IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 02-WY-0460-AJ (OES) HOUSING FOR ALL, RAMONA GAVIN, DEBRA WOODS, PATRICE SWAIN, SHARON HERNDON,
Plaintiffs, v. MONROE GROUP LTD., ALICE ROBINSON, THE AURORA MONTVIEW HEIGHTS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
Defendants.
PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys, Fox & Robertson, P.C., hereby move this Court for partial summary judgment as to liability against all Defendants.
Defendants have promulgated and continue to enforce a curfew at the Montview Heights Apartments which prohibits children under the age of 18 from being outside of their units after a given time, often as early as 8:00 p.m. Because Defendants could achieve their stated goals of safety and quality of life by targeting unsafe and disruptive behavior -- rather than barring from the common area everyone under the age of 18 for any purpose -- the curfew constitutes illegal discrimination on the basis of familial status in violation of the Fair Housing Act as amended (“FHA”). 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment as to liability.

STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
The Montview Heights Apartments (“Montview Heights”) is an apartment complex in
Aurora, Colorado. It is owned by Defendant Aurora Montview Heights Limited Partnership
(“AMHLP”) and managed by Defendant Monroe Group, Ltd. (“Monroe”) through a resident manager, Defendant Alice Robinson, a Monroe employee.1 All Defendants admit that AMHLP has promulgated and enforced curfews for minors at Montview Heights.2 Although the time of
the curfew has varied over the past few years, documents produced by Defendants demonstrate that the curfew has been as early as 8:00 p.m.3
Defendants publicized the curfew in a number of ways. It has been included in Montview’s written rules,4 and was the subject of an announcement, signed by Defendant
Robinson, stating:
EFFECTIVE FRIDAY, JANUARY 12, 2001, CURFEW WILL BE 8:00 PM FOR ANYONE UNDER 18 YEARS OF AGE. THERE WILL BE NO EXCEPTIONS. PARENTS PLEASE REMEMBER THE CURFEW CONTRACT YOU SIGNED A FEW MONTHS AGO IS STILL BINDING AND WILL BE ENFORCED.
NOTE THIS CURFEW IS IN EFFECT 7 DAYS A WEEK UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

1

Complaint ¶¶ 9-11; Defendant The Aurora Montview Heights Limited

Partnership’s Amended Answer and July Demand (“AMHLP Answer”) ¶ 5-6; Defendants

Monroe Group Ltd. and Alice Robinson’s Answer and Jury Demand (“Monroe/Robinson

Answer”) ¶ 5-6.

2

Complaint ¶ 13; AMHLP Answer ¶ 8; Monroe/Robinson Answer ¶ 8.

3

Gavin Decl. ¶ 12 & Ex. 3 (Tab 1 hereto).

4

Gavin Decl. ¶ 11 & Ex. 2.

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I WILL BE WATCHING VERY CLOSELY, AND SEVERE CONSEQUENCES WILL OCCUR FOR ANYONE CAUGHT VIOLATING THIS CURFEW. ALSO REMEMBER IF YOUR CHILD IS CAUGHT 3 TIMES IT WILL RESULT IN YOUR EVICTION.5
Many residents, including the Individual Plaintiffs, were required to sign a “Formal Notice and
Agreement,” which stated
CURFEW AT MONTVIEW HEIGHTS APTS IS 9:00 SUNDAY THRU THURSDAY AND 10:00 FRIDAY AND SATURADAY. [sic] I ACKNOWLEDGE THAT I UNDERSTAND AND WILL COMPLY WITH THESE RULES. . . . EFFECTIVE THE DATE OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THESE RULES I UNDERSTAND THAT AFTER 3 CURFEW VIOLATIONS IT WILL RESULT IN AUTOMATIC EVICTION.6
According to Montview Heights policy, when Defendant Robinson or another agent of
Defendants perceives or receives a report of an alleged violation of the curfew, he or she may
issue a “ticket” to the resident perceived to be in violation. When one resident has received three
“tickets,” he or she may be evicted.7 Defendants have issued tickets pursuant to the curfew
policy. 8
Plaintiffs Ramona Gavin, Sharon Herndon, Patrice Swain and Debra Woods (“Individual
Plaintiffs”) are all adults who either are or have in the recent past been domiciled at Montview

5

Gavin Decl. ¶ 12 & Ex. 3 (emphasis in original).

6

See Gavin Decl. ¶ 13 & Ex. 4; Herndon Decl. ¶ 6 & Ex. 2 (Tab 2 hereto); Woods

Decl. ¶ 5 & Ex. 4 (Tab 3 hereto).

7

Complaint ¶ 14; AMHLP Answer ¶ 9; Monroe/Robinson Answer ¶ 9.

8

AMHLP Answer ¶ 10; Monroe/Robinson Answer ¶ 10.

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Heights with their minor children.9 Defendants admit that the Individual Plaintiffs have received
tickets for violating the curfew.10 Finally, Defendants admit that
[a]ll three Defendants are jointly and severally liable for the enactment, promulgation and enforcement of the curfew. In particular, Defendants Monroe Group and AMHLP have a non-delegable duty to comply with the Fair Housing Act and are therefore liable for the acts of Defendant Robinson and other individuals acting or purporting to act as their agents.11
The only justification offered by Defendants for the curfew is that it “is enforced for
safety reasons and to protect the quality of life for all tenants.”12
These facts are all based on admissions by Defendants in their answers and responses to
interrogatories and on documents produced by Defendants. They are not in dispute.

9

Gavin Decl. ¶¶ 3-4; Herndon Decl. ¶¶ 2-3; Swain Decl. ¶¶ 2-3 (Tab 4 hereto);

Woods Decl. ¶ 2-3.

10 AMHLP Answer ¶ 14; Monroe/Robinson Answer ¶ 14; see also AMHLP Answer ¶¶ 15, 17, 18, 20-23; Monroe/Robinson Answer ¶¶ 15, 17, 18, 20-23 (admitting the issuance of specific tickets to specific plaintiffs); Gavin Decl. ¶ 6 & Ex. 1; Herndon Decl. ¶ 5 & Ex. 1; Swain Decl. ¶ 4 & Ex. 1; Woods Decl. ¶ 4 & Exs. 1-3.

11 Complaint ¶ 18; AMHLP Answer ¶ 12; Monroe/Robinson Answer ¶ 12.

12 Defendant Monroe Group Ltd.’s Response to Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents, Response to Interrogatory No. 14; Defendant Alice Robinson’s Response to Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents, Response to Interrogatory No. 13; see also Defendant Aurora Montview Heights Limited Partnership’s Response to Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents, Response to Interrogatory No. 13. (Robertson Decl. Exs. 1-3 (Tab 5 hereto).)

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ARGUMENT I. The Curfew at Montview Heights Discriminates Against Tenants on the Basis of
Familial Status in Violation of Section 804(b) of the FHA. Plaintiffs “make[] out a prima facie case of intentional discrimination under the [FHA] merely by showing that a protected group has been subjected to explicitly differential -- i.e. discriminatory -- treatment.” Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491, 1501 (10th Cir. 1995). Once Plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, Defendant “must establish that their rules constitute a compelling business necessity and that they have used the least restrictive means to achieve that end.” Fair Housing Congress v. Weber, 993 F. Supp. 1286, 1292 (C.D. Cal. 1997); cf. Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1503 (holding that safety-based restrictions on individuals with disabilities under the FHA cannot be based on blanket stereotypes but must be tailored to particularized concerns). In this case, the facts admitted by Defendants constitute a prima facie of discrimination on the basis of familial status, and, as a matter of law, the blanket curfew is not the least restrictive means of achieving Defendants’ stated ends. Furthermore, Defendants have produced in discovery notices and tickets used to announce the curfew which constitute illegal publications indicating discrimination against families with children. Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). There are no material facts in dispute in this case and Plaintiffs are
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entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to Defendants’ liability under sections 804(b) and 804(c) of the FHA.
A. Plaintiffs Have Stated a Prima Facie Case of Familial Status Discrimination. Section 804(b) of the FHA makes it unlawful “[t]o discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of . . . rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of . . . familial status.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). The implementing regulations explain that this includes “[l]imiting the use of privileges, services or facilities associated with a dwelling because of . . . familial status.” 24 C.F.R. § 100.65(b)(4). “Familial status” means an individual under the age 18 domiciled with a parent or other adult with legal custody. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(k). The curfew at Montview Heights prevents families with children -- but not families without children -- from using the facilities and services of the apartment complex at certain hours. The curfew thus is a “facially discriminatory restriction on the use of apartment facilities by tenant children, which in turn discriminates against tenants with children on the basis of their familial status.” Weber, 993 F. Supp. at 1290-1291. Because the Montview Heights curfew subjects a protected group to explicitly differential and thus discriminatory treatment, pursuant to Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1501, Plaintiffs have made out a prima facie case under section 804(b). B. Defendants’ Justification Fails Because, as a Matter of Law, They Have Not
Used the Least Restrictive Means to Achieve Their Stated Ends. Because the Plaintiffs have established a prima facie case of familial status discrimination under section 804(b), the burden shifts to Defendants both to state a compelling business
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necessity and to demonstrate that they have used the least restrictive means to achieve it. Weber, 993 F. Supp. at 1292; Llanos v. Estate of Coehlo, 24 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1061 (E.D. Cal. 1998); cf. Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1503 (holding that “[r]estrictions [on individuals with disabilities] predicated on public safety cannot be based on blanket stereotypes about the handicapped, but must be tailored to particularized concerns about individual residents.”) Plaintiffs will assume for the purposes of this motion that Defendants’ stated reasons -- safety and quality of life -- are compelling. Because Defendants’ curfew bars all children from any activities anywhere outside their own units after a specified hour of the evening -- rather than targeting unsafe or disruptive behavior -- the curfew is not, as a matter of law, the least restrictive means of achieving those ends. Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment as to liability.
Several courts have granted summary judgment for plaintiffs holding that rules that restrict children’s activities in apartment complexes are discriminatory based upon familial status and are, as matter of law, unjustified by reasons almost identical to those offered by Defendants here. See, e.g., Llanos, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 1060-61 (granting summary judgment to plaintiff holding that rules restricting children to two of the six swimming pools and restricting them from playing in designated “adult areas” violated the FHA); Weber, 993 F. Supp. at 1292 (granting summary judgment to plaintiff holding that rule prohibiting children from playing or running inside apartment building violated FHA); United States v. M. Westland Co., No. CV 93-4141 (AWT), Fair Housing-Fair Lending (P-H) ¶ 15,941 at 15,941.2 - .3 (C.D. Cal. August 3, 1994) (Robertson Decl. Ex. 4) (granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs holding rules that
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barred children from recreational areas and required children to be accompanied by adult in pool violated FHA).
For example, the rule at issue in Weber prohibited children from “play[ing] or run[ning] around inside the building area at any time.” Id., 993 F. Supp. at 1289. As noted above, the Weber court held that that rule constituted discrimination under the familial status provisions of the FHA. That holding shifted the burden to the defendant to justify the rule, which it did on grounds of safety and quiet. The court held that the rule was “not the least restrictive means for accomplishing” these ends. Id. at 1292. Indeed, the court held the rule superfluous in light of the general prohibition on “unnecessary noise, running, jumping, screaming, loud talking, or dangerous behavior.” Id.
Similarly, in Llanos, the court held that a rule limiting use of certain swimming pools by children was illegal under section 804(b). The landlord attempted to justify the rules on safety grounds but the court rejected this justification. “As a general rule, safety judgments are for informed parents to make, not landlords.” Llanos, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 1060-61; Weber, 993 F. Supp. at at 1293 (same); see also Westland at 15, 941.2 - .3 (holding that rules prohibiting unsupervised use of the jacuzzi and pool were unjustified by safety and health concerns); Department of Housing and Urban Dev. v. Paradise Gardens, HUDALJ 04-90-0321-1 & 04-900726-1, slip op at 13-15 (H.U.D. Oct. 15, 1992) (Robertson Decl. Ex. 5) (holding that community covenants restricting the use of the pool by children was discrimination not justified by safety or quality of life concerns); Department of Housing and Urban Dev. v. Edelstein, HUDALJ 05-90-0821-1, slip op at 5-6 (H.U.D. Dec. 9, 1991) (Robertson Decl. Ex. 6) (holding
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that lease provision prohibiting children under 18 from using swimming pool was discrimination).13
Because it prohibits all children from any activities anywhere outside their own units after a specified hour of the evening, the Montview curfew is far more restrictive than the noplaying-indoors rule struck down in Weber. As was the case in Weber, the Montview Heights curfew cannot be justified as the least restrictive means of achieving the goals of safety and quality of life. Indeed, like the rule in Weber, the Montview Heights curfew is superfluous in light of Defendants’ rule that “[n]othing should be done which will interfere with the rights, comfort, convenience or peaceful enjoyment of other residents.”14 That is, behavior that actually interferes with safety or quality of life can be prevented and/or punished under this rule, without punishing, for example, a 16-year-old returning from work, a child retrieving his family’s laundry, or a family of adults and children holding a cook-out, if these activities occur after 8:00 in the evening. See Westland at 15,941.3 (holding that the prohibition on unaccompanied children in the swimming pool was overly restrictive because it would bar “even a 17-year-old certified lifeguard” from swimming unaccompanied).
13 Although Paradise Gardens and Edelstein are administrative decisions, “HUD is the federal agency charged by Congress with interpreting and enforcing the Act, and it has special expertise in housing discrimination. . . . Therefore, these decisions are entitled to great weight.” Llanos, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 1060 n.8 (quoting Fair Housing Council v. Ayres, 855 F. Supp. 315, 318 (C.D. Cal. 1994) and citing Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972)).
14 Gavin Decl. Ex. 2 at 003445. -9-

