IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

JASON HACKER, Plaintiff,
v.
N. BURL CAIN, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 3:14-00063-JWD-EWD

STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES Plaintiff Jason Hacker alleges that officials at the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections (“DOC”) and Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola (“Angola”) violated the Eighth Amendment by withholding medically necessary surgery to remove his cataracts as a result of a DOC and Angola policy to deem cataract surgery “elective” despite actual knowledge of its medical necessity. Plaintiff further alleges that Angola and the DOC referred him to private medical providers for his health care needs but deliberately refused to authorize the surgery prescribed by those providers for financial reasons and because his condition was not, in Defendants’ view, life-threatening. Without taking a position on the factual accuracy of Plaintiff’s claims, the United States files this Statement of Interest to assist the Court in evaluating Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine and related issues. It is the position of the United States that: (1) a State must ensure that the prisoners in its custody receive constitutionally adequate medical treatment, regardless of whether it contracts with private providers to deliver that treatment; (2) where prisoners have objectively serious medical needs that require attention, a
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State cannot consciously disregard the consistent medical judgments and recommendations of
the physicians with whom it contracts; and (3) a State may not escape its duty to provide
constitutionally necessary medical care by labeling that care “elective,” if in fact treatment is
necessary to address an objectively serious medical need.
INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES
The United States has authority to file this Statement of Interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 517, which permits the Attorney General to attend to the interests of the United States in any case pending in federal court.1 The United States, acting through the Civil Rights Division of the
U.S. Department of Justice, has an interest in this matter because the alleged unconstitutional
correctional practices at Angola fall within the Civil Rights Division’s enforcement authority.
Specifically, the Civil Rights Division enforces the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act
(CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997 et seq., which allows it to investigate and remedy unconstitutional
conditions of confinement imposed by state and local governments pursuant to a pattern or
practice of civil rights violations.
The United States has a broad interest in ensuring that prisoners receive constitutionally
adequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. To that end, the
Department of Justice has previously exercised its CRIPA authority to investigate jurisdictions for issues similar to those present in this case, including litigation involving Angola.2 As this
1 The full text of 28 U.S.C. § 517 is as follows: “The Solicitor General, or any officer of the Department of Justice, may be sent by the Attorney General to any State or district in the United States to attend to the interests of the United States in a suit pending in a court of the United States, or in a court of a State, or to attend to any other interest of the United States.” 2 See, e.g., Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Carlos A. Gimenez, Mayor, Miami-Dade Cnty. (Aug. 24, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/08/29/Miami-Dade_findlet_8-24-11.pdf (finding that the Miami-Dade County Jail failed to provide detainees with appropriate medical and mental health care, including screening, chronic care, and access to services for acute needs); Letter from Loretta King, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Marlin N. Gusman, Sheriff, Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office (Sept. 11, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/parish_findlet.pdf (finding that the Orleans Parish
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Court is aware, it has become common practice for states to contract with private health care providers for correctional medical care, particularly given the wide range of prisoners’ medical needs. It is also common practice for states to classify the health care needs of prisoners according to medical urgency, and provide care accordingly. The United States has an interest in ensuring that when a state contracts with private health care providers to provide medical care to prisoners, it ensures that prisoners receive care that meets Eighth Amendment standards.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND On January 30, 2014, Plaintiff Jason Hacker, a prisoner at Angola, filed suit against the former warden at Angola, former Governor of Louisiana, the Louisiana DOC, and various prison officials (collectively, “Defendants”).3 Plaintiff brought an Eighth Amendment claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants failed to provide him with constitutionally adequate medical care for his serious medical condition, and claims under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, alleging that Defendants failed to accommodate Plaintiff’s disability.4 On June 6, 2016, the Court denied both Plaintiff’s and Defendants’ motions for summary judgment, finding that questions of fact pertaining to all the legal issues in the litigation remained.5 This Statement of Interest deals solely with questions of law raised by Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs by denying him medically necessary cataract surgery for his deteriorating vision6
Sheriff’s Office failed to provide Orleans Parish Prison detainees with constitutional levels of medical and mental health care); Letter from John R. Dunn, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Buddy Roemer, Governor, Louisiana (finding that Angola prison failed to provide adequate medical care for its prisoners) (May 13, 1991), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-LA-0006-0001.pdf. 3 Compl., at 2–6. 4 Second Am. Compl., at 11–12. 5 See Hacker v. Cain, No. CV31400063JWDEWD, 2016 WL 3167176, at *3, 17 (M.D. La. June 6, 2016). 6 Mem. Supp. Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J., at 21.
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while he was a prisoner at Angola.7 He was examined by the in-house physicians at Angola,
who noticed he had severe cataracts and referred him to private ophthalmologists on contract
with the prison.8 The specialists who evaluated Plaintiff recommended cataract removal surgery
for his condition at least twelve times.9 They also specifically informed Defendants on
numerous occasions that Plaintiff needed surgery “as soon as possible.”10
Cataract surgeries are not performed at Angola but are referred to outside medical
providers.11 Prisoners at Angola who receive a referral for surgery from an outside provider
cannot get the surgery unless it is approved by DOC.12 DOC, therefore, has the ultimate
authority in determining whether an inmate receives physician-recommended surgery.13 It was
not until Plaintiff filed this lawsuit that Defendants scheduled him for cataract removal in one of
his eyes, and almost a year later, the second eye.14
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have a policy and practice of categorizing cataract
surgery as “elective” in order to delay surgery, thereby denying prisoners constitutionally
adequate care while they wait for medically necessary treatment and potentially exposing them
to long-term harm as a result.15 Plaintiff points to LDPSC Health Care Policy No. HC-16, which
classifies “elective” medical treatments to include both “cosmetic” and “medically necessary”
procedures.16 Through this policy, according to Plaintiff, Defendants categorize a wide array of
medical procedures used to treat serious medical conditions, including cataract removal surgery,
7 Statement of Undisputed Facts, at 2-3. 8 Id. 9 Mem. Supp. Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. at 1; 25. 10 Id. 11 Statement of Undisputed Facts, at 2, 3-4 (“Dr. Collins [stated] … ‘I, as former Medical director of LSP, do not perform surgery on site, nor do the physicians approve or deny appointments/surgery for specialty clinics and offsite clinics. If any type of surgery is approved by the specialty clinic, the same will notify LSP of the surgery date and time and LSP Security will be notified to arrange transportation.’”) 12 Second Am. Compl., at 5-7. 13 Id. 14 Mem. Supp. Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J., at 7. 15 Id. at 23–30. 16 Id. at 15.
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as “elective.”17 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have a practice of delaying all treatments deemed “elective” even if in an individual case the particular treatment is medically necessary.18 Plaintiff alleges he was told by an Angola physician that he would not receive surgery because it was not a “life or death emergency.”19 Plaintiff alleges that at least thirty other prisoners who were recommended for cataract extraction surgery at Angola prison have reportedly experienced excessive delays before receiving cataract surgery, or are still waiting for the surgery.20 Plaintiff further alleges that other prisoners have waited years for cataract removal surgery, with some periods of delay exceeding ten years.21
Defendants deny acting with deliberate indifference by arguing that Plaintiff was always under constant medical supervision.22 Defendants assert that Plaintiff received a “plethora of multiple sick calls and visit[s] to EKL-LSU eye clinic related to cornea eye test[s], blurry vision, and cataracts examinations,” and that his medical care included “updating prescriptions for plaintiff’s eye glasses, referral to specialists, changes/restrictions in his work duty status and completion of cataract removal surgery in both eyes when access to a surgical facility was obtained.”23 Defendants also argue that, because cataract removal surgery is not performed at Angola, Defendants met their constitutional obligations by referring Plaintiff to private medical providers.24
17 Id. 18 Id. 19 Defs.’ Mem. Opp’n. Summ. J. Hacker ARP. Ex. 4, at 6. 20 See Pl.’s Letter to Hon. John W. deGravelles, Judge, at 2–7. 21 Id. at 2. 22 See Hacker v. Cain, No. CV31400063JWDEWD, 2016 WL 3167176, at *15 (M.D. La. June 6, 2016). 23 Defs.’ Mem. Opp’n Summ. J., at 6, 9. 24 Mem. Supp. Pl.’s Mot. in Limine, at 4.
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DISCUSSION Denial of necessary and adequate medical care constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). To prove an Eighth Amendment violation, Plaintiff must satisfy two elements. First, he must show that he has an objectively serious medical need. See id. at 104. Second, he must show that prison officials exhibited deliberate indifference to that need, meaning they knew there was a substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff if that need was not met, yet they consciously disregarded that risk. See id. at 106; Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1970). An “objectively serious medical need” is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1351 (11th Cir. 2004). An objectively serious medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition “pos[es] a substantial risk of serious harm.” Mounce v. Doe, 2014 WL 2587698, at *25 (E.D. La. June 10, 2014). Numerous courts have held that cataracts requiring corrective surgery fall squarely within the ambit of an objectively serious medical need. See, e.g., Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1067–68 (9th Cir. 2014); Cobbs v. Pramstaller, 475 F. App’x 575, 580 (6th Cir. 2012); Rylee v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 343 F. App’x 865, 866 (4th Cir. 2009); Boring v. Sanders, 2013 WL 4080308, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2013); Morris v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 2012 WL 5874477, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 20, 2012). This is especially true when cataract removal surgery is necessary to prevent imminent blindness, as was the case for Plaintiff. See Campbell v. Fry, 1990 WL 15601, at *1 (4th Cir.1990); Davis v. Gusman, 2009 WL 1604590, *7 (E.D. La. June 4, 2009); Padichit v. Unknown Cook County Officials, 2006 WL 1897518, *2 (S.D. Ill. July 11, 2006). Here, Plaintiff alleges that numerous clinicians both within and outside Angola
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diagnosed him with severe cataracts, and referred him for cataract removal surgery on multiple occasions. Defendants concede that Plaintiff’s cataracts also caused him to experience loss of vision. There appears to be no legitimate dispute that Plaintiff exhibited an objectively serious medical need.
This Statement of Interest focuses on the second element of the analysis: whether Defendants exhibited unconstitutional deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s objectively serious medical needs. To exhibit deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment, a prison official must be “aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d 459, 463 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). The plaintiff must show that “jail officials were actually aware of the risk, yet consciously disregarded it.” Lawson v. Dallas Cnty., 286 F.3d 257, 262 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). The Fifth Circuit has held that a prisoner can demonstrate deliberate indifference “by showing that a prison official refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.” Rogers v. Boatright, 709 F.3d 403, 410 (5th Cir. 2013). Of particular relevance to this case, deliberate indifference may also be shown when prison officials deny a prisoner treatment appropriately identified by medical professionals as necessary for the treatment of an objectively serious medical need. See Payne v. Lynaugh, 843 F.2d 177, 178 (5th Cir. 1988); Vanderhoff v. Prentice, 251 F. App’x 861, 862 (5th Cir. 2007).
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I. The State must ensure that the prisoners in its custody receive constitutionally adequate medical treatment, regardless of whether it contracts with private providers to deliver that treatment.
Angola’s policy to refer its prisoners in need of cataract removal surgery to an outside provider does not relieve Angola of its constitutional duty to ensure its prisoners receive constitutionally adequate medical care. State prisons have an affirmative duty to provide access to constitutionally adequate medical care to the prisoners in their custody, regardless of whether the institution chooses to provide the actual care itself. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 56 (1988). When a state entity contracts with a private provider, both the state and the private provider must satisfy constitutional requirements. Private contractors who fall short of those obligations may be sued in their own right. Id. at 57 (holding that prisoner could sue private physician contractor for failing to schedule a necessary ankle surgery); see also Rosborough v. Management & Training Corp., 350 F.3d 459, 460 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that prisoner could sue private prison for the constitutional violations of its employees).
Conversely, where a state chooses to use private providers to assist in meeting its constitutional obligations, the state is liable for the private provider’s unconstitutional actions when the state is aware of those actions and fails to correct them.25 See Jatoi v. Hurst-EulessBedford Hosp. Auth., 807 F.2d 1214, 1220–21 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding state liable for discrimination where a state hospital, managed by a private board of directors, restricted a physician’s surgery privileges on account of his alienage and national origin); Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co., 280 F.2d 531, 535 (5th Cir. 1960) (holding City of Birmingham liable for private bus company’s unconstitutional policy of requiring Black passengers to sit in the back
25 We do not suggest that states are constitutionally or otherwise liable for the medical malpractice of private providers who provide medical care to prisoners in state custody.
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of buses where city had issued ordinance delegating to private bus companies authority to promulgate regulations governing seating on public buses).
Therefore, the mere fact that a state prison contracts with private medical providers to provide care to prisoners cannot by itself insulate it from liability under the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., King v. Kramer, 680 F.3d 1013, 1020-21 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that where a county contracts with a private provider for prisoner medical services, the county is liable for the provider’s constitutional violations whether or not it entrusts final decision-making authority over prisoner care to the provider); Leach v. Shelby County Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1250 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding county sheriff liable for policies of private medical provider used to deliver medical care to prisoners where those policies caused a prisoner harm in violation of the Eighth Amendment); Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 703 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that prisoner stated claim for deliberate indifference against county and sheriff where medical care at county jail had been contracted to private entity). The state cannot shift its constitutional duties to a private party in this manner because, as the West court stated, “if this were the basis for delimiting § 1983 liability, the state will be free to contract out all services which it is constitutionally obligated to provide and leave its citizens with no means for vindication of those rights, whose protection has been delegated to ‘private’ actors, when they have been denied.” West, 487 U.S. at 56, n. 14. Therefore, “[c]ontracting out prison medical care does not relieve the State of its constitutional duty to provide adequate medical treatment to those in its custody.” Id. at 56.
Defendants are therefore responsible for ensuring that the prisoners in their custody are actually receiving constitutionally adequate medical care. This responsibility means that Defendants must either provide that care directly, or ensure that private providers under contract
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render that care. If Plaintiff’s allegations are true, Defendants did neither, despite actual knowledge of Plaintiff’s objective serious medical needs. Defendants did not provide cataract surgery to Plaintiff in-house, and waited almost two years—after Plaintiff filed suit—to approve the cataract surgery prescribed by ophthalmologists with whom Defendants contracted. As Plaintiff alleges, during the time that he waited for cataract surgery, his vision worsened, he became blind, and, as a result, suffered severe physical and emotional harm.
II. State prisons may not substitute their judgment for the consistent medical judgment of physicians in determining the medical care that prisoners will receive.
Plaintiff alleges that he was referred for cataract surgery at least twelve times, but did not receive surgery until he filed this lawsuit. Other prisoners in need of cataract surgery reportedly had similar experiences, and some are still waiting for surgery.26 Defendants respond that Plaintiff did in fact receive medical care throughout the time he was waiting for surgery—they point to Plaintiff’s various sick calls, eyeglass prescription refills and visits to specialists at LSU for additional surgery referrals.
As a preliminary matter, the mere provision of some medical treatment, which the State knows to be incorrect, does not meet a prison’s Eighth Amendment obligation to provide constitutionally adequate medical care. See Fuller v. Harris Cnty., 137 F. App’x 677, 679 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that prisoner stated Eighth Amendment claim where prison officials gave him antibiotics instead of sending him to hospital for scheduled post-surgery follow-up examination, causing him to need an amputation of the leg that had undergone surgery.) Prisons are obligated to provide constitutionally adequate treatment that is appropriate and medically indicated. See Easter, 467 F.3d at 464 (holding that nurse violated Eighth Amendment rights of prisoner with history of heart attacks by failing to administer heart medication when he came to
26 See Pl.’s Letter to Hon. John W. deGravelles, Judge, at 2–7.
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infirmary with severe chest pain, instead sending him to pharmacy to refill prescription, and, when pharmacy was closed, sending him back to his cell with no treatment). The Fifth Circuit has made clear that “intentionally treating [a prisoner] incorrectly” is a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 464. Prisons may not choose a course of medical care simply because it is easier or cheaper to provide than what is medically necessary and required by the Eighth Amendment. See Ancata, 769 F.2d at 705; West v. Keve, 571 F.2d 158, 162 (3d Cir. 1978) (holding that providing a prisoner with “easier and less efficacious treatment” than required demonstrated deliberate indifference).
The important consideration under the Eighth Amendment is not whether any kind of medical care was provided, but rather whether the level of care provided was constitutionally adequate. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-06; De’Lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 526 (4th Cir. 2013). Plaintiff alleges that there was never any question that the correct course of treatment for him was cataract removal surgery, and that this is not the medical care he received for almost two years. The undisputed facts include that Plaintiff had a well-documented history of worsening cataracts and surgery referrals that demonstrate Defendants’ actual knowledge of his medical needs.27 See Easter, 467 F.3d at 464; Woodall v. Foti, 648 F.2d 268, 270-71 (5th Cir. 1981). Plaintiff received surgery referrals from ophthalmologists at LSU, Orleans Charity Hospital, and the Earl K. Long Eye clinic.28 In October 2012, Plaintiff was referred to LSU Hospital for cataract removal surgery.29 In April 2013, when Plaintiff was seen by a specialist again, an LSU ophthalmologist indicated that he needed cataract removal surgery “as soon as possible,” and that cataracts were the reason Plaintiff was going blind.30 Plaintiff’s vision
27 Statement of Undisputed Facts, at 2-3. 28 See Defs.’ Mem. Opp’n. Summ. J. Hacker ARP. Ex. 4, at 4-5; Second Am. Compl., at 4. 29 Statement of Undisputed Facts, at 3. 30 Defs.’ Mem. Opp’n. Summ. J. Collins Aff., at 3; Defs.’ Mem. Opp’n. Summ. J. Hacker ARP. Ex. 4, at 5.
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continued to deteriorate over the course of the two years, and he became legally blind by May 2013.31 All of the physicians who examined Plaintiff agreed that he required cataract removal surgery.32
Yet, like the defendants in Baker v. Wilkinson, Plaintiff alleges that DOC and Angola chose a “conservative” course of treatment for Hacker instead of what was medically indicated and constitutionally required. 635 F.Supp.2d 514, 521 (W.D. La. 2009) (holding that providing hemorrhoid medicine instead of prescribed surgery violated the Eighth Amendment). Plaintiff’s treatment was “incorrect” and therefore constitutionally inadequate because, similar to what the Baker court reasoned, even after LSU specialists referred him for surgery, Defendants continued him on a regimen of sick calls and eyeglass prescription updates instead of providing surgery, which clearly “ran counter to the physicians’ medical judgment,” id., and resulted in significant medical consequences.
Despite contracts with outside medical providers such as LSU, Defendants remained personally involved in Plaintiff’s medical treatment because of their ultimate authority to approve the medical treatment received by prisoners under their care. Although Angola leaves to the private medical providers with which it contracts the “day to day operation[s]” of medical care for prisoners, as was the case in Jatoi, the DOC has kept for itself the ultimate authority to approve any recommended medical procedure before a prisoner can receive it. 807 F.2d at 1221. It was up to DOC to approve the surgery, yet it failed to do so until July 2014, after this lawsuit was filed.33
31 Statement of Undisputed Facts, at 3. 32 Id. Notably, this case is not a matter of Plaintiff merely disagreeing with the treatment he received. See Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006) (“[u]nsuccessful medical treatment, acts of negligence, or medical malpractice do not constitute deliberate indifference, nor does a prisoner’s disagreement with his medical treatment.”) 33 See Second Am. Compl., at 9.
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In sum, if a State chooses to contract with private medical providers for the health care services of prisoners, the State cannot disregard the consistent medical judgment of those providers and substitute its own non-medical judgment in delivering care for objectively serious medical needs. See Lawson, 286 F.3d at 263 (finding Eighth Amendment violation where jail policy allowed for only two dressing changes per day when treating physician had ordered prison nurses to provide paralyzed prisoner with three). If Plaintiff’s allegations are true, Defendants ignored these consistent medical recommendations in violation of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights, substituting their own judgment for that of the clinicians who Defendants contracted with to evaluate him.
III. State prisons may not categorize a medical procedure as “elective” simply to avoid the provision of medical treatment required to meet prisoners’ objectively serious medical needs.
According to the Complaint, Defendants categorized cataract surgery as an “elective” procedure as a way to delay constitutionally required medical care to prisoners at Angola.34 Defendants’ policies dictate that “medically necessary elective procedures” will be provided “when medically necessary,” thereby providing no guidance on when such procedures must actually be provided.35 Plaintiff alleges that, in practice, Defendants used this policy to categorize procedures in a way that resulted in lengthy delays that amounted to the outright denial of treatment for long periods of time.36 As a result, Defendants sent Plaintiff on a repetitive loop: Plaintiff sought medical treatment at Angola. He was referred to specialists outside Angola, who referred him for surgery. The referral was sent to DOC for approval. DOC did not approve his surgery and instead sat on his referral. While waiting for his surgery to be scheduled, Plaintiff continued to seek medical care for his cataracts at Angola. Physicians at
34 Second Am. Compl., at 2. 35 See LSP Health Care Policy No. HC-16; LDPSC Directive No. 13:030. 36 Mem. Supp. Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J., at 15.
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Angola who examined Plaintiff would notice the severity of his cataracts and the worsening of his vision, and would send him for more surgery referrals. The loop continued. Indeed, Plaintiff alleges, a physician at Angola shed some light on why this was happening: Plaintiff was told that due to funding restrictions, he would not receive surgery unless it was a life-threatening matter.37
Prisons may not classify medically necessary treatment as “elective” as a way to avoid providing constitutionally adequate care. The classification of medical treatment as “elective” is irrelevant for purposes of determining whether the treatment is necessary to provide prisoners with constitutionally adequate medical care. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bowers, 884 F.2d 1053, 1056 (8th Cir. 1989); Jones v. Johnson, 781 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1986); Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 64-69 (2d Cir. 1994); Garrett v. Elko, 120 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 1997); Monmouth Cty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 n. 32 (3d Cir. 1987). Prisons have an obligation to provide constitutionally adequate medical care to prisoners when necessary. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103. A delay in treatment violates the Eighth Amendment where the delay was the result of the defendant’s deliberate indifference, and significant harm is suffered during the delay. Easter, 467 F.3d at 464–65; Williams v. Certain Individual Emps. of Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice-Institutional Div. at Jester III Unit, Richmond, Tex., 480 F. App’x 251, 257 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding the delay of providing inmate plaintiff pain medications for almost sixteen hours could support a claim of deliberate indifference, in violation of the Eighth Amendment); Stewart v. Guzman, 555 F. App’x 425, 426, 431–32 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding inmate plaintiff’s allegations that prison officials delayed medical treatment for inmate’s asthma attacks on five occasions when prison officials were aware of inmate’s frequent attacks could support a claim of deliberate indifference, in violation of the Eighth Amendment). Excessive delays in medically
37 Defs.’ Mem. Opp’n. Summ. J. Hacker ARP. Ex. 4, at 6.
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necessary treatment can run afoul of the Eighth Amendment. See Williams, 480 F. App’x. at 258. Moreover, the Eighth Amendment does not cover only life-threatening medical needs. See Baker, 635 F. Supp. 2d at 521. State prisons have an obligation to provide constitutionally adequate medical care for prisoners’ objectively serious medical needs, and funding and other administrative concerns are not a justification for failing to meet Eighth Amendment standards. See Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 286 (5th Cir. 1977) (“compliance with constitutional standards may not be frustrated by legislative inaction or failure to provide the necessary funds”).
If Plaintiff’s allegations are true, Defendants’ policy of categorizing certain medical procedures as “elective” caused excessive delays in the provision of necessary medical treatment, which resulted in the denial of that treatment. In turn, Plaintiff suffered harm while he waited for his surgery. According to Plaintiff, in the 813 days it took for DOC to schedule his procedure, he lost vision in both eyes.38 Plaintiff alleges that his impaired vision resulted in a tear to his chest muscle during one of his work assignments, and the loss of a finger when a license plate machine chopped it off because he could not properly see.39 During this time, Plaintiff’s vision deteriorated to the point that he became legally blind, but he was still required to work in Angola’s fields and machine shops.40 Defendants’ use of its policy deeming cataract surgeries “elective” allegedly led to deliberate delays, effectively denying in the provision of care to Plaintiff for almost two years, thereby causing his condition to worsen, and resulting in him suffering physical and other harm.41
38 Mem. Supp. Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. at 7. 39 Mem. Supp. Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. at 1. 40 Second Am. Compl., at 6-7. 41 Second Am. Compl., at 6 (stating that Mr. Hacker experienced severe pain in his eyes when exposed to sunlight and made an emergency medical request on May 16, 2013 due to “pain and burning” in his eyes.)
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CONCLUSION
When a prisoner has an objectively serious medical need, a state does not meet its Eighth
Amendment obligations by providing medical care that is constitutionally inadequate, incorrect,
and against the consistent and repeated recommendations of medical professionals.
Additionally, State actors are not relieved of their constitutional obligations merely by
contracting with private providers. Accordingly, the Court should consider these constitutional
standards in ruling on Plaintiff’s motion in limine.
Respectfully submitted,
VANITA GUPTA Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Civil Rights Division
ROBERT MOOSSY Deputy Assistant Attorney General Civil Rights Division
CHIRAAG BAINS Senior Counsel Civil Rights Division
STEVEN H. ROSENBAUM Chief Civil Rights Division Special Litigation Section
LAURA L. COON Special Counsel Civil Rights Division Special Litigation Section
/s/ Aparna Patrie APARNA PATRIE Trial Attorney Special Litigation Section
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Civil Rights Division 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, D.C. 20530 Telephone: (202) 305-1107 Email: aparna.patrie@usdoj.gov WALT GREEN United States Attorney Middle District of Louisiana /s/ Catherine Maraist Catherine M. Maraist, LBN 25781 Assistant United States Attorney 777 Florida Street, Suite 208 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70801 Telephone: (225) 389-0443 Fax: (225) 389-0685 Email: catherine.maraist@usdoj.gov Attorneys for the United States
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on December 7, 2016, I served the foregoing via the Court’s CM/ECF system, which will automatically provide notice to all counsel of record.
/s/ Catherine Maraist CATHERINE MARAIST Assistant United States Attorney
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 Case 3:14-cv-00063-JWD-EWD Document 1 01/30/14 Page 1 of 26

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A COMPLAINT UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT

42 U .S.C. § 1983

RECEtVED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

.l~N 30 2014
le&a\ Programs Department

JASON HACKER
(Enter tbe run name of each
PlaintifTin this action.)

#383727 Inmate(DOC Numbe.·)

VERSUS

N. BURLCAIN, WARDEN; DR. RAHM SINGH, DPS&C MEDICALDIRECTOR; ASSISTANT WARDEN STEPHANIE LAMARTINlERE; ~JASON COLLINS, M.D. (Print the fUD name ofall defendants In thfs ad.lon) DO NOT WRITE eta/

In!:intctions for Filing Complaint by Prisoners
Under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §1983.

This packet includes two copies of a complaint fonn and one copy ofthe pauper affidavit.

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complaint for your own records.

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All copies of the complaint mustbe identical to the orn;naJ.

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In order for titis complaint to be filed,
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it must be accompanied by the filing fee will require you to pa.y the oost of s:erving

of the

cmporuomscptelseaidIginfnintytoohfniuellea~mafIcfa)ihdupaonavufaittpbh~eleeruinsdto.de. fpoerFnbt.o.dt,a.ra.pintnahtystihs.thepesufirgiplmionstgeu,freaeaopaafnuadpneswreratvhfifocirdeiazcvoeisdttsoi,s.ffyiinoccuelrumcdeaety1dipfiYnetitnihtgiiostnlptetaictaekmecoto.uunrYtt otoouf money in your imnate account until the entira filing tee is paid.

Case 3:14-cv-00063-JWD-EWD Document 1 01/30/14 Page 2 of 26

You will note that you are !"(~ir-ed to give facts. THIS COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT
CONTAIN LEGAL ARGUMENTS OR CITATIONS. ALSO, DO NOT INCLUDE EXHIBITS.

United

When
States

you have completed these forms, mail the original
Disttict Court for the Middle District ofLouisiana,

and
777

copies to the Clerk of the Florida Street, Suite 139,

Baton Rouge, La 70&01-1712.

1. Previous Lawsuits

A.
fa£ts

Have yon begun other lawsuits in sttte. or federal court dealing with involwd in this action or otherwise relating to your imprisonment? Yes (

the sEe ) No (X)

B.
more

Ifyour than one

mtswer to A i.:; yes, describe each lawsuit in the SJlace belo"': (If there is la\\tJuit, descnoe the additional lawsuits on another piece ofpaper. using

the same outline.)

L

Pm1ies to tbis previous lawsuit

Plaintitf(s): - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Defendant(s):_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

2.

Court (iffeden1 court, name the: district; iftrtat.e court, name the paridl):

3.

Docket number: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

4. Name ofjudge to "'nom case was a s s i g n e d : - - - - - - - - - - - - -

5.

Disposition (for example: Was the care dismissed? Was it appealed'! Is it etill

pending?):

6.

Dme offiling lawsuit: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

7. Dlte of disposition: - - - - - - - - - - -

IrCmef.ahyJtoiecuidorHtoRosan,tsvhowerefe<yri-Jso"sI"nSufeyahsiealsurd,ariehasmnetoydthsipntearettcheviiviasoiulcclsaoaJcmiymtipoflinfal<eiJnnd"wt".wfnedbbdiisecembrrasrilseaslnleiadedwftbshcuyaeintmcsbltyseoprgfoenasd1ipet1iroptaeneld?oc~ofYrweueathsceah(tshc)fearNrsiveooo. rl(oYnXuoosut). must identifY in which feooral district or appeH~e court the action was brought.

TI. Place ofpresent confinement: LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY

Case 3:14-cv-00063-JWD-EWD Document 1 01/30/14 Page 3 of 26

A. Is then'! a ptisoner grievance procedun~ in this institution? Yes (X )No ()

B. DHl you p-esent the fact.s relming to your complaint m the E-1at.e prisoner
grievance procedure? Yes(X)No()

C.

Ifyouran~wer is YES:

1. IdentifY the administrative grievance procedure nmnber(s) in which the claims
raised in this complaint were addressed. -"L""-'·S~P.._-_..2,0"'"'t3-~2""'S~5..z.4_ _ _ _ _ __

2.

What stepS~ did yon take? -=B=ot=h~S=t=e..,ps"-'.Ex=~h=a=u=st=ec,._l_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

3.

What was the result? Reli~fDet':;.t~l~ie~d~--------------

D. If your

NO.

explain

"'by

not:

III. Parties

(In Item A below, place your name in the first blank and place your present adcress in the second blank. Do the same for additional plaintifiS, if any.)

A

N ~-.ne ofplaiutift'{s)..z.J~N~SC=JN~H..,...A-"=C...:.~:Kuo.~ER~---------

Address OAK-4 LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY AN_GOLA LA 70712

In Item B below, place the full nam.e of the defundant in the fitst blmk, his official

position in the second blank, and bis place of employment in tbe third blank. Use Item

C for the names, positions, and places of employment of any addit.ional defe-ndants.

B. Defendant N. BURL CAIN is employed a.-; ~'V:=-=ar=d=en=.- - - - - - - - - - - at the Louisiana Sh:te Penitentiary ~ Angola. Louisiana
C. Additional Defendants DR.. RAHM SINGH is employed ac; ~tedical Director at the Louisiana De,partment ofPublic Safety & CotTections
D. Detl.:mdaut STEPHANIE LAMARTINIERE is employed ac;Ac;st. Warden
at the Louisiana St~e Penitentiary ~ Angola. Louisiana
E. Defendant JASON COLLINS. M.D. is employed a-; Medical Directot· at the Louisiana Shte Penitentiazy ~ Ansol~ Louisiana

Case 3:14-cv-00063-JWD-EWD Document 1 01/30/14 Page 4 of 26
IV Statement ofClaim State here as briefly as possible the facts of your case_ Describe how each defendant is iovolvecl Include also t.he names of other persons involved, elates~ and places. Do not
&ive any l~a1 arpments or cite any czes cr statutes. If you intend to allege a number ofrehied claims> number and set forth each claim in a separate P~- (Use as much space as you need Attach extra sheets ifneceslilary_) Plaintiff is being denied adequate medical care. Plaintiff avers that the Defendants have been deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs resu lting in unnecessary pain and ruffering and loss of sight in violation of
1h.~Ei8hJnAm~<lrnrot_,_~.Att!t~h~ ~g_C!f~!!!l~mJ!!J)_!l_p_p_!rt.,
V. Relief Sf_me briefly exadly what you_ want the CQtu1 to do...f9.r..y.!Hl- Make no legal argtunents. Cite no cases or ftabltes. AUach no exhibits__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Plaiutiti seeks Declar.toty and Iqjunctive relief and reque!ts monetary dmllil8es for the pain~ suflering. and loss of sight caused a~ a result of the deliberate indi.tiereuce to his serious medical needs_

Case 3:14-cv-00063-JWD-EWD Document 1 01/30/14 Page 5 of 26

VI. Plaintitl"'s Dechration

1. I understand that! am prohibited from bringing a. civi l adion in fonna. pauperis: if,

whiJe I wa.~ inca-cented or c~fained in any facility~ I have brought three or more civil

actions or appeals m a court ofthe United States that "''ere dim1issed on the gr01mds that

they were frivolous, mruicious, or failed to state a. claim upon which relief may be

grantee~ unless I am in imminent danger of serious physical injury.

2.

I tmden:tand fh~. even if I am allowed to proceed in fmn a pauperis~ I am

responsible for paying the entire filing fee and any costs assessed by the Court? m1id1,

atlet· payment of the paltial initial tiling fee, shalt be deducted fi·om my ituuate account

by my cubtodian in installment payments as prescribed by law:

J. I understand th~ i f l am released or transferred, it is my !I.'$J>Olll'>ibility to keep the

Court infotmed of my lMiereabouts and failure to do so may result in this a..""'fion being

dismissed with prej:dic~Signed tbisZiday o~1. 2014

I declare under penalty ofpmjury that the ibt-egoing is tme and com~ct.
2£ -/ fL Executed On: / ..

Case 3:14-cv-00063-JWD-EWD Document 1 01/30/14 Page 6 of 26

IN THE
UNITED STATES DIS1RICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT Oil' l,OUISIANA.

JURY 1RIALDEMANDFD
.JASON HACKER #383727
Plaintiff
-Versus-

CIVJLACTION NO. _ _ _ _ __

N. HURLCAIN, WARJJEN;

DR. RAHM SINGH, DPS&C MEDICALDIRECTOR;

ASSISTANTWARDENSJEPHANIELAMARTINJERE;

.JASON COLLINS, M.D.
D~~~~

JLDGE ______________

MAGIS1RATE- - - - - - -

F I L E D : - - - - - - --

CLERKOF COURT

ClV IL RIGHI'S COMPLAfNT Willi JURY DEMAND UNDER 42 U.S.C.f19&3 FOR MONETARY DAMAGES, DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
****************************************************
This is a civil rights action filed by JASON HACKER#3S3727, a slate prisoner, for
m<,netary damag~ declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deliberate indttlerence to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Con!){itution. Plaintiffre<pest.s a trial by jury.
JURISDICTION
1. Titis Court has jurisdictioo over Plaintiff's claims of vi~,Jating Federal
Constitu6onaJ rights rmder 28 U .S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.

1

Case 3:14-cv-00063-JWD-EWD Document 1 01/30/14 Page 7 of 26

2. The Comt has supplemental jurisdiction c.wer Pfaintiff~s State Jaw claims

tmder 28 U S.C.§ 1367. INTERESTED PARTIES
l_ Phtin6ft: JASON HACKER, is a state prisoner who is incm·cernted at the

Lomsiana State Pemtentjary, Angola, Louisiana (LSP).
4. Defendant Rahm SJngh, :M.D., is the final and conb·oiHng mec.iicaJ
autfwrity fc.)r the Deprutment.. He is personaJly resp1.)nsibJe for 3-h--slllling acseu to. ang
deJivery or medical can t4.' p1·isKmers at. a.l1 Depa11ment. instltuti,l11S. He baa the same responsibihhes a.s tlutt. l'~f the Medical Directc.)r at. the Lmthnamt. State Penitent1ruy, however, Jus duties and authority extends Department. wide. Plamtift' g_fbm1ts that
Deteruiant Smgh was aware, or should have been :aware of the numerous gJievances and suits filed by other Offimders pm1ment to imtdequate medical care and/or lUlconstitutjonal conditions, and he took no steps to abate the inadequate and/or unconstitutit.mal care being provided. PJnintjff submits that Dr. Singh has Jmowingly precluded access and delivery of needed medical care and surgery based upon lack of fimds and cost. Defendant Singh is sued in his official capacity for purpose of declaratory and

injunctive retief.

5.

Nathan Burl Cain is the Warden over the Louisiana State Penitentiary and

also serves as a Regional Warden. Defendant cain is respoosible for aswring access to,

nnd delivery of adequate medical cm·e to prisoners at the Louisiana State Penitentiary.

Defendant Cain interprets and implements policy as well as new and revised policy.

2

Case 3:14-cv-00063-JWD-EWD Document 1 01/30/14 Page 8 of 26
Warden Cain meets periodically with the A..."Sistant Warden of Medical Services and the
Medical Director pertinent to providing medical care. All grievances are originally directed to the Warden's Office for review and then forwarded to appropriate Department Heads for response. Plamtiff mbmits that Defendant Cain was aware, or should have been aware of the numerrus grievances and mits filed by other Offenders pertinent to inadequate medtcal care and/or uncom.titutional condttton~ and he took nl"> steps to abate the inadeCJ.tate and/or unconstitutional care being provided. The failure to take steps to abate the inadequate and/or unconstitutional medtcal care being provided evinces deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of Plaintiff and others. L"'.ombined,
Defendant Cain has personal involvement sufficient for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 .
Defendant Cain is sued in his official capacity for purpose of declaratory and injunctive relief.
6. Defendant Stephanie Lamat·tinie1·e is Assistant \¥arden over Medical Services at the Louisiana State Penitentiary. Defendant Lantartiniere recently a~med the position and <.hrtie.fS of A.ssi~t Warden of the Treatment Center and held this position during much ofthe time involving the imtant complaint.
AssiWlfit Wardens of the Treatment Center interpret and implement all existh!e poH£Y a~ well a~ new and t•evised pollg. Plaintiff submits that the position of ~istant Warden over the Treatment L~nter requires supervision of the entire Medical Servtces Department. Plaintiff rubmits that the re~onsibilities of this position include amongst others, to: (1) dired and coordinate all activities of all departments within the treatment
3

Case 3:14-cv-00063-JWD-EWD Document 1 01/30/14 Page 9 of 26
center to ensure federal and state laws, regulations, professiooal standards, and im•titutional goals are followed; (2) conduct periodic inspections to ensure rnax.mum efficiency and effectiveness, which includes review of performance reports completed by supervisors and counseling on rule infractions; (3) interpret and implement all exi!d.ing policy as well as new and revised policy; (4) respond to Reque~s for A.dministrati:ve Remedy submitted by Offenders regarding medical complaints; and (5) investigate matter-s t)f medical and treatment nature. Obviously, the above duties are not being
pe1'£ormed. The adions and/or inactions of Defendant Lamartiniere far from meets professional standards and violates both federal and state law.
Platntift' further submits that Detendant Lamartiniere does not po~ss the medical qualifications to work in this positim. Plaintiff submits that Defendant Lamartiniere is not a physician, a nurse, or even an Rl\-IT. In spite of the above, Defendant Lamartiniere was appointed and a~med these responsibilities.
A.ssi!d.ant Warden Lamartiniere responded to Plaintiffs Reque~ for Administrative Remedy alleging deliberate indifference. Therefore, she was aware of Plaintiffs grievance and aware of the plethora of repeated grievances and/or suits filed by other offenders pertinent to inadequate medical care and/or uncon~'titntional conditions. However) Assistant Warden Lamartiniere took no fteps to abate the inadequate care and/or uncomtitutional condttions provided. Assistant Warden Lamartiniere dis:regarded the risk of harm to Plaintiffs health and other offenders by faUtne to take reasonable measures to abate the risk of harm indicating deliberate indifference. Defendant
4

Case 3:14-cv-00063-JWD-EWD Document 1 01/30/14 Page 10 of 26
Latuartiniere is sued in her individual and official capadties. 7. .Jason Collins, M.D., is the Medical Director at the R. E. Barrow Treabnent
Center at the Louisiana State Penitentiary and superseded Dt·. Jonathan Rotu1dtree. As Medic~tl Director, Dt·. Collins is responsible for en&uing that imnates receive reast)nable and adequate medical care, mclud..ing but not limited to diagnosis, preootibing medication, and amu·ing that outside treatment. and/t)r surgery is oohednJed and rece1ved in a timely manner when indicated. Dr. Collins is also respt)tlstble t<.)r supetvising the othet· physicians and f.:MT's to asstu·e they are providing pn)per care and treatn1a1t.
IX. C(.)IJins is pers..)nally invt)Jved in treating patietlts and supervises the other physicians rendering treabnent. IX. O.)llins is aW3re ,.)f the facts presented herein. Plaintift' submits that IX. Collins was and is aware that Plaintiff suffers fi·mn pain and btm1ing in his eyes, Joss of sight causing dimtption of and inability to perfonn daily Jiving activities. Dr. Collins is aware that. many offenders are ~affering from lad' of
needed medical care, and aware that Plaintiff and others, are being intom1ed that needed care or Stu-gery will not be perfonned due to lack of .fimds. Dr. Collins fiUJed to assure
that necessary care or surgery is provided tJ.) abate the tmnecessary pain and suffering
and/or a~u-e that other treating ph~cians provided adequate care f-..)r same. including the necessity t()r Sln-gery. TI1is vk)lates the C'..t.)tt~itutiona.Jly guaranteed right ft)
reasonable mediat.l care and right to be free fi·t)m cn.lel and m1usual treatment. and evinces deJibet-ate jndifferetJce t.t) the serit)llS medical needs of Plaintiff and t)thers Dr. Collin!' Is
sued in his individual and ofrlcial capacities.
5

Case 3:14-cv-00063-JWD-EWD Document 1 01/30/14 Page 11 of 26
8. Plaintiff rubmits that all of the Defendants have fuiled to provide adequate
medical care and failed to correct the uncomtitutional deficiencies in access to and
delivery of medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the complaint and add or delete Defendants if necessary. All Defendants have acted, and continue to act, under color of State law at all times relevant to this complaint.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE Plaintiff fi1ed Request. f~,.,r Admini~ative Remedy in this matter as a. result. of syst.emic deficiencies and deJibern.te indifference t.t.) his setif..)US tnedica.J needs. n1e
Request.for Administrative Remedy in this matter was accepted tmd assigned LSP-2013-
2554. TI1e Depmtment. denied relief at the First. Step. Plaintiti was not ~tisfied with t11e First Step Response and timely requested review at. the Second Step. The Sec·ond Step wa..;;; denied on 11/27113. Plaintiff awrs that be has exhausted both steps in tlJe process ptior to filing the instant complaint (See attached Exhibit)
STATEMENT OF FACTS For the past two years Plaintiff has suffered continuous loss of sight due to «Cataracts." Beginning at the end of 2011) and through the year 2012, Plaintiffwas sent to outside eye specialist at the "Pennington Research Center, in Baton Rouge) Louisiana. After four trip~ the eye specialist informed Plaintiff that he suffered from "severe cataracts in both eyes." In January 2013, Plaintiff again visited the ey>e doctor at the Louisiana State
6

