·,

Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 1 Filed: 12/06/13 Page 1 of 34 PageID #:1
•

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
t\

RECEIVED

·~ DEC 0 6 2013

·

THOMAS G. BRUTON CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT

(Enter above the full name of the plaintiff or plaintiffs in this action)
vs.
C > .>1\ ( )•) tty i f·::') co j), L
s k y h~, ' I . ,I 'r. I \ d< h I ) q ~ I
1-.

13cv8752 JUDGE SHADUR MAGISTRATE JUDGE KIM

""'-"-------"-_....,_...........-"+--''-'h--,<_----"--<",~' "-1'-', :..t......l4-'-''""" u:,\:..)\ ~I

_(Enter above the full name of ALL r \c:d !"\~'---~' )

defendants in this action. Do not

use "et al.")

Nb '-"v~ff\") 1 M..... App1ch..\ ·-:y"'

a-J C0ylo·.

CHECK ONE ONLY:

COMPLAINT UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT, TITLE 42 SECTION 1983 U.S. Code (state, county, or municipal defendants)

COMPLAINTUNDERTHE CONSTITUTION ("BIVENS" ACTION), TITLE 28 SECTION 1331 U.S. Code (federal defendants)

OTHER (cite statute, ifknown)

BEFORE FILLING OUT TmS COMPLAINT, PLEASE REFER TO "INSTRUCTIONS FOR I
FILING." FOLLOW THESE INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY.

Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 1 Filed: 12/06/13 Page 2 of 34 PageID #:2

I. Plaintiff(s):

A. Name: __:~h~1,I ~·~-L~~~~-------------------------

B.

List all aliases: _ ____;_L..!....~-----------------­

c. Prisoner identification numberf..:):~i ~::-..LL~~~""----------

D. Place of present confinement: Co- K (. ' ty ~ ')- ( •JL1 .

E. Address: -~==--=~____,.;),.....__=,L.!_.J.....;:::~--'--I....:~~.L\-___,_,.~-"-''"""'-';........L!...}-----

(Ifthere is more than one plaintiff, then each plaintiff must list his or her name, aliases, J.D. number, place of confinement, and current address according to the above format on a separate sheet of paper.)

II. Defendant(s): (In A below, place the full name of the first defendant in the first blank, his or her official position in the second blank, and his or her place of employment in the third blank. Space
for two additional defendants is provided in Band C.)

0
Place ofEmployment:
(If you have more than three defendants, then all additional defendants must be listed according to the above format on a separate sheet of paper.)

•

Revised 9(}.007

Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 1 Filed: 12/06/13 Page 3 of 34 PageID #:3

I. Plaintiff(s):

(\

l \

A. Name:

\I

\I

B. List all aliases:

\\

II

C. Prisoner identification number:

,,

ll

D. Place of present confinement:

E. Address:

l•

II

(Ifthere is more than one plaintiff, then each plaintiff must list his or her name, aliases, J.D. number, place of confinement, and current address according to the above format on a separate sheet of paper.)

II. Defendant(s): (In A below, place the full name of the first defendant in the first blank, his or her official position in the second blank, and his or her place of employment in the third blank. Space
for two additional defendants is provided in Band C.)

Title: ·~C~o=2..:...!!..!.~~~~!::L=~~..l.L.1--.LL::::.~-'"_I)..!-...~~II....L..!...--­
Place of Employment: _ \.J..;;,·;·.;..>c-::=> ~:::o....,Jt.=..._~±~....'./~-~~ ~+.!....L._.rJ:.>r..J...___W ,~I~' ----

B.
Title: L i t-Place of Employment: C nK. . tty tk I* :r c.~ I '

c.

Title: _.IL~~l.-O...Jil...-r...:::::::~~~:."...:t..Jt..f.J---I5k-¥r:.!t....·.:,___:.O.~= _.:(~·"..).~_jl-l''--------
.Place of Employment: _::~~~LI rut-=l,y_._v~~c4v-:!.t.l.....·...Os.....~·~('-·..)..L\L-._f,_~----

I
(If you have more than three defendants, then all additional defendants must be listed

according to the above format on a separate sheet of paper.)

1

Revised 912007

Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 1 Filed: 12/06/13 Page 4 of 34 PageID #:4

I. Plaintiff(s):
I>
A. Name:

B. List all aliases:

c. Prisoner identification number:

II

I'

D. Place of present confinement:

,.

I I

E. Address:

(Ifthere is more than one plaintiff, then each plaintiff must list his or her name, aliases, J.D. number, place of confinement, and current address according to the above format on a separate sheet of paper.)

II. Defendant(s): (In A below, place the full name of the first defendant in the first blank, his or her official position in the second blank, and his or her place of employment in the third blank. Space for two additional defendants is provided in Band C.)

A.

+ I Title:

/J b) q. s ~! 1) q 1:

Place ofEmployment: ~io....L~~!l..J...J.-f-~~....1...!.-=...:...._~--LL....~........___ _ _ __

B. Defendant: \" \ C kC) IOf,tb

S Title:

~ :,Y::.r\ f\"1"

c.
Title: s~ r ~ 9rrt

(If you have more than three defendants, then all additional defendants hmst be listed according to the above format on a separate sheet of paper.)

@
•

Revised 9fl007

/Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 1 Filed: 12/06/13 Page 5 of 34 PageID #:5
-, .. / ' '/

I. Plaintiff(s):

II
A. Name:

\I

II

B. List all aliases:

c.

I•
Prisoner identification number:

I\

D. Place of present confinement:
I'
E. Address:

II
II

(Ifthere is more than one plaintiff, then each plaintiff must list his or her name, aliases, J.D. number, place of confinement, and current address according to the above format on a separate sheet of paper.)

II. Defendant(s): (In A below, place the full name ofthe first defendant in the first blank, his or her official position in the second blank, and his or her place of employment in the third blank. Space for two additional defendants is provided in B and C.)

PlaceofEmployment: (").:..)t , d·y \k r i". y C. H I
B. Defundant: --L~~rL·--~~~~~p~(~' -------------------------------

c. Derendant: --~N\~r~.~~v~~~r~t TL________________________________

.Place of Employment: ~~~;:&·J.~.!~JK~!.J...1.____.!~~_____,...~.--~,....a...l-._ _ _ _ __

(If you have more than three defendants, then all additional defendants inust be listed

according to the above format on a separate sheet of paper.)

1

Revised 9fl007

. . / ,.,..-

Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 1 Filed: 12/06/13 Page 6 of 34 PageID #:6

.
.,.

.,..
.. ..-

I. Plaintiff(s): I ')

A. Name: ---------------------------------------------------

I'
B. List all aliases: - - - - - - - -- ----------------- - ------ - -

11

I I

C. Prisoner identification number: - - - ---- --- ----- - -------- - --

,.

I I

D.

,. Place of present confinement: - - ---- - - --- - -- - -- - ---------

E. Address: ____ ____________ ___ ____ _ ____________

(If there is more than one plaintiff, then each plaintiff must list his or her name, aliases, J.D. number, place of confinement, and current address according to the above format on a separate sheet of paper.)

II. Defendant(s): (In A below, place the full name of the first defendant in the first blank, his or her official position in the second blank, and his or her place of employment in the third blank. Space for two additional defendants is provided in Band C.)

k A. Defendant:

ys.t9l S~. K~i f

r* PlaceofEmployment: ((.).;") t. Crt# d

Q + C.urr.

B.

Defundant:

7 -~~v~\ ~r~(~·o~· ''~1 ~L~I'_ }

_

_

_

_

_

_

_

_

_

_

_

_

_

_

_

_

_

_

_

_

_

_

_

_

_

_

_

_

_ _

_

Title:

Co c . ct 1Q!\91 o . - ' <c •\"

c.

Defendant: _ _-v_ r ____:O::____A.:..rJHP::_:k_.:;..b=--'=-r'-_r,___,,v__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Title: _____,"=:·:·:'.:J:~I..\:.. .L:;.=-<:..:::..t!. . :J~':=:>-'~\'i\:___·y :...:::...(...·__-/. = ·· -(.::::.J:c..:·:·;;:-·.\:._· - - - - - - - - - - - -

(If you have more than three defendants, then all additional defendants must be listed according to the above format on a separate sheet of paper.)

•

Revised 911.007

Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 1 Filed: 12/06/13 Page 7 of 34 PageID #:7

III. List ALL lawsuits you (and your co-plaintiffs, if any) have filed in any state or federal court in the United States:

A . Name of case and docket number: T >/'e"' 1-\v~ l) \J . ~-~1'\.'r;;J "0\

\.:::o\l1

~...,-

G\)

, \\

C..

0 6o 7 t..,

B. Approximate date of filing lawsuit: _ _·_ ~·:._ J \-\_ _ _ __ _ _ __ __ _

C. List all plaintiffs (if you had co-plaintiffs), including any aliases: Tyb-- ~vd~S'

D.

\ List all defendants: ~ ';)T · lG\v\ 0'3 <..q~ s:,,... r'~x') 1
i\ 0~1....'!,); f Q. o S)fts t!X"> S.)~c.ffi· ("'=t)' , 2-S.)s:>S.\

\ lt-.cl"h<.;\ o~,
!i~T. ~CHI\).,

E. Court in which the lawsuit was filed (iffederal court, name the district; if state court,

name the county): 'f

\S\ C,o r-T

F. Name ofjudge to whom case was assigned: <.~ ~ .:..-f , f..-1 m ) p(

H. Disposition of this case (for exampl-e: Was the case dismissed? Was it appealed? ls it still pending?): _ \=· t,.~..lu.t__~,.·...r....o...C.i:.,_.l~'\:: .r~--_ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ __

1.

Approximate date of disposition: _...:.k.->'¥',--'-'--)J;.,~ .o \1..:..;___ _ __ __ _ _ __

IF YOU HAVE FILED MORE THAN ONE LA\\'SUIT, THEN YOU MUST DESCRIBE THE ADDITIONAL LAWSUITS ON ANOTHER PIECE OF PAPER, USING THIS SAME FORMAT. REGARDLESS OF HOW MANY CASES YOU HAVE PREVIOUSLY FILED, YOU WILL NOT BE EXCUSED FROM FILLING OUT THIS SECTION COMPLETELY, AND FAILURE TO DO SO MAY RESULT IN DISMISSAL OF YOUR CASE. COPLAINTIFFS MUST ALSO LIST ALL CASES THEY HAVE FILED.

•

Rev1sed 9/2007

Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 1 Filed: 12/06/13 Page 8 of 34 PageID #:8
III. List ALL lawsuits you (and your co-plaintiffs, if any) have filed in any state or federal court in the United States:
A. Name of case and docket number: T/ ¥?,.., \-\v ~ \'\ V~ Qa,.:l\g\ '"3
~ ~ f'O'\ ~ ~'S>,=·'J 's i \- (..-- 7 ~'8:'L
B. Approximate date of filing lawsuit: _ O__:__:_c-.-''r-'--l'".:'--=:J+\ )+ - - - - - - - - - -
C. List all plaintiffs (if you had co-plaintiffs), including any aliases: T1\c:n \-\vd::ef\

E. Court in which the lawsuit was filed (iffederal court, name the district; if state court,
name the county): f .... ~ (..,•\ to.>cr
F. Name ofjudge to whom case was assigned: «; ('('\ d o~" -'1e.~b,q 'f<.th
G. Basic claim made:------9';"";";-)-'-"-'>...;'\)'~,._.;_<,:_.=.,<"."'~if-----------------
H. Disposition of this case (for example: Was the case dismissed? Was it appealed? Is it still pending?): ----"~..__,_>,·__;~.......:.;.;.;.~\..\._).!.&.,"~'----------------

l.

Approximate date of disposition: _ .h:....l:...:;:,:.>._--_J .--l==.oI.\.L...- - - - - - -- - - -

IF YOU HAVE FILED MORE THAN ONE LAWSUIT, THEN YOU MUST DESCRIBE THE ADDITIONAL LAWSUITS ON ANOTHER PIECE OF PAPER, USING THIS SAME FORMAT. REGARDLESS OF HOW MANY CASES YOU HAVE PREVIOUSLY FILED, YOU WILL NOT BE EXCUSED FROM FILLING OUT THIS SECTION COMPLETELY, AND FAILURE TO DO SO MAY RESULT IN DISMISSAL OF YOUR CASE. COPLAINTIFFS MUST ALSO LIST ALL CASES THEY HAVE FILED.

Revised 9/200 7

Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 1 Filed: 12/06/13 Page 9 of 34 PageID #:9

III. List ALL lawsuits you (and your co-plaintiffs, if any) have filed in any state or federal court in the United States: A.
B. Approximate date of filing lawsuit: --~'-v--\':"_;j:s~o-U-_ ::>\,;·L_...,.:......_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ C.

D.

List all defendants:

0 }.b

!:,j'f<-=, (,;, 'j»C s.±<.
I

E. Court in which the lawsuit was filed (iffederal court, name the district; if state court,
name the county): -:fs..\ r('\ C.....,-.r tt

F.

Name ofjudge to whom case was assigned: 9,\ao'\~ N\a ol\\ 1\~

H. Disposition of this case (for example: Was the case dismissed? Was-it appealed?
Is it still pending?): ____.c...l.,.,._.S-=m~·..~...s....= - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

I.

Approximate date of disposition: --'l."J":-:-~"-1 L_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

IF YOU HAVE FILED MORE THAN ONE LAWSUIT, THEN YOU MUST DESCRIBE THE ADDITIONAL LAWSUITS ON ANOTHER PIECE OF PAPER, USING THIS SAME FORMAT. REGARDLESS OF HOW MANY CASES YOU HAVE PREVIOUSLY FILED, YOU WILL NOT BE EXCUSED FROM FILLING OUT THIS SECTION COMPLETELY, AND FAILURE TO DO SO MAY RESULT IN DISMISSAL OF YOUR CASE. COPLAINTIFFS MUST ALSO LIST ALL CASES THEY HAVE FILED.

I

Revised 9/2007

Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 1 Filed: 12/06/13 Page 10 of 34 PageID #:10

III. List ALL lawsuits you (and your co-plaintiffs, if any) have filed in any state or federal court in the United States:

B. Approximate date of filing lawsuit: _ ·k_.....:\.\.,- - - -- - - -- - --
C. List all plaintiffs (ifyou had co-plaintiffs), including any aliases: J'y "\:\\J~k"'
D.

E. Court in which the lawsuit was filed (iffedera.l court, name the district; if state court,
name the county): f~~~t s\ <..o.., c+

F.

\? Name ofjudge to whom case was assigned: V:\S \~.f 1 ~~ n )

H. Disposition of this case (for example : Was the case dismissed? Was it appealed? Is it still pending?): -~&E:....-..lJ..tJ'-'\_..,~,.!JJ'L.(.\.>e...»uoC\..".",r__ __ _ _ _ __ _ __ _ __

I.

Approximate date of disposition: _ _,A~'R_,<w' \c\..!....)..!:.:::g::.LJ\w).,..____ __ _ _ _ __ _

IF YOU HAVE FILED MORE THAN ONE LAWSUIT, THEN YOU MUST DESCRIBE THE ADDITIONAL LAWSUITS ON ANOTHER PIECE OF PAPER, USING THIS SAME FORMAT. REGARDLESS OF HOW MANY CASES YOU HAVE PREVIOUSLY FILED, YOU WILL NOT BE EXCUSED FROM FILLING OUT THIS SECTION COMPLETELY,
AND FAILURE TO DO SO MAY RESULT IN DISMISSAL OF YOUR CASE. COPLAINTIFFS MUST ALSO LIST ALL CASES THEY HAVE FILED.

Revised 9/2007

Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 1 Filed: 12/06/13 Page 11 of 34 PageID #:11

Ill. List ALL lawsuits you (and your co-plaintiffs, if any) have filed in any state or federal court in the United States:

A. Name of case and docket number: T , \oc t\\,)e\~ "· ('l\-.l(.ks: 5..: <,\

I

I

l"k,- (, 5;::>bo.3

B. Approximate date of filing lawsuit: ---=-:=:k-""'i-..2..._ _ _ _ _ _..___ __

C. List all plaintiffs (if you had co-plaintiffs), including any aliases: T'lb" \-\'..1 ' ·~<'-

D.

.b List all defendants: :I *" N\v s.\ ~.t . \"H .., CI I

N:JT ~'-.\S a "-! D

E. Court in which the lawsuit was filed (if federal court, name the district; if state court, name the county): _..Lt..~.::o.~:::....:·....c:.".,.-;.!-..;_=------------------
F. Name ofjudge to whom case was assigned: 1Y\, \~~'~ ::1 sJ.~~ :\,•r·
G. Basic claim made: De.r·qg~ of f'~\i~1~VS. r 1!l'"..'t~
H. Disposition of this case (for example: Was the case dismissed? Was it appealed? Is it still pending?): -~l-:.\~,S;.c:.:~:.-.1~..~:~s.~4;,.~~'---------------
I.
IF YOU HAVE FILED MORE THAN ONE LAWSUIT, THEN YOU MUST DESCRIBE THE ADDITIONAL LAWSUITS ON ANOTHER PIECE OF PAPER, USING THIS SAME FORMAT. REGARDLESS OF HOW MANY CASES YOU HAVE PREVIOUSLY FILED, YOU WILL NOT BE EXCUSED FROM FILLING OUT THIS SECTION COMPLETELY, AND FAILURE TO DO SO MAY RESULT IN DISMISSAL OF YOUR CASE. COPLAINTIFFS MUST ALSO LIST ALL CASES THEY HAVE FILED.

•

Revised 9/2007

Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 1 Filed: 12/06/13 Page 12 of 34 PageID #:12

III. List ALL lawsuits you (and your co-plaintiffs, if any) have filed in any state or federal court in the United States:

A.

n...N arne of case and docket number: _T~.~-'"1-=-!r_,,__\._:"\""\'..,_.=\~ =....;;;;.D.......\.~J -'(,).__~,_-"'-". . :. . .~ ; =-~~\~_:\__,t,_\;_. __
c.. ':\,..__, ~

B. Approximate date of filing lawsuit: _ ')=,:-_\_'1._ .. _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __
C. List all plaintiffs (if you had co-plaintiffs), including any aliases : T~ ~" !-\.... ~

D.

E. Court in which the lawsuit was filed (iffederal court, name the district; if state court,
name the county): ~~~('s\ (,o..>.....,. F. Name ofjudge to whom case was assigned: N\~ \1Sn ") . <::.be .\:..!\
G.

H. Disposition of this case (for example : Was the case dismissed? Was it appealed? Is it still pending?): ____A,._,\...~,.o...t:.;.n...:·.,:.:~,..~.'~ ""'=----------------
l. Approximate date of disposition : _ _l,=.o- .\:...!...___ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _
IF YOU HAVE FILED MORE THAN ONE LAWSUIT, THEN YOU MUST DESCRIBE THE ADDITIONAL LAWSUITS ON ANOTHER PIECE OF PAPER, USING THIS SAME FORMAT. REGARDLESS OF HOW MANY CASES YOU HAVE PREVIOUSLY FILED, YOU WILL NOT BE EXCUSED FROM FILLING OUT THIS SECTION COMPLETELY, AND FAILURE TO DO SO MAY RESULT IN DISMISSAL OF YOUR CASE. COPLAINTIFFS MUST ALSO LIST ALL CASES THEY HAVE FILED.

•

Revised 9f2007

Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 1 Filed: 12/06/13 Page 13 of 34 PageID #:13

III. List ALL lawsuits you (and your co-plaintiffs, if any) have filed in any state or federal court in the United States:
A. Narne of case and docket nurnber: ---!..4i'J'-\"o=.-..>,--'t"-..\o..v:"-A""'~""o::..al...L-".....·.-'D~9.i.L:.~'l~e.u:.t....9::1..\!'--+---­ '© <.;J O % 2~

C. List all plaintiffs (if you had co-plaintiffs) including any aliases: l h<::u'''9'S

q,", Q c. S" T hT

or, o{ '-• P,rys. ;>t It o~ Osvu

'

.$

D.

List all defendants: _T ....!....>J-yf-~'"s"r""--...\L\..t.v.:~~ ~""'e.....__ _ __ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

E. Court in which the lawsuit was filed (iffederal court, name the district; if state court,
name the county): F · .\.<c:.. 9\ \eN r
F. Name ofjudge to whom case was assigned: ---\"~&>i!..t~v\ l>-£'~l......__ _ _ __ __

H. Disposition of this case (for example: Was the case dismissed? Was it appealed? Is it still pending?): ---"·S:::..M ::·s·.~icE.:....:'.:!'f.'!.s·s·.u<sl..,J..·_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

l.

Approximate date of disposition: _ _!.,A.~9~sw-·,..\1.......l~oI-L=:____ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

IF YOU HAVE FILED MORE THAN ONE LAWSUIT, THEN YOU MUST DESCRIBE THE ADDITIONAL LAWSUITS ON ANOTHER PIECE OF PAPER, USING THIS SAME FORMAT. REGARDLESS OF HOW MANY CASES YOU HAVE PREVIOUSLY FILED, YOU WILL NOT BE EXCUSED FROM FILLING OUT THIS SECTION COMPLETELY, AND FAILURE TO DO SO MAY RESULT IN DISMISSAL OF YOUR CASE. COPLAINTIFFS MUST ALSO LIST ALL CASES THEY HAVE FILED.

Revised 9/2007

Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 1 Filed: 12/06/13 Page 14 of 34 PageID #:14

III. List ALL lawsuits you (and your co-plaintiffs, if any) bave filed in any state or federal court in the United States:

B. Approximate date of filing lawsuit: Aff>r'~ , F~. A. a[\

C.

"I List all plaintiffs (if you had co-plaintiffs), including any aliases: _ _ _ __ \co H 'v di-or-.

D. List all defendants: V~ b<t"-'a 'w ,\\, g rn $"1 1 ~ , ~'g \7 9lb

Q""-

)gcf, t rw ,...

E.

Court in which the lawsuit was filed (iffederal court, name the district; if state court,
name the county): ~i-" ~ ~ r -r-

F.

Name ofjudge to whom case was assigned: \-\=:?" t<,l"V'\' \\ h \J ,\11 ~

G.

H.

J!: DIsisitpsotsililtipoennodifntghi?s):ca_s__e;~ ~:....!...e.~:x:_a,_m;'_>~p,~ le: -W- as t- he - cas- e d- ism- isse-d?-W- as - it a- ppe-ale- d?

I.

Approximate date ofd i s p o s i t i o n : - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

AIFAYPFOLDNOYARDDUOMIINWUTFATIAHIOTILIAFN.LLFVUARNSERLEOMFGEITLUALTABSEROWETDDESAMLDUXLEOOICSSTROSUSSEOSOLTEOFIHMDSNHTAAFOANARYWNOLOROLNMMETCEASFHLAUINELASLYRELWTSICPNSIATINUGEHSICEOEDTSEYU,ITSYTHOMHOTAFEIUHSVNPSIHEYSAAAFOPSLVIEEULEORCEM,PFTDURIU.OYESSONTVINUDICGOREOUSMTCSCHALPRILYSSIEEBF.TSEIELATCELMHODYEE-,,

Revised 912007

Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 1 Filed: 12/06/13 Page 15 of 34 PageID #:15

lll. List ALL lawsuits you (and your co-plaintiffs, if any) have filed in any state or federal court in the United States:

A. Name of case and docket number: r ~ ~v~~" 'v NI <(jl" \.J..:x:.\{o!~
\ l L lt9\l \

B.

Approximate date of filing lawsuit: _.Jt..'_~I!.'+I.....::~ L 1 _l.,~:<J!..L.:.:.___ _ _ _ _ _ __ _

C. List all plaintiffs (if you had co-plaintiffs), including any aliases: ___J~/.AI::L...__ _

D. List all defendants: _N:...:...'~...C:..:11.:l.~"' _jfcl_._:.__\_!-=£c-,·~~'~ -.i.!>.SI!\J.Jk~-----------

E. Court in which the lawsuit was filed (iffederal court, name the district; if state court, name the county): S-r""' ~ (QJr'r
F. Name ofjudge to whom case was assigned: - - -- - - - - - - - --
G. Basic claim made:._..:l_=_:r__~q~v~-----------------

H. Disposition of this case (for example: Was the case dismissed? Was it appealed?
Is it still pending?): .\i~ ...... ,..s.<M r \.,.:. vo'r 'Q:fl p ro~cc; r1$Yl

I.

Approximate date of disposition: ~ " 1.D I L f A w o x\

IFYOUHAVEFILEDMORETHANONELAWSUIT, THENYOUMUSTDESCRIBETHE ADDITIONAL LAWSUITS ON ANOTHER PIECE OF PAPER, USJNG TillS SAME FORMAT. REGARDLESS OF HOW MANY CASES YOU HAVE PREVIOUSLY FILED, YOU WILL NOT BE EXCUSED FROM FILLING OUT TIDS SECTION COMPLETELY, AND FAILURE TO DO SO MAY RESULT IN DISMISSAL OF YOUR CASE. COPLAINTIFFS MUST ALSO LIST ALL CASES THEY HAVE FILED.

~~ -

Revised 9/2007

Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 1 Filed: 12/06/13 Page 16 of 34 PageID #:16

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Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 1 Filed: 12/06/13 Page 17 of 34 PageID #:17

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Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 1 Filed: 12/06/13 Page 18 of 34 PageID #:18

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V. Relief: State briefly exactly what you want the court to do for you. Make no legal arguments. Cite no cases or statutes.

E1 VI. The plaintiff demands that the case be tried by a jury.

YES

D NO

CERTIFICATION
By signing this Complaint, I certify that the facts stated in this Complaint are true to the best of my knowledge, infonnation and belief. I understand that if this certification is not correct, I may be subject to sanctions by the Court.
Signed this ),:t day of .\,:>v , 20__B_

(Signa re of plaintiff or plaintiffs)

(I.D. Number)

(Address)

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Revised 912007

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U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division

Ojfice-"oj the Assistant At 'mey General

Washington, D.C. 20530

JUL 1 1 2008

Todd H. Stroqer Coo.k County _3oar_d President 118 N. Clark Street Room 537
Chicago, IL 60602

Thomas Dart
Cook County Sheriff Richard J. Daley Center 50 W. Washington Street Room 704
Chicago, IL 60602

Re: Cook County Jail Chicago, Illinois

·Dear President Stroger and Sheriff Dart:

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16, or

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June 18-22, inspections ons, use of re safety,

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experts

accompanied

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Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 1 Filed: 12/06/13 Page 28 of 34 PageID #:28

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III. FINDINGS .

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A. INADEQUATE PROTECTION FROM HARM

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all

of these regards. 1. Inappropriate

and

Excessive

Use

of

Force

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Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 1 Filed: 12/06/13 Page 29 of 34 PageID #:29

- 10 -

503 U.S. 1, 7 (19~2). Generally accepted correctional practices provide that appropriate uses of force in a given circumstance should include a continuum of interventions, and that the amount of force used should not be disproportionate to the threat posed by the inmate. Absent exigent circ'\lmstances, 'lesser forms of interven~ion, such as issu~ng disciplinary infractions or passive escorts, should be used or considered prior to more serious and forceful interventions.

We found that inmates at CCJ are regularly subjected to

inappropriate and excessive uses of physical force. CCJ officers

too often respond to inmates' verbal insults or -failure to follow

;in,E?..t:i),lG.t;J_C?;t:!~_ py p})y§Jc:~),ly !;lt~~~:t.ns. inm~t.-~1?, _mq§1;: __o~t.eR_ w.i t!} 1:!:;~ .

active assistance of· other officers, .even when the inmate

presents n9 threat to anyone's safety or the security of the

facility. Moreover, even in cases in which the initial use of

force is reasonable, officers sometimes continue to engage in

physical force after the inmate has been brough"t under control or

is effectively restrained.

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A top s~curity administrator frankly acknowledged to us the existence of "a culture of abusing inmates" when he came to CCJ in October 2006. While senior management has taken steps to reduce the use of force, such as requiring Use of Force Reports and by subjecting these -documents to greater scrutiny, the excessive and inappropriate use of force has not been brought under ·control. We.believe that, despite management's efforts, a culture still exists at CCJ in which the excessive and inappropriate use of physical force is too often tolerated.

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Our investigation included an intensive examination of

documents provided by CCJ concerning the incidents listed below

.. ,.
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and a host of others occurring between January 2006 and July 2007. We also conducted a great ·many staff and inmate interviews. In some cases, our findings of inappropriate or

excessive uses of force are in accord with CCJ's own conclusions.

a. Us·e of Force in Response to Verbal Altercations
1 i
.I
The use of force, while sometimes necessary in a corrections setting, must be appropriate to the given circumstances, and proportionate to the threat posed. A veJfbal taunt from:· an inmate
to an officer is a rule violation and may appropriately result in disciplinary action, but it should not require a physical
response. As the examples telow demonstrate, verbal altercations with inmates too often provoke physical responses from CCJ officers:

Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 1 Filed: 12/06/13 Page 30 of 34 PageID #:30
- 11 -
1. In July 2007, following his hour of exercise, Alberto P. 6 refused to return to his cell and a female officer locked the cell doors while Alberto remained 'outside. He called the officer a "b----.~ When Alberto came out with his property to be moved to disciplinary segregation for insulting the officer, he was beaten by a number of officers. One officer later told Alberto that he had tried to stop the beating, but he just "didn't have enough juice" (apparently explaining his inability to control the other officers) . CCJ records confirm that Alberto was transferred to segregatio~ and taken to Cermak for hi~ injuries.
2. In Jun~ ...:2,007 ~- Dennis L. r~turned to his ceiiblock 'affe'r a psychological evaluation. An officer refused to give Dennis a dinner tray. Dennis got into a verbal altercation with the officer and threw a cup of liquid at him. A number of officers attacked Dennis in his cell. Emergency Room records indicate that Dennis suffered blunt trauma to his head and body, three teeth knocked loose, and a laceration to his lower lip from this incident.
3. In April 2007, Billy D. wanted to exit his cell and was accused of pushing his way out. He had a "heated" verbal altercation with the officer. One officer struck Billy in the face . and other officers joined in. Medical records show that Billy required internal and external stitches to close a. one-inch laceration that punctured his lip.
4. In September 2006, an officer was handing out extra lunches to inmates. Malcolm W. asked for one, but was refused. Malcolm and the officer exchanged verbal insults. A mental health staff member and. another inmate witnessed the officer slap Malcolm's face and drag him from the dorm. CCJ's Internal Affairs Division ("IAD") sustained allegations of abuse, and recommended that the officer be suspended t'6r 29 days. The officer wa s "dedeputized" and prohibited from carrying a firearm or effecting arrests.

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To protect privacy, we have used pseudonyms to identify

inma tes and officers list ed in this letter. Upon request, we

will prov ide the County with a s chedule that cross-references the

pseudonyms with the proper names, where appropriate.

''

. .' Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 1 Filed: 12/06/13 Page 31 of 34 PageID #:31

-· 23 investigatory technique that calls into question the credibility of the information gathered by CCJ investigators. 11

· iii. Videocameras and Overhead Cameras When properly utilized, cameras in a correctional setting can augment inmate safety and security and provide essential information for investigations. Certainly video surveillance should never be used to substitute for direct officer supervision of inmates, but it often is helpful- to supplement supervision and for incident reconstruction. CCJ has limited and antiquated live feed overheaq cameras in some divisions, but the cameras do not .have .. the .cri.tical capability. to_ record. .and · replay, and .most do . not capture activities outside of the· housing unit dayrooms. Moreover, while there are two small monitors in the RCDC intake area, we discovered that the officers in the Security Office were unaware that the monitors could view various parts of the intake area. The cameras, installed to monitor activity in a part of CCJ that had experienced among the highest number of allegations of -excessive and inappropriate uses of force, were not being used.

Procedures at CCJ require that a handheld videocamera be

brought to the scene of any use of force and that the use of

force be recorded. While this policy is hetpful for review of

cell extractions and othe~ planned uses of force, it is not

surprising that the use of handheld videocameras has not been an

effective means of . oversight for unplanned uses of force. None

of the numerous videotapes ·we reviewed captured an unplanned use

, ,,a.
~

of force in progress. Improvements and additions to CCJ's video surVeillance system, including the ability to record for

retrieval following an incident, would be a much more effective

oversight mechanism.

2. Deficient Inm~te Safety and Supervision

CCJ does not provide adequate inmate supervision, which exposes inmates and staff to unsafe conditions. Lack of adequate

11

Title VI of the Civil Rights Abts requires that

recipients of federal · t~nds take reasonable steps to provide

meaningful access to limited English proficient communities.

Given Cook County's growing Hispanic population, CCJ should

ensure that some investigators and correctional officers are

familiar with rudimentary Spanish. In addition, CCJ staff would

benefit from receiving diversity training. See Title VI of the

. I

Civil Rights Act of 19E4, 42 u.s.c. § 2000d et ~

Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 1 Filed: 12/06/13 Page 32 of 34 PageID #:32
f. "
- 24 -
security staff, insufficient direct supervision in the majority of the housing units, a dilapidated physical plant, inadequate policies and procedures, and an overcrowded environment combine to result in an unsecure facility that is dangerous for everyone on the premises. On April 9, 2007, the John Howard Association found that the rates of injuries to CCJ inmates and staff have incr'eased significantly in the past decade, despite a substantial decrease in inmate population. 1 ~ In 2006, inmate injuries occurred at the highest rate since the John Howard Association began gathering data, and staff injuries reached the third highest rate since 1991. 13 Our revi_ew of CCJ documents revealed that between January 1, 2007 and june 19, 2007, IAD opened apprcpcima:t:ely _2!:;_4_ _cases _inyql ving inma_t:e . ass~ul t .ai:l_d/ o:r pat tery and five cases of sexual assault. In 2006, IAD opened approximately 357 cases involving inmate assault, battery, or sexual assault.
Insufficient inmate supervision has been a serious problem at CCJ for decades. Inmate supervision is seriously compromised by chronic overcrowding and under-staffing. The federal district court monitoring the Duran Consent Decree has repeatedly cited CCJ for failing to provide adequate security staff to ensure safe and secure conditions at the facility. 1' In September 2006, then-Sheriff Michael Sheahan admitted that the Jail is "severely understaffed." 15 The John Howard Association's April 9, 2007 report found that CCJ would require an additional 189 new correctional officers and suitable replacements for the 130 to

12 Court Monitoring Report, Duran v. Dart, No. 74-C-2949, . at 115-16 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 9, 2007) ("2007 Court Monitoring Report"). Monthly averages for·staff injuries have risen from 6.6 in 1996 to 28.3 staff injuries per month in 2006.

13 Id. at .116. Monthly averages for inmate in)uries increased-from 14.7 injuries per 1000 inmates in 1996 to 27.8 injuries per 1000 inmatesl in 2006.

14

' Leonard N. Fleming, "Federal Judge Warns County to Fix

Overcrowding at the Jail," Chicago Sun Times, Dec. 1, 2007;

Jonathan Lipman, "Judge Blasts Staffing at Jail," Daily

Southtown, Dec. 29, 2005.

15 Joint Status Report, Duran v. Dart, No. 74-C-2949, at 8 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2006).

.' C' ase: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 1 Filed: 12/06/13 Page 33 of 34 PageID #:33

- 25 -

152 correctional officers on inactive status16 to comply with the Duran Consent Decree and "good correctional practices. " 17 CCJ' s Post AnaJysis Reports and Divisional Staffing Reports for April through J~ne 2007 revealed that at least 172 correctional officer positions at CCJ were vacant or inactive. Although the External Operations Uni~, which is responsible for the security of the CCJ perimeters, the Emergency Response Team, the Canine Unit, and the transportation of 800 to 1500 inmates to and from court daily, has an authorized security staffing complement of 420 positions, on May 1, 2007, the actuai External Operations manpower availability comprised 352 positions. Our expert consultant found that the level of correctional staff available to supervise housing units at CCJ is woefully inadequate.

The lack of adequate staff is magnified by the fact that CCJ is chronically overcrowded. In fact, every day from June 2006 through April 2007, num~rous inmates were required to sleep on the floor of two-person cells that house~ three inmates. 18 Divisional reports for the period of February 26, 2007 through June 17, 2007 reflect that an average of 485 inmates were forced to sleep on the floor each night. During our site visit on July 23, 2007, Division VI held .1268 inmates in space with a rated capacity of 992 inmates. 19 Dormitory Four in Division II is operating at twice its design capacity. 20 However, we did not observe any increase in security staffing levels or enhanced supervision practices within the overcrowded divisions.

Overcrowding has an impact on security at CCJ. For example,

the week of March 19, 2007, CCJ had more inmates sleeping on the

floor (591) than any other week in the four-month period of March

through June 2007. During that week, CCJ also had the most

fights (35), the most uses of force (27), and found the third

.I

most "shanks" (homemade knives) (34) and second most weapons

16

Correctional officers on "inactive status" include

persons on disability, suspension, leave of absence, 'military

leave, or leave for a duty injury.

17

2007 Court Monitoring Report ~t 84.

18

Id. at 12.

19

The actual capacity of Division VI was much lower than

992 on July 23,. 2007, due to numerous cell closures because of

maintenance probll~ms, which further exacerbated the overcrowding.

20

2007 Cour~ Monitoring Report at 15.

Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 1 Filed: 12/06/13 Page 34 of 34 PageID #:34

- 26 -
(12), of any other week during the same period. 21 On November 30, 2007, Judge Virginia Kendall for the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois apparently chastised the County and Sheriff's Office f~r failing to ease overcrowding
at CCJ, stating: "This is no longer a budget problem. It is a
constitutional violation.u 2 ~ Despite the fact that CCJ has been subject to the Duran Consent Decree for 25 years, the County and the Sheriff's Office have been unable to solve the problems of overcrowding and inadequate supervision at CCJ.
CCJ has taken some unusual steps to try to deal with the problems of overcrowding and inadequate staffing. The practice of cross watching, discussed below, is an unacceptable and dangerous approach. A recently instituted policy of extended· lockdowns is similarly unacceptable. In the spring of 2007, CCJ implemented extended lockdown periods for all general population inmates. Under this system, only half of the inmates in each .housing tier were allowed out of their cells during each shift. Generally, this meant that half of the inmates were allowed out· of their cells for a period in the morning, half of the inmates were allowed out of their cells for a period in the afternoon and evening, and all of the inmates were locked in their cells during the night. Because the groups of inmates 'rotated on a shift by shift basis, the result was that every other day each group of inmates spent a continuous 26-hour period locked inside the cells. This practice was applied indiscriminately to all general population inmates, except those housed on the medical units. As discussed in further detail below, in addition to constituting an unjust restriction on pre-trial detainees, the extended lockdown practice interfered with medical and mental health care, programs, and .the ' grievance system. Moreover, deficient maintenance in many cells (no lighting, plumbing failures, etc.) resulted in inhumane conditions for an extended lockdown. Therefore, as a result of CCJ's inadequate supervision, inmates are subjected to unjustified, prolonged periods of in-cell confinement. Following our July 2007 visit, the Sheriff's Office informed us that CCJ had ·revised the lockdown policy to decrease · the length of the in-cell periods. This would be an improvement

I
21 Weekly averages for March through June 2007 were: 23.5 fights, 17 uses of force, 23.5 shanks, and 6.6 weapons.

22

Staff Writer, "Judge Orders Cook County to Fix Jail

Overcrowding,n PR Newswire Europe, Nov. 30. 2007; Leonard N.

Fleming, "Federal Judge Warns County to Fix Overcrowding at the

Jail,n Chicago Sun Times, Dec. 1, 2007; Notification of Docket

Entry, Duran v. Dart, No. 74-C-2949 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 20 0 7).

 
 Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 12 Filed: 02/27/14 Page 1 of 59 PageID #:58

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

TYLON HUDSON; LATON STUBBLEFIELD;

)

ANGELO MATTHEWS; JERMAINE BROOKS; )

ANTON CARTER, on behalf themselves and

)

all similarly situated individuals,

)

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

)

v.

)

)

TONI PRECKWINKLE, in her official capacity as )

President of the Cook County Board of

)

Commissioners; THOMAS J. DART, in his

)

Official capacity as Cook County

)

Sherriff; CARA SMITH in her official capacity as )

Executive Director of the Cook County Department of )

Corrections; SUPERINTENDENT OF DIVISION X )

E.GREER, in his official capacity;

)

SUPERINTENDENT OF DIVISON IX, V.

)

THOMAS, in his official capacity;

)

THE COUNTY OF COOK;

)

OFFICER CAMPBELL in his individual capacity; )

SARGEANT LEWIS in her individual capacity;

)

OFFICER WILSON in her individual capacity;

)

LIEUTENANT JOHNSON, in

)

her individual capacity,

)

Case No. 13cv8752 Judge Shadur Magistrate Judge Kim

Defendants.

PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT INTRODUCTION
1. This is a civil rights class action complaint brought, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on behalf of the approximately 2000 men who are detained in Divisions IX and X of the Cook County Jail (“CCJ”). A culture of brutality and lawlessness infects the jail and forces these men, all of whom are awaiting trial, to live under a constant risk of life threatening violence.

Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 12 Filed: 02/27/14 Page 2 of 59 PageID #:59
Officers slam people to the floor, stomp, kick and punch them—often while the individuals are handcuffed and shackled. After beating shackled men until they lose consciousness, officers will drag them by their chains, banging their heads on steel doors or allowing their heads to slam into the concrete floor. Officers often violently attack people living with mental illness—generally for behaviors that are manifestations of mental illness or in response to an individual’s request for a mental health evaluation. People who appear to be in active psychosis are frequently brutalized by mobs of officers for alleged “non-compliance.” Officers also order the men to attack, beat and stomp each other—instigating violence between the very individuals that they are supposed to protect.
2. The Cook County Jail is the largest single site jail in the United States and one of the largest jails in the world. It is also one of the most over-crowded. Approximately 62,573 people are detained in the CCJ each year. This means 1.2% of the population of Cook County—and a far greater fraction of the County’s young African American men— passes through the jail annually.
3. CCJ’s culture of lawlessness has flourished in large part because of the Defendants’ failure to adequately manage the population of the jail and redress the welldocumented overcrowding crisis. As a result of the over-crowding, staff resources are not deployed in a way that will ensure the reasonable safety of the people housed in the jail. There is no effective, training, oversight or accountability of CCJ staff. A lack of professionalism and a violent, sadistic, cruel and sometimes racist and homophobic bravado pervades the ranks of the officers, lieutenants and sergeants working in the jail. Living areas are often understaffed or not staffed at all. Officers rarely make rounds or intervene to ensure that people confined in the jail are protected from each other. When CCJ Staff do interact
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with the men, it is often in a violent, physically aggressive matter. In short, CCJ line staff conduct themselves as if they are at war with the men they are required to supervise and protect because the jail is overcrowded and understaffed and lacks adequately trained and supervised officers.
4. The Defendants have long been on notice that the men in their custody endure tortuous conditions, in large part because for many decades, the CCJ has been a lightning rod for litigation. In 1974, people confined in the jail filed a class action, Duran v. Elrod, 74 C 2949 (“Duran”), alleging abusive conditions in the jail. In 1980, the Duran litigation resulted in a consent decree that addressed almost every aspect of jail operations, including the rights of people housed in the jail to protection from harm and excessive force. Duran remained in effect for 30 years.
5. In a 2008 investigation, which occurred while the Duran decree was still in effect, the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) investigated conditions at CCJ and concluded that people housed at the jail were “regularly subjected to inappropriate and excessive uses of physical force.” DOJ reported:
CCJ officers too often respond to inmates’ verbal insults or failure to follow instructions by physically striking inmates, most often with the active assistance of other officers, even when the inmate presents no threat to anyone’s safety or the security of the facility. Moreover, even in cases in which the initial use of force is reasonable, officers sometimes continue to engage in physical force after the [individual] has been brought under control or is effectively restrained. . . A top security administrator frankly acknowledged to us the existence of “a culture of abusing inmates” when he came to CCJ in October 2006. 6. The DOJ documented how the over-crowded conditions contributed to violence amongst the men housed in the jail: “Lack of adequate security staff, insufficient direct supervision in the majority of the housing units, a dilapidated physical plant, inadequate
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policies and procedures, and an overcrowded environment combine to result in an unsecure facility that is dangerous for everyone on the premises.”
7. Based on these findings, the DOJ filed suit in 2010, United States v. Cook County Illinois et al., 10cv2946 (N.D. Ill.), and the parties entered into a consent decree requiring that the Defendants, among other things, provide the people housed in the jail with reasonably safe living conditions and protect them from excessive force and abuse. The case is currently still pending before Judge Virginia Kendall, and, pursuant to her order, an independent monitor file reports with the Court twice a year, tracking the Defendants’ compliance with the terms of the Decree.
8. However, little has changed in the jail since the DOJ filed suit. The most recent monitor’s report, filed in December 2013 (Doc. No. 211 in United States v. Cook County) and available to each of the Defendants, finds that the County is not in compliance with critical Consent Decree provisions related to protection from harm and excessive use of force.
9. The existence of the Duran and United States v. Cook County litigation is not the only proof that the Defendants have known about—and have chosen to ignore— the brutal conditions in the jail. Individuals who have endured civil rights abuses in the facility have filed hundreds of lawsuits seeking monetary damages from Cook County. In the past three years alone, Defendants Preckwinkle and the Cook County Board have approved litigation settlements totally over $9 million in damages to people who endured civil rights abuses in the CCJ. Rather than preventing violence before the fact, the Defendants let it occur, and then write it off in monetary settlements once the bones are broken.
10. The sadistic violence and brutality in Divisions IX and X of the Cook County Jail are not the work of a few rogue officers. Instead, these violations demonstrate systemic
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problems that have remained unchecked at the highest levels of Cook County government. The Defendants have had actual knowledge of these unconstitutional conditions for decades. Their ongoing failure to halt these abuses and redress the over-crowding crisis at the jail has communicated to officers and other line staff that they can attack individuals and orchestrate violence within the jail with impunity. The Defendants have fostered and implicitly authorized abusive conditions in the CCJ by refusing to promulgate adequate policies on overcrowding, the use of force, and segregation; neglecting to adequately train and supervise officers; failing to conduct meaningful investigations of excessive force and officerinstigated beatings; declining to hold guilty officers accountable; and by ignoring evidence that officers and other officials are covering up incidents of excessive force.
11. When people complain about the violence or make any effort to defend themselves from the officers’ attacks, they are often placed in segregation as retaliatory punishment. In the segregation units, men are locked in their cells for 23 to 24 hours a day. During the one hour per day individuals are sometimes allowed out of their cells, they are frequently handcuffed, shackled and unable to move freely. The segregation cells themselves are unfit for human habitation. The cells are filthy, often streaked with feces and reeking of urine. Meals are delivered through a slot in the door (known as a “chuckhole”) and people are forced to eat just a few feet away from their toilet—which is almost never cleaned. Often two men are housed together in these deplorable conditions. “Double celling” people in isolation cells for days, weeks, and sometimes months at a time causes distress and violence in these units—the predictable result of locking together individuals, many of whom live with mental health illnesses, in small, filthy cells for 23 hours or more a day. People with mental illnesses de-compensate quickly in these conditions and, as a result, frequently throw their own feces
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and scream loudly at all hours of the day and night. Individuals who enter the segregation units without mental health problems quickly develop anxiety, depression and other mental health illnesses while living in this barbaric environment. The conditions in these segregation units clearly violate any standard of decency and amount to the wanton infliction of gratuitous and unnecessary pain.
12. Some people are placed in segregation for weeks and months at a time for alleged minor disciplinary offenses, such as attempting to flush a toilet that appeared clogged, refusing to take prescribed medication, playing cards, swearing, and showering in front of female officers. This punishment is imposed without due process, lacks any legitimate penological justification, and is grossly disproportionate to the underlying offenses.
13. As a result of their actions and inactions, the Defendants have violated the Plaintiffs’ rights pursuant to the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. The putative class seeks an injunction that will—once and for all—end the longstanding, systemic and well-documented abuses at the CCJ and establish a system of effective, sustainable accountability, which will prevent the constitutional violations detailed in this complaint.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 14. This action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress the deprivation under color of law of the Plaintiffs’ rights as secured by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
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15. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because the events giving rise to the claims asserted in this complaint occurred in this judicial district.
PARTIES 16. Plaintiff Tylon Hudson is housed in Division X of the Cook County Jail. He has endured violence and ongoing threats of violence as a result of the Defendants’ actions and inactions. 17. Plaintiff Laton Stubblefield is housed in Division IX of the Cook County Jail. He has endured violence and ongoing threats of violence as a result of the Defendants’ actions and inactions. 18. Plaintiff Angelo Matthews is housed Division X of the Cook County Jail. He has endured violence and ongoing threats of violence as a result of the Defendants’ actions and inactions. 19. Plaintiff Anton Carter is housed in Division IX of the Cook County Jail. He lives in the segregation unit, in which he was placed arbitrarily and without adequate due process, and where he endures deplorable and inhumane living conditions that violate standards of decency. Plaintiff Carter also lives under a threat of violence because of the Defendants’ actions and inaction. 20. Plaintiff Jermaine Brooks is in the custody of Cook County. He has been housed in the segregation unit of Division IX. He is currently housed in another local jail, with which CCJ contracts for overflow space temporarily to house individuals who remain in the custody of Cook County and who will eventually return to the CCJ. When returned to CCJ on March 27, 2014, Plaintiff Brooks will be placed in the segregation unit of Division IX.
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There, he will endure deplorable and inhumane living conditions that violate evolving standards of decency.
21. Defendant Toni Preckwinkle is the President of the Cook County Board of Commissioners, which is responsible for CCJ’s physical plant and has sole responsibility for funding all CCJ operations and programs. This includes ensuring appropriate resources. Defendant Preckwinkle is sued in her official capacity.
22. Defendant Cook County through the County Board of Commissioners is responsible for CCJ’s physical plant and has sole responsibility for funding all operations and programs of the CCJ—this includes ensuring that the CCJ has the sufficient funding and resources necessary to operate the jail lawfully.
23. Defendant Thomas J. Dart is the Sherriff of Cook County. He is solely responsible for all security and corrections policies and practices at the CCJ. Defendant Dart is responsible for the care, custody, and control of each individual housed in the CCJ. Defendant Dart is sued in his official capacity.
24. Defendant Cara Smith is the Executive Director of the Cook County Department of Corrections. She reports directly to Defendant Dart and is responsible for overseeing the implementation of all policies and procedures promulgated by Defendant Dart regarding the operations of the Cook County Jail. Defendant Smith is sued in her official capacity.
25. Defendant Thomas is the Superintendent of Division IX. He reports to Defendant Smith and is responsible for the operations of his Division. Among other responsibilities, Defendant Thomas is responsible for tracking and addressing incidents of
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violence, uses of force and the use of segregation in his Division. He is sued in his official capacity.
26. Defendant Greer is the Superintendent of Division X. He reports to Defendant Smith and is responsible for the operations of his Division. Among other responsibilities, Defendant Greer is responsible for tracking and addressing incidents of violence, uses of force, and the use of segregation in his Division. He is sued in his official capacity.
27. Officer Campbell is a correctional officer who works in Division X. He ordered gang members housed in the jail to attack Plaintiff Tylon Hudson. He is sued in his individual capacity.
28. Lieutenant Johnson works in Division X and oversees aspects of correctional and security operations in that Division. He refused to take reasonable measures to protect Hudson from harm despite knowing that the threats Hudson faced were credible and immediate. He is sued in his individual capacity.
29. Defendant Lewis is a female Sergeant who now may be a Lieutenant. During the times relevant to this complaint, she worked on the protective custody unit in Division III. She ordered Hudson to leave protective custody and return to Division X, ignoring the serious risk of harm he faced there.
30. Officer Wilson is a female officer, who during the times relevant to this complaint worked as a security officer in the law library in Division X. She refused to take reasonable measures to protect Hudson from harm despite knowing that the threats Hudson faced were credible and immediate. She is sued in her individual capacity.
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CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
31. The Plaintiffs bring this suit on their own behalf and on behalf of all people who now or in the future will be housed in Divisions IX or X of the Cook County Jail.
32. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. Approximately 2,000 men are housed in Divisions IX and X of the Cook County Jail. The class also includes an unknown and unknowable number of future class members, since people regularly are transferred in and out of these Divisions.
33. There are questions of law or fact common to the class including, but limited to whether Defendants’ systemic failure to implement policies and practices necessary to halt the longstanding and pervasive pattern of savage attacks in Divisions IX and X has exposed members of the putative class to an unacceptable risk of brutal violence.
34. Because the policies, practices and customs challenged in this Complaint apply with equal force to the named Plaintiffs and the other members of the class, the claims of the named Plaintiffs are typical of the class in general.
35. The named Plaintiffs and their counsel will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class. The named Plaintiffs possess strong personal interests in the subject matter of the lawsuit and are represented by experienced counsel with expertise in civil rights litigation. Counsel have the legal knowledge and resources to fairly and adequately represent the interests of all class members in this action.
36. The Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class: their policies, procedures, practices, acts, and omissions have affected all class members. Accordingly, final injunctive and declaratory relief is appropriate to the class as a whole.
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ALLEGATIONS OF FACT
I. DEFENDANTS HAVE LONG KNOWN ABOUT THE BRUTALLY DANGEROUS CONDITIONS IN THE COOK COUNTY JAIL, YET THE PATTERN AND PRATICE OF VIOLENCE AND OFFICER ABUSE PERSISTS.
37. The official capacity Defendants1 are aware, and have been aware for years, of the longstanding pattern and practice in the Cook County Jail—and particularly in Divisions IX and X—of officer inflicted and officer instigated violence. These conditions have been publicly reported, documented and condemned numerous times over the past half century.
38. In a 1995 Opinion authored by Judge Gettleman, in a case that addressed conditions at the Cook County Jail, the Court noted that in 1964, a researcher toured the Cook County Jail and declared it to be “miserable, overcrowded, crime-and-disease-breeding.” Wilson v. Cook County Bd. of Commissioners, 878 F. Supp. 1163, 1165 (1995). According to the Court, the then-Superintendent acknowledged that the beating of inmates by other inmates, smuggling of contraband, and other “vicious practices” were routine in the jail. Id. The Court highlighted that, ten years after abusive conditions in the jail were first acknowledged publicly, people housed in the jail filed the class action lawsuit in Duran. But as Judge Gettleman noted in Wilson: “[a]s demonstrated by the instant case and many others like it, neither Duran nor the passage of time has lessened the number or volume of complaints by inmates of the Cook County Jail.” The same has been true for decades—and holds true now.
1 Unless explicitly specified otherwise, the use of the term “Defendants” throughout this complaint refers only to those Defendants sued in their official capacities.
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39. Thirty years after Duran was filed, the DOJ investigation into conditions at the Cook County Jail concluded that a “culture exists at CCJ in which the excessive and inappropriate use of physical force is too often tolerated.” The officer- abuse documented by the DOJ demonstrates a pattern and practice of abuse that persists to this day.
40. The DOJ further concluded that “the severity and frequency of inmate on inmate assaults demonstrated that CCJ is not providing for the safety and wellbeing of inmates. . . . Many of these incidents occurred in the CCJ’s maximum security divisions (Divisions IX and X) where [people] should be supervised at the highest level . . . . The level of inmate on inmate and inmate on staff violence is so unacceptably high, that it is clear inmates are not adequately supervised.” The DOJ findings led them to file suit in 2010, in what became United States v. Cook County.
41. Subsequently, Cook County and the DOJ entered into a Consent Decree containing over 70 provisions related to protection from harm and officer abuse. That same year, the Duran Decree was terminated by an agreement of the parties. In the years since, the court-appointed monitor has reviewed the jail’s compliance with the DOJ Decree. The most recent monitor’s findings from December 2013 suggest that while, in the opinion of the monitor, CCJ may have made progress redressing violence and abusive conditions in the jail, the Defendants are out of compliance with essential components of the DOJ Decree.
42. Additionally, the monitor reports that the Defendants have failed to: 1) identify a single accurate source of data for uses of force and allegation of excessive use of force; 2) implement a detainee classification system; 3) ensure a collaboration between security and mental health to protect the safety of detainees who live with a mental illness; or 4) implement an adequate staffing plan.
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43. Perhaps most importantly, the monitor emphasizes that the jail over-crowding crisis continues to threaten the safety of people housed in the jail and CCJ staff. The monitor admonishes the Defendants that their collective efforts to address over-crowding lack “focus and sustainability” and notes that, on the over-crowding issue, the Defendants have made “no progress at all.”
44. The monitor further reports that the Defendants have failed to achieve substantial compliance with critically important provisions of the Decree related to officer abuse and violence. Specifically, the Defendants have failed to maintain the staffing and supervision levels necessary for the safe operation of the facility “consistent with generally accepted correctional standards, failed to establish a classification system that “separates inmates in housing units by classification levels in order to protect inmates from an unreasonable risk of harm,” and failed to establish a grievance system that is accessible to detainees and confidential informants.
45. During the past three years, Cook County officials have agreed to pay over $9 million to settle over 250 individual civil rights lawsuits filed by people who endured unconstitutional conditions at CCJ. This litigation has functioned to provided additional notice to the Defendants about the brutal violence and un constitutional conditions at the CCJ The Defendants were required to approve each of these payouts which include the following:
a. $60,000 to a person who was stabbed after an officer ignored his requests for protection from another person housed at the jail;
b. $7,000 to a person with serious mental health issues who was misclassified, placed in Division IX and then stabbed by other individuals housed in that Division;
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c. $15,000 to a man who was stabbed and beaten by other individuals housed in the jail;
d. $750,000 to a man who was raped by his cellmate; e. $1,950 to a person who was attacked by an officer. The officer slammed the man
into a wall and beat him while he was restrained in handcuffs; f. $7,500 to a person who, as a result of his untreated mental illness, was beaten by
other individuals housed in the jail ; g. $5,000 to a man who was beaten and slammed to the ground by an officer; h. $4,500 to a man who was taken to a dark room and beaten unconscious by an
officer; i. $175,000 to a man who was beaten by another individual housed in the jail in the
presence of and at the instruction of officers; j. $11,000 paid to a man who was raped by another person housed at the jail.
Officers encouraged this rape to occur.; k. $15,000 paid to a man who officers beat and taunted with slurs related to his
sexual orientation; l. $10,000 to man who was assaulted by numerous officers; m. $5,000 to a person who was pepper sprayed by an officer after he attempted to
obtain his prescription medication; n. $15,000 to a man who was beaten and stomped on in his cell by an officer after he
requested to speak to a “white shirt”(referring to an individual higher in the chain of command, usually a Sergeant or Lieutenant) in order to complain about his medically required special diet;
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o. $10,000 to a victim of gang-related stabbing that involved an officer-led cover-up; p. $10,000 to a victim of an officer who handcuffed him, sprayed him with pepper
spray and then beat him; q. $5,850 to a person who was beaten by multiple officers; r. $25,000 to man who was beaten by two officers and suffered injuries to his mouth
and eye; s. $14,500 to victim who suffered a broken wrist as a result of a beating by an
officer; t. $5,000 to a victim who suffered a broken nose and permanent damage to his eye
when he was stabbed by another person housed at the jail; u. $15,000 to victim who was struck and beaten to the ground by a group of officers; v. $15,000 to a victim who was beaten by an officer while handcuffed; w. $100,000 to victim who was punched in the mouth by an officer who was a trained
boxer; x. $15,000 to man who was beaten by officer who told him that “if he didn’t like [the
beating], he should bond out”; y. $7,500 to a victim who was beaten by a mob comprised of both officers and people
housed in the jail; z. $30,000 to a victim who was beaten by an officer and then left unsupervised with
other individuals housed in the jail who subsequently stabbed him; aa. $2,600 to a man who warned officers that he was at risk of imminent harm but was
subsequently stabbed by other individuals in the jail after the officers ignored him; bb. $2,000 to a victim who was beaten by an officer in an elevator;
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cc. $5,000 to a victim who was attacked by officers and, as result, temporarily lost his vision;
dd. $2,500 to a man who was beaten by an officer after he complained about his broken toilet;
ee. $30,000 to a victim who was beaten by an officer; ff. $8,000 to man who was injured in a gang-related fight. He reported his fears of
injury to the superintendent, who responded that he should “be a man and stop running to me. If you want protection, go make a shank”; gg. $2,500 to a victim who was beaten by other people housed in the jail after an officer announced to the other individuals housed at the jail that the victim was a sex offender and then released them to attack the victim. 46. It is likely that—but for the unique, conflict creating role of Cook County State’s Attorney’s office—many more individuals who have had their civil rights violated at the jail would be successful in their efforts to seek relief from the Courts. The Sheriffs’ office is represented by the State’s Attorney civil rights cases concerning jail conditions. The same State’s Attorney office also prosecutes the civil rights Plaintiffs in their criminal cases and makes decisions about charges and pleas. The States Attorney’s office uses this leverage to their advantage in negotiating with Plaintiffs, encouraging them to drop their civil rights claims in exchange for leniency in their criminal cases. This conflict prevents the just resolution of many valid civil rights claims resulting from abusive jail conditions. 47. In addition to the United States v. Cook County litigation and individual damages lawsuits filed on behalf of people housed in CCJ, the Jail’s own internal discipline reports reveal a violent, corrupt culture, and illustrate the Defendants’ ongoing refusal to
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protect people from violence in their living units. During approximately a two month period, during the Spring of 2013, there were over 403 serious allegations of disciplinary violations in Divisions IX and X. 152 were incidents of violence. 112 document the existence of drugs, weapons or other dangerous contraband on the living units. (Counsel submitted a Freedom of Information Act Request for a longer time period, but the County insisted that the request be narrowed.)
II. THERE IS A LONGSTANDING, SYSTEMIC CULTURE OF LAWLESSNESS IN THE COOK COUNTY JAIL, WHICH RESULTS IN AN INTRACTABLE PATTERN AND PRACTICE OF OFFICER BRUTALITY AND ABUSE.
48. DOJ’s investigation and findings in 2008 highlighted cases of individual abuse that were representative of the larger inherent problems in the jail’s operations. Many of the cases described by the DOJ then are practically identical to the abuse endured by members of the current putative class. These individual cases include:
a. Alberto P. was beaten by officers after he and the officer argued. CCJ records confirmed he was injured by the officer and required medical care.
b. Officers attacked Dennis L. after he returned to his cellblock following a mental health evaluation and requested his dinner tray. Dennis received emergency medical treatment for blunt trauma to his head and body, three loose teeth and a laceration to his lip.
c. After an argument with an officer, Billy D. was beaten by that officer and others. Billy required medical care for a laceration on his lip.
d. Officers beat Danny P. while he was handcuffed after he argued with an officer. A sergeant eventually found Danny handcuffed and bleeding in his cell. Danny filed a lawsuit against county officials and eventually settled his case.
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e. Matthew S. received stiches to his face and a tetanus shot after officers shoved his head into the concrete while he was handcuffed. Officers attacked Matthew after he stood up out of turn at the jail’s barber shop.
f. Officers punched and kicked Terrence M. when they discovered he had an unauthorized shirt in his possession. Terrence required surgery for a broken jaw as a result of the beating.
g. After John S. refused to stop tapping on the wall during a strip search, officers beat him, dragged him by his hair and choked him.
h. Jacob requested to speak to a “white shirt” about his housing placement. In response, officers extracted him from his cell, handcuffed him and took him to segregation. On the way to segregation, officers pushed Jacob’s head into the wall, threw him down the stairs, and kicked and punched him repeatedly.
i. Robert T. lives with a mental illness. After he exposed himself to a female officer, male officers handcuffed him and then beat him while he was restrained. Robert was hospitalized with severe head trauma.
j. Officers beat Russell G. after he left his cell without permission. Officers handcuffed Russell, stomped on his back and hit him. They then told Russell that he would be charged with battery unless he told medical staff that he injured himself by falling off his bunk.
k. Officers mistakenly believed that Martin S. had stabbed an officer. Officers punched and stomped Martin, hit him in the head with a radio and punched him in the groin.
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l. As retaliation for an assault on an officer, officers entered a cellblock and began indiscriminately beating people housed in that unit, including Andrew B. who had nothing to do with the assault but was nonetheless stomped and kicked by officers.
m. Jerry M. was attacked by an officer who, during the beating, used his handcuffs like brass knuckles. The officer was recommended for termination as a result of this incident, but was eventually re-instated by the Sherriff’s Merit Board.
49. The excessive use of force and violent and abusive conditions in the jail are well known by County officials and by those who work at the jail. Such officer abuses do not happen in the shadows. Often a large number of officers congregate to assault people housed in the jail and to cheer each other on when these assaults occur. The culture of violence is so embedded in the institution that officers and those housed in the jail have developed their own language to describe the Defendants’ abusive practices. Officers will threaten people with a “walk” to an “elevator ride”— this refers to officers’ practice of forcing people into the jail’s elevators and assaulting them there, out of sight from witnesses and the few cameras that do exist in the living areas.
50. When officers do attempt to document the use of force with a video camera, the officer operating the camera will yell “camera coming, camera coming,” warning their coworkers that their brutality is about to be exposed on film. While beating people housed in the jail, officers will frequently scream “stop resisting, stop resisting” to a person who is not in fact resisting. This is done for the benefit of the cameras and any witnesses in an effort to fabricate a reason to blame the victim for the attack. Officers also have a pattern and practice of attempting to conceal their physical abuse by falsely charging their victims with aggravated
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battery. This practice is yet another effort to blame the individuals housed at the jail for the violence perpetrated by the Defendants.
51. These brutal officer attacks happen with impunity in part because State’s Attorney rarely files criminal charges filed against officers who brutalize people housed in the jail. This may be attributable to the dual—and seemingly irreconcilable—role the State’s Attorneys office plays as both defense counsel for the Sherriff’s office in matters related to jail conditions and as prosecutor of those who commit crimes. If the State’s Attorney office prosecuted all the crimes committed by officers it would most certainly expose its client (the Sherriff and his employees) to even greater civil liability.
52. Degrading, cruel, and sadistic officer attacks are not isolated incidents at CCJ; they are commonplace. This is unsurprising given that the Defendants have promulgated a woefully deficient written use of force policy in May 2011 that promotes the use of unnecessary violence in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Among other deficiencies, the Defendants’ policy (1) is confusing and internally contradictory, (2) omits the basic principle that force should only be used to achieve legitimate correctional objectives, (3) authorizes force in impermissible situations; (4) establishes an inadequate system for internal review and investigation of use of force incidents, (5) fails to prohibit the practice of provoking detainees into assaultive behavior as a pretext for use of force; and (6) fails to prohibit punching and kicking detainees.
53. Defendants Preckwinkle and the County of Cook, through the County Board of Commissioners allow the sadistic and violent use of force to persist at the jail by failing to provide sufficient resources to ensure adequate training, investigations, oversight and accountability of CCJ staff. These Defendants have been aware that the lack of resources
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exposes people housed at the jail to an unacceptable risk of being targeted by officer-inflicted violence, yet for many years they have persisted in failing to ensure that the jail receives appropriate resources.
III. REPRESENTATIVE EXAMPLES OF OFFICER BRUTALITY ARE LEGION. A. Officers savagely beat victims who request medical attention or who attempt to complain about living conditions in the jail.
JOHN DOE 1 51. During July or August 2013, in Division X on deck 1-D, John Doe, who was
clearly suffering from mental illness was beaten unconscious by a number of officers including Officers Keating and Williams. This happened in the day room near cell 20. The officers beat Doe after he repeatedly requested medical attention and the ability to speak to a white shirt. At no time during this interaction was Doe violent or posing a threat to security. After Officers Keating and Williams beat Doe, they summoned additional officers who slammed him on the concrete floor while Officer Keating pounded on his head with a closed fist. During this attack, other people on the living unit pleaded with the officers to stop harming Doe, but the officers ignored their pleas.
JOHN DOE 2
53. In September 2013, in Division X, John Doe 2 was attacked by Officers Soto Toledo after he requested his medication. The officers responded to Doe’s requests by cursing at him, grabbing him around his throat, handcuffing him and beating him until became unconscious. Once Doe lay unconscious on the ground, Officer Soto dragged him by
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the handcuff—banging his head in the process. Doe’s blood covered the floor and eventually a sanitation crew was called to clean up the blood.

54. On June 6, 2013,

was abused by officers after he refused to

be transported to another county jail because he needed medical attention. (The Defendants

transport some people to other counties in an effort to reduce over-crowding at the CCJ).

While officers escorted a handcuffed and shackled

to the medical unit, he

requested that they walk at a pace that would accommodate his need to shuffle because the

shackles limited his ability to walk. The officers responded to this request by throwing him to

the ground and injuring his hand and leg.

received medical attention for the

injuries he sustained during this attack.

55. During the winter of 2013 in Division X, Officer Keating attacked

in

relation for a lawsuit

filed, which detailing a previous attack he endured at the

hands of Officer Keating and others (described in ¶ 77 below). Officer Keating confronted

about the lawsuit by hitting him on the face with the antenna on his radio, taunting

him and calling him a “little bitch.” Officer Keating asked

why he “put that

bullshit” on him. Sergeant Crump observed Officer Keating hitting and taunting

in

retaliation for filing a lawsuit, but she did nothing to stop him.

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LATON STUBBLEFIELD

56. On or about August 2012 in Division IX, Officer Haskel beat Plaintiff Laton Stubblefield after Stubblefield requested permission to clean his cell. The officers on duty refused his request and forced Stubblefield into a squalid cell filled with another person’s garbage. After enduring several hours in these conditions, Plaintiff Stubblefield renewed his request to clean the cell and placed his arm through the chuckhole of his cell door. In response, Officer Haskel used his radio to beat Plaintiff Stubblefield on his arm. This assault caused Plaintiff Stubblefield’s wrist to swell and bruise.

DOE

57. In late August 2013 on the protective custody tier of Division IX, an individual

who is transgendered and known as “

was attacked by officers after she requested to

lodge a complaint with a white shirt. The officers on the tier responded to her request by

beating her, spraying her with mace and dragging her out into the hallway. At no time during

this altercation did she pose any threat to the officers or to security.

58. In January 2012, in Division IX,

was slapped by Officer

Coleman after he requested a commissary request slip.

was handcuffed during this

assault and posed no threat to security.

filed a grievance about this incident and also

filed a complaint with the Office of Professional Responsibility.

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59. In September 2012, in Division IX,

was assaulted by Officer

Zuniga after he requested to stay out of his cell for the full 60 minutes allotted to him pursuant

to CCJ rules.

was in the day room during the one hour a day he was allowed out of

his cell (although he was kept in handcuffs and shackles). After Officer Zuniga ordered him

back in cell after 40 minutes,

protested and requested his full 60 minutes in the day

room. Officer Zuniga responded to

requests by slapping him across his face with

an open hand. The Officer then grabbed

chains and dragged him away from the

cameras. Next Officer Lee and Officer Zuniga removed him from the deck and continued their

attack— kicking him and beating him with handcuffs.

was left with a chipped tooth,

bruised face, and bruised lips. After 24 hours,

received medical care for his chipped

tooth and received x-rays to determine if his ribs were broken.

JOHN DOE 3

62. During the fall of 2013, Officer Lacey attacked John Doe, a very small African-American man who informed officers that he was feeling suicidal and requested a mental health evaluation. Doe repeated this request a number of times and each time, Officer Lacey refused to respond to Doe. In an effort to draw attention to his mental health needs, Doe refused to lock down in his cell when ordered to do so. Officer Lacey responded to Doe’s refusal to lock down by dragging Doe into his cell while simultaneously punching him repeatedly in the face with a closed fist. Once Doe was placed in his cell, he took his sheet and began to fasten a noose to hang himself. Eventually, Sergeant Crump came to the deck and ordered the officers to remove Doe from the tier to take him for a mental health evaluation.

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&

63. In November of 2013, Officers in Division IX beat

and

after they complained about the officers’ orders that they enter a freezing

cold cell with a broken window on Tier 2F. The cell was so cold that flood water covering the

floor of the cell had turned to ice. When

and

explained to the officers that

they would not enter the cell because of the conditions inside it, the officers responded with

brutal force.

64. One officer threw

on the ground and pressed his jaw into the concrete

with his knees. Another officer pressed his knees into

ribs. Throughout this attack,

had a difficult time breathing. CCJ staff sent

to segregation for 35 days after

he was attacked. He filed grievances complaining about the attack and his retaliatory

placement in segregation, but never received a response.

65. The officers, including Officer Tadesco, handcuffed

slammed him

on the ground, and kicked him in the head.

has a mental rod in his leg from a

previous injury. The officers who attacked him caused the metal rod to come out of place and

inflicted excruciating pain. Approximately 20 officers—including some white shirts—

witnessed this attack.

JOHN DOE 4

66. During the fall of 2013, 4 in Division X, Officer McHaffey threw an alreadyinjured Doe into his cell with such force that he landed on and injured his shoulder. Officer McHaffey responded violently after Doe requested a bottom bunk because his foot was broken and he could not climb up to the top bunk.
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JOHN DOE 5
67. In October 2013, in Division IX John Doe 5, who was known for filing many grievances documenting officer wrong-doing was beaten by multiple officers after they searched his cell and threw away his legal paperwork. When the Doe protested and requested his paperwork back, the officers handcuffed him, threw him on the ground and began punching and kicking him.
CHRIS DOE
68. In early December 2013, in Division X, officers including Sergeant Duty and Lieutenant Johnson, attacked Doe after he persisted in requesting protective custody status from them Another person living on the deck told Doe that he intended to harm him. Doe then sought protective custody from both the officer on duty and the white shirts. After repeatedly denying his request for protections, Duty pushed him into his cell and then Lt. Johnson began punching him while screaming obscenities. After this attack, CCJ officials placed Doe in segregation.

69. In January 2014 in Division X,

was beaten after he requested to be

placed on a different deck and he refused to go into his cell until he was moved. The officers

refused to move him and instead called for back-up. In response, a sergeant, a lieutenant and

additional officers arrived on the deck. The officers began to choke

punch him and

throw him in the cell.

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70. In August 2013, in Division IX, Officers, including Officer Appleberry, beat

up

after he complained about the brutal treatment the officers had given an

older man who was housed at the CCJ. The older man was slow to return from recreation, and

the officers slammed him against a wall.

protested, and the officers then

turned their aggression towards him, jumping on him and punching him.

was

left with visible bruises after this attack.

MURPHY DOE

71. In July 2013, in Division X, Officer Appleberry punched a man in his mouth and knocked out his teeth after the man requested medication for his seizures. After officers removed Doe from the medical unit, where he was questioning the nurse about the discontinuation of his medication, Appleberry ran up to Doe and attacked him.

72. On November 5, 2013 in Division IX, Officer Areanas attacked

after

he complained to about his food tray. Because of a medical condition,

has been

prescribed a special diet, but on that day he received a regular tray. When

requested

to speak with a Sergeant about his missing tray, Areneas choked and slapped him.

JOHN DOE 6

73. In November 2013, in Division X, Sergeant Duty and Lieutenant Johnson attacked Doe because he was complaining about a broken toilet in his cell. The toilet would not flush and Doe requested to be moved to a cell with a functioning toilet. He refused to enter
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the cell with the broken toilet and asked to speak with a white shirt. When Sergeant Duty and Lieutenant Johnson arrived on the tier, they began to punch and beat him. After beating him for several minutes, they handcuffed him, and dragged him off the tier.
B. Officers physically attack people who have violated or who are merely perceived to have violated facility rules—even in instances when the alleged violation is relatively minor.

74. In September 2013, in Division IX on Tier E-1,

was beaten

and doused with pepper spray in close range after he and his cellmate had a fistfight. The

lieutenant on duty only sprayed

with pepper spray after the fight had ended—the use of

the spray was not to end violence on the unit, but to punish

and to inflict excruciating

pain upon him. After

was handcuffed and doused with pepper spray, Officer Howell

punched him in the nose with a closed fist while escorting him off the deck.

75. On October 12, 2011, in Division IX,

was attacked by Officer

Julio Castillo. Officer Castillo punched

multiple times and hit him over the head with

handcuffs until he became unconscious.

received medical care for the injuries he

sustained during this attack. The Defendants then charged

with aggravated battery on a

peace officer as part of an effort to cover-up the officers’ brutality and to ensure that

did not complain about the excessive use of force. Officer Castillo told

that he attacked

him to get a “nine month vacation.”

76. On October 15, 2011 Officer Couch attacked

because the officer

believed, or purported to believe, that

was the aggressor during the incident that

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occurred with Officer Castillo. Officer Couch shackled and handcuffed him repeatedly.

and punched

77. On January 11, 2013, in Division X, Officers Appleberry and Keating beat

based on a mistaken belief that

had physically fought another officer. As

lay compliant on the ground, Officer Keating jumped on him, ground his knee into

his back and wrenched his head and neck into a head lock. At the same time, Officer

Appleberry proceeded to handcuff him. Then, both officers began to kick and punch the

handcuffed

until Officer Bell intervened and told the Officers that

was not

involved in the altercation. When officers realized they had attacked the wrong man, the

beating ceased.

78. During February or March 2013, in Division X, Officers Vereen and Graffeo

attacked

The altercation started when Officer Vereen told

to put on his CCJ-

issued shirt.

had previously obtained permission from Lieutenant Johnson to wear a

shirt he obtained from the commissary. He tried to explain this fact to Officer Vereen. Officer

Vereen responded with profanity and told

that he would “beat his ass.”

79. Eventually,

went back to his cell and to put on his CCJ-issued shirt.

Officer Vereen followed him into the cell with a slapjack and began to beat him on the face

and head with the weighted weapon. Officer Graffeo then began to hit and kick

Officer

Masterson finally came in and ended the attack. He handcuffed

and escorted him to

segregation, where was placed for six days without a hearing.

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80. On January 31, 2013 in Division X, on Tier 2-B,

was

brutalized by officers after he was attacked by another person housed in the Cook County Jail.

The officer brutality likely happened because they falsely believed that

had been

the aggressor. The officers handcuffed him, smashed his face into the concrete, and, in the

process, dislocated his shoulder.

is still receiving muscle relaxers and physical

therapy for the injuries he sustained during this attack.

JOHN DOE 7

81. During the summer of 2013, officers in Division X, Tier 2-B brutalized Doe, who had been involved in a fight. They threw him on the floor and beat him repeatedly with metal hand cuffs. In an effort to cover himself from the blows, Doe moved his arm and hit an officer. The officers responded with increased violence—kicking and stomping him. About 10 officers surrounded Doe who was on the ground and non-responsive. The officers jostled each other in order to be able to land a kick or punch on the victim. Only after the attack ended, did a white shirt come in to videotape the incident. By that time Doe was laying on the floor covered in blood.

JOHN DOES 8-10

82. During November 2013, officers in Division X on 2-B sprayed three people who were locked in their cells and who were not threatening anyone or posing a risk to security with pepper spray. The officers assaulted these men after they protested their mistakenly prolonged nutri-loaf punishment. (Nutri-loaf is food that allegedly provides all nutritional requirements, but is hard in consistency and deliberately unappetizing. It is given
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to people housed in the jail in lieu of a meal tray as a relatively serious punishment). The number of days the men were supposed to be subject to this punishment had expired, yet the officers were still serving them the offensive food. In protest, the men placed their hands outside of their chuckholes. The officers responded by spraying all the men in the face with pepper spray while they were in the cells. This direct application of pepper spray on people who pose no threat to security (and who were safely secured in their cells) was done only to wantonly inflict pain.

83. In May of 2012 in Division IX,

was beaten by multiple officers,

including Officer Barnett. The beating happened after

and another person housed at

the CCJ fought. The Officers handcuffed

forced him to the ground in one of the

stairwells in Division IX and punched and kicked him. During this time

was securely

handcuffed and was not resisting the officers’ orders.

ANGELO MATTHEWS 84. On or about October 22, 2013, in Division IX, Plaintiff Angelo Matthews was
assaulted by Officer Lombardi after he attempted to leave his cell without his CCJ-issued shirt. Before he could fully exit his cell, Officer Lombardi instructed Matthews to put on the CCJ shirt. Plaintiff Matthews immediately complied and then attempted to exit his cell. Officer Lombardi refused to let him leave and slammed the metal cell door on Plaintiff Matthews’ leg, causing excruciating pain

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85. During the Fall of 2013 in Division X,

was abused by Officer

after he attempted to follow a Sergeant’s order to exit his cell. As

attempted to

comply with the Sergeant’s order, Officer

slammed the cell door on

foot,

crushing his foot and causing him excruciating pain.

86. On July 6, 2013, in Division 10, Tier 3B,

was beaten by Officer

Coven after Officer Coven attempted to intervene in a fight between

and another

man on the tier. Officer Coven allowed the fight to go on for some time, and when he finally

intervened he threw

up against the wall and choked him. When

tried to

stop Officer Coven from choking him, the officer began beating him with his handcuffs. Then,

another officer arrived and restrained

with cuffs and shackles and pushed him onto

the floor. Officer Coven continued to beat

while he lay shackled on the ground.

87.

was taken to the medical unit. The medical staff determined that he

needed to be treated at the trauma unit at Stroger Hospital.

filed multiple grievances,

about this incident but never received a response.

88. During July 2013, in Division IX Officer Aljazi assaulted

as

punishment for speaking to his cousin while they were both at the CCJ barbershop. After

observing him speak to his cousin, Officer Aljazi began to torment and humiliate

by

pulling the waist of his pants straight up to cause what is commonly referred to as a “wedgie.”

When

asked the officer to stop, Officer Aljazi responded by smashing

face

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into the wall. Officer Aljazi then tried to instigate a fist-fight with

but

refused to rise to the bait. Officer Aljazi continued to taunt

by calling him a “bitch.”

JOHN DOES 11-12

89. During the fall of 2013 on Division IX, on Tier 3D during the 3-11 shift, a number of white officers beat down two Latino men after the men refused to move to another tier. The men were not posing any threat to security. The officers appeared to have planned the beat down and worked together to execute it. The officers went to the men’s cells slammed them against the wall, choked them and handcuffed them. The men were then transferred to Division I.

JOHN DOES 13-14

90. In November 2013, on Division IX in Tier 2E during the 3-11 shift, two men were attacked by multiple officers after they refused to return to their cells because they wanted the chance to speak with white shirts about their living conditions. The officers responded to this request by slamming them on the ground, handcuffing them, grounding their faces into the concrete floor and punching them on the sides of their bodies. Upon information and belief, the officers continued to beat these men once they entered the elevator.

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JOHN DOE 15
91. During the fall of 2013 in Division IX, Officer O’Rourke attacked a Latino man. Officer O’Rourke asked the man to provide information about a fight that occurred on the tier. When the man refused to answer the questions, the Officer O’Rourke hit him behind the knees causing his legs to buckle. Doe fell to the ground and lay there while Officer O’Rourke beat and choked him.
C. Officers target people with whom they have had a verbal disagreements for brutal, retaliatory beatings in which groups of officers participate.
JOHN DOE 16
92. During the fall of 2013 in Division IX, on the protective custody tier, Officer Ferro struck Doe in the face and knocked him unconscious. Once Doe was on the floor, 15 other officers arrived on the tier. They handcuffed him, pushed him against the wall, and bent his arm in a painful manner.

93. On August 6, 2013 in Division X officers attacked

in a

stairwell. The attack was premeditated and committed as retaliation for an alleged verbal

altercation

had with a female officer.

94. The female officer ordered

to the stairwell under the pretext that he

had a medical appointment. When he arrived, three other officers, including Officer Williams

pounced on him. They beat

punching him in the jaw and hitting him all over his

body. Once the beating ended, Officer Williams told

that if he told anyone about

this incident, he would again be beaten by officers.

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95. When the officers returned

to his living area, he asked for medical

attention because he sustained injuries to his finger and jaw. The officers denied his request.

continued to make requests to receive medical care and days after the incident he

finally saw the nurse and received medical treatment.

96. Five days after the attack on or about August 11, 2013,

filed a

grievance about the attack he endured. He heard no response until the week of October 20,

2013, when an investigator met with him and asked him fill out another form documenting the

attack. CCJ staff have provided no further response to his grievance.

JOHN DOE 17

97. During the fall of 2013, in Division 10, Correctional Officer Toledo beat Doe after Doe called Officer Toledo a coward. Officer Toledo punched Doe in the face multiple times until the he appeared unconscious. Officer Toledo and another officer eventually dragged the Doe off the deck. At no time during or before this attack did the Doe act in a violent manner, resist Officer Toledo, or pose any threat to security.

JOHN DOE 18

98. During October 2013, in Division IX, Officer Flores struck Doe in the back of the head the day after the two argued about a meal tray. Officer Flores hit Doe with such force that he was knocked unconscious and fell into Officer Flores’ arms. Doe was bleeding profusely from the lacerations, and blood covered Officer Flores and the deck floor.

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99. In November 2013, on Division IX, tier 3-F Officer Taylor assaulted

after he complained about the treatment he received in the CCJ school. Officer

Taylor responded to

complaints by slapping him with an open hand, grabbing him

by the jumpsuit, throwing him against the wall and slapping him again. At no time during this

interaction was

violent or resisting.

101. On January 6, 2014 in Division X Officer McHafferty assaulted a 57year old man. The attack began when Officer McHafferty insulted by calling him a “punk ass.” responded to him using similar language. Then the officer became violent. He pushed against the wall and grabbed his legs, causing him to fall to the floor. Other officers arrived on the tier, they yelled “stop resisting” even though was lying flat on the floor. An officer proceeded to beat and twist his arms with the intention to inflict pain. After this incident, received a disciplinary charge and was sentenced to 54 days in segregation in an effort to cover-up the excessive use of force employed by Officer McHafferty and the other officers.

102. During September 2013, in Division IX, an officer knocked

unconscious after first taunting him because of his protective custody status. The officer

mocked

by stating “you’re a pussy [because] you’re in PC.”

responded with

similar language but did not threaten the officer or behave in a physically aggressive manner.

The officer, however, did become aggressive and struck

in the back of the head with

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his radio.

lost consciousness. When he came to, he was in the elevator and Officers

O’Hearn and another officer were beating and stomping on him.

JOHN DOES 19-20

103. In early 2013, in Division IX, Tier 2F, an officer attacked a man after instigating an argument with him. The officer began the incident by yelling at two men who were in their cell “y’all some bitches.” The men responded with similar language, but were secure in their cells—they posed no danger to the verbally aggressive officer. The officer then escalated this situation by entering the cell and punching one of the men. Additional officers eventually come to the tier and restrained the man who was attacked by the instigating officer. While the man was restrained, the instigating officer continued to beat him while the other officers carried him off the tier.

104. On April 14, 2012 in Division 10, Tier 4-B, Officer Price attacked

who

was handcuffed at the time. After threatening

Officer Price then restrained him with

handcuffs and began beating him over the head with another pair of handcuffs, while pushing

him off the tier. Once

was outside the tier, Officers Price and Norico began violently

kicking him in the head and stomach. At least two shift sergeants on duty observed this

beating and did nothing to intervene.

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JERMAINE BROOKS 106. During the Summer of 2012, an officer attacked Plaintiff Brooks in Division
IX. The attack occurred in the interlock between Tier 1E and 1F. Officers grabbed Brooks and threw him to the ground. Then they punched and kicked him. The officers beat Brooks until he had to be carried out of the interlock. Officers boasted to other people housed at the jail that Brooks was so injured, 911 had to be called to provide him with emergency medical care. JOHN DOE 21
108. In early November 2013 in Division 9, officers twisted Doe’s ankle explicitly for the purpose of causing him excruciating pain after Doe had a verbal altercation with one of the officers. Witnesses to this incident heard a loud popping noise come from Doe’s ankle. Once his ankle popped, one of the guards tapped the other who was beating him on the shoulder to signal that they needed to end the assault. JOHN DOE 22
109. During July or August 2013 in Division X, on Tier 4D, Officer “D. Roach” beat Doe during an “elevator ride” after the two men had a verbal altercation. During that altercation, the officer threatened Doe with an “elevator ride.” A few hours later, Officer D. Roach and another officer came to Doe’s cell and forced him into the elevator. While in the elevator, the officers beat Doe, causing him a black eye, bruises, and swelling on his head.
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110. During August 2013, in Division IX on Tier 1F an officer beat u until he was unconscious. was handcuffed during this attack, which happened immediately after
and the officer had a verbal altercation.

111. In September 2013 in Division IX, Officer Zuniga assaulted

after the

two had a verbal altercation. Officer Zuniga stood outside of

cell, harassing him with

racial slurs.

responded and the two began arguing. Officer Zuniga then entered

cell and slapped him across the face in an attempt to instigate him into hitting back.

112. In early 2013 in Division IX, an officer assaulted

the day after the two

had a verbal altercation over whether

was spending too much time on the telephone.

The officer decided to retaliate against

for the previous day’s altercation by refusing to

allow

out of his cell—even though

was not on any official cell restriction or

punishment. When

attempted to leave his cell the officer slammed the cell door on his

foot. Then officer began to attack

punching him and slamming him to the ground. As

a result of his beating,

had to attend court with blackened eyes and lacerations around

his lips. He received medical care for the injuries he sustained during this attack.

113. At the end of December 2013, on Division X, Tier 3,

was attacked by a

number of officers including a sergeant when he refused a command to move to the back of

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his cell.

was locked in his cell, but standing near the door when Sergeant Howard

commanded him to move.

refused. He was already secure in his cell and posing no

threat to safety. Despite this fact, Sergeant Howard entered the cell and began to beat him. At

some point Officer Ramirez and another officer entered the cell and began slamming

against the wall. After they finished the attack, Sergeant Howard instructed

that he

better start listening to CCJ staff.

III. CCJ STAFF OFTEN ORDER OR ENCOURAGE THE MEN HOUSED AT THE JAIL TO HARM EACH OTHER AND FAIL TO TAKE REASONABLE MEASURES TO PROTECT THEM FROM VIOLENCE
114. According to the DOJ Investigation in 2008, in a period of two months, there
were seven different knife fights and high rates of assaults. The DOJ noted that many of these
incidents happened in Divisions IX and X, which, as maximum security divisions, should be
supervised at the highest level. The DOJ cited the following individual cases as proof that the
Defendants failed to take reasonable steps to protect detainees from violence at the hands of
other detainees:

a. In December 2007 in a Division IX dayroom, multiple men suffered stab wounds after a knife right. Six men required treatment from outside hospitals. Despite the seriousness of this incident, the Defendants failed to appropriately investigate this incident. b. In June 2007, officers noted that several men from Division X, Tier 4B had stab wounds after a knife fight in the gym. One man was hospitalized with a stab wound and another for a broken jaw. The Defendants responded by placing the entire until on an extended lockdown for several weeks, but took no other efforts to address

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conflict on the tier. When the lockdown ended in July, another fight broke out involving the same detainees who were involved in the earlier fight. c. In June 2007, two men from Division IX suffered injuries to their faces and heads after a fight occurred. Officers only found out about the fight after they observed the injured men. No officers observed the fight, but all the men involved, including one who broke up the fight, were placed in segregation. d. In May 2007, seven men were treated with stab wounds in Division IX. Three of these men had to be transferred to an outside hospital for treatment. e. In April 2006, two men were seriously injured in a gang fight on Division IX. Both were admitted to the hospital with multiple stab wounds to the back.
115. The DOJ further concluded that “insufficient inmate supervision has been a serious problem at CCJ for decades. Inmate supervision is seriously compromised by chronic overcrowding and under-staffing. The federal district court monitoring the Duran Consent Decree repeatedly cited CCJ for failing to provide adequate security staff to ensure safe and secure conditions at the facility. In September 2006, then-Sheriff Michael Sheahan admitted that the jail is ‘severely understaffed.’”
116. To this day, Defendants continue this precise pattern and practice of failing to protect people from harm. Some officers use people locked up in the jail as pawns in their efforts to inflict violence on other people. Officers allow men from rival gangs or who are otherwise in conflict with each other to have ready access to each other, by popping their cell doors open, or arranging for them to be in the same place at the same time. Officers frequently leave the tiers unsupervised for long periods of time—providing ample opportunity for people to inflict great harm on each other.
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117. The Defendants do not require that officers inspect the tier at regular intervals and ensure that all people housed there are safe. Even if the officer is on the tier, he or she sits in the “bubble” area, sometimes falling asleep, sometimes chatting with co-workers, rarely paying attention to what is happening on the tier. When officers are present during incidents of violence, they often wait for the men to become seriously injured before intervening.
118. Officers provide special privileges to men who attack other people housed at the jail at the command of officers. During violent attacks that were ordered or facilitated by officers, many men have been beaten to the point that they appeared unconscious. Others received medical treatment from CCJ staff and contractors including stitches or staples for bloody wounds, treatment for punched out teeth, and broken limbs.
119. The CCJ’s own incident reports during a two month period in 2013, describe such extreme levels of violence and dangerous contraband in Divisions IX and X, that both Divisions can only be described as out-of-control, chaotic and lawless.
120. Defendants Preckwinkle and the County Board of Commissioners create these violent conditions by failing to provide sufficient resources to ensure reasonably safe living conditions for the men housed in Division IX and X of the Cook County Jail. These Defendants have been aware that the lack of resources creates an unreasonable risk of harm for people housed at the jail, yet for many years they have persisted in failing to ensure that the jail has appropriate resources.
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IV. REPRESENTATIVE EXAMPLES OF VIOLENCE ARE PERVASIVE TYLON HUDSON
120. Plaintiff Tylon Hudson has been repeatedly threatened by Officer Campbell during his detention at the Cook County Jail because Defendant Campbell believes that Hudson was responsible for the murder of a family member. Officer Campbell informed Hudson that, at Officer’s Campbell command, members of a well-known street gang would seriously harm—and likely kill—Hudson.
121. On August 3, 2012, Lieutenant Johnson informed Hudson that credible and immediate threats had been made against his life. As a result, Defendant Johnson arranged for Hudson be moved to another tier.
122. Shortly after Hudson was moved, Defendants Johnson and Campbell worked together to ensure that the gang members controlled by Campbell were placed on the same living unit with Hudson. These gang members continued to threaten Hudson at the command of Officer Campbell. One of the gang members spit on Hudson and told him that he was a dead man.
123. After realizing that the men under Campbell’s control had followed him to his new housing unit, Hudson then requested and eventually received protective custody (“PC”). After he had spent two weeks in PC on Division III South, Sergeant Lewis (who is now a Lieutenant) told Hudson that he had to leave protective custody. Hudson has epilepsy and as a result had to be placed in a PC unit that could care for his medical needs. Lewis informed him that people with more serious medical concerns needed his bed in PC, so he would be returned
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to Division X. Lewis forced Hudson to leave PC, and in doing so disregarded the substantial risk of harm Hudson faced in Division X.
124. Upon arriving back in Division X, on August 16, 2012, other men on Hudson’s tier immediately informed him that the gang members under Campbell’s control had obtained law library privileges and were intending to kill him in the law library. Hudson recently began representing himself in his criminal case and thus required regular law library access.
125. Upon learning that one of the gang members under Campbell’s control had access to the law library, Hudson requested that CCJ staff prevent the gang member and Hudson from being at the library at the same time. People who need to use the library are only scheduled to visit once a week for 90 minutes, so keeping Hudson and the gang member separate during their scheduled library time would not have imposed an administrative burden on CCJ staff.
126. On September 4, 2012, Hudson went to the library. The gang member who had previously spit on him was in the library at the same time. He threatened Hudson’s life. Hudson hurriedly gathered his papers and immediately left the library.
127. On September 11, 2012, Hudson and the gang member were again at the library at the same time. As soon as Hudson realized that his would-be-attacker was present, he left. He reported this incident and the September 4, 2102 incident to the CCJ staff and filed a grievance requesting that CCJ staff prevent the man who was threatening him from entering the library during his scheduled library time.
128. On September 17, 2012, Officer Wilson, the security officer at the law library informed Hudson that she received a directive stating that the gang member and Hudson were not to be in the library at the same time. The next day, Hudson went to the library. He was
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engaged in his research when he overheard one of the law librarians call for the gang member to come to the library. Officer Wilson told Hudson to “be careful” because the gang member was on his way to library. Instead of making any effort to protect Hudson from the impending assault by preventing the gang member from entering the library or escorting Hudson back to his tier, Officer Wilson then resumed her post outside the library.
129. Hudson began to quickly gather his things and attempt to leave the library. But he was not fast enough. The gang member entered the library and immediately began assaulting him. The gang member punched Hudson with a closed fist and slashed his face with a shank. He beat Hudson repeatedly until a male security officer ended the fight. By then, Hudson was covered in blood and suffered lacerations on his face and mouth. He received medical attention for these injuries.
130. Defendants Johnson, Lewis, and Wilson knew of the great risk of serious bodily injury Hudson faced because of Officer Campbell and the gang members under his control. Yet, they refused to take reasonable efforts to protect Hudson from this attack.
131. Defendant Campbell intentionally, sadistically and with wanton disregard for Hudson’s rights ordered gang members to attack him. Such actions have no penlogoical justification and are done for the sole purpose of inflicting pain and retribution.

133. During the summer of 2013, in the protective custody tier of Division IX, a

transgendered victim who goes by the name

was sexually assaulted. While

was in

the shower, another person housed in the jail grabbed her, threw her to the ground and fondled

her breasts. Other people on the unit saw this happen and yelled for the assaultive person to

stop.

reported this assault to the officer on duty and to Sergeant Jones. But they did

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nothing to protect her. The person who assaulted her is a staff favorite and is assigned special

jobs around the tier. Only after

reported the assault to the medical staff was she removed

from the tier.

134. This is not the only time Officers have allowed

to endure assaults at the

hands of other people on protective custody. In June 2013, officers on the protective custody

tier in Division IX regularly opened the cell doors of both

and another person in the

middle of night. Officers opened both cells in order to allow the other person to beat

These beating left visible bruises—officers certainly knew that

was enduring serious

physical harm. Despite this fact, the officers continued to facilitate these beatings by opening

her cell door and allowing another person to enter her cell.

JOHN DOE 23

135. On April 30, 2013 in Division IX, the officers on Tier 2-C abandoned their posts and left the tier unsupervised—and as a result a violent fight erupted. The officers knew that there was tension on the deck between many of the men and that violence was brewing. Despite this knowledge, the officers left the deck and unlocked select cell doors. A fight between at least a dozen different men broke out. Eventually, about 20 officers returned to the deck, but they waited for people to sustain serious injuries before they made any move to break it up. People on the deck who were not involved in the fight were injured in this melee, including one person who received stiches over his eye. MAC DOE

136. In Division X during the fall 2013, Doe was seriously beaten by another person housed at the jail during the 3-11 shift. Officers Carroll, Velazquez and others watched this

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attack happen from the hallway but did nothing to stop it. They did not enter the tier until the beating was over. As a result of this attack, Doe suffered serious injuries that required medical attention.

137. In January 2012, Division X, Tier 3-B,

was attacked by other

people housed in the jail. Prior to the attack,

heard that other men wanted to harm him,

so he requested from an officer permission to enter his locked cell. The officer refused this

request and then abandoned the tier. This left

locked out of his cell and in the day room

where he was vulnerable to attack. Almost immediately after the officer left, 12 people

attacked

They stomped him, stabbed him the face with a piece of metal and knocked

him unconscious.

received medical care for lacerations and a broken nose. He filed a

grievance and a compliant with the Office of Professional Responsibility, but received no

response from the Officer of Professional Responsibility. This attack was entirely preventable

had the officer allowed

to return to his cell and manned his post.

138. In June of 2013, in Division X

began informing officers that

his cellmate was acting unstable and that he feared the cellmate was going to harm him in

some way. On the night of June 29, the cellmate’s behaviors began to escalate.

urgently pleaded for the officers to come to the cell and separate the two men. The officers

ignored

pleas. Shortly after

requested assistance from the officers, his

cellmate attacked him, stabbing him with an ink pen five or six time in his left forearm.

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received medical care for the injuries he sustained during this attack. This attack

would have been entirely preventable had the officers heeded

pleas.

139. During June 2013, in Division X, another person housed at the jail stabbed

in the eye with a nail.

brought his injury to the attention of the officers

but they ignored him and refused to allow him to receive immediate medical care.

140. In 2011

was attached by Officer Tedesco and Couch (details of the

officer inflicted abuse are at ¶ 75 above). In response to these beatings,

filed a number

of grievances and cooperated with an investigation conducted by the Office of Professional

Responsibility. On June 26, 2013, Officer Tedesco commanded a number of other people

housed at the jail to beat

as payback for

cooperation with the investigation.

Prior to the attack,

knew his life was in danger and that Officer Tedesco had

commanded other people to attack him. He requested protective custody from several officers,

but CCJ staff refused his request and he was forced to endure a brutal, violent assault.

141. During the fall of 2013 on the protective custody deck of Division IX, a 250-

pound man who is housed at the jail began calling

names that included “bitch”

“sissy” and “fag.” The officers overhead these insults and should have known that this name-

calling would likely lead to violence. Instead, the officers ignored this outburst. The large man

was then emboldened and he began to beat on (who weighs about 160 pounds). The

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large man beat all over his face and body, while the officers on protective custody stood outside the deck watching and laughing. After enduring this attack, CCJ staff placed in segregation for 10 days.

142. During September 2012 in Division IX,

was beaten by his

cellmate after they argued about the remote control.

is 55 years old, takes multiple

medications for his serious mental illness and is vulnerable. Despite these facts, the

Defendants took no measures to keep

reasonably safe in Division IX. Instead, after

reported to the officer and sergeant on duty that he had been attacked by his

roommate, they placed him in segregation for two days.

143. On or about January 12, 2014, two people began to fight in Division X, Tier 3C. The officers did nothing to break up the fight and instead allowed other people housed at the jail to attempt to intervene. Only after they failed to end the fighting (and after the fight had gone on for quite a while) did the officer call for back-up and attempt to end the violence.

144. During the summer of 2012, in Division IX,

was stabbed by

other people housed in the jail. Prior to the stabbing,

informed the officers that several

men had a knife and that he feared that it would be used to harm himself or someone else. The

officers told

to stop complaining and made no effort to confiscate the knife. The group

of men armed with the knife eventually attacked

stabbing him multiple times. During

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the attack,

called for the officers to intervene. But the officers just stood by and

watched the attack and did nothing to save

from the serious injuries he sustained.

145. After this incident,

was transferred to Division X from Division IX.

There, officers harassed him and subjected him to retaliation because he filed a complaint

about the attack he endured in Division IX. The then-Superintendent of Division IX

threatened to send

back to Division X and let the people housed there kill him.

V. THE CONDITIONS IN THE ISOLATION UNITS IN DIVISIONS IX AND X ARE BARBARIC AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL

146. In addition to the brutal physical force described above, the Defendants also rely on isolation and segregation to punish people housed in CCJ. It is well-established that the practice of locking human beings in a cell for 23 hours a day causes profound mental anguish and a documented risk of serious harm. Even short periods of isolation may have lasting, adverse mental health consequences. Juan Mendez, the United States Special Rapporteur on torture had concluded that even 15 days in solitary confinement constitutes torture and that 15 days is limit after which irreversible harmful psychological effects can occur. People housed in the CCJ are regularly forced to serve weeks and months in isolation units.
147. These units, referred to as the “hole” or “seg,” are unfit for human habitation. The cells are filthy, unsanitary, and infested with vermin. Raw sewage frequently floods the cells, creating serious risks to health and safety. People with mental health issues are disproportionately targeted for isolation sentences. In these brutal conditions, they decompensate quickly, screaming and throwing feces around the unit. The people confined in

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these units are not provided with cleaning supplies. They are forced to eat and use the toilet in the same small, disgusting space.
148. People in these units are locked down for 23, often 24, hours a day. Sometimes people go many days without being let out of their cells. On some units, people are forced to wear handcuffs and shackles when they are let of their cells—they must spend their hour of out of cell time handcuffed and shackled. The chains cause bruises on the men’s limbs and make it almost impossible to move around when they freed from the cramped cells.
149. The men in these units are generally allowed virtually no access to phone calls and visits with family.
150. The men and the staff who work in these units have a saying “there’s no sleep in the hole.” People who are descending into psychosis scream, cry and bang on their cells at all hours of the day and night. It is almost impossible to sleep because of the constant noise and the stench of the unsanitary conditions. These conditions create extreme mental anguish for all and cause the onset of mental illness for some.
151. The conditions in the isolation units are extremely different from the conditions throughout the rest of Divisions IX and X. On the other units, people are generally allowed out of their cells for six hours a day. They can use the phone freely and are regularly provided with cleaning supplies. They are allowed recreation time—sometimes outside.
152. Defendants Preckwinkle and the County Board of Commissioners allow these barbaric and unsanitary conditions to persist at the jail by failing to provide sufficient resources to ensure adequate training and oversight of CCJ staff and adequate upkeep of the physical plant. These Defendants have been aware that the lack of resources exposes people
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housed at the jail to inhumane living conditions, yet for many years they have persisted in failing to ensure that the jail receives appropriate resources.
153. Plaintiff Anton Carter received a disciplinary ticket for an incident that occurred on January 14, 2014. However, the ticket was not issued until February 15, 2014. Because too much time had passed, he could no longer be charged with a disciplinary infraction or placed in segregation for disciplinary reasons. However, Defendant Thomas told Plaintiff Carter that even though he could not be sent to segregation for disciplinary reasons, he would just be held in “administrative” segregation. Plaintiff Carter told Defendant Thomas that these actions could lead to a lawsuit. Defendant Thomas responded: “Ain’t my money, my paycheck is still the same.” Plaintiff Carter is held in inhumane segregation conditions in Division IX.
154. Since at the winter of 2011, whenever Plaintiff Jermaine Brooks is housed at the Jail, CCJ staff place him s in administrative segregation on Tier 1-F in Division IX. (Brooks is sometimes confined in a neighboring jail because of the over-crowding problem at the CCJ). He was never given a disciplinary ticket prior to placement on this tier, nor has he been provided with an opportunity to earn his way out of administrative segregation. As a result of his placement on this tier, he is denied full access to the commissary, denied visitation, and denied the ability to use the phone. When is allowed out of his cell, CCJ staff shackle and handcuff him. The conditions he has been held in are squalid and unsanitary—in one of his cells blood and mucus covered the floors. He has been present when other people housed on the tier throw feces. Plaintiff Brooks himself suffers from serious mental health issues including Schizophrenia, with major Depressive Disorder, and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. He has a history of suicide attempts and currently takes five different psychotropic
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medications. The conditions in the segregation unit severely exacerbate his mental illness and cause him extreme anguish.
VI. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINSTRATIVE REMEDIES 155. The named Plaintiffs have exhausted all available administrative remedies. COUNT I—EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE AND SADISTIC TREATMENT (Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment Claim for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
Against All Official Capacity Defendants) 156. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth in this Count. 157. Plaintiffs and the class they represent were deprived and continue to be deprived by the Defendants of their rights under the Eighth and Fourteenths Amendments to the United States Constitution to due process of law and to be free from excessive force, threats of excessive force, and sadistic treatment. 158. The Defendants’ failures to take appropriate steps to curb the widespread pattern of officer brutality in Divisions IX and X of the Cook County Jail, as described in the complaint, constitutes deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs’ rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Defendants know of and disregard a substantial risk of serious injury that people housed in the jail face at the hands of staff. 159. Plaintiffs seek injunctive and declaratory relief against all official capacity Defendants to prevent the continued violation of the rights of Plaintiffs and the class they seek to represent.
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COUNT II—FAILURE TO PROTECT (Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment Claim for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
Against All Official Capacity Defendants) 160. The Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth in this Count. The Plaintiffs and the class they represent were deprived and continue to be deprived by the Defendants of their rights under the Eighth and Fourteenths Amendments to the United States Constitution to due process of law and to be provided with reasonably safe living conditions.
161. The Defendants’ failures to take appropriate steps to curb the widespread pattern of violence in Divisions IX and X of the Cook County Jail, as described in the complaint, constitute deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs’ basic need for reasonable protection from harm and violate Plaintiffs’ rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Defendants know of and disregard the substantial risk of injury created by violence amongst the people housed at the jail.
162. Plaintiffs seek injunctive and declaratory relief against all official capacity Defendants to prevent the continued violation of the rights of Plaintiffs and the class they represent.
COUNT III- CRUEL AND UNUSUAL CONDITIONS IN THE ISOLATION/SEGREGATION UNITS
(Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment Claim for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Against All Official Capacity Defendants)
163. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth in this Count. Plaintiffs and the class they represent were deprived and continue to be deprived by the Defendants of their rights under the Eighth and Fourteenths Amendments to the United States Constitution to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
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164. Defendants’ operation of filthy, unsanitary, unduly restrictive, and inhumane segregation units in which people are locked in their cells for more than 23 hours a day, as described in the complaint, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
165. Plaintiffs seek injunctive and declaratory relief against all official capacity Defendants to prevent the continued violation of the rights of Plaintiffs and the class they seek to represent.
COUNT IV—SADISTIC TREATMENT OF PLAINTIFF HUDSON (Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment Claim for damages against Defendant Officer
Campbell) 166. Plaintiff Hudson repeats and re-alleges the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth in this Count. Plaintiff was deprived by the Defendant Campbell of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenths Amendments to the United States Constitution to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. 167. Defendant Campbell intentionally, sadistically and with wanton disregard for Hudson’s rights ordered gang members to attack him. Such actions have no penlogoical justification and were done for the sole purpose of inflicting pain and retribution. 168. As a result of Defendant Campbell’s actions, Plaintiff Hudson’s constitutional rights were violated and he suffered damages.
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COUNT V—FAILURE TO PROTECT PLAINTIFF HUDSON (Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment Claim for damages against Defendants
Lewis, Wilson and Johnson) 169. Plaintiff Hudson repeats and re-alleges the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth in this Count. Plaintiff was deprived by the Defendants Lewis, Wilson, and Johnson of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenths Amendments to the United States Constitution to reasonably safe living conditions. 170. Defendants Johnson, Lewis and Wilson knew of the great risk of serious bodily injury Hudson faced because of Officer Campbell and the gang members under his control. Yet, they refused to take reasonable efforts to protect Hudson from attack.
171. As a result of Defendant Johnson, Lewis and Wilson’s actions and inactions, Plaintiff Hudson’s constitutional rights were violated and he suffered damages.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully pray that this Court enter judgment in their favor and against the Defendants in the following manner: 1. Enter an Order certifying a class of all people who now or in the future will be housed in Divisions IX and X of the Cook County Jail. 2. Adjudge and declare that the policies, practices, and conduct described in this Complaint are in violation of the rights of Plaintiffs and the class they seek to represent under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 3. Enjoin the Defendants, their agents, employees, and all persons under their control from subjecting Plaintiffs and the class they seek to represent from the unlawful policies, practices, and conduct described in this Complaint.
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4. Retain jurisdiction of this case until such time as the Defendants have fully complied with all orders of the Court, and there is reasonable assurance that the Defendants will continue to comply in the future with these orders.
5. Award Plaintiffs reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
6. Award Plaintiff Hudson compensatory and punitive damages. 7. Award Plaintiffs and the class they seek to represent such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/__David Shapiro_______ Sheila A. Bedi (Pro hac vice motion to be filed) David Shapiro Locke E. Bowman Alexa Van Brunt Roderick MacArthur Justice Center Northwestern University School of Law 357 E. Chicago Avenue Chicago, Illinois 60611 (312) 503-0844 Alan Mills Uptown People's Law Center 4413 N. Sheridan Chicago, Illinois 60640 (773)769-1411 Counsel for the named Plaintiffs and the Putative Class
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned, an attorney, certifies that he filed the foregoing document via the Court’s CM/ECF system and served a copy on the individuals in the attached service list, on February 27, 2014.
/s/ David Shapiro

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SERVICE LIST
Preckwinkle v. Hudson
13cv8752
Nicholas Scouffas Deputy General Counsel Cook County Sheriff's Office 50 W. Washington, 7th Floor Chicago IL 60602 312-603-8856
Alan Mills Uptown People’s Law Center 4413 North Sheridan Chicago, Illinois 60640 (773) 769-1410

 
 Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 15 Filed: 02/27/14 Page 1 of 40 PageID #:127

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

TYLON HUDSON; LATON STUBBLEFIELD;

)

ANGELO MATTHEWS; JERMAINE BROOKS; )

ANTON CARTER, on behalf themselves and

)

all similarly situated individuals,

)

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

)

v.

