilson. Hearing held. The motion is submitted. Order to issue. Court Reporter: Deborah Gackle. (kti) (Entered: 08/08/2013)
225 SUPPLEMENT filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 08/07/2013)
227 OBJECTIONS to Supplement (non−motion) 225 filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, Dennis Burns, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz, Stacy L Lee, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Beach, Paul) (Entered: 08/08/2013)
228 DECLARATION of Lindsay Battles Submitted per Court's Order re Number of Class Member Questionnaires Received filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 08/09/2013)
229 Notice of Appearance or Withdrawal of Counsel: for attorney Barrett S Litt counsel for Plaintiff Mary Amador. Paul J. Estuar is no longer attorney of record for the aforementioned party in this case for the reason indicated in the G−123 Notice. Filed by Plaintiff Mary Amador. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 09/05/2013)
230 STIPULATION for Protective Order filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Battles, Lindsay) (Entered: 02/14/2014)
231 PROTECTIVE ORDER by Magistrate Judge John E. McDermott re Stipulation for Protective Order 230 ; See order for details. (jy) (Entered: 02/18/2014)
232 ORDER RE: MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION by Judge Stephen V. Wilson: For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs motion for class certification is hereby GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as follows: (see attached for further details) The parties shall appear for a status conference on March 31, 2014, at1:30 p.m. to discuss setting a trial date for the injunctive class claims. Ifplaintiffs intend to file a renewed motion for certification of a damages class on the issue of liability, they shall so notify the Clerk in writing not later than March27, 2014, and the status conference will be vacated. renewed motion to certify a damages class on the issue of liabilitypursuant to Rule 23(c)(4), if any, shall be filed not later than April 14, 2014 193 (pj) (Entered: 03/12/2014)
233 EXPARTE APPLICATION for Extension of Time to File Renewed Motion filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 03/14/2014)
234 DECLARATION of Barrett S. Litt re EXPARTE APPLICATION for Extension of Time to File Renewed Motion 233 filed by Plaintiff Mary Amador. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 03/14/2014)
235 ORDER RE PLAINTIFFS UNOPPOSED EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR A 35 DAY EXTENSION TO FILE RENEWED MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION by Judge Stephen V. Wilson: That Plaintiffs renewed motion for class certification to requestcertification of a damages class on the issue of liability pursuant to Rule

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23(c)(4) isdue on May 19, 2014; Defendants Opposition to the renewed motion is due on June 9, 2014; ply to Defendants Opposition is due on June 16, 2014; hearing on the matter shall be held on June 30, 2014, at 1:30p.m. status conference previously scheduled for March 31, 2014 isVACATED 233 : (pj) (Entered: 03/18/2014)
236 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Certify Class filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador. Motion set for hearing on 6/16/2014 at 10:00 AM before Judge Stephen V. Wilson. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 05/19/2014)
237 DECLARATION of Barrett Litt In Support Of MOTION to Certify Class 236 filed by Plaintiff Mary Amador. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 05/19/2014)
238 DECLARATION of Lindsay Battles In Support Of MOTION to Certify Class 236 filed by Plaintiff Mary Amador. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 05/19/2014)
239 MEMORANDUM in Support of MOTION to Certify Class 236 Report of Robert Greifinger filed by Plaintiff Mary Amador. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 05/19/2014)
240 MEMORANDUM in Support of MOTION to Certify Class 236 Report of Harry Grenawitzke filed by Plaintiff Mary Amador. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 05/19/2014)
241 MEMORANDUM in Support of MOTION to Certify Class 236 Report of Haverty/Kupers filed by Plaintiff Mary Amador. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 05/19/2014)
242 NOTICE of Manual Filing filed by Plaintiff Mary Amador of Exhibits to Battles Declaration. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 05/19/2014)
243 NOTICE ERRATA filed by Plaintiff Mary Amador. (Battles, Lindsay) (Entered: 05/19/2014)
244 SCHEDULING NOTICE by Judge Stephen V. Wilson re: MOTION to Certify Class 236 : The hearing is rescheduled 6/30/2014 at 01:30 PM. (See Minute Order issued on 3/17/2014 Dkt #235)THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY. (pc) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 05/22/2014)
245 APPLICATION TO FILE UNDER SEAL EXHIBITS 943−999 SUPPORTING PLAINTIFFS' RENEWED MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION;FILED CONCURRENTLY WITH RENEWED MOTION; MEMORANDUMOF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATIONS; EXHIBIT filed by Plaintiffs (pj) (Entered: 05/29/2014)
246 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' PERMISSION TO FILE EXHIBITS UNDER SEAL by Judge Stephen V. Wilson: 245 (SEE ATTACHED FOR FURTHER DETAILS). (pj) (Entered: 05/29/2014)
247 SEALED DOCUMENT− EXHIBITS A, 943−999 to Declaration of Lindsay Battles to be filed Under Seal. (Attachments: Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5, Part 6, Part 7, Part 8, Part 9)(mat) (Additional attachment(s) added on 5/29/2014: Part 10, Part 11, Part 12, Part 13, Part 14) (mat). Modified on 5/29/2014 (mat). (Entered: 05/29/2014)
248 Opposition re: MOTION to Certify Class 236 filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, Leroy D. Baca, Dennis Burns, Dennis Burns, John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper, Gerald K Cooper, Timothy Cornell, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz, Daniel Cruz, Stacy L Lee, Stacy L Lee, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Beach, Paul) (Entered: 06/09/2014)
249 DEFENDANTS' EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFFS' RENEWED MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION re MOTION to Certify Class 236 filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, Leroy D. Baca, Dennis Burns, Dennis Burns, John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper, Gerald K Cooper, Timothy Cornell, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz, Daniel Cruz, Stacy L Lee, Stacy L Lee, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Beach, Paul) (Entered: 06/09/2014)
250 DECLARATION of Justin W. Clark in opposition to MOTION to Certify Class 236 filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, Leroy D. Baca, Dennis Burns, Dennis Burns, John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper, Gerald K Cooper, Timothy Cornell, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz, Daniel Cruz, Stacy L Lee, Stacy L Lee, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Attorney Justin W Clark

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added to party Leroy D. Baca(pty:dft), Attorney Justin W Clark added to party Dennis Burns(pty:dft), Attorney Justin W Clark added to party John H. Clark(pty:dft), Attorney Justin W Clark added to party Gerald K Cooper(pty:dft), Attorney Justin W Clark added to party Timothy Cornell(pty:dft), Attorney Justin W Clark added to party Daniel Cruz(pty:dft), Attorney Justin W Clark added to party Stacy L Lee(pty:dft))(Clark, Justin) (Entered: 06/09/2014)
251 RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS re MOTION to Certify Class 236 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 06/16/2014)
252 APPLICATION to Exceed Page Limitation Reply Brief filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. Application set for hearing on 6/30/2014 at 01:30 PM before Judge Stephen V. Wilson. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 06/16/2014)
253 REPLY In Support Of Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 06/16/2014)
254 SCHEDULING NOTICE by Judge Stephen V. Wilson re: MOTION to Certify Class 236 : Hearing on the motion previously scheduled for 06/30/2014 at 1:30 PM has been rescheduled to 7/14/2014 at 01:30 PM. THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY. (pc) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 06/17/2014)
255 ORDER GRANTING PERMISSION TO FILE OVERLONG REPLY BRIEF by Judge Stephen V. Wilson: Granting 252 Application for Leave to File Excess Pages. (pc) (Entered: 06/18/2014)
257 MINUTES OF 236 MOTION to Certify Class filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador Hearing held before Judge Stephen V. Wilson. Hearing held. The motion is submitted. Order to issue. Court Reporter: Deborah Gackle. (lom) (Entered: 07/18/2014)
256 IN CHAMBERS ORDER REQUIRING SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING ON CLASS CERTIFICATION MOTION by Judge Stephen V. Wilson: The Court ORDERS as follows: Plaintiffs alternative proposals to expand the classwide issues to include inmates experiences of verbal abuse or to define a subclass of inmates who were esposed to verbal abuse are DENIED for the reasons expressed in the Courts order of March 12, 2014. (See Dkt 232: Order at 11−13.) Membership in such a subclass (or in an expanded class encompassing these allegations) would not be reasonably ascertainable in view of the difficulty of defining what constitutes abusive language and the significant variation in deputies behavior. See Keegan v. American Honda Motor Co., 284 F.R.D. 504, 521 (C.D. Cal. 2012). However, the Court DEFERS ruling on whether subclasses should be certified for inmates who experienced unsanitary conditions, extreme weather conditions, or inadequate privacy protection. The parties shall file supplemental briefs. (SEE ORDER FOR DETAILS.) Plaintiffs shall file a supplemental brief of no more than 25 pages addressing the foregoing questions not later than August 4, 2014. Defendants shall file a responsive brief of no more than 25 pages not more than 14 days after plaintiffs brief. Plaintiffs may file a reply of no more than 15 pages within 7 days of the filing of defendants brief. The parties shall appear for a further hearing on this matter on Monday, September 8, 2014, at 1:30 p.m. The Court concludes that further briefing on the question of whether certification of a damages class on the issue of liability pursuant to Rules 23(b)(3) and 23(c)(4) would be superior to individual lawsuits should await answers to the foregoing questions. The Court DEFERS ruling on defendants evidentiary objections to plaintiffs renewed motion 249 . (kss) (Entered: 07/17/2014)
258 MEMORANDUM in Support of MOTION to Certify Class 193 re Issues Identified Per July 17, 2014 Order filed by Plaintiff Mary Amador. (Battles, Lindsay) (Entered: 08/04/2014)
259 SUPPLEMENT BRIEF RE ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE COURT'S JULY 17, 2014 ORDER filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, Dennis Burns, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz, Stacy L Lee, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Choi, Jin) (Entered: 08/18/2014)