Case 3:14-cv-00063-JWD-EWD Document 1 01/30/14 Page 12 of 26
Penitentiary (L<)P). During that visit, Plaintiff complained that he could not see and that his right eyewas failing at what geemed like an even greater r.d.e than when first seen. At this> the eye doctor agreed. During that same visit, the eye doctor again scheduled Plaintiff to visit an eye speciali~-this time with "Otarity Hospitar' in New Orleans. Louisiana.
On or about April 3) 2013> an eye specialist at Otarity Hospital verified the fact that Plaintilf suffered from a severe case of ((cataracts." The specialist asrured Plaintiff that he would inform the rvtedical Director at LSP of his need for "immediate cataract rurgery in both eyes:" The specialist said he would include the fad. that Plaintiff's cataract condition was the reason for him going blind and that wrgery would '(correct and restore" his vision.
On or about May 6, 2013, while at work in a ('field line;' Plaintiffwas expected to perform "'regular duty," i.e., perfonn like the rest of the workers-as if nothing were wrong with his sight. Plaintiff declared himself a medical emergency. At that time, Plaintiff explained to the EMT that he could only see six to eight feet in his left eye, and that he practically had no sight in his right eye. Additionally, Plaintiff explained to the EMr that, as he understood the specialist at Charity Hospital) he was supposed to receive
eye surgery. While speaking with the arr, Plaintiff complained that, after his visit with
the eye speciati~ he was not iswed a duty status for his medical condition. On or about May 16, 2013> Plaintiff asain declared him~lf a medical emergency
because of pain and burning in his eyes, his inability to see, and his inability to perform 7

Case 3:14-cv-00063-JWD-EWD Document 1 01/30/14 Page 13 of 26
his work detail as would someone without a disability. Plaintiff again was is.g)ed a three day duty status. Plaintiff was again informed that his concern would be referred to the LSP eye doctor. For the second time, Plaintiff asked: '~If awaiting eye mrgery, why have I not received a standard duty status as a result of my failing sight."
On or about June 5, 2013, Plaintiff. was finally seen by the LSP eye doctor. Plaintiff was given another examination wherein the doctor quickly determined that he was "legally blind." The eye doctor further explained that due to lack offunds, he would not receive the rurgery~ and according to the LSP Medical Director, the only way he
would receive the eye surgery is if he was "bleeding from the eyefl' or it was a life or death situation. Plaintiffexplained to the eye doctor that his condition was an emergency
to no avail. The LSP eye doctor informed Plaintiff that if he did not get the needed rurgery, he would end up completely blind. It was made clear that without the needed surgery his medical condition would worsen and result in a lifelong handicap with permanent loss of sight.
On Angmt 21, 2013, Plaintiff again visited the LSP ey>e doctor. During that visit, Plaintiffwas again informed that he would not receive the rurgery as a result of cost/lack
offunds, and that it was not a life or death situation.
Plaintiff nmv suffers continued pain> both physical and mentaL Plaintiff submits
that as a reoolt of the intentional inordinate delays, and knowing denial of needed medical
care) he has become legally blind. Also> the failure of Defendants Singh> Cain~ and Lamartiniere) to remedy ongoing constitutional violations of wltich they were aware>
8

Case 3:14-cv-00063-JWD-EWD Document 1 01/30/14 Page 14 of 26
amotmt.s t.o delibernt.e indifference. This is not a matter of Plaintiff disagreeins with diagnosis as diagnosis was
provided. This is not a disagreement with treatment because no treatment is being provided.
The Defendants have been aware, or should have been aware for extended period of time that Plaintiff is suffering with pain and burning in his eyes, and that this is
severely affecting Plaintiff performing daily activities. They are all also aware that Plaintiff is not the only offender being wbjected to inordinate delay and denial of needed
medical care or surgery. This is not a single incident and the denial of care and surgery is
a blanket policy denying inmates needed care or rurgery.
Plaintiff submits that the Defendants knowing and intentional denial of needed medical care or surgery based upon cost/lack of funds violates the Eighth Amendment and amounts to deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.
CLAIM ONE TilE DEFENDANTS WERE DELIBERATELY INDIFFERENT TO
PLAINTIFFS SERIOUS MEDIC..AL NEEDS IN VIOLATION OF DIE EIGHTII Al\ttENDMENT
LAWAND ARGUMENT
Ad4UpUd.e care mtd dt!.liberate indil.fermee
As stated alx)ve, Plaintiff is ~drering with pain and buming in both eyes, and has
been diagnosed as JegaJJy bJind. Plaintilf was seen by LSP eye doctor and outside
specialist., and inft.)nned that. surgery was necesmry and could be d..). ne, however, it. would
9

Case 3:14-cv-00063-JWD-EWD Document 1 01/30/14 Page 15 of 26
not. be perfonned due to cost/Jack of fimds. Plaintiff continued to seek medica) tn~a.bnent. because the condition wor~med. The loss of sight, du·onic pain and btuning in his eyes presents an objectively se~ious condition and is precluding daily Jiving activities. Grie\reson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 779 (7fh Cir. 2008); Chapma11 \r. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373 (7fh Cir. 1997). The Medical Director and physicians have substantially <iej.'lmted .fi·om profussional judgment by refusing to authmize surgical repair of his painful and debilitating eye condition. See McGowan v. Hulick, 612 F.3d 636) 640 (~
Cir. 2010). Plaintiffs repeated c~Jmplaints (.)f pain and hJss -.)f sight have been ignored. Plaintiff and others are being denied needed medical care and gu·gery based up-.)n CC.)st and lack of .fimds without. regard for the Oftendets health and well being which constitutes delibernt.e indifterence to serious medical needs.
TI1e prn.ctice deSCJibed herein started with Dr. Raman Singh1 and the practice continued with Dr. Jonathan Romu.itree. (Both f01mer Medical Directors at LSP). Plaintiff submits that Dr. Raman Singh and Dr. ROtmdtree (former medical direct.ors) es.tabJished a custom, of pmv1ding "'only, minimal care which is deliberate indifference. This practice was Sll cc..-.r1sist.ent. and widespt·ea.d that it became pl)ficy. Dr. C..oJUns, who is now .Medical Director, has continued the same practices. ·n1e Medical Direct..). r assures that his subc..)rdinates, i.e., t.)ther treating physicians, mu-ses, and EMT's atllere t-.l this practjce resulting in the blanket. daJial c..lf needed medical care and gu-gery. 1l1e Cc..lnsist.ent. use of this practice over years, and it's C(.)ntjnued use, is S~Lfficient. t.(l establim that. it. ha.s bec..lme
1 Dr. Rarnan Singh is fi(NJ Medical Dire:t£..- fC'I' the Louisiana Departm~Jt of F\lbllc Saf~ and C~ oos.
10

Case 3:14-cv-00063-JWD-EWD Document 1 01/30/14 Page 16 of 26
policy. This tmwritten policy reduces needed medical care to Offenders and needed sm·geries, and this pt.llicy is based upon cost. The denial of CBre is )mowing and int.entic..vm1 lvitlJOut. regan.i for the health and weiJ being t.lf the inmates. Plaintiffavers that the cost. based decisions regarding needed care and/or surgery have been (.'flgoing for
years and establim a patt.em. Plaintiff rubmits that the Defenoonts were deliberately indifferent. to his seJious medical needs and that. c..lfothers.
Plaintiff finther submits that. the Defendants ha.'\.'e eiltabHshed a practice ~,,.f flc.',t.ing m an oftend~s respective medical tile that. he has been seen, fc..lHow up has been scheduled, prescriptic..lllS renewed, t..lr even that mu·gery has been EK~heduJe<.i. in t.lrder t.o indicate that a.decp..1a.t.e medical care has been provided. Plaintiff avers this to be a. blatant
cover up because in :fuct, no care or surgery is being providec:l. The fu.ct. that Plaintiff sa:w a doct.or does not. f01·ecloS:l his claims. Lat.er, when responding to ARP and/or subsequent suit, just as dc..'Vle in the instant. case, the Defendants have a record "'falsely indicating" adequate mediad care was being provided when in fuct, the needed care is not. provided. The fact that an Offendet· is seen by a physician at the Clinic aurount.s to just tbat. The Offender is seen, his ce,'\mp1aint. heard, and flj.lfhing is dc..,ne to resc.llve the medical problem. TI1e pn.,mise t.)f surgery being s:cheduJed is nt.lthing mt..,re than a. put off. Titis practice is dei!igned f.t..'\ mitigate JiabiJit.y, but. tllc.'\st. t..)f aJl it. is t.f.) CUt Cc.)stS witht..)Ut regard for the health and weJJ being c.)f the Offender. \Nithin the last. yea~. Pla-intiffs medical problems have now become Wt.)J'Se. TI1e Defendants are bluntly inft.'\mling Plaintiff and others that dte t.o cost and lack of funds smgery won't be perfoJmed mlless considered
11

Case 3:14-cv-00063-JWD-EWD Document 1 01/30/14 Page 17 of 26

life threatening, and prescriptions are being a.tt. to a minirnmn. Plaintiff submits that
classificatjon of stu·gery as "elective,, does not abrogate a ptison's dlty or power Wlder
the Eighth Amendment. b."' promptJy provide necessary medical care f«."'r prisoners. Baker v. Wilkinson, 63S F.Supp.2d Sl4 (WD. La. 2009).
TI1e Defendants are aware of PJaintifPs g~ievance m1d the plethora of other
grievances and suits previously filed. Moret.we1·, Pla.inHff 1s aw~u·e of nunle1.f."'US complaints pursuant. b."' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 presently pending in this Honorable Court assigned to the Honc."'rable Magistrates Riedlinger and Bourgeois, ~Uld t"'ther f."'Jl'enders preparing to file additional complaints.2 The actions and/or inactions of the Defendants are contrary t.o clearly established Jaw. Plaintiff submits that. there are serious systemic
deficiencies in the access t.o and delivery of needed medical care m1d the lalowing m1d intentional fuilm·e to take reasonable measures to abate the C«."tlsWutiona.l vioJatjons ammmt.s to deliberate indifference.
Plaintiff submits that the Defendants have failed to remedy ongoing violations of
which they were aware or should have been a:ware due to the numerous ARP's and/or suits prev iously filed. The actions and/or inactions of the Defendants go beyond being arbitrary, capricious, or negligent. Plaintiff submits thai the actions and/or inactions were deliberate and that there is a pattern of this type treatment. The test of whether

2

FRANCIS BRAUNER #40~665/No. 12-314-BAJ-SCR)~ SHON D. Mll.LER #427562/No. 12-

0730-FJP-SCR); WAYNE FRITZ #96177/No. 13-556-BAJ-SCR; KENNETH LESLEY#422270/No. 13·

490-JJB-SCR; EDWARD GIOVANNI/NO. 13-0566-BAJ-RLB; HYMEL VARNADO #333068/No. 13-
0348-BAI-S.CR; BERNARD DELCARPIO #119047/No. 13-0273-SDD-RLB; LEWL~ BROWN

#73428/No. 11-0103-JJB-SCR;. LARRY ROBERTSON #250866/No, lJ-00171-SDD·RLB.

12

Case 3:14-cv-00063-JWD-EWD Document 1 01/30/14 Page 18 of 26
governmental action is arbitrary and capricious is whether the action is reasonable under the circumstances. Clat•k v. City of Shreveport., App. 2 cir. 1995, 655 So.2d 617, 26, 638 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/10/95). The actions deroribed herein go beyond reasonable. Plaintiff wbmits that there has been repeated deliberate inordinate delay in providing needed medical care and surgery to himself and other offenders at the Louisiana State Penitentiary resulting in needle~ pain and wffering.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that the Eighth Amendment e~ablimes a State's obligation to provide medical care for those whom it has incarcerated. Deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical illness or injury states a cause of action under§ 1983. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103, 97 S.<._:t. 285, 290, 50 L.&l2d 251 (1976). Deliberate mdifference deSt..,-ibes a state of mind more blameworthy than negligence and there must be ..more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interests or safety:• Farma· v. Brennan, 511 U .S. 825, 835, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L .Ed.2d 811 (1994). In E.~telle v. Gamble, the Court defined the standard for Eighth Amencknent review of prisoner's complaints concerning their medical treatment. To ftate a cognizable claim the Court said "A prisoner rrrust allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. 429
U .S. at 106. 97 s.a . at 292. The required indifference could be manife~ed, it said "by prison doctors in thelr response to the prisoner's needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment
once preSJribed. 429 U.S. A1104-105, 97 S.O . at 291.
13

Case 3:14-cv-00063-JWD-EWD Document 1 01/30/14 Page 19 of 26
Under Eighth Amendment proscription against unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain by deliberate indifference to "serious medical needs" ofprisoners, medical need is
serious if it is one that has been diagno~d by physician as mandating treatment or one
that ts so cbvious that even a lay person would easily recognize necessity for doctor's attention. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 8. Plaintiff mbmits that his condition would be
obvious to a layman. A more general definition of serious medical needs refers to "conditions that cause pain, discomfort, or threat to good health." See E."teUe v. Gamble,
429 U .S. 97> 104, 97 S.t"'l. 285 (1976~ McGuckin -v. Smitlt> 974 F.2d at 1060. Plaintiff
avers that even a layman would not have questioned the pain he is enduring. Plaintiff mu~'l not only show that Defendant was callously indifferent to his
medical nee~ but that those needs were serious, and that failure to treat them resulted in personal injury. It is necessary to ~ow either denial or unreasonably delayed access to physician for diagnosis or treatment of discomfort-causing ailment., or failure to provide prtsl."Tibed treatment. Plaintiff submits be has done so.
In the case wb judice, Plaintiff shows denial, unnecessary and/or intentional delay, and that failure to provide adequate medical care and treatment for his serious needs re~lled in needle~ pain, wffering> and injury. The actions andlor inactions of the Defendants also pose a serious threat of hann to Plaintiffs future health. As a result of the above described actions and/or inactions, Plaintiff suffers severe pain) both physical and mental amounting to a-uel and unusual punishment.
As a practical matter, 'deliberate indifference' can be evidenced by 'repeated 14

Case 3:14-cv-00063-JWD-EWD Document 1 01/30/14 Page 20 of 26
examples of negligent acts which disclose a pattern of conduct by the prison medical staffs or it can be demonstrated by 'proving there are such s.-ystemic and gross deficiencies in ~affing, faciliti~ equipment or procedures that the inmate population is effectively denied access to adequate medical care.' Rauros v. Lamut, 639 F.2d 559, 575(10th Cir.l980) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041, 101 S.<-"1. 1759, 68 L.Ed.2d 239 (1981). See also Todaro v. Ward, 565 F.2d 48, 52 (2d Cir.l977).
Plaintiffrubmit~ that there are such deficiencies, and the failure of Dr. R. Singh, Warden
Cain andior A~istant Warden Lamartiniere to afalre that policies already in place were
being enforced, and take the necessary fteps to abate the unconftitutional conditions, this
rewlts in needless pain and wffering in violation of the Eighth Amendment. In the ins.1.ant case, Plaintiff avers that the actions and/or inactions of the Defendants is not negligence or even gross negligence. The actions and/or inactions ofthe Defendantswere and are deliberate and there is a pattern of this type treatmmt. Plaintiff is not the only inmate to endure these conditions. The Defendants were aware of his condition, its severity, the pain it causes, and they di~'regarded the need for treatment without regard for Plaintiff's health and well being. Under such condition~ unnece~ry suffering is inevitable.
Plaintiff submits that he is entitled to damages, and that declaratory and ir~unctive relief are necessary to preclude the defendants from continuing these uncom.titutional actions and asrure that he and others receive adequate medical care in the future.
It is well e§.abllshed that a finding ofdeliberate indifference recp1ires a finding of a
15

Case 3:14-cv-00063-JWD-EWD Document 1 01/30/14 Page 21 of 26
defendant's subiecti'We awareness of the relevant risk. Fat'ltler v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1979, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994).
An Inmate alleging deliberate indifference to his senous medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment must prove objectively that he was exposed to a substantial risk of serious harm and must show that the Deftndants acted or failed to act with deliberate indifference to that risk. PlaintitT submit.~ he has done so. The deliberate indifference ~dard which must. be shown by the Inmate alleging that officials violated his Eighth Amendnent right to ade<p.~ate medical care is a subjective inquiry. The Inmate
mmt establish that the officials were actually aware of the risk to which he was exposed,
yet consciously dia--egarded it. Plaintiff submits be has done so. Access and Delivery of/tl/edical Clll'e
Plaintiff wbmits that the inadequate medical care described is common at the Louisiana State Penitentiary and establishes a pattern. Plaintiff submits that inordinate delays in receiving needed care, in seeing outside specialists, being denied needed surgery or canceling scheduled surgeries without regard for an inmate's health and well being is well known by inmates at LSP. Plaintiff wbmits that there are now over forty (40) inmates suflering from hernias, and a plethora of offenders suffering with serious medical needs who are not receiving adequate medical care or needed surgery. fvf.any offenders have serious medical problems and are being ~'Yl:l1.ematically turned away from any semblance of reasonable medical care re~on~'ive to their needs. Offenders are attending sick call for serious medical needs such as injury to tendon~ severe arthritis,
16

Case 3:14-cv-00063-JWD-EWD Document 1 01/30/14 Page 22 of 26
back injuries, severe pneumonia, flu, ~1aph inf~"'tion, stomach virus, hernia, etc.> and the EM1:"s systematically send Offenders back to their dormitories informing them that they
will see a doctor at appointment in the near future Offenders are presenting themselves
as a self declared emergency with serious medical needs, only to be sent back down the walk to their dormitories without care, without receiving examination by a physician, the slighte~ diagno~ic t~ing} or any medical treatment. Plaintiff will provide witnesses at trial to support his aUegations.
Many offenders have medical conditions requiring wrgery) and wrgery is not
being provided. Physicians are routinely informing inmates that surgery will not be
provided unleoo life threatening due to cost and lacli.9!.!'!!nd~. The Department feels that
a prisoner should expect to ~'llffer a lifetime handicap as long as the medical problem underlying the reason for surgery does not innnediately threaten ltis life. Petitioner rubmits that his eyes are a good example ofthe inadequate care being provided. Plaintiff rubmits that an oftender will not receive rurgery unless in an emet·gency situation. That
literally means life or death situation. This remits in needless pain and suffering and will result in further injury~ permanent lifetime handicap> or worse> even death( Again, the
cla~ification of wrgery as "'elective,, does not abrogate a prison's dlty or power under the Eighth Amendment to promptly provide necessary medical care for prisoners. Baker v. \\1.1k1nson> 635 F.Supp.2d 514 (W.D. La. 2009).
E';en if the Defendants wbmit that the reaoon for lack of adequate care for serious
medical needs was due to balancing their budget or absence of funding from the 17

Case 3:14-cv-00063-JWD-EWD Document 1 01/30/14 Page 23 of 26

legislature, lack of funding is not a defense to EJ&ldh Amendment violations. U.S. Con~. Amend. 8. Casey v. Lewis, 834 F.Supp. 1477, 1546 (D. Ariz. 1993); Hoptowit v.

Ray, 682 F.2d at 1253. In Newman v. State of Ala., 559 F.2d 283 (C.A. 5(Ala.) 1977, the United States Fifth Circuit noted; "it should nd need repeating that compliance with constitutional standards may not be frustrated by legislative inaction or failure to provide the necessary funds:, See also, Hautllton v. Love) 328 F.Supp. 1182 at 1194, E.D. Ark. (l971). "tnadequate resources can never be an adequate justification for depriving any

person of his constitutional rights."
Plaintiff rubmits that the actions and/or inactions described herein are not

inadvettent mistakes or oversight. k~ stated, this practice has been used for extended period of time and it has become policy. Plaintiff may be an incarcerated prisoner, but he is still a human being. A prisoner does not shed all of his constitutional rights at the prison gate. Wolff v. McDonneU, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.a. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d (1974) and

progeny cases.
Plaintiff submits that the Defendants actions and/or inactions amount to deliberate

tndifference to his serious medical needs.

CONCWSION

Plaintiff cc:'fltends that the actions and/or ina.ct1'-"flS of the Defendants in thig mattet·

mdicate deliberate mdifterence t.(.) his serim1s medicaJ needs and constitutes crueJ and

unusuaJ punigtment. Plaintltf submits that the failure of the Defendants t.._., provide

adequate medical care and treatm(2)t. tuHler the circtun~.ances described indicates
18

I

Case 3:14-cv-00063-JWD-EWD Document 1 01/30/14 Page 24 of 26
deliberate indiffera1ce to his se~ious medical needs. Again>Plaintiff submits that there is
an establis.bed patter ofthis type treatment mandating relief. JASON HACKER #383727 OAK -4
LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY
ANGOLA, LOUISIANA 70712
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Case 3:14-cv-00063-JWD-EWD Document 1 01/30/14 Page 25 of 26

DECLARATION l.TNDER PENALTY OJ:i' PERJTJRY

I JASON HACKER, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, hereby declare under

penalty of perjury that:

1.) I am the PlaintitflPetitioner m the above entitled matter and I am solely

responsible for its contents.

infonn7:f. 2. All of the allegations contained herein are true and cotTed. to the best of my
knowledge,

on this~ day of

;)

> 2014.

JASON HACKER #383727 OAK -4
LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY ANGOLA, LOUISIANA 70712

20

Case 3:14-cv-00063-JWD-EWD Document 1 01/30/14 Page 26 of 26

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

[ JA.~ON HA.CKltR, hereby certify that I have placed a copy of this 42 U.S.C. §

1983 Civil Rights Action for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief in the federal Mailbox of

the Louisiana State Penitentiary for Electronic 1hmsfer addre~d to the Clerk of Court

for the United States Dtstrict Court, Middle District of Louisiana> Baton Rouge Division,

this~day of~ P.O. Box 2630, Batoo Rouge, LA7082lon

, 2014 .

JASON HACKER #383727 OAK -4
LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY ANOO~ WUISIANA 70712
PLEASE SERVE 1HE DEFENDANTS AT:
17544 TIJNICA TRACE, ANGOLA, LA 70712

21

 
 Case 3:14-cv-00063-JWD-EWD Document 73 06/02/15 Page 1 of 14

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

____________________________________

)

JASON HACKER

)

Plaintiff,

)

v.

)

)

)

STATE OF LOUISIANA; LOUISIANA )

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY )

AND CORRECTIONS; LOUISIANA

)

STATE PENITENTIARY AT ANGOLA; )

BOBBY JINDAL, GOVERNOR OF

)

LOUISIANA, in his official and individual )

capacities; JAMES M. LEBLANC,

)

SECRETARY OF THE LOUISIANA

)

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY )

AND CORRECTIONS, in his official and )

individual capacities; N. BURL CAIN, )

WARDEN, LOUISIANA STATE

)

PENITENTIARY AT ANGOLA, in his )

official and individual capacities,

)

)

Defendants.

)

____________________________________)

Docket No. 14-063-JWD-SCR

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT COMES NOW, the plaintiff, Jason Hacker, by and through undersigned counsel, and files this Second Amended Complaint against the defendants and, in support, states the following: I. INTRODUCTION
1. This case involves serious transgressions of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), involving defendants’ refusal to provide accommodations to Jason Hacker despite their knowledge of his disability and his need for accommodations, the reasonableness of his requests, and the consequences for his health by refusing his accommodations. Moreover, the

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Case 3:14-cv-00063-JWD-EWD Document 73 06/02/15 Page 2 of 14
“accommodations” the defendants did provide actually served to exclude Mr. Hacker from several of the defendants’ services, programs, or activities.
2. Mr. Hacker began complaining to defendants of eyesight problems in October 2011. Beginning in June 2012, at least three doctors inside and outside Angola recommended cataract removal surgery for Jason Hacker. In May 2013, a doctor declared him legally blind. It was not until July 2014 that Jason Hacker received surgery on one of his eyes. Both his cataracts were removed by September 15, 2014.
3. Defendants classify cataract removal surgery as elective surgery and liken it to cosmetic surgery. In other words, according to the defendants, cataract removal surgery – a common, low-risk surgery to ameliorate a very serious medical problem – is a non-emergency and can be done at any time. Moreover, defendants failed to provide accommodations to plaintiff despite their knowledge of the need for accommodation and the reasonableness and necessity of those accommodations.
4. Numerous doctors determined that Mr. Hacker required cataracts surgery to remedy his disability. However, pursuant to a policy and custom, defendants delayed and prolonged his surgery for years thereby ignoring his need for an accommodation. Defendants’ actions, done pursuant to their own policy and custom, constitute intentional discrimination against persons with certain types of disabilities, see 42 U.S.C. § 12132; 28 C.F.R. 35.130(b)(1)(iv), and violate the Eighth Amendment. See Baker v. Wilkinson, 635 F. Supp. 2d 514, 520-521 (W.D. La. 2009). II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
5. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 42 U.S.C. § 12133, and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
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6. Venue is proper in the Middle District of Louisiana, under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), since the claim arose in this district, all defendants reside in this district, and a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in this district. III. PARTY PLAINTIFF
7. Jason Hacker is a prisoner confined in the Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola. His DOC number is 383727. He is 39 years old and of suitable age and capacity to file suit. At all material times relevant to this lawsuit, Mr. Hacker was a resident of West Feliciana Parish, Louisiana. He is a resident of the Middle District of Louisiana.
8. Mr. Hacker is a qualified person with a disability. At all relevant times of this lawsuit, his is blindness prevented him from engaging in the major life activity of seeing. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.104(2). Eyeglasses did not ameliorate his condition. IV. PARTY DEFENDANT
9. Defendant State of Louisiana is a public entity as that term is used in the ADA and the Rehab Act. It is a recipient of federal financial assistance as that term is used in the Rehab Act.
10. Defendant Louisiana Department of Corrections is a state agency and a public entity as that term is used in the ADA and the Rehab Act. It is a recipient of federal financial assistance as that term is used in the Rehab Act.
11. Defendant Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola (“Angola”) is a state agency and a public entity as that term is used in the ADA and the Rehab Act. It is a recipient of federal financial assistance as that term is used in the Rehab Act.
12. Defendant Bobby Jindal is the Governor of Louisiana and the chief executive of the state. He is a final policymaker and is sued in his official and individual capacity.
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Case 3:14-cv-00063-JWD-EWD Document 73 06/02/15 Page 4 of 14
13. Defendant James LeBlanc is the secretary of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections. He is a final policymaker and is sued in his official and individual capacity.
14. Defendant Burl Cain is the Warden of Angola. He is a final policymaker and is sued in his official and individual capacity. V. STATEMENT OF FACTS
15. Mr. Hacker began complaining of eyesight problems as far back as October 2011. 16. On October 17 of that year he complained to Angola personnel of sudden weight loss, vision changes and that he was unusually hungry. On October 20, 2011, Angola personnel referred Mr. Hacker to an eye clinic. 17. On January 9, 2012, Angola personnel saw Mr. Hacker at the Angola hospital. They noted Mr. Hacker was experiencing heart palpitations, weight loss, vision changes and insomnia. 18. On February 14, 2012, Mr. Hacker complained to Angola personnel of blurry vision, visual changes and weight loss. On that day, Angola personnel referred him to the eye clinic for a further evaluation. Thyroid problems were ruled out as the cause of his eye problems. 19. On June 24, 2012, Interim LSU Hospital Personnel recommended Mr. Hacker receive cataract removal surgery and that a special follow-up is needed for cataract surgery. Defendants were made aware of the need for the cataract surgery. 20. On October 24, 2012, Mr. Hacker was seen at the Earl K. Long Eye Clinic. Upon his return, defendants were notified that Mr. Hacker should be referred to Interim LSU Hospital for cataract removal surgery. 21. On October 30, 2012, LSU Interim Hospital Personnel in the Ophthalmology department diagnosed Mr. Hacker with cataracts. Defendants were made aware of the need for
4 	  

Case 3:14-cv-00063-JWD-EWD Document 73 06/02/15 Page 5 of 14
the surgery. 22. In January 2013, Mr. Hacker was seen by a doctor at Angola. He complained to the
doctor that he could not see and that his eyesight was failing at what seems like an even greater rate than when he was first seen by the doctor. This same doctor scheduled Mr. Hacker to see an eye specialist outside Angola.
23. On or about April 2, 2013, an eye specialist at LSU Interim Hospital diagnosed Mr. Hacker as suffering from cataracts and recommended cataract extraction surgery when approved by the “prison board.” Angola was notified of this fact and the recommendation for immediate cataracts surgery in both eyes.
24. On April 2, 2013, Mr. Hacker was seen in the Ophthalmology Department at LSU Interim Hospital. There, it was determined that he suffered from blurred vision which has slowly progressed over the last “1-2 years” and visually significant cataracts. The recommended treatment was “cataract extraction when approved” and that a “specialty follow-up” was required for cataract extraction when surgery is approved. Defendants were made aware of the need for this surgery.
25. On April 2, 2013, a request for surgery was made by Interim LSU Hospital for a cataract extraction in Mr. Hacker’s right eye. The request indicated that the surgery was “medically necessary” and should be conducted “ASAP.” Defendants were aware of this recommendation; on the same date Angola medical personnel noted that Mr. Hacker should receive cataract extraction surgery when it is approved.
26. On April 2, 2013, LSU Interim Hospital personnel noted that, relative to addressing Mr. Hacker’s eyesight problems, his return for surgery would be arranged “after approval is obtained from the prison board.” Defendants were made aware of the need for the surgery.
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Case 3:14-cv-00063-JWD-EWD Document 73 06/02/15 Page 6 of 14
27. On or about May 6, 2013, Mr. Hacker made a medical emergency request while working on a field line at Angola. As a result, he saw an EMT to whom he explained that he could not see six to eight feet in his left eye and had practically no sight in his right eye. He also told the EMT that he suffered from cataracts and an eye specialist recently told him he needed surgery.
28. In response to plaintiffs request, defendants could have accommodated his disability. They could have promptly provided surgery on his cataracts. Or, they could have granted him a duty status that did not require him to work in Angola’s fields or any other dangerous area of the prison. Instead, defendants gave Mr. Hacker a duty status for three days and sent him right back to work in Angola’s fields.
29. Mr. Hacker made another emergency medical request on May 16, 2013 due to “pain and burning” in his eyes; his inability to see; and his inability to perform his work detail in the field given his disability. He also complained to Angola medical personnel that, because of his cataracts, he had blurred vision, was having trouble seeing far away, and was experiencing severe pain in his eyes when exposed to sunlight and that “his eyes were getting worse.”
30. Again, instead of choosing to accommodate Mr. Hacker’s disability, defendants gave him a temporary duty status of three days. No surgery was scheduled nor were arrangements made to remove him from field duty.
31. It was during this time that Mr. Hacker was injured while working in the field. As he explained to Angola personnel: despite his inability to see, he was assigned to work in a field line charged with stacking hay in a barn; a hay bail was thrown in his direction; his eyes could not ascertain the distance of the bail, its direction of travel, nor its location when he tried to catch it. Consequently, having failed to catch it correctly, he tore his right pectoralis muscle.
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Case 3:14-cv-00063-JWD-EWD Document 73 06/02/15 Page 7 of 14
32. On May 22, 2013, Mr. Hacker was seen by Angola medical personnel in Optometry. The Angola doctor noted that Mr. Hacker was legally blind, that he suffered from cataracts and indicated he needed a duty status consisting off “sit to work, out of field, no sports, no hobbycraft, no rodeo and no kitchen.” Moreover, Angola personnel recommended that Mr. Hacker be seen by a person outside the prison for his condition.
33. On June 26, 2013, Mr. Hacker wrote the following note to defendants: Dear Eye Clinic, This is a note to advise you that as of 6-26-2013 I still have not received my “no duty status” that you said the head doctor would have to give me. It’s been a month since you declared me legally blind. Please find out “why” I have yet to get my status. If I don’t see Doctor Collins or receive my status for “No Duty” I will be fileing [sic] a “ARP” followed by a law suit [sic], under a [sic] Eighth Amendment claim, under “Deliberate Indifference.” The simple fact that I am going blind because I have to wait on surgery, yet I have to make a fuss to get my status is truly unacceptable. Thank you for your time in this matter. /s/ Jason Hacker
(Emphasis added). 34. By July 2013, Mr. Hacker was still being forced to work in the fields. Since he had
not yet had surgery for his cataracts, he was prevented from playing the guitar, playing sports, using hobbycraft or participating in numerous other prison activities and programs. On July 2, 2013, an Angola consultant referral form indicates that Mr. Hacker was inquiring of his duty status in reference to his eyesight problems. It was noted that he was legally blind and was referred out for a cataract evaluation.
35. On July 12, 2013, he was given a duty status that entailed the following: “Regular duty with restrictions: out of field, sit to work; no kitchen duty; no sports, no hobbycraft, no rodeo X permanent.” After three days, this duty status reverted back to a permanent duty status.
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Case 3:14-cv-00063-JWD-EWD Document 73 06/02/15 Page 8 of 14
Rather than remove him from the field, where he was injured, or ameliorate his condition through surgery, the defendants chose to exclude him from various prison activities, i.e, playing sports, the rodeo, hobby craft, etc.
36. On August 21, 2013, Mr. Hacker was seen by a doctor in Ophthalmology. The doctor noted he suffered from cataracts. On the same date, Angola personnel noted that Mr. Hacker should be seen by a person outside Angola for cataracts surgery.
37. As of the fall of 2013, his duty status was listed as “sit to work, out of field, no sports, no hobbycraft, no rodeo and no kitchen.”
38. Mr. Hacker filed an ARP on August 21, 2013. The response to his ARP indicated the following:
The Physicians at [Angola] do not perform surgery on site nor do the [Angola] Physicians approve or deny appointments/surgery for specialty clinics and off-site clinics. If any type of surgery is approved, the specialty clinic will notify [Angola] of the surgery date and time and [Angola] Security will be notified to arrange transportation for you. 39. It ended with the following assurance: “Your complaints and concerns are legitimate and appreciated. Your request for cataract surgery, without further delay, is denied at the time of this response.” 40. On February 19, 2014, Angola personnel again noted Mr. Hacker’s eye problems and recommended that he see an eye specialist. 41. On March 12, 2014, Mr. Hacker was tripped out to the eye clinic at Interim LSU Hospital because of his cataracts. However, he would not receive surgery. Instead, at that visit, the doctor noted that Mr. Hacker presented with visually significant cataracts and complained of continued blurry vision and glare problems. The doctor recommended cataract removal surgery. Angola personnel was notified of this recommendation. 42. On March 12, 2014, a doctor at Interim LSU Hospital made a notation in the medical
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Case 3:14-cv-00063-JWD-EWD Document 73 06/02/15 Page 9 of 14
records indicating the following: “Will schedule surgery…Return visit to be arranged, depending on surgery date.” Also, a “specialty follow-up” was required for cataract surgery, first on the right eye and then the left eye. The form indicates that LSU should not schedule a followup. Instead, it noted, “[t]he offender’s health care provider at their facility must request ALL follow-up, if needed.” However, rather than arrange for surgery, Mr. Hacker was scheduled to return back to the eye doctor in six months – September 12, 2014 – for a simple check up.
43. Oddly enough, it was only after Mr. Hacker filed the instant suit and received counsel before defendants took any action to remove his cataracts. Mr. Hacker filed the instant suit pro se on January 30, 2014. The undersigned enrolled as counsel on June 3, 2014. At the time, Mr. Hacker’s medical records indicate that his next doctor’s visit was not to occur until September 12, 2014. Nevertheless, one month after counsel enrolled, Plaintiff was brought for surgery on his right eye on July 7, 2014 and, subsequent to the right eye’s recovery, Plaintiff was taken for surgery on his left eye on September 15, 2014, the day of the filing of his first amended complaint.
44. The delay between the medical doctor’s surgery recommendation and the surgery itself is not a “medical judgment” subject to differing opinion – it is an outright denial of medical services that caused severe pain to Mr. Hacker and excluded him from participating in prison services and programs. Mr. Hacker and several medical doctors informed defendants on many occasions about his need for surgery and they did not act despite his requests.
45. Given the defendant’s acknowledgement of his disability and his acknowledged need for surgery, defendants have violated the ADA and the Eight Amendment by delaying his access to surgery. Moreover, the delay in providing surgery resulted in a lengthy delay in the next step in Mr. hacker’s treatment, a step the physicians believed was necessary since Mr. Hacker’s
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cataracts and his eyesight had only worsened as time progressed. 46. Angola has knowledge that many prisoners must wait for unreasonably long
periods of time for cataract removal surgery. Defendants were on notice that the delay in providing cataract surgery routinely causes unreasonable pain and suffering and serves to exclude those prisoners from certain prison services, programs, or activities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Defendants refused to provide surgery to plaintiff pursuant to a policy or custom or delaying cataract removal surgery. Their actions in furtherance of this policy caused undue pain and suffering.
47. On information and belief, Angola has a policy or custom of refusing to pay for certain types of surgeries. This determination is not based on sound medical science nor is made on an individualized basis according to the particular medical condition of a specific prisoner. It is the result of a policy or custom adhered to by defendants and their agents, employees and subordinates that subjected Mr. Hacker to discrimination based on disability.
48. The actions of defendants and their agents, employees and subordinates in implementing this policy or custom constitute discrimination under the ADA and the Rehab Act. Moreover, the defendants’ agents, employees and subordinates implementation of the defendantsupervisor’s affirmative wrongful policies of delaying surgery of this type deprived Mr. Hacker of his Eighth Amendment rights against cruel and unusual punishment. Moreover, the officials’ actions in implementing a policy that is so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation effectuated on Mr. Hacker.
49. The failure of defendants to provide surgery to Mr. Hacker for over two years excluded him from prison services, programs and activities by reason of his disability in
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Case 3:14-cv-00063-JWD-EWD Document 73 06/02/15 Page 11 of 14
violation of the ADA. For example, Mr. Hacker’s duty status reads as follows: “sit to work, out of field, no sports, no hobbycraft, no rodeo and no kitchen.” This may be reasonable to accommodate a chronic, life-long disability to someone confined to prison. However, when applied to someone with a correctable disability like cataracts, this status serves to exclude the prisoner from activities enjoyed by every other prisoner in Angola. Deliberate refusal of prison officials to accommodate a prisoner’s disability-related needs in prison programs constitutes exclusion from participation in or denial of the benefits of the prison’s “services, programs, or activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. See also United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 157 (2006); Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998). VI. CAUSES OF ACTION
A. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND § 504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT.
50. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates each and every foregoing paragraph. 51. The Plaintiff is a qualified person with a disability as defined by the ADA. 52. The Defendants – the State of Louisiana, Angola, and the Department of Public Safety and Corrections – are public entities according to 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1). 53. The Defendants, through their actions described above, have:
a. discriminated against a qualified individual with a disability in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131(2) and 28 C.F.R. § 35.130; and
b. subjected Plaintiff to discrimination by reason of his disability when they refused to provide him surgery on his cataracts; and
c. subjected Plaintiff to discrimination by reason of his disability when they failed to make a reasonable accommodation in their policies, practices, or
11 	  

Case 3:14-cv-00063-JWD-EWD Document 73 06/02/15 Page 12 of 14
procedures necessary to avoid discrimination against persons with disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 and 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7); and d. subjected Plaintiff to discrimination based on his disability by excluding him from participation in or denial of the benefits of the prison’s services, programs, or activities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132; 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(i); 29 U.S.C. § 794, 28 C.F.R. § 45.503(1)(i). B. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 54. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates each and every foregoing paragraph. 55. Defendants were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s serious medical needs by refusing to pay for eye surgery for a reasonable amount of time after doctors recommended eye surgery for his cataracts; 56. Defendants knew of Plaintiff’s cataracts, and its devastating effect on his eyesight, yet by following policy or custom, delayed surgery for a significant period of time, constituting deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. 57. Defendants knew or should have known of Plaintiff’s serious medical need and were deliberately indifferent to it; 58. Defendants acted pursuant to a policy or custom of delaying surgery for certain types of disabilities like cataracts. The agents, employees and subordinates of defendants acted pursuant to this policy or custom. Hence, defendants are liable under the Eighth Amendment. 59. Defendants’ deliberate indifference caused plaintiff to experience serious pain and suffering. VII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF THEREFORE, plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court enter the following relief:
12 	  

Case 3:14-cv-00063-JWD-EWD Document 73 06/02/15 Page 13 of 14
A. Issue a permanent injunction, requirement Defendants and their agents, servants and employees, and all persons in active concert with them to institute all policies, procedures, training, and, and enjoining them from violating the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act by discriminating against Plaintiff in his utilization of Defendants’ benefits, programs, services, and activities; and
B. Enter a declaratory judgment, specifying Defendants’ statutory violations and declaring the rights of the Plaintiff as to the Defendants’ benefits, programs, services, and activities;
C. Award special damages; D. Award compensatory damages; E. Award Plaintiff its costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in this action, pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 12205, 28 C.F.R. § 35.175, and 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b); F. Order such other and further relief, at law or in equity, to which Plaintiff may be justly
entitled. Date: March 3, 2015.
Respectfully submitted,
_/s/ Nicholas Trenticosta____ NICHOLAS TRENTICOSTA Louisiana Bar No. 18475 Herrero & Trenticosta 7100 St. Charles Avenue New Orleans, LA 70118 Tel: (504) 864-0700 Fax: (504) 864-0780 Email: nicktr@bellsouth.net
13 	  

Case 3:14-cv-00063-JWD-EWD Document 73 06/02/15 Page 14 of 14
_/s/ John Adcock__________ JOHN ADCOCK Louisiana Bar No. 30372 P.O. Box 750621 New Orleans, LA 70175 Tel: (504) 233-3125 Fax: (504) 308-1266 Email: jnadcock@gmail.com
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on March 3, 2015, a copy of the Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint was filed electronically with the Clerk of Court via the CM/ECF system. Notice of this filing will be sent to all counsel of record by operation of the court’s electronic filing system.
_/s/John Adcock____________ John Adcock
14 	  

 
 U.S. District Court Middle District of Louisiana (Baton Rouge) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:14−cv−00063−JWD−EWD

CLOSED

Hacker v. Cain et al Assigned to: Judge John W. deGravelles Referred to: Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder−Doomes Related Cases: 3:13−cv−00490−JJB−EWD
3:16−cv−00842−SDD−RLB
Case in other court: 5th Circuit, 17−30879 Cause: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 01/30/2014 Date Terminated: 02/07/2017 Jury Demand: Defendant Nature of Suit: 550 Prisoner: Civil Rights Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Jason Hacker

represented by John Nelson Adcock Law Offices of John N. Adcock 3110 Canal Street New Orleans, LA 70119 Orleans (504) 233−3125 Fax: (504) 308−1266 Email: jnadcock@gmail.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nicholas J. Trenticosta 7100 St. Charles Avenue New Orleans, LA 70118 504−864−0700 Fax: 504−864−0708 Email: nicktr@bellsouth.net TERMINATED: 12/06/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Most Law Office of William Most 637 Kerlerec St. New Orleans, LA 70116 650−465−5023 Email: williammost@gmail.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Brock Most Law Office of William Most 201 St. Charles Ave Suite 114 #101 New Orleans, LA 70170 (650) 465−5023 Email: williammost@gmail.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
N. Burl Cain Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, in his official and individual capacities

represented by Andrew Blanchfield Keogh, Cox & Wilson, LTD P. O. Box 1151 701 Main Street Baton Rouge, LA 70821−1151

Defendant Dr. Rahm Singh Dr., DPS&C Medical Director TERMINATED: 09/16/2014
Defendant

225−383−3796 Fax: 225−343−9612 Email: ablanchfield@keoghcox.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Babatunde Mobolade Animashaun Louisiana Department of Justice − B.R. P.O. Box 94005 Baton Rouge, LA 70804−9005 225−326−6300 Fax: 225−326−6495 Email: anima−shaunt@ag.louisiana.gov TERMINATED: 10/22/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brent Joseph Cobb 701 Main Street Baton Rouge, LA 70802 (225) 383−3796 Email: bcobb@keoghcox.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Chelsea Acosta Payne Keogh Cox & WIlson 701 Main Street Baton Rouge, LA 70802 (225) 383−3796 Email: cpayne@keoghcox.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Crews Reynolds LeBlanc , Jr. Keogh, Cox & Wilson, Ltd. 701 Main Street Baton Rouge, LA 70802 (225) 383−3796 Email: rleblanc@keoghcox.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Grant Lloyd Willis LA Department of Justice, Office of Attorney General Post Office Box 94005 Baton Rouge, LA 70804−9005 (225) 326−6405 Fax: 225 326 6495 Email: willisg@ag.louisiana.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Andrew Blanchfield (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Babatunde Mobolade Animashaun (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/22/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by

Stephanie Lamartiniere Assistant Warden TERMINATED: 09/16/2014
Defendant Jason Collins M.D. TERMINATED: 09/16/2014
Defendant State of Louisiana TERMINATED: 02/07/2017
Defendant Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections

Andrew Blanchfield (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Babatunde Mobolade Animashaun (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/22/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Andrew Blanchfield (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Babatunde Mobolade Animashaun (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/22/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Andrew Blanchfield (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Babatunde Mobolade Animashaun (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/22/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brent Joseph Cobb (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Chelsea Acosta Payne (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Crews Reynolds LeBlanc , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Grant Lloyd Willis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Andrew Blanchfield (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Babatunde Mobolade Animashaun (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/22/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola
Defendant Bobby Jindal Governor of Louisiana, in his official and individual capacities TERMINATED: 01/23/2017

Brent Joseph Cobb (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Chelsea Acosta Payne (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Crews Reynolds LeBlanc , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Grant Lloyd Willis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Andrew Blanchfield (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Babatunde Mobolade Animashaun (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/22/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brent Joseph Cobb (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Chelsea Acosta Payne (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Crews Reynolds LeBlanc , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Grant Lloyd Willis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Andrew Blanchfield (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Babatunde Mobolade Animashaun (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/22/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brent Joseph Cobb (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Chelsea Acosta Payne (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant James M. LeBlanc Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, In his official and individual capacities
Defendant John Bel Edwards Governor of Louisiana, in his official and individual capacities TERMINATED: 02/07/2017

Crews Reynolds LeBlanc , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Andrew Blanchfield (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Babatunde Mobolade Animashaun (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/22/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brent Joseph Cobb (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Chelsea Acosta Payne (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Crews Reynolds LeBlanc , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Grant Lloyd Willis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Andrew Blanchfield (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brent Joseph Cobb (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Chelsea Acosta Payne (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Crews Reynolds LeBlanc , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 01/30/2014
01/30/2014 01/31/2014

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against N. Burl Cain, Jason Collins, Stephanie Lamartiniere, Rahm Singh filed by Jason Hacker. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment)(SMG) (Entered: 01/31/2014)
2 MOTION to Proceed In Forma Pauperis with Statement of Account by Jason Hacker. (SMG) (Entered: 01/31/2014)
MOTION(S) REFERRED: 2 MOTION to Proceed In Forma Pauperis with Statement of Account. This motion is now pending before the USMJ. (SMG) (Entered: 01/31/2014)

01/31/2014
01/31/2014
01/31/2014 02/19/2014 02/28/2014 03/25/2014 03/25/2014 03/25/2014 03/25/2014 05/19/2014 06/02/2014 06/02/2014
06/03/2014
06/03/2014 06/03/2014

3 ORDER granting 2 Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. It is ordered that the plaintiff pay an initial partial filing fee of $34.97 in accordance with 28 USC 1915. A copy of this order shall be sent to the plaintiff and to Centralized Inmate Banking. Filing Fee due by 2/24/2014.. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger on 01/31/2014. (NLT) (Entered: 01/31/2014)
4 ORDER: USM is to serve the defendants wherever found. Within 90 days of the date of this order, the parties shall file cross motions for summary judgment as provided under Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P. All discovery requests and responses shall be filed in the record of this matter.. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger on 01/31/2014. (NLT) (Entered: 01/31/2014)
5 Summons Issued as to N. Burl Cain, Jason Collins, Stephanie Lamartiniere, Rahm Singh. (Summons submitted to the USM for service.) (NLT) (Entered: 01/31/2014)
Filing fee: $ 34.97, receipt number 4699022457 (TMR) (Entered: 02/19/2014)
6 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Jason Hacker. N. Burl Cain served on 2/28/2014, answer due 3/21/2014; Jason Collins served on 2/28/2014, answer due 3/21/2014; Stephanie Lamartiniere served on 2/28/2014, answer due 3/21/2014; Rahm Singh served on 2/28/2014, answer due 3/21/2014. (US Marshal, ) (Entered: 02/28/2014)
7 ANSWER to 1 Complaint with Jury Demand by N. Burl Cain, Jason Collins, Stephanie Lamartiniere, Rahm Singh.(Animashaun, Babatunde) (Entered: 03/25/2014)
8 MOTION for Extension of Time, MOTION for Extension of Discovery Deadlines by N. Burl Cain, Jason Collins, Stephanie Lamartiniere, Rahm Singh. (Animashaun, Babatunde) (Entered: 03/25/2014)
MOTION(S) REFERRED: 8 MOTION for Extension of Time MOTION for Extension of Discovery Deadlines . This motion is now pending before the USMJ. (NLT) (Entered: 03/25/2014)
9 ORDER granting 8 Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery and file Cross Motions for Summary Judgment. Discovery and Cross Motion for Summary Judgment shall be filed by 6/23/2014. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger on 03/25/2014. (NLT) (Entered: 03/25/2014)
Confirmation of receipt of payment from JASON HACKER in the amount of $10. Transaction posted on 5/15/2014. Receipt number LAMDDC1074 processed by Finance Import. (NLT ADI, ) (Entered: 05/19/2014)
10 Ex Parte MOTION to Enroll Nicholas Trenticosta and John Adcock as Attorney for Plaintiff by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Adcock, John) (Entered: 06/02/2014)
11 First MOTION for Extension of Time To Extend Deadlines for Completion of Discovery and Filing of Dispositive Motions, MOTION/Request for the Parties to Exchange Initial Disclosures and MOTION/Request for a Pretrial Conference in order to Facilitate the Issuance of a Scheduling Order by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Adcock, John). Added MOTION or the Parties to Exchange Initial Disclosures, MOTION for Pretrial Conference on 6/3/2014 (NLT). (Entered: 06/02/2014)
MOTION(S) REFERRED: 11 First MOTION for Extension of Time To Extend Deadlines for Completion of Discovery and Filing of Dispositive Motions, Request for the Parties to Exchange Initial Disclosures and Request for a Pretrial Conference in order to Facilitate the Issuance of a, 10 Ex Parte MOTION to Enroll Nicholas Trenticosta and John Adcock as Attorney for Plaintiff. This motion is now pending before the USMJ. (NLT) (Entered: 06/03/2014)
12 ORDER granting 10 Motion to Enroll as Attorney. Added attorney Nicholas J. Trenticosta and John Adcock for Jason Hacker. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger on 06/03/2014. (NLT) (Entered: 06/03/2014)
13 ORDER granting 11 MOTION To Extend Deadlines for Completion of Discovery and Filing of Dispositive Motions, Request for the Parties to Exchange Initial Disclosures and Request for a Pretrial Conference in Order to Facilitate the Issuance of a Scheduling Order. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger on 06/03/2014.

