Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV -MDG Document 1 Filed 04/29/09 Page 1 of 52

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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S.W., by and through his guardian, RENEE MARQUISABRAMS; T.G, and J.L., by and through their next friend, MILDRED DEL GROSSO; S.B. and R.E. by and through their guardian, PATRICIA BALDWIN; L.J. and J.G, by and through their guardian, KEVIN HENDRICKSON; J.B., C.B., and T.L.,

* * FILED U S. DINIS~~~~ OFI'IC! OUI'fTE.D.N.y APR 2·9 2009
BROOKLYNOFFICE
09 1777

Plaintiffs,

CV-

-against-
CITY OF NEW YORK, a municipal corporation; ADMINSTRATION FOR CHILDREN'S SERVICES, flk/a CHILD WELFARE ADMINISTRATION; ST. JOSEPH SERVICES FOR CHILDREN, INC., flk/a CATHOLIC CHILD CARE SOCIETY OF THE DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN, INC., a New York corporation; HEARTSHARE HUMAN SERVICES, flk/a CATHOLIC GUARDIAN SOCIETY OF THE DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN, INC., a New York corporation; SCO FAMILY OF SERVICES, flk/a ST. CHRISTOPHER-OTTILIE, a New York corporation,
Defendants.
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COMPLAINT
VITALIANO, J"
PLAINTIFFS' DEMAND TRIAL BY JURY
GO, M.J.

Plaintiffs S.W., R.E., T.G, J.L., S.B., L.J., J.G, J.B., C.B., and T.L., appearing by their

undersigned counsel, serve this, their complaint as to Defendants and allege as follows:

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

I. This is a civil rights action in which Plaintiffs seek damages to redress the

deprivation, under color of state law, of rights secured to them under the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs also append state law claims.

2. From 1986 to 1994, Plaintiffs, who were all classified as special needs children,

were placed in the foster home of Judith Leekin who used the following fictitious identifications:

Judith Lee-Kin, alk!a Judith S. Johnson, a/k/a Anne Marie Williams, alk!a Cheryl Graham, alk!a

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Michelle Wells, and a/k/a Eastlyn Giraud ("Leekin"). Leekin both fostered and subsequently adopted all Plaintiffs using false identities for the sole purpose of collecting the special needs subsidies provided for their care. While in foster care and throughout the duration of their captivity with Leekin, Plaintiffs were repeatedly beaten, starved, humiliated, imprisoned in a basement and/or garage, handcuffed, and hidden from society with no education or medical treatment in gross disregard of their constitutional and common-law rights. Plaintiffs bring this action against the City of New York, Administration for Children's Services and the Defendant foster care agencies that unlawfully placed Plaintiffs in the abusive home and failed to ascertain her fictitious identifications, failed to adequately supervise, investigate, and monitor the foster mother and their placement in her home, caused their wrongful, void adoptions, and failed to protect them from being held captive by Judith Leekin for almost two decades and a lifetime of severe physical and emotional abuse and neglect.
JURISDICTION 3. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by 28 U.S.C. § 1343, which provides for original jurisdiction over all actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and by 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides jurisdiction over all cases brought pursuant to the Constitution and the laws of the United States. The Court has pendent jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state law claims arising under the laws of the State of New York.
PARTIES 4. S.B. was born on March 21, 1981 in New York, and currently resides in Florida. 5. S.B. was placed in Leekin's care on or about May 9, 1986. 6. On or about July 28, 1988, the Family Court of the State of New York entered an adoption decree finalizing the adoption of S.B. by Anne Marie Williams, a non-existent
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individual. 7. The purported adoptive mother was actually Judith Leekin, who used the false
identity of Anne Marie Williams to secure this void adoption del-Tee. 8. L.J. was born on July I, 1980 in New York and currently resides in Florida. 9. L.J. was placed in Leekin's care on or about March 17, 1988. 10. On or about May 31, 1993, the Family Court of the State ofNew York entered an
adoption decree finalizing the adoption ofL.J. by Cheryl Graham, a non-existent individual. 11. The purported adoptive mother was actually Judith Leekin, who used the false
identity of Cheryl Graham to secure this void adoption decree. 12. J.G was born on December 21, 1983 in New York and currently resides in Florida. 13. J.G was placed in Leekin's care on or about September 30, 1988. 14. On or about May 31, 1993, the Family Court of the State of New York entered an
adoption decree finalizing the adoption of J.G by Cheryl Graham, a non-existent individual. 15. The purported adoptive mother was actually Judith Leekin, who used the false
identity of Cheryl Graham to secure this void adoption decree. 16. S.W. was born on June 16, 1987 in New York and currently resides in Florida. 17. S.W. was placed in Leekin's care on or about June 28, 1989. 18. On or about December 13, 1994, the Family Court of the State of New York
entered an adoption decree finalizing the adoption of S.W. by Michelle Wells, a non-existent individual.
19. The purported adoptive mother was actually Judith Leekin, who used the false identity of Michelle Wells to secure this void adoption decree.
20. R.E. was born on September 28, 1990 in New York and currently resides m
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Florida. 21. R.E. was placed in Leekin's care on or about March 27, 1992. 22. On or about June 20, 1995, the Family Court of the State of New York entered an
adoption decree finalizing the adoption ofR.E. by Michelle Wells, a non-existent individual. 23. The purported adoptive mother was actually Judith Leekin, who used the false
identity of Michelle Wells to secure this void adoption decree. 24. J.B. was born on May 18, 1987 in New York and currently resides in Florida. 25. J.B. was placed in Leekin's care on or about December 5, 1992. 26. On or about June 7, 1994, the Family Court of the State of New York entered an
adoption decree finalizing the adoption of J.B. by Michelle Wells, a non-existent individual. 27. The purported adoptive mother was actually Judith Leekin, who used the false
identity of Michelle Wells to secure this void adoption decree. 28. C.B. was born on January 22, 1989 in New York and currently resides in Florida. 29. C.B. was placed in Leekin's care on or about December 5, 1992. 30. On or about June 7, 1994, the Family Court of the State of New York entered an
adoption decree finalizing the adoption of C.B. by Michelle Wells, a non-existent individual. 31. The purported adoptive mother was actually Judith Leekin, who used the false
identity of Michelle Wells to secure this void adoption decree. 32. T.G. was born on June 19, 1991 in New York and currently resides in Florida. 33. T.G. was placed in the Leekin's care on or about December 5, 1992. 34. On or about June 7, 1994, the Family Court of the State of New York entered an
adoption decree finalizing the adoption ofT. G. by Michelle Wells, a non-existent individual. 35. The purported adoptive mother was actually Judith Leekin, who used the false
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identity of Michelle Wells to secure this void adoption decree. 36. T.L. was born on September 15, 1989 in New York and currently resides m
Florida. 37. T.L. was placed in the Leekin's care on or about July 15, 1994. 38. On or aboutAprill6, 1996, the Family Court of the State ofNewYork entered an
adoption decree finalizing the adoption ofT.L. by Eastlyn Giraud, a non-existent individual. 39. The purported adoptive mother was actually Judith Leekin, who used the false
identity of Eastlyn Giraud to secure this void adoption decree. 40. J.L. was born on March 6, 1992 in New York and currently resides in Florida. 41. J.L. was placed in the Leekin's care on or about July 15, 1994. 42. On or about April 16, 1996, the Family Court of the State of New York entered an
adoption decree finalizing the adoption of J.L. by Eastlyn Giraud, a non-existent individual. 43. The purported adoptive mother was actually Judith Leekin, who used the false
identity ofEastlyn Giraud to secure this void adoption decree. 44. Defendant City of New York ("City") is a municipal corporation, incorporated
pursuant to the laws of the State of New York. 45. Defendant City's Administration for Children's Services ("ACS"), f/k/a Child
Welfare Administration ("CWA"), is authorized by New York State law to care for children in foster care. Children in foster care are in the legal custody of the Commissioner of ACS. Although CWA was the responsible agency during the relevant time period, ACS will be used throughout this complaint as the successor agency.
46. Upon information and belief, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. £1da Catholic Child Care Society of the Diocese of Brooklyn, Inc. ("SJSC"), is a not-for-profit corporation
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organized under the laws of the State of New York and is an "authorized agency" as defined in New York Social Services Law§ 371.
47. Upon information and belief, SJSC is in the business of providing foster care, under contract with Defendant City, to children who have been removed from their homes and placed in the custody of the City of New York.
48. Upon information and belief, HeartShare Human Services, f/k/a Catholic Guardian Society of the Diocese of Brooklyn, Inc. ("HHS"), is a not-for-profit corporation organized under the laws of the State of New York and is an "authorized agency" as defined in New York Social Services Law§ 371.
49. Upon information and belief, HHS is in the business of providing foster care, under contract with Defendant City, to children who have been removed from their homes and placed in the custody of the City ofNewYork.
50. Upon information and belief, Defendant SCO Family of Services, f/k/a St. Christopher-Ottilie ("SCO"), is a not-for-profit corporation organized under the laws of the State of New York and is an "authorized agency" as defined in New York Social Services Law§ 371.
51. Upon information and belief, SCO is in the business of providing foster care, under contract with Defendant City, to children who have been removed from their homes and placed in the custody of the City of New York.
SUMMARY OF THE CASE 52. This is a case about the City of New York's unconstitutional foster care system during the years of 1984 through 1996, which was a system that permanently ended the familial relationships of I 0 special needs children only to permanently place them with Judith Leekin in a house of horrors, where they were atrociously abused, tortured, neglected, and held in captivity
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for their entire childhoods until finally rescued by the State of Florida 23 years after this tragedy began.
53. During the relevant time period, Defendant City's child welfare system was a maze of dysfunctional bureaucracy operating under unconstitutional policies and practices that demonstrated its deliberate disregard for the safety and well-being of the children it is dutybound to protect.
54. As a result of the City's grossly unconstitutional system, Defendants SJSC, HHS, and SCO (collectively, "Defendant Agencies") were permitted to operate and did operate in reckless disregard of Plaintiffs' safety and well-being, knowing that the City's own unconstitutional policies and practices prevented it from supervising the agencies, and more importantly, the children in its care and custody.
55. Upon information and belief, in the early 1980s, Leekin learned that the City would pay her significant subsidies, from approximately $800.00 to $1,300.00 per month per child, to foster and adopt special needs children, and that neither the City nor its foster care agencies would properly investigate her fitness, monitor the children, or otherwise care to learn whether children in their custody were safe in her home.
56. Over the course of a decade, from 1986 through 1996, and armed with this knowledge of the City's egregious child welfare system failures, Leekin managed to obtain custody of dozens of special needs children in foster care, including Plaintiffs, using at least four false identities through four different foster care and adoption agencies, all while simultaneously warehousing ten or more children in her basement, subjecting them to horrific abuse and neglect.
57. Until 1995, Leekin was not a naturalized citizen of the United States, but rather a permanent resident alien.
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58. Leekin created her aliases, as well as the aliases for her purported live-in daughters, using fake names.

59. The social security numbers Leekin provided with her false identities either

belonged to other individuals with different names, different genders, or were fictitious.

60. With respect to each of these aliases, Leekin also provided Defendants with nearly

identical family history, educational background, and financial and employment information, with the exception of the specific names and false identities that she used.

61. Throughout the licensing process for foster care and the subsequent adoptions of

Plaintiffs over the course of at least 12 years, Leekin repeatedly provided Defendants with false

information as to the most basic facts, which were facts that all Defendants had an

unquestionable duty to verify and failed to do so in gross disregard of Plaintiffs' constitutional

rights, such as:

a. Identity/Name

b. Social Security number

c. Employment and income

d. Home ownership and address

e. Familial relationships and family history

f. Household composition, including false identities of alleged daughter

g. Religion

h. Education

1.

Training

J. Citizenship status

k. References

62. Had Defendants performed their professional responsibilities and attempted to verify the foregoing information, they would have easily ascertained that Judith Leekin was using phony identities and the fraudulent adoptions of the children would not have occurred.
63. Defendants also failed to make appropriate collateral contacts with neighbors, employers, and community representatives to verify the information Leekin provided and make a
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determination of her character and capacity to foster and adopt special needs children. 64. Had Defendants made appropriate collateral contacts with neighbors, employers,
and community representatives to verify the information Leekin provided and make a determination of her character and capacity to foster and adopt special needs children, they would have easily ascertained that Judith Leekin was using phony aliases and the fraudulent adoptions of the children would not have occurred.
65. Defendants licensed Leekin to foster and ultimately adopt Plaintiffs and did not positively determine her identity, her relationships, her financial and employment information, or her ability to care for children without abusing or neglecting them.
66. Defendants failed to conduct the required assessments as to the suitability of each of Plaintiff's placements with Leekin, which was especially important in light of their special needs, and their contacts with Leekin were superficial in nature.
67. In addition to this total failure to identify Leekin's false identities at any time during the course of a decade, Defendants, each while allegedly supervising the care of the specific children they were duty-bound to protect, deliberately ignored repeated warnings and signs of abuse and deliberately failed to discover all of the other children that were imprisoned in Leekin's home.
68. At all times material, the City had an affirmative policy of prohibiting its caseworkers from making direct contact with the children in its care or with foster and/or adoptive parents in violation of the most basic child welfare policy and the constitutional rights of the Plaintiffs.
69. Leekin, using four false identities, ultimately obtained adoption decrees as to each of the Plaintiffs at various times, with the explicit written consent of the City, ACS and the
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Defendant Agencies. 70. Upon information and belief, Leek:in knew that with no investigations, isolated
visitations, no supervision, no post-adoption services, or verifications of any kind by Defendants, she could continue to receive substantial subsidies until Plaintiffs reached the age of 21 years old and could escape having to spend the foster care payments and adoption subsidies to care for the children.
71. Because Defendants failed in their obligation to supervise the placement of Plaintiffs with Leek:in, Plaintiffs spent nearly their entire childhoods being horrifically abused and neglected while the State of New York continued to send Leekin in excess of one million dollars in subsidy checks for their care.
72. Leekin caused Plaintiffs to be chronically beaten, handcuffed, zip-tied, humiliated, threatened, secreted from the public, locked up in a basement or garage, deprived of their educations, denied medical treatment of any kind, and near starvation until the State of Florida finally rescued the children on July I 0, 2007, 23 years after this tragedy began.
73. Plaintiffs each suffer from unimaginable medical, physical, psychological, educational, and sociological conditions and have experienced the loss of their entire childhoods, their families, and their independence as a result of Defendants' gross disregard and deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs' constitutional rights.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE CITY'S FOSTER CARE SYSTEM 74. Whether by involuntary removal or voluntary surrender, children come into the City's foster care system to be protected from harm. 75. Children placed in the City's care are in the legal custody of the City's Commissioner of Social Services, who delegates that authority to ACS.
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76. Most foster care children are placed with "voluntary" agencies that have contracted with the City to provider foster care and adoption services, such as Defendant Agencies.
77. The voluntary agencies are then responsible for the day-to-day direct care and supervision of the City's foster care children.
78. The City does provide its own foster care and adoption services to a small percentage of children not otherwise placed with voluntary agencies through its Division of Adoption and Foster Care Services ("DAFCS"), in which case the City is directly responsible for all aspects of the child's care.
79. Despite this arrangement, the City and ACS always maintain legal custody of and responsibility for its foster children, and remain legally obligated to protect those children from harm.
80. Defendant Agencies act as ACS's agent in executing some of those responsibilities.
81. Practically speaking, the voluntary agencies provide the day-to-day care for the City's foster children.
82. The voluntary agencies have case planning responsibility, which means completing a case plan, known as Uniform Case Records ("UCRs") that identifies the child's physical and mental health needs, his/her permanency goal (i.e. reunification with the biological family, adoption, or independent living), and the services necessary to achieve that goal.
83. The voluntary agencies are then responsible for ensuring all services identified in the case plan are provided.
84. The City, on the other hand, is responsible for case management, which means it
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is the City's responsibility to review the UCRs to make sure they are properly completed, ensure that each child has an appropriate permanency goal, and ensure that progress is being made to achieve that permanency goal.
85. The City is legally obligated to supervise the voluntary agencies to ensure that all necessary services are being provided to the foster children, and that the agencies are complying with all applicable laws and regulations.
86. Foster children have a right, guaranteed by the United States Constitution, to be free from harm while in the custody of state or local government.
87. Various laws and regulations have been established to ensure this right is not violated.
88. Each Defendant has a fundamental duty to: a. Know with whom a child is being placed; b. Ensure that each foster child is in an appropriate placement; and, c. Confirm that the children in its care are safe and healthy.
89. To fulfill these duties described in paragraph 88, the City and its Agencies are required to properly screen prospective foster care and adoptive parents for fitness and character to care for the City's children.
90. The voluntary agencies are responsible for evaluating the foster homes and those living there and to have monthly face-to-face contacts with the children and their caregivers.
91. Proper screening involves independent verification of identity, employment, housing, family history, criminal background, references, and qualifications to care for special needs children prior to certification as a foster parent or prospective adoptive parent.
92. The need to positively identity and know the person being considered for a license
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to care for foster children is a fundamental duty of the City and its Agencies. 93. The need to positively identifY and know the person being considered to adopt a
foster child is the City's and its Agencies' most fundamental duty prior to adoption. 94. Once a child is placed in a foster or adoptive home, the City or its agencies are
required to maintain monthly face-to-face contact with the children and their caregivers, including at least one visit to the foster home during every three month period.
95. The purpose of these visits is to be sure the child is safe and healthy, that the home they are in is appropriate for them, and to address any continuing service needs or issues that might arise.
96. Face-to-face contacts, though required for all children in care, are even more important when dealing with children who have special needs, like Plaintiffs in this case.
UNCONSTITUTIONAL POLICIES AND PRACTICES 97. On a systemic scale, the City's pervasive pattern of indifference to Plaintiffs was a result of a highly fragmented and unconstitutional system, with a practice and policy of giving the appearance of compliance by focusing on procedures and the completion of legally required paperwork over and above actual compliance with substantive professional child welfare standards. 98. ACS delegated responsibilities as to foster children between various units and voluntary agencies with minimal supervision or accountability. 99. ACS had virtually no involvement with ensuring the safety of children in its care outside of the paperwork submitted by the voluntary agencies. I00. Although ACS delegated much of the day-to-day prov1s1on of child welfare services to voluntary agencies like Defendant Agencies, by law, ACS maintained legal custody
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and responsibility for all foster children including Plaintiff. IOJ. Although ACS retained legal responsibility for the well-being of all children in the
child welfare system, it had a practice and policy of unlawfully delegating virtually every facet of the child welfare system to these voluntary agencies with no supervision or accountability.
I02. Licensing visits and certifications, home studies, case planning, foster care placement, coordinating family and sibling visits, ensuring the referral for and provision of services such as health care and education, and permanency planning were all duties delegated to the voluntary agencies.
103. Cases were processed in an assembly-line fashion, in that every possible phase of a child's case was handled by a separate unit, both within ACS and the voluntary agencies.
104. Cases were often handled by unqualified workers burdened with overwhelming caseloads and mountains of paperwork.
I05. The voluntary agencies operated independently of each other and effectively independent ofACS.
I06. The only connection ACS effectively held to children in its legal custody was the flow of paperwork between its caseworkers and those of the voluntary agencies.
I07. In fact, ACS had a policy of prohibiting its caseworkers and supervisors from making direct contact with foster parents or the children for whom it was legally responsible.
I08. Accordingly, ACS 's supervision of its voluntary agencies and the children in its care consisted of nothing more than reviewing paperwork submitted by the agencies with no method for verifying the accuracy or legitimacy of the information provided.
109. These policies fostered the blatantly superficial execution of child welfare duties. 110. In some cases, these policies also resulted in fraudulent acts by caseworkers who
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were conditioned to believe in the priority of completed paperwork. Ill. The ease with which Leekin was able to take advantage of the City's child welfare
system on such a grand scale epitomizes the unconstitutional policies and practices that served as the impetus for Marisol A. v. Giuliani, a federal class-action lawsuit filed in December 1995.
112. The City's unconstitutional policies and practices that served as the impetus for Marisol A. v. Giuliani, a federal class-action lawsuit filed in December 1995, allowed Judith Leekin to obtain custody of the Plaintiffs and to obtain fraudulent adoption decrees using four phony aliases.
113. The suit was brought on behalf of all children who were or would be in the custody of ACS and sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the continuing federal and state constitutional and statutory violations.
114. As a result of the Marisol A. litigation, ACS entered in to a consent decree in federal court which created a Special Child Welfare Advisory Panel (the "Panel"), consisting of child welfare leaders from across the country to conduct an intensive review of the City's child welfare system and advise the City and ACS on how to correct, tix, and reform the system.
115. The Marisol A. litigation and the Panel's review revealed Defendants' deliberate disregard of its fundamental duties and a system that was failing children at every level of care including:
a. ACS failed to fulfill its legal obligations to monitor and supervise children in its care through accountability of its voluntary agencies;
b. ACS permitted children to remain under the supervisiOn of voluntary agencies that it knew were completely failing to provide adequate care for the children;
c. The information system or lack thereof, was so poor that ACS and the
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voluntary agencies had conflicting data on how many children were under their care at any given time;
d. Thousands of children were effectively missing from care, because ACS did not have an accurate placement address;
e. ACS computer systems were virtually non-functional, providing no accurate and up-to-date information, and caseworkers spent fifty to sixty percent of their time completing paperwork;
f. Case files were incomplete and disorganized, and the physical transfer of paperwork from worker-to-worker or unit-to-unit could take months and frequently resulted in missing files;
g. Caseworkers received only twenty days of training prior to entering the field, the majority of which focused on filling out forms and completing paperwork rather than child development and how to make assessments, judgments, and provide services in accordance with professional child welfare standards of care;
h. Defendants not only continued to employ caseworkers who failed the preservice training examination, but also sent them into the field with full caseloads despite not having demonstrated any level of competency in child welfare;
1. Children were frequently denied their right to remain or be reunited with their birth families, because of Defendants' failure to conduct adequate assessments, provide appropriate services, and assist families in complying with their case plan tasks;
j. Furthermore, Defendants failed to keep siblings together in foster care because of convenience of placements;
k. Licensing home studies, investigations, and monitoring of foster and pre-
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adoptive homes were wholly superficial in nature, and foster license recertification requirements were often disregarded;
I. Many individuals licensed as foster parents were at best, completely unqualified and sometimes, like Judith Leekin, were simply interested in the additional income;
m. Defendants tolerated and/or turned a blind eye to behavior from foster parents that would have otherwise been reported as abuse or neglect by birth parents;
n. When foster parents lost their certifications with one agency, they could easily become certified through another voluntary agency, because ACS had no information system in place to keep track of applicant and active foster families, their training, certification status, and capacity;
o. Defendants placed children in an emergency and ad hoc fashion, with no regard to the child's specific needs or whether the foster parent(s) had been appropriately screened and/or trained;
p. In addition, because of a lack of sufficient placements, especially for special needs children, such children, like Plaintiffs, were often placed inappropriately without regard for their safety or well-being;
q. Defendants had massive turnover rates of caseworkers and supervisors, which disrupted the continuity of care of foster children;
r. R.E., for example, had at least eight (8) different caseworkers during the three (3) years he was in Leekin's care prior to adoption finalization, and J.L and T.L. had at least seven (7) different case workers during the two (2) years they were in Leekin's care prior to adoption finalization;
s. In addition, m1ssmg and incomplete case files made it extraordinarily
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difficult for new caseworkers to familiarize themselves with a particular child and for existing caseworkers to adequately assess and monitor a child's care; and,

t.

Children who came into care with physical or psychological conditions

further deteriorated in Defendants' custody because of inadequately trained caseworkers and

foster parents, failure to conduct required visitations, deliberate ignorance of abuse and neglect

in foster homes, and failure to ensure provision of appropriate services.

116. The failures that prompted the Marisol A. class action were already known and

disregarded by Defendants through a series of notices, studies and reports revealed in the

Marisol A. litigation prior to and before the adoption of the Plaintiffs, including but not limited

to:

a. In 1988, the year of S.B.'s adoption and L.J.'s and J.G's placement, the

City's Human Resource Administration ("HRA") reported that legally mandated foster home

visits only occurred in 49 percent of the cases, and that barely half of the caseworkers and case

managers were formally trained;

b. In 1989, the year of S.W.'s placement, the City Comptroller's Office

reported that ACS fraudulently altered dates and backdated forms in 22 percent of cases in order

to document compliance with case planning requirements;

c. In 1993, the year after R.E.'s, J.B.'s, C.B.'s, and T.G's placements, and the

year ofL.J.'s and J.G's adoptions, another report authored by Carol W. Williams from the Center

for the Study of Social Policy in Washington, D.C. concluded that communication and transfer of

information between ACS and the voluntary agencies was "cumbersome and frequently never

completed," critical information about children in care was often difficult if not impossible to

find due to incomplete and disorganized case files, the City severely lacked appropriate special

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needs placements, the entire system suffered from staffing, training, and supervision problems, and that ACS 's computer system did not support good social work practice;
d. The Court's Committee of the Mayor's Commission for the Foster Care of Children also reported in 1993 that caseloads were unacceptably high and unmanageable, precluding necessary face-to-face contacts; and,
e. In 1994, the year of S.W.'s, J.B.'s, C.B.'s, and T.G's adoptions and T.L.'s and J.L.'s placements, the State Comptroller found that ACS failed to properly monitor and supervise the care provided to children by voluntary agencies and failed to ensure that the services provided by those agencies were sufficient to meet children's needs and goals.
117. The current ACS Commissioner, John Mattingly, was a member of the Panel and therefore became aware no later than that time of the systemic failures throughout the applicable time period.
118. Notwithstanding Commissioner Mattingly's and Defendants City's and ACS's knowledge of the systemic failures, they failed to take any action to determine if there were children who had been placed in unsafe foster care placements that were ultimately adopted by such parents, like Plaintiffs, even after John Mattingly became the ACS Commissioner.
119. Notwithstanding Commissioner Mattingly's and Defendants City's and ACS's knowledge of the systemic failures, they failed to take any action to determine if there were adoptive parents who were fraudulently receiving adoption assistance payments, like Leekin, even after John Mattingly became the ACS Commissioner. Such a determination would have resulted in the rescue of the children years prior to their actual rescue by the State of Florida.
120. Defendants' repeated failures to perform their duties and their pervasive pattern and practice of omissions reveals deliberate indifference to the specific duties imposed upon
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them for the purpose of safeguarding Plaintiffs from abuse. LEEKIN FOSTER HOMES
121. From approximately 1984 through 1988, Leekin, usmg four false identities, became a licensed foster parent with each of the Defendants-all at the same address of 137-48 226 Street, Laurelton, NY 11413 ("Laurelton home").
122. As early as November 1984, Leekin became a licensed foster parent with Defendant SCO, using the false identity ofAnne Marie Williams.
123. From at least 1986 through 1988, ACS and SCO permitted Leekin to have up to six special needs children in her foster home at one time, including Plaintiff S.B.
124. Defendant SCO did not determine Leekin's false identity or ascertain her true identity by using the most basic of background checks, searches, collateral contacts, interviews of neighbors, review of utility bills or deeds, or following the minimum basic standard of care for child welfare practice.
125. While Leekin simultaneously continued to foster S.B. and other children as Anne Marie Williams, under the alleged supervision of SCO and ACS, Leekin became licensed, at the same Laurelton home, with the City's Division of Adoption and Foster Care Services ("DAFCS") using the false identity Cheryl Graham.
126. From March 1988 through February 1989, ACS and DAFCS placed three additional extraordinarily handicapped children, including Plaintiffs L.J. and J.G, in Leekin's care.
127. Defendant City, through DAFCS, did not determine Leekin's false identity or ascertain her true identity by using the most basic of background checks, searches, collateral contacts, interviews of neighbors, review of utility bills or deeds, or following the minimum
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basic standard of care for child welfare practice. 128. Defendant HHS first met Leekin in 1987, when using the identity Eastlyn Giraud,
she posed as the retired mother of Cheryl Jack ("Jack"). Jack became an HHS licensed foster parent in 1987, also using the same Laurelton home where Leekin lived, and posing as Leekin's daughter.
129. Leekin, as Eastlyn Giraud, acted as the caregiver while her alleged daughter worked and went to school.
130. From 1987 through 1996, HHS placed at least eight special needs children in Leekin's home, including Plaintiffs T.L. and J.L.
131. In or about 1987, while simultaneously fostering approximately 6 children with SCO and another 3 children with HHS, all in the Laurelton home, Leekin became a licensed foster parent with SJSC using the false identity, Michelle Wells.
132. As of the date of S.W.'s placement in 1989, Leekin had completed her first adoption and was actively fostering at least 9 special needs children of varying ages from newborn to 9 years of age--in the same home--through three different agencies, using three false identities.
133. From at least 1989 through 1992, SJSC permitted Leekin to have at least up to 5 special needs children in her foster home at one time, including Plaintiffs S.W., R.E., J.B., C.B., and T.G.
134. Defendant SJSC did not determine Leekin's false identity or ascertain her true identity by using the most basic of background checks, searches, collateral contacts, interviews of neighbors, review of utility bills or deeds, or following the minimum basic standard of care for child welfare practice.
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135. Sometime in 1994, Leel<in, as Eastlyn Giraud, finally applied with HHS to be "added to" the Jack foster home license.
136. In that capacity, HHS placed an additional and final sibling group, Plaintiffs T.L. and J.L. in the Leekin home.
137. By this time, Leekin had finalized the fraudulent adoptions ofS.B., L.J., J.G., J.B., C.B., and T.G. and continued to foster S.W. and R.E. through SJSC.
138. Defendant HHS did not determine Leekin's false identity or ascertain her true identity by using the most basic of background checks, searches, collateral contacts, interviews of neighbors, review of utility bills or deeds, or following the minimum basic standard of care for child welfare practice.
LEEKIN PROFITED FROM DEFENDANTS' DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE 139. Leekin's ability to carry out her scheme can be directly tied to the unconstitutional
policies and practices and systemic failure described above. 140. Had a single system, agency, or individual operated in accordance with
professional child welfare standards, this entire tragedy could have been averted. Perfunctory Background Checks
141. Leekin's ability to ever become a licensed foster parent using blatantly false identities and background information underscores the unconstitutional "form over substance" policy described above.
142. As long as the applicant provided the minimum paperwork, all information contained therein was presumed to be accurate.
143. Leekin provided nothing but manufactured and fraudulent paperwork to support her alleged identities, employment, housing, and references.
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144. Leekin utilized wholly concocted identities with each and every application to become a licensed foster parent with Defendant SCO (Plaintiff S.B.), she claimed to be Anne Marie Williams; with Defendant HHS (Plaintiffs T.L. and J.L), she claimed to be Eastlyn Giraud; with DAFCS (Plaintiffs L.J. and J.G.), she claimed to be Cheryl Graham; and, with Defendant SJSC (Plaintiffs S.W., R.E., J.B., C.B., and T.G.), she claimed to be Michelle Wells. None of these individuals actually existed, but for Leekin manufacturing them as aliases.
145. At least as to Defendants HHS and SJSC, Leekin provided stolen social security numbers.
146. Not only did these social security numbers belong to other individuals, but the number provided to SJSC actually belongs to a male.
147. Accordingly, Defendants failed to conduct even the simplest social security number verifications to confirm Leekin's identity.
148. Leekin presented each Defendant with an alleged daughter, for whom she also provided false identities-with DAFCS, her daughter was Ann Jackson, and with SJSC, her daughter was Nicole Cheryl Wells and then Nicole LeeSang.
149. Leekin's alleged daughter was always the back-up guardian for the children in her care in the event of death or incapacity.
150. In fact, Leekin has no daughter. 151. Upon information and belief, these identities were also manufactured and/or stolen in the same manner that Leekin created her own aliases and never verified. 152. Defendants failed to uncover the falsity of such identities, which could have easily been discovered with the most basic verifications. 153. Leekin not only claimed to have a daughter, but not a single Defendant ever
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realized that Leekin had a biological son living in the home which would have affected the outcome of each application to foster and/or adopt Plaintiffs.
154. Had Defendants made any collateral contacts with neighbors, they would have discovered that she had a biological son, because he played with the neighbors' children.
I55. The most incredible of these daughter identities, however, is Cheryl Jack. !56. Cheryl Jack is in fact a real person, who assisted Leekin by posing as the alleged daughter of one of her aliases, Eastlyn Giraud. 157. As discussed in paragraph 128, Jack was the original foster parent licensee with HHS in 1987. However, sometime between 1991 and 1992, while Jack was actively fostering a child not a plaintiff in this case, she entered the military and ultimately left the United States. 158. At this time, Leekin then recruited an unknown individual to assume Jack's identity, yet HHS inexplicably failed to identify that the face of their licensed foster mother had changed, and processed the adoption of this child. 159. Leekin also provided each agency with the same employer information. Although her length of alleged employment and income changed between Defendants and over time, under each alias, Leekin claimed to be employed by NY Life Insurance, working from home as either a secretary or a life insurance agent. 160. Defendants failed to uncover the falsity of such employment information, which could have easily been discovered with the most basic verifications. 161. Leekin claimed to have health and life insurance through her employer, and she provided each agency with the same policy information. 162. Defendants failed to uncover the falsity of such information, which could have easily been discovered with the most basic verifications.
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163. As additional basis for income, Leekin provided each agency with nearly identical checking, savings, and money market account information.
164. Defendants failed to uncover the falsity of such accounts, which could have easily been discovered with the most basic verifications.
165. Upon information and belief, no persons named Anne Marie Williams, Eastlyn Giraud, Cheryl Graham, or Michelle Wells ever worked for NY Life Insurance or maintained any such insurance or accounts.
166. Leekin also changed her purported religion to suit each foster care agency and the children she sought to adopt.
167. During her 10 year history with HHS, every worker failed to notice that her purported religion changed based upon the religion of the children she sought to adopt.
168. With each new religion and identity, Leekin claimed to be actively involved with the corresponding local church. In some instances, her volunteer work with a particular church group was offered as a qualification for caring for special needs children.
169. Defendants failed to uncover the falsity of such information, which could have easily been discovered with the most basic verifications of collateral contacts at each church.
170. Although Leekin's alleged daughter was always presented as the back-up guardian, Defendants also required emergency back-up contacts.
171. HHS licensing recertification reports indicate that the person who is to act as the emergency contact. This individual changes every year, despite listing the same address of the contact as 144-27 221 st Street, Rosedale NY.
172. In 1988, the contact was Eastlyn Giraud; in 1990, the contact is Sonja LeeSang; in 1991, it is Judith S. Johnson; in 1992, it is Judith Lee-kin.
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173. Leekin had become so emboldened by the system's utter failures that she actually used her own name as an emergency contact.
174. HHS did not confirm the existence of these contacts, who any of them were, or what their relationships were to the licensed caregiver, because all of the above listed names are Leekin identities.
ACS's Lack of Centralized System 175. ACS's lack of an information system designed to track foster families and foster children enabled Leekin to become separately licensed with and receive placements from four different agencies, all under the alleged supervision of ACS, while using the same Laurelton address, despite the law prohibiting multiple licenses to the same person and/or address. 176. In the span of just three years, Leekin became licensed with three different voluntary foster care agencies and DAFCS. 177. Although she utilized false identities that should have been discovered by appropriate background checks, she also used the same address for each license, which would have been revealed through the most basic of information systems designed to track foster care and licensees. 178. Defendants placed at least nine children at the same Laurelton address at any one time, and the City and ACS continued to process and mail foster care payments for those children to four different identities at the same address. 179. Defendants City and ACS continued to process and mail adoption assistance payments for Plaintiffs to four different identities at the same address both in the State of New York and after Leekin moved Plaintiffs to Florida in 1998. 180. Demonstrating deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs' constitutional rights,
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Defendants City and ACS had no system in place to track such payments, thereby enabling Leekin to continue to collect subsidies at the same address under four false identities until Plaintiffs were rescued in 2007.
181. Whether through tracking foster licenses, locations of children in care, or payments to foster parents, any centralized system or basic computer checks would have uncovered Leekin's multiple licenses, false identities, or simply the volume of foster children living at one address.
Failure to Train, Massive Turnover Rates, and Deliberate Ignorance 182. Whether from a lack of training, massive turnover rates, failure to perform appropriate visitations, or a culture of deliberate ignorance, Defendants' caseworkers responsible for the safety and well-being of children in the City's custody either failed to identify or deliberately ignored evidence that Leekin was acting fraudulently and that Plaintiffs were being abused and/or neglected while in her care. 183. Defendants failed to conduct appropriate home visits in reckless disregard of Plaintiffs' safety. 184. Unannounced home visits are standard child welfare practice, yet every home visit was scheduled with Leekin in advance. 185. Leekin often changed the dates and times or brought Plaintiffs into the agency instead, and on several occasions, she failed to keep scheduled home visit appointments. 186. Even when there were face-to-face contacts, Defendants interviewed Plaintiffs in Leekin's presence, who are often noted in progress notes as only responding with Leekin's prompting. 187. The standard of care requires child interviews to be done outside of the presence
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of the caregiver. Abused children are rarely, if ever, going to say something is wrong while their abuser is standing there.
188. With special needs children, the requirements are greater, because these children are often unable to express themselves, as was the case with several of the Plaintiffs.
189. Defendants' case workers ignored the most basic of warning signs and red flags when performing their visitations to the Plaintiffs.
190. The majority of the visits consisted of nothing more than a brief conversation with Leekin, who reported everything was fine, and an eyeball of the children who appeared to be dressed nicely and clean.
191. Defendants not only ignored repeated threats and doubts expressed by Leekin about adopting several of Plaintiffs because of their behavior problems, but continued to place and/or leave Plaintiffs and other special needs children in her care and ultimately recommended such adoptions.
192. As the first agency to license Leekin as a foster parent, Defendant SCO was uniquely positioned to prevent every subsequent license, placement, and adoption had it not acted with deliberate indifference to S.B. 's rights, and as such, is liable to each of the Plaintiffs in this lawsuit.
193. Leekin threatened SCO with surrender of the children in her care, and SCO deliberately ignored this substantial risk to S.B. 's safety.
194. When confronted about her failure to keep a home visit appointment with S.B.'s guardian ad litem, Leekin stated that if they did not like how she did things, then she would surrender all of the foster children in her care and simply go to another agency.
195. Leekin's threat to surrender S.B. to SCO was a "red flag'' that should have resulted
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in SCO removing S.B. for her custody. 196. As the second agency to place children in Leekin 's care and the only agency who
did so over the course of the entire ten-year period ofLeekin's fostering and adoptions, HHS was also uniquely positioned to prevent every subsequent license, placement, and adoption.
197. Defendant HHS ignored substantial risks of harm to children in Leekin's care and deliberately ignored those risks when it placed Plaintiffs T.L. and J.L. in her home.
198. In 1988, HHS placed a newborn in Leekin's care (through the Jack license), who died within less than a month in the Leekin home from "crib death."
199. It is standard child welfare practice to investigate deaths occurring in a foster home, to ensure that other children in the home are not at risk of harm.
200. Upon information and belief, neither Defendants ACS nor HHS conducted an appropriate investigation into the infant's death.
201. An appropriate investigation into the infant's death would have revealed that Leekin had four (4) additional children, three of whom were Plaintiffs S.B., L.J., and J.G., in her home at that time through two other agencies.
202. Defendant City, through DAFCS, placed J.G. in Leekin's home just two days following the infant's death.
203. Beginning in 1990 and for the remaining six years of the Jack/Giraud foster home, Leekin claimed the living room was under construction due to remodeling.
204. Upon information and belief, Leekin sometimes used the living room as a place to keep children tied up and/or otherwise restrained.
205. There is no indication that Defendant HHS ever questioned the legitimacy of Leekin having a barren and allegedly under construction living room for six years, which was
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another red flag. 206. HHS workers repeatedly noted that Jack seemed to be under the influence of her
mother (Leekin), that both she and Leekin consistently caused difficulty in arranging the annual licensing visits, and that they both seemed willing to go along with whatever rules got them what they wanted.
207. HHS continued to recertify the home and place children in Leekin's care in gross disregard of Plaintiffs' rights.
208. On January 5, 1995, Jack notified HHS that she no longer wanted to adopt Plaintiffs T.L. and J.L. and gave HHS ten days to remove the children from her home.
209. Despite this surrender constituting a known substantial risk to Plaintiffs, HHS not only negotiated with Leekin to keep the children in her home, but recommended and processed their adoptions.
210. The foregoing letter of surrender of Plaintiffs T.L. and J.L. was another red flag that should have caused Plaintiffs to be removed from the Leekin home.
211. As the third agency to license Leekin as a foster parent, Defendant City, through DAFCS, was uniquely positioned to prevent every subsequent license, placement, and adoption had it not acted with deliberate indifference to J.G's and L.J.'s rights, and as such, is liable to each of the Plaintiffs in this lawsuit.
212. As the fourth agency to license Leekin as a foster parent, Defendant SJSC was uniquely positioned to prevent every subsequent placement and adoption had it not acted with deliberate indifference to S.W.'s, R.E.'s, J.B.'s, C.B's, and T.G's rights, and as such, is liable to each of the Plaintiffs in this lawsuit.
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Lack ofAppropriate Placements 213. Defendants City and ACS knew that it had insufficient placements available for special needs children. 214. ACS knew that it was dangerous to place multiple special needs children in one home and in some instances, such as Plaintiffs S.W. and R.E., used this as its justification for dividing sibling groups. 215. ACS specifically found that because S.W. and his two natural siblings were all special needs children and required additional supervision that it would be difficult for one foster mother to care for these three children. 216. As a result of this finding, ACS concluded that S.W. and his two natural siblings should not be reunited. 217. With this knowledge and with deliberate and reckless disregard for the known substantial risk of harm to all of the children, Defendant SJSC, withACS's approval, placed four additional special needs children, Plaintiffs R.E., J.B., C.B., and T.G, in the Leekin home with S.W., and processed the adoptions of all five children. 218. As the agency that placed the second group of Plaintiffs in Leekin's care, L.J. and J.G, DAFCS was also uniquely positioned to prevent every subsequent license, placement, and adoption had it not acted with deliberate indifference to their rights. 219. Plaintiffs L.J. and J.G, and an additional child who has been missing since 2001 and is believed to be dead, were all profoundly handicapped children. 220. In reckless disregard and deliberate indifference to the known substantial risk to Plaintiffs' safety, DAFCS, with ACS's approval, knowingly placed all three of these children in Leekin's home and processed their adoptions.
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221. At one time, Plaintiff R.E.'s goal included reunification with some of his stx natural siblings.
222. When Leekin was informed of this goal and the possibility of R.E. being removed from her home and placed with the other voluntary agency responsible for R.E. 's siblings, Leekin demanded that SJSC do something to prevent R.E.'s reunification.
223. Based upon Leekin's demands, SJSC requested and received ACS's approval to leave R.E. in the Leekin home and processed his adoption.
224. SJSC and ACS acted in direct violation of R.E.'s constitutional right to maintain his sibling relationships and with deliberate and reckless disregard of the risk of substantial harm resulting from placement in a home with four other special needs children.
225. Plaintiffs T.L. and J.L. were originally placed in the kinship home of their paternal aunt, who repeatedly expressed desire to adopt T.L. and J.L.
226. Defendants HHS and ACS negotiated mere visitation between Plaintiffs and their aunt, failed to act when those visitations did not occur, and ultimately processed their adoptions by Leekin who promptly cut them off from their birth families.
227. Plaintiffs had no means by which to protect their rights so long as they remained in the custody of their abuser, which did not cease until they were rescued by the State of Florida on July 10, 2007.
228. Until Plaintiffs were rescued and the truth as to Leekin's fraud and their own histories were uncovered and revealed to them, Plaintiffs could not and should not have known of the injuries that are the subject of this action.
229. At the time of removal, and as a result of a lifetime of abuse, neglect, being secreted from society with no education, and their respective psychological and physical
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disabilities, Plaintiffs did not have the ability or the mental capacity to comprehend the nature of their circumstances.
230. Additionally, at the time of their rescue, Plaintiffs R.E. and T.L. were minors, and T.G. and J.L. are still minors as of the date of this Complaint. Plaintiffs J.G., L.J., S.B., and S.W. were declared incompetent adults and did not have guardians appointed until May 2008.
COUNT I- 42 U.S.C. § 1983 AGAINST DEFENDANTS CITY AND ACS 231. Plaintiffs hereby reaver and reallege paragraphs I through 230 as if fully set forth herein. 232. At all times relevant hereto, it was clearly established that children in the physical custody of the state had the right to be safe and free from unreasonable risks of harm. 233. At all times relevant hereto, Defendants City and ACS created the opportunity for Plaintiffs to be permanently placed and adopted by fictitious persons and threw Plaintiffs into the Leekin snake-pit as a result of their unconstitutional practices and policies. 234. At all times relevant hereto, Defendants City and ACS had no system in place to track foster children or parents, and thereby no means with which to ensure that they were not issuing and/or approving multiple licenses to one person at one address or to determine and/or verity how many foster children were residing at one address. 235. At all times relevant hereto, Defendants City and ACS had an unconstitutional practice and policy of unlawfully delegating its legal duties to ensure the safety and well-being of children in its care and to protect Plaintiffs from harm to the Defendant Agencies. 236. At all times relevant hereto, Defendants City and ACS had an unconstitutional practice and policy of relying solely on the information provided in the UCRs and other paperwork by the Defendant Agencies, with no procedure in place to verity that the information
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being reported was accurate and/or complete. 237. At all times relevant hereto, Defendants City and ACS had an unconstitutional
practice and policy of prohibiting its caseworkers from making direct contact with foster children and foster parents in deliberate disregard of Plaintiffs' safety and well-being.
238. At all time relevant hereto, Defendants City and ACS operated an unconstitutional child welfare system in the City and were aware of the dysfunctional bureaucracy, operating under unconstitutional policies and practices that demonstrated their deliberate disregard for the safety and well-being of Plaintiffs, whom they were duty-bound to protect.
239. Defendants City andACS had actual knowledge of the following: a. Actual knowledge based upon the 1988 report of the City's Human
Resource Administration that caseworkers were not conducting mandatory home visits in fiftyone percent of the cases;
b. Actual knowledge based upon the 1988 report of the City's Human Resource Administration that nearly half of the City's caseworkers and case managers were not formally trained;
c. Actual knowledge based upon the City Comptroller's Office in 1989 that twenty-two percent of the paperwork submitted to ACS was inaccurate or fraudulent;
d. Actual knowledge again in 1993 regarding the failure to conduct necessary face-to-face contacts as a result of unacceptably high and unmanageable caseloads from the Court's Committee of the Mayor's Commission for the Foster Care of Children;
e. Actual knowledge no later than 1993 that ACS often did not receive critical information regarding children in its custody, because communications from its voluntary agencies was often incomplete or impossible to find;
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f. Actual knowledge no later than 1993 that the City severely lacked appropriate special needs placements;
g. Actual knowledge that the ACS computer system did not support good social work practice; and,
h. Actual knowledge no later than 1994, when the State Comptroller found that ACS failed to properly monitor and supervise the care provided to children by the City's voluntary agencies.
240. Despite actual knowledge of the substantial risk of serious harm resulting from the lack of face-to-face contacts over half of the time, Defendants City and ACS failed to change its policies and practices with deliberate disregard for Plaintiffs' safety and well-being.
241. Despite actual knowledge of the substantial risk of serious harm posed by incomplete, grossly inaccurate, or fraudulent UCRs and other mandatory paperwork from Defendant Agencies, and with deliberate disregard for Plaintiffs' safety and well-being, Defendants City and ACS failed to change its policy of prohibiting direct contact with foster children or any other policy or practice that would enable ACS to check the accuracy of the information being provided.
242. Despite actual knowledge of the substantial risk of serious harm resulting from a lack of appropriate special needs placements, Defendants City and ACS failed to ensure the availability of such placements.
243. Despite the failure to ensure the availability of special needs placements, Defendants City and ACS simultaneously pressured its caseworkers and Defendant Agencies to place and adopt special needs children, which resulted in a substantial risk of serious harm from inappropriate placements.
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244. Despite actual knowledge of the substantial risk of harm caused by untrained caseworkers and case managers, and with deliberate disregard of Plaintiffs' safety and wellbeing, Defendants City and ACS continued place and/or permit Defendant Agencies to place untrained workers in the field and assign them massive caseloads.
245. Despite actual knowledge of the substantial risk of harm posed by the City's voluntary agencies who were not meeting minimum child welfare standards and with deliberate disregard for Plaintiffs' safety and well-being, Defendants City and ACS failed to change its policies regarding supervision of children in the City's custody and continued to place children with Defendant Agencies.
246. Over the course of a decade, Leekin fostered at least 22 special needs children, including Plaintiffs, with up to 9 such children in her home at any one time.
247. Defendants City and ACS, through their unconstitutional policies, practices, deliberate indifference, and repeated acts of negligence, facilitated Leekin's ability to foster and adopt Plaintiffs and to collect substantial subsidies.
248. Defendants City and ACS, through their unconstitutional policies, practices, deliberate indifference, and repeated acts of negligence, failed to uncover Leekin's scheme, which was so easily discoverable at every turn had they discharged their most basic constitutional and statutory duties.
249. At all times relevant hereto, Defendants' unconstitutional practices and policies caused Plaintiffs to suffer in Leekin's custody and be robbed of their right to family.
250. The Circuit Court of the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Port Saint Lucie County, Florida, which has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs R.E., T.G., T.L. and J.L. by virtue of their dependency case, found the adoptions void ab initio.
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251. The court held that:
Under New York law, the adoption of children under fraudulent conditions makes the adoptions not merely voidable but void. If an adoption is premised upon underlying facts which have since been rejected, there is no reason to treat an adoption order any differently than any other order. By using false names to adopt the children, Ms. Leekin did commit a fraud upon the court in New York. As a result, the adoptions entered by that court are void ab initio. Adoption law in New York is purely statutory. If any essential requirement of the statute is not complied with, the court's power to decree an adoption fails. The identity of the adopting parent is a prerequisite to the court securing jurisdiction. As a result of the fraud, the court lacked the necessary elements required to enter an adoption decree, rendering those decrees that were entered void...the result of this is that the children were at all times wards of the City of New York. They now find themselves without caretakers, essentially abandoned in the state of Florida and therefore dependent.
252. The adoptions of the six Plaintiffs who were adults at the time of rescue in July
2007, namely, S.B., L.J., J.G., S.W., J.B., and C.B., are also void ab initio on the same grounds.
Specifically, because Leekin utilized false identities to adopt Plaintiffs and the identity of the
adopting parent is a prerequisite under New York law to the court securing jurisdiction, the
Family Court of the State of New York lacked jurisdiction to enter Plaintiffs' adoption decrees.
253. Because all of the purported adoptions were void ab initio, Plaintiffs, as a matter
of law, were never adopted and remained legally the wards of the City of New York and the
foster care agencies, entitling them to all of the constitutional, statutory, and common law rights
of foster children until no earlier than July 10,2007.
254. At all times relevant hereto, Defendants City and ACS knew that their practices
and policies created a substantial risk of serious harm to children in its care and deliberately
failed to choose reasonable alternatives to those practices and policies in deliberate disregard of
Plaintiffs' constitutional right to be free from harm.
255. At all times relevant hereto, Defendants City and ACS knew that children in
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overcrowded foster homes were at a substantial risk of serious harm because of their failure to appropriately establish a minimally adequate system of placements and adoptions for special needs children in the City of New York, where it could place, monitor, and protect these children, including Plaintiffs.
256. The failures of Defendants' unconstitutional system continued from foster placements, to the purported adoptions, through to the present.
257. Plaintiffs' foster care files contain substantial information that should have immediately set off the alarms, but for the unconstitutional practice and policy of failing to supervise Plaintiffs and their respective Defendant Agencies:
a. Leekin threatened Defendant SCO with surrender all of the children and that she would go find another agency if they did not like the way she did things;
b. Leekin often rescheduled home visit appointments or simply was not at home when the caseworker arrived;
c. School staff complained that Leekin was never involved and failed to return phone calls; and,
d. Several of the children in her care went into the home being sweet, kind, and well behaved despite their disabilities, and suddenly after one year or more in her care, they became violent, aggressive, and displayed severe behavioral problems, and she often indicated she may not want to adopt the children because of these problems. These are clear signs of deterioration that were ignored.
258. However, Defendants deliberately failed to learn this information by virtue of its failure to verify that the information the Defendant Agencies provided was accurate and its prohibition against direct contact with foster children or parents.
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259. At all times relevant hereto, Defendants City and ACS acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs' safety by approving their placement in the Leekin home knowing the substantial risks of serious harm of placing multiple special needs children together in one home. Defendants were deliberately indifferent to said conditions and knowingly and recklessly failed to take action which would ensure Plaintiffs' safety.
260. At all times relevant hereto, Defendants City and ACS knew or deliberately failed to learn through their unconstitutional policies and practices and repeated acts of negligence that any child, including Plaintiffs, that was placed in the Leekin foster home was at a substantial risk of serious harm.
261. At all times relevant hereto, Defendants City and ACS acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs' rights to maintain relationships with their natural siblings and birth families as a result of their unconstitutional practice and policy of basing placements on convenience rather than the child's best interest.
262. Plaintiffs would not have been placed in Leekin's care, been permitted to remain in Leekin's care, or been adopted by Leekin but for Defendants City's and ACS's deliberate indifference to their constitutional rights.
263. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' deliberate indifference while Plaintiffs were in the City's custody, Plaintiffs have suffered a lifetime of abuse--they have horrific physical injuries, scarring, psychological trauma from their imprisonment and inhumane treatment, pain and suffering, discomfort, deterioration, loss of the ability to enjoy life, loss of their entire education, loss of ability to work, loss of the ability of to have a permanent family, and suffered other reasonably foreseeable compensatory damages.
264. Plaintiffs will require services and treatment for the rest of their lives due to the
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severe psychological trauma and other harms they have endured in Leekin's custody. 265. Plaintiffs are obligated to the undersigned firms for the payment of attorney's fees
and seek recovery of reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1988. COUNT II- 42 U.S.C. § 1983 AGAINST DEFENDANTS SCO, HHS, & SJSC 266. Plaintiffs hereby reaver and reallege paragraphs I through 230 as if fully set forth
herein. 267. At all times relevant hereto, Defendants SCO, HHS, & SJSC (collectively,
"Defendant Agencies") acted under color of state Jaw as agents of Defendants City and ACS, by operating in the traditionally public function of providing foster care services.
268. Defendant Agencies, through repeated acts of negligence and reckless indifference to Plaintiffs' safety and well-being, created the opportunity for Plaintiffs to be permanently placed and adopted by fictitious persons and threw Plaintiffs into the Leekin snake-pit by:
a. Failing to investigate and do minimum background checks, which would have revealed Leekin's four fictitious identities;
b. Failing to appropriately monitor Plaintiffs in their placement to ensure their safety and well-being; and,
c. Failing to acknowledge and act upon numerous red flags and warnings about Leekin, her intentions, and her ability and/or desire to care for Plaintiffs.
269. Defendant Agencies knew that failing to perform background checks on potential foster parents posed a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiffs, and they failed to conduct such checks with deliberate indifference to that known substantial risk.
270. Defendant Agencies knew that failing to appropriately monitor Plaintiffs while in Leekin's care posed a substantial risk of serious harm and failed to do so in deliberate disregard
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of Plaintiffs' constitutional rights. 271. Defendants SCO and HHS knew that a foster parent's threat of surrender
constitutes a substantial risk of serious harm, yet failed to act to protect the safety of Plaintiffs S.B., T.L., and J.L. in deliberate disregard of their constitutional right to be free from harm.
272. Defendant Agencies acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs' safety by approving their placements in the Leekin home knowing the substantial risks of serious harm of placing multiple special needs children together in one home. Defendants were deliberately indifferent to said conditions and knowingly and recklessly failed to take action, which would ensure Plaintiffs' safety.
273. Defendant SJSC acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs R.E's. and S.W.'s right to maintain relationships with their natural siblings when it opted to base placement and adoption by Leekin on her demands and convenience rather than the Plaintiffs' best interest.
274. Plaintiffs are obligated to the undersigned firms for the payment of attorney's fees and seek recovery of reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
COUNT III- NEGLIGENCE AGAINST DEFENDANT SCO 275. Plaintiff S.B. hereby reavers and realleges paragraphs I through 230 as if fully set forth herein. 276. Plaintiff had no means by which to protect his rights so long as he remained in the custody of his abuser, which did not cease until he was rescued on July 10, 2007. 277. Additionally, at all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff S.B. was unable to protect his legal rights because of an overall inability to function in society as a result of mental affliction. He was adjudicated incompetent in the State of Florida and not appointed a guardian until May 2008.
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278. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant SCO owed a duty of reasonable care to

S.B., both under the laws of the State of New York and the common-law by their special relationship.

279. Defendant SCO had the following duties:

a. New York state law required SCO to establish an appropriate procedure to review and evaluate an applicant's background;

b. To positively identify each person who was to foster and/or adopt a child; c. To independently verify and substantiate that the information Leekin provided was true. Independent verification means going behind the information and documents provided and making collateral contacts to verify the following information:

1.

Identity;

ii. Employment and income;

iii. Home ownership, address, loans, rental agreements;

iv. Familial relationships and family history;

v. Household composition;

vi. Religion;

vu. Education;

vm. References;

d. Both New York state law and the standard of care require monthly face-toface contact with children to:

1. Evaluate any foster parent or prospective adoptive parent based upon prevailing standards; and,

11. Investigate neglect and abuse m foster homes and prospective

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adoptive homes. 280. Defendant SCO breached its duties to S.B. by: a. Failing to act in accordance with statutory requirements and professional
child welfare standards of care; b. Failing to conduct appropriate background investigation of Leekin prior to
issuing her a foster care license and/or allowing her to adopt S.B.; c. Failing to uncover Leekin's true identity, and that she lied on her
applications; d. Failing to contact and visit S.B. in accordance with the requirements for
face-to-face visits and contacts, including failing to interview S.B. outside ofLeekin's presence; e. Placing S.B. in Leekin's home with five (5) other special needs foster
children; f. Repeatedly ignoring red flags and obvious signs that Leekin's motives for
fostering and adopting were less than sincere: 1. Leekin often rescheduled home visit appointments or simply failed
to keep already scheduled appointments. ii. When confronted about why she failed to keep a home visit
appointment, Leekin advised that if SCO did not like the way she did things, then she would surrender of all six children in her care, including S.B., and go to another agency.
iii. Staff members at S.B. 's school complained that Leekin was not involved at school and repeatedly failed to return phone calls;
iv. S.B. began to show signs of aggressiOn and violence and deteriorating conditions while in Leekin's care, and Leekin often indicated her doubt about
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adopting S.B. as a result of his behavioral problems. g. Ignoring significant behavioral changes that were reflective that S.B. was
being abused; and, h. Proceeding with adoption finalization, despite all indications that Leekin
was not an appropriate candidate for adopting S.B. 281. S.B. would not have been placed in Leekin's care, been permitted to remain in
Leekin's care, or been adopted by Leekin but for SCO's repeated breaches of its duties. 282. As a direct and proximate result of SCO's negligence while S.B. was in its care,
S.B. has suffered a lifetime of abuse--he has suffered horrific physical injuries, scarring, psychological trauma from his imprisonment and inhumane treatment, pain and suffering, discomfort, deterioration, loss of the ability to enjoy life, loss of his entire education, loss of his ability to work, loss of the ability to have a permanent family, and suffered other reasonably foreseeable compensatory damages. S.B. will require services and treatment for the rest of his life due to severe psychological trauma and other harms that he endured in Leekin's custody.
COUNT IV- NEGLIGENCE AGAINST DEFENDANT SJSC 283. Plaintiffs S.W., R.E., J.B., C.B., and T.G hereby reaver and reallege paragraphs I through 230 as if fully set forth herein. 284. Plaintiffs S.W., R.E., J.B., C.B., and T.G had no means by which to protect their rights so long as they remained in the custody of their abuser, which did not cease until they were rescued on July 10,2007. 285. Additionally, at the time of rescue, S.W. was unable to protect his legal rights because of an overall inability to function in society as a result of mental affliction. He was adjudicated incompetent in the State of Florida and not appointed a guardian until May 2008.
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286. Additionally, at the time of rescue, J.B. and C.B. were unable to protect their legal rights because of an overall inability to function in society as a result of mental affliction.

287. PlaintiffT.G is a minor as of the date of this complaint, and R.E. was a minor at the time of rescue.

288. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant SJSC owed a duty of reasonable care to

Plaintiffs, both under the laws of the State of New York and the common-law by their special relationship.

289. Defendant SJSC had the following duties:

a. New York state law required SJSC to establish an appropriate procedure to

review and evaluate an applicant's background;

b. To positively identify each person who was to foster and/or adopt a child;

c. To independently verify and substantiate that the information Leekin

provided was true. Independent verification means going behind the information and documents

provided and making collateral contacts to verify the following information:

1.

Identity;

ii. Employment and income;

iii. Home ownership, address, loans, rental agreements;

iv. Familial relationships and family history;

v. Household composition;

vt. Religion;

vii. Education;

vm. References;

d. Both New York state law and the standard of care require monthly face-to-

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face contact with children to:

1. Evaluate any foster parent or prospective adoptive parent based upon prevailing standards; and,

adoptive homes.

n. Investigate neglect and abuse m foster homes and prospective

290. Defendant SJSC breached its duties to S.W., R.E., J.B., C.B., and T.G. by:

a. Failing to act in accordance with statutory requirements and professional child welfare standards of care;

b. Failing to conduct appropriate background investigation of Leekin prior to issuing her a foster care license and/or allowing her to adopt them;

c. applications;
d.

Failing to uncover Leekin's true identity, and that she lied on her Failing to contact and visit Plaintiffs in accordance with the requirements

for face-to-face visits and contacts, including failing to interview them outside of Leekin's presence;
e. Depriving S.W. of his right to be placed with his two natural siblings, also

special needs children, because of the recognition that it would be too difficult for one foster parent to care for all three children, and then placing him in the Leekin home, where SJSC later placed Plaintiffs R.E., J.B., C.B., and T.G.;
f. Depriving R.E. of his right to be reunited with some of his natural siblings, who were placed with a different voluntary agency, because Leekin demanded SJSC do something to prevent that, and that is exactly what they did without regard to R.E. 's best

interests;

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g. Placing these five (5) special needs foster children together in Leekin's home despite known dangers;

h. Repeatedly ignoring red flags and obvious signs that Leekin's motives for fostering and adopting were less than sincere:

1. Leekin often rescheduled home visit appointments or simply failed to keep already scheduled appointments.

ii. Plaintiffs began to show signs of aggression and violence and

deteriorating conditions while in Leekin's care, and Leekin often indicated her doubt about adopting S.W., R.E., and J.B. as a result of those behavioral problems;

L

Ignoring significant behavioral changes that were reflective that Plaintiffs

were being abused; and,

J. Proceeding with adoption finalization, despite all indications that Leekin was not an appropriate candidate for adopting them.

291. S.W., R.E., J.B., C.B., and T.G would not have been placed in Leekin's care, been

permitted to remain in Leekin's care, or been adopted by Leekin but for SJSC's repeated

breaches of its duties.

292. Plaintiffs would not have been placed in Leekin's care, been permitted to remain

in Leekin's care, or been adopted by Leekin but for SJSC's repeated breaches of its duties.

293. As a direct and proximate result of SJSC's negligence while Plaintiffs were in its care, Plaintiffs have suffered a lifetime of abuse-they have suffered horrific physical injuries,

scarring, psychological trauma from their imprisonment and inhumane treatment, pain and

suffering, discomfort, deterioration, loss of the ability to enjoy life, loss of their entire education,

loss of their ability to work, loss of the ability to have a permanent family, and suffered other

47

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reasonably foreseeable compensatory damages. Plaintiffs will require services and treatment for the rest of their lives due to severe psychological trauma and other harms that they endured in Leekin's custody.
COUNT V- NEGLIGENCE AGAINST DEFENDANT HHS 294. Plaintiffs T.L. and J.L. hereby reaver and reallege paragraphs I through 230 as if fully set forth herein. 295. Plaintiffs T.L. and J.L. had no means by which to protect their rights so long as they remained in the custody of their abuser, which did not cease until they were rescued on July 10,2007. 296. Additionally, at the time of rescue, T.L. and J.L. were minors. J.L. remains a minor as of the date of this complaint. 297. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant HHS owed a duty of reasonable care to Plaintiffs, both under the laws of the State of New York and the common-law by their special relationship. 298. Defendant HHS had the following duties:
a. New York state law required HHS to establish an appropriate procedure to review and evaluate an applicant's background;
b. To positively identify each person who was to foster and/or adopt a child; c. To independently verify and substantiate that the information Leekin provided was true. Independent verification means going behind the information and documents provided and making collateral contacts to verify the following information:
1. Identity; ii. Employment and income;
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iii. Home ownership, address, loans, rental agreements; iv. Familial relationships and family history; v. Household composition; v1. Religion; vn. Education; viii. References; d. Both New York state law and the standard of care require monthly face-toface contact with children to: t. Evaluate any foster parent or prospective adoptive parent based upon prevailing standards; and, ii. Investigate neglect and abuse in foster homes and prospective adoptive homes. 299. Defendant HHS breached its duties to T.L. and J.L. by: a. Failing to act in accordance with statutory requirements and professional child welfare standards of care; b. Failing to conduct appropriate background investigation of Leekin prior to issuing her a foster care license and/or allowing her to adopt them; c. Failing to uncover Leekin's true identity, and that she lied on her applications; d. Failing to contact and visit Plaintiffs in accordance with the requirements for face-to-face visits and contacts, including failing to interview them outside of Leekin's presence; e. Failing to review Leekin's foster parent file before issuing a new annual
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license. Had Defendants done this, they would have seen that Leekin went from being Baptist to being Catholic; she went from being retired to being employed for the past 17 years; she owned her home, but she rented it; and, she claimed her living room was being remodeled for 6 years straight, yet Defendants just kept on licensing her. If they did review her information, then they just ignored the obvious;
f. Repeatedly ignoring red flags and obvious signs that Leekin's motives for fostering and adopting were less than sincere;
g. Leekin often rescheduled home visit appointments or simply failed to keep already scheduled appointments;
h. Ignoring significant behavioral changes that were reflective that Plaintiffs were being abused; and,
1. Proceeding with adoption finalization, despite all indications that Leekin was not an appropriate candidate for adopting them.
300. Plaintiffs would not have been placed in Leekin's care, been permitted to remain in Leekin's care, or been adopted by Leekin but for HHS 's repeated breaches of its duties.
301. As a direct and proximate result of HHS's negligence while Plaintiffs were in its care, Plaintiffs have suffered a lifetime of abuse--they have suffered horrific physical injuries, scarring, psychological trauma from their imprisonment and inhumane treatment, pain and suffering, discomfort, deterioration, loss of the ability to enjoy life, loss of their entire education, loss of their ability to work, loss of the ability to have a permanent family, and suffered other reasonably foreseeable compensatory damages. Plaintiffs will require services and treatment for the rest of their lives due to severe psychological trauma and other harms that they endured in Leekin's custody.
50

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV -MDG Document 1 Filed 04/29/09 Page 51 of 52 WHEREFORE Plaintiffs pray that this Honorable Court enter a judgment in Plaintiffs'
favor against Defendants for all recoverable damages, attorneys' fees and costs and such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL Plaintiffs hereby demand a trial by jury of all issues so triable in this case.
DATED this 'J~ dayofApril,2009.
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Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV -MDG Document 1 Filed 04/29/09 Page 52 of 52 Respectfully submitted,

OWARD M. TALENFELD, to be admitted Pro Hac Vice Florida Bar No. 312398 COLODNY, FASS, TALENFELD, KARLINSKY & ABATE, P.A. Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs 100 S.E. 3rdAvenue, 23rd Floor Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33394 Telephone: (954) 492-4010 Facsimile: (954) 492-1144 htalenfeld@cftlaw.com
cbJL~.L~ S THEODORE BABBITT, to be admitted Pro Hac Vice Florida Bar No. 091146 BABBITT, JOHNSON, OSBORNE & LE CLAINCHE, P.A Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs 1641 Worthington Road, Suite 100 P.O. Box 4426 West Palm Beach, Florida 33402-4426 Telephone: (561) 684-2500 Facsimile: (561) 684-6308 tedbabbitt@babbitt-johnson.com

THOMAS A. M RE (TM-6123) MATTHEW M. GAIER (MG-4239) JORDAN K. MERSON (JM-7939) KRAMER, DILLOF, LIVINGSTON &MOORE Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs 217 Broadway New York, NY 10007 Telephone: (212) 267-4177 Facsimile: (212) 233-8525 tmoore@kdlm.com
N WALSH, ESQ. t e admitted Pro Hac Vice Florida Bar No. 0796360 Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs 3067 Commercial Blvd. Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33308 Telephone: (954) 491-3130 Facsimile: (954) 772-2099 jjwalshlaw@gmail.com

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X S.W., et al.,
Plaintiffs, - against CITY OF NEW YORK, et al.,
Defendants. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X

ORDER CV 2009-1777 (ENV)(MDG)

Plaintiffs, who allege they were classified as special needs children, bring this civil rights action against the City of New York (the “City”), the Administration for Children’s Services and several foster care agencies to recover damages for the severe abuse they suffered at the hands of their foster care mother. Plaintiffs move for a protective order to shield the disclosure of 7 DVDs depicting various interviews of the plaintiffs conducted by counsel and their staff and corresponding transcripts of some of those interviews. Ct. doc. 64. Plaintiffs contend, and the City denies, that the materials are protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or the attorney work product doctrine. Id.; ct. doc. 67.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND Plaintiffs describe the DVDs and corresponding transcripts in dispute as depicting the following: 1) the initial client interviews of plaintiffs R.E., T.G., T.L. and J.L. conducted by

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 124 Filed 06/04/10 Page 2 of 14 PageID #: 1463
counsel on March 4, 2008 (the “attorney-client interviews”); 2) interviews of plaintiffs T.G., S.B., T.L., J.L., C.B., R.E., L.J., J.G., S.W. and J.B. conducted by a paralegal between October 2, 2008 and January 28, 2009 for use in a focus group presentation (the “paralegal-client interviews”); 3) a focus group presentation which consisted of excerpts of the paralegal interviews with corresponding slides containing legal argument (the “focus group presentation”); and 4) excerpts of the focus group presentation that were shared with a news organization (the “media video”). See ct. doc. 64-1.
The attorney-client interviews are of the initial meeting between certain of the plaintiffs and attorneys Howard Talenfeld, Jennifer Pearl, John Walsh and/or paralegal Gina Giovanni. Plaintiffs claim that the purpose of the interviews was to obtain and provide legal advice concerning potential claims arising out of the abuse of the plaintiffs while in the custody of their foster care mother. The March 4, 2008 video of the interview has not been disclosed to anyone other than the attorneys, their agents and the plaintiffs.
The paralegal-client interviews are separate interviews of each plaintiff by a paralegal at the direction and request of plaintiffs’ counsel. “These individual statements were taken with the intent to provide Plaintiffs’ counsel with personalized information from each Plaintiff to provide counsel with material for a focus group presentation, governed by a confidentiality
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agreement, in order to assist counsel with case evaluation and litigation and trial strategy.” Pl.s’ Mem. of Law at 8. These videos also have not been disclosed to any third-party.
The focus group presentation consists of “a compilation of strategically selected clips from” the paralegal-client interviews and corresponding legal argument that were shown to a focus group in February 2009 under a confidentiality agreement. “Plaintiffs’ counsel arranged for and organized the focus group to act as a mock jury to permit counsel to evaluate the strength of Plaintiffs’ case, while providing valuable insight as to trial strategy and for planning purposes.” Id. at 10.
The media video is a condensed and edited version of the focus group presentation and was provided to an employee of a network news organization under an oral agreement of confidentiality. Under the oral agreement, the news organization could view the video but could not disclose or otherwise use the video without the express permission of plaintiffs’ counsel. Plaintiffs’ counsel never gave that consent and the news organization returned the video to counsel, along with a confirmation that it did not make or retain copies of the video.
DISCUSSION I. Attorney-Client Privilege
"A party invoking the attorney-client privilege must show (1) a communication between client and counsel that (2) was
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intended to be and was in fact kept confidential, and (3) was made for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal advice." In re County of Erie, 473 F.3d 413, 419 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Constr. Prods. Research, Inc., 73 F.3d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1996); see Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976). In order to merit protection, the "predominant purpose" of the communication must be to render or solicit legal advice. See In re County of Erie, 473 F.3d at 420. The burden of establishing the applicability of the privilege and all of its elements rests with the party claiming protection. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 219 F.3d 175, 182 (2d Cir. 2000); Constr. Prods., 73 F.3d at 473-74.
A. Attorney-client Interviews I find that the attorney-client interviews are a quintessential example of attorney-client privileged material. The video consists of communications between client and counsel that were intended to be and were in fact kept confidential and were made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. Nevertheless, the City argues that the videos are discoverable because the privilege does not “shield [] facts under Upjohn.” Ct. doc. 67 at 6. While the City is correct that the privilege does not protect from disclosure the underlying facts revealed in the interviews, the privilege does shield the communications themselves even though they contain facts. As the Supreme Court recognized in Upjohn v. U.S., “[t]he client cannot
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be compelled to answer the question, ‘What did you say or write to the attorney?’ but may not refuse to disclose any relevant fact within his knowledge merely because he incorporated a statement of such fact into his communication to his attorney.” 449 U.S. 383, 395-96 (1981) (quoting Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 205 F. Supp. 830, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1962)).
The City further argues that the privilege does not apply because the plaintiffs could not have expected that the interviews would remain confidential in light of counsel’s dissemination of other interviews to the media. Ct. doc. 67 at 6. However, counsel’s disclosure of the media video to a news organization in May 2009 could not have affected the plaintiffs’ expectations of confidentiality when they were interviewed in March 2008. Since I find that the attorney-client interviews are protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege, I need not discuss the application of the attorney work product doctrine to this video.
Finally, the City argues that plaintiffs’ counsel waived protection for any interviews that were used in creating the summary biographies filed with the Court prior to a discovery conference. However, in light of the representation of plaintiffs’ counsel that those biographies were compiled from plaintiffs’ interrogatory responses and a review of the records, ct. doc. 77 at 5, there is no basis to find waiver.
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II. Work Product Doctrine Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) embodies the federal
work-product doctrine which provides qualified protection to "documents and tangible things . . . prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial" from discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); see Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947); Constr. Prods., 73 F.3d at 473. This work includes notes, memoranda, witness interviews, and other materials whether they are created by an attorney or by an agent for the attorney. U.S. v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1975); Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510-11. Documents prepared in anticipation of litigation are those that, "in light of the nature of the document and the factual situation in the particular case . . . can fairly be said to have been prepared or obtained because of the prospect of litigation." United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1202 (2d Cir. 1998).
The party asserting work-product protection bears the burden of establishing its applicability. See Constr. Prods., 73 F.3d at 473. Although the work-product doctrine protects the opinions, theories and strategies of an attorney, the protection extends to facts as well. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Oct. 22, 2001, 282 F.3d 156, 161 (2d Cir. 2002). Fact work product encompasses “factual material, including the result of a factual investigation.” In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated July 6, 2005, 510 F.3d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 2007). “[O]pinion work product reveals the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an
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attorney or other representative, and is entitled to greater protection than fact work product.” Id. If a party seeks disclosure of protected documents, the party must demonstrate a "substantial need” for fact work-product and a “highly persuasive showing of” need for opinion work product. See In re Grand Jury, 219 F.3d at 190-91.
A. Paralegal-client Interviews and Focus Group Presentation The paralegal-client interviews and the focus group presentation were created because of litigation and are entitled to work product protection. The interviews themselves were conducted by a paralegal at the direction of counsel to provide material for the focus group presentation which was designed to assist counsel in shaping case and trial strategy. See In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 343 F.3d 658, 665 (3d Cir. 2003) (“‘Modern trial consulting methods typically consist of many techniques such as witness preparation, and mock trials, that clearly could not be framed as falling outside of the work product rule.’”) (quoting Dennis Pl. Stolle et al., The Perceived Fairness of the Psychologist Trial Consultant, 20 Law and Psychol. Riv. 139, 169 (1996)). That excerpts of these videos were later used for a purpose other than litigation does not mean that they lose protection under the work-product doctrine. See Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1202. The City argues that plaintiffs have waived any work product protection by disclosure of the focus group presentation.
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However, "the work-product doctrine is distinct from and broader than the attorney-client privilege." In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 219 F.3d 175, 182 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Hickman, 329 U.S. at 508 and quoting Nobles, 422 U.S. at 238 & n. 11). "Unlike the attorney-client privilege, the work-product privilege is not necessarily waived by disclosure to any third party; rather, 'the courts generally find a waiver of the work product privilege only if the disclosure substantially increases the opportunity for potential adversaries to obtain the information." Int’l Design Concepts, Inc. v. Saks, No. 05 Civ. 4754, 2006 WL 1564684, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2006); Falise v. American Tobacco Co., 193 F.R.D. 73, 80 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting In re Pfizer Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 90 Civ. 1260, 1993 WL 561125, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 1993)); see Tilberg v. Next Mgmt Co., No. 04CIV7373, 2005 WL 3543701, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2005); Medinol, Ltd. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 214 F.R.D. 113, 114-15 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). The determination of whether there is a waiver depends on the circumstances. Nobles, 422 U.S. at 239-40. The purpose of the work-product doctrine "is to protect material from an opposing party in litigation, not necessarily from the rest of the world generally." United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299-1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Even where the attorney-client privilege has been waived, documents "shown to others" may still be protected as attorney work-product so long as "there was some good reason to show it." Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1199-1200 & n.4; see
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U.S. v. Stewart, 287 F. Supp. 2d 461, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that defendant did not waive work-product protection by forwarding copy of e-mail to daughter that she originally sent to her attorney).
The work product doctrine is designed to “preserve a zone of privacy in which a lawyer can prepare and develop legal theories and strategy ‘with an eye toward litigation, free from unnecessary intrusion by his adversaries.’” Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1196 (quoting Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510-11). Since the focus group was effectively acting as a consultant to counsel, communications with the focus group are within the scope of attorney work product protection. See In re Cendant, 343 F.3d at 667-68; Haugh v. Schroder Investment Mgmt., No. 02 CIV. 7955, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14586, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2003); Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v. Wachner, 198 F.R.D. 53, 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). The focus group was governed by a confidentiality agreement and was engaged to assist counsel with litigation strategy. Disclosure of portions of the paralegal-client interviews to the focus group under these circumstances did not substantially increase the likelihood that defendants would gain access to the material.
The City also argues that it has a substantial need for the information contained in the materials that are protected work product. The City reasons that since the interviews depicted in the videos took place closer in time to the events at issue in the litigation, any deposition they take of the plaintiffs will be
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inferior. However, the same argument could be made with respect to every client interview in every litigation. It is not necessary for defense counsel to invade the privacy of plaintiffs’ counsel’s work product in order to procure plaintiffs’ testimony. See Hickman, 511 U.S. at 513 (despite denial of production of oral witness statements, counsel “need not be unduly hindered in the preparation of his case, in the discovery of facts or in his anticipation of his opponent’s position”); A.I.A. Holdings, S.A. v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 97 Civ. 4978, 2002 WL 31385824, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2002) (“[a] witness’s availability for a deposition defeats a claim of substantial need for work product material”). Even under the lower threshold applicable to fact work product, I find that the City has not met its burden of showing a substantial need for the material at issue.
The City argues that limiting disclosure to the plaintiffs’ answers to counsel’s questions would remove any concerns implicated by the work product doctrine. However, the work product doctrine applies to materials prepared by the client as well as materials created by an attorney. See Lugosch v. Conegel, No. Civ. 00-CV-0784, 2006 WL 931687, at *16 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2006); Tilberg v. Next Mgmt Co., No. 04CIV7373, 2005 WL 3543701, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2005); Bank of New York v. Meridien BIAO Bank Tanzania Ltd., No. 95 CIV. 4856, 1996 WL 490710, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 1996); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) (documents prepared by or for a "party or by or for that other party's
-10-

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 124 Filed 06/04/10 Page 11 of 14 PageID #: 1472
representative"). Moreover, the City’s proposal ignores that counsel’s strategy and mental impressions underlying the questions may be revealed by the plaintiffs’ answers to those questions.
B. Media Video Since the work product doctrine is designed to protect against the disclosure of materials created for the purpose of litigation strategy, it does not ordinarily shield materials for media purposes from disclosure. See Calvin Klein, 198 F.R.D. at 55. However, since the media video contains excerpts of the focus group presentation that this Court has found to be attorney work product, the question then is whether plaintiff’s counsel have waived work product protection by providing the media video to an employee of a news organization under an oral agreement that the video not be used or disclosed without further authorization. Although there is no evidence that the media video itself was disseminated by the news organization, presumably, counsel could reasonably anticipate that employees of the news organization would view the video and later report on the “story.” Even if no portion of the media video was shown to the public, counsel substantially increased the potential that the substance of its work product would be disclosed to their adversaries. The sharing of attorney work product with a news organization neither demonstrates an interest in maintaining confidentiality nor appears to be intended to serve any purpose related to actual or contemplated litigation by the plaintiffs. Rather, "[d]elivering
-11-

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 124 Filed 06/04/10 Page 12 of 14 PageID #: 1473
the [video] to [a third party] was a deliberate, affirmative and selective strategic decision to disclose this information for another benefit other than aiding the lawyer pitched in the battle of litigation." NXIVM Corp. v. O'Hara, 241 F.R.D. 109, 142 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (disclosure of protected report to a retained public relations company) (citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 219 F.3d 175, 192 (2d Cir. 2000)). “[A] waiver of work product protection occurs when the covered materials are used in a manner that is inconsistent with the protection.” Granite Partners, L.P. v. Bear Stearns & Co. Inc., 184 F.R.D. 49, 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). Here, the circumstances for finding waiver are more compelling than in NXIVM Corp. since the release of work product was to a new organization not employed by plaintiffs whose interest in reporting on newsworthy events do not completely coincide with plaintiffs' interest in this case. Since I find that plaintiffs have waived work product protection as to any protected material contained in the media video, plaintiff must produce a copy of the media video.
The City argues that the disclosure of the media video waived the attorney-client privilege or work product protection for the other materials discussed above. I do not find such a broad waiver is warranted here. Since the determination of the scope of waiver is guided by concerns of fairness, courts should "consider whether a party has made affirmative and selective use of privileged documents, as well as the underlying purposes for the
-12-

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 124 Filed 06/04/10 Page 13 of 14 PageID #: 1474
work product doctrine. McGrath v. Nassau County Health Care Corp., 204 F.R.D. 240, 245 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (citation omitted). Although the Second Circuit has not enunciated criteria for determining the scope of any work product waiver, it has never endorsed a broad subject matter waiver. Rather, it has required courts to make "particularized findings" regarding the connection between disclosures that led to a waiver finding and the materials required to be disclosed. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 219 F.3d at 192. Even where waiver of some protected work product results from a client’s testimony in a proceeding, the Second Circuit has recognized “that work-product not communicated to the client remains shielded.” Id.
Since plaintiffs' selective disclosure of the protected work product material was made extrajudicially and has not been used in this litigation, plaintiffs did not "create a risk of legal prejudice" to defendants. Cf. In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 10103 (2d Cir. 1987) (waiver of attorney-client communications disclosed in a book). Thus, I find, as a matter of fairness, that plaintiffs need not produce the undisclosed portions of the focus group presentations or attorney client interviews. Id.
-13-

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 124 Filed 06/04/10 Page 14 of 14 PageID #: 1475

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs' motion for a

protective order is granted in part and denied in part.

