Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 172 Filed: 03/10/06 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:58

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

ARISTOTLE P., CHIUCHIU G., AUGUSTINE N.,

)

YAHARIA R., MICHAEL W., REGINALD R., and

)

GWENDOLYN B., individually and on behalf of

)

all other similarly situated individuals, by their next )

friend, ROBERT F. HARRIS, Public Guardian

)

of Cook County,

)

Plaintiffs,

)

v.

)

)

BRYAN SAMUELS, Director, Illinois Department

)

of Children and Family Services,

)

)

Defendant.

)

No. 88 C 7919 Judge Charles R. Norgle, Sr.

ORDER

This is a class action lawsuit in which a consent order was entered on March 11, 1994. Currently before the Court is a report and motion for entry of an agreed order filed by
the plaintiffs.

This Court having read the motion and being duly advised of the purpose and nature of the request, hereby enters the following order:
Paragraph 28 of the Consent Decree, which currently reads as follows:

This Court retains continuing jurisdiction over this case to enforce compliance with the Consent Decree until March 11, 2006, at which time the Consent Decree will expire unless
extended pursuant to Paragraph 29,

will now read as follows:

This Court retains continuing jurisdiction over this case to enforce compliance with all Consent Decree provisions regarding sibling visitation until March 11, 2008, at which time the Consent Decree will expire unless extended pursuant to Paragraph 29.

 
 • ·'

Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 194 Filed: 03/24/10 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:109

IN THE UNII'Im STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

ARJSTOTLE P., CHIUCHIU G.,

)

AUGUSTINE N., YAH ARIA R.,

)

MICHAEL W., REGINALD R., and )

GWENDOLYN B., individually and

)

on behalf of all other similarly

)

situated individuals, by their

)

next friend, ROBERT F. IIARJUS,

)

Cook County Public Guardian,

)

)

Plaintiffs, )

v.

)

)

ERWIN McEWEN, Director,

)

Illinois Department of Children

)

and Family Services,

)

)

Defendant. )

No. 88 C 7919 Honorable Charles R. Norgle, Sr.

Order to Extend Consent Decree

Before the Court is the Plaintiffs Rep01i to the Court and Motion to Extend the Consent Decree. This Court being advised enters the following order:

Paragraph 28 of the Consent Decree th<It reads:

This Court retains continuing jurisdiction over this case to en liJrce compliance with all Consent Decree provisions regarding sibling visitation until March 11, 20!0, at which time
the Consent Decree will expire unless extended pursuant Lo Paragraph 2'!.
wi II now read:

This Court retains continuing jurisdiction over this case to cni(Jrce compliance with all

Consent Decree provisions regarding sibling visitation until March 11, 2012, at which tirne

the Consent Decree will expire unless extended pursuant to Paragraph 2'-J.

M,. (,-""" ENTER: L

-; / /#
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y:::/.,:>"

~ '

0 DATED: ______

1 / _______

 
 Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 160 Filed: 02/27/04 Page 1 of 10 PageID #:24 ·'

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

ARISTOTLE P., CHIUCHIU G., AUGUSTINE N . YAHARIA R., MICHAEL W., REGINALD R., and GWENDOLYN 8., individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, by their next friend, PATRICK T. MURPHY, Public Guardian of Cook County,
Plaintiffs. v.
BRYAN SAMUELS. Director, Illinois Department of Children and Family Services,
Defendant.

) ) ) No. 88 C 7919 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Judge Charles R. Norgle, Sr. ) ) )

NOTICE OF JOINT MOTION

To: Barbara L. Greenspan Office of the Attorney General 100 West Randolph Street Suite 4-600 Chicago, Illinois 60601

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on March 5, 2004, at 9:30a.m., I shall appear before the Honorable Charles R. Norgle, Sr. or any judge sitting in his stead, in Courtroom 2341 of the Everett McKinley Dirksen United States Courthouse, 219 South Dearborn, Chicago, Illinois, and present the attached Joint Report to the Court and Joint Motion for Entry of an Agreed Order Regarding the Consent Decree.
se~GQ.w~ CERTIFICATE OF

I, Jill Runk, an attorney, certify that I caused a copy of this Notice and Joint

c1 gg Report to be hand-delivered to the party to whom the notice is directed, on February 27,

2004, P'imto 4'00 p.m.

~.

PATRICK T. MURPHY PETER J. SCHMIEDEL JILL RUNK OFFICE OF THE COOK COUNTY PUBLIC GUARDIAN - 70500 69 West Washington Street Suite 1800 Chicago, Illinois 60602 (312) 603-0800

. Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 160 Filed: 02/27/04 Page 2 of 10 PageID #:25

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

ARISTOTLE P., CHIUCHIU G., AUGUSTINE N.,

)

YAHARIA R., MICHAEL W., REGINALD R., and

)

GWENDOLYN B., individually and on behalf of

)

all other similarly situated individuals, by their next )

friend, PATRICK T. MURPHY, Public Guardian of Cook County,

) )

v.

Plaintiffs,

;

J8~
0 ;g

W [~ oti

No.88C7919

.,_ ci.i:

-.J .... :!~

-FA~-

~ ~ ~g§~

)

u

BRYAN SAMUELS, Director, Illinois Department

) Judge Charles R. Norgle, Sr.

of Children and Family Services,

~

Defendant.

)

PARTIES' JOINT REPORT TO THE COURT AND JOINT MOTION FOR

~~
~.. .:,J
ST ¢'
~...&-'0s.

ENTRY OF AN AGREED ORDER REGARDING THE CONSENT DECREE ~

The plaintiffs, a class of children in the custody or under the guardianship of the

Illinois Department of Children and Family Services ("DCFS" or the "Department"), and

the defendant, Bryan Samuels, Director of the Illinois Department of Children and

Family Services, hereinafter the parties, through their respective counsel, hereby

respectfully submit their joint report to the Court and their joint motion for entry of an

agreed order regarding the consent decree.

INTRODUCTION AND PARTIES

1. This action was brought by Patrick T. Murphy, the Cook County Public

Guardian, on behalf of a class of children in the custody or under the guardianship of

the Department, alleging a Departmental practice and policy of placing them apart from

their brothers and sisters and not affording reasonable visitation and other contact with

their siblings.

. Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 160 Filed: 02/27/04 Page 3 of 10 PageID #:26
2. On October 3, 1989, the Honorable Ann Claire Williams certified the following plaintiff class pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c):
Children who are or will be subjects of neglect, dependency or abuse petitions filed in the State of Illinois; who are or will be placed in the custody or under the guardianship of [DCFS] by order of court; who have not been or will not be placed with their siblings in foster homes or residential facilities; and who have been or will be denied regular and reasonable visitation with their siblings. 3. The defendant is the Director of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services ("DCFS"), sued in his official capacity. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d)(1 ), Bryan Samuels, Director of DCFS, has been automatically substituted as the defendant for Jess McDonald, the former DCFS director.1
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
4. The plaintiffs filed their complaint on September 15, 1988, alleging that the defendant had a practice of placing siblings apart from their brothers and sisters and not
affording them reasonable visitation? Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiffs
alleged that these practices and policies violated their rights to freedom of association under the First Amendment, substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and their rights under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of
1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-628, 770-779 ("AAA"). The plaintiffs also filed a motion for
preliminary injunctive relief. On September 7, 1989, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the First Amendment freedom of association claims and the
1 The initial complaint also named DCFS's guardianship administrator as a defendant, who was subsequently dismissed by agreement of the parties upon entry of the consent decree on March 11, 1994. See Consent Decree~ 1(d).
' The court summarized some of the pertinent factual allegations of the Complaint in its opinion denying defendant's motion to dismiss, 721 F. Supp. at 104-08.
2

. Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 160 Filed: 02/27/04 Page 4 of 10 PageID #:27
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claims, and granted defendant's motion with respect to the AAA claims. 3 Aristotle P. v. Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1002 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
5. Subsequent settlement discussions resulted in a consent decree, Exhibit A hereto, which the court approved and entered on March 11, 1994. On February 5, 1997, the court granted the parties' joint motion for entry of an agreed order extending the terms of the consent decree from March 11, 1997 to March 11, 1999. On March 10, . 1999, the court granted the parties' joint motion for entry of an agreed order extending the terms of the consent decree to March 11, 2002.
6. On March 7, 2002, this Honorable Court extended the decree with respect to sibling placement to March 11, 2003. That portion of the decree has expired. Also on March 7, 2002, this Court extended the decree with respect to sibling visitation until
March 11, 2004. See Agreed Order attached hereto as Exhibit A.
7. Counsel for both parties experienced serious difficulties in 2003. In early 2003, Bryan Samuels replaced Jess McDonald as the director of DCFS. Throughout the next few months, the majority of the Department's Aristotle P. team left the agency. One of the attorneys for the plaintiffs died suddenly on July 4, 2003. Counsel for the defendants was on unplanned emergency medical leave for six weeks beginning in September. Shortly after her return, on October 17, 2003, a fire at the Cook County Administration building killed three Public Guardian employees and displaced plaintiff's counsel until the end of the year.
3 Upon the defendant's motion, the court certified its September 7, 1989 order
for an immediate interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The Seventh
Circuit denied the defendant's request for an interlocutory appeal.
3

Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 160 Filed: 02/27/04 Page 5 of 10 PageID #:28
CONSENT DECREE REQUIREMENTS AND DEFENDANT'S PROGRESS TO DATE 8. The requirements of the consent decree address DCFS's rules and regulations, training of case workers and foster parents in relation to placement of siblings together and sibling visitation in circumstances when siblings must be placed apart and notification requirements.4 The major requirements of the consent decree regarding sibling visitation are summarized below. Sibling Visitation 9. The decree requires that, when siblings cannot be placed together for clinical or other defined reasons, they receive, at minimum, two visits per month, for a minimum of two hours per visit. The decree recognizes that, in certain circumstances, it may not be logistically possible to meet these visitation requirements, or it may not be in a child's best interest to have regular visitation with his or her brother(s) or sister(s) or for visits to
last two hours.5 All visits must be documented in the child's case file. See 'IJ18. Each
child's file must also contain a sibling visitation plan specifying, inter alia, the frequency,
duration and location of visitation. See 'IJ14(c)-(e).
4 The decree also contains various provisions for this Court's continuing jurisdiction and enforcement. See, e.g., '11'1!28-30. Under '1128 and the court's March 10, 1999 agreed order referenced above, this Court retains continuing jurisdiction over this case to enforce compliance with the sibling visitation portion of the decree until March 11, 2004, at which time the decree will expire unless extended. Under '1!29, prior to that time, the children may move to extend the duration of the decree and of this Court's continuing jurisdiction, upon a showing that "DCFS has not substantially complied with the terms of this Decree." Paragraph 30 contains further compliance provisions.
5 By way of example, DCFS may afford less visitation (or none at all) if so ordered by a court, or if one sibling poses a specific and documented risk to another sibling, or if siblings are placed more than 150 miles apart. See generally '11'1!13-14, 16.
4

. Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 160 Filed: 02/27/04 Page 6 of 10 PageID #:29
10. The latest statistics that the defendant provided to the plaintiffs are dated October 15, 2002. These statistics show that in Cook County, only 42% of sibling groups had visits in compliance with the decree. Statewide, only 33% of sibling groups had regular visitation. These figures only included purchase of service ("POS") agencies.
11. The most current statistics the defendant provided to the plaintiffs regarding DCFS's compliance with the decree are from January 15, 2002. At that time, DCFS's three Cook County regions averaged 20%, 21% and 27% compliance respectively. DCFS's downstate region provided visitation in compliance with the decree 88% of the time. Transportation Subsidies
12. One of the obstacles to visitation identified in studies regarding sibling visitation is transportation. In an effort to alleviate this barrier, the Department agreed to provide a transportation subsidy of up to $150 per month to foster parents who transport children and supervise sibling visitation and an additional $100 to foster parents who host an overnight sibling visitation.
13. The defendants agreed to secure data as to how many foster parents are (1) aware that transportation subsidies are available and (2) are taking advantage of the transportation subsidies. The plaintiffs have not received this information. Performance Contracting
14. The Department agreed to implement monetary sanctions against private agencies that the Department finds to be below a certain level of compliance with the sibling visitation requirement of the decree. For example, for fiscal years 2002 and
5

Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 160 Filed: 02/27/04 Page 7 of 10 PageID #:30
2003, the threshold for compliance is six visits during a six-month period, or 50% compliance. Although the Department had agreed to increase the threshold for compliance in future years, the plaintiffs' position remains that sanctions should increase annually.
15. As of February 2003, DCFS had sanctioned POS agencies for more that $600,000. The plaintiffs requested current sanction data from the defendant. They have not received this information. Foster Parent Training
16. The Department continues to train foster parents on the importance of sibling relationships, the requirements of the Aristotle P. consent decree, and the various subsidies and fees implemented to facilitate sibling visitation. The Department continues to make efforts to improve this training. Notification Requirements to Children and Foster Parents
17. The decree requires DCFS to provide all children (seven years of age and older) with siblings placed apart, as well as the children's foster parents, with the names, birth dates, placements, addresses and telephone numbers of all such siblings placed apart ("sibling contact information"). If a sibling placed apart is moved, DCFS is required to give written notice of the name, address and telephone number of the child's new placement to each sibling and each sibling's foster parent within seven days of the move ("sibling relocation information"). Copies of these notifications are to be
documented and contained in the child's case file. See 1Mf11, 12.
18. A 1999 amendment to the Child Care Act, 20 ILCS 505/35.3, protects foster parents from disclosure of their addresses and telephone numbers. The parties agreed
6

Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 160 Filed: 02/27/04 Page 8 of 10 PageID #:31
·,
that when a case worker places a child in a foster home, the worker will assess whether there are any clinical or safety reasons why siblings should not have that child's address and telephone number as required under the decree. If no such reasons exist, the foster parent will be notified that the Department intends to convey this information to the siblings, and the foster parent can seek a protective order if he or she so chooses. If such a reason does exist, it will be documented as part of the assessment, and DCFS will notify the child's attorney and guardian ad litem in writing of the decision not to advise the child's siblings of the child's address and telephone number, along with said documentation.
19. A 1999 statewide survey made a variety of recommendations to increase the Department's compliance with the notification issue, including the utilization of agency performance teams to assist in monitoring the notification requirement. Notification Requirements to Child's Attorney and Guardian ad Litem
20. Paragraph 26 of the decree requires that, whenever the Department decides to separate siblings who had been placed together, it must notify each child (seven years or older), and the child's attorney and guardian ad litem, in writing, not less than ten days prior to the implementation of its decision, unless continued joint placement poses an imminent risk of harm to one or more of the children. In such a case, the attorney and guardian ad litem must be notified within ten days of the separation.
21. Counsel for the plaintiffs set up a facsimile number exclusively for case workers to forward notices of changes in placement. Additionally, the defendant promulgated Policy Guide 2002.08, a reminder to all case workers of their obligation to notify the child's attorney and guardian ad litem of any change in placement.
7

Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 160 Filed: 02/27/04 Page 9 of 10 PageID #:32

Nonetheless, plaintiff's counsel has received only a few of these notifications by facsimile since this system was set up.

CONCLUSION

22. The parties agree that, although the Department has made and continues to

make progress in its implementation of the consent decree regarding sibling visitation,

for the reasons stated in the foregoing joint report, the parties agree to a two-year

extension of the consent decree regarding sibling visitation, until March 11, 2006.

Date: February 27, 2004

Respectfully Submitted,

Patrick T. Murphy Peter J. Schmiedel Jill Runk Office of the Cook County Public Guardian 69 West Washington Street Suite 1800 Chicago, Illinois 60602 (312) 603-0800

Barbara L. Greenspan
Office of the Attorney General Child Welfare Litigation Bureau 100 West Randolph Street Suite 4-600 Chicago, Illinois 60601 (312) 814-6747

8

Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 160 Filed: 02/27/04 Page 10 of 10 PageID #:33
See Case File for Exhibits

 
 Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 217-1 Filed: 05/16/14 Page 1 of 29 PageID #:278
EXHIBIT A

Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 217-1 Filed: 05/16/14 Page 2 of 29 PageID #:279

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OP ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

ARISTOTLE P., CHIUCHIU G.,

)

AUGUSTINE N., YAHARIA R.,

)

MICHAEL W., REGINALD R., and )

GWENDOLYN B., individually

)

and on behalf of all other

)

similarly situated individuals)

by their next friend,

)

PATRICK T. MURPHY, Public

)

Guardian of Cook County,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

STERLING M. RYDER, Director, )

Illinois Department of

)

Children and Family Services, )

)

Defendant.