06/05/2014 06/20/2014 07/18/2014 07/28/2014 08/05/2014
08/13/2014 08/13/2014 08/13/2014 08/27/2014 09/15/2014 10/03/2014 10/21/2014

(NLT) (Entered: 06/03/2014)
14 90−DAY CONFERENCE ORDER: Scheduling Conference set for 8/5/2014 at 11:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger. Status Report due by 7/29/2014. The parties may participate by phone. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger on 6/5/14. (BNW) Modified on 6/5/2014 (BNW). (Entered: 06/05/2014)
Confirmation of receipt of payment from JASON HACKER in the amount of $10. Transaction posted on 6/13/2014. Receipt number LAMDDC1099 processed by Finance Import. (NLT ADI, ) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
Confirmation of receipt of payment from JASON HACKER in the amount of $15. Transaction posted on 7/17/2014. Receipt number LAMDDC1123 processed by Finance Import. (NLT ADI, ) (Entered: 07/18/2014)
15 Joint STATUS REPORT by All Plaintiffs. (Adcock, John) Modified to edit text on 7/28/2014 (SMG). (Entered: 07/28/2014)
16 Minute Entry/Scheduling Order and Order Setting Status Conference for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger: Scheduling Conference held on 8/5/2014. Amended Pleadings due by 9/15/2014. Discovery due by 5/4/2015. Discovery from Experts due by 5/4/2015. Plaintiff's Expert Witness List due by 12/1/2014. Defendant's Expert Witness List due by 1/5/2015. Plaintiff's Expert Reports due by 2/2/2015. Defendant's Expert Reports due by 3/2/2015. Motions In Limine shall be filed by 1/22/2016. Responses to Motions In Limine shall be filed by 2/12/2016. Affidavit of Settlement Efforts due by 2/19/2016. Joint jury instructions, voir dire, verdict forms, and trial briefs due by 2/26/2016. Dispositive Motions shall be filed by 6/1/2015. Daubert Motions shall be filed by 8/21/2015. Proposed Pretrial Order due by 12/21/2015. Pretrial Conference set for 1/14/2016 at 01:30 PM in chambers before Chief Judge Brian A. Jackson. Jury Trial set for 3/28/2016 to 3/31/2016 at 09:00 AM in Courtroom 2 before Chief Judge Brian A. Jackson. This case is assigned for a status conference on 10/31/2014 at 11:00 am. (SMG) Modified to add status conference date on 8/13/2014 (SMG). (Entered: 08/12/2014)
Confirmation of receipt of payment from JASON HACKER in the amount of $22. Transaction posted on 8/12/2014. Receipt number LAMDDC1135 processed by Finance Import. (NLT ADI, ) (Entered: 08/13/2014)
Set/Reset Deadlines/Hearings: (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry) Status Conference set for 10/31/2014 at 11:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger. (SMG) (Entered: 08/13/2014)
17 This case is reassigned to Judge John W. deGravelles. Chief Judge Brian A. Jackson no longer assigned to the case.. Signed by Chief Judge Brian A. Jackson on 8/13/2014. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.)(NLT ADI, ) (Entered: 08/13/2014)
18 Notice to Counsel: Jury Trial set for 3/28/2016 at 9:00 AM in Courtroom 1 before Judge John W. deGravelles. Pretrial Conference set for 1/14/2016 at 1:30 PM in chambers before Judge John W. deGravelles. All deadlines previously set remain unchanged. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (KDC) (Entered: 08/27/2014)
19 First AMENDED COMPLAINT against State of Louisiana, Louisiana Department Of Corrections and Public Safety, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, Bobby Jindal, James M. LeBlanc, filed by Jason Hacker.(Adcock, John) Modified to edit text on 9/16/2014 (SMG). (Entered: 09/15/2014)
Confirmation of receipt of payment from JASON HACKER in the amount of $14. Transaction posted on 9/29/2014. Receipt number LAMDDC1161 processed by Finance Import. (NLT ADI, ) (Entered: 10/03/2014)
Confirmation of receipt of payment from JASON HACKER in the amount of $28. Transaction posted on 10/20/2014. Receipt number LAMDDC1171 processed by Finance Import. (NLT ADI, ) (Entered: 10/21/2014)

10/31/2014
11/21/2014 11/26/2014 12/01/2014 12/01/2014 12/11/2014 12/11/2014
12/12/2014 12/22/2014
01/14/2015 01/16/2015 01/16/2015 01/16/2015
01/20/2015

20 Minute Entry/Scheduling Conference Report and Order Setting Status Conference for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger: Status Conference held on 10/31/2014. Telephone Conference set for 12/12/2014 at 11:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger. The purpose of the conference is to review the progress of discovery and address any discovery issues which may arise. If all counsel agree that there are no discovery issues to address and the conference is not needed, they shall so advise the court and the conference will be canceled. (SMG) Modified on 11/12/2014 (BNW). (Entered: 10/31/2014)
Confirmation of receipt of payment from JASON HACKER in the amount of $21. Transaction posted on 11/20/2014. Receipt number LAMDDC1312 processed by Finance Import. (NLT ADI, ) (Entered: 11/21/2014)
21 First MOTION for Extension of Time Extend Deadlines Relative to Expert Discovery by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support)(Adcock, John) (Entered: 11/26/2014)
MOTION(S) REFERRED: 21 First MOTION for Extension of Time Extend Deadlines Relative to Expert Discovery. This motion is now pending before the USMJ. (LLH) (Entered: 12/01/2014)
22 RULING denying 21 Motion to Extend Expert Discovery Deadlines. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger on 12/1/2014. (LLH) (Entered: 12/01/2014)
23 Letter dated 12/11/2014 from John Adcock to Judge Riedlinger Re: Request to cancel and reset status conference set for 12/12/2014. (LLH) (Entered: 12/11/2014)
24 Notice to Counsel: As provided in the 20 Order Setting Status Conference, counsel advised the court by 23 letter dated 12/11/2014 that the conference is not needed. Therefore the 12/12/2014 status conference is canceled and another status conference will be scheduled for January. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.)(Riedlinger, Stephen) (Entered: 12/11/2014)
Confirmation of receipt of payment from JASON HACKER in the amount of $15. Transaction posted on 12/11/2014. Receipt number LAMDDC1332 processed by Finance Import. (NLT ADI, ) (Entered: 12/12/2014)
25 Notice to Counsel: Telephone Status Conference set for 1/23/2015 at 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger. The court will place the calls. The purpose of the conference is to review the progress of discovery and address any discovery issues which may arise. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.)(Riedlinger, Stephen) (Entered: 12/22/2014)
Confirmation of receipt of payment from JASON HACKER in the amount of $29. Transaction posted on 1/13/2015. Receipt number LAMDDC1348 processed by Finance Import. (NLT ADI, ) (Entered: 01/14/2015)
26 MOTION to Amend Deadlines Realtive to Expert Discovery by N. Burl Cain, Jason Collins, Stephanie Lamartiniere, Rahm Singh. (Animashaun, Babatunde) Modified on 1/16/2015 to edit text (LLH). (Entered: 01/16/2015)
MOTION(S) REFERRED: 26 MOTION for Extension of Discovery Deadlines. This motion is now pending before the USMJ. (LLH) (Entered: 01/16/2015)
27 ORDER granting 26 Motion to Amend Deadlines Relative to Expert Discovery. The deadline for the defendants to identify their expert witnesses is retroactively extended to 1/13/2015 for the purpose of identifying Dr. Peter K. Kastil as an expert witness. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger on 1/16/2015. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (Riedlinger, Stephen) (Entered: 01/16/2015)
28 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to Modify the Deadline for Plaintiffs Expert to Produce His Report by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I)(Adcock, John). Modified to rotate pages on 1/21/2015 (BCL). (Entered: 01/20/2015)

01/21/2015 01/23/2015
01/27/2015
03/02/2015 03/03/2015
03/04/2015 03/10/2015
03/11/2015
03/11/2015 03/12/2015
03/12/2015 03/12/2015 03/12/2015 03/12/2015 03/12/2015 03/12/2015 03/12/2015

MOTION(S) REFERRED: 28 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to Modify the Deadline for Plaintiffs Expert to Produce His Report . This motion is now pending before the USMJ. (BCL) (Entered: 01/21/2015)
29 Minute Entry/Status Conference Report and Order Setting Status Conference for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger: Telephone Status Conference held on 1/23/2015. Counsel advised the court on the progress of discovery. Counsel agree on a modification of the current deadline for the plaintiff to produce his experts report. The court will issue a separate Amended Scheduling Order. Counsel agreed that another status conference would be helpful. Telephone Status Conference set for 4/2/2015 at 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger. (SMG) Modified to edit typo on 1/27/2015 (SMG). (Entered: 01/23/2015)
30 AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER: In accordance with the Status Conference Report issued 01/23/2015, the Scheduling Order previously issued is hereby amended. Plaintiff`s Expert Reports due by 2/16/2015. This case remains assigned for a telephone status conference on April 2, 2015 at 10:00 a.m. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger on 01/27/2015. (BCL) (Entered: 01/27/2015)
Confirmation of receipt of payment from JASON HACKER in the amount of $14. Transaction posted on 3/2/2015. Receipt number LAMDDC1364 processed by Finance Import. (NLT ADI, ) (Entered: 03/02/2015)
31 First MOTION for Leave of Court to File Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Proposed Pleading; Second Amended Complaint)(Adcock, John) Modified on 3/10/2015 to edit text(LLH). (Entered: 03/03/2015)
MOTION(S) REFERRED: 31 First MOTION for Leave of Court to File Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint . This motion is now pending before the USMJ. (LLH) Modified on 3/10/2015 to edit text (LLH). (Entered: 03/04/2015)
32 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to 31 MOTION for Leave to Modify the Scheduling Order and File Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint filed by N. Burl Cain. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support Memo in support of Motion)(Animashaun, Babatunde) Modified on 3/10/2015 to edit text (LLH). (Entered: 03/10/2015)
33 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE : Plaintiff Jason Hacker show cause, in writing, on 3/27/2015 why his claims against defendants the State of Louisiana, the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, the Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal and Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections James M. LeBlanc should not be dismissed pursuant to Rule 4(m) for failure to timely serve the defendants. A written response to this order is required; no oral argument will be heard. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger on 3/11/2015. (LLH) (Entered: 03/11/2015)
34 RULING denying 31 MOTION for Leave of Court to File to File Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger on 3/11/2015. (LLH) (Entered: 03/11/2015)
35 MOTION to Dismiss 19 First Amended Complaint by N. Burl Cain. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support Memo in support of Motion to Dismiss)(Animashaun, Babatunde) Modified to edit text on 3/13/2015 (BCL). Modified on 4/10/2015 to reopen the motion (JDL). (Entered: 03/12/2015)
36 Summons Submitted (Adcock, John) (Entered: 03/12/2015)
37 Summons Submitted (Adcock, John) (Entered: 03/12/2015)
38 Summons Submitted (Adcock, John) (Entered: 03/12/2015)
39 Summons Submitted (Adcock, John) (Entered: 03/12/2015)
40 Summons Submitted (Adcock, John) (Entered: 03/12/2015)
41 Summons Submitted (Adcock, John) (Entered: 03/12/2015)
42 Summons Submitted (Adcock, John) (Entered: 03/12/2015)

03/13/2015 03/13/2015
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03/24/2015 03/25/2015
03/25/2015 03/26/2015

MOTION(S) REFERRED: 35 MOTION to Dismiss 19 First Amended Complaint. This motion is now pending before the USMJ. (BCL) (Entered: 03/13/2015)
43 Summons Issued as to N. Burl Cain, Bobby Jindal, James M. LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, State of Louisiana. (NOTICE: Counsel shall print and serve both the summons and all attachments in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4.) (BCL) (Entered: 03/13/2015)
Motions No Longer Referred: 35 MOTION to Dismiss First Amended Complaint. This motion is now pending before the USDJ. (BCL) (Entered: 03/13/2015)
44 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Jason Hacker. All Defendants. (Adcock, John) Modified to rotate pages on 3/17/2015 (SMG). (Entered: 03/16/2015)
MOTION(S) REFERRED: 35 MOTION to Dismiss First Amended Complaint. This motion is now pending before the USMJ. (NLT) (Entered: 03/18/2015)
Motions No Longer Referred: 35 MOTION to Dismiss First Amended Complaint. This motion is now pending before the USDJ. (NLT) (Entered: 03/18/2015)
45 ORDER REFERRING MOTION to USMJ: 35 MOTION to Dismiss First Amended Complaint filed by N. Burl Cain. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 03/20/2015. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.)(KDC) (Entered: 03/20/2015)
46 RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE regarding 33 Order to Show Cause,, and, Alternatively, Request for Extension of Time to Serve Defendants, Who Were Served on March 16, 2015 filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E)(Adcock, John) (Attachment 3 replaced on 3/24/2015 to correct document orientation) (JDL). (Entered: 03/23/2015)
47 Additional Exhibits to 46 Response to Order to Show Cause, by All Plaintiffs. filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit F, # 2 Exhibit G1, # 3 Exhibit G2, # 4 Exhibit H, # 5 Exhibit I)(Adcock, John) (Entered: 03/23/2015)
Confirmation of receipt of payment from JASON HACKER in the amount of $17.53. Transaction posted on 3/23/2015. Receipt number LAMDDC1399 processed by Finance Import. (NLT ADI, ) (Entered: 03/24/2015)
48 MOTION for Extension of Time to Serve Defendants Who Where Served on 3/16/2015 by Jason Hacker. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support)(Adcock, John) Modified to edit text on 3/24/2015 (BCL). (Entered: 03/24/2015)
49 MOTION to Dismiss 19 First Amended Complaint by N. Burl Cain, Bobby Jindal, James M. LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, State of Louisiana. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support Memo in support of MTD)(Animashaun, Babatunde) Modified to edit text on 3/24/2015 (BCL). Modified on 4/10/2015 to reopen the motion (JDL). (Entered: 03/24/2015)
MOTION(S) REFERRED: 48 MOTION for Extension of Time to Serve Defendants Who Where Served on 3/16/2015. This motion is now pending before the USMJ. (BCL) (Entered: 03/24/2015)
50 NOTICE Regarding 33 Order to Show Cause and RULING on 48 Motion for Extension of Time to Serve Defendants: The Motion for Extension of Time to Serve Defendants Who Were Served on 3/16/2015 is denied without prejudice to the plaintiff asserting his arguments in response to the defendants' 49 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger on 3/25/2015. (LLH) (Entered: 03/25/2015)
51 OBJECTION to a Magistrate Judge's Order (Rule 72a) by All Plaintiffs filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D)(Adcock, John) Modified on 3/26/2015 to rotate and replace exhibit c (LLH). (Entered: 03/25/2015)
52 ORDER REFERRING MOTION to USMJ: 49 MOTION to Dismiss 19 First Amended Complaint filed by Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, Louisiana

03/27/2015 04/02/2015
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04/09/2015
04/09/2015

Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, James M. LeBlanc, N. Burl Cain, Bobby Jindal, State of Louisiana. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 03/26/2015. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.)(KDC) (Entered: 03/26/2015)
53 NOTICE of Briefing Schedule on 51 OBJECTION to a Magistrate Judge's Order (Rule 72a) by All Plaintiffs : A response to the 51 OBJECTION to the Magistrate Judge's Order (Rule 72a) may be filed within 14 days after being served with the objection. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.)(KDC) (Entered: 03/27/2015)
54 Minute Entry/Amended Scheduling Order for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger: Telephone Conference held on 4/2/2015. Discovery from Experts due by 5/19/2015. Discovery due by 5/19/2015. Motions shall be filed by 6/30/2015. Telephone Status Conference set for 6/12/2015 at 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger. The court will place the calls. If all counsel agree that there are no discovery issues to address and the conference is not needed, they shall so advise the court and the conference will be canceled. (BCL) (Entered: 04/02/2015)
55 RESPONSE in Opposition to 35 MOTION to Dismiss First Amended Complaint filed by All Plaintiffs. (Adcock, John) (Entered: 04/02/2015)
56 MOTION for Extension of Time to Hold the Motions to Dismiss in Abeyance Until The District Court's Ruling on the Motion for Leave to File the Second Amended Complaint by Jason Hacker. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support)(Adcock, John) (Entered: 04/08/2015)
57 First MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response to 49 MOTION to Dismiss 19 First Amended Complaint by Jason Hacker. (Adcock, John) (Entered: 04/08/2015)
58 NOTICE Regarding Plaintiff's 56 Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Motions to Dismiss, and Plaintiff's 57 Motion to Extend the Deadlines to Respond to the Second Motion to Dismsis by Jason Hacker (Adcock, John) Modified to edit text on 4/9/2015 (SMG). (Entered: 04/09/2015)
MOTION(S) REFERRED: 56 MOTION for Extension of Time to Hold the Motions to Dismiss in Abeyance Until The District Court's Ruling on the Motion for Leave to File the Second Amended Complaint. This motion is now pending before the USMJ. (LLH) (Entered: 04/09/2015)
MOTION(S) REFERRED: 57 First MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response to 49 MOTION to Dismiss 19 First Amended Complaint . This motion is now pending before the USMJ. (LLH) (Entered: 04/09/2015)
59 ORDER granting 56 Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint Until the Court Rules on the Motion to File the Second Amended Complaint. Issuance of magistrate judge's reports on the 35 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint and the 49 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint are deferred until after the district judge rules on the 51 Plaintiff's Objections to the Ruling on Motion to File a Second Amended Complaint by the Magistrate Judge. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger on 4/9/2015. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (Riedlinger, Stephen) (Entered: 04/09/2015)
60 ORDER granting 57 Motion to Extend the Deadline for Plaintiff to Respond to the Second Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff's response to the defendants' 49 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint is due by 5/18/2015. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger on 4/9/2015. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (Riedlinger, Stephen) (Entered: 04/09/2015)
61 ORDER granting 49 Motion to Dismiss 19 First Amended Complaint. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 04/09/2015. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (KDC) (Entered: 04/09/2015)

04/09/2015 04/10/2015
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05/19/2015
05/19/2015
05/20/2015 05/20/2015 05/29/2015

62 ORDER granting 35 Motion to Dismiss 19 First Amended Complaint. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 04/09/2015. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (KDC) (Entered: 04/09/2015)
63 ORDER Vacating 61 Order on Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, 62 Order on Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. The Court will issue a ruling on these motions at the appropiate time. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 04/10/2015. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.)(KDC) (Entered: 04/10/2015)
Set/Reset Deadlines as to 49 MOTION to Dismiss 19 First Amended Complaint. (JDL) Modified on 4/10/2015 to edit text (JDL). (Entered: 04/10/2015)
Set/Reset Deadlines. (JDL) (Entered: 04/10/2015)
Confirmation of receipt of payment from JASON HACKER in the amount of $17.61. Transaction posted on 4/17/2015. Receipt number LAMDDC1420 processed by Finance Import. (NLT ADI, ) (Entered: 04/24/2015)
64 Notice to Counsel: Telephone Conference set for 6/2/2015 at 9:30 AM before Judge John W. deGravelles. Counsel shall call the Court @ 225−389−3568 for the conference call. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.)(KDC) (Entered: 05/15/2015)
Confirmation of receipt of payment from JASON HACKER in the amount of $12.63. Transaction posted on 5/15/2015. Receipt number LAMDDC1443 processed by Finance Import. (NLT ADI, ) (Entered: 05/15/2015)
65 Second MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response to 49 MOTION to Dismiss 19 First Amended Complaint, 57 First MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response to 49 MOTION to Dismiss 19 First Amended Complaint by All Plaintiffs. (Adcock, John) (Entered: 05/18/2015)
66 NOTICE Regarding Defendants do not Oppose 65 Second MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response to 49 Second MOTION to Dismiss (Adcock, John) (Entered: 05/18/2015) (Entered: 05/18/2015)
67 ORDER granting 65 Second Motion to Extend of Time for Plaintiff to Respond to the Second Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff's response to the 49 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint will be due 15 days after the district judge rules on the 51 Plaintiff's Objections to the Ruling on Motion to File a Second Amended Complaint by the Magistrate Judge. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger on 5/18/2015. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (Riedlinger, Stephen) (Entered: 05/18/2015)
68 Notice to Counsel: The telephone conference previously set has been converted to an in−person status conference. Status Conference set for 6/2/2015 at 9:30 AM in chambers before Judge John W. deGravelles. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (KDC) (Entered: 05/19/2015)
69 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to file Motions to Compel by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F, # 8 Exhibit G, # 9 Exhibit H, # 10 Exhibit I, # 11 Exhibit J, # 12 Exhibit K, # 13 Exhibit L)(Adcock, John) (Entered: 05/19/2015)
MOTION(S) REFERRED: 69 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to file Motions to Compel. This motion is now pending before the USMJ. (LLH) (Entered: 05/20/2015)
70 ORDER granting 69 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to file Motions to Compel. Motions to compel fact discovery due by 6/18/2015. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger on 05/20/2015. (BCL) (Entered: 05/20/2015)
71 MOTION to Determine the Sufficiency of DEFENDANT'S RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, #

06/01/2015 06/02/2015
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06/16/2015 06/16/2015 06/16/2015
06/16/2015

6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F, # 8 Exhibit G)(Adcock, John) Modified to edit text on 6/1/2015 (BCL). (Entered: 05/29/2015)
MOTION(S) REFERRED: 71 MOTION to Determine the Sufficiency of DEFENDANT'S RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION. This motion is now pending before the USMJ. (BCL) (Entered: 06/01/2015)
72 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge John W. deGravelles: Status Conference held on 6/2/2015. Parties updated the Court on the status. Counsel presented arguments on objections to the 34 Ruling. 31 Motion for Leave to file Second Amended Complaint is granted. Court notes for the record two pending motions to dismiss. Court grants leave of court to submit a proposed amended scheduling Order. (BCL) (Entered: 06/02/2015)
73 Second AMENDED COMPLAINT against N. Burl Cain, Bobby Jindal, James M. LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, State of Louisiana filed by Jason Hacker.(BCL) (Entered: 06/02/2015)
74 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by Jason Hacker. Bobby Jindal waiver sent on 6/8/2015, answer due 8/7/2015. (Adcock, John) (Entered: 06/10/2015)
75 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by Jason Hacker. James M. LeBlanc waiver sent on 6/9/2015, answer due 8/10/2015. (Adcock, John) (Entered: 06/10/2015)
81 Minute Entry/Amended Scheduling Order/Order Setting Status Conference for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger: Telephone Conference held on 6/12/2015. After discussion of discovery issues it was determined the Counsel for the Plaintiff will file a motion for protective order. After entry of protective order, the defendants will promptly serve supplemental discovery responses to those discovery requests which sought medical records. Fact Discovery due by 7/6/2015. Telephone Conference set for 7/10/2015 at 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger. (LLH) (Entered: 06/16/2015)
76 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff's 2nd Amended Complaint by N. Burl Cain, James M. LeBlanc. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support Memo in support of MTD 2nd Amended Complaint)(Animashaun, Babatunde) Modified on 6/16/2015 to edit text. (ELW). (Entered: 06/15/2015)
77 Letter to Judge deGravelles Dated 6/15/15 regarding scheduling by Jason Hacker (Adcock, John) Modified to edit text on 6/16/2015 (BCL). (Entered: 06/15/2015)
78 NOTICE of Briefing Schedule on 76 MOTION to Dismiss : Opposition to the motion shall be filed within 21 days from the filing of the motion and shall not exceed 10 pages excluding attachments. The mover may file a reply brief within 14 days of the filing of the opposition and shall be limited to a total of 5 pages. No motion for leave will be required. Sur−Reply briefs will be permitted only with leave of Court for extraordinary reasons supported by sufficient facts. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (KDC) (Entered: 06/16/2015)
79 Summons Submitted (Attachments: # 1 State of Louisiana Summons, # 2 LeBlanc (Official) Summons, # 3 DOC Summons, # 4 Cain (Official) Summons, # 5 Angola Summons)(Adcock, John) (Entered: 06/16/2015)
80 Summons Submitted (Adcock, John) (Entered: 06/16/2015)
82 Summons Issued as to N. Burl Cain, James M. LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, State of Louisiana. (NOTICE: Counsel shall print and serve both the summons and all attachments in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4.) (ELW) (Entered: 06/16/2015)
83 Summons Issued as to Bobby Jindal. (NOTICE: Counsel shall print and serve both the summons and all attachments in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4.) (ELW) (Entered: 06/16/2015)

06/23/2015 06/24/2015 06/24/2015 06/24/2015 06/24/2015 06/24/2015 06/24/2015 06/29/2015 06/29/2015
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07/06/2015 07/07/2015
07/07/2015

84 Summons Submitted (Adcock, John) (Entered: 06/23/2015)
85 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Jason Hacker. James M. LeBlanc served on 6/24/2015, answer due 8/10/2015. (Adcock, John) (Entered: 06/24/2015)
86 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Jason Hacker. N. Burl Cain served on 6/24/2015, answer due 7/15/2015. (Adcock, John) (Entered: 06/24/2015)
87 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Jason Hacker. Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola served on 6/24/2015, answer due 7/15/2015. (Adcock, John) (Entered: 06/24/2015)
88 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Jason Hacker. State of Louisiana served on 6/24/2015, answer due 7/15/2015. (Adcock, John) (Entered: 06/24/2015)
89 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Jason Hacker. Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections served on 6/24/2015, answer due 7/15/2015. (Adcock, John) (Entered: 06/24/2015)
90 Summons Issued as to Bobby Jindal. (NOTICE: Counsel shall print and serve both the summons and all attachments in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4.) (BCL) (Entered: 06/24/2015)
Confirmation of receipt of payment from JASON HACKER in the amount of $32. Transaction posted on 6/18/2015. Receipt number LAMDDC1464 processed by Finance Import. (NLT ADI, ) (Entered: 06/29/2015)
91 AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER: Motions to dismiss Plaintiff's 2nd Amended Complaint shall be filed by 6/16/2015. Opposition to any Motions to Dismiss the second amended complaint shall be filed by 6/30/2015. Summary Judgment Motions for all parties shall be filed by 9/17/2015. Daubert Motions shall be filed by 11/16/2015. All other deadlines remain unchanged. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 6/29/2015. (LLH) (Entered: 06/29/2015)
Set/Reset Deadlines. (LLH) (Entered: 06/29/2015)
92 MOTION to Dismiss by N. Burl Cain, James M. LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, State of Louisiana. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support Memo in support of MTD)(Animashaun, Babatunde) (Entered: 06/30/2015)
93 MOTION to Amend Deadline to File Opposition to 92 MOTION to Dismiss by All Plaintiffs. (Trenticosta, Nicholas) Modified on 7/1/2015 to edit text(ELW). (Entered: 06/30/2015)
94 ORDER granting 93 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response to 92 MOTION to Dismiss and 76 MOTION to Dismiss...Opposition due by 7/21/2015. The Court notes that the mover may file a reply brief within 14 days of the filing of the opposition and shall be limited to a total of 5 pages. No motion for leave will be required.. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 07/01/2015. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (KDC) (Entered: 07/01/2015)
95 Motion for Leave of Court to Extend the Deadline to File Motion to Compel by All Plaintiffs. (Trenticosta, Nicholas) Modified to edit text on 7/7/2015 (BCL). (Entered: 07/06/2015)
96 AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER: The 95 Motion for Leave of Court to Extend the Deadline to File Motion to Compel is Granted. All fact discover shall be completed, and motion to compel fact discovery shall be filed by 7/26/2015. A Telephone Status Conference is set for 7/10/2015 at 10:00 AM. The court will place the calls. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger on 07/06/2015. (BCL) (Entered: 07/07/2015)
97 MOTION for Leave to File a Memorandum in Excess of the Page Limitations Imposed by Local Rule 7(g) to 76 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff's 2nd Amended Complaint by Jason Hacker. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Proposed Pleading;)(Adcock, John) Modified to edit text and add docket relationship on 7/8/2015 (BCL). (Entered: 07/07/2015)

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07/27/2015 07/27/2015

98 Joint MOTION for Entry of Protective Order by Jason Hacker. (Attachments: # 1 Joint Protective Order)(Adcock, John) Modified on 7/9/2015 to edit text (LLH). (Entered: 07/08/2015)
99 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Jason Hacker. Bobby Jindal served on 7/2/2015, answer due 8/7/2015. (Adcock, John) (Entered: 07/08/2015)
100 ORDER granting 98 JOINT Motion for Protective Order. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 07/09/2015. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (KDC) (Entered: 07/09/2015)
101 ORDER granting 97 MOTION for Leave to File a Memorandum in Excess of the Page Limitations. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 07/09/2015. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (KDC) (Entered: 07/09/2015)
102 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to 76 MOTION to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint filed by Jason Hacker. (NLT) (Entered: 07/13/2015)
110 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger: Telephone Status Conference held on 7/10/2015. Counsel advised the court on the progress of discovery. If the plaintiff believes the information obtained during the deposition was insufficient, a motion to compel further deposition testimony may be filed. (BCL) (Entered: 07/27/2015)
103 MOTION for Oral Argument on 76 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint by Jason Hacker. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support)(Adcock, John) Modified on 7/14/2015 to edit text (LLH). (Entered: 07/13/2015)
104 MOTION to Adopt 92 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, James M. LeBlanc, N. Burl Cain, State of Louisiana, 76 MOTION to Dismiss filed by James M. LeBlanc, N. Burl Cain by Bobby Jindal. (Animashaun, Babatunde) (Entered: 07/13/2015)
105 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to 103 MOTION for Oral Argument on 102 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion, 76 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint filed by N. Burl Cain, Bobby Jindal, James M. LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, State of Louisiana. (Animashaun, Babatunde) (Entered: 07/13/2015)
106 ORDER granting 103 Motion for Oral Argument as to 76 MOTION to Dismiss . Motion Hearing set for 8/20/2015 at 09:00 AM in Courtroom 1 before Judge John W. deGravelles.. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 07/14/2015. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (JHF) (Entered: 07/14/2015)
Confirmation of receipt of payment from JASON HACKER in the amount of $18.65. Transaction posted on 7/10/2015. Receipt number LAMDDC1485 processed by Finance Import. (NLT ADI, ) (Entered: 07/15/2015)
107 ORDER granting 104 Motion to Adopt 76 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff's 2nd Amended Complaint and 92 MOTION to Dismiss, filed by the Honorable Bobby Jindal. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 7/20/2015. (LLH) (Entered: 07/20/2015)
108 MOTION to Extend the Deadline to File Motions to Compel by Jason Hacker. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Proposed Order)(Adcock, John) Modified to edit text on 7/27/2015 (BCL). (Entered: 07/26/2015)
MOTION(S) REFERRED: 108 MOTION to Extend the Deadline to File Motions to Compel. This motion is now pending before the USMJ. (BCL) (Entered: 07/27/2015)
109 AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER: In accordance with FRCP 16(b), the following discovery deadlines are established. The Amended Scheduling Order previously issued is hereby further amended as follows. Motions to compel fact discovery shall be filed, by August 14, 2015. (The deadline to complete fact discovery is expired.) Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger on 7/27/2015. (BCL) (Entered: 07/27/2015)

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111 NOTICE of Hearing on Motion 76 MOTION to Dismiss (TIME CHANGE ONLY) :Motion Hearing set for 8/20/2015 at 9:30 AM in Courtroom 1 before Judge John W. deGravelles. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (KDC) (Entered: 07/30/2015)
112 MOTION to Extend the Deadline to File a Motion to Compel by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G)(Adcock, John) Modified on 8/17/2015 to edit text (LLH). (Entered: 08/14/2015)
MOTION(S) REFERRED: 112 MOTION for Extension of Time Deadline to File a Motion to Compel. This motion is now pending before the USMJ. (LLH) (Entered: 08/17/2015)
113 AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER: The 112 Motion to Extend the Deadline to File Motionsto Compel. Motions to compel fact discovery shall be filed, by September 10, 2015. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger on 8/18/2015. (BCL) (Entered: 08/18/2015)
Set/Reset Scheduling Order Deadlines(BCL) (Entered: 08/18/2015)
114 MOTION to Enroll as Co−Counsel of Record by N. Burl Cain, Bobby Jindal, James M. LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, State of Louisiana. (Animashaun, Babatunde) Modified to edit text on 8/21/2015 (SGO). (Entered: 08/20/2015)
115 ORDER granting 114 Motion to Enroll as Co−Counsel of Record. Added attorney Grant Lloyd Willis for N. Burl Cain, James M. LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, and the State of Louisiana. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger on 8/20/2015. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (Riedlinger, Stephen) (Entered: 08/20/2015)
116 RULING granting 71 Motion to Determine the Sufficiency of Responses to Requests for Admissions. Plaintiff's Request for Admission Numbers 1 and 2 through 25, propounded as Plaintiff's First Request for Admissions Directed to Defendant James LeBlanc on 4/19/2015, are each deemed admitted under Rule 36(a)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P. Plaintiff is awarded reasonable expenses in the amount of $300, to be paid by the defendant within 14 days. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger on 8/27/2015. (LLH) (Entered: 08/27/2015)
117 MOTION for Leave to File MSJ in excess of the page limitation imposed by local rule 7(g) by N. Burl Cain, Bobby Jindal, James M. LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support Memo in support of filing in excessive page, # 2 Attachment Motion for summary Judgment, # 3 Statement of Undisputed Facts Attached Statements of undisputed facts, # 4 Memorandum in Support Attached Memo in support of MSJ, # 5 Exhibit List Ex. 1 Affidavit Dr. Jason Collins, # 6 Attachment Attachment 1 to Dr. Collins Affidavit, # 7 Exhibit List Ex. 2 Affidavit of Dr. Raman Singh, # 8 Exhibit List Ex. 3 Affidavit of Stephanie Lamartiniere, # 9 Exhibit List Ex. 4 Affidavit of Trish Foster, # 10 Attachment Attachment to Ex 4. LSP−ARP 2013−2554, # 11 Exhibit List Ex. 5 Affidait of Warden Burl Cain, # 12 Exhibit List Ex. 6 Affidvait of Sec. James LeBlanc, # 13 Exhibit List Ex. 7 Affidavit of Dr. Lavespere, # 14 Attachment Attachment to Ex 7. Dr. Lavespere Aff., # 15 Exhibit List Ex. 8. Refusal to accept medical by Hacker, # 16 Exhibit List Ex. 9 Deposition Peabody, # 17 Exhibit List Ex. 10 Health care policy HC−16, # 18 Exhibit List Ex. 11 Dept. Regulation B−08−010, # 19 Exhibit List Ex. 12 Lib. Services 21.004, # 20 Exhibit List Ex. 13 LSP Reg. 13.030)(Animashaun, Babatunde) (Entered: 09/10/2015)
118 ORDER granting 117 MOTION for Leave to File MSJ in excess of the page limitation imposed by local rule 7(g) filed by Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, James M. LeBlanc, N. Burl Cain, Bobby Jindal. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 09/11/2015. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (KDC) (Entered: 09/11/2015)

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122 MOTION for Summary Judgment by N. Burl Cain, Bobby Jindal, James M. LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, Rahm Singh, State of Louisiana. (Attachments: # 1 Statement of Undisputed Facts, # 2 Memorandum in Support, # 3 Exhibit 1, # 4 Exhibit 1 Attachment, # 5 Exhibit 2, # 6 Exhibit 3, # 7 Exhibit 4, # 8 Exhibit 4 Attachment, # 9 Exhibit 5, # 10 Exhibit 6, # 11 Exhibit 7, # 12 Exhibit 7 Attachment, # 13 Exhibit 8, # 14 Exhibit 9, # 15 Exhibit 10, # 16 Exhibit 11, # 17 Exhibit 12, # 18 Exhibit 13)(JDL) (Entered: 09/15/2015)
119 Ex Parte MOTION for Extension of Time to file Motion for Summary Judgment by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Adcock, John) (Entered: 09/12/2015)
120 Exhibit(s) to 119 Ex Parte MOTION for Extension of Time to file Motion for Summary Judgment by Jason Hacker. (Adcock, John) (Entered: 09/12/2015)
121 AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER: Considering the 119 120 Ex Parte Motion to Extend the Deadline to File Summary Judgment Motion and finding good cause as required by Rule 16, Fed.R.Civ.P., the motion is GRANTED. The deadline to file motions for summary judgment is October 16, 2015, and Daubert motions shall be filed by November 16, 2015. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger on 9/12/2015. (BCL) (Entered: 09/14/2015)
123 NOTICE of Briefing Schedule on 122 MOTION for Summary Judgment : Opposition to the motion shall be filed within 21 days from the filing of the motion and shall not exceed 10 pages excluding attachments. The mover may file a reply brief within 14 days of the filing of the opposition and shall be limited to a total of 5 pages. No motion for leave will be required. Sur−Reply briefs will be permitted only with leave of Court for extraordinary reasons supported by sufficient facts. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.)(KDC) (Entered: 09/15/2015)
Confirmation of receipt of payment from JASON HACKER in the amount of $29.44. Transaction posted on 9/16/2015. Receipt number LAMDDC1535 processed by Finance Import. (NLT ADI, ) (Entered: 09/24/2015)
124 Notice to Counsel: Status Conference set for 10/5/2015 at 2:00 PM in chambers before Judge John W. deGravelles. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (KDC) (Entered: 09/29/2015)
125 MOTION for Leave of court to File a Memorandum in Excess of the Page Limits imposed by Local Rule 7(g) by Jason Hacker. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Proposed Pleading;, # 3 Statement of Undisputed Facts)(Adcock, John) Modified on 10/2/2015 to edit text (ELW). (Entered: 10/01/2015)
126 Exhibit to 130 OPPOSITION to Defendants' Summary Judgment by filed by Jason Hacker. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J)(Adcock, John) Modified on 10/5/2015 to edit text (ELW). Modified on 10/6/2015 to edit the linking to the opposition (NLT). (Entered: 10/01/2015)
127 Exhibit to 130 OPPOSITION to Defendants' Summary Judgment by filed by Jason Hacker. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit K, # 2 Exhibit L, # 3 Exhibit M, # 4 Exhibit N, # 5 Exhibit O, # 6 Exhibit P, # 7 Exhibit Q, # 8 Exhibit R, # 9 Exhibit S, # 10 Exhibit T)(Adcock, John) Modified on 10/5/2015 to edit text (ELW). Modified on 10/6/2015 to change the link to the opposition (NLT). (Entered: 10/01/2015)
128 Exhibit to 130 OPPOSITION to Defendants' Summary Judgment by filed by Jason Hacker. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit U, # 2 Exhibit V, # 3 Exhibit W, # 4 Exhibit X, # 5 Exhibit Y, # 6 Exhibit Z, # 7 Exhibit AA, # 8 Exhibit BB, # 9 Exhibit CC, # 10 Exhibit DD, # 11 Exhibit EE, # 12 Exhibit FF)(Adcock, John) Modified on 10/5/2015 to edit text (ELW). Modified on 10/6/2015 to edit the linkage to the opposition (NLT). (Entered: 10/01/2015)
129 ORDER granting 125 MOTION for Leave to File Opposition to Defendants' Summary Judgment Motion in Excess of the Page Limits filed by Jason Hacker. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 10/02/2015. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (KDC) (Entered: 10/02/2015)