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260 REPLY filed by Plaintiff Mary Amador to Supplement(Motion related), 259 (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 08/25/2014)
261 MINUTES OF FURTHER HEARING re 236 MOTION to Certify Class filed by PlaintiffsMary Amador 236 held before Judge Stephen V. Wilson: Hearing held. The Court orders further briefing. Order to issue. Court Reporter: Deborah Gackle. (pj) (Entered: 09/10/2014)
262 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS RENEWED MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION 236 by Judge Stephen V. Wilson: (pj) (Entered: 12/19/2014)
263 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS RENEWED MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION (SEE DOCUMENT FOR SPECIFICS) 236 by Judge Stephen V. Wilson (lc) (Entered: 12/22/2014)
264 MINUTES OF IN CHAMBERS REQUEST FOR STATUS REPORT by Judge Stephen V. Wilson: The Court, observing no activity in this case for over seven months, requests that the parties submit a joint status report no later than 8/17/2015, detailing the progress of this case. The report shall not exceed ten pages. Court Reporter: N/A. (gk) (Entered: 08/07/2015)
265 STATUS REPORT Pursuant to Dkt. 264 filed by Plaintiff Mary Amador. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A (Defendants), # 2 Exhibit B (Defendants), # 3 Exhibit C (Defendants), # 4 Exhibit D (Defendants))(Battles, Lindsay) (Entered: 08/17/2015)
266 SCHEDULING NOTICE: The Court sets a Status Conference for 8/31/2015 at 01:30 PM before Judge Stephen V. Wilson. THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY. (svwlc1, ) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 08/27/2015)
267 MINUTES OF STATUS CONFERENCE held before Judge Stephen V. Wilson. Defendant is granted leave to file a Motion for Summary Judgment regarding C−4 claims and the Court sets the following briefing schedule: Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment − November 2, 2015; Opposition − November 23, 2015; Reply − December 3, 2015 (CHANGED IN CHAMBERS); Hearing − December 14, 2015 at 1:30 p.m. The Court reserves ruling on injunctive claims and stays the state law claims. Court Reporter: Myra Ponce. (lom) (Entered: 09/02/2015)
268 Notice of Appearance or Withdrawal of Counsel: for attorney Paul B Beach counsel for Defendants Leroy D. Baca, Leroy D. Baca, Dennis Burns, Dennis Burns, John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper, Gerald K Cooper, Timothy Cornell, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz, Daniel Cruz, Stacy L Lee, Stacy L Lee, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. Daniel Lee is no longer counsel of record for the aforementioned party in this case for the reason indicated in the G−123 Notice. Filed by Defendant County of Los Angeles, et al.. (Beach, Paul) (Entered: 09/02/2015)
269 STIPULATION to Continue The Briefing and Hearing schedule for Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment filed by DEFENDANTS Leroy D. Baca(individually), Dennis Burns(individually ), John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper(in his official capacity), Timothy Cornell(individually), County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz(in his official capacity), Stacy L Lee(indivdiually), Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Clark, Justin) (Entered: 10/09/2015)
270 ORDER by Judge Stephen V. Wilson, re Stipulation to Continue, 269 The hearing and briefing schedule for Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment (set in the Courts September 2, 2015 minute order, see, Docket No. 267) is continued to the following dates: Filing deadline: December 2, 2015 Plaintiffs Opposition deadline: December 30, 2015;Deadline for Defendants Reply: January 15, 2016; Hearing on Defendants Motion: February 1, 2016. (pj) (Entered: 10/16/2015)
271 STIPULATION to Continue Briefing and Hearing Schedule for Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca(individually), Dennis Burns(individually ), John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper(in his official capacity), Timothy Cornell(individually), County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz(in his official capacity), Stacy L Lee(indivdiually), Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Clark, Justin) (Entered: 11/24/2015)

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272 ORDER by Judge Stephen V. Wilson, re Stipulation to Continue, 271 ,The hearing and briefing schedule for Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment (set in the Courts October 14, 2015 minute order, see, Docket No. 270) is continued to the following dates: Filing deadline: December 21, 2015; Plaintiffs Opposition deadline: January 29, 2016; Deadline for Defendants Reply: February 19, 2016; Hearing on Defendants Motion: March 7, 2016. (pj) (Entered: 11/30/2015)
273 TRANSCRIPT for proceedings held on 8/31/2015 at 1:41 p.m. Court Reporter/Electronic Court Recorder: Myra Ponce, e−mail address myraponce@sbcglobal.net. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Electronic Court Recorder before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Notice of Intent to Redact due within 7 days of this date. Redaction Request due 1/11/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 1/21/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 3/21/2016. (Ponce, Myra) (Entered: 12/21/2015)
274 NOTICE OF FILING TRANSCRIPT filed for proceedings 8/31/2015 at 1:41 p.m. re Transcript 273 THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY. (Ponce, Myra) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 12/21/2015)
275 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Summary Judgment as to THE CERTIFIED F.R.C.P. RULE 23(c)(4) LIABILITYCLASS filed by DEFENDANTS Leroy D. Baca(individually), Leroy D. Baca(in his official capacity), Dennis Burns(individually ), Dennis Burns(in his official capacity ), John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper(in his official capacity), Gerald K Cooper(individually ), Timothy Cornell(individually), Timothy Cornell(in his official capacity), County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz(in his official capacity), Daniel Cruz(individually ), Stacy L Lee(indivdiually), Stacy L Lee(in her official capacity), Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. Motion set for hearing on 3/7/2016 at 01:30 PM before Judge Stephen V. Wilson. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Judgment) (Clark, Justin) (Entered: 12/21/2015)
276 DECLARATION of Janet Hausser, Maria Gutierrez and Justin W. Clark IN SUPPORT OF NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Summary Judgment as to THE CERTIFIED F.R.C.P. RULE 23(c)(4) LIABILITYCLASS 275 filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, Leroy D. Baca, Dennis Burns, Dennis Burns, John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper, Gerald K Cooper, Timothy Cornell, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz, Daniel Cruz, Stacy L Lee, Stacy L Lee, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibits A − Q)(Clark, Justin) (Entered: 12/21/2015)
277 NOTICE OF LODGING filed re NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Summary Judgment as to THE CERTIFIED F.R.C.P. RULE 23(c)(4) LIABILITYCLASS 275 (Attachments: # 1 DEFENDANTS' STATEMENT OF UNCONTROVERTED FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO THE CERTIFIED F.R.C.P. RULE 23(c)(4) LIABILITY CLASS)(Clark, Justin) (Entered: 12/21/2015)
278 STIPULATION to Continue Hearing Date and Related Dates for Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment from March 7, 2016 to April 18, 2016 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Battles, Lindsay) (Entered: 01/11/2016)
279 ORDER GRANTING THE PARTIES' STIPULATION TO CONTINUE BRIEFING SCHEDULE AND HEARING FOR DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by Judge Stephen V. Wilson: Please refer to the Court's order for specifics. The hearing date shall be continued to April 18, 2016 at 8:30 a.m. (cr) (Entered: 01/15/2016)
280 EX PARTE APPLICATION to Exceed Page Limitation 37 pages filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration In Support of Overlong Brief) (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 02/26/2016)
281 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff Mary Amador. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 02/26/2016)

