Case 2:01-cv-00901-JHH Document 1 Filed 04/12/2001 Page 1 of 5

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION

EQUALE~LOYMENTOPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
v.
ELECTRONIC DATA SYSTEMS CORPORATION,
Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

(;TVlL ACTION NO.

)

CV-Ol-H-0901-S

)

)

CO~LAINT

)

JURy TRIAL DEMAND

)

)

)

NATURE OF THE ACTION

This is an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil

Rights Act of 1991 to correct unlawful employment practices on the basis of sex, and to provide

appropriate relief to Lafayette Hodges who was adversely affected by such practices. As alleged with

greater particularity in paragraph 7 below, the Defendant Employer discriminated against Lafayette

Hodges on the basis of his sex in assignment of his work schedule to such an intolerable extent that

he was unable to work the assigned schedule and the Defendant Employer terminated his

employment as a business analyst.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. Jurisdiction ofthis Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.c. §§ 451,1331,1337,1343

and 1345. This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to Sections 706(f)(1) and (3) of Title

VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(f)(1) and (3) ("Title VII") and

Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a.

Case 2:01-cv-00901-JHH Document 1 Filed 04/12/2001 Page 2 of 5
2. The employment practices alleged to be unlawful were committed within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama Southern Division.
PARTIES 3. Plaintiff, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "Commission"), is the agency of the United States of America charged with the administration, interpretation and enforcement of Title VII, and is expressly authorized to bring this action by Section 706(f)(1) and (3) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) and (3).
4. At all relevant times, Defendant, Electronic Data Systems Corporation (the "Employer"), has continuously been a Delaware corporation doing business in the State of Alabama and the City of Hoover, and has continuously had at least 15 employees.
5. At all relevant times, Defendant Employer has continuously been an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 701(b), (g) and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), (g) and (h).
STATEMENT OF CLAIMS 6. More than thirty days prior to the institution of this lawsuit, Lafayette Hodges filed a charge with the Commission alleging violations of Title VII by Defendant Employer. All conditions precedent to the institution of this lawsuit have been fulfilled. 7. On or about July 6, 1999, Defendant Employer engaged in unlawful employment practices at its Hoover, Alabama facility, in violation of Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII, 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(a)(1). In particular, Defendant Employer modified Lafayette Hodges' work schedule to

Case 2:01-cv-00901-JHH Document 1 Filed 04/12/2001 Page 3 of 5
such an extent that he was unable to work it as modified and take care of his family. Defendant Employer refused a request by Lafayette Hodges to set his work schedule in a way that would allow him to continue working and instead terminated his employment while it granted such a request by a similarly situated employee of the opposite sex from Layfayette Hodges.
8. The effect of the practices complained of in paragraph 7 above has been to deprive Lafayette Hodges of equal employment opportunities and otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of his sex.
9. The unlawful employment practices complained of in paragraph 7 above were intentional.
10. The unlawful employment practices complained of in paragraph 7 above were done with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of Lafayette Hodges.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF Wherefore, the Commission respectfully requests that this Court: A. Grant a permanent injunction enjoining Defendant Employer, its officers, successors, assigns, and all persons in active concert or participation with it, from engaging in discriminatory assignment of work schedules on the basis of sex and any other employment practice which discriminates on the basis of sex. B. Order Defendant Employer to institute and carry out policies, practices, and programs which provide equal employment opportunities for men, and which eradicate the effects of its past and present unlawful employment practices.

Case 2:01-cv-00901-JHH Document 1 Filed 04/12/2001 Page 4 of 5
C. Order Defendant Employer to make whole Lafayette Hodges, by providing appropriate backpay with prejudgment interest, in amounts to be determined at trial, and other affirmative relief necessary to eradicate the effects of its unlawful employment practices, including but not limited to rightful-place reinstatement of Lafayette Hodges.
D. Order Defendant Employer to make whole Lafayette Hodges, by providing compensation for past and future pecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful employment practices described in paragraphs 7 above, including relocation expenses, job search expenses, any unreimbursed medical expenses and loss of earning potential, in amounts to be determined at trial.
E. Order Defendant Employer to make whole Lafayette Hodges by providing compensation for past and future nonpecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful practices complained of in paragraph 7 above, including emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, loss of enjoyment of life, and humiliation, in amounts to be determined at trial.
F. Order Defendant Employer to pay Lafayette Hodges punitive damages for its malicious and reckless conduct described in paragraph 7 above, in amounts to be determined at trial.
G. Grant such further relief as the Court deems necessary and proper in the public interest.
H. Award the Commission its costs of this action. JURY TRIAL DEMAND
The Commission requests a jury trial on all questions of fact raised by its complaint. Respectfully submitted, GWENDOLYN YOUNG REAMS Associate General Counsel

Case 2:01-cv-00901-JHH Document 1 Filed 04/12/2001 Page 5 of 5
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 1801 ilL" Street, Northwest Washington, DC 20507
~1dL&z? Supervisory Trial Attorney
J.MARK GRAHAM (LA 06216) Senior Trial Attorney EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Birmingham District Office Ridge Park Place, Suite 2000 1130 22nd Street South Birmingham, AL 35205 Telephone: (205) 731-1172

 
 Case 2:01-cv-00901-JHH Document 22 Filed 04/11/2002 Page 1 of 16

r: \\ r:JJ

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \ i ~"•..

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

Q2 M'R \ \ Pl~ 2: 25

SOUTHERN DIVISION

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EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

0/"- ENTERED

PLAINTIFF,

APR11_

VS.