)

No. 88 C 7919 Judge Ann C. Williams

CONSENT DECREE Plaintiffs filed this action on their own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated on September 15, 1988, against the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services ("DCFS" or the "Department"). Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief regarding alleged policies and practices of DCFS under which, in the plaintiffs' view, they have been wrongfully placed apart from their siblings in substitute care and they have not been permitted to visit their siblings on a regular and reasonable basis. Plaintiffs'

Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 217-1 Filed: 05/16/14 Page 3 of 29 PageID #:280
Complaint alleged that DCFS's failure to place siblings together and to provide regular visitation violates plaintiffs' rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. §§ 670-76.
Plaintiffs in this action are a class of children, certified by this Court's order dated October 3, 1989, who , on or after the date of the commencement of this action, are in the custody or guardianship of DCFS and (i) have not been placed with their siblings in foster homes or residential facilities , or (ii) have been denied regular and reasonable visitation with their siblings. Plaintiffs named Gordon Johnson, former Director of DCFS, for whom current Director of DCFS Sterling M. Ryder has been substituted, and Gary T. Morgan, Guardianship Administrator of DCFS, as defendants . Defendants were sued in their official capacity.
Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs' Complaint in its entirety. In a memorandum opinion and order dated September 6, 1989, this Court denied defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claims under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and granted defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' statutory
2

Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 217-1 Filed: 05/16/14 Page 4 of 29 PageID #:281
claims . Aristotle P . v . Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1002 (N.D . I ll . 1 989) (Williams, J. ).
Upon a motion by defendants, the Court certified the September 6, 1989, order for an immediate interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals denied defendants' request for an interlocutory appeal, and the case was returned to this Court for a hearing on plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs' motion was referred to Magistrate Judge Weisberg for a hearing. Following initial discovery, further proceedings were stayed pending settlement negotiations between the parties. As set forth in this Consent Decree, the parties have agreed that Gary T. Morgan be voluntarily dismissed from this action.
Defendant Ryder denies all of the allegations of plaintiffs' Complaint, particularly all legal contentions that any alleged policies or practices have violated any state or federal law.
In an effort to avoid the burden, costs, and inherent risks of further litigation, p l aintiffs and defendant have determined that it is in the interests of the c l ass and the public to settle this action with the entry of this Consent Decree.
3

Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 217-1 Filed: 05/16/14 Page 5 of 29 PageID #:282
Having carefully reviewed this Consent Decree , the parties being in agreement hereto, and the Court fully advised on the premises, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED: DEFIN'ITIONS
1. As used herein, the following terms have the following meanings:
(a) "Administrative Case Review• or "ACR" means case reviews required by 42 U.S.C. § 675(5) and Ill. Rev . Stat. ch. 23 , 5006a .
(b) "Case plan" or "service plan" means the
,•
plan required by 42 U.S.C. § 675(1), Ill. Rev. Stat. ch . 23, , 2058.2 , and 89 Ill . Adm. Code § 305.
(c) "Child," "children," "class members," or "DCFS clients," unless otherwise indicated by the context, all mean members of the class certified by this Court's order dated October 3, 1989, and defined in Paragraph 3 of this Consent Decree.
(d) "Department of Children and Family Services" or "DCFS" or "Department" or "defendant" means the defendant Director of DCFS in his official capacity and his agents and includes all successor Directors of DCFS and their agents . The parties have agreed and this Court
4

Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 217-1 Filed: 05/16/14 Page 6 of 29 PageID #:283
hereby orders that defendant Gary T. Morgan is voluntaril y dismissed from this action.
(e) "Parent" means the biological or adoptive parent of a child or, unless otherwise specified, the legal guardian or custodian of a child other than DCFS. "Parent" does not include foster parents or, with the exception of the reference in subparagraph (i) below, persons whose parental rights have been terminated.
(f) "Region" means Cook County or any of the downstate DCFS regions .
(g) "Residential Facility" means all non-foster care placements .
(h) "Short-term diagnostic placement" means a placement described in paragraph 37(b) of the Consent Decree entered in the lawsuit captioned B.H .. et al .. v. Suter, No. 88 C 5599 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 1991), a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix A. The excerpt from the B.H. Consent Decree is attached hereto solely for purposes of incorporating the description therein of a "short-term diagnostic placement" and shall not be construed as altering i n any way the enforceability of the B. H. Decree as stated therein or under existing law . Nothing i n this Consent Decree shall be construed as an
5

Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 217-1 Filed: 05/16/14 Page 7 of 29 PageID #:284
endorsement of the B.H. Consent Decree, in whole or in part, by plaintiffs' counsel.
(i) "Siblings," unless otherwise specified, means children in the custody or guardianship of DCFS who have a shared biological or adoptive parent. DISCLAIMER
2. The provisions set forth in this Consent Decree are solely for the purpose of settlement of this action, and by agreeing to this Consent Decree neither party makes any express or implied admission of fact or law for any purpose. CLASS CERTIFICATION
3 . As set forth in this Court's order dated October 3, 1989, the plaintiff class certified in this case is defined as follows:
[c]hildren who are or will be the subject of neglect, dependency or abuse petitions filed in the State of Illinois; who are or will be in the custody or under the guardianship of the Department of Children and Family Services by order of court; who have not been or will not be placed with their siblings in foster homes or residential facilities; and who have been or will be denied regular and reasonable visitation with their siblings.
6

Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 217-1 Filed: 05/16/14 Page 8 of 29 PageID #:285
POLICIES REGARDING PLACEMENT OF SIBLINGS 4. By no later than 180 days from the entry of this
Decree, DCFS shall adopt written rules providing that siblings shall all be placed together unless:
(a) it is in the best interests of one or more of the children to be placed or to remain placed apart from his or her siblings, as defined in subparagraph (a) of Paragraph 5;
(b) DCFS has been unable to locate a joint placement for the siblings, despite a diligent search by DCFS as defined in subparagraph (b) of Paragraph 5;
(c) a court has ordered that the siblings be placed apart; or
(d) it is in the best interests of the child or his or her sibling(s} to be placed with a relative.
5. By no later than 180 days from entry of this Decree, DCFS shall adopt written rules, procedures, protocols, or policy guides, as appropriate , to achieve the following policies:
(a) It shall be in the best interests of a child to be placed apart from his or her siblings only if:
(i) the child has been placed in a short-term diagnostic placement in order to determine the placement
7

Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 217-1 Filed: 05/16/14 Page 9 of 29 PageID #:286
needs of the child, or the child has special medical, educational, behavioral, or emotional needs which require the child to be placed apart from his or her siblings and the child has been placed or accepted at a placement intended to address those needs;
(ii) the child is at risk of physical, mental, or emotional harm if placed with his or her siblings and that specific risk and the basis for assessing that risk are documented in the child's case file;
(iii) placement of the child with his or her siblings would require that the child be removed from a foster home, and it is in the best interests of the child to remain in that foster home rather than move to a joint placement with his or her siblings; or
(iv) it is necessary to place the child apart from his or her siblings in order to achieve permanency for the child.
(b) A diligent search to locate a joint placement for siblings as required by subparagraph (b) of Paragraph 4 shall consist of written documentation that (1) DCFS has asked of the siblings' parents and known relatives whether there are any relatives who may be willing to become relative foster parents for the sibli ngs; (2) DCFS has asked any current foster parents of a
8

Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 217-1 Filed: 05/16/14 Page 10 of 29 PageID #:287
child al~eady in DCFS custody or guardianship whether they can accommodate the child's siblings; and (3) DCFS has conducted a search of vacant Department and private agency foster care placements and other appropriate placements in the same region as the parent's home to identify those placements that can provide a joint placement for the sibling group and that meet the placement requirements for all DCFS cases set forth in 89 Ill. Adm. Code § 302.390.
(i) DCFS shall conduct a diligent search (1) not later than 30 days after DCFS assumes custody of a sibling group or of any child with a sibling; and (2) when DCFS changes the placement of any child with a sibling unless it is not in the best interests, as defined in this Paragraph, of the child or sibling to be placed together. Nothing in this section shall preclude removal of a child when necessary due to an emergency.
(c) If an entire sibling group is not placed together, DCFS shall place as many siblings of the group together as possible, considering their relationship and the best interests of the children.
(d) If DCFS determines it is not in the best interests of the child to be placed with his or her siblings, DCFS shall identify in the child's case plan the
9

Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 217-1 Filed: 05/16/14 Page 11 of 29 PageID #:288
reasons ~hy the siblings were placed apart. If siblings have been placed apart pursuant to subparagraph (b) of Paragraph 4, DCFS shall document in the case file the efforts made to place siblings together.
(e) If an entire sibling group cannot be placed together, DCFS shall make reasonable efforts to place siblings within reasonable proximity to one another taking into account the placement requirements for all DCFS cases as set forth in 89 Ill . Adm . Code § 302.390. DCFS may place a child at greater distance from his or her siblings if his or her treatment needs require placement farther away.
(f) If DCFS places siblings apart or after a change in placement, siblings remain placed apart, the efforts made to place siblings together and/or the reasons why the siblings were or remain placed apart shall be specifically reviewed at the first administrative case review following such placement to ensure compliance with the terms of this Consent Decree.
6. Within one year after the date DCFS promulgates rules, procedures, protocols, or policy guides under Paragraph 5 of this Decree, DCFS shall review the placements of all siblings in custody as of the date of promulgation of the rules, procedures, protocols, or policy
10

Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 217-1 Filed: 05/16/14 Page 12 of 29 PageID #:289
guides, wpo are not placed together to ensure that their placements meet the requirements of Paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Consent Decree .
7 . By no later than 180 days from the date of the entry of this Decree, DCFS shall adopt procedures, policies or protocols requiring it to consider sibling relationships, among other factors, in developing and implementing permanency plans for children. Administrative case review staff shall review DCFS's compliance with such procedures, policies or protocols when reviewing permanency planning generally.
8 . Within 60 days of the entry of this Decree, DCFS shall provide plaintiffs' counsel with an initial plan setting forth the actions DCFS will take to increase the number of foster homes and other placements capable of accommodating sibling groups. The plan shall include descriptions of specific programs, including pilot projects, to be implemented by DCFS.
9 . Subsequent annual plans shall be provided to
~
plaintiffs' counsel by March 31, 199~ and by March 31 of each year thereafter for the term of this decree describing the actions the Department will undertake during the next fiscal year to i ncrease the number of placements capable of accommodating sibling groups.
11

Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 217-1 Filed: 05/16/14 Page 13 of 29 PageID #:290
10. By no later than 90 days from the date of the entry of this Decree, the Department shall:
(a) publish proposed rules and procedures to allow for the waiver of appropriate standards for foster home licensing and relative foster home approval in cases in which such waivers would facilitate the joint placement of siblings while ensuring the safety and well-being of the children placed there; and
(b) review and, as appropriate, amend other rules and procedures which unduly inhibit the joint placement of siblings. CONTACT AMONG SIBLINGS PLACED APART
11 . By no later than 180 days from the entry of this Decree, DCFS shall adopt rules, procedures, or policy guides, as appropriate, for implementing the following policies:
(a) Subject to subparagraphs (c) and (d) of this Paragraph, at the time DCFS places siblings apart from one another in foster care or other substitute care setting, DCFS shall provide the child (seven years old and older) and the foster parent or other caretaker with each sibling's birth date and the name, address, and telephone number of the foster parent or other caretaker of each sibling placed by DCFS in substitute care . DCFS
12

Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 217-1 Filed: 05/16/14 Page 14 of 29 PageID #:291
shall als9 provide them such information regarding siblings in the custody of a parent if that information is or becomes known to DCFS.
(b) Subject to subparagraphs (c) and (d) of this Paragraph, whenever a child is moved to another placement, DCFS shall give w~itten notice of the name, address, and telephone number of the child's new foster parent or other caretaker to each sibling and the foster parent or other caretaker of each sibling in writing within seven days of the move.
(c) If DCFS determines that it is not in a child's best interests to be provided information on a sibling's whereabouts or to have information on his or her whereabouts provided to his or her siblings, DCFS shall notify each child's attorney and guardian ad litem in writing within seven days of that determination. DCFS shall also record the reasons for that determination in the children's case file(s).
(d) Notwithstanding subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this Paragraph, the Department shall not be required to disclose to a child the name, address, and telephone number of a sibling's foster parent or other placement if a court has ordered that the sibling's whereabouts not be revealed to the child .
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Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 217-1 Filed: 05/16/14 Page 15 of 29 PageID #:292
(e) Subject to the provisions of subparagraphs (c) and (d) above, DCFS shall permit and shall encourage foster parents and caretakers to assist children to write and phone their siblings as often as the children wish, provided, however, that, if necessary, a plan for scheduling reasonable phone calls may be established by the children's caseworker, together with the foster parent and the children. This plan shall be i ncorporated in the children's service plans. The Department shall also facilitate the use of mail for siblings' contact with each other, including payment of postage.
(f) The Department shall neither restrict nor seek to have any court restrict contact between siblings as a form of discipline under any circumstances .
12 . Subject to subparagraphs (c) and (d) of Paragraph 11, within 180 days of the entry of this Decree, DCFS shall provide every member of a sibling group in its custody and the foster parent or other caretaker written notice of each other sibling's birth date and the name, address, and telephone number of the foster parent or other caretaker of each sibling placed by DCFS in a different substitute care setting. DCFS shall also provide the same information regarding siblings in the
14

Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 217-1 Filed: 05/16/14 Page 16 of 29 PageID #:293
custody o~ a parent if that information is or becomes known to DCFS. VISITATION AMONG SIBLINGS PLACED APART
13 . By no later than 180 days from the entry of this Decree, DCFS shall adopt written rules to achieve the following policies:
(a) Subject to the provision of subparagraph (b) , the Department shall schedule and provide visits among all siblings placed apart at least twice per month, beginning no later than two weeks after DCFS assumes temporary custody of a sibling, unless:
(i) a court has ordered that sibling visits occur less frequently or not at all;
(ii) the child has stated that he or she does not want to visit with his or her sibling(s) or wants to visit less frequently and has been counseled by DCFS on the importance of maintaining family ties. If such a child is age 16 or under, the Department shall inquire of the child at least quarterly whether he or she wants to resume or increase the frequency of visits; or
(iii) one sibling may physically, mentally, or emotionally harm another during the visit, and supervisian would be inadequate to eliminate the risk of such harm as determined by prior observation or documentation
15

Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 217-1 Filed: 05/16/14 Page 17 of 29 PageID #:294
of their interaction as recorded in the child's case file.
(b) In addition to the provisions set forth in subparagraph (a) , if a sibling is placed in a residential facility, visitation with that child may occur less frequently than twice per month if:
(i) the child is at risk of physical harm if he or she visits with his or her siblings and that harm is specifically documented in the child's case file;
(ii) the child is at risk of mental or emotional harm if he or she visits with his or her siblings as determined by a qualified mental health professional; or
(iii) the child is placed in a residential facility that is located more than 150 miles from his or her siblings, provided, however, that in such event DCFS shall provide the child a visit with his/her other siblings, preferably overnight, at least every other month.
14. By no later than 180 days from the entry of this Decree, DCFS shall adopt written rules, procedures, protocols, or policy guides, as appropriate, to achieve the following policies:
(a) If the frequency of visits between two siblings is reduced to less than twice per month, the
16

Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 217-1 Filed: 05/16/14 Page 18 of 29 PageID #:295
frequency ~f each such child's visits with the other sibling (s), if any, and of the other siblings' visits with each other shall not be reduced unless also in accordance with this Paragraph or Paragraph 13 or by order of a court. The Department shall neither reduce nor seek to have a court reduce the frequency of visits based on the unavailability of a supervisor for the visits or as a form of discipline.
(b) Visits scheduled to begin within two weeks after DCFS assumes temporary custody of a sibling pursuant to subparagraph 13(a) may begin sooner if the siblings express a desire to see each other, no court has prohibited visits, and a qualified supervisor, if deemed necessary, and an appropriate time and l ocation for visits have been identified.
(c) A sibling visitation plan, specifying the frequency of sibling visits, shall be developed by the siblings' caseworker(s), foster parents , and the children (seven years old and older) within 30 days of temporary custody of the siblings. The sibling visitation plan shall be included in the children's case plans.
(d) The sibling visitation plan shall also specify the duration of sibling visits and may also include the location and supervision to be provided for
17

Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 217-1 Filed: 05/16/14 Page 19 of 29 PageID #:296
visits. A brief statement of the reasons for selecting the frequency and duration of sibling visits as specified in the visitation plan shall also be recorded in the plan.
(e) The sibling visitation plan may be amended as often as necessary to reflect changes made in accordance with this Consent Decree in the frequency, length, location, supervision, or other provisions for visits. No such change, however, shall be made without prior consultation with the siblings (seven years old and older) and with the siblings' foster parents. The sibling visitation plan and its implementation shall be reviewed at each child's administrative case review.
15 . For all siblings in DCFS custody as of 180 days after entry of this Decree, a sibling visitation plan as described in subparagraph 14(a) shall be developed no later than 210 days after the entry of this Decree.
16. (a) By 180 days from entry of this Decree, DCFS shall establish a protocol to guide workers in determining the appropriate length and location of sibling visits. This protocol shall be designed to guide workers in determining what is a visit of sufficient length to, among other things, permit siblings the opportunity for meaningful interaction, which generally would
18

Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 217-1 Filed: 05/16/14 Page 20 of 29 PageID #:297
consist of visits of at least two hours. The details of a visitation plan for siblings, includi ng the length of such visits, are to be determined based on the individual circumstances of the children, taking i nto account, for example, the age of the siblings, their relationship, any behavioral or functional difficulties, and any other factors affecting the best interests of the siblings.
(b) The protocol shall also address issues relating to visits between a child in DCFS's custody and siblings in the custody of a parent. Through the application of the protocol, DCFS shall consider the appropriateness of such visits in developing a visitation plan for each child in its custody. If visits are appropriate, DCFS shall include them in the visitation plan. If DCFS determines that such visits are not appropriate, it shall briefly identify the reasons for its determination in the visitation plan. As part of good family service planning, DCFS shall encourage parents to permit children in their custody to visit with their siblings in DCFS custody. Where necessary, DCFS shall counsel the parent on the importance of the children maintaining or developing ties with each other. Nothing in t his Consent Decree, however, shall require DCFS to imp ose visitation requirements on children not in its cust ody or to ensure
19

Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 217-1 Filed: 05/16/14 Page 21 of 29 PageID #:298
that visits occur between children at home and children in DCFS custody.
17 . Sibling visits are to be supervised when in the professional judgment of the caseworker :
(a) one sibling may physically, mentally, or emotionally harm another during the visit as determined by prior observation or documentation of their interaction;
(b) the children are too young to be left unsupervised;
(c) the purpose of the visit is to assess the interaction between the siblings; or
(d) a court has ordered that visits for the siblings be supervised .
18 . The occurrence of sibling visits shall be recorded in the case file.
19. When consistent with good social work practice, the sibling visitation plan may be included as a part of and implemented in coordination with a plan for parent-child visits developed in accordance with 89 Ill . Adm. Code. § 305.7 . The frequency of sibling visitation required by this Consent Decree, however, shall in no way be affected by the failure of any parent to visit his or her child(ren) for any reason.
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Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 217-1 Filed: 05/16/14 Page 22 of 29 PageID #:299
TRAINING 20 . Not later than 12 months from the date of entry
of this Decree, DCFS shall ensure that all DCFS and private agency staff responsible for ensuring that siblings are placed together or are provided with sibling visits, including caseworkers, supervisors, and administrative case reviewers have been trained as to the rules, policies, protocols, and procedures that have been or will be promulgated and effectuated pursuant to this Consent Decree and the duty of each employee to carry out his or her respective responsibilities. The training shall specifically include information on sibling relationships, the importance of developing and maintaining them, the importance of placing siblings or subgroups of siblings together, and the importance of sibling contact and visitation. The training shall also address the factors to be considered in exercising professional judgment in developing a sibling visitation plan and in applying the protocol specified in Paragraph 16 of this Decree . Defendant shall also ensure that such training is provided to all such staff on a regular and periodic basis thereafter and to all new DCFS and private agency staff responsible for ensuring that siblings are placed
21

Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 217-1 Filed: 05/16/14 Page 23 of 29 PageID #:300
together or are provided with sibling visits, prior to such staff assuming their responsibilities.
21 . Not later than 12 months from the date of entry of this Decree, DCFS shall have provided all foster parents training on sibling relationships, the importance of developing and maintaining them, the importance of placing siblings or subgroups of siblings together, and the importance of sibling contact and visitation. As of the same date, DCFS shall ensure that all new foster parents receive such training, prior to placing children in their homes. DCFS shall provide such training to foster parents on a regular and periodic basis thereafter.
22. Defendant shall provide plaintiffs' counsel with 30 days' advance notice of all DCFS training sessions described in Paragraphs 20 and 21 and, upon request of plaintiffs' counsel, 30 days' advance notice of private agency training sessions . DCFS shall also provide plaintiffs' counsel with copies of the materials to be used at such sessions and shall permit plaintiffs' counsel or their designees to attend DCFS , private agency, and foster parent training sessions at least once a year until December 1, 1995.
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Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 217-1 Filed: 05/16/14 Page 24 of 29 PageID #:301
MONITORING AND NOTICE 23. Defendant shall provide to plaintiffs' counsel
drafts of all new or amended policies, procedures, programs, protocols, rules, regulations, and notices for implementation of the provisions of this Consent Decree at least 30 days prior to the relevant effective date specified in this Consent Decree or 30 days prior to their submission for publication in the Illinois Register pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 127, para. 1005.01 (1981), whichever is earlier. Plaintiffs' counsel shall inform defendant's counsel within that time of any objections they have to any such drafts because of plaintiffs' contention that said draft may violate the terms of this Consent Decree. The parties shall negotiate in good faith regarding any such objections. If the parties are unable to reach an agreement, plaintiffs may file a motion with the Court seeking resolution of the dispute. Notwithstanding the provisions of this paragraph, the parties agree that DCFS shall not be required to replicate the language of any provision of this Consent Decree in departmental rule, procedure, or policy guide.
24. On or before 6 months from the date of entry of this Decree, plaintiffs' counsel and defendant shall devise a plan for gathering on a semi-annual basis reli-
23

Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 217-1 Filed: 05/16/14 Page 25 of 29 PageID #:302
able and valid information necessary to measure and ensure compliance with the terms of this Consent Decree. Pursuant to the plan, defendant shall provide plaintiffs' counsel information semi-annually on at least the following:
(a) The number of sibling groups in DCFS care. (b) The number of sibling groups in DCFS care in which all the siblings in care are placed together. (c) The number of sibling groups in DCFS care in which all the siblings are not placed together. (d) Quality assurance site review results regarding a statistically relevant random sample of children not placed together and the reasons why all the children were not placed together. Plaintiffs' counsel will have an opportunity to review and comment on the questionnaire to be used in conducting the site reviews and, upon seven days' request, shall have access to case files of all children studied. 25. Th~ Department shall provide timely and adequate written notice to each plaintiff and his or her attorney and guardian ad litem of all appealable decisions regarding his or her placement, visitation, or contact with siblings, in accordance with the requirements
24

Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 217-1 Filed: 05/16/14 Page 26 of 29 PageID #:303
of 89 Ill. Adm. Code § 309 or as otherwise provided by statute or regulation.
26. If the Department decides to separate siblings who are placed together, it shall notify each child (if seven years old or older) and the children's attorney and guardian ad litem in writing no later than ten days prior to the implementation of its decision unless the joint placement poses an imminent risk of harm to one or more of the children. In such a case, the Department shall notify each child (seven years old and older) and the children's attorney and guardian ad litem in writing no later than five days after its decision.
27. Defendant shall designate a liaison to respond to and act upon comp~aints or questions raised by plaintiffs' counsel or by an attorney or guardian ad litem for any class member regarding the implementation of this Consent Decree. JURISDICTION AND MODIFICATION
28. This Court retains continuing jurisdiction over this case to enforce compliance with the Consent Decree for a period of three years from the approval of this Consent Decree by this Court, at which time the Consent Decree will expire unless extended pursuant to Paragraph 29.
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Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 217-1 Filed: 05/16/14 Page 27 of 29 PageID #:304
29. Prior to the expiration of this Decree, plaintiffs may file a motion with this Court seeking to extend the expiration date and to continue this Court's jurisdiction, upon a showing that DCFS has not substantially complied with the terms of this Decree .
30. Prior to the expiration of this Decree, plaintiffs may file a motion with this Court at any time seeking to compel DCFS's compliance with the provisions of this Consent Decree. Any proceedings brought to enforce the provisions of this Consent Decree shall be litigated in this Court, and shall not be heard unless plaintiffs' counsel has notified DCFS in writing of their intent to begin an enforcement action not less than 30 days prior to bringing such action, and DCFS has failed to take adequate corrective action. DCFS's failure to abide by a requirement of this Consent Decree in the case of a single child or family, by itself , shall not form the basis for a finding of contempt under this Consent Decree.
31. Any party may file a motion with this Court at any time seeking modification of the terms of this Consent Decree in accordance with existing federal law.
32. Nothing in this Consent Decree shall limit the power or authority of any of the circuit courts of Illi-
26

Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 217-1 Filed: 05/16/14 Page 28 of 29 PageID #:305
nois to order joi~t placement or more frequent visitation than that required by this Decree in an individual case, upon a showing of need not common to the class as a whole or based on claims distinct from the claims raised in this suit. However, the Public Guardian, his representatives, and successors shall not systematically seek from the state court orders requiring joint placement or visitation in excess of that required by this Consent Decree.
33. The provisions of this Decree shall constitute a complete resolution of the claims in this action as to the class previously certified by the Court in this action. Plaintiffs did not assert, and this Decree does not resolve, any claims for damages based on the allegations set forth in the Complaint.
34. Plaintiffs have requested, and DCFS has agreed to pay, a total of $12,500.00 in full satisfaction of plaintiffs' claim for costs, expenses and reasonable attorneys' fees in this action. This amount is to be paid by DCFS to the Cook County Public Guardian Fund for Indigents within 120 days of the entry of this Decree.
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Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 217-1 Filed: 05/16/14 Page 29 of 29 PageID #:306

AGREED TO :

Patrick T. Murphy Lee Ann Lowder OFFICE OF THE COOK COUNTY
PUBLIC GUARDIAN 1112 South Oakley Blvd. Chicago, Illinois 60612
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Sterlin Director ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVICES

istina . Tchen

imberley K. Baer

Barry R. Conybeare

SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE,

MEAGHER & FLOM

333 West Wacker Drive

Suite 2100

Chicago, Illinois 60606

,•

(312) 407-0700

Special Assistant Attorneys General

Attorneys for Defendant

ENTEREDA=n-n-c~.--~~~--------­
United States District Judge
DATED=------~·~.~~~~1 ~1~1~~,---------

28

 
 Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 207 Filed: 03/08/14 Page 1 of 9 PageID #:249

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

ARISTOTLE P., CHIUCHIU G.,

)

AUGUSTINE N., YAHARIA R.,

)

MICHAEL W., REGINALD R., and )

GWENDOLYN B., individually and )

on behalf of all other similarly

)

situated individuals, by their

)

next friend, ROBERT F. HARRIS,

)

Cook County Public Guardian,

)

)

Plaintiffs, )

v.

)

)

BOBBIE GREGG, Acting Director,

)

Illinois Department of Children

)

and Family Services,

)

)

Defendant. )

No. 88 C 7919 Honorable Charles R. Norgle, Sr.

CHILDREN’S REPORT TO THE COURT AND MOTION TO EXTEND THE CONSENT DECREE FOR TWO YEARS AND FOR ADDITIONAL RELIEF

Robert F. Harris, Cook County Public Guardian (OPG), class counsel for the Plaintiffs, a

class of children under the custody or guardianship of the Department of Children and Family

Services (DCFS), respectfully submits this Report and moves this Honorable Court to extend the

Consent Decree entered in this case for two years and for additional relief. There continue to be

serious problems with DCFS’s compliance with the Decree, including a sharp drop in the

number of reviews tendered, faulty case selection methodology, and a lack of communication by

DCFS with the Plaintiffs despite repeated requests. This Court previously extended the Decree

for two years in an order dated May 23, 2012.

INTRODUCTION

The Plaintiffs (the Children) are a class of children under DCFS’s custody or

guardianship because they have been removed from their families. The Consent Decree

Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 207 Filed: 03/08/14 Page 2 of 9 PageID #:250
concerns the visits the Children have with their siblings while in DCFS care. Under the Decree’s terms, siblings must visit each other two times per month for four hours total.
Each year, DCFS Quality Assurance (QA) staff members review DCFS-contracted private agencies’ and DCFS teams’ compliance with the Decree. QA visits agencies and DCFS teams to review case files that the agencies or teams have selected for review. DCFS defines compliance as the private agency or DCFS team completing nine sibling visits out of a mandated twelve visits in a six-month period, or 75% of the visits.
In addition to the Decree’s exceptions to sibling visitation (e.g., a court order or a child refuses visits), DCFS has created its own criteria to disqualify cases from being reviewed. For example, DCFS will not review cases that have been in the system less than six months or cases that have not been with the same agency or agency team for the last six months. These DCFS self-created exceptions eliminate review of many cases that are not exempted by the Decree.
MANY REVIEWS HAVE NOT BEEN TENDERED TO THE CHILDREN During the nearly two-year period beginning in March 2012, the Children received reviews for 58 private agencies and 7 DCFS teams for a total of 65 reviews and 467 sibling groups. This is less than half of the 136 reviews tendered during the prior two-year period, from March 2010 through March 2012, and only about a third of the 1331 sibling groups that were reviewed in that period. And DCFS never produced 45 of the reports it had created in the March 2010 through 2012 period, claiming they were lost. If DCFS did the same number of reviews in the last two-year period as it did during the March 2010 through March 2012 period, approximately 181 should exist, but only 65 reviews have been tendered. Therefore, the Children have only about a third of the total estimated number of reports.
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Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 207 Filed: 03/08/14 Page 3 of 9 PageID #:251
The Plaintiffs have attempted to meet with DCFS regarding this issue and other issues since November 2013. However, DCFS has either cancelled meetings or failed to respond to the Children’s requests to schedule a subsequent meeting. The information made available to the Plaintiffs does not show such a drastic fall-off in the number of private agencies or the total number of eligible sibling groups that would account for the fall-off in the number of tendered reviews for the most recent period.
FLAWED METHODOLOGY TO MEASURE SIBLING VISITATION COMPLIANCE It is impossible to give an accurate figure or even an estimate of how well private
agencies or DCFS teams are complying with the Decree in the last two years, due to missing reports, a flawed methodology, and DCFS’s unknown reasoning for disqualifying sibling groups.
Most of the reviews that were tendered used flawed methodology to collect the data. It appears from the reviews that the cases audited were not randomly selected by QA. For example, in the February 2013 Lutheran Social Services of Illinois (LSSI) review, 47 sibling groups were eligible and 14 sibling groups were chosen for the review. If randomly selected, 14 sibling groups might be enough for an appropriate sample. However, because the 14 sibling groups were selected by the private agency and certain sibling groups were disqualified without justification, it is a flawed sample. DCFS’s claim that LSSI is 100% compliant with the Decree is based upon a faulty and biased sample.
Another example of DCFS’s flawed non-random methodology is the November 2012 review of the DCFS-Cook Central region. Eight sibling groups out of a total of 33 sibling groups were selected. The review does not indicate how the eight cases were selected. DCFS’s claim that the DCFS-Cook Central region is 89% compliant with the Decree is based upon flawed or biased reasoning.
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Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 207 Filed: 03/08/14 Page 4 of 9 PageID #:252
Often no reason is given why cases are determined to be ineligible before being reviewed or disqualified after being reviewed, so it is impossible to determine if this process is being done in compliance with the Decree. For example, DCFS’s August 2012 Alliance Human Services review noted that eight out of the 26 sibling groups were ineligible for review, but no reason was given. In the February 2013 LSSI review discussed above, 18 out of the 47 sibling groups were disqualified without explanation.
In order to provide reliable compliance data regarding sibling visitation, DCFS must provide all of the missing reports to Plaintiffs, only disqualify sibling groups excluded by the decree, provide proof that the reviews were completed using a randomized methodology, and explain why certain sibling groups were excluded and disqualified.
NO RESPONSE TO PROPOSED RANDOM SURVEY OF SIBLING VISITATION IN COOK COUNTY
On December 18, 2013, the Children sent a discovery request to DCFS for six months of sibling visitation records for all Cook County eligible sibling groups (approximately 150) that had Permanency Planning Hearings scheduled in the Child Protection Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County between January 21, 2013 and February 21, 2014. DCFS acknowledged receipt of the request but did not reply to the discovery request. A meeting was scheduled to take place on December 30, 2013 to discuss the discovery request and other matters but it was cancelled by DCFS. All other attempts to schedule another meeting with DCFS have not been fruitful. Plaintiff’s discovery request would have provided a truly randomized sample in that the cases were selected using a random month time frame when a Permanency Planning Hearing was scheduled.
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Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 207 Filed: 03/08/14 Page 5 of 9 PageID #:253
DCFS FAILED THE LAST TRULY RANDOM SIBLING VISITATION REVIEW As reported in the May 3, 2012 Children’s Memorandum in Support of their Motion to
Extend the Decree for Two Years, DCFS failed the last U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (“DHHS”) random sampling of its sibling visitation performance. The DHHS random samplings are part of the periodic Child and Family Services review that DHHS conducts in each state to measure compliance with the Social Security Act. In 2009, DHHS found that DCFS complied with sibling visitation two or more times per month in only 55% of the cases reviewed. The next DHHS review in Illinois is scheduled for federal fiscal year 2015. A two-year extension of the Decree will ensure that DCFS, the Children and this Court will have the benefit of the results from the next scheduled DHHS random sibling visitation review.
FINANCIAL SANCTIONS AND MONITORING OF POORLY PERFORMING AGENCIES
DCFS has a process through its Administrative Case Review (ACR) system to issue financial sanctions to private agencies that fall below the DCFS threshold of nine sibling visits in six months for eligible cases. However, this system appears flawed and does not identify noncompliant agencies identified by the QA reviews. Since 2009, there have been no DCFS financial sanctions despite some very poor performances as demonstrated by the private agency QA reviews tendered to the Children. For example, when DCFS reviewed Alliance Human Services (Southern Region) in February 2013, DCFS found Alliance to be at 0% compliance with the Decree, but did not impose sanctions for such an abysmal record. According to an April 2013 review, the Center for Youth and Family Solutions was found to be at 25% compliance but no sanctions were imposed. Lakeside Community Committee of Cook County was found to be at 14% compliance with the Decree according to a June 2013 review but no sanctions were
5

Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 207 Filed: 03/08/14 Page 6 of 9 PageID #:254
imposed. DCFS should amend its policy so that sanctions can be given out based on QA reviews in addition to ACRs.
DCFS HAS NO SANCTIONS FOR UNDERPERFORMING DCFS TEAMS The Children requested that DCFS consider making sibling visitation compliance part of DCFS caseworkers’ job requirements, so that performance reviews could be used as a way to improve the historically lagging DCFS performance in sibling visitation compared to private agencies. DCFS denied this request, stating that the current job performance evaluations do not specifically address sibling visitation and the process to change the criteria would be timeconsuming, and would require approval of various other state agencies. DCFS further responded that the performance review process is a confidential process that cannot be disclosed to third parties due to collective bargaining requirements. Instead, DCFS stated that targeted training is the most appropriate way to address underperforming DCFS teams. Because DCFS has not set up a meeting with the Children despite requests since November 2013, the Children have no knowledge of any targeted training DCFS may be conducting for DCFS caseworkers and supervisors.
REPORTS OF NON-COMPLIANCE IN LAKE COUNTY The Lake County Public Defender has a conflict unit that represents DCFS wards in its child abuse and neglect proceedings. Lake County has the second highest number of wards of the state in its child abuse and neglect system after Cook County. The Lake County Public Defender reported to the Children that it has recurring issues with sibling visitation including: 1) agencies leave sibling visitation up to foster parents who do not feel obligated to keep up with the regular sibling visits; 2) high turnover in caseworkers often creates gaps in sibling visitation during turnover while the new worker is getting trained; 3) the distance between sibling foster
6

Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 207 Filed: 03/08/14 Page 7 of 9 PageID #:255
homes is often so great that caseworkers with limited time struggle to find time to facilitate, or the distance is so great that it is not realistic to do visits Monday through Friday after school, and weekends do not work for the foster family or agency; 4) if a case is split between two or more agencies, they argue over who has to drive the farthest, or which way; and 5) once a child is returned to his or her father or mother and the case closes, there is no way to enforce visits with the siblings that remain in foster care.
The Lake County Public Defender also reported five egregious cases that required court intervention to make progress on the frequency of sibling visitation. In one case, there are five children ranging from ages 7 through 17, who are all placed apart. The reasons why sibling visitation is not occurring include two caseworkers from different offices assigned to the family and the distance between the foster homes. This is an ongoing issue that continues to be addressed in Court. In another case, two teenage siblings were split up and now live 90 minutes apart. Sibling visits were not occurring, possibly because the agency was leaving it up to the foster parents to arrange the visits. With court intervention, the agency began scheduling and supervising sibling visits.
CONCLUSION DCFS has not provided sufficient proof to establish that it is in substantial compliance with the Decree and there are five major problems in DCFS’s performance: 1) DCFS has tendered only about a third (65 of an estimated 181) of its total reviews for the two-year period from March 2012 through March 2014; 2) the reviews that DCFS tendered are flawed because they were based upon biased cases that were not randomly selected; 3) DCFS uses it own 75% threshold (nine out of twelve visits in a six-month period) as substantial compliance in reviewing a case; 4) DCFS excludes cases that are not exceptions as outlined by the Decree; and 5) DCFS
7

Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 207 Filed: 03/08/14 Page 8 of 9 PageID #:256

did not respond to the Children’s request for a randomized sibling visitation study of Cook County cases. The Children have been attempting without success to schedule a meeting with DCFS to discuss these and other issues since November 2013.
The Children respectfully move this Honorable Court to extend the Decree for two years. Additionally, the Children request this Honorable Court to: 1) order DCFS to tender all the QA reviews completed since March 2012; 2) order DCFS to adopt a verifiable methodology for random sampling in its QA review process; 3) order DCFS to use only the reasons that are specified in the Decree to disqualify cases; 4) order that DCFS amend its policy so that sanctions can be given out based on QA reviews; and 5) order DCFS to comply with the Children’s December 18, 2013 discovery request.

DATED: March 8, 2014

Respectfully submitted, Michele McGee /s/ Michele McGee______________________ MICHELE MCGEE #6225600 Representing Robert F. Harris, Public Guardian Office of the Cook County Public Guardian 2245 W. Ogden Ave., 4th Floor Chicago, Illinois 60612 (312) 433-4300

8

Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 207 Filed: 03/08/14 Page 9 of 9 PageID #:257 Certificate of Service
I, Michele McGee, certify that on March 8, 2014, I served this document via the Electronic Case Filing System as to Filing Users and I complied with Local Rule 5.5 as to any party who is not a Filing User or represented by a Filing User.
/s/ Michele McGee_____________ One of the Attorneys for the Plaintiffs
9

 
 Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 221 Filed: 02/23/15 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:348

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERI{ DIVISION

ARISTOTLE P., et al.,

Plaintiffs,
v.
BOBBIE GREGG, Acting Director, Illinois Department of Children and Family Services,

No. 88 CY 7919 Hon. Charles R. Norgle

Defendant.

