Case 1:14-cv-01149-RJL Document 1 Filed 07/07/14 Page 1 of 30

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

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MARCH FOR LIFE

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1317 8th St., NW

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Washington, DC 20001

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JEANNE F. MONAHAN

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3202 Martha Custis Drive

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Alexandria, VA 22302

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and BETHANY A. GOODMAN

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124 Rumsey Ct. SE

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Washington, DC 20003

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Plaintiffs,

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v.

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SYLVIA M. BURWELL, in her official capacity )

as Secretary of the United States Department of )

Health and Human Services; THOMAS E. PEREZ, )

in his official capacity as Secretary of the United )

States Department of Labor; JACOB J. LEW, in )

his official capacity as Secretary of the United )

States Department of the Treasury; UNITED

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STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND )

HUMAN SERVICES; UNITED STATES

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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; and UNITED

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STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE

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TREASURY,

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Defendants.

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_________________________________________ )

Case No. ___14-1149___

VERIFIED COMPLAINT Plaintiffs, the March for Life Education and Defense Fund (March for Life), Jeanne F. Monahan, and Bethany A. Goodman, allege as follows:

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INTRODUCTION
1. The federal government is requiring one of the oldest pro-life organizations in the nation and its employees to pay for health coverage of items that can destroy human embryos early in their development. March for Life exists, and its employees work there, precisely to protect, defend, and respect human life at every stage and to enable other like-minded Americans to do the same. The organization and its employees hold as a basic tenet, based on scientific and medical knowledge that human life begins at conception/fertilization. Thus, a human embryo, small and fragile though it may be, is a human life that the March for Life seeks to protect. The March for Life’s founding documents and articles of incorporation list this belief as an underlying principle. In direct contradiction to the March for Life’s principles about protecting human life at all stages, Defendants seek, under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), to require the March for Life to provide hormonal birth control items or intrauterine devices, which may prevent or dislodge the implantation of a human embryo after fertilization (hereinafter “abortifacients”).
2. March for Life and its employees object to the requirement that their health insurance plan cover such abortifacients. This coverage contradicts their shared beliefs, and none of the employees want to participate in such coverage. Defendants created exemptions from their rules for other groups whose employees “likely” oppose contraception, but they refuse to extend those exemptions to March for Life and its employees.
3. This requirement (hereinafter the “Mandate”) 1 is illegal, unconstitutional and unethical. It is arbitrary and capricious for the government to force a pro-life organization and
1 The Mandate consists of a conglomerate of authorities, including: “Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,” 77 Fed. Reg. 8725–30 (Feb. 15, 2012); the prior interim
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its pro-life employees to pay for abortifacient coverage that fundamentally violates their beliefs and ethical objections in principle and in practice. Thus the Mandate violates the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 500 et seq. (APA), via 5 U.S.C. § 700 et seq. (allowing for judicial review of APA violations). Defendants also violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. (“RFRA”), when they force March for Life’s employees, who work there in order to associate with and express their ethical and religious pro-life beliefs, to obtain health insurance including abortifacients. And the rule violates the Plaintiffs’ right to Equal Protection under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution by refusing them an exemption that Defendants give to similarly situated groups.
4. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief from the Defendants’ violations. The Mandate deprives March for Life’s employees of the ability to choose a non-abortifacient health insurance plan and it prohibits March for Life from obtaining and offering such a plan.
IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES 5. Plaintiff March for Life is a non-profit, non-religious pro-life organization organized under the laws of the District of Columbia. It is located in Washington, D.C.
final rule found at 76 Fed. Reg. 46621–26 (Aug. 3, 2011) which the Feb. 15 rule adopted “without change”; the guidelines by Defendant HHS’s Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/, mandating that health plans include no-cost-sharing coverage of “All Food and Drug Administration approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for all women with reproductive capacity” as part of required women’s “preventive care”; regulations issued by Defendants in 2010 directing HRSA to develop those guidelines, 75 Fed. Reg. 41726 (July 19, 2010); the statutory authority found in 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) requiring unspecified preventive health services generally, to the extent Defendants have used it to mandate coverage to which Plaintiffs object; penalties existing throughout the United States Code for noncompliance with these requirements; and other provisions of ACA or its implementing regulations that affect exemptions or other aspects of the Mandate.
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6. Plaintiff Jeanne F. Monahan is the President of March for Life. She is a nationally recognized pro-life advocate and opponent of abortifacient drugs and devices. She is a participant in March for Life’s health insurance plan. She resides in Alexandria, Virginia.
7. Plaintiff Bethany A. Goodman is an employee at March for Life and a participant in March for Life’s health insurance plan. She resides in Washington, D.C.
8. Defendant Sylvia M. Burwell is the Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). In this capacity, she has the responsibility for the operation and management of HHS. Burwell is sued in her official capacity only.
9. Defendant HHS is an executive agency of the United States government and is responsible for the promulgation, administration, and enforcement of the Mandate.
10. Defendant Thomas E. Perez is the Secretary of the United States Department of Labor. In this capacity, he has responsibility for the operation and management of the Department of Labor. Perez is sued in his official capacity only.
11. Defendant Department of Labor is an executive agency of the United States government and is responsible for the promulgation, administration, and enforcement of the Mandate.
12. Defendant Jacob Lew is the Secretary of the Treasury. In this capacity, he has responsibility for the operation and management of the Department. Lew is sued in his official capacity only.
13. Defendant Department of Treasury is an executive agency of the United States government and is responsible for the promulgation, administration, and enforcement of the Mandate.
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE 14. This action arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1361, jurisdiction to render declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 & 2202, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1, 5 U.S.C. § 702, and Fed. R. Civ. P. 65, and to award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 15. Venue lies in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1391(e). Plaintiff March for Life and the United States Defendants are located in this district. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS I. March for Life’s Beliefs. 16. March for Life was founded in 1973, following the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Roe v. Wad e, when a group of pro-life leaders gathered to express concern that the first anniversary of the decision would come and go with no recognition. 17. The hallmark of March for Life is its annual march on the Supreme Court and United States Capitol, held every year on or around January 22, the anniversary of Roe v. Wade. March for Life intends to hold the march every year until Roe v. Wad e is overturned. The first march was held on January 22, 1974. 18. March for Life organizes for the purpose of protecting the lives of unborn children, promoting respect for the worth and dignity of all unborn children, and opposing abortion in all its forms. 19. Life begins at conception, thus a human embryo is a human life that March for Life believes shall be protected and certainly not intentionally terminated. Therefore, March for Life opposes abortifacients. “The life of each human being shall be preserved and protected from
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the human being’s biological beginning when the Father’s sperm fertilizes the Mother’s ovum.” (See Exhibit 1 at 2, attached, March for Life Articles of Incorporation art. 3.)
20. March for Life’s commitment to opposing all abortion includes opposing coverage for abortion or abortifacients in their health insurance plan.
21. Because of this commitment, March for Life only hires employees who oppose all abortion, including abortifacients.
22. March for Life has three employees who have elected to be covered under its health insurance plan. All three object to participating in a plan that covers abortion-inducing drugs and devices for plan participants. Two of those employees are Plaintiffs Jeanne F. Monahan and Bethany A. Goodman.
23. March for Life’s health insurance plan does not qualify for grandfathered status under the Affordable Care Act because, among other reasons, it did not come into existence until after the Act’s relevant passage date in 2010.
24. March for Life believes that it should provide all of its employees with health insurance as a responsible business practice, as an essential benefit for employees, and so employees will have a pro-life health insurance option.
25. March for Life’s health insurance carrier has indicated it would offer coverage to MFL that omits abortifacients if doing so was legally permissible. II. The March for Life Employees’ Religious Beliefs.
26. Plaintiffs Jeanne F. Monahan and Bethany A. Goodman, are full-time employees of March for Life. Each employee receives health insurance coverage through March for Life.
27. Miss Monahan is a Catholic Christian, and Mrs. Goodman is an Evangelical Protestant Christian (hereinafter “employees”).
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28. Each of the employees strives to follow their ethical and religious beliefs and the moral teachings of their faith throughout their lives, including within their employment.
29. Each of the employees believe that all human lives have full human dignity from the moment of conception/fertilization, because at that moment a new and complete organism comes into existence (although at an immature stage) and is a whole, living, distinct, individual member of the human species; in other words, it is an individual human being. Each employee also holds that the destruction of an innocent human life at any stage in development is a grave injustice. Each employee sees abortion as a violation of human rights.
30. They believe that in order to be true to their religious and ethical conscience, they are called to live out those beliefs in their work and how they live their lives. Furthermore, March for Life employees believe that to sever their beliefs from practice is to disobey their faith.
31. Each employee specifically works at the March for Life in order to educate Americans about the dignity of the human person from conception/fertilization and to help protect life in all of its stages.
32. As a matter of their religious faith and belief, the March for Life employees believe that they are prohibited from using, supporting, or otherwise advocating abortifacients drugs and devices, which may act to end very early human life.
33. The employees have sincere and deeply held religious and moral beliefs against abortion and abortifacients, and they oppose having insurance coverage for the same for themselves and their families.
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34. Consequently, the March for Life employees object, on the basis of their sincerely held ethical and religious beliefs, to participating in a health insurance plan which provides coverage for abortifacient items for themselves and their family members.
35. Forcing the March for Life employees to participate in a health insurance plan which provides coverage for abortifacient items places numerous substantial burdens on the religious beliefs and exercise of each individual employee. III. The ACA Statute.
36. In March 2010, Congress passed, and President Obama signed into law, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Publ. L. 111-148 (March 23, 2010), and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. 111-152 (March 30, 2010), collectively known as the “Affordable Care Act” (“ACA”).
37. The ACA regulates the national health insurance market by directly regulating “group health plans” and “health insurance issuers.”
38. One ACA provision mandates that any “group health plan” (including employers offering the plan) or “health insurance issuer offering group or individual health insurance coverage” must provide coverage for certain preventive care services. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a).
39. These services include medications, screenings, and counseling given an “A” or “B” rating by the United States Preventive Services Task Force; immunizations recommended by the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; and “preventive care and screenings” specific to infants, children, adolescents, and women, as to be “provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health Resources and Services Administration.” 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(1)-(4).
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40. These services must be covered without “any cost sharing.” 42 U.S.C. § 300gg13(a). IV. Defendants Rush an Abortifacient Mandate through the Regulatory Process.
41. On July 19, 2010, HHS published an interim final rule imposing regulations concerning the Affordable Care Act’s requirement for coverage of preventive services without cost sharing. 75 Fed. Reg. 41726, 41728 (2010).
42. After the Interim Final Rule was issued, numerous commenters warned against the potential conscience implications of requiring objecting individuals and organizations to include certain kinds of services—specifically contraception, sterilization, and abortion services—in their health care plans.
43. HHS directed a private health policy organization, the Institute of Medicine (IOM), to make recommendations regarding which drugs, procedures, and services all health plans should cover as preventive care for women.
44. In developing its guidelines, IOM invited a select number of groups to make presentations on the preventive care that should be mandated by all health plans. These were the Guttmacher Institute, the American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), John Santelli, the National Women’s Law Center, National Women’s Health Network, Planned Parenthood Federation of America, and Sara Rosenbaum. All of these groups advocate for access to contraception and abortion.
45. Plaintiff Jeanne Monahan attended each of the public IOM meetings. She provided remarks at each meeting during the public comment section. During this portion of the meeting, any groups that had not specifically been invited to present were allowed to speak and express concerns.
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46. Public commenters included a variety of pro-life medical doctors, attorneys, health insurance representatives. But no group or individual that opposed government-mandated coverage of contraception, sterilization, abortion, and related education and counseling were among the presenters invited by the IOM.
47. On July 19, 2011, the IOM published its preventive care guidelines for women, including a recommendation that preventive services include “[a]ll Food and Drug Administration approved contraceptive methods [and] sterilization procedures” and related “patient education and counseling for women with reproductive capacity.” Institute of Medicine, Clinical Preventive Services for Wo men: Closing the Gaps , at 102-10 and Recommendation 5.5 (July 19, 2011). In issuing these recommendations, the IOM committee ignored and/or disregarded any technical research that discussed the destruction of life prior to, or in the case of ulipristal, after implantation and how that would impact recommendations. They did not address the large number of public meeting participants who expressed grave concern about the modes of action of these drugs and devices that were destructive rather than preventative. This science and research was simply not considered.
48. FDA-approved contraceptive methods include birth-control pills; prescription contraceptive devices such as IUDs; Plan B (also known as the “morning-after pill”); ulipristal (also known as “ella” or the “week-after pill”); and other drugs, devices, and procedures.
49. In the category of “FDA-approved contraceptives” included in the Mandate are all hormonal contraceptives, IUDs, and emergency contraception, which March for Life and its employees believe function to prevent the implantation of a human embryo after fertilization in some cases.
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50. The manufacturers of many hormonal contraceptives, IUDs, and emergency contraception methods indicate in the labeling of those items that they can function to prevent implantation of an early embryo.
51. The FDA approved in this same “contraception” category a drug called “ella” (the so-called “week after” pill), which studies show can function to kill embryos even after they have implanted in the uterus, by a mechanism similar to the abortion drug RU-486.
52. The Defendants admit that at least Plan B, ella, and IUDs can function in part to cause the demise of the embryo after its fertilization and before its implantation.
53. The requirement for related “education and counseling” accompanying abortifacients, sterilization, and contraception necessarily covers education and counseling given in favor of covered drugs and devices, even though it might also include other education and counseling. Moreover, it is inherent in a medical provider’s decision to prescribe one of these items that she is taking the position that use of the item is in the patient’s best interests, and therefore her education and counseling related to the item will be in favor of its proper usage.
54. On August 1, 2011, a mere 13 days after IOM issued its recommendations, HRSA issued guidelines adopting them in full. See http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines (last visited April 8, 2014).
55. Non-exempt insurance plans starting after August 1, 2012 were subject to the Mandate.
56. Any non-exempt employer providing a health insurance plan that omits any abortifacients, contraception, sterilization, or education and counseling for the same, is subject (because of the Mandate) to heavy fines approximating $100 per employee per day. Such employers are also vulnerable to lawsuits by the Secretary of Labor and by plan participants.
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57. Dropping health insurance coverage for employees would harm an entity’s ability to attract and keep good employees, cause the entity to have to increase employee compensation so that they could purchase health insurance themselves, and cause the entity’s employees to have no option for obtaining health insurance that omits abortifacients.
58. The Mandate applies to all plans that March for Life’s employees have the option of enrolling in, whether at March for Life, on insurance exchanges, or in the individual market. V. Defendants Refuse to Exempt March for Life while Exempting Similar Groups.
59. On the very same day HRSA rubber-stamped the IOM’s recommendations, HHS promulgated an additional Interim Final Rule regarding the preventive services mandate. 76 Fed. Reg. 46621 (published Aug. 3, 2011).
60. This Second Interim Final Rule granted HRSA “discretion to exempt certain religious employers from the Guidelines where contraceptive services are concerned.” 76 Fed. Reg. 46621, 46623 (emphasis added). The term “religious employer” was restrictively defined as one that (1) has as its purpose the “inculcation of religious values”; (2) “primarily employs persons who share the religious tenets of the organization”; (3) “serves primarily persons who share the religious tenets of the organization”; and (4) “is a nonprofit organization as described in section 6033(a)(1) and section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.” 76 Fed. Reg. at 46626 (emphasis added).
61. The statutory citations in the fourth prong of this test refers to “churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and conventions or associations of churches” and the “exclusively religious activities of any religious order.” 26 U.S.C.A. § 6033.
62. HRSA exercised its discretion to grant an exemption for religious employers via a footnote on its website listing the Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines. The footnote states
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that “guidelines concerning contraceptive methods and counseling described above do not apply to women who are participants or beneficiaries in group health plans sponsored by religious employers.” See http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines (last visited April 8, 2014).
63. Defendants excluded March for Life from this exemption because it is not religious and is not a church, even though it does in fact employ only people who share its views against abortion and abortifacients.
64. Like the original Interim Final Rule, the Second Interim Final Rule was made effective immediately, without prior notice or opportunity for public comment.
65. Defendants acknowledged that “while a general notice of proposed rulemaking and an opportunity for public comment is generally required before promulgation of regulations,” they had “good cause” to conclude that public comment was “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest” in this instance. 76 Fed. Reg. at 46624.
66. Upon information and belief, after the Second Interim Final Rule was put into effect, over 100,000 comments were submitted opposing the narrow scope of the “religious employer” exemption and protesting the contraception mandate’s gross infringement on the rights of religious individuals and organizations. Among the many commenters, Jeanne Monahan submitted comments to HHS in the capacity of her previous employer. See Family Research Council, “Comments on Women’s Preventive Services Mandate,” Sept. 30, 201l available at http://downloads.frc.org/EF/EF11I58.pdf (last visited June 23, 2014).
67. The public outcry for a broader religious employer exemption continued for many months. On January 20, 2012, HHS issued a press release acknowledging “the important concerns some have raised about religious liberty” and stating that religious objectors would be “provided an additional year . . . to comply with the new law.” See Jan. 20, 2012 Statement by
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U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Secretary Kathleen Sebelius, available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2012pres/01/20120120a.html (last visited April 8, 2014).
68. On February 10, 2012, HHS formally announced a “safe harbor” for non-exempt nonprofit religious organizations that objected to covering free contraceptive and abortifacient services.
69. Under the safe harbor, HHS agreed it would not take any enforcement action against an eligible organization during the safe harbor, which would remain in effect until the first plan year beginning after August 1, 2013.
70. Defendants excluded March for Life from the safe-harbor because it is not religious.
71. Despite the safe harbor and HHS’s accompanying promises, on February 10, 2012, HHS announced a final rule “finalizing, without change,” the contraception and abortifacient mandate and narrow religious employer exemption. 77 Fed. Reg. 8725-01 (published Feb. 15, 2012).
72. On March 21, 2012, HHS issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM), presenting “questions and ideas” to “help shape” a discussion of how to “maintain the provision of contraceptive coverage without cost sharing,” while accommodating the religious beliefs of non-exempt religious organizations. 77 Fed. Reg. 16501, 16503 (2012).
73. The ANPRM conceded that forcing religious organizations to “contract, arrange, or pay for” the objectionable contraceptive and abortifacient services would infringe their “religious liberty interests.” Id.
74. “[A]pproximately 200,000 comments” were submitted in response to the ANPRM, 78 Fed. Reg. 8456, 8459, largely reiterating previous comments that the government’s
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proposals would not resolve conscientious objections, because the objecting religious organizations, by providing a health care plan in the first instance, would still be coerced to arrange for and facilitate access to morally objectionable services. Plaintiff Jeanne Monahan submitted comments to HHS in the formal capacity of her previous employer. See Family Research Council, “Comments on ‘Accommodation’ for HHS Mandate,” June 8, 2012, available at http://downloads.frc.org/EF/EF12F18.pdf (last visited June 23, 2014).
75. On February 1, 2013, HHS issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) purportedly addressing the comments submitted in response to the ANPRM. 78 Fed. Reg. 8456 (published Feb. 6, 2013).
76. The NPRM proposed two changes to the then-existing regulations. 78 Fed. Reg. 8456, 8458-59.
77. First, it proposed revising the religious employer exemption by eliminating the requirements that religious employers have the purpose of inculcating religious values and primarily employ and serve only persons of their same faith. 78 Fed. Reg. at 8461.
78. Under this proposal a “religious employer” would be one “that is organized and operates as a nonprofit entity and is referred to in section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the [Internal Revenue] Code.” 78 Fed. Reg. at 8461.
79. HHS emphasized, however, that this proposal “would not expand the universe of employer plans that would qualify for the exemption beyond that which was intended in the 2012 final rules.” 78 Fed. Reg. 8456, 8461.
80. Second, the NPRM reiterated HHS’s intention to “accommodate” non-exempt, nonprofit religious organizations by making them “designate” their insurers and third party
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administrators to provide plan participants and beneficiaries with free access to contraceptive and abortifacient drugs and services.
81. Defendants did not include March for Life in either its proposed religious employer definition or its proposed accommodation because March for Life is not religious and is not a church.
82. In issuing the NPRM, HHS requested comments from the public by April 8, 2013. 78 Fed. Reg. 8457.
83. “[O]ver 400,000 comments” were submitted in response to the NPRM, 78 Fed. Reg. 39870, 39871, with religious organizations again overwhelmingly decrying the proposed accommodation as a gross violation of their religious liberty because it would conscript their health care plans as the main cog in the government’s scheme for expanding access to contraceptive and abortifacient services.
84. On April 8, 2013, the same day the notice-and-comment period ended, Defendant Secretary Sebelius answered questions about the contraceptive and abortifacient services requirement in a presentation at Harvard University.
85. In her remarks, Secretary Sebelius stated: We have just completed the open comment period for the so-called accommodation, and by August 1st of this year, every employer will be covered by the law with one exception. Churches and church dioceses as employers are exempted from this benefit. But Catholic hospitals, Catholic universities, other religious entities will be providing coverage to their employees starting August 1st. . . . [A]s of August 1st, 2013, every employee who doesn’t work directly for a church or a diocese will be included in the benefit package. See The Forum at Harvard School of Public Health, A Conversation with Kathleen Sebelius, U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services, Apr. 8, 2013, available at http://theforum.sph
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.harvard.edu/events/conversation-kathleen-sebelius (Episode 9 at 2:25) (last visited April 8, 2014) (emphases added). VI. The Final Mandate Excludes March for Life from the Exemption.
86. On June 28, 2013, Defendants issued a final rule, which ignores the objections repeatedly raised by conscientious objectors and continues to co-opt employers into the government’s scheme of coercing free access to contraceptive and abortifacient services. 78 Fed. Reg. 39870.
87. The final rule contains the discretionary “religious employer” exemption, which exempts formal churches and their integrated auxiliaries and religious orders “organized and operate[d]” as nonprofit entities and “referred to in section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the [Internal Revenue] Code.” 78 Fed. Reg. at 39874.
88. Defendants declared that this exemption covers only churches and their integrated auxiliaries because “Houses of worship and their integrated auxiliaries that object to contraceptive coverage on religious grounds are more likely than other employers to employ people of the same faith who share the same objection, and who would therefore be less likely than other people to use contraceptive services even if such services were covered under their plan.” Id.
89. Defendants excluded March for Life from this definition even though it in fact employs only people sharing its opposition to abortifacients.
90. The Mandate also creates a separate “accommodation” for certain non-exempt religious organizations. 78 Fed. Reg. at 39874. A religious organization is eligible for the “accommodation” if it: (1) “[o]pposes providing coverage for some or all of the contraceptive services required”; (2) “is organized and operates as a nonprofit entity”; (3) “holds itself out as a
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religious organization”; and (4) “self-certifies that it satisfies the first three criteria.” Id. The self-certification serves to trigger an organization’s insurer or third-party administrator’s duties to provide the required items under the Mandate without cost-sharing to the employees of eligible organizations.
91. March for Life does not qualify for the accommodation because it is not religious. 92. Amidst the various comment periods and hundreds of thousands of comments between 2011 and the final Mandate rule, several comments were submitted suggesting that the Mandate should exempt pro-life groups such as March for Life alongside churches, but Defendants did not exempt such pro-life groups, and did not offer adequate reasons for declining to do so. VII. The Mandate’s Impact on Plaintiffs. 93. Under the Mandate, March for Life faces the untenable choices of transgressing its pro-life commitment and its commitment to its pro-life employees by offering abortifacients in its health plan, or violating the law and suffering under the Mandate’s penalties, or revoking its employees’ health plan and sending them into a market where all plans offer abortifacients and many offer abortion at later stages of pregnancy. 94. March for Life’s employees, under the Mandate, face similarly untenable choices between participating in a health plan that provides abortifacient coverage for themselves and their families against their religious and moral beliefs, buying such a plan from the open market which will include abortifacients or might also include surgical abortion. 95. Dropping its insurance plan would place March for Life at a severe competitive disadvantage in its efforts to recruit and retain employees.
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96. The Mandate forces March for Life to deliberately provide health insurance that provides free access to abortifacients drugs.
97. The Mandate and the ACA require the employees of March for Life to accept health insurance coverage for abortifacient items, regardless of the fact that none of the employees desire the coverage.
98. In plans required to cover abortifacients by the Mandate, the Mandate allows no employee to opt out of receiving that coverage even if they do not want the coverage, and even if the employer, plan and issuer would be willing to allow the employees to opt out, as here.
99. The Mandate forces March for Life to facilitate government-dictated education and counseling concerning abortion that directly conflicts with its organizational views regarding the sanctity of human life.
100. Facilitating this government-dictated speech directly undermines the express speech and messages concerning the sanctity of life that March for Life seeks to convey.
101. Coercing March for Life to provide abortifacient coverage in its health insurance plan advances no compelling or even rational interest, because not only March for Life but its employees oppose the coverage.
102. There are numerous alternative mechanisms through which the government could provide access to abortifacients, and March for Life’s employees do not even want that access.
103. The government provides exemptions for religious employers on the explicit rationale that they are “likely” to employ people who do not want contraceptive coverage, but it denies that same exemption to March for Life when it in fact and as a matter of policy definitely only employs people who do not want abortifacient coverage.
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104. The government also exempts grandfathered plans from the Mandate,