)

)

TONI PRECKWINKLE, in her official capacity as )

President of the Cook County Board;

)

THOMAS J. DART, in his individual and official )

capacities as Cook County Sherriff; CARA SMITH )

in her official capacity as Executive

)

Director of the Cook County Department of

)

Corrections; SUPERINTENDENT OF DIVISION X )

E.GREER; in his official capacity;

)

SUPERINTENDENT OF DIVISON IX, V. THOMAS, )

in his official capacity; COOK COUNTY BOARD OF )

COMMISSIONERS, in their official capacities;

)

OFFICER CAMPBELL in his individual capacity; )

SARGEANT LEWIS in her individual capacity;

)

OFFICER WILSON in her individual capacity;

)

LIEUTENANT JOHNSON, in her individual capacity, )

)

Defendants.

)

Case No. 13cv8752 Judge Shadur Magistrate Judge Kim

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION AND APPOINTMENT AS CLASS COUNSEL

Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 15 Filed: 02/27/14 Page 2 of 40 PageID #:128
TABLE OF CONTENTS ARGUMENT……………………………………………………………………………………...4 I. THE COURT SHOULD CERTIFY THE CLASS, CONSISITING OF
ALL CURRENT AND FUTURE DETAINEES IN DIVISIONS 9 AND 10……………………………………………………………………4 A. With Regard to the Violence Claims, The Proposed Class Meets All of the Requirements for Maintenance of A Class Action……………….4 1. Numerosity is Satisfied: The Class Includes Hundreds of Members……………..4 2. Commonality is Satisfied: The Challenged Violence Practices
Present Numerous Common Questions of Fact and Law…………………………5 a. Common Contention No. 1………………………………………………..8 b. Common Contention No. 2………………………………………………13 c. Common Contention No. 3………………………………………………14 d. Common Contention No. 4………………………………………………15 e. Common Contention No. 5………………………………………………16 f. Common Contention No. 6……………………………………………....18
3. Typicality is Satisfied: The Named Plaintiffs’ Claims are Representative of Those of the Class at Large…………………………………...22
4. The Named Plaintiffs Will Fairly and Adequately Protect the Interests of the Classes………………………………………………………...…24 a. Absence of Conflict within the Class…………………………………….25 b. Adequacy of Representation……………………………………………..25
5. Plaintiffs Satisfy Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2): This Case Seeks Declaratory and Injunctive Relief from Policies and Practices that Place the Entire Proposed Class at Risk of Brutal Violence………………...28
B. With Regard to the Solitary Confinement Claims, The Proposed Class Meets All of the Requirements for Maintenance of A Class Action……………...29
i

Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 15 Filed: 02/27/14 Page 3 of 40 PageID #:129 1. Commonality and Typicality Are Satisfied: The Class Representatives and Class Members Suffer Common Deprivations that Raise Common Questions of Law and Fact…………………..30 2. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) Is Satisfied…………………………...31
II. THE COURT SHOULD DESIGNATE PLAINTIFFS’ COUNSEL AS CLASS COUNSEL UNDER RULE 23(g)(1)………………………….32
CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………………………..33
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Abadia-Piexoto v. United States Dept. of Homeland Security, 277 F.R.D. 572 (N.D. Cal. 2011) .......................................................................................................................... 4
Anderson v. Garner, 22 F. Supp. 2d 1379 (N.D. Ga. 1997) ......................................................... 23 Areola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2008) ..................................................................... 7, 24 Barragan v. Evanger's Dog and Cat Food Co., 259 F.R.D. 330 (N.D.Ill. 2009)........................... 4 Bolden v. Walsh Const. Co., 688 F.3d 893 (7th Cir. 2012) ............................................................ 7 Bradley v. Harrelson, 151 F.R.D. 422 (M.D. Ala. 1993) ............................................................. 29 Brown v. Dart, No.11-C-0064 (N.D. Ill Filed March 8, 2011)..................................................... 18 Brown v. Kelly, 244 F.R.D. 222 (S.D.N.Y.2007........................................................................... 23 Brown v. Plata, 131 S.Ct. 1910 (2011)......................................................................................... 29 Bruscino v. Carlson, 854 F.2d 162 (7th Cir. 1988) ...................................................................... 29 Bullock v. Sheahan, 225 F.R.D. 227 (N.D. Ill. 2004) ................................................................... 24 Butler v. Suffolk Cnty., 289 F.R.D. 80 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)............................................................. 6, 7 Coleman v. County of Kane, 196 F.R.D. 505 (N.D. Ill. 2000) ....................................................... 5 Corey H. v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, No. 92 C 3409, 2012 WL 2953217 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 19, 2012)................................................................................................................. 5 De La Fuente v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 713 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1983)...................................... 24 Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2006)........................................................................... 27 Filmore v. Page, 358 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 2004)............................................................................. 28 Fonder v. Sheriff of Kankakee County, No. 12-CV-2115, 2013 WL 5644754 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 15,
2013).................................................................................................................................... 23, 27 French v. Owens, 777 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir. 1985) ......................................................................... 29 Gaspar v. Linvatec Corp., 167 F.R.D. 51 (N.D. Ill. 1996) ..................................................... 23, 24 Gomez v. St. Vincent Health, Inc., 649 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2011). ................................................ 25 Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985)......................................................................................... 24 Hadi v. Horn, 830 F.2d 779 (7th Cir. 1987) ................................................................................. 29 Harper v. Albert, 400 F.3d 1052 (7th Cir. 2005) .......................................................................... 28 Hughes v. Judd, No. 8:12–cv–568–T–23MAP, 2013 WL 1821077........................................... 6, 7 Ingles v. City of New York, No. 01 Civ. 8279 (DC), 2003 WL 40256 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2003) ............................................................................................................ 23 Inmates of the Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 453 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1971) .......................... 23 Jackson v. Sheriff of Cook County, No. 06 C 0493, 2006 WL 3718041 ............................ 6, 11, 22 Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 598 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1979) ................................................ 28 Jones 'El v. Berge, 374 F.3d 541 (7th Cir. 2004).......................................................................... 29 Jones v. Blinziner, 536 F. Supp. 1181 (N.D. Ind. 1982)............................................................... 23 Jones v. Diamond, 519 F.2d 1090 (5th Cir. 1975)........................................................................ 29 Jones v. Gusman, __F.R.D. __, 2013 WL 2458817 ................................................................... 6, 7
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King v. Kansas City S. Indus., 519 F.2d 20 (7th Cir. 1975) ........................................................... 5 M.D. v. Perry, 294 F.R.D. 7 (S.D. Tex. 2013)............................................................................ 5, 7 Marcera v. Chinlund, 595 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir.) ............................................................................. 28 Messner v. Northshore University HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802 (7th Cir 2012); ......................... 21 Miller v. Neathery, 52 F.3d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 1995). .................................................................. 18 Muro v. Target Corp., 580 F.3d 485 (7th Cir. 2009).................................................................... 24 Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868 (7th Cir. 2009)............................................................................. 27 Olson v. Brown, 284 F.R.D. at 410-11...................................................................................... 7, 23 Osada v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 290 F.R.D. 485 (N.D.Ill. 2012)......................... 21 Parish v. Sheriff of Cook County, No. 07 4369, 2008 WL 4812875 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2008).......................................................................................................... 6, 24 Parsons v. Ryan, 289 F.R.D. 513 (D. Ariz. 2013) ...................................................................... 6, 7 Pearson v. Welborn, 471 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 2006)....................................................................... 27 Phipps v. Sheriff of Cook County, 249 F.R.D. 298 (N.D. Ill. 2008) ......................................... 6, 22 Rodriguez v. Swank, 318 F. Supp. 289 (N.D. Ill.1970). ............................................................... 25 Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013 (7th Cir. 1992). .................................................................. 4, 5 Rosas v. Baca, No. CV 12–00428, 2012 WL 2061694 .............................................................. 5, 6 Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992) ....................................................... 29 Scholes v. Stone, McGuire & Benjamin,143 F.R.D. 181 (N.D. Ill. 1992) ...................................... 5 Sherman ex rel. Sherman v. Township High School Dist. 214, 540 F. Supp. 2d 985 (N.D.Ill. 2008) ........................................................................................... 22 Smentek v. Sheriff of Cook County, No. 09 C 529, 2013 WL 6696961 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 19, 2013) .. 6 Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) ............................................................................................. 23 Streeter v. Sheriff of Cook County, 256 F.R.D. 609 (N.D. Ill. 2009).................................... 5, 6, 24 Thomas v. Ramos, 130 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 1997) .......................................................................... 28 United States ex rel. Morgan v. Sielaff, 546 F.2d 218 (7th Cir. 1976). ........................................ 29 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). ......................................................... 6, 21
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Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 15 Filed: 02/27/14 Page 6 of 40 PageID #:132

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

TYLON HUDSON; LATON STUBBLEFIELD;

)

ANGELO MATTHEWS; JERMAINE BROOKS; )

ANTON CARTER, on behalf themselves and

)

all similarly situated individuals,

)

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

)

v.

)

)

TONI PRECKWINKLE, in her official capacity as )

President of the Cook County Board;

)

THOMAS J. DART, in his individual and official )

capacities as Cook County Sherriff; CARA SMITH )

in her official capacity as Executive

)

Director of the Cook County Department of

)

Corrections; SUPERINTENDENT OF DIVISION X )

E.GREER; in his official capacity;

)

SUPERINTENDENT OF DIVISON IX, V. THOMAS, )

in his official capacity; COOK COUNTY BOARD OF )

COMMISSIONERS, in their official capacities;

)

OFFICER CAMPBELL in his individual capacity; )

SARGEANT LEWIS in her individual capacity;

)

OFFICER WILSON in her individual capacity;

)

LIEUTENANT JOHNSON, in her individual capacity, )

)

Defendants.

)

Case No. 13cv8752 Judge Shadur Magistrate Judge Kim

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION AND APPOINTMENT AS CLASS COUNSEL Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, Plaintiffs move the Court to enter an order that this case may be maintained as a class action on behalf of: all persons held, now and in the future, in Divisions 9 and 10 of the Cook County Jail. Plaintiffs further request an order appointing the undersigned attorneys as class counsel.

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BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT Plaintiffs’ suit for injunctive relief under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments is based on their contention that Defendants have been, and continue to be, deliberately indifferent to the significant risk that class members will be severely injured by the use of brutal and unnecessary force at the hands of correctional officers and other detainees in Divisions 9 and 10 of the Cook County Jail (“the Jail”). The claims of the class are ideally suited to proceed as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2). This is so because (a) every single member of the class has the same legal theory as to why their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights are being violated; (b) a use of force policy that applies across the board contributes to the risk of harm that class members face; (c) every single member of the class will utilize precisely the same evidence in support of his cause of action; and (d) every single member of the class seeks a uniform injunction against the failure to protect detainees from physical injury and unconstitutional violence at the hands of officers and other detainees. In other words, the named Plaintiffs and the putative class share all legal claims, all factual questions are common to the named Plaintiffs and the putative class, and the named Plaintiffs and the class all seek the same injunctive relief. It is true that Plaintiffs will rely, in part, on a series of different incidents of officer-ondetainee abuse and officers’ failure to protect detainees—but they will do so to prove that there is a pattern and practice of officers attacking detainees and turning a blind eye to detainee attacks on detainees in the Jail. Moreover, a generally applicable use of force policy contributes to the pattern of unrestrained violence. Thus, individual incidents will be marshaled in support of the common question of whether Defendants are deliberately indifferent to the right of all detainees in the Jail to be free of the significant risk of severe injury as a result of physical violence.
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Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 15 Filed: 02/27/14 Page 8 of 40 PageID #:134
In addition to commonality, the class easily satisfies the other requirements of Rule 23(a) as well as the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2). Joinder is impracticable because the number of inmates in Divisions 9 and 10 substantially exceeds 1500 on any given day.
The claims of the named Plaintiffs are typical of those of the class as a whole. That typicality is not solely the result of their having been beaten by officers and other detainees— although they have been—but stems from their claim that Defendants have placed them at significant risk of physical abuse by failing to take appropriate steps to address the pattern of illegal force that they are aware of. That claim is identical across the whole of the proposed class.
Named Plaintiffs have no conflicts with the unnamed members of the proposed class. Their lawyers are experienced in federal court civil rights class actions, particularly those involving prisons and jails. Thus, named Plaintiffs and their counsel will adequately represent the interests of the proposed class.
Finally, Defendants’ have failed to address a culture of physical brutality that thrives among correctional officers in the Jail, and Defendants’ flawed use of force policy applies across the entire class. In short, Defendants have refused to act in a manner that applies generally to the class as a whole, rendering class-wide injunctive relief appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2).
In addition to the violence claim, Plaintiffs also seek class certification with regard to their injunctive solitary confinement claim. Class members run the risk of being thrown in the solitary confinement units of Divisions 9 and 10 at any time. Class members present a unified injunctive claim under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment because, when subjected to solitary confinement, they experience almost identical forms of nontouch torture. They remain locked down alone in their cells in stretches of more than 23 hours
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each day. During the brief time they are allowed to emerge from their cells, they remain alone in a cramped “dayspace,” where they can barely exercise. Sanitation is deplorable. Phone calls are limited to five minutes a week. Detainees subject to this torture hear those in neighboring cells screaming into the night as they descend into psychosis.
ARGUMENT I. THE COURT SHOULD CERTIFY THE CLASS, CONSISITING OF ALL
CURRENT AND FUTURE DETAINEES IN DIVISIONS 9 AND 10 A. With Regard to the Violence Claims, The Proposed Class Meets All of the
Requirements for Maintenance of A Class Action For a district court to certify a class action, the named plaintiffs or the proposed class must satisfy the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements of Rule 23(a) and at least one requirement of Rule 23(b). Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 1992). Because named Plaintiffs and the proposed class meet all four Rule 23(a) requirements and the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2), the class should be certified. 1. Numerosity is Satisfied: The Class Includes Hundreds of Members Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(1) requires that the class be “so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). “[A] class including more than 40 members is generally believed to be sufficient.” Barragan v. Evanger's Dog and Cat Food Co., 259 F.R.D. 330, 333 (N.D.Ill. 2009); Streeter v. Sheriff of Cook County, 256 F.R.D. 609, 612 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (same); accord William B. Rubenstein, et al., Newberg on Class Actions, § 3:12 (5th ed. 2011) (“a class of 40 or more members raises a presumption of impracticability of joinder based on numbers alone”). Numerosity is easily satisfied here.
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Hundreds of detainees are housed in Divisions 9 and 10 and each is impacted by the violence policies challenged in this lawsuit.1
2. Commonality is Satisfied: The Challenged Violence Practices Present Numerous Common Questions of Fact and Law.
Rule 23(a)(2) requires that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). “A common nucleus of operative fact is usually enough to satisfy the commonality requirement.” Rosario, 963 F.2d at 1018; Streeter, 256 F.R.D. at 612 (same). “Rule 23 must be liberally interpreted” and should be read to favor maintenance of class actions, King v. Kansas City S. Indus., 519 F.2d 20, 25-26 (7th Cir. 1975); Scholes v. Stone, McGuire & Benjamin,143 F.R.D. 181, 185 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (“[T]he commonality requirement has been characterized as a ‘low hurdle’ easily surmounted.”).
An injunctive challenge to a systemic failure to protect class members from rampant violence is a textbook example of a case that satisfies the commonality requirement and warrants class certification. Indeed, “[a] class action is . . . an appropriate vehicle to address what is alleged to be a systemic problem . . . .” Coleman v. County of Kane, 196 F.R.D. 505, 507 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (finding commonality in case against sheriff regarding bond fees); Corey H. v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, No. 92 C 3409, 2012 WL 2953217, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 19, 2012) (“Plaintiffs have attacked … systemic failures and district-wide policies that apply to every member of the certified class …”); M.D. v. Perry, 294 F.R.D. 7, 35 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (certifying class of foster children who alleged that Defendants created a “systematic deficiency [that] causes an unreasonable risk of harm” in the form of increased sexual abuse and violence); Rosas v. Baca, No. CV 12–00428, 2012 WL 2061694, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 7, 2012) (certifying class
1 See Ex. 13 (Sheriff Website Printout) (Division 9 is designed to hold 1,056 detainees and Division 10 is designed to hold 768 detainees).
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Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 15 Filed: 02/27/14 Page 11 of 40 PageID #:137
in jail violence claim); Hughes v. Judd, No. 8:12–cv–568–T–23MAP, 2013 WL 1821077, at *23 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2013) (certifying class of detainees subjected to unconstitutional jail conditions); Jones v. Gusman, __F.R.D. __, 2013 WL 2458817, at *9 (E.D. La. June 6, 2013) (certifying class in jail violence claim); Butler v. Suffolk Cnty., 289 F.R.D. 80, 98 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (certifying class of detainees in jail sanitation case); Parsons v. Ryan, 289 F.R.D. 513 (D. Ariz. 2013) (certifying statewide class of prisoners alleging inadequate medical and mental health care).
Indeed, this Court has certified numerous classes of detainees challenging illegal conditions of confinement at the Cook County Jail. See, e.g., Streeter v. Sheriff of Cook County, 256 F.R.D. 609, 612-13 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (certifying class of detainees strip searched upon entry to Cook County Jail); Jackson v. Sheriff of Cook County, No. 06 C 0493, 2006 WL 3718041, No. 06 C 0493 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 2006) (certifying class of detainees involuntarily subjected to an STD test at the Cook County Jail); Parish v. Sheriff of Cook County, No. 07 4369, 2008 WL 4812875, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2008) (certifying class of Cook County Jail detainees who were denied adequate medical care); Phipps v. Sheriff of Cook County, 249 F.R.D. 298, 301 (N.D.Ill. 2008) (certifying class of all detainees using wheelchairs in the Cook County Jail who were subjected to discrimination); Smentek v. Sheriff of Cook County, No. 09 C 529, 2013 WL 6696961, at *1 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 19, 2013) (noting certification of class consisting of all detainees in the Cook County Jail who suffered from dental pain and experienced a delay in treatment).
To be sure, as the Supreme Court held in its latest major pronouncement on commonality, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that there is “some glue” holding the claims together; the class claims “must depend upon a common contention” that is “of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551-52 (2011). (“What
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matters to class certification . . . is not the raising of common ‘questions . . . but, rather the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common answers . . .”) (citations and quotations omitted; emphasis and first ellipsis in original). In numerous post-Walmart cases challenging jail and prison conditions, courts have found that common policies and conditions provide the “glue” necessary to hold a class together. E.g., Olson v. Brown, 284 F.R.D. at 410-11 (jail policies and conditions); Rosas, 2012 WL 2061964, at *3 (jail violence case); Jones, __ F.R.D. __, 2013 WL 2458817, at *9 (jail violence case); Hughes, 2013 WL 1821077, at *23 (unconstitutional conditions for juvenile detainees); M.D., 294 F.R.D. at 35 , 2013 WL 4537955, at * 22 (foster children facing abuse); Parsons, 289 F.R.D. 513 (inadequate medical and mental health care in state prisons); Butler, 289 F.R.D. at 98 (jail sanitation case); Abadia-Piexoto v. United States Dept. of Homeland Security, 277 F.R.D. 572, 577 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (shackling of detainees during judicial proceedings).
The “glue” that was lacking in Wal-Mart exists in this case: Plaintiffs allege that all members of the proposed class are at significant risk of brutal violence at the hands of officers and detainees due to Defendants’ systemic failure to implement policies and practices necessary to halt the longstanding and pervasive pattern of savage attacks in Divisions 9 and 10. Furthermore, commonality was lacking in Wal-Mart because there was no proof that Wal-Mart “operated under a general policy of discrimination.” 131 S.Ct. at 2554. See also Bolden v. Walsh Const. Co., 688 F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir. 2012) (explaining that an across the board procedure or policy would have supplied the commonality that was lacking in Wal-Mart). In this case, by contrast, a flawed Cook County Department of Corrections Use of Force Policy, promulgated by Defendant Dart, applies across the board and contributes to rampant violence at the Jail. Schwartz Dec. ¶¶ 29-40. See also Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 798 (7th Cir. 2008)
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(finding commonality in case challenging Illinois Department of Corrections policy that restricted the use of crutches).
Resolving whether there is a pattern of abuse that poses a significant risk of severe injury to the class and whether Defendants have failed to adopt policies and practices that are a reasonable response to that threat will yield exactly the kind of “common answer” to Plaintiffs’ Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims that the Supreme Court was referring to in Wal-Mart. 131 S. Ct. at 2551.
As the Supreme Court explained in Wal-Mart, “for purposes of Rule 23(a)(2) [e]ven a single [common] question will do . . .” 131 S. Ct. at 2556 (citation and internal quotations omitted; alterations in original). Plaintiffs here, however, can show multiple common questions: all of the following factual and legal contentions (each of which pertains to overarching patterns and practices) are common to the class and will lead to common answers.
a. Common Contention No. 1 There is an unlawful pattern and practice at the Jail of excessive physical violence used by correctional officers against inmates. Support for Common Contention No. 1: The declarations filed by Plaintiffs in support of this motion—nearly 100 in number—demonstrate that Divisions 9 and 10 of the Jail are dominated by a culture of officer-on-detainee violence that often results in crippling injury. Nearly every declaration cites instances of staff-on-detainee abuse. These incidents are too numerous to catalog here, but some of the more horrific beatings include the following: While the detainee was on the floor, the Hispanic officer stomped and kicked him in the head, and he started bleeding from his mouth. Then, approximately 10-15 officers arrived. The officers yelled at all of the detainees on the tier to lay down on the ground. All of the detainees were ordered back in their cells. From my cell, I saw one of the officers throw the detainee
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against the wall like he was trash. He was knocked out and looked like a ragdoll when this happened. I thought he was dead based on how he looked and how hard they beat him. Then the officers took him somewhere that I couldn’t see. I never saw the detainee again.
Declarant 13 (Ex. 3) ¶¶ 1-5; see also Declarant 31 (Ex. 5) ¶ 2 (corroborates above account).
… I saw an incident occur to a detainee…in the interlock between Division 9, Tier 1E and 1F. [The detainee] said he would not go back to 1F, but was not resisting or fighting in any way. Officers grabbed [the detainee] and threw him down on the ground. Once he was on the ground, the officers punched and kicked him. Then the officers carried him out. Later, one of the officers came back and was bragging that 911 was called because of [his] injuries.
Declarant 74 (Ex. 10) ¶ 2.
Around October or November 2012, in Division 10-3B, I saw a detainee. . .hit by Officer Appleberry. Then he was handcuffed, face down on the floor. He was not resisting in any way. There were roughly 10-15 officers. Some of the officers were stomping on him while he was on the floor, and the other officers were just watching. Then some of the officers picked him up by the handcuffs and legs. For part of this, he was just being held and dragged with the cuffs, with his legs unsupported, being dragged like a ragdoll. The last I saw was [the detainee] being dragged off.
Declarant 65 (Ex. 9) ¶ 3.
First, Officer Tadesco grabbed me by the back of my shirt. Another officer swung on me. I fell down. Two officers cuffed behind my back while another officer first put his knee on my neck and then started kicking me in the head. Other officers were trying to cuff my legs together and then cuff my hands to my legs behind my back. I have a metal rod running all along the inside of my right leg. My rod popped out of place and I hollered “I have a rod in my leg.” They ignored me and kept beating me. There were about 20 officers there, and several white shirts watching.
Second Declarant 56 Declaration (Ex. 8) ¶ 3. See also Declarant 27 (Ex. 4) ¶ 2 (“So Sgt. Duty
pushed [a detainee named Chris] in the cell and slammed the door so hard it bounced back open.
Lt. Johnson grabbed Chris and that’s when they started punching him and screaming obscenities.
It was like a show, a wrestling match. We were all then forced into our cell. I didn’t see them
jump on him anymore but I did see them drag him out.”); Declarant 35 (Ex. 6) ¶ 3 (“I walked to
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the stairwell, and that’s when I was grabbed on my shoulder and I heard the female CO say, ‘I got your ass now.’ Three other Cos came down the stairs, and CO Williams hit me in my jaw on the right side of my face. I covered my head with my hands, and the other Cos started punching me in my head and on my body. They me about seven or eight times. I asked them what was going on, and they told me to ‘shut the f*** up.’ Then I heard my finger crack.”); Declarant 38 (Ex. 6) ¶ 4 (“About one month ago, a detainee who was new to the deck walked in. He called C.O. Toledo a coward, but wasn’t resisting or fighting in any way. He was just standing there. Toledo started punching him in the face, from the neck up, again and again. I saw blood. The detainee fell down like road kill. He was not responding. Still appearing unconscious, he was dragged off of the deck by the feet by C.O. Toledo and another C.O. I have never seen this detainee since.”); Declarant 39 (Ex. 6) ¶ 1 (“Rougly a month and a half ago, Officer Flores and a detainee had an argument over a tray. The next day, the detainee was emptying some trash. Then the detainee passed by Flores and said some words to him. The detainee was not resisting or doing anything violent. Flores struck the detainee in the back of the head. The detainee was knocked out cold and fell into Flores’ arms. The detainee was bleeding and got blood all over the floor and Office Flores. It happened in a flash. I did not see if Flores hit the detainee with an object, but given that the detainee was bleeding and was knocked out instantly, I don’t see how it could have been with just a closed fist.”); Declarant 43 (Ex. 7) ¶ 7 (“After he was cuffed, one officer continued to punch him in the face with metal handcuffs. Then, around 10 officers rushed in, yelling at us to get down by your cell door. Officers were kicking and stomping the handcuffed detainee. They made a big ring around him. They were all trying to squeeze in and get a part of the action. After the stomping, they left him on the floor. A white shirt came in to start videotaping at that point. I saw the detainee’s injuries; his face had lumps, cuts, and blood
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Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 15 Filed: 02/27/14 Page 16 of 40 PageID #:142
on it.”); Declarant 84 (Ex. 11) ¶ 1 (“About two months ago, an inmate was jumped on by staff, beating him with handcuffs repeatedly. It was not necessary for the Correctional Officer (CO) to jump on him as so. When the CO was beating the inmate, he had the handcuffs wrapped around his fist.”); Declarant 89 (Ex. 12) ¶ 3 (Guard pushed detainee and slammed cell door on his leg, saying “I don’t do stuff for black people”); Declarant 87 (Ex. 12) ¶ 5 (Officer slapped detainee and called him a “nigger”).
In addition to the declarations submitted in support of this motion, detainees have filed numerous legal complaints in this Court regarding the pattern of brutal physical violence in Divisions 9 and 10. See, e.g., Complaint, Ellison v. Dart, No. 10-C-5224 at 5-6 (N.D. Ill Filed Aug. 18 2010) (Ex. 14); Complaint, Thompson v. Dart, No 11-C-1288 at 5 (N.D. Ill Filed Feb. 23, 2011) (Ex. 14); Complaint, Robinson v. Appleberry, No. 13-CV-01006 at 4-5(N.D. Ill Filed Feb 7, 2013) (Ex. 15); Complaint, Gilmore v. Dart, No. 13-C-1264 at 7 (N.D. Ill Filed Feb 15, 2013) (Ex. 15); Complaint, Olbera v. Michelchewski, No. 13-C-1995 at 4 (N.D. Ill Filed Mar. 14, 2013) (Ex. 15); Complaint, Smith v. Cook County Jail, No. 13-C-2773 at 6 (N.D. Ill Filed Apr 12, 2013) (Ex. 15); Complaint, Taylor v. Crot, No. 13-C-1930 at 4 (N.D. Ill Filed Mar. 12 2013) (Ex. 15); Complaint, Collins v. Dart, No 13-CV-3924 at 4 (N.D. Ill Filed May 28, 2013) (Ex. 15); Complaint, Jackson v. Dart, No. 13-C-4653 at 8 (N.D. Ill Filed June 25, 2013) (Ex. 16); Complaint, Harris v. Carol, No. 13-C-5470 at 2-3 (N.D. Ill Filed July 31, 2013) (Ex. 16); Complaint Janikowksi v. Cook County Dept. of Corrections, No. 13-C-7006 at 3 (N.D. Ill Filed Sep 30, 2013) (Ex.16); Complaint, Lasenby v. Cook County, No. 13-C-3229 at 2 (N.D. Ill Filed
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Nov 7, 2013) (Ex. 16); Complaint, Williams v. Dart, No. 13-C-6545 at 5-6 (N.D. Ill Filed Sept.
12 2013) (Ex. 16).2
Assaults by officers are frequently characterized by several common modi operendi,
including the following:
• Large numbers of officers congregate to assault detainees. Declarant 13 (Ex. 3) ¶ 5; Declarant 4 (Ex. 1) ¶¶ 4, 5; Declarant 16 (Ex. 3) ¶ 3; Declarant 43 (Ex. 7) ¶ 7; Declarant 50 (Ex. 7) ¶ 3; Declarant 57 (Ex. 8) ¶ 2; Declarant 64 (Ex. 9) ¶ 5; Declarant 67 (Ex. 9)¶¶ 3, 7; Declarant 71 (Ex. 10) ¶ 2; Declarant 87 (Ex. 12) ¶ 6; Complaint, Jones v. Dart, No. 13-C-2651 at 5-6, 7 (N.D. Ill Filed Apr 9, 2013) (Ex. 17); Complaint, Sanchez v. Dart, No. 13-CV-3558 at 6 (N.D. Ill Filed May 13. 2013) (Ex. 17).
• Officers attack detainees who are already restrained in handcuffs and/or shackles. Second Declarant 80 Declaration (Ex. 11) ¶ 2; Declarant 74 (Ex. 10) ¶ 3; Declarant 29 (Ex. 5) ¶ 2; Second Declarant 55 Declaration (Ex.8) ¶ 3; Declarant 43 (Ex. 7) ¶ 7; Declarant 15 (Ex. 3) ¶¶ 2, 4; Declarant 1 (Ex. 1) ¶¶ 2, 6; Declarant 4 (Ex. 1) ¶ 5; Declarant 41 (Ex. 6) ¶ 5; Declaration (Ex. 7) ¶ 2; Declarant 50 (Ex. 7) ¶ 3; Declarant 67 (Ex. 9) ¶¶ 3-4; Declarant 71 (Ex. 10) ¶ 2; Declarant 79 (Ex. 11) ¶ 8; Declarant 87 (Ex. 12) ¶ 6; Declarant 72 (Ex. 10) (p. 2 of attachments to declaration); Declarant 81 (Ex. 11) ¶ 4; Complaint, Lasenby v. Cook County, No. 13-C-3229 at 2 (N.D. Ill Filed Nov 7, 2013) (Ex. 16); Complaint, Sanchez v. Dart, No. 13-CV-3558 at 6 (N.D. Ill Filed May 13. 2013) (Ex. 17).
• Officers assault detainees who are not resisting, sometimes ordering them to “stop resisting” as a pretext for commencing or continuing an attack. Declarant 67 (Ex. 9) ¶ 3 (“The CO then grabbed my handcuffs and twisted them. The handcuffs cut into my skin. About 10-15 other COs then surrounded me and started hitting me with a closed fist. They yelled ‘stop resisting’ so they could continue the beating.”); id. ¶ 7; Declarant 62 (Ex. 9) ¶ 3 (“You can only hear them say “stop resisting” when they are the ones who are being physically violent.”); Declarant 33 (Ex. 5) ¶ 3 (“Guards often go into inmates’ cells and drag them out and tell them ‘stop refusing.’ This happens all the time if inmates disobey a small rule. The inmates almost always get back into compliance because they don’t want trouble. But the C/Os still ‘go into action.’ They drag the inmates away, handcuff them, pick them up and scream again that the inmate should stop refusing. The inmates say back, ‘I’m not refusing.’ Before dragging them away, the C/Os will punch the inmates, give knees to the back and spray them with mace”); Declarant 48 (Ex. 7) ¶
2 These complaints are generally filed with the plaintiff signing the certification required on this Court’s form for complaints under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983: “By signing this Complaint, I certify that the facts stated in this Complaint are true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. I understand that if this certification is not correct, I may be subject to sanctions by the Court.”
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5; Declarant 39 (Ex. 6) ¶ 9; Declarant 13 (Ex. 3) ¶¶ 1-5; Declarant 12 (Ex. 2) ¶ 3; Second Declarant 18 Declaration (Ex. 3) (p. 6 of attachments to declaration); Declarant 16 (Ex. 3) ¶ 1; id. ¶¶ 2-3; Declarant 42 (Ex. 6) ¶ 3; Declarant 69 (Ex. 9) ¶ 6.
Far from rare or isolated, these attacks on detainees reflect violence that is systemic –
indeed, epidemic. According to Dr. Jeffrey Schwartz, an expert on corrections and security:
Taken as a whole, these declarations describe a situation that is hellish, horrific and unconscionable. The declarations I read are not minor complaints nor are they expressions of general dissatisfaction with staff or the Jail. Instead, they describe an environment in which brutality is wide-spread and often involves groups of officers; inmate are beaten viciously and then denied medical care and/or threatened or intimidated into not reporting the beatings; gang members receive favored treatment; staff stand by and watch while inmates beat other inmates; staff sometimes use inmates as enforcers; seriously mentally ill and suicidal inmates are treated with cynical disregard and worse, and sometimes physically abused for asking for help; inmates in isolation are denied the required out of cell recreation time; the grievance system does not work and uniformed staff serve as gatekeepers for medical and mental health services. All of this is maintained by a long-standing and pervasive code of silence that few officers are willing to break.
Schwartz Dec. ¶ 7.
b. Common Contention No. 2
The Jail’s use of force policy is woefully deficient, and promotes the use of unnecessary
violence in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Support for Common Contention No. 2
The Use of Force Policy includes Sheriff’s Order 11.2.2.0 (Response to Resistance/Use
of Force Duties, Notifications, and Reporting Procedures), promulgated by Defendant Dart on
May 23, 2011; Sheriff’s Order 24.9.16.0 (Use of Force Alert and Early Intervention),
promulgated by Defendant Dart on December 7, 2011; and Sheriff’s Order 11.2.7.0 (Use of
Restraints), promulgated by Defendant Dart on June 1, 2011. See Exhibit D to Schwartz
Declaration (Ex. 1) The Declaration of Dr. Schwartz analyzes Defendants’ use of force policy in
detail. Flaws and omissions identified by Dr. Schwartz include, among others: (1) the fact that
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the use of force policy is confusing and internally contradictory, (2) the lack of the basic principle that force should only be used to achieve legitimate correctional objectives, (3) the authorization of use of force in situations where force is impermissible; (4) an inadequate system for internal review and investigation of use of force incidents, (5) the lack of a prohibition against provoking detainees into assaultive behavior as a pretext for use of force; and (6) the lack of a prohibition against punching and kicking detainees. Schwartz Dec. ¶¶ 29-40 These and other flaws in the use of force policy contribute to the substantial risk of harm that class members face. Schwartz Dec. ¶¶ 32, 33.
c. Common Contention No. 3 Officers prevent beatings from being captured on camera through methods that include blocking cameras, preventing recording, and beating detainees in areas without cameras (such as elevators). Support for Common Contention No. 3: Second Declarant 56 (Ex. 8) ¶ 8 (“When inmates refuse housing and officers get ready to beat them up, the officers put on their gloves but don’t get their cameras ready. They often don’t film beatings with a hand camera or a shoulder camera.”); id. ¶ 3; Second Declarant 55 Declaration (Ex. 8) ¶ 5 (“Officers also threaten people with “elevator rides.” I have seen officers take an inmate to the elevator and they come back bruised up.”); Declarant 79 (Ex. 11) ¶ 6 (“I’ve also witnessed an officer named D. Roach beat an inmate in an elevator. In Division 10, 4D during July or August of 2013, an inmate got into an argument with D. Roach. It was a verbal altercation during which the officer asked the inmate if he wanted to take an ‘elevator ride.’ The argument happened in the afternoon, during the 3-11 shift. Later, D. Roach and another officer came to the inmate’s cell, took him to the
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Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 15 Filed: 02/27/14 Page 20 of 40 PageID #:146
elevator, and beat him up. When he came back, he had a black eye, bruises and a knot on his head.”); Declarant 67 (Ex. 9) ¶¶ 4-5; Declarant 62 (Ex. 9) ¶ 3; Declarant 2 (Ex. 1) ¶ 7; Declarant 8 (Ex. 2) ¶¶ 5-6; Declarant 9 (Ex. 2) ¶ 1; Declarant 12 (Ex. 2) ¶¶ 1-4; Declarant 15 (Ex. 3) ¶ 2; Declarant 35 (Ex. 6) ¶ 6; Declarant 45 (Ex. 7) ¶ 4; Declarant 61 (Ex. 9) ¶ 2; Declarant 78 (Ex. 11) ¶ 4.
d. Common Contention No. 4 There is an unlawful pattern and practice at the Jail of Officers physically retaliating and threatening to retaliate against detainees who file grievances, requests, and civil complaints regarding prison conditions. Support for Common Contention No. 4: Second Declarant 80 Declaration (Ex. 11) ¶ 1 (“I am scared for my life in here because I was beaten bloody by correctional officers and because the officers threatened to do it again and to put me in a coma. I am targeted because I reported the beating I received.”); Declarant 67 (Ex. 9) ¶ 4 (“(4) After [the detainee] filed a lawsuit, I saw Ofc. Keating come into our rec time, go up to [him], and begun hitting [his] face with the ball of the tip of the antennae on his radio. Keating was spitting as he was talking and provoking him, basically saying lets fight and calling him a “little bitch”. Keating said ‘why’d you put that bullshit in on me?’”); Declarant 59 (Ex. 9) ¶¶ 2-5; First Declarant 13 Declaration (Ex. 3) ¶ 6 ; Declarant 35 (Ex. 6) ¶ 4 (“Once they stopped hitting me, CO Williams told me that if I said anything to anybody I would get beat up again.”); Declarant 27 (Ex. 4) ¶ 1 (“I’m scared being here, I’m scared telling this but somebody has to do it. I’m scared because of the violence I’ve witnessed.”); Declarant 50 (Ex. 7) ¶ 5 (“The other reason we’re not safe here is because C/Os use detainees to discipline other detainees. A black inmate who goes by P.K was accused of reporting on a C/O named Tedesko. Something that Tedesko told another detainee that P.K
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Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 15 Filed: 02/27/14 Page 21 of 40 PageID #:147
“ratted” him out. Then four detainees beat down P.K as punishment for ratting out Tedesko.”); Declarant 6 (Ex. 1) ¶ 1; Declarant 8 (Ex. 2) ¶ 7; Declarant 9 (Ex. 2) ¶ 2; Declarant 15 (Ex. 3) ¶ 4; Declarant 37 (Ex. 6) ¶¶ 4-5; Declarant 69 (Ex. 9) ¶ 3; Declarant 72 (Ex. 10) (p. 6 of .attachment to Declaration) (after detainee complained to the United States Department of Justice about violence to a correctional officer, the officer harassed him by saying, “Nice letter, you better watch your back!”); Declarant 78 (Ex. 11) ¶ 6 (Superintendent of Division 10 threatened to send detainee back to Division 9 and “let the other inmates finish [him] off”); id. ¶¶ 7-8; Complaint, Harris v. Carol, No. 13-C-5470 at 4-6 (N.D. Ill Filed July 31, 2013) (officer retaliated against Harris for a previous fight with a different officer) (Ex. 16); Complaint, Hughes v. Boutte, No. 13-CV-05770 at 3 (N.D. Ill Filed Aug 13, 2013) (officers informed rival gang member of a report Hughes made against him charging that the rival hoarded food; rival gang retaliated against Hughes, breaking his leg) (Ex. 17); Complaint, Lasenby v. Cook County, No. 13-C-3229 at 3 (N.D. Ill Filed Nov 7, 2013) (officers threatened to file criminal charges if a complaint was filed against the officers) (Ex. 16); Complaint, Walker v. Cook County, No. 13-C-5122 at 4, 5, 6, 7 (N.D. Ill Filed Jul 17, 2013) (Ex. 17).
e. Common Contention No. 5 There is an unlawful pattern and practice at the Jail of failing to prevent detainee-ondetainee attacks. Support for Common Contention No. 5: Divisions 9 and 10 of the Cook County Jail are a free-for-all of detainee-on-detainee attacks for all of the following reasons: • Staff do not prevent—and in some cases, affirmatively encourage and instigate—detainee attacks on other detainees. Declarant 35 (Ex. 6) ¶ 6 (“Sometimes the Cos will ask inmates to go beat up other inmates, in exchange for favors or privileges. Sometimes COs won’t break up fights between inmates
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Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 15 Filed: 02/27/14 Page 22 of 40 PageID #:148
or they will let another inmate break it up.”); Declarant 43 (Ex. 7) ¶ 6 (Officers told detainees who were fighting to “go ahead, get it over with…”); Declarant 3(Ex. 1) ¶¶ 3-4; id. ¶ 9; Declarant 10 (Ex. 2) ¶ 3; Declarant 88 (Ex. 12) ¶ 5; Declarant 64 (Ex. 9) ¶ 2 (Officers were “watching and laughing” as detainees fought); Declarant 78 (ex. 11) ¶ 4; Declarant 84 (Ex. 11) ¶ 2; Jarvis Winfield Declarant 85 (Ex. 11) ¶ 3; Declarant 87 (Ex. 12) ¶ 1; Complaint, Simmons v. Moreci, No 11-C-5328 at 5 (N.D. Ill Filed Aug 5, 2011) (Ex. 14); Complaint, Granville v. Dart, No. 11-CV-2866 at 7 (N.D. Ill Filed Aug 29,2011) (Ex. 14); Complaint, Carreon v. Dart, No. 12 CV 928 at 4 (N.D. Ill Filed Mar 23, 2012) (Ex. 14); Complaint, White v. Cook County Jail, No. 12-C-3956 at 4 (N.D. Filed Jan 31, 2013) (Ex.14); Complaint, Kestian v. Dart, No. 13-CV-1020 at 5 (N.D. Ill Filed Feb 7, 2013) (Ex. 18); Complaint, Morris v. Dart, No 13-C-0190 at 4 (N.D. Ill Filed Jan 10, 2013) (Ex. 18); Complaint, Green v. Cook County Jail, No. 13CV-7052 at 5-6 (N.D. Ill Filed Oct 1, 2013) (Ex. 18); Complaint, Mitchell v. Cook County Dept. of Corrections, No. 13-CV-05723 at 5 (N.D. Ill Filed Aug. 15, 2013) (Ex. 18); Complaint, Reyes v. Dart, No. 13-C-5009 at 4 (N.D. Ill Filed Jul 12, 2013) (Ex. 18); Complaint, Whirley v. Pasqua, No. 13-CV-5938 at 4-5 (N.D. Ill Filed Aug 20, 2013) (Ex.18) ; Complaint, Barraza v. Dart, No. 13-CV-3532 at 4 (N.D. Ill Filed May 10, 2013) (Ex. 18).
• Officers fail to monitor cells. Declarant 48 (Ex. 7) ¶ 4 (“The other reason we’re not safe is because officers sit in the bubble (away from detainees) and do not do anything when fights break out. They let detainees beat on each other. I saw this happen about 2 months ago on 3D during the 3-11 shift. The officers never walk around the deck to check on us when we are in our cells. If two cellmates were fighting there is no way to get help, there is no way to call the C/Os other than banging the check hole (the flap in the cell door they use to deliver our food).”); Declarant 53 (Ex. 8) ¶ 3 (After a detainee threw a light bulb at another detainee and tried to rape him, “it took the officers about 15 minutes before they came into the cell ad finally broke it up. They usually take about that long to do anything about detainee fights.”); Declarant 29 (Ex. 5) ¶ 3; Declarant 54 (Ex. 8) ¶¶ 3-4 (After a detainee complained to officers that another detainee was harassing him for oral sex, officers stated that the other inmate “does this all the time.” The other detainee was then moved to a cell with an old man who wore diapers. The other detainee then raped the old man.); Declarant 1 (Ex. 1) ¶ 10; Declarant 21 (Ex. 4) ¶ 5; Declarant 58 (Ex. 8) ¶ 6; Declarant 62 (Ex. 9) ¶ 4; Declarant 69 (Ex. 9) ¶ 2.
• Officers fail to monitor tiers and dayspaces. Declarant 21 (Ex. 4) ¶ 4 (“About three weeks ago a detainee who goes by ‘Menice’ beat down an detainee named ‘T-mac.’ The beating was in the day room and lasted for 7-8 minutes. T-mac was seriously hurt he had to get stitches for injuries. The C/Os watched this beat down from the hallway and did nothing until it was over.”); Declarant 40 (Ex. 6) ¶ 4 (“In 2011, during the 7-3 shift, I witnessed an inmate get stabbed about 30 times
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Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 15 Filed: 02/27/14 Page 23 of 40 PageID #:149
by another inmate. The officers left the deck unsupervised, which is typical, because they don’t watch over us. This could have been prevented if officers didn’t have a blind eye.”); Declarant 46 (Ex. 7) ¶ 3; Complaint, Brown v. Dart, No.11-C-0064 at 3-4 (N.D. Ill Filed March 8, 2011) (Ex. 14), Complaint, Pettis v. Barnes, No 11 C 0519 at 8-9 (N.D. Ill Filed Mar. 10, 2011) (Ex. 14); Complaint, Thompson v. Cook County Dept. of Corrections, No. 13-C-0642 at 6 (N.D. Ill Filed Jan 25, 2013) (Ex. 15).
f. Common Contention No. 6 Defendants know of and disregard a substantial risk of harm to detainees in Divisions 9 and 10. Support for Common Contention No. 6: To prevail against supervisory defendants in a case alleging unconstitutional violence in a prison or jail, plaintiffs must show (1) that plaintiffs face “a substantial risk of serious harm” and (2) that defendants “kn[o]w of and disregard[ ]” that risk. Miller v. Neathery, 52 F.3d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 1995). In this case, evidence of substantial risk of serious harm includes all of the declarations filed with this motion, which show that detainees in Divisions 9 and 10 are exposed to intolerable levels of violence each and every day. As a result of this violence, detainees in these divisions fear—with good reason—that they will be seriously injured, if not murdered, while awaiting trial. Declarant 74 (Ex. 10) ¶ 4 (“I feel scared about the level of violence at the jail, in Divisions 9 and 10. I worry about getting home safe to my 8 year old son and five year old daughter”); Declarant 16 (Ex. 3) ¶ 5 (“Because I’ve been beaten up very badly, I fear for my life in Division 9.”); Declarant 13 (Ex. 3) ¶ 8 (“I live in constant fear of being beaten by officers because its’ an ongoing thing.”); Declarant 21 (Ex. 4) ¶ 5 (“We are not safe here because the C/Os will beat us or allow other detainees to beat us. The C/Os won’t save us.”); Declarant 30(Ex. 5) ¶ 7 (“Violence is all in a day’s work for the officers here. It seems like some of the officers just come to work to make us miserable and put their hands on us.”); Declarant 35 (Ex.
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6) ¶ 1 (“This is a dangerous place. It’s not about if you will experience violence here, it’s about when.”); Declarant 41 (Ex. 6) ¶ 1 (“I fear for my life every day.”); Declarant 42 (Ex. 6) ¶ 4 (“In Division 9, if officers don’t like you, they’ll punch and kick or use some kind of physical force against. It happens all the time and I don’t feel safe. The officers take it out on us and are violent.”); Declarant 45 (Ex. 7) ¶ 13 (“I am afraid of the COs. On any day, they could beat me …”); Declarant 53 (Ex. 8) ¶ 5 (“I fear for my safety and life because there is so much violence in the jail, even in protective custody.”); Declarant 50 (Ex. 7) ¶ 1 (staff “use abusive forces on us daily”); Second Declarant 56 Declaration (Ex. 8) ¶ 7 (“I see detainees getting beaten up by officers in Division 9 all the time. I am afraid about what is going to happen to me because of all the violence.”); Declarant 59 (Ex. 9) ¶ 1 (“I have been in Cook County for 3 years. I am afraid of the officers and I feel traumatized by their actions. I have never been afraid of another person like this.”); Declarant 57 (Ex. 8) ¶ 1 (“[I]t is very common for officers to physically abuse inmates.”); Declarant 66 (Ex. 9) ¶ 3 (“I’ve seen officers lay their hands on inmates many times. Usually it’s just because the officer has a problem with the inmate. They will hit the inmate and then they’ll say the inmate touched them first.”); Declarant 87 (Ex. 12) ¶ 8 (“I see violence every day and I am endangered”); Complaint, Harris v. Carol, No. 13-C-5470 at 7-8 (N.D. Ill Filed July 31, 2013) (Ex. 16), Complaint, Reyes v. Dart, No. 13-C-5009 at 4 (N.D. Ill Filed Jul 12, 2013) (Ex. 18).
There is substantial evidence that the supervisory Defendants know of disregard this risk of serious harm. First, it would be all but impossible for the superintendents of Divisions 9 and 10 and the Director of the Jail to be unaware of the levels of violence in their divisions. According to Dr. Schwartz: “[H]igh-ranking officials have to have been aware of these matters … [because of] the seriousness of the incidents portrayed in these declarations (stabbings, broken
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Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 15 Filed: 02/27/14 Page 25 of 40 PageID #:151
jaws, etc.) and the frequency with which excessive force situations are occurring, according to the declarations.” Schwartz Decl. ¶ 10.
Second, Defendants have been put on notice of the brutality that pervades the Jail through previous litigation, including United States v. Cook County and Duran v. Elrod, both of which did not succeed in curbing unacceptable levels of violence at the Jail. See Complaint ¶¶ 37-45.
Third, discipline reports provide administrators with an important source of information about detainee-on-detainee attacks. For a two-month period, March 30, 2013 to May 31, 2013, there were 152 were for incidents recorded in disciplinary reports involving physical violence. Schwartz Decl. ¶ 9. 3 The frequency of these incidents paints “a picture of a jail that is out of control.” Id.
Fourth, detainees have also spoken to the Division Superintendents about violence, but their complaints have been rebuffed. Declarant 52 (Ex. 8) ¶ 6 (“I’ve tried to speak to Superintendent Thomas about violence when he makes rounds. He has said things like ‘officers can put their hands on you,’ and ‘where does the constitution say we’re not supposed to be beating?’ I’ve also written to Sheriff Dart about violence in the jail.”)
Fifth, the Cook County Board of Commissioners, over which Defendant Preckwinkle presides, has been put on notice as to the brutal violence and constitutional conditions at the Cook County jail by the over 250 lawsuits filed in the last three years against Defendants Dart, Preckwinkle and the Cook County Board, which allege civil rights violations at the jail. During this period, the Cook County Board approved settlements in aggregate of over $9 million to settle the civil rights claims of these plaintiffs. Complaint ¶ 45. Rather than preventing violence before the fact, the Board lets it occur, and writes it off in monetary 3 Counsel sought incident reports for a longer period, but the County’s Freedom of Information Office would not provide them.
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settlements once the bones are broken. Of course, prior to discovery and even initial disclosures, Plaintiffs need not prove a
substantial risk of harm or establish Defendants’ knowledge thereof. “[T]he court,” after all, “should not turn the class certification proceedings into a dress rehearsal for the trial on the merits.” Messner v. Northshore University HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 811 (7th Cir 2012); Osada v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 290 F.R.D. 485, 492 (N.D.Ill. 2012) (same). The evidence above is put forward at this stage only to show that the risk of harm faced by Plaintiffs, and Defendants knowledge of such risk, present “questions of law or fact common to the class,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) (emphasis added), that lend themselves to common answers, therefore making class-wide adjudication appropriate. To satisfy the commonality requirement, a “common contention . . . must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution— which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Wal-Mart Stores, 131 S.Ct. at 2551. This litigation is ideally suited to proceed as a class action because each class member’s claim rises or falls based on whether plaintiffs can establish both a substantial risk of harm and Defendants’ knowledge of such a risk.
In light of the common questions identified above, differences among class members with respect to the specific uses of force against them do not undermine the commonality of legal and factual issues in this case. That is true because, as explained above, Plaintiffs will rely on numerous individual incidents of violence not to prove their own individual entitlement to monetary relief, but to prove that there is a pattern of officer-on-inmate and inmate-on-inmate abuse in the Divisions 9 and 10 that shows that there is a substantial risk of severe injury to all
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inmates in these divisions. The facts of the individual incidents are equally applicable to the deliberate indifference claim of all members of the proposed class.
The fact that class members in this case suffered various means of assault—some punched, others kicked or choked; some assaulted while standing up, others while handcuffed on the ground; some knocked unconscious on the tiers, others bloodied in the elevators—is immaterial to commonality. Phipps v. Sheriff of Cook County, 249 F.R.D. 298, 301 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (certifying class of all detainees needing wheelchairs in the Cook County Jail; commonality exists even though “particular conditions may differ slightly from one cell block to the next”); Jackson v. Sheriff of Cook County, No. 06 C 0493, 2006 WL 3718041, at *4 (Dec. 14, 2006) (certifying class of detainees involuntarily subjected to an STD screening at the Cook County Jail; in contesting commonality, the Sheriff relied “too much on select factual determinations that might vary on a case-by-case basis.”); Fonder v. Sheriff of Kankakee County., No. 12-CV-2115, 2013 WL 5644754, at * 6 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 2013) (rejecting Defendants’ argument that a jail strip search class action would “require a fact-bound inquiry into the individual circumstances and facts of each search,” thus precluding a finding of commonality). Indeed, “if factual distinctions could preclude findings of commonality and typicality under Rule 23(a), they would be the death knell for class actions challenging the systemic enforcement of an unconstitutional statute.” Sherman ex rel. Sherman v. Township High School Dist. 214, 540 F. Supp. 2d 985, 992 (N.D.Ill. 2008) (quoting Brown v. Kelly, 244 F.R.D. 222, 230 (S.D.N.Y.2007)).
3. Typicality is Satisfied: The Named Plaintiffs’ Claims are Representative of Those of the Class at Large.
Rule 23(a)(3) requires that “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). The standard for determining
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typicality is not an identity of interest between the named plaintiffs and the class, but rather a “sufficient homogeneity of interest.” See, e.g., Jones v. Blinziner, 536 F. Supp. 1181, 1190 (N.D. Ind. 1982) (citing Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 403 n.13 (1975)). “[T]he typicality requirement is liberally construed.” Gaspar v. Linvatec Corp., 167 F.R.D. 51, 57 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
In this case, the claims of the Plaintiffs are typical of the class as a whole. Every inmate in Divisions 9 and 10 is at risk of being injured as a result of the unlawful practices that give rise to unrestrained violence in these divisions. Each proposed class representative for the violence claims (Tylon Hudson, Laton Stubblefield, and Angelo Matthews) was subjected to a severe beating in the Cook County Jail, and each class member’s claims are based on the same legal theories—deliberate indifference to officer-on-detainee and detainee-on-detainee violence. Complaint ¶¶ 37-145. See Fonder v. Sheriff of Kankakee County, No. 12-CV-2115, 2013 WL 5644754, at *6 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 2013) (typicality satisfied where “Plaintiff is challenging the same strip search policy as the class he seeks to represent”); Olson, 284 F.R.D. at 411 (typicality satisfied where class representative and members of proposed class had legal mail opened improperly by correctional officers); Inmates of the Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 453 F.2d 12, 24-25 (2d Cir. 1971) (finding typicality in lawsuit challenging excessive force by guards, despite individual factual differences); Ingles v. City of New York, No. 01 Civ. 8279 (DC), 2003 WL 402565, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2003) (same); Anderson v. Garner, 22 F. Supp. 2d 1379, 1385 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (finding typicality in prison excessive force case even though “when compared to the Plaintiffs’ claims, the unnamed class members may have suffered different injuries under different circumstances . . .”).
“Typical,” as this Court has stated, “does not mean identical.” Gaspar, 167 F.R.D. at 57. See also De La Fuente v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 713 F.2d 225, 232 (7th Cir. 1983) (“The
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typicality requirement may be satisfied even if there are factual distinctions between the claims of the named plaintiffs and those of other class members.”), overruled on other grounds, Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985); Muro v. Target Corp., 580 F.3d 485, 492 (7th Cir. 2009) (same). Thus, the “typicality” requirement is satisfied when the representative’s injuries arise from the same practice affecting the rest of the class, even if factual differences exist. Streeter v. Sheriff of Cook County, 256 F.R.D. 609, 612-13 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (certifying class of detainees strip searched upon entry to Cook County Jail, despite the Sheriff’s argument that there were differences in the circumstances of each search “because ‘the likelihood of some range of variation in how different groups of … detainees were treated does not undermine the fact that the claims of each class [member] share a common factual basis and legal theory.’”); Areola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 798 (7th Cir. 2008) (typicality satisfied where plaintiff was in the “same boat” as other Cook County Jail detainees who had been denied crutches); Parish v. Sheriff of Cook County, No. 07 4369, 2008 WL 4812875, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2008) (certifying class of Cook County Jail detainees who were denied adequate medical care and rejecting the Sheriff’s argument that commonality did not exist because “the named plaintiffs’ claims vary as to the type of illness complained of and the type of medication at issue”); Bullock v. Sheahan, 225 F.R.D. 227, 230 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (“[p]otential factual differences” relating to individual searches held insufficient to defeat typicality in a jail strip search case).
4. The Named Plaintiffs Will Fairly and Adequately Protect the Interests of the Classes.
Rule 23(a)(4) requires that “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) “This adequate representation inquiry consists of two parts: (1) the adequacy of the named plaintiffs as representatives of the proposed class's myriad members, with their differing and separate interests, and (2) the adequacy of the proposed
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class counsel.” Gomez v. St. Vincent Health, Inc., 649 F.3d 583, 592 (7th Cir. 2011). All Plaintiffs here are represented by counsel experienced in the protection and enforcement of the constitutional and statutory rights of prisoners. Plaintiffs, all of whom remain incarcerated and face an ongoing risk of severe physical injury, each have a strong personal stake in the proceedings that will “insure diligent and thorough prosecution of the litigation.” Rodriguez v. Swank, 318 F. Supp. 289, 294 (N.D. Ill.1970), aff'd 403 U.S. 901 (1971).
a. Absence of Conflict within the Class. The named Plaintiffs and the class members raise the same claims, giving rise to common questions of fact and law. The class representatives do not have interests antagonistic to the interests of the class. Both representatives and class members have a common interest in ensuring that inmates in Divisions 9 and 10 are protected from savage violence perpetrated and encouraged by officers. There is no suggestion of any collusion between named Plaintiffs and any of the Defendants. Moreover, no conflicts exist that could hinder the named Plaintiffs’ ability to pursue this lawsuit vigorously on behalf of the class. The named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. b. Adequacy of Representation. Plaintiffs’ counsel are qualified, experienced, and able to conduct the proposed litigation. Plaintiffs are represented by attorneys from the Roderick and Solange MacArthur Justice Center at Northwestern University School of Law and the Uptown People’s Law Center. The Roderick and Solange MacArthur Justice Center is a public interest law firm founded in 1985 by the family of J. Roderick MacArthur to advocate for human rights and social justice through litigation. The MacArthur Justice Center became part of Northwestern University School of Law's Bluhm Legal Clinic in 2006. Shapiro Declaration (Ex. 19) ¶ 2.
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Prior to joining the MacArthur Justice Center in September 2012, Sheila Bedi served as the deputy legal director of the Southern Poverty Law Center in New Orleans where she represented people who are imprisoned in federal class action litigation challenging abusive prison conditions and worked on policy campaigns aimed at reducing incarceration rates and reforming criminal and juvenile justice systems. Some of her honors include the 2010 The Peter M. Cicchino Award for Outstanding Advocacy in the Public Interest and the 2007 Fannie Lou Hamer Award. Bedi received her LLM from Georgetown University Law Center and her JD, cum laude, from American University. Id. ¶ 4.
David Shapiro joined the MacArthur Justice Center in October 2011 after working as a staff attorney for the ACLU's National Prison Project. Shapiro obtained what is believed to be the largest settlement ever in a case involving censorship by a prison or jail and led the first major challenge to Communication Management Units, a new type of federal prison unit designed to radically limit the communications of federal prisoners suspected of links to terrorism. In 2012, he was part of a trial team nominated for the Public Justice “Trial Lawyer of the Year” Award for litigation challenging the segregation of prisoners with HIV in Alabama. Shapiro clerked for the late Hon. Edward R. Becker, Third Circuit Court of Appeals and received his JD from Yale Law School. Id. ¶ 3.
Alexa Van Brunt has served since 2010 as an attorney at the MacArthur Justice Center working on cases including litigating on behalf of victims of the Jon Burge police torture scandal, and bringing suits to address such issues as conflicts of interest within the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office and the violation of prisoners’ rights in Illinois correctional facilities. Van Brunt clerked for the Hon. Myron Thompson, U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama and received her JD, with distinction, from Stanford Law School. Id. ¶ 5.
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Locke Bowman is the director of the MacArthur Justice Center. Bowman has handled a variety of civil and criminal litigation, including police misconduct litigation, civil suits seeking damages for the wrongfully convicted, suits seeking resources for indigent criminal defendants, and suits on a variety of other topics. Bowman was named an Illinois “Super Lawyer” in 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009 for his work in constitutional law and civil rights. He also is a recipient of the “First Defender Award,” presented by the First Defense Legal Aid (FDLA); the “Citizens Alert Rev. Willie Baker Award,” given by Citizens Alert for contributions toward community justice; the Clarence Darrow Award, given by the Clarence Darrow Commemorative Committee for leadership efforts to reform the death penalty system; and the Illinois Public Defender Association Award for Excellence and Meritorious Service, among other awards and honors. Id. ¶ 6.
Alan Mills is the Legal Director of the Uptown People’s Law Center and has litigated dozens of civil rights actions brought by prisoners in both federal and state courts. Mr. Mills was lead counsel for the plaintiff class in Westefer v. Snyder, a case alleging that prisoners transferred to Tamms Correctional Center were not provided with a hearing which complied with the minimum requirements of due process. The order finding in plaintiffs’ favor is reported at 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72758. (S.D. Ill., July 20, 2010). Some of the cases litigated by Mr. Mills which have resulted in reported decisions include: Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868 (7th Cir. 2009) (RLUIPA claim regarding denial of religious diet to prisoner at Tamms); Pearson v. Welborn, 471 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 2006) (retaliation claim brought by prisoner at Tamms); Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2006) (reversal of summary judgment entered against prisoner plaintiff for failure to exhaust, in a case arising out of Menard); Harper v. Albert, 400 F.3d 1052 (7th Cir. 2005) (affirming judgment against plaintiff in an excessive use of force case arising
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Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 15 Filed: 02/27/14 Page 33 of 40 PageID #:159
from Menard); Filmore v. Page, 358 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 2004) (reversing, in part, judgment against prisoner in an excessive use of force case arising from Menard); Thomas v. Ramos, 130 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 1997) (affirming summary judgment in a due process case). Id. ¶ 7.
5. Plaintiffs Satisfy Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2): This Case Seeks Declaratory and Injunctive Relief from Policies and Practices that Place the Entire Proposed Class at Risk of Brutal Violence.
The final requirement for class certification is satisfaction of at least one of the subsections of Rule 23(b). Subsection (b)(2) requires that “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Courts have repeatedly held that civil rights class actions are the paradigmatic 23(b)(2) suits, “for they seek classwide structural relief that would clearly redound equally to the benefit of each class member.” Marcera v. Chinlund, 595 F.2d 1231, 1240 (2d Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 442 U.S. 915 (1979); see also Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 598 F.2d 432, 435 (5th Cir. 1979).4 As stated in the leading treatise on class actions:
Rule 23(b)(2) was drafted specifically to facilitate relief in civil rights suits. Most class actions in the constitutional and civil rights areas seek primarily declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of the class and therefore readily satisfy Rule 23(b)(2) class action criteria. A. Conte & H. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions § 25.20 (4th ed. 2002). In addition, the Seventh Circuit has recognized that prisoners, “by reason of ignorance, poverty, illness, or lack of counsel may not... [be] in a position to seek ... [relief] on their own behalf,” and that this factor militates in favor of class certification. United States ex rel. Morgan v. Sielaff, 546 F.2d 218, 222 (7th Cir. 1976).
4 Plaintiffs do not seek class certification for any damages claims. While Plaintiff Hudson seeks damages for his individual injuries, he represents a class seeking purely declaratory and injunctive relief.
28

Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 15 Filed: 02/27/14 Page 34 of 40 PageID #:160
Injunctive challenges to prison and jail conditions routinely proceed as class actions. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 1923 (2011); Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 374 (1992); Jones 'El v. Berge, 374 F.3d 541 (7th Cir. 2004); Bruscino v. Carlson, 854 F.2d 162, 164 (7th Cir. 1988); Hadi v. Horn, 830 F.2d 779, 781 (7th Cir. 1987); French v. Owens, 777 F.2d 1250, 1251 (7th Cir. 1985); Jones v. Diamond, 519 F.2d 1090, 1097 (5th Cir. 1975) (“Realistically, class actions are the only practicable judicial mechanism for the cleansing reformation and purification of these penal institutions.”); Baby Neal, 43 F.3d at 58 (noting that subsection (b)(2) “is almost automatically satisfied in actions primarily seeking injunctive relief”); Bradley v. Harrelson, 151 F.R.D. 422, 427 (M.D. Ala. 1993) (stating that subsection (b)(2) “is particularly applicable to suits such as the one sub judice which involve conditions of confinement in a correctional institution.”). Here, the practice of high-level officials turning a blind eye to brutality inflicted on class members and failing to adopt the policies and practices necessary to ensure that there is not a pattern of excessive force in Divisions 9 and 10 places all class members at risk of grave physical harm.
B. With Regard to the Solitary Confinement Claims, The Proposed Class Meets All of the Requirements for Maintenance of A Class Action.
Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks and Anton Carter also seek to represent the proposed class with regard to their solitary confinement claim. Detainees in Tier SI (“Special Incarceration”) in Division 9, Tier 1F in Division 9, and the Segregation Tier in Division 10 (collectively, “the Solitary Confinement Tiers”) are all subjected to solitary confinement—the practice of isolating detainees in their cells for 23 or more hours a day. All class members face a risk of being locked in the solitary confinement tiers, both because these tiers are used or disciplinary purposes, and because the reasons for throwing detainees into solitary confinement are often trivial or pretextual. See Declarant 11 (Ex. 2) ¶ 5 (“They put us in the hole for any little thing-like talking
29

Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 15 Filed: 02/27/14 Page 35 of 40 PageID #:161
back to the C/O, covering your chuck hole, or having a pen in your cell.”); Declarant 28 (Ex. 5) ¶
5 (“[O]fficers frequently provide known false information concerning detainee-officer
altercations. As a matter of fact, the officers prepare disciplinary reports to cover-up their
physical abuse of detainees.”)
The numerosity and adequacy of representation requirements for class certification, see
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) & (4), are met with regard to the solitary confinement claim for the same
reasons these requirements are met with regard to the violence claim—prospective class counsel,
and the size of the class, are the same. Commonality, typicality, and the requirements of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) are discussed below.
1. Commonality and Typicality Are Satisfied: The Class Representatives and Class Members Suffer Common Deprivations that Raise Common Questions of Law and Fact.
All members of the proposed class contend that conditions in the Solitary Confinement Tiers
• Detainees are locked down and left alone in their cells except for one-hour periods. The one-hour periods occur rarely, and certainly less than once every 24 hours. During their one hour of out of cell time, detainees pace alone in a day space, where they have virtually no opportunity to exercise. Declarant 11 (Ex. 2) ¶ 5 (“When we are in the hole, we are locked down for 23-73 hours a day with no shower and no time to exercise or use the phone.”); Declarant 74 (Ex. 10) ¶ 6 (“We had to walk around in full shackles-that means both handcuffs and leg shackles with a chain connecting the cuffs and leg shackles. That makes it impossible to move or exercise. I have bruises from the leg shackles, everyone from 1F does.”); Declarant 1 (Ex. 1) ¶ 9; Declarant 45 (Ex. 7) ¶ 7; Declarant 47 (Ex. 7) ¶ 2; Declarant 61 (Ex. 9) ¶ 4; Declarant 63 (Ex. 8) ¶ 4; Declarant 89 (Ex. 12) ¶ 2
• Conditions are filthy and unsanitary. First Declarant 74 Declaration (Ex. 10) ¶ 7 (“It’s in the basement. My cell flooded with sewage three times while I was in SI. Once time, the sewage seeped outside into SI from the cells. Even though the cells are a step down, the whole step got overflowed. It even flowed out of SI into the dispensary and boulevard (main corridor). Every time this happened, I was kept in my cell for three hours. The sewage smells like feces, and you see bugs crawling in it. Usually, officers make us clean it up ourselves. They didn’t even give us a shower afterwards.”); Declarant 45 (Ex. 7) ¶ 7 (“Seg is inhumane, cruel, 30

Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 15 Filed: 02/27/14 Page 36 of 40 PageID #:162
and unusual. It feels like being in a dungeon. I was in SI from March to May. I was kept in a windowless basement for 3 months. Raw sewage would come out of a drain.”); Declarant 11 (Ex. 2) ¶ 5 (“The hole in Division 10 is filthy. It is covered with shit and piss. They never clean or mop. It smells like shit and piss. It is infested with rats and roaches.”); Declarant 20 (Ex. 4) ¶ 2 (“I was in seg in Division 10 about a month ago. I was sent there in December 2013. The water in seg is dirty-you see things floating in it.”); Declarant 1 (Ex. 1) ¶¶ 8-9.
• Detainees suffer emotionally as those in neighboring cells descend into psychosis, demonstrating such behaviors as screaming and throwing feces. . First Declarant 74 Declaration (Ex. 10) ¶ 8 (“I have been told by a doctor that I have schizophrenia, ADHD, depression, anxiety and sleeping problems. Being in SI was extremely stressful for me and would be for anyone.”); Declarant 18 Declaration (Ex. 3) ¶ 5 (“ABO will make you go crazy if you’re back there long enough. You’re all by yourself all the time. I would just pace back and forth in my cell. Sometimes I would scream and bang to wake everybody up because there was no one to talk to. Lots of people do the same thing, and it makes it impossible to sleep.”); id. ¶ 12; Declarant 29 (Ex. 5) ¶ 4 (“Some of the guys in there have been in seg for 6 or 9 months even for minor infractions. Some of these guys go crazy and throw their feces and urine at other inmates in segregation.”); Declarant 73 Declaration (Ex. 10) ¶ 2 (“People are so alone in 1F, they start throwing feces, spitting on people, insert things into their butts and cut their wrists.”); Declarant 20 (Ex. 4) ¶ 2 (“Detainees in 10 seg sometimes throw feces and piss at other detainees.”).
Plaintiffs, in short, bring a unified challenge to common conditions and policies—the
very sort of systemic challenge that is the sine qua non of an injunctive class action.
2. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) Is Satisfied
Because any class member may be thrown into one of the Solitary Confinement Tiers in
Divisions 9 and 10, the solitary confinement claims are “generally applicable to the class,
thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with
respect to the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
31

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II. THE COURT SHOULD DESIGNATE PLAINTIFFS’ COUNSEL AS CLASS COUNSEL UNDER RULE 23(g)(1). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(g) requires that the district court appoint class counsel
for any class that is certified. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1). The attorneys appointed to serve as class counsel must “fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(B). The appointed class counsel must be listed in the Court’s class certification order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(B).
The Rule identifies four factors that the Court must consider in appointing class counsel: (1) “the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in the action;” (2) “counsel’s experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and the types of claims asserted in the action;” (3) “counsel’s knowledge of the applicable law;” and (4) “the resources that counsel will commit to representing the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(A). The undersigned attorneys satisfy each of these requirements. First, Plaintiffs’ counsel have worked for many months in identifying and investigating the claims in the action, through interviews with the named Plaintiffs, with scores of other putative class members and with other potential fact witnesses, consultation with potential experts, review of court records, and other extensive factual and legal research. Shapiro Declaration (Ex. 19) ¶ 8. With regard to the second and third factors, and as is set forth in the Shapiro Declaration, Plaintiffs’ counsel have significant experience in handling class actions as well as other complex litigation, including the very kind of matters asserted in this case, namely, civil rights actions on behalf of incarcerated persons; and they are knowledgeable with regard to the applicable law. Id. ¶¶ 3-7.
Finally, Plaintiffs’ litigation team includes several highly experienced lawyers who have dedicated and will continue to commit major staffing and material resources to the representation of this class. Id. ¶ 9. Plaintiffs’ counsel have built a strong, effective working relationship with
32

Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 15 Filed: 02/27/14 Page 38 of 40 PageID #:164
the named Plaintiffs and several other members of the proposed class. Id. Counsel are prepared to retain highly qualified experts and to undertake the other necessary litigation expenses on behalf of the Plaintiffs and the proposed class. Shapiro Declaration Id. In sum, Plaintiffs’ counsel fully satisfy the criteria for class counsel set forth in Rule 23(g) and Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court appoint them as such.
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant the motion for class certification and appoint the undersigned attorneys as Class Counsel. DATED: February 27, 2014 s/David M. Shapiro David M. Shapiro Sheila Bedi Alexa A. Van Brunt Locke E. Bowman Roderick and Solange MacArthur Justice Center Northwestern University School of Law 375 East Chicago Avenue Chicago, Illinois 60611 Alan Mills Uptown People’s Law Center 4413 North Sheridan Chicago, Illinois 60640 Counsel for Plaintiffs
33

Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 15 Filed: 02/27/14 Page 39 of 40 PageID #:165 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned, an attorney, certifies that he filed the foregoing document via the Court’s CM/ECF system and served a copy on the individuals in the attached service list, on February 27, 2014.
/s/ David Shapiro
34

Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 15 Filed: 02/27/14 Page 40 of 40 PageID #:166

Nicholas Scouffas Deputy General Counsel Cook County Sheriff's Office 50 W. Washington, 7th Floor Chicago IL 60602 312-603-8856
Alan Mills Uptown People’s Law Center 4413 North Sheridan Chicago, Illinois 60640 (773) 769-1410

SERVICE LIST Preckwinkle v. Hudson
13cv8752

35

 
 Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 5 Filed: 12/27/13 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:43

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS Eastern Division

Tylon Hudson Plaintiff
v.
Preckwinkle, et al, Defendants

)

)

Case No: 13-cv-8752

)

)

)

Judge: Milton I. Shadur

)

)

)

ORDER

For the reasons set out in the Memorandum Opinion and Order, the plaintiff’s motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [3] and for appointment of counsel [4] are granted. The Court assigns the following attorney to represent the plaintiff: Francis X. Buckley, Jr., Thompson Coburn LLP, 55 E. Monroe Street, 37th Floor, Chicago, IL 60603, (312) 580-2210. The Clerk’s Office is directed to send a copy of the complaint, docket sheet and a copy of this order to Mr.Buckley. Status hearing is set for 1/10/14 at 9:30 a.m. ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER.

Date: 12/27/13

/s/ Milton I. Shadur United States District Judge

 
 Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 113 Filed: 05/21/14 Page 1 of 4 PageID #:2005

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

TYLON HUDSON, et al., on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated individuals,
Plaintiffs,
v.
TONI PRECKWINKLE, et al.,
Defendants.

) ) No. 13 CV 8752 ) ) ) Magistrate Judge Young B. Kim ) ) ) ) ) May 21, 2014 )

ORDER

A. Motion to Compel

Plaintiffs’ motion to compel [90]─as supplemented on May 15, 2014─is granted in part and denied in part for the reasons stated in open court on May 14, May 16, May 19, and May 21, 2014. The following is a summary of the court’s ruling on the motion to compel:

1. Plaintiffs’ Amended First Set of Requests for Production

The motion is denied as to request ## 6-9 and 11-12. The motion is granted in part as to the following:

Request

Required Production and Deadline

Defendants must produce all completed Office of Professional Review (“OPR”) investigation reports for the years 2012 through 2014 by May 22, 2014.

1

As for the Criminal Investigative Division (“CID”) reports, Defendants

are to first produce the 10 most recent CID reports by May 22, 2014, and

then produce the remaining CID reports for the first three months of

2014 by June 6, 2014, on a rolling basis.

Defendants must first produce the summary of information (covering

2

the period of January 1, 2013, to April 30, 2014) they referenced in their response and during the motion hearing by May 22, 2014, and then

produce the individual disciplinary reports for the months of November

Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 113 Filed: 05/21/14 Page 2 of 4 PageID #:2006

2013, December 2013, and January 2014 by June 6, 2014, on a rolling

basis.

3

Defendants must produce the specific disciplinary records requested for the first three months of 2014 by May 27, 2014.

Defendants are to produce a detainee population report reflecting the

4

information already maintained for the detainees by the IMACS as of

January 15, 2013, May 15, 2013, and April 15, 2014, by June 6, 2014.

5

Defendants are to produce the 30 most recent use of force incident reports prepared as of February 27, 2014, by May 27, 2014.

10

Defendants are to produce the requested documents for the identified 30 detainees by June 6, 2014, on a rolling basis.

2. Plaintiffs’ Second Set of Requests for Production

The motion is denied as to request # 2. The motion is granted in part as to the following:

Request 1 3

Required Production and Deadline
Defendants are to produce the videos requested for the 30 detainees from January 1, 2013, through April 30, 2014, by June 6, 2014, on a rolling basis. Defendants are to produce the videos requested from December 1, 2013, through April 30, 2014, by June 6, 2014, on a rolling basis.

3. First Set of Interrogatories

The motion is denied as to Interrogatory 1 as moot because Defendants have agreed to provide the requested list by May 23, 2014.

4. Expert Tour

As for the touring of Divisions IX and X, the parties are to adhere to the following conditions:

1. Plaintiffs’ Expert Dr. Jeffery Schwartz and Defendants’ Expert Margo Fraiser will jointly conduct a tour of the Cook County Jail, with an emphasis on Divisions IX and X from May 28, 2014, until May 30, 2014;

2. By no later than May 22, 2014, each party shall produce and/or identify all facts, data, documents and other materials provided to that party’s expert in advance of the scheduled tour. If either party provides their expert with any additional facts, data, documents and materials after the

2

Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 113 Filed: 05/21/14 Page 3 of 4 PageID #:2007
tour, that party must also contemporaneously produce and/or identify those materials to opposing counsel.
3. No attorneys involved in this litigation and/or employed by the Defendants will accompany the experts during the tour. Defendants may select the individual who will accompany the experts on their tour. This individual should have high-level knowledge of jail operations. Both experts are permitted to ask general operational questions of the individual leading the tour, which can be answered, if known. Plaintiffs’ expert may be accompanied by a law student or non-attorney agent of Plaintiffs’ counsel.
4. While the tour will focus primarily on Divisions IX and X, the experts shall be provided access to other areas of the jail that affect operations and security in those Divisions.
5. The experts will be permitted to conduct detainee interviews. Only the two experts and the detainee may be present for the interview and the interviews will occur in a confidential meeting area where Defendants’ agents and/or staff cannot overhear the interview. Each expert will have the opportunity to identify detainees to interview. The expert who initiated the interview will be the first to interview the detainee. The observing expert will remain silent until the initiating expert concludes his or her questioning. Only then may the observing expert ask questions of the detainee. Neither expert may speak while the other expert has his or her turn questioning the detainee.
6. Defendants’ expert shall not have meetings or phone calls with any of Defendants’ agents or employees (with the exception of Defendants’ attorneys who have appeared in this case). However, to the extent that Defendants’ expert relies upon conversations with any agent or employee of Defendants, Defendants will make that person available for deposition. To the extent the agent or employee has already been deposed by Plaintiffs, Defendants will not be required to produce that agent or employee for another deposition without court order.
7. The tour will adhere to the following unless modified by mutual agreement of the experts:
May 28, 2014
8:00 a.m. - 10:30 a.m.: tour both Divisions 10:30 a.m. - 1:00 p.m.: tier observations (during these observations, experts will speak informally to detainees, observe staff/detainee interactions, and examine unit log books)
3

Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 113 Filed: 05/21/14 Page 4 of 4 PageID #:2008

1:30 p.m. - 4:00 p.m.: tier observations 4:00 p.m. - 6:00 p.m.: detainee interviews
The following tiers/units/officers/events will be visited for each Division:
 Punitive Segregation  Protective custody  Suicide watch  Acute mental health  Any step down units  General Population  Any special tiers (i.e. 40 and over)  Administrative segregation  Grievance Officer  Classification  Medical  Meals  Shift changes
8:00 p.m. - 10:00 p.m.: detainee interviews
May 29, 2014
8:00 a.m. - 12:30 p.m.: detainee interviews 1:00 p.m. - 6:00 p.m.: tier observations 9 p.m. - 1:00 a.m.: tier observations
May 30, 2014
8:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.: complete outstanding observations/interviews.
B. May 2014 Depositions
Based on the information provided by the parties in open court on May 19, 2014, the court orders that Defendants produce and Plaintiffs take: (a) two 30(b)(6) depositions on May 22, 2014, at 10:00 a.m. and at 1:00 p.m.; (b) two 30(b)(6) depositions on May 23, 2014, at 10:00 a.m. and at 1:00 p.m.; and (c) the deposition of Defendant Cara Smith on May 27, 2014, from 1:00 to 5:00 p.m.

Date: May 21, 2014

/s/ Young B. Kim

4

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

TYLON HUDSON, et al., on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated individuals,
Plaintiffs,
v.
TONI PRECKWINKLE, et al.,
Defendants.

) ) No. 13 CV 8752 ) ) ) ) ) Magistrate Judge Young B. Kim ) ) ) June 10, 2014 )

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

Before the court is the motion of Defendants Thomas J. Dart, in his official

capacity as Cook County Sheriff, and the Sheriff’s Office defendants (collectively,

“Defendants”), to compel Plaintiffs to supplement their responses to Defendants’

Request for Production No. 8 (questionnaires completed by detainees) and

Interrogatory No. 11. For the following reasons, the motion is granted as it pertains

to Request No. 8, but denied as it pertains to Interrogatory No. 11:1

1 Defendants sought to have Plaintiffs respond to their Interrogatory No. 11, but their arguments in the motion (and during the motion hearing) largely are devoted to securing the questionnaires in response to Request for Production No. 8. Based on its review of the interrogatory and response, the court sustains Plaintiffs’ objections that the scope of Interrogatory No. 11 is overbroad and burdensome on its face. Also, the court cannot glean from the motion how a response to this interrogatory is relevant to the instant action. The court finds that the burden of compiling the information Interrogatory No. 11 seeks outweighs any use that can be derived from it because many of the communications necessarily will be privileged. Accordingly, the motion is denied as to Interrogatory No. 11.

Background Plaintiffs allege that a “culture of lawlessness has flourished” at Cook County Jail because of Defendants’ failure to adequately manage the jail’s population. (R. 12, Am. Compl. ¶ 3.) This culture, Plaintiffs allege, has resulted in a pattern and practice of violence and officer abuse in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 14, 48-50, 116.) In 2013, attorneys for the putative class sent letters to Cook County Jail detainees seeking information about jail conditions “as a precursor to potential litigation.” (R. 18, Pls.’ Mot. for Protective Order at 7.) The letter opened with the following statement: I am an attorney and a law professor who focuses on the civil rights of people who are locked up. People who are in jail have important rights. . . . I am writing to you to find out more information about conditions in Cook County [Jail]. I am hoping you will share with me your experience in the jail and to help me understand whether your rights are protected. Please answer the question [sic] below and return to me via legal mail[.] (Id. (emphasis in original).) The letter included a form questionnaire asking for the detainee’s name, age, length of detention, and medications taken. (R. 127, Defs.’ Mot., Ex. E.) The questionnaire also asked for information about conditions at the jail, including how many hours a day detainees spend in their cells, how many cellmates they have, how often fights occur in their units, and whether the detainees think they receive adequate medical care. (Id.) The letter then concluded by asking whether the detainee “[w]ould like a legal visit from an attorney or law student to discuss these issues further” and provided checkboxes for either a “Yes” or “No” response. (Id.)
2

Defendants filed the current motion to compel on June 4, 2014, seeking production of the completed questionnaires from putative class member-detainees after Plaintiffs’ counsel refused to produce them in response to Request No. 8 on the basis of attorney-client privilege. (R. 127, Defs.’ Mot. at 3.) On June 6, 2014, this court ordered Plaintiffs to provide the court with the questionnaires submitted by the following 10 detainees for an in camera review: Clarence Anderson, Arthur Chaney, Chazz Collins, Sean Hanks, Edwin Figueroa, Jerome Watson, Ronald Shorter, Jermaine Brooks, Laton Stubblefield, and Angelo Matthews.2
Analysis Federal law provides the rules of decision in this case, so issues of privilege are governed by federal common law. See Fed. R. Evid. 501; Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 5 (1996) (applying federal common law of privileges to a case including a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); In re Pebsworth, 705 F.2d 261, 262 (7th Cir. 1983) (in non-diversity actions privileges are matters of federal common law). The attorneyclient privilege protects communications made in confidence by a client to his attorney in the attorney’s professional capacity for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. Jenkins v. Bartlett, 487 F.3d 482, 490 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Evans, 113 F.3d 1457, 1461 (7th Cir. 1997)). Because the privilege is “in derogation of the search for the truth,” this court construes it narrowly. Id. (quotation
2 At the motion hearing, Defendants limited the scope of the motion to secure a copy of the questionnaires completed by those detainees whose declarations Plaintiffs’ expert reviewed in developing his opinions. The court directed Defendants to identify 10 declarants who also submitted questionnaires to Plaintiffs’ counsel.
3

ommitted). Determining whether a communication is protected by the attorneyclient privilege “hinges upon the client’s belief that he is consulting a lawyer in that capacity and his manifested intention to seek professional legal advice.” Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1319 (7th Cir. 1978) (citations omitted). The party seeking privilege protection carries the burden of showing that it applies. Valero Energy Corp. v. United States, 569 F.3d 626, 630 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
Defendants argue that neither the contents of the completed questionnaires nor the detainees’ relationships with Plaintiffs’ counsel gives rise to an attorneyclient relationship protecting the questionnaires from disclosure. (R. 127, Defs.’ Mot. at 3.) At the June 6, 2014 hearing, Plaintiffs responded that allowing detainees to request a “legal visit” at the end of the questionnaire met the requirements for privilege to apply.3 Plaintiffs also pointed to the decision in American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan v. Livingston County, No. 14 CV 11213, 2014 WL 1977152, at *5 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (“ACLU”) in support of their position that these questionnaires are protected because privilege can extend to prospective clients as well as current clients.
This court finds that attorney-client privilege does not protect the questionnaire responses from disclosure. Although the form gave detainees the opportunity to request a “legal visit,” courts in this district have required that offers to provide legal assistance be more explicit before privilege will attach. For
3 Plaintiffs stated at the hearing that they are not asserting work-product protection over the questionnaires.
4

example, in EEOC v. Scrub, Inc., No. 09 CV 4228, 2010 WL 2136807, at *8 (N.D. Ill. May 25, 2010), questionnaires were considered privileged because they expressly asked if the recipients would like the EEOC to represent them. In Vodak v. City of Chicago, No. 03 CV 2463, 2004 WL 783051, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 2004), the court found privilege applied to completed questionnaires because they were distributed at a meeting where “only those who were seeking legal representation or specific advice were requested to complete the form questionnaire.” Similarly, in Bauman v. Jacobs Suchard, Inc., 136 F.R.D. 460, 463 (N.D. Ill. 1990), the court found that questionnaires returned to the EEOC by prospective claimants were protected because only those who desired legal representation were asked to complete the questionnaire. Even in ACLU, which Plaintiffs cited to at the June 6, 2014 hearing, the relevant correspondence stated that its purpose was “to find out if you are interested in meeting with an ACLU attorney, or someone who works under the supervision of an ACLU attorney, for the purpose of obtaining legal advice or assistance[.]” ACLU, 2014 WL 1977152, at *5 (emphasis added).
In contrast, the questionnaire here only offered an opportunity for detainees to discuss “issues” relating to jail conditions with an attorney or law student. Such a vague invitation is a far cry from the express language other courts have relied upon to find that privilege applies. Also, unlike in the cases discussed above, the detainees had the option of completing and returning the form regardless of whether they wanted to have a follow-up discussion with an attorney or law student. Furthermore, rather than conveying that the information collected would
5

be used to evaluate potential claims on behalf of the detainee, the questionnaire’s stated purpose was “to find out more information about conditions in Cook County.” (R. 127, Defs.’ Mot., Ex. E.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of proving that by completing the form, the detainees reasonably believed they were consulting counsel instead of merely aiding in a fact-finding mission. See Vodak, 2004 WL 783051, at *3.
The questionnaire also did not indicate that the information detainees provided would remain confidential. See Evans, 113 F.3d at 1462 (attorney-client privilege only shields communications intended to be confidential). The letter did not say that Plaintiffs’ counsel would refrain from sharing the information with others, nor did it provide a place for the detainees to indicate whether they wished the information to be kept confidential. See Schiller v. City of New York, 245 F.R.D. 112, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). Although the letter directed detainees to return answers “via legal mail,” it is unclear whether the detainees understood this to mean that Plaintiffs’ counsel would not disclose the information provided. (See R. 127, Defs.’ Mot., Ex. E); see also Morisky v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 191 F.R.D. 419, 423 (D.N.J. 2000). Given the absence of additional evidence, Plaintiffs have not born their burden of demonstrating that the completed questionnaires were confidential, and their assertion of attorney-client privilege cannot stand. See Vill. of Rosemont v. Priceline.com Inc., No. 09 CV 4438, 2010 WL 4876217, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 22, 2010).
6

Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to compel is granted as it pertains to Request for Production No. 8, but denied as to Interrogatory No. 11. Plaintiffs are ordered to serve a copy of the questionnaires completed by those detainees who also provided a declaration for Plaintiffs’ expert’s consideration. Because this ruling is based on the court’s in camera review of a sample of 10 questionnaires, Plaintiffs are entitled to seek to have questionnaires outside that sample exempt from production if they reflect additional information tending to show that they are privileged.
ENTER:
____________________________________ Young B. Kim United States Magistrate Judge
7

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

TYLON HUDSON, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v.
TONI PRECKWINKLE, et al.,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) 13 C 8752 ) ) Judge Virginia M. Kendall ) ) ) ) )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff Tylon Hudson and four other individuals who were or are housed in Divisions IX and X of the Cook County Jail (the “Jail”) seek to represent a class of all current and future detainees in Divisions IX and X in arguing that the risk of violence and the conditions of confinement in those divisions violate the Constitution. Plaintiffs moved the Court to enter a preliminary injunction to put a stop to the alleged “deliberate indifference” of Cook County officials to the alleged “sadistic” behavior of guards and detainees. This case is the latest in a long string of court cases seeking to improve conditions at the Jail dating back to at least 1974. In response, Cook County Board President Toni Preckwinkle and Cook County have filed a motion to dismiss arguing that they cannot be held liable for the actions of those who have direct responsibility for operating the Jail. Named in their official capacities, Cook County Sheriff Tom Dart, Executive Director of the Cook County Department of Corrections Cara Smith, Superintendent of Division X E. Greer, Superintendent of Division IX V. Thomas, as well as Officer Campbell, Sergeant Lewis, Officer Wilson, and Lieutenant Johnson, who were named individually, (the “Sheriff’s Office Defendants”) have separately moved to dismiss the Amended

Complaint arguing that the injunctive relief sought already exists in the form of an agreed order in United States v. Cook County (10 C 2946) (the “Federal Agreed Order”) and that the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim for damages.
For the reasons stated below, President Preckwinkle and Cook County’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 81) is denied. The Sheriff’s Office Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 144) is granted in part and denied in part. The Amended Complaint is dismissed as to Lieutenant Lewis, but the remainder of the motion is denied. Also pending is Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiffs’ submission related to the preliminary injunction hearing. (Dkt. No. 231). That motion is denied. Finally, Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction (Dkt. No. 36) is denied.
BACKGROUND I. The Cook County Jail The Jail is one of the largest, if not the largest, single-site county detention facilities in the United States. Roughly 100,000 people are admitted to the Jail each year and the average total daily population is about 9,000. The oldest parts of the Jail date back to 1929. Division IX is a maximum security division designed to house roughly 1,000 male detainees. Division X is a maximum security division designed to hold roughly 800 male detainees. The Cook County Department of Corrections, a division of the Cook County Sheriff’s Office, operates the Jail. The Cook County Board provides funding for the Jail. II. Cook County Jail Conditions Litigation The present case is the latest in a string of civil cases seeking to redress alleged unconstitutional conditions of confinement at the Cook County Jail. The saga began in 1974 with Duran v. Elrod, 74 C 2949. Duran was a class action that dealt specifically with overcrowding
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and insufficient staffing at the Jail. (Dkt. No. 144 Ex. A)1. The class in Duran represented “all pre-trial detainees at Cook County Jail.” The Duran class was represented by Robert Lehrer of the Law Offices of Robert E. Lehrer and Locke Bowman of the MacArthur Justice Center at Northwestern University. The case resulted in the “Duran Consent Decree,” an agreement between the Sheriff, the County Board President, and the pretrial detainee class that required the jail be monitored by an outside third party which party would report regularly to a district court judge regarding efforts made on the part of the Defendants to correct the overcrowding situation. The Duran Consent Decree was handled by a number of federal judges, the last of which was this Court.
The next civil case seeking to improve conditions at the Jail was Harrington v. DeVito, 74 C 3290. The class in Harrington represented all pre-trial detainees at the Jail who were in need of mental health treatment. (Id.). The class claimed that the failure to provide adequate mental health services at the Jail constituted a Fourteenth Amendment violation. The Harrington case also resulted in an agreed order requiring the parties responsible for operating the Jail to follow mental illness screening and classification procedures and provide treatment to eligible detainees. The Harrington agreed order also required adequate security staffing for mental health treatment units.
While both Decrees were still operational and in effect, in 2008, the Department of Justice investigated the Jail and found that despite the Duran consent decree and Harrington agreed order, violence and overcrowding were still pervasive. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5-7). In May 2010, the Department of Justice brought suit against Cook County as well as the defendants
1 Exhibit A to Dkt. No. 144 is the notice provided by plaintiffs’ counsel in Duran and Harrington to members of the classes in those cases regarding the proposed voluntarily dismissal of those cases.
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named in Duran and Harrington under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (“CRIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997a. Captioned United States v. Cook County, 10 C 2946, the injunctive relief sought by the DOJ was significantly more expansive and fully encompassed the relief sought in both previous agreed orders and sought relief for a number of other alleged violations including violations regarding excessive force and training of correctional officers. For the first time, the new proposed relief sought to bring in experts in the field to monitor and improve the conditions at the Jail. These experts would be divided into four categories – facilities, operations, medical and mental health – and would have an over-arching monitor who would coordinate the experts’ work.2 In the words of the Duran and Harrington classes, the Federal Agreed Order in United States v. Cook County was “more comprehensive than the Duran consent decree and the Harrington agreed order.” (Dkt. No. 144 Ex. A p. 2). The new order, which this Court will refer to as the Federal Agreed Order, was assigned to this Court and resulted in quarterly in-chambers meetings and semi-annual reports by all of the expert monitors to the Court. These meetings addressed whatever needs were addressed by each expert report, whether it be pest control or correctional officer training, and included all of the parties and any other stakeholder within the facility who could add a solution to any of the problems addressed by the monitors. These meetings are intense and ongoing and the Federal Agreed Order and the regular reports and meetings are in effect today.
Specifically, the Federal Agreed Order identifies and regulates the Jail in eight areas: use of force; protection from harm; medical care; mental health care; sanitation; training; quality assurance/performance improvement; fire and life safety; and improved policies, procedures, and
2 There are four independent monitors involved in the Cook County case: Dr. Esmaeil Porsa M.D. MPH is the monitor for medical provisions, Dr. Jeffrey Metzner is the monitor for mental health provisions, Harry Grenawitzke is the monitor for the physical plant and capital planning provisions, and Susan McCampbell is the monitor for the corrections provisions.
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practices. The protection from harm section is further subdivided into use of force by staff, safety and supervision, security staffing, incidents and referrals, investigations, inmate disciplinary procedures, classification, inmate grievance procedure, access to information, and training and supervision. The Federal Agreed Order provided that it would remain in effect until Defendants maintained a rating of “Substantial Compliance” in each area, as determined by court appointed monitors and approved by the Court, for eighteen months.
The Federal Agreed Order was entered into on May 26, 2010 and monitors reports have occurred 37 times since it was entered into, each series of reports is followed by a meeting with this Court to address any areas of concern – especially those which the reports show as either out of compliance or in need of improvement. The overarching monitor on the Federal Agreed Order is Susan McCampbell, an expert in the field of corrections and criminal justice system leadership with over forty years of experience in the field. The first report submitted by Monitor McCampbell on September 24, 2010 showed a total of 74 of 77 provisions in partial or noncompliance and only three provisions in substantial compliance. As of November 4, 2014, defendants were in substantial or sustained compliance with all provisions of the Federal Agreed Order related to protection from harm. (10 C 2946 Dkt. No. 262 p. 2). All of these reports are on the public docket of United States v. Cook County.
At the time that the Federal Agreed Order was entered into, the parties on both sides of the Duran and Harrington cases “agreed that Judge Kendall should vacate the consent decree in Duran and the agreed order in Harrington, and dismiss both cases.” (Dkt. No. 144 Ex. A p. 11). Recognizing that “the 2010 Agreed Order and the 2011 Supplementary Orders had not only secured for the plaintiff classes [in Duran and Harrington] all the relief that the Duran consent decree and the Harrington agreed order had afforded them, but also extended to them substantial
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additional relief and protection,” (Id.) the parties relinquished their cases in favor of the new Federal Agreed Order which offered them a comprehensive and monitored form of relief.In truth, never before had the Jail had the scrutiny of this number of experts analyzing in such exacting detail every structure, procedure, and process at the Jail. Moreover, the parties agreed that “the 2010 Agreed Order and 2011 Supplementary Orders reasonably promised to secure the rights of the plaintiff classes under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” (Id.).
At the time of the entry of the Federal Agreed Order, members of the Duran and Harrington classes were given the opportunity to respond and object to the voluntarily dismissal of their cases. Sixty-six class members responded to the notice of proposed voluntary dismissal and sixteen objected. (74 C 2949 Dkt. No. 1137 p. 6). The “theme” of the bulk of the objections was that “existing conditions at the Jail [were] so poor and [gave] rise to and threat ensuch [sic] injury to plaintiffs, violating their constitutional rights in the process, that dismissal of lawsuits that were brought precisely to correct poor conditions at the Jail, and to secure plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, is unwarranted.” (Id.). Of course, the dismissal of the previous lawsuits was not to abandon the issue of poor conditions, but rather to expand the expert intervention into the jail and to expand that intervention beyond any intervention previously contemplated. Although the handful of objectors filed their positions, it was clear to the class representatives that the new Federal Agreed Order would give their clients more relief than even their respective lawsuits had sought previously, and therefore, the class representatives advocated to the Court to approve the voluntary dismissal. The dismissal to the class counsel was actually a moot point because the Federal Agreed Order fully encompassed the existing relief and yet was much broader than Duran and Harrington relief combined.
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Ironically, because he was then incarcerated at the Jail, Plaintiff Hudson was a member of the Duran class and entitled to respond or object to the dismissal. Hudson did respond; he did not, however, object. (See 74 C 2949 Dkt. No. 1137-1 p. 3). Further irony exists in that one of the class counsel in the Duran Consent Decree informed this Court on the record that the Federal Agreed Order “fairly promise[d] a substantial improvement in overall Jail conditions.” (74 C 2949 Dkt. No. 1137 p. 10). That same attorney now represents the Hudson class arguing that the Federal Agreed Order is inadequate. Ultimately, the Court accepted the classes’ argument that voluntary dismissal of Duran and Harrington would comport with Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and dismissed the cases in light of the new, more comprehensive relief that would be provided all members with the Federal Agreed Order covering all aspects of the Jail.
III. The Present Lawsuit Hudson was a detainee at the Jail. On December 6, 2013, Hudson filed a pro se complaint alleging that correctional officers at the Jail coordinated an attack on him by another inmate and failed to intervene while he was being attacked in the Division X law library. (Dkt. No. 1). The Complaint also included a Monell claim. Hudson sought compensatory and punitive monetary damages to redress his injuries as well as attorneys’ fees. (Id. p. 24). On December 27, 2014, Judge Shadur granted Hudson’s application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and recruited an attorney to represent him. (Dkt. No. 5). The recruited attorney’s tenure was short. On February 27, 2014 Locke Bowman and David Shapiro of the MacArthur Justice Center at Northwestern University filed appearances on behalf of Hudson and the recruited attorney withdrew. The new attorneys filed an Amended Complaint, adding four named plaintiffs and class claims, and immediately issued a press
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release.3 (Dkt. No. 12). The Amended Complaint was filed “on behalf of all people who now or in the future will be housed in Divisions IX and X of the Cook County Jail” (Id. ¶ 31). The Amended Complaint sought injunctive relief on behalf of the class in the form of an order preventing “the Defendants, their agents, employees, and all persons under their control from subjecting Plaintiffs and the class they seek to represent from the unlawful policies, practices, and conduct described” in the Amended Complaint. (Id. p. 56). The Amended Complaint also sought money damages for Hudson alone. (Id. p. 57). The Amended Complaint acknowledges the Federal Agreed Order, but claims that “little has changed in the jail since the DOJ filed suit.” (Id.¶ 8).
Plaintiffs quickly moved for the entry of a preliminary injunction.4 (Dkt. No. 36). The Cook County Defendants – Cook County itself and President Preckwinkle – moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint as to them, arguing that Sheriff Dart was solely responsible for any constitutional violations at the Jail. (Dkt. No. 81). Sheriff Dart and the remaining defendants moved to dismiss arguing that the relief sought in the Amended Complaint overlaps with the Federal Agreed Order’s injunctive relief and that the Amended Complaint also failed to state a claim for money damages under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Dkt. No. 144).
3 See Press Release, Roderick and Solange MacArthur Justice Center, Civil Rights Class Action Suit Documents Culture of Brutality and Violence at Cook County Jail (Feb. 27, 2014) (http://www.law.northwestern.edu/legalclinic/macarthur/projects/treatment/documents/CookCou ntyJailclassactionnewsreleaseFeb272014.pdf)
4 Plaintiffs also sought class certification. (Dkt. No. 14). The parties stipulated that Plaintiffs had timely moved for class certification and the motion was withdrawn without prejudice. (Dkt. No. 226). Whether the putative class should be certified has not been briefed and is not presently before the Court.
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I. Background

MOTIONS TO DISMISS

The Amended Complaint contains fifty-six pages of allegations of horrific treatment of

detainees in Divisions IX and X of the Jail. The Amended Complaint contains five counts.

Counts I, II, and III seek injunctive relief on behalf of the putative class and Counts IV and V

seek monetary damages on behalf of Hudson individually. Counts I, II, and III seek injunctive

relief against all defendants named in their official capacity, specifically President Preckwinkle,

Sheriff Tom Dart, Executive Director of the Cook County Department of Corrections Cara

Smith, Superintendent of Division X E. Greer, and Superintendent of Division IX V. Thomas (collectively the “Official Capacity Defendants”). (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 156-65).5 Count IV seeks

money damages from Officer Campbell individually for ordering other detainees to attack

Hudson. (Id. ¶¶ 166-68). Count V seeks money damages from Lieutenant Johnson, Sergeant

Lewis, and Officer Wilson for their failure to protect Hudson from the gang members under

Officer Campbell’s control. (Id. ¶¶ 169-71).