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282 STATEMENT of Genuine Issues and Additional Material Facts NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Summary Judgment as to THE CERTIFIED F.R.C.P. RULE 23(c)(4) LIABILITYCLASS 275 filed by Plaintiff Mary Amador. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 02/26/2016)
283 APPLICATION to file document Exhibits 800 through 999 under seal filed by Plaintiff Mary Amador. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration, # 2 Proposed Order, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit, # 8 Exhibit, # 9 Exhibit, # 10 Exhibit, # 11 Exhibit, # 12 Exhibit, # 13 Exhibit, # 14 Exhibit, # 15 Exhibit, # 16 Exhibit, # 17 Exhibit, # 18 Exhibit, # 19 Exhibit, # 20 Exhibit, # 21 Exhibit, # 22 Exhibit, # 23 Exhibit, # 24 Exhibit, # 25 Exhibit, # 26 Exhibit, # 27 Exhibit, # 28 Exhibit, # 29 Exhibit, # 30 Exhibit, # 31 Exhibit, # 32 Exhibit, # 33 Exhibit)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 02/26/2016)
284 DECLARATION of Lindsay Battles in opposition to NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Summary Judgment as to THE CERTIFIED F.R.C.P. RULE 23(c)(4) LIABILITYCLASS 275 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Lorna Mallyon, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex. 150, # 2 Exhibit Ex. 151, # 3 Exhibit Ex. 154, # 4 Exhibit Ex. 155, # 5 Exhibit Ex. 160, # 6 Exhibit Ex. 161, # 7 Exhibit Ex. 162, # 8 Exhibit Ex. 163, # 9 Exhibit Ex. 165, # 10 Exhibit Ex. 166, # 11 Exhibit Ex. 167, # 12 Exhibit Ex. 168, # 13 Exhibit Ex. 169, # 14 Exhibit Ex. 170, # 15 Exhibit Ex. 171, # 16 Exhibit Ex. 172, # 17 Exhibit Ex. 173, # 18 Exhibit Ex. 174, # 19 Exhibit Ex. 175, # 20 Exhibit Ex. 176, # 21 Exhibit Ex. 177, # 22 Exhibit Ex. 180, # 23 Exhibit Ex. 200, # 24 Exhibit Ex. 201, # 25 Exhibit Ex. 203, # 26 Exhibit Ex. 207, # 27 Exhibit Ex. 208, # 28 Exhibit Ex. 211, # 29 Exhibit Ex. 212, # 30 Exhibit Ex. 214, # 31 Exhibit Exs. 307, 310, 311, 312, 312.1, 313, 314, 315, 316, # 32 Exhibit Exs. 403, 418, 423, 424, # 33 Exhibit Ex. 602, # 34 Exhibit Ex. 603, # 35 Exhibit Ex. 604, # 36 Exhibit Ex. 605, # 37 Exhibit Ex. 606, # 38 Exhibit Ex. 700, # 39 Exhibit Ex. 701, # 40 Exhibit Ex. 702, # 41 Exhibit Ex. 703, # 42 Exhibit Ex. 704, # 43 Exhibit Ex. 705, # 44 Exhibit Ex. 707, # 45 Exhibit Ex. 708, # 46 Exhibit Ex. 709, # 47 Exhibit Ex. 710, # 48 Exhibit Ex. 711, # 49 Exhibit Ex. 713, # 50 Exhibit Ex. 714, # 51 Exhibit Ex. 715, # 52 Exhibit Ex. 716, # 53 Exhibit Ex. 717, # 54 Exhibit Ex. 719, # 55 Exhibit Ex. 720, # 56 Exhibit Ex. 721, # 57 Exhibit Ex. 722, # 58 Exhibit Ex. 723, # 59 Exhibit Ex. 724, # 60 Exhibit Ex. 725, # 61 Exhibit Ex. 726)(Battles, Lindsay) (Entered: 02/26/2016)
285 ORDER by Judge Stephen V. Wilson Granting Permission to File Certain Documents Under Seal: Having considered Plaintiffs' 283 APPLICATION to File Exhibits 800 through 999 under seal, IT SO ORDERED That Plaintiffs' application is hereby Granted. (mg) (Entered: 02/29/2016)
286 SEALED DOCUMENT Exhibits 800 through 999 re MEMORANDUM in Opposition to Motion 281 , Order on Motion for Leave to File Document Under Seal, 285 filed by Plaintiff Mary Amador. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit, # 8 Exhibit, # 9 Exhibit, # 10 Exhibit, # 11 Exhibit, # 12 Exhibit, # 13 Exhibit, # 14 Exhibit, # 15 Exhibit, # 16 Exhibit, # 17 Exhibit, # 18 Exhibit, # 19 Exhibit, # 20 Exhibit, # 21 Exhibit, # 22 Exhibit, # 23 Exhibit, # 24 Exhibit, # 25 Exhibit, # 26 Exhibit, # 27 Exhibit, # 28 Exhibit, # 29 Exhibit, # 30 Exhibit, # 31 Exhibit)(Battles, Lindsay) (Entered: 02/29/2016)
287 NOTICE OF ERRATA filed by Plaintiff Mary Amador. correcting MEMORANDUM in Opposition to Motion 281 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum Corrected Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' MSJ)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 03/03/2016)
288 REPLY in Support of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Summary Judgment as to THE CERTIFIED F.R.C.P. RULE 23(c)(4) LIABILITYCLASS 275 filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, Leroy D. Baca, Dennis Burns, Dennis Burns, John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper, Gerald K Cooper, Timothy Cornell, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz, Daniel Cruz, Stacy L Lee, Stacy L Lee, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Clark, Justin) (Entered: 03/18/2016)
289 DECLARATION of Maria Gutierrez and Justin W. Clark in Support of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Summary Judgment as to THE CERTIFIED F.R.C.P. RULE 23(c)(4) LIABILITYCLASS 275 and Exhibit R filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, Leroy D. Baca, Dennis Burns, Dennis Burns, John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper, Gerald K Cooper, Timothy Cornell, Timothy Cornell, County of

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Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz, Daniel Cruz, Stacy L Lee, Stacy L Lee, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Clark, Justin) (Entered: 03/18/2016)
290 Evidentiary Objection in Support of re: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Summary Judgment as to THE CERTIFIED F.R.C.P. RULE 23(c)(4) LIABILITYCLASS 275 Evidentiary Objections to Plaintiffs' 227 Inmate Declarations, and Declarations of Paliga, Kriegler, Roberts, Stilll, Haverty/ Kuppers Re Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, Leroy D. Baca, Dennis Burns, Dennis Burns, John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper, Gerald K Cooper, Timothy Cornell, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz, Daniel Cruz, Stacy L Lee, Stacy L Lee, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Clark, Justin) (Entered: 03/18/2016)
291 EX PARTE APPLICATION to Submit Exhibit 606, Inadvertently Omitted from Exhibits Filed in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment filed by plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Lorna Mallyon, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Lindsay Battles, # 2 Proposed Order) (Battles, Lindsay) (Entered: 03/22/2016)
292 NOTICE of Errata filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Lorna Mallyon, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 606, # 2 Exhibit A)(Battles, Lindsay) (Entered: 03/22/2016)
293 DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION re: EX PARTE APPLICATION to Submit Exhibit 606, Inadvertently Omitted from Exhibits Filed in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 291 filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, Dennis Burns, Dennis Burns, John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper, Gerald K Cooper, Timothy Cornell, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz, Daniel Cruz, Stacy L Lee, Stacy L Lee, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Clark, Justin) (Entered: 03/23/2016)
294 MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS): (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER RE: EX PARTE APPLICATION 291 by Judge Stephen V. Wilson. The Court, having reviewed Plaintiffs' ex parte application and Defendants' opposition, finds good cause to GRANT the application. The Court will permit Plaintiffs to submit Exhibit 606 in opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendants may supplement their reply brief with no more than ten pages addressing Exhibit 606, to be filed no later than April 1, 2016. (lom) (Entered: 03/25/2016)
295 SUPPLEMENT to NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Summary Judgment as to THE CERTIFIED F.R.C.P. RULE 23(c)(4) LIABILITYCLASS 275 Defendants' Supplemental Reply Brief Addressing the Declaration of Haverty/Kupers(Doc. #292−1) filed in Suppport of Plaintiffs' Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, Leroy D. Baca, Dennis Burns, Dennis Burns, John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper, Gerald K Cooper, Timothy Cornell, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz, Daniel Cruz, Stacy L Lee, Stacy L Lee, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Clark, Justin) (Entered: 04/01/2016)
296 Evidentiary Objection in support re: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Summary Judgment as to THE CERTIFIED F.R.C.P. RULE 23(c)(4) LIABILITYCLASS 275 Defendants' Evidentiary Objection to the Declaration of Haverty/Kupers (Doc. # 292−1) Re: Plaintiffs' Oppostion to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, Leroy D. Baca, Dennis Burns, Dennis Burns, John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper, Gerald K Cooper, Timothy Cornell, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz, Daniel Cruz, Stacy L Lee, Stacy L Lee, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Clark, Justin) (Entered: 04/01/2016)
297 SCHEDULING NOTICE re: MOTION for Summary Judgment 275 : Hearing on the motion previously scheduled for 04/18/2016 at 1:30 p.m. has been rescheduled to 5/9/2016 at 01:30 PM before Judge Stephen V. Wilson. THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY. (pc) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 04/12/2016)
298 OPPOSITION to NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Summary Judgment as to THE CERTIFIED F.R.C.P. RULE 23(c)(4) LIABILITYCLASS 275 Response to

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Defendants' Evidentiary Objections filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. (Battles, Lindsay) (Entered: 05/02/2016)
299 MINUTES of Motion Hearing before Judge Stephen V. Wilson: Proceedings: 275 Motion for Summary Judgment as to THE CERTIFIED F.R.C.P. RULE 23(c)(4) LIABILITY CLASS filed by DEFENDANTS. Hearing held. The motion is submitted. The Court sets the following schedule: Filing of Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to F.R.C.P.12(b)(2): 5/31/16. Opposition: 6/14/2016. Reply: 6/21/2016. Hearing on the motion: 7/11/2016 at 01:30 PM. Court Reporter: Deborah Gackle. (mg) (Entered: 05/13/2016)
300 IN CHAMBERS ORDER FOR SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING ON WHETHER THE RULE 23(C)(4) CLASS SHOULD BE MODIFIED OR DECERTIFIED ORDER IN CHAMBERS by Judge Stephen V. Wilson: The parties may file their (supplemental) briefs, no longer than ten pages in length, by June 3, 2016. Please refer to the Court's order for specifics. (cr) (Entered: 05/18/2016)
301 EX PARTE APPLICATION for Extension of Time to File Supplemental Briefing filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Lorna Mallyon, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Lindsay Battles, # 2 Proposed Order) (Battles, Lindsay) (Entered: 05/25/2016)
302 ORDER GRANTINGPLAINTIFFS' EX PARTE APPLICATION TO EXTEND THE DEADLINE TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING ON WHETHER THE RULE 23(c)(4) CLASS SHOULD BE MODIFIED OR DECERTIFIED FROM JUNE 3, 2016 TO JUNE 17, 2016 by Judge Stephen V. Wilson: The parties are to file their supplemental briefing on whether the Rule 23( c )( 4) 2 class should be modified or decertfied by June 17, 2016. (kss) (Entered: 05/25/2016)
303 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Summary Judgment as to Injunctive Relief filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca(individually), Leroy D. Baca(in his official capacity), Dennis Burns(individually ), Dennis Burns(in his official capacity ), John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper(in his official capacity), Gerald K Cooper(individually ), Timothy Cornell(individually), Timothy Cornell(in his official capacity), County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz(in his official capacity), Daniel Cruz(individually ), Stacy L Lee(indivdiually), Stacy L Lee(in her official capacity), Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. Motion set for hearing on 7/11/2016 at 01:30 PM before Judge Stephen V. Wilson. (Attachments: # 1 Separate Statement, # 2 Proposed Judgment) (Clark, Justin) (Entered: 05/31/2016)
304 DECLARATION of Kellee Hicks, Maria Gutierrez, Justin Clark in support of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Summary Judgment as to Injunctive Relief 303 filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, Leroy D. Baca, Dennis Burns, Dennis Burns, John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper, Gerald K Cooper, Timothy Cornell, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz, Daniel Cruz, Stacy L Lee, Stacy L Lee, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Clark, Justin) (Entered: 05/31/2016)
305 STATEMENT of Response to Defendants' MSJ re Injunctive Relief Claims NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Summary Judgment as to Injunctive Relief 303 filed by Plaintiff Mary Amador. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 06/14/2016)
306 PLAINTIFFS' SEPARATE STATEMENT re NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Summary Judgment as to Injunctive Relief 303 filed by Plaintiff Mary Amador. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Lindsay Battles, # 2 Exhibit 165, # 3 Exhibit 166, # 4 Exhibit 167, # 5 Exhibit 168, # 6 Exhibit 169, # 7 Exhibit 171, # 8 Exhibit 180, # 9 Exhibit 312.1, # 10 Exhibit 403, # 11 Exhibit 602, # 12 Exhibit 605)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 06/14/2016)
307 SUPPLEMENT Per Court's Order of 5/17/16 filed by Plaintiff Mary Amador. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 06/17/2016)
308 SUPPLEMENT to NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Summary Judgment as to THE CERTIFIED F.R.C.P. RULE 23(c)(4) LIABILITYCLASS 275 Pursuant to the Court's 5/17/16 Order (Dkt 300) filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, Leroy D. Baca,