Finally, to the extent it is the safety of the children themselves that Defendants seek to protect, the swimming pool cases are dispositive. If an apartment complex cannot restrict children from using a swimming pool -- a direct source of drowning risk -- it cannot restrict children from being anywhere outside their units, the source of only far more generalized and speculative risk. As the courts in Weber and Llanos held, these determinations are for parents, not landlords, to make.
Because the facially discriminatory curfew constitutes a prima facie case of familial status discrimination, and because Defendants cannot, as a matter of law, show that they have used the least restrictive means to achieve their stated ends, Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment as to liability under section 804(b) of the FHA. II. Notices and Statements Concerning the Curfew Discriminate Against Families with
Children in Violation of Section 804(c) of the FHA. The curfew notices published by Defendants violate the FHA by indicating a preference, limitation and discrimination against families with children. Section 804(c) of the FHA makes it unlawful: To make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on. . . familial status. . . or an intention to make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c). This section applies “to all written or oral notices or statements by a person engaged in the sale or rental of a dwelling.” 24 C.F.R. § 100.75(b). Defendants have published a number of notices and statements announcing and enforcing the curfew, including rules and
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regulations, periodic announcements and curfew tickets. These notices and statements violate section 804(c) of the FHA.
The standard for determining whether a given statement violates section 804(c) is whether the statement suggests a preference to the ordinary reader. Ragin v. New York Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 999-1000 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 821 (1991); see also Jancik v. Dep’t of Housing and Urban Dev., 44 F.3d 553, 556 (7th Cir. 1995) (same); Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc., 943 F.2d 644, 646 (6th Cir. 1991) (same); Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 29-30 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that the standard is whether to a “reasonable reader the natural interpretation” indicates a preference or an intention to make a preference); United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 215 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972) (holding that the standard is the ordinary reader). The author does not have to intend for the statement to be discriminatory; rather “the touchstone is . . . the message.” Ragin, 923 F. 2d at 1000. A number of cases have held the publication of rules restricting the use by children of an apartment’s facilities to violate section 804(c). See, e.g., Weber, 993 F.Supp. at 1290-92 (granting summary judgment for plaintiffs holding that the promulgation and enforcement of a rule prohibiting children from running or playing inside an apartment building was a violation of section 804(c)); Westland at 15,941 - .4 (granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs holding rules that barred children from recreational areas and required children to be accompanied by adult in pool violated section 804(c)); Paradise Gardens, slip op. at 16 (holding that published rules limiting access of children to swimming pools violated section 804(c)).
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In Weber, for example, the court held that the rule restricting children’s play activities was “clearly a ‘limitation’ on the use by children tenants of the apartment facilities, and an ordinary reader . . . could not reasonably interpret it otherwise.” 993 F. Supp. at 1292. Likewise at Montview, residents were given a number of written notices that children were not to be outside their apartments in the evenings, including one notice they were required to sign that asserted “3 curfew violations it will result in automatic eviction,” and another that threatened “I WILL BE WATCHING VERY CLOSELY, AND SEVERE CONSEQUENCES WILL OCCUR FOR ANYONE CAUGHT VIOLATING THIS CURFEW. ”15 Each Plaintiff received notices of curfew violations pursuant to this policy.16 An ordinary reader would reasonably find that these notices limited the use of the facilities at Montview Heights by children- -- and therefore by families with children -- in violation of section 804(c).
15 Gavin Decl. Ex. 3. 16 Gavin Decl. ¶ 6 & Ex. 1; Herndon Decl. ¶ 5 & Ex. 1; Swain Decl. ¶ 4 & Ex. 1; Woods Decl. ¶ 4 & Exs. 1-3.
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CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff respectfully request that this Court enter summary judgment against Defendants as to liability for violation sections 804(b) and 804(c) of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(b) & (c).
Respectfully submitted, FOX & ROBERTSON, P.C.

Dated: August 14, 2002

Amy F. Robertson Timothy P. Fox 910 - 16th Street, Suite 610 Denver, CO 80202 303.595.9700
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 02-WY-0460-AJ (OES)
HOUSING FOR ALL, RAMONA GAVIN, DEBRA WOODS, PATRICE SWAIN, SHARON HERNDON, and DELILAH HICKS,
Plaintiffs,
v.
MONROE GROUP LTD., ALICE ROBINSON, THE AURORA MONTVIEW HEIGHTS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
Defendants.
PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS’ CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys, Fox & Robertson, P.C., hereby submit this
Reply Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and in
Opposition to Defendants’ Cross Motion for Summary Judgment.
Defendants maintain a curfew for minors at Montview Heights Apartments. In support of
their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs provided this Court with five cases --
three of which were decided in favor of the plaintiffs on summary judgment -- holding that rules
that restrict use of an apartment’s facilities by children constitute facial disparate treatment
discrimination in violation of the familial status provisions of the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”). 42

U.S.C. § 3604(a) & (c). Defendants cite no cases to the contrary. Instead, Defendants base their opposition on a complete misunderstanding of Plaintiffs’ case, ignoring Plaintiffs’ disparate treatment argument and instead arguing that Plaintiffs’ have not met the standard for disparate impact discrimination. Analyzed under the correct standard, Defendants’ curfew constitutes facial disparate treatment discrimination and Defendants are thus required to demonstrate both that the curfew serves a compelling business necessity and that they have used the least restrictive means to achieve that end. Because Defendants have not -- and cannot as a matter of law -- make this showing, it is appropriate to deny their motion for summary judgment and grant Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment as to liability.
Background The parties agree on the undisputed facts set forth in Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (“Summary Judgment Memorandum” or “Pls. Summ. J. Mem.”). (See id. at 2-4; Opening Br. in Supp. of Defs.’ Cross Mot. for Summ. J. (“Opening Brief” or “Defs.’ Br.”) at 2.) Plaintiffs demonstrate here and in their Summary Judgment Memorandum that these facts entitle them to summary judgment as to liability in this case. In their Opening Brief, Defendants assert several additional facts, for example, that the curfew is effective in minimizing crime. The effectiveness of the curfew in minimizing crime is, however, irrelevant because Defendants have not -- as a matter of law -- provided sufficient evidence that the curfew is the least restrictive means of achieving that goal. However, should the Court determine that it is necessary to examine the effectiveness of the curfew, the proper
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approach at this juncture is to deny both motions for summary judgment and permit the parties to take discovery on this subject.1
Argument I. Plaintiffs Have Stated A Prima Facie Case of Familial Status Discrimination.
The parties agree that the Tenth Circuit case of Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491 (10th Cir. 1995) sets forth the standard for disparate treatment. (See Defs.’ Br. at 2.) According to the Bangerter standard, Plaintiffs “make[] out a prima facie case of intentional discrimination under the [Fair Housing Act] merely by showing that a protected group has been subjected to explicitly differential -- i.e. discriminatory -- treatment.” Id. at 1501. Plaintiffs have done that here, by showing that Defendants’ curfew subjects families with children -- a protected group -- to explicitly differential treatment by limiting the ability of children to use the complex after the curfew. The curfew does this on its face because it explicitly applies only to individuals under 18 years of age. See, e.g., Llanos v. Estate of Coehlo, 24 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1060-61 (E.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that rules limiting access of children to swimming pools were facially discriminatory); Fair Hous. Cong. v. Weber, 993 F. Supp. 1286, 1290-91 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that rule prohibiting children from running or playing inside apartment building was facially discriminatory).

1

The Second Declaration of Amy F. Robertson sets forth the reasons, pursuant to

Rule 56(f), why additional discovery is required should the Court wish to analyze the

effectiveness of the curfew.

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After correctly setting forth the case citation for the disparate treatment standard, Defendants devote the remainder of this section of their brief to attacking Plaintiffs’ case as if Plaintiffs were proceeding on a disparate impact theory. (See Defs.’ Br. at 3-4.) This is not accurate. As explained above, Plaintiffs are alleging disparate treatment by Defendants’ facially discriminatory policy. As such, Defendants’ reliance on the cases of Pfaff v. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 88 F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 1996) and Mountain Side Mobile Estates Partnership v. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, 56 F.3d 1243 (10th Cir. 1995) -- and their discussion of statistics -- are completely irrelevant to the present case. Both of these cases concerned facially neutral rules that the plaintiffs alleged had a disparate impact on families with children. For example, the Pfaff case involved a rule limiting occupancy of a house to four persons, id. at 742, and Mountain Side involved a rule limiting occupancy of a mobile home to three persons. Id. at 1246. In neither case -- in contrast to the present case -- did the rule itself address, limit or even mention the ages of the residents in question. Under such circumstances, statistical evidence becomes relevant to show that occupancy limitations of three or four persons tend to screen out more families with children than other types of families. Pfaff, 88 F.3d at 746; Mountain Side, 56 F.3d at 1251-52.
No such showing is required here, however, when the discrimination is obvious on the face of the rule itself. As the Tenth Circuit held in Bangerter, Plaintiffs’ prima facie case is complete upon a showing of “explicitly differential . . . treatment.” Id., 46 F.3d at 1501.
Defendants also argue that the curfew applies equally to all residents because households without children may have children as guests. (See Defs.’ Br. at 3.) This represents a
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misreading of the Fair Housing Act. That statute prohibits discrimination on the basis of “familial status,” and defines that term as one or more individuals under the age 18 domiciled with a parent or other adult with legal custody. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(k). The protected class is thus families with children -- not childless households with minor guests -- and the former are precisely the families singled out by the Montview curfew for disparate treatment. Households without children -- that is, any member of such a household or the entire household together -may use the complex unfettered by the curfew. II. Defendants Cannot as a Matter of Law Justify Their Curfew.
A. Defendants Are Required to Show That the Curfew Serves a Compelling Business Necessity and That They Have Used the Least Restrictive Means to Achieve That End.
Because Defendants’ curfew policy is discriminatory on its face, Defendants can only justify the policy by demonstrating that it serves “a compelling business necessity and that they have used the least restrictive means to achieve that end.” Weber, 993 F. Supp. at 1292. Defendants argue that all they are required to show is a “‘manifest relationship to the housing in question,’” (Defs.’ Br. at 4 (quoting Mountain Side, 56 F.3d at 1254)), or that the curfew is “‘reasonably necessary to achieve an important business objective.’” (Defs.’ Br. at 4 (quoting Hack v. President and Fellows of Yale Coll., 237 F.3d 81, 100 (2d Cir. 2000) (Moran, J., dissenting)).)2 Neither of these is the standard in disparate treatment cases. Both Mountain Side

2

The text in Hack on which Defendants rely in their Opening Brief occurs in the

dissent. The majority held that because the plaintiffs -- religious college students protesting co-

educational dormitories -- sought exclusion rather than integration, they had not stated a claim

(continued...)