encompassing tens of millions of women, 42 U.S.C. § 18011; 75 Fed. Reg. 41,726, 41,731

(2010). Employers who follow HHS guidelines have a “right” to use grandfathered plans

indefinitely. Id.

105. In the ACA, Congress chose to impose a variety of requirements on grandfathered

health plans, but decided that this Mandate was not important enough to impose to the purported

benefit of tens of millions of women.

106. The Mandate was promulgated by government officials, and supported by non-

governmental organizations, who strongly oppose religious and moral beliefs such as those held

by the March for Life and its employees regarding marriage, family, and life.

107. On October 5, 2011, six days after the comment period for the original interim

final rule ended, Secretary Sebelius gave a speech at a fundraiser for NARAL Pro-Choice

America. She told the assembled crowd that “we are in a war.”

108. She further criticized individuals and entities whose beliefs differed from those

held by her and others at the fundraiser, stating: “Wouldn’t you think that people who want to

reduce the number of abortions would champion the cause of widely available, widely affordable

contraceptive services? Not so much.”

109. On July 16, 2013, Secretary Sebelius further compared opponents of the

Affordable Care Act generally to “people who opposed civil rights legislation in the 1960s,”

stating that upholding the Act requires the same action as was shown “in the fight against

lynching

and

the

fight

for

desegregation.”

See

http://www.hhs.gov/secretary/about/speeches/sp20130716.html (last visited April 8, 2014).

20

Case 1:14-cv-01149-RJL Document 1 Filed 07/07/14 Page 21 of 30
110. Consequently, on information and belief, the purpose of the Final Mandate is to discriminate against organizations and individuals that oppose contraception and abortion.
111. The Mandate subjects Plaintiffs to irreparable harm to their statutory and constitutional rights, and Plaintiffs will continue to suffer such harm absent injunctive and declaratory relief.
112. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law. FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution Equal Protection
113. Plaintiffs reallege all matters set forth in paragraphs 1–112 and incorporate them herein.
114. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that government actors treat equally all persons similarly-situated.
115. This requirement of equal treatment applies to organizations as well as to individuals.
116. Through the Mandate’s “religious employer” exemption, Defendants have exempted certain religious organizations that object to complying with the contraceptive mandate based on the dictates of their conscience.
117. Defendants limited that religious employer exemption to churches, religious orders and integrated auxiliaries thereof on the explicit rationale that such entities “are more likely than other employers to employ people of the same faith who share the same objection, and who would therefore be less likely than other people to use contraceptive services even if such services were covered under their plan.” 78 Fed. Reg. at 39874.
118. Defendants refused to exempt non-religious organizations such as March for Life.
21

Case 1:14-cv-01149-RJL Document 1 Filed 07/07/14 Page 22 of 30
119. March for Life in fact only employs currently, and only hires as a matter of policy, employees who share March for Life’s opposition to abortion, abortifacients, and coverage of the same in their health insurance plans.
120. By extending exemptions to churches etc. but failing to extend it to March for Life, Defendants have treated March for Life differently than similarly-situated groups.
121. This differential treatment is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest, furthers no compelling governmental interest, and is not narrowly tailored to any compelling governmental interest.
122. The Mandate thus violates March for Life’s rights secured to it by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
123. Absent injunctive and declaratory relief against application and enforcement of the Mandate, March for Life will suffer irreparable harm.
SECOND CLAIM OF RELIEF Violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb 124. Plaintiffs reallege all matters set forth in paragraphs 1–112 and incorporate them herein. 125. The March for Life employee Plaintiffs including Ms. Monahan and Mrs. Goodman (“March for Life employees”) sincerely hold religious beliefs against using, supporting, or otherwise advocating the use of abortifacients, or participating in a health insurance plan that covers such items for themselves or their families. Their beliefs also require them to maintain their health and wellness, along with that of their families, in order to obey God’s command of honoring him with their physical bodies, and health insurance is an integral part of doing that.
22