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130 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to 122 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Jason Hacker. (Attachments: # 1 Statement of Undisputed Facts)(NLT) (Entered: 10/06/2015)
131 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge John W. deGravelles: Status Conference held on 10/5/2015. Visits to witnesses/ potential clients at LSP was discussed and resolved. Consolidation of cases was discussed. The Court advised the parties on filing a motion. Counsel for Plaintiff advised the Court a master list of all cases including the underlying causes of action to be considered for consolidation will be filed by Wednesday, 10/7/2015. (LLH) (Entered: 10/08/2015)
132 Ex parte Motion to Extend the Deadline to File Summary Judgment Motion by Jason Hacker. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E)(Adcock, John) Modified on 10/8/2015 to edit text (ELW). (Entered: 10/08/2015)
133 AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER granting 132 Motion for Extension of Time to File Summary Judgment Motion. The Amended Scheduling Order previously issued is hereby further amended. The deadline to file motions for summary judgment is 10/30/2015, and Daubert motions shall be filed by 11/16/2015. All other deadlines to remain unchanged. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger on 10/8/2015. (LLH) (Entered: 10/08/2015)
134 Joint MOTION to Substitute Counsel by N. Burl Cain, Jason Collins, Bobby Jindal, Stephanie Lamartiniere, James M. LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, Rahm Singh, State of Louisiana. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Proposed Order)(Blanchfield, Andrew) Modified on 10/22/2015 to edit text (ELW). (Entered: 10/22/2015)
135 ORDER granting 134 Joint Motion to Substitute Counsel. Attorneys Andrew Blanchfield, C. Reynolds LeBlanc, Jr., and Brent J. Cobb added for N. Burl Cain, Bobby Jindal, James M. LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, and State of Louisiana, replacing Babatunde M. Animashaun. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger on 10/22/2015. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (Riedlinger, Stephen) (Entered: 10/22/2015)
Confirmation of receipt of payment from JASON HACKER in the amount of $9.17. Transaction posted on 10/22/2015. Receipt number LAMDDC1555 processed by Finance Import. (NLT ADI, ) (Entered: 10/23/2015)
136 Ex Parte MOTION to Enroll William Most as Additional Attorney by Jason Hacker. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Mr. Most, # 2 Ex. 1 to Declaration of Mr. Most)(Adcock, John) Modified on 11/3/2015 to rotate and replace exhibit 2 (LLH). (Entered: 10/27/2015)
MOTION(S) REFERRED: 136 Ex Parte MOTION to Enroll William Most as Additional Attorney . This motion is now pending before the USMJ. (LLH) (Entered: 10/27/2015)
Notice of Payment of $100.00 Pro Hac Vice Fee by Jason Hacker. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 053N−1313244. (Adcock, John) (Entered: 10/28/2015)
137 ORDER granting 136 Ex Parte Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice. William Most added as attorney pro hac vice for Jason Hacker. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger on 10/28/2015. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (Riedlinger, Stephen) (Entered: 10/28/2015)
138 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File Memorandum in excess of the page limitations of LR 7(g) by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Proposed Pleading;, # 3 Proposed Pleading;, # 4 Statement of Undisputed Facts, # 5 Exhibit List)(Adcock, John) (Entered: 10/30/2015)
139 Additional Exhibits to 138 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File Memorandum in excess of the page limitations of LR 7(g) by All Plaintiffs. filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit H, # 8 Exhibit J, # 9 Exhibit K, # 10 Exhibit L)(Adcock,

10/30/2015
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John) (Attachment 7 replaced on 11/2/2015) (ELW). Modified on 11/2/2015 to correct page orientation (ELW). (Attachment 10 replaced on 1/25/2018) (KAH). (Entered: 10/30/2015)
140 Additional Exhibits to 138 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File Memorandum in excess of the page limitations of LR 7(g) by Jason Hacker. filed by Jason Hacker. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit M, # 2 Exhibit N, # 3 Exhibit O, # 4 Exhibit P, # 5 Exhibit Q, # 6 Exhibit R, # 7 Exhibit S, # 8 Exhibit T, # 9 Exhibit U, # 10 Exhibit V)(Adcock, John) Modified to replace attachments 1−3 on 1/25/2018 for appeal purposes (KAH). (Entered: 10/30/2015)
141 Additional Exhibits to 138 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File Memorandum in excess of the page limitations of LR 7(g) by Jason Hacker. filed by Jason Hacker. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Y, # 2 Exhibit AA, # 3 Exhibit DD, # 4 Exhibit GG, # 5 Exhibit II, # 6 Exhibit JJ, # 7 Exhibit LL, # 8 Exhibit NN, # 9 Exhibit QQ, # 10 Exhibit SS)(Adcock, John) (Entered: 10/30/2015)
142 Additional Exhibits to 138 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File Memorandum in excess of the page limitations of LR 7(g) by Jason Hacker. filed by Jason Hacker. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit TT, # 2 Exhibit VV, # 3 Exhibit XX, # 4 Exhibit ZZ, # 5 Exhibit AAA)(Adcock, John) (Attachment 4 replaced on 11/2/2015) (ELW). (Entered: 10/30/2015)
143 First SEALED DOCUMENT Medical Records Filed Under Seal Pursuant to Protective Order (R. Doc. 100). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit X, # 2 Exhibit Z, # 3 Exhibit BB, # 4 Exhibit CC, # 5 Exhibit EE, # 6 Exhibit FF, # 7 Exhibit HH, # 8 Exhibit KK)(Adcock, John) (Entered: 10/30/2015)
144 SEALED DOCUMENT Second Set of Medical Records filed under seal pursuant to the protective order (R. Doc. 100). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit MM, # 2 Exhibit OO, # 3 Exhibit PP, # 4 Exhibit RR, # 5 Exhibit UU, # 6 Exhibit WW, # 7 Exhibit YY)(Adcock, John) (Attachment 2 replaced on 11/2/2015) (JDL). (Attachment 3 replaced on 11/2/2015) (JDL). (Attachment 4 replaced on 11/2/2015) (JDL). (Attachment 5 replaced on 11/2/2015) (JDL). (Attachment 7 replaced on 11/2/2015) (JDL). Modified on 11/2/2015 to correct document orientations (JDL). (Entered: 10/30/2015)
145 NOTICE of Certificate of Service by Jason Hacker re 140 Additional Exhibit to Main Document, 139 Additional Exhibit to Main Document, 141 Additional Exhibit to Main Document, (Adcock, John) (Entered: 11/02/2015)
146 NOTICE of Certificate of Service by Jason Hacker re 144 SEALED Document,, 143 SEALED Document, (Adcock, John) (Entered: 11/02/2015)
147 ORDER granting 138 Unopposed MOTION for Leave of Court to File Memorandum in excess of the page limitations of LR 7(g) filed by Jason Hacker. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 11/5/2015. (JDL) (Entered: 11/06/2015)
148 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Jason Hacker. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Statement of Material Facts that are Not in Dispute, # 3 Exhibit List)(JDL) (Entered: 11/06/2015)
149 NOTICE of Briefing Schedule on 148 MOTION for Summary Judgment : Opposition to the motion shall be filed within 21 days from the filing of the motion and shall not exceed 10 pages excluding attachments. The mover may file a reply brief within 14 days of the filing of the opposition and shall be limited to a total of 5 pages. No motion for leave will be required. Sur−Reply briefs will be permitted only with leave of Court for extraordinary reasons supported by sufficient facts. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.)(KDC) (Entered: 11/09/2015)
150 MOTION to Exclude Expert Testimony/Daubert Challenge Edward C. Bell by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Attachment Proposed Order, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit)(Blanchfield, Andrew) Modified on 11/13/2015 to edit text (LLH). (Entered: 11/12/2015)
151 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to 148 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Timeline of Treatment, # 2 Attachment

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Statement of Disputed Facts)(Blanchfield, Andrew) (Entered: 11/20/2015)
152 Notice to Counsel: Status Conference set for 12/17/2015 at 9:00 AM in chambers before Judge John W. deGravelles. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.)(KDC) Modified on 12/11/2015 (KDC). (Entered: 11/23/2015)
153 STRICKEN FROM THE RECORD MEMORANDUM in Opposition to 150 MOTION Exclude Expert Testimony/Daubert Challenge filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit List, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F, # 8 Exhibit G, # 9 Exhibit G1)(Adcock, John) Modified on 12/7/2015 to remove the document as it has been stricken (BCL). (Entered: 12/03/2015)
154 NOTICE OF NON−COMPLIANCE with LR 7(g) as to 153 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion,. REQUIRED CORRECTION: A combined Motion for Leave to Exceed the Page Limits and Motion to Strike the Incorrect Pleading must filed within 24 hours of this notice. Otherwise, the original filing may be stricken by the Court without further notice. (LLH) (Entered: 12/04/2015)
155 REPLY to 151 Memorandum in Opposition to 148 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Jason Hacker. (Attachments: # 1 Response to Disputed Facts)(Adcock, John) Modified to edit text on 12/7/2015 (BCL). (Entered: 12/04/2015)
156 Combined MOTION for Leave of Court to Exceed the Page Limits Imposed by Local Rule 7(g) and Motion to Strike the Incorrect Pleading by Jason Hacker. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Proposed Pleading;, # 3 Exhibit List, # 4 Exhibit A, # 5 Exhibit B, # 6 Exhibit C, # 7 Exhibit D, # 8 Exhibit E, # 9 Exhibit F, # 10 Exhibit G, # 11 Exhibit G 1)(Adcock, John) Modified to edit text on 12/7/2015 (BCL). (Entered: 12/04/2015)
157 ORDER granting 156 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages; granting 156 Motion to Strike 153 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion . Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 12/6/15. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (KDC) (Entered: 12/06/2015)
158 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to 150 Exclude Expert Testimony/Daubert Motion (Edward C. Bell) filed by Jason Hacker. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(BCL) (Entered: 12/07/2015)
159 MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memorandum to Exclude Expert Testimony/Daubert Motion by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading;)(Blanchfield, Andrew) Modified on 12/10/2015 to edit text (ELW). (Entered: 12/10/2015)
160 ORDER granting 159 MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memo filed by Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, N. Burl Cain, Rahm Singh, James M. LeBlanc, Jason Collins, Bobby Jindal, Stephanie Lamartiniere, State of Louisiana. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 12/17/2015. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (KDC) (Entered: 12/17/2015)
161 REPLY to 158 Memorandum in Opposition to 150 MOTION to Exclude Expert Testimony/Daubert Challenge Edward C. Bell, filed by Bobby Jindal, James M. LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, State of Louisiana. (LLH) (Entered: 12/17/2015)
164 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge John W. deGravelles: Status Conference held on 12/17/2015. Court went over the motions currently pending in this matter. Upon the request of the parties, the four day jury trial of this matter currently set for March 28, 2016, is continued and reassigned to begin at 9:00 a.m. on Monday, January 9, 2017, in courtroom 1 before the undersigned. Pretrial conference is also continued and will instead be held at 11:00 a.m. on Thursday, December 8, 2016. Parties shall submit to the undersigned a proposed scheduling order resetting the necessary deadlines on or before December 31, 2015. Pursuant to Local Rules, offering parties shall retain custody of exhibits..(BCL) (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/22/2015: # 1 Attachment) (BCL). (Entered: 12/22/2015)

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162 Joint MOTION for Oral Argument on the MOTIONS for Summary Judgment by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Adcock, John) Modified on 12/18/2015 to edit text (ELW). (Entered: 12/18/2015)
163 ORDER granting 162 Motion for Oral Argument as to 148 MOTION for Summary Judgment, 122 MOTION for Summary Judgment. Motion Hearing set for 2/26/2016 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 1 before Judge John W. deGravelles. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 12/21/15. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (KDC) (Entered: 12/21/2015)
165 AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER: In accordance with FRCP 16(b), the following discovery deadlines are established. Proposed Pretrial Order due by 11/14/2016. Motions In Limine shall be filed by 10/27/2016. Responses to Motions In Limine shall be filed by 11/17/2016. Affidavit of Settlement Efforts due by 12/2/2016. Joint jury instructions, voir dire, verdict forms, and trial briefs due by 12/12/2016. Jury Trial set for 1/9/2017 − 1/12/2017 at 09:00 AM in Courtroom 1 before Judge John W. deGravelles. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 01/05/2016. (BCL) (Entered: 01/05/2016)
166 NOTICE: Pursuant to General Order 2016−02, this case is reassigned from Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger to Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder−Doomes. Signed by Chief Judge Brian A. Jackson on 1/4/2016. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.)(NLT) (Entered: 01/07/2016)
167 ORDER: As such, based on the representation made by their counsel and their latest dispositive motions, this Court DENIES as MOOT Defendants' identical Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs 2nd Amended Complaint (Rec. Doc. # 73), (Doc. 76), and the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's 2nd Amended Complaint (Rec. Doc. #73), (Doc. 92). In addition, as Defendant filed other motions to dismiss, (Docs. 35, 49), prior to Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, (Doc. 73), the latter filing has rendered both these motions moot as a matter of law. Accordingly, this Court DENIES as MOOT Defendants' identical Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, (Doc. 35), and the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, (Doc. 49). The merits of the motions for summary judgment filed by Defendants and Plaintiff remain unaffected by this order. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 01/25/2016. (BCL) (Entered: 01/25/2016)
168 NOTICE of Hearing on Motion 148 MOTION for Summary Judgment, 122 MOTION for Summary Judgment (TIME CHANGE ONLY) : Motion Hearing reset for 2/26/2016 at 8:30 AM in Courtroom 1 before Judge John W. deGravelles. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (KDC) (Entered: 02/04/2016)
169 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge John W. deGravelles: Motion Hearing held on 2/26/2016 regarding 148 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Jason Hacker, 122 MOTION for Summary Judgment John Nelson Adock, William Most and Andrew Blanchfield were present. Counsel presented arguments. The Court takes motions under advisement. (Court Reporter G. Delatte−Richard.) (ELW) Modified on 4/21/2016 to add text (ELW). (Entered: 04/05/2016)
170 ORDER denying 122 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 148 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 06/06/2016. (KDC) (Entered: 06/06/2016)
171 RULING AND ORDER denying 150 MOTION to Exclude Expert Testimony/Daubert Challenge, Edward C. Bell. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 7/5/2016. (LLH) (Entered: 07/06/2016)
172 NOTICE OF APPEAL to the USCA for the 5th Circuit by N. Burl Cain, Jason Collins, Bobby Jindal, Stephanie Lamartiniere, James M. LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola. Filing fee $ 505, receipt number 053N−1432695. (Blanchfield, Andrew) (Entered: 07/06/2016)
173 NOTICE OF APPEAL to the USCA for the 5th Circuit of 170 Order on Motion for Summary Judgment, by Jason Hacker. (Adcock, John) (Entered: 07/06/2016)

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174 MANDATE of USCA as to 173 Notice of Appeal to the USCA for the 5th Circuit filed by Jason Hacker, 172 Notice of Appeal to the USCA for the 5th Circuit, filed by Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, Jason Collins, James M. LeBlanc, N. Burl Cain, Bobby Jindal, Stephanie Lamartiniere Under FED R. APP. P. 42(b), the appeals are dismissed as of 7/26/2016, pursuant to the motions of both Appellants Cross−Appellees and Appellee−Cross Appellant. (LLH) (Entered: 07/26/2016)
175 MOTION Leave to Appear Unshackled and in Ordinary Clothing by Jason Hacker. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Draft Order)(Most, William) Modified on 11/1/2016 to replace documents as per Order #179 (LLH). (Entered: 10/27/2016)
176 MOTION in Limine Re Def's Obligation to Provide Medical Care by Jason Hacker. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Draft Order, # 3 Exhibit A (Cannon Dep.), # 4 Exhibit B (LSP 13.030), # 5 Exhibit C (HC−16), # 6 Exhibit D (Lavespere Dep.), # 7 Exhibit E (Singh Dep.), # 8 Exhibit F (Peabody Dep.), # 9 Exhibit G (Collins Dep.), # 10 Exhibit H, # 11 Exhibit I, # 12 Exhibit J)(Most, William) Modified on 10/28/2016 to rotate pages (SGO). Modified to replace attachments 3, 6, 8−9 on 1/25/2018 for appeal purposes (KAH). (Attachment 7 replaced on 1/31/2018) (KAH). (Entered: 10/27/2016)
177 MOTION in Limine Re Irrelevant Testimony and Evidence by Jason Hacker. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Appendix A, # 3 Draft Order, # 4 Exhibit E (Singh Dep.), # 5 Exhibit K (Dep. Notice), # 6 Exhibit L (Deponent Designation), # 7 Exhibit M (Expert Designation), # 8 Exhibit N (Kastl Report), # 9 Exhibit O (Kastl Invoice))(Most, William) (Attachment 4 replaced on 1/25/2018) (KAH). (Entered: 10/27/2016)
178 MOTION to Substitute for R. Doc. 175 by Jason Hacker. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading;, # 2 Draft Order)(Most, William) Modified on 10/28/2016 to edit text. (EDC). (Entered: 10/28/2016)
179 ORDER granting 178 MOTION for Leave to Substitute R. Doc. 175 filed by Jason Hacker. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 10/31/2016. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (KDC) (Entered: 10/31/2016)
180 Proposed Pretrial Order (Joint Uniform) by Jason Hacker (For your free look at document, enter your ECF login and pw to confirm your right to view). (Most, William) (Entered: 11/14/2016)
181 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to 175 MOTION Leave to Appear Unshackled and in Ordinary Clothing filed by N. Burl Cain, Bobby Jindal, James M. LeBlanc, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, State of Louisiana. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Blanchfield, Andrew) (Entered: 11/17/2016)
182 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to 176 MOTION in Limine Re Def's Obligation to Provide Medical Care filed by N. Burl Cain, Bobby Jindal, James M. LeBlanc, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, State of Louisiana. (Blanchfield, Andrew) (Entered: 11/17/2016)
183 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to 177 MOTION in Limine Re Irrelevant Testimony and Evidence filed by N. Burl Cain, Bobby Jindal, James M. LeBlanc, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, State of Louisiana. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Blanchfield, Andrew) (Entered: 11/17/2016)
184 Motion to Withdraw Deemed Admission by N. Burl Cain, Bobby Jindal, James M. LeBlanc, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, State of Louisiana. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Proposed Pleading;)(Blanchfield, Andrew) Modified on 11/17/2016 to edit text. (EDC). (Entered: 11/17/2016)
MOTION(S) REFERRED: 184 MOTION Motion to Withdraw Deemed Admission . This motion is now pending before the USMJ. (EDC) (Entered: 11/17/2016)
185 Notice and Order: Pending before the court is defendants' 184 Motion to Withdraw Deemed Admission (the "Motion to Withdraw"). The Motion to Withdraw does not indicate whether Plaintiff objects or consents to the Motion to Withdraw. Defendants

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are hereby ORDERED to file a Supplement to the Motion to Withdraw stating whether Plaintiff consents or objects to the Motion to Withdraw. Defendants shall file the Supplement to Motion to Withdraw within seven (7) days of this Notice and Order without further leave of court. Signed by Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder−Doomes on 11/21/2016. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.)(BLR) (Entered: 11/21/2016)
186 Supplement to MOTION to Withdraw Deemed Admission by N. Burl Cain, Jason Collins, Bobby Jindal, Stephanie Lamartiniere, James M. LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, Rahm Singh, State of Louisiana. (Blanchfield, Andrew) Modified on 11/22/2016 to edit text. (EDC). Modified on 11/30/2016 to link entry properly. (EDC). (Entered: 11/21/2016)
187 MOTION for Leave to File Reply In Support of Motion to Appear Unshackled and in Ordinary Clothing by Jason Hacker. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading;, # 2 Draft Order)(Most, William) Modified on 12/1/2016 to edit text. (EDC). (Entered: 11/29/2016)
188 MOTION for Leave to File Reply In Support of Motion in Limine Regarding Defendant's Obligation to Provide Medical Care by Jason Hacker. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading;, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Draft Order)(Most, William) Modified on 12/1/2016 to edit text.(EDC). (Entered: 11/29/2016)
MOTION(S) REFERRED: 186 Supplemental MOTION to Withdraw Deemed Admission. This motion is now pending before the USMJ. (EDC) (Entered: 11/30/2016)
189 ORDER granting 188 Motion for leave to file a Reply Memo to 176 MOTION in Limine Re Def's Obligation to Provide Medical Care filed by Jason Hacker. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 11/30/2016. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (KDC) (Entered: 11/30/2016)
190 ORDER granting 187 MOTION for Leave to File Reply ISO Motion to Appear Unshackled filed by Jason Hacker. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 11/30/2016. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (KDC) (Entered: 11/30/2016)
192 REPLY in Support of 176 MOTION in Limine Re Def's Obligation to Provide Medical Care filed by Jason Hacker. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(LLH) (Entered: 12/02/2016)
193 REPLY in Support of 175 MOTION Leave to Appear Unshackled and in Ordinary Clothing filed by Jason Hacker. (LLH) (Entered: 12/02/2016)
191 MOTION for NICHOLAS TRENTICOSTA to Withdraw as Attorney by Jason Hacker. (Trenticosta, Nicholas) (Entered: 12/01/2016)
MOTION(S) REFERRED: 191 MOTION for NICHOLAS TRENTICOSTA to Withdraw as Attorney . This motion is now pending before the USMJ. (NLT) (Entered: 12/02/2016)
194 AFFIDAVIT of Settlement Efforts by All Plaintiffs. (Adcock, John) (Entered: 12/02/2016)
195 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File Sur−Reply Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion in Limine Regarding Defendant's Obligation to Provide Medical Care by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Sur−Reply Memorandum, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit C, # 5 Attachment Proposed Order)(Blanchfield, Andrew) Modified on 12/7/2016 to edit text. (EDC). (Entered: 12/05/2016)
196 Joint NOTICE of the Filing of An Amended Uniform Pretrial Order by Jason Hacker (Attachments: # 1 Amended Uniform Pretrial Order)(Adcock, John) Modified on 12/8/2016 (NLT). (Entered: 12/05/2016)

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197 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to 184 MOTION Motion to Withdraw Deemed Admission filed by Jason Hacker. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Most, William) (Entered: 12/05/2016)
198 MOTION for Leave to File Reply ISO for Plaintiff's Motion in Limine Re Irrelevant Testimony by Jason Hacker. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading;, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Draft Order)(Most, William) Modified on 12/7/2016 to edit text. (EDC). (Entered: 12/05/2016)
199 ORDER granting 195 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File Sur−Reply Memorandum filed by Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, N. Burl Cain, Rahm Singh, James M. LeBlanc, Jason Collins, Bobby Jindal, Stephanie Lamartiniere, State of Louisiana. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 12/6/2016. (EDC) (Entered: 12/06/2016)
200 SUR−REPLY to 176 MOTION in Limine Re Defendant's Obligation to Provide Medical Care, 192 Reply to Response to Motion filed by N. Burl Cain, Bobby Jindal, James M. LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, State of Louisiana. (Attachments: # 1 exhibits, # 2 exhibits, # 3 exhibits)(EDC) (Entered: 12/06/2016)
201 ORDER granting 191 Motion for NICHOLAS TRENTICOSTA to Withdraw as Attorney. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 12/06/2016. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (KDC) (Entered: 12/06/2016)
Motions No Longer Referred: 186 Supplemental MOTION to Withdraw Deemed Admission, 184 MOTION Motion to Withdraw Deemed Admission . This motion is now pending before the USDJ. (SGO) (Entered: 12/06/2016)
202 Notice to Counsel (TIME CHANGE ONLY): Pretrial Conference reset for 12/8/2016 at 12:15 PM in chambers before Judge John W. deGravelles.

Evidence, in electronic format, shall be provided in accordance with Local Rule 79 and Administrative Procedures.

12/07/2016 12/08/2016
12/12/2016 12/21/2016 12/22/2016

(This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (KDC) (Entered: 12/07/2016)
203 Statement of Interest of the United States of America. (Maraist, Catherine) Modified on 12/8/2016 to edit text (LLH). (Entered: 12/07/2016)
205 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge John W. deGravelles.Final Pretrial Conference held on 12/8/2016. Plaintiff`s Expert Witness List due by 1/9/2017. Defendant`s Expert Witness List due by 1/9/2017. Joint jury instructions, voir dire, verdict forms, and trial briefs due by 1/9/2017. Status Conference set for 1/30/2017 at 08:30 AM in chambers before Judge John W. deGravelles. Jury Trial set for 1/30/2017 through 2/2/2017 at 09:00 AM in Courtroom 1 before Judge John W. deGravelles. (ELW) (Entered: 12/12/2016)
204 SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE ORDER: Video Settlement Conference set for 1/9/2017 at 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder−Doomes. The Warden of Louisiana State Penitentiary produce plaintiff Jason Hacker (#383727) in the video conferencing facilities at Louisiana State Penitentiary, for the settlement conference. Signed by Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder−Doomes on 12/12/2016. (LLH) (Entered: 12/12/2016)
206 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Trial Exhibits Listed by Plaintiff's Counsel by N. Burl Cain, Bobby Jindal, James M. LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, State of Louisiana. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Attachment Proposed Order)(Blanchfield, Andrew) (Entered: 12/21/2016)
207 NOTICE of Expedited Briefing Schedule on 206 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Trial Exhibits Listed by Plaintiff's Counsel : Opposition to the motion shall be filed within 10 days from the filing of the motion and shall not exceed 10 pages excluding attachments. The mover may file a reply brief within 5 days of the filing of the

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opposition and shall be limited to a total of 5 pages. No motion for leave will be required. Sur−Reply briefs will be permitted only with leave of Court for extraordinary reasons supported by sufficient facts. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.)(KDC) (Entered: 12/22/2016)
208 RESPONSE to 203 Brief Statement of Interest of the United States filed by N. Burl Cain, Bobby Jindal, James M. LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, State of Louisiana. (Blanchfield, Andrew) (Entered: 12/22/2016)
209 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to 206 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Trial Exhibits Listed by Plaintiff's Counsel filed by Jason Hacker. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F)(Adcock, John) (Entered: 01/02/2017)
210 Ex Parte MOTION to Enroll Chelsea A. Payne as Additional Attorney by N. Burl Cain, Bobby Jindal, James M. LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, State of Louisiana. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Proposed Order)(Blanchfield, Andrew) (Entered: 01/05/2017)
211 Return on SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE ORDER. ACCEPTED BY RHONDA WELDON, PARALEGAL, DOC LEGAL OFFICE ON 12/22/2016. (US Marshal, ) (Entered: 01/05/2017)
212 REPLY Memorandum In Support of 206 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Trial Exhibits Listed by Plaintiff's Counsel filed by N. Burl Cain, Bobby Jindal, James M. LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, State of Louisiana. (Blanchfield, Andrew) Modified on 1/9/2017 to edit text (ELW). (Entered: 01/06/2017)
213 Exhibit List by N. Burl Cain, Bobby Jindal, James M. LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, State of Louisiana.. (Blanchfield, Andrew) (Entered: 01/09/2017)
214 Witness List by N. Burl Cain, Bobby Jindal, James M. LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, State of Louisiana. (For your free look at document, enter your ECF login and pw to confirm your right to view). (Blanchfield, Andrew) (Entered: 01/09/2017)
215 Proposed Voir Dire Questions by N. Burl Cain, Bobby Jindal, James M. LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, State of Louisiana. (Blanchfield, Andrew) (Entered: 01/09/2017)
216 PROPOSED JURY VERDICT FORM by N. Burl Cain, Bobby Jindal, James M. LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, State of Louisiana.. (Blanchfield, Andrew) (Entered: 01/09/2017)
217 PROPOSED JURY CHARGES by N. Burl Cain, Bobby Jindal, James M. LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, State of Louisiana.. (Blanchfield, Andrew) (Entered: 01/09/2017)
218 Proposed Voir Dire Questions by Jason Hacker. (Adcock, John) (Entered: 01/09/2017)
219 Proposed Jury Instructions by Jason Hacker. (Adcock, John) (Entered: 01/09/2017)
220 PROPOSED JURY VERDICT FORM by Jason Hacker.. (Adcock, John) (Entered: 01/09/2017)
221 Exhibit List and Witness List by Jason Hacker.. (Most, William) (Entered: 01/09/2017)
223 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder−Doomes: Settlement Conference held on 1/9/2017. The parties were unable to reach amicable resolution. All remaining established deadlines, including those contained in the Courts Minute Entry (R. Doc. 205), remain in effect. (SGO) (Entered: 01/10/2017)
222 Notice to Counsel: The parties are required to resubmit both the jury charges and jury verdict form as a joint submission. The joint jury charges and joint jury verdict form shall be filed no later than 5:00 p.m. on Friday, January 13, 2017.

Evidence, in electronic format, shall be provided in accordance with Local Rule 79 and Administrative Procedures.

01/10/2017 01/10/2017 01/13/2017
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01/13/2017 01/13/2017 01/13/2017 01/13/2017 01/13/2017 01/15/2017 01/17/2017 01/17/2017
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(This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (KDC) (Entered: 01/10/2017)
224 ORDER granting 198 MOTION for Leave to File Reply to 177 Motion in Limine Re Irrelevant Testimony into the record. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 1/10/2017. (LLH) (Entered: 01/10/2017)
225 REPLY in Support of 177 MOTION in Limine Re Irrelevant Testimony and Evidence filed by Jason Hacker. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(LLH) (Entered: 01/10/2017)
226 RULING AND ORDER denying without prejudice 184 Motion to Withdraw Deemed Admission and 186 Supplement to MOTION to Withdraw Deemed Admission . Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 01/13/2017. (KDC) Modified on 1/13/2017 (NLT). (Entered: 01/13/2017)
227 RULING AND ORDER denying without prejudice 176 Plaintiff's Motion in Limine regarding Defendants' Obligation to Provide Medical Care. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 01/13/2017. (KDC) (Entered: 01/13/2017)
228 ORDER granting 210 Motion to Enroll Additional Attorney. Added attorney Chelsea Acosta Payne for N. Burl Cain, Bobby Jindal, James M. LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, and State of Louisiana. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 01/13/2017. (EDC) (Entered: 01/13/2017)
229 RULING AND ORDER granting 206 Motion in Limine. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 01/13/2017. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (KDC) (Entered: 01/13/2017)
230 Proposed Jury Instructions by Jason Hacker. (Adcock, John) (Entered: 01/13/2017)
231 PROPOSED JURY VERDICT FORM by Jason Hacker.. (Adcock, John) (Entered: 01/13/2017)
232 Ex Parte MOTION for Writ of Habeas Corpus ad testificandum for the Attendance at Trial of Four Witnesses by Jason Hacker. (Adcock, John) (Entered: 01/13/2017)
233 Ex Parte MOTION for Writ of Habeas Corpus ad testificandum to Secure Plaintiff's Presence at Trial by Jason Hacker. (Adcock, John) (Entered: 01/13/2017)
234 Ex Parte MOTION for Writ of Habeas Corpus ad testificandum For the Attendance at Trial of One Witness by Jason Hacker. (Adcock, John) (Entered: 01/15/2017)
235 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 177 Plaintiff's Motion in Limine Regarding Irrelevant Testimony. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 01/17/2017. (KDC) (Entered: 01/17/2017)
236 MOTION to Compel Production of "Cataract List" by Jason Hacker. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Draft Order, # 3 Exhibit A, # 4 Exhibit B, # 5 Exhibit C, # 6 Exhibit D, # 7 Exhibit E, # 8 Exhibit F, # 9 Exhibit G, # 10 Exhibit H, # 11 Exhibit I, # 12 Exhibit J)(Most, William) (Entered: 01/17/2017)
239 ORDER granting 234 Motion for Writ of Habeas Corpus ad testificandum. The Warden of the Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, Louisiana, Darrell Vannoy transport and produce Vincent Simmons (DOC #85188), for trial before Judge John deGravelles scheduled to begin at 9:00 a.m. January 30, 2017, and on each day thereafter until he has testified. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 01/17/2017. (ELW) (Entered: 01/18/2017)
240 ORDER granting 233 Motion for Writ of Habeas Corpus ad testificandum. The Warden of the Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, Louisiana, Darrell Vannoy, transport and produce Plaintiff, Jason Hacker, DOC #383727, for trial before Judge John W. deGravelles scheduled to be held at 9:00 a.m. January 30, 2017, R. Doc. 205, and on each day thereafter until the trial is concluded. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 01/17/2017. (ELW) (Entered: 01/18/2017)

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237 Notice to Counsel: Status Conference set for 1/20/2017 at 2:00 PM in chambers before Judge John W. deGravelles. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (KDC) (Entered: 01/18/2017)
238 ORDER granting 232 Motion for Writ of Habeas Corpus ad testificandum. The Warden of the Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, Louisiana, Darrell Vannoy transport and produce Floyd Noel(DOC #373596), Calvin Lewis (DOC #94091), Scott Meyers (DOC #301299) and Jackie Wafer (DOC #322257), for trial before Judge John W. deGravelles scheduled to begin at 9:00 a.m. January 30, 2017, and on each day thereafter until they have testified. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 01/17/2017. (ELW) (Entered: 01/18/2017)
241 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 175 Motion to Have Plaintiff Appear Unshackled and In Ordinary Clothing. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 01/19/2017. (KDC) (Entered: 01/19/2017)
245 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge John W. deGravelles. Status Conference held on 1/20/2017. MOTION 236 to Compel is GRANTED. Court orders parties to file a brief on or before 12:00 pm on 1/25/2017, setting forth if the parties disagrees with this process. If the Court does not receive a brief, the Court will begin taking notes during the trial as a dual fact finder. (ELW) Modified on 1/30/2017 to edit text (ELW). (Entered: 01/24/2017)
242 Unopposed MOTION to Substitute Party Gov. Edwards for Former Gov. Jindal by Jason Hacker. (Attachments: # 1 Draft Order)(Most, William) (Entered: 01/22/2017)
243 NOTICE of Filing of Letter Brief re Monell by Jason Hacker (Most, William) (Entered: 01/22/2017)
244 ORDER granting 242 Motion to Substitute Party. John Bel Edwards added. Bobby Jindal (Governor of Louisiana, in his official and individual capacities) terminated. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 01/23/2017. (EDC) (Entered: 01/23/2017)
246 MEMORANDUM in Opposition Regarding Plaintiff's Request for Injunctive Relief filed by N. Burl Cain, John Bel Edwards, James M. LeBlanc, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, State of Louisiana. (Blanchfield, Andrew) (Entered: 01/25/2017)
247 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Demonstrative Chart Proposed by Plaintiff as Trial Exhibit by N. Burl Cain, John Bel Edwards, James M. LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, State of Louisiana. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F, # 8 Exhibit G, # 9 Exhibit H, # 10 Exhibit I, # 11 Exhibit J, # 12 Exhibit K, # 13 Exhibit L, # 14 Attachment Proposed Order)(Blanchfield, Andrew) (Entered: 01/26/2017)
248 RESPONSE to 246 MEMORANDUM in Opposition Regarding Plaintiff's Request for Injunctive Relief filed by Jason Hacker. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Adcock, John) Modified on 1/27/2017 to edit text.(EDC). (Entered: 01/26/2017)
249 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to 247 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Demonstrative Chart Proposed by Plaintiff as Trial Exhibit filed by Jason Hacker. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit K, # 6 Exhibit M, # 7 Exhibit O, # 8 Exhibit Q)(Most, William) (Entered: 01/26/2017)
250 SEALED DOCUMENT Sealed Exhibits to Opposition to Motion in Limine . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit E, # 2 Exhibit F, # 3 Exhibit H, # 4 Exhibit I, # 5 Exhibit J, # 6 Exhibit L, # 7 Exhibit N, # 8 Exhibit P, # 9 Exhibit R, # 10 Exhibit T, # 11 Exhibit U, # 12 Exhibit V)(Most, William) (Entered: 01/26/2017)
251 RETURN OF SERVICE of Trial subpoena(s) on Witnesses (Attachments: # 1 Dr. Collins Subpoena, # 2 Dr. Collins Return, # 3 Mr. Peabody Subpoena, # 4 Mr. Peabody Return, # 5 Dr. Bell Subpoena and Return, # 6 Ms. Tait Subpoena and Return)(Most, William) Modified on 1/27/2017 to edit text. (EDC). (Entered: 01/27/2017)
252 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memorandum Regarding Plaintiff's Request for Injunctive Relief by N. Burl Cain, John Bel Edwards, James M. LeBlanc,

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Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, State of Louisiana. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Reply Memorandum, # 2 Attachment Proposed Order)(Blanchfield, Andrew) (Entered: 01/27/2017)
253 Return on ORDER. ACCEPTED BY RHONDA WELDON − DOC PARALEGAL ON 01/19/2017. (US Marshal, ) (Entered: 01/27/2017)
254 Motion and Incorporated Memorandum to Request Judicial Notice . (Attachments: # 1 Draft Order, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F, # 8 Exhibit G)(Most, William) Modified on 1/30/2017 to edit event and text (LLH). (Entered: 01/28/2017)
255 MOTION and Memorandum to Read Deposition Transcript in lieu of Live Testimony for Kenneth Norris by Jason Hacker. (Attachments: # 1 Draft Order, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D)(Most, William) Modified on 1/30/2017 to edit text (LLH). (Attachment 2 replaced on 1/25/2018) (KAH). (Entered: 01/28/2017)
256 MOTION and Memorandum to Add Unredacted Cataract List to Exhibit List by Jason Hacker. (Attachments: # 1 Draft Order, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B)(Most, William) Modified on 1/30/2017 to edit text (LLH). (Entered: 01/28/2017)
257 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to 254 Motion and Incorporated Memorandum to Request Judicial Notice filed by N. Burl Cain, John Bel Edwards, James M. LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, State of Louisiana. (Blanchfield, Andrew) Modified on 1/30/2017 to edit text (LLH). (Entered: 01/29/2017)
258 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to 255 MOTION for Leave to Use Deposition in lieu of Live Testimony Due to Infirmity for Kenneth Norris filed by N. Burl Cain, John Bel Edwards, James M. LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, State of Louisiana. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Deposition Transcript of Kenneth Norris)(Blanchfield, Andrew) Modified on 1/30/2017 to edit text (LLH). (Entered: 01/29/2017)
259 STRICKEN FROM THE RECORD MEMORANDUM in Opposition to 256 MOTION for Leave to Add Unredacted Cataract List to Exhibit List filed by N. Burl Cain, John Bel Edwards, James M. LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, State of Louisiana. (Blanchfield, Andrew) Modified on 2/1/2017 Stricken as ordered by the court (ELW). (Entered: 01/29/2017)
260 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to 256 MOTION for Leave to Add Unredacted Cataract List to Exhibit List filed by N. Burl Cain, John Bel Edwards, James M. LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, State of Louisiana. (Blanchfield, Andrew) (Entered: 01/29/2017)
261 MOTION to Strike 259 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion, by N. Burl Cain, John Bel Edwards, James M. LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, State of Louisiana. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support)(Blanchfield, Andrew) (Entered: 01/30/2017)
262 ORDER granting 252 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memorandum Regarding Plaintiff's Request for Injunctive Relief filed by John Bel Edwards, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, James M. LeBlanc, N. Burl Cain, State of Louisiana. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 01/30/2017. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (KDC) (Entered: 01/30/2017)
263 REPLY Memorandum Regarding Plaintiff's Request for Injunctive Relief filed by N. Burl Cain, John Bel Edwards, James M. LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, State of Louisiana. (LLH) (Entered: 01/31/2017)
270 ELECTRONIC EXHIBITS for hearing dated 01/30/2017.(EDC) (Main Document 270 replaced on 11/6/2017) (KDC). (Additional attachment(s) added on 11/16/2017: # 1 Exhibit Pla−11, # 2 Exhibit Pla−12, # 3 Exhibit Pla−13, # 4 Exhibit Pla−14, # 5 Exhibit Pla−15, # 6 Exhibit Pla−16, # 7 Exhibit Pla−17, # 8 Exhibit Pla−18, # 9

