11 cv 3743 Case 1:11-cv-03743-LGS Document 1 Filed 06/02/11 Page 1 of 50 JUDGE HOLWELL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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DONNA KASSMAN, individually and on

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behalf of a class of similarly-situated female )

employees,

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l'laintiffs,

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v.

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KPMGLLP,

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Defendant.

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CLASS JURY TRIAL DEMANDED Civ. No. _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Plaintiff Donna Kassman ("Plaintiff," "Named Plaintiff' or "Class Representative"), by her attorneys Sanford Wittels & Heisler, LLP, brings this action in her individual capacity and on behalf of a class of similarly situated women, including but not limited to female Managers, Senior Managers and Managing Directors (collectively "Managers"), against KPMG LLP ("KPMG" or the "Company") to redress gender discrimination in employment. Plaintiff Kassman alleges upon knowledge as to herself and her own acts, and otherwise upon information and belief, as follows:

I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF CLASS-WIDE GENDER DISCRIMINATION AT KPMG

A. KPMG's Glass Ceiling: Discriminatory Denial of Promotions

1.

As one of the "Big Four" accounting firms, KPMG is part of an elite cadre of

accountancy and professional services :fit:ms that help set industry standards. But rather than use

its vast resources and status to stamp out gender discrimination, KPMG actively perpetuates it.

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2.

Women are conspicuously absent from KPMG's leadership. Among the 20

members of KPMG's global executive team, only one, or 5%, is female. Similarly, of the 24

members of the global board, only one, or 4%, is female.

3.

Although KPMG's workforce is approximately 50% female, partnership is largely

reserved for men. 1 Less than one in five KPMG Partners is female.2 Managing Directors are

also predominately male. Even in lower-level management positions such as Manager and Senior

Manager, women only do marginally better, representing approximately one in three managers.

Nonetheless, across KPMG's management ranks, the number of female managers never

approaches parity with their overall representation at the Company.

4.

KPMG's gender hierarchy is all the more janing considering women have entered

the accounting industry in record numbers for decades. For the past twenty-five years, women have comprised more than half of all accounting graduates.3 In 2009, women made up 55% of newly hired accounting graduates and 61.8% of all accountants and auditors.4 But despite

constituting half of the workforce at accounting firms for decades, women are only 23% of all partners industry-wide and 18% at KPMG.5

5.

At the Big Four- the creme de la creme of accounting firms- women fare even

worse than the industry average. Studies show that women are not "moving through the pipeline" as quickly at these larger, more elite firms compared to their smaller counterparts.6

1 Catalyst, Women in Accounting (2010), at l, available at http://www.catalyst.org/file/178/qt women in accounting.Jllif. 2 /d. 3 AlCPA, AICPA Work/Life and Women's Initiatives 2004 Research. A Decade of Changes in The Accounting Profession: Workforce Trends and Human Capital Practices (2006), at 5, available at ll!tp:llwlvw.awscpa.orgipdfs and docs/ResearchPaperDecadeofChange.pdf. 4 Catalyst, Women in Accounting, at 1. 5 /d. 6 AI CPA, AICPA Work/Life and Women's Initiatives 2004 Research, at 5.
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6.

KPMG is one of the worst offenders. The Company promotes fewer women to

Partner (18%) than the industry average (23%).7 KPMG also promotes fewer women to Senior

Manager (35%) positions than the industry average (44%). 8 KPMG's promotion rate falls below

its competitors, even though KPMG has a similar number of female non-management employees

(48%) as the industry (49%) to groom and mentor for leadership.

7.

Rather than reward high-performing female employees with partnership, KPMG

tracks a disproportionate number of these women into non-partnership roles as career managers at

drastically lower compensation levels. Industry-wide, 60% of female Senior Managers and 36%

of female Managers have followed lower paid non-partnership career tracks, compared to only 26% of male Senior Managers and 9% of male Managers.9

8.

These figures make it clear that while male and female accountants may begin

their careers on roughly equal footing, their paths sharply diverge as they ascend up the hierarchy,

particularly at KPMG. Women in the accounting industry face a number of systemic barriers to

promotion, including lack of visible role models and their exclusion from after-work activities

and other informal networking opportunities, reflecting the gender bias of "old boys" networks within these firms. 10

8. As one accounting professional noted, as women come within reach of making

Partner, "[i]t becomes subtle who's mentored, who's invited out to the important dinners with the

. important clients [and] who's groomed to participate in AICPA and state society committees. All

of these are indicative of who is going to be promoted to Partner a year or two or three or four

7 Catalyst, Women in Accounting, at 1. 8 Public Accounting Report, Public Accounting Report's 2008 Survey of Women in Public Accounting- Percentage

of Women by Staff Category (Dec. 15, 2008).

9 Catalyst, Women in Accounting, at 3.

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°1 Catalyst, Women of Color in Accounting (2008), at 31, available at

http://www.catalyst.org/fi]e/l38/woc accounting final book.Jll!f.

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into the fhture." 11 9. At KPMG, the discrimination is not always so subtle. High-performing female
managers are viewed as interlopers by their male Partners, as threats by their male peers, and as individuals unworthy of respect by their male subordinates. As soon as these women come within reach of partnership, they are suddenly- without warning or provocation- chastised and removed from the promotion track before they can infiltrate KPMG's "good old boys" network. By contrast, male employees who "have an issue working with women" effortlessly ascend through the ranks at KPMG.
10. Plaintiff Ms. Kassman was a casualty of this discriminatory system. After languishing in a Senior Manager position for a decade, during which she demonstrated stellar performance, Ms. Kassman was finally "put up" for a promotion to Managing Director. At this pivotal juncture, a troika of men - Scott Schapiro ("Principal Schapiro"), Principal in Charge of the National Employment Tax Practice and the person to whom Ms. Kassman reported; John Montgomery ("Manager Montgomery"), another Senior Manager in Ms. Kassman' s practice; and Jon Stone ("Associate Stone"), an Associate who worked under Ms. Kassman and Manager Montgomery - conspired to derail her career advancement. Principal Schapiro abruptly removed Ms. Kassman from the promotion track based on unfounded, stereotypical complaints by the other two men about Ms. Kassman's "tone" and "direct" approach - a complaint never before lodged against her during her 17-year tenure at KPMG. Unilaterally adopting the position of the male troika, the Company instead put up Manager Montgomery for the position that had been slated for Ms. Kassman.
11 Liz Gold, "Women in Accounting: How far to the top?," ACCOUNTING TODAY, available at http://www.accountingtoday.com/ato issues/2007 18/25549-l.html (last visited May 19, 2011).
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11. KPMG's subjective promotion procedures and practices reflect the biases of the Company's mostly male management and, naturally, have a disparate impact on the Company's female employees. The Company's promotion practices consistently result in males being promoted more rapidly and assigned more frequently to higher positions than women within and across management levels Company-wide. Although KPMG has had knowledge of these stark gender disparities for decades, it has acted deliberately indifferent towards them.
12. Like Ms. Kassman, countless women have progressed along KPMG's standard career track with rave reviews, only to find their career ambitions shattered by KPMG's glass ceiling.
B. "You Don't Need the il'fonev Because You Have a Nice Engagement Ring": Pay Discrimination at KPMG
13. Upon information and belief, KPMG's female Managers are not only underpromoted, but underpaid as well.
14. Recent reports on the accounting industry have found that female Associates, Senior Associates, Managers and Senior Managers are systematically paid less than their male colleagues, with white male Senior Managers out-earning their female counterparts by $53,000 on average. 12 This pay disparity is even greater at the Partner level. 13
15. Far from disproving this industry-wide trend, KPMG actively perpetuates it. Because KPMG employs a compensation system that lacks transparency, utilizes highly subjective criteria and commonly allows stereotypes to dictate pay decisions, its compensation practices have had a disparate impact on the Company's female employees. Upon information and belief, KPMG took advantage of this system by paying female employees less than similarly
12 Catalyst, Women of Color in Accounting, at 50 (discussing survey results from top 20 revenue-generating U.S. accounting firms). 13 l<l
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situated male employees. 16. In one particularly egregious act of discrimination, KPMG slashed Ms.
Kassman's base salary by $20,000 while she was on matemity leave because she was paid "too much." KPMG cited no business justification for slashing her salary- and indeed, could not, as Ms. Kassman was a top-notch performer. When Ms. Kassman complained about the salary cut and wanted to discuss ways for her to earn back the $20,000 that was taken from her, her male supervisor asserted that she did not need the money because she "ha(d] a nice engagement ring."
17. Moreover, KPMG's compensation policies and practices regarding flexible workers have a disparate impact on the Company's female employees. Employees who avail themselves of KPMG's flexible work arrangements - the overwhelming majority of whom are working mothers and other women - are forced to accept reduced pay while still working fulltime schedules and being held to virtually full-time standards.
C. The Scarlet "F": Pregnancy/Caregiver Discrimination at KPMG 18. In addition to the systematic discrimination faced by female Managers at KPMG, female employees with children also face discrimination based on their status as caregivers and/or pregnant women. 19. KPMG promotes a corporate culture whereby female employees are made to feel they cannot have successful careers after they have children. Ms. Kassman hoped to be the one to prove them wrong. As a female manager with an impressive seventeen-year career at KPMG and two children under the age of seven, Ms. Kassman set out to demonstrate that one could be both a good mother and a successful manager at the Company. Indeed, KPMG and Ms. Kassman's supervisors publicly touted her as a role model for other working mothers. 20. However, Ms. Kassman quickly discovered that KPMG's purported support for
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female employees and working mothers was just a sham. After she gave birth to her first child in 2003, Ms. Kassman's career advancement at KPMG - which had previously progressed at a steady clip - came to a screeching halt. KPMG abruptly cut her salary while she was on matemity leave and - as if this did not send a clear enough message - placed her on a Performance Improvement Plan ("PIP") upon her return to work.
21. Although KPMG touts its flexible work schedule plan as proving it supp01ts working mothers, the reality is that working mothers are often forced to take a so-called "reduced" schedule for less pay- but are still expected to shoulder the same responsibilities as their full-time counterparts. Like Ms. Kassman, many of KPMG's female employees feel pressured to move to a flexible plan after having children due to the Company's stereotype that working mothers with young children are less effective employees and less committed to their careers. These mothers do not accept reduced pay by choice, but to avoid heightened scrutiny and termination.
22. KPMG has what amounts to a "don't ask, don't tell" policy regarding flexible schedules for working mothers with young children. Employees who avail themselves of the Company's flex time option- the overwhelming majority of whom are working mothers- rarely discuss it freely and are ultimately penalized for it. One of KPMG's male Partners even commented that women who are on t1exible plans "work exactly their x hours and not a minute over" and "you know they're not going to get anywhere [at KPMG]."
23. Indeed, when Plaintiff- the first t1ex worker in her practice -moved to a reduced schedule upon her retum from maternity leave, she was made to feel like she had a scarlet "F" on her chest for "t1ex time benefit taker." As it tums out, t1ex time as a result of motherhood is not viewed as a badge of honor, but a source of shame (as if the woman cannot handle both
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motherhood and full-time employment) and a handicap at KPMG. "Having it all" remains a pipe dream.
24. KPMG discriminates against its female employees by assuming they are less committed to their careers- a gender stereotype that the Company's male employees do not have to overcome. Tellingly, of the few working mothers who have managed to break through KPMG's glass ceiling, most, upon information and belief, have stay-at-home spouses like Patricia Brown ("Principal Brown"), Principal in Charge of the East for the International Executive Services ("IES") practice - a luxury that the overwhelming majority of KPMG's female employees do not have. Indeed, one study of the accounting industry revealed that 46% of male professionals employed by large national/international firms have stay-at-home spouses, compared to only 11% of female professionals. 14 And, even if men work a flexible work schedule, they can do so free of gender stereotypes and are therefore less likely than their female counterparts to experience a negative career impact as a result. 15
25. Given this discriminatory culture, it is no wonder that female employees especially working mothers- are a rarity in KPMG's upper ranks. Upon information and belief, there were only a handful of female Managers with small children in the Northeast State and Local Tax ("SALT") Practice during Ms. Kassman's tenure with the Company.
D. "He Mig/it Have rm Issue Working witli Women": KPMG's Hostile Work Environment and Retaliation
27. As a recent report noted, "With women... joining the accounting industry at an increasing rate, firms are faced with the job of creating more inclusive environments in a traditionally white, male-dominated, 'up-or-out' culture."16 KPMG has clearly failed to rise to
14 AICPA, AICPA Work/Life and Women's Initiatives 2004 Research, at 39. 15 Id. at 34. 16 Catalyst, Women of Color in Accounting, at I.
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this challenge. 28. At KPMG, female employees routinely expenence harassment and unequal
treatment. In particular, once they become poised to assume positions of greater authority, female employees frequently encounter gender hostility, including subjective, unfounded criticisms and other attempts to derail their career advancement.
29. Ms. Kassman's experience in many ways typifies that of KPMG's female Managers. In late 2008, after more than fifteen years of hard work and impressive achievements at the Company, Ms. Kassman was finally told she was next in line for a promotion to Managing Director. But rather than support Ms. Kassman, her male colleagues reacted with overt hostility. One of Ms. Kassman's male subordinates, Associate Stone, suddenly complained that he "didn't like [her] tone." He and Manager Montgomery, one of Ms. Kassman's peers, complained that Ms. Kassman was "unapproachable" and "too direct," a thinly veiled gender-based criticism particularly given these two men's "direct" personalities, which are embraced by senior leadership at KPMG.
30. Even though Ms. Kassman's supervisor, Principal Schapiro, acknowledged that Associate Stone "might have an issue working with women," neither Associate Stone nor Manager Montgomery was disciplined for his discriminatory conduct. Instead, the Company took these two male employees' unfounded and gender-biased complaints at face value, and repeatedly interrogated Ms. Kassman about her behavior, ultimately recommending that she consult a "coach" to resolve these trumped up issues.
31. Rather than address Ms. Kassman's complaints of discrimination, KPMG retaliated against her by removing her from the promotion track, instead "putting up" her harasser (Manager Montgomery) for the Managing Director position once slotted for her.
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32. As a result of KPMG's hostile work environment, Ms. Kassman - a strong, competent manager with a long and distinguished career at KPMG - was reduced to someone who could barely eat or sleep, and took the back elevators at work to avoid running into her tormentors. She was ultimately forced to resign from her position because the work environment at KPMG had become unbearable.
33. Upon information and belief, other female Managers have experienced harassment and retaliation similar to what Ms. Kassman experienced at KPMG. In particular, other female Managers have suddenly found themselves targeted and elbowed out by the Company's "old boys" network once they come perilously close to infiltrating the upper ranks of management.
E. "This is Three Men Ganging Up on a Woman; We've Had it Be(Ore": KPMG's Deliberate Indifference to Complaints of Discrimination
34. KPMG has long been on notice regarding its Company-wide gender discrimination, but has taken no steps to remedy it.
35. Ms. Kassman repeatedly complained about the discrimination and harassment she was experiencing, going through all of the requisite channels, including her performance manager, Principal Schapiro; his boss, Principal Brown; the Office of Ethics and Compliance; the Office of General Counsel; and Human Resources. Every step of the way, the Company reacted with its characteristic indifference and simply passed the buck.
36. Even while acknowledging that the facts presented by Ms. Kassman were undisputed, KPMG sat on its hands and allowed the discrimination and harassment to continue unabated. Throughout the complaint process, the Company seemed more concerned about
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offending Ms. Kassman's harassers than the harassment itself. In fact, all of the "solutions" proposed by KPMG treated Ms. Kassman as the source of the problem.
37. KPMG's mishandling of Ms. Kassman's repeated complaints highlights various system-wide flaws in the Company's complaint mechanisms, including inadequate reporting mechanisms; the lack of a defined channel to report complaints of discrimination and harassment; the lack of defined investigation procedures; inadequate training of HR and other professionals tasked with addressing complaints of discrimination and harassment; and the leadership's willingness to allow discrimination and an "old boys" culture to flourish at the Company.
38. The blatant disregard and indifference displayed by KPMG towards Ms. Kassman's complaints is all the more shocking given the Company's awareness that these problems are systemic. As Vicki Sweeney ("Principal Sweeney"), Principal in Charge of Ethics and Compliance, told Ms. Kassman, "This is three men ganging up on a woman. We've had it before."
* * *
39. Plaintiff brings this lawsuit on her own behalf and on behalf of a class of similarly situated female employees Company-wide, including but not limited to Managers, Senior Managers and Managing Directors, to remedy the gender discrimination she has witnessed and experienced during her seventeen years of exemplary service to KPMG. The lawsuit is designed to achieve systemic injunctive relief and to change KPMG's discriminatory employment policies, practices and/or procedures based on gender, including discrimination in assignment, promotion and advancement; pay discrimination; and pregnancy/caregiver discrimination; as well as a hostile work environment; retaliation; and routine mishandling of complaints of
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discrimination and harassment.
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 40. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this suit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a)(l), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(f), et seq., as amended ("Title VII"), and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, et seq, and supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
41. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 139l(b) and 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f) because Defendant KPMG is headquartered and conducts substantial business in this District, and because Plaintiff was an employee ofKPMG's New York, New York office when the unlawful employment practices were committed.
42. Plaintiff has standing to bring this suit as she has duly filed her administrative charge before the EEOC and received her Notice of Right to Sue on March 9, 201 1.
III. THE PARTIES 43. Plaintiff DONNA KASSMAN is a resident of New York. Plaintiff was
employed at KPMG as an Associate, a Senior Associate, a Manager, and then a Senior Manager from April 1993 until her constructive discharge from the Company in October 2010.
44. Defendant KPMG LLP ("KPMG" or the "Company") is an audit, tax, and advisory services finn headquartered in New York, New York. It is the U.S. member firm of KPMG International, which is headquartered in the Netherlands. In 2010, KPMG reported global revenues of $20.63 billion.
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IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS A. Bacl<ground
45. In April of 1993, Ms. Kassman began working at KPMG as an Associate. 46. In the years that followed, she steadily progressed along the Company's standard career track. 17 In 1995, Ms. Kassman became a Senior Associate, and two years later, in 1997, she advanced to the position of Manager. In 1999, Ms. Kassman went on to become a Senior Manager - the position in which she would be stuck for eleven years, before ultimately being pushed out of the Company. 47. Tln·oughout her seventeen-year tenure, Ms. Kassman demonstrated stellar performance at KPMG. 48. In Ms. Kassman's Fiscal Year 2006 Year End Performance Review ("Review"), Principal Schapiro, to whom she directly reported, wrote that she "contributed greatly to the overall success of the practice" and that "staff look to her for guidance." 49. The following year, in Ms. Kassman's 2007 Review, he wrote that Plaintiff"had a very strong year." 50. Principal Schapiro wrote in Ms. Kassman's 2008 Review that she "had a very successful FY 2008, and ha[d] shown excellent leadership abilities." 51. He wrote in Ms. Kassman's 2009 Review that she "did all the right things from a business perspective to be successful," that she "ha[d] been a leader in the office, and ha[d] been forward thinking."
17 For promotions from entry-level Associates to Senior Managers, KPMG uses a standard career progression track, which advances employees on a schedule of approximately every two years in the following order: Associate, Senior Associate, Manager, and Senior Manager.
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52. In Ms. Kassman's 2010 Review, Principal Schapiro wrote that she again had "a very strong year."
B. Disparate Pay 53. Upon information and belief, KPMG paid Ms. Kassman less than similarly situated male employees, despite her exemplary performance. 54. Ten years after joining KPMG, Ms. Kassman went on maternity leave in May 2003, just before the birth of her first child in June 2003. 55. While Ms. Kassman was on maternity leave, KPMG abruptly cut her base salmy
;
by $20,000 because she was paid "too much." Upon information and belief, KPMG viewed Ms. Kassman as an easy target because of her gender and her status as a working mother.
56. KPMG cited no business justification for slashing her salary. When Ms. Kassman asked her manager at the time, Gary Rosen ("Partner Rosen"), Pminer in Charge of the Northeast SALT Practice, to reconsider the cut in her salmy, he said that she should consider some of her past salary "a loan," implying that she had not earned it for exemplary performance. He also indicated that Ms. Kassman did not need the money because she had a nice engagement ring.
57. In addition, KPMG discriminates against flex time workers- the overwhelming majority of whom are women - by reducing their salaries without a commensurate reduction in responsibilities.
58. Upon information and belief, KPMG underpays female Managers at all levels throughout the Company relative to similarly situated male employees.
C. Denial of Promotions 59. Despite Ms. Kassman's stellar qualifications and performance, KPMG denied her promotions in favor of lesser qualified male employees.
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60. Throughout Ms. Kassman's last decade as a Senior Manager at KPMG, she consistently expressed interest in a promotion to Managing Director and ultimately to Partner. After several strong performance years and numerous requests for advancement, Principal Schapiro finally told Ms. Kassman she was next in line for a promotion in the employment tax practice. In December 2008, Principal Schapiro confirmed that Ms. Kassman would be put up for a promotion to Tax Managing Director effective for the Fiscal Year 2009/2010 beginning October 1, 2009. The promotion decision was to be made during the summer of 2009. However, Ms. Kassman was not promoted that year, despite her strong performance.
61. In early 2009, Ms. Kassman successfully completed the formal Leadership Evaluation & Assistance Program ("LEAP") for the KPMG SALT Practice in preparation for her promotion to Managing Director. According to Ms. Kassman's 2009 Review, she "successfully presented and navigated the SALT LEAP program and received favorable reviews." She presented to the National Partner in Charge of the SALT Practice, Tim Gillis, who told her that she had his vote.
62. In mid-2009, Principal Schapiro again confirmed that Plaintiff was next in line for a promotion in her practice. On at least one occasion in or around summer 2009, Ben Garfunkel ("Partner Garfunkel"), the National Partner in Charge of IES, echoed Principal Schapiro's comments by stating that he knew Ms. Kassman was "in queue" to make Managing Director. Ms. Kassman's status was specifically a point of discussion with Partner Garfunkel since she was leaving the SALT Practice (where she was presented for promotion) and entering the IES practice, of which he was the leader. Ms. Kassman wanted confirmation that she would not lose her "next in line" status by switching practices.
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63. In Ms. Kassman's 2009 Review, Principal Schapiro wrote that "an effort was made to promote Donna. to TMD effective fy '10 ... ," but explained that it did not happen because of the economy. Principal Schapiro also toJd·Ms. Kassman that no one would receive a promotion to Managing Director at that time due to the economy, but that she would remain first in line.
64. Shortly after Ms. Kassman was "put-up" for promotion and proceeded through the formal channels set up by the SALT Practice (i.e., the LEAP program) in 2009, Manager Montgomery and his direct subordinate, Associate Stone, lodged unfounded complaints about her. Although Plaintiff had never received a similar complaint in her seventeen years with KPMG, Associate Stone and Manager Montgomery claimed she was considered "unapproachable" and "too direct," a thinly-veiled gender-based criticism, particularly given the abundance of"direct" male personalities in the senior leadership ofKPMG.
65. · As a result of Associate Stone's and Manager Montgomery's unfounded, stereotypical and subjective complaints, KPMG removed Ms. Kassman from the promotion track sometime in late 2009 or early 20 I 0, when a candidate is typically put up for promotion.
66. In December 2009, Ms. Kassman again discussed with Principal Schapiro whether she would be put up for the Managing Director position for the 2010/2011 fiscal year beginning October I, 2010. Although Principal Schapiro had previously assured Ms. Kassman that she was next in line for the promotion, he claimed that he "[didn't] know anything about making Tax Managing Director in the IES practice," and instead referred Ms. Kassman to Principal Brown.
67. At Principal Schapiro's suggestion, Ms. Kassman met with Principal Brown in January 2010 to discuss her career. When Ms. Kassman brought up the Managing Director
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position, Principal Brown said that Ms. Kassman's name had never come up, that she was not on the list of candidates for that year, and that it was too late for her name to be submitted. Principal Brown later acknowledged that she had lied about the list of candidates being closed.
68. In April 2010, Ms. Kassman learned from a colleague that Manager Montgomery was up for promotion to Managing Director for the 2010/2011 Fiscal Year- the same position that had previously been slated for Ms. Kassman. Principal Schapiro had apparently - without informing Ms. Kassman- removed her from the promotion track and replaced her with Manager Montgomery, even though he had a shorter tenure with the Company, fewer years as Senior Manager and less professional experience overall than Ms. Kassman.
69. Ms. Kassman was a victim of Associate Stone's and Manager Montgomery's discriminatory campaign to derail a female employee's advancement to Managing Director- an effort that KPMG's partnership not only failed to stop, but actively carried out.
70. Upon information and belief, KPMG has perpetrated and/or condoned similar discriminatory campaigns to derail the careers of other successful female Managers who were poised to assume positions of greater authority and influence within the Company.
D. Pregnancy/Caregiver Discrimination 71. From 2003 until her constructive discharge in 2010, KPMG discriminated against Ms. Kassman based on her gender due to her caregiving responsibilities as a working mother. Because of Ms. Kassman's status as a working mother, KPMG continuously subjected her to disparate treatment, and also made adverse decisions concerning her employment. 72. From 1993 until 1999, before Ms. Kassman had her children, she was promoted on KPMG's progressive career track from Associate to Senior Manager. However, after she had
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her first child in 2003, her advancement abruptly stopped. She was not promoted after she became a Senior Manager and remained in this position for over ten years.
73. Even though Ms. Kassman hit the glass ceiling shortly after having children, KPMG and Principal Schapiro touted Plaintiff as a role model for working mothers. In practice, however, KPMG and Principal Schapiro in particular did not support Ms. Kassman's efforts to be a successful working mother.
74. In addition to slashing Ms. Kassman's salary while she was on maternity leave, KPMG took a number of adverse employment actions against her. For example, in March of 2004, shortly after Ms. Kassman's maternity leave ended, Principal Schapiro gave PlaintitT her first negative review at the Company for not meeting her goals. Instead of taking her leave into account in measuring Ms. Kassman's goal attainment for the year, Principal Schapiro penalized her for it.
75. As a further penalty for taking maternity leave, Principal Schapiro put Plaintiff on a 60-day PIP, increasing her goals, upon her return from maternity leave. Shortly before being slapped with a PIP, Ms. Kassman told Principal Schapiro that she planned to move to a flexible work schedule. Principal Schapiro placed Ms. Kassman's PIP in between papers on her desk (including the flexible plan paperwork that she was preparing to submit), seemingly in an attempt to avoid drawing attention to the PIP.
76. Before placing Ms. Kassman on a PIP, Principal Schapiro had never indicated to Ms. Kassman that her performance was unsatisfactory or that she was in jeopardy of being placed on a PIP. Shocked and dismayed by this unexpected development, Ms. Kassman spoke to Sharon Katz-Pearlman, another Partner at the Company, who confirmed that there was nothing in Ms. Kassman's performance record that would supp01t the imposition of a PIP before she had
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her baby. 77. Two years later, Principal Schapiro again penalized Plaintiff for taking maternity
leave when she had her second child. He again held her to higher standards than her peers after retuming from leave. He also wrote in her 2006 Review that her work was "somewhat abbreviated due to Donna's maternity leave."
78. From 2004 until Plaintiffs constructive discharge in 2010, she worked a reduced schedule under KPMG's flexible schedule policy. Ms. Kassman felt pressured to move to a flexible plan because of KPMG's working conditions and gender stereotypes about working mothers with young children. Although the Company reduced Ms. Kassman's pay in prop01iion to her reduced schedule, it held her to the same or higher performance standards than full-time employees. If she did not meet full-time standards on her reduced schedule, Plaintiff was penalized and considered less committed to her caree1:. Her flexible schedule essentially acted as a "penalty" on her employment opportunities at KPMG.
79. While Ms. Kassman· was working on a reduced schedule, KPMG essentially expected her to do the job of a full-time senior manager in fewer hours for less pay. For example, her job requirements related to marketing, teaching, speaking, coaching, administrative, and client development were the same job requirements of full-time Senior Managers. When KPMG evaluated Plaintiffs work performance, the Company measured her against the requirements of a full-time employee. Indeed, both of Plaintiffs direct supervisors- Principal Schapiro and Partner Rosen - acknowledged this by writing in her LEAP Nomination Form, "Although she works a reduced hourly schedule, she has the same responsibilities as every other Senior Manager in the Practice."
80. Upon information and belief, other female employees who took maternity leave
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and had caregiving responsibilities faced similar systemic barriers to equal employment opportunities at KPMG. In particular, Ms. Kassman's department, the SALT practice, had a poor track record of retaining working mothers. KPMG fired several working mothers within the SALT practice, including one who was pregnant, and forced others out of the Company under circumstances similar to Plaintiff.
81. KPMG's overwhelmingly female flexible workers are denied not only the pay they deserve, but also various other Company benefits. For example, in early 2010, the Company's Stamford office adopted a policy requiring employees to be in the office a minimum of three days per week in order to qualify for office space. This policy had a disparate impact on female employees such as Ms. Kassman, who had three "in-office" days (per her flex time agreement), one of which was typically spent out of the office generating business.
82. In addition, because most of KPMG's relationship-building activities occur after hours, employees with primmy caregiving responsibilities- the majority of whom ai'e womenare at a disadvantage in their career development. For example, when Ms. Kassman expressed concern to Partner Rosen about her $20,000 salary cut, he suggested that she socialize at KPMG's weekly happy hours as a way to ingratiate herself with the Company's leadership and advance her career. Ms. Kassman explained that, because she had young children, she could not attend happy hours, but was more than willing to meet with people over lunch, breakfast or coffee.
83. The few women who have advanced to the partnership ranks at KPMG have done so by sacrificing their personal lives and abandoning any semblance of work-life balance. For example, KPMG frequently touted a Partner in the Atlanta office, Tammy Hunter, as a role model for other working mothers because she called the Company to discuss work matters on her
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way to the delivery room to give birth to her child. The Company apparently viewed this as a level of dedication to which other working mothers should aspire.
84. Aside from these rare exceptions, working mothers have been unable to make significant inroads at KPMG- and are unlikely to do so given the Company's discriminatory culture. In May 2010, Plaintiff was at dinner during an American Payroll Association conference with several colleagues, including the Partner in charge of the West IES practice, Ray Pascuzzi ("Partner Pascuzzi"). At this dinner, Partner Pascuzzi proclaimed that "part time women work exactly their x hours and not a minute over," that "you know you can't make them work any more, and that "you know they're not going to get anywhere."
E. Hostile Work Environment 85. From late 2009 until her constructive discharge in October 2010, Plaintiff suffered harassment and unequal treatment at KPMG. Beginning in October 2009, Associate Stone began complaining that he "didn't like [Plaintiffs] tone." Manager Montgomery agreed with these complaints. Together, these two men complained that Ms. Kassman was "unapproachable" and "too direct," a gender-based criticism, particularly given Associate Stone's and Manager Montgomery's "direct" personalities, which are embraced by senior leadership at KPMG. Nonetheless, KPMG did not correct Associate Stone's or Manager Montgomery's discriminatory behavior. 86. In addition to complaining about Ms. Kassman's "tone," Associate Stone also complained about her flexible work schedule. Consistent with the work-life balance priorities marketed at KPMG, the Company had approved Plaintiffs schedule after the birth of her first child. However, Associate Stone disapproved of Plaintiffs flexible work schedule and
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complained - again, without basis - that it forced him to "work harder" from Monday until Thursday.
87. KPMG did nothing to correct Associate Stone's discriminatory actions, even though Principal Schapiro told Plaintiff in March 2010 that Associate Stone "might have an issue working with women." Moreover, when Ms. Kassman complained about Associate Stone's conduct, Principal Schapiro replied that he did not know if Associate Stone was "unprofessional, stupid or vicious."
88. Instead of disciplining Associate Stone, KPMG constantly reprimanded Plaintiff as a result of Associate Stone's and Manager Montgomery's gender-based criticisms. For example, KPMG forced Ms. Kassman to patiicipate in an excessive number of stressful meetings and intense interrogations from late 2009 until mid-2010. During the meetings, Ms. Kassman was questioned about her "tone" and other stereotypical complaints like her "direct" approach. This harassment and unequal treatment was extremely disruptive to Plaintiff both personally and professionally.
89. After months of meetings, the Company encouraged Plaintiff to consult with a "coach" to resolve issues concerning Associate Stone's and Manager Montgomery's discriminatory complaints and harassment. By issuing such a reprimand to Ms. Kassman, KPMG chose to believe these two men's unfounded complaints over her longstanding "very strong" performance and collaborative work style. At the time, Associate Stone - who was widely regarded as an "asshole" - had only been at the Company for approximately sixteen months, whereas Plaintiff had been there for sixteen years.
90. Instead of disciplining Mr. Stone for his discriminatory conduct, KPMG recently promoted Mr. Stone to a Senior Associate position.
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91. Instead of resolving Plaintiffs complaints of discrimination, KPMG removed her

from the promotion track as a result of the gender-biased criticisms leveled against her.

92. When the work environment in KPMG's New York office became unbearable,

Ms. Kassman asked to be transferred to the Stamford office. She successfully worked out of the

Stamford office in late 2009 and early 2010, until it adopted a policy requiring employees to be

in the office a minimum of three days per week in order to qualify for office ·space. Per Ms.

Kassman's flex time agreement, she spent three days "in-office" and two working from home.

However, at least one of Ms. Kassman's "in-office" days was typically spent out of the office

with clients. Accordingly, the Company forced her to vacate her Stamford office in April 2010.

In lieu of an office, Ms. Kassman was provided with four drawers.

93. Ken Seal, the Patiner in charge of the Stamford office, ren1sed to allow Ms.

Kassman to retain her office space, even though the alternative was for Ms. Kassman to return to

a hostile work environment in New York.

F.

Mishandling of Complaints and Retaliation

94. After Plaintiff complained about the harassment and unequal treatment by

Associate Stone, Manager Montgomery, and Principal Schapiro, KPMG retaliated against her.

95. Plaintiff complained to both the Office of Ethics and Compliance and the Office

of General Counsel in April 2009 about the ongoing discriminatory treatment towards her.

96. Principal Sweeney, the Principal in Charge of the Office of Ethics and

Compliance, told Ms. Kassman, "This is three men ganging up on a woman. We've had it

before."

97. However, instead of addressing the discrimination, the Office of Ethics and

Compliance suggested that Plaintiff try to relocate to another position within KPMG or leave

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the Company with a "package." On one occasion, Principal Sweeney suggested that Ms. Kassman go out on leave for emotional distress, noting that many female employees had done so in the past under similar circumstances.
98. The Office of General Counsel was equally ineffective in addressing Plaintiffs complaints of discrimination. After investigating the matter (through David Burns of Firmwide Security) - and finding the facts undisputed - it simply referred Ms. Kassman to Human Resources because it was unable to come up with an acceptable solution.
99. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Kassman spoke with Keri Fleming, Human Resources Associate Director, East Region Tax, about the ongoing discrimination and harassment she was experiencing. Together, they decided that Human Resources would be Plaintiffs mouthpiece to Principal Schapiro because Plaintiff would physically shake every time he called her.
100. To minimize contact with her harassers, Ms. Kassman decided that she would try to transfer to another position within KPMG, even if it meant taking a pay cut, assuming an administrative position or having to transfer offices. Human Resources assured Ms. Kassman that it would help with this transition, but failed to follow through on its promise.
101. Moreover, even though Plaintiff told Human Resources that she did not want to discuss the matter any further with Principals Schapiro and Brown, she continued to receive calls from them. From the tenor of those conversations, it was clear to Ms. Kassman that Principals Schapiro and Brown thought she simply needed time to cool off and would eventually resume working with Manager Montgomery and Associate Stone.
102. After Principal Schapiro was informed of Ms. Kassman' s complaints, she faced a number of adverse employment actions. KPMG reprimanded her with a "coach," forced her to sit tlu·ough numerous meetings and interrogations in response to Manager Montgomery's and
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Associate Stone's gender-based criticisms of her, and ultimately removed her from the promotion track.
103. By contrast, KPMG did not discipline Associate Stone, Manager Montgomery, or Principal Schapiro in any way. In fact, the Company promoted Associate Stone and, adding insult to injury, "put up" Manager Montgomery for the Managing Director position once slotted for Plaintiff.
G. Constructive Discharge 104. As a result of KPMG's campaign of discrimination and harassment, Plaintiffs work environment became unbearable. She could barely eat or sleep, and feared walking into the office. To avoid running into her tormentors, Plaintiff made a habit of taking the back elevators at work. 105. Because Ms. Kassman's previous experience had taught her that KPMG would not properly address its employees' unlawful conduct, she felt that she had no recomse against the pervasive harassment and discrimination. 106. On October 1, 2010, Plaintiff resigned from KPMG, stating in her letter of resignation, "By ignoring my requests to put an end to the discriminatory treatment, KPMG has forced me to either continue to endure an intolerable work environment or end my employment. I therefore have no choice but to leave the Firm."
V. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 107. Class Representative Donna Kassman and the class of female employees she
seeks to represent have been subjected to a pattern and practice of gender discrimination, and employment policies and practices which have had a continuing, unlawful disparate impact on
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them and their employment opportunities. Such gender discrimination includes (a) paying female Managers less than their male counterparts; (b) denying female Managers promotion and advancement opportunities in favor of male employees; (c) retaliating against female Managers for complaining about gender discrimination; and (d) subjecting female Managers to other disparate terms and conditions of employment, including pregnancy/caregiver discrimination and a hostile work environment, with no viable avenue for recourse.
108. KPMG, in effect, bars female employees from better and higher-paying positions which have traditionally been held by male employees. The systemic means of accomplishing such gender-based stratification include, but are not limited to, KPMG's assignment, development, promotion, advancement, and performance evaluation policies, practices and procedures.
109. KPMG's assignment, development, promotion, advancement, and performance evaluation policies, practices and procedures incorporate the following gender-based discriminatory practices: (a) relying upon subjective judgments, procedures, and criteria which permit and encourage the incorporation of gender stereotypes and biases by KPMG's predominately male executive, managerial and supervisory staff in making promotion, performance evaluation, and compensation decisions; (b) refusing or failing to provide equal training opportunities to females; (c) refusing or failing to establish and/or follow policies, practices, procedures, or criteria that reduce or eliminate disparate impact and/or intentional biases or stereotypes; and (d) ignoring, disregarding, minimizing, covering up, mishandling, or otherwise failing to properly respond to evidence of discrimination in the workplace, even when directly brought to the attention of senior management, Human Resources, or other supposed reporting channels.
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110. In addition, KPMG cultivates a hostile environment in which the Company regularly retaliates against women who have brought gender discrimination complaints to their attention.
111. Further, KPMG demonstrates a reckless disregard - a deliberate indifference - to its female employees by overlooking or otherwise dismissing even blatant evidence of gender discrimination.
112. KPMG's compensation, promotion and flexible schedule policies, practices, and procedures have had a disparate impact on the Class Representative and the members of the class. Such procedures are not valid, job-related, or justified by business necessity.
113. Defendant's assignment, development, compensation, promotion, training, performance evaluation, termination and transfer policies, practices and procedures have a disparate impact on the Class Representative and the class she seeks to represent. Such practices form a part of the Defendant's overall pattern-or-practice of keeping women in the lower classifications which have less desirable terms and conditions of employment.
114. Because of Defendant's pattern-or-practice of gender discrimination, the Class Representative and class she seeks to represent have been adversely affected and have experienced harm, including the loss of compensation, promotion and other advancement opportunities, employment benefits and non-economic damages.
115. KPMG has failed to impose adequate discipline on managers and employees who violate equal employment opp01iunity laws and has failed to create adequate incentives for its managerial and supervisory personnel to comply with such laws regarding the employment policies, practices, and procedures described above.
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116. The Class Representative and the class have no plain, adequate, or complete remedy at law to redress the wrongs alleged herein, and this suit is their only means of securing adequate relief. The Class Representative and the class are now suffering, and will continue to suffer, irreparable injury from KPMG's ongoing, unlawful policies, practices, and procedures as set forth herein unless those policies, practices, and procedures are enjoined by this Court.
A. General Facts Relevant to Class Claims and Class Definition 117. Class Representative Kassman seeks to maintain claims on her own behalf and on behalf of a class of current and former Managers at KPMG. 118. The class consists of all female Managers, including but not limited to Managers, Senior Managers and Managing Directors, who are, or have been, employed by KPMG nationwide in the applicable liability period. Upon information and belief, there are thousands of such employees in the proposed class. 119. The Class Representative seeks to represent all of the female employees described above. The systemic and disparate impact gender discrimination described in this Complaint has been, and is, continuing in nature. B. Efficiency of Class Prosecution of Common Claims 120. Certification of a class of female Managers is the most efficient and economical means of resolving the questions of law and fact which are common to the claims of the Class Representative and the proposed class. The individual claims of the Class Representative require resolution of the common question of whether KPMG has engaged in a systemic pattern and/or practice of gender discrimination against female Managers. Class Representative Kassman seeks remedies to eliminate the adverse effects of such discrimination in her own life, career and working conditions, and in the lives, careers and working conditions of the proposed class
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members, and to prevent continued gender discrimination in the future. Plaintiff has standing to seek such relief because of the adverse effect that such discrimination has had on her individually and on female employees generally. In order to gain such relief for herself, as well as for the class members, Plaintiff will first establish the existence of systemic gender discrimination as the premise for the relief she seeks. Without class certification, the same evidence and issues would be subject tore-litigation in a multitude of individual lawsuits with an attendant risk of inconsistent adjudications and conflicting obligations. Certification of the proposed class of females is the most efficient and judicious means of presenting the evidence and arguments necessary to resolve such questions for the Class Representative, the proposed class, and Defendant KPMG.
C. Numerosity and Impracticability of Joinder 121. The class which the Class Representative seeks to represent is too numerous to make joinder practicable. Upon information and belief, the proposed class consists of thousands of current and former female Managers during the liability period. KPMG's pattern and/or practice of gender discrimination also makes joinder impracticable by discouraging females from applying for or pursuing promotional, training, or transfer opportunities, thereby making it impractical and inefficient to identify many members of the class prior to determination of the merits of KPMG's class-wide liability. D. Common Questions of Law and Fact 122. The prosecution of the claims of the Class Representative will require the adjudication of numerous questions of law and fact common to both her individual claims and those of the putative class she seeks to represent. The common questions of law include, inter
alia: whether KPMG has engaged in unlawful, systemic gender discrimination in its
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compensation, assignment, selection, promotion, advancement, transfer, training and discipline policies, practices, and procedures, and in the general terms and conditions of work and employment; whether KPMG is liable for a continuing systemic violation of Title VII, and/or other statutes; and a determination of the proper standards for proving a pattern or practice of discrimination by KPMG against its female Managers. The common questions of fact include, inter alia: whether KPMG has, through its policies, practices, and procedures: (a) compensated female Managers less than similarly-situated males through the use of salary, bonuses, and/or other perks; (b) precluded or delayed the selection, assignment and promotion of female Managers into higher level jobs traditionally held by male employees; (c) minimized, ignored, or covered up evidence of gender discrimination and harassment in the workplace and/or otherwise mishandled the investigation of and response to complaints of discrimination and harassment brought to the attention of senior management, the human resources department, or other reporting channels; (d) retaliated against those who have complained of gender-based discrimination; and (e) otherwise subjected female Managers to disparate treatment with respect to terms and conditions of employment, including pregnancy/caregiver discrimination and a hostile work environment.
123. The employment policies, practices, and procedures to which the Class Representative and the class members are subjected are set at KPMG's corporate level and apply universally to all class members. These employment policies, practices and procedures are not uniqtw or limited to any department; rather, they apply to all depatiments and, thus, affect the Class Representative and class members in the same ways no matter the facility, department, or position in which they work.
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124. Throughout the liability period, a disproportionately large percentage of the managers and officers at KPMG have been male.
125. Discrimination in selection, assignment, promotion and advancement occurs as a pattern and practice throughout KPMG. Selection, assignment, promotion, and advancement opportunities are driven by personal familiarity, subjective decision-making, pre-selection and interaction between male managers and subordinates rather than by merit or equality of opportunity. As a result, male employees have advanced and continue to advance more rapidly to better and higher-paying jobs than do female employees. KPMG's policies, practices, and procedures have had an adverse impact on female Managers seeking selection for, or advancement to, better and higher-paying positions. In general, the higher the level of the job classification, the lower the percentage of female employees holding it.
E. Typicality of Claims and Relief Sought 126. The claims of Class Representative Kassman are typical of the claims of the class. The relief sought by the Class Representative for gender discrimination complained of herein is also typical of the relief which is sought on behalf of the class. 127. Like the members of the class, Class Representative Kassman is a Manager who worked at KPMG during the liability period. 128. Discrimination in selection, promotion, advancement, and training affects the compensation of the Class Representative and all the employee class members in the same or similar ways. 129. KPMG has failed to create adequate incentives for its management to comply with its own policies and equal employment opportunity laws regarding each of the employment policies, practices, and procedures referenced in this Complaint, and has failed to discipline
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adequately its managers and other employees when they violate the Company policy or discrimination laws. These failures have affected the Class Representative and the class members in the same or similar ways.
130. The relief necessary to remedy the claims of the Class Representative is exactly the same as that necessary to remedy the claims of the class members in this case. Class Representative Kassman seeks the following relief for her individual claims and for those of the members of the proposed class: (a) a declaratory judgment that KPMG has engaged in systemic gender discrimination against female Managers by (1) paying female Managers less than their male counterparts, and (2) denying female Managers promotions into better and higher-paying positions, (3) discriminating against pregnant women and women with child-rearing responsibilities, and (4) otherwise failing to investigate or respond to evidence of discrimination or harassment in the workplace; (b) a permanent injunction against such continuing discriminatory conduct; (c) injunctive relief which effects a restructuring of KPMG's assignment, promotion, transfer, training, performance evaluation, compensation, and discipline policies, practices, and procedures - so that female Managers will be able to compete fairly in the future for promotions, transfers, and assignments to better and higher-paying classifications with terms and conditions of employment traditionally enjoyed by male employees; (d) back pay, front pay, and other equitable remedies necessary to make the female Managers whole from the Defendant's past discrimination; (f) punitive and nominal damages to prevent and deter KPMG from engaging in similar discriminatory practices in the future; (g) compensatory damages; (h) pre- and post-judgment interest; and (i) attorneys' fees, costs and expenses.
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F. Adequacy of Representation 131. The Class Representative's interests are co-extensive with those of the members of the proposed class which she seeks to represent in this case. Class Representative Kassman seeks to remedy KPMG's discriminatory employment policies, practices, and procedures so that female Managers will no longer be prevented from advancing into higher-paying and/or more desirable higher-level positions. Plaintiff is willing and able to represent the proposed class fairly and vigorously as she pursues her individual claims in this action. 132. Class Representative Kassman has retained counsel who are qualified, experienced, and able to conduct this litigation and to meet the time and fiscal demands required to litigate an employment discrimination class action of this size and complexity. The combined interests, experience, and resources of Plaintiffs counsel to litigate competently the individual and class claims at issue in this case clearly satisfy the adequacy of representation requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(4). G. Requirements Of Rule 23(b)(2) 133. KPMG has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class Representative and the class by adopting and following systemic policies, practices, and procedures which are discriminatory. Gender discrimination is KPMG's standard operating procedure rather than a sporadic occurrence. KPMG has refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class by, inter alia: (a) failing to pay female Managers on par with similarly-situated male employees; (b) refusing to adopt and apply selection, assignment, promotion, training, performance evaluation, compensation, and discipline policies, practices, and procedures which do not have a disparate impact on, or othetwise systemically discriminate against, female Managers; and (c) refusing to provide equal terms and conditions of employment for female Managers. KPMG's systemic
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discrimination and refusal to act on grounds that are not discriminatory have made appropriate the requested final injunctive and declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.
134. Injunctive and declaratory relief are the predominant relief sought in this case because they are the culmination of the proof of KPMG's individual and class-wide liability and the essential predicate for the Class Representative's and the class members' entitlement to monetary and non-monetary remedies at Stage II of such trial. Declaratory and injunctive relief flow directly and automatically from proof of the common questions of law and fact regarding the existence of systemic gender discrimination against female Managers at KPMG. Such relief is the factual and legal predicate for the Class Representative's and the class members' entitlement to monetary and non-monetary remedies for individual losses caused by such systematic discrimination.
H. Requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) 13 5. The common issues of fact and law affecting the claims of Class Representative Kassman and proposed class members, including, but not limited to, the common issues previously identified herein, predominate over any issues affecting only individual claims. These issues include whether KPMG has engaged in gender discrimination against female Managers by denying them equal pay, promotion, and advancement opportunities and whether KPMG has tolerated a culture of gender discrimination directed against such employees. 136. A class action is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims of the Class Representative and members of the proposed class. 137. The cost of proving KPMG's pattern and practice of discrimination makes it impracticable for the Class Representative and members of the proposed class to prosecute their claims individually.
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VI. COLLECTIVE ACTION ALLEGATIONS (EQUALPAY ACT) 13 8. Plaintiff Kassman incorporates by reference the allegations from the previous
paragraphs of this Complaint alleging class-based discrimination against similarly-situated female employees.
139. Plaintiff brings collective violations of the Equal Pay Act ("EPA") as a collective action pursuant to Section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) on behalf of all members of the gender class- e.g. current, former, and future female Managers, during the liability period. The EPA action includes female Managers who (a) were not compensated equally to males who had substantially similar job classifications, functions, families, titles and/or duties, (b) were not compensated equally to males who performed substantially similar work, and (c) who were denied promotion and advancement opportunities that would result in greater compensation in favor of lesser qualified male employees.
140. Questions of law and fact common to the EPA Collective Action Plaintiffs as a whole include but are not limited to the following: (a) whether Defendant unlawf11lly failed and continues to fail to compensate female Managers at a level commensurate with similarly situated male employees; (b) whether Defendant unlawfi.Jlly failed and continues to fail to promote and advance female Managers in a fashion commensurate with similarly qualified males; (c) whether Defendant's policy and practice of failing to compensate female Managers on a par with comparable male employees as a result of (a) and (b) violates applicable provisions of the EPA; and (d) whether Defendant's failure to compensate female Managers on a par with comparable male employees as a result of (a) and (b) was willful within the meaning of the EPA.
141. Counts for violation of the EPA may be brought and maintained as an "opt-in"
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collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), for all claims asserted by the EPA Collective Action Plaintiffs because the claims of Plaintiff are similar to the claims of the EPA Collective Action Plaintiffs.
142. Plaintiff Kassman and the EPA Collective Action Plaintiffs (a) are similarly situated; (b) have substantially similar job classifications, functions, families, titles and/or duties; and (c) are subject to Defendant's common policy and practice of gender discrimination in (i) failing to compensate female Managers on par with men who perform substantially equal work and/or hold equivalent levels and positions, and (ii) failing to provide female Managers equal pay by denying opportunities for promotion and advancelnent to them comparable to those afforded to males who perform substantially equal work.
CLASS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION COUNTS
COUNT I (INDIVIDUAL AND CLASS CLAIMS) VIOLATION OF TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 ("TITLE VII")-
GENDER DISCRIMINATION 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.
143. Plaintiff Kassman re-alleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in each and every aforementioned paragraph as if fully set forth herein.
144. This Count is brought on behalf of Plaintiff and all members of the class. 145. Defendant KPMG has discriminated against Plaintiff and all members of the class in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("Title VII"), by subjecting them to different treatment on the basis of their gender. Plaintiff has suffered both disparate impact and disparate treatment as a result of Defendant's wrongful conduct.
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146. Defendant has discriminated against Plaintiff and all members of the class by treating them differently from and less preferably than similarly-situated male employees and by subjecting them to discriminatory pay, discriminatory denial of promotions, discriminatory performance evaluations, disparate terms and conditions of employment, and other forms of discrimination, in violation of Title VII.
147. Defendant's conduct has been intentional, deliberate, willful, malicious, reckless and conducted in callous disregard of the rights of Plaintiff and all members of the class, entitling Plaintiff and all members of the class to punitive damages.
148. By reason of the continuous nature of Defendant's discriminatory conduct, which persisted throughout the employment of Plaintiff and the members of the class, Plaintiff and the members of the class are entitled to application of the continuing violations doctrine to all violations alleged herein.
149. As a result of Defendant's conduct alleged in this complaint, Plaintiff and the members of the class have suffered and continue to suffer harm, including but not limited to lost earnings, lost benefits, lost future employment opportunities, other financial loss, and noneconomic damages.
150. Defendant's policies, practices and/or procedures have produced a disparate impact on Plaintiff and the members of the class with respect to the terms and conditions of their employment.
151. By reason of Defendant's discrimination, Plaintiff and the members of the class are entitled to all remedies available for violations of Title VII, including an award of punitive damages.
152. Attomeys' fees should be awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).
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COUNT II (INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAIMS) VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT OF 1938, AS AMENDED BY THE EQUAL PAY ACT OF 1963- 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, et seq.
DENIAL OF EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK
153. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the previous paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein, including the allegations that any waivers signed by collective plaintiffs are ineffective.
154. Defendant, an employer of Plaintiff and the EPA Collective Action Plaintiffs within the meaning of the Equal Pay Act, has discriminated against Plaintiff and EPA Collective Action Plaintiffs in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, et seq., as amended by the Equal Pay Act of 1963 ("EPA"), by subjecting them to unequal pay on the basis of sex.
155. Defendant has discriminated against Plaintiff and EPA Collective Action Plaintiffs by treating them differently from and less preferably than similarly-situated male employees who performed jobs which required equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which were performed under similar working conditions. Defendant so discriminated by subjecting them to discriminatory pay, discriminatory denials of bonuses and other compensation incentives, discriminatory denials of promotions and other advancement opportunities that would result in higher compensation, and other forms of discrimination in violation of the Equal Pay Act.
156. Defendant caused, attempted to cause, contributed to, or caused the continuation of, the wage rate discrimination based on sex in violation of the Equal Pay Act. Moreover,
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Defendant knew of or showed reckless disregard for the fact that its conduct was in violation of the Equal Pay Act.
157. As a result of Defendant's conduct alleged in this Complaint and/or Defendant's willful, knowing and intentional discrimination, Plaintiff and EPA Collective Action Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer harm, including but not limited to lost earnings, lost . benefits, other financial loss, and non-economic damages.
158. Plaintiff and EPA Collective Action PlaintifTs are therefore entitled to all remedies available for violations of the EPA, including liquidated damages for all willful violations.
159. Attorneys' fees should be awarded under 29 U.S. C. §§ 216, et seq. COUNT III
(INDIVIDUAL AND CLASS CLAIMS) VIOLATION OF NEW YORK EXECUTIVE LAW§ 296, subd. l(a)-
GENDER DISCRIMINATION 160. Plaintiff Kassman re-alleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in each and every aforementioned paragraph as if fully set forth herein. 161. This Count is brought on behalf of Plaintiff and all members of the class. 162. Defendant KPMG has discriminated against Plaintiff and all members of the class in violation of Section 296, subdivision l(a) of the New York Executive Law, by subjecting them to different treatment on the basis of their gender. 163. Defendant has discriminated against Plaintiff and all members of the class by treating them differently from and less preferably than similarly-situated male employees and by subjecting them to discriminatmy pay, discriminatmy denial of promotions, discriminatory
39

Case 1:11-cv-03743-LGS Document 1 Filed 06/02/11 Page 40 of 50
performance evaluations, disparate terms and conditions of employment, and other forms of discrimination, in violation of New York Executive law.
164. As a result of Defendant's conduct alleged in this complaint, Plaintiff and all members of the class have suffered and continue to suffer harm, including but not limited to lost earnings, lost benefits, lost future employment opportunities, other financial loss, and noneconomic damages.
165. By reason of Defendant's discrimination, Plaintiff and all members of the class are entitled to all remedies available for violations of the New York Executive Law.
COUNT IV (INDIVIDUAL AND CLASS CLAIMS) VIOLATION OF NEW YORK CITY ADMINISTRATIVE CODE§ 8-107, subd. l(a)-
GENDER DISCRIMINATION 166. Plaintiff Kassman re-alleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in each and every aforementioned paragraph as if ft1lly set forth herein. 167. This Count is brought on behalf of Plaintiff and all members of the class. 168. Defendant KPMG has discriminated against the Class Representative and all members of the class in violation of Section 8-107, subdivision 1(a) of the New York City Administrative Code, by subjecting them to different treatment on the basis of their gender. 169. Defendant has discriminated against Plaintiff and all members of the class by treating them differently from and less preferably than similarly-situated male employees and by subjecting them to discriminatory pay, discriminatory denial of promotions, discriminatory performance evaluations, disparate terms and conditions of employment, and other forms of discrimination, in violation of New York City Administrative Code.
40

Case 1:11-cv-03743-LGS Document 1 Filed 06/02/11 Page 41 of 50
170. As a result of Defendant's conduct alleged in this complaint, Plaintiff and all members of the class have suffered and continue to suffer harm, including but not limited to lost earnings, lost benefits, lost future employment opportunities, other financial loss, and noneconomic damages.
171. By reason of Defendant's discrimination, Plaintiff and all members of the class are entitled to all remedies available for violations of the New York City Administrative Code, including an award of punitive damages.
COUNTV (INDIVIDUAL AND CLASS CLAIMS) VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK EQUAL PAY LAW-
N.Y. LABOR LAW § 194 DENIAL OF EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK
172. Plaintiff Kassman re-alleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the previous paragraphs of this Complaint as though fi.dly set forth herein.
173. This Count is brought on behalf of Plaintiff and all members of the class. 174. Defendant, an employer of Plaintiff and all members of the class within the meaning of the New York Equal Pay Law, has discriminated against Plaintiff and all members of the class in violation of the New York Labor Law § 194, by subjecting them to unequal pay on the basis of sex. 175. Defendant has discriminated against Plaintiff and all members of the class by treating them differently from and less preferably than similarly-situated male employees who performed jobs which required equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which were performed under similar working conditions. Defendant so discriminated by subjecting them to
41

Case 1:11-cv-03743-LGS Document 1 Filed 06/02/11 Page 42 of 50
discriminatory pay, discriminatory denials of promotions and other advancement opportunities that would result in higher compensation, and other forms of discrimination in violation of the New York Equal Pay Law.
176. Defendant caused, attempted to cause, contributed to, or caused the continuation of, the wage rate discrimination based on sex in violation of the New York Equal Pay Law. Moreover, Defendant willfi.Jlly violated the New York Equal Pay Law by intentionally paying women less than men.
177. Plaintiff and all members of the class are therefore entitled to all remedies available for violations ofN.Y. Labor Law§ 194, including liquidated damages and attorneys' fees and costs for all willful violations.
INDIVIDUAL COUNTS
COUNT VI (INDIVIDUAL CLAIM- PLAINTIFF KASSMAN)
VIOLATION OF TITLE VII-RETALIATION 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3
178. Plaintiff Kassman re-alleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in each and every aforementioned paragraph as if fully set forth herein.
179. In the final year of her employment with Defendant, Plaintiff repeatedly voiced concerns about KPMG's discriminatory treatment of her, complaining to the Office of Ethics and Compliance, the Office of General Counsel, and Human Resources.
180. In retaliation for Plaintiffs complaints regarding KPMG's unlawful employment practices, Defendant took adverse employment actions against her, including giving her a disciplinary "coach," failing to provide her equal pay or promote her, and subjecting her to
42

Case 1:11-cv-03743-LGS Document 1 Filed 06/02/11 Page 43 of 50
stressful meetings and interrogations based on baseless accusations. Defendant ultimately bullied Plaintiff into resigning by subjecting her to escalating gender discrimination and harassment.
181. Upon information and belief, other women at KPMG who opposed or complained about unlawful gender discrimination were similarly retaliated against.
182. Defendant's conduct has been intentional, deliberate, willfhl, malicious, reckless and conducted in callous disregard of the rights of Plaintiff, entitling her to punitive damages.
183. As a result of Defendant's conduct alleged in this Complaint, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer harm, including but not limited to lost earnings, lost benefits, other financial loss, and non-economic damages.
184. By reason of Defendant's retaliation, Plaintiff is entitled to all remedies available for violations of Title VII, including an award of punitive damages.
185. Attomeys' fees should be awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). COUNT VII
(INDIVIDUAL CLAIM- PLAINTIFF KASSMAN) VIOLATIONS OF THE EQUAL PAY ACT, U.S.C. § 215(a)(3)-RETALIATION
186. Plaintiff Kassman re-alleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in each and every aforementioned paragraph as if fully set forth herein.
187. In the final year of her employment with Defendant, Plaintiff repeatedly voiced concerns about KPMG's discriminatory treatment of her, complaining to the Office of Ethics and Compliance, the Office of General Counsel, and Human Resources.
188. In retaliation for Plaintiffs complaints regarding KPMG's unlawful employment practices, Defendant took adverse employment actions against her, including giving her a
43

Case 1:11-cv-03743-LGS Document 1 Filed 06/02/11 Page 44 of 50
disciplinary "coach," failing to provide her equal pay or promote her, and subjecting her to stressful meetings and interrogations based on baseless accusations. Defendant ultimately bullied Plaintiff into resigning by subjecting her to escalating gender discrimination and harassment.
189. By reason of Defendant's conduct as alleged herein, Plaintiff is entitled to all remedies available under the EPA, including liquidated damages for all willful violations.
190. Attorneys' fees shonld be awarded under 29 U.S.C. § 216, et seq. COUNT VIII
(INDIVIDUAL CLAIM- PLAINTIFF KASSMAN) VIOLATION OF NEW YORK EXECUTIVE LAW § 296
RETALIATION 191. Plaintiff Kassman re-alleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in each and every aforementioned paragraph as if fully set forth herein. 192. In the final year of her employment with Defendant, Plaintiff repeatedly voiced concems about KPMG's discriminatory treatment of her, complaining to the Office of Ethics and Compliance, the Office of General Counsel, and Human Resources. 193. In retaliation for Plaintiffs complaints regarding KPMG's unlawful employment practices, Defendant took adverse employment actions against her, including giving her a disciplinmy "coach," failing to provide her equal pay or promote her, and subjecting her to stressful meetings and interrogations based on baseless accusations. Defendant ultimately bullied Plaintiff into resigning by subjecting her to escalating gender discrimination and harassment. 194. By reason of Defendant's conduct as alleged herein, Plaintiff is entitled to all remedies available under the New York Executive Law.
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Case 1:11-cv-03743-LGS Document 1 Filed 06/02/11 Page 45 of 50
COUNT IX (INDIVIDUAL CLAIM- PLAINTIFF KASSMAN) VIOLATION OF NEW YORK CITY ADMINISTRATIVE CODE§ 8-107, sub d. 7-
RETALIATION 195. Plaintiff Kassman re-alleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in each and every aforementioned paragraph as if fully set forth herein. 196. In the final year of her employment with Defendant, Plaintiff repeatedly voiced concerns about KPMG's discriminatory treatment of her, complaining to the Office of Ethics and Compliance, the Office of General Counsel, and Human Resources. 197. In retaliation for Plaintiffs complaints regarding KPMG's unlawful employment practices, Defendant took adverse employment actions against her, including giving her a disciplinary "coach," failing to provide her equal pay or promote her, and subjecting her to stressful meetings and interrogations based on baseless accusations. Defendant ultimately bullied Plaintiff into resigning by subjecting her to escalating gender discrimination and harassment. 198. By reason of Defendant's retaliation, Plaintiff is entitled to all remedies available for violations of the New York City Administrative Code, including an award of punitive damages.
COUNT X (INDIVIDUAL CLAIM- PLAINTIFF KASSMAN) VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK EQUAL PAY LAW-
N.Y. LABOR LAW§ 215- RETALIATION 199. Plaintiff Kassman re-alleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in each and every aforementioned paragraph as if fully set fmih herein.
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Case 1:11-cv-03743-LGS Document 1 Filed 06/02/11 Page 46 of 50
200. In retaliation for Plaintiffs complaints regarding KPMG's unlawful employment practices, Defendant took adverse employment actions against her, including giving her a disciplinary "coach," failing to provide her equal pay or promote her, and subjecting her to stressful meetings and interrogations based on baseless accusations. Defendant ultimately bullied Plaintiff into resigning by subjecting her to escalating gender discrimination and harassment.
201. By reason of Defendant's conduct as alleged herein, PlaintiffKassman is entitled to all remedies available under the New York Equal Pay Law.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff, on her own behalf and on behalf of the class and collective action members, pray that this Court: A. Certify the case as a class action maintainable under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(a), (b)(2) and/or (b)(3), on behalf of the proposed Plaintiff class, and designate Ms. Kassman as the representatives of this class and their counsel of record as class counsel; B. Designate this action as a collective action on behalf of the proposed EPA Collective Plaintiffs (asserting EPA claims) and
(i) promptly issuing notice pursuant to 29 U.S. C.§ 216(b) to all similarly situated members of the EPA Opt-In Class, which (a) apprises them of the pendency of this action, and (b) permits them to assert timely EPA claims in this action by filing individual Consent to Sue forms pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); and
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(ii) tolling the statute of limitations on the claims of all members of the FLSA Opt-In Class from the date the original complaint was filed until the Class members are provided with reasonable notice of the pendency of this action and a fair opportunity to exercise their right to opt-in as Plaintiffs; C. Designate Plaintiff Kassman as representatives of the EPA Collective Action; D. Declare and adjudge that Defendant's employment policies, practices and/or procedures challenged herein are illegal and in violation of the rights of Class Representative and members of the class under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, the New York Executive Law, the New York City Administrative Code, the New York Labor Law, and the Equal Pay Act; E. Issue a permanent injunction against the Defendant and its patiners, officers, trustees, owners, employees, agents, attorneys, successors, assigns, representatives and any and all persons acting in concert with them from engaging in any conduct violating the rights of Plaintiff, class members, and collective action plaintiffs, and those similarly situated as secured by 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., and order such injunctive relief as will prevent Defendant from continuing its discriminatory practices and protect others similarly situated; F. Issue a permanent injunction against Defendant and its partners, officers, trustees, owners, employees, agents, attorneys, successors, assigns, representatives and any and all persons acting in concert with them from engaging in any fmiher unlawful practices, policies, customs, usages, gender discrimination or retaliation by the Defendant as set forth herein; G. Order Defendant to initiate and implement programs that will: (i) provide equal employment opportunities for female Managers; (ii) remedy the effects of the Defendant's past
47

Case 1:11-cv-03743-LGS Document 1 Filed 06/02/11 Page 48 of 50

and present unlawfiJl employment policies, practices and/or procedures; and (iii) eliminate the

continuing effects of the discriminatory and retaliatory practices described above;

H. Order Defendant to initiate and implement systems of assigning, training,

transferring, compensating and promoting female Managers in a non-discriminatory manner;

I.

Order Defendant to establish a task force on equality and fairness to determine the

effectiveness of the programs described in G through H above, which would provide for: (i)

monitoring, rep01ting, and retaining of jurisdiction to ensure equal employment opportunity; (ii)

the assurance that injunctive relief is properly implemented; and (iii) a quarterly report setting

forth information relevant to the determination of the effectiveness of the programs described in

G through H above;

J. Order Defendant to adjust the wage rates and benefits for Plaintiff, class members

and collective action plaintiffs to the level that they would be enjoying but for the Defendant's

discriminatory policies, practices and/or procedures;

K. Order that this Comt retain jurisdiction of this action until such time as the Court

is satisfied that Defendant has remedied the practices complained of herein and is determined to

be in full compliance with the law;

L. Award nominal, compensatory and punitive damages to Plaintiff, class members

and collective action plaintiffs, in excess of 350 million dollars;

M. Award litigation costs and expenses, including, but not limited to, reasonable

attorneys' fees, to Plaintiff, the class members, and the collective action plaintiffs;

N. Award back pay, front pay, lost benefits, preferential rights to jobs and other

damages for lost compensation and job benefits with pre-judgment and post-judgment interest

suffered by Plaintiffs, class members and collective action plaintiffs to be determined at trial;

48

Case 1:11-cv-03743-LGS Document 1 Filed 06/02/11 Page 49 of 50 0. Order Defendant to make whole Plaintiff, class members and collective action plaintiffs by providing them with appropriate lost earnings and benefits, and other affirmative relief; P. Award any other appropriate equitable relief to Plaintiff, class members and collective action plaintiffs; and Q. Award any additional and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper.
JURY DEMAND Plaintiff demands a trial by jury on all issues triable ofl·ight by jury.
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Case 1:11-cv-03743-LGS Document 1 Filed 06/02/11 Page 50 of 50

Dated: June 2, 2011

Respectfully submitted,

Jer

eis1e ( 'I-014 )

Steven L. Wit s (SLW-8110)

Siham Nurhussein (SN-9379)

Deepika Bains (DB-4935)

SANFORD W!TTELS, & HEI$LER, LLP

1350 Avenue of the Americas, 31st Floor

New York, New York 10019

Telephone: (646) 723-2947

Facsimile: (646) 723-2948

swittels@swhlegal.com

Janette Wipper (CA Bar No. 275264)
SANFORD WITTELS & HEISLER, LLP
555 Montgome1'y Street, Suite 1206 San Francisco, CA 94111 Telephone: (415) 391-6900 Facsimile: (415) 391-6901 jwipper@swhlegal.com

Counsel for PlaintiffDonna Kassman and tffe Class

50

 
 Case 1:11-cv-03743-JMF Document 35 Filed 01/06/12 Page 1 of 120

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT Ol< NEW YORK

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DONNA KASSMAN, LINDA

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O'DONNELL, SPARKLE PATTERSON,

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JEANETTE POTTER AND ASHWINI

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VASUDEVA, individually and on behalf of

)

THIRD AMENDED CLASS

a class of similarly-situated female

)

ACTION COMPLAINT

employees,

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Plaintiffs,

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JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

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v.

)

Civ. No. 11-CV-3743 (RJH)

)

KPMGLLP,

)

)

Defendant.

)

Plaintiffs Donna Kassman, Linda O'Donnell, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter and Ashwini Vasudeva ("Plaintiffs," "Named Plaintiffs" or "Class Representatives"), by their attomeys Sanford Wittels & Heisler, LLP, bring this action against KPMG LLP ("KPMG" or the "Company") in their individual capacities and on behalf of a class of female exempt Client Service and Support Professionals, including but not limited to female Associates, Senior Associates, Managers, Senior Managers and Managing Directors (collectively "Professionals"), to redress gender discrimination in employment. Plaintiffs allege upon knowledge as to themselves and their own acts, and otherwise upon information and belief, as follows:

Case 1:11-cv-03743-JMF Document 35 Filed 01/06/12 Page 2 of 120

I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF CLASS-WIDE GENDER, DISCRIMINATION AT KPMG

A. KPMG's Glass Ceililll',;__Discriminatory Denial of Promotions

1. As one of the "Big Four" accounting firms, KPMG is part of an elite cadre of

accountancy and professional services firms that help set industry standards. But rather than use

its vast resources and status to stamp out gender discrimination, KPMG actively perpetuates it.

2.

Women are conspicuously absent from KPMG's leadership. Among the 20

members of KPMG's global executive team, only one, or 5%, is female. 1 Similarly, of the 24

members of the global board, only one, or 4%, is female. 2

3.

Although KPMG's workforce is approximately 50% female, partnership is largely

reserved for men.3 Less than one in five KPMG Patiners is female. 4 Managing Directors are

also predominately male. Even in lower-level management positions such as Manager and Senior

Manager, women only do marginally better, representing approximately one in three managers.

Nonetheless, across KPMG's management ranks, the number of female managers never

approaches parity with their overall representation at the Company.

4.

KPMG's gender hierarchy is all the more jarring considering women have entered

the accounting industry in record numbers for decades. For the past twenty-five years, women have comprised more than half of all accounting graduates. 5 In 2009, women made up 55% of newly hired accounting graduates and 61.8% of all accountants and auditors.6 But despite

1 KPMG Intemational, KPMG Intemational Annual Review 2010: Cutting Through Complexity (2011 ), at 55. 2 Id. at 56. 3 Catalyst, Women in Accounting (2010), at 1, available at http://www.catalyst.org/file/178/gt women in accounting.pdf.} 4 Id. 5 AICPA, AICPA Work/Life and Women's Initiatives 2004 Research. A Decade of Changes in The Accounting Profession: Workforce Trends and Human Capital Practices (2006), at 5, available at http://wmv.awscpa.org/pdfs and docs/ResearchPaperDecadeofChange.pdf. 6 Catalyst, Women in Accounting, at 1.
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Case 1:11-cv-03743-JMF Document 35 Filed 01/06/12 Page 3 of 120

constituting half of the workforce at accounting fitms for decades, women are only 23% of all partners industry-wide and 18% at KPMG.7

5.

At the Big Four- the creme de Ia creme of accounting finns- women fare even

worse than the industry average. Studies show that women are not "moving tlu·ough the pipeline" as quickly at these larger, more elite finns compared to their smaller counterpm1s.8

6.

KPMG is one of the worst offenders. The Company promotes fewer women to

Partner (18%) than the industry average (23%).9 KPMG also promotes fewer women to Senior

Manager (35%) positions than the industry average (44%). 10 KPMG's promotion rate falls below

its competitors, even though KPMG has a similar number of female non-management employees

(48%) as the industry (49%) to groom and mentor for leadership.

7.

Rather than reward high-perf01ming female employees with partnership, KPMG

tracks a disprop011ionate number of these women into non-pm1nership roles as career managers at

drastically lower compensation levels. Industry-wide, 60% of female Senior Managers and 36%

of female Managers have followed lower paid non-partnership career tracks, compared to only 26% of male Senior Managers and 9% of male Managers. 11

8.

These figures make it clear that while male and female accountants may begin

their careers on roughly equal footing, their paths sharply diverge as they ascend up the hierarchy,

particularly at KPMG. Women in the accounting indushy face a number of systemic baniers to

promotion, including lack of visible role models and their exclusion from after-work activities

and other infonnal networking opportunities, reflecting the gender bias of "old boys" networks

1 Id. · 8 AICPA, AICPA Work/Life and Women's Initiatives 2004 Research, at 5.
9 Catalyst, Women in Accounting, at I. 10 Public Accounting Report, Public Accounting Report's 2008 Survey of Women in Public AccountingPercentage of Women by Staff Category (Dec. !5, 2008). 11 Catalyst, Women in ACcounting, at 3.
3

Case 1:11-cv-03743-JMF Document 35 Filed 01/06/12 Page 4 of 120

within these firms. 12

9.

As one accounting professional noted, as women come within reach of making

Partner, "[i]t becomes subtle who's mentored, who's invited out to the important dinners with the

important clients [and] who's groomed to participate in AICPA and state society committees. All

of these are indicative of who is going to be promoted to Partner a year or two or three or four into the future." 13

10. At KPMG, the disctimination is not always so subtle. High-performing female

managers are viewed as interlopers by their male Pminers, as threats by their male peers, and as

individuals unwmihy of respect by their male subordinates. As soon as these women come within

reach of pminership, they are suddenly- without waming or provocation- chastised and removed

from the promotion track before they can infiltrate KPMG's "good old boys" network. By

contrast, male employees who "have an issue working with women" effmilessly ascend through

the ranks at KPMG.

11. Plaintiff Donna Kassman was a casualty of this discriminatory system. After

languishing in a Senior Manager position for a decade, during which she demonstrated stellar

perfonnance, Ms. Kassman was finally "put up" for a promotion to Managing Director. At this

pivotal juncture, a troika of men - Scott Schapiro ("Principal Schapiro"), Principal in Charge of

the National Employment Tax Practice and the person to whom Ms. Kassman reported; John

Montgomery ("Senior Manager Montgomery''), another Senior Manager in Ms. Kassman's

practice; and Jon Stone ("Associate Stone"), an Associate who worked under Ms. Kassman and

Senior Manager Montgomery - conspired to derail her career advancement. Principal Schapiro

12 Catalyst, Women of Color in Accounting (2008), at 31, available at.
http://www.catalyst.org/file/138/woc accounting final book.pdf. 13 Liz Gold, "Women in Accounting: How far to the top?," ACCOUNTING TODAY, available at
http://www.accountingtoday.com/ato issues/2007 18/25549-l.himl (last visited May 19, 20 II).

4

Case 1:11-cv-03743-JMF Document 35 Filed 01/06/12 Page 5 of 120
abmptly removed Ms. Kassman from the promotion track based on unfounded, stereotypical complaints by the other two men about Ms. Kassman' s "tone" and "direct" approach - a complaint never before lodged against her during her 17-year tenure at KPMG. Unilaterally adopting the position of the male troika, the Company instead put up Senior Manager Montgomery for the position that had been slated for Ms. Kassman.
12. Like Ms. Kassman, Plaintiff Jeanette Potter eamed exceptional reviews at KPMG, only to spend a decade stuck in a Senior Manager position. Principal Bmce McLaughlin ("Principal McLaughlin") had only one criticism of Ms. Potter: she did not "schmooze" enough. In fact, Ms. Potter avoided the Company's happy hours - one of the main venues for "schmoozing" - because they were known to be hostile to women; among other things, male Partners did "body shots" off of female employees. Because KPMG's promotion decisions rely substantially on personal relationships built at Company social events that are unwelcoming to women, high-achieving female employees like Ms. Potter are frequently passed over for promotion in favor of their less qualified, but more well-connected, male counterparts.
13. Until 2010, KPMG utilized a 9-box rating system, ranging from EP-1 (exceptional) to NI-9 (needs improvement), for all of its professional staff, across the Company's spectrum of job titles, practice areas, and offices. Each employee was evaluated "The KPMG Way"- a set of criteria which purported to measure behaviors and values but failed to provide a consistent or reliable measure of performance.
14. After the initial round of evaluations, the Partners in each group had discretion to change the ratings to ensure that the employees they had taken under their wing - most of whom were male - were ranked higher relative to their peers, and thus stood a greater chance of being promoted.
5

Case 1:11-cv-03743-JMF Document 35 Filed 01/06/12 Page 6 of 120
15. Upon infmmation and belief, female employees were disproportionately and discriminatorily downgraded and undervalued within K.PMG's performance review system, which is uniform tlu·oughout the Company. The Company's new 5-point evaluation system, introduced last year, suffers from the same defects.
16. Upon information and belief, KPMG's performance evaluation system's insufficient standards, quality controls and implementation metrics, coupled with its lack of transparency and opportunities for redress, had a discriminatory and disparate impact on women and caretaking employees.
17. K.PMG employees are promoted within a system that is insufficiently designed, articulated, explained or implemented to consistently, reliably or fairly develop and promote excellent employees. Promotions are not based upon tme comparative performance as they lack transparency and sufficient quality controls in their design and implementation.
18. KPMG's promotion procedures and practices reflect and codify the biases of the Company's mostly male management and, naturally, have a disparate impact on the Company's female employees. Even when ostensibly based on perfmmance, Partners have discretion to promote those within the "good old boys" club based on factors such as friendship and social connections or to otherwise give undue weight to these or other improper factors. Participation in male-dominated social activities-such as golf outings and after-work happy hours (where body shots might be consumed off of female employees) are among criteria that may be considered for evaluation, compensation and advancement within K.PMG.
19. KPMG was able to and systematically did derail the advancement of highperforming female Professionals who were viewed as a threat, who were wrongly cast as less committed to their careers, or who the Company wanted to push out for other discriminatory
6

Case 1:11-cv-03743-JMF Document 35 Filed 01/06/12 Page 7 of 120

reasons. 20. The Company's promotion practices consistently result in males being promoted
more rapidly and assigned more frequently to higher positions than women within and across levels Company-wide. Although KPMG has had knowledge of these stark gender disparities for decades, it has been deliberately indifferent towards them.
21. Countless women have progressed along KPMG's standard career track with rave reviews, only to find their career ambitions shattered by KPMG's glass ceiling.
B. "You Don't Need the il'Jonev Because You Have a Nice Engagement Ring"' Pay Discrimination at KPMG
22. Upon information and belief, KPMG's female Professionals are not only underpromoted, but underpaid as well.
23. Recent reports on the accounting industry have found that female Associates, Senior Associates, Managers and Senior Managers are systematically paid less than their male colleagues, with white male Senior Managers out-earning their female counterparts by $53,000 on average. 14 This pay disparity is even greater at the Partner level. 15
24. Far from disproving this industry-wide trend, KPMG actively perpetuates it. Because KPMG employs a compensation system that has insufficient quality standards, controls, and implementation metrics, and lacks transparency and opportunities for redress or challenge, its compensation practices have had a disparate impact on the Company's female employees.
25. Upon infonnation and belief, KPMG management systematically took advantage of the flaws in the system by paying female employees less than similarly situated male employees. This pattern and practice of discrimination stems, in part, from an antiquated

14 Catalyst, Women of Color in Accounting, at 50 (discussing survey results from top 20 revenue-generating U.S.

accounting firms).

·

15 ld.

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Case 1:11-cv-03743-JMF Document 35 Filed 01/06/12 Page 8 of 120
adherence to the idea that if there is a husband who acts as a "breadwinner" in the home, then there is no need for a woman to work at all or to be compensated at the same level as a male employee.
26. For example, in an egregious act of discrimination, KPMG slashed Ms. Kassman's base salary by $20,000 while she was on matemity leave because she was paid "too much." KPMG cited no business justification for slashing her salary~ and indeed, could not, as Ms. Kassman was a top-notch performer. When Ms. Kassman complained about the salary cut and wanted to discuss ways for her to eam back the $20,000 that was taken from her, her male supervising Patiner asserted that she did not need the money because she "ha[d] a nice engagement ring."
27. Similarly, when KPMG fired Plaintiff Linda O'Donnell on her first day back from maternity leave, Partner True To ("Patiner To") reassured her that she "should be fine without a job" because her husband "rna[de] a lot of money."
28. Like Ms. Kassman and many other female Professionals, Ms. Potter was told she was "paid too much," even though her less experienced male counterparts eamed more than her. Ms. Potter received no pay increases during her last four years of employment at KPMG, despite her consistently strong perfmmance.
29. Moreover, KPMG's compensation policies and practices regarding flexible workers have a disparate impact on the Company's female employees. Employees who avail themselves of KPMG's flexible work anangements ~ the overwhelming majority of whom are working mothers and other women ~ are forced to accept reduced pay while still working fulltime schedules and being held to vhiually full-time standards.
30. At KPMG, salary increases and bonuses are based largely on a performance
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Case 1:11-cv-03743-JMF Document 35 Filed 01/06/12 Page 9 of 120
evaluation system that is insufficiently designed, atiiculated, explained or implemented to consistently, reliably or fairly compensate strong-perfmming employees. Upon information and belief, KPMG's discriminatory performance evaluation system has resulted in the under-payment of female Professionals at all levels throughout the Company.
31. In addition, the compensation system as a whole lacks the adequate quality standards and controls and implementation metrics to consistently or reliably result in compensation decisions that con·elate with an employee's overall quality or contributions to the Company. The lack of transparency and sufficient oppmiunities or systems for redress result in women being systematically undercompensated.
C. The "Scarlet F": Pregnancy/Caregiver Discrimination at KPMG 32. In addition to the systematic discrimination faced by female Professionals at KPMG, female employees with children also face discrimination based on their status as caregivers and/or pregnant women. 33. KPMG promotes a corporate culture whereby female employees are made to feel they cannot have successful careers after they have children. Indeed, at least one Partner explicitly suggested that women should go on part-time schedules or move away from his practice group when they become mothers. Another Patiner has stated that he believes pregnant women are incapable of doing their jobs and that he did not see how a working mother could "tend to a child and work at KPMG at the same time." 34. Ms. Kassman hoped to be the one to prove them wrong. As a female manager with an impressive seventeen-year career at KPMG and two children under the age of seven, Ms. Kassman set out to demonstrate that one could be both a good mother and a successful manager at the Company. Indeed, KPMG and Ms. Kussman's supervisors publicly touted her as a role model
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for other working mothers. 35. However, Ms. Kassman quickly discovered that KPMG's purported support for
female employees and working mothers was just a sham. After she gave birth to her first child in 2003, Ms. Kassman's career advancement at KPMG - which had previously progressed at a steady clip - came to a screeching halt. KPMG abruptly cut her salary while she was on matemity leave and - as if this did not send a clear enough message - placed her on a Performance Improvement Plan ("PIP") upon her return to work.
36. Ms. Kassman's experience as a working mother at KPMG is far from unique. Plaintiff Ashwini Vasudeva, a Senior Associate in the Company's Mountain View, California office, faced swift and ongoing retaliation following her decision to go on matemity leave. After she became a mother, Ms. Vasudeva, who had always earned stellar reviews, was abruptly removed from her largest, most lucrative engagement; was assigned to projects without any staff to support her; and was passed over for promotion in favor of a less-experienced male employee.
37. Plaintiff Sparkle Patterson, an award-winning Associate in KPMG's Atlanta office, also fell victim to the Company's pregnancy/caregiver discrimination. Although the standard promotion track at KPMG provides for the promotion of Associates to Senior Associates after two years, Ms. Patterson never received a promotion during her three-and-a-half year tenure with the Company, despite her exceptional perf01mance. When Ms. Patterson retumed fi·om matemity leave, her work load was decreased and her repeated requests for work were systematically denied, leaving her with virtually no billable work, even though she was available and willing to work long hours.
38. Ms. O'Donnell, a Senior Associate in the Atlanta office, suffered a similar fate. Shortly after notifying her supervising Partner that she was pregnant and planned to take
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maternity leave, Ms. O'Donnell was denied a promotion to a Manager position for which she was abundantly qualified. Just weeks before she mmounced her pregnancy, Ms. O'Donnell's Perfonnance Manager and various others had reassured her that she was on track for promotion. Adding insult to injury, KPMG terminated Ms. O'Donnell on her very first day back from matemity leave.
39. Although KPMG touts its flexible work schedule plan as proving it supp01is working mothers, the reality is that working mothers are often forced to take a so-called "reduced" schedule for less pay- but are still expected to shoulder the same responsibilities as their full-time counterparts. These mothers accept reduced pay only to avoid unfair and discriminatory heightened scmtiny and wrongful tennination.
40. KPMG has what amounts to a "don't ask, don't tell" policy regarding flexible schedules for working mothers with young children. Employees who avail themselves of the Company's flex time option- the overwhelming majority of whom are working mothers- rarely discuss it freely and are ultimately penalized for it. One of KPMG's male Pminers even commented that women who are on flexible plans "work exactly their x hours and not a minute over" and "you know they're not going to get anywhere [at KPMG]."
41. Indeed, when Plaintiff Kassman- the first flex worker in her practice- moved to a "reduced" schedule upon her retum from maternity leave, she was made to feel like she had a scarlet "F" on her chest for "flex time benefit taker." As it tums out, flex time as a result of motherhood is not viewed as a badge of honor, but a source of shame and a handicap at KPMG. "Having it all" remains a pipe dream.
42. KPMG discriminates against its female employees by assuming they are less committed to their careers - a gender stereotype that the Company's male employees do not have
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to overcome. Upon information and belief, of the few working mothers who have managed to break through KPMG's glass ceiling, most- like Patricia Brown ("Principal Brown"), Ptincipal in Charge of the East for the International Executive Services ("IES") practice - have a stay-athome spouse, a luxury that the ovetwhelming maj01ity of KPMG's female employees do not have. Indeed, one study of the accounting industry revealed that 46% of male professionals employed by large national/intemational films have stay-at-home spouses, compared to only II% of female professionals. 16 And, even if men work a flexible work schedule, they can do so free of gender stereotypes and are therefore less likely than their female countetparts to experience a negative career impact as a result. 17
43. Given this discriminatory culture, it is no wonder that female employees especially working mothers- are a rarity in KPMG's upper ranks. Taking leave or going on flex time for pregnancy and caretaking reasons can weigh as a negative factor within KPMG's evaluation, compensation, development and promotion systems, which have insufficient standards, quality controls, implementation metlics, and transparency, and which lack means of redress to prevent or cotTect this discrimination.
D. "He 1l1ight Have an Issue Working with Women": KPMG's Hostile Work Environment and Retaliation
44. As a recent report noted, "With women... joining the accounting industry at an increasing rate, firms are faced with the job of creating more inclusive environments in a traditionally white, male-dominated, 'up-or-out' culture."18 KPMG has clearly failed to rise to this challenge.
45. At KPMG, female employees routinely experience harassment and unequal
16 AJCPA, AICPA Work/Life and Women's Initiatives 2004 Research, at 39. 17 Id. at 34. 18 Catalyst, Women of Color in Accounting, at I.
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treatment. In particular, once they become poised to assume positions of greater authority, female employees frequently encounter gender hostility, including hypocritical and unfounded criticisms and other attempts to derail their career advancement.
46. Ms. Kassman's experience in many ways typifies that of KPMG's female Professionals. In late 2008, after more than fifteen years of hard work and impressive achievements at the Company, Ms. Kassman was finally told she was next in line for a promotion to Managing Director. But rather than support Ms. Kassman, her male colleagues reacted with overt hostility. One of Ms. Kassman's male subordinates, Associate Stone, suddenly complained that he "didn't like [her] tone." He and Senior Manager Montgomery, one of Ms. Kassman's peers, complained that Ms. Kassman was "unapproachable" and "too direct," a thinly veiled gender-based criticism - pmiicularly given these two men's "direct" personalities, which are embraced by senior leadership at KPMG.
47. Even though Ms. Kassman's supervisor, Principal Schapiro, acknowledged that Associate Stone "might have an issue working with women," neither Associate Stone nor Senior Manager Montgomery was disciplined for his discriminatory conduct. Instead, the Company took these two male employees' unfounded and gender-biased complaints at face value, and repeatedly interrogated Ms. Kassman about her behavior, ultimately recommending that she consult a "coach" to resolve these trumped up issues.
48. Rather than address Ms. Kassman's complaints of discrimination, KPMG retaliated against her by removing her fi·om the promotion track, instead "putting up" her harasser (Senior Manager Montgomery) for the Managing Director position once slotted for her.
49. As a result of KPMG's hostile work environment, Ms. Kassman - a strong, competent manager with a long and distinguished career at KPMG - was reduced to someone
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who could barely eat or sleep, and took the back elevators at work to avoid mnning into her tormentors. She was ultimately forced to resign from her position because the work environment at KPMG had become unbearable.
50. Upon information and belief, other female Professionals have experienced harassment and retaliation similar to what Ms. Kassman expe1ienced at KPMG. In particular, other female managers have suddenly found themselves targeted and elbowed out by the Company's "old boys" network once they come perilously close to infiltrating the upper ranks of management. At least one Partner has explicitly acknowledged that it is "much harder being a woman" at KPMG.
E. "This Is Three Men Ganging Up on a Woman; We've Had It Be(ore"l KPMG's Deliberate Indifference to Complaints of Discrimination
51. KPMG has long been on notice regarding its Company-wide gender discrimination, but has taken no steps to remedy it.
52. Ms. Kassman repeatedly complained about the disc1imination and harassment she was experiencing, going through all of the requisite channels, including her performance manager, Principal Schapiro; his boss, Principal Brown; the Office of Ethics and Compliance; the Office of General Counsel; and Human Resources. Every step of the way, the Company reacted with indifference and simply passed the buck.
53. Even while acknowledging that the facts presented by Ms. Kassman were undisputed, KPMG sat on its hands and allowed the discrimination and harassment to continue unabated. Throughout the complaint process, the Company seemed more concerned about offending Ms. Kassman's harassers than the harassment itself. In fact, all of the "solutions" proposed by KPMG treated Ms. Kassman as the source of the problem.
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54. Other female employees have also complained about KPMG's discrimination, only to have their complaints fall on deaf ears. For example, Ms. Patterson repeatedly
complained over the course of a year about the discrimination she was facing to HR and Ethics
and Compliance. However, KPMG failed to do anything to resolve the situation, forcing Ms. Patterson to leave the Company.
55. In yet another situation, HR not only failed to investigate the complaints of discrimination but failed to intervene when male managers then retaliated against the female complainant, ultimately forcing her from the Company.
56. KPMG's mishandling of these repeated complaints highlights various systemwide flaws in the Company's complaint mechanisms, including inadequate reporting mechanisms; the lack of a defined cham1el to report complaints of discrimination and harassment; insufficiently defined and implemented investigation procedures; inadequate training of HR and other professionals tasked with addressing complaints of discrimination and harassment; and the leadership's willingness to allow discrimination and an "old boys" culture to flourish at the Company.
57. The blatant disregard and indifference displayed by KPMG towards complaints of discrimination is all the more shocking given the Company's awareness that these problems are systemic. As Vicki Sweeney ("Principal Sweeney''), Principal in Charge of Ethics and Compliance, told Ms. Kassman, "This is three men ganging up on a woman. We've had it before."
* * *
58. Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of similarly situated female employees Company-wide, including but not limited to Associates,
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Senior Associates, Managers, Senior Managers and Managing Directors, to remedy the gender discrimination they have witnessed and experienced during their years of exemplaty service to KPMG. The lawsuit is designed to achieve systemic injunctive relief and to change KPMG's discriminatmy employment policies, practices and/or procedures based on gender, including: (1) assigning female Professionals to lower titles than similarly-situated male employees; (2) paying female Professionals less than their male counterparts; (3) denying female Professionals promotion and advancement opportunities in favor of male employees; (4) treating pregnant employees and mothers differently from non-pregnant employees, male employees, and noncaregivers; and (5) failing to prevent, respond to, adequately investigate, and/or appropriately resolve instances of gender discrimination and pregnancy/caregiver discrimination in the workplace.
59. Had the changes sought been in place previously, Plaintiffs might still be employed there and might, in fact, be able to pursue careers there moving fmward should those changes come about as a result of this action.
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 60. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this suit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a)(l), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(f), et seq., as amended ("Title VII"), the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206, et seq., the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S. C. § 2601, et seq., the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, et seq., as amended, and supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
61. Venne is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f) because Defendant KPMG is headquartered and conducts substantial business in this
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District, and because Plaintiffs Kassman and Potter were employees ofKPMG's New York, New York office when the unlawful employment practices were committed.
62. Plaintiffs have standing to bring this suit as Plaintiff Kassman has duly filed her administrative charge before the EEOC and received her Notice of Right to Sue on March 9, 2011. Ms. Kassman's administrative charge gave notice of the class-wide nature of the allegations, including those alleged by the other Named Plaintiffs.
III. THE PARTIES 63. Plaintiff DONNA KASSMAN is a resident of New York. Plaintiff was
employed at KPMG in its New York, New York office as an Associate, a Senior Associate, a Manager, and then a Senior Manager from April 1993 until her constructive discharge from the Company in October 2010.
64. Plaintiff LINDA O'DONNELL is a resident of Georgia. Plaintiff was employed at KPMG in its Johannesburg, South Africa office as an Associate, a Senior Associate, and a Manager from January 2003 through August 2006, then in its Atlanta, Georgia office as a Senior Associate from September 2006 until her wrongful termination in April2009.
65. Plaintiff SPARKLE PATTERSON is a resident of Florida. Plaintiff was employed at KPMG in its Atlanta, Georgia office as an Associate fi·om June 2007 until her constructive discharge from the Company in November 2010.
66. Plaintiff JEANETTE POTTER is a resident of New York. Plaintiff was employed at KPMG in its New York, New York office as a Manager, then a Senior Manager ii'om July 1995 until her constructive discharge in July 2006.
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67. Plaintiff ASIIWINI VASUDEVA is a resident of California. Plaintiff was employed at KPMG in its Mountain View, Califomia office as an Associate, then a Senior Associate, from January 2005 until her constructive discharge from the Company in September 2009.
68. Defendant KPMG LLP ("KPMG" or the "Company") is an audit, tax, and advisory services firm headqumiered in New York, New York. It is the U.S. member fi1m of KPMG International, which is headquartered in the Netherlands. In 2011, KPMG reported global revenues of$22.7 billion.
~V. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS A. PLAINTIFF DONNA KASSMAN 69. Ms. Kassman suffered discrimination in pay, denial of promotional opportunities,
discrimination as a result of pregnancy, and a hostile work environment. She was ultimately constructively discharged.
70. In April of 1993, Ms. Kassman began working at KPMG as an Associate. She had previously earned her Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the University of Michigan in 1989 and completed her law degree in 1992.
71. For promotions from entry-level Associates to Senior Managers, KPMG uses a standard career progression track, which advances employees on a schedule of approximately every two years in the following order: Associate, Senior Associate, Manager, and Senior Manager.
72. In the years after Ms. Kassman began working at KPMG, she steadily progressed along the Company's standard career track. In 1995, Ms. Kassman became a Senior Associate,
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and two years later, in 1997, she advanced to the position of Manager. In 1999, Ms. Kassman went on to become a Senior Manager- the position in which she would be stuck for eleven years, before ultimately being pushed out of the Company.
73. Throughout her seventeen-year tenure, Ms. Kassman demonstrated stellar perfmmance at KPMG.
74. In Ms. Kassman's Fiscal Year 2006 Year End Perfmmance Review ("Review"), Principal Schapiro, to whom she directly repmied, wrote that she "contributed greatly to the ·overall success of the practice" and that "stafflook to her for guidance."
75. The following year, in Ms. Kassman's 2007 Review, he wrote that Plaintiff"had a very strong year."
76. Principal Schapiro wrote in Ms. Kassman's 2008 Review that she "had a very successful FY 2008, and ha[d] shown excellent leadership abilities."
77. He wrote in Ms. Kassman's 2009 Review that she "did all the tight things from a business perspective to be successful," that she "ha[d] been a leader in the office, and ha[d] been forward thinking."
78. In Ms. Kassman's 2010 Review, Ptincipal Schapiro wrote that she again had "a very strong year."
Disparate Pay 79. Upon information and belief, KPMG paid Ms. Kassman less than similarlysituated male employees, despite her exemplary perfmmance; she was paid at a lower rate than men for equal work on jobs requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which were performed under similar working conditions.
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80. Ten years after joining KPMG, Ms. Kassman went on maternity leave in May 2003, just before the birth of her first child in June 2003.
81. While Ms. Kassman was on maternity leave, KPMG abruptly cut her base salary by $20,000 because she was paid "too much." Similar cuts were not made to male counterparts' salaries, and as a result, Ms. Kassman was and continued to be paid $20,000 less than her male counterparts during her tenure at KPMG.
82. For example, Senior Manager Jolm i'viontgomery's pay was not cut in May 2003 or later as a Senior Manager, even though he had joined KPMG after Ms. Kassman, worked under the same Partner, and worked on engagements for similar clients. He performed the same tasks as Ms. Kassman, and upon infmmation and belief, did so with no greater skill or effort than Ms. Kassman, achieving a substantially equivalent level of performance.
83. KPMG cited no business justification for slashing her salary. When Ms. Kassman asked her manager at the time, Gary Rosen ("Partner Rosen"), Pminer in Charge of the Nmiheast State and Local Tax ("SALT") Practice, to reconsider the cut in her salary, he said that she should consider some of her past salary "a loan," implying that she had not earned it for exemplary perfonnance. He also indicated that Ms. Kassman did not need the money because she had a nice engagement ring. Upon infmmation and belief, KPMG disparately paid Ms. Kassman because of her gender and her status as a working mother.
84. In addition, KPMG discriminates against flex time workers - the overwhelming majority of whom are women - by reducing their salaries without a commensurate reduction in responsibilities. While Ms. Kassman perfonned precisely the same tasks after she became a "flex time" employee as male Senior Managers in SALT with her experience level, she received less in salary than male and non-caretaking Senior Managers. These conditions did not change fi·om
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when she began the flex time plan after returning from maternity leave in 2004 until she departed from the Company in 2010.
85. Upon information and belief, Ms. Kassman was not the only woman to suffer the effects of the compensation policies and practices at KPMG, which lacked sufficient standards and quality controls, transparency, implementation metrics, and oppmtunities for redress that would otherwise have ensured there was no disparate impact on female professionals.
86. Upon information and belief, KPMG management systematically took advantage of the flaws in the system by paying female employees less than similarly situated male employees. KPMG underpays female Professionals at all levels throughout the Company relative to similarly situated male employees.
Denial of Promotions 87. Despite Ms. Kassman's stellar qualifications and performance, KPMG denied her promotions in favor of lesser-qualified male employees. The Company's evaluation and promotion systems' insufficient quality standards and controls and implementation metrics, coupled with their lack of transparency and oppmtunities for redress, had a discriminatory and disparate impact on women and caretaking employees. 88. Throughout Ms. Kassman's last decade as a Senior Manager at KPMG, she consistently expressed interest in a promotion to Managing Director and ultimately to Partner. After several strong performance years and numerous requests for advancement, Principal Schapiro finally told Ms. Kassman she was next in line for a promotion in the employment tax practice. In December 2008, Principal Schapiro confirmed that Ms. Kassman would be put up for a promotion to Tax Managing Director effective for the Fiscal Year 2009/2010 beginning October
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1, 2009. The promotion decision was to be made during the summer of 2009. However, Ms. Kassman was not promoted that year, despite her strong perfotmance.
89. In early 2009, Ms. Kassman successfully completed the formal Leadership Evaluation & Assistance Program ("LEAP") for the KPMG SALT Practice in preparation for her promotion to Managing Director. According to Ms. Kassman's 2009 Review, she "successfully presented and navigated the SALT LEAP program and received favorable reviews." She presented to the National Partner in Charge of the SALT Practice, Tim Gillis, who told her that she had his vote.
90. In mid-2009, Principal Schapiro again continued that Ms. Kassman was next in line for a promotion in her practice. On at least one occasion in or around summer 2009, Ben Garfunkel ("Partner Garfunkel"), the National Partner in Charge of IES, echoed Principal Schapiro's comments by stating that he knew Ms. Kassman was "in queue" to make Managing Director. Ms. Kassman's status was specifically a point of discussion with Pminer Garfunkel since she was leaving the SALT Practice (where she was presented for promotion) and entering the IES practice, of which he was the leader. Ms. Kassman wanted confitmation that she would not lose her "next in line" status by switching practices.
91. In Ms. Kassman's 2009 Review, Principal Schapiro wrote that "an effmi was made to promote Donna to TMD effective fy '1 0... ,"but explained that it did not happen because of the economy. Principal Schapiro also told Ms. Kassman that no one would receive a promotion to Managing Director at that time due to the economy, but that she would remain first in line.
92. Shotily after Ms. Kassman was "put-up" for promotion and proceeded through the fonnal channels set up by the SALT Practice (i.e., the LEAP program) in 2009, Senior Manager
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Montgomery and his direct subordinate, Associate Stone, lodged unfounded complaints about her. Although Ms. Kassman had never received a similar complaint in her seventeen years with KPMG, Associate Stone and Senior Manager Montgomery claimed she was considered "unapproachable" and "too direct," a thinly-veiled gender-based criticism, particularly given the abundance of"direct" male personalities in the senior leadership ofKPMG.
93. As a result of Associate Stone's and Senior Manager Montgomery's unfounded and gendered complaints, KPMG removed Ms. Kassman from the promotion track sometime in late 2009 or early 2010, when a candidate is typically put up for promotion.
94. In December 2009, Ms. Kassman again discussed with Principal Schapiro whether she would be put up for the Managing Director position for the 2010/2011 fiscal year beginning October 1, 2010. Although Principal Schapiro had previously assured Ms. Kassman that she was next in line for the promotion, he claimed that he "[didn't] know anything about making Tax Managing Director in the IES practice," and instead referred Ms. Kassman to Principal Brown.
95. At Principal Schapiro's suggestion, Ms. Kassman met with Principal Brown in January 2010 to discuss her career. When Ms. Kassman brought up the Managing Director position, Principal Brown said that Ms. Kassman's name had never come up, that she was not on the list of candidates for that year, and that it was too late for her name to be submitted. Principal Brown later acknowledged that she had lied about the list of candidates being closed.
96. In April 2010, Ms. Kassman learned from a colleague that Senior Manager Montgomery was up for promotion to Managing Director for the 2010/2011 Fiscal Year- the same position that had previously been slated for Ms. Kassman. Principal Schapiro had apparently - without informing Ms. Kassman - removed her from the promotion track and
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replaced her with Senior Manager Montgomery, even though he had a shorter tenure with the Company, fewer years as Senior Manager, and less professional experience overall than Ms. Kassman by several years. Upon information and belief, no male Senior Managers were removed from the Managing Director track in this abiUpt fashion.
97. Ms. Kassman was a victim of Associate Stone's and Senior Manager Montgomery's discriminatory campaign to derail a female employee's advancement to Managing Director- an effort that KPMG's partnership not only failed to stop, but actively canied out.
98. Upon information and belief, KPMG has perpetrated and/or condoned similar discriminatory campaigns to derail the careers of other successful female Professionals who were poised to assume positions of greater authority and influence within the Company.
99. Upon information and belief, KPMG's performance evaluation system's insufficient quality standards and controls and implementation metrics, coupled with its lack of transparency and opportunities for redress, had a discriminatory and disparate impact on women and caretaking employees.
100. Upon infom1ation and belief, KPMG management systematically took advantage of the flaws in the system and often undervalued, mismeasured, or othetwise inaccurately captured perfonnance to the particular detriment of women and mothers. In addition, unfounded criticism can be included and legitimate criticism given undue weight. Within this flawed system, leave for pregnancy and caretaking responsibilities can constitute a negative factor in female Professionals' evaluations, compensation decisions and promotion considerations at KPMG.
101. Moreover, KPMG's flawed promotion practices consistently result in males being promoted more rapidly and assigned more frequently to higher positions than women across the Company.
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Pregl\ancy/Caregiver :Qisct}mi~~tiOJl 102. From 2003 until her constructive discharge in 2010, KPMG discriminated against Ms. Kassman based on her gender due to her caregiving responsibilities as a working mother. Because of Ms. Kassman's status as a working mother, KPMG continuously subjected her to disparate treatment, and also made adverse decisions concerning her employment. I03. From 1993 until 1999, before Ms. Kassman had her children, she was promoted on KPMG's progressive career track from Associate to Senior Manager. However, after she had her first child in 2003, her advancement abruptly stopped. She was not promoted after she became a Senior Manager and remained in this position for over ten years as she watched men and individuals without p1imary caretaking responsibilities-who shared her level of experience, responsibility and skill-proceed to Managing Director and Pminer positions. 104. Upon information and belief, there were only a handful of female managers with small children in the Northeast SALT Practice during Ms. Kassman's tenure with the Company. Ms. Kassman was the first in her practice to work a flexible schedule. 105. Even though Ms. Kassman hit the glass ceiling shortly after having children, KPMG and Principal Schapiro touted her as a role model for working mothers. In practice, however, KPMG and Principal Schapiro in pmiicular did not support Ms. Kassman's efforts to be a successful working mother. 106. In addition to slashing Ms. Kassman's salary while she was on maternity leave, KPMG took a number of adverse employment actions against her. For example, in March of 2004, shortly after Ms. Kassman's maternity leave ended, Plincipal Schapiro gave Ms. Kassman her first negative review at the Company for not meeting her goals. Instead of taking her leave into account in measuring Ms. Kassman's goal attainment for the year, P1incipal Schapiro
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penalized her for it. 107. As a fi.niher penalty for taking maternity leave, Principal Schapiro put Plaintiff on
a 60-day PIP, increasing her goals upon her return from matemity leave. Shmtly before being slapped with a PIP, Ms. Kassman told Principal Schapiro that she planned to move to a flexible work schedule. Principal Schapiro placed Ms. Kassman's PIP in between papers on her desk (including the flexible plan paperwork that she was preparing to submit), seemingly in an attempt to avoid drawing attention to the PIP.
108. Before placing Ms. Kassman on a PIP, Principal Schapiro had never indicated to Ms. Kassman that her performance was unsatisfactory or that she was in jeopardy of being placed on a PIP. Shocked and dismayed by this unexpected development, Ms. Kassman spoke to Sharon Katz-Pearlman, another Pminer at the Company, who confirmed that there was nothing in Ms. Kassman's perfmmance record that would support the imposition of a PIP before she had her baby.
I 09. Two years later, Principal Schapiro again penalized Ms. Kassman for taking maternity leave when she had her second child. He again held her to higher standards than her peers after returning from leave. He also wrote in her 2006 Review that her work was "somewhat abbreviated due to Donna's maternity leave."
11 0. From 2004 until her constructive discharge in 20 I 0, Ms. Kassman worked a reduced schedule under KPMG's flexible schedule policy. Although the Company reduced Ms. Kassman's pay in proportion to her reduced schedule, it held her to the same or higher performance standards than full-time employees. If she did not meet full-time standards on her reduced schedule, Ms. Kassman was penalized and considered less cmmnitted to her career. Her flexible schedule essentially acted as a "penalty" on her employment opportunities at KPMG.
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111. While Ms. Kassman was working on a reduced schedule, KPMG essentially expected her to do the job of a full-time Senior Manager in fewer hours and for less pay. For example, her job requirements related to marketing, teaching, speaking, coaching, administrative, and client development were the same job requirements of full-time Senior Managers. \Vhen KPMG evaluated Ms. Kassman's work performance, the Company measured her against the requirements of a full-time employee. Indeed, both of Plaintiff's direct supervisors - Principal Schapiro and Partner Rosen - acknowledged this by writing in her LEAP Nomination Form, "Although she works a reduced hourly schedule, she has the same responsibilities as eve1y other Senior Manager in the Practice."
112. Upon infonnation and belief, other female Professionals who took maternity leave and had caregiving responsibilities faced similar systemic barriers to equal employment opportunities at KPMG. In pmiicular, Ms. Kassman's department, the SALT practice, had a poor track record of retaining working mothers. KPMG fired several working mothers within the SALT practice, including one who was pregnant, and forced others out of the Company under circumstances similar to Ms. Kassman's.
113. Upon information and belief, taking leave or hours reductions for pregnancy and caretaking reasons is considered a negative factor in employees' evaluations, compensation decisions and promotion considerations, resulting in an adverse impact on women and mothers at the Company. The Company's policies and procedures regarding evaluation, compensation and promotion lack the transparency, standards, quality controls, implementation metrics, and means for redress necessary to prevent this disparate impact on female Professionals who are pregnant or mothers.
114. KPMG's overwhelmingly female flexible workers are denied not only the pay
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they deserve, but also various other Company benefits. For example, in early 2010, the Company's Stamford office adopted a policy requiring employees to be in the office a minimum of three days per week in order to qualify for office space. This policy had a disparate impact on female employees such as Ms. Kassman, who had three "in-office" days (per her flex time agreement), one of which was typically spent out of the office generating business.
115. In addition, because most of KPMG's relationship-building activities occur after hours, employees with p1imary caregiving responsibilities - the majority of whom are women are at a disadvantage in their career development. For example, when Ms. Kassman expressed concem to Partner Rosen about her $20,000 salary cut, he suggested that she socialize at KPMG's weekly happy hours as a way to ingratiate herself with the Company's leadership and advance her career. Ms. Kassman explained that, because she had young children, she could not attend happy . hours, but was more than willing to meet with people over lunch, breakfast or coffee.
116. The few women who have advanced to the partnership ranks at KPMG have done so by sac1ificing their personal lives and abandoning any semblance of work-life balance. For example, KPMG frequently touted a Partner in the Atlanta office, Tammy Hunter, as a role model for other working mothers because she called the Company to discuss work matters on her way to the delivery room to give birth to her child. The Company apparently viewed this as a level of dedication to which other working mothers should aspire.
117. Aside from these rare exceptions, working mothers have been unable to make significant imoads at KPMG - and are unlikely to do so given the Company's discriminatory culture, which, in combination with insufficiently designed and articulated systems of evaluation, compensation, development, and promotion, produces an adverse impact on working mothers. In May 2010, Ms. Kassman was at dinner during an American Payroll Association conference with
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several colleagues, including the Partner in charge of the West IES practice, Ray Pascuzzi ("Partner Pascuzzi"). At this dinner, Partner Pascuzzi proclaimed that "part time women work exactly their x hours and not a minute over," that "you know you can't make them work anymore," and that "you know they're not going to get anywhere."
Hostile Work Environment 118. From late 2009 until her constructive discharge in October 2010, Ms. Kassman suffered increasing harassment and unequal treatment at KPMG. 119. Beginoing in October 2009, Associate Stone began complaining that he "didn't like [Ms. Kassman's] tone." Senior Manager Montgomery agreed with these complaints. Together, these two men complained that Ms. Kassman was "unapproachable" and "too direct," a gender-based criticism, particularly given Associate Stone's and Senior Manager Montgomery's "direct" personalities, which are embraced by senior leadership at KPMG. Principal Schapiro, her Perfonnance Manager, conveyed these unfounded criticisms to Ms. Kassman directly in infonnal evaluations. Nonetheless, KPMG did not conect Associate Stone's or Senior Manager Montgomery's discriminatory behavior. 120. In addition to complaining about Ms. Kassman's "tone," Associate Stone also complained about her flexible work schedule. Consistent with the work-life balance priorities marketed at KPMG, the Company had approved Ms. Kassman's schedule after the birth of her first child. However, Associate Stone disapproved of Ms. Kassman's flexible work schedule and complained - again, without basis - that it forced him to "work harder" from Monday until Thursday. 121. KPMG did nothing to conect Associate Stone's discriminatory actions, even though Principal Schapiro told Ms. Kassman in March 2010 that Associate Stone "might have an
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issue working with women." Moreover, when Ms. Kassman complained about Associate Stone's conduct, Principal Schapiro replied that he did not know if Associate Stone was "unprofessional, stupid or vicious." Despite Principal Schapiro's admission regarding Associate Stone's inappropriate and discriminatory behavior, upon information and belief, KPMG took no steps to respond to Ms. Kassman's concerns.
122. Instead of disciplining Associate Stone, KPMG constantly reprimanded Ms. Kassman as a result of Associate Stone's and Senior Manager Montgomery's gender-based criticisms. For example, KPMG forced Ms. Kassman to participate in an excessive number of stressful meetings and intense interrogations, often occurring on a weekly basis, from late 2009 until mid-2010. During the meetings, Ms. Kassman was questioned about her "tone" and other gendered complaints like her "direct" approach. This harassment and unequal treatment was extremely disruptive and distressing to Ms. Kassman both personally and professionally.
123. After months of meetings, the Company encouraged Ms. Kassman to consult with a "coach" to resolve issues concerning Associate Stone's and Senior Manager Montgomery's discriminatory complaints and harassment. By issning such a reprimand to Ms. Kassman, KPMG chose to believe these two men's unfounded complaints over her longstanding "very strong" performance and collaborative work style. At the time, Associate Stone - who was widely regarded as an "asshole" - had only been at the Company for approximately sixteen months, whereas Ms. Kassman had been there for sixteen years.
124. Instead of disciplining Mr. Stone for his discriminatory conduct, KPMG promoted Mr. Stone to a Senior Associate position and recently promoted him to Manager.
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125. Instead of resolving Ms: Kassman's complaints of discrimination, KPMG removed her ftom the promotion track as a result of the gender-biased c1iticisms leveled against her.
126. When the work environment in KPMG's New York office became unbearable, Ms. Kassman sought to work only ti·om the Company's Stamford office in order to avoid her tormentors. KPMG temporarily granted this request in October 2009, only to effectively rescind the option six months later. Per Ms. Kassman's flex time agreement, she spent three days "inoffice" and two working from home. However, at least one of Ms. Kassman's "in-office" days was typically spent out of the office with clients.
127. In early 2010, the Stamford office adopted a policy requiring employees to be "in the office" a minimum of three days per week in order to qualify for office space. Accordingly, the Company forced her to vacate her Stamford office in Apiil201 0. In lieu of an office, KPMG suggested Ms. Kassman could make due with four drawers.
128. . The loss of office space in Stamford made it considerably harder for Ms. Kassman to perfonn her work each day. For example, she had to transport and reanange her work mate1ials and supplies, which was time-consuming and increased her escalating stress level. Moreover, it signified to her colleauges and subordinates that her status within KPMG was diminished, pmiicularly because multiple offices remained unoccupied.
129. Despite available office space, Ken Seal, the Partner in charge of the Stamford office, refused to allow Ms. Kassman to retain an office. The only altemative was for Ms. Kassman to return to a hostile work enviromnent in New York.
130. Thus, KPMG ignored and/or failed to respond to repeated and escalating complaints and concerns regarding discrimination and retaliation and provided her with the
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Hobson's choice of having no real place at KPMG or retuming to the discriminatory environment which KPMG refused to address.
131. These accumulating incidents of harassment, increased scmtiny, and marginalization negatively altered the tenus and conditions of Ms. Kassman's employment at KPMG, and caused her significant stress in both her professional and personal life.
Mishandling of Complaints and Retaliation 132. Upon information and belief, what Human Resources and Ethics and Compliance policies and procedures exist at KPMG, they lack meaningful quality controls, standards, implementation metrics, and means of redress. Concerns about discrimination made to supervising staff and HR itself are allowed to go unaddressed, or worse, to result in further or increased discrimination and retaliation. 133. After Ms. Kassman complained about the harassment and unequal treatment by Associate Stone, Senior Manager Montgomery, and Principal Schapiro, KPMG retaliated against her. 134. Ms. Kassman complained to both the Office of Ethics and Compliance and the Office of General Counsel in April2009 about the ongoing discriminatory treatment towards her. 135. Principal Sweeney, the Principal in Charge of the Office of Ethics and Compliance, told Ms. Kassman, "This is three men ganging up on a woman. We've had it before." 136. However, instead of addressing the discrimination, the Office of Ethics and Compliance suggested that Ms. Kassman try to relocate to another position within KPMG or leave the Company with a "package." On one occasion, Principal Sweeney suggested that Ms.
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Kassman go out on leave for emotional distress, noting that many female employees had done so in the past under similar circumstances.
137. The Office of General Counsel was equally ineffective in addressing Ms. Kassman's complaints of discrimination. After investigating the matter (through David Burns of Finnwide Security) - and finding the facts undisputed - it simply refencd Ms. Kassman to Human Resources because it was unable to come up with an acceptable solution.
138. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Kassman spoke with Keri Fleming, Human Resources Associate Director, East Region Tax, about the ongoing discrimination and harassment she was experiencing. Together, they decided that Human Resources would be Ms. Kassman's mouthpiece to Principal Schapiro because Ms. Kassman would physically shake every time he called her.
139. To minimize contact with her harassers, Ms. Kassman decided that she would try to transfer to another position within KPMG, even if it meant taking a pay cut, assuming an administrative position or having to transfer offices. Human Resources assured Ms. Kassman that it would help with this transition, but failed to follow through on its promise.
140. Moreover, even though Ms. Kassman told Human Resources that she did not want to discuss the matter any further with Pdncipals Schapiro and Brown, she continued to receive calls from them. From the tenor of those conversations, it was clear to Ms. Kassman that Principals Schapiro and Brown thought she simply needed time to "cool off' and would eventually resume working with Senior Manager Montgomery and Associate Stone.
141. After Principal Schapiro was informed of Ms. Kassman's complaints, she faced a number of adverse employment actions. KPMG reprimanded her with a "coach," forced her to sit through numerous meetings and intetTOgations in response to Senior Manager Montgomery's and
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Associate Stone's gender-based criticisms of her, and ultimately removed her from the promotion track.
142. By contrast, KPMG did not discipline Associate Stone, Senior Manager Montgomery, or Principal Schapiro in any way. In fact, the Company promoted Associate Stone and, adding insult to injury, "put up" Senior Manager Montgomery for the Managing Director position once slotted for Ms. Kassman.
Constructive Discharge 143. Ms. Kassman was forced to end her career at KPMG on October 1, 2010 because the Company had deliberately made her working conditions so intolerable that she was compelled to resign involuntarily. Although it had been her goal to continue at KPMG and eventually reach the Partnership level, the escalating harassment and hostility she faced from her peers and supervisors - to which HR turned a blind eye - crushed these hopes. It became clear to her that not only had her career stalled, but that she was being marginalized and ultimately pushed out of the Company against her will. Indeed, the only options provided to her by HR and Ethics and Compliance were to continue working with her harassers or to leave the Company. 144. Associate Stone and Senior Manager Montgomery's unfounded criticisms of Ms. Kassman, which were exacerbated and reinforced by the "coaching" and intenogations KPMG forced her to attend, led her to doubt her self-wmth and, more impmtant, highlighted what little value the company to which she had dedicated her professional life placed on her. 145. As a result of KPMG's campaign of discrimination and harassment, Ms. Kassman's work environment became unbearable. She could barely eat or sleep, and she would physically shake when she approached the KPMG building or when Principal Schapiro called her.
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To avoid running into her tormentors when she worked from the New York office, Ms. Kassman made a habit of taking the back elevators at work.
146. Because of her torment and desperation at work, anxiety and depression also spread into her home life. Her relationship with her husband became strained, and she lacked the energy to care for her children. She experienced daily headaches, neck pain, back pain, and weight loss.
147. Working fi'om the Stamford office was Ms. Kassman's only hope for escaping the intolerable conditions of the New York office, but even there she was both marginalized by her colleagues and physically removed fi·om her office space to a mere set of drawers, all while she was expected to maintain the same responsibilities and performance of other Senior Managers.
148. On at least five occasions, Ms. Kassman contacted Keri Fleming in HR to request a transfer to a different practice. Although Ms. Kassman was willing to work in any division other than her cutTent one, HR failed to connect her to any oppmiunities or otherwise address the ongoing and persistent disctimination.
149. Because Ms. Kassman's previous expetience had taught her that KPMG would not properly address its employees' unlawful conduct, she felt that she had no recourse against the pervasive harassment and discrimination. Her repeated requests for assistance were ignored or resulted in further intimidation, and she was left with the choice of returning to an office where she was made physically ill by the treatment of her co-workers, or working in a diminished and disreputable capacity in Stamford. Losing the right to office space in Stamfordwhile other offices remained unoccupied was demoralizing and physically embodied how she was being pushed out of the Company.
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150. On October 1, 2010, Ms. Kassman resigned from KPMG, stating in her letter of resignation, "By ignoring my requests to put an end to the discriminatory treatment, KPMG has forced me to either continue to endure an intolerable work environment or end my employment. I therefore have no choice but to leave the Firm."
B. PLAINTIFF LINDA O'DONN,ELL 151. Ms. O'Donnell suffered discrimination 111 assignment, discrimination in pay, denial of promotional oppmiunities, discrimination as a result of her gender and pregnancy, and wrongful tetmination. 152. KPMG employed Ms. O'Donnell, the mother of a young child, from January 2003 until her wrongful termination in April2009. 153. Ms. O'Donnell began her career at KPMG in January 2003 as an Associate in the Johannesburg, South Africa office. She was promoted to Senior Associate in 2005 and to Manager in March 2006. Upon infmmation and belief, although KPMG South Africa and KPMG LLP are separate entities, they operate within the same global organization and follow the same practices, policies and procedures. 154. In September 2006, Ms. O'Dmmell, who had graduated from the University of Johannesburg and is a South African Chmiered Accountant, began a temporary rotation in the Company's Atlanta office. Although she had been a Manager in the Johannesburg office, Ms. O'Donnell was demoted to a Senior Associate position when she transferred to the Atlanta office. 155. In February 2007, Ms. O'Donnell was offered a permanent Senior Associate position in Atlanta's Transactional Services group with green card sponsorship through her thenhusband, a higher-ranking KPMG employee who was transferring during the same time. 156. On September 4, 2008, Ms. O'Donnell eamed her American CPA.
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157. Ms. O'Dotmcll proved herself to be an excellent perfmmer and distinguished herself with her strong work ethic, often working through the night.
158. In 2007, she earned a high "Strong Performer" rating with ovetwhelmingly positive comments from her clients.
159. In March 2008, KPMG gave Ms. O'Donnell another outstanding review. Discriminato!:Y.Msignment
160. Although Jvis. O'Donnell was highly qualified for the Manager position, and had in fact successfully held that position for several months in Johannesburg, KPMG demoted Ms. O'Donnell to a Senior Associate position when she began her rotation in the Company's Atlanta office in September 2006. The Company told Ms. O'Donnell that it was "standard practice" to drop a promotion level when transferring from an intemationallevel. Ms. O'Donnell remained a Senior Associate when she was offered a petmanent position in the Atlanta office in February 2007.
161. However, the Company did not automatically drop male employees a level when they transfetred from intemational offices. For example, Bruce O'Donnell, Ms. O'Donnell's then-husband, retained his Senior Manager title when he transferred from KPMG's Johannesburg office to the Atlanta office at the very same time. Ms. O'Donnell was also aware of other individuals who transferred from the Company's international branches to the Audit division of KPMG in Atlanta; all of those who were dropped down a level were women, while men who transferred from intemational offices did not lose their status.
162. Upon infonnation and belief, KPMG regularly discriminates against female employees by assigning them to lower-level positions than they are qualified for or than they would have received had they been men. Women are disparately impacted by the lack of
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transparency, standards, quality controls and implementation metrics in the Company's practices and procedures in assigning job titles.
163. Further, KPMG management systematically takes advantage of the flaws in the assignment practices and procedures to place female employees in positions below their level of qualification.
Disparate Pay 164. Upon information and belief, KPMG paid Ms. O'Donnell at a lower rate than men for equal work on jobs requiring equal skill, eff01i, and responsibility, and which were perf01med under similar working conditions. 165. Ms. O'Donnell regularly performed Manager-level tasks, and so should have been compensated accordingly. Among other things, Ms. O'Donnell set up engagements, met with clients, and frequently worked with Partners and Directors regarding substantive matters, all tasks typically perfonned by Managers. 166. Further, KPMG gave Ms. O'Donnell special access to computer programs that enabled her to perfom1 Manager-level tasks like setting up engagements. Access to these programs is typically granted to Managers and not to Senior Associates. Additionally, Ms. O'Donnell performed other tasks normally completed by Managers, including prepanng engagement letters, performing conflict-of-interest checks and compiling budgets. 167. Ms. O'Donnell also trained new Managers to stmcture reports, communicate with clients, collect data, send documents and manage invoices. Typically, experienced Managers train new Managers in these areas. 168. Because she was compensated as a "Senior Associate," Ms. O'Donnell earned substantially less in salary than "Managers" who were male or lacked childcare responsibilies.
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No Managers in the Transactional Services group had children and they were predominantly male. Even though these "Managers" held precisely the same role and performed the same work as Ms. O'Donnell, they received full Manager salaries, which were approximately $20,000 higher than what Senior Associates received in base salary.
169. For example, male Manager Krupa! Mehta performed precisely the same tasks as Ms. O'Donnell and had a comparable educational background and experience in Transactional Services, yet he held the formal title of Manager and was compensated as such. His performance as a Manager was not meaningfully or substantially better than Ms. O'Donnell's while performing the same or similar duties. Upon infonnation and belief, Ms. O'Donnell was paid less than him and other similarly-situated male employees who perfonned the same or similar duties but were called "Manager."
170. Upon infonnation and belief, KPMG underpays female Professionals at all levels tln·oughout the Company relative to similarly situated male employees due to opaque compensation and assignment practices that lack sufficient standards and quality controls in both their design and implementation, as well as means of redress.
Denial of Promotions 171. In addition to being misassigned and demoted from Manager to Senior Associate upon her transfer to the Atlanta office and being underpaid accordingly, Ms. 0 'Donnell also was denied a promotion to Manager after she informed her supervising Partner, Rob Coble ("Partner Coble"), that she was pregnant. 172. Because of her experience and skill set, KPMG even tasked Ms. O'Donnell with training new Managers who were coming into the department from other firms. Accordingly, in March 2008, KPMG gave Ms. O'Donnell outstanding performance reviews. According to her a)