Case 1:14-cv-01149-RJL Document 1 Filed 07/07/14 Page 23 of 30
126. The March for Life employees’ compliance with those beliefs is a religious exercise within the meaning of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
127. The Mandate imposes a substantial burden on the March for Life employees’ religious exercise and coerces them to change or violate their religious beliefs.
128. The Mandate fundamentally changes the compensation package that can be offered to the individuals employees, or that they can purchase as health insurance for their families. The Mandate requires that, if the employees accept March for Life’s insurance plan, or buy one for their families, it must provide coverage for abortifacients. This pressures the employees to decline health insurance as compensation, and to deprive themselves and their families of health insurance coverage. At the same time, the individual mandate imposes penalties on the employees and their family members if they do not have insurance.
129. The Mandate exerts pressure to change the employees’ behavior of maintaining health insurance in accordance with their religious beliefs and toward not having health insurance, since all plans they could buy must include coverage for abortifacients. The Mandate makes it impossible for the March for Life employees to find a health insurance plan that would comport with their sincerely held religious beliefs.
130. The Mandate conditions a significant benefit, namely health insurance, on the March for Life employees’ accepting health insurance that covers abortifacients. The Mandate therefore pressures the employees to forfeit benefits otherwise available, or to violate their sincerely held religious beliefs.
131. The Mandate chills the March for Life employees’ religious exercise within the meaning of RFRA.
23

Case 1:14-cv-01149-RJL Document 1 Filed 07/07/14 Page 24 of 30
132. The Mandate serves no compelling governmental interest and is not narrowly tailored to further any compelling government interest.
133. The Mandate or other significant provisions of the ACA do not apply to, inter alia, (1) the enormous number of health insurance plans that enjoy “grandfathered” status, (2) and churches and their integrated auxiliaries, on the explicit rationale that their employees are “likely” to oppose contraception and/or abortifacients. Both exceptions conclusively demonstrate the lack of a compelling interest in imposing the Mandate on March for Life and its employees.
134. The government cannot serve any legitimate government interest by forcing people to accept insurance with abortifacient coverage when they do not want abortifacient coverage.
135. Compelling the March for Life plan and employees to carry health insurance which provides access to such drugs and services is not the least restrictive means of advancing any interest the Defendants might have.
136. The Mandate violates RFRA as applied to March for Life’s employees. THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution Free Exercise of Religion
137. Plaintiffs reallege all matters set forth in paragraphs 1–112 and incorporate them herein.
138. The March for Life employee Plaintiffs including Ms. Monahan and Mrs. Goodman (“March for Life employees”) sincerely hold religious beliefs against using, supporting, or otherwise advocating the use of abortifacients, or participating in a health insurance plan that covers such items for themselves or their families. Their beliefs also require them to maintain their health and wellness, along with that of their families, in order to obey
24

Case 1:14-cv-01149-RJL Document 1 Filed 07/07/14 Page 25 of 30
God’s command of honoring him with their physical bodies, and health insurance is an integral part of doing that.
139. The March for Life employees’ compliance with those beliefs is a religious exercise within the meaning of the Free Exercise of Religion Clause of the First Amendment.
140. The Mandate imposes a burden, and a substantial burden, on the March for Life employees’ religious exercise and coerces them to change or violate their religious beliefs.
141. The Mandate fundamentally changes the compensation package that can be offered to the individuals employees, or that they can purchase as health insurance for their families. The Mandate requires that, if the employees accept March for Life’s insurance plan, or buy one for their families, it must provide coverage for abortifacients. This pressures the employees to decline health insurance as compensation, and to deprive themselves and their families of health insurance coverage. At the same time, the individual mandate imposes penalties on the employees and their family members if they do not have insurance.
142. The Mandate exerts pressure to change the employees’ behavior of maintaining health insurance in accordance with their religious beliefs and toward not having health insurance, since all plans they could buy must include coverage for abortifacients. The Mandate makes it impossible for the March for Life employees to find a health insurance plan that would comport with their sincerely held religious beliefs.
143. The Mandate conditions a significant benefit, namely health insurance, on the March for Life employees’ accepting health insurance that covers abortifacients. The Mandate therefore pressures the employees to forfeit benefits otherwise available, or to violate their sincerely held religious beliefs.
25

Case 1:14-cv-01149-RJL Document 1 Filed 07/07/14 Page 26 of 30
144. The Mandate chills the March for Life employees’ religious exercise within the meaning of the Free Exercise of Religion Clause of the First Amendment.
145. The Mandate is not neutral and is not generally applicable. 146. The Mandate or other significant provisions of the ACA do not apply to, inter alia, (1) the enormous number of health insurance plans that enjoy “grandfathered” status, (2) and churches and their integrated auxiliaries, on the explicit rationale that their employees are “likely” to oppose contraception. Both exceptions conclusively demonstrating the lack of neutrality, general applicability, and a compelling interest in imposing the Mandate on March for Life and its employees. 147. The Mandate serves no compelling governmental interest and is not narrowly tailored to further any compelling government interest. 148. The government cannot serve any legitimate government interest by forcing people to accept insurance with abortifacient coverage when they do not want abortifacient coverage. 149. Despite being informed in detail of the religious objections of groups and people like Plaintiffs, Defendants designed the Mandate and the exemption therefrom in a way that continues to impose the Mandate on them, while not imposing it on some other similarly situated persons. 150. Compelling the March for Life plan and employees to carry health insurance which provides access to abortifacient drugs and services is not the least restrictive means of advancing any interest the Defendants might have. 151. The Mandate violates March for Life’s employees’ rights under the Free Exercise of Religion Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.
26

Case 1:14-cv-01149-RJL Document 1 Filed 07/07/14 Page 27 of 30
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Violation of the Administrative Procedure Act 152. Plaintiffs reallege all matters set forth in paragraphs 1–112 and incorporate them herein. 153. The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) requires a reviewing court to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action” that is “not in accordance with law” or “contrary to [a] constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) & (B). 154. As set for above, the Mandate violates RFRA and the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 155. Defendants did not adequately consider or respond to comments they received indicating that groups like March for Life should be exempt from the Mandate. 156. The Mandate is arbitrary and capricious within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) because it exempts churches which are merely “likely” to have employees who oppose contraception and/or abortifacients, but refuses to exempt March for Life, which is explicitly an anti-abortion organization that only hires anti-abortifacient employees. 157. The Mandate is arbitrary and capricious under the APA because no rational government interest is served by forcing people to accept abortifacient coverage as a condition of having health insurance when those people morally or religiously oppose abortifacient coverage. 158. The Mandate is also contrary to the provision of the ACA that states that “nothing in this title”—i.e., title I of the Act, which includes the provision dealing with “preventive services”—“shall be construed to require a qualified health plan to provide coverage of [abortion] services . . . as part of its essential health benefits for any plan year.” Section 1303(b)(1)(A).
27

Case 1:14-cv-01149-RJL Document 1 Filed 07/07/14 Page 28 of 30
159. The Mandate is also contrary to the provisions of the Weldon Amendment of the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act of 2009, Public Law 110 329, Div. A, Sec. 101, 122 Stat. 3574, 3575 (Sept. 30, 2008), which provides that “[n]one of the funds made available in this Act [making appropriations for Defendants Department of Labor and Health and Human Services] may be made available to a Federal agency or program . . . if such agency, program, or government subjects any institutional or individual health care entity to discrimination on the basis that the health care entity does not provide, pay for, provide coverage of, or refer for abortions.”
160. The Mandate also violates the provisions of the Church Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(d), which provides that “No individual shall be required to perform or assist in the performance of any part of a health service program or research activity funded in whole or in part under a program administered by the Secretary of Health and Human Services if his performance or assistance in the performance of such part of such program or activity would be contrary to his religious beliefs or moral convictions.”
161. The Mandate is contrary to existing law and is in violation of the APA under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests the following relief: A. That this Court enter a judgment declaring the Mandate and its application to March for Life and its employees is a violation of their rights protected by RFRA, the APA and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution; B. That this Court enter a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants from continuing to apply the Mandate to Plaintiffs and their insurers, and other pro-
28

Case 1:14-cv-01149-RJL Document 1 Filed 07/07/14 Page 29 of 30

life groups similarly situated but not before the Court, in a way that requires March for Life or its

employees to provide or participate in health insurance that contains coverage for abortifacients,

or that penalizes March for Life or its employees or their insurers for not offering abortifacient

coverage in Plaintiffs’ health insurance plan;

C. That this court award Plaintiffs nominal damages, and court costs and reasonable

attorney’s fees as provided by the Equal Access to Justice Act and RFRA (as provided in 42

U.S.C. § 1988);

D. That this Court grant such other and further relief as to which Plaintiffs may be

entitled.

Respectfully submitted this 8th day of July, 2014. Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

DAVID A. CORTMAN (DC Bar No. 478748)
ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM 1000 Hurricane Shoals Road NE Suite D-1100 Lawrenceville, GA 30043 (770) 339-0774 (770) 339-6744 (facsimile) dcortman@alliancedefendingfreedom.org
ELISSA GRAVES* ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM 15100 N 90th Street Scottsdale, AZ 85260-2901 (480) 444-0020 (480) 444-0028 (facsimile) egraves@alliancedefendingfreedom.org

s/ Matthew S. Bowman _ _ _ _ _ STEVEN H. ADEN
(DC Bar No. 46777) MATTHEW S. BOWMAN
(DC Bar No. 993261) ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM 801 G Street, NW, Suite 509 Washington, D.C. 20001 (202) 393-8690 (202) 347-3622 (facsimile) saden@alliancedefendingfreedom.org mbowman@alliancedefendingfreedom.org

*Pro hac vice application forthcoming

29

Case 1:14-cv-01149-RJL Document 1 Filed 07/07/14 Page 30 of 30

VERIFICATION OF COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1746
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Executed on July 7, 2014

___ s/ Jeanne F. Monahan_______________ JEANNE F. MONAHAN

s/ Bethany A. Goodman_______________ BETHANY A. GOODMAN

30

 
 ..

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MARCH FOR LIFE, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

) Case No. 14-cv-1149 (RJL)

)

SYLVIA M. BURWELL, et al.,

)

)

FILED

Defendants.

)

MEMO~DUM OPINION

(August~' 20 15) [Dkts. ## 1L 16]

AUG 3 1 2015
Clerk, U.S. District &Bankruptcy Courts for the District of Columbia

Plaintiffs, the March for Life Education and Defense Fund ("March for Life"),

Jeanne F. Monahan, and Bethany A. Goodman (together, "employee plaintiffs"), bring

this action seeking injunctive relief from what is commonly referred to as the

"Contraceptive Mandate" embodied in the regulations implementing the Patient

Protection and Affordable Care Act. Defendants are three federal agencies and their

respective Secretaries: the United States Department of Health and Human Services

("HHS") and Secretary ofHHS Sylvia M. Burwell; the United States Department of

Labor and Secretary of Labor Thomas E. Perez; and the United States Department of the

Treasury and Secretary of the Treasury Jacob Lew (together "defendants" or "the

government''). Secretaries Burwell, Perez, and Lew are named in their official capacities

only. See generally Verified Compl. ("Compl.") [Dkt. #1]. 1

1 A verified complaint is treated as an affidavit to the extent it is based on personal knowledge and sets out facts admissible in evidence. See Neal v. Kelly, 963 F.2d 453, 457-58 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
1

..
Plaintiffs move for a preliminary injunction and consolidated trial on the merits, requesting permanent declaratory and injunctive relief. Mot. for Prelim. Inj. & Consolidated Trial on the Merits & Mem. ofLaw in Supp. ("Pis.' Mot.") [Dkt. #11]. Defendants oppose and move to dismiss plaintiffs' Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss or for Summ. J. [Dkt. #16]; Mem. ofP. &. A. in Supp. ofDefs.' Mot. to Dismiss or for Summ. J. & Opp'n to Pls.' Mot. for Prelim. Inj. ("Defs.' Opp'n") [Dkt. #16].
After reviewing the pleadings, record. and applicable law, the trial on the merits is consolidated with the preliminary injunction and, as the disputes are purely legal, plaintiffs' motion is construed as a motion for summary judgment. For the reasons discussed herein, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to their First Claim for Relief, under the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment; GRANTED as to their Second Claim for Relief, under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act; GRANTED as to their Fourth Claim for Relief under the Administrative Procedure Act; and DENIED as to their Third Claim for Relief, under the free exercise clause of the First Amendment. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to plaintiffs' Third Claim for Relief, and DENIED as to plaintiffs' First, Second, and Fourth Claims for Relief.
BACKGROUND I. Statutory and Regulatory Background
In March 2010, President Obama signed into law The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148. 124 Stat. 119 ("ACA"). One of its many
2

provisions mandates that group health plans and insurers offering group or individual health insurance coverage must cover certain preventive health services without imposing cost sharing requirements on plan participants or beneficiaries. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a). The required preventive services include items or services rated an "A" or "B" by the United States Preventive Services Task Force; immunizations recommended by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices; and preventive care and screenings for women as "provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health Resources and Services Administration" ("HRSA"), a section within HHS. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(l)-(4).
In keeping with the ACA's provisions, HHS directed a third party, the Institute of Medicine ("IOM"), to recommend which services and care should be included under the aegis ofwomen's preventive services. IOM, Clinical Preventive Services for Women: Closing the Gaps (2011) ("IOM Report''), AR2 at 285-534. IOM did so, and the ensuing HRSA Guidelines, published in August 2011, adopted IOM's recommendations. HRSA, Women's Preventive Services Guidelines (Aug. 1, 2011 ), http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/. The HRSA Guidelines provide that, among other things, "[a]ll Food and Drug Administration approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for all women with reproductive capacity" will be covered by the ACA without cost sharing. !d. FDAapproved contraceptive methods include hormonal contraceptives, such as birth control pills, intrauterine devices, and emergency contraception. IOM Report at 105, AR 403.
2 Parallel citations to the administrative record [Dkt. #23] are denoted "AR."
3