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Exhibit Pla−18A, # 10 Exhibit Pla−18B, # 11 Exhibit Pla−18C) (TMR). (Additional attachment(s) added on 11/16/2017: # 12 Exhibit Pla−21, # 13 Exhibit Pla−55, # 14 Exhibit Pla−56, # 15 Exhibit Pla−58, # 16 Exhibit Pla−59, # 17 Exhibit Pla−60, # 18 Exhibit Pla−61, # 19 Exhibit Pla−63, # 20 Exhibit Pla−64, # 21 Exhibit Pla−65, # 22 Exhibit Pla−67, # 23 Exhibit Pla−68, # 24 Exhibit Pla−69, # 25 Exhibit Pla−72, # 26 Exhibit Pla−73, # 27 Exhibit Pla−74, # 28 Exhibit Pla−75, # 29 Exhibit Pla−76, # 30 Exhibit Pla−77, # 31 Exhibit Pla−78, # 32 Exhibit Pla−79) (TMR). (Additional attachment(s) added on 11/16/2017: # 33 Exhibit Pla−80, # 34 Exhibit Pla−84, # 35 Exhibit Pla−85, # 36 Exhibit Pla−86, # 37 Exhibit Pla−88, # 38 Exhibit Pla−90, # 39 Exhibit Pla−91, # 40 Exhibit Pla−92, # 41 Exhibit Pla−93, # 42 Exhibit Pla−94, # 43 Exhibit Pla−100, # 44 Exhibit Pla−104, # 45 Exhibit Def−1) (TMR). (Additional attachment(s) added on 11/16/2017: # 46 Exhibit Def−2, # 47 Exhibit Def−3, # 48 Exhibit Def−4, # 49 Exhibit Def−6, # 50 Exhibit Def−7, # 51 Exhibit Def−8, # 52 Exhibit Def−9, # 53 Exhibit Def−10, # 54 Exhibit Def−11, # 55 Exhibit Def−12, # 56 Exhibit Def−13, # 57 Exhibit Def−14, # 58 Exhibit Def−15, # 59 Exhibit Def−16, # 60 Exhibit Def−17, # 61 Exhibit Def−18, # 62 Exhibit Def−19, # 63 Exhibit Def−20, # 64 Exhibit Def−21, # 65 Exhibit Def−22, # 66 Exhibit Def−23, # 67 Exhibit Def−24, # 68 Exhibit Def−25, # 69 Exhibit Def−26, # 70 Exhibit Def−27, # 71 Exhibit Def−28, # 72 Exhibit Def−29) (TMR). (Attachment 37 replaced on 1/25/2018) (KAH). (Entered: 02/03/2017)
272 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge John W. deGravelles: Jury Trial held on 1/30/2017.Status Conference was held prior to start of jury trial. Previous 170 RULING is reversed, and Plaintiff's claims under Monell are DISMISSED with prejudice. Parties agreed Plaintiff's Request for Injuctive Relief should be decided by the Court not the jury and it is taken under advisement. Pending motions were discussed. For oral reasons assigned the 254 Motion to Request Judicial Notice is DENIED. An Order of Sequestration was issued. Jurors were chosen and given instructions by the Court. It was determined that Plaintiff will be allowed to have both hands un−restrained during his testimony. Jury was escorted in, stipulations read and exhibits filed. Counsel presented opening arguments. Outside presence of jury, two Motions for Mistrial were DENIED. Plaintiff's oral motion to have stipulations submitted to the jury as an exhibit was GRANTED. Witnesses were sworn and testified. Jury was excused until 9:30 AM on 1/31/2017. For oral reasons 247 Motion in Limine is DENED. The 255 Motion as to Kenneth Norris is DISMISSED as moot and 256 Motion to add Unredacted Cataract List to Exhibit List is DENIED. (Court Reporter G. Delatte−Richard.) Pursuant to Local Rules, offering parties shall retain custody of exhibits.(LLH) (Entered: 02/07/2017)
264 ORDER: All witnesses shall be sequestered during the course of this trial.It shall be the responsibility of the lawyers to give a copy of this order to each of their respective witnesses. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 1/30/2017. (LLH) (Entered: 01/31/2017)
265 ORDER granting 261 Motion to Strike 261 document 259 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion . Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 01/31/2017. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (KDC) (Entered: 01/31/2017)
266 NOTICE of Filing of Letter Brief re Verdict Form by Jason Hacker (Most, William) (Entered: 01/31/2017)
273 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge John W. deGravelles: Jury Trial held on 1/31/2017. The jury trial continues. Outside of the presence of the jury, Plaintiff's Request for Injunctive Relief is denied as moot. The Cataract Chart was entered into evidence. Witnesses were sworn and testified. Plaintiff's Exibit 101 B and the Testimony of Dr. Singh as to the exhibit was present Under Seal and admitted into evidence Under Seal. Dr. Bell was qualified and an Expert. The Jury was excused until 9:00 AM on 2/1/2017. (Court Reporter G. Delatte−Richard.) Pursuant to Local Rules, offering parties shall retain custody of exhibits.(LLH) (Entered: 02/07/2017)
267 RESPONSE to 266 Notice of (other) Letter Brief re Verdict Form filed by N. Burl Cain, John Bel Edwards, James M. LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, State of Louisiana. (Blanchfield, Andrew) (Entered: 02/01/2017)

02/01/2017 02/01/2017
02/02/2017
02/02/2017
02/06/2017 02/07/2017 02/07/2017 02/07/2017 02/07/2017 02/13/2017
02/17/2017 02/20/2017

268 NOTICE of Corresponding Numbers Between Exhibits and Jury Benchbook by Jason Hacker (Most, William) (Entered: 02/01/2017)
274 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge John W. deGravelles: Jury Trial held on 2/1/2017. The jury trial continues. Plaintiff's motion to admit evidence was granted prior to jury entering the courtroom. Plaintiff is sworn and testifies. Plaintiff rests. Defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff's Eighth Amendent claims against John Bel Edwards, James LeBlanc and N. Burl Cain. The Rule 50 motion is Granted as it relates to John Bel Edwards. Witnesses were sworn and testified. Defendants rest. Plaintiff moved for judgment as a matter of law. The Motion was denied, the State of Louisiana is dismissed in this matter. Counsel presented closing arguments. The Jury was charged and excused to return for deliberations at 9:30 AM on 2/2/2017. A change on the grounds of nominal damages was discussed but ultimately withdrawn by defendants. (Court Reporter G. Delatte−Richard.) Pursuant to Local Rules, offering parties shall retain custody of exhibits.(LLH) (Entered: 02/07/2017)
269 SEALED ELECTRONIC EXHIBITS for hearing dated 01/30/2017. (NLT) (Main Document 269 replaced on 11/6/2017) (KDC). (Additional attachment(s) added on 11/16/2017: # 1 Exhibit Pla−1, # 2 Exhibit Pla−2, # 3 Exhibit Pla−3, # 4 Exhibit Pla−4, # 5 Exhibit Pla−5, # 6 Exhibit Pla−6, # 7 Exhibit Pla−7, # 8 Exhibit Pla−8, # 9 Exhibit Pla−9, # 10 Exhibit Pla−10, # 11 Exhibit Pla−22, # 12 Exhibit Pla−54, # 13 Exhibit Pla−81, # 14 Exhibit Pla−101B) (TMR). (Entered: 02/02/2017)
275 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge John W. deGravelles: Jury Trial held on 2/2/2017. Jury Trial Continues. Plaintiff's motion to seal exhibits identified in Open Court is GRANTED. The jury is escourted into the courtroom and given instructions on the concordance table. Jury is excused to begin deliberations. A verdict was confirmed, each juror was polled individually and the jury was thanked and excused. (Court Reporter G. Delatte−Richard.) Pursuant to Local Rules, offering parties shall retain custody of exhibits.(LLH) (Entered: 02/07/2017)
271 In Forma Pauperis REQUEST for Trial TRANSCRIPT by Jason Hacker for proceedings held on 1/30/2017 to 2/2/2017 before Judge Judge deGravelles.. (Attachments: # 1 Transcript Request Form)(Most, William) Modified on 2/7/2017 to edit the text (NLT). (Entered: 02/06/2017)
276 Jury Notes. (LLH) (Entered: 02/07/2017)
277 JURY VERDICT FORM. (LLH) (Entered: 02/07/2017)
278 JUDGMENT is hereby rendered in favor of Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, State of Louisiana, James M. LeBlanc, John Bel Edwards, N. Burl Cain against Jason Hacker, dismissing this matter with prejudice. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 2/6/2017. (LLH) (Entered: 02/07/2017)
279 SEALED Jury Verdict Form. (LLH) (Entered: 02/07/2017)
280 ORDER as to 271 Transcript Request filed by Jason Hacker: The Plaintiff's In Forma Pauperis Request for Trial Transcript (Doc. 271) is denied without prejudice. Plaintiff is directed to 28 U.S.C. Section 753(f) and will be given leave to show cause, if any he can, why his request complies with the requirements of this provision or why he is otherwise entitled to the relief sought. The parties are advised that the estimated cost to prepare the transcript within 30 days is $2,502.50. An expedited transcript would cost approximately $3,100.00 and could be prepared in 14 days. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 02/13/2017. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.)(KDC) (Entered: 02/13/2017)
281 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion to Certify that Plaintiff's Appeal is not Frivolous and REQUEST for a Trial Transcript at No Cost to Him (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Draft Order)(Most, William) Modified on 2/17/2017 to edit the text (KAH). Modified on 2/17/2017 (NLT). (Entered: 02/17/2017)
282 REPLY Brief to 281 Motion to Certify that Plaintiff's Appeal is not Frivolous and Request for a Trial Transcript at No Cost to Him filed by N. Burl Cain, James M. LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola. (Blanchfield, Andrew) Modified on 2/21/2017 to edit text.

02/21/2017
02/21/2017 02/22/2017 02/23/2017 03/02/2017 03/02/2017 03/02/2017 03/03/2017
03/03/2017
03/21/2017 03/23/2017 03/23/2017

(EDC). (Entered: 02/20/2017)
283 NOTICE of ABBREVIATED Briefing Schedule on 281 REQUEST for a Trial Transcript at No Cost to Him : Opposition to the motion shall be filed within 10 days from the filing of the motion and shall not exceed 10 pages excluding attachments. The mover may file a reply brief within 5 days of the filing of the opposition and shall be limited to a total of 5 pages. No motion for leave will be required. Sur−Reply briefs will be permitted only with leave of Court for extraordinary reasons supported by sufficient facts. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (KDC) (Entered: 02/21/2017)
284 REPLY In Support of Motion to Certify That Plaintiff's Appeal is not Frivolous And Request for a Trial Transcript at Not Cost to Him filed by Jason Hacker. (Most, William) Modified on 2/22/2017 to edit text (ELW). Modified on 2/23/2017 to replace doc as per Order #286 (LLH). (Entered: 02/21/2017)
285 MOTION to Strike 284 Reply to Response to Motion by Jason Hacker. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Draft Order, # 3 Exhibit A)(Most, William) (Entered: 02/22/2017)
286 ORDER granting 285 Motion to Strike and Replace 284 Reply with Exhibit A. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 2/23/2017. (LLH) (Entered: 02/23/2017)
287 RULING granting 281 Motion and Memorandum in Support of Motion to Certify that Plaintiff's Appeal is not Frivolous and REQUEST for a Trial Transcript at No Cost to Him. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 3/1/2017. (LLH) (Entered: 03/02/2017)
288 MOTION for New Trial and Renewed Judgment as a Matter of Law by Jason Hacker. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Draft Order)(Most, William) (Entered: 03/02/2017)
289 MOTION to Supplement the Motion for New Trial and Renewed Judgment as a Matter of Law Once Trial Transcript is Received by Jason Hacker. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Draft Order)(Most, William) Modified on 3/3/2017 to edit text. (EDC). (Entered: 03/02/2017)
290 NOTICE of Briefing Schedule on 288 MOTION for New Trial and Renewed Judgment as a Matter of Law : Opposition to the motion shall be filed within 21 days from the filing of the motion and shall not exceed 10 pages excluding attachments. The mover may file a reply brief within 14 days of the filing of the opposition and shall be limited to a total of 5 pages. No motion for leave will be required. Sur−Reply briefs will be permitted only with leave of Court for extraordinary reasons supported by sufficient facts. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.)(KDC) (Entered: 03/03/2017)
291 ORDER granting 289 MOTION to Supplement the Motion for New Trial and Renewed Judgment as a Matter of Law Once Trial Transcript is Received filed by Jason Hacker. Plaintiff shall have twenty−one days to supplement his Motion for a New Trial and Renewed Judgment as a Matter of Law after receiving the transcript of trial. Defendant shall also have twenty−one days to supplement its Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial and Renewed Judgment as a Matter of Law after receiving the transcript of trial. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 03/03/2017. (EDC) (Entered: 03/03/2017)
292 TRANSCRIPT REQUEST by Jason Hacker for proceedings held on 1/30/2017 to 2/2/2017 before Judge Judge deGravelles.. (Most, William) Modified on 3/28/2017 to replace document as per Order #302 and edit text (LLH). (Entered: 03/21/2017)
293 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to 288 MOTION for New Trial and Renewed Judgment as a Matter of Law filed by N. Burl Cain, James M. LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola. (Blanchfield, Andrew) (Entered: 03/23/2017)
294 MOTION to Substitute R. Doc. 292 by Jason Hacker. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading;, # 2 Draft Order)(Most, William) Modified on 3/23/2017 to edit text. (EDC). (Entered: 03/23/2017)

03/23/2017 295 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of Jury Trial Vol. I before Judge John W. deGravelles held on Jan. 30, 2017. Court Reporter: Gina Delatte−Richard. Phone Number: 225−389−3564.

NOTICE RE: REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. The policy is located on our website at www.lamd.uscourts.gov.

03/23/2017

Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER.. Redaction Request due 4/10/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/20/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/19/2017. (Delatte−Richard, Gina) (Entered: 03/23/2017)
296 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of Jury Trial Vol. II before Judge John W. deGravelles held on Jan. 31, 2017. Court Reporter: Gina Delatte−Richard. Phone Number: 225−389−3564.

NOTICE RE: REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. The policy is located on our website at www.lamd.uscourts.gov.

03/23/2017

Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER.. Redaction Request due 4/10/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/20/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/19/2017. (Delatte−Richard, Gina) (Entered: 03/23/2017)
297 SEALED TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on Jan. 31, 2017 before Judge John W. deGravelles

NOTICE RE: REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. The policy is located on our website at www.lamd.uscourts.gov.

03/23/2017

. (Delatte−Richard, Gina) Modified on 3/27/2017 to edit the text(NLT). (Entered: 03/23/2017)
298 SEALED TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on Jan. 31, 2017 held before Judge John W. deGravelles

NOTICE RE: REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. The policy is located on our website at www.lamd.uscourts.gov.

03/23/2017

. (Delatte−Richard, Gina) Modified on 3/27/2017 to edit the text (NLT). (Entered: 03/23/2017)
299 SEALED TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on Jan. 31, 2017 before Judge John W. deGravelles

NOTICE RE: REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. The policy is located on our website at www.lamd.uscourts.gov.

03/23/2017

. (Delatte−Richard, Gina) Modified on 3/27/2017 to edit the text (NLT). (Entered: 03/23/2017)
300 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of Jury Trial Proceedings before Judge John W. deGravelles held on February 1, 2017. Court Reporter: Gina Delatte−Richard. Phone Number: 225−389−3564.

NOTICE RE: REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. The policy is located on our website at www.lamd.uscourts.gov.

03/23/2017

Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER.. Redaction Request due 4/10/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/20/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/19/2017. (Delatte−Richard, Gina) (Entered: 03/23/2017)
301 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of Jury Trial Proceedings before Judge John W. deGravelles held on February 2, 2017. Court Reporter: Gina Delatte−Richard. Phone Number: 225−389−3564.

NOTICE RE: REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. The policy is located on our website at www.lamd.uscourts.gov.

03/24/2017 04/13/2017 04/13/2017 04/17/2017 04/17/2017 04/17/2017

Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER.. Redaction Request due 4/10/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/20/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/19/2017. (Delatte−Richard, Gina) (Entered: 03/23/2017)
302 ORDER granting 294 Motion to Substitute R. Doc. 292. The Court orders that the document attached to the Motion to Substitute R. Doc. 292 shall replace the document filed as R. Doc. 292. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 03/24/2017. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (KDC) (Entered: 03/24/2017)
303 Supplemental MEMORANDUM in Support of 288 MOTION for New Trial and Renewed Judgment as a Matter of Law filed by Jason Hacker. (Most, William) (Entered: 04/13/2017)
304 Supplemental MEMORANDUM in Opposition to 288 MOTION for New Trial and Renewed Judgment as a Matter of Law filed by N. Burl Cain, James M. LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola. (Blanchfield, Andrew) (Entered: 04/13/2017)
305 NOTICE OF NON−COMPLIANCE with LR 7(g) as to 304 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion. REQUIRED CORRECTION: A combined Motion for Leave to Exceed the Page Limits and Motion to Strike the Incorrect Pleading must filed within 24 hours of this notice. Otherwise, the original filing may be stricken by the Court without further notice. (EDC) (Entered: 04/17/2017)
306 NOTICE OF NON−COMPLIANCE with LR 7(g) as to 303 Memorandum in Support of Motion. REQUIRED CORRECTION: A combined Motion for Leave to Exceed the Page Limits and Motion to Strike the Incorrect Pleading must filed within 24 hours of this notice. Otherwise, the original filing may be stricken by the Court without further notice. (ELW) (Entered: 04/17/2017)
307 Ex Parte MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages IMPOSED BY LOCAL RULE 7(G) by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading;)(Blanchfield, Andrew) Modified on 4/17/2017 to edit text (LLH). (Entered: 04/17/2017)

04/17/2017 04/18/2017
04/18/2017
08/07/2017 08/16/2017 08/21/2017 08/23/2017
10/30/2017 11/03/2017 12/29/2017
01/03/2018 01/03/2018 01/04/2018
01/16/2018 02/06/2018 02/16/2018

308 MOTION to Strike 303 Memorandum in Support of Motion and File Memorandum in Excess of Page Limit by Jason Hacker. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Proposed Pleading;, # 3 Draft Order)(Most, William) (Entered: 04/17/2017)
309 ORDER granting 307 Motion for Leave to File Brief (Doc. 304) in Excess Pages. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 04/18/2017. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (KDC) (Entered: 04/18/2017)
310 ORDER granting 308 Motion to file Memorandum(Doc. 303) in Excess of Page Limit. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 04/18/2017. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (KDC) (Entered: 04/18/2017)
311 Letter to Attorney concerning the disposition of sealed documents in this case. (Attachments: # 1 General Order 93−1) (TMR) (Entered: 08/07/2017)
312 Consent MOTION To Keep Case Open and Files Sealed by Jason Hacker. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Draft Order)(Most, William) (Entered: 08/16/2017)
313 ORDER granting Consent 312 Motion To Keep Case Open and Files Sealed. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 8/18/17. (DCB) (Entered: 08/21/2017)
314 AMENDED ORDER : The portion of the Courts 313 ORDER, that states the above−captioned case shall not be listed as closed on PACER is vacated, and this matter shall remain a closed case on the Court's docket even though there is a pending for a new trial in this matter. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 8/23/2017. (LLH) (Entered: 08/23/2017)
315 ORDER denying 288 Motion for New Trial. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 10/30/2017. (KDC) (Entered: 10/30/2017)
316 NOTICE OF APPEAL to the USCA for the 5th Circuit of 278 Judgment, by Jason Hacker. (Adcock, John) (Entered: 11/03/2017)
317 STRICKEN FROM THE RECORD MOTION for Plaintiff to Proceed In Forma Pauperis on Appeal with Statement of Account by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Prisoner Statement of Account)(Adcock, John) Modified on 1/2/2018 to edit text. (EDC). Modified on 1/4/2018 to remove document as it ahs been stricken (LLH). (Entered: 12/29/2017)
318 MOTION to Strike 317 MOTION to Proceed In Forma Pauperis with Statement of Account by Jason Hacker. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support)(Adcock, John) (Entered: 01/03/2018)
Notice of Payment of $505.00 Appeal Filing Fee by Jason Hacker. Filing fee $ 505, receipt number 053N−1693973. (Adcock, John) (Entered: 01/03/2018)
319 ORDER granting 318 Motion to Strike 317 MOTION to Proceed In Forma Pauperis with Statement of Account. Filing fee has been paid.. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 01/04/2018. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (KDC) (Entered: 01/04/2018)
320 USCA Case Number 17−30879 for 316 Notice of Appeal to the USCA for the 5th Circuit filed by Jason Hacker. (KAH) (Entered: 01/16/2018)
Record on Appeal #17−30879 Electronically Certified regarding 316 Notice of Appeal to the USCA for the 5th Circuit. US Court of Appeals notified of certification. (KAH) (Entered: 02/06/2018)
321 Electronic Access to the Record on Appeal is now available to Andrew Blanchfield through the Court of Appeals CM/ECF document filing system. Instructions for accessing the record can be found at www.ca5.uscourts.gov/attorneys/attorney−forms/eroa_downloads. Request for paper exhibits in addition to the record on appeal and shipping information should be faxed to the clerks office at 225−389−3501. The clerk of court will retain the responsibility of sending the record to the 5th Circuit upon their request. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (KAH)

02/21/2018 04/16/2018 01/18/2019

(Entered: 02/16/2018)
322 Electronic Access to the Record on Appeal is now available to John Nelson Adcock through the Court of Appeals CM/ECF document filing system. Instructions for accessing the record can be found at www.ca5.uscourts.gov/attorneys/attorney−forms/eroa_downloads. Request for paper exhibits in addition to the record on appeal and shipping information should be faxed to the clerks office at 225−389−3501. The clerk of court will retain the responsibility of sending the record to the 5th Circuit upon their request. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (KAH) (Entered: 02/21/2018)
323 Electronic Access to the Record on Appeal is now available to Samuel Weiss through the Court of Appeals CM/ECF document filing system. Instructions for accessing the record can be found at www.ca5.uscourts.gov/attorneys/attorney−forms/eroa_downloads. Request for paper exhibits in addition to the record on appeal and shipping information should be faxed to the clerks office at 225−389−3501. The clerk of court will retain the responsibility of sending the record to the 5th Circuit upon their request. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (KAH) (Entered: 04/16/2018)
324 MANDATE of USCA as to 316 Notice of Appeal to the USCA for the 5th Circuit filed by Jason Hacker. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. (KAH) (Entered: 01/18/2019)