CV-OI-H-901-S

ELECTRONIC DATA SYSTEMS CORPORATION,

DEFENDANT.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
On April 12, 2001 plaintiff commenced this Title VII action seeking relief for Lafayette Hodges, a former employee of defendant, who plaintiff claims was discriminated against by defendant on the basis of his sex. Plaintiff specifically asserts that such discrimination arose over and in connection with the scheduled hours of defendant's employees, including Hodges, to perform business analyst work in connection with services supplied by defendant to BellSouth. Prior to the events at issue the business analysts were divided into four teams; each team included several analysts and had a separate team leader; and the various members of the teams worked a wide variety of hours between 7:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. For reasons unimportant to the issues in this case, defendant decided to keep the four teams and their leaders but to have all team members perform their work

Case 2:01-cv-00901-JHH Document 22 Filed 04/11/2002 Page 2 of 16
during one of two shifts, either between 7:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. or between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. Sheila Wildes, the supervisor of the four team leaders, randomly assigned the business analyst to the two shifts, and this resulted in many of the analysts, including Hodges, having a change in working hours. Plaintiff charges that Hodges' change from a 7:00 a.m. - 3:30 p.m. shift to a 8:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m. shift discriminated against him on the basis of his sex. Plaintiff also asserts that, because of childcare problems, Hodges was not able to work the new schedule, resulting in defendant terminating Hodges' employment, which termination was therefore discrimination against Hodges because of his sex.
The court has before it the February 19, 2002 motion of defendant for summary judgment. The motion seeks judgment in favor of defendant, asserting that plaintiff cannot make out a prima facie case of work assignments which discriminated against Hodges because of his sex and asserting that DeMarco Johnson, the female with whom plaintiff compares Hodges, was not similarly situated with Hodges. To the extent plaintiff seeks to use the same female comparator with regard to the alleged unlawful termination of Hodges, defendant also points out that the comparator was not similarly situated. Further, with regard to the alleged unlawful termination, even if plaintiff has made a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of sex, defendant seeks summary judgment as to that claim asserting that plaintiff
2

Case 2:01-cv-00901-JHH Document 22 Filed 04/11/2002 Page 3 of 16
cannot show defendant1s articulated reason was a pretext for discrimination on the basis of sex.
The parties have submitted extensive evidence and briefs in support of their respective positions on the issues raised by the motion for summary judgment. On pages two through ten of defendant1s February 19, 2002 brief there is a chronology of relevant facts with evidentiary support noted; and on pages two through nine of plaintiff1s March 27, 2002 brief there is likewise a chronology of relevant facts with evidentiary support noted. No useful purpose can be served by a recitation of those facts here. The court accepts as fact (but not any opinions or conclusion stated with regard to such fact) those factual statements by plaintiff in its brief. Further, except where any factual statement is expressly disputed by plaintiff1s factual statement in its brief, the court accepts as fact (but not any opinion or conclusion stated with regard to such fact) those factual statements by defendant in its brief. Pursuant to the February 20, 2002 order, the motion for summary judgment is now under submission.
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), summary judgment is proper nif the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.1I See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) ; Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000). The party
3

Case 2:01-cv-00901-JHH Document 22 Filed 04/11/2002 Page 4 of 16
asking for summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings or filings, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(e) requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by its own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions of file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
The substantive law will identify which facts are material and which are irrelevant. Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1023; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). All reasonable doubts about the facts and all justifiable inferences are resolved in favor of the non-movant. Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1023; Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). A dispute is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1023. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
The method used by the party moving for summary judgment to discharge its initial burden depends on whether that party bears the burden of proof on the issue at trial. See Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1115-17 (citing United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428 (11th Cir. 1991) (en bane)). If the
4

Case 2:01-cv-00901-JHH Document 22 Filed 04/11/2002 Page 5 of 16
moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, then it can only meet its initial burden on summary judgment by coming forward with positive evidence demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact; i.e. facts that would entitle it to a directed verdict if not controverted at trial. Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1115. Once the moving party makes such a showing, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce significant, probative evidence demonstrating a genuine issue for trial.
If the moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, it can satisfy its initial burden on summary judgment in either of two ways. First, the moving party may produce affirmative evidence negating a material fact, thus demonstrating that the non-moving party will be unable to prove its case at trial. Once the moving party satisfies its burden using this method, the non-moving party must respond with positive evidence sufficient to resist a motion for directed verdict at trial.
The second method by which the moving party who does not bear the burden of proof at trial can satisfy its initial burden on summary judgment is to affirmatively show the absence of any evidence in the record in support of a judgment for the nonmoving party on the issue in question. This method requires more than a simple statement that the non-moving party cannot meet its burden at trial but does not require evidence negating the nonmovant's claim; it simply requires the movant to point out to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1115-16. If
5

Case 2:01-cv-00901-JHH Document 22 Filed 04/11/2002 Page 6 of 16
the movant meets its initial burden by using this second method, the non-moving party may either point to evidence in the court record, overlooked or ignored by the movant, sufficient to withstand a directed verdict, or the non-moving party may come forward with additional evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial based on the alleged evidentiary deficiency. However, when responding, the non-movant can no longer rest on mere allegations, but must set forth evidence of specific facts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). The Court is aware that the summary judgment rule applies in job discrimination cases just as in other cases. See Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1025 (rejecting an earlier, contrary general rule and emphasizing that no thumb is to be placed on either side of the scale) .
The analysis of the plaintiff's claims will be determined not only by the nature of the allegations but also by the quality of the evidence offered in support of those claims. See Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., 161 F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998), (noting that II [t]he analytical framework and burden of production var[y] depending on the method of proof chosen"). In general, a plaintiff may attempt to establish a claim of illegal employment discrimination through the use of direct evidence, circumstantial (indirect) evidence, or statistics. See id.; see also Schoenfeld v. Babbitt, 168 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir. 1999) (recognizing the availability of either direct or circumstantial evidence). A
6

Case 2:01-cv-00901-JHH Document 22 Filed 04/11/2002 Page 7 of 16
plaintiff's ability to proceed through the use of circumstantial evidence of discrimination is necessarily important because direct proof of discrimination is uncommon. See Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1537 (11th Cir. 1997) i Grigsby v. Reynolds Metals Co., 821 F.2d 590, 595 (11th Cir. 1987). Direct evidence is II [s]uch evidence [which], if believed, proves the existence of a fact in issue without inference or presumption. II Burns v. Gadsden State Community College, 908 F.2d 1512 (11th Cir. 1990). Cf. Wright v. Southland Corp., 187 F.3d 1287, 1293-94 (11th Cir. 1999) (per Tjoflat, J.) (defining direct evidence as "evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find, more probably than not, a causal link between an adverse employment action and a protected personal characteristic" and finding the outcomes reflected in prior case law consistent with that definition) .
Here, plaintiff has presented only circumstantial evidence of racial discrimination. "In evaluating [discrimination] claims supported by circumstantial evidence, [the courts of this circuit] use the now-familiar framework established by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973), and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1981)." Combs, 106 F.3d at 1527. Under the McDonnell Douglas and Burdine framework, the plaintiff first has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, which creates a rebuttable presumption that the
7