Together, the ACA preventive services coverage provision, the HRSA Guidelines, and the HHS, Labor, and Treasury implementing regulations, form what is colloquially referred to as the "Contraceptive Mandate," or, here, simply the "Mandate."
The Mandate is not without its opponents. In the wake of its issuance, HHS was deluged with concerns about "imposing on certain religious employers through binding guidelines the requirement to cover contraceptive services that would be in conflict with the religious tenets ofthe employer." 76 Fed. Reg. 46,621, 46,625 (Aug. 3, 2011). To preserve the "unique relationship between a house of worship and its employees in ministerial positions," and to prevent the Mandate from "imping[ing]" upon religious employees' faith-based objections to contraceptives, HHS promulgated an interim regulation granting HRSA "discretion to exempt certain religious employers from the Guidelines where contraceptive services are concerned." 76 Fed. Reg. at 46,623. The interim regulation was adopted, without change, as a final rule in February 2012. See 77 Fed. Reg. 8,725 (Feb. 15, 20 12). The story, however, does not end there. Besieged by concerns that this safe harbor did not fully resolve fears about imposing the Mandate on classes of individuals that object to the use of contraceptives, HHS initiated a notice-andcomment rulemaking procedure. See 77 Fed. Reg. 16,501, 16,503 (Mar. 21, 2012).
At the conclusion of this rulemaking process in 2013, HHS arrived at the rule in place at the time the Complaint in this case was filed. 3 Under this final rule, HRSA was given authority to exempt from the Mandate health plans "established or maintained by
3 The government issued another set of interim final regulations in August 2014, but they did not change the religious exemption described herein. See 79 Fed. Reg. 51,092 (Aug. 27, 2014); 79 Fed. Reg. 51,118 (Aug. 27, 2014).
4

religious employers." 78 Fed. Reg. 39,870, 39,873 (July 2, 2013). As defined in the regulation, "religious employers'' are confined to "churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and conventions or associations of churches as well as to the exclusively religious activities of any religious order.'' 78 Fed. Reg. at 39,874. Secular non-profit organizations, regardless of their employees' views on contraceptives, are thus excluded from this exemption. HHS reasoned that a narrow religious employer exemption was necessary to accomplish two objectives. First, it addressed HHS' s desire to "respect the religious interests of houses of worship and their integrated auxiliaries." 78 Fed. Reg. at 39,874. Second, it accommodated these religious interests without undermining "the governmental interests furthered by the contraceptive coverage requirement," i.e.-the provision of contraceptive coverage to women who "want it." 78 Fed. Reg. at 39,874; see 77 Fed. Reg. at 8,727. As to the latter objective, HHS opined that the Mandate's central purpose would remain undisturbed because employees of religious organizations would be less likely than employees of secular organizations to want contraceptive coverage in the first instance. Specifically, "[h]ouses of worship and their integrated auxiliaries that object to contraceptive coverage on religious grounds are more likely than other employers to employ people of the same faith who share the same objection, and who would therefore be less likely than other people to use contraceptive services even if such services were covered under their plan." 78 Fed. Reg. at 39,874 (emphasis added).4
4 HHS also devised another mechanism to address the concerns of certain religious non-profit organizations that do not qualify for the exemption. Under its "religious accommodation," an eligible organization can opt out of providing contraceptive coverage through its employer-sponsored plan, in which case the third-party administrator separately provides employees coverage. See 78 Fed. Reg. at 39,874-82. This accommodation applies only to employers claiming a religious objection to providing
5

HHS did not, however, supply a rationale for subjecting to the Mandate secular non-
profit groups whose employees share an analogous objection to the use of certain
contraceptives. 5
II. Parties
March for Life is a non-profit, non-religious pro-life organization founded in 1973
following the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Compl.
~~ 5, 16. March for Life holds as a foundational tenet the idea that life begins at
conception. Id. at~ 1. March for Life defines conception as fertilization of an egg by a
sperm, and thus considers a human embryo to be an unborn human life. Id. at~~ 1, 19.
March for Life will not support abortion in any way, and, as such, opposes coverage in its
health insurance plan for contraceptive methods it deems "abortifacients." Id. at~ 20.
March for Life believes that hormonal contraceptives, IUDs, and emergency
contraception can, and in some cases do, prevent the implantation into the uterus of a
fertilized human embryo, and making them abortifacients; See id. at~ 49.
contraceptive coverage, though it now looks to be extended beyond the original non-profit scope by the Supreme Court's decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (20 14). March for Life does not qualify for an accommodation because it is not religious. Compl. at~ 91. March for Life focuses on the fact that it is not included within the scope of the religious employer exemption, and does not argue that it should be, or wants to be, included within the scope of the accommodation regulation. In addition to those plans offered by exempt religious employers, ce11ain other plans need not provide contraception coverage. Plans that were created prior to March 23, 2010, and have not made specified changes ("grandfathered plans"), are not required to comply with, among other things, the preventive services mandate. 42 U.S.C. § 180 II. This allows certain plans that did not previously offer contraceptive coverage to continue declining to do so. In addition, religious health plans not governed by ERISA ("church plans") need not cover contraceptives. See 79 Fed. Reg. at 51,095 n.8. 5 HHS made passing reference to the fact that "[s]ome commenters requested that the definition of eligible organization be broadened to include nonprofit secular employers and for-profit employers with religious objections to contraceptive coverage." 78 Fed. Reg. at 38,874. HHS, however, "decline[d) to adopt these suggestions." 78 Fed. Reg. at 39,875.
6

March for Life offers health insurance to its employees. See id. at~~ 6-7, 22. March for Life does not qualify for the religious exemption because it is not religious, much less a house of worship or integrated auxiliary. !d. at~ 63. Nor is its health insurance plan a "grandfathered plan," because it did not exist prior to the passage of the ACA in 2010. !d. at~ 23. March for Life's insurance carrier has indicated that it would be willing to offer March for Life a health insurance plan that does not include coverage for abortifacients if it were legally permissible to do so. !d. at~ 25; CareFirst Letter, Ex. A to Affidavit of Pl. Jeanne F. Monahan ("Monahan Affidavit") [Dkt. #27].
March for Life only hires individuals who oppose all forms of abortion, including contraceptives that the organization believes are abortifacients. Compl. ~ 21. This includes the two individual employee plaintiffs here: Jeanne Monahan, a Catholic, is President of March for Life, and Bethany Goodman, an Evangelical Protestant, is one of the organization's employees. !d. at~~ 6-7,27. Both employee plaintiffs participate in the insurance plan currently offered by March for Life. !d. at~~ 6-7.
The employee plaintiffs state that their religious faiths prohibit them from using or supporting the use of abortifacient drugs and devices. Id. at~ 32. They, like the organization they \Vork for, believe that certain ofthe FDA-approved contraceptives are abortifacients. !d. at~ 49. On the basis ofthese "sincere and deeply held religious and moral beliefs against abortion and abortifacients," employee plaintiffs oppose having insurance coverage for contraceptives they deem abortifacients and object to participating in a health insurance plan that provides them such coverage. !d. at~~ 33-34.
7

III. Procedural History Plaintiffs filed the instant suit in July 2014. Compl. Not all claims are alleged by
all plaintiffs. March for Life alone claims that the Contraceptive Mandate and the attendant religious employer exemption violate its right to equal protection under the Fifth Amendment. Compl. ~~ 113-123 (First Claim for Relief). All plaintiffs claim that the Mandate is unlawful and must be set aside under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706, ("APA") for two separate reasons: ( 1) it is arbitrary and capricious because it does not serve a rational government interest as applied to an organization employing only people who are opposed to contraceptive coverage, while exempting churches; and (2) it violates the Constitution and federal laws. Compl. ~~ 152-161 (Fourth Claim for Relief).
The employee plaintiffs also bring challenges based on their religious beliefs. They claim that that applying the Mandate to their health insurance plans violates their rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq., Compl. ~~ 124-136 (Second Claim for Relief), as well as under the First Amendment's Free Exercise clause, id. ~~ 137-151 (Third Claim for Relief).6
6 The government initially challenged employee plaintiffs' standing on the grounds that they needed to submit evidence that their alleged injury here would be redressed by a favorable decision by this Court, because a third party (an insurer) would have to make the decision to otTer employee plaintiffs insurance without contraception coverage. See Defs.' Opp 'n at 22-28. At the request of the Court, plaintiffs submitted a letter received from March for Life's insurance carrier, CareFirst BlueCross BlueShield. The letter states that "Care First would be willing to offer March for Life or its employees a plan omitting the contraceptive coverage that they are objecting to" "[i]f a legal exemption from [the Mandate] is obtained." CareFirst Letter, Ex. A to Monahan Affidavit. This addresses the government's concerns, and the employee plaintiffs, as such, have standing to bring their claims.
8

Plaintiffs request that the Court declare the Mandate unconstitutional and contrary to federal law, and enjoin defendants from continuing to apply the Mandate to plaintiffs and their insurers, such that March for Life can provide, and its employees can participate in, health insurance plans that do not provide coverage for the opposed contraceptives. Compl. at 28-29.
In September 2014, plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction and consolidated trial on the merits on all of their claims. Pls.' Mot. Defendants opposed and moved to dismiss, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. Defs.' Opp'n. I heard oral argument on November 6, 2014, see November 6, 2014 Minute Entry, and received supplemental briefing from both sides on December 10, 2014, see Defendants' Supplemental Brief [Dkt. #28]; Plaintiffs' Supplemental Brief [Dkt. #29].
LEGAL STANDARD
The questions raised by the parties are matters of law, and they have been fully briefed. There are no material factual disputes regarding the administrative record or the allegations in plaintiffs' Verified Complaint. 7 Accordingly, the record is sufficient for a determination on the merits under the summary judgment standard, or, where reliance on the record is unnecessary, under the motion to dismiss standard. I consolidate the preliminary injunction with trial on the merits on all claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)(2), and, theretore, do not need to analyze the typical preliminary injunction factors.
7 As described above, plaintiffs also have supplemented the record with one additional affidavit and an attached exhibit for the purposes of establishing standing. See Monahan Affidavit.
9

I. Rule 12(b)(6) Dismissal The Court may dismiss a complaint or any portion thereof for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court "may consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint and matters ofwhich [the court] may take judicial notice." EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court must "accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint." !d. However, the Court need not "accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations," nor "inferences drawn by plaintiffs if such inferences are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint." Kowal v. MCJ Commc'ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). II. Rule 56(a) Summary Judgment
Where a plaintiffs complaint properly states a claim, summary judgment is the appropriate method by which to resolve the merits of a dispute regarding federal agency action "because the ... regulation's validity is a question of law." See Lederman v. United States, 89 F. Supp. 2d 29, 33 (D.D.C. 2000), on reconsideration in part, 131 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C. 200 I). Summary judgment is warranted when the evidence in the record demonstrates that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
10

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'' Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,322-23 (1986).
ANALYSIS I. Governing Principles
Plaintiffs advance several statutory and constitutional challenges to the Mandate, averring that it violates the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 706, the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. ("RFRA''), and the free exercise clause ofthe First Amendment. See generally Compl. The APA permits a reviewing court to set aside an agency action that is "(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law" or, alternatively, that is "(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)-(B). Stated differently, the APA allows courts to right two types of agency wrongs: procedural missteps and substantive transgressions. While procedural correctness is, to be sure, an important facet of any judicial inquiry, compliance with the law is the true touchstone of legality. Thus, in a context such as this, where plaintiffs have alleged serious constitutional and statutory infirmities, the appropriate starting point for the Court's analysis is not the integrity of the agency's decision-making process, but rather the lawfulness of the Mandate itself. I will therefore begin by addressing plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment, RFRA, and First Amendment arguments and, because I find the first two challenges meritorious, I will refrain from delving into the thicket of an APA review.
11

II. Equal Protection Clause March for Life first argues that the Mandate violates the Fifth Amendment's
guarantee of equal protection because it treats March for Life differently than it treats similarly situated employers. Pis.' Mot. at 8-10. I agree.
The equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits lawmakers from "treating differently [entities that] are in all relevant respects alike." See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 ( 1992) (citation omitted). The practical reality is that regulatory regimes may, and in some cases must, classify persons for one purpose or another. See Pers. Adm 'r ofMass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271 (1979). Thus, to preserve the regulatory balance, equal protection prevents only classifications motivated by discriminatory animus. See id. In the ordinary course, laws that neither burden a fundamental right, nor target a suspect class, must satisfy so-called rational basis review-meaning that to survive an equal protection challenge, they must rationally relate to a legitimate governmental purpose. FCC v. Beach Commc 'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307,313 (1993); see Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677,684-85 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en bane) (applying rational basis review to an agency regulation).
Were defendants to have their way here, rational basis review would have all the bite of a rubber stamp! The sin quo non of equal protection is that the government must ''not treat similarly situated individuals differently without a rational basis" for doing so. Noble v. US Parole Comm 'n, 194 F.3d 152, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (citing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,439 (1985)). The Court is, of course, mindful that the equal protection clause does not impose on lawmakers a requirement of
12

perfect parity. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 ( 1993 ). But the elusiveness of perfection will not excuse regulatory animus. Rational basis review, if it is to have any meaning in the constellation ofjudicial scrutiny, demands that agency line drawing, however inartful, rationally relate to its purported objective. Even under this "most deferential of standards,'' it is incumbent on the Court to find "the relation between the classification adopted and the object to be attained.'' Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996). Were the Court to abdicate this search, it would disregard basic principles of equal protection, which secure not only the rights of domestic persons, but also the limits of regulatory authority. See id. Unfortunately for defendants, the Mandate here defies this conventional inquiry.
Defendants contend that March for Life is not "similarly situated" to the exempted organizations because it "is not religious and is not a church." Defs.' Opp'n at 18 (internal quotation marks omitted). Rational basis review is met, they argue, because the purpose served, "accommodating religious exercise by religious institutions," is "'permissible and legitimate."' See Defs.' Opp'n at 15. This not only oversimplifies the issue-it misses the point entirely! The threshold question is not whether March for Life is "generally" similar to churches and their integrated auxiliaries. It is whether March for Life is similarly situated with regard to the precise attribute selected for accommodation. See Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc. v. Marion Circuit Court Clerk, 758 F.3d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 2014). For the following reasons, I conclude that it most assuredly is.
The clear, and undisputed, purpose of the Mandate is to provide accessible contraceptive coverage for women who "want it" in order to avoid "unintended
13

pregnancies." See 77 Fed. Reg. at 8,727. Religious employers are exempt from the Mandate because of the "unique relationship between a house of worship and its employees in ministerial positions." 76 Fed. Reg. at 46,623. What, then, makes that particular employment relationship "unique" in this particular context? The answer, according to HHS, is simple: employees of religiously exempt organizations are "less likely" than other groups to want contraceptives because of their moral beliefs. In HHS' s own words, "'[h]ouses of worship and their integrated auxiliaries that object to contraceptive coverage on religious grounds are more likely than other employers to employ people of the same faith who share the same objection, and who would therefore be less likely than other people to use contraceptive services even if such services were covered under their plan." 78 Fed. Reg. at 39,874 (emphasis added); see 77 Fed. Reg. at 8,728 ("A group health plan ... qualifies for the exemption if ... the plan is established and maintained by an employer that primarily employs persons who share the religious tenets of the organization. As such, the employees of employers availing themselves of the exemption would be less likely to use contraceptives even if contraceptives were covered under their health plans.") (emphasis added). What emerges is a curious rationale indeed. HHS has chosen to protect a class of individuals that, it believes, are less likely than other individuals to avail themselves of contraceptives. It has consequently moored this accommodation not in the language of conscientious objection, but in the vernacular of religious protection. This, of course, is puzzling. In HHS' s own view, it is not the belief or non-belief in God that warrants safe harbor from the Mandate. The characteristic that warrants protection-an employment relationship based in part on
14