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Performance Manager, Director Ron Evans ("Director Evans"); b) Partner To; and c) Directors Hudy Mulia and Jon Parker, Ms. O'Donnell was on track for promotion to Manager.
173. However, later in March 2008, Ms. O'Donnell informed Partner Coble that she was pregnant and would take maternity leave beginning in November 2008. Almost immediately after this announcement, Ms. O'Donnell's career progression came to an abrupt halt.
174. In April 2008, Director Evans gave Ms. O'Donnell a contrary and negative review, which included unfounded criticism about her performance. In June 2008, Ms. O'Donnell was denied the promotion to Manager, even though she had been performing Manager-level duties and had been reassured that she was on track for promotion.
175. Ms. O'Donnell asked Patiner Coble and Director Evans about her denied promotion. Despite her previous, consistently excellent reviews, Director Evans told Ms. O'D01mell that she was "not performing at manager level." This response shocked Ms. O'Donnell as it was inconsistent with all prior feedback. Ms. O'Donnell always approached Directors at the outset of each project to verify how she could perform at the "Manager level," and the feedback and reviews she received fi·om those to whom she directly reported was uniformly positive.
176. When Ms. O'Donnell inquired into how she might improve to Manager-level performance, Director Evans provided her no suggestions for improvement, and, tellingly, told her it was "just not [Ms. O'Donnell's] time." Upon information and belief, this comment pertained to her maternity leave.
177. In contrast, KPMG promoted Derek Pitts, a male Senior Associate, and Elizabeth Roberts, a female Senior Associate without children, to Manager positions. However, neither Manager Pitts nor Manager Roberts had Ms. O'Donnell's extensive experience performing
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managerial duties prior to their promotion, nor were they involved in training new Managers or handling other management tasks while still titled "Senior Associates."
178. Ms. O'Donnell learned from Manager Roberts that the two had received essentially the same evaluations prior to the awarding of promotions. Only Ms. O'Donnell's announcement of her pregnancy differentiated them, and it was she who was denied promotion to Manager.
179. Manager Roberts left KPMG in 2010 to have children of her own. Upon infmmation and belief, Manager Roberts left because having children is incompatible with a successful career at KPMG because of unlawful discrimination.
180. Upon infmmation and belief, KPMG's performance evaluation system's insufficient quality standards, controls and implementation metrics, coupled with its lack of transparency and opportunities for redress, had a discriminatory and disparate impact on women and cardaking employees.
181. Upon infom1ation and belief, KPMG management systematically took advantage of the flaws in the system and often undervalued, mismeasured, or otherwise inaccurately captured perfmmance to the particular detriment of women and mothers. In addition, unfounded criticism can be included and legitimate criticism given undue weight. Within this flawed system, leave for pregnancy and caretaking responsibilities can constitute a negative factor in female Professionals' evaluations, compensation decisions and promotion considerations at KPMG.
182. Upon information and belief, KPMG's non-transparent, inadequately designed, implemented, and reviewed promotion and assignment practices consistently result in males being promoted more rapidly and/or assigned m9re frequently to higher-level positions than women and mothers across the Company.
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Pregnancy/Caregiver Discrimination and Retaliation 183. Because of Ms. O'Donnell's pregnancy and decision to take maternity leave, KPMG subjected her to hostile comments, denied her a promotion, and ultimately terminated her employment the day she returned from matemity leave. 184. In March 2008, Ms. O'Donnell separately informed Partners Coble and To that she was pregnant and that she planned to take maternity leave begitming in November 2008. 185. Patiner To did not attempt to hide his hostility towards working mothers. After Ms. O'Donnell infonned him of her pregnancy, Partner To said he thought pregnant women were incapable of doing their jobs, and that he did not see how, as a working mother, one could "tend to a child and work at KPMG at the same time." 186. Partner To also told Ms. O'Dom1cll it was "much harder being a woman [than a man]" at KPMG in a manner that suggested this was acceptable. Further, he told Ms. O'Donnell that, because her husband was the "breadwinner" in her family, there would not be a need for her to work. This was not the only hostile or negative comment that Partner To made about women at KPMG. Upon information and belief, Partner To had caused several women to contact HR regarding his hostile comments toward women. 187. In addition, Manager Spiceda Davis had received EP (Excellent Perfonner) ratings until she complained to HR about Partner To. After her complaints, she received unfairly negative reviews and was forced to leave KPMG. 188. Knowing of this retaliatory action strongly discouraged Ms. O'Donnell from reaching out to HR, because she wanted to continue her employment at the Company.
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189. In June 2008, KPMG denied Ms. O'Donnell a promotion to Manager, despite her track record of outstanding work, in favor of her two peers without childi·en or caretaking responsibilities.
190. As a result of these comments and her discriminatory denial of the promotion to Manager, Ms. O'Donnell found that her pregnancy- which she expected to be a joyful experience -was the worst time of her life. She feared that she was being pushed out of the Company, where she had planned to work long-term, as a result of her pregnancy. The stress and anxiety of her situation caused her to cry every day, and caused tension in her maniage.
191. In November 2008, Ms. O'Donnell went on maternity leave, only to be tmminated immediately upon her return to work in April2009.
1'92. Upon information and belief, KPMG has subjected and continues to subject female employees with caregiving responsibilities and/or young children like Ms. O'Donnell to disparate tenus and conditions of employment, as leave to tend to these responsibilities is considered a negative factor in employees' evaluations, compensation and promotion prospects.
Wrongful Termination 193. In April 2009, on the very day Ms. O'Donnell retumed from maternity leave, Partners Coble and To told her she had been "laid off' due to "the economy." Consistent with his earlier comments to her, however, Partner To told Ms. O'Donnell that her husband "rna[de] a lot of money so [she] should be fine without a job." Futiher, Manager To told Ms. O'Donnell that she "shouldn't be upset because [she would] get more time to spend with [her] baby." 194. Upon information and belief, Ms. O'Donnell's termination was not a nondiscriminatory layoff but was, instead, the product of disctimination and retaliation in relation to her gender, pregnancy and matemity leave.
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C. ,P.LAINTIFF SPARKLE PATTERSON 195. Ms. Patterson suffered discrimination in pay, denial of promotional opportunities, and discrimination as a result of gender, pregnancy, and race. She was ultimately constructively discharged. 196. KPMG employed Ms. Patterson, an Afdcan-American mother of two children, from June 2007 until her constructive discharge from the Company in November 2010. 19';. ·· In June 2007, Ms. Patterson began working at KPMG as an Associate in Atlanta, first in Federal Tax, then in the IES practice, which she joined in August 2008. 198. Ms. Patterson proved herself to be an excellent performer. 199. In her 2008 year-end review, Federal Tax Partner Bernard Cates gave Ms. Patterson a "Strong" rating and wrote that she was "trending towards an EP ['Exceptional'] performance level." 200. In Ms. Patterson's October 2008 engagement review, IES Manager Greg Woofter ("Manager Woofter") wrote that Ms. Patterson worked "diligently'' and that he was "pleased with [her] progress." 201. In her April 2009 review, Manager Woofter wrote that Ms. Patterson "excelled" and "exceeded [his] expectations," and that he wanted to "continue [Ms. Patterson's] career progression within the IES practice." 202. In her 2009 year-end review, Senior Manager Yozura Yoshida ("Manager Yoshida") gave Ms. Patterson a "Strong" rating and wrote that she was "pr[o]fessional, commit[t]ed, motivated and eager to learn" and that he "expect[ed] her to continue this positive trend."
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203. In April 2008 and October 2008, Ms. Patterson received a "Standing Ovation" award with a $500 American Express Card, one of the highest honors within KPMG's "Encore" award system that recognizes employees who go "above and beyond" in their work.
204. In January 2009, Ms. Patterson received a $200 "Bravo" award, another .form of recognition within KPMG's "Encore" award system. Manager Yoshida originally nominated her for the "Standing Ovation" award, but as pa1i of KPMG's effort to manage costs, that award was temporarily unavailable. In the award description, Manager Yoshida wrote that Ms. Patterson had "[gone] the extra mile to get things done."
Disparate PJ!Y 205. Upon infmmation and belief, KPMG paid Ms. Patterson at a lower rate than men, non-caregivers, and non-African Americans for equal work on jobs requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which were perfotmed under similar working conditions. 206. Although Ms. Patterson was a stellar perfmmer, her total compensation was not commensurate with that awarded to similarly-situated male and non-African-American employees. 207. Ms. Patterson regularly performed the duties of a "Senior Associate" starting in early 2009, though she was not compensated accordingly. For example, Ms. Patterson served as an initial point of contact for clients and met with them directly. She managed engagements herself, allocating work to Associates and Tax Technicians and reviewing their work, as well as drafting client bills and invoices for Managers' review. 208. These tasks were not usually assigned to individuals classified as "Associates" like Ms. Patterson, but instead were given to "Senior Associates" who received higher pay than Associates. For example, Stephan Rabbitt and Anna Bankston, who were both white and lacked
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caretaking responsibilities, also worked under Ms. Patterson's same Managers in IES and performed the same tasks as she did. Upon information and belief, their perfom1ance was no stronger than Ms. Patterson's. However, Mr. Rabbitt and Ms. Bankston were assigned and paid as "Senior Associates." Upon infmmation and belief, Senior Associates were paid approximately $10,000 more in base salary than Ms. Patterson, and also received a "promotion bonus" along with the title.
209. In addition, KPMG refused to pay Ms. Patterson for the entire month of June 2010 following her maternity leave.
210. In February 2010, Ms. Patterson requested a paid sabbatical following her maternity leave from June 1, 2010 to August 15,2010 to complete two additional courses for her CPA license, which were important for career growth. KPMG routinely approved paid sabbaticals for other employees to travel overseas, go hiking, 1un biathlons, or pursue other personal interests. While KPMG promptly approved other employees' paid sabbaticals, Partner Gary Lusk ("Partner Lusk"), who reported up the IES chain to Principal Brown and Pminer Garfunkel in New York, ignored Ms. Patterson's sabbatical request.
211. According to KPMG policy, sabbatical requests must either be approved or fonnally denied with a written explanation. On March 1, 2010, Ms. Patterson consulted HR Tax Manager Tammy Woodard ("HR Manager Woodard"), who confi1med that Ms. Patterson could proceed with the sabbatical application process if Partner Lusk did not formally deny the request.
212. From March through May 2010, Ms. Patterson went on maternity leave before the birth of her second child. In March 2010, Partner Lusk finally confirmed that he had received Ms. Patterson's sabbatical request and would review it by mid-A1nil. In Aplil 2010, Ms. Patterson followed up about the status of her sabbatical request. Pminer Lusk ignored her request.
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In May 2010, Ms. Patterson again followed up with Pattner Lusk, and once again Pmtner Lusk refused to approve or deny her request.
213. In June 2010, Ms. Patterson did not return to work following her paid maternity leave because her sabbatical request was still pending. Ms. Patterson consulted her informal mentor Partner Milford McGuirt ("Partner McGuirt"), co-chair of KPMG's national AfricanAmetican Network and one of few Afiican-Ametican partners at the Company. Partner McGuili confirmed that Ms. Patterson had followed the proper procedure for requesting a sabbatical.
214. In July 2010, after months of ignoring Ms. Patterson's sabbatical request, Partner Lusk verbally denied Ms. Patterson's request and instead approved a sabbatical "beginning" in July 2010. Pmtner Lusk refused to pay Ms. Patterson for the entire month of June. Thus, while Ms. Patterson's male, non-caregiving, and non-African-American employees received sabbatical pay to pursue recreational activities, Ms. Patterson was only compensated for part of the time she used for career development.
215. Because KPMG employs a compensation system that has insufficient quality standards and controls, and implementation metrics, and lacks transparency and opportunities for redress or challenge, its compensation practices have had a disparate impact on the Company's female employees.
216. Upon inf01mation and belief, KPMG management systematically took advantage of the flaws in this system by knowingly and intentionally paying female employees less than similarly situated male employees.
217. Upon information and belief, Ms. Patterson was also paid less as compared to non-Aftican-Ametican KPMG employees who performed the same duties or had the same job title as she did within the company. This disparity arose in part because of the disparate career
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advancement opportunities she was provided in comparison to non-Afi·ican-American colleagues, described below.
Denial of P:t.:Qmotions au_d Discriminatory Assignments 218. Despite Ms. Patterson's award-winning performance, KPMG denied her a promotion in favor of less-qualified male and non-African-American employees. Although the standard promotion h·ack at KPMG promotes Associates to Senior Associates after two years, Ms. Patterson was never promoted beyond Associate in her three-and-a-half-year tenure with the Company. 219. Approximately seven of Ms. Patterson's Associate-level peers in Federal Tax were promoted within two years (i.e. by approximately July 2009); all seven were Caucasian and none had children. Ms. Patterson and two other black females were not promoted; Associate Gaymm Greene (also a mother of two small children) resigned, and Associate Avalyn Goodwin was laid off. 220. In July 2009, however, Ms. Patterson was passed up for the promotion usually granted after two years at the Company. Instead, Ms. Bankston and Mr. Rabbitt, who were white and lacked childcare responsibilities, were promoted to Senior Associate. Their educational and experiential backgrounds were equal to Ms. Patterson's, and they performed the same duties as Ms. Patterson under Partner Lusk in IES. Moreover, when Ms. Patterson moved out of the Federal Tax practice and into IES, Partner Lusk had assured her that this change would not affect her progression toward promotion to Senior Associate. 221. After being passed up in July 2009, Ms. Patterson made Partner Lusk aware of her concern about not being promoted along with her class of Associates. He promised her that she would be promoted the following year, in 2010.
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222. Accordingly, Ms. Patterson believed she was still on track for promotion to Senior Associate in the fall of 2009. Ms. Patterson regularly solicited feedback from her Engagement Managers to ensure she stayed on track for promotion, and her interim reviews in 2009 were excellent.
223. However, in November 2009, Ms. Patterson infmmed Partner Lusk and Manager Yoshida that she was pregnant and would take matemity leave beginning March 2010. Pmtner Lusk expressed strong disapproval of Ms. Patterson's leave and told her that missing the week before March 15111 was like "missing the whole year."
224. While Ms. Patterson was on matemity leave in April 2010, Partner Lusk asked Ms. Patterson to take on a lesser role in IES. Pmtner Lusk suggested that Ms. Patterson retum to work "part time" or move to the Japanese practice, even though it was not a good fit for her interests, experience or background. Ms. Patterson told Pmtner Lusk that neither working part time nor transfening to an entirely new practice was in line with her career goals. Upon infotmation and belief, similarly-situated male employees were not asked to work "part time" or to change practices at this time.
225. When Ms. Patterson retumed from leave and sabbatical in August 2010, Partner Lusk and Manager Yoshida intentionally intimidated Ms. Patterson. In a change from the standard year-end performance review practice where only the Perfonnance Manager would review the evaluation with Ms. Patterson, both men joined together to raise pretextual concerns with her performance. Upon infonnation and belief, there were no other Associates in the Atlanta IES practice whose performance was evaluated by both a Partner and a Manager in their 2010 year-end review.
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226. Specifically, Pminer Lusk and Manager Yoshida criticized Ms. Patterson in her fiscal year-end review about concems that had never been raised before her matemity leave. In Ms. Patterson's interim perfonnance review for the same fiscal year, Manager Yoshida wrote that Ms. Patterson was "eager to perfonn well" and that she "manage[d] her time well." In her fiscal year-end review, after she retumed from maternity leave, Manager Yoshida wrote that Ms. Patterson was "unavailable" and caused her manager to spend more time during the Christmas holidays, though Ms. Patterson had not taken any vacation days during this time and frequently worked overtime. Ms. Patterson had never heard this criticism before her matemity leave.
227. In the same fiscal year-end review for 2010, Partner Lusk and Manager Yoshida accused Ms. Patterson of "not mak[ing] herself available to help others" when Ms. Patterson had taken a Saturday, Sunday and Monday out of the office one week in August 2009 to complete the final portion of her CPA exam. Prior to announcing her pregnancy, both Partner Lusk and Manager Yoshida had approved this time out of the office. Partner Lusk had known Ms. Patterson needed to complete the exam since he accepted her transfer in July 2008 and knew that her passing scores on previous sections would expire if she did not timely complete the final section.
228. Ms. Patterson's August 2010 review also ignored her notable achievements, such as completing her CPA, achieving all of her perf01mance goals set at the beginning of the fiscal year, being on the Board of Directors for a non-profit organization and participating in KPMG Affinity Networks.
229. Upon infonnation and belief, KPMG's performance evaluation system's insufficient quality standards and controls and implementation metrics, coupled with its lack of
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transparency and opportunities for redress, had a discriminatory and disparate impact on women and caretaking employees.
230. Upon information and belief, KPMG management systematically took advantage of the flaws in the system and often undervalued, mismeasured, or otherwise inaccurately captured performance to the particular detriment of women and mothers. In addition, unfounded criticism can be included and legitimate c1iticism given undue weight. Within this flawed system, leave for pregnancy and caretaking responsibilities can constitute a negative factor in female Professionals' evaluations, compensation decisions and promotion considerations at KPMG.
23!. As a result of the unfounded negative comments in the review, Ms. Patterson was denied a promotion to Senior Associate in 2010 despite her three-year track record of awardwinning performance.
232. In October 20 I0, Ms. Patterson was removed fi:om her largest client, despite previously winning a "Bravo" award in April 2009 for her work relating to the same client. Partner Lusk and Manager Yoshida told Ms. Patterson she was being removed so she could "get more exposure" to other clients. However, Ms. Patterson was not given work on other clients despite her persistent requests. KPMG generally does not remove employees from their largest clients without clear transfers to new clients.
233. Partner Lusk and Manager Woofter, both Caucasian males, assigned Associate Sarah Bohman ("Associate Bohman''), a Caucasian recent college graduate with no children, to take Ms. Patterson's place on the client team.
234. This was not the first time Ms. Patterson had been excluded from careeradvancement oppmiunities at KPMG; since the beginning of her employment at KPMG, Ms.
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Patterson found that white managers would develop friendly, casual relationships with white Associates, but made no such efforts with her.
235. Upon information and belief, KPMG's develoment and mentoring systems have insufficient standards, quality controls, and implementation metrics, lack of transparency and opportunities for redress, and have a discriminatory and disparate impact on women and caretaking employees.
236. Further, upon information and belief, KPMG management systematically takes advantage of the flaws in the system, as Partners are allowed to mentor and develop employees selectively, without any standards or guidelines for providing these advancement opportunities.
237. Upon information and belief, Ms. Patterson was not the only female employee to suffer the effect of the lack of adequate opportunities for mentorship, development (both personal and client-based) and advancement at KPMG. Instead of having transparent and systematic policies and procedures in place based on objective performance and qualifications, how and when such opportunities are provided is slu·ouded in secrecy, most often to the detriment of women, caregivers, and African-Americans.
238. Upon information and belief, KPMG's flawed promotion practices consistently result in males and non-caregivers being promoted more rapidly and assigned more frequently to higher-level positions than women across the Company.
Pregnancy/Caregiver Discrimination and Retaliation 239. During Ms. Patterson's tenure with KPMG, she was the only employee in the Atlanta IES practice with small children other than Manager Yoshida and Partner Lusk, both of whom had stay-at-home wives or close family members living at home.
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240. KPMG discriminated against Ms. Patterson based on her pregnancy. From July 2007 to November 2009, Ms. Patterson received awards and strong reviews. However, when she became pregnant, she was subjected to hostile comments and her opportunities for advancement disappeared.
241. When Ms. Patterson infonned Manager Yoshida of her pregnancy in November 2009, Manager Yoshida angrily asked, "Did you plan this?"
242. From February 2010 to July 2010, Partner Lusk actively ignored Ms. Patterson's sabbatical request to complete her CPA licensing requirements while KPMG granted sabbatical requests and facilitated the efforts of similarly situated male and non-caretaking employees, such as Manager Woofter, to become CPAs.
243. In August 2010, Partner Lusk and Manager Yoshida subjected Ms. Patterson to increased scrutiny when both reviewed her perf01mance, and wrote negative comments in her review that had never been raised as issues prior to Ms. Patterson mmouncing her pregnancy.
244. After Ms. Patterson returned from maternity leave, her requests for work were systematically denied by the KPMG managers she approached. Indeed, only one Manager, Cordelia Scott ("Manager Scott") - an African-American woman- regularly provided her work. This prevented Ms. Patterson from reaching the 89% target for billable work set by IES Partners in New York. At best, Ms. Patterson was only able to bill twelve hours in a f01ty-hour work period, which made her 30% chargeable. Prior to her pregnancy, Ms. Patterson did not have difficulty obtaining billable work.
245. Although Ms. Patterson was available and willing to work long hours, KPMG managers refused to give her work because of the predominant culture at KPMG that assumes
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working mothers with young children are less effective employees and less committed to their careers.
246. Because it had become clear that she was not going to advance in IES following her pregnancy, Ms. Patterson requested a transfer to another group in August 2010. However, KPMG glossed over the difficulties Ms. Patterson was experiencing and refused to consider her request for a transfer, despite Ms. Patterson's repeated inquiries. Associates without caretaking responsibilities were regularly considered and often approved for transfers.
247. In October 2010, Ms. Patterson was removed from her largest client and replaced by Associate Bohman, a Caucasian recent college graduate with no children.
248. Upon information and belief, the Company's policies and procedures regarding evaluation, compensation, development and promotion lack the transparency, standards, quality controls, implementation metrics, and means for redress necessary to prevent this disparate impact on female Professionals who are pregnant or mothers. Within this flawed system, leave for pregnancy and caretaking responsibilities can constitute a negative factor in female Professionals' evaluations, compensation decisions and promotion considerations at KPMG.
249. Upon information and belief, KPMG management systematically took advantage of the flaws in the system and often undervalued, mismeasured, or otherwise inaccurately captured performance to the particular detriment of women and mothers. KPMG has subjected and continues to subject female employees with caregiving responsibilities and/or young children, like Ms. Patterson, to disparate terms and conditions of employment and retaliation.
Mishandling of Complaints 250. From December 2009 until her constructive discharge on November 29, 2010, Ms. Patterson complained through various repmiing cham1els, including HR and Ethics and
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Compliance, about the disc1imination and retaliation she was experiencing. However, KPMG failed to address Ms. Patterson's complaints.
251. In December 2009, Ms. Patterson contacted HR Manager Tammy Woodard to rmse concems regarding Manager Yoshida's negative and discriminatory response to her pregnancy. Upon infotmation and belief, HR did nothing to investigate or address Ms. Patterson's complaints, despite her repeated attempts to follow up regarding this matter.
252. In March 2010, Ms. Patterson contacted HR Manager Woodard regarding Pminer Lusk's failure to address her sabbatical request, but no action was taken until July 2010, after her desired sabbatical was supposed to begin.
253. In July 2010, Ms. Patterson contacted HR Regional Director Chris Beall ("HR Director Beall") about the discriminatory treatment she had received since atmouncing her pregnancy, including Manager Yoshida and Partner Lusk's comments, and Pminer Lusk's refusal to address her sabbatical request. Following a meeting with HR Director Beall, Ms. Patterson sent him an electronic message outlining and detailing her discrimination claims. Without Ms. Patterson's consent, HR Director Beall sent her message to Partner Lusk and requested a meeting.
254. At the end of the month, Ms. Patterson met with HR Director Beall and Partner Lusk to discuss Ms. Patterson's discrimination claims, including the denial of her sabbatical request. Because Ms. Patterson felt intimidated, she brought her mentor, Senior Manager T. Angie Napier to the meeting. At the meeting, HR Director Beall and Partner Lusk ignored Ms. Patterson's discrimination claims and instead focused on her CPA exam in August 2009, telling her that time taken for her CPA exam would not be held against her in her year-end review.
255. Following the meeting, Partner Lusk denied Ms. Patterson's initial request for sabbatical fi·om June 1 to August 15 and pressured her to take a sabbatical fium August through
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October, which she feared would have damaged her prospects for a fall promotion. When Ms. Patterson protested, Partner Lusk finally allowed a sabbatical beginning July 1 but still ending August 15, 2010, thus shortening her sabbatical by one full month and denying her compensation for June.
256. In August 2010, Ms. Patterson complained to Ethics and Compliance about the negative comments in her Perfonnance Review- the first negative comments of her career- and the discriminatory denial of her promotion following her pregnancy. During a second perfmmance review meeting, Partner Lusk and Manager Yoshida told newly appointed HR Tax Manager, Rebecca Berry, that Ms. Patterson's review was not negative. HR did not challenge this or otherwise investigate or respond to the situation futiher.
257. Later that month, Ms. Patterson requested a transfer out of IES because the managers in her group refused to give her any work, despite repeated requests. The Ethics officer. Craig DeCampli ("Ethics Officer DeCampli"), told her to "wait," and that the situation in IES would be resolved.
258. Ms. Patterson continually followed up with HR and Ethics through November, as her work situation had not improved. Although she had been told the investigation would be resolved in October 2010, she was told when she inquired again that it would be resolved in early November. When she followed up with Ethics Officer DeCampli after the appointed date in November had come and gone, he again told her that it had not yet been resolved. Ms. Patterson followed up one final time, in January 2011, only to leam that the investigation had been closed. She was never applised of the Company's findings.
259. KPMG never granted the transfer out of IES or made any effoti to address Ms. Patterson's complaints of discrimination and retaliation.
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260. Upon information and belief, KPMG's HR and Ethics and Compliance offices and procedures lack standards, quality controls, transparency, implementation mctrics, means of redress, and requirements that concems of discrimination be addressed and resolved. Women, mothers, and African-Americans are negatively affected by these insufficiently designed and implemented procedures, as unresponsiveness to complaints about discrimination disprop01iionately falls upon such employees.
Constructive Discharge 261. Ms. Patterson was forced to end her career at KPMG in November of 2010 because the Company had deliberately made her working conditions so intolerable that she was compelled to resign involuntarily. 262. When she returned fi·om maternity leave, she was removed from her largest engagement, and, contrary to standard practice at KPMG, was not provided a replacement project. She was reliant on odd jobs and work provided to her by one African-American female Manager, Cordelia Scott, to reach even a 30% billable level. She often went to work each day only to suffer the humiliation of sitting at her desk for eight to ten hours with nothing to do, despite her repeated requests for work and the obvious evidence that there was work to be done being deliberately kept from her. 263. Although Ms. Patterson had always been a strong perfmmer at KPMG, she was not only denied the work and promotions for which she was qualified but also denied support in the advancement she sought through pursuing her CPA. 264. Because it had become clear to Ms. Patterson that there was no future for her in IES and conditions in the division had become intolerable, she sought a transfer. Even this channel for redress was denied her, though, because KPMG refused even to consider her request,
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making it impossible for her to escape the discrimination and marginalization she was experiencing in IES. As her options for a future at KPMG were systematically closed, Ms. Patterson became increasingly fearful for her ability to support herself and her children.
265. These stresses at work carried over to the home, as Ms. Patterson's work situation strained her relationship with her significant other and deteriorated her health. Ms. Patterson's isolation and hopelessness at work made her unable to eat. ~While she had been nursing her newbom, she stopped producing breast milk as a result of the physical and emotional strains she suffered at KPMG.
266. Ms. Patterson wanted nothing more than to stay at KPMG and further her career. She built a house in Atlanta where she expected to raise her two children. In November 2010, after enduring months of escalating discrimination and retaliation with no hope or resolution whatsoever in light of KPMG's persistent refusal to help, Ms. Patterson had no choice but to resign from KPMG.
D. PLAINTIFF JEANETTE POTTER 267. Ms. Potter suffered discrimination in assigmnent, disctimination m pay, and denial of promotional opportnnities. She was ultimately constmctively discharged. 268. KPMG employed Ms. Potter from July 1995 until her constmctive discharge from the Company in July 2006. 269. In July 1995, Ms. Potter began working at KPMG as a Manager in the IES Tax practice. She had previously graduated from the Universite Nanterre in France and, while at KPMG, received a Master's degree in Tax from Pace University. In addition, she has earned two other advanced degrees. She had five years of Manager-level experience when she came to KPMG.
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270. In June 1996, Ms. Potter was promoted to Senior Manager, the position in which she would be stuck for ten years before being pushed out of the company.
271. Tln·oughout her eleven-year tenure, Ms. Potter demonstrated excellent performance. From 1996 to 2000, Ms. Potter always received "Meets Expectations" or "Exceeds Expectations" on her performance reviews, then, under a new performance rating system, received "Exceptional Perfonner" ratings in 2001 and 2002.
272. Ms. Potter received "Strong Performer" ratings from 2003 to 2006, when she was pushed out of the Company. Ms. Potter was applauded for her excellent work and praised as "clearly a leader in the group."
Discriminatory Assignmcn! 273. Although Ms. Potter was highly qualified for a Senior Manager position at the time she was hired by KPMG, the Company initially assigned her to the position of Manager. 274. Ms. Potter's previous employer did not have a "Senior Manager" distinction, so Ms. Potter held the title of Manager even though she perfotmed duties typically perfmmed by Senior Managers at comparable fitms, including KPMG. These tasks included, primarily, full responsibility in perfmming clients' returns and managing staff assigned to work on the retums. At KPMG, the title of "Senior Manager" typically went to individuals with two or more years of Manager experience, and Ms. Potter had a full five years of experience at this level. It was not until a year after Ms. Potter joined KPMG, however, that she received the title she should have been assigned upon her hire. 275. Upon information and belief, KPMG regularly discriminates against female employees by assigning them to lower-level positions than those for which they are qualified or than they would have received had they been men. Women are disparately impacted by the lack
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of transparency, standards, quality controls and implementation metrics in the Company's practices and procedures in assigning job titles.
276. Further, KPMG management systematically takes advantage of the flaws in the assignment practices and procedures to place female employees in positions below their level of qualification.
Disparate Pay 277. Ms. Potter's excellent performance over the course of her eleven-year career at KPMG was not rewarded with the compensation she desetved. Upon information and belief, the Company paid Ms. Potter at a lower rate than men for equal work on jobs requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which were perfonned under similar working conditions. 278. Upon information and belief, because of her initial misassignment as "Manager,." Ms. Potter's salary continued to be less than that of similarly-situated men throughout her tenure atKPMG. 279. From 1996 to 2001, Ms. Potter received yearly pay increases, but the amounts of these increases were based on a percentage of her base salary, which, upon infonnation and belief, was already lesser than her male peers' because of the initial misassignment. 280. In addition, after October 2002, Ms. Potter's pay was fi'ozen when her performance rating was lowered to "Strong Perfmmer," even though there had been no identifiable change in Ms. Potter's performance, or KPMG's assessment of it, beyond the discriminatory instmction to "socialize more." 281. Similarly situated male employees in her office who had previously been paid at the same rate as or higher than Ms. Potter did not have their pay frozen. Ms. Potter was not aware of any male Senior Managers in the IES Tax practice who ceased to receive pay raises, and, on
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information and belief, they continued to receive the raises that Ms. Potter expected but was suddenly denied throughout the remainder of her tenure at KPMG.
282. In addition to Ms. Potter, at least two other female Professionals in the IES Tax practice, Senior Manager Elaine Blum ("Senior Manager Blum") and Director Jeanne Jue ("Director Jue"), also had their pay frozen at this time. Both Senior Manager Blum and Director Jue had well over a decade of experience, like Ms. Potter, and both were strong performers.
283. After October 2002, Ms. Potter received no pay increases before her constructive discharge from the Company in July 2006, despite her consistently strong perfmmance. Upon information and belief, comparable men continued to make more than Ms. Potter throughout her employment at KPMG, even though their experience, skills, and responsibilities never exceeded hers. For example, Senior Manager David Buchner, whose qualifications, experience, and responsibilities were no greater than Ms. Potter's or Senior Manager Blum's, continued to receive pay raises after 2002.
284. When, in May 2006, Ms. Potter asked Principal Ed Gibbons about her frozen pay, he referenced a spreadsheet with pay infmmation and told Ms. Potter she was the fifth highest paid Senior Manager in her practice. When Ms. Potter asked which Senior Managers earned more than her, Principal Gibbons confirmed that the four higher salaries belonged to male employees. No male Senior Managers in IES Tax had comparable tenure at KPMG to Ms. Potter, and, on infmmation and belief, none of them exceeded her in performance or responsibility. Ms. Potter asked why the less-experienced men were paid more than she was, but Principal Gibbons refused to engage on the issue and instead told Ms. Potter she was "paid too much."
285. Although Ms. Potter requested that Principal Gibbons provide her details about salary ranges at the Company - information that was heavily guarded and kept secret for
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employees - and he indicated that he would do so, he never did so. Rather than taking any steps to address Ms. Potter's concems about discriminatory compensation, Principal Gibbons became increasingly hostile toward her. He ignored her entirely, even excluding her fi·om discussions about her clients.
286. Upon information and belief, KPMG's policies regarding voicing complaints of discrimination and subsequent investigations thereof lack transparency, adequate implementation metrics, standards, and quality controls, and fail to require the Company's Partners and Principals to address discrimination. These policies, and the lack of means of redress for unanswered complaints, have a disparate and discriminatory effect on women in the tenns and conditions of their employment.
287. FUliher, upon information and belief, at least two other female Senior Managers received pay cuts after their pay was initially frozen, while no male Senior Managers in her office received pay cuts. For example, KPMG cut Senior Manager Blum's salary because she was "paid too much," and Director Jue's salary was also cut. Senior Manager Blum's qualifications, tenure, and experience were at least as strong as her male peers'.
288. Upon information and belief, KPMG also subjects female employees to discriminatmy demotions that come with lower salaries. For example, Senior Manager Lu Tseng ("Senior Manager Tseng") was sent on an eighteen-month assignment to Japan. When she returned to the United States, she was told there were no Senior Manager positions available even though her previous position had not been filled. Instead, KPMG offered Senior Manager Tseng a Manager position for a salary cut.
289. Upon information and belief, KPMG underpays female Professionals at all levels throughout the Company relative to similarly-situated male employees. KPMG's opaque
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evaluation and compensation practices lack sufficient standards, quality controls, implementation metrics, transparency and opportunities for redress or challenge, and create a disparate impact on the Company's female employees..
290. Upon infonnation and belief, KPMG management systematically took advantage of the flaws in these systems and often undervalued, mismeasured, or othe1wise inaccurately captured perfonnance to the particular detriment of women.
penial of Promotion~ 291. Despite Ms. Potter's exceptional perfom1ance, KPMG denied her promotions in favor oflesser qualified male employees. 292. By the summer of 2000, it had become clear to Ms. Potter that she was not going to be promoted at the rate she deserved. Ms. Potter observed that employees who spent a significant amount of time sclnnoozing and socializing at office happy hours were more likely to advance, while employees who did not were less likely to be promoted. This corporate culture and improper advancement criteria dispropmiionately harmed female employees like Ms. Potter, who were less likely to be welcomed into the Company's "good old boys" club and who felt uncomfmiable at many social events, which tended to be hostile to women. 293. Upon infmmation and belief, the Company's evaluation, development, and promotion policies lacked the standards and quality controls to reward excellent performance like Ms. Potter's. 294. In the summer of 2000, Ms. Potter infmmed Patiner McLaughlin that she planned to resign from KPMG due to the lack of promotional opportunities. She was prepared to accept an offer at Emst & Young for a comparable position with a $13,000 salary increase and a $17,000 signing bonus. Ms. Potter expected that Ernst & Young would provide greater
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opportunities for promotion than KPMG. However, Partners McLaughlin, Pete Dolan, Patricia Brown (who also served as Principal in Charge of the East for IES during the time Ms. Kassman experienced discrimination and retaliation), Bill Hibbit, Dan Orchant, Sam Russo and Jeff Stein told Ms. Potter that they refused to accept her resignation and reassured her that she was just about to be promoted. The group of Pminers offered her a $20,000 retention bonus (which she had to repay if she left within one year) and sent her a box of chocolates with a card that read, "Please don't leave."
295. Because Ms. Potter believed, based on the Patiners' representations, that she was about to be promoted, she declined the attractive offer from Ernst & Young and decided to stay at KPMG.
296. In Ms. Potter's May 2001 review, Principal McLaughlin wrote that she "had a fabulous year" and was "clearly a leader in the group." Despite Principal McLaughlin's positive comments and Ms. Potter's "Exceptional Performer" rating, she was not promoted in 2001.
297. In Ms. Potter's May 2002 performance review, Principal McLaughlin gave Ms. Potter a "Strong Performer" rating, lower than all her previous ratings, despite the review's overwhelmingly positive comments. The only criticism Principal McLaughlin wrote was that Ms. Potter needed to "continue to build relationships" for a promotion to Tax Managing Director.
298. In May 2002, however, Ms. Potter was abmptly removed from the Managing Director track she had been promised. KPMG denied Ms. Potter the promotion to Managing Director because, according to Ptineipal McLaughlin, she did not "socialize" enough. Principal McLaughlin told Ms. Potter she needed to "schmooze" more. However, Ms. Potter could not attend events on Ftidays - when many of the happy hours were scheduled - because her religion dictates that she observe the Sabbath.
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299. In addition, Ms. Potter did not attend many of the Company's other informal social events because she strongly disapproved of male Partners' ovettly sexual conduct toward female staff at the events. Upon information and belief, KPMG Pmtners accosted and manhandled junior female employees at the Company happy hours. Male Pmtners regularly took "body shots" off of female employees, eluting which Partners would put salt or sugar on a female employee's neck and lick it off. Senior leadership including Pdncipal Brown were present and witnessed these events and, through their inaction, tacitly condoned the behavior of their male counterparts and subordinates.
300. Accordingly, these socializing events were much more amenable to fostering male employees' se;;se of belonging and ownership than women. Nonetheless, KPMG's promotion decisions rely heavily on personal relationships built at Company social events that are hostile to, or that tend to exclude, female employees. Indeed, upon infonnation and belief, the Company's evaluation, development, and promotion practices lack the transparency, standards, quality controls, implementation metdcs and means for redress necessary to reward rather than disadvantage successful female employees. Upon information and belief, Ms. Potter was not the only woman who was forced to choose between submitting to hostile social activities or allowing her career to stagnate.
301. When Ms. Potter expressed her concems about his assessment of her potential for promotion with Principal McLaughlin, he was unresponsive, consistent with the treatment she later received from Principal Gibbons. When she questioned the justification for why she was not promoted, Principal McLaughlin told her this was the way things were at KPMG.
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302. Following this discussion, Principal McLaughlin ignored Ms. Potter, excluding her from decisions about clients and staff, ceasing to direct any new clients to her, and instead focusing his attention on Senior Manager Buchner.
303. Because Ms. Potter did not engage in or otherwise support these hostile social events, she was marginalized, downgraded in her review, and denied a promotion. While Ms. Potter hit a glass ceiling, she witnessed males of her same educational and experiential background, who shared the same responsibilities as her and performed no better than her, move upward in the Company.
304. Indeed, upon infonnation and belief, after Ms. Potter was removed from the partnership track, Senior Managers Tom Condon and Roger Koferl- who lacked Ms. Potter's years of experience, advanced degree in Tax, and record of exceptional perfonnance - were prioritized in her place. Both were eventually promoted, and both took part in the maledominated after-hours culture that Principal McLaughlin criticized Ms. Potter for avoiding.
305. Upon information and belief, because of their lack of clearly defined and implemented standards and transparency, KPMG's promotion practices consistently result in males being promoted more rapidly, developed more purposefully, and assigned more fi·equently to higher level positions than women across the Company. Upon infonnation and belief, KPMG took advantage of the professional development and performance evaluation systems' lack of h·ansparency, quality standards and controls, implementation metrics, and opportunities for redress by including unfounded criticism against many female employees, resulting in their exclusion fi·om promotion opportunities.
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Cq_nstru~tive Discharge 306. Ms. Potter was forced to end her career at KPMG in July of 2006 because the Company had deliberately made her working conditions so intolerable that she was compelled to resign involuntarily. While she had hopes to continue building a long career at KPMG, and to become a Partner, it became clear that she was not valued and would always be subject to discrimination. 307. Ms. Potter found her situation at KPMG increasingly intolerable as she witnessed men who were no more qualified than she smpass her in pay and status within the Company. This, along with the explicit devaluing of her contributions through comments like Principal Gibbons' that she was "paid too much," made her feel wmthless. KPMG's failure to provide her a legitimate justification for her stagnant pay caused her particular distress as she saw her perfonnance reviews altered downward for the first time in her tenure. She foresaw being pushed out of the Company. 308. Because the Company provided her with no suggestions for becoming eligible for pay increases or promotion beyond submitting to social activities that were degrading to women, Ms. Potter saw no avenue for a continued role at KPMG. 309. Her experience of Principal Gibbons' and Principal McLaughlin's umesponsiveness and hostility to her concerns about discriminatory pay and advancement oppmtunities led her to believe there would be no recourse within the Company. Not only did the latter individuals fail to respond to her concerns, but they also responded with open hostility, which went beyond just unkindness to fi·eezing Ms. Potter out of assignments and infmmation about her clients that was necessary for her to succeed at work.
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310. Reaching out to Human Resources within her division would be a fruitless exercise, as she had been provided no literature about the Company's policies and procedures, and had observed that HR was controlled by the very Principals who tmmented her. An atmosphere of hostility pervaded the office, such that she feared any complaints would result in the retaliation and marginalization she experienced from Principals Gibbons and McLaughlin, which led her to fear termination.
311. As doors closed for Ms. Potter at KPMG in 2006, she became increasingly anxious and depressed. She had persistent headaches, which escalated at this time, along with back pain and frequent sleeplessness.
312. Thus, after more than a decade as a Senior Manager with no hope for promotion and four years with no salary increase, Ms. Potter had no choice but to resign from KPMG in July 2006. Ms. Potter was forced to accept a job for half her exiting salary before finding permanent employment in the financial services industry.
E. PLAINTIFF ASHWINI VASUDEVA 313. Ms. Vasudeva suffered discrimination in pay, denial of promotional oppmiunities, and discrimination as a result of pregnancy. She was ultimately constructively discharged. 314. KPMG employed Ms. Vasudeva, the mother of a young child, full-time fi·om January 2005 until her constmctive discharge from the Company in September 2009. 315. In the summer of2004, Ms. Vasudeva began working at KPMG's Mountain View office as an Intem. She returned to KPMG as a full-time Associate in the same office in January of 2005, first working in the Extemal Audit practice, then in Contracts Compliance Services within the Advisory practice approximately a year and a half later. In June 2007, Ms. Vasudeva was promoted to Senior Associate.
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316. Prior to working at KPMG, Ms. Vasudeva earned her first Bachelor's Degree in Commerce and Economics fi-om University of Mumbai in India, then worked for two years in India in accounting and sales. Ms. Vasudeva then earned a second Bachelor of Science Degree in Accounting fi:om California State University, Hayward in 2005.
317. Throughout her nearly five-year tenure, Ms. Vasudeva proved herself to be·· a stellar perfmmer. During her reviews, Ms. Vasudeva's performance managers consistently rated her as a "strong" or "exceptional performer." In or around 2005 and 2006, KPMG also awarded Ms. Vasudeva "Encore" awards, reserved for employees who go "above and beyond the call of duty."
Disparate Pay 318. Upon information and belief, KPMG paid Ms. Vasudeva at a lower rate than men for equal work on jobs requiring equal skill, effmi, and responsibility, and which were perfonned under similar working conditions. 319. For example, KPMG paid Ms. Vasudeva less than her male peer Ryan WoodTaylor, who had statied at KPMG around the same time as Ms. Vasudeva after graduating from University, and had similar job duties as a Senior Associate in Contracts Compliance Services. For example, both Ms. Vasudeva and Mr. Wood-Taylor managed projects for clients, managed staff and travelled to client sites to perform their work. Indeed, Mr. Wood-Taylor even lagged behind Ms. Vasudeva in key respects, having performed fewer audits in less diverse settings than Ms. Vasudeva. 320. Although Ms. Vasudeva and Mr. Wood-Taylor held the same roles on projects, often working under the same supervisor, and although were both strong perfom1ers, she came to believe during the time that they were both Senior Associates that he was paid more than her.
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Eventually, she learned from her colleague, Manager Sarabdecp Narang, that Mr. Wood-Taylor's salary was in fact $10,000 higher than hers.
321. Mr. Wood-Taylor was not the only similarly situated male Senior Associate paid more than Ms. Vasudeva. Upon infom1ation and belief, Ms. Vasudeva's salary has been lower than that of other similarly situated male colleagues throughout her employment.
322. Upon infmmation and belief, KPMG underpays female Professionals at all levels throughout the Company relative to similarly situated male employees.
323. For example, while Ms. Vasudeva was an Associate, she saw the pay stub of male Senior Associate Nishant Shah, who was working with her and Senior Associate Kathryn Hanis ("Senior Associate Harris") on a project. She was shocked to discover that he earned approximately $10,000 more than Senior Associate Harris though both held MBA degrees and had the same job duties.
324. Moreover, KPMG also discriminates in bonus pay. In 2008, when Ms. Vasudeva took matemity leave, KPMG denied Ms. Vasudeva a bonus despite the fact that her overall performance did not decrease. With the same level of performance in previous years, Ms. Vasudeva had received a bonus.
325. When she questioned her Perfonnance Manager, Director Abhijit Joshi ("Director Joshi"), about the reason she had been denied a bonus, Director Joshi told her she was denied a bonus due to "economic" reasons. However, upon information and belief, Ms. Vasudeva's male peers, including Mr. Wood-Taylor, received bonuses.
326. The only difference was that Ms. Vasudeva is a woman who had taken maternity leave. In addition and upon information and belief, women and women with child-rearing responsibilities were primarily those who did not receive bonuses for 2008.
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Denial of Prom_9tions 327. Despite Ms. Vasudeva's stellar qualifications and performance, KPMG denied her promotions in favor of lesser qualified male employees. 328. Initially, Ms. Vasudeva progressed along KPMG's standard career track, receiving a promotion to Senior Associate in June 2007. However, her career progression suddenly stalled once she became pregnant. 329. After Ms. Vasudeva returned from maternity leave, KPMG placed a number of obstacles in her path, in a seeming attempt to derail her advancement. Among other things, Ms. Vasudeva's supervising P1incipal Matt Behan ("Principal Behan") abmptly removed her from her largest engagement, assigned her to a client an hour and a half away, and regularly imposed unrealistic demands on her. 330. In May 2009, KPMG promoted Senior Associate Ryan Wood-Taylor, a lessexperienced male, to Manager instead of Ms. Vasudeva. As a result, Ms. Vasudeva had to report to Manager Wood-Taylor, who had previously been her peer. Manager Wood-Taylor did not have comparable audit experience to Ms. Vasudeva. Manager Wood-Taylor had only worked on one or two software engagements, while Ms. Vasudeva had diverse experiences in a variety of audits. 331. Senior Associate Bryan Dillon, another male employee, was also promoted to Manager in May 2009 over Ms. Vasudeva, even though the two had comparable experience. Senior Associate Dillon had also joined KPMG after receiving his Bachelor of Science degree. He held her same role within Contracts Compliance Services under the same Partners and generally perfmmed her same job duties. On infom1ation and belief, his performance was not substantially or meaningfully better than Ms. Vasudeva's.
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332. When Ms. Vasudeva asked Director Joshi, her male Performance Manager, why her male colleagues were promoted instead of her, Director Joshi told her that Managers WoodTaylor and Dillon were "friends" with the management, and that was "how things work around KPMG." When asked, he was unable to provide Ms. Vasudeva any ways in which she could improve her perfmmance or develop her skill set to better position herself for a promotion.
333. Ms. Vasudeva also asked Partner Vanessa Lo why she was not promoted, and was told that management counted her six months of maternity leave against her tenure and considered her "too inexperienced" with Manager duties. However, Ms. Vasudeva had ample exposure to Manager-level work. She had regularly performed Manager-level tasks such as budgeting and forecasting and had even trained new Managers on their duties for certain projects.
334. Upon infonnation and belief, Ms. Vasudeva was not the only woman to suffer the effects of the evaluation, development, and promotion systems at KPMG, which lacked sufficient standards, quality controls, implementation metrics, transparency, and opportunities for redress that would otherwise have ensured there was no disparate impact on female professionals who took FMLA leave.
335. Upon infonnation and belief, KPMG management systematically took advantage of the flaws in these systems and often undervalued, mismeasured, or otherwise inaccurately captured performance to the particular detriment of women.
336. Indeed, Senior Associates Dillon and Wood-Taylor, like other male employees at KPMG, were regularly invited to "client-building" events, while their female counterpatis toiled away in the office. For example, in 2008 and 2009, when Ms. Vasudeva was staffed on an audit for Engagement Manager Jared Collins ("Manager Collins"), the Pminers, Managers and other Senior Associates working on the project, all of whom were male, often went golfing on the
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Company dime to develop relationships with clients and senior management. Ms. Vasudeva, the sole female Senior Associate who had taken FMLA leave was systematically excluded. For example, on one occasion, Manager Collins, Senior Associate Dillon, Senior Associate WoodTaylor and three male Team Leads went golfing with the audit client. Ms. Vasudeva, the only other Team Lead, was not informed about the event until it was already underway.
Pregnancy/Caregiver Djscrimination and Retaliation 337. From 2007 until her constrnctive discharge in 2009, KPMG discriminated against Ms. Vasudeva based on her gender and her caregiving responsibilities as a working mother. Because of Ms. Vasudeva's status as a working mother, and her decision to take maternity leave, KPMG made a number of adverse decisions concerning her employment. 338. In January 2008, Ms. Vasudeva told her Engagement Partner, Principal Behan, that she planned to take matemity leave. Principal Behan told her that, if she took maternity leave, she might not come back at the same level or same pay. 339. When Ms. Vasudeva noted that it was illegal to penalize her for taking maternity leave, Principal Behan replied that "in England that is not the case." 340. In July 2008, when Ms. Vasudeva retumed fi·om maternity leave, Principal Behan abtuptly removed her from her largest, most lucrative engagement, to which she had been assigned for over a year. Though Ms. Vasudeva had previously trained staff to work on the client, Principal Behan claimed it was "fully staffed" without her. 341. Principal Behan reassigned Ms. Vasudeva to a new client in Stockton, CA, nearly an hour and a half from Ms. Vasudeva's home in Union City, CA. The Stockton client required high volumes of unchallenging work and was not in need of Ms. Vasudeva's skill set. Further, Ms. Vasudeva had to drive to and fi·om Stockton each day, making her commute three hours per
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clay. While other employees staffed to the client stayed in Stockton eluting the week and returned home for the weekends, Ms. Vasudeva had to return home daily to care for her newbom. Ms. Vasudeva's similarly situated male counterparts in Contracts Compliance Services were not reassigned to new clients at this time or in this abrupt fashion.
342. Two weeks after being reassigned to the Stockton client, Ms. Vasudeva told Principal Behan that she believed the reassignment was unfair. She asked to be removed from the client, but Principal Behan refused to do so. Ms. Vasudeva's request for release was only granted when she asked the Engagement Partner on the Stockton client.
343. Ms. Vasudeva also expressed her concerns to her Performance Manager, Director Joshi. Shortly after her complaints she was placed on a new project, on which KPMG expected Ms. Vasudeva to achieve results as "Team Lead" for a software audit under Partner Ron Brill ("Partner Btill") and Manager Collins, but provided her no staff to fill her "team." During the ten-month period that Ms. Vasudeva was staffed on the project, she only received assistance for two weeks, while she was traveling overseas for a client site visit.
344. Typically, such a project would have been staffed with at least two or three other members of the team. Indeed, the three additional "Team Leads" on the client, all of whom were male, had at least two staff members reporting to them. Fmiher, Senior Associates Wood-Taylor and Dillon, who were given infotmal promotions to "Supet Senior Associates" on the same audit, had two to three Senior Associates reporting them, who in tum had three to four Associates reporting to them. Unlike Ms. Vasudeva, who was left to fend for herself on her audit, male Senior Associates had teams of Associates conducting analysis and perf01ming other support tasks for them. Although Manager Collins was directly responsible for Ms. Vasudeva's engagement, he claimed he had "no expertise" and refused to support her.
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345. Once again, the Company was setting Ms. Vasudeva up for failure. On Manager Collins' project, Ms. Vasudeva was the only female Senior Associate. All Managers and Partners were male. Ms. Vasudeva, without a team to lead, was put at a distinct disadvantage compared to her male peers, who had several people on their teams.
346. Not only did Ms. Vasudeva's maternity leave affect the assignments she received, but it also pe1meated her year-end perfmmance review. The final and only comment in the Year End Overall Perfmn1ance Rating Comments for Ms. Vasudeva's 2008 Fiscal Year review was that "Ashwini was on Maternity Leave for most of this perfmmance year."
347. After the Company had set Ms. Vasudeva up for failure, in her 2009 fiscal year end review, KPMG included unjust criticisms of her software-related skills, though her work required only business, accounting and audit skills. Upon infmmation and belief, these criticisms came from Managers Collins and Wood-Taylor. In fact, Ms. Vasudeva did not need softwarerelated skills to fulfill her job duties. Ms. Vasudeva addressed this concern to Director Joshi, and he indicated that he understood the problem, yet declined to remove this irrelevant criticism from her evaluation.
348. While recognizing her "excellent" work product, Director Joshi made unfounded, gendered criticisms of Ms. Vasudeva's communication style, stating that she should develop a "softer approach." Upon infmmation and belief, these criticisms also came from Managers Collins and Wood-Taylor.
349. Upon infonnation and belief, KPMG's promotion system's insufficient quality standards and controls and implementation metrics, coupled with its lack of transparency and opportunities for redress, had a discriminatory and disparate impact on women and caretaking employees.
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350. Upon infom1ation and belief, KPMG management systematically took advantage of the flaws in the system by allowing isolated, pretexual criticisms to infiltrate promotion decisions, overwhelmingly to the disadvantage of female employees.
351. In December 2008, Manager Collins told Ms. Vasudeva that she should sign up for a flex schedule because she was "working only from 9 a.m. to 5:00p.m." Although Manager Collins assumed Ms. Vasudeva was working less or otherwise underperforming as a new mother, this was not true. While Ms. Vasudeva would leave work at 5:00p.m. to pick up her child from daycare, she would work late at night to compensate for any lost time. Indeed, she typically worked twelve hours per day, and had no desire to work a reduced schedule or otherwise pm1icipate in the flex time program.
352. After female Partner Vanessa Lo reassured her that she should not go on a flexible plan if she was working full-time hours, Ms. Vasudeva told Manager Collins that she saw no need for her to go on a flex schedule, which would have come with reduced pay and lessened her chances for her promotion to manager. Manager Collins appeared to disapprove of her decision when Ms. Vasudeva told him.
353. Like Ms. Vasudeva, many female Professionals at KPMG are pressured to move to a flexible schedule after having children because of the predominant culture at KPMG that assumes working mothers with young children are less effective employees and less committed to their careers. Upon information and belief, taking leave or hours reductions for pregnancy and caretaking reasons is considered a negative factor in employees' evaluations, compensation decisions and promotion considerations, resulting in an adverse impact on women and mothers at the Company.
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354. In June 2009, Ms. Vasudeva requested a ninety-day sabbatical because of stress from the unrealistic demands being imposed on her and the lack of opportunities and support. While Principal Behan-who was no longer Ms. Vasudeva's direct supervisor-approved the sabbatical requests of an employee who had not taken maternity leave in order to engage in recreational activities, he persuaded HR to reject Ms. Vasudeva's because "his client need[ed] [her]." At the time, however, Ms. Vasudeva had no work pending. Indeed, Partner Btill, Ms. Vasudeva's Engagement Pminer at the time, had previously approved her sabbatical request because Ms. Vasudeva had completed all her deliverables.
355. In June 2009, after Principal Behan rejected her sabbatical request, Ms. Vasudeva complained to HR. In addition to discussing her denied sabbatical request, Ms. Vasudeva complained about the ongoing discrimination she was expetiencing. She also discussed her complaints of discrimination with Ethics and Compliance. However, KPMG never addressed Ms. Vasudeva's complaints prior to her conshuctive discharge.
356. Upon information and belief, during Ms. Vasudeva's tenure with KPMG, she was the only pregnant female at the Associate or Senior Associate level in both the Audit and Advisory Practices at KPMG Mountain View. The only other pregnant female employee in either practice who Ms. Vasudeva was aware of was Shanti Krislmaswamy, a Director whom Principal Behan asked to leave approximately a year after her she gave birth to her child.
357. Upon information and belief, KPMG has subjected and continues to subject female employees with caregiving responsibilities and/or young children like Ms. Vasudeva to disparate tetms and conditions ofemployment.
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~pnstructive DJ.sch~JX"'
358. Ms. Vasudeva was forced to end her career at KPMG in September of 2009 because the Company had deliberately made her working conditions so intolerable that she was compelled to resign involuntarily.
359. When Ms. Vasudeva began at KPMG, building a career at the Company was her lifelong dream. However, despite her hard work, her dream steadily grew more and more elusive. During Ms. Vasudeva's tenure at KPMG, she was paid less than male counterparts, denied oppmtunities for mentorship and advancement, and experienced discrimination and retaliation when she became pregnant and took matemity leave. Although she continued to be a top perfonner, she bore the burden of unrealistic demands, insufficient resources to complete her work, and regular hostility from male superiors such as Principal Behan.
360. For example, in 2007, when Principal Behan noticed that Ms. Vasudeva worked well with her female colleague, Senior Associate Kathryn Harris, he attempted to sabotage their working relationship. Speaking with each woman privately, Ptincipal Behan told Ms. Vasudeva and Ms. Harris that one had made negative comments about the other, though neither had done so. Ultimately, the two women reconciled and discovered that Principal Behan had lied to them both. Upon information and belief, Principal Behan's divide-and-conquer strategy was intended to further marginalize the female Professionals in his group, who already constituted a minmi ty.
361. In another example of Principal Behan's hostility to women, in July 2009, Principal Behan made overt sexual innuendos to Ms. Vasudeva including a suggestion that, to women, the flavor of cetiain Indian food was similar to semen "in their mouth[s]." The comment made Ms. Vasudeva extremely uncomfortable. Upon information and belief, Principal Behan regularly made degrading comments to and about other women.
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362. Even once he was no longer her direct supervisor, Principal Behan saw to it that Ms. Vasudeva would not be able to take sabbatical, compounding the retaliation to which he had already subjected her to in moving her to the Stockton project.
363. Manager Collins, too, made it clear that he disapproved of Ms. Vasudeva's status as a full-time working mother, and, accordingly, increased demands on her by declining to provide her support in working on his software audit.
364. While Ms. Vasudeva had originally hoped that things might get better with timeas she proved herself and her skills to the Company - her treatment upon her retum from maternity leave proved that to be a fhlse hope. Although Ms. Vasudeva had long experienced hostility at KPMG, these conditions escalated dramatically when she returned from matemity leave. She was not only singled out for overly-burdensome unchallenging work, but also was denied adequate resources, excluded from oppmtunities for further advancement, subjected to criticisms regarding an assumed lack of commitment to the company, and otherwise isolated and devalued.
365. Ms. Vasudeva found herself constantly unhappy and irritable, detrimentally affecting her relationships with her family. Her misery at work suffused not only her life at KPMG, but also her home life. Ms. Vadudeva was frequently unhappy and overcome by anxiety about work, disrupting even the simplest of moments at home.
366. As a result of ongoing discrimination, hostility and retaliation, Ms. Vasudeva also developed stress-induced pain in her neck and lower and middle back, severe enough eventually to necessitate treatment by a physician.
367. KPMG took no action whatsoever in response to her concerns despite the fact that she voiced them to senior management, Human Resources, and Ethics and Compliance. KPMG's
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deliberate and purposeful indifference to her concems, and its active steps to deny her a sabbatical, exacerbated and otherwise contributed to her distress. Once it became clear to Ms. Vasudeva that even HR and Ethics and Compliance were not going to ameliorate the situation, her work environment became more oppressive. Eventually, she could not even think about going to work day to day; resignation was her only option.
368. Once it became clear to Ms. Vasudeva that HR and Ethics and Compliance were not going to step in-and that they were going to be indifferent to her concerns and even complicit in her tmment-she could not even think about going to work day to day. Resignation became her only option.
369. Like Ms. Vasudeva, other female employees in Ms. Vasudeva's practice group have complained to HR and/or through other reporting channels about the Company's "old boys' club." Upon information and belief, since Ms. Vasudeva's constmctive discharge from KPMG, at least four female Associates and one female Senior Associate from her practice group have left the Company due to fmstration about the lack of opportunities. Upon information and belief, on!y one male employee has left Ms. Vasudeva's group, while most of the other men have been swiftly and steadily promoted.
370. Upon information and belief, KPMG's flawed evaluation, development, mentoring and promotion practices consistently result in males being promoted more rapidly and assigned more frequently to higher-level positions than women across the Company.
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V. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 371. Class Representatives D01ma Kassman, Linda O'Donnell, Sparkle Patterson,
Jeanette Potter and Ashwini Vasudeva and the class of female employees they seek to represent have been subjected to a pattern and practice of gender discrimination, and employment policies and practices which have had a continuing, unlawful disparate impact on them and their employment opportunities. Such gender discrimination includes (a) assigning female Professionals to lower titles and classifications than their male counterparts; (b) paying female Professionals less than their male counterparts; (c) denying female Professionals promotion and advancement oppmtunities in favor of male employees; (d) treating pregnant employees and mothers differently from non-pregnant employees, male employees, and non-caregivers; and (e) failing to prevent, respond to, adequately investigate, and/or appropriately resolve instances of gender discdmination and pregnancy/caregiver discrimination in the workplace.
372. KPMG, in effect, bars female employees from better and higher-paying positions which have traditionally been held by male employees. The systemic means of accomplishing such gender-based stratification include, but are not limited to, KPMG's assignment, development, promotion, advancement, compensation and performance evaluation policies, practices and procedures. These practices and procedures all suffer fi'om a lack of: transparency, adequate quality standards and controls; sufficient implementation metrics; upper management!HR review; and opportunities for redress or challenge. As a result, employees are assigned, evaluated, compensated, developed, and promoted within a system that is insufficiently designed, atiiculated, explained or implemented to consistently, reliably or fairly manage or reward employees.
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373. Within these flawed stmctures, specific practices negatively affect KPMG's female Professionals. For example, assignments do not reflect female employees' experience and qualifications, and promotions are not based upon tme comparative perfonnance. The evaluation system lacks sufficient standards or quality controls and metdcs to accurately and reliably measure perfonnance. Within this system, unfounded criticisms may be lodged against KPMG Professionals who are female, pregnant or mothers, and legitimate criticisms given undue weigbt. Participation in male-dominated and exclusive social activities can improperly control or influence an employees' standing and prospects within KPMG. Partners, Managing Directors, Senior Managers and Managers mentor and develop employees selectively, without the appropriate standards or guidelines or transparency necessary to ensure an equitable workplace. Moreover, taking leave or flex time for pregnancy and caretaking reasons can constitute a negative factor in employees' evaluations, compensation and promotion prospects; and HR and management has failed to curb a corporate culture that presumes being a mother makes an employee less dedicated or productive.
374. These problems are systemic and Company-wide, because, upon infmmation and belief, all stem from flawed policies, practices and procedures which emanate from the Company's New York headquarters.
375. Where Human Resources and Ethics complaint and compliance policies exist, they lack meaningful quality controls, standards, implementation metdcs, and means of redress. Concerns about discrimination made to supervising staff and HR itself are allowed to go unaddressed. Worse, there is no meaningful separation between HR/Ethics complaint processes and the Managers and Partners who create discdminatory or hostile work conditions toward
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women and mothers, such that victims of discrimination often face retaliation or are dissuaded from voicing concerns altogether.
376. Thus, KPMG tolerates and even cultivates a hostile environment in which women and mothers are openly devalued and where (a) retaliation for voicing gender disc1imination complaints is the norm and (b) women mothers who question or even inadvertently disrupt the gendered norms are routinely pushed out of the Company.
377. In all, KPMG demonstrates a reckless disregard- a deliberate indifference- to its female employees by overlooking or otherwise dismissing even blatant evidence of gender discrimination.
378. KPMG's assignment, evaluation, development, compensation, promotion and matemity/flexible schedule policies, practices, and procedures, as well as its failure to prevent, respond to, adequately investigate, and/or appropriately resolve instances of gender and pregnancy/caregiver disczimination, have had a disparate impact on the Class Representatives and the members of the class. Such policies, practices and procedures are not valid, job-related, or justified by business necessity.
379. Because of Defendant's pattem-or-practice of gender discrimination, the Class Representatives and class they seek to represent have been adversely affected and have expedcnced ham1, including the loss of compensation, promotion and other advancement opportunities, employment benefits and non-economic damages.
380. KPMG has failed to impose adequate discipline on managers and employees who violate equal employment oppmtunity laws and has failed to create adequate incentives for its managerial and supervisory personnel to comply with such laws regarding the employment policies, practices, and procedures described above.
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381. The Class Representatives and the class have no plain, adequate, or complete remedy at law to redress the wrongs alleged herein, and this suit is their only means of securing adequate relief. The Class Representatives and the class have suffered, and will continue to suffer, incparable injury from KPMG's ongoing, unlawful policies, practices, and procedures as set fmih herein unless those policies, practices, and procedures are enjoined by this Court.
A. General Facts Relevant to Class Claims and Class Definition 382. The Class Representatives seek to maintain claims on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of current and former female exempt Client Service and Support Professionals at KPMG. 383. The class consists of all female exempt Client Service and Support Professionals, including but not limited to Associates, Senior Associates, Managers, Senior Managers and Managing Directors (collectively "Professionals"), who are, or have been, employed by KPMG nationwide during the applicable liability period until the date of judgment. Upon information and belief, there are thousands of such employees in the proposed class. 384. The Class Representatives seek to represent all of the female employees described above. The systemic and disparate impact gender discrimination described in this Complaint has been, and is, continuing in nature. B. Efficiency of Class Prosecution of Common Claims 385. Certification of a class of female Professionals is the most efficient and economical means of resolving the questions of!aw and fact which are common to the claims of the Class Representatives and the proposed class. 386. The individual claims of the Class Representatives require resolution of the common question of whether KPMG has engaged in a systemic pattem and/or practice of gender
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discrimination against female Professionals. The Class Representatives seek remedies to eliminate the adverse effects of such discrimination in their own lives, career and working conditions, and in the lives, careers and working conditions of the proposed class members, and to prevent continued gender discrimination in the future.
387. Plaintiffs have standing to seek such relief because of the adverse effect that such discrimination has had on them individually and on female employees generally. KPMG caused Plaintiffs' injuries through its disctiminatory practices, policies, and procedures, as well as its disparate treatment of employees who are fcniale, pregnant, and/or have caregiving responsibilities. These injuries are redressible through systemic relief, such as an injunction, and other approptiate class-wide and individual remedies sought in this action.
388. In addition, proper relief for Plaintiffs' individual constructive discharge and wrongful termination claims can include reinstatement. As such, each has a personal interest in the policies, practices and procedures implemented at KPMG moving forward.
389. In order to gain relief for themselves, as well as for the class members, Plaintiffs will first establish the existence of systemic gender discrimination as the premise for the relief they seek.
390. Without class certification, the same evidence and issues would be subject to relitigation in a multitude of individual lawsuits with an attendant risk of inconsistent adjudications and conflicting obligations. Certification of the proposed class of females is the most efficient and judicious means of presenting the evidence and arguments necessary to resolve such questions for the Class Representatives, the proposed class, and Defendant KPMG.
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C. Numerosity and Impracticability of Joinder 391. The class which the Class Representatives seek to represent is too numerous to make joinder practicable. Upon information and belief, the proposed class consists of thousands of current and former female Professionals during the liability period. 392. KPMG's pattern and/or practice of gender discrimination also makes joinder impracticable by discouraging females from applying for or pursuing promotional, training, or transfer opportunities, thereby making it impractical and inefficient to identify many members of the class prior to determination of the merits ofKPMG's class-wide liability. D. Common Questions of Law and Fact 393. The prosecution of the claims of the Class Representatives will require the adjlldication of numerous questions of law and fact common to both their individual claims and those of the putative class they seek to represent. 394. The common questions of!aw include, inter alia: (a) whether KPMG has engaged m a pattern and practice of unlawful, systemic gender discrimination in its compensation, assignment, selection, perfmmance evaluation, promotion, advancement, transfer, tr·aining and discipline policies, practices and procedures, and in the general terms and conditions of work and employment; (b) whether the failure to institute adequate standards, quality controls, implementation meh'ics, or oversight in assigmnent, compensation, evaluation, development, maternity and flex/time, and promotion systems violate Title VII, and/or other statutes; (c) whether the lack of transparency and of opportunities for redress in those systems violates Title VII, and/or other statutes; (d) whether senior management and HR's failure to prevent, investigate, or properly respond to evidence and complaints of discrimination in the workplace violates Title VII, and/or other statutes; and (e) whether KPMG is liable for a continuing systemic
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violation of Title VII, and/or other statutes; and a determination of the proper standards for proving a pattern or practice of discrimination by KPMG against its female Professionals.
395. The common questions of fact include, inter alia: whether KPMG has: (a) used a system of assignment that lacks meaningful or appropriate standards, implementation metrics, quality controls, transparency and opportunities for redress; (b) through the use of that system of assignment placed female Professionals in job titles or classifications lower than similarlysituated male employees; (c) systematically, intentionally or knowingly placed female Professionals in job titles or classifications lower than similarly-situated male employees; (d) used a compensation system that lacks meaningful or appropriate standards, implementation metrics, quality controls, transparency and oppmiunities for redress; (e) through the use of that compensation system compensated female Professionals less than similarly-situated males in salary, bonuses, and/or other perks; (f) systematically, intentionally or knowingly compensated female Professionals less than similarly-situated males; (g) used a system of development and mentoring that lacks meaningful or appropriate standards, implementation metrics, quality controls, transparency and oppo1iunities for redress (h) through the use of that development and mentoring system failed to develop or mentor female Professionals in a commensurate ma1111er to their similarly-situated male counterparts; (i) systematically, intentionally or knowingly failed to develop or mentor female Professionals in a commensurate manner to their similarly-situated male counterparts; (j) used a promotion system that lacks meaningful or appropriate standards, implementation metrics, quality controls, transparency and opportunities for redress; (k) through use of that promotion system precluded or delayed the promotion of female Professionals into higher level jobs traditionally held by male employees; (I) systematically, intentionally or knowingly precluded or delayed the promotion of female Professionals into higher level jobs
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traditionally held by male employees; (m) used a system for performance evaluations which lacks meaningful or appropriate standards, implementation metrics, quality controls, transparency and opportunities for redress; (n) through use of that perfonnance evaluation system inaccurately, unfairly or disparately measured and classified female and male employee perfonnance; (o) systematically, intentionally or knowingly subjected female employees to inaccurate, unfair, or discriminatorily lowered performance evaluations; through its policies, practices, and procedures, developed male and female employees equitably; (p) used matemity and flex time policies, practices, and procedures that lack meaningful or appropriate standards, implementation metrics, quality controls, transparency or opportunities for redress; (q) tln·ough use of those policies; practices and pnocedures treated pregnant employees and mothers differently and discriminatorily from non-pregnant employees, male employees, and non-caregivers; (r) systematically, intentionally or knowingly subjected pregnant employees and mothers to disparate and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment; (s) used HR, EEO, and Ethics systems that lack meaningful or appropriate standards, implementation metrics, quality controls, transparency or opportunities for redress; (t) tln·ough use of those systems minimized, ignored, or covered up evidence of gender discrimination and harassment in the workplace and/or otherwise mishandled the investigation of and response to complaints of discrimination and harassment brought to the attention of senior management, the human resources department, or other reporting channels; (u) systematically, intentionally, knowingly or deliberately showed an indifference to evidence of discrimination in the workplace or otherwise minimized, ignored, mishandled, or covered up evidence of or complaints about gender and pregnancy discrimination and harassment in the workplace; and (v) failed to adequately or meaningfully train, coach, or discipline senior management on EEO principles and compliance.
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396. The employment policies, practices, and procedures to which the Class Representatives and the class members are subjected are set at KPMG's corporate level, which is headquartered in and directed from New York, and apply universally to all class members. These employment policies, practices and procedures are not unique or limited to any department; rather, they apply to all departments and, thus, affect the Class Representatives and class members in the same ways no matter the facility, department, or position in which they work.
397. Throughout the liability period, a disproportionately large percentage of the managers and officers at KPMG have been male.
398. The systemic means of accomplishing such gender-based stratification include, but are not limited to, KPMG's assignment, development, promotion, advancement, compensation and performance evaluation policies, practices and procedures. These policies, practices and procedures all suffer from a lack of: transparency, adequate quality standards and controls; sufficient implementation metrics; upper management/HR review; and opportunities for redress or challenge. As a result, employees are assigned, evaluated, compensated, developed, and promoted within a system that is insufficiently designed, articulated, explained or implemented to consistently, reliably or fairly manage or reward employees.
399. As a result, male employees have advanced and continue to advance more rapidly to better and higher-paying jobs than do female employees. KPMG's policies, practices, and procedures have had an adverse impact on female Professionals seeking selection for, or advancement to, better and higher-paying positions. In general, the higher the level of the job classification, the lower the percentage of female employees holding it.
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E. Typicality of Claims and Relief Sought 400. The claims of the Class Representatives are typical of the claims of the class. The relief sought by the Class Representatives for gender discrimination complained of herein is also typical of the relief which is sought on behalf of the class. 401. Like the members of the class, the Class Representatives are Professionals who worked at KPMG during the liability period. 402. Discrimination in selection, assignment, performance evaluation, promotion, advancement, and training affects the compensation of the Class Representatives and all the employee class members in the same or similar ways. 403. KPMG has failed to create adequate incentives for its management to comply with its own policies and equal employment oppmiunity laws regarding each of the employment policies, practices, and procedures referenced in this Complaint, and has failed to discipline adequately its managers and other employees when they violate the Company policy or discrimination laws. These failures have affected the Class Representatives and the class members in the same or similar ways. 404. The relief necessary to remedy the claims of the Class Representatives is exactly the same as that necessary to remedy the claims of the class members in this case. 405. The Class Representatives seek the following relieffor their individual claims and for those of the members of the proposed class: (a) a declaratory judgment that KPMG has engaged in systemic gender discrimination against female Professionals by (1) paying female Professionals less than their male counterparts, (2) denying female Professionals promotion and advancement oppmiunities in favor of male employees, (3) treating pregnant employees and mothers differently from non-pregnant employees, male employees, and non-caregivers, and (4) failing to prevent, respond to, adequately investigate, and/or appropriately resolve instances of
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gender discrimination and pregnancy/caregiver discrimination in the workplace; (b) a pennanent injunction against such continuing discriminatory conduct; (c) injunctive relief which effects a restructuring of KPMG's assignment, promotion, transfer, training, perfonnance evaluation, compensation, and discipline policies, practices, and procedures - so that female Professionals will be able to compete fairly in the future for promotions, transfers, and assignments to better and higher-paying classifications with terms and conditions of employment traditionally enjoyed by male employees; (d) back pay, front pay, reinstatement and/or other equitable remedies necessary to make the female Professionals whole from the Defendant's past discrimination; (f) punitive and nominal damages to prevent and deter KPMG from engaging in similar discriminatory practices in the future; (g) compensatory damages; (h) pre·· and post-judgment interest; and (i) attomeys' fees, costs and expenses.
F. Adequacy of Representation 406. The Class Representatives' interests are co-extensive with those of the members of the proposed class which they seek to represent in this case. The Class Representatives seek to remedy KPMG's discriminatory employment policies, practices, and procedures so that female Professionals will no longer be prevented from advancing into higher-paying and/or more desirable higher-level positions. Plaintiffs are willing and able to represent the proposed class fairly and vigorously as they pursue their individual claims in this action. 407. The Class Representatives have retained counsel who are qualified, experienced, and able to conduct this litigation and to meet the time and fiscal demands required to litigate an employment discrimination class action of this size and complexity. The combined interests, experience, and resources of Plaintiffs' counsel to litigate competently the individual and class
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claims at issue in this case clearly satisfy the adequacy of representation requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(4).
G. Requirements Of Rule 23(b)(2) 408. KPMG has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class Representatives and the class by adopting and following systemic policies, practices, and procedures which arc discriminatory. Gender discrimination is KPMG's standard operating procedure rather than a sporadic occurrence. KPMG has refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class by, inter alia: (a) assigning female Professionals to job titles and classifications lower than proper for their qualifications and/or actual job duties and responsibilities; (b) failing to pay female Professionals on par with similarly-situated male employees; (c) denying female Professionals promotion and advancement opportunities in favor of male employees; (d) treating pregnant employees and mothers differently fi'om non-pregnant employees, male employees, and noncaregivers; and (e) failing to prevent, respond to, adequately investigate, and/or appropriately resolve claims of gender discrimination and pregnancy/caregiver disclimination. 409. The systemic means of accomplishing such gender-based stratification include, but are not limited to, KPMG's assignment, development, promotion, advancement, compensation and performance evaluation policies, practices and procedures. These practices and procedures all suffer from a lack of: transparency, adequate quality standards and controls; sufficient implementation mettics; upper management/HR review; and opportunities for redress or challenge. As a result, employees are assigned, evaluated, compensated, developed, and promoted within a system that is insufficiently designed, articulated, explained or implemented to consistently, reliably or fairly manage or reward employees.
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410. KPMG's systemic discrimination and refi.1sa1 to act on grounds that are not discriminatory have made appropriate the requested final injunctive and declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.
411. Injunctive, declaratory and affitmative relief are the predominant relief sought in this case because they are the culmination of the proof of KPMG's individual and class-wide liability and the essential predicate for the Class Representatives' and the class members' entitlement to monetary and non-monetary remedies at Stage II of such trial. Entitlement to declaratory, injunctive and affinnative relief flows directly and automatically fimn proof of the common questions of law and fact regarding the existence of systemic gender discrimination against female Professionals at KPMG.
412. In addition, entitlement to declaratory, injunctive and affirmative relief fonns the factual and legal predicate for recovery by the Class of punitive damages.
H. Requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) 413. The common issues of fact and law affecting the claims of the Class Representatives and proposed class members, including, but not limited to, the common issues previously identified herein, predominate over any issues affecting only individual claims. These issues include whether KPMG has engaged in gender discrimination against female Professionals by (a) assigning female Professionals to lower job titles and classifications than their male counterpmis; (b) paying female Professionals less than their male counterparts, (c) denying female Professionals promotion and advancement oppotiunities in favor of male employees, (d) treating pregnant employees and mothers differently from non-pregnant employees, male employees, and non-caregivers, and (e) failing to prevent, respond to, adequately investigate,
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and/or appropriately resolve instances of gender discrimination and pregnancy/caregiver discrimination in the workplace.
414. A class action is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims of the Class Representatives and members of the proposed class.
415. The cost of proving KPMG's pattern and practice of discrimination makes it impracticable for the Class Representatives and members of the proposed class to prosecute their claims individually.
416. By viliue of the pattern and practice of discrimination at KPMG, Class Representatives and Class members are eligible for monetary remedies for losses caused by the systemic discrimination, including backpay, frontpay, reinstatement, compensatory damages, and other nominal and punitive damages. VI. COLLECTIVE ACTION ALLEGATIONS (EOUAL PAY ACT)
417. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations from the previous paragraphs of this Complaint alleging class-based discrimination against similarly-situated female employees.
418. Plaintiffs bring collective violations of the Equal Pay Act ("EPA") as a collective action pursuant to Section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) on behalf of all members of the gender class - e.g. current, former, and fi.Jture female Managers, during the liability pedod. The EPA action includes female Professionals who (a) were not compensated equally to males who had substantially similar job classifications, functions, families, titles and/or duties, (b) were not compensated equally to males who performed substantially similar work, and (c) who were denied promotion and advancement opportunities that would result in greater compensation in favor oflesser qualified male employees.
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419. Questions of law and fact common to the EPA Collective Action Plaintiffs as a whole include but are not limited to the following: (a) whether Defendant unlawfully failed and continues to fail to compensate female Professionals at a level commensurate with similarly situated male employees; (b) whether Defendant unlawfully failed and continues to fail to promote and advance female Professionals in a fashion commensurate with similarly qualified males; (c) whether Defendant's policy and practice of failing to compensate female Professionals on a par with comparable male employees as a result of (a) and (b) violates applicable provisions of the EPA; and (d) whether Defendant's failure to compensate female Professionals on a par with comparable male employees as a result of (a) and (b) was willful within the meaning of the EPA.
420. Counts for violation of the EPA may be brought and maintained as an "opt-in" collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), for all claims asserted by the EPA Collective Action Plaintiffs because the claims of Plaintiff are similar to the claims of the EPA Collective Action Plaintiffs.
421. Plaintiffs and the EPA Collective Action Plaintiffs (a) are similarly situated; (b) have substantially similar job classifications, functions, families, titles and/or duties; and (c) are subject to Defendant's common policy and practice of gender discrimination in (i) failing to compensate female Professionals on par with men who perfmm substantially equal work and/or · hold equivalent levels and positions, and (ii) failing to provide female Professionals equal pay by denying opportunities for promotion and advancement to them comparable to those afforded to males who perform substantially equal work.
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CLASS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION COUNTS
~OUNTI
(INDIVIDUAL AND CLASS CLAIMS) VIOLATION OF TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 ("TITLE VII")-
PAY DISCRIMINATION 47, U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. 422. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation in each and every aforementioned paragraph as if fully set forth herein. 423. This Count is brought on behalf of Ms. Kassman, Ms. Patterson, and all members of the class. 424. Defendant KPMG has discriminated against Plaintiffs and all members of the class in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S. C. § 2000e, et seq., as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("Title VII"), by subjecting them to different treatment on the basis of their gender. Plaintiffs have suffered both disparate impact and disparate treatment as a result of Defendant's wrongful conduct. 425. Defendant has discriminated against Plaintiffs and all members of the class by subjecting them to discriminatory pay, discriminatory denials of pay raises, and discriminatory perfmmance evaluations that affect pay, in violation of Title VII. 426. Defendant's conduct has been intentional, deliberate, willful, malicious, reckless and conducted in callous disregard of the rights of Plaintiffs and all members of the class, entitling Plaintiffs and all members of the class to punitive damages. 427. By reason of the continuous nature of Defendant's discriminatory conduct, which persisted throughout the employment of Plaintiffs and the members of the class, Plaintiffs and the members of the class are entitled to application of the continuing violations doctrine to all violations alleged herein.
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428. As a result of Defendant's conduct alleged in this complaint, Plaintiffs and the members of the class have suffered and continue to suffer harm, including but not limited to lost eamings, lost benefits, lost future employment opportunities, other financial loss, and noneconomic damages.
429. Defendant's policies, practices and/or procedures have produced a disparate impact on Plaintiffs and the members of the class with respect to the terms and conditions of their employment.
430. By reason of Defendant's disc1imination, Plaintiffs and the members of the class are entitled to all remedies available for violations of Title VII, including an award of punitive damages.
431. Attorneys' fees should be awarded under 42 U.S. C. § 2000e-5(k). COUNT II
(INDIVIDUAL AND CLASS CLAIMS) VIOLATION OF TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 ("TITLE VII")-
PROMOTION DISCRIMINATION 42 U.S.C. § 2000c, et seq.
432. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation in each and every aforementioned paragraph as if fully set fmih herein.
433. This Count is brought on behalf of Ms. Kassman, Ms. Patterson, and all members of the class.
434. Defendant KPMG has discriminated against Plaintiffs and all members of the class in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("Title VII"), by subjecting them to different treatment on the basis of their gender. Plaintiffs have suffered both disparate impact and disparate treatment as a result of Defendant's wrongful conduct.
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435. Defendant has discriminated against Plaintiffs and all members of the class by treating them differently from and less preferably than similarly-situated male employees, and by subjecting them to discriminatory denials of promotions, discriminatory denials of developmental opportunities, and discriminatory performance evaluations that affect promotions in violation of Title VII.
436. Defendant's conduct has been intentional, deliberate, willful, malicious, reckless and conducted in callous disregard of the rights of Plaintiffs and all members of the class, entitling Plaintiffs and all members of the class to punitive damages.
437. By reason of the continuous nature of Defendant's disc1iminatory conduct, which persisted throughout the employment of Plaintiffs and the members of the class, Plaintiffs and the members of the class are entitled to application of the continuing violations doctrine to all violations alleged herein.
438. As a result of Defendant's conduct alleged in this complaint, Plaintiffs and the members of the class have suffered and continue to suffer harm, including but not limited to lost earnings, lost benefits, lost future employment oppmtunities, other financial loss, and noneconomic damages.
439. Defendant's policies, practices and/or procedures have produced a disparate impact on Plaintiffs and the members of the class with respect to the terms and conditions of their employment.
440. By reason of Defendant's discrimination, Plaintiffs and the members of the class are entitled to all remedies available for violations of Title VII, including an award of punitive damages.
441. Attomeys' fees should be awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).
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COU_[\'T III (INDIVIDUAL AND CLASS CLAIMS) VIOLATION Ol< TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 ("TITLE VII")PREGNANCY AND CAREGiVER DISCRIMINATION
42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. 442. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation in each and every aforementioned paragraph as if fully set forth herein. 443. This Count is brought on behalf of Ms. Kassman, Ms. Patterson, and all similar members of the class. 444. Defendant KPMG has discriminated against Plaintiffs and all members of the Class in violation of Title VII by subjecting them to different treatment on the basis of their gender. The members of the Class have been disparately impacted and disparately treated as a result ofKPMG's wrongful conduct and its policies, practices and procedures. 445. KPMG has discriminated against the class members b1inging this claim by treating them differently from and less preferably than similarly-situated male employees and female employees without primary caregiving responsibilities, and by subjecting them to differential and substandard terms and conditions of employment including but not limited to discriminatory denials of fair compensation, discriminatory denials of promotional and discriminatory treatment with respect to work responsibilities and other tenns and conditions of employment in violation of Title VII. 446. KPMG's conduct has been intentional, deliberate, willful, malicious, reckless and conducted in callous disregard of the rights of the Plaintiffs and the members of the proposed class, entitling the Plaintiffs and the members of the class to punitive damages.
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447. As a result of Defendant's conduct alleged in this complaint, Plaintiffs and the members of the class have suffered and continue to suffer harm, including but not limited to lost earnings, lost benefits, and other financial loss, and non-economic damages.
448. By reason of Defendant's discrimination, Plaintiffs and members of the class are entitled to all legal and equitable remedies available for violations of Title VII, including an award of punitive damages.
449. Attorneys' fees should be awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e··5(k). COUNT IV
(INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAIMS) VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT OF 1938, AS AMENDED BY THE EQUAL PAY ACT OF 1963-29 U.S.C. §§ 206, el· seq.
DENIAL OF EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK 450. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the previous paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 451. This Count is brought on behalf of Ms. Kassman, Ms. O'Donnell, Ms. Patterson, Ms. Vasudeva, and the EPA Collective Action Class, including all EPA Collective Action Plaintiffs who "opt in" to this action. 452. Defendant, an employer of Plaintiffs and the EPA Collective Action Plaintiffs within the meaning of the Equal Pay Act, has discriminated against Plaintiff and EPA Collective Action Plaintiffs in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, et seq., as amended by the Equal Pay Act of 1963 ("EPA"), by subjecting them to unequal pay on the basis of sex. 453. Defendant has discriminated against Plaintiffs and EPA Collective Action Plaintiffs by treating them differently fi"om and less preferably than similarly-situated male employees who performed jobs which required equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which
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were performed under similar working conditions. Defendant so discriminated by subjecting them to discriminatory pay, discriminatory denials of bonuses and other compensation incentives, discriminatory denials of promotions and other advancement opportunities that would result in higher compensation, and other forms of discrimination in violation of the Equal Pay Act.
454. Defendant caused, attempted to cause, contributed to, or caused the continuation of, the wage rate discrimination based on sex in violation of the Equal Pay Act. Moreover, Defendant knew of or showed reckless disregard for the fact that its conduct was in violation of the Equal Pay Act.
455. As a result of Defendant's conduct alleged in this Complaint and/or Defendant's willful, knowing and intentional discrimination, Plaintiffs and EPA Collective Action Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer hmm, including but not limited to lost eamings, lost benefits, other financial loss, and non-economic damages.
456. Plaintiffs and EPA Collective Action Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to all remedies available for violations of the EPA, including liquidated damages for all willful violations.
457. Attorneys' fees should be awarded under 29 U.S.C. §§ 216, et seq. COUNTY
(INDIVIDUAL AND CLASS CLAIMS) VIOLATION OF NEW YORK EXECUTIVE LAW§ 296, subd.l(a)-
PAY DISCRIMINATION 458. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation in each and every aforementioned paragraph as if fully set forth herein. 459. This Count is brought on behalf of Ms. Kassman and all members of the class. 460. Defendant KPMG has discriminated against Plaintiff and all members of the class
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in violation of Section 296, subdivision 1(a) of the New York Executive Law, by subjecting them to different treatment on the basis of their gender.
461. Defendant has discriminated against Plaintiff and all members of the class by subjecting them to discriminatory pay, discriminatory denials of pay raises, and discriminatory performance evaluations that affect pay, in violation of the New York Executive Law.
462. As a result of Defendant's conduct alleged in this complaint, Plaintiff and all members of the class have suffered and continue to suffer hann, including but not limited to lost earnings, lost benefits, lost future employment oppotiunities, other financial loss, and noneconomic damages.
463. By reason of Defendant's disc1imination, Plaintiff and all members of the class are entitled to all remedies available for violations of the New York Executive Law.
COUNT VI (INDIVIDUAL AND CLASS CLAIMS) VIOLATION OF NEW YORK EXECUTIVE LAW§ 296, subd. l(a)-
PROMOTION DISCRIMINATION 464. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation in each and every aforementioned paragraph as if fully set fmih herein. 465. This Count is brought on behalf of Ms. Kassman and all members of the class. 466. Defendant KPMG has discriminated against Plaintiff and all members of the class in violation of Section 296, subdivision l(a) of the New York Executive Law, by subjecting them to different treatment on the basis of their gender. 467. Defendant has discriminated against Plaintiff and all members of the class by treating them differently fi"om and less preferably than similarly-situated male employees, and by subjecting them to discliminatory denials of promotions, discriminatory denials of developmental
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oppmtunities, and discriminatory perfmmance evaluations that affect promotions in violation of the New York Executive Law.
468. As a result of Defendant's conduct alleged in this complaint, Plaintiff and all members of the class have suffered and continue to suffer harm, including but not limited to lost eamings, lost benefits, lost future employment opportunities, other financial loss, and noneconomic damages.
469. By reason of Defendant's discrimination, Plaintiff and all members of the class are entitled to all remedies available for violations of the New York Executive Law
COUNT VII (INDIVIDUAL AND CLASS CLAIMS) VIOLATION OF NEW YORK EXECUTIVE LAW§ 296, sub d. l(a)PREGNANCY AND CARETAKER DISCRIMINATION 470. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation in each and every aforementioned paragraph as if fully set forth herein. 471. This Count is brought on behalf of Ms. Kassman and all similar members of the class. 472. Defendant KPMG has discriminated against Plaintiff and all members of the class in violation of Section 296, subdivision 1(a) of the New York Executive Law, by subjecting them to different treatment on the basis of their gender. 473. KPMG has discriminated against the class members bringing this claim by treating them differently from and less preferably than similarly-situated male employees and female employees without primary caregiving responsibilities, and by subjecting them to differential and substandard tenns and conditions of employment including bnt not limited to discriminatory denials of fair compensation, discriminatory denials of promotions and
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discriminatory treatment with respect to work responsibilities and other terms and conditions of employment in violation of the New York Executive Law.
474. As a result of Defendant's conduct alleged in this complaint, Plaintiff and all members of the class have suffered and continue to suffer harm, including but not limited to lost earnings, lost benefits, lost future employment opp01tunities, other financial loss, and noneconomic damages.
475. By reason of Defendant's discrimination, Plaintiff and all members of the class are entitled to all remedies available for violations of the New York Executive Law.
COUNT VIII (INDIVIDUAL AND CLASS CLAIMS) VIOLATION OF NEW YORK CITY ADMINISTRATIVE CODE§ 8-107, subd.l(a)-
PAY DISCRIMINATION 476. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation in each and every aforementioned paragraph as if fully set f01ih herein. 477. This Count is brought on behalf of Ms. Kassman and all members of the class. 478. Defendant KPMG has discriminated against Plaintiff and all members of the class in violation of Section 8-107, subdivision 1(a) of the New York City Administrative Code, by subjecting them to different treatment on the basis of their gender. 479. Defendant has discriminated against Plaintiff and all members of the class by subjecting them to discriminatory pay, disctiminatory denials of pay raises, and disctiminatory perf01mance evaluations that affect pay, in violation of the New York City Administrative Code. 480. As a result of Defendant's conduct alleged in this complaint, Plaintiff and all members of the class have suffered and continue to suffer harm, including but not limited to lost
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earnings, lost benefits, lost future employment opportunities, other financial loss, and noneconomic damages.
481. By reason of Defendant's discrimination, Plaintiff and all members of the class are entitled to all remedies available for violations of the New York City Administrative Code, including an award of punitive damages.
~OUNTIX,
(INDIVIDUAL AND CLASS CLAIMS) VIOLATION OF NEW YORK CITY ADMINISTRATIVE CODE§ 8··107, subd. l(a)-
PROMOTION DISCRIMll'IATION 482. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation in each and every aforementioned paragraph as if fully set forth herein. 483. This Count is brought on behalf of Ms. Kassman and all members of the class. 484. Defendant KPMG has discriminated against Plaintiff and all members of the class in violation of Section 8-107, subdivision l(a) of the New York City Administrative Code, by subjecting them to different treatment on the basis of their gender. 485. Defendant has discriminated against Plaintiff and all members of the class by treating them differently fi"om and less preferably than similarly-situated male employees, and by subjecting them to discriminatory denials of promotions, discriminatory denials of developmental opportunities, and discriminatory performance evaluations that affect promotions in violation of the New York City Administrative Code. 486. As a result of Defendant's conduct alleged in this complaint; Plaintiff and all members of the class have suffered and continue to suffer hatm, including but not limited to lost earnings, lost benefits, lost future employment oppmiunities, other financial loss, and noneconomic damages.
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487. By reason of Defendant's discrimination, Plaintiff and all members of the class are entitled to all remedies available for violations of the New York City Administrative Code, including an award of punitive damages.
~OUNT.~
(INDIVIDUAL AND CLASS CLAIMS) VIOLATION OF NEW YORK CITY ADMINISTRATIVE CODE§ 8-107, subd. l(a)-
PREGNANCY AND CAREGIVER DISCRIMINATION 488. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation in each and every aforementioned paragraph as if fully set fmih herein. 489. This Count is brought on behalf of Ms. Kassman and all similar members of the class. 490. Defendant KPMG has discriminated against Plaintiff and all members of the class in violation of Section 8-107, subdivision l(a) of the New York City Administrative Code, by subjecting them to different treatment on the basis of their gender. 491. KPMG has discriminated against the class members bringing this claim by treating them differently from and less preferably than similarly-sihmted male employees and female employees without primary caregiving responsibilities, and by subjecting them to differential and substandard terms and conditions of employment including but not limited to discriminatory denials of fair compensation, discriminatory denials of promotions and discriminatory treatment with respect to work responsibilities and other terms and conditions of employment in violation of the New York City Administrative Code. 492. As a result of Defendant's conduct alleged in this complaint, Plaintiff and all members of the class have suffered and continue to suffer hann, including but not limited to lost
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earnings, lost benefits, lost future employment opportunities, other financial loss, and noneconomic damages.
493. By reason of Defendant's discrimination, Plaintiff and all members of the class are entitled to all remedies available for violations of the New York City Administrative Code, including an award of punitive damages.
~OUNTXI
(INDIVIDUAL AND CLASS CLAIMS) VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK EQUAL PAY LAW-
N.Y. LABOR LAW§ 194 DENIAL OF EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK 494. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the previous paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 495. This Count is brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and all members of the class. 496. Defendant, an employer of Plaintiffs and all members of the class within the meaning of the New York Equal Pay Law, has discliminated against Plaintiffs and all members of the class in violation of the New York Labor Law § 194, by subjecting them to unequal pay on the basis of sex. 497. Defendant has discriminated against Plaintiffs and all members of the class by treating them differently from and less preferably than similarly-situated male employees who performed jobs which required equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which were perf01med under similar working conditions. Defendant so discriminated by subjecting them to discliminatory pay, discliminatory denials of promotions and other advancement oppo1iunities that would result in higher compensation, and other f01ms of discrimination in violation of the New York Equal Pay Law.
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498. Defendant caused, attempted to cause, contributed to, or caused the continuation of, the wage rate discrimination based on sex in violation of the New York Equal Pay Law. Moreover, Defendant willfully violated the New York Equal Pay Law by intentionally paying women less than men.
499. Plaintiffs and all members of the class are therefore entitled to all remedies available for violations of N.Y. Labor Law § 194, including liquidated damages and attomeys' fees and costs for all willful violations.
INDIVIDUAL COUNTS
COUNT XII (INDIVIDUAL CLAIM- PLAINTIFFS KASSMAN AND PATTERSON)
VIOLATION OF TITLE VII- RETALIATION 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3
500. Plaintiffs Kassman and Patterson re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation in each and every aforementioned paragraph as if fully set forth herein.
501. In their final years of employment with Defendant, Ms. Kassman and Ms. Patterson repeatedly voiced concerns about KPMG's discriminatory treatment of them, complaining through various reporting channels, including the Office of Ethics and Compliance, the Office of General Counsel, and Human Resources.
502. In retaliation for their complaints regarding KPMG's unlawfhl employment practices, Defendant took adverse employment actions against Ms. Kassman and Ms. Patterson.
503. Defendant retaliated against Ms. Kassman by, inter alia, giving her a disciplinary "coach," failing to provide her equal pay or promote her, and subjecting her to stressful meetings
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and intenogations based on baseless accusations. Defendant ultimately bullied Ms. Kassman into resigning by subjecting her to escalating gender discrimination and harassment.
504. Defendant retaliated against Ms. Patterson by, inter alia, subjecting her to unfounded criticism, refusing to give her billable work, and denying her the pay and promotion she deserved.
505. Upon information and belief, other women at KPMG who opposed or complained about unlawful gender discrimination were similarly retaliated against.
506. Defendant's conduct has been intentional, deliberate, willful, malicious, reckless and conducted in callous disregard of the rights of Ms. Kassman and Ms. Patterson, entitling them to punitive damages.
507. As a result of Defendant's conduct alleged in this Complaint, Ms. Kassman and Ms. Patterson have suffered and continue to suffer hann, including but not limited to lost earnings, lost benefits, other financial loss, and non-economic damages.
508. By reason of Defendant's retaliation, Ms. Kassman and Ms. Patterson are entitled to all remedies available for violations of Title VII, including an award of punitive damages.
509. Attorneys' fees should be awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).
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COUNT XIII (INDIVIDUAL CLAIM- PLAINTIFFS KASSMAN, O'DONNELL, PATTERSON, AND
VASUDEVA) VIOLATIONS OF THE EQUAL PAY ACT,
U.S.C. § 21S(a)(3)-RETALIATION 510. Plaintiffs Kassman, Patterson, Vasudeva and O'Donnell re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation in each and every aforementioned paragraph as if fully set forth herein. 511. While employed by Defendant, Plaintiffs voiced conccms about KPMG's · discriminatory treatment of them, complaining through various reporting channels, including the Office of Ethics and Compliance, the Office of General Counsel, Human Resources, and management. 512. In retaliation for their complaints regarding KPMG's unlawful employment practices, Defendant took adverse employment actions against Ms. Kassman, Ms. Patterson, Ms. Vasudeva and Ms. O'Donnell. 513. Defendant retaliated against Ms. Kassman by, inter alia, giving her a disciplinary "coach," failing to provide her equal pay or promote her, and subjecting her to stressful meetings and interrogations based on baseless accusations. Defendant ultimately bullied Plaintiff into resigning by subjecting her to escalating gender discrimination and harassment. 514. Defendant retaliated against Ms. Patterson, Ms. Vasudeva, and Ms. O'Donnell by, inter alia, subjecting them to unfounded criticism, denying them the pay and promotions they deserved, and ultimately tetminating them or forcing them to resign. 515. By reason of Defendant's conduct as alleged herein, Ms. Kassman, Ms. Patterson, Ms. Vasudeva and Ms. O'Donnell are entitled to all remedies available nnder the EPA, including liquidated damages for all willful violations.
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516. Attorneys' fees should be awarded under 29 U.S.C. § 216, et seq. COUNT XIV
(INDIVIDUAL CLAIM- PLAINTIFF KASSMAN) VIOLATION OF NEW YORK EXECUTIVE LAW § 296
RETALIATION 517. Plaintiff Kassman re-alleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in each and every aforementioned paragraph as if fully set forth herein. 518. In the final year of her employment with Defendant, Ms. Kassman repeatedly voiced concerns about KPMG's discriminatory treatment of her, complaining to the Office of Ethics and Compliance, the Office of General Counsel, and Human Resources. 519. In retaliation for Ms. Kassman's complaints regarding KPMG's unlawful employment practices, Defendant took advers~ employment actions against her, including giving her a disciplinary "coach," failing to provide her equal pay or promote her, and subjecting her to stressful meetings and intenogations based on baseless accusations. Defendant ultimately bullied Ms. Kassman into resigning by subjecting her to escalating gender discrimination and harassment. 520. By reason of Defendant's conduct as alleged herein, Ms. Kassman is entitled to all remedies available under the New York Executive Law.
.<:;:OUNTXV (INDIVIDUAL CLAIM- PLAINTIFF KASSMAN) VIOLATION OF NEW YORK CITY ADMINISTRATIVE CODE§ 8-107, subd. 7-
RETALIATION 521. Plaintiff Kassman re-alleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in each and every aforementioned paragraph as if fully set fot1h herein.
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522. In the final year of her employment with Defendant, Ms. Kassman repeatedly voiced concerns about KPMG's disctiminatory treahnent of her, complaining to the Office of Ethics and Compliance, the Office of General Counsel, and Human Resources.
523. In retaliation for Ms. K.assman's complaints regarding KPMG's unlawfi.Jl employment practices, Defendant took adverse employment actions against her, including giving her a disciplinary "coach," failing to provide her equal pay or promote her, and subjecting her to stressful meetings and intetTogations based on baseless accusations. Defendant ultimately bullied Ms. K.assman into resigning by subjecting her to escalating gender disctimination and harassment.
524. By reason of Defendant's retaliation, Ms. K.assman is entitled to all remedies available for violations of the New York City Administrative Code, including an award of punitive damages.
COUNT XVI (INDIVIDUAL CLAIM- PLAINTIFFS KASSMAN AND POTTER)
VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK EQUAL PAY LAWN.Y. LABOR LAW§ 215- RETALIATION
525. Plaintiffs K.assman and Potter re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation in each and every aforementioned paragraph as if fully set forth herein.
526. In retaliation for Ms. Kassman and Ms. Potter's complaints regarding K.PMG's unlawful employment practices, Defendant took adverse employment actions against them.
527. Among other things, Defendant failed to provide Ms. K.assman and Ms. Potter equal pay or promotional opportunities after they complained about the Company's gender discrimination. Defendant ultimately forced them to resign by subjecting them to escalating gender disctimination and harassment.
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528. By reason of Defendant's conduct as alleged herein, Ms. Kassman and Ms. Potter are entitled to all remedies available under the New York Equal Pay Law.
COUNT XVII (INDIVIDUAL CLAIM- PLAINTIFFS O'DONNELL, PATTERSON AND VASUDEVA)
VIOLATION OF FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT ("FMLA") 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq.
529. Ms. Vasudeva, Ms. Patterson and Ms. O'Dmmell re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation in each and every aforementioned paragraph as if fully set fmih herein.
530. KPMG discriminated against Ms. Vasudeva, Ms. Patterson and Ms. O'Donnell on the basis of their pregnancy, childbirth, and related conditions in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA").
531. Under the FMLA, an employee must be restored by the employer to the same position held by the employee when the leave commenced, or to an equivalent position with equivalent employment benefits, pay, and other terms and conditions of employment.
532. After Ms. Patterson retumed from maternity leave, KPMG refused to give her billable work, suggested she work part-time or move to a different practice, and denied her equal pay and promotional opportunities, ultimately forcing Ms. Patterson to leave the Company.
533. After Ms. Vasudeva returned from matemity leave, KPMG reassigned her to less desirable projects, refused to provide her with staffing support, and denied her equal pay and promotional opportunities, ultimately forcing Ms. Vasudeva to leave the Company.
534. After Ms. O'Donnell returned from maternity leave, KPMG tetminated her employment on her very first day back in the office.
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535. Defendants acted willfully, intentionally, and with reckless disregard for Ms. Vasudeva, Ms. Patterson and Ms. O'Donnell's rights under the FMLA.
536. As a direct and proximate result of defendants' actions, Ms. Vasudeva, Ms. Patterson and Ms. O'Donnell suffered injnry and monetary damages, including but not limited to, past and future loss of income, benefits, promotion and promotional opportunities, expenses and costs, and are entitled to all legal and equitable remedies available.
537. By reason of KPMG's discrimination, Ms. Vasudeva, Ms. Patterson and Ms. O'Donnell are entitled to all legal and equitable remedies available for violations of the FMLA, including an award of liquidated damages for all willful violations, prejudgment interest, attorneys' fees, costs, and other compensation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 2617.
COUNT XVIII (INDIVIDUAL CLAIM- PLAINTIFFS O'DONNELL, PATTERSON AND VASUDEVA) VIOLATION OF FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT ("FMLA")- RETALIATION
30 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. 538. Ms. Vasudeva, Ms. Patterson and Ms. O'Donnell re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation in each and every aforementioned paragraph as if fully set forth herein. 539. KPMG discriminated against Ms. Vasudeva, Ms. Patterson and Ms. O'Donnell on the basis of their pregnancy, childbirth, and related conditions in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"). 540. KPMG retaliated against Ms. Vasudeva, Ms. Patterson and Ms. O'Donnell for taking their FMLA-protected leave by adversely and materially changing the terms and conditions of their employment. KPMG retaliated against Ms. Vasudeva and Ms. Patterson by, inter alia, denying them career advancement oppOliunities, making inaccurate statements hannful to their
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professional careers, pressuring them to move to a part-time or flex-time schedule and/or to switch practices, and otherwise creating an environment hostile to pregnancy and the taking of statutorily protected leave. KPMG retaliated against Ms. O'Donnell by, inter alia, terminating her employment the day she returned from maternity leave.
541. Defendant acted willfully, intentionally, and with reckless disregard for Ms. Vasudeva, Ms. Patterson and Ms. O'Dom1ell's rights under the FMLA.
542. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's actions, Ms. Vasudeva, Ms. Patterson and Ms. O'D01mell suffered injury and monetary damages, including but not limited to, past and future loss of income, benefits, promotion and promotional opportunities, expenses and costs, and are entitled to all legal and equitable remedies available.
543. By reason of KPMG's discrimination, Ms. Vasudeva, Ms. Patterson and Ms. O'Donnell are entitled to all legal and equitable remedies available for violations of the FMLA, including an award of liquidated damages tor all willful violations, prejudgment interest, attorneys' fees, costs, and other compensation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 2617.
COUNT XIX (INDIVIDUAL CLAIM- PLAINTIFF PATTERSON) .YIOLATIONS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866-
RACE DISCRIMINATION 42 U.S.C. § 1981, et seq., AS AMENDED 544. Ms. Patterson re-alleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in each and every aforementioned paragraph as though fully set forth herein. 545. KPMG has discriminated against Ms. Patterson, an African-American, in the terms and conditions of their employment on the basis of her race, denying her the same right to make and enforce contracts as enjoyed by white citizens employed by KPMG, including rights involving the making, performance, modification and te1mination of contracts with KPMG, as
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well as the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms and conditions of that relationship, in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C § 1981, et seq., as amended.
546. KPMG discriminated against Ms. Patterson by subjecting her to discriminatory pay, discriminatory denial of promotions, discriminatory performance evaluations, disparate terms and conditions of employment, and other f01ms of discrimination, in violation of Section 1981.
547. In the employment practices described above, KPMG intentionally engaged in discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless indifference to Ms. Patterson's federally protected rights, entitling her to punitive damages.
548. As a result of Defendant's discriminatory conduct, Ms. Patterson has suffered and continues to suffer hann, including, but not limited to, lost earnings, lost benefits, other financial loss, and non-economic damages.
549. By reason of Defendant's discrimination, Ms. Patterson is entitled to all remedies available for violations of Section 1981, including an award of punitive damages.
550. Attomeys' fees should be awarded under§ 1981, et seq.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs, on their own behalf and on behalfof the class and collective action members, pray that this Court: A. Certify the case as a class action maintainable under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(a), (b)(2) and/or (b)(3), on behalf of the proposed Plaintiff class, and designate Ms. Kassman, Ms. O'Donnell, Ms. Patterson, Ms. Potter, and Ms. Vasudeva as the representatives of this class and their counsel ofTecord as class counsel;
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B. Designate this action as a collective action on behalf of the proposed EPA Collective Plaintiffs (asserting EPA claims) and
(i) promptly issuing notice pursuant to 29 U.S. C.§ 216(b) to all similarly situated members of the EPA Opt-In Class, which (a) apprises them of the pendency of this action, and (b) permits them to assert timely EPA claims in this action by filing individual Consent to Sue forms pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); and (ii) tolling the statute of limitations on the claims of all members of the FLSA Opt-In Class from the date the original complaint was filed until the Class members are provided with reasonable notice of the pendency of this action and a fair opportunity to exercise their right to opt in as Plaintiffs; C. Designate Plaintiffs Kassman, O'Donnell, Patterson, and Vasudeva as representatives of the EPA Collective Action; D. Declare and adjudge that Defendant's employment policies, practices and/or procedures challenged herein are illegal and in violation of the rights of Class Representatives and members of the class under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, the New York Executive Law, the New York City Administrative Code, the New York Labor Law, the Equal Pay Act, and the Family and Medical Leave Act; E. Issue a permanent injunction against the Defendant and its pminers, officers, trustees, owners, employees, agents, attorneys, successors, assigns, representatives and any and all persons acting in concert with them from engaging in any conduct violating the rights of Plaintiffs, class members, and collective action plaintiffs, and those similarly situated as secured by 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., and order such injunctive relief as will prevent Defendant from continuing its discriminatory practices and protect others similarly situated;
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F. Issue a permanent injunction against Defendant and its partners, officers, trustees,

owners, employees, agents, attorneys, successors, assigns, representatives and any and all

persons acting in concert with them fi·mn engaging in any further unlawful practices, policies,

customs, usages, gender discrimination or retaliation by the Defendant as set forth herein;

G. Order Defendant to initiate and implement programs that will: (i) provide equal

employment opportunities for female Professionals; (ii) remedy the effects of the Defendant's

past and present unlawful employment policies, practices and/or procedures; and (iii) eliminate

the continuing effects of the discriminatory and retaliatory practices described above;

H. Order Defendant to initiate and implement systems of assigning, training,

transfening, evaluating, compensating, developing and promoting female Professionals in a non-

discriminatory manner;

I.