Case 2:01-cv-00901-JHH Document 22 Filed 04/11/2002 Page 8 of 16
employer acted illegally. See id. at 1527-28. The methods of presenting a prima facie case, as well as the exact elements of
the case, are not fixed; rather they are flexible and depend to a large degree upon the facts of the particular situation. See, ~, Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Communications, 738 F.2d 1181, 1185 (11th Cir. 1984); Lincoln v. Board of Regents of Univ. Sys., 697 F.2d 928, 937 (11th Cir. 1983). In general, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of disparate treatment employment
discrimination by showing that he or she was a qualified member of a protected class and was subjected to an adverse employment action but that otherwise similarly situated employees outside the plaintiff's class were treated dissimilarly.l See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (hiring); Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997) (discipline); see also Nix, 738 F.2d at 1185 (discipline); Pittman v. Hattiesburg Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 644 F.2d 1071, 1074 (5th Cir. 1981) (wages).
Once the plaintiff has shown a prima facie case and,
thereby, has raised the presumption of discrimination, the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate,
See also McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13 ("The facts necessary will vary in Title VII cases, and the specification above of the prima facie proof required from respondent is not applicable in every respect in different factual situations."). In using a comparator to establish a prima facie case, the comparator must be "similarly situated in all relevant aspects." Silvera v. Orange County School Board, 244 F.3d 1253, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001).
8

Case 2:01-cv-00901-JHH Document 22 Filed 04/11/2002 Page 9 of 16
non-discriminatory reason for its actions. 2 See Combs, 106 F.3d at 1528. The employer "need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55; see Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1024. If the employer satisfies that burden by articulating one or more such reasons, then the presumption of discrimination falls and the burden of production again shifts to the plaintiff to offer evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that the employer's supposedly legitimate reason is merely a pretext for illegal discrimination. 3 Where the defendant articulates multiple, reasonable r legitimate and non-discriminatory reasons, plaintiff must rebut each of defendant's proffered reasons. See Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1024-25. Although the prima facie case is irrelevant
once the employer has offered a legitimate reason for its actions, the evidence of pretext may include the same evidence offered to establish the prima facie case. See Combs, 106 F.3d
at 1528. Despite this shifting of the burden of production between
the plaintiff and the defendant under the McDonnell Douglas and Burdine framework, "[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier
See Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1032 (A subjective reason is a legally sufficient, legitimate, non-discriminatory reason if the defendant articulates a clear and reasonably specific factual basis upon which the employer based its subjective opinion.).
If the proffered reason is one that might motivate a reasonable employer, a plaintiff cannot recast the reason but must meet it head on and rebut it. Simply quarreling with that reason is not sufficient. Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030.
9

Case 2:01-cv-00901-JHH Document 22 Filed 04/11/2002 Page 10 of 16
of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff." Burdine, 450 U.S. at. 253. Given that the ultimate burden of persuasion always lies with the employee, a plaintiff may prevail on an employment discrimination claim and may also defeat a summary judgement either by proving that intentional discrimination did indeed motivate the defendant or by producing sufficient evidence to allow a rational trier of fact to disbelieve the employer's proffered legitimate reasons, thus permitting but not compelling the trier of fact to make a finding of illegal discrimination. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods .. Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2108-09 (2000) (pointing out that the production of the necessary sufficient evidence by plaintiff will not always prevent the employer from prevailing on a Rule 50 motion and suggesting that the strength of plaintiff's prima facie case, the probative value of the proof that the employer's explanation is false, and any other properly considered evidence that supports the employer's case are among other factors to take into account in evaluating a Rule 50 motion);4 St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); Abel v. Dubberly, 210 F.3d 1334, 1339 (11th Cir. 2000); Alexander v. Fulton County, 207 F.3d 1303, 1336 (11th Cir. 2000); Combs, 106 F.3d at 1529-38 (interpreting Hicks and the post-Hicks
The court in Chapman modified the statement in Combs contrary to this holding in Reeves after noting that the standard for granting summary judgment mirrors the standard for judgment as a matter of law. See Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1025, n.11.
10