SO ORDERED.

Dated:

Brooklyn, New York June 4, 2010

/s/ MARILYN D. GO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

-14-

 
 Case 1:09C-cavs-e0117:0797--cEvN-0V1-7M77D-GENVD-MocDuGmeDnot c2u0m8 enFti2le0d5-110/0F8i/l1ed009P/2a4g/e101 oPfa4gePa1goefI?D #: 6582

u:-IITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ----------·--·-··--···-- •• ··--- ----------- -· ---------------------X S.W., by and through hi:; guardian, RENEE MARQUIS-ABRAMS; T.G., and .LL., by and through their next friend, MILDRED DEL GROSSO; S.B. and R.E. by and through their guardian, PATRJCIA BALDWIN; L.J. and J.G., by and through their guardian, KEVIN HENDRICKSON; lB., C.B., and T.L
Plaintifi~.
-against-
CITY OF NE\V YORK, ADMfNIS'TRAT!ON FOR CHfLDREN'S SERVlCES, flk/a CIIILD WELFARE ADMINISTRATION; ST. JOSEPH SERVICES FOR CHILDREN, INC. flkia CATHOLIC CHfLD CARE SOCIETY OF THE DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN, INC., a New York corporation; HEARTSHARE HCMAN SERVICES, ilk/a CATHOLlC GUARDIAN SOCIETY OF THE DIOCESE OF BROOKLYI\, INC., a New York corporation; SCO FAMILY OF SERVICES, f!k/a ST. CH.RISTOPilER-OTTlLIE, A New York corporation,
Dctcndants.
-------·-------------------·-.....···-.---------------------------X
CITY OF NEW YORK, ADMINISTRATION FOR CHfLDREN'S SERVICES,
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
- against -
JUDITH LEEKfN, DESMOND LEEKIN, ANTHON':{ VERNON J,EEKIN, CAROL LEEKfl\, ISHMATIIE NAGASSARIAS!vu\N, ANITA LEZAME, DR. RALPH SQU!TTERl, RHONDA MORGAN, EDWfN GOL!LD SERVICES FOR CHILDREN, SABIU)'.;A COLLfNS, LYSTRA LEWIS, MIA KARENGA. CHERYL JACK, CLAUDETTE JACKSON, THEL\·1A BOWES, and VONTRELL LEEKlN,
Third-Party Defendants. -------------------- -------------···· · · - ------------------ . . . -···-X

Docket No.: 09-CV -1777
STIPULATION A!'ID OHDER OF DISCONTINUANCE

'WHEREAS, plaintiff'> commenced this action by f]ling a complaint on April 29, 2009, against defendants CTTY OF NEW YORK, ADMlNISTR:\TlON FOR CHILDREN'S

PHD,\TA 3327180.)

Case 1:09-Ccavs-0e117:7079--cEvN-0V1-7M77D-GENVD-oMcDuGmeDntoc2u0m8enFt i2le0d5-110/0F8il/e1d009P/2a4g/1e02 oPfa4geP2agofe7ID #: 6583

SERVICES, f/k/a CHfLD WELFARE ADMI]';ISTKA. TlOl\ ("City Defendants); ST. JOSEPH SERVICES FOR CHILDREN, !~C. f!k/a CATHOLIC CHILD CARE SOCJETY OF THE

DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN, lNC., a New York corporation; HEARTSHARE I·HJMAN SERVICES, ffk!a CATHOLIC GUARDIAN SOCll~TY OF THE DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN,

INC., a New York corporation; SCO FAMILY OF SERVJCES, f/k!a ST. CHRISTOPHER-

OTTILIE ("Agency Defendants''), making certain allegations of liability; and,

WHEREAS, the City Defendants and Agency Defendants have denied any and all

liability arising out of plaintiffs' allegations; and,

WHEREAS, the City Defendants fileJ u Third-Party Complaint on September 15, 2009

against, inter alia, RALPH SQUITIERI, alk!a R.A.LPH SQU!TIERl ("Squitieri") for

contribution and indemnification; and,

WHEREAS, the Agency Defendants filed a Third-Party Complaint on January 7, 2010

against, inter alia, Squitieri for contribution and indemnification; and

WHEREAS, City Defendants and Third-Party Defcnda11t Squitieri now desire to resolve

all issues raised between them in this iitigatjon, >vithout further rroceedings and without

admitting fault or liability; and,

WHEREAS, Agency Defendants and Third-Party Defendant Squitieri now desire to

resolve all issues raised between them in this litigation, without further proceedings and without

admitting fault or liability; and,

NOW, THERI:FORE, IT fS HHREBY STIPULATED Al\TD AGREED, by and

between the undersigned, as follows:

l.

'T'he above-captioned action is hereby dismissed against Third-Party Defendant

Squitieri with prejudice, and witlx>ut costs, expenses, or fees.

2

PHDATA H27l80_.3

Case 1:09C-cavs-e0117:0797--cEv-N0V17-M77D-EGNVD-MocDuGmeDnotc2u0m8entF2il0e5d-110/0F8ile/1d009/P2a4g/1e0 3 Poaf g4eP3aogfe7ID #: 6584
2. City Defendants and Agency Defendants agree to dismiss:.tl \Vith prejudice of all the claims against Third-Pany Defendant Squitieri, and to release all Squitieri's successors and/or assigns, and all of Squitieri's present or former representatives, or agents (collectively the "Released Pa.'1:ies") and do release them from any and all liability, claims, or rights or causes of action which could have been asserted by or on behalf of City Defendants or Agency Defendants against any of the Released Parties based on any act. omission, event or occurrence from the beginning of the world up to and including the date hereof, without limitation, arising out of or relating to the events contained in the Complaint or Third-Party Complaint in this action and arising from any incidents mentioned therein, including, but not limited to, any and all claims relating tO the placement, foster care, adoption, or medical services, as well as all claims for costs, expenses, interest and/or attorneys' fees.
3. This Court retains jurisdiction for the purposes of enforcing this Stipulation and Order.
4. This Stipulation and Order cont<lins all the t.;rms and conditions agreed upon by the parties hereto and no oral agreement entered into at any time nor any written agreement entered into prior to tbe execution of this Stipulation and Order regarding the subject matter of the instant proceeding shall be deemed to exist. or to bind the parties hereto, or to vary the tenns and c,onditions cont~1int:d herein.

3

PHDATA 3327180)

Case 1:09C-cavs-e0117:0797-c-Ev-N0V17-7M7D-EGNVD-MocDuGmeDnotc2u0m8entF2il0e5d-110/0F8ile/1d009/P2a4g/1e0 4 Poaf g4eP4aogfe7ID #: 6585

Dated: New York, New York Scptcrnb~;r !4, 20 J 0
B:c~~~~-

Attorneys for Dejendantslfl1ird-Party Plaintiffs CITY OP NEW YORK and ADMJ)IISTRATION FOR CHILDREN'S SERVICES, f!k/a CHILD WELFARE ADMINISTRATION 140 Broadway, Suite 3100 New York, ·!\lY 10005 (212) 971-8000

Dated: New York, New York September , 20 l 0
............. ~----'\
Cot~)YAY,~RRE;''LL C~R'fl~& KBLYL.CC. '
By: .. ',\.{-~(~;I~;t-.J,;1~~~f, ~~-/~jJ.:>{f!Ici-.{7.1. -~::/:: .
Attomeysfor Defendants ST. JOSEPH SERVIChS FOR CHILDREN. INC. fi'k!a CATHOLIC CHILD CARE SOCIETY OF TilE DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN. INC., a New York corporation; llliARTSJIAR.E llU\·1Af\ SERVICES, t/k/a CATHOLIC GUARDIAN SOCIETY OF THE DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN, INC., a New York corporation; SCO PAMil,Y OF SERVICES, flkia ST. CHRISTOPHER-OTffLIE, a New York corporation 48 Wall Street, 20th Fl. New York, NY 10005 (212) 785-2929

Dated: New York, New· York September , 20 I0

RALPH SQUITIERI, AIK/A

RALPH By:

S(Q-NUIiT:-IEtR~I>J~:~I•:·':::..._

Charles Kutner, Esq. LAW OFFICES OF CHARLES E. KUTNER UP

Attorneyfor Third-Party Dcfendam DR. RALPH SQUJ'ITERl 110 E. 59th Street, 25th F!oor New York, NY 10022

I S0..01}.DERED:
U.S.DJs. /ENV

OCT 7 2010

4

PHDATA 33271 80_3

 
 Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 238 Filed 11/17/10 Page 1 of 3 PageID #: 7204

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X

S.W., et al.

Plaintiffs,

- against -

ORDER

THE CITY OF NEW YORK, et al.,

CV 2009-1777 (ENV)(MDG)

Defendants.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X

This order concerns a subpoena served on:

RHONDA MORGAN, defaulting Third Party Defendant.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X

This Order concerns a deposition subpoena served on RHONDA

MORGAN by the City of New York and the Administration for

Children's Services (the "City defendants"). Although Ms. Morgan

has been sued by the City defendants and other defendants, she

has not formally appeared in this action and default has been

entered against her.1 In its letter motion to compel Ms. Morgan

to appear for a deposition, counsel for the City defendants

claims Ms. Morgan has knowledge of information critical to this

case, but has refused to appear at a deposition. Ct. doc. 234.

1 Ms. Morgan sent a letter dated September 21, 2010 to the Court advising that she does not have money for an attorney and is not in default. See ct. doc. 200. The question of Ms. Morgan's default and lack of legal representation will be addressed later at a conference, which the Court shall schedule if the pending motions to dismiss the third party complaint are denied by the Court or if any claims against Ms. Morgan remain.

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 238 Filed 11/17/10 Page 2 of 3 PageID #: 7205
Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that an attorney, as an officer of the court, may issue a subpoena on behalf of a court in which the attorney is authorized to practice, or for a court in a district in which a document production is compelled by the subpoena. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(3). Valid attorney-issued subpoenas under Rule 45(a)(3) operate as enforceable mandates of the court on whose behalf they are served. See, e.g., Advisory Committee Notes, 1991 Amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 45; Board of Govenors of Federal Reserve System v. Pharaon, 140 F.R.D. 634, 641-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
Absent an improperly issued subpoena or an "adequate excuse" by the non-party, failure to comply with a subpoena made under Rule 45 may be deemed a contempt of the court from which the subpoena issued. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(e); see also Daval Steel Products v. M/V Fakredine, 951 F.2d 1357, 1364 (2d Cir. 1991) Indeed, the judicial power to hold a non-party who has failed to obey a valid subpoena in contempt is the primary mechanism by which a court can enforce a subpoena. See David D. Siegel, Fed. R. Civ. P. 45, Practice Commentaries, ¶C45-26.
Having examined the subpoena and affidavit of service submitted by the City defendants, the Court finds that the subpoena in question appears to be valid and properly served upon Ms. Morgan. Ms. Morgan is advised that she must thus comply with the subpoena and appear for a deposition, even if she does not have much information on Judith Leekins, as claimed in her letter. She is obligated to appear at a deposition and answer
-2-

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 238 Filed 11/17/10 Page 3 of 3 PageID #: 7206

questions posed by counsel for the City defendants about Ms. Leekins or any other issue relevant to this case.

CONCLUSION

RHONDA MORGAN is hereby ORDERED to comply with the subpoena

served upon her. She must immediately call Bruce Strikowsky or

Carl Schaerf, the attorneys for the City defendants, to arrange

for a mutually convenient date for her to appear at a deposition

to give testimony and to produce documents requested by the

subpoena. She must call these attorneys by December 1, 2010 and appear for a deposition to be held on or before December 30,

2010.

RHONDA MORGAN is warned that if she fails to comply with

this order, she could be subject to contempt proceedings for

failure to respond to the subpoena and this order. If found to

be in contempt of the subpoena or this order, she could be

subject to sanctions, including imposition of a monetary fine,

attorneys fees and costs. If the failure to comply continues,

the court could issue a warrant of arrest for failure to comply

with a court order.

SO ORDERED.

Dated:

Brooklyn, New York November 17, 2010

Mailed to: Rhonda Morgan 451 Fulton Street, Apt. 3 Hempstead, NY 11501

_/s/_________________________ MARILYN D. GO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

-3-

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X S.W., et al.,
Plaintiffs, - against CITY OF NEW YORK, et al.,
Defendants. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X

ORDER CV 2009-1777 (ENV)(MDG)

This order summarizes and further explains rulings made on the record during a conference held on November 5, 2010 with respect to plaintiffs’ motion pursuant to Rule 32(a)(8) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 The motion was also discussed at a conference on October 6, 2010 at which this Court required plaintiffs to provide more specific designations of deposition excerpts. In their motion, plaintiffs seek to be able to use deposition testimony of City witnesses and State witnesses taken in Marisol A. v. Guiliani, 95 Civ. 10533 (S.D.N.Y.), as if taken in this litigation. Plaintiffs intend to use any testimony allowed against only the Administration for Children's Services

1 The City defendants have apparently already served an objection to the rulings made, prior to docketing of the minute entry for the ruling and before preparation of the transcript. The defendants are given leave to supplement their objection to this order by December 2, 2010. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) (objections must be filed within 14 days after being served with a copy of the order).

("ACS") and the City of New York (collectively, the "City
defendants").
Rule 32(a)(8) provides that a deposition “may be used in a
later action involving the same subject matter between the same
parties, or their representatives or successors in interest, to
the same extent as if taken in the later action.” The purpose of
the rule is to “avoid a needless waste of time, money and effort
and to expedite the litigation.” Baldin-Montrose Chem. Co. v.
Rothberg, 37 F.R.D. 354, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
As a preliminary matter, I address the City defendants’
argument that I lack jurisdiction to address the motion which they
characterize as one involving evidentiary rulings. However,
plaintiffs do not seek rulings on the admissibility of the
deposition testimony. Rather, they seek a ruling permitting use
of the testimony to the same extent as if the depositions had been
taken in this action. Thus, the motion is properly treated as a
matter within my pretrial reference authority because any ruling
will impact the number of depositions that would be needed to be taken in this case.2 Any ruling pursuant to Rule 32(a)(8) would
2 In their objection, the City defendants inexplicably continue to cite Forbes v. 21st Century Ins. Co., 258 F.R.D. 335 (D. Ariz. 2009) for the proposition that “[a] dispute over the ability to designate depositions from prior litigation for use at trial as if taken in the subject litigation is not a ‘discovery dispute.’” See ct. doc. 204 at 2. In fact, as the plaintiffs noted in their reply papers on the underlying motion, the court stated “[t]he parties’ dispute over the admissibility of [depositions from earlier actions] is not a discovery dispute.” Forbes, 258 F.R.D. at 337 (emphasis added).
-2-

not include any determination of admissibility in terms of whether the testimony is relevant, hearsay or whether its probative value is outweighed by undue prejudice. See Pesterfield v. Sunbeam Corp., 2005 WL 1076293, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. 2005); Clay v. Buzas, 208 F.R.D. 636 (D. Utah 2002). Those matters would still have to be resolved closer to or at trial.
Even if this order were viewed as evidentiary in nature, in limine rulings may sometimes be within the pretrial reference authority of magistrate judges "even though they may ultimately affect the outcome of a claim or defense, [since they are] non-dispositive orders," as this and other courts have recognized. Hassan v. Maersk Lines, Ltd., No. CV 2003-5443 (DLI)(MDG), 2005 WL 5712849 at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2005) (quoting Lithuanian Commerce Corporation Ltd. v. Sara Lee Hosiery, 177 F.R.D. 205, 456 (D.N.J. 1997)). In Hassan, this Court ruled on whether statements taken of six employees of the defendant within the scope of their employment fell within the hearsay exception of Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D), a ruling affecting whether additional depositions needed to be taken. Clearly, many other discovery rulings, particularly ones regarding the scope and time of discovery may also affect evidentiary matters at trial.
In determining motions brought under Rule 32(a)(8), courts have focused on the question whether the issues in the case are sufficiently similar that the party in the prior action had the same motive and interest in the deposition as in the later action.
-3-

See Rule v. Int’l Ass’n of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Ironworkers, 568 F.2d 558, 568-69 (8th Cir. 1977); Hertz v. Graham, 23 F.R.D. 17, 20 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). These considerations reflect the concern that a litigant against whom prior deposition testimony may be used had fair notice in the prior litigation. Ultimately, the consideration of fairness should be evaluated in light of whether a party will have a fair opportunity to address or challenge any deposition testimony at trial.
As this Court noted at the conference on November 5, 2010, there is substantial overlap in the subject matter for which the deposition testimony may be relevant in this case and the subject matter at issue in Marisol. In both actions, plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the City provided for inadequate screening of foster parents; inadequate home visits; inadequate background checks; inadequate management of case records; inadequate training and supervision of caseworkers; excessive caseloads; high turnover of caseworkers; and that the City knew about and deliberately disregarded these widespread failures. Further, in both actions, plaintiffs alleged that these systemic problems deprived them of their constitutional rights.
In addition, the City was a party to the Marisol case and had the same incentive as it would have in this case to cross-examine the State’s witnesses and develop a record with its own witnesses on issues involving systemic problems with the City’s foster care system. That plaintiffs in this case seek money damages rather
-4-

than the injunctive relief requested in Marisol does not affect the City’s corresponding interest in disproving the claims asserted in each action. Regardless of whether some of the plaintiffs in this case were members of the class in Marisol, more significant is the fact that the City is the same party and had the same interest in the prior action. In Rule v. Int’l Assoc. Of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Ironworkers, the prior suit was brought by the Department of Justice alleging discriminatory practices against the union. The later suit was brought by individual workers against the union for racial discrimination. There, the Eighth Circuit found that “the ultimate issue in both the Government’s case and the instant case is whether defendants have engaged in racially discriminatory employment practices. Defendants had the same interest in disproving that claim in the prior suit as in the present one.” 568 F.2d at 569; see also Clay v. Buzas, 208 F.R.D. 636 (D. Utah 2002) (permitting plaintiff to use depositions of other employees taken in prior sexual harassment suit brought by different plaintiff against same employer).
Arguing that the overlap in the issues is the result of the plaintiffs' generous copying of allegations in the Marisol complaint, the City defendants contend that Marisol is different because it involved broader challenges to the City's foster care system. However, Rule 32(a)(8) speaks to "involving the same subject matter," not identity of claims. In any event, the claims
-5-

of the plaintiffs against the City defendants in this action clearly are dependent upon proof that many of the systemic problems raised in Marisol resulted in placement of the plaintiffs with Judith Leekin, a foster parent who abused them with inadequate subsequent monitoring by the defendants.
On the other hand, the City defendants also argue that no issues of false identities, false documentation and outright fraud were implicated in Marisol. These are defenses that the City defendants apparently will raise in this action to explain why so many plaintiffs were placed with Ms. Leekin. In this regard, if the City defendants intend to support these defenses with evidence that they acted properly or that any system in place would not have prevented Ms. Leekin from acting as she did, the City defendants will necessarily have to present witnesses with knowledge of what was in place. The ability of the City defendants to present such defenses at trial would not be affected by any ruling regarding Marisol deposition testimony. Thus, whether or not there are specific issues in this case that were not raised in Marisol, does not change the substantial overlap in the issues raised in both litigations. Nor are the plaintiffs required to prove by evidentiary showing, at this juncture, a causal link between their injuries and the systemic problems in the City’s foster care/adoption oversight.
The City defendants also object to the relevance of the testimony -- challenges which go to admissibility rather than use
-6-

of the deposition testimony and which may be raised later in this case prior to trial. As to the City defendants’ claims that the deposition excerpts selected by the plaintiffs are taken out of context, the City is granted leave to designate its own portions of the testimony.
In any event, as I noted at an earlier conference, the depositions at issue are of governmental employees, most of whom occupy higher positions of responsibility. In the designated portions of the transcripts, the witnesses primarily testified about governmental reports, policies and procedures. This Court assumes and would expect that such witnesses would not give testimony which would conflict with testimony of other governmental witnesses regarding the same subject matter. In fact, in other cases before me involving claims regarding the conduct of ACS with respect to foster children, counsel for the City defendants have agreed to use of depositions taken in prior cases. Irrespective of the fact there is a greater lapse in time here between the Marisol depositions and this action than the gap between the prior depositions and the other cases mentioned, if the City defendants’ supplementation of the information in any Marisol deposition is appropriate, it would have the right, like any other governmental entity, to present either the same employee, if available, or another employee in a comparable position. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d) (automatic substitution of public officers upon death or separation from office).
-7-

This Court recognizes that the City of New York may not have the same ease in obtaining witnesses to explain the testimony by State employees made in Marisol. But, the City defendants have not given any reason why they would not be able to do so, if further explication is necessary. Notably, this Court directed plaintiffs to make more specific designations as to the depositions of State employees so that defendants will have notice of the matters plaintiffs intend to present at trial from those depositions. However, the City defendants have not pointed out that they would be hampered in their ability to challenge the designated deposition testimony of any State witness. While the City defendants may arguably have had less incentive to examine an employee of the co-defendant State of New York at the time of the Marisol litigation, that is the sort of tactical decision frequently made in an action. Certainly, even before the time of the Marisol depositions, there had already been much public outcry regarding the inadequacies of New York City’s foster care system. It is hard to imagine that counsel for the City of New York would not have been cognizant of the possibility that subsequent lawsuits would later be brought by representatives of foster children, many of whom were very young when placed.
Finally, as this Court noted, although the plaintiffs have stated that they do not seek to use the Marisol depositions against the social service agency defendants, none of whom were involved in the prior litigation, limiting instructions may be
-8-

appropriate should any of the testimony be introduced. This is a concern that can also be later addressed. Although the agency defendants initially objected to plaintiffs’ motion, see ct. doc. 201, they have not responded since the plaintiffs specifically designated those portions of depositions they seek to use as if taken in this case, let alone identified any of the deposition testimony that would cause them prejudice. In any event, the one case cited by the agency defendants where the court doubted the adequacy of limiting instructions concerned a wrongful death action against an airline and the manufacturer of the aircraft that involved “highly technical proof.” See First Nat’l Bank in Greenwich v. Nat’l Airlines, 22 F.R.D. 46, 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). In contrast, here, the roles of the City defendants and the agency defendants are different and separable.
SO ORDERED.

Dated:

Brooklyn, New York November 18, 2010

/s/ MARILYN D. GO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

-9-

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X S.W., et al.,
Plaintiffs, - against CITY OF NEW YORK, et al.,
Defendants. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X

ORDER CV 2009-1777 (ENV)(MDG)

Defendants City of New York and the Administration for Children’s Services (the “City Defendants”) move to compel production of three documents withheld by plaintiffs under the attorney work product doctrine. Ct. doc. 242. Two of the documents are described in plaintiffs’ privilege log as “resource indexes of NYC Systemic documents” prepared by Carolyn Kubitschek, Esq. “in anticipation of other litigation and disclosed to Plaintiffs’ Counsel pre-suit with an understanding that the privilege would be maintained.” Id., Exh. A. The third document is a deposition transcript from an unrelated litigation that was redacted pursuant to a confidentiality order issued in that litigation.

DISCUSSION Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), which embodies the federal work product doctrine, provides qualified protection to "documents and tangible things . . . prepared in anticipation of

litigation or for trial" from discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); see Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947); Constr. Prods., 73 F.3d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1996). Work product includes notes, memoranda, witness interviews, and other materials whether they are created by an attorney or by an agent for the attorney. U.S. v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1975); Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510-11. Documents prepared in anticipation of litigation are those that, "in light of the nature of the document and the factual situation in the particular case . . . can fairly be said to have been prepared or obtained because of the prospect of litigation." U.S. v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1202 (2d Cir. 1998).
“[O]pinion work product reveals the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative, and is entitled to greater protection than fact work product.” Constr. Prods., 73 F.3d at 473. If a party seeks disclosure of protected documents, the party must demonstrate a "substantial need” for fact work product and a “highly persuasive showing of” need for opinion work product. See In re Grand Jury, 219 F.3d 175, 190-91 (2d Cir. 2000).
The City defendants do not contest that the two “resource indexes” were created in anticipation of litigation, but argue that the documents are not protectible as work product because they were created by a person with no relation to plaintiffs’ counsel. Ct. doc. 242 at 2. Plaintiffs explain that they retained Ms. Kubitschek as a consultant prior to commencement of
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this action, a fact that the City defendants may have discovered had they conferred in good faith with plaintiffs prior to filing the motion. Clearly, work product protection extends to documents “prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or its representative (including . . . [a] consultant . . .).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A); see Nobles, 422 U.S. at 238-39. Moreover, work product materials retain their immunity from discovery after termination of a litigation and are not "routinely" available in subsequent litigation. FTC v. Grolier, Inc., 462 U.S. 19, 27 (1983) (discussing work product in the context of exemption 5 of F.O.I.A.); In re Omeprazole Patent Litig., 2005 WL 818821, at *8-*9 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Absent a showing of need, work product materials may not be disclosed even if previously ordered disclosed in a prior litigation. Grolier, 462 U.S. at 27.
Even though the documents at issue here were originally created for a third-party, the policies underlying the work product doctrine articulated in Hickman are no less applicable to ensure that attorneys are not inhibited from putting their thoughts down in writing for fear that they will be revealed at some later date. See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510-11; see also Crosby v. City of New York, 269 F.R.D. 267, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (recognizing that the “Hickman doctrine” may protect against disclosure of documents where Rule 26(b)(3) does not by its express terms); 8 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
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Practice & Procedure § 2024, at 523-24 (3d ed. 2010) (addressing documents prepared for one who is not a party to the present suit). As the City defendants acknowledge, Ms. Kubitscheck regularly litigates § 1983 actions against the City of New York.
Critically, plaintiffs' counsel utilized the two indexes at issue to select documents for use in this case and have produced to defendants all documents provided by Ms. Kubitschek. See ct. doc. 243 at 2. Thus, the indexes not only constituted work product created by Ms. Kubitchek in connection with prior lawsuits, their disclosure would reveal the thought processes of plaintiffs' counsel. Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., 825 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1987) (“where a request is made for documents already in possession of the requesting party, with the goal of learning what the opposing attorney’s thinking or strategy may be, even third-party documents may be protected”). Having received the underlying documents, the City defendants have not shown a substantial need for the indexes.
As to the redacted deposition transcript, plaintiffs state that they do not possess an unredacted copy. As they explain, they promptly destroyed an unredacted copy after being apprised that the complete transcript was mistakenly produced in contravention of a confidentiality order issued in the other case. Moreover, since the deposition was taken in a case where the City of New York was a party, the City presumably has access to the undisclosed portion of the transcript. Therefore, the unredacted
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transcript need not be produced.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the City defendants' motion to

compel is denied.

SO ORDERED.

Dated:

Brooklyn, New York December 15, 2010

/s/ MARILYN D. GO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X S.W., et al.,
Plaintiffs, - against CITY OF NEW YORK, et al.,
Defendants. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X

ORDER CV 2009-1777 (ENV)(MDG)

Plaintiffs have moved for an order permitting Stuart LeBlanc, a former employee of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”), to testify as an expert. Ct. doc. 286. As plaintiffs concede, they failed to disclose Mr. LeBlanc as an expert witness by the August 16, 2010 deadline previously set. Nor did they serve a report by the December 3, 2010 deadline for liability expert reports. Plaintiffs argue that they could not have identified the witness earlier and that defendants will not be prejudiced by the late disclosure.

DISCUSSION Courts considering whether to permit testimony by a witness belatedly disclosed by a party must determine whether “the failure was substantially justified or is harmless." Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). The imposition of sanctions is discretionary and district courts have generally not ordered preclusion of expert witnesses even where the failure to disclose is neither

"justifi[ed]" nor "harmless." See Design Strategy, Inc. v. Davis, 469 F.3d 284, 297-98 (2d Cir. 2006); Northington v. Gospel Volunteers, Inc., No. 04 CIV 7589, 2007 WL 1175292, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2007); Atkins v. County of Orange, 372 F. Supp. 2d 377, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing cases); Potter v. Phillips, No. CV 03-4942, 2004 WL 3250122, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2004) ("the imposition of sanctions under this rule is discretionary, and preclusion is ordered only rarely").
Plaintiffs seek to add Mr. LeBlanc, who was a supervisor in a section of the SSA dealing with the verification of social security numbers, as an expert on whether the SSA would have assisted the City and its agencies in checking the names against the Social Security numbers provided by Ms. Leekin. Defendants have argued that they could not have conducted the cross-check suggested by plaintiffs during the time period when the children were fostered and ultimately adopted. Plaintiffs contend that had the defendants checked with the SSA the false names against the false Social Security numbers used by defendant Leekin, they would have detected that the names and numbers did not match and would not have certified Ms. Leekin as a foster parent for the ten plaintiffs.
Although plaintiffs claim that much of Mr. LeBlanc’s testimony is factual, this court will analyze the instant dispute under the factors set forth in Softel, Inc. v. Dragon Med. & Scientific Comm., Inc., 118 F.3d 955 (2d Cir. 1997), for
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determining whether to preclude expert testimony not timely disclosed. These factors are: "(1) the party's explanation for the failure to comply with the discovery order; (2) the importance of the testimony of the precluded witness; (3) the prejudice suffered by the opposing party as a result of having to prepare to meet the new testimony; and (4) the possibility of a continuance." Softel, 118 F.3d at 961 (citing Outley v. City of New York, 837 F.2d 587, 590-91 (2d Cir. 1988)); see also Patterson v. Balsamico, 440 F.3d 104, 117 (2d Cir. 2004).
Plaintiffs’ counsel assert that they attempted to obtain an expert report on this subject before the August 16, 2010 deadline, but were told by representatives of the SSA that the agency has a policy prohibiting current employees from testifying in court. Although the plaintiffs had located Mr. LeBlanc prior to the deadline, he would not give testimony on this subject unless the SSA took an official position on the question. On March 20, 2011, Mr. LeBlanc agreed to testify after reviewing letters plaintiff’s counsel obtained from the SSA stating that the SSA would have provided information to a state or local foster care/child services agency if it had been provided the proper written consent from a prospective foster parent.
The City argues that since plaintiffs were advised by the SSA as to the procedures to follow to obtain testimony from a representative of the agency, they could have availed themselves of those procedures within the discovery deadline. The plaintiffs
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respond that they were repeatedly advised by SSA employees that SSA policy was such that SSA employees could not testify as to policy. However valid this advice, plaintiffs nonetheless should have followed the SSA procedures much earlier in this litigation, particularly given the stated importance of the information they seek to have Mr. LeBlanc provide. Their failure to abide by the applicable regulations is mentioned in the February 16, 2011 letter from Jeremy Linden, Assistant Regional Counsel of the SSA, to Senator Bill Nelson. See ct. doc. 286-1 at 3. While this Court recognizes that the letter resulted from unusual extrajudicial efforts on the part of plaintiffs' counsel, we are left to speculate whether the SSA would have chosen to ignore its own regulations had plaintiff made formal discovery requests in accordance with the applicable regulations set forth in 20 C.F.R. Part 403.
Thus, this Court finds that the plaintiffs' explanation for their delay in retaining an expert to be a factor against extension, even though Mr. LeBlanc only recently agreed to testify. A related issue on the applicability of the regulations in Part 403, is the question whether Mr. LeBlanc is subject to the requirement in 20 C.F.R. § 403.100 that he obtain prior authorization by the Commissioner of the SSA before giving his testimony. After review of the affidavit of Mr. LeBlanc and his description of his proposed testimony and his duties when he worked at the SSA, I find that he does not need approval by the
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SSA to testify. His proposed testimony neither pertains to a matter "in which he ... was personally involved while at SSA" nor involves "official [,] sensitive or confidential information" that he acquired while working. See 20 C.F.R. § 403.110(b)(3); cf. Gulf Group General Enters. Co. W.L.L. v. U.S., --- Fed. Cl. ---, 2011 WL 1663608, at *5-*6 (Fed. Cl. 2011) (permitting retired Army officer to testify as expert).
The second factor weighs in favor of the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs allege that “[t]hroughout the licensing process for foster care and the subsequent adoptions of Plaintiffs over the course of at least 12 years, Leekin repeatedly provided Defendants with false information as to the most basic facts [including her identity and social security number], which were facts that all Defendants had an unquestionable duty to verify and failed to do so in gross disregard of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.” Complaint at ¶ 61. The City admits that “Ms. Leekin used fraudulent identifications and social security numbers in perpetuation of her scheme . . . .” City’s Answer at ¶ 59. Attempting to minimize the significance of Ms. Leekins's use of false Social Security numbers, the City defendants argue that plaintiffs have not shown "what policy, practice or custom was deficient, why it was deficient under the circumstances, or how such alleged deficiencies were the moving force behind the victimization of the plaintiffs at the hands of a fraud artist like Ms. Leekin." Ct. doc. 287 at 4. Clearly, testimony as to
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whether social services agencies could have verified social security numbers during the relevant time period is important to proving deficiencies in the City’s policies, practices and customs.
Finally, prejudice to the defendants is minimal since there is sufficient time to allow defendant’s expert to supplement his report and for defendants to depose Mr. LeBlanc. The deadline for plaintiffs’ rebuttal expert reports is June 16, 2011, expert depositions must be completed by August 31, 2011 and no trial date has been set. See Northington, 2007 WL 1175292, at *1; Cartier, Inc. v. Four Star Jewelry Creations, Inc., 01 Civ. 11295, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19417, at *4-*5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2003). Although plaintiff's disclosure of its expert is well past the deadline set, there is ample time before trial and submission of the motion for summary judgment to cure any prejudice defendants would otherwise suffer. Cf. Patterson, 440 F.3d at 118 (affirming district court's preclusion of witness testimony disclosed ten days before trial); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C) ("Absent a stipulation or a court order, the disclosures [of expert testimony] must be made at least 90 days before the date set for trial or for the case to be ready for trial . . .").
Therefore, having considered the relevant factors, I decline to order preclusion of plaintiffs’ expert's testimony. Nevertheless, to the extent that the extension granted causes defendants to incur significant incidental expenses, plaintiffs
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are ordered to pay those reasonable costs incurred upon presentation of appropriate proof.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ motion to permit Mr.

LeBlanc's testimony is granted, but plaintiff must pay any

significant incidental costs occasioned by the expedited schedule.

The expert discovery schedule is modified to permit plaintiffs to

serve Mr. LeBlanc’s report by June 21, 2011 and for defendants to

supplement their expert reports by July 21, 2011.

SO ORDERED.

Dated:

Brooklyn, New York June 3, 2011

/s/ MARILYN D. GO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-----------------------------------------------------------------)(
S.W., ET AL.,

-against-

Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER 09-CV -1777(ENV)(MDG)

CITY OF NEW YORK, ET AL., Defendants.
-----------------------------------------------------------------)(
VITALIANO, D.J. Plaintiffs, who were all classified as special needs children, bring this civil rights action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City ofNew York and one of its municipal agencies, the Administration for Children's Services (collectively, "the City"), and several foster care agencies to recover damages for the severe abuse they suffered at the hands of their foster mother. After el(tensive negotiations, all plaintiffs reached an agreement to settle their claims against the City. They now move for court approval of their proposed settlement. 1
i. Plaintiffs' awards. This Court's Local Civil Rule 83.2(a) provides that any "action by or on behalf of an
infant or incompetent shall not be settled or compromised, or voluntarily discontinued, dismissed or terminated, without leave of the court." Moreover, "[t]he proceeding upon an application to

1 At the commencement of this action, guardians appeared on behalf of five of the ten plaintiffs: Renee Marquis, as guardian of S. W., Patricia Baldwin, as guardian of S.B. and R.E., and Kevin Hendrickson as guardian of J.G. and L.J. Two of the five remaining plaintiffs were minors who appeared through their nel(t of friends. All plaintiffs have moved for Court approval of the settlement. Since five of the ten plaintiffs are no longer minors and apparently are not incompetent so as to require guardians, there is no requirement that the Court approve their settlements. However, the proportion of each plaintiffs recovery is necessarily a factor in determining the fairness of the settlement to the incompetent plaintiffs.
I

settle or compromise such an action shall conform, as nearly as may be, to the New York State statutes and rules, but the Court, for cause shown, may dispense with any New York State requirement." !d. In considering such a motion, the Court must determine whether the amount of the settlement is fair, whether the distribution of the settlement proceeds will protect the interests of each plaintiff, and whether the attorneys' fees and costs sought are reasonable. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Williams, No. 04-CV-4575(CLP), 2006 WL 2711538, at *I (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2006); Clemente v. Bd. ofEduc. ofthe City ofNew York, No. 02-CV-3963(CLP), 2005 WL 1594335, at *I (E.D.N.Y. July 6, 2005); Local Civil Rule 83.2(a); N.Y. Jud. Law§ 474; N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1208. The Court may authorize payment of"reasonable attorney's fees ... after due inquiry as to all charges against the fund." Local Civil Rule 83.2(a)(2); accord N.Y. Jud. Law§ 474 (requiring any attorney representing an infant on a contingent basis to submit an application for court approval of compensation).
In determining whether a proposed settlement on behalf of an infant or incompetent plaintiff is "fair, reasonable and adequate," the Court compares "the terms of the compromise with the likely rewards of litigation." Neilson v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 199 F.3d 642, 654 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotations omitted). A strong presumption exists that a settlement is fair and reasonable where "(i) the settlement is not collusive but was reached after arm's length negotiation; (ii) the proponents have counsel experienced in similar cases; and, (iii) there has been sufficient discovery to enable counsel to act intelligently." Camac v. Long Beach City School Dist., No. 09-CV-5309(MLB)(GRB), 2012 WL 3277228, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. July 25, 2012). Moreover, "[p]roposed settlements which have been negotiated by the infant's natural guardian carry a presumption that they are fair and in the infant's best interests, and should therefore be afforded some level of deference." De Alvarez v. City ofNew York, No. I0-CV4434(SJ)(LB), 2012 WL 2087761, at *I (E.D.N.Y. May 16, 2012). See also Parham v. J. R., 442
2

U.S. 584, 623 (1979) (reciting the general proposition oflaw that a "parent or guardian is presumed to be acting in [a] person's best interests").
The assigned magistrate judge in this action was directly involved in supervising the negotiations that resulted in the settlement agreement. The plaintiffs then sought approval from the Florida state court with jurisdiction over the five plaintiffs as wards of the state. The Honorable Dwight Geiger, Judge in the Circuit Court for St. Lucie County, Florida, Probate Division, held a hearing on November 26, 2012 at which the guardians were present and consented to the settlements. Since the Florida court has approved the agreement after a duly conducted hearing, the Court defers to Judge Geiger's determination as to the fairness of the settlement to the extent that it provides compensation to the plaintiffs. For this reason, and to expedite the process for the sake of those the plaintiffs who find themselves in financial hardship, this Court finds cause to dispense with any additional requirements that New York law may ordinarily impose with regard to the fairness of the plaintiffs' awards.
The Court has considered the documents submitted in support ofthis motion and finds that the best interests of the incapacitated plaintiffs will be served by the proposed settlement. As described in Docket Number 383, Exhibit 12 at page 35 (the "approved proportion"), the proposal is fair and reasonable in light of the injuries sustained and the procedural posture of this case. The Court is satisfied that the guardians, who have deemed the proposed agreement fair and reasonable, understand its terms as well as the risks and benefits of proceeding with litigation. Hence, the terms of the settlement regarding plaintiffs' awards are approved according to the orders below.
ii. Attorneys' fees and costs. Judge Geiger also approved payment of requested attorneys' fees and costs to plaintiffs'
counsel. Under Local Civil Rule 83.2(a)(2), this Court has an obligation under the to determine 3

"a reasonable attorney's fee and proper disbursements" following "due inquiry after all charges against the fund." Generally, as a matter of public policy, courts "give particular scrutiny to fee arrangements between attorneys and clients." King v. Fox, 7 N.Y.3d 181, 191 (N.Y. 2006). Hence, we will consider the request for fees in more detail.
Section 474 of the New York Judiciary Law directs that the appropriate amount of attorneys' fees to be awarded in an infant compromise proceeding is the '"suitable compensation for the attorney for his service therein ... on behalf of said infant."' Allstate, 2006 WL 2711538, at *4 (quoting N.Y. Jud. Law§ 474). Thus, "[a]ny agreement of the guardian is advisory only" and the amount of the attorney's fee is fixed by the court. See Allstate, 2006 WL 2711538, at *4 (quoting Werner v. Levine, 276 N.Y.S.2d 269,271 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967); N.Y. Jud. Law§ 474. New York courts have long held that attorneys' fees amounting to one-third of the total recovery in an cases brought on behalf of infants or incompetents constitute "the usual and customary level," Liss v. McCrory Stores Corp., 7 A.D.2d 738,738 (N.Y. App. Div., 2d Dep't 1958), while fees in excess of one-third are unreasonable. See, e.g., Scolavino v. State, 74 N.Y.S.2d 573, 575 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1947) (asserting that attorney's fees in infant recovery cases "should not exceed approximately one-third of the recovery"). The same is true in New York courts more generally. See, e.g., Application ofNew York Convention Ctr. Dev. Corp., 234 A.D.2d 167, 167 (N.Y. App. Div., 1st Dep't 1996) (referring to contingency fees of33 113% the total recovery as "the standard").
Plaintiff's counsel here seeks attorneys' fees in the amount of33 1/3% of the settlement after deduction of costs, in accordance with New York practices. Given the standard figures for attorney's fees as described in the case law, the complexity ofthis case, the extensive work performed by counsel, and the consistency with the retainer agreement, the Court finds this
4

amount appropriate and reasonable under New York Jaw. The proposed settlement is therefore approved with regard to attorney's fees, in accordance with the orders below.
On the matter of costs, however, a more searching inquiry is necessary. Plaintiffs' counsel has requested total costs amounting to over 16% of the total settlement. This figure is particularly large in both magnitude and in proportion, and requires further consideration by the Court. Therefore, Magistrate Judge Go shall issue a report and recommendation regarding the reasonableness and propriety of the requested costs. Otherwise, so that disbursement of funds to the plaintiffs and approved fees is not delayed, the Court hereby approves the settlement as set forth below.
NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED, that the guardians are hereby authorized and empowered to settle this action against the City ofNew York and the Administration for Children's Services in the amounts described in the papers submitted, and to execute a General Release to the defendants conditioned upon the payment of said amount in accordance with this Order and to sign all papers necessary in that connection; and it is further ORDERED, that the settlement funds be paid in their entirety as set forth herein; and it is further ORDERED, that the settlement funds, Jess approved fees and costs, shall be paid to the plaintiffs directly or to the structured settlement funds or special needs trusts to be established; and it is further ORDERED, that the amount of attorneys' fees as requested be disbursed to plaintiffs' counsel; and it is further
5

ORDERED, that because plaintiffs' counsel has waived its claim to advance costs for future litigation expenses as a cost and disbursement payable from the settlement, two-thirds of that amount should be distributed to the plaintiffs pro rata in the approved proportion and onethird of that amount paid to counsel as fee; and it is further
ORDERED, that the amount of the remaining costs sought by plaintiffs' counsel is hereby referred to Magistrate Judge Go for report and recommendation and that remaining amount allocated to disbursements shall be held by plaintiffs' counsel in escrow pending approval of the amount of costs by the Court; and it is further
ORDERED, that any amount of the costs requested that are disallowed will be distributed two-thirds to the plaintiffs pro rata in the approved proportion and one-third to plaintiffs' counsel for attorneys' fees; and it is further
ORDERED, that plaintiffs' counsel must file a letter proposing how remitted future costs and disallowed costs should be specifically administered as to each plaintiff; and it is further
ORDERED, that the filing of a bond be dispensed with in accordance with N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1210(c).

Dated: Brooklyn, New York December 18,2012

s/ ENV
ERIC N. VITALIANO United States District Judge

6

 
 Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 406 Filed 02/12/13 Page 1 of 4 PageID #: 12711
United States District Court Eastern District of New York
MINUTE ORDER 09cv1777 (ENV)(MDG) S.W., et al. v. CITY OF NEW YORK, et al.
This Order sets forth rulings made on the record at a conference on February 5, 2013 granting in part and denying in part plaintiff’s motion for a protective order (ct. doc. 396), denying the Agency defendants' cross-motion for a protective order (ct. doc. 399) and granting the Agency defendants' motion for an extension of time (ct. doc. 397).
1. Plaintiffs' motion for a protective order is granted in part and denied in part. The Agency defendants are encouraged to confer with plaintiffs' counsel in advance of issuing subpoenas for depositions. Although such coordination is not required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it may be a more efficient method of scheduling depositions and is likely to foster cooperation and collegiality among counsel.
a. Absent prior consultation in scheduling future depositions, the Agency defendants must give all parties and the subpoenaed witness at least 30 days' notice of any deposition. In order to reduce the burden on non-party witnesses, defense counsel should also make every effort to schedule depositions at a location convenient for the witnesses. Prior to any deposition, the Agency defendants must provide the witness and each party a set of that witness's records that will likely be used at the deposition.
b. Any party may participate in a deposition by telephone but that party must bear the cost of teleconferencing. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(4).

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 406 Filed 02/12/13 Page 2 of 4 PageID #: 12712
c. Plaintiffs' request that the Agency defendants make arrangements to pay expert witness fees to plaintiffs' treating physicians is denied without prejudice. Whether a treating physician is entitled to a "reasonable fee" under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(E) depends on the substance of that witness's testimony at the deposition. See Turner v. Delta Air Lines, 2008 WL 222559, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). Accordingly, after the deposition, the witness can make an appropriate application seeking fees if warranted.
2. The Agency defendants' cross-motion for a protective order is denied. Defendants have not offered any evidence to support their bald allegation that plaintiffs' counsel improperly attempted to contact non-party witnesses. It is not improper for an attorney to contact a non-party witness, discuss the case with her or prepare her for deposition. Samad Brothers v. Bokara Rug Co., 2012 WL 43613, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); N.Y. City Bar Assoc. Formal Opinion 2009-5; Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 116. Any suggestion by defendants to the contrary is without support as a matter of law. Insofar as defendants are intimating that plaintiffs' counsel improperly attempted to influence a witness not to comply with a subpoena or to alter his or her testimony, defendants have provided no basis in fact to make any such reckless insinuation.
However, should counsel for either side have prior contact with a non-party, the parties are advised that work product protection does not shield an attorney's preparation of a nonparty witness. See SEC v. Gupta, 281 F.R.D. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). A party can inquire as to a non-party witness's preparation with another party's counsel to test that witness's credibility so long as the questions are not designed to elicit counsel's strategy. See id.

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 406 Filed 02/12/13 Page 3 of 4 PageID #: 12713
3. The Agency defendants' motion for an extension of time to serve expert reports is granted. Although the Agency defendants should have raised this issue at the December 13, 2012 conference at which the schedule for expert discovery was set, the Court agrees that defendants' experts should have the opportunity to review the ongoing damages discovery being taken and the plaintiffs' depositions before preparing their reports. However, the Agency defendants are warned that any subsequent request for an updated deposition of plaintiffs will be viewed with circumspection.
a. Accordingly, the discovery schedule is amended and extended as follows: (i) medical examinations of each plaintiff must be completed by 7/31/13; (ii) defendants' medical expert reports must be served within 3 weeks of each plaintiffs' medical examination; (iii) should plaintiffs wish to supplement their medical expert reports in response, plaintiffs' supplemental medical expert reports must be served within 4 weeks of the service of defendants' medical expert reports;1 (iv) defendants' life care planning expert report must be served within 3 weeks of defendants' medical expert reports; (v) defendants' economist's expert report must be served within 2 weeks of defendants' life care planning expert report; (vi) plaintiffs' rebuttal life care planning expert report and economist's expert report must be served within 4 weeks of defendants' corresponding expert report. Parties must send the Court a joint report regarding the status of discovery on November 1, 2013.
b. Questioning of plaintiffs is limited to the issue of damages to the extent it was not previously covered in the prior depositions.
1 The Court did not discuss the schedule of plaintiffs' rebuttal and supplemental expert reports at the conference.

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 406 Filed 02/12/13 Page 4 of 4 PageID #: 12714

c. Plaintiffs' depositions and medical examinations shall be conducted in Florida but without prejudice to application by defendants that a deposition or medical examination of a particular plaintiff be conducted in New York. If defendents seek to conduct both the deposition and medical examination of a plaintiff in New York, defendants must be prepared to conduct both in one trip by the plaintiff.

SO ORDERED.

Dated:

Brooklyn, New York February 12, 2013

/s/___________________________ MARILYN D. GO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 
 United States District Court Eastern District of New York
MINUTE ORDER 09cv1777 (ENV)(MDG) S.W., et al. v. City of New York, et al.,
This order summarizes and supplements rulings made on the record at a conference held on August 6, 2013 granting in part and denying in part the Agency defendants' letter motion dated July 11, 2013 [449] to compel and for sanctions relating to the plaintiffs' production of electronically stored information ("ESI"). Defendants sought: 1) to compel plaintiffs to supplement their production of ESI and interrogatory responses; 2) to hold depositions of eight of the ten plaintiffs open until after the supplemental production; 3) to adjourn production of all expert reports until after the supplemental production; 4) an adverse inference instruction concerning spoliation by T.L. of his autobiographical writings; and 5) attorneys' fees and costs incurred with respect to the motion.
At a conference held on July 24, 2013, the Court directed defendants to provide the Court with highlighted transcripts of the update depositions of plaintiffs J.B., T.G., T.L., and J.L. and plaintiffs to describe the volume of their most recent production of ESI. After review of the submissions and familiarity with prior proceedings, the motion is denied in part and granted in part only to the following extent:
1. Plaintiffs' counsel must describe in a declaration the

efforts that they have made to retrieve plaintiffs' email and social media account usernames and passwords, and particularly, what they did with respect to the methods suggested by defendants in their July 11, 2013 submission (ct. doc. 449-4). The parties must confer regarding any further methods to retrieve such information, including the service of subpoenas on the account providers. Counsel for plaintiffs are directed to promptly make further efforts to obtain access information, including contacting the entities providing email and social media accounts to request information for accessing any accounts from which plaintiffs have not produced any information.
2. Plaintiffs must supplement their production of ESI material by 8/16/13, including information from accounts which plaintiffs testified they are actively using contrary to their interrogatory responses which stated that such accounts were inaccessible. In addition, plaintiff TG must produce the autobiographical material she described in her deposition testimony.
3. Defendants' application to hold open certain plaintiffs' depositions and adjourn expert reports is denied without prejudice to a further application after plaintiffs' supplemental production.
4. Defendants' request for an adverse inference instruction as a sanction for spoliation by T.L. is denied. An adverse
-2-

inference instruction is an extreme sanction that should not be given lightly. Williams v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 2011 WL 5024280, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. 2011); R.F.M.A.S., Inc. v. So, 271 F.R.D. 13, 52 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). Defendants have not made a showing sufficient to warrant the relief requested under Second Circuit law. A party seeking a sanction for spoliation of evidence must establish "(1) that the party having control over the evidence had an obligation to preserve it at the time it was destroyed; (2) that the records were destroyed 'with a culpable state of mind;' and (3) that the destroyed evidence was 'relevant' to the party's claim or defense such that a reasonable trier of fact could find that it would support that claim or defense." Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 2002); see Fujitsu Ltd. v. Federal Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 436 (2d Cir. 2001). Defendants failed to discuss the pertinent factors in their motion. First, defendants have not established that plaintiff T.L. destroyed his writings with a culpable state of mind. Based on a review of the transcript of T.L.'s deposition, it is not clear whether T.L. understood that his attempt to "put [his] thoughts on paper" would have been within his obligation to preserve. See Hamilton v. Mt. Sinai Hosp., 528 F. Supp.2d 431, 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding no culpable state of mind where destroyed handwritten notes had been put into typewritten form).
-3-

In any event, defendants have not demonstrated that the autobiographical writings allegedly destroyed by T.L. would have been favorable to their case. "Where a party destroys evidence in bad faith, that bad faith alone is sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the missing evidence was unfavorable to that party." Residential Funding, 306 F.3d at 109. When a party was merely negligent however, the moving party must submit extrinsic evidence sufficient to infer that the missing documents would have been favorable to it. Id. Defendants have not established the content of the destroyed material or that it is not otherwise available. Defendants elicited only a general description of the material at T.L.'s deposition which is amenable to almost any interpretation. Even assuming there was something of substance to preserve, the missing documents are as likely to be favorable to plaintiff's case as unfavorable. Moreover, given that plaintiff T.L. has already produced approximately 1,500 pages from his email accounts, approximately 55 pages from his Twitter account and over 250 pages from his Facebook account, it is unlikely that his writings would have contained any noncumulative relevant material.
5. Plaintiffs are reminded that they must preserve any electronically stored data that may be relevant to their claims for damages. Counsel must regularly remind their clients of
-4-

their obligation to preserve relevant information, including

preservation of ESI, and what measures are necessary to do so.

6. Defendants' request for attorneys' fees is denied. To

the extent there are discrepancies between the plaintiffs'

interrogatory responses and their deposition testimonies

regarding their ability to access accounts containing ESI, there

has been no showing that counsel conferred regarding a

supplemental production prior to filing the instant motion.

SO ORDERED.

Dated:

Brooklyn, New York August 8, 2013

/s/___________________________ MARILYN D. GO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

-5-

 
 Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 476 Filed 02/05/14 Page 1 of 2 PageID #: 19732

SHAUB, AHMUTY, CITRIN & SPRATT, LLP
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 1983 MARCUS AVENUE, SUITE 260 LAKE SUCCESS, NEW YORK 11042
(516) 488-3300 Facsimile: (516) 488-2324
info@sacslaw.com

77 WATER STREET, SUITE 702 NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10005
(212) 599-8200 Facsimile: (212) 599-7765

Jeremy S. Rosof jrosof@sacslaw.com

February 5, 2014

Via CM/ECF

Hon. Eric N. Vitaliano United States District Judge United States District Court Eastern District of New York 225 Cadman Plaza East Brooklyn, NY 11201

Re: S.W., et al. v. City of New York, et al. Civil Action No.: 1:09-cv-1777 (ENV) (MDG)

Dear Judge Vitaliano:

On behalf of the Agency Defendants, I write to advise the Court of the Agency Defendants’ intention to seek leave to certify for interlocutory appeal, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), so much of the Court’s Memorandum and Order, filed January 28, 2014, as denied the Agency Defendants summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based upon the Court’s legal determination that the Agency Defendants’ alleged conduct constituted action under color of state law, or state action. Pursuant to this Court’s Individual Motion Practice and Rules, I respectfully request that the Court so-order the following briefing schedule:

1. The Agency Defendants’ motion shall be filed on or before Friday, February 7, 2014;

2. Plaintiffs’ opposition to the motion shall be filed on or before Tuesday, February 18, 2014; and

3. The Agency Defendants’ reply, if any, shall be filed on or before February 24, 2014.

The undersigned has conferred with and obtained consent to the above schedule from lead counsel for the plaintiffs, Theodore Babbitt, and his co-counsel William A. Kapell.

{00923908.2}

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 476 Filed 02/05/14 Page 2 of 2 PageID #: 19733 SHAUB, AHMUTY, CITRIN & SPRATT, LLP
S.W., et al. v. City of New York, et al. United States District Court, Eastern District of New York
Docket No.: 1:09-cv-1777 (ENV-MDG) Page 2
I thank the Court for its courtesies. Respectfully submitted, /s/ Jeremy S. Rosof Jeremy S. Rosof
cc: All Counsel of Record (via CM/ECF) Ishmatee Nagassar Appearing Pro Se as Third-Party Defendant 105-12 103rd Road Ozone Park, New York 11417 (via U.S. Mail)
{00923908.2}

 
 Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG

Document 493

FILED Filed 09/19/14 Page 1 of 8 PageID #: 20750 IN CLERK'S OFFICE * * U.S. DISTRlf:T COURT E.D N.Y. SEP 19 2014

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
--------------------------------------------------------------x
S.W. et. al,

BROOKLYN OFFICE

Plaintiffs,
-against-
CITY OF NEW YORK, a municipal corporation; ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN'S SERVICES; ST. JOSEPH SERVICES FOR CHILDREN, INC f/k/a CATHOLIC CHILD CARE SOCIETY OF THE DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN, INC., a New : York corporation; HEARTSHARE HUMAN SERVICES, f/k/a CATHOLIC GUARDIAN SOCIETY OF THE DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN, INC., a New York corporation; SCO FAMILY OF SERVICES, f/k/a ST. CHRISTOPHER-OTTILIE, a New York corporation,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER 09-cv-1777 (ENV) (MDG)

Defendants.
--------------------------------------------------------------x
VITALIANO, D.J.,

Plaintiffs, who were all classified as special needs children, brought this civil

rights action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the City of New York and one of

its municipal units, the Administration for Children's Services (collectively "the

City"), as well as several eleemosynary foster care agencies to recover damages for

the severe abuse they suffered at the hands of their foster mother, now incarcerated

in a Florida state correctional facility. By Memorandum & Order, dated December

18, 2012, the Court approved a settlement between all ten plaintiffs and the City

("2012 Settlement"). (See dkt. # 385.)

1

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 493 Filed 09/19/14 Page 2 of 8 PageID #: 20751
Following continued and extensive litigation, the remaining defendants moved for summary judgment. On January 17, 2014, the Court dismissed the claims against the foster agencies brought by L.J. and J.G. but denied the motion as to the claims of all other plaintiffs. On June 13, 2014 the parties reached a settlement through mediation. Plaintiffs now move for court approval of that settlement.
I. Plaintiffs' Awards Local Civil Rule 83.2(a) provides that any "action by or on behalf of an infant
or incompetent shall not be settled or compromised, or voluntarily discontinued, dismissed or terminated, without leave of the court."1 Moreover, "[t]he proceeding upon an application to settle or compromise such an action shall conform, as nearly as may be, to the New York State statutes and rules, but the Court, for cause shown, may dispense with any New York State requirement." Id. In considering a motion to compromise and settle such a claim, the Court must determine whether the amount of the settlement is fair, whether the distribution of proceeds will protect the interests of each plaintiff, and whether the attorney's fees and costs sought are reasonable. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Williams, 2006 WL 2711538, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); Local Civil Rule 83.2(a). The Court may authorize payment of"reasonable attorney's fees ... after due inquiry as to all charges against the fund." Local Civil Rule 83.2(a).
Of the eight remaining plaintiffs, only three (S.W., R.E. and S.B.) are incompetent and have guardians who approved this settlement, which, in turn, requires this Court's approval. See Motion to Approve Settlement, dkt. # 490, at 3; EDNY Local Rule 83.2. None of the plaintiffs are still infants.
2

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 493 Filed 09/19/14 Page 3 of 8 PageID #: 20752
In determining whether a proposed compromise settlement on behalf of an infant or incompetent plaintiff is "fair, reasonable and adequate,'' the Court compares "the terms of the compromise with the likely rewards of the litigation." Neilson v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 199 F.3d 642, 654 (2d Cir. 1999) (quotations omitted). A strong presumption exists that a settlement is fair and reasonable where "(i) the settlement is not collusive but was reached after arm's length negotiation; (ii) the proponents have counsel experienced in similar cases; and, (iii) there has been sufficient discovery to enable counsel to act intelligently." Camac v. Lng Beach City School Dist., 2012 WL 3277228, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). Moreover, "[p]roposed settlements which have been negotiated by the infant's natural guardian carry a presumption that they are fair and in the infant's best interests, and should therefore be afforded some level of deference." De Alvarez v. City of New York, 2012 WL 2087761, at *1(E.D.N.Y.2012).
The incompetents do not have natural guardians, but they do have Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go. Judge Go has been directly and actively involved in supervising the negotiations that resulted in this settlement, as well as virtually all other aspects of this long and complex litigation. In belt and suspenders fashion, plaintiffs have also sought approval of this settlement from the Florida state court with guardian jurisdiction over the three plaintiffs who remain wards of the state. In that regard, Judge Geiger, of the state Circuit Court for St. Lucie County, Florida has entered orders, dated August 1, 2014 and August 14, 2014, approving these settlements-as he previously did with the 2012 Settlement. The Court stands well-informed by Judge Geiger's determination as to the fairness of the settlement
3

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 493 Filed 09/19/14 Page 4 of 8 PageID #: 20753
to those plaintiffs. For these reasons and the safeguards they provide, and to expedite the process for the sake of those plaintiffs who appear to be in financial hardship, the Court finds cause to dispense with any additional requirements that New York Jaw may ordinarily impose as part of a claim compromise proceeding.
The Court has considered the documents submitted in support of the motion and finds that the best interests of the incapacitated plaintiffs will be served by the proposed settlement. As described in Docket # 490, the proposal is fair and reasonable in light of the injuries sustained and the procedural posture of this case. The Court is satisfied, in sum, that the guardians, who have deemed the proposed agreement fair and reasonable, understand the terms of the settlement and have carefully evaluated the risks and benefits of proceeding with litigation. Hence, upon the specified orders below, the proposed settlement is approved.
II. Attorney's Fees and Costs Judge Geiger also approved payment of requested attorney's fees and costs to
plaintiffs' counsel. Under Rule 83.2(a)(2), the Court shall approve "a reasonable attorney's fee and proper disbursements" following "due inquiry after all charges against the fund." Generally, as a matter of public policy, courts "give particular scrutiny to fee arrangements between attorneys and clients." King v. Fox, 7 N.Y.3d 181, 191 (2006) (citation omitted).
Section 474 of the New York Judiciary Law directs that the appropriate amount of attorney's fees to be awarded in an infant or incompetent compromise proceeding is the "'suitable compensation for the attorney for his service therein ... on behalf of said infant [or incompetent]."' Allstate, at *4 (quoting N.Y. Jud. Law§
4

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 493 Filed 09/19/14 Page 5 of 8 PageID #: 20754
474). Thus, any agreement of the guardian is "advisory only" and the amount of the attorney's fees is fixed by order. Id. New York courts have held that attorney's fees amounting to one-third of the total recovery in cases brought on behalf of infants or incompetents constitute "the usual and customary level," while fees in excess of onethird are ordinarily unreasonable. Liss v. McCrorv Stores Corp., 7 A.D.2d 738, 738 (2d Dep't 1958). As the forum state, New York's law controls. See Orlandi v. Navistar Leasing Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99484, at *15-16 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
Plaintiffs' counsel seeks attorney's fees in the amount of 33 113°/o of the settlement after deduction of costs, in accordance with New York's customary practices. Given that (a) the request mirrors the New York standard, (b) the complexity of this case, (c) the extensive work performed by counsel, and even (d) the request's consistency with the retainer agreement, the Court finds the amount requested appropriate and reasonable. The proposed settlement is, therefore, approved with regard to the attorney's fees requested.
On the matter of costs, however, additional inquiry is required. As part of the 2012 Settlement, plaintiffs requested costs amounting to over 16o/o of the total settlement. In its December 2012 Order approving that settlement, the Court referred the issue of costs to Magistrate Judge Go. Then, on May 7, 2013 the Court approved disbursement of 75% of the requested costs, with the remainder to continue to be held by plaintiffs' counsel in escrow. (See May 2, 2013 Memorandum & Order, dkt. # 421.)
Further, as part of the 2012 Settlement, the costs allocated to plaintiffs L.J.
5

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 493 Filed 09/19/14 Page 6 of 8 PageID #: 20755
and J.G. were far higher2 than the costs allocated to the other eight plaintiffs because L.J. and J.G. were the only two plaintiffs placed with their foster mother directly by the City, and, accordingly, those two received by far the most money in the 2012 Settlement. As part of the settlement, all plaintiffs agreed that "in the event of a further recovery by plaintiffs in this lawsuit, there should be an accounting of the total costs incurred on behalf of all ten plaintiffs and a reallocation of those costs in an equitable manner proportionate to the pro-rata recovery of each plaintiff." Motion to Approve Settlement, Ex. C, at 3-4. This agreement was intended to ensure that there is "no windfall to any plaintiff based upon the timing of when costs were incurred or when settlement [was] reached." Id. Notably, L.J. and J.G. were the two plaintiffs whose claims against the foster agencies were dismissed by the Court's January 2014 Order, and, therefore, they recovered nothing as part of the instant settlement. Accordingly, L.J. and J.G. appear to be owed money by the other eight plaintiffs as part of the re-allocation of costs related to the 2012 Settlement.3
In light of the foregoing, the Court refers the issue of costs and the questions it raises to Magistrate Go for a report and recommendation regarding the reasonableness and propriety of the requested costs, including the possible release of the remaining 25°/o of the costs component of the 2012 Settlement as well as any 2 Specifically, 62°/o of the joint costs were allocated to L.J. and J.G., which
resulted in their settlement amounts being reduced by $529,342 each, while the other eight plaintiffs had their settlement amounts reduced by just $88,223 each. See Motion to Approve Settlement, Ex. B. 3 Plaintiffs aver that L.J. is owed a refund of $228,873.42 and J.G. is owed a refund of $228,579.10.
6

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 493 Filed 09/19/14 Page 7 of 8 PageID #: 20756
refund that may be due to L.J. and J.G. as non-recovering plaintiffs. Order
NOW, THEREFORE, upon the foregoing findings, it is hereby ORDERED, that the guardians are hereby authorized and empowered to settle this action against St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc., Heartshare Human Services and SCO Family of Services in the amounts described in the papers submitted, and to execute a General Release to the defendants conditioned upon the payment of said amount in accordance with this Order and to sign all papers necessary in that connection; and it is further ORDERED, that the settlement funds be paid in their entirety as set forth herein; and it is further ORDERED, that the settlement funds, less approved fees and costs, shall be paid to the plaintiffs directly or to the structured settlements funds; and it is further ORDERED, that the amount of attorney's fees as requested be disbursed to plaintiffs' counsel; and it is further ORDERED, that the amount of costs sought by plaintiffs' counsel is hereby referred to Magistrate Judge Go for a report and recommendation and that the remaining amount allocated to costs and disbursements shall be held by plaintffs' counsel in escrow pending approval of the amount of costs by the Court; and it is further ORDERED, that any amount of the costs requested that are disallowed will be distributed two-thirds to plaintiffs pro rata in the approved proportion and onethird to plaintiffs' counsel for attorney's fees; and it is further
7

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 493 Filed 09/19/14 Page 8 of 8 PageID #: 20757

ORDERED, that the filing of a bond be dispensed with in accordance with

N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1210(c).

SO ORDERED.

Dated:

Brooklyn, New York September 11, 2014

s/Eric N. Vitaliano

ERIC N. VITALIANO United States District Judge

8

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X S.W., et al.,
Plaintiffs,
- against THE CITY OF NEW YORK, et al.,
Defendants.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X

ORDER CV 2009-1777 (ENV)(MDG)

GO, United States Magistrate Judge: By Memorandum and Order dated December 19, 2012 and September 11,
2014, the Honorable Eric N. Vitaliano approved the settlement of plaintiffs' claims against the City of New York defendants and the Agency defendants, respectively, and authorized disbursement of the settlement funds, less an amount for the litigation expenses claimed by plaintiffs' counsel, which was to remain in escrow pending determination of the reasonableness of the costs sought. See ct. docs. 385, 493. After conferring with Judge Vitaliano, and upon consideration of plaintiffs' counsel having withdrawn its request for $280,354.41 in expenses (see ct. doc. 496 at 2, 3), it is hereby
ORDERED that $280,354.41 of the settlement funds held in escrow be disbursed to plaintiffs' counsel and that the remainder continue to be held by plaintiffs' counsel in escrow pending approval by the Court.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York July 6, 2015
/s/ MARILYN D. GO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 
 46 F.Supp.3d 176 (2014)
S.W., by and through his guardian, Renee MARQUIS-ABRAMS; T.G. and J.L., by and through their next friend, Mildred Del Grosso; S.B. and R.E. by and through their guardian, Patricia Baldwin; L.J. and J.G., by and through their guardian, Kevin Hendrickson; J.B.,
C.B., and T.L., Plaintiffs, v.
CITY OF NEW YORK, a municipal corporation; Administration for Children's Services, f/k/a Child Welfare Administration; St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc., f/k/a Catholic Child Care Society of the
Diocese of Brooklyn, Inc., a New York corporation; Heartshare Human Services, f/k/a Catholic Guardian Society of the Diocese of Brooklyn, Inc., a New York corporation; SCO Family of Services, f/k/a St. Christopher-Ottilie, a New York corporation, Defendants.
No. 09-CV-01777 ENV MDG.
United States District Court, E.D. New York.
Signed January 17, 2014. Filed January 28, 2014.
183*183 Ami Romanelli, Theodore Babbitt, Stephan A. Le Clainche, Babbitt, Johnson, Osborne & Le Clainche, PA, West Palm Beach, FL, Howard M. Talenfeld, Colodny, Fass, Talenfeld, Karlinsky & Abate, P.A., John Walsh, Fort Lauderdale, FL, William A. Kapell, Children's Rights, Marcia Lowry, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs.
Bruce Michael Strikowsky, Carl Judah Schaerf, Matthew James Kelly, Allison Naomi Fihma, Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP, New York, NY, Jeremy S. Rosof, Timothy Robert Capowski, William G. Spratt, Adam S. Covitt, Ralph Vincent Morales, Robert Ortiz, Shaub, Ahmuty, Citrin & Spratt, LLP, Lake Success, NY, Judd Cohen, Robert Boccio, Shaub, Ahmuty, Citrin & Spratt, LLP, New Hyde Park, NY, Marc J. Citrin, Steven J. Ahmuty, Jr., Craig Garrett Bienstock, John D. Paterniti, Juan C. Gonzalez, Steven I. Rubin, Shaub Ahmuty Citrin & Spratt LLP, New York, NY, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM & ORDER

VITALIANO, District Judge.
Between 1986 and 1996, plaintiffs, ten individuals who were at the time special needs children, were placed in foster care with, and were subsequently adopted by, Judith Leekin, who abused, neglected, imprisoned, and denied them any education or medical care. Plaintiffs bring this action against the City of New York (the "City") and the private foster care agencies that placed them with Leekin, namely, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. ("SJSC"), Heartshare Human Services ("HHS"), and SCO Family of Services ("SCO") (together, 184*184 the "agency defendants").[1] They seek damages for alleged violations of their Fourteenth Amendment rights and for negligence, based on alleged failures that allowed Leekin to fraudulently obtain foster care custody of them and then, later, to adopt them. The agency defendants now move for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the reasons that follow, that motion is denied in part and granted in part.
Background
The following facts are drawn from the complaint and the submissions of the parties on the motion, including their statements of undisputed material fact filed pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1. The facts are construed, as they must be in the summary judgment context, in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, as the nonmoving parties. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hamilton Beach/Proctor Silex, Inc., 473 F.3d 450, 456 (2d Cir.2007) (citation omitted). Any factual disputes are noted.
The story is undisputedly sad and tragic. From 1986 to 1994, plaintiffs were all classified as special needs children, and were removed from their homes and placed in the custody of the City. (Compl. ¶ 2.) The agency defendants were private child care agencies that provide foster care placement and other services for children in the custody of the City, pursuant to contracts with the City. (Compl. ¶¶ 47, 49, 51.) During this time, Leekin, using at least four false identities, obtained foster care custody of plaintiffs and numerous other special needs children from the City and the agency defendants. She subsequently adopted each plaintiff.[2](Compl. ¶ 56.) As was later revealed, Leekin launched this scheme in order to collect subsidies provided by the City for the fostering and adoption of special needs children, which she used for her own purposes while neglecting to care for plaintiffs.[3] In 1998, Leekin 185*185 transported plaintiffs from New York to Florida, where she relocated them in various houses over the following years. (See Def.'s 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 118-142).

With the exception of J.B., who left the house in which they lived sometime between May 2004 and May 2005,[4] plaintiffs remained with Leekin until July 2007, when Florida authorities searched the house in which they were then residing, discovered and removed plaintiffs, and arrested Leekin. (SeeDef.'s 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 149, 243.)
From the point when Leekin obtained custody of plaintiffs until they were released in July 2007, Leekin abused, tortured, neglected, and held plaintiffs in captivity, first in New York and then in Florida. It would be impossible here to describe in detail the brutality plaintiffs were subjected to over the course of their captivity, some for more than 15 years, but the following examples provide a glimpse of life in Leekin's house of horrors: Leekin routinely and for lengthy periods denied the children access to food and a toilet; handcuffed and restrained them for hours, including all night restraint with zip ties; trapped them in cribs held shut with boards and heavy objects; beat them with a belt, nightstick, and other objects; forced them to stand for hours on end, sometimes with their hands above their heads, as punishment; failed to protect them from sexual abuse; and repeatedly threatened them with a gun or with being beaten to death. (See Aff. of Dr. Peg McCart Hess, May 2, 2013, Ex. A ("Hess Report") at 3, 38-39, 62-64.) In New York, plaintiffs were often confined to the basement, where they were forced to sleep uncovered on the floor; in Florida, they generally slept on the floor of the garage. Id. If anyone came to the house where they were kept, plaintiffs were placed in a room and told to be quiet, and were threatened that if they did not remain quiet, they would be beaten.[5] Pl.'s Statement of Additional Disputed Material Facts ("Pl.'s Stmt. of Add'l Facts") ¶ 321; Hess Report at 63.) When removed from Leekin's Florida home in 2007, the ages of the named plaintiffs ranged from 15 to 27. None had completed elementary school; only three could read, and even then only at a third grade level. None had had any contact with a member of their biological families. Six were declared either "totally incapacitated" or "vulnerable adults." (Hess Report at 4.)
Plaintiffs commenced this action on April 29, 2009. Plaintiffs allege that the 186*186agency defendants failed to properly screen Leekin as a potential foster parent, monitor plaintiffs while they were in Leekin's care, or undertake their duties in connection with investigating Leekin prior to plaintiffs' adoptions, and that the defendants' reckless indifference to their duties and to plaintiffs led to plaintiffs' fraudulent adoption and abuse by Leekin. Plaintiffs bring claims against the agency defendants for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as for common law negligence.[6] The agency defendants seek summary judgment on a host of grounds.

Preliminarily, there are factual disputes surrounding how Leekin came to obtain custody of plaintiffs so long ago. Bluntly, the aged and incomplete nature of the agency defendants' records makes it difficult at times to piece together the relevant events. It is undisputed, though, that in applying to be a foster parent under her various false identities, Leekin provided the agency defendants with false names, and at least in the case of SJSC and HHS, with one or more falsified documents such as birth certificates, W-2s, written references, and Social Security cards.[7](See, e.g., Def.'s 56.1 Stmt ¶¶ 67, 69 (SJSC); 106(HHS).) Plaintiffs, correspondingly, acknowledge that Leekin provided false information to the agency defendants, but, relying on the agency defendants' records and their employees' testimony, assert that the agency defendants failed to take certain reasonable — and at times statutorily required — steps which would have uncovered the phony nature of Leekin's background information. For example, it is uncontradicted that none of the agency defendants requested or obtained photo identification from Leekin. (See Pl.'s Stmt of Add'l Facts ¶ 7.) Further, none sought to verify the Social Security numbers Leekin gave them, which did not match the aliases she provided (and SCO's records do not reflect Leekin being asked for a Social Security number at all).[8] (See id. ¶ 22.) Plaintiffs also assert that the agency defendants failed to obtain from Leekin the number of references required by state regulation, or to conduct mandatory inperson interviews with the references she did provide. (SeePl.'s 56.1 Stmt ¶ 34(c); Pl.'s Stmt of Add'l Facts ¶ 56, 59-61, 88, 110-11, 146.) Nor did the agency defendants question references that, plaintiffs allege, were obviously lacking, such as an employment reference that, although appearing to be on New York Life Insurance Company letterhead, contained no phone number, address, or contact information for the reference.[9] (Pl.'s Stmt. of Add'l Facts ¶ 54).
187*187 Each of the agency defendants also visited Leekin's home in Queens and conducted inspections in connection with approving and annually recertifying Leekin as a foster parent, and later as an adoptive parent. The parties dispute, however, what occurred during the inspections and home visits and whether they were sufficiently thorough. (Compare id. at ¶¶ 68, 88 with Pl.'s 56.1 Stmt. at ¶¶ 68, 88). In particular, plaintiffs point out that, as reflected by their records, none of the agency defendants inspected the basement, where Leekin hid plaintiffs. (Pl.'s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 22, 108; Pl.'s Stmt. of Add'l Facts ¶¶ 22, 24.) Leekin falsely told at least SCO that its employees could not inspect the basement because it was being rented by a third party, a claim that SCO apparently never attempted to verify. (See Pl.'s Stmt of Add'l Facts ¶ 172.)

Plaintiffs further assert that the agency defendants failed to identify or investigate numerous inconsistencies and red flag representations on the face of the documents Leekin provided to each of them in connection with her applications and their investigations. For example, the information that Leekin provided was internally inconsistent as to whether, where, and for how long she was employed; her religion, which she sometimes reported as Catholic, sometimes as Protestant, sometimes as Baptist; the number of bedrooms in her home; whether she owned the home; and various facts about her family members, such as whether she had siblings, and her mother's name. (See, e.g., Pl.'s Stmt of Add'l Facts ¶¶ 48-52, 113-14, 140-42, 164, 174.) The agency defendants do not dispute the existence of these inconsistencies, but do dispute their materiality.
Plaintiffs also allege failures in monitoring while in foster care. For example, plaintiffs claim that HHS and SCO failed to make monthly visits to the plaintiffs they placed, a claim the agency defendants dispute. (See Def.'s 56.1 Stmt ¶ 108.) It appears to be undisputed, however, that the agency defendants failed to conduct unannounced visits to Leekin's home, as opposed to scheduled visits, and that Leekin often changed the dates and times of scheduled visits, failed to keep appointments for scheduled visits, or brought the children into the agency for visits that were supposed to take place in her home. (Compl. ¶¶ 184-85.) When the agency defendants did visit, plaintiffs allege that they failed to speak with plaintiffs outside of Leekin's presence, and that the visits were essentially nothing more than a rubber stamp. (See Compl. ¶¶ 186-87, 190.) Additionally, it is undisputed that SJSC placed five special-needs children between the ages of one and five with "Michelle Wells," who claimed to be a single woman working full-time, which SJSC acknowledged was "very unusual." (Conway Dep., 8/18/10, at 190:22).
At the same time, the agency defendants present evidence that outside observers unanimously gave Leekin high marks as foster parent. For example, early progress notes state that after his placement with Leekin, plaintiff S.B. had "calmed down a lot," "interacted very well with everyone," and was "improving nicely," and caseworker reviews were positive. (See Def.'s 56.1 Stmt ¶ 49, 53.) A psychiatrist found that S.B. was improving under Leekin's care, (id. at ¶ 56), and S.B.'s courtappointed guardian ad litem issued a positive report about his relationship with Leekin. (Id. at ¶ 57). There were similarly positive reports for other of plaintiffs as well. (See id. at ¶¶ 82-86 (R.E.), 109-10, 114 (T.L. and J.L.)) Plaintiffs do not dispute these facts, but argue 188*188 that such positive feedback was a result of the alleged deficiencies in the agency defendants' monitoring of plaintiffs. For example, plaintiffs

point out that S.B. had at least ten different caseworkers in the 26 months between his placement with Leekin and his adoption, which, plaintiffs argue, undermined the quality of any communication they had with S.B.; plaintiffs also note that the psychiatrist who issued the report on S.B. saw S.B. only twice, one year apart; and point to what they allege are glaring inconsistencies between the information Leekin reported to the guardian ad litem and the information she reported to SCO. (See Pl.'s 56.1 Stmt ¶¶ 51, 55, 57.) Plaintiffs also contend that the positive Uniform Case Reports ("UCRs") that the agency defendants cite for positive feedback about Leekin fail to contain minimally adequate information regarding plaintiffs' placements, and contain identical language to prior UCRs. (Id. at 114.)
The agency defendants move for summary judgment on several grounds. First, they argue that the claims of three of the plaintiffs are barred by the statute of limitations. Next, they argue that plaintiffs' § 1983 claim should be dismissed because the agency defendants are not state actors; because the agency defendants did not act with the required mental state; for lack of causation; and because the claim is precluded by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Finally, the agency defendants argue that they are entitled to judgment on plaintiffs' negligence claims.
Standard of Review
A district court must grant summary judgment if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact" such that "the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The Court's responsibility in assessing the merits of a summary judgment motion is not to try issues of fact, but rather to "determine whether there are issues of fact to be tried." Sutera v. Schering Corp.,73 F.3d 13, 16 (2d Cir.1995) (quoting Katz v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 737 F.2d 238, 244 (2d Cir.1984)). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, see Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 553 (2d Cir.2005), and the Court will resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion. See Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 391 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir.2004); Gummo v. Vill. of Depew, 75 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir.1996) ("If, as to the issue on which summary judgment is sought, there is any evidence in the record from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the opposing party, summary judgment is improper.").

