UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
ASTRID G. ESTRADA, WENDY M. ESTRADA, GUILFREDO E. MUNOZ, JOSE A. AQUINO, CRUZ F. m R A , CARLOS E. TAMUP, JOSE BURGOS, ABELINO M. UFUZAR, ISRAEL TEBALAN, ROLAND0 NORIEGA, BORIS R CRUZ,and ELSA HERNANDEZ VILAVICENCIO,
Plaintiffs
C.A. No.:
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, State Police Department, STEVEN M. PARE, individually and in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Rhode Island State Police, THOMAS CHABOT, individually and in his official capacity as a state trooper employed by the State of Rhode Island, JANE DOE, individually and in her official capacity as a state trooper employed by the State of Rhode Island,
Defendants
COMPLAINT
I. Introduction
This action is brought by Plaintiffs seeking relief for injuries suffered as a result of acts
andlor omissions committed by Defendants in violation of 42 U.S.C. $1981, the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, actionable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. $1983,
Article I, $2 of the Rhode Island Constitution, Article I, $6 of the Rhode Island Constitution, the
Racial Profiling Prevention Act of 2004, R.I.G.L. $31-21.2-1, et seq., and common law.
11. Parties
1. At all relevant times, Plaintiff Astrid G. Estrada ("Astrid Estrada") was a resident of
the City of Providence, County of Providence, State of Rhode Island.

2. At all relevant times, Plaintiff Wendy M. Estrada ("Wendy Estrada") was a resident of the City of Providence, County of Providence, State of Rhode Island.
3. At all relevant times, Plaintiff Guilfredo E. Munoz ("Munoz") was a resident of the City of Providence, County of Providence, State of Rhode Island.
4. At all relevant times, Plaintiff Jose A. Aquino ("Aquino") was a resident of the City of Providence, County of Providence, State of Rhode Island.
5. At all relevant times, Plaintiff Cruz F. Rivera ("Rivera") was a resident of the City of Providence, County of Providence, State of Rhode Island.
6. At all relevant times, Plaintiff Carlos E. Tamup ("Tamup") was a resident of the City of Providence, County of Providence, State of Rhode Island.
7. At all relevant times, Plaintiff Jose Burgos ("Burgos") was a resident of the City of Providence, County of Providence, State of Rhode Island.
8. At all relevant times, Plaintiff Abelino M. Urizar ("Urizar") was a resident of the City of Providence, County of Providence, State of Rhode Island.
9. At all relevant times, Plaintiff Israel Tebalan ("Tebalan") was a resident of the City of Providence, County of Providence, State of Rhode Island.
10. At all relevant times, Plaintiff Rolando Noriega ("Noriega") was a resident of the City of Providence, County of Providence, State of Rhode Island.
11. At all relevant times, Plaintiff Boris R. Cruz ("Cruz") was a resident of the City of Providence, County of Providence, State of Rhode Island.
12. At all relevant times, Plaintiff Boris R. Cruz ("Cruz") was a resident of the City of Providence, County of Providence, State of Rhode Island.
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13. At all relevant times, Plaintiff Elsa Hernandez Vilavicencio ("Vilavicencio") was a resident of the City of Providence, County of Providence, State of Rhode Island.
14. Defendant State of Rhode Island ("State") is sued on the basis of official acts andlor omissions committed by employees and agents of the Rhode Island State Police ("Department"), a department created pursuant to R.I.G.L. $42-28-1, et seq., within the executive branch of state government, which said State is a sovereign state of the United States and is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court in accordance with its express waiver of sovereign immunity pursuant to R.I.G.L. $9-31-1. Marrapese v. Rhode Island, 500 F.Supp. 1207 (D.R.I. 1980); Saunders v. State, 446 A.2d 748,751 (R.I. 1982).
15. Defendant Steven M. Pare ("Pare") is the Superintendent of the Department and is responsible for, inter aha, providing a uniformed force for law enforcement, appointment and supervision of state police, preparing rules and regulations for law enforcement, maintaining facilities for crime detection and suppression, and controlling traffic and maintaining safety on highways. R.I.G.L. $942-28-2 and 3. Defendant Pare is sued in his individual and official capacities as Superintendent of the Department for his failure or refusal to carry out his foregoing obligations in breach of his duty of care owed to the Plaintiffs and with deliberate indifference to andlor reckless disregard of the serious foreseeable harm posed to the Plaintiffs.