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case law); Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ'g Co., 9 F.3d 913, 920-21 (11th Cir. 1993).
Defendant argues that plaintiff's inability to demonstrate that a similarly situated female employee was treated differently than Hodges prevents plaintiff from establishing a prima facie
case on its claim that, by requiring Hodges to work the 8:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m. shift rather than the 7:00 a.m. - 4:00 p.m. shift, defendant discriminated against Hodges on the basis of his sex. To establish its prima facie case plaintiff offers DeMarco
Johnson as its only "comparator." She was on a team led by Trent Williams; Hodges was on a team led by Becky Galey. Williams and Galey both reported to Wildes, who reported to Tammy Yeager, who reported to Penny Blankenship. After Wildes randomly assigned the business analyst on the four teams to either the shift beginning at 7:00 a.m. or the shift beginning at 8:00 a.m., both Hodges and Johnson were assigned to the shift which began at 8:00 a.m. 5 Both of them were thereby changed from an earlier shift, which change created childcare arrangement problems for each of them. The changes were announced in separate team meetings, but there the similarity essentially ends. 6 When Johnson learned of
In addition to Johnson, four other females were changed from an earlier shift to the 8:00 a.m. shift. Three of them requested that they be allowed to keep their old schedules. None of the requests were granted.
Both of them were also given the opportunity to work their old schedules for two weeks while they tried to make new childcare arrangements. Johnson was allowed additional extensions by Williams or wildes until Blankenship decided to allow her to continue working her old schedule.
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Case 2:01-cv-00901-JHH Document 22 Filed 04/11/2002 Page 12 of 16
the changes in her team meeting she did not object to the change in a raised voice; rather she later discussed her problem with Williams and Wildes and also initiated an "open door" discussion with Blankenship. The "open door" policy is a method by which employees can speak to any leader within defendant without fear of retaliation. There is no evidence that Hodges used or tried to use such policy. During none of these meetings did Johnson complain or refuse to work the new schedule or act in a manner viewed by a supervisor as insubordinate or unprofessional or make a statement viewed by a supervisor as a lie. As a result of Johnson's problems with the new schedule, Penny Blankenship, after consultation with Johnson's team leader, Williams, made the decision to allow Johnson to continue working her old schedule and told Williams to allow Johnson to do so if Williams could accommodate it from a business perspective. See Affidavit of Blankenship. When Hodges learned of the change in his team meeting he disagreed with the changes in a raised voice, frequently stating "this is not going to happen." Wildes, who was present at the Galey team meeting, believed Hodges acted belligerently during the meeting.? After the Galey team meeting Wildes informed Yeager of what had happened. The day after the team meeting Hodges met with Wildes and Galey. Wilder told Hodges his action during the previous day's team meeting was unacceptable and unprofessional, and she did not expect it to
Following the meeting one employee on Hodges' team said to their team leader she was concerned about Hodges' behavior during the meeting.
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Case 2:01-cv-00901-JHH Document 22 Filed 04/11/2002 Page 13 of 16
occur again. Wildes was the decision-maker who refused to allow Hodges to work the earlier shift and directed him to begin his new shift the following week. As noted earlier, Blankenship was the decision-maker who "trumped" Wildes earlier decision assigning Johnson to the same shift as Hodges.
In order to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment, a plaintiff must show a comparator who is "similarly situated in all relevant aspects." Silvera v. Orange County School Board, 244 F.3d 1253, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001). Based upon the totality of the circumstances, including the fact that Hodges and Johnson had different team leaders and the fact that the relevant decision-maker for Hodges and the relevant decisionmaker for his comparator Johnson were different individuals, plaintiff has failed to come forward with a comparator who is similarly situation in all relevant respects. See Britton v. City of Poplar Bluff. Mo., 244 F.3d 994, 998 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that rarely are two employees similarly situated in all relevant respects when there are different decision-makers.). Since there is no other evidence of discrimination present and plaintiff has failed to show the existence of an employee similarly situated to Hodges, defendant's motion for summary judgment is due to be granted. Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.2d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997). This conclusion also is sufficient to require summary judgment as to plaintiff's termination claim since that claim, in essence, is bottomed on the disparate treatment claim and Hodges insistence that he was unable to work
13

Case 2:01-cv-00901-JHH Document 22 Filed 04/11/2002 Page 14 of 16
the 8:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m. shift due to childcare problems. But there is an additional reason why summary judgment is appropriate on the termination claim. Assuming a prima facie case as to the termination claim, defendant has made a very strong showing of an articulated legitimate and non-discriminatory reason for its decision to terminate Hodges, which reason the plaintiff has failed to rebut. See Combs, 106 F.3d at 1527-29 (explaining that once an employment discrimination plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production then shifts to the defendant to articulate legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its action, following which the burden of production then shifts back to the plaintiff to offer evidence tending to show that the defendant's proffered reasons are really pretext for illegal discrimination) i Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1024-25 (same as above) .
Defendant has satisfied its burden by articulating the following legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating plaintiff: Yeager, who made the decision to terminate Hodges, believed that Hodges had lied to her twice, and was unwilling to try to make arrangements that would allow him to work the new schedule. Yeager concluded Hodges was being insubordinate and should therefore be terminated. While this conclusion is arguably subjective, a subjective opinion is nonetheless legally sufficient if the defendant articulates a clear factual basis for that opinion. See Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1032. The Eleventh Circuit has clearly stated that" [f]ederal courts 'do not sit as
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Case 2:01-cv-00901-JHH Document 22 Filed 04/11/2002 Page 15 of 16
a super-personnel department that reexamines an entity's business decision. No matter how medieval a firm's practices, no matter how high-handed its decisional process, no mater how mistaken the firm's managers, the [court] does not interfere. Rather our inquiry is limited to whether the employer gave an honest explanation of its behavior. '" See id. at 1030 (quoting Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted)); see also Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahal1 Communications, 738 F.2d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir. 1984) (An "employer may fire an employee for a good reason, a bad reason, a reason based on erroneous facts, or for no reason at all, as long as its action is not for a discriminatory reason.") Abel v. Dubberly, 210 F.3d 1334, 1339 n.5 (11th Cir. 2000). In this case, defendant provided a legitimate reason for Hodges' termination.
Certainly the paucity of evidence from plaintiff of pretext does not satisfy the requirement of Combs and Chapman which require a production of evidence to create a factual or credibility issue as to the articulated reason for the employment decision given by a defendant. Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1024-25; Combs, 106 F.3d at 1529. Although plaintiff quarrels with defendant's reasoning for the termination, plaintiff has offered insufficient evidence to show that defendant's decision to terminate plaintiff was in fact motivated by a prohibited factor. See Lee v. GTE Fla., Inc., 226 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2000). Because plaintiff has failed to rebut defendant's articulated,
15

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legitimate and non-discriminatory reason, defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's termination is due to be granted for this reason in addition to the reason earlier stated.
In summary, the court finds that plaintiff has failed to establish its claims of Title VII discrimination. Because no material issues of fact remain and because defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment is appropriate. A separate order will be entered.
DONE this /1 tl day of April, 2002.
)/)/~
OR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
16

 
 ~ Case 2:01-cv-00901-JHH Document 35 Filed 01/22/2003 PageFI1LFofIJ6 United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

Z003 JAN 22 PM I: 09

j (
. ~:: '0 'u'II:: I ~. •

No. 02-13248

FILED U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

District Court Docket No. 01-0090 l-CV-H-S

Nov 29,2002
THOMAS K. KAHN CLERK

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

ELECTRONIC DATA SYSTEMS CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court ~JLJJ~-=--=---:---r for the Northern District of Alabama
--------------------------------------------------------------7---
JUDGMENT
It is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the attached opinion included herein reference, is entered as the judgment of this Court.
Entered: November 29, 2002 For the Court: Thomas K. Kahn, Clerk
By: Meoii, Anthony

J • Case 2:01-cv-00901-JHH Document 35 Filed 01/22/2003 Page 2 of 6

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF A.=P__P.;;;;E;.;.;A=L:.:::;S...=-::-:-'~_ _ __
F J LED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT u.s. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-13248 Non-Argument Calendar
D.C. Docket No. 01-00901-CV-H-S