Order Defendant to establish a task force on equality and fairness to determine the

effectiveness of the programs described in G through H above, which would provide for: (i)

monitoring, repmiing, and retaining of jurisdiction to ensure equal employment opportunity; (ii)

the assurance that injunctive relief is properly implemented; and (iii) a quarterly repmi setting

forth information relevant to the determination of the effectiveness of the programs described in

G through H above;

J.

Order Defendant to adjust the wage rates and benefits for Plaintiffs, class

members and collective action plaintiffs to the level that they would be enjoying but for the

Defendant's disc1iminatory policies, practices and/or procedures;

K. Order that this Court retain jurisdiction of this action until such time as the Comi

is satisfied that Defendant has remedied the practices complained of herein and is determined to

be in full compliance with the law;

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L. Award nominal, compensatory and punitive damages to Plaintiffs, class members and collective action plaintiffs, in excess of 400 million dollars;
M. Award litigation costs and expenses, including, but not limited to, reasonable attorneys' fees, to Plaintiffs, the class members, and the collective action plaintiffs;
N. Award back pay, front pay, lost benefits, preferential rights to jobs and other damages for lost compensation and job benefits with pre-judgment and post-judgment interest suffered by Plaintiffs, class members and collective action plaintiffs to be dctennined at trial;
0. Order Defendant to make whole Plaintiffs, class members and collective action plaintiffs by providing them with appropriate lost earnings and benefits, reinstatement opportunities, and other affinnative relief;
P. Award any other appropriate equitable relief to Plaintiffs, class members and collective action plaintiffs; and
Q. Award any additional and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper. JURY DEMAND
Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury on all issues triable of right by jury.
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Dated: January 6, 2012

Respectfully submitted,
~~{)~
·emyHeis1er (JH-0145) Steven L. Wittels (SLW-8110) Siham Nurhussein (SN-9379) Deepika Bains (DB-4935) SANFORD WITTELS & HEISLER, LLP 1350 Avenue of the Americas, 31st Floor New York, New York 10019 Telephone: (646) 723-2947 Facsimile: (646) 723-2948 swittels@swhlegal.com
Katherine M. Kimpel (D.C. Bar No. 493028) David W. Sanford (D.C. Bar No. 457933) Katherine E. Lamm (N.Y. Bar No. 4912507) SAJ'IFORD WITTELS & HEISLER, LLP 1666 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 300 Washington, DC 20009 Telephone: (202) 742-7777 Facsimile: (202) 742-7776 kkimpcl@swhlegal.com
Janette Wipper (CA Bar No. 275264) SAJ'IFORD WITTELS & HEISLER, LLP 555 Montgomery Street, Suite 1206 San Francisco, CA 94111 Telephone: (415) 391-6900 Facsimile: (415) 391-6901 jwipper@swhlegal.com
Counselfor PlaintiffS Donna Kassman, Linda 0 'Donnell, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva, and the Class and Collective Action PlaintiffS

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 Case 1:11-cv-03743-JMF Document 69 Filed 02/07/13 Page 1 of 38

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

---------------------------------------------------------------------- X

DONNA KASSMAN et al., individually and on behalf of :

a class of similarly situated female employees,

:

:

Plaintiffs,

:

:

-v-

:

:

KPMG LLP,

:

:

Defendant.

:

---------------------------------------------------------------------- X

2/7/2013
11 Civ. 3743 (JMF) OPINION AND ORDER

JESSE M. FURMAN, United States District Judge:

Plaintiffs, five women, have brought this action on behalf of themselves and a putative

class of current and former female professional employees of Defendant KPMG LLP, the U.S.

member firm of global accounting firm KPMG International, alleging various forms of

employment discrimination. Defendant has moved to dismiss, strike, or transfer most of

Plaintiffs’ claims, including all of their class claims. For the reasons discussed below,

Defendant’s motions are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

BACKGROUND

The Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) in this case is 120 pages long and contains over

550 paragraphs. For present purposes, it suffices to describe the five named plaintiffs — Donna

Kassman, Linda O’Donnell, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, and Ashwini Vasudeva — and to briefly summarize their claims.1

1

On a motion to dismiss, a court may consider facts stated in the complaint, any

documents attached to the complaint, and any documents incorporated by reference into the

complaint. See, e.g., Nechis v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 421 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 2005).

Accordingly, the following facts are taken from the Complaint and are assumed to be true for

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A. The Named Plaintiffs Kassman began working at KPMG in 1993 and was steadily promoted until 1999, when
she was made Senior Manager. (TAC ¶¶ 70-72). In 2003, while out on maternity leave, her pay was significantly cut without sufficient explanation and in spite of strong performance reviews. (TAC ¶¶ 74-78, 80-81). When Kassman returned from maternity leave in 2004, she began working on a flexible time schedule. (TAC ¶¶ 84, 106-7, 110). For the next six years, Kassman was repeatedly denied promotion to Managing Director despite her interest in such a promotion, a promise to promote her, and the promotion of less senior and equally or less qualified male colleagues. (TAC ¶¶ 88-91, 96). During this same period, she experienced baseless and gendered complaints from her colleagues that led to her removal from the promotion track. (TAC ¶¶ 92-97). For example, a fellow Senior Manager and one of his subordinates filed complaints about Kassman, claiming that she was “unapproachable” and “too direct,” and later criticized her “tone.” (TAC ¶¶ 92, 119). In April 2009, after these complaints began, Kassman filed discrimination complaints with KPMG’s Office of Ethics and Compliance and Office of the General Counsel. (TAC ¶ 134). Shortly thereafter, Kassman began experiencing harassment and enhanced discrimination that led her to transfer, in October 2009, from the New York to the Stamford office. (TAC ¶¶ 118-31). Despite repeated complaints to KPMG human resources officials, nothing was done to remedy the discrimination and, in October 2010, Kassman felt compelled to resign. (TAC ¶¶ 132-50).
O’Donnell worked at KPMG from January 2003 until her termination in April 2009. (TAC ¶ 152). O’Donnell began her career in KPMG’s Johannesburg, South Africa office, where
purposes of this motion. See, e.g., LaFaro v. N.Y. Cardiothoracic Grp., PLLC, 570 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir. 2009).
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she was promoted to Manager. (TAC ¶ 153). In September 2006, O’Donnell began a rotation in KPMG’s Atlanta office, and transitioned to a permanent position there in February 2007. (TAC ¶¶ 154-55). As part of the rotation, KPMG demoted her to Senior Associate, ostensibly because all employees who transferred were demoted. (TAC ¶¶ 154, 160). Despite her demotion, O’Donnell continued performing Manager-level tasks. (TAC ¶¶ 164-70). In March 2008, O’Donnell informed her supervisors that she was pregnant, which resulted in a halt to her career progression. (TAC ¶ 173). She began receiving negative performance reviews for the first time and was denied a promotion to Manager, despite having held that title in South Africa, while others with less experience were promoted. (TAC ¶¶ 174-78). Moreover, after learning that O’Donnell was pregnant, her supervisor made several negative comments to her about pregnant women’s abilities and a woman’s role in an office and a family. (TAC ¶¶ 185-86). For example, he told her that he thought pregnant women were incapable of doing their jobs; that he did not see how, as a working mother, one could “tend to a child and work at KPMG at the same time”; and that O’Donnell did not need to work when her husband was the “breadwinner” in the family. (TAC ¶ 185-86). On the day O’Donnell returned from maternity leave, KPMG fired her, allegedly because of the economy. (TAC ¶ 193).
Patterson worked as an Associate at KPMG from June 2007 until November 2010. (TAC ¶¶ 196, 218). Through 2009, Patterson received strong performance reviews and several performance awards. (TAC ¶¶ 199-204). Moreover, Patterson regularly performed tasks done by Senior Associates, but was never compensated or promoted, despite working as an Associate for longer than the standard two-year promotion timeframe. (TAC ¶¶ 207-08, 218-21). While Patterson was out on maternity leave, her supervisors asked her to reduce her role at KPMG. (TAC ¶ 224). When she returned from maternity leave, Patterson was intentionally intimidated
3

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and harassed by her supervisors and given negative performance reviews. (TAC ¶ 225). In addition, her largest client was taken away from her and, despite repeated requests, she was not provided with alternative work, resulting in a failure to meet her billable work goals. (TAC ¶¶ 232, 244). Patterson complained about the alleged discrimination and retaliation through various channels, but her complaints were ignored. (TAC ¶¶ 250-59). In November 2010, she felt compelled to resign because of the treatment, KPMG’s failure to address her complaints, and a belief that there was no future for her at the company. (TAC ¶¶ 261-66).
Potter was employed at KPMG for eleven years, from July 1995 to July 2006. (TAC ¶ 268). Potter was hired as a Manager and received strong performance reviews during her entire tenure at KPMG. (TAC ¶¶ 269, 271-72). Despite those reviews, Potter had her pay frozen when similarly situated male colleagues did not. (TAC ¶¶ 280-87). Potter was also induced to decline attractive employment offers from other accounting firms with the promise of a promotion, but was ultimately passed over for that promotion in favor of less qualified male colleagues, allegedly because she did not engage in hostile and degrading social activities. (TAC ¶¶ 292-304). For example, in May 2002 Potter was removed from the track for a promotion she had been promised because she did not “schmooze” enough at Friday happy hours. (TAC ¶ 298). Potter declined to attend these happy hours for religious reasons and because male partners regularly engaged in overtly sexual conduct toward female employees at the events, including doing “body shots” (licking salt or sugar off of another person’s body while consuming alcohol) off of female employees. (TAC ¶¶ 298-99). In July 2006, Potter felt compelled to resign from KPMG based on the lack of possible advancement, hostile and harassing comments from her supervisors, and the company’s failure to address any of the discriminatory and harassing treatment she received. (TAC ¶¶ 306-12).
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Vasudeva began her career at KPMG as an Intern, but was ultimately promoted to Senior Associate based on her strong performance, which was reflected in the positive reviews and numerous performance awards she received. (TAC ¶¶ 313-17). Vasudeva’s career at KPMG stalled, however, when she informed her supervisors that she was pregnant and planned to take maternity leave. (TAC ¶ 328). Thereafter, she was passed over for promotions in favor of less qualified male employees, removed from her biggest client, reassigned to a client located far from her office, not invited to “client-building” events when male employees were, denied adequate support staff to meet her supervisors’ expectations, began receiving negative performance reviews for irrelevant skills, and steered toward a flexible time schedule despite the fact that she was working full-time hours. (TAC ¶¶ 327-54). She was also subjected to sexual harassment and other degrading treatment by senior managers. (TAC ¶ 361). For example, in July 2009, one of Vasudeva’s former supervisors suggested that, for women, the flavor of certain Indian food was similar to semen “in their mouth[s].” (TAC ¶ 361). In June 2009, Vasudeva complained about her treatment to senior management, human resources personnel, and ethics and compliance personnel. (TAC ¶¶ 355, 367). Nevertheless, KPMG failed to respond. (TAC ¶ 367). In September 2009, Vasudeva felt compelled to resign. (TAC ¶ 368). B. Summary of Claims
The TAC includes nineteen counts of employment discrimination under various statutes and on behalf of different combinations of named and putative class plaintiffs. Specifically, it includes counts alleging: (1) individual and class claims for pay discrimination, promotion discrimination, and pregnancy and caregiving discrimination in violation of Title VII, the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), and the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”) on behalf of Kassman, Patterson, and all members of the putative class (Counts I-
5

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III, V-VI, VII-X); (2) claims for the denial of equal pay for equal work under the federal and New York State Equal Pay Acts (“EPA” and “NYSEPA,” respectively) on behalf of Kassman, O’Donnell, Patterson, Vasudeva and similarly situated claimants with respect to the EPA, and on behalf of all individual plaintiffs and putative class plaintiffs with respect to the NYSEPA (Counts IV, XI); (3) individual claims for retaliation under Title VII on behalf of Kassman and Patterson; under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL on behalf of Kassman; under the EPA on behalf of Kassman, O’Donnell, Patterson, and Vasudeva; under the NYSEPA on behalf of Kassman and Potter; and under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) on behalf of O’Donnell, Patterson, and Vasudeva (Counts XII-XVI, XVIII); (4) individual claims for violations of the FMLA on behalf of O’Donnell, Patterson, and Vasudeva (Count XVII); and (5) an individual claim for race discrimination in violation of Title 42, United States Code, Section 1981 on behalf of Patterson (Count XIX).
The class claims (Counts I-XI) are brought on behalf of a putative class composed of “female exempt Client Service and Support Professionals, including but not limited to female Associates, Senior Associates, Managers, Senior Managers and Managing Directors.” (TAC at 1). Plaintiffs allege that this class suffers from “a pattern and practice of gender discrimination, and employment policies and practices.” (TAC ¶ 371). Such policies and practices include
(a) assigning female Professionals to lower titles and classifications than their male counterparts; (b) paying female Professionals less than their male counterparts; (c) denying female Professionals promotion and advancement opportunities in favor of male employees; (d) treating pregnant employees and mothers differently from non-pregnant employees, male employees, and noncaregivers; and (e) failing to prevent, respond to, adequately investigate, and/or appropriately resolve instances of gender discrimination and pregnancy/caregiver discrimination in the workplace.
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(TAC ¶ 371). Plaintiffs allege that problems resulting from these practices were “systemic and Company-wide, because . . . all stem from flawed policies, practices and procedures which emanate from the Company’s New York headquarters.” (TAC ¶ 374). They identify as problematic Defendant’s “assignment, development, promotion, advancement, compensation and performance evaluation policies, practices and procedures.” (TAC ¶ 372). Plaintiffs allege that these policies “all suffer from a lack of transparency, adequate quality standards and controls; sufficient implementation metrics; upper management/HR review; and opportunities for redress or challenge.” (TAC ¶ 372). “As a result,” they contend, “employees are assigned, evaluated, compensated, developed, and promoted within a system that is insufficiently designed, articulated, explained or implemented to consistently, reliably or fairly manage or reward employees.” (TAC ¶ 372).
With respect to their claims under the EPA, Plaintiffs allege a putative Collective Action class composed of all future, current, and former female Professionals during the liability period, including female Professionals who “(a) were not compensated equally to males who had substantially similar job classifications, functions, families, titles and/or duties, (b) were not compensated equally to males who performed substantially similar work, and (c) who were denied promotion and advancement opportunities that would result in great compensation in favor of lesser qualified male employees.” (TAC ¶ 418). Putative class members are required to “opt-in” to the Collective Action class pursuant to Title 29, United States Code, Section 216(b). (TAC ¶ 420).
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LEGAL STANDARDS A. Rule 12(b)(6)
Defendant moves to dismiss many of Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must generally plead sufficient facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). More specifically, the plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to show “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint that offers only “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Further, if the plaintiff has not “nudged [his or her] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, [the] complaint must be dismissed.” Id. at 570.
Twombly and Iqbal notwithstanding, the Supreme Court has held that, to survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint in an employment discrimination lawsuit [need] not contain specific facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).” Id. at 569 (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).2 Nevertheless, the

2

Whether Swierkiewicz remains good law in light of Twombly and Iqbal is “somewhat of

an open question” in this Circuit. Hedges v. Town of Madison, 456 F. App’x 22, 23 (2d Cir.

2012) (summary order). Although the Supreme Court expressly reaffirmed the decision in

Twombly, see 550 U.S. at 569-70, the Second Circuit has questioned its continuing vitality in

several unpublished opinions. See Hedges, 456 F. App’x at 23; Jackson v. Cnty. of Rockland,

450 F. App’x. 15, 19 (2d Cir. 2011) (summary order); Schwab v. Smalls, 435 F. App’x 37, 39-40

(2d Cir. 2011) (summary order). The Court of Appeals has not resolved the question, however,

suggesting only “that, at a minimum, employment discrimination claims must meet the standard

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elements of a prima facie case “provide an outline of what is necessary to render [a plaintiff’s employment discrimination] claims for relief plausible.” Sommersett v. City of N.Y., No. 09 Civ. 5916 (LTS) (KNF), 2011 WL 2565301, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2011). Accordingly, “courts consider these elements in determining whether there is sufficient factual matter in the complaint which, if true, gives Defendant a fair notice of Plaintiff's claim and the grounds on which it rests.” Murphy v. Suffolk Cnty. Cmty. Coll., No. 10-CV-0251 (LDW) (AKT), 2011 WL 5976082, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2011). B. Rule 23(d)(1)(D)
Defendant also moves to strike some of Plaintiffs’ class claims pursuant to Rule 23(d)(1)(D), which provides that a court may “require that the pleadings be amended to eliminate allegations about representation of absent persons.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(1)(D); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A) (providing that “[a]t an early practicable time . . . , the court must determine by order whether to certify the action as a class action”). Pursuant to that Rule, a party may move to strike class claims even before discovery. See, e.g., Davito v. AmTrust Bank, 743 F. Supp. 2d 114, 115-16 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (collecting cases); Rahman v. Smith & Wollensky Rest. Grp., Inc., No. 06 Civ. 6198 (LAK) (JCF), 2008 WL 161230, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2008). In this Circuit, however, “[m]otions to strike are generally looked upon with disfavor.” Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 877 F. Supp. 2d 113, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Chenensky v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., No. 07 Civ. 11504 (WHP), 2011 WL 1795305, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2011)) (internal quotation mark omitted); accord Calibuso v. Bank of Am. Corp., — F. Supp. 2d —, No. 10 Civ. 1413 (JFB) (ETB), 2012 WL 4458404, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2012) (quoting
of pleading set forth in Twombly and Iqbal, even if pleading a prima facie case is not required.” Hedges, 456 F. App’x at 23.
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Chenensky, 2011 WL 1795305, at *1). A motion to strike class claims “is even more disfavored because it requires a reviewing court to preemptively terminate the class aspects of . . . litigation, solely on the basis of what is alleged in the complaint and before plaintiffs are permitted to complete the discovery to which they would otherwise be entitled on questions relevant to class certification.” Chen-Oster, 877 F. Supp. 2d at 117 (quoting Chenensky, 2011 WL 1795305, at *1); see also, e.g., Winfield v. Citibank, N.A., 842 F. Supp. 2d 560, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[D]istrict courts in this Circuit have frequently found that a determination of whether the Rule 23 requirements are met is more properly deferred to the class certification stage, where a more complete factual record can aid the court in making this determination.”). Nevertheless, such a motion may be entertained “if the inquiry would not mirror the class certification inquiry and if resolution of the motion is clear.” Davito, 743 F. Supp. 2d at 116 (quoting In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 21 MC 92 (SAS), 2008 WL 2050781, *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2008)) (internal quotation mark omitted); accord Chen-Oster, 877 F. Supp. 2d at 117.
DISCUSSION Defendant challenges Plaintiffs’ class claims pursuant to both Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 23(d)(1)(D). (Def.’s Mem. 12-36). In addition, it moves to dismiss various individual claims brought by Plaintiffs pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (Id. at 36-49). The Court will begin with the class claims and then turn to Plaintiffs’ individual claims. A. The Class Claims Defendant raises several arguments with respect to Plaintiffs’ class claims. First and foremost, relying primarily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, — U.S. —, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011), KPMG seeks to dismiss or strike all of Plaintiffs’ class claims on the grounds that (1) Plaintiffs’ allegations are insufficient to state a claim; (2) Plaintiffs
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fail to allege common questions of law or fact sufficient to maintain a class action; (3) Plaintiffs, as former employees of KPMG, lack standing to certify a class under Rule 23(b)(2); (4) certification under Rule 23(b)(2) would be improper because Plaintiffs seek monetary relief and there is no class-wide injunctive relief that could be granted; (5) certification under Rule 23(b)(3) would be improper because Plaintiffs cannot establish that questions of law or fact common to the class predominate over individual questions and because a class action is not superior to other methods of litigating the case; and (6) hybrid certification under Rules 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) would be improper. (Def.’s Mem. 12-31). Second, KPMG contends that Plaintiffs cannot maintain a nationwide class under the NYSHRL, the NYCHRL, or the NYSEPA insofar as the proposed class would include people who neither lived nor worked in New York State or City. (Id. at 31-32). And third, it argues that Plaintiffs’ disparate impact claims must be dismissed because the TAC fails to identify any specific, facially neutral policy or practice that caused a disparate impact. (Id. at 33-36). The Court will address these arguments in turn.
1. The Motion to Dismiss or Strike in Light of Dukes As an initial matter, Defendant moves to dismiss or strike Plaintiffs’ class claims in light
of Dukes. In that case, the Supreme Court reversed a decision of the Ninth Circuit to certify a nationwide class of female Wal-Mart employees who alleged that “the discretion exercised by their local supervisors over pay and promotion matters” was discriminatory. 131 S. Ct. at 2547. The Supreme Court held that the class could not satisfy the “commonality” requirement set forth in Rule 23(a)(2), which “requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members have suffered the same injury.” Id. at 2551 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court explained that the plaintiffs could have satisfied that requirement in either of two ways:
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First, if the employer “used a biased testing procedure to evaluate both applicants for employment and incumbent employees, a class action on behalf of every applicant or employee who might have been prejudiced by the test clearly would satisfy the commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a).” Second, “[s]ignificant proof that an employer operated under a general policy of discrimination conceivably could justify a class of both applicants and employees if the discrimination manifested itself in hiring and promotion practices in the same general fashion, such as through entirely subjective decisionmaking processes.” Id. at 2553 (quoting Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159 n.15). In Dukes, the plaintiffs could do neither: Wal-Mart had no companywide testifying procedure or evaluation method and the only “policy” at issue was one of unfettered local discretion, which “is just the opposite of a uniform employment practice that would provide the commonality needed for a class action; it is a policy against having uniform employment practices.” Id. at 2254 (emphasis in original). Significantly, however, the Court did not close the door altogether on the possibility of certifying a class based on a policy of giving discretion to lower-level supervisors. See Calibuso, 2012 WL 4458404, at *15. The Court acknowledged that “‘in appropriate cases,’ giving discretion to lower-level supervisors can be the basis of Title VII liability under a disparateimpact theory — since ‘an employer’s undisciplined system of subjective decisionmaking [can have] precisely the same effects as a system pervaded by impermissible intentional discrimination.’” Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2254 (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990-91 (1988)). To warrant certification in such a case, however, a plaintiff must identify “a ‘specific employment practice’ . . . that ties all [of the class members’] claims together.” Id. at 2255-56 (quoting Watson, 487 U.S. at 994 (plurality opinion)). “The operative question is whether the plaintiffs can identify a ‘common mode of exercising discretion that pervades the entire company.’” Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 10 Civ. 6950, 2012 WL 205875, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2012) (Francis, M.J.) (Report & Recommendation)
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(quoting Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2254-55), adopted in relevant part by Chen-Oster, 877 F. Supp. 2d 113.
Relying on Dukes, KPMG makes a forceful argument that Plaintiffs will be unable to satisfy Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement in this case, but its argument is premature. Unlike Dukes, which involved an appeal from the certification of a class, the present case is at the motion to dismiss or strike stage. Thus, the relevant question is not, as it was in Dukes, whether Plaintiffs have “prove[d] that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law or fact, etc.,” for purposes of Rule 23. 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (initial emphasis added). Instead, the relevant question is whether, based on the allegations in the TAC, “it is plausible that plaintiffs will come forth with sufficient evidence at the class certification stage to demonstrate commonality.” Calibuso, 2012 WL 4458404, at *15. The answer to that question is yes. Although the TAC includes generalized and conclusory allegations of “flaws” and “discretion” that would not suffice by themselves, Plaintiffs allege that several specific headquarters-level policies resulted in discrimination. These policies include, but are not limited to, evaluation of employees using a common standard known as “The KPMG Way” (TAC ¶13); KPMG’s flexible work schedule policy (TAC ¶¶ 29, 39-43); and KPMG’s alleged policy of automatically demoting women, but not men, who transfer to the United States from an international office (TAC ¶ 160-61). These allegations suffice to survive at this stage of the proceedings. See Calibuso, 2012 WL 4458404, at *13-16 (denying a post-Dukes motion to dismiss in an analogous employment discrimination class action on the ground that plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged specific headquarters-level policies to satisfy their burden at the pleadings stage); Chen-Oster, 877 F. Supp. 2d at 118-19 (same); see also, e.g., Barghout v. Bayer Healthcare Pharms., No. 11-CV-1576 (DMC) (JAD), 2012 WL 1113973 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2012)
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(finding that a motion to dismiss should be denied where plaintiffs had plausibly alleged a disparate impact claim based on company-wide promotion and pay policies).
Putting aside whether Plaintiffs have standing to bring a Rule 23(b)(2) class action — an issue that is addressed in more detail below — Defendants’ other arguments in support of its motion to strike are even more easily rejected. That is because, at least in this Circuit, a motion to strike class claims is considered premature if the issues raised are “the same ones that would be decided in connection with determining the appropriateness of class certification under Rules 23(a) and 23(b).” Rahman, 2008 WL 161230, at *3; accord Winfield, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 573; Chen-Oster, 877 F. Supp. 2d at 117; Calibuso, 2012 WL 4458404, at *8. KPMG’s assertions to the contrary notwithstanding (Def.’s Reply Mem. 4-6), that is the case here. KPMG’s objections go to whether Plaintiffs can satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(a)(2), (b)(2), and (b)(3). (Def.’s Mem. 14-31 (arguing that class certification discovery cannot save the class claims)). These are “exactly the sort[s] of issues[s] that would be litigated and decided in the context of a motion for class certification.” Chen-Oster, 877 F. Supp. 2d at 117; accord Winfield, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 573-74; Calibuso, 2012 WL 4458404, at *13-16; Barghout, 2012 WL 1113973, at *11-12. Accordingly, they are “procedurally premature,” Chen-Oster, 877 F. Supp. 2d at 117, and denied “without prejudice to the defendant’s ability to oppose class certification on these same grounds,” Winfield, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 574.
2. Plaintiffs’ Standing to Seek Class Certification Under Rule 23(b)(2) The one component of Defendant’s motion to strike that calls for more detailed analysis
is its argument that Plaintiffs, as former employees of KPMG, lack standing to seek injunctive or declaratory relief and, therefore, cannot, as a matter of law, obtain class certification under Rule
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23(b)(2).3 (Def.’s Mem. 19-22). The Supreme Court has held that a court may defer consideration of Article III standing until after class certification where certification issues are “‘logically antecedent’ to Article III concerns.” Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 831 (1999) (quoting Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 612 (1997)); see also Mahon v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 683 F.3d 59, 64-65 (2d Cir. 2012) (limiting Ortiz’s “logically antecedent” holding to cases where the certification issue is dispositive). But this exception to the usual rule that a court must confirm that it has jurisdiction over a plaintiff at the outset of a case, see, e.g., Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. Merck-Medco Managed Care, L.L.C., 433 F.3d 181, 197-98 (2d Cir. 2005), does not apply where, as here, the standing of the named plaintiffs is in question, see, e.g., In re Digital Music Antitrust Litig., 812 F. Supp. 2d 390, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing cases). Moreover, in Chen-Oster — a factually analogous case — Judge Sand addressed the question of standing at the motion-to-dismiss stage and, consistent with Defendant’s argument here, held that, following Dukes, a former employee lacks standing to seek injunctive or declaratory relief. See 877 F. Supp. 2d at 120-22.
To satisfy the “‘irreducible constitutional minimum’ of standing,” a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) a personal injury-in-fact (2) that the challenged conduct of the defendant caused and (3) that a favorable decision will likely redress. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 651 F.3d 218, 228 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)), cert. granted, 2013 WL 135533 (U.S. Jan. 11, 2013). Where, as here, a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, he or she must also establish a “real and immediate threat

3

Rule 23(b)(2) provides that “[a] class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied

and if . . . the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally

to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate

respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).

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of repeated injury” demonstrated by more than “[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct.” City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983) (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., Shain v. Ellison, 356 F.3d 211, 215 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[A]bstract injury is not enough; rather, the injury or threat of injury must be both real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical.” (quoting O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 494) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). Put another way, a plaintiff seeking prospective relief “cannot rely on past injury to satisfy the injury requirement but must show a likelihood that he or she will be injured in the future.” Deshawn E. ex. rel. Charlotte E. v. Safir, 156 F.3d 340, 344 (2d Cir. 1998).
These principles demonstrate that a plaintiff generally lacks standing to seek injunctive or declaratory relief against his or her former employer, as there is no prospect that he or she will be injured in the future. See, e.g., Walsh v. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res., 471 F.3d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Oakley v. Verizon Commc’ns Inc., 09 Civ. 9175 (CM), 2012 WL 335657, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2012) (“Former employees lack standing to obtain injunctive relief because they are no longer affected by the challenged policies, and an injunction would do nothing to remedy their past injuries.”). Where, as here, a plaintiff seeks reinstatement with a former employer, however, several courts have held that the former employee does have standing to seek prospective relief. See, e.g., Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 547-48 (9th Cir. 2006); Chen-Oster, 2012 WL 205875, at *5-6, overruled in relevant part by 877 F. Supp. 2d at 121-22; Gilster v. Primebank, No. C 10-4084-MWB, 2012 WL 3518507, at *32 (N.D. Iowa Aug. 14, 2012); Levin v. Madigan, 697 F. Supp. 2d 958, 975 (N.D. Ill. 2010); see also True v. Neb., 612 F.3d 676, 679 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that a former employee had standing to seek
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injunctive relief against enforcement of a random vehicle search policy by his employer where he sought reinstatement). As Judge Sand explained in Chen-Oster:
The reason . . . is that a specific request for “reinstatement absent a corresponding injunction would expose plaintiffs to the immediate threat of further discrimination.” In other words, should plaintiffs prevail, and should a court grant them reinstatement, they have a very real interest in a court issued injunction preventing their employer from engaging in the same or substantially identical discriminatory behavior. 877 F. Supp. 2d at 122 (quoting Chen-Oster, 2012 WL 205875, at *6); accord Levin, 697 F. Supp. 2d at 975. In addition, denying such plaintiffs standing to pursue injunctive relief might have perverse effects: It could encourage plaintiffs “to remain employed, sometimes under very difficult conditions, to ensure standing” or encourage employers to terminate employees in order to forestall their ability to seek prospective relief. Chen-Oster, 877 F. Supp. 2d at 122. “Neither outcome is desirable.” Id. Judge Sand recognized the force of these arguments in Chen-Oster, see id. at 121-22, but nevertheless concluded that he was bound by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Dukes to hold that a plaintiff may never seek injunctive relief against his or her former employer. His conclusion was based on the third part of Dukes, in which the Supreme Court opined that the plaintiffs’ claims for backpay were also improperly certified under Rule 23(b)(2) because that provision “applies only when a single injunction or declaratory judgment would provide relief to each member of the class. . . . [I]t does not authorize class certification when each class member would be entitled to an individualized award of monetary damages.” 131 S. Ct. at 2557. As part of its analysis, the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that a Rule 23(b)(2) class may be certified as long as claims for monetary damages did not “predominate” over requests for injunctive and
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declaratory relief. See id. at 2559. Among other things, the Court reasoned, such a
“predominance test” would
require the District Court to reevaluate the roster of class members continually. The Ninth Circuit recognized the necessity for this when it concluded that those plaintiffs no longer employed by Wal-Mart lack standing to seek injunctive or declaratory relief against its employment practices. The Court of Appeals’ response to that difficulty, however, was not to eliminate all former employees from the certified class, but to eliminate only those who had left the company’s employ by the date the complaint was filed. That solution has no logical connection to the problem, since those who have left their Wal-Mart jobs since the complaint was filed have no more need for prospective relief than those who left beforehand. As a consequence, even though the validity of a (b)(2) class depends on whether “final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole,” about half the members of the class approved by the Ninth Circuit have no claim for injunctive or declaratory relief at all. . . . What follows from this . . . is not that some arbitrary limitation on class membership should be imposed but that the backpay claims should not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) at all.
Id. at 2559-60 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2)) (original emphasis omitted and emphases
added) (citation omitted).
Despite “misgivings” and “reservations,” Judge Sand relied on this language to conclude
that Dukes had adopted a “blanket rule that always denies standing to ex-employees.” Chen-
Oster, 877 F. Supp. 2d at 121-22. He based this conclusion on three considerations:
First, like the Plaintiffs here, the plaintiffs in Dukes sought reinstatement. In this respect, then, the facts of this case cannot be meaningfully differentiated from the facts in Dukes. Second, the issue of ex-employee standing was fully briefed and, we presume, fully considered by the Supreme Court. Third, the Supreme Court’s analysis of this issue, and its blanket denial of standing to ex-employees, is not dictum: it was necessary to the resolution of this case insofar as it undergirded the invalidation of the Ninth Circuit’s “predominance test” and foreclosed certification under 23(b)(2).
Id. at 121-22 (citations omitted). For these reasons, Judge Sand concluded that he was
“obligated to follow the rule, notwithstanding misgivings about its wisdom.” Id. at 121
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This Court respectfully disagrees with Judge Sand. In fact, there are several reasons that the language from Dukes quoted above should not be read to hold categorically that a former employee seeking reinstatement can never seek injunctive or declaratory relief against his or her former employer — a holding that would apply not only in the class action context, but also to individual Title VII claims. First, it is not clear from the passage whether the Supreme Court itself reached the conclusion that former employees lacked standing or merely accepted as its premise the Ninth Circuit’s judgment on that issue. Cf. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 272 (1990) (“The Court often grants certiorari to decide particular legal issues while assuming without deciding the validity of antecedent propositions, and such assumptions — even on jurisdictional issues — are not binding in future cases that directly raise the questions.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).4 Second, to the extent the Court did reach that conclusion itself, it did not have occasion to consider the specific question presented here — namely, whether a former employee seeking reinstatement has standing to seeking injunctive relief. That issue was not part of the questions on which the Court granted certiorari. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 795 (2010); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (No. 10-277), 2010 WL 3355820, at *1. And while the parties did address the standing of former employees in their briefs, they did so only in passing and did not address the specific question of

4

Notably, the Ninth Circuit itself appears to accept that a former employee can have

standing to pursue injunctive or declaratory relief if he or she seeks reinstatement. Indeed, the

very case cited by the Ninth Circuit in Dukes for the blanket proposition that former Wal-Mart

employees “do not have standing to pursue injunctive or declaratory relief,” Dukes v. Wal-Mart

Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 623 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (citing Walsh, 471 F.3d at 1037),

acknowledged Circuit precedent indicating non-employees “may have standing to sue for

injunctive relief against an employer . . . [where] those non-employees [are] in the process of

seeking reinstatement to their former positions, or seeking work from that employer,” Walsh, 471

F.3d at 1037 (citing Freitag, 468 F.3d 528, and Nanty v. Barrows Co., 660 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir.

1981), overruled on other grounds by O’Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 79 F.3d 756

(9th Cir. 1996)).

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whether former employees seeking reinstatement have standing. See Brief for Petitioner 51-52, Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (No. 10–277), 2011 WL 201045; Brief for Respondents 61-64, Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (No. 10–277), 2011 WL 686407; Reply Brief for Petitioner 22, Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (No. 10–277), 2011 WL 970341.
Third, and more substantively, the Dukes Court’s larger analysis does not depend on such a broad reading of the language concerning the standing of former employees. It is true that the operative complaint in Dukes sought “[a]n order restoring class members to their rightful positions at Wal-Mart,” Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint 25, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (No. C 01–02252), 2002 WL 33645690, but it is implausible that such an order would have applied to all 750,000 or so former employees in the class, see 131 S. Ct. at 2560, many (perhaps most) of whom likely had no intention of seeking reinstatement, let alone reasonable prospect of getting it. In other words, the Court did not need to reach the question of whether a former employee seeking reinstatement would have standing to seek injunctive relief for its point — that some members of the class in Dukes lacked such standing — to be valid. Finally, with all due respect to Judge Sand’s assessment, there is a strong argument that the passage quoted above is indeed dictum, both because the Court did not need to go beyond its holding with respect to Rule 23(a)(2), discussed above, to conclude that the Ninth Circuit had erred in certifying a class and because, strictly speaking, the Court’s point about class members’ standing was not necessary to its conclusion that claims for monetary relief may not generally be certified under Rule 23(b)(2).
In short, the Supreme Court’s arguably broad language notwithstanding, it is a mistake to read Dukes as having adopted a “blanket rule that always denies standing to ex-employees,” Chen-Oster, 877 F. Supp. 2d at 122, which would have implications far beyond the class action
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context. Accordingly, the Court follows those courts that have held that a plaintiff seeking reinstatement has standing to pursue injunctive or declaratory relief. Applying that rule here, Kassman and Patterson — the two Plaintiffs who bring class claims — have standing to pursue claims for prospective relief, as both seek reinstatement at KPMG. (See TAC ¶ 388; id. at 119). Thus, to the extent that Defendant moves to dismiss or strike the named Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive and declaratory relief on the ground that they lack standing, that motion is denied on the merits. To the extent that Defendant relies on Dukes to attack the standing of potential class members (who may not seek or be eligible for reinstatement) or to challenge the adequacy of Kassman and Patterson as class representatives (Def.’s Mem. 21-22), its motion is denied as premature, because such arguments go to the propriety of certifying a class under Rule 23(b)(2). As many courts in this Circuit have held — even after Dukes — arguments of that sort can and should be deferred until class certification. See, e.g., In re DDAVP Indirect Purchaser Antitrust Litig., — F. Supp. 2d —, No. 05 Civ. 2237 (CS), 2012 WL 4932158, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2012) (describing “a growing consensus among district courts that class certification is logically antecedent, where its outcome will affect the Article III standing determination, and the weight of authority holds that in general class certification should come first” and citing cases (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Winfield, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 574 (same); In re Digital Music Antitrust Litig., 812 F. Supp. at 406-07 (same).
3. The Motion to Strike Class Claims Under New York City and State Law In addition to the federal law class claims, the TAC includes nationwide class claims
pursuant to the NYSHRL (Counts V-VII), the NYCHRL (Counts XIII-X), and the NYSEPA (Count XI). Defendant moves to strike the nationwide putative classes under each of these statutes because the TAC fails to allege that the putative class members lived or worked in New
21

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York City or State. (Def.’s Mem. 31). Plaintiffs concede that they may bring class claims pursuant to the NYSHRL and NYCHRL only on behalf of people who live or work in New York State and New York City, respectively, and therefore represent that they will seek to certify classes for those claims consistent with those geographic limitations. (Pls.’ Mem. 29-30). Plaintiffs dispute Defendant’s arguments with respect to their NYSEPA claims, however, and maintain that a nationwide class may be appropriate because “KPMG’s pay decisions are made, implemented and enforced in New York by actors in the state of New York.” (Id. at 30).
Plaintiffs’ contention — for which they cite no legal authority — does not survive scrutiny. Under New York law, it is a “settled rule of statutory interpretation, that unless expressly stated otherwise, ‘no legislation is presumed to be intended to operate outside the territorial jurisdiction of the state . . . enacting it.’” Goshen v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 730 N.Y.S.2d 46, 47 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2001) (quoting 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 359, at 492), aff’d, 98 N.Y.2d 314 (2002); see also N.Y. Stat. Law § 149 (“The laws of one state can have no force and effect in the territorial limits of another jurisdiction, in the absence of the consent of the latter.”). The NYSEPA is “silent as to its application abroad.” Hart v. Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein Sec., LLC., No. 06 Civ. 0134 (DAB), 2006 WL 2356157, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2006). Given the presumption against extraterritoriality, it follows that the statute does not apply to people who live and work outside of New York State. See id.; see also Hammell v. Banque Paribas, No. 90 Civ. 4799 (JSM), 1993 WL 426844, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 1993) (stating, with respect to a provision of the New York Labor Law in the same Article as the NYSEPA, that “[t]he purpose of this area of the labor law is clearly to protect workers laboring in New York”); cf. Hoffman v. Parade Publ’ns, 15 N.Y.3d 285, 289-92 (2010) (rejecting an argument that
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decisionmaking at corporate headquarters in New York State or City was sufficient to establish application of the NYSHRL and NYCHRL to workers outside the relevant jurisdiction).5
Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to strike the NYSHRL, NYCHRL, and NYSEPA class claims is granted to the extent those claims are brought on behalf of people who do or did not live or work in New York State (for purposes of the NYSHRL and NYSEPA) or New York City (for purposes of the NYCHRL). The motion is denied with respect to named Plaintiffs and putative class members who did live or work within the relevant geographic boundaries.
4. The Motion to Dismiss the Disparate Impact Claims Next, Defendant moves to dismiss the Title VII disparate impact claims brought on
behalf of the putative class in Counts I through III for failure “to identify any specific facially neutral policy or practice that caused any disparate impact.” (Def.’s Mem. 33). Defendant cites a number of cases for the general proposition that plaintiffs must identify a specific facially neutral employment policy in order to survive a motion to dismiss. (Id. at 33-34 (quoting and citing Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 241 (2005), Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell, Bd. of Educ., 243 F.3d 93, 111-12 (2d Cir. 2001), Tucker v. Gonzales, No. 03 Civ. 3106 (LTS) (FM), 2005 WL 2385844 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005), and Kulkarni v. City Univ. of N.Y., No. 01 Civ. 10628 (DLC), 2002 WL 1315596, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2002))). As discussed above, however, Plaintiffs in this case do allege that specific, facially neutral companywide policies had a disparate impact on female class members, including, for example, the evaluation of employees

5

It is perhaps worth noting that in a factually analogous case in this District, counsel for

Plaintiffs here recently filed an amended complaint limiting claims under the NYSHRL, the

NYCHRL, and the NYSEPA to people living or working in New York State and City. See

Second Amended Complaint, Moore v. Publicis Groupe, SA, No. 11 Civ. 1279 (AC) (Docket

No. 257).

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using a common standard known as “The KPMG Way.” (TAC ¶ 13). Whether or not Plaintiffs can ultimately prevail, those allegations are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. B. The Individual Claims
The Court turns, then, to Defendants’ various challenges to the individual claims. In particular, KPMG moves to dismiss (1) several of Plaintiffs’ individual claims under the EPA and the NYSEPA; (2) all of Plaintiffs’ retaliation claims under the EPA and NYSEPA; (3) all of Patterson’s individual Title VII claims; (4) Kassman’s claims for discriminatory performance evaluations; and (5) Kassman’s constructive discharge claim. In addition, Defendant moves to sever and dismiss the claims of all Plaintiffs other than Kassman on the ground of misjoinder. The Court will address each of these arguments in turn.
1. Plaintiffs’ Claims Under the EPA and NYSEPA First, Defendant moves to dismiss some Plaintiffs’ individual claims under the EPA and
NYSEPA for failure to state a claim, arguing that two plaintiffs failed to name male comparators as required and that two plaintiffs are stating disguised failure-to-promote claims. To prove discrimination under the EPA and NYSEPA, a plaintiff must show that “(i) the employer pays different wages to employees of the opposite sex; (ii) the employees perform equal work on jobs requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility; and (iii) the jobs are performed under similar working conditions.” Lavin-McEleney v. Marist Coll., 239 F.3d 476, 480 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Belfi v. Prendergast, 191 F.3d 129, 135 (2d Cir.1999)), abrogated on other grounds by Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Rose v. Goldman, Sachs, & Co., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 238, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“Claims for violations of the Equal Pay Act and the New York State Equal Pay Act may be evaluated under the same standard.”). Significantly, a plaintiff “need not demonstrate that her job is identical to a higher paid position, but only must show that
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the two positions are ‘substantially equal’ in skill, effort, and responsibility.” Lavin-McEleney, 239 F.3d at 480 (quoting Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1310 (2d Cir. 1995)).
Applying these standards, Defendant argues first that Kassman’s and Potter’s equal pay claims are fatally flawed because neither Plaintiff alleges the existence of a specific male comparator who was paid more than her. (Def.’s Mem. 37-39). Whether or not a female plaintiff must identify a specific male comparator — an issue on which the Second Circuit has reserved judgment, see Lavin-McEleney, 239 F.3d at 480 — the allegations in the TAC suffice to survive at this stage. Kassman alleges that while on maternity leave her base salary was cut by $20,000, that “[s]imilar cuts were not made to male counterparts’ salaries, and as a result, Kassman was and continued to be paid $20,000 less than her male counterparts during her tenure at KPMG.” (TAC ¶ 81). Further, she specifically alleges that Senior Manager John Montgomery, who “joined KPMG after Kassman, worked under the same Partner, . . . worked on engagements for similar clients[, and] . . . performed the same tasks as Kassman . . . with no greater skill or effort than Kassman,” was paid more than she was. (TAC ¶ 82). For her part, Potter alleges that she and other women at KPMG had their pay frozen in October 2002 and that similarly situated men did not. (TAC ¶¶ 280-82). She also alleges that a specific male comparator, Senior Manager David Buchner, “whose qualifications experience, and responsibilities were no greater than Ms. Potter’s . . . continued to receive pay raises after 2002.” (TAC ¶ 283). These allegations plainly name specific comparators and thus are sufficient to state a claim, even under the higher standard urged by Defendants.
Defendant also seeks dismissal of Patterson’s and O’Donnell’s equal pay claims on the ground that they are merely disguised failure-to-promote claims. (Def.’s Mem. 39). Although the EPA does not afford a remedy for denial of promotions, or “titles,” the fact that comparators
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of the opposite sex had different job titles does not bar an EPA claim. See, e.g., Moccio v. Cornell Univ., — F. Supp. 2d —, No. 09 Civ. 3601 (PAE), 2012 WL 3648450, at *25 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2012) (quoting EEOC v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., No. 10 Civ. 7462 (NRB), 2012 WL 1758128, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2012)) (“In determining whether two positions are substantially equal in skill, superficial comparisons based on job title or code are insufficient.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Indeed, the EPA and implementing regulations are clear that the statute is concerned with the provision of equal pay for equal work, and that the “[a]pplication of the equal pay standard is not dependent on job classifications or titles but depends rather on actual job requirements and performance.” 29 C.F.R. § 1620.13(e); see also, e.g., Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1310 (stating that “the standard under the Equal Pay Act is job content and not job title or description.”). Accordingly, whether or not Patterson and O’Donnell had different titles than their male comparators, they have stated a claim under the EPA if they allege that they performed substantially the same job for less pay than those comparators.
They have so alleged. In a section of the TAC titled “Disparate Pay,” Patterson alleges that although she was an “Associate,” she regularly performed tasks conducted by a “Senior Associate,” but that she was compensated only at an Associate’s level. (TAC ¶¶ 207-08). Further, Patterson identifies specific male comparators who were supervised by the same manager and performed the same job as she did, but who were labeled — and paid — as Senior Associates. (TAC ¶ 208). In her “Disparate Pay” section, O’Donnell alleges that although she was employed as a Senior Associate, she regularly performed Manager-level tasks including setting up engagements, meeting with clients, working directly with partners and directors, performing conflict-of-interest checks and compiling budgets. (TAC ¶¶ 165-67). O’Donnell also alleges that in order to perform these tasks, she was given special access to computer
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programs that was typically restricted to Managers, and at times even trained new Managers, a task normally done only by experienced Managers. (TAC ¶ 166-67). Finally, she too identifies a specific male comparator, Krupal Mehta, who she alleges was paid as a Manager despite the fact that he “performed precisely the same tasks” as O’Donnell, in a manner “not meaningfully or substantially better” than she, and that he had “a comparable educational background and experience” to hers. (TAC ¶ 169). These allegations plainly state a claim.
2. Plaintiffs’ Pay-Retaliation Claims Next, Defendant moves to dismiss all of the Plaintiffs’ EPA and NYSEPA pay-related
retaliation claims. The anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA, of which the EPA is a part, states in relevant part that it shall be unlawful “to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter.” 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3); see also N.Y. Labor Law § 215 (anti-retaliation statute). To establish a prima facie claim of retaliation under the FLSA and the New York State analogue, a plaintiff must show: “(1) participation in protected activity known to the defendant, like the filing of a FLSA lawsuit; (2) an employment action disadvantaging the plaintiff; and (3) a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Mullins v. City of N.Y., 626 F.3d 47, 53 (2d Cir. 2010); see also, e.g., Salazar v. Bowne Realty Assocs., L.L.C., 796 F. Supp. 2d 378, 384 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting that the standards under the EPA and NYSEPA “significantly overlap” and require the same three elements). Defendant contends that Plaintiffs’ claims fail because they do not allege they made sufficiently specific complaints to satisfy the first prong of this test. (Def.’s Mem. 4142). While Plaintiffs concede that O’Donnell and Potter have not pled retaliation claims under
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the EPA or NYSEPA, they contend that Kassman, Patterson, and Vasudeva have done so. (Pls.’ Mem. 36-38 & 36 n.31).
As the Supreme Court recently made clear, to satisfy the first prong of the test for a prima facie claim of retaliation, “a complaint must be sufficiently clear and detailed for a reasonable employer to understand it, in light of both content and context, as an assertion of rights protected by the statute and a call for their protection.” Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1335 (2011). Similarly, under the New York Labor Law, Plaintiffs must show that they “complained about a specific violation of the Labor Law.” Castagna v. Luceno, No. 09 Civ. 9332 (CS), 2011 WL 1584593, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2011) (quoting Epifani v. Johnson, 882 N.Y.S.2d 234, 244 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). An employee need not cite a specific statute, see N.Y. Labor Law § 215(1)(a), but her “complaint to the employer [must] be of a colorable violation of the statute,” Castagna, 2011 WL 1584593, at *12 (quoting Weiss v. Kaufman, No. 103473/2010, 2010 WL 4858896 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. Nov. 18, 2010)) (internal quotation mark omitted); see also, e.g., Duarte v. Tri-State Physical Med. & Rehab., P.C., No. 11 Civ. 3765 (NRB), 2012 WL 2847741, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2012) (denying a motion to dismiss a New York Labor Law retaliation claim where the plaintiff had begun asking her coworkers whether they were receiving statutorily required overtimes wages); Patel v. Baluchi’s Indian Rest., No. 08 Civ. 9985 (RJS), 2009 WL 2358620, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2009) (finding that the plaintiffs had alleged a retaliation claim where they complained to their employer of “‘substandard and unsafe working conditions, low wages, and lack of benefits’” (quoting Second Amended Complaint)).
Applying these standards here, Plaintiffs’ claims fail as a matter of law. To be sure, Kassman alleges that she made a number of complaints, about her salary cut (TAC ¶ 26),
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discrimination generally (TAC ¶¶ 52, 137-38), and harassment and disparate treatment generally (TAC ¶¶ 133-35); Vasudeva alleges that she contacted supervisors to question why she had been denied a bonus (TAC ¶ 325) and that she made general complaints about discrimination and the denial of a sabbatical (TAC ¶¶ 354-55); and Patterson alleges that she complained to supervisors about a KPMG Partner’s refusal to address her sabbatical request and negative comments about her pregnancy (TAC ¶¶ 251-54), that she sent “an electronic message outlining and detailing her discrimination claims” to a Human Resources Director (TAC ¶ 253), and that she complained about negative comments in her performance review (TAC ¶ 256). Even taking these allegations as true, however, none of these complaints rises to the level of specificity required to state a retaliation claim under the FLSA or the New York Labor Law, as there is no indication that any Plaintiffs were actually complaining of EPA or NYSEPA violations such that these complaints constituted “an assertion of rights protected by the statute” and a “call for their protection.” Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1335. Indeed, given the multiple forms of discrimination alleged by each Plaintiff, it is possible, and perhaps even likely, that the alleged complaints concerned (or were understood by KPMG to concern) racial, caregiver, or promotion discrimination, which are not actionable under the EPA or NYSEPA and therefore could not support a retaliation claim under those statutes. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ pay-related retaliation claims fail as a matter of law and Counts XVIII and XVI must be dismissed.6

6

Plaintiffs’ retaliation claims under the FLSA also fail because they do not allege that they

complained to a governmental entity. In Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 55 (2d Cir.

1993), the Second Circuit held that the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision only proscribes

retaliation that occurs after an employee has complained of a potential violation to a government

authority. Although the Supreme Court recently abrogated Lambert in part, see Kasten, 131 S.

Ct. at 1336, it expressly refrained from deciding whether intra-company complaints may

constitute protected activity under the statute. Accordingly, Lambert’s holding on that issue

remains controlling precedent in this Circuit. See, e.g., Duarte, 2012 WL 2847741, at *3; Ryder

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3. Patterson’s Title VII Claims Defendant moves to dismiss Patterson’s individual Title VII claims (Counts I through III
and XII) on two grounds: (1) that the Court lacks jurisdiction because Patterson failed to file suit within ninety days of receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC; and (2) that venue in this District is improper. (Def.’s Mem. 42-43). The first argument — that this Court lacks jurisdiction7 — is easily rejected, as the Supreme Court has held, in a case with virtually identical facts to those here (albeit not cited by either party), that “‘the commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class action.’ Once the statute of limitations has been tolled, it remains tolled for all members of the putative class until class certification is denied.” Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 353-54 (1983) (citation omitted) (quoting Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974)); see also In re WorldCom Sec. Litig., 496 F.3d 245, 252-56 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that the American Pipe rule extends to plaintiffs who file individual suits prior to a decision on class certification). Applying that rule here, Patterson’s claim is plainly timely, as the First Amended Complaint in this case, which asserted Title VII claims on behalf of a class that would include Patterson, was filed on June 6, 2011, six days before Patterson received her right-to-sue letter from the EEOC.

v. Platon, No. 11 Civ. 4292 (JFB) (ARL), 2012 WL 2317772, at *7-8 (E.D.N.Y. June 19, 2012); Hyunmi Son v. Reina Bijoux, Inc., 823 F. Supp. 2d 238, 242-44 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).

7

It should be noted that, although Defendant argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction in

light of Patterson’s delay in bringing suit, the law is clear that the ninety-day rule is not

jurisdictional. See, e.g., Francis v. City of N.Y., 235 F.3d 763, 767-68 (2d Cir. 2000).

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KPMG’s second argument — that venue is improper — also fails. To the extent relevant here, Title VII provides that suit “may be brought in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).8 Applying that provision, courts have held that where a plaintiff alleges that a corporate policy developed in the company’s headquarters has a disparate impact throughout the company, the relevant employment practice “is ‘committed’ where . . . [it] is initiated,” namely, in the district where the company’s headquarters is located. Turnley v. Banc of Am. Inv. Servs., Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 204, 213 (D. Mass. 2008); accord Hoffman v. United Telecomms., Inc, 575 F. Supp. 1463, 1483-85 (D. Kan. 1983); cf. Ring v. Roto-Rooter Servs. Co., No. 10-CV-179, 2010 WL 3825390, at *5-7 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 28, 2010) (declining to apply Turnley and Hoffman where the plaintiff had alleged only a disparate treatment claim, not a disparate impact claim). Here, as discussed above, Patterson brings a disparate impact claim challenging various company-wide policies and practices. (See, e.g., TAC ¶¶ 371-81). Further, the TAC plausibly alleges that these policies and practices “emanate from the Company’s New York headquarters” (TAC ¶ 374), and Defendant has not submitted any evidence contradicting that allegation. Cf. Cook v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 05 Civ. 8842 (SHS), 2006 WL 760284, at *3-5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2006) (distinguishing Hoffman and holding that venue could not be based on the location of the defendant’s headquarters because the complaint alleged that all the unlawful employment practices had occurred elsewhere and the defendant had submitted a declaration stating that none of the relevant employment decisions required headquarters approval). It follows that venue is proper.

8

Title VII includes other bases for venue, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), but they are not

relevant in this case.

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4. Kassman’s Discriminatory Performance Evaluation Claim Next, Defendant moves to dismiss Kassman’s claims for discriminatory performance
evaluations under Title VII, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL as time-barred. (Def.’s Mem 44). Under Title VII, a plaintiff must file a charge with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL, claims must be brought within three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8502(d). In this case, as Kassman filed her EEOC charge on August 19, 2010, and the complaint in this case on June 2, 2011, the parties agree that she cannot bring Title VII claims for events that occurred prior to October 29, 2010, or claims under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL for events that occurred prior to June 2, 2008. (Def.’s Mem. 44; Pls.’ Mem. 42). Thus, to the extent that Kassman alleges that she received discriminatory performance evaluations prior to those dates, they are — as Kassman implicitly concedes by not arguing to the contrary — time barred under the relevant statutes. However, to the extent that she alleges such discrimination after those dates (see, e.g., TAC ¶¶ 92-94, 118-23), her claims are timely and may proceed.
5. Kassman’s Constructive Discharge Claim Defendant’s final substantive challenge to the complaint is to Kassman’s claim of
constructive discharge. As the Second Circuit has explained, constructive discharge “occurs when an employer, rather than directly discharging an individual, intentionally creates an intolerable work atmosphere that forces an employee to quit involuntarily. Working conditions are intolerable if they are so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee’s shoes would have felt compelled to resign.” Serricchio v. Wachovia Sec. LLC, 658 F.3d 169, 185 (2d Cir. 2011). Given this high standard, an employee’s mere dissatisfaction with job assignments or the denial of a raise do not, in themselves, give rise to a constructive discharge
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claim. See, e.g., Stetson v. NYNEX Serv. Co., 995 F.2d 355, 360-61 (2d Cir. 1993); Spence v. Md. Cas. Co., 995 F.2d 1147, 1156 (2d Cir. 1993). At the same time, “the effect of a number of adverse conditions in the workplace is cumulative . . . [b]ecause a reasonable person encounters life’s circumstances cumulatively and not individually.” Chertkova v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 81, 90 (2d Cir. 1996); see also, e.g., Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 152-53 & 153 n. 24 (2d Cir. 2003) (applying this cumulative effect standard); Madray v. Long Island Univ., 789 F. Supp. 2d 403, 410-11 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (same).
Whether Kassman’s allegations are sufficient to state a claim in light of these standards is a close question, but the Court concludes that they are. Among other things, Kassman alleges that she experienced a more acute form of harassment and hostility beginning in or about October 2009, several months after she began complaining about harassment and discrimination. (TAC ¶¶ 119, 134). Beginning that month, another Senior Manager and an Associate in Kassman’s group began complaining to senior leadership that Kassman was “unapproachable,” and “too direct.” (TAC ¶ 119). Although Kassman’s superiors acknowledged that the complaining Associate “might have an issue working with women,” and he had only been working at KPMG for sixteen months, they nonetheless credited his complaints and discounted Kassman’s own complaints about him. (TAC ¶¶ 119-23). Kassman was “constantly reprimanded,” encouraged to meet with a behavioral “coach,” and forced “to participate in an excessive number of stressful meetings and intense interrogations,” often on a weekly basis. (TAC ¶¶ 122-23). Additionally, Kassman was removed from the promotion track, despite having been promised a promotion. (TAC ¶¶ 88-93). Adding insult to injury, although Kassman was told that she would be put up for the promotion the following year (TAC ¶ 94), the Senior Manager who had complained about her was promoted to fill the opening instead. (TAC ¶ 96).
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Despite Kassman’s complaints, the harassing Associate’s career also blossomed: He was promoted first to Senior Associate and then to Manager. (TAC ¶ 124).
In late 2009, Kassman transferred to the Stamford office to escape the harassment. (TAC ¶ 126). A few months later, however, the Stamford office adopted a policy that required workers to be physically in the office for three days per week to qualify for office space. (TAC ¶ 127). Due to her flex-time arrangement, Kassman worked only three days per week “in office,” one of which was usually spent out of the physical office with clients, so she was forced to vacate her office — despite the fact that there were empty offices available. (TAC ¶¶ 126-29). That, in turn, made Kassman’s job performance much more difficult, required her to transport and rearrange her workspace each day she was in the office, and signified a significant loss of status to coworkers. (TAC ¶ 128). When Kassman complained to the Office of Ethics and Compliance about her treatment, was told that it was “three men ganging up on a woman. We’ve had it before.” (TAC ¶¶ 134-35). Instead of addressing the harassment, however, the Office of Ethics and Compliance suggested that Kassman relocate to another position within KPMG or leave the company with a “package.” (TAC ¶ 136). The person in charge also suggested that Kassman take a leave of absence for emotional distress, noting that “many” female employees had done so in the past under similar circumstances. (TAC ¶ 136).
In short, Kassman faced a combination of circumstances, including the denial of a promotion; the promotions of two harassers despite her complaints about them; the encouragement to attend coaching; her forced participation in interrogations; eviction from her office even though extra offices were available; the failure to address her repeated complaints notwithstanding an acknowledgment that the company had repeated gender harassment issues; and the suggestion that she leave the company, either permanently with a “package” or on a
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leave of absence for emotional distress as other harassed women had done. Taken together, these allegations render plausible Kassman’s claim that she was “forced to end her career at KPMG . . . because the Company had deliberately made her working conditions so intolerable that she was compelled to resign involuntarily.” (TAC ¶ 143). Put another way, she plausibly alleges that Defendant intentionally created an intolerable working environment sufficiently severe to make her feel that she was “not wanted as an employee,” Terry, 336 F.3d at 152, thus compelling her to resign. That is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Timothy v. Our Lady of Mercy Med. Ctr., 03 Civ. 3556 (RCC), 2004 WL 503760, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2004) (finding that the plaintiff had stated a claim for constructive discharge where she had alleged that “she [has] been passed over for positions for which she was qualified . . . been placed in inferior positions below her skill level[,] . . . stripped of her substantive responsibilities, removed from her office, shunted to several inadequate work locations, and that Defendants generally engaged in actions that made it more difficult for her to work”); Halbrook v. Reichhold Chems., Inc., 735 F. Supp. 121, 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding that the plaintiff had stated a claim of constructive discharge where she had alleged a “change in responsibilities, reduction in workload, humiliation and embarrassment, and the absence of any further chance of advancement”).
6. Joinder of the Named Plaintiffs’ Claims Finally, Defendant moves to sever and dismiss the claims of O’Donnell, Patterson, Potter,
and Vasudeva on the ground of misjoinder. (Def.’s Mem. 46-49). Under Rule 20(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiffs may join claims in a single lawsuit if
(A) they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and
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Case 1:11-cv-03743-JMF Document 69 Filed 02/07/13 Page 36 of 38
(B) any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a). By its terms, Rule 20(a) requires that both criteria “be met for joinder to be proper.” Deskovic v. City of Peekskill, 673 F. Supp. 2d 154, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). The two requirements, however, are “not rigid tests. They are flexible concepts used by the courts to implement the purpose of Rule 20 and therefore are to be read as broadly as possible whenever doing so is likely to promote judicial economy.” 7 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1653 (3d ed.) (footnotes omitted); see also United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966) (“Under the Rules, the impulse is toward entertaining the broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties; joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged.”). In particular, “‘[c]ourts within this Circuit repeatedly have interpreted the phrase “same transaction” to encompass “all logically related claims” and have counseled that such determinations are to be made on a case-by-case basis.’” Deskovic, 673 F. Supp. 2d at 166 (quoting Barnhart v. Town of Parma, 252 F.R.D. 156, 160 (W.D.N.Y. 2008)).
Applying these standards here, the Court concludes that the allegations in the TAC — which must be accepted as true for these purposes, see id. at 159 — are sufficient to justify joinder at this stage in the proceedings. As discussed above, Plaintiffs allege that several specific, company-wide employment policies have resulted in employment discrimination. In light of these allegations, the requirements of Rule 20(a) have been met and “considerations of judicial economy and fairness dictate” — at least for now — that the case move forward as one lawsuit. Barnhart, 252 F.R.D. at 160 (quoting United States v. Aquavella, 615 F.2d 12, 22 (2d Cir. 1979)); see also, e.g., Tardd v. Brookhaven Nat’l Lab., No. 04 Civ. 3262 (ADS), 2007 WL 1423642, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. May 8, 2007) (noting other courts’ acceptance of joinder in
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Case 1:11-cv-03743-JMF Document 69 Filed 02/07/13 Page 37 of 38
employment discrimination cases where “plaintiffs were subjected to the same type of conduct giving rise to the discrimination, even though that conduct occurred at different times or was perpetrated by different people”); Fong v. Rego Park Nursing Home, No. 95 Civ. 4445 (SJ), 1996 WL 468660, at *2-3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 1996) (permitting joinder of employment discrimination claims by three plaintiffs when events occurred several years apart and under different supervisors). If, after discovery, there is a basis to revisit the question of joinder, the Court will do so. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 (“On motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party.” (emphasis added)); see also, e.g., Barnhart, 252 F.R.D. at 161 (denying a motion to sever trials at the pleading stage without prejudice to revisiting the issue after discovery). For now, however, Defendant’s motion to sever and dismiss the claims of O’Donnell, Patterson, Potter, and Vasudeva must be denied.
CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed above, Defendant’s motions to strike or dismiss are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. In particular, Defendant’s motions to strike or dismiss the class claims in their entirety in light of Dukes are DENIED. Defendant’s motion to strike the class claims under New York State and New York City law is GRANTED with respect to putative class members not living or working in the relevant jurisdictions, but DENIED with respect to putative class members living or working within those jurisdictions. Defendant’s motion to dismiss the disparate impact class claims is DENIED. Defendant’s motion to dismiss the individual Plaintiffs’ equal pay claims under the EPA and NYSEPA is DENIED, although Defendant’s motion to dismiss the individual Plaintiffs’ retaliation claims under those statutes is GRANTED. Defendant’s motion to dismiss Patterson’s Title VII claims on grounds of timeliness or improper venue is DENIED. Defendant’s motion to dismiss Kassman’s
37

Case 1:11-cv-03743-JMF Document 69 Filed 02/07/13 Page 38 of 38 discriminatory performance evaluation claims is GRANTED as to claims prior to the statute of limitations and DENIED as to claims accruing after the statute of limitations. Defendant’s motion to dismiss Kassman’s constructive discharge claim is DENIED. Finally, Defendant’s motion to sever and dismiss the individual claims other than Kassman’s is DENIED.
SO ORDERED. Dated: February 7, 2013
New York, New York __________________________________ JESSE M. FURMAN United States District Judge
38

 
 Case 1:11-cv-03743-LGS Document 87 Filed 05/13/13 Page 1 of 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

)

DONNA KASSMAN, LINDA

)

O'DONNELL, SPARKLE PATTERSON,

)

JEANETTE POTTER AND ASHWINI

)

VASUDEVA, individually and on behalf of

)

a class of similarly-situated female

)

employees,

) Civ. No. 11-CV-3743 (LGS)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

Jury Trial Demand

v.

)

)

KPMGLLP,

)

)

Defendant.

)

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR EQUITABLE TOLLING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR ABSENT COLLECTIVE ACTION MEMBERS' CLAIMS UNDER
THE EQUAL PAY ACT
Pursuant to tllis Comi's Order of April 29, 2013, Plaintiffs Donna Kassman, Linda
O' Donnell, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, and Ashwini Vasudeva, by and tln·ough
undersigned counsel, respectfully submit this Motion for Equitable Tolling of the Statute of
Limitations for Absent Collective Action Members' Claims Under the Equal Pay Act. This
motion is based upon the memorandum in support filed herewith and the applicable law.

1

Case 1:11-cv-03743-LGS Document 87 Filed 05/13/13 Page 2 of 3

Dated May 13, 20 13

Respectfully submitted,
s/ Katherine Kimpel Katherine M. Kimpel (admitted pro hac vice) Katherine E. Lmm11 (admitted pro hac vice) Kate Mueting (admitted pro hac vice) David W. Sanford (admitted pro hac vice) SANFORD HEISLER, LLP 1666 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. , Suite 300 Washington, DC 20009 Telephone: (202) 499-5200 Facsimile: (202) 499-5199 kkimpel@sanfordheisler.com dsanford@sanfordhei sler.com klamm@sanfordheisler. com kmueting@sanfordhei s1er.com
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs and the Class

2

Case 1:11-cv-03743-LGS Document 87 Filed 05/13/13 Page 3 of 3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby ce1iify that a true and con ect copy of the foregoing and all documents attached

hereto were served May 13, 2013 upon the following counsel of record by operation of the

Court's electronic filing system:

Cheryl M. Stanton, Esq. OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK &STEWART, P.C. 1745 Broadway, 22nd Floor New York, NY 10019 cheryl.stanton@ogletreedeakins.com

Diane M. Saunders, Esq. OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK &STEWART, P.C. One Boston Place, Suite 320 Boston, MA 021 08 diane.saunders@ogletreedeakins.com

Peter 0. Hughes, Esq. OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK &STEWART, P.C. 10 Madison Avenue, Suite 400 Morristown, NJ 07960 peter.hughes@ogletreedeakins.com
Steven W. Moore, Esq. OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK&STE,VART, P.C. 1700 Lincoln St., Suite 4650 Denver, CO 80203 steven .moore@ogl etreed eaki ns. c o m

Colleen M. Kenney, Esq. John G. Levi, Esq. OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK &STEWART, P.C. One South Dearbom St. Chicago, IL 60603 cketmey@ sidl ey. com jlevi@sidley.com
Wendy M. Lazerson, Esq. OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK &STEWART, P.C. 1001 Page Mill Road Building 1 Palo Alto, CA 94304 wlazerson@sidley.com

s/Kritika Thukral Kritika Thukral

3

 
 Case 1:11-cv-03743-LGS Document 99 Filed 08/20/13 Page 1 of 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

-------------------------------------------------------------- X

:

DONNA KASSMAN et al.,

:

Plaintiffs, :

:

-against-

:

:

KPMG, LLP.

:

Defendants. :

------------------------------------------------------------- :

X

11 Civ. 3743 (LGS) ORDER

8/20/13

LORNA G. SCHOFIELD, District Judge:

For the reasons stated on the record on August 1, 2013, the Clerk of Court is directed to close the motion at Dkt. No. 87.

Dated: August 20, 2013 New York, New York

1

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

-------------------------------------------------------------- X

:

DONNA KASSMAN, et al.,

:

Plaintiffs, :

:

-against-

:

:

KPMG LLP,

:

Defendant. :

:

------------------------------------------------------------- X

11 Civ. 03743 (LGS) OPINION AND ORDER

7/8/14

LORNA G. SCHOFIELD, District Judge:

Plaintiffs Donna Kassman, Linda O’Donnell, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter and

Ashwini Vasudeva, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, bring this action

against Defendant KPMG LLP alleging various forms of employment discrimination, including

individual and Rule 23 class claims for violations of Title VII; individual and collective action

claims for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) as amended by the Equal Pay Act

(“EPA”); individual and class claims for violations of the New York State Human Rights Law

(“NYSHRL”), the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”) and the New York Equal

Pay Law (“NYEPL”); individual claims for violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act

(“FMLA”); and an individual claim for a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

Before the Court are two motions: (1) Plaintiffs’ Motion for Conditional Certification and

Authorization of Notice (“Motion for Conditional Certification”), and (2) Defendants’ Rule

12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Rule 23 Class Claims in the Third Amended Complaint for

Lack of Constitutional Standing (“Motion to Dismiss”). For the reasons discussed below,

Plaintiffs’ Motion to Certify is granted, and Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and

denied in part.

I. Background A. Procedural Background
Kassman filed her original Complaint in this action on June 2, 2011, and her Amended Complaint on June 6, 2011. On September 29, 2011, Kassman filed her Second Amended Complaint, which also named O’Donnell, Patterson, Potter and Vasudeva as Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs filed their Third Amended Complaint on January 6, 2012.
On February 3, 2012, KPMG filed a Motion to Dismiss Certain Claims and Strike Class Claims as Contained in the Third Amended Complaint. One of Defendant’s arguments, relying on Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011), was that Plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2) because they were no longer employed by KPMG. Judge Jesse Furman issued an Opinion and Order on February 7, 2013 (“Judge Furman’s Opinion”), which left the majority of Plaintiffs’ individual and class claims intact. Judge Furman held that the Rule 23 class claims survived because Plaintiffs sought reinstatement at KPMG.
On May 13, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Equitable Tolling of the Statute of Limitations for Absent Collective Action Members’ Claims under the Equal Pay Act. At a hearing on August 1, 2013, the Court denied the motion without prejudice to renewal by future opt-in Plaintiffs. The Court explained that it would allow discovery and notice to be issued as if the motion had been granted.
B. Facts Relevant to the Motions Before the Court This opinion assumes familiarity with the basic facts of this case, which are detailed in Judge Furman’s Opinion. See Kassman v. KPMG LLP, 925 F. Supp. 2d 453, 457-59 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
2

i. Motion for Conditional Certification The facts are taken from the parties’ submissions in connection with Plaintiffs’ Motion for Conditional Certification. Defendant KPMG employs over 23,000 people in over 80 offices. KPMG divides its operations into Audit, Tax and Advisory functions, which are then further divided into specialized areas. The proposed collective consists of women employed in KPMG’s Tax and Advisory functions in the positions of Associate, Senior Associate, Manager, Senior Manager/Director and Managing Director, which includes more than 7,000 women. As evidenced by KPMG’s Career Snapshots and Job Descriptions, employees with the same job title have substantially similar responsibilities and qualifications. These descriptions do not include every task an employee might perform, however, and state that additional qualifications may be required for specific specializations. KPMG’s website states that the firm “aim[s] to make it easy for [its employees] to move around at KPMG – geographically, as well as between different job functions.” KPMG’s Compensation Guidelines evince that compensation policies are set at high levels and applied across job titles, function groups and geographic locations. For example, KPMG has a firm-wide policy for awarding merit-based increases in compensation. Also, KPMG has a policy providing that compensation must be based on the firm’s study of the market rate for each position in each geographic location. Additionally, KPMG has firm-wide salary bands, which establish uniform compensation ranges. Specific pay amounts are not dictated by these policies, but are determined by the partners in each of KPMG’s offices based on factors specific to location and employee. Compensation is reduced for those employees on reduced schedules. Partners can set compensation outside the
3

suggested ranges for a legitimate business reason. Nonetheless, firm policy provides that all employee compensation is ultimately decided by persons at the highest level of firm leadership, who “review compensation recommendations,” make “revisions” and “notify [lower level leadership] when all salary and compensation planning has been approved.”
Named Plaintiffs Kassman, Patterson, O’Donnell and Vasudeva1 were employed by KPMG as client service professionals in the Advisory and Tax practices. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant paid them and similarly-situated female employees less than their male counterparts for performing substantially equivalent work.
Kassman was employed by KPMG in the New York metro area for over seventeen years. She started as a Tax Associate (known then as a Tax Specialist) and was promoted to Tax Senior Manager. Kassman received positive performance reviews from KPMG. Nevertheless, KPMG paid Kassman nearly $50,000 less per year than comparator John Montgomery, even though Kassman held a law degree and Montgomery did not. KPMG reduced Kassman’s salary by $20,000 per year while she was on maternity leave, but did not reduce any male comparator’s pay during this time. When Kassman asked her superior about her pay cut, he told her that she should consider her past salary a loan and that she did not need the money because she had “a nice engagement ring.”
Patterson was employed by KPMG in its Atlanta, Georgia office as a Tax Associate for approximately four years. Patterson received positive performance reviews and received a “Standing Ovation” award twice, which KPMG gives to employees who go “above and beyond” in their work. Patterson performed the same tasks as a Senior Associate, although she was never
1 Potter does not bring claims under the EPA, as her claims would be time-barred. 4

officially promoted. KPMG paid Patterson significantly less per year than male comparator Stephan Rabbitt, even though Patterson held a CPA certification and Rabbitt did not.
O’Donnell was employed by KMPG at one of its international offices and at its Atlanta, Georgia office, where she was a Senior Associate in the Advisory function. O’Donnell was demoted upon her transfer to Atlanta, even though transferred male employees were not demoted. O’Donnell performed Manager-level tasks, but was never officially promoted. KPMG paid O’Donnell approximately $20,000 less per year than male comparator Krupal Mehta.
Vasudeva was employed by KPMG in its Mountain View, California office as an Advisory Associate and Senior Associate for approximately five years. KPMG paid Vasudeva significantly less than male comparators Ryan Wood-Taylor and Bryan Dillon.
Plaintiffs’ preliminary expert analysis shows that nationwide pay disparities at KPMG attributable to gender are statistically significant at more than eleven standard deviations, meaning that the probability that KPMG’s compensation could be gender neutral is less than one in one hundred million. This analysis shows that, controlling for gender-neutral variables, KPMG paid female employees in the Tax and Advisory practice groups, from 2008 through 2013, approximately 3% less than their male counterparts for doing equivalent work.
ii. Motion to Dismiss The facts are taken from the parties’ submissions in connection with Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and, as required on this motion, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
5

a. Kassman The Third Amended Complaint lists reinstatement in its Prayer for Relief. However, during her deposition on November 4, 2013, in response to the question: “But you’re not seeking to be reinstated; are you?” Kassman responded, “No.” During this same deposition, Kassman also testified that she “did want to stay at KPMG,” but could not do so due to the discriminatory environment. She testified that in order to stay at KPMG, she was willing to “move offices,” “take[] a pay cut,” “take[] a different title” or be “in some kind of support role,” provided she would no longer be working with the people being abusive towards her. Additionally, she testified that leaving KPMG “wasn’t [her] choice, it was KPMG’s choice.” Two weeks later, via interrogatory, Kassman stated that “should the discriminatory conditions be satisfactorily remedied[,] . . . reinstatement to the proper role Plaintiff would have held absent discrimination would be appropriate.” In her declaration submitted with the instant motion, Kassman declares that she is seeking reinstatement at KPMG, provided the discrimination she faced there would be abolished, and that when she answered “no” at her deposition it was because she “could not imagine going back to the same KPMG [she] left in 2010 and going back through the same discrimination and torment once again.”
b. Patterson Patterson worked at KPMG as an Associate in the Federal Tax and Executive Services (“IES”) service lines. In her positions in both Federal Tax and IES, Patterson prepared tax returns. Through her work, Patterson was knowledgeable about the rules for filing tax returns, including the rules for declaring a dependent.
6

In June 2009, Patterson’s significant other, Jacneil Baker, who is not related to her, moved in with her. Patterson listed Baker as her dependent nephew on her personal tax returns in 2009, 2010 and 2011. Patterson represented in these returns that Baker did not have any income during the years at issue, which was untrue. Patterson later filed amended returns to correct these misrepresentations. She attests to having made no similar errors or misrepresentations in her work at KPMG.
KPMG has a “Code of Conduct” that requires all of its employees, among other things, to “comply[] with all applicable laws and regulations.” The “Code of Conduct” also states that any employee “may be subject to discipline, up to and including termination of employment” for, among other things, “violating laws, regulations, or KPMG policies.” KPMG also has an “Involuntary Termination of Employment” policy, which states in relevant part that “KPMG reserves the right to terminate an individual’s employment with the firm . . . due to . . . misconduct.” Included in the listed examples of “misconduct” are “[v]iolation of any firm policy, rule, or code of conduct” and “[i]mmoral or indecent conduct, as well as conduct that results or could potentially result in embarrassment or other damage to the reputation and/or goodwill of the firm.”
The National Managing Partner of KPMG’s Tax division, Laura Newinski, testified that KPMG’s “Code of Conduct” does not require termination for an employee who violates the law. However, Newinski also testified that according to the facts of Patterson’s situation, she does “not believe there’s any room for interpretation that termination and non-rehiring is the conclusion” and that she would be the one at KPMG to make that determination.
Newinski further testified that she knew of only two instances, besides Patterson’s, in which current or prospective KPMG tax employees engaged in untruthful conduct in connection
7

with their personal tax returns, and in both instances, the employees’ employment or employment offer was terminated.
II. Standard of Review A. Motion for Conditional Certification
“As part of the FLSA, the EPA utilizes the FLSA’s enforcement mechanisms and employs its definitional provisions.” Anderson v. State Univ., 169 F.3d 117, 119 (2d Cir. 1999), vacated on other grounds, 528 U.S. 1111 (2000). Section 216(b) of the FLSA provides that an action “may be maintained against any employer . . . in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). “Neither the FLSA nor its implementing regulations define the term ‘similarly situated.’” Cunningham v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 754 F. Supp. 2d 638, 643 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Certification” under the FLSA is simply “the district court’s exercise of the discretionary power . . . to facilitate the sending of notice to potential class members.” Myers v. Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537, 555 n. 10 (2d Cir. 2010). Although the Second Circuit has never offered a definitive standard for the certification of collective actions under the FLSA, it has endorsed the two-step approach widely used by the district courts in this Circuit and by other circuit courts. See id. at 554-55 (“[T]he district courts of this Circuit appear to have coalesced around a two-step method, a method which . . . we think is sensible”); see also Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1260-62 (11th Cir. 2008); Sandoz v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 553 F.3d 913, 915 n.2 (5th Cir. 2008); Comer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 454 F.3d 544, 546-47 (6th Cir. 2006).
“The first step involves the court making an initial determination to send notice to potential opt-in plaintiffs who may be ‘similarly situated’ to the named plaintiffs with respect to
8

whether a FLSA violation has occurred.” Myers, 624 F.3d at 555. To establish that the named plaintiffs are “similarly situated” to the potential opt-in plaintiffs in the first stage of the inquiry, the named plaintiffs must “make a ‘modest factual showing’ that they and potential opt-in plaintiffs ‘together were victims of a common policy or plan that violated the law.’” Id. (quoting Hoffmann v. Sbarro, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 249, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
“The modest factual showing cannot be satisfied simply by unsupported assertions, but it should remain a low standard of proof because the purpose of this first stage is merely to determine whether similarly situated plaintiffs do in fact exist . . . .” Id. (internal citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Lynch v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 491 F. Supp. 2d 357, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (describing plaintiff’s burden as “very low” and “minimal”). At this procedural stage, “the court does not resolve factual disputes, decide substantive issues going to the ultimate merits, or make credibility determinations.” Cunningham, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 644 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Once a court is satisfied that the first-stage inquiry has been satisfied, it conditionally certifies the class and orders notice to putative class members, who are given the opportunity to opt in.” Id. The second step, typically taken upon the completion of discovery, requires the court to determine, “on a fuller record, . . . whether a so-called ‘collective action’ may go forward by determining whether the plaintiffs who have opted in are in fact ‘similarly situated’ to the named plaintiffs.” Myers, 624 F.3d at 555. “The action may be ‘de-certified’ if the record reveals that they are not . . . .” Id.
B. Motion to Dismiss “A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Makarova v.
9

United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). “A plaintiff asserting subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it exists.” Id. “[T]he court must take all facts alleged in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, . . . but jurisdiction must be shown affirmatively, and that showing is not made by drawing from the pleadings inferences favorable to the party asserting it.” Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (first alteration in original).
“[W]here jurisdictional facts are placed in dispute, the court has the power and obligation to decide issues of fact by reference to evidence outside the pleadings[.]” LeBlanc v. Cleveland, 198 F.3d 353, 356 (2d Cir. 1999). However, where the disputed facts determining jurisdiction are “intertwined with the merits . . . the trial court should employ the standard applicable to a motion for summary judgment.” London v. Polishook, 189 F.3d 196, 198 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he district court should dismiss such a claim for lack of jurisdiction only if there are no triable issues of fact.” Id. at 198-99.
III. Discussion A. Motion for Conditional Certification
Plaintiffs move for conditional certification of a collective action for their claims brought pursuant to the EPA and to authorize notice to be sent to potential members of the collective. This motion is granted. Plaintiffs have made a “modest factual showing” that they and the potential opt-in plaintiffs are “similarly situated” and “together were victims of a common policy or plan that violated the law.”
Specifically, Plaintiffs have submitted declarations detailing their personal experiences; documentary evidence of KPMG’s firm-wide compensation policies and job descriptions; and
10

statistical evidence of discrimination.2 This is sufficient to satisfy Plaintiffs’ burden at this stage of litigation. See Moore v. Publicis Groupe SA, No. 11 Civ. 1279, 2012 WL 2574742, at *10-11 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2012) (granting a motion to conditionally certify a nationwide collective where the plaintiffs submitted evidence of centralized corporate policies regarding compensation and job responsibilities, as well as statistical evidence of unequal pay based on gender).
Defendant argues that the named Plaintiffs are not proper representatives of the collective because their own EPA claims are deficient. At the conditional certification stage, when discovery is incomplete, however, “a court should not weigh the merits of the underlying claims in determining whether potential opt-in plaintiffs may be similarly situated.” Cunningham, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 644 (internal quotation marks omitted). “The focus of [the] inquiry [during a motion for conditional certification] . . . is not on whether there has been an actual violation of law but rather on whether the proposed plaintiffs are ‘similarly situated’ . . . with respect to their allegations that the law has been violated.” Young v. Cooper Cameron Corp., 229 F.R.D. 50, 54 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
Next, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have not shown that they are “similarly situated” to the proposed collective because the named Plaintiffs’ experience is too limited in relation to the proposed collective in terms of geography and job function. This is incorrect. As discussed above, courts require only that plaintiffs make a “modest factual showing” that they and potential
2 Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ expert analysis is facially deficient and should be disregarded because it fails to control for certain variables. However, “defendant’s attacks on plaintiffs’ . . . evidence are premature at the notice stage.” In re Penthouse Exec. Club Compensation Litig., No. 10 Civ. 1145, 2010 WL 4340255, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A]rguments about credibility or the weight of the evidence . . . are out of place in a conditional certification motion.” Spencer v. No Parking Today, Inc., No. 12 Civ. 6323, 2013 WL 1040052, at *5 n. 16 (S.D.N.Y. March 15, 2013) (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
11

collective action members “were victims of a common policy or plan that violated the law.” Myers, 624 F.3d at 555 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Courts have found employees ‘similarly situated’ for purposes of the FLSA where they performed different job functions or worked at different locations, as long as they were subject to the same allegedly unlawful policies.” Diaz v. S & H Bondi's Dept. Store, No. 10 Civ. 7676, 2012 WL 137460, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2012).
Conditional certification does not require named plaintiffs from each geographical area included in the collective. See, e.g., id.at *6 (holding that courts may authorize notice to employees at locations where named plaintiffs never worked if named plaintiffs alleged that the same pay policies applied to all of defendants’ locations); Pendlebury v. Starbucks Coffee Co., No. 04-CV-80521, 2005 WL 84500, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 3, 2005) (certifying nationwide collective with two named plaintiffs from Florida); Leuthold v. Destination America, Inc., 224 F.R.D. 462, 465 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (certifying nationwide collective with three named plaintiffs from California).
“[I]t is not necessary for the purposes of conditional certification that the prospective class members all performed the same duties as the named plaintiffs.” Diaz, 2012 WL 137460, at *5 n.6 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Plaintiff need not show that his position is or was identical to the putative class members’ positions; a class may be certified under the FLSA if the named plaintiff can show that his position was or is similar to those of the absent class members.” Sanchez v. Sephora USA, Inc., No. 11–03396, 2012 WL 2945753, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (rejecting defendant’s argument that conditional certification is inappropriate on the grounds that the potential plaintiffs’ duties varied from store to store).
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Furthermore, courts “routinely grant conditional certification of multiple-job-title classes. . . .” Cunningham, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 651 (internal quotation marks omitted) (finding that “employees in a given job progression are similarly situated to each other”). The “similarly situated” requirement does not mean that plaintiffs must show that all members of the collective have “perfectly identical” job duties; “rather, plaintiffs need only show that they are similar.” Pippins v. KPMG LLP, No. 11 Civ. 0377, 2012 WL 19379, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2012).
Ultimately, the “proper inquiry” during conditional certification is whether the named plaintiffs and the other potential members of the proposed collective “are similarly situated with respect to their allegations that the law has been violated.” Diaz, 2012 WL 137460, at *5 (internal quotations omitted); see also Myers, 624 F.3d at 555. Other “factual variances that may exist between the plaintiff and the putative class do not defeat conditional class certification.” Lynch, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 369; see also Iglesias-Mendoza v. La Belle Farm, Inc., 239 F.R.D. 363, 369 (S.D.N.Y.2007). “Such variances are more appropriately analyzed during the second— decertification—stage.” Pippins, 2012 WL 19379, at *5; see also Cunningham, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 651; Sanchez, 2012 WL 2945753, at *4.
Finally, Defendant argues that the proposed collective is not part of the same “establishment,” as is required by the EPA, because its members are not limited to employees at one physically distinct place of business. This argument fails.
The EPA prohibits an employer from paying wages “at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 206 (d)(1). The term “establishment” in this context “refers to a distinct physical place of business rather than to an entire business or ‘enterprise’ which may include several separate places of business.” 29 C.F.R. § 1620.9(a). However, “unusual circumstances may call for two
13

or more distinct physical portions of a business enterprise being treated as a single establishment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1620.9(b). “For example, a central administrative unit may hire all employees, set wages, and assign the location of employment; employees may frequently interchange work locations; and daily duties may be virtually identical and performed under similar working conditions.” Id.
Courts identify “a widely followed standard recognizing that central control and administration of disparate job sites can support a finding of a single establishment for purposes of the EPA.” Mulhall v. Advance Sec., Inc., 19 F.3d 586, 591 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing Brennan v. Goose Creek Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 519 F.2d 53, 57 (5th Cir. 1975)). “The hallmarks of this standard are centralized control of job descriptions, salary administration, and job assignments or functions.” Id. (holding that “[a] reasonable trier of fact could infer that because of centralized control . . . a single establishment exist[ed] for purposes of the EPA”). Courts reason that “narrow construction of the word ‘establishment’ could make proof of discrimination more difficult, thus frustrating congressional intent.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence that KPMG’s offices nationwide may be considered one establishment for the purposes of conditional certification under the EPA. Specifically, Plaintiffs have presented evidence that job responsibilities were generally the same across offices, compensation policies were firm-wide and ultimate compensation decisions were made by centralized leadership. Moreover, “there is limited authority that district courts must engage in the establishment analysis when considering the [conditional] certification of a collective action under the EPA.” Moore, 2012 WL 2574742, at *11 (citing cases in which the court conditionally certified EPA collectives including employees from geographically diverse offices without discussing the establishment issue).
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In sum, Defendant’s arguments are more suited to a later, more demanding stage of the proceedings, such as a motion to decertify or for summary judgment. The “modest factual showing” required for conditional certification requires “a low standard of proof.” Myers v. Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d at 555. Accordingly, “[a]t this stage, Plaintiffs’ assertions are sufficient, but remain vulnerable during a motion for de-certification.” Moore, 2012 WL 2574742, at *11.
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Conditional Certification is granted. Notice shall be issued to all female employees of KPMG who held any of the following positions – Associate, Senior Associate, Manager, Senior Manager/Director and/or Managing Director – in either the Tax or Advisory practice groups from October 17, 2008, to the present. Those who held any of the relevant positions from October 30, 2010, to the present may opt-in to the collective action, pursuant to the EPA’s statute of limitations. See 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). Additionally, those who held any of the relevant positions from October 17, 2008, through October 30, 2010, may move the Court for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations, pursuant to the Court’s previous ruling.
The notices shall include language explaining that it is illegal for employers to retaliate against employees for exercising their federally-protected rights. Because of the large number of potential opt-in plaintiffs and the need for certain of those plaintiffs to move the Court regarding tolling the statute of limitations, the opt-in period shall be 120 days. Potential plaintiffs may submit their opt-in by email, fax or regular mail. Plaintiffs have attached to their reply brief drafts of proposed notices. These drafts will be discussed at the upcoming status conference.
B. Motion to Dismiss Kassman and Patterson are the only Plaintiffs asserting Rule 23 class claims in the Third Amended Complaint. Defendant moves to dismiss their Rule 23 class claims for lack of subject
15

matter jurisdiction. This motion is denied as to Kassman, but granted as to Patterson. Plaintiffs previously stated that they would seek Rule 23(b)(2) or “hybrid” Rule 23(b)(2)
and 23(b)(3) certification, both of which require that Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief. Rule 23(b)(2) certification is appropriate where “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2).
Defendant previously argued, relying on Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, that Plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue relief under Rule 23(b)(2) because they were no longer employed by KPMG. Judge Furman’s Opinion held that Kassman’s and Patterson’s statuses as former employees did not preclude them from having standing to seek injunctive and declaratory relief because Plaintiffs sought reinstatement at KPMG. See Kassman, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 468. Defendant now argues that even under the holding of Judge Furman’s Opinion, Kassman’s and Patterson’s Rule 23 class claims must be dismissed in light of admissions made during their respective depositions demonstrating that Kassman is not seeking reinstatement and Patterson is ineligible for reinstatement.
Defendant characterizes its instant motion as a challenge to Kassman’s and Patterson’s standing, but Defendant is actually making a mootness argument. “While the standing doctrine evaluates a litigant’s personal stake at the onset of a case . . . the mootness doctrine ensures that the litigant’s interest in the outcome continues throughout the life of the lawsuit.” Comer v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 775, 797-98 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Standing is “assessed as of the time the lawsuit is brought.” Id. at 787. On the other hand, “[a] case can become moot at any stage of litigation.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Conn., Inc. v. City of New Haven, 41 F.3d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 1994).
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In the instant case, Judge Furman’s Opinion has already determined that Kassman and Patterson had standing when the Third Amended Complaint was filed. See Kassman, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 468. Therefore, Defendant’s current challenge to the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over Kassman’s and Patterson’s Rule 23 claims will be evaluated on mootness grounds.
“[T]he party seeking to have the case dismissed bears the burden of demonstrating mootness and that burden ‘is a heavy one.’” Etuk v. Slattery, 936 F.2d 1433, 1441 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting County of L.A. v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979)); see also Associated Gen. Contractors of Conn., Inc., 41 F.3d at 65 (“[T]he burden on the party alleging mootness is a heavy one.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). A party establishes mootness only by showing that “it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.” Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017, 1023 (2013) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). “As long as the parties have a concrete interest, however small, in the outcome of the litigation, the case is not moot.” Id.
Thus, here, in order to demonstrate that Kassman’s and Patterson’s claims for injunctive relief are moot, Defendant must show, respectively, that at the time of class certification, it would be “impossible” for Kassman to be seeking reinstatement and it would be “impossible” for Patterson to be eligible for rehire. Defendant has not met this burden as to Kassman, but has met this burden as to Patterson.
i. Kassman Defendant argues that Kassman’s answer of “no” when asked at her deposition whether she was seeking reinstatement establishes as a matter of law that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Kassman’s Rule 23 claims. This argument fails.
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Kassman’s deposition testimony must be construed in the light most favorable to Kassman, the nonmoving party, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in her favor. Kassman could have reasonably understood the question as asking whether she was seeking reinstatement at that time, under the current conditions at KPMG, and her response could reasonably be interpreted to mean that she was not seeking reinstatement in that narrow circumstance.
Kassman’s deposition as a whole makes clear that she wanted to remain at KPMG, but could not do so due to the discrimination she faced there and the fact that the company would not accommodate her with a new assignment away from the discriminatory environment. The deposition testimony shows that Kassman was so committed to continuing her career at KPMG that she was even willing to take a pay cut or a demotion in order to remain with the firm provided that she would not be working with the people who were discriminating against her. Furthermore, both Kassman’s interrogatory response and declaration make it clear that, if the discriminatory conditions at KPMG were to change, then she would want to be reinstated. This is consistent with her deposition.
Defendant argues that this subsequent evidence should be disregarded as “sham testimony,” citing Perma Research & Dev. Co. v. Singer Co., 410 F.2d 572, 578 (2d Cir. 1969), which observed that “[i]f a party who has been examined at length on deposition could raise an issue of fact simply by submitting an affidavit contradicting his own prior testimony, this would greatly diminish the utility of summary judgment as a procedure for screening out sham issues of fact.” However, the Perma Research “principle does not apply if the deposition and the later sworn statement are not actually contradictory.” Palazzo ex rel. Delmage v. Corio, 232 F.3d 38,
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43 (2d Cir. 2000). “Thus, it does not apply where the later sworn assertion addresses an issue that was not, or was not thoroughly or clearly, explored in the deposition.” Id.
A court “should not disregard the [post-deposition] testimony because of an earlier account that was ambiguous, confusing, or simply incomplete.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). Similarly, a court should consider “subsequent sworn testimony that amplifies or explains, but does not merely contradict . . . prior testimony.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806 (1999) (holding that subsequent testimony could defeat summary judgment if a reasonable juror could conclude that, “assuming the truth of, or the plaintiff’s good-faith belief in, the earlier statement, the plaintiff could nonetheless” be telling the truth in her later statement).
In the present case, the declaration at issue does not definitively contradict the prior deposition. Instead, the declaration works to clarify and explain the deposition on an issue that was not thoroughly explored at the deposition and on which Kassman’s answer was incomplete. In other words, assuming good faith on Kassman’s part when she answered “no” at her deposition, she still could be telling the truth in her declaration. As Kassman explained, when she answered “no,” it was because she “could not imagine going back to the same KPMG [she] left in 2010 and going back through the same discrimination and torment once again,” not because she would not want to return to KPMG under any circumstances.
Thus, Kassman’s declaration will not be disregarded. Consequently, Defendant has not met its burden of establishing that it would be impossible for the Court to order injunctive relief to Kassman. Defendant’s motion to dismiss Kassman’s Rule 23 class claims is denied.
ii. Patterson Patterson’s admissions at her deposition that she lied on her personal tax returns make her
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ineligible for reinstatement and thus establish as a matter of law that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Patterson’s Rule 23 claims.
Reinstatement is not an appropriate remedy for a plaintiff whom “the employer would have terminated, and will terminate, in any event and upon lawful grounds.” McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 362 (1995). “Where an employer seeks to rely upon after-acquired evidence of wrongdoing, it must first establish that the wrongdoing was of such severity that the employee in fact would have been terminated on those grounds alone if the employer had known of it at the time of the discharge.” Id. at 362-63. Here, Defendant has so established.
The evidence is undisputed that Patterson lied on her tax returns. KPMG’s policies state that an individual’s employment may be terminated for violating the law and for conduct that could result in embarrassment or other damage to the reputation of the firm. Plaintiffs argue that these policies leave room for interpretation on a case by case basis; however, Newinski, who makes decisions of this type for KPMG, testified that there is no room for interpretation in Patterson’s case, as termination without the possibility of rehiring would be the only possible outcome for Patterson.
Plaintiffs argue that Newinski’s opinion on this matter was given during the course of litigation and cannot be relied on as unbiased. However, Newinski’s statement is credible as a matter of common sense, and is corroborated by two prior instances in which KPMG found that an employee and a potential employee had lied to the IRS. KPMG terminated the employee and revoked the offer to hire the potential employee.
Accordingly, there is no genuine issue of material fact that Patterson, who was employed as a Tax Associate, would have been fired when KPMG learned that she had lied on her own tax
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returns. See Wallace v. Dunn Const. Co., 62 F.3d 374, 380 (11th Cir. 1995) (finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact that plaintiff would have been fired when the employer learned that she had lied on her job application about her prior conviction where company policy stated that “falsification of records is conduct for which the company will impose a penalty that may include termination[]” and the company testified that it would have fired the plaintiff upon learning of her lie).
A reasonable jury would not order Patterson to be reinstated as a tax professional knowing that she had lied on her tax returns. Defendant therefore has met its burden of establishing that it would be impossible for the Court to order injunctive relief to Patterson. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Patterson’s Class 23 claims is granted.
IV. Conclusion For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Certify is GRANTED, and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the motions at docket numbers 109 and 144. SO ORDERED. Dated: July 8, 2014 New York, New York
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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

-------------------------------------------------------------- X

:

DONNA KASSMAN, et al.,

:

Plaintiffs, :

:

-against-

:

:

KPMG LLP,

:

Defendant. :

:

-------------------------------------------------------------- X

USDC SDNY DOCUMENT ELECTRONICALLY FILED DOC #: DATE FILED: 09/04/2015
11 Civ. 03743 (LGS)
OPINION AND ORDER

LORNA G. SCHOFIELD, District Judge:

Plaintiffs Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter and Ashwini Vasudeva

(collectively, “Plaintiffs” or “Named Plaintiffs”) bring this action against Defendant KPMG LLP

(“KPMG”) alleging that KPMG paid female client service professionals in its Tax and Advisory

Functions less than their male counterparts in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act as

amended by the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”), and alleging other claims not relevant to this motion.

Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Equitable Tolling of the Statute of Limitations for

Collective Action Members’ Claims under the EPA. For the following reasons, Plaintiffs’

motion is granted in part.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are those relevant to this motion and are taken from the docket in this

case and the parties’ submissions in connection with this motion.