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and Hack address disparate impact, and both make clear that the standard annunciated is directed toward those types of cases. See Hack, 237 F.3d at 102 (Moran, J., dissenting); Mountain Side, 56 F.3d at 1254. As such, neither provides the standard for the present case.
Even under the standard urged by Defendants, however, Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment. Defendants concede that they cannot “unreasonably refuse[ ] to adopt an alternative policy ‘that would provide a comparably effective means of meeting the defendant’s objective without imposing significant additional costs.’” (See Defs.’ Br. at 8 (quoting Hack, 237 F.3d at 102) (Moran, J., dissenting).) As demonstrated below, Defendant has unreasonably refused to adopt more narrowly tailored rules -- rules that would target specific unwelcome conduct and thereby achieve their goal of punishing that conduct, without simultaneously punishing innocent families with children.
B. Defendants Cannot as a Matter of Law Show That They Have Used the Least Restrictive Means of Achieving Their Stated Goals.
Assuming, arguendo, that the goals of safety and quality of life are compelling, Defendants have selected a means of achieving those goals that is grossly over-restrictive. In order to prevent crime and protect children, Defendants prohibit all children from any activity anywhere on the Montview Heights premises after 9:00 in the evening. They cannot, as a matter
2(...continued) under the Fair Housing Act. Hack, 237 F.3d at 90. As such, the majority did not analyze the questions at issue here. Because Defendants relied on text from the dissent -- on issues not addressed by the majority -- Plaintiffs’ discussion also addresses the dissent.
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of law, demonstrate that this blanket prohibition is the least restrictive way to accomplish their stated goals.3 This rule would prohibit, for example, the following activities:
! A child retrieving laundry for a sick parent after 8:00 or 9:004 (see Pls. Summ. J. Mem., Tab 2, Herndon Decl. (“Herndon Decl.”) ¶ 4);
! Family cook-outs that go past 8:00 or 9:00 (see Pls. Summ. J. Mem., Tab 1, Gavin Decl. (“Gavin Decl.”) ¶ 10);
! Families of adults and children playing together outdoors after 8:00 or 9:00 (see Gavin Decl. ¶¶ 8, 9);
! A parent sending a child to run an errand to a neighbor’s house after 8:00 or 9:00; ! A 12-year-old playing indoors at a friend’s house if he had to return home after
8:00 or 9:00; ! A 14-year-old attending a church activity that caused him to arrive home after
8:00 or 9:00;

3

Defendants have the burden of showing this. Weber, 993 F. Supp. at 1292.

Defendants cite to Keys Youth Servs., Inc. v. City of Olathe, Kansas, 248 F.3d 1267, 1276 (10th

Cir. 2001) for the proposition that “plaintiff’s requested accommodation must substantially

negate the defendant’s concern in order to be considered reasonable.” This discussion in Keys,

however, concerns the provision of the Fair Housing Act requiring reasonable accommodations

for individuals with handicaps. See id. at 1275 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B)). As such, it is

irrelevant to the question whether Defendants have selected the least restrictive means when

imposing a rule that facially discriminates on the basis of familial status.

4

Defendants concede that the curfew has been as early as 8:00 p.m. seven days a

week. (Defs.’ Br. at 1 n.1.) Defendants have provided no reassurances that they will not go back

to this early hour.

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! A 15-year-old coming home after a school athletic or music activity after 8:00 or 9:00;
! A 17-year-old having a job that ended after 8:00 or 9:00 or the commute for which brought him or her home after that time.
This is an enormous burden on families with children. Instead of enjoying Colorado’s long, warm summer evenings together, families at Montview must stay indoors after 8:00 or 9:00. Instead of teaching children to contribute to the family by running errands, assisting with laundry or getting a job, Montview parents must curtail these activities -- and participation in church or school functions -- if they might result in children being outside their units after 9:00. This is a radically over-restrictive way of attempting to protect children and prevent crime. And, of course, the curfew does nothing to prevent crimes committed by individuals over 18 years of age at Montview Heights.
Instead of essentially locking children inside their units every night, Defendants could promulgate and enforce rules that target specific, unwelcome conduct. Indeed, Defendants essentially concede this point when they offer the testimony of Alice Robinson that “[a]ll but one of the tickets . . . referenced by plaintiffs in their Motion for Summary Judgment were issued because the tenant to whom the ticket was issued was disturbing other tenants.” (Defs.’ Br. at 7.)5 That is, if Ms. Robinson in fact observed the children in question “disturbing other tenants,”

5

Plaintiffs dispute that this was the case. However, it is clear that Ms. Robinson

perceives that she is already ticketing only offensive behavior.

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she could have issued tickets for that infraction, rather than enforcing a rule that catches within its net all of the innocent activities listed above.
Defendants argue that the curfew is proactive, preventing problems before they happen, on the grounds that any other rule would “require[ ] tenants to report problems, after the problem has already occurred.” (Defs.’ Br. at 8.) Through this, Defendants concede that the curfew essentially treats all children as “problems” and punishes them all, without waiting for an infraction. Furthermore, this statement makes no sense: curfew tickets are given out when Ms. Robinson observes or receives a report of children out of doors after the designated time; presumably, violations of the curfew are prevented “proactively” by tenants who do not want to receive tickets and therefore keep their children inside. With similar effectiveness, Ms. Robinson could give out tickets for specific offending behaviors either when she observes them or when she receives a report of them. Those offending behaviors would be prevented “proactively” by such narrowly tailored rules by tenants who do not want to receive tickets and therefore refrain from -- and teach their children to refrain from -- committing those offenses. A more narrowlytailored rule would have the added salutary effects of (1) punishing not only children but adults who commit these specific offenses; and (2) permitting parents rather than the landlord to take responsibility for teaching and disciplining their children and keeping them safe. See Llanos, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 1060-61 (“As a general rule, safety judgments are for informed parents to make, not landlords.”) (quotation omitted); Weber, 993 F. Supp. at 1293 (same).
Defendants rely on the Bangerter case for the proposition that “[t]he FHA ‘expressly allows discrimination rooted in public safety concerns’ and it permits ‘reasonable restrictions on
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the terms or conditions of housing when justified by public safety concerns.’” (Defs.’ Br. at 4
(quoting Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1503).) A review of the Tenth Circuit’s language in context
demonstrates (1) that it was addressed to 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(9), which applies only to
discrimination on the basis of handicap; and (2) that the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of the
provision would bar the sorts of gross overgeneralizations relied on by Defendants here. The
Tenth Circuit held:
[T]he FHAA [Fair Housing Amendments Act] expressly allows discrimination rooted in public safety concerns when it provides that “[n]othing in this subsection requires that a dwelling be made available to an individual whose tenancy would constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals or whose tenancy would result in substantial physical damage to the property of others.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(9). We read section 3604(f)(9) as permitting reasonable restrictions on the terms or conditions of housing when justified by public safety concerns, given that housing can be denied altogether for those same reasons. However, the exceptions to the FHAA’s prohibitions on discrimination should be narrowly construed.
Restrictions predicated on public safety cannot be based on blanket stereotypes about the handicapped, but must be tailored to particularized concerns about individual residents.
Id., at 1503 (citations omitted). Because section 3604(f)(9) applies only to discrimination on the
basis of handicap, it is not applicable here. In any event, Defendants’ curfew imposes
restrictions on the use of the premises by children based entirely on “blanket stereotypes” about
those children; they have made no attempt to tailor these restrictions to “particularized concerns
about individual residents.” As such, even if § 3604(f)(9) did apply to familial status
discrimination, it would not permit Defendants’ curfew.6

6

Defendants also attempt to justify their curfew by relying on a case approving a

(continued...)

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Finally, Defendants argue that state law imposing on them a duty to “exercise reasonable care to protect against dangers of which [they] actually knew or should have known,” C.R.S. § 13-21-115(3)(c)(I), implicitly authorizes the curfew. Defendants offer no support the proposition that they may fulfill this duty through discriminatory rules, rules that violate federal law, or rules that impose restrictions on the tenants, rather than seeking out and remedying the dangerous conditions. For example, in Taco Bell, Inc. v. Lannon, 744 P.2d 43 (Colo. 1987), on which Defendants rely, the defendant restaurant was held liable for the plaintiff’s injuries sustained in a robbery. The measures it should have taken but did not take, however, were not restrictions on patrons but the hiring of an armed security guard. Id. at 51. Although an armed guard may not be an appropriate solution at Montview Heights, the case illustrates the important point that businesses protect their customers not by locking them up but by attacking the source of the threat.
C. Defendants Have Failed to Distinguish or Offer Contradictory Precedent to Plaintiffs’ Cases Prohibiting Housing Rules That Limit the Use of Premises by Children.
In their Summary Judgment Memorandum, Plaintiffs presented five cases in which restrictions on the use of premises by children were held invalid and noted that, in three of them,
6(...continued) curfew imposed by a municipal government. (Defs.’ Br. at 5 (quoting Ramos ex rel. Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 48 F. Supp. 2d 176, 185 (D. Conn. 1999).) But Defendants concede that this case is not apposite: “defendants are not a municipality and the constitutionality analysis [in their brief] is not directly applicable to the present action.” (Defs.’ Br. at 6.) The Tenth Circuit confirmed this in Bangerter, when it explicitly rejected the use of a constitutional analysis under the Fair Housing Act. Id. at 1503.
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the court had granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs declaring the restrictions to be in violation of the Fair Housing Act. Llanos, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 1060-61 (granting summary judgment to plaintiff holding that rules restricting children to two of the six swimming pools and restricting them from playing in designated “adult areas” violated the FHA); Weber, 993 F. Supp. at 1291-92 (granting summary judgment to plaintiff holding that rule prohibiting children from playing or running inside apartment building violated FHA); United States v. M. Westland Co., No. CV 93-4141 (AWT), Fair Housing-Fair Lending (P-H) ¶ 15,941, at 15,941.3 - .4 (C.D. Cal. August 3, 1994) (Pls. Summ. J. Mem., Tab 5 (“Robertson Decl.”), Ex. 4) (granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs holding rules that barred children from recreational areas and required children to be accompanied by adult in pool violated FHA); Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev. v. Paradise Gardens, HUDALJ 04-90-0321-1 & 04-90-0726-1, slip op at 13-16 (H.U.D. Oct. 15, 1992) (Robertson Decl. Ex. 5) (holding that community covenants restricting the use of the pool by children was discrimination not justified by safety or quality of life concerns); Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev. v. Edelstein, HUDALJ 05-90-0821-1, slip op at 5-6 (H.U.D. Dec. 9, 1991) (Robertson Decl. Ex. 6) (holding that lease provision prohibiting children under 18 from using swimming pool was discrimination).
Defendants have cited no cases to the contrary. That is, they can cite no case in which the court has approved a limitation on the use of premises by children.
Defendants attempt to distinguish Plaintiffs’ cases by arguing that they involve “More egregious facts.” (Defs.’ Br. at 6.) As an initial matter, the Defendants offer no legal support for the proposition that less egregious but still facially discriminatory rules are permissible.
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Bangerter suggests that when a rule is discriminatory on its face, it is illegal unless justified. In any event, a review of the facts in each of the cases cited by Plaintiffs reveals that the curfew at issue here is, in fact, far more restrictive. Recalling that Defendants prohibit all children from any activity anywhere on the Montview Heights premises after 8:00 or 9:00:
! Llanos involved a restriction on use of a swimming pool and a requirement that children not play in “adult areas.” Id. at 1060.
! Weber involved a rule prohibiting children from playing or running inside the apartment building. Id. at 1289.
! Westland involved rules that made several specific areas off limits to children (the jacuzzi and clubhouse rooms) and required adult supervision in others. Id. at 15,941.3.
! Although Paradise Gardens and Edelstein both involved statements that families were not welcome, the administrative law judges specifically held that rules limiting use of the swimming pool by children violated the Fair Housing Act. Paradise Gardens, slip op. at 13-16; Edelstein slip op. at 6.
All of these rules were declared unjustified by safety and/or quality of life concerns; all were found to violate the FHA. While it is true that -- during daylight hours -- the rules at issue in these cases are more restrictive than Montview’s curfew, this begs the question. None of these cases involved a blanket prohibition on use of the common area by children at any time. Even Weber, which addressed use by children of the indoor common area, limited the restriction to “playing or running,” rather than banning children completely. There is no sense in which the
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facts of these cases are “more egregious” than the curfew at issue here and no sense in which any differences can serve to justify Montview’s blanket curfew.
It is not clear what Defendants mean when they dismiss Plaintiffs’ cases as “California cases.” (Defs.’ Br. at 6.) The first three were decided by federal district courts in California, applying the same federal statute that is at issue here. There is no question of differing standards under different states’ laws. And while precedent from the Tenth Circuit would be binding, in the absence of such cases, this Court may look to sister districts for guidance and reasoning. The last two cases were decided by administrative law judges of the Department of Housing and Urban Development. As Plaintiffs pointed out in their Summary Judgment Memorandum, “HUD is the federal agency charged by Congress with interpreting and enforcing the Act, and it has special expertise in housing discrimination. . . . Therefore, these decisions are entitled to great weight.” Llanos, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 1060 n.8 (citations and quotation omitted).
In any event, a case recently decided by a Colorado state court -- applying the Colorado equivalent of the FHA -- held that a lease provision requiring that children under twelve be accompanied by an adult on the grounds of the apartment violated that statute. Atzenbeck v. Westport Apartments, Case No. 01CV749, Div. 5 (Jeff. Co. Dist. Ct. Sept. 11, 2002), transcript (“Tr.”) at 30-31 (text of discriminatory provision); 53-55 (holding).7 The decision came in response to the plaintiffs’ motion for a directed verdict in a case before Judge Frank Plaut of the Jefferson County District Court. The defendants in that case, like Defendants here, argued that