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Dennis Burns, Dennis Burns, John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper, Gerald K Cooper, Timothy Cornell, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz, Daniel Cruz, Stacy L Lee, Stacy L Lee, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Clark, Justin) (Entered: 06/17/2016)
309 REPLY in Support of Motion NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Summary Judgment as to Injunctive Relief 303 filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, Leroy D. Baca, Dennis Burns, Dennis Burns, John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper, Gerald K Cooper, Timothy Cornell, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz, Daniel Cruz, Stacy L Lee, Stacy L Lee, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Clark, Justin) (Entered: 06/21/2016)
310 REQUEST for Hearing Regarding Plaintiffs' Certified Rule 23(c)(4) Class, re Minutes of In Chambers Order/Directive − no proceeding held, 300 , filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Lorna Mallyon, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. Request set for hearing on 7/11/2016 at 01:30 PM before Judge Stephen V. Wilson. (Attachments: # 1 Supplement) (Battles, Lindsay) (Entered: 07/06/2016)
311 MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 303 by Judge Stephen V. Wilson: The Court GRANTS Defendants motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive relief class. The hearing scheduled to take place on July 11, 2016 is VACATED and OFF−CALENDAR. (pj) (Entered: 07/08/2016)
312 MINUTE ORDER (IN CHAMBERS) DE−CERTIFYING RULE 23(c)(4) CLASS by Judge Stephen V. Wilson re: 275 for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs are granted leave to file a renewed motion to certify a damages class on the issue of liability pursuant to Rule 23(c)(4), no later than 9/2/16. Defendants' motion for summary judgment 275 is DENIED as MOOT. (mrgo) (Entered: 07/29/2016)
313 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Vacate Decertification Order filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. Motion set for hearing on 9/12/2016 at 01:30 PM before Judge Stephen V. Wilson. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Barrett S. LItt) (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 08/08/2016)
314 Joint STIPULATION to Exceed Page Limitation as to Renewed Motion for Class Certification filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 08/08/2016)
315 NOTICE TO FILER OF DEFICIENCIES in Electronically Filed Documents RE: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Vacate Decertification Order 313 . The following error(s) was found: Proposed Document was not submitted as separate attachment. In response to this notice the court may order (1) an amended or correct document to be filed (2) the document stricken or (3) take other action as the court deems appropriate. You need not take any action in response to this notice unless and until the court directs you to do so. (mrgo) (Entered: 08/09/2016)
316 NOTICE OF LODGING filed re NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Vacate Decertification Order 313 (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order re Decertification)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 08/10/2016)
317 NOTICE OF ERRATA filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. correcting Notice of Lodging 316 , NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Vacate Decertification Order 313 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum Motion for Reconsideration, # 2 Declaration of Barrett S. Litt, # 3 Proposed Order)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 08/10/2016)
318 ORDER RE OVERLONG BRIEFS AND BRIEFING SCHEDULE RE PLAINTIFFS' RENEWED MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION by Judge Stephen V. Wilson, re Stipulation to Exceed Page Limitation, 314 . Plaintiffs' moving brief is due by 9/16/16. (Responses due by 10/7/2016, Replies due by 10/21/2016. Motion continued to 11/14/2016 at 01:30 PM before Judge Stephen V. Wilson.) (mrgo) (Entered: 08/16/2016)

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319 Opposition re: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Vacate Decertification Order 313 Dkt No. 317 filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, Leroy D. Baca, Dennis Burns, Dennis Burns, John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper, Gerald K Cooper, Timothy Cornell, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz, Daniel Cruz, Stacy L Lee, Stacy L Lee, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Attorney Jin S Choi added to party Leroy D. Baca(pty:dft), Attorney Jin S Choi added to party John H. Clark(pty:dft), Attorney Jin S Choi added to party Gerald K Cooper(pty:dft), Attorney Jin S Choi added to party Timothy Cornell(pty:dft), Attorney Jin S Choi added to party Daniel Cruz(pty:dft), Attorney Jin S Choi added to party Stacy L Lee(pty:dft))(Choi, Jin) (Entered: 08/22/2016)
320 REPLY in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration of Dkt. 312 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Vacate Decertification Order 313 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. (Battles, Lindsay) (Entered: 08/29/2016)
321 Renewed NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Certify Class Pursuant to Dkt. 312 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. Motion set for hearing on 11/14/2016 at 01:30 PM before Judge Stephen V. Wilson. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Barrett S. Litt, # 2 Proposed Order) (Battles, Lindsay) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
322 DECLARATION of Lindsay Battles in support of Renewed NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Certify Class Pursuant to Dkt. 312 321 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 174, # 2 Exhibit 601, # 3 Exhibit 727, # 4 Exhibit 728, # 5 Exhibit 730, # 6 Exhibit 731, # 7 Exhibit 732, # 8 Exhibit 733, # 9 Exhibit 734, # 10 Exhibit 735, # 11 Exhibit 736, # 12 Supplement 737, # 13 Exhibit 738, # 14 Exhibit 739, # 15 Exhibit 740)(Battles, Lindsay) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
323 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to Renewed NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Certify Class Pursuant to Dkt. 312 321 filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, Leroy D. Baca, Dennis Burns, Dennis Burns, John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper, Gerald K Cooper, Timothy Cornell, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz, Daniel Cruz, Stacy L Lee, Stacy L Lee, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Choi, Jin) (Entered: 10/07/2016)
324 Evidentiary Objection in Opposition re: Renewed NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Certify Class Pursuant to Dkt. 312 321 in Support of Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Class Certification filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, Leroy D. Baca, Dennis Burns, Dennis Burns, John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper, Gerald K Cooper, Timothy Cornell, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz, Daniel Cruz, Stacy L Lee, Stacy L Lee, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Choi, Jin) (Entered: 10/07/2016)
325 REPLY In Support of Renewed Motion for Class Certificationb Renewed NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Certify Class Pursuant to Dkt. 312 321 filed by Plaintiff Mary Amador. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 10/21/2016)
326 MINUTES OF 313 MOTION to Vacate Decertification Order filed by Plaintiffs; 321 MOTION to Certify Class Pursuant to Dkt. 312 filed by Plaintiffs Hearing held before Judge Stephen V. Wilson: Hearing held. The motions are submitted. Order to issue. Court Reporter: Sheri Kleeger. (kss) (Entered: 11/18/2016)
327 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S RENEWED MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION 321 313 by Judge Stephen V. Wilson: Please refer to the Court's order for specifics. (cr) (Entered: 11/18/2016)
328 NOTICE TO PARTIES by District Judge Stephen V. Wilson. Effective December 5, 2016, Judge Wilson will be located at the 1st Street Courthouse, COURTROOM 10A on the 10th floor, located at 350 W. 1st Street, Los Angeles, California 90012. All Court appearances shall be made in Courtroom 10A of the 1st Street Courthouse, and all mandatory chambers copies shall be hand delivered to the judge's mail box outside the Clerk's Office on the 4th floor of the 1st Street Courthouse. The location for filing civil documents in paper format exempted from electronic filing and for viewing case files and other records services remains at the United States Courthouse, 312 North Spring Street, Room G−8, Los Angeles, California 90012. The location for filing