Counts I and II allege pervasive violence at the Jail. According to the Amended

Complaint, detainees routinely suffer serious injuries both by jail staff and other inmates.

Plaintiffs also allege deficient grievance processes to redress injuries suffered in the Jail. The

Amended Complaint alleges that the Official Capacity Defendants are aware of the danger and

have adopted a custom of condoning correctional officers’ failure to report uses of force to the

proper authorities within the Jail, which both constitutes deliberate indifference to a substantial

risk of serious harm and exacerbates that risk. Count I alleges that the Official Capacity

Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to the serious risk that detainees would suffer

5 The County of Cook is named as a defendant in the case caption, but not any count of the Amended Complaint.

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substantial harm at the hands of correctional officers within the Jail. Similarly, Count II alleges that the Official Capacity Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to the serious risk of substantial harm that detainees would suffer substantial harm at the hands of other detainees.
Count III alleges that the conditions in the isolation and segregation units at the Jail constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. The Amended Complaint alleges that holding detainees in solitary confinement “for 23 hours a day causes profound mental anguish and a documented risk of serious harm.” (Id. ¶ 146).
Counts IV and V are specific to Hudson himself and are described in greater detail below. II. Legal Standard A complaint “must state a claim that is plausible on its face” to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 728 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads sufficient factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct.” Id. (quoting Aschroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). A plaintiff must allege that all elements of its claims are satisfied, but must supply more than bare legal conclusions in order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Reynolds v. CB Sports Bar, Inc., 623 F.3d 1143, 1147 (7th Cir. 2010). “[A]llegations in the form of legal conclusions are insufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 694 F.3d 873, 885 (7th Cir. 2012). III. Discussion As an initial matter, the Court treats Counts I, II, and III as suits against the Cook County Board and the Cook County Sheriff’s Office because “[a]ctions against individual defendants in their official capacities are treated as suits brought against the government entity itself.” Walker
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v. Sheahan, 526 F.3d 973, 977 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991)). Thus, to the extent the suit is filed against Defendants Dart, Smith, Greer, and Thomas, it is really a suit against the office of the Cook County Sheriff, who has statutory responsibility for operating the Jail. See 55 ILCS 5-3-15003. To the extent the suit is filed against Defendant Preckwinkle, it is really a suit against the Cook County Board who has statutory responsibility for funding the jail. See 55 ILCS 5/3-15015.
A. Judicial Estoppel The Sherriff Defendants first argue that Plaintiffs are judicially estopped from arguing that the Federal Agreed Order does not adequately protect Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights because the Duran and Harrington classes argued that Duran and Harrington should be dismissed because the Federal Agreed Order provided sufficient relief to detainees at the Jail. Judicial estoppel is not lightly tossed around in the legal arena, yet there appears to be some justifiable legal irritation on the part of Defendants here in that both classes of plaintiffs actually sought the relief that is currently being given in the form of the Federal Agreed Order, and at least one of the attorneys who stood before the Court seeking to eliminate the earlier orders is now representing the class that says the Federal Agreed Order is ineffective. Defendants can’t help but feel whipsawed under the circumstances: one day you are with me; the next you are against me. “Judicial estoppel is an equitable concept that prevents parties from playing fast and loose with the courts by prevailing twice on opposing theories.” United States v. Hallahan, 756 F.3d 962, 975 (7th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Though there is no precise formula for judicial estoppel, there are at least three factors relevant to whether the doctrine should apply: “(1) whether the party’s later position was ‘clearly inconsistent’ with its
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earlier position; (2) whether the party against whom estoppel is asserted in a later proceeding has succeeded in persuading the court in an earlier proceedings; and (3) whether the party ‘seeking to assert an inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped.’ ” In re Airadigm Comms., Inc., 616 F.3d 642, 661 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750-51 (2001)). The application of judicial estoppel is a matter of discretion. In re Pansier, 451 F. App’x 593, 596-97 (7th Cir. 2011).
Unfortunately for the Defendants, the doctrine is not applicable here because it cannot fairly be said that the party against whom estoppel would be asserted is the same party who took the purportedly inconsistent position in prior litigation. The putative class here comprises all individuals housed now or in the future in Divisions IX and X of the Jail. (Am. Compl. ¶ 31). The Duran and Harrington classes represented individuals housed in the Jail during the pendency of those cases. Neither Harrington nor Duran purported to represent the interest of future detainees in perpetuity.6 While there is some overlap among the identity of the classes – Hudson himself, for example, was a member of the Duran class – the bulk of the class that Plaintiffs seek to represent were not members of the Duran or Harrington classes. Though counsel in this case overlaps substantially with counsel in Duran, prohibiting the present class from presenting arguments that the present conditions in Divisions IX and X of the Jail are unconstitutional today because some members of the present class were members of the Duran
6 The current litigation, however, does. (See Am. Compl. p. 56) (“Plaintiffs respectfully pray that this Court . . . enter an order certifying a class of all people who nor or will be housed in Divisions IX and X of the Cook County Jail”). The Court struggles to square this fact with Plaintiffs’ assertion that “[i]t would be inequitable for a statement made in 2011, on behalf of detainees no longer at the jail, to foreclose any further effort by Cook County Jail detainees to enforce their constitutional rights through injunctive litigation.” (Dkt. No. 178 p. 9).
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or Harrington classes would not serve the interest of justice. The Court will not punish the class members for class counsel’s caprice.
B. Mootness The Sherriff Defendants next argue that the portions of the Amended Complaint seeking injunctive relief should be dismissed on mootness grounds because the relief sought overlaps with injunctive relief already mandated under the Federal Agreed Order. (Dkt. No. 144 p. 13). A claim for injunctive relief may be moot when there is a “high degree of duplication” between the claim and existing injunctive relief. See Madyun v. Thompson, 657 F.2d 868, 872 (7th Cir. 1981). This theory also does not fall entirely flat in that the previous judge who was assigned the matter also was concerned about that overlap. That judge sought to have the cases combined before this Court in order not to duplicate any of the relief that might have been given already in this matter and, of course, not to drain judicial resources. The standard is high, however, requiring nearly an “identity of content” between existing injunctive relief and the subsequent lawsuit. Id. Though the potential for substantial overlap in injunctive relief is obviously present here, the case is not moot. It is difficult to know exactly what sort of injunctive relief Plaintiffs are seeking since it evolved over time with each court hearing. Plaintiffs, however, established based on their written submissions that they seek injunctive relief that is not necessarily provided by the Federal Agreed Order. Plaintiffs presented various specific actions that they would like to be taken at the Jail to redress their alleged constitutional injury. Based on the parties’ submissions and the representations made at in open court, the Court determined that a hearing on the preliminary injunction was necessary because the relief did not overlap completely with the relief already being provided by the Federal Agreed Order. (Dkt. No. 248).
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The finding that the case is not moot, of course, does not necessarily suggest that any of the relief sought by Plaintiffs is appropriate in this case. That must be addressed on the merits after review of the evidence presented during the evidentiary hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction. At this point, the Court simply finds that Plaintiffs seek at least some injunctive relief not presently provided by the Federal Agreed Order. The Court addresses the propriety of the injunctive relief below.
C. PLRA The Sheriff Defendants argue that the Prison Litigation Reform Act, specifically 18 U.S.C. § 3626, prohibits the Court from granting the relief sought in the Amended Complaint. The PLRA requires that any prospective relief be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to remedy a constitutional violation, and is the least intrusive means necessary to achieve that goal. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). Defendants’ one paragraph argument on this point is conclusory and underdeveloped to the point of waiver. See United States v. Wescott, 576 F3d 347, 356 (7th Cir, 2009) (unsupported and undeveloped arguments are waived). While Defendants may be correct that granting all the relief sought by Plaintiffs would violate the PLRA, this conclusion supports crafting a pointed remedy if prospective relief is shown to be appropriate, not dismissing the case at the pleadings stage. The Court is aware of its obligations for crafting injunctive relief under the PLRA.
D. Cook County Motion to Dismiss Cook County and President Preckwinkle move to dismiss the Complaint as to them. They argue that they cannot be held liable for the conduct of the Sheriff’s Office at the jail because Sheriff Dart is not an employee of the County and the operation of the jail is committed to his sole responsibility under Illinois law. Preckwinkle and Cook County Board are correct to the
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extent that they argue that no vicarious liability exists under § 1983, see, e.g., O’Shell v. Cline, 571 F. App’x 487, 491 (7th Cir. 2014), but they are incorrect that that conclusion warrants dismissal in this case. A governmental body can be held directly liable under § 1983 when there is a plausible “allegation that the official policy is responsible for the deprivation of rights.” Thomas v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293, 306 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978)). The Board itself can indeed be held accountable for its own actions under § 1983.
The Amended Complaint states a claim for injunctive relief based on the Board’s own conduct in underfunding the jail despite its knowledge of the substantial risk of serious harm that detainees experience at the Jail. As this Court is well aware, a significant number of the issues regarding conditions at the Jail are related to the extremely old facility itself. Simply maintaining the old structure is costly and requires movement of pretrial detainees to other areas of the jail simply to keep the Jail at its most basic level of adequate functioning. Monitor McCampbell has frequently raised the significant impact of the decaying facility on operations and safety. All of the funding for that functioning and that old facility comes from the Cook County Board. The Amended Complaint alleges in Counts I, II, and III that the County policy or practice of providing inadequate funding for the jail were causally related to the harms suffered by inmates. Moreover, the Amended Complaint alleges that the County was well aware of the risk of harm in the Jail and maintained the allegedly inadequate level of funding. These allegations are sufficient to state a claim and survive the motion to dismiss. See, .e.g., Shoppell v. Schrader, No. 08 C 284, 2009 WL 1886090 at *6 (N.D. Ind. June 30, 2009) (“critical question is whether Council’s funding decisions were made with deliberate indifference to [prisoner’s] rights”). Thus, Cook County’s motion to dismiss is denied.
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The Court also notes the practical reality of the Cook County Board’s involvement with the Jail. The Board is responsible for providing adequate funding for the Jail under Illinois law. See 55 ILCS 5/3-15015 (“The County Board must appropriate and provide funds for the necessary ordinary and contingent cost incurred by the office of the Sheriff in the performance of its powers, duties and functions” which include operation of a jail). President Preckwinkle’s predecessor signed on to the Federal Agreed Order on behalf of the Board. Indeed, the Board recently moved the Court to enter an order transferring responsibility for the execution of the emergency Prisoner Release Order in the Federal Agreed Order from the Sheriff to the Cook County Board. (10 C 2946 Dkt. No. 218). It strains credulity for the Board to distance itself from the Jail when it comes to shielding itself from liability here while at once seeking greater involvement with Jail operations under the Federal Agreed Order.
For those reasons, Preckwinkle and the Cook County Board’s motion to dismiss is denied.
E. Adequacy of Pleading as to Counts IV and V Defendants Campbell, Johnson, Lewis, and Wilson move to dismiss Counts IV and V for failing to plead sufficient facts that state a plausible claim for money damages. (Dkt. No. 144 p. 15). As stated above, the Court takes the following allegations from the Complaint as true for the purposes of the motions to dismiss. See Vinson v. Vermillion Cnty. Ill., 776 F.3d 924, 925 (7th Cir. 2015). The Amended Complaint alleges that Officer Campbell and Lieutenant Johnson used their positions of authority to recruit other detainees to assault Hudson because Officer Campbell believed that Hudson had murdered a member of Campbell’s family. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 120-31). The other detainees had openly threatened Hudson and prison officials were aware of the threats. (Id.). Even though Johnson arranged to move Hudson to protective custody in Division III as a
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result of the credible threats, Johnson and Campbell further conspired to move the threatening detainees to Hudson’s new tier. (Id. ¶ 122). After two weeks in protective custody, then-Sergeant Lewis informed Hudson that he was required to move back to Division X because Division III did not have the ability to treat his epilepsy. (Id. ¶ 123).
After returning to Division X, Hudson spent a substantial amount of time in the law library preparing for his criminal case. Officer Wilson was the correctional officer assigned to the law library and was aware of the need to keep Hudson separate from the threatening detainees in the law library. (Id. ¶ 125). Eventually, the other detainee and Hudson were in the law library at the same time. Rather than enforcing a directive to keep the two separated, Officer Wilson, the correctional officer assigned to the law library, told Hudson simply to “be careful” when the other detainee was on his way to the law library. (Id. ¶ 128). While in the library, the other detainee punched Hudson and slashed him with a shank. (Id. ¶ 129).
Prison officials have a duty to protect detainees from violence at the hands of other detainees. See Borello v. Allison, 446 F.3d 742, 747 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). Correctional officers may not exhibit “deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm,” including harm posed by other inmates. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828. “The deliberate indifference requirement means that the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Olson v. Morgan, 750 F.3d 708, 713 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837) (internal quotation marks omitted). Once the correctional officer is subjectively aware of the risk, he or she may not simply disregard it. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 744 F.3d 443, 461 (7th Cir. 2014).
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The Amended Complaint alleges sufficient facts to state a plausible claim against Officers Wilson and Campbell as well as Sergeant Johnson. The Amended Complaint alleges that Campbell and Johnson conspired to create a substantial risk of harm in the form of a gang attack directed at Hudson. The Amended Complaint further states that Wilson received a directive to keep Hudson apart from the detainees who had been threatening him, plausibly suggesting that Wilson was subjectively aware of the risk of harm that Hudson faced. Moreover, Wilson’s own words corroborate her knowledge of the threat against Hudson. Officer Wilson warned Hudson to be careful of the detainee about whom she had received a directive, but did nothing to ensure that the two remained separated in the law library according to the allegations. According to the Amended Complaint, Wilson, Campbell, and Johnson all knew of the specific threat that specific other detainees posed to Hudson and either did nothing to stop the harm or, worse, actually worked to ensure the threats would come to fruition. See, e.g., Hoban v. Godinez, 502 F. App’x 574, 578 (7th Cir. 2012) (complaint stated Eighth Amendment claim when prison officials had knowledge of specific threat but refused to take action to protect inmate). At this stage, the allegations are sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
The Amended Complaint does not allege sufficient facts to support a claim of deliberate indifference against Lewis. The only factual allegation involving then-Sergeant Lewis is that she oversaw Hudson’s move from Division III protective custody to Division X. (Am. Compl. ¶ 123). The Amended Complaint contains no allegations that lead to the inference that Lewis knew anything about the threat against Hudson, let alone that she subjectively believed that Hudson was in serious danger and was indifferent to the threat. See Olson, 750 F.3d at 713. The Amended Complaint would be insufficient as to Lewis even if Hudson had alleged that he had stated that he felt threatened in Division X because “prison guards are neither required nor
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expected to believe everything inmates tell them.” Id. The Amended Complaint does not plead facts sufficient to find that Lewis had the subjective knowledge required for a deliberate indifference claim. Defendant Lewis is therefore dismissed.
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION Shortly after filing an Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs moved the Court to enter a preliminary injunction “to protect the men housed in Divisions IX and X from the serious injuries that most certainly await them in the absence of court intervention.” (Dkt. No. 36 p. 1). The Plaintiffs are not specific about the nature of the relief they request. Instead, they ask the Court to: (1) order Defendants to propose a remedial plan; (2) order Plaintiffs to respond to the proposed remedial plan; and (3) resolve any dispute among the parties as to the appropriate injunctive relief. (Am. Compl. p. 55). Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief only on Counts I and II of the Amended Complaint relating to Jail officials’ deliberate indifference to the risk of physical harm at the Jail. Defendants oppose the entry of a preliminary injunction. For the reasons that follow, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. I. Hearing Testimony The Court held a nine-day evidentiary hearing over nearly two months on the preliminary injunction motion. During the hearing, the following witnesses testified: (1) Dr. Jeffrey Schwartz, an expert in the field of jail operations and security who testified on behalf of the Plaintiffs; (2) James Ford, a detainee at the Jail, (3) Marcus Simmons, a detainee at the Jail; (4) Quinton Brown, a detainee at the Jail; (5) Curtis Curry, a detainee at the Jail; (6) Matthew Burke, Chief of Staff to the Executive Director of the Cook County Department of Corrections; (7) Margo Frasier, an expert in the field of jail operations who testified on behalf of the Defendants; and (8) Nancy Donahoe, General Counsel to the Cook County Sheriff. The Court also admitted into evidence designated portions of the deposition of Frank Arce, Commander of Operations in
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Division IX. Finally, Plaintiffs introduced 120 unsworn statements of detainees regarding
conditions in the Jail.
A. Expert Testimony
1. Dr. Schwartz Dr. Jeffrey Schwartz testified on behalf of Plaintiffs as an expert witness7 in the areas of jail operations and security. (Tr. 160) 8. Dr. Schwartz has a Ph.D. in Psychology and has worked
in the field of corrections for over two decades as a consultant. Dr. Schwartz testified that his
methodology involved reviewing documents, policies, procedures, use of force packages or
investigations, inmate grievances, disciplinary records, and video. (Tr. 38). Dr. Schwartz also
toured the Jail. (Tr. 53). Dr. Schwartz testified for two full days.
It was Dr. Schwartz’s professional opinion that the Jail was “among the worst” in in the
country with regard to violence. (Tr. 159). He opined that a culture of violence exists at the Jail
and that detainees live in constant fear of violence at the hands of guards and detainees alike. In
his opinion, there exists a code of silence among correctional officers that the higher-level
officers at the Jail supports.
7 The Court denied Defendants Daubert motion to the extent it sought to prevent Dr. Schwartz from testifying as an expert in the fields of jail operations and security. The Court took the motion under advisement as to Dr. Schwartz’s qualification to testify to various statistical conclusions in his expert report. (Dkt. No. 278). At that time, Plaintiffs represented to the Court that Dr. Schwartz would not testify to his statistical conclusions and he did not, in fact, testify in that area. Therefore, Defendants’ oral Daubert motion is dismissed as moot to the extent it sought to bar Dr. Schwartz’s statistical opinions.
8 Unless otherwise noted, Transcript references are to the preliminary injunction hearing that took place over eight days before the Court. The pages are numbered continuously across nine Volumes, each corresponding to a single day of testimony. Volume 1 is Dkt. No. 280; Volume 2 is Dkt. No. 281; Volume 3 is Dkt. No. 295; Volume 4 is Dkt. No. 299; Volume 5 is Dkt. No. 304; Volume 6 is Dkt. No. 308; Volume 7 is Dkt. No. 309; Volume 8 is Dkt. No. 314; and Volume 9 is Dkt. No. 315.
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In order to reach his conclusion, Dr. Schwartz relied heavily on detainee declarations and statements that were created and gathered by Plaintiffs’ counsel, describing them as a major factor in reaching his conclusions as to the prevalence of officer misconduct at the Jail. (Tr. 43, 70). In spite of testifying that detainees lie at a greater rate than the general population, Dr. Schwartz relied heavily on the unsworn statements of the pretrial detainees.
Dr. Schwartz’s conclusions were based upon his review of the thousands of pages of documents that he received from the lawyers and law students working with the Northwestern’s MacArthur Justice Center who represent the Plaintiff class. Those lawyers and students would review incident reports and statements made by pretrial detainees and would then analyze those reports and statements and would provide that analysis to Dr. Schwartz for his professional review. Dr. Schwartz would supposedly then review the reports and interviews objectively and through his expert eye would reach a conclusion as to whether the incident was a constitutional violation based on his experience. Although this was the procedure he described, what became clear on cross-examination is that the majority of the conclusions he reached were the conclusions set forth by the students and lawyers working for the Plaintiffs. Numerous emails were presented to show that the alleged expert report was nothing more than a regurgitation – often verbatim – of the analysis and opinions of the MacArthur Justice Center lawyers. Dr. Schwartz’s opinions and conclusions were “word for word” what the lawyers fed to him. Dr. Schwartz explained this by saying they were the ones who put pen to paper to put his conclusions into words. (Tr. 116-19). He testified that he reviewed what the MacArthur staff provided to him and was confident that it was consistent with the conclusions he would have reached anyway and that it would have been duplicative to rewrite what they had written, though he did use their drafts “word for word.” (Tr. 94-95).
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Dr. Schwartz did not testify as to the constitutional floor for conduct on the part of Jail officials, although he described the length of investigation at the jail as giving him “a concern” (Tr. 243) and concluded at times that conduct exhibited “a lack of professionalism.” (Tr. 114; see also Tr. 115, 169, 265). Dr. Schwartz further testified on cross that incompetence of OPR investigators could have accounted for the delay in cases that were delayed. (Tr. 255). Dr. Schwartz also testified that he had a negative opinion of the Jail’s policy of allowing detainees to self-select for protective custody. (Tr. 171). On cross, however, Dr. Schwartz testified that this practice was not unacceptable within the field of corrections nationally. He testified that protective custody at the Jail was “unusual.” (Tr. 171). Finally, Dr. Schwartz admitted that episodes of excessive force will occur even in the best run jails. (Tr. 301)
The Court assigns little weight to Dr. Schwartz’s testimony due to its significant flaws in its methodology and analysis. First, Dr. Schwartz’s heavy reliance on detainee declarations and statements that are not subjected to cross examination or even verified by oath reflects his desire to rely on evidence that has not been subjected to scrutiny or validated with risk of prosecution or other detriment to the affiant if it is false., See, e.g., Walker v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 208 F.3d 581, 586 (7th Cir. 2000) (reliance on unsworn, self-serving statements goes to weight of expert testimony); see also Tate v. Riegert, 390 F. App’x 550, 552 (7th Cir. 2010) (“unsworn letter was entitled to no weight as substantive evidence) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Second, Dr. Schwartz’s reliance on the statements of the MacArthur Justice Center lawyers and students for the conclusions he reached within his expert report erodes the Court’s confidence in his conlcusions. An expert is expected to review evidence objectively and to apply his methodology to scrutinize it and conclude based on his expertise. Here, Dr. Schwartz completely abdicated his role as an objective and critical analyst when he accepted without scrutiny the conclusions given
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to him by Plaintiffs’ lawyers. See, e.g., Obrycka v. City of Chicago, 792 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1026 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (court “harbored serious concerns” about expert report influenced by counsel). Third, by failing to look at all sides of the incident, his conclusions fail to take into account all factors and circumstances involving the incidents he purported to analyze. Just as each pretrial detainee was entitled to have the incident reviewed from his perspective, so too were the defendants. An expert trained in jail operations should be comfortable looking at both sides of the incident and reaching a conclusion based on that analysis. See, e.g., Richman v. Sheahan, 415 F. Supp. 2d 929, 944 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (expert report relying on one versions of events without having considered other versions would not be helpful to jury). Here, by failing to review the opposing version of events, his conclusions carry less weight. Finally, the Court questions whether Dr. Schwartz was truly aware of the standard to be applied to the matter. His testimony was replete with comments, such as the need to increase “professionalism” or that behavior was not “appropriate.” The Court needs to determine whether there are ongoing constitutional violations, not whether Defendants are acting politely or professionally. The nature of Dr. Schwartz’s criticisms was sufficiently vague as to be unhelpful to the Court’s determination. See Davis v. Duran, 276 F.R.D. 227, 236 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (vagueness of expert testimony negatively affects its weight); see also Cage v. City of Chicago, 979 F. Supp. 2d 787, 827 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (expert’s bias goes to weight of testimony).
2. Margo Frasier Margo Frasier testified as an expert on behalf of Defendants. Frasier has a law degree from Florida State University and an undergraduate degree from Sam Houston State University in criminology and corrections. (Tr. 768). She worked as a correctional officer while she was in college in Huntsville, Texas. (Tr. 768-69). Frasier also worked at the Travis County, Texas
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Sheriff’s Department and wrote the use of force policy for the Travis County Jail. Frasier has led training on use of force in jail settings and jail management. In reaching her conclusions, Frasier reviewed in depth documents from two incidents involving the use of force. (Tr. 853). Frasier testified as an expert in the fields of jail operations and security. (Tr. 664).
Frasier concluded in her expert opinion that detainees in Divisions IX and X of the jail do not live under a constant risk of life threatening violence. (Tr. 891). In reaching her conclusion, Frasier relied on use of force review documents, OPR documents, monitors’ reports from United States v. Cook County, and detainee interviews. Frasier looked at the detainee declarations provided by Plaintiffs, reviewed them skeptically, and analyzed them as only one version of the offense while looking to all other facts provided to her. (Tr. 850) Frasier also toured the Jail. Frasier testified that there were fights between detainees at the Jail, something not uncommon in a jail setting, but that the violence was not pervasive. She also testified that correctional officers used force – sometimes inappropriately – at the Jail, but that it was not a situation where detainees live in fear of violence at the hands of the guards.
Frasier testified that Officer Gonzalez, who was shown on video in an altercation with Brian Gracia, should face discipline for his actions. (Tr. 909). The video shown to the Court of this incident depicted a clear and egregious example of excessive force committed by a correctional officer against a detainee. The video depicts Garcia on a telephone in what appears to be an empty day room and a correctional officer approaching him and without warning punching his face and dragging him away in a headlock. There is no dispute that the behavior is abhorrent. Frazier testified that the correctional officer should be disciplined for the incident. (Tr. 909).
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Frasier reviewed the existing use of force policy at the Jail and found it to be adequate. (Tr. 918). She reached this conclusion by reviewing the policy itself and speaking with employees at the Jail and Sheriff’s Department. Frasier testified that the detainees with whom she and Dr. Schwartz spoke were familiar with the grievance process and were aware that they could contact the Department of Justice if they had concerns about the use of force at the Jail. (Tr. 828). Although Frasier testified that vague language in use of force reporting by guards is disfavored because it hampers the use of force review process, she commended the Jail for the implementation of a use of force review system as a check and balance on the use of force. Frasier testified that vague language in use of force reporting by guards is disfavored because it hampers the use of force review process.
B. Detainee Testimony 1. James Ford
James Ford is a nineteen year-old former detainee at the Jail. Ford was housed at the Jail while his criminal charge of armed robbery was pending. At the time of the hearing, Ford had not been housed at the Jail for five months because he had transitioned into IDOC custody. Ford testified about two incidents of excessive force that he personally experienced. First, he testified that correctional officers hit him in the face and turned the camera away from the beating. (Tr. 424). Second, Ford testified that on March 20, 2014, he received another beating following a verbal altercation with Officer Couch. (Tr. 436-42). Ford claimed that Couch pushed him to the ground, knocked his legal papers out of his hands, put him in a headlock, and punched him. (Tr. 453). OPR was still investigating the incidents as a potential wrongful use of force at the time of the hearing. (Dkt. No. 317 p. 12; Dkt. No. 318 p. 17). There was no testimony that
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Defendants blocked his access to the grievance procedure, failed to investigate the claims, or failed to discipline officers if those officers were deemed to have violated his rights.
Ford testified that he believed detainee on detainee violence occurred at the Jail, but that he had never observed it. (Tr. 514). Ford testified that he occupied a corner cell in Division 9 and had a poor view of what went on outside his cell. (Id.). Ford testified that he is a member of the Vice Lords. On cross-examination, Defendants introduced a recorded phone call of Ford discussing plans to attack a correctional officer if he were given the opportunity, demonstrating his bias. Ford also testified that he faked a suicide attempt in order to manipulate his housing assignment. (Tr. 529-30).
2. Markus Simmons Video showed Markus Simmons being escorted into an elevator by multiple correctional officers after a gang fight in one of the Jail’s dayrooms. The officer holding the camera does not enter the elevator. Dr. Schwartz testified that the term “elevator ride” is a term used in the Jail to describe a beating by correctional officers on elevators where there are no cameras. (Tr. 248-49). No other photographic or medical evidence documented any physical harm after the elevator ride depicted on video. Following the elevator ride, Simmons gave a taped statement to correctional officers in which he denied being subjected to excessive force and even denied that a fight between the gangs had occurred in the dayroom. (Tr. 573). Video of that statement confirmed that Simmons did not suffer any sever facial injuries. Although Simmons did not file a grievance following the elevator ride, he testified in Court that two officers punched him on the elevator. (Tr. 546). Simmons further testified that he had never filed a grievance related to correctional officer conduct or violence during his time at the Jail. (Tr. 559).
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Simmons also testified regarding the fight that preceded the alleged “elevator ride.” (Tr. 562). He testified that fifteen to seventeen members of the Gangster Disciples and Vice Lords were fighting in the day room while a handful of correctional officers watched from the protected “bubble.” (Tr. 561).
The Court was able to view this incident on video. Simmons’s account of the event exaggerated both the duration of time before correctional officers entered the day room and the force used against him. While he claimed to be thrown to the ground by officers, the video showed Simmons already to be on his knees and getting on the ground when officers placed him in handcuffs. Simmons testified that he had lied to investigators about the incident. (Tr. 573-74). Simmons lied to correctional officers about his gang affiliation in order to manipulate his housing assignment at the Jail. Simmons is a Gangster Disciple. (Tr. 561).
3. Quinton Brown Quinton Brown testified that he requested a transfer away from detainees who had threatened him and that the request was denied. (Tr. 594-99). Brown did not receive a response to his request. (Tr. 595). A month later, Brown testified that two detainees attacked him while officers looked on and took no action to protect him. (Tr. 595-96). He requested to be moved again while he was at Cermak being treated. (Tr. 597). The next day Brown returned from Cermak and again was attacked by the same detainees. (Tr. 597-98). Brown did not press charges against the detainees who attacked him and declined the Jail’s offer to be transferred to protective custody. (Tr. 601). Although Brown testified that these incidents occurred, he never filed a grievance with the Defendants to apprise them of the alleged beatings.
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Brown also testified that he had never been a victim of violence at the hands of officers at the Jail, though he has been housed at the Jail on five separate occasions. (Tr. 616). He testified that he has filed one grievance at the Jail – a complaint having to do with his laundry. (Id.).
4. Curtis Curry Curry testified that he has been in and out of the Jail for the past thirty years. During those thirty years, he testified that he was the victim of violence in the Jail one time. In that incident, a correctional officer slapped Curry’s face which resulted in a perforated eardrum. (Tr. 636). Curry filed a grievance after the incident. (Tr. 637). Curry testified that he received a response to his grievance about a week after the incident and was interviewed around six months later. (Tr. 638-39). OPR investigated within five days of receiving Curry’s grievance. (Tr. 68889). Curry and the officer who allegedly hit him have not been alone together since the date of the incident. (Tr. 690). The investigation remains open. Curry testified that he intended to file a civil lawsuit regarding that incident of violence and he hoped to purchase an Escalade with the proceeds. (Tr. 706).
C. Detainee Declarations Plaintiffs have presented a number of unsworn and unauthenticated letters describing the conditions at the jail and their experiences there. (Pl. Ex. 124). This Court may grant a preliminary injunction based on less formal procedures and less extensive evidence than a trial on the merits, see Goodman v. Ill. Dept. Of Financial and Professional Regulation, 430 F.3d 432, 439 (7th Cir. 2005) (the court may rely on hearsay affidavits), yet the Court finds little reason to afford any significant weight to these unsworn and unauthenticated statements for a number of reasons. See, e.g., Ill. League of Advocates for Developmentally, Disabled, et al. v. Quinn, No. 13 C 1300, 2013 WL 6355552, at *4 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 5 2013) (admitting, but providing
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less weight to unsworn letters than to stipulated facts and sworn testimony at preliminary injunction hearing); D.U. v. Rhodes, 2015 WL 224932, at *4 (E.D. Wis. 2015) (unsworn statements and unauthenticated documents insufficient to grant preliminary injunction). First, the majority, if not all, the statements in this case were compiled en masse by MacArthur Center staff and volunteers visiting the jail to interview inmates and were neither sworn to, nor made under penalty of perjury. See, e.g., London v. Guzman, 26 F. Supp, 3d 746, 753 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (distinguishing between unsworn declaration dated and signed “under penalty of perjury” and unsigned affidavit not made under penalty of perjury); 28 U.S.C. § 1746 (same). There is no explanation in the record for why Plaintiffs’ counsel would go through the trouble of obtaining the statements without the added step of having them sworn as being the truth. There are numerous reasons why a pretrial detainee might not swear to a statement including, but not limited to, his potential risk of being prosecuted for perjury if a statement is deemed to be a false statement presented to the Court. The benefit of a sworn statement is that the Court recognizes that the affiant is putting himself at risk in stating the facts that are contained within the statement. This Court will not guess at the Plaintiffs’ reasoning for gathering this type of statement where they could have acquired sworn or authenticated statements made under penalty of perjury.
This Court and the magistrate judge who worked diligently for months on the discovery management of this matter afforded Plaintiffs ample opportunity to obtain statements with greater indicia of reliability and they failed to do so. Plaintiffs’ counsel repeatedly sought to have the preliminary injunction hearing held and repeatedly objected to any delay in presenting their evidence. Defendants, on the other hand, sought discovery extensions to respond to Plaintiffs’ allegations. Not once did Plaintiffs’ counsel seek a delay to obtain the statements under oath
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recognizing what little weight a biased and unsworn statement can have in a trial of facts. Even during the hearing, the Court offered the Plaintiffs an opportunity to obtain a portion of the affidavits under oath and it was not until after the close of evidence that they sought to take the Court up on its offer to strengthen their evidence. That request was too late. Because these statements lack any indicia of reliability, this Court grants them very little weight in its analysis. See, e.g., Eyler v. Babcox, 582 F. Supp. 981, 986 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (unsworn representations cast considerable doubt upon plaintiff's probability of success).
D. Cook County Employee Testimony 1. Matthew Burke
Matthew Burke is the Chief of Staff to the Jail’s Executive Director, a position he has held since May 2014. (Tr. 1139). Prior to that he was an attorney at the Sheriff’s Office. (Tr. 1169). Burke testified that he was not personally involved in the use of force review process and he does not independently review the work of those who are.
Burke testified to the process that led to the creation and implementation of the Jail’s use of force policy. Court appointed Monitor Susan McCampbell from the United States v. Cook County case provided input on the policy. (Tr. 752; Tr. 1074). The Department of Justice reviewed the policy and did not object to its implementation. (Id.). The policy was implemented in the spring of 2011 and none of the parties who provided input on the policy have sought its modification since then. (Tr. 1078). The policy’s implementation involved training for supervisors, administrators, and correctional officers. The Sheriff’s Office paid substantial overtime to its employees to ensure that they were all trained quickly. Burke testified that Monitor McCampbell receives weekly reports on the use of force within the jail. She has not had
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any criticisms of Divisions IX or X since monitoring began and has documented those reports in her Monitor reports to the Court.
2. Nancy Donahoe Nancy Donahoe is General Counsel of the Cook County Sheriff’s Office. (Tr. 1380). Danahoe was involved with drafting the use of force policy and worked on a team that addressed, among other things, the backlog of Office of Professional Review (“OPR”) investigations. (Tr. 1207). The OPR procedure is described in greater detail below. Donahoe provided Defendants’ perspective with respect to the use of force incidents and investigations about which Dr. Schwartz and the detainees testified. In general, Donahoe testified that while she was aware of rank and file officers who violated the Jail’s use of force review policy and who were not disciplined for doing so (Tr. 1394), Defendants’ response in the vast majority of incidents was satisfactory. Donahoe’s testimony is best described in conjunction with her review of various incidents involving the use of force, which are detailed below when relevant to the Court’s findings of fact.
3. Frank Arce Frank Arce is the Superintendent of Division IX. (7:24-8:1).9 He also worked in Division X in around 2002. (9:18). Arce was not aware of the internal procedures or purpose of the Use of Force Review Unit. (12:24-14:5). Arce testified that fights occasionally occurred at the Jail and that he was essentially powerless to prevent detainees from fighting, though he could stop fights when they began. (123:8-13). Arce could not testify that kneeing an inmate in the face constituted a per se policy violation because the totality of the circumstances of an incident dictate the proper amount of force to use. (213:12-214:3). Arce testified that there was nothing
9 Citations are to Arce’s deposition which is Dkt. No. 227-51.
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inherently suspicious about multiple correctional officers who submit identical reports on the
same incident (145: 22-146:2), though he would be concerned if two officers sat together and
wrote a single report on an incident (148:5-10). Arce testified that the incident involving detainee
Robinson and a knee to the face was a close enough call that it justified referring the case to
OPR. (218:20-24). In general, Arce testified that his job as superintendent was to refer cases to
OPR when they were “questionable.” (221:1-16).
II. Findings of Fact
A. Findings of Fact Related to OPR Referral Policy
There is a “complex regime” in place at the Jail to report and investigate uses of force.
(Dkt. No. 317 p. 8). Plaintiffs summarize the regime well:
Policy requires that an incident be referred to OPR when (1) ‘there are documented or known injuries to a subject including but not limited to extensive or serious injuries; injuries involving fractures or head trauma; injuries of a suspicious nature (including black eyes, injuries to the mouth, injuries to the genitals, etc.)’ and (2) ‘when an inmate’s injuries, as a result of a response to a resistance/use of force incident, cannot be treated within Cermak Health Services and requires transfer to an outside hospital.’ (Tr. 1414). As set forth in the Cook County Agreed Order, each investigation referred to OPR must be timely, thorough, and include all supporting evidence.
Before an incident reaches OPR, policy establishes a review process that must occur each time an officer uses force. The immediate supervisor or the involved officer provides the first level of review. (Tr. 1223-23). According to Ms. Donahoe’s testimony, the immediate supervisor is required to respond to the scene of the incident, ensure medical treatment for the detainee, review the paperwork submitted by the involved officer, and conduct interviews of the detainee and detainee witnesses. (Id.). The watch commander (generally a lieutenant, and mandated by jail policy to be an officer senior to the immediate supervisor) provides the second tier of review, and is required to make preliminary findings as to whether the officer’s actions comply with the use of force policy and refer any potential excessive force cases to OPR. (Tr. 1383-84). The exempt member (either the superintendent or the commander of the division) reviews the
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watch commander’s finding (Tr. 1242) and is also tasked with referring any excessive force cases to OPR. (Tr. 1383-84). The final level of review is provided by the department head (the executive director of the Cook County Department of Corrections or her designee), who reviews the preliminary findings of the immediate supervisor, watch commander, and exempt member. (Tr. 1243).
(Dkt. No. 317 p. 8-9) (citations to exhibits omitted). Plaintiffs argue, however, that these policies are widely disregarded in the jail. In support of that contention, Plaintiffs presented evidence of numerous use of force incidents and the investigations that followed.
B. Findings of Fact Related to Use of Force Incidents and Investigations Plaintiffs highlight twelve incidents in their post-hearing briefing as relevant to the Court’s determination. (See Dkt. No. 317). 1) Plaintiffs presented evidence that Officer Jeffrey Ferrell kneed detainee Kevin Robinson in the head while he was handcuffed, restrained, and bent at the waist. (Tr. 1283). The incident was recorded on video. A grievance was filed by the inmate and an OPR investigation followed. After OPR concluded its investigation, it recommended Officer Ferrell for termination. (Tr. 1283). The investigation was delayed because other officers who witnessed the assault issued false reports and lied to OPR during the investigation. (Tr. 1390). Though officers failed to refer the case to OPR in conformity with policy, discipline of those officers was recommended after Robinson himself filed a complaint register and triggered an OPR investigation. (Tr. 1396). Donahoe testified that those responsible for reporting the incident to OPR, including the watch commander, had violated protocol in this incident. (Tr. 1392). At the close of the investigation, these officers were all recommended for discipline. (Id.). After the internal investigation was completed and the officers were disciplined, the Sheriff’s Office referred the case to the State’s
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Attorney for possible criminal prosecution against the officer who committed the underlying violation. Robinson did not testify at the hearing.
2) Plaintiffs presented evidence that detainee Brian Garcia suffered injury at the hands of a correctional officer when he was punched and dragged from a telephone in a dayroom in May 2014. The watch commander on duty at the time of the incident did not refer the case to OPR immediately, though the exempt member did. (Tr. 237-38). Garcia was given 40 days in solitary confinement after the incident based on accusations from the correctional officer involved. Multiple levels of supervisor failed to refer the incident to OPR initially, despite Garcia’s visible injuries. (Def. Ex. 388; Tr. 237-38). The investigation remained pending as of the close of discovery in 2014 and the officer was removed from detainee contact until the resolution of the investigation. Defendants represent that the incident remains open because it has been referred to the U.S. Attorney’s Office and State’s Attorney’s office for possible criminal prosecution of the correctional officer. (Tr. 1579). Garcia did not testify at the hearing.
3) Plaintiffs presented evidence of injuries that Epigmenio Garcia suffered during an altercation with a correctional officer. Garcia suffered contusions on his back and shoulders, bruising on his forehead and right knee, and loss of consciousness. (Tr. 1306). Garcia was treated at Mt. Sinai Hospital for his injuries. (Tr. 1480). His case did not initially reach OPR despite the fact that he was treated at an outside hospital and the incident resulted in a lack of consciousness, both of which require referral to OPR under Jail policy. (Tr. 1418-19). Donahoe testified that this case should have been referred to OPR under Jail policy but was not. Nevertheless, Donahoe testified that in her judgment it did not need to be referred to OPR in practice because members of OPR, including Investigator Ellitch, had reached an internal conclusion as to what happened,
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though the procedure did not comply with official policy. No formal investigation was ever conducted. Garcia did not testify at the hearing.
4) Detainee John Gentry suffered blunt trauma to his face during an altercation in 2012. (Tr. 1424). The supervisory review channel did not initiate an OPR investigation until Gentry himself submitted a complaint register and OPR’s investigation began two years after the incident. (Tr. 1426). The incident was one of the many cases involved in the backlog of cases that existed after the implementation of the Federal Agreed Order. (Tr. 1422). The investigation did not include an interview with Officer Norise, the correctional officer accused of assaulting Gentry. OPR concluded that Gentry had initially pushed Norise and that Norise struck Gentry with a closed fist in order to gain compliance. (Tr. 1435). Norise provided a statement in the form of an incident report and a use of force report at the time of the incident. (Tr. 1430-31). Donahoe testified that OPR was able to assess the threat facing Norise by using those statements, though he should have been interviewed according to official policy. (Tr. 1431). No witnesses observed the altercation, though officers and three detainees were interviewed. (Tr. 1436). OPR investigated the matter and concluded that the allegations of excessive force were not sustained. In spite of the internal investigation. Officers on the OPR review chain who did not refer the incident to OPR were not disciplined.
5) Plaintiffs argue that detainee Yuron Robinson was subjected to a use of force by four to six officers in October 2012. The Court viewed footage of the incident in which officers entered a dayroom to put a stop to an ongoing fight. No officers completed a use of force report following the incident. (Tr. 1407). Robinson eventually filed a complaint register, which prompted an OPR investigation. (Tr. 1401). Detainee witnesses testified during OPR’s investigation that they had seen correctional officers punch Robinson. (Tr. 1408). The OPR
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investigation did not find any indication of any force used against detainee Robinson. (Tr. 1403). The Court has no basis to find that OPR’s assessment was incorrect. Robinson did not testify at the hearing.
6) Luis Serrano suffered a broken arm during a cell extraction, but no Jail employee referred the incident to OPR. (Tr. 1450). Serrano required treatment at Mt. Sinai Hospital, meaning that his case was required to be referred to OPR. (Tr. 1446). OPR investigated the case only when Serrano filed an excessive force lawsuit. (Tr. 1448). OPR did not find evidence of unreasonable force during the cell extraction. (Tr. 1449-50). Video of the incident exists, but the location of correctional officers in the frame obscures the view of the actual extraction. Serrano’s civil case (13 C 5519) was settled before another judge in this District. The Court has no basis to disagree with OPR’s assessment. Serrano did not testify at the hearing.
7) Everette Robinson filed a grievance alleging that Officer Appleberry placed him in a headlock, punched, and kicked him. (Pl. Ex. 65). OPR interviewed Appleberry, but not until over a year after receiving the grievance. Appleberry denied using force and no video existed because the lieutenant on the tier had ordered cameras turned off due to nude detainees in the frame. (Tr. 1454). The lieutenant was not disciplined, but failing to video tape the incident was in violation of Jail policy. Appleberry was eventually found to have failed to report a use of force. Pl. Ex. 65. There is insufficient evidence in the record for the Court to make any finding with respect to this incident. Robinson did not testify at the hearing.
8) Omar Gunn filed a grievance alleging that correctional officers stood by while inmates fought and allowed him to suffer a stab wound in April 2014. (Tr. 1370-71). The grievance claimed that an officer stated that he was going to give the detainees five minutes to settle their differences before he intervened. (Tr. 285). The grievance did not state how many
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officers were in the protective bubble or how many inmates were fighting. Donahoe stated that it would not have been appropriate in this case for officers to use verbal control or other nonphysical interventions while waiting for more officers to arrive. OPR did not investigate the incident. There is insufficient evidence in the record for the Court to make any factual findings related to the underlying allegations. Gunn did not testify at the hearing.
9) Isaac Martinez was stabbed in the back by another detainee. (Pl. Ex. 89). Martinez had previously requested to be moved from the unit but the correctional officer denied the request. OPR is investigating the incident. (Tr. 1354). Martinez did not testify at the hearing.
10) James Ford was struck by correctional officers on two separate occasions. (Tr. 424; 436-42). At the time of hearing, OPR was still investigating the incident as a potential wrongful use of force. (Dkt. No. 317 p. 11). Regardless of the veracity of Ford’s allegations, this Court finds on the record before it that Ford was allowed full access to the grievance procedure and was not denied investigation of his claims. The Court finds no evidence that the Jail failed to discipline the subject officers for a violation of Ford’s rights.
11) Following a gang fight, Markus Simmons was escorted onto an elevator by a number of correctional officers, but the officer holding the camera did not enter the elevator. Video from immediately after the alleged elevator ride showed no signs of physical harm. The Court does not find Simmons credible because of the disparities between his reports to officers immediately following the incident and his testimony in court. Simmons exaggerated both the duration and the severity of the force used against him as evidence by the video of his condition immediately prior to and following the alleged attack. Simmons did not file a grievance following the alleged elevator ride. (Tr. 546). Simmons had never filed a grievance related violence during his time at the Jail. (Tr. 559).
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12) Quinton Brown was attacked twice in March 2014 by other detainees. (Tr. 59499). Brown received adequate medical treatment for his injuries at Cermak. (Tr. 597). Brown requested to be moved away from his attackers. The Jail offered to move Brown to protective custody, but he declined the offer. (Tr. 601). Brown did not file a grievance or press charges against his attackers. (Tr. 598-99).
III. Legal Standard A party seeking a preliminary injunction “must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits,” Adkins v. Nestle Purina PetCare Co., 779 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)), that he or she “has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable harm if a preliminary injunction is denied.” Stuller, Inc. v. Steak N Shake Enters., Inc., 695 F.3d 676, 678 (7th Cir. 2012). If the party seeking the injunction is able to establish the presence of these “threshold requirements, the district court must consider the irreparable harm that the nonmoving party will suffer if preliminary relief is granted, balancing such harm against the irreparable harm the moving party will suffer if relief is denied.” Id. (quoting Ty, Inc. v. Jones Grp., Inc., 237 F.3d 891, 895 (7th Cir. 2001)). The Court must also consider the public interest, “assessing whether the balance of harms favors the moving party or whether the harm to the nonmoving party or the public is sufficiently weighty that the injunction should be denied.” Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 694 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). The balance process “involves engaging in . . . [a] sliding scale approach; the more likely the plaintiff will succeed on the merits, the less the balance of irreparable harms needs to favor the plaintiff’s position.” Ty, Inc.., 237 F.3d at 895. “The sliding scale approach is not mathematical in nature, rather ‘it is more properly characterized as subjective and intuitive, one which permits district courts to weigh the competing considerations and mold appropriate
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relief.’ ” Id. at 895–96 (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 12 (7th Cir.1992)).
The Prison Litigation Reform Act circumscribes the Court’s authority to enter an injunction in the corrections context. See Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 2012). Any remedial relief granted must be “narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). An “injunction requiring an affirmative act by the defendant” such as the one Plaintiffs here seeks, must be “cautiously viewed and sparingly issued.” Graham v. Med. Mut. of Ohio, 130 F.3d 293, 295 (7th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).
IV. Discussion A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
A municipal defendant cannot be held liable under § 1983 solely because it employs a tortfeasor, or even a criminal. Bd. of Cnty. Com’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). Plaintiffs must demonstrate the existence of a substantial risk of serious harm of which the municipality itself aware and to which it was deliberately indifferent. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994); see also Canton v. Harris. 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) (to support municipal liability, municipal actions must be taken with deliberate indifference to known or obvious consequences). “If the same problem has arisen many times and the municipality has acquiesced in the outcome, it is possible (though not necessary) to infer that there is a policy at work[.]” Calhoun v. Ramsey, 408 F.3d 375, 380 (7th Cir. 2005). “[T]he word ‘policy’ generally implies a course of action consciously chosen from among various alternatives.” Calhoun, 408 F.3d at 380 (quoting City of Okla. v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823
39

(1985)) (alteration in original). Evidence of harm is not evidence of deliberate indifference. Dale v. Poston, 548 F.3d 563, 569-70 (7th Cir. 2008). “The deliberate indifference test therefore has both objective and subjective prongs, the former requiring a grave risk and the latter requiring actual knowledge of that risk. A response can be reasonable even if it fails to aver the harm.” Dale, 584 F.3d at 570; see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836.
A plaintiff must also demonstrate that the municipality, through deliberate conduct, was the cause of the alleged injury. In deciding whether to impose municipal liability, the Court must decide “whether there is a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Snyder v. King, 745 F.3d 242, 247 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 385). “A governmental body’s policies must be the moving force behind the constitutional violation before [the Court] can impose liability under Monell.” Thomas v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293, 306 (7th Cir. 2009) (emphasis in original). The Court must proceed with caution when considering municipal liability under § 1983. “[R]igorous standards of culpability and causation must be applied to ensure that the municipality is not held liable solely for the actions of its employees.” Id. (quoting Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405 (1997)).
There are therefore two elements for which Plaintiffs must establish a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits. First, plaintiffs must show that there is a substantial risk of serious harm at the Jail. Second, they must show that the municipality itself, that is Sheriff Dart, has been deliberately indifferent to that risk. In support of the first, Plaintiffs have introduced episodic evidence of uses of force at the Jail. For purposes of the preliminary injunction, the Court assumes for the sake of argument that these episodes have established that a substantial
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risk of harm exists.10 The record, however, is devoid of any evidence of a custom of deliberate
indifference on the part of the municipal defendants.
Plaintiffs’ have failed to demonstrate any likelihood of success on the merits because the
record does not contain evidence that shows that Defendants have been deliberately indifferent to
the risk of harm at the jail, let alone that that indifference was the “moving force” behind the
proliferation of a culture of violence at the Jail. Instead, the testimony and evidence produced at
the hearing show that the Defendants in the vast majority of cases that Plaintiff selected as
demonstrating the worst practices committed by Defendants were reviewed by the internal
procedures established to review violence either at the behest of either inmates or staff and those
that were determined to have merit resulted in discipline in some form. Both experts testified
that even the best run jails have incidents of violence. The issue for the Court is not whether
Defendants have eradicated that violence entirely but whether they respond to it reasonably. It is
10 By no means, however, does the Court mean to imply that the Plaintiffs have necessarily met their burden of establishing the existence of a substantial risk of serious harm; it is simply not necessary for the Court to reach that issue in order to deny the injunction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(c); see also Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765, 787 (7th Cir. 2011) (findings made at preliminary injunction stage do not bind the district court as the case progresses). The episodic evidence of harm that Plaintiffs presented is fraught with serious deficiencies and suggests a misunderstanding of the realities of jail operations and the constitutional standards that apply to this case. Pl. Ex. 111, for example, is a video that shows a fight between detainees that is taking place in a sealed dayroom. Officers look on from inside the protective “bubble” before eventually entering the room, yelling “get on the ground” and subduing the scene. Plaintiffs characterize the video as an example of correctional officers allowing detainees to fight without intervening. They present no evidence, however, of how many officers were immediately available to subdue the fight, the ratio of officers to detainees that represents a safe operation, or how many detainees were in the cellblock. The Court can see no fewer than twenty-five in the video. Plaintiffs argue that this is an example of correctional officers failing to deescalate the situation. Prison guards are “not required to take the unreasonable risk of attempting to break up a fight between . . . inmates when the circumstances make it clear that such action would put [them] in significant jeopardy.” Guzman, 495 F.3d at 858; Peate v. McCann, 294 F.3d 879, 883 (7th Cir.2002).
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unrealistic to expect that no incidents will occur but it is expected that when they do occur they will be handled in a constitutional manner. The evidence presented at hearing demonstrated that Defendants have worked diligently – and with marked success in many areas – at combatting the danger that exists at the Jail.
Plaintiffs argue that Defendants have “failed – and continue to fail – to take reasonable actions to protect the men in their custody” even though they are aware of the threat of violence at the Jail. (Dkt. No. 317 p. 5). Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants’ “failure to hold accountable officers who engage in excessive force and/or fail to protect detainees from violence” is the clearest evidence of that failure. (Id.). The evidence, however, is inconsistent with the notion that officers are not held accountable. There is a significant disconnect between Plaintiffs’ arguments and the facts that were presented in court. Specifically, Plaintiffs introduced testimony and documentary evidence of nine use of force incidents at the Jail and four instances of guards allegedly failing to protect detainees. Four of those incidents, involving Markus Simmons, Epigmenio Garcia, Omar Gunn, and Quinton Brown were not investigated by OPR. In none of those cases did Jail staff members refer the cases. Neither Simmons nor Brown filed a grievance for the violence conduct. Three incidents, involving Kevin Robinson, Brian Garcia, and Everette Robinson resulted in staff discipline after the case was referred to OPR. Allegations in three incidents, involving John Gentry, Yuron Robinson, and Luis Serrano, were found to be unfounded after OPR investigated. Three investigations, involving Ford, Curry, and Martinez remain open. Even if the Court were to assume that Defendants intentionally ignored the four incidents that OPR did not investigate, it still would not constitute a pattern of deliberate indifference sufficient to warrant the entry of a preliminary injunction. See Robles v. City of Fort Wayne, 113 F.3d 732, 737 (7th Cir. 1997) (evidence that one in five complaints was sustained
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foreclosed argument that city had a custom of investigating complaints so as to exonerate police officers).
Plaintiffs have simply failed to supply evidence to support their claims that the Defendants have engaged in a pattern and custom of failing to investigate cases of excessive force or have investigated them in such a way that officers are intentionally exonerated. On the contrary, Defendants provided evidence that shows they have worked diligently to eliminate violence in the jail and have opened the facility to frequent, regular review from four monitors who report the conditions and the incidents of potential violence directly to the Court. Counsel for the Plaintiffs agreed that he had “no doubt that Mr. Burke and Ms. Donahoe have worked conscientiously and have made improvements in policy, use of force review policy, and OPR policy.” (Tr. 1563). Conscientious work is not deliberate indifference.
Plaintiffs introduced through testimony and documentary evidence and cited in their posthearing briefs thirteen incidents at the Jail and argued that each one evinced the Defendants’ failure to react reasonably. Of those incidents, OPR had completed investigations in six of them. Three of those investigations sustained charges against the officers. Officers were then disciplined and, in two cases, the incidents were referred to the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office for criminal prosecution. (E.g Tr 1361). Half of the completed OPR investigations resulted in discipline. The subsequent discipline in itself “belies the existence” of a practice of failing to discipline officers or investigating in such a way that officers were intentionally exonerated. See Robles, 113 F.3d at 737 (7th Cir. 1997). The evidence, instead, demonstrates that Defendants were anything but deliberately indifferent to these incidents.
That OPR had not completed investigations in the other three incidents at the time discovery was exchanged likewise does not evince deliberate indifference on the part of the
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Defendants. The fact that the OPR investigations did not conclude in the manner that Plaintiffs believe that they should have does not mean that the Defendants are deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm. The OPR system was completely overhauled in 2010 as part of the Federal Agreed Order, after the monitor identified a significant backlog of investigations. (Tr. 1267). Through the monitor’s, Defendants have worked diligently to reduce that backlog. Some of the cases have taken longer to investigate than contemplated in Jail guidelines because of the sheer volume of cases for which OPR was responsible. (Tr. 1270-71). Most importantly, at the time of the hearing in autumn of 2014, OPR was reviewing only 2014 incidents, the entire previous backlog having been cleared through the efforts of Defendants in the Federal Agreed Order.
Some cases have been referred for prosecution and even Plaintiffs’ own expert conceded, referring cases to prosecutors adds significantly to the investigatory timeline. Regardless, the facts do not support that there are case delays due to indifference. A new procedure was put into place to ensure that cases move more quickly through the review process and it has taken time to work through the backlog of those cases. While again potentially not the ideal outcome, delayed investigations do not constitute a constitutional violation when the delay was reasonable. Cf. Guzman v. Sheahan, 495 F.3d 852, 857 (7th Cir. 2007) (“The mere failure of the prison official to choose the best course of action does not amount to a constitutional violation.”) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Even to the extent that Jail officials mishandled investigations – and they did in some cases by Ms. Donahoe’s own testimony – a finding of deliberate indifference “requires more than a showing of negligent or even grossly negligent behavior.” Id. Importantly, none of the evidence of mishandled investigations showed any knowledge or
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mistake on behalf of any named defendant or even an employee with the discretion to create policy at the Jail.
The affirmative steps that Defendants have taken since the entry of the Federal Agreed Order cannot in any sense be characterized as deliberate indifference. Since the monitoring began under the Federal Agreed Order, Monitor McCampbell has visited the Jail and provided periodic reports on the Jail’s compliance with the portions of the Federal Agreed Order related to protection from harm. As of her most recent report in November 2014, the Jail was in compliance with all 77 paragraphs of the Federal Agreed Order related to protection from harm. McCampbell provided a chart documenting the Jail’s progress since 2010:

Report #
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Sustained Compliance
21 35 50 68

Substantial Compliance
3 1 22 39 53 39 31 17 9

Partial Compliance
62 63 55 34 20 17 11 10 0

Non= Compliance
12 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Not Applicable
8 8 4 4 4 0 0 0 0

Total
77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77

(10 C 2946 Dkt. No. 262 p. 4). Specific to the use of force review process at the Jail, McCampbell stated that “CCDOC has the most robust investigative process regarding uses of force than most likely any large or small jail in the United States, in my opinion and experience. Jails are coming to CCDOC to learn how to investigate and analyze uses of force, and develop strategies to minimize use of force.” (Id.). Specifically, McCambpell noted that she had confidence in the Jails, employee discipline system, incident reporting system, inmate grievance process, referral process, early warning system, and data analysis. (Id. p. 7). In short, Defendants
45

were able to satisfy an independent monitor, the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, and a federal judge, all of whom has devoted countless hours ensuring compliance at the Jail. “That is not deliberate indifference; it is almost the opposite. What more should they have done?” Dale v. Poston, 548 F.3d 563, 571 (7th Cir. 2008).
These accolades belie Plaintiffs argument that Defendants have “fail[ed] to take reasonable steps to protect detainees.” (Dkt. No. 317 p. 6). The Jail is not a pleasant place to live, but “[t]he Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted). As the Court is well aware, Defendants must work hard to ensure that the various categories within the Federal Agreed Order are addressed, but “[t]he mere failure of the prison official to choose the best course of action does not amount to a constitutional violation.” Guzman v. Sheahan, 495 F.3d 852, 857 (7th Cir. 2007). Defendants need not do more to comply with the Constitution.
B. Lack of Adequate Remedy at Law Plaintiffs have not shown the inadequacy of legal remedies available to them. The Federal Agreed Order, which overhauled the policies and practices of Cook County Jail in response to a Department of Justice investigation, represents effective relief for the established constitutional violation. See Newman v. Alabama, 683 F.2d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 1982) (plaintiffs in prison overcrowding litigation had adequate legal remedy in existing consent decree). This is not a case where the Federal Agreed Order has grown stale and requires modification to renew its adequacy. On the contrary, the Federal Agreed Order addresses the precise subject matter raised in this lawsuit and which was entered and determined to be
46

adequate by this Court and has been given the full weight and resources of this Court over recent years and months to ensure its enforcement and the Jail’s compliance.
C. Irreparable Harm Plaintiffs are required to show that they would suffer irreparable harm during the pending lawsuit absent the preliminary injunction. See Girl Scouts of Manitou Council, Inc. v. Girl Scouts of USA, Inc., 549 F.3d 1079, 1086 (7th Cir. 2008). Though there is some analytical overlap, this element is distinct from the inquiry into whether Plaintiffs have demonstrated that they are likely to succeed on the merits. See Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765, 787-88 (7th Cir. 2011). Here, the inquiry is whether the Court has “the ability to correct [the purported harm] if it is created.” Id. A generalized risk of harm from all inmates and guards without more specific evidentiary support is too speculative to warrant relief. See Biard v. Hodge, No. 14-1088 slip op. at 3 (7th Cir. March 27, 2015) (citing U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d at 788 (7th Cir. 2011)). The imprecise nature of the relief requested muddies the analysis of this prong substantially. Here, Plaintiffs do not seek a specific order remedying some deficient practice at the Jail. Instead, Plaintiffs essentially seek a seat at the bargaining table to craft a new consent decree or rework the existing Federal Agreed Order. (Am. Compl. p. 55; Tr. 1564). Because it is not clear what the negotiated relief would look like, the Court has no basis to find that a clear showing has been made that there will be immediate, irreparable harm if such negotiation is not ordered. Plaintiffs have not pointed to specific remedies that they feel will protect them from harm. To the contrary, Plaintiffs cite non-compliance with existing injunctive relief and official policy as the source of their purported constitutional injuries. (Tr. 1564). The Court agrees that compliance with the Federal Agreed Order is necessary and works diligently with the monitors in
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the United States v. Cook County case to enforce that compliance, but the Court cannot find on
the record presently before it that irreparable harm will result without another order of Court to
comply with an existing order. The Federal Agreed Order remains in effect and will protect
Plaintiffs against irreparable harm in the immediate future.
D. Balancing of Harms
Because the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have not demonstrated the presence of the
threshold elements required for the entry of a preliminary injunction, the Court need not reach
the balance of the harms. See Ezell, 651 F.3d at 694 (district court weighs balance of harms “[i]f
the moving party meets . . . threshold requirements”). Even so, the Court finds that the balance of
harms would not warrant the entry of a preliminary injunction even if the threshold requirements
were met.
The public and Defendants have a strong interest in the continued monitoring of the Jail
by the four expert monitors in place in United States v. Cook County under the Federal Agreed Order without interference by individual detainees.11 The Federal Agreed Order was the product
of extensive negotiations between the Department of Justice, Cook County officials, and the
parties to the Duran and Harrington litigation. A benefit of the relief, as the plaintiffs in Duran
and Harrington recognized, was that a single set of comprehensive standards would govern
operations at the Jail. The entry of an injunction in this case would undermine that goal. While
11 The Court does not hold that all injunctive relief is foreclosed by the existence of the Federal Agreed Order. Neither CRIPA itself nor the Federal Agreed Order intended to prevent detainees from bringing individual suits when injunctive relief was in place separately. E.g. United States v. Oregon, 839 F.2d 635, 636-37 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Both the language and the history of [CRIPA] show that Congress did not intend by its enactment to restrict in any way the authority of the district courts to adjudicate claims brought by or on behalf of institutionalized persons themselves.”). Instead, the Court balances the public interest with the understanding that the Federal Agreed Order is in place and provides a comprehensive regulatory scheme for Jail operations.
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Plaintiffs contend that it is their desire to coordinate relief between the two cases, the fact is that any injunction here would change the role and duties of the monitors in that case. Plaintiffs presented no evidence or argument of how the two injunctions could be coordinated in such a way as not to impose a severe financial burden on the Jail or practical burden on the monitors under the Federal Agreed Order.
The strong policy against entering injunctions in the prison context represents he strong public and institutional interest in leaving the operation of jails to those who best know the field. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979) (warning courts against becoming “enmeshed in the minutiae of prison operations”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2) (limiting range of injunctions that can be issued in jail cases). Prison conditions are important matters of public policy that prison officials are peculiarly situated to address. Judicial oversight of jails in the form of injunctive relief is “limited by the nature of our mission: that mission is to ensure that those facilities meet the requirements of the Constitution. Beyond what is proper to that end, we lack authority to interfere with the lawful discretion of state officials to manage jail facilities as they see fit.” Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, 928 F.2d 33, 36 (2nd Cir. 1991) (Campbell, J., concurring); accord Williams v. Lane, 851 F.2d 867, 871 (7th Cir. 1988). Courts, therefore, approach the issuance of injunctive orders in the prison setting with caution and Plaintiffs have provided no public policy reason for departing from this usual course of caution. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 846 .
CONCLUSION Because Plaintiffs’ have failed to demonstrate any likelihood of success on the merits that Defendants have been deliberately indifferent to the risk of harm at the jail and the evidence presented at hearing demonstrates that Defendants have worked diligently – and with marked
49

success in many areas – at combatting the danger that exists at the Jail, the motion for preliminary injunction (Dkt. No. 36) is denied. For the reasons stated herein, President Preckwinkle and Cook County’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 81) is denied. The Sheriff’s Office Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 144) is granted in part and denied in part. The Amended Complaint is dismissed as to Lieutenant Lewis, but the remainder of the motion is denied. Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiffs’ submission related to the preliminary injunction hearing (Dkt. No. 231) is denied.

Date: March 31, 2015

________________________________________ Virginia M. Kendall United States District Court Judge Northern District of Illinois

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 Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 383 Filed: 11/16/15 Page 1 of 8 PageID #:12463

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

TYLON HUDSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
OFFICER CAMPBELL, an individual; OFFICER WILSON, an individual; and LIEUTENANT JOHNSON, an individual.
Defendants.

) Case No. 13 CV 8752 ) ) ) Judge Virginia M. Kendall ) ) ) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED ) ) ) ) ) )

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 1. Plaintiff Tylon Hudson (“Plaintiff” or “Mr. Hudson”), by and through his counsel, Jenner & Block LLP, complains against Defendants, Officer Campbell, Lieutenant Johnson, and Officer Wilson, as follows: 2. In September 2012, Mr. Hudson was a pre-trial detainee at Cook County Jail. While in detention, Mr. Hudson suffered violations of his constitutional rights for which he seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 3. While Mr. Hudson was detained at Cook County Jail, he was repeatedly threatened by Officer Campbell, who informed Mr. Hudson that he had commanded members of a gang to seriously harm, and potentially kill, Mr. Hudson. Mr. Hudson was, in fact, attacked by a gang member on or about September 18, 2012 and sustained serious injuries in the attack. Cook County officials knew of the serious harm that these gang members presented and failed to protect Mr. Hudson while he was in custody at Cook County Jail. 4. As a result of those violations to Mr. Hudson’s Fourteenth Amendment right to
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Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 383 Filed: 11/16/15 Page 2 of 8 PageID #:12464

due process, Mr. Hudson brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

5.

This is an action for money damages brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

6.

Accordingly, this Court has original subject matter jurisdiction over Mr.

Hudson’s federal claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

7. Venue is proper in the Northern District of Illinois under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)

because a substantial part of the events giving rise to Mr. Hudson’s claims occurred in this

District.

PARTIES

8. Plaintiff Tylon Hudson is currently housed in Stateville Correctional Center.

He was formerly housed in Division X of the Cook County Jail.

9. Officer Campbell is a Cook County Correctional Officer and is employed by

the Cook County Department of Corrections, which is a Department of the Cook County

Sheriff’s Office and part of Cook County. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Officer

Campbell was acting under color of state law and in the course and scope of his

employment.

10. Lieutenant Johnson is a Cook County Correctional Officer and is employed

by the Cook County Department of Corrections, which is a Department of the Cook County

Sheriff’s Office and part of Cook County. At all times relevant to this Complaint,

Lieutenant Johnson was acting under color of state law and in the course and scope of his

employment.

11. Officer Wilson is a Cook County Correctional Officer and is employed by

the Cook County Department of Corrections, which is a Department of the Cook County

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Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 383 Filed: 11/16/15 Page 3 of 8 PageID #:12465
Sheriff’s Office and part of Cook County. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Officer Wilson was acting under color of state law and in the course and scope of her employment.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS COMMON TO ALL COUNTS 12. Plaintiff Tylon Hudson was repeatedly threatened by Defendant Campbell during his detention at the Cook County Jail because Officer Campbell believes that Mr. Hudson was responsible for the murder of a family member. Officer Campbell informed Mr. Hudson that, at Officer Campbell’s command, members of a well-known street gang would seriously harm—and likely kill—Mr. Hudson. 13. On or around August 3, 2012, Lieutenant Johnson informed Mr. Hudson that credible and immediate threats had been made against his life. As a result, Defendant Johnson arranged for Mr. Hudson to be moved to another tier. 14. Shortly after Mr. Hudson was moved, Lieutenant Johnson and Officer Campbell worked together to ensure that the gang members controlled by Officer Campbell were placed on the same living unit with Mr. Hudson. These gang members continued to threaten Mr. Hudson at the command of Officer Campbell. One of the gang members spit on Mr. Hudson and told him that he was a dead man. 15. After realizing that the men under Officer Campbell’s control had followed him to his new housing unit, Mr. Hudson then requested and eventually received protective custody (“PC”). After he had spent two weeks in PC on Division III South, Sergeant Lewis (who is now a Lieutenant) told Mr. Hudson that he had to leave protective custody. Mr. Hudson has epilepsy and as a result had to be placed in a PC unit that could care for his medical needs. Lewis informed him that people with more serious medical concerns needed his bed in PC, so he would be returned to Division X. Lewis forced Hudson to leave PC, and
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Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 383 Filed: 11/16/15 Page 4 of 8 PageID #:12466
in doing so disregarded the substantial risk of harm Mr. Hudson faced in Division X. 13. Upon arriving back in Division X, on August 16, 2012, other men on Mr.
Hudson’s tier immediately informed him that the gang members under Officer Campbell’s control had obtained law library privileges and intended to kill him in the law library. Mr. Hudson had recently begun representing himself in his criminal case and thus required regular law library access.
14. Upon learning that one of the gang members under Officer Campbell’s control had access to the law library, Mr. Hudson requested that Cook County Jail staff prevent the gang member and Mr. Hudson from being at the library at the same time. The gang member was permitted to visit the law library twice per week, so keeping Mr. Hudson and the gang member separate during their scheduled library time would not have imposed an administrative burden on Cook County Jail staff.
15. On September 4, 2012, Mr. Hudson went to the library. The gang member who had previously spit on him was in the library at the same time. He threatened Mr. Hudson’s life. Mr. Hudson hurriedly gathered his papers and immediately left the library.
16. On September 11, 2012, Mr. Hudson and the gang member were again at the library at the same time. As soon as Mr. Hudson realized that his would-be-attacker was present, he left. He reported this incident and the September 4, 2102 incident to the Cook County Jail staff and filed a grievance requesting that Cook County Jail staff prevent the man who was threatening him from entering the library during his scheduled library time.
17. On or about September 18, 2012, Officer Wilson, the security officer at the law library informed Mr. Hudson that she received a directive stating that the gang member and Mr. Hudson were not to be in the library at the same time. The next day, Mr. Hudson
4

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went to the library. He was engaged in his research when he overheard one of the law librarians call for the gang member to come to the library. Officer Wilson told Mr. Hudson to “be careful” because the gang member was on his way to library. Instead of making any effort to protect Mr. Hudson from the impending assault by preventing the gang member from entering the library or escorting Mr. Hudson back to his tier, Officer Wilson then resumed her post outside the library.
18. The gang member entered the library and assaulted Mr. Hudson. The gang member punched Mr. Hudson with a closed fist and slashed his face with a shank. He beat Mr. Hudson repeatedly until a male security officer ended the fight. By then, Mr. Hudson was covered in blood and suffered lacerations on his face and mouth. He received medical attention for those injuries.
19. Defendants Johnson and Wilson knew of the great risk of serious bodily injury Mr. Hudson faced because of Officer Campbell and the gang members under his control. Yet, they refused to take reasonable efforts to protect Mr. Hudson from this attack.
20. Officer Campbell intentionally, sadistically, and with wanton disregard for Mr. Hudson’s rights ordered gang members to attack him. Such actions have no penological justification and are done for the sole purpose of inflicting pain and retribution.
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINSTRATIVE REMEDIES 21. Mr. Hudson exhausted all available administrative remedies. Mr. Hudson complied with Cook County Jail policy and timely filed grievances for the allegations contained herein.
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Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 383 Filed: 11/16/15 Page 6 of 8 PageID #:12468
COUNT I—EXCESSIVE FORCE AGAINST PLAINTIFF HUDSON (Fourteenth Amendment Claim for damages against Defendant Officer Campbell)
22. Plaintiff Hudson repeats and re-alleges the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth in this Count.
23. Plaintiff Hudson was deprived by the Defendant Campbell of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution to be free from sadistic treatment and excessive force.
24. Defendant Campbell intentionally, sadistically, and with wanton disregard for Plaintiff Hudson’s rights ordered gang members to attack him. Such actions have no penological justification and were done for the sole purpose of inflicting pain and retribution. At a minimum, Defendant Campbell’s actions were objectively unreasonable.
25. As a result of Defendant Campbell’s actions, Plaintiff Hudson’s constitutional rights were violated and he suffered damages.
COUNT II—FAILURE TO PROTECT PLAINTIFF HUDSON (Fourteenth Amendment Claim for damages against Defendants Lieutenant Johnson and
Officer Wilson) 26. Plaintiff Hudson repeats and re-alleges the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth in this Count. 27. Plaintiff Hudson was deprived by the Defendants Johnson and Wilson of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution to reasonably safe living conditions. 28. Defendants Johnson and Wilson knew of the great risk of serious bodily injury Plaintiff Hudson faced because of Officer Campbell and the gang members under his control and were deliberately indifferent to that risk. They refused to take reasonable efforts to protect
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Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 383 Filed: 11/16/15 Page 7 of 8 PageID #:12469 Plaintiff Hudson from attack. Those actions were objectively unreasonable.
29. As a result of Defendant Johnson and Wilson’s actions and inactions, Plaintiff Hudson’s constitutional rights were violated and he suffered damages.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully prays that this Court enter judgment in his favor and against the Defendants in the following manner: 1. Award Plaintiff Hudson compensatory damages; 2. Award Plaintiff Hudson punitive damages; 3. Award Plaintiff Hudson reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1988; and 4. Award Plaintiff Hudson any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
7

Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 383 Filed: 11/16/15 Page 8 of 8 PageID #:12470

Dated: November 16, 2015
David J. Bradford Andrew F. Merrick Leah K. Williams Alan J. Iverson JENNER & BLOCK, LLP 353 North Clark Street Chicago, Illinois 60654-3456 (312) 222-9350
Shelia A. Bedi David Shapiro Roderick MacArthur Justice Center Northwestern University School of Law 357 E. Chicago Avenue Chicago, Illinois 60611 (312) 503-0844

Respectfully submitted, Tylon Hudson
By: __ s/Andrew Merrick____ One of his attorneys

8

 
 Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 430 Filed: 09/23/16 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:12673

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

TYLON HUDSON,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

OFFICER CAMPBELL, an individual; OFFICER )

WILSON, an individual; and LIEUTENANT

)

JOHNSON, an individual.

)

)

Defendants.

)

)

)

Case No. 13 CV 8752 Judge Virginia M. Kendall

STIPULATION TO DISMISS

IT IS HEREBY stipulated and agreed by and between the parties, through their counsel, that pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 41 this cause should be dismissed against the Defendants’ OFFICER CAMPBELL, OFFICER WILSON AND LIEUTENANT JOHNSON pursuant to settlement without prejudice with each party bearing its own attorney’s fees and costs. This order will be deemed with prejudice if a party to this lawsuit does not file a motion to vacate within 60 days following the filing of this Stipulation.

Dated: September 23, 2016

Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/ Andrew F. Merrick
David J. Bradford Andrew F. Merrick Leah K. Casto Alan J. Iverson JENNER & BLOCK, LLP 353 North Clark Street Chicago, Illinois 60654-3456 (312) 222-9350
Sheila A. Bedi David Shapiro Roderick MacArthur Justice Center Northwestern U. School of Law 357 E. Chicago Avenue Chicago, Illinois 60611 (312) 503-0844

By: /s/ Paul O’Grady
Paul O’Grady Dominick L. Lanzito Peterson, Johnson & Murray Chicago LLC 200 W. Adams, Suite 2125 Chicago, Illinois 60606 (312) 724-8035 pogrady@pjmlaw.com

Case: 1:13-cv-08752 Document #: 430 Filed: 09/23/16 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:12674
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Leah K. Casto, an attorney, certify that on September 23, 2016, I caused the Parties’ Stipulation to Dismiss to be served via ECF to all counsel of record.
/s/ Leah K. Casto
Leah K. Casto

 
 Case: 1:13-cv-8752 As of: 11/13/2018 09:54 AM CST 1 of 45
KIM,PROTO,TERMED
United States District Court Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.2.2 (Chicago)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:13−cv−08752

Hudson v. Preckwinkle et al Assigned to: Honorable Virginia M. Kendall Cause: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights
Plaintiff Tylon Hudson

Date Filed: 12/06/2013 Date Terminated: 09/26/2016 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 555 Civil Rights (Prison Condition) Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Alan J. Iverson DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP 50 South Sixth Street Suite 1500 Minneapolis, MN 55402−1498 (612) 492−6731 Email: iverson.alan@dorsey.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alan S. Mills Uptown People's Law Center 4413 North Sheridan Chicago, IL 60646 (773) 769−1411 Email: alan@uplcchicago.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alexa Van Brunt Macarthur Justice Center 375 E. Chicago Avenue Chicago, IL 60611 (312) 503−1336 Email: a−vanbrunt@law.northwestern.edu ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew Francis Merrick Jenner & Block LLP 353 North Clark Street Chicago, IL 60654 (312) 840−7695 Email: amerrick@jenner.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David J. Bradford Jenner & Block LLP 353 North Clark Street Chicago, IL 60654 (312)222−9350 Email: dbradford@jenner.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David M. Shapiro Roderick Macarthur Justice Center/Northwestern University 375 E. Chicago Avenue Chicago, IL 60611 (312) 503−0711 Email: david.shapiro@law.northwestern.edu ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-8752 As of: 11/13/2018 09:54 AM CST 2 of 45

Francis X. Buckley , Jr. Thompson Coburn LLP 55 E. Monroe 37th Floor Chicago, IL 60603 (312) 580−2210 Email: fxbuckleyjr@thompsoncoburn.com TERMINATED: 01/10/2014

Laura A Kleinman Riley Safer Holmes & Cancila, LLP Three First National Plaza 70 W. Madison Street, Suite 2900 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 258−5543 Email: lkleinman@rshc−law.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leah K Casto Jenner & Block LLP 353 N. Clark Street Chicago, IL 60654 (312) 840−7636 Email: lcasto@jenner.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Locke E. Bowman , III MacArthur Justice Center Northwestern University School of Law 357 East Chicago Avenue Chicago, IL 60611 (312) 503−0844 Email: l−bowman@law.northwestern.edu ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nicole C. Berg Jenner & Block Llp 353 N. Clark Street Chicago, IL 60654 (312) 840−7249 Email: nberg@jenner.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sheila A Bedi Roderick Macarthur Justice Center 375 E. Chicago Avenue Chicago, IL 60611 (312) 503−2492 Email: sheila.bedi@law.northwestern.edu ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Steve Weil MacArthur Justice Center 375 East Chicago Avenue Chicago, IL 60611−3069 312 503 1271 Email: steve.weil@law.northwestern.edu

Plaintiff
Laton Stubblefield TERMINATED: 11/16/2015

represented by Andrew Francis Merrick (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David J. Bradford

Case: 1:13-cv-8752 As of: 11/13/2018 09:54 AM CST 3 of 45

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David M. Shapiro (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laura A Kleinman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leah K Casto (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nicole C. Berg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Steve Weil (See above for address)

Plaintiff
Angelo Matthews TERMINATED: 11/16/2015

represented by Andrew Francis Merrick (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David J. Bradford (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David M. Shapiro (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laura A Kleinman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leah K Casto (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nicole C. Berg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Steve Weil (See above for address)

Plaintiff
Jermaine Brooks TERMINATED: 11/16/2015

represented by Andrew Francis Merrick (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David J. Bradford (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laura A Kleinman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leah K Casto

Case: 1:13-cv-8752 As of: 11/13/2018 09:54 AM CST 4 of 45

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nicole C. Berg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Steve Weil (See above for address)

Plaintiff
Anton Carter on behalf themselves and all similarly situated individuals TERMINATED: 11/16/2015

represented by Andrew Francis Merrick (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David J. Bradford (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David M. Shapiro (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laura A Kleinman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leah K Casto (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nicole C. Berg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Steve Weil (See above for address)

V.
Defendant
Toni Preckwinkle TERMINATED: 11/16/2015 doing business as Cook County, Il TERMINATED: 11/16/2015

represented by Donald J. Pechous Chicago, IL (312) 388−1198 Email: donpechous@hotmail.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Justin William Hanson Gould & Ratner LLP 222 North LaSalle Street Suite 800 Chicago, IL 60601 312−236−3003 Email: jwhanson@gouldratner.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa Marie Meador Cook County State's Attorney 500 Richard J. Daley Center Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 603−3369 Email: LMeador@jsotoslaw.com

Case: 1:13-cv-8752 As of: 11/13/2018 09:54 AM CST 5 of 45

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael Jude Sorich Cavanagh Law Group 161 N. Clark Street Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 425−1900 Email: mjs@CavanaghLawGroup.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott A. Golden Cook County State's Attorney's Office Civil Actions Bureau 50 West Washington 500 Richard J. Daley Center Chicago, IL 60602 312 603 1902 Email: scott.golden@cookcountyil.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas Edward Nowinski Cook County State's Attorneys Office (50 W) 50 West Washington Avenue Chicago, IL 60602 312−603−4327 Email: tnowinski@cookcountyassessor.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Tom Dart Sheriff/Warden TERMINATED: 11/16/2015

represented by Daniel P Duffy Peterson, Johnson & Murray, SC 120 North LaSalle Street Suite 2850 Chicago, IL 60602 (312)782−7150 Email: dduffy@pjmlaw.com TERMINATED: 05/12/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY

James Matthias Lydon Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP 151 N. Franklin Street Suite 2500 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 704−3000 Email: jlydon@hinshawlaw.com TERMINATED: 12/03/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY

Robert Thomas Shannon Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP 151 N. Franklin Street Suite 2500 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 704−3901 Email: rshannon@hinshawlaw.com TERMINATED: 12/03/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY

Dominick L Lanzito Peterson Johnson & Murray − Chicago LLC 200 West Adams Street

Case: 1:13-cv-8752 As of: 11/13/2018 09:54 AM CST 6 of 45
Suite 2125 Chicago, IL 60606 312 724−8024 Email: dlanzito@pjmchicago.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gretchen Harris Sperry Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP 151 N. Franklin Street Suite 2500 Chicago, IL 60606 (312)704−3521 Email: gsperry@hinshawlaw.com TERMINATED: 12/03/2015
Lisa Marie Meador (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Jude Sorich (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul A O'Grady Peterson Johnson and Murray Chicago LLC 200 West Adams Street Suite 2125 Chicago, IL 60606 312 782−7150 Email: pogrady@pjmchicago.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Virginia Brette Bensinger Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP 151 N. Franklin Street Suite 2500 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 704−3000 Email: bbensinger@hinshawlaw.com TERMINATED: 12/03/2015
Defendant
K. Sankey TERMINATED: 02/27/2014
Defendant
Mr. Wynerkeyh TERMINATED: 02/27/2014
Defendant
Mr. Nelepa TERMINATED: 02/27/2014
Defendant
Mr. Mundt TERMINATED: 02/27/2014
Defendant
S. Bratlien TERMINATED: 02/27/2014

Case: 1:13-cv-8752 As of: 11/13/2018 09:54 AM CST 7 of 45

Defendant Mr. Clemons TERMINATED: 02/27/2014
Defendant Mr. Johnson TERMINATED: 11/16/2015
Defendant Theresa Olson TERMINATED: 02/27/2014
Defendant Ms. Lewis TERMINATED: 11/16/2015
Defendant Mr. Kolnecki TERMINATED: 02/27/2014
Defendant Ms. Crump TERMINATED: 02/27/2014
Defendant Mr. Appleberry TERMINATED: 02/27/2014
Defendant Mr. Coyler TERMINATED: 02/27/2014
Defendant Cara Smith in her official capacity as Executive Director of the Cook County Department of Corrections TERMINATED: 11/16/2015

represented by Daniel P Duffy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/12/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY
James Matthias Lydon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/03/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY
Robert Thomas Shannon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/03/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY
Dominick L Lanzito (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gretchen Harris Sperry (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/03/2015
Lisa Marie Meador (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-8752 As of: 11/13/2018 09:54 AM CST 8 of 45

Defendant E. Greer Superintendent of Division X, in his official capacity TERMINATED: 11/16/2015
Defendant Thomas Superintendent of Division IX, V., in his official capacity TERMINATED: 11/16/2015

Michael Jude Sorich (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul A O'Grady (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Virginia Brette Bensinger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/03/2015
represented by Daniel P Duffy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/12/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY
James Matthias Lydon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/03/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY
Robert Thomas Shannon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/03/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY
Dominick L Lanzito (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gretchen Harris Sperry (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/03/2015
Lisa Marie Meador (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Jude Sorich (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul A O'Grady (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Virginia Brette Bensinger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/03/2015
represented by Daniel P Duffy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/12/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY
James Matthias Lydon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/03/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 1:13-cv-8752 As of: 11/13/2018 09:54 AM CST 9 of 45

Robert Thomas Shannon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/03/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY

Dominick L Lanzito (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gretchen Harris Sperry (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/03/2015

Lisa Marie Meador (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael Jude Sorich (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Paul A O'Grady (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Virginia Brette Bensinger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/03/2015

Defendant
The County of Cook TERMINATED: 11/16/2015

represented by Donald J. Pechous (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Justin William Hanson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa Marie Meador (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott A. Golden (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas Edward Nowinski (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Officer Campbell in his individual capacity

represented by James Matthias Lydon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/03/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY

Robert Thomas Shannon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/03/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY

Dominick L Lanzito (See above for address)

Case: 1:13-cv-8752 As of: 11/13/2018 09:54 AM CST 10 of 45

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gretchen Harris Sperry (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/03/2015

Paul A O'Grady (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Virginia Brette Bensinger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/03/2015

Defendant
Sargeant Lewis in her individual capacity TERMINATED: 11/16/2015

represented by James Matthias Lydon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/03/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY

Robert Thomas Shannon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/03/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY

Dominick L Lanzito (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gretchen Harris Sperry (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/03/2015

Paul A O'Grady (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Virginia Brette Bensinger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/03/2015

Defendant
Officer Wilson in her individual capacity

represented by James Matthias Lydon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/03/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY

Robert Thomas Shannon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/03/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY

Dominick L Lanzito (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gretchen Harris Sperry (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/03/2015

Paul A O'Grady (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-8752 As of: 11/13/2018 09:54 AM CST 11 of 45

Virginia Brette Bensinger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/03/2015

Defendant
Lieutenant Johnson in her individual capacity

represented by James Matthias Lydon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/03/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY

Robert Thomas Shannon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/03/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY

Dominick L Lanzito (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gretchen Harris Sperry (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/03/2015

Paul A O'Grady (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Virginia Brette Bensinger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/03/2015

V.
Respondent
Susan McCampbell TERMINATED: 11/16/2015

represented by Catherine Macneil Barber Rock Fusco & Connelly, Llc 321 N. Clark St. Suite 2200 Chicago, IL 60654 (312) 494−1000 Email: cbarber@rockfuscoconnelly.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John Joseph Rock Rock Fusco & Connelly, LLC 321 North Clark Street Suite 2200 Chicago, IL 60654 (312) 494−1000 Email: jrock@rfclaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stacy Ann Benjamin Rock Fusco & Connelly, LLC 321 North Clark Street Suite 2200 Chicago, IL 60654 (312) 494−1000 Email: sbenjamin@rfclaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed # Docket Text

Case: 1:13-cv-8752 As of: 11/13/2018 09:54 AM CST 12 of 45

12/06/2013 12/06/2013 12/06/2013 12/06/2013 12/27/2013
12/27/2013 12/30/2013 01/08/2014 01/08/2014 01/10/2014
01/14/2014 01/14/2014 02/27/2014
02/27/2014 02/27/2014 02/27/2014

1 RECEIVED Complaint and one copy by Tylon Hudson; (Exhibits); (Envelope not postmarked). (Poor Quality Original − Document on File.) (mjc, ) (Entered: 12/09/2013)
2 CIVIL Cover Sheet. (mjc, ) (Entered: 12/09/2013)
3 MOTION by Plaintiff Tylon Hudson for leave to proceed in forma pauperis; (Exhibits). (mjc, ) (Entered: 12/09/2013)
4 MOTION by Plaintiff Tylon Hudson for attorney representation. (mjc, ) (Entered: 12/09/2013)
5 ORDER: For the reasons set out in the Memorandum Opinion and Order, the plaintiffs motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis 3 and for appointment of counsel 4 are granted. The Court assigns the following attorney to represent the plaintiff: Francis X. Buckley, Jr., ThompsonCoburn LLP, 55 E. Monroe Street, 37th Floor, Chicago, IL 60603, (312) 580−2210. The Clerk's Office is directed to send a copy of the complaint, docket sheet and a copy of this order to Mr.Buckley. Status hearing is set for 1/10/14 at 9:30 a.m. ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER. Attorney Francis X. Buckley, Jr for Tylon Hudson added. Signed by the Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 12/27/2013. Mailed notice(mjc, ) (Entered: 12/30/2013)
6 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 12/27/2013.(mjc, ) (Entered: 12/30/2013)
MAILED a copy of the complaint, docket sheet and a copy of the order dated 12/27/13 to Attorney Francis X. Bucley, Jr. (mjc, ) (Entered: 12/30/2013)
7 MOTION by Plaintiff Tylon Hudson to substitute attorney (Buckley, Francis) (Entered: 01/08/2014)
8 NOTICE of Motion by Francis X. Buckley, Jr for presentment of motion to substitute attorney 7 before Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 1/10/2014 at 09:30 AM. (Buckley, Francis) (Entered: 01/08/2014)
9 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Milton I. Shadur: Status hearing held on 1/10/2014 and continued to 5/7/2014 at 9:00 a.m. Plaintiff's motion for leave to substitute counsel 7 is granted. David M. Shapiro is granted leave to substitute as counsel for plaintiff and attorney Francis X. Buckley, Jr is granted leave to withdraw as counsel for plaintiff. Plaintiff's new counsel is granted leave to amend the complaint, as discussed in open court, before service on defendants. Mailed notice by judge's staff. (srb,) (Entered: 01/10/2014)
10 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Tylon Hudson by David M. Shapiro (Shapiro, David) (Entered: 01/14/2014)
11 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Tylon Hudson by Locke E. Bowman, III (Bowman, Locke) (Entered: 01/14/2014)
12 First AMENDED complaint by Tylon Hudson against All Defendants and terminating Mr. Clemons, Mr. Coyler, Ms. Crump, Mr. Kolnecki, Mr. Mundt, Mr. Nelepa, Theresa Olson, K. Sankey, Mr. Wynerkeyh, Mr. Appleberry and S. Bratlien (Shapiro, David) (Entered: 02/27/2014)
13 NOTICE of Motion by David M. Shapiro for presentment of before Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 3/3/2014 at 09:15 AM. (Shapiro, David) (Entered: 02/27/2014)
14 MOTION by Plaintiff Tylon Hudson to certify class (Shapiro, David) (Entered: 02/27/2014)
15 Memorandum in Support of Motion To Certify Class by Tylon Hudson (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 (class member declarations), # 2 Exhibit 2 (class member declarations), # 3 Exhibit 3 (class member declarations), # 4 Exhibit 4 (class member declarations), # 5 Exhibit 5 (class member declarations), # 6 Exhibit 6 (class member declarations), # 7 Exhibit 7 (class member declarations), # 8 Exhibit 8 (class member declarations), # 9 Exhibit 9 (class member declarations), # 10 Exhibit 10 (class member declarations), # 11 Exhibit 11 (class member declarations), # 12 Exhibit 12 (class member declarations), # 13 Exhibit 13 (Sheriff's website printout), # 14 Exhibit 14 (civil cases), # 15 Exhibit 15 (civil cases), # 16 Exhibit 16 (civil cases), # 17 Exhibit 17 (civil

Case: 1:13-cv-8752 As of: 11/13/2018 09:54 AM CST 13 of 45

02/27/2014 02/27/2014 02/27/2014 02/27/2014 02/27/2014 02/27/2014 02/27/2014 02/28/2014 02/28/2014 03/02/2014 03/03/2014 03/03/2014 03/03/2014
03/05/2014 03/06/2014 03/07/2014 03/07/2014 03/07/2014 03/07/2014

cases), # 18 Exhibit 18 (civil cases), # 19 Exhibit 19 (Shapiro Declaration), # 20 Exhibit 20 (Schwartz Declaration))(Shapiro, David) (Entered: 02/27/2014)
16 MOTION by Plaintiff Tylon Hudson for leave to file excess pages (memorandum in support of motion to certify class) (Shapiro, David) (Entered: 02/27/2014)
17 NOTICE of Motion by David M. Shapiro for presentment of motion for leave to file excess pages 16 before Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 3/3/2014 at 09:15 AM. (Shapiro, David) (Entered: 02/27/2014)
18 MOTION by Plaintiff Tylon Hudson for protective order (Emergency Motion) (Shapiro, David) (Entered: 02/27/2014)
19 NOTICE of Motion by David M. Shapiro for presentment of motion for protective order 18 before Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 3/3/2014 at 09:15 AM. (Shapiro, David) (Entered: 02/27/2014)
20 FILED on incorrect docket (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Docket Text Modified by Clerk's Office)(mr, ). (Entered: 02/27/2014)
21 Notice of correction 20 (mr, ) (Entered: 02/27/2014)
22 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Tylon Hudson by Alexa Van Brunt (Corrected) (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 02/27/2014)
23 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Tom Dart, E. Greer, Toni Preckwinkle, Cara Smith, Thomas by Michael Jude Sorich (Sorich, Michael) (Entered: 02/28/2014)
24 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Tom Dart, E. Greer, Toni Preckwinkle, Cara Smith, The County of Cook, Thomas by Lisa Marie Meador (Meador, Lisa) (Entered: 02/28/2014)
25 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Tom Dart, E. Greer, Cara Smith, Thomas by Daniel P Duffy as Special State's Attorney (Duffy, Daniel) (Entered: 03/02/2014)
26 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Filing fee $ 50, receipt number 0752−9250634. (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 03/03/2014)
27 NOTICE of Motion by Sheila A Bedi for presentment of motion to appear pro hac vice 26 before Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 3/6/2014 at 09:15 AM. (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 03/03/2014)
28 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Milton I. Shadur: Motion hearing held on 3/3/2014. Plaintiff's motion for class certification and appointment as class counsel 14 is entered and continued generally and plaintiff's emergency motion for a protective order 18 is also entered and continued. Plaintiff's motion for leave to file instanter a supporting memorandum in excess of the prescribed page limitation 16 is granted. Sheila A. Bedi's motion for leave to appear pro hac vice 26 is granted. No appearance necessary on 3/6/2014. Mailed notice by judge's staff. (srb,) (Entered: 03/03/2014)
29 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Tylon Hudson by Sheila A Bedi (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 03/05/2014)
30 Waivers of Service and Addenda (Defendants Dart, Smith, Greer, Thomas) by Tylon Hudson (Shapiro, David) (Entered: 03/06/2014)
31 PAYMENT of Filing fee $ 400, receipt number 0752−9268812. (Shapiro, David) (Entered: 03/07/2014)
32 MOTION by Plaintiff Tylon Hudson for protective order (Renewed Motion) (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Shapiro, David) (Entered: 03/07/2014)
33 NOTICE of Motion by David M. Shapiro for presentment of motion for protective order 32 before Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 3/12/2014 at 09:15 AM. (Shapiro, David) (Entered: 03/07/2014)
34 MOTION by Plaintiff Tylon Hudson to certify class (Motion for Provisional Class Certification) (Shapiro, David) (Entered: 03/07/2014)

Case: 1:13-cv-8752 As of: 11/13/2018 09:54 AM CST 14 of 45

03/07/2014 03/08/2014 03/08/2014 03/08/2014 03/11/2014 03/11/2014
03/12/2014 03/12/2014

35 NOTICE of Motion by David M. Shapiro for presentment of motion to certify class 34 before Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 3/12/2014 at 09:15 AM. (Shapiro, David) (Entered: 03/07/2014)
36 MOTION by Plaintiff Tylon Hudson for preliminary injunction (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 03/08/2014)
37 MEMORANDUM by Tylon Hudson in support of motion for preliminary injunction 36 (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 03/08/2014)
38 NOTICE of Motion by Sheila A Bedi for presentment of motion for preliminary injunction 36 before Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 3/12/2014 at 09:15 AM. (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 03/08/2014)
39 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Tylon Hudson by Alan S. Mills (Mills, Alan) (BLANK FORM) Modified on 3/12/2014 (mjc, ). (Entered: 03/11/2014)
40 NOTICE by Tylon Hudson re MOTION by Plaintiff Tylon Hudson for protective order (Renewed Motion) 32 , MOTION by Plaintiff Tylon Hudson to certify class (Motion for Provisional Class Certification) 34 , MOTION by Plaintiff Tylon Hudson for preliminary injunction 36 (Notice of Filing of Additional Declarations in Support of Pending Motions) (Attachments: # 1 Declaration, # 2 Declaration, # 3 Declaration, # 4 Declaration, # 5 Declaration, # 6 Declaration, # 7 Declaration, # 8 Declaration, # 9 Declaration, # 10 Declaration, # 11 Declaration)(Shapiro, David) (Entered: 03/11/2014)
41 WAIVER OF SERVICE returned executed by Tylon Hudson. Toni Preckwinkle waiver sent on 3/5/2014, answer due 5/5/2014; The County of Cook waiver sent on 3/5/2014, answer due 5/5/2014. (Shapiro, David) (Entered: 03/12/2014)
42 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 03/03/2014 before the Honorable Milton I. Shadur. Court Reporter Contact Information: Rosemary Scarpelli, (312)435−5815, Rosemary_Scarpelli@ilnd.uscourts.gov.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

03/12/2014

Redaction Request due 4/2/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/14/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/10/2014. (Scarpelli, Rosemary) (Entered: 03/12/2014)
43 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 01/10/2014 before the Honorable Milton I. Shadur. Court Reporter Contact Information: Rosemary Scarpelli, (312)435−5815, Rosemary_Scarpelli@ilnd.uscourts.gov.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

03/12/2014 03/14/2014

Redaction Request due 4/2/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/14/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/10/2014. (Scarpelli, Rosemary) (Entered: 03/12/2014)
44 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Milton I. Shadur: Motion hearing held on 3/12/2014. Plaintiffs' oral motion to amend the complaint to add class parties is granted. Status hearing set for 3/14/2014 at 9:30 a.m. All pending motions 14 , 18 , 32 , 34 and 36 are continued. Mailed notice by judge's staff. (srb,) (Entered: 03/12/2014)
45 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Milton I. Shadur: Status hearing held on 3/14/2014. Mailed notice by judge's staff. (srb,) (Entered: 03/14/2014)

Case: 1:13-cv-8752 As of: 11/13/2018 09:54 AM CST 15 of 45

03/14/2014 03/14/2014 03/17/2014 03/18/2014 03/20/2014 03/21/2014 03/21/2014
03/26/2014 03/26/2014

46 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Tom Dart, E. Greer, Cara Smith, Thomas by Paul A O'Grady as Special State's Attorney (O'Grady, Paul) (Entered: 03/14/2014)
47 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Tom Dart, E. Greer, Cara Smith, Thomas by Dominick L Lanzito as Special State's Attorney (Lanzito, Dominick) (Entered: 03/14/2014)
48 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Tylon Hudson by Alan S. Mills (Mills, Alan) (Entered: 03/17/2014)
49 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ORDER: Case reassigned to the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr. pursuant to the provisions of 28 USC 294(b), for all further proceedings. Signed by Executive Committee on 3/18/14. (tlm (Entered: 03/19/2014)
50 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Status hearing set for 3/21/2014 at 11:30 AM. Mailed notice (tbk, ) (Entered: 03/20/2014)
51 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Toni Preckwinkle, The County of Cook by Thomas Edward Nowinski (Nowinski, Thomas) (Entered: 03/21/2014)
52 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Status hearing held on 3/21/2014. Plaintiff having filed a renewed motion for protective order 32 , the original motion for protective order 18 is stricken as moot. Plaintiff's Motions to certify the class 14 and 34 remain entered and continued generally. Plaintiff's Motion for protective order 32 is taken under advisement; response due by 3/28/2014; reply due by 4/2/2014. Defendants Dart, Smith, Greer, Thomas will respond to the operative complaint on or before 4/18/2014. Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction 36 is taken under advisement; response due by 4/18/2014. Further status hearing set for 4/23/2014 at 11:00 a.m. Mailed notice (tbk, ) (Entered: 03/21/2014)
53 NOTICE by Dominick L Lanzito of Change of Address (Lanzito, Dominick) (Entered: 03/26/2014)
54 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 03/12/2014 before the Honorable Milton I. Shadur. Court Reporter Contact Information: Rosemary Scarpelli, Rosemary_Scarpelli@ilnd.uscourts.gov, (312)435−5815.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

03/26/2014 03/26/2014 03/28/2014 04/01/2014
04/02/2014

Redaction Request due 4/16/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/28/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/24/2014. (Scarpelli, Rosemary) (Entered: 03/26/2014)
SUMMONS Issued as to Defendants Officer Campbell, Lieutenant Johnson, Sargeant Lewis, Officer Wilson (jp, ) (Entered: 03/26/2014)
55 NOTICE by Paul A O'Grady of Change of Address (O'Grady, Paul) (Entered: 03/26/2014)
56 MOTION by Defendants Tom Dart, E. Greer, Cara Smith, Thomas for extension of time to file Response in Opposition to Motion for Protective Order (Duffy, Daniel) (Entered: 03/28/2014)
57 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: MOTION by Defendants Tom Dart, E. Greer, Cara Smith, Thomas for extension of time 56 to file Response in Opposition to Motion for Protective Order, on or before 4/2/2014, IS GRANTED. Plaintiff's reply brief due by 4/9/2014. All further motions that are not noticed for a hearing date before the Court will be stricken. Mailed notice (tbk, ) (Entered: 04/01/2014)
58 RESPONSE by Tom Dart, E. Greer, Cara Smith, Thomasin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff Tylon Hudson for protective order (Renewed Motion) 32 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Northwestern Soliciitation Letter)(Duffy, Daniel) (Entered: 04/02/2014)

Case: 1:13-cv-8752 As of: 11/13/2018 09:54 AM CST 16 of 45

04/07/2014 04/09/2014 04/09/2014 04/10/2014 04/11/2014 04/11/2014 04/13/2014 04/14/2014 04/16/2014
04/22/2014 04/22/2014 04/23/2014
04/23/2014 04/28/2014

59 REPLY by Tylon Hudson to response in opposition to motion 58 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5)(Shapiro, David) (Entered: 04/07/2014)
60 MOTION by Defendants Tom Dart, E. Greer, Cara Smith, Thomas for extension of time to Answer or Otherwise Plead and to Withdraw the Appearance of Counsel (Lanzito, Dominick) (Entered: 04/09/2014)
61 NOTICE of Motion by Dominick L Lanzito for presentment of extension of time 60 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 4/16/2014 at 09:15 AM. (Lanzito, Dominick) (Entered: 04/09/2014)
62 AFFIDAVIT of Service filed by Plaintiff Tylon Hudson regarding Summons and Complaint served on Defendants Lewis, Campbell, Wilson, Johnson on 4/4/14 (Shapiro, David) (Entered: 04/10/2014)
63 MOTION by Defendants Tom Dart, E. Greer, Cara Smith, Thomas for extension of time to respond to Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (Lanzito, Dominick) (Entered: 04/11/2014)
64 NOTICE of Motion by Dominick L Lanzito for presentment of extension of time 63 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 4/16/2014 at 09:15 AM. (Lanzito, Dominick) (Entered: 04/11/2014)
65 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Tylon Hudson to extension of time 60 , extension of time 63 (Attachments: # 1 Declaration (Declarant 118), # 2 Declaration (Declarant 119))(Shapiro, David) (Entered: 04/13/2014)
66 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Tylon Hudson to extension of time 60 , extension of time 63 (Amended Consolidated Response) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 (Department of Justice Letter), # 2 Exhibit 2 (Declarant 118), # 3 Exhibit 3 (Declarant 119))(Shapiro, David) (Entered: 04/14/2014)
67 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Motion and status hearing held on 4/16/2014. MOTION by Defendants for extension of time to respond to Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction 63 is granted. Motion by Defendants for extension of time to answer or otherwise plead 60 also is granted. Counsel are to meet and confer on (1) a briefing schedule on Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction preferably to be complete by July 2, (2) a hearing date on the motion for preliminary injunction preferably during the week of July 14, (3) a deadline by which Defendants will answer or otherwise plead, and (4) a schedule for completing any discovery necessary to the briefing on the preliminary injunction motion. Counsel are also to meet and confer on the Court's comments concerning the motion for protective order. Status hearing date of 4/23/2014 at 11:00 a.m. to stand at which time the parties are to report to the Court on the foregoing items. Mailed notice (tbk, ) (Entered: 04/17/2014)
68 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Status hearing set for 4/23/2014 at 10:00 AM. Mailed notice (tbk, ) (Entered: 04/22/2014)
69 Joint Notice Regarding Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction by Tylon Hudson and Official Capacity Sheriff's Office Defendants (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Shapiro, David) (Entered: 04/22/2014)
72 ORDER Entered by the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr on 4/23/2014: Status hearing held on 4/23/2014. Oral motion of Attorney Michael Sorich for leave to withdraw his appearance on behalf of Tom Dart is granted. ENTER SCHEDULING ORDER ON MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION. (Order signed by Hon. Judge Robert M. Dow, Jr.). Preliminary Injunction hearing to commence on 7/l4/20l4 at 9:30 a.m. As discussed on the record, joint status report to be filed by 5/2/2014. Mailed notice (tlm) (Entered: 04/28/2014)
73 SCHEDULING ORDER On Motion for Preliminary Injunction Entered by the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr on 4/23/2014. Mailed notice (tlm) Docket Text modified on 5/29/2014 (lw, ). (Entered: 04/28/2014)
70 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Officer Campbell, Lieutenant Johnson, Sargeant Lewis, Officer Wilson by Paul A O'Grady (O'Grady, Paul) (Entered: 04/28/2014)

Case: 1:13-cv-8752 As of: 11/13/2018 09:54 AM CST 17 of 45

04/28/2014 05/02/2014 05/02/2014 05/02/2014 05/02/2014 05/02/2014 05/05/2014 05/05/2014 05/05/2014 05/05/2014 05/05/2014
05/05/2014 05/05/2014 05/05/2014 05/07/2014
05/08/2014