a shared objection to abortifacients-is altogether separate from theism. Stated differently, what HHS claims to be protecting is religious beliefs, when it actually is protecting a moral philosophy about the sanctity of human life. HHS may be correct that this objection is common among religiously-affiliated employers. Where HHS has erred, however, is in assuming that this trait is unique to such organizations. It is not.
March for Life and its employees are evidence of this fact. Anti-abortion advocacy is March for Life's sole and central tenet. Compl. ~ 1. It is an entity founded exclusively on pro-life principles, and its governing ethos-indeed its corporate dogmais staunchly anti-abortifacient. !d. This philosophy is shared, moreover, by March for Life's employees, who "not only agree with its anti-abortifacient views, but [who] work there precisely to advocate those views.'' Pis.' Mem. at 9; see Compl. ~~ 21,26-35, 119, 156. To say that its employees oppose contraceptives understates the vehemence oftheir objection. According to plaintiffs, March for Life's employees not only reject abortifacients in principle, but they "don't want them, don 't want coverage for them, and will not use" them in practice. Pis.' Mem. at 9 (emphasis added). On the spectrum of "likelihood" that undergirds HHS's policy decisions, March's for Life's employees are, to put it mildly, "unlikely" to use contraceptives. In this respect, March for Life and exempted religious organizations are not just "similarly situated," they are identically situated. Their employees share, as a function of their belief system, the "unique" tenets of an employment relationship that HHS seeks to protect. It is difficult to imagine a more textbook example of the trait HHS purports to accommodate. And yet, March for Life
15

has been excised from the fold because it is not "religious." This is nothing short of
regulatory favoritism.
While it is true, as defendants assert, that religious employers have long enjoyed
advantages over their secular counterparts, "religion'' is not a talisman that sweeps aside all constitutional concerns. 8 See Defs.' Opp 'n at 12. As the Seventh Circuit recently
cautioned, the special solicitude given to religions "does not imply an ability to favor
religions over non-theistic groups that have moral stances that are equivalent to theistic
ones" with regard to the regulated attribute. See Ctr. for Inquiry, 758 F.3d at 873. Our
jurisprudence has long recognized that "[i]f an individual deeply and sincerely holds
beliefs that are purely ethical or moral in source and content ... those beliefs certainly
occupy in the life of that individual a place parallel to that filled by God in traditionally
religious persons." See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970) (internal quotation marks omitted).9 Recognizing the role morality plays in the lives of citizens,
courts prohibit regulatory ''distinctions between religious and secular beliefs that hold the
same place in adherents' lives." See Ctr.for Inquiry. 758 F.3d at 873 (citations omitted).
Yet, here, HHS has made a distinction of this very ilk. March for Life is an avowedly
pro-life organization whose employees share in, and advocate for, a particular moral
8 The Court is, of course, cognizant that ordinarily, when the government lifts a regulation that "might interfere with religious organizations' 'exercise of religion,'" there is ''no reason to require that the exemption comes packaged with benefits to secular entities." Corp. ofPresiding Bishop ofChurch of Jesus Christ ofLatter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987). However, as the Seventh Circuit recently pointed out, religiosity ''cannot be a complete answer" where, as here, two groups with a shared attribute are similarly situated "in everything except a belief in deity." See Ctr.for Inquiry, 758 F.3d at 872. 9 Although Welsh was decided under statute, rather than under the Constitution, the Court nonetheless finds its reasoning persuasive here.
16

philosophy. HHS has chosen, however, to accommodate this moral philosophy only when it is overtly tied to religious values. HHS provides no principled basis, other than the semantics of religious tolerance, for its distinction. If the purpose of the religious employer exemption is, as HHS states, to respect the anti-abortifacient tenets of an employment relationship, then it makes no rational sense-indeed, no sense whatsoever-to deny March Life that same respect. By singling out a specific trait for accommodation, and then excising from its protection an organization with that precise trait, it sweeps in arbitrary and irrational strokes that simply cannot be countenanced, even under the most deferential of lenses. As such, the Mandate violates the equal protection clause ofthe Fifth Amendment and must be struck down as unconstitutional. III. Religious Freedom Restoration Act
Although March for Life is avowedly non-religious, the employee plaintiffs do oppose the Mandate on religious grounds. See Compl. ~~ 34, 124-51. They contend as an initial matter that the Mandate violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, or ''RFRA," codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. Compl. ~~ 124-36. I agree.
Congress enacted RFRA in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division, Department ofHuman Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), which held that as a matter of constitutional law, "neutral, generally applicable laws may be applied to religious practices even when not supported by a compelling governmental interest." City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 514 (1997). RFRA raises the bar via statute, requiring that such laws must be narrowly-tailored if they substantially burden religious exercise. "Under RFRA, the federal government may not 'substantially burden'
17

a person's religious exercise-even where the burden results from a religiously neutral, generally applicable law that is constitutionally valid under Smith-unless the imposition of such a burden is the least restrictive means to serve a compelling governmental interest." Priests For Life v. U.S Dep 't ofHealth & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 236-37 (D.C. Cir. 2014); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b). Congress found that this test allows courts to ·'strik[e] sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5).
The threshold question, thus, is whether the employee plaintiffs have demonstrated that the Mandate substantially burdens their sincere exercise of religion. See Sample v. Lappin, 424 F. Supp. 2d 187, 192 (D.D.C. 2006) (explaining burden-shifting analysis under RFRA). The employee plaintiffs affirm that they "sincerely hold religious beliefs against using, supporting, or otherwise advocating the use of abortifacients, or participating in a health insurance plan that covers such items for themselves or their families," Compl. ~ 125, and defendants assert that they "do not dispute that the employee plaintiffs' desire not to participate in a health insurance plan that covers contraceptives is a sincere religious belief,'' Defs.' Opp'n at 30.
However, elsewhere in their brief, defendants argue that "[n]o one is required to use her health coverage for services that she does not want, and it is not a burden on a person's religion to participate in a group health plan that covers services that she will not use.'' Defs.' Opp'n at 29. Despite defendants' proclamation that they do not dispute the sincerity of plaintiffs' religious beliefs, this argument is a thinly veiled attack on those beliefs. Employee plaintiffs swear that participation in a plan covering contraceptives
18

violates their beliefs. Compl. ~ 125. Defendants' argument that such participation "is not a burden'" at all is. in essence, a dispute about what plaintiffs' religious beliefs are.
It is not, of course, this Court's role to "determine what religious observance [plaintiffs"] faith commands," and I do not do so here. See Priests For Life, 772 F.3d at 247; see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751,2779 (2014) (explaining that the Court's "narrow function ... in this context is to determine whether the line drawn reflects an honest conviction, and there is no dispute that it does" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). The situation presented in this case is unlike the one presented in Priests for Life. where our Circuit Court held that the Mandate did not substantially burden accommodated organizations' beliefs against providing, paying for, or facilitating access to contraception because it found the Mandate did not, in fact, require them to do that which they opposed. Priests For Life, 772 F.3d at 246-47; see also id. at 252-54. Here, employee plaintiffs assert that they hold religious beliefs against participating in a health insurance plan that covers contraceptives, and there is no dispute that the existence of the Mandate requires them either to so participate, or to forego health insurance coverage and pay a penalty.
Defendants argue that the Mandate acts on employers and health plans, not individual employees, and therefore does not substantially burden employee plaintiffs' exercise of religion. Defs.' Opp'n at 30; see Priests For Life, 772 F.3d at 247 ("Whether a law substantially burdens religious exercise under RFRA is a question of law for courts to decide, not a question of fact."). I disagree. While it is true that "[a]n asserted burden is also not an actionable substantial burden when it falls on a third party, not the religious
19

adherent," Priests For Life, 772 F.3d at 246, health insurance does not exist independently of the people who purchase it. Indeed, we commonly refer to such purchasers as health plan "participants." A participant pays premiums into a plan in exchange for coverage for his or her future health needs. Given the nature of health insurance, employee plaintitTs do play a role in the health care plans that provide contraceptive coverage. C). Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 679 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (noting that burdens arise from the affirmative exercise of a particular act). Even though employee plaintiffs are not the direct objects of the Mandate, they are thus very much burdened by it.
"A substantial burden exists when government action puts substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs." !d. at 678 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Such pressure exists here. The Mandate, in its current form, makes it impossible for employee plaintiffs to purchase a health insurance plan that does not include coverage of contraceptives to which they object. If their employer, March for Life, continues to provide a health insurance plan, it must include contraceptive coverage, as must any plan available for individual purchase on a state health exchange. Employee plaintiffs are thus caught between the proverbial rock and a hard place: they can either buy into and participate in a health insurance plan that includes the coverage they find objectionable and thereby violate their religious beliefs, or they can forgo health insurance altogether and thereby subject themselves to penalties for violating the ACA's individual mandate, codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A. Either way, employee plaintiffs must act and may not maintain health insurance consistent with their
20

religious beliefs. This is not a case of a government program with "incidental effects ... which may make it more difficult to practice certain religions," but rather one which has a ·'tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs." See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass 'n, 485 U.S. 439, 450 (1988). Thus, the Mandate imposes a substantial burden on employee plaintiffs' exercise of religion.
In light of this substantial burden to employee plaintiffs' exercise of religion, defendants must demonstrate that the Mandate ( 1) furthers a compelling government interest, and (2) is the least restrictive means of doing so. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b); Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779. Our Circuit Court has concluded that the Mandate, in general, does further compelling government interests. "The government has overlapping and mutually reinforcing compelling interests in promoting public health and gender equality. The contraceptive coverage requirement specifically advances those interests." Priests For Life, 772 F.3d at 263-64; see also id. at 259 ("[C]ompelling interests converge to support the government's decision, reflected in the challenged regulations, to provide cost-free contraceptive coverage and to remove administrative and logistical obstacles to accessing contraceptive care.'').
The government's assertion of a compelling interest in the Mandate in general is not sufficient to satisfy the standard established by RFRA. Instead, "the compelling interest test [must be] satisfied through application of the challenged law 'to the person'-the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially burdened.'' Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 430-31 (2006) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b)). The Court "must look beyond the
21

broadly formulated interests justifying the general applicability of the statute to examine the interests the government seeks to promote as applied to [the particular plaintiff] and the impediment to those objectives that would flow from granting [her] a specific exemption." Kaemmerling, 553 F.3d at 682 (internal quotation marks omitted).
"The challenged regulations seek to ensure timely and effective access to contraception for all women who want it and for whom it is medically appropriate." Priests For Life, 772 F.3d at 257. As employee plaintiffs repeatedly point out, they do not want such access. See, e.g., Compl. ~~ 1, 32-35, 125. But our Circuit Court also recognized the government's compelling interest "in a sustainable system of taxes and subsidies under the ACA to advance public health." Priests For Life, 772 F.3d at 258. And as just noted, the Court held that the seamless provision of cost-free contraceptive coverage advances public health. !d. at 263-64. A program requiring broad participation-including some who do not wish to use certain aspects of the coveragedoes serve the government's interest in a functional and sustainable insurance system.
Of course, that is not the end of the inquiry. The final question the Court must ask under RFRA is whether the current Mandate is the least restrictive means of serving this governmental interest. Assuredly, it is not! The inquiry at this stage "focus[es] on the context of the religious objectors, and consider[s] whether and how the government's compelling interest is harmed by granting specific exemptions to particular religious claimants. [A Court] must look to the marginal interest in enforcing the regulation to which the plaintiffs object." Priests For Life, 772 F.3d at 264 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
22

In arguing that the current set-up is the least restrictive means of ensuring a
functioning health insurance system that covers contraceptives for those who want them,
defendants rely heavily on United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), a pre-Smith free
exercise case. 10 See Defs.' Opp'n at 33. In Lee, the Supreme Court held that an Amish
man could not, in essence, "opt out" of the Social Security system even though it
conflicted with his religious beliefs. 455 U.S. at 261. The Court explained that
"mandatory participation is indispensable to the fiscal vitality of the social security
system" and "a comprehensive national social security system providing for voluntary
participation would be almost a contradiction in terms and difficult, if not impossible, to
administer." !d. at 258. Therefore "it would be difficult to accommodate the
comprehensive social security system with myriad exceptions flowing from a wide
variety of religious beliefs." 11 !d. at 259-60.
Defendants say the same is true here. They contend that "[i]nsurance markets
could not function-either administratively or financially-if insurers had to tailor each
health plan to the specific needs and desires of each individual plan participant and
beneficiary." Defs.' Opp ·n at 31. They raise the specter of individuals ''pick[ing] and
°1 Courts look to pre-Smith free exercise jurisprudence when analyzing RFRA claims. See Tyndale House
Publishers, Inc.\'. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106, 120 (D.D.C. 2012). 11 As defendants point out, this reasoning has been employed by other courts, primarily, but not exclusively, in the tax context. See Defs.' Opp'n at 32-33; see also, e.g., Hernande= v. Comm 'r of Internal Re\'(:nue, 490 U.S. 680. 699-700 ( 1989) (applying the reasoning in Lee in a case involving federal income taxes). In the health insurance context, the Ninth Circuit denied student plaintiffs' RFRA challenge to the mandatory fee for their public university's health insurance program, which covered certain services to which plaintiffs objected. See Goehring v. Brophy, 94 F.3d 1294 (9th Cir. 1996), overruled on other grounds by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 ( 1997). There, the Ninth Circuit explained that "the fiscal vitality of the University's fee system would be undermined if the plaintiffs in the present case were exempted from paying a portion of their student registration fee on free exercise grounds. Mandatory uniform participation by every student is essential to the insurance system's survival." !d. at 130 l.
23

choos[ing]" from a long list of preventive services what their plans will and will not cover, arguing that this "would be an impossible administrative undertaking.... [and] would all but lead to the end of group health coverage." Defs.' Opp'n at 32. Please!
Defendants overlook a critical distinction. Unlike in Lee, the government does not provide the insurance at issue here, and there is no single "comprehensive national [health insurance] system." See Lee, 455 U.S. at 258. Instead, the government regulates a host of third party insurers. The Mandate burdens employee plaintiffs' religious exercise by restricting the form in which those third parties can offer something that plaintiffs, for all intents and purposes, must buy.
There is, of course, a simple solution: prohibit the government from enforcing the Mandate against, and penalizing, a third-party insurer that offers individual employee plaintiffs insurance plans consistent with their sincerely held religious beliefs. This removes the burden imposed on employee plaintiffs by the government by allowing an insurance company to offer them plans in the individual market consistent with their beliefs. The government need not require an insurer offer such a plan at plaintiffs' request in order to avoid burdening plaintitis' religious exercise.
March for Life's insurer has represented that it will offer individual employee plaintitTs the type of plan they desire. CareFirst Letter, Ex. A to Monahan Affidavit. However, if it declines to do so, now or at some point in the future, and plaintiffs are unable to purchase a plan consistent with their beliefs, their inability would be a product of market or other forces, not the government regulation, and would therefore not implicate RFRA.
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Defendants' parade ofhorribles necessarily looks beyond the employee plaintiffs in this particular case and purports to project what would happen if other individuals assert similar objections. 12 However, defendants seem to envisage a world in which the government would require third-party insurance companies to provide coverage in every possible form requested by an individual on religious grounds. 13 That, most assuredly, is not the action the Court is taking here.
Insurance companies have every incentive to maintain a sustainable and functioning market, and the government's interest in the same would not be undermined by simply making it legal for a third-party provider to offer, without penalty, a plan consistent with plaintiffs' religious beliefs. If, as defendants suggest, offering an insurance plan that does not include a service or services to which a potential purchaser objects on religious grounds would be "an impossible administrative undertaking," insurance companies will not do it. One particular religious accommodation may make actuarial sense, while another may not. A company may even choose not to entertain possible changes as a matter of policy if it deems the cost of analysis too high. Those decisions can, and should be, left to private actors.
12 Note that here, as in Hobby Lobby, the defendants argue that ruling in favor of plaintiffs here "will lead to a flood of religious objections regarding a wide variety of medical procedures and drugs, such as vaccinations and blood transfusions, but [the government] has made no effort to substantiate this prediction.'' See 134 S. Ct. at 2783. 13 At oral argument, however, the government does acknowledge the possibility of the approach taken by the Court: "[I]f this court ordered that, owing to RFRA, for example, an issuer needed to be permitted to sell the employee plaintiffs an individual plan that accorded with their religious beliefs, they could, indeed, take that to an insurer in the market for individual plans and receive that coverage." Nov. 6, 2014 Mot. Hr' g Tr. 29:20-25.
25