Plaintiff Donna Kassman filed this action on June 2, 2011, and four days later filed her

First Amended Complaint. Judge Richard J. Holwell was assigned to preside. In September

2011, Kassman moved to file a Second Amended Complaint, adding Plaintiffs Patterson, Potter

and Vasudeva and a fourth person who is no longer a party. Defendant filed its opposition on

October 17, 2011 -- the date from which Plaintiffs seek to have the statute of limitations tolled --

and the motion was fully briefed on November 3, 2011. Before deciding the motion, Judge Holwell granted Plaintiffs leave to file a Third Amended Complaint.
In February 2012, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint, which was fully briefed on March 16, 2012. In April 2012, Judge Jesse M. Furman was assigned to preside over this matter, replacing Judge Holwell, who had resigned from the bench. On February 7, 2013, Judge Furman granted in part and denied in part Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
In March 2013, Defendant answered the Third Amended Complaint, and this case was reassigned to me. In April 2013, the parties were ordered to conduct and complete electronic discovery, and a briefing schedule was set for Plaintiffs’ equitable tolling motion, with the final brief to be filed on June 10, 2013. In May 2013, a protective order and an electronic discovery protocol order were signed.
A conference was held on August 1, 2013, to discuss the progress of discovery, the equitable tolling motion, and Plaintiffs’ anticipated motion for conditional certification of a collective under FLSA. Plaintiffs explained that, in order to prepare a “properly tailored motion for conditional certification,” they needed Defendant to produce certain class data, which Defendant had resisted producing. The Court set a schedule for Defendant to produce the necessary information, and then for the parties to brief Plaintiffs’ conditional certification motion. Since the equitable tolling motion would apply only to opt-in plaintiffs in the event the conditional certification motion was granted, the Court denied equitable tolling without prejudice to renewal by any future opt-in plaintiffs after the disposition of the conditional certification motion. The relevant period for purposes of discovery and any notice were to be determined as if
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the tolling motion had been granted. Defendant completed its production of information on October 29, 2013, and Plaintiffs moved for conditional certification and authorization of notice two days later. Plaintiffs’ conditional certification motion was fully briefed on December 16, 2013.
Before a ruling on conditional certification could be issued, in January 2014, Defendant expressed its intent to file a second motion to dismiss. The Court informed the parties that it would adjudicate the conditional certification motion and the motion to dismiss simultaneously. Defendant’s second motion to dismiss was fully briefed on February 24, 2014.
By opinion and order dated July 8, 2014 (the “July 8 Opinion”), conditional certification of a collective action was granted for Plaintiffs’ EPA claims. The July 8 Opinion also authorized notice to be sent to “all female employees of KPMG who held any of the following positions -Associate, Senior Associate, Manager, Senior Manager/Director and/or Managing Director -- in either the Tax or Advisory practice groups from October 17, 2008, to the present.” The opinion stated that (1) individuals “who held any of the relevant positions from October 30, 2010” -- three years prior to the filing of the conditional certification motion -- “to the present may opt-in to the collective action, pursuant to the EPA’s statute of limitations,” and (2) individuals “who held any of the relevant positions from October 17, 2008” -- three years before Defendant’s opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Amend -- “through October 30, 2010, may move the Court for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.” The July 8 Opinion also resolved Defendant’s second Motion to Dismiss, which did not affect Plaintiffs’ EPA claims.
Plaintiffs represented that on October 3, 2014, notice was sent to 8,966 women who were employed in the relevant positions “for at least one day on or after October 17, 2008.” The opt-in
3

period was originally 120 days, ending on January 31, 2015, but was extended to April 1, 2015, to enable the acceptance of 25 late consent forms from putative plaintiffs as follows: 5 whose claims are not barred, 9 whose claims are partially barred and 11 whose claims are entirely barred by the statute of limitations absent any tolling. The results of the notice, by Defendant’s calculation, were approximately as follows:
 In total, 1,292 women opted into the collective action (collectively, “Opt-In Plaintiffs”);  The number whose EPA claims are entirely dependent on equitable tolling is 519;  The number whose EPA claims are partially dependent on equitable tolling is 543; and  The number whose EPA claims are unaffected by equitable tolling is 230. Plaintiffs’ calculation is not materially different. DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs seek to toll the statute of limitations for opt-in plaintiffs as of October 17, 2011, under the doctrine of equitable tolling. In other words, they ask that the claims and consent forms of opt-in plaintiffs be deemed filed as of that date. October 17, 2011, is when Defendant filed its opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion to file the Second Amended Complaint. For the following reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion is granted in part. I. APPLICABLE LAW
A. Statute of Limitations for EPA Collective Actions The EPA is a part of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and prohibits gender discrimination in the payment of wages for equal work. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). The FLSA permits an employee to bring a collective action against an employer for a violation of the EPA “for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated.” 29 U.S.C. §
4

216(b). To join a FLSA collective action, an employee must file with the court her written consent to become a party. 29 U.S.C. 216(b). Thus, employees must “opt in” to a FLSA collective action in order to be bound and benefit from its judgment, in contrast to members of a Rule 23 class action, who are bound unless they “opt out.” Myers v. Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537, 542 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 368 (2011).
Most courts in this Circuit follow a two-step approach in FLSA collective actions. First, and typically before extensive discovery, the named plaintiffs move for conditional certification of the collective. If the motion is granted, plaintiffs provide court-supervised notice to other potential plaintiffs who appear to be similarly situated to the plaintiffs, and invite them to join the collective action by filing a written consent. After discovery, courts make a determination on a full record whether the opt-in plaintiffs are in fact similarly situated. See id. at 554-55 (“[D]istrict courts of this Circuit appear to have coalesced around a two-step method . . . we think is sensible.”); Jenkins v. TJX Companies Inc., 853 F. Supp. 2d 317, 320-21 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); Cohen v. Gerson Lehrman Group, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 2d 317, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). Although FLSA does not mandate notice to potential opt-in plaintiffs, providing them notice of their right to join the action “comports with the broad remedial purpose of the [FLSA] , . . . as well as with the interest of the courts in avoiding multiplicity of suits.” Braunstein v. E. Photographic Labs., Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir. 1978).
In a FLSA collective action, the statute of limitations continues to run until an employee files her consent to be a plaintiff. 29 U.S.C. § 256. The limitations period for a violation of FLSA is ordinarily two years, but for willful violations it is extended to three years. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). “[B]ack pay awards for Equal Pay Act violations are typically limited to damages
5

sustained within [the limitations] period.” Pollis v. New Sch. for Soc. Research, 132 F.3d 115, 118 (2d Cir. 1997).
B. Equitable Tolling Notwithstanding the EPA’s timeliness requirements, district courts have the discretion to apply equitable tolling to the EPA’s statute of limitations “as necessary to avoid inequitable circumstances.” Iavorski v. I.N.S., 232 F.3d 124, 129 (2d Cir. 2000); accord Alli-Balogun v. United States, 281 F.3d 362, 367-68 (2d Cir. 2002) (“We review the district court’s ruling on equitable tolling for abuse of discretion.”). Equitable tolling “is read into every federal statute of limitation.” Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962, 1975 (2014) (quoting Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946)). “Equitable tolling applies as a matter of fairness where a party has been prevented in some extraordinary way from exercising his rights.” Iavorski, 232 F.3d at 129 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). The Second Circuit seems not to have addressed equitable tolling in a FLSA collective action, but the general principles are well established. The putative plaintiff has the burden of showing that equitable tolling is appropriate. Boos v. Runyon, 201 F.3d 178, 185 (2d Cir. 2000). To determine whether to apply the principle of equitable tolling, the district court must consider whether the plaintiff (1) “has proved that the circumstances are so extraordinary that the doctrine should apply” and (2) “has acted with reasonable diligence during the time period she seeks to have tolled.” Zerilli-Edelglasss v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 333 F.3d 74, 80-81 (2d Cir. 2003); accord Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). The first test, which requires extraordinary circumstances, stems from the fact that equitable tolling undermines to some extent the interests served by statutes of limitations. “Because statutes of limitations protect important
6

social interests in certainty, accuracy, and repose . . . equitable tolling is considered a drastic remedy applicable only in rare and exceptional circumstances.” A.Q.C. ex rel. Castillo v. United States, 656 F.3d 135, 144 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks, citations and alterations omitted). The second test, which requires reasonable diligence, limits this equitable remedy to litigants who have not contributed to the delay that, without equitable tolling, would bar their claims.
1. Extraordinary Circumstances Plaintiffs have shown that extraordinary circumstances caused the passage of almost four years between June 2, 2011, when this action was commenced and April 1, 2015, the last date on which opt-in plaintiffs could join this action. This delay was caused by several factors, the most significant of which are attributable to the Court. This case was assigned to three separate judges between its filing and the approval of notice to opt-in plaintiffs. It was first assigned to Judge Holwell, who retired; then to Judge Furman; then to me. These circumstances are by no means part of the ordinary course of litigation and cannot be attributed to Plaintiffs. Accord, e.g., Gorey v. Manheim Servs. Corp., No. 10 Civ. 1132, 2010 WL 5866258, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2010) (applying equitable tolling where district judge’s resignation, inter alia, delayed adjudication of conditional certification motion). In addition, and perhaps exacerbated by the reassignment of judges, the Court spent an extraordinary amount of time considering motions -- including one motion for leave to file an amended complaint, two motions to dismiss, the first iteration of the equitable tolling motion and the conditional certification motion. Motions were pending for approximately 27 months of the
7

almost four-year delay between the filing of the case and the last date for putative plaintiffs to opt in. Significant delays attributable to the court may constitute “extraordinary circumstances.” See, e.g., Hart v. Crab Addison, No. 13 Civ. 6458, 2015 WL 365785, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2015) (holding that “equitable tolling may be appropriate when a significant delay in ruling on an FLSA motion for conditional certification is attributable to the Court and not the parties,” where “the delay . . . may adversely affect the rights of [collective] members who may have no notice of th[e] lawsuit”); Jackson v. Bloomberg, L.P., 298 F.R.D. 152, 170-71 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (equitable tolling as of date of filing of conditional certification motion which took seven months to decide); McGlone v. Contract Callers, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 2d 438, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (equitable tolling as of date of filing of conditional certification motion which took four months to decide); Yahraes v. Rest. Assocs. Events Corp., No. 10 Civ. 935, 2011 WL 844963, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2011) (equitable tolling as of the dates of service and refiling of conditional certification motion, where -- despite “no trickery or wrongdoing,” defendants’ actions “frustrated plaintiffs’ diligent attempts to ensure that claims did not expire”); Lee v. ABC Carpet & Home, 236 F.R.D. 193, 199-200 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (equitable tolling where “the Court directed Plaintiff after he had filed his Complaint to postpone any motions for collective or class action until after its decision regarding summary judgment”); see also Bergman v. Kindred Healthcare, Inc., 949 F. Supp. 2d 852, 860-61 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (collecting cases). Accordingly, the delays in this case were exceptional and in large part caused by the Court.
In its opposition briefing, Defendant argues that litigation delays are an unfortunate product of rising caseloads and should not be considered extraordinary. In support, however, Defendant cites from this Circuit that involved delays far shorter than the delay in this case. See,
8

e.g., Arena v. Plandome Taxi Inc., No. Civ. 12-1078, 2013 WL 1748451, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2013) (delay of 12 months between plaintiffs’ request for leave to file conditional certification motion and adjudication of equitable tolling motion); Gordon v. Kaleida Health, No. 08 Civ. 378, 2009 WL 3334784, at *12 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2009) (delay of 13 months between plaintiff’s motion for expedited notice and adjudication of equitable tolling motion); Hintergerger v. Catholic Health Sys., No. 08 Civ. 380, 2009 WL 3464134, at *13-14 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2009) (delay of 13 months between plaintiff’s motion for expedited notice and adjudication of equitable tolling motion); Amendola v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 558 F. Supp. 2d 459, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (adjudicating equitable tolling motion less than one year after commencement of action). Fortunately, the repeated reassignment of judges and exceptional delays in the present case cannot be viewed as part of the normal litigation process.
Defendant also argues that equitable tolling, as a “rare and exceptional” remedy, “must be strictly construed because Congress has already weighed the equities in setting limitations.” Defendant is correct that equitable tolling should not be routinely applied in FLSA collective actions. However, Defendant’s plea for the application of a “bright line” rule is misplaced. “[C]ourts do not apply [equitable tolling’s] requirements mechanistically,” and “‘the exercise of a court’s equity powers must be made on a case-by-case basis,’ mindful ‘that specific circumstances, often hard to predict in advance, could warrant special treatment in an appropriate case.’” Harper v. Ercole, 648 F.3d 132, 136 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 650 (2010)).
Accordingly, Plaintiffs have satisfied Zerilli-Edelglass’ “extraordinary circumstances” requirement.
9

2. Diligence
In addition to showing “extraordinary circumstances,” Plaintiffs have shown that they
exercised reasonable diligence during the time period they seek to have tolled. Their failure to
commence their own lawsuits or join this one prior to the time notice was given is not attributable
to lack of diligence.
Plaintiffs allege that they were paid less than their male counterparts for performing
substantially equivalent work. Plaintiffs could not readily discern these pay disparities that are
the basis of the EPA claims at the time of the payments. Plaintiffs submit as an example
testimony that a Senior Manager did not know how much her peers made or how much her
subordinates made because people did not talk about compensation. The difficulties of
uncovering the facts giving rise to pay disparity claims have been widely acknowledged. In her
dissent in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Justice Ginsburg described the “common
characteristics of pay discrimination”:
Pay disparities often occur, as they did in Ledbetter’s case, in small increments; cause to suspect that discrimination is at work develops only over time. Comparative pay information, moreover, is often hidden from the employee’s view. Employers may keep under wraps the pay differentials maintained among supervisors, no less the reasons for those differentials. Small initial discrepancies may not be seen as meet for a federal case, particularly when the employee, trying to succeed in a nontraditional environment, is averse to making waves.
550 U.S. 618, 645 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Marianne DelPo Kulow, Beyond the
Paycheck Fairness Act: Mandatory Wage Disclosure Laws-A Necessary Tool for Closing the
Residual Gender Wage Gap, 50 Harv. J. on Legis. 385, 434 (2013) (“[M]any women remain
unaware that they are victims of wage discrimination and/or lack access to salary data of a male
10

comparator in their organization -- necessary for an Equal Pay Act claim.”); Sarah Lyons, Note, Why the Law Should Intervene to Disrupt Pay-Secrecy Norms: Analyzing the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act Through the Lens of Social Norms, 46 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 361, 380 (2013) (“Traditional etiquette cautions against discussing salary with co-workers.”). Given these difficulties, Defendant’s assertion that “nothing prevents an individual from filing her own EPA claim, irrespective of any pending collective action” is incorrect. It was not for lack of diligence that the opt-in plaintiffs relied on court-ordered notice to alert them -- not only to the existence of this litigation -- but to the facts that are the basis for their claims.
Equitable tolling is proper “if despite all due diligence [plaintiff] is unable to obtain vital information bearing on the existence of his claim.” Valdez ex rel. Donely v. U.S., 518 F.3d 173, 182 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 451 (7th Cir. 1990)). Courts have applied a reasonable plaintiff test to assess opt-in plaintiffs’ knowledge of the facts giving rise to their claims -- “whether a reasonable plaintiff in the circumstances would have been aware of the existence of a cause of action, and despite all due diligence he was unable to obtain vital information bearing on the existence of his claim.” Lanzetta v. Florio’s Enters., Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 615, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see Veltri v. Building Serv. 32B-J Pension Fund, 393 F.3d 318, 323 (2d Cir. 2004) (“The relevant question is . . . whether a reasonable plaintiff in the circumstances would have been aware of the existence of a cause of action.”).
Defendant argues that an individual inquiry must be made of each of the over 1,000 opt-in plaintiffs who, without equitable tolling, have time barred claims. That argument is misplaced in this case. The record already shows that the delay here was caused by circumstances outside the
11

control of the opt-in plaintiffs, and was not caused by their lack of diligence. A further inquiry would be pointless.
As discussed above, extraordinary circumstances were largely responsible for the passage of several years before opt-in plaintiffs were provided notice. Those circumstances were the reassignment of this case to multiple judges, and the time required to adjudicate the many motions between the filing of the action and providing notice to potential opt-in plaintiffs. The delay also was caused by not so extraordinary circumstances outside the opt-in plaintiffs’ control -- namely Defendant’s vigorous opposition at every juncture, as well as Defendant’s resistance to providing information necessary for the class certification motion. Delays caused by a defendant may warrant equitable tolling, even without any evidence of bad faith. See Yahraes, 2011 WL 844963, at *2 (“attribut[ing] no trickery or wrongdoing on the part of defendants” but noting that “defendants’ actions -- re-briefing the certification motion, seeking to defer certification in anticipation of dispositive motions, and failing to produce documents . . . -- have frustrated plaintiffs’ diligent attempts to ensure that claims did not expire”). Defendants’ failure to provide necessary information also may warrant equitable tolling. See, e.g., Stransky v. HealthONE of Denver, Inc., 868 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1181-82 (D. Colo. 2012) (applying equitable tolling where early notice to opt-ins was not possible because defendant had “sole possession” of potential opt-ins’ contact information) (citing Gray v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 858 F.2d 610, 616 (10th Cir. 1988)); Myers v. Copper Cellar Corp., No. 95 Civ. 541, 1996 WL 766505, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 27, 1996) (applying equitable tolling from “the date of the filing of the original complaint and plaintiffs’ motion for notice to those similarly situated” where defendant delayed production of names of potential FLSA opt-ins).
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Equitable tolling requires a showing that the party seeking tolling was diligent. This requirement seeks to ensure that equitable relief is denied claimants whose own actions contributed to the delay that resulted in the filing of an untimely claim. A court may examine the cause of delay. If the delay in filing was caused by circumstances outside the control of the party seeking equitable tolling, then the court need not engage in an individual inquiry. See, e.g., Jackson, 298 F.R.D. at 171 (applying equitable tolling to all potentially time-barred collective members where “a piecemeal approach to equitable tolling . . . would waste judicial resources, further delay resolution of this action, and contravene the purposes of FLSA”); Sexton v. Franklin First Fin., Ltd., No. 08 Civ. 4950, 2009 WL 1706535, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. June 16, 2009) (rejecting defendants’ argument that equitable tolling analysis required individualized analysis for each optin plaintiff where tolling argument was based on defendants’ failure to post FLSA-required notices).
Here, the opt-in plaintiffs were unable to learn the facts necessary to bring a claim or even realize one might exist; they filed timely claims (except for the few who did not) and acted diligently to do so; and the cause of the delay was obviously outside their control. Under these circumstances, no good purpose is served by inquiring of each of them about their individual diligence. This sort of mechanistic and unthinking application of the law would be costly, cause further delay and would burden all concerned. No individual inquiry is warranted.
Plaintiffs have therefore satisfied Zerilli-Edelglass’ diligence requirement. B. Remaining Issues Equitable tolling is a discretionary doctrine that requires the Court to fashion relief that is most appropriate for the facts and circumstances of the particular case. See Valverde v. Stinson,
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224 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 2000) (as to length of tolling, “equitable tolling does not lend itself to bright-line rules” (quoting Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1999)); Carter v. Univ. of Connecticut, No. 04 Civ. 1625, 2006 WL 2130730, at *2 (D. Conn. July 28, 2006) (“Equitable tolling is a form of discretionary relief that can be awarded upon consideration of all the facts and circumstances.”), aff’d, 264 F. App’x 111 (2d Cir. 2008).
Plaintiffs request that the statute of limitations be tolled from October 17, 2011 -- the date on which Defendant opposed Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend -- “to cover claims running back to October of 2008.” The date for tolling is March 16, 2012 -- the date on which Defendant’s first motion to dismiss became fully briefed, as ordered by Judge Holwell. This date is appropriate as Judge Holwell’s resignation and the ensuing delay in adjudicating Defendant’s motion to dismiss are the first in a series of “extraordinary circumstances” that delayed the sending of notice. See Gorey, 2010 WL 5866258, at *5 (applying tolling as of date on which motion -- whose adjudication was delayed by resignation of presiding judge -- became fully briefed). Claims running back to March 16, 2009 -- assuming willfulness and a three-year statute of limitations -- would therefore be deemed timely.
Second, the statute of limitations is not tolled for the opt-in Plaintiffs who failed to file timely claims by January 31, 2015, the deadline stated in the notice.
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CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Equitable Tolling is GRANTED in part.
The statute of limitations is equitably tolled from March 16, 2012; claims running back to March 16, 2009, are therefore deemed timely.
The Clerk of Court is directed to close the motion at Docket No. 332. SO ORDERED. Dated: September 4, 2015 New York, New York
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 Case 1:11-cv-03743-LGS Document 548 Filed 05/13/16 Page 1 of 121

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

)

DONNA KASSMAN, SPARKLE

)

PATTERSON, JEANETTE POTTER,

)

ASHWINI VASUDEVA, TINA BUTLER,

)

CHERYL CHARITY, HEATHER

) FOURTH AMENDED CLASS

INMAN, NANCY JONES AND CAROL

) ACTION COMPLAINT

MURRAY, individually and on behalf of a

)

class of similarly-situated female

)

employees,

)

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

)

Plaintiffs,

)

Civ. No. 11-CV-3743 (RJH)

)

v.

)

)

KPMG LLP,

)

Defendant.

Plaintiffs Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva, Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones and Carol Murray (“Plaintiffs,” “Named Plaintiffs” or “Class Representatives”), by their attorneys Sanford Heisler Kimpel, LLP, bring this action against KPMG LLP (“KPMG” or the “Company”) in their individual capacities and on behalf of a class of female exempt Client Service and Support Professionals, including but not limited to female Associates, Senior Associates, Managers, Senior Managers/Directors and Managing Directors (collectively “Professionals”), to redress gender discrimination in employment. Plaintiffs allege upon knowledge as to themselves and their own acts, and otherwise upon information and belief, as follows:

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I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF CLASS-WIDE GENDER DISCRIMINATION AT KPMG
A. KPMG’s Glass Ceiling: Discriminatory Denial of Promotions
1. As one of the “Big Four” accounting firms, KPMG is part of an elite cadre of
accountancy and professional services firms that help set industry standards. But rather than use
its vast resources and status to stamp out gender discrimination, KPMG actively perpetuates it.
2. Women are conspicuously absent from KPMG’s leadership. Among the 20 members of KPMG’s global executive team, only one, or 5%, is female.1 Similarly, of the 24 members of the global board, only one, or 4%, is female.2
3. Although KPMG’s workforce is approximately 50% female, partnership is largely reserved for men.3 Less than one in five KPMG Partners is female.4 Managing Directors are
also predominately male. Even in lower-level management positions such as Manager and
Senior Manager, women only do marginally better, representing approximately one in three
managers. Nonetheless, across KPMG’s management ranks, the number of female managers
never approaches parity with their overall representation at the Company.
4. KPMG’s gender hierarchy is all the more jarring considering women have entered
the accounting industry in record numbers for decades. For the past twenty-five years, women have comprised more than half of all accounting graduates.5 In 2009, women made up 55% of newly hired accounting graduates and 61.8% of all accountants and auditors.6 But despite
constituting half of the workforce at accounting firms for decades, women are only 23% of all
1 KPMG International, KPMG International Annual Review 2010: Cutting Through Complexity (2011), at 55. 2 Id. at 56. 3 Catalyst, Women in Accounting (2010), at 1, available at http://www.catalyst.org/file/178/qt_women_in_accounting.pdf. 4 Id. 5 AICPA, AICPA Work/Life and Women’s Initiatives 2004 Research. A Decade of Changes in The Accounting Profession: Workforce Trends and Human Capital Practices (2006), at 5, available at http://www.awscpa.org/pdfs_and_docs/ResearchPaperDecadeofChange.pdf. 6 Catalyst, Women in Accounting, at 1.
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partners industry-wide and 18% at KPMG.7 5. At the Big Four – the crème de la crème of accounting firms – women fare even
worse than the industry average. Studies show that women are not “moving through the pipeline” as quickly at these larger, more elite firms compared to their smaller counterparts.8
6. KPMG is one of the worst offenders. The Company promotes fewer women to Partner (18%) than the industry average (23%).9 KPMG also promotes fewer women to Senior Manager (35%) positions than the industry average (44%).10 KPMG’s promotion rate falls below its competitors, even though KPMG has a similar number of female non-management employees (48%) as the industry (49%) to groom and mentor for leadership.
7. Rather than reward high-performing female employees with partnership, KPMG tracks a disproportionate number of these women into non-partnership roles as career managers at drastically lower compensation levels. Industry-wide, 60% of female Senior Managers and 36% of female Managers have followed lower paid non-partnership career tracks, compared to only 26% of male Senior Managers and 9% of male Managers.11
8. These figures make it clear that while male and female accountants may begin their careers on roughly equal footing, their paths sharply diverge as they ascend up the hierarchy, particularly at KPMG. Women in the accounting industry face a number of systemic barriers to promotion, including lack of visible role models and their exclusion from after-work activities and other informal networking opportunities, reflecting the gender bias of “old boys”
7 Id. 8 AICPA, AICPA Work/Life and Women’s Initiatives 2004 Research, at 5. 9 Catalyst, Women in Accounting, at 1. 10 Public Accounting Report, Public Accounting Report’s 2008 Survey of Women in Public Accounting – Percentage of Women by Staff Category (Dec. 15, 2008). 11 Catalyst, Women in Accounting, at 3.
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networks within these firms.12 9. As one accounting professional noted, as women come within reach of making
Partner, “[i]t becomes subtle who’s mentored, who’s invited out to the important dinners with the important clients [and] who’s groomed to participate in AICPA and state society committees. All of these are indicative of who is going to be promoted to Partner a year or two or three or four into the future.”13
10. At KPMG, the discrimination is not always so subtle. High-performing female managers are viewed as interlopers by their male Partners, as threats by their male peers, and as individuals unworthy of respect by their male subordinates. As soon as these women come within reach of partnership, they are suddenly – without warning or provocation – chastised and removed from the promotion track before they can infiltrate KPMG’s “good old boys” network. By contrast, male employees who “have an issue working with women” effortlessly ascend through the ranks at KPMG.
11. Plaintiff Donna Kassman was a casualty of this discriminatory system. After languishing in a Senior Manager position for a decade, during which she demonstrated stellar performance, Ms. Kassman was finally “put up” for a promotion to Managing Director. At this pivotal juncture, a troika of men – Scott Schapiro (“Principal Schapiro”), Principal in Charge of the National Employment Tax Practice and the person to whom Ms. Kassman reported; John Montgomery (“Senior Manager Montgomery”), another Senior Manager in Ms. Kassman’s practice; and Jon Stone (“Associate Stone”), an Associate who worked under Ms. Kassman and Senior Manager Montgomery – conspired to derail her career advancement. Principal Schapiro
12 Catalyst, Women of Color in Accounting (2008), at 31, available at http://www.catalyst.org/file/138/woc_accounting_final_book.pdf. 13 Liz Gold, “Women in Accounting: How far to the top?,” ACCOUNTING TODAY, available at http://www.accountingtoday.com/ato_issues/2007_18/25549-1.html (last visited May 19, 2011).
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abruptly removed Ms. Kassman from the promotion track based on unfounded, stereotypical complaints by the other two men about Ms. Kassman’s “tone” and “direct” approach – a complaint never before lodged against her during her 17-year tenure at KPMG. Unilaterally adopting the position of the male troika, the Company instead put up Senior Manager Montgomery for the position that had been slated for Ms. Kassman.
12. Like Ms. Kassman, Plaintiff Jeanette Potter earned exceptional reviews at KPMG, only to spend a decade stuck in a Senior Manager position. Principal Bruce McLaughlin (“Principal McLaughlin”) had only one criticism of Ms. Potter: she did not “schmooze” enough. In fact, Ms. Potter avoided the Company’s happy hours – one of the main venues for “schmoozing” – because they were known to be hostile to women; among other things, male Partners did “body shots” off of female employees. Because KPMG’s promotion decisions rely substantially on personal relationships built at Company social events that are unwelcoming to women, high-achieving female employees like Ms. Potter are frequently passed over for promotion in favor of their less qualified, but more well-connected, male counterparts.
13. Until 2010, KPMG utilized a 9-box rating system, ranging from EP-1 (exceptional) to NI-9 (needs improvement), for all of its professional staff, across the Company’s spectrum of job titles, practice areas, and offices. Each employee was evaluated “The KPMG Way” – a set of criteria which purported to measure behaviors and values but failed to provide a consistent or reliable measure of performance.
14. After the initial round of evaluations, the Partners in each group had discretion to change the ratings to ensure that the employees they had taken under their wing – most of whom were male – were ranked higher relative to their peers, and thus stood a greater chance of being promoted.
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15. Upon information and belief, female employees were disproportionately and discriminatorily downgraded and undervalued within KPMG’s performance review system, which is uniform throughout the Company. The Company’s new 5-point evaluation system, introduced last year, suffers from the same defects.
16. Upon information and belief, KPMG’s performance evaluation system’s insufficient standards, quality controls and implementation metrics, coupled with its lack of transparency and opportunities for redress, had a discriminatory and disparate impact on women and caretaking employees.
17. KPMG employees are promoted within a system that is insufficiently designed, articulated, explained or implemented to consistently, reliably or fairly develop and promote excellent employees. Promotions are not based upon true comparative performance as they lack transparency and sufficient quality controls in their design and implementation.
18. KPMG’s promotion procedures and practices reflect and codify the biases of the Company’s mostly male management and, naturally, have a disparate impact on the Company’s female employees. Even when ostensibly based on performance, Partners have discretion to promote those within the “good old boys” club based on factors such as friendship and social connections or to otherwise give undue weight to these or other improper factors. Participation in male-dominated social activities—such as golf outings and after-work happy hours (where body shots might be consumed off of female employees) are among criteria that may be considered for evaluation, compensation and advancement within KPMG.
19. KPMG was able to and systematically did derail the advancement of highperforming female Professionals who were viewed as a threat, who were wrongly cast as less committed to their careers, or who the Company wanted to push out for other discriminatory
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reasons. 20. The Company’s promotion practices consistently result in males being promoted
more rapidly and assigned more frequently to higher positions than women within and across levels Company-wide. Although KPMG has had knowledge of these stark gender disparities for decades, it has been deliberately indifferent towards them.
21. Countless women have progressed along KPMG’s standard career track with rave reviews, only to find their career ambitions shattered by KPMG’s glass ceiling.
B. “You Don’t Need the Money Because You Have a Nice Engagement Ring”: Pay Discrimination at KPMG
22. Upon information and belief, KPMG’s female Professionals are not only underpromoted, but underpaid as well.
23. Recent reports on the accounting industry have found that female Associates, Senior Associates, Managers and Senior Managers are systematically paid less than their male colleagues, with white male Senior Managers out-earning their female counterparts by $53,000 on average.14 This pay disparity is even greater at the Partner level.15
24. Far from disproving this industry-wide trend, KPMG actively perpetuates it. Because KPMG employs a compensation system that has insufficient quality standards, controls, and implementation metrics, and lacks transparency and opportunities for redress or challenge, its compensation practices have had a disparate impact on the Company’s female employees.
25. Upon information and belief, KPMG management systematically took advantage of the flaws in the system by paying female employees less than similarly situated male employees. This pattern and practice of discrimination stems, in part, from an antiquated
14 Catalyst, Women of Color in Accounting, at 50 (discussing survey results from top 20 revenue-generating U.S. accounting firms). 15 Id.
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adherence to the idea that if there is a husband who acts as a “breadwinner” in the home, then there is no need for a woman to work at all or to be compensated at the same level as a male employee.
26. For example, in an egregious act of discrimination, KPMG slashed Ms. Kassman’s base salary by $20,000 while she was on maternity leave because she was paid “too much.” KPMG cited no business justification for slashing her salary – and indeed, could not, as Ms. Kassman was a top-notch performer. When Ms. Kassman complained about the salary cut and wanted to discuss ways for her to earn back the $20,000 that was taken from her, her male supervising Partner asserted that she did not need the money because she “ha[d] a nice engagement ring.”
27. Like Ms. Kassman and many other female Professionals, Ms. Potter was told she was “paid too much,” even though her less experienced male counterparts earned more than her. Ms. Potter received no pay increases during her last four years of employment at KPMG, despite her consistently strong performance.
28. Moreover, KPMG’s compensation policies and practices regarding flexible workers have a disparate impact on the Company’s female employees. Employees who avail themselves of KPMG’s flexible work arrangements – the overwhelming majority of whom are working mothers and other women – are forced to accept reduced pay while still working fulltime schedules and being held to virtually full-time standards.
29. At KPMG, salary increases and bonuses are based largely on a performance evaluation system that is insufficiently designed, articulated, explained or implemented to consistently, reliably or fairly compensate strong-performing employees. Upon information and belief, KPMG’s discriminatory performance evaluation system has resulted in the under-
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payment of female Professionals at all levels throughout the Company. 30. In addition, the compensation system as a whole lacks the adequate quality
standards and controls and implementation metrics to consistently or reliably result in compensation decisions that correlate with an employee’s overall quality or contributions to the Company. The lack of transparency and sufficient opportunities or systems for redress result in women being systematically undercompensated.
C. The “Scarlet F”: Pregnancy/Caregiver Discrimination at KPMG 31. In addition to the systematic discrimination faced by female Professionals at KPMG, female employees with children also face discrimination based on their status as caregivers and/or pregnant women. 32. KPMG promotes a corporate culture whereby female employees are made to feel they cannot have successful careers after they have children. Indeed, at least one Partner explicitly suggested that women should go on part-time schedules or move away from his practice group when they become mothers. Another Partner has stated that he believes pregnant women are incapable of doing their jobs and that he did not see how a working mother could “tend to a child and work at KPMG at the same time.” 33. Ms. Kassman hoped to be the one to prove them wrong. As a female manager with an impressive seventeen-year career at KPMG and two children under the age of seven, Ms. Kassman set out to demonstrate that one could be both a good mother and a successful manager at the Company. Indeed, KPMG and Ms. Kassman’s supervisors publicly touted her as a role model for other working mothers. 34. However, Ms. Kassman quickly discovered that KPMG’s purported support for female employees and working mothers was just a sham. After she gave birth to her first child in
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2003, Ms. Kassman’s career advancement at KPMG – which had previously progressed at a steady clip – came to a screeching halt. KPMG abruptly cut her salary while she was on maternity leave and – as if this did not send a clear enough message – placed her on a Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”) upon her return to work.
35. Ms. Kassman’s experience as a working mother at KPMG is far from unique. Plaintiff Ashwini Vasudeva, a Senior Associate in the Company’s Mountain View, California office, faced swift and ongoing retaliation following her decision to go on maternity leave. After she became a mother, Ms. Vasudeva, who had always earned stellar reviews, was abruptly removed from her largest, most lucrative engagement; was assigned to projects without any staff to support her; and was passed over for promotion in favor of a less-experienced male employee.
36. Plaintiff Sparkle Patterson, an award-winning Associate in KPMG’s Atlanta office, also fell victim to the Company’s pregnancy/caregiver discrimination. Although the standard promotion track at KPMG provides for the promotion of Associates to Senior Associates after two years, Ms. Patterson never received a promotion during her three-and-a-half year tenure with the Company, despite her exceptional performance. When Ms. Patterson returned from maternity leave, her work load was decreased and her repeated requests for work were systematically denied, leaving her with virtually no billable work, even though she was available and willing to work long hours.
37. Although KPMG touts its flexible work schedule plan as proving it supports working mothers, the reality is that working mothers are often forced to take a so-called “reduced” schedule for less pay – but are still expected to shoulder the same responsibilities as their full-time counterparts. These mothers accept reduced pay only to avoid unfair and discriminatory heightened scrutiny and wrongful termination.
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38. KPMG has what amounts to a “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy regarding flexible schedules for working mothers with young children. Employees who avail themselves of the Company’s flex time option – the overwhelming majority of whom are working mothers – rarely discuss it freely and are ultimately penalized for it. One of KPMG’s male Partners even commented that women who are on flexible plans “work exactly their x hours and not a minute over” and “you know they’re not going to get anywhere [at KPMG].”
39. Indeed, when Plaintiff Kassman – the first flex worker in her practice – moved to a “reduced” schedule upon her return from maternity leave, she was made to feel like she had a scarlet “F” on her chest for “flex time benefit taker.” As it turns out, flex time as a result of motherhood is not viewed as a badge of honor, but a source of shame and a handicap at KPMG. “Having it all” remains a pipe dream.
40. KPMG discriminates against its female employees by assuming they are less committed to their careers – a gender stereotype that the Company’s male employees do not have to overcome. Upon information and belief, of the few working mothers who have managed to break through KPMG’s glass ceiling, most – like Patricia Brown (“Principal Brown”), Principal in Charge of the East for the International Executive Services (“IES”) practice – have a stay-athome spouse, a luxury that the overwhelming majority of KPMG’s female employees do not have. Indeed, one study of the accounting industry revealed that 46% of male professionals employed by large national/international firms have stay-at-home spouses, compared to only 11% of female professionals.16 And, even if men work a flexible work schedule, they can do so free of gender stereotypes and are therefore less likely than their female counterparts to experience a negative career impact as a result.17
16 AICPA, AICPA Work/Life and Women’s Initiatives 2004 Research, at 39. 17 Id. at 34.
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41. Given this discriminatory culture, it is no wonder that female employees – especially working mothers – are a rarity in KPMG’s upper ranks. Taking leave or going on flex time for pregnancy and caretaking reasons can weigh as a negative factor within KPMG’s evaluation, compensation, development and promotion systems, which have insufficient standards, quality controls, implementation metrics, and transparency, and which lack means of redress to prevent or correct this discrimination.
D. “He Might Have an Issue Working with Women”: KPMG’s Hostile Work Environment and Retaliation
42. As a recent report noted, “With women… joining the accounting industry at an increasing rate, firms are faced with the job of creating more inclusive environments in a traditionally white, male-dominated, ‘up-or-out’ culture.”18 KPMG has clearly failed to rise to this challenge.
43. At KPMG, female employees routinely experience harassment and unequal treatment. In particular, once they become poised to assume positions of greater authority, female employees frequently encounter gender hostility, including hypocritical and unfounded criticisms and other attempts to derail their career advancement.
44. Ms. Kassman’s experience in many ways typifies that of KPMG’s female Professionals. In late 2008, after more than fifteen years of hard work and impressive achievements at the Company, Ms. Kassman was finally told she was next in line for a promotion to Managing Director. But rather than support Ms. Kassman, her male colleagues reacted with overt hostility. One of Ms. Kassman’s male subordinates, Associate Stone, suddenly complained that he “didn’t like [her] tone.” He and Senior Manager Montgomery, one of Ms. Kassman’s peers, complained that Ms. Kassman was “unapproachable” and “too direct,”
18 Catalyst, Women of Color in Accounting, at 1.
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a thinly veiled gender-based criticism – particularly given these two men’s “direct” personalities, which are embraced by senior leadership at KPMG.
45. Even though Ms. Kassman’s supervisor, Principal Schapiro, acknowledged that Associate Stone “might have an issue working with women,” neither Associate Stone nor Senior Manager Montgomery was disciplined for his discriminatory conduct. Instead, the Company took these two male employees’ unfounded and gender-biased complaints at face value, and repeatedly interrogated Ms. Kassman about her behavior, ultimately recommending that she consult a “coach” to resolve these trumped up issues.
46. Rather than address Ms. Kassman’s complaints of discrimination, KPMG retaliated against her by removing her from the promotion track, instead “putting up” her harasser (Senior Manager Montgomery) for the Managing Director position once slotted for her.
47. As a result of KPMG’s hostile work environment, Ms. Kassman – a strong, competent manager with a long and distinguished career at KPMG – was reduced to someone who could barely eat or sleep, and took the back elevators at work to avoid running into her tormentors. She was ultimately forced to resign from her position because the work environment at KPMG had become unbearable.
48. Upon information and belief, other female Professionals have experienced harassment and retaliation similar to what Ms. Kassman experienced at KPMG. In particular, other female managers have suddenly found themselves targeted and elbowed out by the Company’s “old boys” network once they come perilously close to infiltrating the upper ranks of management. At least one Partner has explicitly acknowledged that it is “much harder being a woman” at KPMG.
E. “This Is Three Men Ganging Up on a Woman; We’ve Had It Before”: KPMG’s Deliberate Indifference to Complaints of Discrimination
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49. KPMG has long been on notice regarding its Company-wide gender discrimination, but has taken no steps to remedy it.
50. Ms. Kassman repeatedly complained about the discrimination and harassment she was experiencing, going through all of the requisite channels, including her performance manager, Principal Schapiro; his boss, Principal Brown; the Office of Ethics and Compliance; the Office of General Counsel; and Human Resources. Every step of the way, the Company reacted with indifference and simply passed the buck.
51. Even while acknowledging that the facts presented by Ms. Kassman were undisputed, KPMG sat on its hands and allowed the discrimination and harassment to continue unabated. Throughout the complaint process, the Company seemed more concerned about offending Ms. Kassman’s harassers than the harassment itself. In fact, all of the “solutions” proposed by KPMG treated Ms. Kassman as the source of the problem.
52. Other female employees have also complained about KPMG’s discrimination, only to have their complaints fall on deaf ears. For example, Ms. Patterson repeatedly complained over the course of a year about the discrimination she was facing to HR and Ethics and Compliance. However, KPMG failed to do anything to resolve the situation, forcing Ms. Patterson to leave the Company.
53. In yet another situation, HR not only failed to investigate the complaints of discrimination but failed to intervene when male managers then retaliated against the female complainant, ultimately forcing her from the Company.
54. KPMG’s mishandling of these repeated complaints highlights various systemwide flaws in the Company’s complaint mechanisms, including inadequate reporting mechanisms; the lack of a defined channel to report complaints of discrimination and
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harassment; insufficiently defined and implemented investigation procedures; inadequate training of HR and other professionals tasked with addressing complaints of discrimination and harassment; and the leadership’s willingness to allow discrimination and an “old boys” culture to flourish at the Company.
55. The blatant disregard and indifference displayed by KPMG towards complaints of discrimination is all the more shocking given the Company’s awareness that these problems are systemic. As Vicki Sweeney (“Principal Sweeney”), Principal in Charge of Ethics and Compliance, told Ms. Kassman, “This is three men ganging up on a woman. We’ve had it before.”
* * * 56. Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of similarly situated female employees Company-wide, including but not limited to Associates, Senior Associates, Managers, Senior Managers and Managing Directors, to remedy the gender discrimination they have witnessed and experienced during their years of exemplary service to KPMG. The lawsuit is designed to achieve systemic injunctive relief and to change KPMG’s discriminatory employment policies, practices and/or procedures based on gender, including: (1) assigning female Professionals to lower titles than similarly-situated male employees; (2) paying female Professionals less than their male counterparts; (3) denying female Professionals promotion and advancement opportunities in favor of male employees; (4) treating pregnant employees and mothers differently from non-pregnant employees, male employees, and noncaregivers; and (5) failing to prevent, respond to, adequately investigate, and/or appropriately resolve instances of gender discrimination and pregnancy/caregiver discrimination in the workplace.
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57. Had the changes sought been in place previously, Plaintiffs might still be employed there and might, in fact, be able to pursue careers there moving forward should those changes come about as a result of this action.
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 58. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this suit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a)(1), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(f), et seq., as amended (“Title VII”), the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206, et seq., the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq., the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, et seq., as amended, and supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
59. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f) because Defendant KPMG is headquartered and conducts substantial business in this District, and because Plaintiffs Kassman and Potter were employees of KPMG’s New York, New York office when the unlawful employment practices were committed.
60. Plaintiffs have standing to bring this suit as Plaintiff Kassman has duly filed her administrative charge before the EEOC and received her Notice of Right to Sue on March 9, 2011. Ms. Kassman’s administrative charge gave notice of the class-wide nature of the allegations, including those alleged by the other Named Plaintiffs.
III. THE PARTIES 61. Plaintiff DONNA KASSMAN is a resident of New York. Plaintiff was
employed at KPMG in its New York, New York office as an Associate, a Senior Associate, a Manager, and then a Senior Manager from April 1993 until her constructive discharge from the Company in October 2010.
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62. Plaintiff SPARKLE PATTERSON is a resident of Georgia. Plaintiff was employed at KPMG in its Atlanta, Georgia office as an Associate from June 2007 until her constructive discharge from the Company in November 2010.
63. Plaintiff JEANETTE POTTER is a resident of Israel. Plaintiff was employed at KPMG in its New York, New York office as a Manager, then a Senior Manager from July 1995 until her constructive discharge in July 2006.
64. Plaintiff ASHWINI VASUDEVA is a resident of California. Plaintiff was employed at KPMG in its Mountain View, California office as an Associate, then a Senior Associate, from January 2005 until her constructive discharge from the Company in September 2009.
65. Plaintiff TINA BUTLER is a resident of Virginia. Plaintiff is a current employee of KPMG and has been employed at KPMG since October 2004 in its Atlanta, Georgia and Tysons, Virginia offices as an Associate, Senior Associate, and, since 2013, as a Manager.
66. Plaintiff CHERYL CHARITY is a resident of Virginia. Plaintiff is a current employee of KPMG and has been employed at KPMG since March 2001 in its Washington, D.C. and Tysons, Virginia offices as a Senior Associate, Manager, and, since 2011, as a Senior Manager/Director.
67. Plaintiff HEATHER INMAN is a resident of Missouri. Plaintiff was employed at KPMG from August 2005 to October 2014 in its St. Louis, Missouri office as a Manager.
68. Plaintiff NANCY JONES is a resident of Georgia. Plaintiff was employed at KPMG in its Atlanta, Georgia office as a Senior Associate from November 2010 until her constructive discharge from the Company in June 2014.
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69. Plaintiff CAROL MURRAY is a resident of Washington. Plaintiff is a current employee of KPMG and has been employed at KPMG since October 2008 in its Los Angeles, California and Seattle, Washington offices as an Associate, Senior Associate, and, since 2013, as a Manager.
70. Defendant KPMG LLP (“KPMG” or the “Company”) is an audit, tax, and advisory services firm headquartered in New York, New York. It is the U.S. member firm of KPMG International, which is headquartered in the Netherlands. In 2011, KPMG reported global revenues of $22.7 billion.
IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS A. PLAINTIFF DONNA KASSMAN 71. Ms. Kassman suffered discrimination in pay, denial of promotional opportunities,
discrimination as a result of pregnancy, and a hostile work environment. She was ultimately constructively discharged.
72. In April of 1993, Ms. Kassman began working at KPMG as an Associate. She had previously earned her Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the University of Michigan in 1989 and completed her law degree in 1992.
73. For promotions from entry-level Associates to Senior Managers, KPMG uses a standard career progression track, which advances employees on a schedule of approximately every two years in the following order: Associate, Senior Associate, Manager, and Senior Manager.
74. In the years after Ms. Kassman began working at KPMG, she steadily progressed along the Company’s standard career track. In 1995, Ms. Kassman became a Senior Associate, and two years later, in 1997, she advanced to the position of Manager. In 1999, Ms. Kassman
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went on to become a Senior Manager – the position in which she would be stuck for eleven years, before ultimately being pushed out of the Company.
75. Throughout her seventeen-year tenure, Ms. Kassman demonstrated stellar performance at KPMG.
76. In Ms. Kassman’s Fiscal Year 2006 Year End Performance Review (“Review”), Principal Schapiro, to whom she directly reported, wrote that she “contributed greatly to the overall success of the practice” and that “staff look to her for guidance.”
77. The following year, in Ms. Kassman’s 2007 Review, he wrote that Plaintiff “had a very strong year.”
78. Principal Schapiro wrote in Ms. Kassman’s 2008 Review that she “had a very successful FY 2008, and ha[d] shown excellent leadership abilities.”
79. He wrote in Ms. Kassman’s 2009 Review that she “did all the right things from a business perspective to be successful,” that she “ha[d] been a leader in the office, and ha[d] been forward thinking.”
80. In Ms. Kassman’s 2010 Review, Principal Schapiro wrote that she again had “a very strong year.”
Disparate Pay 81. Upon information and belief, KPMG paid Ms. Kassman less than similarlysituated male employees, despite her exemplary performance; she was paid at a lower rate than men for equal work on jobs requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which were performed under similar working conditions. 82. Ten years after joining KPMG, Ms. Kassman went on maternity leave in May 2003, just before the birth of her first child in June 2003.
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83. While Ms. Kassman was on maternity leave, KPMG abruptly cut her base salary by $20,000 because she was paid “too much.” Similar cuts were not made to male counterparts’ salaries, and as a result, Ms. Kassman was and continued to be paid $20,000 less than her male counterparts during her tenure at KPMG.
84. For example, Senior Manager John Montgomery’s pay was not cut in May 2003 or later as a Senior Manager, even though he had joined KPMG after Ms. Kassman, worked under the same Partner, and worked on engagements for similar clients. He performed the same tasks as Ms. Kassman, and upon information and belief, did so with no greater skill or effort than Ms. Kassman, achieving a substantially equivalent level of performance.
85. KPMG cited no business justification for slashing her salary. When Ms. Kassman asked her manager at the time, Gary Rosen (“Partner Rosen”), Partner in Charge of the Northeast State and Local Tax (“SALT”) Practice, to reconsider the cut in her salary, he said that she should consider some of her past salary “a loan,” implying that she had not earned it for exemplary performance. He also indicated that Ms. Kassman did not need the money because she had a nice engagement ring. Upon information and belief, KPMG disparately paid Ms. Kassman because of her gender and her status as a working mother.
86. In addition, KPMG discriminates against flex time workers – the overwhelming majority of whom are women – by reducing their salaries without a commensurate reduction in responsibilities. While Ms. Kassman performed precisely the same tasks after she became a “flex time” employee as male Senior Managers in SALT with her experience level, she received less in salary than male and non-caretaking Senior Managers. These conditions did not change from when she began the flex time plan after returning from maternity leave in 2004 until she departed from the Company in 2010.
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87. Upon information and belief, Ms. Kassman was not the only woman to suffer the effects of the compensation policies and practices at KPMG, which lacked sufficient standards and quality controls, transparency, implementation metrics, and opportunities for redress that would otherwise have ensured there was no disparate impact on female professionals.
88. Upon information and belief, KPMG management systematically took advantage of the flaws in the system by paying female employees less than similarly situated male employees. KPMG underpays female Professionals at all levels throughout the Company relative to similarly situated male employees.
Denial of Promotions 89. Despite Ms. Kassman’s stellar qualifications and performance, KPMG denied her promotions in favor of lesser-qualified male employees. The Company’s evaluation and promotion systems’ insufficient quality standards and controls and implementation metrics, coupled with their lack of transparency and opportunities for redress, had a discriminatory and disparate impact on women and caretaking employees. 90. Throughout Ms. Kassman’s last decade as a Senior Manager at KPMG, she consistently expressed interest in a promotion to Managing Director and ultimately to Partner. After several strong performance years and numerous requests for advancement, Principal Schapiro finally told Ms. Kassman she was next in line for a promotion in the employment tax practice. In December 2008, Principal Schapiro confirmed that Ms. Kassman would be put up for a promotion to Tax Managing Director effective for the Fiscal Year 2009/2010 beginning October 1, 2009. The promotion decision was to be made during the summer of 2009. However, Ms. Kassman was not promoted that year, despite her strong performance.
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91. In early 2009, Ms. Kassman successfully completed the formal Leadership Evaluation & Assistance Program (“LEAP”) for the KPMG SALT Practice in preparation for her promotion to Managing Director. According to Ms. Kassman’s 2009 Review, she “successfully presented and navigated the SALT LEAP program and received favorable reviews.” She presented to the National Partner in Charge of the SALT Practice, Tim Gillis, who told her that she had his vote.
92. In mid-2009, Principal Schapiro again confirmed that Ms. Kassman was next in line for a promotion in her practice. On at least one occasion in or around summer 2009, Ben Garfunkel (“Partner Garfunkel”), the National Partner in Charge of IES, echoed Principal Schapiro’s comments by stating that he knew Ms. Kassman was “in queue” to make Managing Director. Ms. Kassman’s status was specifically a point of discussion with Partner Garfunkel since she was leaving the SALT Practice (where she was presented for promotion) and entering the IES practice, of which he was the leader. Ms. Kassman wanted confirmation that she would not lose her “next in line” status by switching practices.
93. In Ms. Kassman’s 2009 Review, Principal Schapiro wrote that “an effort was made to promote Donna to TMD effective fy ’10…,” but explained that it did not happen because of the economy. Principal Schapiro also told Ms. Kassman that no one would receive a promotion to Managing Director at that time due to the economy, but that she would remain first in line.
94. Shortly after Ms. Kassman was “put-up” for promotion and proceeded through the formal channels set up by the SALT Practice (i.e., the LEAP program) in 2009, Senior Manager Montgomery and his direct subordinate, Associate Stone, lodged unfounded complaints about her. Although Ms. Kassman had never received a similar complaint in her seventeen years with
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KPMG, Associate Stone and Senior Manager Montgomery claimed she was considered “unapproachable” and “too direct,” a thinly-veiled gender-based criticism, particularly given the abundance of “direct” male personalities in the senior leadership of KPMG.
95. As a result of Associate Stone’s and Senior Manager Montgomery’s unfounded and gendered complaints, KPMG removed Ms. Kassman from the promotion track sometime in late 2009 or early 2010, when a candidate is typically put up for promotion.
96. In December 2009, Ms. Kassman again discussed with Principal Schapiro whether she would be put up for the Managing Director position for the 2010/2011 fiscal year beginning October 1, 2010. Although Principal Schapiro had previously assured Ms. Kassman that she was next in line for the promotion, he claimed that he “[didn’t] know anything about making Tax Managing Director in the IES practice,” and instead referred Ms. Kassman to Principal Brown.
97. At Principal Schapiro’s suggestion, Ms. Kassman met with Principal Brown in January 2010 to discuss her career. When Ms. Kassman brought up the Managing Director position, Principal Brown said that Ms. Kassman’s name had never come up, that she was not on the list of candidates for that year, and that it was too late for her name to be submitted. Principal Brown later acknowledged that she had lied about the list of candidates being closed.
98. In April 2010, Ms. Kassman learned from a colleague that Senior Manager Montgomery was up for promotion to Managing Director for the 2010/2011 Fiscal Year – the same position that had previously been slated for Ms. Kassman. Principal Schapiro had apparently – without informing Ms. Kassman – removed her from the promotion track and replaced her with Senior Manager Montgomery, even though he had a shorter tenure with the Company, fewer years as Senior Manager, and less professional experience overall than Ms.
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Kassman by several years. Upon information and belief, no male Senior Managers were removed from the Managing Director track in this abrupt fashion.
99. Ms. Kassman was a victim of Associate Stone’s and Senior Manager Montgomery’s discriminatory campaign to derail a female employee’s advancement to Managing Director – an effort that KPMG’s partnership not only failed to stop, but actively carried out.
100. Upon information and belief, KPMG has perpetrated and/or condoned similar discriminatory campaigns to derail the careers of other successful female Professionals who were poised to assume positions of greater authority and influence within the Company.
101. Upon information and belief, KPMG’s performance evaluation system’s insufficient quality standards and controls and implementation metrics, coupled with its lack of transparency and opportunities for redress, had a discriminatory and disparate impact on women and caretaking employees.
102. Upon information and belief, KPMG management systematically took advantage of the flaws in the system and often undervalued, mismeasured, or otherwise inaccurately captured performance to the particular detriment of women and mothers. In addition, unfounded criticism can be included and legitimate criticism given undue weight. Within this flawed system, leave for pregnancy and caretaking responsibilities can constitute a negative factor in female Professionals’ evaluations, compensation decisions and promotion considerations at KPMG.
103. Moreover, KPMG’s flawed promotion practices consistently result in males being promoted more rapidly and assigned more frequently to higher positions than women across the Company.
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Pregnancy/Caregiver Discrimination 104. From 2003 until her constructive discharge in 2010, KPMG discriminated against Ms. Kassman based on her gender due to her caregiving responsibilities as a working mother. Because of Ms. Kassman’s status as a working mother, KPMG continuously subjected her to disparate treatment, and also made adverse decisions concerning her employment. 105. From 1993 until 1999, before Ms. Kassman had her children, she was promoted on KPMG’s progressive career track from Associate to Senior Manager. However, after she had her first child in 2003, her advancement abruptly stopped. She was not promoted after she became a Senior Manager and remained in this position for over ten years as she watched men and individuals without primary caretaking responsibilities—who shared her level of experience, responsibility and skill—proceed to Managing Director and Partner positions. 106. Upon information and belief, there were only a handful of female managers with small children in the Northeast SALT Practice during Ms. Kassman’s tenure with the Company. Ms. Kassman was the first in her practice to work a flexible schedule. 107. Even though Ms. Kassman hit the glass ceiling shortly after having children, KPMG and Principal Schapiro touted her as a role model for working mothers. In practice, however, KPMG and Principal Schapiro in particular did not support Ms. Kassman’s efforts to be a successful working mother. 108. In addition to slashing Ms. Kassman’s salary while she was on maternity leave, KPMG took a number of adverse employment actions against her. For example, in March of 2004, shortly after Ms. Kassman’s maternity leave ended, Principal Schapiro gave Ms. Kassman her first negative review at the Company for not meeting her goals. Instead of taking her leave into account in measuring Ms. Kassman’s goal attainment for the year, Principal Schapiro
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penalized her for it. 109. As a further penalty for taking maternity leave, Principal Schapiro put Plaintiff on
a 60-day PIP, increasing her goals upon her return from maternity leave. Shortly before being slapped with a PIP, Ms. Kassman told Principal Schapiro that she planned to move to a flexible work schedule. Principal Schapiro placed Ms. Kassman’s PIP in between papers on her desk (including the flexible plan paperwork that she was preparing to submit), seemingly in an attempt to avoid drawing attention to the PIP.
110. Before placing Ms. Kassman on a PIP, Principal Schapiro had never indicated to Ms. Kassman that her performance was unsatisfactory or that she was in jeopardy of being placed on a PIP. Shocked and dismayed by this unexpected development, Ms. Kassman spoke to Sharon Katz-Pearlman, another Partner at the Company, who confirmed that there was nothing in Ms. Kassman’s performance record that would support the imposition of a PIP before she had her baby.
111. Two years later, Principal Schapiro again penalized Ms. Kassman for taking maternity leave when she had her second child. He again held her to higher standards than her peers after returning from leave. He also wrote in her 2006 Review that her work was “somewhat abbreviated due to Donna’s maternity leave.”
112. From 2004 until her constructive discharge in 2010, Ms. Kassman worked a reduced schedule under KPMG’s flexible schedule policy. Although the Company reduced Ms. Kassman’s pay in proportion to her reduced schedule, it held her to the same or higher performance standards than full-time employees. If she did not meet full-time standards on her reduced schedule, Ms. Kassman was penalized and considered less committed to her career. Her flexible schedule essentially acted as a “penalty” on her employment opportunities at KPMG.
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113. While Ms. Kassman was working on a reduced schedule, KPMG essentially expected her to do the job of a full-time Senior Manager in fewer hours and for less pay. For example, her job requirements related to marketing, teaching, speaking, coaching, administrative, and client development were the same job requirements of full-time Senior Managers. When KPMG evaluated Ms. Kassman’s work performance, the Company measured her against the requirements of a full-time employee. Indeed, both of Plaintiff’s direct supervisors – Principal Schapiro and Partner Rosen – acknowledged this by writing in her LEAP Nomination Form, “Although she works a reduced hourly schedule, she has the same responsibilities as every other Senior Manager in the Practice.”
114. Upon information and belief, other female Professionals who took maternity leave and had caregiving responsibilities faced similar systemic barriers to equal employment opportunities at KPMG. In particular, Ms. Kassman’s department, the SALT practice, had a poor track record of retaining working mothers. KPMG fired several working mothers within the SALT practice, including one who was pregnant, and forced others out of the Company under circumstances similar to Ms. Kassman’s.
115. Upon information and belief, taking leave or hours reductions for pregnancy and caretaking reasons is considered a negative factor in employees’ evaluations, compensation decisions and promotion considerations, resulting in an adverse impact on women and mothers at the Company. The Company’s policies and procedures regarding evaluation, compensation and promotion lack the transparency, standards, quality controls, implementation metrics, and means for redress necessary to prevent this disparate impact on female Professionals who are pregnant or mothers.
116. KPMG’s overwhelmingly female flexible workers are denied not only the pay
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they deserve, but also various other Company benefits. For example, in early 2010, the Company’s Stamford office adopted a policy requiring employees to be in the office a minimum of three days per week in order to qualify for office space. This policy had a disparate impact on female employees such as Ms. Kassman, who had three “in-office” days (per her flex time agreement), one of which was typically spent out of the office generating business.
117. In addition, because most of KPMG’s relationship-building activities occur after hours, employees with primary caregiving responsibilities – the majority of whom are women – are at a disadvantage in their career development. For example, when Ms. Kassman expressed concern to Partner Rosen about her $20,000 salary cut, he suggested that she socialize at KPMG’s weekly happy hours as a way to ingratiate herself with the Company’s leadership and advance her career. Ms. Kassman explained that, because she had young children, she could not attend happy hours, but was more than willing to meet with people over lunch, breakfast or coffee.
118. The few women who have advanced to the partnership ranks at KPMG have done so by sacrificing their personal lives and abandoning any semblance of work-life balance. For example, KPMG frequently touted a Partner in the Atlanta office, Tammy Hunter, as a role model for other working mothers because she called the Company to discuss work matters on her way to the delivery room to give birth to her child. The Company apparently viewed this as a level of dedication to which other working mothers should aspire.
119. Aside from these rare exceptions, working mothers have been unable to make significant inroads at KPMG – and are unlikely to do so given the Company’s discriminatory culture, which, in combination with insufficiently designed and articulated systems of evaluation, compensation, development, and promotion, produces an adverse impact on working mothers.
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In May 2010, Ms. Kassman was at dinner during an American Payroll Association conference with several colleagues, including the Partner in charge of the West IES practice, Ray Pascuzzi (“Partner Pascuzzi”). At this dinner, Partner Pascuzzi proclaimed that “part time women work exactly their x hours and not a minute over,” that “you know you can’t make them work anymore,” and that “you know they’re not going to get anywhere.”
Hostile Work Environment 120. From late 2009 until her constructive discharge in October 2010, Ms. Kassman suffered increasing harassment and unequal treatment at KPMG. 121. Beginning in October 2009, Associate Stone began complaining that he “didn’t like [Ms. Kassman’s] tone.” Senior Manager Montgomery agreed with these complaints. Together, these two men complained that Ms. Kassman was “unapproachable” and “too direct,” a gender-based criticism, particularly given Associate Stone’s and Senior Manager Montgomery’s “direct” personalities, which are embraced by senior leadership at KPMG. Principal Schapiro, her Performance Manager, conveyed these unfounded criticisms to Ms. Kassman directly in informal evaluations. Nonetheless, KPMG did not correct Associate Stone’s or Senior Manager Montgomery’s discriminatory behavior. 122. In addition to complaining about Ms. Kassman’s “tone,” Associate Stone also complained about her flexible work schedule. Consistent with the work-life balance priorities marketed at KPMG, the Company had approved Ms. Kassman’s schedule after the birth of her first child. However, Associate Stone disapproved of Ms. Kassman’s flexible work schedule and complained – again, without basis – that it forced him to “work harder” from Monday until Thursday.
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123. KPMG did nothing to correct Associate Stone’s discriminatory actions, even though Principal Schapiro told Ms. Kassman in March 2010 that Associate Stone “might have an issue working with women.” Moreover, when Ms. Kassman complained about Associate Stone’s conduct, Principal Schapiro replied that he did not know if Associate Stone was “unprofessional, stupid or vicious.” Despite Principal Schapiro’s admission regarding Associate Stone’s inappropriate and discriminatory behavior, upon information and belief, KPMG took no steps to respond to Ms. Kassman’s concerns.
124. Instead of disciplining Associate Stone, KPMG constantly reprimanded Ms. Kassman as a result of Associate Stone’s and Senior Manager Montgomery’s gender-based criticisms. For example, KPMG forced Ms. Kassman to participate in an excessive number of stressful meetings and intense interrogations, often occurring on a weekly basis, from late 2009 until mid-2010. During the meetings, Ms. Kassman was questioned about her “tone” and other gendered complaints like her “direct” approach. This harassment and unequal treatment was extremely disruptive and distressing to Ms. Kassman both personally and professionally.
125. After months of meetings, the Company encouraged Ms. Kassman to consult with a “coach” to resolve issues concerning Associate Stone’s and Senior Manager Montgomery’s discriminatory complaints and harassment. By issuing such a reprimand to Ms. Kassman, KPMG chose to believe these two men’s unfounded complaints over her longstanding “very strong” performance and collaborative work style. At the time, Associate Stone – who was widely regarded as an “asshole” – had only been at the Company for approximately sixteen months, whereas Ms. Kassman had been there for sixteen years.
126. Instead of disciplining Mr. Stone for his discriminatory conduct, KPMG promoted Mr. Stone to a Senior Associate position and recently promoted him to Manager.
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127. Instead of resolving Ms. Kassman’s complaints of discrimination, KPMG removed her from the promotion track as a result of the gender-biased criticisms leveled against her.
128. When the work environment in KPMG’s New York office became unbearable, Ms. Kassman sought to work only from the Company’s Stamford office in order to avoid her tormentors. KPMG temporarily granted this request in October 2009, only to effectively rescind the option six months later. Per Ms. Kassman’s flex time agreement, she spent three days “inoffice” and two working from home. However, at least one of Ms. Kassman’s “in-office” days was typically spent out of the office with clients.
129. In early 2010, the Stamford office adopted a policy requiring employees to be “in the office” a minimum of three days per week in order to qualify for office space. Accordingly, the Company forced her to vacate her Stamford office in April 2010. In lieu of an office, KPMG suggested Ms. Kassman could make due with four drawers.
130. . The loss of office space in Stamford made it considerably harder for Ms. Kassman to perform her work each day. For example, she had to transport and rearrange her work materials and supplies, which was time-consuming and increased her escalating stress level. Moreover, it signified to her colleauges and subordinates that her status within KPMG was diminished, particularly because multiple offices remained unoccupied.
131. Despite available office space, Ken Seal, the Partner in charge of the Stamford office, refused to allow Ms. Kassman to retain an office. The only alternative was for Ms. Kassman to return to a hostile work environment in New York.
132. Thus, KPMG ignored and/or failed to respond to repeated and escalating complaints and concerns regarding discrimination and retaliation and provided her with the
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Hobson’s choice of having no real place at KPMG or returning to the discriminatory environment which KPMG refused to address.
133. These accumulating incidents of harassment, increased scrutiny, and marginalization negatively altered the terms and conditions of Ms. Kassman’s employment at KPMG, and caused her significant stress in both her professional and personal life.
Mishandling of Complaints and Retaliation 134. Upon information and belief, what Human Resources and Ethics and Compliance policies and procedures exist at KPMG, they lack meaningful quality controls, standards, implementation metrics, and means of redress. Concerns about discrimination made to supervising staff and HR itself are allowed to go unaddressed, or worse, to result in further or increased discrimination and retaliation. 135. After Ms. Kassman complained about the harassment and unequal treatment by Associate Stone, Senior Manager Montgomery, and Principal Schapiro, KPMG retaliated against her. 136. Ms. Kassman complained to both the Office of Ethics and Compliance and the Office of General Counsel in April 2009 about the ongoing discriminatory treatment towards her. 137. Principal Sweeney, the Principal in Charge of the Office of Ethics and Compliance, told Ms. Kassman, “This is three men ganging up on a woman. We’ve had it before.” 138. However, instead of addressing the discrimination, the Office of Ethics and Compliance suggested that Ms. Kassman try to relocate to another position within KPMG or leave the Company with a “package.” On one occasion, Principal Sweeney suggested that Ms.
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Kassman go out on leave for emotional distress, noting that many female employees had done so in the past under similar circumstances.
139. The Office of General Counsel was equally ineffective in addressing Ms. Kassman’s complaints of discrimination. After investigating the matter (through David Burns of Firmwide Security) – and finding the facts undisputed – it simply referred Ms. Kassman to Human Resources because it was unable to come up with an acceptable solution.
140. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Kassman spoke with Keri Fleming, Human Resources Associate Director, East Region Tax, about the ongoing discrimination and harassment she was experiencing. Together, they decided that Human Resources would be Ms. Kassman’s mouthpiece to Principal Schapiro because Ms. Kassman would physically shake every time he called her.
141. To minimize contact with her harassers, Ms. Kassman decided that she would try to transfer to another position within KPMG, even if it meant taking a pay cut, assuming an administrative position or having to transfer offices. Human Resources assured Ms. Kassman that it would help with this transition, but failed to follow through on its promise.
142. Moreover, even though Ms. Kassman told Human Resources that she did not want to discuss the matter any further with Principals Schapiro and Brown, she continued to receive calls from them. From the tenor of those conversations, it was clear to Ms. Kassman that Principals Schapiro and Brown thought she simply needed time to “cool off” and would eventually resume working with Senior Manager Montgomery and Associate Stone.
143. After Principal Schapiro was informed of Ms. Kassman’s complaints, she faced a number of adverse employment actions. KPMG reprimanded her with a “coach,” forced her to sit through numerous meetings and interrogations in response to Senior Manager Montgomery’s
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and Associate Stone’s gender-based criticisms of her, and ultimately removed her from the promotion track.
144. By contrast, KPMG did not discipline Associate Stone, Senior Manager Montgomery, or Principal Schapiro in any way. In fact, the Company promoted Associate Stone and, adding insult to injury, “put up” Senior Manager Montgomery for the Managing Director position once slotted for Ms. Kassman.
Constructive Discharge 145. Ms. Kassman was forced to end her career at KPMG on October 1, 2010 because the Company had deliberately made her working conditions so intolerable that she was compelled to resign involuntarily. Although it had been her goal to continue at KPMG and eventually reach the Partnership level, the escalating harassment and hostility she faced from her peers and supervisors – to which HR turned a blind eye – crushed these hopes. It became clear to her that not only had her career stalled, but that she was being marginalized and ultimately pushed out of the Company against her will. Indeed, the only options provided to her by HR and Ethics and Compliance were to continue working with her harassers or to leave the Company. 146. Associate Stone and Senior Manager Montgomery’s unfounded criticisms of Ms. Kassman, which were exacerbated and reinforced by the “coaching” and interrogations KPMG forced her to attend, led her to doubt her self-worth and, more important, highlighted what little value the company to which she had dedicated her professional life placed on her. 147. As a result of KPMG’s campaign of discrimination and harassment, Ms. Kassman’s work environment became unbearable. She could barely eat or sleep, and she would physically shake when she approached the KPMG building or when Principal Schapiro called
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her. To avoid running into her tormentors when she worked from the New York office, Ms. Kassman made a habit of taking the back elevators at work.
148. Because of her torment and desperation at work, anxiety and depression also spread into her home life. Her relationship with her husband became strained, and she lacked the energy to care for her children. She experienced daily headaches, neck pain, back pain, and weight loss.
149. Working from the Stamford office was Ms. Kassman’s only hope for escaping the intolerable conditions of the New York office, but even there she was both marginalized by her colleagues and physically removed from her office space to a mere set of drawers, all while she was expected to maintain the same responsibilities and performance of other Senior Managers.
150. On at least five occasions, Ms. Kassman contacted Keri Fleming in HR to request a transfer to a different practice. Although Ms. Kassman was willing to work in any division other than her current one, HR failed to connect her to any opportunities or otherwise address the ongoing and persistent discrimination.
151. Because Ms. Kassman’s previous experience had taught her that KPMG would not properly address its employees’ unlawful conduct, she felt that she had no recourse against the pervasive harassment and discrimination. Her repeated requests for assistance were ignored or resulted in further intimidation, and she was left with the choice of returning to an office where she was made physically ill by the treatment of her co-workers, or working in a diminished and disreputable capacity in Stamford. Losing the right to office space in Stamfordwhile other offices remained unoccupied was demoralizing and physically embodied how she was being pushed out of the Company.
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152. On October 1, 2010, Ms. Kassman resigned from KPMG, stating in her letter of resignation, “By ignoring my requests to put an end to the discriminatory treatment, KPMG has forced me to either continue to endure an intolerable work environment or end my employment. I therefore have no choice but to leave the Firm.”
B. PLAINTIFF SPARKLE PATTERSON 153. Ms. Patterson suffered discrimination in pay, denial of promotional opportunities, and discrimination as a result of gender, pregnancy, and race. She was ultimately constructively discharged. 154. KPMG employed Ms. Patterson, an African-American mother of two children, from June 2007 until her constructive discharge from the Company in November 2010. 155. In June 2007, Ms. Patterson began working at KPMG as an Associate in Atlanta, first in Federal Tax, then in the IES practice, which she joined in August 2008. 156. Ms. Patterson proved herself to be an excellent performer. 157. In her 2008 year-end review, Federal Tax Partner Bernard Cates gave Ms. Patterson a “Strong” rating and wrote that she was “trending towards an EP [‘Exceptional’] performance level.” 158. In Ms. Patterson’s October 2008 engagement review, IES Manager Greg Woofter (“Manager Woofter”) wrote that Ms. Patterson worked “diligently” and that he was “pleased with [her] progress.” 159. In her April 2009 review, Manager Woofter wrote that Ms. Patterson “excelled” and “exceeded [his] expectations,” and that he wanted to “continue [Ms. Patterson’s] career progression within the IES practice.”
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160. In her 2009 year-end review, Senior Manager Yozura Yoshida (“Manager Yoshida”) gave Ms. Patterson a “Strong” rating and wrote that she was “pr[o]fessional, commit[t]ed, motivated and eager to learn” and that he “expect[ed] her to continue this positive trend.”
161. In April 2008 and October 2008, Ms. Patterson received a “Standing Ovation” award with a $500 American Express Card, one of the highest honors within KPMG’s “Encore” award system that recognizes employees who go “above and beyond” in their work.
162. In January 2009, Ms. Patterson received a $200 “Bravo” award, another form of recognition within KPMG’s “Encore” award system. Manager Yoshida originally nominated her for the “Standing Ovation” award, but as part of KPMG’s effort to manage costs, that award was temporarily unavailable. In the award description, Manager Yoshida wrote that Ms. Patterson had “[gone] the extra mile to get things done.”
Disparate Pay 163. Upon information and belief, KPMG paid Ms. Patterson at a lower rate than men, non-caregivers, and non-African Americans for equal work on jobs requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which were performed under similar working conditions. 164. Although Ms. Patterson was a stellar performer, her total compensation was not commensurate with that awarded to similarly-situated male and non-African-American employees. 165. Ms. Patterson regularly performed the duties of a “Senior Associate” starting in early 2009, though she was not compensated accordingly. For example, Ms. Patterson served as an initial point of contact for clients and met with them directly. She managed engagements
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herself, allocating work to Associates and Tax Technicians and reviewing their work, as well as drafting client bills and invoices for Managers’ review.
166. These tasks were not usually assigned to individuals classified as “Associates” like Ms. Patterson, but instead were given to “Senior Associates” who received higher pay than Associates. For example, Stephan Rabbitt and Anna Bankston, who were both white and lacked caretaking responsibilities, also worked under Ms. Patterson’s same Managers in IES and performed the same tasks as she did. Upon information and belief, their performance was no stronger than Ms. Patterson’s. However, Mr. Rabbitt and Ms. Bankston were assigned and paid as “Senior Associates.” Upon information and belief, Senior Associates were paid approximately $10,000 more in base salary than Ms. Patterson, and also received a “promotion bonus” along with the title.
167. In addition, KPMG refused to pay Ms. Patterson for the entire month of June 2010 following her maternity leave.
168. In February 2010, Ms. Patterson requested a paid sabbatical following her maternity leave from June 1, 2010 to August 15, 2010 to complete two additional courses for her CPA license, which were important for career growth. KPMG routinely approved paid sabbaticals for other employees to travel overseas, go hiking, run triathlons, or pursue other personal interests. While KPMG promptly approved other employees’ paid sabbaticals, Partner Gary Lusk (“Partner Lusk”), who reported up the IES chain to Principal Brown and Partner Garfunkel in New York, ignored Ms. Patterson’s sabbatical request.
169. According to KPMG policy, sabbatical requests must either be approved or formally denied with a written explanation. On March 1, 2010, Ms. Patterson consulted HR Tax
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Manager Tammy Woodard (“HR Manager Woodard”), who confirmed that Ms. Patterson could proceed with the sabbatical application process if Partner Lusk did not formally deny the request.
170. From March through May 2010, Ms. Patterson went on maternity leave before the birth of her second child. In March 2010, Partner Lusk finally confirmed that he had received Ms. Patterson’s sabbatical request and would review it by mid-April. In April 2010, Ms. Patterson followed up about the status of her sabbatical request. Partner Lusk ignored her request. In May 2010, Ms. Patterson again followed up with Partner Lusk, and once again Partner Lusk refused to approve or deny her request.
171. In June 2010, Ms. Patterson did not return to work following her paid maternity leave because her sabbatical request was still pending. Ms. Patterson consulted her informal mentor Partner Milford McGuirt (“Partner McGuirt”), co-chair of KPMG’s national AfricanAmerican Network and one of few African-American partners at the Company. Partner McGuirt confirmed that Ms. Patterson had followed the proper procedure for requesting a sabbatical.
172. In July 2010, after months of ignoring Ms. Patterson’s sabbatical request, Partner Lusk verbally denied Ms. Patterson’s request and instead approved a sabbatical “beginning” in July 2010. Partner Lusk refused to pay Ms. Patterson for the entire month of June. Thus, while Ms. Patterson’s male, non-caregiving, and non-African-American employees received sabbatical pay to pursue recreational activities, Ms. Patterson was only compensated for part of the time she used for career development.
173. Because KPMG employs a compensation system that has insufficient quality standards and controls, and implementation metrics, and lacks transparency and opportunities for redress or challenge, its compensation practices have had a disparate impact on the Company’s female employees.
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174. Upon information and belief, KPMG management systematically took advantage of the flaws in this system by knowingly and intentionally paying female employees less than similarly situated male employees.
175. Upon information and belief, Ms. Patterson was also paid less as compared to non-African-American KPMG employees who performed the same duties or had the same job title as she did within the company. This disparity arose in part because of the disparate career advancement opportunities she was provided in comparison to non-African-American colleagues, described below.
Denial of Promotions and Discriminatory Assignments 176. Despite Ms. Patterson’s award-winning performance, KPMG denied her a promotion in favor of less-qualified male and non-African-American employees. Although the standard promotion track at KPMG promotes Associates to Senior Associates after two years, Ms. Patterson was never promoted beyond Associate in her three-and-a-half-year tenure with the Company. 177. Approximately seven of Ms. Patterson’s Associate-level peers in Federal Tax were promoted within two years (i.e. by approximately July 2009); all seven were Caucasian and none had children. Ms. Patterson and two other black females were not promoted; Associate Gayann Greene (also a mother of two small children) resigned, and Associate Avalyn Goodwin was laid off. 178. In July 2009, however, Ms. Patterson was passed up for the promotion usually granted after two years at the Company. Instead, Ms. Bankston and Mr. Rabbitt, who were white and lacked childcare responsibilities, were promoted to Senior Associate. Their educational and experiential backgrounds were equal to Ms. Patterson’s, and they performed the same duties as
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Ms. Patterson under Partner Lusk in IES. Moreover, when Ms. Patterson moved out of the Federal Tax practice and into IES, Partner Lusk had assured her that this change would not affect her progression toward promotion to Senior Associate.
179. After being passed up in July 2009, Ms. Patterson made Partner Lusk aware of her concern about not being promoted along with her class of Associates. He promised her that she would be promoted the following year, in 2010.
180. Accordingly, Ms. Patterson believed she was still on track for promotion to Senior Associate in the fall of 2009. Ms. Patterson regularly solicited feedback from her Engagement Managers to ensure she stayed on track for promotion, and her interim reviews in 2009 were excellent.
181. However, in November 2009, Ms. Patterson informed Partner Lusk and Manager Yoshida that she was pregnant and would take maternity leave beginning March 2010. Partner Lusk expressed strong disapproval of Ms. Patterson’s leave and told her that missing the week before March 15th was like “missing the whole year.”
182. While Ms. Patterson was on maternity leave in April 2010, Partner Lusk asked Ms. Patterson to take on a lesser role in IES. Partner Lusk suggested that Ms. Patterson return to work “part time” or move to the Japanese practice, even though it was not a good fit for her interests, experience or background. Ms. Patterson told Partner Lusk that neither working part time nor transferring to an entirely new practice was in line with her career goals. Upon information and belief, similarly-situated male employees were not asked to work “part time” or to change practices at this time.
183. When Ms. Patterson returned from leave and sabbatical in August 2010, Partner Lusk and Manager Yoshida intentionally intimidated Ms. Patterson. In a change from the
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standard year-end performance review practice where only the Performance Manager would review the evaluation with Ms. Patterson, both men joined together to raise pretextual concerns with her performance. Upon information and belief, there were no other Associates in the Atlanta IES practice whose performance was evaluated by both a Partner and a Manager in their 2010 year-end review.
184. Specifically, Partner Lusk and Manager Yoshida criticized Ms. Patterson in her fiscal year-end review about concerns that had never been raised before her maternity leave. In Ms. Patterson’s interim performance review for the same fiscal year, Manager Yoshida wrote that Ms. Patterson was “eager to perform well” and that she “manage[d] her time well.” In her fiscal year-end review, after she returned from maternity leave, Manager Yoshida wrote that Ms. Patterson was “unavailable” and caused her manager to spend more time during the Christmas holidays, though Ms. Patterson had not taken any vacation days during this time and frequently worked overtime. Ms. Patterson had never heard this criticism before her maternity leave.
185. In the same fiscal year-end review for 2010, Partner Lusk and Manager Yoshida accused Ms. Patterson of “not mak[ing] herself available to help others” when Ms. Patterson had taken a Saturday, Sunday and Monday out of the office one week in August 2009 to complete the final portion of her CPA exam. Prior to announcing her pregnancy, both Partner Lusk and Manager Yoshida had approved this time out of the office. Partner Lusk had known Ms. Patterson needed to complete the exam since he accepted her transfer in July 2008 and knew that her passing scores on previous sections would expire if she did not timely complete the final section.
186. Ms. Patterson’s August 2010 review also ignored her notable achievements, such as completing her CPA, achieving all of her performance goals set at the beginning of the fiscal
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year, being on the Board of Directors for a non-profit organization and participating in KPMG Affinity Networks.
187. Upon information and belief, KPMG’s performance evaluation system’s insufficient quality standards and controls and implementation metrics, coupled with its lack of transparency and opportunities for redress, had a discriminatory and disparate impact on women and caretaking employees.
188. Upon information and belief, KPMG management systematically took advantage of the flaws in the system and often undervalued, mismeasured, or otherwise inaccurately captured performance to the particular detriment of women and mothers. In addition, unfounded criticism can be included and legitimate criticism given undue weight. Within this flawed system, leave for pregnancy and caretaking responsibilities can constitute a negative factor in female Professionals’ evaluations, compensation decisions and promotion considerations at KPMG.
189. As a result of the unfounded negative comments in the review, Ms. Patterson was denied a promotion to Senior Associate in 2010 despite her three-year track record of awardwinning performance.
190. In October 2010, Ms. Patterson was removed from her largest client, despite previously winning a “Bravo” award in April 2009 for her work relating to the same client. Partner Lusk and Manager Yoshida told Ms. Patterson she was being removed so she could “get more exposure” to other clients. However, Ms. Patterson was not given work on other clients despite her persistent requests. KPMG generally does not remove employees from their largest clients without clear transfers to new clients.
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191. Partner Lusk and Manager Woofter, both Caucasian males, assigned Associate Sarah Bohman (“Associate Bohman”), a Caucasian recent college graduate with no children, to take Ms. Patterson’s place on the client team.
192. This was not the first time Ms. Patterson had been excluded from careeradvancement opportunities at KPMG; since the beginning of her employment at KPMG, Ms. Patterson found that white managers would develop friendly, casual relationships with white Associates, but made no such efforts with her.
193. Upon information and belief, KPMG’s develoment and mentoring systems have insufficient standards, quality controls, and implementation metrics, lack of transparency and opportunities for redress, and have a discriminatory and disparate impact on women and caretaking employees.
194. Further, upon information and belief, KPMG management systematically takes advantage of the flaws in the system, as Partners are allowed to mentor and develop employees selectively, without any standards or guidelines for providing these advancement opportunities.
195. Upon information and belief, Ms. Patterson was not the only female employee to suffer the effect of the lack of adequate opportunities for mentorship, development (both personal and client-based) and advancement at KPMG. Instead of having transparent and systematic policies and procedures in place based on objective performance and qualifications, how and when such opportunities are provided is shrouded in secrecy, most often to the detriment of women, caregivers, and African-Americans.
196. Upon information and belief, KPMG’s flawed promotion practices consistently result in males and non-caregivers being promoted more rapidly and assigned more frequently to higher-level positions than women across the Company.
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Pregnancy/Caregiver Discrimination and Retaliation 197. During Ms. Patterson’s tenure with KPMG, she was the only employee in the Atlanta IES practice with small children other than Manager Yoshida and Partner Lusk, both of whom had stay-at-home wives or close family members living at home. 198. KPMG discriminated against Ms. Patterson based on her pregnancy. From July 2007 to November 2009, Ms. Patterson received awards and strong reviews. However, when she became pregnant, she was subjected to hostile comments and her opportunities for advancement disappeared. 199. When Ms. Patterson informed Manager Yoshida of her pregnancy in November 2009, Manager Yoshida angrily asked, “Did you plan this?” 200. From February 2010 to July 2010, Partner Lusk actively ignored Ms. Patterson’s sabbatical request to complete her CPA licensing requirements while KPMG granted sabbatical requests and facilitated the efforts of similarly situated male and non-caretaking employees, such as Manager Woofter, to become CPAs. 201. In August 2010, Partner Lusk and Manager Yoshida subjected Ms. Patterson to increased scrutiny when both reviewed her performance, and wrote negative comments in her review that had never been raised as issues prior to Ms. Patterson announcing her pregnancy. 202. After Ms. Patterson returned from maternity leave, her requests for work were systematically denied by the KPMG managers she approached. Indeed, only one Manager, Cordella Scott (“Manager Scott”) – an African-American woman – regularly provided her work. This prevented Ms. Patterson from reaching the 89% target for billable work set by IES Partners in New York. At best, Ms. Patterson was only able to bill twelve hours in a forty-hour work
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period, which made her 30% chargeable. Prior to her pregnancy, Ms. Patterson did not have difficulty obtaining billable work.
203. Although Ms. Patterson was available and willing to work long hours, KPMG managers refused to give her work because of the predominant culture at KPMG that assumes working mothers with young children are less effective employees and less committed to their careers.
204. Because it had become clear that she was not going to advance in IES following her pregnancy, Ms. Patterson requested a transfer to another group in August 2010. However, KPMG glossed over the difficulties Ms. Patterson was experiencing and refused to consider her request for a transfer, despite Ms. Patterson’s repeated inquiries. Associates without caretaking responsibilities were regularly considered and often approved for transfers.
205. In October 2010, Ms. Patterson was removed from her largest client and replaced by Associate Bohman, a Caucasian recent college graduate with no children.
206. Upon information and belief, the Company’s policies and procedures regarding evaluation, compensation, development and promotion lack the transparency, standards, quality controls, implementation metrics, and means for redress necessary to prevent this disparate impact on female Professionals who are pregnant or mothers. Within this flawed system, leave for pregnancy and caretaking responsibilities can constitute a negative factor in female Professionals’ evaluations, compensation decisions and promotion considerations at KPMG.
207. Upon information and belief, KPMG management systematically took advantage of the flaws in the system and often undervalued, mismeasured, or otherwise inaccurately captured performance to the particular detriment of women and mothers. KPMG has subjected
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and continues to subject female employees with caregiving responsibilities and/or young children, like Ms. Patterson, to disparate terms and conditions of employment and retaliation.
Mishandling of Complaints 208. From December 2009 until her constructive discharge on November 29, 2010, Ms. Patterson complained through various reporting channels, including HR and Ethics and Compliance, about the discrimination and retaliation she was experiencing. However, KPMG failed to address Ms. Patterson’s complaints. 209. In December 2009, Ms. Patterson contacted HR Manager Tammy Woodard to raise concerns regarding Manager Yoshida’s negative and discriminatory response to her pregnancy. Upon information and belief, HR did nothing to investigate or address Ms. Patterson’s complaints, despite her repeated attempts to follow up regarding this matter. 210. In March 2010, Ms. Patterson contacted HR Manager Woodard regarding Partner Lusk’s failure to address her sabbatical request, but no action was taken until July 2010, after her desired sabbatical was supposed to begin. 211. In July 2010, Ms. Patterson contacted HR Regional Director Chris Beall (“HR Director Beall”) about the discriminatory treatment she had received since announcing her pregnancy, including Manager Yoshida and Partner Lusk’s comments, and Partner Lusk’s refusal to address her sabbatical request. Following a meeting with HR Director Beall, Ms. Patterson sent him an electronic message outlining and detailing her discrimination claims. Without Ms. Patterson’s consent, HR Director Beall sent her message to Partner Lusk and requested a meeting. 212. At the end of the month, Ms. Patterson met with HR Director Beall and Partner Lusk to discuss Ms. Patterson’s discrimination claims, including the denial of her sabbatical
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request. Because Ms. Patterson felt intimidated, she brought her mentor, Senior Manager T. Angie Napier to the meeting. At the meeting, HR Director Beall and Partner Lusk ignored Ms. Patterson’s discrimination claims and instead focused on her CPA exam in August 2009, telling her that time taken for her CPA exam would not be held against her in her year-end review.
213. Following the meeting, Partner Lusk denied Ms. Patterson’s initial request for sabbatical from June 1 to August 15 and pressured her to take a sabbatical from August through October, which she feared would have damaged her prospects for a fall promotion. When Ms. Patterson protested, Partner Lusk finally allowed a sabbatical beginning July 1 but still ending August 15, 2010, thus shortening her sabbatical by one full month and denying her compensation for June.
214. In August 2010, Ms. Patterson complained to Ethics and Compliance about the negative comments in her Performance Review – the first negative comments of her career – and the discriminatory denial of her promotion following her pregnancy. During a second performance review meeting, Partner Lusk and Manager Yoshida told newly appointed HR Tax Manager, Rebecca Berry, that Ms. Patterson’s review was not negative. HR did not challenge this or otherwise investigate or respond to the situation further.
215. Later that month, Ms. Patterson requested a transfer out of IES because the managers in her group refused to give her any work, despite repeated requests. The Ethics officer. Craig DeCampli (“Ethics Officer DeCampli”), told her to “wait,” and that the situation in IES would be resolved.
216. Ms. Patterson continually followed up with HR and Ethics through November, as her work situation had not improved. Although she had been told the investigation would be resolved in October 2010, she was told when she inquired again that it would be resolved in early
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November. When she followed up with Ethics Officer DeCampli after the appointed date in November had come and gone, he again told her that it had not yet been resolved. Ms. Patterson followed up one final time, in January 2011, only to learn that the investigation had been closed. She was never apprised of the Company’s findings.
217. KPMG never granted the transfer out of IES or made any effort to address Ms. Patterson’s complaints of discrimination and retaliation.
218. Upon information and belief, KPMG’s HR and Ethics and Compliance offices and procedures lack standards, quality controls, transparency, implementation metrics, means of redress, and requirements that concerns of discrimination be addressed and resolved. Women, mothers, and African-Americans are negatively affected by these insufficiently designed and implemented procedures, as unresponsiveness to complaints about discrimination disproportionately falls upon such employees.
Constructive Discharge 219. Ms. Patterson was forced to end her career at KPMG in November of 2010 because the Company had deliberately made her working conditions so intolerable that she was compelled to resign involuntarily. 220. When she returned from maternity leave, she was removed from her largest engagement, and, contrary to standard practice at KPMG, was not provided a replacement project. She was reliant on odd jobs and work provided to her by one African-American female Manager, Cordella Scott, to reach even a 30% billable level. She often went to work each day only to suffer the humiliation of sitting at her desk for eight to ten hours with nothing to do, despite her repeated requests for work and the obvious evidence that there was work to be done being deliberately kept from her.
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221. Although Ms. Patterson had always been a strong performer at KPMG, she was not only denied the work and promotions for which she was qualified but also denied support in the advancement she sought through pursuing her CPA.
222. Because it had become clear to Ms. Patterson that there was no future for her in IES and conditions in the division had become intolerable, she sought a transfer. Even this channel for redress was denied her, though, because KPMG refused even to consider her request, making it impossible for her to escape the discrimination and marginalization she was experiencing in IES. As her options for a future at KPMG were systematically closed, Ms. Patterson became increasingly fearful for her ability to support herself and her children.
223. These stresses at work carried over to the home, as Ms. Patterson’s work situation strained her relationship with her significant other and deteriorated her health. Ms. Patterson’s isolation and hopelessness at work made her unable to eat. While she had been nursing her newborn, she stopped producing breast milk as a result of the physical and emotional strains she suffered at KPMG.
224. Ms. Patterson wanted nothing more than to stay at KPMG and further her career. She built a house in Atlanta where she expected to raise her two children. In November 2010, after enduring months of escalating discrimination and retaliation with no hope or resolution whatsoever in light of KPMG’s persistent refusal to help, Ms. Patterson had no choice but to resign from KPMG.
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C. PLAINTIFF JEANETTE POTTER 225. Ms. Potter suffered discrimination in assignment, discrimination in pay, and denial of promotional opportunities. She was ultimately constructively discharged. 226. KPMG employed Ms. Potter from July 1995 until her constructive discharge from the Company in July 2006. 227. In July 1995, Ms. Potter began working at KPMG as a Manager in the IES Tax practice. She had previously graduated from the Universite Nanterre in France and, while at KPMG, received a Master’s degree in Tax from Pace University. In addition, she has earned two other advanced degrees. She had five years of Manager-level experience when she came to KPMG. 228. In June 1996, Ms. Potter was promoted to Senior Manager, the position in which she would be stuck for ten years before being pushed out of the company. 229. Throughout her eleven-year tenure, Ms. Potter demonstrated excellent performance. From 1996 to 2000, Ms. Potter always received “Meets Expectations” or “Exceeds Expectations” on her performance reviews, then, under a new performance rating system, received “Exceptional Performer” ratings in 2001 and 2002. 230. Ms. Potter received “Strong Performer” ratings from 2003 to 2006, when she was pushed out of the Company. Ms. Potter was applauded for her excellent work and praised as “clearly a leader in the group.”
Discriminatory Assignment 231. Although Ms. Potter was highly qualified for a Senior Manager position at the time she was hired by KPMG, the Company initially assigned her to the position of Manager.
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232. Ms. Potter’s previous employer did not have a “Senior Manager” distinction, so Ms. Potter held the title of Manager even though she performed duties typically performed by Senior Managers at comparable firms, including KPMG. These tasks included, primarily, full responsibility in performing clients’ returns and managing staff assigned to work on the returns. At KPMG, the title of “Senior Manager” typically went to individuals with two or more years of Manager experience, and Ms. Potter had a full five years of experience at this level. It was not until a year after Ms. Potter joined KPMG, however, that she received the title she should have been assigned upon her hire.
233. Upon information and belief, KPMG regularly discriminates against female employees by assigning them to lower-level positions than those for which they are qualified or than they would have received had they been men. Women are disparately impacted by the lack of transparency, standards, quality controls and implementation metrics in the Company’s practices and procedures in assigning job titles.
234. Further, KPMG management systematically takes advantage of the flaws in the assignment practices and procedures to place female employees in positions below their level of qualification.
Disparate Pay 235. Ms. Potter’s excellent performance over the course of her eleven-year career at KPMG was not rewarded with the compensation she deserved. Upon information and belief, the Company paid Ms. Potter at a lower rate than men for equal work on jobs requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which were performed under similar working conditions.
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236. Upon information and belief, because of her initial misassignment as “Manager,” Ms. Potter’s salary continued to be less than that of similarly-situated men throughout her tenure at KPMG.
237. From 1996 to 2001, Ms. Potter received yearly pay increases, but the amounts of these increases were based on a percentage of her base salary, which, upon information and belief, was already lesser than her male peers’ because of the initial misassignment.
238. In addition, after October 2002, Ms. Potter’s pay was frozen when her performance rating was lowered to “Strong Performer,” even though there had been no identifiable change in Ms. Potter’s performance, or KPMG’s assessment of it, beyond the discriminatory instruction to “socialize more.”
239. Similarly situated male employees in her office who had previously been paid at the same rate as or higher than Ms. Potter did not have their pay frozen. Ms. Potter was not aware of any male Senior Managers in the IES Tax practice who ceased to receive pay raises, and, on information and belief, they continued to receive the raises that Ms. Potter expected but was suddenly denied throughout the remainder of her tenure at KPMG.
240. In addition to Ms. Potter, at least two other female Professionals in the IES Tax practice, Senior Manager Elaine Blum (“Senior Manager Blum”) and Director Jeanne Jue (“Director Jue”), also had their pay frozen at this time. Both Senior Manager Blum and Director Jue had well over a decade of experience, like Ms. Potter, and both were strong performers.
241. After October 2002, Ms. Potter received no pay increases before her constructive discharge from the Company in July 2006, despite her consistently strong performance. Upon information and belief, comparable men continued to make more than Ms. Potter throughout her employment at KPMG, even though their experience, skills, and responsibilities never exceeded
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hers. For example, Senior Manager David Buchner, whose qualifications, experience, and responsibilities were no greater than Ms. Potter’s or Senior Manager Blum’s, continued to receive pay raises after 2002.
242. When, in May 2006, Ms. Potter asked Principal Ed Gibbons about her frozen pay, he referenced a spreadsheet with pay information and told Ms. Potter she was the fifth highest paid Senior Manager in her practice. When Ms. Potter asked which Senior Managers earned more than her, Principal Gibbons confirmed that the four higher salaries belonged to male employees. No male Senior Managers in IES Tax had comparable tenure at KPMG to Ms. Potter, and, on information and belief, none of them exceeded her in performance or responsibility. Ms. Potter asked why the less-experienced men were paid more than she was, but Principal Gibbons refused to engage on the issue and instead told Ms. Potter she was “paid too much.”
243. Although Ms. Potter requested that Principal Gibbons provide her details about salary ranges at the Company – information that was heavily guarded and kept secret for employees – and he indicated that he would do so, he never did so. Rather than taking any steps to address Ms. Potter’s concerns about discriminatory compensation, Principal Gibbons became increasingly hostile toward her. He ignored her entirely, even excluding her from discussions about her clients.
244. Upon information and belief, KPMG’s policies regarding voicing complaints of discrimination and subsequent investigations thereof lack transparency, adequate implementation metrics, standards, and quality controls, and fail to require the Company’s Partners and Principals to address discrimination. These policies, and the lack of means of redress for
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unanswered complaints, have a disparate and discriminatory effect on women in the terms and conditions of their employment.
245. Further, upon information and belief, at least two other female Senior Managers received pay cuts after their pay was initially frozen, while no male Senior Managers in her office received pay cuts. For example, KPMG cut Senior Manager Blum’s salary because she was “paid too much,” and Director Jue’s salary was also cut. Senior Manager Blum’s qualifications, tenure, and experience were at least as strong as her male peers’.
246. Upon information and belief, KPMG also subjects female employees to discriminatory demotions that come with lower salaries. For example, Senior Manager Lu Tseng (“Senior Manager Tseng”) was sent on an eighteen-month assignment to Japan. When she returned to the United States, she was told there were no Senior Manager positions available even though her previous position had not been filled. Instead, KPMG offered Senior Manager Tseng a Manager position for a salary cut.
247. Upon information and belief, KPMG underpays female Professionals at all levels throughout the Company relative to similarly-situated male employees. KPMG’s opaque evaluation and compensation practices lack sufficient standards, quality controls, implementation metrics, transparency and opportunities for redress or challenge, and create a disparate impact on the Company’s female employees. .
248. Upon information and belief, KPMG management systematically took advantage of the flaws in these systems and often undervalued, mismeasured, or otherwise inaccurately captured performance to the particular detriment of women.
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Denial of Promotions 249. Despite Ms. Potter’s exceptional performance, KPMG denied her promotions in favor of lesser qualified male employees. 250. By the summer of 2000, it had become clear to Ms. Potter that she was not going to be promoted at the rate she deserved. Ms. Potter observed that employees who spent a significant amount of time schmoozing and socializing at office happy hours were more likely to advance, while employees who did not were less likely to be promoted. This corporate culture and improper advancement criteria disproportionately harmed female employees like Ms. Potter, who were less likely to be welcomed into the Company’s “good old boys” club and who felt uncomfortable at many social events, which tended to be hostile to women. 251. Upon information and belief, the Company’s evaluation, development, and promotion policies lacked the standards and quality controls to reward excellent performance like Ms. Potter’s. 252. In the summer of 2000, Ms. Potter informed Partner McLaughlin that she planned to resign from KPMG due to the lack of promotional opportunities. She was prepared to accept an offer at Ernst & Young for a comparable position with a $13,000 salary increase and a $17,000 signing bonus. Ms. Potter expected that Ernst & Young would provide greater opportunities for promotion than KPMG. However, Partners McLaughlin, Pete Dolan, Patricia Brown (who also served as Principal in Charge of the East for IES during the time Ms. Kassman experienced discrimination and retaliation), Bill Hibbit, Dan Orchant, Sam Russo and Jeff Stein told Ms. Potter that they refused to accept her resignation and reassured her that she was just about to be promoted. The group of Partners offered her a $20,000 retention bonus (which she
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had to repay if she left within one year) and sent her a box of chocolates with a card that read, “Please don’t leave.”
253. Because Ms. Potter believed, based on the Partners’ representations, that she was about to be promoted, she declined the attractive offer from Ernst & Young and decided to stay at KPMG.
254. In Ms. Potter’s May 2001 review, Principal McLaughlin wrote that she “had a fabulous year” and was “clearly a leader in the group.” Despite Principal McLaughlin’s positive comments and Ms. Potter’s “Exceptional Performer” rating, she was not promoted in 2001.
255. In Ms. Potter’s May 2002 performance review, Principal McLaughlin gave Ms. Potter a “Strong Performer” rating, lower than all her previous ratings, despite the review’s overwhelmingly positive comments. The only criticism Principal McLaughlin wrote was that Ms. Potter needed to “continue to build relationships” for a promotion to Tax Managing Director.
256. In May 2002, however, Ms. Potter was abruptly removed from the Managing Director track she had been promised. KPMG denied Ms. Potter the promotion to Managing Director because, according to Principal McLaughlin, she did not “socialize” enough. Principal McLaughlin told Ms. Potter she needed to “schmooze” more. However, Ms. Potter could not attend events on Fridays – when many of the happy hours were scheduled – because her religion dictates that she observe the Sabbath.
257. In addition, Ms. Potter did not attend many of the Company’s other informal social events because she strongly disapproved of male Partners’ overtly sexual conduct toward female staff at the events. Upon information and belief, KPMG Partners accosted and manhandled junior female employees at the Company happy hours. Male Partners regularly
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took “body shots” off of female employees, during which Partners would put salt or sugar on a female employee’s neck and lick it off. Senior leadership including Principal Brown were present and witnessed these events and, through their inaction, tacitly condoned the behavior of their male counterparts and subordinates.
258. Accordingly, these socializing events were much more amenable to fostering male employees’ sense of belonging and ownership than women. Nonetheless, KPMG’s promotion decisions rely heavily on personal relationships built at Company social events that are hostile to, or that tend to exclude, female employees. Indeed, upon information and belief, the Company’s evaluation, development, and promotion practices lack the transparency, standards, quality controls, implementation metrics and means for redress necessary to reward rather than disadvantage successful female employees. Upon information and belief, Ms. Potter was not the only woman who was forced to choose between submitting to hostile social activities or allowing her career to stagnate.
259. When Ms. Potter expressed her concerns about his assessment of her potential for promotion with Principal McLaughlin, he was unresponsive, consistent with the treatment she later received from Principal Gibbons. When she questioned the justification for why she was not promoted, Principal McLaughlin told her this was the way things were at KPMG.
260. Following this discussion, Principal McLaughlin ignored Ms. Potter, excluding her from decisions about clients and staff, ceasing to direct any new clients to her, and instead focusing his attention on Senior Manager Buchner.
261. Because Ms. Potter did not engage in or otherwise support these hostile social events, she was marginalized, downgraded in her review, and denied a promotion. While Ms. Potter hit a glass ceiling, she witnessed males of her same educational and experiential
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background, who shared the same responsibilities as her and performed no better than her, move upward in the Company.
262. Indeed, upon information and belief, after Ms. Potter was removed from the partnership track, Senior Managers Tom Condon and Roger Koferl – who lacked Ms. Potter’s years of experience, advanced degree in Tax, and record of exceptional performance – were prioritized in her place. Both were eventually promoted, and both took part in the maledominated after-hours culture that Principal McLaughlin criticized Ms. Potter for avoiding.
263. Upon information and belief, because of their lack of clearly defined and implemented standards and transparency, KPMG’s promotion practices consistently result in males being promoted more rapidly, developed more purposefully, and assigned more frequently to higher level positions than women across the Company.
264. Upon information and belief, KPMG took advantage of the professional development and performance evaluation systems’ lack of transparency, quality standards and controls, implementation metrics, and opportunities for redress by including unfounded criticism against many female employees, resulting in their exclusion from promotion opportunities.
Constructive Discharge 265. Ms. Potter was forced to end her career at KPMG in July of 2006 because the Company had deliberately made her working conditions so intolerable that she was compelled to resign involuntarily. While she had hopes to continue building a long career at KPMG, and to become a Partner, it became clear that she was not valued and would always be subject to discrimination. 266. Ms. Potter found her situation at KPMG increasingly intolerable as she witnessed men who were no more qualified than she surpass her in pay and status within the Company.
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This, along with the explicit devaluing of her contributions through comments like Principal Gibbons’ that she was “paid too much,” made her feel worthless. KPMG’s failure to provide her a legitimate justification for her stagnant pay caused her particular distress as she saw her performance reviews altered downward for the first time in her tenure. She foresaw being pushed out of the Company.
267. Because the Company provided her with no suggestions for becoming eligible for pay increases or promotion beyond submitting to social activities that were degrading to women, Ms. Potter saw no avenue for a continued role at KPMG.
268. Her experience of Principal Gibbons’ and Principal McLaughlin’s unresponsiveness and hostility to her concerns about discriminatory pay and advancement opportunities led her to believe there would be no recourse within the Company. Not only did the latter individuals fail to respond to her concerns, but they also responded with open hostility, which went beyond just unkindness to freezing Ms. Potter out of assignments and information about her clients that was necessary for her to succeed at work.
269. Reaching out to Human Resources within her division would be a fruitless exercise, as she had been provided no literature about the Company’s policies and procedures, and had observed that HR was controlled by the very Principals who tormented her. An atmosphere of hostility pervaded the office, such that she feared any complaints would result in the retaliation and marginalization she experienced from Principals Gibbons and McLaughlin, which led her to fear termination.
270. As doors closed for Ms. Potter at KPMG in 2006, she became increasingly anxious and depressed. She had persistent headaches, which escalated at this time, along with back pain and frequent sleeplessness.
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271. Thus, after more than a decade as a Senior Manager with no hope for promotion and four years with no salary increase, Ms. Potter had no choice but to resign from KPMG in July 2006. Ms. Potter was forced to accept a job for half her exiting salary before finding permanent employment in the financial services industry.
D. PLAINTIFF ASHWINI VASUDEVA 272. Ms. Vasudeva suffered discrimination in pay, denial of promotional opportunities, and discrimination as a result of pregnancy. She was ultimately constructively discharged. 273. KPMG employed Ms. Vasudeva, the mother of a young child, full-time from January 2005 until her constructive discharge from the Company in September 2009. 274. In the summer of 2004, Ms. Vasudeva began working at KPMG’s Mountain View office as an Intern. She returned to KPMG as a full-time Associate in the same office in January of 2005, first working in the External Audit practice, then in Contracts Compliance Services within the Advisory practice approximately a year and a half later. In June 2007, Ms. Vasudeva was promoted to Senior Associate. 275. Prior to working at KPMG, Ms. Vasudeva earned her first Bachelor’s Degree in Commerce and Economics from University of Mumbai in India, then worked for two years in India in accounting and sales. Ms. Vasudeva then earned a second Bachelor of Science Degree in Accounting from California State University, Hayward in 2005. 276. Throughout her nearly five-year tenure, Ms. Vasudeva proved herself to be a stellar performer. During her reviews, Ms. Vasudeva’s performance managers consistently rated her as a “strong” or “exceptional performer.” In or around 2005 and 2006, KPMG also awarded Ms. Vasudeva “Encore” awards, reserved for employees who go “above and beyond the call of duty.”
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Disparate Pay 277. Upon information and belief, KPMG paid Ms. Vasudeva at a lower rate than men for equal work on jobs requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which were performed under similar working conditions. 278. For example, KPMG paid Ms. Vasudeva less than her male peer Ryan WoodTaylor, who had started at KPMG around the same time as Ms. Vasudeva after graduating from University, and had similar job duties as a Senior Associate in Contracts Compliance Services. For example, both Ms. Vasudeva and Mr. Wood-Taylor managed projects for clients, managed staff and travelled to client sites to perform their work. Indeed, Mr. Wood-Taylor even lagged behind Ms. Vasudeva in key respects, having performed fewer audits in less diverse settings than Ms. Vasudeva. 279. Although Ms. Vasudeva and Mr. Wood-Taylor held the same roles on projects, often working under the same supervisor, and although were both strong performers, she came to believe during the time that they were both Senior Associates that he was paid more than her. Eventually, she learned from her colleague, Manager Sarabdeep Narang, that Mr. Wood-Taylor’s salary was in fact $10,000 higher than hers. 280. Mr. Wood-Taylor was not the only similarly situated male Senior Associate paid more than Ms. Vasudeva. Upon information and belief, Ms. Vasudeva’s salary has been lower than that of other similarly situated male colleagues throughout her employment. 281. Upon information and belief, KPMG underpays female Professionals at all levels throughout the Company relative to similarly situated male employees. 282. For example, while Ms. Vasudeva was an Associate, she saw the pay stub of male Senior Associate Nishant Shah, who was working with her and Senior
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Associate Kathryn Harris (“Senior Associate Harris”) on a project. She was shocked to discover that he earned approximately $10,000 more than Senior Associate Harris though both held MBA degrees and had the same job duties.
283. Moreover, KPMG also discriminates in bonus pay. In 2008, when Ms. Vasudeva took maternity leave, KPMG denied Ms. Vasudeva a bonus despite the fact that her overall performance did not decrease. With the same level of performance in previous years, Ms. Vasudeva had received a bonus.
284. When she questioned her Performance Manager, Director Abhijit Joshi (“Director Joshi”), about the reason she had been denied a bonus, Director Joshi told her she was denied a bonus due to “economic” reasons. However, upon information and belief, Ms. Vasudeva’s male peers, including Mr. Wood-Taylor, received bonuses.
285. The only difference was that Ms. Vasudeva is a woman who had taken maternity leave. In addition and upon information and belief, women and women with child-rearing responsibilities were primarily those who did not receive bonuses for 2008.
Denial of Promotions 286. Despite Ms. Vasudeva’s stellar qualifications and performance, KPMG denied her promotions in favor of lesser qualified male employees. 287. Initially, Ms. Vasudeva progressed along KPMG’s standard career track, receiving a promotion to Senior Associate in June 2007. However, her career progression suddenly stalled once she became pregnant. 288. After Ms. Vasudeva returned from maternity leave, KPMG placed a number of obstacles in her path, in a seeming attempt to derail her advancement. Among other things, Ms. Vasudeva’s supervising Principal Matt Behan (“Principal Behan”) abruptly removed her from
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her largest engagement, assigned her to a client an hour and a half away, and regularly imposed unrealistic demands on her.
289. In May 2009, KPMG promoted Senior Associate Ryan Wood-Taylor, a lessexperienced male, to Manager instead of Ms. Vasudeva. As a result, Ms. Vasudeva had to report to Manager Wood-Taylor, who had previously been her peer. Manager Wood-Taylor did not have comparable audit experience to Ms. Vasudeva. Manager Wood-Taylor had only worked on one or two software engagements, while Ms. Vasudeva had diverse experiences in a variety of audits.
290. Senior Associate Bryan Dillon, another male employee, was also promoted to Manager in May 2009 over Ms. Vasudeva, even though the two had comparable experience. Senior Associate Dillon had also joined KPMG after receiving his Bachelor of Science degree. He held her same role within Contracts Compliance Services under the same Partners and generally performed her same job duties. On information and belief, his performance was not substantially or meaningfully better than Ms. Vasudeva’s.
291. When Ms. Vasudeva asked Director Joshi, her male Performance Manager, why her male colleagues were promoted instead of her, Director Joshi told her that Managers WoodTaylor and Dillon were “friends” with the management, and that was “how things work around KPMG.” When asked, he was unable to provide Ms. Vasudeva any ways in which she could improve her performance or develop her skill set to better position herself for a promotion.
292. Ms. Vasudeva also asked Partner Vanessa Lo why she was not promoted, and was told that management counted her six months of maternity leave against her tenure and considered her “too inexperienced” with Manager duties. However, Ms. Vasudeva had ample exposure to Manager-level work. She had regularly performed Manager-level tasks such as
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budgeting and forecasting and had even trained new Managers on their duties for certain projects.
293. Upon information and belief, Ms. Vasudeva was not the only woman to suffer the effects of the evaluation, development, and promotion systems at KPMG, which lacked sufficient standards, quality controls, implementation metrics, transparency, and opportunities for redress that would otherwise have ensured there was no disparate impact on female professionals who took FMLA leave.
294. Upon information and belief, KPMG management systematically took advantage of the flaws in these systems and often undervalued, mismeasured, or otherwise inaccurately captured performance to the particular detriment of women.
295. Indeed, Senior Associates Dillon and Wood-Taylor, like other male employees at KPMG, were regularly invited to “client-building” events, while their female counterparts toiled away in the office. For example, in 2008 and 2009, when Ms. Vasudeva was staffed on an audit for Engagement Manager Jared Collins (“Manager Collins”), the Partners, Managers and other Senior Associates working on the project, all of whom were male, often went golfing on the Company dime to develop relationships with clients and senior management. Ms. Vasudeva, the sole female Senior Associate who had taken FMLA leave was systematically excluded. For example, on one occasion, Manager Collins, Senior Associate Dillon, Senior Associate WoodTaylor and three male Team Leads went golfing with the audit client. Ms. Vasudeva, the only other Team Lead, was not informed about the event until it was already underway.
Pregnancy/Caregiver Discrimination and Retaliation 296. From 2007 until her constructive discharge in 2009, KPMG discriminated against Ms. Vasudeva based on her gender and her caregiving responsibilities as a working mother.
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Because of Ms. Vasudeva’s status as a working mother, and her decision to take maternity leave, KPMG made a number of adverse decisions concerning her employment.
297. In January 2008, Ms. Vasudeva told her Engagement Partner, Principal Behan, that she planned to take maternity leave. Principal Behan told her that, if she took maternity leave, she might not come back at the same level or same pay.
298. When Ms. Vasudeva noted that it was illegal to penalize her for taking maternity leave, Principal Behan replied that “in England that is not the case.”
299. In July 2008, when Ms. Vasudeva returned from maternity leave, Principal Behan abruptly removed her from her largest, most lucrative engagement, to which she had been assigned for over a year. Though Ms. Vasudeva had previously trained staff to work on the client, Principal Behan claimed it was “fully staffed” without her.
300. Principal Behan reassigned Ms. Vasudeva to a new client in Stockton, CA, nearly an hour and a half from Ms. Vasudeva’s home in Union City, CA. The Stockton client required high volumes of unchallenging work and was not in need of Ms. Vasudeva’s skill set. Further, Ms. Vasudeva had to drive to and from Stockton each day, making her commute three hours per day. While other employees staffed to the client stayed in Stockton during the week and returned home for the weekends, Ms. Vasudeva had to return home daily to care for her newborn. Ms. Vasudeva’s similarly situated male counterparts in Contracts Compliance Services were not reassigned to new clients at this time or in this abrupt fashion.
301. Two weeks after being reassigned to the Stockton client, Ms. Vasudeva told Principal Behan that she believed the reassignment was unfair. She asked to be removed from the client, but Principal Behan refused to do so. Ms. Vasudeva’s request for release was only granted when she asked the Engagement Partner on the Stockton client.
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302. Ms. Vasudeva also expressed her concerns to her Performance Manager, Director Joshi. Shortly after her complaints she was placed on a new project, on which KPMG expected Ms. Vasudeva to achieve results as “Team Lead” for a software audit under Partner Ron Brill (“Partner Brill”) and Manager Collins, but provided her no staff to fill her “team.” During the ten-month period that Ms. Vasudeva was staffed on the project, she only received assistance for two weeks, while she was traveling overseas for a client site visit.
303. Typically, such a project would have been staffed with at least two or three other members of the team. Indeed, the three additional “Team Leads” on the client, all of whom were male, had at least two staff members reporting to them. Further, Senior Associates Wood-Taylor and Dillon, who were given informal promotions to “Super Senior Associates” on the same audit, had two to three Senior Associates reporting them, who in turn had three to four Associates reporting to them. Unlike Ms. Vasudeva, who was left to fend for herself on her audit, male Senior Associates had teams of Associates conducting analysis and performing other support tasks for them. Although Manager Collins was directly responsible for Ms. Vasudeva’s engagement, he claimed he had “no expertise” and refused to support her.
304. Once again, the Company was setting Ms. Vasudeva up for failure. On Manager Collins’ project, Ms. Vasudeva was the only female Senior Associate. All Managers and Partners were male. Ms. Vasudeva, without a team to lead, was put at a distinct disadvantage compared to her male peers, who had several people on their teams.
305. Not only did Ms. Vasudeva’s maternity leave affect the assignments she received, but it also permeated her year-end performance review. The final and only comment in the Year End Overall Performance Rating Comments for Ms. Vasudeva’s 2008 Fiscal Year review was that “Ashwini was on Maternity Leave for most of this performance year.”
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306. After the Company had set Ms. Vasudeva up for failure, in her 2009 fiscal year end review, KPMG included unjust criticisms of her software-related skills, though her work required only business, accounting and audit skills. Upon information and belief, these criticisms came from Managers Collins and Wood-Taylor. In fact, Ms. Vasudeva did not need software-related skills to fulfill her job duties. Ms. Vasudeva addressed this concern to Director Joshi, and he indicated that he understood the problem, yet declined to remove this irrelevant criticism from her evaluation.
307. While recognizing her “excellent” work product, Director Joshi made unfounded, gendered criticisms of Ms. Vasudeva’s communication style, stating that she should develop a “softer approach.” Upon information and belief, these criticisms also came from Managers Collins and Wood-Taylor.
308. Upon information and belief, KPMG’s promotion system’s insufficient quality standards and controls and implementation metrics, coupled with its lack of transparency and opportunities for redress, had a discriminatory and disparate impact on women and caretaking employees.
309. Upon information and belief, KPMG management systematically took advantage of the flaws in the system by allowing isolated, pretexual criticisms to infiltrate promotion decisions, overwhelmingly to the disadvantage of female employees.
310. In December 2008, Manager Collins told Ms. Vasudeva that she should sign up for a flex schedule because she was “working only from 9 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.” Although Manager Collins assumed Ms. Vasudeva was working less or otherwise underperforming as a new mother, this was not true. While Ms. Vasudeva would leave work at 5:00 p.m. to pick up her child from daycare, she would work late at night to compensate for any lost time. Indeed, she typically
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worked twelve hours per day, and had no desire to work a reduced schedule or otherwise participate in the flex time program.
311. After female Partner Vanessa Lo reassured her that she should not go on a flexible plan if she was working full-time hours, Ms. Vasudeva told Manager Collins that she saw no need for her to go on a flex schedule, which would have come with reduced pay and lessened her chances for her promotion to manager. Manager Collins appeared to disapprove of her decision when Ms. Vasudeva told him.
312. Like Ms. Vasudeva, many female Professionals at KPMG are pressured to move to a flexible schedule after having children because of the predominant culture at KPMG that assumes working mothers with young children are less effective employees and less committed to their careers. Upon information and belief, taking leave or hours reductions for pregnancy and caretaking reasons is considered a negative factor in employees’ evaluations, compensation decisions and promotion considerations, resulting in an adverse impact on women and mothers at the Company.
313. In June 2009, Ms. Vasudeva requested a ninety-day sabbatical because of stress from the unrealistic demands being imposed on her and the lack of opportunities and support. While Principal Behan—who was no longer Ms. Vasudeva’s direct supervisor—approved the sabbatical requests of an employee who had not taken maternity leave in order to engage in recreational activities, he persuaded HR to reject Ms. Vasudeva’s because “his client need[ed] [her].” At the time, however, Ms. Vasudeva had no work pending. Indeed, Partner Brill, Ms. Vasudeva’s Engagement Partner at the time, had previously approved her sabbatical request because Ms. Vasudeva had completed all her deliverables.
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314. In June 2009, after Principal Behan rejected her sabbatical request, Ms. Vasudeva complained to HR. In addition to discussing her denied sabbatical request, Ms. Vasudeva complained about the ongoing discrimination she was experiencing. She also discussed her complaints of discrimination with Ethics and Compliance. However, KPMG never addressed Ms. Vasudeva’s complaints prior to her constructive discharge.
315. Upon information and belief, during Ms. Vasudeva’s tenure with KPMG, she was the only pregnant female at the Associate or Senior Associate level in both the Audit and Advisory Practices at KPMG Mountain View. The only other pregnant female employee in either practice who Ms. Vasudeva was aware of was Shanti Krishnaswamy, a Director whom Principal Behan asked to leave approximately a year after her she gave birth to her child.
316. Upon information and belief, KPMG has subjected and continues to subject female employees with caregiving responsibilities and/or young children like Ms. Vasudeva to disparate terms and conditions of employment.
Constructive Discharge 317. Ms. Vasudeva was forced to end her career at KPMG in September of 2009 because the Company had deliberately made her working conditions so intolerable that she was compelled to resign involuntarily. 318. When Ms. Vasudeva began at KPMG, building a career at the Company was her lifelong dream. However, despite her hard work, her dream steadily grew more and more elusive. During Ms. Vasudeva’s tenure at KPMG, she was paid less than male counterparts, denied opportunities for mentorship and advancement, and experienced discrimination and retaliation when she became pregnant and took maternity leave. Although she continued to be a
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top performer, she bore the burden of unrealistic demands, insufficient resources to complete her work, and regular hostility from male superiors such as Principal Behan.
319. For example, in 2007, when Principal Behan noticed that Ms. Vasudeva worked well with her female colleague, Senior Associate Kathryn Harris, he attempted to sabotage their working relationship. Speaking with each woman privately, Principal Behan told Ms. Vasudeva and Ms. Harris that one had made negative comments about the other, though neither had done so. Ultimately, the two women reconciled and discovered that Principal Behan had lied to them both. Upon information and belief, Principal Behan’s divide-and-conquer strategy was intended to further marginalize the female Professionals in his group, who already constituted a minority.
320. In another example of Principal Behan’s hostility to women, in July 2009, Principal Behan made overt sexual innuendos to Ms. Vasudeva including a suggestion that, to women, the flavor of certain Indian food was similar to semen “in their mouth[s].” The comment made Ms. Vasudeva extremely uncomfortable. Upon information and belief, Principal Behan regularly made degrading comments to and about other women.
321. Even once he was no longer her direct supervisor, Principal Behan saw to it that Ms. Vasudeva would not be able to take sabbatical, compounding the retaliation to which he had already subjected her to in moving her to the Stockton project.
322. Manager Collins, too, made it clear that he disapproved of Ms. Vasudeva’s status as a full-time working mother, and, accordingly, increased demands on her by declining to provide her support in working on his software audit.
323. While Ms. Vasudeva had originally hoped that things might get better with time – as she proved herself and her skills to the Company – her treatment upon her return from maternity leave proved that to be a false hope. Although Ms. Vasudeva had long experienced
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hostility at KPMG, these conditions escalated dramatically when she returned from maternity leave. She was not only singled out for overly-burdensome unchallenging work, but also was denied adequate resources, excluded from opportunities for further advancement, subjected to criticisms regarding an assumed lack of commitment to the company, and otherwise isolated and devalued.
324. Ms. Vasudeva found herself constantly unhappy and irritable, detrimentally affecting her relationships with her family. Her misery at work suffused not only her life at KPMG, but also her home life. Ms. Vadudeva was frequently unhappy and overcome by anxiety about work, disrupting even the simplest of moments at home.
325. As a result of ongoing discrimination, hostility and retaliation, Ms. Vasudeva also developed stress-induced pain in her neck and lower and middle back, severe enough eventually to necessitate treatment by a physician.
326. KPMG took no action whatsoever in response to her concerns despite the fact that she voiced them to senior management, Human Resources, and Ethics and Compliance. KPMG’s deliberate and purposeful indifference to her concerns, and its active steps to deny her a sabbatical, exacerbated and otherwise contributed to her distress. Once it became clear to Ms. Vasudeva that even HR and Ethics and Compliance were not going to ameliorate the situation, her work environment became more oppressive. Eventually, she could not even think about going to work day to day; resignation was her only option.
327. Once it became clear to Ms. Vasudeva that HR and Ethics and Compliance were not going to step in—and that they were going to be indifferent to her concerns and even complicit in her torment—she could not even think about going to work day to day. Resignation became her only option.
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328. Like Ms. Vasudeva, other female employees in Ms. Vasudeva’s practice group have complained to HR and/or through other reporting channels about the Company’s “old boys’ club.” Upon information and belief, since Ms. Vasudeva’s constructive discharge from KPMG, at least four female Associates and one female Senior Associate from her practice group have left the Company due to frustration about the lack of opportunities. Upon information and belief, only one male employee has left Ms. Vasudeva’s group, while most of the other men have been swiftly and steadily promoted.
329. Upon information and belief, KPMG’s flawed evaluation, development, mentoring and promotion practices consistently result in males being promoted more rapidly and assigned more frequently to higher-level positions than women across the Company.
E. PLAINTIFF TINA BUTLER 330. Ms. Butler, a current employee of the Company, has suffered and continues to suffer discrimination in pay and denial of promotional opportunities. 331. In October of 2004, Ms. Butler transitioned from her Client Services Support role to an Associate role in Business Performance Services Advisory, which became Performance Advisory Services in 2009. When she joined KPMG in 1999, she brought with her eight years of relevant work experience. She was promoted to Senior Associate in 2007 and to Manager in Federal Advisory Services in 2013. 332. Ms. Butler worked out of KPMG’s Atlanta, Georgia and Tysons, Virginia offices during her tenure at the Company. 333. Ms. Butler’s experiences at KPMG have been similar to those of the other Named Plaintiffs and the class.
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334. Ms. Butler has been paid less than similarly situated men during the class period. She has consistently earned less than similarly or worse performing men in her position, function, and service line, despite having the same or more experience and tenure in job.
335. Despite her stellar performance ratings, Ms. Butler has been denied promotions at KPMG. In 2009, for example, Ms. Butler’s male colleague Jesse Traylor was promoted to Manager. Though the two performed similar work at the time, Ms. Butler was forced to wait until 2013 to be similarly promoted.
336. As she languished in the Senior Associate position, Ms. Butler saw less qualified and less experienced men promoted over her.
337. Upon information and belief, Ms. Butler is not the only woman to suffer the effects of the compensation and promotion policies and practices at KPMG, which lack sufficient standards and quality controls, transparency, implementation metrics, and opportunities for redress that would otherwise have ensured there was no disparate impact on female professionals. Other women were similarly underpaid and underpromoted relative to men.
338. Upon information and belief, KPMG management systematically takes advantage of the flaws in the system by paying female employees less than similarly situated male employees. KPMG underpays female Professionals at all levels throughout the Company relative to similarly situated male employees.
339. Moreover, KPMG’s flawed promotion practices consistently result in males being promoted more rapidly and assigned more frequently to higher positions than women across the Company.
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340. Ms. Butler is a member of the opt-in EPA collective and would be a member of any Rule 23 class. She alleges both disparate impact and treatment claims consistent with the other Named Plaintiffs in this action.
F. PLAINTIFF CHERYL CHARITY 341. Ms. Charity, a current employee of the Company, has suffered and continues to suffer discrimination in pay and denial of promotions at KPMG. 342. In March of 2001, Ms. Charity began working at KPMG as a Senior Associate in IT Advisory, bringing with her a decade of prior work experience. She had previously earned her Bachelor of Science from Virginia Commonwealth University in 1991. She earned her Master’s in Management Information Systems from the University of Maryland University College in 2003 and her MBA from the same in 2004. Ms. Charity was promoted to Manager in 2004 and to Senior Manager/Director in July 2010. 343. Ms. Charity has worked out of KPMG’s Washington, DC and Tysons, Virginia offices during her tenure with the Company. 344. Ms. Charity’s experiences at KPMG have been similar to those of the other Named Plaintiffs and the class. 345. Ms. Charity has been paid less than similarly situated men at KPMG during the class period. She has consistently earned less than similarly or worse performing men in her position, function, and service line, despite having more experience, qualifications, and tenure in job. 346. At the same time, poorly designed and implemented performance management and promotion systems systematically undervalue women’s contributions to KPMG.
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347. Ms. Charity’s performance ratings at KPMG have also been unfairly lower than those of her male colleagues who performed similar work at the same level, which has led to her being denied promotions and fair compensation increases. These discriminatory reviews have consistently barred her from receiving promotions the first year she was eligible, and have limited her compensation.
348. Upon information and belief, KPMG’s performance management system’s insufficient quality standards and controls and implementation metrics, coupled with its lack of transparency and opportunities for redress, has a discriminatory and disparate impact on women.
349. Upon information and belief, Ms. Charity is not the only woman to suffer the effects of the compensation and promotion policies and practices at KPMG, which lack sufficient standards and quality controls, transparency, implementation metrics, and opportunities for redress that would otherwise have ensured there was no disparate impact on female professionals. Other women were similarly underpaid and underpromoted relative to men.
350. Upon information and belief, KPMG management systematically takes advantage of the flaws in the system by paying female employees less than similarly situated male employees. KPMG underpays female Professionals at all levels throughout the Company relative to similarly situated male employees.
351. Moreover, KPMG’s flawed promotion practices consistently result in males being promoted more rapidly and assigned more frequently to higher positions than women across the Company. KPMG management systematically takes advantage of the flaws in the system to exclude and undervalue women’s contributions.
352. For example, a male Principal frequently invited his male counselees and the men on his projects to golf with him on the weekends. No women were invited. While the men who
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accompanied him on these trips were rated highly in their performance evaluations and promoted quickly, excluded women, like Ms. Charity, were left to languish for years without promotion. Similarly, another male Partner told Ms. Charity that he was “surprised [she] was still with the firm” because of his view that “single women” did not stay in the same job for long.
353. Finally, Ms. Charity has firsthand experience with how KPMG not only ignores concerns regarding unfair treatment but actively dissuades women from reporting them. For example, when Ms. Charity raised the possibility of filing a formal HR complaint, a Partner told her, “if you go to HR, it will turn on you.”
354. Upon information and belief, KPMG’s HR and Ethics and Compliance offices and procedures lack standards, quality controls, transparency, implementation metrics, means of redress, and requirements that concerns of discrimination be addressed and resolved. Concerns about discrimination made to supervising staff and HR itself are allowed to go unaddressed, or worse, to result in further or increased discrimination and retaliation. Women and mothers are negatively affected by these insufficiently designed and implemented procedures, as unresponsiveness to complaints about discrimination disproportionately falls upon such employees.
355. Ms. Charity is a member of the opt-in EPA collective and would be a member of any Rule 23 class. She alleges both disparate impact and treatment claims consistent with the other Named Plaintiffs in this action.
G. PLAINTIFF HEATHER INMAN 356. Ms. Inman suffered discrimination in pay and denial of promotional opportunities until she left the KPMG in October 2014.
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357. In August of 2005, Ms. Inman began working at KPMG as a Manager in IT Advisory, bringing with her over twelve years of work experience. She previously earned her Bachelor of Science in Accounting in 1991 from University of Missouri-Columbus School of Business.
358. Ms. Inman worked out of KPMG’s St. Louis, Missouri office during her tenure at the Company.
359. Ms. Inman’s experiences at KPMG have been similar to those of the other Named Plaintiffs and the class.
360. Ms. Inman was paid less than similarly situated men during the class period. She consistently earned less than similarly or worse performing men in her position, function, and service line, despite having the same or more experience and tenure in her job.
361. Upon information and belief, Ms. Inman is not the only woman to suffer the effects of the compensation policies and practices at KPMG, which lack sufficient standards and quality controls, transparency, implementation metrics, and opportunities for redress that would otherwise have ensured there was no disparate impact on female professionals. Other women were similarly underpaid relative to men.
362. Despite her positive performance ratings, Ms. Inman was denied a promotion at KPMG. Though she worked at KPMG as a Manager for over nine years, she was never promoted to Senior Manager. During that time period, Ms. Inman saw less qualified and less experienced men be promoted over her.
363. Upon information and belief, Ms. Inman is not the only woman to suffer the effects of the promotion policies and practices at KPMG, which lack sufficient standards and quality controls, transparency, implementation metrics, and opportunities for redress that would
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otherwise have ensured there was no disparate impact on female professionals. Other women were similarly passed over for promotion compared to male peers.
364. Ms. Inman was also denied professional opportunities due to her status as a mother. After she returned from maternity leave in 2007, Ms. Inman’s manager, Rob Wolf, denied her opportunities to work on the best accounts, which included travel. Ms. Inman was willing to travel, but Mr. Wolf told her that she could not because she had young children. When Ms. Inman pointed out that a male colleague was given these assignments despite having a young child, Mr. Wolf responded that it was different because “you’re the mom.”
365. Finally, Ms. Inman has firsthand experience with how KPMG ignores concerns regarding unfair treatment. For example, Ms. Inman submitted multiple complaints of sexual harassment from male Partners while working for KPMG. In one instance, the Partner received a verbal warning. In two instances, KPMG took no action in response to her complaints. In addition, Ms. Inman also observed her male colleagues frequently having lunch at a local restaurant where the waitresses dressed in skimpy lingerie or body paint, and taking clients to strip clubs. They told Ms. Inman she could not accompany them on such outings. As a result, she lost out on valuable networking opportunities with her peers and with clients.
366. Upon information and belief, KPMG’s HR and Ethics and Compliance offices and procedures lack standards, quality controls, transparency, implementation metrics, means of redress, and requirements that concerns of discrimination be addressed and resolved. Concerns about discrimination made to supervising staff and HR itself are allowed to go unaddressed, or worse, to result in further or increased discrimination and retaliation. Women and mothers are negatively affected by these insufficiently designed and implemented procedures, as
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unresponsiveness to complaints about discrimination disproportionately falls upon such employees.
367. Ms. Inman is a member of the opt-in EPA collective and would be a member of any Rule 23 class. She alleges both disparate impact and treatment claims consistent with the other Named Plaintiffs in this action.
H. PLAINTIFF NANCY JONES 368. Ms. Jones suffered discrimination in pay and denial of promotions until her constructive discharge from KPMG in June 2014. 369. In November of 2010, Ms. Jones began working at KPMG as a Senior Associate in Performance Advisory, bringing with her five years of previous work experience. She had previously received her Bachelor of Business Administration in Actuarial Science and Finance from Georgia State University. 370. Ms. Jones worked out of KPMG’s Atlanta, Georgia office during her tenure at the Company. She worked with employees from the Chicago, Boston, and New York offices, and her mentor was based in KPMG’s Dallas office. Ms. Jones also spent time working in KPMG’s San Francisco, Houston, and Chicago offices. 371. Ms. Jones’ experiences at KPMG have been similar to those of the other Named Plaintiffs and the class. 372. Ms. Jones was paid less than similarly situated men at KPMG during the class period, despite her stellar performance and additional experience . 373. Ms. Jones was eligible for promotion, but despite her stellar performance ratings, and the fact that she was consistently performing work at or above the level of her male peers, Ms. Jones was not promoted during her tenure at KPMG.
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374. Ms. Jones asked her PML repeatedly about her denied promotion and lack of advancement opportunities. While her PML assured her she would be promoted, Ms. Jones was not promoted during her tenure at KPMG. She also raised her concerns with the leader of her department, who failed to take any action in response.
375. Ms. Jones found herself constantly unhappy and stressed, detrimentally affecting her relationships with her family and loved ones. As a result of ongoing discrimination and hostility, Ms. Jones began taking anti-depressants in January 2012.
376. KPMG took no action in response to her concerns despite the fact that she repeatedly voiced them to management. KPMG’s deliberate and purposeful indifference to her concerns contributed to her distress. Once it became clear to Ms. Jones that KPMG was not going to ameliorate the situation, her work environment became more oppressive. Eventually, she could not even think about going to work day to day; resignation was her only option.
377. Having been repeatedly denied opportunities for advancement and faced with a stalled career, Ms. Jones had no choice but to leave KPMG in June 2014.
378. Upon information and belief, Ms. Jones is not the only woman to suffer the effects of the compensation and promotion policies and practices at KPMG, which lack sufficient standards and quality controls, transparency, implementation metrics, and opportunities for redress that would otherwise have ensured there was no disparate impact on female professionals. Other women were similarly underpaid and underpromoted relative to men.
379. Upon information and belief, KPMG management systematically takes advantage of the flaws in the system by paying female employees less than similarly situated male employees. KPMG underpays female Professionals at all levels throughout the Company relative to similarly situated male employees.
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380. Moreover, KPMG’s flawed promotion practices consistently result in males being promoted more rapidly and assigned more frequently to higher positions than women across the Company.
381. Ms. Jones is a member of the opt-in EPA collective and would be a member of any Rule 23 class. She alleges both disparate impact and treatment claims consistent with the other Named Plaintiffs in this action.
I. CAROL MURRAY 382. Ms. Murray, a current employee of the Company, has suffered and continues to suffer discrimination in pay at KPMG. 383. After working at KPMG as an Intern in the summer of 2007, Ms. Murray completed her Bachelor of Science (Finance) and Bachelor of Arts (Philosophy) degrees summa cum laude from Azusa Pacific College in May 2008. She returned to KPMG in October 2008 as an Associate in Financial Risk Management Advisory. Ms. Murray was promoted to Senior Associate in 2010. In March 2011, Ms. Murray transferred to become a Senior Associate in Economic and Valuation Services Tax, and she was promoted to Manager in October 2013. 384. Ms. Murray has worked out of KPMG’s Los Angeles, California and Seattle, Washington offices during her tenure with the Company. 385. Ms. Murray’s experiences at KPMG have been similar to those of the other Named Plaintiffs and the class. 386. Ms. Murray has been paid less than similarly situated men during the class period. She has consistently earned less than similarly or worse performing men in her position, function, and service line, despite having the same or more experience and tenure in job.
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387. Upon information and belief, Ms. Murray is not the only woman to suffer the effects of the compensation policies and practices at KPMG, which lack sufficient standards and quality controls, transparency, implementation metrics, and opportunities for redress that would otherwise have ensured there was no disparate impact on female professionals. Other women were similarly underpaid relative to men.
388. Ms. Murray is a member of the opt-in EPA collective and would be a member of any Rule 23 class. She alleges both disparate impact and treatment claims consistent with the other Named Plaintiffs in this action.
V. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 389. Class Representatives Donna Kassman, Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather
Inman, Nancy Jones, Carol Murray and the class of female employees they seek to represent have been subjected to a pattern and practice of gender discrimination, and employment policies and practices which have had a continuing, unlawful disparate impact on them and their employment opportunities. Such gender discrimination includes (a) assigning female Professionals to lower titles and classifications than their male counterparts; (b) paying female Professionals less than their male counterparts; (c) denying female Professionals promotion and advancement opportunities in favor of male employees; (d) treating pregnant employees and mothers differently from non-pregnant employees, male employees, and non-caregivers; and (e) failing to prevent, respond to, adequately investigate, and/or appropriately resolve instances of gender discrimination and pregnancy/caregiver discrimination in the workplace.
390. KPMG, in effect, bars female employees from better and higher-paying positions which have traditionally been held by male employees. The systemic means of accomplishing such gender-based stratification include, but are not limited to, KPMG’s assignment,
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development, promotion, advancement, compensation and performance evaluation policies, practices and procedures. These practices and procedures all suffer from a lack of: transparency, adequate quality standards and controls; sufficient implementation metrics; upper management/HR review; and opportunities for redress or challenge. As a result, employees are assigned, evaluated, compensated, developed, and promoted within a system that is insufficiently designed, articulated, explained or implemented to consistently, reliably or fairly manage or reward employees.
391. Within these flawed structures, specific practices negatively affect KPMG’s female Professionals. For example, assignments do not reflect female employees’ experience and qualifications, and promotions are not based upon true comparative performance. The evaluation system lacks sufficient standards or quality controls and metrics to accurately and reliably measure performance. Within this system, unfounded criticisms may be lodged against KPMG Professionals who are female, pregnant or mothers, and legitimate criticisms given undue weight. Participation in male-dominated and exclusive social activities can improperly control or influence an employees’ standing and prospects within KPMG. Partners, Managing Directors, Senior Managers and Managers mentor and develop employees selectively, without the appropriate standards or guidelines or transparency necessary to ensure an equitable workplace. Moreover, taking leave or flex time for pregnancy and caretaking reasons can constitute a negative factor in employees’ evaluations, compensation and promotion prospects; and HR and management has failed to curb a corporate culture that presumes being a mother makes an employee less dedicated or productive.
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392. These problems are systemic and Company-wide, because, upon information and belief, all stem from flawed policies, practices and procedures which emanate from the Company’s New York headquarters.
393. Where Human Resources and Ethics complaint and compliance policies exist, they lack meaningful quality controls, standards, implementation metrics, and means of redress. Concerns about discrimination made to supervising staff and HR itself are allowed to go unaddressed. Worse, there is no meaningful separation between HR/Ethics complaint processes and the Managers and Partners who create discriminatory or hostile work conditions toward women and mothers, such that victims of discrimination often face retaliation or are dissuaded from voicing concerns altogether.
394. Thus, KPMG tolerates and even cultivates a hostile environment in which women and mothers are openly devalued and where (a) retaliation for voicing gender discrimination complaints is the norm and (b) women mothers who question or even inadvertently disrupt the gendered norms are routinely pushed out of the Company.
395. In all, KPMG demonstrates a reckless disregard – a deliberate indifference – to its female employees by overlooking or otherwise dismissing even blatant evidence of gender discrimination.
396. KPMG’s assignment, evaluation, development, compensation, promotion and maternity/flexible schedule policies, practices, and procedures, as well as its failure to prevent, respond to, adequately investigate, and/or appropriately resolve instances of gender and pregnancy/caregiver discrimination, have had a disparate impact on the Class Representatives and the members of the class. Such policies, practices and procedures are not valid, job-related, or justified by business necessity.
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397. Because of Defendant’s pattern-or-practice of gender discrimination, the Class Representatives and class they seek to represent have been adversely affected and have experienced harm, including the loss of compensation, promotion and other advancement opportunities, employment benefits and non-economic damages.
398. KPMG has failed to impose adequate discipline on managers and employees who violate equal employment opportunity laws and has failed to create adequate incentives for its managerial and supervisory personnel to comply with such laws regarding the employment policies, practices, and procedures described above.
399. The Class Representatives and the class have no plain, adequate, or complete remedy at law to redress the wrongs alleged herein, and this suit is their only means of securing adequate relief. The Class Representatives and the class have suffered, and will continue to suffer, irreparable injury from KPMG’s ongoing, unlawful policies, practices, and procedures as set forth herein unless those policies, practices, and procedures are enjoined by this Court.
A. General Facts Relevant to Class Claims and Class Definition 400. The Class Representatives seek to maintain claims on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of current and former female exempt Client Service and Support Professionals at KPMG. 401. The class consists of all female exempt Client Service and Support Professionals, including but not limited to Associates, Senior Associates, Managers, Senior Managers/Directors and Managing Directors (collectively “Professionals”), who are, or have been, employed by KPMG nationwide during the applicable liability period until the date of judgment. Upon information and belief, there are thousands of such employees in the proposed class. 402. The Class Representatives seek to represent all of the female employees described
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above. The systemic and disparate impact gender discrimination described in this Complaint has been, and is, continuing in nature.
B. Efficiency of Class Prosecution of Common Claims 403. Certification of a class of female Professionals is the most efficient and economical means of resolving the questions of law and fact which are common to the claims of the Class Representatives and the proposed class. 404. The individual claims of the Class Representatives require resolution of the common question of whether KPMG has engaged in a systemic pattern and/or practice of gender discrimination against female Professionals. The Class Representatives seek remedies to eliminate the adverse effects of such discrimination in their own lives, career and working conditions, and in the lives, careers and working conditions of the proposed class members, and to prevent continued gender discrimination in the future. 405. Plaintiffs have standing to seek such relief because of the adverse effect that such discrimination has had on them individually and on female employees generally. KPMG caused Plaintiffs’ injuries through its discriminatory practices, policies, and procedures, as well as its disparate treatment of employees who are female, pregnant, and/or have caregiving responsibilities. These injuries are redressible through systemic relief, such as an injunction, and other appropriate class-wide and individual remedies sought in this action. 406. In addition, proper relief for Plaintiffs’ individual constructive discharge and wrongful termination claims can include reinstatement. As such, each has a personal interest in the policies, practices and procedures implemented at KPMG moving forward.
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407. In order to gain relief for themselves, as well as for the class members, Plaintiffs will first establish the existence of systemic gender discrimination as the premise for the relief they seek.
408. Without class certification, the same evidence and issues would be subject to relitigation in a multitude of individual lawsuits with an attendant risk of inconsistent adjudications and conflicting obligations. Certification of the proposed class of females is the most efficient and judicious means of presenting the evidence and arguments necessary to resolve such questions for the Class Representatives, the proposed class, and Defendant KPMG.
C. Numerosity and Impracticability of Joinder 409. The class which the Class Representatives seek to represent is too numerous to make joinder practicable. Upon information and belief, the proposed class consists of thousands of current and former female Professionals during the liability period. 410. KPMG’s pattern and/or practice of gender discrimination also makes joinder impracticable by discouraging females from applying for or pursuing promotional, training, or transfer opportunities, thereby making it impractical and inefficient to identify many members of the class prior to determination of the merits of KPMG’s class-wide liability. D. Common Questions of Law and Fact 411. The prosecution of the claims of the Class Representatives will require the adjudication of numerous questions of law and fact common to both their individual claims and those of the putative class they seek to represent. 412. The common questions of law include, inter alia: (a) whether KPMG has engaged in a pattern and practice of unlawful, systemic gender discrimination in its compensation, assignment, selection, performance evaluation, promotion, advancement, transfer, training and
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discipline policies, practices and procedures, and in the general terms and conditions of work and employment; (b) whether the failure to institute adequate standards, quality controls, implementation metrics, or oversight in assignment, compensation, evaluation, development, maternity and flex/time, and promotion systems violate Title VII, and/or other statutes; (c) whether the lack of transparency and of opportunities for redress in those systems violates Title VII, and/or other statutes; (d) whether senior management and HR’s failure to prevent, investigate, or properly respond to evidence and complaints of discrimination in the workplace violates Title VII, and/or other statutes; and (e) whether KPMG is liable for a continuing systemic violation of Title VII, and/or other statutes; and a determination of the proper standards for proving a pattern or practice of discrimination by KPMG against its female Professionals.
413. The common questions of fact include, inter alia: whether KPMG has: (a) used a system of assignment that lacks meaningful or appropriate standards, implementation metrics, quality controls, transparency and opportunities for redress; (b) through the use of that system of assignment placed female Professionals in job titles or classifications lower than similarlysituated male employees; (c) systematically, intentionally or knowingly placed female Professionals in job titles or classifications lower than similarly-situated male employees; (d) used a compensation system that lacks meaningful or appropriate standards, implementation metrics, quality controls, transparency and opportunities for redress; (e) through the use of that compensation system compensated female Professionals less than similarly-situated males in salary, bonuses, and/or other perks; (f) systematically, intentionally or knowingly compensated female Professionals less than similarly-situated males; (g) used a system of development and mentoring that lacks meaningful or appropriate standards, implementation metrics, quality controls, transparency and opportunities for redress (h) through the use of that development and
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mentoring system failed to develop or mentor female Professionals in a commensurate manner to their similarly-situated male counterparts; (i) systematically, intentionally or knowingly failed to develop or mentor female Professionals in a commensurate manner to their similarly-situated male counterparts; (j) used a promotion system that lacks meaningful or appropriate standards, implementation metrics, quality controls, transparency and opportunities for redress; (k) through use of that promotion system precluded or delayed the promotion of female Professionals into higher level jobs traditionally held by male employees; (l) systematically, intentionally or knowingly precluded or delayed the promotion of female Professionals into higher level jobs traditionally held by male employees; (m) used a system for performance evaluations which lacks meaningful or appropriate standards, implementation metrics, quality controls, transparency and opportunities for redress; (n) through use of that performance evaluation system inaccurately, unfairly or disparately measured and classified female and male employee performance; (o) systematically, intentionally or knowingly subjected female employees to inaccurate, unfair, or discriminatorily lowered performance evaluations; through its policies, practices, and procedures, developed male and female employees equitably; (p) used maternity and flex time policies, practices, and procedures that lack meaningful or appropriate standards, implementation metrics, quality controls, transparency or opportunities for redress; (q) through use of those policies, practices and prrocedures treated pregnant employees and mothers differently and discriminatorily from non-pregnant employees, male employees, and noncaregivers; (r) systematically, intentionally or knowingly subjected pregnant employees and mothers to disparate and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment; (s) used HR, EEO, and Ethics systems that lack meaningful or appropriate standards, implementation metrics, quality controls, transparency or opportunities for redress; (t) through use of those systems
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minimized, ignored, or covered up evidence of gender discrimination and harassment in the workplace and/or otherwise mishandled the investigation of and response to complaints of discrimination and harassment brought to the attention of senior management, the human resources department, or other reporting channels; (u) systematically, intentionally, knowingly or deliberately showed an indifference to evidence of discrimination in the workplace or otherwise minimized, ignored, mishandled, or covered up evidence of or complaints about gender and pregnancy discrimination and harassment in the workplace; and (v) failed to adequately or meaningfully train, coach, or discipline senior management on EEO principles and compliance.
414. The employment policies, practices, and procedures to which the Class Representatives and the class members are subjected are set at KPMG’s corporate level, which is headquartered in and directed from New York, and apply universally to all class members. These employment policies, practices and procedures are not unique or limited to any department; rather, they apply to all departments and, thus, affect the Class Representatives and class members in the same ways no matter the facility, department, or position in which they work.
415. Throughout the liability period, a disproportionately large percentage of the managers and officers at KPMG have been male.
416. The systemic means of accomplishing such gender-based stratification include, but are not limited to, KPMG’s assignment, development, promotion, advancement, compensation and performance evaluation policies, practices and procedures. These policies, practices and procedures all suffer from a lack of: transparency, adequate quality standards and controls; sufficient implementation metrics; upper management/HR review; and opportunities for redress or challenge. As a result, employees are assigned, evaluated, compensated, developed,
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and promoted within a system that is insufficiently designed, articulated, explained or implemented to consistently, reliably or fairly manage or reward employees.
417. As a result, male employees have advanced and continue to advance more rapidly to better and higher-paying jobs than do female employees. KPMG’s policies, practices, and procedures have had an adverse impact on female Professionals seeking selection for, or advancement to, better and higher-paying positions. In general, the higher the level of the job classification, the lower the percentage of female employees holding it.
E. Typicality of Claims and Relief Sought 418. The claims of the Class Representatives are typical of the claims of the class. The relief sought by the Class Representatives for gender discrimination complained of herein is also typical of the relief which is sought on behalf of the class. 419. Like the members of the class, the Class Representatives are Professionals who worked at KPMG during the liability period. 420. Discrimination in selection, assignment, performance evaluation, promotion, advancement, and training affects the compensation of the Class Representatives and all the employee class members in the same or similar ways. 421. KPMG has failed to create adequate incentives for its management to comply with its own policies and equal employment opportunity laws regarding each of the employment policies, practices, and procedures referenced in this Complaint, and has failed to discipline adequately its managers and other employees when they violate the Company policy or discrimination laws. These failures have affected the Class Representatives and the class members in the same or similar ways. 422. The relief necessary to remedy the claims of the Class Representatives is exactly the same as that necessary to remedy the claims of the class members in this case.
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423. The Class Representatives seek the following relief for their individual claims and for those of the members of the proposed class: (a) a declaratory judgment that KPMG has engaged in systemic gender discrimination against female Professionals by (1) paying female Professionals less than their male counterparts, (2) denying female Professionals promotion and advancement opportunities in favor of male employees, (3) treating pregnant employees and mothers differently from non-pregnant employees, male employees, and non-caregivers, and (4) failing to prevent, respond to, adequately investigate, and/or appropriately resolve instances of gender discrimination and pregnancy/caregiver discrimination in the workplace; (b) a permanent injunction against such continuing discriminatory conduct; (c) injunctive relief which effects a restructuring of KPMG’s assignment, promotion, transfer, training, performance evaluation, compensation, and discipline policies, practices, and procedures – so that female Professionals will be able to compete fairly in the future for promotions, transfers, and assignments to better and higher-paying classifications with terms and conditions of employment traditionally enjoyed by male employees; (d) back pay, front pay, reinstatement and/or other equitable remedies necessary to make the female Professionals whole from the Defendant’s past discrimination; (f) punitive and nominal damages to prevent and deter KPMG from engaging in similar discriminatory practices in the future; (g) compensatory damages; (h) pre- and post-judgment interest; and (i) attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses.
F. Adequacy of Representation 424. The Class Representatives’ interests are co-extensive with those of the members of the proposed class which they seek to represent in this case. The Class Representatives seek to remedy KPMG’s discriminatory employment policies, practices, and procedures so that
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female Professionals will no longer be prevented from advancing into higher-paying and/or more desirable higher-level positions. Plaintiffs are willing and able to represent the proposed class fairly and vigorously as they pursue their individual claims in this action.
425. The Class Representatives have retained counsel who are qualified, experienced, and able to conduct this litigation and to meet the time and fiscal demands required to litigate an employment discrimination class action of this size and complexity. The combined interests, experience, and resources of Plaintiffs’ counsel to litigate competently the individual and class claims at issue in this case clearly satisfy the adequacy of representation requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(4).
G. Requirements Of Rule 23(b)(2) 426. KPMG has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class Representatives and the class by adopting and following systemic policies, practices, and procedures which are discriminatory. Gender discrimination is KPMG’s standard operating procedure rather than a sporadic occurrence. KPMG has refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class by, inter alia: (a) assigning female Professionals to job titles and classifications lower than proper for their qualifications and/or actual job duties and responsibilities; (b) failing to pay female Professionals on par with similarly-situated male employees; (c) denying female Professionals promotion and advancement opportunities in favor of male employees; (d) treating pregnant employees and mothers differently from non-pregnant employees, male employees, and noncaregivers; and (e) failing to prevent, respond to, adequately investigate, and/or appropriately resolve claims of gender discrimination and pregnancy/caregiver discrimination. 427. The systemic means of accomplishing such gender-based stratification include, but are not limited to, KPMG’s assignment, development, promotion, advancement,
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compensation and performance evaluation policies, practices and procedures. These practices and procedures all suffer from a lack of: transparency, adequate quality standards and controls; sufficient implementation metrics; upper management/HR review; and opportunities for redress or challenge. As a result, employees are assigned, evaluated, compensated, developed, and promoted within a system that is insufficiently designed, articulated, explained or implemented to consistently, reliably or fairly manage or reward employees.
428. KPMG’s systemic discrimination and refusal to act on grounds that are not discriminatory have made appropriate the requested final injunctive and declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.
429. Injunctive, declaratory and affirmative relief are the predominant relief sought in this case because they are the culmination of the proof of KPMG’s individual and class-wide liability and the essential predicate for the Class Representatives’ and the class members’ entitlement to monetary and non-monetary remedies at Stage II of such trial. Entitlement to declaratory, injunctive and affirmative relief flows directly and automatically from proof of the common questions of law and fact regarding the existence of systemic gender discrimination against female Professionals at KPMG.
430. In addition, entitlement to declaratory, injunctive and affirmative relief forms the factual and legal predicate for recovery by the Class of punitive damages.
H. Requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) 431. The common issues of fact and law affecting the claims of the Class Representatives and proposed class members, including, but not limited to, the common issues previously identified herein, predominate over any issues affecting only individual claims.
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These issues include whether KPMG has engaged in gender discrimination against female Professionals by (a) assigning female Professionals to lower job titles and classifications than their male counterparts; (b) paying female Professionals less than their male counterparts, (c) denying female Professionals promotion and advancement opportunities in favor of male employees, (d) treating pregnant employees and mothers differently from non-pregnant employees, male employees, and non-caregivers, and (e) failing to prevent, respond to, adequately investigate, and/or appropriately resolve instances of gender discrimination and pregnancy/caregiver discrimination in the workplace.
432. A class action is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims of the Class Representatives and members of the proposed class.
433. The cost of proving KPMG’s pattern and practice of discrimination makes it impracticable for the Class Representatives and members of the proposed class to prosecute their claims individually.
434. By virtue of the pattern and practice of discrimination at KPMG, Class Representatives and Class members are eligible for monetary remedies for losses caused by the systemic discrimination, including backpay, frontpay, reinstatement, compensatory damages, and other nominal and punitive damages.
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VI. COLLECTIVE ACTION ALLEGATIONS (EQUAL PAY ACT) 435. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations from the previous paragraphs of
this Complaint alleging class-based discrimination against similarly-situated female employees. 436. Plaintiffs bring collective violations of the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”) as a collective
action pursuant to Section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) on behalf of all members of the gender class – e.g. current, former, and future female Managers, during the liability period. The EPA action includes female Professionals who (a) were not compensated equally to males who had substantially similar job classifications, functions, families, titles and/or duties, (b) were not compensated equally to males who performed substantially similar work, and (c) who were denied promotion and advancement opportunities that would result in greater compensation in favor of lesser qualified male employees.
437. Questions of law and fact common to the EPA Collective Action Plaintiffs as a whole include but are not limited to the following: (a) whether Defendant unlawfully failed and continues to fail to compensate female Professionals at a level commensurate with similarly situated male employees; (b) whether Defendant unlawfully failed and continues to fail to promote and advance female Professionals in a fashion commensurate with similarly qualified males; (c) whether Defendant’s policy and practice of failing to compensate female Professionals on a par with comparable male employees as a result of (a) and (b) violates applicable provisions of the EPA; and (d) whether Defendant’s failure to compensate female Professionals on a par with comparable male employees as a result of (a) and (b) was willful within the meaning of the EPA.
438. Counts for violation of the EPA may be brought and maintained as an “opt-in” collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), for all claims asserted by the EPA Collective
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Action Plaintiffs because the claims of Plaintiff are similar to the claims of the EPA Collective Action Plaintiffs.
439. Plaintiffs and the EPA Collective Action Plaintiffs (a) are similarly situated; (b) have substantially similar job classifications, functions, families, titles and/or duties; and (c) are subject to Defendant’s common policy and practice of gender discrimination in (i) failing to compensate female Professionals on par with men who perform substantially equal work and/or hold equivalent levels and positions, and (ii) failing to provide female Professionals equal pay by denying opportunities for promotion and advancement to them comparable to those afforded to males who perform substantially equal work.
INDIVIDUAL, CLASS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION COUNTS
COUNT I (INDIVIDUAL AND CLASS CLAIMS) VIOLATION OF TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (“TITLE VII”) -
PAY DISCRIMINATION 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. 440. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation in each and every aforementioned paragraph as if fully set forth herein. 441. This Count is brought on behalf of Ms. Kassman, Ms. Patterson, Ms. Butler, Ms. Charity, Ms. Jones, Ms. Inman, Ms. Murray, and all members of the class. 442. This Count is brought on behalf of Ms. Patterson only in her capacity as an individual Plaintiff, and not as a Class Representative. 443. Defendant KPMG has discriminated against Plaintiffs and all members of the class in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (“Title VII”), by subjecting them to different treatment on the basis
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of their gender. Plaintiffs have suffered both disparate impact and disparate treatment as a result of Defendant’s wrongful conduct.
444. Defendant has discriminated against Plaintiffs and all members of the class by subjecting them to discriminatory pay, discriminatory denials of pay raises, and discriminatory performance evaluations that affect pay, in violation of Title VII.
445. Defendant’s conduct has been intentional, deliberate, willful, malicious, reckless and conducted in callous disregard of the rights of Plaintiffs and all members of the class, entitling Plaintiffs and all members of the class to punitive damages.
446. By reason of the continuous nature of Defendant’s discriminatory conduct, which persisted throughout the employment of Plaintiffs and the members of the class, Plaintiffs and the members of the class are entitled to application of the continuing violations doctrine to all violations alleged herein.
447. As a result of Defendant’s conduct alleged in this complaint, Plaintiffs and the members of the class have suffered and continue to suffer harm, including but not limited to lost earnings, lost benefits, lost future employment opportunities, other financial loss, and noneconomic damages.
448. Defendant’s policies, practices and/or procedures have produced a disparate impact on Plaintiffs and the members of the class with respect to the terms and conditions of their employment.
449. By reason of Defendant’s discrimination, Plaintiffs and the members of the class are entitled to all remedies available for violations of Title VII, including an award of punitive damages.
450. Attorneys’ fees should be awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).
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COUNT II (INDIVIDUAL AND CLASS CLAIMS) VIOLATION OF TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (“TITLE VII”) -
PROMOTION DISCRIMINATION 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.
451. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation in each and every aforementioned paragraph as if fully set forth herein.
452. This Count is brought on behalf of Ms. Kassman, Ms. Patterson, Ms. Butler, Ms. Charity, Ms. Jones, Ms. Inman, and all members of the class.
453. This Count is brought on behalf of Ms. Patterson only in her capacity as an individual Plaintiff, and not as a Class Representative.
454. Defendant KPMG has discriminated against Plaintiffs and all members of the class in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (“Title VII”), by subjecting them to different treatment on the basis of their gender. Plaintiffs have suffered both disparate impact and disparate treatment as a result of Defendant’s wrongful conduct.
455. Defendant has discriminated against Plaintiffs and all members of the class by treating them differently from and less preferably than similarly-situated male employees, and by subjecting them to discriminatory denials of promotions, discriminatory denials of developmental opportunities, and discriminatory performance evaluations that affect promotions in violation of Title VII.
456. Defendant’s conduct has been intentional, deliberate, willful, malicious, reckless and conducted in callous disregard of the rights of Plaintiffs and all members of the class, entitling Plaintiffs and all members of the class to punitive damages.
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457. By reason of the continuous nature of Defendant’s discriminatory conduct, which persisted throughout the employment of Plaintiffs and the members of the class, Plaintiffs and the members of the class are entitled to application of the continuing violations doctrine to all violations alleged herein.
458. As a result of Defendant’s conduct alleged in this complaint, Plaintiffs and the members of the class have suffered and continue to suffer harm, including but not limited to lost earnings, lost benefits, lost future employment opportunities, other financial loss, and noneconomic damages.
459. Defendant’s policies, practices and/or procedures have produced a disparate impact on Plaintiffs and the members of the class with respect to the terms and conditions of their employment.
460. By reason of Defendant’s discrimination, Plaintiffs and the members of the class are entitled to all remedies available for violations of Title VII, including an award of punitive damages.
461. Attorneys’ fees should be awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). COUNT III
(INDIVIDUAL AND CLASS CLAIMS) VIOLATION OF TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (“TITLE VII”) –
PREGNANCY AND CAREGIVER DISCRIMINATION 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.
462. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation in each and every aforementioned paragraph as if fully set forth herein.
463. This Count is brought on behalf of Ms. Kassman, Ms. Patterson, Ms. Inman, and all similar members of the class.
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464. This Count is brought on behalf of Ms. Patterson only in her capacity as an individual Plaintiff, and not as a Class Representative.
465. Defendant KPMG has discriminated against Plaintiffs and all members of the Class in violation of Title VII by subjecting them to different treatment on the basis of their gender. The members of the Class have been disparately impacted and disparately treated as a result of KPMG’s wrongful conduct and its policies, practices and procedures.
466. KPMG has discriminated against the class members bringing this claim by treating them differently from and less preferably than similarly-situated male employees and female employees without primary caregiving responsibilities, and by subjecting them to differential and substandard terms and conditions of employment including but not limited to discriminatory denials of fair compensation, discriminatory denials of promotional and discriminatory treatment with respect to work responsibilities and other terms and conditions of employment in violation of Title VII.
467. KPMG’s conduct has been intentional, deliberate, willful, malicious, reckless and conducted in callous disregard of the rights of the Plaintiffs and the members of the proposed class, entitling the Plaintiffs and the members of the class to punitive damages.
468. As a result of Defendant’s conduct alleged in this complaint, Plaintiffs and the members of the class have suffered and continue to suffer harm, including but not limited to lost earnings, lost benefits, and other financial loss, and non-economic damages.
469. By reason of Defendant’s discrimination, Plaintiffs and members of the class are entitled to all legal and equitable remedies available for violations of Title VII, including an award of punitive damages.
470. Attorneys’ fees should be awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).
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COUNT IV (INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAIMS) VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT OF 1938, AS AMENDED BY THE EQUAL PAY ACT OF 1963 – 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, et seq.
DENIAL OF EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK 471. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the previous paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 472. This Count is brought on behalf of Ms. Kassman, Ms. Patterson, Ms. Vasudeva, Ms. Butler, Ms. Charity, Ms. Jones, Ms. Inman, Ms. Murray, and the EPA Collective Action Class, including all EPA Collective Action Plaintiffs who “opt in” to this action. 473. Defendant, an employer of Plaintiffs and the EPA Collective Action Plaintiffs within the meaning of the Equal Pay Act, has discriminated against Plaintiff and EPA Collective Action Plaintiffs in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, et seq., as amended by the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (“EPA”), by subjecting them to unequal pay on the basis of sex. 474. Defendant has discriminated against Plaintiffs and EPA Collective Action Plaintiffs by treating them differently from and less preferably than similarly-situated male employees who performed jobs which required equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which were performed under similar working conditions. Defendant so discriminated by subjecting them to discriminatory pay, discriminatory denials of bonuses and other compensation incentives, discriminatory denials of promotions and other advancement opportunities that would result in higher compensation, and other forms of discrimination in violation of the Equal Pay Act. 475. Defendant caused, attempted to cause, contributed to, or caused the continuation of, the wage rate discrimination based on sex in violation of the Equal Pay Act. Moreover,
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Defendant knew of or showed reckless disregard for the fact that its conduct was in violation of the Equal Pay Act.
476. As a result of Defendant’s conduct alleged in this Complaint and/or Defendant’s willful, knowing and intentional discrimination, Plaintiffs and EPA Collective Action Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer harm, including but not limited to lost earnings, lost benefits, other financial loss, and non-economic damages.
477. Plaintiffs and EPA Collective Action Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to all remedies available for violations of the EPA, including liquidated damages for all willful violations.
478. Attorneys’ fees should be awarded under 29 U.S.C. §§ 216, et seq. COUNT V
(INDIVIDUAL AND CLASS CLAIMS) VIOLATION OF NEW YORK EXECUTIVE LAW § 296, subd. 1(a) –
PAY DISCRIMINATION 479. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation in each and every aforementioned paragraph as if fully set forth herein. 480. This Count is brought on behalf of Ms. Kassman and all members of the class who live or lived and or work or worked in New York at any point after September 29, 2005. 481. Defendant KPMG has discriminated against Plaintiff and all members of the class in violation of Section 296, subdivision 1(a) of the New York Executive Law, by subjecting them to different treatment on the basis of their gender. 482. Defendant has discriminated against Plaintiff and all members of the class by subjecting them to discriminatory pay, discriminatory denials of pay raises, and discriminatory performance evaluations that affect pay, in violation of the New York Executive Law.
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483. As a result of Defendant’s conduct alleged in this complaint, Plaintiff and all members of the class have suffered and continue to suffer harm, including but not limited to lost earnings, lost benefits, lost future employment opportunities, other financial loss, and noneconomic damages.
484. By reason of Defendant’s discrimination, Plaintiff and all members of the class are entitled to all remedies available for violations of the New York Executive Law.
COUNT VI (INDIVIDUAL AND CLASS CLAIMS) VIOLATION OF NEW YORK EXECUTIVE LAW § 296, subd. 1(a) –
PROMOTION DISCRIMINATION 485. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation in each and every aforementioned paragraph as if fully set forth herein. 486. This Count is brought on behalf of Ms. Kassman and all members of the class who live or lived and or work or worked in New York at any point after September 29, 2005. 487. Defendant KPMG has discriminated against Plaintiff and all members of the class in violation of Section 296, subdivision 1(a) of the New York Executive Law, by subjecting them to different treatment on the basis of their gender. 488. Defendant has discriminated against Plaintiff and all members of the class by treating them differently from and less preferably than similarly-situated male employees, and by subjecting them to discriminatory denials of promotions, discriminatory denials of developmental opportunities, and discriminatory performance evaluations that affect promotions in violation of the New York Executive Law. 489. As a result of Defendant’s conduct alleged in this complaint, Plaintiff and all members of the class have suffered and continue to suffer harm, including but not limited to lost
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earnings, lost benefits, lost future employment opportunities, other financial loss, and noneconomic damages.
490. By reason of Defendant’s discrimination, Plaintiff and all members of the class are entitled to all remedies available for violations of the New York Executive Law
COUNT VII (INDIVIDUAL AND CLASS CLAIMS) VIOLATION OF NEW YORK EXECUTIVE LAW § 296, subd. 1(a) – PREGNANCY AND CARETAKER DISCRIMINATION 491. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation in each and every aforementioned paragraph as if fully set forth herein. 492. This Count is brought on behalf of Ms. Kassman and all similar members of the class who live or lived and or work or worked in New York at any point after September 29, 2005. 493. Defendant KPMG has discriminated against Plaintiff and all members of the class in violation of Section 296, subdivision 1(a) of the New York Executive Law, by subjecting them to different treatment on the basis of their gender. 494. KPMG has discriminated against the class members bringing this claim by treating them differently from and less preferably than similarly-situated male employees and female employees without primary caregiving responsibilities, and by subjecting them to differential and substandard terms and conditions of employment including but not limited to discriminatory denials of fair compensation, discriminatory denials of promotions and discriminatory treatment with respect to work responsibilities and other terms and conditions of employment in violation of the New York Executive Law.
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495. As a result of Defendant’s conduct alleged in this complaint, Plaintiff and all members of the class have suffered and continue to suffer harm, including but not limited to lost earnings, lost benefits, lost future employment opportunities, other financial loss, and noneconomic damages.
496. By reason of Defendant’s discrimination, Plaintiff and all members of the class are entitled to all remedies available for violations of the New York Executive Law.
COUNT VIII (INDIVIDUAL AND CLASS CLAIMS) VIOLATION OF NEW YORK CITY ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 8-107, subd. 1(a) –
PAY DISCRIMINATION 497. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation in each and every aforementioned paragraph as if fully set forth herein. 498. This Count is brought on behalf of Ms. Kassman and all members of the class. 499. Defendant KPMG has discriminated against Plaintiff and all members of the class in violation of Section 8-107, subdivision 1(a) of the New York City Administrative Code, by subjecting them to different treatment on the basis of their gender. 500. Defendant has discriminated against Plaintiff and all members of the class by subjecting them to discriminatory pay, discriminatory denials of pay raises, and discriminatory performance evaluations that affect pay, in violation of the New York City Administrative Code. 501. As a result of Defendant’s conduct alleged in this complaint, Plaintiff and all members of the class have suffered and continue to suffer harm, including but not limited to lost earnings, lost benefits, lost future employment opportunities, other financial loss, and noneconomic damages.
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502. By reason of Defendant’s discrimination, Plaintiff and all members of the class are entitled to all remedies available for violations of the New York City Administrative Code, including an award of punitive damages.
COUNT IX (INDIVIDUAL AND CLASS CLAIMS) VIOLATION OF NEW YORK CITY ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 8-107, subd. 1(a) –
PROMOTION DISCRIMINATION 503. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation in each and every aforementioned paragraph as if fully set forth herein. 504. This Count is brought on behalf of Ms. Kassman and all members of the class. 505. Defendant KPMG has discriminated against Plaintiff and all members of the class in violation of Section 8-107, subdivision 1(a) of the New York City Administrative Code, by subjecting them to different treatment on the basis of their gender. 506. Defendant has discriminated against Plaintiff and all members of the class by treating them differently from and less preferably than similarly-situated male employees, and by subjecting them to discriminatory denials of promotions, discriminatory denials of developmental opportunities, and discriminatory performance evaluations that affect promotions in violation of the New York City Administrative Code. 507. As a result of Defendant’s conduct alleged in this complaint, Plaintiff and all members of the class have suffered and continue to suffer harm, including but not limited to lost earnings, lost benefits, lost future employment opportunities, other financial loss, and noneconomic damages.
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508. By reason of Defendant’s discrimination, Plaintiff and all members of the class are entitled to all remedies available for violations of the New York City Administrative Code, including an award of punitive damages.
COUNT X (INDIVIDUAL AND CLASS CLAIMS) VIOLATION OF NEW YORK CITY ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 8-107, subd. 1(a) – PREGNANCY AND CAREGIVER DISCRIMINATION 509. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation in each and every aforementioned paragraph as if fully set forth herein. 510. This Count is brought on behalf of Ms. Kassman and all similar members of the class. 511. Defendant KPMG has discriminated against Plaintiff and all members of the class in violation of Section 8-107, subdivision 1(a) of the New York City Administrative Code, by subjecting them to different treatment on the basis of their gender. 512. KPMG has discriminated against the class members bringing this claim by treating them differently from and less preferably than similarly-situated male employees and female employees without primary caregiving responsibilities, and by subjecting them to differential and substandard terms and conditions of employment including but not limited to discriminatory denials of fair compensation, discriminatory denials of promotions and discriminatory treatment with respect to work responsibilities and other terms and conditions of employment in violation of the New York City Administrative Code. 513. As a result of Defendant’s conduct alleged in this complaint, Plaintiff and all members of the class have suffered and continue to suffer harm, including but not limited to lost
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earnings, lost benefits, lost future employment opportunities, other financial loss, and noneconomic damages.
514. By reason of Defendant’s discrimination, Plaintiff and all members of the class are entitled to all remedies available for violations of the New York City Administrative Code, including an award of punitive damages.
COUNT XI (INDIVIDUAL AND CLASS CLAIMS) VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK EQUAL PAY LAW–
N.Y. LABOR LAW § 194 DENIAL OF EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK 515. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the previous paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 516. This Count is brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and all members of the class. 517. Defendant, an employer of Plaintiffs and all members of the class within the meaning of the New York Equal Pay Law, has discriminated against Plaintiffs and all members of the class in violation of the New York Labor Law § 194, by subjecting them to unequal pay on the basis of sex. 518. Defendant has discriminated against Plaintiffs and all members of the class by treating them differently from and less preferably than similarly-situated male employees who performed jobs which required equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which were performed under similar working conditions. Defendant so discriminated by subjecting them to discriminatory pay, discriminatory denials of promotions and other advancement opportunities that would result in higher compensation, and other forms of discrimination in violation of the New York Equal Pay Law.
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519. Defendant caused, attempted to cause, contributed to, or caused the continuation of, the wage rate discrimination based on sex in violation of the New York Equal Pay Law. Moreover, Defendant willfully violated the New York Equal Pay Law by intentionally paying women less than men.
520. Plaintiffs and all members of the class are therefore entitled to all remedies available for violations of N.Y. Labor Law § 194, including liquidated damages and attorneys’ fees and costs for all willful violations.
INDIVIDUAL ONLY COUNTS
COUNT XII (INDIVIDUAL CLAIM – PLAINTIFFS KASSMAN AND PATTERSON)
VIOLATION OF TITLE VII – RETALIATION 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3
521. Plaintiffs Kassman and Patterson re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation in each and every aforementioned paragraph as if fully set forth herein.
522. In their final years of employment with Defendant, Ms. Kassman and Ms. Patterson repeatedly voiced concerns about KPMG’s discriminatory treatment of them, complaining through various reporting channels, including the Office of Ethics and Compliance, the Office of General Counsel, and Human Resources.
523. In retaliation for their complaints regarding KPMG’s unlawful employment practices, Defendant took adverse employment actions against Ms. Kassman and Ms. Patterson.
524. Defendant retaliated against Ms. Kassman by, inter alia, giving her a disciplinary “coach,” failing to provide her equal pay or promote her, and subjecting her to stressful meetings and interrogations based on baseless accusations. Defendant ultimately bullied Ms. Kassman into resigning by subjecting her to escalating gender discrimination and harassment.
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525. Defendant retaliated against Ms. Patterson by, inter alia, subjecting her to unfounded criticism, refusing to give her billable work, and denying her the pay and promotion she deserved.
526. Upon information and belief, other women at KPMG who opposed or complained about unlawful gender discrimination were similarly retaliated against.
527. Defendant’s conduct has been intentional, deliberate, willful, malicious, reckless and conducted in callous disregard of the rights of Ms. Kassman and Ms. Patterson, entitling them to punitive damages.
528. As a result of Defendant’s conduct alleged in this Complaint, Ms. Kassman and Ms. Patterson have suffered and continue to suffer harm, including but not limited to lost earnings, lost benefits, other financial loss, and non-economic damages.
529. By reason of Defendant’s retaliation, Ms. Kassman and Ms. Patterson are entitled to all remedies available for violations of Title VII, including an award of punitive damages.
530. Attorneys’ fees should be awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). COUNT XIII
(INDIVIDUAL CLAIM – PLAINTIFFS KASSMAN, PATTERSON, AND VASUDEVA) VIOLATIONS OF THE EQUAL PAY ACT, U.S.C. § 215(a)(3)-RETALIATION
531. Plaintiffs Kassman, Patterson and Vasudeva re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation in each and every aforementioned paragraph as if fully set forth herein.
532. While employed by Defendant, Plaintiffs voiced concerns about KPMG’s discriminatory treatment of them, complaining through various reporting channels, including the
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Office of Ethics and Compliance, the Office of General Counsel, Human Resources, and management.
533. In retaliation for their complaints regarding KPMG’s unlawful employment practices, Defendant took adverse employment actions against Ms. Kassman, Ms. Patterson and Ms. Vasudeva.
534. Defendant retaliated against Ms. Kassman by, inter alia, giving her a disciplinary “coach,” failing to provide her equal pay or promote her, and subjecting her to stressful meetings and interrogations based on baseless accusations. Defendant ultimately bullied Plaintiff into resigning by subjecting her to escalating gender discrimination and harassment.
535. Defendant retaliated against Ms. Patterson and Ms. Vasudeva by, inter alia, subjecting them to unfounded criticism, denying them the pay and promotions they deserved, and ultimately terminating them or forcing them to resign.
536. By reason of Defendant’s conduct as alleged herein, Ms. Kassman, Ms. Patterson and Ms. Vasudeva are entitled to all remedies available under the EPA, including liquidated damages for all willful violations.
537. Attorneys’ fees should be awarded under 29 U.S.C. § 216, et seq. COUNT XIV
(INDIVIDUAL CLAIM – PLAINTIFF KASSMAN) VIOLATION OF NEW YORK EXECUTIVE LAW § 296
RETALIATION 538. Plaintiff Kassman re-alleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in each and every aforementioned paragraph as if fully set forth herein.
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539. In the final year of her employment with Defendant, Ms. Kassman repeatedly voiced concerns about KPMG’s discriminatory treatment of her, complaining to the Office of Ethics and Compliance, the Office of General Counsel, and Human Resources.
540. In retaliation for Ms. Kassman’s complaints regarding KPMG’s unlawful employment practices, Defendant took adverse employment actions against her, including giving her a disciplinary “coach,” failing to provide her equal pay or promote her, and subjecting her to stressful meetings and interrogations based on baseless accusations. Defendant ultimately bullied Ms. Kassman into resigning by subjecting her to escalating gender discrimination and harassment.
541. By reason of Defendant’s conduct as alleged herein, Ms. Kassman is entitled to all remedies available under the New York Executive Law.
COUNT XV (INDIVIDUAL CLAIM – PLAINTIFF KASSMAN) VIOLATION OF NEW YORK CITY ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 8-107, subd. 7 –
RETALIATION 542. Plaintiff Kassman re-alleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in each and every aforementioned paragraph as if fully set forth herein. 543. In the final year of her employment with Defendant, Ms. Kassman repeatedly voiced concerns about KPMG’s discriminatory treatment of her, complaining to the Office of Ethics and Compliance, the Office of General Counsel, and Human Resources. 544. In retaliation for Ms. Kassman’s complaints regarding KPMG’s unlawful employment practices, Defendant took adverse employment actions against her, including giving her a disciplinary “coach,” failing to provide her equal pay or promote her, and subjecting her to stressful meetings and interrogations based on baseless accusations. Defendant ultimately
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bullied Ms. Kassman into resigning by subjecting her to escalating gender discrimination and harassment.
545. By reason of Defendant’s retaliation, Ms. Kassman is entitled to all remedies available for violations of the New York City Administrative Code, including an award of punitive damages.
COUNT XVI (INDIVIDUAL CLAIM – PLAINTIFFS PATTERSON AND VASUDEVA)
VIOLATION OF FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT (“FMLA”) 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq.
546. Ms. Vasudeva and Ms. Patterson re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation in each and every aforementioned paragraph as if fully set forth herein.
547. KPMG discriminated against Ms. Vasudeva and Ms. Patterson on the basis of their pregnancy, childbirth, and related conditions in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”).
548. Under the FMLA, an employee must be restored by the employer to the same position held by the employee when the leave commenced, or to an equivalent position with equivalent employment benefits, pay, and other terms and conditions of employment.
549. After Ms. Patterson returned from maternity leave, KPMG refused to give her billable work, suggested she work part-time or move to a different practice, and denied her equal pay and promotional opportunities, ultimately forcing Ms. Patterson to leave the Company.
550. After Ms. Vasudeva returned from maternity leave, KPMG reassigned her to less desirable projects, refused to provide her with staffing support, and denied her equal pay and promotional opportunities, ultimately forcing Ms. Vasudeva to leave the Company.
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551. Defendants acted willfully, intentionally, and with reckless disregard for Ms. Vasudeva and Ms. Patterson’s rights under the FMLA.
552. As a direct and proximate result of defendants’ actions, Ms. Vasudeva and Ms. Patterson suffered injury and monetary damages, including but not limited to, past and future loss of income, benefits, promotion and promotional opportunities, expenses and costs, and are entitled to all legal and equitable remedies available.
553. By reason of KPMG’s discrimination, Ms. Vasudeva and Ms. Patterson are entitled to all legal and equitable remedies available for violations of the FMLA, including an award of liquidated damages for all willful violations, prejudgment interest, attorneys’ fees, costs, and other compensation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 2617.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs, on their own behalf and on behalf of the class and collective action members, pray that this Court: A. Certify the case as a class action maintainable under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(a), (b)(2) and/or (b)(3), on behalf of the proposed Plaintiff class, and designate Ms. Kassman, Ms. Butler, Ms. Charity, Ms. Inman, Ms. Jones, and Ms. Murray as the representatives of this class and their counsel of record as class counsel; B. Designate this action as a collective action on behalf of the proposed EPA Collective Plaintiffs (asserting EPA claims) and
(i) promptly issuing notice pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) to all similarly situated members of the EPA Opt-In Class, which (a) apprises them of the pendency of this action, and (b) permits them to assert timely EPA claims in this action by filing individual Consent to Sue forms pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); and
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(ii) tolling the statute of limitations on the claims of all members of the FLSA Opt-In Class from the date the original complaint was filed until the Class members are provided with reasonable notice of the pendency of this action and a fair opportunity to exercise their right to opt in as Plaintiffs; C. Designate Plaintiffs Kassman, Patterson, Vasudeva, Butler, Charity, Jones, Inman, and Murray as representatives of the EPA Collective Action; D. Declare and adjudge that Defendant’s employment policies, practices and/or procedures challenged herein are illegal and in violation of the rights of Class Representatives and members of the class under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, the New York Executive Law, the New York City Administrative Code, the New York Labor Law, the Equal Pay Act, and the Family and Medical Leave Act; E. Issue a permanent injunction against the Defendant and its partners, officers, trustees, owners, employees, agents, attorneys, successors, assigns, representatives and any and all persons acting in concert with them from engaging in any conduct violating the rights of Plaintiffs, class members, and collective action plaintiffs, and those similarly situated as secured by 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., and order such injunctive relief as will prevent Defendant from continuing its discriminatory practices and protect others similarly situated; F. Issue a permanent injunction against Defendant and its partners, officers, trustees, owners, employees, agents, attorneys, successors, assigns, representatives and any and all persons acting in concert with them from engaging in any further unlawful practices, policies, customs, usages, gender discrimination or retaliation by the Defendant as set forth herein; G. Order Defendant to initiate and implement programs that will: (i) provide equal employment opportunities for female Professionals; (ii) remedy the effects of the Defendant’s
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past and present unlawful employment policies, practices and/or procedures; and (iii) eliminate the continuing effects of the discriminatory and retaliatory practices described above;
H. Order Defendant to initiate and implement systems of assigning, training, transferring, evaluating, compensating, developing and promoting female Professionals in a nondiscriminatory manner;
I. Order Defendant to establish a task force on equality and fairness to determine the effectiveness of the programs described in G through H above, which would provide for: (i) monitoring, reporting, and retaining of jurisdiction to ensure equal employment opportunity; (ii) the assurance that injunctive relief is properly implemented; and (iii) a quarterly report setting forth information relevant to the determination of the effectiveness of the programs described in G through H above;
J. Order Defendant to adjust the wage rates and benefits for Plaintiffs, class members and collective action plaintiffs to the level that they would be enjoying but for the Defendant’s discriminatory policies, practices and/or procedures;
K. Order that this Court retain jurisdiction of this action until such time as the Court is satisfied that Defendant has remedied the practices complained of herein and is determined to be in full compliance with the law;
L. Award nominal, compensatory and punitive damages to Plaintiffs, class members and collective action plaintiffs, in excess of 400 million dollars;
M. Award litigation costs and expenses, including, but not limited to, reasonable attorneys’ fees, to Plaintiffs, the class members, and the collective action plaintiffs;
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Case 1:11-cv-03743-LGS Document 548 Filed 05/13/16 Page 119 of 121 N. Award back pay, front pay, lost benefits, preferential rights to jobs and other damages for lost compensation and job benefits with pre-judgment and post-judgment interest suffered by Plaintiffs, class members and collective action plaintiffs to be determined at trial; O. Order Defendant to make whole Plaintiffs, class members and collective action plaintiffs by providing them with appropriate lost earnings and benefits, reinstatement opportunities, and other affirmative relief; P. Award any other appropriate equitable relief to Plaintiffs, class members and collective action plaintiffs; and Q. Award any additional and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper.
JURY DEMAND Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury on all issues triable of right by jury.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing and all documents attached hereto were served May 13, 2016 upon the following counsel of record via ECF:

Peter O. Hughes, Esq. OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C. 10 Madison Avenue, Suite 400 Morristown, NJ 07960 peter.hughes@ogletreedeakins.com

Diane M. Saunders, Esq. OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C. One Boston Place, Suite 3220 Boston, MA 02108 diane.saunders@ogletreedeakins.com

Steven W. Moore, Esq. CONSTANGY, BROOKS, SMITH & PROPHETE, LLP 600 17th Street Suite 2700-S Denver, CO 80202 smoore@constangy.com

Colleen M. Kenney, Esq. John G. Levi, Esq. SIDLEY AUSTIN, LLP One South Dearborn St. Chicago, IL 60603 ckenney@sidley.com jlevi@sidley.com

Wendy M. Lazerson, Esq. SIDLEY AUSTIN, LLP 1001 Page Mill Road Building 1 Palo Alto, CA 94304 wlazerson@sidley.com

s/ Julia Coppelman Julia Coppelman

 
 Case 1:11-cv-03743-LGS Document 831 Filed 11/30/18 Page 1 of 61

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

-------------------------------------------------------------X

:

DONNA KASSMAN, et al.,

:

:

Plaintiffs, :

:

-against-

:

:

KPMG LLP,

:

:

Defendant. :

-------------------------------------------------------------X

11/30/18
11 Civ. 3743 (LGS) OPINION AND ORDER

LORNA G. SCHOFIELD, District Judge:

Plaintiffs bring this putative sex discrimination class action against Defendant KPMG

LLP (“KPMG”). Plaintiffs assert claims under the disparate impact and disparate treatment

provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on behalf of a nationwide class of more

than 10,000 female KPMG employees, from 2009 to the present, and analogous claims under

New York state and city law on behalf of a New York subclass. Plaintiffs also seek second stage

collective action certification of the Equal Pay Act claims of 1,112 Opt-In Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs filed this suit on June 2, 2011, claiming that KPMG discriminates against

thousands of women in their pay and promotions. Less than three weeks later, the Supreme Court

decided Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011) (“Dukes”). Dukes makes it

extremely difficult for a gender discrimination suit to proceed as a class action when the

discriminatory treatment was the product of local supervisors exercising their discretion in

awarding pay and promotions. See id. at 355.

Most of the conduct challenged in this lawsuit occurred after Dukes provided a roadmap

to avoid class certification of a nationwide class asserting gender discrimination. Not

surprisingly, during the years since Dukes, with this lawsuit pending, KPMG has utilized a

decentralized system for determining pay and promotion reminiscent of that used by Walmart in

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Dukes. KPMG also has been attentive to gender disparities and workplace misconduct. (It would have been surprising -- indeed irresponsible -- if KPMG had not been attentive to gender issues with potential liability looming these past years.)
Although individual decisions are made by managers at the local level, KPMG’s overall system is not the product of accident or happenstance. It is under the direction of a National Director of Compensation Strategies, who -- with a staff of approximately 12 people -- is responsible for designing and implementing the firm’s employee compensation program and managing the firm’s performance recognition programs. The result, according to Plaintiffs, is a pay disparity between women and men of approximately 2.8%. Although any statistically significant pay disparity on account of gender would be improper, for context, the national disparity in pay between women and men is 18%. See Nikki Graf, Anna Brown and Eileen Patten, The Narrowing, but Persistent, Gender Gap in Pay, Pew Research Center (“In 2017, women earned 82% of what men earned . . . .”) (last visited November 27, 2018).1 KPMG counters Plaintiffs’ analysis and asserts that Plaintiffs have provided “no statistical evidence of anything more than sporadic and isolated within-job sex disparities in pay.”
Regardless of who is correct, under Dukes, the proposed class cannot be certified; Plaintiffs’ argument, at its core, still boils down to “managers, who were left without meaningful guidance . . . , fell back on their own stereotyped views of women in making pay and promotion decisions.” Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1127 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (“Dukes II”) (on remand). The district court on remand in Dukes called this “a perfectly logical theory” for liability, id., an observation echoed by at least one other court, see Moussouris v.
Available at: http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/04/09/gender-pay-gap-facts/.
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Microsoft Corp., No. 15 Civ. 1483, 2018 WL 3328418, at *15 (W.D. Wash. June 25, 2018). Nevertheless, this argument “leaves [p]laintiffs right back where they started: challenging [defendant’s] practice of delegating discretion to local managers, which the Supreme Court specifically held was not a specific employment practice supplying a common question sufficient to certify a class.” Dukes II, 964 F. Supp. 2d at 1127. As Plaintiffs provide insufficient evidence of “some glue” holding together the reasons for the countless individual employment decisions they challenge, the motion for class certification is denied.2 Dukes, 564 U.S. at 352. I. BACKGROUND
The facts below are taken from the parties’ submissions in connection with the pending motions, and the Court resolves factual disputes as necessary for the disposition of those motions. See Shahriar v. Smith & Wollensky Rest. Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 234, 251 (2d Cir. 2011).
A. Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class Plaintiffs are Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva, Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones and Carol Murray. The proposed nationwide class consists of female Associates, Senior Associates, Managers, Senior Managers/Directors and Managing Directors employed within KPMG’s Tax and Advisory
2 One wonders, however, about the empirical reality of a key assumption that underlies Dukes -that “left to their own devices most managers in any corporation -- and surely most managers in a corporation that forbids sex discrimination -- would select sex-neutral, performance-based criteria for hiring and promotion that produce no actionable disparity at all.” Dukes, 564 U.S. at 355. This assumption is contradicted by studies finding that implicit bias has profound effects. See, e.g., Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 at 373 n.6 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Claudia Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of “Blind” Auditions on Female Musicians, 90 Am. Econ. Rev. 715, 715–16 (2000)); see generally Annika L. Jones, Implicit Bias as Social-Framework Evidence in Employment Discrimination, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1221, 1228 (2017) (Before Dukes, “[c]ourts generally accepted . . . even generalized evidence of implicit bias to supply the ‘glue holding the class theory together.’”).
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Functions between October 30, 2009, through the date of judgment (the “Class Positions” and “Class Period”). 3 Plaintiffs held Class Positions during the Class Period.
B. Management Structure of KPMG KPMG is a professional services firm with more than 34,000 employees in over 90 offices nationwide. KPMG is governed by a Board of Directors, composed of up to 18 of KPMG’s top partners, which is responsible for adopting firm-wide policies and overseeing the firm’s management. The firm’s Management Committee implements firm policies as promulgated by the Board. KPMG is divided into four Functions, three with client-facing professionals -- Advisory, Tax and Audit -- and the Business Process Group, which provides back-office support. The Management Committee includes leaders from each Function. Each Function is led by a National Managing Partner, who reports to a Vice Chair, who reports to the Management Committee. This case involves only the Advisory and Tax Functions, which together employ more than 10,000 women in Class Positions. These Functions together have over 150 specialized practice areas that provide a variety of services to businesses across a broad range of industries and locations. Advisory is divided into 4 Service Groups -- Management Consulting, Risk Consulting, Deal Advisory and Strategy -- which are subdivided into approximately 15 Service Lines, and then increasingly more focused practice areas -- over 40 Service Networks, over 80 sub-practice areas (called “Cost Centers”) and numerous Service Offerings, which are targeted toward particular industries. Tax has 6 Service Lines, subdivided into nearly 70 Cost Centers and
3 Excluded from the class are employees in KPMG’s client services support groups, such as Human Resources; Information Technology; Facilities; Finance; and Sales, Marketing and Communications.
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other sub-practices. Each sub-practice has a Partner leader (or Principal if they do not have an active CPA license) and budget, down to at least the Service Network in Advisory or Cost Center in Tax.
KPMG’s varied service offerings and industries result in diverse skills, responsibilities and working conditions across jobs. The firm’s professionals include, for example, accountants, scientists, engineers, lawyers and Ph.D. economists. The hierarchy of non-Partner positions at KPMG beginning with the most junior is: Associates; Senior Associates; Managers; Senior Managers/Directors and Managing Directors.
C. Compensation During the Class Period, KPMG’s overall compensation strategy was to compensate at the market rate, differentiating among employees based on performance. KPMG calibrates the 75th and 25th percentiles of its compensation for each position with the corresponding percentiles in the market. Employee compensation consists of two components, annual salary increases (called “merit increases”) and variable compensation (bonuses). Both are determined through KPMG’s annual compensation process. Compensation budgets are determined on a firm-wide basis each year. The process begins with the Vice Chairs and National Managing Partners for each Function creating financial projections and proposing a compensation budget, each of which is sent to KPMG’s firm-wide Compensation Strategies Department. The Compensation Strategies Department then conducts a market study to determine the market compensation for the various jobs. The Compensation Strategies Department uses the market study and budgets to create proposed salary ranges for each job within each practice group. The Compensation Strategies Department then conducts salary range meetings with the senior management of Tax and
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Advisory, which can result in revisions to the proposed ranges. The Management Committee approves the compensation budgets before KPMG begins the process of determining individual employees’ merit increases and variable compensation.
After the salary ranges and budgets are approved, the Compensation Strategies Department provides benchmark merit increase and variable compensation figures for all of the positions throughout the firm via a firm-wide “Compensation Tool.” Merit increases and variable compensation are expressed in the Compensation Tool as percentages of current base salary, as are pay raises for promotions. The tool recommends percentage ranges for merit increases and variable compensation, with percentage bands based on the employee’s performance level (as determined at the annual assessment meeting) and current salary in relation to the market. The percentage bands overlap such that an employee with a relatively lower performance rating who is undercompensated compared to the market can get a higher percentage increase than someone with a higher rating who is compensated more favorably compared to the market. The Compensation Tool also generates a “target” salary. The “target” is the firm’s estimate of market-rate compensation for a particular employee based on factors such as job content, geography, performance and tenure. KPMG endeavors to bring all employees’ compensation toward their target compensation over time, amortizing any premiums paid to lateral hires over several years and keeping homegrown talent up to pace with the market. As stated in a Tax compensation presentation, “Over time, we expect employees to move closer to their relative reference point and we recognize that this may not occur in a single Salary Review process.”
Sub-practice area leaders -- who are usually Partners, but can be a Managing Director, if they are the most senior professional in a given practice area and office -- ultimately determine compensation and receive the prepopulated salary increase and variable compensation
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benchmarks for individual employees. The sub-practice area leaders review the benchmarks and use their discretion to make any appropriate adjustments for individual employees. These subpractice area leaders participate in compensation training programs that instruct them on the firm’s compensation policies, and warn them to avoid gender biases in determining pay. KPMG tells decision makers that they are not bound by the prepopulated benchmarks and expects that they will deviate from the benchmarks based on their judgment. As explained in an Advisory compensation training presentation, “[W]hen we develop the guidelines, we don’t have line of sight into the individual and unique contributions of each employee so we count on you to apply those guidelines in a way that makes most sense for your employees . . . .” Similarly, a Tax presentation states: “[Benchmark] values do not represent minimums, maximums, or exact prescribed salaries -- they are simply a general point of reference. . . . It should be noted that in some geographies and practices not all employees’ compensation is within the anticipated relative range of the compensation tool values.” While the sub-practice leaders have discretion to determine individual salary increases and variable compensation, allocating these amounts among employees in a practice area is a zero-sum exercise; the sub-practice leaders’ total allocation of compensation within their practice area needs to align with the budget. Sub-practice leaders’ proposed compensation allocations are subject to review against budget. Ultimately, the Vice Chair, the National Managing Partner and the National Head of Human Resources for each Function execute final approval of the compensation budget.
D. Performance Assessment and Promotions Assessment of employees’ performance takes place mainly at the practice area level. Each professional employee in Tax and Advisory has a People Management Leader (“PML”), who is a more senior employee (i.e., Manager or higher) typically in the same practice. The PML
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works with each “counselee” to set individual performance goals. Each employee’s performance against goals is assessed both at a mid-year review meeting and at a year-end assessment meeting held by the employee’s individual practice area, resulting in hundreds of such meetings each year across the many Tax and Advisory practices. The employee’s PML, other senior employees with knowledge of their work and a designated human resources (“HR”) representative participate. The scope of the assessment meeting varies by practice area and may cover, for example, one practice in one office, a sub-practice in a few offices, an entire practice area nationwide or a regional subgroup of a Service Network. Local practice leaders determine the structure, attendance, procedure and assessment criteria. For example, Tampa BTS at one time ranked all their employees -- from Associates to Senior Managers, regardless of job level -- in a single list in order of “which one could you not live without in this practice?” On the other hand, San Francisco Accounting Advisory Services ranks its employees only within job levels. The Pacific Southwest region of the IAER Service Network does not rank, but discusses each employee and notes low performers.
KPMG’s performance rating metric has changed over the relevant time in this action -from 2009 to the present. Prior to 2011, a “9-box” system was used. From 2011 through 2015, a 5-point rating system was used. In 2016, KPMG began using the relative percentile of an employee’s variable compensation (bonus) award in the applicable range to denote performance. In other words, higher-rated performers received a higher percentage of their base salary as a bonus than lower-rated performers. Practice groups also keep track of performance distinctions among employees who receive the same rating or bonus percentile. Partners at more senior levels
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and firm leadership may review aggregate performance and pay data, but generally do not review individual performance, compensation or promotion decisions.4
To be eligible for promotion at KPMG, an employee must have worked a certain number of years at a particular position, or have commensurate external experience. Tenure or experience requirements may be reduced by high performance ratings or advanced degrees. For instance, as of 2013, to be promoted from Manager to Director in Advisory, an employee should generally have at least eight years of experience in professional services, three to five years of management experience and have spent at least three years as Manager unless rated 1 or 2 (out of 5) for two consecutive years. A master’s degree may qualify as one year of experience, and a J.D. may qualify as two years. Employees received documents describing qualitative criteria for promotion readiness. For instance, the criteria for promotion to Senior Manager in Tax include reputation, thought leadership, project management and execution, risk management, recruiting, team management, communication skills, coaching and mentoring, understanding client issues, relationship building, personal brand, external involvement and profitable growth opportunity.
PMLs and other practice area members discuss an employee’s promotion readiness with the employee as a matter of course at several points throughout the performance management process, including (1) at the annual goal-setting meeting with the PML, (2) prior to mid-year review meetings and (3) prior to year-end assessment meetings. Promotion readiness is also evaluated for each eligible employee at the year-end practice area assessment meetings. Promotions are ultimately determined by consensus at the annual practice group meetings, which
4 Although Plaintiffs dispute this, they have not presented credible evidence that shows otherwise.
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are conducted by individual practice area members. The parties proffer no evidence that senior
management reviewed individual promotion decisions to positions lower than Managing Director.
E. Job Responsibilities
Declarations submitted by 24 KPMG executives illustrate the wide-ranging educations,
experiences, skills and specializations of employees across the 150 Cost Centers in Tax and
Advisory. Examples from three Cost Centers within Tax are illustrative. Employees in Tax
Controversy Services have J.D.s or L.L.M.s and represent clients in resolving disputes with the
IRS. Employees in Economic Services have a Masters or Ph.D. in economics and create
econometric and statistical models for KPMG clients. Employees in the Accounting Methods
and Credits specialize in one type of tax credit or industry for which they have scientific or
technical expertise, such as oil and gas, software or architecture.
To study the disparate job responsibilities across KPMG, Defendant’s Industrial
Psychologist, Dr. Cristina Banks, performed an “individualized job analysis” of “the job
characteristics and work performed by KPMG employees in the Tax and Advisory functions . . . .”5 Dr. Banks conducted structured interviews with 81 female employees across
5 The expert reports, and other documents discussed in this Opinion, are subject to a Protective Order agreed to by the parties. These materials are “judicial documents,” as they are “relevant to the performance of the judicial function and useful in the judicial process.” Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Bernstein v. Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, 814 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 2016) (“In determining whether a document is a judicial record, we evaluate the ‘relevance of the document’s specific contents to the nature of the proceeding’ . . . .”). To the extent that information in those documents is disclosed in this Opinion, the privacy and business interests that justified their confidential treatment during discovery are outweighed by “the public’s right of access to judicial documents necessary to understand the basis for court rulings.” Spinelli v. Nat’l Football League, 903 F.3d 185, 193 n.2 (2d Cir. 2018); see also Dodona I, LLC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 119 F. Supp. 3d 152, 155 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“[E]ven if material is properly designated as Confidential or Highly Confidential by a protective order governing discovery, that same material might not overcome the presumption of public access once it becomes a judicial document.”).
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Tax and Advisory. The interviewees were randomly selected from a study sample, which was designed to mirror the population of Opt-In Plaintiffs based upon: (1) Cost Center; (2) job level; (3) office; (4) job title and (5) tenure in position. Dr. Banks informed each interviewee that the information collected would not be shared with supervisors or used for performance evaluation, and that participation would be neither rewarded nor penalized.
Dr. Banks and her staff conducted all interviews using the same verbatim interview protocol. The interviewees were asked 94 open-ended questions, such as, “Do you typically work with large, medium or small-sized companies? In what industry or industries?” Dr. Banks then performed a qualitative content analysis, coding interviewee answers when possible.6 Dr. Banks computed frequency distributions for the 68 questions that could be coded. For example, with respect to business development, 14% of interviewees had formal responsibility for selling KPMG services, 46% had informal responsibility and 41% had no responsibility. Certain questions, however, could not be coded, because the responses were too varied to be sorted into coherent categories. For example, when asked about the specific knowledge required for doing their jobs, interviewees responded with more than 32 different answers.
Based on her study, Dr. Banks concludes, “KPMG professionals differ widely in the jobs they perform in the Tax and Advisory functions of the firm . . . .” To demonstrate this variety, Dr. Banks’s report holistically describes a number of interviewees. For example, Dr. Banks’s report juxtaposes a Senior Associate in the Procurement and Product Operations Cost
6 Randomly assigned teams of two coders independently analyzed the same set of responses. If the coding did not match, the two coders would attempt to reach a consensus, but if they could not agree, then a third coder would determine the final code.
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Center of the Advisory function, who has an M.B.A. and Master’s in mechanical engineering and works directly with clients on implementation projects in the power and utility industries, with a Senior Associate in the Federal IA & SOAS Strategic Sourcing Cost Center of the Advisory function, who has a Bachelor’s in accounting and works with federal agencies to identify and mitigate financial risks.
F. Sex-Based Disparities Both parties hired statistical experts to study sex-based disparities in pay and promotion at KPMG; they reach differing -- but not necessarily contradictory -- conclusions. As described below, Dr. Vekker and Dr. Bloom may both be correct; women in Class Positions were paid less than men who held the same job titles (per Dr. Vekker), but that discrepancy is associated predominantly with Service Line or Cost Center (per Dr. Bloom) -- i.e., the highest paying Cost Centers had more men and/or the lowest paying Cost Centers had more women.
1. Plaintiffs’ Expert Dr. Vekker Plaintiffs’ statistical expert, Dr. Alexander Vekker, analyzed whether women in the Class Positions were paid and promoted less than men who held the same positions at KPMG. His answer is yes.
a. Pay Dr. Vekker ran aggregate linear regressions using KPMG data from 2008 to 2016 and found statistically significant differences in compensation -- both in terms of base pay and total pay -- between men and women who held Class Positions, when controlling for job level, experience, education, job location and performance ratings. “[M]easuring the significance of statistical disparities involves calculation of the standard deviation as a measure of predicted fluctuations from the expected value of a sample.” Burgis v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Sanitation, 798 F.3d
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63, 70 n.6 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 n.14 (1977)). As the number of standard deviations increases, the probability that differences in pay could have been generated by chance decreases. Generally, results are deemed significant at around 2 standard deviations (i.e., 1.96), which signifies a probability of 5 in 100 (0.05) that the differences are due to chance. See Burgis, 798 F.3d at 70 n.6; see also Jones v. City of Boston, 752 F.3d 38, 46–47 (1st Cir. 2014) (describing 1.96 standard deviations as the threshold for significance most used by social scientists and adopted by “most federal courts” to measure disparate impact).
Dr. Vekker’s regressions show that between 2008 and 2016, women in Class Positions in Tax earned an average of 2.7% less in total compensation, with a standard deviation of 7.88. Likewise, women in Class Positions in Advisory earned an average of 2.8% less in total pay, with a standard deviation of 8.19.
b. Promotions With respect to promotions, Dr. Vekker ran logistic regressions, because the dependent variable is binary (i.e., promoted or not promoted). Dr. Vekker used the same controls as those for the compensation regressions but included an additional control for having a CPA license. He found that women in all Tax Class Positions were on average 3.4% less likely than men to be promoted, with a standard deviation of 7.64. When broken down by position, female Senior Associates in Tax were most disadvantaged, as they were 5.5% less likely than male Senior Associates to be promoted to Manager, with a standard deviation of 5.97. Women in Advisory Class Positions were an average of 1.8% less likely to be promoted than men, with a standard deviation of 4.93. Female Managers in Advisory were most disadvantaged, as they were 2.9% less likely to be promoted than men, with a standard deviation of 3.66.
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2. Defendant’s Expert Dr. Bloom Defendant’s statistical expert, Dr. David Bloom, analyzed “whether there is meaningful statistically significant evidence of sex-based differences in pay and promotion -- adverse to women -- involving US-based [employees] holding job titles of Associate, Senior Associate, Manager, Senior Manager/Director, or Managing Director in KPMG’s Tax function or its Advisory function during 2009 through 2016.” Dr. Bloom concluded that no statically significant differences exist.
a. Pay Dr. Bloom argued that Dr. Vekker’s aggregate regressions “erroneously equate[] job with job title,” leading them to “incorrectly pool[] data across job titles.” To support the proposition that Dr. Vekker erred by amalgamating all persons within one Class Position into a single category, Dr. Bloom pointed to divergent average base pay rates across Service Lines. For example, within Tax, an Associate in the Mergers and Acquisitions Service Line earned on average approximately 20% and 60% more than both Senior Associates and Associates respectively in Business Tax Services. This discrepancy between persons holding the same job title -- or even differing job titles -- was greater at the Service Network and Cost Center levels. For example, in Tax, a Managing Director in the SALT Income and Incentives Cost Center earned on average more than three times as much as a Managing Director in the BTS High Volume Trust Tax Cost Center. Similar but smaller differences existed in Advisory. Large discrepancies between persons with the same title sometimes existed even within the same Service Network, for example in the Restructuring Service Network. According to Dr. Bloom, Dr. Vekker’s failure to acknowledge these differences and instead consolidating, for example, all Senior Associates in Tax into a single category, regardless
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of their specialized job and accompanying average pay, led Dr. Vekker to find a sex-based disparity in pay where none exists.7 Rather, Dr. Bloom’s regressions suggest that the gender pay disparity Dr. Vekker found reflects a heavier concentration of men in higher compensated units and heavier concentration of women in lesser compensated units. To illustrate that area of specialization, rather than sex, drives any pay disparity, Dr. Bloom repeated Dr. Vekker’s analyses, but, instead of running the regression by job title, he used a job title-Service Line combination.
When accounting for Service Line in addition to job title, Dr. Bloom’s regressions yielded few statistically significant pay disparities. In Tax, the estimated sex disparities are either positive (i.e., favored women) or statistically insignificant for 96% of those year-title-service line combinations with a sample size of 30 or more, which cover 91% of the overall sample. Likewise, in Advisory, the estimated sex disparities are either positive (i.e., favored women) or statistically insignificant for 91% of those with a sample size of 30 or more, which cover 85% of the overall sample. Based on these regressions, Dr. Bloom concludes that there is “no statistical evidence of anything more than sporadic and isolated within-job sex disparities in pay” at KPMG.
b. Promotions Dr. Bloom also repeated Dr. Vekker’s logistic regression, but without pooling data across job titles, using two different statistical methods.8 With respect to Tax, of the 224 (of 247 possible) reported analyses of promotion rates, the estimated sex disparities are either positive
7 Dr. Bloom also ran models to correct other perceived deficiencies in Dr. Vekker’s analysis, such as pooling data from 2008 to 2016 and failing to include years of experience at KPMG as a control variable. 8 Fisher’s Exact Tests are used to analyze small sample size, whereas logit results require sample sizes of at least 30.
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(i.e., favored women) or statistically insignificant in 221 (99%). Additional logit estimates are reported for 135 of the 247 cells; of those 135 cells, 129 (96%) are either positive (i.e., favored women) or statistically insignificant. With respect to Advisory, of the 330 possible analyses of promotion rates, Fisher’s Exact Test results are reported for 287 cells. Of those 287 cells, the estimated sex disparities are either positive (i.e., favored women) or statistically insignificant in 282 (98%). Additional logit estimates are reported for 212 of the 330 cells. Of those 212 cells, 209 (99%) are either positive (i.e., favored women) or statistically insignificant. Based on these analyses, Dr. Bloom concluded that there was no firm-wide promotion disparity at KPMG.9
G. Work Environment The parties provided evidence supporting contrasting narratives of the work environment for women at KPMG. Margaret Teegan, the Managing Director of Human Resources Communications and Culture, submitted a declaration describing KPMG’s “long history of inclusion and diversity efforts,” noting awards that the firm has received, such as the “prestigious Catalyst Award” for “proven, measurable results that benefit women across a wide range of dimensions.” All employees are governed by KPMG’s Code of Conduct, which espouses “KPMG’s core values” such as “respect the individual,” and requires them to “‘raise their hand’ and report any observed or potential violation.” The Code of Conduct does not include a policy
9 Dr. Vekker responded to Dr. Bloom’s criticisms of his analyses by arguing that Dr. Bloom exhibits an “indifference to statistical power” by disaggregating the pooled data, which is necessary to have a sufficiently large sample size. See Moussouris, 311 F. Supp. 3d at 1236 (“[D]isaggregating data as Microsoft suggests seems to produce pools with varying sizes, some of which may ‘mask common mechanisms’ because of their small sample size.”); Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 114 F. Supp. 3d 110, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (alteration in original) (“The difficulty with analyzing data on the business unit level, as Goldman Sachs advocates, is that such disaggregation tends to mask common mechanisms because the sample size in each unit is so small. As a general matter, ‘[statistical] power increases with sample size.’”).
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expressly targeting sex discrimination. Employees also undergo Equal Employment Opportunity training focusing on sexual harassment and bias. Since 2010, KPMG has used a Key Performance Indicator web tool to track diversity data, “monitor the firm’s progress” against diversity goals and “respond as necessary to achieve” those goals.
Thirteen female KPMG employees submitted declarations, stating that the Class allegations do not reflect reality; for example, one female partner states:
I read the allegations and description of KPMG in the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint, and it does not resemble the firm that I know or reflect my own experience at KPMG. I have always been treated with respect, treated as an equal, promoted ahead of my peers, and repeatedly acknowledged based on my performance . . . . In fact, I believe the firm has gone above and beyond in its support . . . . These declarations describe a workplace culture in which women are comfortable reporting instances of misconduct. Defendant also submitted evidence of “Inclusion and Diversity” training conducted at the firm. In contrast, Plaintiffs submitted 150 internal complaints filed by or on behalf of women in Class Positions with KPMG’s Human Resources and Ethics & Compliance departments from 2008 to 2016, including 147 complaints of sexual harassment, “unprofessional behavior” and gender discrimination by or on behalf of 134 women in Class Positions. These internal complaints reflect, among other things, allegations of male coworkers engaging in: rape, attempted rape, sexual assault or groping, unwanted sexual advances or lewd remarks and teamwide visits to strip clubs. Although KPMG terminated at least 12 employees as a result of investigations into misconduct during the Class Period, even after investigating complaints of non-consensual physical contact and finding them substantiated, KPMG sometimes sanctioned the perpetrator with only a reprimand.
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Plaintiffs also submitted the declarations and deposition testimony of 20 Class Representatives who, in addition to describing conduct similar to that in the HR complaints, also describe a culture where women expect no changes and fear retaliation if they report misconduct.10 Some of the HR Complaints also express mistrust of KPMG’s investigatory process and a fear of retaliation. A 2014 study conducted by KPMG’s Women’s Advisory Board similarly suggested that only 75% of female employees felt they could “report unethical practices without fear of reprisal.” II. DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs seek to certify a nationwide class of female Associates, Senior Associates, Managers, Senior Managers/Directors and Managing Directors employed within KPMG’s Tax and Advisory Functions from October 30, 2009, through the date of judgment. Class certification of a Title VII class is denied because Plaintiffs have not shown a common question sufficient to meet the Rule 23 standard enunciated in Dukes, 564 U.S. at 359.
Plaintiff Kassman also seeks to certify a class of the same group of employees employed by KPMG in the state of New York from June 2, 2008, through the date of judgment.11 Class
10 Both parties were limited to 30 declarations with respect to the motions for class and final collective certification. 11 Plaintiffs do not seek to certify a New York City subclass, although they assert a claim under the New York City Human Rights Law (the “NYCHRL”). However, they cannot bring claims under the NYCHRL on a statewide basis. See, e.g., Bahl v. N.Y. Coll. of Osteopathic Med. of N.Y. Inst. of Tech., No. 14 Civ. 4020, 2015 WL 4603210, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. July 28, 2015) (stating that the NYCHRL only applies where the “impact of the adverse action” is felt in New York City); Rohn Padmore, Inc. v. LC Play Inc., 679 F. Supp. 2d 454, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[T]he NYCHRL only applies where the actual impact of the discriminatory conduct or decision is felt within the five boroughs, even if a discriminatory decision is made by an employer’s New York City office.”).
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certification for the subclass is denied because Kassman provided no evidence specific to a New York class.
Plaintiffs also seek second stage collective action certification of the Equal Pay Act claims of 1,112 Opt-In Plaintiffs who have been employed in class positions since March 16, 2009. Final certification of an opt-in collective under the Equal Pay Act is also denied because Plaintiffs have not shown that members of the proposed collective work at a single “establishment” or that they are “similarly situated” to one another.
A. Evidentiary Motions Before turning to the merits of Plaintiffs’ certification motions, the following discussion defines the universe of materials considered by this Opinion. The parties have filed various motions to strike as well as Daubert motions with respect to each other’s experts. For the reasons below, these motions are denied.
1. Motions to Strike Lay Testimony a. Federal Rules of Evidence
Defendant moves to strike portions of the affidavits submitted by 20 female KPMG employees on the basis that their statements (1) are not supported by personal knowledge in violation of Rule 602; (2) constitute inadmissible hearsay and/or (3) are contradicted by their deposition testimony. Defendant also moves to strike paragraph 27 of Attorney Tiseme Zegeye’s Declaration as improper expert testimony. Plaintiffs move to strike portions of KPMG’s memorandum in opposition to class certification that rely on Dr. Bloom’s reiteration of hearsay as facts.
The Second Circuit has yet to rule on the standard for motions to strike lay witness evidence at the class certification stage, but “most district courts addressing this question have
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held that evidence need not be admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence -- or that the rules should not be applied strictly -- on a motion for class certification.” Flores v. Anjost Corp., 284 F.R.D. 112, 124 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (collecting cases); accord Sali v. Corona Reg’l Med. Ctr., 889 F.3d 623, 632 (9th Cir. 2018); but see Unger v. Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 319 (5th Cir. 2005) (“[F]indings must be made based on adequate admissible evidence to justify class certification.”). This authority is persuasive. The parties’ arguments concerning testimony challenged under the Federal Rules of Evidence are considered only to evaluate the weight of the evidence and not its admissibility.
b. Failures to Disclose Plaintiffs move to strike the organizational chart attached to the declaration of Lynne Doughtie, KPMG’s CEO, on the basis that the chart was not produced during discovery. The motion is denied. Defendant’s counsel represents that the chart was created in conjunction with Lynne Doughtie’s April 17, 2018, declaration -- i.e., after fact discovery was closed. As the chart was created -- based on documents and data previously produced and Doughtie’s knowledge of KPMG’s structure -- to serve as a demonstrative aid in understanding her declaration, it is properly considered in this manner; Plaintiffs are free to attack the chart as misleading, but such attacks go to its weight and not admissibility. See Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 114 F. Supp. 3d 110, 130 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (denying a motion to strike a Goldman Sachs organizational chart not produced in discovery on the basis that it was a demonstrative aid). The motion to strike the organizational chart is denied. Plaintiffs also move to strike portions of the declaration of Joseph Kovatch on the basis that the information underlying the declaration was not produced in discovery. This motion is denied as moot, because the Kovatch Declaration is not relied upon in this Opinion. See, e.g.,
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Patel v. L-3 Commc’ns Holdings Inc., 2016 WL 1629325, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2016) (“Because the Court did not consider Exhibit U in deciding Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Lead Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike is denied as moot.”).
c. Violations of Court Orders Plaintiffs move to strike two exhibits as violating prior orders. First, Plaintiffs move to strike a supplemental declaration filed by Dr. Bloom on January 16, 2018, arguing that it violates the deadlines for the production of expert reports and close of expert discovery. Second, Plaintiffs move to strike a 71-page document containing excerpts from 109 resumes in Defendant’s internal personnel database, arguing that it violates a prior order prohibiting excerpts. Likewise, Defendant moves to strike paragraph 4 of Attorney Kate Mueting’s Declaration. Because this Opinion does not rely on any of these materials, the motions are denied as moot. See, e.g., Yearwood v. N.Y. & Presbyterian Hosp., No. 12 Civ. 6985, 2014 WL 1651942, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2014) (“Because the Court has not relied on any other document or representation in the supplemental affidavit, the Hospital’s motion to strike the remainder is denied as moot.”).
2. Daubert Motions The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Pursuant to that Rule: A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if[] (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.
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Fed. R. Evid. 702. “While the proponent of expert testimony has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the admissibility requirements of Rule 702 are satisfied, the district court is the ultimate ‘gatekeeper.’” United States v. Williams, 506 F.3d 151, 160 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 n.10 (1993)); accord In re Pfizer Inc. Sec. Litig., 819 F.3d 642, 658 (2d Cir. 2016).
“The district court has broad discretion to carry out this gatekeeping function. Its inquiry is necessarily a ‘flexible one,’ and the types of factors that are appropriate to consider will ‘depend upon the particular circumstances of the particular case at issue.’” Pfizer, 819 F.3d at 658 (first quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594; and then quoting Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999)). “In deciding whether a step in an expert’s analysis is unreliable, the district court should undertake a rigorous examination of the facts on which the expert relies, the method by which the expert draws an opinion from those facts, and how the expert applies the facts and methods to the case at hand. A minor flaw in an expert’s reasoning or a slight modification of an otherwise reliable method will not render an expert’s opinion per se inadmissible.” Amorgianos v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 267 (2d Cir. 2002); accord United States v. Morgan, 675 F. App’x 53, 55 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order). “The judge should only exclude the evidence if the flaw is large enough that the expert lacks ‘good grounds’ for his or her conclusions.” Amorgianos, 303 F.3d at 267; accord United States v. Jones, No. 15 Crim. 153, 2018 WL 2684101, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2018). The Supreme Court has outlined four relevant factors for assessing an expert’s reliability:
(1) whether a theory or technique can be (and has been) tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) a technique’s known or potential rate of error, and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s operation; and (4) whether a particular
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technique or theory has gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community. Amorgianos, 303 F.3d at 266 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593). These factors “do not constitute a ‘definitive checklist or test . . . . Rather, . . . the trial judge must have considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go about determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable.” Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 150–52; accord Jones, 2018 WL 2684101, at *7. Although “[t]he Supreme Court has not definitively ruled on the extent to which a district court must undertake a Daubert analysis at the class certification stage,” it has “offered limited dicta suggesting that a Daubert analysis may be required at least in some circumstances.” In re U.S. Foodservice Inc. Pricing Litig., 729 F.3d 108, 129 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Royal Park Invs. SA/NV v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 324 F. Supp. 3d 387, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“[T]he Second Circuit has not resolved whether and to what extent Daubert applies at the class certification stage.”). Because of this dicta, and because the parties assume that Daubert applies, this Opinion applies Daubert. See Royal Park Invs., 324 F. Supp. 3d 393. For the reasons below, the motions are denied.
a. Dr. Banks Plaintiffs move to exclude Dr. Banks’s report under the first and third factors of Rule 702, arguing that her methodology is unreliable and her opinion is unhelpful. Fed. R. Evid. 702(a), (c). Neither ground supports exclusion pursuant to Daubert.
i. Reliability Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Banks’s report is unreliable because she “did not perform a standard job analysis;” rather, she performed an “individualized job analysis,” which Dr. Banks
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advertises and developed for the purpose of defeating class and collective certification and which lacks peer review. This argument fails. While it is necessary to be skeptical where “experts lacked pre-litigation expertise in the [subject matter] . . . and developed their theories for the purposes of this litigation,” In re Mirena IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 713 F. App’x. 11, 15 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order) (citing Washburn v. Merck & Co., 213 F.3d 627 (2d Cir. 2000) (unpublished)), that is not the case here. Dr. Banks was an acknowledged expert in the field of industrial psychology prior to this litigation, whose methodology has gained acceptance in the field; she has been a Senior Lecturer at Berkeley since 1992, and was awarded the Presidential Citation for Innovative Practice by the American Psychological Association in 2009 for her “groundbreaking methodologies” in job analysis. Dr. Banks has published peer reviewed works and given peer reviewed master tutorials to the Society of Industrial and Organizational Psychology on her “individualized job analysis” methodology. Plaintiffs’ depiction of Dr. Banks as advertising her methodology to corporate defendants for the purpose of defeating class certification is a stretch; her PowerPoint states, “I-O psychologists can aid both parties in determining class certifications by defining and distinguishing between and among certain job titles” and “help employees . . . gain the compensation and benefits they earned.” Dr. Banks’s methodology has never been disqualified, despite her testifying as an expert in 83 cases.
Plaintiffs further argue that, even if Dr. Banks’s use of an “individualized job analyses” is not totally disqualifying, her opinion should nevertheless be disqualified, because her application of the methodology was unsound for: (1) failing to create a task list; (2) using open ended questions; (3) comparing responses across job title and (4) reporting only dissimilarities in responses while ignoring commonalities. None of these arguments are persuasive. First, to support the argument that failure to create a task list makes a job analysis unreliable, Plaintiffs
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cite only the report of their own expert, who in turn cites no authority for that proposition. Second, the use of open ended, rather than close ended, questions in a job analysis comes with both advantages and disadvantages, see generally Reference Guide on Survey Research, Federal Judicial Center 391–94 (3d. ed. 2011), and does not necessarily make a study unreliable. See also Guardians Ass’n of N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of City of N.Y., 630 F.2d 79, 95 (2d Cir. 1980) (approving the use of open ended questions where “the work behaviors involved in being a police officer were identified by extensive interviewing, and subjected to serious review”); Gulino v. Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of City of N.Y., 113 F. Supp. 3d 663, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (excluding a study for failing to use “an open ended investigation into [] job tasks,” because the close ended approach was “inherently flawed”). Third, in contrast to Plaintiffs’ depiction, the majority of Dr. Banks’s report focuses on “comparison of work performed by function and employee level.” Fourth, Dr. Banks reported both similarities and dissimilarities with respect to each question that she coded in frequency tables, stating what percentage of interviewees responded in the same way to a particular question, but determined that only 6 out of 68 questions “showed substantial similarity across interviewees.”
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude Dr. Banks’s report as unreliable is denied. To the extent that Plaintiffs’ arguments raise methodological concerns about Dr. Banks’s reports, those concerns go to weight and not admissibility. See, e.g., Restivo v. Hessemann, 846 F.3d 547, 577 (2d Cir. 2017) (“Frequently, though, ‘gaps or inconsistencies in the reasoning leading to the expert’s opinion . . . go to the weight of the evidence, not to its admissibility.’”) (alteration omitted); see also In re Namenda Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 15 Civ. 7488, 2018 WL 3970674, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2018).
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ii. Helpfulness Plaintiffs also argue that Dr. Banks’s report should be excluded as unhelpful for two reasons. First, Dr. Banks “admitted to not conducting any analysis of the interview responses -statistical or otherwise -- but said she simply reviewed the information provided by the interviewees and reported it to the Court.” Second, “to the extent Dr. Banks performed any qualitative analysis, she did so based not on any specialized knowledge or expertise but only on a reasonable person standard.” The first argument mischaracterizes Dr. Banks’s report and her testimony. Dr. Banks’s report describes her methodology in detail, explaining how she used her expertise to build a study sample, devise the interview questions, conduct interviews and code the responses. Even the portion of Dr. Banks’s deposition that Plaintiffs cite illustrates that she analyzed the interview responses in order to code them: My job is to describe what they do the best way I know how and the most -- in the most reliable and valid manner, and to give this analysis the best opportunity to be judged objectively. So I -- I do the study. I let the facts speak for themselves, and it’s up to the court whether they would draw the same conclusion. . . . [I]f I did my job right in conducting this study and gave what I consider a competent analysis following established practices, then I can draw conclusions on the basis of what I see. (emphasis added). Common sense also suggests that Dr. Banks performed an analysis when conducting her “individualized job analysis.” Plaintiffs’ “reasonable person” argument fails because it too mischaracterizes Dr. Banks’s report and testimony. The content analysis procedure Dr. Banks and her staff used to code the responses was far more complex than a “reasonable person” estimation; it included: (1) devising an initial unique coding scheme for each question; (2) testing the adequacy of the initial coding scheme by coding a sample of data; (3) modifying the initial scheme so it was sufficiently
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specific to be useful in the analysis but sufficiently broad to cover a majority of responses; (4) calibrating the code by asking interviewers to code randomly selected questions to ensure that they interpreted and applied codes consistently; (5) randomly assigning teams of two to code responses; (6) asking the two coders to reach a consensus if they disagreed and (7) asking a third coder to determine the final code where consensus was not reached. Furthermore, the single statement made by Dr. Banks at her deposition about using a “reasonable person” standard was in response to a question about a hypothetical exercise, not her actual methodology -- i.e., whether “reviewing deliverables and assessing if it is ready to go to the client” is similar work to “producing reports to a client.” Her response was, “It sounds like it’s similar work” based on “[w]hat a reasonable person listening to those two descriptions might say . . . .” Dr. Banks did not say that she used a reasonable person standard when conduction her study. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Daubert motion as to Dr. Banks is denied.
b. Dr. Vekker Defendant moves to exclude the Report of Dr. Vekker under the first Rule 702 factor, arguing that his opinions are “not connected to the [Equal Pay Act (“EPA”)] claim” and “irrelevant” to the Rule 23 commonality inquiry, because he aggregated data across function. See Fed. R. Evid. 702(a) (requiring that expert testimony “help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue”). In order to determine relevancy under Daubert, the “trial court should look to the standards of Rule 401 in analyzing whether proffered expert testimony is relevant, i.e., whether it ‘ha[s] any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.’” Amorgianos, 303 F.3d at 265; accord Tramontane v. Home Depot
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U.S.A., Inc., No. 15 Civ. 8528, 2018 WL 4572254, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2018). Dr. Vekker’s testimony is relevant under this standard.
Included within the analyses of Plaintiffs’ disparate treatment and EPA claims are two questions: (1) as a descriptive matter, whether women at KPMG are paid less than men (i.e., correlation), and (2) as a causative matter, whether women at KPMG are paid less than men because of their sex (i.e., causation). See Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 118 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc) (“A plaintiff alleging disparate treatment based on sex in violation of Title VII must show two things: (1) that he was ‘discriminated against with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,’ and (2) that the employer discriminated ‘because of sex.’”) (alterations omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). Likewise, Plaintiffs’ disparate impact claim contains both a correlation and causation element. See Chin v. Port Authority of N.Y. & N.J., 685 F.3d 135, 151 (2d Cir. 2012). At the class certification stage, the key question is whether those mechanisms are common across the class. See Dukes, 564 U.S. at 352 (stating that in most Title VII class actions “proof of commonality necessarily overlaps with [the] merits contention that [the defendant] engages in a pattern or practice of discrimination” because the plaintiffs must be able to “produce a common answer to the crucial question why was I disfavored”) (emphasis in original).
Dr. Vekker analyzes only correlation and is up front about that goal: “Dr. Bloom’s analysis fundamentally ignores the relevant question that I am answering . . . the question in this case whether there are gender disparities in compensation and selections for promotions in Tax and Advisory functions at KPMG.” Dr. Vekker’s regressions convincingly answer this threshold question of correlation in the affirmative, which is an important starting point. Defendant is correct that, for the reasons discussed below, Dr. Vekker’s report, coupled with the remainder of
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Plaintiffs’ evidence, does not convincingly show that causation can be determined on a classwide basis -- but this does not mean that Dr. Vekker’s testimony is unhelpful. Dr. Vekker’s testimony need only logically advance Plaintiffs’ case. It does so by showing that disparities exist and affect all members of the Proposed Class. The motion is denied.
c. Dr. Goldberg Defendant moves to exclude the testimony of Plaintiffs’ Human Resources expert, Dr. Caren Goldberg, arguing that her opinion that KPMG policies do not comply with best practices is irrelevant because she fails to demonstrate that the policies caused women to be paid less. This argument fails. As with Dr. Vekker, Dr. Golberg’s failure to address causation does not make her opinion irrelevant, as no single expert must prove a party’s entire case. See Moussouris, 311 F. Supp. 3d at 1237 (“It is certainly true that Dr. Farber did not draw any specific casual links between the Calibration Process and the disparities he found. But that does not render Dr. Farber’s analysis of the alleged disparity irrelevant to the question of commonality.”) (citation omitted); Chen-Oster, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 125 (“[I]t is not necessary for each expert to provide evidence establishing every element of a party’s case . . . .”). Dr. Goldberg merely needs to advance Plaintiffs’ case, which she does by suggesting KPMG’s compensation and promotion policies, which operated uniformly across the class, do not comply with HR best practices and are not justified by business necessity. See Chen-Oster, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 126 (“[E]xpert evidence that addresses the reliability of Goldman Sachs’ evaluation processes goes to the business necessity defense and is relevant at the class certification stage to the question of commonality.”); Houser v. Pritzker, 28 F.Supp.3d 222, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding commonality established by defenses applicable to all class members); see also McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 489 (7th Cir.
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2012) (holding that whether “teaming” policy is justified by business necessity is an issue “common to the entire class and therefore appropriate for class-wide determination”). The motion to exclude Dr. Goldberg is denied.
d. Additional Motions Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude Dr. Stockdale and Defendant’s motion to exclude Dr. Hanges are denied as moot, because those experts are not relied upon in this Opinion. See, e.g., Axiom Inv. Advisors, LLC v. Duetsche Bank AG, No. 15 Civ. 9945, 2018 WL 4253152, at *8 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2018) (“Deutsche Bank’s Daubert motion to strike Feller’s expert testimony is denied as moot because the Court does not rely on Feller’s testimony in ruling on Plaintiff’s motion for class certification.”). B. Title VII Class Certification Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) provides that plaintiffs may sue on behalf of a class where: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.12 The Second Circuit “has also ‘recognized an implied requirement of ascertainability in Rule 23,’ which demands that a class be ‘sufficiently definite so that it is administratively feasible for the court to determine whether a particular individual is a member.’” In re Petrobras Secs., 862 F.3d 250, 260 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Brecher v. Republic of Argentina, 806 F.3d 22, 24 (2d Cir. 2015)).
12 This Opinion is mindful that Rule 23 will be updated effective December 1, 2018.
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The Second Circuit gives Rule 23 a “liberal rather than restrictive construction, and courts are to adopt a standard of flexibility.” Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372, 377 (2d Cir. 1997); accord In re J.P. Morgan Stable Value Fund ERISA Litig., No. 12 Civ. 2548, 2017 WL 1273963, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2017). But “Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading standard.” Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350. Plaintiffs must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that each of Rule 23’s requirements is met. In re Vivendi, S.A. Secs. Litig., 838 F.3d 223, 264 (2d Cir. 2016). A certifying court “must receive enough evidence, by affidavits, documents, or testimony, to be satisfied that each Rule 23 requirement has been met.” Shahriar, 659 F.3d at 251 (citing In re IPO Secs. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 41 (2d Cir. 2006)). Although “a court’s class-certification analysis must be ‘rigorous’ and may ‘entail some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff’s underlying claim,’ Rule 23 grants courts no license to engage in free-ranging merits inquiries at the certification stage.” Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 465–66 (2013) (citing Dukes, 564 U.S. at 351). Any factual disputes relevant to satisfying each Rule 23 requirement should be resolved, but a court “should not assess any aspect of the merits unrelated to a Rule 23 requirement.” In re IPO Secs. Litig., 471 F.3d at 41.
As is true in many Title VII class actions, the “crux of this case is commonality.” See Dukes, 564 U.S. at 349. Rule 23(a)(2) requires a plaintiff to show that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). “[E]ven a single common question will do” to satisfy the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2). Dukes, 546 U.S. at 359 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). However, because any competently crafted class complaint “literally raises common ‘questions,’” not every common question suffices. Id. at 349. Instead, Plaintiffs’ claims must “depend upon a common contention” that is “of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution -- which means that determination of its truth or falsity will
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resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Id. at 350. In other words, Plaintiffs must pose a common question that “will produce a common answer to the crucial question why was I disfavored.” Id. at 352.
Certain requirements for class certification, including the elements of commonality, typicality and predominance, can be assessed only in light of the substantive law governing a case. The core provision of Title VII states that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . . 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Plaintiffs here assert claims of both disparate impact and disparate treatment under Title VII. Plaintiffs’ motion to certify a class with respect to either or both claims is denied for failure to satisfy the commonality requirement, for the reasons explained below.
1. Plaintiffs Cannot Show Commonality on Their Disparate Impact Claim a. Governing Law
Under a disparate impact theory of Title VII liability, a plaintiff may prevail by demonstrating that the employer “uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(k)(1)(A)(i). Title VII prohibits some employment practices “that are not intended to discriminate but in fact have a disproportionately adverse effect” on a protected class. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009). To prove disparate impact discrimination, a plaintiff must “(1) identify a specific employment practice or policy; (2) demonstrate that a disparity exists; and
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(3) establish a causal relationship between the two.” Chin, 685 F.3d at 151 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Dukes addressed the issue of commonality in a Title VII gender discrimination case that challenged the discretion exercised by individual supervisors over pay and promotion matters. See 564 U.S. at 344–45. The Dukes plaintiffs alleged that “local managers’ discretion over pay and promotions [was] exercised disproportionately in favor of men, leading to an unlawful disparate impact on female employees.” Id. Plaintiffs’ theory of commonality was that WalMart’s “strong and uniform ‘corporate culture’ permits bias against women to infect . . . the discretionary decisionmaking of each one of Wal-Mart’s thousands of managers -- thereby making every woman at the company the victim of one common discriminatory practice.” Id. at 345.
The Supreme Court held that the class could not be certified and observed that “[t]he only corporate policy that the plaintiffs’ evidence convincingly establishes is Wal-Mart’s ‘policy’ of allowing discretion by local supervisors over employment matters.” Id. at 355. Such a policy of discretion is, “[o]n its face . . . just the opposite of a uniform employment practice that would provide the commonality needed for a class action; it is a policy against having uniform employment practices.” Id. Because “demonstrating the invalidity of one manager’s use of discretion will do nothing to demonstrate the invalidity of another’s,” a party basing commonality on such a system of discretion “will be unable to show that all the employees’ Title VII claims will in fact depend on the answers to common questions.” Id. at 355–56.
The Court in Dukes recognized that in appropriate cases, granting unlimited discretion to lower-level supervisors could be the basis of Title VII liability. Id. at 355; see Scott v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 733 F.3d 105, 113–14 (4th Cir. 2013) (describing how a disparate impact
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claim challenging discretion may satisfy commonality post-Dukes). Plaintiffs challenging a system of discretion must identify “a common mode of exercising discretion that pervades the entire company.” Dukes, 564 U.S. at 356; see also Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 325 F.R.D. 55, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). In other words, when plaintiffs wish to challenge numerous employment decisions at once, they must point to “some glue holding the alleged reasons for all those decisions together.” Dukes, 564 U.S. at 352. Otherwise, it would be “quite unbelievable that all managers would exercise their discretion in a common way without some common direction.” Id. at 356. The Supreme Court determined that both the plaintiffs’ aggregated statistical evidence and anecdotal evidence fell “well short” of indicating a “common direction” from upper management, and thus, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the existence of common issues. Id. at 356–58.
On remand, the Dukes plaintiffs narrowed their class significantly, from a nationwide class to three regional classes, all within California. Dukes II, 964 F. Supp. 2d at 1118–19. They identified several corporate policies, such as a “tap on the shoulder” system for promotions and company-wide guidelines for pay decisions, which allegedly provided “common direction.” Id. at 1119–25. But the alleged promotion and pay criteria “were so vague or numerous that they imposed no real constraints,” and the defendant did not prohibit managers from considering other factors of their own choosing. Id. at 1126. The plaintiffs were not challenging the policies themselves or the faithful application of those policies; instead, the plaintiffs’ argument still boiled down to the theory that “managers, who were left without meaningful guidance in applying the impossibly vague criteria, fell back on their own stereotyped views of women in making pay and promotion decisions.” Id. at 1127. While the court found this to be “a perfectly logical theory, . . . it leaves [p]laintiffs right back where they started: challenging Wal-Mart’s
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practice of delegating discretion to local managers, which the Supreme Court specifically held was not a specific employment practice supplying a common question sufficient to certify a class.” Id.
As in Dukes II, other courts addressing challenges to discretionary pay and promotion practices have concluded that commonality is lacking. See Tabor v. Hilti, Inc., 703 F.3d 1206, 1229 (10th Cir. 2013) (recognizing that courts “have generally denied certification when allegedly discriminatory policies are highly discretionary”). In Jones v. National Council of Young Men’s Christian Associations, the plaintiffs argued that the company did not have “effective oversight” and thus allowed local managers’ exercise of discretion to result in adverse outcomes for the protected class. 34 F. Supp. 3d 896, 905 (N.D. Ill. 2014). Plaintiffs attempted to “downplay[] the degree of discretion” by describing the entire evaluation and promotion process as a mandatory company-wide policy. Id. at 904. The court in Jones rejected this attempt to “increas[e] the level of abstraction in defining the policy.” Id.; see id. at 905 (observing that at the level of abstraction the plaintiffs propose, “every company -- even WalMart -- could be said to have a company-wide policy”). Instead, the court characterized the plaintiffs’ challenge to oversight as “precisely the argument held to be inadequate to support class certification in [Dukes].” Id. at 905; see also Bolden v. Walsh Constr. Co., 688 F.3d 893, 898 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[Dukes] tells us that local discretion cannot support a company-wide class no matter how cleverly lawyers may try to repackage local variability as uniformity.”).
After Dukes, for discretionary pay and promotion procedures to satisfy commonality, lower-level supervisors must operate under “a common mode of exercising discretion that pervades the entire company,” such that individual discretionary decisions nonetheless produce a common answer to the question “why was I disfavored.” See 564 U.S. at 352, 356 (emphasis in
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original); see also Ross v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 267 F. Supp. 3d 174, 198 (D.D.C. 2017) (requiring the plaintiffs to demonstrate that “all managers would exercise their discretion in a common way”). Factors that are helpful to consider in determining whether a common mode of exercising discretion pervades the entire company include: (1) the nature of the purported class; (2) the process through which discretion is exercised; (3) the criteria governing the discretion and (4) the involvement of upper management. See Moussouris, 2018 WL 3328418, at *16 (collecting cases).
b. Application to Plaintiffs’ Claims All four factors suggest that Plaintiffs have not shown that their disparate impact claims depend on a common question whose answer will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each class member’s claims. See Dukes, 546 U.S. at 350.
i. Class Size The nature of the purported class is relevant to the commonality inquiry. Although class size “has no per se bearing on commonality,” courts recognize that “when the claims focus in part on the exercise of managerial discretion, it is reasonable to suspect that the larger the class size, the less plausible it is that a class will be able to demonstrate a common mode of exercising discretion.” See Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 285 F.R.D. 492, 509 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (citing Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 877 F. Supp. 2d 113, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)). “[A] more centralized, circumscribed environment generally increases . . . the consistency with which managerial discretion is exercised . . . .” Brown v. Nucor Corp., 785 F.3d 895, 910 (4th Cir. 2015); see also Rollins v. Traylor Bros., Inc., No. 14 Civ. 1414, 2016 WL 258523, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 21, 2016), abrogated on other grounds, 2016 WL 5942943 (W.D. Wash. May 3, 2016). In Brown, for example, the proposed class consisted of about 100 putative members, all
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located in a single facility. 785 F.3d at 910. For a “localized, circumscribed class” of that size, a policy of subjective, discretionary decision-making can “more easily form the basis of Title VII liability.” Id. at 916; see also Chen-Oster, 325 F.R.D. at 62–63 (approving class of 1,762 to 2,300 people holding two job positions). On the other hand, for a nationwide class, “proving a consistent exercise of discretion will be difficult, if not impossible.” Brown, 785 F.3d at 916.
Plaintiffs seek to certify a nationwide class of at least 10,000 women in various offices throughout the country. Although Plaintiffs’ class size is a small fraction of the 1.5 million putative class members in Dukes, 564 U.S. at 342, the proposed class here is still several times the size of the certified classes in Ellis, 285 F.R.D. at 509 (700 members), Chen-Oster, 325 F.R.D. at 62–63 (between approximately 1,762 and 2,300 members) and Brown, 785 F.3d at 910 (100 members). Nor is the proposed Nationwide Class centralized or localized. Unlike Ellis -where all class members held “two closely related” positions sharing “a uniform job description across the class,” 285 F.R.D. at 509 -- or Chen-Oster -- where class members held two positions, 325 F.R.D. at 63 -- Plaintiffs’ proposed class covers a myriad of job descriptions, ranging from accountants to scientists, engineers, attorneys and Ph.D. economists, at levels of seniority ranging from Associate to Managing Director. And unlike those in Brown, the proposed class members in this case are not located in a single location. See 785 F.3d at 910. They are located all over the country. Plaintiffs’ proposed class is more akin to the expansive Dukes class than the circumscribed classes in Ellis, Chen-Oster and Brown.
ii. Framework for Discretion Second, to determine whether a common mode of exercising discretion pervades the entire company, courts look to what procedures govern the discretion and then analyze the rigidity of the process through which discretion is exercised. A process that constrains and
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channels the exercise of discretion may show sufficient common direction. In Ellis, the court noted that Costco not only had a single procedure that governed promotion decisions, but the company also imposed several non-negotiable requirements, such as mandatory promotion from within the company and a prohibition on posting job openings. See 285 F.R.D. at 511. Those requirements -- implemented company wide -- distinguished the discretion at issue in Ellis from the unfettered discretion in Dukes. See Ellis, 285 F.R.D. at 509; see also McReynolds, 672 F.3d at 489–90 (holding that two company-wide policies that required the managers to allow certain practices, rather than leaving managers to make the decision themselves, sufficiently restrained discretion).
KPMG’s pay and promotion procedures act more as a framework that dictates who will make discretionary decisions rather than how they will exercise their discretion. Broadly speaking, putative class members were all subject to “uniform and firm-wide compensation and promotion practices.” Employees participate in goal-setting meetings with their PMLs, and are evaluated in practice area assessment meetings at which eligible employees are reviewed for promotion. Under the direction of Compensation Strategies, the company sets salary ranges and recommended pay increases and bonuses for employees depending on, among other factors, their specific position and market rates for that position, current salary and performance. The subpractice leader in charge of compensation for a practice area decides the compensation of the employees in that practice area. These decisions are reviewed in the aggregate for compliance with the budget by higher management. These procedures, while uniform and firm-wide, merely “set[] up a structure” through which employees are evaluated. Valerino v. Holder, 283 F.R.D. 302, 313 (E.D. Va. 2012). Like the evaluation and promotion process in Valerino, the process Plaintiffs identify reveals only stages or phases, during which individual decision makers or
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groups at the practice area level exercised discretion. See id. at 313–14. Identifying the framework says nothing about whether the exercise of discretion itself can “be said to be the same or ‘common.’” Id. at 313.
Plaintiffs argue, relying on the testimony of Dr. Goldberg, that common compensation policies exist based upon KPMG’s use of overlapping salary ranges, which “divorce[] pay from performance” to women’s detriment, and its use of “prior salaries” to set current salaries, which “entrenches pre-existing gender disparities.” Neither argument is persuasive. The “overlap” argument fails for two reasons. First, it is possible that overlapping merit and variable compensation pay scales disentangle pay and performance by allowing lower rated men to be compensated better than higher rated women -- e.g., under the 2012 Tax Managing Director Salary Increase Guidelines, a lower 3-rated employee could earn a 5% merit increase while a higher 1-rated employee might earn only a 4% increase. However, Plaintiffs have not provided evidence that a single woman was disadvantaged in this manner, as Dr. Goldberg acknowledged at her deposition, let alone “significant evidence” that “overlap” operated as a common causal mechanism across the class. Second, the “overlap” argument boils down to a claim that discretion delegated to lower-level managers allowed bias to infect compensation decisions. As described in Dr. Goldberg’s report, overlapping pay scales are problematic because they “create an opaque system that provides fertile ground for bias.”
Plaintiffs’ “compounding pay gap” argument also fails, because they have not shown an initial pay gap.13 In support of this argument, Plaintiffs cite the Ninth Circuit’s recent holding
13 This argument is also properly rejected because Plaintiffs raised it in one conclusory sentence in their opening memorandum of law and developed it only in their reply. See, e.g., Jaen v. Sessions, 899 F.3d 182, 187 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Norton v. Sam’s Club, 145 F. 3d 114, 117
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“that prior salary alone or in combination with other factors cannot justify a wage differential.” Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d 453, 456 (9th Cir. 2018). However, Rizo was not a class action. Id. at 457–58. In that case, one female plaintiff was paid less at her new job than men holding the same position, because she had been paid less at her previous job than her male counterparts had been paid at their previous jobs. Id. at 458–59. But in this case, Plaintiffs have not shown that their source salaries -- i.e., their original salaries at KPMG -- were lower than the source salaries of their male counterparts. Accordingly, Plaintiffs do not provide “significant proof” of a common initial pay disparity that KPMG’s compensation system could have compounded over time. To the extent there is relevant evidence in the record, it cuts against the “compounding pay gap” theory, because, as Dr. Goldberg puts it, KPMG “moves” employees “to the middle” of their pay bands over time by “putting more money towards groups that are further behind [in] the compensation tool.” While this policy of moving people “to the middle” might “decouple[] pay and performance,” it also presumably dissipates any initial sex-based pay discrepancies over time.
Plaintiffs also argue that KPMG uses a common “tap on the shoulder” system for promotions to the detriment of women, because it does not post job openings and invite applications. This mischaracterizes how promotions are made at KPMG. A “tap on the shoulder” system implies a setting where promotions are scarce and made at irregular intervals, so that only employees who are “tapped on the shoulder” are promoted or know to apply. See Dukes, 564 U.S. 371 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). However, the record reflects that KPMG employees operate on a career track; they are routinely reviewed for promotion when they meet
(2d Cir. 1998)) (“Issues not sufficiently argued in the briefs are considered waived . . . .”); accord Pirnik v. Fiat Chrysler Autos., N.V., 327 F.R.D. 38, 44 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
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certain eligibility requirements, and therefore need not apply or be “tapped on the shoulder.” PMLs and other practice area members discuss an employee’s promotion readiness with the employee as a matter of course at several points throughout the performance management process, including (1) at the annual goal-setting meeting with the PML, (2) prior to mid-year review meetings and (3) prior to the year-end assessment meetings. Promotion readiness is also evaluated for each eligible employee at the year-end practice area assessment meetings.
iii. Criteria Governing Discretionary Decisions Third, in assessing whether a discretionary system satisfies commonality, courts consider the criteria that govern the discretionary decisions. Again, whether a set of criteria creates a common mode of exercising discretion depends on the rigidity of the criteria. Subjective criteria, prone to different interpretations, generally do not provide common direction. See, e.g., Ross, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 198 (“[T]hat all . . . supervisors used the same allegedly ill-defined numerical rubric . . . says nothing about how individual supervisors exercised what discretion was left to them.”); Jones, 34 F. Supp. 3d at 906 (“That supervisors evaluate candidates according to specific, but subjective, factors . . . does not make the decisions produced by the process meaningfully less discretionary.”) But objective criteria, or even subjective criteria defined uniformly, may establish a common mode of exercising discretion. In Ellis, the court found commonality sufficient for class certification in part because most of the promotion criteria -such as the applicant’s ability to relocate or an applicant’s prior experience in the position -- were objective and thus not open to interpretation by individual decision-makers. See 285 F.R.D. at 514, 531. The remaining criteria, while subjective, were uniformly interpreted within the company. See id. at 518–19.
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KPMG’s evaluation and promotion criteria are not sufficiently specific to constrain discretion. Plaintiffs argue that KPMG’s numerical evaluation metrics are “vague and unweighted” like the “allegedly ill-defined numerical rubric” in Ross, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 198, and that many of KPMG’s promotions criteria are abstract like the “amorphous concepts” in Jones, 34 F. Supp. 3d at 906, including considerations like “professionalism,” “integrity,” “reputation” and potential to be a “partner candidate.” Plaintiffs do not present evidence that any of these challenged criteria constrained discretion. See id. at 905–06. While this “delegation of discretion over pay and promotions is a policy uniform throughout” KPMG, Dukes, 564 U.S. at 377 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) -- and, as explained by Dr. Goldberg, the use of nebulous criteria such as “partner candidate” by managers at KPMG very likely disadvantages women in a profession traditionally dominated by men -- it is nevertheless the type of uniform policy that Dukes held cannot support a finding of commonality. 564 U.S. at 356–57.
iv. Managerial Non-involvement Fourth, and last, the involvement of top management in the discretionary decision-making is a key consideration in assessing commonality. See Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350 (suggesting that commonality may be satisfied if class members were subject to the bias of a single supervisor); Brown, 785 F.3d at 916 (recognizing commonality if high-level personnel exercise the discretion at issue). If, for instance, “a single decisionmaker[] or a small, cohesive group” vetted all of the pay and promotion decisions, then the involvement of that one individual, or small group of individuals, could constitute a common practice. Jones, 34 F. Supp. 3d at 908; see Chen-Oster, 325 F.R.D. at 66, 76, 84 (certifying a class where upper management developed the list of eligible candidates and “[u]ltimately, [the] management committee decide[d] who [wa]s promoted”); Ellis 285 F.R.D. at 511–12 (finding commonality where, even though lower-level managers had input,
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top management actually made the promotion decisions). But mere approval or limited oversight by higher-level executives, without more, falls short of showing a sufficient common denominator. See Jones, 34 F. Supp. 3d at 908.
Plaintiffs have not shown sufficient involvement by top management. Plaintiffs claim that “ultimately all pay and promotion decisions must be approved by two individuals: the Vice Chair and National Managing Partner for Tax and Advisory.” But final approval in the aggregate does not show commonality in the exercise of discretion. As in Jones, Plaintiffs provide no evidence that levels of management above the more than 150 practice area leaders reviewed individual promotion recommendations with “any frequency, much less that they did so with . . . regularity.” 34 F. Supp. 3d at 908. In the absence of contradictory evidence, the Court credits the sworn statement of Lynne Doughtie, KPMG’s CEO and former National Managing Partner and then Vice Chair of Advisory, that members of senior management “do not review or secondguess individual employee performance, pay or promotion decisions . . . .” Rather, upper management “simply confirm[s] that, as a matter of process, assessment meetings were held and the compensation process completed” and “look[s] at aggregated pay and promotion decisions against budgets.” The involvement of KPMG senior management in pay and promotion decisions more closely resembles the “limited oversight” in Jones, 34 F. Supp. 3d at 908, than the “consistent[] and pervasive” involvement in Ellis, 285 F.R.D. at 511–12.
In sum, these factors -- the class size of thousands of female employees, the relative freedom and independence extended to local supervisors who made pay and promotion decisions, the lack of rigid criteria to channel discretion and the lack of review by senior management of individual personnel decisions -- all dictate the conclusion that there was no common mode of exercising discretion that would warrant class certification after Dukes. See Dukes II, 964 F.
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Supp. 2d at 1127. Accordingly, Plaintiffs motion for class certification of a disparate impact class is denied.
2. Plaintiffs Cannot Show Commonality on Their Disparate Treatment Claim
Unlike disparate impact claims, where the employer’s practice or policy is facially neutral, a disparate treatment claim is based on the allegation that the defendant engaged in intentional discrimination. The plaintiff must present “evidence supporting a rebuttable presumption that an employer acted with the deliberate purpose and intent of discrimination against an entire class.” United States v. City of New York, 717 F.3d 72, 87 (2d Cir. 2013) (“City of New York”); accord EEOC v. Mavis Discount Tire, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 3d 90, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). Disparate treatment claims do not require plaintiffs to identify a specific company-wide employment practice responsible for the discrimination. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.16 (1977). In a disparate treatment class action, plaintiffs must provide evidence of a “systemwide pattern or practice” of pervasive discrimination against the class, such that the discrimination is “the regular rather than the unusual practice.” Id. at 336. Such a showing creates a rebuttable presumption of the required discriminatory intent. City of New York, 717 F.3d at 83. Plaintiffs may satisfy their burden of showing a pattern or practice of discrimination through statistics alone. Teamsters, at 339–40; see Hazelwood School Dist., 433 U.S. at 307–08 (“Where gross statistical disparities can be shown, they alone may in a proper case constitute prima facie proof of a pattern or practice of discrimination.”). Although anecdotal evidence of discrimination is relevant to show a policy of intentional discrimination, such evidence is not required. City of New York, 717 F.3d at 84.
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If plaintiffs satisfy their burden, the burden of production then shifts to the employer to show a non-discriminatory reason for the apparently discriminatory result. City of New York, 717 F.3d at 84–85. The employer may rebut the inference of discriminatory intent by offering any relevant evidence. Id. at 85–87. The ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff to show that the employer acted with discriminatory intent. Id. at 87.
In a disparate treatment case, proof of commonality for purposes of Rule 23 overlaps with Plaintiffs’ prima facie burden to show that KPMG engaged in a systemwide pattern or practice of discrimination. See Dukes, 564 U.S. at 352. There is a “wide gap” between an individual’s claim that he was subjected to a company’s policy of discrimination and the existence of a class of persons who have suffered the same injury as that individual such that the individual’s claim and the class claims will share common questions of law or fact. Id. at 352–53 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982)). To bridge that gap, Plaintiffs must provide “significant proof” that KPMG “operated under a general policy of discrimination.” Id. at 353 (quoting Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159, n.15).
Here, Plaintiffs point to “statistically significant disparities resulting from common compensation and promotion processes; . . . evidence of knowledge on the part of KPMG’s senior leadership [and] a failure of KPMG’s senior leadership to remedy known disparities; and . . . substantial anecdotal evidence.” This evidence is insufficient to show, for purposes of Rule 23 commonality, that KPMG operated under a general policy of discrimination.
a. Statistical Evidence Contrary to their assertion, Plaintiffs’ evidence does not show statistically significant disparities between similarly situated men and women in pay and promotion -- much less the kind
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of gross disparities that on their face would suggest discriminatory intent. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339.
The plaintiffs in Dukes offered a statistical study similar to that of Plaintiffs’ statistical expert Dr. Vekker, in which regression analyses revealed statistically significant disparities between men and women that “can be explained only by gender discrimination.” 564 U.S. at 356. Dukes held that this statistical evidence was insufficient because it suffered from a “failure of inference.” Id. The evidence established only that there was a disparity at the national or regional level, but information at that level did not establish the existence of disparities at individual stores, let alone “the inference that a company-wide policy of discrimination is implemented by discretionary decisions at the store and district level.” Id. at 356–57. For example, a regional pay disparity could be attributable to a small set of stores, and cannot alone establish a “uniform, store-by-store disparity.” Id. at 357. Thus, these higher-level statistics could not produce a common answer to the question “why was I disfavored.” Id. at 352.
Post-Dukes, the statistical study must “conform[] to the level of decision for the challenged practices.” Ellis, 285 F.R.D. at 523. When decisions are made at the discretion of local decision makers, courts may find aggregated statistical evidence inadequate because it is “derived from hundreds of employment decisions made by myriad decision makers, at different times, under mutable procedures and guidelines, in different departments, and in different office locations, concerning employees at varying levels of experience, responsibilities, and education.” Jones, 34 F. Supp. 3d at 909. But if plaintiffs demonstrate that practices are uniform across the company, then courts have found “good reason to rely on nationwide statistics.” Ellis, 285 F.R.D. at 523 (relying on aggregated statistics because the CEO averred that the promotion policies derived from the top management and were uniform across the company).
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Plaintiffs here have not shown that promotion policies and practices are uniform across KPMG. Thus, there is no “good reason to rely on nationwide statistics.” Id. The relevant level of decision-making for the challenged practices here remains at the practice-area level. Dr. Vekker’s statistical study, however, is based on aggregate figures. Dr. Vekker ran regressions comparing all relevant employees at the Function level (i.e, the Tax Function and the Advisory Function), in line with Plaintiffs’ theory that KPMG’s Function- and firm-wide pay and promotion policies had a disparate impact on women. Even accepting the validity of Dr. Vekker’s statistical analysis, his evidence “has the same problem as the statistical evidence in [Dukes]: it begs the question.” Bolden, 688 F.3d at 896. Dr. Vekker’s finding of disparity “may be attributable to only a small set of [KPMG decision makers at the practice-area level], and cannot by itself establish the uniform . . . disparity upon which the [P]laintiffs’ theory of commonality depends.” See Dukes, 564 U.S. at 357.
Furthermore, the regressions of Defendant’s expert Dr. Bloom suggest that Service Line, rather than gender, accounts for any pay and promotion disparities. When Dr. Bloom compared men and women who hold the same job title within the same Service Line, gender disparities largely disappeared, suggesting that Dr. Vekker’s decision to aggregate data across function, thereby equating job and job title, obfuscated the principal explanatory variable. Dr. Vekker’s results are likely explained by a higher concentration of men in the best compensated Service Lines and Cost Centers within a single function -- e.g., Managing Directors in the SALT Income and Incentives Cost Center earn more than three times as Managing Directors in the BTS High Volume Trust Tax Cost Center -- even though men and women with the same job title within the same Service Lines and Cost Centers earn the same amounts. Dr. Vekker’s statistical evidence is insufficient to show any common issue that would warrant a nationwide class.
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b. Failure to Remedy Known Disparities Plaintiffs claim that KPMG was aware that its pay and promotion policies resulted in a disparate impact against women and allowed those policies to continue. This argument mischaracterizes the evidence. The documents Plaintiffs cite generally concern KPMG’s diversity efforts, which lay out KPMG’s shortcomings as well as successes with regard to diversity and inclusion, and also steps KPMG is taking to address shortcomings. For example, Plaintiffs cite a study performed by DiversityInc. as standing for the proposition that “KPMG acknowledged as early as 2009 that ‘compensation disparities still exist,’” but the document Plaintiffs cite actually lauds KPMG’s progress: KPMG has dramatically increased its position as a diversity leader through concerted efforts in talent development, mentoring and employee resource groups. In 2008, the firm’s initial placement was 49, then advanced to 21 in 2009. . . . Our efforts with women have strongly contributed to the increase in ranking; however the number of women on the Board will adversely impact us in the future. . . . The firm should focus on increased diversity of senior management. While we have done a good job with developing and retaining women, compensation disparities still exist. Plaintiffs claim that KPMG failed to “review or analyze the centrally determined compensation and promotion decisions to see if women are paid or promoted equally.” This argument is unavailing, first, because (as discussed above) compensation and promotion decisions are not “centrally determined,” but rather, left to the discretion of practice area leaders within general guidelines set by the firm. Second, in response to the 2009 DiversityInc. report’s recommendation that KPMG “[a]nalyze compensation data for women and minorities across all levels,” KPMG began doing so in 2010 via its Key Performance Indicator and a yearly anonymous Work Environment Survey (now called “Employee Engagement Surveys”).
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Plaintiffs cite a discovery letter from KPMG stating that the company is not aware of analyses of “any alleged gender impact of KPMG’s compensation, promotion or evaluation systems.” This representation is not the same as saying that senior leadership at KPMG was inattentive to the issue. Several documents show that the firm was sensitive to gender disparities in pay and promotion and made efforts to remedy the issue.
Through their expert Dr. Goldberg, Plaintiffs claim that KPMG does not conduct training specifically targeted at avoiding bias in compensation and promotion decisions, and that the diversity training KPMG does conduct is ineffective. Plaintiffs’ evidence does not amount to “significant proof” that KPMG “operated under a general policy of discrimination.” Dukes, 564 U.S. at 353. At most, Plaintiffs have shown that KPMG was aware of a pay and promotions gap, and that the firm’s efforts have not completely eradicated the gap.
c. Anecdotal Evidence Plaintiffs’ anecdotal evidence also does not constitute the necessary “significant proof” of classwide discriminatory intent. A disparate treatment claim often includes “a combination of strong statistical evidence of disparate impact coupled with anecdotal evidence of the employer’s intent to treat the protected class unequally.” Mozee v. Am. Commercial Marine Serv. Co., 940 F.2d 1036, 1051 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Robinson v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 158 (2d Cir. 2001). In Teamsters, the Supreme Court found sufficient evidence of a systemwide pattern or practice of employment discrimination based on pervasive statistical disparities “bolstered” by anecdotal evidence of discrimination. 431 U.S. at 337–88. Anecdotal evidence by definition is individual rather than widespread; it serves an illustrative purpose to bring “the cold numbers convincingly to life.” Id. at 339. “While anecdotal evidence may suffice to prove individual claims of discrimination, rarely, if ever, can such evidence show a systemic
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pattern of discrimination.” Middleton v. City of Flint, 92 F.3d 396, 405 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting O’Donnell Constr. Co. v. District of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
Here, Plaintiffs’ anecdotal evidence fails to raise any inference that KPMG engaged in a systemwide pattern or practice of discrimination. The record contains the 150 internal complaints by or on behalf of putative class members submitted to KPMG’s Human Resources and Ethics & Compliance departments, including 147 complaints of sexual harassment and “unprofessional behavior,” and 134 complaints of gender discrimination. Plaintiffs also submitted 20 declarations from putative class members describing misconduct at KPMG and presumably would have submitted many more had the Court not limited the parties’ submissions.14
The issue is whether KPMG paid and promoted women and men differently throughout the firm because of discriminatory intent. If Plaintiffs had presented strong statistical evidence of discriminatory treatment, then anecdotal evidence might bolster the inference that the discriminatory treatment was the result of discriminatory intent. However, in this case as discussed above, Plaintiffs lack strong statistical evidence showing that women and men were paid and promoted differently. Anecdotal evidence of individual incidents of sexist attitudes and behavior -- whether 200 or 500 in number -- cannot supply this critical missing piece. See Dukes, 564 U.S. at 358 (“In Teamsters, in addition to substantial statistical evidence of company-wide
14 In Teamsters, the plaintiffs offered 1 anecdote for every 8 class members to buttress the statistical evidence of discriminatory treatment. See Dukes, 431 U.S. at 358. Here, Plaintiffs would have needed 1,250 anecdotes for the approximately 10,000 class members to achieve the same ratio. Holding Plaintiffs to this measure, especially in cases of this size, undermines any standard of reasonableness and proportionality that should temper what is demanded of litigants, cf., e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case . . . .”), and undermines the Court’s need to manage the amount of evidence that will be presented for the Court’s review. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 64 (1987) (“[A]n individual’s right to present evidence is subject always to reasonable restrictions.”).
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discrimination, the Government (as plaintiff) produced about 40 specific accounts of racial discrimination from particular individuals.”) (citation omitted, emphasis added); see also Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339 (“[T]his was not a case in which the Government relied on ‘statistics alone.’ The individuals who testified about their personal experiences with the company brought the cold numbers convincingly to life.”).
Also, reliance on anecdotal evidence to show disparate treatment undermines Plaintiffs’ goal of showing commonality. Anecdotal evidence, by definition, raises individual rather than common questions. In Dukes, the Supreme Court found the plaintiffs’ anecdotal evidence “too weak to raise any inference that all the individual, discretionary personnel decisions are discriminatory” in part because individual managers are likely to provide non-discriminatory reasons for their respective compensation and promotion decisions. 564 U.S. at 357. In the burden-shifting framework of disparate treatment cases, the employer is entitled to elicit such evidence; the employer must rebut the presumption of discriminatory intent and show some nondiscriminatory reason for the apparently discriminatory results, and may respond with any relevant evidence. City of New York, 717 F.3d at 84–85. The prospect of Defendant rebutting the approximately 270 separate incidents Plaintiffs have introduced illustrates that the question of discriminatory intent in this case is not a common one.
3. Rule 23(c)(4) Issue Class Certification Barring certification under Rule 23(b)(2) or (b)(3), Plaintiffs seek issue class certification as to issues such as liability or disparate impact under Rule 23(c)(4). The Court declines to certify any issue class because Plaintiffs have not satisfied the commonality requirement under Rule 23(a). “[E]ven if the common questions do not predominate over the individual questions so that class certification of the entire action is warranted, Rule 23 authorizes the district court in
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appropriate cases to isolate the common issues under Rule 23(c)(4)(A) and proceed with class treatment of these particular issues.” In re Nassau Cty. Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 226 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1996)). But as discussed above, Plaintiffs have not identified a common question warranting class certification under Dukes, 546 U.S. at 349. Because there are no common questions that will generate “common answers” in a classwide proceeding, id. at 350, no issue class can be certified under Rule 23(c)(4).
4. New York Subclass Plaintiffs’ application to certify a New York subclass is denied because Plaintiffs fail to provide any evidence specific to a New York class. For instance, Dr. Vekker does not present any analysis of pay and promotions specific to employees in New York. His findings of nationwide aggregate disparities say nothing about New York pay or promotions. Plaintiffs argue without citing authority that they need not submit statistical analysis specific to the application of KPMG’s national employment policies to New York employees at the class certification phase. Even assuming that this argument is valid, it offers no reason why a New York class can be certified when, as discussed above, the record is insufficient to show the commonality necessary for certification of a nationwide class. C. EPA Final Certification Plaintiffs move for final certification of an EPA collective, which was conditionally certified in 2014, of “all female employees of KPMG who held any of the following positions -Associate, Senior Associate, Manager, Senior Manager/Director and/or Managing Director -- in either the Tax or Advisory practice groups from October 17, 2008, to the present” (the “Proposed Collective”). Kassman v. KPMG LLP, No. 11 Civ. 3743, 2014 WL 3298884, at *9 (S.D.N.Y.
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July 8, 2014). Final certification of the Proposed Collective is denied because Plaintiffs fail to show that the members of the Proposed Collective (1) work at a single “establishment” and (2) are “similarly situated” to one another.
1. Background Legal Framework The EPA prohibits an employer from paying wages “at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). “As part of the [Fair Labor Standards Act (the “FLSA”)], the EPA utilizes the FLSA’s enforcement mechanisms and employs its definitional provisions.” Anderson v. State Univ. of N.Y., 169 F.3d 117, 119 (2d Cir. 1999), vacated on other grounds, 528 U.S. 1111 (2000). Section 216(b) of the FLSA provides that an EPA action “may be maintained against any employer . . . in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). “Neither the FLSA nor its implementing regulations define the term ‘similarly situated.’” Cunningham v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 754 F. Supp. 2d 638, 643 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Certification” under the FLSA is simply “the district court’s exercise of the discretionary power . . . to facilitate the sending of notice to potential class members.” Myers v. Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537, 555 n.10 (2d Cir. 2010). Although the Second Circuit has never offered a definitive standard for the certification of collective actions under the FLSA, it has endorsed the two-step approach widely used by the district courts in this Circuit and by other circuit courts. See id. at 554–55 (“[T]he district courts of this Circuit appear to have coalesced around a twostep method, a method which . . . we think is sensible.”).
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“The first step involves the court making an initial determination to send notice to potential opt-in plaintiffs who may be ‘similarly situated’ to the named plaintiffs with respect to whether a FLSA violation has occurred.” Id. at 555. To establish that the named plaintiffs are “similarly situated” to the potential opt-in plaintiffs in the first stage of the inquiry, the named plaintiffs must “make a ‘modest factual showing’ that they and potential opt-in plaintiffs ‘together were victims of a common policy or plan that violated the law.’” Id. (quoting Hoffmann v. Sbarro, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 249, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
“Once a court is satisfied that the first-stage inquiry has been satisfied, it conditionally certifies the class and orders notice to putative class members, who are given the opportunity to opt in.” Cunningham, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 644. The second step, typically taken upon the completion of discovery, requires the court to determine, “on a fuller record, . . . whether a socalled ‘collective action’ may go forward by determining whether the plaintiffs who have opted in are in fact ‘similarly situated’ to the named plaintiffs. The action may be ‘de-certified’ if the record reveals that they are not . . . .” Myers, 624 F.3d at 555.
2. Single Establishment The EPA requires equal pay for equal work for employees who work in a single “establishment.” 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). The term “establishment” in the EPA “refers to a distinct physical place of business rather than to an entire business or ‘enterprise’ which may include several separate places of business.” 29 C.F.R. § 1620.9(a). However, “unusual circumstances may call for two or more distinct physical portions of a business enterprise being treated as a single establishment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1620.9(b). “For example, a central administrative unit may hire all employees, set wages, and assign the location of employment; employees may
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frequently interchange work locations; and daily duties may be virtually identical and performed under similar working conditions.” Id.
Courts identify “a widely followed standard recognizing that central control and administration of disparate job sites can support a finding of a single establishment for purposes of the EPA.” Mulhall v. Advance Sec., Inc., 19 F.3d 586, 591 n.11 (11th Cir. 1994) (collecting cases). “The hallmarks of this standard are centralized control of job descriptions, salary administration, and job assignments or functions.” Id. at 591–92 (holding that “[a] reasonable trier of fact could infer that because of centralized control . . . a single establishment exist[ed] for purposes of the EPA”). Courts reason that “narrow construction of the word ‘establishment’ could make proof of discrimination more difficult, thus frustrating congressional intent.” Id. at 591 (internal quotation marks omitted). “However, [courts] presume that multiple offices are not a ‘single establishment’ unless unusual circumstances are demonstrated.” Meeks v. Comput. Assocs. Int’l, 15 F.3d 1013, 1017 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1620.9(a)). In Meeks, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that “the evidence . . . [did] not demonstrate the level of centralization necessary to justify treating all of the company’s technical writers as working at a single establishment” where “[a]lthough [defendant] centrally sets broad salary ranges, the specific salary to be offered a job applicant is determined by the local supervisor,” and “[a]lthough personnel records are maintained centrally, job applicants are interviewed by local officials and hired upon their recommendation.” Id.
As discussed above, upon review of a “fuller record,” Myers, 624 F.3d at 555, although KPMG set generally applicable guidelines, individual pay and promotion decisions were left to the discretion of local practice area leaders. These decentralized discretionary determinations were reviewed by firm leadership on an aggregate basis against budget. Pay and promotion
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decisions were not sufficiently “centralized” to amount to “unusual circumstances” warranting a finding that the many offices and practice areas represented in the 1,100-member Proposed Collective qualify as a single “establishment” under the EPA. See Meeks, 15 F.3d at 1017; 29 C.F.R. § 1620.9(b).
3. “Similarly Situated” At the final certification stage, “the district court will, on a fuller record, determine whether a so-called ‘collective action’ may go forward by determining whether the plaintiffs who have opted in are in fact ‘similarly situated’ to the named plaintiffs.” Myers, 624 F.3d at 555. In analyzing this issue: Although the Second Circuit has yet to prescribe a particular method for determining whether members of a class are similarly situated, district courts in this circuit typically look to the (1) disparate factual and employment settings of the individual plaintiffs; (2) defenses available to defendants which appear to be individual to each plaintiff; and (3) fairness and procedural considerations counseling for or against collective action treatment. Zivali v. AT & T Mobility, LLC, 784 F. Supp. 2d 456, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted); accord LoCurto v. AT&T Mobility Servs. LLC, No. 13 Civ. 4303, 2018 WL 4519201, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2018). All three considerations weigh against certifying the Proposed Collective. First, Plaintiffs seek to certify a Proposed Collective with approximately 1,100 members, from approximately 80 offices nationwide, who work in about 115 different Cost Centers. As illustrated by Dr. Banks’s report, the job content of the 1,100 Opt-Ins is wide-ranging. The sheer size and breadth of the Proposed Collective suggests that its members are not similarly situated. See, e.g., Scott v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., No. 12 Civ. 8333, 2017 WL 1287512, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2017) (“[T]he ‘similarly situated’ analysis for the purposes of FLSA
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certification can be viewed, in some respects, as a sliding scale. In other words, the more opt-ins there are in the class, the more the analysis under § 216(b) will mirror the analysis under Rule 23.”). The second and third factors lead to the same conclusion. For the reasons discussed above with respect to commonality, there is no (non-discretionary) uniform causal mechanism for determining pay and promotion operating across the Proposed Collective. This means that there are likely 1,100 defenses to justify why the 1,100 Opt-Ins were paid as they were. Adjudicating the claims of the proposed collective in a single action would give rise to obvious procedural difficulties and could not assure fair treatment of any party involved.
Despite the size of the Proposed Collective, and variety of job responsibilities amongst Opt-Ins, Plaintiffs nevertheless argue, “Because Opt-In Plaintiffs within the same job level and function perform the same principal duties under similar working conditions, certification of this collective is appropriate. Any marginal variation between Opt-in Plaintiffs’ job duties does not undermine the collective nature of the claims.” In support of this argument, Plaintiffs state that “[a]ll Tax employees are expected to be able to distinguish tax authorities, identify and analyze tax issues, and use tax technologies.” Plaintiffs state, “Employees in Advisory also perform work with a common set of skills and responsibilities. They help clients improve business performance, leverage information technology, protect assets, and manage risk.” Plaintiffs also note that more senior employees across both Tax and Advisory are expected to “oversee the work of more junior staff” and “provid[e] feedback.”
This argument fails, because it is shortsighted; Plaintiffs ignore what the members of the Proposed Collective will eventually need to prove -- and the impossibility of practically adjudicating that proof in a single action. The EPA requires “equal pay for -- emphatically -equal work. To that end, Congress rejected statutory language encompassing ‘comparable work’
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. . . .” E.E.O.C. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 768 F.3d 247, 254 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)). “[T]o prove a violation of the EPA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that ‘(1) the employer pays different wages to employees of the opposite sex; (2) the employees perform equal work on jobs requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility; and (3) the jobs are performed under similar working conditions.’” Id. at 254–55 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). Assessing the second prong requires a “focus on job content,” in which courts assess “the congruity and equality of actual job content between the plaintiff and comparator . . . .” Id. at 255. “To satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must establish that the jobs compared entail common duties or content, and do not simply overlap in titles or classifications.” Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1620.13(e) (“Application of the equal pay standard is not dependent on job classifications or titles but depends rather on actual job requirements and performance.”). Second Circuit “cases as well as the EEOC’s regulations and Compliance Manual stand for a common principle: a successful EPA claim depends on the comparison of actual job content; broad generalizations drawn from job titles, classifications, or divisions, and conclusory assertions of sex discrimination, cannot suffice.” Port Auth., 768 F.3d at 256 (citing EEOC Compliance Manual § 10-IV(E)(2) (2000)).
Plaintiffs’ arguments fail because they operate at the wrong level of abstraction; the “equal work” analysis requires a micro-level -- rather than a macro-level -- approach to comparing job responsibilities, skills and requirements. See id. at 257 (“[B]land abstractions -untethered from allegations regarding Port Authority attorneys’ actual job duties -- say nothing about whether the attorneys were required to perform ‘substantially equal’ work.”). That female supervisors across Tax and Advisory are expected to “provide feedback” does not mean that they are similarly situated to male supervisors who also must “provide feedback.” The “equal work” analysis must “focus on job content.” Id. at 255 (emphasis added). By lumping all Tax
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Associates into the same category, the Proposed Collective assumes without reason that an Associate in the Accounting Methods and Credits practice, who has a science Ph.D. and collects data at oil facilities in order to analyze Research and Development tax credits, performs “equal work” to an Associate in the Tax Controversy Services practice, who has a J.D., and advocates in IRS disputes. While both associates might need to “analyze tax issues,” they do not engage in “equal work” when “job content” is examined.
Plaintiffs’ attempt to shoehorn the Opt-Ins into a single EPA collective asks too much when compared with other proposed collectives that courts in the Second Circuit have rejected. See, e.g., id. at 257 (holding that the EEOC failed to state an EPA claim where it pleaded only that female non-supervisory attorneys at the Port Authority were paid less than male nonsupervisory attorneys, because it cannot be assumed that “an attorney is an attorney is an attorney”); Chiaramonte v. Animal Med. Ctr., 677 F. App’x 689, 691–92 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order) (holding that a female primary care veterinarian did not establish that she performed “equal work” to male specialist veterinarians); Miller v. City of New York, No. 15 Civ. 7563, 2018 WL 2059841, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2018) (“The stark differences in training, job requirements, and job responsibilities between Traffic Enforcement Agents and School Crossing Guards warrant summary judgment on the EPA claim.”); Scott v. Chipotle, 2017 WL 1287512, at *8–9 (decertifying a collective of “Apprentices” at Chipotle restaurants because “Apprentices had vastly different levels and amounts of authority in exercising managerial tasks” across the 37 states in which they worked). In short, because employees sharing a single job title at KPMG are not “similarly situated” to one another, if the Proposed Collective were certified, it would be necessary to: (1) match the Opt-ins with 1,100 unique proposed male comparators; (2) adjudicate approximately 1,100 “equal work” questions and only then (3) turn to any individualized
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Case 1:11-cv-03743-LGS Document 831 Filed 11/30/18 Page 60 of 61 defenses KPMG might raise with respect to specific Opt-Ins (e.g., poor performance reviews). Such an undertaking is impractical if not impossible. “[F]airness and procedural considerations counsel” against collective action treatment in this case. See Zivali, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 464. For this reason too, the motion for final certification of a collective is denied, and the collective that was preliminarily certified is decertified.
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Case 1:11-cv-03743-LGS Document 831 Filed 11/30/18 Page 61 of 61 III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motions for Rule 23 class certification and EPA collective certification are DENIED. Both parties’ Daubert motions and motions to strike are DENIED. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the motions at Dkt. Nos. 797, 800, 802, 803, 813, 815, 817, 818, 827 and 829. Dated: November 30, 2018
New York, New York
61