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criminal documents in paper format exempted from electronic filing remains at Edward R. Roybal Federal Building and U.S. Courthouse, 255 East Temple Street, Room 178, Los Angeles, California 90012. THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY. (rrp) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 11/28/2016)
329 STATUS REPORT Post Certification Joint Report filed by Plaintiff Mary Amador. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 11/28/2016)
330 NOTICE Notice re Filing Third Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 12/02/2016)
331 Third AMENDED COMPLAINT against All Defendants All Defendants amending Amended Complaint,,, 109 , filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Diana Paiz, Evangelina Madrid, Diane Vigil, Felice Cholewiak(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 12/02/2016)
332 STIPULATION for Leave to FILE A FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT filed by DEFENDANTS Leroy D. Baca(individually), Leroy D. Baca(in his official capacity), Dennis Burns(individually ), Dennis Burns(in his official capacity ), John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper(in his official capacity), Gerald K Cooper(individually ), Timothy Cornell(individually), Timothy Cornell(in his official capacity), County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz(in his official capacity), Daniel Cruz(individually ), Stacy L Lee(indivdiually), Stacy L Lee(in her official capacity), Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Attachments: # 1 Fourth Amended Class Action Complaint For Damages, # 2 Proposed Order)(Clark, Justin) (Entered: 12/15/2016)
333 ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION FOR LEAVE TO FILE FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT by Judge Stephen V. Wilson, re Stipulation for Leave, 332 . (mrgo) (Entered: 12/19/2016)
334 FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT against defendants Leroy D. Baca(individually), Leroy D. Baca(in his official capacity), Dennis Burns(individually ), Dennis Burns(in his official capacity ), John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper(in his official capacity), Gerald K Cooper(individually ), Timothy Cornell(individually), Timothy Cornell(in his official capacity), County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz(in his official capacity), Daniel Cruz(individually ), Does, Sammy Jones(in his official capacity), Sammy Jones(individually), Stacy L Lee(indivdiually), Stacy L Lee(in her official capacity), Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department amending Amended Complaint/Petition 331 , filed by plaintiffs Nancy Briseno, Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Diana Paiz, Evangelina Madrid, Myeshia Williams, Diane Vigil, Felice Cholewiak. (mrgo) (Entered: 12/19/2016)
335 ANSWER to Amended Complaint,,, 334 ANSWER OF DEFENDANTS COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, SHERIFF LEROY D. BACA, CAPTAIN JOHN H. CLARK, TIMOTHY CORNELL, DENNIS BURNS, GERALD K. COOPER, DANIEL CRUZ, AND STACY L. LEE TO PLAINTIFFS' FOURTH AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL filed by DEFENDANTS Leroy D. Baca(individually), Leroy D. Baca(in his official capacity), Dennis Burns(individually ), Dennis Burns(in his official capacity ), John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper(in his official capacity), Gerald K Cooper(individually ), Timothy Cornell(individually), Timothy Cornell(in his official capacity), County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz(in his official capacity), Daniel Cruz(individually ), Stacy L Lee(indivdiually), Stacy L Lee(in her official capacity), Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department.(Clark, Justin) (Entered: 01/03/2017)
336 IN CHAMBERS ORDER−TEXT ONLY: The matter is set for a Trial Setting Conference on 1/23/2017 at 01:30 PM before Judge Stephen V. Wilson. THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY. (pc) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 01/04/2017)
337 STIPULATION for Order SETTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION BRIEFING SCHEDULE filed by DEFENDANTS Leroy D. Baca(individually), Leroy D. Baca(in his official capacity), Dennis Burns(individually ), Dennis Burns(in his

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official capacity ), John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper(in his official capacity), Gerald K Cooper(individually ), Timothy Cornell(individually), Timothy Cornell(in his official capacity), County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz(in his official capacity), Daniel Cruz(individually ), Stacy L Lee(indivdiually), Stacy L Lee(in her official capacity), Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Clark, Justin) (Entered: 01/05/2017)
338 ORDER SETTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION BRIEFING SCHEDULE by Judge Stephen V. Wilson, re Stipulation for Order, 337 . Moving briefs due: 3/10/17; opposition briefs due: 4/3/17; reply briefs due: 4/17/17; hearing date: 5/1/17. The Trial Setting Conference set for 1/23/17 is hereby vacated. (mrgo) (Entered: 01/06/2017)
339 STIPULATION for Order FOR RELEASE OF CHEERS REPORTS filed by DEFENDANTS Leroy D. Baca(individually), Leroy D. Baca(in his official capacity), Dennis Burns(individually ), Dennis Burns(in his official capacity ), John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper(in his official capacity), Gerald K Cooper(individually ), Timothy Cornell(individually), Timothy Cornell(in his official capacity), County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz(in his official capacity), Daniel Cruz(individually ), Stacy L Lee(indivdiually), Stacy L Lee(in her official capacity), Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Clark, Justin) (Entered: 02/03/2017)
340 ORDER FOR RELEASE OF CHEERS REPORTS approved by Judge Stephen V. Wilson, re Stipulation for Order, 339 . IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant County of Los Angeles will generate reports from the Los Angeles County Consolidated Criminal History System ("CHEERS Reports") for Plaintiffs Myeisha Williams and Nancy Briseno and provide them to counsel for plaintiffs. (mrgo) (Entered: 02/06/2017)
341 STIPULATION to Exceed Page Limitation as to Motions and Oppositions re Summary Judgment/Adjudication filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Battles, Lindsay) (Entered: 03/08/2017)
342 ORDER RE JOINT STIPULATION TO FILE OVERLONG BRIEFS FOR MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND OPPOSITIONS TO SAME by Judge Stephen V. Wilson: That Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgement and Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment may each contain a maximum of 30 pages for each document. (cr) (Entered: 03/09/2017)
343 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca(individually), Leroy D. Baca(in his official capacity), Dennis Burns(individually ), Dennis Burns(in his official capacity ), John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper(in his official capacity), Gerald K Cooper(individually ), Timothy Cornell(individually), Timothy Cornell(in his official capacity), County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz(in his official capacity), Daniel Cruz(individually ), Stacy L Lee(indivdiually), Stacy L Lee(in her official capacity), Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. Motion set for hearing on 5/1/2017 at 01:30 PM before Judge Stephen V. Wilson. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Judgment) (Clark, Justin) (Entered: 03/10/2017)
344 NOTICE OF LODGING filed by Defendants re NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 343 (Attachments: # 1 Defendants' Seperate Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and Conclusions of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment)(Clark, Justin) (Entered: 03/10/2017)
345 DECLARATION of DEPUTY MABEL DE LA TORRE, MARIA GUTIERREZ, DEPUTY ANDREA J. ARROYO, DEPUTY ALEJANDRA DIAZ,DEPUTY NEDILA ESTRADA, DEPUTY JANET HAUSSER, DEPUTY CHRYSTAL PONCE, DEPUTY CHRISTINE SHAMBAUGH, DEPUTY DENISE VARGAS, JUSTIN W. CLARK in support of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 343 & EXHIBITS A−JJ filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, Leroy D. Baca, Dennis Burns, Dennis Burns, John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper, Gerald K Cooper, Timothy Cornell, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz, Daniel Cruz, Stacy L Lee, Stacy L Lee, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−L, # 2 Exhibit

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M−S, # 3 Exhibit T−EE, # 4 Exhibit FF−JJ)(Clark, Justin) (Entered: 03/10/2017)
346 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs' Section 1983 Fourth Amendment Claims filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Nancy Briseno, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil, Myeshia Williams. Motion set for hearing on 5/1/2017 at 01:30 PM before Judge Stephen V. Wilson. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Battles, Lindsay) (Entered: 03/10/2017)
347 STATEMENT of Uncontroverted Material Facts and Conclusions of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment re Plaintiffs' 1983 Fourth Amendment Claims NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs' Section 1983 Fourth Amendment Claims 346 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Nancy Briseno, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil, Myeshia Williams. (Battles, Lindsay) (Entered: 03/10/2017)
348 Effective April 10, 2017, Judge McDermott will be located at the Edward R. Roybal Federal Building, COURTROOM 630 on the 6th Floor, located at 255 East Temple Street, Los Angeles, California 90012. All court appearances shall be made in Courtroom 630 of the Roybal Federal Building, and all mandatory chambers copies shall be hand delivered to the judge's mailbox located outside the Clerk's Office on the 1st Floor of the Roybal Federal Building. The location for filing civil documents in paper format exempted from electronic filing and for viewing case files and other records services remains at the United States Courthouse, 312 North Spring Street, Room G−8, Los Angeles, California 90012. The location for filing criminal documents in paper format exempted from electronic filing remains at the Roybal Federal Building, 255 East Temple Street, Room 178, Los Angeles, California 90012. THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY. (rrp) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 04/03/2017)
349 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs' Section 1983 Fourth Amendment Claims 346 filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, Leroy D. Baca, Dennis Burns, Dennis Burns, John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper, Gerald K Cooper, Timothy Cornell, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz, Daniel Cruz, Stacy L Lee, Stacy L Lee, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Clark, Justin) (Entered: 04/03/2017)
350 DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' SEPARATE STATEMENT OF UNCONTROVERTED FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW re NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs' Section 1983 Fourth Amendment Claims 346 filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, Leroy D. Baca, Dennis Burns, Dennis Burns, John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper, Gerald K Cooper, Timothy Cornell, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz, Daniel Cruz, Stacy L Lee, Stacy L Lee, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Clark, Justin) (Entered: 04/03/2017)
351 DEFENDANTS' EVIDENTIRARY OBJECTION IN SUPPORT OF THEIR OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMAMMRY JUDGMENT re NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs' Section 1983 Fourth Amendment Claims 346 filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, Leroy D. Baca, Dennis Burns, Dennis Burns, John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper, Gerald K Cooper, Timothy Cornell, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz, Daniel Cruz, Stacy L Lee, Stacy L Lee, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Clark, Justin) (Entered: 04/03/2017)
352 Opposition Opposition re: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 343 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Nancy Briseno. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 04/03/2017)
353 DECLARATION of Lindsay Battles In Opposition To NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 343 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Nancy Briseno. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Burba Deposition Pages, # 2 Exhibit Carrillo Deposition Pages, # 3 Exhibit Luther Deposition Pages, # 4 Exhibit Thomas Deposition Pages, # 5 Exhibit Reynolds Deposition Pages, # 6 Exhibit Martinez Deposition Pages, # 7