16. Defendant Thomas Chabot ("Chabot") is sued individually and in his official
capacity as a state trooper within the Department employed by the State.
17. Defendant Jane Doe ("Doe") is sued individually and in her official capacity as a state trooper within the Department employed by the state.'
' At this time, a fictitious name is being used for an individual Defendant whose identity could not be established despite
reasonable diligence by Plaintiffs to identi@ said Defendant.
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111. Jurisdiction 18. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. $91331, 1343, 1367, 2201 and 2202.
IV. Venue 19. Venue is proper in this Court since all of the Defendants reside or may found in the Stateof Rhode Island in compliancewith the requirements set forth in 28 U.S.C. $1391.
V. Material Facts 20. All of the Plaintiffs are Hispanic. 21. On or about July 11, 2006, Plaintiffs were traveling in a Dodge passenger van on Route 95 in Richmond, Rhode Island, that was operated by Plaintiff Tamup. 22. That while the Plaintiffs were traveling on Route 95, a marked state police cruiser, operated by Defendant Chabot, pulled behind Plaintiffs van and engaged its overhead lights after the operator of the van failed to use its turn signal. 23. Plaintiff Tamup immediately pulled the vehicle to the side of the road and stopped the vehicle. 24. Defendant Chabot exited his cruiser and approached Plaintiffs' motor vehicle. 25. Defendant Chabot then requested that Plaintiff Tarnup produce his license, the vehicle's registration, and proof of insurance. 26. Plaintiff Tamup gave the foregoing items to Defendant Chabot, and Defendant Chabot returned to his police cruiser. 27. Defendant Chabot conducted a criminal check of Plaintiff Tamup and checked the status of his operator's license. The results of the criminal check were negative and Plaintiff Tamup's license was valid.
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28. Within a few minutes, Defendant Chabot returned to Plaintiffs' vehicle. 29. At that time, Defendant Chabot opened the front and rear passenger doors of the vehicle and, by utilizing Plaintiff Tamup as a translator, requested that Plaintiffs Astrid Estrada, Wendy Estrada, Munoz, Aquino, Rivera, Burgos, Urizar, Tebalan, Noriega, Cruz and Vilavicencio present a form of identification. 30. While a few of the Plaintiffs were able to produce Guatemalan Consular documents, most of the Plaintiffs did not possess any form of identification. 31. Defendant Chabot then asked the Plaintiffs if they possessed any documents demonstratingtheir U.S. citizenship. 32. None of the Plaintiffs were able to produce such documents. 33. Defendant Chabot then told Plaintiff Tamup to exit the vehicle, and asked him, "Why are you transporting undocumented persons?'Defendant Chabot then conducted a Terry pat of Plaintiff Tamup. 34. Thereafter, Defendant Doe arrived at the scene and conferred with Defendant Chabot. 35. Defendant Chabot conducted another Terry pat of Plaintiff Tamup. 36. Defendants Chabot and/or Doe then advised the Plaintiffs that, on account of the lack of identification, they were being escorted in the van to the Office of Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") located in Providence, Rhode Island. 37. Defendant Chabot instructed Plaintiff Tamup that he was responsible for the vehicle's passengers, and that if any passenger attempted to escape fiom the van en route to Providence, that passenger would be shot. 38. Defendants Chabot and Doe then escorted the Plaintiffs to ICE.
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39. That Defendants State and Pare failed to properly select, train, instruct, supervise and discipline officers in the Department, including Defendants Chabot and Doe, relative to the proper manner in which to effectuate a lawfd search, seizure, detention, and motor vehicle stop.
40. That on information and belief, during all relevant time periods, a custom or policy existed in the State Police Department wherein police misconduct was encouraged, acquiesced to or condoned or in which Defendants were deliberately indifferent to such misconduct.
41. The State is liable under the doctrine of resvondeat suverior for the negligent acts and/or omissions of their agents, including Defendants Chabot and Doe, state troopers employed by the State Police Department and under the direct supervision of Defendant Pare, whose acts and/or omissions were within the scope of their employment, were the proximate cause of the injuries suffered by the Plaintiffs. R.I.G.L. $9-31-1.