NOV 2 9 2002
THOMAS K. KAHN CLERK

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

ELECTRONIC DATA SYSTEMS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama
(November 29,2002) Before TJOFLAT, CARNES and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
In its comprehensive Memorandum of Decision dated April 11, 2002, the
district court granted appellee's motion for summary judgment in this sex-
discrimination-in-employment case. We find no error in the district court's

Case 2:01-cv-00901-JHH Document 35 Filed 01/22/2003 Page 3 of 6 application of the law to the material facts, none of which are in dispute. The court's judgment is therefore due to be affirmed. AFFIRMED.
/
2

Case 2:01-cv-00901-JHH Document 35 Filed 01/22/2003 Page 4 of 6

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT BILL OF COSTS

Equal Employ~ent Opportunity Commission

Appellant

VS.

C~eNo. _ __0~2_-=1~3~2~4~8~ _________________

Electronic Data Systems Corporation

Appellee

Fed..R.App.P. 39 and lIth Cir. ~. 3~-1 (se~ reverse) g~vem costs whi:h are ta,.a~le in(p.~ccel~}b;n~~~e Bill:ofCosts. A

motion for leave to file out of tIme IS requITed for a Bill of Costs not timely rea:Jved. . ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

.

INSTRUCTlCNS
In the grid below, multiply the number of original pages of each document by t le total nurpbeDWoBia:~d ~ced to call1Ulate the total
number of copies reproduced. Multiply this number by the cost per copy ( $. I5per copy fillr "In-House", up to $.25 per copy fc: commercial
reproduction, supponed by receipts) showing the product as costs requested.

DOCUMENT

Repro. Method (Mark One)
In-House Comm*

No. of Original
Pages

Total No. Documen. Reproduced

TIIOMAS K. I<AIIN

Total No. of

CLER~STS

Copies

REQUESTED

CT. USE ONLY COSTS
ALLOWED

Appellant's Brief

Record Excerpts

X

Appellee's Brief

X

Reply Brief

81

81

1

1~115

-0- **

58

406

7

60.90

$60.90

"'Note: If reproduction was done commercially, receipt(s) must be attached.

TOTAL

$ 73 05 REQUESTED

$ $60 go ALLOWED

1hereby swear or affinn that the costs claimed were actually and necessarily incurred or perfonned in this appeal and that I have served this of Costs on counsel/panies of record.
/
Date Signed: --.I@=--f-..w..~-----
__ Attomeyfur: ~~~~~~~__~~~~~~~~~~~~~_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _-+_~

**

e record excerpts when fili~~a~uel1ant's brief.

FOR COURT USE UNLY

Costs are hereby taxed in the amount of $ _$_6_0_.9__0 _______ against ------....:A::a:.~===---::-:-l::1-l..LWSf_Io.~4-=...z:...,."

and are payable directly to --I6Qji:5O.lo..w;;~---------------------------"""A"~+::>r"'~4-
JAN 21 2003
Issued on: __________________

M1SC-12
. ---- --TRev.""n19S' -

_. ~~~ --- -..,---f

Case 2:01-cv-00901-JHH Document 35 Filed 01/22/2003 Page 5 of 6
FRAP 39. Costs
(a) Against Whom Assessed. The following rules apply unless the law provides or the court orders otherwise:
( I) if an appeal is dismissed. costs are taxed against the appellant. unless the parties agree otherwise; (2) if a judgment is affirmed. costs are taxed against the appellant; (3) if a judgment is reversed. costs are taxed against the appellee: (4) if a judgment is affirmed in part. reversed in part. modified. or vacated. costs are taxed only as the court orders.
(b) Costs For and Against the United States. Costs for or against the United States, its agency, or officer wiII be assessed under Rule 39(a) only if authorized by law.
(c) Costs of Copies. Each court of appeals must, by local rule, fix the maximum rate fortaxing the cost ofproducing necessary copies of a brief or appendix, or copies of records authorized by Rule 30(1). The rate must not exceed that generally charged for such work in the area where the clerk's office is located and should encourage economical methods of copying.
(d) Bill of Costs; Objections; Insertion in Mandate.
(1) A party who wants costs taxed must - within 14 days after entry ofjudgment - file with the circuit clerk, with proof of service, an itemized and verified biIJ of costs.
(2) Objections must be filed within 10 days after service of the bill of costs, unless the court extends the time. (3) The clerk must prepare and certify an itemized statement of costs for insertion in the mandate, but issuance of the
mandate must not be delayed for taxing costs. If the mandate issues before costs are finally determined, tbe district clerk must - upon the circuit clerk's request - add the statement of costs, or any amendment of it, to the mandate.
(e) Costs on Appeal Taxable in the District Court. The following costs on appeal are taxable in the district court for the benefit of the party entitled to costs under this rule:
(1) the preparation and transmission ofthe record; (2) the reporter's transcript. if needed to determine the appeal; (3) premiums paid for a supersedeas bond or other bond to preserve rights pending appeal; and (4) the fee for filing the notice of appeal.
••••
I Ith Cir. R. 39- I Costs. In taxing costs for prinling or reproduction and binding pursuant to FRAP 39(c} the clerk shall tax such costs at rates not higher than those determined by the clerk from time to time by reference to the rates gerierally charged for the most economical methods ofprinting or reproduction and binding in the principal cities of the circuit, or at actual cost, whichever is less.
Unless advance approval for additional copies is secured from the clerk, costs will be taxed only for the number of copies of a brief and record t"xcerpts or appendix required by the rules to be filed and served, plus two copies for each party signing the brief.
...... All costs shall be paid and mailed directly to the party to whom costs have been awarded. Costs should not be mailed to the
clerk of the court.
l.a.p. -
1. Time - Exterrsio17S. A bill a/costs is timeZv iffiledwithin 14 days ofentry ofjudgment. Judgment is entered on the opinionfiiing date. The filing ofa petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc does not extend the time for filing a bill ofcosts. A motion to extend Ihe.. ti,:,e to file a bill ofcosts may be considered by the clerk.
2. Costs for or Against the United States. When costs are sought/or or against the United States. the statutory or other authority relied upon for such an award must be set/orth as an attachment to the Bill ofCosts.
3. Reproduction ofSwllItes. Rules. and Regulations. Costs will be taxed/or the reproductIOn o.fstatutes. rules, and regulations in conformity with FRAP 28(/). Costs will not be taxedfor the reproduction ofpapers 110t required or allowed to be filed pursuant to FRAP 28 and 30 and the corresponding circuit rules. even though (he bri(';(. appendix. or record excerpts within which said papers are included was accep(edfor/iling by the clerk.
I ...