 
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2016 WL 3167176 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, M.D. Louisiana.
Jason Hacker, Plaintiff, v.
N. Burl Cain et al., Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION No. 3:14-00063-JWD-EWD |
Signed 06/06/2016
Attorneys and Law Firms
John Nelson Adcock, Law Offices of John N. Adcock, William Most, Law Office of William Most, Nicholas J. Trenticosta, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff.
Andrew Blanchfield, Crews Reynolds LeBlanc, Jr., Keogh, Cox & Wilson, Ltd., Babatunde Mobolade Animashaun, Grant Lloyd Willis, LA Department of Justice, Office of Attorney General, Brent Joseph Cobb, Baton Rouge, LA, for Defendants.
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
JOHN W. deGRAVELLES, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
I. INTRODUCTION *1 Before the Court are dueling dispositive motions, with each party seeking judgement in its favor pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.1 Mr. Jason Hacker (“Hacker” or “Plaintiff”) has filed the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Plaintiff’s MSJ”). (Doc. 148.) To this filing, six natural and artificial persons—the former warden of Louisiana State Penitentiary, Mr. N. Burl Cain
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(“Former Warden” or “Cain”); Louisiana State Penitentiary itself (“LSP” or “Angola”); the State of Louisiana (“Louisiana” or “State”); the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections (“LDPSC”); the former governor of Louisiana, the Honorable Bobby Jindal (“Jindal”); and the Secretary of LDPSC, Mr. James M. LeBlanc (“LeBlanc” or “Secretary”) (collectively, “Defendants”)—have responded with Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Defendants’ Opposition”). (Doc. 151.) In response, Hacker has defended his motion with the Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Defendants’ Reply”). (Doc. 155.) Prior to the docketing of Plaintiff’s MSJ, Defendants filed the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“Defendants’ MSJ”), (Doc. 122), to which Plaintiff has responded with Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“Plaintiffs’ Opposition”), (Doc. 130), with thousands of pages of supporting exhibits docketed separately, (Docs. 126–28). In these varied motions (collectively, “Motions”), each party insists that no reasonable jury could disagree that the uncontested facts favor his or its victory as to every claim or defense asserted pursuant to controlling constitutional and statutory law, including the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution; the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended in 2008 (“ADA”); Section 5042 of the Rehabilitation Act of 19733 (“RA”); the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”); and Section 1983 of the Forty– Second Title of the United States Code.4 Despite this seeming complexity, once these sprawling motions are distilled to their bare essentials, four questions must be asked, their answers leaving no doubt about their required resolution under Rule 56.
*2 The answers to the first two compel denial of Defendants’ MSJ. First, have Defendants shown that no genuine dispute exists as to the propriety of Plaintiff’s medical treatment, the facts incontestably demonstrating that he never endured medical indifference of such extent and incontrovertibility as to offend the Eighth Amendment? Second, have they demonstrated a similarly indisputable absence of
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reasonably construed evidence demonstrating that Plaintiff suffered disability discrimination in contravention of the ADA/RA? The answer to both questions is “no.” Considered in toto, the existing record does not establish the certain impossibility of a jury reaching a reasonable verdict as these issues and in Plaintiff’s favor. Thus, Defendants’ MSJ must be denied.
Just as clearly, subject to the same limits imposed by Rule 56, the necessary answers to the second two questions lead to the defeat of Plaintiff’s MSJ. First, has Plaintiff provided incontrovertible proof compelling a favorable judgment on his Eighth Amendment claim, proof that no jury could reject and which no doubt infects? Second, has Plaintiff also offered up indisputable proof of the kind of discrimination barred by the RA/ADA so that judgment in his favor must now be ordered by this Court, no fair dispute as to this fact even remotely possible? The answer to both questions is “no,” as the record can be reasonably, if barely, construed in Defendants’ favor. Therefore, Plaintiff’s MSJ must fail.
For these reasons, as discussed in more detail below, the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. 148), and the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. 122), must both be rejected, the factual issues too many and too crucial for anyone but a jury to make the necessary calls.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Facts Summarized in First Complaint5 Plaintiff filed his first complaint on January 30, 2014. (Doc. 1.) It lists several different persons as Defendants: Louisiana; LDPSC; LSP; Jindal, Cain, and LeBlanc, in both their official and individual capacities; Dr. Rahm Singh, LSP’s medical director; and Ms. Stephanie Lamartiniere, LSP’s assistant warden. (Id.) The latter two persons disappeared from Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, (Doc. 19 at 1), having been terminated on September 15, 2014, by Plaintiff’s filing of this pleading, (Id.), and thereby rendering at least part of Defendants’ MSJ irrelevant, (See Doc. 122-2 at 13–14).
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In this first attempt, Plaintiff characterized his central claim as the unreasonable and unjustifiable denial of “adequate medical care,” averring “that the Defendants have been deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs[,] resulting in unnecessary pain and suffering and loss of sight in violation of the Eighth Amendment.” (Doc. 1 at 4.) As the PLRA commands, Plaintiff had formally tendered “Request for Administrative Remedy” (“ARP”) as a result of these “systemic deficiencies and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.” (Id. at 11.) This request was denied at the first and second steps, this second denial exhausting his remedies and triggering his right to sue in federal court. (Id.)
During his incarceration, Plaintiff’s eyesight noticeably worsened. After four trips to an outside eye specialist at the Pennington Biomedical Research Center at Louisiana State University (“LSU”), an unnamed doctor diagnosed him with “severe cataracts in both eyes.” (Id. at 11.) Subsequently, he visited one more eye specialist at LSP. (Id. at 12.) At that time, he complained “that he could not see and that his right eye was failing at what seemed like an even greater rate [than] when first seen.” (Id.) Afterward, pursuant to this second physician’s recommendations and with the LSP’s facilitation, Plaintiff met an eye specialist at the Charity Hospital in New Orleans. (Id.) During this visit, Plaintiff maintains, “th[is] specialist assured Plaintiff that he would inform the Medical Director at LSP of his need for ‘immediate cataract surgery in both eyes.’ ” (Id.) According to Plaintiff’s account, he added “that he would include the fact that Plaintiff’s cataract condition was the reason for him going blind and that surgery would ‘correct and restore’ his vision.” (Id.) During these numerous visits, not one specialist failed to note Plaintiff’s increasingly poor eyesight and his “need” for surgery, but not one described cataracts removal surgery as either purely “elective” or as medically and immediately imperative as that ambiguous classification has been delineated by LSP and LDPSC. (See also Doc. 148-1 at 23–26; Doc. 151 at 9 n.2.)
*3 Meanwhile, Plaintiff’s life continued mostly unchanged in spite of this diagnosed physical deterioration. On or about May 6, 2013, while assigned to “a field line,” Plaintiff was ordered to
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perform “regular duty.” (Id.) At that point, Plaintiff “declared himself a medical emergency” and “explained to the EMT that he could only see six to eight feet in his left eye, and that he practically had no sight in his right eye.” (Id.) Allegedly, he also “explained to the [same] EMT that, as he understood the [third] specialist, he was supposed to receive eye surgery.” (Id.) During that same colloquy, Plaintiff “complained that, after his visit with the eye specialist, he was not issued a duty status for his medical condition.” (Id.) On May 16, 2013, Plaintiff “again declared himself a medical emergency,” specifically complaining of “pain and burning in his eyes, his inability to see, and his inability to perform his work detail as would someone without a disability.” (Id. at 12–13.) As a result of these physical complaints, implicitly, albeit temporarily, credited by prison officials, Plaintiff again received “a three day duty status.” (Id. at 13.) Again “informed that his concern would be referred,” Plaintiff wondered, “[f]or the second time,” why his failing eye sight had not yet resulted in his receipt of “standard duty status.” (Id.)
In June of 2013, an LSP doctor finally saw Plaintiff. (Id.) This doctor allegedly determined Plaintiff to have become “legally blind” rather “quickly.” (Id.) Unfortunately (and purportedly), he simultaneously informed Plaintiff that no surgery would be scheduled due to a dearth of funds. (Id.) This specialist apparently blamed “the LSP Medical Director,” who had once said “that the only way ... [Plaintiff] would receive ... eye surgery is if he was ‘bleeding from the eyes’ or if it was a life or death situation.” (Id.) It did not matter that “without the needed surgery ... [Plaintiff’s] medical condition would worsen and result in a lifelong handicap with permanent loss of sight.” (Id.) A similar conversation occurred when Plaintiff visited an LSP eye doctor in August 2013. (Id.) His state, though purportedly dire, “was not a life or death situation” for which funds, presently unavailable, would be spent to correct. (Id.) Policy, not necessarily a doctor’s objective medical opinion, lay behind this decision, so Plaintiff then said and still claims. (Id.)
Due to these “intentional inordinate delays, and [Defendants’] knowing denial of needed medical care,” Plaintiff suffered “continued pain, both physical and mental.” (Id.) He, in fact, bore a
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grievous and confirmable physical deterioration: legal blindness, a condition evidenced by the medical documents created and maintained by LSP and its appointed doctors. (Id.) In this first complaint, his denial of medical care “based upon cost/lack of funds” was described as a violation of the Eighth Amendment because Defendants were “deliberate[ly] indifferen[t] to his serious medical needs.” (Id. at 14.) No other law, including the ADA and RA, appears in this first pleading.
B. Story Expanded: The Amended Complaint Plaintiff filed the operative complaint (“Amended Complaint”) on June 2, 2015. (Doc. 73.)
The Amended Complaint initially supplements and corrects Plaintiff’s timeline. According to this filing, “[o]n June 24, 2012, Interim LSU Hospital Personnel recommended ... [Plaintiff] receive cataract surgery and that a special follow-up is needed for cataract surgery,” a need for which Defendants were allegedly informed. (Id. at 4.) In the fall of 2012, Plaintiff was seen at the Earl K. Long Eye Clinic. (Id.) During this visit, he was diagnosed with cataracts; “[u]pon his return [to Angola], [D]efendants were notified that Mr. Hacker should be referred to Interim LSU Hospital for cataract removal surgery.” (Id.) In January 2013, a doctor in Angola saw Plaintiff for his rapidly declining eye sight and “scheduled Mr. Hacker to see an eye specialist outside Angola.” (Id. at 5.) In April 2013, “cataract extraction surgery” was recommended once “approved by the ‘prison board.’ ” (Id.) Despite this qualifier, Plaintiff described this recommendation as one for “immediate cataracts surgery in both eyes” and as deeming surgery “medically necessary.” (Id.) As he had previously contended, on May 6 and 13, 2013, Defendants did no more than “provide[ ] [P]laintiff[ ] with a threeday duty status” but did not “issue[ ] a permanent duty status” or schedule him for cataracts surgery. (Id. at 6–7.) Though a prison doctor would indicate that Plaintiff “needed a duty status consisting of[ ] ‘sit to work, out of field, no sports, no hobbycraft, no rodeo and no kitchen’ ” in late May 2013, Defendants ignored these directions. (Id. at 7.) Indeed, in July 2013, Plaintiff was still being forced to work in the fields, no surgery yet scheduled,
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though he was deemed “legally blind” by Angola personnel. (Id.) Oddly, Plaintiff “was given a temporary duty status that entailed the following: ‘Regular duty with restrictions ...’ ” but his duty status “reverted back” to its original state after three days. (Id.)
*4 In the fall of 2013, he again temporarily received a modified duty status consistent with his doctors’ recommendations. (Id. at 7–8.) In effect, Defendants’ denial of surgery in this case, as in so many others, was “not based on sound medical science” nor “made on an individualized basis according to the particular medical condition of a specific prisoner.” (Id. at 10.) Eventually, in the summer and fall of 2014 and roughly one month after Plaintiff obtained private counsel, Plaintiff did receive surgery on his right and left eyes. (Id. at 9; see also, e.g., Doc. 155 at 3–4.)
In two paragraphs, the Amended Complaint contains explicit statements regarding the extent to which his untreated cataracts engendered Plaintiff’s physical suffering. As he awaited surgery, Plaintiff allegedly endured “severe pain” in both eyes. (Id. at 6.) He had “blurred vision” and “trouble seeing far away.” (Id.) On at least one occasion, Plaintiff was injured in the field as a result of his deficient sight. (Id.) As he tells it, when “a hay bail was thrown in his direction,” he “could not ascertain the distance of the bail, its direction of travel, nor its location when he tried to catch it.” (Id.) “[H]aving failed to catch it correctly, he tore his right pectoralis muscle.” (Id.) In contrast, the first complaint had avoided such precision, though it too alleged the existence of “continued pain, both physical and mental.” (Doc. 1 at 13.)
Significantly, the Amended Complaint adds a second basis for relief. Plaintiff, of course, repeats his Eighth Amendment claim, accusing Defendants of being “deliberately indifferent to ... [his] serious medical needs by refusing to pay for eye surgery for a reasonable amount of time after doctors recommended eye surgery for his cataracts” and despite knowing of his cataracts “and its devastating effect on his eye sight.” (Id. at 12.) Plaintiff now goes further, however, by contending that Defendants discriminated against him, a qualified individual with a disability, in violation of the ADA
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and RA. (Id. at 11.) The specific ADA and RA violations alleged are Defendants’ refusal to provide Plaintiff with cataracts extraction surgery and exclusion of Plaintiff “from participation in or denial of the benefits of the prison’s services, programs, or activities” by virtue of their failure to accommodate his specialized needs. (Id. at 11–12.)
C. Contested Timeline and Extant Policy To an extent, based on both Parties’ filings, a timeline can be fashioned. (See, e.g., Doc. 148-1; Doc. 151-1.) Thus, the dates of doctors’ visits can be confirmed, but the precise import of every diagnosis remains contested. (See, e.g., Doc. 148-1; Doc. 1511.) Simply put, the Parties continue to dispute the extent to which the medical record made it patently clear that cataract removal surgery was so essential that its delay bordered on and eventually demonstrated Defendants’ indifference.
In contrast, the language of two general policies is not in question. Per LDPSC’s Health Care Policy No. HC-16, dated August 27, 2010, a “medically necessary procedure” is defined as “[t]reatments/procedures routinely prescribed by health care providers to maintain/preserve basic health and/or functionality.” (Doc. 126-7 (Ex. G) ¶ 3D, at 1.) It further defines an “[e]lective procedure” as “[a]ny planned” and “non-emergency procedure”; though so deemed, “[tha]t may be either medically necessary (e.g., cataract surgery, routinely scheduled heart surgery, etc.) or optional (e.g., cosmetic, etc.).” (Id. ¶ 3A, at 1.) LSP’s Directive Number 13.030 uses the same definitions: an elective procedure can be “medically necessary” or “optional” yet still be “non-emergency” and even “planned.” (Doc. 126-6 (Ex. E), at 1.)
D. Defendants’ MSJ: Arguments and Counterarguments
1. Immunities *5 Defendants’ MSJ begins with three common immunity arguments. First, Defendants argue that Cain, LeBlanc, and Jindal are not liable under Section 1983 for monetary damages, as a state is not
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a person for purposes of Section 1983, nor are state officials acting in their official capacities. (Doc. 1222 at 7.) In particular, Defendants insist the Plaintiff has failed to allege any personal act by Cain, LeBlanc, and Jindal that violated his constitutional rights. (Id.) This failure is fatal since, argue these Defendants, to be liable under Section 1983 either a defendant must be personally involved in the act depriving the constitutional right or Plaintiff must show a causal connection between any one of his or her acts and the constitutional violation to be redressed. (Id.) Since the acts of the employees and subordinates of the Defendants cannot be imputed to these three Defendants, they are immune. (Id. at 9– 12)
Second, every natural Defendant claims that he is entitled to qualified immunity, insisting the Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the first prong of the requisite two prong test. (Id. at 8.) As the Defendant’s MSJ explains, “Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for a violation of a right secured to him under the United States constitution” and “makes no specific allegations of any personal act by these defendants that violated his constitutional rights.” (Id.) Third, Defendants argue that Louisiana, LSP, and LDPSC are protected by sovereign immunity absent consent by the state or congressional action abrogating such immunity. (Id. at 29.)
The Plaintiff attacks the bases for these supposed immunities. First, he emphasizes that the theory under which he commenced his suit as to Cain, Jindal, and LeBlanc is the doctrine of liability allowed in Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed. 2d 611 (1978). (Doc. 130 at 5–6.) As this doctrine requires, see infra Part IV.A.3, Plaintiff contends that Defendants have a policy of delaying medically necessary “elective surgery” that has been followed for years (Id.) The Plaintiff insists he will be able to show a pattern of these delays and that the Defendants have failed to show that Plaintiff is alleging only a “single wrongful act,” thereby triggering this form of liability. (Id. at 6–7.)
In making this argument the Plaintiff sets forth the following evidence: a policy that defines certain “medically necessary” surgeries as “elective,” one followed by LSP and LDPSC; medical records of six
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other inmates who have been referred for cataract surgery but not yet received it, three others who are still waiting for surgical referrals, and one more who obtained essential surgery only after an extensive delay; and a string of cases evidencing, on the basis of analogous facts, that a policy of delaying medically-needed surgery could be seen as deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s serious medical needs by a reasonable group of empaneled citizens. (Id. at 6–9.) Even apart from this invocation of Monell, Plaintiff denies that Jindal, Cain, and LeBlanc are entitled to qualified immunity. (Id. at 35.) In his view, neither prong of the pertinent test favors these three Defendants, as his constitutional right to barely adequate medical care was wellestablished when surgery was first recommended on June 24, 2012. (Id.) Third, Plaintiff argues the immunity has been waived for purposes of the RA/ADA since the other Defendants—Louisiana, LSP, and LDPSC—receive federal funds. (See Doc. 130 at 16.)
2. Eighth Amendment Thereafter, Defendants contend no evidence shows that any single one of them was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s obvious and established medical needs. (Doc. 122-2 at 16–18.) Pointing out that Plaintiff was under constant medical supervision, as evidenced by his own medical records, Defendants maintain that Plaintiff’s minimal medical needs were not ignored. (Id. at 18– 21.) Consequently, while Plaintiff has alleged he suffered unconstitutional indifference, “the evidence is overwhelming to the contrary.” (Id. at 16.)
*6 Plaintiff responds that a reasonable jury could find the Defendant’s actions constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. (Doc. 130 at 9.) Plaintiff points out that courts have repeatedly found that delaying surgery for medical procedures deemed “elective” as a matter of policy can constitute unconstitutionally deliberate indifference. (Id. at 10.) Certainly, making Hacker “wait[ ] 813 days for surgery to be completed, despite doctors insisting that he need surgery ‘as soon as possible,’ ” facts supported by the existing record, could be enough to convince a reasonable jury to find Defendants’ policy in general and delay as to Plaintiff in
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particular constituted the kind of deliberate medical indifference plainly forbidden by the Eighth Amendment. (Id. at 11.) Additional support for such a conclusion could be found in one more uncontested fact: LSP required Hacker to do field work, though he was legally blind according to its black-letter files, a decision that could not only be regarded as a danger to his health. (Id.) Indeed, Plaintiff was arguably injured during the field-work due in part to his poor vision. (Id.; see also, e.g., Doc. 148-1 at 30–33.)
3. RA/ADA Defendants’ attack begins with the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement,6 arguing that Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to his RA/ADA claim. (Doc. 122 at 21.) Indeed, they contend that no record exists indicating that Hacker gave notice to any of the Defendants regarding the allegations contained in his ARP, which bears the designation “LSP – 2013-2554,” regarding this particular claim. (Id. at 27.) Since the ARP process is mandatory and access to inmate counsel is available for assistance in completing the process, Plaintiff’s failure cannot be excused. (Id. at 27–28.) Indeed, while the Amended Complaint included these new RA/ADA allegations, it made no mention of exhaustion. (Id. at 28.) Defendants conclude the MSJ by arguing that “[t]he court should dismiss the [P]laintiff’s silent claim on ADA based on his failure to plead the exhaustion of his ADA claim in his administrative remedies.” (Id.)
The Plaintiff counters that Defendants have read the PLRA’s exhaustion standard too expansively. (Doc. 130 at 12.) Under controlling precedent, Hacker did not need to name all defendants in a subsequent suit to properly exhaust his remedies under PLRA. (Id.) Furthermore, any failure to mention the RA/ADA is irrelevant since a grievance must do no more than alert prison officials to a problem and provide the opportunity to address it; no more and no less is mandated. (Id. at 13.) To summarize, Plaintiff maintains that the PLRA contains no requirement that an inmate list every person involved, make explicit reference to a statute like the ADA, or invoke legal words like “disability” or “accommodation,” and its exhaustion criterion will
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be fulfilled if an inmate complies with a prison’s own grievance procedure. (Id. at 12–13.) By laying out all the pertinent facts, their cumulative weight leaving no question about the colorable existence of an ADA claim, the Plaintiff satisfied the law’s minimum. (Id. at 13–14.) Indeed, since Defendants’ grievance procedure “requires only that ... [a] prisoner write a letter to the Warden, in which he briefly sets out the basis for his claim, and the relief sought” and as Plaintiff wrote about his “impending blindness,” his inability “to perform daily living activities,” and his need for surgery, his ARP was “more than sufficient to fulfill Defendant’s”—and the PLRA’s—“exhaustion requirements.” (Id. at 14.)
Defendants’ MSJ next focuses upon the substantive merits of Plaintiff’s RA/ADA claims. Broadly, Defendants argue that no records exist showing either a request for accommodation by Hacker or a denial of his request. (Doc. 122-2 at 28.) Defendants insist an inmate may seek formal review of a complaint regarding his or her request for reasonable accommodation and make this request in writing or orally. (Id.) Further, Defendants contend that a variety of accommodations exist for blind inmates at LSP, ones that Plaintiff never requested. (Id. at 29.) Yet, Plaintiff never did make a formal request for any one of these accommodations or articulate a request for any reasonable adjustment of his duties and status (but surgery), as attested by LSP’s ADA coordinator, Deputy Warden Richard Lee Peabody (“Peabody”). (Id. at 28.) In other words, Plaintiff himself failed to document his attempts to obtain the modifications purportedly essential for his wellbeing. (See id.)
*7 The Plaintiff counters that a request for accommodation does not require any particular manner and can be verbal or written. (Doc. 130 at 14.) Moreover, it is simply not necessary for an inmate to mention the ADA or use the phrase “reasonable accommodation.” (Id. at 15.) Plaintiff insists his request for an accommodation could be inferred from his ARP, in which he explicitly mentioned his “inability to perform [his] work detail as would someone without a disability” and described his diagnosed cataracts as leaving him “unable to perform daily activities.” (Id.) It even referenced inaction’s danger—“denial of the needed surgery will result in a lifelong handicap”—and
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requested “a specific accommodation—that he be ‘scheduled for cataracts surgery without further delay.’ ” (Id.)
E. Plaintiff’s MSJ: Arguments and Counterarguments Plaintiff begins with the RA/ADA, arguing that no reasonable jury could find that the Defendants accommodated the Plaintiff’s disability. (Doc. 148-1 at 9.) According to LSP’s own records, Hacker had become legally blind, and the need for some accommodation for this disability was so obvious that the Defendants should have adjusted his work schedule without need for Plaintiff to so request. (Id. at 10) Even so, Plaintiff contends that multiple verbal and written requests were actually made. (Id. at 13.) Furthermore, the Plaintiff argues that the Defendants did not engage in the interactive process mandated by the ADA, as Defendants have purportedly admitted. (Id. at 13–14.)
Plaintiff also argues that certain Defendants have failed to follow their own ADA procedures to his detriment by, for example, not relaying his medical diagnosis to LSP’s ADA coordinator. (Id. at 19–20.) As further support, the Plaintiff relies on Defendants’ alleged history of discrimination against persons with disabilities, a history sufficient to establish discriminatory intent under Rule 56. (Id. at 14–16.) Indeed, by Plaintiff’s reckoning, until 2014 the Defendants had not responded to any blind inmate’s requests for reasonable accommodation. (Id. at 16.)
The Defendants counter that the Plaintiff’s RA/ADA claims do not entitle him to victory under Rule 56, giving three familiar reasons. (Doc. 151 at 2.) Once more, Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit. (Id.) Once more, Defendants insist that Plaintiff’s original request for an accommodation focused solely on his underlying medical condition and that he only requested surgery. (Id. at 5.) Once more, the Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot show how he (or any other inmate) was discriminated against due to his disability. (Id.)
Plaintiff’s final arguments center on his medical
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indifference claim, from which he urges two separate constitutional claims. First, Plaintiff maintains that the Defendants violated the Eighth Amendment when they neglected his surgical need, eventually resulting in his temporary blindness, in accordance with a general department policy. (Doc. 148-1 at 20.) The Plaintiff insists an Eighth Amendment violation for delaying medical care occurred due to: (1) his serious need for surgery so as to avoid going blind from untreated cataracts; (2) Defendants’ knowledge of, and deliberate indifference to, his need; and (3) the substantial harm that resulted from Defendants’ indifference. (Id. at 21.) Plaintiff contends the Defendants’ own doctors conceded he had a serious medical need when they describe him going blind as “a serious medical problem.” (Id. at 22.) Plaintiff insists that Defendants were deliberately indifferent since they knew about the serious medical need because of the various medical records and doctor visits that show his medical condition. (Id. at 21, 23.)
*8 Relatedly, the Plaintiff argues that a violation of the Eighth Amendment occurred when he was forced to conduct dangerous work in Angola’s field since he was visually-impaired. (Doc. 148-1 at 30.) Plaintiff maintains that all three elements of proving a work-assignment violation of the Eighth Amendment are met: (1) defendant acted with knowledge of, and deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s condition; (2) plaintiff’s medical condition was serious one; and (3) type of work assigned worsened the medical condition. (Id. at 31.) Plaintiff insists these elements were met since the Defendants had “extensive knowledge” of the vision problems and his work schedule eventually resulted in his sustaining actual injuries. (Id. at 32.) Finally, the Plaintiff argues he has established that his denial of medical care was part of an official pattern of delaying elective surgery, a custom or policy sufficiently widespread to trigger liability under Monell as to every Defendant. (Doc. 148-1 at 34.) In support of this contention, Plaintiff points to seventeen cases at LSP where inmates are still waiting for surgeries. (Id.)
In counter, Defendants insist that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case for the alleged medical indifference under the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. 151 at 7.) To them, the constant medical care,
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treatment, medication, and surgeries that LSP provided to Plaintiff prevent him from meeting the “extremely high” burden of establishing constitutionally verboten medical indifference. (Id. at 9.) His condition was treated, although perhaps not perfectly or to his satisfaction; hence, he cannot succeed in this tightly cabined cause of action. (Id.; accord Doc. 122-2 at 16.)
III. DISCUSSION
A. Relevant Legal Standards 1. Procedural Law: Rule 56 Under Rule 56(a), summary judgment is generally appropriate “if the movant shows there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Wilson v. Tregre, 787 F.3d 322, 325 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Rule 56(a)). A dispute is “genuine” so long as “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party”; a fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed. 2d 202 (1986); see also Ray v. United Parcel Serv., 587 Fed.Appx. 182, 186 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). Axiomatically, a court construes all facts and evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Haverda v. Hays Cnty., 723 F.3d 586, 591 (5th Cir. 2013). In response to another’s motion, the nonmovant cannot rely on “[c]onclusory allegations, speculation, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic arguments,” none “an adequate substitute for specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James of Wash., 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002). Still, “[w]hen both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts,” Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., Inc., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 2005), a court is bound to “draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party” and cannot “make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence,” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumping Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2110, 147 L.Ed. 2d 105 (2000); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (emphasizing the irrelevance of “[a]ny proof or evidentiary requirements imposed by the substantive law,”
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materiality “not a criterion for evaluating the evidentiary underpinning of [factual disputes]”).
Thus, “the court should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.” 9A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2529 (2d ed. 1995). In other words, “although the court should review the record as a whole, it must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151, cited in Havera, 723 F.3d at 591. If more than a scintilla of evidence is assembled, “[t]he court must resolve factual controversies in favor of the nonmoving party.” White v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 457 Fed.Appx. 374, 377 (5th Cir. 2012). Under Rule 56, summary judgment is hence inappropriate (1) if there are legitimate, not superficial or frivolous, factual disputes that may affect the outcome of the case under the applicable substantive law, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, and (2) so long as the nonmovant does not exclusively rely on “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” “conclusory allegations,” “unsubstantiated” or “bare assertions,” or “a scintilla of evidence,” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3188, 111 L.Ed. 2d 695 (1990); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed. 2d 538 (1986); Hopper v. Frank, 16 F.3d 92, 94 (5th Cir. 1994); and Davis v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 14 F.3d 1082, 1086 (5th Cir. 1994)). An alleged “lack of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case” can hence be countered by “[s]pecific evidence in the record,” such tailored opposition foreclosing summary judgment. Jobe v. ATR Mktg., Inc., No. 98-31366, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 40209, at *8–9, 1999 WL 511380, at *3 (5th Cir. June 23, 1999) (citing Duffy v. Leading Edge Prods., Inc., 44 F.3d 308, 312 (5th Cir. 1995), and ContiCommodity Servs., Inc. v. Ragan, 63 F.3d 438, 441 (5th Cir. 1995)).
*9 As explained more fully below, see infra Part III.A.2–3, two principles derived from the governing substantive law indirectly affect how Rule 56 plays
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out in discrimination and medical indifferences cases. For purposes of the RA/ADA, “a fact-specific, case-by-case inquiry that considers, among other factors, the effectiveness of ... [a possible] modification in light of the nature of the disability in question” is invariably required. Staron v. McDonald’s Corp., 51 F.3d 353, 356 (2d Cir. 1995); cf., e.g., Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 403 F.3d 1026, 1032 (8th Cir. 2005) (employment discrimination under the ADA). As another appellate court said, an ADA or RA case frequently rides upon “resolution of ... complicated, fact-intensive inquiries.” R.K. v. Bd. of Educ., 494 Fed.Appx. 589, 597 (6th Cir. 2012). Similarly, deliberate indifference is often described as a “fact-intensive inquir[y],” Garrett v. Thaler, 560 Fed.Appx. 375, 379 n.3 (5th Cir. 2014), a logical consequence of this doctrine’s use of objective and subjective elements, see Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1979, 128 L.Ed. 2d 811 (1994); see also infra Part III.A.2.
2. Substantive Law: Eighth Amendment To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) that the challenged conduct was “committed by a person acting under color of state law,” and (2) that such conduct “deprived [the plaintiff] of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2010). In Estelle v. Gamble, the Court held that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners” constituted the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” proscribed by the Eighth Amendment, wholly actionable under Section 1983. 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S. Ct. 285, 291, 50 L.Ed. 2d 251 (1976). However, as Defendants correctly point out, “an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care” does not amount to a constitutional violation; “[m]edical malpractice,” if predicated on pure negligence, “does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; see also, e.g., Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 2323, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106); Rodrigue v. Grayson, 557 Fed.Appx. 341, 344 (5th Cir. 2014) (same). Instead, the operative test requires deliberate indifference on the part of the
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prison officials, a subjective prong, and that the prisoner’s medical needs be serious, an objective prong. Monmouth Cnty. Correctional Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987).
Per this standard, if “a prisoner allege[s] acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs” by, for example, showing that “prison guards ... intentionally den[ied] or delay[ed] access to medical care,” he or she has indeed stated a cognizable claim under Section 1983. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105, 106; see also Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d 459, 463 (5th Cir. 2006). True, “evidence which shows only that an inmate disagrees with a diagnosis or the course of treatment selected for him is [inherently] not sufficient.” Little v. Lycoming Cnty., 912 F. Supp. 809, 816 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105–06). Conversely (and logically), evidence that prison officials provided no treatment despite their own medical staff’s diagnosis or professional judgment may be sufficient, depending on the nature and strength of the evidence. As the Fifth Circuit has further explained, refusing to “treat” a prisoner, “ignoring his complaints,” “intentionally treat[ing] him incorrectly, or engag[ing] in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs” trigger such liability. Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006).
*10 An intent to harm or animus towards a particular inmate is not itself required so long as such reckless disregard for his or her medical needs can be shown. See, e.g., Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 346 (“Where prison authorities deny reasonable requests for medical treatment ... and such denial exposes the inmate to ‘undue suffering or the threat of tangible residual injury’ ... deliberate indifference is manifest.” (internal citations omitted)); Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., 769 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1985) (“The knowledge of the need for medical care and intentional refusal to provide that care has consistently been held to surpass negligence and constitute deliberate indifference.”). In recent months, this Court has applied this same standard. See, e.g., Donahue v. Wilder, No. 15-cv-499-JWDRLB, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15984, at *12–15, 2016 WL 552588, at *4–5 (M.D. La. Feb. 10, 2015).
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In undertaking such complex analyses, courts have focused on five questions:
• How serious was the prisoner’s need for medical attention?
• Has the alleged medical need been confirmed by a health care professional?
• Did the prisoner request any medical treatment and, if so, did he or she receive treatment that addressed his need?
• Was the treatment rendered adequate?
• If the prisoner did not receive any treatment or only inadequate treatment, what was the subjective motivation of the responsible prison official for denying or delaying medical treatment?
Damon Martin, Comment, State Prisoners’ Rights to Medical Treatment: Merely Elusive or Wholly Illusory?, 8 BLACK L.J. 427, 433 (1983). As these questions suggest, “[a] claim against prison officials and/or prison medical professionals for failure to provide medical care is ‘fact-intensive and ... require[s] ... development of the record’ and a ‘conclusory assessment essentially disregards [a] [plaintiff’s] allegations.’ ” Randolph v. Wetzel, 987 F. Supp. 2d 605, 624 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (alterations in original) (quoting Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 547 (3d Cir. 2002)). This concern reflects the doctrine’s common understanding. As one court explained, “[d]eliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal [or state] actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his [, her, or its] action.” Shadrick v. Hopkins Cnty., 805 F.3d 724, 737 (6th Cir. 2015). As another explained, the Eighth Amendment is only offended when a serious medical need and exists and the relevant officials are both “aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harms exists, and ... [actually] draw the inference.” Barnett v. Luttrell, 414 Fed.Appx. 784, 787–88 (6th Cir. 2011).
3. Substantive Law: Monell Liability Named after the famed case that first recognized it,
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Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, Monell liability requires proof of four elements: (1) a policymaker; (2) an official policy; (3) a constitutional violation;7 and (4) a violation of that constitutional right whose “moving force” is “the policy or custom,” Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (construing (3) and (4) as one element). Stated differently, “[a] plaintiff must point to a persistent and widespread practice[ ] of municipal [or state] officials, the duration and frequency of which indicate that policymakers (1) had actual or constructive knowledge of the conduct, and (2) failed to correct it due to their deliberate indifference”; as such, knowledge and indifference, factors incorporating subjective and objective components, are required, as is an actual threshold constitutional violation. Owens v. Balt. City State’s Attys. Office, 767 F.3d 379, 402–03 (4th Cir. 2014); see also, e.g., Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 1388, 137 L.Ed. 2d 626 (1997) (“The plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the moving force behind the injury alleged. That is, a plaintiff must show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 2005) (enumerating the pertinent elements).
*11 Monell “presupposes a conscious adoption of a course of action ‘from among various alternatives,’ ” Shadrick, 805 F.3d at 752, and the practice that it and its progeny forbid must be “so persistent and widespread and so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law,”8 Moody v. City of Newport News, 93 F. Supp. 3d 516, 542 (E.D. Va. 2015) (emphasis added). It is, as the Fifth Circuit has emphasized, “difficult to prove,” Anderson v. Marshall Cnty., Miss., No. 15-60051, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 621, at *12–13, 2016 WL 143303, at *4 (5th Cir. Jan. 12, 2016), though some circuits permit trial courts to infer the requisite knowledge and indifference from a proven record of “widespread or flagrant violations,” Owens, 767 F.3d at 403 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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4. Substantive Law: RA/ADA Under well-established precedent,9 prisoner may bring claims against their jailors for disability discrimination under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the RA.10 Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 209–10, 118 S. Ct. 1952, 1954–55, 141 L.Ed. 2d 215 (1998); see also, e.g., Frame v. City of Arlington, 657 F.3d 215, 224–25 (5th Cir. 2011). Title II prohibits discrimination by “public entities,” 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1), and state prisons fall squarely within this statutory definition, Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 210. As a general matter, a plaintiff proceeding under Title II must “show that: (1) he or she is a ‘qualified individual with a disability’; (2) he or she is being excluded from participation in, or being denied the benefits of some service, program, or activity by reason of his or her disability; and (3) the entity which provides the service, program or activity is a public entity.” Douglas v. Gusman, 567 F. Supp. 2d 877, 889 (E.D. La. 2008). Beyond these general guiding principles, five conclusions about the ADA’s and RA’s applicability to LSP can be drawn from Fifth Circuit case law.
First, while the ADA’s reasonable accommodation requirement does not apply under Title II, its “reasonable modifications” requirement—“A public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity,” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7); PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 121 S. Ct. 1879, 149 L.Ed. 2d 904 (2001)—has been held to apply in the prison context. Garrett v. Thaler, 560 Fed.Appx. 375, 382 (5th Cir. 2014). This distinction has two consequences. Overall, the ADA “does not require prisons to provide new services or programs for disabled prisoners.” Borum v. Swisher Cnty., No. 2:14-CV-127-J, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8628, at *21, 2015 WL 327508, at *9 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2015) (emphasis added).11 However, these same entities “do have an affirmative obligation to make reasonable modifications ... so that a disabled prisoner can have meaningful access to existing public services or programs.” Id. (emphasis added).
*12 Second, a plaintiff-inmate must usually request
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a modification to commence an interactive process that considers that possibility. See Taylor v. Principal Fin. Grp., LLC, 93 F.3d 155, 165 (5th Cir. 2009). Nonetheless, he or she is excused from doing so in a situation in which the defendant was unquestionably aware of the disability by, for example, receiving reports from its own doctor that recommend one or more specific accommodations. Id. Nonetheless, a pivotal caveat exists, for “failure to engage in the interactive process is only an independent violation of the ADA if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie showing that he proposed a reasonable accommodation.” Rorrer v. City of Stow, 743 F.3d 1025, 1041 (6th Cir. 2014) (emphasis added); see also, e.g., Rehling v. City of Chicago, 207 F.3d 1009, 1015–16 (7th Cir. 2000) (recognizing that the interactive process the ADA contemplates is not an end in itself).
Notably, whether an employer has failed to interact in good faith and thus failed to reasonably accommodate a plaintiff is a question of fact, one that can preclude summary judgment. See Lowe v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 363 Fed.Appx. 548, 552 (10th Cir. 2010) (as to an employer). The same can be said about the point in time when a certain medical condition like cataracts has rendered an indivdual disabled as defined by the RA/ADA. See White v. Orange Auto Ctr., 101 F. Supp. 2d 485, 487, 494–95 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (issue of fact existed as to whether plaintiff who suffered from “poor vision, cataracts, and macular degeneration disease” was disabled within the meaning of the ADA); cf. MacDonald v. Delta Air Lines, 94 F.3d 1437, 1444– 45 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing regulations explaining that to demonstrate that an impairment substantially limits the major life activity of working, an individual must show “significant[ ] restriction in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities” and rejecting the argument that a cataract afflicted employee met this crucial component of the RA/ADA’s definition of disability, as his “inability to perform one aspect of a job” did not deprive him of “the ability to perform work in general”).
Third, Louisiana and its every sub-entity, including LSP, have most likely waived their Eleventh
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Amendment immunity from any RA-based suit under the express conditions of 42 U.S.C. § 2000d7.12 Miller v. Tex. Tech Univ. Health Scis. Ctr., 421 F.3d 342, 345 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that when a state entity accepts federal funds that are granted by Congress under authority of the U.S. Constitution’s Spending Clause and expressly conditioned on waiver of immunity from § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, acceptance of such federal funds operates to waive the state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity”). This section reads: “A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ... or the provisions of any other Federal statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1). This Fifth Circuit ruling compels but one conclusion: assuming it accepted even a cent of federal funds, as Plaintiff contends, (Doc. 148-2 ¶¶ 30–32 at 4), Louisiana has fully forfeited any vestige of constitutional immunity for discrimination in contravention of the RA. See Miller, 421 F.3d at 345; accord, e.g., Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1152 (9th Cir. 2002).
*13 Fourth, application of the ADA13 to LSP, which bars the same kind of discrimination, does not even depend upon Louisiana’s receipt of federal funds. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit has made this point crystal clear: “[T]he ADA plainly covers state institutions without any exception that could cast the coverage of prisons into doubt.” Hall v. Thomas, 190 F.3d 693, 696 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 209). More than two decades after Yeskey, the Supreme Court itself again endorsed this construction. United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 159, 126 S. Ct. 877, 881, 163 L.Ed. 2d 650 (2006) (“[I]nsofar as Title II [of the ADA] creates a private cause of action for damages against the States for conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II validly abrogates state sovereign immunity.”); accord Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1988, 158 L.Ed. 2d 820 (2004).
Lastly, the Fifth Circuit has held that a defendant’s failure to make the reasonable modifications necessary to adjust for the unique needs of disabled persons can constitute intentional discrimination
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under the ADA and the RA. See, e.g., Melton v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 391 F.3d 669, 672 (5th Cir. 2004); Garrett v. Thaler, 560 Fed.Appx. 375, 382 (5th Cir. 2014). In actuality, no requirement for a showing of an intentional harm has yet been appended to either statute by other circuits. E.g., Liese v. Indian River Cnt. Hosp. Dist., 701 F.3d 334, 345 (11th Cir. 2012); Powers v. MJB Acquisition Corp., 184 F.3d 1147, 1153 (10th Cir. 1999). In the context of the RA and the ADA, then, if not for purposes of the Eighth Amendment, “intentional discrimination against the disabled does not require personal animosity or ill will”; “it may be inferred when a policymaker acted with at least deliberate indifference to the strong likelihood that a violation of federally protected rights will result from the implementation of the challenged policy ... or custom.” Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Examiners, 156 F.3d 321, 331 (2d Cir. 1998). As such, based on much precedent, the failure to provide a disabled inmate with access to existing modifications can be held to violate the ADA’s second title and the RA’s five-hundred-and-fourth section. See, e.g., McCoy v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice, No. C-05-370, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55403, at *23–24, 2006 WL 2331055, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2006) (“In the prison context, ... failure to make reasonable accommodations to the needs of a disabled prisoner may have the effect of discriminating against that prisoner because the lack of an accommodation may cause the disabled prisoner to suffer more pain and punishment than non-disabled prisoners.”).
5. Substantive Law: Qualified Immunity Qualified immunity is available when a § 1983 suit is brought against a state official in his individual capacity, making him or her personally liable for any damages awarded to a plaintiff. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “In deciding whether a state official is entitled to qualified immunity, it must first be determined whether a plaintiff successfully alleged facts showing the violation of a constitutional right by state officials.” Cohn v. New Paltz Cent. Sch. Dist., 363 F. Supp. 2d 421, 431 (N.D.N.Y. 2005). “If a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties’ submissions, the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established.”
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Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed. 2d 272 (2001).14 For the right to be so classified, its “contours ... must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he [or she] is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed. 2d 523 (1987). “[I]f ... [a] defendant’s conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the violation,” however, even a right’s status as firmly established will not foreclose qualified immunity’s invocation. Dorsett-Felicelli v. Cnty. of Clinton, 371 F. Supp. 2d 183, 193 (N.D.N.Y. 2005).
*14 This inquiry regarding whether a defendant’s actions were objectively reasonable has been described as “a fact-intensive inquiry.” Id.; see also, e.g., Sales v. Barizone, No. 03 Civ. 6691RJH, 2004 WL 2781752, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2004). For this reason, this particular affirmative defense can often prevent a plaintiff’s success under Rule 56. Only in one situation have the cases trended differently: the evidentiary record made it impossible for any reasonable factfinder to not find a knowing violation of a clearly established right. See McKenna v. Wright, 386 F.3d 432, 435 (2d Cir. 2004).
6. Substantive Law: Exhaustion of Remedies under the PLRA 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), as amended by the PLRA, provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 ... by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” As the Court has held, “the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532, 122 S. Ct. 983, 992, 152 L.Ed. 2d 12 (2002). As a general rule, the grievance need not adduce claims framed in perfect and comprehensive legal terminology nor identify each and every later defendant. Instead, “a grievance suffices to exhaust a claim if it puts the prison on adequate notice of the problem for which the prisoner seeks redress.” Sapp
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v. Kimbrel, 623 F.3d 813, 824 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Thomas v. Joslin, 524 Fed.Appx. 107, 110 (5th Cir. 2013) (affirming a grant of summary judgment as plaintiff’s grievances “failed to put” the relevant officials “on notice that ... [plaintiff] intended to sue concerning alleged [their] indifference”).
B. Application to Defendants’ MSJs As this Court is compelled to “disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe,” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151, cited in Havera, 723 F.3d at 591, it finds that Defendants have not satisfied the high threshold for summary judgment implanted in Rule 56.
1. Eighth Amendment Claim (a) Existence of Sufficient Factual Support for Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment Claims under Rule 56 First, more than enough facts can be gathered to support Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim. Per the existing record, even though several different doctors recommended Plaintiff for cataracts surgery, (See, e.g., Doc. 148-1 at 2–7, 23–26; Doc. 127-6 (Ex. P); Doc. 127-10 (Ex. T), and though he was referred at least four separate times, (Doc. 127-10 (Ex. T)), LSP delayed this medically essential operation. It did so, Plaintiff alleges, on the basis of its own definition of “elective surgery,” technically defined to include “medically-necessary” but nonetheless a “non-emergency procedure”; that this definition represents official policy is evidenced by its appearance in LDPSC’s own Directive No. 13:030, (Doc. 126-6 (Ex. F) at 1), and LSP’s more specific Health Care Policy No. HC-16, (Doc. 126-7 (Ex. G) ¶ 3A, at 1). Textually, the latter is almost Orwellian, self-evidently circular: “It is the Secretary’s policy to provide medically necessary elective procedures or surgeries for offenders ... when medically necessary.” (Doc. 126-7 (Ex. G) ¶ 4, at 2 (emphasis added).)
That LSP generally adheres to this definition, arguably disregarding a doctor’s judgment that a certain operation may be “medically necessary” by deeming the underlying problem to be a non-
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emergency, can be gleaned from this district’s own docket,15 in which similar such allegations have been advanced, (Docs. 126-7 (Ex. H), 126-8 (Ex. I), 126-10 (Ex. J), 127-1 (Ex. K), 127-2 (Ex. L)), and Defendant’s own list of “inmates for whom a doctor recommended cataract surgery” but who await it still, (Doc. 127-3 (Ex. M); see also Doc. 148-1 at 8). In fact, at least two different officials with LSP and LDPSC, Doctor Randy Lane Lavespere (“Lavespeare”) and Ms. Terri L. Cannon (“Cannon”), so testified, describing HC-16 and Directive No. 13:030 as “the prison’s policy.” (Doc. 140-1 (Ex. M.) at 77–85; Doc. 140-3 (Ex. O) at 36– 39). Adhering to this policy, LSP did not provide Plaintiff with the recommended surgical operation for 813 days.16 (See, e.g., Doc. 148-1 at 26; see also, e.g., Doc. 148-2 ¶ 10 at 2, ¶¶ 23–24, at 3; Doc. 151-1 at 3.)
*15 Unquestionable and unquestioned, this evidence can be arranged so as to tell an elegantly simple— and damning—tale. LSP has a general program, (Doc. 140-3 at 38), effectively dogma, from which few deviations are, at best, grudgingly allowed, in which a doctor’s “recommended” treatment will be ignored if classified as a “non-emergency,” (Doc. 126-6 at 1), by a coterie of unknown “specialists,” (Doc. 140-1 at 83–84). Thus, by adhering to this explicit policy, LSP treats cataracts as “nonemergency” by default even though, Lavespeare conceded, “[i]t can be medically necessary,” such surgery becoming “necessary” “[w]hen the [appointed] specialist says that it needs to come out,” (Doc. 140-3 at 85). As a matter of unambiguous law, refusing to “treat” a prisoner, “ignoring his complaints,” “intentionally treat[ing] him incorrectly, or engag[ing] in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs” violates the Eighth Amendment. Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, “[w]here prison authorities deny reasonable requests for medical treatment ... and such denial exposes the inmate to undue suffering or the threat of tangible residual injury ... deliberate indifference is manifest.” Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 346 (internal quotation marks omitted). If such denial occurs, “the alleged imposition of administrative inconvenience, unattached to any legitimate penological objective such as security,” will offer no excuse. Monmouth
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Cnty. Correctional Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 337 (3d Cir. 1987); see also, e.g., Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 286 (5th Cir. 1977) (“[C]ompliance with constitutional standards may not be frustrated by legislative inaction or failure to provide the necessary funds.”). So convinced, more than one court has found deliberate indifference when a prison official knows of a prisoner’s need and delays necessary medical treatment for a non-medical reason or prevents a prisoner from receiving needed or recommended treatment. See, e.g., Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).
Applying this law to the facts at hand, the evidence so far uncovered could lead a reasonable jury to find that LSP and its agents, acting pursuant to an explicit statement of department policy, “intentionally” refused to provide care, though “knowledge[able] of ... [his] need” for a specific type of operation, because it was clerically designated as “non-emergency” and was not classified otherwise by their chosen specialist. Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., 769 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1985). Undoubtedly, some doctors recommended cataracts surgery, and just as assuredly, more than one form described it as “medically necessary.” (See Doc 148-1 at 23–26.17) Only certain specialists could have designated his “medically necessary” surgery as “emergency” and thus ensure that the recommended operation would take place; other doctors’ opinions were simply irrelevant, (See Doc. 140-1 at 82), as both Plaintiff’s four separate recommendations, (Doc. 127-10), and a single allusion to cost as a justification, can attest, (Doc. 148-1 at 26 n.7). In sum, because “[d]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs is shown when prison officials have prevented an inmate from receiving recommended treatment,” Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir. 1980), enough evidence here exists for Plaintiff’s constitutional claim to easily survive Defendants’ MSJ. See, e.g., Richardson v. Nassau Cnty., 277 F. Supp. 2d 196 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (denying summary judgment motion relating to Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim concerning glaucoma treatment). Certainly, with court after court presented with analogous factual circumstances have held that cataracts removal surgery falls squarely within the Eighth Amendment’s protection. See, e.g., Colwell
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v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 2014); Boring v. Sanders, No. 1:12-CV-419, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114215, at *17–18, 2013 WL 4080308, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2013) (citing dozens of cases so determining), a jury in this case could clearly find in Plaintiff’s favor.
(b) Defendants’ Inadequate Showing under Rule 56 Defendants’ counter to Plaintiff’s account, in turn, is weak. Arguing that “the evidence” of medical indifference is “overwhelming[ly]” absent, Defendants point out that “Plaintiff had been under constant medical supervision and medical care at LSP.” (Doc. 122-2 at 16; see also Doc. 151 at 7–10.) He always “received proper medication and treatment,” Defendants’ Opposition stresses, and “medical evidence shows that [P]laintiff was treated repeatedly for the ailments of which he complained.” (Doc. 151 at 7, 9; see also Doc. 122-2 at 16.) He was, then, treated, and the Eighth Amendment, in Defendants’ view, rightly impels no more.
*16 Yet, in so averring, Defendants overstate the law’s import. Of course, incorrect medical treatment, such as a mistaken diagnosis, is not actionable under the Eighth Amendment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105–06. However, even regular treatment, if known to be insufficient and ineffective for a diagnosed and serious ailment, will not be adequate to defeat Plaintiff’s medical indifference claim. See, e.g., Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006) (“Unsuccessful medical treatment, acts of negligence, or medical malpractice do not constitute deliberate indifference, nor does a prisoner’s disagreement with his medical treatment, absent exceptional circumstances.”); Norton v. Dimanzana, 122 F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir. 1997) (concluding that “[d]isagreement with medical treatment does not state a claim for Eighth Amendment indifference to medical needs” when the medical record is unanimous). In other words, under binding jurisprudence, categorically inadequate treatment for a verifiably and knowingly worsening condition does not earn constitutional immunity simply because it is regularly provided; monotony does not somehow excuse patent inadequacy. Thus, as the Fifth Circuit itself said in the very case upon which Defendants rely, (Doc. 151 at 8), officials who
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“ignore[ ]” an inmate’s “complaints” or “intentionally treat[ ] him incorrectly” contravene the Eighth Amendment. Brauner v. Coody, 793 F.3d 493, 498 (5th Cir. 2015). Considering the evidence adduced by Plaintiff—LSP consistently ignored Plaintiff’s doctor-supported requests for surgery, classifying this ostensibly “medically necessary” operation as a “non-emergency” one—one could reasonably find his treatment to have been “intentionally ... incorrect[ ].” Id.; see also, e.g., Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1063 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he blanket, categorical denial of medically indicated surgery solely on the basis of an administrative policy that ‘one eye is good enough for prison inmates’ is the paradigm of deliberate indifference.”). A verdict of unconstitutional medical indifference as to Plaintiff would then follow, reasonable and logical, based on the record as it now appears. Cf., e.g., Gobert, 463 F.3d at 346; Norton, 122 F.3d at 292.
Moreover, Defendants overlook key factual differences between their handful of ostensible supporting case law, (Doc. 151 at 8–9), and the present matter. Unlike Johnson v. Treen, Plaintiff was not “treated repeatedly for the ailments of which he complained.” 759 F.2d 1236, 1238 (5th Cir. 1985). Instead, if his evidence is believed, medically appropriate treatment was repeatedly requested by and denied to him. See supra Part III.A–B. In contrast with Stewart v. Murphy, a “pressure-sores deliberate-indifference case” in which “independent acts of negligence by various physicians” and “a difference in opinion as to the appropriate method of treatment under the circumstances” were evidenced, 174 F.3d 530, 535–36 (5th Cir. 1999),18 both Plaintiff’s ailment and the required treatment were arguably known and obvious, “medically-necessary” per LSP’s own files, (See Doc. 26-6 at 1).
Lastly, Defendants’ continually stressed case— Brauner—differs greatly in its procedural posture from Hacker’s. There, “Brauner supported his claims primarily with his own statements (some of which were sworn under penalty of perjury), and largely challenged the medical decisions of his doctors.” Brauner, 793 F.3d at 497. Based on such evidence, “[i]n a 22-page order, the magistrate judge reviewed the evidence and concluded that circuit precedent foreclosed a deliberate indifference claim.” Id.
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Thereupon, “Judge Africk rejected the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation in a brief order holding that there were genuine issues of material fact.” Id. Here, as shown above, the evidence is extensive, and the record consists of more than the Plaintiff’s own sworn statements, including his own doctor’s medical statements. (See also Doc. 148-1 at 23–26; Doc. 155 at 4.) As “Hacker is not disputing any doctor’s judgment or alleging that subordinates delinquently carried out doctors’ orders,” (Doc. 155 at 4), his case is unlike that of Johnson, Stewart, and Brauner.
The foregoing reasoning also resolves three other discrete arguments raised by Defendants. First, Directive No. 13:030, (Doc. 126-6 at 1), and Health Care Policy No. HC-16, (Doc. 126-7), indicate the existence of “a policy or custom,” averred as such by Lavespere and Cannon, that specifically classifies certain “medically necessary” operations as elective and allows officials to override the recommendations of an inmate’s own doctors. Seemingly, moreover, this policy has led to lengthy delays by other inmates in receiving recommended surgery, (Doc. 148-1 at 8). As with Plaintiff’s individual medical indifference claim, such evidence is more than the scintilla required for Plaintiff’s case to survive Rule 56’s scrutiny.
*17 Second, since sufficient enough evidence exists to support a finding of a broad policy, the argument for qualified immunity by three defendants—Jindal, LeBlanc, and Cain—as to this constitutional claim lacks merit. Quite simply, if it could be reasonably found that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical needs in accordance with the general policy of LSP and LDPSC, a jury could just as reasonably find that Defendants ignored a clearly established constitutional right. If so, they would not be entitled to immunity. (See Doc. 148-1 at 35–36.) As the Third Circuit explained, “a reasonable [official] ... could not believe that her actions comported with clearly established law while also believing that there is an excessive risk to the plaintiff[ ] and failing to adequately respond to that risk.” Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 142 n.15 (3d Cir. 2001). Accordingly, “[i] is axiomatic that conduct which is deliberately indifferent under the Eighth Amendment is a fortiori unreasonable.” Hollihan v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., No. 3:15-CV-5, 2016
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U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6318, at *21, 2016 WL 235003, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 20, 2016).
Lastly, based on this same evidence, a reasonable jury could find Defendants to have known of Plaintiff’s serious medical need, understood its dangers, and ignored these dangers in providing him with a certain work assignment. As a matter of law, such a finding would mean that Defendants did not provide Plaintiff with a workplace suitable for someone similarly impaired, a discrete Eighth Amendment violation that Plaintiff has also advanced, (See Doc. 148-1 at 31.)
2. RA/ADA Claim (a) Existence of Sufficient Factual Support for Plaintiff’s RA/ADA Claim under Rule 56 Defendants’ contention that no RA/ADA claim could possibly be reasonably won cannot withstand scrutiny. Based on the clear applicability of the RA and ADA to both LSP and LDPSC, at least two facts, amply attested to by the existing record, foretell the failure of Defendants’ MSJ. First, Plaintiff was diagnosed with cataracts and progressively worsening eyesight over a period of years, (See, e.g., Doc. 148-1 at 23–26), as Defendants’ own timeline divulges, (See Doc. 151-1 at 2–6). Second, though LSP on at least one occasion gave him a modified duty schedule, it never provided him with permanent modifications specially designed for the visually impaired; at best, ad hoc adjustments were made. Hence, for example, though his medical “records note that Plaintiff needed surgery” on October 17, 2012, and though LSU Interim Hospital “recommended surgery as soon as possible” on April 2, 2013, (Doc. 151-1 at 3 (internal quotation marks omitted)), Plaintiff continued to work in Angola’s fields, (Doc. 148-1 at 31–32). Tellingly, Peabody, LSP’s ADA coordinator, conceded: “I think the department would say if he is legally blind to the point where it interferes with his ability to perform his job, then yes ... he should not be in the field.” (Doc. 140-2 (Ex. N) at 43.) Equally significantly, Lavespeare arguably seemed to agree. (Doc. 139-10 (Ex. L) at 61–62 (noting that “[o]ut in the field” you could “hurt yourself” if your vision is impaired).) Plaintiff made these allegations in the Amended Complaint,
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(Doc. 73), and he has now assembled enough evidence, including other instances in which LSP and/or LDPSC failed to accommodate impaired inmates, to substantiate his contentions for Rule 56’s limited purposes.
Consequently, a reasonable jury could find Defendants knew of Plaintiff’s disability, understood its consequences, and ignored these dangers in providing him with his work assignments, entirely ignoring the possibility of and the need for providing him with a permanently modified duty schedule suitable for someone with a failing eyesight. Per the record, LSP gave him temporary modified duty status at least once; one could infer that it could have done permanently but chose not to do so. This evidence, so reasonably read, suggests that Plaintiff was not accommodated in accordance with the ADA/RA, either statute’s intent prong satisfied by LSP’s failure to provide Plaintiff with access to existing modifications, i.e. a non-field work position. (See Doc. 148-1 at 9–10; Doc. 155 at 2–3.) Confronted with similar facts, other district courts have denied similar motions by other prisons. See, e.g., Hollihan, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6318, at *3, 2016 WL 235003, at *5 (collecting cases). With the record here by no means conclusively to the “contrary,” as Defendants allege, this Court concurs with these courts.
*18 Defendants’ second argument in favor of summary judgment as to this claim—Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust his remedies, as the PLRA requires, by not specifically requesting an accommodation (beyond cataracts surgery) pursuant to the ADA/RA in his ARP—is oversold. Per the PLRA, “a grievance complaint must provide administrators with a fair opportunity under the circumstances to address the problem that will later form the basis of the suit.” Rebaldo v. Jenkins, 660 F. Supp. 2d 755, 763 (E.D. La. 2009). It need not “give adequate notice of all claims or potential defendants.” Id. Rather, an ARP must do no more than “address the same inappropriate behavior by ... [Defendants] that is addressed in the” later filed suit. Id. Plaintiff’s ARP, as well as his medical record, leave no doubt as to the nature of his complaint: his worsening eyesight and approaching blindness. While he may have specifically asked for surgery, no reasonable reader could be confused about the
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underlying medical problem; indeed, LSP and LDPSC specifically define “cataracts surgery” as “medically necessary.” With enough evidence available to validate this inference, a reasonable jury could readily reach the pivotal subsidiary conclusion that Defendants were on notice of Plaintiff’s need for an accommodation, as his declining vision necessarily rendered him unable to perform the work of an inmate whose vision was unimpaired. The PLRA requires no more than such holistic and general notice, one which Plaintiff’s ARP sufficiently provided.
C. Application to Plaintiff’s MSJs Subjected to the same standard that has proven inimical to Defendants’ MSJ, Plaintiff’s MSJ too falters. If one “disregard[s] all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe,” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151, cited in Havera, 723 F.3d at 591, Plaintiff’s case falls apart, and Defendants would be vindicated. Simply put, a jury could still disbelieve Plaintiff’s contentions and interpret his evidence differently and, by so doing, conclude that Plaintiff’s claims lack merit. Because this result may still reasonably come to fruition, a genuine dispute over material facts remains that only a jury can properly resolve.
1. Eighth Amendment Claim Just as the record could be construed to reveal Defendants’ knowledge of Plaintiff’s serious medical need and deliberate unwillingness to provide medically necessary treatment, it could also be construed differently: although cataracts removal surgery was repeatedly recommended, no doctor labeled Plaintiff’s declining eyesight an emergency which necessitated immediate resolution. (Doc. 1511 at 1–6.) Even the one doctor who recommend it “as soon as possible” did not choose to deem it “urgent” or “emergency,” as LSP’s and LDPSC’s policies require before an operation is expeditiously scheduled. Meanwhile, as Plaintiff’s medical file attests, he received treatment which, though inadequate in stymieing his encroaching blindness, was still treatment. Court after court has “distinguish[ed] between cases where the complaint
17!

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alleges a complete denial of medical care and those cases where the claim is that a prisoner received inadequate medical treatment.” Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976); see also supra Part IV.A.2. Plaintiff clearly received medical care without one physician choosing to label his condition an “emergency,” (See, e.g., Doc. 122-2 at 16; Doc. 151 at 7), and in such cases, “federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgment.” Westlake, 537 F.2d at 860 n.5; see also, e.g., Mayweather v. Foti, 958 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1992) (“The treatment may not have been the best that money could buy, and occasionally, a dose of medication may have been forgotten, but these deficiencies were minimal, they do not show an unreasonable standard of care, and they fall far short of establishing deliberate indifference by the prison authorities.”). True, “more could [have] be[en] done for him and with greater alacrity.” McQueen v. LeBlanc, No. 14-174, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116632, at *6, 2014 WL 4182617 (E.D. La. Apr. 8, 2014). Still, so long as a prisoner has received “some medical treatment and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment,” the Eighth Amendment has not been violated. Westlake, 537 F.2d at 860 n.5.
Here, based on both Parties’ papers, the evidence can be so construed. Looking at the record, one could still find that Plaintiff endured no more than constitutionally permissible, if morally objectionable, “negligence or medical malpractice.” See, e.g., Hall, 190 F.3d at 697–98; Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1993); Kelly v. Gusman, No. 07-611, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99098, at *12, 2007 WL 2007992, at *4 (E.D. La. July 5, 2007).19 Put differently, “the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment does not include the right to the treatment of one’s choice,” with the provision of “other forms of treatment” for a particular condition held sufficient to defeat an Eighth Amendment claim entirely. Rathy v. Wetzel, No. 13-72, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15331, at *15, 2014 WL 4104946, at *7 (W.D. Pa. July 28, 2014). Here, the evidence could be so weighed by a reasoned mind, thereby establishing the existence of a genuine dispute over the adequacy of LSP’s treatment of Plaintiff. As such, Rule 56 forbids the granting of Plaintiff’s MSJ as to his Eighth Amendment claims.
!
!

2. RA/ADA Claim *19 Though a much closer call, Plaintiff’s demand for summary judgment on his RA/ADA claim falls due to the standard erected by Rule 56. To “win” his disability case at this stage, Plaintiff needed to show no reasonable jury could not conclude that his cataracts rendered him disabled, that his disability substantially impaired his ability to perform a wide class of positions, and that Defendant failed to provide him with a reasonable accommodation. Chambers ex rel. Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 189 (3d Cir. 2009); see also supra Part III.A.4. At present, however, every one of these essential conclusions can be questioned. For every alleged interpretation of the same fact, a counter-interpretation, also supported by the existing record, can be posited. As no contention can be decided indisputably in Plaintiff’s favor, summary judgment is not appropriate.
True, Plaintiff’s cataracts made him increasingly and eventually totally blind. But at least one appellate court has specifically refused to classify cataracts as a cognizable disability under the ADA, as the afflicted person could nonetheless perform “a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes.” MacDonald, 94 F.3d at 1444–45. Convinced by this reasoning, multiple courts have refused to consider either cataracts or legal blindness as an automatic disability under the RA/ADA, as someone so impaired is “disqualifie[d] ... from only a narrow range of jobs,” such an impairment not so “substantially limiting” as to render the afflicted legally disabled. Heilweil v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 32 F.3d 718, 723 (2d Cir. 1994). Plaintiff’s cataracts, therefore, did not indisputably render him disabled as a matter of law.
True, Plaintiff could have been provided any number of reasonable accommodations. But a failure to accommodate claim first requires a plaintiff to pinpoint a proposed reasonable accommodation, the law’s burden upon him and him alone, and Plaintiff’s own lawyers here have conceded that he sought a single “specific accommodation – that he be scheduled for cataracts surgery without any delay.’ ” (Doc. 130 at 15.) If one disregards evidence the jury need not believe, LSP arguably did far more
18!