If the moving party meets its initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a disputed issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e). The nonmoving party may not rely solely on "conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation" in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment.Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir.1998). Rather, the nonmoving party must "make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of [each] element to that party's case .... since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548. If the evidence favoring the nonmoving party is "merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 189*189 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (internal citations omitted).
Discussion
I. Statute of Limitations
The agency defendants first argue that the claims of three plaintiffs, J.B., S.B., and S.W., are barred by the statute of limitations. As previewed above, plaintiffs bring two claims against the agency defendants: a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C § 1983 and a common law negligence claim. "In section 1983 actions, the applicable limitations period is found in the `general or residual [state] statute [of limitations] for personal injury actions.'" Ormiston v. Nelson, 117 F.3d 69, 71 (2d Cir.1997)(quoting Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989)). The statute of limitations for plaintiffs' § 1983 claims is thus three years. N.Y. C.P.L.R. ("CPLR") § 214(5). Likewise, the statute of limitations on plaintiffs' negligence claims is three years. Id. When plaintiffs' claims accrued, however, is a more complex and hotly disputed question.
The accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of federal law. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007). A § 1983 claim "accrues once the `plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.'" Veal v. Geraci, 23 F.3d 722, 724 (2d Cir.1994) (quotingSingleton v. New York, 632 F.2d 185, 191 (2d Cir.1980)). In other words, "the claim accrues when the alleged conduct has caused the claimant harm and the claimant knows or has reason to know of the allegedly impermissible conduct and the resulting harm." Veal, 23 F.3d at 724. This concept of accrual is known as the "discovery rule." Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 80 (2d

Cir.2002). The agency defendants argue that under this rule, each plaintiffs claim accrued as of the moment he or she first experienced abuse, because plaintiffs knew of their injuries as of that time. (Def.'s Mem. at 5-6). Acknowledging that plaintiffs were infants when that occurred, and as such their claims would have been tolled until they reached the age of majority, see CPLR § 208, the agency defendants argue that plaintiffs had three years after each of their 18th birthdays to file their complaint. That would mean that for three of the plaintiffs, J.B., S.B., and S.W., their claims are untimely, because they turned 21 on May 18, 2008, March 21, 2002, and June 16, 2008, respectively — all before the complaint was filed on April 29, 2009.
The limitations argument misses half the equation, however. Accrual is determined based on when plaintiffs knew of or had reason to know of both "the allegedly impermissible conduct and the resulting harm." Veal, 23 F.3d at 724 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs claim that their injuries were caused by the agency defendants' wrongful placement of them in Leekin's care; the abuse they suffered while in Leekin's care is merely the resulting harm. Even assuming that plaintiffs can be charged with awareness of their injuries as of their placement date, the pertinent question is when plaintiffs knew, or should have known, that the agency defendants had committed the conduct that plaintiffs allege led to their placement with Leekin. See Barrett v. United States, 689 F.2d 324, 328 (2d Cir.1982) ("... plaintiffs' cause of action accrued when they discovered or should have discovered the critical facts of [the victim's] injury and its cause. Since the injury was immediately known, the crucial question is when [the victim's] family should have discovered the critical facts relating to the cause of his death."); Sledge v. Guest,107 F.3d 4 (2d Cir.1996) (reversing sua sponte dismissal of case because "though it is clear that 190*190 [plaintiff] became aware of his injury more than three years prior to bringing this action, there appear to be questions as to when he became, or reasonably should have become, aware that his injury could have been caused by jail officials' serving food that was contaminated.").[10]
Plaintiffs argue, and the agency defendants do not contest, that they could not have personally been aware that they were wrongfully placed in foster care by the agency defendants until after their rescue and Leekin's arrest in July 2007. Indeed, the record indicates that while living with Leekin, plaintiffs did not even know they were in foster care at all. (See Pl.'s Br. in Opposition to Def.'s Mot. ("Pl.'s Opp.") at 39.) Even if plaintiffs should have learned that the agency defendants were responsible for their placement with Leekin as of the day they were released from her custody, their claims, filed on April 29, 2009, would be timely. Thus it is not necessary to

determine when, exactly, accrual of each plaintiffs § 1983 claim occurred; it is sufficient to say that it could not have occurred while plaintiffs were in Leekin's custody. Accordingly, S.B., and S.W.'s § 1983 claims are timely.
J.B. presents a different situation. Given that he escaped Leekin's home earlier than the other plaintiffs, his physical domination ended at the latest in May 2005.[11] Plaintiffs counter that, despite no longer being in Leekin's custody, J.B. had no way to know that defendant SJSC was responsible for his injuries until after Leekin's arrest in July 2007, when the details of her scheme finally emerged. The argument also relies on the fact that J.B. was suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, Cognitive Disorder and severe learning disabilities. (Pl.'s Opp. at 41). Whether J.B. should have been able to learn of the facts underlying his claim prior to April 20, 2006 — three years before the filing of the complaint — is a disputed issue of fact, such that summary judgment as to whether J.B.'s § 1983 claim is timebarred is not appropriate. Cf. Ormiston, 117 F.3d at 71-72 (holding that, in the case of involuntary medical or psychiatric confinement, the fact that a plaintiff is unable to assert his rights as the result of mental incapacity may delay accrual of his claim for unconstitutional confinement).
Plaintiffs' negligence claims are a different matter. Under New York law, which governs accrual of these claims, a negligence claim accrues "when the claim becomes enforceable, i.e., when all elements of the tort can be truthfully alleged in a complaint," which is generally at the time that the plaintiff is injured. Snyder v. Town Insulation, Inc., 81 N.Y.2d 429, 432-33, 599 N.Y.S.2d 515, 615 N.E.2d 999, 1000-01 (1993); see Syms v. Olin Corp., 408 F.3d 95, 109 (2d Cir.2005)("Historically, New York's statute of limitations generally began to run at the time of injury."). Plaintiffs argue that all elements of their claim could not be truthfully alleged until they became or could have become aware 191*191 of the agency defendants' wrongful acts, which could not have occurred until after their rescue in 2007. In other words, plaintiffs contend that a discovery rule should apply to their negligence claims. Unlike the § 1983 claim, however, the discovery rule does not apply to tort claims under New York law. See Kronos, Inc. v. AVX Corp., 81 N.Y.2d 90, 94, 595 N.Y.S.2d 931, 612 N.E.2d 289, 292 (1993) (The date of injury, "rather than ... discovery of the injury by plaintiff, is the relevant date for marking accrual."); Greenwald v. City of New York, No. 06-CV-2864, 2012 WL 6962297 (E.D.N.Y. July 19, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 354169 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2013) ("According to New York's general accrual rule, `mere ignorance or lack of discovery of the wrong is not sufficient to toll the Statute of Limitations, which commences running when the

wrong is perpetrated.'") (quotingGen. Stencils, Inc. v. Chiappa, 18 N.Y.2d 125, 127, 272 N.Y.S.2d 337, 219 N.E.2d 169 (1966)).
The agency defendants again argue that each plaintiff's negligence claim accrued as of the first time that Leekin abused him or her, an event defendants contend occurred as soon as each plaintiff was placed in Leekin's custody. A "first injury" rule is not appropriate in this action, however. "In New York, `(d)espite the general principle that a cause of action accrues when the wrong is done, regardless of when it is discovered, certain wrongs are considered to be continuing wrongs, and the statute of limitations, therefore, runs from the commission of the last wrongful act.'" Leonhard v. United States, 633 F.2d 599, 613 (2d Cir.1980) (quoting advisory note to CPLR § 203). Plaintiffs' negligence claims allege just such a continuing wrong. Indeed, plaintiffs allege a series of negligent acts or omissions by the agency defendants over several years, of which their placement in foster care with Leekin was only the first. Other acts or omissions include the agency defendants' initial screening and investigation of Leekin, their placement of multiple special needs children in foster care with her, their deficient monitoring of plaintiffs after placing them in Leekin's care, and their handling of the adoption process. Plaintiffs allege that together, the combination of these pre-adoption wrongful acts resulted in their respective adoptions and the decade of abuse that followed. SeeThomas v. New York City, 814 F.Supp. 1139, 1153 (E.D.N.Y.1993) (tort claims against foster care agencies based on abuse of children in their custody alleged a continuing wrong that did not accrue until "the continual negligent oversight by the defendants over the care of the infant plaintiffs while the children were in the defendants' custody" had ceased).
Notwithstanding, the continuing wrong exception does not save the day. The agency defendants' "last wrongful act" took place, at the latest, when plaintiffs were adopted by Leekin. Although Leekin continued to abuse and mistreat plaintiffs until 2007, the continuing violation doctrine "may only be predicated on continuing unlawful acts [by the tortfeasor] and not on the continuing effects of earlier unlawful conduct" Selkirk v. State, 249 A.D.2d 818, 819, 671 N.Y.S.2d 824, 825 (3d Dep't 1998) (rejecting argument that continuing wrong doctrine applied where plaintiff alleged that she continued to suffer effects of property seizure). It is a pathway to legal relief from continuing wrongdoing, not continuing suffering from stale wrongs. Plaintiffs allege no negligent conduct by the agency defendants after each of their adoptions were finalized.[12] 192*192 Accordingly, there can be no dispute that under New York law, each plaintiffs negligence claim accrued no later than the date of adoption, which

occurred for all plaintiffs between 1988 and 1996. The three-year statute of limitations clock started then.
The story does not end there, of course, since, as noted earlier, all plaintiffs were infants at the time of claim accrual. CPLR § 208 tolls the statute of limitations on any such accrued claim until three years after an infant plaintiff turns 18. The agency defendants concede that, in light of the infancy toll, five of plaintiffs' negligence claims are timely. However, they argue that J.B., S.B., and S.W.'s negligence claims are time-barred, given that the complaint was filed more than three years after their respective 18th birthdays.
Seeking to avoid this result, plaintiffs ask the Court to treat their negligence claim as a claim for false imprisonment, which in New York does not accrue until the plaintiffs release from confinement. See Whitmore v. City of New York, 80 A.D.2d 638, 639, 436 N.Y.S.2d 323, 324 (2d Dep't 1981). Plaintiffs advance the afterthought theory that this is the appropriate lens through which to view their claim. The confection rests on plaintiffs' claimed confinement against their will, incompetence to comprehend their loss of liberty, and inability to protect their rights until after they had been released. (See Pl.'s Opp. at 40, 42.) Notwithstanding that there are, indeed, factual parallels, plaintiffs have interposed a negligence claim, not a false imprisonment claim, and, importantly, do not bring a claim against the individual who imprisoned them. In any event, this is, at bottom, simply another way of asking the Court to apply a discovery rule where New York law does not. The Court sees no ground on which to apply the law of false imprisonment to plaintiffs' negligence claims.
The next straw is equity. Plaintiffs alternatively argue that equitable tolling should be invoked to toll the statute of limitations. Under federal law, equitable tolling may be available "as a matter of fairness where a plaintiff has been prevented in some extraordinary way from exercising his rights." Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 85 (2d Cir.2002) (internal quotation omitted); see also Zerilli-Edelglass v. New York City Transit Auth., 333 F.3d 74, 80 (2d Cir.2003) ("[E]quitable tolling is only appropriate in rare and exceptional circumstances ...") (internal quotations and alterations omitted). However, while the facts of this case might well merit such extraordinary intervention, plaintiffs' negligence claim is governed by state law, and New York law does not recognize the federal rule of equitable tolling.[13]David D. Siegel, N.Y. Prac. § 56 193*193 (5th ed. 2011) ("The equitable tolling doctrine has no precise New York counterpart."). New York does recognize the somewhat analogous

doctrine of equitable estoppel, under which a defendant may be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense, but that rule applies only "where it is the defendant's affirmative wrongdoing which produced the ... delay between the accrual of the cause of action and the institution of the legal proceeding." Zumpano v. Quinn, 6 N.Y.3d 666, 673, 816 N.Y.S.2d 703, 849 N.E.2d 926, 929 (2006) (alteration omitted) (quoting General Stencils v. Chiappa,18 N.Y.2d 125, 128, 272 N.Y.S.2d 337, 219 N.E.2d 169 (1966)). Although it could be said that the agency defendants' wrongful conduct ultimately resulted in plaintiffs' inability to bring their claims upon accrual, because their conduct led to plaintiffs' confinement by Leekin, which led to the delay in filing suit, equitable estoppel requires a more direct connection between a defendant's obstructive conduct and the plaintiff's inability to timely file, such as a showing that the "plaintiff was induced by fraud, misrepresentations or deception to refrain from filing a timely action." Simcuski v. Saeli, 44 N.Y.2d 442, 448-49, 406 N.Y.S.2d 259, 377 N.E.2d 713, 716 (1978); see also Corsello v. Verizon New York, Inc., 18 N.Y.3d 777, 789, 944 N.Y.S.2d 732, 967 N.E.2d 1177, 1184 (2012) (equitable estoppel not appropriate because "[p]laintiffs here have not alleged an act of deception... on which an equitable estoppel could be based."). The agency defendants are not alleged to have deceived or misled plaintiffs regarding timely filing of their claims, and thus equitable estoppel is not available.
All else failing, a specific additional pitch is made that J.B., alone, is eligible for tolling on insanity grounds under CPLR 208, which provides, in relevant part, that
[i]f a person entitled to commence an action is under a disability because of... insanity at the time the cause of action accrues, ... the time within which the action must be commenced shall be extended to three years after the disability ceases.... The time within which the action must be commenced shall not be extended by this provision beyond ten years after the cause of action accrues."
CPLR § 208. Thus, for insanity, as opposed to infancy, CPLR § 208 only tolls the statute of limitations for a maximum of ten years from accrual of the otherwise timebarred claim. J.B.'s negligence claim accrued when he was adopted by Leekin, under the alias "Michelle Wells," on June 7, 1994, so at the latest, his claim was tolled pursuant to the insanity relief of § 208 until June 7, 2004. This is actually an earlier bar date than the one that arises under the separate and non-cumulative infancy toll — May 18, 2008, three years after J.B.'s 18th birthday.[14]Accordingly,

even if J.B. was entitled to invoke the insanity toll, it would provide him no benefit. Under either measure, consequently, J.B.'s claim is untimely.
In sum, J.B., S.B., and S.W.'s negligence claims are barred by the statute of limitations, and they are dismissed.
II. Section 1983 Claims
The agency defendants also move substantively for summary judgment 194*194 on the § 1983 claim. To establish a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate "that the challenged conduct (1) was attributable to a person acting under color of state law, and (2) deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Whalen v. Cnty. of Fulton, 126 F.3d 400, 405 (2d Cir.1997) (citing Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865, 875-76 (2d Cir.1994)). The Second Circuit has held that, "[w]hen individuals are placed in custody or under the care of the government, their governmental custodians are sometimes charged with affirmative duties, the nonfeasance of which may violate the constitution." Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 649 F.2d 134, 141 (2d Cir. 1981). "In particular, `children in foster care [have] a substantive due process right [under the Fourteenth Amendment] to protection from harm.'" Tylena M. v. Heartshare Children's Servs., 390 F.Supp.2d 296, 302 (S.D.N.Y.2005)(quoting Marisol A. by Forbes v. Giuliani, 929 F.Supp. 662, 675 (S.D.N.Y.1996));see also DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201 n. 9, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (citing Doe and noting, without reaching the issue, that a state "may be held liable under the Due Process Clause for failing to protect children in foster homes from mistreatment at the hands of their foster parents.").
Two requirements must be satisfied in order for a state actor to be held liable for failing to protect a child in its custody. First, the alleged acts and omissions "must have been a substantial factor leading to the denial" of the constitutional right.Doe, 649 F.2d at 141. Second, "the officials in charge of the agency being sued must have displayed a mental state of `deliberate indifference.'" Id. (quoting Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152, 166 (2d Cir. 1978)). The agency defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs' § 1983 claims because plaintiffs cannot demonstrate (1) that they acted "under color of state law" in placing plaintiffs with Leekin; (2) that they demonstrated "deliberate indifference;" (3) that their conduct was a "substantial factor" leading to the harm plaintiffs suffered; and, in any

case, (4) because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives the Court of subject matter jurisdiction.
A. State Action Requirement
The agency defendants first argue de rigueur that, as private foster care agencies, they are not "state actors," and, as a consequence, plaintiffs cannot establish the "under color of state law" element of their claim.[15] While it is true that the agency defendants are private entities, the Second Circuit has set out the three situations in which "the actions of a nominally private entity are attributable to the state":
(1) the entity acts pursuant to the "coercive power" of the state or is "controlled" by the state ("the compulsion test"); (2) when the state provides "significant encouragement" to the entity, the entity is a "willful participant in joint activity with the [s]tate," or the entity's functions are "entwined" with state policies ("the joint action test" or "close nexus test"); or (3) when the entity "has been delegated a public function by the [s]tate," ("the public function test").
Sybalski v. Indep. Grp. Home Living Program, Inc., 546 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir.2008) (citing Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary 195*195 Sch. Athletic Ass'n,531 U.S. 288, 296, 121 S.Ct. 924, 148 L.Ed.2d 807 (2001)).
In Perez v. Sugarman, the Second Circuit determined that private childcare agencies perform the "public function" of "accepting and retaining custody of children alleged to have been `neglected' or `abandoned,'" and thus that they are "state actors" for purposes of § 1983 claims. Perez v. Sugarman, 499 F.2d 761, 765 (2d Cir.1974); see also Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 822 (2d Cir.1977) (reaffirming this decision in light of the intervening Supreme Court opinion in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 95 S.Ct. 449, 42 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974)). The Second Circuit came to this conclusion based in part on New York's Social Services Law ("SSL"), which, according to the court, makes clear that "it is the State which in effect is providing the care through the private institutions."[16] Id. Courts in this circuit continue to apply this rule. See, e.g., J.R. ex rel. Blanchard v. City of New York, No. 11-cv-841, 2012 WL 4511442 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2012); Vega v. Fox, 457 F.Supp.2d 172, 182 (S.D.N.Y.2006) ("It is now well established in this circuit that private child-care institutions authorized by New York's Social Services Law to care for neglected children are acting `under color of state law' for purposes of section 1983.") (collecting cases); Phillips ex rel. Green v.

City of New York, 453 F.Supp.2d 690, 737 (S.D.N.Y.2006) ("In the case of private child care agencies, courts in this Circuit have consistently held that they act under color of state law for § 1983 purposes....").
The agency defendants do not deny the existence of this longstanding precedent. Rather, they argue that Perez is no longer good law and should not be applied here. In particular, they argue that current jurisprudence has narrowed the applicability of the "public function" test, undermining Perez's holding that private childcare agencies perform a "public function" of the state. In so arguing, the agency defendants rely heavily on a recent decision in this district that questioned the continuing viability of Second Circuit precedent designating private foster care agencies as state actors. See Phelan ex rel. Phelan v. Torres, 843 F.Supp.2d 259, 268 (E.D.N.Y.2011) ("[T]he Supreme Court has so dramatically changed the legal landscape in this area that [Perez and Duchesne] are arguably no longer good law."); see id. at 268-72 (expressing doubt as to whether the foster placement role is "exclusively reserved to the state, as is now required of a public function under the Supreme Court's current jurisprudence.") (emphasis in original). Ultimately, however, the court in Phelan determined that it was bound to treat the foster agency defendant as a state actor, "until the Second Circuit holds otherwise." Id. at 274. The Second Circuit affirmed, noting that it, too, would assume without deciding that the foster care agency defendant was a state actor. Phelan ex rel. Phelan v. Mullane, 512 Fed.Appx. 88, 90 (2d Cir.2013). Without expressing any opinion on the Phelan court's misgivings as to the validity of Perez, this Court agrees with its result: until the Second Circuit holds otherwise, the law in this 196*196circuit is that private foster care agencies, including the agency defendants here, are state actors.[17]
B. Deliberate Indifference
The agency defendants alternatively seek summary judgment on plaintiffs' § 1983 claim on the ground that plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that the agencies acted with "deliberate indifference" in placing plaintiffs with Leekin. As the Second Circuit held in Doe,[18] a private foster care agency, acting under color of state law, can be held liable for harm to a child by a foster parent under § 1983 if it was "deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's welfare," meaning that "its top supervisory personnel ... exhibited deliberate indifference to a known injury, a known risk, or a specific duty, and their failure to perform the duty or act to ameliorate the risk or injury was a proximate cause of plaintiffs deprivation of rights under the Constitution." Doe, 649

F.2d at 145. "An indifference is deliberate when a policymaker `made a deliberate choice ... from among various alternatives.'" Richards v. City of New York, 433 F.Supp.2d 404, 424 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (quoting Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 297 (2d Cir. 1992)). "However, deliberate indifference does not require `ill-will or the affirmative acquiescence in mistreatment'" Richards, 433 F.Supp.2d at 424(quoting Doe, 649 F.2d at 144).
Nonetheless, "`deliberate indifference' is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action." Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997). Ordinary negligence by itself cannot constitute deliberate indifference, but "gross negligent conduct creates a strong presumption of deliberate indifference." Doe, at 143; see also id. at 142 ("repeated acts of negligence could be evidence of indifference."); Phillips, 453 F.Supp.2d at 739 ("The Second Circuit has "often equated gross negligence with recklessness, and [has] defined it as the `kind of conduct ... where [the] defendant has reason to know of facts creating a high degree of risk of physical harm to another and deliberately acts or fails to act in conscious disregard or indifference to that risk.'"") (quoting Poe v. Leonard, 282 F.3d 123, 140 n. 14 (2d Cir.2002)). The pertinent question, then, is whether plaintiffs have demonstrated a disputed issue of material fact as to whether each of the agency defendants was at least grossly negligent with regard to "a known injury, a known risk, or a specific duty," in placing plaintiffs in the charge of Leekin.[19]
197*197 Plaintiffs argue that they have raised a triable issue of fact as to defendants' deliberate indifference to both a known risk and a specific duty. As to a known risk, plaintiffs present testimony from agency supervisors — who were at least in part responsible for plaintiffs' placements — that they understood that poor foster parent screening would pose a risk to the safety of children placed in foster care. (See Pl.'s Opp. at 14 (citing Conway Dep. of Aug. 18, 2010)); id at 23 (citing Smith-Nijiri Dep. of August 19, 2010); id. at 28 (citing Odom Dep. of Sept. 23, 2010 and May 20, 2010.) It has been held in this district that a foster care agency's policies and customs that, among other things, "inadequately governed the investigation, certification, and selection of foster parents ... could constitute deliberate indifference ... to the increased risk such policies would pose that foster children would be abused in their foster homes." J.R. ex rel. Blanchard v. City of New York,No. 11-cv841, 2012 WL 4511442, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2012) (deciding a motion to

dismiss). This is the precise risk that plaintiffs claim the record shows existed here and allege that the agency defendants disregarded.
As to the agency defendants' deliberate indifference to a specific duty, Plaintiffs argue that this can be inferred from their violation of a series of statutes and regulations governing the investigation of potential foster parents. The Court can "infer[] deliberate unconcern for [plaintiffs'] welfare from a pattern of omissions revealing deliberate inattention to specific duties imposed for the purpose of safeguarding plaintiffs from abuse." Doe, 649 F.2d at 145; see also id. (Defendants can be "`charged with knowledge' of unconstitutional conditions when they persistently violated a statutory duty to inquire about such conditions and to be responsible for them."). Whether deliberate indifference can be inferred from breach of a statutory duty in part depends on the nature of the statute. "The more a statute or regulation clearly mandates a specific course of conduct, the more it furnishes a plausible basis for inferring deliberate indifference from a failure to act, even without any specific knowledge of harm or risk." Id. at 145-46 (finding triable issue of fact as to deliberate indifference based on foster agency's failure to report suspected child abuse in violation of SSL § 413); cf. Phillips, 453 F.Supp.2d at 740(deliberate indifference could not be found based on agency's failure to comply with "a contract describing duties and responsibilities undertaken by the foster parents," rather than the agency.).
198*198 In pursuit of this theory, plaintiffs cite several laws and regulations, in force at the time they were placed in foster care and/or adopted, governing the screening and monitoring of foster care and adoption placements. For example, state law required a foster agency to obtain, before certifying a foster parent, the applicant's employment history and personal and employment references, among other things, and instructed that "not until all inquiries are completed and evaluated shall the agency cause such certificate to be issued." SSL § 376(1) (1992). State regulations required obtaining similar information, including four non-relative references, 18 NYCRR § 443.3(a)(10)(iii) (1988), and directed the foster agency to conduct a "careful investigation" of the foster parent application before issuing a license or certificate to an applicant, § 444.3(e) (1981), as well as "review and evaluate" the background information provided by the applicant, § 443.3(a)(10) (1988), and conduct in-person interviews with at least two references, § 443.3(f)(1) (1988), among other things. Annual renewal investigations were required to include a home visit and written evaluation. 18 NYCRR 444.6(a) (1981). Prior to approving an applicant to adopt a child, an agency was required to conduct a home inspection,

and collect three references, at least two of which could not be relatives, and employment verification, such as W-2s or pay stubs, among other things. 18 NYCRR 421.15(a)-(c) (1983).
To demonstrate deliberate indifference of the agency defendants to these statutes and regulations, and to the known risk inherent in failing to properly screen an applicant, plaintiffs set forth a passel of specific failings by the agency defendants in connection with approving Leekin as a foster and adoptive parent. Among other things, plaintiffs assert that each of the three agencies failed to verify Leekin's identity by not requesting photo identification from her, and failed to verify the Social Security numbers Leekin gave them, or in some cases even ask for a Social Security number at all.[20] Plaintiffs also point out that the agency defendants failed to ensure that Leekin provide the number of references required by state regulation, and failed likewise to conduct the required in-person interviews with the references she did provide. During obligatory home inspections, the agency defendants' records indicate that their employees did not inspect the basement, where Leekin hid plaintiffs, and failed to verify whether the off-limits space was truly being rented by a third party. Plaintiffs also allege that HHS and SCO failed to monthly visit the plaintiffs they placed, and when they did visit, failed to speak with them privately outside of Leekin's presence. (See Pl.'s Opp. at 35, n. 29). These failings, plaintiffs assert, along with others, occurred not only when the children were initially placed with Leekin, but also each time she was annually recertified as a foster parent, and again when she was approved to adopt each child. Plaintiffs further highlight numerous discrepancies within the documentation that Leekin provided to each of the agency defendants and within their own investigations of Leekin. See supra at 8. The failure to identify these discrepancies, plaintiffs press, is more evidence of defendants' deliberate indifference in assessing Leekin's suitability as a parent. Additionally, plaintiffs argue that SJSC's placement of five special-needs children with "Michelle Wells," who claimed to be a single woman working full-time, is itself evidence of deliberate indifference.
199*199 Plaintiffs point out as well that the adoption home studies for each of the plaintiffs, reflecting much of the noncompliant conduct, were signed by top supervisory personnel at the agency defendants, and cite to testimony that plaintiffs' case files were reviewed by supervisors. (See Pl.'s Opp. at 22 (SJSC); id.at 27(HHS); id. at 29-30(SCO)). They further identify evidence that the failure to investigate Leekin's identity, collect the proper number of references, and the failure to interview references were not just isolated missteps by employees, but

representative of the policies and procedures in place at each agency. See, e.g.,Smith-Nijiri Decl. ¶ 39 (stating that HHS required two, not four, personal references from an applicant); Odom Decl. ¶ 24 (stating that SCO policy was to call references, as opposed to interview them in person); Conway Decl. ¶ 31 (declaring that no set number of personal references was required by law at the time SJSC placed plaintiffs with Leekin, a claim that is contradicted by the relevant regulations).
While not all of the failures that plaintiffs raise would necessarily amount to gross negligence individually — and some may not have been negligent at all — taken together, they unquestionably present disputed issues of fact as to whether the agency defendants engaged in "repeated acts of negligence" sufficient to constitute deliberate indifference. Contrary to the defendants' argument, the alleged acts and omissions go well beyond mere "bureaucratic inaction," and demonstrate failure to comply with specific laws and policies designed to protect foster children and to take other reasonable precautions, in a way that provides a "plausible basis for inferring deliberate indifference from a failure to act." Doe, 649 F.2d at 145-46. The agency defendants respond with evidence that Leekin consistently presented as an excellent parent, provided them with fake references, W-2s, and Social Security cards that would have fooled any reasonable investigator, and also provide testimony that their policies and practices were reasonable for the era. And, it may be so. This is a classic disputed issue of fact.See, e.g., Ingrao v. Cnty. of Albany, N.Y., No. 01-cv730, 2006 WL 2827856, at *10 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2006) ("Because a reasonable jury might conclude that the conglomeration of these instances evince a pattern, practice, or custom of deliberate indifference to [plaintiff's] rights, Defendant's motion for summary judgment must be denied.").
Additionally, it is worth noting that much of plaintiffs' argument assumes that when a particular procedure or occurrence — such as a home visit — is not reflected in the agency defendants' records, it did not take place. In this context, the absence from the agency defendants' voluminous records of any evidence of the procedures in question being completed is sufficient to demonstrate disputed issues of fact as to whether they ever were completed. The agency defendants may ultimately present evidence that these deficiencies in their records resulted not from the failure to actually take the necessary steps, but rather from a failure to properly record the steps taken, or to retain the relevant records in the intervening decades. Whether that is the case, and whether plaintiffs can demonstrate that, on balance, the agency defendants' failures amounted to deliberate indifference, is an issue for the fact finder.[21]

200*200 C. Causation
To survive summary judgment, plaintiffs also must demonstrate that there is a genuine dispute concerning whether the agency defendants' deliberate indifference was "a substantial factor leading to the denial" of their right to be protected from harm while in foster care. Doe, 649 F.2d at 141 (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976)); see id. at 145 (formulating the requirement as one of proximate causation). For deliberate indifference to be a substantial factor in the violation of a constitutional right under § 1983, the policy at issue must be "closely related to the ultimate injury," and it must appear that the injury could have been avoided had the policy not been "deficient in the identified respect." Richards, 433 F.Supp.2d at 426.
The agency defendants seek summary judgment on this issue, on the ground that plaintiffs' theory is too hypothetical to demonstrate that the agency defendants proximately caused their injuries. The agency defendants argue that it is impossible to determine, on the record before the Court, whether the agency defendants ever followed up on the claimed inconsistencies with Leekin; and that Leekin, a successful con artist, would most likely have been able to easily correct or deal with such inconsistencies if they had. But these propositions, even putting aside their own essential speculativeness and assuming the existence of admissible evidence establishing their truth, do not demonstrate the absence of any issue of fact as to causation; indeed, they actually pose disputes as to issues of material fact, and are thus insufficient to carry the agency defendants' burden on summary judgment. See Jeffreys, 426 F.3d at 553.
The agency defendants also protest that Leekin's extensive fraud was an intervening force "so bizarre, unique and unforeseeable" that it broke the causal chain needed to impose liability on the agency defendants. (Def.'s Mem. at 45.) Under New York law, "[w]here the acts of a third person intervene between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiffs injury,... liability turns upon whether the intervening act is a normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation created by the defendant's negligence." Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308, 315, 434 N.Y.S.2d 166, 414 N.E.2d 666, 670 (1980). "Because questions concerning what is foreseeable and what is normal may be the subject of varying inferences,... these issues generally are for the fact finder to resolve." Id. That is the case here. Whether it is foreseeable that plaintiffs would have been harmed by Leekin, after being placed her care without proper screening and investigation — if plaintiffs can prove that the

screening here was grossly negligent — is an issue for the fact finder. Again, the agency defendants fail to demonstrate the absence of a dispute of fact.
To be clear, the burden does not shift to plaintiffs to demonstrate a disputed issue of fact as to causation. They do so anyway. Specifically, plaintiffs offer that causation exists because if the agency defendants had verified Leekin's self-reported information as required, they would have uncovered her lies, and, presumably, would never have placed plaintiffs with her. They proffer evidence that the agency defendants, pursuant to their own policies and testimony, would not have placed foster children with an applicant who had provided them with false information as to her identity. (See Pl.'s Opp. at 35-36.) 201*201 Assuming for causation purposes that plaintiffs have established the agency defendants' deliberate indifference, plaintiffs successfully demonstrate an issue of fact as to whether that indifference was a substantial factor leading to the abuse they suffered at the hands of Leekin. See Doe, 649 F.2d at 144 ("the causal link between the agency's alleged failure to supervise and the continuation of [plaintiffs] abuse is clear," because if the agency had investigated "with sufficient acuity and diligence to discover the abuse, it would have been able to prevent further abuse by withdrawing her from the home."); J.R., No. 11-cv-841, 2012 WL 4511442, at *8 (At least at the motion to dismiss stage, policies that, among other things, "inadequately governed the investigation, certification, and selection of foster parents for particular foster children" could be "a `substantial factor leading to the denial' of [a child's] right to be protected from harm while in foster care.").
D. Rooker-Feldman
The agency defendants next argue that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine divests this Court of subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs' § 1983 claim, because the claim is based on events that took place after they were adopted by Leekin. Under theRooker-Feldman doctrine, "federal district courts lack jurisdiction over suits that are, in substance, appeals from state-court judgments." Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir.2005).
[T]here are four requirements for the application of Rooker-Feldman.First, the federal-court plaintiff must have lost in state court. Second, the plaintiff must "complain[] of injuries caused by [a] state-court judgment[.]" Third, the plaintiff must "invit[e] district court review and rejection of [that] judgment[]." Fourth, the state-court

judgment must have been "rendered before the district court proceedings commenced...."
Id. at 85 (2d Cir.2005) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005)) (footnote omitted). In Exxon Mobil, the Supreme Court unanimously narrowed the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in response to what it saw as overly broad applications by the circuit courts, and set out the four requirements above. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517.
The Rooker-Feldman argument advanced by the agency defendants rests on the New York Family Court and Surrogate's Court decrees finalizing plaintiffs' adoptions by Leekin. They argue that any of plaintiffs' claims arising out of the post-adoption period necessarily invite this Court to review and invalidate those adoption decrees. In what could generously be called an overreach, the agency defendants then argue that Rooker-Feldman bars this Court's review of plaintiffs' § 1983 claim in its entirety, because the injury for which plaintiffs seek relief is, in part, their post-adoption abuse.
The agency defendants purport to rely for this argument on the Seventh Circuit's decision in Lewis v. Anderson, 308 F.3d 768 (7th Cir.2002), a case in which individuals sued officials of the Wisconsin Department of Health and Human Services ("WDHHS") under § 1983 for improperly placing them with foster parents who abused them. Invoking Rooker-Feldman, the Seventh Circuit in Lewis stated that "[t]o the extent that the plaintiffs in this case contend that their constitutional rights were violated by the defendants during the pre-adoption period, they may proceed; to the extent that they challenge the decision to approve the Lewises as adoptive parents, they may not (as the latter decision was taken under the supervision of the state courts)." Lewis, 308 202*202 F.3d at 772. Although it is not clear whether the Seventh Circuit intended to suggest that the decision by WDHHS to approve the adoptive parents — as opposed to a judicial ruling by a state court — would be given preclusive effect under Rooker-Feldman, that would almost certainly not survive the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Exxon Mobil.[22] In any event, the Lewis court ultimately held that Rooker-Feldman did not bar plaintiffs' claims, because those claims arose out of WDHHS's selection of the foster parents and monitoring of "their performance in that capacity prior to the adoption," which "was not taken pursuant to any court order." Id. (concluding that, accordingly, "the § 1983 suit cannot be the equivalent of an attempt to have a lower federal court review a state court judgment.").

The parallel, for sure, is strong. As in Lewis, the allegations in the complaint focus on the agency defendants' selection and approval of Leekin as a foster parent, the monitoring of plaintiffs prior to their adoptions, and other pre-adoption procedures. Thus, even applying Lewis, plaintiffs' claims would not be barred by RookerFeldman. Moreover, to the extent that plaintiffs' claims do arise out of incidents that took place post-adoption, Rooker-Feldman still does not bar jurisdiction in this action, because plaintiffs' claims do not meet at least two of the RookerFeldmanrequirements: plaintiffs did not lose in state court and they do not "invite district court review and rejection" of a state court judgment. Green v. Mattingly, 585 F.3d 97, 102 (2d Cir.2009) (quoting Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 85).
In delineating the meaning of the Supreme Court's decision in Exxon Mobil, the Second Circuit has made clear that the "core requirement" of Rooker-Feldman is that "federal plaintiffs are not subject to the Rooker-Feldman bar unless theycomplain of an injury caused by a state judgment." Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 87(emphasis in original). The requisite causal connection between the state court judgment and the source of the injury may be satisfied under two circumstances: "(1) where ... the state court judgment itself rather than some action by the defendant in the prior state court litigation is the source or cause of the injury the federal plaintiff complains about in the federal suit, or (2) where ... the underlying harmful action the federal plaintiff complains about was actually taken by a third party in compliance with an order embodied in a judgment rendered by a state court" Glatzer v. Barone, 614 F.Supp.2d 450, 463-64 (S.D.N.Y.2009) aff'd, 394 Fed.Appx. 763 (2d Cir.2010). Either way, the causation must be direct. "[A] plaintiff who seeks in federal court a result opposed to the one he achieved in state court does not, for that reason alone, run afoul of Rooker-Feldman." Id. Indeed, even if the claimed injury has been previously presented to a state court, "[t]he fact that the state court chose not to remedy the injury does not transform the subsequent federal suit on the same matter into an appeal, forbidden by Rooker-Feldman, of the state-court judgment," although the subsequent federal suit could, of course, be barred by ordinary preclusion principles. Id. at 87-88.
Under this reasoning, the injuries alleged in the complaint were not "caused" by a state-court judgment. Plaintiffs do not complain that their injuries were brought about directly by the state court decrees finalizing their adoptions, but rather by the agency defendants' pre-adoption conduct in making the foster placements and supporting those adoptions; nor do they base their claims on conduct the 203*203agency defendants took in compliance with such decrees. Plaintiffs' claims do not "invite

district court review and rejection of any state court judgment, and they "plainly ha[ve] not repaired to federal court to undo the [Family Court] judgment."Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293, 125 S.Ct. 1517.
Additionally, plaintiffs are not "state court losers" by virtue of having had their adoptions finalized in the state courts. Even if the agency defendants could be considered prevailing parties in plaintiffs' adoption proceedings, which is not at all clear, a Florida court has already declared at least three of the adoptions to be void ab initio, under New York law, on account of Leekin's misrepresentations to the New York Family Court regarding her identity. (See Kapell Decl. Ex. 9 at PLF00849851 (Order for Adjudication of Dependency, In the interest of: [R.W., T.W., and J.G.], Fl. Cir. Ct. 19th Cir. (Sept. 15, 2008).)) Thus, to the extent plaintiffs were "state court losers" following their adoption proceedings, the Florida proceeding has since converted them to "state court winners." See Green, 585 F.3d at 102 (2d Cir.2009) (Reversing a dismissal on Rooker-Feldman grounds on the basis that, "[b]ecause the Family Court issued a superseding order [in a second proceeding] returning plaintiffs child to her, and because the Family Court proceedings were ultimately dismissed, we conclude that plaintiff was not a `state-court loser[].'"). For these reasons, in sum, Rooker-Feldman does not bar plaintiffs' claims.
E. The City-Placed Plaintiffs
Two of the ten plaintiffs — L.J. and J.G. — were placed in foster care by the City, rather than by any of the agency defendants. The agency defendants argue that they cannot be held liable to these two plaintiffs under § 1983. In this regard, the agency defendants are correct.
In general, "a State's failure to protect an individual against private violence," such as Leekin's abuse of the plaintiffs, "simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause," and thus cannot form the basis of a § 1983 claim.DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989) (holding that state had had no duty under the Due Process Clause to protect a child against beatings by his father even though the state had received reports that the father physically abused the child). There are two exceptions to this broad rule. A § 1983 action may arise out of a private harm if: "(1) the victim of private conduct was in a `special relationship' with the State or (2) the state or its agents `in some way assisted in creating or increasing the danger to the victim.'" Campbell v. Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist., 904 F.Supp.2d 275, 280

(E.D.N.Y.2012) (quoting Matican v. City of New York, 524 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 2008)).
As the agency defendants acknowledge, the "special relationship" required for the first exception may exist between the state and a child when a state official places the child in foster care. See, e.g., Doe ex rel. Johnson v. S. Carolina Dep't of Soc. Servs., 597 F.3d 163, 172-73 (4th Cir.2010); Doe, 649 F.2d at 141 (pre-DeShaney). However, it is undisputed that the agency defendants did not place L.J. or J.G. in foster care. Accordingly, L.J. and J.G. cannot assert a § 1983 claim against the agency defendants based on the "special relationship" exception. L.J. and J.G. argue, nonetheless, that they can assert a § 1983 claim against the agency defendants based on the "state-created danger" exception.
Under this exception, "state actors may be liable under section 1983 if they affirmatively created or enhanced the 204*204 danger of private violence." Okin v. Vill. of Cornwall-On-Hudson Police Dep't, 577 F.3d 415, 427-28 (2d Cir.2009) (citingDwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 99 (2d Cir.1993)). The state actor must have engaged in "affirmative" conduct that actively facilitated the danger to the plaintiff; "passive failure to stop private violence" will not suffice to establish a state-create danger. Pena v. DePrisco, 432 F.3d 98, 109 (2d Cir.2005) ("`state created danger' liability arises from the relationship between the state and the private assailant."); see also Lombardi v. Whitman, 485 F.3d 73, 79 (2d Cir.2007)("It is not enough to allege that a government actor failed to protect an individual from a known danger of bodily harm or failed to warn the individual of that danger.").
The Second Circuit has recognized that "[d]istinguishing between `active' and `passive' facilitation can of course sometimes be difficult," id. at 110, and a review of relevant cases demonstrates how fine the line can be. See Dwares, 985 F.2d at 99 (state-created danger existed where police officers explicitly told assailants they would not interfere with an attack and thus gave "prearranged official sanction" to the private violence); Matican v. City of New York, 524 F.3d 151, 157-58 (2d Cir. 2008) (police failure to inform confidential informant of a suspect's violent criminal history or release on bail is too passive to constitute state-created danger; but sting operation planned in a manner that would lead the suspect to learn about the informant's involvement was sufficiently affirmative); Okin, 577 F.3d at 429-30(statecreated danger existed when police officers, in responding to plaintiffs complaints of domestic violence, "openly expressed camaraderie with [the assailant] and contempt

for [the plaintiff]" and expressed a "dismissive and indifferent attitude" toward her complaints.); Pena, 432 F.3d at 111 (state-created danger exists when "state officials communicate to a private person that he or she will not be arrested, punished, or otherwise interfered with while engaging in misconduct that is likely to endanger the life, liberty or property of others.");Hemphill v. Schott, 141 F.3d 412, 419 (2d Cir.1998) (state-created danger where police officers gave a handgun to a retired officer who then shot a fleeing robber).
Plaintiffs argue that the conduct of the agency defendants falls on the "affirmative conduct" side of the line. By improperly screening Leekin as a foster and adoptive parent, continuing to place more and more special needs children in the Leekin home, and failing to discover plaintiffs L.J. and J.G. during any of their required visits to or inspections of the home, plaintiffs argue that the agency defendants increased the risk that L.J. and J.G. would be harmed by Leekin. Plaintiffs also appear to argue that by repeatedly demonstrating to Leekin that she would not be even minimally investigated, screened, or monitored, the agency defendants affirmatively communicated to her that she could abuse the children in her custody with impunity, thus increasing the risk of harm to all of the children she subsequently harmed.[23] Indeed, the Pena court indicated that "repeated inaction by government officials over a sustained period of time, without explicit advance approval or encouragement of the misbehavior in question, might effectively constitute an implicit `prior assurance' rising to the level of an affirmative act."Pena, 432 F.3d at 110 (2d Cir.2005); see also Okin, 205*205 577 F.3d at 429("affirmative conduct of a government official may give rise to an actionable due process violation if it communicates, explicitly or implicitly, official sanction of private violence.").
Even so, precedent suggests that a more deliberate — though not explicit — communication to the private actor sanctioning her misconduct than the one plaintiffs allege here is required. Indeed, in finding that the defendants had encouraged the private violence against the plaintiff in Pena, the court there noted that "[s]ometimes deliberate silence is equivalent to explicit permission." Id. at 112 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs do not argue that the agency defendants intended by their incompetence to communicate to Leekin that she could abuse the children in her custody at will.[24] The agency defendants' failings in this case are closer to a "failure to prevent misbehavior," which is precisely what Second Circuit precedent cautions cannot constitute a state-created danger. Pena, 432 F.3d at 112; see alsoChambers v. N. Rockland Cent. Sch. Dist., 815 F.Supp.2d 753, 769

(S.D.N.Y.2011) ("At worst, [defendants'] actions were insufficient to prevent the danger, thus placing this case squarely in the ambit of DeShaney.").
The Court, accordingly, with no material facts in dispute, holds that the agency defendants' conduct did not create the danger to L.J. and J.G. from Leekin. Those two plaintiffs cannot maintain a § 1983 claim against the agency defendants, and the claim is dismissed as to them.
III. Negligence Claims
Finally, the agency defendants seek summary judgment on plaintiffs' common law negligence claims.[25] "To establish a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff must establish the existence of a duty owed by a defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty, and that such breach was a proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff." Nappi v. Inc. Vill. of Lynbrook, 19 A.D.3d 565, 566, 796 N.Y.S.2d 537 (2d Dep't 2005).
The agency defendants first argue that, as a matter of law, they did not act negligently — i.e., breach their duty of care to plaintiffs. In support of this argument, the agency defendants point to evidence that, in addition to deceiving them, Leekin duped numerous law enforcement and financial institutions over the years, whose employees had specialized training and experience in fraud detection. (See Def.'s 56.1 Stmt ¶ 34). This fact, the agency defendants plead, "defeats any claim that the foster care professionals here failed to exercise reasonable care in their oversight of plaintiffs' foster care or adoptions." (Def.'s Mem. at 44). In other words, the agency defendants claim that the fact that Leekin defrauded multiple institutions is conclusive proof that none of these entities were negligent in their interactions with her. Put another way, had they looked with 20/20 vision, they would not have seen Leekin's deficiencies. Far from a matter of law, of course, at most the agency defendants' argument raises an issue of fact as to whether Leekin's skill at deception prevented them — along with others — from discovering the truth, despite having exercised due care. Similarly unpersuasive, the agency defendants present reports 206*206 from outside psychiatrists and other professionals that, based on evaluations of the plaintiffs and Leekin, determined that plaintiffs were benefitting and even improving in Leekin's custody, as evidence that they acted reasonably in placing and leaving plaintiffs with her. (See, e.g.,Def.'s 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 56-57, 79, 80, 84-86, 110). These reports are hardly conclusive as a matter of law; they form one piece of the conflicting evidence that the fact finder will have to weigh in determining whether the agency defendants breached their duty of care.

The agency defendants also seek judgment on the ground that plaintiffs cannot establish causation, relying on the same arguments they made regarding causation under § 1983. For the same reasons discussed earlier in connection with the § 1983 claim, plaintiffs have demonstrated the existence of a triable issue of fact as to causation, and judgment on this ground is denied.[26]
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, J.B., S.B., and S.W.'s negligence claims are dismissed as untimely, and L.J. and J.G.'s § 1983 claims are dismissed. In all other respects, the motion is denied. Consequently, the § 1983 action continues with respect to plaintiffs S.W., T.G., J.L., S.B., R.E., J.B., C.B., and T.L., and the negligence action continues with respect to plaintiffs T.G., J.L., R.E., C.B., and T.L.
SO ORDERED.
[1] The City settled with plaintiffs on December 19, 2012. (See Dkt. No. 388 (so-ordered stipulation).) The agency defendants and the City have also interposed complaints against numerous third-party defendants in this case. The third-party actions have no bearing on this motion and will not be addressed in its disposition.
[2] Plaintiff S.B. was placed by SCO in foster care in Leekin's home on May 9, 1986 and was subsequently adopted by her under the alias Anne Marie Williams on July 28, 1988. Plaintiff L.J. was placed by the City in Leekin's care on May 7, 1988 and was subsequently adopted by her under the alias Cheryl Graham on May 4, 1993. Plaintiff J.G. was placed by the City in Leekin's care on September 30, 1988 and was subsequently adopted by her under the alias Cheryl Graham on May 4, 1993. Plaintiff S.W. was placed by SJSC in Leekin's care on June 28, 1989 and was subsequently adopted by her under the alias Michelle Wells on December 13, 1994. Plaintiff R.E. was placed by SJSC in Leekin's care on March 27, 1992 and was subsequently adopted by her under the alias Michelle Wells on June 20, 1995. Plaintiff J.B. was placed by SJSC in Leekin's care on May 26, 1993 and was subsequently adopted by her under the alias Michelle Wells on June 7, 1994. Plaintiff C.B. was placed by SJSC in Leekin's care on May 26, 1993 and was subsequently adopted by her under the alias Michelle Wells on June 7, 1994. Plaintiff T.G. was placed by SJSC in Leekin's care on December 5, 1992 and was subsequently adopted by her under the alias Michelle Wells on June 7, 1994. Plaintiff T.L. was placed by HHS in Leekin's care on July 15, 1994 and was subsequently adopted by her under the alias Eastlyn Giraud on April 16, 1996. Plaintiff J.L. was placed by HHS in Leekin's care on July 15, 1994 and was subsequently adopted by her under the alias Eastlyn Giraud on April 16, 1996. (Def.'s Local Rule 56.1 Statement ("Def.'s 56.1 Stmt") at ¶¶ 4-13.)
[3] Following her arrest in Florida in July 2007, Leekin pleaded guilty to charges of, inter alia,aggravated child abuse and aggravated disabled/adult abuse in Florida, and mail and wire fraud in New York, and is currently incarcerated. (See Def.'s 56.1 Stmt ¶¶ 33, 246, 259-60.)
[4] Defendants submit that J.B. left Leekin's home on November 20, 2004, based on deposition testimony given by S.W. (Def.'s 56.1 Stmt ¶ 143). Plaintiffs fail to dispute this fact, (Pl.'s 56.1 Stmt ¶ 143) but elsewhere point to testimony that J.B. left when he was "about 17," and given that J.B. turned 17 on May 18, 2004, assert that he left at some point between May 2004 and May 2005. The outcome of this motion would be the same based on either date.
[5] The agency defendants — while not disputing plaintiffs' account of their experience in Leekin's custody — point to certain excerpts of plaintiffs' deposition testimony that they contend demonstrate that plaintiffs' experienced "elements of normalcy" during this time. (Def.'s 56.1 Stmt ¶ 150.) Apparently, at times before 1995, Leekin took S.B. to Macy's, and in Florida, two plaintiffs were taken to an amusement park with

Leekin's biological grandchildren; at certain times throughout their 20-year ordeal, some of the plaintiffs were also allowed to watch television or play with toys. The agency defendants also point out that some of the plaintiffs believed that their lives were "good" or "normal" at times. (SeeDef.'s 56.1 Stmt ¶¶ 151-178.) Plaintiffs vigorously dispute these excerpts as gross mischaracterizations of the environment of pervasive abuse and neglect in which they lived, (see Pl.'s 56.1 Stmt ¶¶ 150-178), and argue that they only demonstrate how removed plaintiffs were from the world and from any understanding of a normal childhood.
[6] All plaintiffs bring a § 1983 claim together against all of the agency defendants; each plaintiff additionally brings a negligence claim only against the agency that placed him or her with Leekin. L.G. and J.G., who were placed with Leekin by the City, join the § 1983 claim but do not assert negligence claims.
[7] The agency defendants do not assert in their submissions that such information was provided to SCO.
[8] The agency defendants dispute that it would have been possible to verify an applicant's Social Security number during the relevant time period. Plaintiffs provide expert testimony that it was possible at the time of plaintiffs' foster placements to have Social Security numbers verified by the Social Security Administration by phone or written communication, and that this was done by the City in some circumstances. (See Aff. of Mark E. Safarik, May 2, 2013 ("Safarik Aff."), Ex. A at 33-35.) It is undisputed, however, that such verification was not required by law at the time.
[9] Leekin testified that the people she used as references only knew her by her real identity, not the aliases she gave the agency defendants. (See Kapell Decl. Ex. 40, Leekin Dep. 10/22/2010, at 57:21-61:9, 150:10151:17.) While Leekin's veracity is obviously dubious, to say the least, this suggests that she wrote the reference letters for her aliases herself.
[10] Plaintiffs' claims accrued when they knew or should have known of the fact of defendants' actions, whether or not plaintiffs understood those actions to be negligent at that time — accrual does not depend on plaintiff's knowledge that the injury in question constitutes a legal wrong. See, e.g., Lugo-Young v. Courier Network Inc., No. 10-CV-3197, 2012 WL 847381, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2012); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 122, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) ("The prospect is not so bleak for a plaintiff in possession of the critical facts that he has been hurt and who has inflicted the injury. He is no longer at the mercy of the latter. There are others who can tell him if he has been wronged, and he need only ask.").
[11] See supra note 4.
[12] This case is thus distinguishable from negligent supervision cases in which the alleged perpetrator was the defendant's employee for the entire period of abuse, in which case the allegedly negligent conduct has been found to have continued until the last act of abuse. See John Doe No. 6 v. Yeshiva & Mesivta Torah Temimah, Inc., 21 Misc.3d 443, 444, 863 N.Y.S.2d 891, 893 (Sup.Ct. Kings Cty. 2008)(former student's negligence claims against operator of school for personal injuries from sexual abuse by teacher accrued on the last date of abuse); Pichardo v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 99 A.D.3d 606, 607, 953 N.Y.S.2d 31, 32 (1st Dep't 2012) (teacher's negligent supervision claims accrued on the date of the last alleged harassing act).
[13] Because the Court holds that plaintiffs' § 1983 claim did not accrue until they were released from Leekin's custody, i.e., the statute had not run by the time this action was filed, no question is presented as to whether the federal doctrine of equitable tolling would toll the statute of limitations based on these facts.
[14] The insanity toll cannot be added on to the end of the infancy toll. Effectively, the two tolls run concurrently, not consecutively. See John Doe No. 6, 21 Misc.3d at 449, 863 N.Y.S.2d 891 (noting that because of this, "[t]here will be cases where the insanity toll provides no real benefit to the infant, as where the three-year statute applies to a claim that accrues before the infant's 11th birthday.").
[15] "In cases under § 1983, `under color' of law has consistently been treated as the same thing as the `state action' required under the Fourteenth Amendment." Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838, 102 S.Ct. 2764, 73 L.Ed.2d 418 (1982).

[16] The Second Circuit also separately determined that such agencies were state actors in light of the "degree to which the State has insinuated itself into the actions of the private defendants here," as evidenced by the SSL. Id. at 765. Thus, while the Perez court did not express itself in terms of the three tests set out above, it clearly held that private childcare agencies are state actors under the "public function" test, and appeared to also take the view as well that such agencies' functions are "entwined" with state policies in a way that might satisfy the "close nexus" test.
[17] For similar reasons, the Court finds reliance on Lynn ex rel. Julie B. v. St. Anne Inst., 03-cv-1333, 2006 WL 516796 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2006) unavailing. The Court notes that Lynn held that Perez is no longer good law relying largely on Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353, 95 S.Ct. 449, 42 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974). Lynn, 2006 WL 516796, at *13. Under Jackson, a function is only "public" if it is "traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State." Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353, 95 S.Ct. 449. But the Second Circuit in Duchesne specifically considered the Perez holding that foster agencies perform a "public function" in light of Jackson, and reaffirmed it. See Duchesne, 566 F.2d at 822, n. 4.
[18] Doe is "the leading Second Circuit case dealing with section 1983 claims against a city for failing to protect foster children from abuse." J.R. ex rel. Blanchard v. City of New York, No. 11-cv-841, 2012 WL 4511442, at n. 4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2012).
[19] Like a municipality, a private institution can only be held liable under § 1983 if the constitutional violation of which a plaintiff complains resulted from an official custom, policy, practice, or usage of the institution. Mejia v. City of New York, 119 F.Supp.2d 232, 275 (E.D.N.Y.2000) (citing Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)). Doeappears to hold that in the foster care context, this standard is met if an agency's top supervisory personnel exhibit "deliberate indifference" to a known injury, a known risk, or a specific duty. Doe, 649 F.2d at 145. Municipal liability can also be satisfied by demonstrating "a municipality's `custom' of failing to train or supervise its employees." Park v. City of New York, No. 99-cv-2981, 2003 WL 133232 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2003). Doe formulated the foster child's "failure to supervise" claim as the failure by the agency to supervise the foster placement, rather than its employees. Doe, 649 F.2d at 137. Other courts in this circuit have embraced this formulation in cases involving allegations by foster children against foster care agencies. See J.R., 2012 WL 4511442, at *7, n. 4; Richards, 433 F.Supp.2d at 424-25; Tylena M., 390 F.Supp.2d at 303, n. 3. Here, in addition to alleging deliberate indifference by the agency defendants' top supervisory officials, plaintiffs allege that the agency defendants maintained customs or practices of improperly investigating and certifying prospective foster and adoptive parents, and improperly caring for and monitoring children in their care. They further claim that the agency defendants failed to properly supervise plaintiffs' foster care placements. Under the approach set out inDoe, plaintiffs can seek to establish the agency defendants' liability under these theories.
[20] See supra note 8.
[21] The agency defendants correctly point out that each agency is a separate legal entity, and that each of the plaintiffs interacted with at most only one of them. The Court finds that plaintiffs have raised issues of fact as to each agency's deliberate indifference, and, of course, each plaintiff will have the burden of "connecting the dots" between his or her individual claim and the specific agency with which he or she interacted.
[22] Regardless, the Seventh Circuit's decision would not be binding on this Court.
[23] The Court notes that L.J. and J.G. were the second and third of the ten plaintiffs to be placed with Leekin.
[24] This has no bearing on the determination of whether the agency defendants acted with deliberate indifference, which does not require complicity in the violation. See Richards, 433 F.Supp.2d at 424("deliberate indifference does not require ill-will or the affirmative acquiescence in mistreatment.").
[25] L.J. and J.G. do not assert negligence claims against any of the agency defendants.

[26] Because the Court denies summary judgment on plaintiffs' § 1983 claim, the Court need not consider the agency defendants' request to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the negligence claims. (Defs.' Mem. at 43).
	  

 
 S.W. v. City of New York

2012 WL 1100906 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, E.D. New York.
S.W., et al., Plaintiffs, v.
The CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., Defendants.
No. 09–CV–1777 (ENV)(MDG). |
April 2, 2012.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Ami Romanelli, Theodore Babbitt, Stephan A. Le Clainche, Babbitt, Johnson, Osborne & Le Clainche, PA, West Palm Beach, FL, Howard M. Talenfeld, Colodny, Fass, Talenfeld, Karlinsky & Abate, P.A., John Walsh, Fort Lauderdale, FL, Melissa Cohen, Shirim Nothenberg, William A. Kapell, Children‘s Rights Inc., Marcia Lowry, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs.
Thaddeus Jeremiah Hackworth, New York City Law Department, Bruce Michael Strikowsky, Carl Judah Schaerf, Matthew James Kelly, Allison Naomi Fihma, Robert Scott Delmond, Margo O’Donnell Gallagher, Conway, Farrell, Curtin & Kelly, P.C., New York, NY, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
VITALIANO, District Judge.
*1 On November 18, 2010, Magistrate Judge Go issued a written order, further to an oral ruling made on November 5, 2010, that granted plaintiffs’ motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 32(a) (8), seeking to use deposition testimony taken in Marisol A. v. Guiliani, 95– cv–10533 (S.D.N.Y.), as if taken in this litigation. Before reaching the merits of plaintiffs’ motion, Magistrate Judge Go addressed defendants’ argument that she lacked jurisdiction over the motion. Noting that plaintiffs had not sought a ruling on the admissibility of the testimony at trial, but rather a ruling pertaining only to the need to take additional pretrial depositions, Judge Go held that, as a pretrial matter, the motion properly fell under her referred authority pursuant to Local Rule 72. Judge Go then

granted plaintiffs’ motion to permit the use of certain deposition testimony of city and state witnesses taken in Marisol because the issues in Marisol and this case were sufficiently similar.
Defendants now challenge Judge Go’s oral and written orders, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72. They argue (1) that the ruling is outside the scope of Judge Go’s authority; (2) that the ruling is dispositive and should be reviewed de novo; and (3) that the ruling is erroneous on the merits. All three arguments are unavailing.
First, Judge Go’s written and oral orders were well within the scope of her authority to rule on pretrial matters. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a), a district court may designate a magistrate judge to hear and decide pretrial matters that are not dispositive of a party’s claim or defense. See also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Defendants charge that Judge Go went beyond such authority because she made an evidentiary ruling regarding the Marisol depositions’ admissibility at trial; a matter properly left to the district court.
Defendants misconstrue Judge Go’s ruling. Her written and oral orders both make explicit that they do not make any ruling with respect to the Marisol depositions’ admissibility at trial. S.W. v. City of New York, No. CV 2009–1777(ENV)(MDG), 2010 WL 4791712, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2010); Tr. at 6:21–25, 7:1–16, Nov. 5, 2010. The effect of the ruling is simply to allow plaintiffs to avoid retaking the depositions of certain governmental witnesses by allowing the Marisol depositions to be used against the City and the Administration for Children’s Services (“ACS”) as if taken in this litigation. Treating a deposition as if it had been taken in this action is not tantamount to ruling it is admissible at trial. Indeed, depositions taken during discovery in general are not automatically admissible at trial; they are admissible only when allowed by both Rule 32(a) and the Federal Rules of Evidence. Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2142 (3d ed.2011) (stating that in order to use a deposition at a trial or hearing, “[f]irst, the conditions set forth in Rule 32(a) must be satisfied before the deposition can be used at all. Second, when it is found that these conditions authorize the use of the deposition, it must be determined whether the matters contained in it are admissible under the rules of evidence.”) Defendants are in no way precluded by Judge Go’s ruling from objecting to the admissibility of the Marisol depositions at trial, just as they may object to the admissibility of any other depositions taken in this litigation, or for that matter any other testimony the plaintiffs seek to introduce. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 32(b) (“... an objection may be made at a
1

S.W. v. City of New York
hearing or trial to the admission of any deposition testimony that would be inadmissible if the witness were present and testifying.”); Pesterfield v. Sunbeam Corp., No. 3:00CV104, 2005 WL 1076293, at *3 (E.D.Tenn. May 6, 2005) (allowing the use of depositions pursuant to Rule 32(a)(8) but reserving questions of admissibility for trial). At one with these authorities and precedents, Judge Go’s order was well within her authority over pretrial issues.
*2 Underscored by its pretrial essence, Judge Go’s order is also non-dispositive of any claim or defense on its face. Correspondingly, the order should only be set aside if it is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a); see also Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 116 (2d. Cir.2010) (“matters concerning discovery generally are considered non-dispositive of the litigation”) (internal citation omitted). “An order is contrary to law ‘when it fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law, or rules of procedure.’ ” Rathgaber v. Town of Oyster Bay, 492 F.Supp.2d 130, 137 (E.D.N.Y.2007) (quoting Catskill Dev., L.L.C. v. Park Place Entm’t Corp., 206 F.R.D. 78, 86 (S.D.N.Y.2002)). “A magistrate judge’s findings may be considered clearly erroneous where on the entire evidence, the district court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” In re Comverse Tech., Inc. Derivative Litig., No. 06–CV–1849, 2006 WL 3511375, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2006) (internal quotations omitted). “Furthermore, because this standard of review is ‘highly deferential’ and ‘imposes a heavy burden on the objecting party,’ magistrate judges are afforded broad discretion, and the law ‘only permits reversal where the magistrate judge abused [her] discretion.’ ” Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Century 21 Rustic Realty, 233 F.Supp.2d 418, 430 (E.D.N.Y.2002)).
Defendants dispute Judge Go’s finding that S.W. is sufficiently similar to Marisol to allow the Marisol depositions to be used as if taken in S.W. Defendants assign clear error to the decision, arguing that Marisol is too far removed from S.W. because it did not deal with issues of identity or identity verification in the foster care system, because it was a broader case than S.W., because plaintiffs in Marisol sought only an injunction, and because the State of New York was a defendant in Marisol but is not in S.W.
None of these differences are determinative, however,
	  

since the key question in deciding whether the depositions may be used is whether the cases are sufficiently similar such that the party-opponent in the prior case had “the same interest and motive” to cross-examine the deponent as the present opponent. Rivera v. American Export Lines, 13 F.R.D. 27, 28–29 (S.D.N.Y.1952); Hertz v. Graham, 23 F.R.D. 17, 20 (S.D.N.Y.1958). Here, the issues involved in both cases are substantially the same, and thus the City would have the same interest and motive in crossing the deponents as it had in Marisol. In both cases, plaintiffs brought substantive due process claims against the City based on allegations of pervasive problems in the foster care system caused by the City’s acts and omissions. More specifically, in both cases the plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that the City’s screening of foster parents, home visits, background checks, management of case records, and supervision of caseworkers were all inadequate, and that the City was aware of and deliberately disregarded each of these inadequacies. See S.W., 2010 WL 4791712, at *2. This roll call of systemic problems is the heart of both Marisol and this case. As a result, the City’s motive in deposing witnesses would have been the same in both: to cross-examine the state witnesses and develop a record with its own witnesses demonstrating that its foster care system was not plagued by the problems alleged. Furthermore, and as explained in Judge Go’s well-reasoned order, none of the differences between the two actions pointed to by defendants changes this essential fact and animating principle. See id. at *2–4. Therefore, it is entirely appropriate to use the Marisol depositions as if taken in this action.
*3 For the foregoing reasons, there is no merit to defendants’ claim that Judge Go’s order was dispositive of any claim, was beyond her referred authority, or was clearly erroneous or contrary to law.
Accordingly, defendants’ objections are overruled and the order of Magistrate Judge Go is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
All Citations
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2012 WL 1100906
	  
	  

2

 
 Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 496 Filed 10/02/14 Page 1 of 7 PageID #: 20777
U.S. District Court Eastern District of New York
Case No: 1:09 -cv-1777-ENVMDG
S.W., by and through his guardian, RENEE MARQUIS-ABRAMS; R.E., T.G. , and J.L., by and through their next friend, MILDRED DEL GROSSO; S.B. by and through his guardian, PATRICIA BALDWIN; L.J. and J.G., by and through their guardian, KEVIN HENDRICKSON; J.B., C.B., and T.L.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
CITY OF NEW YORK, a municipal corporation; ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN'S SERVICES, f/kla CHILD WELFARE ADMINISTRATION; ST. JOSEPH SERVICES FOR CHILDREN, INC., f/kla CATHOLIC CHILD CARE SOCIETY OF THE DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN, INC., a New York corporation; HEARTSHARE HUMAN SERVICES, f/kla CATHOLIC GUARDIAN SOCIETY OF THE DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN, INC., a New York corporation; SCO FAMILY OF SERVICES, f/kla ST. CHRISTOPHER-OTTILIE, a New York corporation,
Defendants
PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED MOTION TO APPROVE COSTS
COMES NOW the Plaintiffs, by and through their undersigned attorneys, and
hereby file their Amended Motion to Approve Costs and state as follows:
This case is now completely settled. The total of all costs for all attorneys on the
first settlement with the City of New York were $1,595, 158.17. Of that amount 25% or a

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 496 Filed 10/02/14 Page 2 of 7 PageID #: 20778
total of $341,947.54 was held in the trust account pursuant to the Order of Judge Vitaliano of December 18, 2012 [D.E.# 385].
The total costs requested with respect to the Agency Defendants was $462,252.00. Plaintiffs believe this amount was reasonable and necessary in order to properly prosecute this case. All of these costs have been approved multiple times by the Honorable Judge Dwight Geiger and by the Guardians. This Court has jurisdiction to approve the settlement only with respect to five of the Plaintiffs, three of whom remain under guardianship, the remaining two incompetent Plaintiffs are not involved in the second settlement.
At the request of the Court, Plaintiffs' attorneys have reviewed all costs in this case. In light of the suggestions made by Magistrate Marilyn Go, Plaintiffs have reduced the request for approval of costs by the following amounts. These calculations encompass every question raised by Magistrate Go with the exception of expert fees. No reduction has been made with respect to the expert fees because Plaintiffs had no control over what the experts charged and the total of all expert fees were a small fraction of the amount spent on experts by the Defendants. Plaintiffs' attorneys negotiated, and in many cases reduced, the fees charged by these experts and the case could not have been prosecuted for a lesser amount. While Magistrate Go only raised a question about the extent of the following categories, rather than the total of those categories, in large part, we have eliminated the entire amounts.
While the Court's jurisdiction is limited to only the five Plaintiffs indicated previously, Plaintiffs' attorneys will reimburse all Plaintiffs pro rata as to all costs

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 496 Filed 10/02/14 Page 3 of 7 PageID #: 20779

withdrawn after deducting one-third attorneys' fees because Plaintiffs' attorneys feel it

would be unfair to charge different amounts to different clients.

1. All coding

$71,039.85

2. All document research done by Lansler, Kubitschek and Schaffer

$13,509 .85

3. 50% of all travel of any form done by all attorneys and their employees in this case

$103,429 .28

4. All Federal Express charges

$11,896.46

5. All copies whether in-house or by unrelated companies

$62,967.95

6. All paralegal charges

$2,396.31

7. All long-distance telephone charges

$1,359 .04

8. 50% of all on-line research

$13,755.67

TOTAL

$280,354.41

The above charges, which are being withdrawn, subject to this Court's approval of the remaining costs, constitute a 13.6% reduction in costs to all clients. Plaintiffs have attempted to eliminate any concern on the Court's part concerning the costs requested in large part eliminating any costs requested to be justified by Magistrate Go.
This Court previously approved $1,196,368.63 constituting 75% of the $1 ,595,158.17 previously requested as costs leaving a balance in the Plaintiffs' attorneys' trust account of $398 ,789.54. This has earned $997.52 in interest. When this is added to the $462,252 .00 requested as costs in the settlement with the Agency

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 496 Filed 10/02/14 Page 4 of 7 PageID #: 20780

Defendants, the total at issue is $862,039.06. Plaintiffs are requesting that the Court

approve costs in the amount of $581 ,684 .65.

The Court was also concerned about the allocation of the costs as to L.J . and

J.G. , the two Plaintiffs who did not take part in the settlement with the Agencies. In

accordance with Plaintiffs' previously filed Motion to Approve Settlement and Costs

[D.E.# 490], the costs were recalculated and there was a reallocation of these costs in a

manner proportionate to the pro rata recovery of each Plaintiff. The excess amount

paid by L.J. and J.G. has been returned to them by the remaining Plaintiffs and that

issue is no longer extant.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been

?

~~;~;t.

furnished to: counsel on the attached list, by eservice, this ---='=----- day of ~tember,

2014.

BABBITT JOHNSON OSBORNE & LECLAINCHE, P.A. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 1641 Worthington Road, Suite 100 Post Office Box 4426 West Palm Beach, FL 33402 (561) 684-2500; Fax (561) 684-6308 tedbabbitt@babbitt-johnson.com
~ Florida Bar No.: 091146

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 496 Filed 10/02/14 Page 5 of 7 PageID #: 20781

COUNSEL OF RECORD

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS

JOHN WALSH, ESQ., admitted Pro Hac Vice Florida Bar No: 0796360 Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs 3067 Commercial Blvd. Fort Lauderdale, FL 33308 Telephone: (954) 491-3130 Facsimile: (954) 772-2099 jjwalshlaw@gmail.com

MARCIA R. LOWRY MELISSA COHEN WILLIAM KAPELL CHILDREN'S RIGHTS INC. 330 Seventh Avenue 4th Floor New York, NY 10001 Telephone: (212) 683-2210 Facsimile: (212) 683-4015 mlowry@childrensrights .org wkapell@childrensrights.org mcohen@childrensrights.org
Bruce Strikowsky, Esq. Matthew Kelly, Esq. Carl Schaerf, Esq. Allison Fihma, Esq. Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP Co-Counsel for Defendants City ofNew York and Administration for Children's Services cschaerf@schnader.com 140 Broadway Suite 3100 New York, NY 10005 bstrikowsky@schnader.com mjkelly@schnader.com cschaerf@schnader.com afihma@schnader.com

HOWARDM. TALENFELD Florida Bar No. 312398 ANNV. ALPER Florida Bar No. 748293 Admitted Pro Hac Vice COLODNY FASS TALENFELD KARLINSKY & ABATE, P.A. Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs 23rd Floor 100 S.E. 3rd Avenue Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33394 Telephone: (954) 492-4010 Facsimile: (954) 492-1144 htalenfeld@cftlaw.com aalper@ cftlaw. com

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 496 Filed 10/02/14 Page 6 of 7 PageID #: 20782

Steven J. Ahmuty, Jr.

Timothy R. Capowski

Jeremy S. Rosof

William G. Spratt, Esq.

Judd Cohen, Esq.

Robert Boccio, Esq.

AdamS. Covitt, Esq.

Ralph Morales, Esq.

Shaub Ahmuty Citrin & Spratt, LLP

Suite 260

1983 Marcus Avenue

Lake Success, NY 11042

Telephone: (516) 488-3300

Fax:

(516) 488-2324

sahmuty@ sacslaw .com

tcapowski @ sacs law .com

j r o s o f@ sacslaw.com

wspratt@ sacslaw.com

jcohen@sacslaw.com

rboccio @ sacslaw .com

rmorales@sacslaw.com

Sonya A Smith-Valentine, Esq. Valentine Legal Group, LLC sonya@valentinelegal.com Attorney for Third-Party Defendant Thelma Bowes P.O. Box 56 Oxon Hill, MD 20750 (30 1) 513-9500 (866) 301-9155 (fax)

Richard Eniclerico, Esq. Thomas A. Catalano, Esq. Lester Schwab Katz & Dwyer, LLP Attorney for Third-Party Defendant Edwin Gould Services for Children 100 Wall Street New York, NY 10005
RENICLERICO @ LSKDNYLA W .C O M
TCATALANO@LSKDNYLAW.COM

Cheryl Jack Appearing ProSe as Third-Party Defendant 805 SW Regency Dr. Oak Harbor, WA 98277

Marc J. Citrin

John D. Paterniti

Craig G. Bienstock

Juan C. Gonzalez

Shaub Ahmuty Citrin & Spratt, LLP

Suite 702

77 Water Street

New York, NY 10005

Telephone: (212) 599-8200

Fax:

(212) 599-7765

mcitrin@sacslaw.com

j paterniti@sacslaw.com

cbienstock@sacslaw.com

j gonzalez@sacslaw.com

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 496 Filed 10/02/14 Page 7 of 7 PageID #: 20783
Ishmatee Nagassar Appearing Pro Se as Third-Party Defendant 105-12 103rd Rd. Ozone Park, NY 11417

 
 Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 515 Filed 02/18/16 Page 1 of 3 PageID #: 21074

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February 18, 2016

VIAECF
Honorable Marilyn D. Go, U.S.M.J. United States District Com1 Eastern District ofNew York 225 Cadman Plaza East Brooklyn, New York 11201
RE: S.W., et al. v. City of New York, et al. Docket No.: 09-cv-1777 Our File No.: 3009099-0038
Honorable Madam:
As the Court knows, our motion to stay the federal court action in deference to the state court action remains pending. In the state court suit, the City of New York sought to amend its answer to assert cross claims and counterclaims. The insurer did not oppose the counterclaims, but the agencies and the Diocese opposed the joinder into the state court action of the claims for breach of the contractual obligation to procure insurance.
Oral argument was held last week before the Honorable Cynthia Kern of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, New York County. Justice Kern stated that because she was concerned about conflicting opinions in the federal and State actions, she would not permit a cross claim against the agency defendants for breach of its obligation to procure insurance unless the federal action was stayed or dismissed. The motion was resolved such that the cross claim can be re-filed in the event that the federal action is stayed or dismissed. A copy of the state court order is attached. The City would like to resolve all of the claims among the parties in the two actions as expeditiously as possible. That can be achieved by decisions in both the federal and State actions or by the resolution of all of the insurance claims in the State action. We write in order to advise the Court of this development.
Respectfully submitted,
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BMS:sh Enclosure

Bruce M. Strikowsky (BS-8791) For SCHNADER HARRISON SEGAL & LEWIS LLP

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Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 515 Filed 02/18/16 Page 2 of 3 PageID #: 21075

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

INDIVIDUAL ASSIGNMENT PART S .1.

STIPULATION

INDEX NO. C,.(JSJ_rjf~

-3 MOTION CALENDAR NO.

/ctf DATE ].

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' .. IT fS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and between the below-named attomey(s) as follows: A-1'Jt;. . h~(l'j~J i$~TJU.«AJT cfl/'4/ L r1'

Date: 1{4//~
So Ordered. ENTER:

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Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 515 Filed 02/18/16 Page 3 of 3 PageID #: 21076
X. ADDITIONAL DIRECTIVES: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-·--·----------------------------
X. ADDITIONAL DIRECTIVES
SC·BF (REV 2186j

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X S.W., et al.,
Plaintiffs, - against CITY OF NEW YORK, et al.,
Defendants. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X

ORDER CV 2009-1777 (ENV)(MDG)

Defendant City of New York moves to preclude the rebuttal report of plaintiffs’ expert Mark E. Safarik and the rebuttal/supplemental reports of plaintiffs’ experts Henry Gunn and Peg McCartt Hess. See ct. doc. 296.