7

A copy of the portion of the transcript relating to the directed verdict motion is

attached as Exhibit 1 to the Second Declaration of Amy F. Robertson.

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the restrictive lease provision served the interests of safety and quality of life. (Tr. at 29-30.) Judge Plaut held that the lease provision violated the Colorado Fair Housing Act, which contains provisions that track sections 804(a) and 804(c) of the federal statute, the provisions at issue here. C.R.S. §§ 24-34-502(1)(a) & (d).8 Specifically, that court held that the provision requiring adult supervision “is discriminatory on its face and that there is no legitimate business reason for a policy that is that restrictive.” (Tr. at 53.) Judge Plaut explained:
I don’t think the first sentence in that paragraph on unaccompanied children is susceptible of a nondiscriminatory interpretation. And it was not supported by any legitimate business reason. The whole idea that a lease provision can exist which precludes an 11-year-old from walking to the mailbox or the grocery store or local park, which this provision does, is one that the Court rejects. (Id. at 54.) While it is true that the Aztenbeck lease provision applied throughout the day, it is also true that it was not a complete ban on children -- as is the curfew here -- and did not apply to children 13 to 18 years of age. For example, families with children at the Westport Apartments presumably could play or cook-out or travel together at any hour, whereas such activities are prohibited after 8:00 or 9:00 by Montview’s curfew. Defendants have offered no cases that contradict the conclusion dictated by Weber, Llanos, Westland, Paradise Gardens, Edelstein, and Atzenbeck: restrictions that facially target children are illegal.

8

One of the counsel for Defendants here -- Heather Salg – represented the

defendants in the Atzenbeck case and argued against the directed verdict. In that case, Ms. Salg

acknowledged that “[i]n cases of fair housing discrimination, federal case law is persuasive in

interpreting the Colorado Fair Housing Act because it is similar to the federal Fair Housing Act

and case law that supports that is [Weinstein v. Cherry Oaks Retirement, 917 P.2d 336, 339

(Colo. App. 1996).]” (Tr. at 50-51.)

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III. As a Matter of Law, the Curfew Constitutes a Notice, Statement or Advertisement Expressing a Preference, Limitation and Discrimination Based on Familial Status. Plaintiffs have presented evidence, which Defendants do not contest,9 of a number of
different publications of Montview’s curfew. It appeared in Montview’s written rules10 and was the subject of a notice sent to all tenants, informing them -- in all capital letters using bold-face type -- of the curfew.11 In addition, some residents were required to sign a document entitled “Formal Notice and Agreement,” which informed them of the curfew and purported to bind them to it.12 These notices constitute “notice[s], statement[s], [and/]or advertisement[s], with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicate[ ] [a] preference, limitation, or discrimination based on. . . familial status. . . or an intention to make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination” and are barred by § 804(c). 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c). In their Summary Judgment Memorandum, Plaintiffs cited to three cases in which published limitations on the use by children of an apartment’s premises were held to violate this provision. Weber, 993 F. Supp. at 1290-92 (granting summary judgment for plaintiffs holding that the promulgation and enforcement of a rule prohibiting children from running or playing inside an apartment building was a violation of section 804(c)); Westland, ¶ 15,941 at 15,941.3 - .4 (granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs holding rules that barred children from recreational areas and

9

Defs.’ Br. at 2.

10 Gavin Decl. ¶ 11 & Ex. 2.

11

Id. ¶ 12 & Ex. 3.

12 Id. ¶ 13 & Ex. 4; Herndon Decl. ¶ 6 & Ex. 2; Pls. Summ. J. Mem., Tab 3, Woods Decl. ¶ 5 & Ex. 4.

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required children to be accompanied by adult in pool violated section 804(c)); Paradise Gardens, slip op. at 15-16 (holding that published rules limiting access of children to swimming pools violated section 804(c)).
Defendants’ primary response to this argument is to assert incorrectly that all but one of Plaintiffs cases dealt with “advertisements rather than rules in a lease contract.” (Defs.’ Br. at 9.) As an initial matter, as noted above, Plaintiffs provided three cases that were directly on point. In addition, the present case does not concern a “rule in a lease contract.” Rather, it concerns a set of published rules, a one-page notice in capitalized, bold-face type, and a document titled “Formal Notice and Agreement.” All of these are clearly notices and/or statements, two types of communication explicitly covered by the statute.13
Defendants also argue that an “ordinary reader” would not infer an “anti-children” preference from the curfew notices or tickets. (Defs.’ Br. at 9.) The statute is not limited to “preferences,” however, but prohibits statements or notices that express a “preference, limitation or discrimination.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c). There can be no question that a curfew that prohibits individuals under the age of 18 from being outdoors after a certain period is -- on its face, without the need for inference or interpretation -- a “limitation” on children and therefore discriminates against them and their families. As such, Defendant’s reliance on Soules v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, 967 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1992), is
13 Judge Plaut in Atzenbeck held that the lease provision in that case did not violate the equivalent Colorado law. (Tr. at 58-59.) However, there is no evidence of additional notices above and beyond the lease provision, as there is in this case.
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misplaced. The challenged conduct in that case was a question: “How old is your child?” Id. at 820. It was not a notice, a statement or an advertisement and because -- as a question -- it asked rather than asserted, it did not on its face contain any preference, limitation or discrimination. In analyzing this question under § 804(c), the Soules court first noted that “[i]n cases where ads are clearly discriminatory” and with respect to “openly discriminatory” statements, the court may resolve the matter by considering the statement on its face. Id. at 824. Only where statements are not facially discriminatory -- such as the question at issue in that case -- is a further examination of the speaker’s rationale or intent required. Id. at 824-25. Thus, Defendants’ assertion that Soules permits inquiry into whether there was a legitimate reason for the statements here is incorrect. Defendants’ statements are all discriminatory on their face and the reasons for the statements, as Soules made clear, are irrelevant.
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Conclusion For the reasons set forth above and in Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court grant their motion for partial summary judgment as to liability under sections 804(a) and 804(c) and deny Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Should this Court determine that Plaintiffs are not entitled to partial summary judgment, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court deny both parties’ motions and permit discovery to proceed on (1) Defendants’ reasons for the curfew; and (2) the means Defendants have used to achieve their goals.
Respectfully submitted, FOX & ROBERTSON, P.C.

Dated: October 7, 2002

Amy F. Robertson Timothy P. Fox 910 - 16th Street, Suite 610 Denver, CO 80202 303.595.9700
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that on October 7, 2002, a copy of Reply Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Defendants’ Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, and the Second Declaration of Amy F. Robertson were served by first-class mail, postage prepaid, on:
Arthur R. Karstaedt III Heather A. Salg Harris, Karstaedt, Jamison & Powers, P.C., 383 Inverness Drive South Suite 400 Englewood, CO 80112
______________________________

 
 Case: 1:02-cv-00460-ABJ-OES As of: 06/09/2010 12:18 AM MDT 1 of 11
STAYDI, TERMED
U.S. District Court District of Colorado (Denver) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:02−cv−00460−ABJ−OES

Housing For All, et al v. Monroe Group Ltd., et al Assigned to: Judge WY. Alan B. Johnson Referred to: Magistrate Judge O. Edward Schlatter Demand: $0 Cause: 42:405 Fair Housing Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 03/07/2002 Date Terminated: 11/24/2003 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 443 Civil Rights: Accomodations Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Housing For All

represented by Amy Farr Robertson Fox &Robertson, P.C. 104 Broadway #400 Denver, CO 80203 303−595−9700 Fax: 303−595−9705 Email: arob@foxrob.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Timothy Patrick Fox Fox &Robertson, P.C. 104 Broadway #400 Denver, CO 80203 303−595−9700 Fax: 303−595−9705 Email: tfox@foxrob.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Ramona Gavin

represented by Amy Farr Robertson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Timothy Patrick Fox (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Debra Woods

represented by Amy Farr Robertson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Timothy Patrick Fox (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Patrice Swain

represented by Amy Farr Robertson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 1:02-cv-00460-ABJ-OES As of: 06/09/2010 12:18 AM MDT 2 of 11

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Timothy Patrick Fox (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Sharon Herndon

represented by Amy Farr Robertson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Timothy Patrick Fox (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Delilah Hicks

represented by Amy Farr Robertson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Timothy Patrick Fox (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Monroe Group Ltd.

represented by Arthur R. Karstaedt , III Harris, Karstaedt, Jamison &Powers, PC−Englewood 188 Inverness Drive West #300 Englewood, CO 80112−5205 720−875−9140 Fax: 720−875−9141 Email: akarstaedt@hkjp.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Curtis W. Shortridge Stewart, Shortridge &Fitzke, P.C. 4 Inverness Court East #100 Englewood, CO 80112 303−694−2000 Fax: 303−694−2020 Email: cshortridge@ssr−law.net TERMINATED: 04/23/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Heather A. Salg Harris, Karstaedt, Jamison &Powers, PC−Englewood 188 Inverness Drive West #300 Englewood, CO 80112−5205

Case: 1:02-cv-00460-ABJ-OES As of: 06/09/2010 12:18 AM MDT 3 of 11

720−875−9140 Fax: 720−875−9141 Email: hsalg@hkjp.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Alice Robinson

represented by Arthur R. Karstaedt , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Curtis W. Shortridge (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather A. Salg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Aurora Montview Heights Limited Partnership, The

represented by Arthur R. Karstaedt , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather A. Salg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 03/07/2002 03/07/2002 03/22/2002
03/22/2002
03/22/2002
04/01/2002 04/04/2002

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT (Summons(es) issued); jury demand (bpm) (Entered: 03/08/2002)
FILING FEE PAID: on 3/7/02 in the amount of $ 150, receipt # 233122. (bpm) (Entered: 03/08/2002)
2 RETURN OF SERVICE of Summons and Complaint and Notice of Availiability of US Magistrate Judge to Exercise Jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 636(c) and Local Rule 72.6 personally upon defendant Alice Robinson on 3/15/02 (former empl) (Entered: 03/25/2002)
3 RETURN OF SERVICE of Summons and Complaint, Instructions for Notice of Availability of US Magistrate Judge to Exercise Jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 636(c) and Local Rule 72.6 personally upon Quy Mong Tran, registered agent, for defendant Aurora Montview Hght on 3/15/02 (former empl) (Entered: 03/25/2002)
4 RETURN OF SERVICE of Summons and Complaint and Instructions Re NOtice of Availability of US Magistrate Judge to Exercise Jurisdiction pursuant to 28 USc 636(c) and Local Rule 72.6 personally upon defendant Monroe Group Ltd. on 3/13/02 (former empl) (Entered: 03/25/2002)
5 MOTION by defendant Monroe Group Ltd., defendant Alice Robinson to extend time to answer to and including 4/22/02 with statement pursuant to Local Rule 7.1 (former empl) (Entered: 04/01/2002)
6 ANSWER by defendant Aurora Montview Hght to complaint [1−1]; jury demand (former empl) (Entered: 04/04/2002)