 
 Kassman v. KPMG LLP, Slip Copy (2020)

2020 WL 4003367 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, S.D. New York.
Donna KASSMAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
KPMG LLP, Defendant.
11 Civ. 3743 (LGS) |
Signed 07/15/2020
Attorneys and Law Firms
Jeremy Heisler, Jennifer Siegel, Sanford Heisler Sharp, LLP, Rachel Geman, Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, New York, NY, Anne B. Shaver, Michelle Lamy, Kelly Dermody, Michael Ian Levin-Gesundheit, Tiseme Gabriella Zegeye, Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, San Francisco, CA, Conor Daniel Ahern, Thomas J. Henderson, David W. Sanford, Pro Hac Vice, Katie Mueting, Pro Hac Vice, Saba Bireda, Shaun Rosenthal, Sanford Heisler Sharp, Washington, DC, Leigh Anne St. Charles, Sanford Heisler Sharp, LLP, Nashville, TN, for Plaintiffs.
Colleen M. Kenney, Pro Hac Vice, John Gerson Levi, Pro Hac Vice, Jonathan D. Lotsoff, Melanie Elizabeth Walker, Sidley Austin LLP, Chicago, Il, Diane Marjorie Saunders, Ogletree, Dearkins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, PC, Boston, MA, Douglas R. Hart, Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP, Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP, Eric G. Hoffman, Sidley Austin LLP, Stephanie Lauren Aranyos, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., New York, NY, Peter O. Hughes, Pro Hac Vice, Ogletree Deakins, Morristown, NJ, Steven W. Moore, Pro Hac Vice, Constangy, Brooks & Smith & Prophete, LLC, Denver, CO, Wendy M. Lazerson, Sidley Austin LLP, Palo Alto, CA, for Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
1

LORNA G. SCHOFIELD, District Judge
*1 Plaintiffs, current or former employees of KPMG, LLC, bring Equal Pay Act (“EPA”) claims against Defendant KPMG, LLP (“KPMG”). Plaintiffs include nine named Plaintiffs, and 452 former opt-in Plaintiffs (“FOIPs”). KPMG moves to dismiss the claims of ten representative FOIPs1 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and to strike pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) the following: (1) each attorney addendum (“Addenda[um]”) attached to each of the FOIPs’ Verified Fact Sheets (“VFS”), and (2) all claims for damages not recoverable under the EPA. For the reasons stated below, KPMG’s motion to dismiss is granted in part, and the motion to strike is denied.
I. BACKGROUND The Court assumes familiarity with the facts. See, e.g., Kassman v. KPMG LLP, 925 F. Supp. 2d 453, 457-59 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Kassman I”); Kassman v. KPMG LLP, No. 11 Civ. 03743, 2014 WL 3298884, at *2-4 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2014) (“Kassman II”); Kassman v. KPMG LLP, 416 F. Supp. 3d 252, 257-67 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“Kassman III”). The facts summarized herein are taken from the FOIPs’ VFSs, and are accepted as true for purposes of this motion. See Chamberlain Estate of Chamberlain v. City of White Plains, 960 F.3d 100, 103 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020).
A. Procedural History Relating To The VFSs Plaintiffs brought suit in 2011 alleging that “KPMG discriminates against thousands of women in their pay and promotions.” Kassman III, 416 F. Supp. 3d at 257. The operative complaint names nine plaintiffs who sought to certify a class alleging, inter alia, violations of the EPA.2 The Court conditionally certified an EPA collective of approximately 1,100 opt-in plaintiffs in 2014, see Kassman II, 2014 WL 3298884, at *9, and decertified the collective on November 30, 2018. Kassman III, 416 F. Supp. 3d at 290.
On January 17, 2019, the Court held a status conference to discuss next steps in the case, including whether or

Kassman v. KPMG LLP, Slip Copy (2020)
how the FOIPs intended to proceed with their claims following decertification. At the end of the conference, the Court directed the parties to meet and confer and, in an order following the conference, directed the parties to file a joint letter regarding, inter alia, “a potential agreement to exchange information about the opt-in Plaintiffs and to stop the Equal Pay Act limitations period from running ....”
In the subsequently filed joint letter, KPMG emphasized its desire to preserve its “Due Process and other rights and defenses,” but stated its “willing[ness] to compromise and agree to a procedure that allows a FOIP to continue to prosecute her claims in this Court without filing a Complaint if such FOIP submits a verified Fact Sheet” because such a process would give KPMG, inter alia, “a reasonable understanding of the principal basis for the FOIP’s purported EPA claim.” On that basis, the Court ordered the parties to file a joint proposed Order and exemplar VFS, and further stated that the Court was not inclined to appoint a Special Master or to grant further discovery for FOIPs “until after they have filed their Complaints and/or Opt-In Fact Sheets.”
*2 On February 22, 2019, the parties submitted a proposed VFS template and a proposed joint order that would govern the VFS process. The Court issued the proposed order (the “VFS Order”) without substantive alteration. The VFS Order contained the following relevant provisions “as to every [FOIP] who intends to continue in good faith to prosecute her EPA claim in this Court without filing a Complaint”:
§ I.1 Such person shall complete and execute a verified Fact Sheet;
§ I.3 Plaintiffs’ Counsel shall serve the completed, verified and executed Fact Sheet upon counsel for KPMG in the manner described in Section III below;
§ I.4 A verified Fact Sheet signed by the Former Opt-In Plaintiff and counsel shall act in all respects as if it were a filed Complaint in this Court.
The VFS Order further provides that, in order to toll the statute of limitations as to the EPA claims, each FOIP “shall either (a) no later than April 30, 2019 file a Complaint in an appropriate jurisdiction; or (b) no later than April 19, 2019 complete and execute a verified Fact Sheet” and “[a]fter April 30, 2019, any [FOIP] that wishes to prosecute her claims in good faith may file a Complaint in an appropriate court.” Finally, the VFS
2

Order states that “[n]othing in this Order shall be deemed to limit the Parties’ rights, claims, or defenses, including with respect to proceeding in discovery, engaging in motion practice or in any other way.”
The VFS template adopted by the Court contains the following relevant provisions:
KPMG has stated its willingness to follow a procedure that allows you to continue, in good faith, to prosecute your EPA claim on an individual basis as a Named Plaintiff in this Court without filing a Complaint, and without needing to institute a new lawsuit in this Court or another Court, should you choose to do so.
If you wish to continue to prosecute an EPA claim in good faith in this Court without filing an individual Complaint, you must timely complete and certify the enclosed Fact Sheet. If you do not: (1) submit this form to Plaintiffs’ Counsel by April 19, 2019 and have your Counsel serve this form on KPMG by April 30, 2019, or (2) file a Complaint on your own with other counsel by April 30, 2019, your EPA claim will be dismissed ....
Please attach as many sheets of paper as necessary to fully answer these questions.
The VFS template also includes several questions seeking responses of Yes or No, followed by further elaboration, and an inquiry regarding damages:
Are you [the FOIP] claiming that you received less compensation because of your gender than one or more male KPMG employees who did substantially equal work to you? For purposes of your response, “substantially equal work” means work requiring substantially equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which is performed under similar working conditions in the same establishment. The term “establishment” in the EPA refers to a distinct physical place of business rather than to an entire business or enterprise which may include several separate places of business. However, unusual circumstances may call for two or more distinct physical portions of a business enterprise being treated as a single establishment. For example, a central administrative unit may hire all employees, set wages, and assign the location of employment; employees may frequently interchange work locations; and daily duties may be virtually identical and performed under similar working conditions.... If Yes, please: identify each male ... that you are aware did equal work to you; the time period you and he did

Kassman v. KPMG LLP, Slip Copy (2020)
equal work; why you understand that you performed equal work to each such male; and whether you believe you were paid less than each such male because of your gender. You may work with Plaintiffs’ Counsel (who has KPMG’s payroll data) to provide this information.
*3 [Is the FOIP claiming that] KPMG acted willfully in paying [her] less compensation than one or more males for equal work because of [her] gender? ... If Yes, please explain why as best you can, if possible. Your failure to provide detailed information does not prevent you from submitting this Fact Sheet but may affect the period of time for which you may collect damages.
[Is the FOIP claiming that she] suffered any damages as a result of KPMG’s alleged EPA violation? ... If Yes, please state the damages you intend to seek....
Damages (may be completed by Counsel). State below the categories and best estimates of the amounts of damages claimed, so that KPMG can reasonably understand the damages sought.
B. Subsequent Procedural History Leading to This Motion By April 30, 2019, 452 VFSs had been served on KPMG. On May 20, 2019, KPMG notified the Court of VFSs that were untimely served, requesting that they be dismissed. The Court issued an order on May 23, 2019, dismissing without prejudice from the action the FOIPs who had failed to timely serve VFSs. The next day, KPMG filed a pre-motion letter seeking to “[d]ismiss certain [VFSs] and to Strike allegations in various VFSs pursuant to [Rules] 12(b)(6) and 12(f).” The letter argues that the VFSs must state a plausible claim pursuant to Twombly and Iqbal.3 In a May 31, 2019, joint status letter KPMG reiterated its intention to move to dismiss and strike certain VFSs. In the same joint letter, Plaintiffs “dispute[d] KPMG’s characterizations of the Fact Sheets[,]” but also asserted that KPMG “must, consistent with the [Federal] rules and with this Court’s prior Order, either move to dismiss or answer each” VFS (citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a)). In a separate response to KPMG’s pre-motion letter dated the same day, Plaintiffs argued that dismissal was “inappropriate” because the “[VFSs] are not Complaints” but further argued that, “[p]articularly given that the [VFSs] are not filed Complaints, the [FOIPs] must be given the opportunity to amend or supplement their [VFSs] prior to dismissal, to attempt to satisfy any
3

deficiencies in [the] pleading.” On June 3, 2019, the Court denied KPMG’s request to file a motion to dismiss and to strike without prejudice to renewal, and directed Plaintiffs serve any amended VFSs by July 1, 2019. On July 1, 2019, Plaintiffs submitted approximately 138 amended VFSs to KPMG.
On July 26, 2019, KPMG renewed its pre-motion letter seeking leave to file a motion to dismiss and strike portions of the FOIPs’ VFSs. Plaintiffs’ response maintained that the VFSs were not subject to dismissal “under Iqbal and Twombly,” but argued that “[e]ven assuming that [Twombly and Iqbal] apply,” it would not be “appropriate to dismiss or strike” the VFSs “at this stage” because, inter alia, KPMG’s arguments to dismiss “require[ ] highly fact-specific inquiries that are inappropriate for adjudication at the motion to dismiss stage ... [and] are more efficiently raised before a special master or mediator.” On August 5, 2019, the Court issued an order directing KPMG to “move, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), to dismiss ten [10] of the Challenged VFSs, whose purported defects are representative of the Challenged VFSs as a whole” and to move to strike pursuant to 12(f). KPMG filed the instant motion on September 27, 2019.
II. MOTION TO DISMISS
A. The VFSs Are Subject to Rule 12(b)(6) *4 Plaintiffs argue that the VFSs are not subject to the Rule 12(b)(6) pleading standards set out in the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal. Plaintiffs are incorrect.
The VFS Order and VFS template establish that each VFS “shall act in all respects as if it were a filed Complaint in this Court” and that as such KPMG reserves “rights, claims, or defenses, including ... engaging in motion practice ....” This necessarily means that a VFS, like a complaint filed in this Court, is governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including the general rules of pleading, and is subject to applicable defenses and objections by the defendant upon whom the complaint is served. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, 11, 12. It is axiomatic that Supreme Court precedent applies to any motion brought to dismiss the VFSs pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Kassman v. KPMG LLP, Slip Copy (2020)
Plaintiffs characterize the VFSs as the result of a “collaborative process” by which “the parties agreed that the [FOIPs] could submit fact sheets that would provide KPMG with information KPMG specifically requested” and that would “act as if they were complaints for the purposes of protecting [FOIPs] from the EPA’s statute of limitations” but which “were not complaints and not subject to the ‘plausibility’ pleading standard of Iqbal and Twombly.” But nothing on the record supports Plaintiffs’ assertion that the VFSs are not subject to the plausibility pleading standard. Plaintiffs’ selective quotations from the January 17, 2019, conference transcript do not support such an understanding, because the Court issued no substantive order at that conference, and instead directed the parties to meet and confer to propose next steps. KPMG also has consistently denied that the VFSs are “claims forms” for settlement purposes only, having emphasized its rejection of “the skeletal summary process that Plaintiffs seem to envision” before agreeing to the VFS compromise, because a “claims form” process “would violate KPMG’s due process and statutory rights ... [and] KPMG has the right to try individualized claims and defenses, once it knows what the claims are, before a jury or the Court should the parties so choose.” Based on this record, Plaintiffs’ argument that KPMG agreed to conduct settlement discussions with Plaintiffs without being on notice of the claims against them -- and without having the opportunity to challenge those claims -- is unpersuasive.
The language of the VFS template also does not support Plaintiffs’ argument. First, that the VFS template requests information above and beyond what is typically required in a complaint does not logically lead to the conclusion that the VFSs were not also required to plead an EPA claim. Based on the record in this case, the VFS template is reasonably construed as a compromise designed to allow the FOIPs to avoid the burden of separately filing full complaints at this time and pursuant to which the parties could agree to exchange certain information -some of which might not ordinarily be included in a complaint -- but which otherwise acts “in all respects as if it were a filed Complaint in this Court.” The VFS template allows KPMG to understand the claims against it, subject to applicable defenses including under Rule 12(b)(6), as dictated in the Court’s VFS Order.
*5 Second, Plaintiffs’ argument that the VFSs are not subject to the “plausibility” pleading standard of Iqbal and Twombly because “fact sheets informed [F]OIPs that summary or partial answers would be acceptable” and that
4

“[a]t no point in the detailed fact sheet instructions is the [F]OIP told that failing to provide details may cause her claims to be dismissed” for a lack of completeness or specificity is not persuasive. Plaintiffs jointly proposed these VFS templates with KPMG, and ultimately the onus is on the FOIPs’ counsel to ensure the FOIPs understand what is necessary to plead a sufficient claim. Also, the VFS directs in bold on the first page to: “attach as many sheets of paper as necessary to fully answer these questions,” and the questions themselves give detailed guidance as to the information required, including by directing the FOIPs to work with counsel if necessary.
In any event, even if Plaintiffs did not understand that the VFSs would be subject to the plausibility pleading standard when serving the initial VFSs on KPMG, Plaintiffs were indisputably on notice of KPMG’s intent to move to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) as of KPMG’s first letter motion seeking to move to dismiss on that basis, and could have (but did not) seek modification, clarification or construction of the VFS Order. Instead, Plaintiffs requested -- and were granted -- leave to amend the VFSs “to attempt to satisfy any deficiencies in [the] pleading.” Plaintiffs cannot now claim prejudice or lack of notice that the VFSs are subject to normal pleading standards. Cf. McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 192 (1949) (“Respondents could have petitioned the District Court for a modification, clarification or construction of the order. But respondents did not take that course either. They undertook to make their own determination of what the decree meant. They knew they acted at their peril.” (citation omitted)); accord CBS Broad. Inc. v. FilmOn.com, Inc., 814 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2016). Indeed, Plaintiffs acknowledged after KPMG filed its first pre-motion letter seeking leave to move to dismiss that KPMG, “consistent with the [Federal] rules and with this Court’s prior Order, [must] either move to dismiss or answer each” VFS (citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a)).4 Accordingly, this argument is rejected.
B. Pleading Standard To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint need not make “detailed factual allegations,” but it must contain more than mere “labels

Kassman v. KPMG LLP, Slip Copy (2020)

and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Id. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, a “claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). It is not enough for a plaintiff to allege facts that are consistent with liability; the complaint must “nudge[ ] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. On a motion to dismiss, a court must “accept[ ] all factual allegations in the complaint and draw[ ] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Kleinman v. Elan Corp., plc, 706 F.3d 145, 152 (2d Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted); accord Dass v. City Univ. of New York, No. 18 Civ. 11325, 2020 WL 1922689, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2020). The EPA prohibits:
*6 discriminat[ion], within any establishment in which such employees are employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions ....

(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “To satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must establish that the jobs compared entail common duties or content, and do not simply overlap in titles or classifications.” Id. at 255. Allegations are insufficient if they amount to a “bald recitation of the elements of an EPA claim” or assert that plaintiffs “held the same job code.” Id. at 256 (quotation marks omitted). Allegations relating solely to “experience, training, education, or ability” are also insufficient. See id. (quotation marks omitted) (finding such allegations insufficient because “such bland abstractions -- untethered from allegations regarding ... actual job duties -- say nothing about whether the [comparators] were required to perform ‘substantially equal work’ ”). “The determination of whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is ‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.’ ” Id. at 258 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).5
C. Eight of the Ten Representative VFSs Are Dismissed *7 The VFSs submitted by Nelson, Huss, Fukushima, Driscoll, Gioia, Silveira-Pio, Bae and Lam fail to plead the second element of an EPA claim -- that the FOIPs perform equal work to their comparators on jobs requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility. See Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 768 F.3d at 254-55. For that reason, those FOIPs are dismissed.

29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). “Thus, to prove a violation of the EPA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that “(1) the employer pays different wages to employees of the opposite sex; (2) the employees perform equal work on jobs requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility; and (3) the jobs are performed under similar working conditions.” E.E.O.C. v. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 768 F.3d 247, 254–55 (2d Cir. 2014) (alterations omitted); accord Green v. New York City Transit Auth., No. 15 Civ. 8204, 2019 WL 1428336, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2019).
“At the pleading stage ... a plausible EPA claim must include ‘sufficient factual matter, accepted as true’ to permit ‘the reasonable inference” that the relevant employees’ job content was ‘substantially equal.’ ” Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 768 F.3d at 256
5

i. The Nelson and Huss VFSs
All ten Plaintiffs allege, by virtue of checking “Yes” in Section II.1 of their VFS, that they “received less compensation because of [their] gender than one or more male KPMG employees who did substantially equal work to [them],” where “substantially equal work means work requiring substantially equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which is performed under similar working conditions in the same establishment.” This conclusory assertion is insufficient, on its own, to allege a sufficient EPA claim. See, e.g., Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 768 F.3d at 258; accord Edwards v. Thomson Reuters (Tax & Accounting) Inc., No. 19 Civ. 93, 2020 WL 2132348, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2020); Wu v.

Kassman v. KPMG LLP, Slip Copy (2020)
Good Samaritan Hosp. Med. Ctr., No. 19 Civ. 2209, 2020 WL 2551033, at *4 (2d Cir. May 20, 2020). The Nelson and Huss VFSs do not contain additional factual allegations, and therefore the Nelson and Huss EPA claims are dismissed.
Plaintiffs’ cited cases do not support a contrary conclusion because the complaints in those cases provide more specific factual allegations than provided in Nelson’s and Huss’s VFSs, involve a pro se plaintiff or otherwise do not reflect current Second Circuit Law. See, e.g., Chepak v. Metro. Hosp., 555 F. App’x 74, 76 (2d Cir. 2014) (summary order) (“In light of Chepak’s pro se status, those allegations were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.”); Kassman I, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 471 (finding allegations sufficient to state an EPA claim where, for example, the complaint alleged that a plaintiff’s comparator “joined KPMG after [the plaintiff], worked under the same Partner, ... worked on engagements for similar clients[, and] ... performed the same tasks as [the plaintiff] with no greater skill or effort than [the plaintiff]” but was paid more).
Plaintiffs argue that the Attorney Addenda to the Nelson and Huss VFSs, which assert that “Plaintiff performed substantially equal work to the following men during the noted time periods,” and list nineteen men and 623 men, respectively, by name, date and year, make sufficient allegations to meet the pleading standard at the motion to dismiss stage. But neither the VFSs nor the Attorney Addenda provide information regarding the content of Nelson’s, Huss’s or the alleged comparators’ jobs. Naming possible comparators is not sufficient on its own to plead an EPA claim without sufficient “factual matter, ‘accepted as true’ to permit ‘the reasonable inference’ that the relevant employees’ job content was ‘substantially equal.’ ” Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 768 F.3d at 256. For the same reason, the Attorney Addenda attached to the other representative VFSs cannot aid in alleging substantially equal work.
Plaintiffs also argue that the VFSs must be “considered in the context of the existing precertification record evidence,” and as “explicitly incorporat[ing] the discovery record.” The argument is unpersuasive, even reviewing these VFSs within the specific context of this case and their purpose pursuant to the VFS Order. First, if the purpose of the VFSs was to provide KPMG with “additional, individualized information about the [F]OIPs ... prior to engaging in settlement discussions” and to “provide KPMG with information KPMG specifically requested” as Plaintiffs represent in their opposition,
6

VFSs like those of Nelson and Huss that are devoid of actual factual allegations do not serve this purpose.
*8 Similarly insufficient are broad references to the discovery record -- encompassing more than eighty depositions and over a half million pages of documents. Two VFSs refer broadly to their depositions, see Huss VFS (“Please see deposition notes.”); Hernberg VFS (stating in response to the question regarding damages, “I refer you to my deposition for further details”), and other VFSs contain general references to information produced by KPMG or in the possession of Plaintiffs’ counsel without specifics as to what portion of the discovery record is referenced or why it is relevant.6 Plaintiffs cite to no cases -- and the Court has found none -- where broad references to prior discovery, or even to prior deposition transcripts, can serve to replace the requirement to plead facts, particularly where Plaintiffs are counseled throughout. The new allegations and the more specific citations to the record in Plaintiffs’ opposition are not appropriately considered by the Court. See Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[A] a party is not entitled to amend its complaint through statements made in motion papers.”); accord Bellevue v. 1199SEIU Health Care Emps. Pension Fund, No. 17 Civ. 7430, 2019 WL 400638, at *6 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2019).
KPMG broadly makes two arguments as to multiple representative VFSs that are rejected. KPMG argues that VFSs that identify only comparators who worked outside of the FOIP’s office should be dismissed for failing to satisfy the EPA’s single establishment requirement. But KPMG cites no caselaw showing that the motion to dismiss stage is the appropriate time to determine what constitutes an “establishment” for purposes of the FOIPs’ claims. See Kassman III, 416 F. Supp. 3d at 287 (conducting analysis at the motion for class certification stage); Balding-Margolis v. Cleveland Arcade, 352 F. App’x 35, 42 n.7 (6th Cir. 2009) (conducting analysis at summary judgment); Meeks v. Comput. Assocs. Int’l, 15 F.3d 1013, 1017 (11th Cir. 1994) (conducting analysis after trial). Where “numerous courts in this district have noted that the ‘establishment’ requirement of the EPA is an issue that goes to the merits and must not be decided at [the motion for conditional collective certification] stage,” Knox v. John Varvatos Enters. Inc., 282 F. Supp. 3d 644, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (citing cases), the Court declines to engage in this analysis at the even earlier pleading stage. For the same reason, the Court declines to limit FOIPs’ claims based on a willfulness analysis at this stage. See Bonn-Wittingham v. Project O.H.R. (Office for Homecare

Kassman v. KPMG LLP, Slip Copy (2020)
Referral), Inc., No. 16 Civ. 541, 2016 WL 7243541, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2016), aff’d sub nom. Bonn-Wittingham v. Project OHR, Inc., 792 F. App’x 71 (2d Cir. 2019) (“Plaintiffs allege generally that defendants ‘intentionally, willfully and repeatedly engaged in a pattern, practice and/or policy of violating the FLSA.’ At this stage of litigation, a general averment of willfulness suffices to invoke the three-year statute of limitations.”); Chime v. Peak Sec. Plus, Inc., 137 F. Supp. 3d 183, 192 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“[T]he SACAC makes several general averments of willfulness, which are sufficient to invoke the three-year statute of limitations under the FLSA.”). The Court declines to follow other district courts that have held otherwise. See, e.g., Watkins v. First Student, Inc., No. 17 Civ. 1519, 2018 WL 1135480, at *7 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2018) (finding general allegations of willfulness to be insufficient, noting that “[o]ther courts in this circuit have accepted general averments of willfulness at the pleadings stage.”).
ii. The Fukushima, Driscoll and Gioia VFSs
*9 Each of the Fukushima, Driscoll and Gioia VFSs make allegations that men with the same job titles -- and in the case of the Fukushima and Driscoll VFS, men in the same service line -- were paid more than the complainants. See Fukushima’s VFS (“I believe that, many men at KPMG performed substantially equal work to me, including men in the same job title and service line. I don’t have sufficient information to identify all these men. I understand that my attorneys will provide additional information.”); Driscoll VFS (listing four men as comparators, and stating “I believe several other Managers who work in my division at KPMG who performed substantially equal work to me including men with same job title and service line.”); Gioia VFS (listing three men, with date ranges, and stating as to the first man that he “and I were associates in Cincinnati office,” and as to the second and third men that they and Gioia were “senior associates ... in Louisville office at the same time. I believe this based on information collected by our Counsel.”). Allegations that men with the same job title or in the same service line were paid more than the FOIPs are insufficient to permit the Court to infer that these proposed comparators had substantially equal job content. See Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 768 F.3d at 258 (“[A] successful EPA claim depends on the
7

comparison of actual job content; broad generalizations drawn from job titles, classifications, or divisions, and conclusory assertions of sex discrimination, cannot suffice.”); Kassman I, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 471 (“[T]he EPA and implementing regulations are clear that the statute is concerned with the provision of equal pay for equal work, and that the ‘[a]pplication of the equal pay standard is not dependent on job classifications or titles but depends rather on actual job requirements and performance.’ ” (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1620.13(e)).7
iii. The Silveira-Pio, Bae and Lam VFSs
First, the Silveira-Pio and Bae VFSs make allegations relating to promotion discrimination. See Silveira-Pio VFS (“[M]ale counterparts were being promoted at a much faster rate although I had been there longer and doing substantially more work. Additionally, while they were at an equal or higher position, I was reviewing and correcting their work/mistakes (some in the millions of dollars)”); Bae VFS (identifying, inter alia, two comparators: (1) Bae’s “manager even though he possessed less experience, credentials, knowledge and skills than me. He provided less work.”; and (2) Bae’s “performance manager even though he was not a CPA, had less skills and knowledge than me to perform on [t]he job. He provide[d] less work on the project.”). The Bae VFS also alleges that men “were compensated more and promoted to positions to justify the compensation” and that a “female Partner acknowledge[ed] that Females have difficulty advancing at KPMG.” But promotion discrimination is not actionable under the EPA. See Kassman I, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 473. And allegations that solely relate to “experience, training, education, or ability” -- like the allegations in the Bae VFS relating to the experience and skills of her managers, and the implied allegation in the Silveira-Pio VFS that those in positions above her were also less skilled -- are also insufficient to plead an EPA claim. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 768 F.3d at 256-57.
The Bae and Lam VFSs also allege that they worked on the same projects and engagements as their alleged comparators. See Bae VFS (identifying a comparator who was a “peer on the project” who “provided equal work.”); Lam VFS (identifying six men by name, three of whom are alleged to have “worked on the same engagements

Kassman v. KPMG LLP, Slip Copy (2020)
together [as Lam], performing substantially equal work, billing at the same rate” between 2006-2007, and three of whom are alleged to have “worked on the same engagements together [as Lam], performing substantially equal work” between 2007-2009. For each, the VFS asserts that Lam “believe[s she] was paid less than him because of [her] gender.”). Plaintiffs argue that these allegations are sufficient to plausibly plead a claim, but the VFSs provide no information regarding the FOIP’s and their comparator’s roles on the project or engagements or how this individual was Bae’s “peer” by explaining any shared duties, skills and responsibilities. Similarly, although the allegation that Lam and her comparators billed the same rate may suggest equal work, it does not itself provide information regarding job content. Accordingly, these claims are dismissed. See Edwards, 2020 WL 2132348, at *3 (finding allegation that plaintiff’s “job responsibilities with respect to lead-generation managing were exactly the same as her counterparts in Carrollton, Texas” to be insufficient to plead an EPA claim because “[a]t best, they suggest that some overlap exists between Edwards’ job duties and her counterparts in Carrollton. There are no factual allegations, however, that Edwards and her counterparts in Carrollton performed their jobs under similar working conditions, or that their jobs require comparable effort and skill level.”); Dass, 2020 WL 1922689, at *6 (“As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s mere parroting that other employees are ‘similarly situated’ to her coupled with conclusory allegations are insufficient to state an EPA claim.”).
*10 The cases cited by Plaintiffs are consistent with this holding, as the plaintiffs in those cases alleged significantly more detail in support of their claims, or were pro se litigants. See Verdone v. Am. Greenfuels, LLC, No. 16 Civ. 01271, 2017 WL 3668596, at *6 (D. Conn. Aug. 24, 2017) (finding EPA claim sufficiently pled where plaintiff alleged she and her competitor had management positions in human resources, “assisted one another, worked together,” and “handled ... projects jointly”); Crawley v. Macy’s Retail Holdings, Inc., No. 15 Civ. 2228, 2016 WL 6993777, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2016) (finding pro se plaintiff to have plausibly pleaded an EPA claim where she alleged “that she and [her comparator] worked the same job, during the same shift, at the same Macy’s store, under the same supervisor” such that “every material aspect of their positions apart from compensation -- their hours, their location, their supervisor -- appears to have been the same”); Lenzi v. Systemax, Inc., No. 14 Civ. 7509, 2015 WL 6507842, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2015) (finding an EPA claim to be
8

sufficiently pled where plaintiff alleged enough detail regarding her own position and her comparators such that the court found “that her job content encompasses the ‘same “common core” of tasks’ as that of her male comparators”).
D. The Hernberg and Koch VFSs Are Not Dismissed
i. The Hernberg VFS
KPMG seeks to dismiss the Hernberg VFS for failing to allege equal work sufficient to state an EPA violation. Drawing all inferences in Herberg’s favor, Kleinman, 706 F.3d at 152, the Hernberg VFS pleads an EPA claim. The VFS alleges that Hernberg reviewed tax returns, as did certain comparators who were paid more. See Hernberg VFS (alleging she received less compensation than male KPMG employees who did substantially equal work, and stating, “[d]uring 2008-2009, I observed men that performed the same work (as tax return reviewers) as I did.... I also observed many other men in tax compliance that were charged with reviewing returns, but I cannot recall their names.”). This is sufficient. See, e.g., Stern v. State Univ. of New York, No. 16 Civ. 5588, 2018 WL 6106755, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2018) (finding EPA claim sufficiently pled where plaintiff alleged she was paid less than a comparator who “perform[ed] many of the same computer functions” in a group in which employees “must possess ‘substantially similar’ ‘programming skills’ ”); Verdone, 2017 WL 3668596, at *6 (finding EPA claim sufficiently pled where plaintiff alleged that she and her comparator “both managed [defendant’s] human resources matters”); Chiaramonte v. Animal Med. Ctr., No. 13 Civ. 5117, 2014 WL 3611098, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2014) (finding EPA claim sufficiently pled where the plaintiff “alleged that she and [her comparator] both performed similar work as veterinarians practicing internal medicine” because plaintiff “identifie[d] the content of a comparator’s work, not merely his title” by “alleg[ing] that [plaintiff] and [her comparator] share[d] a specialty that they both practice”).8
*11 KPMG also seeks to dismiss the Hernberg VFS for identifying comparators that were, in fact, paid less than Hernberg. But to allege an EPA claim, Hernberg was not

Kassman v. KPMG LLP, Slip Copy (2020)
required to identify a specific comparator at all; “the Second Circuit has not adopted the requirement of identifying a specific comparator.” Chiaramonte, 2014 WL 3611098, at *5 (citing Lavin-McEleney v. Marist Coll., 239 F.3d 476, 480 (2d Cir. 2001)); accord Kassman I, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 471 (noting that “the Second Circuit has reserved judgment” on the issue of “[w]hether or not a female plaintiff must identify a specific male comparator”). Here, Hernberg alleges that she was paid less than men who performed substantially the same work as tax return reviews as Hernberg. For the reasons stated above, this is sufficient to plead a claim and KPMG’s motion to dismiss the Hernberg VFS is denied.
ii. The Koch VFS
KPMG seeks to dismiss the Koch VFS for failing to allege equal work sufficient to state an EPA violation. The argument is unpersuasive. The Koch VFS identifies three men who, “[f]or the period 2008-2010 ... in the Philadelphia office Tax Department ... were Senior Managers at the same time, held similar professional and educational degrees, had similar years’ experience and performed similar work to me.” The VFS asserts, inter alia, that she and the “males identified were responsible for ensuring engagement teams delivered quality client service; coordinated projects; managed client relationships and expectations, worked to enhance business development, recruitment of new employees, resource allocation, risk and other people management decisions.” These are not “bland abstractions” or “sweeping generalization[s],” “untethered” from actual job content. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 768 F.3d at 257. In concert with the allegations regarding experience and education, these statements describe duties and responsibilities shared between Koch and her comparators that are alleged with sufficient specificity to plead the second element of an EPA claim: that “the employees perform equal work on jobs requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility.” Id. at 254-55; see also Craven v. City of New York, No. 19 Civ. 1486, 2020 WL 2765694, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 2020) (finding allegations sufficient to plead an EPA claim where plaintiff alleged that she and her comparator both “supervised investigators and oversaw investigations of Medicaid and social services fraud,” and “attended the same routine meetings” (quotation marks omitted)).
9

Defendants argue that the Koch VFS does not sufficiently allege that the overall job she performed was substantially equal to her identified comparators, but pleading an EPA claim does not require pleading identical responsibilities. See Lavin-McEleney, 239 F.3d at 480 (“[A] plaintiff need not demonstrate that her job is identical to a higher paid position, but only must show that the two positions are ‘substantially equal’ in skill, effort, and responsibility.”); see also Craven, 2020 WL 2765694, at *3 (finding allegations to sufficiently plead substantially equal work where plaintiff alleged that she and her comparator had “similar responsibilities,” but the comparator “managed fewer employees and fewer units than” plaintiff); Chiaramonte, 2014 WL 3611098, at *5 (finding allegations to sufficiently plead substantially equal work where plaintiff “performed similar work as veterinarians practicing internal medicine” and “she shouldered responsibilities that [her comparator] did not match”). The case cited by KPMG in support of this argument, Verdone, is not to the contrary; there, the court found that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged substantially equal work where she alleged that her comparator had a “management position concerning human resources,” that she “continued to perform human resources tasks” after her comparator was hired, and that “she and [the comparator] handled human resources projects jointly.” 2017 WL 3668596, at *6.
*12 KPMG also asserts that Koch’s identified comparators were “in different practices than Koch and therefore had different job duties (or, at a minimum, cannot plausibly be deemed to have ‘substantially equal’ job duties at the pleading stage)” and argues that this Court already rejected similar arguments in the certification context, including Plaintiffs’ argument that sharing the responsibilities of “provid[ing] feedback” and “analyz[ing] tax issues” was sufficient to demonstrate equality of work. See Kassman III, 416 F. Supp. 3d at 289. The finding that the collective could not remain certified because of “the impossibility of practically adjudicating [the proposed class’s claims] in a single action,” id. at 288, including because of differences in job content between positions across practice groups, id. at 289, does not bear on a finding as to the sufficiency of one FOIP’s pleading at the motion to dismiss stage. Although there may be merits-stage arguments that KPMG can make distinguishing Koch’s job content from those of her comparators when the positions are examined at a higher level of granularity, at this stage the Court declines to consider the extrinsic evidence regarding the duties of Koch’s alleged comparators. See Stern, 2018

Kassman v. KPMG LLP, Slip Copy (2020)
WL 6106755, at *3 (“[T]he question of whether or not [plaintiff and her comparator] work in ‘substantially similar’ jobs is one for the jury -- or, at least, inappropriate for resolution on a motion to dismiss.”); Lenzi, 2015 WL 6507842, at *5 (“And while defendants assert differences between her job responsibilities, and those of her male comparators, this is a factual question that the Court cannot resolve at the pleadings stage.”). The motion to dismiss Koch’s VFS is denied.
III. MOTION TO STRIKE
A. Legal Standard Rule 12(f) provides that a “court may strike from a pleading ... any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “[M]otions to strike material solely ‘on the ground that the matter is impertinent and immaterial’ are disfavored,” Brown v. Maxwell, 929 F.3d 41, 51 n.42 (2d Cir. 2019), and “courts should not tamper with the pleadings unless there is a strong reason for so doing.” Lipsky v. Commonwealth United Corp., 551 F.2d 887, 893 (2d Cir. 1976); accord Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Honig, No. 18 Civ. 8175, 2020 WL 906383, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2020). “In deciding whether to strike a Rule 12(f) motion on the ground that the matter is impertinent and immaterial, it is settled that the motion will be denied, unless it can be shown that no evidence in support of the allegation would be admissible.” Lipsky, 551 F.2d at 893; accord Honig, 2020 WL 906383, at *5.
Courts in this district have held that, “[t]o prevail in such a motion, defendants must demonstrate that (1) no evidence in support of the allegations would be admissible; (2) that the allegations have no bearing on the issues in the case; and (3) that to permit the allegations to stand would result in prejudice to the movant.” Dubai Equine Hosp. v. Equine Imaging, LLC, No. 18 Civ. 6925, 2019 WL 3811922, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2019) (quotation marks omitted). Ultimately, “[f]ederal courts have discretion to decide whether to grant a motion to strike.” Ong v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 3d 199, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
10

B. Discussion KPMG moves to strike (1) certain comparator lists from attorney-prepared Addenda appended to each VFS as “irrelevant and prejudicial,” and (2) any allegations seeking damages not recoverable under the EPA and the Addenda text stating “Plaintiff reserves the right to seek additional damages once updated data is provided, as well as additional damages for other claims, including but not limited to emotional distress, denial of promotions, front pay, and state law claims.” The motion is denied.
First, lists of possible comparators are not “irrelevant and immaterial” to an EPA claim, and KPMG has not shown that this material might not be admissible in the future. Lipsky, 551 F.2d at 893 (“[I]t is settled that the motion will be denied, unless it can be shown that no evidence in support of the allegation would be admissible.”).
Second, as to the allegations regarding damages, KPMG relies solely on out-of-circuit caselaw in support of its assertion that compensatory damages for emotional distress or psychological harm are not recoverable as a matter of law under the EPA. The Court declines to resolve the issue on a motion to strike. See Jablonski v. Special Counsel, Inc., No. 16 Civ. 05243, 2020 WL 1444933, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2020) (“[A] motion to strike should not be used as an opportunity for the determination of disputed, substantial questions of law.” (quotation marks omitted)).
*13 Third, KPMG has failed to demonstrate that the inclusion of either the comparator lists or the damages requests are prejudicial to KPMG. See, e.g., Shouq v. Norbert E. Mitchell Co., No. 18 Civ. 00293, 2018 WL 4158382, at *6 (D. Conn. Aug. 30, 2018) (denying motion to strike in part due to lack of prejudice to defendant). And KPMG’s argument that “these overbroad lists are highly prejudicial because they would require KPMG to undertake onerous and prohibitively expensive discovery” is unpersuasive; the Second Circuit has not recognized striking pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(f) on the basis of the possible burden it may impose on a party in discovery, nor has KPMG cited to any relevant in-circuit caselaw on the issue.
Finally, neither the comparator lists nor the requested damages were relied on for purposes of this Opinion. See Demosthene v. City of New York, No. 18 Civ. 1358, 2019 WL 2436681, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. June 11, 2019) (denying motion to strike in part because the court did not rely on the disputed allegations in its ruling on the motion to dismiss).

Kassman v. KPMG LLP, Slip Copy (2020)

Ultimately, although each VFS was designed to “act in all respects as if it were a filed Complaint in this Court, the VFS process was also designed to permit an exchange of information between the parties including -- per representation of Plaintiffs -- damages sought by FOIPs relating to “any class claims subject to appeal.” In light of that purpose, and because the decision of whether to grant a motion to strike is at the discretion of the court, Ong, 294 F. Supp. 3d at 222, the motion to strike is denied.

is DENIED as to the Hernberg and Koch VFSs and is otherwise GRANTED. KPMG’s motion to strike is DENIED.
It is further ORDERED that by July 29, 2020, the parties shall meet and confer, and file a joint letter proposing appropriate next steps.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully requested to close the motion at Dkt. No. 909.

All Citations
Slip Copy, 2020 WL 4003367 IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, KPMG’s motion to dismiss
Footnotes

1

The ten (10) representative FOIPs whom Defendants seek to dismiss are: Helen Bae, Veronica Driscoll, Rhoda

Fukushima, Diana Gioia, Carolann Hernberg, Sarah Huss, Artemis Koch, Barbara Lam, Heidi Nelson, and Elizabeth

Silveira Pio.

2

These nine named plaintiffs are Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva, Tina Butler,

Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones and Carol Murray.

3

See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

4

Plaintiffs do not explain in their memorandum of law in opposition what pleading standards would be appropriate in

evaluating a motion to dismiss the VFSs. In an uninvited sur-reply, Plaintiffs for the first time argue that the VFSs

should be evaluated as “discovery documents” and, if evaluated as complaints, should be found “akin to ... pro se

complaint[s].” These arguments are rejected as inconsistent with the record and with the fact that the FOIPs are

represented. They are also rejected because they were raised for the first time in a sur-reply. See Herod’s Stone

Design v. Mediterranean Shipping Co. S.A., 434 F. Supp. 3d 142, 161 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). KPMG’s rebuttal of

Plaintiffs’ characterization of the VFSs -- the argument to which Plaintiffs’ sur-reply purportedly responds -- was not

a new argument that the VFSs are similar to form complaints in product liability cases; rather, KPMG simply quoted

more fully a portion of conference transcript in order to provide greater context to Plaintiffs’ quotations.

5

Plaintiffs are incorrect that Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey is distinguishable because the plaintiff in that case

engaged in three years of investigation prior to filing the complaint, a fact that was deemed relevant to the finding

that “the EEOC failed ... to allege any factual basis for inferring that the attorneys at issue performed substantially

equal work.” See E.E.O.C. v. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 768 F.3d 247, 258 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs here engaged in substantial class discovery before preparing these VFSs, and in

fact argue that “[t]he class discovery record contains substantial evidence that the [F]OIPs and their male

comparators performed substantially equal work.” In any event, courts in this district regularly apply the pleading

standards outlined in Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey to motions to dismiss in cases without analogous

investigations. See, e.g., Wu v. Good Samaritan Hosp. Med. Ctr., No. 19 Civ. 2209, 2020 WL 2551033, at *4 (2d Cir.

May 20, 2020) (summary order) (affirming a ruling that an EPA claim was insufficiently pled where,“[a]lthough

11

Kassman v. KPMG LLP, Slip Copy (2020)

Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that the Hospital and Madonna Defendants paid or offered her less than they paid or offered similarly situated male employees, she has not alleged anything about her actual job duties or the actual job duties of her putative comparators” (citing Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 768 F.3d at 257)); Edwards v. Thomson Reuters (Tax & Accounting) Inc., No. 19 Civ. 93, 2020 WL 2132348, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2020) (finding EPA claim inadequately pled where the plaintiff “fail[ed] to adequately allege that she and her comparators performed equal work on jobs requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility; and the jobs are performed under similar working conditions (citing Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 768 F.3d at 254-55)). Plaintiffs’ out-of-circuit legal authority does not dictate a contrary conclusion.

6

See, e.g., Driscoll VFS (referencing “info provided by KPMG”); Fukushima VFS (“I understand that my attorneys will

provide additional information.”); Gioia VFS (“I believe this based on information collected by our Cousel [sic].”);

Koch VFS (“My Counsel may be able to provide additional male colleagues either in Philadelphia or elsewhere based

on their data.”); Lam VFS (“I understand that my attorneys will provide more information.”); Silveira-Pio VFS (“[I]t is

my understanding attorneys will provide additional information.”).

7

Plaintiffs cite this Court’s observation in the Opinion and Order granting conditional certification of the EPA

collective that, “[a]s evidenced by KPMG’s Career Snapshots and Job Descriptions, employees with the same job title

have substantially similar responsibilities and qualifications,” Kassman II, 2014 WL 3298884, at *2, in support of its

argument that an allegation of unequal pay between people of the same job title is sufficient. But this argument was

later rejected in the Opinion and Order decertifying the collective, finding “employees sharing a single job title at

KPMG are not ‘similarly situated’ to one another.” Kassman III, 416 F. Supp. 3d at 290.

8

KPMG argues that Hernberg confirms differences in job duties when she asserts that “reviewing estate fiduciary

income tax returns” was her “specialty.” “At the pleading stage ... a plausible EPA claim must include ‘sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true’ to permit ‘the reasonable inference’ that the relevant employees’ job content was

‘substantially equal.’ ” Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 768 F.3d at 256. This ambiguity will need to be resolved

before the claim can ultimately prevail, but drawing all inferences in Herberg’s favor, these allegations are sufficient

at the pleading stage to infer that employees conducting tax reviews did substantially similar work. See Snyder v.

Town of Potsdam, No. 716 Civ. 1462, 2018 WL 6267922, at *14 n.51 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2018) (“To demonstrate

‘equal work,’ a plaintiff ‘need not prove that her job is identical to a higher-paid position, but only must

demonstrate that the two positions are substantially equal.’ ”) (quoting Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 56

(2d Cir. 1993)).

12

 
 ECF
U.S. District Court Southern District of New York (Foley Square) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:11−cv−03743−LGS

Kassman v. KPMG LLP

Date Filed: 06/02/2011

Assigned to: Judge Lorna G. Schofield

Jury Demand: Plaintiff

Cause: 42:2000e−2e Job Discrimination (Unlawful Employment Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs

Practices)

Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Plaintiff

Donna Kassman Individually and on behalf of a class of similarly−situated female employees

represented by Jeremy Heisler Sanford Heisler Sharp, LLP (NYC) 1350 Avenue Of The Americas New York, NY 10019 (646) 402−5650 Fax: (646) 402−5651 Email: jheisler@sanfordheisler.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Aimee Krause Stewart Sanford Heisler Sharp, LLP 700 Pennsylvania Ave SE Suite 300 Washington, DC 20003 202−499−5208 Email: akrause54@gmail.com TERMINATED: 04/11/2019

Anne B. Shaver Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP( SF ) 275 Battery Street, 30th Floor San Francisco, CA 94111−3339 (415)−956−1000 Fax: (415)−956−1008 Email: ashaver@lchb.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Conor Daniel Ahern Sanford Heisler Sharp 700 Pennsylvania Ave. SE Suite 300 Washington, DC 20003 202−499−5208 Fax: 202−499−5199 Email: cahern@sanfordheisler.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David W. Sanford Sanford Heisler Sharp LLP 700 Pennsylvania Ave SE Washington, DC 20003 (646) 402−5650 Fax: (646) 402−5651 Email: dsanford@sanfordheisler.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Deepika Bains Sanford Heisler Sharp, LLP (NYC) 1350 Avenue Of The Americas

New York, NY 10019 (646)−402−5650 Fax: (646)−402−5651 Email: dbains@sanfordheisler.com TERMINATED: 07/29/2013
Janette Lynn Wipper Sanford Heisler, LLP (SF) 555 Montgomery Street, Suite 820 San Francisco, CA 94111 (415) 391−6900 Fax: (415) 421−5784 Email: jwipper@sanfordheisler.com TERMINATED: 01/24/2014 PRO HAC VICE
Jennifer Siegel Sanford Heisler& Sharp, LLP 1350 Avenue of The Americas, 31st Floor New York, NY 10019 (646)−402−5650 Fax: (646)−402−5651 Email: jsiegel@sanfordheisler.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine M. Kimpel Sanford Heisler Sharp, LLP (DC) 1666 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Suite 300 Washington, DC 20009 (202) 742−7788 Fax: (202) 742−7776 Email: kkimpel@sanfordheisler.com TERMINATED: 06/07/2016
Katherine E. Lamm Sanford Heisler Sharp, LLP (DC) 1666 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Suite 300 Washington, DC 20009 (202) 742−7781 Fax: (202) 742−7776 Email: klamm@swhlegal.com TERMINATED: 11/24/2014 PRO HAC VICE
Katie Mueting Sanford Heisler Sharp, LLP 700 Pennsylvania Ave SE Suite 300 Washington, DC 20003 202−499−5206 Email: kmueting@sanfordheisler.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kelly Dermody Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP( SF ) 275 Battery Street, 30th Floor San Francisco, CA 94111−3339 (415) 956 1000 Fax: (415) 956 1008 Email: kdermody@lchb.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kevin Love Hubbard Sanford Heisler Kimpel, LLP 111 Sutter Street, Suite 975 San Francisco, CA 94104 (415)−749−9078 Fax: (415)−795−2021 Email: khubbard@sanfordheisler.com TERMINATED: 08/22/2017
Leigh Anne St. Charles Sanford Heisler Sharp, LLP 611 Commerce Street, Ste 3100 Nashville, TN 37203 (615)−434−7006 Email: lstcharles@sanfordheisler.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Martin Daniel Quinones Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP( SF ) 275 Battery Street, 30th Floor San Francisco, CA 94111−3339 (415)−956−1000 Fax: (415)−956−1008 Email: mquinones@lchb.com TERMINATED: 02/04/2016
Maya Sequeira Sanford Heisler Sharp, LLP (DC) 1666 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Suite 300 Washington, DC 20009 (202)−499−5213 Fax: (202)−499−5199 Email: msequeira@sanfordheisler.com TERMINATED: 07/26/2016 PRO HAC VICE
Michael Frederick Decker Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein LLP(Hudson St.) 250 Hudson Street, 8th Floor New York, NY 10013 (212)−355−9500 Email: mdecker@lchb.com TERMINATED: 11/29/2018
Michael Ian Levin−Gesundheit Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP( SF ) 275 Battery Street, 30th Floor San Francisco, CA 94111−3339 (415)−956−1000 Fax: (415)−956−1008 Email: mlevin@lchb.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle Lamy Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP( SF ) 275 Battery Street, 30th Floor San Francisco, CA 94111−3339 (415)−956−1000 Email: mlamy@lchb.com

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rachel Geman Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP 250 Hudson Street 8th Floor New York, NY 10013−1413 (212) 355−9500 Fax: (212)−355−9592 Email: rgeman@lchb.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Saba Bireda Sanford Heisler Sharp, LLP (DC) 1666 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Suite 300 Washington, DC 20009 (202) 499−5209 Email: sbireda@sanfordheisler.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shaun Rosenthal Sanford Heisler Sharp 700 Pennsylvania Ave. SE Suite 300 Washington, DC 20003 202−499−5225 Fax: 202−499−5199 Email: srosenthal@sanfordheisler.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shira Jordan Tevah Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP( SF ) 275 Battery Street, 30th Floor San Francisco, CA 94111−3339 (415)−956−1000 Email: stevah@lchb.com TERMINATED: 09/17/2018
Siham Nurhussein Sanford Heisler Sharp, LLP (NYC) 1350 Avenue Of The Americas New York, NY 10019 (646)−402−5650 Fax: (646)−402−5651 Email: snurhussein@sanfordheisler.com TERMINATED: 12/16/2014
Steven Lance Wittels Wittels McInturff Palikovic 18 Half Mile Road Armonk, NY 10504 914−319−9945 Email: slw@wittelslaw.com TERMINATED: 12/05/2012
Thomas J Henderson Sanford Heisler Sharp, LLP 700 Pennsylvania Ave SE Suite 300 Washington, DC 20003 202−499−5200 Email: thenderson@sanfordheisler.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Jeanette Potter individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated female employees

Tiseme Gabriella Zegeye Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP( SF ) 275 Battery Street, 30th Floor San Francisco, CA 94111−3339 (415)−956−1000 Fax: (415)−956−1008 Email: tzegeye@lchb.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Yaman Salahi Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP( SF ) 275 Battery Street, 30th Floor San Francisco, CA 94111−3339 (415)−956−1000 Email: ysalahi@lchb.com TERMINATED: 06/02/2017
represented by Jeremy Heisler (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Aimee Krause Stewart (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/11/2019
Anne B. Shaver (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Conor Daniel Ahern (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David W. Sanford (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deepika Bains (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/29/2013
Jennifer Siegel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine M. Kimpel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/07/2016
Katherine E. Lamm (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/24/2014 PRO HAC VICE
Katie Mueting (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kelly Dermody (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kevin Love Hubbard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/22/2017
Leigh Anne St. Charles (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Martin Daniel Quinones (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/04/2016
Maya Sequeira (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/26/2016 PRO HAC VICE
Michael Frederick Decker (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/29/2018
Michael Ian Levin−Gesundheit (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle Lamy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rachel Geman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Saba Bireda (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shaun Rosenthal (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shira Jordan Tevah (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/17/2018
Siham Nurhussein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/16/2014
Steven Lance Wittels (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/05/2012
Thomas J Henderson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tiseme Gabriella Zegeye (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Sparkle Patterson individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated female employees

Yaman Salahi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/02/2017
represented by Jeremy Heisler (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Aimee Krause Stewart (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/11/2019
Anne B. Shaver (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Conor Daniel Ahern (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David W. Sanford (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deepika Bains (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/29/2013
Jennifer Siegel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine M. Kimpel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/07/2016
Katherine E. Lamm (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/24/2014 PRO HAC VICE
Katie Mueting (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kelly Dermody (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kevin Love Hubbard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/22/2017
Leigh Anne St. Charles (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Martin Daniel Quinones (See above for address)

Plaintiff
Ashwini Vasudeva individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated female employees

TERMINATED: 02/04/2016
Maya Sequeira (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/26/2016 PRO HAC VICE
Michael Frederick Decker (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/29/2018
Michael Ian Levin−Gesundheit (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle Lamy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rachel Geman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Saba Bireda (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shaun Rosenthal (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shira Jordan Tevah (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/17/2018
Siham Nurhussein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/16/2014
Steven Lance Wittels (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/05/2012
Thomas J Henderson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tiseme Gabriella Zegeye (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Yaman Salahi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/02/2017
represented by Jeremy Heisler (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Aimee Krause Stewart (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/11/2019

Anne B. Shaver (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Conor Daniel Ahern (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David W. Sanford (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deepika Bains (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/29/2013
Jennifer Siegel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine M. Kimpel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/07/2016
Katherine E. Lamm (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/24/2014 PRO HAC VICE
Katie Mueting (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kelly Dermody (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kevin Love Hubbard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/22/2017
Leigh Anne St. Charles (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Martin Daniel Quinones (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/04/2016
Maya Sequeira (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/26/2016 PRO HAC VICE
Michael Frederick Decker (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/29/2018
Michael Ian Levin−Gesundheit (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Linda O'Donnell individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated female employees TERMINATED: 11/20/2013

Michelle Lamy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rachel Geman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Saba Bireda (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shaun Rosenthal (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shira Jordan Tevah (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/17/2018
Siham Nurhussein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/16/2014
Steven Lance Wittels (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/05/2012
Thomas J Henderson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tiseme Gabriella Zegeye (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Yaman Salahi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/02/2017
represented by Jeremy Heisler (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Anne B. Shaver (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David W. Sanford (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deepika Bains (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/29/2013
Katherine M. Kimpel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/07/2016
Katherine E. Lamm

Plaintiff Tina Butler

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/24/2014 PRO HAC VICE
Katie Mueting (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kelly Dermody (See above for address)
Michael Ian Levin−Gesundheit (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Siham Nurhussein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/16/2014
Steven Lance Wittels (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/05/2012
represented by Aimee Krause Stewart (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/11/2019
Anne B. Shaver (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Conor Daniel Ahern (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jennifer Siegel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine M. Kimpel Sanford Heisler Kimpel, LLP (DC) 1666 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Suite 300 Washington, DC 20009 (202) 742−7788 Fax: (202) 742−7776 Email: kkimpel@sanfordheisler.com TERMINATED: 06/07/2016
Katie Mueting (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kelly Dermody (See above for address)
Kevin Love Hubbard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/22/2017
Leigh Anne St. Charles

Plaintiff Heather Inman

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Frederick Decker (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/29/2018
Michael Ian Levin−Gesundheit (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle Lamy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Saba Bireda (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shaun Rosenthal (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shira Jordan Tevah (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/17/2018
Thomas J Henderson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tiseme Gabriella Zegeye (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Aimee Krause Stewart (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/11/2019
Anne B. Shaver (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Conor Daniel Ahern (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jennifer Siegel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine M. Kimpel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/07/2016
Katie Mueting (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kelly Dermody (See above for address)

Plaintiff Carol Murray

Kevin Love Hubbard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/22/2017
Leigh Anne St. Charles (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Frederick Decker (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/29/2018
Michael Ian Levin−Gesundheit (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle Lamy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Saba Bireda (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shaun Rosenthal (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shira Jordan Tevah (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/17/2018
Thomas J Henderson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tiseme Gabriella Zegeye (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Aimee Krause Stewart (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/11/2019
Anne B. Shaver (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Conor Daniel Ahern (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jennifer Siegel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine M. Kimpel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/07/2016
Katie Mueting (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE

Plaintiff Cheryl Charity

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kelly Dermody (See above for address)
Kevin Love Hubbard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/22/2017
Leigh Anne St. Charles (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Frederick Decker (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/29/2018
Michael Ian Levin−Gesundheit (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle Lamy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Saba Bireda (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shaun Rosenthal (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shira Jordan Tevah (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/17/2018
Thomas J Henderson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tiseme Gabriella Zegeye (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Aimee Krause Stewart (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/11/2019
Anne B. Shaver (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Conor Daniel Ahern (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jennifer Siegel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine M. Kimpel (See above for address)

Plaintiff Nancy Jones

TERMINATED: 06/07/2016
Katie Mueting (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kelly Dermody (See above for address)
Kevin Love Hubbard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/22/2017
Leigh Anne St. Charles (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Frederick Decker (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/29/2018
Michael Ian Levin−Gesundheit (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle Lamy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Saba Bireda (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shaun Rosenthal (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shira Jordan Tevah (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/17/2018
Thomas J Henderson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tiseme Gabriella Zegeye (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Aimee Krause Stewart (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/11/2019
Anne B. Shaver (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Conor Daniel Ahern (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jennifer Siegel

Plaintiff Jessica Lake
V. Defendant

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine M. Kimpel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/07/2016
Katie Mueting (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kelly Dermody (See above for address)
Kevin Love Hubbard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/22/2017
Leigh Anne St. Charles (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Frederick Decker (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/29/2018
Michael Ian Levin−Gesundheit (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle Lamy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Saba Bireda (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shaun Rosenthal (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shira Jordan Tevah (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/17/2018
Thomas J Henderson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tiseme Gabriella Zegeye (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Michael Ian Levin−Gesundheit (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

KPMG LLP

represented by Cheryl Marie Stanton Ogletree Deakins 599 Lexington Avenue 17th Floor New York, NY 10022 (212) 492−2500 Fax: (212) 492−2501 Email: cheryl.stanton@ogletreedeakins.com TERMINATED: 07/29/2013
Chris R. Pace Ogletree Deakins 4520 Main Street, Suite 400 Kansas City, MO 64111 (816) 410−2232 Fax: (816) 471−1303 Email: chris.pace@ogletreedeakins.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Colleen M. Kenney Sidley Austin LLP One South Dearborn Chicago, Il 60603 (312) 853−7000 Fax: (312) 853−7036 Email: ckenney@sidley.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Diane Marjorie Saunders Ogletree, Dearkins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, PC (Boston) One Boston Place, Suite 3500 Boston, MA 02108 617−494−5704 Fax: 617−994−5701 Email: diane.saunders@ogletreedeakins.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Douglas R. Hart Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP 300 S Grand Ave. Los Angeles, CA 90071 213−612−7332 Email: dhart@sidley.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric G. Hoffman Sidley Austin LLP (NY) 787 Seventh Avenue New York, NY 10019 (212) 839−5300 Fax: (212) 839−5599 Email: eghoffman@sidley.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John Gerson Levi Sidley Austin LLP One South Dearborn St. Chicago, IL 60603 (312) 853.7701 Fax: (312) 853−7036 Email: jlevi@sidley.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jonathan D. Lotsoff Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP 77 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60601 312−324−1000 Fax: 312−324−1001 Email: jlotsoff@sidley.com TERMINATED: 02/06/2020
Melanie Elizabeth Walker Sidley Austin LLP One S. Dearborn St. Chicago, IL 60603 (312) 853−2078 Fax: (312) 853−7036 Email: mewalker@sidley.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter O. Hughes Ogletree Deakins 10 Madison Avenue Suite 400 Morristown, NJ 07960 973−656−1600 Fax: 973−656−1611 Email: peter.hughes@ogletreedeakins.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sarah M. Konsky Sidley Austin, LLP (Chicago) One South Dearborn Chicago, IL 60603 (312)−853−1078 Fax: (312)−853−7036 Email: skonsky@sidley.com TERMINATED: 04/01/2016
Stephanie Lauren Aranyos Ogletree, Deakins, Nash,Smoak & Stewart,P.C. 1745 Broadway 22nd, Floor New York, NY 10019 (212) 492−2500 Fax: (212) 492−2501 Email: stephanie.aranyos@ogletreedeakins.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven W. Moore Constangy, Brooks & Smith & Prophete, LLC 600 17th, Street, Suite 2700 Denver, CO 80202 (720)−343−7533 Fax: (720)−343−7541 Email: smoore@constangy.com TERMINATED: 03/09/2020 PRO HAC VICE
Wendy M. Lazerson Sidley Austin LLP 1001 Page Mill Road, Building 1 Palo Alto, CA 94304 (650) 565−7065

Defendant
Douglas R Hart Sidley Austin LLP 555 West Fifth Street Suite 4000 Los Angeles Los Angeles, CA 90013 213896−6016

Fax: (650) 565−7100 Email: wlazerson@sidley.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 06/02/2011 06/02/2011 06/02/2011 06/02/2011 06/06/2011 06/07/2011 07/07/2011 09/07/2011 09/08/2011
09/29/2011 09/29/2011 09/29/2011 09/29/2011
09/30/2011

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against KPMG LLP. (Filing Fee $ 350.00, Receipt Number 1008108)Document filed by Donna Kassman.(ama) (Entered: 06/03/2011)
SUMMONS ISSUED as to KPMG LLP. (ama) (Entered: 06/03/2011)
Magistrate Judge Frank Maas is so designated. (ama) (Entered: 06/03/2011)
Case Designated ECF. (ama) (Entered: 06/03/2011)
3 AMENDED COMPLAINT amending 1 Complaint against KPMG LLP with JURY DEMAND.Document filed by Donna Kassman. Related document: 1 Complaint filed by Donna Kassman.(tro) (Entered: 06/08/2011)
2 CONSENT TO JOIN CLASS. Document filed by Donna Kassman. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Nurhussein, Siham) (Entered: 06/07/2011)
4 NOTICE of Filing of Consent to Join Forms. Document filed by Donna Kassman. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Nurhussein, Siham) (Entered: 07/07/2011)
5 FILING ERROR − DEFICIENT DOCKET ENTRY − CONSENT TO JOIN CLASS. Document filed by Donna Kassman. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Nurhussein, Siham) Modified on 9/8/2011 (ka). (Entered: 09/07/2011)
***NOTE TO ATTORNEY TO RE−FILE DOCUMENT − DEFICIENT DOCKET ENTRY ERROR. Note to Attorney Siham Nurhussein to RE−FILE Document 5 Consent to Join Class. ERROR(S): Consenting party pltff Linda O'Donnell missing from docket.***NOTE: When the computer prompts to ADD PARTY Joining Class party plaintiff, if not already added you must add Linda O'Donnell and select as the filer. Modified on 9/8/2011 (ka). (Entered: 09/08/2011)
6 WAIVER OF SERVICE RETURNED EXECUTED. KPMG LLP waiver sent on 9/20/2011, answer due 11/21/2011. Document filed by Donna Kassman. (Nurhussein, Siham) (Entered: 09/29/2011)
7 MOTION for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint. Document filed by Donna Kassman. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Nurhussein, Siham) (Entered: 09/29/2011)
8 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 7 MOTION for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint.. Document filed by Donna Kassman. (Nurhussein, Siham) (Entered: 09/29/2011)
10 SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT amending 3 Amended Complaint against KPMG LLP with JURY DEMAND.Document filed by Donna Kassman, Jeanette Potter, Sparkle Patterson, Ashwini Vasudeva, Linda O'Donnell. Related document: 3 Amended Complaint filed by Donna Kassman. (Received in the night deposit box on 9/29/11 at 7:19pm)(mro) (Additional attachment(s) added on 10/6/2011: # 1 Sec. Amended Complaint Pages 51−95) (ama). (Entered: 10/04/2011)
9 FILING ERROR − WRONG DOCUMENT TYPE SELECTED FROM MENU − CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE F.L.S.A.. Document filed by Donna Kassman. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Nurhussein, Siham) Modified on 10/3/2011 (ka). (Entered: 09/30/2011)

10/03/2011
10/04/2011
10/04/2011 10/04/2011 10/05/2011 10/06/2011 10/17/2011 10/17/2011 10/17/2011 10/17/2011
10/18/2011 10/18/2011
10/19/2011 10/19/2011 10/20/2011
10/21/2011 10/21/2011

***NOTE TO ATTORNEY TO RE−FILE DOCUMENT − EVENT TYPE ERROR. Note to Attorney Siham Nurhussein to RE−FILE Document 9 Consent to Become Party Plaintiff. Use the event type Consent to Join Class found under the event list Other Documents.***NOTE: When the computer prompts to "ADD PARTY Joining Class, if not already added" you MUST add new filer Linda O'Donnell with party role of plaintiff". Your entry should read as follows: "CONSENT TO JOIN CLASS. Document filed by Linda O'Donnell". (ka) (Entered: 10/03/2011)
***NOTE TO ATTORNEY TO E−MAIL PDF. Note to Attorney Siham Nurhussein for noncompliance with Section 14.3 of the S.D.N.Y. Electronic Case Filing Rules & Instructions. E−MAIL the PDF for Document 10 Amended Complaint, to: caseopenings@nysd.uscourts.gov. (mro) (Entered: 10/04/2011)
11 MOTION for Katherine M. Kimpel to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Linda O'Donnell, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(pgu) (Entered: 10/05/2011)
12 MOTION for David W. Sanford to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Linda O'Donnell, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(pgu) (Entered: 10/05/2011)
13 CONSENT TO JOIN CLASS. Document filed by Linda O'Donnell. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Nurhussein, Siham) (Entered: 10/05/2011)
CASHIERS OFFICE REMARK on 12 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice, 11 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice in the amount of $400.00, paid on 10/04/2011, Receipt Number 1018128,1018129. (jd) (Entered: 10/06/2011)
14 ORDER FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE granting 12 Motion for David Sanford to Appear Pro Hac Vice. (Signed by Judge Richard J. Holwell on 10/17/2011) (cd) (Entered: 10/17/2011)
15 ORDER FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE granting 11 Motion for Katherine Kimpel to Appear Pro Hac Vice. (Signed by Judge Richard J. Holwell on 10/17/2011) (cd) (Entered: 10/17/2011)
16 FILING ERROR − DEFICIENT DOCKET ERROR − RULE 7.1 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT. No Corporate Parent. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Stanton, Cheryl) Modified on 10/18/2011 (kco). (Entered: 10/17/2011)
17 FILING ERROR − DEFICIENT DOCKET ERROR − MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Opposition re: 7 MOTION for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint.. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Cheryl M. Stanton, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B)(Stanton, Cheryl) Modified on 10/18/2011 (kco). (Entered: 10/17/2011)
18 RULE 7.1 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT. No Corporate Parent. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Stanton, Cheryl) (Entered: 10/18/2011)
19 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Opposition re: 7 MOTION for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint.. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Cheryl M. Stanton, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B)(Stanton, Cheryl) (Entered: 10/18/2011)
20 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Cheryl Marie Stanton on behalf of KPMG LLP (Stanton, Cheryl) (Entered: 10/19/2011)
21 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Diane Marjorie Saunders on behalf of KPMG LLP (Saunders, Diane) (Entered: 10/19/2011)
22 CONSENT MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 19 Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Linda O'Donnell, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Nurhussein, Siham) (Entered: 10/20/2011)
23 MOTION for Steven W. Moore to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(bcu) (pgu). (Entered: 10/21/2011)
24 MOTION for Peter O. Hughes to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(bcu) (pgu). (Entered: 10/21/2011)

10/25/2011 10/31/2011
11/03/2011 11/03/2011 11/03/2011 11/28/2011
12/06/2011 12/08/2011 12/13/2011 12/13/2011 12/20/2011 12/20/2011
01/06/2012

CASHIERS OFFICE REMARK on 24 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice, 23 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice in the amount of $400.00, paid on 10/21/2011, Receipt Number 1019792,1019793. (jd) (Entered: 10/25/2011)
25 ORDER granting 22 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply re 7 MOTION for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint. Replies due by 11/3/2011. It is hereby Ordered that the motion is GRANTED, and further Ordered, that the plaintiff shall have until 11/3/11 to file a reply in support of motion for leave second amended complaint, the length of which may total 15 pages. (Signed by Judge Richard J. Holwell on 10/28/2011) (jfe) (Entered: 10/31/2011)
26 ORDER FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE: granting 23 Motion for Steven W. Moore to Appear Pro Hac Vice for all purposes as counsel for Defendant KMPG LLP in the above−captioned case in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Additional relief as set forth in this Order. (Signed by Judge Richard J. Holwell on 11/2/2011) (pl) (Entered: 11/03/2011)
27 ORDER FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE granting 24 Motion for Peter O. Hughes to Appear Pro Hac Vice. (Signed by Judge Richard J. Holwell on 11/2/2011) (rjm) (Entered: 11/03/2011)
28 REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 7 MOTION for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint.. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Linda O'Donnell, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Nurhussein, Siham) (Entered: 11/03/2011)
29 ENDORSED LETTER: addressed to Judge Richard J. Holwell from Cheryl M. Stanton dated 11/21/2011 re: Pursuant to the Court's Individual Motion Practices, Defendant KPMG LLP respectfully request a pre−motion conference concerning its anticipated motion under Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 23(d)(1)(D) to dismiss or strike class claims, and to dismiss certain individual claims in Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. ENDORSEMENT: A pre−motion conference will be held on Thursday, December 8, 2011 at 2:30 p.m. Plaintiff shall respond to defendant's 11/21/2012 letter by December 2, 2011 So Ordered. (Signed by Judge Richard J. Holwell on 11/22/11) (js) (Entered: 11/28/2011)
30 MOTION for Katherine E. Lamm to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Linda O'Donnell, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(bwa) (Entered: 12/08/2011)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Richard J. Holwell: Interim Pretrial Conference held on 12/8/2011. Plaintiff shall file further amended complaint by 12/23/11; Defendant's motion to dismiss by 1/17/12; Plaintiff's opposition filed by 2/17/12; Defendant's reply by 3/2/12. (jfe) (Entered: 01/12/2012)
31 SCHEDULING ORDER: Plaintiffs shall file a further Amended Complaint by 12/23/2011. Defendant shall file any Motion to strike by 1/17/2012. Responses due by 2/17/2012, Replies due by 3/2/2012. (Signed by Judge Richard J. Holwell on 12/8/2011) (djc) Modified on 12/27/2011 (djc). (Entered: 12/13/2011)
CASHIERS OFFICE REMARK on 30 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice in the amount of $200.00, paid on 12/06/2011, Receipt Number 1023624. (jd) (Entered: 12/13/2011)
32 ORDER FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE granting 30 Motion for Katherine Lamm to Appear Pro Hac Vice. It is hereby ordered that Katherine Lamm is admitted to appear pro hac vice for all purposes as counsel for the plaintiffs. (Signed by Judge Richard J. Holwell on 12/19/2011) (mro) (Entered: 12/20/2011)
33 ENDORSED LETTER addressed to Judge Richard J. Holwell from Katherine Kimpel dated 12/12/11 re: Counsel writes to request the approval of the following proposed briefing schedule: motion to dismiss: 2/3/12; response: 3/2/12; reply: 3/16/12; third amended complaint: 1/6/12. ENDORSEMENT: Request granted. So ordered. ( Amended Pleadings due by 1/6/2012., Motions due by 2/3/2012., Responses due by 3/2/2012, Replies due by 3/16/2012.) (Signed by Judge Richard J. Holwell on 12/19/2011) (mro) (Entered: 12/20/2011)
34 NOTICE of Filing Third Amended Complaint re: 10 Amended Complaint,. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Linda O'Donnell, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini

01/06/2012
02/03/2012 02/03/2012 03/03/2012
03/05/2012 03/16/2012 03/21/2012 04/05/2012 04/05/2012 04/16/2012 04/19/2012 04/20/2012

Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Nurhussein, Siham) (Entered: 01/06/2012)
35 THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT amending 10 Amended Complaint, against KPMG LLP with JURY DEMAND.Document filed by Ashwini Vasudeva, Jeanette Potter, Donna Kassman, Linda O'Donnell, Sparkle Patterson. Related document: 10 Amended Complaint, filed by Sparkle Patterson, Donna Kassman, Linda O'Donnell, Ashwini Vasudeva, Jeanette Potter. (Received in the night deposit box on 1/6/12 at 10:11pm)(mro) (Entered: 01/10/2012)
36 MOTION to Dismiss Certain Claims, Sever All Plaintiffs Claims and Strike All Class Claims as Contained in the Third Amended Complaint. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Stanton, Cheryl) (Entered: 02/03/2012)
37 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 36 MOTION to Dismiss Certain Claims, Sever All Plaintiffs Claims and Strike All Class Claims as Contained in the Third Amended Complaint.. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Cheryl M. Stanton, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B)(Stanton, Cheryl) (Entered: 02/03/2012)
38 FILING ERROR − DEFICIENT DOCKET ENTRY − MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Opposition re: 36 MOTION to Dismiss Certain Claims, Sever All Plaintiffs Claims and Strike All Class Claims as Contained in the Third Amended Complaint.. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Linda O'Donnell, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Kimpel, Katherine) Modified on 3/5/2012 (db). (Entered: 03/03/2012)
39 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Opposition re: 36 MOTION to Dismiss Certain Claims, Sever All Plaintiffs Claims and Strike All Class Claims as Contained in the Third Amended Complaint. CORRECTED. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Linda O'Donnell, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 03/05/2012)
40 REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 36 MOTION to Dismiss Certain Claims, Sever All Plaintiffs Claims and Strike All Class Claims as Contained in the Third Amended Complaint.. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Stanton, Cheryl) (Entered: 03/16/2012)
41 ENDORSED LETTER addressed to Judge Loretta A. Preska from Cheryl M. Stanton dated 3/14/2012 re: We respectfully seek permission from the Court that KPMG be permitted to file a reply brief that is 20 pages in length. ENDORSEMENT: So ordered. (Signed by Judge Loretta A. Preska on 3/20/2012) (lmb) (Entered: 03/21/2012)
42 MOTION for Leave to File Sur−Reply in Further Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Certain Claims and to Strike Class Claims as Contained in the Third Amended Complaint. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Linda O'Donnell, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 04/05/2012)
43 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 42 MOTION for Leave to File Sur−Reply in Further Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Certain Claims and to Strike Class Claims as Contained in the Third Amended Complaint.. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Linda O'Donnell, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 04/05/2012)
44 NOTICE OF CASE REASSIGNMENT to Judge Jesse M. Furman. Judge Richard J. Holwell is no longer assigned to the case. (pgu) (Entered: 04/16/2012)
45 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Opposition re: 42 MOTION for Leave to File Sur−Reply in Further Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Certain Claims and to Strike Class Claims as Contained in the Third Amended Complaint.. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Stanton, Cheryl) (Entered: 04/19/2012)
46 ORDER denying 42 Motion for Leave to File Sur−Reply in Further Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Certain Claims and to Strike Class Claims as Contained in the Third Amended Complaint. This case was recently transferred to the undersigned. On April 5, 2012 Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File a Sur−Reply in Further Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. That motion is hereby

05/01/2012 05/10/2012 05/16/2012 05/21/2012
05/23/2012 06/11/2012 06/14/2012 06/20/2012 07/23/2012
07/30/2012
07/30/2012