BACKGROUND Plaintiffs, who were classified as special needs children, bring this civil rights action against the City of New York (the “City”), the New York City Administration for Children’s Services (“ACS”) and several foster care agencies to recover damages for the severe abuse they suffered at the hands of their foster care and adoptive mother, Judith Leekin, with whom they were placed between 1986 and 1994. Ms. Leekin used different names and identities to accomplish her fraudulent scheme and, after adopting the plaintiffs, collected approximately $1.68 million in adoption subsidies. On or about December 3, 2010, plaintiffs served the reports

of two experts, Mr. Gunn and Dr. Hess. Dr. Hess, a child welfare consultant, concludes in her report that the failures in management and case practice of ACS, formerly the Child Welfare Administration, and the private foster care agencies enabled Leekin to perpetrate her fraudulent scheme. Mr. Gunn, also a child welfare consultant, assesses the organizational structure and management of ACS from 1984 to 1996 and opines that the systemic problems resulted in the injuries to the plaintiffs.
On January 7, 2011, the City requested an extension of time to serve its expert reports, in part, because fact discovery had not been completed. See ct. doc. 273. Plaintiffs responded that any extension of time should be conditioned on plaintiffs’ experts having the opportunity to supplement their opinions based on discovery that had not yet been produced. See ct. doc. 275. By letter dated January 26, 2011, the City informed the Court that the parties had agreed to extend the time to serve defendants’ expert reports but the letter does not mention whether any agreement was reached regarding the supplementation of plaintiffs’ expert reports. See ct. doc. 278.
Defendants later served expert reports on March 16, 2011, including a report by Gregory D. Meacham and a report by Dr. Roger Depue. Mr. Meacham discusses the criminal aspects of Leekin’s fraud and her abilities as a criminal fraudster. Dr. Depue also discusses Leekin’s criminal means and methods and, from a behavioral sciences perspective, her capacity to have defrauded
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several organizations and individuals. On March 28, 2011, plaintiffs filed a letter informing the
Court that the parties had agreed to amend the expert discovery schedule extending defendants’ time to serve their remaining expert reports and setting a date, June 16, 2011, for plaintiffs to serve rebuttal expert reports regarding issues of criminology and Leekin’s criminal activities. Defendants reserved their right to object that any rebuttal report would be improper. See ct. doc. 285.
On or about April 11, 2011 and April 13, 2011, respectively, the foster care agencies and the City served the reports of Elaine M. Walsh and Richard P. Barth. Dr. Walsh finds that the agencies followed prescribed procedures for certifying and monitoring Leekin’s foster home. Dr. Barth states that the fraudulent activities of Leekin were so anomalous that a typical child welfare agency would not have been expected to detect them. Dr. Barth also opines that the systemic problems identified by the plaintiffs’ experts were similar to those occurring in other similar jurisdictions.
On June 14, 2011, plaintiffs served a rebuttal expert report of Mark E. Safarik, who had not previously been identified by plaintiffs as an expert. Plaintiffs also served rebuttal/supplemental expert reports of Mr. Gunn and Dr. Hess, which plaintiffs argue, respond to the reports of Dr. Barth and Dr. Walsh. Defendants have challenged the propriety of all three
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reports. DISCUSSION
Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(I) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an expert’s initial report contain “a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them,” while Rule 26(a)(2)(C)(ii) allows the admission of rebuttal testimony that is “intended solely to contradict or rebut evidence on the same subject matter identified by another party . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2). “Rebuttal evidence is properly admissible when it will explain, repel, counteract or disprove the evidence of the adverse party.” Crowley v. Chait, 322 F. Supp. 2d 530, 551 (D.N.J. 2004).
Rule 26(e) requires that disclosures made pursuant to Rule 26(a), including expert disclosures, be supplemented when the party who made the disclosure “learns that in some material respect the disclosure . . . is incomplete or incorrect . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e). “It is only if the expert subsequently learns of information that was previously unknown or unavailable, that renders information previously provided in an initial report inaccurate or misleading because it was incomplete, that the duty to supplement arises.” Sandata Techs., Inc. v. Infocrossing, Inc., 2007 WL 4157163, at *3-*4 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). Safarik Report
Mr. Safarik directly disputes the conclusions of Mr. Meacham and Dr. Depue as to the degree of criminal sophistication
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demonstrated by Leekin. Mr. Meacham states that Judith Leekin was “a sophisticated con artist who is expert in the psychological manipulation of her victims.” Meacham Report at 4. Similarly, Dr. Depue offers the opinion that Leekin is a “sophisticated and highly organized serial criminal,” Depue Report at 1, and “she would have been very difficult to detect by anyone who had not been trained in fraud investigation, the detection of deception and the characteristics of a psychopathic manipulator,” id. at 11. In response, Mr. Safarik states that “Leekin was not, as Meacham and Roger Depue opine, a sophisticated criminal mastermind impervious to detection. A review of the record clearly reflects that Judith Leekin was reckless, disorganized and lacked a high level of sophistication.” Safarik Report at 2.
Mr. Safarik’s report contains quintessential rebuttal testimony to that of the defendants’ experts. The City argues that “[t]estimony from Mr. Safarik to the effect that Ms. Leekin’s fraud was ‘easily’ or ‘readily’ detectable belongs in their case in chief, and is not appropriately a rebuttal issue.” See ct. doc. 296. However, Mr. Safarik’s report is not focused on “the existence of an unconstitutional policy, practice or custom concerning the vetting and supervision of foster parents” as the City describes plaintiffs’ burden on their case-in-chief. Rather, Mr. Safarik directly contradicts the defendants’ experts’ opinions that Leekin was a criminal mastermind who was so sophisticated in her schemes that the City could not have been expected to protect
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the plaintiffs against them. Mr. Safarik describes Leekin as “sloppy” and lists several examples of instances where Leekin’s lapses created opportunities for the City to have detected her criminal conduct. Contrary to the City’s claims, I do not find that Mr. Safarik’s report is an effort by plaintiffs to “game” the system.
The City further objects to Mr. Safarik’s reliance on a study on welfare fraud as injecting a new issue. Although the procedures used by the City to combat welfare fraud were not discussed in the reports of defendants’ experts, Mr. Meacham recognizes in his report that “there is an issue of whether or not it would have been feasible under then-existing disclosure and privacy laws for ACS, the agencies, or New York State to somehow verify names with SSNs during the relevant time period.” Meacham Report at 74. Dr. Walsh states that “there was no way that the agencies would have been able to learn about the various identities [Leekin] used to foster and then adopt the plaintiffs.” Walsh Report at 5. Mr. Safarik’s reliance on a City report that states that the City had the ability to conduct Social Security Number verification checks in the welfare context is appropriate rebuttal testimony. Such testimony supports the opposite conclusion than reached by defendants’ experts but concerns the “same subject matter” as the testimony of defendants’ experts. Cf. Park West Radiology v. CareCore Nat., LLC, 675 F. Supp. 2d 314, 325-26 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (permitting rebuttal report that uses
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new methodologies); Scientific Components Corp. v. Sirenza Microdevices, Inc., 2008 WL 4911440, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2008) (“technical information . . . that was not previously the subject of expert testimony in this litigation . . . is not out of place in a rebuttal report”); TC Sys. Inc. v. Town of Colonie, 213 F. Supp. 2d 171, 180 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (permitting rebuttal expert to use different methodology). Gunn and Hess Reports
The Gunn and Hess reports are also directly targeted at rebutting the reports of defendants’ experts. See Crowley, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 551. Defendants’ experts explain the City’s failure to uncover Leekin’s fraud, in part, by claiming that foster care workers are not trained in fraud detection and the City had no reason to think that such training was necessary. In their rebuttal reports, Hess and Gunn argue that even if foster care workers were not trained to detect fraud, the City was on notice that foster parents sometimes harmed the children placed with them and that the City had to screen foster parents carefully to prevent that from happening. Specifically, Mr. Gunn opines that as part of their obligation to evaluate foster and adoptive parent applicants and monitor foster care placements, the case workers were required to verify information provided by applicants. Mr. Gunn points to a City report on welfare fraud as evidence that the City was able to match information regarding recipients of welfare benefits with Social Security and SSI files. Mr. Gunn also
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references letters received by counsel for plaintiffs from the Social Security Administration which he argues confirm his recollection that during the relevant time period the City could have verified Social Security numbers provided by foster and adoptive parent applicants.
Similarly, Dr. Hess responds to the defendants’ expert reports by elaborating that the rigorous screening and monitoring necessary to protect the children should have included verification of the names and Social Security numbers provided by foster and adoptive parent applicants. Dr. Hess also cites the letters from the Social Security Administration and the study on welfare fraud as evidence that ACS could have requested such information from the local Social Security offices. To the extent that plaintiffs’ experts disclose new opinions that were not included in their original reports, they are clearly responsive to defendants’ experts’ reports and do not cause prejudice or surprise to the City. See Park West Radiology v. CareCore Nat. LLC, 675 F. Supp. 2d 314, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
The City argues that these “rebuttal” opinions should have been disclosed in plaintiffs’ experts’ initial reports. However, the rules do not require an expert to anticipate every argument made by an opposing expert or risk preclusion. See Scientific Components, 2008 WL 4911440, at *3 n.2. As to the supplementary portion of their reports, both experts discuss letters from the Social Security Administration and the study on welfare fraud that
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had not been produced at the time they served their initial reports. Since this constitutes information that was previously unknown or unavailable to them, those portions of their reports are proper supplementation.
In any event, as discussed in a previous ruling, “exclusion of expert testimony is a drastic remedy.” Lab Crafters, Inc. v. Flow Safe, Inc., 2007 WL 7034303, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); RMED Int’l, Inc. v. Sloan Supermarkets, Inc., 2002 WL 31780188, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Courts in the Second Circuit consider the factors set forth in Softel, Inc. v. Dragon Med. & Scientific Comm., Inc., 118 F.3d 955 (2d Cir. 1997), for determining whether to preclude expert testimony. These factors are: "(1) the party's explanation for the failure to comply with the discovery order; (2) the importance of the testimony of the precluded witness; (3) the prejudice suffered by the opposing party as a result of having to prepare to meet the new testimony; and (4) the possibility of a continuance." Softel, 118 F.3d at 961 (citing Outley v. City of New York, 837 F.2d 587, 590-91 (2d Cir. 1988)); see also Patterson v. Balsamico, 440 F.3d 104, 117 (2d Cir. 2004). Even assuming that portions of plaintiffs’ experts’ reports should have been included in their initial reports, there is no prejudice to the City by permitting plaintiffs’ experts to serve these reports since expert depositions have not been taken and no trial date has been set. Further, defendants are granted leave to serve surrebuttal reports by their experts if they deem it necessary. See
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Park West, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 326 (denying motion to exclude expert report where party seeking preclusion could redepose expert and submit sur-rebuttal report).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the City defendant’s motion to

preclude the three expert reports is denied. The schedule for

limited discovery on welfare and additional expert reports is set

as discussed at the hearing on this motion.

SO ORDERED.

Dated:

Brooklyn, New York July 25, 2011

/s/ MARILYN D. GO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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 Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 382-6 Filed 12/06/12 Page 1 of 34 PageID #: 11211
SETTLEME T RELEASE AND INDEMNITY AGREEMENT

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SETTLEMENT, RELEASE, AND INDEMNITY AGREEMENT This Settlement, Release, and Indemnity Agreement and the attached Addenda to the Settlement Release and Indemnity Agreement the "Addenda"), which are expressly incorporated herein by reference and is attached hereto ("Settlement Agreement"), is made this 30711;/ ay of October, 2012, by and among Plaintiff, nd her respective heirs, beneficiaries, guardians, representatives and assigns, ("Releasor") in favor of Defendant City of New York, (sued herein as the City of New York, and Administration for Children's Services), ("City"), its predecessors, successors, affiliates, assigns, agencies, departments, divisions, municipal entities or corporate bodies politic, corporations, parents or subsidiaries, together with their respective past or present officers, officials, directors, trustees, employees, representatives, servants, agents, attorneys, adjusters, consultants, experts, accountants, -volunteers or contractors (collectively the "Releasees"). The foregoingparties to this Settlement Agreement are sometimes referred to individually as a "Party" or collectively as the "Parties," Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the definition of "Release,es" or elsewhere in this document, no other party will be released from any liability or claim, including but not limited to St. Joseph's Services (SJS), St. Christopher Otille (SCO), Heartshare Human Services ("BBS")„. Edwin Gould Services for Children, the Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn or their respective insurers, from whom/which Releasor intends to seek the remainder of her damages. Wherever the word "agencies" is used it is expressly understood and agreed that this term does not include St. Joseph's Services MS), St. Christopher Otille (SCO), Heartshare Human Services ("FIBS"), or, the Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn.
RECITALS The Parties, in good faith, recite as follows:

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WHEREAS, on or about April 29, 2009, Releaser initiated this action in the United States Court, Eastern District of New York, Civil Action Number 09-CV-1777, titled S.W., at at. v. City of New York, at al„ to recover, inter alga, damages relating to personal injuries and other deprivations allegedly sustained by Releaser as the result of her placement into foster care with Judith Leekin.
WHEREAS, the City denied, and continues to deny, any liability to Releaser and denied, and continues to deny, all allegations of wrongful conduct or liability advanced by Releaser;
WHEREAS, by this Settlement Agreement, the Parties desire and intend to settle, fully and finally, the matters set forth herein without malting any admission of liability of any kind, and by way of a full and complete compromise and accord, and without any admission relating to the merits of F_eleaser's claims, or Action;
WHEREAS, by this Settlement Agreement, the Patties intend to confmn, memorialize, and implement the settlement of the Action, with prejudice, including any and all claims that Releaser ever had, now has, or may have in the future against Releasees arising from or in connection with the Action or circumstances surrounding the allegations contained in the Action;
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and of the mutual promises, covenants and agreements contained herein, coupled with the understanding of the costs and risks associated with trial and other good and valuable consideration including future performance under this Settlement Agreement, the sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, and intending to be legally bound hereby, it is agreed by and between the Parties as follows: 1. Payment
This Settlement Agreement is given in consideration of the sum of which will be paid, in upfront cash and/or periodic payments
by and on behalf of Releasees, within forty-two (42) days following the receipt in proper form by

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the City's counsel of all necessary closing papers as defined in paragraph 5 below, each complete and duly-executed, including a So-Ordered Stipulation of Discontinuance with Prejudice as to the City.
2. Releases
Releaser, in consideration of the settlement being paid to Releaser by and on behalf of
Releasees as good and valuable consideration, hereby irrevocably waives, relinquishes, and fully .
andforevlsichagetRlsofndrmaylpst,end Mare causes of action, claims, rights, obligations, demands, liabilities, costs, expenses, penalties and fees of any kind or nature, irrespective of the theory of liability or recovery sought at law or equity, whether or not presently known, that were, or could have been asserted by the Releaser or anyone acting in his name (whether or not actually assented), by reason of, or arising from, any matter, cause or thing whatsoever, from the beginning of the world up to the effective date of this Settlement Agreement, including but not limited to, claims for compensatory damages, punitive and/or exemplary damages, treble damages, statutory damages, constitutional deprivation, litigation costs and expenses, and attorneys' fees. The Parties specifically intend, without limitation, that the terms of this Settlement Agreement shall fully and finally settle, resolve, and extinguish, with prejudice, all of Releaser's claims arising from the Action and all matters alleged or that could have been alleged by the Releaser in the Action. Without limitation, plaintiff releases all claims based in any manner on any claimed act, omission, policy, practice, procedure or custom of the City of New York. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, this Release does not release any direct claim that plaintiffs possess against St. Joseph's Services (STS), St. Christopher Otille (SCO), Heartshare Human Services ("IBS"), the Roman Catholic Diocese'bf-Brooklyn and all claims asserted in the Complaint against these agencies are preserved.

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3. Indemnification
Releaser agrees to indemnify Releasees, their attorneys and insurers from and against any and all damages, liabilities and expenses (including reasonable attorneys' fees incurred by counsel of Releasees` choice to defend against and resolve any demands, claims or suits) resulting from or arising out of any demands, claims or suits made or brought by Releaser or any third-parties against Releasees, their attorneys or insurers, asserting that Releaser or any such third-party is entitled to receive part or all of the Settlement Amount, including any claims arising from or connected to any liens asserted against Releaser's recovery or the attorneys' fees being paid hereunder,
Without limitation of the foregoing, the Releaser expressly understands and acknowledges that this settlement is strictly contingent upon completion of Medicare Conditional Payment research. The Releaser recognizes the obligation to satisfy conditional payments made by Medicare for medical care related to the clahnsfiniury/accident herein, pursuant to 42 U.S,C. § 1395(y)(b)(2). The Releaser agrees to fully cooperate with the Releasees to accomplish this research and to sign all documents necessary to achieve this goal including but not limited to authorizations, The Releaser's counsel shall pay the final demand from the settlement funds Releaser agrees to instruct his/her attorneys to hold in trust the full amount of any Medicare lien. and to Satisfy the full amount of any negotiated Medicare lien from such Rinds and provide Releasees with written proof when such payments have been made. The Releaser shall be solely responsible for any additional conditional payments which may arise and be demanded by the MSPRC after satisfaction of the final demand by the Releasees_
The Releaser further agrees and states that she shall be liable for the full and final satisfaction of any and all liens, subrogation claims, Medicare Set-Asides, supplemental payments to Medicare and any costs, expenses or penalties associated with Releaser's failure to

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fund, pay or reimburse Medicare, as well as all other claims, losses, costs mid expenses, now existing or arising in the future against the proceeds of the settlement of the above-referenced action, including but not limited to liens, set-asides, supplemental payments or associated amounts claimed by Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security Disability, The Department of Social Services, workers' compensation or any state or federal governmental agency or affiliate, including any Medicare Set-Asides under the Medicare Secondary Payer Statute (•2 § I 395y(b)(2)) for past and/or future medical expenses, any attorney, insurer, physician, health care facility, other medical andfor health care provider, or any other person or entity, and/or liens andfo• subrogation claims and/or other claims, losses, costs and expenses asserted by any health, automobile, disability or workers' compensation insurer or any other insurer or entity (hereinafte• collectively referred to as "Claims"), which are compensation for medical expenses or other damages, claimed to have been incurred due to conduct for which relief was sought against Releasees, and Releaser further agrees and states that she shall fully defend, indemnify and hold harmless Releasees from and against any and all Claims that arise out of or relate to or may in the future arise out of or relate to the injuries ox damages that Releaser has asserted in the above-referenced action, regarding any payments made by Releasees to pay, fund or reimburse Medicare, together with any vests, expenses or penalties associated with Releaser's failure to fund, pay or reimburse Medicare. 4. Confidential Materials
All materials exchanged in discovery will be treated in conformance with the Confidentiality Order So-Ordered by Magistrate Go on February 5, 2010, which remains in full force and effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Settlement Agreement.

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5. Additional Documents
All parties agree to cooperate fully and to execute and deliver any and all supplementary
documents and to give effect to the terms and intent of the Settlement Agreement. These
documents include, but are not limited to, the following form documents to be attached as
Addenda to this Settlement, Release and Indemnity Agreement:
I Stipulation of Settlement; 2. Stipulation of Discontinuance With Prejudice As to the City of New York,
Administration for Children's Services Only; 3. General Release; 4. General Release (for minor/incompetent parties, if applicable); 5. Plaintiffs' Affidavit of Status of Liens; 6. Affidavit of Status of Attorney's Liens; and 7. A W-9 Form; and 8. To the extent plaintiffs intend to seek a structured settlement, any and all documents
necessary to establish a structured settlement (in agreed-to-foim), with all required supporting materials. 6. Undiscovered 'sets With respect to the consideration paid and matters released hereunder, the Parties
specifically acknowledge that they may hereafter discover facts in addition to ot different from
those which they now believe to be true with respect to released matters, but agree that they have
taken that possibility into account in reaching this Settlement Agreement, and that the releases
shall be and remain in effect, and the consideration paid shall not be modified, notwithstanding
the discovery or existence of any such additional or different facts, as to which the parties
assume the risk.
7. Cooperation
It is understood that Releasees possess claims against certain insurers which may have
obligations to reimburse some or all of the settlement payment called for by this Settlement
Agreement. Releasor's counsel agrees to cooperate with reasonable requests seeking documents

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or testimony, together with all such assistance as may be needed in support of insurance recovery provided however that no such assistance shall be required when and where it would serve to materially prejudice plaintiff's remaining claims against any non-settling defendants. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Releasors will not agree, in any settlement agreement with a nonsettling defendant or their insurer(s), to characterize liability or damages, or allocate liability or damages. Releasee's payment of the settlement called for by this Settlement. Agreement is subject to a reservation of the right to pursue all applicable insurance coverage, without waiver. The amount of the settlement payment was a recommendation from the Court, and the tinting of the settlement was directed by a time-limited settlement demand offered by the plaintiffs. It is understood that Releaser's willingness to participate in this settlement was materially conditioned on Releasee's acceptance of the settlement offer on or before October 16, 2012. The payment made by Releasees is necessary to effectuate the settlement and as such is not intended to be a "voluntary payment" as defined under any applicable insurance policy. 8. Withdrawal of Action
Releaser agrees that contemporaneously with the execution of this Settlement Agreement, he or she will cause counsel to execute and file with the Court for So-Ordering, a Stipulation of Discontinuance with prejudice and without costs, of all claims asserted in the Action as against the City, and that copies of the filed Stipulation will be forwarded to counsel for Defendants within 10 (ten) days after the execution of this Settlement Agreement. 9. Pio Admission of Liability
Releaser represents and agrees that this Settlement Agreement is entered into as a complete compromise and in full satisfaction of all matters involving disputed issues of law and fact. By entering into this Settlement Agreement, none of the Releasees have made nor shall be deemed to have made any admission. of any kind. The Parties agree that they are entering into

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this Settlement Agreement in good faith and neither the payment provided for herein nor anything else contained in this Settlement Agreement shall be construed as an admission by any Party as to liability, any such liability being expressly denied.
10. Representations and Warranties
Each Party to this Settlement Agreement represents that it has fully read and understood its terms and further represents that it is authorized to enter into and implement same. This Settlement Agreement shall be binding upon the undersigned Parties, their respective agents, representatives, guardians, heirs, and assigns. It is represented that Releasor has capacity to eater into this Settlement Agreement and that it is agreed to willingly, without duress, after consultation with counsel and with the understanding that this Settlement Agreement terminates any claim of any nature against any Releasee arising prior to the Effective Date. It is agreed that the amount of the settlement payment is fair and reasonable.
11. Adxrdssibility of Agreement
This Settlement Agreement constitutes a settlement and compromise of disputed claims and issues subject to state and federal rules protecting against discovery and use by anyone other than the Parties or any other person or entity released hereunder. This Settlement Agreement is not intended to be used by anyone other than the Parties. This Settlement Agreement shall not be admissible in a suit, action, or other proceeding unless necessary to enforce the terms hereof. Neither this Settlement Agreement nor any aspect of its negotiation or performance shall be used in any manner by anyone as evidence anywhere in the world of the alleged rights, ditties, or obligations of the Parties or any other person or entity released hereunder, nor does this Settlement Agreement confer any rights, benefits, interests, or obligations upon any other persons or entities, as third-party beneficiaries or otherwise. The Parties specifically disavow any intention to create rights or interests for anyone not a Party to this Settlement Agreement.

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Notwithstanding the fmegoing, parties may divulge the Settlement Agreement and terms to the Florida Guardianship Courts where necessary to obtain Court approval pursuant to Florida law. 12. constryction of Agreement
The Parties undertook their own due diligence in deciding that this Settlement Agreement is approptiate and consulted with counsel of choke when entering into this Settlement Agreement. This Settlement Agreement is the product of arms-length negotiations of the Parties and involves compromises of the Parties' respective positions.
The Parties acknowledge that they have been counseled independently by their attorneys concerning the meaning and legal effect of the terms of this Settlement Agreement and have reviewed and had the opportunity to revise this Settlement Agreement. Ater` snob counseling, the Parties represent that they fully understand this Settlement Agreement and its terms, and, with this full understanding, voluntarily enter into this Settlement Agreement as evidenced by signing it below. In any proceeding to enforce the terms, this Settlement Agreement shalt in no event be construed against any Party as the drafter.
Whenever the text hereof requires, the use of gender or singular number shall include the appropriate gender or plural number as the text of the within instrument may require. 13. Xntegratien
This Settlement Agreement along with the attached Addenda contain the entire agreement between the Releasor and Releasees with respect to the subject matter thereof, and supersedes all prior discussions, agreements, and undertakings, both written and oral, between the Releasor aid Releasees with respect thereto. In the event of any inconsistency between the terms of this Settlement, Release and Indemnity Agreement with any term or condition within the Addenda, this Settlement, Release and Indemnity Agreement shall control, except that with

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respect to the scope of the release or any indemnity undertaking, the more expansive shall be given effect. 14. No Modification
Neither this Settlement, Release and tadernuity Agreement nor the attached Addenda may be altered, amended, and/or modified in any way except by written agreement signed by all Parties. 15, Waiver of Joinder of All Parties to Enforce Agreement
The Parties expressly waive any requirement that the joinder of all the Parties is necessary to enforce this Settlement Agreement. 16. Governing Law and Venue
This Settlement Agreement shall be interpreted under and governed by %claws of the State of New York without regard to general principles of choice of law which might otherwise call for the application of a different state's law. Any claim seeking to interpret or enforce rights or obligations arising out of the Settlement Agreement will be verened in the State and City of New York. 11. Execution
This Settlement Agreement may be executed in counterparts, and the signature pages may be exchanged electronically or by facsimile. The text of the SettlententAgreement, together with accurate copies of the relevant Parties' signatures, shalt have the force and effect of an original. Counsel for Defendants may execute this Settlement Agreement on behalf of their respective clients.

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18. StVe4bilitv

In the event that any provision of this Settlement Agreement is held to be void, voidable,

unlawful, or otherwise imenforceablc, the 'remaining terms of this gettfeinerit Agreement. shall

remain in full force and &fleet.

10. tffeetive Date

The effective date of this SettleMent Agreement shall be the date which if has been fully

=dined.

Dated: New York, New York October 7.w , 2012

SIGNED BY RELEASOR

ATTORNEY FOR RELEAS'

Dal : y of October, 2612

Theod

t;-

Bab t„ pb.pson, Osborne. & Le Minch; P A

Atiorp4s for .ektiniffis •

1.641 Woithington Rd., Ste. 100

P.O. Boys 4426

West Paint Beach, FL 334024426

(561) 684-2500

STATE OF FLORIDA

COUNTY OF gen ; fit

Before nee, the Undersigned Notary Pub11c of the State 04 county aforesaid, personally

appeared , Who, ttpOti bath and after being duly sworn, acknowledged

or herself to be r

and that sfhe, as such individual, executed the foregoing

instrument for the purposes therein contained and With full atithOt'ity to do so by signing the

foregoing Settlement Agreement

. WITNESS my hand and nOtary seal, at office this
day a Octobor; 2012
Notary Pith ie

owEifeXoidttPitAnkoiotaualtf,ttfsE`r'Nn1f7ortoh.t2rpednompttoA.aie'rs

Pgeli

P.11DATA 404099)

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/2/0/2oz
uce trikowsky, Es Selo:lacier Harrison Segal & Lewis Attorneys for Defendants City of New York, Administration for Children's Services 140 Broadway, Suite 3100 New York, New York 10005 (212) 973-g070

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PAGE INTENTIOIN ALLY LEFT BLANK

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GENERAL RELEASE

the plaintiff ia the nation entitled S.W. ei al. Ci of New York, ei al.,

Eastern District of New York, Civil Action # 09 CV 1777, being over the age of eighteen (18) years and

residing at

as "RELEASOR," in

consideration of the payment of

''WnZai, in upfront cash and/or

periodic payments, receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, does hereby release and forever discharge

the City of New York, and all past and present officers, directors, managers, administrators, employees,

agents, assignees, lessees, and representatives of tire City of New York, and all other entities represented

and/or indemnified by the City of New York, collectively the "RELEASEES", front any and all claims,

causes of action, suits, debts, sums of money, accounts, controversies, transactions, occurrences,

agreement; promises, damages, judgments, mentions, and demands whatsoever; known or unknown,

which RELEASOR had, now has or hereafter can, shall, or may have, either directly or through

subrogees or other third persons, against the RELEASE ES for, upon or by reason of any matter, cause or

thing whatsoever that occurred through the date of this RELEASE. This RELEASE and settlement

constitutes complete payment and satisfaction for all damages and injuries, including all claims for costs,

expenses, attorney's fees and disbursements. It is expressly understood and agreed that RELEASES do

Hot include St. Joseph's Services (SAS), St. Christopher Otille (SCO), Heartsbare Human Services,

(NHS), or, the Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, from which/whom RELEASOR intends to seek the

remainder of his/her damages.

In further consideration of the payment set forth above, RELEASOR hereby waives, releases, and

forever discharges RELEASER from any and all claims, known or unknown, past and/or future

conditional payments, arising out of the RELEASOR's Medicare eligibility for and receipt of Medicare

benefits related to the claimed injury in this matter, and/or arising out of the provision of primary

payment (or appropriate reimbursement), including causes of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section

1395y(b)(3)(A) of the Medicate, Medicaid and SCH1P Extension Act of 2007.

In the event a portion of the net settlement proceeds will be in the form of a structured settlement,

the terms and amount of that structrwed settlement will be described in an Addendum to the Release_

The words "RELEASOR" and "RELEASES?' include all mleasors and all releasees under this

RELEASE, but do not include, St. Joseph's Services (SJS), St. Christopher Otille (SCO), Heartshare

Human Services, (FIRS), or, the Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn.

This RELEASE may not be changed orally.

PHDATA 4054407J

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 382-6 Filed 12/06/12 Page 16 of 34 PageID #: 11226

PIE UNDERSIGNED II-AS READ THE FOR.EGOING RELEASE AND FULLY UNDERSTANDS IT

IN 'WITNESS WIIEREUT,l have executed this Release

da ofC-,4,171, Jae— 20
'
, Plaintiff (Signtneure) •

STATF, P PLOIUDA: COUNTY OF OAVY\ ,

Oti rYAijr-,0<

, .20

WO° 7ne personally came to inc loam0i, and looimin to nte to be

the bidiiildual deSelibecl ilt, aotl who eieetited the liat'egoitig GENE ]L REVEASE, and duly

acknowledged to toe that (S)Ite.exeented the same.

Notary PUl fie

4, YP'..

0405 WOEHEAD
uyoolussfotIRDDMial

41.$ EXP/RES; February IT 2613

Y.Kt, BandedlfivRaletyPuh:114qw,Ilets

PODA TA 4,054407

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 382-6 Filed 12/06/12 Page 17 of 34 PageID #: 11227

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

------

---------- ------ – -------------- — x

S.W., by and through his guardian, RENEE IviARQUIS-AEMMS; T.G., and J.L., by and through their next friend, MILDRED DEL GROSSO; S.R. and R.E. by and
through their pardian, PATRICIA BALDWIN; L.J. and la,
by and through their guardian, KEVIN HENDRICKSON;
Cii, and T.L.,
Plaintiffs,
-against •

PLAINTIFFS' .AFFI ►AVIT OF STATUS OF LIENS
Docket No.: 09-CV-1777
NYC Law Dept. 1;
2008.042107
NYC Comptroller if:

CITY OF NEW YORK, ADIv1INISTRATION FOR CHILDREN'S SERVICES, fikfa CHILD WELFARE ADMINISTRATION; ST. JOSEPH SERVICES FOR CHILDREN, INC., filth CATHOLIC CHILD CARE
SOCIETY OF THE moms OF BROOKLYN, INC., a
New York corporation; HEARTSHARE HUMAN SERVICES, filch CATHOLIC GUARDIAN SOCIETY OF THE DIOCESE OP BROOKLYN, INC„ ik New York corporation; SCO FAMILY OF SERVICES, fik/a ST. CHRISTOPHER-OITILIE, A New York corporation,

Defendants.
CITY OF NEW YORK, ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN'S SERVICES,
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
-against-
JUDITH LEEKIN, DESMOND LEEKIN, ANTHONY VERNON LEEKIN, CAROL LEEKIN, ISHMATilE NAGASSAWASMAK ANITA. LEZAME, DR. RALPH SQUITTERI, RHONDA MORGAN, EDWIN GOULD SERVICES FOR CHILDREN, SABRINA. COLLINS, LYSTRA LEWIS, MIA K.A.RENCfA, CHERYL JACK, CLAUDETTE JACKSON, THELMA BOWES, and VONTRELL LEEKIN,
Third-Party Defendants,
x

PHDATA4G154602 _f

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 382-6 Filed 12/06/12 Page 18 of 34 PageID #: 11228

STATE OF FLORIDA SS.:
COUNTY OF

being duly sworn, says:

The laintiff

the above-entitled action and I reside at

I am making this affidavit

with r1 knowledge that the same will be relied upon by the City of New York, its agents,

employees and representatives in connection with settlement of this claim/action against them_

Check either a or b in all sections. If b is checked in any section, please Jill in all applicable detail.

la.

I am not indebted to any department or agency of the City of New York and there

are no liens outstanding.

lb. Pr I have unpaid. Hens, violations or other debts owed to a department and/or agency of the City of New York. I expressly consent to the payment of those sums; or to the sums agreed upon by counsel, directly from the settlement proceeds.

List all liens, violations and/or other debts by providing the name of each City agency (e,g. Department of Finance; Department of Sanitation; Avironmentar Control Board) and the outstanding sums due.

2a. El I have not received Medicaid or Public Assistance benefits.

2h. L I have received and/or am still receiving Medicaid and/or Public Assistance

benefits. The State of Florida has issued a Final Notice of Lien. which provides a total amount due

vi $

(attach copy). I understand that The State of Florida will be paid

that amount, or the amount agreed upon by counsel, directly from the settlement proceeds, and that

the payment of an amount less than the final notice amount is a non-assertion of The State of

Florida's lien against the proceeds of this settlement and shall not be deemed a waiver of the

balance of the lien or the amount owed.

For Question 3, if 3b is checked, please complete 3c and provide a copy orate- Medicare final
demand letter. if 3d is checked, please provide the information pertaining to the lifedkare replacement policy.

3a, V As of the date of this affidavit, I am not a Medicare beneficiary nor have I Mr been a Medicare beneficiary. (Note: This query is made pursuant to Section III of the Medicare, Medicaid and SCITIP Extension Act of 2007, V.S.C. 1395(B)03)1,

PkIDATA 4054502J

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 382-6 Filed 12/06/12 Page 19 of 34 PageID #: 11229

3b. 0 I sin a Medicare beneficiary.

Y Medicare #

is

. I am aware of .my

obligation to reimburse Medicare, out of the- proceeds of a settlement or judgment in !this

lawsuit, for-payments arid/or benefits Medicare has provided to Me, or prOvides to in in

the future, that relate to the injury Or conditiOn that is the subject of this, lawsuit. .1

understand that reimbukseinent directly to Medicare may be made froth proceeds I receive

from anyjiidgment or settlement of this action.

The effec=tive date of my Medicare coverage is [Please provide a copy of the Medicate card).

304 0 Medicare has confirmed that it will accept the total amonni of .00 as fall and final reimbursement of all Medicare payments made to. ate,
[Attach copy pf.Medicare Final Demand letter], In acpordance with the attached Medicare final demand letter, I consent to the ptiymerit Of that sum directly from the settlement proceeds.

3d. 0 I am the beneficiary of a Medicare Replacement Policy (also kflOWil as 'Medicare

Part C.) with pOliey #

which is provided by

[name of health insurance company]. [Attach

copy of health insurance policy card].

4a.

I am, not in arrears in child support payments:

4b. 0 I 01 in arrears in child suppor.t payments and expressly agree to the collection by
the NYCtop")ro of Child support of all unpaid sums directly froth the settlement proceeds.

5a

I ant not indebted to, or subject to liens by any New York City Health and HoSPitais

Coipdration iwNYCI-11-1C1 hospital or medical facility.

5b.

I sin indebted t6

[NYCAFIC

hospital or medical faeility] in the total lien amount of $

I expressly Consent to the payment of tbitt,stun directly from the settlement proceeds.

6a, Pj7 I have not received Workers' Comperisafioli ox Disability Benefits and there are no liens for the sante in this matter.

6b, 0 I ain indebted to

[for Workers'

Compensation or Disability Benefits) in the total lien a. inount of

I

expressly consent *the payMent of That sum directly Vora. the settlement proueeds.

Iworn to befoie me this day of Cse,1_4"1-, 20 t NOTARY PUBLIC

COSIIIEVMVIE-R-E6A., Wila':F01914i7,2013
P}/DATA 4654502i

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 382-6 Filed 12/06/12 Page 20 of 34 PageID #: 11230
PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 382-6 Filed 12/06/12 Page 21 of 34 PageID #: 11231

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
S.W., by and through his guardian, RENEE MARQUIS: ABRAMS; T.G., and IL., by and through their next friend, MILDRED DEL GROSSO; S.B. and R.E. by and through their guardian, PATRICIA BALDWIN; L.J. and JIG., by and through their guardian, KEVIN HENDRICKSON; LB, C,B., and T.L.,
Plaintiffs,
-against-
an OF NEW YORK, ADMINISTRATION FOR
CHILDREN'S SERVICES, Vida CHILD WELFARE ADMINISTRATION; ST. JOSEPH SERVICES FOR CHILDREN, INC., f/k/a CATHOLIC CHILD CARE SOCIETY OF THE DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN, INC., a New York corporation; HEARTSHARB HUMAN SERVICES, f/k/a CATHOLIC GUARDIAN SOCIETY OF THE DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN, INC., a New York corporation; SCO FAMILY OF SERVICES, f/k/a ST, CHRISTOPHER-OTTILIE, A New York corporation,

STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT Docket 09-CV-1777
NYC Law Dept. 2008-042107
NYC Comptroller

-------

, Defendants. ---------------

CITY OF NEW YORK, ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN'S SERVICES,
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
-against-

JUDITH LEEKIN, DESMOND LEEKIN, ANTHONY VERNON LEEKIN, CAROL LEEKIN, ISHMATTIE NAGASSAR/ASMAN, ANITA LEZAIVIE, DR, RALPH SQUITTERI, RHONDA MORGAN, EDWIN GOULD SERVICES FOR CHILDREN, SABRINA COLLINS,
LYSTRA LEWIS, MIA KARENGA, CHERYL JACK,
CLAUDETTE JACKSON, THELMA BOWES, and
VONTRELL LEEKIN,

Third-Party Defendants,

--------- ....... ..... w•-sss , sss,•••••s....1.14 ss• ,+,61.. .....

X

PRDATA 4074294

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 382-6 Filed 12/06/12 Page 22 of 34 PageID #: 11232

IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and between the undersigned attorneys of

rem* based upon full authority given by the respective parties, that all claims against the City of

New York, Administration for Children's Services, fik/a Child Welfare Administration are settled

for the total amount o

;.

inclusive of costs,

interest, attorney's fees, and disbursements, and subject to statutory liens and/or statutory rights to

reimbursement by third-parties, including Medicaid, Medicare, and prior attorneys, and that

far purposes of Medicaid, Medicare, and any other statutory right of reimbursement, this

settlement includes compensation for medical expenses.

IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that based upon this settlement, the ("RELEASOR") agrees to discontinue this action with prejudice and to
reledse and discharge the City - of New York, i/s/b/a City of New York, Adminisfration for Children's Services and its/their past and present officers, managers, administrators, employees, agents, and representatives, and all other individually named defendants and entities represented and/or indemnified by the City of New York (hereafter, "RELEASERS"). Plaintiff has been advised and agrees that he/she is forever barred ftom seeking any other recovery relating to the subject incident as against the RELEASEES, Notwithstanding the foregoing, this settlement and release shall not serve to release any direct claim that plaintiff possess against St. Joseph's Services (SYS), St Christopher Guile (SCO), Heartshare Human Services ("HHS"), or, the Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn from whorn/which RELEASOR intends to seek the remainder of his/her damages, and all claims asserted in the Complaint against these agencies are preserved.

IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that from the total settlement sum, plaintiffs) shall satisfy all outstanding Medicaid liens

IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that prior to tendering the requisite documents for payment, as provided in CPLR 5003-a(b), that any Medicare-recipient plaintiff shall have notified Medicare and obtained and submitted with the closing papers a final demand letter from Medicare for conditional payments related to the claimed injury in this
matter.

IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that plaintiff agrees to hold harmless RELEASEES, regarding any Bens, claims, or past Medicare payments, presently known or unknown in connection with this matter. Plaintiff agrees to instruct his/her attorneys to hold in trust the amount of any Medicare lien pending final resolution of such lien with Medicare. Thereafter, plaintiff agrees to fully satisfy (from the funds held by his/her attorney in trust) the full amount of the lien negotiated with Medicare and to provide Releasee copies of any/all documentation reflecting such payment. Upon tender of all required settlement papers, payment of the settlement shall be made in accordance with CPLR 5003-a(b) except that payment will be made within 42 days of the City's receipt of a complete set of all required papers in proper form, as stated in Part I. of the Settlement Agreement.

Plaintiff is required to obtain a release/discharge of any attorney's lien asserted against the proceeds. Faxed signatures shall be deemed originals.

PMATA 4074294_1

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 382-6 Filed 12/06/12 Page 23 of 34 PageID #: 11233

Dated: West. PaInit Beach,

1

WWI"

Attorneys for Plaints

Babbitt, jolinson;Osborne & Le Ciainche,

1641 Worthington Rmd, Suite 100

P.O. Box 4426

West Palm Beach, FL 13402-4426

Tel (561) 531-5953

,

tt

So Ordered:

Dated: New York, NY • , 2012
Bruce 0-0,-owsky, Esq.
AcrttrornOeyPsNfoErWDYeOfeRndKa.nt
140 Broadway New Yorlc., New York 10005 TA (212) 973-8000 , . BT--2xoce- 9-r:told-FS i<y
Date:

PIIDATA 4074294

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 382-6 Filed 12/06/12 Page 24 of 34 PageID #: 11234
STRUCTURE • i I DENDUM PREIVIERE
TL.

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 382-6 Filed 12/06/12 Page 25 of 34 PageID #: 11235

SYN RGY
SETTLEMENT CONSULTING

From: To: Date: Re:

Jason D. Lazarus, J.D.,

CSSC

Noveinber 29th, 2012

As you know, the above case had been resolved with a structured settlement. In order to guarantee the rates on this case lease have the defense carrier issue and send the following premium chec

Premium check In the amount of

pAdepaya12k-

BI-IG Structured Settlements, Inc Attn: Structured Settlements 3024 Harney Street Omaha, NE 68131-3580 TAX ID: BHGSS: 47-07-93577

Please send remium check to: Elizabeth Braunschn6der, Case Manager Synergy Settlement Consulting 4025 Edgewater Drive Orlando, FL 32804
We truly appreciate the opportunity to assist you with this case. If you have any questions, or if we can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to call. Best regards,
Jason D. Lazarus, Esq.
4025 Edgewater Drive Orlando, Florida 32804 Telephone 877,349.6901 Facsimile 407.704,2638

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 382-6 Filed 12/06/12 Page 26 of 34 PageID #: 11236

Qualified Assignment and Release Agreement
In Accordance With Internal Revenue Code Section 130

"Claimant(s)":

"Assignor": City Of New York
"Settlement Agreement": [Date and exact title of Settlement Agreement, order or other document that sets forth the Assignor's obligation to make the agreed periodic payments)
_ "Assignee": BHG STRUCTURED SETTLEMENTS, INC

"Annuity issuer"';

FIRST BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY

"Effective Date': Annuity Contract No.:

This Qualified Assignment and Release Agreement ("Agreement") is made and entered into as of the Effective Date by and among the undersigned parties with reference to the following facts:

A. Claimant(s) and Assignor are parties to or

are otherwise subject to, and Claimants)

islare entitled to receive payments under,

the

above-referenced

Settlement

Agreement, under which Assignor has

liability to make certain periodic payments to .

orfthebniClam(s)pecfid

in Addendum No_ 1 of this Agreement (the

"Periodic Payments"); and

B. Assignor and Assignee wish to effect a "qualified assignment" within the meaning and subject to the conditions of Section 130(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the "Code").

Now, therefore, in consideration of the foregoing and for other good and valuable consideration, the parties agree as follows:

1. Assignment and Assumption; Release of Assignor. Assignor hereby assigns to Assignee, and Assignee hereby accepts and assumes, all of Assignor's liability to make the Periodic Payments, Each Claimant hereby accepts and consents to such assignment by Assignor and assumption by Assignee. Effective on the Effective Date, each Claimant hereby releases and discharges Assignor from all liability to make the Periodic Payments.

BN-102d (05/2011)

Page 1 of 5

2. Nature of Periodic Payments. The Periodic Payments constitute
damages (other than punitive damages), whether by suit or agreement, or
if, compensation under a workers' compensation act,
on account of personal injury or sickness in a case involving physical injury or physical sickness, within the meaning of Sections 130(c) and 104(a) of the Code.
3. Extent of Assignee's Liability. Assignee's liability to make the Periodic Payments shall be no greater than the liability of Assignor asof the Effective Date, Assignee assumes no liability other than the liability to make the Periodic Payments. Assignee's liability to make the Periodic Payments shall be unaffected by any bankruptcy or insolvency of Assignor.
4, Qualified Funding Asset. Assignee will fund the Periodic Payments by purchasing from Annuity Issuer a "qualified funding asset," as defined in Section 130(d) of the Code, in the form of an annuity contract (the "Annuity') issued by Annuity Issuer and providing for payments corresponding to the Periodic Payments, Assignee shall be designated as the owner of the Annuity. Ali rights of legal ownership and control of the Annuity shall (subject to paragraph 9 of this Agreement) be and remain vested exclusively in Assignee; provided, however, that the Annuity shall be used by Assignee to fund the Periodic Payments and shall at

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 382-6 Filed 12/06/12 Page 27 of 34 PageID #: 11237

all times be designated by Assignee on its records as being taken into account, under Section 130 of the Code, with respect to this Agreement. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Agreement, neither any Claimant nor any Successor Payee (as defined in paragraph 8 of this Agreement) shall have any rights with respect to the Annuity or the payments thereunder that would cause any amount
attributable to the Annuity to be currently
includable in the recipient's income or would otherwise affect the determination of when any recipient is treated as having received any payment for income tax purposes, or would otherwise prevent this Agreement from satisfying all of the conditions for a 'qualified assignment" within the meaning of Section 130(c) of the Code.
5, Delivery of Payments. Assignee may instruct Annuity Issuer to send payments directly to Claimant, or, if applicable, to a Successor Payee. Such direction of payments under the Annuity shall not be deemed to afford Claimant or any Successor Payee any rights of ownership or control of the Annuity.
Each Claimant and any Successor Payee shall at all times keep Annuity Issuer apprised of such Claimant's or Successor Payee's current mailing address and telephone number and, if such Claimant or Successor Payee receives payments by electronic funds transfer (EFT), the name, address, ABA routing number and telephone number of the applicable depository institution and the account name and number of the account to which the payments are to be credited. Such notices shall be in a form reasonably acceptable to Annuity Issuer.
6. Discharge of Liability. Assignee's liability to make each Periodic Payment to Claimant or Successor Payee designated to receive such payment shall be fully discharged upon:
i. the mailing of a valid check on or before the due date for such payment to the address of record specified by Claimant or Successor Payee; or
IL the electronic funds transfer (EFT) on or before the due date for such periodic payment to the financial institution account designated by Claimant or Successor Payee.
7. Acceleration, Transfer of Payment Rights. None of the Periodic Payments and no rights to or interest in any of the Periodic

Bpi-102d (05/2011)

Page 2 of 5

Payments (all of the foregoing being hereinafter collectively referred to as "Payment Rights") can be
i. Accelerated, deferred, increased or decreased by any recipient of any of the Periodic Payments; or
ii. Sold, assigned, pledged, hypothecated or otherwise transferred or encumbered, either directly or indirectly, unless such sale, assignment, pledge, hypothecation or other transfer or encumbrance (any such transaction being hereinafter referred to as a "Transfer") has been approved in advance in a "Qualified Order" as defined in Section 5891(b)(2) of the Code (a "Qualified Order") and otherwise complies with applicable state law, including without limitation any applicable state structured settlement protection statute.
No Claimant or Successor Payee shall have the power to effect any Transfer of Payment Rights except as provided in sub-paragraph (ii) above, and any other purported Transfer of Payment Rights shall be wholly void. If Payment Rights under this Agreement become the subject of a Transfer approved in accordance with sub-paragraph (ii) above the rights of any direct or indirect transferee of such Transfer shall be subject to the terms of this Agreement and any defense or claim in recouprnent arising hereunder.
8. Contingent Beneficiaries. Any Periodic Payments to be made after the death of any Claimant or Successor Payee shall be made to such party as shall have been designated in, or in accordance with, the Settlement Agreement Any party so designated is referred to in this Agreement as a "Contingent Beneficiary." if no Contingent Beneficiary is living at the time of the death of a Claimant or Successor Payee, payment shall be made to the decedent's estate unless otherwise provided in the Settlement Agreement, As used in this Agreement the term "Successor Payee" refers to a Contingent Beneficiary or an estate that has become entitled to receive Periodic Payments following the death of a Claimant or a Successor Payee. Except as otherwise provided in the Settlement Agreement, no designation or change of designation of a Contingent Beneficiary shall be effective unless such change (i) is requested in a written request submitted to Assignee in accordance with Assignee's customary procedures for processing such requests; and (ii) is confirmed by Assignee. Except for a designation that is expressly identified in

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 382-6 Filed 12/06/12 Page 28 of 34 PageID #: 11238

the Settlement Agreement as irrevocable, any designation of a Contingent Beneficiary shall be deemed to be revocable; and no party that is designated as a Contingent Beneficiary (other than a party irrevocably designated as a Contingent Beneficiary in the Settlement Agreement) shall, solely by virtue of its designation as a Contingent Beneficiary, be deemed to have any cognizable interest in any Periodic Payments.
9. Failure to Satisfy Section 130(e), if at any time prior to completion of the Periodic Payments, the Settlement Agreement is declared terminated in a final, nonappealable order of a court of competent jurisdiction (or in the case of a workers' compensation settlement, a final order of the applicable workers' compensation authority) or if it Is determined in any such final order that the requirements of Section 130(c) of the Code have not been satisfied in connection with this Agreement: (i) the assignment by Assignor to Assignee of the liability to make the Periodic Payments, Assignee's acceptance of such assignment and the release by Cialmant(s) of Assignor's liability shalt be of no force or effect (ii) Assignee shall be conclusively deemed to be acting as the agent of Assignor; (iii) the Annuity shall be owned by Assignor, which shall retain the liability to make the Periodic Payments; (iv) Assignee shall have no liability to make any Periodic Payments; and (v) the parties hereto agree to cooperate in taking such actions as may be necessary or appropriate to implement the foregoing.
10. Governing Law; Disclosure of Certain Tax information; Binding Effect.
i. This Agreement shall be governed by and interpreted in accordance with the internal laws of the State of New York; provided, however, that any Transfer of Payment Rights under this Agreement may be subject to the laws of other

states in addition to the state designated above.
This Agreement shall be binding upon the parties hereto and their respective successors, heirs, executors, administrators and permitted assigns, including without limitation any party asserting an interest in Payment Rights.
11. Advice, Comprehension of Agreement, In entering into this Agreement, each Claimant warrants, represents and agrees that Claimant is solely relying on the attorneys and advisors of such Claimants own choosing; and not upon Assignor, Assignee or their advisors, for legal and tax advice regarding the consequences of this Agreement. Each Claimant further warrants, represents and agrees that the terms of this Agreement have been completely read by and explained to such Claimant and are fully understood and voluntarily accepted by such Claimant. Furthermore, each Claimant hereby releases and discharges Assignor, Assignee, and Annuity Issuer, their respective counsel, and anyone else associated with them from any and all claims, rights, damages, costs or expenses of any nature whatsoever that may hereafter accrue to or be acquired by Claimant by reason of the legal or tax consequences of the Periodic Payments to be made pursuant to this Agreement being other than those anticipated by Claimant.
12. Description of Periodic Payments. The Periodic Payments are as set forth in attached Addendum No. 1, which is hereby incorporated in and made a part of this Agreement.

BN-102d (05/2011)

Page 3 of 5

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 382-6 Filed 12/06/12 Page 29 of 34 PageID #: 11239

This Qualified Assignment and Release Agreement is signed in one or more counterparts as of the Effective Date by the following:

Assignor
By: Authorized Representative
Title:

Assignee: BRG Structured Settlements, Inc.
By: Authorized Representative
Title:

Attorney for Claimants

By: Claimant Signature
By: Claimant Signature

Signature
Signature By:
Signature

BN-102d (05/2011)

Page 4 of 5

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 382-6 Filed 12/06/12 Page 30 of 34 PageID #: 11240
Addendum No., Description of Periodic Payments

Life with Certain annuity:

for life, payable monthly, guaranteed for 30

year(s), beginning on 3/1/2013, with the last guaranteed. payment on 2/1/2043.

INITIALS

Assignor: Assignee: Claimant:

Attorney for Claimant:

Ski-102d (05/2011)

Page 5 of 5

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 382-6 Filed 12/06/12 Page 31 of 34 PageID #: 11241

Addendum to General Release
Payments
In consideration of the release executed separately, the City of New York, (Defendant) agrees to pay the sums outlined in this Section below:

Upfront monies: (Cash Total payable to Babbitt, Johnson, Osborne & eCla nche, PA.

• Periodic payments funded at a cost of

(recipient bank for

annuity premium is Wells Fargo Bank

420 Montgomery Street San

Francisco, CA 94163) and made according to the schedule as follows (the

"Periodic Payments"):

Payee:

Life with Certain annuity:

for life, payable monthly, guaranteed for 30

year(s), beginning on 3/01/2013, with the last guaranteed payment on 2/01/2043.

The payments above constitute:
i. damages (other than punitive damages), whether by suit or agreement, or
compensation under a workers' compensation act,
on account of personal injury or sickness in a case involving physical injury or physical sickness, within the meaning of Sections 130(c) and 104(a)(2) of the Code.

Acceleration, Transfer of Payment Rights
None of the Periodic Payments and no rights to or interest in any of the Periodic Payments (all of the foregoing being hereinafter collectively referred to as "Payment Rights") can be
i. Accelerated, deferred, increased or decreased by any recipient of any of the Periodic Payments; or
ii. Sold, assigned, pledged, hypothecated or otherwise transferred or encumbered, either directly or indirectly.
No Claimant or Successor Payee shall have the power to affect any Transfer of Payment Rights, and any purported Transfer of Payment Rights shall be wholly void.

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 382-6 Filed 12/06/12 Page 32 of 34 PageID #: 11242

Claimant's Beneficiary

Any payments to be made after the death o

pursuant

to the terms of this Settlement Agreement shall be made to such person or entity as shall be

designated in. writin b

the Assignee. If no person or entity is

so designated b

or if the person designated is not living at the

time of

-

death, such payments shall be made to the estate of

No such designation, nor any revocation thereof, shall be effective

unless it is in writing and delivered to the 'Assignee: The designation must be in a form

acceptable to the Assignee before such payments are made,

Consent to Qualified Assignment

Claimant acknowledges and agrees that the Defendant City of New York, shall make a "qualified assignment", within the meaning of Section 130(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, of Defendant's liability to make the Periodic Payments set forth
above to BHG Snuetured Settlements, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Assignee"). The Assignee's obligation for payment of the Periodic Payments shall be no greater than that of Defendant (whether by judgment or agreement) immediately preceding the assignment of the
Periodic Payments obligation.

Any such assignment shall be accepted by the Claimant without right of rejection and shall completely release and discharge the Defendant from the Periodic Payments obligation assigned to the Assignee. The Claimant recognizes that in the event of such an assignment, the Assignee shall be the sole obligor with respect to the Periodic Payments obligation, and that all other releases with respect to the Periodic Payments obligation that pertain to the liability of the Defendant shall thereupon become final, irrevocable and absolute.

Right to Purchase an Annuity

The Assignee, shall fund the liability to make the Periodic Payments through the purchase of an annuity policy from First Berkshire Hathaway Life Insurance Company (hereinafter referred to as "Annuity Issuer"). The Assignee shall be the sole owner of the annuity policy and shall have all rights of ownership. The Assignee may have Annuity Issuer mail payments directly to the Payee(s). The Payee shall be responsible for maintaining a current mailing address with the Assignee.

Plaintiffs (Payee's) Rights to Payments

Said payments to Plaintiff required herein are fixed and determined as to amount and time of payment and cannot be accelerated, deferred, increased or decreased by the Plaintiff or any Payee, nor shall the Plaintiff or any Payee have the right, power or authority to sell, mortgage or hypothecate or encumber same, or any part thereof, nor anticipate the same or any part thereof, by assignment, contract, agreement, pledge or other device.

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 382-6 Filed 12/06/12 Page 33 of 34 PageID #: 11243
Stipulation Regarding Settlement Obligations
It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between the parties that the rights, responsibilities and obligations of Defendant are totally extinguished and satisfied upon payment of the sums necessary for the purchase of the annuity together with an immediate payment as shown. herein_
It is further understood that the Defendant is not a guarantor or insurer with respect to,,the aforementioned annuity. The purpose of this stipulation is to make clear that the obligations and responsibilities of the Defendant are satisfied upon issuance of the aforementioned settlement monies.
Discharge of Obligation
The obligation of the Assignee to make each Periodic Payment shall be discharged upon the mailing of a valid check or electronic funds transfer in the amount of such payment on or before the due date to the last address on record for the Payee (a) or Beneficiary with the .Annuity Issuer named in this Settlement Agreement. If the Payee or Beneficiary notifies the Assignee that any check or electronic funds transfer was not received, the Assignee shall direct the Annuity Issuer to initiate stop payment action and, upon confirmation that the check was not previously negotiated or electronic funds transfer deposited, the Annuity Issuer shall process a replacement payment in the amount of such payment to the designated address of the Payee or Beneficiary.
Authorization Section
Claimant
Dated„3A2•_
Claimant's Counsel
App oved as to dr& • — • d CYO
tok .
T eo•ore Babbitt, Esq. Babbitt, Johnson, Osborne & Le Clainche, P.A. 1641 Worthington Road, Suite 100 West Palm Beach, FL 33409

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 382-6 Filed 12/06/12 Page 34 of 34 PageID #: 11244
Tel: 561-684-2500 Fax 561-684-6308 Date: i i 30 -- i r ,
Defendant — of New York
Title: ' ki-ornett -ar t-1 ,,C iVek"Vilic
Date: • t 2-1614•6" 2-

 
 Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 490 Filed 08/25/14 Page 1 of 13 PageID #: 20289

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

S.W., by and through his guardian, RENEE MARQUIS-ABRAMS; R.E., T.G., and J.L., by and through their next friend, MILDRED DEL GROSSO; S.B. by and through his guardian, PATRICIA BALDWIN; L.J. and J.G., by and through their guardian, KEVIN HENDRICKSON; J.B., C.B., and T.L.,

CASE NO.: 1:09 -cv-1777-ENV-MDG

Plaintiffs,

vs.

CITY OF NEW YORK, a municipal corporation; ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN'S SERVICES, f/k/a CHILD WELFARE ADMINISTRATION; ST. JOSEPH SERVICES FOR CHILDREN, INC., f/k/a CATHOLIC CHILD CARE SOCIETY OF THE DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN, INC., a New York corporation; HEARTSHARE HUMAN SERVICES, f/k/a CATHOLIC GUARDIAN SOCIETY OF THE DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN, INC., a New York corporation; SCO FAMILY OF SERVICES, f/k/a ST. CHRISTOPHEROTTILIE, a New York corporation,,

Defendants. ___________________________________/

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO APPROVE SETTLEMENT AND FOR DISBURSEMENT OF COSTS HELD IN ESCROW

COME NOW the Plaintiffs, by and through their undersigned attorneys, and file their

Motion to Approve Settlement and for Disbursement of Costs Held in Escrow and states as

follows:

1

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 490 Filed 08/25/14 Page 2 of 13 PageID #: 20290

1. This case has been settled with all remaining Defendants for the total sum of

$17,500,000.00 with the parties to bear their own costs and attorney’s fees. This settlement is in

addition to the $9,700,000.00 previously obtained in settlement with the City of New York. This

settlement is divided as follows:

JL

$2,500,000.00

CB

$2,500,000.00

TG

$2,500,000.00

TL

$2,500,000.00

RE

$2,500,000.00

SB

$2,000,000.00

SW

$2,000,000.00

JB

$1,000,000.00

2. This Court previously approved the aforesaid settlement with the City of New

York on behalf of the above eight (8) Plaintiffs as well as Plaintiffs, JG and LJ. By its Orders

dated December 18, 2012, and May 2, 2013 which are attached hereto as composite Exhibit “A,”

this Court approved costs in the amount of $1,172,091.22 which represented 75% of the costs

expended by Plaintiffs’ counsel, and an attorneys’ fee of one-third of the settlement amount after

the deduction of these costs. Therefore, $390,697.07 was retained in the trust account of the

undersigned Plaintiffs’ attorneys pending approval of the remainder of the costs expended on

behalf of the Plaintiffs.

3. The costs of the prior settlement with the City of New York were divided among

the Plaintiffs pro rata based upon the percentage of the settlement received by each Plaintiff as

shown in the chart attached hereto as Exhibit “B.” Close to 62% of those costs were related to

the settlement of the Plaintiffs, JG and LJ. By Order filed on January 28, 2014, this Court

granted summary judgment as to the Plaintiffs, JG and LJ; consequently these two Plaintiffs did

2

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 490 Filed 08/25/14 Page 3 of 13 PageID #: 20291
not receive additional money in the current settlement. The agreement with the Plaintiffs as to costs, marked as composite Exhibit “C,” provided on Page 3 that in the event of a settlement with the remaining Defendants other than the City of New York, the pro rata distribution of costs would be adjusted based upon that settlement. Attached hereto as Exhibit “D” is a revision of the pro rata costs so that the Plaintiffs’ pro rata costs are adjusted based upon the new settlement. The result of this adjustment is a repayment of $228,579.10 in costs to Plaintiff, JG, and $228,873.42 in costs to Plaintiff, LJ.
4. Of the remaining eight Plaintiffs, only SW, RE, and SB remain under guardianship and are, therefore, under this Court’s jurisdiction to approve settlement pursuant to Local Civil Rule 83.2.
5. Plaintiffs are requesting an order from the Court under Local Rule 83.2 because these three Plaintiffs who are taking funds out of this settlement are incapacitated and have guardians who, in turn, have approved these settlements. Attached to this application, as composite Exhibit “E,” are the orders of the Honorable Dwight Geiger dated August 1, and August 4, 2014, approving these settlements filed in the Probate Court in St. Lucie County. Supplemental Orders were submitted to Judge Geiger once the guardians elected to structure a portion of the settlement proceeds. At this time, we are awaiting the signed orders from Judge Geiger. Copies will be furnished to this court as a supplemental (composite) exhibit once received. In the interim, copies of the unexecuted supplemental orders submitted to Judge Geiger are also enclosed, as composite Exhibits “E-4,” “E-5,” and “E-6.” Judge Geiger is the Judge with jurisdiction over these wards and the guardians were present during the hearings. Judge Geiger previously approved the prior settlement with the City on November 26, 2012, and that Order is attached as Exhibit “F.” Judge Geiger and each of the guardians were fully aware
3

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 490 Filed 08/25/14 Page 4 of 13 PageID #: 20292
of the costs expended by Plaintiffs’ counsel and the attorneys’ fee claimed and both the guardians and Judge Geiger approved all of those costs and attorney’s fees which are the subject of this Motion. Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees are in accordance with the rules of the state of New York and will be based upon the contract with the guardians in the amount of one-third of the settlement proceeds after deducting costs as shown on the Closing Statements attached hereto as composite Exhibit “G.” This attorney’s fee is reasonable under these circumstances. There have been over 140 depositions in this case conducted at significant expense all over the country and this case has been ongoing since 2009. Plaintiffs’ attorneys have expended thousands of hours collectively and this fee will be divided among four firms all of whom have been active throughout the litigation.
6. Since the last settlement, Plaintiffs’ attorneys have expended or incurred the costs shown on the attached composite Exhibit “H1.” These costs have been expended by Plaintiffs’ attorneys over a period of two years and were out-of-pocket expenses of the attorneys. Plaintiffs request an Order approving the portion of these costs attributable to the above-named three Plaintiffs in accordance with the attached Closing Statements pursuant to Eastern District of New York Local Rule 83.2.
7. Attached hereto as composite Exhibit “I” are the portion of the costs which are attributable to the Plaintiffs, JG and LJ. Plaintiffs’ attorneys do not seek reimbursement of those costs because no recovery was made on behalf of the Plaintiffs, JG and LJ in connection with the current settlement. Thus, those costs will be deducted from the attorney’s fees paid to the Plaintiffs’ attorneys.
1 Composite Exhibit “H-2” also contains a cost statement from the prior settlement which, on further review, contained certain costs which had been inadvertently included. Accordingly, these items have been removed, and/or adjusted, and such removals/adjustments are reflected on page 60 of “H-2b.”
4

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8. As to the costs retained in the trust account of the undersigned Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs attach as Exhibit “J” the costs previously presented to this Court for approval, 25% of which have been retained as aforesaid. Plaintiffs now request that this Court approve the expenditure of those costs pursuant to the above-cited Local Rule. These costs have also been approved by the Probate Court in St. Lucie County as aforesaid on November 27, 2012, as well as having been approved by the guardians directly responsible for the wards under Florida law. The Court previously questioned the amount of these costs because the total costs were substantial in proportion to the amount of the prior settlement. The amount of the total settlement has now almost tripled and the proportion of the costs is, therefore, much reduced representing approximately 7% of the amount recovered by Plaintiffs. All of these costs were out-of-pocket to Plaintiffs’ attorneys and are reasonable.
9. To understand why both the costs expended and the attorney’s fees requested are reasonable, it is important to realize the extent of the efforts that Plaintiffs’ attorneys undertook in the handling of this case. This case has been pending for nearly five (5) years. Several other law firms declined to participate in this case because of the difficulty it imposed on the firm’s involved. While there were four law firms representing the Plaintiffs and the labor was divided in accordance with the talent of each firm, it was still necessary for several of the attorneys involved to spend 100% of their time working on nothing but this case for years at a time. In order to even bring this case to begin with, several attorneys had to spend their significant time in New York City and Albany unearthing documents many of which were hand-written. This required winnowing down thousands of documents amounting to millions of pages spanning 40 years of time. Several law firms were contacted and paid to review their archives as well. A searchable database of such documents had to be created and assembled to find documents to
5

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prepare Plaintiffs’ Complaint, provide documents to experts, to prepare for depositions and to respond to discovery. Witnesses had to be uncovered and interviewed from that time period. Plaintiffs’ standard of care experts had to review those hundreds of thousands of pages of source documents and depositions and had to be constantly updated as facts were uncovered. The number of hours spent by these experts and Plaintiffs’ attorneys stagger the imagination. No one attorney could possibly retain the content or even the location of many of the documents necessary for hearings, depositions and meetings with experts. This necessitated more than one attorney being present at any event, thus incurring travel expenses as well as attorney time.
Plaintiffs were up against Defendants who had unlimited resources whereas the resources of Plaintiffs’ counsel were self-funded by essentially small firms who had to take out personallyguaranteed loans over this five (5) year span. These costs totaled nearly $2 million in a case which was handled entirely on a contingent basis with no assurance that Plaintiffs’ counsel would be reimbursed. Unlike corporate counsel who are guaranteed a fee and costs, the payment of a fee and the repayment of costs were entirely contingent in this case. If Plaintiffs were not successful in either settling or winning this case, the Talenfeld and Babbitt firms would have lost approximately $1 million each in addition to five years of attorney time. Thus, there was no incentive whatsoever to expend costs beyond that required in order to properly prosecute the case. Plaintiffs had to fight fire with fire with respect to the expenditure of costs. A perfect example of that was that the City of New York was charged approximately $500,000.00 by a relatively minor expert, Gregory Meacham, an ex-FBI agent who testified on the criminal cleverness of Judith Leekin. This single expert’s charge approached the total cost of all of Plaintiffs’ experts with respect to the City case. Plaintiffs’ success was due, in no small part, to
6

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 490 Filed 08/25/14 Page 7 of 13 PageID #: 20295
the willingness of Plaintiffs’ attorneys to expend both their time and their money on the successful prosecution of this case.
10. Based upon the discussion had with the Honorable Marilyn Go at the time of the last settlement, Plaintiffs below provide a breakdown of the costs expended and an explanation of the concerns voiced by Judge Go where appropriate.
COPIES The attached cost documents break down the charge for copies. The total cost for copies of all firms for both settlements is $88,215.00. Of that, the amount paid to outside firms because of the volume of copies was $24,899.00. Thus, the internal copy costs were $63,316.00. This was for actual copies charged. The vast majority of copies in the case were printed from a computer rather than using a copy machine. There was no charge to the client for these computerized copies prior to 2012. Ten times the amount of copies in the first settlement were not charged at all. The combined firms charged different amounts depending upon whether the copies were color or black and white. Based upon the best calculation that we can make, the average cost of internal copies was .32 cents a page. Thus, if the Court wished to adjust the copy cost to the clients down to .15 cents per page, as suggested at the last conference, the Court should deduct from the $63,316.00 approximately half of that amount.
RESEARCH The total amount charged for Westlaw and LexisNexis research by all firms was $29,489.00. Both Westlaw and LexisNexis have a procedure that is outlined in the prior documents sent to the Court on January 31, 2013, which are attached as a composite Exhibit “K.” The research firms charge a pro rata share of the monthly charge based upon the number of
7

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 490 Filed 08/25/14 Page 8 of 13 PageID #: 20296
minutes spent online. The amount charged to the clients for research was a small fraction of the amount paid by the firms on a monthly basis. As an example, the Babbitt Johnson firm until the first settlement was charged $180,000.00 for Westlaw services during the period encompassed by the first settlement. The Talenfeld firm paid substantially more because of the number of attorneys in their firm. It is not possible to reconstruct the number of minutes spent each month during this five year period, but the amount of research done was substantial. The amount charged of $29,489.00 is a very small fraction of what the firms paid for online research during the five year period of this litigation.
TRAVEL EXPENSES Plaintiffs would refer the Court to Exhibit “K” for discussion of why multiple lawyers were necessary to attend hearings and depositions. Plaintiffs have explained previously as to the necessity for multiple lawyers because of the overwhelming number of documents. This would be true whether at a deposition, at a hearing or at the few meetings which were held. Plaintiffs were always “out gunned” by the number of attorneys present on behalf of the City and Agencies. These were actually out-of-pocket expenses which totaled $135,957.00 for the first settlement and $21,955.00 for the second. Plaintiffs would refer the Court to the categorical summary cost expanded explanation of January 31, 2013, Page 5, relative to these travel expenses which is part of Exhibit “K.”
CODING $71,039.85 was spent by the Talenfeld firm for coding. On Page 1 of their submission of January 31, 2013, the explanation for this expense is detailed. Suffice it to say that without coding, there is no way that the four Plaintiffs’ firms could have accessed the documents for any purposes from this vast sea of documents.
8

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 490 Filed 08/25/14 Page 9 of 13 PageID #: 20297
FEDERAL EXPRESS The Court questioned why there were so many documents FedExed and whether it was always an emergency or necessary. Transmittal of documents in this case was a nightmare. Usually, documents were transmitted by email or disks. Plaintiffs’ counsel used their judgment prior to using federal express. Every document sent to the Plaintiffs had to be FedExed in order to have a tracking number to avoid the necessity of duplicating the effort of copying these documents and re-transmitting them in case they were lost in transit. Much of this was the result of the Plaintiffs’ disability because documents would be sent by regular mail and lost or misplaced with no ability to track its delivery. Every time a document was sent to the Plaintiffs that needed to be returned, a return Federal Express envelope had to be included and then the Plaintiffs had to be literally talked through how to deposit the Federal Express envelope into the Federal Express box or have it picked up. Early in this case before Federal Express was used, large volumes of documents sent to the Defendants or to experts would end up getting misplaced on numerous occasions. The only way to avoid the vast amount of time needed to relocate the documents, recopy them and retransmit them was to use the Federal Express tracking system.
NOVEMBER 13, 2009, CONFERENCE Judge Go questioned why it was necessary to spend over $4,000.00 for a conference. That conference consisted of the following individuals: Theodore Babbitt, Howard Talenfeld, John Walsh, Jim Walsh, Amanda Sundarsingh, Ami Romanelli, Stephan LeClainche, Shirim Nothenberg, Melissa Cohen, Susan Landry, and Julie Goodman. This was one of the rare times that all of the attorneys met to strategize the handling of this case. The firms spent two days going through how the case would be handled and brainstorming how to respond to the defense. The Court questioned an item during this meeting for a “working dinner.” The firms met at the
9

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 490 Filed 08/25/14 Page 10 of 13 PageID #: 20298
office of Children’s Rights and one individual was sent to Pret A Manger to buy inexpensive meals for each to eat while working to avoid the expense of staying extra days.
JUNE 1, 2010, MEETING IN KNOXVILLE, TENNESSEE Judge Go questioned the use of a private aircraft to fly to Knoxville, Tennessee, from West Palm Beach. The explanation for this use is contained on Page 8 of Babbitt Johnson’s submission of January 31, 2013, attached as Exhibit “K.” It was necessary to fly to Knoxville rather than to have the expert witness, Peg Hess, come to West Palm Beach because Ms. Hess had in her home hundreds of thousands of pages of documents that she simply could not bring with her to West Palm Beach on a commercial airliner and did not trust them being shipped because they were indexed and notated by her as a result of hundreds if not thousands of hours of work which she feared would be lost and have to be duplicated if something happened to the documents. The plane carried Theodore Babbitt, Howard Talenfeld, Ami Romanelli, Stephan LeClainche, and Jennifer Pearl as well as the pilot and was less money than the cost of five airline tickets plus the cost of staying overnight. By using the private plane, we were able to return the same day.
JULY 15, 2010, PRIVATE PLANE USE The explanation for this charge is contained on Page 9 of the January 31, 2013, submission in Exhibit “K.”
SUMMATION The remaining questions raised by Judge Go are detailed in the summaries provided by the Babbitt, Talenfeld and Children’s Rights firms on January 31, 2013. Plaintiffs’ attorneys are proud of the effort expended and the result obtained in this case on behalf of these deserving Plaintiffs. There are not many firms in this country who would have undertaken this case to
10

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 490 Filed 08/25/14 Page 11 of 13 PageID #: 20299
begin with or lasted through the time and effort spent to accomplish this goal. We believe the effort of the attorneys speaks for itself and the formula for the fee now approved by both this Court and twice by the guardianship court is perfectly reasonable. Plaintiffs’ attorneys are mindful of this Court’s obligation to assure that the costs expended, on behalf of these three Plaintiffs still under guardianship, were both reasonable and necessary. We are confident that they are both. We used our business judgment in expending all costs recognizing that we were expending money out of pocket and necessarily subjecting the financial well-being of our firms to significant risk. Should the Court raise concerns that any submitted costs should be deducted from the attorney’s fees earned by Plaintiffs’ lawyers, counsel will accept that determination.
This case was settled at mediation on June 13, 2014, with an agreement that the settlement would be funded ninety (90) days from the date of mediation or September 11, 2014. The vast majority of this settlement has been annuitized through a structured settlement. It is vital that those annuities be funded as soon as the funds are received to avoid them lapsing and to ensure that the full measure of the Plaintiffs’ settlement is paid to them when the funds are available. The amount of the annuity paid is dependent, in part, on this Court’s order on this motion. In addition, the structured payout formed a part of the settlement and will be paid directly from the Defendants to the structure companies. Copies of the structures which have been selected by the Guardians for the benefit of RE, SB, and SW are contained within Exhibits “E-4,” “E-5,” and “E-6.” The Settlement Agreement reached during mediation is attached as Exhibit “L,” and the Settlement Agreement and Releases for RE, SB, and SW are attached as composite Exhibits “M-1,” “M-2,” and “M-3,” respectively.
Plaintiffs’ attorneys are willing to adjust their schedule in any manner reasonable in order to attend a hearing on this matter if the Court deems that such an in-person or telephone hearing is necessary.
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Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-MDG Document 490 Filed 08/25/14 Page 13 of 13 PageID #: 20301

COUNSEL OF RECORD

Via ECF:

Bruce Strikowsky, Esq. Matthew Kelly, Esq. Carl Judah Schaerf, Esq. Allison Fihma, Esq. SCHNADER HARRISON SEGAL & LEWIS LLP 140 Broadway, Suite 3100 New York, NY 10005 bstrikowsky@schnader.com mjkelly@schnader.com cschaerf@schnader.com afihma@schnader.com Co-Counsel for Defendants City of New York and Administration for Children’s Services
Marc J. Citrin, Esq John D. Paterniti, Esq. Craig G. Bienstock, Esq. SHAUB AHMUTY CITRIN & SPRATT, LLP 77 Water Street, Suite 702 New York, NY 10005 Telephone: (212) 599-8200 Fax: (212) 599-7765 mcitrin@sacslaw.com JPaterniti@sacslaw.com cbienstock@sacslaw.com

Steven J. Ahmuty, Jr., Esq. Timothy R. Capowski, Esq. Jeremy S. Rosof, Esq. William G. Spratt, Esq. Judd Cohen, Esq. Robert Boccio, Esq. Adam S. Covitt, Esq. Ralph Morales, Esq. SHAUB, AHMUTY, CITRIN & SPRATT, LLP 1983 Marcus Avenue, Suite 260 Lake Success, NY 11042 Telephone: (516) 488-3300 Fax: (516) 488-2324 sahmuty@sacslaw.com tcapowski@sacslaw.com jrosof@sacslaw.com wspratt@dsacslaw.com jcohen@sacslaw.com rboccio@sacslaw.com rmorales@sacslaw.com Counsel for Defendants St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc., f/k/a Catholic Child Care Society of the Diocese of Brooklyn, Inc.,Heartshare Human Services, f/k/a Catholic Guardian Society of the Diocese of Brooklyn, Inc., and SCO Family of Services, f/k/a St. Christopher-Ottilie

Sonya A Smith-Valentine VALENTINE LEGAL GROUP, LLC P. O. Box 56 Oxon Hill, MD 20750 (301) 513-9500 (866) 301-9155 (fax) sonya@valentinelegal.com Counsel for Third-Party Defendant Thelma Bowes

Richard Eniclerico, Esq. Thomas A. Catalano, Esq. Lester Schwab Katz & Dwyer, LLP 120 Broadway New York, NY 10271 reniclerico@lskdnylaw.com tcatalano@lskdynlaw.com Counsel for Third-Party Defendant Edwin Gould Services for Children

Via U.S. Mail:
Cheryl Jack 805 SW Regency Dr. Oak Harbor, WA 98277 Appearing Pro Se as Third-Party Defendant

Ishmatee Nagassar 105-12 103rd Rd.
Ozone Park, NY 11417
Appearing Pro Se as Third-Party Defendant

13

 
 Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-JO Document 538 Filed 02/06/17 Page 1 of 27 PageID #: 21295

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X

S.W., et al.,

Plaintiffs, - against CITY OF NEW YORK, et al.,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
CV 2009-1777 (ENV)(MDG)

Defendants.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X

In this action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs, who

were classified as special needs children, assert federal and

pendant state law claims against the City of New York (the “City”)

and the New York City Administration for Children’s Services

(“ACS”) (collectively the "City defendants"), and against several

foster care agencies (the "Agency defendants"). Plaintiffs allege

that they were subject to severe abuse inflicted upon them by

Judith Leekins, their foster care mother, with whom they had been

placed by defendants. In the fall of 2012, plaintiffs reached an

agreement to settle their claims against the City defendants for

$9.7 million and moved for court approval of the proposed

settlement. By memorandum and order filed on December 19, 2012,

the Honorable Eric N. Vitaliano approved the amount of the

settlement and the amount of attorneys' fees but referred to me for

report and recommendation the reasonableness of the costs sought by

plaintiffs' counsel. See DE 385. After plaintiffs later reached a

settlement agreement with the Agency defendants for $17.5 million,

Case 1:09-cv-01777-ENV-JO Document 538 Filed 02/06/17 Page 2 of 27 PageID #: 21296
Judge Vitaliano approved the amount of the second settlement and attorneys' fees and referred to me for report and recommendation the amount of costs incurred and the proper allocation of costs to be borne by each plaintiff. See DE 421.
PRIOR PROCEEDINGS The two settlements reached in this case have resulted from years of contentious litigation.1 The first settlement with the City defendants was negotiated after almost three years of intensive fact and expert discovery. The second settlement was reached two years later with the Agency defendants only after completion of more discovery and disposition of a voluminous summary judgment motion filed by the Agency defendants. Suffice to say, the parties expended substantial resources and efforts prior to reaching the two settlements. Nonetheless, review of the costs claimed is appropriate given the magnitude of costs claimed. Unfortunately, the determination of reasonableness of the costs sought and the proper allocation of costs among the plaintiffs has not been an easy task because of the submissions made. In their motion for approval of the first settlement with
1 Besides vigorously contesting the claims brought by the plaintiffs, the City and Agency defendants filed cross claims against each other, as well as third party complaints against Judith Leekins and other persons they claimed, inter alia, assisted Ms. Leekins in perpetrating a fraud against the respective sets of defendants. See DE 36, 87. Both the City defendants and the Agency defendants later advised the Court that they would not pursue their third party claims. See DE 486, 487.
-2-