The remedy here is limited, and has no effect on the Mandate's application to employers or to individuals who do want contraceptive coverage included without cost sharing. Prohibiting the government from punishing a company that offers a modified plan to an employee plaintiff who certifies that she objects on religious grounds to otherwise-required contraceptive coverage does not enable that company to refuse to provide such coverage to others who do not share those religious objections. Thus, employee plaintiffs' RFRA claim is clearly independent of their employer, and has no impact on March for Life's obligations under the Mandate. As such, the Mandate is additionally in violation ofRFRA and plaintiffs' Second Claim for Relief must also be granted. IV. Free Exercise
Although the decision on employee plaintiffs' RFRA challenge grants them the individual relief they seek, I must still address their First Amendment free exercise claim briefly, because our Circuit Court has spoken to this issue recently.
Under the First Amendment's protection ofthe free exercise of religion, "a law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice." Church ofthe Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City ofHialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 ( 1993) (citing Smith, 494 U.S. 872); see also Kaemmerling, 553 F.3d at 677. If a law is not neutral or generally applicable, it is subject to strict scrutiny. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531-32 ("A law failing to satisfy these requirements must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that
26

interest.''). The employee plaintiffs contend that the Mandate is not neutral and generally applicable, and therefore their Free Exercise claim must be evaluated using strict scrutiny. See Pls.' Mot. at 17-19.
A neutral regulation does not "target[] religious conduct for distinctive treatment,'" Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534. A regulation is not neutral if its ''object ... is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation" or if it "refers to a religious practice without a secular meaning discernable from the language or context." !d. at 533. "General applicability" in the free exercise context "does not mean absolute universality." Olsen v. Mukasey, 541 F.3d 827, 832 (8th Cir. 2008). To be generally applicable, a regulation "cannot in a selective manner impose burdens only on conduct motivated by religious belief,'' and the court looks to whether the enacting body decided "that the governmental interests it seeks to advance are worthy of being pursued only against conduct with a religious motivation." Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 542-43.
After the initial briefing in this case, our Circuit Court analyzed whether the Mandate violated a religious organization's free exercise rights in Priests For Life, 772 F.3d 229. Plaintiffs in Priests for Life, like the employee plaintiffs here, contended "that the exemptions provided to houses of worship and grandfathered plans render the contraceptive coverage requirement non-neutral and not generally applicable." !d. at 268; see Pis.' Mot. at 17-19. The Priests for Life Court found their arguments unavailing and concluded that "[t]hose exemptions, however, do not impugn the contraceptive coverage requirement's neutrality and generality: it is both, in the relevant sense of not selectively targeting religious conduct, whether facially or intentionally, and broadly
27

applying across religious and nonreligious groups alike." Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 268. The exemptions "do not amount to the kind of pattern of exemptions from a facially neutral law that demonstrate that the law was motivated by a discriminatory purpose," and the Mandate '·applies across the board," rather than "target[ing] religious organizations." !d.
The relevant questions regarding the Mandate's neutrality and general applicability are no different in this case, even though plaintiffs are religious individuals rather than religious non-profits. The underlying Mandate itself remains the same. Just as the exemptions that do exist do not "render the law so under-inclusive as ... to suggest that disfavoring Catholic or other pro-life employers was its objective," id., nor do they suggest that disfavoring religious individuals-who are not even acted upon directly by the Mandate-was its objective. "The exemptions in the ACAdo not single out any religion and are wholly consistent with the law's neutral purpose." !d.
Our Circuit's ruling that the Mandate is neutral and generally applicable, and thus not subject to strict scrutiny under the free exercise clause, precludes employee plaintiffs' claim here. ''The right of free exercise protected by the First Amendment 'does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).'" Kaemmerling, 553 F.3d at 677 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 879). The fact that the government requires via a neutral, generally-applicable regulation that the employee plaintiffs participate in an insurance plan that covers contraception does not violate their free exercise rights. Plaintiffs have therefore not
28

stated a free exercise claim upon which relief can be granted. As such, their Third Claim for Relief must be dismissed.
CONCLUSION For all the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS in part plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. Specifically, the Court GRANTS plaintiffs' Motion as to plaintiffs' First Claim for Relief under the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment, their Second Claim for Relief under the RFRA, and their Fourth Claim for Relief under the Administrative Procedure Act, but DENIES their Motion as to plaintiffs' Third Claim for Relief under the free exercise clause of the First Amendment. The Court further GRANTS defendants' Motion to Dismiss as to plaintiffs' Third Claim for Relief, but DENIES the remainder of defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, as to plaintiffs' First, Second, and Fourth Claims for Relief. Defendants are hereby permanently ENJOINED from enforcing against plaintiff March for Life, its health insurance issuer, and the insurance issuer(s) of employee plaintiffs Jeanne Monahan and/or Bethany Goodman, the statutes and regulations requiring a health insurance issuer to include contraceptive coverage in plaintiffs' health insurance plans. An Order consistent with this decision accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
?rn~ United States District Judge
29

 
 CLOSED,TYPE−L
U.S. District Court District of Columbia (Washington, DC) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:14−cv−01149−RJL

MARCH FOR LIFE et al v. PRICE et al Assigned to: Judge Richard J. Leon Case in other court: USCA, 15−05301 Cause: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 07/07/2014 Date Terminated: 09/01/2015 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Defendant

MARCH FOR LIFE

represented by Steven Henry Aden AMERICANS UNITED FOR LIFE 1105 Connecticut Ave. NW 1105 Connecticut Ave. NW Ste 500 Washington, DC 20036 202−741−4917 Email: saden@adflegal.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elissa Graves ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM 1907 Bonanza Drive Sachse, TX 75048 (214) 733−3213 Email: egraves@adflegal.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew S. Bowman US DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES Office of the General Counsel Personal Address 4101 Crittenden Street Hyattsville, MD 20781 (301) 209−8363 Email: matthewsbowman@gmail.com TERMINATED: 01/16/2017

Plaintiff JEANNE F. MONAHAN

represented by Steven Henry Aden (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elissa Graves (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew S. Bowman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/2017

Plaintiff BETHANY A. GOODMAN

represented by Steven Henry Aden (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

V. Defendant SYLVIA MATHEWS BURWELL in her official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services TERMINATED: 08/15/2017
Defendant THOMAS E. PEREZ in his official capacity as the Secretary of the United States Department of Labor TERMINATED: 08/15/2017 Defendant JACOB J. LEW in his official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of the Treasury TERMINATED: 08/15/2017 Defendant UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
Defendant UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elissa Graves (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew S. Bowman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/2017
represented by Adam Anderson Grogg U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Office of General Counsel 219 Cannon House Office Building Washington, DC 20515 (202) 225−9700 Email: adam.grogg@mail.house.gov TERMINATED: 08/15/2017
represented by Adam Anderson Grogg (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/15/2017
represented by Adam Anderson Grogg (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/15/2017
represented by Michelle Renee Bennett U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch 1100 L Street NW Room 12026 Washington, DC 20005 (202) 305−8902 Fax: (202) 616−8470 Email: michelle.bennett@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam Anderson Grogg (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/15/2017
represented by Michelle Renee Bennett (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam Anderson Grogg (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/15/2017

Defendant UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Defendant THOMAS E. PRICE M.D., in his official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services
Defendant R. ALEXANDER ACOSTA in his official capacity as the Secretary of the United States Department of Labor
Defendant STEVEN T. MNUCHIN in his official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of the Treasury

represented by Michelle Renee Bennett (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam Anderson Grogg (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/15/2017
represented by Michelle Renee Bennett (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Michelle Renee Bennett (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Michelle Renee Bennett (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 07/07/2014
07/07/2014 07/07/2014 07/08/2014
07/09/2014 07/31/2014
08/08/2014

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT Verified against All Defendants ( Filing fee $ 400 receipt number 0090−3771311) filed by BETHANY A. GOODMAN, JEANNE F. MONAHAN, MARCH FOR LIFE. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Summons of Attorney General, # 3 Summons of U.S. Attorney, # 4 Summons of Burwell, # 5 Summons of Lew, # 6 Summons of Perez, # 7 Summons of HHS, # 8 Summons of DOL, # 9 Summons of DOT)(Bowman, Matthew) (Entered: 07/07/2014)
2 Corporate Disclosure Statement by MARCH FOR LIFE. (Bowman, Matthew) (Entered: 07/07/2014)
Case Assigned to Judge Richard J. Leon. (kb) (Entered: 07/08/2014)
3 SUMMONS Issued (8) Electronically as to SYLVIA M. BURWELL, JACOB J. LEW, THOMAS E. PEREZ, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, U.S. Attorney and U.S. Attorney General. (Attachments: # 1 ConsentForm, # 2 Notice of Consent)(kb) (Entered: 07/08/2014)
4 STANDING ORDER. Signed by Judge Richard J. Leon on 7/9/2014. (lcrjl3) (Entered: 07/09/2014)
5 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Elissa Graves, :Firm− Alliance Defending Freedom, :Address− 15100 N 90th St., Scottsdale, AZ 85260−2901. Phone No. − 480−444−0020. Fax No. − 800−835−5233 Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0090−3796571. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by BETHANY A. GOODMAN, MARCH FOR LIFE, JEANNE F. MONAHAN (Bowman, Matthew) (Entered: 07/31/2014)
MINUTE ORDER granting 5 Motion for Admission of Attorney Pro Hac Vice. It is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED and Elissa Graves be, and hereby is, admitted pro hac vice in this case. Signed by Judge Richard J. Leon on 8/8/2014. (lcrjl3) (Entered: 08/08/2014)

08/14/2014
08/14/2014
08/14/2014
08/15/2014 08/18/2014 08/18/2014 09/02/2014 09/02/2014 09/03/2014 09/03/2014
09/05/2014
09/10/2014 09/11/2014 09/12/2014

6 RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed. SYLVIA MATHEWS BURWELL served on 7/21/2014; JACOB J. LEW served on 7/22/2014; THOMAS E. PEREZ served on 7/21/2014; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES served on 7/21/2014; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR served on 7/21/2014; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY served on 7/22/2014 (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service on Federal Defendants)(Bowman, Matthew) (Entered: 08/14/2014)
7 RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed as to the United States Attorney. Date of Service Upon United States Attorney on 7/22/2014. Answer due for ALL FEDERAL DEFENDANTS by 9/20/2014. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service on Attorney for the District of Columbia)(Bowman, Matthew) Modified date of service/deadline on 8/15/2014 (znmw, ). (Entered: 08/14/2014)
8 RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed on United States Attorney General. Date of Service Upon United States Attorney General 07/21/2014. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service on U.S. Attorney General)(Bowman, Matthew) Modified date of service on 8/15/2014 (znmw, ). (Entered: 08/14/2014)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Answer due by 9/20/2014 for all defendants. (znmw, ) (Entered: 08/15/2014)
9 NOTICE of Appearance by Adam Anderson Grogg on behalf of All Defendants (Grogg, Adam) (Entered: 08/18/2014)
10 ERRATA exhibit to complaint by BETHANY A. GOODMAN, MARCH FOR LIFE, JEANNE F. MONAHAN. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Articles of Incorporation)(Bowman, Matthew) (Entered: 08/18/2014)
11 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction and consolidated trial on the merits under FRCP 65(a)(2) by BETHANY A. GOODMAN, MARCH FOR LIFE, JEANNE F. MONAHAN (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Bowman, Matthew). Added MOTION for Consolidated Trial on 9/3/2014 (znmw, ). (Entered: 09/02/2014)
Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference set for 9/10/2014 11:30 AM in Courtroom 18 before Judge Richard J. Leon. (tb, ) (Entered: 09/02/2014)
12 NOTICE of Appearance by Steven Henry Aden on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Aden, Steven) (Entered: 09/03/2014)
13 First MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 11 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction and consolidated trial on the merits under FRCP 65(a)(2) MOTION for Consolidated Trial (Partially Unopposed) by SYLVIA M. BURWELL, JACOB J. LEW, THOMAS E. PEREZ, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY (Grogg, Adam) (Entered: 09/03/2014)
MINUTE ORDER granting in part 13 Defendants' Partially Unopposed Motion for an Extension of Time to Respond to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction. It is hereby ORDERED that defendants' motion is GRANTED IN PART; it is further ORDERED that defendants' response to plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction will be due at a date to be determined at the 9/10/2014 status conference. Signed by Judge Richard J. Leon on 9/5/2014. (lcrjl3) (Entered: 09/05/2014)
Minute Entry: Status Conference held on 9/10/2014 before Judge Richard J. Leon: Parties will file Joint Proposed Scheduling Order within 10 (ten) days from today's hearing. (Court Reporter Vicki Eastvold) (tb, ) (Entered: 09/10/2014)
14 STIPULATION Joint Proposed Schedule by all parties, by BETHANY A. GOODMAN, MARCH FOR LIFE, JEANNE F. MONAHAN. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Bowman, Matthew) (Entered: 09/11/2014)
15 NOTICE of Additional Availability for Oral Argument by SYLVIA M. BURWELL, JACOB J. LEW, THOMAS E. PEREZ, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

09/23/2014
09/23/2014
10/07/2014 10/07/2014 10/08/2014
10/11/2014
10/13/2014 10/20/2014 10/21/2014
10/23/2014 10/30/2014