ORDER

Children's Report to the Court and Motion to Extend the Consent Decree for Two Years and for
Additional Relief [207] is granted. Therefore, over objection, the consent decree shall be
extended by two years and Defendant Bobbie Gregg, Acting Director of the Illinois Department
of Children and Family Services, shall comply with the Children's discovery requests as follows: (1) Defendant shall tender all the QA reviews completed since March 2012; (2) Defendant shall adopt a verifiable methodology for random sampling in its QA review process; (3) Defendant shall use only the reasons that are specified in the Decree to disqualify cases; (4) Defendant shall amend its policy so that sanctions can be given out based on QA reviews; and (5) Defendant shall comply with the Children's December 18, 2013 discovery request.

DATE: February 23,2015

CHARLES RONALD NOR United States District Court

 
 Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 188 Filed: 07/31/09 Page 1 of 5 PageID #:88

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

ARISTOTLE P., CHIUCHIU G.,

)

AUGUSTINE N., YAHARIA R.,

)

MICHAEL W., REGINALD R., and )

GWENDOLYN B., individually and

)

on behalf of all other similarly

)

situated individuals, by their

)

next friend, ROBERT F. HARRIS,

)

Cook County Public Guardian,

)

)

Plaintiffs, )

v.

)

)

ERWIN McEWEN, Director,

)

Illinois Department of Children

)

and Family Services,

)

)

Defendant. )

No. 88 C 7919 Honorable Charles R. Norgle, Sr.

Children’s Status Report

Introduction

The Plaintiffs are a class of children under the custody or guardianship of DCFS because

they have been removed from their families. The Consent Decree concerns the visits these

Children have with their brothers and sisters while in DCFS care. Under the Decree’s terms,

siblings must visit each other two times per months for four hours total. Each fiscal year (July 1

to June 30), DCFS Quality Assurance (QA) staff members review its various private agencies’

and DCFS teams’ compliance with the Decree.

The parties appeared before this Honorable Court on February 10, 2009 and reported on

the status of the Consent Decree. The Court asked the Children to file a status report on July 31,

2009, after the close of fiscal year 2009.

Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 188 Filed: 07/31/09 Page 2 of 5 PageID #:89
Decree compliance When the Plaintiff last reported to the Court, private agencies complied with the Decree
59.5% of the time and DCFS teams complied only 57.5% of the time, according to the reviews received. For reviews received in fiscal year 2009, private agencies complied with the Decree 75% of the time and DCFS teams complied 60% of the time. While the numbers are improving, this is not the substantial compliance the Decree requires. Financial sanctions
DCFS financially sanctions a private agency that falls below a threshold of nine visits in six months. Of the agencies reviewed in fiscal year 2009, DCFS sanctioned one agency $6,517 for not complying with the Decree. Transportation subsidies
DCFS provides a transportation subsidy of up to $150 per month to a foster parent who transports a child and supervises a visit and $100 to a foster parent who hosts an overnight visit. Private agencies and teams used almost $40,000 in transportation subsidies in fiscal year 2009. This is up from $29,000 in fiscal year 2008. Public Guardian employees distributed fliers explaining the subsidies to foster parents in court, in letters, and during home visits. DCFS will look into posting periodic announcements on its intranet to remind DCFS and private agency workers about the Decree and the subsidies available. Monitoring poorly-performing agencies and DCFS teams
DCFS has provided its private agency and DCFS team reviews for five years now. One thing is clear: An agency or team that performed well one year generally performs well the next time it is reviewed. And the same goes for a poorly-performing agency or team. There is generally little or no improvement in its next review.
2

Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 188 Filed: 07/31/09 Page 3 of 5 PageID #:90
As it stands now, DCFS puts a poorly-performing agency on a corrective action plan. But there is no DCFS follow-up to ensure that the agency has followed the plan until QA rereviews the agency two or three years later. DCFS does not put a poorly-performing DCFS team on a corrective action plan at all and does not follow-up to see if the team is improving. Indeed, one DCFS team actually got worse — compliance declined from 36% to 17%.
The Children believe that QA should monitor an agency or team more closely after a poor review, e.g., every three or six months. Naturally, this would be more labor-intensive. So the Children suggest holding off on reviewing agencies and teams that have consistently scored well to focus on agencies and teams that have not. DCFS is considering this proposal. Sanctioning DCFS workers
The parties are encouraged by the increase in the private agencies’ compliance with the Decree. But as the Court can see, DCFS teams lag behind. For a number of years, the parties have struggled to create a system to take action against DCFS workers or supervisors who consistently fail to comply with the Decree that the workers’ labor union would agree to.
The parties had been working on holding a DCFS supervisor responsible for a worker’s noncompliance. But this year the supervisors became unionized as well. The parties need to go back to the drawing board and devise a way to discipline DCFS workers or supervisors who consistently do not comply with the Decree. Notification requirements
The Decree requires DCFS to give each sibling and foster parent the names, birth dates, placements, addresses, and telephone numbers of all siblings placed apart. This way, siblings can talk on the telephone and write letters in addition to seeing their siblings twice monthly. For fiscal year 2009, private agencies complied with this requirement 76% of the time and DCFS
3

Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 188 Filed: 07/31/09 Page 4 of 5 PageID #:91

teams complied 100% of the time. These numbers are a big improvement, especially for DCFS

teams. DCFS teams complied only 42% of the time in fiscal year 2008.

Whenever DCFS decides to separate siblings who are placed together, it must notify each

child and the child's attorney and guardian ad litem, in writing, at least ten days prior to a move

or, if there is imminent risk, within five days after a move. Private agencies complied with this

rule just 50% of the time. DCFS teams did not disrupt any of its sibling groups in fiscal year

2009.

Conclusion

DCFS is not in substantial compliance with the decree. But there is improvement. Of the

fiscal year 2009 reviews received, private agencies complied with the sibling visit requirement

75% of the time and DCFS teams complied 60% of the time.

An agency or team who has a poor compliance review one year inevitably has a poor

showing on its next review. The Children want DCFS to monitor a poorly-performing agency or

team more closely. DCFS is considering the Children’s suggestion.

The parties need to devise a way to discipline DCFS teams or supervisors for

noncompliance with the Decree that the labor union will approve. This work continues.

The children request that this Honorable Court continue this matter to March 5, 2010 for

the Children’s Report to the Court and Motion to Extend the Consent Decree.

Date: July 31, 2009

Respectfully submitted,

Robert F. Harris, Jill Runk Office of the Cook County Public Guardian 69 West Washington Street, Suite 700 Chicago, Illinois 60602 (312) 603-0800

/s/ Jill Runk______________________ One of the Attorneys for the Plaintiffs

4

Case: 1:88-cv-07919 Document #: 188 Filed: 07/31/09 Page 5 of 5 PageID #:92 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Jill Runk, certify that on July 31, 2009, I served this document via the Electronic Case Filing System as to Filing Users and I complied with Local Rule 5.5 as to any party who is not a Filing User or represented by a Filing User.
/s/ Jill Runk______________________ One of the Attorneys for the Plaintiffs
Robert F. Harris Jill Runk Office of the Cook County Public Guardian 69 West Washington Street Suite 700 Chicago, Illinois 60602 (312) 603-0800
5

 
 Case: 1:88-cv-7919 As of: 02/14/2019 12:05 PM CST 1 of 17
SuppressAnsRpt,TERMED
United States District Court Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.2.2 (Chicago)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:88−cv−07919

P, et al v. Johnson, et al Assigned to: Honorable Charles R. Norgle, Sr Demand: $0 Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff
Aristotle P

Date Filed: 09/15/1988 Date Terminated: 09/27/1991 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Brian A Finley Office Of The Public Guardian 2245 W. Ogden Ave. 4th Floor Chicago, IL 60612 (312) 433−4300 Email: brian.finley@cookcountyil.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jill P Runk Cook County Public Guardian 69 West Washington Street 700 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 603−0800 Email: jill.runk@cookcountyil.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Catherine V. Tannen Office of the Cook County Public Guardian 69 West Washington Suite 1800 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 603−0800 TERMINATED: 07/10/2008
Charles Perez Golbert Office of the Cook County Public Guardian 69 West Washington Suite 1800 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 603−0800 Email: charles.golbert@cookcountyil.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michele Marie McGee Office of the Cook County Public Guardian 2245 West Ogden Avenue 4th Floor Chicago, IL 60612 312−433−4300 Email: michele.mcgee@cookcountyil.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patrick Thomas Murphy Circuit Court of Cook County Circuit Court of Cook County

Case: 1:88-cv-7919 As of: 02/14/2019 12:05 PM CST 2 of 17

10220 South 76th Avenue Bridgeview, IL 60455−2425

(708) 974−6838 Email: psmj007@hotmail.com TERMINATED: 07/10/2008

Peter J. Schmiedel Fischel & Kahn, Ltd. 155 North Wacker Suite 1950 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 726−0440 Email: pschmiedel@fischelkahn.com TERMINATED: 08/04/2005

Thomas J. Grippando Cook County Department of Administrative Hearings 118 N Clark St Ste 1140 Chicago, IL 60602−1415

(312) 603−2120 Email: tgrippando@yahoo.com TERMINATED: 07/10/2008

Plaintiff Chiuchiu G

represented by Brian A Finley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jill P Runk (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Catherine V. Tannen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/10/2008

Charles Perez Golbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michele Marie McGee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patrick Thomas Murphy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/10/2008

Peter J. Schmiedel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/04/2005

Thomas J. Grippando (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/10/2008

Plaintiff Augustine N

represented by Brian A Finley (See above for address)

Case: 1:88-cv-7919 As of: 02/14/2019 12:05 PM CST 3 of 17

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jill P Runk (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Catherine V. Tannen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/10/2008

Charles Perez Golbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michele Marie McGee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patrick Thomas Murphy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/10/2008

Peter J. Schmiedel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/04/2005

Thomas J. Grippando (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/10/2008

Plaintiff Yaharia R

represented by Brian A Finley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jill P Runk (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Catherine V. Tannen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/10/2008

Charles Perez Golbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michele Marie McGee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patrick Thomas Murphy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/10/2008

Peter J. Schmiedel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/04/2005

Thomas J. Grippando

Case: 1:88-cv-7919 As of: 02/14/2019 12:05 PM CST 4 of 17

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/10/2008

Plaintiff Michael W

represented by Brian A Finley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jill P Runk (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Catherine V. Tannen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/10/2008

Charles Perez Golbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michele Marie McGee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patrick Thomas Murphy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/10/2008

Peter J. Schmiedel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/04/2005

Thomas J. Grippando (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/10/2008

Plaintiff Reginald R

represented by Brian A Finley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jill P Runk (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Catherine V. Tannen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/10/2008

Charles Perez Golbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michele Marie McGee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patrick Thomas Murphy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/10/2008

Case: 1:88-cv-7919 As of: 02/14/2019 12:05 PM CST 5 of 17

Plaintiff Gwendolyn B
Plaintiff Charles P. Golbert

Peter J. Schmiedel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/04/2005
Thomas J. Grippando (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/10/2008
represented by Brian A Finley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jill P Runk (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Catherine V. Tannen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/10/2008
Charles Perez Golbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michele Marie McGee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patrick Thomas Murphy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/10/2008
Peter J. Schmiedel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/04/2005
Thomas J. Grippando (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/10/2008
represented by Brian A Finley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michele Marie McGee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
Gordon Johnson TERMINATED: 12/10/1993

represented by Susan Getzendanner 1410 North LaSalle Street Chicago, IL 60610 (312)944−2629 LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 1:88-cv-7919 As of: 02/14/2019 12:05 PM CST 6 of 17

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christina M. Tchen Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom, LLP CH 155 North Wacker Drive Suite 2700 Chicago, IL 60606−1720 (312) 407−0700 Email: ttchen@skadden.com

Defendant Gary T Morgan

represented by Susan Getzendanner (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christina M. Tchen (See above for address)

Defendant
Sterling M Ryder Director of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services

represented by Barbara Lynn Greenspan Attorney General's Office 100 West Randolph Street Suite 11−200 Chicago, IL 60601 (312)814−7087 Email: barbara.greenspan@illinois.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry R. Conybeare Conybeare Law Office, P.C. 519 Main Street St. Joseph, MI 49085 (616) 983−0561

Danielle Jenkins Steimel Office of the Attorney General 100 West Randolph Street 13th Floor Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 814−7087 Email: dsteimel@idcfs.state.il.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kimberley K. Baer Wandro & Associates, P.C. 2501 Grand Avenue Suite B Des Moines, IA 50312 (515) 281−1475

Nancy K. Hall−Walker

1013 N. West Street Galesburg, IL 61401−2670

(309) 343−1509 Email: nancyhallwalker@gmail.com

Defendant Director, DCFS Erwin McEwen

Case: 1:88-cv-7919 As of: 02/14/2019 12:05 PM CST 7 of 17
Defendant Mr. Richard H Calica Defendant Bobbie Gregg Defendant Director, DCFS George H. Sheldon

Date Filed 10/25/1990 11/13/1990 12/05/1990
12/20/1990 01/29/1991 02/20/1991 03/13/1991 03/14/1991 03/19/1991 04/05/1991 04/10/1991 05/10/1991 05/24/1991 06/07/1991

# Docket Text
81 MINUTE ORDER of 10/25/90 before Magistrate Bernard Weisberg : Status hearing held; continued to 04 Dec 90 at 10:00 a.m. Notice not mailed. (or) (Entered: 10/30/1990)
82 MINUTE ORDER of 11/13/90 before Honorable Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference held; continued to 20 Dec 90 at 9:00 a.m. Notice not mailed. (ac) (Entered: 11/14/1990)
83 MINUTE ORDER of 12/5/90 before Magistrate Bernard Weisberg : Case called for status on December 04, 1990. No one appears. Status hearing reset for December 27, 1990 at 10:00 a.m. Counsel agree to submit a joint written status report by the December 27 court date to Magistrate Weisberg's chambers. Notice mailed. (ac) (Entered: 12/06/1990)
84 MINUTE ORDER of 12/20/90 before Honorable Ann C. Williams : Motion for preliminary injunction is stayed. Pretrial conference held; continued to 29 Jan 91 at 9:00 a.m. Notice not mailed. (ac) (Entered: 12/26/1990)
85 MINUTE ORDER of 1/29/91 before Honorable Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference held; continued to 02/20/91 at 10:00 a.m. Notice not mailed. (fce) (Entered: 02/04/1991)
86 MINUTE ORDER of 2/20/91 before Honorable Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference reset for 03/14/91 at 9:00 a.m. Notice not mailed. (fce) (Entered: 02/27/1991)
87 MINUTE ORDER of 3/13/91 before Magistrate Bernard Weisberg : Status hearing set for 04/09/91 at 10:00 a.m. Notice mailed 03/15/91. (fce) (Entered: 03/15/1991)
88 MINUTE ORDER of 3/14/91 before Honorable Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference held; continued to 03/19/91 at 10:00 a.m. Notice not mailed. (fce) (Entered: 03/15/1991)
89 MINUTE ORDER of 3/19/91 before Honorable Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference held; continued to April 5, 1991 at 2:00 p.m. Notice mailed 03/20/91 (tlm) (Entered: 03/20/1991)
90 MINUTE ORDER of 4/5/91 before Honorable Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference held; continued to 05/10/91 at 12:30 p.m. No notice mailed. (tlm) (Entered: 04/11/1991)
91 MINUTE ORDER of 4/10/91 before Honorable Bernard Weisberg : Status hearing set for 07/11/91 at 10:00 a.m. Notice mailed 04/12/91. (tlm) (Entered: 04/12/1991)
92 MINUTE ORDER of 5/10/91 before Honorable Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference reset for 05/24/91 at 10:30 a.m. Judge's staff notified counsel by telephone. (fce) (Entered: 05/15/1991)
93 MINUTE ORDER of 5/24/91 before Honorable Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference reset for 06/07/91 at 11:00 a.m. Judge's staff notified counsel by telephone. (amb) (Entered: 05/30/1991)
94 MINUTE ORDER of 6/7/91 before Honorable Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference held; continued to 07/10/91 at 9:00 a.m. No notice mailed. (tlm) (Entered: 06/13/1991)

Case: 1:88-cv-7919 As of: 02/14/2019 12:05 PM CST 8 of 17

07/10/1991 07/15/1991
08/06/1991 08/07/1991 08/28/1991 09/27/1991
10/01/1991
10/18/1991 11/15/1991 12/20/1991 01/15/1992 01/31/1992 02/14/1992 03/13/1992 04/03/1992 04/24/1992 05/20/1992 05/29/1992 06/09/1992

95 MINUTE ORDER of 7/10/91 before Honorable Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference held; continued to 08/08/91 at 9:00 a.m. Notice not required, advised in open court. (tlm) (Entered: 07/11/1991)
96 MINUTE ORDER of 7/15/91 before Honorable Bernard Weisberg Case was called for status. No one appeared. Parties to inform this court if they have settled. Further status hearing set for 08/06/91 at 10:00 a.m. Notice mailed 07/17/91. (tlm) (Entered: 07/17/1991)
97 MINUTE ORDER of 8/6/91 before Honorable Bernard Weisberg : Status hearing held; continued to 11/21/91 at 10:00 a.m. Notice mailed 08/07/91. (tlm) (Entered: 08/07/1991)
98 MINUTE ORDER of 8/7/91 before Honorable Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference set for 08/08/91 is stricken. Pretrial conference reset for 08/28/91 at 10:00 . Notice mailed 08/08/91. (tlm) (Entered: 08/08/1991)
99 MINUTE ORDER of 8/28/91 before Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference reset for 09/27/91 at 3:00 p.m. Notice mailed 08/29/91. (tlm) (Entered: 08/29/1991)
100 MINUTE ORDER of 9/27/91 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference held; continued to 10/18/91 at 3:30 p.m. Order all pending motions dismissed with leave to reinstate of settlement is not executed. Order case dismissed with leave to reinstate if settlement does not go through. Mailed notice (tlm) (Entered: 09/30/1991)
101 MINUTE ORDER of 10/1/91 by Hon. Bernard Weisberg : This court having been advised that the case is dismissed and all matters relating to the referral of this action having been resolved, this case is returned to Judge Williams for further proceedings. Status hearing set for 11/21/91 is vacated. Mailed notice (tlm) (Entered: 10/04/1991)
102 MINUTE ORDER of 10/18/91 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference held; continued to 11/15/91 at 3:00 p.m. No notice (tlm) (Entered: 10/22/1991)
103 MINUTE ORDER of 11/15/91 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference re−set to 12/20/91 at 2:00 p.m. Mailed notice (tlm) (Entered: 11/20/1991)
104 MINUTE ORDER of 12/20/91 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference held; continued to 01/17/92 at 3:30 p.m. No notice (fce) (Entered: 12/31/1991)
105 MINUTE ORDER of 1/15/92 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference re−set for 01/31/92 at 2:30 P.M. By agreement of the parties, pretrial conference set for 01/17/92 is stricken. Telephoned notice (fce) (Entered: 01/16/1992)
106 MINUTE ORDER of 1/31/92 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference re−set for 02/14/92 at 4:00 p.m. Mailed notice (tlm) (Entered: 02/05/1992)
107 MINUTE ORDER of 2/14/92 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference held; continued to 03/13/92 at 2:00 p.m. No notice (tlm) (Entered: 02/21/1992)
108 MINUTE ORDER of 3/13/92 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference reset for 04/03/92 at 2:00 p.m. No notice (ldg) (Entered: 03/17/1992)
109 MINUTE ORDER of 4/3/92 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference re−set for 04/24/92 at 2:30 p.m. No notice (fce) (Entered: 04/07/1992)
110 MINUTE ORDER of 4/24/92 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : , Pretrial conference held; continued to 05/22/92 at 3:30 p.m. No notice (tlm) (Entered: 04/30/1992)
111 MINUTE ORDER of 5/20/92 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : By agreement of parties, pretrial conference set for 05/22/92 is stricken. Pretrial conference reset for 05/29/92 at 4:00 p.m. Telephone notice (tlm) (Entered: 05/21/1992)
112 MINUTE ORDER of 5/29/92 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference is stricken. New date to be set within a short date. Telephoned notice (fce) (Entered: 06/02/1992)
113 MINUTE ORDER of 6/9/92 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference set for 06/25/92 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice (tlm) (Entered: 06/10/1992)