Case: 1:02-cv-00460-ABJ-OES As of: 06/09/2010 12:18 AM MDT 4 of 11

04/11/2002 04/11/2002 04/17/2002 04/19/2002 04/19/2002 04/22/2002 04/23/2002
04/23/2002 06/19/2002
06/19/2002
06/19/2002 06/21/2002 06/24/2002 07/31/2002 08/02/2002
08/14/2002 08/14/2002

7 ANSWER by defendant Monroe Group Ltd., defendant Alice Robinson to complaint [1−1]; jury demand (former empl) (Entered: 04/11/2002)
8 AMENDED ANSWER [6−1] by defendant Aurora Montview Hght; jury demand (former empl) (Entered: 04/11/2002)
9 MOTION by defendant Monroe Group Ltd., defendant Alice Robinson to withdraw attorney Curtis Shortridge being replaced by Arthur R. Karstaedt (former empl) (Entered: 04/18/2002)
10 ORDER R16,stat,stlmt,pt,pto Case referred to Magistrate Judge O. E. Schlatter by Chief Judge Lewis T. Babcock (cc: to counsel) (gms) (Entered: 04/22/2002)
11 MINUTE ORDER : by Judge WY. Alan B. Johnson ; disp mtn ddl set 9/1/02 ; Jury trial set for 8:30 1/18/03 on the trialing docket (cc: all counsel) ; entry date : 4/22/02 (gms) Modified on 04/22/2002 (Entered: 04/22/2002)
12 MEMORANDUM by Judge WY. Alan B. Johnson referring to Magistrate Judge O. E. Schlatter the motion to withdraw attorney Curtis Shortridge being replaced by Arthur R. Karstaedt [9−1] (gms) (Entered: 04/22/2002)
13 MINUTE ORDER : by Magistrate Judge O. E. Schlatter granting motion to withdraw attorney Curtis Shortridge being replaced by Arthur R. Karstaedt [9−1] attorney Curtis W. Shortridge for Alice Robinson, attorney Curtis W. Shortridge for Monroe Group Ltd. (cc: all counsel) ; entry date : 4/24/02 (dlb) (Entered: 04/24/2002)
14 ORDER FOR RULE 16 CONFERENCE by Magistrate Judge O. E. Schlatter ; Rule 16 conference set for 9:00 6/19/02 (cc: all counsel) (dlb) (Entered: 04/24/2002)
15 COURTROOM MINUTES by Magistrate Judge O. E. Schlatter ; rule 16 conf held on 6/19/02 ; discovery ddl set 8/1/02 ; disp mtn ddl set 9/1/02 ; settlement conf set for 9:00 8/21/02 ; pretrial conf set for 9:30 10/15/02 ; entry date : 6/20/02 (former empl) (Entered: 06/20/2002)
16 SCHEDULING ORDER signed 6/19/02 by Magistrate Judge O. E. Schlatter ; Discovery cutoff 8/1/02 ;dispositive motions due 9/1/02 ; settlement conference 9:00 8/21/02 ;pretrial conference set 9:30 10/15/02; parties anticipate 3 day jury trial (cc: all counsel) (former empl) (Entered: 06/20/2002)
17 MINUTE ORDER : by Magistrate Judge O. E. Schlatter ; settlement conf set for 9:00 8/21/02 ; pretrial conf set for 9:30 10/15/02 (cc: all counsel) ; entry date : 6/20/02 (former empl) (Entered: 06/20/2002)
18 MINUTE ORDER : by Judge WY. Alan B. Johnson amending [11−1] Scheduling order [11−2] minute order ; jury trial set for 8:30 1/21/03 (cc: all counsel) ; entry date : 6/21/02 (former empl) (Entered: 06/21/2002)
19 Joint MOTION by plaintiffs, defendants to reset dispositive motion deadline and trial date and amend scheduling order (former empl) (Entered: 06/25/2002)
20 Unopposed MOTION by plaintiffs, defendants to extend itme to respond to dfts' first set of interrogatories and requests for production for production of documents (former empl) (Entered: 08/01/2002)
21 MINUTE ORDER : by Magistrate Judge O. E. Schlatter granting pltfs' unopposed motion to extend itme to respond to dfts' first set of interrogatories and requests for production for production of documents [20−1] (cc: all counsel) ; entry date : 8/9/02 (former empl) (Entered: 08/09/2002)
22 MOTION by plaintiffs for partial summary judgment as to liability of sections 804(b) aqnd 804(c) of the Fair Housing Act, 42 USC 3604(b)(former empl) (Entered: 08/14/2002)
23 MEMORANDUM (BRIEF) by plaintiffs in support of motion for partial summary judgment as to liability of sections 804(b) aqnd 804(c) of the Fair Housing Act, 42 USC 3604(b)[22−1] (former empl) (Entered: 08/14/2002)

Case: 1:02-cv-00460-ABJ-OES As of: 06/09/2010 12:18 AM MDT 5 of 11

08/21/2002 09/03/2002 09/04/2002 09/05/2002 09/06/2002
09/10/2002 09/10/2002 09/12/2002 09/16/2002
09/16/2002 09/17/2002 09/17/2002 09/17/2002
09/17/2002
09/23/2002 09/23/2002 09/23/2002 09/23/2002

24 MEMORANDUM by Magistrate Judge O. E. Schlatter regarding [16−1] schedule order ; settlement conf held 8/21/02 (former empl) (Entered: 08/21/2002)
25 MOTION by defts Monroe Group Ltd., Alice Robinson, Aurora Montview Hght for protective order (former empl) (Entered: 09/04/2002)
26 Unopposed MOTION by defendants to extend time to respond to motion for summary judgment and proposed briefing schedule (former empl) (Entered: 09/06/2002)
28 MINUTE ORDER : by Magistrate Judge O. E. Schlatter response due 9/16/02 regarding [25−1] motion for protective order (cc: all counsel) ; entry date : 9/6/02 (former empl) (Entered: 09/06/2002)
27 MINUTE ORDER : by Judge WY. Alan B. Johnson granting dfts' unopposed motion to extend time to respond to motion for summary judgment and proposed briefing schedule [26−1], regarding [22−1] motion for partial summary judgment as to liability of sections 804(b) aqnd 804(c) of the Fair Housing Act, 42 USC 3604(b)response due 9/17/02, reply due 10/21/02, cross−motion due 9/17/02, response due 10/7/02, reply due 10/21/02, responses to be no more than 20 pages, replies 10 pages (cc: all counsel) ; entry date : 9/6/02 (former empl) (Entered: 09/06/2002)
29 MOTION by plaintiffs to amend complaint [1−1] to add pltf Delilah Hicks (former empl) (Entered: 09/10/2002)
Tendered Amended Complaint submitted by plaintiff re: motion to amend complaint [1−1] to add pltf Delilah Hicks [29−1] (former empl) (Entered: 09/10/2002)
30 Unopposed MOTION by plaintiff Housing For All to extend time to respond to dfts' motion for protective order to 9/23/02 (former empl) (Entered: 09/16/2002)
31 MINUTE ORDER : by Magistrate Judge O. E. Schlatter granting pltf's motion to amend complaint [1−1] to add pltf Delilah Hicks [29−1], accepting for filing [0−0] document tendered (cc: all counsel) ; entry date : 9/16/02 (former empl) (Entered: 09/16/2002)
32 AMENDED COMPLAINT [1−1] by plaintiff Housing For All, plaintiff Ramona Gavin, plaintiff Debra Woods, plaintiff Patrice Swain, plaintiff Sharon Herndon; jury demand; adding plaintiff Delilah Hicks (former empl) (Entered: 09/16/2002)
33 CROSS−MOTION by defendants Monroe Group Ltd., Alice Robinson, Aurora Montview Hght for summary judgment (former empl) (Entered: 09/17/2002)
34 OPENING BRIEF by defendants in support of their cross− motion for summary judgment [33−1] (former empl) (Entered: 09/17/2002)
35 RESPONSE BRIEF IN OPPOSITION by defendants Monroe Group Ltd., Alice Robinson, Aurora Montview Hght to motion for partial summary judgment as to liability of sections 804(b) aqnd 804(c) of the Fair Housing Act, 42 USC 3604(b)[22−1] (former empl) (Entered: 09/17/2002)
36 MINUTE ORDER : by Magistrate Judge O. E. Schlatter granting pltf's unopposed motion to extend time to respond to dfts' motion for protective order to 9/23/02 [30−1], regarding [25−1] motion for protective order (cc: all counsel) ; entry date : 9/18/02 (former empl) (Entered: 09/18/2002)
37 MOTION by plaintiffs to compel re production of documents and information (former empl) Modified on 02/07/2003 (Entered: 09/24/2002)
38 BRIEF by plaintiffs in opposition to motion for protective order [25−1]...and (former empl) (Entered: 09/24/2002)
38 ... and (BRIEF) by plaintiff in support of motion to compel [37−1] (former empl) (Entered: 09/24/2002)
39 DECLARATION of Amy F. Robertson by plaintiffs re: motion to compel [37−1] (former empl) (Entered: 09/24/2002)

Case: 1:02-cv-00460-ABJ-OES As of: 06/09/2010 12:18 AM MDT 6 of 11

09/24/2002 09/24/2002 09/25/2002 09/26/2002 09/27/2002 10/07/2002 10/07/2002 10/07/2002 10/07/2002 10/08/2002 10/21/2002
10/21/2002 10/23/2002 10/23/2002
10/23/2002 10/23/2002 10/25/2002

40 MINUTE ORDER : by Magistrate Judge O. E. Schlatter : dfts response due 10/4/02 regarding [37−1] motion to compel (cc: all counsel) ; entry date : 9/24/02 (former empl) (Entered: 09/24/2002)
41 MEMORANDUM by Judge WY. Alan B. Johnson referring to Magistrate Judge O. E. Schlatter the motion to compel [37−1] (former empl) (Entered: 09/24/2002)
42 ANSWER by defendants Monroe Group Ltd., Alice Robinson, Aurora Montview Hght to amended complaint [32−1] (former empl) (Entered: 09/30/2002)
43 Unopposed MOTION by defendants to extend time to 10/8/02 to respond to motion to compel (former empl) (Entered: 09/30/2002)
44 MINUTE ORDER : by Magistrate Judge O. E. Schlatter granting dfts' unopposed motion to extend time to 10/8/02 to respond to motion to compel [43−1] (cc: all counsel) ; entry date : 10/1/02 (former empl) (Entered: 10/01/2002)
45 REPLY MEMORANDUM by plaintiffs to support their motion for partial summary judgment as to liability of sections 804(b) aqnd 804(c) of the Fair Housing Act, 42 USC 3604(b)[22−1] (former empl) (Entered: 10/07/2002)
46 Second DECLARATION of Amy F. Robertson by plaintiff re: reply brief [45−1] to pltfs' motion for partial summary judgment (former empl) (Entered: 10/07/2002)
47 JOINT MOTION by plaintiffs and defendants to stay discovery and other deadlines pending ruling on cross motions for summary judgment (former empl) (Entered: 10/07/2002)
48 AMENDED CERTIFICATE OF MAILING by plaintiffs' counsel of motion to stay discovery and other deadlines pending ruling on cross motions for summary judgment [47−1] (former empl) (Entered: 10/07/2002)
49 REPLY by defendants response in opposition to motion to compel [37−1], and Reply Brief support of its motion for protective order [25−1] (former empl) (Entered: 10/09/2002)
50 MOTION by defts Monroe Group Ltd., Alice Robinson, Aurora Montview Hght to strike [Atzenbeck transcript and references from the reply memoradum and second declaration of Amy F. Robertson) (former empl) Modified on 10/25/2002 (Entered: 10/21/2002)
51 REPLY BRIEF by defendants Monroe Group Ltd., Alice Robinson, Aurora Montview Hght to the pltfs' response to their cross−motion for summary judgment [33−1] (former empl) (Entered: 10/23/2002)
52 MOTION by plaintiffs for leave to file surreply brief in response to dfts reply brief in support of cross−motion for summary judgment (former empl) (Entered: 10/25/2002)
Tendered Surreply Brief to Cross Motion for Summary Judgment submitted by plaintiffs with motion for leave to file surreply brief in response to dfts reply brief in support of cross−motion for summary judgment [52−1] (former empl) (Entered: 10/25/2002)
53 MOTION by plaintiffs for leave to supplement their memorandum in opposition to dfts' motion for protective order and in support of pltfs' motion to compel (former empl) (Entered: 10/25/2002)
54 OPPOSITION (RESPONSE) by plaintiffs to dfts' motion to strike [Atzenbeck transcript and references from the reply memoradum and second declaration of Amy F. Robertson) [50−1] (former empl) (Entered: 10/25/2002)
55 MEMORANDUM by Judge WY. Alan B. Johnson referring to Magistrate Judge O. E. Schlatter the motion for leave to supplement their memorandum in opposition to dfts' motion for protective order and in support of pltfs' motion to compel [53−1], and the motion for leave to file surreply brief in response to dfts reply brief in support of cross−motion for summary judgment [52−1] (former empl) (Entered: 10/25/2002)