Case 2:01-cv-00901-JHH Document 35 Filed 01/22/2003 Page 6 of 6
rILED

Thomas K. Kahn Clerk

United States Court of Appeals

Eleventh Circuit

Z .

56 Forsyth Street, N.W. Atlanta, Georgia 30303

'OOJ )AN 22 PH I ~ fl(')

In Iiepq7lD.g Give Number

.. j. " . ' ~Case And Names of Parties

·.-"11111..1'~I'll

January 21, 2003

Perry D. Mathis Clerk, U.S. District Court 1729 Fifth Avenue North, #140 Birmingham AL 35203

RE: 02-13248-CC EEOC v. Electronic Data Systems DC DKT NO.: 01-00901 CV-H-S
, t

The enclosed certified copy of the judgment and a copy of this court's opinion are hereby issued as the mandate of this court.

Also enclosed are the following:

Bill of Costs Original Exhibits, consisting of: one folder Original record on appeal or review, consisting of: one volume

The district court clerk is requested to acknowledge receipt on the copy of this letter enclosed to the clerk.

A copy of this letter and the judgment fonn, but not a copy of the court's opinion or Rule 36-1 decision, is also being mailed to counsel and pro se parties. A copy of the court's opinion or Rule 36-1 decision was previously mailed to counsel and pro se parties on the date it was issued.

Sincerely, THOMAS K. KAHN, Clerk Reply To: James Delaney (404) 335-6113

Encl.

MDT-1 (8-2002)

 
 CM/ECF - U.S. District Court Northern District of Alabama - Docket R... https://ecf.alnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?805717479240222-L_9...
APPEAL, CLOSED
U.S. District Court Northern District of Alabama (Southern) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:01-cv-00901-JHH

EEOC v. Electronic Data Sys Assigned to: Judge James H Hancock Demand: $0 Cause: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Sex) Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
1 of 5

Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Plaintiff
represented by Charles Guerrier EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Ridge Park Place, Suite 2000 1130 22nd Street South Birmingham, AL 35205 205-212-2044 Fax: 205-212-2041 Email: charles.guerrier@eeoc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gwendolyn Young Reams EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 1801 L Street NW Washington, DC 20507 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
J Mark Graham EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Ridge Park Place, Suite 2000 1130 22nd Street South Birmingham, AL 35205 205-212-2054 Fax: 205-212-2041 Email: john.graham@eeoc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mildred Byrd EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Ridge Park Place, Suite 2000 1130 22nd Street South Birmingham, AL 35205 205-212-2054 Fax: 205-212-2041
3/26/2007 11:25 AM

CM/ECF - U.S. District Court Northern District of Alabama - Docket R... https://ecf.alnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?805717479240222-L_9...

V. Defendant Electronic Data Systems Corporation

Email: Mildred.Byrd@eeoc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by D Christopher Carson BURR & FORMAN LLP Southtrust Tower, Suite 3100 420 North 20th Street Birmingham, AL 35203 251-3000 Fax: 458-5100 Email: CCarson@burr.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
K Bryance Metheny BURR & FORMAN LLP Southtrust Tower, Suite 3100 420 North 20th Street Birmingham, AL 35203 251-3000 Fax: 458-5100 fax Email: bmetheny@burr.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee J Hutton DUVIN CAHN & HUTTON Erieview Tower - 20th Floor 1301 East 9th Street Cleveland, OH 44114 1-216-696-7600 Fax: 1-216-696-2038 fax ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Vicki L Gillette LITTLER MENDELSON Suite 2600, Lock Box 116 2001 Ross Avenue Dallas, TX 75201-2931 1-214-880-8100 Fax: 1-214-880-0181 fax ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 04/12/2001

#

Docket Text

1 COMPLAINT filed (Former Employee) (Entered: 04/12/2001)

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04/30/2001 06/08/2001 07/05/2001 07/25/2001 07/26/2001 10/17/2001 10/17/2001 10/18/2001 02/15/2002 02/19/2002
02/19/2002 02/20/2002 03/13/2002
03/15/2002 03/15/2002

2 WAIVER of Service of Summons by defendant Electronic Data Sys by Vicki L Harden, filed (Former Employee) (Entered: 04/30/2001)
3 ANSWER by defendant w/appear by atty(s) Vicki L Harden, Lee J Hutton, D Christopher Carson filed cs (Former Employee) (Entered: 06/08/2001)
4 ORDER reminding parties of obligations under rule 26 filed ( by Judge James H. Hancock ) cm (SNH) (Entered: 07/05/2001)
5 Report of Parties (form 35) of compliance with FRCP 26 filed (Former Employee) (Entered: 07/25/2001)
6 ORDER (Scheduling) that discovery cutoff is 1/17/02; dispositive motions to be filed by 2/18/02; case ready fore trial by 5/02; other time limits as set out (by Judge James H. Hancock) entered cm (Former Employee) (Entered: 07/26/2001)
7 MOTION by defendant Electronic Data Sys for attorney Vicki L Harden to appear pro hac vice with afdt in support att, filed cs (Former Employee) (Entered: 10/17/2001)
PRO HAC VICE admission fee paid on 10/17/01 receipt # 169851 (Former Employee) (Entered: 10/17/2001)
8 7 - ORDER granting motion for attorney Vicki L Harden to appear pro hac vice [7-1] ( by Judge James H. Hancock ) entered cm (Former Employee) (Entered: 10/18/2001)
9 Notice of defendant Electronic Data Sys of filing of attorney time records in response to order # w/sealed envelope of time records attached filed cs (Former Employee) (Entered: 02/19/2002)
10 MOTION by defendant Electronic Data Sys for summary judgment with afdts of Cicki L Gillette, Sheila Wildes, Leah Ridgeway, Melissa Hutchison, Jo Lenae Sadler, Heather Harry, Tammy Yeager, Trent Williams, Lesley Harper, Liz Vines, and other exhs att, filed cs (Former Employee) (Entered: 02/19/2002)
11 BRIEF by defendant in support of motion for sum jgm, with exh att, filed cs (Former Employee) (Entered: 02/19/2002)
12 ORDER (Submission) that the motion for summary judgment [10-1] will be deemed submitted 3/20/02; affidavits and briefs to be filed by 3/20/02 filed (Judge James H. Hancock) cm (Former Employee) (Entered: 02/20/2002)
13 SUBMISSION (Evidentiary) by plaintiff in opposition to dfts motion for sum jgm, with afdts of Lafayette D Hodges, Demarco Johnson, Carlene Johnson Schultz and Tameka Taylor, and other exhs att (1-13) filed cs (exhs in separate expandable binder) (Former Employee) (Entered: 03/13/2002)
14 MOTION by plaintiff for extension of time of 1 week til 3/27/02 to file pla brief in opposition to dfts motion for sum jgm filed cs (Former Employee) (Entered: 03/15/2002)
15 BRIEF by plaintiff EEOC in support of motion for extension of time [14-1], filed cs (Former Employee) (Entered: 03/15/2002)