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the City defendants for $9,700,000.00. plaintiffs' counsel sought reimbursement of costs totaling $1,714,287.60. See DE 383. This amount was not clearly set forth in the motion, but, instead, was mentioned as part of one-page summary of the settlement monies buried in Exhibit 12, one of 17 exhibits attached to the 555 page motion for approval. See DE 383-12 at 35. The settlement summary listed the settlement amounts received by each plaintiff, the total costs claimed by various attorneys and entities, and the amounts to be disbursed to each plaintiff after deduction of costs and attorneys' fees pro rata according to the settlement amounts each plaintiff received. Id. There was no itemization of costs and the summary, as well as subsequent submissions, contained a number of computational or typographical errors.2 At this Court's request, plaintiffs' counsel submitted cost statements identifying the types of expenses incurred and agreed in their submission to waive retention of a $100,000 advance against future costs, which was included as part of the original amount of costs requested, thereby reducing the requested costs to $1,614,287.60. See DE 384.
In his order approving the settlement reached between the plaintiffs and the City defendants, Judge Vitaliano found that the
2 For example, after deducting $1,714,287.60 in claimed costs from the settlement amount, counsel allocated $5,323,834.89 of the remainder for payment to the plaintiffs and $2,661,877.51 for fees. See DE 383-12 at 35. However, the correct amounts based on a 2/3 and 1/3 division should have been $5,323,808.27 and $2,661,904.13. Although a minor computational error, this error and the many other similar errors have contributed to the confusing record presented for review.
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settlement reached and the proposed allocation of costs in proportion to amounts received by each plaintiff was both fair and reasonable and in the best interests of the incapacitated plaintiffs. DE 385 at 3. He also found that the attorneys' fees sought by plaintiffs' counsel based on 33-1/3% of the settlement, after deduction of costs, was appropriate. See DE 385 at 4-5. However, because he found that the costs requested by counsel, which amounted to over 16% of the total settlement, "particularly large both in magnitude and in proportion," he referred the question of the reasonableness and propriety of the requested costs for a report and recommendation. Id. at 5. Judge Vitaliano also ordered that the amount of fees as requested by plaintiffs be disbursed to counsel, along with one-third of the $100,000 advance for costs that counsel had waived. Id. He required that the remaining amount of settlement proceeds claimed as costs by counsel be held in escrow pending report and recommendation by this Court of the appropriate amount to award for costs. Id. at 6. Any amount of disallowed costs would be distributed "two-thirds to the plaintiffs pro rata in the approved proportion and one-third to counsel for attorneys' fees." Id. Following this order, the proceeds of the settlement should have been distributed as follows: $1,614,287.60 held in escrow for costs, $5,390,474.93 paid to plaintiffs and $2,695,237.47 for counsel's fees.3
3 Because the plaintiffs have been neither consistent nor clear (continued...)
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At a conference held on January 8, 2013, this Court requested specific documentation on the claimed costs. See Minute Entry for conference held on 1/8/2013 requiring counsel to supplement submissions. Plaintiffs' counsel subsequently submitted a large binder of documents to support their claimed costs. In the course of further discussions with my chambers, plaintiffs' counsel agreed to drop their claim for costs of $19,129.43, thereby reducing the total costs requested to $1,595,158.17. See DE 497 at 1.
On May 7, 2013, Judge Vitaliano filed an order allowing disbursement of 75% of the settlement funds held in escrow pending determination of the reasonableness of the costs, but requiring the remainder to continue to be held in escrow. See DE 421. As he noted, he authorized the partial release of funds after further consideration and discussions with the undersigned. Id. As I discussed with Judge Vitaliano, plaintiffs' counsel undoubtedly would be entitled to recoupment of a substantial amount for costs in this contentiously litigated case, and, in any event, would be entitled under their retainer agreement to one-third of any costs disallowed. The partial release of funds would afford plaintiffs' counsel access to monies that were likely to be approved for costs, but still sufficiently protect the interests of plaintiffs. As contemplated in the order, release of 75% of the escrow should have
3(...continued) in their submissions as to the amounts held in escrow, this report discusses the amounts that should have been deposited or distributed pursuant to orders of the Court.
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resulted in a disbursement of $1,196,368.63 ($1,595,158.17 x 0.75) to counsel for costs, leaving a balance of $398,789.54 in escrow, not including any interest accrued thereon.4
Following the settlement with the City defendants, the Agency defendants conducted further discovery, but, also proceeded with a motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claims. See DE 434. On January 17, 2014, Judge Vitaliano granted in part the motion of the Agency defendants for summary judgment, dismissing the claims of L.J. and J.G., but denying the motion as to the claims of the other plaintiffs. See DE 475.
The plaintiffs and Agency defendants then agreed to submit to private mediation and reported at a conference on June 25, 2014 that they had reached an agreement to settle. See minute entry dated 6/25/2014. As set forth in plaintiffs' subsequent motion for approval, the Agency defendants agreed to pay a total of $17.5 million to be paid in varying amounts to the plaintiffs, except for L.J. and J.G. See DE 490. On September 11, 2014, Judge Vitaliano approved the amount of the second settlement and attorneys' fees and again referred to me for report and recommendation the amount of costs incurred, which amount would be held in escrow pending
4 According to plaintiffs in their letter dated October 31, 2014, there was $997.52 in interest earned on the escrow. DE 497. Given the relatively small amount of interest involved and the fact it pertains to amounts escrowed for costs that was, or is, likely to be paid in large part to counsel, I have not included any discussion of interest earned on the escrow and recommend that all interest be released to counsel.
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approval of the amount of costs by the Court. See DE 493 at 7. Judge Vitaliano also referred for report and recommendation the amount of costs to be allocated among the plaintiffs, noting that L.J. and J.G. bore a disproportionately larger amount of the costs because they received larger settlements amounts in the settlement with the City defendants, but no share of the settlement with the Agency defendants. Id. at 6-7.
In their motion for approval of the settlement with the Agency defendants (the "second motion"), plaintiffs' counsel seek reimbursement of additional costs incurred since the costs claimed with respect to the first settlement which they set forth in charts in the "attached composite Exhibit H" to the motion. See DE 490 at ¶ 6; DE 490-8. Since the first chart in Exhibit H lists total claimed costs of $341,947.54, see DE 490-8 at 3, the total costs claimed by plaintiffs' counsel in both motions for approval is $1,937,105.71. However, as discussed, plaintiffs' counsel are not consistent in discussing the costs incurred, particularly as to the claimed costs under the first settlement ($1,595,158.17). Nor are they consistent or clear in discussing categories of expenses and in providing supporting documentation.5
5 For example, the total costs set forth summaries attached to plaintiffs' motion with respect to the second settlement appear to be slightly higher than $341,947.54 based on the summary of costs presented by the four sets of plaintiffs' counsel. See DE 480-8 at 3, 27, 105 and 110 (sum of total costs amounting $350,191.13). Also, the amounts listed in the summaries are not always supported by documentation or logs. However, since plaintiffs' counsel seek
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Plaintiffs also seek reallocation of the costs among the
plaintiffs under the first settlement, which were allocated pro
rata according to amounts each was to received under the first
settlement agreement. DE 490 at ¶ 3. Such a reallocation is
required because J.G. and L.J., who each received $3,000,000 under
the first settlement and were assessed over 62% of the costs under
the first settlement,6 did not receive any monies from the second
settlement. DE 490 at ¶ 3. The reallocation is in accordance with
agreements plaintiffs made following the first settlement that
costs would be readjusted pro rata based on the total settlement
amounts received by each plaintiff, in the event of a settlement
5(...continued) only $341,947.54 in additional costs, I will use that amount for purposes of this report.
6 Plaintiffs refer to charts in Exhibit J of their motion for the amounts J.G. and L.J. were each assessed under the first settlement which should be reallocated. DE 490 at ¶ 3, referencing DE 490-10 at 3, 4. The charts indicate that both plaintiffs each paid $529,342.40 in costs for the first settlement. Id. However, that figure bears no relation to other numbers submitted. Under their motion for approval of the first settlement, counsel indicated that J.G. and L.J. were each allocated 30.9278351% of costs. However, plaintiffs claimed in their first motion total costs of $1,714,287.60, and claimed that J.G. and L.G. each was responsible for $530,192.04 in costs. DE 383-12 at 35. However, in Exhibit B to the motion for approval of the second settlement, counsel indicates in the chart entitled "Prorata Share - Original" that the "[a]ctual disbursed amounts of the first settlement" totaled $1,711,540.44 and that J.G. and L.G. each were responsible for $529,342.40 of total costs. DE 480-2. The total costs claimed to have been incurred should not have been $1,711,540.44, since the $1,714,287.60 in costs that plaintiffs' counsel originally sought included a $100,000 advance for future costs that counsel had agreed not to seek. If actual costs sought under the first settlement were for costs paid of $1,614,287.60, the pro rata share of J.G. and L.J. should have been $499,264.20.
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with any remaining defendant. Id. at ¶ 3 and 480-4 (copies of agreements).
In proposing reallocation of costs, plaintiffs' counsel provide information regarding the specific costs chargeable to each plaintiff and the general costs, which would be allocated pro rata among the plaintiffs according to settlement amounts received. While differentiating between client specific costs and general costs is appropriate (though not previously done as to the first settlement), the figures used by plaintiffs are not consistent. In their charts with proposed reallocation of costs filed as Exhibit J to the motion, DE 490-10, plaintiffs list $1,203,452.92 as the total general costs with respect to the first settlement and $358,613.26 as client specific costs, for a total of $1,562,066.18. See DE 490-10 at 3, 4 and 5. This sum is described in column for "Actual Costs" in the first chart entitled "Settlement 1 Reconciliation - Leekin Client Summary."7 Id. at 3. However, $1,562,066.18 is less than any amount plaintiffs previously claimed for costs, and $31,091.99 less than the $1,595,158.17, which is the amount reduced, per counsels' agreement, from the $1,714,287.60 originally claimed.
Counsel also state in the motion for approval that because no
7 The column for "Actual Costs" in is preceded by a column described as "Costs Paid" which lists a total sum of $1,714,287.60, the amount originally sought by plaintiffs in their first motion for approval. See DE 490-19 at 3 and DE 480. As discussed in fn. 7, this $1,714,287.60 figure included a $100,000 advance against future costs.
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recovery was made on behalf of plaintiffs J.G. and L.J. under the second settlement, they would not seek reimbursement of the client specific costs attributable to J.G. and L.J. set forth in Exhibit "I." Id. at 7, referring to DE 490-9. The client specific costs in Exhibit I for J.G. and L.J. total $20,553.85 -- $9,845.19 as to L.G. and $10,708.66 as to J.G. These amounts are not included in the total client specific costs of $201,249.04 claimed by counsel. See DE 490-8 at 3, DE 490-10 at 4.
In discussing the funds escrowed with respect to costs claimed under the first settlement, counsel state in the second motion that the "Court approved costs in the amount of $1,172,091.22, which represented 75% of the costs expended by Plaintiffs' counsel" and that "$390,697.07 was retained in the trust account of the undersigned Plaintiffs' attorneys." DE 480 at ¶ 2. However, as discussed above, because $1,595,158.17 should have been held in escrow and $1,196,368.638 should have been released pursuant to Judge Vitaliano's order, the balance held in escrow should have been $398,789.54.
In response to my continued concerns regarding the magnitude of costs sought, plaintiffs' counsel subsequently revised their request for reimbursement of costs in an amended motion to approve costs and withdrew their request for $280,354.41 in expenses. See
8 If, as plaintiffs' counsel claim, the $1,172,091.22 released constituted 75% of the amount escrowed, then the amount held would have been $1,562,788.29, $32,369.88 less than what should have been maintained.
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DE 496. Specifically, counsel withdrew all requested charges for coding ($71,039.85), document research by Lansler, Kutischek and Schaffer ($13,509.85), Federal Express charges ($11,896.46), copies ($62,967.95), paralegal costs ($2,396.31) and long-distance telephone charges ($1,359.04); and 50% of charges for travel ($103,429.28) and online research ($13,755.67). See DE 497 at 2. Plaintiffs also confirmed that under Judge Vitaliano's order for partial release of escrowed funds, the amount that should have been released was $1,196,368.63, "which constitute[d] 75% of the $1,595,158.17 previously requested as costs[,] leaving a balance in the Plaintiffs' attorneys' trust account of $398,789.54." DE 497. Id. at 3. However, in their amended motion, plaintiffs' counsel mistakenly stated that they are requesting an additional $462,252.00 in costs as to the second settlement and request that "the Court approve costs in the amount of $581,684.65." DE 496 at 4. Plaintiffs subsequently explained in their letter filed on October 31, 2014 that the amended motion contained a number of "scrivener's errors" and that DE 490-8 (Exhibit H) "accurately reflects the costs associated with the second settlement, $341,947.54." DE 497. Plaintiffs also confirmed that the correct number for the funds remaining in escrow for the first settlement costs should have been $398,789.54.9 Id.
9 Unfortunately, the letter of plaintiffs' counsel correcting the prior errors also contains a typographical error and wrongly refers to plaintiffs' proposed cost reduction of $281,354.41, instead of
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As a result counsel's agreement to reduce their request for costs by $280,354.41, the amount of additional costs requested with respect to the second settlement is reduced from $341,947.54 to $61,593.13, and the total costs requested for both settlements is $1,656,651.31. In response to plaintiffs request for a further partial release of the escrow, by order filed July 8, 2015, this court authorized release of $280,354.41 to plaintiff's counsel. DE 514. Thus, the total amount in the escrow for costs should be $460,382.67, not including any accrued interest.
Annexed as Appendix A is a chart setting forth the disbursement of the proceeds of both settlement discussed above, including the amounts that plaintiffs counsel claimed for costs, the reductions in requested costs made, the amounts authorized to be distributed, and the amounts that should be held in escrow.
DISCUSSION Local Civil Rule 83.2 provides that an action on behalf of an infant or incompetent may not be settled without leave of court. "The Court shall authorize payment to counsel for the infant or incompetent of a reasonable attorney's fee and proper disbursements from the amount recovered in such an action . . . and shall
9(...continued) $280,354.41. DE 497 at 2. This typographical error was repeated in counsel's subsequent submission, and counsel again referred to having proposed a reduction in costs of $281,354.41 and claimed costs of $460,380.19 as to the second settlement. See DE 505.
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determine the said fee and disbursements, after due inquiry as to all charges against the fund." Local Civil Rule 83.2. In determining whether to recommend approval of a proposed compromise, the Court's "sole duty is to exercise the most jealous care that no injustice be done to the infant." Anderson v. Sam Airlines, 1997 WL 1179955, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (internal quotation and citation omitted). As mentioned in plaintiffs' motions for approval, J.G., L.G., R.E., S.B. and S.W. are under guardianship, and their settlements, as well as the reallocation of costs, are subject to the Court's approval. See DE 383, 499 at ¶ 5.
As Judge Vitaliano recognized, the costs originally requested in connection with the settlement with the City defendants amounted to more than 16% of the total settlement. If the full amount of the costs sought were allowed, plaintiffs would have received only 50% of the settlement after deduction for fees. However, in light of the additional funds available under the second settlement and costs claimed, as reduced by counsel's agreement, the total costs requested by plaintiffs' counsel is now $1,656,751.73, which is approximately 6.09% of the total settlements. Counsel thus now seek release of $180,028.26 from the $461,380.19 that should still be held in escrow.
As a preliminary matter, this Court notes that reallocation of all the claimed costs among the plaintiffs is appropriate, even though the bulk of the costs claimed were incurred prior to the first settlement. The work performed by plaintiffs' counsel which
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led to the settlement with the City defendants was critical to plaintiffs for the rest of the case, particularly in defending against the summary judgment motion of the Agency defendants, which facilitated settlement discusions with these defendants. In addition, the Court is mindful of the fact that plaintiffs' counsel diligently litigated this case for more than five years and expended significant resources to help plaintiffs who were unable to protect themselves. Besides opposing the summary judgment motion of the Agency defendants, plaintiffs' counsel engaged in extensive discovery, including conducting over 140 depositions, retaining numerous experts, litigating many discovery disputes, and analyzing volumes of documents.
Amount of Reasonable Costs In reviewing the reasonableness of the claimed costs, I will
analyze the total costs claimed for both settlements together. Counsels' agreement to withdraw their claim for $280,354.41 in costs is significant. However, I briefly discuss why I had previously questioned the propriety of a number of those claimed costs.
Coding, Electronic Research. Plaintiffs' counsel sought reimbursement of $71,039.85 for "coding" documents, a cost primarily for inputting data which counsel explains was necessary to enable management and use of the voluminous materials produced in discovery. Costs for data inputting should ordinarily be
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treated as office overhead. Cf. United States v. City of New York, No. 07 CV 2067 (NGG)(RLM), 2013 WL 5542459, at *26 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2013) (finding that word processing is part of routine overhead); Mendez v. Radec Corp., 907 F. Supp. 2d 353, 359-60 (W.D.N.Y. 2012) (treating as overhead cost of temporary or contract workers); In re Bausch & Lomb, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.R.D. 78, 90 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (reducing word processing charges by 50% as overhead expense).
In fee shifting cases where an attorney fee award is based on the number of hours spent working on a case, disbursements that save counsel time should be balanced by the savings achieved in the amount of attorneys' fees. Here, however, since counsel have received over $8.5 million in fees, the cost of measures that save counsel time should, in fairness under the circumstances, be included as a part of counsel's fees rather than charged separately to the client. Similarly, research conducted by attorneys in another firm for work that plaintiffs' counsel would have otherwise performed should not be claimed as a cost and costs for paralegals, which ordinarily are recoverable as part of attorneys fees, should not now be permitted as a cost.
In addition, in this district, costs for electronic research are "routinely disallowed" and found to be "recoverable as a portion of attorney's fees rather than as costs." U.S. v. City of New York, WL 5542459 at *12-13 (citations omitted); Chinatrust Bank (U.S.A.) v. Pinter, 2008 WL 2987152, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 31, 2008)
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(disallowing recovery of electronic research costs). Copying Costs: Plaintiffs' counsel are withdrawing their
claims for all copying costs, which amount to $62,967.95. As the supporting documents submitted in connection with the first settlement reveal, photocopying costs amounted to over $45,000, with Babbitt, Johnson, Osborne and LeClainche, P.A. charging $0.35 per black and white page and $0.75 per color page, and Colodny, Fass, Talenfeld Karlinsky, Abate & Webb charging photocopies at a rate of $0.25 per page. The going rate for copying charges in this Circuit is 10-15 cents per page. See United States v. City of New York, 2013 WL 5542459, at *27; Torres v. Gristede's Operating Corp., 2012 WL 3878144, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Febus v. Guardian First Funding Group, LLC, 870 F. Supp. 2d 337, 341-42 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Robinson v. City of N.Y., 2009 WL 3109846, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). A reduction is appropriate, even though this court would not have recommended complete disallowance of such costs.
Travel costs and meals. Plaintiffs' counsel agree to waive $103,429.28 in travel costs, which they claim represents 50% of all travel costs.10 Plaintiffs were represented by four law firms, three of which are located in Florida and one of which is located
10 From review of the submissions, this court finds that counsel actually claimed travel costs of $246,526.10 - - $194,949.00 based on the "categorical summaries" submitted by the four plaintiffs' firms and supporting documentation with respect to the first settlement and $51,577.12 with respect to the second settlement. See 490-8. Thus, the amount waived by counsel is approximately 41.9% of total travel costs claimed, which may be closer to an appropriate reduction for such expenses.
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in New York. Some of the costs clearly were necessary, but a large portion of the costs incurred resulted from overstaffing for attendance at court conferences and depositions. For example, with respect to the first settlement, Florida counsel made at least at least 12 trips which involved between 4 and 6 attorneys traveling.
This court also expressed concern over expenses unrelated to out-of-town travel of approximately $7,500 claimed by Children's Rights Inc. for local cab fare and meals for late or weekend work, and for travel within New York City for court appearances or meetings. Courts routinely do not permit recovery of local transportation and meal costs and require such costs to be treated as part of overhead. See Merck Eprova AG v. Brookstone Pharmaceuticals, LLC, No. 09 Civ. 9684 (RJS), 2013 WL 3146768, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2013); D.G. v. Yarbrough, 2012 WL 7829602, at *11 (N.D. Okl. 2012), rejected in part on other grounds, D.G. ex rel. Strickland v. Yarbrough, 2013 WL 1343151, at *7-9 (N.D. Okl. 2013) (denying expenses to Children's Rights for meals and taxis for local travel); L.V. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 700 F. Supp. 2d 510, 528 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (meals); Kenny A. v. Perdue, 454 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1292 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (denying Children's Rights' request for reimbursement for meals), vacated on other grounds by 616 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2010); Aiello v. Town of Brookhaven, No. 94-CV-2622 (FB)(WDW), 2005 WL 1397202, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. June 13, 2005) (meals).
Experts: By far the largest expense claimed by plaintiffs'
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counsel is for expert fees, approximately $830,00011 with respect to the first settlement and an additional $155,000 for the second settlement. This Court had previously expressed concern as to the magnitude of fees paid to certain experts, some of whom have prior relationships with counsel. Plaintiffs' counsel do not include in their proposed reduction of $280,354.41 any amount for expert expenses. Instead, counsel point to the difficulty and complexities of the litigation and the fact that defendants' experts charged considerably more. See 490 at 5-6. Notwithstanding the disparity in available resources, plaintiffs' attorneys nonetheless have a obligation to their clients to insure that the amounts charged by experts are reasonable, particularly in this case where the costs for experts would not be recoverable, notwithstanding the fact that attorneys' fees are under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for cases brought under Section 1983. See Davis v. City of New York, No. 10 Civ. 699 (SAS), 2011 WL 4946243 at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (expert witness fees are not recoverable in § 1983 cases because "[p]ursuant to section 1988, courts only have the discretion to tax expert fees as costs in actions brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1981a, not section 1983").
11 This figure is based on the itemized entries in the "categorical" summaries submitted in support of the motion as to the first settlement. Although the Babbitt firm states in its summary that expert expenses amounted to $499,716.65, the separate amounts listed for each expert totals $547,484.27. Notably, this court found that the supporting documentation for some of the experts does not correspond to the amounts claimed.
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While this Court understands that counsel need to insure they have good working relationships with their experts, review of billings should not undermine professional relationships. In fact, some of plaintiffs' experts reduced their charges, including Golda Zimmerman who cut her time charges from $123,960 to $75,000 and Dr. Geoffrey D.P. Kantar, a neuropsychologist who cut his fee from $47,000 to $25,000. Other experts apparently were paid by counsel based on invoices sent. This is, of course, an appropriate practice, but since there was no client independently scrutinizing costs here, I discuss some examples of charges that seem to be high for the services billed.
Plaintiffs' counsel seek recovery of expert fees paid to Paul M. Deutsch, Ph.D, CRC, CCM, CLCP, FIALCP, for evaluating the past and future needs of the plaintiffs based on their individual emotional, psychological, psychiatric, behavioral, educational and social damages. Dr. Deutsch billed for over 500 hours of work at the rate of $350 per hour for testing, reviewing records, and evaluating each plaintiff and $300 per hour for work to "Review & Summarize Medicals," "Nursing Research" and "Medical Research." He charged approximately $155,00012 prior to the first settlement and an additional $20,000 for work through the second settlement. Plaintiffs' counsel has used Dr. Deutsch's services in other cases.
12 Plaintiffs' counsel state in their categorical summary that the amount sought for Dr. Deutsch is $113,085.98, but the invoices submitted total $155,175.
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Setting aside whether there should have been some costs savings by virtue of the fact that Dr. Deutsch produced ten reports for the plaintiffs, some of whom had similar conditions or needs, the time claimed by Dr. Deutsch seems excessive in a number of respects. For example, Dr. Deutsch conducted testing of the plaintiffs at a hotel where he and staff stayed in Port St. Lucie, Florida from September 1, 2008 through September 6, 2008. He requested reimbursement for his time for a trip of 300 miles13 and charged a total of 15 hours of travel time, pro rated at 1.5 hours among each plaintiff, all at the $350 rate. This is too high for the distance traveled. Also, since Doctor Deutsch billed for over 25 hours of time on September 2 and 15 hours on September 4, 2008, Dr. Deutsch clearly did not perform all the work billed. There is no indication who performed the work and whether the work billed for services rendered by persons other than Dr. Deutsch was properly billed at a $350 rate. In addition, the costs billed for photocopying on the separate invoices for each plaintiff were often billed at the same flat rate. The invoices for seven plaintiffs billed on or before October 7, 2008 each contained a charge of $50 for photocopying and subsequent invoices for the same plaintiff or other plaintiffs contained additional or higher charges. Since
13 Mileage of 300 miles for round trip travel is consistent with my independent research that Port St. Lucie is approximately 130 miles from Dr. Deutsch's office in Oviedo.
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photocopying charges were substantially more than $100 for almost all the plaintiffs, aggregate charges for photocopying were high.
Mark E. Safarik, a retired FBI agent with the Behavioral Analysis Unit, was retained as a rebuttal expert witness who submitted invoices total $59,865.00, including expenses (though plaintiffs claim that they paid Mr. Safarik $59,665.50). In any event, Mr. Safarik billed for 172.5 hours of work at $350 per hour, except for travel time which was billed at $275 per hour. Besides billing primarily in increments of an hour or quarter of an hour (as did a number of other if plaintiffs' experts), Mr. Safarik billed 33 hours to prepare for his eight hour deposition and an additional eight hours to review the transcript of his deposition. This amount of time seems high, particularly for someone who undoubtedly has had experience and training in testifying.
Henry Gunn, III was retained as an expert on child welfare systems and conducted an analysis of policies and practices of the New York City child welfare system from 1984-1999. Counsel paid Mr. Gunn $92,475 for 616.5 hours at the rate of $150 per hour. However, there is no description contained in Dr. Gunn's invoices describing what he did for those 616.5 hours charged. Absent such an explanation, the Court cannot make any meaningful determination whether the amount sought is reasonable.
Peg Hess was retained as an expert to conduct an analysis of the plaintiffs' case records and the laws, regulations and standards of care applicable to the New York City foster care and
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adoption system during the relevant time period. Plaintiffs seek reimbursement of $134,495 for approximately 772.50 hours out of 838.5 hours she charged for her time and 465 hours for her research assistant. While this court is hesitant to criticize a clearly qualified expert for having expended too much time on a complex report requiring review of vast amounts of material, the hours spent for the time period involved seem high, particularly for some of the work billed. For example, in addition to the 66 hours for which counsel are not seeking reimbursement for preparation by Ms. Hess for her deposition in December 2011, Ms. Hess billed 63 hours for preparing for her deposition in February deposition and 30 hours for one in March 2012.
There may very well be a adequate explanation for all the charges billed by plaintiffs' experts. However, on the record presented, this court cannot be confident that plaintiffs' counsel, who were in the best position to review the invoices of their experts, sufficiently monitored the bills with the interests of plaintiffs in mind. Likewise, this court cannot be certain, given the many discrepancies in the numbers presented by plaintiffs' counsel, what amounts were actually incurred.
One notable discrepancy is the lower claim for costs as to the first settlement reflected in the charts plaintiffs' counsel presented in proposing the reallocation of costs. See DE 490-4, 490-10 at 3-5. As discussed, in segregating general from client specific costs for each plaintiff, plaintiffs' counsel claim
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general costs of $1,203,452.92 and client specific costs of

$358,613.26 with respect to the first settlement. Id. The sum of

these two numbers is $1,562,066.18, which is $31,091.99 less than

the adjusted amount of $1,595,158.17 previously claimed. Since the

plaintiffs' counsel presumably reviewed all of the client specific

and general costs in compiling the numbers reflected in the charts,

this court assumes that the charts reflect counsel's latest

assessment of costs incurred. Thus, I recommend that the Court

accept the lower number of $1,562,066.18 for costs incurred as to

the first settlement.

This recommended reduction of $31,091.99, together with the

$280,354.41 in costs that counsel agreed to waive, total

$311,446.00. Such a reduction is approximately 16% of the

$1,937,105.71. Based on my review of the records presented, I find

that such a reduction would sufficiently address the concerns over

costs discussed above. Thus, I recommend that this Court award

plaintiffs' counsel total costs of $1,625,659.31 calculated as

follows:

Claimed Costs: Settlement 1 Claimed Costs: Settlement 2
Total Costs Claimed Partial waiver of costs Additional recommended reduction Recommended Costs to Award

$1,595,158.17 + 341,947.54 1,937,105.71 (280,354.41) (31,091.99)
$1,625,659.31

Since $1,476,723.04 should have already been distributed to counsel for costs, counsel are entitled to receive an additional
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$148,936.27 in costs from the escrow. The $311,446.40 remaining in escrow should be divided between counsel and the plaintiffs in accordance with the retainer agreements signed -- $103,815.47 to counsel and $207,630.93 to the plaintiffs, pro rata according to total settlements amounts to be received.
Reallocation of Costs I set forth in Appendix B a chart of the costs that should be
allocated to each plaintiff and amounts distributed to plaintiffs and counsel based on the foregoing recommendation. In this Appendix B, I have utilized the client specific costs for the first and second settlements presented by plaintiffs ($358,613.26 and $201,249.04, respectively). Because of the recommend reduction in total allowable costs, the total general costs on the chart is $1,065,797.01, which represents the difference between the recommended amount of allowable costs of $1,625,659.31, less the client specific costs claimed of $559,862.30.
Last, given the proposed reallocation of costs, I recommend, should the Court accept this report and recommendation, that plaintiffs' counsel be required to file a further report regarding the disposition of all the settlement funds to insure and payments are properly made and costs are properly allocated among the plaintiffs. I do not make any recommendations in Appendix B as to actual amount of the costs to be reallocated among plaintiffs given the uncertainties discussed above regarding the amounts actually
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held in escrow and distributed. The corrections made by counsel as the amounts that should be in escrow is troubling, since the determination of the amount in escrow should be a straightforward task.
In this regard, I note a further discrepancy and error in the submissions as to the amounts of funds paid to each plaintiff in the first settlement which likely stem from counsel's use of the original amount of costs claimed of $1,714,287.60, rather than the reduced claim, which does not include the advance for future costs previously discussed. In the charts concerning reallocation, plaintiffs' counsel indicates that $1,647,388.28 was the "Actual (amount) Paid" to J.G. and L.G. based on $1,714,287.60, see DE 49010 at 4, while plaintiffs' earlier chart in the motion for approval of the first settlement indicates that the disbursement amount for these plaintiffs is $1,646,546.87. Thus, I recommend that plaintiffs' counsel be required in their report to provide an accounting of all the settlement funds, including the amounts held in escrow, the distributions made to each plaintiff and counsel, and a proper calculation of the amounts of costs and settlement proceeds to be reallocated to each plaintiff.
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CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully recommend that the Court award plaintiffs' counsel total costs of $1,625,659.31 and that settlement proceeds be distributed between plaintiffs and their counsel as set forth in Appendix A. I further recommend approval of the reallocation of costs among plaintiffs in proportion to their pro rata share of the settlement as set forth in Appendix B. Assuming that the principal amount of funds held in escrow is $460,382.67 and that funds were released as contemplated, counsel are entitled to receive a payment from the escrow of $148,936.27 as costs and that the $311,446.40 remaining in escrow should be divided between counsel and the plaintiffs in accordance with the retainer agreements signed - - $103,815.47 to counsel and $207,630.93 to the plaintiffs, pro rata according to total settlements amounts to be received. I further recommend that any interest earned on the escrow be released to counsel. Last, I recommend that counsel be required file a report regarding the distribution of settlement funds within two weeks of disposition of this report and recommendation. Copies of this report and recommendation will be filed via Electronic Case Filing ("ECF") on this date. Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Court by February 20, 2017, and courtesy copies be provided to Judge Vitaliano. Failure to file objections within the specified time
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waives the right to appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

SO ORDERED.

Dated:

Brooklyn, New York February 5, 2017

/s/ MARILYN D. GO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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 Nat.  Union  Fire  Ins.  Co.  of  Pittsburgh,  PA  v.  The  Roman...,  2017  WL  748834  (2017)  

  

  
  

2017 WL 748834 (N.Y.Sup.), 2017 N.Y. Slip Op. 30368(U) (Trial Order) Supreme Court of New York. New York County
**1 NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, PA, Illinois National Insurance Company, Plaintiffs, v.
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN, City Of New York, A Municipal Corporation, Administration for Children’s Services f/k/a Child Welfare Administration, St. Joseph Services For Children, Inc. f/k/a Catholic Child Care Society of the Diocese of Brooklyn, Inc., Heart Share Human Services Of New York, Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, Inc. f/k/a Catholic Guardian Society of the Diocese of Brooklyn, Inc.,
Sco Family of Services, Inc. f/k/a St. Christopher-Ottile, Westchester Fire Insurance Company, In Its Own Capacity and as Successor-In-Interest To International Insurance Company, The National Catholic Risk Retention Group, Inc., Defendants.
No. 653575/2014. February 27, 2017.
Decision/Order

Hon. Cynthia Kern, J.

*1 Plaintiffs National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA (“National Union”) and Illinois National Insurance Company (“Illinois National”) have commenced the present action to recover over $24 million they paid to defend and settle a lawsuit brought against the City of New York and three foster care agencies affiliated with The Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn (the “Diocese”); St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. f/k/a Catholic Child Care Society of the Diocese of Brooklyn, Inc. (“SJSC”); Heart Share Human Services of New York, Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, Inc. f/k/a Catholic Guardian Society of the Diocese of Brooklyn, Inc. (“HHS”); SCO Family of Services, Inc. f/k/a St. Christopher-Ottilie (“SCO”) (collectively, the “agencies”). National Union and Illinois National have now brought the present motion for partial summary judgment seeking a declaration that the $24 million they paid to defend the City and defend and indemnify the agencies in the underlying lawsuit must be allocated pro rata to the twenty- **2 two annual periods of potential exposure between 1985 and 2007 -- the years in which the claimants allege that they were abused. They also seek a declaration that, after the required pro rata allocation, the Diocese must satisfy a $250,000 SIR for each occurrence that resulted in bodily injury to each claimant during a particular policy period.

The relevant background of this action is as follows. In 2009, ten individuals who had been placed as foster children in the home of Judith Leekin (the “claimants”) filed a lawsuit alleging abuse in her home in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The lawsuit alleged that the City and the agencies negligently placed ten children in the foster care home of Judith Leekin, where they suffered years of abuse. SCO placed one foster child in 1986, the City placed two children in 1988, SJSC placed five children between 1989 and 1992, and HHS placed two children in 1994. S.B. was placed with Leekin by SCO on May 9, 1986; LJ. was placed with Leekin by the City on March 17, 1988; J.G. was placed with Leekin by the City on September 30, 1988; S.W. was placed with Leekin by SJSC on June 28, 1989; R.E. was placed with Leekin by SJSC on March 27, 1992; J.B. was placed with Leekin by SJSC on December 5, 1992; C.B. was placed with Leekin by SJSC on December 5, 1992; T.G. was placed with Leekin by SJSC on December 5, 1992; T.L. was placed with Leekin by HHS on July 15, 1994; and J.L. was placed with Leekin by HHS on July 15, 1994.

In the underlying lawsuit, the claimants allege that they each suffered horrific abuse and neglect while in Leekin’s custody at each of the various locations where they resided and that they were abused by Leekin until they were removed from her custody in July 2007, or in J.B.’s case, escaped in 2004. The plaintiffs alleged that the agency defendants failed to properly screen Leekin as a potential foster parent, monitor plaintiffs while they were in Leekin’s care or undertake their duties in connection with investigating Leekin prior to plaintiffs’ adoptions and that the defendants’ reckless indifference to their

  

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duties and to plaintiffs led to plaintiffs’ fraudulent adoption and abuse by Leekin. S. W. v. City of New York, 46 F. Supp. 3d 176 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). Plaintiffs brought claims against the agency defendants for violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1983 (the “1983” claims) as well as for common law negligence. Id. The agency defendants made a motion for summary judgment in the lawsuit to dismiss all of the 1983 and negligence **3 claims. The federal court dismissed three of the eight claimant’s negligence claims as untimely but held that the negligence claims of the remaining five claimants were timely. Id. The court also denied the motion for summary judgment dismissing the 1983 claims of the eight claimants who had been placed by the agency defendants. Id.

*2 In the underlying lawsuit, the claimants filed a Rule 56.1 statement in opposition to the motion, which detailed the individual acts of abuse suffered by each of them over the years. The claimants alleged that they suffered abuse from the time of their placement in Leekin’s custody until the time they were removed from her custody in July 2007, with the exception of J.B., who was abused until he allegedly escaped from Leekin in November 2004. According to their Rule 56.1 statement, each of the claimants was originally placed with Leekin at a residence she owned in Laurelton, Queens, New York. In 1998, Leekin moved the ten claimants from New York to Florida, where she relocated them in various houses over the following years. The claimants alleged they were beaten, handcuffed, zip-tied, humiliated, threatened, secreted from the public, locked up in a basement or garage, deprived of education, denied medical treatment and starved. While all claimants alleged this type of abuse, each claimant allegedly endured independent abusive acts that varied widely, was unique to each claimant, and occurred at different times and locations over many years.

National Union and Illinois National issued a series of sixteen commercial general liability policies to the Diocese for consecutive annual policy periods between September 1, 1985 and August 31, 2001 (the “policies”). The policies cover the insured’s liability for bodily injury as long as it: (a) is caused by an “occurrence,” (b) takes place during the policy period; and (c) is otherwise covered under the terms and conditions of the policies. NCRRG issued six policies to the Diocese that were in effect between September 1, 2001 and September 1, 2007. Each of the sixteen National Union and Illinois National policies contains a Self-Insured Retention (SIR) Endorsement (per occurrence) that states the insurance will apply “excess of a $250,000 Self-Insured Retention.”

Subject to a reservation of their rights, National Union and Illinois National agreed to defend the agencies and the City against the underlying lawsuit. To date, National Union and Illinois National have paid $3,737,431 to defend the City and $3,558,198 to date to defend the agencies. National Union and **4 Illinois National began paying the City’s and agencies’ defense costs after the Diocese paid the first $250,000 of defense costs, representing the equivalent of a single SIR. The Diocese asserted that it need only pay one SIR in connection with the underlying lawsuit. National Union and Illinois National disputed that position and advised the Diocese and agencies that their SIR obligations would not be satisfied until at least one $250,000 SIR was exhausted for each claimant, per occurrence, under each relevant policy. National Union and Illinois National agreed to advance the costs of defending and settling the case. As a result, the Diocese, the agencies, National Union and Illinois National entered into an Interim Funding/Non-Waiver Agreement. Under that agreement, National Union and Illinois National agreed to advance money to the City and agencies to defend and/or settle the underlying lawsuit, subject to a mutual reservation of rights and National Union’s and Illinois National’s right to recoup from the Diocese and/or the agencies any amounts advanced if it was later determined that those amounts either fell within the Diocese’s SIR obligations or otherwise were not owed by National Union or Illinois National. In June 2014, with the consent of the Diocese and the agencies, National Union and Illinois National agreed to advance, under a reservation of rights, a total of $17.5 million to settle the claims against the agencies by eight of the ten claimants, with payments allocated paying $2 million to each of the eight claimants. Plaintiffs then commenced the present action seeking a declaration with respect to the payments they have expended for defense and settlement costs and have brought the present motion for partial summary judgment with respect to these issues.

In a case involving the same parties as the present litigation, the Court of Appeals addressed many of the issues present in this litigation. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, 21 N.Y.3d 139(2013). The issue to be determined in that case was the apportionment of liability for a settlement between the Diocese and a minor plaintiff in an underlying civil action charging sexual molestation by a priest. The court there held that the incidents of sexual abuse by the same priest against the same plaintiff over a number of years constituted multiple occurrences and that any potential liability should be apportioned among the several insurance policies, pro rata. The complaint in that case, as amplified by the bill of particulars, alleged that the priest sexually abused the plaintiff on **5 several occasions from 1996 through 2002 and that the molestation took place in several locations. The Diocese settled the

  

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action brought against it for $2 million and then demanded reimbursement from its insurance company National Union for the cost of the settlement. National Union had provided primary insurance to the Diocese and issued three consecutive one-year commercial general liability insurance policies for August 31, 1995 to August 31, 1996; August 31, 1996 to August 31, 1997; and August 31, 1997 to August 31,1998. Another insurance company provided insurance coverage for the next three years from August 31, 1998 to August 31, 2001. The policies issued by National Union provided coverage for damages resulting in bodily injury during the policy period and a $250,000 self-insured retention (SIR) applicable to each occurrence. National Union moved for partial summary judgment in that action, *3 “seeking an order that the incidents of sexual abuse in the underlying action constituted a separate occurrence in each of the seven implicated policy periods, and required the exhaustion of a separate $250,000 SIR for each occurrence covered under a policy from which the Diocese sought coverage. National Union also sought a ruling requiring that the $2 million settlement be paid on a pro rata basis across each of the seven policies. In opposition, the Diocese argued that the sexual abuse constituted a single occurrence requiring the exhaustion of only one SIR, and that allocation of liability should be pursuant to a joint and several allocation methods, under which the entire settlement amount could be paid for with National Union’s 1995-1996 and 1996-1997 policies.”

Id. at 145.

The Court of Appeals granted the relief requested by National Union, holding that the several acts of sexual abuse constituted multiple occurrences, rather than a single occurrence. Id. at 147. According to the court, absent policy language indicating an intent to aggregate separate incidents into a single occurrence, the “unfortunate event” test should be applied to determine how occurrences are categorized for insurance coverage purposes. Id. at 148. The application of this test “requires consideration of ‘whether there is a close temporal and spatial relationship between the incidents giving rise to injury or loss, and whether the incidents can be viewed as part of the same causal continuum, without intervening agents or factors.’ ” Id. at 149. Applying the unfortunate event test, the court found that the incidents of sexual abuse constituted multiple occurrences as they spanned a six-year period and occurred in multiple locations, thereby lacking the requisite temporal and spatial closeness to join the incidents. Id. The court specifically rejected the argument by the Diocese that the acts of sexual abuse were one occurrence because they constituted **6 “continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions”, as defined in the policies. Id. at 150. As a result of the court’s finding that the incidents of sexual abuse constituted separate occurrences, the court found that the Diocese was required to exhaust the SIR for each occurrence that transpired within an implicated policy from which it sought coverage. Id. at 153.

In Int’l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc. v. Royal Insurance Company of America, 46 A.D.3d 224 (1st Dept 2007), the First Department applied the unfortunate event test to a situation where there were multiple claimants who were injured as a result of exposure to a hazardous ingredient in the plaintiff’s butter at the factory where they worked. The court there held, in the context of a summary judgment motion, that the insurance company was entitled to a declaration that each of the personal injury claims in the underlying action constituted a separate occurrence under the policy definition subject to a separate SIR. The court found that “ ‘occurrence,’ as defined in the policy as ‘an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions,’ does not reflect the parties’ intent to aggregate the individual claims for the purpose of subjecting them to a single policy deductible.” Id. at 227. According to the court, the exposure of numerous persons to a hazardous condition cannot be deemed a single occurrence in the absence of any identifiable precipitating event or accident. Id. at 261.

In the present case, the court must initially determine whether to apply the unfortunate event test to determine how many occurrences there were. As the Court of Appeals held in Diocese, the unfortunate event test should be applied to determine how occurrences are categorized for insurance coverage purposes unless there is policy language indicating an intent to aggregate separate incidents into a single occurrence. Diocese, 21 N.Y.3d at 148. In the present case, there is no policy language indicating an intent to aggregate the separate incidents into a single occurrence. The argument by the Diocese that the language in the policy regarding “continuous or repeated exposures to conditions” constitutes such language is without basis. The Court of Appeals in Diocese of Brooklyn specifically rejected the argument by the Diocese that the acts of sexual abuse were one occurrence because they constituted “continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions”, as defined in the policies. Id. at 150. The court considered the identical language that the Diocese is relying on here concerning “continued or repeated **7 exposure to conditions” and found that “nothing in the language of the policies, nor the definition of ‘occurrence,’ evinces an intent to aggregate the incidents of sexual abuse into a single occurrence.” Diocese of Brooklyn, 21 N.Y.3d at 149. According to the court:

  

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*4 ...[S]exual abuse does not fit neatly into the policies’ definition of “continuous or repeated exposure” to “conditions.” This “sounds like language designed to deal with asbestos fibers in the air, or lead-based paint on the walls, rather than with priests and choirboys. A priest is not a ‘condition’ but a sentient being.

Diocese of Brooklyn, 21 N.Y.3d at 151. See also Int’l. Flavors & Fragrances, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 46 A.D.3d 224, 232 (1st Dep’t 2007) (holding that a definition incorporating the “continuous or repeated exposure to conditions” language did not reflect an intent “to aggregate [] individual underlying claims.”)

Because the policies do not contain any provision that allows for the “grouping” of the underlying injuries, New York’s “unfortunate event” test applies to determine the number of occurrences. See Diocese, 21 N.Y.3d at 148. Under the unfortunate event test, the inquiry is “whether there is a close temporal and spatial relationship between the incidents giving rise to injury or loss, and whether the incidents can be viewed as part of the same causal continuum, without intervening agents or factors.” Id. The “unfortunate event” test focuses on “the nature of the incident[s] giving rise to damages” to the claimant, rather than other factors such as the theory of liability asserted. Id. at 150.

Applying the unfortunate event test, the court finds that the abuse suffered by each of the claimants in the underlying lawsuit do not share the “requisite temporal and spatial closeness to join the incidents” into a single occurrence under New York’s unfortunate event test. Diocese, 21 N.Y.3d at 149. Rather, the incidents of abuse suffered by each of the claimants constituted multiple occurrences and there was at least one “occurrence” per claimant per policy period because the injuries suffered by each claimant were unique to that claimant in a given policy year and caused by separate incidents. Each of the claimants were abused individually through independent acts committed against the individual claimant. The abuse inflicted on each claimant, at different times and in different locations, caused an injury unique to each of them in each period during which they were abused. Just as the plurality found in Diocese of Brooklyn that the separate **8 acts of sexual abuse perpetrated in unique locations and interspersed over an extended period of time should not be grouped into one occurrence, the abuse of each of the individual claimants in this case, which was perpetrated in several locations, involved many different types of abuse and occurred over a very extended period of time, should also not be grouped into one occurrence. As a result, National Union and Illinois National are entitled to a declaration that the Diocese must satisfy a separate $250,000 SIR, per occurrence, in each policy period for each claimant who was abused during that period.

The decision relied upon by the Diocese and agency defendants to support their argument that there should be no more than one SIR per policy period despite the fact that there were multiple victims of abuse, is inapposite. Nesmith v. Allstate Ins. Co., 24 N.Y.3d 520 (2014). In that case, the Court of Appeals held that in a situation where members of different families were successively exposed to lead paint in the same apartment, the insurer’s maximum total liability is only one policy limit. The policy in that case, unlike the policy in the present case, specifically provided that “all bodily injury [resulting] from continuous or repeated exposure to the same general conditions is considered the result of one accidental loss.” Id. at 523-524. Thus, there was specific policy language indicating an intent to aggregate separate incidents into a single occurrence, precluding the use of the unfortunate event test. In the instant case, however, there is no policy language indicating an intent to aggregate the separate acts of abuse into a single occurrence.

*5 Based on this court’s finding that there were multiple occurrences rather than a single occurrence, the court must next determine the issue of allocation of the defense and settlement costs among the various policies. This exact issue was addressed by the Court of Appeals in Diocese of Brooklyn. The court there found that the allocation of liability should be on a pro rata basis, thereby limiting “an insurer’s liability to all sums incurred during the policy period.” Id. at 153-154. According to the court, assuming that the plaintiff suffered bodily injury in each policy year, “it would be consistent to allocate liability across all implicated policies, rather than holding a single insurer liable for harm suffered in years covered by other successive policies.” Id.

In the instant case, as in Diocese of Brooklyn, the court finds that the allocation of defense and settlement costs should be on a pro rata basis, allocated to the twenty-two annual periods of potential **9 exposure between 1985 and 2007, which is the years in which the claimants in the underlying action were allegedly abused and suffered bodily injury. During this twenty-two year period, there were sixteen National Union and Illinois National policy periods, plus the six one-year periods between 2001 and 2007. Initially, the total amount paid in settlement to each of the eight underlying claimants should be allocated pro rata to each annual period during which the claimant was injured, based on their date of placement until the time that they were removed. All of the costs paid to defend both the City and the agencies in the underlying lawsuit must be

  

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divided equally among all ten claimants and the one tenth share attributed to each claimant must be allocated for that claimant across all potentially triggered annual policy periods from the time that the claimant was placed until that claimant was removed or escaped.

The court next addresses the argument by the Diocese and the agency defendants that the policies in effect after 1996 should not be implicated for purposes of allocating the amounts paid by plaintiffs towards defense and settlement of the agencies’ liability because the court in the underlying action found that there were no wrongful acts by the agency defendants after the claimants were adopted by Leekin. The court finds that there is no merit to this argument as the federal court denied the motion for summary judgment by the agency defendants which sought to dismiss that portion of the plaintiffs’ claims to recover for post adoption abuse as time barred. S. W. v. City of New York, 46 F. Supp. 3d 176 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). The federal court specifically found that the claims of the eight plaintiffs placed by the agency defendants for post adoption abuse were timely under their 1983 cause of action and that five of the eight plaintiffs had timely interposed negligence claims for their post adoption abuse. Id. There is absolutely no indication in the decision of the federal court in the underlying action that the court was holding that the defendants were not legally responsible for any harm caused by post adoption abuse. When the court made the statement that there were no wrongful acts by the agency defendants post adoption, the court was merely determining when the common law negligence claim accrued for statute of limitations purposes for the purpose of analyzing whether there was a continuing wrong. Id. at 191-192. The court was not making any determination that the agency defendants were not legally responsible for the harm allegedly suffered by the plaintiffs after they were adopted by Leekin. Based on the foregoing, it is appropriate for this court to **10 allocate the settlement and defense costs to the post-adoption policies because there is a reasonable basis to conclude that the agencies might have been liable for those injuries which occurred post adoption as such injuries were a natural consequence of the alleged actions by the agency defendants in failing to properly screen Leekin as a potential foster parent, monitor plaintiffs while they were in Leekin’s care or undertake their duties in connection with investigating Leekin prior to plaintiffs’ adoptions.

*6 With respect to this court’s analysis of the decision by the Court of Appeals in Diocese of Brooklyn, the Diocese argues that the decision by the Court of Appeals should not be given any precedential value because it is based on a three judge plurality opinion of the Court of Appeals while National Union and Illinois National argue that the decision is binding because all five judges agreed that the language of the policies require pro rata allocation and a majority of the court agreed that bodily injuries arising from abuse to a claimant during separate policy periods were caused by at least one occurrence per policy period. The court finds that a majority of the court found that there was at least one occurrence per policy period as the plurality held that that injuries to a single claimant in a particular policy period were caused by more than one occurrence while the concurrence held that that only one occurrence per policy period caused the injuries. However, even if the court did not agree about whether a majority of the court found that there was at least one occurrence per policy period, the court would still follow the determination of the plurality.

The argument by the Diocese and the agencies that plaintiffs’ motion must be denied on the ground that it fails to offer any admissible evidence in support of the facts asserted and instead relies solely on Federal Rule 56.1 statements filed in the underlying action is without basis. For purposes of the present action, plaintiffs are not required to prove that the abuse alleged in the underlying action actually occurred or that there were in fact multiple acts of abuse over many years. To the contrary, all that they need to establish is that the plaintiffs in the underlying action alleged that these events occurred and there was a settlement of the action, agreed to by all parties including the Diocese, based on the existence of these allegations. This is in fact exactly what occurred in the Court of Appeals case commenced by the Diocese against National Union and Illinois National. The decision by the Court of Appeals deciding that there were multiple occurrences occurring over the years of abuse was solely based on the complaint in the underlying **11 action as amplified by the bill of particulars. There was no proof before the court that the sexual abuse had actually occurred and no such determination had ever been made as the Diocese settled the underlying action before there was ever any determination of liability in that case. What was relevant in that case, and the present case between the same parties, was that all parties had agreed to settle the lawsuit based on the allegations in the complaint and that a determination had to be made whether the settlement amount represented a loss for one occurrence or multiple occurrences under the language of the insurance policies. Even assuming, arguendo, that proof of the abuse was required, the Federal Court Judge in the underlying lawsuit specifically noted in his decision determining the agency defendants’ summary judgment motion that the agency defendants did not dispute plaintiffs’ accounts of their experience in Leekin’s custody. S. W. v. City of New York, 46 F. Supp. 3d 176, 185 ft. 5 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).

To the extent the Diocese and the agency defendants contends that summary judgment should be denied pursuant to CPLR §

  

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3212(f) because discovery remains outstanding, such argument is unavailing. It is well settled that “a claimed need for discovery, without some evidentiary basis indicating that discovery may lead to relevant evidence, is insufficient to avoid an award of summary judgment.” Hariri v. Amper, 51 A.D.3d 146, 152 (1st Dept 2008).

The Diocese and agency defendants argue that summary judgment is premature as they require discovery concerning the underwriting of the policies, the plaintiffs’ handling of the Diocese’s claim for coverage and claims involving other insureds under other policies. However, defendants have failed to establish that discovery of any of this information will lead to the relevant evidence as they cannot demonstrate any ambiguity in the policy language which would allow for the admission of any extrinsic evidence. Initially, the defendants do not require the underwriting information to oppose the motion because the policy language at issue is unambiguous, as a result of which extrinsic evidence is not admissible to interpret it. See, e.g., W2001Z/15 CPW Realty, LLC v. Lexington Ins. Co., 127 A.D.3d 643, 643 (1st Dep’t 2015) (holding that the court correctly excluded extrinsic evidence when the policies were unambiguous). The principal issues to be determined in this motion are whether certain policies are implicated because bodily injury took place “during the policy period,” and the number of “occurrences” **12 under each policy for purposes of the Diocese’s self-insured retentions. With respect to the interpretation of the language of the policies providing coverage for bodily injury “during the policy period’, there is no ambiguity. Similarly, there is no ambiguity with respect to the term occurrence contained in the policies and the Court of Appeals interpreted the same exact definition of occurrence without resort to any extrinsic evidence. See Diocese of Brooklyn, 21 N.Y.3d at 144, note 1.

*7 The decision relied upon by the Diocese to argue that additional discovery is required is inapposite. See Mr. McKinley Ins. Co. v. Corning Inc., 96 A.D.3d 451 (1st Dep’t 2012). Unlike the policies in the present case, the policies in that case contained language which specifically addressed the grouping of multiple claims arising out of exposures to asbestos into one occurrence. The policies specifically stated that bodily injury arising out of continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general conditions shall be considered as arising out of one occurrence. It was because of this specific grouping language in the policy that the court found discovery was required before the number of occurrences into which the underlying claims can be grouped may be determined. Id. at 453. Since the National Union and Illinois National policies do not contain any such language, the court is required to apply the unfortunate event test to determine the number of occurrences. See Diocese of Brooklyn, 21 N.Y.3d at 148.

There is also no basis for the claim by the Diocese and the agency defendants that they require discovery with respect to plaintiffs’ claims handling information. Any information in the claims handling file would not be admissible to interpret the unambiguous provisions in the policy. The only dispute before the court is how many occurrences there were under the policies and how the expenses should be allocated and the claims handling file will not provide any information that will resolve the issue. Similarly, any discovery about the handling by plaintiffs of other claims which are not the subject of this lawsuit is not necessary to interpret the unambiguous provisions of the insurance policies.

Based on the foregoing, it is hereby declared and adjudged that that the $24 million plaintiffs National Union and Illinois National paid to defend the City and defend and indemnify the agencies in the underlying lawsuit must be allocated pro rata to the twenty-two annual periods of potential exposure between 1985 and 2007 -- the years in which the claimants allege that they were abused and that after the **13 required pro rata allocation, the Diocese must satisfy a $250,000 SIR for each occurrence that resulted in bodily injury to each claimant during a particular policy period. Settle order.

DATE: 2/27/17

<<signature>>

KERN, CYNTHIA S., JSC

  

  

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 U.S. District Court Eastern District of New York (Brooklyn) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:09−cv−01777−ENV−JO

CLOSED

S.W. et al v. City of New York et al Assigned to: Judge Eric N. Vitaliano Referred to: Magistrate Judge James Orenstein
Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go (Settlement) Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 04/29/2009 Date Terminated: 07/21/2017 Jury Demand: Defendant Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

S.W. by and through his guardian, Renee Marquis−Abrams

represented by Ami Romanelli Babbitt, Johnson, Osborne & Le Clainche, PA 1641 Worthington Road Suite 100 West Palm Beach, FL 33409 561−684−2500 Fax: 561−684−6308 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Howard M. Talenfeld Colodny, Fass, Talenfeld, Karlinsky & Abate, P.A. 100 S.E. 3rd Avenue 23rd Flr. Fort Lauderdale, FL 33394 954−492−4010 Fax: 954−492−1144 Email: htalenfeld@cftlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John Walsh 3067 Commercial Blvd. Fort Lauderdale, FL 33308 954−491−3130 Fax: 954−772−2099 Email: jjwalshlaw@gmail.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jordan K. Merson Kramer, Dillof, Livingston & Moore 217 Broadway New York, NY 10007 212−267−4177 Fax: 212−233−8525 Email: jmerson@kdlm.com TERMINATED: 02/04/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew Gaier Kramer, Dillof, Livingston & Moore 217 Broadway, 10th Floor New York, NY 10007 212−267−4177

Fax: 212−233−8525 Email: mgaier@kdlm.com TERMINATED: 02/04/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theodore Babbitt Babbitt, Johnson, Osborne & Le Clainche, P.A. 1641 Worthington Road Ste. 100 P.O. Box 4426 West Palm Beach, FL 33402−4426 561−684−2500 Fax: 561−684−6308 Email: tedbabbitt@babbitt−johnson.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas A. Moore Kramer, Dillof, Livingston & Moore 217 Broadway New York, NY 10007 212−267−4177 Fax: 212−233−8525 Email: tmoore@kdlm.com TERMINATED: 02/04/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marcia Lowry 84 Fifth Avenue New York, NY Email: MLowry@Childrensrights.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa Cohen Children's Rights 330 Seventh Ave Fourth Floor New York, NY 10001 (212)683−2210 Fax: (212)683−4015 TERMINATED: 04/22/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shirim Nothenberg Children's Rights 330 Seventh Avenue Fourth Floor New York, NY 10001 212−683−2210 Fax: 212−683−4015 Email: Snothenberg@childrensrights.org TERMINATED: 05/23/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephan A. Le Clainche Babbitt, Johnson, Osborne & Le Clainche, P.A. 1641 Worthington Road, Suite 100 West Palm Beach, FL 33409 561−684−2500 Fax: 561−684−6308

Plaintiff
J.L. by and through their next friend Mildred Del Grosso

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Lambiase Children's Rights 330 Seventh Ave Fourth Floor New York, NY 10001 (212)683−2210 Fax: (212)683−4015 TERMINATED: 09/27/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William A. Kapell Children's Rights 330 7th Avenue 4th Floor New York, NY 10001 212−683−2210 Fax: 212−683−4015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Ami Romanelli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jordan K. Merson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/04/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Howard M. Talenfeld (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John Walsh (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marcia Lowry (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew Gaier (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/04/2010 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/22/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shirim Nothenberg (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/23/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Lambiase (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/27/2011

Plaintiff
S.B. by and through their guardian, Patricia Baldwin also known as S.B. and R.E.

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theodore Babbitt (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas A. Moore (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/04/2010 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William A. Kapell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Ami Romanelli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Howard M. Talenfeld (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John Walsh (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jordan K. Merson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/04/2010 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marcia Lowry (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew Gaier (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/04/2010 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/22/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shirim Nothenberg (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/23/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Lambiase (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/27/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theodore Babbitt (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
L.J. by and through their guardian, Kevin Hendrickson also known as L.J. and J.G.

Thomas A. Moore (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/04/2010 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William A. Kapell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Ami Romanelli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Howard M. Talenfeld (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John Walsh (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jordan K. Merson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/04/2010 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marcia Lowry (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew Gaier (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/04/2010 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/22/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shirim Nothenberg (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/23/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Lambiase (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/27/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theodore Babbitt (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas A. Moore (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/04/2010 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff J.B.
Plaintiff C.B.

William A. Kapell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Ami Romanelli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Howard M. Talenfeld (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John Walsh (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jordan K. Merson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/04/2010 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marcia Lowry (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew Gaier (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/04/2010 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/22/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shirim Nothenberg (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/23/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Lambiase (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/27/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theodore Babbitt (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas A. Moore (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/04/2010 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William A. Kapell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by

Plaintiff T.L.

Ami Romanelli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Howard M. Talenfeld (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John Walsh (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jordan K. Merson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/04/2010 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marcia Lowry (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew Gaier (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/04/2010 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/22/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shirim Nothenberg (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/23/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Lambiase (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/27/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theodore Babbitt (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas A. Moore (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/04/2010 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William A. Kapell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Ami Romanelli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
J.G. by and through their guardian, Kevin Hendrickson

Howard M. Talenfeld (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John Walsh (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jordan K. Merson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/04/2010 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marcia Lowry (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew Gaier (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/04/2010 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/22/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shirim Nothenberg (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/23/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Lambiase (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/27/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theodore Babbitt (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas A. Moore (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/04/2010 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William A. Kapell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Ami Romanelli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Howard M. Talenfeld (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John Walsh (See above for address)

Plaintiff
R.E. by and through their guardian, Patricia Baldwin

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jordan K. Merson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/04/2010 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marcia Lowry (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew Gaier (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/04/2010 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa Cohen Children's Rights 330 Seventh Ave Fourth Floor New York, NY 10001 (212)683−2210 Fax: (212)683−4015 TERMINATED: 04/22/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shirim Nothenberg (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/23/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Lambiase Children's Rights 330 Seventh Ave Fourth Floor New York, NY 10001 (212)683−2210 Fax: (212)683−4015 TERMINATED: 09/27/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theodore Babbitt (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas A. Moore (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/04/2010 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William A. Kapell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Ami Romanelli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Howard M. Talenfeld (See above for address)

Plaintiff
T.G. by and through their next friend Mildred Del Grosso

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John Walsh (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jordan K. Merson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/04/2010 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marcia Lowry (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew Gaier (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/04/2010 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/22/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shirim Nothenberg (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/23/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephan A. Le Clainche (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Lambiase (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/27/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theodore Babbitt (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas A. Moore (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/04/2010 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William A. Kapell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Ami Romanelli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theodore Babbitt Babbitt, Johnson, Osborne & Le Clainche, P.A. Suite 100

V.
Defendant
City of New York a municipal corporation

1641 Worthington Road P O Box 4426 West Palm Beach, FL 33409 561−684−2500 Fax: 561−684−6408 Email: tedbabbitt@babbitt−johnson.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Howard M. Talenfeld Colodny, Fass, Talenfeld, Karlinsky & Abate, P.A. One Financial Plaza, 23rd Floor 100 Se 3rd Avenue 23rd Floor Fort Lauderdale, FL 33394 954−492−4010 Fax: 954−492−1144 Email: htalenfeld@cftlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/22/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shirim Nothenberg (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/23/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Lambiase (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/27/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William A. Kapell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Bruce Michael Strikowsky Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP 140 Broadway Suite 3100 New York, NY 10005 212−973−8000 Fax: 212−972−8798 Email: bstrikowsky@schnader.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carl Judah Schaerf Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP 140 Broadway Suite 3100 New York, NY 10005 212−973−8000 Fax: 212−972−8798 Email: cschaerf@schnader.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Administration for Children's Services formerly known as Child Welfare Administration
Defendant St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. a New York Corporation formerly known as Catholic Child Care Society of the Diocese of Brooklyn, Inc.

Matthew James Kelly Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP 140 Broadway Suite 3100 New York, NY 10005−1101 (212)973−8000 Fax: (212)972−8798 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thaddeus Jeremiah Hackworth New York City Law Department 100 Church Street, Room 2−165 New York, NY 10007 212−788−1165 Fax: 212−788−0877 Email: thackwor@law.nyc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Allison Naomi Fihma Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP 140 Broadway Suite 3100 New York, NY 10005−1101 212−973−8161 Fax: 212−972−8798 Email: afihma@schnader.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Bruce Michael Strikowsky (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carl Judah Schaerf (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew James Kelly (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Allison Naomi Fihma (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jeremy S Rosof Shaub, Ahmuty, Citrin & Spratt, LLP 1983 Marcus Avenue Suite 260 Lake Success, NY 11042 516−488−3300 Fax: 516−488−2324 Email: jrosof@sacslaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Judd Cohen

Shaub, Ahmuty, Citrin & Spratt, LLP 1983 Marcus Avenue New Hyde Park, NY 11042 (516)488−3300 Fax: (516)488−2324 Email: jcohen@sacslaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marc J. Citrin Shaub, Ahmuty, Citrin & Spratt, L.L.P. 655 3rd Avenue 28th Floor New York, NY 10017 212−599−8200 Fax: 212−599−7765 Email: mcitrin@sacslaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven J. Ahmuty , Jr. Shaub, Ahmuty, Citrin & Spratt, L.L.P. 77 Water Street, Suite 702 New York, NY 10005 212−599−8200 Fax: 212−599−7765 Email: sahmuty@sacslaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Timothy Robert Capowski Shaub, Ahmuty, Citrin & Spratt 1983 Marcus Avenue Lake Success, NY 11042 516−488−3300 Fax: 516−488−2324 Email: tcapowski@sacslaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William G. Spratt Shaub, Ahmuty, Citrin & Spratt, L.L.P. 1983 Marcus Avenue, Suite 260 Lake Success, NY 11042 516−488−3300 Fax: 516−488−2324 Email: wsprat@sacslaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam S. Covitt Shaub, Ahmuty, Citrin & Spratt, LLP 1983 Marcus Avenue, Suite 260 Lake Success, NY 11042 516−488−3300 Fax: 516−488−2324 Email: acovitt@sacslaw.com TERMINATED: 12/20/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Craig Garrett Bienstock Shaub Ahmuty Citrin & Spratt 10 Liberty Street New York, NY 10005 (212)599−8200

Fax: (212)850−5545 Email: cbienstock@sacslaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deirdre E Tracey Shaub, Ahmuty, Citrin & Spratt, LLP 1983 Marcus Avenue Suite 260 New Hyde Park, NY 11042 516−488−3300 Fax: 516−488−2324 Email: dtracey@sacslaw.com TERMINATED: 12/22/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John D. Paterniti Shaub, Ahmuty, Citrin & Spratt, L.L.P. 77 Water Street, Suite 702 New York, NY 10005 212−599−8200 Fax: 212−850−5545 Email: jpaterniti@sacslaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Juan C. Gonzalez Shaub, Ahmuty, Critrin & Spratt, LLP 77 Water Street, Suite 702 New York, NY 10005 212−599−8200 Fax: 212−850−5545 Email: jgonzalez@sacslaw.com TERMINATED: 03/03/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Margo O'Donnell Gallagher Conway, Farrell, Curtin & Kelly, P.C 48 Wall Street 20th Floor New York, NY 10005 212−785−2929 Fax: 212−785−7229 Email: mgallagher@conwayfarrell.com TERMINATED: 10/26/2012
Ralph Vincent Morales Shaub, Ahmuty, Citrin & Spratt, LLP 1983 Marcus Avenue, Ste 260 Lake Success, NY 11042 516−488−3300 Fax: 516−488−2324 Email: rmorales@sacslaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Boccio Shaub Ahmuty Citrin & Spratt LLP 1983 Marcus Avenue Suite 260 New Hyde Park, NY 11042 516−488−3300 Fax: 516−488−2324 Email: rboccio@sacslaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Scott Delmond Conway, Farrell, Curtin & Kelly, P.C.

Defendant
Heartshare Human Services a New York Corporation formerly known as Catholic Guardian Society of the Diocese of Brooklyn, Inc.

48 Wall Street, 20th Floor New York, NY 10005 212−785−2929 Fax: 516−255−4640 Email: rdelmond@conwayfarrell.com TERMINATED: 10/26/2012
Robert Ortiz Shaub, Ahmuty, Citrin & Spratt, LLP 1983 Marcus Avenue Suite 260 Lake Success, NY 11042 516−326−7181 Fax: 516−488−2324 Email: rortiz@sacslaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven I. Rubin Shaub Ahmuty Citrin & Spratt LLP 77 Water Street New York, NY 10005 (212) 660−3436 Fax: (212) 599−7765 Email: srubin@sacslaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jeremy S Rosof (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Judd Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marc J. Citrin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven J. Ahmuty , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Timothy Robert Capowski (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William G. Spratt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam S. Covitt (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/20/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Craig Garrett Bienstock (See above for address)

Defendant
SCO Family of Services a New York Corporation formerly known as St. Christopher−Ottilie

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deirdre E Tracey (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/22/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John D. Paterniti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Juan C. Gonzalez (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/03/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Margo O'Donnell Gallagher (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/26/2012
Ralph Vincent Morales (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Boccio (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Scott Delmond (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/26/2012
Robert Ortiz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven I. Rubin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jeremy S Rosof (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Judd Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marc J. Citrin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven J. Ahmuty , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Timothy Robert Capowski (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

ThirdParty Defendant
Thelma Bowes TERMINATED: 01/09/2015

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William G. Spratt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam S. Covitt (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/20/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Craig Garrett Bienstock (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deirdre E Tracey (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/22/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John D. Paterniti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Juan C. Gonzalez (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/03/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Margo O'Donnell Gallagher (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/26/2012
Ralph Vincent Morales (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Boccio (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Scott Delmond (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/26/2012
Robert Ortiz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven I. Rubin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Sonya A Smith−Valentine Valentine Legal Group, LLC POB 56 Oxon Hill, MD 20750 301−513−9500 Fax: 866−301−9155 Email: sonya@valentinelegal.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

ThirdParty Defendant
Vontrell Leekin also known as Vontrell/Stephan Leekin
ThirdParty Defendant
Barbara Raikes also known as Barbara G. Raikes/Smith also known as Barbara Smith
ThirdParty Defendant
Vontrell Leekin also known as Vontrell/Stephan Leekin also known as Stephanie Leekin
Cross Defendant
Barbara Raikes also known as Barbara G. Raikes/Smith also known as Barbara Smith
Cross Defendant
Vontrell Leekin also known as Vontrell/Stephan Leekin also known as Stephanie Leekin
Cross Defendant
Vontrell Leekin also known as Vontrell/Stephan Leekin also known as Stephanie Leekin
Cross Defendant
Barbara Raikes also known as Barbara G. Raikes/Smith also known as Barbara Smith
Cross Defendant
Desmond Leekin
Cross Defendant
Judith Leekin
Cross Defendant
Anthony Vernon Leekin
Cross Defendant
Anthony Vernon Leekin

Cross Defendant Desmond Leekin Cross Defendant Judith Leekin Cross Defendant Carol Leekin Interested Party Social Security Administration of the United States
Interested Party National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA Interested Party Illinois National Insurance Company Cross Claimant St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. a New York Corporation

represented by Kathleen Anne Nandan United States Attorneys Office Eastern District of New York 271 Cadman Plaza East Brooklyn, NY 11201−1820 (718) 254−6409 Fax: (718) 254−6081 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jeremy S Rosof (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Judd Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marc J. Citrin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven J. Ahmuty , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Timothy Robert Capowski (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William G. Spratt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam S. Covitt (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/20/2016

Cross Claimant
Heartshare Human Services a New York Corporation

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Craig Garrett Bienstock (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deirdre E Tracey (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/22/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John D. Paterniti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Juan C. Gonzalez (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/03/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ralph Vincent Morales (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Boccio (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Scott Delmond (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/26/2012
Robert Ortiz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven I. Rubin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jeremy S Rosof (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Judd Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marc J. Citrin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven J. Ahmuty , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Timothy Robert Capowski (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Cross Claimant
SCO Family of Services a New York Corporation

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William G. Spratt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam S. Covitt (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/20/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Craig Garrett Bienstock (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deirdre E Tracey (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/22/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John D. Paterniti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Juan C. Gonzalez (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/03/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Margo O'Donnell Gallagher (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/26/2012
Ralph Vincent Morales (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Boccio (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Scott Delmond (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/26/2012
Robert Ortiz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven I. Rubin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jeremy S Rosof (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Judd Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marc J. Citrin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven J. Ahmuty , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Timothy Robert Capowski (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William G. Spratt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam S. Covitt (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/20/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Craig Garrett Bienstock (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deirdre E Tracey (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/22/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John D. Paterniti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Juan C. Gonzalez (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/03/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Margo O'Donnell Gallagher (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/26/2012
Ralph Vincent Morales (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Boccio (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Scott Delmond (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/26/2012
Robert Ortiz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven I. Rubin

V. Cross Defendant City of New York a municipal corporation Cross Claimant Administration for Children's Services
Cross Claimant City of New York a municipal corporation
V. Cross Defendant Heartshare Human Services a New York Corporation

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Thaddeus Jeremiah Hackworth (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Bruce Michael Strikowsky (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carl Judah Schaerf (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Bruce Michael Strikowsky (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carl Judah Schaerf (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thaddeus Jeremiah Hackworth (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jeremy S Rosof (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Judd Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marc J. Citrin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven J. Ahmuty , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cross Defendant
SCO Family of Services a New York Corporation

Timothy Robert Capowski (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William G. Spratt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam S. Covitt (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/20/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Craig Garrett Bienstock (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deirdre E Tracey (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/22/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John D. Paterniti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Juan C. Gonzalez (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/03/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Margo O'Donnell Gallagher (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/26/2012
Ralph Vincent Morales (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Boccio (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Scott Delmond (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/26/2012
Robert Ortiz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven I. Rubin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jeremy S Rosof (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Judd Cohen

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marc J. Citrin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven J. Ahmuty , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Timothy Robert Capowski (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William G. Spratt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam S. Covitt (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/20/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Craig Garrett Bienstock (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deirdre E Tracey (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/22/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John D. Paterniti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Juan C. Gonzalez (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/03/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Margo O'Donnell Gallagher (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/26/2012
Ralph Vincent Morales (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Boccio (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Scott Delmond (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/26/2012
Robert Ortiz (See above for address)

Cross Defendant
St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. a New York Corporation

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven I. Rubin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jeremy S Rosof (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Judd Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marc J. Citrin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven J. Ahmuty , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Timothy Robert Capowski (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William G. Spratt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam S. Covitt (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/20/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Craig Garrett Bienstock (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deirdre E Tracey (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/22/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John D. Paterniti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Juan C. Gonzalez (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/03/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ralph Vincent Morales (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cross Defendant Administration for Children's Services
ThirdParty Plaintiff Administration for Children's Services
ThirdParty Plaintiff City of New York a municipal corporation
V. ThirdParty Defendant Judith Leekin Broward Correctional Institution 20421 Sheridan Street Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33332−2300 DC# K76752

Robert Boccio (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Scott Delmond (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/26/2012
Robert Ortiz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven I. Rubin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Bruce Michael Strikowsky (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carl Judah Schaerf (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Bruce Michael Strikowsky (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carl Judah Schaerf (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Bruce Michael Strikowsky (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carl Judah Schaerf (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thaddeus Jeremiah Hackworth (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

ThirdParty Defendant Desmond Leekin ThirdParty Defendant Anthony Vernon Leekin ThirdParty Defendant Carol Leekin
ThirdParty Defendant Ishmattie Nagassar/Asman TERMINATED: 01/09/2015
ThirdParty Defendant Anita Lexame ThirdParty Defendant Ralph Squitteri TERMINATED: 10/08/2010
ThirdParty Defendant Rhonda Morgan 451 Fulton Ave, Apt 327 Hempstead, NY 11550 ThirdParty Defendant Edwin Gould Services for Children TERMINATED: 01/09/2015
ThirdParty Defendant

represented by Kevin J. Brennan Conway, Farrell, Curtin and Kelly, P.C. 48 Wall Street, 20th Floor New York, NY 10005 212−993−9356 Email: kjbrennan@dwyerbrennan.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Ishmattie Nagassar/Asman 105−12 103rd Road Ozone Park, NY 11417 PRO SE
represented by Charles E. Kutner 110 East 59th Street 25th Floor New York, NY 10022 (212)308−0210 Fax: (212)308−0213 Email: ckutneresq@gmail.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Richard Eniclerico Lester Schwab Katz & Dwyer, LLP 120 Broadway New York, NY 10271 212−341−4207 Fax: 212−267−5916 Email: RENICLERICO@LSKDNYLAW.COM ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas A. Catalano Lester, Schwab, Katz & Dwyer, LLP 100 Wall Street New York, NY 10005 (212) 341−4298 Fax: (212) 267−5916 Email: TCatalano@LSKDNYLAW.COM ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sabrina Collins ThirdParty Defendant Lystra Lewis ThirdParty Defendant Mia Karenga ThirdParty Defendant Cheryl Jack
ThirdParty Defendant Claudette Jackson ThirdParty Defendant Theresa Smith ThirdParty Plaintiff SCO Family of Services a New York Corporation

represented by Cheryl Jack 805 SW Regency Drive Oak Harbor, WA 98277 PRO SE
represented by Jeremy S Rosof (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Judd Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marc J. Citrin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven J. Ahmuty , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Timothy Robert Capowski (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William G. Spratt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam S. Covitt (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/20/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Craig Garrett Bienstock (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deirdre E Tracey

ThirdParty Plaintiff
St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. a New York Corporation

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/22/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John D. Paterniti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Juan C. Gonzalez (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/03/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Margo O'Donnell Gallagher (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/26/2012
Ralph Vincent Morales (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Boccio (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Scott Delmond (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/26/2012
Robert Ortiz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven I. Rubin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jeremy S Rosof (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Judd Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marc J. Citrin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven J. Ahmuty , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Timothy Robert Capowski (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William G. Spratt

ThirdParty Plaintiff
Heartshare Human Services a New York Corporation

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam S. Covitt (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/20/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Craig Garrett Bienstock (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deirdre E Tracey (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/22/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John D. Paterniti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Juan C. Gonzalez (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/03/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ralph Vincent Morales (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Boccio (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Scott Delmond (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/26/2012
Robert Ortiz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven I. Rubin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jeremy S Rosof (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Judd Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marc J. Citrin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven J. Ahmuty , Jr.