DENIED. It is hereby ORDERED that unless notified otherwise by the Court, any Scheduling Order or Case Management Plan remains in effect notwithstanding the case's transfer, except that any currently scheduled conference or oral argument with the Court is adjourned until further notification. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that each party must submit a letter to the Court, not to exceed five pages, updating the Court on the status of the case no later than May 4, 2012. The parties are directed to the Court's applicable Individual Rules and Practices (available at http://nysd.uscourts.gov /judge/Furman) regarding the submission of letters. The status letter should include the following information as further set forth in this order. (Signed by Judge Jesse M. Furman on 4/20/2012) (lmb) (Entered: 04/20/2012)
47 NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS by Cheryl Marie Stanton on behalf of KPMG LLP. New Address: Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., 1745 Broadway, 22nd Floor, New York, NY, USA 10019, 212.492.2500. (Stanton, Cheryl) (Entered: 05/01/2012)
48 NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS by Diane Marjorie Saunders on behalf of KPMG LLP. New Address: Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart PC, One Boston Place, Suite 3220, Boston, MA, USA 02108, 617−994−5704. (Saunders, Diane) (Entered: 05/10/2012)
49 MOTION for Katie Mueting to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Linda O'Donnell, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(pgu) (Entered: 05/16/2012)
50 ORDER FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE: granting 49 Motion for Katie Mueting to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Applicant having requested admission Pro Hac Vice to appear for all purposes as counsel for Plaintiffs and others similarly situated in the above entitled action. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Applicant is admitted to practice Pro Hac Vice in the above captioned case in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Additional relief as set forth in this Order. (Signed by Judge Jesse M. Furman on 5/21/2012) (pl) (Entered: 05/21/2012)
CASHIERS OFFICE REMARK on 49 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice in the amount of $200.00, paid on 05/16/2012, Receipt Number 1038461. (jd) (Entered: 05/23/2012)
51 MOTION for John G. Levi to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(bwa) (Entered: 06/13/2012)
52 ORDER FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE granting 51 Motion for John G. Levi to Appear Pro Hac Vice. It is hereby Ordered that John G. Levi is admitted to to appear for all purposes as counsel for defendant KPMG LLP. (Signed by Judge Jesse M. Furman on 6/14/2012) (mro) (Entered: 06/14/2012)
CASHIERS OFFICE REMARK on 51 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice in the amount of $200.00, paid on 06/11/2012, Receipt Number 1040653. (jd) (Entered: 06/20/2012)
53 ENDORSED LETTER addressed to Judge Jesse M. Furman from Cheryl M. Stanton dated 7/20/2012 re: We propose to include in the Notice a two−paragraph explanation of how this new case is relevant to KPMG's Motion. ENDORSEMENT: Plaintiffs and Defendant may each file a letter, not to exceed two pages, with respect to the District Courts decision in Chen−Oster, on or before Friday, July 27, 2012. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Jesse M. Furman on 7/23/2012) (ama) (Entered: 07/23/2012)
54 Letter addressed to Judge Jesse M. Furman from Katherine M. Kimpel dated 7/27/2012 re: Accordingly, while this Court should find the great bulk of Judge Sand's findings in Chen−Oster persuasive in this case−−consistent with the approach many courts have taken in Dukes' wake−−Plaintiffs submit that neither his conclusion nor Dukes itself compel a finding that Plaintiffs lack (b)(2) standing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Linda O'Donnell, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(lmb) (Entered: 07/30/2012)
55 Letter addressed to Judge Jesse M. Furman from Cheryl M. Stanton dated 7/27/2012 re: KPMG respectfully submits the decision in Chen−Oster v. Goldman, Sachs, & Co., 10−CV−6950 (LBS) (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2012) ("Chen−Oster") (Exhibit A) as supplemental authority in support of its Motion to Dismiss Certain Claims and To Strike Class Claims Contained in the Third Amended Complaint ("KPMG's Motion")

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[Master Dkt. No. 37]. We respectfully request that KPMG's Motion be granted, and that Plaintiffs class allegations be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, stricken. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(lmb) (Entered: 07/30/2012)
56 ENDORSED LETTER addressed to Judge Jesse M. Furman from Cheryl M. Stanton dated 8/24/2012 re: counsel for defendant respectfully requests leave to submit information regarding additional supplemental authority in Further Support of Its Motion to Dismiss Certain Claims and To Strike Class Claims as Contained in the Third Amended Complaint ("KPMG's Motion) [Master Dkt. No. 37]. ENDORSEMENT: Application granted. Each party may file a letter, not to exceed 3 pages and limited to the decision in Bolden, by August 31, 2012. (Signed by Judge Jesse M. Furman on 8/24/2012) (pl) (Entered: 08/27/2012)
57 Letter addressed to Judge Jesse M. Furman from Katherine M. Kimpel dated 8/31/2012 re: For these reasons, the Bolden decision in no way supports Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Certain Class Claims and to Strike Class Claims as Contained in the Third Amended Complaint. If anything, the Seventh Circuit's analysis in Bolden −like its analysis in McReynolds− supports the viability of Plaintiffs' case. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Linda O'Donnell, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(lmb) (Entered: 09/04/2012)
58 Letter addressed to Judge Jesse M. Furman from Cheryl M. Stanton dated 8/31/2012 re: KPMG LLP ("KPMG") respectfully submits the decision in Bolden v. Walsh Construction Co., Case No. 12−2205, 2012 WL 3194593 (7th Cir. Aug. 8, 2012) ("Bolden") (Exhibit A) as supplemental authority in support of its Motion to Dismiss Certain Claims and to Strike Class Claims Contained in the Third Amended Complaint [Master Dkt. No. 37 ("KPMG's Motion")]. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(lmb) (Entered: 09/04/2012)
59 ENDORSED LETTER addressed to Judge Jesse M. Furman from Katherine M. Kimpel dated 10/04/2012 re: Plaintiffs respectfully request leave to provide the Court with supplemental authority in support of their Opposition to Defendant KPMG's Motion to Dismiss Certain Claims and to Strike Class Claims as Contained in the Third Amended Complaint (Dkt. 39). ENDORSEMENT: Application DENIED as the Court is aware of Judge Bianco's decision. (Signed by Judge Jesse M. Furman on 10/04/2012) (ama) (Entered: 10/04/2012)
60 NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS by Jeremy Heisler on behalf of All Plaintiffs. New Address: Sanford Heisler, LLP, 1350 Avenue of the Americas, Floor 31, New York, New York, USA 10019, 646−402−5650. (Heisler, Jeremy) (Entered: 10/11/2012)
61 NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS by Siham Nurhussein on behalf of All Plaintiffs. New Address: Sanford Heisler, LLP, 1350 Avenue of the Americas, Floor 31, New York, New York, United States 10019, 646−402−5650. (Nurhussein, Siham) (Entered: 10/11/2012)
62 NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS by Deepika Bains on behalf of All Plaintiffs. New Address: Sanford Heisler, LLP, 1350 Avenue of the Americas, Floor 31, New York, New York, United States 10019, 646−402−5650. (Bains, Deepika) (Entered: 10/11/2012)
63 NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS by David W. Sanford on behalf of All Plaintiffs. New Address: Sanford Heisler, LLP, 1666 Connecticut Ave. N.W., Suite 300, Washington, District of Columbia, United States 20009, 202−499−5201. (Sanford, David) (Entered: 10/11/2012)
64 NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS by Katherine M. Kimpel on behalf of All Plaintiffs. New Address: Sanford Heisler, LLP, 1666 Connecticut Ave. N.W., Suite 300, Washington, District of Columbia, United States 20009, 202−499−5202. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 10/11/2012)
65 NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS by Katherine E. Lamm on behalf of All Plaintiffs. New Address: Sanford Heisler, LLP, 1666 Connecticut Ave. N.W., Suite 300, Washington, District of Columbia, United States 20009, 202−499−5212. (Lamm, Katherine) (Entered: 10/11/2012)

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66 NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS by Katie Mueting on behalf of All Plaintiffs. New Address: Sanford Heisler, LLP, 1666 Connecticut Ave. N.W., Suite 300, Washington, District of Columbia, United States 20009, 202−499−5206. (Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 10/11/2012)
67 MOTION for Steven L. Wittels to Withdraw as Attorney. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Linda O'Donnell, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 12/04/2012)
68 ORDER: granting 67 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. granting 67 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Upon consideration of Plaintiffs' Motion to Withdraw Steven L. Wittels as Counsel of Record, the Court finds that good cause has been shown for the granting of the Motion. ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby ORDERED, that the Motion is GRANTED, and FURTHER ORDERED, that Mr. Steven L. Wittels be withdrawn as Plaintiffs' counsel in this matter. (Signed by Judge Jesse M. Furman on 12/5/2012) (mt) (Entered: 12/05/2012)
69 OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 36 Motion to Dismiss. For the reasons discussed above, Defendants motions to strike or dismiss are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. In particular, Defendants motions to strike or dismiss the class claims in their entirety in light of Dukes are DENIED. Defendants motion to strike the class claims under New York State and New York City law is GRANTED with respect to putative class members not living or working in the relevant jurisdictions, but DENIED with respect to putative class members living or working within those jurisdictions. Defendants motion to dismiss the disparate impact class claims is DENIED. Defendants motion to dismiss the individual Plaintiffs equal pay claims under the EPA and NYSEPA is DENIED, although Defendants motion to dismiss the individual Plaintiffs retaliation claims under those statutes is GRANTED. Defendants motion to dismiss Pattersons Title VII claims on grounds of timeliness or improper venue is DENIED. Defendants motion to dismiss Kassmans discriminatory performance evaluation claims is GRANTED as to claims prior to the statute of limitations and DENIED as to claims accruing after the statute of limitations. Defendants motion to dismiss Kassmans constructive discharge claim is DENIED. Finally, Defendants motion to sever and dismiss the individual claims other than Kassmans is DENIED. (Signed by Judge Jesse M. Furman on 2/7/2013) (ago) (Entered: 02/07/2013)
70 NOTICE OF INITIAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE: It hereby ORDERED that Defendant shall file its answer to Plaintiffs' remaining claims on or before February 28, 2013. It is further ORDERED that counsel for all parties appear for an initial pretrial conference with the Court on March 14, 2013 at 3:00p.m. in Courtroom 1105 of the Thurgood Marshall Courthouse, 40 Centre Street, New York, New York. All counsel are required to register promptly as filing users on ECF. All pretrial conferences must be attended by the attorney who will serve as principal trial counsel. Counsel are directed to confer with each other prior to the conference regarding settlement and each of the other subjects to be considered at a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 conference. Additionally, in accordance with the Court's Individual Rules and Practices, which are available at http://nysd.uscourts.gov/judge/Furman, the parties are hereby ORDERED to submit via e−mail(Furman_NYSDChambers@nysd.uscourts.gov) a Proposed Civil Case Management Plan and Scheduling Order by Thursday of the week prior to the initial pretrial conference. The parties shall use this Court's form Proposed Civil Case Management Plan and Scheduling Order, which is also available at http://nysd.uscourts.gov/judge/Furman. Any open legal issues can be addressed at the conference.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that included with the Proposed Civil Case Management Plan and Scheduling Order, the parties jointly submit a letter, not to exceed five (5) pages, providing the following information in separate paragraphs as further set forth herein. Counsel who have noticed an appearance as of the issuance of this order are directed (i) to notify all other parties' attorneys in this action by serving upon each of them a copy of this order and the Court's Individual Rules and Practices (available at http://nysd.uscourts.gov/judge/Furman) forthwith, and (ii) to file proof of such notice with the Court. If unaware of the identity of counsel for any of the parties, counsel receiving this order must forthwith send a copy of this order and the Court's Individual Rules and Practices to that party personally.( Initial Conference set for 3/14/2013 at 03:00 PM in Courtroom 1105, 40 Centre Street, New York, NY 10007 before Judge Jesse M. Furman.), KPMG LLP answer due 2/28/2013. (Signed by Judge

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Jesse M. Furman on 2/7/2013) (ago) (Entered: 02/07/2013)
71 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Wendy M. Lazerson on behalf of KPMG LLP (Lazerson, Wendy) (Entered: 02/08/2013)
72 ENDORSED LETTER addressed to Judge Jesse M. Furman from Katherine M. Kimpel dated 2/20/2013 re: We write on behalf of both parties to notify the Court of what we believe to be a typographical error in the Court's Order of February 7, 2013 (Dkt. 69)...Accordingly, the parties request the Court update the record on this matter. ENDORSEMENT: SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Jesse M. Furman on 2/21/2013) (mt) Modified on 2/26/2013 (mt). (Entered: 02/22/2013)
73 ENDORSED LETTER addressed to Judge Jesse M. Furman from Cheryl M. Stanton dated 2/22/2013 re: Defendant KPMG LLP ("KPMG"), with the consent of Plaintiffs' counsel, respectfully requests a twenty−one (21) day extension, to and including Thursday, March 21, 2013, in which to file an Answer to the Third Amended Complaint. ENDORSEMENT: Application GRANTED. The parties shall promptly advise the Court if they believe that this extension warrants adjournment of the initial pretrial conference currently scheduled for March 14, 2013., KPMG LLP answer due 3/21/2013. (Signed by Judge Jesse M. Furman on 2/25/2013) (lmb) (Entered: 02/25/2013)
74 REVISED SCHEDULING ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the conference in this matter, previously scheduled for March 14, 2013, at 3:00 p.m., is RESCHEDULED for March 25, 2013, at 9:30 a.m., in Courtroom 1105 of the Thurgood Marshall Courthouse, 40 Centre Street, New York, New York. Initial Conference set for 3/25/2013 at 09:30 AM in Courtroom 1105, 40 Centre Street, New York, NY 10007 before Judge Jesse M. Furman. (Signed by Judge Jesse M. Furman on 3/4/2013) (lmb) (Entered: 03/05/2013)
75 ENDORSED LETTER: addressed to Judge Jesse M. Furman from Cheryl M. Stanton dated 3/6/2013 re: Counsel requests that the conference currently scheduled for March 25, 2013 be adjourned until Thursday, April 18, 2013. ENDORSEMENT: Application GRANTED. The pretrial conference is rescheduled for April 18, 2013, at 3 pm in Courtroom 1105 of the Thurgood Marshall Courthouse, 40 Centre Street, New York, NY 10007. (Signed by Judge Jesse M. Furman on 3/7/2013) (js) (Entered: 03/07/2013)
76 MOTION for Colleen M. Kenney to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Filing fee $ 200.00, receipt number 0208−8337768. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing, # 2 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 03/19/2013)
>>>NOTICE REGARDING PRO HAC VICE MOTION. Regarding Document No. 76 MOTION for Colleen M. Kenney to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Filing fee $ 200.00, receipt number 0208−8337768. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff.. The document has been reviewed and there are no deficiencies. (bwa) (Entered: 03/20/2013)
77 ORDER granting 76 Motion for Colleen M. Kenney to Appear Pro Hac Vice (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Jesse M. Furman)(Text Only Order) (Furman, Jesse) (Entered: 03/21/2013)
78 FILING ERROR − DEFICIENT DOCKET ENTRY (SEE DOCUMENT #79) − ANSWER to 35 Amended Complaint,. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Stanton, Cheryl) Modified on 3/21/2013 (ldi). (Entered: 03/21/2013)
79 ANSWER to 35 Amended Complaint,. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Stanton, Cheryl) (Entered: 03/21/2013)
80 ORDER OF AUTOMATIC REFERRAL TO MEDIATION (See M−10−468 Order filed January 3, 2011). Please reference the following when corresponding with the Mediation Office. E−mail MediationOffice@nysd.uscourts.gov, telephone (212) 805−0643, and facsimile (212) 805−0647. Mediator to be Assigned by 4/1/2013. (Signed by Judge Loretta A. Preska on 1/3/2011) (rpr) (Entered: 03/22/2013)
81 NOTICE OF CASE REASSIGNMENT to Judge Lorna G. Schofield. Judge Jesse M. Furman is no longer assigned to the case. (pgu) (Entered: 03/22/2013)

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82 ORDER: It is hereby ORDERED that counsel for all parties appear for an initial pretrial conference with the Court at the time and place listed below. All pretrial conferences must be attended by the attorney who will serve as principal trial counsel. Any open legal issues can be addressed at the conference. Initial Conference set for 4/22/2013 at 02:30 PM in Courtroom 1106 of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Thurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse at 40 Foley Square, New York, New York before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 3/25/2013) (ft) (Entered: 03/25/2013)
NOTICE OF MEDIATOR ASSIGNMENT − Notice of assignment of mediator. Mediator Schedule due by 5/2/2013.(cda) (Entered: 04/02/2013)
83 Letter addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Cheryl M. Stanton dated 4/15/2013 re: Pursuant to the Court's Order dated March 25, 2013, the Parties in the above−captioned action hereby submit this joint letter providing the information requested in the Court's Notice. Document filed by KPMG LLP, Donna Kassman, Linda O'Donnell, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(ft) (Entered: 04/16/2013)
***DELETED DOCKET ENTRY. Deleted docket entry Notice of Mediator Assignment. The document was incorrectly filed in this case. (sn) (Entered: 04/18/2013)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lorna G. Schofield: Status Conference held on 4/22/2013. (See Order) (jcs) (Entered: 04/23/2013)
84 SCHEDULING ORDER: Expert Discovery due by 4/28/2014. The parties are directed to submit a status letter regarding electronic discovery by May 22, 2013. Status Conference set for 6/25/2013 at 02:30 PM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. This action shall be removed from the Court annexed mediation program. Motions due by 5/13/2013. Responses due by 5/27/2013. Replies due by 6/3/2013. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 4/23/2013) (ft) (Entered: 04/24/2013)
Terminate Mediation Case Tracking Deadlines: Mediator Schedule Deadline. (rpr) (Entered: 04/25/2013)
85 ENDORSED LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Cheryl M. Stanton dated 4/26/2013 re: Counsel requests a revision to paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Order based on the Pretrial Conference held on April 22, 2013. Counsel also requests the the Scheduling Order be so modified. ENDORSEMENT: The opposition shall be filed by June 3, 2013. The reply shall be filed by June 10, 2013.(Responses due by 6/3/2013, Replies due by 6/10/2013.) (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 4/29/2013) (ft) Modified on 4/29/2013 (ft). (Entered: 04/29/2013)
86 STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER...regarding procedures to be followed that shall govern the handling of confidential material... (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 5/1/2013) (ft) (Entered: 05/01/2013)
87 MOTION for Equitable Tolling of the Statute of Limitations for Absent Collective Action Members Claims Under the Equal Pay Act. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Linda O'Donnell, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 05/13/2013)
88 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 87 MOTION for Equitable Tolling of the Statute of Limitations for Absent Collective Action Members Claims Under the Equal Pay Act.. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Linda O'Donnell, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 05/13/2013)
89 STIPULATED ORDER CONCERNING PROTOCOL FOR PRODUCTION OF ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION: Plaintiffs Donna Kassman, Linda O'Donnell, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter and Ashwini Vasudeva ("Plaintiffs") and Defendant KPMO LLP ("KPMO") (collectively, "the Parties" and each a "Party"), through their attorneys of record, hereby stipulate as follows: WHEREAS, counsel for the Parties have met and conferred regarding discovery of electronically stored information ("ESI") of the Parties; WHEREAS, the Patties have reached agreement on cel1ain of the issues discussed regarding such discovery; WHEREAS, the Patties have entered into this Stipulation and [Proposed] Order Concerning Protocol for Production of Electronically Stored Information ("Order")to facilitate the just, speedy, and

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inexpensive conduct of discovery involving ESI and to promote, to the fullest extent possible, the resolution of disputes regarding the discovery of ESI without Court intervention; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: All Parties are bound by and subject to the terms of this Order. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 5/22/2013) (Attachments: # 1 Order, # 2 Order, # 3 Order)(rsh) (Entered: 05/22/2013)
90 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Opposition re: 87 MOTION for Equitable Tolling of the Statute of Limitations for Absent Collective Action Members Claims Under the Equal Pay Act.. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Unpublished Decision)(Stanton, Cheryl) (Entered: 06/03/2013)
91 REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 87 MOTION for Equitable Tolling of the Statute of Limitations for Absent Collective Action Members Claims Under the Equal Pay Act.. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Linda O'Donnell, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 06/10/2013)
92 MOTION for Cheryl M. Stanton to Withdraw as Attorney. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Stanton, Cheryl) (Entered: 06/13/2013)
93 ORDER: The conference scheduled for June 25, 2013, is adjourned to July 16, 2013, at 3:00 PM.(Status Conference set for 7/16/2013 at 03:00 PM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield.) (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 6/24/2013) (rsh) (Entered: 06/24/2013)
94 MOTION for Deepika Bains to Withdraw as Attorney. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Linda O'Donnell, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 06/24/2013)
95 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Stephanie Lauren Aranyos on behalf of KPMG LLP. (Aranyos, Stephanie) (Entered: 06/28/2013)
96 ENDORSED LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Peter O. Hughes dated 6/28/2013 re: Counsel for defendant jointly requests that the July 16, 2013 status conference be rescheduled to the following dates: July 10, July 11, and or August 1st. ENDORSEMENT: The conference is adjourned to August 1, 2013 at 11:30 a.m. APPLICATION GRANTED. (Status Conference set for 8/1/2013 at 11:30 AM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield.) (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 6/28/2013) (rsh) (Entered: 07/01/2013)
97 MEMO ENDORSEMENT granting 92 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. ENDORSEMENT: Application granted. Attorney Cheryl Marie Stanton terminated. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 7/29/2013) (lmb) (Entered: 07/29/2013)
98 MEMO ENDORSEMENT granting 94 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. ENDORSEMENT: Application granted. Attorney Deepika Bains terminated. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 7/29/2013) (lmb) (Entered: 07/29/2013)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lorna G. Schofield: Status Conference held on 8/1/2013. (See Order) (Court Reporter Kris Sellin) (jcs) (Entered: 08/01/2013)
99 ORDER: For the reasons stated on the record on August 1, 2013, the Clerk of Court is directed to close the motion at Dkt. No. 87. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 8/20/2013) (rdz) (Entered: 08/21/2013)
100 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: ARGUMENT held on 8/1/2013 before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Khristine Sellin, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 10/18/2013. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/28/2013. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/26/2013.(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 09/23/2013)
101 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a ARGUMENT proceeding held on 8/1/13 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this

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transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 09/23/2013)
102 ENDORSED LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated 10/22/2013 re: Pursuant to the Court's Individual Rules and Procedures, Defendant KPMG LLP (KPMG) respectfully requests a pre−motion conference concerning its anticipated motion under Rule 37 to compel the production of documents and information in response to KPMG's Requests for Production ("RFP") and Interrogatories. ENDORSEMENT: Plaintiff shall submit any letter response, not to exceed three pages, by October 28, 2013. The parties shall appear for a telephonic conference on October 30, 2013, at 11:30 a.m. Eastern time., ( Telephone Conference set for 10/30/2013 at 11:30 AM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield.) (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 10/24/2013) (lmb) (Entered: 10/24/2013)
103 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting dated 10/24/2013 re: We write in response to KPMG's letter to the Court on October 22, 2013, in which KPMG represented to the Court that the parties have reached an impasse on several discovery issues. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Linda O'Donnell, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(lmb) (Entered: 10/25/2013)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lorna G. Schofield: Telephone Conference held on 10/30/2013. (Court Reporter Bill Richards) (jcs) (Entered: 10/30/2013)
104 FILING ERROR − DEFICIENT DOCKET ENTRY − MOTION to Certify Class CONDITIONALLY AND AUTHORIZATION OF NOTICE. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Linda O'Donnell, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. Responses due by 12/2/2013 Return Date set for 12/9/2013 at 11:59 PM. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Ex. E, # 2 Affidavit Ex. G, # 3 Affidavit Ex. H, # 4 Affidavit Ex. Q, # 5 Certificate of Service)(Kimpel, Katherine) Modified on 10/31/2013 (db). (Entered: 10/30/2013)
***NOTE TO ATTORNEY TO RE−FILE DOCUMENT − DEFICIENT DOCKET ENTRY ERROR. Note to Attorney Katherine M. Kimpel to RE−FILE Document 104 MOTION to Certify Class CONDITIONALLY AND AUTHORIZATION OF NOTICE. ERROR(S): Supporting Documents are filed separately, each receiving their own document #. (db) (Entered: 10/31/2013)
105 FILING ERROR − DEFICIENT DOCKET ENTRY − DECLARATION of Sparkle Patterson in Support re: 104 MOTION to Certify Class CONDITIONALLY AND AUTHORIZATION OF NOTICE.. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Linda O'Donnell, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) Modified on 11/1/2013 (db). (Entered: 10/31/2013)
106 FILING ERROR − DEFICIENT DOCKET ENTRY − DECLARATION of Donna Kassman in Support re: 104 MOTION to Certify Class CONDITIONALLY AND AUTHORIZATION OF NOTICE.. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Linda O'Donnell, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) Modified on 11/1/2013 (db). (Entered: 10/31/2013)
107 FILING ERROR − DEFICIENT DOCKET ENTRY − DECLARATION of Jeanette Potter in Support re: 104 MOTION to Certify Class CONDITIONALLY AND AUTHORIZATION OF NOTICE.. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Linda O'Donnell, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) Modified on 11/1/2013 (db). (Entered: 10/31/2013)
108 FILING ERROR − DEFICIENT DOCKET ENTRY − DECLARATION of Ashwini Vasudeva in Support re: 104 MOTION to Certify Class CONDITIONALLY AND AUTHORIZATION OF NOTICE.. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Linda O'Donnell, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) Modified on 11/1/2013 (db). (Entered: 10/31/2013)
***NOTE TO ATTORNEY TO RE−FILE DOCUMENT − DEFICIENT DOCKET ENTRY ERROR. Note to Attorney Katherine M. Kimpel to RE−FILE Document 108 Declaration in Support of Motion, 107 Declaration in Support of Motion, 105 Declaration in Support of Motion, 106 Declaration in Support of

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Motion. ERROR(S): Documents linked to filing error. Refile Motion to Certify Class first, then file and link any supporting documents. (db) (Entered: 11/01/2013)
109 MOTION to Certify Class CONDITIONALLY AND AUTHORIZATION OF NOTICE. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Linda O'Donnell, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. Responses due by 12/2/2013 Return Date set for 12/12/2013 at 11:59 PM. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 11/01/2013)
110 DECLARATION of Sparkle Patterson in Support re: 109 MOTION to Certify Class CONDITIONALLY AND AUTHORIZATION OF NOTICE.. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Linda O'Donnell, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 11/01/2013)
111 DECLARATION of Donna Kassman in Support re: 109 MOTION to Certify Class CONDITIONALLY AND AUTHORIZATION OF NOTICE.. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Linda O'Donnell, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 11/01/2013)
112 DECLARATION of Jeanette Potter in Support re: 109 MOTION to Certify Class CONDITIONALLY AND AUTHORIZATION OF NOTICE.. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Linda O'Donnell, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 11/01/2013)
113 DECLARATION of Ashwini Vasudeva in Support re: 109 MOTION to Certify Class CONDITIONALLY AND AUTHORIZATION OF NOTICE.. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Linda O'Donnell, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 11/01/2013)
114 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: CONFERENCE held on 10/30/2013 before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. Court Reporter/Transcriber: William Richards, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 12/6/2013. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/16/2013. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/13/2014.(Rodriguez, Somari) (Entered: 11/12/2013)
115 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a CONFERENCE proceeding held on 10/30/13 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(Rodriguez, Somari) (Entered: 11/12/2013)
116 ORDER: It is hereby ORDERED that the August 21, 2013 Order at Dkt. No. 99, terminating the Plaintiffs' Motion for Equitable Tolling, is amended to state that the Motion for Equitable Tolling was denied without prejudice to renewal by opt−in plaintiffs asserting equitable tolling claims on their own behalf. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 11/20/2013) (lmb) (Entered: 11/20/2013)
117 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Katherine Kimpel dated 11/20/2013 re: We write in response to KPMG's letter of November 15, 2013, in which KPMG seeks a premotion conference on its requests (a) to compel documentation related to Plaintiffs' expert's declaration in support of Plaintiffs' motion and (b) to extend its deadline to respond to Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional Certification. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Linda O'Donnell, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(lmb) (Entered: 11/20/2013)
118 STIPULATED ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE OF ALL CLAIMS OF PLAINTIFF LINDA O'DONNELL: 1. Plaintiff Linda O'Donnell hereby dismisses all claims asserted by her in this action in their entirety and with prejudice, and waives all rights of appeal and as further set forth in this order., Linda O'Donnell terminated. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 11/20/2013) (lmb) (Entered: 11/20/2013)

11/20/2013 11/26/2013
11/26/2013
12/02/2013
12/16/2013 12/17/2013 12/19/2013 12/19/2013 01/23/2014 01/24/2014 01/24/2014
01/27/2014 01/30/2014

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lorna G. Schofield: Pretrial Conference held on 11/20/2013. (Court Reporter Tara Jones) (jcs) Modified on 11/26/2013 (jcs). (Entered: 11/25/2013)
119 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: CONFERENCE held on 11/20/2013 before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Tara Jones, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 12/20/2013. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/30/2013. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/27/2014.(Rodriguez, Somari) (Entered: 11/26/2013)
120 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a CONFERENCE proceeding held on 11/20/13 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(Rodriguez, Somari) (Entered: 11/26/2013)
121 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting dated 11/26/2013 re: In light of the fact that the parties are engaged in discussions regarding KPMG's proposed redactions, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court provide the parties with time to confer on the issue before ruling on KPMG's proposed redactions. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(lmb) (Entered: 12/02/2013)
122 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE of Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Conditional Certification and Authorization of Notice served on Defendant's Counsel on 12/16/2013. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 12/16/2013)
123 JOINT MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 12/17/2013)
124 MEMO ENDORSEMENT granting 123 Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery. ENDORSEMENT: Application granted. The dates proposed in the table on page 7 of this letter shall replace the prior deadlines. Deposition due by 8/1/2014. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 12/19/2013) (lmb) (Entered: 12/19/2013)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Expert Discovery due by 8/1/2014. Fact Discovery due by 3/28/2014. (lmb) (Entered: 12/19/2013)
127 MOTION for Janette Lynn Wipper to Withdraw as Attorney. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 01/23/2014)
128 ORDER: It is hereby ORDERED that the proceeding in this matter, previously scheduled for January 27, 2014 at 10:30 a.m., shall be adjourned to January 27, 2014 at 4:30 p.m., due to a conflict in the Court's schedule., ( Pre−Motion Conference set for 1/27/2014 at 04:30 PM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield.) (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 1/24/2014) (lmb) (Entered: 01/24/2014)
129 ORDER granting 127 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Upon consideration of Plaintiffs' Motion to Withdraw Janette Wipper as Counsel of Record, the Court finds that good cause has been shown for the granting of the Motion. ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby ORDERED, that the Motion is GRANTED, and FURTHER ORDERED, that Ms. Wipper be withdrawn as Plaintiffs' counsel in this matter. Attorney Janette Lynn Wipper terminated. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 1/24/2014) (lmb) (Entered: 01/24/2014)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lorna G. Schofield: Pre−Motion Conference held on 1/27/2014. (jcs) (Entered: 02/03/2014)
133 ORDER: At the request of the parties, the Clerk shall remove the documents at Docket No. 125 and 126 from ECF. SO ORDERED. (Text Only Order) (Schofield, Lorna) (Entered: 01/30/2014)

01/30/2014 02/05/2014
02/27/2014 02/28/2014 02/28/2014 03/06/2014
03/06/2014
03/10/2014 03/10/2014 03/10/2014 03/12/2014 03/12/2014 03/13/2014

***STRICKEN DOCUMENT. Deleted document number [125 & 126] from the case record. The document was stricken from this case pursuant to 133 Order. (jcs) (Entered: 01/30/2014)
135 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a CONFERENCE proceeding held on 1/27/14 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(Rodriguez, Somari) (Entered: 02/05/2014)
136 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated 2/27/2014 re: Requesting a pre−motion conference. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 02/27/2014)
137 ENDORSED LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Meuting dated 2/20/2014 re: Request that the 1/27/2014 Pre−Motion Conference Transcript be publicly docketed with plaintiffs' proposed redactions, and that unredacted versions be filed under seal. ENDORSEMENT: Application Granted. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 2/27/2014) (cd) (Entered: 02/28/2014)
Transmission to Sealed Records Clerk. Transmitted re: 137 Endorsed Letter, to the Sealed Records Clerk for the sealing or unsealing of document or case. (cd) (Entered: 02/28/2014)
138 Redaction of 134 Transcript of Proceedings re: CONFERENCE held on 1/27/2014 before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Martha Drevis, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. (jcs) (Entered: 03/06/2014)
139 ORDER: It is hereby ORDERED that the parties file their motion papers on ECF with the proposed redactions. It is further ORDERED that the parties jointly submit two binders of the fully briefed, unredacted, motion papers, one of which will be placed under seal with the Clerk of Court and one of which will be the parties courtesy copy to the Court. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 3/6/2014) (js) (Entered: 03/07/2014)
140 MOTION for Chris R. Pace to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Filing fee $ 200.00, receipt number 0208−9438538. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Certificates of Good Standing, # 2 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order)(Pace, Chris) (Entered: 03/10/2014)
141 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Eric G. Hoffman on behalf of KPMG LLP. (Hoffman, Eric) (Entered: 03/10/2014)
>>>NOTICE REGARDING PRO HAC VICE MOTION. Regarding Document No. 140 MOTION for Chris R. Pace to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Filing fee $ 200.00, receipt number 0208−9438538. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff.. The document has been reviewed and there are no deficiencies. (bcu) (Entered: 03/10/2014)
142 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Sarah M. Konsky dated 03/12/2014 re: Application by Letter. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Konsky, Sarah) (Entered: 03/12/2014)
143 ORDER granting 140 Motion for Chris R. Pace to Appear Pro Hac Vice (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Lorna G. Schofield)(Text Only Order) (Schofield, Lorna) (Entered: 03/12/2014)
144 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs Rule 23 Class Claims in the Third Amended Complaint for Lack of Constitutional Standing. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 03/13/2014)

03/13/2014
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03/24/2014 03/26/2014 03/27/2014 03/28/2014 03/28/2014 04/01/2014
04/01/2014 04/02/2014 04/02/2014

145 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 144 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs Rule 23 Class Claims in the Third Amended Complaint for Lack of Constitutional Standing. (Redacted Version). Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A.1, # 2 Exhibit A.2, # 3 Exhibit A.3, # 4 Exhibit A.4, # 5 Exhibit A.5, # 6 Exhibit A−1, # 7 Exhibit A−2, # 8 Exhibit A−3, # 9 Exhibit A−4, # 10 Exhibit A−5, # 11 Exhibit A−6, # 12 Exhibit A−7, # 13 Exhibit B, # 14 Exhibit C.1, # 15 Exhibit C.2)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 03/13/2014)
146 MOTION for Sarah M. Konsky to Appear Pro Hac Vice on behalf of KPMG LLP. Filing fee $ 200.00, receipt number 0208−9456886. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing, # 2 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order to Admit Pro Hac)(Konsky, Sarah) (Entered: 03/14/2014)
>>>NOTICE REGARDING PRO HAC VICE MOTION. Regarding Document No. 146 MOTION for Sarah M. Konsky to Appear Pro Hac Vice on behalf of KPMG LLP. Filing fee $ 200.00, receipt number 0208−9456886. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff.. The document has been reviewed and there are no deficiencies. (wb) (Entered: 03/14/2014)
147 RESPONSE in Opposition to Motion re: 144 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs Rule 23 Class Claims in the Third Amended Complaint for Lack of Constitutional Standing. (Redacted Version). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G)(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 03/14/2014)
148 LETTER MOTION for Local Rule 37.2 Conference addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Katherine Kimpel dated March 24, 2014. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 03/24/2014)
Set/Reset Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 4/2/2014 at 11:45 AM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. (Lewis, Barton) (Entered: 03/26/2014)
149 LETTER RESPONSE to Motion addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen Kenney dated March 27, 2014 re: 148 LETTER MOTION for Local Rule 37.2 Conference addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Katherine Kimpel dated March 24, 2014.. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 03/27/2014)
150 ORDER granting 146 Motion for Sarah M. Konsky to Appear Pro Hac Vice (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Lorna G. Schofield)(Text Only Order) (Schofield, Lorna) (Entered: 03/28/2014)
151 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney and Katherine Kimpel dated March 28. 2014 re: Six−Week Extension of Upcoming Discovery Deadlines. Document filed by KPMG LLP, Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 03/28/2014)
152 MEMO ENDORSEMENT on 151 Letter, filed by Sparkle Patterson, Donna Kassman, KPMG LLP, Ashwini Vasudeva, Jeanette Potter. ENDORSEMENT: Application granted. Fact and expert discovery shall be completed by May 9, 2014. The parties shall submit a joint proposed revised scheduling order at or before the conference reflecting to the extent possible, the remainder of the schedule. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 4/1/2014) (ft) (Entered: 04/01/2014)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Expert Discovery due by 5/9/2014. Fact Discovery due by 5/9/2014. (ft) (Entered: 04/01/2014)
153 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Katherine Kimpel dated April 2, 2014 re: Proposed Revised Scheduling Order. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 04/02/2014)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lorna G. Schofield: Telephone Conference held on 4/2/2014: The parties shall appear for a status conference on May 16, 2014 at 10:30 a.m. ( Status Conference set for 5/16/2014 at 10:30 AM in

04/10/2014
04/10/2014
04/14/2014 04/15/2014 04/15/2014 04/18/2014 04/27/2014 04/30/2014 05/01/2014 05/01/2014 05/02/2014 05/02/2014

Courtroom 1106, Thurgood Marshal Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, New York, NY 10007 before Judge Lorna G. Schofield.). (Court Reporter Karen Gorlaski) (jcs) (Entered: 04/02/2014)
154 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: CONFERENCE held on 4/2/2014 before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Karen Gorlaski, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 5/5/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/15/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/14/2014.(Rodriguez, Somari) (Entered: 04/10/2014)
155 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a CONFERENCE proceeding held on 4/2/14 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(Rodriguez, Somari) (Entered: 04/10/2014)
156 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Katherine Kimpel dated April 14, 2014 re: Request to Amend Case Caption. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 04/14/2014)
157 STATUS REPORT. Proposed Joint Stipulation Regarding Certain Non−Party Witnesses Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 04/15/2014)
158 MEMO ENDORSEMENT on re: 156 Letter filed by Sparkle Patterson, Donna Kassman, Ashwini Vasudeva, Jeanette Potter. ENDORSEMENT: Application granted. The caption shall be amended to remove the name of Linda O'Donnell. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 4/15/2014) (mro) (Entered: 04/16/2014)
159 LETTER MOTION for Local Rule 37.2 Conference addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Katherine Kimpel dated April 18, 2014. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 04/18/2014)
160 LETTER RESPONSE to Motion addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen Kenney dated April 27, 2014 re: 159 LETTER MOTION for Local Rule 37.2 Conference addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Katherine Kimpel dated April 18, 2014. . Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 04/27/2014)
161 ORDER granting 159 Letter Motion for Local Rule 37.2 Conference: Application Granted. Status Conference set for 5/2/2014 at 11:30 AM in Courtroom 1106, Thurgood Marshal Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, New York, NY 10007 before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Lorna G. Schofield)(Text Only Order) (Schofield, Lorna) (Entered: 04/30/2014)
162 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated 05/01/2014 re: response to Plaintiffs April 23, 2014 letter to your Honor concerning their proposed motion for leave to depose Ilene Kassman. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 05/01/2014)
163 ORDER finding as moot 148 Letter Motion for Local Rule 37.2 Conference (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Lorna G. Schofield)(Text Only Order) (Schofield, Lorna) (Entered: 05/01/2014)
164 ORDER: WHEREAS a discovery conference was held on May 2, 2014. It is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff be granted an additional three hours to depose Ms. Doughty. Plaintiff shall pay reasonable travel costs associated with the additional time for deposition. It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff be allowed to depose Ilene Kassman. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 5/2/2014) (kgo) (Entered: 05/02/2014)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lorna G. Schofield: Status Conference held on 5/2/2014. (jcs) (Entered: 05/06/2014)

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06/06/2014 06/06/2014

165 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Katherine Kimpel dated May 5, 2014 re: Dkt. #164. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 05/05/2014)
Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference set for 5/16/2014 at 10:30 AM in Courtroom 1106, Thurgood Marshal Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, New York, NY 10007 before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. (jcs) (Entered: 05/07/2014)
166 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen Kenney dated May 7, 2014 re: response to Plaintiffs' May 5, 2014 letter to Your Honor (Dkt. 165) concerning their request for reconsideration of the Court's May 2, 2014 Order. (Dkt. 164). Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 05/07/2014)
167 MEMO ENDORSEMENT on re: 165 Letter filed by Sparkle Patterson, Donna Kassman, Ashwini Vasudeva, Jeanette Potter. ENDORSEMENT: Application denied. Plaintiffs shall pay the cost of transportation (coach class if by air) of the senior lawyer to and from the deposition. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 5/8/2014) (kgo) (Entered: 05/08/2014)
168 ORDER: It is hereby ORDERED that the proceeding in this matter, previously scheduled for May 16, 2014 at 10:30 a.m., shall be adjourned to June 25, 2014 at 10:30 a.m. SO ORDERED. (Status Conference set for 6/25/2014 at 10:30 AM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield.) (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 5/15/2014) (kgo) (Entered: 05/16/2014)
169 JOINT LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Katherine Kimpel and Colleen Kenney dated 5/23/2014 re: Extension of Deadlines. Document filed by KPMG LLP, Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 05/23/2014)
170 JOINT LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Katherine Kimpel and Colleen Kenney dated 5/23/2014 re: Extension of Deadlines. Document filed by KPMG LLP, Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 05/23/2014)
171 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting and Colleen M. Kenney dated May 27, 2014 re: Revised Proposed Scheduling Order, replacing Dkt. 170−1. Document filed by KPMG LLP, Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Revised Proposed Scheduling Order)(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 05/27/2014)
172 SCHEDULING ORDER: IT IS ORDERED: 1. Settlement Conference: Plaintiffs' Proposal: The Parties shall submit a joint letter to the Court regarding a settlement conference two weeks after the Court's rulings on Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional Certification and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Defendant's Proposal: The Parties shall participate in a settlement conference within four weeks of the date of this Order, and that conference shall be attended in person by the four Named Plaintiffs and a KPMG representative with settlement authority. 2. Expert Discovery in light of the Court denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional Certification: If the Court denies Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional Certification, Plaintiffs shall serve all expert reports six weeks from the date of that ruling. Defendants shall accordingly serve all expert reports five weeks later. Both parties shall serve rebuttal expert reports eighteen business days later. Expert discovery, including expert depositions, is to be completed four weeks later. 3. Expert Discovery in light of the Court granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional Certification: If the Court grants Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional Certification, the Parties shall abide by the Proposed Schedule set forth at Dkt. 153. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 5/30/2014) (kgo) (Entered: 05/30/2014)
173 JOINT LETTER MOTION to Adjourn Conference set for June 25, 2014 addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney − Counsel for Defendants and Kate Mueting − Counsel for Plaintiffs dated June 6, 2014. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 06/06/2014)
174 ORDER granting 173 Letter Motion to Adjourn Conference: Application granted. The June 25, 2014 conference is adjourned to July 9, 2014, at 4:15 PM. (Status Conference set for 7/9/2014 at 04:15 PM in Courtroom 1106, Thurgood Marshal Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, New York, NY 10007 before Judge Lorna G. Schofield.) (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Lorna G. Schofield)(Text Only Order) (Schofield, Lorna)

07/08/2014
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07/18/2014
07/18/2014 07/18/2014 07/21/2014 07/23/2014 07/23/2014 07/23/2014

(Entered: 06/06/2014)
175 OPINION AND ORDER re: 144 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs Rule 23 Class Claims in the Third Amended Complaint for Lack of Constitutional Standing. filed by KPMG LLP, 109 MOTION to Certify Class CONDITIONALLY AND AUTHORIZATION OF NOTICE. filed by Sparkle Patterson, Donna Kassman, Linda O'Donnell, Ashwini Vasudeva, Jeanette Potter. For the reasons discussed herein, Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify is GRANTED, and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the motions at docket numbers 109 and 144. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 7/8/2014) (kgo) (Entered: 07/08/2014)
176 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated July 15, 2014 re: KPMG Proposed Notice and Consent Form. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 07/17/2014)
177 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Sanford Heisler, LLP dated July 15, 2014 re: Plaintiffs' Proposed Notice and Consent Forms. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit "Non−Tolling Notice", # 2 Exhibit "Tolling Notice")(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 07/17/2014)
178 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: CONFERENCE held on 7/9/2014 before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Khristine Sellin, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 8/11/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/21/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/20/2014.(Rodriguez, Somari) (Entered: 07/18/2014)
179 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a CONFERENCE proceeding held on 7/9/14 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(Rodriguez, Somari) (Entered: 07/18/2014)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lorna G. Schofield: Telephone Conference held on 7/18/2014. (Court Reporter Bridget Lombardozzi) (Lewis, Barton) (Entered: 07/18/2014)
180 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from David Sanford dated July 16, 2014 re: Postponing the Court's July 16 Telephonic Conference. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 07/18/2014)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lorna G. Schofield: Status Conference held on 7/21/2014. (Court Reporter Khris Sellin) (Lewis, Barton) (Entered: 07/21/2014)
181 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Plaintiffs and Defendant KPMG LLP dated July 23, 2014 re: Comparison of Parties' proposed forms of notice and consent. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 07/23/2014)
182 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Katherine Kimpel dated July 23, 2014 re: Plaintiffs' Proposed Notice Forms. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Non−Tolling Notice, # 2 Exhibit Tolling Notice)(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 07/23/2014)
183 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated July 23, 2014 re: KPMG LLP's Proposed Form of Notice and Consent. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A KPMG's Proposed Form of Notice and Consent, # 2 Exhibit B KPMG's Comparison of the Parties' Proposed Forms of Notice and Consent)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 07/23/2014)

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184 MEMORANDUM OF LAW In Support Of Its Letter Motions To Redact From The Public Record Limited Portions Of The Parties' Briefing And Exhibits Regarding Plaintiffs' Motion To Conditionally Certify An Equal Pay Act Collective Action. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 07/28/2014)
185 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: CONFERENCE held on 7/16/2014 before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Bridget Lombardozzi, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 8/25/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/5/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/3/2014.(Rodriguez, Somari) (Entered: 07/31/2014)
186 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a CONFERENCE proceeding held on 7/16/14 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(Rodriguez, Somari) (Entered: 07/31/2014)
187 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Opposition re: 184 Memorandum of Law, Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to KPMG's Memorandum at Dkt. 184. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 08/07/2014)
188 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Katherine Kimpel dated August 7, 2014 re: Binders Related to the Parties' Redaction Briefing at Dkt. 184 and Dkt. 187. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 08/07/2014)
189 ORDER: For the reasons stated on the record, the parties shall file on ECF redacted versions of their papers concerning Plaintiffs' motion for conditional certification as follows: Category 1 documents shall not be redacted except as the parties agreed. Category 2 documents shall be redacted as Plaintiffs have requested. Category 3 and Category 4 documents shall be redacted as Defendant requested. The parties shall file unredacted versions of said papers under seal with the Clerk of Court. ORDERED that, Plaintiff shall send to potential opt−in collective action plaintiffs a notice substantially in the form attached to this order. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 8/13/2014) (kgo) (Entered: 08/14/2014)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lorna G. Schofield: Telephone Conference held on 8/13/2014. (See Order) (Court Reporter Rose Prater) (jcs) (Entered: 08/14/2014)
190 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: conference held on 8/13/2014 before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Rose Prater, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 9/12/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/22/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/20/2014.(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 08/19/2014)
191 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a conference proceeding held on 8/13/2014 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 08/19/2014)
192 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 109 MOTION to Certify Class CONDITIONALLY AND AUTHORIZATION OF NOTICE. . Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Declaration of Alexander Vekker, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E − Declaration of Sparkle Patterson, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G − Declaration of Donna Kassman, # 8 Exhibit H − Declaration of Jeanette Potter, #

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9 Exhibit I − Part I, # 10 Exhibit I − Part II, # 11 Exhibit K, # 12 Exhibit L, # 13 Exhibit M, # 14 Exhibit O, # 15 Exhibit P, # 16 Exhibit Q − Declaration of Ashwini Vasudeva)(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 08/27/2014)
193 LETTER MOTION for Local Rule 37.2 Conference Requesting a Pre−Motion Conference on Plaintiffs' Anticipated Motion for an In Camera Review addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting dated September 3, 2014. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 09/03/2014)
194 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Opposition re: 109 MOTION to Certify Class CONDITIONALLY AND AUTHORIZATION OF NOTICE. . Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4A, # 5 Exhibit 4B, # 6 Exhibit 4C, # 7 Exhibit 5A, # 8 Exhibit 5B, # 9 Exhibit 6A, # 10 Exhibit 6B, # 11 Exhibit 6C, # 12 Exhibit 7, # 13 Exhibit 8, # 14 Exhibit 9)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 09/03/2014)
195 ORDER granting 193 Letter Motion for Local Rule 37.2 Conference: Defendant KPMG LLP shall file its response, if any, by September 12, 2014. The parties shall jointly call chambers at 212−805−0288 at 11:50 a.m. on September 17, 2014. (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Lorna G. Schofield)(Text Only Order) (Schofield, Lorna) (Entered: 09/05/2014)
196 REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 109 MOTION to Certify Class CONDITIONALLY AND AUTHORIZATION OF NOTICE. . Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Attachment 1, # 2 Exhibit Attachment 2, # 3 Exhibit Attachment 3, # 4 Exhibit Attachment 4, # 5 Exhibit Exhibit A−1, # 6 Exhibit Exhibit A−2, # 7 Exhibit Exhibit B, # 8 Exhibit Exhibit C, # 9 Exhibit Exhibit D)(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 09/10/2014)
197 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated September 12, 2014 re: Response to Plaintiffs September 3, 2014 letter requesting in camera review. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 09/12/2014)
198 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated September 12, 2014 re: Response to Plaintiffs' September 3, 2014 letter requesting in camera review. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 09/12/2014)
199 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting dated September 16, 2014 re: Plaintiffs' Withdrawal of Request for Pre−Motion Conference Re: Dkt. 193. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 09/16/2014)
200 ORDER: The pre−motion conference, scheduled for September 17, 2014, at 11:50 a.m., is hereby CANCELLED. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 9/16/2014) (ama) (Entered: 09/16/2014)
201 LETTER MOTION for Conference regarding KPMG LLP's proposed motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(B) addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated September 18, 2014. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 09/18/2014)
202 ORDER granting 201 Letter Motion for Conference: Application granted. Parties shall appear for a pre−motion conference on September 24, 2014, at 12:15 p.m., in Courtroom 1106 at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, New York, New York 10007. (Pre−Motion Conference set for 9/24/2014 at 12:15 PM in Courtroom 1106, Thurgood Marshal Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, New York, NY 10007 before Judge Lorna G. Schofield.) (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Lorna G. Schofield)(Text Only Order) (Schofield, Lorna) (Entered: 09/19/2014)
Set/Reset Hearings: Pre−Motion Conference set for 9/24/2014 at 12:15 PM in Courtroom 1106, Thurgood Marshal Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, New York, NY

09/22/2014
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10/07/2014
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10007 before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. (jcs) (Entered: 09/22/2014)
203 LETTER RESPONSE in Opposition to Motion addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from David Sanford dated September 22, 2014 re: 201 LETTER MOTION for Conference regarding KPMG LLP's proposed motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(B) addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated September 18, 2014. . Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Declaration of Kate Mueting)(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 09/22/2014)
204 LETTER REPLY to Response to Motion addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated 9/23/2014 re: 201 LETTER MOTION for Conference regarding KPMG LLP's proposed motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(B) addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated September 18, 2014. . Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 09/23/2014)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lorna G. Schofield: Pre−Motion Conference held on 9/24/2014. (Court Reporter Jennifer Thun) (jcs) (Entered: 09/25/2014)
205 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: conference held on 9/24/2014 before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Jennifer Thun, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 10/31/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/10/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/8/2015.(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 10/07/2014)
206 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a conference proceeding held on 9/24/2014 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 10/07/2014)
207 LETTER MOTION for Local Rule 37.2 Conference regarding KPMG LLP's requested protective order concerning deposition scheduling addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated 10/8/14. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 10/08/2014)
208 LETTER RESPONSE in Opposition to Motion addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from David Sanford dated October 10, 2014 re: 207 LETTER MOTION for Local Rule 37.2 Conference regarding KPMG LLP's requested protective order concerning deposition scheduling addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated 10/8/14. . Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 10/10/2014)
209 ORDER granting 207 Letter Motion for Local Rule 37.2 Conference:Application granted. The parties shall jointly call chambers at (212) 805−0288 on October 15, 2014, at 12:15 p.m. for a telephonic conference. (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Lorna G. Schofield)(Text Only Order) (Schofield, Lorna) (Entered: 10/10/2014)
210 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Katherine Kimpel dated October 14, 2014 re: Filing Process for Consent to Join Forms. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 10/14/2014)
211 ORDER: Upon consideration of Plaintiffs' October 14, 2014 letter, the Court directs Class Counsel to file all completed and timely−submitted Consent to Join Forms as follows: IT IS ORDERED THAT: 1. Class Counsel shall file a "Notice of Filing." 2. Class Counsel shall attach a list of opt−ins' names to the Notice as "Exhibit A." 3. Immediately after filing the Notice, Class Counsel shall file all corresponding Consent to Join Forms under the filing event "Consent to Become Party Plaintiff Under the 29 U.S.C. 206(d)." Class Counsel shall file the forms in appropriately−sized batches such that the Court's electronic filing system can accept each electronic document. SO

10/17/2014 10/17/2014 10/17/2014 10/17/2014 10/17/2014 10/17/2014 10/17/2014 10/17/2014 10/17/2014 10/17/2014 10/17/2014 10/17/2014 10/22/2014
10/22/2014

ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 10/14/2014) (ama) (Entered: 10/15/2014)
212 NOTICE of of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit List of Consent to Join Form Opt−Ins)(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 10/17/2014)
213 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 10/17/2014)
214 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 10/17/2014)
215 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 10/17/2014)
216 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 10/17/2014)
217 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 10/17/2014)
218 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 10/17/2014)
219 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 10/17/2014)
220 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 10/17/2014)
221 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 10/17/2014)
222 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 10/17/2014)
223 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 10/17/2014)
224 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: conference held on 10/15/2014 before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Denise Richards, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 11/17/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/1/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/23/2015.(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 10/22/2014)
225 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a conference proceeding held on 10/15/2014 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 10/22/2014)

10/24/2014 10/24/2014 10/24/2014 10/24/2014 10/24/2014 10/24/2014 10/24/2014 10/24/2014 10/24/2014 10/24/2014 10/24/2014 10/24/2014 10/27/2014 10/27/2014 10/27/2014 10/27/2014 10/31/2014

226 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A List of Opt−In Plaintiffs)(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 10/24/2014)
227 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 10/24/2014)
228 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 10/24/2014)
229 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 10/24/2014)
230 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 10/24/2014)
231 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 10/24/2014)
232 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 10/24/2014)
233 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 10/24/2014)
234 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 10/24/2014)
235 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 10/24/2014)
236 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 10/24/2014)
237 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 10/24/2014)
238 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A − List of Opt−In Plaintiffs)(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 10/27/2014)
239 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 10/27/2014)
240 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 10/27/2014)
241 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 10/27/2014)
242 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A − List of Opt−In Plaintiffs)(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 10/31/2014)

10/31/2014 10/31/2014 10/31/2014 10/31/2014 10/31/2014 10/31/2014 11/07/2014 11/07/2014 11/07/2014 11/07/2014 11/07/2014 11/07/2014 11/07/2014 11/10/2014
11/14/2014 11/14/2014 11/14/2014

243 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 10/31/2014)
244 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 10/31/2014)
245 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 10/31/2014)
246 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 10/31/2014)
247 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 10/31/2014)
248 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 10/31/2014)
249 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − List of Opt−In Plaintiffs)(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 11/07/2014)
250 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 11/07/2014)
251 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 11/07/2014)
252 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 11/07/2014)
253 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 11/07/2014)
254 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 11/07/2014)
255 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 11/07/2014)
256 NOTICE of Joint Stipulation and Proposed Order Regarding Provision of Confidential Information For Notices Returned as Undeliverable. Document filed by KPMG LLP, Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 11/10/2014)
257 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A)(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 11/14/2014)
258 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 11/14/2014)
259 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 11/14/2014)

11/14/2014 11/14/2014 11/14/2014 11/14/2014 11/21/2014 11/24/2014
11/24/2014
11/25/2014 11/25/2014 11/25/2014 11/25/2014 11/25/2014 11/25/2014 12/04/2014
12/05/2014

260 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 11/14/2014)
261 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 11/14/2014)
262 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 11/14/2014)
263 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 11/14/2014)
264 MOTION for Katherine Lamm to Withdraw as Attorney . Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 11/21/2014)
265 ORDER granting 264 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Upon consideration of Plaintiffs' Motion to Withdraw Katherine Lamm as Counsel of Record, the Court finds that good cause has been shown for the granting of the Motion. ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby ORDERED, that the Motion is GRANTED, and FURTHER ORDERED, that Ms. Lamm be withdrawn as Plaintiffs' counsel in this matter. (***Attorney Katherine E. Lamm terminated.) (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 11/24/2014) (kgo) (Entered: 11/24/2014)
266 JOINT STIPULATION AND PROPOSED ORDER REGARDING PROVISION OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION FOR NOTICES RETURNED AS UNDELIVERABLE...regarding procedures to be followed that shall govern the handling of confidential material... (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 11/24/2014) (kgo) (Entered: 11/24/2014)
267 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 11/25/2014)
268 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 11/25/2014)
269 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 11/25/2014)
270 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 11/25/2014)
271 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 11/25/2014)
272 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 11/25/2014)
273 LETTER MOTION for Conference on Plaintiffs' Reminder Postcard to Potential Opt−In Plaintiffs addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting dated December 4, 2014. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A −− Reminder Postcard)(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 12/04/2014)
274 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A −− List of Opt−In Plaintiffs)(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 12/05/2014)

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275 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 12/05/2014)
276 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 12/05/2014)
277 ORDER granting 273 Letter Motion for Conference: Application granted. The parties shall jointly call chambers at (212) 805−0288 for a telephone conference on December 10, 2014, at 5:00 p.m. Defendant may file a response to Plaintiffs' letter, if any, by December 8, 2014. (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Lorna G. Schofield)(Text Only Order) (Schofield, Lorna) (Entered: 12/08/2014)
278 LETTER MOTION for Extension of Time addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated December 8, 2014. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 12/08/2014)
279 ORDER granting 278 Letter Motion for Extension of Time: Application granted. Defendant shall file its response by 5:00 p.m. Eastern on December 9, 2014. (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Lorna G. Schofield)(Text Only Order) (Schofield, Lorna) (Entered: 12/09/2014)
280 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated Dec. 9, 2014 re: KPMG's Opposition Letter to Plaintiffs' Request for Premotion Conference Concerning Reminder Notice. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 12/09/2014)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lorna G. Schofield: Telephone Conference held on 12/10/2014. (jcs) (Entered: 12/15/2014)
281 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A −− List of Opt−In Plaintiffs)(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 12/12/2014)
282 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 12/12/2014)
283 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 12/12/2014)
284 MOTION for Siham Nurhussein to Withdraw as Attorney . Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 12/15/2014)
285 ORDER granting 284 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby ORDERED, that the Motion is GRANTED, and FURTHER ORDERED, that Ms. Nurhussein be withdrawn as Plaintiffs' counsel in this matter. SO ORDERED. Attorney Siham Nurhussein terminated. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 12/16/2014) (ama) (Entered: 12/17/2014)
286 LETTER MOTION for Conference Regarding Management of Equitable Tolling Discovery and Briefing addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Katherine Kimpel dated December 18, 2014. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 12/18/2014)
287 ORDER granting 286 Letter Motion for Conference: Application granted. The parties shall jointly call chambers at (212) 805−0288 on January 7, 2015, at 10:55 a.m. Defendant shall file its response to Plaintiffs' letter, if any, by 5:00 p.m. on January 6, 2015. (Telephone Conference set for 1/7/2015 at 10:55 AM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield.) (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Lorna G. Schofield)(Text Only Order) (Schofield, Lorna) (Entered: 12/18/2014)
288 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − List of Opt−In Plaintiffs)(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 12/22/2014)

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289 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 12/22/2014)
290 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 12/22/2014)
291 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: CONFERENCE held on 12/10/2014 before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. Court Reporter/Transcriber: William Richards, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 1/15/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 1/26/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 3/26/2015.(Rodriguez, Somari) (Entered: 12/22/2014)
292 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a CONFERENCE proceeding held on 12/10/14 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(Rodriguez, Somari) (Entered: 12/22/2014)
293 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − List of Opt−In Plaintiffs)(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 01/02/2015)
294 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 01/02/2015)
295 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 01/02/2015)
296 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 01/02/2015)
297 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated 1/6/2015 re: Response to Plaintiffs' December 18, 2014 Letter Request for Case Management Conference. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 01/06/2015)
298 ORDER: WHEREAS a conference was held in this matter on January 7, 2015. It is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiffs shall file their Motion for Equitable Tolling by February 6, 2015. Defendant shall file its response, if any, by March 6, 2015. Plaintiffs shall file their reply, if any, by March 20, 2015. Motions due by 2/6/2015. Responses due by 3/6/2015 Replies due by 3/20/2015. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 1/7/2015) (kgo) (Entered: 01/07/2015)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lorna G. Schofield: Telephone Conference held on 1/7/2015. (Court Reporter Tom Murray) (Lewis, Barton) (Entered: 01/08/2015)
299 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A −− List of Opt−In Plaintiffs)(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 01/09/2015)
300 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 01/09/2015)
301 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 01/09/2015)

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302 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 01/09/2015)
303 FILING ERROR − ELECTRONIC FILING OF NON−ECF DOCUMENT − NOTICE of Stipulation and (Proposed( 502(d) Order. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Kenney, Colleen) Modified on 1/14/2015 (db). (Entered: 01/13/2015)
304 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: conference held on 1/7/2015 before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Thomas Murray, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 2/9/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/20/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/17/2015.(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 01/14/2015)
305 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a conference proceeding held on 1/7/2015 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 01/14/2015)
***NOTE TO ATTORNEY TO RE−FILE DOCUMENT − NON−ECF DOCUMENT ERROR. Note to Attorney Colleen M. Kenney to E−MAIL Document No. 303 Stipulation to judgments@nysd.uscourts.gov. This document is not filed via ECF. (db) (Entered: 01/14/2015)
306 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A −− List of Opt−In Plaintiffs)(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 01/16/2015)
307 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 01/16/2015)
308 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 01/16/2015)
309 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: CONFERENCE CORRECTED held on 1/7/2015 before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Thomas Murray, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 2/17/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/26/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/27/2015.(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 01/22/2015)
310 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a CONFERENCE CORRECTED proceeding held on 1/7/2015 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 01/22/2015)
311 STIPULATION AND 502(d) ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: The production of privileged or work product−protected information contained or reflected in the documents produced by KMPG at production numbers, listed herein, is not, and will not result in, a waiver of any applicable privilege or protection from discovery in this case or in any other federal or state proceeding. This Order shall be interpreted to provide the maximum protection allowed by Federal Rule of Evidence 502(d). The foregoing is AGREED and STIPULATED TO by the Parties through their undersigned counsel. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 1/22/2015) (mro) (Entered: 01/22/2015)

01/23/2015 01/23/2015 01/23/2015 01/23/2015 01/23/2015 01/30/2015 01/30/2015 01/30/2015 01/30/2015 01/30/2015 01/30/2015 01/30/2015 02/02/2015 02/02/2015 02/02/2015 02/02/2015 02/02/2015

312 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A −− List of Opt−In Plaintiffs)(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 01/23/2015)
313 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 01/23/2015)
314 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 01/23/2015)
315 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 01/23/2015)
316 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 01/23/2015)
317 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−−List of Opt−In Plaintiffs)(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 01/30/2015)
318 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 01/30/2015)
319 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 01/30/2015)
320 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 01/30/2015)
321 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 01/30/2015)
322 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 01/30/2015)
323 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 01/30/2015)
324 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A −− List of Opt−In Plaintiffs)(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 02/02/2015)
325 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 02/02/2015)
326 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 02/02/2015)
327 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 02/02/2015)
328 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 02/02/2015)

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329 FILING ERROR − DEFICIENT DOCKET ENTRY − MOTION for Maya Sequeira to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Filing fee $ 200.00, receipt number 0208−10560451. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Certificate of Standing, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Kimpel, Katherine) Modified on 2/3/2015 (bcu). (Entered: 02/03/2015)
>>>NOTICE REGARDING DEFICIENT MOTION TO APPEAR PRO HAC VICE. Notice regarding Document No. 329 MOTION for Maya Sequeira to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Filing fee $ 200.00, receipt number 0208−10560451. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff.. The filing is deficient for the following reason(s): Missing Certificate of Good Standing. Certificates of Good Standing must be issued from the Supreme court of California and not from a State Bar Association. Re−file the document as a Corrected Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice and attach a valid Certificate of Good Standing, issued within the past 30 days. (bcu) (Entered: 02/03/2015)
330 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A −− List of Opt−In Plaintiffs)(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 02/06/2015)
331 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 02/06/2015)
332 MOTION for Equitable Tolling of the Statute of Limitations for Collective Action Members' Claims Under the Equal Pay Act . Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 02/06/2015)
333 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE of Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Equitable Tolling served on KPMG LLP on February 6, 2015. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 02/06/2015)
334 SEALED DOCUMENT placed in vault.(rz) (Entered: 02/09/2015)
335 MOTION for Maya Sequeira to Appear Pro Hac Vice (Corrected). Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Certificate of Standing, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 02/12/2015)
>>>NOTICE REGARDING PRO HAC VICE MOTION. Regarding Document No. 335 MOTION for Maya Sequeira to Appear Pro Hac Vice (Corrected). Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff.. The document has been reviewed and there are no deficiencies. (bcu) (Entered: 02/13/2015)
336 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 332 MOTION for Equitable Tolling of the Statute of Limitations for Collective Action Members' Claims Under the Equal Pay Act . . Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 02/19/2015)
337 LETTER MOTION for Local Rule 37.2 Conference addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting dated February 20, 2015. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 02/20/2015)
338 LETTER MOTION for Local Rule 37.2 Conference addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting dated February 20, 2015. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 02/20/2015)
339 ORDER granting 335 Motion for Maya Sequeira to Appear Pro Hac Vice (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Lorna G. Schofield)(Text Only Order) (Schofield, Lorna) (Entered: 02/23/2015)

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340 ORDER granting 337 Letter Motion for Local Rule 37.2 Conference: Application granted. The parties shall jointly call chambers on March 4, 2015, at 10:30 a.m. at (212) 805−0288 for a discovery conference. Defendant shall file a response to this letter by February 27, 2015. (Discovery Hearing set for 3/4/2015 at 10:30 AM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield.) (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Lorna G. Schofield)(Text Only Order) (Schofield, Lorna) (Entered: 02/23/2015)
341 LETTER MOTION for Conference to discuss Plaintiffs anticipated motion to compel discovery and motion for an in camera review of KPMG's privileged communication addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated 02/24/2015. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 02/24/2015)
342 ORDER granting 341 Letter Motion for Conference: Application granted. Defendant shall file its response to Plaintiffs' letter, dated February 20, 2015, by March 3, 2015. The conference, scheduled for March 4, 2015, at 10:30 a.m., is hereby adjourned to March 6, 2015, at 10:30 a.m. Defendant's counsel's request to appear in person is granted. Plaintiffs' counsel may appear telephonically or in person. (Discovery Hearing set for 3/6/2015 at 10:30 AM in Courtroom 1106, Thurgood Marshal Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, New York, NY 10007 before Judge Lorna G. Schofield.) (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Lorna G. Schofield)(Text Only Order) (Schofield, Lorna) (Entered: 02/24/2015)
343 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Rachel Geman on behalf of Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Geman, Rachel) (Entered: 02/27/2015)
344 ORDER: It is hereby ORDERED that the proceeding in this matter, previously scheduled for March 6, 2015 at 10:30 a.m., shall be adjourned to March 6, 2015 at 12:30 p.m., due to a conflict in the Court's schedule. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 3/3/2015) (kgo) (Entered: 03/03/2015)
Set/Reset Hearings: Discovery Hearing set for 3/6/2015 at 12:30 PM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. (kgo) (Entered: 03/03/2015)
345 NOTICE of Change of Address. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Moore, Steven) (Entered: 03/03/2015)
346 LETTER RESPONSE to Motion addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated March 03, 2015 re: 338 LETTER MOTION for Local Rule 37.2 Conference addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting dated February 20, 2015., 337 LETTER MOTION for Local Rule 37.2 Conference addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting dated February 20, 2015. . Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Steven Moore, # 2 Declaration of Colleen M. Kenney, # 3 Exhibit 1−A to Declaration of Colleen M. Kenney, # 4 Exhibit 1−B to Declaration of Colleen M. Kenney)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 03/03/2015)
347 LETTER RESPONSE to Motion addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated March 3, 2015 re: 338 LETTER MOTION for Local Rule 37.2 Conference addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting dated February 20, 2015., 337 LETTER MOTION for Local Rule 37.2 Conference addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting dated February 20, 2015. (CORRECTED). Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Declaration of Colleen M. Kenney, # 2 Exhibit 1−A to the Declaration of Colleen M. Kenney, # 3 Exhibit 1−B to the Declaration of Colleen M. Kenney, # 4 Exhibit 2 − Declaration of Steven Moore)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 03/03/2015)
348 MOTION for Anne B. Shaver to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Filing fee $ 200.00, receipt number 0208−10668381. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Certificate of Good Standing, # 2 Text of Proposed Order For Admission Pro Hac Vice)(Shaver, Anne) (Entered: 03/05/2015)
349 LETTER MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages Opposition To Plaintiffs' Motion For Equitable Tolling addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated March 5, 2015. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 03/05/2015)

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350 MOTION for Kelly M. Dermody to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Filing fee $ 200.00, receipt number 0208−10668496. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing, # 2 [Proposed] Order For Admission Pro Hac Vice of Kelly M. Dermody)(Dermody, Kelly) (Entered: 03/05/2015)
351 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Maya Sequeira dated March 5, 2015 re: KPMG's Letter Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 03/05/2015)
>>>NOTICE REGARDING PRO HAC VICE MOTION. Regarding Document No. 350 MOTION for Kelly M. Dermody to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Filing fee $ 200.00, receipt number 0208−10668496. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff., 348 MOTION for Anne B. Shaver to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Filing fee $ 200.00, receipt number 0208−10668381. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff.. The document has been reviewed and there are no deficiencies. (wb) (Entered: 03/06/2015)
352 ORDER granting 348 Motion for Anne B. Shaver to Appear Pro Hac Vice (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Lorna G. Schofield)(Text Only Order) (Schofield, Lorna) (Entered: 03/06/2015)
353 ORDER granting 350 Motion for Kelly M. Dermody to Appear Pro Hac Vice (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Lorna G. Schofield)(Text Only Order) (Schofield, Lorna) (Entered: 03/06/2015)
354 ORDER granting 349 Letter Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages: Application granted. Defendant may file an opposition brief up to 30 pages in length. Plaintiffs may file a reply brief up to 15 pages in length. (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Lorna G. Schofield)(Text Only Order) (Schofield, Lorna) (Entered: 03/06/2015)
355 RESPONSE in Opposition to Motion re: 332 MOTION for Equitable Tolling of the Statute of Limitations for Collective Action Members' Claims Under the Equal Pay Act . . Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Declaration Of Colleen M. Kenney, # 2 Exhibit A − 1 To Declaration "Yancey Email", # 3 Exhibit A − 2 To Declaration "Initial Disclosure Excerpts")(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 03/06/2015)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lorna G. Schofield: Discovery Hearing held on 3/6/2015. (jcs) (Entered: 04/13/2015)
356 LETTER MOTION for Conference addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting dated March 13, 2015. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 03/13/2015)
357 ORDER granting 356 Letter Motion for Conference : Application granted. A pre−motion conference shall be held at 11:30 a.m. on April 1, 2015, in Courtroom 1106, Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, New York, New York. Defendant shall file its response, if any, no later than March 24, 2015. (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Lorna G. Schofield)(Text Only Order) (Schofield, Lorna) (Entered: 03/16/2015)
358 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting dated March 20, 2015 re: Request to Appear Telephonically at April 1, 2015 Conference. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 03/20/2015)
359 MEMO ENDORSEMENT on re: 358 Letter requesting to Appear Telephonically at April 1, 2015 Conference, filed by Sparkle Patterson, Donna Kassman, Ashwini Vasudeva, Jeanette Potter. ENDORSEMENT: Application granted. Plaintiffs shall call chambers at (212) 805− 0288 at 11:30 a.m. on April 1, 2015. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 3/20/2015) (spo) (Entered: 03/20/2015)
360 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE of Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Equitable Tolling served on KPMG LLP on March 20, 2015. Document

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filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 03/20/2015)
361 SEALED DOCUMENT placed in vault.(rz) (Entered: 03/23/2015)
362 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: CONFERENCE held on 3/6/2015 before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Rose Prater, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 4/17/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/27/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/25/2015.(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 03/24/2015)
363 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a CONFERENCE proceeding held on 3/6/2015 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 03/24/2015)
364 LETTER MOTION for Conference re: 360 Certificate of Service Other, addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated 3/24/15. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 03/24/2015)
365 LETTER RESPONSE in Opposition to Motion addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated 3/24/15 re: 356 LETTER MOTION for Conference addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting dated March 13, 2015. . Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 03/24/2015)
366 ORDER granting 364 Letter Motion for Conference: Application granted. The Court shall address the issues raised in Defendant's pre−motion letter at the conference scheduled for April 1, 2015, at 11:30 a.m. Plaintiffs may file a response to Defendant's letter no later than noon on March 30, 2015. (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Lorna G. Schofield)(Text Only Order) (Schofield, Lorna) (Entered: 03/24/2015)
367 NOTICE of. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 03/25/2015)
368 LETTER RESPONSE in Opposition to Motion addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Maya Sequeira dated March 30, 2015 re: 364 LETTER MOTION for Conference re: 360 Certificate of Service Other, addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated 3/24/15. . Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 03/30/2015)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lorna G. Schofield: Pre−Motion Conference held on 4/1/2015. (See Order) (Court Reporter Feliz) (jcs) (Entered: 04/01/2015)
370 ORDER: It is hereby ORDERED that any plaintiff who submits a late Consent to Join Form ("opt−in") on or before April 1, 2015, shall be accepted as part of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") collective, but that no opt−ins filed after April 1, 2015, shall be accepted as part of the FLSA collective. It is further ORDERED that, no later than April 8, 2015, the parties shall file a joint letter indicating (1) the total number of opt−ins, (2) the number of opt−ins whose FLSA claims are entirely dependent on equitable tolling, (3) the number of opt−ins whose FLSA claims are partially dependent on equitable tolling, (4) the number of opt−ins whose FLSA claims are unaffected by equitable tolling; (5) an estimate of the number of Rule 23 putative class members, categorized according to their assignment at KPMG; (6) regarding categories 2 and 3 above, an estimate of the number in each category who are not included in the Rule 23 putative class; and (7) any other related data or explanation that would be helpful to the Court. It is further ORDERED that Defendant's request for leave to file a sur−reply is DENIED. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 4/1/2015) (kgo) (Entered: 04/01/2015)

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371 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A −− List of Opt−In Plaintiffs)(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 04/01/2015)
372 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 04/01/2015)
373 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 04/01/2015)
374 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 04/08/2015)
375 JOINT LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Plaintiffs and Defendant KPMG LLP dated April 8, 2015 re: Information Requested at Dkt. 370. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 04/08/2015)
376 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Maya Sequeira on behalf of Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Sequeira, Maya) (Entered: 04/08/2015)
377 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: CONFERENCE held on 4/1/2015 before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Lisa Picciano Fellis, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 5/8/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/18/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/16/2015.(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 04/14/2015)
378 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a CONFERENCE proceeding held on 4/1/15 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 04/14/2015)
379 NOTICE of Stipulated Order Regarding Filing of Consent to Join Form for Elizabeth Barker. Document filed by KPMG LLP, Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 04/29/2015)
380 LETTER MOTION for Conference regarding proposed Motion to Compel Discovery addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated May 13, 2015. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 05/13/2015)
381 LETTER MOTION for Conference regarding proposed Motion for Leave addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated May 13, 2015. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 05/13/2015)
382 ORDER granting 380 Letter Motion for Conference and granting 381 Letter Motion for Conference: Defendant's applications at Docket Nos. 380 and 381 are granted. A telephone conference addressing both issues will be held on May 28, 2015, at 10:50 a.m. The parties shall jointly call chambers at (212) 805−0288 at that time. Plaintiffs shall file responses to each of Defendant's letters by May 21, 2015. (Telephone Conference set for 5/28/2015 at 10:50 AM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield.) (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Lorna G. Schofield)(Text Only Order) (Schofield, Lorna) (Entered: 05/14/2015)
383 STIPULATED ORDER REGARDING FILING OF CONSENT TO JOIN FORM FOR ELIZABETH BARKER: The Parties hereby STIPULATE as follows: 1. The Consent to Join Form for Elizabeth Barker may be filed with the Court, in the manner ordered by the Court at Dkt. 211; 2. Ms. Barker will be included as a plaintiff in the conditionally certified Equal Pay Act ("EPA") collective; 3. KPMG does not waive any defenses, arguments or objections regarding Ms. Barker's EPA claim or potential recovery thereunder, including but not limited to any objection to Ms. Barker's late

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filing of her consent to join and any argument that all or part of Ms. Barker's claims are barred by the statute of limitations. The foregoing is stipulated to by the Parties through their undersigned counsel. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 5/14/2015) (kgo) (Entered: 05/14/2015)
384 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 05/14/2015)
386 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 05/18/2015)
387 LETTER RESPONSE in Opposition to Motion addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting dated May 21, 2015 re: 380 LETTER MOTION for Conference regarding proposed Motion to Compel Discovery addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated May 13, 2015. . Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 05/21/2015)
388 LETTER RESPONSE in Opposition to Motion addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Katherine Kimpel dated May 21, 2015 re: 381 LETTER MOTION for Conference regarding proposed Motion for Leave addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated May 13, 2015. . Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 05/21/2015)
389 ENDORSED LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting dated 5/15/2015 re: We request the removal of Docket No. 385. ENDORSEMENT: Application granted. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to remove from the Docket the document at No. 385. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 5/26/2015) (kgo) (Entered: 05/26/2015)
390 ORDER: It is hereby ORDERED that, for reasons stated on the record, Defendant's application to compel documents and communications concerning or with current or former KPMG partners, principals or employees named in the Third Amended Complaint or Plaintiffs' initial disclosures is GRANTED, subject to the limitations previously imposed. It is further ORDERED that, concerning Defendant's Request for Production No. 11, Defendant shall propound up to five interrogatories to each of Plaintiffs Kassman and Vasudeva about mitigation. The two plaintiffs shall respond to these interrogatories within 14 days or such other period as the parties shall agree. The parties shall then meet and confer to determine what further discovery concerning mitigation, if any, is necessary. Should any discovery disputes remain after the meet−and−confer, the parties shall promptly file a joint letter. It is further ORDERED that Defendant's application for leave to file a limited supplemental memorandum in opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Equitable Tolling is DENIED. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 5/28/2015) (kgo) (Entered: 05/28/2015)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lorna G. Schofield: Telephone Conference held on 5/28/2015. (jcs) (Entered: 06/02/2015)
391 ORDER: It is hereby ORDERED that Defendant's application is GRANTED. The parties shall proceed with the procedure for filing redacted documents outlined in Individual Rule I.C.3. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 6/02/2015) (ama) (Entered: 06/03/2015)
392 REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 332 MOTION for Equitable Tolling of the Statute of Limitations for Collective Action Members' Claims Under the Equal Pay Act . . Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D)(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 06/04/2015)
393 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: conference held on 5/28/2015 before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Steven Griffing, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 7/6/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 7/13/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set

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for 9/11/2015.(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 06/09/2015)
394 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a conference proceeding held on 5/28/2015 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 06/09/2015)
395 LETTER MOTION for Conference addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from David W. Sanford dated June 30, 2015. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Sanford, David) (Entered: 06/30/2015)
396 ORDER granting 395 Letter Motion for Conference. Application granted. A telephone conference will be held at 11:10 a.m. on July 8, 2015. The parties shall jointly call chambers at (212) 805−0288 at that time. No later than 6:00 p.m. on July 6, 2015, Defendant shall (1) send ex parte to chambers copies of the disputed documents and (2) file a response, if any, to Plaintiffs' letter. Telephone Conference set for 7/8/2015 at 11:10 AM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 7/1/2015) (kgo) (Entered: 07/01/2015)
397 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 396 Order on Motion for Conference,, . Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 07/02/2015)
398 ORDER granting 397 Letter Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply. Application granted. No later than July 10, 2015, Defendant shall (1) send ex parte to chambers copies of the disputed documents and (2) file a response, if any, to Plaintiffs' letter. The telephone conference currently scheduled for July 8, 2015, at 11:10 a.m. is adjourned to July 15, 2015, at 10:50 a.m. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 7/6/2015) (kgo) (Entered: 07/06/2015)
Set/Reset Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 7/15/2015 at 10:50 AM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. (kgo) (Entered: 07/06/2015)
399 LETTER RESPONSE to Motion addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Peter O. Hughes dated July 10, 2015 re: 395 LETTER MOTION for Conference addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from David W. Sanford dated June 30, 2015. . Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Hughes, Peter) (Entered: 07/10/2015)
400 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated July 14, 2015 re: Request pre−motion conference re proposed motion for leave to file Notice of Supplemental Authority. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 07/14/2015)
401 MEMO ENDORSEMENT on re: 400 Letter filed by KPMG LLP. ENDORSEMENT: Application denied. Defendant's letter will be considered. Should Plaintiffs wish to respond to this letter, they may file a response no later than July 21, 2015. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 7/14/2015) (kgo) (Entered: 07/14/2015)
402 LETTER MOTION for Conference re: 401 Memo Endorsement, Plaintiffs' Response addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Katherine Kimpel dated July 14, 2015. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 07/14/2015)
403 ORDER: WHEREAS a telephone conference was held on July 15, 2015. It is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiffs' application to compel the production of the two documents described in their letter dated June 30, 2015 (Dkt. No. 395) is DENIED. The Court finds that the two documents are protected by the attorney−client privilege. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 7/15/2015) (kgo) (Entered: 07/15/2015)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lorna G. Schofield: Telephone Conference held on 7/15/2015. (Court Reporter Tom Murray) (jcs) (Entered: 08/12/2015)
404 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: Conference held on 7/15/2015 before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Thomas Murray, (212) 805−0300.

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Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 8/17/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/27/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/23/2015.(Rodriguez, Somari) (Entered: 07/22/2015)
405 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a Conference proceeding held on 07/15/2015 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(Rodriguez, Somari) (Entered: 07/22/2015)
406 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 07/29/2015)
407 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 08/18/2015)
408 LETTER MOTION for Local Rule 37.2 Conference addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Anne B. Shaver dated August 21, 2015. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Linda O'Donnell, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Shaver, Anne) (Entered: 08/21/2015)
409 ORDER granting 408 Letter Motion for Local Rule 37.2 Conference: Application granted. A telephone conference shall be held on September 2, 2015, at 11:00 a.m. The parties shall call chambers jointly at (212) 805−0288 at that time. Defendant may file a response −− not to exceed three pages in length −− by August 28, 2015. (Telephone Conference set for 9/2/2015 at 11:00 AM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield.) (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Lorna G. Schofield)(Text Only Order) (Schofield, Lorna) (Entered: 08/24/2015)
410 LETTER MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply To Plaintiffs' August 15, 2015, Letter Motion addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated 8/25/15. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 08/25/2015)
411 ORDER granting 410 Letter Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply: Application granted. The telephone conference, currently scheduled for September 2, 2015, at 11:00 a.m., is adjourned to September 10, 2015, at 10:40 a.m. Defendant's time to respond to Plaintiffs' letter is extended to September 1, 2015. (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Lorna G. Schofield)(Text Only Order) (Schofield, Lorna) (Entered: 08/26/2015)
Set/Reset Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 9/10/2015 at 10:40 AM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. (Schofield, Lorna) (Entered: 08/26/2015)
412 LETTER RESPONSE in Opposition to Motion addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated September 1, 2015 re: 408 LETTER MOTION for Local Rule 37.2 Conference addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Anne B. Shaver dated August 21, 2015. . Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 09/01/2015)
413 OPINION AND ORDER re: 332 MOTION for Equitable Tolling of the Statute of Limitations for Collective Action Members' Claims Under the Equal Pay Act: For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs Motion for Equitable Tolling is GRANTED in part. The statute of limitations is equitably tolled from March 16, 2012; claims running back to March 16, 2009, are therefore deemed timely. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the motion at Docket No. 332 . (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 09/04/2015) (jcs) (Entered: 09/04/2015)
414 ORDER: WHEREAS, by Opinion and Order dated September 4, 2015, Plaintiffs motion for equitable tolling was granted in part; WHEREAS a conference is scheduled to take place on September 10, 2015, at 10:40 a.m. It is hereby ORDERED that, no later than September 9, 2015, at 12:00 noon, the parties shall file a joint letter stating how they wish to proceed in this matter. The letter shall, at a minimum, specify what

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discovery, if any, remains to be done; by when such discovery will be completed; and any anticipated motion practice by either party. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 09/04/2015) (jcs) (Entered: 09/04/2015)
415 JOINT LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Plaintiffs and Defendant KPMG LLP dated September 9, 2015 re: Information Requested at Dkt. 414. Document filed by KPMG LLP, Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 09/09/2015)
416 ORDER. It is hereby ORDERED that, subject to the limitations described above, Defendant must produce complaints containing allegations of sexual harassment; It is further ORDERED that, for the reasons stated on the record, (1) complaints made by or on behalf of any Advisory or Tax female client−facing, exempt employee must be produced and (2) Defendant may redact any employee identifying information in the materials to be produced. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 9/10/2015) (rjm) (Entered: 09/11/2015)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lorna G. Schofield: Telephone Conference held on 9/10/2015. (Court Reporter Pamela Uttr) (jcs) (Entered: 10/13/2015)
417 MOTION for Reconsideration re; 413 Memorandum & Opinion,, on Equitable Tolling. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 09/18/2015)
418 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 417 MOTION for Reconsideration re; 413 Memorandum & Opinion,, on Equitable Tolling. . Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 09/18/2015)
419 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Katherine Kimpel dated September 21, 2015 re: KPMG's Motion for Reconsideration. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 09/21/2015)
420 JOINT LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Katherine Kimpel and Colleen Kenney dated September 25, 2015 re: Proposed Scheduling Order and Discovery Plan. Document filed by KPMG LLP, Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A −− Text of Proposed Scheduling Order)(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 09/25/2015)
421 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Katherine Kimpel dated September 25, 2015 re: Plaintiffs' Proposed Discovery Plan. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A −− Text of Proposed Discovery Plan Order)(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 09/25/2015)
422 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated Sept. 25, 2015 re: KPMG's Proposed Opt−In Discovery Plan. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 09/25/2015)
423 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: Phone Conference held on 9/10/2015 before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Pamela Utter, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 10/26/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/5/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/1/2016.(Siwik, Christine) (Entered: 09/30/2015)
424 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a Phone Conference proceeding held on 9/10/15 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(Siwik, Christine) (Entered: 09/30/2015)
425 NOTICE of Stipulated Order Regarding Filing of Consent to Join Form for Yukiko Miura. Document filed by KPMG LLP, Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette

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Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 09/30/2015)
426 STIPULATED ORDER REGARDING FILING OF CONSENT TO JOIN FORM BY PLAINTIFFS ON BEHALF OF YUKIKO MIURA: The Parties hereby STIPULATE as follows: 1.The Consent to Join Form for Yukiko Miura, attached as Exhibit A, may be filed with the Court in the manner ordered by the Court at Dkt. No. 211; 2.Ms. Miura will be included as a plaintiff in the conditionally certified Equal Pay Act ("EPA") collective; 3. The date from which the statute of limitations runs on Ms. Miura's claims is a matter that remains in dispute by the Parties. The Parties reserve all rights as to their arguments regarding the running of the statute of limitations on Ms. Miura's claims; 4.KPMG reserves its rights and does not waive any defenses, arguments or objections regarding any claim or potential recovery by Ms. Miura against KPMG. (As further set forth in this Order.) (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 10/1/2015) (spo) (Entered: 10/01/2015)
427 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 10/01/2015)
428 CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF UNDER THE 29 U.S.C. 206(d). Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 10/01/2015)
429 OPINION AND ORDER re: 417 MOTION for Reconsideration re; 413 Memorandum & Opinion,, on Equitable Tolling. filed by KPMG LLP. For the foregoing reasons herein, Defendant's motion for reconsideration and clarification is DENIED. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the motion at Docket No. 418. (As further set forth in this Order.) (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 10/2/2015) (kgo) (Main Document 429 replaced on 10/2/2015) (jcs). (Entered: 10/02/2015)
430 STIPULATED SCHEDULING ORDER: This Scheduling Order herein is submitted by the Parties in accordance with Judge Lorna G. Schofield's Individual Rules and Procedures for Civil Cases Rule I(B)(2) and in light of the Court's Order (Dkt. 414) and Instruction at the September 10, 2015 status conference. All document discovery shall be completed by December 31, 2015. All deposition discovery shall be completed by April 15, 2016. Expert discovery will close August 12, 2016. Motions regarding class and/or collective action certification and any dispositive motions based on pre−class certification discovery shall be filed by September 30, 2016. Oppositions to motions regarding class and/or collective action certification and dispositive motions shall be filed by November 30, 2016. Replies regarding motions for class and/or collective action certification and dispositive motions shall be filed by December 30, 2016. (As further set forth in this Order.) ( Deposition due by 4/15/2016., Discovery due by 12/31/2015., Expert Discovery due by 8/12/2016., Motions due by 9/30/2016., Responses due by 11/30/2016, Replies due by 12/30/2016.) (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 10/8/2015) (kgo) (Entered: 10/08/2015)
431 DISCOVERY PLAN ORDER: IT IS ORDERED THAT: 1. Representative discovery regarding certification/decertification of the collective shall be used. 2. The percentage of the collective that shall provide written discovery responses is set at fifteen percent (15%). a. The parties shall meet and confer regarding the scope, content and form of written discovery. 3. The members of the collective who will provide discovery shall be selected as follows: 50% by Defendant with the remainder (50%) selected randomly. a. Absent parties' agreement, the selection process need not account for witnesses' job titles, locations or divisions. Plaintiffs may use supplemental discovery (as limited by paragraph 4) if they do not feel that the initial selection yields a representative assortment. 4. Plaintiffs may supplement the written discovery provided in paragraph 3 with written discovery from additional members of the collective, but this number shall not exceed Defendant's number. In other words, at no point will greater than twenty−two and one−half percent (22.5%) of the collective provide written discovery responses. 5. Considering the responses to the document demands and interrogatories, the parties shall confer and seek to agree on which members of the collective providing written discovery will be deposed. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 10/8/2015) (kgo) (Entered: 10/08/2015)
432 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: CORRECTED TRANSCRIPT CONFERENCE held on 9/10/2015 before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. Court Reporter/Transcriber:

10/09/2015 10/15/2015 10/15/2015 10/16/2015
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Pamela Utter, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 11/2/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/12/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/10/2016.(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 10/09/2015)
433 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a CONFRENCE proceeding held on 9/10/15 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 10/09/2015)
434 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Katherine Kimpel dated October 15, 2015 re: Clarification of Equitable Tolling Ruling. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 10/15/2015)
435 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 10/15/2015)
436 ORDER: It is hereby ORDERED that the Court's equitable tolling orders' effect on claims brought by Barbara Lam, Sherri Avara and Anita Lakha Virji is as follows: The Court−authorized consent to join form informed potential opt−in plaintiffs that the "form must be postmarked, faxed or e−mailed by January 31, 2015." Plaintiff's letter states only that Lam, Avara and Virji "mailed" their forms in a timely manner, but due to "postal error" or "postal delay" the forms were either delivered or postmarked after the deadline. Whether or not the statute of limitations is tolled as to these claims depends on whether Lam, Avara and Virji were in fact diligent in attempting to comply with the form's requirements. Equitable tolling will apply if Plaintiffs can show that the delay in delivering or postmarking these forms was through no fault of their own. Plaintiffs shall provide Defendant with evidence of these individuals' diligence within a timeframe the parties shall agree upon. If upon review of these submissions Defendant believes the explanations to be insufficient, the parties shall file a joint letter articulating their positions as to each plaintiff in dispute. It is further ORDERED that equitable tolling shall apply to the claims of Elizabeth Barker and Yukiko Miura, as the parties have stipulated that for these individuals the delays were caused either by counsels error or because the notice was sent to an incorrect address. (As further set forth in this Order.) (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 10/16/2015) (kgo) Modified on 10/16/2015 (kgo). (Entered: 10/16/2015)
437 NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS by Steven W. Moore on behalf of KPMG LLP. New Address: Constangy, Brooks, Smith & Prophete, LLP, 600 17th Street, Suite 2700−S, Denver, CO, USA 80202, 720.343.7540. (Moore, Steven) (Entered: 10/21/2015)
438 JOINT LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Katherine Kimpel and Colleen Kenney dated October 30, 2015 re: Status of Opt−In Discovery. Document filed by KPMG LLP, Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 10/30/2015)
439 LETTER MOTION for Local Rule 37.2 Conference regarding Opt−In Discovery addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated Nov. 2, 2015. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 11/02/2015)
440 ORDER granting 439 Letter Motion for Local Rule 37.2 Conference. Application GRANTED. Plaintiffs shall file a letter response not to exceed 3 pages by November 9, 2015. A telephone conference will be held on November 12, 2015, at 10:50 a.m. At the appointed time, the parties shall jointly call Chambers at (212) 805−0288. Telephone Conference set for 11/12/2015 at 10:50 AM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 11/2/2015) (kgo) (Entered: 11/03/2015)
441 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 11/06/2015)

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442 LETTER RESPONSE in Opposition to Motion addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting dated November 9, 2015 re: 439 LETTER MOTION for Local Rule 37.2 Conference regarding Opt−In Discovery addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated Nov. 2, 2015. . Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 11/09/2015)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lorna G. Schofield: Telephone Conference held on 11/12/2015. (Court Reporter Kristen Carannante) (jcs) (Entered: 12/10/2015)
443 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 11/17/2015)
444 MOTION for Yonina Alexander to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Filing fee $ 200.00, receipt number 0208−11659472. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Certificate of Standing, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 11/23/2015)
>>>NOTICE REGARDING PRO HAC VICE MOTION. Regarding Document No. 444 MOTION for Yonina Alexander to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Filing fee $ 200.00, receipt number 0208−11659472. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff.. The document has been reviewed and there are no deficiencies. (sdi) (Entered: 11/23/2015)
445 ORDER granting 444 Motion for Yonina Alexander to Appear Pro Hac Vice (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Lorna G. Schofield)(Text Only Order) (Schofield, Lorna) (Entered: 11/23/2015)
446 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 11/24/2015)
447 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 12/02/2015)
448 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: CONFERENCE held on 11/12/2015 before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Kristen Carannante, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 12/31/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 1/7/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 3/6/2016.(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 12/04/2015)
449 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a CONFERENCE proceeding held on 11/12/15 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 12/04/2015)
450 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 12/04/2015)
451 STATUS REPORT. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 12/04/2015)
452 STATUS REPORT. Corrected Status Report Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 12/07/2015)
453 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 12/07/2015)
454 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 12/10/2015)
455 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 12/13/2015)

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456 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 12/14/2015)
457 LETTER MOTION for Local Rule 37.2 Conference addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Anne B. Shaver dated December 14, 2015. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Linda O'Donnell, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D)(Shaver, Anne) (Entered: 12/14/2015)
458 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 12/15/2015)
459 ORDER granting 457 Letter Motion for Local Rule 37.2 Conference: Application GRANTED. Defendant shall file a letter response by noon on December 21, 2015. A telephone conference will be held on December 23, 2015, at 10:30 a.m. At the appointed time, telephone participants shall jointly call Chambers at (212) 805−0288. (Telephone Conference set for 12/23/2015 at 10:30 AM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield.) (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Lorna G. Schofield)(Text Only Order) (Schofield, Lorna) (Entered: 12/15/2015)
460 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 12/16/2015)
461 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 12/17/2015)
462 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 12/18/2015)
463 LETTER RESPONSE in Opposition to Motion addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated 12/21/2015 re: 457 LETTER MOTION for Local Rule 37.2 Conference addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Anne B. Shaver dated December 14, 2015. . Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 12/21/2015)
464 MOTION for Martin D. Quiones to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Filing fee $ 200.00, receipt number 0208−11766687. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing, # 2 Proposed Order)(Quinones, Martin) (Entered: 12/22/2015)
>>>NOTICE REGARDING PRO HAC VICE MOTION. Regarding Document No. 464 MOTION for Martin D. Quiones to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Filing fee $ 200.00, receipt number 0208−11766687. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff.. The document has been reviewed and there are no deficiencies. (wb) (Entered: 12/22/2015)
465 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 12/22/2015)
466 MOTION for Michael Ian Levin−Gesundheit to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Filing fee $ 200.00, receipt number 0208−11771628. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing, # 2 Proposed Order)(Levin−Gesundheit, Michael) (Entered: 12/23/2015)
>>>NOTICE REGARDING PRO HAC VICE MOTION. Regarding Document No. 466 MOTION for Michael Ian Levin−Gesundheit to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Filing fee $ 200.00, receipt number 0208−11771628. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff.. The document has been reviewed and there are no deficiencies. (bcu) (Entered: 12/23/2015)
467 ORDER. It is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiffs' request for a pre−motion conference, considered to be a motion to compel discovery of electronically stored information from certain custodians employed by Defendant KPMG, is GRANTED in part. Plaintiffs are allowed to take discovery from up to five additional custodians. The parties shall confer in deciding which individuals will serve as the additional custodians. It is further ORDERED that Plaintiffs shall bear one−third of the costs

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KPMG incurs in the collection, review and production of these custodians' documents. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 12/23/2015) (rjm) (Entered: 12/23/2015)
468 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 12/23/2015)
469 ORDER granting 464 Motion for Martin D. Quiones to Appear Pro Hac Vice (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Lorna G. Schofield)(Text Only Order) (Schofield, Lorna) (Entered: 12/28/2015)
470 ORDER granting 466 Motion for Michael Ian Levin−Gesundheit to Appear Pro Hac Vice (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Lorna G. Schofield)(Text Only Order) (Schofield, Lorna) (Entered: 12/28/2015)
471 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 12/29/2015)
472 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 12/29/2015)
473 LETTER MOTION for Discovery addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated 12/30/2015. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 12/30/2015)
474 ORDER granting 473 Letter Motion for Discovery: Application GRANTED. The deadline for opt−in discovery is extended to February 15, 2016. The parties shall file a joint motion proposing new discovery deadlines by January 11, 2016. (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Lorna G. Schofield)(Text Only Order) (Schofield, Lorna) (Entered: 01/04/2016)
475 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 01/04/2016)
476 MOTION for Reconsideration re; 467 Order,, Granting in Part Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Discovery. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Shaver, Anne) (Entered: 01/06/2016)
477 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 476 MOTION for Reconsideration re; 467 Order,, Granting in Part Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Discovery. . Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Shaver, Anne) (Entered: 01/06/2016)
478 ORDER: that Defendant shall file a response to Plaintiff's motion by 1/21/2016. (As further set forth in this Order.) Set Deadlines/Hearing as to 476 MOTION for Reconsideration re; 467 Order, Granting in Part Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Discovery:(Responses due by 1/21/2016) (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 1/7/2016) (tro) (Entered: 01/07/2016)
479 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated January 11, 2016 re: Proposed Revised Opt−In Discovery Schedule. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Proposed Revised Opt−In Discovery Order)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 01/11/2016)
480 REVISED OPT−IN DISCOVERY ORDER: IT IS ORDERED THAT: Subject to Paragraph 1(d) below, for Opt−In Discovery Plaintiffs who were selected prior to December 1, 2015 Plaintiffs' answers to interrogatories and Plaintiffs' document production shall be completed and served no later than January 15, 2016. KPMG's document production for these Opt−in Discovery Plaintiffs will be complete no later than January 29, 2016. The third status conference letter due to the Court regarding Opt−In Discovery shall be due on March 31, 2016 and a fourth status conference letter will be due May 13, 2016. Parties shall submit pre−conference status letters on potential motions regarding class and/or collective action certification and any dispositive or other motions based on pre−class certification discovery by November 22, 2016. (As further set forth in this Order.) Motions due by 2/3/2017. Deposition due by 7/15/2016. Expert Discovery due by 11/23/2016. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 1/12/2016) (kgo) (Entered: 01/12/2016)

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481 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: CONFERENCE held on 12/23/2015 before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Tara Jones, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 2/5/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/16/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/14/2016.(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 01/12/2016)
482 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a CONFERENCE proceeding held on 12/23/15 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 01/12/2016)
483 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 01/13/2016)
484 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 01/19/2016)
485 LETTER MOTION for Conference (Pre−Motion) Regarding Proposed Motion To Dismiss addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated January 19, 2016. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 01/19/2016)
486 ORDER granting 485 Letter Motion for Conference: Application GRANTED. Plaintiffs shall file a response not to exceed three pages by noon on January 25, 2016. A telephone conference will be held on January 27, 2016, at 10:40 a.m. At the appointed time, the parties shall jointly call Chambers at (212) 805−0288. (Telephone Conference set for 1/27/2016 at 10:40 AM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield.) (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Lorna G. Schofield)(Text Only Order) (Schofield, Lorna) (Entered: 01/20/2016)
487 OPPOSITION BRIEF re: 477 Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion, (Opposition To Plaintiffs Memorandum Of Law In Support Of Their Motion For Reconsideration Of Order Granting In Part Motion To Compel Discovery). Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 01/21/2016)
488 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: CONFERENCE held on 12/23/2015 before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Tara Jones, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 2/16/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/25/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/25/2016.(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 01/21/2016)
489 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a CONFERENCE proceeding held on 12/23/15 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 01/21/2016)
490 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 01/22/2016)
491 LETTER RESPONSE in Opposition to Motion addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Katherine Kimpel dated January 25, 2016 re: 485 LETTER MOTION for Conference (Pre−Motion) Regarding Proposed Motion To Dismiss addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated January 19, 2016. . Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 01/25/2016)
492 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 01/26/2016)

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Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lorna G. Schofield: Telephone Conference held on 1/27/2016. (Court Reporter Carrol Ganley) (jcs) (Entered: 02/10/2016)
493 ORDER: WHEREAS, by letter motion filed on January 19, 2016, Defendant KPMG requested a pre−motion conference, which is construed to be a Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice Non−Responsive Opt−In Plaintiffs' Equal Pay Act Claims. It is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Counsel shall mail a copy of this order by Certified US Mail to the fourteen women who have been non−responsive regarding their discovery obligations. It is further ORDERED that each woman will have until Monday, February 29, 2016 to provide her discovery responses with the assistance of Plaintiffs' Counsel, and anyone who fails to respond by that date will have her Equal Pay Act claims dismissed without prejudice. It is further ORDERED that, if any woman's claims are dismissed without prejudice, she will have until Tuesday, November 15, 2016, to consult with Plaintiffs' Counsel and, if she wishes, seek possible reinstatement of her Equal Pay Act Claims from this Court based upon the Court's review of her individual extenuating circumstances. If she does not make an application for reinstatement by November 15, 2016, her Equal Pay Act claims will be dismissed with prejudice, with no possibility for reinstatement., ( Motions due by 11/15/2016.) (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 1/28/2016) (lmb) (Entered: 01/28/2016)
494 ORDER denying 476 Motion for Reconsideration. For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration is DENIED. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the motion at Docket No. 476. (As further set forth in this Order.) (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 1/28/2016) (kgo) (Entered: 01/29/2016)
495 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 02/01/2016)
496 MOTION for Martin D. Quiones to Withdraw as Attorney . Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Levin−Gesundheit, Michael) (Entered: 02/01/2016)
497 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 02/04/2016)
498 ORDER granting 496 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby ORDERED, that the Motion is GRANTED, and FURTHER ORDERED, that Mr. Quiones be withdrawn as Plaintiffs' counsel in this matter. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the motion at Docket No. 496. SO ORDERED. Attorney Martin Daniel Quinones terminated. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 2/04/2016) (ama) (Entered: 02/04/2016)
499 LETTER MOTION for Extension of Time addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting dated February 12, 2016. Document filed by KPMG LLP, Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 02/12/2016)
500 STIPULATION ORDER REGARDING DOCUMENT PRODUCTION FOR OPT−IN PLAINTIFFS WHO ARE CURRENTLY EMPLOYED BY KPMG: It is further ORDERED that each current employee Discovery Opt−in Plaintiff selected prior to February 1, 2016 shall make her KPMG laptop available to KPMG no later than February 21, 2016. It is further ORDERED that Docket No. 480 Paragraphs 1.e. is amended as follows: 1. Opt−In Fact Discovery: Fact discovery related to the collective ("Opt−In Discovery") will be completed as below: e. No later than March 20, 2016, the Parties should begin to meet and confer regarding the number and scheduling of depositions and any disputes regarding the number of depositions must be jointly briefed for the Court no later than March 31, 2016. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 2/16/2016) (kl) (Entered: 02/16/2016)
501 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 02/17/2016)
502 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 02/22/2016)
503 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: Conference held on 1/27/2016 before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Carol Ganley, (212) 805−0300. Transcript

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may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 3/18/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/28/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/26/2016.(Grant, Patricia) (Entered: 02/23/2016)
504 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a Conference proceeding held on 01/27/2016 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(Grant, Patricia) (Entered: 02/23/2016)
505 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated February 24, 2016 re: Joint Stipulated Order and Notice of Nonresponsive Plaintiffs. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Joint Stipulation on Nonresponsive Opt−In Plaintiff's, # 2 Exhibit Notice of Non−Responsive Opt−In Plaintiffs)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 02/24/2016)
506 STIPULATED ORDER: It is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Counsel shall mail a copy of this Order by Certified U.S. Mail to any Opt−In Plaintiff who Plaintiffs' Counsel has identified as unresponsive during discovery. It is further ORDERED that each such unresponsive Opt−In Plaintiff will have thirty days from the date Plaintiffs' Counsel mailed a copy of this Order to provide her discovery responses with the assistance of Plaintiffs' Counsel, and anyone who fails to respond by that date will have her Equal Pay Act claims dismissed without prejudice. It is further ORDERED that, if any woman's claims are dismissed without prejudice, she will have until Tuesday, November 15, 2016 to consult with Plaintiffs' Counsel and, if she wishes, seek possible reinstatement of her Equal Pay Act Claims from this Court based upon my review of her individual extenuating circumstances. If she does not make an application for reinstatement by November 15, 2016, her Equal Pay Act claims will be dismissed with prejudice, with no possibility for reinstatement. (As further set forth in this Order.) (Motions due by 11/15/2016.) (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 2/25/2016) (kko) (Entered: 02/25/2016)
507 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 02/26/2016)
508 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 03/02/2016)
509 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 03/07/2016)
510 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated March 15, 2016 re: Notice of Additional Non−Responsive Opt−In. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Notice of Additional Non−Responsive Opt−In)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 03/15/2016)
511 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated March 15, 2016 re: Proposed Stipulated Order re Opt−In Discovery. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order regarding Opt−In Discovery Schedule)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 03/15/2016)
512 STIPULATED ORDER REGARDING OPT−IN DISCOVERY: IT IS ORDERED that KPMG shall have until April 5, 2016 to complete the document discovery identified above but that KPMG shall use its best efforts to produce these documents before that date. (As further set forth in this Order.) ( Discovery due by 4/5/2016.) (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 3/18/2016) (kgo) (Entered: 03/18/2016)
513 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated March 29, 2016 re: Notice of Additional Non−Responsive Opt−In Plaintiffs. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 03/29/2016)
514 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 03/30/2016)

03/31/2016 03/31/2016 03/31/2016 03/31/2016 04/01/2016
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04/06/2016
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04/13/2016

515 MOTION for Sarah M. Konsky to Withdraw as Attorney . Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 03/31/2016)
516 STATUS REPORT. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 03/31/2016)
517 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting dated March 31, 2016 re: Opt−In Plaintiff Depositions. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 03/31/2016)
518 LETTER MOTION for Discovery re: Opt−In Plaintiff Depositions addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated March 31, 2016. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 03/31/2016)
519 ORDER granting 518 Letter Motion for Discovery: Application GRANTED. A telephone conference will be held on April 14, 2016, at 11:00 a.m. At the appointed time, the parties shall jointly call chambers at (212) 805−1288. Any further submissions concerning the issues identified in Dkt. Nos. 517 and 518 shall be filed by noon on April 11, 2016. (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Lorna G. Schofield)(Text Only Order) (Schofield, Lorna) (Entered: 04/01/2016)
Set/Reset Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 4/14/2016 at 11:00 AM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. (Schofield, Lorna) (Entered: 04/01/2016)
520 MEMO ENDORSEMENT granting 515 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. ENDORSEMENT: Application GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the letter motion at Dkt. No. 515 and terminate Sarah M. Konsky as counsel for Defendant. Attorney Sarah M. Konsky terminated. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 4/1/2016) (kgo) (Entered: 04/01/2016)
521 ORDER: It is hereby ORDERED that the proceeding in this matter, previously scheduled for April 14, 2016 at 11:00 a.m., shall be rescheduled for April 20, 2016 at 10:40 a.m., due to a conflict in the Court's schedule. The parties are advised that the conference may be moved to a time later on April 20 depending on the Court's trial schedule. Any parties not located within the metropolitan area who wish to participate telephonically may do so by informing Chambers by telephone at least one day in advance, and at the time of the conference convening all phone participants on the line and calling Chambers at (212) 805−0288. Telephone Conference set for 4/20/2016 at 10:40 AM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 4/6/2016) (kgo) (Entered: 04/06/2016)
522 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting dated April 11, 2016 re: Opt−In Depositions. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 04/11/2016)
523 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Peter O. Hughes dated April 11, 2016 re: Plaintiff's Request to Disclose Attorneys'−Eyes Only Information. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Hughes, Peter) (Entered: 04/11/2016)
524 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 04/12/2016)
525 FILING ERROR − DEFICIENT DOCKET ENTRY − MOTION for Yaman Salahi to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Filing fee $ 200.00, receipt number 0208−12178767. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Certificate of Good Standing, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Salahi, Yaman) Modified on 4/13/2016 (sdi). (Entered: 04/12/2016)
>>>NOTICE REGARDING DEFICIENT MOTION TO APPEAR PRO HAC VICE. Notice to RE−FILE Document No. 525 MOTION for Yaman Salahi to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Filing fee $ 200.00, receipt number 0208−12178767. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff... The filing is deficient for the following reason(s): missing Certificate of Good Standing from Supreme Court of California;. Re−file the motion as a Corrected Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice − attach the correct signed PDF − select the correct named filer/filers − attach valid Certificates of Good Standing issued within the past 30

04/18/2016 04/19/2016
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days − attach Proposed Order.. (sdi) (Entered: 04/13/2016)
526 LETTER MOTION for Leave to File Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Reply to Motions Regarding Depositions addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Peter O. Hughes dated April 18, 2016. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Hughes, Peter) (Entered: 04/18/2016)
527 FILING ERROR − WRONG EVENT TYPE SELECTED FROM MENU − LETTER MOTION for Conference regarding Plaintiffs' Anticipated Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Maya Sequeira dated April 19, 2016. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Kimpel, Katherine) Modified on 4/20/2016 (db). (Entered: 04/19/2016)
528 MOTION for Yaman Salahi to Appear Pro Hac Vice (Corrected Motion). Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Salahi, Yaman) (Entered: 04/19/2016)
***NOTICE TO ATTORNEY TO RE−FILE DOCUMENT − EVENT TYPE ERROR. Notice to Attorney Katherine M. Kimpel to RE−FILE Document 527 LETTER MOTION for Conference regarding Plaintiffs' Anticipated Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Maya Sequeira dated April 19, 2016. Use the event type Leave to File Document found under the event list Motion (Letter). (db) (Entered: 04/20/2016)
>>>NOTICE REGARDING PRO HAC VICE MOTION. Regarding Document No. 528 MOTION for Yaman Salahi to Appear Pro Hac Vice (Corrected Motion). Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff.. The document has been reviewed and there are no deficiencies. (sdi) (Entered: 04/20/2016)
529 LETTER MOTION for Leave to File Amended Complaint addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Maya Sequeira dated April 19, 2016. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 04/20/2016)
530 ORDER granting 529 Letter Motion for Leave to File Document. Defendant shall file a letter response not to exceed three pages by May 2, 2016. A telephone conference will be held on May 11, 2016, at 11:30 a.m. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 4/20/2016) (ama) (Entered: 04/21/2016)
Set/Reset Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 5/11/2016 at 11:30 AM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. (ama) (Entered: 04/21/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lorna G. Schofield: Telephone Conference held on 4/20/2016. (Court Reporter Rebecca Forman) (jcs) (Entered: 05/12/2016)
531 ORDER granting 528 Motion for Yaman Salahi to Appear Pro Hac Vice (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Lorna G. Schofield)(Text Only Order) (Schofield, Lorna) (Entered: 04/21/2016)
532 MOTION for Yonina Alexander to Withdraw as Attorney . Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 04/21/2016)
533 ORDER denying 526 Letter Motion for Leave to File Document: that Defendant may designate no more than thirty of the opt−in plaintiffs who have provided written discovery for deposition. In addition to these thirty deponents, Defendant may depose any opt−in plaintiff who submits a declaration, any Named Plaintiff and any opt−in plaintiff identified as a witness in Plaintiffs' initial disclosures. Plaintiffs may designate no more than thirty additional opt−in plaintiffs for deposition. Each deposition of an opt−in plaintiff is presumptively limited to four hours. The parties shall meet and confer if either side anticipates that any given deposition will require more time. No request for additional time from the Court is required if the parties consent to a mutually acceptable time limit. Plaintiffs' counsel's request to share with their clients in connection with deposition preparation compensation data currently designated as

04/22/2016 04/27/2016 05/02/2016 05/03/2016
05/03/2016
05/04/2016 05/04/2016 05/05/2016
05/05/2016
05/09/2016 05/10/2016

Attorneys' Eyes Only is DENIED. Defendant's motion to strike Plaintiff's April 11, 2016, letter is DENIED. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the letter motion at Dkt. No. 526. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 4/21/2016) (tn) (Entered: 04/22/2016)
534 ORDER granting 532 Motion for Yonina Alexander to Withdraw as Attorney. ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby ORDERED, that the Motion is GRANTED, and FURTHER ORDERED, that Ms. Alexander be withdrawn as Plaintiffs' counsel in this matter. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the motion at Dkt. No. 532. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 4/22/2016) (kko) (Entered: 04/22/2016)
535 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 04/27/2016)
536 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated May 2, 2016 re: Opposition to Plaintiffs' Request for Leave to File Amended Complaint. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 05/02/2016)
537 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: conference held on 4/20/2016 before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Rebecca Forman, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 5/27/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 6/6/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/4/2016.(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 05/03/2016)
538 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a conference proceeding held on 4/20/16 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 05/03/2016)
539 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 05/04/2016)
540 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Maya Sequeira dated May 4, 2016 re: KPMG's Letter at Dkt. 536. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 05/04/2016)
541 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: conference held on 4/20/2016 before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Rebecca Forman, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 5/31/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 6/9/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/8/2016.(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 05/05/2016)
542 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a conference proceeding held on 4/20/16 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 05/05/2016)
543 FILING ERROR − WRONG EVENT TYPE SELECTED FROM MENU − LETTER MOTION for Conference regarding KPMG's Motion to Compel addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated May 9, 2016. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) Modified on 5/11/2016 (db). (Entered: 05/09/2016)
544 LETTER RESPONSE in Opposition to Motion addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Maya Sequeira dated May 10, 2016 re: 543 LETTER MOTION for Conference regarding KPMG's Motion to Compel addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from