71 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Officer Campbell, Lieutenant Johnson, Sargeant Lewis, Officer Wilson by Dominick L Lanzito (Lanzito, Dominick) (Entered: 04/28/2014)
74 MOTION by Defendants Officer Campbell, Tom Dart, E. Greer, Lieutenant Johnson, Sargeant Lewis, Cara Smith, Thomas, Officer Wilson for protective order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Lanzito, Dominick) (Entered: 05/02/2014)
75 NOTICE of Motion by Dominick L Lanzito for presentment of motion for protective order 74 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 5/8/2014 at 09:15 AM. (Lanzito, Dominick) (Entered: 05/02/2014)
76 Joint Status Report on Discovery by Tylon Hudson (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 05/02/2014)
77 MOTION by Plaintiff Tylon Hudson for protective order (Joint Motion) (Attachments: # 1 Attachment A −− Proposed Agreed Confidentiality Order, # 2 Attachment B −− Proposed Agreed Confidentiality Order (Redlined), # 3 Attachment C −− Proposed Agreed HIPAA Order)(Shapiro, David) (Entered: 05/02/2014)
78 NOTICE of Motion by David M. Shapiro for presentment of motion for protective order, 77 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 5/8/2014 at 09:15 AM. (Shapiro, David) (Entered: 05/02/2014)
79 MOTION by Defendants Tom Dart, E. Greer, Lieutenant Johnson, Cara Smith, Thomas to withdraw Appearance of Daniel P. Duffy as Counsel (O'Grady, Paul) (Entered: 05/05/2014)
80 NOTICE of Motion by Paul A O'Grady for presentment of motion to withdraw 79 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 5/8/2014 at 09:15 AM. (O'Grady, Paul) (Entered: 05/05/2014)
81 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM (Meador, Lisa) (Entered: 05/05/2014)
82 NOTICE of Motion by Lisa Marie Meador for presentment of Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim 81 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 5/8/2014 at 09:15 AM. (Meador, Lisa) (Entered: 05/05/2014)
83 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Before the Court are Defendants' motion for protective order 74 , joint status report on discovery 76 , and joint motion for entry of protective orders 77 . The joint motion for entry of protective orders 77 is granted; signed orders will be placed on the docket. In view of the disputes identified in the joint status report on discovery 76 , Defendants' motion for protective order 74 is referred to Magistrate Judge Kim, along with all other discovery motions and supervision. Notice of motion date of 5/8/2014 before Judge Dow is stricken and no appearances will be necessary on that date; Judge Kim will notify the parties when he wishes to hear the pending motion 74 and/or set the case for a status hearing. Mailed notice (tbk, ) (Entered: 05/05/2014)
84 AGREED CONFIDENTIALITY ORDER. Signed by the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr on 5/5/2014. Mailed notice(tbk, ) (Entered: 05/05/2014)
85 QUALIFIED PROTECTIVE ORDER. Signed by the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr on 5/5/2014. Mailed notice(tbk, ) (Entered: 05/05/2014)
86 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ORDER: Case referred to the Honorable Young B. Kim for all discovery motions, discovery supervision and discovery motion regarding defendants motion for protective order 74 . Signed by Executive Committee on 5/5/14.(mjc, ) (Entered: 05/07/2014)
87 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Defendants' motion for protective order 74 is entered and continued to May 14, 2014, at 2:00 p.m. in courtroom 1019. Plaintiffs have until May 12, 2014, to file a response. Parties should also be prepared to discuss other discovery issues after the motion hearing. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 05/07/2014)
88 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Defendants Cook County and Preckwinkle's MOTION to dismiss 81 is taken under advisement; briefing is to

Case: 1:13-cv-8752 As of: 11/13/2018 09:54 AM CST 18 of 45

05/12/2014
05/13/2014 05/13/2014 05/13/2014 05/13/2014 05/13/2014 05/13/2014 05/13/2014 05/13/2014
05/13/2014 05/13/2014 05/14/2014

proceed in tandem with previously set dates for responses and replies to anticipated motion to dismiss filed by other Defendants. Motion to withdraw appearance of Daniel P. Duffy as counsel for Defendants Dart, Greer, Smith, and Thomas 79 is granted. Oral motion to withdraw appearance of Lisa Marie Meador as counsel for Defendants Dart, Greer, Smith, and Thomas is granted. Oral motion to withdraw appearance of Mike Sorich as counsel for Defendants Smith, Greer and Thomas is granted. Mailed notice (tbk, ) (Entered: 05/12/2014)
89 RESPONSE by Tylon Hudsonin Opposition to MOTION by Defendants Officer Campbell, Tom Dart, E. Greer, Lieutenant Johnson, Sargeant Lewis, Cara Smith, Thomas, Officer Wilson for protective order 74 (Shapiro, David) (Entered: 05/12/2014)
90 MOTION by Plaintiff Tylon Hudson to compel (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Shapiro, David) (Entered: 05/13/2014)
91 NOTICE of Motion by David M. Shapiro for presentment of motion to compel 90 before Honorable Young B. Kim on 5/16/2014 at 11:00 AM. (Shapiro, David) Modified on 5/14/2014 (mjc, ). (Entered: 05/13/2014)
92 NOTICE of Motion by David M. Shapiro for presentment of motion to compel 90 before Honorable Young B. Kim on 5/16/2014 at 11:00 AM. (Shapiro, David) (Entered: 05/13/2014)
93 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield by David J. Bradford (Bradford, David) (Entered: 05/13/2014)
94 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield by Leah K Williams (Williams, Leah) (Entered: 05/13/2014)
95 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield by Andrew Francis Merrick (Merrick, Andrew) (Entered: 05/13/2014)
96 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield by Nicole C. Berg (Berg, Nicole) (Entered: 05/13/2014)
97 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Officer Campbell, Tom Dart, E. Greer, Lieutenant Johnson, Sargeant Lewis, Cara Smith, Thomas, Officer Wilson by Robert Thomas Shannon (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing Appearance)(Shannon, Robert) (Entered: 05/13/2014)
98 MOTION by Plaintiffs Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton StubblefieldLeave for Additional Counsel To Appear on Plaintiffs' Behalf (Shapiro, David) (Entered: 05/13/2014)
99 NOTICE of Motion by David M. Shapiro for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 98 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 5/20/2014 at 09:15 AM. (Shapiro, David) (Entered: 05/13/2014)
100 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Motion hearing held. For the reasons stated in open court, Defendants' motion for protective order 74 is granted in part and denied in part. The motion is denied to the extent that Plaintiffs are entitled to notice the deposition of Sheriff Tom Dart and inquire about the extent of his knowledge and awareness regarding the alleged problems and issues pertaining to Divisions IX and X they raise in this instant litigation and actions he took in response to those alleged issues, if any. However, the court limits Sheriff Dart's deposition to four hours. Plaintiffs' motion to compel 90 is entered and continued to May 16, 2014, at 1:30 p.m. in courtroom 1019. Based on the discussions held with the parties, the court expects them to confer further about the remaining discovery issues and reach a resolution. Plaintiffs have until close of business tomorrow to file a supplement to the motion to compel in order to identify the specific discovery requests that remain unresolved. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 05/14/2014)

Case: 1:13-cv-8752 As of: 11/13/2018 09:54 AM CST 19 of 45

05/15/2014 05/15/2014 05/15/2014 05/15/2014 05/15/2014 05/16/2014 05/16/2014 05/16/2014 05/16/2014 05/16/2014
05/16/2014
05/19/2014

101 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Officer Campbell, Tom Dart, E. Greer, Lieutenant Johnson, Sargeant Lewis, Cara Smith, Thomas, Officer Wilson by James Matthias Lydon (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing Appearance of James M. Lydon)(Lydon, James) (Entered: 05/15/2014)
102 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Officer Campbell, Tom Dart, E. Greer, Lieutenant Johnson, Sargeant Lewis, Cara Smith, Thomas, Officer Wilson by Virginia Brette Bensinger (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing Appearance of V. Brette Bensinger)(Bensinger, Virginia) (Entered: 05/15/2014)
103 MOTION by Defendants Officer Campbell, Tom Dart, E. Greer, Lieutenant Johnson, Cara Smith, Thomas, Officer WilsonConsent For Leave For Additional Attorneys To Appear On Defendant's Behalf (Lanzito, Dominick) (Entered: 05/15/2014)
104 NOTICE of Motion by Dominick L Lanzito for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 103 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 5/20/2014 at 09:15 AM. (Lanzito, Dominick) (Entered: 05/15/2014)
105 MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield to supplement Plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit)(Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 05/15/2014)
106 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Officer Campbell, Tom Dart, E. Greer, Lieutenant Johnson, Sargeant Lewis, Cara Smith, Thomas, Officer Wilson by Gretchen Marie Sperry (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Sperry, Gretchen) (Entered: 05/16/2014)
107 RESPONSE by Defendants Officer Campbell, Tom Dart, E. Greer, Lieutenant Johnson, Sargeant Lewis, Cara Smith, Thomas, Officer Wilson to motion to supplement 105 Plaintiffs First Motion To Compel (O'Grady, Paul) (Entered: 05/16/2014)
108 NOTICE by Officer Campbell, Tom Dart, E. Greer, Lieutenant Johnson, Sargeant Lewis, Cara Smith, Thomas, Officer Wilson re Response 107 (O'Grady, Paul) (Entered: 05/16/2014)
109 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Motion hearing held and continued to May 19, 2014, at 1:30 p.m. in courtroom 1019. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 05/16/2014)
110 ORDER: MOTION by Defendants Officer Campbell, Tom Dart, E. Greer, Lieutenant Johnson, Cara Smith, Thomas, Officer Wilson Consent For Leave For Additional Attorneys To Appear On Defendant's Behalf 103 is granted. Attorneys James M. Lydon, V. Brette Bensinger, Robert t. Shannon and Gretchen H. Sperry of the firm of Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP., to file their appearances as additional counsel. Notice of Motion date of 5/20/2014 is stricken and no appearances are necessary on that date. Signed by the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr on 5/16/2014. Mailed notice(mjc, ) (Entered: 05/19/2014)
111 ORDER: MOTION by Plaintiffs Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield Leave for Additional Counsel To Appear on Plaintiffs' Behalf 98 is granted. Attorneys David J. Bradford, Andrew F. Merrick, Nicole C. Berg, and Leah K. Williams of the law firm of Jenner & Block LLP to file their appearances. Notice of Motion date of 5/20/2014 is stricken and no appearances are necessary on that date. Signed by the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr on 5/16/2014. Mailed notice(mjc, ) (Entered: 05/19/2014)
112 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Motion hearing on Plaintiffs' motion to compel 90 is held and continued to May 21, 2014, at 9:00 a.m. by phone. Plaintiffs' motion to supplement their motion to compel 105 is granted. If the parties are able to agree on a draft order (incorporating the court's May 16, 2014 rulings) pertaining to the experts' tour of Divisions IX and X, they may submit the same to the court by email (proposed_order_kim@ilnd.uscourts.gov). If an agreed draft order is submitted prior to the next motion hearing, the court will cancel the hearing and issue the remainder of the court's rulings on Plaintiffs' motion to compel electronically. The conference call number for the telephonic hearing is (877) 336−1839 and the passcode is 4333213. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 05/19/2014)

Case: 1:13-cv-8752 As of: 11/13/2018 09:54 AM CST 20 of 45

05/21/2014 05/21/2014 05/21/2014 05/23/2014 05/23/2014 05/23/2014 05/27/2014
05/29/2014
05/30/2014 05/30/2014 06/02/2014 06/03/2014 06/03/2014 06/03/2014

113 ORDER Signed by the Honorable Young B. Kim on 5/21/2014. (ma,) (Entered: 05/21/2014)
114 MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield to supplement scheduling order (Shapiro, David) (Entered: 05/21/2014)
115 NOTICE of Motion by David M. Shapiro for presentment of motion to supplement 114 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 5/27/2014 at 09:15 AM. (Shapiro, David) (Entered: 05/21/2014)
116 MOTION by Defendant Tom Dart for reconsideration (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G)(Shannon, Robert) (Entered: 05/23/2014)
117 NOTICE of Motion by Robert Thomas Shannon for presentment of motion for reconsideration 116 before Honorable Young B. Kim on 5/29/2014 at 11:00 AM. (Shannon, Robert) (Entered: 05/23/2014)
118 MEMORANDUM by Officer Campbell, Tom Dart, E. Greer, Lieutenant Johnson, Sargeant Lewis, Cara Smith, Thomas, Officer Wilson in Opposition to motion to supplement 114 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exh A, # 2 Exhibit Exh B, # 3 Exhibit Exh C)(Shannon, Robert) (Entered: 05/23/2014)
119 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: As stated on the record in open court, MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield to supplement scheduling order 114 is granted in part. Pre−hearing conference set for 7/9 at 10:30 a.m. Oral motion to depose any currently incarcerated individuals with information that is relevant to the preliminary injunction hearing is granted. The Court has conferred with Magistrate Judge Kim regarding the process of narrowing the potential witnesses promptly so that a pre−hearing discovery can be completed in a timely fashion; Judge Kim will work with the parties to that end. As discussed on the record, although motions in limine are not typical in a preliminary injunction hearing context, to the extent that any party wishes to file any motions in limine, they should do so as soon as practicable and well in advance of the hearing date to facilitate briefing and an informed decision−making process. Mailed notice (tbk, ) (Entered: 05/27/2014)
120 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Motion hearing held. For the reasons stated in open court, Defendants' motion for reconsideration 116 is denied. A planning meeting is scheduled for June 11, 2014, at 9:00 a.m. in courtroom 1019 to discuss the scope of remaining discovery (including depositions) and to identify hearing witnesses. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 05/29/2014)
121 MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield for leave to appear as Attorney (Shapiro, David) (Entered: 05/30/2014)
122 NOTICE of Motion by David M. Shapiro for presentment of motion for leave to appear 121 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 6/5/2014 at 09:15 AM. (Shapiro, David) (Entered: 05/30/2014)
123 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: A conference call is scheduled for June 3, 2014, at 1:30 p.m. to discuss the planning meeting set for June 11, 2014. The conference call number is (877) 336−1839 and the passcode is 4333213. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 06/02/2014)
124 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Status hearing held. The planning meeting scheduled for June 11, 2014, is rescheduled for June 16, 2014, at 9:00 a.m. in courtroom 1019. A settlement conference is scheduled for June 19, 2014, at 3:00 p.m. in courtroom 1019. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 06/03/2014)
125 MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield to compel (Shapiro, David) (Entered: 06/03/2014)
126 NOTICE of Motion by David M. Shapiro for presentment of motion to compel 125 before Honorable Young B. Kim on 6/6/2014 at 11:00 AM. (Shapiro, David) (Entered: 06/03/2014)

Case: 1:13-cv-8752 As of: 11/13/2018 09:54 AM CST 21 of 45

06/04/2014 06/04/2014 06/04/2014 06/04/2014 06/05/2014
06/05/2014 06/05/2014 06/05/2014 06/05/2014 06/05/2014 06/05/2014 06/05/2014 06/05/2014 06/05/2014
06/06/2014

127 MOTION by Defendants Officer Campbell, Tom Dart, E. Greer, Lieutenant Johnson, Sargeant Lewis, Cara Smith, Officer Wilson to compel (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit (RESTRICTED), # 5 Exhibit)(Shannon, Robert) Docket Text Modified By Clerk's Office. (Entered: 06/04/2014)
128 NOTICE of Motion by Robert Thomas Shannon for presentment of (Shannon, Robert) (Entered: 06/04/2014)
129 MOTION by Defendants Officer Campbell, Tom Dart, E. Greer, Lieutenant Johnson, Sargeant Lewis, Cara Smith, Officer Wilson for extension of time to file response/reply as to motion for preliminary injunction 36 , memorandum in support of motion 37 (Shannon, Robert) (Entered: 06/04/2014)
130 NOTICE of Motion by Robert Thomas Shannon for presentment of motion for extension of time to file response/reply, motion for relief,,,, 129 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 6/10/2014 at 09:15 AM. (Shannon, Robert) (Entered: 06/04/2014)
131 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: MOTION by Defendants Officer Campbell, Tom Dart, E. Greer, Lieutenant Johnson, Sargeant Lewis, Cara Smith, Officer Wilson for extension of time 129 to file response as to motion for preliminary injunction, GRANTED. Response due by 6/25/2014 and reply due by 7/25/2014. Notice of Motion date of 6/10/2014 is stricken and no appearances are necessary on that date. Mailed notice (tbk, ) (Entered: 06/05/2014)
132 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield by Steve Weil (Weil, Steve) (Entered: 06/05/2014)
133 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield by Laura A Kleinman (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Kleinman, Laura) (Entered: 06/05/2014)
134 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Regarding Protective Order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Shapiro, David) (Entered: 06/05/2014)
135 MOTION by Defendants Officer Campbell, Tom Dart, E. Greer, Lieutenant Johnson, Sargeant Lewis, Cara Smith, Officer Wilson to strike plfs' discovery requests (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit)(Shannon, Robert) (Entered: 06/05/2014)
136 NOTICE of Motion by Robert Thomas Shannon for presentment of motion to strike, 135 before Honorable Young B. Kim on 6/10/2014 at 11:00 AM. (Shannon, Robert) (Entered: 06/05/2014)
137 MOTION by Defendants Cara Smith, Officer Wilson to seal document MOTION by Defendants Officer Campbell, Tom Dart, E. Greer, Lieutenant Johnson, Sargeant Lewis, Cara Smith, Officer Wilson to compel 127 Exhibit 4 (Shannon, Robert) (Entered: 06/05/2014)
138 NOTICE of Motion by Robert Thomas Shannon for presentment of motion to seal document, motion for relief,, 137 before Honorable Young B. Kim on 6/6/2014 at 11:00 AM. (Shannon, Robert) (Entered: 06/05/2014)
139 MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield to compel (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit a, # 2 Exhibit b, # 3 Exhibit c, # 4 Exhibit d, # 5 Errata e)(Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 06/05/2014)
140 ORDER: Motion hearing held on 6/5/2014. MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield for leave to appear as Attorney 121 is granted. Laura A. Kleinman of the law firm Robinson Curley and Clayton P.C., and Stephen Weil, MacArthur Justice Center may file their appearances as additional counsel on behalf of Plaintiffs. Signed by the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr on 6/5/2014. Mailed notice(mjc, ) (Entered: 06/06/2014)
141 NOTICE by Gretchen Marie Sperry of Change of Address (Sperry, Gretchen) (Entered: 06/06/2014)

Case: 1:13-cv-8752 As of: 11/13/2018 09:54 AM CST 22 of 45

06/06/2014 06/06/2014
06/09/2014 06/09/2014 06/09/2014 06/09/2014 06/10/2014 06/10/2014 06/10/2014 06/10/2014 06/11/2014 06/11/2014 06/11/2014

142 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Defendants' agreed motion to file document under seal 137 is granted. Defendants are granted leave to file Exhibit 4 of their motion to compel (R. 127−4) under seal. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 06/06/2014)
143 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Motion hearing held. For the reasons stated in open court, Plaintiffs' motion to compel 125 is denied without prejudice. Defendants' motion to compel Plaintiffs' production of documents 127 is entered and continued. The court will rule on this motion electronically. As discussed during the motion hearing, Plaintiffs are ordered to provide the court with a copy of the communication sent to the detainees and the survey answers submitted by the following 10 detainees for an in camera review by close of business today: Clarence Anderson, Arthur Chaney, Chazz Collins, Sean Hanks, Edwin Figueroa, Jerome Watson, Ronald Shorter, Jermaine Brooks, Laton Stubblefield, Angelo Matthews. Also, based on the discussions in open court, this court stays its May 21, 2014 order only as it pertains to Defendants having to produce videos in response to Request #3 of Plaintiffs' second set of requests for production, (R. 113 at 2). The attorneys are to confer and further narrow the scope of production. The issue will be revisited on June 11, 2014, at 3:00 p.m. Defendants' motion to strike 135 and Plaintiffs' motion to compel 139 are both entered and continued to June 11, 2014, at 3:00 p.m. in courtroom 1019. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 06/06/2014)
144 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit, # 8 Exhibit, # 9 Exhibit)(Shannon, Robert) (Entered: 06/09/2014)
145 RESPONSE by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield to motion to strike, 135 (Shapiro, David) (Entered: 06/09/2014)
146 MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews to compel (Shapiro, David) (Entered: 06/09/2014)
147 NOTICE of Motion by David M. Shapiro for presentment of motion to compel 146 before Honorable Young B. Kim on 6/11/2014 at 03:00 PM. (Shapiro, David) (Entered: 06/09/2014)
148 MOTION by Defendant Tom Dart to amend/correct protective order 84 Motion to Amend Confidentiality Order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Redline, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Bensinger, Virginia) (Entered: 06/10/2014)
149 NOTICE of Motion by Virginia Brette Bensinger for presentment of motion to amend/correct, motion for relief 148 before Honorable Young B. Kim on 6/11/2014 at 03:00 PM. (Bensinger, Virginia) (Entered: 06/10/2014)
150 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Defendants' motion to compel 127 is granted in part and denied in part. Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. Plaintiffs have until June 17, 2014, to provide a copy of the questionnaires ordered herein. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 06/10/2014)
151 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Young B. Kim on 6/10/2014. (ma,) (Entered: 06/10/2014)
152 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Today's motion hearing scheduled for 3:00 p.m. is rescheduled for 4:00 p.m. in courtroom 1019. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 06/11/2014)
153 MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton StubblefieldModify Scheduling Order re; Expert Report Deadline (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 06/11/2014)
154 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Motion hearing held. For the reasons stated in open court, Defendants' motion to strike 135 , Plaintiff's third motion to compel 139 , and Plaintiff's fourth motion to compel 146 are all granted in part and denied in part. Defendants' Motion to Amend the Confidentiality Order 148 is granted. Plaintiffs' motion to modify scheduling order 153 is granted. The planning meeting scheduled for June 16, 2014, is rescheduled for June 19, 2014. The settlement conference scheduled for June 19, 2014, at 3:00 p.m. is rescheduled for June 19, 2014,

Case: 1:13-cv-8752 As of: 11/13/2018 09:54 AM CST 23 of 45

06/12/2014 06/12/2014 06/12/2014 06/13/2014

at 1:00 p.m. in courtroom 1019. The court will issue a more detailed order summarizing today's rulings on the motions tomorrow. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 06/11/2014)
155 ORDER Signed by the Honorable Young B. Kim on 6/12/2014. (ma,) (Entered: 06/12/2014)
156 MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield to enforce the Court's Order of May 21, 2014 (Shapiro, David) (Entered: 06/12/2014)
157 NOTICE of Motion by David M. Shapiro for presentment of motion to enforce 156 before Honorable Young B. Kim on 6/17/2014 at 11:00 AM. (Shapiro, David) (Entered: 06/12/2014)
158 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 06/11/2014 before the Honorable Young B. Kim. − Motion. Court Reporter Contact Information: Gayle A. McGuigan, CSR, RMR, CRR, (312) 435−6047, Gayle_McGuigan@ilnd.uscourts.gov.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

06/13/2014 06/13/2014 06/13/2014 06/16/2014 06/17/2014 06/17/2014
06/18/2014

Redaction Request due 7/4/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 7/14/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 9/11/2014. (McGuigan, Gale) (Entered: 06/13/2014)
159 AMENDED CONFIDENTIALITY Order Signed by the Honorable Young B. Kim on 6/13/2014. (ma,) (Entered: 06/13/2014)
160 MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield to compel depositions (Shapiro, David) (Entered: 06/13/2014)
161 NOTICE of Motion by David M. Shapiro for presentment of motion to compel 160 before Honorable Young B. Kim on 6/19/2014 at 11:00 AM. (Shapiro, David) (Entered: 06/13/2014)
162 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: The settlement conference scheduled for June 19, 2014, at 1:00 p.m. is rescheduled for June 19, 2014, at 12:30 p.m. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 06/16/2014)
163 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Referral order to Magistrate Judge Kim is enlarged to include: Settlement Conference. Mailed notice (tbk, ) (Entered: 06/17/2014)
164 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Motion hearing held. For the reasons stated in open court, Plaintiffs' motion to enforce 156 is granted to the extent that Defendants are ordered to supplement their response to Request 10 of Plaintiffs' first set of requests for production and Request 1 of Plaintiffs' second set of requests for production by June 20, 2014. Also by June 20, 2014, Defendants are to provide a log listing the detainees (of the 30 specific detainees identified) for whom they are refusing to turn over certain open OPR investigative files, and the complaint or request that triggered the OPR investigation. Defendants are to turn over a copy of such complaints or requests if they were prepared by detainees or members of the public with the log. Plaintiffs' motion to compel 160 is entered and continued to June 19, 2014, at 12:30 p.m. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 06/17/2014)
165 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 6/6/14 before the Honorable Young B. Kim. Court Reporter Contact Information: Kathy Fennell, Kathleen_Fennell@ilnd.uscourts.gov.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of

Case: 1:13-cv-8752 As of: 11/13/2018 09:54 AM CST 24 of 45

Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

06/18/2014 06/18/2014 06/19/2014
06/20/2014 06/20/2014 06/23/2014
06/23/2014 06/24/2014 06/25/2014 06/25/2014 06/25/2014

Redaction Request due 7/9/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 7/21/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 9/16/2014. (Fennell, Kathleen) (Entered: 06/18/2014)
166 MOTION by Defendants Officer Campbell, Tom Dart, E. Greer, Lieutenant Johnson, Sargeant Lewis, Cara Smith, Officer Wilson to bar certain evidence at injunction hearing (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit)(Shannon, Robert) (Entered: 06/18/2014)
167 NOTICE of Motion by Robert Thomas Shannon for presentment of motion to bar, 166 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 6/24/2014 at 09:15 AM. (Shannon, Robert) (Entered: 06/18/2014)
168 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: In−person settlement conference and planning meeting held. Parties are not able to resolve this matter at this time. Plaintiffs have identified 13 witnesses (1 expert and 11 detainees and one former detainee) for the preliminary injunction hearing. Plaintiffs are to provide a summary of the detainee−witnesses' anticipated testimony along with the dates of particular incidents they will discuss at the hearing by the close of business on June 20, 2014. Although Plaintiffs have made a proposal to limit the number of non−expert witnesses, they should provide all 12 summaries because Defendants may not agree to the proposal made. A status hearing is scheduled for June 23, 2014, at 2:00 p.m. in courtroom 1019 to determine whether Plaintiffs' proposal, as modified by the court, is acceptable to Defendants. Plaintiffs' motion to compel 160 is entered and continued to June 23, 2014, at 2:00 p.m. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 06/19/2014)
169 MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield for extension of time To Respond to County Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
170 NOTICE of Motion by Sheila A Bedi for presentment of extension of time 169 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 6/24/2014 at 09:15 AM. (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
171 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Motion hearing and status hearing held. For the reasons stated in open court, Plaintiffs' motion to compel depositions 160 is denied without prejudice. Parties are to submit to the court, by email (proposed_order_kim@ilnd.uscourts.gov), an agreed proposed order based on the discussions held today in open court. Parties are ordered to submit the agreed proposed order today. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 06/23/2014)
172 RESPONSE by Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefieldin Opposition to MOTION by Defendants Officer Campbell, Tom Dart, E. Greer, Lieutenant Johnson, Sargeant Lewis, Cara Smith, Officer Wilson to bar certain evidence at injunction hearing 166 (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 06/23/2014)
173 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield for extension of time To Respond to County Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 169 , to and including 8/1/2014, is granted. Time of preliminary hearing conference set for 7/9/2014 is reset for 9:00a.m. Mailed notice (tbk, ) (Entered: 06/24/2014)
174 AGREED ORDER Signed by the Honorable Young B. Kim on 6/25/2014. (ma,) (Entered: 06/25/2014)
175 RESPONSE by Tom Dart, E. Greer, Cara Smith, Thomasin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff Tylon Hudson for preliminary injunction 36 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit)(Shannon, Robert) (Entered: 06/25/2014)
176 MOTION by Defendants Tom Dart, E. Greer, Cara Smith, Thomas for leave to file oversized brief (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Shannon, Robert) (Entered: 06/25/2014)

Case: 1:13-cv-8752 As of: 11/13/2018 09:54 AM CST 25 of 45

06/25/2014 06/25/2014
06/30/2014 07/01/2014 07/02/2014
07/02/2014 07/02/2014 07/02/2014 07/02/2014 07/02/2014 07/02/2014 07/03/2014 07/03/2014

177 NOTICE of Motion by Robert Thomas Shannon for presentment of motion for leave to file 176 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 7/1/2014 at 09:15 AM. (Shannon, Robert) (Entered: 06/25/2014)
178 REPLY by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield to Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim 144 To Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Attachments: # 1 Appendix, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit 3, # 5 Exhibit 4, # 6 Exhibit 5, # 7 Exhibit 6, # 8 Exhibit 7, # 9 Exhibit 8, # 10 Exhibit 9, # 11 Exhibit 10, # 12 Exhibit 11, # 13 Exhibit 12, # 14 Exhibit 13, # 15 Exhibit 14, # 16 Exhibit 15, # 17 Exhibit 16, # 18 Exhibit 17, # 19 Exhibit 18, # 20 Exhibit 19, # 21 Exhibit 20, # 22 Exhibit 21, # 23 Exhibit 22, # 24 Exhibit 23, # 25 Exhibit 24, # 26 Exhibit 25, # 27 Exhibit 26, # 28 Exhibit 27, # 29 Exhibit 28, # 30 Exhibit 29, # 31 Exhibit 30, # 32 Exhibit 31, # 33 Exhibit 32, # 34 Exhibit 33, # 35 Exhibit 34, # 36 Exhibit 35, # 37 Exhibit 36, # 38 Exhibit 37, # 39 Exhibit 38)(Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 06/25/2014)
179 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: MOTION by Defendants Tom Dart, E. Greer, Cara Smith, Thomas for leave to file 176 oversized brief is granted. Notice of Motion date of 7/1/2014 is stricken and no appearances are necessary on that date. Mailed notice (tbk, ) (Entered: 06/30/2014)
180 MOTION by Defendants Tom Dart, E. Greer, Cara Smith, Thomas to bar schwartz opinions (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit)(Shannon, Robert) (Entered: 07/01/2014)
181 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: MOTION hearing held on 7/2/2014. Attorneys appear by telephone. For the reasons stated on the record, MOTION by Defendants to bar certain evidence 166 is denied to the extent stated on the record. For the reasons stated on the record, MOTION by Defendants to bar Schwartz opinions 180 is granted to the extent stated on the record. The time for the 7/9 status hearing is reset from 9 a.m. to 8:45 a.m. Mailed notice (tbk, ) (Entered: 07/02/2014)
182 MOTION by Defendants Tom Dart, E. Greer, Cara Smith, Thomas for extension of time to file response/reply as to reply,,, 178 unopposed (Shannon, Robert) (Entered: 07/02/2014)
183 NOTICE of Motion by Robert Thomas Shannon for presentment of motion for extension of time to file response/reply, motion for relief 182 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 7/8/2014 at 09:15 AM. (Shannon, Robert) (Entered: 07/02/2014)
184 ATTORNEY Appearance for Respondent Susan McCampbell by Stacy Ann Benjamin (Benjamin, Stacy) (Entered: 07/02/2014)
185 ATTORNEY Appearance for Respondent Susan McCampbell by John Joseph Rock (Rock, John) (Entered: 07/02/2014)
186 MOTION by Respondent Susan McCampbell to quash or Stay Plaintiffs' Subpoena for Documents and Deposition (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D)(Rock, John) (Entered: 07/02/2014)
187 NOTICE of Motion by John Joseph Rock for presentment of motion to quash 186 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 7/9/2014 at 09:15 AM. (Rock, John) (Entered: 07/02/2014)
188 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Notice of Motion date of 7/9/2014 on MOTION by Respondent Susan McCampbell to quash or Stay Plaintiffs' Subpoena for Documents and Deposition 186 is stricken and should be re−noticed before Magistrate Judge Kim. Mailed notice (tbk, ) (Entered: 07/03/2014)
189 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on May 29, 2014, before the Honorable Young B. Kim. Court Reporter Contact Information: Laura LaCien, 312−408−5032, laura_lacien@ilnd.uscourts.gov.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see

Case: 1:13-cv-8752 As of: 11/13/2018 09:54 AM CST 26 of 45

the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

07/03/2014 07/05/2014 07/05/2014 07/08/2014 07/09/2014 07/09/2014 07/09/2014 07/09/2014 07/09/2014 07/10/2014 07/17/2014 07/19/2014 07/19/2014 07/22/2014

Redaction Request due 7/24/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/4/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/1/2014. (Lacien, Laura) (Entered: 07/03/2014)
190 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Respondent Susan McCampbell's motion to quash or stay Plaintiffs' subpoena for documents and her depositions 186 is entered and continued to July 9, 2014, at 8:15 a.m. in courtroom 1019. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 07/03/2014)
191 MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton StubblefieldMotion Regarding Hearing Exhibits (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Shapiro, David) (Entered: 07/05/2014)
192 NOTICE of Motion by David M. Shapiro for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 191 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 7/9/2014 at 08:45 AM. (Shapiro, David) (Entered: 07/05/2014)
193 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: MOTION by Defendants Tom Dart, E. Greer, Cara Smith, Thomas for extension of time to file reply 182 is entered and continued to 7/9/2014 at 8:45a.m. Mailed notice (tbk, ) (Entered: 07/08/2014)
194 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Motion hearing held. Respondent Susan McCampbell's motion to quash or stay Plaintiffs' subpoena for documents and her depositions 186 is entered and continued until further order of the court. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 07/09/2014)
195 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr:Pretrial conference held on 7/9/2014. Status hearing set for 7/10/2014 at 10:30 AM. Mailed notice (tbk, ) (Entered: 07/09/2014)
196 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Status hearing date of 7/10/2014 was entered in error. Parties to appear for a Status hearing on 7/11/2014 at 10:30 AM. Mailed notice (tbk, ) (Entered: 07/09/2014)
197 REPLY by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield to motion for preliminary injunction 36 (Shapiro, David) (Entered: 07/09/2014)
198 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Status hearing set for 7/10/2014 at 11:30 AM. Mailed notice (tbk, ) (Entered: 07/09/2014)
199 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Status hearing held on 7/10/2014. For reasons stated on the record, Preliminary Injunction hearing date of 7/14/2014 is stricken. Status hearing date of 7/11/2014 is stricken. Mailed notice (tbk, ) (Entered: 07/10/2014)
200 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: MOTION by Defendants Tom Dart, E. Greer, Cara Smith, Thomas for extension of time 182 to file reply brief to motion to dismiss, to and including 7/23/2014, is granted. Mailed notice (tbk, ) (Entered: 07/17/2014)
201 MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton StubblefieldModify Protective Order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2)(Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 07/19/2014)
202 NOTICE of Motion by Sheila A Bedi for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 201 before Honorable Young B. Kim on 7/23/2014 at 10:00 AM. (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 07/19/2014)
203 MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield to amend/correct MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton StubblefieldModify Protective Order 201 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3)(Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 07/22/2014)

Case: 1:13-cv-8752 As of: 11/13/2018 09:54 AM CST 27 of 45

07/23/2014 07/23/2014 07/23/2014 07/28/2014 07/28/2014 07/29/2014
07/30/2014 07/31/2014

204 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Motion hearing held. For the reasons stated in open court, Plaintiffs' motion to modify protective order [ 201 , 203 ] is denied without prejudice. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 07/23/2014)
205 REPLY by Tom Dart, E. Greer, Cara Smith to reply,,, 178 (Shannon, Robert) (Entered: 07/23/2014)
206 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ORDER: Case reassigned to the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall for all further proceedings pursuant to a finding of relatedness to case 10C2946. Signed by Executive Committee on 7/23/2014.(mr, ) (Entered: 07/24/2014)
207 MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefieldrequesting a status conference (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 07/28/2014)
208 NOTICE of Motion by Sheila A Bedi for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 207 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 7/31/2014 at 09:00 AM. (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 07/28/2014)
209 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall: MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield requesting a status conference 207 is granted. Status hearing set for 8/5/2014 at 09:00 AM. Motion hearing set for 7/31/2014 on this motion is hereby stricken.Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 07/29/2014)
210 ATTORNEY Appearance for Respondent Susan McCampbell by Catherine Macneil Barber (Barber, Catherine) (Entered: 07/30/2014)
211 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 6/17/14 before the Honorable Young B. Kim. Court Reporter Contact Information: Kathleen_Fennell@ilnd.uscourts.gov.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

08/01/2014 08/05/2014 08/08/2014 08/14/2014

Redaction Request due 8/21/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/1/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/29/2014. (Fennell, Kathleen) (Entered: 07/31/2014)
212 RESPONSE by Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefieldin Opposition to MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 81 (Defendants Cook County and Preckwinkle) (Shapiro, David) (Entered: 08/01/2014)
213 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Initial status hearing held on 8/5/2014. The Court requests an agreed written status report regarding dates for the preliminary injunction hearing by 8/8/2014.Pre Preliminary hearing set for 9/3/2014 at 09:00 AM.Advised in open court notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 08/05/2014)
214 STATUS Report Joint Status Report by Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 08/08/2014)
215 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 08/05/2014 before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. Court Reporter Contact Information: Gayle A. McGuigan, CSR, RMR, CRR, (312) 435−6047, Gayle_McGuigan@ilnd.uscourts.gov.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

Redaction Request due 9/4/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/15/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/12/2014. (McGuigan, Gale) (Entered:

Case: 1:13-cv-8752 As of: 11/13/2018 09:54 AM CST 28 of 45

08/14/2014 08/14/2014 08/25/2014 08/25/2014 08/26/2014 08/26/2014 08/28/2014
08/29/2014

08/14/2014)
216 REPLY by Defendants Toni Preckwinkle, The County of Cook to response in opposition to motion 212 (Meador, Lisa) (Entered: 08/14/2014)
217 NOTICE by Toni Preckwinkle, The County of Cook re reply 216 (Meador, Lisa) (Entered: 08/14/2014)
218 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall: Preliminary Injunction hearing reset for 9/9/2014 at 10:00 AM.Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 08/25/2014)
219 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Minute entry 218 is amended to reflect the following: Pre Preliminary hearing reset for 9/9/2014 at 10:00 AM.Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 08/25/2014)
220 MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton StubblefieldJoint Emergency Motion for Status Regarding Scheduling of the Preliminary Injunction Hearing (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 08/26/2014)
221 NOTICE of Motion by Sheila A Bedi for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 220 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 8/28/2014 at 09:00 AM. (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 08/26/2014)
222 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall: MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield Joint Emergency Motion for Status Regarding Scheduling of the Preliminary Injunction Hearing 220 is granted. In Court hearing set for 9/22/2014 at 10:00 AM.Advised in open court notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 08/28/2014)
223 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 08/28/2014 before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. Court Reporter Contact Information: Gayle A. McGuigan, CSR, RMR, CRR, (312) 435−6047, Gayle_McGuigan@ilnd.uscourts.gov.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

09/03/2014

Redaction Request due 9/19/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/29/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/27/2014. (McGuigan, Gale) (Entered: 08/29/2014)
224 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on May 16, 2014 before the Honorable Young B. Kim. Court Reporter Contact Information: Carolyn Cox, Carolyn_Cox@ilnd.uscourts.gov.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

09/03/2014

Redaction Request due 9/24/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/6/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/2/2014. (Cox, Carolyn) (Entered: 09/03/2014)
225 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on May 19, 2014 before the Honorable Young B. Kim. Court Reporter Contact Information: Carolyn Cox, Carolyn_Cox@ilnd.uscourts.gov.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see

Case: 1:13-cv-8752 As of: 11/13/2018 09:54 AM CST 29 of 45

the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

09/05/2014 09/06/2014
09/06/2014 09/06/2014 09/08/2014 09/08/2014 09/08/2014 09/09/2014 09/09/2014 09/09/2014 09/10/2014

Redaction Request due 9/24/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/6/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/2/2014. (Cox, Carolyn) (Entered: 09/03/2014)
226 STIPULATION Regarding Motion for Class Certification (Shapiro, David) (Entered: 09/05/2014)
227 Submission Describing Urgent Need for a Preliminary Injunction Hearing by Jermaine Brooks, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 23, # 4 Exhibit 3, # 5 Exhibit 24, # 6 Exhibit 25, # 7 Exhibit 28, # 8 Exhibit 30, # 9 Exhibit 32, # 10 Exhibit 33, # 11 Exhibit 34, # 12 Exhibit 36, # 13 Exhibit 53, # 14 Exhibit 54, # 15 Exhibit 56, # 16 Exhibit 58, # 17 Exhibit 59, # 18 Exhibit 61, # 19 Exhibit 63, # 20 Exhibit 74, # 21 Exhibit 124(1), # 22 Exhibit 124(3), # 23 Exhibit 124(4), # 24 Exhibit 124(5), # 25 Exhibit 124(6), # 26 Exhibit 124(7), # 27 Exhibit 124(8), # 28 Exhibit 124(9), # 29 Exhibit 124(10), # 30 Exhibit 124(11), # 31 Exhibit 124(12), # 32 Exhibit 124(13), # 33 Exhibit 124(14), # 34 Exhibit 124(15), # 35 Exhibit 124(16), # 36 Exhibit 124(17), # 37 Exhibit 124(18), # 38 Exhibit 124(19), # 39 Exhibit 124(20), # 40 Exhibit 126, # 41 Exhibit 150, # 42 Exhibit 151, # 43 Exhibit 152, # 44 Exhibit 153, # 45 Exhibit 154, # 46 Exhibit 156, # 47 Exhibit 164, # 48 Exhibit 165, # 49 Exhibit 166, # 50 Exhibit 168, # 51 Exhibit 180, # 52 Exhibit 124(2))(Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 09/06/2014)
228 MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield to seal (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 09/06/2014)
229 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield to seal 228 (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 09/06/2014)
230 NOTICE of Motion by Sheila A Bedi for presentment of motion to seal 228 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 9/10/2014 at 09:00 AM. (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 09/08/2014)
231 MOTION by Defendants Officer Campbell, Tom Dart, E. Greer, Lieutenant Johnson, Sargeant Lewis, Cara Smith, Officer Wilson to strike other,,,,, 227 Submission on preliminary injunction hearing (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exh A)(Shannon, Robert) (Entered: 09/08/2014)
232 NOTICE of Motion by Robert Thomas Shannon for presentment of motion to strike,, motion for relief, 231 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 9/9/2014 at 09:00 AM. (Shannon, Robert) (Entered: 09/08/2014)
233 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Pursuant to stipulation, MOTION by Plaintiff Tylon Hudson to certify class 14 is dismissed without prejudice. Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 09/09/2014)
234 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall: MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield to seal 228 is granted. Motion hearing set for 9/10/2014 on this motion is hereby stricken. Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 09/09/2014)
235 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Status hearing held on 9/9/2014 regarding the pre preliminary injunction hearing. Defendant to file a response by 9/19/2014. No reply is necessary from the plaintiff. Tentative preliminary injunction hearing during the week of October 6, 2014.Advised in open court notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 09/09/2014)
236 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 09/09/2014 before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. Court Reporter Contact Information: Gayle A. McGuigan, CSR, RMR, CRR (312) 435−6047 Gayle_McGuigan@ilnd.uscourts.gov.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court

Case: 1:13-cv-8752 As of: 11/13/2018 09:54 AM CST 30 of 45

Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

09/19/2014 09/19/2014 09/19/2014 09/19/2014 09/19/2014 09/19/2014
09/22/2014 09/22/2014 09/22/2014
09/23/2014
09/24/2014 09/24/2014

Redaction Request due 10/1/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/13/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/9/2014. (McGuigan, Gale) (Entered: 09/10/2014)
237 MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum for Curtis Curry (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 09/19/2014)
238 MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum for James Ford (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 09/19/2014)
239 MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum Markus Simmons (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 09/19/2014)
240 MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum for Quinton Brown (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 09/19/2014)
241 MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum for Tylon Hudson (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 09/19/2014)
242 NOTICE of Motion by Sheila A Bedi for presentment of writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum 241 , writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum 237 , writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum 238 , writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum 240 , writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum 239 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 9/25/2014 at 09:00 AM. (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 09/19/2014)
243 MOTION by Defendants Officer Campbell, Tom Dart, E. Greer, Lieutenant Johnson, Sargeant Lewis, Cara Smith, Thomas, Officer Wilson to seal Motion to File Portions of Defendants' Response Brief Under Seal (Shannon, Robert) (Entered: 09/22/2014)
244 NOTICE of Motion by Robert Thomas Shannon for presentment of (Shannon, Robert) (Entered: 09/22/2014)
245 RESPONSE by Defendants Officer Campbell, Tom Dart, E. Greer, Cara Smith to other,,,,, 227 Plaintiffs' Submission re Preliminary Injunction Hearing (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit, # 8 Exhibit, # 9 Exhibit, # 10 Exhibit, # 11 Exhibit, # 12 Exhibit, # 13 Exhibit)(Shannon, Robert) (Entered: 09/22/2014)
246 RESPONSE by Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefieldin Opposition to MOTION by Defendants Officer Campbell, Tom Dart, E. Greer, Lieutenant Johnson, Sargeant Lewis, Cara Smith, Thomas, Officer Wilson to seal Motion to File Portions of Defendants' Response Brief Under Seal 243 (Shapiro, David) (Entered: 09/23/2014)
247 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall: MOTION by Defendants Officer Campbell, Tom Dart, E. Greer, Lieutenant Johnson, Sargeant Lewis, Cara Smith, Thomas, Officer Wilson to seal Motion to File Portions of Defendants' Response Brief Under Seal 243 is granted. Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 09/24/2014)
248 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Based on the parties' arguments and submissions, the Court has determined that a hearing is required to make factual determinations in order to determine whether a preliminary injunction is appropriate. The hearing will be held as needed beginning on 10/6/14 from 10:00 am to 12:00 pm; and continuing 10/8/14 from 10:00 am to 11:45 am and 2:00 pm to 4:00 pm; and 10/9/14 from 10:00 am to 12:00 pm and 2:00 pm to 4:00 pm. The Plaintiffs are directed to resubmit their motions for writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum. In order to avoid unnecessary transportation of detainees, each motion should mention specifically the period of time to which it refers. Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 09/24/2014)

Case: 1:13-cv-8752 As of: 11/13/2018 09:54 AM CST 31 of 45

09/26/2014 09/26/2014 09/26/2014 09/30/2014 10/01/2014
10/01/2014 10/02/2014 10/02/2014 10/02/2014 10/02/2014 10/02/2014 10/02/2014
10/02/2014

249 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall: In Court hearing will begin on 10/8/2014 at 10:00 AM. If necessary, the hearing shall proceed on 10/10/2014 at 10:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M. and from 2 P.M. to 4:00 P.M.Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 09/26/2014)
250 MOTION by Defendants Tom Dart, E. Greer, Sargeant Lewis, Cara Smith for leave to file oversized brief (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Errata, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit, # 8 Exhibit, # 9 Exhibit, # 10 Exhibit, # 11 Exhibit, # 12 Exhibit, # 13 Exhibit)(Shannon, Robert) (Entered: 09/26/2014)
251 NOTICE of Motion by Robert Thomas Shannon for presentment of motion for leave to file, 250 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 10/1/2014 at 09:00 AM. (Shannon, Robert) (Entered: 09/26/2014)
252 RESPONSE by Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefieldin Opposition to MOTION by Defendants Tom Dart, E. Greer, Sargeant Lewis, Cara Smith for leave to file oversized brief 250 (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 09/30/2014)
253 MOTION by Defendants Officer Campbell, Tom Dart, E. Greer, Lieutenant Johnson, Sargeant Lewis, Cara Smith, Officer Wilson Defendants' Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs' Expert (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K, # 12 Exhibit L)(Bensinger, Virginia) (Entered: 10/01/2014)
254 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Motion for leave to file 250 is taken under advisement. In Court hearing set for 10/9/2014 at 10:00 AM. − 12:00 p.m. and 2:00 p.m − 4:00 p.m.Advised in open court notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 10/01/2014)
255 MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum for Curtis Curry (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 10/02/2014)
256 MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum for James Ford (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 10/02/2014)
257 MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum for Markus Simmons (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 10/02/2014)
258 MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum for Quinton Brown (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 10/02/2014)
259 MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum for Tylon Hudson (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 10/02/2014)
260 NOTICE of Motion by Sheila A Bedi for presentment of writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum 259 , writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum 256 , writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum 257 , writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum 255 , writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum 258 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 10/6/2014 at 09:00 AM. (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 10/02/2014)
261 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 10/01/2014 before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. Court Reporter Contact Information: Gayle A. McGuigan, CSR, RMR, CRR, (312) 435−6047, Gayle_McGuigan@ilnd.uscourts.gov.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

Case: 1:13-cv-8752 As of: 11/13/2018 09:54 AM CST 32 of 45

10/02/2014 10/02/2014 10/03/2014 10/03/2014 10/06/2014 10/06/2014
10/06/2014 10/06/2014 10/06/2014 10/06/2014
10/06/2014
10/06/2014 10/06/2014 10/06/2014 10/06/2014 10/08/2014

Redaction Request due 10/23/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/3/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/31/2014. (McGuigan, Gale) (Entered: 10/02/2014)
262 MOTION to Redact transcript 236 (Shannon, Robert) (Entered: 10/02/2014)
263 NOTICE of Motion by Robert Thomas Shannon for presentment of Motion to Redact Transcript, motion for relief 262 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 10/8/2014 at 10:00 AM. (Shannon, Robert) (Entered: 10/02/2014)
264 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Motions for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum 255 , 256 , 257 , 258 , 259 are set for 10/6/2014 @ 10:00 a.m. (TIME CHANGE)Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 10/03/2014)
265 RESPONSE by Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefieldin Opposition to MOTION to Redact transcript 236 262 (Shapiro, David) (Entered: 10/03/2014)
266 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Motions for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum 255 , 256 , 257 , 258 , 259 are reset to 10/8/2014 @ 10:00 a.m. Mailed/Telephoned notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 10/06/2014)
267 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Motions for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum 255 , 256 , 257 , 258 , 259 as to Markus Simmons, Tylon Hudson, Quinton Brown, James Ford and Curtis Curry are granted.Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 10/06/2014)
268 MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum for Markus Simmons (Revised) (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 10/06/2014)
269 MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum for Quinton Brown (revised) (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 10/06/2014)
270 MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum for Tylon Hudson (revised) (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 10/06/2014)
271 NOTICE of Motion by Alexa Van Brunt for presentment of writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum 269 , writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum 268 , writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum 270 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 10/8/2014 at 09:00 AM. (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 10/06/2014)
WRIT of habeas corpus ad testificandum issued to the U.S. Marshal's Office for service as to Tylon Hudson, Quinton Brown, Curtis Curry, Markus Simmons and James Ford for October 9, 2014 and October 10, 2014 via email. (mjc, ) (Entered: 10/06/2014)
272 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Motions for revised writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum 268 , 269 , 270 are granted. Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 10/06/2014)
REVISED WRIT of habeas corpus ad testificandum issued to the U.S. Marshal's Office for service as to Quinton Brown, Tylon Hudson and Markus Simmons for October 8 and 10th, 2014 via email. (mjc, ) (Entered: 10/06/2014)
273 MOTION by Defendants Officer Campbell, Tom Dart, E. Greer, Cara Smith to bar certain testimony and evidence (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit)(Shannon, Robert) (Entered: 10/06/2014)
274 NOTICE of Motion by Robert Thomas Shannon for presentment of motion to bar, 273 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 10/8/2014 at 10:00 AM. (Shannon, Robert) (Entered: 10/06/2014)
275 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: In light of the assigned District Judge's denial of Defendants' motion to lift confidentiality provision of agreed order in United States v. Cook County, 10 CV 2946, as moot, (R. 261), Respondent Susan McCampbell's motion to quash or stay Plaintiffs' subpoena for documents and her

Case: 1:13-cv-8752 As of: 11/13/2018 09:54 AM CST 33 of 45

10/08/2014 10/09/2014 10/09/2014
10/14/2014 10/20/2014

deposition 186 is granted. Plaintiffs' subpoena served on McCampbell for documents and for her deposition is quashed. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 10/08/2014)
276 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:In court hearing held on 10/8/2014. Motion hearing held on 10/8/2014 regarding Motion to Redact Transcript, motion for relief 262 , motion to bar, 273 . In Court hearing continued to 10/9/2014 at 09:00 AM.Advised in open court notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 10/09/2014)
277 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:In court hearing held on 10/9/2014 and continued to 10/10/2014 at 09:30 AM.Advised in open court notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 10/09/2014)
278 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Defendants' motion to exclude expert testimony 253 is denied in part. The expert is permitted to testify under Fed. R. Evid. 702. The Court will take the motion under advisement with respect to the expert's testimony on statistical conclusions. Defendants' motion to bar certain testimony and evidence 273 is dismissed as moot to the extent that Plaintiffs' representations that the expert will not testify about matters included in Section II and that they will not rely on documents described in Section III of the motion in their case in chief. To the extent that the motion seeks to bar undisclosed expert opinions, the motion is taken under advisement. Hearing set for 10/10/2014 is stricken.Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 10/10/2014)
279 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:In court hearing continued to 10/27/2014 at 9:30 AM. Defendants are directed to file an updated witness list by 10/22/2014. Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 10/14/2014)
280 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 10/08/2014 before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. − Preliminary Injunction Hearing − Vol. 1. Court Reporter Contact Information: Gayle A. McGuigan, CSR, RMR, CRR, (312) 435−6047, Gayle_McGuigan@ilnd.uscourts.gov.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

10/20/2014

Redaction Request due 11/10/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/20/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/19/2015. (McGuigan, Gale) (Entered: 10/20/2014)
281 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 10/09/2014 before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. Preliminary Injunction Hearing − Vol. 2. Court Reporter Contact Information: Gayle A. McGuigan, CSR, RMR, CRR, (312) 435−6047, Gayle_McGuigan@ilnd.uscourts.gov.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

10/20/2014 10/20/2014

Redaction Request due 11/10/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/20/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/19/2015. (McGuigan, Gale) (Entered: 10/20/2014)
282 MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum Curtis Curry (Kleinman, Laura) (Entered: 10/20/2014)
283 NOTICE of Motion by Laura A Kleinman for presentment of writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum 282 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 10/23/2014 at 09:00 AM. (Kleinman, Laura) (Entered: 10/20/2014)