Case: 1:88-cv-7919 As of: 02/14/2019 12:05 PM CST 9 of 17

06/25/1992 07/01/1992 07/23/1992 07/30/1992 09/10/1992 09/23/1992 10/26/1992 11/20/1992 01/22/1993 02/25/1993 12/10/1993 12/10/1993 12/10/1993 12/10/1993
12/10/1993 12/10/1993 12/10/1993 03/11/1994
03/11/1994

114 MINUTE ORDER of 6/25/92 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference re−set for 07/10/92 at 9:00 a.m. Telephone notice (tlm) (Entered: 06/29/1992)
115 MINUTE ORDER of 7/1/92 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference held; continued to 07/24/92 at 3:00 p.m. No notice (ldg) (Entered: 07/02/1992)
116 MINUTE ORDER of 7/23/92 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference re−set for 07/30/92 at 3:30 P.M. By agreement of parties pretrial conference set for 07/24/92 is stricken. Telephoned notice (fce) (Entered: 07/24/1992)
117 MINUTE ORDER of 7/30/92 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference held; continued to 09/10/92 at 9:30 a.m. No notice (fce) Modified on 08/03/1992 (Entered: 07/31/1992)
118 MINUTE ORDER of 9/10/92 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference reset for 09/23/92 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (tlm) (Entered: 09/14/1992)
119 MINUTE ORDER of 9/23/92 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference held; continued to 10/26/92 at 9:00 a.m. No notice (tlm) (Entered: 09/24/1992)
120 MINUTE ORDER of 10/26/92 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference re−set for 11/20/92 3:00 p.m. Telephoned notice (fce) Modified on 10/28/1992 (Entered: 10/27/1992)
121 MINUTE ORDER of 11/20/92 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Status hearing set for 01/22/93 at 10:00 a.m. Pretrial conference held. , No notice (fce) (Entered: 11/25/1992)
122 MINUTE ORDER of 1/22/93 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Status hearing reset for 02/26/93 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (tlm) (Entered: 01/25/1993)
123 MINUTE ORDER of 2/25/93 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Status hearing set for 02/26/93 is stricken. Telephoned notice (fce) (Entered: 02/26/1993)
124 MOTION by defendant Sterling M Ryder for leave to file instanter the supplemental appearance of Kimberley K. Baer and Barry R. Conybeare ; Notice of motion (eav) (Entered: 01/05/1994)
125 JOINT MOTION by defendant Sterling M Ryder for preliminary approval of consent decree, class notice and date for Fairness hearing (Attachments); Notice of motion (eav) (Entered: 01/05/1994)
126 AGREED ORDER regarding motion for preliminary approval of consent decree, class notice and [125−1], motion date for Fairness hearing [125−2] (eav) (Entered: 01/05/1994)
127 MINUTE ORDER of 12/10/93 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Defendant Sterling M. Ryder's motion for leave to file instanter the supplemental appearance of Kimberley K. Baer and Barry R. Conybeare is granted. Joint motion for preliminary approval of consent decree, class notice and date for fairness hearing is granted. [125−1], [125−2], [124−1] Fairness hearing hearing is set for March 11, 1994 at 10:00 a.m No notice (eav) (Entered: 01/05/1994)
128 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendant Sterling M Ryder by Kimberley K. Baer, Barry R. Conybeare (eav) (Entered: 01/05/1994)
129 RULE 39 Affidavit of Kimberley K. Baer (eav) (Entered: 01/05/1994)
130 RULE 39 Affidavit of Barry R. Conybeare (eav) (Entered: 01/05/1994)
131 NOTICE OF class action and proposed settlement to all children who are subjects of abuse, neglect or dependency petitions in the Juvenile Court of Cook County by defendant Gary T Morgan, defendant Sterling M Ryder (Attachment) (jmp) (Entered: 03/14/1994)
132 NOTICE of filing by defendant Gary T Morgan, defendant Sterling M Ryder regarding notice of class action and proposed settlement to all children who are subjects of abuse, neglect or dependency petitions in the Juvenile Court of Cook County [131−1] (jmp) (Entered: 03/14/1994)

Case: 1:88-cv-7919 As of: 02/14/2019 12:05 PM CST 10 of 17

03/11/1994 03/11/1994 01/29/1997 01/29/1997 01/29/1997 02/05/1997
02/05/1997
02/05/1997 02/05/1997
02/05/1997
02/05/1997 02/05/1997
02/05/1997 02/05/1997
02/07/1997 03/05/1999 03/05/1999 03/05/1999 03/10/1999 03/10/1999
11/20/2001

133 CONSENT DECREE (jmp) (Entered: 03/17/1994)
134 MINUTE ORDER of 3/11/94 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Fairness hearing held. Enter consent decree. No notice (jmp) (Entered: 03/17/1994)
139 MOTION by plaintiffs for leave to file appearances and general rule 39 affidavits of additional counsel ; Notice of motion (yap) (Entered: 02/10/1997)
142 JOINT MOTION by defendants and plaintiffs for entry of agreed order regarding consent decree ; Notice of motion (yap) (Entered: 02/10/1997)
145 JOINT MOTION by defendants and plaintiffs for entry of agreed order regarding attorneys' fees ; Notice of motion (yap) (Entered: 02/10/1997)
136 MOTION by defendant Jess McDonald for leave to substitute Barbara L. Greenspan, Danielle Steimel and Nancy Hall−Walker as counsel ; Notice of motion (yap) (Entered: 02/10/1997)
137 MINUTE ORDER of 2/5/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams: Defendant Jess McDonald, Director of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Service for leave to substitute counsel [136−1] is granted. Christina M. Tchen and her colleagues at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom are given leave to withdraw as defendant's counsel and Assistant Attorneys General Barbara L. Greenspan, Danielle Steimel and Nancy Hall−Walker are given leave to file appearance as counsel. Mailed notice (yap) (Entered: 02/10/1997)
138 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendant Jess McDonald by Barbara L. Greenspan and Nancy K. Hall−Walker with rule 39 affidavits (yap) (Entered: 02/10/1997)
140 MINUTE ORDER of 2/5/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams: Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file appearances and general rule 39 affidavits of additional counsel [139−1] is granted. Mailed notice (yap) (Entered: 02/10/1997)
141 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for plaintiffs by Charles Perez Golbert, Peter J. Schmiedel and Thomas J. Grippando with rule 39 affidavits (yap) (Entered: 02/10/1997)
143 AGREED ORDER [142−1] (yap) (Entered: 02/10/1997)
144 MINUTE ORDER of 2/5/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams: Joint motion by plaintiffs and defendants for entry of agreed order regarding consent decree [142−1] is granted. Enter agreed order. Mailed notice (yap) (Entered: 02/10/1997)
146 AGREED ORDER [145−1] (yap) (Entered: 02/10/1997)
147 MINUTE ORDER of 2/5/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams: Plaintiffs and defendants joint motion for entry of agreed order regarding attorneys' fees [145−1] is granted. Enter agreed order. Mailed notice (yap) (Entered: 02/10/1997)
135 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendant Sterling M Ryder by Danielle Jenkins Steimel with rule 39 affidavit (yap) (Entered: 02/10/1997)
148 JOINT motion for entry of an agreed order regarding consent decree ; Notice of motion. (fce) (Entered: 03/11/1999)
151 JOINT REPORT by the parties to the Court with joint motion for entry of order regarding consent decree (Exhibit); Notice of filing. (mak) (Entered: 03/22/1999)
151 JOINT MOTION for entry of agreed order regarding the consent decree with joint report (Exhibit); Notice of filing. (mak) (Entered: 03/22/1999)
149 AGREED order regarding motion for entry of an agreed order regarding consent decree [148−1] (fce) (Entered: 03/11/1999)
150 MINUTE ORDER of 3/10/99 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Joint motions for entry of an agreed order regarding consent decree are granted. Enter agreed order. [148−1] No notice (fce) Modified on 03/11/1999 (Entered: 03/11/1999)
152 MOTION by plaintiff to reassign a judge to case ; Notice. (cdy) (Entered: 11/26/2001)

Case: 1:88-cv-7919 As of: 02/14/2019 12:05 PM CST 11 of 17

01/10/2002 01/14/2002
01/22/2002 02/26/2002 03/01/2002 03/07/2002 03/26/2002
02/27/2004 02/27/2004 03/04/2004 03/05/2004 12/01/2004 12/09/2004 08/01/2005 08/01/2005 08/04/2005 03/07/2006 03/07/2006
03/10/2006

155 MOTION by plaintiff for a status hearing ; Notice. (air) (Entered: 01/31/2002)
153 REASSIGNMENT ORDER of 1/14/02 This case is reassigned to the Hon. Charles R. Norgle Sr. This case having been assigned to the calendar of Judge Williams who is no longer sitting, it is recommended that it be reassigned to the calendar of an active judge of this court as it appears to require further judicial action. (For further detail see order.) Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 01/16/2002)
154 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for plaintiffs by Jill P Runk, Catherine V. Tannen, Thomas Grippando; Notice. (air) (Entered: 01/23/2002)
156 JOINT report to the court and JOINT MOTION by defendants and plaintiff for entry of an agreed order regarding the consent decree (Attachment); Notice. (jmp) (Entered: 03/04/2002)
157 MINUTE ORDER of 3/1/02 by Hon. Charles R. Norgle Sr : Joint motion for entry of an agreed order regarding the consent decree [156−1] is taken under advisement. Telephoned notice (jmp) (Entered: 03/04/2002)
158 MINUTE ORDER of 3/7/02 by Hon. Charles R. Norgle Sr: (Entered agreed order regarding consent decree.) Telephone notice (air) (Entered: 03/13/2002)
159 MINUTE ORDER of 3/26/02 by Hon. Charles R. Norgle Sr: Motion of plaintiff DOC 152 to reassign is granted [152−1]. Motion for status hearing DOC 155 is granted [155−1]. Motion by defendants DOC 156 for agreed order regarding consent decree is granted [156−1]. Consent Decree in separate form was entered. No notice (air) (Entered: 03/28/2002)
160 PARTIES' JOINT REPORT to the court and motion (Attachment). (air) (Entered: 03/05/2004)
160 JOINT MOTION by parties for entry of an agreed order regarding the consent decree (Attachment) with report; Notice. (air) (Entered: 03/05/2004)
161 MINUTE ORDER of 3/4/04 by Hon. Charles R. Norgle Sr: Parties' joint report to the court [160−1] and joint motion for entry of an agreed order regarding the consent decree is approved and granted [160−1]. Telephoned notice (air) (Entered: 03/05/2004)
162 MINUTE ORDER of 3/5/04 by Hon. Charles R. Norgle Sr: (Entered Agreed Order.) Telephoned notice (air) (Entered: 03/09/2004)
163 ROUTINE MOTION by plaintiffs to substitute party ; Notice (cdy) (Entered: 12/10/2004)
164 MINUTE ORDER of 12/9/04 by Hon. Charles R. Norgle Sr: Routine motion to substitute party [163−1], is granted. Robert F. Harris, County Public Guardian is substituted as the named plaintiff. Mailed notice (cdy) (Entered: 12/10/2004)
165 MOTION by Plaintiffs to withdraw Peter J. Schmiedel as counsel (gma, ) (Entered: 08/01/2005)
166 NOTICE of Motion by Peter J. Schmiedel for presentment of MOTION by Plaintiffs to withdraw Peter J. Schmiedel as counsel 165 before Honorable Charles R. Norgle Sr. on 8/5/2005 at 09:30 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 08/01/2005)
167 MINUTE entry before Judge Charles R. Norgle Sr.: Motion to withdraw as counsel 165 is granted. Peter J. Schmiedel is granted leave to withdraw his name as counsel for the plaintiffs. Mailed notice (air, ) (Entered: 08/05/2005)
168 REPORT by Plaintiffs to the court and MOTION for entry of an order regarding the consent decree (gma, ) (Entered: 03/07/2006)
169 NOTICE of Motion by Jill P Runk for presentment of REPORT by Plaintiffs to the court and MOTION for entry of an order regarding the consent decree 168 before Honorable Charles R. Norgle Sr. on 3/10/2006 at 09:30 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 03/07/2006)
170 MINUTE entry before Judge Charles R. Norgle Sr.: Motion for entry of an order regarding the consent order 168 is granted. Motion hearing held on 3/10/2006. Mailed notice (ewf, ) (Entered: 03/10/2006)

Case: 1:88-cv-7919 As of: 02/14/2019 12:05 PM CST 12 of 17

03/10/2006 03/10/2006 02/29/2008 02/29/2008 03/05/2008 04/16/2008 04/16/2008 04/18/2008
06/10/2008 06/10/2008 06/13/2008 07/30/2008 07/30/2008 08/05/2008
11/14/2008 01/05/2009

171 MINUTE entry before Judge Charles R. Norgle Sr.: Enter Order. (gcy, ) (Entered: 03/14/2006)
172 ORDER Signed by Judge Charles R. Norgle Sr. on 3/10/2006:(gcy, ) (Entered: 03/14/2006)
173 MOTION Extend the Consent Decree (Runk, Jill) (Entered: 02/29/2008)
174 NOTICE of Motion by Jill P Runk for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 173 before Honorable Charles R. Norgle Sr. on 3/7/2008 at 09:30 AM. (Runk, Jill) (Entered: 02/29/2008)
175 MINUTE entry before Judge Charles R. Norgle Sr.: Plaintiff's motion to extend the Consent Decree 173 is granted. Mailed notice (tlm) (Entered: 03/10/2008)
176 MOTION for extension of time to file response/reply to Plaintiffs Report to the Court and Motion to Extend the Consent Decree (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Greenspan, Barbara) (Entered: 04/16/2008)
177 NOTICE of Motion by Barbara Lynn Greenspan for presentment of motion for extension of time to file response/reply 176 before Honorable Charles R. Norgle Sr. on 4/18/2008 at 10:30 AM. (Greenspan, Barbara) (Entered: 04/16/2008)
178 MINUTE entry before Judge Honorable Charles R. Norgle, Sr:Defendant's Motion to Extend Time to Respond to Plaintiffs' Report to the Court and Motion to Extend the Consent Decree 176 is granted. Defendant is granted until June 6, 2008 to file his response to Plaintiffs' Motion to extend Time for Defendant to Respond to Plaintiffs' Report to the Court and Motion to Extend the Consent Decree. Mailed notice (ewf, ) (Entered: 04/18/2008)
179 MOTION by Defendant Erwin McEwen for extension of time to file response/reply as to notice of motion 174 TO PLAINTIFFS REPORT TO THE COURT AND MOTION TO EXTEND THE CONSENT DECREE (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Greenspan, Barbara) (Entered: 06/10/2008)
180 NOTICE of Motion by Barbara Lynn Greenspan for presentment of motion for extension of time to file response/reply, motion for relief 179 before Honorable Charles R. Norgle Sr. on 6/13/2008 at 09:30 AM. (Greenspan, Barbara) (Entered: 06/10/2008)
181 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Charles R. Norgle, Sr: Defendant's Second Motion to Extend Time to Respond to Plaintiff's Report to the Court and Motion to Extend the Consent Decree is 179 is granted. Mailed notice (ewf,) (Entered: 06/16/2008)
182 RESPONSE by Defendant Erwin McEwen to Plaintiffs' Report to the Court and Motion to Extend Consent Decree (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Greenspan, Barbara) (Entered: 07/30/2008)
183 NOTICE by Erwin McEwen re Response 182 by Defendant to Plaintiffs' Report to the Court and Motion to Extend Consent Decree (Greenspan, Barbara) (Entered: 07/30/2008)
184 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Charles R. Norgle, Sr: On March 5, 2008 the Court extended the Consent Decree until March 11, 2010. The Illinois Attorney General, on behalf of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services, has advised the Court that counsel for Defendant will meet with Plaintiff's counsel to discuss issues raised by Plaintiff's in their submission to the Court. The matter is therefore set for November 14, 2008 at 10:30 a.m. Mailed notice (ep, ) (Entered: 08/07/2008)
185 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Charles R. Norgle, Sr: Status hearing is rescheduled from 11/14/2008 to 1/6/2009 at 10:00 a.m. Telephoned/mailed notice (ewf, ) (Entered: 11/14/2008)
186 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Charles R. Norgle, Sr: Status hearing is rescheduled from 1/6/2009 to 2/10/2009 at 10:00 a.m.Telephoned/mailed notice (ewf, ) (Entered: 01/05/2009)

Case: 1:88-cv-7919 As of: 02/14/2019 12:05 PM CST 13 of 17

02/10/2009 07/31/2009 02/26/2010 02/26/2010 03/02/2010 03/04/2010 03/24/2010 03/24/2010 03/06/2012 03/06/2012 03/07/2012 03/09/2012
03/30/2012 03/30/2012 04/05/2012
04/20/2012 04/20/2012 05/03/2012 05/23/2012