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03/15/2002 03/27/2002 04/01/2002 04/01/2002 04/01/2002 04/03/2002 04/11/2002 04/11/2002
04/12/2002 04/30/2002 04/30/2002 05/01/2002 05/20/2002 05/30/2002 06/07/2002 06/13/2002
06/13/2002

16 ORDER that pla motion for extension of time of 1 week til 3/27/02 to file pla brief is GRANTED [14-1] filed (by Judge James H. Hancock) cm (Former Employee) (Entered: 03/15/2002)
17 BRIEF by plaintiff EEOC in opposition to dfts motion for sum jgm filed cs (Former Employee) (Entered: 03/28/2002)
18 WITNESS list by defendant filed cs (Former Employee) (Entered: 04/01/2002)
19 EXHIBIT list by defendant filed cs (Former Employee) (Entered: 04/01/2002)
20 WITNESS and Exhibit list by plaintiff EEOC filed cs (Former Employee) (Entered: 04/01/2002)
21 RESPONSE (Reply) by defendant to pla brief in opposition to dfts motion for sum jgm [17-1] filed cs (Former Employee) (Entered: 04/03/2002)
22 MEMORANDUM of Decision, filed (by Judge James H. Hancock) cm (Former Employee) (Entered: 04/11/2002)
23 ORDER (Final) that in accord with memo of decision this day, dfts motion for sum jgm is GRANTED [10-1]; final judgment is entered in favor of dft EDS Corp as to all claims; costs taxed against pla filed (by Judge James H. Hancock) cm (Former Employee) (Entered: 04/11/2002)
24 OBJECTIONS by defendant to pla evidence, filed cs (Former Employee) (Entered: 04/12/2002)
25 MOTION by defendant EDS for costs with exhs att, filed cs (see entry on 2/5/03 taxing costs against pla and to dft in amount of $3,073.10) (Former Employee) Modified on 02/05/2003 (Entered: 04/30/2002)
26 AFFIDAVIT of atty Vicki L Gillette regarding motion for costs [25-1] filed cs (Former Employee) (Entered: 04/30/2002)
27 ORDER that court intends to grant motion to tax against pla costs as set out unless pla shows cause by 5/20/02 filed (by Judge James H. Hancock) cm (Former Employee) (Entered: 05/01/2002)
28 BRIEF by plaintiff EEOC in response to dft's motion for costs filed cs (MAA) (Entered: 05/21/2002)
29 ORDER that court intends to award costs to dft and against pla in amount of $3,073.10 unless dft shows cause by 6/7/02 filed (by Judge James H. Hancock) cm (Former Employee) (Entered: 05/30/2002)
30 NOTICE of appeal by plaintiff EEOC from District Court decision [22-1] [23-1]; notice of appeal, orders appealed from and court copy of docket entries w/transmittal letter cm (Former Employee) (Entered: 06/10/2002)
31 ORDER that court will not rule on dfts motion to tax costs at this time, but will consider it folling resolution of appeal; should appeal result in affirmance, costs of $3,073.10 will be taxed [25-1] filed (by Judge James H. Hancock) cm (Former Employee) (Entered: 06/13/2002)
32 Appeal Information Sheet filed [30-1] (no hearing) (Former Employee) (Entered: 06/13/2002)

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06/19/2002 09/16/2002 09/16/2002 01/22/2003
02/05/2003

NOTIFICATION by Circuit Court of Appellate docket number 02-13248C (Former Employee) (Entered: 06/19/2002)
33 CERTIFICATE of Readiness issued cm (SRJ) (Entered: 09/16/2002)
34 CERTIFIED Record on Appeal [One (1) Vol. Pleadings & One (1) Expandable Folder with certified copy of docket entries and transmittal mailed to USCA cm (SRJ) (Entered: 09/16/2002)
35 CERTIFIED copy of Appellate Court order: dated 11/29/02 issued as mandate 1/21/03 affirming the decision of the District Court [30-1], with unpublished opinion att, filed [TJOFLAT, CARNES, WILSON] cm (record received) (Former Employee) (Entered: 01/22/2003)
COSTS taxed for defendant Electronic Data Sys in the amount of $ 3,073.10 against plaintiff EEOC filed cm (ECS) (Entered: 02/05/2003)

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 US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

http://pacer.ca11.uscourts.gov/CHMSDKTP.FWX
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
56 Forsyth Street, N.W. Atlanta, GA 30303-2289
(404) 335-6100

02-13248-CC EEOC v. Electronic Data Systems

Closed
Docket #: 02-13248-CC Short Style: EEOC v. Electronic Data Systems Docket Date: 06/12/2002 Lead Case:
Agency: Nature of Suit: Civil Rights: Employment
Misc. Type: Clerk: Dixon, Eleanor
Clerk Phone: (404) 335-6172