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than reject Plaintiff’s proposed sole accommodation. Instead, on more than one occasion, it modified Plaintiff’s schedule, a reasonable modification, in an attempt to account for his declining eyesight. (Doc. 151-1 at 4.) While some of these modifications were temporary and even imperfect, as Plaintiff himself concedes, on June 12, 2013, Plaintiff eventually “received a permanent duty status intended to keep him from working in the fields.” (Doc. 148-1 at 33 (emphasis added).) However halfhearted, LSP’s efforts before and after June 12, 2013, undercut the conclusion that Plaintiff received no reasonable accommodation. See Rorrer, 743 F.3d at 1041. Arguably, then, the RA/ADA was not necessarily offended by Defendants’ chosen route, with only such certainty compelling Plaintiff’s victory under Rule 56. In contrast, the uncertainty that now exists requires the opposite.
True, Plaintiff needed and desired surgery, without which he was becoming disabled. But “[t]he ADA prohibits discrimination because of disability, not inadequate treatment for disability.” Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir. 2010). So construed, neither the RA nor the ADA is violated by a prison’s simply failing to attend to the medical needs of its disabled prisoners. Grzan v. Charter Hosp. of Nw. Ind., 104 F.3d 116, 121, 123 (7th Cir. 1997) (as to Section 504); Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 249 (7th Cir. 1996) (as to the ADA); see also, e.g., Kiman v. N.H. Dep’t of Corr., 451 F.3d 274, 284 (1st Cir. 2006) (emphasizing that “courts have differentiated ADA claims based on negligent medical care from those based on discriminatory medical care”); Lesley v. Chie, 250 F.3d 47, 55 (1st Cir. 2001) (“[A] plaintiff’s showing of medical unreasonableness [under the Rehabilitation Act] must be framed within some larger theory of disability discrimination.”). As in the medical indifference cases, it “does not create a remedy for medical malpractice,” Bryant, 84 F.3d at 249, and “purely medical decisions ... do not ordinarily fall within the scope of the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act,” Fitzgerald v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 403 F.3d 1134, 1144 (10th Cir. 2005). Minimal treatment not based on a discriminatory motive may meet the ADA and RA, if a jury so determines, as here it still could, based on the uncontroverted facts.
*20 True, Plaintiff’s cataracts rendered him legally
!
!

blind and realistically disabled, and the latter fact could be found to have been obvious. Yet, this exception is narrowly understood, and a defendant will usually only be held liable for not accommodating an obvious disability when its doctors have recommended a specific accommodation. See Taylor, 93 F.3d at 165. Here, however, while several of Plaintiff’s doctors recommended surgery, none advised LSP to place Plaintiff on a permanently modified duty schedule, the one accommodation that would have prevented his actual physical injury in Angola’s fields. It could, then, be believed that LSP—and, by implication, the other defendants—did not deny Plaintiff access to certain services solely by reason of disability, though such a motive is necessary for the RA and ADA to have been contravened in the prison context.
True, Plaintiff has an extensive record attesting to his need for cataracts removal surgery, and it would not be unreasonable for a jury to find him to have become disabled by virtue of this delay. In some sense, it could be depicted as a rather predictable— perhaps even unavoidable—outcome that triggered LSP’s obligation to accommodate an impairment that it still seemingly refused to effectively and fully treat. Yet, whether a defendant failed to engage in good faith efforts to accommodate a plaintiff’s disability is a question of fact often held to preclude summary judgment, see, e.g., Lowe, 363 Fed.Appx. at 552, and rarely found when, as here, a defendant has not totally ignored a plaintiff’s disability by failing to make any attempt at a complete accommodation. Cf. Wright v. Giuliani, 230 F.3d 543, 548 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that under the ADA and RA, a demand for “reasonable accommodations to assure access to an existing program” is cognizable, but a demand for “additional or different substantive benefits” is not).
In the end, despite the strength of Plaintiff’s RA/ADA claims, the law and the facts do not make it impossible for Defendant to win a jury’s reprieve, Rule 56 barring Plaintiff’s success on the papers so far submitted and the evidence so far adduced.
IV. CONCLUSION
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!

A fair review of the record in this case reveals that both Parties have provided more than a modicum of evidence for their respective yet incompatible positions. With both sides having assembled some evidence from which both have constructed colorable claims or defenses, it is impossible to conclude that a reasonable jury would incontestably find in either’s favor on every such assertion as a matter of law. Indeed, the fact that Defendants and Plaintiff have filed dueling dispositive motions, citing to specific portions of an already expansive record, militates for this conclusion. Above all else, as jurisprudence amply evinces, questions surrounding the Eighth Amendment and the RA/ADA are invariably fact-intensive, often

dependent upon determinations of fact for which juries are empaneled. Such is the case here. For these reasons, this Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. 122), and Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgement, (Doc. 148).
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on June 6, 2016.
All Citations
Slip Copy, 2016 WL 3167176
!

Footnotes!

!

1! In!this!memorandum,!any!and!all!reference!to!“Rules”!or!“Rule![!]”!are!to!the!Federal!Rules!of!Civil!Procedure!unless!

!

otherwise!noted.! !

2! In! this! memorandum,! any! and! all! references! to! “Section! 507”! or! “§! 507”! are! to! this! section! of! the! RA! unless!

!

otherwise!noted.! !

3! Although!the!RA!predates!the!ADA!by!twentyLone!(21)!years,!it!codified!a!definition!of!disability!later!adopted!by!the!

!

ADA.! Consequently,! courts! mine! the! same! body! of! law! in! construing! these! related! statutes.! See# infra! note! 10;! see# also,# e.g.,! Crawford# v.# Ind.# Dep’t# of# Corr.,! 115! F.3d! 481,! 483! (7th! Cir.! 1997)! (“The! Rehabilitation! Act! is! materially!

identical! to! and! the! model! for! the! ADA! ...! except! that! it! is! limited! to! programs! that! receive! federal! financial!

assistance[.]”);! cf.! ANTONIN! SCALIA! &! BRYAN! A.! GARNER,! READING! LAW:! THE! INTERPRETATION! OF! LEGAL! TEXTS!

252–55!(2012)!(explaining!the!relevant!relatedLstatutes!canon).!For!this!reason,!throughout!this!opinion,!the!Court!

will! refer! to! Plaintiff’s! disability! claims! as! arising! under! the! “RA/ADA”! or! “ADA/RA,”! these! two! statutes’! technical!

distinctions!irrelevant!to!this!ruling’s!legal!analysis.!

!

4! In!this!opinion,!any!and!all!reference!to!“Section!1983”!or!“§!1983”!are!to!this!oftLused!statute.!

!

!

5! Because! the! factual! allegations! in! this! first! complaint! are! expanded! upon! in! the! operative! pleading,! they! are!

!

summarized!here.!More!detail!emerges,!but!the!factual!allegations!made!here!are!never!deleted.! !

6! Even!though!Defendants!initially!lodge!the!exhaustion!argument!against!Plaintiff’s!RA/ADA!and!Eighth!Amendment!

!

claims,!(Doc.!122L2!at!27),!their!counsel!later!narrowed!this!defense!to!the!RA/ADA!alone,!(Doc.!151!at!2–3).! !

7! Arguably,!merely!the!deprivation!of!a!federal!right!will!suffice.!King#v.#Kramer,!764!F.3d!635,!649!(7th!Cir.!2014).!

!

!

8! Under! Monell,! liability! may! be! shown! in! four! separate! ways.! See,# e.g.,! Castanza# v.# Town# of# Brookhaven,! 700!

!

F.Supp.2d!277,!287!(E.D.N.Y.!2010).! !

9! Defendants! once! averred! differently,! (Doc.! 76L1,! 92L1).! At! present,! they! contest! whether! Plaintiff! was! denied! an!

!

accommodation!on!the!basis!of!a!cognizable!disability,!not!the!RA/ADA’s!reach.! !

10! Section!504!of!the!RA!protects!qualified!individuals!from!discrimination!on!the!basis!of!disability!by!entities!receiving!

!

20!

!

!

!

financial! assistance! from! any! federal! department! or! agency.! 29! U.S.C.! §! 794! et# seq.! Passed! in! 1973,! the! ADA!

expanded!upon!its!protections.!Naturally,!therefore,!the!same!prima!facie!case!be!made!by!a!disabled!plaintiff!under!

both! acts,! Zukle# v.# Regents# of# Univ.# of# Cal.,! 166! F.3d! 1041,! 1045! (9th! Cir.! 1999),! and! courts! readily! “examine! cases!

construing! claims! under! the! ADA,! as! well! as! [S]ection! 504! of! the! Rehabilitation! Act,! because! there! is! no! significant!

difference!in!the!analysis!of!rights!and!obligations!created!by!the!two!Acts,”!Vinson#v.#Thomas,!288!F.3d!1145,!1152!

n.7!(9th!Cir.!2002).!

!

11! In!convincing!detail,!this!Court!dissects!the!cases!upon!which!Defendants!rely,!most!particularly!Douglas#v.#Gusman,!

!

567! F.! Supp.! 2d! 877,! 889! (E.D.! La.! 2008)! and! Owens# v.# O’Dea,! No.! 97L5517,! 1998! U.S.! App.! LEXIS! 10761,! 1998! WL! 344063,!at!*3!(6th!Cir.!May!27,!1998).!

!

12! As!Defendants!no!longer!contest!the!reach!of!these!discrimination!statutes,!see#supra!note!9,!they!have!implicitly!

!

conceded!both!law’s!applicability.! !

13! It!bears!repeating,!see#supra!note!3,!that!the!ADA!and!the!RA!are!“similar!in!substance!and,!with!the!exception!of!

!

the! RA’s! federal! funding! requirement,! cases! interpreting! either! are! applicable! and! interchangeable,”! Randolph# v.# Rodgers,!170!F.3d!850,!858!(8th!Cir.!1999)!(internal!quotation!marks!omitted).!

!

14! Despite!the!language!in!Saucier,!this!twoLpart!analysis!need!not!proceed!sequentially,!and!the!order!may!be!readily!

!

reversed!depending!on!the!case’s!peculiar!circumstances.!See,#e.g.,!Pearson#v.#Callahan,!555!U.S.!223,!236,!129!S.!Ct.! 808,! 818,! 172! L.Ed.! 2d! 565! (2009);! L.A.# Cnty.# v.# Rettele,! 550! U.S.! 609,! 616,! 127! S.! Ct.! 1989,! 1994,! 167! L.Ed.! 2d! 974!

(2007)!(per!curiam).!

!

15! Pursuant!to!Federal!Rule!of!Evidence!201,!a!court!may!always!take!judicial!notice!of!its!own!public!docket.!June#Med.#

!

Servs.#LLC#v.#Kliebert,!No.!14LCVL00525LJWDLRLB,!___!F.!Supp.!3d!____,!2016!U.S.!Dist.!LEXIS!8716,!at!*93!!n.50,!2016! WL!320942,!at!*32!n.50!(M.D.!La.!Jan.!26,!2016)!(collecting!cases).!

!

16! Plaintiff! counts! days! beginning! on! June! 24,! 2012,! when! LSU! Hospital! Personnel! allegedly! diagnosed! him! and!

!

recommended! surgery.! (Doc.! 148L2! ¶! 10,! at! 2.)! He! received! surgery! on! his! right! and! left! eyes! on! July! 7! and! September!15,!2014,!respectively.!(Id.!¶¶!24–25,!at!3.)!

!

17! Defendants’!Opposition!itself!concedes!this!fact,!acknowledging!that!Plaintiff’s!medical!record!described! cataracts!

!

surgery! as! “medically! necessary,”! if! also! “nonLurgent”! and! subject! to! approval.! (Doc.! 151! at! 9! n.2.)! The! precise! import! of! this! bureaucratic! designation! is! a! question! of! fact,! a! judgment! predicated! on! deductions! rather! than!

incontestable!principles!of!law.!

!

18! Defendant!emphasizes!the!fact!that!the!inmate!there!died!without!medical!indifference!being!found.!(Doc.!151!at!8.)!

!

!

19! Relatedly,! the! existence! of! such! an! ambiguous! record! and! a! history! of! treatment! makes! it! hard! to! conclude,! on!

!

motions! alone,! that! any! Defendant! acted! with! the! subjective! culpability! that! Eighth! Amendment! jurisprudence! requires.!

!
!

!

!

21!

!

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

JASON HACKER (#383727)

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 14-063-JWD-EWD

N. BURL CAIN, ET AL.

JUDGMENT This matter came before the Court for a trial by jury beginning on January 30, 2017. On February 1, 2017, the Court granted Defendants' Rule 50 motion that dismissed John Bel Edwards individually and in his official capacity as the Governor of State of Louisiana, and the parties agreed to dismiss the State of Louisiana in this matter. On February 2, 2017, the jury rendered its verdict and found (1) that Mr. Hacker failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he suffered from a qualified disability under the ADA/RA before he received eye surgery, (2) that the Plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that neither of the Individual Defendants, Burl Cain nor James LeBlanc, through their supervision of others, subjected Plaintiff to deliberate medical indifference by delaying Plaintiff's cataract surgery in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and (3) that Plaintiff failed to prove that neither of the Individual Defendants, Burl Cain nor James LeBlanc, through their supervision of others, were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's medical needs by requiring Mr. Hacker to do manual work in the field that was dangerous because he had a visual impairment and (4) that Plaintiff failed to prove that neither of the Individual Defendants, Burl Cain nor James LeBlanc, through their supervision

of others, were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's medical needs by requiring Mr. Hacker to do manual work in the license tag plant that was dangerous because he had a visual impairment.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the Defendants, State of Louisiana, Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections ("DPSC"), Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola ("LSP"), Burl N. Cain, individually and in his official capacity as Warden of the Louisiana State Penitentiary ("Cain"), James M. LeBlanc, individually and in his official capacity as Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections ("Sec. LeBlanc"), and John Bel Edwards individually and in his official capacity as the Governor of State of Louisiana against the Plaintiff, Jason Hacker, (DOC# 383727), dismissing this matter with prejudice. Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on February 6, 2017.
HNW. deGRAVELLES ITED TATES DISTRICT COURT .u.a..LLJ....,......,., DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

 
 Case 3:14-cv-00063-JWD-EWD Document 315 10/30/17 Page 1 of 23

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

JASON HACKER
VERSUS
N. BURL CAIN, WARDEN, ET AL.

CV. NO. 14-63-JWD-EWD JUDGE JOHN W. deGRAVELLES

RULING AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for a New Trial and Renewed Judgment as a Matter of Law. (“Motion,” Doc. 288). Defendants oppose the Motion. (“Opposition,” Doc. 293). After transcripts were prepared, Plaintiff and Defendants filed Supplemental Memoranda in further support of their positions. (Docs. 308-2 and 307-1, respectively). After careful consideration of the law, the facts of this case, and the parties’ arguments, for the reasons set forth below, the Motion is DENIED. II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In January 2014, Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a Complaint. (Doc. 1). The Complaint was ultimately superseded by a Second Amended Complaint filed in June 2015. (Doc. 73). Plaintiff, a prisoner at the Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola (“Angola”), alleged in relevant part that Defendants violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), and the Eighth Amendment by delaying his receipt of cataract surgery for several years and failing to provide reasonable accommodations in the interim. (Id. at 1-12).
1

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In October 2016, Plaintiff moved in limine to exclude certain evidence and testimony as irrelevant. (Doc. 177-1). As it is germane to the instant Motion, the motion in limine sought to exclude evidence of Plaintiff’s conviction or crimes (id. at 2-3), evidence of Plaintiff’s prison disciplinary record (id. at 3-4), and evidence of Plaintiff’s medical care other than cataract surgery (id. at 4-5).1
The Court ruled that: (1) the jury would be permitted to consider evidence that Plaintiff was “convicted of a felony for which he is serving a sentence at [Angola],” but Defendants would not be permitted to offer evidence of or refer to the “specific crimes for which Plaintiff was convicted or the conduct which led to his conviction”; (2) because Defendants represented that they would not introduce evidence regarding Plaintiff’s disciplinary record (Doc. 183 at 2), this aspect of the motion in limine was moot; and (3) the jury would be permitted to receive evidence of medical care “given in connection” with his cataracts, even if non-surgical in nature, but not for “unrelated” treatment “except as it may bear on the issues related to Plaintiff’s cataracts.” (Doc. 235 at 1-2). The case was tried before a jury from January 30, 2017, through February 2, 2017. (Docs. 272, 273, 274, 275).
a. Opening Statements In his opening statement, Plaintiff’s counsel argued that Angola deliberately failed to fix Plaintiff’s cataracts for so long that he lost his eyesight. (Trial Tr. Vol I, Doc. 295 at 13:14-14:8). Plaintiff’s counsel also argued that Angola had failed to give Plaintiff “accommodations [or] a safe place to work” while he was suffering from cataracts. (Id. at 14:22-15:3). During the course of
1 Plaintiff’s original Motion did not discuss references to Plaintiff’s disciplinary record but instead challenged defense counsel’s alleged references to the medical care received by “free people.” (Doc. 288-1 at 4). As Defendants correctly note, however, defense counsel made no such reference. (Doc. 293 at 6). Plaintiff’s supplemental memorandum in support of the Motion does not make any argument regarding the care “free people” receive, but references Plaintiff’s disciplinary history instead. (Doc. 308-2 at 5-6). The Court therefore addresses Plaintiff’s argument regarding his disciplinary history.
2

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his opening statement, Plaintiff’s counsel argued that Plaintiff “basically kept on the straight and [n]arrow” in prison by playing music and exercising, but, because his surgery was delayed and because he was injured after being assigned to dangerous work, he was no longer able to do so. (Id. at 16:25-17-10).
In the first line of his opening statement, defense counsel stated that Plaintiff had been “serving a life sentence at Angola” since the early 2000s. (Id. at 23:6-8). Defense counsel then argued that prison staff had not failed to respond to Plaintiff’s medical needs, observing that Plaintiff had received diabetes tests and bloodwork in response to his complaints, which included weight loss, hunger, and heart palpitations. (Id. at 24:14-25:16). Plaintiff’s counsel objected, arguing that defense counsel was violating the Court’s ruling in limine to exclude statements about medical treatment unrelated to Plaintiff’s cataracts. (Id. at 25:17-26:7). Defense counsel argued that it was impossible to “extract” these other conditions from Plaintiff’s treatment for cataracts. (Id. at 26:8-22). The Court reiterated that evidence and testimony about treatment “unrelated” to Plaintiff’s cataracts would not be permitted, but evidence and testimony regarding conditions that were “linked” or “connected” to Plaintiff’s cataracts, that would “explain in some way why he was or was not treated in the way he was,” were permissible. (Id. at 26:23-28:14). Immediately following the Court’s ruling, defense counsel continued with his opening statement, mentioning that in January 2012 medical records contained references to Plaintiff’s “heart palpitations, visual [sic], weight loss, [and] insomnia,” and that the jury would hear testimony about “all these lab tests” trying to determine what Plaintiff was suffering from.2 (Id. at 29:8-17).
2 Additionally, during later testimony, Plaintiff’s counsel objected that a witness was testifying about Plaintiff’s unrelated medical history in violation of the Court’s ruling in limine. (Doc. 300 at 99:11-15). Defense counsel argued that treatment for Plaintiff’s vision problems was “mixed in” with differential diagnoses and attempted treatment for Plaintiff’s other complaints. (Id. at 99:18-100:1). The Court ultimately overruled the objection, stating that “part of eye workup has to do with ruling out other potential causes,” but cautioned that defense counsel would not be permitted to inquire any further into medical care addressed in the in limine ruling. (Id. at 101:10-20).
3

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After discussing Plaintiff’s history of testing for cataracts, defense counsel said that it was “not true” that Plaintiff was doing “all that he was supposed to be doing” but was nevertheless assigned to dangerous work: according to defense counsel, Plaintiff “broke all the rules.” (Id. at 33:14-18). Plaintiff’s counsel objected, arguing that Defendants had agreed not to present evidence or testimony regarding Plaintiff’s disciplinary history. (Id. at 33:19-24, 34:7-14). Defense counsel argued that, contrary to Plaintiff’s counsel’s assertions, Plaintiff was “sent out into the fields” because he was “caught with all kinds of recording paraphernalia” and was “selling his music on iTunes.” (Id. at 34:16-23). The Court stated that that had “nothing to do with the issues in this case” and chastised defense counsel for violating a ruling in limine. (Id. at 34:2435:10). The Court sustained the objection but denied Plaintiff’s counsel’s motion for a mistrial. (Id. at 35:12-15).
Following defense counsel’s opening, Plaintiff’s counsel argued to the Court that defense counsel’s opening also contained an impermissible reference to the “life sentence” that Plaintiff was serving and asked for a mistrial on this basis. (Id. at 38:22-39:9). Defense counsel argued that his statement “fell right in line with [the] ruling on this motion in limine,” and the Court advised counsel that it would “check that during a break” and denied the motion for a mistrial. (Id. at 39:14-24). Later on, the Court read its ruling in limine to counsel and opined that “a very fair reading” of the ruling would not permit defense counsel to say what Plaintiff’s sentence was. (Id. at 50:22-51:20).
b. Scott Meyers Scott Meyers, an inmate at Angola, testified that he had known Plaintiff for close to ten years and had worked alongside Plaintiff in prison industries and played with Plaintiff in a band. (Id. at 40:11-41:7). Meyers stated that Plaintiff’s vision had worsened while Meyers had known
4

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Plaintiff, affecting Plaintiff’s ability to play music, see his food, and identify people on sight. (Id. at 41:8-42:14). Meyers testified that it wasn’t Angola’s “policy” to help with vision problems like Plaintiff’s, and prisoners relied on each other for help. (Id. at 42:22-43:1). Meyers claimed that Plaintiff had had a “temper” when his eyesight was failing but did not have a temper after his eyes were “fixed.” (Id. at 43:2-22). Meyers also observed that Plaintiff did not exercise as much as he used to following an injury to one of his chest muscles.3 (Id. at 45:3-17).
c. Deputy Warden Richard Peabody Richard Peabody, a deputy warden and the ADA coordinator at Angola, testified that he had worked at Angola for roughly 40 years. (Id. at 52:13-53:4). Warden Peabody confirmed that, under the ADA, Angola should provide accommodations to people who cannot see well and people whose eyesight interferes with their ability to walk; read and write; read, write, and play music; or exercise. (Id. at 59:19-60:13). Warden Peabody also agreed that being legally blind or needing surgery to correct cataracts impairing a “major life function” is a “serious medical problem.” (Id. at 62:3-18). Warden Peabody also testified that, at Angola, an inmate who did not have a “duty status” was on “regular duty” and could be assigned to work outside in “the field” using an Lblade, sling blade, shovel, or hoe. (Id. at 79:6-80:6). Warden Peabody also confirmed that, according to May 6, 2013 forms, Plaintiff had been assigned two days of reduced duty status because he could not “see due to cataracts [and was] waiting on surgery.” (Id. at 80:10-83:7; P. Exh. 2 at 000002; P. Exh. 5 at 000035).4 Similarly, on May 16, 2013, Plaintiff received a medical referral and was placed on reduced duty; a Health Care
3 According to testimony discussed infra, the chest injury occurred because Plaintiff was assigned to stack hay bales in the field at Angola while he was unable to see. 4 The exhibit numbers and exhibit page numbers used during trial frequently do not match those on the Court’s electronic exhibit storage system. For ease of reference, the Court uses the numbering provided by the electronic exhibit storage system.
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Request Form from the same date indicated that Plaintiff complained of blurry vision and difficulty seeing far away due to cataracts. (Doc. 295 at 85:20-87:3; P. Exh. 1 at 000001; P. Exh. 6 at 000036; P. Exh. 7 at 000071). A May 22, 2013 record from the eye clinic at Angola stated that Plaintiff was “legally blind” and recommended surgery. (Doc. 295 at 90:15-92:10; D. Exh. 1 at 001635). Another medical record from the same date indicated that Plaintiff had “20/400 vision” in his left eye and should be placed on a reduced duty status. (Doc. 295 at 93:7-22; P. Exh. 7 at 000068). A June 26, 2013 note from Plaintiff to the “eye clinic” stated that, although it had been a month since he had been “declared . . . legally blind,” he had not received a duty status. (Id. at 95:25-98:21; D. Exh. 10 at 002076). Reviewing several other exhibits, Warden Peabody confirmed that it appeared that Plaintiff had been assigned to field work or work manufacturing license tags during the period at issue. (Doc. 295 at 102:2-103:11).
Warden Peabody stated that cataracts “could” be a disability, depending on their severity, but many people “do quite fine” with them. (Id. at 109:22-110:18).
Warden Peabody also discussed Plaintiff’s Administrative Remedy Procedure letter dated August 21, 2013, which stated that Plaintiff had been diagnosed with “severe cataracts” affecting daily life activities and declared legally blind. (Id. at 113:15-18, 116:21-24; D. Exh. 3 at 001875 - 001877). Plaintiff’s letter also stated that he had torn his right pectoral muscle because he had been unable to catch a hay bale while working in the field. (Doc. 295 at 118:3-18; D. Exh. 3 at 001875 - 001877). Warden Peabody noted that he had been unable to investigate Plaintiff’s claims because no one told him about them. (Doc. 295 at 119:1-5).
On cross-examination, Warden Peabody said that inmates “constantly” make complaints to avoid working outdoors, and that he had not been shown any complaints related to when Plaintiff worked indoors making license tags, even though the tag plant was “much more dangerous.” (Id.
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at 134:14-135:7). Warden Peabody also observed that, because Plaintiff’s complaints had not been
referred to Warden Peabody, Warden Peabody could only consider what Plaintiff claimed and
statements by doctors. (Id. at 135:11-136:12). Warden Peabody also confirmed that he believed
that a disability had to have “some level of permanence” in order to implicate the ADA. (Id. at
136:17-19).
On redirect, Warden Peabody confirmed that prisoners are disciplined for making “bogus”
medical complaints or refusing to work. (Id. at 140:20-141:18). Plaintiff’s counsel then elicited
the following testimony:
Q Now, [your] testimony also was [that] the ADA requires that the disability has to be permanent; is that right? A Permanent or longstanding, I don’t remember the exact wording. Q Okay. So it was your testimony that that’s what the ADA requires, correct? A Yes. Q That it must be long-term? A Yes. Q That it cannot be episodic? A Correct. Q And your definition of long-term is; is that longer than three months? A I don’t have a definition. I would consider it mainly if it’s permanent. Q Permanent. And so that would be longer than three months? A Yes. Q It would be longer than six months? A I would assume so, yes. Q You would assume so. I’m asking if you know. A If I know – Q Yeah. You’re the ADA coordinator, correct? A If I know that the condition is not going to change, yes. Q But you know that long-term permanent disability means more than – you know that the ADA requires that, that’s your testimony? A Yes. Q And [defense counsel] made note of this complaint about [Plaintiff’s] eyesight in 2011, correct? A I believe that was the date. Q And that was a complaint from – that was a complaint made to the eye clinic at Angola, correct? A Yes. I don’t remember the dates. I’ve looked at so much of that. Q Okay. And that he was complaining of blurry vision when he first went to the doctor then, correct?
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A I believe so. I’m not really sure. Q And he was working in the tag plant at that point too, correct? A I don’t know. I don’t recall. Q Okay. (Id. at 141:19-143:12).
d. Miranda Tait Miranda Tait, an attorney with the Advocacy Center of Louisiana, testified that she had visited Angola in summer 2013 and several times afterward and had not seen certain inmates with visual impairments using Braille, using a magnifier or magnifying glass, or being guided around by prison staff. (Trial Tr. Vol II, Doc. 296 at 15:2-4, 16:10-22, 29:10-30:16). Tait acknowledged that the Advocacy Center was involved in litigation against Angola regarding “medical issues.” (Id. at 31:4-13).
e. Dr. Randy Lavespere Dr. Randy Lavespere, the medical director at Angola, testified that, according to Department of Corrections policy, “at times” cataract surgery could be a medically necessary procedure. (Id. at 35:10-12; 39:13-15). Dr. Lavespere discussed an October 24, 2012 “trip return” form from an outside facility, acknowledging that it recommended that Plaintiff be referred to a hospital for cataract removal. (Id. at 49:8-50:11; D. Exh. 1 at 001517). He also discussed an April 2, 2013 medical form listing “cataract extraction, right eye” as a “non-emergent but medically necessary” procedure to be performed “ASAP.” (Doc. 296 at 52:9-54:3; D. Exh. 1 at 001508 001509). Dr. Lavespere also stated that, although Angola medical staff had found that Plaintiff was legally blind and ordered cataract surgery, the finding was made by an optometrist, not an ophthalmologist, so “verification and the need for him to see an ophthalmologist would result.” (Doc. 296 at 58:5-18). Dr. Lavespere said it was necessary to “keep in mind” that optical testing at Angola is “very subjective:” an inmate self-reports what he is able to read and see. (Id. at 59:11-
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20). Dr. Lavespere also reported that, when prisoners are sent to the hospital, the hospital can choose to “keep” them and operate on the following day, but in Plaintiff’s case, they kept “sending [Plaintiff] back.” (Id. at 63:16-21). Dr. Lavespere later returned to the stand and discussed other, similar medical records at some length. (See generally Trial Tr. Vol. III, Doc. 300 at 87-132).
f. Jackie Wafer Jackie Wafer, an inmate at Angola, testified that he met Plaintiff while auditioning to be in Plaintiff’s band. (Doc. 296 at 68:16-17, 69:19-70:3). Wafer testified that Plaintiff played guitar and sang, wrote music, and performed managerial functions for the band. (Id. at 70:23-24, 72:2373:3, 73:15-21). Wafer also testified that, when he met Plaintiff, Plaintiff “worked out a lot.” (Id. at 75:2-4). Like Meyers, Wafer testified that Plaintiff’s failing eyesight affected his ability to participate in the band’s activities, exercise, read, and recognize people. (Id. at 75:15-76:1, 78:979:2).
g. Dr. Raman Singh Dr. Raman Singh, the Chief Medical Mental Health Director for the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, stated that cataracts usually “take[] years” to develop and are generally elective surgeries. (Id. at 104:16-18, 121:16-18). Dr. Singh also discussed documents allegedly describing other instances in which medical care for inmates had been delayed. (See generally Docs. 298, 299).
h. Dr. Jason Collins Dr. Jason Collins, who during some of the events at issue was the medical director at Angola, testified that, when he started working at Angola in 2011 the warden expressed interest in creating a “procedural area” for cataract patients. (Doc. 296 at 153:21-154:4, 155:15-20). Dr. Collins also testified that, in or after 2012, the state’s medical system started to “change,” and
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“there was no one available do to the cataract surgery after a while.” (Id. at 157:1-5). On crossexamination, Dr. Collins said that he believed from his review of the record that Plaintiff had 20/60 vision in his right eye due to cataracts and, to the best of Dr. Collins’s knowledge, this did not constitute legal blindness. (Id. at 172:25-173:11). Dr. Collins also testified that, as medical director, he would rely on an outside specialist ophthalmologist’s opinion rather than an Angola optician’s. (Id. at 174:1-10). On redirect, Dr. Collins confirmed that some medical records said that Plaintiff was “legally blind.” (Id. at 175:6-19).
i. Dr. Edward Bell Dr. Edward Bell, the Director of the Professional Development and Research Institute on Blindness at Louisiana Tech University, testified as Plaintiff’s expert witness on management and accommodation of physical disabilities. (Id. at 176:20-25, 187:21-23). Dr. Bell testified that Plaintiff’s complaints and experiences were consistent with the experiences of someone with cataracts, including the occasional waxing and waning of his symptoms. (Id. at 191:10-192:10, 193:7-13). Dr. Bell testified that a person who is “legally blind” has a visual acuity of 20/200 in the better eye after correction or a field restriction of less than 20 degrees. (Id. at 197:3-8). According to Dr. Bell, someone who is not legally blind may nevertheless be “pretty significantly visually impaired” and need accommodations. (Id. at 198:8-19). Dr. Bell testified that having ophthalmologists acknowledge his cataracts was “an indication” that Plaintiff was having “significant problems.” (Id. at 199:16-21). Dr. Bell also reported that 20/400 vision was “beyond legal blindness,” and Plaintiff likely was not “faking” based on the duration of his vision problems, their progressive nature, and that the fact that Plaintiff ultimately had cataract surgery. (Id. at 200:14-201:2, 205:10-206:6). Dr. Bell said that, in his opinion, Plaintiff was disabled and Angola
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did not treat him appropriately. (Id. at 209:18-210:5). On cross-examination, Dr. Bell confirmed that, to his knowledge, Plaintiff had never been totally blind. (Id. at 214:6-9).
j. Jason Hacker Plaintiff testified that, immediately before his surgery, he “couldn’t see anything” in his right eye and could see very little out of his left eye. (Doc. 300 at 12:14-18). He would “bump[] into people” that he was unable to see. (Id. at 13:6-9). He was also unable to read or write music and communicate with other members of his band during performances. (Id. at 16:4-10, 22). Plaintiff also described how, on May 6, 2013, he “just couldn’t take” working in the field anymore and told an emergency technician that he was waiting for surgery and could not see. (Id. at 21:1023:12). Plaintiff said that he received “two or three” days of reduced duty status; Plaintiff believed that the prison intended that he would be seen by a doctor during that time. (Id. at 24:4-12). Plaintiff claimed that, when stacking hay bales on May 16, 2013, he injured his chest because he was unable to see. (Id. at 24:15-25:18). Plaintiff also discussed the June 2013 note that he wrote to the eye clinic regarding his inability to see and the fact that he had not received a no-duty status. (Id. at 29:4-31:11). Plaintiff acknowledged that prisoners might sometimes “fake,” but argued that this was a “genuine case” where he did not receive needed help. (Id. at 46:3-9). On cross-examination, Plaintiff acknowledged that he had never asked for a duty status change while at the tag plant or from any other work duty in prison, although he stated that he had “partners” that did work that he was unable to do at the tag plant. (Id. at 51:2-12; 52:18-21). Plaintiff also claimed that the “higher rates of sunlight” outside bothered him and said working at the tag plant was “better” than working outside. (Id. at 52:6-25). Plaintiff also acknowledged that, on the advice of others, he had signed his name to an Administrative Remedy Procedure form
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requesting cataract surgery, attorney’s fees and litigation costs, and monetary damages for his pain and suffering. (Id. at 54:7-55:23). Plaintiff also testified that he thought filing this lawsuit would get his issues resolved more quickly. (Id. at 60:14-22).
On redirect, Plaintiff confirmed that he understood that he could be punished for falsely declaring himself an “emergency” and refusing to work. (Id. at 67:24-68:1).
k. Dr. Peter R. Kastl Dr. Peter R. Kastl, an ophthalmologist and faculty member at Tulane University, testified as Defendants’ expert in the field of ophthalmology. (Id. at 156:6-157:5, 159:13-15). Dr. Kastl testified that, based on his review of Plaintiff’s medical records, Plaintiff had never been legally blind. (Id. at 160:9-19, 170:20-25). Dr. Kastl observed that “all of us will get cataracts,” but an individual might live with cataracts for a long time without them requiring surgical intervention. (Id. at 162:19-20, 164:17-165:4). Dr. Kastl also stated that “the whole measurement of visual acuity is the response of the patient.” (Id. at 169:15-16). Dr. Kastl reviewed a record from March 12, 2014 and opined that “the refraction shows that the patient is pretty mild.” (Id. at 170:5-19; D. Exh. 1 at 001478). On cross-examination, Dr. Kastl acknowledged that someone could be legally blind either due to a loss of visual acuity or loss of visual field. (Doc. 300 at 171:24-172:7). Following the presentation of evidence, Plaintiff moved for a directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 50 on several issues, including “that there was a failure to accommodate on the basis of [Plaintiff’s] disability.” (Id. at 177:2-13). The Court denied the motion, finding that there was “evidence going on both sides of every issue [] mentioned.” (Id. at 178:4-5). The jury found for Defendants on all claims. (Doc. 277). In particular, the jury checked “no” in response to an interrogatory asking whether Plaintiff had proven “by a preponderance of
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the evidence that he suffered from a qualified disability under the ADA/RA before he received eye surgery.” (Id. at 1). With respect to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims, the jury checked “no” in response to interrogatories asking whether Defendants “subjected Plaintiff to deliberate medical indifference” or “were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical needs” by delaying his cataract surgery or assigning him to dangerous work. (Id. at 3).
The Court entered judgment on February 7, 2017 (Doc. 278), and Plaintiff’s Motion was filed on March 2, 2017. (Doc. 288).
III. DISCUSSION a. Standard
Rule 59(a) provides that a new trial may be granted “on all or some of the issues . . . after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action in federal court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1). Although Rule 59(a) does not list specific grounds for a new trial, the Fifth Circuit has held that a new trial may be granted if “the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the damages awarded are excessive, the trial was unfair, or prejudicial error was committed in its course.” Smith v. Transworld Drilling Co., 773 F.2d 610, 613 (5th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). However, a trial court should not grant a new trial on evidentiary grounds unless the verdict is against the great weight of the evidence, and it is within the “sound discretion of the trial court” to determine whether to grant or deny a motion for new trial. Pryor v. Trane Co., 138 F.3d 1024, 1026 (5th Cir. 1998).
A Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law “in an action tried by jury is a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict.” Flowers v. S. Reg’l Physician Servs., Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 235 (5th Cir. 2001). Such a motion may be granted only if “there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to have found for [the non-
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moving] party with respect to that issue.” Id. The Court must “consider all of the evidence, drawing all reasonable inferences and resolving all credibility determinations in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Id.5
i. Plaintiff’s Arguments Plaintiff asserts five grounds upon which the Court should grant a new trial or judgment as a matter of law. First, Plaintiff argues that defense counsel’s opening statement violated the three rulings in limine discussed previously. (Docs. 288-1 at 3-5; 308-2 at 3-6). Second, Plaintiff contends that the trial evidence overwhelmingly establishes that Plaintiff was disabled. (Docs. 288-1 at 5-7; 308-2 at 6-12). Third, Plaintiff maintains that the trial evidence overwhelmingly establishes that Plaintiff has proven the other elements of an ADA or RA violation. (Docs. 288-1 at 8-11; 308-2 at 12-15). Fourth, Plaintiff argues that Warden Peabody testified erroneously that temporary impairment is not a disability under the ADA, and the jury’s verdict may have been tainted by this false testimony. (Docs. 288-1 at 11-12; 308-2 at 15-16). Fifth, Plaintiff contends that the trial evidence overwhelmingly establishes that Plaintiff was forced to work in dangerous conditions in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Docs. 288-1 at 12-14; 308-2 at 16-18).
ii. Defendants’ Arguments Defendants oppose the Motion in all respects. First, Defendants argue that defense counsel did not violate the Court’s rulings in limine or that any violations were harmless. (Docs. 293 at 36; 307-1 at 3-7). Second, Defendants contend that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that Plaintiff was not disabled under the ADA or RA. (Docs. 293 at 6-8; 307-1 at 7-10). Third, Defendants maintain that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that Defendants’ conduct
5 The Court observes that the standard for granting a new trial is lower than that for granting judgment as a matter of law. See Shows v. Jamison Bedding, Inc., 671 F.2d 927, 930 (5th Cir. 1982). The Court will therefore generally analyze Plaintiff’s arguments under the “new trial” standard, as failure to meet that standard also precludes judgment as a matter of law in Plaintiff’s favor.
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did not satisfy the other elements of the ADA or RA. (Docs. 293 at 8-9; 307-1 at 10-11). Fourth, Defendants argue that Plaintiff had “ample opportunity” to address Warden Peabody’s testimony on cross-examination and that Warden Peabody’s testimony likely had no effect on the jury’s verdict. (Docs. 293 at 9; 307-1 at 11). Fifth, Defendants contend that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that Plaintiff was not forced to work in dangerous conditions in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Docs. 293 at 9-10; 307-1 at 12).
The Court now considers each of these issues in turn. b. The Court’s Rulings In Limine
Plaintiffs argue that defense counsel’s opening statement violated the Court’s rulings in limine by referring to Plaintiff’s “life sentence,” to medical conditions allegedly unrelated to Plaintiff’s cataracts, and to Plaintiff’s disciplinary record. (Docs. 288-1 at 3-5; 308-2 at 3-6).
The Court declines to grant a new trial on this basis. Preliminarily, although portions of defense counsel’s opening skirted and occasionally crossed over into forbidden territory, the references were generally oblique and isolated. For example, one of the Court’s rulings in limine barred reference to the “specific crimes for which Plaintiff was convicted or the conduct which led to his conviction.” (Doc. 235 at 1). Defense counsel’s statement that Plaintiff is serving a life sentence, while certainly irrelevant to the issues in this case and more problematic than a statement that Plaintiff is serving “a sentence,” requires inferential steps and some knowledge about Louisiana sentencing law in order to definitively link it to Plaintiff’s specific crimes or the conduct that led to his conviction. Similarly, some of the statements regarding Plaintiff’s medical history may have resulted from a genuine misunderstanding about whether Plaintiff’s complaints and medical testing regarding facially “unrelated” conditions were nevertheless related for purposes of
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describing the differential diagnosis procedure that Defendants undertook. (Doc. 300 at 100:2102:1).
More significantly, Plaintiff has made no specific showing of prejudice from defense counsel’s violations. In fact, particularly with respect to Plaintiff’s life sentence and disciplinary record, it does not appear that defense counsel introduced any evidence on either of these issues, and the jury was instructed to base their verdict on the evidence in the case and not any arguments by counsel.6 (Doc. 300 at 237:18-21). There is simply no credible suggestion or record evidence that defense counsel’s comments influenced the jury’s verdict, and Plaintiff has not demonstrated, in light of the record as a whole, that “manifest injustice” resulted from the comments. Foradori v. Harris, 523 F.3d 477, 506 (5th Cir. 2008) (new trial will not be granted based on trial error “unless, after considering the record as a whole, the court concludes that manifest injustice will result from letting the verdict stand”); see also City of Cleveland v. Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co., 624 F.2d 749, 756 (6th Cir. 1980) (in determining whether there is a “reasonable probability” that jury was influenced by improper conduct, court examines totality of the circumstances, including “nature of the comments, their frequency, their possible relevancy to the real issues before the jury, the manner in which the parties and the court treated the comments, the strength of the case (e.g. whether it is a close case), and the verdict itself”); Pullman v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 262 F.3d 759, 762 (8th Cir. 2001) (for violation of ruling in limine to warrant new trial, ruling must be specific in its prohibition, the violation must be clear, and violation must “prejudice[] the parties or den[y] them a fair trial”); Hemmings v. Tidyman’s Inc., 285 F.3d 1174, 1192 (9th Cir. 2002) (misconduct by trial counsel results in a new trial if the “flavor of misconduct sufficiently permeates an entire proceeding to provide conviction that the jury was influenced by passion and prejudice in reaching
6 Indeed, as Defendants note, it appears that Plaintiff’s exhibits contain documents describing Plaintiff’s crimes and prison disciplinary history. (P. Exh. 79 at 001173, 001178).
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its verdict”); Blevins v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 728 F.2d 1576, 1579 (10th Cir. 1984) (violation of
ruling in limine did not warrant new trial where party seeking new trial failed to show how he was
prejudiced by testimony). Therefore, neither a new trial nor judgment as a matter of law is
warranted on this basis.
c. Evidence of Disability
Plaintiff contends that the trial evidence overwhelmingly establishes that Plaintiff was
disabled. (Docs. 288-1 at 5-7; 308-2 at 6-12). Plaintiff points particularly to numerous statements
in medical records that he had low visual acuity, was “legally blind,” performed poorly on vision
tests, should receive a no duty or reduced duty status, needed surgery or needed surgery “ASAP,”
and was complaining of blurred vision. (Docs. 288-1 at 6; 308-2 at 9-11). Plaintiff also argues
that he was moved out of the fields in response to his disability, demonstrating that Defendants
believed him to be disabled. (Docs. 288-1 at 7; 308-2 at 11). Plaintiff also makes much of the
following excerpt from Warden Peabody’s testimony, considering it an “admission” that Plaintiff
was disabled:
Q. But, Warden, You know, Mr. Coordinator, the definition of disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act. A. Yes. Q. And it’s a physical impairment, correct? A. Correct. Q. That impairs life activities? A. Yes, major life function. Q. And an example of a physical impairment is a cataract? A. I’m not aware that cataract is – now I’m aware that blindness is, but cataracts, no. Q. No, you don’t think cataracts is a physical impairment? A. It depends upon the severity of the cataracts. Q. If it’s causing someone to be declared legally blind that would be pretty severe, correct? A. I would consider that severe. Q. Okay. And if it’s affecting their ability to walk, that would be a major life activity, correct? A. Correct.
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Q. If it’s affecting their ability to work that would be a major life activity, correct? A. Yes. Q. I’m sorry? A. Yes. Q. And affecting their ability to exercise, that would be a major life activity, correct? A. Yes. Q. Affecting their ability to play music that would be a major life activity, correct? A. Yes. Q. Affecting their ability to read and write letters, correct? A. Yes. Q. So this person has a disability, Warden. A. Yes. Q. And they should have gotten an accommodation? A. The accommodation that was recommended was surgery, which I believe he did get.
(See Docs. 308-2 at 7, 295 at 110:1-111:15).
Although the issue is close, the Court concludes that this claim does not warrant a new
trial. As Plaintiff observes, an individual has a “disability” under the relevant provisions of the
ADA if he has “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities” or has “a record of such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)-(B). Here, it is true
that the medical evidence shows that Plaintiff repeatedly complained of difficulty seeing and was
evaluated by numerous medical professionals in connection with his professed inability to see.
However, there was also testimony at trial that much of the medical testing that Plaintiff
underwent, the records substantiating his disability, and the recommendations made about his
treatment were based primarily on his own self-reports. (Doc. 296 at 59:11-20). Additionally,
according to Dr. Kastl, Plaintiff’s medical records just prior to his surgery showed that his visual
acuity was significantly better than prison records suggested. (Doc. 300 at 170:5-171:10).
Moreover, most of the evidence about how Plaintiff’s impairments actually affected his daily life
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came from the testimony of Plaintiff and other inmates. The jury could properly have rejected this testimony.
In evaluating whether Plaintiff had established that he was disabled, the jury could also properly have considered testimony that the hospital with the ability to correct Plaintiff’s cataracts kept “sending [him] back” without surgery, (Doc. 296 at 63:16-21), or that inmates frequently exaggerate their conditions to avoid working in the field and that Plaintiff never asked for a duty status change from work other than work in the field. (Doc. 295 at 134:14-135:7; Doc. 300 at 51:2-12; 52:18-21).
The jury also need not have considered Warden Peabody’s testimony as an admission that Plaintiff was disabled. A fair reading of the exchange is that Warden Peabody accepted the parameters of Plaintiff’s counsel’s hypothetical but, at the end, also attempted to note that Plaintiff, clearly the individual that Plaintiff’s counsel was referencing, had received surgery. Plaintiff’s duty status similarly does not indicate that Angola personnel believed that Plaintiff was “disabled” under the ADA or RA: it appears from Plaintiff’s own testimony that duty status may be given where an inmate is to be evaluated by medical personnel but an injury or disability has not been established. (Doc. 300 at 24:5-12).
In short, Plaintiff is correct that there is significant evidence that would have permitted a finding that he was disabled. However, it was not the only permissible finding that the jury could make, and a new trial or judgment as a matter of law is unwarranted.
d. Evidence of ADA/RA Violation Plaintiff maintains that the trial evidence also overwhelmingly establishes the other elements of an ADA or RA violation. (Docs. 288-1 at 8-11; 308-2 at 12-15). Because the jury found that Plaintiff was not disabled, it did not make any findings on the other elements of an ADA
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or RA violation. (Doc. 277). The jury was not required to do so, and the Court need not make such findings either, as Plaintiff’s failure to establish any element of an ADA or RA violation, including that he suffers from a “disability,” defeats his claim. See, e.g., Wright v. New York State Dep’t of Corr., 831 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2016) (to establish ADA and RA violation, inmate plaintiff must show that he is a qualified individual with a disability; defendant is an entity subject to the acts; and plaintiff was denied the opportunity to participate in or benefit from defendant’s services, programs, or activities or defendant otherwise discriminated against him by reason of his disability). However, even if Plaintiff had a disability, the Court notes that, because the evidence of the precise extent and nature of Plaintiff’s disability was mixed, it would not have been error warranting a new trial or judgment as a matter of law for a jury to determine that Plaintiff had not shown discrimination or a denial of access to services or programs sufficient to give rise to a claim under the ADA or RA.
e. Testimony of Warden Peabody Plaintiff argues that Warden Peabody testified erroneously that temporary impairment is not a disability under the ADA, and the jury’s verdict may have been tainted by this false testimony. (Docs. 288-1 at 11-12; 308-2 at 15-16). This argument does not warrant relief. In a civil case, a new trial may be granted when a witness willfully testifies falsely to a material fact. See Traylor v. Pickering, 324 F.2d 655, 658 (5th Cir. 1963); see also Hitachi Consumer Electronics Co. Ltd. v. Top Victory Electronics (Taiwan) Co. Ltd., 2013 WL 5273326 at *6 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2013) (party seeking new trial based on false testimony must establish “by clear and convincing evidence that: (i) the witness ‘willfully perjured himself,’ and (ii) the allegedly false testimony prevented the party from fully and fairly presenting its case”). Here, Plaintiff asserts that Warden Peabody “either perjured
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himself or does not know what a disability is under current law.” (Doc. 288-1 at 11; 308-2 at 16). Therefore, Plaintiff does not clearly assert that Warden Peabody’s false testimony was provided “willfully.”
Moreover, Plaintiff’s counsel recognized and attempted to correct this alleged error during trial. Plaintiff’s counsel did little to point it out while cross-examining Warden Peabody (Doc. 295 at 141:19-143:12), but argued to the Court that the jury should be instructed that a “disability” may be temporary. (Doc. 300 at 142:2-19). The Court agreed to give the instruction, and Plaintiff argued in closing that “someone can have a disability and be covered by the ADA even if that disability is temporary.” (Id. at 206:22-24). The Court instructed the jury in accordance with its prior ruling. (Id. at 229:12-14).
Plaintiff’s only evidence that the jury was influenced by Warden Peabody’s statement appears to be its verdict that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Doc. 288-1 at 12; 308-2 at 16). However, as the Court discussed previously, there are other permissible ways that the jury could have reached this decision. The jury was instructed on the law as Plaintiff asked; absent any meaningful evidence that the jury instead adhered to Warden Peabody’s interpretation, there is no basis on which to grant a new trial or judgment as a matter of law.
f. Evidence of Eighth Amendment Violation Plaintiff contends that the trial evidence overwhelmingly establishes that he was forced to work in dangerous conditions in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Docs. 288-1 at 12-14; 3082 at 16-18). To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must show that he was exposed to a “substantial risk of serious harm” and that officials acted or failed to act with “deliberate indifference” to that risk. See Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 345-46 (5th Cir. 2006).
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Plaintiff’s claim does not warrant relief. Plaintiff alleges that he was placed in working conditions that were dangerous in light of his disability. (Docs. 288-1 at 12-14; 308-2 at 16-18). As discussed previously, the evidence of Plaintiff’s limitations (including those preventing him from working safely in certain conditions) was ambiguous.
Even more significant, however, is that the Eighth Amendment’s “deliberate indifference” inquiry is subjective. That is, a prison official does not violate the Eighth Amendment unless he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); see also Williams v. Hampton, 797 F.3d 276, 280-81 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (re-affirming applicability of Farmer standard in inmate deliberate indifference suit). Here, even if prison officials should not have assigned Plaintiff to work in the field or the tag plant, Plaintiff has done little to establish that any Defendant involved in assigning Plaintiff work actually knew that he had a visual impairment and disregarded any resultant risks when assigning him work. The jury concluded that no individual Defendant subjected Plaintiff to deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment (Doc. 277 at 3-4), and the jury was properly given this responsibility. See Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74 F.3d 633, 654 (5th Cir. 1996) (“Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence, and a fact finder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.” (emphasis added)). The jury might reasonably have reached a different conclusion, but Plaintiff has not shown that the jury’s verdict was impermissible such that a new trial or judgment as a matter of law is appropriate.
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Case 3:14-cv-00063-JWD-EWD Document 315 10/30/17 Page 23 of 23 IV. CONCLUSION Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion (Doc. 288) is DENIED. Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on October 30, 2017.
S
JUDGE JOHN W. deGRAVELLES UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
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 Case: 17-30879 Document: 00514800764 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/18/2019 Case 3:14-cv-00063-JWD-EWD Document 324 01/18/19 Page 1 of 17