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Exhibit Lopez Deposition Pages, # 8 Exhibit Paiz Deposition Pages, # 9 Exhibit Vigil Deposition Pages, # 10 Exhibit Madrid Deposition Pages, # 11 Exhibit Gutierrez Deposition Pages)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 04/03/2017)
354 STATEMENT of Genuine Disputes NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 343 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Nancy Briseno. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 04/03/2017)
355 REPLY in support of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 343 filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca, Leroy D. Baca, Dennis Burns, Dennis Burns, John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper, Gerald K Cooper, Timothy Cornell, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz, Daniel Cruz, Stacy L Lee, Stacy L Lee, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Clark, Justin) (Entered: 04/17/2017)
356 REPLY In Support Of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs' Section 1983 Fourth Amendment Claims 346 filed by Plaintiff Mary Amador. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 04/17/2017)
357 RESPONSE IN SUPPORT of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs' Section 1983 Fourth Amendment Claims 346 filed by Plaintiff Mary Amador. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 04/17/2017)
358 Objection To In Support Of re: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs' Section 1983 Fourth Amendment Claims 346 filed by Plaintiff Mary Amador. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 04/17/2017)
359 DECLARATION of Tomi−Ann Roberts, PhD In Support Of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs' Section 1983 Fourth Amendment Claims 346 filed by Plaintiff Mary Amador. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 04/17/2017)
360 IN CHAMBERS ORDER−TEXT ONLY ENTRY by Judge Stephen V. Wilson: The Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 filed by Defendants 343 , and the Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs' Section 1983 Fourth Amendment Claims filed by Plaintiffs 346 , are suitable to a determination without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Local Rule 7−15. The hearing scheduled for 5/1/2017 is VACATED and OFF−CALENDAR. Order to issue. THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY. (pc) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 04/27/2017)
361 MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by Judge Stephen V. Wilson re: 343 for Summary Judgment ; 346 for Summary Judgment. (See document for specific rulings) (mrgo) (Entered: 06/07/2017)
362 SCHEDULING NOTICE by Judge Stephen V. Wilson: A Status Conference is set for 6/26/2017 at 01:30 PM before Judge Stephen V. Wilson. THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY. (pc) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 06/08/2017)
363 STATUS REPORT of Plaintiffs' Post−Summary Judgment Litigation Plan filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Nancy Briseno, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil, Myeshia Williams. (Battles, Lindsay) (Entered: 06/21/2017)
364 MINUTES OF STATUS CONFERENCE held before Judge Stephen V. Wilson: Conference held. The Court moves this case to the inactive calendar to allow the parties to resolve the matter. A further status conference is set for September 11, 2017 at 1:30 p.m. Court Reporter: Deborah Gackle. (cr) (Entered: 06/27/2017)
365 TRANSCRIPT ORDER as to Defendants Leroy D. Baca(individually), Leroy D. Baca(in his official capacity), Dennis Burns(individually ), Dennis Burns(in his official capacity ), John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper(in his official capacity), Gerald K Cooper(individually ), Timothy Cornell(individually), Timothy Cornell(in his official capacity), County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz(in his official

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capacity), Daniel Cruz(individually ), Stacy L Lee(indivdiually), Stacy L Lee(in her official capacity), Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department for Court Reporter. Court will contact Julia Valino at jvalino@lbaclaw.com with any questions regarding this order. Transcript preparation will not begin until payment has been satisfied with the court reporter. (Choi, Jin) (Entered: 07/21/2017)
366 STIPULATION to Continue STATUS CONFERENCE from SEPTEMBER 11, 2017 to JANUARY 22, 2018 Re: Status Conference,, Set/Reset Hearing, 364 filed by DEFENDANTS Leroy D. Baca(individually), Leroy D. Baca(in his official capacity), Dennis Burns(individually ), Dennis Burns(in his official capacity ), John H. Clark, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper(in his official capacity), Gerald K Cooper(individually ), Timothy Cornell(individually), Timothy Cornell(in his official capacity), County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz(in his official capacity), Daniel Cruz(individually ), Stacy L Lee(indivdiually), Stacy L Lee(in her official capacity), Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Clark, Justin) (Entered: 09/01/2017)
367 ORDER CONTINUING THE SEPTEMBER 11, 2017 STATUS CONFERENCE TO PERMIT MEDIATION BEFORE RETIRED JUDGE KING 366 by Judge Stephen V. Wilson: The status quo of this case shall be maintained and the September 11, 2017 Further Status Conference shall be continued to January 22, 2018 at 1:30 p.m. (cr) (Entered: 09/05/2017)
368 TRANSCRIPT for proceedings held on 6/26/17 PM Hrg. Court Reporter: Deborah K. Gackle, phone number (213) 894−8913 deborahgackle.com. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Electronic Court Recorder before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through deborahgackle.com or PACER. Notice of Intent to Redact due within 7 days of this date. Redaction Request due 10/16/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/26/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/26/2017. (Gackle, Deborah) (Entered: 09/25/2017)
369 NOTICE of Change of address by Barrett S Litt attorney for Plaintiff Mary Amador. Changing attorneys address to 975 E. Green St., Pasadena, CA 91106. Filed by Plaintiff Mary Amador. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 12/28/2017)
370 STIPULATION to Continue January 22, 2018 Status Conference from January 22, 2018 to early April 2018 filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca(individually), Dennis Burns(individually ), John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper(in his official capacity), Timothy Cornell(individually), County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz(in his official capacity), Stacy L Lee(indivdiually), Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Clark, Justin) (Entered: 01/18/2018)
371 ORDER CONTINUING THE JANUARY 22, 2018 STATUS CONFERENCE BASED ON FURTHER MEDIATION by Judge Stephen V. Wilson, re Stipulation to Continue, 370 . (Status Conference continued to 4/9/2018 at 01:30 PM before Judge Stephen V. Wilson.) (mrgo) (Entered: 01/19/2018)
372 STIPULATION to Continue April 9, 2018 Status Conference based on Further Mediation from April 9, 2018 to June 11, 2018 filed by defendnats Leroy D. Baca(individually), Dennis Burns(individually ), John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper(in his official capacity), Timothy Cornell(individually), County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz(in his official capacity), Stacy L Lee(indivdiually), Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Clark, Justin) (Entered: 04/04/2018)
373 ORDER CONTINUING THE APRIL 9, 2018 STATUS CONFERENCE BASED ON FURTHER MEDIATION 372 by Judge Stephen V. Wilson. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 22 The status quo of this case shall be maintained and the April 9, 2018 Further Status Conference shall be continued to June 11, 2018 or another date convenient to the Court. (lom) (Entered: 04/05/2018)
374 STIPULATION to Continue Status Conference from June 11, 2018 to September 10, 2018 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador, Lora Barranca, Alisa Battiste, Nancy Briseno, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Diana Paiz, Diane Vigil, Myeshia Williams. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Battles, Lindsay) (Entered: 06/06/2018)

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375 ORDER RE JUNE 11, 2018 STATUS CONFERENCE 374 by Judge Stephen V. Wilson. IT IS ORDERED The June 11, 2018 status conference is continued to September 10, 2018 at 1:30 p.m. (lom) (Entered: 06/07/2018)
376 SCHEDULING NOTICE by Judge Stephen V. Wilson: The status conference previously scheduled for 09/10/2018 at 1:30 PM has been rescheduled to 9/17/2018 at 1:30 PM. THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY. (pc) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 08/15/2018)
377 Notice of Appearance or Withdrawal of Counsel: for attorney Andrew I Baum counsel for Defendants Leroy D. Baca, Dennis Burns, John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper, Timothy Cornell, County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz, Stacy L Lee, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. Adding Andrew Baum as counsel of record for Defendants for the reason indicated in the G−123 Notice. Filed by DEFENDANTS County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Sheriff Leroy D. Baca, Captain John H. Clark, Timothy Cornell, Dennis Burns, Gerald K. Cooper, Daniel Cruz and Stacy L. Lee. (Attorney Andrew I Baum added to party Leroy D. Baca(pty:dft), Attorney Andrew I Baum added to party Dennis Burns(pty:dft), Attorney Andrew I Baum added to party John H. Clark(pty:dft), Attorney Andrew I Baum added to party Gerald K Cooper(pty:dft), Attorney Andrew I Baum added to party Timothy Cornell(pty:dft), Attorney Andrew I Baum added to party County of Los Angeles(pty:dft), Attorney Andrew I Baum added to party Daniel Cruz(pty:dft), Attorney Andrew I Baum added to party Stacy L Lee(pty:dft), Attorney Andrew I Baum added to party Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department(pty:dft))(Baum, Andrew) (Entered: 08/20/2018)
378 Joint STIPULATION to Reschedule Status Conference filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 09/11/2018)
379 ORDER RE SEPTEMBER 17, 2018 STATUS CONFERENCE by Judge Stephen V. Wilson, re Stipulation to Reschedule 378 . (Status Conference continued to 3/18/2019 at 01:30 PM before Judge Stephen V. Wilson.) (mrgo) (Entered: 09/13/2018)
380 Joint STIPULATION to Continue Status Conference Based on the Parties' Tentative Settlement from March 18, 2019 to May 20, 2019 filed by Defendants Leroy D. Baca(individually), Dennis Burns(individually ), John H. Clark, Gerald K Cooper(in his official capacity), Timothy Cornell(individually), County of Los Angeles, Daniel Cruz(in his official capacity), Stacy L Lee(indivdiually), Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order RE March 18, 2019 Status Conference)(Baum, Andrew) (Entered: 03/08/2019)
381 STIPULATION AND ORDER 380 by Judge Stephen V. Wilson. IT IS ORDERED The March 18, 2019 status conference is continued to May 20, 2019, at 1:30 p.m. (lom) (Entered: 03/14/2019)
382 Joint STIPULATION to Continue Status Conference from May 20, 2019 to June 24, 2019 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 05/16/2019)
383 ORDER RE MAY 20, 2019 STATUS CONFERENCE by Judge Stephen V. Wilson, re Stipulation to Continue 382 : The matter having come before this Court, and Good Cause appearing, IT IS ORDERED The May 20, 2019 status conference is continued to June 24, 2019, at 1:30 p.m. (bm) (Entered: 05/16/2019)
384 STIPULATION for Hearing re STIPULATION TO CONTINUE THE JUNE 24, 2019 STATUS CONFERENCE BASED ON TENTATIVE SETTLEMENT filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 06/21/2019)
385 ORDER RE STIPULATION TO CONTINUE THE JUNE 24, 2019 STATUS CONFERENCE BASED ON TENTATIVE SETTLEMENT granted by Judge Stephen V. Wilson, re Stipulation for Hearing 384 . The June 24, 2019 status conference is hereby taken off calendar. Plaintiffs expect to file a motion for preliminary approval by July 15, 2019. (mrgo) (Entered: 06/21/2019)
386 EX PARTE APPLICATION to Shorten Time for Hearing on to August 12, 2019 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 07/16/2019)