05/10/2016 05/11/2016
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Colleen M. Kenney dated May 9, 2016. . Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 05/10/2016)
545 LETTER MOTION for Local Rule 37.2 Conference re: Location of Opt−In Depositions addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Michael Levin−Gesundheit dated May 10, 2016. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 05/10/2016)
***NOTICE TO ATTORNEY TO RE−FILE DOCUMENT − EVENT TYPE ERROR. Notice to Attorney Colleen M. Kenney to RE−FILE Document 543 LETTER MOTION for Conference regarding KPMG's Motion to Compel addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated May 9, 2016. Use the event type Letter found under the event list Other Documents. (db) (Entered: 05/11/2016)
546 ORDER denying 545 Letter Motion for Local Rule 37.2 Conference. ORDERED that Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file an amended complaint is GRANTED. Plaintiffs shall file a Fourth Amended Class Action Complaint by May 13, 2016. Any resulting additional discovery by Plaintiffs is limited to that described in Plaintiff's letter. Such discovery shall take place within the Opt−In fact discovery period. It is further ORDERED that Defendant's request for a pre−motion conference, construed as its motion to compel discovery from certain replacement Discovery Opt−In Plaintiffs, is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED that Plaintiffs' letter motion for a pre−motion conference concerning the location of depositions is DENIED without prejudice to renewal. The parties shall meet and confer on this issue by May 18, 2016. Any renewed application for a discovery conference shall be filed by May 23, 2016, and shall describe the parties efforts to resolve this dispute without court intervention. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the motions at Dkt. Nos. 543 and 545. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 5/11/2016) (ama) (Entered: 05/11/2016)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Amended Pleadings due by 5/13/2016. (ama) (Entered: 05/11/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lorna G. Schofield: Telephone Conference held on 5/11/2016. (jcs) (Entered: 06/14/2016)
547 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Donna Kassman, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 05/12/2016)
548 FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT amending 35 Amended Complaint, against KPMG LLP with JURY DEMAND.Document filed by Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva, Donna Kassman, Tina Butler, Heather Inman, Carol Murray, Cheryl Charity, Nancy Jones. Related document: 35 Amended Complaint, filed by Sparkle Patterson, Donna Kassman, Linda O'Donnell, Ashwini Vasudeva, Jeanette Potter.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 05/13/2016)
549 STATUS REPORT. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 05/13/2016)
550 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 05/16/2016)
551 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 05/17/2016)
552 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from David Sanford dated May 18, 2016 re: Plaintiffs' Expert. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 05/18/2016)
553 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 05/18/2016)

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06/01/2016 06/07/2016 06/07/2016

554 NOTICE of of Non−Responsive Opt−In. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 05/19/2016)
555 MOTION for Melanie E. Walker to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Filing fee $ 200.00, receipt number 0208−12329180. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing)(Walker, Melanie) (Entered: 05/20/2016)
>>>NOTICE REGARDING PRO HAC VICE MOTION. Regarding Document No. 555 MOTION for Melanie E. Walker to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Filing fee $ 200.00, receipt number 0208−12329180. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff.. The document has been reviewed and there are no deficiencies. (sdi) (Entered: 05/23/2016)
556 LETTER MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated 05/24/2016. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 05/24/2016)
557 NOTICE of Filing of Opt Out. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 05/24/2016)
558 NOTICE of Filing of Opt Out. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 05/25/2016)
559 ORDER granting 556 Letter Motion for Extension of Time to File: Application GRANTED. Defendant shall answer the Fourth Amended Complaint by June 14, 2016. (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Lorna G. Schofield)(Text Only Order) (Schofield, Lorna) (Entered: 05/25/2016)
560 ORDER granting 555 Motion for Melanie E. Walker to Appear Pro Hac Vice (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Lorna G. Schofield)(Text Only Order) (Schofield, Lorna) (Entered: 05/25/2016)
561 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 05/27/2016)
562 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: CONFERENCE held on 5/11/2016 before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Ellen Simone, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 6/20/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 6/30/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/29/2016.(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 05/27/2016)
563 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a CONFERENCE proceeding held on 5/11/2016 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 05/27/2016)
564 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 06/01/2016)
565 MOTION for Katherine Kimpel to Withdraw as Attorney . Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 06/07/2016)
566 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 06/07/2016)

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567 ORDER granting 565 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Upon consideration of Plaintiffs' Motion to Withdraw Katherine Kimpel as Counsel of Record, the Court finds that good cause has been shown for the granting of the Motion. ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby ORDERED, that the Motion is GRANTED, and FURTHER ORDERED, that Ms. Kimpel be withdrawn as Plaintiffs' counsel in this matter. Attorney Katherine M. Kimpel terminated. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 6/7/2016) (mro) (Entered: 06/08/2016)
568 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 06/08/2016)
569 NOTICE of Additional Non−Responsive Opt−In Plaintiff re: 506 Stipulation and Order, Set Deadlines,,,,,,,,. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 06/10/2016)
570 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 06/10/2016)
571 MOTION for Kevin Love Hubbard to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Filing fee $ 200.00, receipt number 0208−12414156. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Certificate of Good Standing, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Hubbard, Kevin) (Entered: 06/13/2016)
572 MOTION to Substitute Party. Old Party: Roxanna Lake, New Party: Jessica Lake . Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 06/13/2016)
>>>NOTICE REGARDING PRO HAC VICE MOTION. Regarding Document No. 571 MOTION for Kevin Love Hubbard to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Filing fee $ 200.00, receipt number 0208−12414156. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff.. The document has been reviewed and there are no deficiencies. (wb) (Entered: 06/14/2016)
573 ANSWER to 548 Amended Complaint,. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 06/14/2016)
574 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 06/14/2016)
575 ORDER granting 572 Motion to Substitute Party.. It is hereby ORDERED that Jessica Lake, as personal representative of the Estate of Roxanna Lake, is substituted for Opt−In Plaintiff Roxanna Lake in this matter. (As further set forth in this Order.) Jessica Lake added. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 6/14/2016) (kgo) (Entered: 06/15/2016)
576 MOTION for Michael F. Decker to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Filing fee $ 200.00, receipt number 0208−12425988. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service, # 2 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order)(Shaver, Anne) (Entered: 06/15/2016)
>>>NOTICE REGARDING PRO HAC VICE MOTION. Regarding Document No. 576 MOTION for Michael F. Decker to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Filing fee $ 200.00, receipt number 0208−12425988. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff.. The document has been reviewed and there are no deficiencies. (sdi) (Entered: 06/16/2016)
577 ORDER granting 571 Motion for Kevin Love Hubbard to Appear Pro Hac Vice (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Lorna G. Schofield)(Text Only Order) (Schofield, Lorna) (Entered: 06/20/2016)

06/20/2016 06/24/2016
06/24/2016
06/28/2016 06/28/2016 06/30/2016 07/06/2016 07/12/2016 07/15/2016 07/15/2016 07/15/2016 07/25/2016 07/26/2016
07/27/2016 08/02/2016

578 ORDER granting 576 Motion for Michael F. Decker to Appear Pro Hac Vice (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Lorna G. Schofield)(Text Only Order) (Schofield, Lorna) (Entered: 06/20/2016)
579 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Maya Sequeira dated June 24, 2016 re: Proposed Revised Schedule. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 06/24/2016)
580 ORDER MODIFYING SCHEDULING ORDER: It is hereby ORDERED that the Scheduling Order be modified as follows herein. Motions due by 3/31/2017. Responses due by 5/26/2017 Replies due by 6/30/2017. Deposition due by 8/31/2016. Expert Discovery due by 2/3/2017. Discovery due by 8/31/2016. The Parties shall submit joint status letters regarding opt−in discovery on July 15 and August 31, 2016. Parties shall submit pre−conference status letters on potential motions regarding class and/or collective action certification and any dispositive or other motions based on pre−class certification discovery by February 17, 2017. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 6/24/2016) (kgo) (Entered: 06/24/2016)
581 NOTICE of Notice of Additional Non−Responsive Opt−In Plaintiff. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 06/28/2016)
582 NOTICE of Notice of Additional Non−Responsive Opt−In Plaintiff. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 06/28/2016)
583 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 06/30/2016)
584 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 07/06/2016)
585 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 07/12/2016)
586 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 07/15/2016)
587 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Michael Frederick Decker on behalf of Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Decker, Michael) (Entered: 07/15/2016)
588 STATUS REPORT. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Dermody, Kelly) (Entered: 07/15/2016)
589 MOTION for Maya Sequeira to Withdraw as Attorney . Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 07/25/2016)
590 MEMO ENDORSEMENT granting 589 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. ENDORSEMENT: Application GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate Maya Sequeira as counsel for Plaintiffs. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the motion at Dkt. No. 589. Attorney Maya Sequeira terminated. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 7/26/2016) (kgo) (Entered: 07/26/2016)
591 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Kimpel, Katherine) (Entered: 07/27/2016)
592 RULE 502(d) ORDER: IT IS ORDERED THAT: 1. The production of any privileged or protected information contained in KPMG's IEM case histories or the pages identified by Bates number above shall not constitute a waiver of any privilege or

08/10/2016 08/11/2016 08/16/2016 08/16/2016 08/17/2016
08/25/2016 08/26/2016 08/26/2016

protection from discovery for this information (or any other documents or information) for the purposes of this matter and any other federal or state proceeding. 2. This Order shall be interpreted to provide the maximum protection allowed by Federal Rule of Evidence 502(d). 3. Nothing contained herein is intended to or shall serve to limit a party's right to conduct a review of documents, ESI or information (including metadata) for relevance, responsiveness and/or segregation of privileged and/or protected information before production. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 8/1/2016) (kgo) (Entered: 08/02/2016)
593 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 08/10/2016)
594 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 08/11/2016)
595 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 08/16/2016)
596 JOINT LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting and Colleen Kenney dated August 16, 2016 re: Proposed Revised Schedule. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 08/16/2016)
597 ORDER MODIFYING SCHEDULING ORDER: 1. Opt−In Fact Discovery: a. Depositions of Named Plaintiff Nancy Jones and certain opt−ins yet to be scheduled will be completed by September 30, 2016. b. KPMG's 30(b)(6) deposition regarding training will take place during the first week of October. 2. Expert Discovery: a. Plaintiffs shall serve expert reports by November 16, 2016. b.Defendant shall serve expert reports by January 27, 2017. c. Plaintiffs shall serve rebuttal expert reports by March 10, 2017. d. Expert Discovery will close on April 14, 2017. 3. Motions regarding class certification and collective action certification and dispositive motions: a. Parties shall submit pre−conference status letters on potential motions regarding class and/or collective action certification and any dispositive or other motions based on pre−class certification discovery by April 28, 2017. b. Motions regarding class and/or collective certification and any dispositive motions based on pre−class certification discovery shall be filed by May 12, 2017. c. Responses regarding class and/or collective certification and any dispositive motions based on pre−class certification discovery shall be filed by July 7, 2017. d. Replies class and/or collective certification and any dispositive motions based on pre−class certification discovery shall be filed by August 11, 2017. 4. Status Letters: a. The Parties shall submit a joint status letter August 31, 2016 as set forth in the Court's individual rules and every 45 days thereafter. Motions due by 5/12/2017. Responses due by 7/7/2017 Replies due by 8/11/2017. Deposition due by 9/30/2016. Expert Discovery due by 4/14/2017. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 8/17/2016) (lmb) Modified on 8/17/2016 (lmb). (Entered: 08/17/2016)
598 FILING ERROR − WRONG EVENT TYPE SELECTED FROM MENU − MOTION to Substitute Party. Old Party: Catherine Moriarty, New Party: Michael Moriarty . Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Mueting, Katie) Modified on 9/1/2016 (db). (Entered: 08/25/2016)
599 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Tiseme Gabriella Zegeye on behalf of Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Zegeye, Tiseme) (Entered: 08/26/2016)
600 ORDER TO SUBSTITUTE PARTY granting 598 Motion to Substitute Party.. It is hereby ORDERED that Michael Moriarty, as personal representative of the Estate of Catherine Moriarty, is substituted for Opt−In Plaintiff Catherine Moriarty in this matter. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 8/26/2016) (kgo) (Entered: 08/26/2016)

08/31/2016 09/09/2016 09/26/2016 09/30/2016 09/30/2016 10/03/2016
10/04/2016 10/05/2016
10/05/2016 10/10/2016 10/17/2016 10/27/2016 10/31/2016

601 STATUS REPORT. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 08/31/2016)
602 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 09/09/2016)
603 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 09/26/2016)
604 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 09/30/2016)
605 JOINT LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney and Kevin Love Hubbard dated September 16, 2016 re: Modifying Scheduling Order. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 09/30/2016)
606 MEMO ENDORSEMENT on re: 605 Letter filed by KPMG LLP. ENDORSEMENT: Application DENIED without prejudice to renewal. The parties shall jointly call chambers at 212−805−0288 at 10:30 a.m. on October 5, 2016, to discuss the status of fact discovery and their request to extend deadlines. (Telephone Conference set for 10/5/2016 at 10:30 AM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield.) (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 10/3/2016) (kl) (Entered: 10/03/2016)
607 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 10/04/2016)
608 ORDER MODIFYING SCHEDULING ORDER: It is hereby ORDERED that the Scheduling Order be modified as follows: Plaintiffs' 30(b)(6) deposition of KPMG regarding training will take place on October 5, 2016. Opt−In Fact Discovery will be completed by October 31, 2016 with the exception of two opt−in depositions yet to be scheduled. Expert Discovery will close on June 23, 2017. Motions regarding class and/or collective certification and any dispositive motions based on pre−class certification discovery shall be filed by July 28, 2017..Responses regarding class and/or collective certification and any dispositive motions based on pre−class certification discovery shall be filed by September 22, 2017. Replies regarding class and/or collective certification and any dispositive motions based on pre−class certification discovery shall be filed by November 17, 2017. Motions due by 7/28/2017. Responses due by 9/22/2017 Replies due by 11/17/2017. Deposition due by 10/5/2016. Fact Discovery due by 10/31/2016. Expert Discovery due by 6/23/2017. In light of the conference held today, October 5, 2016, the parties need not submit a joint status letter on October 15, 2016. The Parties shall submit a joint status letter every 45 days after October 15, 2016. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 10/5/2016) (kgo) (Entered: 10/05/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lorna G. Schofield: Initial Pretrial Conference held on 10/5/2016. (jcs) (Entered: 11/10/2016)
609 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 10/10/2016)
610 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 10/17/2016)
611 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 10/27/2016)
612 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 10/31/2016)

10/31/2016 11/01/2016 11/01/2016 11/02/2016
11/09/2016
11/09/2016
11/15/2016 11/29/2016 12/09/2016 12/12/2016
12/12/2016 12/12/2016

613 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Rachel Geman dated 10/31/2016 re: Discovery. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Jessica Lake, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Levin−Gesundheit, Michael) (Entered: 10/31/2016)
614 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated November 1, 2016 re: In Response To Plaintiffs' October 31, 2016 Letter To Court Which Purports To Inform The Court Of Certain Discovery Matters. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 11/01/2016)
Magistrate Judge Ronald L. Ellis is so redesignated. (wb) (Entered: 11/01/2016)
615 MEMO ENDORSEMENT on re: 614 Letter, filed by KPMG LLP. ENDORSEMENT: Defendant's application to strike Plaintiffs' letter is DENIED. The parties are reminded that the purpose of meeting and conferring is to avoid involving the Court in matters that the parties can resolve without judicial intervention. The parties need not apprise the Court of potential, unripe discovery disputes except by the joint status letters required by the Scheduling Order dated October 5, 2016. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 11/2/2016) (kgo) (Entered: 11/02/2016)
616 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: CONFERENCE held on 10/5/2016 before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Kelly Surina, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 12/5/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/15/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/10/2017.(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 11/09/2016)
617 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a CONFERENCE proceeding held on 10/5/16 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 11/09/2016)
618 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 11/15/2016)
619 STATUS REPORT. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 11/29/2016)
620 FILING ERROR − WRONG EVENT TYPE SELECTED FROM MENU − LETTER MOTION for Discovery to Compel Responses to Interrogatories addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Peter O. Hughes dated December 9, 2016. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Hughes, Peter) Modified on 1/4/2017 (ldi). (Entered: 12/09/2016)
621 MEMO ENDORSEMENT with respect to 620 Letter Motion for Discovery. ENDORSEMENT: Plaintiffs shall file a letter response not to exceed three pages by December 19, 2016. A telephone conference will be held on December 21, 2016, at 11:30 a.m. At the appointed time, the parties shall jointly call Chambers at (212) 805−0288. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 12/12/2016) (kgo) (Entered: 12/12/2016)
Set/Reset Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 12/21/2016 at 11:30 AM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. (kgo) (Entered: 12/12/2016)
622 LETTER MOTION for Discovery of Defendant KPMG's Witnesses addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kelly M. Dermody dated December 12, 2016. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Linda O'Donnell, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Dermody, Kelly) (Entered: 12/12/2016)

12/12/2016 12/12/2016 12/13/2016 12/13/2016
12/13/2016 12/14/2016 12/15/2016
12/19/2016
12/19/2016
12/28/2016 01/03/2017 01/04/2017 01/04/2017

623 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting dated December 12, 2016 re: Plaintiffs' Expert. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 12/12/2016)
624 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M Kenney dated 12/12/2016 re: Doc. #608 Plaintiff's Request that the Court Vacate the 1/17/2017 Deadine. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 12/12/2016)
625 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 12/13/2016)
626 ORDER granting 622 Letter Motion for Discovery. Application GRANTED. Plaintiffs' request will be addressed at the discovery conference scheduled for December 21, 2016. KPMG's response, if any, shall not exceed three pages and is due by December 19, 2016. Plaintiffs' request to the extend the deadline to file its expert report (Dkt. No. 624) will also be addressed at the upcoming conference. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 12/13/2016) (kgo) (Entered: 12/14/2016)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Responses due by 12/19/2016 (kgo) (Entered: 12/14/2016)
627 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Peter O. Hughes dated December 14, 2016 re: Request for Adjournment of Discovery Conference Scheduled for December 21, 2016. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Hughes, Peter) (Entered: 12/14/2016)
628 MEMO ENDORSEMENT on re: 627 Letter re: Request for Adjournment of Discovery Conference Scheduled for December 21, 2016, filed by KPMG LLP. ENDORSEMENT: Application GRANTED in part. The telephone conference, currently scheduled for December 21, 2016, is adjourned to January 4, 2017, at 11:10 a.m. At the appointed time, the parties shall jointly call Chambers at (212) 805−0288. (Telephone Conference set for 1/4/2017 at 11:10 AM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield.) (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 12/15/2016) (cla) (Entered: 12/15/2016)
629 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated 12/19/16 re: Response in opposition to Plaintiffs December 12, 2016 letter request for a pre−motion conference on their anticipated Motion to Compel discovery with respect to declarants. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 12/19/2016)
630 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kelly Dermody dated December 19, 2016 re: Response to 620 Letter Motion for Discovery. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Zegeye, Tiseme) (Entered: 12/19/2016)
631 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 12/28/2016)
632 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 01/03/2017)
633 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 01/04/2017)
634 ORDER: For the reasons stated at the January 4, 2017, conference, KPMG's application to compel Plaintiffs to respond to certain interrogatories is DENIED; the Court RESERVES decision on the Plaintiffs' application concerning discovery of KPMG declarants; Plaintiff's application to extend the expert discovery schedule is GRANTED; and the parties are directed to file additional information by January 13, 2017. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 1/4/2017) (kgo) Modified on 1/4/2017 (kgo). (Entered: 01/04/2017)

01/04/2017 01/13/2017 01/13/2017 01/17/2017 01/18/2017 01/18/2017 01/20/2017
01/26/2017
01/26/2017
03/15/2017 03/24/2017 03/27/2017

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lorna G. Schofield: Telephone Conference held on 1/4/2017. (jcs) (Entered: 01/06/2017)
635 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen Kenney dated 1/13/17 re: Supplemental Letter Regarding Dates and Potential Limits on Discovery, Briefing, Exhibits and Declarations. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment A)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 01/13/2017)
636 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen Kenney dated 1/13/17 re: Joint Letter Regarding the Status of Discovery in Accordance with the Court's 10/5/16 Oedwe (Dkt. 608) and Court's 1/4/17 Order (Dkt. 634).. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 01/13/2017)
637 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting dated January 17, 2017 re: Plaintiffs' Proposed Schedule. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment A −− Proposed Order)(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 01/17/2017)
638 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated January 18, 2017 re: KPMG's Reply to Plaintiffs' Letter dated 1−17−17 Re: Scheduling and Related Limits Dkt. 637, Dkt. 637−1. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 01/18/2017)
639 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated 1/18/2017 re: Corrected Attachment A to 1/13/2017 Supplemental Letter Regarding Dates and Potential Limits on Discovery, Briefing, Exhibits and Declarations. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 01/18/2017)
640 ORDER ON SCHEDULING AND DISCOVERY LIMITS: All Expert Discovery, including any depositions, will conclude by October 20, 2017. A pre−motion conference will be held on November 15, 2017, at 11:00 a.m. The Court will set a briefing schedule and rule on the Parties' requested limitations at the pre−motion conference. The Parties shall submit a joint status letter on March 15, 2017, as set forth in the Court's Individual Rules and every 45 days thereafter. Deposition due by 10/20/2017. Expert Discovery due by 10/20/2017. Pre−Motion Conference set for 11/15/2017 at 11:00 AM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 1/20/2017) (kgo) (Entered: 01/20/2017)
641 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: confernece held on 1/4/2017 before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Kristen Carannante, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 2/16/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/27/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/26/2017.(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 01/26/2017)
642 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a CONFERENCE proceeding held on 1/4/17 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 01/26/2017)
643 STATUS REPORT. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 03/15/2017)
644 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated 03/24/17 re: Clarification of Court's January 20, 2017. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 03/24/2017)
645 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting dated March 27, 2017 re: KPMG's Letter Motion at Dkt. No. 644. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 03/27/2017)

03/28/2017
03/29/2017 03/30/2017 04/04/2017 04/04/2017 04/05/2017 04/12/2017
04/12/2017 04/13/2017 04/15/2017

646 ORDER: It is hereby ORDERED that a telephone conference is hereby scheduled for April 6, 2017, at 10:30 a.m. At the appointed time, the parties shall jointly call Chambers at (212) 805−0288. It is further ORDERED that by April 4, Plaintiffs shall file a letter opposing KPMG's applications for reconsideration/clarification and to compel. If Plaintiffs have an interest in confidential treatment of the motion and their response thereto, they shall email their opposition instead of filing it and prepare a separate letter requesting and justifying confidential treatment. If Plaintiffs do not assert confidential treatment, they shall file their opposition letter on ECF by April 4, and Defendant shall file its March 23, 2017, letter on ECF no later than one day thereafter. Telephone Conference set for 4/6/2017 at 10:30 AM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 3/28/2017) (kgo) (Entered: 03/28/2017)
647 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Peter O. Hughes dated March 29, 2017 re: Request for Adjournment of April 6, 2017 Telephone Conference. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Hughes, Peter) (Entered: 03/29/2017)
648 MEMO ENDORSEMENT: ENDORSEMENT: Application GRANTED. The telephone conference, currently scheduled for April 6, 2017, is adjourned to April 12, 2017, at 4:00 p.m. At the appointed time, the parties shall jointly call Chambers at (212) 805−0288. (Telephone Conference set for 4/12/2017 at 04:00 PM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield.) (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 3/30/2017) (ap) (Entered: 03/30/2017)
649 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting dated April 4, 2017 re: KPMG's Application for Reconsideration/Clarification at Dkt. 644. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 04/04/2017)
650 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kevin Love Hubbard dated April 4, 2017 re: KPMG's Request to Compel Rule 35 Examination. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 04/04/2017)
651 LETTER MOTION to Compel Plaintiff Nancy Jones to Submit to Rule 35 Examination addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Peter O. Hughes dated March 23, 2017. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Hughes, Peter) (Entered: 04/05/2017)
652 RULE 502(D) ORDER: IT IS ORDERED THAT: 1. The production of any privileged or protected information contained in the documents identified above, or in any additional documents that the Parties later stipulate will be produced pursuant to this Order, shall not constitute a waiver of any privilege or protection from discovery of this information (or any other documents or information) for the purposes of this matter or any other federal or state proceeding. 2. This Order shall be interpreted to provide the maximum protection allowed by Federal Rule of Evidence 502(d). 3. Nothing contained herein is intended to or shall serve to limit a party's right to conduct a review of documents, ESI or information (including metadata) for relevance, responsiveness and/or segregation of privileged and/or protected information before production. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 4/12/2017) (kgo) Modified on 4/12/2017 (kgo). (Entered: 04/12/2017)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lorna G. Schofield: Telephone Conference held on 4/12/2017. (Court Reporter Khris Sellin) (Lewis, Barton) (Entered: 04/14/2017)
653 ORDER granting 651 Letter Motion to Compel. It is hereby ORDERED that Defendant's motion to compel is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED that Plaintiffs' request to redact a portion of Defendant's March 23 letter is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED that Plaintiffs' request for costs is DENIED. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the motion at Dkt. No. 651. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 4/13/2017) (kgo) (Entered: 04/13/2017)
***DELETED DOCUMENT. Deleted document number 615 ORDER. The document was incorrectly filed in this case. (ap) (Entered: 05/16/2017)

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05/18/2017
05/18/2017

654 LETTER MOTION to Compel Plaintiffs to Pay costs addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated April 27, 2017. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 04/27/2017)
655 STATUS REPORT. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 04/28/2017)
656 ORDER re 654 Letter Motion to Compel: Application GRANTED. A telephone conference is hereby scheduled for May 10, 2017, at 10:50 a.m. to address KPMG's application. At the appointed time, the parties shall jointly call Chambers at (212) 805−0288. By May 3, 2017, Plaintiffs shall file a letter−response not to exceed three pages. (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Lorna G. Schofield)(Text Only Order) (Schofield, Lorna) (Entered: 05/01/2017)
Set/Reset Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 5/10/2017 at 10:50 AM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. (Schofield, Lorna) (Entered: 05/01/2017)
657 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kelly M. Dermody dated May 4, 2017 re: Telephone hearing schedule. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Levin−Gesundheit, Michael) (Entered: 05/04/2017)
658 MEMO ENDORSEMENT on re: 657 Letter, filed by Nancy Jones, Ashwini Vasudeva, Jeanette Potter, Tina Butler, Donna Kassman, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Carol Murray. ENDORSEMENT: Application GRANTED. The telephone conference, currently set for May 10, 2017, is adjourned to May 15, 2017, at 1:30 p.m. At the appointed time, the parties shall jointly call Chambers at (212) 805−0288. Telephone Conference set for 5/15/2017 at 01:30 PM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 5/8/2017) (kgo) (Entered: 05/08/2017)
Set/Reset Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 5/15/2017 at 01:30 PM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. (kgo) (Entered: 05/08/2017)
659 ORDER: It is hereby ORDERED that KPMG shall promptly produce its defense counsel invoices to Plaintiffs, and Plaintiffs shall have a reasonable opportunity to challenge any charges contained therein. Should KPMG deem it necessary to redact or re−phrase any invoice entry before sending the invoices to Plaintiffs, KPMG must submit a letter to the Court explaining the specific reason for the redactions or edits. The parties shall meet and confer to arrange for payment as promptly as possible. It is further ORDERED that the Document Hosting Charges and KPMG's FTechs Services are compensable under the December 23, 2015, Order, and KPMG shall produce to Plaintiffs any additional invoices or other documents that explain these costs. It is further ORDERED that if either party has an interest in confidential treatment of Plaintiffs' May 3 letter, it shall submit an application by May 17, 2017, in accordance with Individual Rule I.C.3. Motions due by 5/17/2017. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 5/15/2017) (kgo) (Entered: 05/16/2017)
660 ORDER: WHEREAS, by letter dated May 17, 2017, sent by email, KPMG requested that Plaintiffs file a redacted version of Plaintiffs' letter, dated May 3, 2017, responding to KPMG's request for a pre−motion conference to address its motion to compel costs; WHEREAS, the requested redaction concerns defense counsel's billing arrangements. It is hereby ORDERED that KPMG's application is GRANTED. The billing information at issue was not critical to the motion for costs and there is strong privacy interest in the information, which outweighs the presumption of access. See GoSmile, Inc., v. Dr. Jonathan Levine, D.M.D. P.C., 769 F. Supp. 2d 630, 64950 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (permitting the sealing of "highly proprietary material concerning the defendants' marketing strategies... costs and budgeting"). (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 5/18/2017) (jwh) (Entered: 05/18/2017)
661 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kelly M. Dermody dated May 3, 2017 re: KPMG's Anticipated Motion to Compel (ECF 654). Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Jessica Lake, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Levin−Gesundheit, Michael) (Entered: 05/18/2017)

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662 MOTION for Yaman Salahi to Withdraw as Attorney of Record. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Salahi, Yaman) (Entered: 06/01/2017)
663 MEMO ENDORSEMENT: on granting 662 PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO WITHDRAW YAMAN SALAHI AS COUNSEL OF RECORD: ENDORSEMENT: Application GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to remove Yaman Salahi from the docket sheet and close the motion at Dkt. No. 662. Attorney Yaman Salahi terminated. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 6/2/2017) (ap) Modified on 6/8/2017 (ap). (Entered: 06/02/2017)
664 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: Conference held on 5/15/2017 before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Vincent Bologna, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 6/29/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 7/10/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 9/6/2017.(Siwik, Christine) (Entered: 06/08/2017)
665 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a Conference proceeding held on 5/15/17 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(Siwik, Christine) (Entered: 06/08/2017)
666 STATUS REPORT. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Levin−Gesundheit, Michael) (Entered: 06/13/2017)
667 LETTER MOTION for Leave to File Motion For Preclusion Of Further Expert Discovery addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated June 28, 2017. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 06/28/2017)
668 ORDER granting 667 Letter Motion for Leave to File Document: Application GRANTED. Plaintiffs shall file a letter response not to exceed 5 pages by July 7, 2017. A telephone conference will be held on July 19, 2017, at 10:50 a.m. At the appointed time, the parties shall jointly call Chambers at (212) 805−0288. (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Lorna G. Schofield)(Text Only Order) (Schofield, Lorna) (Entered: 06/29/2017)
Set/Reset Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 7/19/2017 at 10:50 AM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. (Lewis, Barton) (Entered: 06/29/2017)
669 LETTER RESPONSE to Motion addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting dated 7/7/2017 re: 667 LETTER MOTION for Leave to File Motion For Preclusion Of Further Expert Discovery addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated June 28, 2017. . Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 07/07/2017)
670 ORDER: It is hereby ORDERED that the proceeding in this matter, previously scheduled for July 19, 2017 at 10:50 a.m., shall be rescheduled for July 19, 2017 at 12:00 p.m., due to a scheduling conflict. SO ORDERED, ( Telephone Conference set for 7/19/2017 at 12:00 PM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield.) (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 7/18/2017) (ama) (Entered: 07/18/2017)
671 ORDER: It is hereby ORDERED that KPMG's motion to preclude post−certification discovery is DENIED without prejudice to renewal. KPMG may renew its request upon resolution of any class/collective certification and dispositive motions. See Joint Letter dated September 9, 2015, at Dkt. No. 415; Order dated January 12, 2016, at Dkt. No. 480. It is further ORDERED that by July 20, 2017, at 5:00 p.m., Plaintiff shall file a letter addressing KPMG's motion to compel Plaintiffs to supplement their answers to damages interrogatories. By July 21, 2017, at 5:00 p.m., KPMG shall file its response to Plaintiff's letter. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 7/19/2017) (kgo) (Entered: 07/19/2017)

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07/25/2017 07/25/2017 07/28/2017 07/31/2017
08/15/2017 08/15/2017

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lorna G. Schofield: Telephone Conference held on 7/19/2017. (jcs) (Entered: 08/07/2017)
672 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting dated 7/20/2017 re: KPMG's Motion to Compel Plaintiffs to Supplement Their Answers to Damages Interrogatories. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 07/20/2017)
673 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated July 21, 2017 re: Response to Plaintiffs' Letter dated July 20, 2017. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 07/21/2017)
674 ORDER: It is hereby ORDERED that, without knowing what the evidence at issue is or how it is necessary, or how it differs from the evidence on many subjects that Plaintiffs assert that KPMG should update, KPMG has failed to meet its burden and the motion is DENIED. The parties are reminded and cautioned that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e) requires updating, regardless of the status of discovery (closed, bifurcated, stayed etc.), "in a timely manner if the party learns that in some material respect the disclosure or response is incomplete or incorrect...." The parties, and the Court, may reasonably expect that in the absence of updating, the prior responses are not materially incomplete or incorrect. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 7/24/2017) (kgo) (Entered: 07/24/2017)
675 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: telephone Confrence held on 5/15/2017 before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Vincent Bologna, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 8/15/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/25/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/23/2017.(Siwik, Christine) (Entered: 07/25/2017)
676 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a telephone Confrence proceeding held on 5/15/17 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(Siwik, Christine) (Entered: 07/25/2017)
677 STATUS REPORT. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 07/28/2017)
678 MEMO ENDORSEMENT on re: 677 Status Report filed by Sparkle Patterson, Nancy Jones, Ashwini Vasudeva, Jeanette Potter, Tina Butler, Donna Kassman, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Carol Murray. ENDORSEMENT: The parties shall conduct as much expert discovery as possible before the decision on class certification motions. They should not wait to conduct "merits" expert discovery on the assumption that the full gamut of merits discovery will be available thereafter. The Court will evaluate what if any further specific expert discovery may be reasonably necessary and the reason for the delay. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 7/31/2017) (kgo) (Entered: 07/31/2017)
679 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: Conference held on 7/19/2017 before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Jennifer Thun, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 9/5/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/15/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/13/2017.(Jackson, Jasmine) (Entered: 08/15/2017)
680 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a CONFERENCE proceeding held on 07/19/2017 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely

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electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(Jackson, Jasmine) (Entered: 08/15/2017)
681 MOTION for Kevin Love Hubbard to Withdraw as Attorney . Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 08/18/2017)
682 ORDER granting 681 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Upon consideration of Plaintiffs' Motion to Withdraw Kevin Love Hubbard as Counsel of Record, the Court finds that good cause has been shown for the granting of the Motion. ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby ORDERED, that the Motion is GRANTED, and FURTHER ORDERED, that Mr. Hubbard be withdrawn as Plaintiffs' counsel in this matter. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the motion at Dkt. No. 681. Attorney Kevin Love Hubbard terminated. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 8/22/2017) (kgo) (Entered: 08/22/2017)
683 LETTER MOTION for Leave to File Motion For Preclusion Of Plaintiff's New Expert Disclosure addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated August 30, 2017. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 08/30/2017)
684 MEMO ENDORSEMENT with respect to 683 Letter Motion for Leave to File Document. ENDORSEMENT: A telephone conference will be held September 6, 2017, at 10:50 a.m. At the appointed time, the parties shall jointly call Chambers at (212) 805−0288. Plaintiff shall file a letter response by September 5, 2017, at noon. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 8/30/2017) (kgo) (Entered: 08/30/2017)
Set/Reset Deadlines: ( Responses due by 9/5/2017), Set/Reset Hearings:( Telephone Conference set for 9/6/2017 at 10:50 AM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield.) (kgo) (Entered: 08/30/2017)
685 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Rachel Geman dated August 31, 2017 re: Request for Adjournment of Telephone Conference Scheduled for September 6, 2017. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Zegeye, Tiseme) (Entered: 08/31/2017)
686 MEMO ENDORSED on re: 685 Letter, filed by Sparkle Patterson, Nancy Jones, Ashwini Vasudeva, Jeanette Potter, Tina Butler, Donna Kassman, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Carol Murray. ENDORSEMENT: Application GRANTED in part. The telephone conference, currently set for September 6, 2017, is adjourned to September 13, 2017, at 11:30 a.m. If the parties are unable to attend, they shall propose at least three alternative dates and times. ( Telephone Conference set for 9/13/2017 at 11:30 AM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield.) (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 8/31/2017) (js) (Entered: 09/01/2017)
687 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Rachel Geman dated September 5, 2017 re: KPMG's Letter Motion For Preclusion Of Plaintiffs' Expert Disclosure. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Levin−Gesundheit, Michael) (Entered: 09/05/2017)
688 MOTION for Saba Bireda to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Filing fee $ 200.00, receipt number 0208−14090335. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Affidavit, # 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Bireda, Saba) (Entered: 09/05/2017)
689 MOTION for Thomas J. Henderson to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Filing fee $ 200.00, receipt number 0208−14090521. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Certificates of Good Standing, # 2 Affidavit, # 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Henderson, Thomas) (Entered: 09/05/2017)

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09/22/2017 09/25/2017

>>>NOTICE REGARDING PRO HAC VICE MOTION. Regarding Document No. 689 MOTION for Thomas J. Henderson to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Filing fee $ 200.00, receipt number 0208−14090521. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff., 688 MOTION for Saba Bireda to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Filing fee $ 200.00, receipt number 0208−14090335. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff.. The document has been reviewed and there are no deficiencies. (bcu) (Entered: 09/06/2017)
690 ORDER granting 688 Motion for Saba Bireda to Appear Pro Hac Vice and granting 689 Motion for Thomas J. Henderson to Appear Pro Hac Vice (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Lorna G. Schofield)(Text Only Order) (Schofield, Lorna) (Entered: 09/08/2017)
691 STATUS REPORT. Joint Status Letter Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Levin−Gesundheit, Michael) (Entered: 09/11/2017)
692 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated September 12, 2017 re: Untimely Experts. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 09/12/2017)
693 NOTICE of Filing. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 09/12/2017)
694 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Rachel Geman dated September 12, 2017 re: KPMG's Reply (#692) In Support of Its Letter Motion For Preclusion Of Plaintiffs' Expert Disclosure. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Levin−Gesundheit, Michael) (Entered: 09/12/2017)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lorna G. Schofield: Telephone Conference held on 9/13/2017. (jcs) (Entered: 10/06/2017)
695 ORDER: denying 683 Letter Motion for Leave to File Document. ORDERED that Defendant's application is DENIED. The testimony of Drs. McGowan and Hanges shall be permitted. It is further ORDERED that Dr. Banks shall be permitted to respond to their reports, and Drs. McGowan and Hanges shall not be permitted a sur−response. It is further ORDERED that the parties shall file a letter with the Court proposing any revisions to the schedule in light of this order. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to close the motion at Docket No. 683. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 9/14/2017) (ap) (Entered: 09/14/2017)
696 JOINT LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting and Colleen M. Kenney dated September 22, 2017 re: Amending The Scheduling Order (Docket No. 640). Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 09/22/2017)
697 ORDER REGARDING SCHEDULING: Expert Discovery, with the exception of Dr. Banks' rebuttal and deposition, will conclude by November 3, 2017. All Expert Discovery, including any depositions, will conclude by December 1, 2017. The Parties shall submit pre−motion letters as provided in the Court's Individual Rules, regarding class and/or collective action certification or decertification and any dispositive or other motions based on preclass certification discovery by November 10, 2017. Responsive letters are due November 17, 2017. The Parties shall submit a joint letter containing their proposed briefing schedule and limitations on briefing, including as to the number of pages, exhibits and declarations by November 17, 2017. The parties shall meet and confer in advance of this date in an effort to agree on these items. A pre−motion conference will be held on December 6, 2017, at 10:50 a.m. The Court will set a briefing schedule and rule on the Parties' requested limitations at the pre−motion conference. Deposition due by 12/1/2017. Expert Discovery due by 12/1/2017. Pre−Motion Conference set for 12/6/2017 at 10:50 AM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 9/25/2017) (kgo) (Entered: 09/25/2017)

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698 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: conference held on 9/13/2017 before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Thomas Murray, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 11/16/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/27/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/24/2018.(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 10/26/2017)
699 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a conference proceeding held on 9/13/17 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 10/26/2017)
700 STATUS REPORT. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 10/26/2017)
701 LETTER MOTION for Leave to File Motion to Certify Rule 23 Class addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting dated November 10, 2017. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 11/10/2017)
702 JOINT LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen Kenney dated 11/17/2017 re: Briefing Schedule and Limitations. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 11/17/2017)
703 LETTER MOTION for Leave to File Daubert Motions to Exclude Expert Testimony addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting dated November 20, 2017. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 November 10, 2017 Letter Motion)(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 11/20/2017)
704 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen Kenney dated November 20, 2017 re: KPMGs Pre−Motion Conference Letter regarding anticipated motions, including those to exclude Plaintiffs expert testimony.. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 November 10, 2017 Letter)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 11/20/2017)
705 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting dated November 21, 2017 re: KPMG's Letter at Docket No. 704. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Letter in Opposition to KPMG's November 10, 2017 Letter)(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 11/21/2017)
706 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen Kenney dated November 21, 2017 re: KPMGs Response to Plaintiffs Pre−Motion Conference Letter of November 17, 2017 regarding anticipated motions, including those to exclude Plaintiffs expert testimony.. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 November 17, 2017 Letter)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 11/21/2017)
707 ORDER: It is hereby ORDERED that Defendant shall file a letter by December 14, 2017, explaining the type and number of additional declarations they seek to file with their upcoming class certification, EPA collective decertification and Daubert briefing. Plaintiffs shall file a responsive letter by December 20, 2017. The parties shall file a joint proposed briefing schedule by January 12, 2018. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 12/6/2017) (anc) (Entered: 12/06/2017)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lorna G. Schofield: Pre−Motion Conference held on 12/6/2017. (jcs) (Entered: 12/14/2017)
708 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated December 14, 2017 re: Proposed Declarations for use in its briefing on Plaintiffs Certification and Daubert motions.. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen)

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01/18/2018 01/19/2018

(Entered: 12/14/2017)
709 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting dated December 20, 2017 re: KPMG's Letter at Docket #708. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 12/20/2017)
710 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated December 20, 2017 re: KPMG's Reply letter regarding declaration limits. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 12/20/2017)
711 ORDER granting 701 Letter Motion for Leave to File Document; granting 703 Letter Motion for Leave to File Document. Plaintiff shall simultaneously file its motions for preliminary certification of a class under Rule 23, Fed. R. Civ. P., and final certification under the Equal Pay Act. Court papers in support and in opposition shall consist of the following herein. The parties shall file motions and related court papers to exclude expert testimony pertinent to the class certification motions as follows herein. The parties shall file a joint proposed briefing schedule by January 12, 2018, which shall include deadlines for the filing of all of the foregoing submissions. KPMG's request for reconsideration of this Court's ruling at Docket No. 640 is denied. (As further set forth herein.) (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 12/22/2017) (kgo) Modified on 2/7/2018 (kgo). (Entered: 12/22/2017)
712 JOINT LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated January 12, 2018 re: Proposed Briefing Schedule. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Proposed Order re Briefing Schedule)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 01/12/2018)
713 LETTER MOTION for Discovery Re: Proposed Motion to Compel the production of any undisclosed analyses performed by Plaintiffs statistical expert. addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated January 16, 2018. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit No. 1, # 2 Exhibit No. 2, # 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 01/16/2018)
714 ORDER: with respect to 713 Letter Motion for Discovery. Plaintiff shall file a letter response not to exceed three pages no later than January 22, 2018. A telephone conference will be held on January 24, 2018, at 10:50 a.m. to discuss this matter. Response due by 1/22/2018. Telephone conference set for 1/24/2018, at 10:50 A.M. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 1/17/2018) (ap) (Entered: 01/17/2018)
Set/Reset Deadlines: (Responses due by 1/22/2018) Set/Reset Hearings: (Telephone Conference set for 1/24/2018 at 10:50 AM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield.) (ap) (Entered: 01/17/2018)
715 ORDER REGARDING BRIEFING SCHEDULE granting 713 Letter Motion for Discovery. Motions for Class and Collective Certification. 1. Plaintiffs' single opening brief in support of their motions for Rule 23 and Equal Pay Act certification must be filed by January 31, 2018. 2. KPMG's single responsive brief must be filed by April 13, 2018. 3. Plaintiffs' single reply brief must be filed by June 22, 2018. Daubert Motions to Exclude Expert Testimony Related to Class Certification and Collective Decertification. 1. KPMG's motions to exclude expert testimony related to class certification and collective decertification must be filed by April 13, 2018. 2. Plaintiffs' oppositions to KPMG's motions must be filed by May 18, 2018. 3. Plaintiffs' motions to exclude expert testimony related to class certification and collective decertification must be filed by June 22, 2018. 4. KPMG's oppositions to Plaintiffs' motions must be filed by July 18, 2018. (As further set forth in this Order.) (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 1/18/2018) (cf) (Entered: 01/18/2018)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Motions due by 6/22/2018. Responses due by 7/18/2018 Replies due by 6/22/2018. (cf) (Entered: 01/18/2018)
716 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated January 19, 2018 re: Request for Rescheduling of January 24, 2018 Telephone Conference. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 01/19/2018)

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717 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Rachel J. Geman dated January 22, 2018 re: KPMG's Letter at Docket No. 713. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Levin−Gesundheit, Michael) (Entered: 01/22/2018)
718 MEMO ENDORSEMENT on re: 716 Letter filed by KPMG LLP. ENDORSEMENT: Application GRANTED. The conference is rescheduled to 4:30 p.m. on January 24, 2018. (Telephone Conference set for 1/24/2018 at 04:30 PM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield.) (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 1/22/2018) (cf) (Entered: 01/22/2018)
719 FILING ERROR − WRONG EVENT TYPE SELECTED FROM MENU − MOTION to Substitute Party. Old Party: Valerie Hughes, New Party: Frank Hughes . Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Mueting, Katie) Modified on 3/23/2018 (ldi). (Entered: 01/22/2018)
720 ORDER TO SUBSTITUTE PARTY granting 719 Motion to Substitute Party. It is hereby ORDERED that Frank Hughes, as personal representative of the Estate of Valerie Hughes, is substituted for Opt−In Plaintiff Valerie Hughes in this matter. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 1/23/2018) (kgo) Modified on 3/5/2018 (kgo). (Entered: 01/23/2018)
721 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated January 23, 2018 re: Request to file a short reply to correct significant misstatements in Plaintiffs January 22, 2018 response (Dkt. 717) to KPMGs January 16, 2018 pre−motion letter requesting certain alternative analyses by their expert, Dr. Vekker.. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 01/23/2018)
722 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Rachel J. Geman dated January 24, 2018 re: KPMG's Improper Reply Letter Filed at Docket No. 721. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Levin−Gesundheit, Michael) (Entered: 01/24/2018)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lorna G. Schofield: Telephone Conference held on 1/24/2018. (jcs) (Entered: 01/25/2018)
723 ORDER COMPELLING DR. VEKKER: It is HEREBY ORDERED: A. Dr. Vekker shall provide verified answers to the questions below within 7 days of this Order. 1. Did you ever conduct analyses of base pay (in whole or in part) by job title or level? 2. Did you ever conduct analyses of total compensation (in whole or part) by job title or level? 3. Did you ever conduct analyses for promotions (in whole or in part) by year? 4. If you ran but did not retain your files and programming for one or more of the above analyses, identify the date you ran and the date you deleted or otherwise destroyed the programming and files. B. To the extent not already produced, Dr. Vekker shall produce all information, including files, programming and results, with the original meta data, for any analysis relating to the questions listed in A above within 7 days of this Order. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 1/25/2018) (anc) (Entered: 01/25/2018)
724 ENDORSED LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated 2/6/2018 re: KPMG respectfully requests that the Court Order Plaintiffs to revise their brief and exhibits to comply with the Courts Orders, as set forth in the attached draft order. ENDORSEMENT: The Court's order at Dkt. 711 is hereby clarified as follows: "Each party may submit no more than 125 additional exhibits, which in total shall not exceed 1,875 pages." The exhibits shall not include excerpts, except that any single voluminous document of more than 100 pages or the deposition testimony of a single witness may be excerpted as an exhibit, and the entire unexcerpted document shall be provided on a CD. The due dates in the Court's order at Dkt. 715 are hereby extended by two weeks. Defendant shall provide the Court via email in Word format with a form of Order to replace Dkt. 715. The parties shall file all future correspondence concerning the motions on ECF rather than emailing them. Both Defendant's letter and Plaintiff's response are filed herewith as a single document. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 2/7/2018) (kgo) (Entered:

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02/07/2018)
725 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated February 8, 2018 re: pre−motion letter on KPMGs proposed Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Exhibits filed in support of Motion for Class Certification under Rule 23 and Final Certification of the Equal Pay Act Collective because they violate the Courts Order. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order re Briefing Schedule)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 02/08/2018)
726 MOTION for Michelle A. Lamy to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Filing fee $ 200.00, receipt number 0208−14678321. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Michelle A. Lamy and attached Certificate of Good Standing, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Lamy, Michelle) (Entered: 02/08/2018)
>>>NOTICE REGARDING PRO HAC VICE MOTION. Regarding Document No. 726 MOTION for Michelle A. Lamy to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Filing fee $ 200.00, receipt number 0208−14678321. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff.. The document has been reviewed and there are no deficiencies. (wb) (Entered: 02/08/2018)
727 ORDER granting 726 Motion for Michelle A. Lamy to Appear Pro Hac Vice (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Lorna G. Schofield)(Text Only Order) (Schofield, Lorna) (Entered: 02/08/2018)
728 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated February 9, 2018 re: KPMG requests a pre−motion conference because Plaintiffs have failed to comply with the Courts January 25, 2018 discovery order regarding analyses performed by their expert, Dr. Vekker. (Dkt. 723). Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 02/09/2018)
729 ORDER REGARDING REVISED BRIEFING SCHEDULE: It is hereby ORDERED that the following briefing schedule be adopted: Motions for Class and Collective Certification Plaintiffs' single opening brief in support of their motions for Rule 23 and Equal Pay Act certification must be filed by February 14, 2018. KPMG's single responsive brief must be filed by April 27, 2018. Plaintiffs' single reply brief must be filed by July 6, 2018. KPMG's motions to exclude expert testimony related to class certification and collective decertification must be filed by April 27, 2018. Plaintiffs' oppositions to KPMG's motions must be filed by June 1, 2018. Plaintiffs' motions to exclude expert testimony related to class certification and collective decertification must be filed by July 6, 2018. KPMG's oppositions to Plaintiffs' motions must be filed by August 1, 2018. (As further set forth herein.) Motions due by 7/6/2018. Responses due by 8/1/2018 Replies due by 7/6/2018. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 2/9/2018) (kgo) (Entered: 02/09/2018)
730 MOTION for Shira J. Tevah to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Filing fee $ 200.00, receipt number 0208−14686296. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Affidavit and Certificate of Good Standing, # 2 Text of Proposed Order for Admission Pro Hac Vice)(Tevah, Shira) (Entered: 02/09/2018)
>>>NOTICE REGARDING PRO HAC VICE MOTION. Regarding Document No. 730 MOTION for Shira J. Tevah to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Filing fee $ 200.00, receipt number 0208−14686296. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff.. The document has been reviewed and there are no deficiencies. (bcu) (Entered: 02/12/2018)
731 ORDER granting 730 Motion for Shira J. Tevah to Appear Pro Hac Vice (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Lorna G. Schofield)(Text Only Order) (Schofield, Lorna) (Entered: 02/12/2018)
732 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Rachel J. Geman dated February 12, 2018 re: KPMG's Letter at Docket No. 728. Document filed by Tina

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03/06/2018 03/08/2018

Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Jessica Lake, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Levin−Gesundheit, Michael) (Entered: 02/12/2018)
733 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: CONFERENCE held on 1/24/2018 before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Kristen Carannante, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 3/6/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/16/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/14/2018.(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 02/13/2018)
734 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a CONFERENCE proceeding held on 1/24/18 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 02/13/2018)
735 MEMO ENDORSEMENT on re: 732 Letter, filed by Sparkle Patterson, Nancy Jones, Ashwini Vasudeva, Jeanette Potter, Tina Butler, Donna Kassman, Cheryl Charity, Jessica Lake, Heather Inman, Carol Murray. ENDORSEMENT: A telephone conference will be held on February 21, 2018, at 11:00 a.m. to discuss these issues. ( Telephone Conference set for 2/21/2018 at 11:00 AM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield.) (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 2/13/2018) (kgo) (Entered: 02/13/2018)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lorna G. Schofield: Telephone Conference held on 2/21/2018. (jcs) (Entered: 02/21/2018)
736 ORDER: It is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiffs shall send an ex parte email to the Court by February 28, 2018, attaching unredacted copies of the documents at issue, and containing an explanation of their contents and of the material redacted in Plaintiffs' production to Defendant. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 2/21/2018) (kgo) (Main Document 736 replaced on 2/23/2018) (kgo). (Entered: 02/22/2018)
737 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Aimee Krause Stewart on behalf of Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Stewart, Aimee) (Entered: 02/23/2018)
738 ORDER: WHEREAS, by email to Chambers dated February 27, 2018, Defendant submitted a pre−motion letter seeking to strike certain material in support of Plaintiffs' motion for class certification; WHEREAS, Plaintiffs responded by email on February 27, 2018. It is hereby ORDERED that a telephone conference will be held on March 1, 2018, at 11:30 a.m., ( Telephone Conference set for 3/1/2018 at 11:30 AM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield.) (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 2/28/2018) (ama) (Entered: 02/28/2018)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lorna G. Schofield: Telephone Conference held on 3/1/2018. (jcs) (Entered: 03/01/2018)
739 MEMO ENDORSEMENT: on re: 728 Letter, filed by KPMG LLP. ENDORSEMENT: Upon ex parte review of unredacted versions of the documents at issue, which have been designated "ATTORNEY EYES ONLY" under the protective order in this case, as well as Plaintiffs' explanation of the contents of the documents, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiffs need not produce unredacted versions of these documents to Defendant. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 3/2/2018) (ap) (Entered: 03/05/2018)
740 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Jennifer Siegel on behalf of Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Siegel, Jennifer) (Entered: 03/06/2018)
741 MOTION for Leigh Anne St. Charles to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Filing fee $ 200.00, receipt number 0208−14785460. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by

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Clerk's Office staff. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit, # 2 Exhibit Certificate of Good Standing, # 3 Text of Proposed Order)(St. Charles, Leigh) (Entered: 03/08/2018)
>>>NOTICE REGARDING PRO HAC VICE MOTION. Regarding Document No. 741 MOTION for Leigh Anne St. Charles to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Filing fee $ 200.00, receipt number 0208−14785460. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff.. The document has been reviewed and there are no deficiencies. (wb) (Entered: 03/08/2018)
742 STATUS REPORT. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 03/09/2018)
743 ORDER granting 741 Motion for Leigh Anne St. Charles to Appear Pro Hac Vice (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Lorna G. Schofield)(Text Only Order) (Schofield, Lorna) (Entered: 03/09/2018)
744 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: confernece held on 2/21/2018 before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Steven Greenblum, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 4/3/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/13/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/11/2018.(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 03/13/2018)
745 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a conference proceeding held on 2/21/18 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 03/13/2018)
746 FILING ERROR − DEFICIENT DOCKET ENTRY − MOTION for Douglas R. Hart to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Filing fee $ 200.00, receipt number 0208−14957210. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff. Document filed by Douglas R Hart. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Douglas R. Hart In Support of Motion to Admit Counsel Pro Hac Vice)(Hart, Douglas) Modified on 4/18/2018 (bcu). (Entered: 04/18/2018)
>>>NOTICE REGARDING DEFICIENT MOTION TO APPEAR PRO HAC VICE. Notice to RE−FILE Document No. 746 MOTION for Douglas R. Hart to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Filing fee $ 200.00, receipt number 0208−14957210. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff... The filing is deficient for the following reason(s): missing Certificate of Good Standing from Supreme Court of California. We do not except certificates from a district court or a state bar association.;. Re−file the motion as a Corrected Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice − attach the correct signed PDF − select the correct named filer/filers − attach valid Certificates of Good Standing issued within the past 30 days − attach Proposed Order.. (bcu) (Entered: 04/18/2018)
747 AMENDED MOTION for Douglas R. Hart to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Douglas R. Hart In Support of Motion to Admit Counsel Pro Hac Vice)(Hart, Douglas) (Entered: 04/19/2018)
>>>NOTICE REGARDING PRO HAC VICE MOTION. Regarding Document No. 747 AMENDED MOTION for Douglas R. Hart to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff.. The document has been reviewed and there are no deficiencies. (wb) (Entered: 04/20/2018)
748 STATUS REPORT. Joint Status Letter. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 04/23/2018)

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749 ORDER granting 747 Motion for Douglas R. Hart to Appear Pro Hac Vice (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Lorna G. Schofield)(Text Only Order) (Schofield, Lorna) (Entered: 04/23/2018)
750 MOTION for Jonathan D. Lotsoff to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Filing fee $ 200.00, receipt number 0208−14996602. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Jonathan D. Lotsoff)(Lotsoff, Jonathan) (Entered: 04/27/2018)
>>>NOTICE REGARDING PRO HAC VICE MOTION. Regarding Document No. 750 MOTION for Jonathan D. Lotsoff to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Filing fee $ 200.00, receipt number 0208−14996602. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff.. The document has been reviewed and there are no deficiencies. (wb) (Entered: 04/27/2018)
751 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kelly M. Dermody dated 4/30/2018 re: Letter to Honorable Lorna G. Schofield Re KPMG's Letter Motion to Strike Declarations. Document filed by Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Jessica Lake, Carol Murray, Linda O'Donnell, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Zegeye, Tiseme) (Entered: 04/30/2018)
752 ORDER granting 750 Motion for Jonathan D. Lotsoff to Appear Pro Hac Vice (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Lorna G. Schofield)(Text Only Order) (Schofield, Lorna) (Entered: 04/30/2018)
753 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen Kenney dated April 30, 2018 re: Response to Plaintiffs' April 30, 2018 Letter regarding KPMG's pre−motion conference letter regarding its anticipated motion to strike portions of the twenty Declarations of putative class members. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 04/30/2018)
754 MEMO ENDORSEMENT on re: 753 Letter, filed by KPMG LLP. ENDORSEMENT: Plaintiffs may respond to Defendant's premotion letter in a letter up to six pages long by May 7, 2018. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 5/1/2018) (kgo) (Entered: 05/01/2018)
755 ORDER: It is hereby ORDERED that Defendant is deemed to have moved to strike, and the letters emailed to the Court are deemed the full briefing for the motion, which will be considered with the class certification and Equal Pay Act collective final certification motion. Defendant's May 10, 2018, letter will be considered as a reply. As movant, it is appropriate that Defendant be allowed to close the briefing on this issue. See, e.g., Springs Indus., Inc. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 137 F.R.D. 238, 239 (N.D. Tex. 1991) ("In our jurisprudence the party who must persuade the court of the merits of the relief it seeks is almost always given the final word."). No sur−reply shall be filed. It is further ORDERED that the parties shall file these letters on ECF and comply with Individual Rule I.C.3 if they seek any redactions as soon as practicable. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 5/11/2018) (kgo) (Entered: 05/11/2018)
756 STATUS REPORT. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 06/04/2018)
757 ORDER, It is hereby ORDERED that the parties shall provide courtesy copies of the class and collective certification briefing to the Court by July 10, 2018, in accordance with the Court's individual rules. It is further ORDERED that the parties shall provide courtesy copies of the Daubert briefing to the Court by August 3, 2018, in accordance with the Court's individual rules. It is further ORDERED that a hearing will take place on July 16, 2018, at 2:30 p.m., at which the parties shall provide the Court with an overview of the arguments and evidence relevant to class and collective certification. This hearing will serve as a preliminary overview; the parties should not assume that the Court has any familiarity with the motion papers. It is further ORDERED that a hearing will take place on August 8, 2018, at 2:30 p.m., at which the parties shall provide the Court with an overview of the arguments and evidence relevant to the Daubert motions. This hearing will serve as a preliminary overview; the parties should not assume that the Court has any familiarity with the motion papers. It is further ORDERED that each party's presentation at each of the above mentioned hearings shall not exceed 100 minutes. The Plaintiffs may reserve up to 15 minutes of the total

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100 minutes for rebuttal. It is further ORDERED that oral argument on the motions will take place, if at all, on September 4, 2018, at 4:00 p.m., and only to address specific questions. In the unlikely event that the Court decides to hear oral argument, the parties will be informed in advance and may participate by telephone. (Motions due by 8/1/2018., Daubert Hearing set for 8/8/2018 at 02:30 PM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield., Oral Argument set for 9/4/2018 at 04:00 PM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield.), Set Deadlines/Hearing as to (Motion Hearing set for 7/16/2018 at 02:30 PM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield.) (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 6/7/18) (yv) (Entered: 06/07/2018)
758 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen Kenney dated June 12, 2018 re: Request for Adjournment of July 16, 2018 Hearing and clarification to the Hearing set for August 8, 2018 as to whether the Court wants Parties' respective experts to be present at the hearing.. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 06/12/2018)
759 MEMO ENDORSEMENT: on re: 758 Letter filed by KPMG LLP. ENDORSEMENT: Application GRANTED. The first hearing is adjourned to from July 16 to August 2, 2018, at 2:30 p.m. The parties' experts need not be present and will not be asked to testify at the August 8, 2018, hearing. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 6/13/2018) (ama) (Entered: 06/13/2018)
Set/Reset Deadlines as to Motion Hearing set for 8/2/2018 at 02:30 PM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. (ama) (Entered: 06/13/2018)
760 LETTER MOTION for Leave to File Defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Motion to Stike Defendant's Expert David Bloom, Ph.D addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Peter O. Hughes dated July 10, 2018. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Hughes, Peter) (Entered: 07/10/2018)
761 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Rachel Geman dated July 10, 2018 re: Response to Dkt. No. 760. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Jessica Lake, Carol Murray, Linda O'Donnell, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Geman, Rachel) (Entered: 07/10/2018)
762 LETTER MOTION for Leave to File Motion to Strike Expert Report of Plaintiffs' Expert Robert McGowan addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Peter O. Hughes dated July 11, 2018. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Hughes, Peter) (Entered: 07/11/2018)
763 MEMO ENDORSEMENT: on re: 761 Letter, filed by Sparkle Patterson, Nancy Jones, Ashwini Vasudeva, Jeanette Potter, Tina Butler, Donna Kassman, Cheryl Charity, Jessica Lake, Heather Inman, Linda O'Donnell, Carol Murray. ENDORSEMENT: Defendant shall file letter not exceeding six pages responding to Plaintiffs' July 6, 2018, letter by July 26, 2018, 12:00p.m. (Eastern time)., ( Responses due by 7/26/2018) (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 7/11/2018) (ama) (Entered: 07/12/2018)
764 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated July 12, 2018 re: Notice of supplemental authority in support of its opposition to Plaintiffs motion for class certification. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 07/12/2018)
765 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting dated July 12, 2018 re: Plaintiffs' Letter in Response to KPMG's Letter to Strike Plaintiffs' expert Dr. McGowan. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 07/12/2018)
766 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kelly M. Dermody dated 7/13/2018 re: Dkt. 764. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Jessica Lake, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Zegeye, Tiseme) (Entered: 07/13/2018)
767 STATUS REPORT. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter,

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08/29/2018

Ashwini Vasudeva.(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 07/20/2018)
768 MEMO ENDORSEMENT on re: 767 Status Report filed by Sparkle Patterson, Nancy Jones, Ashwini Vasudeva, Jeanette Potter, Tina Butler, Donna Kassman, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Carol Murray. ENDORSEMENT: The parties shall provide each other with any demonstratives no later than 10:00 a.m. Eastern the morning of the preliminary overview hearing on class certification. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 7/23/2018) (kgo) (Entered: 07/23/2018)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lorna G. Schofield: Motion Hearing held on 8/2/2018. (Court Reporter Jerry Harrison) (jcs) (Entered: 08/02/2018)
769 ORDER: It is hereby ORDERED that each party's presentation at each of the abovementioned hearings shall not exceed 80 minutes. The parties may reserve up to 15 minutes for rebuttal. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 8/3/2018) (kgo) (Entered: 08/03/2018)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lorna G. Schofield: Daubert Hearing held on 8/8/2018. (Court Reporter Tom Murray) (Lewis, Barton) (Entered: 08/28/2018)
770 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kelly M. Dermody dated August 9, 2018 re: Notice of Supplemental Authority Filed Pursuant to Court's Request at August 8, 2018 Hearing on Evidentiary Motions. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Levin−Gesundheit, Michael) (Entered: 08/09/2018)
771 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen Kenney dated August 13, 2018 re: KPMG's Response to Plaintiffs Notice of Supplemental Authority submitted on August 9, 2018. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 08/13/2018)
772 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: MOTION held on 8/8/2018 before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Thomas Murray, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 9/14/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/24/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/23/2018.(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 08/24/2018)
773 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a MOTION proceeding held on 8/8/18 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 08/24/2018)
774 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: motion held on 8/2/2018 before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Jerry Harrison, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 9/17/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/27/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/26/2018.(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 08/27/2018)
775 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a motion proceeding held on 8/2/18 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 08/27/2018)
776 ORDER: It is hereby ORDERED that the conference in this matter previously scheduled for September 4, 2018 at 4:00 p.m., is canceled. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 8/29/2018) (anc) (Entered: 08/29/2018)

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777 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kelly M. Dermody dated September 4, 2018 re: Notice of Supplemental Authority re Denial of 23(f) Review in Chen−Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 10−cv−6950 (SDNY). Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray.(Levin−Gesundheit, Michael) (Entered: 09/04/2018)
778 STATUS REPORT. Joint Status Report Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 09/04/2018)
779 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen Kenney dated September 5, 2018 re: KPMG respectfully moves to strike the argument contained in the second paragraph and the numbered paragraphs in Plaintiffs Notice of Supplemental Authority, submitted on September 4, 2018. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 09/05/2018)
780 MOTION for Shira J. Tevah to Withdraw as Attorney . Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Jessica Lake, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Tevah, Shira) (Entered: 09/14/2018)
781 MEMO ENDORSEMENT granting 780 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. ENDORSEMENT: Application GRANTED. Shira Tevah shall be withdrawn as Plaintiffs' counsel in this matter. Attorney Shira Jordan Tevah terminated. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 9/17/2018) (mro) (Entered: 09/17/2018)
782 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kelly M. Dermody dated September 20, 2018 re: Notice of Supplemental Authority − Ninth Circuit's Grant of Rule 23(f) Review of District Court's Denial of Class Certification in Moussouris v. Microsoft Corp., No. 15−cv−1483 (W.D. Wash.). Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray.(Levin−Gesundheit, Michael) (Entered: 09/20/2018)
783 STATUS REPORT. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 10/19/2018)
784 NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS by David W. Sanford on behalf of Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. New Address: Sanford Heisler Sharp, LLP, 700 Pennsylvania Ave SE, Suite 300, Washington, D.C., United States 20003, (202) 499−5201. (Sanford, David) (Entered: 11/02/2018)
785 NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS by Katie Mueting on behalf of Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. New Address: Sanford Heisler Sharp, LLP, 700 Pennsylvania Ave SE, Suite 300, Washington, D.C., United States 20003, (202) 499−5206. (Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 11/02/2018)
786 NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS by Thomas J Henderson on behalf of Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. New Address: Sanford Heisler Sharp, LLP, 700 Pennsylvania Ave SE, Suite 300, Washington, D.C., United States 20003, (202) 499−5205. (Henderson, Thomas) (Entered: 11/02/2018)
787 NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS by Aimee Krause Stewart on behalf of Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. New Address: Sanford Heisler Sharp, LLP, 700 Pennsylvania Ave SE, Suite 300, Washington, D.C., United States 20003, (202) 499−5208. (Stewart, Aimee) (Entered: 11/02/2018)
788 NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS by Saba Bireda on behalf of Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. New Address: Sanford Heisler Sharp, LLP, 700 Pennsylvania Ave SE, Suite 300, Washington, D.C., United States 20003, (202) 499−5209. (Bireda, Saba) (Entered: 11/02/2018)
789 ORDER: WHEREAS, at the Courts direction, the parties submitted via mail and email to Chambers all of their motions and related court papers regarding Plaintiffs class and

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collective certifications motions; it is hereby ORDERED that the parties shall confer and submit a joint proposed schedule by November 19, 2018, for the orderly filing on the docket of all court papers submitted in connection with Plaintiffs class and collective certification motions, as well as the Daubert motions and motions to strike, including provisions for filing with redactions and under seal. The parties should consider filing on multiple days to promote a logical and findable ordering of the documents. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 11/14/2018) (kv) (Entered: 11/14/2018)
790 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: corrected motion held on 8/8/2018 before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Thomas Murray, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 12/6/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/17/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/13/2019.(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 11/15/2018)
791 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a corrected motion proceeding held on 8/8/18 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 11/15/2018)
792 PROPOSED ORDER. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Kenney, Colleen) Proposed Order to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff. (Entered: 11/19/2018)
793 MOTION to Redact 774 Transcript,, . Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 11/20/2018)
794 NOTICE of Intent to Request Redaction by Colleen M. Kenney re 774 Transcript,,.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 11/20/2018)
***NOTICE TO COURT REGARDING PROPOSED ORDER. Document No. 792 Proposed Order was reviewed and approved as to form. (dt) (Entered: 11/20/2018)
795 ORDER: It is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiffs proposed redactions are accepted. It is hereby ORDERED that the Defendants first two categories of redactions are accepted. It is further ORDERED that Defendants third category of redactions is rejected. It is further ORDERED that the following schedule is adopted for the filing of motions and papers on ECF in redacted form or wholly under seal (as further set forth in this Order). It is further ORDERED that the Parties may reasonably adjust the foregoing deadlines by agreement amongst themselves for technological, logistical or other appropriate reasons, provided that all motions and papers are filed by December 5, 2018. Any document that is filed in redacted form on ECF shall be filed in unredacted form under seal by December 5, 2018. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 11/20/2018) (jcs) (Entered: 11/20/2018)
796 MEMO ENDORSED ORDER granting 793 Motion to Redact 774 Transcript. ENDORSEMENT: Application GRANTED. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 11/26/18) (yv) Transmission to Office of the Clerk of Court for processing. (Entered: 11/26/2018)
797 FILING ERROR − DEFICIENT DOCKET ENTRY − MOTION to Certify Class Under Rule 23 and Final Certification of the Equal Pay Act Collective. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum of Law, # 2 Declaration of Tiseme Zegeye, # 3 Exhibit 1, pages 0000850R−0004528, # 4 Exhibit 1, pages 0004529−0007581, # 5 Exhibit 1, pages 0007582−0009015, # 6 Exhibit 1, pages 0009255−0019506, # 7 Exhibit 1, pages 0019507−0019803, # 8 Exhibit 1, pages 0019804−0040443, # 9 Exhibit 1, pages 0040444−0070249, # 10 Exhibit 1, pages 0070250−0136821, # 11 Exhibit 1, pages 0136822−0139662, # 12 Exhibit 1, pages 0139663−0148696, # 13 Exhibit 1, pages 0148697−0149313, # 14 Exhibit 1, pages 0149314−0181784, # 15 Exhibit 1, pages 0183254−0466359, # 16 Exhibit 1, pages 0466360−0529039, # 17 Exhibit 1, pages

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0529040−0581174, # 18 Exhibit 1, pages 0581175−0632017, # 19 Exhibit 2, # 20 Exhibit 3, # 21 Exhibit 4, # 22 Exhibit 5, # 23 Exhibit 6, # 24 Exhibit 7, # 25 Exhibit 8, # 26 Exhibit 9, # 27 Exhibit 10, # 28 Exhibit 11, # 29 Exhibit 12, # 30 Exhibit 13, # 31 Exhibit 14, # 32 Exhibit 15, # 33 Exhibit 16, # 34 Exhibit 17, # 35 Exhibit 18, # 36 Exhibit 19, # 37 Exhibit 20, # 38 Dr. Vekker Report, # 39 Dr. Goldberg Report, # 40 Dr. Goldberg Reply Report, # 41 Dr. Hanges Rebuttal Report, # 42 Declaration of Kate Mueting, # 43 Declaration of Kelly Dermody, # 44 Declaration of David Sanford, # 45 Declaration of Carlynn Alexander, # 46 Declaration of Holly Barnes, # 47 Declaration of Hillary Bennetts, # 48 Declaration of Elizabeth Carey, # 49 Declaration of Marilyn Farley, # 50 Declaration of Anna Gracia, # 51 Declaration of Lauren Guenter, # 52 Declaration of Carolyn Gustafson, # 53 Declaration of Jessica Luke, # 54 Declaration of Lisa Schmaltz, # 55 Declaration of Sabrina Starnes, # 56 Declaration of Jody Underhill, # 57 Declaration of Deena Wallace, # 58 Declaration of Elisa Wu, # 59 Declaration of Tina Butler, # 60 Declaration of Cheryl Charity, # 61 Declaration of Heather Inman, # 62 Declaration of Nancy Jones, # 63 Declaration of Donna Kassman, # 64 Declaration of Carol Murray)(Mueting, Katie) Modified on 1/2/2019 (db). (Entered: 11/27/2018)
798 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Opposition re: 797 MOTION to Certify Class Under Rule 23 and Final Certification of the Equal Pay Act Collective. . Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 11/27/2018)
799 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Opposition re: 797 MOTION to Certify Class Under Rule 23 and Final Certification of the Equal Pay Act Collective. . Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K, # 12 Exhibit L, # 13 Exhibit M, # 14 Exhibit N, # 15 Exhibit O, # 16 Exhibit P, # 17 Exhibit Q, # 18 Exhibit R, # 19 Exhibit S, # 20 Exhibit T, # 21 Exhibit U, # 22 Exhibit V, # 23 Exhibit W, # 24 Exhibit X, # 25 Exhibit Y, # 26 Exhibit Z, # 27 Exhibit AA, # 28 Exhibit BB, # 29 Exhibit CC, # 30 Exhibit DD, # 31 Exhibit 1 (Part 1), # 32 Exhibit 1 (Part 2), # 33 Exhibit 1 (Part 3), # 34 Exhibit 1 (Part 4), # 35 Exhibit 1 (Part 5), # 36 Exhibit 1 (Part 6), # 37 Exhibit 1 (Part 7), # 38 Exhibit 1 (Part 8), # 39 Exhibit 1 (Part 9), # 40 Exhibit 1 (Part 10), # 41 Exhibit 1 (Part 11), # 42 Exhibit 1 (Part 12), # 43 Exhibit 1 (Part 13), # 44 Exhibit 1 (Part 14), # 45 Exhibit 2, # 46 Exhibit 3, # 47 Exhibit 4 (Part 1), # 48 Exhibit 4 (Part 2), # 49 Exhibit 4 (Part 3), # 50 Exhibit 4 (Part 4), # 51 Exhibit 4 (Part 5), # 52 Exhibit 5, # 53 Exhibit 6, # 54 Exhibit 7, # 55 Exhibit 8, # 56 Exhibit 9, # 57 Exhibit 10, # 58 Exhibit 11, # 59 Exhibit 12, # 60 Exhibit 13, # 61 Exhibit 14, # 62 Exhibit 15, # 63 Exhibit 16, # 64 Exhibit 17, # 65 Exhibit 18, # 66 Exhibit 19, # 67 Exhibit 20, # 68 Exhibit 21, # 69 Exhibit 22, # 70 Exhibit 23, # 71 Exhibit 24, # 72 Exhibit 25, # 73 Exhibit 26, # 74 Exhibit 27, # 75 Exhibit 28, # 76 Exhibit 29, # 77 Exhibit 30, # 78 Exhibit 31, # 79 Exhibit 32, # 80 Exhibit 33, # 81 Exhibit 34, # 82 Exhibit 35, # 83 Exhibit 36, # 84 Exhibit 37, # 85 Exhibit 38, # 86 Exhibit 39, # 87 Exhibit 40, # 88 Exhibit 41, # 89 Exhibit 42, # 90 Exhibit 43, # 91 Exhibit 44, # 92 Exhibit 45, # 93 Exhibit 46, # 94 Exhibit 47, # 95 Exhibit 48, # 96 Exhibit 49, # 97 Exhibit 50, # 98 Exhibit 51, # 99 Exhibit 52, # 100 Exhibit 53, # 101 Exhibit 54, # 102 Exhibit 55, # 103 Exhibit 56)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 11/27/2018)
800 FILING ERROR − DEFICIENT DOCKET ENTRY − MOTION to Preclude /Exclude Testimony from Plaintiffs' Experts. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Brief in Support of KPMG LLP's Motion to Strike Expert Dr. Vekker, # 2 Brief in Support of KPMG LLP's Motion to Strike Expert Dr. Goldberg, # 3 Brief in Support of KPMG LLP's Motion to Strike Expert Dr. Hanges)(Kenney, Colleen) Modified on 1/2/2019 (db). (Entered: 11/28/2018)
801 REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 797 MOTION to Certify Class Under Rule 23 and Final Certification of the Equal Pay Act Collective. . Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Kate Mueting, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Proposed Order, # 4 Certificate of Service, # 5 Dr. McGowan Rebuttal Report)(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 11/28/2018)
802 FILING ERROR − DEFICIENT DOCKET ENTRY − MOTION to Preclude /Exclude Testimony from Defendant's Expert Margaret Stockdale, Ph.D.. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: #

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1 Memorandum of Law, # 2 Declaration of Tiseme Zegeye, # 3 Exhibit 1, # 4 Exhibit 2, # 5 Exhibit 3, # 6 Proposed Order)(Mueting, Katie) Modified on 1/2/2019 (db). (Entered: 11/28/2018)
803 FILING ERROR − DEFICIENT DOCKET ENTRY − MOTION to Preclude /Exclude Testimony from Defendant's Expert Cristina Banks, Ph.D.. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum of Law, # 2 Declaration of Kate Mueting, # 3 Exhibit 1, pages 0002318−0002325, # 4 Exhibit 1, pages 0002326−0002333, # 5 Exhibit 1, pages 0002334−0002340, # 6 Exhibit 1, pages 0002341−0002348, # 7 Exhibit 1, pages 0002349−0002356, # 8 Exhibit 1, pages 0002357−0002364, # 9 Exhibit 1, pages 0002365−0002371, # 10 Exhibit 1, pages 0002372−0002377, # 11 Exhibit 2, # 12 Proposed Order, # 13 Dr. Banks Report, # 14 Dr. Banks Rebuttal Report)(Mueting, Katie) Modified on 1/2/2019 (db). (Entered: 11/28/2018)
804 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Opposition re: 800 MOTION to Preclude /Exclude Testimony from Plaintiffs' Experts. Opposition to KPMG LLP's Motion to Strike Expert Dr. Vekker. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration from Aimee K. Stewart, # 2 Exhibit 1, pages 0011351−0011358, # 3 Exhibit 1, pages 0011359−0011366, # 4 Exhibit 1, pages 0011367−0011374, # 5 Exhibit 1, pages 0011399−0011408, # 6 Exhibit 1, pages 0011409−0011420, # 7 Exhibit 1, pages 0011421−0020390, # 8 Exhibit 2, # 9 Exhibit 3, # 10 Exhibit 4)(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 11/28/2018)
805 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Opposition re: 802 MOTION to Preclude /Exclude Testimony from Defendant's Expert Margaret Stockdale, Ph.D.. . Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Peter O. Hughes, Esq. in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Exclude Stockdale Testimony)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 11/28/2018)
806 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Opposition re: 800 MOTION to Preclude /Exclude Testimony from Plaintiffs' Experts. Opposition to KPMG LLP's Motion to Strike Expert Dr. Goldberg. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Tiseme Zegeye, # 2 Exhibit 1)(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 11/28/2018)
807 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Opposition re: 800 MOTION to Preclude /Exclude Testimony from Plaintiffs' Experts. Opposition to KPMG LLP's Motion to Strike Expert Dr. Hanges. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Michelle Lamy, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit 3, # 5 Exhibit 4)(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 11/28/2018)
808 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Opposition re: 803 MOTION to Preclude /Exclude Testimony from Defendant's Expert Cristina Banks, Ph.D.. . Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Cristina G. Banks, Ph.D.)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 11/28/2018)
809 MOTION for Michael Decker to Withdraw as Attorney . Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Shaver, Anne) (Entered: 11/28/2018)
810 PROPOSED ORDER. Document filed by KPMG LLP. Related Document Number: 800 . (Kenney, Colleen) Proposed Order to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff. (Entered: 11/28/2018)
811 PROPOSED ORDER. Document filed by KPMG LLP. Related Document Number: 800 . (Kenney, Colleen) Proposed Order to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff. (Entered: 11/28/2018)
812 PROPOSED ORDER. Document filed by KPMG LLP. Related Document Number: 800 . (Kenney, Colleen) Proposed Order to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff. (Entered: 11/28/2018)

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***NOTICE TO COURT REGARDING PROPOSED ORDER. Document No. 810 Proposed Order 811 Proposed Order 812 Proposed Order was reviewed and approved as to form. (km) (Entered: 11/28/2018)
813 LETTER MOTION for Leave to File Motion to Strike KPMG LLP's Reliance on Testimony From Expert Dr. Bloom addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Rachel Geman dated July 6, 2018. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 11/29/2018)
814 PROPOSED ORDER. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. Related Document Number: 813 . (Mueting, Katie) Proposed Order to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff. (Entered: 11/29/2018)
815 LETTER MOTION for Leave to File Motion to Strike KPMG LLP's Exhibits Filed in Support of Its Memorandum of Law Opposing Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting dated July 6, 2018. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibits 1 and 2)(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 11/29/2018)
816 PROPOSED ORDER. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. Related Document Number: 815 . (Mueting, Katie) Proposed Order to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff. (Entered: 11/29/2018)
***NOTICE TO COURT REGARDING PROPOSED ORDER. Document No. 816 Proposed Order, was reviewed and approved as to form. (dt) (Entered: 11/29/2018)
***NOTICE TO COURT REGARDING PROPOSED ORDER. Document No. 814 Proposed Order, was reviewed and approved as to form. (dt) (Entered: 11/29/2018)
817 LETTER MOTION for Leave to File Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Exhibits Filed in Support of Motion for Class Certification addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated February 6, 2018. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 11/29/2018)
818 LETTER MOTION for Leave to File Motion to Strike Paragraph 4 of Attorney Kate Mueting's Declaration and Paragraph 27 of Attorney Tiseme Zegeye's Declaration Filed in Support of Plainitffs' Motion for Class Certification addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated February 27, 2018. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 11/29/2018)
819 FILING ERROR − DEFICIENT DOCKET ENTRY (SEE 827 Letter Motion) − LETTER MOTION for Leave to File Motion to Strike Portions of Putative Class Member Declarations addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated April 27, 2018. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Kenney, Colleen) Modified on 11/29/2018 (db). (Entered: 11/29/2018)
820 LETTER RESPONSE in Opposition to Motion addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kelly Dermody dated February 7, 2018 re: 817 LETTER MOTION for Leave to File Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Exhibits Filed in Support of Motion for Class Certification addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated February 6, 2018. . Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 11/29/2018)
821 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Peter O. Hughes dated July 13, 2018 re: Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Proposed Motion to Strike Certain Exhibits Filed by KPMG in Opposition to Motion for Class Certification and Final Certification of an EPA Collective. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 11/29/2018)

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822 LETTER RESPONSE in Opposition to Motion addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kelly Dermody dated February 27, 2018 re: 818 LETTER MOTION for Leave to File Motion to Strike Paragraph 4 of Attorney Kate Mueting's Declaration and Paragraph 27 of Attorney Tiseme Zegeye's Declaration Filed in Support of Plainitffs' Motion for Class Certification addre ssed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated February 27, 2018. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 11/29/2018)
823 LETTER RESPONSE in Opposition to Motion addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting dated May 7, 2018 re: 819 LETTER MOTION for Leave to File Motion to Strike Portions of Putative Class Member Declarations addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated April 27, 2018. . Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 11/29/2018)
824 PROPOSED ORDER. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment A) Related Document Number: 823 . (Mueting, Katie) Proposed Order to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff. (Entered: 11/29/2018)
825 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Peter O. Hughes dated July 26, 2018 re: Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Pre−Motion Conference Letter dated July 6, 2018. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − KPMG Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, # 2 Exhibit B − Brief in Support of KPMG's Motion to Strike Dr. Vekker's Testimony)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 11/29/2018)
826 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated May 10, 2018 re: Response to Plaintiffs' Letter Opposing KPMG's Anticipated Motion to Strike Declarations Submitted in Support of Class Certification. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 11/29/2018)
827 LETTER MOTION for Leave to File Motion to Strike Portions of Putative Class Member Declarations addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated April 27, 2018. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order − Correction to 819−1)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 11/29/2018)
828 MEMO ENDORSEMENT on PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO WITHDRAW MICHAEL DECKER AS COUNSEL OF RECORD. ENDORSEMENT: Application granted. Granting 809 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Michael Frederick Decker terminated. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 11/29/2018) (rjm) (Entered: 11/29/2018)
829 LETTER MOTION for Leave to File Motion to Strike Portions of Putative Class Member Declarations addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated April 27, 2018. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 11/29/2018)
***NOTICE TO COURT REGARDING PROPOSED ORDER. Document No. 824 Proposed Order, was reviewed and approved as to form. (dt) (Entered: 11/29/2018)
830 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated November 29, 2018 re: Motion to Strike Dkt No. 819 and Dkt No. 827 from the Record. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 11/29/2018)
***STRICKEN DOCUMENTS. Deleted the PDFs attached to document numbers [819 & 827] from the case record. These documents were stricken from this case pursuant to 832 Order. Per instructions from chambers, the docket text remains on the docket. (cf) (Entered: 12/03/2018)
831 OPINION AND ORDER: For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs motions for Rule 23 class certification and EPA collective certification are DENIED. Both parties Daubert motions and motions to strike are DENIED. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the

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motions at Dkt. Nos. 797 , 800 , 802 , 803 , 813 , 815 , 817 , 818 , 827 and 829 .(Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 11/30/2018) (jcs) (Entered: 11/30/2018)
832 ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion is GRANTED, and that Docket Nos. 819 and 827 are hereby stricken and have been replaced by Docket No. 829. (As further set forth in this Order.) (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 12/3/2018) (cf) (Entered: 12/03/2018)
833 ORDER: WHEREAS, on November 30, 2018, the Court denied Plaintiffs' motions for Rule 23 class certification and Equal Pay Act collective certification (Dkt. No. 831). It is hereby ORDERED that by December 17, 2018, the parties shall file a joint letter on ECF stating how they wish to proceed in this matter. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 12/4/2018) (ne) (Entered: 12/04/2018)
834 LETTER MOTION for Extension of Time addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Aimee K. Stewart dated December 4, 2018. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Stewart, Aimee) (Entered: 12/04/2018)
835 PROPOSED ORDER. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. Related Document Number: 834 . (Stewart, Aimee) Proposed Order to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff. (Entered: 12/04/2018)
840 SEALED DOCUMENT placed in vault.(mhe) (Entered: 12/06/2018)
836 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME 834 Letter Motion for Extension of Time. ORDERED that the parties' December 5, 2018 deadline to file redacted documents in unredacted form under seal is hereby extended 10 days; and that the parties may file the required hard copy, sealed declarations and reports with scanned signatures if necessary. (As further set forth in this Order.) (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 12/5/2018) (cf) (Entered: 12/06/2018)
841 SEALED DOCUMENT placed in vault.(mhe) (Entered: 12/06/2018)
***NOTICE TO COURT REGARDING PROPOSED ORDER. Document No. 835 Proposed Order was reviewed and approved as to form. (km) (Entered: 12/06/2018)
837 MOTION for Reconsideration re; 831 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion to Preclude,,, Order on Motion for Leave to File Document,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, Notice of Motion for Reconsideration of Denial of Class Certification Under Rule 23. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Jessica Lake, Carol Murray, Linda O'Donnell, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Levin−Gesundheit, Michael) (Entered: 12/06/2018)
838 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 837 MOTION for Reconsideration re; 831 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion to Preclude,,, Order on Motion for Leave to File Document,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, Notice of Motion for Reconsideration of Denial of Class Certification Under Rule 23. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Jessica Lake, Carol Murray, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Levin−Gesundheit, Michael) (Entered: 12/06/2018)
839 PROPOSED ORDER. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Jessica Lake, Carol Murray, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Levin−Gesundheit, Michael) Proposed Order to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff. (Entered: 12/06/2018)
***NOTICE TO COURT REGARDING PROPOSED ORDER. Document No. 839 Proposed Order was reviewed and approved as to form. (km) (Entered: 12/06/2018)
842 MEMO ENDORSEMENT on re: 837 MOTION for Reconsideration re; 831 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion to Preclude,,, Order on Motion for Leave to File Document Notice of Motion for Reconsideration of Denial of Class Certification Under Rule filed by Nancy Jones, Ashwini Vasudeva, Jeanette Potter, Tina Butler, Donna Kassman, Cheryl Charity, Jessica Lake, Linda O'Donnell, Heather Inman, Carol Murray. ENDORSEMENT: It is ORDERED that Defendant shall file a letter

12/07/2018
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responding to Plaintiffs' motion no later than December 14, 2018. (Responses due by 12/14/2018) (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 12/7/2018) (cf) (Entered: 12/07/2018)
843 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kelly M. Dermody dated December 7, 2018 re: 23(f) Deadline of December 14, 2018 and Request for Temporary Withdrawal of Dkt. 831 Pending Decision on Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Jessica Lake, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Levin−Gesundheit, Michael) (Entered: 12/07/2018)
844 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated December 7, 2018 re: Objection to Plantiffs' Repeated Attempts to Have This Court Withdraw Order of November 30, 2018. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 12/07/2018)
845 MEMO ENDORSEMENT on re: 844 Letter filed by KPMG LLP. ENDORSEMENT: For substantially the reasons stated in Defendant's letter, Plaintiffs' application (Dkt. No. 843) that the Court withdraw its prior order is DENIED. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 12/10/2018) (cf) (Entered: 12/10/2018)
846 LETTER MOTION for Leave to File Motion for Tolling addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting dated December 12, 2018. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 12/12/2018)
847 PROPOSED ORDER. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. Related Document Number: 846 . (Mueting, Katie) Proposed Order to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff. (Entered: 12/12/2018)
***NOTICE TO COURT REGARDING PROPOSED ORDER. Document No. 847 Proposed Order, was reviewed and approved as to form. (dt) (Entered: 12/12/2018)
848 MEMO ENDORSEMENT on re: 846 LETTER MOTION for Leave to File Motion for Tolling addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting dated December 12, 2018. filed by Sparkle Patterson, Nancy Jones, Ashwini Vasudeva, Jeanette Potter, Tina Butler, Donna Kassman, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Carol Murray. ENDORSEMENT: It is ORDERED that Defendant shall file a response letter on ECF by December 18, 2018. (Responses due by 12/18/2018) (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 12/13/2018) (cf) (Entered: 12/13/2018)
849 SEALED DOCUMENT placed in vault.(mhe) (Entered: 12/14/2018)
850 LETTER RESPONSE to Motion addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated 12/14/2018 re: 837 MOTION for Reconsideration re; 831 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion to Preclude,,, Order on Motion for Leave to File Document,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, Notice of Motion for Reconsideration of Denial of Class Certification Under Rule . Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 12/14/2018)
851 STATUS REPORT. Joint Status Report Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 12/17/2018)
852 LETTER RESPONSE in Opposition to Motion addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated 12/18/18 re: 846 LETTER MOTION for Leave to File Motion for Tolling addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting dated December 12, 2018. . Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 12/18/2018)
853 ORDER granting 846 Letter Motion for Leave to File Document. For substantially the reasons stated in Plaintiffs' letter, The APPLICATION IS GRANTED. The Equal Pay Act statute of limitations for individual Opt−In Plaintiffs is tolled for 120 days following the Opinion and Order denying Plaintiffs' motion for class certification (i.e., to March 30, 2019). (As further set forth in this Order.) (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 12/19/2018) (cf) Modified on 12/20/2018 (cf). (Entered: 12/19/2018)

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854 ORDER re: 851 Status Report filed by KPMG LLP. It is ORDERED that a status conference will be held on January 17, 2019, at 11:30 a.m., to discuss the parties Joint Status Report at Docket 851, whether the Court should impose a stay pending mediation by the parties, and the possible assignment of a Special Master for case management of the individual claims. (Status Conference set for 1/17/2019 at 11:30 AM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield.) (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 12/19/2018) (jca) (Entered: 12/19/2018)
855 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kelly M. Dermody dated December 19, 2018 re: Request to File Letter Replying to KPMG's Letter Opposing Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration of Denial of Class Certification Under Rule 23 (Dkts. 837, 850). Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Jessica Lake, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Levin−Gesundheit, Michael) (Entered: 12/19/2018)
856 OPINION AND ORDER: re: 837 MOTION for Reconsideration − Because Plaintiffs have not identified an intervening change of controlling law, theavailability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice, Kolel Beth, 729 F.3d at 104, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED. Plaintiffs request that the Court withdraw the Class Certification Order pending decision on this motion is DENIED as moot. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to close the motion at Docket No. 837. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 12/21/2018) (jcs) (Entered: 12/21/2018)
857 ORDER denying as moot 760 Letter Motion for Leave to File Document; denying as moot 762 Letter Motion for Leave to File Document. WHEREAS, the Court ruled on the admissibility of the parties expert reports in the Opinion and Order denying Plaintiffs motion for class certification (Dkt. No. 831). It is hereby ORDERED that Defendants letter motions at Docket Nos. 760 and 762 are DENIED as moot. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to close the motions at Docket Nos. 760 and 762. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 12/26/2018) (jca) (Entered: 01/02/2019)
858 ORDER: For the reasons stated at the conference, it is hereby ORDERED that the parties shall meet and confer regarding potential candidates for appointment as a special master. The parties shall also confer regarding a potential agreement to exchange information about the opt−in Plaintiffs and to stop the Equal Pay Act limitations period from running (by tolling or some other means). (As further set forth in this Order.) (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 1/17/2019) (cf) (Entered: 01/17/2019)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lorna G. Schofield: Status Conference held on 1/17/2019. (Court Reporter Eve Giniger) (Lewis, Barton) (Entered: 01/28/2019)
859 JOINT LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting and Colleen M. Kenney dated February 7, 2019 re: Status. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order (KPMG), # 2 Text of Proposed Order (Plaintiffs)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 02/07/2019)
860 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: CONFERENCE held on 1/17/2019 before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Eve Giniger, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 3/6/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/18/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/14/2019.(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 02/13/2019)
861 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a CONFERENCE proceeding held on 1/17/19 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 02/13/2019)

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862 ORDER: It is hereby ORDERED that by February 22, 2019, the parties shall file a joint proposed Order and Opt−In Fact Sheet. To the extent the parties cannot agree on any specific provision, (1) they shall note their respective proposals within the document and may further explain their position in an accompanying letter; (2) they shall advise the Court whether they request a ruling and/or assistance regarding their differences or regarding any other matter that pertains to the Opt−In Plaintiffs. The Court is not inclined to appoint a Special Master or to grant further discovery for the Former Opt−In Plaintiffs until after they have filed their Complaints and/or Opt−In Fact Sheets. (As further set forth in this Order.) (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 2/15/2019) (cf) (Entered: 02/15/2019)
863 JOINT LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting dated February 22, 2019 re: Joint Proposed Order and Fact Sheet. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 02/22/2019)
864 PROPOSED ORDER. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. Related Document Number: 863 . (Mueting, Katie) Proposed Order to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff. (Entered: 02/22/2019)
***NOTICE TO COURT REGARDING PROPOSED ORDER. Document No. 864 Proposed Order was reviewed and approved as to form. (km) (Entered: 02/25/2019)
865 ORDER CONCERNING OPT−IN PLAINTIFF FACT SHEETS: It is hereby ORDERED that: The form of Former Opt−In Fact Sheet (Fact Sheet) that shall be used is attached as Exhibit A. In accordance with the schedule set forth in Section II below, as to every Former Opt−In Plaintiff who intends to continue in good faith to prosecute her EPA claim in this Court without filing a Complaint: Such person shall complete and execute a verified Fact Sheet; as further set forth in this Order. For any Opt−In Plaintiff that does not meet deadlines set forth in A. above: The statute of limitations shall begin to run as of April 30, 2019; If the Parties disagree as to a given Untimely Opt−In, the Parties shall, no later than May 31, 2019, notify the Court of such Untimely Opt−Ins, and of the fact that the Parties disagree after meeting and conferring as to whether a good cause exists for a further extension of such Untimely Opt−Ins Fact Sheet service deadline. On May 31, 2019, the parties shall file a joint letter and proposed Order regarding status, including the status of the serving of Fact Sheets or filing of Complaints by FOIPs and whether the Parties believe that the appointment of a Special Master pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 would be helpful. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 2/25/2019) (cf) (Entered: 02/25/2019)
866 MANDATE of USCA (Certified Copy) USCA Case Number 18−3728. Petitioners request, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), leave to appeal the district court's order denying class certification. Non−parties move for leave to file an amici curiae brief. Upon due consideration, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion for leave to file an amici curiae brief is GRANTED. See Fed. R. App. P. 29(a). It is further ORDERED that the Rule 23(f) petition is DENIED because an immediate appeal is not warranted. See Sumitomo Copper Litig. v. Credit Lyonnais Rouse, Ltd., 262 F.3d 134, 13940 (2d Cir. 2001).. Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk USCA for the Second Circuit. Issued As Mandate: 03/19/2019. (nd) (Entered: 03/19/2019)
867 MOTION for Aimee Krause Stewart to Withdraw as Attorney . Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 04/11/2019)
868 PROPOSED ORDER FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ATTORNEY. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. Related Document Number: 867 . (Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 04/11/2019)
869 ORDER granting 867 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby ORDERED, that the Motion is GRANTED, and FURTHER ORDERED, that Ms. Stewart be withdrawn as Plaintiffs' counsel in this matter. (As further set forth in this

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Order.) The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to close the motion at Docket No. 867. Attorney Aimee Krause Stewart terminated (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 4/11/2019) (cf) (Entered: 04/12/2019)
870 MEMO ENDORSEMENT on re: 867 PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO WITHDRAW AIMEE KRAUSE STEWART AS COUNSEL OF RECORD for Aimee Krause Stewart to Withdraw as Attorney filed by Sparkle Patterson, Nancy Jones, Ashwini Vasudeva, Jeanette Potter, Tina Butler, Donna Kassman, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Carol Murray. ENDORSEMENT: Application GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to remove Aimee Krause Stewart as Plaintiffs' counsel and to close the motion at Dkt. No. 867. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 4/12/2019) (rjm) (Entered: 04/12/2019)
871 LETTER MOTION to Stay Deadline To Answer Or Otherwise Respond To Fact Sheets addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated 5/1/2019. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 05/01/2019)
872 ORDER granting 871 Letter Motion to Stay. Application GRANTED. The deadline for Defendant to answer or otherwise respond to the Fact Sheets is adjourned to June 28, 2019. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 5/2/2019) (ks) (Entered: 05/02/2019)
873 NOTICE of Untimely Former Opt−Ins. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 05/20/2019)
874 MEMO ENDORSEMENT on re: 873 Notice (Other) filed by KPMG LLP. ENDORSEMENT: It is ORDERED that, Plaintiffs shall file a letter, not to exceed three pages, by May 24, 2019 stating whether they have any objection to Defendant's list of Untimely Former Opt−Ins (Dkt. No. 873−1) or proposed form of order (Dkt. No. 873−2). (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 5/21/2019) (ks) (Entered: 05/21/2019)
875 MEMO ENDORSEMENT on re: 873 Notice (Other) filed by KPMG LLP. ENDORSEMENT: It is hereby ORDERED that Defendant's request to file the exhibit in redacted form is GRANTED. Although "[t]he common law right of public access to judicial documents is firmly rooted in our nation's history," this right is not absolute, and courts "must balance competing considerations against" the presumption of access. Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 11920 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns., Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 599 (1978) ("[T]he decision as to access is one best left to the sound discretion of the trial court, a discretion to be exercised in light of the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case."). Filing the exhibit under seal is necessary to prevent the unauthorized dissemination of sensitive personal information. Defendant shall file the exhibit in redacted form on ECF and in unredacted form under seal. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 5/21/2019) (ks) (Entered: 05/21/2019)
876 REDACTION to 873 Notice (Other) by KPMG LLP(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 05/21/2019)
877 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting dated May 22, 2019 re: KPMG's Notice of Untimely Former Opt−Ins at Dkt. No. 873. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 05/22/2019)
878 ORDER: Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: (1) Each FOIP listed on Exhibit A to the Notice and her respective EPA claims are hereby dismissed without prejudice, without costs or attorneys' fees to any party; (2) With respect to each FOIP listed on Exhibit A to the Notice, the statute of limitations as to her EPA claims (if any) shall begin to run as of April 30, 2019; and (3) With respect to each such FOIP listed on Exhibit A to the Notice, the tolling of the EPA statute of limitations previously ordered by the Court (Dkt. 413 and Dkt. 853) shall no longer apply. (As further set forth in this Order.) (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 5/23/2019) (cf) (Entered: 05/23/2019)
879 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated May 24, 2019 re: Proposed Motion to Dismiss Certain Verified Fact Sheets And To Strike Allegations In Various VFSs. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen)

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(Entered: 05/24/2019)
880 MEMO ENDORSEMENT on re: 879 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated May 24, 2019 re: Proposed Motion to Dismiss Certain Verified Fact Sheets And To Strike Allegations In Various VFSs. Document filed by KPMG LLP. ENDORSEMENT: It is ORDERED that Plaintiffs shall file a letter response, not to exceed three pages, by May 31, 2019. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 5/28/2019) (rjm) (Entered: 05/28/2019)
881 ORDER: It is herebyORDERED that Defendants request to file the exhibit in redacted form is GRANTED. Although "[t]he common law right of public access to judicial documents is firmly rooted in our nations history," this right is not absolute, and courts "must balance competing considerations against" the presumption of access. Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 11920 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Nixon v. Warner Commcns., Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 599 (1978) ("[T]he decision as to access is one best left to the sound discretion of the trial court, a discretion to be exercised in light of the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case."). Filing the exhibit under seal is necessary to prevent the unauthorized dissemination of sensitive personal information. Defendant shall file the exhibit in redacted form on ECF and in unredacted form under seal. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 5/28/2019) (jca) Transmission to Sealed Records Clerk for processing. (Entered: 05/28/2019)
882 REDACTION to 879 Letter by KPMG LLP(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 05/28/2019)
883 STATUS REPORT. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 Plaintiffs' Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit 2 Defendant's Proposed Order)(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 05/31/2019)
884 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting dated May 31, 2019 re: KPMG's May 24, 2019 Letter at Dkt. 879. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 05/31/2019)
885 ORDER: It is hereby ORDERED that Defendant's application to file a motion to dismiss and to strike the VFSs is DENIED without prejudice to renewal. Defendant shall answer or otherwise respond to the VFSs (amended or otherwise) by July 29, 2019. It is further ORDERED that Plaintiffs' application for the appointment of a special master is DENIED without prejudice to renewal after Defendant has answered or otherwise responded to the Amended VFSs. (As further set forth in this Order.) KPMG LLP answer due 7/29/2019. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 6/3/2019) (cf) (Entered: 06/03/2019)
886 SEALED DOCUMENT placed in vault.(mhe) (Entered: 06/03/2019)
887 SEALED DOCUMENT placed in vault.(mhe) (Entered: 06/03/2019)
888 ORDER: WHEREAS, by letter to Chambers dated May 31, 2019, Plaintiffs sought leave to file in redacted form exhibits to Plaintiffs' May 31, 2019, letter (Dkt. No. 884). It is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiffs request to file the exhibits in redacted form is GRANTED. Although "[t]he common law right of public access to judicial documents is firmly rooted in our nations history," this right is not absolute, and courts "must balance competing considerations against" the presumption of access. Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 11920 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns., Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 599 (1978) ("[T]he decision as to access is one best left to the sound discretion of the trial court, a discretion to be exercised in light of the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case."). Filing the exhibits under seal is necessary to prevent the unauthorized dissemination of sensitive personal information. Plaintiffs shall file the exhibit in redacted form on ECF and in unredacted form under seal. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 6/4/2019) (ks) (Entered: 06/04/2019)
889 REDACTION to 884 Letter, by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 06/04/2019)

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890 SEALED DOCUMENT placed in vault.(rz) (Entered: 06/07/2019)
891 MOTION to Withdraw (Notice of Withdrawn Former Opt−In Plaintiffs). Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 07/15/2019)
892 ORDER granting 891 Motion to Withdraw. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that with respect to each of Roneshia Revels and Jennifer Resnick: (1) Their respective EPA claims are hereby dismissed without prejudice and without costs or attorneys' fees to any party; (2) The statute of limitations as to each their respective EPA claims (if any) shall begin to run as of April 30, 2019; and (3) The tolling of the EPA statute of limitations previously ordered by the Court (Dkt. 413 and Dkt. 853) shall no longer apply. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 7/16/2016) (anc) (Entered: 07/16/2019)
893 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting dated July 18, 2019 re: the Claims of Two Opt−In Plaintiffs. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 07/18/2019)
894 PROPOSED ORDER. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. Related Document Number: 893 . (Mueting, Katie) Proposed Order to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff. (Entered: 07/18/2019)
***NOTICE TO COURT REGARDING PROPOSED ORDER. Document No. 894 Proposed Order was reviewed and approved as to form. (km) (Entered: 07/18/2019)
895 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated July 18, 2019 re: Responding To Late Submission Of Fact Sheets. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 07/18/2019)
896 ORDER: Upon consideration of the parties' letters regarding the dismissal of the claims of Opt−In Plaintiffs Pamela Hardy and Deborah Haas Moeller, the Court hereby ORDERS, that the Equal Pay Act claims of Pamela Hardy and Deborah Haas Moeller are REINSTATED nunc pro tunc, effective May 23, 2019, and that this Court's Order at Docket No. 878 does not apply to them. Defendant may file a pre−motion letter to strike or dismiss with respect to any Verified Fact Sheet it contends was untimely served or amended. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 7/19/2019) (cf) (Entered: 07/19/2019)
897 LETTER MOTION to Stay the July 29, 2019 deadline to answer the Verified Fact Sheets addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated July 19, 2019. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 07/19/2019)
898 PROPOSED ORDER. Document filed by KPMG LLP. Related Document Number: 897 . (Kenney, Colleen) Proposed Order to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff. (Entered: 07/19/2019)
***NOTICE TO COURT REGARDING PROPOSED ORDER. Document No. 898 Proposed Order was reviewed and approved as to form. (km) (Entered: 07/19/2019)
899 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting dated July 22, 2019 re: KPMG's July 19, 2019 Letter Motion at Dkt. 897. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 07/22/2019)
900 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated July 22, 2019 re: Replying To Plaintiff's Response To KPMG's July 19, 2019 Request For A Stay. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 07/22/2019)
901 ORDER granting 897 Letter Motion to Stay. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that KPMG's answers to the VFSs (to the extent not previously dismissed and not as to any allegations which have been stricken) shall be due the later of (1) sixty (60) days after the Court rules on KPMG's proposed Motion to Dismiss and to Strike; or (2) in the event the Court does not grant KPMG leave to file its Motion to Dismiss or Strike,

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sixty (60) days after the Court's ruling resolving KPMG's letter request for leave to file such motion. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 7/22/2019) (mro) (Entered: 07/23/2019)
902 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated July 26, 2019 re: Proposed Motion to Dismiss certain Verified Fact Sheets (VFSs) and to Strike various VFS allegations. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 07/26/2019)
903 MEMO ENDORSEMENT on re: 902 Letter filed by KPMG LLP. ENDORSEMENT: It is ORDERED that Plaintiffs shall file a letter response, in accordance with Individual Rules III.A.1 and III.C.2, by August 2, 2019. It is further ORDERED that Plaintiffs' letter shall include a joint proposed briefing schedule. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 7/26/2019) (cf) (Entered: 07/26/2019)
904 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting dated August 2, 2019 re: KPMGs Pre−Motion Letter at Dkt. 902. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 08/02/2019)
905 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated August 3, 2019 re: KPMGs Reply in support of its renewed pre−motion letter on its proposed Motion to Dismiss certain Verified Fact Sheets (VFSs) and to Strike various VFS allegations.. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 08/03/2019)
906 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated August 5, 2019 re: LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated August 5, 2019 re: Substitute Dkt. No. 905 to Correct Typographical Error in the Chart in KPMGs Reply in support of its renewed pre−motion letter on its proposed Motion to Dismiss certain Verified Fact Sheets (VFSs) and to Strike various VFS allegations. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 08/05/2019)
907 ORDER: ORDERED that Defendant shall move, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), to dismiss ten of the Challenged VFSs, whose purported defects are representative of the Challenged VFSs as a whole. Defendant's motion will be without prejudice to a subsequent Rule 12 motion to dismiss the remaining Challenged VFSs. Defendant's motion shall also address any basis to strike allegations in the Challenged VFSs pursuant to Rule 12(f). It is further ORDERED that, by September 10, 2019, Defendant shall file its memorandum of law in support of the motion, not to exceed thirty pages, and may file an additional one−page addendum per case. By October 25, 2019, Plaintiffs shall file their opposition, not to exceed thirty pages, and may file a one−page response to any addendum that Defendant files. Defendant shall file its reply, not to exceed fifteen pages, by November 15, 2019. The parties are directed to consult the Court's Individual Rules regarding formatting, exhibit limits and courtesy copies. It is further ORDERED that within fourteen days after resolution of Defendants motion, the parties shall meet and confer and shall file a joint letter regarding (1) the possibility of a stipulated dismissal of certain Challenged VFSs in light of the Court's decision, (2) whether a Special Master should be appointed to resolve any further Rule 12 motions and (3) any other issue the parties would like to address. The parties shall also jointly file a proposed Case Management Plan and Scheduling Order as to the remaining cases., ( Motions due by 9/10/2019., Responses due by 10/25/2019, Replies due by 11/15/2019.) (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 8/05/2019) (ama) (Entered: 08/05/2019)
908 ORDER: Defendant submitted a modified request to file in redacted form or under seal portions of Defendant's Memorandum of Law in support of the Motion to Dismiss and to Strike and supporting exhibits. It is hereby ORDERED that Defendant's request is GRANTED. Filing the above−referenced documents in redacted form or under seal is necessary to prevent the unauthorized dissemination of sensitive personal information. (As further set forth in this Order.) (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 9/26/2019) (cf) (Entered: 09/26/2019)
909 MOTION to Dismiss Certain Equal Pay Act Claims., MOTION to Strike Certain Allegations Contained In Verified Fact Sheets. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 09/27/2019)

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910 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 909 MOTION to Dismiss Certain Equal Pay Act Claims. MOTION to Strike Certain Allegations Contained In Verified Fact Sheets. . Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 09/27/2019)
911 PROPOSED ORDER. Document filed by KPMG LLP. Related Document Number: 909 . (Kenney, Colleen) Proposed Order to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff. (Entered: 09/27/2019)
912 SEALED DOCUMENT placed in vault.(mhe) (Entered: 09/27/2019)
***NOTICE TO COURT REGARDING PROPOSED ORDER. Document No. 911 Proposed Order was reviewed and approved as to form. (dt) (Entered: 09/27/2019)
913 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Opposition re: 909 MOTION to Dismiss Certain Equal Pay Act Claims. MOTION to Strike Certain Allegations Contained In Verified Fact Sheets. . Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Certificate of Service)(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 10/25/2019)
914 PROPOSED ORDER. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva. Related Document Number: 913 . (Mueting, Katie) Proposed Order to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff. (Entered: 10/25/2019)
***NOTICE TO COURT REGARDING PROPOSED ORDER. Document No. 914 Proposed Order was reviewed and approved as to form. (km) (Entered: 10/28/2019)
915 REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 909 MOTION to Dismiss Certain Equal Pay Act Claims. MOTION to Strike Certain Allegations Contained In Verified Fact Sheets. . Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 11/15/2019)
916 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kate Mueting dated November 20, 2019 re: KPMGs Reply Memorandum of Law at Dkt. No. 915. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva.(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 11/20/2019)
917 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Colleen M. Kenney dated November 22, 2019 re: Response to Plaintiffs Sur−Reply re: KPMGs Motion to Dismiss and to Strike.. Document filed by KPMG LLP.(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 11/22/2019)
918 MOTION for Jonathan D. Lotsoff to Withdraw as Attorney . Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order).(Kenney, Colleen) (Entered: 02/05/2020)
919 ORDER granting 918 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. ACCORDINGLY, it is herby matter. ORDERED, that the Motion is GRANTED, and FURTHER ORDERED, that Mr. Lotsoff be withdrawn as Defendant's counsel in this SO ORDERED. (Attorney Jonathan D. Lotsoff terminated.) (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 2/6/2020) (rro) (Entered: 02/06/2020)
920 MOTION for Steven W. Moore to Withdraw as Attorney . Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order).(Moore, Steven) (Entered: 02/28/2020)
921 MEMO ENDORSED ORDER denying without prejudice to renewal by formal motion 920 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. ENDORSEMENT: Application DENIED without prejudice to renewal. Any application for withdrawal of counsel must comply with the requirements of Local Rule 1.4. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 3/2/20) (yv) (Entered: 03/02/2020)

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922 FILING ERROR − DEFICIENT DOCKET ENTRY − MOTION for Steven W. Moore to Withdraw as Attorney for Defendant KPMG LLP. Document filed by KPMG LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Declaration of Steven W. Moore in Support of Motion to Withdraw, # 2 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order).(Moore, Steven) Modified on 4/3/2020 (ldi). (Entered: 03/06/2020)
923 ORDER granting 922 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby matter. ORDERED, that the Motion is GRANTED, and FURTHER ORDERED, that Mr. Moore be withdrawn as Defendant's counsel in this matter. (As further set forth in this Order.) Attorney Steven W. Moore terminated (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 3/9/2020) (cf) (Entered: 03/09/2020)
924 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Shaun Rosenthal on behalf of Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva..(Rosenthal, Shaun) (Entered: 03/16/2020)
925 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Conor Daniel Ahern on behalf of Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva..(Ahern, Conor) (Entered: 03/16/2020)
926 OPINION AND ORDER re: 909 MOTION to Dismiss Certain Equal Pay Act Claims. MOTION to Strike Certain Allegations Contained In Verified Fact Sheets. filed by KPMG LLP. For the reasons stated above, KPMG's motion to dismiss is DENIED as to the Hernberg and Koch VFSs and is otherwise GRANTED. KPMG's motion to strike is DENIED. It is further ORDERED that by July 29, 2020, the parties shall meet and confer, and file a joint letter proposing appropriate next steps. The Clerk of Court is respectfully requested to close the motion at Dkt. No. 909. (As further set forth in this Order.) (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 7/15/2020) (cf) (Entered: 07/15/2020)
927 STATUS REPORT. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva..(Mueting, Katie) (Entered: 07/29/2020)
928 ORDER: It is hereby ORDERED that, by August 4, 2020, Plaintiffs shall file any letter motion to amend any Verified Fact Sheets ("VFSs"). Defendant shall file any letter response by August 11, 2020. It is further ORDERED that a conference will be held on August 12, 2020, at 2:00 p.m. to address Plaintiffs letter motion to amend. The conference will occur on the following conference line: (888) 363−4749, access code: 5583333. The time of the conference is approximate, but the parties shall ensure that they are dialed into the conference line by the appointed conference time. It is further ORDERED that Defendant's deadline to answer, move or otherwise respond to the VFSs is STAYED pending the Court's ruling on the letter motion to amend. (As further set forth in this Order.) ( Motions due by 8/4/2020., Responses due by 8/11/2020, Telephone Conference set for 8/12/2020 at 02:00 PM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield.) (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 7/30/2020) (cf) (Entered: 07/30/2020)
929 LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Kelly M. Dermody dated August 4, 2020 re: Plaintiffs' proposed Motion for Leave to Amend. Document filed by Tina Butler, Cheryl Charity, Heather Inman, Nancy Jones, Donna Kassman, Carol Murray, Sparkle Patterson, Jeanette Potter, Ashwini Vasudeva..(Zegeye, Tiseme) (Entered: 08/04/2020)