Case: 1:02-cv-00460-ABJ-OES As of: 06/09/2010 12:18 AM MDT 7 of 11

11/07/2002 11/08/2002 11/12/2002 11/12/2002 11/12/2002 11/14/2002 11/21/2002 11/22/2002 11/27/2002 12/06/2002
12/10/2002 12/11/2002
12/30/2002 02/21/2003 03/25/2003 05/27/2003

56 REPLY BRIEF by plaintiffs to response to motion to strike (Atzenbeck transcript and references from the reply memoradum and second declaration of Amy F. Robertson) [50−1] (former empl) (Entered: 11/08/2002)
57 NOTICE of Change of addresses of pltfs of Ramona Gavin and Delilah Hicks by plaintiffs' counsel (former empl) (Entered: 11/13/2002)
58 RESPONSE by defendants to motion for leave to file surreply brief in response to dfts reply brief in support of cross−motion for summary judgment [52−1] (former empl) Modified on 02/07/2003 (Entered: 11/14/2002)
58 MOTION by defendant for leave to file sur response to summary judgment pleadings (former empl) Modified on 02/07/2003 (Entered: 11/14/2002)
59 OPPOSITION (RESPONSE) by defendants to pltfs' motion for leave to supplement their memorandum in opposition to dfts' motion for protective order and in support of pltfs' motion to compel [53−1] (former empl) (Entered: 11/14/2002)
60 MEMORANDUM by Judge WY. Alan B. Johnson referring to Magistrate Judge O. E. Schlatter the motion for leave to file sur response [58−1] (former empl) (Entered: 11/14/2002)
61 Joint Request (MOTION) by plaintiffs, defendants for status conference (gms) (Entered: 11/25/2002)
62 MINUTE ORDER : by Judge WY. Alan B. Johnson granting joint motion for status conference [61−1] ; status conf set for 1:30 12/6/02 by phone in Cheyenne (cc: all counsel) ; entry date : 11/25/02 (gms) (Entered: 11/25/2002)
63 MINUTE ORDER : by Judge WY. Alan B. Johnson ; status conf reset for 8:30 12/6/02 (cc: all counsel) ; entry date : 11/27/02 (gms) (Entered: 11/27/2002)
64 COURTROOM MINUTES by Judge WY. Alan B. Johnson ; status conf held 12/6/02 ; Discovery will not be stayed, jury trial is vacated pending ruling on sum jgm &completion of discovery. Status conf to be held at later date. Extension of discovery &discovery disputes to be referred to Mag. Schlatter. ; entry date : 12/10/02 Court Reporter: Nordberg (gms) (Entered: 12/10/2002)
65 MINUTE ORDER : by Judge WY. Alan B. Johnson. Jury trial set for 1/21/03 is vacated. (cc: all counsel) ; entry date : 12/10/02 (gms) (Entered: 12/10/2002)
66 ORDER by Judge WY. Alan B. Johnson denying joint motion to stay discovery and other deadlines pending ruling on cross motions for summary judgment [47−1]. Court refers to Mag Judge for resolution any discovery issues that exists and request the Mag Judge establish revised discovery deadlines &discovery cutoff dates. The pending cross motions for sum jgm ([22−1] motion for partial summary judgment as to liability of sections 804(b) and 804(c) of the Fair Housing Act, 42 USC 3604(b)&[33−1] motion for summary judgment) will be submitted to the court on the written submissions, w/o further oral argument. Status conf may be held to reset trial date. Parties joint request to continue 1/21/03 trial date is granted, trial to be reset by separate order at a later date if necessary. (cc: all counsel) ; entry date : 12/12/02 (gms) (Entered: 12/12/2002)
67 NOTICE of Change of street name of Harris Karstaedt Jamison &Powers by defendant Aurora Montview Hght (former empl) (Entered: 12/30/2002)
68 MINUTE ORDER : by Magistrate Judge O. E. Schlatter granting joint request (motion) for status conference [61−1] ; mag status conference set for 9:30 3/18/03 (cc: all counsel) ; entry date : 2/25/03 (former empl) (Entered: 02/25/2003)
69 ORDER singed 3/25/03 by Magistrate Judge O. E. Schlatter regarding [16−1] schedule order ; discovery ddl was vacated; mag conference held 3/18/03 Order: discovery stayed pending ruling on dispositive motions (cc: all counsel) ; entry date : 3/25/03 (former empl) (Entered: 03/25/2003)
70 ORDER signed 5/21/03 by Judge WY. Alan B. Johnson , filed 5/27/03, denying as set forth dfts' motion for summary judgment [33−1], granting in part and denying in part, as set forth, pltfs' motion for partial summary judgment as to liability of

Case: 1:02-cv-00460-ABJ-OES As of: 06/09/2010 12:18 AM MDT 8 of 11

05/28/2003 06/04/2003 06/04/2003 06/12/2003
06/13/2003
07/16/2003 07/17/2003 08/07/2003
08/12/2003 08/12/2003 08/18/2003 08/19/2003 08/19/2003 08/20/2003

sections 804(b) and 804(c) of the Fair Housing Act, 42 USC 3604(b)[22−1] (cc: all counsel) ; entry date : 5/27/03 (former empl) (Entered: 05/27/2003)
71 MINUTE ORDER : by Magistrate Judge O. E. Schlatter ; mag status conference set for 10:30 6/12/03 (cc: all counsel) ; entry date : 5/28/03 (former empl) (Entered: 05/28/2003)
72 JOint STATUS REPORT by plaintiffs and defendants (former empl) (Entered: 06/05/2003)
72 and... MOTION by plaintiffs and defendants to change scheduling order dates and for hearing (former empl) Modified on 08/07/2003 (Entered: 06/05/2003)
73 COURTROOM MINUTES by Magistrate Judge O. E. Schlatter granting items 1 and 3 of them motion and taking under advisement on 6/12/03 item 2 the motion to compel re production of documents and information [37−1] regarding [16−1] schedule order ; discovery ddl set 12/1/03 ; disp mtn ddl set 1/15/04 ; pretrial conf set for 9:00 2/19/04 ; entry date : 6/16/03 Court Reporter: OES Tape 2003−23ct (former empl) (Entered: 06/16/2003)
74 MINUTE ORDER : by Magistrate Judge O. E. Schlatter: granting items 1 and 3 and taking under advisement on 6/12/03 item 2 of the motion to compel re production of documents and information [37−1], regarding [16−1] schedule order, regarding [73−2] minutes ; discovery ddl set 12/1/03 ; disp mtn ddl set 1/15/04 ; mag conference held 6/12/03 ; pretrial conf set for 9:00 2/19/04 (cc: all counsel) ; entry date : 6/16/03 (former empl) (Entered: 06/16/2003)
75 MINUTE ORDER : by Judge WY. Alan B. Johnson regarding [16−1] schedule order ; 1 week jury trial set for 8:30 5/17/04 (cc: all counsel) ; entry date : 7/16/03 (former empl) (Entered: 07/16/2003)
76 MINUTE ORDER : by Magistrate Judge O. E. Schlatter regarding [16−1] schedule order ; mag hearing on poltf's request for certain items from all tenants' files set for 2:00 8/20/03 (cc: all counsel) ; entry date : 7/18/03 (former empl) (Entered: 07/18/2003)
78 MEMORANDUM by Judge WY. Alan B. Johnson referring to Magistrate Judge O. E. Schlatter the motion to change scheduling order dates and for hearing [72−1], the motion for leave to supplement their memorandum in opposition to dfts' motion for protective order and in support of pltfs' motion to compel [53−1], the motion to strike [Atzenbeck transcript and references from the reply memoradum and second declaration of Amy F. Robertson) [50−1] (former empl) (Entered: 08/14/2003)
77 SUPPLEMENT by defendant Monroe Group Ltd., defendant Alice Robinson, defendant Aurora Montview Hght to motion for protective order [25−1] (former empl) (Entered: 08/13/2003)
77 and RESPONSE in OPPOSITION by defts Monroe Group Ltd., Alice Robinson, Aurora Montview Hght to pltfs' motion to compel re production of documents and information [37−1] (former empl) (Entered: 08/13/2003)
79 RESPONSE by plaintiffs to motion response [77−1], and supplement [77−1] (former empl) (Entered: 08/21/2003)
80 MOTION by defendant Alice Robinson, defendant Aurora Montview Hght to strike motion [80−1] or in the alternative motion to submit reply brief (former empl) (Entered: 08/21/2003)
81 MEMORANDUM by Judge WY. Alan B. Johnson referring to Magistrate Judge O. E. Schlatter the motion to strike motion [80−1] or in the alternative motion to submit reply brief [80−1] (former empl) (Entered: 08/21/2003)
82 MINUTE ORDER : by Magistrate Judge O. E. Schlatter after hearing on 8/20/03, Orders: granting motion to compel re production of documents and information [37−1], granting motion for protective order [25−1] (cc: all counsel) ; entry date : 8/21/03 (former empl) (Entered: 08/21/2003)

Case: 1:02-cv-00460-ABJ-OES As of: 06/09/2010 12:18 AM MDT 9 of 11

08/20/2003 08/27/2003 08/27/2003 08/27/2003 08/28/2003 09/03/2003 09/17/2003
09/22/2003 09/24/2003
10/01/2003 10/01/2003 10/02/2003 10/03/2003
10/06/2003 10/07/2003