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387 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Order for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador. Motion set for hearing on 8/12/2019 at 01:30 PM before Judge Stephen V. Wilson. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit A to Preliminary Approval Order, # 3 Exhibit B to Preliminary Approval Order, # 4 Exhibit C to Preliminary Approval Order, # 5 Exhibit D to Preliminary Approval Order) (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 07/16/2019)
388 DECLARATION of Barrett S. Litt In Support Of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Order for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement 387 filed by Plaintiff Mary Amador. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 07/16/2019)
389 IN CHAMBERS ORDER−TEXT ONLY ENTRY by Judge Stephen V. Wilson: EX PARTE APPLICATION to Shorten Time for Hearing on to August 12, 2019 filed by Plaintiffs 386 − The application is denied. THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY. (pc) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 07/16/2019)
390 NOTICE TO FILER OF DEFICIENCIES in Electronically Filed Documents RE: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Order for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement 387 . The following error(s) was/were found: Hearing information is missing, incorrect, or not timely. In response to this notice, the Court may: (1) order an amended or correct document to be filed; (2) order the document stricken; or (3) take other action as the Court deems appropriate. You need not take any action in response to this notice unless and until the Court directs you to do so. (mrgo) (Entered: 07/16/2019)
391 RESPONSE BY THE COURT TO NOTICE TO FILER OF DEFICIENCIES IN ELECTRONICALLY FILED DOCUMENTS RE: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Order for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement 387 by Clerk of Court. The hearing date has been rescheduled. Motion set for hearing on 8/19/2019 at 01:30 PM before Judge Stephen V. Wilson. (mrgo) (Entered: 07/16/2019)
393 OBJECTION TO SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT BY CLASS MEMBER LECIA L. SHORTER filed by Objector Lecia L Shorter. (mrgo) (Entered: 08/23/2019)
392 MINUTES OF Motion Hearing held before Judge Stephen V. Wilson: 387 MOTION for Order for Preliminary Approval of Class ActionSettlement. The Court orders the motion submitted. Order to issue. Court Reporter: Lisa Gonzalez. (twdb) (Entered: 08/20/2019)
394 MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT 387 by Judge Stephen V. Wilson. If the parties wish to present another agreement for preliminary approval that is otherwise consistent with this opinion, the motion must be filed by no later than November 1, 2019. (See document for details) (mrgo) (Entered: 09/23/2019)
395 RENEWED NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Order for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement 387 Amended Documents filed by Plaintiff Mary Amador. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Settlement Agreement, # 2 Exhibit Redlined Agreement, # 3 Exhibit Revised Class Notice, # 4 Proposed Order Amended Approval Order)(Litt, Barrett) Modified on 11/4/2019 (pc). (Entered: 10/31/2019)
396 NOTICE TO FILER OF DEFICIENCIES in Electronically Filed Documents RE: Amendment (Motion related), 395 . The following error(s) was/were found: Incorrect event selected. Correct event to be used is: Motions > Settlement or Order. In response to this notice, the Court may: (1) order an amended or correct document to be filed; (2) order the document stricken; or (3) take other action as the Court deems appropriate. You need not take any action in response to this notice unless and until the Court directs you to do so. (mrgo) (Entered: 11/01/2019)
397 NOTICE OF ERRATA filed by Plaintiff Mary Amador. correcting Amendment (Motion related), 395 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Corrected Approval Order)(Battles, Lindsay) (Entered: 11/04/2019)
398 RESPONSE BY THE COURT TO NOTICE TO FILER OF DEFICIENCIES IN ELECTRONICALLY FILED DOCUMENTS RE: Motion for Preliminary Injunction 395 by Clerk of Court. The document is accepted as filed. (mrgo) (Entered:

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399 CORRECTED PRELIMINARY APPROVAL ORDER by Judge Stephen V. Wilson, re for Preliminary Injunction Motion 395 . IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT: I. PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT: 1. This Order incorporates by reference the definitions in the SettlementAgreement, a copy of which is attached to this Order as Exhibit A, and also incorporates Exhibits C through E to this Order (which are described above). All terms defined therein shall have the same meaning in this Order. (See document for details) (mrgo) (Entered: 11/08/2019)
400 Joint STIPULATION for Order To Take 12/2/2019 Hearing Off Calendar filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 11/25/2019)
401 IN CHAMBERS ORDER−TEXT ONLY ENTRY by Judge Stephen V. Wilson re: Joint STIPULATION for Order To Take 12/2/2019 Hearing Off Calendar filed by Plaintiffs 400 − The stipulation is granted. The hearing is vacated and off−calendar. THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY. (pc) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 11/26/2019)
402 NOTICE OF DISCREPANCY AND ORDER: by Judge Stephen V. Wilson, ORDERING Motion to Object submitted by Objector Darla Ray Jones received on 12/27/19 is not to be filed but instead rejected. Denial based on: Documents must be filed electronically; written notice of motion lacking or timeliness of notice incorrect; no Certification of Interested Parties; no copy provided for Judge; no proof of service. (mrgo) (Entered: 01/09/2020)
403 EX PARTE APPLICATION for Order for Filing of Objection Erroneously Titled as a Motion filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Proposed Order) (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 01/10/2020)
404 ORDER RE PLAINTIFFS' UNOPPOSED EX PARTE APPLICATION TO ACCEPT THE OBJECTION OF DARLA JONES by Judge Stephen V. Wilson re: 403 EX PARTE APPLICATION for Order. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That the submission of Darla Jones received by this Court on December 27, 2019 be deemed an objection according to the rules set out in the Class Notice, and that the same accordingly shall be filed as an Objection to the proposed Settlement. (mrgo) (Entered: 01/15/2020)
405 OBJECTION TO SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT BY CLASS MEMBER DARLA JONES filed by Objector Darla Ray Jones. (mrgo) (Entered: 01/27/2020)
406 NOTICE OF DISCREPANCY AND ORDER: by Judge Stephen V. Wilson, ORDERING Class Action Claim Form submitted by Claimant Dana Champion received on 1/24/2020 is not to be filed but instead rejected. Denial based on: No certification of interested parties; lacking name, address, phone, etc.; no copy for judge; no proof of service. (mrgo) (Entered: 02/03/2020)
407 NOTICE OF DISCREPANCY AND ORDER: by Judge Stephen V. Wilson, ORDERING Letter with attachment submitted by Claimant Tasma Brown received on 1/22/2020 is not to be filed but instead rejected. Denial based on: No certification of interested parties; lacking name, address, phone, etc.; no copy for judge; no letters to the judge; no letters to the judge; no proof of service. (mrgo) (Entered: 02/03/2020)
408 NOTICE OF DISCREPANCY AND ORDER: by Judge Stephen V. Wilson, ORDERING Class Action Claim Form submitted by Claimant Janice Taylor received on 1/22/2020 is not to be filed but instead rejected. Denial based on: No certification of interested parties; lacking name, address, phone, etc.; no copy for judge; no proof of service. (mrgo) (Entered: 02/03/2020)
409 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Attorney Fees filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador. Motion set for hearing on 7/20/2020 at 01:30 PM before Judge Stephen V. Wilson. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 02/09/2020)
410 DECLARATION of Barrett S. Litt In Support Of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Attorney Fees 409 filed by Plaintiff Mary Amador. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Litt CV, # 2 Exhibit Source Materials, # 3 Exhibit Litt Firm Fees, # 4 Exhibit Anderson−Barker Fees, # 5 Exhibit Litt Firm Costs, # 6 Exhibit Cook, et al.