187 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Charles R. Norgle, Sr:Status hearing held on 2/10/2009. Plaintiffs' Report to the Court is due 7/31/2009. Mailed notice (ewf, ) (Entered: 02/10/2009)
188 STATUS Report by Robert F Harris (Runk, Jill) (Entered: 07/31/2009)
189 STATUS Report and Motion to Extend the Consent Decree by Robert F Harris (Runk, Jill) (Entered: 02/26/2010)
190 NOTICE of Motion by Jill P Runk for presentment of before Honorable Charles R. Norgle Sr. on 3/5/2010 at 09:30 AM. (Runk, Jill) (Entered: 02/26/2010)
191 MOTION by Plaintiff Robert F Harris to Extend Consent Decree (Runk, Jill) (Entered: 03/02/2010)
192 MINUTE entry before Honorable Charles R. Norgle, Sr: Motion to Extend the Consent Decree 191 is granted. Parties are not required to appear in court on Friday, March 5, 2010. Mailed notice (ewf, ) (Entered: 03/04/2010)
193 MINUTE entry before Honorable Charles R. Norgle, Sr: Enter Order to extend Consent Decree. Mailed notice (tlm) (Entered: 03/25/2010)
194 ORDER to Extend Consent Decree 193 signed by the Honorable Charles R. Norgle, Sr on 3/24/2010. Mailed notice (tlm) (Entered: 03/25/2010)
195 MOTION to Extend the Consent Decree; Children's Report to the Court by Robert F Harris (Runk, Jill) (Docket Text modified by Clerks Office). (Entered: 03/06/2012)
196 NOTICE of Motion by Jill P Runk for presentment of before Honorable Charles R. Norgle Sr. on 3/9/2012 at 09:30 AM. (Runk, Jill) (Entered: 03/06/2012)
197 NOTICE of Correction regarding document 195 . (tlm) (Entered: 03/07/2012)
198 MINUTE entry before Honorable Charles R. Norgle, Sr: Motion hearing held on 3/9/2012. Response to Motion to Extend Consent Decree 195 is due on or before 3/30/2012. Reply is due on or before 4/13/2012. Mailed notice (ewf, ) (Entered: 03/12/2012)
199 MOTION by Defendant Richard H Calica for extension of time to respond to Plaintiffs' report to the court and motion to extend consent decree (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Greenspan, Barbara) (Entered: 03/30/2012)
200 NOTICE of Motion by Barbara Lynn Greenspan for presentment of extension of time 199 before Honorable Charles R. Norgle Sr. on 4/6/2012 at 09:30 AM. (Greenspan, Barbara) (Entered: 03/30/2012)
201 MINUTE entry before Honorable Charles R. Norgle, Sr: Agreed Motion to Extend Time for Defendant to Respond to Plaintiffs' Report to the Court and Motion to Extend the Consent Decree 199 is granted. The parties are not required to appear before the Court on April 6, 2012. Mailed notice (ewf, ) (Entered: 04/05/2012)
202 RESPONSE by Richard H Calica to MOTION for extension of time 195 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Certificate of Service)(Greenspan, Barbara) (Entered: 04/20/2012)
203 NOTICE by Richard H Calica re response to motion 202 (Greenspan, Barbara) (Entered: 04/20/2012)
204 REPLY by Plaintiff Robert F Harris in Support of Motion to Extend Consent Decree for Two Years (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit B, # 3 Certificate of Service)(Runk, Jill) (Entered: 05/03/2012)
205 MINUTE entry before Honorable Charles R. Norgle, Sr: In response to Children's Report to the Court and Motion to Extend the Consent Decree for two years, Defendant Richard H. Calica, Director of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services, requests a one−year extension. The movant, however, has made a sound case for a two−year extension. Children's Motion to Extend the Consent Decree 195 is therefore granted. Mailed notice (tlm) (Entered: 05/29/2012)

Case: 1:88-cv-7919 As of: 02/14/2019 12:05 PM CST 14 of 17

03/08/2014 03/08/2014 03/08/2014 03/13/2014 04/11/2014 04/11/2014 04/11/2014 04/17/2014 05/02/2014 05/02/2014 05/08/2014
05/16/2014
05/16/2014 06/06/2014
06/06/2014 02/23/2015

206 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Gwendolyn B, Chiuchiu G, Robert F Harris, Augustine N, Aristotle P, Reginald R, Yaharia R, Michael W by Michele Marie McGee (McGee, Michele) (Entered: 03/08/2014)
207 MOTION by Plaintiffs Gwendolyn B, Chiuchiu G, Robert F Harris, Augustine N for extension of time Childrens' Report to the Court and Motion to Extend the Consent Decree for Two Years (McGee, Michele) (Entered: 03/08/2014)
208 NOTICE of Motion by Michele Marie McGee for presentment of extension of time 207 before Honorable Charles R. Norgle Sr. on 3/14/2014 at 09:30 AM. (McGee, Michele) (Entered: 03/08/2014)
209 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Charles R. Norgle: Response to the Motion to Extend the Consent Decree for Two Years 207 is due on or before 4/11/2014. The l reply will be due on or before 5/2/2014. The parties are not required to appear on Friday, March 14, 2014. Mailed notice (ewf, ) (Entered: 03/13/2014)
210 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Gwendolyn B, Chiuchiu G, Robert F Harris, Augustine N, Aristotle P, Reginald R, Yaharia R, Michael W by Brian A Finley (Finley, Brian) (Entered: 04/11/2014)
211 MOTION by Defendant Bobbie Gregg for extension of time to file response/reply as to extension of time 207 (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Greenspan, Barbara) (Entered: 04/11/2014)
212 NOTICE of Motion by Barbara Lynn Greenspan for presentment of motion for extension of time to file response/reply, motion for relief 211 before Honorable Charles R. Norgle Sr. on 4/18/2014 at 09:30 AM. (Greenspan, Barbara) (Entered: 04/11/2014)
213 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Charles R. Norgle: Agreed Motion to Extend Time for Defendant to Respond 211 is granted. The parties are not required to appear on Friday, April 18, 2014. Mailed notice (ewf, ) (Entered: 04/17/2014)
214 MOTION by Defendant Bobbie Gregg for extension of time to file response/reply as to extension of time 207 (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Greenspan, Barbara) (Entered: 05/02/2014)
215 NOTICE of Motion by Barbara Lynn Greenspan for presentment of motion for extension of time to file response/reply, motion for relief 214 before Honorable Charles R. Norgle Sr. on 5/9/2014 at 09:30 AM. (Greenspan, Barbara) (Entered: 05/02/2014)
216 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Charles R. Norgle:Agreed Motion for Second Extension of Time for Defendant to Respond to Children's Report to the Court and Motion to Extend the Consent Decree for Two Years and for Additional Relief 214 is granted. The parties are not required to appear before the court on Friday, May 9, 2014. Mailed notice (ewf, ) (Entered: 05/08/2014)
217 RESPONSE by Bobbie Greggin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiffs Gwendolyn B, Chiuchiu G, Robert F Harris, Augustine N for extension of time Childrens' Report to the Court and Motion to Extend the Consent Decree for Two Years 207 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Consent Decree, # 2 Certificate of Service)(Greenspan, Barbara) (Entered: 05/16/2014)
218 NOTICE by Bobbie Gregg re response in opposition to motion, 217 (Greenspan, Barbara) (Entered: 05/16/2014)
219 REPLY by Gwendolyn B, Chiuchiu G, Robert F Harris, Augustine N, Aristotle P, Reginald R, Yaharia R, Michael W to response in opposition to motion, 217 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A −− Alliance Review, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit B −− CYFS Review, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit C −− Lakeside Review)(Finley, Brian) (Entered: 06/06/2014)
220 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re reply to response to motion, 219 (Finley, Brian) (Entered: 06/06/2014)
221 ORDER: Children's Report to the Court and Motion to Extend the Consent Decree for Two Years and for Additional Relief 207 is granted. Therefore, over objection, the

Case: 1:88-cv-7919 As of: 02/14/2019 12:05 PM CST 15 of 17

02/22/2017 02/22/2017 02/23/2017
03/21/2017 03/21/2017 03/27/2017 03/27/2017 05/10/2017
06/19/2017 07/18/2017

consent decree shall be extended by two years and Defendant Bobbie Gregg, Acting Director of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services, shall comply with the Children's discovery requests as follows: (1) Defendant shall tender all the QA reviews completed since March 2012; (2) Defendant shall adopt a verifiable methodology for random sampling in the Decree to disqualify cases; (4) Defendant shall amend its policy so that sanctions can be given out based on QA reviews; and (5) Defendant shall comply with the Children's December 18, 2013 discovery request. Signed by the Honorable Charles R. Norgle, Sr on 2/23/2015. Mailed notice (mmy, ) (Entered: 02/25/2015)
222 MOTION by Plaintiff Robert F Harris for order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1A, # 2 Exhibit 1B, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit 3, # 5 Exhibit 4, # 6 Exhibit 5, # 7 Exhibit 6, # 8 Exhibit 7, # 9 Exhibit 8)(Finley, Brian) (Entered: 02/22/2017)
223 NOTICE of Motion by Brian A Finley for presentment of motion for order 222 before Honorable Charles R. Norgle Sr. on 2/24/2017 at 09:30 AM. (Finley, Brian) (Entered: 02/22/2017)
224 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Charles R. Norgle: Response to Children's Report to the Court and Motion to Extend The Consent Decree for Two Years and for Additional Relief 222 is due on or before 3/24/2017 Reply, if any, will be due on or before 4/7/2017. The parties are not required to appear before the court on Friday, February 24, 2017. Mailed notice (ewf, ) (Entered: 02/23/2017)
225 MOTION by Defendant George H. Sheldon for extension of time to file response/reply as to motion for order 222 (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Greenspan, Barbara) (Entered: 03/21/2017)
226 NOTICE of Motion by Barbara Lynn Greenspan for presentment of motion for extension of time to file response/reply, motion for relief 225 before Honorable Charles R. Norgle Sr. on 3/31/2017 at 09:30 AM. (Greenspan, Barbara) (Entered: 03/21/2017)
227 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Charles R. Norgle: Enter Order. Agreed Motion to Extend Time 225 is granted. The parties are not required to appear before the court on Friday, March 31, 2017. Mailed notice (ewf, ) (Entered: 03/27/2017)
228 ORDER signed by the Honorable Charles R. Norgle, Sr on 3/27/2017.mailed notice(rm, ) (Entered: 03/28/2017)
229 ORDER: This matter coming before the Court for hearing on the Agreed Motion to Extend Time for Defendant to Respond to Children's Report to the Court and Motion to Extend the Consent Decree for Two Years and for Additional Relief, the parties being in agreement and the Court being fully advised, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Agreed Motion to Extend Time for Defendant to Respond to Children's Report to the Court and Motion to Extend the Consent Decree for Two Years and for Additional Relief is granted. Defendant shall file his response to the Children's Report to the Court and Motion to Extend the Consent Decree and for Additional Relief on or by June 16, 2017; Plaintiffs shall file their reply in support of their motion on or by June 30, 2017. Signed by the Honorable Charles R. Norgle, Sr on 5/10/2017. Mailed notice. (pk, ) (Entered: 05/11/2017)
230 ORDER Signed by the Honorable Charles R. Norgle, Sr on 6/19/2017: Mailed notice (jk, ) (Entered: 06/20/2017)
231 ORDER: This matter coming before the Court for hearing on the Agreed Motion to Extend Time for Defendant to Respond to Children's Report to the Court and Motion to Extend the Consent Decree for Two Years and for Additional Relief, the parties being in agreement and the Court being fully advised, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Agreed Motion to Extend Time for Defendant to Respond to Children's Report to the Court and Motion to Extend the Consent Decree for Two Years and for Additional Relief is granted. Defendant shall file his response to the Children's Report to the Court and Motion to Extend the Consent Decree and for Additional Relief on or by July 28, 2017; Plaintiffs shall file their reply in support of their motion on or by August 11, 2017. Signed by the Honorable Charles R. Norgle, Sr on 7/18/2017. Mailed notice (jk, ) (Entered: 07/21/2017)

Case: 1:88-cv-7919 As of: 02/14/2019 12:05 PM CST 16 of 17

08/01/2017
08/25/2017
09/15/2017 10/04/2017 10/04/2017 10/12/2017 10/12/2017
10/12/2017
11/06/2017

232 ORDER: This matter coming before the Court for hearing on the Agreed Motion to Extend Time for Defendant to Respond to Children's Report to the Court and Motion to Extend the Consent Decree for Two Years and for Additional Relief, the parties being in agreement and the Court being fully advised, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Agreed Motion to Extend Time for Defendant to Respond to Children's Report to the Court and Motion to Extend the Consent Decree for Two Years and for Additional Relief is granted. Defendant shall file her response to the Children's Report to the Court and Motion to Extend the Consent Decree and for Additional Relief on or by August 25, 2017; Plaintiffs shall file their reply in support of their motion on or by September 15, 2017. Signed by the Honorable Charles R. Norgle, Sr on 8/1/2017. Mailed notice (jk, ) (Entered: 08/03/2017)
233 ORDER: This matter coming before the Court for hearing on the Agreed Motion to Extend Time for Defendant to Respond to Children's Report to the Court and Motion to Extend the Consent Decree for Two Years and for Additional Relief, the parties being in agreement and the Court being fully advised, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Agreed Motion to Extend Time for Defendant to Respond to Children's Report to the Court and Motion to Extend the Consent Decree for Two Years and for Additional Relief is granted. Defendant shall file her response to the Children's Report to the Court and Motion to Extend the Consent Decree and for Additional Relief on or by September 15, 2017; Plaintiff shall file their reply in support of their motion on or by September 29, 2017. Signed by the Honorable Charles R. Norgle, Sr on 8/25/2017:Mailed notice(jk, ) (Entered: 08/30/2017)
234 ORDER Signed by the Honorable Charles R. Norgle, Sr on 9/15/2017. Mailed notice (jk, ) (Entered: 09/19/2017)
235 MOTION by Plaintiff Robert F Harris to substitute party (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Finley, Brian) (Entered: 10/04/2017)
236 NOTICE of Motion by Brian A Finley for presentment of motion to substitute party 235 before Honorable Charles R. Norgle Sr. on 10/13/2017 at 09:30 AM. (Finley, Brian) (Entered: 10/04/2017)
237 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Charles R. Norgle: Motion for Substitution of Next Friend/Plaintiff 235 is granted. The parties are not required to appear before the court on Friday, October 13, 2017. Mailed notice (ewf, ) (Entered: 10/12/2017)
238 ORDER: This matter coming before the court for hearing on the Agreed Motion to Extend Time for Defendant to Respond to Children's Report to the Court and Motion to Extend the Consent Decree for Two Years and for Additional Relief, the parties being in agreement and the Court being fully advised, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Agreed Motion to Extend Time for Defendant to Respond to Children's Report to the Court and Motion to Extend the Consent Decree for Two Years and for Additional Relief is granted. Defendant shall file her response to the Children's Report to the Court and Motion to Extend the Consent Decree and for Additional Relief on or by November 3, 2017; Plaintiffs shall file their reply in support of their motion on or by November 17, 2017. Signed by the Honorable Charles R. Norgle, Sr on 10/12/2017. Mailed notice (jk, ) (Entered: 10/13/2017)
239 ORDER: This matter coming before the Court for hearing on the Motion for Substitution of Next Friend/Plaintiff Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), the parties being in agreement and the Court being fully advised, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Substitution of Next Friend/Plaintiff Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d) is granted, and Charles P. Golbert, Acting Public Guardian of Cook County, is substituted for Robert F. Harris, former Public Guardian of Cook County, as next friend/plaintiff in this matter. Signed by the Honorable Charles R. Norgle, Sr on 10/12/2017. Mailed notice (jk, ) (Entered: 10/13/2017)
240 ORDER: This matter coming before the Court for hearing on the Agreed Motion to Extend Time for Defendant to Respond to Children's Report to the Court and Motion to Extend the Consent Decree for Two Years and for Additional Relief, the parties being in agreement and the Court being fully advised, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Agreed Motion to Extend Time for Defendant to Respond to Children's Report to the Court and Motion to Extend the Consent Decree for Two Years and for Additional Relief is granted. Defendant shall file her response to the Children's Report to the Court and Motion to Extend the Consent Decree and for Additional Relief on or by

Case: 1:88-cv-7919 As of: 02/14/2019 12:05 PM CST 17 of 17

12/04/2017
01/12/2018
02/21/2018
03/26/2018 04/27/2018 06/06/2018 07/26/2018 08/22/2018
10/02/2018

December 1, 2017; Plaintiffs shall file their reply in support of their motion on or by December 15, 2017. Signed by the Honorable Charles R. Norgle, Sr on 11/6/2017. Mailed notice (jk, ) (Entered: 11/07/2017)
241 ORDER: This matter coming before the Court for hearing on the Agreed Motion to Extend Time for Defendant to Respond to Children's Report to the Court and Motion to Extend the Consent Decree for Two Years and for Additional Relief, the parties being in agreement and the Court being fully advised, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Agreed Motion to Extend Time for Defendant to Respond to Children's Report to the Court and Motion to Extend the Consent Decree for Two Years and for Additional Relief is granted. Defendant shall file her response to the Children's Report to the Court and Motion to Extend the Consent Decree and for Additional Relief on or by January 12, 2018; Plaintiffs shall file their reply in support of their motion on or by January 26, 2018. Signed by the Honorable Charles R. Norgle, Sr on 12/4/2017. Mailed notice (jk, ) (Entered: 12/05/2017)
242 ORDER: This matter coming before the Court for hearing on the Agreed Motion to Extend Time for Defendant to Respond to Children's Report to the Court and Motion to Extend the Consent Decree for Two Years and for Additional Relief, the parties being in agreement and the Court being fully advised, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Agreed Motion to Extend Time for Defendant to Respond to Children's Report to the Court and Motion to Extend the Consent Decree for Two Years and for Additional Relief is granted. Defendant shall file her response to the Children's Report to the Court and Motion to Extend the Consent Decree and for Additional Relief on or by February 16, 2018; Plaintiffs shall file their reply in support of their motion on or by March, 2 2018. Signed by the Honorable Charles R. Norgle, Sr on 1/12/2018. Mailed notice (jk, ) (Entered: 01/16/2018)
243 ORDER: This matter coming before the Court for hearing on the Agreed Motion to Extend Time for Defendant to Respond to Children's Report to the Court and Motion to Extend the Consent Decree for Two Years and for Additional Relief, the parties being in agreement and the Court being fully advised, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Agreed Motion to Extend Time for Defendant to Respond to Children's Report to the Court and Motion to Extend the Consent Decree for Two Years and for Additional Relief is granted. Defendant shall file her response to the Children's Report to the Court and Motion to Extend the Consent Decree and for Additional Relief on or by March 23, 2018; Plaintiffs shall file their reply in support of their motion on or by April 6, 2018. Signed by the Honorable Charles R. Norgle, Sr on 2/21/2018. Mailed notice (jk, ) (Entered: 02/22/2018)
244 ORDER Signed by the Honorable Charles R. Norgle, Sr on 3/26/2018. Mailed notice (jk, ) (Entered: 03/27/2018)
245 ORDER. Signed by the Honorable Charles R. Norgle, Sr on 4/27/2018. (Received for docketing on 05/01/2018). Mailed notice (jk, ) (Entered: 05/01/2018)
246 ORDER. Signed by the Honorable Charles R. Norgle, Sr on 6/6/2018. Mailed notice (jk, ) (Entered: 06/07/2018)
247 ORDER. Signed by the Honorable Charles R. Norgle, Sr on 7/26/2018. Mailed notice (jk, ) (Entered: 07/30/2018)
248 ORDER: This matter coming before the Court for hearing on the Agreed Motion to Extend Time for Defendant to Respond to Children's Report to the Court and Motion to Extend the Consent Decree for Two Years and for Additional Relief, the parties being in agreement and the Court being fully advised, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Agreed Motion to Extend Time for Defendant to Respond to Children's Report to the Court and Motion to Extend the Consent Decree for Two Years and for Additional Relief is granted. Defendant shall file her response to the Children's Report to the Court and Motion to Extend the Consent Decree and for Additional Relief on or by October 1, 2018; Plaintiffs shall file their reply in support of their motion on or by October 15, 2018. Signed by the Honorable Charles R. Norgle, Sr on 8/22/2018. Mailed notice (tt, ) (Entered: 08/23/2018)
249 ORDER Signed by the Honorable Charles R. Norgle, Sr on 10/2/2018. Mailed notice (nsf, ) (Entered: 10/02/2018)