Case: 1:13-cv-8752 As of: 11/13/2018 09:54 AM CST 34 of 45

10/20/2014 10/20/2014 10/20/2014 10/20/2014 10/20/2014 10/20/2014 10/20/2014 10/20/2014 10/21/2014
10/21/2014 10/22/2014 10/27/2014 10/28/2014

284 MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum James Ford (Kleinman, Laura) (Entered: 10/20/2014)
285 NOTICE of Motion by Laura A Kleinman for presentment of writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum 284 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 10/23/2014 at 09:00 AM. (Kleinman, Laura) (Entered: 10/20/2014)
286 MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum Markus Simmons (Kleinman, Laura) (Entered: 10/20/2014)
287 NOTICE of Motion by Laura A Kleinman for presentment of writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum 286 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 10/23/2014 at 09:00 AM. (Kleinman, Laura) (Entered: 10/20/2014)
288 MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum Quinton Brown (Kleinman, Laura) (Entered: 10/20/2014)
289 NOTICE of Motion by Laura A Kleinman for presentment of writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum 288 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 10/23/2014 at 09:00 AM. (Kleinman, Laura) (Entered: 10/20/2014)
290 MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum Tylon Hudson (Kleinman, Laura) (Entered: 10/20/2014)
291 NOTICE of Motion by Laura A Kleinman for presentment of writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum 290 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 10/23/2014 at 09:00 AM. (Kleinman, Laura) (Entered: 10/20/2014)
292 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Minute entry 279 is amended to reflect that the in court hearing will take place 10/27/2014 and 10/29/2014 at 10:00 a.m., but not 10/28/2014. The Court's calendar is not clear on 10/28/2014. Plaintiff's motions for writs of habeas corpus ad testifcandum 282 , 284 , 286 , 288 , and 290 are granted in part. The Court will order the presence of the witnesses at the hearing on 10/27/2014, but reserves decision for 10/29/2014 depending on the necessity of their presence on later dates. The motions are denied as to 10/28/2014. Motion hearings set for these motions are hereby stricken. Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 10/21/2014)
294 WRIT of habeas corpus ad testificandum issued as to Quinton Brown, James Ford, Curtis Curry, Tylon Hudson, Markus Simmons for October 27, 2014 & October 29, 2014 to the U.S. Marshal's Office via email. (mjc, ) (Attachment(s) : # 2 Attachment 3, # 3 Attachment 4, # 4 Attachment 5, # 5 Attachment 6) (mjc, ). (Entered: 10/21/2014)
293 Updated Witness List by Tom Dart, E. Greer, Cara Smith, Thomas (Shannon, Robert) (Entered: 10/22/2014)
296 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:In court hearing held on 10/27/2014 and continued to 10/29/2014 at 10:00 AM.Advised in open court notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 10/28/2014)
295 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 10/27/2014 before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. − Preliminary Injunction Hearing − Vol. 3 −. Court Reporter Contact Information: Gayle A. McGuigan, CSR, RMR, CRR, (312) 435−6047, Gayle_McGuigan@ilnd.uscourts.gov.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

Redaction Request due 11/18/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/28/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/26/2015. (McGuigan, Gale) (Entered:

Case: 1:13-cv-8752 As of: 11/13/2018 09:54 AM CST 35 of 45

10/28/2014
10/29/2014 10/30/2014

10/28/2014)
297 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:In court preliminary injunction hearing continued to 10/29/2014 at 9:30 AM to 12:00 PM. If the Court's schedule permits, the hearing shall be continued 11/3/2014 from 1:30 PM to 5:00 PM; 11/4/2014 from 11:00 AM to 3:30 PM; and 11/5/2014 from 1:30 PM to 4:00 PM. The parties shall verify the schedule each night at the conclusion of the hearing.Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 10/28/2014)
298 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:In court hearing held on 10/29/2014.Advised in open court notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 10/29/2014)
299 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 10/29/2014 before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. −Preliminary Injunction Hearing − Vol. 4. Court Reporter Contact Information: Gayle A. McGuigan, CSR, RMR, CRR, (312) 435−6047, Gayle_McGuigan@ilnd.uscourts.gov.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

10/31/2014 10/31/2014 11/03/2014 11/03/2014 11/04/2014

Redaction Request due 11/20/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/1/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/28/2015. (McGuigan, Gale) (Entered: 10/30/2014)
300 Plainitffs' Statement Regarding Deposition Designations STATEMENT by Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield (Shapiro, David) (Entered: 10/31/2014)
301 opposing use of deposition testimony STATEMENT by Tom Dart, E. Greer, Cara Smith, Thomas (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Shannon, Robert) (Entered: 10/31/2014)
302 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:The Court is not available Wednesday, November 5 from 1:30 to 4:30 as previously indicated. No hearing will be held on November 5, 2014.Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 11/03/2014)
303 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:In court hearing held on 11/3/2014 and continued to 11/4/2014 at 11:00 AM.Advised in open court notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 11/03/2014)
304 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 11/03/2014 before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. − Preliminary Injunction Hearing − Vol. 5 −. Court Reporter Contact Information: Gayle A. McGuigan, CSR, RMR, CRR, (312) 435−6047, Gayle_McGuigan@ilnd.uscourts.gov.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

11/04/2014

Redaction Request due 11/25/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/5/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/2/2015. (McGuigan, Gale) (Entered: 11/04/2014)
305 ORDER: Plaintiffs oral motion to enter detainee declarations into evidence is granted. Plaintiffs oral motion to designate portions of Mr. Arces deposition for use in its case in chief is granted. Defendants to submit cross−designations, if any, by 11/10/2014.The Court may consider hearsay in deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction. SEC v. Cherif, 993 F.2d 403, 412 n.8 (7th Cir. 1991). The Court has considerable discretion to admit hearsay evidence at a preliminary injunction hearing. See Goodman v. Ill. Dept. of Financial and Professional Regulation, 430 F.3d 432, 438−39 (7th Cir. 2005). Therefore, Plaintiffs are permitted to introduce

Case: 1:13-cv-8752 As of: 11/13/2018 09:54 AM CST 36 of 45

11/04/2014 11/04/2014 11/05/2014

declarations of detainees in support of their motion for a preliminary injunction. Recognizing that the declarations are unsworn and not given under penalty of perjury, the Court will give appropriate weight to the declarations.Plaintiffs are permitted to introduce designated portions of Mr. Arces deposition as part of their case in chief over Defendants objection. Defendants are permitted to cross−designate portions of the deposition for introduction. Cross−designations, if any, shall be filed by 11/10/2014. Defendants are permitted to call Mr. Arce as a live witness. Signed by the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 11/4/2014.Mailed notice(tsa, ) (Entered: 11/04/2014)
306 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall: In Court hearing set for 11/6/2014 at 01:30 PM.Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 11/04/2014)
307 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:In court hearing held on 11/4/2014 and continued to 11/6/2014 at 01:30 PM.Advised in open court notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 11/04/2014)
308 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 11/04/2014 before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. Preliminary Injunction Hearing − Vol. 6. Court Reporter Contact Information: Gayle A. McGuigan, CSR, RMR, CRR, (312) 435−6047, Gayle_McGuigan@ilnd.uscourts.gov.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

11/06/2014 11/07/2014

Redaction Request due 11/26/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/8/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/3/2015. (McGuigan, Gale) (Entered: 11/05/2014)
310 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:In court hearing held on 11/6/2014 and continued to 11/13/2014 at 10:00 AM. Proceedings will conclude at 5:00 p.m.Advised in open court notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 11/07/2014)
309 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 11/06/2014 before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. − Preliminary Injunction Hearing − Vol. 7 −. Court Reporter Contact Information: Gayle A. McGuigan, CSR, RMR, CRR, (312) 435−6047, Gayle_McGuigan@ilnd.uscourts.gov.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

11/10/2014 11/13/2014

Redaction Request due 11/28/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/8/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/5/2015. (McGuigan, Gale) (Entered: 11/07/2014)
311 OBJECTIONS and cross−designations of Arce deposition (Shannon, Robert) (Entered: 11/10/2014)
312 ORDER: The Plaintiffs' objection to the introduction of the monitor's reports into evidence on the basis of hearsay is overruled. The reports are not hearsay because they are not being admitted for the truth of the matters asserted as to the conditions in Cook County Jail. Instead, they are relevant to the issue of whether or not there is a remedy that is currently in place. The reports are relevant since they represent whether there is adequate equitable relief in effect independent of any preliminary injunction in this case. See Judge v. Quinn, 612 F.3d 537, 546 (7th Cir. 2010) ("To justify a preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs must show... that they are likely to suffer irreparable injury without the injunction[.]"). The Court recognizes the potential prejudice to the Plaintiffs given their inability to cross−examine the reports' author and will weigh the

Case: 1:13-cv-8752 As of: 11/13/2018 09:54 AM CST 37 of 45

11/13/2014 11/14/2014

reports accordingly. Moreover, to the extent that the reports constitute hearsay, the Court has considerable discretion to rely on hearsay in deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction. See Goodman v. Ill. Dept. of Financial and Professional Regulation, 430 F.3d 432, 438−39 (7th Cir. 2005); SEC v. Cherif, 993 F.2d 403, 412 n.8 (7th Cir. 1991). Signed by the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 11/13/2014.Mailed notice(tsa, ) (Entered: 11/13/2014)
313 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:In court hearing held on 11/13/2014 and continued to 11/14/2014 at 01:30 PM. for closing arguments.Advised in open court notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 11/14/2014)
314 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 11/13/2014 before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. Preliminary Injunction Hearing − Vol. 8. Court Reporter Contact Information: Gayle A. McGuigan, CSR, RMR, CRR, (312) 435−6047, Gayle_McGuigan@ilnd.uscourts.gov.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

11/14/2014 11/21/2014

Redaction Request due 12/5/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/15/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/12/2015. (McGuigan, Gale) (Entered: 11/14/2014)
316 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:In court hearing held on 11/14/2014. Defendant's oral motion pursuant to Rule 52 is taken under advisement. Supplemental briefing shall proceed as follows: Plaintiffs' opening brief due 12/5/14. Response due 1/2/15. Replies due 1/16/15. Advised in open court notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 12/02/2014)
315 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 11/14/2014 before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. − Preliminary Injunction Hearing − Vol. 9. Court Reporter Contact Information: Gayle A. McGuigan, CSR, RMR, CRR, (312) 435−6047, Gayle_McGuigan@ilnd.uscourts.gov.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

12/05/2014 01/02/2015 01/16/2015 02/03/2015 02/03/2015

Redaction Request due 12/12/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/22/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/19/2015. (McGuigan, Gale) (Entered: 11/21/2014)
317 SUPPLEMENT to motion for preliminary injunction 36 , memorandum in support of motion 37 (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 12/05/2014)
318 SUPPLEMENT to response in opposition to motion 175 for preliminary injunction (Shannon, Robert) (Entered: 01/02/2015)
319 SUPPLEMENT to motion for preliminary injunction 36 , memorandum in support of motion 37 (Plaintiffs' Post−Hearing Reply Brief) (Shapiro, David) (Entered: 01/16/2015)
320 MOTION by Defendants Tom Dart, E. Greer, Lieutenant Johnson, Cara Smith for leave to file supplemental surreply brief in opposition (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Shannon, Robert) (Entered: 02/03/2015)
321 NOTICE of Motion by Robert Thomas Shannon for presentment of motion for leave to file 320 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 2/9/2015 at 09:00 AM. (Shannon, Robert) (Entered: 02/03/2015)

Case: 1:13-cv-8752 As of: 11/13/2018 09:54 AM CST 38 of 45

02/04/2015
02/04/2015
03/03/2015 03/03/2015 03/03/2015
03/31/2015 03/31/2015
03/31/2015 04/07/2015 04/07/2015 04/07/2015 04/15/2015 04/16/2015
04/17/2015 04/17/2015 04/17/2015 04/23/2015

322 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall: MOTION by Defendants Tom Dart, E. Greer, Lieutenant Johnson, Cara Smith for leave to file supplemental surreply brief in opposition 320 is granted. No further briefing will be permitted.Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 02/04/2015)
323 SUPPLEMENTAL SUR−REPLY Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction by Defendants Officer Campbell, Tom Dart, E. Greer, Lieutenant Johnson, Mr. Johnson, Ms. Lewis, Sargeant Lewis, Toni Preckwinkle, Cara Smith, The County of Cook, Thomas, Officer Wilson. (mr, ) (Entered: 02/05/2015)
324 MOTION by counsel for Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield to withdraw as attorney Nicole C. Berg (Berg, Nicole) (Entered: 03/03/2015)
325 NOTICE of Motion by Nicole C. Berg for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney 324 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 3/9/2015 at 09:00 AM. (Berg, Nicole) (Entered: 03/03/2015)
326 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall: MOTION by counsel for Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield to withdraw as attorney Nicole C. Berg 324 is granted. Nicole C. Berg is given leave to withdraw her appearance. Motion hearing set for 3/9/2015 on this motion is hereby stricken.Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 03/03/2015)
327 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall: MOTION by Defendants Tom Dart, E. Greer, Sargeant Lewis, Cara Smith for leave to file oversized brief 250 is granted. Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 03/31/2015)
328 President Preckwinkle and Cook Countys motion to dismiss 81 is denied. The Sheriffs Office Defendants motion to dismiss 144 is granted in part and denied in part. The Amended Complaint is dismissed as to Lieutenant Lewis, but the remainder of the motion is denied. Defendants motion to strike Plaintiffs submission related to the preliminary injunction hearing 231 is denied. Plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction 36 is denied. Signed by the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 3/31/2015:mailed notice(Kendall, Virginia) (Entered: 03/31/2015)
329 Enter MEMORANDUM, OPINION AND ORDER: This is the corrected order of document 328 to correct typographical errors. Signed by the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 3/31/2015.Mailed notice(tsa, ) (Entered: 04/01/2015)
330 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall: Status hearing set for 4/16/2015 at 09:00 AM.Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 04/07/2015)
331 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Toni Preckwinkle, The County of Cook by Scott A. Golden (Golden, Scott) (Entered: 04/07/2015)
332 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Toni Preckwinkle, The County of Cook by Justin W. Hanson (Hanson, Justin) (Entered: 04/07/2015)
333 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Toni Preckwinkle, The County of Cook by Donald J. Pechous (Pechous, Donald) (Entered: 04/15/2015)
334 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Status hearing held on 4/16/2015. Parties to call in by 4/30/2015 to inform the court if the parties agree that the discovery is stayed pending appeal. Advised in open court notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 04/16/2015)
335 NOTICE of appeal by Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield regarding orders 329 , 328 Filing fee $ 505, receipt number 0752−10552259. (Shapiro, David) (Entered: 04/17/2015)
336 NOTICE of Appeal Due letter sent to counsel of record regarding notice of appeal 335 . (smm) (Entered: 04/17/2015)
337 TRANSMITTED to the 7th Circuit the short record on notice of appeal 335 . Notified counsel (smm) (Entered: 04/17/2015)
338 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:By agreement of the parties, discovery is stayed pending appeal. Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 04/23/2015)

Case: 1:13-cv-8752 As of: 11/13/2018 09:54 AM CST 39 of 45

05/01/2015 05/01/2015 05/04/2015 05/04/2015 05/04/2015
05/08/2015 05/08/2015
05/08/2015 05/21/2015 05/28/2015

339 MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield, Respondent Susan McCampbell to supplement record on appeal (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 05/01/2015)
340 NOTICE of Motion by Sheila A Bedi for presentment of motion to supplement 339 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 5/11/2015 at 09:00 AM. (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 05/01/2015)
341 MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield to seal (Attachments: # 1 Errata A)(Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 05/04/2015)
342 NOTICE of Motion by Sheila A Bedi for presentment of motion to seal 341 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 5/11/2015 at 09:00 AM. (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 05/04/2015)
343 EXHIBIT by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield, Respondent Susan McCampbell regarding MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield, Respondent Susan McCampbell to supplement record on appeal 339 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Defendants 662, # 2 Exhibit Plaintiffs 124 A, # 3 Exhibit Plaintiffs 124B, # 4 Exhibit Plaintiffs 124C, # 5 Exhibit Plaintiffs125D, # 6 Exhibit Plaintiffs 124E, # 7 Exhibit Plaintiffs 124F, # 8 Exhibit Plaintiffs 124G, # 9 Exhibit Plaintiffs 124H, # 10 Exhibit Plaintiffs 124I, # 11 Exhibit Plaintiffs124J, # 12 Exhibit Plaintiffs124K, # 13 Exhibit Plaintiffs124L, # 14 Exhibit Plaintiffs124M, # 15 Exhibit Plaintiffs124N, # 16 Exhibit Plaintiffs124O, # 17 Exhibit Plaintiffs124P, # 18 Exhibit Plaintiffs124Q, # 19 Exhibit Plaintiffs124R, # 20 Exhibit Plaintiffs124S, # 21 Exhibit Defendants unnumbered U.S. v. Cook County Monitoring Report 9, # 22 Exhibit Defendants 41)(Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 05/04/2015)
344 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Motion to supplement 339 the record on appeal is granted. Motion to seal 341 is granted. Motion hearings set for 5/11/2015 on these motions are hereby stricken.Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 05/08/2015)
345 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Minute entry 344 is stricken and was entered in error. Status hearing set for 5/21/2015 at 9:00 a.m. Reopen Document MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield, Respondent Susan McCampbell to supplement record on appeal 339 and MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield to seal 341 . Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 05/08/2015)
346 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Minute entry 345 is clarified that the parties need not appear on 5/11/2015, but shall appear for status on 5/21/2015 @ 9:00 a.m. The rest of the order shall stand.Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 05/08/2015)
347 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Status hearing held on 5/21/2015. Motions to supplement 339 and to seal 341 are taken under advisement. Status hearing set for 6/22/2015 at 09:00 AM. Parties shall go through the exhibits and submit an agreed order to the court on 6/22/2015.Advised in open court notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 05/21/2015)
348 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 05/21/2015 before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. Court Reporter Contact Information: Gayle A. McGuigan, CSR, RMR, CRR, (312) 435−6047, Gayle_McGuigan@ilnd.uscourts.gov.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

Redaction Request due 6/18/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 6/29/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/26/2015. (McGuigan, Gale) (Entered: 05/28/2015)

Case: 1:13-cv-8752 As of: 11/13/2018 09:54 AM CST 40 of 45

06/19/2015
06/26/2015 07/01/2015 07/02/2015
07/07/2015 07/07/2015 07/13/2015 07/29/2015 07/30/2015
07/31/2015
08/20/2015 08/20/2015 08/21/2015 08/21/2015 08/21/2015 09/04/2015

349 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall: The parties' joint telephonic request for an extension of time is granted. The status hearing on 6/22/2015 is stricken and reset to 7/1/2015 at 9:00 AM. The parties' agreed order regarding which exhibits should be included in the record on appeal is due on 6/26/2015. Mailed notice (am) (Entered: 06/19/2015)
350 Joint Submission Regarding Plaintiffs' Motion to Supplement the Record on Appeal by Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Susan McCampbell, Laton Stubblefield (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 06/26/2015)
351 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Status hearing held on 7/1/2015. Cook County defendant shall file their answer by 7/8/2015. Advised in open court notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 07/01/2015)
352 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:To assist the Court's review, the parties shall file a revised joint submission regarding the Plaintiffs' motion to supplement the record on appeal by July 14, 2015. The parties shall add a column to the tables of contested exhibits that indicates the binder in which the referenced exhibit can be found. Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 07/02/2015)
353 ANSWER to amended complaint with Affirmative Defenses and Jury Demand by Toni Preckwinkle, The County of Cook(Golden, Scott) (Entered: 07/07/2015)
354 NOTICE by Toni Preckwinkle, The County of Cook re answer to amended complaint 353 (Golden, Scott) (Entered: 07/07/2015)
355 Joint Submission Regarding Plaintiffs' Motion to Supplement the Record on Appeal by Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 07/13/2015)
356 STIPULATION of Dismissal for Plaintiff Brooks' Claims (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 07/29/2015)
357 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties, through their respective attorneys, hereby stipulate and agree to the dismissal of all claims brought in this action by plaintiff Jermain Brooks, with prejudice and with each side bearing its own costs and fees. This is pursuant to settlement.Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 07/30/2015)
358 Enter ORDER: Plaintiffs motion to supplement the record on appeal 339 is granted in part and denied in part. All exhibits attached to Plaintiffs motion except Exhibits PX 122, DX 11, and DX 263 shall be included in the record on appeal. Exhibits PX 121, PX 144, DX 301, DX 303, and DX 393 shall be sealed. Plaintiffs motion to seal 341 is granted. Signed by the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 7/31/2015.Mailed notice(tsa, ) (Entered: 07/31/2015)
359 MOTION by Plaintiffs Laton Stubblefield, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews to dismiss injunctive claims (Shapiro, David) (Entered: 08/20/2015)
360 NOTICE of Motion by David M. Shapiro for presentment of motion to dismiss 359 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 8/26/2015 at 09:00 AM. (Shapiro, David) (Entered: 08/20/2015)
361 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Motion to dismiss 359 injunctive claims is granted. Motion hearing set for 8/26/2015 on this motion is hereby stricken.Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 08/21/2015)
362 LETTER from the Seventh Circuit returning the record on appeal in USCA no. 15−1833 no record to be returned (sr, ) (Entered: 08/24/2015)
363 MANDATE of USCA dated 08/21/2015 regarding notice of appeal 335 ; USCA No. 15−1833. Upon consideration of the motion to dismiss appeal, filed on August 20, 2015, by counsel for the appellants, IT IS ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(b). (sr, ) (Entered: 08/24/2015)
364 MOTION by Defendants Officer Campbell, Tom Dart, E. Greer, Lieutenant Johnson, Sargeant Lewis, Cara Smith, Thomas, Officer Wilson for bill of costs (Shannon, Robert) (Entered: 09/04/2015)

Case: 1:13-cv-8752 As of: 11/13/2018 09:54 AM CST 41 of 45

09/04/2015
09/09/2015 09/11/2015 09/11/2015 09/11/2015 09/21/2015 09/21/2015 09/22/2015 10/02/2015 10/02/2015 10/05/2015 10/12/2015 10/12/2015 10/13/2015 11/12/2015 11/12/2015

365 NOTICE OF EMAIL NOTIFICATION FAILURE, for document # 364 sent to Attorney Steve Weil steve.weil@law.northwestern.edu returned as: Unknown address error. Mailed to attorney Steve Weil Letter re: bounce back email and a Notification of Change of Address form. Notices have been set to No. Counsel must email the Clerk's Office at Docketing_ILND@uscourts.gov when a Notification of Change of Address has been filed to ensure electronic notification is reset. (sxn, ) (Entered: 09/08/2015)
366 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:The Court grants the Defendants' motion to redact portions of the transcript of the September 9, 2014 236 conference (Dkt. No. 262) pursuant to the Protective Order entered in the case. Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 09/10/2015)
367 MOTION by Plaintiffs Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield for extension of time Agreed, MOTION by Plaintiffs Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield for extension of time to file response/reply as to motion for bill of costs 364 (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 09/11/2015)
368 NOTICE of Motion by Sheila A Bedi for presentment of extension of time, motion for extension of time to file response/reply, motion for relief,,, 367 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 9/17/2015 at 09:00 AM. (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 09/11/2015)
369 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Motion for extension of time 367 to file response to the bill of costs is granted to 9/21/2015. Motion hearing set for 9/17/2015 on this motion is hereby stricken.Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 09/11/2015)
370 MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews for extension of time (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 09/21/2015)
371 NOTICE of Motion by Sheila A Bedi for presentment of extension of time 370 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 9/29/2015 at 09:00 AM. (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 09/21/2015)
372 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Motion for second extension of time 370 to respond to defendants' bill of costs is granted to 10/2/2015. Motion hearing set for 9/29/2015 on this motion is hereby stricken. Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 09/22/2015)
373 MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton Stubblefield for extension of time (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 10/02/2015)
374 NOTICE of Motion by Sheila A Bedi for presentment of extension of time 373 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 10/7/2015 at 09:00 AM. (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 10/02/2015)
375 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Motion for extension of time 373 to file a response to the bill of costs is granted to 10/12/2015. Motion hearing set for 10/7/2015 on this motion is hereby stricken. Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 10/05/2015)
376 MOTION by Plaintiffs Jermaine Brooks, Anton Carter, Tylon Hudson, Angelo Matthews, Laton StubblefieldJoint Motion Withdrawing Bill of Costs (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 10/12/2015)
377 NOTICE of Motion by Sheila A Bedi for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 376 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 10/19/2015 at 09:00 AM. (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 10/12/2015)
378 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Motion 376 to withdraw bill of costs is granted. Motion for bill of costs 364 is withdrawn. Motion hearing set for 10/19/2015 on this motion is hereby stricken. Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 10/13/2015)
379 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Tylon Hudson by Alan J. Iverson (Iverson, Alan) (Entered: 11/12/2015)
380 MOTION by Plaintiff Tylon Hudson for leave to file / Unopposed Motion For Leave To File Second Amended Complaint (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Second Amended

Case: 1:13-cv-8752 As of: 11/13/2018 09:54 AM CST 42 of 45

11/12/2015 11/13/2015
11/16/2015
11/23/2015 11/23/2015 11/24/2015 12/02/2015 12/02/2015 12/03/2015
12/23/2015 12/23/2015 03/31/2016 04/05/2016 04/06/2016

Complaint)(Merrick, Andrew) (Entered: 11/12/2015)
381 NOTICE of Motion by Andrew Francis Merrick for presentment of motion for leave to file 380 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 11/24/2015 at 09:00 AM. (Merrick, Andrew) (Entered: 11/12/2015)
382 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Unopposed motion for leave to file 380 second amended complaint is granted. The second amended complaint shall be filed as a separate document and not as an attachment. Motion hearing set for 11/24/2015 on this motion is hereby stricken. Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 11/13/2015)
383 Second AMENDED complaint by Tylon Hudson against Officer Campbell, Lieutenant Johnson, Officer Wilson and terminating Tom Dart (Sheriff/Warden), E. Greer (Superintendent of Division X, in his official capacity), Mr. Johnson, Ms. Lewis, Sargeant Lewis (in her individual capacity), Angelo Matthews, Susan McCampbell, Toni Preckwinkle, Cara Smith (in her official capacity as Executive Director of the Cook County Department of Corrections), Laton Stubblefield, The County of Cook, Thomas (Superintendent of Division IX, V., in his official capacity), Jermaine Brooks and Anton Carter (on behalf themselves and all similarly situated individuals) (Merrick, Andrew) (Entered: 11/16/2015)
384 MOTION by Defendants Officer Campbell, Lieutenant Johnson, Officer Wilson for extension of time to file answer regarding amended complaint,, 383 AGREED (O'Grady, Paul) (Entered: 11/23/2015)
385 NOTICE of Motion by Paul A O'Grady for presentment of motion for extension of time to file answer, motion for relief 384 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 12/1/2015 at 09:00 AM. (O'Grady, Paul) (Entered: 11/23/2015)
386 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Motion for extension of time to answer 384 or otherwise plead to plaintiff's amended complaint is granted to 12/23/2015. Motion hearing set for 12/1/2015 on this motion is hereby stricken. Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 11/24/2015)
387 MOTION by Attorney Shannon, Lydon, Bensinger, Sperry to withdraw as attorney for Officer Campbell, Tom Dart, E. Greer, Lieutenant Johnson, Cara Smith, Thomas, Officer Wilson. No party information provided (Shannon, Robert) (Entered: 12/02/2015)
388 NOTICE of Motion by Robert Thomas Shannon for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney 387 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 12/7/2015 at 09:00 AM. (Shannon, Robert) (Entered: 12/02/2015)
389 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Motion to withdraw as attorney 387 is granted. Robert T. Shannon, James M. Lydon, V. Brette Bensinger, and Gretchen Harris Sperry are given leave to withdraw their appearances on behalf of Officer Campbell, Tom Dart, E. Greer, Lieutenant Johnson, Cara Smith, Thomas, Officer Wilson. Motion hearing set for 12/7/2015 on this motion is hereby stricken. Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 12/03/2015)
390 ANSWER to amended complaint and Affirmative Defenses by Officer Campbell, Lieutenant Johnson, Officer Wilson(O'Grady, Paul) (Entered: 12/23/2015)
391 NOTICE by Officer Campbell, Lieutenant Johnson, Officer Wilson re answer to amended complaint 390 (O'Grady, Paul) (Entered: 12/23/2015)
392 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. Joint Status Report due by 4/5/2016. Status hearing set for 4/7/2016 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice. (lk, ) Modified and regenerated NEF on 3/31/2016 (lk, ). (Entered: 03/31/2016)
393 STATUS Report (Joint) by Tylon Hudson (Merrick, Andrew) (Entered: 04/05/2016)
394 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. The parties state in their Joint Status Report they provided Court with a Proposed Discovery Order on 1/26/2016 "docket 338". No such Proposed Order was docketed or filed with the Court. End of Discovery ordered closed by 7/29/2016. End of Fact Discovery Status hearing set for 8/1/2016 at 9:00 AM. Final Pretrial Order due 8/19/2016. Final Pretrial

Case: 1:13-cv-8752 As of: 11/13/2018 09:54 AM CST 43 of 45

05/09/2016 05/09/2016
05/10/2016 05/17/2016 05/17/2016 05/18/2016 05/23/2016
05/24/2016 06/13/2016 07/25/2016 08/02/2016
08/04/2016 09/16/2016 09/19/2016 09/19/2016 09/19/2016 09/19/2016

Conference set for 9/2/2016 at 10:00 AM. Motions in limine with supporting memoranda due by 8/19/2016. Jury instructions in three sets (1 agreed, 1 defendant, 1 plaintiff) by 8/19/2016. Jury Trial set for 9/12/2016 at 9:15 AM. Status hearing set for 4/7/2016 is stricken. Mailed notice. (lk, ) (Entered: 04/06/2016)
395 MOTION by Defendants Officer Campbell, Lieutenant Johnson, Officer WilsonLeave to take Incarcerated Plaintiff and witness depositions (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(O'Grady, Paul) (Entered: 05/09/2016)
396 NOTICE by Officer Campbell, Lieutenant Johnson, Officer Wilson re MOTION by Defendants Officer Campbell, Lieutenant Johnson, Officer WilsonLeave to take Incarcerated Plaintiff and witness depositions 395 (O'Grady, Paul) (Entered: 05/09/2016)
397 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. Defendants' Motion for leave to take incarcerated Plaintiff and witness depositions 395 is granted. Motion hearing stricken. Mailed notice (lk, ) (Entered: 05/10/2016)
398 MOTION by Plaintiff Tylon Hudson to continue / Unopposed Motion To Continue Trial Date (Merrick, Andrew) (Entered: 05/17/2016)
399 NOTICE of Motion by Andrew Francis Merrick for presentment of motion to continue 398 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 5/23/2016 at 09:00 AM. (Merrick, Andrew) (Entered: 05/17/2016)
400 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall: The parties are directed to appear on the unopposed motion with their calendars. The Court is not available for a full week trial October 3, 2016. Mailed notice. (et, ) (Entered: 05/18/2016)
401 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. Motion hearing held on 5/23/2016 regarding Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion to continue trial date. Plaintiff's 398 Motion to continue trial date 398 is granted. Jury Trial set for 9/12/2016 is reset to begin 10/3/2016 at 9:15 AM. Mailed notice. (lk, ) (Entered: 05/23/2016)
402 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: All matters relating to the referral of this action having been concluded, the referral is closed and the case is returned to the assigned District Judge. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 05/24/2016)
403 NOTICE by Leah K Casto of Change of Address / Notice of Change of Name (Casto, Leah) (Entered: 06/13/2016)
404 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. Status hearing set for 8/1/2016 is reset for 8/2/2016 at 9:00 AM. Mailed notice (lk, ) (Entered: 07/25/2016)
405 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. Status hearing held on 8/2/2016. Final Pretrial Order due 9/16/2016. Final Pretrial Conference set for 9/23/2016 at 10:00 AM. Motions in limine with supporting memoranda due by 9/19/2016. Jury instructions in three sets (1 agreed, 1 defendant, 1 plaintiff) by 9/19/2016. Jury Trial set for 10/3/2016 at 9:15 AM. Mailed notice (lk, ) (Entered: 08/03/2016)
406 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. Final Pretrial Conference set for 9/23/2016 at 3:00 PM. (TIME CHANGE ONLY) Mailed notice (lk, ) (Entered: 08/04/2016)
407 Proposed Final Pre−Trial Order by Tylon Hudson (Attachments: # 1 Schedule (f) Deposition Designations)(Merrick, Andrew) (Entered: 09/16/2016)
408 MOTION by Plaintiff Tylon Hudsonin limine No. 1 To Bar Evidence Regarding His Current Incarceration (Merrick, Andrew) (Entered: 09/19/2016)
409 MOTION by Plaintiff Tylon Hudsonin limine No. 2 To Bar Evidence Regarding Prior Arrests And Convictions (Merrick, Andrew) (Entered: 09/19/2016)
410 MOTION by Plaintiff Tylon Hudsonin limine No. 3 To Exclude Third Party Witnesses From The Courtroom (Merrick, Andrew) (Entered: 09/19/2016)
411 MOTION by Plaintiff Tylon Hudsonin limine No. 4 To Bar Evidence Of Prior Lawsuits (Merrick, Andrew) (Entered: 09/19/2016)

Case: 1:13-cv-8752 As of: 11/13/2018 09:54 AM CST 44 of 45

09/19/2016 09/19/2016 09/19/2016 09/19/2016 09/19/2016 09/19/2016 09/19/2016 09/19/2016 09/19/2016 09/19/2016 09/19/2016 09/19/2016
09/19/2016 09/19/2016 09/20/2016
09/21/2016

412 MOTION by Plaintiff Tylon Hudson for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum (Merrick, Andrew) (Entered: 09/19/2016)
413 MOTION by Defendants Officer Campbell, Lieutenant Johnson, Officer Wilsonin limine (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3)(Lanzito, Dominick) (Entered: 09/19/2016)
414 NOTICE of Motion by Andrew Francis Merrick for presentment of writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum 412 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 9/22/2016 at 09:00 AM. (Merrick, Andrew) (Entered: 09/19/2016)
415 MOTION by Defendants Officer Campbell, Lieutenant Johnson, Officer Wilsonin limine #2 (Lanzito, Dominick) (Entered: 09/19/2016)
416 MOTION by Defendants Officer Campbell, Lieutenant Johnson, Officer Wilsonin limine #4 (Lanzito, Dominick) (Entered: 09/19/2016)
417 MOTION by Defendants Officer Campbell, Lieutenant Johnson, Officer Wilsonin limine #5 (Lanzito, Dominick) (Entered: 09/19/2016)
418 MOTION by Defendants Officer Campbell, Lieutenant Johnson, Officer Wilsonin limine #6 (Lanzito, Dominick) (Entered: 09/19/2016)
419 MOTION by Defendants Officer Campbell, Lieutenant Johnson, Officer Wilsonin limine #7 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Lanzito, Dominick) (Entered: 09/19/2016)
420 PROPOSED Jury Instructions by Officer Campbell, Lieutenant Johnson, Officer Wilson (Lanzito, Dominick) (Entered: 09/19/2016)
421 PROPOSED Voir Dire by Officer Campbell, Lieutenant Johnson, Officer Wilson (Lanzito, Dominick) (Entered: 09/19/2016)
422 MOTION by Defendants Officer Campbell, Lieutenant Johnson, Officer Wilsonin limine #3 (Lanzito, Dominick) (Entered: 09/19/2016)
423 NOTICE by Officer Campbell, Lieutenant Johnson, Officer Wilson re MOTION by Defendants Officer Campbell, Lieutenant Johnson, Officer Wilsonin limine #7 419 , proposed voir dire 421 , MOTION by Defendants Officer Campbell, Lieutenant Johnson, Officer Wilsonin limine #2 415 , MOTION by Defendants Officer Campbell, Lieutenant Johnson, Officer Wilsonin limine #5 417 , MOTION by Defendants Officer Campbell, Lieutenant Johnson, Officer Wilsonin limine 413 , MOTION by Defendants Officer Campbell, Lieutenant Johnson, Officer Wilsonin limine #6 418 , proposed jury instructions 420 , MOTION by Defendants Officer Campbell, Lieutenant Johnson, Officer Wilsonin limine #3 422 , MOTION by Defendants Officer Campbell, Lieutenant Johnson, Officer Wilsonin limine #4 416 (Lanzito, Dominick) (Entered: 09/19/2016)
424 PROPOSED Jury Instructions by Tylon Hudson (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Merrick, Andrew) (Entered: 09/19/2016)
425 PROPOSED Jury Instructions by Tylon Hudson (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Merrick, Andrew) (Entered: 09/19/2016)
426 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:The Court is unable to accommodate a full week of trial on the previously scheduled trial date and therefore intends to start the trial during the week of September 26, 2016. The parties shall meet and confer and choose a date that week for the commencement of the trial. Five trial days are available from September 26−30, and one trial day on October 3. Therefore, the parties should choose a start date that provides them with the appropriate number of trial days. Finally, no motion to change the trial date will be entertained absent extraordinary circumstances. The case is three years old and has had over one year of discovery in its current stream−lined, single plaintiff form (but two years of extension litigation and discovery preceded the single plaintiff case), the trial date was originally scheduled for September and was moved, and the facts of the case are very narrow and straight−forward. Therefore, the parties should be prepared to proceed during the week of September 26.Mailed notice. (jlj, ) (Entered: 09/20/2016)
427 STIPULATION of Dismissal (Partial Voluntary) (Merrick, Andrew) (Entered: 09/21/2016)

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09/21/2016 09/21/2016
09/23/2016 09/26/2016
10/23/2018

428 AMENDED other 407 Proposed Final Pre−Trial Order (Merrick, Andrew) (Entered: 09/21/2016)
429 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. Plaintiff's Motion for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum 412 is granted. Motion hearing set for 9/22/2016 is stricken. Mailed notice (lk, ) (Entered: 09/21/2016)
430 STIPULATION of Dismissal (Merrick, Andrew) (Entered: 09/23/2016)
431 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. Case is dismissed without prejudice to become with prejudice 11/23/2016. Civil case terminated. Mailed notice (lk, ) (Entered: 09/26/2016)
432 LETTER by Martel Erving.(gcy, ) (Envelope postmarked 10/18/2018) Modified on 10/24/2018 (ew, ). (Entered: 10/23/2018)

 
 Ro	   derick and Solange MacArthur Justice Center

	  

FOR	  IMMEDIATE	  RELEASE	   	  

CONTACT:	  	  Jim	  Bray	  

LEGAL DIRECTOR AND CLINICAL PROFESSOR OF LAW Locke E. Bowman 312.503.0844 l-bowman@law.northwestern.edu
CLINICAL PROFESSOR OF LAW Joseph Margulies 312.503.0890 j-margulies@law.northwestern.edu

Feb.	  27,	  2014	  	  

	  

	  

	  

	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  217-­‐494-­‐5532	  (mobile)	  

	  

Civil	  rights	  class	  action	  suit	  documents	  culture	  of	  

brutality	  and	  violence	  at	  Cook	  County	  Jail	  

	  
Overcrowded	  conditions	  contribute	  to	  out-­‐of-­‐control	  

officers	  and	  barbaric	  conditions	  

CLINICAL ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF LAW Sheila A. Bedi 312.503.2492 sheila.bedi@law.northwestern.edu

	   CHICAGO	  –	  As	  a	  result	  of	  a	  sadistic	  culture	  of	  brutality	  and	  violence,	   2,000	  men	  in	  Cook	  County	  Jail’s	  highest	  security	  units	  live	  under	  a	  

CLINICAL ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF LAW David M. Shapiro 312.503.0711 david.shapiro@law.northwestern.edu

constant	  risk	  of	  life	  threatening	  violence,	  and	  Cook	  County	  elected	   leaders	  and	  jail	  administrators	  have	  failed	  to	  take	  reasonable	   measures	  to	  protect	  the	  men	  awaiting	  trial,	  according	  to	  a	  civil	  rights	  

CLINICAL ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF LAW Alexa Van Brunt 312.503.1336 a-vanbrunt@law.northwestern.edu

class	  action	  lawsuit	  filed	  Thursday	  in	  U.S.	  District	  Court.	   	   Sheriff	  Tom	  Dart,	  Cook	  County	  Board	  President	  Toni	  Preckwinkle	  and	   top	  jail	  administrators	  were	  named	  as	  defendants	  in	  the	  lawsuit	  filed	  

on	  behalf	  of	  people	  housed	  at	  the	  jail	  by	  attorneys	  from	  the	  Roderick	  

GENERAL COUNSEL David J. Bradford 312.222.9350 dbradford@jenner.com

and	  Solange	  MacArthur	  Justice	  Center	  and	  the	  Uptown	  People’s	  Law	   Center.	  	   	  

“The	  sadistic	  violence	  and	  brutality	  at	  the	  Cook	  County	  Jail	  is	  not	  the	  

work	  of	  a	  few	  rogue	  officers,”	  the	  lawsuit	  states.	  “It	  is	  a	  systemic	  

problem	  that	  has	  remained	  unchecked	  at	  the	  highest	  levels	  of	  Cook	  

County	  government.	  The	  Defendants	  have	  had	  actual	  knowledge	  of	  

this	  pattern	  of	  violence	  for	  years	  –	  if	  not	  decades.	  Yet	  they	  have	  still	  

failed	  to	  protect	  people	  confined	  in	  the	  jail	  with	  safe	  from	  brutally	  

abusive	  correctional	  officers	  and	  violence	  on	  the	  living	  units.”	  	  	  

	  

“The	  Cook	  County	  Jail	  is	  lawless,	  corrupt	  and	  the	  people	  confined	  

there	  endure	  barbaric	  violence	  on	  a	  near	  daily	  basis,”	  said	  Sheila	  A.	  

Bedi,	  Clinical	  Associate	  Professor	  of	  Law	  and	  attorney	  for	  the	  

MacArthur	  Justice	  Center.	  Because	  County	  officials	  have	  resisted	  

efforts	  to	  address	  the	  over-­‐crowding	  crisis	  at	  the	  jail,	  people—mostly	  

poor	  and	  African	  American-­‐-­‐	  are	  funneled	  into	  the	  jail	  at	  astounding	  

rates	  ”	  “The	  human	  rights	  abuses	  documented	  in	  this	  lawsuit	  require	  

that	  County	  officials	  take	  immediate	  action	  to	  downsize	  the	  jail	  

population	  and	  adopt	  a	  zero	  tolerance	  approach	  to	  officer	  abuse	  and	  

corruption.	  

	  

-­‐	  more	  -­‐	  

	  

	  

Northwestern University School of Law 375 East Chicago Avenue Chicago, Illinois 60611-3069 Phone: 312.503.1271; Fax 312.503.1272 www.law.northwestern.edu/macarthur

	   	   Feb.	  27,	  2014	   Page	  2	  	   	   “Officers	  attack	  men	  housed	  at	  the	  jail	  when	  they	  are	  handcuffed	  and	  shackled	  and	  pose	  no	   threat	  to	  security–and	  they	  often	  beat	  people	  who	  live	  with	  mental	  illness	  for	   manifestations	  of	  that	  illness,”	  Bedi	  said.	  	  “The	  lack	  of	  mental	  health	  treatment	  in	  the	  jail	   has	  been	  well-­‐documented,	  and	  Cook	  County	  Jail	  employees	  punish	  people	  who	  request	   mental	  health	  treatment	  by	  beating,	  choking,	  slamming	  them	  into	  the	  ground	  and	  stomping	   on	  them.”	  	  	   	   “To	  cover	  up	  these	  attacks	  by	  officers,	  the	  victims	  of	  these	  brutal	  assaults	  are	  often	  placed	   in	  segregation	  as	  retaliatory	  punishment,”	  said	  David	  M.	  Shapiro,	  Clinical	  Assistant	   Professor	  of	  Law	  and	  attorney	  for	  the	  MacArthur	  Justice	  Center.	  	  “Segregation	  is	  the	  polite	   term	  jailers	  use	  when	  they	  lock	  you	  in	  a	  cramped,	  filthy	  cell	  for	  nearly	  every	  minute	  of	  the	   day.	  	  The	  one	  hour	  a	  day	  you	  might	  be	  allowed	  out	  of	  segregation	  is	  spent	  with	  your	  hands	   cuffed	  together,	  your	  legs	  shackled	  and	  your	  handcuffs	  chained	  to	  your	  leg	  shackles,	   preventing	  any	  physical	  activity	  beyond	  a	  hunched-­‐over	  shuffle.”	  	   	   Shapiro	  said	  some	  people	  are	  held	  in	  segregation	  for	  weeks	  and	  months	  at	  a	  time	  for	   alleged	  minor	  disciplinary	  offenses	  and	  explained	  the	  mental	  anguish	  torments	  those	   entering	  without	  a	  history	  mental	  illness	  and	  can	  cripple	  those	  already	  suffering	  from	  a	   mental	  illness.	  	  “Men	  tortured	  in	  segregation	  hear	  those	  in	  neighboring	  cells	  screaming	  into	   the	  night	  as	  they	  descend	  into	  psychosis,”	  Shapiro	  said.	  	  	  	  	   	   The	  class	  action	  complaint	  alleges	  violations	  of	  the	  individuals’	  right	  to	  due	  process	  of	  law	   and	  to	  be	  free	  from	  excessive	  force,	  threats	  of	  excessive	  force	  and	  sadistic	  treatment.	  The	   suit	  alleges	  that	  these	  cruel	  and	  unusual	  punishments	  are	  not	  isolated	  incidents;	  rather,	   they	  are	  the	  result	  of	  a	  culture	  that	  Preckwinkle,	  Dart	  and	  the	  jail’s	  administrators	  have	   done	  little	  to	  change.	  	  	   	   “Cook	  County	  Jail	  is	  the	  largest	  single	  site	  jail	  in	  the	  nation,”	  said	  Alan	  Mills,	  Legal	  Director	   of	  the	  Uptown	  People’s	  Law	  Center.	  	  “It	  is	  horribly	  overcrowded,	  understaffed,	  and	   underfunded	  for	  the	  number	  of	  people	  we	  send	  to	  jail.	  Many	  of	  these	  abuses	  have	  been	   documented	  in	  scores	  of	  lawsuits	  brought	  by	  individuals	  injured	  in	  jail	  beatings,	  and	  in	  a	   2008	  federal	  investigation	  documenting	  how	  overcrowded	  conditions	  contributed	  to	   violence	  in	  the	  jail.	  	  	   	   “A	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Justice	  case	  resulted	  in	  a	  consent	  decree	  with	  Cook	  County	  promising	   to	  provide	  reasonably	  safe	  living	  conditions	  and	  protection	  from	  excessive	  force	  and	   abuse,”	  Mills	  said.	  	  “An	  independent	  monitor	  reports	  twice	  a	  year	  about	  conditions	  at	  the	   jail.	  However,	  despite	  reports	  which	  document	  abuse	  year	  after	  year,	  little	  has	  changed.”	   	   	  
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Feb.	  27,	  2014	   Page	  3	   	   	   The	  lawsuit	  is	  accompanied	  by	  sworn	  declarations	  from	  nearly	  100	  people	  confined	  at	  the	   jail.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  declarations,	  the	  complaint	  is	  based	  on	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  jail’s	  own	   written	  policies	  and	  incident	  reports	  from	  March-­‐May	  2013	  conducted	  by	  a	  nationally	   recognized	  expert	  in	  corrections.	  	  Attorneys	  also	  reviewed	  hundreds	  of	  individual	  civil	   rights	  cases	  filed	  by	  people	  housed	  in	  the	  jail	  during	  the	  past	  three	  years.	  Cook	  County	  paid	   over	  $9	  million	  to	  settle	  claims	  of	  civil	  rights	  violations	  in	  the	  jail.	   	   The	  chilling	  accounts	  of	  brutalization	  in	  the	  jail	  detail	  dozens	  of	  examples	  of	  excessive	  force	   by	  jail	  officers,	  as	  well	  as	  instances	  of	  officers	  commanding	  men	  to	  attack	  other	  people	   housed	  in	  the	  jail.	  	   	   The	  allegations	  in	  the	  lawsuit	  include	  the	  following:	  	   	  
• Jail	  officers	  often	  slam	  people	  to	  the	  floor,	  stomp,	  kick	  and	  punch	  them.	   	  
• Officers	  regularly	  assault	  people	  who	  request	  mental	  health	  care	  or	  attempt	  to	   complain	  to	  higher-­‐ups	  about	  living	  conditions.	  	  	  
	  
• Officers	  rarely	  make	  rounds	  or	  provide	  any	  interventions	  to	  ensure	  people	  are	   protected	  from	  violence	  on	  the	  living	  tiers,	  and	  officers	  order	  men	  to	  attack	  and	  beat	   each	  other.	  
	   • A	  lack	  of	  professionalism	  and	  “a	  violent,	  sadistic,	  cruel	  and	  sometimes	  racist	  and	   homophobic	  bravado	  pervades	  the	  ranks”	  of	  the	  officers,	  lieutenants	  and	  sergeants	   charged	  with	  operating	  the	  jail.	  
	  
• People	  are	  often	  subjected	  to	  physical	  violence	  while	  handcuffed.	  “Officers	  will	  slap,	   kick	  and	  punch	  detainees	  who	  are	  cuffed	  and	  shackled.	  Then	  Officers	  will	  frequently	   drag	  these	  man	  by	  their	  chains,	  banging	  their	  heads	  on	  steel	  doors	  or	  allow	  their	   heads	  to	  slam	  into	  the	  concrete.”	  
	   • Officers	  often	  target	  people	  living	  with	  mental	  illness	  with	  violent	  attacks—often	  for	   behaviors	  that	  are	  manifestations	  of	  mental	  illness	  or	  in	  response	  to	  a	  request	  for	  a	   mental	  health	  evaluation.	  Suicidal	  people	  who	  request	  a	  mental	  health	  evaluation	   are	  also	  beaten	  and	  forced	  back	  into	  their	  cells.	  	  
	   • People	  confined	  in	  the	  jail	  are	  threatened	  with	  taking	  “an	  elevator	  ride”	  –	  code	  for	  a	   beating	  in	  an	  elevator	  away	  from	  witnesses	  and	  cameras.	  	  	  
	   	  
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Feb.	  27,	  2014	   Page	  4	   	  
• Before	  an	  officer	  begins	  to	  videotape	  the	  use	  of	  force	  in	  the	  jail,	  the	  officer	  yells	   “camera	  coming,	  camera	  coming”	  as	  a	  warning	  to	  co-­‐workers.	  	  And	  when	  officers	   are	  on	  video	  during	  a	  beating,	  they	  frequently	  scream	  “stop	  resisting,	  stop	  resisting”	   to	  fabricate	  a	  justification	  for	  the	  attacks.	  
	   In	  addition	  to	  seeking	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  class	  of	  individuals	  who	  now	  are	  or	  in	  the	  future	   will	  be	  housed	  in	  maximum	  and	  super	  maximum	  security	  at	  the	  Cook	  County	  Jail,	  the	   lawsuit	  seeks	  a	  court	  order	  to	  end	  the	  abusive	  and	  barbaric	  practices	  at	  the	  jail	  and	  to	   establish	  a	  system	  of	  effective	  oversight.	  	  One	  of	  the	  named	  plaintiffs	  seeks	  damages	  for	  an	   assault	  he	  endured	  after	  an	  officer	  ordered	  another	  detainee	  to	  attack	  him.	   	   The	  unspeakable	  brutality	  at	  the	  Cook	  County	  Jail	  is	  being	  meted	  out	  in	  the	  name	  of	  county	   taxpayers—and	  taxpayers	  are	  literally	  paying	  for	  this	  abuse	  through	  the	  millions	  of	  dollars	   the	  county	  pays	  annually	  to	  settle	  civil	  rights	  claims	  stemming	  from	  abusive	  jail	  conditions.	   But	  the	  people	  who	  bear	  the	  real	  cost	  are	  those	  who	  leave	  the	  jail	  with	  permanent	  injuries	   as	  a	  result	  of	  county	  officials	  operating	  an	  overcrowded,	  violent	  and	  out	  of	  control	  jail	   system.	  This	  lawsuit	  presents	  an	  opportunity	  for	  county	  officials	  to	  reduce	  the	  jail	   population	  and	  finally	  reform	  jail	  operations	  in	  a	  permanent	  sustainable	  way.	  	   	  
#	  #	  #	   	   	   About	  the	  Roderick	  and	  Solange	  MacArthur	  Justice	  Center	   The	  Roderick	  and	  Solange	  MacArthur	  Justice	  Center	  advocates	  for	  human	  rights	  and	  social	   justice	  through	  litigation.	  As	  one	  of	  the	  nation's	  premier	  civil	  rights	  organizations,	  the	   MacArthur	  Justice	  Center	  has	  played	  a	  prominent	  role	  in	  bringing	  Chicago	  police	   misconduct	  and	  torture	  to	  the	  public's	  attention	  and	  has	  helped	  wrongfully	  convicted	  men	   and	  women	  win	  multi-­‐million	  dollar	  verdicts	  and	  settlements	  as	  compensation	  for	  the	  time	   they	  spent	  in	  prison.	  	  Among	  its	  other	  cases,	  the	  Center	  has	  helped	  lead	  the	  fight	  against	   capital	  punishment	  in	  Illinois,	  has	  fought	  for	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  indigent	  in	  the	  criminal	   justice	  system,	  challenged	  the	  detention	  of	  terrorism	  suspects	  without	  trial	  or	  access	  to	  the	   courts,	  and	  has	  launched	  legal	  battles	  on	  behalf	  of	  juvenile	  parolees	  deprived	  of	  their	  rights	   to	  a	  fair	  hearing	  and	  legal	  representation.	   	   For	  additional	  information,	  visit	   http://www.law.northwestern.edu/legalclinic/macarthur/