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Costs)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 02/09/2020)
411 DECLARATION of Donald W. Cook In Support Of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Attorney Fees 409 filed by Plaintiff Mary Amador. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Mann Time Records, # 2 Exhibit Cook Time Records, # 3 Exhibit Koerner Time Records, # 4 Exhibit Flynn−1− Time Records, # 5 Exhibit Gallegos Time Records, # 6 Exhibit Gormley Time Records, # 7 Exhibit Pinelo Time Records, # 8 Exhibit Tokeshi Time Records, # 9 Exhibit Flynn−2−Time Records)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 02/09/2020)
412 DECLARATION of Carol A. Sobel In Support Of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Attorney Fees 409 filed by Plaintiff Mary Amador. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10, # 11 Exhibit 11, # 12 Exhibit 12, # 13 Exhibit 13)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 02/09/2020)
413 DECLARATION of William B. Rubenstein In Support Of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Attorney Fees 409 filed by Plaintiff Mary Amador. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 02/09/2020)
414 DECLARATION of Richard M. Pearl NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Attorney Fees 409 filed by Plaintiff Mary Amador. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 02/09/2020)
415 NOTICE OF DISCREPANCY AND ORDER: by Judge Stephen V. Wilson, ORDERING Letter submitted by Claimant Joyce Lucero received on 2/3/2020 is not to be filed but instead rejected. Denial based on: No certification of interested parties; lacking name, address, phone, etc.; no copy for judge; no proof of service. (mrgo) (Entered: 02/18/2020)
416 NOTICE OF DISCREPANCY AND ORDER: by Judge Stephen V. Wilson, ORDERING Class Action Claim Form submitted by Defendant Yvonne Cruz received on 2/4/2020 is not to be filed but instead rejected. Denial based on: No certification of interested parties; lacking name, address, phone, etc.; no copy for judge; no proof of service. (mrgo) (Entered: 02/18/2020)
417 NOTICE OF DISCREPANCY AND ORDER: by Judge Stephen V. Wilson, ORDERING Letter submitted by Defendant Luz Medina received on 1/31/2020 is not to be filed but instead rejected. Denial based on: No certification of interested parties; lacking name, address, phone, etc.; no copy for judge; no proof of service. (mrgo) Modified on 2/19/2020 (mrgo). [Hard copy mailed to non−party Gilberto Figueroa Merced on 2/19/2020] (Entered: 02/18/2020)
418 NOTICE OF DISCREPANCY AND ORDER: by Judge Stephen V. Wilson, ORDERING Letter submitted by Claimant JoAnn Nelson received on 2/13/2020 is not to be filed but instead rejected. Denial based on: No certification of interested parties; lacking name, address, phone, etc.; no copy for judge; no proof of service. (mrgo) (Entered: 02/19/2020)
419 NOTICE OF DISCREPANCY AND ORDER: by Judge Stephen V. Wilson, ORDERING Letter submitted by Claimant Jessica Vega received on 2/24/2020 is not to be filed but instead rejected. Denial based on: No certification of interested parties; lacking name, address, phone, etc.; no copy for judge; no proof of service. (mrgo) (Entered: 02/26/2020)
420 EX PARTE APPLICATION for Order for To Correct The Record filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−Blank Claim Form, # 2 Proposed Order) (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 03/05/2020)
421 STIPULATION to Produce CDCR Class Member Information filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador.(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 03/06/2020)
422 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Order for Class Contact Information filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador. Motion set for hearing on 4/6/2020 at 01:30 PM before Judge Stephen V. Wilson. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 03/06/2020)

03/06/2020 03/06/2020 03/06/2020 03/06/2020 03/06/2020 03/06/2020
03/06/2020 03/07/2020 03/09/2020
03/09/2020 03/09/2020 03/10/2020

423 EX PARTE APPLICATION to Shorten Time for Hearing on re NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Order for Class Contact Information 422 to 03/23/2020 filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 03/06/2020)
424 Joint STIPULATION for Protective Order filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 03/06/2020)
425 DECLARATION of Barrett S. Litt re NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Order for Class Contact Information 422 filed by Plaintiff Mary Amador. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 03/06/2020)
427 APPLICATION for Pro Se Litigant to electronically file documents in a specific case filed by objector Lecia L Shorter. (mrgo) (Entered: 03/09/2020)
428 OBJECTION to EX PARTE APPLICATION for Order for Striking Erroneously Filed Documents 426 filed by Objector Lecia L Shorter. (mrgo) (Entered: 03/09/2020)
429 NOTICE OF INTENT TO APPEAR AT SETTLEMENT APPROVAL HEARING; OBJECTION TO APPROVAL OF PRELIMINARY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT; NOTICE OF INTENT TO OPT−OUT OF SETTLEMENT PROCEEDS BUT NOT CLASS MEMBERSHIP STATUS; AND OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES re NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Attorney Fees 409 , for Preliminary Injunction. Motion 395 filed by Objector Lecia L Shorter. (mrgo) (Entered: 03/09/2020)
430 PROOF OF SERVICE filed by objector Lecia L Shorter, re Motion Related Document, 429 , Objection/Opposition (Motion related) 428 served on 3/6/2020. (mrgo) (Entered: 03/09/2020)
426 Amended EX PARTE APPLICATION for Order for Striking Erroneously Filed Documents filed by Plaintiffs Mary Amador. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 03/07/2020)
431 ORDER by Judge Stephen V. Wilson: granting 427 APPLICATION for Pro Se Electronic Filing. The applicant must register to use the Courts CM/ECF System within five (5) days of being served with this order. Registration information is available at the Pro Se Litigant E−Filing web page located on the Courts website. Upon registering, the applicant will receive a CM/ECF login and password that will allow him/her to file non−sealed documents electronically in this case only. Any documents being submitted under seal must be manually filed with the Clerk. (mrgo) (Entered: 03/09/2020)
432 ORDER RE PLAINTIFFS' STIPULATION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER by Magistrate Judge John E. McDermott: re Stipulation for Protective Order 424 . (sbou) (Entered: 03/09/2020)
433 REPLY filed by Plaintiff Mary Amador to Objection/Opposition (Motion related) 428 (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 03/09/2020)
434 Notice of Electronic Filing re Declaration 425 , EX PARTE APPLICATION to Shorten Time for Hearing on re NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Order for Class Contact Information 422 to 03/23/2020 423 , APPLICATION for Pro Se Litigant to electronically file documents in a specific case 427 , EX PARTE APPLICATION for Order for To Correct The Record 420 , Stipulation for Protective Order 424 , NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Order for Class Contact Information 422 , Motion Related Document, 429 , Reply 433 , Objection/Opposition (Motion related) 428 , Amended EX PARTE APPLICATION for Order for Striking Erroneously Filed Documents 426 , Proof of Service (subsequent documents) 430 , Order on Motion for Pro Se Electronic Filing − CV−5 O,, 431 , Protective Order 432 , Stipulation to Produce 421 e−mailed to David D. Lawrence bounced due to dlawrence wasn't found at lbaclaw.com. The primary e−mail address associated with the attorney record has been deleted. Pursuant to Local Rules it is the attorneys obligation to maintain all personal contact information including e−mail address in the CM/ECF system. THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY. (lmh) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 03/10/2020)

03/11/2020
03/11/2020
03/11/2020
03/18/2020 03/19/2020 03/20/2020 03/20/2020 03/23/2020 03/25/2020 03/25/2020 03/25/2020 03/25/2020 03/25/2020

435 IN CHAMBERS ORDER/TEXT ONLY ENTRY by Judge Stephen V. Wilson: The Motion for Order for Class Contact Information 422 is submitted. Order to issue. The hearing previously scheduled for 04/06/2020 at 1:30 p.m. is vacated and off−calendar. The Application for Order to Correct the Redord 420 , and the Application to Shorten Time 423 are denied as moot. THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY. (pc) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 03/11/2020)
436 ORDER TO STRIKE APPEARANCES AND FILED CLAIM FORMS by Judge Stephen V. Wilson re: 426 EX PARTE APPLICATION for Order. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That the appearances of Dana Champion, Tasma Brown, Janice Taylor, Mercy Ibarra, and JoAnn Nelson be stricken from the Court's records; that any claim forms or other documents from these individuals filed in the Court's records also be stricken from the record; and that JoAnn Nelson's description of her experiences be stricken and placed by the Class Administrator as part of the "My Experience" section of the settlement website, all of which plaintiffs' counsel represent they will provide to the court in connection with the motion for final approval of settlement, but without identifying personal information. (mrgo) (Entered: 03/12/2020)
437 ORDER RE PLAINTIFFS' UNOPPOSED MOTION PURSUANT TO 15 OF THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT FOR AN ORDER 1) FOR DEFENDANT COUNTY TO PROVIDE CII NUMBERS TO THE CLASS ADMINISTRATOR AND 2) FOR THIRD PARTY CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION TO PROVIDE CONTACT INFORMATION ON CLASS MEMBERS PRESENTLY OR PREVIOUSLY IN ITS CUSTODY approved by Judge Stephen V. Wilson re: 422 MOTION for Order. (See document for details) (mrgo) (Entered: 03/12/2020)
445 OBJECTION filed by Non−Party Mayra Reyes. (mrgo) (Entered: 03/25/2020)
446 OBJECTION filed by Non−Party Anika J. White. (mrgo) (Entered: 03/25/2020)
438 Mail Returned addressed to Tasma Brown re Protective Order 432 . (et) (Entered: 03/20/2020)
442 Mail Returned addressed to Tasma Brown re Protective Order 432 . (mrgo) (Entered: 03/25/2020)
447 REQUEST To Speak at the Hearing Scheduled for July 20, 2020 filed by Non−Party Brenda Datcher. (mrgo) (Entered: 04/09/2020)
439 Mail Returned addressed to Tasma Brown re Notice of Document Discrepancies and Order − Rejecting, 419 . (mrgo) (Entered: 03/25/2020)
440 Mail Returned addressed to Tasma Brown re Notice of Document Discrepancies and Order − Rejecting, 408 . (mrgo) (Entered: 03/25/2020)
441 Mail Returned addressed to Tasma Brown re Order on Motion for Pro Se Electronic Filing − CV−5 O,, 431 . (mrgo) (Entered: 03/25/2020)
443 Mail Returned addressed to Tasma Brown re Notice of Document Discrepancies and Order − Rejecting, 418 . (mrgo) (Entered: 03/25/2020)
444 Mail Returned addressed to Tasma Brown re Notice of Document Discrepancies and Order − Rejecting, 407 (mrgo) (Entered: 03/25/2020)