LYLE W. CAYCE CLERK

United States Court of Appeals
FIFTH CIRCUIT OFFICE OF THE CLERK
TEL. 504-310-7700 600 S. MAESTRI PLACE,
Suite 115 NEW ORLEANS, LA 70130
January 18, 2019

Mr. Michael L. McConnell Middle District of Louisiana, Baton Rouge United States District Court 777 Florida Street Room 139 Baton Rouge, LA 70801
No. 17-30879 Jason Hacker v. N. Cain, et al USDC No. 3:14-CV-63

Dear Mr. McConnell,
Enclosed is a copy of the judgment issued as the mandate and a copy of the court's opinion.

Sincerely, LYLE W. CAYCE, Clerk

By: _________________________ Kenneth G. Lotz, Deputy Clerk
cc: Mr. John Nelson Adcock Mr. Andrew Blanchfield Mr. Samuel Weiss

Case: 17-30879 Document: 00514800762 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/18/2019 Case 3:14-cv-00063-JWD-EWD Document 324 01/18/19 Page 2 of 17

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________________

JASON HACKER,

No. 17-30879 _______________________
D.C. Docket No. 3:14-CV-63

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit
FILED
December 27, 2018
Lyle W. Cayce Clerk

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

N. BURL CAIN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, in His Official and Individual Capacities; LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS; LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY AT ANGOLA; JAMES M. LEBLANC, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS, in His Official and Individual Capacities,

Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, KING and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

J U D G M E N T

This cause was considered on the record on appeal and was argued by counsel.

It is ordered and adjudged that the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

Certified as a true copy and issued as the mandate on Jan 18, 2019
Attest:

Case: 17-30879 Document: 00514800763 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/18/2019 Case 3:14-cv-00063-JWD-EWD Document 324 01/18/19 Page 3 of 17

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-30879
JASON HACKER, Plaintiff - Appellant

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit
FILED
December 27, 2018
Lyle W. Cayce Clerk

v.

N. BURL CAIN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, in His Official and Individual Capacities; LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS; LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY AT ANGOLA; JAMES M. LEBLANC, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS, in His Official and Individual Capacities,

Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana USDC No. 3:14-CV-63
Before STEWART, Chief Judge, KING and OWEN, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff Jason Hacker, an inmate in the Louisiana State Penitentiary, sued the prison and various officials for failure to accommodate his disability. A jury determined that Hacker did not suffer a disability as defined by the

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

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No. 17-30879 Americans with Disabilities Act, and the district court denied Hacker’s posttrial motions. Hacker appeals. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.
I. Jason Hacker is incarcerated in the Louisiana State Penitentiary, commonly known as Angola. On October 17, 2011, Hacker went to Angola’s eye clinic complaining of blurred vision, sudden weight loss, and increased hunger. After the visit, his symptoms did not improve, and he continued to complain of “blurry vision.” Hacker was prescribed and received eyeglasses but still had trouble seeing. On June 24, 2012, a doctor at Pennington Biomedical Research Center at Louisiana State University (“LSU”) diagnosed Hacker with cataracts and recommended that he receive cataract-removal surgery. Later that year, LSU ophthalmologists performed a corneal topography to determine the quality of Hacker’s vision. The results of this test are not clear from the record. Hacker did not receive cataract removal surgery until 2014. Between his initial diagnosis and the surgery, Hacker contends that his vision continued to decline. In addition to his generalized complaints that his vision was blurry, in May 2013, Hacker began to complain that his cataracts were causing him trouble seeing far away and that he had severe pain in his eyes when exposed to sunlight. On several occasions, medical records indicate that Hacker was “legally blind.” At one point, his vision was recorded as being as bad as 20/400 in his left eye, and he was unable to read the eye chart with his right eye. But in March 2014, just four months before his cataract surgery, Hacker’s vision was 20/60 in his right eye and 20/100 in the left—although his medical records note that he “look[ed] ‘over his cataract’ [in his] right eye in order to see [the] eye chart.” Hacker argues that despite his inability to see, the prison did not accommodate his disability. In fact, Hacker was moved from working in the tag
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No. 17-30879 plant to work in Angola’s fields in the spring of 2013—work he contends is too dangerous to be performed by someone with limited vision. On one occasion, Hacker made an emergency request for health care while working in the fields because of his vision problems. Hacker testified that, while working in the fields, he tore his pectoral muscle off his bone because he could not see a heavy bale of hay that was being tossed toward him. Hacker and his fellow inmates also testified that his poor eyesight impaired his ability to see, write, work, and play music.
After filing an unsuccessful request through Angola’s administrative remedy procedure, Hacker filed suit in federal court. His amended complaint asserted claims under the Eighth Amendment, Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and Rehabilitation Act. Prior to trial, the district court entered several orders in limine. As is relevant here, the district court denied Hacker’s motion to exclude evidence regarding his disciplinary record as moot based on defendants’ representation to the court that they would not introduce such evidence. The district court ordered that defendants could not “offer evidence or refer to the specific crimes for which [Hacker] was convicted or the conduct which led to his conviction.” Finally, the district court also prohibited evidence of medical treatment unrelated to Hacker’s cataracts, “except as it may bear on the issues related to [Hacker’s] cataracts.”
The jury returned a verdict for the defense, finding that Hacker was not disabled under the ADA and defendants did not act with deliberate indifference to Hacker’s medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Having properly moved for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) at the close of defendants’ case, Hacker renewed his motion under Rule 50(b), or, in the alternative, moved for a new trial under Rule 59. The court denied the motions, finding that reasonable jurors could
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No. 17-30879 have found for defendants on all issues and a new trial was not necessary. Hacker’s appeal is limited to his claim under the ADA.
II. “We review de novo the district court’s denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law, applying the same standard as the district court.” Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Ernst & Young LLP, 542 F.3d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 2008). A court may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law if “the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on [an] issue.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). “When reviewing the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law, we will uphold a jury verdict unless the facts and inferences point so strongly and so overwhelmingly in favor of one party that reasonable men could not arrive at any verdict to the contrary.” Cousin v. Trans Union Corp., 246 F.3d 359, 366 (5th Cir. 2001); see also Foradori v. Harris, 523 F.3d 477, 485 n.8 (5th Cir. 2008) (noting that same standard applies to review of renewed motion under Rule 50(b)). “In resolving such challenges, we draw all reasonable inferences and resolve all credibility determinations in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Foradori, 523 F.3d at 485. But “[e]ven though we might have reached a different conclusion if we had been the trier of fact, we are not free to re-weigh the evidence or to re-evaluate credibility of witnesses.” Id. (quoting Int’l Ins. Co. v. RSR Corp., 426 F.3d 281, 297 (5th Cir. 2005)). Our review of a motion for a new trial is more deferential, and we will only reverse the trial court’s denial of a motion for a new trial “when there is a clear showing of an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 497. “Where a jury verdict is at issue, ‘there is no . . . abuse of discretion unless there is a complete absence of evidence to support the verdict.’” Benson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 889 F.3d 233, 234 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (omission in original) (quoting Sam’s Style Shop v. Cosmos Broad. Corp., 694 F.2d 998, 1006 (5th Cir. 1982)). Courts
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No. 17-30879 “should not grant a new trial on evidentiary grounds unless the verdict is against the great weight of the evidence.” Whitehead v. Food Max of Miss., Inc., 163 F.3d 265, 269 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Pryor v. Trane Co., 138 F.3d 1024, 1026 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam)).
III. Hacker first argues that the district court should have granted his posttrial motions because the jury unreasonably concluded that he was not disabled.1 Hacker also argues that even if the jury’s conclusion was reasonable, the district court should have granted his motion for a new trial because defendants violated the district court’s orders in limine. We address each argument in turn.
A. Hacker fails to demonstrate that no reasonable juror could find that he was not disabled. Nor has Hacker demonstrated that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s denial of his post-trial motions as they pertain to his disability claim. The Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the ADA prohibit state and local governments, including prisons, from discriminating on the basis of disability. 29 U.S.C. § 794; 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-32; see also Hale v. King, 642 F.3d 492, 500 (per curiam) (5th Cir. 2011). To qualify for protection, a plaintiff must first show that he is a “qualified individual within the meaning of the ADA”—i.e.,
1 Hacker also challenges the district court’s summary judgment ruling. We “will not review the pretrial denial of a motion for summary judgment where on the basis of a subsequent full trial on the merits final judgment is entered adverse to the movant.” Black v. J.I. Case Co., 22 F.3d 568, 570 (5th Cir. 1994). Therefore, we do not address Hacker’s arguments relating to summary judgment.
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No. 17-30879 that he is disabled.2 See Windham v. Harris County, 875 F.3d 229, 235 (5th Cir. 2017). The ADA defines a “disability” as “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). Hacker argues that the jury should have found that he was disabled under either subsection A or B.
1. We first consider whether a reasonable juror could have concluded that Hacker did not have a physical impairment that substantially limited one or more major life activities. To prove that he is disabled under subsection A, a plaintiff must show that he has a physical or mental impairment. E.E.O.C. v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., 570 F.3d 606, 614 (5th Cir. 2009). But merely having an impairment is not sufficient to prove disability under the ADA; the plaintiff “also need[s] to demonstrate that the impairment substantially limits a major life activity.” Id. “[T]o be substantially limited means to be unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform, or to be significantly restricted in the ability to perform it.” Hale, 642 F.3d at 500 (alteration in original) (quoting Chevron Phillips, 570 F.3d at 614); see also 28 C.F.R. § 35.108(d)(v). The ADA’s implementing regulations expressly state that “seeing” is a major life activity. § 35.108(c)(1)(i). Considering all the evidence, the facts and inferences do not point so strongly in favor of Hacker such that a reasonable juror must find Hacker to be disabled under subsection A. At trial, the parties presented competing narratives. Hacker argued that he suffered progressive visual impairment over
2 For our purposes, the analysis under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act is the same. Cf. Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Jurisprudence interpreting either section is applicable to both.”).
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No. 17-30879 several years, emphasizing the numerous medical records labeling him “legally blind” or recommending cataract surgery. Defendants conceded that Hacker had cataracts but posited that Hacker had exaggerated the extent to which the cataracts hindered his vision to avoid working in the fields. They pointed to the fact that Hacker’s complaints became more frequent and his reports of his vision problems became more severe when he was assigned to work in the fields in the spring of 2013. And defendants highlighted that an eye exam is necessarily based on a person’s own subjective reporting of his ability to read an eye chart and thus any diagnoses of legal blindness were based on Hacker’s self reports. Defendants’ expert Dr. Peter Kastl also testified that a person can function with cataracts for years, or even decades. Dr. Kastl further testified that in March 2014, medical records suggested that Hacker’s vision was not as poor as earlier records indicated. Although earlier records stated that his vision was 20/400 in his left eye and he was unable to read the eye chart with his right, the March 2014 record states his vision to be 20/60 in his left eye and 20/100 in his right. Thus, a reasonable jury could fairly conclude that even though Hacker had cataracts, they did not substantially limit his vision.
Hacker protests that Congress’s 2008 amendment to the ADA broadened the definition of disability such that courts must broadly construe the term “in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA.”3 See § 35.108(a)(2)(i). But the issue here is not whether severe cataracts are a disability that would fall within the ADA; the question is
3 Similarly, Hacker argues that the Ninth and Sixth Circuits have found cataracts to be a “serious medical need” in the Eighth Amendment context. But again, these arguments miss the point: the parties agree that severe cataracts may qualify as a disability, but the question is whether Hacker in fact had such cataracts. The Ninth Circuit recognized as much, acknowledging that a cataract can be “minor” with “little impact on an inmate’s vision.” Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Michaud v. Bannister, No. 2:08-cv-1371, 2012 WL 6720602, at *5 (D. Nev. Dec. 26, 2012)).
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No. 17-30879 whether Hacker actually suffered from severe cataracts. This is a factual dispute that the jury reasonably resolved in defendants’ favor.
In fact, most of Hacker’s arguments on appeal concern factual disputes. For example, he argues that the jury could not reasonably conclude that Hacker raised his vision problems to avoid working in the fields because he had tried to obtain cataract treatment for two years prior. It is true that Hacker first visited the eye clinic in October 2011 and on several occasions throughout 2012. But his visits picked up around the time he was assigned to field work in the spring of 2013, and it was during this time that he made his emergency request for health care, complaining of his vision. Moreover, although Hacker argued at trial that working in the tag plant was a dangerous job for someone with poor vision, he did not complain that his vision prevented him from working until he was reassigned from the tag plant to field work. Thus, there is evidence on both sides of this issue.
Hacker also argues that defendants “manufacture credibility issues regarding medical records they dislike.” Hacker contends that the medical records are objective and must be believed; therefore, because the records state that he was legally blind, the jury could not have reasonably found that he was not substantially limited in a major life activity. But as Dr. Kastl testified at trial, a vision exam in which a patient reads an eye chart depends on the patient’s own self-reported responses. Therefore, jurors could have judged the credibility of the various witnesses and found that Hacker had exaggerated the effect of his cataracts in his vision exams.
Dr. Kastl also pointed out that Hacker’s medical records just prior to surgery showed that his visual acuity was 20/60 and 20/100—significantly better than prior records suggested. Hacker argues that Dr. Kastl failed to consider his visual field, noting that the same record states that Hacker had to “look around” his cataract to read the eye chart. Hacker points out that his own
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No. 17-30879 expert, Dr. Bell, also reviewed the medical records and testified that he believed Hacker was blind. Although Hacker’s argument is reasonable, it does not definitively show that no reasonable juror could have found against him. Dr. Kastl testified that he had reviewed all of Hacker’s medical records, so the jurors could reasonably infer that Dr. Kastl considered Hacker’s loss of visual field but found it not to be convincing. And it is possible that the jurors chose to trust the medical diagnosis of Dr. Kastl, a board-certified ophthalmologist, over the opinion of Dr. Bell, who held a doctorate in rehabilitation education rather than medicine.
Hacker’s various other objections to the evidence at trial are unsuccessful. He argues that the Assistant Warden of Health Services concluded that Hacker was legally blind, but her review was based on the same records discussed above. He contests defendants’ evidence that Hacker was substantially limited in major life activities because he could still play in a band and write letters, pointing to testimony that he had trouble reading other band members’ cues and that his cataracts prevented him from reading and writing in some conditions but not others. And he argues that the jurors must have concluded that his ripped pectoral muscle occurred because of his inability to see, even though there was no medical record of the event. But to overturn the jury’s verdict would require us to engage in the type of evidence weighing and credibility assessments prohibited on appellate review. Because there was sufficient factual evidence to support the jury’s verdict against Hacker, we must let the verdict lie.
Finally, Hacker argues that the jury should have drawn an adverse inference from defendants’ failure to put forward a witness to testify about Hacker’s limitations. Otherwise put, Hacker argues that because defendants’ employees would have observed Hacker in the prison, defendants should have called one of their own employees to testify to his ability to perform major life
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No. 17-30879 activities. Because they did not present such evidence, Hacker reasons that the jury should have inferred that if defendants had called their own witness, the witness’s testimony would not have been in their favor. Although we have recognized this adverse inference in some circumstances, its application is limited; the inference only applies when “the missing witness has information ‘peculiarly within his knowledge.’” United States v. Wilson, 322 F.3d 353, 363 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Streber v. Comm’r, 138 F.3d 216, 221-22 (5th Cir. 1998)). Here, Hacker’s fellow inmates witnessed his behavior and testified on his behalf. Therefore, there was no need for defendants to also put a witness on the stand, as they could rely on their cross-examination of Hacker and his fellow inmates. Cf. id. at 363 n.14 (noting exception to presumption where witness is equally available to both parties).
In sum, Hacker presents a reasonable case for why the jury should have found in his favor. But it is the function of the jury, not the court, to make credibility determinations and weigh the evidence. Because we cannot conclude that the jury acted unreasonably in finding that Hacker was not disabled, we find that the district court properly denied judgment as a matter of law on this issue. Additionally, it cannot be said that there was no evidence in support of such a verdict, and the district court acted within its discretion in denying Hacker’s motion for a new trial.
2. Hacker fails to demonstrate that the jury’s conclusion that he did not have a record of impairment was unreasonable or unsupported by evidence. “An individual has a record of such an impairment if the individual has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” § 35.108(e)(1). To demonstrate a disability under subsection B, the plaintiff
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No. 17-30879 must show that (1) he “has a record of an injury or impairment” and (2) that the “impairment limited a major life activity.” Hale, 642 F.3d at 502.
Hacker points to instances in his medical records noting that he was legally blind or that he had cataracts. These medical records alone, he reasons, show that he is disabled under subsection B. But defendants presented evidence disputing whether he had a record of, or history of, visual impairment. See Adams v. Rice, 531 F.3d 936, 946 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (applying three-step test to evaluate claims of disability under subsection B, first considering whether the plaintiff has a “history of a mental or physical impairment”). Otherwise put, defendants challenged whether Hacker’s medical record, when taken as a whole, reflected a history of visual impairment. As discussed above, defendants presented evidence calling into question whether Hacker’s eye chart examinations could objectively measure the severity of his visual impairment. Defendants also pointed to Hacker’s March 2014 medical record indicating that his vision had improved, or at least was not as bad as other medical records indicated. Additionally, defendants’ medical expert testified that based on his review of Hacker’s medical history as a whole, he was never legally blind. Therefore, a jury considering Hacker’s medical records could reasonably conclude that they did not establish a record of impairment that substantially limited one or more major life activities. See Cochran v. Holder, 436 F. App’x 227, 233-34 (4th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (unpublished) (finding no record of impairment when medical history included conflicting records: one indicating that plaintiff suffered severe hearing loss, but another indicating that he had only lost 10% of his hearing). Thus, the district court did not err in denying Hacker’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. And because at least some evidence supported the jury’s verdict, we cannot say the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial.
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No. 17-30879 Because we decline to disturb the jury’s verdict that Hacker was not disabled within the meaning of the ADA, we need not reach the parties’ arguments concerning reasonable accommodations or exhaustion.
B. In the alternative, Hacker argues that defendants violated the court’s orders in limine and a new trial should be ordered on these grounds. When a movant requests a new trial “based on the submission of prejudicial information to the jury, the district court must decide whether the error is harmless by assessing whether ‘the error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect.’” Hollybrook Cottonseed Processing, L.L.C. v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 772 F.3d 1031, 1034 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting O’Rear v. Fruehauf Corp., 554 F.2d 1304, 1308 (5th Cir. 1977)). We afford the district court “a great deal of discretion in determining whether an objectionable question is so prejudicial as to require a retrial” because the district court judge “is in a far better position to measure the effect of an improper question on the jury than an appellate court which reviews only the cold record.” Id. (quoting O’Rear, 554 F.2d at 1308). Hacker argues that defendants violated the orders in limine in three ways. First, they referenced the medical care Hacker received in 2011 and 2012 in their opening statement, thus violating the court’s order excluding evidence that did not “bear on the issues related to [Hacker’s] cataracts.” Hacker argues that Dr. Lavespere also testified about this treatment and defendants referenced the treatment in closing, stating: “You heard the whole story, beginning in 2011. There were issues going on. The doctors at Angola, including Dr. Lavespere, looked at it, tried to find out what was going on.” Second, defendants said that “the testimony and the evidence is going to be Jason Hacker broke all the rules” in their opening statement. Hacker argues that this violated the parties’ agreement that defendants would not reference
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No. 17-30879 Hacker’s disciplinary records. Third, defendants began their opening statement with “What’s this case about? Well, Jason Hacker is serving a life sentence at Angola where he has been since the year—early 2000s,” which Hacker argues violated the order in limine prohibiting references to “the specific crimes for which [Hacker] was convicted or the conduct which led to his conviction.” In addition, Hacker argues that he was prejudiced by defenseexpert Dr. Lavespere’s inflammatory testimony that “to be sent to the field is the ultimate slap in the face . . . . You know, some of [the inmates] view it as slavery. Some of the black ones in particular view it as slavery.”
We do not find that the district court abused its discretion by denying Hacker’s motion for a new trial. The testimony regarding Hacker’s medical history was arguably related to defendants’ efforts to diagnose Hacker’s cataracts, thus within the scope of the court’s order, which allowed “[e]vidence of medical care given in connection with his cataract condition.” Defendants’ reference to Hacker’s life sentence complied with the letter of the court’s order in limine, which only prevented defendants from referencing “the specific crimes for which [Hacker] was convicted or the conduct which led to his conviction.” And the statement that Hacker “broke all the rules” was made while discussing Hacker’s counsel’s opening statement that Hacker had “kept on the straight and arrow [sic].” To the extent the statement can be interpreted to refer to Hacker’s disciplinary record, the reference was vague, and it is unlikely that a juror would recognize it was in connection to any disciplinary infraction.
More importantly, even if these statements violated the court’s orders in limine, Hacker has not shown that he was prejudiced by these violations other than arguing that the jury returned a verdict against him. But the references were brief and vague, and defendants did not submit any other evidence on these topics. Hacker analogizes his case to Hollybrook, but the Hollybrook
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Case: 17-30879 Document: 00514800763 Page: 14 Date Filed: 01/18/2019 Case 3:14-cv-00063-JWD-EWD Document 324 01/18/19 Page 16 of 17
No. 17-30879 plaintiff was able to draw a connection between the defendant’s conduct and the prejudice suffered. There, the defendant elicited testimony that the plaintiff had made a settlement demand for $750,000. Hollybrook, 772 F.3d at 1033. The testimony was elicited on the next-to-last day of an eleven-day trial, and the jury awarded the plaintiff $1,750,000 in damages—well below the damages the plaintiff claimed it had suffered. Id. The district court granted a new trial, at which the plaintiff ultimately won a $6 million award. Id. On appeal, we affirmed the district court’s order granting the new trial because there was “no discernable basis” for the jury’s initial award and it seemed that the jurors had simply added $1 million to the settlement demand. Id. at 1034. Further, the defendant could not offer another explanation for how the jury arrived at its verdict. Id. In contrast, as described above, the jury’s verdict in this case was reasonable and supported by evidence.
Likewise, there is no evidence that Hacker—a white man—was prejudiced by Dr. Lavespere’s inflammatory racial statements. Although Hacker cites United States v. Sanchez, 482 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1973), in which we reversed a defendant’s conviction when the prosecutor’s argument was “replete with racial and political undertones,” the racially inflammatory comments in Sanchez were directed at the defendant. Id. at 8. Hacker provides no explanation for why the objectionable behavior of an opposing party’s witness would prejudice his own case when not directed at him. It was also within the district court’s discretion to avoid instructing the jury to ignore this testimony to avoid drawing further attention to it. Cf. Caldarera v. E. Airlines, Inc., 705 F.2d 778, 782 (5th Cir. 1983) (“The trial court may exercise judgment on the basis of his own opinion of the effect the evidence will have, considering the courtroom surroundings.”).
Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hacker’s motion for a new trial.
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Case: 17-30879 Document: 00514800763 Page: 15 Date Filed: 01/18/2019 Case 3:14-cv-00063-JWD-EWD Document 324 01/18/19 Page 17 of 17 No. 17-30879 IV. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
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 Jason Hacker v. N. Cain, et al, Docket No. 17-30879 (5th Cir. Nov 07, 2017), Court Docket

Current on Bloomberg Law as of Mar. 23, 2019 17:28:34
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket for Case #: 17-30879

Date Filed: Status: Nature of suit: Related Cases:
Original Cases:

Jason Hacker v. N. Cain, et al
Nov 7, 2017 Closed 3550 Prisoner - Civil Rights 16-30801 on Jul 8, 2016
Status: closed Decision Date: Jul 26, 2016 Note: Dismissed 3:14-CV-63 on Jan 30, 2014, Middle District of Louisiana, Baton Rouge District: 053N NOA Date: Nov 3, 2017

Parties and Attorneys

Plaintiff - Appellant Representation

JASON HACKER
Samuel Weiss Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law 1401 New York Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20005 Personal: 202-662-8600 [COR LD NTC Retained]

John Nelson Adcock P.O. Box 750621 New Orleans, LA 70175 Personal: 504-233-3125 [COR NTC Retained]

Defendant - Appellee Representation

N. BURL CAIN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, in His Official and Individual Capacities
Andrew Blanchfield Keogh, Cox & Wilson, Limited 701 Main Street Baton Rouge, LA 70802 Personal: 225-383-3796 [COR LD NTC Retained]

Defendant - Appellee

STATE OF LOUISIANA

Defendant - Appellee Representation

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS
Andrew Blanchfield Keogh, Cox & Wilson, Limited 701 Main Street Baton Rouge, LA 70802 Personal: 225-383-3796 [COR LD NTC Retained]
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Jason Hacker v. N. Cain, et al, Docket No. 17-30879 (5th Cir. Nov 07, 2017), Court Docket

Defendant - Appellee Representation

LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY AT ANGOLA
Andrew Blanchfield Keogh, Cox & Wilson, Limited 701 Main Street Baton Rouge, LA 70802 Personal: 225-383-3796 [COR LD NTC Retained]

Defendant - Appellee Representation

JAMES M. LEBLANC, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS, in His Official and Individual Capacities
Andrew Blanchfield Keogh, Cox & Wilson, Limited 701 Main Street Baton Rouge, LA 70802 Personal: 225-383-3796 [COR LD NTC Retained]

Defendant - Appellee

JOHN BEL EDWARDS, In His Official and Individual Capacities

Docket Entries

Entry # BL-1 BL-2
BL-3 BL-4 BL-5 BL-6 BL-7 BL-8
BL-9

Filing Date Nov 7, 2017 Nov 13, 2017
Jan 16, 2018 Jan 16, 2018 Jan 30, 2018 Feb 6, 2018 Feb 6, 2018 Feb 8, 2018
Feb 16, 2018

Description PRISONER CASE WITH COUNSEL docketed. NOA filed by Appellant Mr. Jason Hacker [17-30879] (RLL)
INITIAL CASE CHECK by Attorney Advisor complete, Action: Case OK to Process. [8637820-2] Initial AA Check Due satisfied. Fee or motion for IFP in DC due on 01/08/2018 for Appellant Jason Hacker [17-30879] (RLL)
FEE PAID by Appellant Mr. Jason Hacker. Fee deadline satisfied [17-30879] (CB)
ELECTRONIC RECORD ON APPEAL REQUESTED FROM DISTRICT COURT for 3:14CV-63. Electronic ROA due on 01/31/2018. [17-30879] (CB)
EXTENSION OF TIME GRANTED to the District Court to prepare the Electronic ROA until 02/14/2018. Electronic ROA deadline updated to 02/14/2018. [17-30879] (CB)
ELECTRONIC RECORD ON APPEAL FILED. Exhibits on File in District Court? Yes. Electronic ROA deadline satisfied. [17-30879] (DDL)
BRIEFING NOTICE ISSUED A/Pet's Brief Due on 03/19/2018 for Appellant Jason Hacker. [17-30879] (DDL)
APPEARANCE FORM received from Mr. Andrew Blanchfield, Esq. for State of Louisiana, Mr. James M. LeBlanc, Secretary, Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Mr. N. Burl Cain, Mr. John Bel Edwards, Governor of the State of Louisiana and Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola for the court's review. Lead Counsel? Yes. [17-30879] (Andrew Blanchfield )
CASE CAPTION updated. Involvement terminated for Appellees State of Louisiana and John Bel Edwards, Governor of the State of Louisiana in 17-30879. Reason: the parties advised that the State of LA and Mr Edwards are not parties to the appeal. [17-30879] (MRW)
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BL-10
BL-11 BL-12 BL-13 BL-14 BL-15 BL-16 BL-17 BL-18 BL-19
BL-20
BL-21 BL-22 BL-23 BL-24

Jason Hacker v. N. Cain, et al, Docket No. 17-30879 (5th Cir. Nov 07, 2017), Court Docket

Feb 16, 2018
Feb 19, 2018 Feb 20, 2018 Feb 20, 2018 Feb 21, 2018 Mar 11, 2018 Mar 12, 2018 Apr 12, 2018 Apr 13, 2018 Apr 30, 2018
Apr 30, 2018
May 9, 2018 May 9, 2018 May 16, 2018 May 29, 2018

APPEARANCE FORM FILED by Attorney Andrew Blanchfield for Appellee James M. LeBlanc, Secretary, Department of Public Safety and Corrections in 17-30879, Attorney Andrew Blanchfield for Appellee Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola in 17-30879, Attorney Andrew Blanchfield for Appellee Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections in 17-30879, Attorney Andrew Blanchfield for Appellee N. Burl Cain in 17-30879 [17-30879] (MRW)
APPEARANCE FORM for the court's review. Lead Counsel? Yes. [17-30879] (Mercedes Hardy Montagnes )
Attorney Mercedes Hardy Montagnes is advised to resubmit an appearance form. Reason: The submitted appearance form does not match the registered attorney. [17-30879] (BPL)
APPEARANCE FORM received from Mr. John Nelson Adcock for Mr. Jason Hacker for the court's review. Lead Counsel? Yes. [17-30879] (John Nelson Adcock )
APPEARANCE FORM FILED by Attorney John Nelson Adcock for Appellant Jason Hacker in 17-30879 [17-30879] (CB)
UNOPPOSED MOTION filed by Appellant Mr. Jason Hacker to extend time to file brief as appellant until 04/30/2018 at 11:59 pm [8723147-2]. Date of service: 03/11/2018 via clerk Attorney for Appellee: Blanchfield [17-30879] (John Nelson Adcock )
CLERK ORDER granting motion to extend time to file appellant's brief filed by Appellant Mr. Jason Hacker A/Pet's Brief deadline updated to 04/30/2018 for Appellant Jason Hacker [17-30879] (AGL)
APPEARANCE FORM <i>Samuel Weiss</i> for the court's review. Lead Counsel? Yes. [17-30879] (Samuel Weiss )
APPEARANCE FORM FILED by Attorney(s) Samuel Weiss for party(s) Appellant Jason Hacker, in case 17-30879. [17-30879] (CB)
SUFFICIENT APPELLANT'S BRIEF FILED.<br> Sufficient Brief deadline satisfied. Paper Copies of Brief due on 05/16/2018, for Appellant Jason Hacker. [17-30879] REVIEWED AND/OR EDITED - The original text prior to review appeared as follows: APPELLANT'S BRIEF FILED Additionally the Brief requires corrected citations to the record. Instructions to Attorney: PLEASE READ THE ATTACHED NOTICE FOR INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW TO REMEDY THE DEFAULT. # of Copies Provided: 0. A/Pet's Brief deadline satisfied. Sufficient Brief due on 05/18/2018 for Appellant Jason Hacker. Appellee's Brief due on 05/30/2018, for Appellees N. Burl Cain, James M. LeBlanc, Secretary, Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections and Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola. [17-30879] REVIEWED AND/OR EDITED - The original text prior to review appeared as follows: APPELLANT'S BRIEF FILED by Mr. Jason Hacker. Date of service: 04/30/2018, via email - Attorney for Appellants: Adcock, Weiss; Attorney for Appellee: Blanchfield. [17-30879] (Samuel Weiss )
RECORD EXCERPTS FILED. # of Copies Provided: 0 Paper Copies of Record Excerpts due on 05/09/2018 for Appellant Jason Hacker. [17-30879]<br>REVIEWED AND/OR EDITED - The original text prior to review appeared as follows: RECORD EXCERPTS FILED by Appellant Mr. Jason Hacker. Date of service: 04/30/2018 via email - Attorney for Appellants: Adcock, Weiss; Attorney for Appellee: Blanchfield [17-30879] (Samuel Weiss )
PROPOSED SUFFICIENT BRIEF filed by Appellant Mr. Jason Hacker in 17-30879 Date of service: 05/09/2018 via email - Attorney for Appellants: Adcock, Weiss; Attorney for Appellee: Blanchfield [17-30879] (Samuel Weiss )
Paper copies of Record Excerpts filed by Appellant Mr. Jason Hacker in 17-30879 received. Paper copies match electronic version of document? Yes # of Copies Provided: 4. Paper Copies of Record Excerpts due deadline satisfied. [17-30879] (SBS)
Paper copies of Appellant Brief filed by Appellant Mr. Jason Hacker in 17-30879 received. Paper copies match electronic version of document? Yes # of Copies Provided: 7. Paper Copies of Brief due deadline satisfied. [17-30879] (SBS)
SUFFICIENT APPELLEES' BRIEF FILED. Sufficient Brief deadline satisfied. Paper Copies of Brief due on 06/18/2018, for Appellees N. Burl Cain, James M. LeBlanc, Secretary, Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections and Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola. [17-30879]<br>REVIEWED AND/OR EDITED - The original text prior to review appeared as follows: APPELLEE'S BRIEF FILED Additionally the Brief requires the caption must match the court's official caption and a signature is required
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BL-25 BL-26
BL-27 BL-28 BL-29 BL-30 BL-31 BL-32 BL-33 BL-34 BL-35

Jason Hacker v. N. Cain, et al, Docket No. 17-30879 (5th Cir. Nov 07, 2017), Court Docket

June 8, 2018 June 12, 2018
June 13, 2018 June 15, 2018 June 18, 2018 Oct 3, 2018 Oct 17, 2018 Dec 3, 2018 Dec 27, 2018 Dec 27, 2018 Jan 18, 2019

after the conclusion. Instructions to Attorney: PLEASE READ THE ATTACHED NOTICE FOR INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW TO REMEDY THE DEFAULT. # of Copies Provided: 0 E/Res's Brief deadline satisfied. Sufficient Brief due on 06/13/2018 for Appellees N. Burl Cain, James M. LeBlanc, Secretary, Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections and Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola.. Reply Brief due on 06/12/2018 for Appellant Jason Hacker [17-30879] REVIEWED AND/OR EDITED - The original text prior to review appeared as follows: APPELLEE'S BRIEF FILED by Mr. N. Burl Cain, Mr. James M. LeBlanc, Secretary, Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections and Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola. Date of service: 05/29/2018 via email - Attorney for Appellants: Adcock, Weiss; Attorney for Appellee: Blanchfield [17-30879] (Andrew Blanchfield )
PROPOSED SUFFICIENT BRIEF filed by Appellees Mr. James M. LeBlanc, Secretary, Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Mr. N. Burl Cain and Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola in 17-30879 Date of service: 06/08/2018 via email - Attorney for Appellants: Adcock, Weiss; Attorney for Appellee: Blanchfield [17-30879] (Andrew Blanchfield )
SUFFICIENT APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF FILED.<br> Sufficient Brief deadline satisfied. Paper Copies of Brief due on 06/19/2018, for Appellant Jason Hacker. [17-30879] REVIEWED AND/OR EDITED - The original text prior to review appeared as follows: APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF FILED. Brief NOT Sufficient as it requires a Certificate of Service. Instructions to Attorney: PLEASE READ THE ATTACHED NOTICE FOR INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW TO REMEDY THE DEFAULT. # of Copies Provided: 0. Reply Brief deadline satisfied. Sufficient Brief due on 06/27/2018, for Appellant Jason Hacker. [17-30879] REVIEWED AND/OR EDITED - The original text prior to review appeared as follows: APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF FILED by Mr. Jason Hacker. Date of service: 06/12/2018, via email - Attorney for Appellants: Adcock, Weiss; Attorney for Appellee: Blanchfield. [17-30879] (Samuel Weiss )
PROPOSED SUFFICIENT BRIEF filed by Appellant Mr. Jason Hacker in 17-30879 Date of service: 06/13/2018 via email - Attorney for Appellants: Adcock, Weiss; Attorney for Appellee: Blanchfield [17-30879] (Samuel Weiss )
Paper copies of Appellee Brief filed by Appellees Mr. James M. LeBlanc, Secretary, Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Mr. N. Burl Cain and Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola in 17-30879 received. Paper copies match electronic version of document? Yes # of Copies Provided: 7. Paper Copies of Brief due deadline satisfied. [17-30879] (SBS)
Paper copies of Appellant Reply Brief filed by Appellant Mr. Jason Hacker in 17-30879 received. Paper copies match electronic version of document? Yes # of Copies Provided: 7. Paper Copies of Brief due deadline satisfied. [17-30879] (SBS)
CASE TENTATIVELY calendared for oral argument for the week of 12/03/2018. [17-30879] (GAM)
CASE CALENDARED for oral argument on Monday, 12/03/2018 in New Orleans in the West Courtroom -- AM session. In accordance with our policy, lead counsel only will receive via email at a later date a copy of the court's docket and an acknowledgment form. All other counsel of record should monitor the court's website for the posting of the oral argument calendars.. [17-30879] (KMP)
ORAL ARGUMENT HEARD before Judges Stewart, King, Owen. Arguing Person Information Updated for: Andrew Blanchfield arguing for Appellee N. Burl Cain, Appellee Secretary LeBlanc, Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Appellee Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections; Arguing Person Information Updated for: Samuel Weiss arguing for Appellant Jason Hacker [17-30879] (KMP)
UNPUBLISHED OPINION FILED. [17-30879 Affirmed ] Judge: CES , Judge: CDK , Judge: PRO. Mandate issue date is 01/18/2019 [17-30879] (DTG)
JUDGMENT ENTERED AND FILED. [17-30879] (DTG)
MANDATE ISSUED. Mandate issue date satisfied. [17-30879] (KGL)

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Jason Hacker v. N. Cain, et al, Docket No. 17-30879 (5th Cir. Nov 07, 2017), Court Docket
General Information

Court
Federal Nature of Suit Docket Number Status

US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Prisoner Petitions - Civil Rights[3550]
17-30879
CLOSED

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