 
 Aristotle v. Johnson, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1989) 1989 WL 121210

1989 WL 121210 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern
Division. ARISTOTLE P., et al., Plaintiffs,
v. Gordon JOHNSON and Gary Morgan, Defendants.
No. 88 C 7919. |
Oct. 3, 1989.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, District Judge.
*1 The seven plaintiffs bring this three count complaint on the behalf of a class of similarly situated children pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the defendants violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and under the Adoptive Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 620–628, 670–679 (“AAA”). On September 6, 1989, this court issued its memorandum opinion and order which denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts I and II, which allege the constitutional violations, and granted the motion to dismiss Count III, which alleges the statutory violation. See Aristotle v. Johnson, No. 88 C 7919, Slip op. (N.D.Ill. September 6, 1989) (Williams, J.). The court certified the plaintiffs’ class on September 28, 1989.1
The defendants bring this motion to certify the issues resolved by the court’s opinion for immediate appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The plaintiffs do not oppose and, in fact, support this motion. For the following reasons, the court will grant the motion for certification.
1

I
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)
Under § 1292(b), a court may certify an interlocutory order for immediate appeal if the court is “of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). These two factors are met in this case. In addition, there are other extraordinary circumstances which “justify a departure from the basic policy of postponing appellate review until after the entry of final judgment.’ ” Cooper & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 475 (1978), quoting Fisons, Ltd. v. United States, 458 F.2d 1241, 1248 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1041 (1972).
a) Controlling Questions of Law
Controlling questions of law have been defined as questions of law that would require reversal if decided incorrectly or as questions that could materially affect the course of litigation with resulting savings of the court or the parties’ resources. See Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 755 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974); In re Cement Antitrust Litigation, 673 F.2d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir.1982), aff’d sub nom., Arizona v. Ash Grove Cement Co., 459 U.S. 1190 (1983). The court’s legal rulings with respect to Counts I and II of the complaint involve controlling questions of law.
In Count I, the court found that the plaintiffs have a right to association with their siblings under the First Amendment which is allegedly being impermissibly infringed by the defendants’ policy. See Aristotle, Slip op. at 4–10. The policy at issue is the defendants’ practice of placing siblings in separate foster homes of residential facilities and denying the plaintiffs the opportunity to visit their sisters and brothers who are placed elsewhere. Id. at 3. In Count II, the court held that the plaintiffs had stated

Aristotle v. Johnson, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1989) 1989 WL 121210

a claim for the violation of their Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights by alleging that the defendants’ policy had seriously damaged or severed their sibling relationships in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner. Id. at 10–13. The court also held that the plaintiffs had stated a claim for the violation of their substantive due process rights by alleging that the defendants had violated their affirmative duty to provide for the childrens’ safety and well-being. The defendants allegedly violated their duty by pursuing the above policy which caused the plaintiffs to suffer emotional harm. Id. at 13–19.
*2 While the court has confidence in the correctness of its rulings, it recognizes that there is substantial ground for difference of opinion on these questions. Decisions from the Second and Eleventh Circuit provide direct support for the ruling with respect to one of the questions of law at issue here. Still, the court acknowledges that these substantial, complex questions of constitutional law have not been decided by either the Supreme Court or the Seventh Circuit. The court further notes that there is a question as to whether the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir.1984) is controlling authority with respect to some aspects of the plaintiffs’ claims. Certification is proper when the applicability of prior precedent is in question. See In Re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248, 1252 (7th Cir.1980). Accordingly, the court finds that the first prong of the test has been satisfied.
b) Material Advancement of the Termination of this Litigation

for a settlement of this case short of trial “will be greatly enhanced.” Thus, it is likely that an immediate appeal will allow this case to be terminated short of trial regardless as to how it is decided. If an immediate appeal is not taken, the defendants have represented that they will be unlikely to settle the case and will fight on to the bitter end.2 The defendants’ position is influenced in large part by the three other class action cases that are pending against them in this District. These other cases also concern the existence of statutory and constitutional rights to various procedural and substantive protections. The defendants are hesitant to settle any of these cases without a definite determination as to their liability. Consequently, this case will, in all likelihood, proceed to trial if an immediate appeal is not allowed. A trial in this matter would involve the further, and possibly unnecessary, expenditure of substantial public funds as counsel for both sides are publicly funded.
In consideration of all of the above matters, the court finds that the defendants have met their burden of showing that this matter should be certified for an immediate appeal. Accordingly, their motion is granted.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the court certifies the plaintiffs’ class and grants the defendants’ motion for certification pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

There is little doubt that an immediate appeal would materially advance the termination of this litigation. If this court’s judgment is reversed, the case will be finished because the remaining count of the plaintiff’s complaint has already been dismissed. If this court’s judgment is affirmed, the defendants have represented that the chances
Footnotes

All Citations Not Reported in F.Supp., 1989 WL 121210

1

With the parties’ agreement, the court certified the plaintiff class as follows: Children who are or will be the subject of neglect,

dependency, or abuse petitions in the State of Illinois; who are or will be in the custody or under the guardianship of the

Department of Children and Family Services by order of court; who have not or will not be placed with their siblings in foster

homes or residential facilities; and who have been or will be denied regular and reasonable visitation with their siblings.

2

No discovery has been conducted in this case. The parties anticipate, particularly because of the manner in which documents are

organized at the Department of Children and Family Services, significant time will be required to organize and analyze the

compiled data. Furthermore, expert witnesses will probably have to be retained and deposed.

2

Aristotle v. Johnson, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1989) 1989 WL 121210
3

 
 721 F.Supp. 1002 (1989)
ARISTOTLE P., et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Gordon JOHNSON and Gary Morgan, Defendants.
No. 88 C 7919.
United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, E.D.
September 7, 1989.
1003 *1003 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ANN C. WILLIAMS, District Judge.
The seven plaintiffs bring this three count complaint on the behalf of a class of similarly situated children pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the defendants Gordon Johnson and Gary Morgan violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and under the Adoptive Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-628, 670-679 ("AAA"). The defendants move to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, the court will grant the defendants' motion in part and deny the motion in part.
1004 *1004 I
Rule 12(b)(6)
When ruling on this motion, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court will "take the allegations in the complaint to be true and view them, along with the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Ellsworth v. City of Racine, 774 F.2d 182, 184 (7th Cir.1985); cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1047, 106 S.Ct. 1265, 89 L.Ed.2d 574 (1986). A complaint should be dismissed only when "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff is unable to prove any set of facts which would entitle plaintiff to relief." Id. A "court must construe pleadings liberally, and mere vagueness or lack of detail does not constitute sufficient grounds for a motion to dismiss." Strauss v. City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765, 767 (7th Cir.1985). Moreover, "in `complex cases involving fundamental rights and important questions of public policy, such preemptory treatment [as dismissal] is rarely appropriate.'" DeMallory v. Cullen, 855 F.2d 442, 445 (7th Cir.1988), quoting Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 848 F.2d 1396, 1414 (7th Cir.1988) (Ripple, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
The pertinent factual allegations of the complaint are as follows. The plaintiffs are children who are wards of the court and are under the guardianship of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services ("DCFS"). On September 15, 1988, when the complaint was filed, the plaintiffs ranged in age from one year to eighteen years old. The defendant Johnson, who is sued in his official capacity, is the Director of DCFS. He is responsible for developing, implementing, and administering the programs and practices of DCFS and for ensuring that DCFS' practices comply with all constitutional and statutory provisions. The defendant Morgan, who is also sued in his official capacity, is the Guardianship Administrator of DCFS. Morgan is responsible for establishing policies and procedures to provide adequate care and protection to children in placement. The plaintiffs challenge the defendant's practices of placing siblings in separate foster homes or residential facilities and denying the plaintiffs the opportunity to visit their sisters and brothers who are placed elsewhere. Complaint, ¶ 3.
With the exception of the plaintiff Aristotle P., all of the Children were involuntarily removed from their families' homes by DCFS.[1] Each of the plaintiffs were physically separated from their siblings. This separation caused the plaintiffs to suffer emotional harm. Complaint, ¶¶ 29, 31, 39, 41, 51, 69. DCFS had knowledge of the

childrens' woes. Id. at ¶¶ 29, 31, 39, 41. Some of the plaintiffs' foster parents informed DCFS of their willingness to facilitate visits between their foster children and his or her siblings. Id. at ¶¶ 34, 70. Notwithstanding this, DCFS has either refused to arrange sibling visits[2] or has provided for them on an infrequent basis.[3] Mary Freeman, a DCFS worker, stated that DCFS is mandated to provide only parent and child visits. Id. at ¶ 54. The DCFS foster homes operated by Ada McKinley have a practice of prohibiting anyone, including relatives of their foster children, from coming into their foster homes. The McKinley homes also prohibit foster children from visiting other homes including those of their relatives. The defendants are aware of McKinley's practice and support it. Id. at ¶¶ 1005 70-72. The plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that DCFS' practices violate the First and Fourteenth *1005 Amendments and the AAA. They also seek injunctive relief.[4]
II
Count I: First Amendment Freedom of Association
In Count I of the complaint, the plaintiffs contend that the defendants' practices of placing siblings in separate placements and then failing to provide visits among siblings on a reasonable basis violates their right to freedom of association under the First Amendment as applied to the state through the Fourteenth Amendment. Their theory is predicated on the Supreme Court's decision in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984). In Roberts, the Court noted that it has "referred to constitutionally protected `freedom of association' in the two distinct senses." Id. at 617, 104 S.Ct. at 3249. Freedom of association, as defined by one line of decisions, protects "choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships ... against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme." Id. at 617-18, 104 S.Ct. at 3249. The relationship between two family members is the paradigm of such intimate human relationships. See Id. at 618-19, 104 S.Ct. at 3249-50. "In this respect, freedom of association receives protection as a fundamental element of personal liberty." Id. at 618, 104 S.Ct. at 3249.[5] The Children base their rights of freedom of association on the above language.
The Supreme Court has cited Roberts for the proposition that the First Amendment embraces both variants of the right of freedom of association. See City of Dallas v. Stanglin, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 1591, 1594, 104 L.Ed.2d 18 (1989) ("While the First Amendment does not in terms protect a `right of association,' our cases have recognized that it embraces such a right in certain circumstances"); Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545, 107 S.Ct. 1940, 1945, 95 L.Ed.2d 474 (1987) "The First Amendment protects those relationships, including family relationships ..."). Notwithstanding the Rotary International and the Stanglin decisions, some lower courts have interpreted Roberts to find that the right to enter into and maintain certain private, intimate relationships is guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See IDK, Inc. v. County of Clark, 836 F.2d 1185, 1192 (9th Cir.1988); Trujillo v. Board of County Commissioners, 768 F.2d 1186, 1188-89 n. 4 (10th Cir.1985); Kukla v. Village of Antioch, 647 F.Supp. 799, 806 (N.D. Ill.1986) (Moran, J.); see also, Mayo v. Lane, 867 F.2d 374, 375 (7th Cir.1989) ("The concept of liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment has been held to embrace a right to associate with one's relatives"), Linder, Freedom of Association After Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 82 Mich.L. Rev. 1878, 1884-85 (1984).
The chronological order in which the various decisions were issued provides one possible explanation for the divergent views as to which amendment protects the first variant of the right to freedom of association. The Stanglin case was decided after all of the lower court cases cited above. Nevertheless, even the members of the Supreme Court are not in unanimous agreement on this question. See Stanglin, 109 S.Ct. at 1597 (Steven, J., concurring). This court finds that the childrens' relationships with their siblings are the sort of "intimate human 1006 relationships" that are afforded "a substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by the State." *1006 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618, 104 S.Ct. at 3250; see Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1189 n. 5 (the siblings' "relationships at issue clearly fall within the protected range" established in Roberts); Cf. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1204-05 (3d Cir.1988) (relationship with brother-in-law, a non-blood relative, is not protected).[6] The plaintiffs'

relationships with their siblings are even more important because their relationships with their biological parents are often tenuous or non-existent. See Complaint, ¶¶ 44-46, 48, 61, 67, 75, 83.
The defendants' policies, which allegedly infringe on the plaintiffs' constitutionally protected right to associate with their siblings, must be evaluated under a heightened level of scrutiny. See Stanglin, 109 S.Ct. at 1594; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25, 96 S.Ct. 612, 637, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976). The defendants, as state actors, may infringe on an individual's right to associate if they have a sufficiently compelling interest that "cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms." Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623, 104 S.Ct. at 3252. The plaintiffs do not challenge the defendants' action which removed them from their parents or initial guardians and placed them in DCFS' custody. Accordingly, the court presumes that the defendants had a compelling interest in removing the plaintiffs from their initial home environment. However, in light of the policies at issue here, the question of whether the defendants could protect their compelling interest in a manner significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms is an open one. The plaintiffs argue that a DCFS policy which allowed and facilitated sibling visits would be less restrictive of associational freedoms. Such a policy would also further promote the compelling interest of protecting the children from harm.[7] This question must be taken up at a latter stage in the proceedings.
The defendants also move for dismissal on the grounds that the plaintiffs have failed to make sufficient allegations of intent. The defendants are sued in their official capacities. "Official capacity suits ... `generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.'" Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3105, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985), quoting Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690, n. 55, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035 n. 55, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). An entity will be liable under § 1983 when its policy or custom causes the injury in question. See City of Canton v. Harris, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 1203, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989); Monell, 436 U.S. at 694-95, 98 S.Ct. at 2037-38. A showing of "deliberate indifference" is sufficient to sustain a § 1983 action against a government entity. See Canton, 109 S.Ct. at 1206; B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F.Supp. 1387, 1398 (N.D.Ill.1989) (Grady, J.) (same).
The allegations of the complaint, read in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, establish that the defendants enforced and maintained their policies regarding sibling visitation notwithstanding their knowledge that these policies were causing severe emotional harm to the plaintiffs. The allegations support an inference that the defendants were deliberately indifferent toward the plaintiffs' rights. See, e.g., Richardson v. Penfold, 839 F.2d 1007 392, 395 *1007 (7th Cir.1988) (deliberate indifference is proven by showing actual intent or recklessness. An actor is reckless when he or she disregards a substantial and known risk of danger). Accordingly, the court finds that the plaintiffs have stated a § 1983 claim for the defendants' violation of their First Amendment Rights.
III
Count II: Substantive Due Process
The plaintiffs contend that the defendants violated their substantive due process rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment in Count II of their complaint. The defendants move to dismiss this count on the grounds that the plaintiffs do not have a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in their relationships with their siblings. They rely primarily on the Seventh Circuit's decision in Bell. The Bell decision, as this court interprets it, does not stand for the proposition that a liberty interest in a sibling relationship will never be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Seventh Circuit was careful to distinguish between awarding money damages and providing other forms of relief. As the court stated,
[w]e can conceive of potential state statutes severing relationships between siblings (though likely not effecting a severance as irreversible and egregious as the one resulting from the shouting and killing at issue). Such statutes should be stricken as being arbitrary and unreasonable, but this approach is not the equivalent of awarding damages under Section 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment for the loss of society and companionship of a sibling, state law being entirely subsumed in the process.