V. ThirdParty Defendant

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Timothy Robert Capowski (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William G. Spratt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam S. Covitt (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/20/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Craig Garrett Bienstock (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deirdre E Tracey (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/22/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John D. Paterniti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Juan C. Gonzalez (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/03/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Margo O'Donnell Gallagher (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/26/2012
Ralph Vincent Morales (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Boccio (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Scott Delmond (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/26/2012
Robert Ortiz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven I. Rubin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thelma Bowes TERMINATED: 01/09/2015
ThirdParty Defendant Sabrina Collins ThirdParty Defendant Claudette Jackson ThirdParty Defendant Mia Karenga ThirdParty Defendant Anthony Vernon Leekin ThirdParty Defendant Carol Leekin
ThirdParty Defendant Desmond Leekin ThirdParty Defendant Judith Leekin ThirdParty Defendant Lystra Lewis ThirdParty Defendant Ishmattie Nagassar/Asman TERMINATED: 01/09/2015
ThirdParty Defendant Theresa Smith ThirdParty Defendant Ralph Squitteri TERMINATED: 10/08/2010
ThirdParty Defendant Anita Lezame Cross Defendant Thelma Bowes TERMINATED: 01/09/2015
Cross Defendant Sabrina Collins

represented by Sonya A Smith−Valentine (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Kevin J. Brennan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Ishmattie Nagassar/Asman (See above for address) PRO SE
represented by Charles E. Kutner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Sonya A Smith−Valentine (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cross Defendant Edwin Gould Services for Children TERMINATED: 01/09/2015
Cross Defendant Claudette Jackson Cross Defendant Mia Karenga Cross Defendant Lystra Lewis Cross Defendant Anita Lexame Cross Defendant Theresa Smith ThirdParty Defendant Cheryl Jack
ThirdParty Defendant Rhonda Morgan Cross Defendant Thelma Bowes TERMINATED: 01/09/2015
Cross Defendant Sabrina Collins Cross Defendant Claudette Jackson Cross Defendant Mia Karenga Cross Defendant Lystra Lewis Cross Defendant Anita Lexame Cross Claimant Edwin Gould Services for Children TERMINATED: 01/09/2015

represented by Richard Eniclerico (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED Thomas A. Catalano (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Cheryl Jack (See above for address) PRO SE
represented by Sonya A Smith−Valentine (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Richard Eniclerico (See above for address)

V. Cross Defendant Cheryl Jack Cross Defendant Rhonda Morgan Cross Defendant Ralph Squitteri TERMINATED: 10/08/2010
Cross Claimant Ishmattie Nagassar/Asman TERMINATED: 01/09/2015
V. Cross Defendant Cheryl Jack Cross Defendant Theresa Smith Cross Defendant Ralph Squitteri TERMINATED: 10/08/2010
Cross Defendant Rhonda Morgan Cross Defendant Carol Leekin
Cross Defendant Ishmattie Nagassar/Asman TERMINATED: 01/09/2015
ThirdParty Defendant Edwin Gould Services for Children TERMINATED: 01/09/2015

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED Thomas A. Catalano (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Charles E. Kutner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Ishmattie Nagassar/Asman (See above for address) PRO SE
represented by Charles E. Kutner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Kevin J. Brennan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Ishmattie Nagassar/Asman (See above for address) PRO SE
represented by Richard Eniclerico (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED Thomas A. Catalano (See above for address)

Cross Claimant
SCO Family of Services a New York Corporation

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jeremy S Rosof (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Judd Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marc J. Citrin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven J. Ahmuty , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Timothy Robert Capowski (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William G. Spratt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam S. Covitt (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/20/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Craig Garrett Bienstock (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deirdre E Tracey (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/22/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John D. Paterniti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Juan C. Gonzalez (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/03/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Margo O'Donnell Gallagher (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/26/2012
Ralph Vincent Morales (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cross Claimant
St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. a New York Corporation

Robert Boccio (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Scott Delmond (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/26/2012
Robert Ortiz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven I. Rubin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jeremy S Rosof (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Judd Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marc J. Citrin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven J. Ahmuty , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Timothy Robert Capowski (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William G. Spratt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam S. Covitt (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/20/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Craig Garrett Bienstock (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deirdre E Tracey (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/22/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John D. Paterniti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cross Claimant
Heartshare Human Services a New York Corporation

Juan C. Gonzalez (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/03/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ralph Vincent Morales (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Boccio (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Scott Delmond (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/26/2012
Robert Ortiz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven I. Rubin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jeremy S Rosof (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Judd Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marc J. Citrin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven J. Ahmuty , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Timothy Robert Capowski (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William G. Spratt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam S. Covitt (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/20/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Craig Garrett Bienstock (See above for address)

V. Cross Defendant Administration for Children's Services
Cross Defendant City of New York a municipal corporation
Cross Claimant Edwin Gould Services for Children TERMINATED: 01/09/2015

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deirdre E Tracey (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/22/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John D. Paterniti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Juan C. Gonzalez (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/03/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Margo O'Donnell Gallagher (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/26/2012
Ralph Vincent Morales (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Boccio (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Scott Delmond (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/26/2012
Robert Ortiz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven I. Rubin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Bruce Michael Strikowsky (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carl Judah Schaerf (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Thaddeus Jeremiah Hackworth (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Richard Eniclerico (See above for address)

V. Cross Defendant Thelma Bowes TERMINATED: 01/09/2015
Cross Defendant C.B.

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas A. Catalano (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Sonya A Smith−Valentine (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Ami Romanelli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Howard M. Talenfeld (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John Walsh (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jordan K. Merson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/04/2010 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marcia Lowry (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew Gaier (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/04/2010 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa Cohen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shirim Nothenberg (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/23/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Lambiase (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/27/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theodore Babbitt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas A. Moore (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/04/2010

Cross Defendant Sabrina Collins
Cross Defendant Heartshare Human Services a New York Corporation

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William A. Kapell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jeremy S Rosof (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Judd Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marc J. Citrin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven J. Ahmuty , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Timothy Robert Capowski (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William G. Spratt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam S. Covitt (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/20/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Craig Garrett Bienstock (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deirdre E Tracey (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/22/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John D. Paterniti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Juan C. Gonzalez (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/03/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Margo O'Donnell Gallagher

Cross Defendant Cheryl Jack Cross Defendant Claudette Jackson Cross Defendant Mia Karenga Cross Defendant Anthony Vernon Leekin Cross Defendant Carol Leekin
Cross Defendant Desmond Leekin Cross Defendant Judith Leekin Cross Defendant Judith Leekin DC# K76752 Cross Defendant Vontrell Leekin Cross Defendant Lystra Lewis Cross Defendant Anita Lexame

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/26/2012 Ralph Vincent Morales (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED Robert Boccio (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED Robert Scott Delmond (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/26/2012 Robert Ortiz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED Steven I. Rubin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Kevin J. Brennan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cross Defendant Anita Lezame
Cross Defendant Rhonda Morgan
Cross Defendant Ishmattie Nagassar/Asman TERMINATED: 01/09/2015
Cross Defendant Barbara Raikes
Cross Defendant SCO Family of Services a New York Corporation

represented by Jeremy S Rosof (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Judd Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marc J. Citrin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven J. Ahmuty , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Timothy Robert Capowski (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William G. Spratt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam S. Covitt (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/20/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Craig Garrett Bienstock (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deirdre E Tracey (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/22/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John D. Paterniti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cross Defendant Theresa Smith
Cross Defendant St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. a New York Corporation

Juan C. Gonzalez (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/03/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Margo O'Donnell Gallagher (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/26/2012
Ralph Vincent Morales (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Boccio (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Scott Delmond (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/26/2012
Robert Ortiz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven I. Rubin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jeremy S Rosof (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Judd Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marc J. Citrin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven J. Ahmuty , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Timothy Robert Capowski (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William G. Spratt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Adam S. Covitt (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/20/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Craig Garrett Bienstock (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deirdre E Tracey (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/22/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John D. Paterniti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Juan C. Gonzalez (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/03/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ralph Vincent Morales (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Boccio (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Scott Delmond (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/26/2012
Robert Ortiz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven I. Rubin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 04/29/2009
04/29/2009 04/29/2009 04/29/2009 04/29/2009

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against City of New York, Administration for Children's Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc., Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services $ 350 Disclosure Statement on Civil Cover Sheet completed −yes,, filed by L.J. and J.G., J.B., C.B., T.L., S.W., J.L., S.B. and R.E.. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet) (Bowens, Priscilla) (Entered: 04/30/2009)
Summons Issued as to City of New York, Administration for Children's Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc., Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services. (Bowens, Priscilla) (Entered: 04/30/2009)
3 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice as to Howard M. Talenfeld by L.J. and J.G., J.B., C.B., T.L., S.W., J.L., S.B. and R.E.. (Brucella, Michelle) (Entered: 05/05/2009)
4 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice as to John Walsh by L.J. and J.G., J.B., C.B., T.L., S.W., J.L., S.B. and R.E.. (Brucella, Michelle) (Entered: 05/05/2009)
5 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice as to Theodore Babbitt by L.J. and J.G., J.B., C.B., T.L., S.W., J.L., S.B. and R.E.. (Brucella, Michelle) (Entered: 05/05/2009)

04/29/2009 04/30/2009 05/07/2009 05/07/2009 05/07/2009 05/19/2009 05/20/2009 05/27/2009 05/29/2009 06/01/2009 06/01/2009 06/02/2009
06/05/2009
06/08/2009 06/10/2009

6 FILING FEE re 3 , 4 , 5 : $ 75.00 paid; Receipt # 366134. (Brucella, Michelle) (Entered: 05/05/2009)
2 NOTICE of Change of Firm/address/email by Jordan K. Merson (Merson, Jordan) (Entered: 04/30/2009)
7 ORDER granting 3 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice as to Howard M. Talenfeld. Ordered by Judge Eric N. Vitaliano on 5/7/2009. (Brucella, Michelle) (Entered: 05/07/2009)
8 ORDER granting 4 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice as to John Walsh. Ordered by Judge Eric N. Vitaliano on 5/7/2009. (Brucella, Michelle) (Entered: 05/07/2009)
9 ORDER granting 5 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice as to Theodore Babbitt. Ordered by Judge Eric N. Vitaliano on 5/7/2009. (Brucella, Michelle) (Entered: 05/07/2009)
10 STIPULATION EXTENDING TIME TO ANSWER by Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services (Attachments: # 1 Stipulation Extending Time to Answer) (Gallagher, Margo) (Entered: 05/19/2009)
ORDER: The 10 Stipulation extending the time of defendants SCO Family of Services and Heartshare Human Services defendant to answer or otherwise respond to the complaint by 6/18/09 is "so ordered." Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 5/20/2009. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 05/20/2009)
11 MOTION for Default Judgment as to Defendants City of New York, Administration for Children's services and St. Joseph Services for Children Inc. by L.J. and J.G., J.B., C.B., T.L., S.W., J.L., S.B. and R.E.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Summons and Complaint, # 2 Exhibit Affidavits of Service) (Merson, Jordan) (Entered: 05/27/2009)
12 STIPULATION Extending Defendant St. Joseph's Time To Answer and Withdrawing Plaintiffs' Motion for Default Judgment as against Defendant St. Joseph by St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc., Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services (Attachments: # 1 Stipulation) (Gallagher, Margo) (Entered: 05/29/2009)
13 Letter MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 11 MOTION for Default Judgment as to Defendants City of New York, Administration for Children's services and St. Joseph Services for Children Inc., 1 Complaint, or Otherwise Respond by City of New York. (Hackworth, Thaddeus) (Entered: 06/01/2009)
ORDER: The 12 Stipulation extending the time to 6/18/09 for defendant St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. to answer and withdrawing Plaintiffs' motion for Default Judgment as against said defendant St. Joseph is "so ordered." Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 6/1/2009. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 06/01/2009)
14 RESPONSE to Motion re 13 Letter MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 11 MOTION for Default Judgment as to Defendants City of New York, Administration for Children's services and St. Joseph Services for Children Inc., 1 Complaint, or Otherwise ResponLetter MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 11 MOTION for Default Judgment as to Defendants City of New York, Administration for Children's services and St. Joseph Services for Children Inc., 1 Complaint, or Otherwise Respon filed by all plaintiffs. (Merson, Jordan) (Entered: 06/02/2009)
15 SCHEDULING ORDER: Initial Conference set for 6/19/2009 02:30 PM before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go. The 13 Letter MOTION of defendant City of New York, Administration for Children's Services for Extension of Time to File Answer and plaintiffs' 11 MOTION for Default Judgment as to said defendant will be discussed at this conference.Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 6/5/2009. (DeVeaux, Yvonne) (Entered: 06/05/2009)
16 NOTICE of Appearance by Robert Scott Delmond on behalf of St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc., Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services (notification declined or already on case) (Delmond, Robert) (Entered: 06/08/2009)
17 Letter Confirming Adjournment of Initial Conference from June 19, 2009 at 2:30 p.m. to June 29, 2009 at 11:30 a.m. by St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc., Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services (Gallagher, Margo) (Entered: 06/10/2009)

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06/29/2009 06/30/2009
07/07/2009 07/08/2009 07/15/2009

18 ANSWER to 1 Complaint,, CROSSCLAIM against City of New York by St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc., Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services. (Delmond, Robert) (Entered: 06/16/2009)
19 DISCLOSURE of Interested Parties by St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc., Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services. (Delmond, Robert) (Entered: 06/16/2009)
20 DISCLOSURE of Interested Parties by St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc., Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services. (Delmond, Robert) (Entered: 06/16/2009)
21 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice as to Jennifer M. Pearl by S.W.. (Talenfeld, Howard) (Entered: 06/26/2009)
ORDER granting 21 Motion of Jennifer M. Pearl for Leave to Appear pro hac vice, subject to payment of the $25.00 admission fee within 10 business days after receipt of this order. After payment, the admitted attorney is permitted to argue or try this action in whole or in part as counsel or advocate for plaintiffs. When paying the fee by mail or in person, the attorney must present a copy of this electronic Order to the Clerk's Office with the required fee. Appearance of counsel in this case will then be entered on the Court's docket and a notation of the attorney's admission pro hac vice will be made on this Court's roll of attorneys. If the attorney admitted pro hac vice is not registered for Electronic Case Filing ("ECF") with this Court, she must register for ECF or submit an application for exemption within two weeks of the date of this order. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 6/26/2009. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 06/26/2009)
22 NOTICE of Appearance by Carl Judah Schaerf on behalf of City of New York, Administration for Children's Services (aty to be noticed) (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 06/29/2009)
Minute Order for for Initial Conference Hearing, Motion for Default Judgment 11 and Motion for Extension of Time to Answer 13 held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on June 29, 2009.Appearances by Thomas Moore, Thomas Babbitt, Jennifer Pearl, Jordan Merson, John Walsh for plaintiffs; Carl Schaerf, Bruce Strikowsky, Thaddeus Hackworth and Abigail Goldenberg for City of New York; Robert Delmond for agency defendants. Plaintiffs agreed to withdraw their motion for entry of default against the City of New York. With plaintiffs' consent, the City defendant's motion to extend the time to answer is granted and the time to file an answer extended to 8/7/09. Schedule established pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b) as follows: (1) defendants are given leave, with consent, to file a third party complaint by 9/15/09; (2) plaintiffs' depositions must be taken no later than 11/20/09 and remaining fact discovery completed by 3/24/10; (3) damages expert report(s) and disclosures must be served by plaintiffs by 6/29/09 and by defendants by 1/15/10; (4) liability expert report(s) and disclosures must be served by plaintiffs by 12/15/10 and defendants by 2/26/10. Applying federal law in light of the federal claims herein, the Court finds that the privacy interests protected under the Social Services Law and other state laws raised by the City defendant are outweighed by the probative value of the records sought and adequacy of protections afforded under an appropriate protective order. See King v. Conde, 121 F.R.D. 180, 187 (E.D.N.Y. 1988). Pending issuance of a formal protective order, counsel for the parties shall maintain the confidentiality of the records produced herein and may not disclose them to other persons, except for experts who also agree to so limit dissemination and disclosure. The parties should promptly provide the court with a proposed protective order. Next conference scheduled for November 13, 2009 at 11:30 a.m. (Tape #FTR 11:45−12:46; 12:51−12:57 and ESR B09/22 1109 − 09/23 263.) (DeVeaux, Yvonne) (Entered: 06/30/2009)
23 NOTICE of Appearance by Bruce Michael Strikowsky on behalf of City of New York, Administration for Children's Services (aty to be noticed) (Strikowsky, Bruce) (Entered: 07/07/2009)
24 FILING FEE re 21 : $ 25.00 paid; Receipt # 4653002368. (Brucella, Michelle) (Entered: 07/09/2009)
25 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice by S.W.. (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 07/15/2009)

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08/07/2009 08/19/2009 09/02/2009 09/15/2009

26 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on 6/29/09, before Judge Go. Court Transcriber FIORE REPORTING AND TRANSCRIPTION SERVICE, Telephone number 203−929−9992. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 8/10/2009. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/18/2009. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/16/2009. (Hong, Loan) (Entered: 07/21/2009)
27 FILING FEE: $ 25.00 paid; Receipt # 4653003318. (Brucella, Michelle) (Entered: 07/22/2009)
ORDER granting 25 Motion for Leave to Appear pro hac vice by Stephan Alain Le Clainche, subject to payment of the $25.00 admission fee within 10 business days after receipt of this order. After payment, the admitted attorney is permitted to argue or try this action in whole or in part as counsel or advocate for plaintiffs. When paying the fee by mail or in person, the attorney must present a copy of this electronic Order to the Clerk's Office with the required fee. Appearance of counsel in this case will then be entered on the Court's docket and a notation of the attorney's admission pro hac vice will be made on this Court's roll of attorneys. If the attorney admitted pro hac vice is not registered for Electronic Case Filing ("ECF") with this Court, he must register for ECF or submit an application for exemption within two weeks of the date of this order. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 7/23/2009. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 07/23/2009)
28 Letter MOTION for Discovery by C.B., J.B., J.L., L.J. and J.G., S.B. and R.E., S.W., T.L.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibits) (Merson, Jordan) (Entered: 07/31/2009)
29 FILING FEE: $ 25 received on the 25 motion to appear pro hac vice by Stephan Alain Le Clainche; receipt number 4653003509. (Chee, Alvin) (Entered: 07/31/2009)
30 Letter by Administration for Children's Services, City of New York (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 07/31/2009)
31 RESPONSE to Motion re 28 Letter MOTION for Discovery. (Delmond, Robert) (Entered: 08/03/2009)
32 REPLY in Support re 31 Response to Motion filed by C.B., J.B., J.L., L.J. and J.G., S.B. and R.E., S.W., T.L.. (Merson, Jordan) (Entered: 08/04/2009)
ORDER granting 28 Motion for Discovery as follows. Although the deadline specified by Rule 26(a)(1)(C) of the Fed. R. Civ. P. has passed and this Court did not set a deadline for exchange of initial disclosures at the initial conference, this Court understood from the discussion at the conference that the parties would be providing disclosures and materials as promptly as possible. To facilitate production pending entry of a formal confidentiality order, the Court required counsel to maintain the confidentiality of all materials produced. No redactions of any confidential information contained in the materials and documents should be made. The defendants must produce initial disclosures by 8/7/09. The request of defendants Heartshare, SCO and St. Joseph's Services for an extension of time until 8/30/09 to respond to plaintiffs' interrogatories is granted. However, said defendants must use best efforts to respond earlier and must produce documents on a rolling basis beginning no later than 8/14/09. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 8/6/2009. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 08/06/2009)
33 ANSWER to 1 Complaint,, CROSSCLAIM against Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. by Administration for Children's Services, City of New York. (Strikowsky, Bruce) (Entered: 08/07/2009)
34 AMENDED ANSWER to Plaintiffs' Complaint, CROSSCLAIM against Administration for Children's Services, City of New York by SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc., Heartshare Human Services. (Gallagher, Margo) (Entered: 08/19/2009)
35 ANSWER to 34 Amended Answer to Complaint, Crossclaim by Administration for Children's Services, City of New York. (Strikowsky, Bruce) (Entered: 09/02/2009)
36 THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT against Judith Leekin, Desmond Leekin, Anthony Vernon Leekin, Carol Leekin, Ishmattie Nagassar/Asman, Anita Lexame, Ralph

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09/17/2009
11/02/2009 11/05/2009 11/05/2009 11/09/2009 11/10/2009 11/10/2009 11/10/2009 11/12/2009 11/13/2009
11/13/2009 11/16/2009

Squitteri, Rhonda Morgan, Edwin Gould Services for Children, Sabrina Collins, Lystra Lewis, Mia Karenga, Cheryl Jack, Claudette Jackson, Theresa Smith, Thelma Bowes, filed by Administration for Children's Services, City of New York. (Strikowsky, Bruce) (Entered: 09/15/2009)
37 Letter to Hon. Marilyn D. Go by Administration for Children's Services, City of New York (Strikowsky, Bruce) (Entered: 09/15/2009)
38 REPLY in Opposition to ECF Document 37, City defendants' Letter filed by C.B., J.B., J.L., L.J. and J.G., S.B. and R.E., S.W., T.L.. (Merson, Jordan) (Entered: 09/16/2009)
39 Second MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery by Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Delmond, Robert) (Entered: 09/16/2009)
40 Letter MOTION for Discovery Extension to File Discovery Responses by C.B., J.B., J.L., L.J. and J.G., S.B. and R.E., S.W., T.L.. (Merson, Jordan) (Entered: 09/17/2009)
ORDER granting 39 Motion for Extension of Time. The time for the agency defendants to respond to the document requests of the City defendants is extended to 10/9/09. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 9/17/2009. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 09/17/2009)
ORDER granting 40 Motion for an Extension. The time for the plaintiffs to respond to the discovery requests of the City defendants is extended to 10/9/09. Discovery Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 9/17/2009. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 09/17/2009)
41 Letter MOTION for pre motion conference Pursuant to FRCP Rule 14 by C.B., J.B., J.L., L.J. and J.G., S.B. and R.E., S.W., T.L.. (Merson, Jordan) (Entered: 11/02/2009)
ORDER granting 41 Motion for Pre Motion Conference. Ordered by Judge Eric N. Vitaliano on 11/5/2009. (Villanueva, William) (Entered: 11/05/2009)
NOTICE of Hearing:Pre Motion Hearing set for 11/13/2009 02:30 PM in Courtroom 4C South before Judge Eric N. Vitaliano. (Villanueva, William) (Entered: 11/05/2009)
42 Letter to Judge Eric N. Vitaliano by Administration for Children's Services, City of New York (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 11/09/2009)
43 Letter MOTION for Hearing Agenda for the Compliance Conference by C.B., J.B., J.L., L.J. and J.G., S.B. and R.E., S.W., T.L.. (Merson, Jordan) (Entered: 11/10/2009)
46 Letter dated 11/05/09 from Carole Lee Kin to Clerk of Court, responding to allegations. (Galeano, Sonia) (Entered: 11/13/2009)
47 ANSWER to 36 Third Party Complaint by Carol Leekin. (Brucella, Michelle) (Entered: 11/16/2009)
44 Letter to Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go in response to plaintiffs' submission dated November 10, 2009 by City of New York (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 11/12/2009)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Eric N. Vitaliano: Pre Motion Conference held on 11/13/2009. Plaintiff's motion for leave to move to strike Defendant's third−party complaint is granted and shall be filed at the close of discovery in accordance with the Individual Motion Practice and Rules of this Court. (Feirman, Jordan) (Entered: 11/13/2009)
49 THIRD−PARTY DEFT THELMA BOWES' ANSWER to 36 Third Party Complaint and Affirmative Defenses. (Galeano, Sonia) (Entered: 11/17/2009)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. GoTelephonic Status Conference held on 11/13/2009.Appearances by Theodore Babitt, Jordan K. Merson, Howard Talenfeld, Jennifer Pearl and Matthew Gaier for plaintiffs; Carl Schaerf, Bruck Strikowsky, Allison Fihma and Matthew Kelly for the City defendants; Robert Delmond for the Agency defendants. Status of discovery discussed. Counsel must confer and attempt to resolve disputes concerning a proposed confidentiality order and outstanding discovery. Counsel are encouraged to consider the privacy interests of the parties. The parties consent to sealing 45 . The parties must amend their

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11/30/2009 12/01/2009 12/10/2009 12/14/2009
12/14/2009 12/14/2009

discovery responses to state clearly whether all responsive documents have been produced notwithstanding general objections. By 11/16/09, plaintiffs must identify the documents withheld on privilege grounds that they seek to challenge. Defendants must file a motion for a protective order regarding privileged documents at issue by 12/3/09, plaintiffs opposition is due by 12/10/09 and any reply is due by 12/15/09. Motions as to any discovery disputes discussed that remain unresolved must be filed in accordance with this schedule. Any changes to the discovery schedule set will be discussed at the next conference. Next conference scheduled for 12/18/09 at 2:30 p.m. (Tape #FTR 1:40−2:40; ESR B09/39 1447−5996..) (DeVeaux, Yvonne) (Entered: 11/16/2009)
48 NOTICE of Appearance by Matthew James Kelly on behalf of Administration for Children's Services, City of New York (aty to be noticed) (Kelly, Matthew) (Entered: 11/16/2009)
50 First MOTION for Joinder by Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Delmond, Robert) (Entered: 11/23/2009)
51 Letter MOTION to Amend/Correct/Supplement 36 Third Party Complaint, by City of New York. (Strikowsky, Bruce) (Entered: 11/23/2009)
52 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on 11/13/09, before Judge Go. Court Transcriber TYPEWRITE WORD PROCESSING SERVICE, Telephone number 718−966−1401. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 12/11/2009. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/21/2009. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/18/2010. (Hong, Loan) (Entered: 11/23/2009)
53 RESPONSE in Opposition re 50 First MOTION for Joinder filed by C.B., J.B., J.L., L.J. and J.G., S.B. and R.E., S.W., T.L.. (Merson, Jordan) (Entered: 11/30/2009)
54 Letter MOTION for Discovery /Amend Discovery Schedule by City of New York. (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 12/01/2009)
55 3rd PARTY DEFT CHERYL JACK'S ANSWER to the 36 Third Party Complaint and Affirmative Defenses, filed by Cheryl Jack. (Galeano, Sonia) (Please Note: that 3rd Party Deft Cheryl Jack's Address was not noted on this document) (Entered: 12/11/2009)
ORDER granting 50 Motion for Joinder, in the absence of opposition. Rule 14(a) "'was designed to permit the liberal joinder of parties so that judicial energy could be conserved and consistency of results guaranteed.'" State of New York v. Solvent Chemical Co., Inc., 875 F.Supp. 1015, 1021 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) (quoting Olympic Corp. v. Societe Generale, 462 F.2d 376, 379 (2d Cir. 1972)). As reflected in the minute entry for a conference on November 13, 2009 before Judge Vitaliano, discovery is to proceed on the third party complaint brought by the City defendants against the same persons whom the movants seek to join in the instant application. Thus, this Court finds that leave to implead the third parties here would not "prejudice the plaintiff, unduly complicate the trial, or would foster an obviously unmeritorious claim." See Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1959); see also Shafarman v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 100 F.R.D. 454, 458−59 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 12/14/2009. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 12/14/2009)
ORDER granting 51 Motion to Amend/Correct/Supplement. Absent opposition, the Court finds no undue delay, bad faith or prejudice to warrant denial of the amendment sought herein. See Block v. First Blood Association, 988 F.2d 344, 350 (2d Cir. 1993). Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 12/14/2009. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 12/14/2009)
ORDER granting 54 Motion for Discovery. The prior schedule for any motion for a protective order or with respect to any other discovery dispute is extended as follows: motion papers filed by 12/31/09, opposition papers filed by 1/19/10 and any reply filed by NOON on 1/26/10. Courtesy copies of any submissions involving more than 2 exhibits or exceeding 10 pages must be delivered to chambers within one day of filing. The next conference is adjourned to January 29, 2010 at 3:00 p.m. However, the parties are warned that this date is subject to change depending on the nature of the motions filed. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 12/14/2009. (Go,

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Marilyn) (Entered: 12/14/2009)
56 RESPONSE to Motion re 50 First MOTION for Joinder Clarification of Order filed by C.B., J.B., J.L., L.J. and J.G., S.B. and R.E., S.W., T.L.. (Merson, Jordan) (Entered: 12/15/2009)
ORDER endorsed on 56 Response to Motion filed by plaintiffs. The electronic order giving Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services and St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. leave to file a third party complaint did not, and was not intended to, preclude a motion to strike by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs may file a motion to strike this third party complaint at the conclusion of discovery without seeking a pre−motion conference with Judge Vitaliano, as long as plaintiffs move on the same grounds as set forth in their pre−motion letter against the City defendants. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 12/17/2009 (after conferring with Judge Vitaliano). (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 12/17/2009)
57 MOTION for pre motion conference by Ralph Squitteri. (Kutner, Charles) (Entered: 12/18/2009)
58 NOTICE of Appearance by Charles E. Kutner on behalf of Ralph Squitteri (notification declined or already on case) (Kutner, Charles) (Entered: 12/18/2009)
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 57 Motion for Pre Motion Conference. As set forth in the Individual Motion Practice and Rules of this Court, service of Third Party Defendant Squitieri's request for a pre−motion conference regarding a proposed motion to dismiss constitutes timely service of a motion made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), and thus satisfies his obligation to move or answer the third party complaint served on December 1, 2009. Third Party Defendant's motion will be scheduled for briefing and filing at the close of discovery and in accordance with the schedule that shall be set for the Plaintiff's motion to strike the third party complaints on the same grounds. Ordered by Judge Eric N. Vitaliano on 12/18/2009. (Feirman, Jordan) (Entered: 12/18/2009)
59 ANSWER to Complaint, Third Party CROSSCLAIM against Judith Leekin by Ralph Squitteri. (Kutner, Charles) (Entered: 12/21/2009)
60 NOTICE of Appearance by Kevin J. Brennan on behalf of Carol Leekin (aty to be noticed) (Brennan, Kevin) (Entered: 12/21/2009)
61 Letter MOTION for Extension of Time to File Motions for Protective Orders by City of New York. (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 12/29/2009)
ORDER granting 61 Motion for Extension of Time to File. The schedule for any motion for a protective order or with respect to any other discovery dispute is further extended as follows: motion papers filed by 1/8/10, opposition papers filed by 1/21/10 and any reply filed by 1/28/10. Courtesy copies of any submissions involving more than 2 exhibits or exceeding 10 pages must be delivered to chambers within one day of filing. The next conference is adjourned to Feb. 4, 2010 at 3:00 p.m. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 12/30/2009. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 12/30/2009)
62 Second THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT against Thelma Bowes, Sabrina Collins, Claudette Jackson, Mia Karenga, Anthony Vernon Leekin, Carol Leekin, Desmond Leekin, Judith Leekin, Lystra Lewis, Ishmattie Nagassar/Asman, Theresa Smith, Ralph Squitteri, VONTRELL/STEPHANIE LEEKIN, Barbara G. Raikes/Smith, Anita Lezame, Cheryl Jack Ellison, filed by SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc., Heartshare Human Services. (Gallagher, Margo) (Entered: 01/07/2010)
63 Letter MOTION to Compel by C.B., J.B., J.L., L.J. and J.G., S.B. and R.E., S.W., T.L.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−P) (Talenfeld, Howard) (Entered: 01/08/2010)
64 MOTION for Protective Order by C.B., J.B., J.L., L.J. and J.G., S.B. and R.E., S.W., T.L.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A & B) (Talenfeld, Howard) (Entered: 01/08/2010)
65 Letter Motion to Compel by City of New York (Schaerf, Carl) Modified on 2/5/2010 (DeVeaux, Yvonne). (Entered: 01/08/2010)
66 MOTION for Protective Order by Administration for Children's Services, City of New York. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Affidavit in Support, # 3

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Affidavit in Support, # 4 Affidavit of Service) (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 01/08/2010)
67 RESPONSE in Opposition re 64 MOTION for Protective Order, 63 Letter MOTION to Compel filed by City of New York. (Strikowsky, Bruce) (Entered: 01/21/2010)
68 REPLY in Opposition re 65 Letter from City Defendants dated 1/8/2010 filed by C.B., J.B., J.L., L.J. and J.G., S.B. and R.E., S.W., T.L.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A. Plaintiff's Letter regarding discovery/retainer, # 2 Exhibit B.Defendant's Letter regarding discovery/retainer) (Talenfeld, Howard) (Entered: 01/21/2010)
69 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 66 MOTION for Protective Order filed on 1/8/2010 by City Defendants filed by C.B., J.B., J.L., L.J. and J.G., S.B. and R.E., S.W., T.L.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A. ACS Organizational Chart) (Talenfeld, Howard) (Entered: 01/21/2010)
70 EXHIBIT A: Amended ACS Organizational Chart by C.B., J.B., J.L., L.J. and J.G., S.B. and R.E., S.W., T.L.. Related document: 69 Memorandum in Opposition, filed by C.B., L.J. and J.G., S.W., T.L., S.B. and R.E., J.B., J.L.. (Talenfeld, Howard) (Entered: 01/22/2010)
71 First MOTION for Extension of Time to File opposition by Ralph Squitteri. (Kutner, Charles) (Entered: 01/22/2010)
ORDER granting 71 Motion for Extension of Time to File. The Dr. Squittieri may file opposition papers to the motion for a protective order, but must do so by 5:00 p.m. on Jan. 28, 2010. ACS may file a reply to this opposition by Feb. 1, 2010. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 1/25/2010. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 01/25/2010)
72 ANSWER to 62 Third Party Complaint by Thelma Bowes. (Brucella, Michelle) (Entered: 01/27/2010)
73 Motion for an extension of time to accomplish service on certain third−party defendants by City of New York (Schaerf, Carl) Modified on 2/5/2010 (Kuzycz, Motria). (Entered: 01/28/2010)
74 Letter MOTION to Dismiss Second Third Party Complaint by Ralph Squitteri. Responses due by 1/28/2010 (Kutner, Charles) (Entered: 01/28/2010)
ORDER re: 74 Motion to Dismiss. As set forth in the Individual Motion Practice and Rules of this Court, service of the instant motion by Third Party Defendant Squitieri regarding a proposed motion to dismiss constitutes timely service of a motion made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), and thus satisfies his obligation to move or answer the "Second" third party complaint in a timely fashion. Third Party Defendant's motion will be scheduled for briefing and filing at the close of discovery and in accordance with the schedule that shall be set for the Plaintiff's motion to strike the third party complaints on the same grounds. Ordered by Judge Eric N. Vitaliano on 1/28/2010. (Feirman, Jordan) (Entered: 01/28/2010)
75 RESPONSE in Opposition re 66 MOTION for Protective Order filed by Ralph Squitteri. (Kutner, Charles) (Entered: 01/28/2010)
76 REPLY in Support re 66 MOTION for Protective Order and in further support of motion to compel production of retainer agreements filed by City of New York. (Strikowsky, Bruce) (Entered: 01/28/2010)
77 REPLY in Support re 64 MOTION for Protective Order, 63 Letter MOTION to Compel, REPLY in Opposition re 73 Letter Requesting Extension of Time to Effectuate Service filed by C.B., J.B., J.L., L.J. and J.G., S.B. and R.E., S.W., T.L.. (Talenfeld, Howard) (Entered: 01/28/2010)
78 Letter to Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go by City of New York (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 01/29/2010)
ORDER re 66 MOTION for Protective Order filed by Administration for Children's Services, City of New York. The City must produce for in camera inspection the documents at issue in its motion for a protective order. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 2/2/2010. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 02/02/2010)

02/02/2010 02/03/2010 02/04/2010 02/05/2010
02/05/2010 02/07/2010
02/10/2010 02/12/2010 02/12/2010 02/16/2010 02/18/2010
02/22/2010
02/23/2010

79 Letter to Magistrate Judge Go re: City Defendants' Privileged documents by City of New York (Kelly, Matthew) (Entered: 02/02/2010)
80 Letter MOTION to Substitute Attorney by C.B., J.B., J.L., L.J. and J.G., S.B. and R.E., S.W., T.L.. (Attachments: # 1 Supplement Notices of Appearance) (Merson, Jordan) (Entered: 02/03/2010)
ORDER granting 80 Motion to Substitute Attorney. Added attorneys Marcia Lowry, William A. Kapell, Shirim Nothenberg for C.B., J.B., J.L., L.J., J.G., S.B., R.E., S.W., and T.L. Attorney Thomas A. Moore; Matthew Gaier and Jordan K. Merson terminated. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 2/4/2010. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 02/04/2010)
81 Minute entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 2/4/10. Appearances by Theodore Babbitt, Jennifer Pearl and Marcia Lowry for plaintiffs; Carl Schaerf, Bruce Strikowsky, Matthew Kelly and Allison Fihma for the City defendants; Robert Delmond for the Agency defendants; Kevin Brennan for Carol Leekin; and Charles Kuttner for Ralph Squitieri. Argument heard on cross−motions for protective orders [64, 66], cross−motions to compel [63, 65] and the Citys motion for extension of time to serve third−party defendants 73 . Decision reserved on the cross−motions for protective orders implicating various privileges [64, 66]. Rulings made on the record [re 63, 65, 73] are summarized in the attached minute order. The fact discovery deadline is extended to 9/10/10. Next conference scheduled for 5/25/10 at 2:00 p.m. (Tape #FTR 3:17−4:22, 5:09−5:46 and ESR B10/3 1928−end, B10/4 0−2584.) (Kuzycz, Motria) (Entered: 02/05/2010)
82 PROTECTIVE ORDER. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 2/5/2010. (Attachments: # 1 Confidentiality Order) (Chee, Alvin) (Entered: 02/05/2010)
83 Second Third Party Defendant's ANSWER to Complaint Second Third Party Complaint, Third Party CROSSCLAIM against Thelma Bowes, Sabrina Collins, Edwin Gould Services for Children, Cheryl Jack Ellison, Claudette Jackson, Mia Karenga, VONTRELL/STEPHANIE LEEKIN, Anthony Vernon Leekin, Carol Leekin, Desmond Leekin, Judith Leekin, Lystra Lewis, Anita Lexame, Ishmattie Nagassar/Asman, Barbara G. Raikes/Smith, Theresa Smith by Ralph Squitteri. (Kutner, Charles) (Entered: 02/07/2010)
84 STIPULATION Extending Time to Respond by Carol Leekin (Brennan, Kevin) (Entered: 02/10/2010)
85 NOTICE of Appearance by Sonya A Smith−Valentine on behalf of Thelma Bowes (aty to be noticed) (Smith−Valentine, Sonya) (Entered: 02/12/2010)
86 Cross Claim Defendant's ANSWER to 83 Answer to Complaint, Crossclaim,, by Thelma Bowes. (Smith−Valentine, Sonya) (Entered: 02/12/2010)
ORDER: The 84 Stipulation extending the time for Carol Lee Kin to answer the third party complaint of the agency defendants to the earlier of 30 days after her deposition or June 30, 2010 is "so ordered." Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 2/16/2010. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 02/16/2010)
87 AMENDED THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT against Thelma Bowes, Sabrina Collins, Edwin Gould Services for Children, Cheryl Jack, Claudette Jackson, Mia Karenga, VONTRELL/STEPHANIE LEEKIN, Anthony Vernon Leekin, Carol Leekin, Desmond Leekin, Judith Leekin, Lystra Lewis, Anita Lexame, Rhonda Morgan, Ishmattie Nagassar/Asman, Ralph Squitteri, filed by Administration for Children's Services, City of New York. (Strikowsky, Bruce) (Entered: 02/18/2010)
88 Third Party ANSWER to 87 Amended Third Party Complaint, City of New York, Administration for Children's Services, Third Party CROSSCLAIM against Thelma Bowes, Sabrina Collins, Edwin Gould Services for Children, Cheryl Jack, Claudette Jackson, Mia Karenga, VONTRELL/STEPHANIE LEEKIN, Anthony Vernon Leekin, Carol Leekin, Desmond Leekin, Judith Leekin, Lystra Lewis, Anita Lexame, Rhonda Morgan, Ishmattie Nagassar/Asman by Ralph Squitteri. (Kutner, Charles) (Entered: 02/22/2010)
89 Letter Motion for extension of time to serve process in Trinidad by City of New York (Strikowsky, Bruce) Modified on 2/24/2010 (DeVeaux, Yvonne (Entered: 02/23/2010)

02/24/2010 90 ANSWER to 87 Amended Third Party Complaint, by Thelma Bowes. (Smith−Valentine, Sonya) (Entered: 02/24/2010)

02/24/2010 91 ANSWER to 88 Answer to Amended Third Party Complaint, Crossclaim,, by Thelma Bowes. (Smith−Valentine, Sonya) (Entered: 02/24/2010)

03/03/2010

92 ANSWER to 83 Answer to Complaint, Crossclaim,, 88 Answer to Amended Third Party Complaint, Crossclaim,, Ralph Squitieri's Crossclaim, and her ANSWER to 83 Answer to Complaint, Crossclaim,, 88 Answer to Amended Third Party Complaint, Crossclaim,, Ralph Squitieri's Crossclaim by Carol Leekin. (Brennan, Kevin) (Entered: 03/03/2010)

03/04/2010

ORDER granting 89 Motion for Extension of Time. There being no opposition, the time to serve the third party defendants Anthony Leekin, Ishmattee Nagassar and Anita Lezame is extended to 3/14/10. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 3/4/2010. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 03/04/2010)

03/05/2010 93 STIPULATION re 87 Amended Third Party Complaint, extending time to respond by Carol Leekin (Brennan, Kevin) (Entered: 03/05/2010)

03/05/2010

ORDER: The 93 Stipulation extending the time of Carol Leekin to answer the amended third party complaint is "so ordered." Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 3/5/2010. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 03/05/2010)

03/12/2010 94 RESPONSE to Discovery Request by Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Delmond, Robert) (Entered: 03/12/2010)

03/24/2010 95 NOTICE to Take Deposition by SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Delmond, Robert) (Entered: 03/24/2010)

04/21/2010

Minute entry for telephone discovery hearing held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 4/20/10. Appearances by Theodore Babbitt for plaintiffs; Carl Schaerf for the City defendants; and Robert Delmond for the Agency defendants. Counsel for the City defendants initiated call to chambers regarding deposition of plaintiff. Rulings made on the record concerning plaintiff's objections on grounds of attorney−client privilege to questions regarding initial contacts between plaintiff and counsel. (Tape #ESR 10/9 1932−2524.) (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 04/21/2010)

04/22/2010 96 NOTICE of Appearance by Thomas A. Catalano on behalf of Edwin Gould Services for Children (aty to be noticed) (Catalano, Thomas) (Entered: 04/22/2010)

04/22/2010 97 Corporate Disclosure Statement by Edwin Gould Services for Children (Catalano, Thomas) (Entered: 04/22/2010)

04/22/2010

98 ANSWER to 87 Amended Third Party Complaint,, CROSSCLAIM against Thelma Bowes, Sabrina Collins, Cheryl Jack Ellison, Heartshare Human Services, Cheryl Jack, Claudette Jackson, Mia Karenga, VONTRELL/STEPHANIE LEEKIN, Anthony Vernon Leekin, Carol Leekin, Desmond Leekin, Judith Leekin, Lystra Lewis, Anita Lexame, Anita Lezame, Rhonda Morgan, Ishmattie Nagassar/Asman, SCO Family of Services, Ralph Squitteri, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. by Edwin Gould Services for Children. (Catalano, Thomas) (Entered: 04/22/2010)

04/22/2010

99 Answer to the crossclaim of third−party defendant Dr. Ralph Squitieri s/h/a as Dr. Ralph Squitteri ANSWER to 88 Answer to Amended Third Party Complaint, Crossclaim,, by Edwin Gould Services for Children. (Catalano, Thomas) (Entered: 04/22/2010)

04/23/2010 100 NOTICE of Appearance by Richard Eniclerico on behalf of Edwin Gould Services for Children (aty to be noticed) (Eniclerico, Richard) (Entered: 04/23/2010)

04/23/2010 101 Letter MOTION for Discovery requesting a conference before Magistrate Go to discuss a revised discovery schedule by Edwin Gould Services for Children. (Eniclerico, Richard) (Entered: 04/23/2010)

04/23/2010 102 MOTION for ENTRY of Default as to Judith Leekin, Desmond Leekin, Sabrina Collins, Claudette Jackson, Rhonda Morgan, Vontrell Leekin and Anthony Vernon Leekin by City of New York. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Bruce M. Strikowsky in Support of Motion for Default Judgment, # 2 Exhibit A−G, # 3 Affidavit of Service)

(Strikowsky, Bruce) Modified on 9/14/2010 (Abdallah, Fida). (Entered: 04/23/2010)

04/23/2010 103 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on April 20, 2010, before Judge Go. Court Transcriber TypeWrite Word Processing Service, Telephone number 718−966−1401. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 5/14/2010. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/24/2010. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/22/2010. (Rocco, Christine) (Entered: 04/23/2010)

04/23/2010

ORDER granting 101 Motion for a Discovery Conference. A conference will be held on April 30, 2010 at 12:00 p.m. The parties may appear by telephone, provided they confer and make arrangements for a conference call. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 4/23/2010. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 04/23/2010)

04/26/2010 104 RESPONSE to Motion re 102 MOTION for Default Judgment as to Judith Leekin, Desmond Leekin, Sabrina Collins, Claudette Jackson, Rhonda Morgan, Vontrell Leekin and Anthony Vernon Leekin Letter in Opposition to Motion for Default Judgment filed by S.W.. (Talenfeld, Howard) (Entered: 04/26/2010)

04/27/2010 105 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on February 4, 2010, before Judge Go. Court Transcriber TypeWrite Word Processing Service, Telephone number 718−966−1401. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 5/18/2010. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/28/2010. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/26/2010. (Rocco, Christine) (Entered: 04/27/2010)

04/29/2010 107 VERIFIED ANSWER to 62 SECOND Third Party Complaint WITH CROSSCLAIM against Thelma Bowes, Sabrina Collins, Cheryl Jack, Claudette Jackson, Mia Karenga, VONTRELL/STEPHANIE LEEKIN, Anthony Vernon Leekin, Carol Leekin, Desmond Leekin, Judith Leekin, Lystra Lewis, Anita Lexame, Barbara G. Raikes/Smith, Theresa Smith, Ralph Squitteri by Ishmattie Nagassar/Asman. (Galeano, Sonia) (W/ CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ATTACHED) (Entered: 04/30/2010)

04/29/2010 108 VERIFIED ANSWER to 87 Amended Third Party Complaint WITH CROSSCLAIM against Thelma Bowes, Sabrina Collins, Edwin Gould Services for Children, Cheryl Jack, Claudette Jackson, Mia Karenga, Anthony Vernon Leekin, Carol Leekin, Desmond Leekin, Judith Leekin, Lystra Lewis, Anita Lexame, Rhonda Morgan, Theresa Smith, Ralph Squitteri by Ishmattie Nagassar/Asman. (Galeano, Sonia) (W/ CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ATTACHED) (Entered: 04/30/2010)

04/30/2010 106 REPLY to Response to Motion re 102 MOTION for Default Judgment as to Judith Leekin, Desmond Leekin, Sabrina Collins, Claudette Jackson, Rhonda Morgan, Vontrell Leekin and Anthony Vernon Leekin filed by City of New York. (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 04/30/2010)

04/30/2010

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go. Discovery Hearing held on 4/30/2010. Appearances by Theodore Babbitt, Marcia Lowry, Howard Talenfeld (by tel) for plaintiffs; Carl Schaerf, Bruce Strikowsky, Matthew Kelly and Allison Fihma for the City defendants; Robert Delmond for the Agency defendants; Kevin Brennan for Carol Leekin; Patrick Mevs for Squitieri; Richard Eniclerico, Thomas Catalano for Edwin Gould Svs.; Sonya Smith−Valentine for Bowes. The motion which the City defendants incorrectly denominated as a motion for default judgment will be modified by the Clerk's Office to be a motion for entry of default. The determination of default judgment shall await disposition of the main claims asserted against the City defendants. The request of Gould Svs. to delay depositions is denied. However, this and any other third party defendant that has only recently appeared and is not ready to question defendants' witnesses at scheduled depositions in May shall not be precluded from deposing the witnesses at a later date. Such witnesses shall be required to appear a second time for such depositions, but shall not be subject to questioning by any party posing questions at an earlier deposition. The City defendants must respond to written discovery requests of third party defendants as promptly as possible, but, in any event, no later than 28 days. The conference scheduled 5/25/10 is adjourned to June 8, 2010 at 1:00 p.m. FTR 12:18−12:49; ESR B10/14 1400−3396 (Wallace, Saundra) (Entered: 04/30/2010)

05/02/2010 109 ANSWER to 108 Answer to Amended Third Party Complaint, Crossclaim,, of ISHMATTIE NAGASSAR/ASMAN by Ralph Squitteri. (Kutner, Charles) (Entered: 05/02/2010)

05/02/2010 110 ANSWER to 98 Answer to Amended Third Party Complaint, Crossclaim,,,, of Edwin Gould Services for Children by Ralph Squitteri. (Kutner, Charles) (Entered: 05/02/2010)

05/03/2010 111 ANSWER to 98 Answer to Amended Third Party Complaint, Crossclaim,,,, by Thelma Bowes. (Smith−Valentine, Sonya) (Entered: 05/03/2010)

05/03/2010 112 ANSWER to 108 Answer to Amended Third Party Complaint, Crossclaim,, 107 Answer to Third Party Complaint, Crossclaim,,, ANSWER to 108 Answer to Amended Third Party Complaint, Crossclaim,, 107 Answer to Third Party Complaint, Crossclaim,, by Thelma Bowes. (Smith−Valentine, Sonya) (Entered: 05/03/2010)

05/04/2010 113 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. Thelma Bowes served on 1/16/2010, answer due 2/8/2010; Sabrina Collins served on 1/16/2010, answer due 2/8/2010; Cheryl Jack Ellison served on 1/21/2010, answer due 2/11/2010; Claudette Jackson served on 2/8/2010, answer due 3/1/2010; Mia Karenga served on 3/2/2010, answer due 3/23/2010; VONTRELL/STEPHANIE LEEKIN served on 1/23/2010, answer due 2/15/2010; Carol Leekin served on 1/16/2010, answer due 2/8/2010; Desmond Leekin served on 1/15/2010, answer due 2/5/2010; Judith Leekin served on 2/12/2010, answer due 3/5/2010; Lystra Lewis served on 1/16/2010, answer due 2/8/2010; Ishmattie Nagassar/Asman served on 3/11/2010, answer due 4/1/2010; Barbara G. Raikes/Smith served on 1/16/2010, answer due 2/8/2010; Ralph Squitteri served on 1/23/2010, answer due 2/15/2010. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Service Affidavit of Service of Second Third Party Summons & Complaint on Second Third Party Defendant Carol Leekin, # 2 Affidavit of Service Affidavit of Service of Second Third Party Summons & Complaint on Second Third Party Defendant Cheryl Jack Ellison, # 3 Affidavit of Service Affidavit of Service of Second Third Party Summons & Complaint on Second Third Party Defendant Claudette Jackson, # 4 Affidavit of Service Affidavit of Service of Second Third Party Summons & Complaint on Second Third Party Defendant Desmond Leekin, # 5 Affidavit of Service Affidavit of Service of Second Third Party Summons & Complaint on Second Third Party Defendant Ishmatee Nagassar Asman, # 6 Affidavit of Service Affidavit of Service of Second Third Party Summons & Complaint on Second Third Party Defendant Judith Leekin, # 7 Affidavit of Service Affidavit of Service of Second Third Party Summons & Complaint on Second Third Party Defendant Lystra Lewis, # 8 Affidavit of Service Affidavit of Service of Second Third Party Summons & Complaint on Second Third Party Defendant Mia Karenga, # 9 Affidavit of Service Affidavit of Service of Second Third Party Summons & Complaint on Second Third Party Defendant Ralph Squitteri, # 10 Affidavit of Service Affidavit of Service of Second Third Party Summons & Complaint on Second Third Party Defendant Sabrina Collins, # 11 Affidavit of Service Affidavit of Service of Second Third Party Summons & Complaint on Second Third Party Defendant Thelma Bowes−Smith, # 12 Affidavit of Service Affidavit of Service of Second Third Party Summons & Complaint on Second Third Party Defendant Vontrell Leekin) (Gallagher, Margo) (Entered: 05/04/2010)

05/04/2010 114 STIPULATION extending time to respond (Brennan, Kevin) (Entered: 05/04/2010)

05/04/2010

STIPULATION AND ORDER: The 114 Stipulation extending the time of third party defendant Carol Lee Kin to answer or otherwise respond to the complaint by 6/30/10 is "so ordered." Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 5/4/2010. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 05/04/2010)

05/06/2010 115 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Ami Romanelli's Verified Motion For Admission Pro Hac Vice by S.W.. (Le Clainche, Stephan) (Additional attachment(s) added on 5/12/2010: # 1 Receipt of Payment for Pro Hac Vice) (Abdallah, Fida). (Entered: 05/06/2010)

05/06/2010

ORDER granting 115 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice, subject to payment of the $25.00 admission fee within 10 business days after receipt of this order. After payment, the admitted attorney is permitted to argue or try this action in whole or in part as counsel or advocate for Plaintiffs. When paying the fee by mail or in person, the attorney must present a copy of this electronic Order to the Clerk's Office with the

required fee. Appearance of counsel in this case will then be entered on the Court's docket and a notation of the attorney's admission pro hac vice will be made on this Court's roll of attorneys. If the attorney admitted pro hac vice is not registered for Electronic Case Filing ("ECF") with this Court, he or she must register for ECF or submit an application for exemption within two weeks of the date of this order. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 5/6/2010. (Kuzycz, Motria) (Entered: 05/06/2010)

05/11/2010 116 AMENDED ANSWER to 87 Amended Third Party Complaint, 98 Answer to Amended Third Party Complaint, Crossclaim,,,,, CROSSCLAIM against Sabrina Collins, Cheryl Jack Ellison, Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), Cheryl Jack, Claudette Jackson, Mia Karenga, VONTRELL/STEPHANIE LEEKIN, Anthony Vernon Leekin, Carol Leekin, Desmond Leekin, Judith Leekin, Lystra Lewis, Anita Lexame, Anita Lezame, Rhonda Morgan, Ishmattie Nagassar/Asman, SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), Ralph Squitteri, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. by Edwin Gould Services for Children. (Catalano, Thomas) (Entered: 05/11/2010)

05/13/2010 117 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. Anthony Vernon Leekin served on 4/28/2010, answer due 5/19/2010; Anita Lezame served on 5/4/2010, answer due 5/25/2010. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Service) (Gallagher, Margo) (Entered: 05/13/2010)

05/24/2010 118 ANSWER to 116 Amended Answer to Complaint, Crossclaim,,,, by Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Gallagher, Margo) (Entered: 05/24/2010)

05/25/2010 119 NOTICE of Appearance by Susan Lambiase on behalf of C.B., J.B., J.L., L.J. and J.G., S.B. and R.E., S.W., T.L. (aty to be noticed) (Lambiase, Susan) (Entered: 05/25/2010)

05/25/2010 120 NOTICE of Appearance by Melissa Cohen on behalf of C.B., J.B., J.L., L.J. and J.G., S.B. and R.E., S.W., T.L. (aty to be noticed) (Cohen, Melissa) (Entered: 05/25/2010)

05/26/2010 121 ANSWER to 33 Answer to Complaint, Crossclaim by Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Gallagher, Margo) (Entered: 05/26/2010)

06/01/2010 122 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Pro Hac Vice for Amanda H. S. Thompson Filing fee $ 25, receipt number 0207−4182102. by S.W.. (Talenfeld, Howard) (Entered: 06/01/2010)

06/01/2010

ORDER granting 122 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice. The admitted attorney, Amanda H. Thompson, is permitted to argue or try this action in whole or in part as counsel or advocate for plaintiffs. Since the docket sheet indicates that the admission fee has been paid, the Clerk of the Court is respectfully requested to enter the appearance of counsel promptly on the docket sheet for this action and to make a notation of the attorney's admission pro hac vice on this Court's roll of attorneys. If not already registered for Electronic Case Filing ("ECF") with this Court, the admitted attorney must register for ECF or submit an application for exemption within two weeks of the date of this order.. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 6/1/2010. (Kuzycz, Motria) (Entered: 06/01/2010)

06/03/2010 123 Letter to Honorable Marilyn D. Go re June 8 Discovery Conference by C.B., J.B., J.L., L.J. and J.G., S.B. and R.E., S.W., T.L. (Attachments: # 1 Calendar) (Lambiase, Susan) (Entered: 06/03/2010)

06/04/2010 124 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 64 Motion for Protective Order. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 6/4/2010. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 06/04/2010)

06/07/2010 125 ANSWER to 116 Amended Answer to Complaint, Crossclaim,,,, by Thelma Bowes. (Smith−Valentine, Sonya) (Entered: 06/07/2010)

06/07/2010 126 Letter to Magistrate Go in response to Ms. Lowry's letter of June 3, 2010 by City of New York (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 06/07/2010)

06/07/2010 127 Letter to Magistrate Go in response to Ms. Lowrys letter of June 3 (plaintiffs' atty) and Mr. Schaefs letter of June 7 (City atty) by Edwin Gould Services for Children (Catalano, Thomas) (Entered: 06/07/2010)

06/09/2010

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 6/8/2010. Appearances by Theodore Babbitt, Marcia Lowry, Howard Talenfeld, Shirim Nothenberg for plaintiffs; Carl Schaerf, Bruce Strikowsky, Matthew Kelly and Allison Fihma for the City defendants; Robert Delmond and Margo Gallagher for the Agency defendants; Kevin Brennan for Carol Leekin; Patrick Mevs for Squitieri; Curt Schiner, Thomas Catalano for Edwin Gould Svs.; Sonya Smith−Valentine for Bowes. All fact discovery regarding liability must be completed by 9/10/10. Plaintiffs may submit subpoena for family court records to be so ordered. The City must submit subpoenas by 6/9/10 for depositions to be held in early July and must serve the subpoenas by 6/11/10. The City defendant must supplement its response to document requests seeking adoption records and contracts by 6/18/10. The agency defendants must expand the temporal scope of their search for contracts with the City to the period from 1980 to 2001 and supplement their responses to document requests regarding contracts by 6/18/10 and regarding licensing by 6/28/10. The plaintiffs must supplement their Rule 26(a) disclosures and, if unsuccessful in resolving the dispute, respond to the Citys motion to compel electronic discovery by 6/18/10. Plaintiffs must serve notice designating their liability experts and the subject matter to be addressed by their experts by 8/16/10. Plaintiffs must serve their liability expert reports by 9/15/10 and defendants must serve their liability expert reports by 10/15/10. Liability expert depositions must be completed by 11/24/10. Third party defendants must advise the other parties by 9/17/10 as to whether they intend to move to dismiss on grounds other than Rule 12(b)(6). Dispositive motions by the third party defendants must be served by 10/8/10; opposition by 11/8/10; and reply by 11/22/10. Defendants must file pre−motion letters by 12/3/10 and response by 12/10/10. Next conference scheduled for 9/24/10 at 1:00 p.m. (Tape #FTR 1:10−2:24 and 3:34−4:04 and ESR B10/24 0−end.) (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 06/09/2010)

06/09/2010 128 NOTICE of Appearance by Allison Naomi Fihma on behalf of Administration for Children's Services, City of New York (aty to be noticed) (Fihma, Allison) (Entered: 06/09/2010)

06/09/2010

SCHEDULING ORDER: any party may supplement its submissions regarding the Citys motion for a protective order 66 by 6/16/10 in light of the Second Circuits opinion in In re the City of New York, No. 10−0237 (2d Cir. June 9, 2010). Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 6/9/2010. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 06/09/2010)

06/09/2010 129 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Administration for Children's Services, City of New York. (Kelly, Matthew) (Entered: 06/09/2010)

06/09/2010 130 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Administration for Children's Services, City of New York. VONTRELL/STEPHANIE LEEKIN served on 2/23/2010, answer due 3/16/2010. (Kelly, Matthew) (Entered: 06/09/2010)

06/09/2010 131 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Administration for Children's Services, City of New York. Claudette Jackson served on 3/11/2010, answer due 4/1/2010. (Kelly, Matthew) (Entered: 06/09/2010)

06/09/2010 132 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Administration for Children's Services, City of New York. Sabrina Collins served on 10/23/2009, answer due 11/13/2009. (Kelly, Matthew) (Entered: 06/09/2010)

06/09/2010 133 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Administration for Children's Services, City of New York. Rhonda Morgan served on 3/5/2010, answer due 3/26/2010. (Kelly, Matthew) (Entered: 06/09/2010)

06/09/2010 134 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Administration for Children's Services, City of New York. Judith Leekin served on 10/27/2009, answer due 11/17/2009. (Kelly, Matthew) (Entered: 06/09/2010)

06/09/2010 135 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Administration for Children's Services, City of New York. Anthony Vernon Leekin served on 3/15/2010, answer due 4/5/2010. (Kelly, Matthew) (Entered: 06/09/2010)

06/09/2010 136 Summons Returned Unexecuted by Administration for Children's Services, City of New York as to Anita Lexame. (Kelly, Matthew) (Entered: 06/09/2010)

06/09/2010 137 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Administration for Children's Services, City of New York. Cheryl Jack served on 11/7/2009, answer due 11/28/2009. (Kelly, Matthew) (Entered: 06/09/2010)

06/09/2010 138 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Administration for Children's Services, City of New York. Ishmattie Nagassar/Asman served on 2/27/2010, answer due 3/22/2010. (Kelly, Matthew) (Entered: 06/09/2010)

06/11/2010 139 Letter to Honorable Marilyn D. Go re Parties' Agreed Upon Deposition Calendar by C.B., J.B., J.L., L.J. and J.G., S.B. and R.E., S.W., T.L. (Attachments: # 1 Deposition Calendar) (Cohen, Melissa) (Entered: 06/11/2010)

06/12/2010

SCHEDULING ORDER: The deposition schedule attached to the 139 Letter filed by plaintiffs' is "so ordered" but may be modified upon consent of all participating parties. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 6/12/2010. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 06/12/2010)

06/14/2010 140 MOTION for Discovery for Orders Unsealing Adoption Records of Plaintiffs by C.B., J.B., J.L., L.J. and J.G., S.B. and R.E., S.W., T.L.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Queens County Family Court, # 2 Proposed Order Queens County Surrogate's Court) (Cohen, Melissa) (Entered: 06/14/2010)

06/14/2010

ORDER: Any opposition to the 140 MOTION for Discovery for Orders Unsealing Adoption Records of Plaintiffs must be filed by 6/30/10. Plaintiffs are directed to send a copy of their motion and this electronic order to the Queens Surrogate Court and Queens Family Court, as well as a copy of this order to third party defendant Judith Leekin. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 6/14/2010. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 06/14/2010)

06/14/2010 141 Letter to Magistrate Judge Go withdrawing the pending application concerning emails and social networking by City of New York (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 06/14/2010)

06/16/2010 142 Letter to Magistrate Judge Go by City of New York (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 06/16/2010)

06/17/2010 143 Letter to Magistrate Judge Go with proposed Order for the Production of Records and Testimony by Certain Physicians and Attorneys by City of New York (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 06/17/2010)

06/18/2010

ORDER: Plaintiffs and counsel for the City of New York must promptly confer about the request set forth in the 143 Letter filed by City of New York. Any opposition must be filed by 6:00 p.m. If there is no opposition, the parties must so advise by this deadline. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 6/18/2010. NOTICE: Prior to making any future requests for relief from the court, an applicant must first confer with counsel for the affected parties. Any request for relief by the Court may, if appropriate, be made by letter application, but must be filed under the appropriate "motion" on the ECF list of civil events. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 06/18/2010)

06/18/2010 144 Letter Regarding Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Request re Production of Records [Dkt. No. 143] by C.B., J.B., J.L., L.J. and J.G., S.B. and R.E., S.W. by C.B., J.B., J.L., L.J. and J.G., S.B. and R.E., S.W. (Lambiase, Susan) (Entered: 06/18/2010)

06/18/2010 145 ORDER: The 143 Letter request filed by City of New York for an order for production of medical records is granted. A signed copy will be separately faxed to counsel for defendant. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 6/18/2010. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 06/18/2010)

06/21/2010 146 Letter to Judge Go in Response to Docket 142 as filed by The City of New York by S.W. (Talenfeld, Howard) (Entered: 06/21/2010)

06/29/2010 147 NOTICE: As a result of changes in this Court's Electronic Case Filing system, parties are now able to file documents electronically under seal provided they first file a motion for leave to do so and obtain the Court's permission. Instructions are attached. The instructions and a short tutorial are available on the Court's website at: http://www.nyed.uscourts.gov/CM_ECF/Learning_More_About_It/sealed_filing.html. In the future, any party seeking to submit a document under seal must file a short letter

motion for leave to do so. (Wallace, Saundra) (Entered: 06/29/2010)

06/30/2010 148 RESPONSE to Motion re 140 MOTION for Discovery for Orders Unsealing Adoption Records of Plaintiffs Response letter requesting adjournment of motion until state court proceedings are concluded filed by Family Court, Queens County. (Sanders, Charles) (Entered: 06/30/2010)

06/30/2010 149 Letter re pre−motion conference (Brennan, Kevin) (Entered: 06/30/2010)

07/01/2010 150 Letter to Judge Go regarding Response to Motion [dkt 148] by C.B., J.B., J.L., L.J. and J.G., S.B. and R.E., S.W., T.L. (Nothenberg, Shirim) (Entered: 07/01/2010)

07/06/2010 151 ORDER granting 140 Motion for Unsealing of Queens County Surrogate's Court Records. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 07/06/2010)

07/06/2010 152 First MOTION for Entry of Default by Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit) (Delmond, Robert) (Entered: 07/06/2010)

07/06/2010 153 Letter MOTION to Compel Judith Leekin's appearance at deposition by City of New York. (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 07/06/2010)

07/07/2010 154 RESPONSE to Motion re 140 MOTION for Discovery for Orders Unsealing Adoption Records of Plaintiffs Letter explaining July 6, 2010 Family Court Hearing filed by Family Court, Queens County. (Sanders, Charles) (Entered: 07/07/2010)

07/07/2010 155 RESPONSE to Motion re 140 MOTION for Discovery for Orders Unsealing Adoption Records of Plaintiffs Letter withdrawing motion filed by C.B., J.B., J.L., L.J. and J.G., S.B. and R.E., S.W., T.L.. (Nothenberg, Shirim) (Entered: 07/07/2010)

07/09/2010

ORDER re 149 Letter seeking premotion conference by third party defendant Carole Lee Kin. No premotion conference is necessary at this time. Third party defendant Carole Lee Kin's proposed 12(b)(6) motion will be briefed in accordance with the schedule set forth in the Court's June 9, 2010 minute entry. Ordered by Judge Eric N. Vitaliano on 7/9/2010. (Feirman, Jordan) (Entered: 07/09/2010)

07/12/2010 156 Letter MOTION for Discovery regarding discovery dispute by City of New York. (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 07/12/2010)

07/13/2010 157 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on 6/8/10, before Judge Go. Court Transcriber FIORE REPORTING AND TRANSCRIPTION SERVICE, Telephone number 203−929−9992. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 8/3/2010. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/13/2010. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/12/2010. (Hong, Loan) (Entered: 07/13/2010)

07/13/2010 158 Letter to Magistrate Judge Go concerning the application (docket number 156) filed 7/12/10. by City of New York (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 07/13/2010)

07/13/2010 159 RESPONSE to Motion re 156 Letter MOTION for Discovery regarding discovery dispute and Response to Docket Entry #158. filed by S.W.. (Talenfeld, Howard) (Entered: 07/13/2010)

07/13/2010

SCHEDULING ORDER: re 156 Letter MOTION for Discovery regarding discovery dispute filed by City of New York. A telephone conference will be held on 7/15/10 at 12:00 p.m. to discuss the scheduling of Ms. Graber's deposition. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 7/13/2010. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 07/13/2010)

07/16/2010

Minute Order for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go granting in part and denying in part 156 Motion for Discovery. Discovery Hearing held on 7/15/2010; Motion Hearing held on 7/15/2010 re 156 Letter MOTION for Discovery regarding discovery dispute filed by City of New York. Appearances by Howard Talenfeld, Amanda Thompson, Susan Lambiase and Melissa Cohen for plaintiffs; Bruce Strikowsky and Matthew Kelly for the City defendants; Robert Delmond for the agency defendants. The motion of the City defendants for relief with respect to the deposition of Bracha Graber is denied, except that the deposition shall be adjourned from 7/21/10 as follows. The plaintiffs shall confer with Ms. Graber as to her availability for deposition on 7/26/10, with 8/5 and 8/9 as alternative dates and other

possible continuation dates. The plaintiffs confirmed that their subpoena served on Morrison & Forrester is intended to be limited to documents regarding operations and policies rather than disclosure of identifying confidential and information of individuals whose cases were administered by CWA. The deposition of Judith Leekin shall be limited to testimony concerning the named plaintiffs, including all conduct and events concerning her relationship with them, but without prejudice to a future application by the defendants to enlarge the scope of the deposition. Plaintiffs shall provide the Court with the Leekin indictment and other documents related to her criminal prosecution. The deposition of Paula Forman is adjourned; plaintiffs may initiate efforts to re−schedule the deposition only after they are able to confirm the city in which the deposition shall take place. (Tape #ESR 10/18 2694−6476; FTR/C 12:08−12:52.) (Wallace, Saundra) (Entered: 07/16/2010)

07/28/2010 160 Letter MOTION to Amend/Correct/Supplement to Magistrate Go, seeking clarification of confidentialy order, that we may produce protected documents without violating HIPAA and/or HITECH by Edwin Gould Services for Children. (Catalano, Thomas) (Entered: 07/28/2010)

07/28/2010

SCHEDULING ORDER: a telephone conference will be held regarding discovery on the third party claims on 8/2/10 at 9:30 a.m. The parties should make arrangements for the conference call. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 7/28/2010. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 07/28/2010)

07/30/2010

SCHEDULING ORDER: due to a change in the Court's schedule, the telephone conference on 8/2/10 will be held at 5:00 p.m. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 7/30/2010. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 07/30/2010)

07/30/2010

Set/Reset Hearings: Telephone/Status Conference set for 8/2/2010 05:00 PM before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go. (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 07/30/2010)

08/02/2010 161 Letter by S.W. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit) (Talenfeld, Howard) (Entered: 08/02/2010)

08/02/2010

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go:Telephone/Motion Hearing held on 8/2/2010 re 160 . Appearances by telephone by Theodore Babbitt for plaintiffs; Carl Schaerf, Bruce Strikowsky for the City defendants; Robert Delmond for the Agency defendants; Kevin Brennan for Carol Kin; Thomas Catalano, Curt Shiner for Edwin Gould Svs.; Sonya Smith−Valentine for Bowes. Conference regarding scope of discovery and the motion of Edwin Gould Srvs. is continued to August 3, 2010 at 5:00 p.m. (by tel). The oral request of the City defendant to seal Exhibit 2 of the letter filed by plaintiffs (ct. 161) is GRANTED. ESR 10/20 3763 to end; FTR/C 5:05−5:43. (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 08/03/2010)

08/03/2010 162 Letter MOTION to Adjourn Conference before Magistrate Judge Go scheduled for 8/3/10 at 5:00 p.m. by City of New York. (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 08/03/2010)

08/03/2010

ORDER granting 162 Motion to Adjourn Conference on 8/3/10. Counsel for the City defendants and counsel for Edwin Gould Services must file a proposal by 8/9/10 regarding limitations on the scope of discovery sought from Edwin Gould. If agreement cannot be reached, they must promptly call to schedule a further conference. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 8/3/2010. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 08/03/2010)

08/03/2010 163 First MOTION for Protective Order by Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit) (Delmond, Robert) (Entered: 08/03/2010)

08/04/2010 164 RESPONSE to Motion re 163 First MOTION for Protective Order filed by C.B., J.B., J.L., L.J. and J.G., S.B. and R.E., S.W., T.L.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit Exhibit 7) (Nothenberg, Shirim) (Entered: 08/04/2010)

08/05/2010 165 REPLY in Support Letter Motion Seeking a Protective Order filed by Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit) (Delmond, Robert) (Entered: 08/05/2010)

08/05/2010 166 REPLY in Opposition re 163 First MOTION for Protective Order filed by C.B., J.B., J.L., L.J. and J.G., S.B. and R.E., S.W., T.L.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 1)

(Nothenberg, Shirim) (Entered: 08/05/2010)

08/05/2010 167 CROSSCLAIM against Edwin Gould Services for Children, filed by Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Gallagher, Margo) (Entered: 08/05/2010)

08/06/2010 168 Letter to Honorable Marilyn D. Go by City of New York(a municipal corporation) (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 08/06/2010)

08/10/2010

SCHEDULING ORDER: a telephone conference will be held on 8/12/10 at 1:30 p.m. regarding 163 the motion for a protective order filed by St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc., SCO Family of Services, Heartshare Human Services. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 8/10/2010. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 08/10/2010)

08/10/2010 169 Letter to Magistrate Go re: non−party foster children discovery by City of New York (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 08/10/2010)

08/11/2010 170 Letter MOTION to Strike 167 Crossclaim by the Agency Defendants against Edwin Gould on the ground that neither consent nor leave of court was obtained as requred by FRCP 15(a) by Edwin Gould Services for Children. (Catalano, Thomas) (Entered: 08/11/2010)

08/12/2010 171 RESPONSE in Opposition re 170 Letter MOTION to Strike 167 Crossclaim by the Agency Defendants against Edwin Gould on the ground that neither consent nor leave of court was obtained as requred by FRCP 15(a) Response in Opposition filed by Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit) (Delmond, Robert) (Entered: 08/12/2010)

08/12/2010

Minute Order for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go: Motion Hearing held on 8/12/2010 re 163 First MOTION for Protective Order. Appearances by Susan Lambiase, Stephan LeClainche, Howard Talenfeld for plaintiffs; Bruce Strikowsky, Matthew Kelly and Allison Fihma for the City defendants; Robert Delmond for the Agency defendants; Kimberly Miller for Edwin Gould Svs.; Sonya Smith−Valentine for Bowes. Argument heard and rulings made granting in part and denying in part 163 the Agency defendants' motion for a protective order. The plaintiffs must convert their deposition notices for the agency defendants' executive directors into 30(b)(6) deposition notices for persons with knowledge of the plaintiffs' case files. The agency defendants must use best efforts to produce such witnesses on 8/18/10 and 8/19/10 as reflected in the deposition schedule "so ordered" by this Court on June 12, 2010. The 30(b)(6) depositions held in May will be continued on 8/25/10 and 8/31/10. (ESR 10/21 4388−6387 and FTR/C 1:36−1:58) (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 08/12/2010)

08/12/2010 172 REPLY in Support re 170 Letter MOTION to Strike 167 Crossclaim by the Agency Defendants against Edwin Gould on the ground that neither consent nor leave of court was obtained as requred by FRCP 15(a) filed by Edwin Gould Services for Children. (Catalano, Thomas) (Entered: 08/12/2010)

08/13/2010

ORDER denying 170 Motion to Strike. To prevail on a motion to strike, a party must demonstrate that "(1) no evidence in support of the allegations would be admissible; (2) that the allegations have no bearing on the issues in the case; and (3) that to permit the allegations to stand would result in prejudice to the movant." Roe v. City of N.Y., 151 F. Supp. 2d 495, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Upon review of the parties' letter submissions, the Court is not persuaded that third party defendant Edwin Gould Services has been prejudiced by first party defendants' untimely assertion of cross−claims for contribution. Third party defendant may move to dismiss the cross−claims in accordance with the schedule set forth in the June 9, 2010 minute entry. Ordered by Judge Eric N. Vitaliano on 8/13/2010. (Feirman, Jordan) (Entered: 08/13/2010)

08/16/2010 173 NOTICE by S.W. of Expert Witness Disclosure (Liability and Damages) (Talenfeld, Howard) (Entered: 08/16/2010)

08/17/2010 174 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on 7/15/10, before Judge Go. Court Transcriber TYPEWRITE WORD PROCESSING SERVICE, Telephone number 718−966−1401. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court

Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 9/7/2010. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/17/2010. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/15/2010. (Hong, Loan) (Entered: 08/17/2010)

08/18/2010 175 Letter to Honorable Marilyn D. Go by City of New York (Strikowsky, Bruce) (Entered: 08/18/2010)

08/20/2010 176 Letter to Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go by City of New York (Strikowsky, Bruce) (Entered: 08/20/2010)

08/23/2010 177 Letter to Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go by City of New York (Strikowsky, Bruce) (Entered: 08/23/2010)

08/23/2010 178 ANSWER to 167 Crossclaim of the Agency Defendants by Edwin Gould Services for Children. (Catalano, Thomas) (Entered: 08/23/2010)

08/25/2010 179 Letter RE: DISCOVERY ISSUES by S.W. (Talenfeld, Howard) (Entered: 08/25/2010)

08/25/2010 180 Letter Amended Letter to Judge Go Re: Discovery Issues, with Attached Exhibits by S.W. (Talenfeld, Howard) Modified on 9/2/2010 (Abdallah, Fida). (Entered: 08/25/2010)

08/26/2010 181 Letter responding to ltr by plaintiffs' counsel 8−25−2010 by Edwin Gould Services for Children (Catalano, Thomas) (Entered: 08/26/2010)

08/26/2010 182 Letter to Magistrate Judge Go by City of New York (Strikowsky, Bruce) (Entered: 08/26/2010)

08/26/2010

ORDER: To the extent that formal court approval is necessary, the 169 Letter filed by the City defendants is "so ordered." Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 8/26/2010. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 08/26/2010)

08/30/2010

SCHEDULING ORDER: a telephone conference will be held on 9/1/10 at 12:00 p.m. to discuss the issues raised in 180 plaintiffs' motion to compel. Prior to the conference, the parties are directed to confer in an effort to resolve the dispute. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 8/30/2010. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 08/30/2010)

09/01/2010 183 Letter to Magistrate Judge Go by C.B., J.B., J.L., L.J. and J.G., S.B. and R.E., S.W., T.L. (Nothenberg, Shirim) (Entered: 09/01/2010)

09/01/2010

Minute entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 9/1/2010. Appearances by Theodore Babbitt, Howard Talenfeld and Shirim Nothenberg for plaintiffs; Carl Schaerf for the City defendants; Margo Gallagher for the Agency defendants; Thomas Catalano and Curt Shiner for Edwin Gould Svs.; Sonya Smith−Valentine for Bowes; Patrick Mevs for Squitteri. Argument heard and rulings made granting 180 the plaintiffs motion to compel to the extent discussed. The City defendants agree to stipulate to the authenticity of any documents produced by them in this litigation that were created by any agency of the City of New York. The parties must confer on stipulating to the authenticity of other categories of documents produced by the City defendants in this litigation. To the extent that the City defendants will not stipulate to the authenticity of any document produced by the City in the Marisol litigation that were created by any agency of the City of New York and is responsive to plaintiffs' document requests, the City defendants must produce a complete copy of the document by 9/22/10. The City defendants will file a letter by 9/8/10 as to its position on the use in this litigation of depositions taken in the Marisol litigation. The plaintiffs must reformulate their document requests concerning the Graber litigation by 9/3/10 and the City defendants must respond by 9/22/10. The deposition of Ms. Graber will be completed by 9/30/10. On the consent of the parties, the fact discovery deadline is extended to 9/30/10, the plaintiffs' expert reports are due on 10/29/10 and the defendants' expert reports are due on 11/20/10. If the City defendants intend to retain experts other than in rebuttal, they must serve notice designating such experts, their qualifications and the subject matter to be addressed by 9/30/10. The City defendants will voluntarily discontinue their third party claims against Squitteri. To the extent plaintiffs' September 1, 2010 letter sets forth agreements by the parties, it is "so ordered." (Tape #ESR 10/23 2296−10/24 3124 and FTR/C 12:05−1:42.) (Proujansky, Josh) (Modified on 9/2/2010 to correct date

conference held (Kuzycz, Motria). (Entered: 09/02/2010)

09/03/2010 184 ORDER. This Order concerns a subpoena served on Judith Leekin, defaulting Third Party Defendant. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 9/3/2010. See attached for details. (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 09/03/2010)

09/03/2010 185 NOTICE of Appearance by Howard M. Talenfeld on behalf of S.W. (notification declined or already on case) (Talenfeld, Howard) (Entered: 09/03/2010)

09/07/2010 186 Letter MOTION to Amend/Correct/Supplement Order on Motion for Discovery, Discovery Hearing,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, by City of New York. (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 09/07/2010)

09/07/2010 187 Letter MOTION for Protective Order by City of New York. (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 09/07/2010)

09/07/2010

ORDER granting 186 Motion to Amend/Correct/Supplement. The minute entry for the conference held on 9/1/10 is amended to correct the date for the defendants' expert reports from 11/20/10 to 11/30/10. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 9/7/2010. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 09/07/2010)

09/08/2010 188 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on 8/2/10, before Judge Go. Court Transcriber TYPEWRITE WORD PROCESSING SERVICE, Telephone number 718−966−1401. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 9/29/2010. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/12/2010. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/7/2010. (Hong, Loan) (Entered: 09/08/2010)

09/08/2010 189 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on 8/12/10, before Judge Go. Court Transcriber TYPEWRITE WORD PROCESSING SERVICE, Telephone number 718−966−1401. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 9/29/2010. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/12/2010. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/7/2010. (Hong, Loan) (Entered: 09/08/2010)

09/08/2010 190 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on September 1, 2010, before Judge Go. Court Transcriber ARIA TRANSCRIPTIONS, Telephone number (215) 767−7700. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 9/29/2010. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/12/2010. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/7/2010. (Rocco, Christine) (Entered: 09/08/2010)

09/08/2010 191 Letter to Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go by City of New York (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 09/08/2010)

09/09/2010 192 RESPONSE in Opposition re 187 Letter MOTION for Protective Order Letter response filed by C.B., J.B., J.L., L.J. and J.G., S.B. and R.E., S.W., T.L.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A Amended Complaint in US v City of New York, # 2 Exhibit B February 27, 1992, correspondence to Commissioner Sabol, # 3 Exhibit C Part 1 Deposition of Bracha Graber, # 4 Exhibit C Part 2 Deposition of Bracha Graber, # 5 Exhibit D Plaintiff's Demand Trial by Jury) (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 09/09/2010)

09/10/2010

SCHEDULING ORDER: a telephone conference will be held on 9/14/10 at 1:00 p.m. to discuss the defendants' 187 motion for a protective order. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 9/10/2010. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 09/10/2010)

09/10/2010 193 Letter MOTION for Sanctions by C.B., J.B., J.L., L.J. and J.G., S.B. and R.E., S.W., T.L.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit Exhibit K, # 12 Exhibit Exhibit L, # 13 Exhibit Exhibit M, # 14 Exhibit Exhibit N) (Nothenberg, Shirim) (Entered: 09/10/2010)

09/13/2010 194 REPLY to Response to Motion re 187 Letter MOTION for Protective Order filed by City of New York. (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 09/13/2010)

09/13/2010 195 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on 4/30/10, before Judge Go. Court Transcriber TYPEWRITE WORD PROCESSING SERVICE, Telephone number 718−966−1401. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 10/4/2010. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/14/2010. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/13/2010. (Hong, Loan) (Entered: 09/13/2010)

09/15/2010 196 Minute Order entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 9/14/10. Appearances by Howard Talenfeld, Susan Lambiase, Ami Romanelli, Jennifer Pearl for plaintiffs; Carl Schaerf, Bruce Strikowsky for City of New York; Robert Delmond for agency defendants; Thomas Catalano for Edwin Gould Srvs. Argument heard and rulings made on the record granting in part and denying in part 187 the City defendants' motion for a protective order to the extent discussed. The City defendants must respond to all document requests, but limitations placed on production, as summarized in attached minute order. Plaintiffs agree to withdraw, without prejudice, that portion of 193 their motion filed on 9/10/10 seeking sanctions. The City defendants must file their response to the remainder of such motion by 9/24/10 and the plaintiffs' reply is due 9/29/10. If, after further attempts, the plaintiffs cannot resolve their other pending discovery disputes, plaintiffs shall file a further motion to compel by 9/24/10. Any opposition must be filed by 9/29/10. Discovery is extended for the purpose of taking Judith Leekin's deposition and completing the Graber deposition, which shall be held after production of the documents by the City defendants from the Graber litigation files. Next conference is adjourned to 10/4/10 at 4:00 p.m. (Tape #ESR 10/25 1046−10/26 3719 and FTR/C 1:06−2:43.) (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 09/15/2010)

09/15/2010 197 Letter MOTION for Discovery by C.B., J.B., J.L., L.J. and J.G., S.B. and R.E., S.W., T.L.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E Part 1, # 6 Exhibit E Part 2, # 7 Exhibit E Part 3, # 8 Exhibit E Part 4, # 9 Exhibit E Part 5, # 10 Exhibit E Part 6, # 11 Exhibit E Part 7, # 12 Exhibit E Part 8, # 13 Exhibit F Part 1, # 14 Exhibit F Part 2, # 15 Exhibit F Part 3, # 16 Exhibit F Part 4, # 17 Exhibit F Part 5, # 18 Exhibit F Part 6, # 19 Exhibit F Part 7) (Lambiase, Susan) (Entered: 09/15/2010)

09/16/2010

ORDER withdrawing 193 Motion for Sanctions without prejudcie in light the 197 Motion for Discovery which plaintiffs filed in substitution. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 9/16/2010. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 09/16/2010)

09/16/2010

Clerk's ENTRY OF DEFAULT as to Sabrina Collins, Claudette Jackson, Anthony Vernon Leekin, Judith Leekin, Rhonda Morgan, pursuant to Rule55(a) of the Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure. (Hamilton, Janet) (Entered: 09/16/2010)

09/23/2010 198 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on September 14, 2010, before Judge Go. Court Transcriber TypeWrite Word Processing Service, Telephone number (518) 581−8973. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 10/14/2010. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/25/2010. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/22/2010. (Rocco, Christine) (Entered: 09/23/2010)

09/23/2010 199 Letter to Magistrate Judge Go by City of New York (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 09/23/2010)

09/23/2010 200 Letter dated 9/21/2010 from Rhonda R. Morgan to Judge Go. (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 09/23/2010)

09/24/2010 201 RESPONSE in Opposition re 197 Letter MOTION for Discovery filed by Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Gallagher, Margo) (Entered: 09/24/2010)

09/24/2010 202 Letter Letter to Judge Go re Discovery by S.W. (Talenfeld, Howard) (Entered: 09/24/2010)

09/24/2010

SCHEDULING ORDER: Plaintiffs' 202 Letter request for an extension of time for filing their motion to compel is granted. The motion must be filed by 10/1/10 and any opposition by 10/6/10. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 9/24/2010. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 09/24/2010)

09/24/2010 203 Letter Letter to Judge Go re Motion for Protective Order by C.B., J.B., J.L., S.B. and R.E., S.W., T.L. (Nothenberg, Shirim) (Entered: 09/24/2010)

09/24/2010 204 RESPONSE in Opposition re 197 Letter MOTION for Discovery filed by City of New York. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C) (Strikowsky, Bruce) (Entered: 09/24/2010)

09/24/2010 205 STIPULATION of Dismissal Discontinuing Third Party Action by Ralph Squitteri (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Discontinuing Third Party Action) (Kutner, Charles) (Entered: 09/24/2010)