83 PROTECTIVE ORDER issued 8/20/03 after hearing by Magistrate Judge O. E. Schlatter : regarding [82−1] minute order on confidential discovery materials (cc: all counsel) (former empl) (Entered: 08/21/2003)
84 NOTICE of Change of pltfs' addresses of RObertson &Fox by plaintiff Housing For All (former empl) (Entered: 08/27/2003)
85 Unopposed MOTION by plaintiffs to amend schedule order [16−1] to designate experts (former empl) (Entered: 08/27/2003)
86 MEMORANDUM by Judge WY. Alan B. Johnson referring to Magistrate Judge O. E. Schlatter the motion to amend schedule order [16−1] to designate experts [85−1] (former empl) (Entered: 08/27/2003)
87 MINUTE ORDER : by Magistrate Judge O. E. Schlatter granting pltfs' unopposed motion to amend schedule order [16−1] to designate experts [85−1] to 10/17/03 to designate and to 11/17/03 to designate rebuttal experts (cc: all counsel) ; entry date : 9/2/03 (former empl) (Entered: 09/02/2003)
88 RESPONSE by defendants to minute order [82−1] with attached Exhibit A (former empl) (Entered: 09/04/2003)
89 ORDER signed 9/15/03 by Judge WY. Alan B. Johnson denying as moot motion for leave to supplement their memorandum in opposition to dfts' motion for protective order and in support of pltfs' motion to compel [53−1], and the motion to strike (Atzenbeck transcript and references from the reply memorandum and second declaration of Amy F. Robertson) [50−1] (cc: all counsel) ; entry date : 9/17/03 (former empl) (Entered: 09/17/2003)
90 Second Unopposed MOTION by plaintiffs to amend schedule order [16−1]: deadline to designate experts to 12/17/04; deadline to desingate rebuttal experts to 1/16/04; move discovery cutoff to 2/13/04 and move dispositive motion deadline to 2/28/04 (former empl) (Entered: 09/24/2003)
91 MINUTE ORDER : by Judge WY. Alan B. Johnson referring to Magistrate Judge O. E. Schlatter the motion to amend schedule order [16−1]: deadline to designate experts to 12/17/04; deadline to designate rebuttal experts to 1/16/04; move discovery cutoff to 2/13/04; Ordered: motion to change motion deadline is denied and dispositive motion deadline of 1/15/03 remains set [90−1] (cc: all counsel) ; entry date : 9/26/03 (former empl) (Entered: 09/26/2003)
92 LETTER to court from counsel for defendant Monroe Group Ltd., Alice Robinson, Aurora Montview Hght re: minute order [82−1] (former empl) (Entered: 10/02/2003)
93 MOTION by plaintiff to supplement motion to compel re production of documents and information [37−1] , or for reconsideration of the motion to compel (former empl) (Entered: 10/02/2003)
94 MEMORANDUM by Judge WY. Alan B. Johnson referring to Magistrate Judge O. E. Schlatter the motion to supplement motion to compel re production of documents and information [37−1] [93−1], and/or for reconsideration of the motion to compel [93−2] (former empl) (Entered: 10/06/2003)
95 MINUTE ORDER : by Magistrate Judge O. E. Schlatter setting hearing on motion to supplement motion to compel re production of documents and information [37−1] [93−1] or for reconsideration of the motion to compel [93−2] 10:00 10/24/03 (cc: all counsel) ; entry date : 10/6/03 (former empl) (Entered: 10/06/2003)
96 MINUTE ORDER : by Magistrate Judge O. E. Schlatter in light of [91−1] minute order: parties are directed to sbumit additional comments in regard to pltf's second unopposed motion to amend scheduling order (cc: all counsel) ; entry date : 10/6/03 (former empl) (Entered: 10/06/2003)
97 Unopposed MOTION by plaintiffs to amend schedule order [16−1] with respect to catregories of expert testimony (former empl) (Entered: 10/10/2003)

Case: 1:02-cv-00460-ABJ-OES As of: 06/09/2010 12:18 AM MDT 10 of 11

10/07/2003 10/08/2003
10/20/2003
10/20/2003 10/22/2003 10/23/2003 10/23/2003 10/23/2003 10/23/2003 10/23/2003 10/24/2003 10/24/2003 10/24/2003 10/24/2003 10/24/2003

98 Additional Comments (SUPPLEMENT) by plaintiff, defendant, re pltfs' second unopposed motion to amend schedule order [16−1] with respect to catregories of expert testimony [97−1] (former empl) (Entered: 10/10/2003)
99 MINUTE ORDER : by Magistrate Judge O. E. Schlatter regarding [98−1], granting motion to amend schedule order [16−1] [97−1], granting motion to amend schedule order [16−1]: deadline to designate experts to 12/17/04; deadline to desingate rebuttal experts to 1/16/04; move discovery cutoff to 2/13/04 and move dispositive motion deadline to 2/28/04 [90−1], regarding [16−1] schedule order ; discovery ddl set 1/15/04 (cc: all counsel) ; entry date : 10/10/03 (former empl) (Entered: 10/10/2003)
100 MINUTE ORDER : by Magistrate Judge O. E. Schlatter on advise by counsel that the matters have been resolved, Order: denying as moot motion to supplement motion to compel re production of documents and information [37−1] [93−1],or, for reconsideration of the motion to compel [93−2] and vacating the 10/24/03 hearing (cc: all counsel) ; entry date : 10/23/03 (former empl) (Entered: 10/23/2003)
101 Unopposed MOTION by defendants to extend time in which to submit response to pltfs' motion to suplement and/or for reconsideration of their motion to compel (former empl) (Entered: 10/23/2003)
107 MINUTE ORDER : by Magistrate Judge O. E. Schlatter vacating portion [100−1] minute order finding the motion for reconsideration of the motion to compel as moot, reinstating motion for reconsideration of the motion to compel [93−2] (cc: all counsel) ; entry date : 11/17/03 (former empl) (Entered: 11/17/2003)
102 COPY OF EXECUTED Notices of Acceptance of Offers of Judgment, and COPIES OF OFFERS of judgment filed by plaintiff Ramona Gavin, plaintiff Debra Woods, plaintiff Patrice Swain, plaintiff Sharon Herndon, plaintiff Delilah Hicks (former empl) (Entered: 10/23/2003)
103 MINUTE ORDER : by Judge WY. Alan B. Johnson regarding [102−1] judgment: the originals of the offers of judgment and acceptances are to be fijled by 5:00 pm on 10/27/03 (cc: all counsel) ; entry date : 10/23/03 (former empl) (Entered: 10/23/2003)
104 MEMORANDUM by Judge WY. Alan B. Johnson referring to Magistrate Judge O. E. Schlatter the motion to extend time in which to submit response to pltfs' motion to supplement and/or for reconsideration of their motion to compel [101−1] (former empl) (Entered: 10/24/2003)
105 MINUTE ORDER : by Magistrate Judge O. E. Schlatter following a settlement conference the court was advised the case has settled; regarding [16−1] schedule order ; dsm papers ddl set for 11/7/03 (cc: all counsel) ; entry date : 10/25/03 (former empl) (Entered: 10/25/2003)
106 MEMORANDUM by Magistrate Judge O. E. Schlatter regarding [16−1] schedule order settlement conference held 10/23/03 (former empl) (Entered: 10/29/2003)
108 OFFER of judgment to Plaintiff Ramona Gavin filed by defendant Monroe Group Ltd., defendant Alice Robinson, defendant Aurora Montview Hght (former empl) (Entered: 11/17/2003)
109 ACCEPTANCE by plaintiff Ramona Gavin of offer judgment [108−1] (former empl) (Entered: 11/17/2003)
110 OFFER of judgment to Patrice Swain filed by defendant Monroe Group Ltd., defendant Alice Robinson, defendant Aurora Montview Hght (former empl) (Entered: 11/17/2003)
111 ACCEPTANCE by plaintiff Patrice Swain of offer judgment [110−1] (former empl) (Entered: 11/17/2003)
112 OFFER of judgment to Debra Woods filed by defendant Monroe Group Ltd., defendant Alice Robinson, defendant Aurora Montview Hght (former empl) (Entered: 11/17/2003)

Case: 1:02-cv-00460-ABJ-OES As of: 06/09/2010 12:18 AM MDT 11 of 11

10/24/2003 10/24/2003 10/24/2003 10/24/2003 10/24/2003 10/28/2003
11/12/2003 11/24/2003

113 ACCEPTANCE by plaintiff Debra Woods of offer judgment [112−1] (former empl) (Entered: 11/17/2003)
114 OFFER of judgment to Delilah Hicks filed by defendant Monroe Group Ltd., defendant Alice Robinson, defendant Aurora Montview Hght (former empl) (Entered: 11/17/2003)
115 ACCEPTANCE by plaintiff Delilah Hicks of offer judgment [114−1] (former empl) (Entered: 11/17/2003)
116 OFFER of judgment to Sharon Herndon filed by defendant Monroe Group Ltd., defendant Alice Robinson, defendant Aurora Montview Hght (former empl) (Entered: 11/17/2003)
117 ACCEPTANCE by plaintiff Sharon Herndon of offer judgment [116−1] (former empl) (Entered: 11/17/2003)
118 MINUTE ORDER : by Magistrate Judge O. E. Schlatter, as the matter has settled, Order: finding the motion for reconsideration of the motion to compel [93−2] moot, finding the motion to strike motion [80−1] or in the alternative motion to submit reply brief [80−1] moot, finding the motion to change scheduling order dates and for hearing [72−1] moot (cc: all counsel) ; entry date : 11/17/03 (former empl) (Entered: 11/17/2003)
119 Stipulation (MOTION) by plaintiffs and defendants to dismiss the action with prejudice (former empl) (Entered: 11/17/2003)
120 ORDER by Judge WY. Alan B. Johnson granting stipulation for dismissal of the action with prejudice [119−1] dismissing case (cc: all counsel) ; entry date : 11/24/03 (gms) (Entered: 11/24/2003)