Bell, 746 F.2d at 1246-47 (emphasis added). Moreover, the fact that Wisconsin state law did not allow siblings to recover for loss of society and companionship was not, as the defendants contend, merely "incidental" to the court's holding. See Id. at 1247 ("the legal consequences of many important relationships, including family relationships, are often governed by State law, and here the Wisconsin legislature has expressly decided that no tort recovery is in order").
Supreme Court and subsequent Seventh Circuit caselaw provides further support for the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment embraces a right to associate with one's relatives. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 500-04, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1936-38, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977) (plurality opinion); Mayo, 867 F.2d at 375 (appellant's argument "that her natural liberty includes a right of association with members of her family, such as [her] grandnephew ... is not a frivolous argument"); Bergren v. City of Milwaukee, 811 F.2d 1139, 1144 (7th Cir.1987). As the Seventh Circuit noted in Bergren, "[t]here can be no question that the `integrity of the family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'" Bergren, 811 F.2d at 1144, quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1213, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972). In Moore, the court stated that "[o]ur decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." Moore, 431 U.S. at 503, 97 S.Ct. at 1938; see also Philadelphia Police and Fire Association for Handicapped Children, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 874 F.2d 156, 165 (3d Cir.1989) (the court, in reliance on Moore, recognized a fundamental right to family integrity).
In Bell, the Seventh Circuit relied on Moore to find that a state statute which severs relationships between siblings should be stricken. Bell, 746 F.2d at 1246. The defendants contend that they have not severed the plaintiffs' relationships in the manner contemplated by the Seventh Circuit. Defendants' Reply, at 6. While the court did not precisely determine what sort of severance would suffice, it did state that such a severance need not be irrevocable and as egregious as one resulting from a siblings' death at the hands of a state actor. Bell, 746 F.2d 1008 at 1247. In this case, the defendants' policies, resulted in the physical separation of the plaintiffs and *1008 their siblings for extended periods of time.[8] One plaintiff specifically alleges that he was unable to maintain a relationship with two of his siblings because of DCFS' visitation policies. Complaint, ¶ 82. In another instance, one plaintiff has never even had the opportunity to develop a relationship with her siblings because the sisters were infants when taken into DCFS' custody and DCFS has never arranged for visitation between them. Id. at ¶¶ 85-88. Thus, the defendants' policies have seriously damaged, if not severed, the relationships between the plaintiffs and their siblings.
The defendants further contend that the plaintiffs have failed to specifically allege that their actions were arbitrary and unreasonable. Defendants' Reply, at 6. This is true. However, there are no allegations in the complaint which suggest that the defendants' policies are based in reason. The defendants' support of Ada S. McKinley's foster home policies as well as their failure to facilitate visits when the foster parents have expressed their willingness to cooperate seem to be particularly unreasonable. Of course, the complaint presents only the plaintiffs' side of the story. The defendants will have the opportunity to present their side of the story at a latter stage of these proceedings. The pertinent consideration at this point is that the plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged the existence of a policy which deprives their liberty interests in their sibling relationships by severing these relationships. The court may grant relief on this claim. Bell, 746 F.2d at 1205.
The second prong of the plaintiffs' substantive due process argument is based on the fact that they were involuntarily taken into the State's custody. The plaintiffs seek to analogize their situation to incarceration or institutionalization. The Supreme Court has held that the State has an affirmative duty to assume some responsibility for the safety and general well-being of those who are incarcerated or involuntarily institutionalized. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 998, 1004-06, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989) (citing to Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04, 97 S.Ct. 285, 290-91, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) and Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316-17, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2458-59, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982)). In DeShaney, the Court expressed "no view on the validity of the analogy" between the circumstances of children whom the state removes from free society and places in a foster home operated by its agents and the circumstances of those who are incarcerated or institutionalized. DeShaney, 109 S.Ct. at 1006 n. 9. The Seventh Circuit has also failed to express a definite opinion on the validity of the plaintiffs' analogy. See Doe v. Bobbitt,

881 F.2d 510, 512 (7th Cir.1989). However, the Second and Eleventh Circuits as well as Judge Grady from this District have found that the plaintiffs' analogy is a valid one. See Doe v. New York City Department of Social Services, 649 F.2d 134, 141-42 (2d Cir.1981), appeal after remand, 709 F.2d 782 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864, 104 S.Ct. 195, 78 L.Ed.2d 171 (1983); Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 794-97 (11th Cir.1987) (en banc), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 1337, 103 L.Ed.2d 808 (1989); B.H., 715 F.Supp. at 1396; see also Gibson v. Merced County Department of Human Resources, 799 F.2d 582, 589-90 (9th Cir.1986) (assumes, without expressly holding, that the Doe analogy is proper).
The defendants object to the extension of the Youngberg-Estelle principles to the circumstances of this case. The defendants rely principally on the Second Circuit's decision in Black v. Beame, 419 F.Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y.1976), aff'd, 550 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1977). In Black, the district court noted that "[t]here is no constitutional obligation on the State either to provide plaintiffs with welfare or housing benefits or to affirmatively insure a given type of 1009 family life...." Id. at 607. The relief sought by *1009 the plaintiffs in Black was more expansive than the relief sought in this case. More importantly, the children in Black were voluntarily placed into foster care by their mother. Id. at 602, 606; see Milburn v. Anne Arudel County Department of Social Services, 871 F.2d 474, 476 (4th Cir. 1989) (the court notes the distinction between voluntary and involuntary placement into a foster home). The court emphasized that "[t]here [was] no claim that the four plaintiffs in foster care were pulled involuntarily from their home by the State...." Id. at 606. In this case, the plaintiffs were involuntarily taken from free society. In Black, the court also held that it "ha[d] the power to insure that no state agency improperly interfere[d] in the Black's family life." Id. at 607 (emphasis in the original). The plaintiffs here allege here that the defendants' policies are improperly interfering with their family right by depriving them of their liberty interest in their sibling relationships. The Black decision is distinguishable for these reasons.[9]
After reviewing the pertinent authority, the court finds that the Taylor and Doe decisions are persuasive and will follow them.[10] In Taylor, the court held "that a child involuntarily placed in a foster home is in a situation so analogous to a prisoner in a penal institution and a child confined in a mental health facility that the foster child may bring a section 1983 action for violation of fourteenth amendment rights." Taylor, 818 F.2d at 797; see also Philadelphia Police, 874 F.2d at 168, quoting DeShaney, 109 S.Ct. at 1006 ("a `state's affirmative act of restraining the individual's freedom to act on his own behalf 0907 through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint on personal liberty' is a prerequisite to the state's obligation to provide care"). The Taylor court based its decision in main part on the "risk of harm" that the helpless, isolated children are exposed to in foster homes. Id. The court also made note of society's rising consciousness and stated that "it is time that the law [should] give to these defenseless children at least the same protection afforded adults who are imprisoned as a result of their own misdeeds." Id; see Doe, 649 F.2d at 145.
This court is further persuaded to accept the above reasoning after a review of the Seventh Circuit's decision in DeShaney where the court intimated its approval of Doe. In DeShaney, the plaintiffs sued the defendant county department of social services alleging that it recklessly failed to protect the minor plaintiff from his father's child abuse. The minor plaintiff was in the custody of his father at all pertinent times. The Seventh Circuit stated that "[h]ad Joshua (the minor plaintiff) been a foundling in the custody of the state, which then placed him with foster parents who it knew or strongly suspected would abuse the child, this case would be like Doe." DeShaney, 812 F.2d at 303.
The court finds that the plaintiffs have a substantive due process right under the Fourteenth Amendment
to be free from unreasonable and unnecessary intrusions upon their physical and emotional wellbeing, while directly or indirectly in state custody, and to be provided by the state with adequate food, shelter, clothing and medical care ...
B.H., 715 F.Supp. at 1396. The plaintiffs have stated a claim for the violation of their substantive due process 1010 clause by *1010 alleging that the defendants, with deliberate indifference,[11] pursued policies which caused
them injuries by impairing their relationships with their siblings. The fact that the plaintiffs' injuries are psychological rather than physical is of no moment. See White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 385 (7th Cir.1979) (citing to Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978)) ("the protections of the Due Process Clause against arbitrary intrusions on personal security includes [sic] both physical and emotional well-

being"); Crawford v. Garnier, 719 F.2d 1317, 1324 (7th Cir.1983) (personal distress and emotional pain and suffering while "very subjective matter ... [are] compensable" under § 1983); Mendez v. Rutherford, 655 F.Supp. 115, 118 (N.D. Ill.1986).
When determining whether the plaintiffs' substantive due process rights "ha[ve] been violated, it is necessary to balance `the liberty of the individual[s]' and `the demands of an organized Society.'" Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 320, 102 S.Ct. at 2460, quoting Doe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542, 81 S.Ct. 1752, 1776, 6 L.Ed.2d 989 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The balancing of these interests is entrusted to professionals and is not "left to the unguided discretion of a judge or jury." Id.[12] The court must first determine whether professional judgment was exercised when the policies at issue were devised and implemented. Id. The decision with respect to the policies, "if made by a professional, is presumptively valid; liability may be imposed only when the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment." Id. at 323, 102 S.Ct. at 2462. This is a deferential standard. Id. at 321-23, 102 S.Ct. at 2461-62. However, this issue cannot be resolved on the defendants' motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Gibson, 799 F.2d at 590. Accordingly, the defendants' motion to dismiss Count II of the complaint is denied.
Count IV: Violation of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980
In Count III, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants' policies violate the AAA by not requiring the development of a case plan that ensures placement in the least restrictive, most family like setting, consistent with a child's best interests and special needs. The plaintiffs further allege that the defendants have violated the AAA by not making reasonable efforts to reunify their families. The defendants move to dismiss this count asserting that there are several hurdles which stand in the way of the plaintiffs' efforts to state a valid cause of action under this statute. While the court does not find all of the supposed hurdles to be insurmountable, it does agree that this count must be dismissed.
The plaintiffs bring this action under § 1983.[13] The court must first determine whether the AAA creates any enforceable rights under § 1983. "Since 1871, when it was passed by Congress, § 1983 has stood as an independant safeguard against deprivations of federal constitutional and statutory rights." Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1012, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 3468, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984). The Supreme Court has "recognized two exceptions to the application of § 1983 to remedy statutory violations: where Congress has foreclosed such 1011 enforcement of the statute in the enactment itself and where the statute did not create *1011 enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities within the meaning of § 1983." Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418, 423, 107 S.Ct. 766, 770, 93 L.Ed.2d 781 (1987). When making this determination, the court is aware that "[t]he crucial consideration is what Congress intended." Smith, 468 U.S. at 1012, 104 S.Ct. at 3468. The defendants bear the burden of demonstrating that Congress intended to preclude reliance on § 1983 as a remedy for the deprivation of a federally secured right. Wright, 479 U.S. at 423-24, 107 S.Ct. at 770-71 This conclusion is not easily drawn. Id.
The defendants assert that Congress foreclosed the enforcement of any AAA rights under § 1983. Specifically, they contend that the AAA's remedial devices are "sufficiently comprehensive ... to demonstrate Congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under § 1983." Middlesex County Sewage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association, 453 U.S. 1, 20, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 2626, 69 L.Ed.2d 435 (1981). The Section 671(b) of the AAA allows the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services to withhold or reduce the federal funds paid to a state when the state plan fails to comply with § 671(a) or when there is a substantial failure to substantially comply with the terms of the plan. 42 U.S.C. § 671(b). The AAA also makes provisions for administrative hearings. Id. The court finds that these remedial provisions are insufficient to demonstrate the requisite Congressional intent.
As an initial matter, "generalized powers" such as the ability to cut off federal funds, "are insufficient to indicate a congressional intention to foreclose § 1983 remedies." Wright, 479 U.S. at 428, 107 S.Ct. at 773, Cf. Pennhurst

State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 1545, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981). Moreover, the absence of a private judicial remedy within the AAA statutory scheme is persuasive evidence that Congress did not intend to foreclose a § 1983 remedy. See Wright, 479 U.S. at 427, 107 S.Ct. at 772 (citing to Sea Clammers and Smith). Finally, the First and Fourth Circuits along with at least two district courts have held that a § 1983 action may be brought for the violation of certain rights guaranteed by the AAA. L.J. v. Massinga, 838 F.2d 118, 123 (4th Cir.1988); Lynch v. Dukakis, 719 F.2d 504, 509-12 (1st Cir. 1983); Joseph A. by Wolfe v. New Mexico Department of Human Services, 575 F.Supp. 346, 353 (N.N.M.1983); B.H., 715 F.Supp. at 1403-04; see also, Spielman v. Hildebrand, 873 F.2d 1377, 1386 (10th Cir. 1989).
The remaining question is the exact nature of the enforceable rights provided by the AAA. The defendants contend that the rights that the plaintiffs seek to enforce are more expansive than the rights found enforceable by any other court. They are correct. For example, in Lynch the First Circuit held that the plaintiffs "could maintain a § 1983 action for prospective injunctive relief where it has alleged that the state had not complied with the statutorily mandated procedure of developing and periodically reviewing case plans for the children under its supervision." Scrivner, 816 F.2d at 263 (citing to Lynch with approval). The court also approved the district court's requirement that limited the number of cases handled by each social worker to twenty-four and required the Department of Social Services to assign each case to a social worker within twenty-four hours at its receipt. Lynch, 719 F.2d at 512-13. The above conditions are ancillary ones intended to "ensure prospective compliance" with the case plan and review requirements. Id. at 512.
The court will follow the analysis established by the Supreme Court in Pennhurst when determining whether the claimed rights are enforceable. Statutes "enacted pursuant to the spending power," such as the AAA, are "much in the nature of ... contract[s]; in return for the federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions." Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17, 101 S.Ct. at 1540. "The legitimacy of Congress' power to legislate under the spending power thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the `contract.' 1012 ... [t]here can ... be no knowing acceptance if a State is *1012 unaware of the conditions or is unable to ascertain what of it." Id. (citations omitted).
In this case, the AAA "amended Title IV of the Social Security Act and `sought to provide the states with fiscal incentives to encourage a more active and systematic monitoring of children in the foster care system.'" Scrivner, 816 F.2d at 263, quoting Vermont Department of Social and Rehabilitative Services v. United States Department of Health and Human Services, 798 F.2d 57, 59 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1064, 107 S.Ct. 950, 93 L.Ed.2d 999 (1987). A state is "afforded considerable flexibility in unilaterally developing administrative procedures compatible with its own unique foster care circumstances" as long as it complies with case plan, status review, and dispositional hearing requirements as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 675. Scrivner, 816 F.2d at 263; Vermont, 798 F.2d at 60.
The court finds that the plaintiffs' claimed rights are not enforceable for the following reasons. Some of these rights, such as the right to be placed "in the least restrictive, most family like setting" and the right to have DCFS make "reasonable efforts to reunify families," are amorphous and not subject to precise definition. See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 24-25, 101 S.Ct. at 1544 ("It is difficult to know what is meant by providing `appropriate treatment' in the `least restrictive' setting"). Another right, the right to "meaningful sibling visitation," is not mentioned within the statute although it seems consistent with the statute's purpose. Given the uncertain nature of these rights and the fact that at least one of them is not even found within the statute, the court finds that Congress did not "unambiguously" express its intent to condition the grant of federal funds on the state's compliance with the above "contractual terms." Id. at 17, 24, 101 S.Ct. at 1539-40, 1543. In addition, the court finds for the above reasons that the state did not "knowingly" accept these "terms" of the contract. Id. at 17, 101 S.Ct. at 1540.
The court's conclusion should not be understood as allowing the defendants to ignore the language of the statute. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 671(a)(15), 671(a)(16), 675(5)(A). Rather, the court holds that any rights contained in these provisions may not be enforced through a § 1983 action. See Scrivner, 816 F.2d at 264 (the AAA "does not create a right to meaningful visitation enforceable under § 1983"); B.H., 715 F.Supp. at 1402 (no enforceable rights to family reunification services or meaningful visits between siblings under the AAA). The defendants are allowed flexibility in developing administrative procedures to pursue these objectives. See Scrivner, 816 F.2d at

263. Consequently, the defendants' motion to dismiss Count III of the complaint will be granted because the plaintiffs' have failed to allege the violation of any enforceable rights under the AAA.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the court denies the defendants' motion to dismiss Counts I and II and grants the motion to dismiss Count III. The plaintiffs' motions for class certification and for a preliminary injunction will be discussed at the pretrial settlement conference on September 13, 1989 at 9:00 a.m. This case, in the court's opinion, is ripe for settlement. The defendants are obligated to act in the best interest of the child plaintiffs because they are wards of the state. It seems beyond question that establishing a policy which facilitates sibling visitation would be in the plaintiffs' best interest. The parties are directed to pursue settlement negotiations and to develop settlement proposals prior to the pretrial conference.
[1] DCFS gained custody of Aristotle P. and his twin brother Andre pursuant to what their guardian grandmother believed to be a voluntary and temporary agreement. Complaint, ¶ 19. Their grandmother believed that she could regain custody of her grandsons whenever she wished. Id. at ¶ 20. Some years later, the grandmother expressed her intent to regain custody of the brothers. DCFS refused her request and instead attempted to arrange the brothers' adoption. Id. at ¶ 24. At this point, given the wishes of their former guardian, Aristotle and Andre were involuntarily in DCFS' custody.
[2] See Complaint, ¶¶ 32, 33, 34, 43, 54, 55, 68, 70, 88.
[3] See Complaint, ¶¶ 52, 77, 81.
[4] As the Supreme Court recently noted, a state official sued for injunctive relief in his or her official capacity is a "person" under § 1983. See Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2311 n. 10, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). Thus, the plaintiffs' suit is not barred by the provisions of the Eleventh Amendment.
[5] Freedom of association, in the second sense, "recognize[s] a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment 0907 speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion." Id.
[6] The defendants cite the Seventh Circuit's decision in Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir.1984) for the proposition that the plaintiffs have no liberty interests in the relationships with siblings. In Bell, the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs could not bring a § 1983 action to secure the damages suffered when the state caused the loss of their siblings' society and companionship. Id. at 1247. Notwithstanding its holding, the court "fully recognize[d] the importance of intrafamily relationships generally, including those between siblings." Id. Moreover, the Court, in a manner more fully discussed later, stated that the Fourteenth Amendment could be used to strike statutes which sever relationships between siblings. Id. at 1246-47. Finally, the court decided the case under the Fourteenth Amendment and made no mention of the Roberts decision which was decided approximately two months before Bell. For these reasons, the court finds that the Bell decision does not foreclose the plaintiffs' First Amendment claim.
[7] As stated above, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants' policies regarding sibling visitation have caused them to suffer emotional harm.
[8] DCFS arranged for the plaintiff Richard to have only six visits with three of his siblings over a twelve year period of time. Complaint, ¶ 77. Other plaintiffs have gone for periods of at least fifteen and seventeen months without having a visit with their siblings. Id. at ¶¶ 33, 37, 43.
[9] The defendants also cite to the district court's decision in Child v. Beame, 412 F.Supp. 593 (S.D.N.Y.1976) to buttress their contentions. The Child Court found the attempt to equate the status of children under foster care with those who have been institutionalized or incarcerated to be "somewhat farfetched." Id. at 608. In light of the Second Circuit's decision in Doe, any persuasive value that the Child decision may have initially had has been greatly, if not entirely, eroded. See Doe, 649 F.2d at 141-142. Moreover, the Child plaintiffs were challenging the

fact or duration of their custody rather than the conditions under which they are living as are the plaintiffs in this case. The court will not follow the Child decision for these reasons.
[10] The court notes that it must give "substantial weight" to these decisions from the Second and Eleventh Circuits even though they are not necessarily controlling. See Richards v. Local 134, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 790 F.2d 633, 636 (7th Cir.1986); NuPulse, Inc. v. Schlueter Co., 853 F.2d 545, 550-51 (7th Cir. 1988).
[11] See supra, at 1006 (discussion of how complaint sufficiently alleges deliberate indifference).
[12] A professional decisionmaker, as the Court noted, is "a person competent, whether by education, training or experience, to make the particular decision at issue." Id. at 323 n. 30, 102 S.Ct. at 2462 n. 30.
[13] The court acknowledges that the analysis used to determine whether a federal statute creates rights that are enforceable under § 1983 "resembles" the analysis used to determine whether an implied right of action may be implied from such a statute. See Polchowski v. Gorris, 714 F.2d 749, 751 (7th Cir.1983). The court, however, will not discuss the implied right of action analysis developed in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975) because the plaintiffs assert their claim solely under § 1983.
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