09/29/2010 206 REPLY in Support re 197 Letter MOTION for Discovery filed by C.B., J.B., J.L., L.J. and J.G., S.B. and R.E., S.W., T.L.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit B Part 1, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit B Part 2, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit C Part 1, # 5 Exhibit Exhibit C Part 2, # 6 Exhibit Exhibit D Part 1, # 7 Exhibit Exhibit D Part 2, # 8 Exhibit Exhibit E Part 1, # 9 Exhibit Exhibit E Part 2, # 10 Exhibit Exhibit F Part 1, # 11 Exhibit Exhibit F Part 2, # 12 Exhibit Exhibit F Part 3, # 13 Exhibit Exhibit G Part 1, # 14 Exhibit Exhibit G Part 2, # 15 Exhibit Exhibit G Part 3, # 16 Exhibit Exhibit H Part 1, # 17 Exhibit Exhibit H Part 2, # 18 Exhibit Exhibit I Part 1, # 19 Exhibit Exhibit I Part 2, # 20 Exhibit Exhibit J, # 21 Exhibit Exhibit K, # 22 Exhibit Exhibit L Part 1, # 23 Exhibit Exhibit L Part 2, # 24 Exhibit Exhibit M, # 25 Exhibit Exhibit N Part 1, # 26 Exhibit Exhibit N Part 2, # 27 Exhibit Exhibit O Part 1, # 28 Exhibit Exhibit O Part 2, # 29 Exhibit Exhibit P Part 1, # 30 Exhibit Exhibit P Part 2, # 31 Exhibit Exhibit Q Part 1, # 32 Exhibit Exhibit Q Part 2, # 33 Exhibit Exhibit R Part 1, # 34 Exhibit Exhibit R Part 2, # 35 Exhibit Exhibit S, # 36 Exhibit Exhibit T Part 1, # 37 Exhibit Exhibit T Part 2, # 38 Exhibit Exhibit U Part 1, # 39 Exhibit Exhibit U Part 2, # 40 Exhibit Exhibit V Part 1, # 41 Exhibit Exhibit V Part 2, # 42 Exhibit Exhibit W Part 1, # 43 Exhibit Exhibit W Part 2, # 44 Exhibit Exhibit X, # 45 Exhibit Exhibit Y Part 1, # 46 Exhibit Exhibit Y Part 2, # 47 Exhibit Exhibit Z Part 1, # 48 Exhibit Exhibit Z Part 2, # 49 Exhibit Exhibit AA Part 1, # 50 Exhibit Exhibit AA Part 2, # 51 Exhibit Exhibit BB Part 1, # 52 Exhibit Exhibit BB Part 2, # 53 Exhibit Exhibit BB Part 3, # 54 Exhibit Exhibit CC, # 55 Exhibit Exhibit DD Part 1, # 56 Exhibit Exhibit DD Part 2, # 57 Exhibit Exhibit EE Part 1, # 58 Exhibit Exhibit EE Part 2, # 59 Exhibit Exhibit FF Part 1, # 60 Exhibit Exhibit FF Part 2) (Nothenberg, Shirim) (Entered: 09/29/2010)

10/01/2010 207 Letter To Magistrate Judge Go by C.B., J.B., J.L., L.J. and J.G., S.B. and R.E., S.W., T.L. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C) (Lambiase, Susan) (Entered: 10/01/2010)

10/05/2010

ORDER granting 160 Motion to Amend/Correct/Supplement. Edwin Gould's production is court ordered and subject to the provisions of [82−1] confidentiality order. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 10/5/2010. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 10/05/2010)

10/06/2010

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 10/4/10. Appearances by Theodore Babbitt, Howard Talenfeld, Jennifer Pearl and Susan Lambiase for plaintiffs; Carl Schaerf, Bruce Strikowsky, Matthew Kelly and Allison Fihma for City defendants; Robert Delmond for agency defendants; Thomas Catalano and Curt Schiner for Edwin Gould and Kevin Brennan for Carole Leekin. Argument heard regarding 197 plaintiffs motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(8). Plaintiffs must revise their line/page designations of non−City depositions and defendants must respond to the plaintiffs arguments regarding City deponents by 10/14/10. The plaintiffs reply regarding City deponents and the defendants response to plaintiffs revised designations is due on 10/21/10. Any reply regarding non−City deponents must be filed by 10/25/10. The City defendants must produce the Marisol documents discussed by 10/8/10. Plaintiffs must file a letter identifying which Marisol documents that have not been produced or stipulated to that were created by a City agency. Defendants must produce the Graber documents on a rolling basis with the first production due on 10/12/10, the second production on 10/18/10 and the final production by 10/25/10. The agency defendants must supplement their responses to the City defendants by 10/8/10. Next conference scheduled for 10/27/10 at 4:00 p.m. (Tape #FTR 4:00−5:30.) (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 10/06/2010)

10/08/2010 208 STIPULATION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL: This action is dismissed against Third−Party Defendant Squitieri with prejudice, and without costs, expenses, or fees. Ordered by Judge Eric N. Vitaliano on 10/7/2010. (Brucella, Michelle) (Entered: 10/08/2010)

10/08/2010 209 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on October 4, 2010, before Judge Go. Court Transcriber TypeWrite Word Processing Service, Telephone number (518) 581−8973. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 10/29/2010. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/8/2010. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/6/2011. (Rocco, Christine) (Entered: 10/08/2010)

10/08/2010 210 MOTION for Summary Judgment under Rule 56 and for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), notice of motion by Edwin Gould Services for Children. (Catalano, Thomas) (Entered: 10/08/2010)

10/08/2010 211 RULE 56.1 STATEMENT re 210 MOTION for Summary Judgment under Rule 56 and for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), notice of motion filed by Edwin Gould Services for Children. (Catalano, Thomas) (Entered: 10/08/2010)

10/08/2010 212 AFFIDAVIT/DECLARATION in Support re 210 MOTION for Summary Judgment under Rule 56 and for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), notice of motion of Thomas A. Catalano filed by Edwin Gould Services for Children. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−compl in main action, # 2 Exhibit B−amended third−party compl, # 3 Exhibit C−answer to third−pary compl, # 4 Exhibit D−Agency dfts cross−claim and answer, # 5 Exhibit E−home studies (redacted), # 6 Exhibit F−City's ans to interrogatories and resp to notice to produce, # 7 Exhibit G−Leekin SCR clearance, # 8 Exhibit H−indemnity provision, # 9 Exhibit I−progress note (redacted)) (Catalano, Thomas) (Entered: 10/08/2010)

10/08/2010 213 MEMORANDUM in Support re 210 MOTION for Summary Judgment under Rule 56 and for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), notice of motion filed by Edwin Gould Services for Children. (Catalano, Thomas) (Entered: 10/08/2010)

10/08/2010 214 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Thelma Bowes. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Main Complaint, # 2 Exhibit B − Third Party Complaint by City of New York, # 3 Exhibit C − Third Party Complaint by Agency Defendants, # 4 Exhibit D − Answer and Cross Claim by Edwin Gould, # 5 Exhibit E − Answer and Cross Claim by Ishmattie Nagassar/Asman, # 6 Exhibit F − Affidavit of Thelma Bowes, # 7 Exhibit G − City of New York Answers to Bowes Discovery Requests, # 8 Exhibit H − Agency Defendants' Answers to Bowes Discovery Requests) (Smith−Valentine, Sonya) (Entered: 10/08/2010)

10/08/2010 215 DECLARATION re 214 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Thelma Bowes (Smith−Valentine, Sonya) (Entered: 10/08/2010)

10/08/2010 216 RULE 56.1 STATEMENT re 214 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Thelma Bowes. (Smith−Valentine, Sonya) (Entered: 10/08/2010)

10/11/2010 217 Letter to Magistrate Judge Go re: updated subpoenas by City of New York (Kelly, Matthew) (Entered: 10/11/2010)

10/13/2010 218 Letter to Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go by City of New York (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 10/13/2010)

10/13/2010

SCHEDULING ORDER: re 66 MOTION for Protective Order filed by Administration for Children's Services, City of New York. The privilege log attached to the DOI's affidavit indicates that plaintiffs challenge the assertion of privilege as to documents numbered 17−19 and 195−96. However, those documents were not included in the City's in camera production and were not specifically discussed in the plaintiffs' opposition. Plaintiffs must promptly notify the City whether they challenge the privilege claims as to those documents and, if so, the City must promptly produce those documents for in camera review. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 10/13/2010. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 10/13/2010)

10/13/2010 219 REPLY in Support re 197 Letter MOTION for Discovery filed by C.B., J.B., J.L., L.J. and J.G., S.B. and R.E., S.W., T.L.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A) (Lambiase, Susan)

(Entered: 10/13/2010)

10/14/2010 220 Letter to Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go by City of New York (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 10/14/2010)

10/19/2010 221 Letter to Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go by City of New York (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 10/19/2010)

10/21/2010 222 Letter to Magistrate Judge Go concerning plaintiffs' proposed "designation" of "State Witnesses" from the Marisol A. litigation by City of New York (Kelly, Matthew) (Entered: 10/21/2010)

10/21/2010 223 Letter MOTION to Adjourn Conference of October 27 by C.B., J.B., J.L., L.J. and J.G., S.B. and R.E., S.W., T.L.. (Nothenberg, Shirim) (Entered: 10/21/2010)

10/21/2010

ORDER granting 223 Motion to Adjourn Conference: Conference is adjourned to 11/5/2010, at 9:30 a.m. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 10/21/2010. (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 10/21/2010)

10/21/2010 224 REPLY in Support re 197 Letter MOTION for Discovery filed by C.B., J.B., J.L., L.J. and J.G., S.B. and R.E., S.W., T.L.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A) (Nothenberg, Shirim) (Entered: 10/21/2010)

10/22/2010

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go: Discovery Hearing held on 10/22/2010. Appearances by Theodore Babbitt for plaintiffs; Carl Schaerf for the City defendants; Robert Delmond for the Agency defendants; Judith Leekin, defendant. Rulings made on the record regarding questioning of Judith Leekin. (FTR/C 9:17 − 9:23; ESR: 10/29 5876 − 6580. 2nd Call: Discussions held re deposition of Judith Leekin. (FTR/C 1:17 − 1:25; ESR: 10/29 134−634) Modified on 10/26/2010 to include FTR Time for 2nd call. (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 10/22/2010)

10/22/2010 225 REPLY in Support re 197 Letter MOTION for Discovery filed by C.B., J.B., J.L., L.J. and J.G., S.B. and R.E., S.W., T.L.. (Lambiase, Susan) (Entered: 10/22/2010)

10/28/2010 226 Letter MOTION for Discovery response to request to produce by S.W.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Emails between counsel) (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 10/28/2010)

10/28/2010 227 RESPONSE to Motion re 226 Letter MOTION for Discovery response to request to produce filed by City of New York. (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 10/28/2010)

10/28/2010

ORDER denying as moot 226 Motion for Discovery. The City has offered to show plaintiffs the DVD it received and it must do so, at the latest, immediately prior to the conference scheduled for 11/5/10. The parties are directed to confer on a mutually convenient time for the viewing. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 10/28/2010. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 10/28/2010)

10/28/2010 228 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on 10/22/2010, before Judge Go. Court Transcriber ARIA TRANSCRIPTIONS, Telephone number 215−767−7700. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 11/18/2010. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/29/2010. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/26/2011. (Hong, Loan) (Entered: 10/28/2010)

11/03/2010 229 Letter to Magistrate Go, regarding City's request for our consent to a modification of the briefing scheduling for the third−party action dispositive motions by Edwin Gould Services for Children (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit) (Catalano, Thomas) (Entered: 11/03/2010)

11/03/2010 230 Letter to Magistrate Judge Go serving as a statement of City defendant's agenda for the upcoming conference by City of New York (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 11/03/2010)

11/03/2010 231 Letter (Brennan, Kevin) (Entered: 11/03/2010)

11/04/2010 232 Letter regarding the City's request for an extension of time to respond to dispositive motions by Thelma Bowes (Smith−Valentine, Sonya) (Entered: 11/04/2010)

11/04/2010 233 Letter by C.B., J.B., J.L., L.J. and J.G., S.B. and R.E., S.W., T.L. (Attachments: # 1 Chart of City Documents Needing Authentication, # 2 Chart of Non−City Documents

Needing Authentication) (Nothenberg, Shirim) (Entered: 11/04/2010)

11/05/2010

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go: Motion Hearing/Status Conference held on 11/5/2010. Appearances by Theodore Babbitt, Jennifer Pearl (by tel), Susan Lambiase, Ami Romanelli, Melissa Cohen and Shirim Rothenberg for plaintiffs; Carl Schaerf, Bruce Strikowsky, Matthew Kelly and Allison Fihma for City defendants; Robert Delmond for agency defendants; Thomas Catalano and Curt Schiner for Edwin Gould and Sonya Smith−Valentine for Thelma Bowes. Rulings made on the record granting 197 plaintiffs' motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(8), as to be further discussed in an order to follow. Plaintiffs must produce documents and privilege log regarding "systemic" documents requested by defendants by 11/12/10. Defendants must respond to plaintiff's list of City documents to be authenticated by 11/19/10. Plaintiffs must complete authentication depositions for non−City documents by 1/31/11. Plaintiffs must serve their motion to strike third party claims by 11/16/10; responses to plaintiffs' motion and third party defendants' motions to dismiss must be served by 12/6/10 and any reply served by 12/20/10 and filed thereafter in accordance with Judge Vitaliano's rules. Discovery concerning third party defendants must be completed by 1/31/11. Edwin Gould must provide within one week of a request the last know addresses for any employee no longer employed by the agency. Defendants must identify the type(s) of expert(s) they intend to use, including area of expertise, and the subject matter or topics the expert will address. Plaintiffs must serve their expert report by 12/3/10; defendants' expert report regarding identification must be served by 1/14/11; defendants' expert report regarding other issues must be served by 1/31/11. Depositions of experts shall be conducted beginning one week after service of defendants' expert report on a particular subject and expert depositions completed by 3/11/11. Defendants' pre−motion letters must be served by 2/18/11 and response by 3/4/11. FTR 9:54−11:09 and ESR 10/38 3080 − 10/39 end. (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 11/16/2010)

11/08/2010 234 Letter MOTION to Compel the deposition of Rhonda Morgan by City of New York. (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 11/08/2010)

11/12/2010 235 Letter MOTION for Protective Order to Magistrate Judge Go, seeking an order (a) striking the Citys Rule 30(b)(6) notice; and (b) precluding the City from taking the non−party depositions of Edwin Goulds former employees pending the outcome of the third−party dispositive motions by Edwin Gould Services for Children. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Rule 30(b)(6) notice by City to Edwin Gould, # 2 Exhibit ltr requesting last known addresses of employees, # 3 ltr from SCR on Leekin clearance) (Catalano, Thomas) (Entered: 11/12/2010)

11/15/2010 236 Letter to Judge Eric N. Vitaliano by Administration for Children's Services, City of New York (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 11/15/2010)

11/15/2010 237 MOTION to Strike by S.W.. (Talenfeld, Howard) (Entered: 11/15/2010)

11/17/2010 238 ORDER re 234 Motion to Compel: RHONDA MORGAN is hereby ORDERED to comply with the subpoena served upon her. She must immediately call Bruce Strikowsky or Carl Schaerf, the attorneys for the City defendants, to arrange for a mutually convenient date for her to appear at a deposition to give testimony and to produce documents requested by the subpoena. She must call these attorneys by December 1, 2010 and appear for a deposition to be held on or before December 30, 2010. RHONDA MORGAN is warned that if she fails to comply with this order, she could be subject to contempt proceedings for failure to respond to the subpoena and this order. If found to be in contempt of the subpoena or this order, she could be subject to sanctions, including imposition of a monetary fine, attorneys fees and costs. If the failure to comply continues, the court could issue a warrant of arrest for failure to comply with a court order. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 11/17/2010. C/M to Rhonda Morgan at 451 Fulton Street, Apt. 3, Hempstead, New York 11501. (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 11/17/2010)

11/18/2010

SCHEDULING ORDER: re 235 Letter MOTION for Protective Order. Any response to this motion must be filed by 11/23/10. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 11/18/2010. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 11/18/2010)

11/18/2010 239 ORDER granting 197 Motion for Discovery. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 11/18/2010. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 11/18/2010)

11/22/2010 240 RESPONSE to Motion re 235 Letter MOTION for Protective Order to Magistrate Judge Go, seeking an order (a) striking the Citys Rule 30(b)(6) notice; and (b) precluding the City from taking the non−party depositions of Edwin Goulds former employees pending the outcome of the thiLetter MOTION for Protective Order to Magistrate Judge Go, seeking an order (a) striking the Citys Rule 30(b)(6) notice; and (b) precluding the City from taking the non−party depositions of Edwin Goulds former employees pending the outcome of the thiLetter MOTION for Protective Order to Magistrate Judge Go, seeking an order (a) striking the Citys Rule 30(b)(6) notice; and (b) precluding the City from taking the non−party depositions of Edwin Goulds former employees pending the outcome of the thi filed by City of New York. (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 11/22/2010)

11/23/2010 241 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on November 5, 2010, before Judge Go. Court Transcriber ARIA TRANSCRIPTIONS, Telephone number 215−767−7700. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 12/14/2010. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/24/2010. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/21/2011. (Rocco, Christine) (Entered: 11/23/2010)

11/23/2010

SCHEDULING ORDER: a telephone conference will be held re 235 Letter MOTION for Protective Order filed by Edwin Gould Services for Children on 11/30/10 at 3:30 p.m. The movant should initiate the conference call with the City defendants. Any other parties that wish to participate should make arrangements with counsel for Edwin Gould. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 11/23/2010. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 11/23/2010)

11/24/2010 242 Letter MOTION to Compel by City of New York. (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 11/24/2010)

11/30/2010

Minute Order for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go: Motion Hearing held on 11/30/2010. Appearances by Jennifer Pearl for plaintiff; Carl Schaerf for City defendants; Robert Delmond for agency defendants; Thomas Catalano for Edwin Gould. Rulings made on the record granting in part and denying in part 235 Edwin Gould's motion for protective order. The City defendants may depose Edwin Gould's former employees who had direct contact with Judith Leekin and/or visited Leekin's Laurelton home. The 30(b)(6) notice served on Edwin Gould is stayed pending disposition of the third−party dispositive motions. Plaintiffs' response to the City defendants' motion to compel 242 is due 12/1/10. (FTR/C 3:31−3:38 and ESR 10/32 2456−2972) (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 11/30/2010)

12/01/2010 243 RESPONSE in Opposition re 242 Letter MOTION to Compel Production of Systemic Documents listed on Plaintiffs Privilege Log filed by S.W.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit) (Talenfeld, Howard) (Entered: 12/01/2010)

12/02/2010 244 Letter to Judge Eric N. Vitaliano in further support of its November 15, 2010 submission seeking relief pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72 by City of New York (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 12/02/2010)

12/06/2010 245 RESPONSE in Opposition re 214 MOTION for Summary Judgment of Defendant Thelma Bowes filed by Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F − Part 1 of 2, # 7 Exhibit F − Part 2 of 2, # 8 Exhibit G, # 9 Exhibit H − Part 1 of 3, # 10 Exhibit H − Part 2 of 3, # 11 Exhibit H − Part 3 of 3, # 12 Exhibit I, # 13 Exhibit J, # 14 Exhibit K, # 15 Exhibit L, # 16 Exhibit M, # 17 Exhibit N, # 18 Exhibit O) (Delmond, Robert) (Entered: 12/06/2010)

12/06/2010 246 STIPULATION of Dismissal of Third−Party Claims Against Carole Lee Kin (Brennan, Kevin) (Entered: 12/06/2010)

12/07/2010 247 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Agency Defendants' Opposition to Third−Party Defendant Bowes' Motion for Summary Judgment by Renato Guy served on Ishmatee Nagassar/Asman and Cheryl Jack on 12/06/2010, filed by Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Delmond, Robert) (Entered: 12/07/2010)

12/13/2010 248 First MOTION to Seal Document 245 Response in Opposition to Motion,, by Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Delmond, Robert) (Entered: 12/13/2010)

12/13/2010 249 MOTION for New Trial to Set for Trial by S.W.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Magistrate Judge Go's Minute Entry) (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 12/13/2010)

12/14/2010 250 Mail, copy of minute entry dated 11/30/10, sent to Rhonda Morgan at 451 Fulton Ave, Apt 32A, Hempstead, NY 11550, Returned as Undeliverable. (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 12/14/2010)

12/15/2010 251 ORDER denying 242 Motion to Compel. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 12/15/2010. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 12/15/2010)

12/16/2010

ORDER granting 248 Motion to Seal the 245 Response in Opposition to Motion filed by the Agency defendants, but only to the following extent. The main document in opposition, 245 , will be sealed. However, in light of the First Amendment right of access to court proceedings and the Court's previous instruction that the parties must minimize the number of documents filed under seal, movant must fax to my chambers by the close of business on 12/17/10 the specific exhibits to 245 which should be sealed. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 12/16/2010. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 12/16/2010)

12/16/2010 252 Letter MOTION to Vacate pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72 objecting to Magistrate Judge Go's ruling dated November 5, 2010 by City of New York. (Attachments: # 1 11−15−2010 Cover Letter to Judge Vitaliano, # 2 12−2−2010 Letter to Judge Vitaliano, # 3 12−9−2010 Letter to Judge Vitaliano re Rule 72 Objection, # 4 12−9−2010 Cover Letter to Judge Vitaliano, # 5 Exhibit Ex A − 2010 09 15 Letter Motion for Discovery − AS FILED, # 6 Exhibit Ex B − 2010 09 29 Rule 32 Reply − AS FILED, # 7 Exhibit Ex C − Pages from 2010 11 05 Court Hearing Transcript, # 8 Exhibit Ex D − 2010 11 18 Order re rulings made at the 2010 11 05 Hearing, # 9 Exhibit Ex E − 2010 12 03 FINAL Gunn Report, # 10 12−16−2010 Letter Reply to Judge Vitaliano) (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 12/16/2010)

12/20/2010 253 STIPULATION of Dismissal of Cross−Claims against Carole Lee Kin (Brennan, Kevin) (Entered: 12/20/2010)

12/20/2010 254 AFFIDAVIT/DECLARATION in Opposition re 210 MOTION for Summary Judgment under Rule 56 and for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), notice of motion filed by Edwin Gould Services for Children. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K, # 12 Exhibit L, # 13 Exhibit M, # 14 Exhibit N, # 15 Exhibit O, # 16 Exhibit P, # 17 Exhibit Q, # 18 Exhibit R, # 19 Exhibit S, # 20 Exhibit T, # 21 Exhibit U, # 22 Exhibit V, # 23 Exhibit W, # 24 Exhibit X) (Catalano, Thomas) (Entered: 12/20/2010)

12/20/2010 255 AFFIDAVIT/DECLARATION in Opposition re 210 MOTION for Summary Judgment under Rule 56 and for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), notice of motion Declaration of Raphael Asusta filed by Edwin Gould Services for Children. (Catalano, Thomas) (Entered: 12/20/2010)

12/20/2010 256 RULE 56.1 STATEMENT re 210 MOTION for Summary Judgment under Rule 56 and for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), notice of motion (in oppostion) response to Rule 56.1 Statement filed by Edwin Gould Services for Children. (Catalano, Thomas) (Entered: 12/20/2010)

12/20/2010 257 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 210 MOTION for Summary Judgment under Rule 56 and for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), notice of motion filed by Edwin Gould Services for Children. (Catalano, Thomas) (Entered: 12/20/2010)

12/20/2010 258 REPLY in Support re 210 MOTION for Summary Judgment under Rule 56 and for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), notice of motion reply memorandum of law filed by Edwin Gould Services for Children. (Catalano, Thomas) (Entered: 12/20/2010)

12/20/2010 259 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 214 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Administration for Children's Services, City of New York. (Smith−Valentine, Sonya) (Entered: 12/20/2010)

12/20/2010 260 AFFIDAVIT/DECLARATION in Opposition re 214 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Administration for Children's Services, City of New York. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K, # 12 Exhibit L, # 13 Exhibit M, # 14 Exhibit N, # 15 Exhibit O, # 16 Exhibit P) (Smith−Valentine, Sonya) (Entered: 12/20/2010)
12/20/2010 261 Letter re voluntary dismissals of all claims against Carole Lee Kin (Brennan, Kevin) (Entered: 12/20/2010)
12/20/2010 262 RULE 56.1 STATEMENT re 214 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Administration for Children's Services, City of New York. (Smith−Valentine, Sonya) (Entered: 12/20/2010)
12/20/2010 263 REPLY in Support re 214 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Thelma Bowes. (Smith−Valentine, Sonya) (Entered: 12/20/2010)
12/20/2010 264 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 214 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.(a New York Corporation). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F − Part 1, # 7 Exhibit F − Part 2, # 8 Exhibit G − Part 1, # 9 Exhibit G − Part 2, # 10 Exhibit G − Part 3, # 11 Exhibit G − Part 4, # 12 Exhibit H − Part 1, # 13 Exhibit H − Part 2, # 14 Exhibit H − Part 3, # 15 Exhibit H − Part 4, # 16 Exhibit H − Part 5, # 17 Exhibit H − Part 6, # 18 Exhibit I, # 19 Exhibit J, # 20 Exhibit K, # 21 Exhibit L, # 22 Exhibit M − Part 1, # 23 Exhibit M − Part 2, # 24 Exhibit N, # 25 Exhibit O) (Smith−Valentine, Sonya) (Entered: 12/20/2010)
12/20/2010 265 Plaintiff's Corrected MOTION to Strike, correcting #237 Motion, by S.W. (Talenfeld, Howard) Modified to correct event and descriptive text on 12/21/2010 (Lee, Tiffeny). (Entered: 12/20/2010)
12/20/2010 266 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re Plaintiff's 265 Corrected MOTION to Strike filed by City of New York. (Talenfeld, Howard) Modified descriptive text on 12/21/2010 (Lee, Tiffeny). (Entered: 12/20/2010)
12/20/2010 267 AFFIDAVIT/DECLARATION in Opposition re Plaintiff's 265 Corrected MOTION to Strike filed by City of New York. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit) (Talenfeld, Howard) Modified descriptive text on 12/21/2010 (Lee, Tiffeny). (Entered: 12/20/2010)
12/20/2010 268 REPLY in Support re Plaintiff's 265 Corrected MOTION to Strike filed by S.W. (Talenfeld, Howard) Modified descriptive text on 12/21/2010 (Lee, Tiffeny). (Entered: 12/20/2010)
12/21/2010 269 Letter to Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go by City of New York (Kelly, Matthew) (Entered: 12/21/2010)
12/22/2010 270 CONFIDENTIALITY AND PROTECTIVE ORDER. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 12/22/2010. (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 12/22/2010)
12/22/2010 271 Letter dated 12/17/10, from the Social Security Administration to Matthew J. Kelly, Jr. (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 12/22/2010)
12/29/2010 272 ORDER: The parties are directed to confer with each other and file by January 7, 2011 a stipulated list of all parties and claims asserted, including identification of the parties that have been dismissed or are in default. Upon receipt of the stipulated list, the Clerk of Court shall update and correct the Court's docket sheet accordingly. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 12/29/2010. See attached for further details. (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 12/29/2010)
01/07/2011 273 Letter To Magistrate Judge Go requesting an extension of time to exchange defense expert reports by City of New York (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 01/07/2011)
01/10/2011 274 STIPULATION Stipulation of Remaining Parties and Claims by S.W. (Talenfeld, Howard) (Entered: 01/10/2011)
01/10/2011 275 Letter Response to City's Request for Extension of Time to serve Expert Reports by S.W. (Talenfeld, Howard) (Entered: 01/10/2011)

01/13/2011

SCHEDULING ORDER: a telephone conference will be held on 1/25/11 at 3:00 p.m. to discuss the City's request for an extension. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 1/13/2011. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 01/13/2011)

01/13/2011 276 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery (Defendants' Expert Exchange) by Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Delmond, Robert) (Entered: 01/13/2011)

01/18/2011 277 Letter In Response to Agency Request for Extension of Time to Serve Expert Reports by S.W. (Talenfeld, Howard) (Entered: 01/18/2011)

01/26/2011 278 Letter to Magistrate Judge Go re: an agreement by the parties on the extension of scheduling issue by City of New York (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 01/26/2011)

01/26/2011 279 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Pro Hac Vice Filing fee $ 25, receipt number 0207−4586888. by S.W.. (Talenfeld, Howard) (Entered: 01/26/2011)

01/26/2011

SCHEDULING ORDER: The discovery schedule set forth in the 278 Letter filed by City of New York is approved. Discovery is extended as follows: discovery concerning third party defendants, to the extent previously allowed, must be completed by 3/31/11; defendants' expert report regarding identification must be served by 3/16/11; defendants' expert report regarding other issues must be served by 3/31/11. Depositions of experts shall be conducted beginning one week after service of defendants' expert report on a particular subject and expert depositions completed by 5/11/11. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 1/26/2011. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 01/26/2011)

01/26/2011

Minute Order for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go: Telephone Conference held on 1/26/2011. Appearances by Matthew Kelley for City defendants. Counsel advised that the parties have reached agreement on a proposed expert schedule. The motion 276 and letter request 273 for an extension are denied as moot. Parties will file a proposed new discovery schedule. (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 02/07/2011)

02/09/2011

ORDER granting 279 Motion for Leave to Appear pro hac vice. The admitted attorney, Michael T. Dolce, is permitted to argue or try this action in whole or in part as counsel or advocate for plaintiffs. Since the docket sheet indicates that the admission fee has been paid, the Clerk of the Court is respectfully requested to enter the appearance of counsel promptly on the docket sheet for this action and to make a notation of the attorney's admission pro hac vice on this Court's roll of attorneys. If not already registered for Electronic Case Filing ("ECF") with this Court, the admitted attorney must register for ECF or submit an application for exemption within two weeks of the date of this order. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 2/9/2011. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 02/09/2011)

02/18/2011 280 Letter MOTION for Summary Judgment (request permission to move under FRCP 56 for summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs' complaint) by Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Delmond, Robert) (Entered: 02/18/2011)

02/22/2011 281 Letter MOTION to Amend/Correct/Supplement the Scheduling Order by City of New York. (Strikowsky, Bruce) (Entered: 02/22/2011)

02/23/2011

Clerk's ENTRY OF DEFAULT as to Desmond Leekin, pursuant toRule 55(a) of the Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure. (Hamilton, Janet) (Entered: 02/23/2011)

02/23/2011

Clerk's ENTRY OF DEFAULT as to Vontrell Leekin,pursuant to Rule 55(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Hamilton, Janet) (Entered: 02/23/2011)

02/28/2011 282 Letter In Response to Request for Extension of Time to File Pre−Motion Letters by S.W. (Talenfeld, Howard) (Entered: 02/28/2011)

03/02/2011

ORDER granting 281 Motion to Supplement the scheduling order. This Court set the original schedule with the view that pre−motion letters would be filed after completition of the remaining authorized discovery concerning third party defendants. Accordingly, the scheduling order is also extended as follows: Defendants' pre−motion letters must be filed by 4/18/11 and any response filed no later than 5/4/11. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 3/2/2011. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 03/02/2011)

03/03/2011 283 Letter MOTION for Discovery application for Confidentialty Order and Subpoena to Social Security Administration by S.W.. (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 03/03/2011)

03/10/2011 284 ORDER granting 283 Motion for Discovery. The "So Ordered" subpoena may be picked up from Chambers. The executed CONFIDENTIALITY ORDER with respect to the documents produced is attached. Because plaintiffs failed to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2 in filing their motion, that document will be sealed. (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 03/10/2011)

03/28/2011 285 Letter MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery re Parties' Agreed Upon Modification to Expert Discovery Schedule by C.B., J.B., J.G., J.L., L.J., R.E., S.B., S.W., T.G., T.L.. (Lambiase, Susan) (Entered: 03/28/2011)

03/28/2011

ORDER granting 285 Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery. Defendants must serve their remaining expert reports by 4/14/11; plaintiffs must serve their rebuttal reports by 6/16/11; expert depositions must be completed by 8/31/11; defendants' pre−motion letters must be filed by 6/30/11 and plaintiffs' response by 7/14/11. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 3/28/2011. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 03/28/2011)

04/05/2011

Clerk's ENTRY OF DEFAULT as to Third−Party Defendant Mia Karenga,pursuant to Rule 55(a) of the Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure. (Hamilton, Janet) (Entered: 04/05/2011)

04/05/2011

Clerk's ENTRY OF DEFAULT as to Third−Party Defendant Barbara Raikesaka Barbara Smith, pursuant to Rule 55(a) of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure. (Hamilton, Janet) (Entered: 04/05/2011)

04/06/2011 286 Letter MOTION for Disclosure Adding Witness to Case in Chief by S.W.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A Senator Nelson letter, # 2 Exhibit B−1 Gregory Meacham report, # 3 Exhibit B−2 Gregory Meacham report) (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 04/06/2011)

04/12/2011 287 RESPONSE in Opposition re 286 Letter MOTION for Disclosure Adding Witness to Case in Chief filed by City of New York. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D) (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 04/12/2011)

04/14/2011 288 REPLY in Support re 286 Letter MOTION for Disclosure Adding Witness to Case in Chief filed by S.W.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Social Security letter of February 16, 2011) (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 04/14/2011)

04/18/2011 289 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on November 30, 2010, before Judge Go. Court Transcriber: Aria Transcriptions, Telephone number 215−767−7700. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 5/9/2011. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/19/2011. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/18/2011. (Rocco, Christine) (Entered: 04/18/2011)

04/19/2011

SCHEDULING ORDER: a telephone conference will be held on 4/21/11 at 3:00 p.m. re 286 plaintiff's motion to add a witness. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 4/19/2011. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 04/19/2011)

04/21/2011

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go: Telephone Conference held on 4/21/2011. Appearances by Theodore Babbitt, Ami Romanelli, Stephan Le Clainche and Michael Dolce for plaintiffs; Carl Schaerf, Bruce Strikowsky and Allison Fihma for City defendants; Robert Delmond for agency defendants; Curt Schiner for Edwin Gould. Argument heard on 286 plaintiffs' motion for an extension of time. For the reasons stated on the record and as further discussed in a separate order to be filed, the motion is granted, but subject to compliance with 20 C.F.R. § 403.110(b)(3), to the extent applicable. Discovery shall be extended to the extent necessary with respect to the subject matter of the factual and expert testimony that plaintiffs intend to present through Mr. LeBlanc. By 5/5/11, plaintiffs must file a report discussing the applicability of the regulation to Mr. LeBlanc's report and a proposed discovery schedule, after conferring with the other parties. The report should include an affidavit of Mr. LeBlanc generally describing his proposed testimony and the circumstances under which he acquired knowledge of the information to be contained in his report. (ESR 11/10 1590−3859 and FTR 3:34−4:06) (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered:

04/22/2011)

04/28/2011 290 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on 4/21/11, before Judge Go. Court Transcriber ARIA TRANSCRIPTIONS, Telephone number 215−767−7700. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 5/19/2011. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/31/2011. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/27/2011. (Hong, Loan) (Entered: 04/28/2011)

05/04/2011 291 REPLY in Support re 286 Letter MOTION for Disclosure Adding Witness to Case in Chief Regarding Proposed Testimony of Stanley LeBlanc filed by S.W.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Affidavit of Stanley LeBlanc) (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 05/04/2011)

05/06/2011 292 RESPONSE in Opposition re 286 Letter MOTION for Disclosure Adding Witness to Case in Chief filed by City of New York. (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 05/06/2011)

06/03/2011 293 ORDER granting 286 Motion to Permit Expert. The expert discovery schedule is modified to permit plaintiffs to serve Mr. LeBlanc's report by June 21, 2011 and for defendants to supplement their expert reports by July 21, 2011. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 6/3/2011. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 06/03/2011)

06/17/2011 294 Letter to Judge Eric N. Vitaliano by Administration for Children's Services, City of New York (Strikowsky, Bruce) (Entered: 06/17/2011)

06/17/2011 295 Letter to Magistrate Judge Go by Administration for Children's Services, City of New York (Strikowsky, Bruce) (Entered: 06/17/2011)

06/21/2011 296 Letter MOTION for Disclosure to Preclude Plaintiffs' Rebuttal and/or Supplemental Reports by City of New York. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D) (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 06/21/2011)

06/21/2011 297 SCHEDULING ORDER: This Court has received a letter from the Office of the Regional Counsel which has also been faxed to counsel for the plaintiffs and the City defendants. A copy is filed herewith. Any response to the letter, as well as plaintiffs' response to the letter application for reconsideration filed by the City defendants 295 , must be filed by 6/28/11. Any reply must be filed by 7/1/11. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 6/21/2011. (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 06/21/2011)

06/22/2011 298 Letter MOTION for Extension of Time to File Pre−Motion Letter on Summary Judgment by City of New York. (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 06/22/2011)

06/23/2011

ORDER granting 298 Motion for Extension of Time to File. A schedule will be set at a hearing to be scheduled or in a decision on pending motions regarding expert discovery. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 6/23/2011. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 06/23/2011)

06/24/2011 299 MOTION to Compel Further Interference from Defendant, City of New York, in Plaintiffs Obtaining Social Security Administration Witness by S.W.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Social Security Application) (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 06/24/2011)

06/27/2011

ORDER: if they have not already done so, plaintiffs must promptly send a copy of the Court's June 3, 2011 order and the parties' submissions concerning Mr. LeBlanc's testimony to Michelle Christ, Assistant Regional Counsel, Social Security Administration. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 6/27/2011 (sent via fax to Michelle Christ). (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 06/27/2011)

06/27/2011 300 NOTICE by S.W. Notice of Compliance with the Court's Order dated June 27, 2011 Regarding Submissions Concerning Mr. Le Blanc's Testimony to Michelle Christ (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 06/27/2011)

06/27/2011 301 RESPONSE in Opposition re 299 MOTION to Compel Further Interference from Defendant, City of New York, in Plaintiffs Obtaining Social Security Administration Witness filed by Administration for Children's Services, City of New York. (Strikowsky, Bruce) (Entered: 06/27/2011)

06/28/2011 302 NOTICE by S.W. Notice of Compliance with Court's 6−27−11 Order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A Part I, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit A Part II, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit A Part III, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit A Part IV) (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 06/28/2011)

06/28/2011 303 Letter to Honorable Marilyn Go regarding supplemental correspondence to the Social Security Administration by S.W. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A Social Security Administration letter) (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 06/28/2011)

06/28/2011 304 RESPONSE to Motion re 296 Letter MOTION for Disclosure to Preclude Plaintiffs' Rebuttal and/or Supplemental Reports filed by C.B., J.B., J.G., J.L., L.J., R.E., S.B., S.W., T.G., T.L.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex. A Part 1, # 2 Exhibit Ex. A Part 2, # 3 Exhibit Ex. B, # 4 Exhibit Ex. C Part 1, # 5 Exhibit Ex. C Part 2, # 6 Exhibit Ex. D, # 7 Exhibit Ex. E, # 8 Exhibit Ex. F) (Nothenberg, Shirim) (Entered: 06/28/2011)

07/01/2011 305 REPLY in Support re 296 Letter MOTION for Disclosure to Preclude Plaintiffs' Rebuttal and/or Supplemental Reports filed by City of New York. (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 07/01/2011)

07/07/2011

SCHEDULING ORDER: re 296 Letter MOTION to Preclude Plaintiffs' Rebuttal and/or Supplemental Reports filed by City of New York. A telephone conference will be held on 7/15/11 at 11:30 a.m. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 7/7/2011. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 07/07/2011)

07/11/2011 306 Letter MOTION to Vacate Pursuant to Fderal Rule of Civil Procedure 72 Objecting to Magistrate Judge Go's Order Dated June 3, 2011 by Administration for Children's Services, City of New York. (Attachments: # 1 Cover Letter to Hon. Vitaliano dated June 17, 2011, # 2 Plaintiffs' Response to Rule 72 Motion, # 3 City's Reply in Further Support of Rule 72 Motion) (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 07/11/2011)

07/11/2011 307 Letter to Magistrate Judge Go requesting the July 15, 2011 conference be held in person by City of New York (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 07/11/2011)

07/11/2011 308 Letter to Magistrate Go Opposition to Defendant's Request the July 15, 2011, Conference be Held in Person by S.W. (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 07/11/2011)

07/12/2011

SCHEDULING ORDER: the conference scheduled for 7/15/11 is adjourned to 7/22/11 at 3:30 p.m. The parties may appear in−person. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 7/12/2011. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 07/12/2011)

07/15/2011 309 Letter to Judge Go attaching Social Security Administration letter of July 14, 2011 by S.W. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A Social Security Administration Letter of July 14, 2011) (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 07/15/2011)

07/19/2011 310 MOTION for Reconsideration re 293 Order on Motion for Disclosure, (motion for leave to move for reconsideration on or before August 5, 2011) by Social Security Administration of the United States. (Nandan, Kathleen) (Entered: 07/19/2011)

07/21/2011

NOTICE re 310 MOTION for Reconsideration re 293 Order on Motion for Disclosure: the government's letter will be discussed at the 7/22/11 conference. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 07/21/2011)

07/22/2011

NOTICE: Attorneys appearing in court proceedings today must dress neatly. However, in light of the heat advisory issued by National Weather Service, attorneys need not wear jacket, tie or long−sleeved shirts. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 07/22/2011)

07/22/2011

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go: Motion Hearing/Scheduling/Settlement Conference held on 7/22/2011. Appearances by Theodore Babbitt, Stephan LeClainche, Ami Romanelli, Michael Dolce for plaintiffs; Carl Schaerf, Bruce Strikowsky, Matthew Kelly, Allison Fihma for the City defendants; Thomas Reilly for the agency defendants; Thomas Catalano for third−party defendant Edwin Gould; and Kathleen Nandan for non−party United States. Plaintiff will advise whether it seeks review of the Social Security Administrations determination regarding Mr. LeBlanc's testimony by 7/27/11 and if so, any appeal, with the Government's consent, shall be filed in this action. Moving papers must be filed by 8/3/11; opposition by 8/17/11 and any reply by 8/24/11. The City defendants motion to preclude 296 plaintiff's rebuttal/supplemental expert reports is denied, as discussed on the record, but fact discovery is extended to 10/14/11 solely as to the facts underlying the new matters raised in the said reports. Defendants may

submit sur−rebuttal/supplemental expert reports but only as to these new matters by 11/14/11. Notice must be given by 8/5/11 of any new experts not previously disclosed. Expert depositions to be completed by 12/23/11. Pre−motion letters regarding dispositive motions must be filed by 1/6/11 and opposition by 1/13/11. Next conference with defendants regarding insurance coverage scheduled for 8/31/11 at 9:30 a.m. (FTR 3:35−4:36 and ESR B11/19 3003−B11/20 299) (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 07/25/2011)

07/25/2011 311 ORDER denying 296 Motion to Preclude. The City defendant's motion to preclude the three expert reports is denied. The schedule for limited discovery on welfare and additional expert reports is set as discussed at the hearing on this motion. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 7/25/2011. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 07/25/2011)

07/26/2011 312 Letter withdrawing pre−motion letter of 2/18/11 by Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. (Delmond, Robert) (Entered: 07/26/2011)

07/26/2011

ORDER withdrawing request of Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services and St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. for a pre−motion conference 280 , which was filed as a Motion for Summary Judgment, in light of their letter filed 7/26/11 318 . Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 7/26/2011. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 07/26/2011)

07/27/2011 313 Letter Honorable Marilyn Go regarding abiding by decision of Social Security Administration by S.W. (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 07/27/2011)

07/27/2011

ORDER denying as moot 299 Motion to Compel; denying as moot 310 Motion for Reconsideration; denying as moot 295 Letter motion for reconsideration in light of 313 plaintiffs' Letter that they will abide by the decision of the Social Security Administration. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 7/27/2011. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 07/27/2011)

07/27/2011 314 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on 7/22/11, before Judge Go. Court Transcriber TRANSCRIPTION PLUS II, Telephone number 718−987−4285. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 8/17/2011. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/29/2011. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/25/2011. (Hong, Loan) (Entered: 07/27/2011)

07/27/2011

NOTICE: Future requests to compel discovery or for any other type of relief may be made by letter, if appropriate, but must be filed as a "motion" from the appropriate category on the ECF list of civil events. Requests not properly filed may be disregarded. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 07/27/2011)

07/29/2011 315 NOTICE of Appearance by Theodore Babbitt on behalf of T.G. (aty to be noticed) (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 07/29/2011)

08/01/2011

ORDER denying as moot 306 Motion to Vacate Magistrate Judge's Order. The motion is denied as moot in light of 313 plaintiffs' letter advising Judge Go that they will abide by the decision of the Social Security Administration. Ordered by Judge Eric N. Vitaliano on 8/1/2011. (Nuttall, Sean) (Entered: 08/01/2011)

08/02/2011 316 Consent MOTION to Adjourn Conference of August 31, 2011 by Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Delmond, Robert) (Entered: 08/02/2011)

08/02/2011 317 MOTION for Reconsideration of Minute Order of the Extension of Discovery and Attendant Schedule at Hearing on July 22, 2011 by S.W.. (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 08/02/2011)

08/02/2011 318 RESPONSE in Opposition re 317 MOTION for Reconsideration of Minute Order of the Extension of Discovery and Attendant Schedule at Hearing on July 22, 2011 filed by City of New York. (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 08/02/2011)

08/03/2011 319 Letter MOTION for Extension of Time to File notice of any new experts not previously disclosed by City of New York. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B) (Schaerf,

Carl) (Entered: 08/03/2011)

08/03/2011

ORDER denying 317 Motion for Reconsideration; granting 319 Motion for Extension of Time to File to 8/19/11 to provide expert notice. As this Court recognized at the 7/22/11 conference, there is a compelling need to complete discovery promptly. This extension of defendants' time to provide expert notice does not otherwise affect the discovery schedule set. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 8/3/2011. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 08/03/2011)

08/04/2011

ORDER granting 316 Motion to Adjourn Conference: The conference is adjourned to September 13, 2011, at 3:00 p.m. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 8/4/2011. (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 08/04/2011)

08/04/2011 320 Letter to Judge Eric N. Vitaliano by Administration for Children's Services, City of New York (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 08/04/2011)

08/12/2011 321 Letter to Judge Eric N. Vitaliano by C.B., J.B., J.G., J.L., L.J., R.E., S.B., S.W., T.G., T.L. (Nothenberg, Shirim) (Entered: 08/12/2011)

08/16/2011 322 Letter MOTION to Vacate Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72 Objecting to Magistrate Judge Go's Order dated July 25, 2011 by City of New York. (Attachments: # 1 Plaintiffs' Response to Motion dated August 12, 2011, # 2 Exhibit A to Plaintiffs' Response to Motion, # 3 Letter Reply, # 4 Cover Letter to Judge Vitaliano dated August 16, 2011) (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 08/16/2011)

09/06/2011 323 MOTION to Strike Defendants' Proposed Additional Expert Reports by C.B., J.B., J.G., J.L., L.J., R.E., S.B., S.W., T.G., T.L.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit C) (Nothenberg, Shirim) (Entered: 09/06/2011)

09/08/2011 324 RESPONSE to Motion re 323 MOTION to Strike Defendants' Proposed Additional Expert Reports filed by City of New York. (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 09/08/2011)

09/08/2011 325 Letter MOTION for Leave to Electronically File Document under Seal by City of New York. (Kelly, Matthew) (Entered: 09/08/2011)

09/08/2011

ORDER granting 325 Motion for Leave to Electronically File Document under Seal. Counsel is directed to file the transcript of the final adoption proceedings that are the subject of this application under seal as a separate entry. Instructions on filing sealed documents on ECF are located at www.nyed.uscourts.gov. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 9/8/2011. NOTICE: This application was filed under seal, but does not contain any confidential information. The Clerk of the Court is respectfully requested to unseal this motion which apparently was automatically sealed with its filing via ECF. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 09/08/2011)

09/09/2011 326 RESPONSE to Motion re 323 MOTION to Strike Defendants' Proposed Additional Expert Reports filed by City of New York. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Part 1, # 2 Exhibit Part 2, # 3 Exhibit Part 3, # 4 Exhibit Part 4) (Kelly, Matthew) (Entered: 09/09/2011)

09/12/2011 327 REPLY to Response to Motion re 323 MOTION to Strike Defendants' Proposed Additional Expert Reports filed by All Plaintiffs. (Nothenberg, Shirim) (Entered: 09/12/2011)

09/13/2011

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go: Settlement Conference held on 9/13/2011. Appearances by Carl Schaerf, Bruce Strikowsky, Audrey Goldenber for City defendants; Robert Delmond, for agency defendants; Thomas Catalano and Curt Schiner for Edwin Gould. Settlement discussions held with defendants. Court will have discussion with plaintiffs' counsel and set a conference for next week. (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 09/15/2011)

09/14/2011

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go: Settlement Conference held on 9/14/2011. Appearances by Theodore Babbitt. Settlement discussions held. Next conference scheduled for Sept. 28, 2011 at 11:00 a.m. to discuss plaintiffs' motion and settlement (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 09/15/2011)

09/23/2011 329 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney Susan Lambiase by C.B., J.B., J.G., J.L., L.J., R.E., S.B., S.W., T.G., T.L.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Proposed Order Granting Motion to Withdraw Susan Lambiase as Attorney) (Nothenberg, Shirim) (Entered:

09/23/2011)

09/27/2011

ORDER granting 329 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Susan Lambiase terminated. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 9/27/2011. (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 09/27/2011)

09/28/2011

Minute Order for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go: Motion Hearing/Scheduling Conference held on 9/28/2011. Appearances by Shirim Nothenberg, Theodore Babbit and Howard Talendfeld for plaintiffs; Carl Schaerf and Bruce Strikowsky for City defendant; Robert Delmond for agency defendants and Thomas Catalano for Edwin Gould. Rulings made on the record granting in part and denying in part plaintiffs' 323 motion to preclude expert witnesses. Plaintiffs' motion is denied as to the City defendant's welfare fraud expert and proposed welfare policy expert, which the Court finds to be within the scope of the Court's prior order permitting defendants to designate experts responsive to the new issues raised in plaintiffs' supplemental/rebuttal reports, but the proposed testimony by the welfare policy expert is limited to testimony explaining the reasons for the procedures that were in place for detecting welfare fraud and related issues during the relevant time period. The testimony of the City's proposed privacy expert may not include procedures utilized by banks and all expert testimony permitted is limited to the procedures and policies in place during the relevant time period. As to the City's proposed judicial expert, decision is reserved subject to review of that their expert's report which must be submitted by 10/14/11. A settlement conference will be held by telephone on 10/17/11 at 3:30 p.m. (by tel.) and an in person conference on 10/28/11 at 11:00 a.m. (FTR 11:11 − 11:35 and ESR B11/24 6398 − B11/25 10) (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 09/29/2011)

10/04/2011 330 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on September 28, 2011, before Judge Go. Court Transcriber: Transcription Plus II, Telephone number 718−987−4285. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 10/25/2011. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/4/2011. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/3/2012. (Rocco, Christine) (Entered: 10/04/2011)

10/10/2011 331 Letter MOTION for Extension of Time to File Expert Report by City of New York. (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 10/10/2011)

10/11/2011 332 RESPONSE in Opposition re 331 Letter MOTION for Extension of Time to File Expert Report filed by C.B., J.B., J.G., J.L., L.J., R.E., S.B., S.W., T.G., T.L.. (Nothenberg, Shirim) (Entered: 10/11/2011)

10/12/2011 333 REPLY to Response to Motion re 331 Letter MOTION for Extension of Time to File Expert Report filed by City of New York. (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 10/12/2011)

10/13/2011 334 ORDER granting 331 Motion for Extension of Time to File. The report must be produced by 11/7/11, any objections filed by 11/9/11 and a response filed by 11/10/11. All documents must be filed or produced by 6 p.m. on the date specified. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 10/13/2011. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 10/13/2011)

10/17/2011 335 Letter MOTION to Adjourn Conference (telephone conference of 10/17/2011 at 3:30 pm) by Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Delmond, Robert) (Entered: 10/17/2011)

10/17/2011

ORDER denying 335 Motion to Adjourn Conference. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 10/17/2011. (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 10/17/2011)

10/17/2011 336 First MOTION to Seal Document # 335 by Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Delmond, Robert) (Entered: 10/17/2011)

10/17/2011

ORDER granting 336 Motion to Seal Document 335 Letter MOTION to Adjourn Conference since the letter contains communications concerning settlement. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 10/17/2011. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 10/17/2011)

10/17/2011

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go: Scheduling Conference held on 10/17/2011. Appearances by Theodore Babbitt, Howard Talenfeld,

Shirim Nothenberg for plaintiffs; Carl Schaerf, Bruce Strikowsky, Matthew Kelly and Allison Fihma for City defendants; Robert Delmond for agency defendants; Kimberly Miller for Edwin Gould and Sonya Smith−Valentine for Thelma Bowes. Counsel for the Agency defendants shall report on the progress of the insurer's evaluation at a conference on Oct. 25, 2011 at 9:30 a.m. (by tel). The conference scheduled for Oct. 28, 2011 at 11:00 a.m. shall be changed to a telephone conference. An in−person settlement conference will be held on November 9, 2011, at 9:30 a.m. (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 10/19/2011)

10/25/2011

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go: Settlement Conference held on 10/25/2011. Appearances by Robert Delmond for agency defendants. Counsel must promptly arrange for a further conference that he, coverage counsel for the insurer and the insured must attend. (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 10/26/2011)

10/26/2011

SCHEDULING ORDER: An in−person Settlement Conference will be held on 10/26/11, at 10:00 a.m. with counsel for agency defendants and representatives from from Chartis and the Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 10/26/2011. (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 10/26/2011)

10/26/2011

CORRECTED SCHEDULING ORDER: An in−person Settlement Conference will be held on 10/28/11, at 10:00 a.m. with counsel for agency defendants and representatives from from Chartis and the Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 10/26/2011. (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 10/26/2011)

10/28/2011

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go: Settlement Conference held on 10/28/2011. Appearances by Robert Delmond for agency defendants. Settlement discussions held with the agency defendants, the primary insurer and their coverage counsel. A further conference will be held after disclosure of all issues of relevant policies and contact with the issuers of those policies. (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 10/31/2011)

10/28/2011

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go: Settlement Conference held on 10/28/2011. Appearances by Theodore Babbitt, Howard Talenfeld, Ami Romanelli for plaintiffs; Carl Schaerf, Bruce Strikowsky, for City defendants; Robert Delmond for agency defendants; Kimberly Miller for Edwin Gould. Settlement discussions held. Next conference scheduled for Nov. 9, 2011 at 9:30 a.m. (by tel) with counsel for agency defendants only. (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 10/31/2011)

11/09/2011

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go: Settlement Conference held on 11/9/2011. Appearances by Robert Delmond for Agency defendants. Coverage issues discussed and continued to Dec. 1, 2011 at 9:45 a.m. (by tel) (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 11/14/2011)

11/10/2011 337 MOTION to Strike to preclude defendants' judicial expert by C.B., J.B., J.G., J.L., L.J., R.E., S.B., S.W., T.G., T.L.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Cozier Report) (Nothenberg, Shirim) (Entered: 11/10/2011)

11/10/2011 338 Letter MOTION for Discovery Barring Additional Supplemental Disclosures or Additional Discovery Demands by City of New York. (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 11/10/2011)

11/11/2011

ORDER: Defendants' 338 Motion for Discovery is granted insofar as they seek an extension of time to respond to plaintiff's motion to strike 337 . Defendants' response must be filed by Nov. 17, 2011 at 12:00 noon. A hearing on the motion will be held on Nov. 18, 2011 at 3:30 p.m. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 11/11/2011. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 11/11/2011)

11/14/2011 339 RESPONSE to Motion re 338 Letter MOTION for Discovery Barring Additional Supplemental Disclosures or Additional Discovery Demands filed by All Plaintiffs. (Talenfeld, Howard) (Entered: 11/14/2011)

11/17/2011 340 RESPONSE in Opposition re 337 MOTION to Strike to preclude defendants' judicial expert filed by City of New York. (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 11/17/2011)

11/21/2011

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go: Motion Hearing held on 11/18/2011 re 337 MOTION to Strike. Appearances by Howard

Talenfeld (by tel), Melissa Cohen and Shirim Nothenberg for plaintiffs; Carl Schaerf, Bruce Strikowsky, Matthew Kelly and Allison Fihma for City defendants; Thomas Reilly for agency defendants; Kimberly Miller for Edwin Gould. As discussed on the record, plaintiffs' motion to strike the expert report of Barry Crozier is granted. The report is not appropriate sur−rebuttal and addresses issues raised in Dr. Hess's original report of 12/2010, rather than in plaintiffs' rebuttal expert reports. The new issues raised in the report regarding the role of the Family Court are tangential to plaintiffs' claims regarding the conduct of ACS and the Agency defendants. (FTR: 3:40−4:18, ESR: B11/31 258−2735). (Albertsen, Joanne) (Entered: 11/21/2011)

11/22/2011 341 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on November 18, 2011, before Judge Go. Court Transcriber: Transcription Plus II, Telephone number 718−987−4285. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 12/13/2011. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/23/2011. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/21/2012. (Rocco, Christine) (Entered: 11/22/2011)

12/01/2011

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go: Settlement Conference held on 12/1/2011. Appearances by Robert Delmond for Agency defendants. Counsel reported on status of discussions with insurers. Next settlement conference with agency defendant scheduled for Dec. 15, 2011 at 5:00 p.m. (by tel) (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 12/02/2011)

12/05/2011 342 Letter MOTION to Vacate Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72 Objecting to Magistrate Judge Go's Order Striking the Report of Barry Cozier by City of New York. (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 12/05/2011)

12/12/2011 343 RESPONSE in Opposition re 342 Letter MOTION to Vacate Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72 Objecting to Magistrate Judge Go's Order Striking the Report of Barry Cozier filed by C.B., J.B., J.G., J.L., L.J., R.E., S.B., S.W., T.G., T.L.. (Nothenberg, Shirim) (Entered: 12/12/2011)

12/15/2011

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go: Settlement Conference held on 12/15/2011. Appearances by Robert Delmond for agency defendants. Next conference scheduled for Jan. 13, 2012 at 12:45 p.m. (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 12/20/2011)

12/16/2011 344 Letter MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply Supplemental Responses to City Defendant's Interrogatories by C.B., J.B., J.G., J.L., L.J., R.E., S.B., S.W., T.G., T.L.. (Talenfeld, Howard) (Entered: 12/16/2011)

12/16/2011 345 RESPONSE in Opposition re 344 Letter MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply Supplemental Responses to City Defendant's Interrogatories filed by City of New York. (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 12/16/2011)

12/19/2011

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 344 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply. This Court agrees with the City defendants that deadlines set should be observed. While defendants have articulated only generalized complaints, plaintiffs have not forwarded any reason for not meeting the deadline set and made their application on the day of the deadline. However, in the interest of full disclosure, this Court will grant an extension until 12/20/11. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 12/19/2011. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 12/19/2011)

01/04/2012 346 Letter MOTION for Discovery by City of New York. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E) (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 01/04/2012)

01/06/2012 347 First MOTION for Leave to File motion for summary judgment by Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Delmond, Robert) (Entered: 01/06/2012)

01/06/2012 348 Letter MOTION for pre motion conference regarding a Rule 56 motion by City of New York. (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 01/06/2012)

01/09/2012

SCHEDULING ORDER: Any response re 346 Letter MOTION for Discovery must be filed by 1/11/12 by 12 noon. A telephone conference will be held on 1/13/12, at 4:00 p.m. Defendants shall provide this court with a courtesy copy of the motion papers.

Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 1/9/2012. (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 01/09/2012)

01/11/2012 349 RESPONSE to Motion re 346 Letter MOTION for Discovery filed by All Plaintiffs. (Talenfeld, Howard) (Entered: 01/11/2012)

01/12/2012 350 REPLY to Response to Motion re 346 Letter MOTION for Discovery filed by City of New York. (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 01/12/2012)

01/13/2012 351 RESPONSE in Opposition re 347 First MOTION for Leave to File motion for summary judgment filed by All Plaintiffs. (Nothenberg, Shirim) (Entered: 01/13/2012)

01/13/2012 352 RESPONSE in Opposition re 348 Letter MOTION for pre motion conference regarding a Rule 56 motion filed by All Plaintiffs. (Nothenberg, Shirim) (Entered: 01/13/2012)

01/13/2012

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go: Settlement Conference held on 1/13/2012. Appearances by Robert Delmond for agency defendants. Report on coverage given. Counsel must fax to the Court a further status report by 2/22/12. (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 01/20/2012)

01/13/2012

Minute Order for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go: Motion Hearing via telephone held on 1/13/2012. City defendants' 346 motion for discovery−to compel is granted. The plaintiffs must supplement their response to interrogatory 12 by 2/3/12. (FTR/C: 4:01 − 4:13 ESR: C11/37 1382 − 2165)(Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 01/23/2012)

01/30/2012 353 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on January 13, 2012, before Judge Go. Court Transcriber Transcription Plus II, Inc., Telephone number 718−987−4285. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 2/21/2012. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/1/2012. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/30/2012. (Rocco, Christine) (Entered: 01/30/2012)

02/28/2012 354 First MOTION for Protective Order by Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Delmond, Robert) (Entered: 02/28/2012)

02/29/2012 355 RESPONSE in Opposition re 354 First MOTION for Protective Order filed by S.W.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Agency Defendant Supplemental Response to July 1, 2009, interrogatories, # 2 Exhibit Agency Defendants Supplemental Responses) (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 02/29/2012)

02/29/2012

SCHEDULING ORDER: a telephone conference will be held on 3/6/12 at 4:00 p.m. regarding the Agency defendants' motion for a protective order. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 2/29/2012. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 02/29/2012)

03/06/2012

Minute Order for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go: Motion Hearing held on 3/6/2012. Appearances by Theodore Babbitt, Howard Talenfeld, Ami Romanelli, and Amanda Thompson for plaintiffs; Carl Schaerf, Bruce Strikowsky, Matthew Kelly and Allison Fihma for City defendants; Robert Delmond for agency defendants. Argument heard denying 354 the Agency defendants' motion for a protective order. The Agency defendants must promptly produce any insurance policies in their possession and must attempt to obtain the policies they lack, particularly those polices for which coverage has been denied. They must update the information regarding the layers of insurance coverage previously provided, identifying the policies for which denials have been issued, and provide copies of correspondence regarding denials. The agency defendants must file a status report regarding coverage issues by 3/30/12. (FTR/C 4:07−4:27 and ESR C11/41 2051−3487) (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 03/07/2012)

03/12/2012 356 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on March 6, 2012, before Judge Go. Court Transcriber: Transcription Plus II, Telephone number 718−987−4285. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 4/2/2012. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/12/2012. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/11/2012.

(Rocco, Christine) (Entered: 03/12/2012)

03/28/2012 357 NOTICE of Change of Address by Sonya A Smith−Valentine (Smith−Valentine, Sonya) (Entered: 03/28/2012)

03/28/2012

ORDER granting 328 Motion for Leave to Electronically File Document under Seal. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 3/28/2012. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 03/28/2012)

03/28/2012

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go: Discovery Hearing held on 3/28/2012. Appearances by Theodore Babbitt, Ami Romanelli, Amanda Thompason for plaintiffs; Carl Schaerf for the City defendants; Robert Delmond for the agency defendants; and Kimberly Miller for third−party defendant Edwin Gould. Rulings made on the record regarding objections during deposition of plaintiffs' liability expert. (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 03/29/2012)

04/02/2012 358 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. There is no merit to defendants' claim that Judge Go's order was dispositive of any claim, was beyond her referred authority, or was clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Accordingly, defendants' objections are overruled and the order of Magistrate Judge Go is affirmed. Ordered by Judge Eric N. Vitaliano on 3/25/2012. (Siegfried, Evan) (Entered: 04/02/2012)

04/02/2012 359 Letter MOTION to Compel against Agency Defendants relative to compliance with Court's Order of March 7, 2012 by S.W.. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix A − Emails regarding insurance policies) (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 04/02/2012)

04/03/2012 360 REPLY in Opposition to plaintiffs' motion to compel filed by Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Delmond, Robert) (Entered: 04/03/2012)

04/03/2012 361 REPLY to Response to Motion re 359 Letter MOTION to Compel against Agency Defendants relative to compliance with Court's Order of March 7, 2012 and Withdrawal of Motion to Compel filed by S.W.. (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 04/03/2012)

04/03/2012

ORDER withdrawing 359 Motion to Compel per plaintiffs' reply 361 . Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 4/3/2012. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 04/03/2012)

04/04/2012

STATUS REPORT ORDER: The agency defendants must file a status report regarding coverage issues by 5/15/2012. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 4/4/2012. (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 04/04/2012)

04/30/2012 362 Letter MOTION for Hearing On Motions to Dismiss Third−Party Defendants by S.W.. (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 04/30/2012)

05/01/2012 363 Letter by Edwin Gould Services for Children (Eniclerico, Richard) (Entered: 05/01/2012)

05/22/2012 364 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney Shirim Nothenberg by C.B., J.B., J.G., J.L., L.J., R.E., S.B., S.W., T.G., T.L.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Kapell, William) (Entered: 05/22/2012)

05/23/2012

ORDER granting 364 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Shirim Nothenberg terminated. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 5/23/2012. (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 05/23/2012)

06/11/2012

SCHEDULING ORDER: a telephone status conference will be held on 6/19/12 at 4:30 p.m. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 6/11/2012. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 06/11/2012)

06/19/2012

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go: Status/Settlement Conference held on 6/19/2012. Appearances by T. Babbitt, A. Romanelli and W. Kappel for plaintiffs; C. Schaerf, B. Strikowsky, M. Kelly and A. Fihma for City defendants; R. Delmond for agency defendants; C. Shiner for Edwin Gould; S. Smith−Valentine for Thelma Bowes. Agency defendants must file a status report regarding coverage issues by 8/20. Court discussed status of settlement with the parties. (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 06/20/2012)

06/26/2012 365 Witness List by S.W. (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 06/26/2012)

06/26/2012 366 Witness List by S.W. (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 06/26/2012)

09/13/2012 367 MOTION for Protective Order by S.W.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Bruce Strikowsky August 23, 2012 letter, # 2 Exhibit Deposition Excerpt, # 3 Exhibit Carl Schaerf email of September 11, 2012) (Babbitt, Theodore) Modified on 9/13/2012 (Abdallah, Fida). (Entered: 09/13/2012)

09/13/2012 368 RESPONSE to Motion re 367 MOTION for Protective Order filed by City of New York. (Strikowsky, Bruce) (Entered: 09/13/2012)

09/13/2012

NOTICE: the Court has restricted access to ct. doc. 367−2 and modified its description on the docket sheet since they disclose the names of plaintiffs. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 09/13/2012)

09/14/2012

SCHEDULING ORDER: Defendants shall file their response to the 367 MOTION for Protective Order by 9/24/12. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 9/14/2012. (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 09/14/2012)

09/24/2012 369 RESPONSE in Opposition re 367 MOTION for Protective Order filed by City of New York. (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 09/24/2012)

09/26/2012 370 REPLY in Opposition re 367 MOTION for Protective Order filed by S.W.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Plaintiffs' Notice of Expert Witness Disclosure, # 2 Exhibit Minute Entry for Hearing Held on November 18, 2011) (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 09/26/2012)

09/28/2012

ORDER granting the City's and agency defendants' motions for a pre−motion conference 347 348 to the extent that the motions are referred to Judge Go who will determine whether a pre−motion conference is necessary at this time and whether the City and agency defendants should be given leave to file their proposed summary judgment motions. Ordered by Judge Eric N. Vitaliano on 9/28/2012. (Rasor, Katherine) (Entered: 09/28/2012)

10/02/2012

ORDER granting in part and denying in part without prejudice 367 Motion for Protective Order. Although this Court has not precluded damages discovery, no schedule for such discovery has been set. That part of the motion relating to further depositions of the plaintiffs is granted. This Court agrees with plaintiffs that the update depositions should be taken closer to trial, if and when a trial date is set. The parties must confer on whether a schedule for remaining damages discovery is best set after disposition of the contemplated summary judgment motions or earlier. They should include in their discussion the timing of the depositions of the police officers. At the direction of Judge Vitaliano, this court will hold a conference on 10/19/12 at 3:00 p.m. to discuss the City's and agency defendants' summary judgment motions and damages discovery. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 10/2/2012. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 10/02/2012)

10/11/2012

NOTICE: any of plaintiffs' counsel may attend the 10/19/12 conference by telephone if plaintiffs' local counsel attends in−person. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 10/11/2012)

10/19/2012

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 10/19/2012. Appearances by T. Babbitt for plaintiffs; R. Delmond for Agency defendants; C. Schaerf and B. Strikowsky for City defendants; T. Catalano for Edwin Gould. Discussions held regarding the status of settlement discussions between the plaintiffs and the City defendants and a framework for discussions as to claims involving other parties. Plaintiffs must convey a settlement demand to the Agency defendants by 10/24/12. A telephone conference with plaintiffs and the City defendants will be held on 10/26/12 at 2:00 p.m. The Agency defendants must attend an in−person conference with the Court on 10/26/12 at 3:30 p.m. Conferences with plaintiffs and the Agency defendants will be held by telephone on 11/2/12 at 3:30 p.m and in−person on 11/7/12 at 12:00 p.m. A conference will be held on 11/29/12 at 12:00 p.m. to discuss defendants' pre−motion letters. If the Court finds there is little likelihood of a settlement at that time, a final discovery schedule will be set. (Tape #FTR 3:11−3:47.) (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 10/19/2012)

10/24/2012 371 NOTICE of Consent to Change Attorney by Steven J. Ahmuty, Jr on behalf of SCO Family of Services (Ahmuty, Steven) (Entered: 10/24/2012)

10/24/2012 372 NOTICE of Consent to Change Attorney by Steven J. Ahmuty, Jr on behalf of St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. (Ahmuty, Steven) (Entered: 10/24/2012)

10/24/2012 373 NOTICE of Consent to Change Attorney by Steven J. Ahmuty, Jr on behalf of Heartshare Human Services (Ahmuty, Steven) (Entered: 10/24/2012)

10/24/2012 374 NOTICE of Appearance by Steven J. Ahmuty, Jr on behalf of Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. (aty to be noticed) (Ahmuty, Steven) (Entered: 10/24/2012)

10/24/2012 375 NOTICE of Appearance by Marc J. Citrin on behalf of Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. (aty to be noticed) (Citrin, Marc) (Entered: 10/24/2012)

10/24/2012 376 NOTICE of Appearance by Jeremy S Rosof on behalf of Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. (aty to be noticed) (Rosof, Jeremy) (Entered: 10/24/2012)

10/24/2012 377 NOTICE of Appearance by Timothy Robert Capowski on behalf of Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. (aty to be noticed) (Capowski, Timothy) (Entered: 10/24/2012)

10/26/2012

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go: Settlement Conference held on 10/26/2012. Appearances by T. Babbitt for plaintiff; C. Schaerf for the City defendants. Counsel advised that they have agreed to the language of the draft settlement agreement and are working to finalize remaining aspects of the settlement. (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 11/01/2012)

10/26/2012

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go: Settlement Conference held on 10/26/2012. Appearances by S. Ahmuty and clients for Agency defendants. Preliminary settlement discussions held. (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 11/01/2012)

11/02/2012 378 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on October 19, 2012, before Judge Go. Court Transcriber: Transcriptions Plus II, Telephone number 718−987−4285. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 11/26/2012. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/3/2012. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/31/2013. (Rocco, Christine) (Entered: 11/02/2012)

11/02/2012

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go: Settlement Conference held on 11/2/2012. Appearances by T. Babbitt, A. Romanelli, H. Talenfeld, J. Walsh and S. Le Clainche for plaintiffs; S. Ahmuty for defendants. Settlement discussions held. Next conference is adjourned to 11/13/12 at 3:30 p.m. (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 11/09/2012)

11/13/2012

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go: Settlement Conference held on 11/13/2012. Appearances by T. Babbitt, A. Romanelli, A. Thompson, W. Kappel, J. Walsh and S. Le Clainche for plaintiffs; S. Ahmuty for defendants. Settlement discussions held. The parties are urged to reconsider their positions. The conference scheduled for 11/29/12 at 12:00 p.m. will be held by telephone. The parties must confer before the conference regarding the remaining discovery. (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 11/15/2012)

11/19/2012 379 MOTION to Adjourn Conference Scheduled for November 29, 2012 by Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Capowski, Timothy) (Entered: 11/19/2012)

11/19/2012 380 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. re 379 MOTION to Adjourn Conference Scheduled for November 29, 2012 (Capowski, Timothy) (Entered: 11/19/2012)

11/20/2012

ORDER granting 379 Motion to Adjourn Conference: The conference is adjourned to December 13, 2012, at 2:15 p.m. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 11/20/2012. (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 11/20/2012)

12/06/2012 381 MOTION to Seal and Application for Leave to File Document Under Seal by S.W.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A Plaintiffs' Proposed Motion to File Documents Under Seal) (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 12/06/2012)

12/06/2012 382 MOTION for Settlement Approval by S.W.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A Stipulation of Discontinuance with Prejudice as to City of New York, Administration for Children's Services Only, # 2 Exhibit B Affidavit of Status of Attorney's Liens, # 3 Exhibit C New York City Medicaid, # 4 Exhibit D Medicare, # 5 Exhibit E MFL Medicaid, # 6 Exhibit F T.L. Settlement Documents, # 7 Exhibit G J.B. Settlement Documents, # 8 Exhibit H C.B. Settlement Documents, # 9 Exhibit I T.G. Settlement Documents, # 10 Exhibit J S.B. Settlement Documents, # 11 Exhibit K R.E. Settlement Documents, # 12 Exhibit L L.J. Settlement Documents, # 13 Exhibit M S.W. Settlement Documents, # 14 Exhibit N J.G. Settlement Documents, # 15 Exhibit O J.L. Settlement Documents) (Babbitt, Theodore) Modified on 12/19/2012 (Abdallah, Fida). (Entered: 12/06/2012)

12/06/2012

ORDER granting 381 Motion to Seal, as supplemented by the sealed documents filed as 383 . Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 12/6/2012. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 12/06/2012)

12/13/2012

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go: Status Conference held on 12/13/2012. Appearances by T. Babbitt, A. Romanelli, A. Thompson, W. Kappel, J. Walsh, H. Talenfeld and M. Cohen for plaintiffs; S. Ahmuty, T. Capowski and J. Rosof for defendants; C. Shiner and T. Catalano for Edwin Gould. Defendants' proposed motion for summary judgment discussed. The Agency defendants are encouraged to consider moving on fewer grounds than articulated and the parties should attempt to agree to stipulated facts as to the grounds that raise purely legal issues. Defendants' summary judgment motion must be served by 3/1/13; any opposition by 4/20/13; and a reply by 5/15/13. The parties must follow Judge Vitaliano's rules regarding filing and providing courtesy copies of motion papers. Defendants must give notice by 1/11/13 of the type of damages expert to be retained, areas of expertise and general subject matter to be addressed by the expert. Failure to provide expert notice may be deemed waiver of the right to conduct expert discovery. Defendants' expert report(s) and disclosures must be served by 2/13/13; rebuttal expert report(s) and disclosures must be served by 3/29/13. Parties must send the Court a joint status report on 4/5/13 regarding the status of discovery. (FTR/C: 2:15−3:20) (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 12/17/2012)

12/14/2012 384 Letter regarding cost statements of Plaintiffs' counsels by S.W. (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 12/14/2012)

12/19/2012 385 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. See attached order for further details. Ordered by Judge Eric N. Vitaliano on 12/18/2012. (Siegfried, Evan) (Entered: 12/19/2012)

12/19/2012 386 NOTICE of Appearance by Robert Ortiz on behalf of Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. (aty to be noticed) (Ortiz, Robert) (Entered: 12/19/2012)

12/19/2012

SCHEDULING ORDER: a telephone scheduling conference will be held on 1/8/13 at 4:00 p.m. between plaintiffs and the Court regarding the referral from Judge Vitaliano. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 12/19/2012. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 12/19/2012)

12/19/2012 387 AFFIDAVIT/AFFIRMATION re 386 Notice of Appearance by Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. (Ortiz, Robert) (Entered: 12/19/2012)

12/19/2012

ORDER granting 382 Motion for Settlement: Stipulations of Discontinuance and Settlement attached to motion "So Ordered" by Judge Vitaliano on 12/19/12 and will be filed separately under seal. (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 12/19/2012)

01/02/2013 389 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on 12/13/12, before Judge Go. Court Transcriber TYPEWRITE WORD PROCESSING SERVICE, Telephone number 718−966−1401. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 1/23/2013. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/4/2013. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/2/2013. (Hong, Loan) (Entered: 01/02/2013)

01/08/2013

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go: Status Conference held on 1/8/2013. Appearances by T. Babbitt, H. Talenfeld, S. LeClainche, A. Romanelli and W. Kappel for plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' submissions regarding costs claimed discussed. Plaintiffs' counsel must supplement their submissions by 1/25/13. (FTR/C 4:05−4:37) (sealed) (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 01/10/2013)

01/11/2013 390 NOTICE by Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. of Agency Defendants' Expert Witness Disclosure (Damages) (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service) (Ahmuty, Steven) (Entered: 01/11/2013)

01/24/2013

SCHEDULING ORDER: upon counsel's oral application, plaintiffs' deadline to file supplemental submissions regarding costs is extended to 1/31/13. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 1/24/2013. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 01/24/2013)

01/25/2013 391 NOTICE of Appearance by William G. Spratt on behalf of Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. (aty to be noticed) (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Service) (Spratt, William) (Entered: 01/25/2013)

01/29/2013 392 STIPULATION to Amend Answer by Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service) (Capowski, Timothy) (Entered: 01/29/2013)

01/30/2013 393 NOTICE of Appearance by Judd Cohen on behalf of Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. (aty to be noticed) (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service) (Cohen, Judd) (Entered: 01/30/2013)

01/31/2013

ORDER: The 392 Stipulation to amend further the 34 Amended Answer to Complaint filed by St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc., SCO Family of Services and Heartshare Human Services by adding as paragraph 56 the affirmative defense set forth in the stipulation is "so ordered." Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 1/31/2013. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 01/31/2013)

01/31/2013 394 AMENDED ANSWER to Plaintiffs' 1 Complaint, , CROSSCLAIM against Administration for Children's Services, City of New York by SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc., Heartshare Human Services. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service) (Capowski, Timothy) (Entered: 01/31/2013)

01/31/2013 395 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Anne V. Alper, Esq. Filing fee $ 25, receipt number 0207−5984487. by C.B., J.B., J.G., J.L., L.J., R.E., S.B., S.W., T.G., T.L.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Proposed Order) (Talenfeld, Howard) (Entered: 01/31/2013)

01/31/2013 396 Letter MOTION for Protective Order by S.W.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Bruce Strikowsky August 23, 2012 letter, # 2 Exhibit December 14, 2012, emails, # 3 Exhibit December 15, 2012, emails, # 4 Exhibit December 18, 2012, emails, # 5 Exhibit January 29, 2013, emails, # 6 Exhibit January 29, 2013, email) (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 01/31/2013)

02/01/2013

ORDER granting 395 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Petitioning attorney's request to appear in this proceeding pro hac vice is granted. Ordered by Judge Eric N. Vitaliano on 2/1/2013. (Restrepo, Andres) (Entered: 02/01/2013)

02/01/2013

ORDER granting 395 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice. The admitted attorney, Anne V. Alper, is permitted to argue or try this action in whole or in part as counsel or advocate for plaintiffs. Since the docket sheet indicates that the admission fee has been paid, the Clerk of the Court is respectfully requested to enter the appearance of counsel promptly on the docket sheet for this action and to make a notation of the attorney's admission pro hac vice on this Court's roll of attorneys. If not already registered for Electronic Case Filing ("ECF") with this Court, the admitted attorney must register for ECF or submit an application for exemption within two weeks of the date of this order. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 2/1/2013. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 02/01/2013)

02/01/2013

SCHEDULING ORDER: the agency defendants' response to plaintiffs' 396 motion for a protective order must be filed by 2/4/13. A telephone conference will be held on 2/5/13 at 4:30 p.m. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 2/1/2013.

(Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 02/01/2013)

02/01/2013 397 First MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery by Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service) (Capowski, Timothy) (Entered: 02/01/2013)

02/04/2013 398 RESPONSE in Opposition re 396 Letter MOTION for Protective Order filed by Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Subpoena, # 2 Exhibit B − Email / Calendar, # 3 Exhibit C − Subpoena, # 4 Exhibit D − Notice of Subpoena, # 5 Exhibit E − Notice of Subpoenas, # 6 Exhibit F − Email, # 7 Exhibit G − Email, # 8 Exhibit H − Plaintiffs' Cross Notice, # 9 Certificate of Service) (Rosof, Jeremy) (Entered: 02/04/2013)

02/04/2013 399 Cross MOTION for Protective Order by Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service) (Rosof, Jeremy) (Entered: 02/04/2013)

02/05/2013 400 RESPONSE in Opposition re 399 Cross MOTION for Protective Order by Defendants filed by All Plaintiffs. (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 02/05/2013)

02/05/2013 401 RESPONSE to Motion re 397 First MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery filed by All Plaintiffs. (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 02/05/2013)

02/05/2013 402 REPLY in Support re 396 Letter MOTION for Protective Order filed by All Plaintiffs. (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 02/05/2013)

02/06/2013 403 STIPULATION AND ORDER (proposed) for leave to serve amended answer to third−party complaint to assert affirmative defense of NY General Oligations Law § 15−108 regarding the City of New York's settlement with plaintiffs by Edwin Gould Services for Children (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Service) (Catalano, Thomas) (Entered: 02/06/2013)

02/07/2013

ORDER: The 403 Stipulation filed by Edwin Gould Services for Children for leave to file an amended answer adding a Thirteenth Affirmative defense to the amended third party complaint of the City of New York is "so ordered." Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 2/7/2013. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 02/07/2013)

02/07/2013 404 AMENDED ANSWER to 87 Amended Third Party Complaint, (SECOND) asserting thirteenth affirmative defense under NY GOL § 15−108, CROSSCLAIM against Thelma Bowes, C.B., Sabrina Collins, Heartshare Human Services, Cheryl Jack, Claudette Jackson, Mia Karenga, Anthony Vernon Leekin, Carol Leekin, Desmond Leekin, Judith Leekin, Judith Leekin(DC# K76752), Vontrell Leekin, Lystra Lewis, Anita Lexame, Anita Lezame, Rhonda Morgan, Ishmattie Nagassar/Asman, Barbara Raikes, SCO Family of Services, Theresa Smith, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. by Edwin Gould Services for Children. (Catalano, Thomas) (Entered: 02/07/2013)

02/11/2013 405 NOTICE of Appearance by Robert Boccio on behalf of Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. (aty to be noticed) (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Service) (Boccio, Robert) (Entered: 02/11/2013)

02/12/2013 406 Minute Entry and Order for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 2/5/13. Appearances by T. Babbitt, H. Talenfeld, J. Walsh, A. Romanelli, A. Thompson and M. Cohen for plaintiffs; M. Citrin, J. Rosoff and T. Capowski for the Agency defendants; B. Strikowsky for the City defendants. Rulings made on the record as set forth in the attached minute order granting in part and denying in part plaintiffs motion for a protective order (ct. doc 396), denying the Agency defendants' cross−motion for a protective order (ct. doc. 399) and granting the Agency defendants' motion for an extension of time (ct. doc. 397). (FTR/C: 4:36−5:57) (Proujansky, Josh) Modified on 4/11/2013 to correct hearing date. (Abdallah, Fida) (Entered: 02/12/2013)

02/15/2013 407 First MOTION for Extension of Time to File Summary Judgment Motion and to File Oversized Memorandum of Law by Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service) (Rosof, Jeremy) (Entered: 02/15/2013)

02/19/2013 408 NOTICE of Appearance by Adam S. Covitt on behalf of Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. (aty to be noticed) (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service) (Covitt, Adam) (Entered: 02/19/2013)

02/20/2013 409 RESPONSE in Opposition re 407 First MOTION for Extension of Time to File Summary Judgment Motion and to File Oversized Memorandum of Law filed by All Plaintiffs. (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 02/20/2013)

02/20/2013 410 ANSWER to 404 Amended Answer to Complaint, Crossclaim,,,, by Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service) (Capowski, Timothy) (Entered: 02/20/2013)

02/21/2013 411 First MOTION to Amend/Correct/Supplement Plaintiffs' Complaint by C.B., J.B., J.G., J.L., L.J., R.E., S.B., S.W., T.G., T.L.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Highlighted Changes to Complaint, # 2 Exhibit B − 1 Part 1 of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, # 3 Exhibit B − 2 Part 2 of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, # 4 Exhibit B − 3 Part 3 of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint) (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 02/21/2013)

02/21/2013

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 407 Motion for Extension of Time to File. Agency defendants' motion for an extension of time is granted. They may also file an enlarged memorandum of law, but with a limit of 50 pages, rather than 65 pages. Hence, the page limitation for all briefs shall be doubled. The new briefing schedule is as follows: agency defendants shall serve their motion for summary judgment and memorandum of law on or before 4/1/2013, with a limit of 50 pages on the memorandum; plaintiffs shall serve any opposition on or before 5/20/2013, with a limit of 50 pages; and agency defendants shall serve any reply on or before 6/17/13, with a limit of 20 pages. Agency defendants shall file the entire briefing bundle electronically at the time it serves its reply. Ordered by Judge Eric N. Vitaliano on 2/21/2013. (Restrepo, Andres) (Entered: 02/21/2013)

02/26/2013 412 NOTICE of Appearance by Steven I. Rubin on behalf of Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. (aty to be noticed) (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service) (Rubin, Steven) (Entered: 02/26/2013)

02/26/2013

SCHEDULING ORDER: a telephone conference will be held on 2/27/13 at 9:45 a.m. regarding non−party deposition of Dr. Choudry. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 2/26/2013. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 02/26/2013)

02/27/2013

SCHEDULING ORDER: any opposition to 411 Plaintiff's MOTION to Amend/Correct/Supplement Plaintiffs' Complaint must be filed by 3/4/13. A telephone conference will be held on 3/7/13 at 12:00 p.m. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 2/27/2013. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 02/27/2013)

02/27/2013

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 2/27/2013. Appearances by T. Babbitt, H. Talenfeld, J. Johnson for plaintiffs; J. Rosoff and S. Rubin for the Agency defendants; A. Fihma for the City defendants; M. Dix for non−parties New Horizons of the Treasure Coast and Dr. Chaube. Plaintiffs' counsel confirmed that they consent to release of all oral, as well as written, information about the plaintiffs by New Horizons and Dr. Chaube. Because the information is relevant, and in light of the protective order in place, New Horizons and Dr. Chaube are directed to produce records and give testimony concerning plaintiffs which would reveal information otherwise protected by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1966, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320 et seq., and the regulations promulgated thereunder. See National Abortion Federation v. Ashcroft, 2004 WL 555701, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). Parties shall confer with subpoenaed witnesses to accommodate their schedules in scheduling depositions. (Tape #FTR/C 9:51−10:04 (sealed)) (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 02/27/2013)

03/06/2013

SCHEDULING ORDER: since no opposition has been filed to 411 Plaintiffs' First MOTION to Amend/Correct/Supplement Complaint, the conference scheduled for 3/7/13 is canceled. However, the parties must confer on entering into a Stipulation to preserve plaintiffs' right to argue an exception to CLPR 1601 as an alternative to filing an amended complaint and file a report as to the status of their discussions by 3/14/13. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b)(2) (providing that issue not raised by the pleadings may be

tried by the parties' express consent). (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 03/06/2013)

03/14/2013 413 STIPULATION by S.W. (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 03/14/2013)

03/14/2013

STIPULATION AND ORDER: 413 Stipulation filed by S.W. is "so ordered." Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 3/14/2013. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 03/14/2013)

03/22/2013 414 NOTICE of Appearance by Deirdre E Tracey on behalf of Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. (aty to be noticed) (Tracey, Deirdre) (Entered: 03/22/2013)

04/04/2013 415 NOTICE of Appearance by John D. Paterniti on behalf of Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. (aty to be noticed) (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service) (Paterniti, John) (Entered: 04/04/2013)

04/12/2013 416 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on February 5, 2013, before Judge Go. Court Transcriber: TypeWrite Word Processing Service, Telephone number 718−966−1401. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 5/3/2013. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/13/2013. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/11/2013. (Rocco, Christine) (Entered: 04/12/2013)

04/24/2013

SCHEDULING ORDER: a telephone conference will be held with plaintiffs' counsel on 5/1/13 at 9:45 a.m. regarding the costs sought pursuant to the settlement. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 4/24/2013. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 04/24/2013)

04/25/2013 417 NOTICE of Appearance by Craig Garrett Bienstock on behalf of Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. (aty to be noticed) (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service) (Bienstock, Craig) (Entered: 04/25/2013)

04/30/2013 418 MOTION for Protective Order Regarding Port St. Lucie Police Officers Conger and Holman by C.B., J.B., J.G., J.L., L.J., R.E., S.B., S.W., T.G., T.L.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 1 Notice of Subpoenas to Testify at a Deposition in a Civil Action, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit 2 City of New York correspondence dated August 23, 2012, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit 3 Plaintiff's Motion for Protective order, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit 4 DE369 Letter from City Defendant to Magistrate Go, # 5 Exhibit Exhibit 5 DE 367 Reply to City Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Protective Order, # 6 Exhibit Exhibit 6 Minute Order dated October 2, 2012) (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 04/30/2013)

04/30/2013

SCHEDULING ORDER: the agency defendants' response to plaintiff's motion for protective order must be filed by 5/6/13. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 4/30/2013. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 04/30/2013)

05/01/2013 419 RESPONSE to Motion re 418 MOTION for Protective Order Regarding Port St. Lucie Police Officers Conger and Holman filed by Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Rosof, Jeremy) (Entered: 05/01/2013)

05/01/2013

ORDER re 419 Response to Motion, filed by St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc., SCO Family of Services, Heartshare Human Services. Unlike the previous filing by plaintiffs of ct. doc. 418−3, here, the names of the plaintiffs have been redacted. To the extent defendants contend that ct. doc. 418−3 discloses the identity of a person or other information that is within the scope of the protective order, defendants may promptly supplement their application. Defendants are granted leave to file under seal a further submission if necessary. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 5/1/2013. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 05/01/2013)

05/01/2013

Minute Entry for Status Conference held on 5/1/2013 before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go: Appearances by T. Babbitt, H. Talenfeld and W. Cappel for plaintiffs. Discussions held regarding plaintiffs' application for approval of costs. FTR/C 10:50−11:22 (recording sealed) (Hugh, Lewis) Modified on 5/8/2013 to specify sealing

of recording (Hugh, Lewis). (Entered: 05/08/2013)

05/06/2013 420 RESPONSE to Motion re 418 MOTION for Protective Order Regarding Port St. Lucie Police Officers Conger and Holman filed by Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Certificate of Service) (Rosof, Jeremy) (Attachment 3 replaced on 5/22/2013) (Hugh, Lewis). (Entered: 05/06/2013)

05/07/2013 421 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. ORDERED that 75 percent of the settlement funds held in escrow be disbursed to plaintiffs' counsel and that the remainder continue to be held by plaintiffs' counsel in escrow pending approval by the Court. Ordered by Judge Eric N. Vitaliano on 5/2/2013. (Siegfried, Evan) (Entered: 05/07/2013)

05/08/2013

SCHEDULING ORDER: re 418 MOTION for Protective Order Regarding Port St. Lucie Police Officers Conger and Holman filed by plaintiffs. A telephone conference will be held on 5/15/13 at 10:00 a.m. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 5/8/2013. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 05/08/2013)

05/09/2013 422 MOTION for Leave to Electronically File Document under Seal by Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service) (Rosof, Jeremy) (Entered: 05/09/2013)

05/09/2013

ORDER: The Clerk of the Court is respectfully requested to unseal the 422 MOTION for Leave to Electronically File Document under Seal, which apparently inadvertently filed under seal. Nothing in the letter motion itself merits sealing. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 5/9/2013. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 05/09/2013)

05/09/2013 423 MOTION for Protective Order Regarding the Deposition of Stacey Cason by S.W.. (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 05/09/2013)

05/10/2013

SCHEDULING ORDER: plaintiffs' response to defendants' 422 motion for leave to file under seal and defendants' response to plaintiffs' 423 motion for protective order must be filed by 5/14/13 at 12:00 p.m. The parties should consider this Court's view, as expressed in Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, 2011 WL 4736359 (E.D.N.Y. 2011), that "district courts should avoid sealing judicial documents in their entirety unless necessary." Id. at *3 (quoting U.S. v. Aref, 533 F.3d 72, 81−83 (2d Cir. 2008)). Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 5/10/2013. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 05/10/2013)

05/13/2013 424 RESPONSE in Opposition re 423 MOTION for Protective Order Regarding the Deposition of Stacey Cason filed by Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Certificate of Service) (Rosof, Jeremy) (Entered: 05/13/2013)

05/13/2013 425 RESPONSE in Opposition re 423 MOTION for Protective Order Regarding the Deposition of Stacey Cason filed by Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Certificate of Service) (Rosof, Jeremy) (Entered: 05/13/2013)

05/14/2013 426 RESPONSE to Motion re 422 MOTION for Leave to Electronically File Document under Seal filed by C.B., J.B., J.G., J.L., L.J., R.E., S.B., S.W., T.G., T.L.. (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 05/14/2013)

05/16/2013

Minute entry and order for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go. Appearances by T. Babbitt and H. Talenfeld for plaintiffs; J. Rosof and T. Capowski for the Agency defendants; C. Schaerf for the City defendants. Rulings made on the record granting in part and denying in part [418, 423] plaintiffs' motions for protective order and granting in part and denying in part 422 the Agency defendants' motion for leave to file under seal. Liability discovery is closed and depositions of Officers Holman and Conger and Stacey Cason are permitted only to the extent counsel has a good faith basis to believe that the deponent is able to testify about his observations of the condition of any plaintiff at Ms. Leekin's home. Questioning is limited to such observations and if a deponent denies having observed any plaintiff, then the

questioning of the deponent must terminate. The parties may file under seal their exhibits to the summary judgment motion, but must publicly file affidavits, declarations and all other documents prepared in connection with the motion, with appropriate redactions for the publicly filed versions. (FTR/C 5:37−5:58) (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 05/16/2013)

05/17/2013 427 NOTICE of Appearance by Ralph Vincent Morales on behalf of Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. (aty to be noticed) (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service) (Morales, Ralph) (Entered: 05/17/2013)

05/20/2013 428 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery Rule 35 physical and mental examinations of the Plaintiffs by Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Certificate of Service) (Rosof, Jeremy) (Entered: 05/20/2013)

05/20/2013 429 Letter by City of New York (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 05/20/2013)

05/21/2013

SCHEDULING ORDER: re 428 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery Rule 35 physical and mental examinations of the Plaintiffs filed by St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc., SCO Family of Services, Heartshare Human Services. Plaintiffs' response must be filed by 5/29/13. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 5/21/2013. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 05/21/2013)

05/21/2013

ORDER: having conferred with Judge Vitaliano's chambers, the summary judgment motion must be filed electronically in accordance with Judge Vitaliano's motion practice rules. As discussed at a conference held on May 15, 2013, the defendants are given leave to file all the exhibits to their summary judgment motion under seal given the large number and volume of exhibits, most of which are foster care, adoption or medical records containing personal, confidential information. The larger exhibits should be separately filed with a short description (e.g., St. Joseph's record re S.W.). The exhibits containing shorter documents may be combined in one filing (e.g., Exhs. D−F), again with a short description of each. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 5/21/2013. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 05/21/2013)

05/29/2013 430 RESPONSE in Opposition re 428 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery Rule 35 physical and mental examinations of the Plaintiffs filed by C.B., J.B., J.G., J.L., L.J., R.E., S.B., S.W., T.G., T.L.. (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 05/29/2013)

05/29/2013

Minute Entry for Discovery Hearing held on 5/29/2013 before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go: Appearances by J. Walsh for plaintiffs; S. Rubin for the Agency defendants, B. Strikowsky for City of New York. Parties called from deposition of non−party Lt. Carmichael of Port St. Lucie Police Dept. Rulings made on the record regarding scope of questioning. (Hugh, Lewis) (Entered: 05/30/2013)

05/31/2013 431 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 428 Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery. The time for completion of plaintiffs' depositions is extended to 7/31/13. The remaining schedule is accordingly extended by 30 days as follows: (i) medical examinations of each plaintiff must be completed by 8/31/13; (ii) defendants' medical expert reports must be served within 3 weeks of each plaintiffs' medical examination; (iii) should plaintiffs wish to supplement their medical expert reports in response, plaintiffs' supplemental medical expert reports must be served within 4 weeks of the service of defendants' medical expert reports; (iv) defendants' life care planning expert report must be served within 3 weeks of defendants' medical expert reports; (v) defendants' economist's expert report must be served within 2 weeks of defendants' life care planning expert report; and (vi) plaintiffs' rebuttal life care planning expert report and economist's expert report must be served within 4 weeks of defendants' corresponding expert report. Parties must send the Court a joint report regarding the status of discovery on 12/2/13. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 5/31/2013. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 05/31/2013)

06/05/2013 432 NOTICE by Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. of Amended Notice of Expert Disclosure (Damages) (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service) (Rosof, Jeremy) (Entered: 06/05/2013)

06/13/2013 433 MOTION to Compel Plaintiffs' Response to Interrogatories by Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. W/Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Certificate of Service. (Rosof, Jeremy) (Main Document and Exhibits 4, 5, 6 were replaced with redacted documents.) (Entered: 06/13/2013)

06/13/2013

SCHEDULING ORDER: plaintiffs' response to 433 the Agency defendants' motion to compel must be filed by 6/19/13. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 6/13/2013. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 06/13/2013)

06/17/2013 434 First MOTION for Summary Judgment by Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Rule 56.1 Statement, # 3 Declaration of Rosof, # 4 Declaration of Odom, # 5 Declaration of Conway, # 6 Declaration of Smith−Njiiri, # 7 Certificate of Service) (Rosof, Jeremy) (Entered: 06/17/2013)

06/17/2013 435 MEMORANDUM in Support Rosof Dec Exh 1 to 8 in Support of Agency Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Rosof Dec Exhs 8 to 15, # 2 Exhibit Rosof Dec Exhs 16 to 19, # 3 Exhibit Rosof Dec Exhs 20 to 30, # 4 Exhibit Rosof Dec Exhs 31 to 36, # 5 Exhibit Rosof Dec Exhs 37 to 47, # 6 Exhibit Rosof Dec Exhs 48 to 49, # 7 Exhibit Rosof Dec Exhs 50 to 55) (Rosof, Jeremy) (Entered: 06/17/2013)

06/17/2013 436 MEMORANDUM in Support Odom Dec Exh A (1 of 2) in Support of Agency Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment filed by Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Odom Dec Exh A (2 of 2)) (Rosof, Jeremy) (Entered: 06/17/2013)

06/17/2013 437 MEMORANDUM in Support Conway Dec Exh A (1 of 3) in Support of Agency Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment filed by Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Conway Dec Exh A (2 of 3), # 2 Exhibit Conway Dec Exh A (3 of 3), # 3 Exhibit Conway Dec Exhs B, C, D and E) (Rosof, Jeremy) (Entered: 06/17/2013)

06/17/2013 438 MEMORANDUM in Support Smith−Njiiri Dec Exh A (1 of 4) in Support of Agency Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment filed by Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Smith−Njiiri Dec Exh A (2 of 4), # 2 Exhibit Smith−Njiiri Dec Exh A (3 of 4), # 3 Exhibit Smith−Njiiri Dec Exh A (4 of 4), B and C) (Rosof, Jeremy) (Entered: 06/17/2013)

06/17/2013 439 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 434 First MOTION for Summary Judgment uploaded onto ECF by Movant per Judge Vitaliano's Rules filed by C.B., J.B., J.G., J.L., L.J., R.E., S.B., S.W., T.G., T.L.. (Attachments: # 1 Rule 56.1 Statement, # 2 Declaration Kapell Declaration, # 3 Affidavit in Opposition Hess Affidavit, # 4 Affidavit in Opposition Kanter Affidavit, # 5 Affidavit in Opposition Safarik Affidavit, # 6 Affidavit in Opposition Eth Affidavit, # 7 Affidavit in Opposition Castro Affidavit, # 8 Affidavit in Support) (Rosof, Jeremy) (Entered: 06/17/2013)

06/17/2013 440 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to Agency Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment uploaded onto ECF by Movant per Judge Vitaliano's Rules − Kapell Exh 1 (1 of 2) filed by C.B., J.B., J.G., J.L., L.J., R.E., S.B., S.W., T.G., T.L.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Kapell Dec Exh 1 (2 of 2), # 2 Exhibit Kapell Dec Exhs 2 and 3, # 3 Exhibit Kapell Dec Exh 4 (1 of 2), # 4 Exhibit Kapell Dec Exh 4 (2 of 2)) (Rosof, Jeremy) (Entered: 06/17/2013)

06/17/2013 441 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to Agency Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment uploaded by Movant per Judge Vitaliano's Rules − Kapell Dec Exhs 5 to 12 filed by C.B., J.B., J.G., J.L., L.J., R.E., S.B., S.W., T.G., T.L.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Kapell Dec Exhs 13 and 14, # 2 Exhibit Kapell Dec Exhs 15 to 21, # 3 Exhibit Kapell Dec Exhs 22 to 30, # 4 Exhibit Kapell Dec Exhs 31 to 43) (Rosof, Jeremy) (Entered: 06/17/2013)

06/17/2013 442 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to Agency Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment uploaded by Movant per Judge Vitaliano's Rules − Hess Aff Exh A filed by C.B., J.B., J.G., J.L., L.J., R.E., S.B., S.W., T.G., T.L.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Kanter Aff Exh A (1 of 2), # 2 Exhibit Kanter Aff Exh A (2 of 2), # 3 Exhibit Safarik Aff Exh A, # 4 Exhibit Eth Aff Exh A, # 5 Exhibit Castro Aff Exh A (1 of 2), # 6 Exhibit Castro Aff Exh A (2 of 2)) (Rosof, Jeremy) (Entered: 06/17/2013)

06/17/2013 443 REPLY in Support re 434 First MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration Odom Reply Declaration, # 2 Declaration Conway Reply Declaration, # 3 Declaration Smith−Njiiri Reply Declaration, # 4 Certificate of Service) (Rosof, Jeremy) (Entered: 06/17/2013)

06/19/2013 444 RESPONSE in Opposition re 433 MOTION to Compel Plaintiffs' Response to Interrogatories Second Set filed by C.B., J.B., J.G., J.L., L.J., R.E., S.B., S.W., T.G., T.L.. (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 06/19/2013)

06/20/2013 445 REPLY in Support re 433 MOTION to Compel Plaintiffs' Response to Interrogatories filed by Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Certificate of Service) (Rosof, Jeremy) (Entered: 06/20/2013)

06/20/2013 446 NOTICE of Change of Address by Sonya A Smith−Valentine (Smith−Valentine, Sonya) (Entered: 06/20/2013)

06/20/2013

SCHEDULING ORDER: re 433 MOTION to Compel Plaintiffs' Response to Interrogatories filed by St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc., SCO Family of Services, Heartshare Human Services. A telephone conference will be held on 6/24/13 at 4:00 p.m. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 6/20/2013. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 06/20/2013)

06/24/2013 447 RESPONSE to Motion re 433 MOTION to Compel Plaintiffs' Response to Interrogatories filed by C.B., J.B., J.G., J.L., L.J., R.E., S.B., S.W., T.G., T.L.. (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 06/24/2013)

06/24/2013

Minute Order for Motion Hearing held on 6/24/2013 re 433 MOTION to Compel before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go: Appearances by J. Walsh, A. Romanelli and A. Sunderstein for plaintiffs; T. Capowski and D. Tracey for the Agency defendants; B. Strikowsky for City defendants. Rulings made on the record granting 433 the Agency defendants' motion to compel. Plaintiffs' discovery responses must be supplemented as discussed at the conference, including providing individual responses by each plaintiff, and explanation of their efforts to preserve ESI and a verification by each plaintiff that their responses are accurate. Supplemental responses of S.B. and S.W. must be completed by 6/28/13 at 12:00 p.m. and of the other plaintiffs by 7/2/13 at 12:00 p.m. (Tape #4:06−4:35.) (Hugh, Lewis) (Entered: 06/27/2013)

07/02/2013 448 STIPULATION to be So Ordered regarding Scheduling the Plaintiffs' Rule 35 Examinations by the Plaintiffs and by Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service) (Rosof, Jeremy) (Entered: 07/02/2013)

07/09/2013

ORDER: The 448 Stipulation regarding the scheduling of the Rule 35 examinations of plaintiffs is "so ordered." Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 7/9/2013. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 07/09/2013)

07/11/2013 449 MOTION to Compel and, MOTION for Sanctions by Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Ex. A, # 2 Ex. B, # 3 Ex. C, # 4 Ex. D, # 5 Ex. E, # 6 Ex. F, # 7 Ex. G, # 8 Ex. H, # 9 Ex. I, # 10 Ex. J, # 11 Ex. K, # 12 Ex. L, # 13 Ex. M, # 14 Ex. N, # 15 Affidavit of Service) (Rosof, Jeremy) (Entered: 07/11/2013)

07/11/2013

SCHEDULING ORDER: plaintiff's response to the Agency defendants' 449 motion to compel must be filed by 7/18/13. A telephone conference will be held on 7/24/13 at 11:00 a.m. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 7/11/2013. (Proujansky,

Josh) (Entered: 07/11/2013)

07/18/2013 450 RESPONSE to Motion re 449 MOTION to Compel and MOTION for Sanctions filed by C.B., J.B., J.G., J.L., L.J., R.E., S.B., S.W., T.G., T.L.. (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 07/18/2013)

07/19/2013 451 Letter MOTION for Leave to File Reply Papers in Further Support of Pending Motions to Compel and for Sanctions by Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service) (Rosof, Jeremy) (Entered: 07/19/2013)

07/24/2013

Minute Order for Motion Hearing held on 7/24/2013 re 451 Letter MOTION for Leave to File before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go: Appearances by J. Walsh, A. Romanelli, A. Sundarsingh for plaintiff; J. Rosoff, T. Capowski and D. Tracey for the Agency defendants; B. Strikowsky for the City defendants. Rulings made on the record granting 451 the Agency defendants' request to file reply papers. The parties must confer on highlighting portions of plaintiffs' deposition transcripts and must submit the entire deposition transcript with highlights to chambers by 7/26/13. By 8/2/13, plaintiffs must submit modify the charts attached to their Amended Responses to the Agency Defendants' Second Set of Interrogatories with a fourth column added to reflect the number of pages produced for each account and the time period encompassed by that production. Next conference scheduled for 8/6/13 at 1:00 p.m. NOTE: After further consideration, full transcripts are requested. FTR 11:07−11:26. (Hugh, Lewis) (Entered: 07/26/2013)

08/07/2013 452 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on August 6, 2013, before Judge Go. Court Transcriber: TypeWrite Word Processing Service, Telephone number 718−966−1401. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 8/28/2013. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/9/2013. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/5/2013. (Rocco, Christine) (Entered: 08/07/2013)

08/08/2013 453 Minute entry and order for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 8/6/13. Rulings made on the record granting in part and denying in part the Agency defendants' 449 motion to compel and for sanctions as summarized and supplemented in the attached order. (Tape #FTR/C 1:06−1:45.) (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 08/08/2013)

08/15/2013 454 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on 6/24/13, before Judge Go. Court Reporter/Transcriber TYPEWRITE WORD PROCESSING SERVICE, Telephone number 718−966−1401. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 9/5/2013. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/16/2013. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/13/2013. (Hong, Loan) (Entered: 08/15/2013)

08/15/2013 455 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on 7/24/13, before Judge Go. Court Reporter/Transcriber TYPEWRITE WORD PROCESSING SERVICE, Telephone number 718−966−1401. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 9/5/2013. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/16/2013. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/13/2013. (Hong, Loan) (Entered: 08/15/2013)

08/16/2013 456 STIPULATION and Order Modifying the Parties' Schedule for the Exchange of Expert Reports by Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service) (Rosof, Jeremy) (Entered: 08/16/2013)

08/19/2013

STIPULATION AND ORDER: the parties' 456 Stipulation is "so ordered." Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 8/19/2013. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 08/19/2013)

10/02/2013

Clerk's ENTRY OF DEFAULT It appearing from the docket maintained in this action that Third−Party Defendant Cheryl Jack has failed to appear or otherwise defend this

action, the default of Third−Party Defendant Cheryl Jack is hereby noted pursuant to Rule 55a of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Hamilton, Janet) (Entered: 10/02/2013)

10/04/2013

ORDER granting 457 Motion to Seal. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 10/4/2013. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 10/04/2013)

10/15/2013 458 RESPONSE in Opposition re 457 MOTION to Seal Letter Motion for Status Conference for the Purpose of Setting this Matter for Trial filed by Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Affidavit of Service) (Rosof, Jeremy) (Entered: 10/15/2013)

10/16/2013 459 REPLY to Response to Motion re 457 MOTION to Seal Letter Motion for Status Conference to Agency Defendants' Response [DE458] filed by All Plaintiffs. (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 10/16/2013)

10/17/2013 460 RESPONSE in Opposition re 457 MOTION to Seal Letter Motion for Status Conference oppostion to plaintiffs' motion to set a trial date, or the alternative, if a trial date is set, that the third−party action be severed filed by Edwin Gould Services for Children. (Catalano, Thomas) (Entered: 10/17/2013)

10/18/2013 461 REPLY in Opposition re 460 Response in Opposition to Motion, Letter in opposition to Edwin Gould Services for Children's application for a severance of the third−party actions filed by City of New York. (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 10/18/2013)

10/18/2013 462 Letter in Response to Edwin Gould Services for Children's Application to Sever Third−Party Action by Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. (Rosof, Jeremy) (Entered: 10/18/2013)

10/21/2013 463 REPLY in Opposition re 460 Response in Opposition to Motion, for Status Conference to Schedule Trial filed by All Plaintiffs. (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 10/21/2013)

10/23/2013 464 REPLY to Response to Motion re 457 MOTION to Seal Letter Motion for Status Conference (response to plaintiffs counsel Theodore Babbitts letter of October 21, 2013 (Dkt. No. 463)) filed by Edwin Gould Services for Children. (Catalano, Thomas) (Entered: 10/23/2013)

10/23/2013 465 REPLY in Support re 463 Reply in Opposition to Edwin Gould's Reply letter (DE 464) filed by All Plaintiffs. (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 10/23/2013)

10/28/2013

The Court is in receipt of the parties' letters requesting and opposing a conference for the purpose of setting a trial date. The Court will not schedule a conference at this time for that purpose. A trial date will be set on the conclusion of discovery and resolution of all dispositive motions. Ordered by Judge Eric N. Vitaliano on 10/28/2013. (Weiner Chernoff, Stephanie) (Entered: 10/28/2013)

10/29/2013

ORDER ORDER REFERRING MOTION: 214 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Thelma Bowes, 210 MOTION for Summary Judgment under Rule 56 and for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) filed by Edwin Gould Services for Children, 265 CORRECTED MOTION to Strike filed by S.W. Motions referred to Marilyn D. Go.. Ordered by Judge Eric N. Vitaliano on 10/29/2013. (Weiner Chernoff, Stephanie) (Entered: 10/29/2013)

11/12/2013

SCHEDULING ORDER: a telephone conference will be held on 11/20/13 at 11:00 a.m. regarding the status of the motions referred by Judge Vitaliano. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 11/12/2013. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 11/12/2013)

11/20/2013

Minute Entry for Settlement/Status Conference held on 11/20/2013 before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go: Appearances by T. Babbitt, H. Talenfeld, M. Cohen for plaintiffs; J. Rosoff, T. Capowski for the Agency defendants; C. Schaerf, A. Fihma for City defendants; T. Catalano for Edwin Gould and S. Smith−Valentine for Bowes, 3d party defendants. Discussion held regarding motions referred for report and recommendation. The Agency defendants, who did not file any opposition papers to Edwin Gould's motion for summary judgment, advise that they take no position on the

motion. A settlement conference with plaintiffs and the Agency defendants is scheduled for 12/4/13 at 3:30 p.m. (by tel.) Bowes is encouraged to confer with defendants and to call chambers to schedule a settlement conference if it would be helpful. FTR/C 11:09−11:26 (Hugh, Lewis) (Entered: 11/21/2013)

11/21/2013

SCHEDULING ORDER: re 434 First MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc., SCO Family of Services, Heartshare Human Services. Oral argument set for 12/13/2013 02:30 PM before Judge Eric N. Vitaliano. Ordered by Judge Eric N. Vitaliano on 11/21/2013. (Weiner Chernoff, Stephanie) (Entered: 11/21/2013)

12/02/2013 466 MOTION for Reconsideration to be Excused from Further Productions of ESI by C.B., J.B., J.G., J.L., L.J., R.E., S.B., S.W., T.G., T.L.. (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 12/02/2013)

12/02/2013 467 STATUS REPORT Joint on Discovery by C.B., J.B., J.G., J.L., L.J., R.E., S.B., S.W., T.G., T.L. (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 12/02/2013)

12/02/2013 468 Letter re Status of Discovery by Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Service) (Rosof, Jeremy) (Entered: 12/02/2013)

12/04/2013

Minute Entry for Settlement Conference held on 12/4/2013 before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go: Appearances by T. Babbitt, A. Romanelli, H. Talenfeld and J. Walsh for plaintiff; S. Ahmuty for the Agency defendants (w/ clients). Settlement discussions held. Next conference scheduled for 12/6/13 at 11:30 a.m. (by tel.) THE PARTIES SHOULD NOTE THE NEW TIME (Hugh, Lewis) (Entered: 12/05/2013)

12/06/2013 469 RESPONSE to Motion re 466 MOTION for Reconsideration to be Excused from Further Productions of ESI filed by Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Affidavit of Service) (Rosof, Jeremy) (Modified: Attachment 3 replaced on 12/6/2013) (Entered: 12/06/2013)

12/09/2013

Minute Entry for Settlement Conference held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 12/6/2013. Appearances by T. Babbitt, H. Talenfeld, J. Walsh, A. Romanelli, M. Cohen for plaintiffs; S. Ahmuty for the Agency defendants (w/ representatives from AIG). Further discussions re settlement are not possible at this time. Parties must check−in with chambers immediately following oral argument before Judge Vitaliano on 12/13/13 to report on status of settlement discussion and, if time permits, to discuss plaintiffs' motion 466 for reconsideration. Next conference scheduled for 12/18/13 at 9:30 a.m. (by tel.) (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 12/09/2013)

12/09/2013

SCHEDULING ORDER: due to a change in Judge Go's schedule, the conference scheduled for 12/18/13 will be held at 10:00 a.m. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 12/9/2013. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 12/09/2013)

12/13/2013 470 NOTICE of Appearance by Juan C. Gonzalez on behalf of Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. (aty to be noticed) (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service) (Gonzalez, Juan) (Entered: 12/13/2013)

12/13/2013

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Eric N. Vitaliano:Motion Hearing held on 12/13/2013 re 434 First MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc., SCO Family of Services, Heartshare Human Services. Counsel: Theodore Babbitt and Melissa Cohen appearing for the plaintiffs; Bruce Strikowsky and Carl Shaerf appearing for defendant City of New York Administration for Children Services; Steven Ahmuty Jr. and Juan Gonzalez appearing for the agency defendants; and Curt Schiner and Thomas Catalano for third−party defendant Edwin Gould Services for Children. Parties gave oral argument on the agency defendants' motion for summary judgment. (Court Reporter Allan Sherman.) (Weiner Chernoff, Stephanie) (Entered: 12/13/2013)

12/18/2013

Minute Order for Scheduling/Settlement Conference/Motion Hearing held on 12/18/2013 re 466 MOTION for Reconsideration to be Excused from Further

Productions of ESI filed by S.B., T.L., J.B., R.E., J.L., C.B., J.G., S.W., T.G., L.J. ; held on 12/18/201 before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go: Appearances by T. Babbit, A. Sundarsingh, J. Walsh for plaintiff; J. Rosoff and J. Gonzalez for the Agency defendants; B. Strikowsky and C. Schaerf for the City defendants. Rulings made on the record granting in part and denying in part 466 plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration. Plaintiffs must continue to supplement their production of ESI but may delay production until after disposition of the pending dispositive motions. Expert depositions are likewise be delayed. A schedule for depositions and ESI production shall be set at a conference to be scheduled after decisions are rendered. The parties should further discuss settlement and call chambers to schedule a settlement conference if it would be helpful. FTR/C 10:36−10:52. (Hugh, Lewis) (Entered: 12/19/2013)

12/20/2013 471 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Tracey, Deirdre) (Entered: 12/20/2013)

12/22/2013

ORDER granting 471 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Deirdre E Tracey terminated. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 12/21/13. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 12/22/2013)

01/02/2014 472 MOTION for Disclosure to Defer Service of Rebuttal Economist Reports and Life Care Plans by C.B., J.B., J.G., J.L., L.J., R.E., S.B., S.W., T.G., T.L.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A − Minute Order for Scheduling/Settlement Conference/Motion Hearing) (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 01/02/2014)

01/06/2014 473 RESPONSE in Opposition re 472 MOTION for Disclosure to Defer Service of Rebuttal Economist Reports and Life Care Plans filed by Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A (Affidavit of Service of Mattson Reports), # 2 Exhibit B (Affidavit of Service of Abboud Reports), # 3 Exhibit C (Rosof Email Exchange with Plaintiffs' Counsel), # 4 Certificate of Service) (Rosof, Jeremy) (Entered: 01/06/2014)

01/08/2014 474 REPLY to Response to Motion re 472 MOTION for Disclosure to Defer Service of Rebuttal Economist Reports and Life Care Plans filed by All Plaintiffs. (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 01/08/2014)

01/08/2014

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 472 Motion to Defer Service of Expert Reports. Although the Court is mindful of plaintiffs' stated intention to conserve resources, plaintiffs have repeatedly advocated for completing discovery expeditiously. Accordingly, plaintiffs' rebuttal life care planning expert reports must be served by 4/3/14 and 4/6/13, respectively, and plaintiffs' rebuttal economist report must be served by 4/17/14, or 30 days after determination of the Agency defendants' motion for summary judgment, whichever is earlier. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 1/8/2014. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 01/08/2014)

01/28/2014 475 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER re 434 Motion for Summary Judgment; For the foregoing reasons, J.B., S.B., and S.W.'s negligence claims are dismissed as untimely, and L.J. and J.G.'s § 1983 claims are dismissed. In all other respects, the motion is denied. Consequently, the § 1983 action continues with respect to plaintiffs S.W., T.G., J.L., S.B., R.E., J.B., C.B., and T.L., and the negligence action continues with respect to plaintiffs T.G., J.L., R.E., C.B., and T.L. Ordered by Judge Eric N. Vitaliano on 1/17/2014. (Fernandez, Erica) (Entered: 01/28/2014)

01/29/2014

SCHEDULING ORDER: a telephone conference will be held on 2/7/14 at 10:00 a.m. to discuss settlement and set a schedule for the completion of discovery and submission of a JPTO. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 1/29/2014. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 01/29/2014)

02/05/2014 476 Letter Requesting Briefing Schedule For Proposed Petition For Interlocutory Appeal by Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service) (Rosof, Jeremy) (Entered: 02/05/2014)

02/05/2014

ORDER SCHEDULING ORDER: The parties' proposed briefing schedule on the agency defendants' motion to seek leave to certify an issue for interlocutory appeal is

adopted: The agency defendants' motion shall be served on or before Friday, February 7, 2014; plaintiffs' opposition to the motion shall be served on or before Tuesday, February 18, 2014; and the agency defendants' reply, if any, shall be served on or before February 24, 2014. Upon completion of all briefing, the moving party shall upload the fully briefed motion to ECF. Ordered by Judge Eric N. Vitaliano on 2/5/2014. (Weiner Chernoff, Stephanie) (Entered: 02/05/2014)

02/24/2014 477 First MOTION for Certificate of Appealability on Issue of State Action Under Sec. 1983, and for a Stay by Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service) (Ahmuty, Steven) (Entered: 02/24/2014)

02/24/2014 478 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 477 First MOTION for Certificate of Appealability on Issue of State Action Under Sec. 1983, and for a Stay (Opposition on Behalf of Plaintiffs) filed by All Plaintiffs. (Ahmuty, Steven) (Entered: 02/24/2014)

02/24/2014 479 REPLY to Response to Motion re 477 First MOTION for Certificate of Appealability on Issue of State Action Under Sec. 1983, and for a Stay filed by Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service) (Ahmuty, Steven) (Entered: 02/24/2014)

02/26/2014

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 2/7/2014. Appearances by T. Babbitt, A. Romanelli, H. Talenfeld, J. Walsh, A. Sundarsingh, W. Kappel, J. Pearl for plaintiff; S. Ahmuty, J. Rosof, T. Capowski for the Agency defendants w/ representative of client; C. Schaerf for the City; R. Eniclerico and T. Catalano for Edwin Gould. Further settlement discussions are not possible at this time. Discovery is stayed until next conference scheduled for 3/7/14 at 9:30 a.m. (by tel.) (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 02/26/2014)

03/07/2014

Minute Entry for Settlement Conference held on 3/7/2014 before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go: Appearances by T. Babbitt for plaintiffs; S. Ahmuty, T. Capowski and J. Rosof for the Agency defendants; C. Shiner and T. Catalano for Edwin Gould. Plaintiffs and the Agency defendants reported that they will engage in private mediation. The discovery stay is continued until the next conference scheduled for 4/18/14 at 9:30 a.m. (by tel.) (Hugh, Lewis) (Entered: 03/07/2014)

03/13/2014 480 ORDER denying 477 Motion for Certificate of Appealability: For the foregoing reasons, the Court declines to grant certification for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Ordered by Judge Eric N. Vitaliano on 3/10/2014. (Fernandez, Erica) (Entered: 03/13/2014)

04/18/2014 481 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney Melissa Cohen by C.B., J.B., J.G., J.L., L.J., R.E., S.B., S.W., T.G., T.L.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order A − Proposed Order) (Cohen, Melissa) (Entered: 04/18/2014)

04/18/2014

Minute Entry for Status Conference held on 4/18/2014 before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go: Appearances by T. Babbitt, H. Talenfeld, W. Kapell, J. Walsh, A. Sundarsingh for plaintiffs; T. Capowski, J. Rosof for the Agency defendants; T. Catalano, C. Shiner for Edwin Gould. Parties reported that private mediation is scheduled. Next conference scheduled for 6/25/14 at 9:30 a.m. (by tel.) (Hugh, Lewis) (Entered: 04/22/2014)

04/22/2014

ORDER granting 481 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Melissa Cohen terminated. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 4/22/2014. (Hugh, Lewis) (Entered: 04/22/2014)

06/25/2014

Minute Entry for Status Conference held on 6/25/2014 before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go: Appearances by T. Babbitt for plaintiffs; S. Ahmuty, T. Capowski, J. Rosof for the Agency defendants; B. Strikowsky for the City defendants; and T. Catalano for Edwin Gould. Parties reported that plaintiffs and the Agency defendants reached an agreement to settle. Discussions held regarding status of action following settlement. As discussed, the City defendants and the Agency defendants must confer in advance of the next conference scheduled for 7/3/14 at 1:00 p.m. (by tel.) NOTICE: the parties are requested to arrange for a conference call and to notify the court before the call as to the arrangements. (Hugh, Lewis) (Entered: 07/01/2014)

07/04/2014 482 NOTICE of Change of Address of LESTER SCHWAB KATZ & DWYER by Thomas A. Catalano new: 100 Wall St, New York, NY 10005) (Catalano, Thomas) (Entered: 07/04/2014)

07/08/2014 483 Letter Providing Dates of Availability by C.B., J.B., J.G., J.L., L.J., R.E., S.B., S.W., T.G., T.L. (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 07/08/2014)

07/08/2014

Minute Entry for Status Conference held on 7/8/2014 before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go. Appearances by S. Le Clainche, A. Romanelli, A. Sundarsingh, H. Talenfeld for plaintiffs; T. Capowski, J. Rosof for Agency defendants; B. Strikowsky for City defendants; S. Smith−Valentine for Thelma Bowes; T. Catalano, C. Shiner for Edwin Gould. Discussions held regarding status of cross−claims and third−party claims. Plaintiffs must submit a letter by 7/11/14 proposing a schedule for filing a motion for approval of the settlement and costs. If the defendants have not made progress towards a resolution of the cross−claims, a discovery schedule will be set at the next conference scheduled for 7/31/14 at 2:00 p.m. (by tel.) (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 07/08/2014)

07/14/2014 484 Letter Pursuant to Minute Entry Regarding Schedule for Filing Motion for Approval of the Settlement and Costs by C.B., J.B., J.G., J.L., L.J., R.E., S.B., S.W., T.G., T.L. (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 07/14/2014)

07/25/2014 485 Letter regarding availability to schedule a hearing by C.B., J.B., J.G., J.L., L.J., R.E., S.B., S.W., T.G., T.L. (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 07/25/2014)

07/31/2014

Minute Entry for Status Conference held on 7/31/2014 before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go: Appearances by T. Babbitt, H. Talenfeld for plaintiffs; S. Ahmuty, J. Rosof, T. Capowski, R. Ortiz for the Agency defendants; B. Strikowsky, C. Schaerf for the City defendants; T. Catalano for Edwin Gould; S. Smith−Valentine for Bowes. The City defendants report that they will voluntarily dismiss their third party claims against Bowes and will pursue default judgment only against Judith Leekin. The City defendants and the Agency defendants must each file a report by 8/8/14 as to which cross−claims and third−party claims they intend to pursue. Next conference scheduled for 8/15/14 at 2:00 p.m. at which the City defendants and the Agency defendants must appear in−person and the other parties may appear by telephone. The plaintiffs must file a motion for approval of the settlement and disbursement of costs by 8/14/14. FTR/C 2:08−2:34. (Hugh, Lewis) (Entered: 08/01/2014)

08/08/2014 486 Letter Informing Court of Agency Defendants' Position With Respect to Their Pending Cross Claims and Third−Party Claims by Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service) (Ahmuty, Steven) (Entered: 08/08/2014)

08/08/2014 487 Letter informing the Court of the claims and third−party claims the City intends to pursue, and those it does not intend to pursue by City of New York (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 08/08/2014)

08/15/2014

Minute Entry for Status Conference held on 8/15/2014 before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go: Appearances by T. Babbitt, H. Talenfeld for plaintiffs; C. Schaerf, B. Strikowsky for the City defendants; S. Ahmuty, J. Rosof for the Agency defendants; T. Catalano for Edwin Gould. Plaintiffs shall supplement their motion for approval as discussed, including publicly filing a motion for approval with redactions, as may be appropriate. The defendants confirmed that they will discontinue their third party claims and indemnification cross−claims. The defendants must exchange initial disclosures regarding remaining cross−claims by 9/16/14. Any further discovery on the cross− claims will be discussed at the next conference. Preliminary settlement discussions held regarding remaining City defendant's cross claims for failure to obtain insurance and contribution. Next conference scheduled for 9/23/14 at 3:00 p.m. FTR 2:11−2:44. (Hugh, Lewis) (Entered: 08/18/2014)

08/18/2014

ORDER granting 488 Motion for Leave to Electronically File Document under Seal; denying 489 Motion for Leave to Electronically File Document under Seal. Although plaintiffs consented to unsealing of these filings at a conference held on August 15, 2014, after counsel conferred with their clients, plaintiffs contacted chambers and requested that their identities remain confidential. Given the nature of some of the allegations in this action, I find good cause exists to protect the plaintiffs' identities which are revealed in many of the documents submitted with 488 . Plaintiffs' counsel

must re−file the motion papers publicly with appropriate redactions along with copies of the settlement agreement, releases, structured settlement documents and subsequent orders of the Florida court. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 8/18/2014. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 08/18/2014)

08/25/2014 490 MOTION for Settlement Approval and for Disbursement of Costs Held in Escrow by C.B., J.B., J.G., J.L., L.J., R.E., S.B., S.W., T.G., T.L.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Orders Entered by Judge Vitaliano, # 2 Exhibit B − Original Pro Rata Shares, # 3 Exhibit C − Amended Authority to Represent, # 4 Exhibit D − Adjusted Pro Rata Shares for Settlement 1, # 5 Exhibit E − Orders Approving Second Settlement, # 6 Exhibit F − Orders Approving First Settlement, # 7 Exhibit G − Closing Statements, # 8 Exhibit H − Costs − Second Settlement, # 9 Exhibit I − Costs − Attributable to JG and LG, # 10 Exhibit J − Costs − Submitted on January 31, 2013, # 11 Exhibit K − Categorical Summaries Submitted on January 31, 2013, # 12 Exhibit L − Mediation Agreement, # 13 Exhibit M − Settlement Agreement and Releases) (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 08/25/2014)

09/04/2014 491 NOTICE by C.B., J.B., J.G., J.L., L.J., R.E., S.B., S.W., T.G., T.L. re 490 MOTION for Settlement Approval and for Disbursement of Costs Held in Escrow of Filing Supplemental Exhibits (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit E−4, # 2 Exhibit E−5, # 3 Exhibit E−6) (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 09/04/2014)

09/05/2014 492 NOTICE by C.B., J.B., J.G., J.L., L.J., R.E., S.B., S.W., T.G., T.L. of Filing Supplemental Exhibits (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit M−1 RE Settlement Agreement and Release, # 2 Exhibit M−3 S.W. Settlement Agreement and Release) (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 09/05/2014)

09/19/2014 493 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER re 490 Motion for Settlement: It is hereby ORDERED, that the guardians are hereby authorized and empowered to settle this action against St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc., Heartshare Human Services and SCO Family of Services in the amounts described in the papers submitted, and to execute a General Release to the defendants conditioned upon the payment of said amount in accordance with this Order and to sign all papers necessary in that connection (see order for details). Ordered by Judge Eric N. Vitaliano on 9/11/2014. (Fernandez, Erica) (Entered: 09/19/2014)

09/23/2014 494 STIPULATION of Dismissal Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) by Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Stipulation of Voluntary Dismissal Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii)) (Ahmuty, Steven) (Entered: 09/23/2014)

09/23/2014

Minute Entry for Status/Settlement Conference held on 9/23/2014 before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go: Appearances by H. Talenfeld for plaintiffs; B. Strikowsky, C. Schaerf for City defendants; S. Ahmuty, J. Rosof for Agency defendants. Plaintiffs may submit a revised application for costs by 10/7/14. Defendants reported that they are preparing stipulations to dismiss third party claims. Settlement discussions held, but settlement is not possible at this time. The parties should call for a further settlement conference if their positions change. The Agency defendants' application to conduct discovery is granted. Discovery must be completed by 12/23/14. Next conference scheduled for 12/23/14 at 2:00 p.m. FTR 3:05−3:19 (Hugh, Lewis) (Entered: 09/24/2014)

10/02/2014 495 Letter MOTION to Dismiss by Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Stipulation of Voluntary Dismissal, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B) (Ahmuty, Steven) (Entered: 10/02/2014)

10/02/2014 496 Amended MOTION to Amend/Correct/Supplement to Approve Costs by C.B., J.B., J.G., J.L., L.J., R.E., S.B., S.W., T.G., T.L.. (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 10/02/2014)

10/31/2014 497 RESPONSE to Motion re 490 MOTION for Settlement Approval and for Disbursement of Costs Held in Escrow In Support Thereof filed by C.B., J.B., J.G., J.L., L.J., R.E., S.B., S.W., T.G., T.L.. (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 10/31/2014)

11/21/2014 498 STIPULATION AND ORDER OF VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL: The third−party claims asserted by defendants/third−party plaintiffs City of New York and

Administration for Children's Services (together, "the City") are voluntarily dismissed,with prejudice, with each party to bear the costs it incurred: (See doc. for further details) Ordered by Judge Eric N. Vitaliano on 11/12/2014. (Brucella, Michelle) (Entered: 11/21/2014)

12/17/2014 499 Letter by City of New York (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 12/17/2014)

12/17/2014

SCHEDULING ORDER: re 499 Letter filed by City of New York. The Agency defendants' response must be filed by 12/22/14 at 12:00 p.m. The issues raised will be discussed at the conference set for 12/23/14 which will be held by telephone. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 12/17/2014. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 12/17/2014)

12/22/2014 500 Letter Response to City of New York's Letter 499 by Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F) (Ahmuty, Steven) (Entered: 12/22/2014)

12/22/2014 501 Letter to Judge Go by City of New York (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 12/22/2014)

12/23/2014

Minute Entry for Status Conference held on 12/23/2014 before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go: Appearances by T. Babbitt for plaintiffs; S. Ahmuty, J. Rosof for Agency defendants; C. Schaerf, B. Strikowsky for City defendants. Preliminary discussion held regarding defendants' responses to each other's discovery requests. The parties must confer in an effort to resolve the disputes. Any motion to compel must be filed by 1/22/15, opposition by 1/29/15 and reply by 2/2/15. Next conference scheduled for 2/6/15 at 2:00 p.m. (by tel.) FTR/C 2:07−2:20. (Hugh, Lewis) (Entered: 12/24/2014)

01/08/2015 502 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER, For the foregoing reasons, pursuant to Rules 41(a)(2) and (c), the Agency deft's claims, as well as Gould and Bowe's cross−claims, against Nagassar are dismissed without prejudice. Nagassar's cross−claims against Gould and Bowes's are similarly dismissed without prejudice, pursuant to Rules 41(b) and (c) for failure to prosecute. (Ordered by Judge Eric N. Vitaliano on 12/28/14)m c/m (Galeano, Sonia) (Entered: 01/08/2015)

01/14/2015 503 STIPULATION AND ORDER OF VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL pursuant to FRCP 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). (So Ordered by Judge Eric N. Vitaliano on 1/14/15). Must See Document For Further Details. (Galeano, Sonia) (Entered: 01/14/2015)

01/21/2015 504 Letter MOTION for Extension of Time to File Motion to Compel, Letter MOTION to Adjourn Conference by City of New York. (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 01/21/2015)

01/21/2015

AMENDED ORDER granting 504 Motion for Extension of Time to File; granting 504 Motion to Adjourn Conference. Any motion to compel must be filed by 2/23/15, opposition by 3/2/15 and reply by 3/6/15. If neither party intends to file a motion to compel, the parties must file a report on the status of discovery by 2/23/15. The next conference is adjourned to 3/12/15 at 2:00 p.m. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 1/21/2015. (Proujansky, Josh) Modified on 1/21/2015 (Hugh, Lewis). (Entered: 01/21/2015)

02/02/2015 505 Letter MOTION for Disbursement of Funds (Partial) Being Held in Escrow by C.B., J.B., J.G., J.L., L.J., R.E., S.B., S.W., T.G., T.L.. (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 02/02/2015)

02/23/2015 506 Letter MOTION for Extension of Time to File Motion to Compel, Letter MOTION to Adjourn Conference by City of New York. (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 02/23/2015)

02/23/2015

ORDER granting 506 Motion for Extension of Time to File; granting 506 Motion to Adjourn Conference. Any motion to compel must be filed by 3/23/15, opposition by 4/2/15 and reply by 4/6/15. If neither party intends to file a motion to compel, the parties must file a report on the status of discovery by 3/23/15. The next conference is adjourned to 4/9/15 at 2:30 p.m. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 2/23/2015. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 02/23/2015)

03/23/2015 507 Letter MOTION for Extension of Time to File Motion to Compel, Letter MOTION to Adjourn Conference by City of New York. (Strikowsky, Bruce) (Entered: 03/23/2015)

03/23/2015

ORDER granting 507 Motion for Extension of Time to File. Any motion to compel must be filed by 4/23/15, opposition by 5/4/15 and reply by 5/8/15. If neither party intends to file a motion to compel, the parties must file a report on the status of discovery by 4/23/15. The next conference is adjourned to 5/14/15 at 2:00 p.m. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 3/23/2015. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 03/23/2015)

04/23/2015 508 First MOTION for Extension of Time to File Motion to Compel, Letter Motion to Adjourn Conference by Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.(a New York Corporation). (Rosof, Jeremy) (Entered: 04/23/2015)

04/23/2015

ORDER granting 508 Motion for Extension of Time to File motion to compel, as follows: moving papers filed by 5/14/15, opposition filed by 5/26/15 and reply by 5/29/15. The next conference is adjourned to 6/3/2015 at 3:00 p.m. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 4/23/2015. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 04/23/2015)

05/13/2015 509 Letter MOTION to Stay by City of New York. (Attachments: # 1 National Union v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn − Summons and Complaint) (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 05/13/2015)

05/13/2015

SCHEDULING ORDER: re 509 Letter MOTION to Stay filed by City of New York. The Agency defendants' response must be filed by 5/21/15 and the City's reply by 5/27/15. The schedule previously set for motions to compel is adjourned. The motion to stay will be discussed at the conference scheduled for 6/3/15 at 3:00 p.m. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 5/13/2015. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 05/13/2015)

05/21/2015 510 RESPONSE to Motion re 509 Letter MOTION to Stay filed by Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Ahmuty, Steven) (Entered: 05/21/2015)

05/27/2015 511 REPLY in Support re 509 Letter MOTION to Stay filed by City of New York. (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 05/27/2015)

06/01/2015

NOTICE: the conference scheduled for 6/3/15 will be held by telephone. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 06/01/2015)

06/03/2015

Minute Entry for Settlement Conference/Motion Hearing held on 6/3/2015 before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go: Appearances by tel. by B. Strikowsky and C. Schaerf for the City defendants; T. Capowski and J. Rosof for the Agency defendants. Argument heard regarding the City defendants' 509 motion to stay. Supplemental briefs by the City defendants must be filed by 6/12/15 and the Agency defendants' by 6/19/15. Preliminary settlement discussions held. The parties are encouraged to contact chambers to schedule a settlement conference if they feel it would be useful. FTR/C 3:02−3:16. (Hugh, Lewis) (Entered: 06/04/2015)

06/12/2015 512 MEMORANDUM in Support re 509 Letter MOTION to Stay Supplemental Brief filed by City of New York. (Strikowsky, Bruce) (Entered: 06/12/2015)

06/18/2015 513 RESPONSE in Opposition re 509 Letter MOTION to Stay And In Opposition To City's Supplemental Brief 512 filed by Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit AIG/Chartis Letter Dated 10/11/2012) (Rosof, Jeremy) (Entered: 06/18/2015)

07/06/2015 514 ORDER re 496 Amended MOTION to Amend/Correct/Supplement to Approve Costs filed by S.B., T.L., J.B., R.E., J.L., C.B., J.G., S.W., T.G., L.J. Ordered that $280,354.41 of the settlement funds held in escrow be disbursed to plaintiffs' counsel and that the remainder continue to be held by plaintiffs' counsel in escrow pending approval by the Court. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 7/6/2015. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 07/06/2015)

02/18/2016 515 Letter to Magistrate Judge Go advising of state court order by City of New York (Strikowsky, Bruce) (Entered: 02/18/2016)

04/18/2016 516 Letter to Magistrate Judge Go advising of recent developments in the state court proceeding by City of New York (Strikowsky, Bruce) (Entered: 04/18/2016)

04/25/2016 517 Letter to Judge Go responding to City's Letter dated 4/18/16 (Docket Entry #516) by Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. (Rosof, Jeremy) (Entered: 04/25/2016)

04/27/2016 518 Letter in response to Agency Defendants Letter dated 4/25/16 by City of New York (Strikowsky, Bruce) (Entered: 04/27/2016)

05/05/2016

SCHEDULING ORDER: a conference to discuss the pending motion to stay will be held on 5/23/2016 at 11:30 AM in Courtroom 11C South before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 5/5/2016. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 05/05/2016)

05/06/2016 519 MOTION for pre motion conference for status conference by S.W.. (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 05/06/2016)

05/23/2016

Minute Entry for Status Conference held on 5/23/2016 before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go: Appearances by B. Strikowsky, A. Kleinman for City defendants; S. Ahmuty, B. Clements for Agency defendants. Argument heard regarding developments in state court coverage action in relation to City's 509 motion to stay. The parties must confer regarding City's proposal to discontinue claims in this action in favor of state court coverage action. Next conference scheduled for 6/2/16 at 3:30 p.m. The parties may seek to convert the in−person appearance to a telephone conference. FTR 11:27−12:00. (Hugh, Lewis) (Entered: 05/25/2016)

06/01/2016

NOTICE: the conference set for 6/2/16 at 3:30 p.m. will be held by telephone. (Proujansky, Josh) (Entered: 06/01/2016)

06/02/2016

Minute Entry for Status Conference held on 6/2/2016 before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go: Appearances by C. Schaerf, B. Strikowsky, A. Kleinman for City defendants; J. Rosof for Agency defendants. Further argument held regarding 509 motion to stay. The Agency defendants set forth the four arguments. The parties must file a status report by 6/13/16 as to the Court's proposal that the parties discontinue their indemnification and contribution claims and their respective positions on the discovery necessary for disposition of these and other cross claims and defenses. FTR/c: 3:49−4:13 (Hugh, Lewis) (Entered: 06/08/2016)

06/10/2016 520 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on May 23, 2016, before Judge Go. Court Transcriber: Fiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc, Telephone number (203)929−9992. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER.File redaction request using event "Redaction Request − Transcript" located under "Other Filings − Other Documents". Redaction Request due 7/1/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 7/11/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 9/8/2016. (Rocco, Christine) (Entered: 06/10/2016)

06/13/2016 521 Letter Status report to Judge Go relating to the City's Stay Motion by St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. (Rosof, Jeremy) (Entered: 06/13/2016)

06/13/2016 522 STATUS REPORT Letter to Magistrate Judge Go by City of New York (Strikowsky, Bruce) (Entered: 06/13/2016)

06/27/2016 523 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Covitt, Adam) (Entered: 06/27/2016)

07/22/2016 524 Letter to Magistrate Judge Go advising of a development in the state court action by City of New York (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum of Law in Support of National Union's and Illinois National's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment) (Strikowsky, Bruce) (Entered: 07/22/2016)

09/02/2016 525 Letter to Honorable Eric Vitaliano by City of New York (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 09/02/2016)

09/06/2016

ORDER. Plaintiffs are to file a response to 525 by 9/9/2016, in accordance with this Court's Individual Rules. Ordered by Judge Eric N. Vitaliano on 9/6/2016. (Rice, Liane) (Entered: 09/06/2016)

09/07/2016 526 Letter to Justice Vitaliano in response to pre motion ltr by Heartshare Human Services, SCO Family of Services, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. (Ahmuty, Steven) (Entered: 09/07/2016)

09/08/2016 527 NOTICE by C.B., J.B., J.G., J.L., L.J., R.E., S.B., S.W. re 525 Letter Response to Request of City of New York (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 09/08/2016)

09/08/2016 528 NOTICE to Terminate Electronic Filing, filed by Charles E. Kutner, Atty for Third Party Deft Ralph Squitieri. (Galeano, Sonia) (Entered: 09/13/2016)

09/14/2016

ORDER. The City's 525 request for pre−motion conference to discuss a proposed motion to dismiss is respectfully referred to Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go. Ordered by Judge Eric N. Vitaliano on 9/14/2016. (Rice, Liane) (Entered: 09/14/2016)

09/28/2016 529 Letter by St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Amendment to Protective Order) (Rosof, Jeremy) (Entered: 09/28/2016)

09/30/2016 530 Letter to Magistrate Judge Go in response to September 28, 2016 Letter from counsel for the Agency Defendants by City of New York (Strikowsky, Bruce) (Entered: 09/30/2016)

10/25/2016 531 Letter Regarding Proposed Amendment to Protective Order by National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA, Illinois National Insurance Company (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit September 28, 2016 Letter to Judge Go from Agency Defendants, # 2 Proposed Amendment to Protective Order) (DiUbaldo, Robert) (Entered: 10/25/2016)

11/07/2016 532 Letter to Magistrate Judge Go Regarding Proposed Amendment to Protective Order by Illinois National Insurance Company, National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A Judge Kern's Order Granting Adjournment) (DiUbaldo, Robert) (Entered: 11/07/2016)

11/28/2016

Case Reassigned to Magistrate Judge James Orenstein. Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go no longer assigned to the case. Please download and review the Individual Practices of the assigned Judges, located on our website. Attorneys are responsible for providing courtesy copies to judges where their Individual Practices require such. Motions referred to James Orenstein. (Marziliano, August) (Entered: 11/28/2016)

11/28/2016 533 Letter by SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation) (Rosof, Jeremy) (Entered: 11/28/2016)

11/28/2016 534 Letter to Magistrate Judge Orenstein Regarding Proposed Amendment to Protective Order by Illinois National Insurance Company, National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D) (DiUbaldo, Robert) (Entered: 11/28/2016)

12/01/2016

ORDER re 529 Letter filed by St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. −− The application is granted. The proposed amendment to the Protective Order dated February 5, 2010, see docket entry 82 , is so ordered, without prejudice to the right of any interested party to seek further modifications later. Ordered by Magistrate Judge James Orenstein on 12/1/2016. (Klewin, Erin) (Entered: 12/01/2016)

12/06/2016 535 Letter Motion for Status Conference by C.B., J.B., J.G., J.L., L.J., R.E., S.B., S.W., T.G., T.L. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit B) (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 12/06/2016)

12/08/2016 536 Letter MOTION for Hearing In−Person Status Conference by City of New York. (Strikowsky, Bruce) (Entered: 12/08/2016)

12/20/2016

ORDER granting 523 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney −− The application is granted; attorney Adam S. Covitt terminated. Ordered by Magistrate Judge James Orenstein on 12/20/2016. (Klewin, Erin) (Entered: 12/20/2016)

01/25/2017

ORDER granting 519 Motion for Pre Motion Conference; granting 536 Motion for Hearing −− A status conference will be held on February 7, 2017 at 10:30 a.m. Counsel for all parties are directed to appear in person. Ordered by Magistrate Judge James Orenstein on 1/25/2017. (Klewin, Erin) (Entered: 01/25/2017)

02/03/2017 537 RESPONSE to Motion re 519 MOTION for pre motion conference for status conference and Case History Summary and Motion to Approve Costs filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit DE385 Memorandum and Order, # 2 Exhibit DE 493 Memorandum & Order) (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 02/03/2017)

02/06/2017 538 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: re 490 , 496 MOTION to to Approve Costs filed by S.B., T.L., J.B., R.E., J.L., C.B., J.G., S.W., T.G., L.J. Objections to R&R due by 2/20/2017. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 2/6/2017. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix A − Disposition of Settlement Proceeds, # 2 Appendix B − Allocation of Costs) (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 02/06/2017)

02/07/2017 539 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge James Orenstein:Status Conference held on 2/7/2017. SCHEDULING: There are no further conferences scheduled before me at this time. SUMMARY: (1) I granted the plaintiffs an extension of the time to file objections to the Report and Recommendation issued on February 6, 2017; any such objections shall be filed by March 9, 2017. The defendants are excused from attending any future conferences before me relating to the plaintiffs' request for the reimbursement of costs. (2)On consent of all defendants, I will terminate the outstanding requests for procedural relief, without prejudice to any defendant seeking appropriate relief once the state court has ruled on summary judgment motions in related state court litigation. Once such a ruling has been issued, the parties will promptly submit a joint status report that proposes conference dates; in the absence of a ruling, the parties will submit a joint status report by May 8, 2017. (3) As discussed with the parties, the decision to await the state court ruling is intended to avoid placing any constraint, actual or perceived, on the options available to the state court in deciding how best to resolve the issues before it. (Orenstein, James) (Main Document 539 replaced on 2/7/2017) (Guy, Alicia). Modified on 2/7/2017 (Guy, Alicia). (Entered: 02/07/2017)

02/07/2017

ORDER terminating 509 Motion to Stay −− see docket entry 539 . Ordered by Magistrate Judge James Orenstein on 2/7/2017. (Orenstein, James) (Entered: 02/07/2017)

03/01/2017 540 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response to Judge Go's Report and Recommendation [DE 538] by C.B., J.B., J.G., J.L., L.J., R.E., S.B., S.W., T.G., T.L.. (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 03/01/2017)

03/01/2017

ORDER granting 540 Motion for Extension of Time to File −− The motion is granted; the plaintiffs' time to file objections to the Report and Recommendation issued on February 6, 2017, see docket entry 538 , is extended to April 9, 2017. Ordered by Magistrate Judge James Orenstein on 3/1/2017. (Klewin, Erin) (Entered: 03/01/2017)

03/03/2017 541 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Heartshare Human Services(a New York Corporation), SCO Family of Services(a New York Corporation), St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Gonzalez, Juan) (Entered: 03/03/2017)

03/03/2017

ORDER granting 541 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Juan C. Gonzalez terminated. Ordered by Magistrate Judge James Orenstein on 3/3/2017. (Guy, Alicia) (Entered: 03/03/2017)

03/13/2017 542 Letter submitted jointly on behalf of the City of New York and the Agency Defendants in response to this Court's February 7, 2017 directive by City of New York (Strikowsky, Bruce) (Main Document 542 replaced on 3/13/2017 per phone request). (Layne, Monique). (Entered: 03/13/2017)

03/15/2017

SCHEDULING ORDER: re 542 Letter, filed by City of New York −− A status conference will be held on May 8, 2017, at 11:30 a.m. Ordered by Magistrate Judge James Orenstein on 3/15/2017. (Klewin, Erin) (Entered: 03/15/2017)

04/06/2017 543 RESPONSE in Opposition re 538 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS re 496 Amended MOTION to Amend/Correct/Supplement to Approve Costs filed by S.B., T.L., J.B., R.E., J.L., C.B., J.G., S.W., T.G., L.J. filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Report of Moore Ellrich & Neal) (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 04/06/2017)

04/19/2017

ORDER RETURNING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION. Although plaintiffs' 543 objection to Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go's 538 report and recommendation does not challenge her reasoning or her recommendation as to what should be

approved as costs, the objection highlights computational discrepancies revealed by an analysis performed by an accountant retained by plaintiffs. Accordingly, the report and recommendation is returned to Magistrate Judge Go to consider the computational discrepancies raised by plaintiffs. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). Ordered by Judge Eric N. Vitaliano on 4/19/2017. (Fielding, Peter) (Entered: 04/19/2017)

05/05/2017 544 SCHEDULING ORDER: A telephone conference will be held on May 18, 2017 at 11:00 a.m. to discuss the 538 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS re 496 Amended MOTION to Amend/Correct/Supplement to Approve Costs. Plaintiffs' counsel must participate. The Court respectfully requests that the Clerk of the Court seal the accountant's report [543−1] and directs that all parties continue to maintain the anonymity of the plaintiffs, as set forth in the order. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 5/5/2017. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix) (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 05/05/2017)

05/08/2017 545 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge James Orenstein:Status Conference held on 5/8/2017. SCHEDULING: The next status conference will be held on May 17, 2017, at 10:30 a.m. SUMMARY: The parties will confer as to a possible resolution of their respective claims or, in the absence of a settlement, the remaining steps needed to prepare those claims for trial. They will submit a status report on those matters (including, as appropriate, a reference to previously terminated motions that are now ripe for resolution) by May 15, 2017. I will expect the parties to be fully prepared to discuss and resolve any remaining discovery matters at the next conference and to set an expedited schedule for all remaining pretrial tasks. (Orenstein, James) (Entered: 05/08/2017)

05/11/2017 546 Letter Response to Judge Go's Order [DE 544] by C.B., J.B., J.G., J.L., L.J., R.E., S.B., S.W., T.G., T.L. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Cancelled checks, # 2 Exhibit B − Accountants Report) (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 05/11/2017)

05/15/2017 547 STATUS REPORT Joint letter in advance of May 17, 2017 conference by City of New York (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 05/15/2017)

05/15/2017 548 STIPULATION of Dismissal Stipulation of Partial Voluntary Dismissal Pursuant to F.R.C.P. (a)(1)(A)(ii) by City of New York (Schaerf, Carl) (Entered: 05/15/2017)

05/17/2017 549 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge James Orenstein:Status Conference held on 5/17/2017. The parties have resolved all cross−claims except for the City's claim that the Agency defendants breached their obligation to procure insurance. The City will submit a letter motion by May 26, 2017, seeking dismissal of that claim without prejudice, so as to allow the claim to be prosecuted in state court. The Agency defendants will submit a letter opposing the motion by June 2, 2017. Once that motion is resolved, I will schedule further proceedings as appropriate. (Orenstein, James) (Entered: 05/17/2017)

05/17/2017 550 ORDER OF PARTIAL VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL, That the cross−claims that defts have asserted against one another in this action shall be and hereby are voluntarily dismissed, with prejudice, pursuant to the FRCP 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), except that the City Defts' cross−claim against the Agency Defts for breach of contract based upon the failure to procure insurance ("Second Cross−Claim") shall survive this stipulation of partial voluntary dismissal and shall not be dismissed. (Ordered by Judge Eric N. Vitaliano on 5/17/2017) c/m (Galeano, Sonia) (Entered: 05/17/2017)

05/18/2017

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go:Motion Hearing held on 5/18/2017 re 538 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS re 490 496 MOTION to Approve Costs. Appearances by tel. by T. Babbitt, J. Murphy for plaintiffs. Discussion held with accountants Caryl Neal and Nancy Richardson participating. The Court notes that the numbers in the revised accountant's report regarding reallocations of costs and proposed distributions to be made from escrow appear to be consistent with the numbers discussed Court's 5/5/2017 order. However, the plaintiffs must provide further information regarding the actual distribution to plaintiffs and counsel of all settlement monies, including the funds to and from escrow, to enable determination whether all the plaintiffs will the received the proper amounts. (Tape #FTR 11:07−11:22). (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 05/18/2017)

05/22/2017 551 Letter Response by C.B., J.B., J.G., J.L., L.J., R.E., S.B., S.W., T.G., T.L. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A) (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 05/22/2017)

05/26/2017 552 Letter MOTION to Dismiss /Decline Supplemental Jurisdiction by City of New York. (Strikowsky, Bruce) (Entered: 05/26/2017)

05/26/2017

ORDER REFERRING MOTION: 552 Letter MOTION to Dismiss /Decline Supplemental Jurisdiction filed by City of New York. The motion to dismiss is respectfully referred to Magistrate Judge James Orenstein for a report and recommendation as to his findings. Ordered by Judge Eric N. Vitaliano on 5/26/2017. (Fielding, Peter) (Entered: 05/26/2017)

05/31/2017

SCHEDULING ORDER: The 551 Letter of plaintiffs' counsel contains a breakdown of distributions to the plaintiffs and to attorneys for fees, but does not specify the distributions made to attorneys for costs. Counsel is requested to provide a breakdown of payments made for costs, including dates of such distributions, by June 6, 2017. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 5/31/2017. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 05/31/2017)

05/31/2017 553 RESPONSE to Motion re 552 Letter MOTION to Dismiss /Decline Supplemental Jurisdiction Opposition to letter Motion of City (552) filed by Heartshare Human Services. (Rosof, Jeremy) (Entered: 05/31/2017)

06/01/2017

AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER: In addition to the information required in the scheduling order electronically filed on 5/31/2017, plaintiffs' counsel must provide a breakdown of all monies deposited into the escrow account, including amounts for payments to be made to LG and JG as a resulted of reallocation of costs. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 6/1/2017. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 06/01/2017)

06/05/2017

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS re 552 Letter MOTION to Dismiss /Decline Supplemental Jurisdiction filed by City of New York −− All of the defendants now agree that this court should dismiss without prejudice the sole remaining claims in this litigation: the cross−claims asserted by the City of New York (the "City") against the Agency defendants. See Docket Entry ("DE") 552 ; DE 553 . I therefore respectfully recommend that the court grant the City's motion for such relief. Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed no later than June 22, 2017. Failure to file objections within this period designating the particular issues to be reviewed waives the right to appeal the district court's order. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); Wagner & Wagner, LLP v. Atkinson, Haskins, Nellis, Brittingham, Gladd & Carwile, P.C., 596 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir. 2010). Ordered by Magistrate Judge James Orenstein on 6/5/2017. (Klewin, Erin) (Entered: 06/05/2017)

06/05/2017 554 Letter Response to Court's Scheduling Order of May 31, 2017, and Amended Scheduling Order of June 1, 2017 by C.B., J.B., J.G., J.L., L.J., R.E., S.B., S.W., T.G., T.L. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Summary of Costs, # 2 Exhibit B − Summary of Deposits) (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 06/05/2017)

06/06/2017

SCHEDULING ORDER: Plaintiffs' counsel must appear by telephone for a conference to be held on Wednesday, June 14, 2017 at 11:00 a.m. to discuss plaintiffs' letters 551 , 554 . As previously discussed, this Court requires information about the distribution of settlement proceeds, including the amounts of deposits into and disbursements from the attorney escrow account. Such information should including the total amount of payments made to plaintiffs and to counsel after each settlement and the amounts deposited and released from the escrow account. To assist in focusing discussion, this Court will fax two versions of a revised draft Appendix A and some calculations. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 6/6/2017. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 06/06/2017)

06/12/2017 555 Letter Response by C.B., J.B., J.G., J.L., L.J., R.E., S.B., S.W., T.G., T.L. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B) (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 06/12/2017)

06/14/2017

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go:Motion Hearing held on 6/14/2017 re 538 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS re 496 , 490 MOTIONs for Approval and for Disbursement of Costs. Appearance by T. Babbitt for plaintiffs (by tel.). Discussion held regarding motion for costs, with accountants Caryl Neal and Nancy Richardson and Donna Collucci, controller for Babbitt & Johnson, participating. Plaintiffs shall provide a further and more detailed summary of deposits and payments with respect to settlement proceeds which includes specific information regarding payments made for structured annuities acquired under each settlement and an explanation regarding payments made on behalf of plaintiffs out of

settlement proceeds. (Tape #FTR 11:08−11:34.) (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 06/14/2017)

06/15/2017 556 MOTION for Leave to Electronically File Document under Seal by C.B., J.B., J.G., J.L., L.J., R.E., S.B., S.W., T.G., T.L.. (Attachments: # 1 Letter to Judge Go, # 2 Summary of Deposits and Payments, # 3 Names) (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 06/15/2017)

06/22/2017

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 556 Motion for Leave to Electronically File Document under Seal. The motion is granted as to the attachment listing the names of the plaintiffs, DE 556−3, which shall remain under seal. Counsel is requested to file the remainder of the submission (DE 556−1 and 556−2) publicly. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 6/22/2017. (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 06/22/2017)

06/23/2017 557 Letter by C.B., J.B., J.G., J.L., L.J., R.E., S.B., S.W., T.G., T.L. (Attachments: # 1 Summary of Payment) (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 06/23/2017)

06/23/2017 558 Letter by C.B., J.B., J.G., J.L., L.J., R.E., S.B., S.W., T.G., T.L. (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 06/23/2017)

06/23/2017

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS. With notice given, no party has filed objections to the June 5, 2017, report and recommendation in which Magistrate Judge James Orenstein concluded that the City of New York's 552 motion to dismiss/decline supplemental jurisdiction should be granted. In accordance with the applicable clear−error standard of review, see Dafeng Hengwei Textile Co. v. Aceco Indus. & Commercial Corp., 54 F. Supp. 3d 279, 283 (E.D.N.Y. 2014), the Court has carefully reviewed Magistrate Judge Orenstein's report and recommendation, and found it to be correct, well−reasoned, and free of any clear error. The Court, therefore, adopts it in its entirety as the opinion of the Court. Accordingly, the City of New York's 552 motion to dismiss/decline supplemental jurisdiction is granted, and the sole remaining cross−claim in this action, the City of New York's breach−of−contract claim against the Agency Defendants, is dismissed. Ordered by Judge Eric N. Vitaliano on 6/23/2017. (Fielding, Peter) (Entered: 06/23/2017)

07/10/2017 559 SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS re 496 Amended MOTION to Amend/Correct/Supplement to Approve Costs filed by Plaintiffs. Objections to R&R due by 7/27/2017. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 7/10/2017. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Schedule A, # 2 Appendix Schedule B) (Go, Marilyn) (Entered: 07/10/2017)

07/12/2017 560 Letter Certificate of Agreement by C.B., J.B., J.G., J.L., L.J., R.E., S.B., S.W., T.G., T.L. (Babbitt, Theodore) (Entered: 07/12/2017)

07/17/2017

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION. With notice given, plaintiffs−−the only party with an interest in plaintiffs' 496 amended motion to approve costs−−have waived all objections to Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go's 559 supplemental report and recommendation, awarding costs. See 560 , 539 . In accordance with the applicable clear−error standard of review, see Dafeng Hengwei Textile Co. v. Aceco Indus. & Commercial Corp. , 54 F. Supp. 3d 279, 283 (E.D.N.Y. 2014), the Court has carefully reviewed Magistrate Judge Go's 538 initial report and recommendation and her 559 supplemental report and recommendation, and found the report and recommendation, as supplemented, to be correct, well−reasoned, and free of any clear error. The Court, therefore, adopts the report and recommendation, as supplemented, in its entirety as the opinion of the Court. Accordingly, plaintiffs' are awarded costs in the amount of $1,625,659.31. Costs, fees, and settlement payments shall be allocated to each plaintiff as set forth in [559−2] schedule B of Magistrate Judge Go's supplemental report and recommendation, and any interest earned on escrowed funds shall be paid to plaintiffs counsel. The $958,621.68 held in the escrow account shall be distributed as detailed in Magistrate Judge Go's 559 supplemental report and recommendation.Because this order resolves the last outstanding issue in controversy in this case, the Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to close this case and to issue judgment reflecting the following: The City of New York's breach−of−contract cross−claim against the Agency Defendants for failure to procure insurance; the Agency Defendants' third−party claims against Ishmatee Nagassar; Edwin Gould and Thelma Bowes's cross−claims against Nagassar; and Nagassar's cross−claims against Gould and Bowes are dismissed without prejudice, see June 23, 2017 Docket Order, June 5, 2017 Report and Recommendation, 552 , 502 , and all other claims; cross−claims; and third−party claims are dismissed with prejudice, see

550 , 503 , 498 , 475 , 388 , December 19, 2012 Docket Order, [382−1], 208 . Ordered by Judge Eric N. Vitaliano on 7/17/2017. (Fielding, Peter) (Entered: 07/17/2017)
07/21/2017 561 JUDGMENT, that The City of NY's breach−of−contract cross−claims against St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc., f/k/a Catholic Child Care Society of the Diocese of Brooklyn, Inc., Heartshare Human Services f/k/a Catholic Guardian Society of the Diocese of Brooklyn, Inc., and SCO Family Services f/k/a St. Christopher−Ottilie for failure to procure insurance; St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. f/k/a Catholic Child Care Society of the Diocese of Brooklyn, Inc., Heartshare Human Services f/k/a Catholic Guardian Society of the Diocese of Brooklyn., and SCO Family of Services f/k/a St. Christopher−Ottilie third−party claims against Ishmatee Nagassar, Edwin Gould and Thelma Bowes's cross−claims against Ishmatee Nagassar; and Ishmatee Nagassar's cross−claims against Edwin Gould and Thelma Bowes's are dismissed without prejudice; and that all other claims; and third−party claims are dismissed with prejudice. (Ordered by Janet Hamilton, Deputy Clerk on 7/20/2017) c/m (Galeano, Sonia) (Entered: 07/21/2017)
07/31/2017 563 Mail Returned as Undeliverable, "Forward Time Expired, Return to Sender." Order Adopting R&R dated 7/17/17 previously sent to William A. Kapell, Children's Rights. (Galeano, Sonia) (Entered: 08/04/2017)
08/04/2017 562 Mail Returned as Undeliverable, "Forward Time Expired, Return to Sender." Order Adopting R&R dated 7/17/17 previously sent to Melissa Cohen, Children's Rights. (Galeano, Sonia) (Entered: 08/04/2017)
08/04/2017 564 Mail Returned as Undeliverable, "Forward Time Expired, Return to Sender." Judgment dated 7/20/17 previously sent to Melissa Cohen, Children's Rights. (Galeano, Sonia) (Entered: 08/07/2017)
08/04/2017 565 Mail Returned as Undeliverable, "Forward Time Expired, Return to Sender." Judgment dated 7/20/17 previously sent to William A. Kapell. (Galeano, Sonia) (Entered: 08/07/2017)