LABOR, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY re 14 Stipulation (Grogg, Adam) (Entered: 09/12/2014)
16 MOTION to Dismiss or, in the alternative,, MOTION for Summary Judgment by SYLVIA M. BURWELL, JACOB J. LEW, THOMAS E. PEREZ, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Declaration Certification of the Index of the Rulemaking Record)(Grogg, Adam) (Entered: 09/23/2014)
17 Memorandum in opposition to re 11 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction and consolidated trial on the merits under FRCP 65(a)(2) MOTION for Consolidated Trial filed by SYLVIA M. BURWELL, JACOB J. LEW, THOMAS E. PEREZ, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY. (Grogg, Adam) (Entered: 09/23/2014)
18 Memorandum in opposition re 16 MOTION to Dismiss or, in the alternative, MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by BETHANY A. GOODMAN, MARCH FOR LIFE, JEANNE F. MONAHAN. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Bowman, Matthew) Modified event title and link on 10/8/2014 (znmw, ). (Entered: 10/07/2014)
19 REPLY to opposition to motion re 11 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction and consolidated trial on the merits under FRCP 65(a)(2) MOTION for Consolidated Trial filed by BETHANY A. GOODMAN, MARCH FOR LIFE, JEANNE F. MONAHAN. (See Docket Entry 18 to view document). (znmw, ) (Entered: 10/08/2014)
20 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 16 MOTION to Dismiss or, in the alternative, MOTION for Summary Judgment by SYLVIA M. BURWELL, JACOB J. LEW, THOMAS E. PEREZ, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY (Grogg, Adam) (Entered: 10/08/2014)
MINUTE ORDER granting 20 Defendants' Unopposed Motion for an Extension of Time to File Their Reply In Support of Their Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment. It is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED; it is further ORDERED that the defendants shall have up to and including October 21, 2014, to file their reply. Signed by Judge Richard J. Leon on 10/11/2014. (lcrjl3) (Entered: 10/11/2014)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Defendants' Reply In Support of their Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment is now due by 10/21/2014. (jth) (Entered: 10/13/2014)
Set/Reset Hearings: Motion Hearing set for 11/6/2014 at 02:30 PM in Courtroom 18 before Judge Richard J. Leon. (tb, ) (Entered: 10/20/2014)
21 REPLY to opposition to motion re 16 MOTION to Dismiss or, in the alternative, MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by SYLVIA M. BURWELL, JACOB J. LEW, THOMAS E. PEREZ, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY. (Grogg, Adam) (Entered: 10/21/2014)
22 NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY by BETHANY A. GOODMAN, MARCH FOR LIFE, JEANNE F. MONAHAN (Bowman, Matthew) (Entered: 10/23/2014)
23 NOTICE of Filing of Appendix of Administrative Record by SYLVIA M. BURWELL, JACOB J. LEW, THOMAS E. PEREZ, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY re 16 MOTION to Dismiss or, in the alternative, MOTION for Summary Judgment , 11 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction and consolidated trial on the merits under FRCP 65(a)(2) MOTION for Consolidated Trial (Attachments: # 1 Appendix AR appendix part 1, # 2

11/06/2014 11/14/2014
11/17/2014 11/17/2014 11/21/2014 11/24/2014 12/10/2014 12/10/2014

Appendix AR appendix part 2, # 3 Appendix AR appendix part 3, # 4 Appendix AR appendix part 4, # 5 Appendix AR appendix part 5, # 6 Appendix AR appendix part 6)(Grogg, Adam) (Entered: 10/30/2014)
Minute Entry: Motion Hearing held on 11/6/2014 before Judge Richard J. Leon: re 11 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction and consolidated trial on the merits under FRCP 65(a)(2) MOTION for Consolidated Trial and 16 MOTION to Dismiss or, in the alternative, MOTION for Summary Judgment ; Motions heard and taken under advisement. Declarations due by 11/21/2014. Status Conference set for 11/24/2014 03:00 PM in Courtroom 18 before Judge Richard J. Leon. (Court Reporter Dan Dickman) (tb, ) (Entered: 11/07/2014)
24 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Richard J. Leon held on November 6, 2014; Page Numbers: 1−64. Date of Issuance: November 14, 2014. Court Reporter/Transcriber Jan Dickman, Telephone number: (202) 354−3267, Court Reporter Email Address: jandickman@yahoo.com.<P></P>For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.<P>NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at ww.dcd.uscourts.gov.<P></P> Redaction Request due 12/5/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/15/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/12/2015.(Dickman, Janice) (Entered: 11/14/2014)
25 NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY by SYLVIA MATHEWS BURWELL, JACOB J. LEW, THOMAS E. PEREZ, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY (Attachments: # 1 Slip Opinion, Priests for Life v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services)(Grogg, Adam) (Entered: 11/17/2014)
26 RESPONSE re 25 NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY, filed by BETHANY A. GOODMAN, MARCH FOR LIFE, JEANNE F. MONAHAN. (Bowman, Matthew) (Entered: 11/17/2014)
27 AFFIDAVIT re 11 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction and consolidated trial on the merits under FRCP 65(a)(2) MOTION for Consolidated Trial related to health insurance availability by BETHANY A. GOODMAN, MARCH FOR LIFE, JEANNE F. MONAHAN. (Bowman, Matthew) (Entered: 11/21/2014)
Minute Entry: Status Conference held on 11/24/2014 before Judge Richard J. Leon: Parties may file supplemental brief (10 pages or less)addressing the D.C.Circuit's recent decision by 12/10/2014. (Court Reporter Barbara Devico) (tb, ) (Entered: 11/25/2014)
28 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM to re 16 MOTION to Dismiss or, in the alternative, MOTION for Summary Judgment , 11 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction and consolidated trial on the merits under FRCP 65(a)(2) MOTION for Consolidated Trial filed by SYLVIA MATHEWS BURWELL, JACOB J. LEW, THOMAS E. PEREZ, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY. (Grogg, Adam) (Entered: 12/10/2014)
29 MEMORANDUM re 16 MOTION to Dismiss or, in the alternative, MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by THOMAS E. PEREZ, JACOB J. LEW, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, SYLVIA MATHEWS BURWELL, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 11 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction and consolidated trial on the merits under FRCP 65(a)(2) MOTION for Consolidated Trial filed by BETHANY A. GOODMAN, JEANNE F. MONAHAN, MARCH FOR LIFE by BETHANY A. GOODMAN, MARCH FOR

08/31/2015 08/31/2015
09/01/2015 09/08/2015
09/10/2015 10/28/2015
10/29/2015 10/29/2015 11/02/2015 02/24/2016
05/25/2016 01/16/2017

LIFE, JEANNE F. MONAHAN. (Bowman, Matthew) (Entered: 12/10/2014)
30 MEMORANDUM AND OPINION. Signed by Judge Richard J. Leon on 08/31/15. (tb) (Entered: 08/31/2015)
31 ORDER : For reasons set forth in the Memorandum Opinion entered this date, it is hereby ordered that plaintiff's 11 Motion for Consolidated Trial on the Merits or for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART ; it is further ordered that defendant's 16 Motion to Dismiss or for Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. SEE ORDER FOR FULL DETAILS. Signed by Judge Richard J. Leon on 08/31/15. (tb) (Entered: 08/31/2015)
32 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to file motion for attorney's fees and costs by BETHANY A. GOODMAN, MARCH FOR LIFE, JEANNE F. MONAHAN (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Bowman, Matthew) (Entered: 09/01/2015)
MINUTE ORDER granting 32 Unopposed Motion to Extend Deadline. It is hereby ORDERED that plaintiffs' Motion is GRANTED, and it is further ORDERED that plaintiffs shall file any motion for attorney's fees and costs in this matter on or before December 14, 2015. It is further ORDERED that this deadline shall go into abeyance if any appeal from the Court's August 31, 2015 judgment is filed, and shall remain in abeyance until such appellate proceedings conclude. Signed by Judge Richard J. Leon on 9/8/2015. (lcrjl2, ) (Entered: 09/08/2015)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Motion due by 12/14/2015. (tb) (Entered: 09/10/2015)
33 NOTICE OF APPEAL TO DC CIRCUIT COURT as to 31 Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Order on Motion for Trial, Order on Motion to Dismiss, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,, 30 Memorandum & Opinion by JACOB J. LEW, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, SYLVIA M. BURWELL, THOMAS E. PEREZ. Fee Status: No Fee Paid. Parties have been notified. (Grogg, Adam) (Entered: 10/28/2015)
34 Transmission of the Notice of Appeal, Order Appealed, and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals. The Fee remains to be paid and another notice will be transmitted when the fee has been paid in the District Court re 33 Notice of Appeal to DC Circuit Court. (znmw) (Entered: 10/29/2015)
35 AMENDED Transmission of the Notice of Appeal, Order Appealed, and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals docketing fee was not paid because the fee was an Appeal by the Government re 33 Notice of Appeal to DC Circuit Court,. (znmw) (Entered: 10/29/2015)
USCA Case Number 15−5301 for 33 Notice of Appeal to DC Circuit Court, filed by THOMAS E. PEREZ, JACOB J. LEW, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, SYLVIA M. BURWELL, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES. (md) (Entered: 11/06/2015)
36 ORDER of USCA (certified copy) ORDERED that the motion be granted, and this case is hereby held in abeyance pending further order of the court as to 33 Notice of Appeal to DC Circuit Court, filed by THOMAS E. PEREZ, JACOB J. LEW, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, SYLVIA M. BURWELL, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES. USCA Case Number 15−5301. (vt) (Entered: 02/26/2016)
37 NOTICE of Change of Address by Elissa Graves (Graves, Elissa) (Entered: 05/25/2016)
38 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to BETHANY A. GOODMAN, MARCH FOR LIFE, JEANNE F. MONAHAN. Attorney Matthew S. Bowman terminated. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration Consent of Bethany Goodman to Withdrawal, # 2 Declaration Consent of Jeanne Mancini to Withdrawal)(Bowman, Matthew) (Entered: 01/16/2017)

08/15/2017 09/17/2018

39 NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL by Michelle Renee Bennett on behalf of SYLVIA MATHEWS BURWELL, JACOB J. LEW, THOMAS E. PEREZ, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY Substituting for attorney Adam Grogg (Bennett, Michelle) (Entered: 08/15/2017)
40 MANDATE of USCA as to 33 Notice of Appeal to DC Circuit Court filed by THOMAS E. PEREZ, JACOB J. LEW, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, SYLVIA MATHEWS BURWELL, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES. USCA Case Number 15−5301. (Attachment: # 1 order filed September 17, 2018)(zvt) (Entered: 09/20/2018)

 
 Case: 1:14-cv-1149 As of: 10/31/2017 11:56 AM EDT 1 of 7
APPEAL,CLOSED,TYPE−L
U.S. District Court District of Columbia (Washington, DC) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:14−cv−01149−RJL

MARCH FOR LIFE et al v. PRICE et al Assigned to: Judge Richard J. Leon Case in other court: USCA, 15−05301 Cause: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 07/07/2014 Date Terminated: 09/01/2015 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Defendant

MARCH FOR LIFE

represented by Steven Henry Aden ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM 440 First STreet, NW Suite 600 Washington, DC 20001 (202) 393−8690 Fax: (202) 347−3622 Email: saden@adflegal.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elissa Graves ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM 1907 Bonanza Drive Sachse, TX 75048 (214) 733−3213 Email: egraves@adflegal.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew S. Bowman 4101 Crittenden Street Hyattsville, MD 20781 (301) 209−8363 Email: matthewsbowman@gmail.com TERMINATED: 01/16/2017

Plaintiff JEANNE F. MONAHAN

represented by Steven Henry Aden (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elissa Graves (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew S. Bowman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/2017

Plaintiff BETHANY A. GOODMAN

represented by Steven Henry Aden (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elissa Graves (See above for address)

Case: 1:14-cv-1149 As of: 10/31/2017 11:56 AM EDT 2 of 7
PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew S. Bowman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/2017

V. Defendant SYLVIA MATHEWS BURWELL in her official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services TERMINATED: 08/15/2017
Defendant THOMAS E. PEREZ in his official capacity as the Secretary of the United States Department of Labor TERMINATED: 08/15/2017 Defendant JACOB J. LEW in his official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of the Treasury TERMINATED: 08/15/2017 Defendant UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
Defendant UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Defendant UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

represented by Adam Anderson Grogg DEMOCRACY FORWARD FOUNDATION P.O. Box 6293950 Washington, DC 20043 (202) 701−1790 Email: agrogg@democracyforward.org TERMINATED: 08/15/2017
represented by Adam Anderson Grogg (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/15/2017
represented by Adam Anderson Grogg (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/15/2017
represented by Michelle Renee Bennett U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch 20 Massachusetts Avenue NW Washington, DC 20530 (202) 305−8902 Fax: (202) 616−8470 Email: michelle.bennett@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam Anderson Grogg (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/15/2017
represented by Michelle Renee Bennett (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam Anderson Grogg (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/15/2017
represented by Michelle Renee Bennett (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 1:14-cv-1149 As of: 10/31/2017 11:56 AM EDT 3 of 7

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Adam Anderson Grogg (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/15/2017

Defendant
THOMAS E. PRICE M.D., in his official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services

represented by Michelle Renee Bennett (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
R. ALEXANDER ACOSTA in his official capacity as the Secretary of the United States Department of Labor

represented by Michelle Renee Bennett (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
STEVEN TERNER MNUCHIN in his official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of the Treasury

represented by Michelle Renee Bennett (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 07/07/2014
07/07/2014 07/07/2014 07/08/2014
07/09/2014 07/31/2014
08/08/2014 08/14/2014

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT Verified against All Defendants ( Filing fee $ 400 receipt number 0090−3771311) filed by BETHANY A. GOODMAN, JEANNE F. MONAHAN, MARCH FOR LIFE. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Summons of Attorney General, # 3 Summons of U.S. Attorney, # 4 Summons of Burwell, # 5 Summons of Lew, # 6 Summons of Perez, # 7 Summons of HHS, # 8 Summons of DOL, # 9 Summons of DOT)(Bowman, Matthew) (Entered: 07/07/2014)
2 Corporate Disclosure Statement by MARCH FOR LIFE. (Bowman, Matthew) (Entered: 07/07/2014)
Case Assigned to Judge Richard J. Leon. (kb) (Entered: 07/08/2014)
3 SUMMONS Issued (8) Electronically as to SYLVIA M. BURWELL, JACOB J. LEW, THOMAS E. PEREZ, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, U.S. Attorney and U.S. Attorney General. (Attachments: # 1 ConsentForm, # 2 Notice of Consent)(kb) (Entered: 07/08/2014)
4 STANDING ORDER. Signed by Judge Richard J. Leon on 7/9/2014. (lcrjl3) (Entered: 07/09/2014)
5 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Elissa Graves, :Firm− Alliance Defending Freedom, :Address− 15100 N 90th St., Scottsdale, AZ 85260−2901. Phone No. − 480−444−0020. Fax No. − 800−835−5233 Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0090−3796571. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by BETHANY A. GOODMAN, MARCH FOR LIFE, JEANNE F. MONAHAN (Bowman, Matthew) (Entered: 07/31/2014)
MINUTE ORDER granting 5 Motion for Admission of Attorney Pro Hac Vice. It is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED and Elissa Graves be, and hereby is, admitted pro hac vice in this case. Signed by Judge Richard J. Leon on 8/8/2014. (lcrjl3) (Entered: 08/08/2014)
6 RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed. SYLVIA MATHEWS BURWELL served on 7/21/2014; JACOB J. LEW served on 7/22/2014; THOMAS E. PEREZ served on 7/21/2014; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES served on 7/21/2014;