District Information

Docket #: 01-00901-CV-H-S Judge: James H. Hancock

Dkt Date: 04/12/2001

District: Alabama-Northern

NOA Date: 06/07/2002

Office: NAL-Birmingham

Secondary Case Information

Docket #: Judge: Dkt Date: / /
Case Relationships

Docket # Short Style Relation Status

Pending Motions
No Pending Motions

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US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

http://pacer.ca11.uscourts.gov/CHMSDKTP.FWX
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
56 Forsyth Street, N.W. Atlanta, GA 30303-2289
(404) 335-6100

02-13248-CC EEOC v. Electronic Data Systems
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ELECTRONIC DATA SYSTEMS CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
United States Court OF Appeals FOR the Eleventh Circuit
56 Forsyth Street, N.W. Atlanta, GA 30303-2289
(404) 335-6100

02-13248-CC EEOC v. Electronic Data Systems

Appellant
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Address Not On File Appellant Brief Filed filed on 07.25.2002 Record Excerpts filed on 07.25.2002 Reply Brief Filed filed on 09.20.2002 Fees: Not Required on . .
Appellee
Electronic Data Systems Corporation Address Not On File kstark@duvin.com

Appellant Attorney
John F. Suhre 1801 L Street N.W. Room 7040 Washington, DC 20507(202) 663-4716 No Briefing Information Found.
Appellee Attorney
Vicki L. Gillette Littler Mendelson, P.C. 2001 ROSS AVE STE 1500 DALLAS, TX 75201-2931 (214) 880-8100

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US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Initial Service Nicolas Inzeo 1801 L St., NW Washington, DC 20507 (305) 530-6007 Gwendolyn Y. Reams 1801 L ST NW WASHINGTON, DC 20507-0001 Philip B. Sklover 1 NE 1ST ST MIAMI, FL 33132-2433 Vincent Blackwood 1801 "L" Street, Northwest Washington, DC 20507Charles E. Guerrier 1130 22ND ST S STE 2000 BIRMINGHAM, AL 35203-2886 (205) 212-2044 charles.guerrier@eeoc.gov Mildred Byrd (EEOC) 1130 22ND ST S STE 2000 Birmingham, AL 35205-2886 (205) 731-0082 J. Mark Graham 1130 22ND ST S STE 2000 BIRMINGHAM, AL 35203-2886 D. Christopher Carson Burr & Forman LLP 420 20TH ST N STE 3100 BIRMINGHAM, AL 35203-5206 (205) 458-5372 Fax: (205) 458-5100 ccarson@burr.com Lee J. Hutton Duvin, Cahn & Hutton 1301 E 9TH ST FL 20 CLEVELAND, OH 44114-1817 (216) 696-7600 Fax: (216) 696-2038 lhutton@duvin.com
3 of 5

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Fax: (214) 880-0181 vgillette@littler.com Appellee Brief Filed filed on 08.26.2002
6/14/2007 9:25 AM

US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

http://pacer.ca11.uscourts.gov/CHMSDKTP.FWX
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
56 Forsyth Street, N.W. Atlanta, GA 30303-2289
(404) 335-6100

02-13248-CC EEOC v. Electronic Data Systems

File Date

Entry

Party

Equal

/ /

Fee Status: Not Required for Equal Employment Opportunity Employment

Commission

Opportunity

Commission

DKT7CIV (Docketing 7) issued. cc: Mathis, Perry D. cc: Inzeo, Nicolas cc: Reams, Gwendolyn Young cc: Sklover, Philip cc: 06/17/2002 Blackwood, Vincent cc: Guerrier, Charles E. cc: Byrd, Mildred To: Graham, J. Mark cc: Carson, D. Christopher cc: Hutton, Lee J. cc: +

06/17/2002

Probable Jurisdiction Noted: Opportunity Commission,

Appellant-Equal

Employment

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

06/17/2002 Briefing Notice Issued

06/17/2002

Transcript Order Form-no hearing: Appellant-Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

06/21/2002 Civil Appeal Statement Form

06/24/2002 Appearance Form Submitted: John F. Suhre

John F. Suhre

06/27/2002 Appearance Form Submitted: Vicki L. Gillette

Vicki L. Gillette

07/25/2002

Appellant Brief Filed: Appellant-Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, (Atty: John F. Suhre)

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

07/25/2002

Record Excerpts: Appellant-Equal Employment Commission, (Atty: John F. Suhre)

Opportunity

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Appellee Brief Filed: Pt'd (stmt reg OA) M9/4/02

Electronic Data

08/26/2002 Appellee-Electronic Data Systems Corporation, (Atty: Vicki L. Systems

Gillette)

Corporation

Pending No
No
No No No No No No No
No
No

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US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

http://pacer.ca11.uscourts.gov/CHMSDKTP.FWX

BR8CIV (Brief deficiency letter) issued. cc: Suhre, John F. To:

08/28/2002 Gillette, Vicki L. cc: Inzeo, Nicolas cc: Reams, Gwendolyn

No

Young cc: Sklover, Philip

Over the Phone Extension to File Reply Brief Granted by AR 08/29/2002 Until September 16, 2002: Appellant-Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, (Atty: John F. Suhre)

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

No

09/18/2002 Record on Appeal

No

09/18/2002 Exhibits

No

09/18/2002 Certificate of Readiness

No

Equal

09/20/2002

Reply Brief Filed: Appellant-Equal Commission, (Atty: John F. Suhre)

Employment

Opportunity

Employment Opportunity

No

Commission

11/29/2002 Judgment Entered

No

OPIN1A (Opinion - Issuance with Costs) issued. Costs taxed

11/29/2002 against plaintiff-appellant. cc: Suhre, John F. cc: Gillette, Vicki

No

L. cc: Hancock, James H.

11/29/2002 Opinion Issued

No

Bill of Costs Filed: Costs Awarded to Appellee:

Electronic Data

12/05/2002 Appellee-Electronic Data Systems Corporation, (Atty: Vicki L. Systems

No

Gillette)

Corporation

01/21/2003 CASE CLOSED-Mandate Issued

No

01/21/2003 Mandate Issued

No

01/21/2003

MDT1 (Mandate - Issuance) issued. cc: Gillette, Vicki L. To: Perry D. Mathis

Suhre,

John

F.

cc:

No

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