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 02-WY-0460-AJ (OES) HOUSING FOR ALL, RAMONA GAVIN, DEBRA WOODS, PATRICE SWAIN, SHARON HERNDON, and DELILAH HICKS,
Plaintiffs, v. MONROE GROUP LTD., ALICE ROBINSON, THE AURORA MONTVIEW HEIGHTS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
Defendants.
AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiffs Housing for All, Ramona Gavin, Debra Woods, Patrice Swain, Sharon Herndon, and Delilah Hicks, by and through their attorneys, Fox & Robertson, P.C., hereby bring this Amended Complaint against Defendants Monroe Group Ltd., Alice Robinson, and The Aurora Montview Heights Limited Partnership for violation of the Fair Housing Act at the Montview Heights apartment complex.
Jurisdiction 1. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A). 2. Venue is proper within this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Parties 3. Plaintiff Housing for All (“HFA”) is a Colorado non-profit corporation. HFA’s mission is to eliminate housing discrimination, increase free choice in housing and promote integration of housing throughout the Denver metro area. To accomplish this mission, HFA works with governmental and quasi-governmental agencies, housing providers, housing service providers and housing consumers. It provides information, conducts education, counseling, mediation, outreach, and testing, assesses and investigates complaints, and engages in policy analysis. 4. Plaintiff Ramona Gavin is and was at all times material hereto a resident of Colorado. Ms. Gavin lived at 14319 Montview Boulevard, Apt. B, Aurora, Colorado 80011 in the Montview Heights apartment complex from approximately 1995 to 2002. Ms. Gavin currently lives at 2800 Grape Street, Denver, Colorado 80207. Ms. Gavin had two children under the age of 18 living with her at the Montview Heights apartment complex: Shealean Gavin, born March 12, 1994; and Charles Gavin, born May 18, 1997. 5. Plaintiff Debra Woods is and was at all times material hereto a resident of Colorado. Ms. Woods has lived at 14397 Montview Boulevard, Apt. D, Aurora, Colorado 80011 in the Montview Heights apartment complex since approximately 1988. Ms. Woods has five children under the age of 18 living with her at the Montview Heights apartment complex: Lareana Sturdivant, born June 13, 1984; Javige Sturdivant, February 25, 1986; Elisha Sturdivant, born April 1, 1988; Grace Sturdivant, born August 23, 1990; and Sarai Sturdivant, born April 24, 1993.
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6. Plaintiff Patrice Swain is and was at all times material hereto a resident of Colorado. Ms. Swain has lived at 14399 Montview Boulevard, Apt. E, Aurora, Colorado 80011 in the Montview Heights apartment complex since approximately 1998. Ms. Swain has three children under the age of 18 living with her at the Montview Heights apartment complex: Denotra Swain, born August 15, 1987; Maurice Futrell Jr., born January 31, 1990; and Chandra Swain, December 28, 1992. Ms. Swain also has a son, Jashar Swain, born August 20, 1988, who now lives with her at Montview Heights, but did not live with her for several months in 2002.
7. Plaintiff Sharon Herndon is and was at all times material hereto a resident of Colorado. Ms. Herndon has lived at 14397 Montview Boulevard, Apt. C, Aurora, Colorado 80011 in the Montview Heights apartment complex since approximately 1999. Ms. Herndon has two children under the age of 18 living with her at the Montview Heights apartment complex: Marcus Edward Brayant Barge, born July 3, 1990; and Vanessa Alexandria Glass, born August 27, 1996.
8. Plaintiff Delilah Hicks is and was at all times material hereto a resident of Colorado. Ms. Hicks has lived at 14387 Montview Blvd., Apt. F, Aurora, Colorado 80011 in the Montview Heights apartment complex since approximately 1983. Ms. Hicks has two children under the age of 18 living with her at the Montview Heights apartment complex: Bobby Hicks, born June 10, 1986; and Jarred Hicks, born April 2, 1988.
9. Plaintiffs Gavin, Woods, Swain, Herndon and Hicks will be referred to herein as “Individual Plaintiffs.”
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10. Defendant Monroe Group Ltd, (“Monroe Group”) is a corporation incorporated under the laws of Colorado. Its principal address is 5140 E. 9th Ave, Denver, Colorado 80202. On information and belief, Monroe Group manages the Montview Heights Apartment complex.
11. Defendant Alice Robinson is and was at all times material hereto a resident of Colorado. Ms. Robinson is the on-site manager of the Montview Heights Apartment Complex, residing at 14389 Montview Boulevard, Apt. E, Aurora, Colorado 80011 and is employed by Monroe Group.
12. Defendant The Aurora Montview Heights Limited Partnership (“AMHLP”) is a Colorado limited partnership. Its principal address is 4221 S. Yarrow Court, Lakewood, Colorado 80235. Defendant AMHLP owns the Montview Heights apartment complex (“Montview Heights”) located at 14389 Montview Blvd. in Aurora, Colorado.
Factual Allegations 13. Montview Heights is an apartment complex in Aurora, Colorado, that consists of eight buildings of two-story units. 14. Defendants have promulgated and enforced -- and continue to enforce -- a curfew at the Montview Heights apartments for individuals under the age of 18. The curfew has required, at various times, that all individuals under the age of 18 be indoors after a certain time of the evening. This time has varied, including 8:00 or 9:00, and at times has been 10:00 on Friday and Saturday nights. 15. According to the Montview Heights policy, when Defendant Robinson or another agent of Defendants perceives or receives a report of an alleged violation of the curfew, he or she
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may issue a “ticket” to the resident perceived to be in violation. When one resident has received three “tickets,” he or she may be evicted.
16. Defendants have issued a number of tickets pursuant to the curfew policy and, on information and belief, some residents have been evicted as a result.
17. The curfew is a facially discriminatory restriction on the use of the facilities at Montview Heights by the Individual Plaintiffs’ children, which in turn discriminates against the Individual Plaintiffs on the basis of their familial status.
18. This curfew significantly restricts the Individual Plaintiffs’ ability to use and enjoy their residence at Montview Heights and its other facilities with their children and to formulate and enforce their own disciplinary systems, and otherwise discriminates against them in the terms, conditions, privileges, services and facilities at Montview Heights on the basis of their familial status.
19. All three Defendants are jointly and severally liable for the enactment, promulgation and enforcement of the curfew. In particular, Defendants Monroe Group and AMHLP have a non-delegable duty to comply with the Fair Housing Act and are therefore liable for the acts of Defendant Robinson and other individuals acting or purporting to act as their agents.
20. The impact of the curfew on the Individual Plaintiffs includes but is not limited to that described herein.
21. The Individual Plaintiffs have received tickets for violating the curfew. Examples of those tickets are described below.
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22. In or about April of 2001, Plaintiff Ramona Gavin’s two children were playing in the yard of her home. Ms. Gavin was inside her home at the time. The two children came inside at approximately 9:30 p.m. The next day, a ticket was taped to Ms. Gavin’s front door, stating that she had violated the curfew.
23. In the evening of May 17, 2001, Ms. Gavin telephoned a taxi company to arrange for a taxi to take her and her two children to a store in order to purchase supplies for her son’s birthday party, which was to take place the next day. Ms. Gavin’s children were sitting on the front steps of Ms. Gavin’s apartment, waiting for the taxi, while Ms. Gavin was just inside her home getting ready. When the taxi arrived, Ms. Gavin and her two children got into the cab and went to the store. The two children were waiting outside Ms. Gavin’s apartment for not more than ten minutes.
24. The following day, May 18, 2001, Ms. Gavin hosted her son’s fourth birthday party. Guests at the party included a number of adults and children. The party took place both in the front and back yards of Ms. Gavin’s home, and the children played there and in the Montview Heights playground. Most of the children left by approximately 9:30 p.m, but several children remained to spend the night at Ms. Gavin’s home. These several children, Ms. Gavin’s own children, as well as several adults, were outside in the backyard until approximately 10:45 p.m.
25. On or about May 21, 2001, Ms. Gavin found another ticket taped to her door listing two curfew violations, one each on May 17 and May 18, 2001.
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26. One evening in June of 2001, Ms. Gavin was barbecuing in her backyard after 9:00 p.m. Ms. Gavin’s two children and one other child were with her, playing in the yard. Sometime after the barbecue, she was issued another ticket asserting that she had violated the curfew on the evening of the barbecue.
27. Ms. Gavin has, on several occasions, witnessed Defendant Robinson walking around the grounds of Montview Heights shouting “curfew time!” For example, on May 1, 2001, at approximately 8:00 p.m., Ms. Gavin witnessed Ms. Robinson shouting “curfew time!”
28. On other occasions, Defendant Robinson has shouted “curfew time!” from inside her own apartment, looking out from her upstairs window. For example, in or about July of 2001, Shealean and Charles Gavin went to a neighbor’s home to accompany their friend, Chandra Swain, back to their home to spend the night. On the way back to Ms. Gavin’s home, Ms. Robinson yelled out her window at the three children, telling them to get inside.
29. Plaintiff Debra Woods has received tickets for the following violations of the curfew: her son Javigie Sturdivant and his friends were playing outside after 9:00 p.m.; one of Ms. Woods’s daughters was outside between 8:00 and 8:30 p.m.; one of Ms. Woods’s children walked to the laundry room to purchase a soda between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m.; and one of Ms. Woods’s children returned home from a movie after curfew time.
30. Plaintiff Patrice Swain has received at least three tickets for curfew violations. Each of these tickets was issued because her children were playing outside -- either in her own yard or in a yard belonging to a neighbor, whose children are friends with Ms. Swain’s children.
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31. For example, sometime in late 2001, Ms. Swain’s son Jashar was playing outside with a friend near the friend’s home, which is also located at Montview Heights. Jashar came back inside Ms. Swain’s home no later than 9:10 p.m. The following day, a curfew ticket was hanging on Ms. Swain’s door.
32. Plaintiff Sharon Herndon has received one ticket for a curfew violation. In or about April of 2001, Ms. Herndon was doing the family’s laundry. She still had one load in the dryer, and was not feeling well, so she asked her son to retrieve the laundry for her. At approximately 8:15 p.m., Ms. Herndon’s son went to the laundry room, approximately 20 feet away from her unit, and brought back the laundry. The next day, Ms. Herndon found a ticket taped to her door accusing her of violating the curfew.
33. Ms. Herndon has also seen Defendant Robinson walking around the Montview Heights complex calling out, "It's curfew time!" Most recently, at approximately 10:15 on the evening of February 22, 2002, Ms. Herndon heard Ms. Robinson shouting, "It's past curfew!" or words to that effect.
34. Ms. Hicks has received two tickets for curfew violations. Both tickets were posted on Ms. Hicks’s door after her children were outside after 8:00 p.m. Both tickets were received in approximately the last 12 months.
35. In addition to the threat of eviction that comes with every ticket, the Individual Plaintiffs are (variously) injured by the curfew in ways that include but are not limited to the following:
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a. they are restricted in their ability to have gatherings with their children in their yards;
b. they are restricted in their ability to permit their children to play outside in the evening;
c. they are restricted in their ability to permit their children to walk to and from other apartments at Montview Heights, which inhibits their ability to make friends at the complex;
d. they are restricted in their ability to invite friends with children to their homes;
e. they are restricted in their ability to ask their children to run errands for them after the curfew, for example, to retrieve laundry or take out the trash; and
f. they are restricted in their ability to permit their children to visit friends or relatives or go on other outings that will result in their returning home after curfew.
g. they are restricted in their ability to permit their children to work in employment that may result in their returning home after curfew.
36. The Individual Plaintiffs have suffered, continue to suffer and will in the future suffer, irreparable injuries including but not limited to extreme stress, humiliation, embarrassment, emotional distress, and deprivation of the right to equal housing opportunities regardless of familial status.
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37. The actions of Defendants in promulgating and enforcing the curfew described herein has caused and will continue to cause distinct and palpable injury to HFA.
38. Violations of the Fair Housing Act by Defendants have been and will continue to be a barrier to the elimination of housing discrimination, to free choice in housing and to the integration of housing and therefore frustrate HFA’s mission. For example, Defendants’ actions perpetuate discrimination against families with children and send the message that such discrimination is acceptable.
39. Defendants’ discrimination has required and will continue to require HFA to make a greater effort -- and to divert scarce resources -- to, among other things, educating members of the public concerning the requirements of the Fair Housing Act and otherwise to counteracting the adverse impact of such discrimination. This perceptibly impairs HFA’s counseling, educational and outreach missions.
40. HFA also diverted and continues to divert scarce resources -- including but not limited to those devoted to the investigation and litigation of the present lawsuit -- to investigating, detecting, identifying and counteracting housing discrimination in the community, including that of Defendants.
41. HFA has suffered, continues to suffer and will in the future suffer, irreparable injuries including but not limited to those set forth herein. HFA’s injuries are traceable to Defendants’ discriminatory conduct and will be redressed by the relief requested.
Claim For Relief: Violation of The Fair Housing Act
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42. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
43. The actions of Defendants alleged herein violate the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. Such violations include but are not limited to:
a. discrimination in the terms, conditions, and privileges of the rental of apartments at Montview Heights and in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith because of familial status, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b); and
b. making, printing, or publishing, or causing to be made, printed, or published a notice, statement, or advertisement that indicates a preference, limitation, and/or discrimination based familial status, and/or an intention to make such preference, limitation, or discrimination, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c).
44. Plaintiffs have been injured by Defendants’ actions including but not limited to the injuries alleged herein.
45. Plaintiffs are “aggrieved persons” as defined in 42 U.S.C. §§ 3602(i) and 3613(a)(1)(A).
46. Defendants’ actions were all taken intentionally, maliciously and/or with reckless and/or callous indifference for the Plaintiffs’ federally protected rights.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully pray:
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1. That this Court assume jurisdiction; 2. That this Court issue an order declaring Defendants to be in violation of the Fair Housing Act; 3. That this Court issue an injunction ordering Defendants, their agents, employees, and successors, and all other persons in active concert or participation with them to cease from discriminating on the basis of familial status in any aspect of the rental of a dwelling, including but not limited to revoking the curfew, ceasing to enforce same, and informing all tenants that the policy is no longer effective and that any “tickets” issued with respect to violations of the curfew are ineffective; 4. That this Court award Plaintiffs compensatory damages in an amount to be determined at trial; 5. That this Court award Plaintiffs exemplary and punitive damages for Defendants’ intentional, malicious, reckless, and/or callous conduct, such damages to be in an amount commensurate with each Defendant’s ability to pay and sufficient to deter future illegal conduct; 6. That this Court award Plaintiffs their reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs; and 7. That this Court award such additional or alternative relief as may be just, proper and equitable. Plaintiffs demand a jury for all claims that may be tried to a jury.
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Dated: September 10, 2002
Addresses of Plaintiffs:
Housing for All 1600 Downing St. Suite 650 Denver, CO 80218
Ramona Gavin 2800 Grape Street Denver, CO 80207
Debra Woods 14397 Montview Blvd. Apt. D Aurora, CO 80011

Respectfully submitted,
FOX & ROBERTSON, P.C.
Amy F. Robertson Timothy P. Fox 910 - 16th Street Suite 610 Denver, CO 80202 303.595.9700
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Patrice Swain 14399 Montview Blvd. Apt. E Aurora, CO 80011
Sharon Herndon 14397 Montview Blvd. Apt. C Aurora, CO 80011
Delilah Hicks 14387 Montview Blvd. Apt. F Aurora, CO 80011

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