Case: 1:14-cv-1149 As of: 10/31/2017 11:56 AM EDT 4 of 7

08/14/2014
08/14/2014
08/15/2014 08/18/2014 08/18/2014 09/02/2014 09/02/2014 09/03/2014 09/03/2014
09/05/2014
09/10/2014 09/11/2014 09/12/2014

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR served on 7/21/2014; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY served on 7/22/2014 (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service on Federal Defendants)(Bowman, Matthew) (Entered: 08/14/2014)
7 RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed as to the United States Attorney. Date of Service Upon United States Attorney on 7/22/2014. Answer due for ALL FEDERAL DEFENDANTS by 9/20/2014. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service on Attorney for the District of Columbia)(Bowman, Matthew) Modified date of service/deadline on 8/15/2014 (znmw, ). (Entered: 08/14/2014)
8 RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed on United States Attorney General. Date of Service Upon United States Attorney General 07/21/2014. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service on U.S. Attorney General)(Bowman, Matthew) Modified date of service on 8/15/2014 (znmw, ). (Entered: 08/14/2014)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Answer due by 9/20/2014 for all defendants. (znmw, ) (Entered: 08/15/2014)
9 NOTICE of Appearance by Adam Anderson Grogg on behalf of All Defendants (Grogg, Adam) (Entered: 08/18/2014)
10 ERRATA exhibit to complaint by BETHANY A. GOODMAN, MARCH FOR LIFE, JEANNE F. MONAHAN. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Articles of Incorporation)(Bowman, Matthew) (Entered: 08/18/2014)
11 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction and consolidated trial on the merits under FRCP 65(a)(2) by BETHANY A. GOODMAN, MARCH FOR LIFE, JEANNE F. MONAHAN (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Bowman, Matthew). Added MOTION for Consolidated Trial on 9/3/2014 (znmw, ). (Entered: 09/02/2014)
Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference set for 9/10/2014 11:30 AM in Courtroom 18 before Judge Richard J. Leon. (tb, ) (Entered: 09/02/2014)
12 NOTICE of Appearance by Steven Henry Aden on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Aden, Steven) (Entered: 09/03/2014)
13 First MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 11 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction and consolidated trial on the merits under FRCP 65(a)(2) MOTION for Consolidated Trial (Partially Unopposed) by SYLVIA M. BURWELL, JACOB J. LEW, THOMAS E. PEREZ, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY (Grogg, Adam) (Entered: 09/03/2014)
MINUTE ORDER granting in part 13 Defendants' Partially Unopposed Motion for an Extension of Time to Respond to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction. It is hereby ORDERED that defendants' motion is GRANTED IN PART; it is further ORDERED that defendants' response to plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction will be due at a date to be determined at the 9/10/2014 status conference. Signed by Judge Richard J. Leon on 9/5/2014. (lcrjl3) (Entered: 09/05/2014)
Minute Entry: Status Conference held on 9/10/2014 before Judge Richard J. Leon: Parties will file Joint Proposed Scheduling Order within 10 (ten) days from today's hearing. (Court Reporter Vicki Eastvold) (tb, ) (Entered: 09/10/2014)
14 STIPULATION Joint Proposed Schedule by all parties, by BETHANY A. GOODMAN, MARCH FOR LIFE, JEANNE F. MONAHAN. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Bowman, Matthew) (Entered: 09/11/2014)
15 NOTICE of Additional Availability for Oral Argument by SYLVIA M. BURWELL, JACOB J. LEW, THOMAS E. PEREZ, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY re 14 Stipulation (Grogg, Adam) (Entered: 09/12/2014)

Case: 1:14-cv-1149 As of: 10/31/2017 11:56 AM EDT 5 of 7

09/23/2014
09/23/2014
10/07/2014 10/07/2014 10/08/2014
10/11/2014
10/13/2014 10/20/2014 10/21/2014
10/23/2014 10/30/2014

16 MOTION to Dismiss or, in the alternative,, MOTION for Summary Judgment by SYLVIA M. BURWELL, JACOB J. LEW, THOMAS E. PEREZ, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Declaration Certification of the Index of the Rulemaking Record)(Grogg, Adam) (Entered: 09/23/2014)
17 Memorandum in opposition to re 11 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction and consolidated trial on the merits under FRCP 65(a)(2) MOTION for Consolidated Trial filed by SYLVIA M. BURWELL, JACOB J. LEW, THOMAS E. PEREZ, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY. (Grogg, Adam) (Entered: 09/23/2014)
18 Memorandum in opposition re 16 MOTION to Dismiss or, in the alternative, MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by BETHANY A. GOODMAN, MARCH FOR LIFE, JEANNE F. MONAHAN. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Bowman, Matthew) Modified event title and link on 10/8/2014 (znmw, ). (Entered: 10/07/2014)
19 REPLY to opposition to motion re 11 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction and consolidated trial on the merits under FRCP 65(a)(2) MOTION for Consolidated Trial filed by BETHANY A. GOODMAN, MARCH FOR LIFE, JEANNE F. MONAHAN. (See Docket Entry 18 to view document). (znmw, ) (Entered: 10/08/2014)
20 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 16 MOTION to Dismiss or, in the alternative, MOTION for Summary Judgment by SYLVIA M. BURWELL, JACOB J. LEW, THOMAS E. PEREZ, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY (Grogg, Adam) (Entered: 10/08/2014)
MINUTE ORDER granting 20 Defendants' Unopposed Motion for an Extension of Time to File Their Reply In Support of Their Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment. It is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED; it is further ORDERED that the defendants shall have up to and including October 21, 2014, to file their reply. Signed by Judge Richard J. Leon on 10/11/2014. (lcrjl3) (Entered: 10/11/2014)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Defendants' Reply In Support of their Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment is now due by 10/21/2014. (jth) (Entered: 10/13/2014)
Set/Reset Hearings: Motion Hearing set for 11/6/2014 at 02:30 PM in Courtroom 18 before Judge Richard J. Leon. (tb, ) (Entered: 10/20/2014)
21 REPLY to opposition to motion re 16 MOTION to Dismiss or, in the alternative, MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by SYLVIA M. BURWELL, JACOB J. LEW, THOMAS E. PEREZ, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY. (Grogg, Adam) (Entered: 10/21/2014)
22 NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY by BETHANY A. GOODMAN, MARCH FOR LIFE, JEANNE F. MONAHAN (Bowman, Matthew) (Entered: 10/23/2014)
23 NOTICE of Filing of Appendix of Administrative Record by SYLVIA M. BURWELL, JACOB J. LEW, THOMAS E. PEREZ, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY re 16 MOTION to Dismiss or, in the alternative, MOTION for Summary Judgment , 11 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction and consolidated trial on the merits under FRCP 65(a)(2) MOTION for Consolidated Trial (Attachments: # 1 Appendix AR appendix part 1, # 2 Appendix AR appendix part 2, # 3 Appendix AR appendix part 3, # 4 Appendix AR appendix part 4, # 5 Appendix AR appendix part 5, # 6 Appendix AR appendix part 6)(Grogg, Adam) (Entered: 10/30/2014)

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11/06/2014 11/14/2014
11/17/2014 11/17/2014 11/21/2014 11/24/2014 12/10/2014 12/10/2014
08/31/2015

Minute Entry: Motion Hearing held on 11/6/2014 before Judge Richard J. Leon: re 11 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction and consolidated trial on the merits under FRCP 65(a)(2) MOTION for Consolidated Trial and 16 MOTION to Dismiss or, in the alternative, MOTION for Summary Judgment ; Motions heard and taken under advisement. Declarations due by 11/21/2014. Status Conference set for 11/24/2014 03:00 PM in Courtroom 18 before Judge Richard J. Leon. (Court Reporter Dan Dickman) (tb, ) (Entered: 11/07/2014)
24 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Richard J. Leon held on November 6, 2014; Page Numbers: 1−64. Date of Issuance: November 14, 2014. Court Reporter/Transcriber Jan Dickman, Telephone number: (202) 354−3267, Court Reporter Email Address: jandickman@yahoo.com.<P></P>For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.<P>NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at ww.dcd.uscourts.gov.<P></P> Redaction Request due 12/5/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/15/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/12/2015.(Dickman, Janice) (Entered: 11/14/2014)
25 NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY by SYLVIA MATHEWS BURWELL, JACOB J. LEW, THOMAS E. PEREZ, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY (Attachments: # 1 Slip Opinion, Priests for Life v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services)(Grogg, Adam) (Entered: 11/17/2014)
26 RESPONSE re 25 NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY, filed by BETHANY A. GOODMAN, MARCH FOR LIFE, JEANNE F. MONAHAN. (Bowman, Matthew) (Entered: 11/17/2014)
27 AFFIDAVIT re 11 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction and consolidated trial on the merits under FRCP 65(a)(2) MOTION for Consolidated Trial related to health insurance availability by BETHANY A. GOODMAN, MARCH FOR LIFE, JEANNE F. MONAHAN. (Bowman, Matthew) (Entered: 11/21/2014)
Minute Entry: Status Conference held on 11/24/2014 before Judge Richard J. Leon: Parties may file supplemental brief (10 pages or less)addressing the D.C.Circuit's recent decision by 12/10/2014. (Court Reporter Barbara Devico) (tb, ) (Entered: 11/25/2014)
28 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM to re 16 MOTION to Dismiss or, in the alternative, MOTION for Summary Judgment , 11 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction and consolidated trial on the merits under FRCP 65(a)(2) MOTION for Consolidated Trial filed by SYLVIA MATHEWS BURWELL, JACOB J. LEW, THOMAS E. PEREZ, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY. (Grogg, Adam) (Entered: 12/10/2014)
29 MEMORANDUM re 16 MOTION to Dismiss or, in the alternative, MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by THOMAS E. PEREZ, JACOB J. LEW, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, SYLVIA MATHEWS BURWELL, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 11 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction and consolidated trial on the merits under FRCP 65(a)(2) MOTION for Consolidated Trial filed by BETHANY A. GOODMAN, JEANNE F. MONAHAN, MARCH FOR LIFE by BETHANY A. GOODMAN, MARCH FOR LIFE, JEANNE F. MONAHAN. (Bowman, Matthew) (Entered: 12/10/2014)
30 MEMORANDUM AND OPINION. Signed by Judge Richard J. Leon on 08/31/15. (tb) (Entered: 08/31/2015)

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08/31/2015
09/01/2015 09/08/2015
09/10/2015 10/28/2015
10/29/2015 10/29/2015 11/02/2015 02/24/2016
05/25/2016 01/16/2017 08/15/2017

31 ORDER : For reasons set forth in the Memorandum Opinion entered this date, it is hereby ordered that plaintiff's 11 Motion for Consolidated Trial on the Merits or for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART ; it is further ordered that defendant's 16 Motion to Dismiss or for Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. SEE ORDER FOR FULL DETAILS. Signed by Judge Richard J. Leon on 08/31/15. (tb) (Entered: 08/31/2015)
32 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to file motion for attorney's fees and costs by BETHANY A. GOODMAN, MARCH FOR LIFE, JEANNE F. MONAHAN (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Bowman, Matthew) (Entered: 09/01/2015)
MINUTE ORDER granting 32 Unopposed Motion to Extend Deadline. It is hereby ORDERED that plaintiffs' Motion is GRANTED, and it is further ORDERED that plaintiffs shall file any motion for attorney's fees and costs in this matter on or before December 14, 2015. It is further ORDERED that this deadline shall go into abeyance if any appeal from the Court's August 31, 2015 judgment is filed, and shall remain in abeyance until such appellate proceedings conclude. Signed by Judge Richard J. Leon on 9/8/2015. (lcrjl2, ) (Entered: 09/08/2015)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Motion due by 12/14/2015. (tb) (Entered: 09/10/2015)
33 NOTICE OF APPEAL TO DC CIRCUIT COURT as to 31 Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Order on Motion for Trial, Order on Motion to Dismiss, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,, 30 Memorandum & Opinion by JACOB J. LEW, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, SYLVIA M. BURWELL, THOMAS E. PEREZ. Fee Status: No Fee Paid. Parties have been notified. (Grogg, Adam) (Entered: 10/28/2015)
34 Transmission of the Notice of Appeal, Order Appealed, and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals. The Fee remains to be paid and another notice will be transmitted when the fee has been paid in the District Court re 33 Notice of Appeal to DC Circuit Court. (znmw) (Entered: 10/29/2015)
35 AMENDED Transmission of the Notice of Appeal, Order Appealed, and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals docketing fee was not paid because the fee was an Appeal by the Government re 33 Notice of Appeal to DC Circuit Court,. (znmw) (Entered: 10/29/2015)
USCA Case Number 15−5301 for 33 Notice of Appeal to DC Circuit Court, filed by THOMAS E. PEREZ, JACOB J. LEW, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, SYLVIA M. BURWELL, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES. (md) (Entered: 11/06/2015)
36 ORDER of USCA (certified copy) ORDERED that the motion be granted, and this case is hereby held in abeyance pending further order of the court as to 33 Notice of Appeal to DC Circuit Court, filed by THOMAS E. PEREZ, JACOB J. LEW, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, SYLVIA M. BURWELL, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES. USCA Case Number 15−5301. (vt) (Entered: 02/26/2016)
37 NOTICE of Change of Address by Elissa Graves (Graves, Elissa) (Entered: 05/25/2016)
38 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to BETHANY A. GOODMAN, MARCH FOR LIFE, JEANNE F. MONAHAN. Attorney Matthew S. Bowman terminated. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration Consent of Bethany Goodman to Withdrawal, # 2 Declaration Consent of Jeanne Mancini to Withdrawal)(Bowman, Matthew) (Entered: 01/16/2017)
39 NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL by Michelle Renee Bennett on behalf of SYLVIA MATHEWS BURWELL, JACOB J. LEW, THOMAS E. PEREZ, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY Substituting for attorney Adam Grogg (Bennett, Michelle) (Entered: 08/15/2017)