42. The Defendants knew or should have known that the search, seizure, and detention of the Plaintiffs were without reasonable or probable cause and were therefore un1awfi.d under the circumstances. Despite such knowledge, the State, by and through their policy-making officials and agents, approved, acquiesced to, condoned, intentionally ignored, or were deliberately indifferent to the practice of routinely searching, seizing, and detaining individuals without legal cause, and failed to change or eliminate such unlawful policy.
43. At all relevant times, the Defendants acted negligently, intentionally, willfully, maliciously, andlor with reckless or callous indifference to Plaintiffs' constitutionallyand statutorily protected rights. Furthermore, at all relevant times, the Defendants knew or should have known that their conduct would cause or contribute to the deprivation of Plaintiffs' civil rights and would cause Plaintiffs great harm.
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44. As a proximate result of the Defendants' acts andlor omissions, including, but not limited to, these described herein, Plaintiffs have suffered, and will continue to suffer, severe mental anguish, embarrassment, pain and suffering, deprivation of their civil rights, and other great harm.
VI. Claims for Relief
45. Plaintiffs incorporate in the countsbelow the allegations contained in 77 1-44above.
Count One Negligence 46. Defendants, by their individual and concerted acts and/or omissions, including, but not limited to, those described herein, breached the duty of care owed to Plaintiffs thereby causing Plaintiffs to sustain reasonably foreseeableharm and damages as aforesaid. Count Two Unreasonable Search and Seizure in Violation of 42 U.S.C. $1983 47. Defendants, acting under color of state law, by their individual and concerted acts and/or omissions, including, but not limited to, those described herein, caused Plaintiffs to be illegally searched and seized in derogation of Plaintiffs' constitutional right to be fiee fiom unreasonable searches and seizures, causing Plaintiffs to sustain damages as aforesaid, and thereby deprived Plaintiffs of rights secured under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution, actionable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 8 1983.
Count Three Unlawful Discrimination in Violation of 42 U.S.C. $1983 48. Defendants, acting under color of state law, by their individual and concerted acts andfor omissions, including, but not limited to, those described herein, caused Plaintiffs to be discriminated against and profiled based on their race in derogation of Plaintiffs' constitutional right to be fiee fiom unlawhl racial discriminationand profiling, causing Plaintiffs to sustain damages as
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aforesaid, and thereby deprived Plaintiffs of rights secured under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, actionable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. $1983.
Count Four Deprivation of Civil Rights in Violation of 42 U.S.C. 91981 49. That Defendants, acting under color of state law, by their individual and concerted acts andlor omissions, including, but not limited to, those described herein, caused the Plaintiffs to be illegally searched and seized and unlawfully discriminated against in derogation of Plaintiffs' civil rights, causing Plaintiffs to sustain damages as aforesaid, and thereby deprived Plaintiffs of rights secured under 42 U.S.C. $1981.
Count Five Unlawful Discrimination in Violation of Article I, 92 of the Rhode Island Constitution
50. Defendants, acting under color of state law, by their individual and concerted acts andor omissions, including, but not limited to, those described herein, caused Plaintiffs to be unlawfully discriminated against in derogation of Plaintiffs' constitutional right to be fiee fiom unlawful racial discrimination, causing Plaintiffs to sustain damages as aforesaid, and thereby deprived Plaintiffs of rights secured under Article I, 86 of the Rhode Island Constitution.
Count Six Unreasonable Search and Seizure in Violation of Article I, 96 of the Rhode Island Constitution
5 1. Defendants, acting under color of state law, by their individual and concerted acts and/or omissions, including, but not limited to, those described herein, caused Plaintiffs to be illegally searched and seized in derogation of Plaintiffs' constitutional right to be fiee fiom unreasonable search and seizures, causing Plaintiffs to sustain damages as aforesaid, and thereby deprived Plaintiffs of rights secured under Article I, $6 of the Rhode Island Constitution.
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Count Seven Unlawful Racial Profiling in Violation of 31-21.2-1, et seq. 52. Defendants, acting under color of state law, by their individual and concerted acts andlor omissions, including, but not limited to, those described herein, caused Plaintiffs to be unlawfully discriminated against and profiled based on their race in derogation of Plaintiffs' statutory right to be fiee fiom unlawll racial discrimination and profiling, causing Plaintiffs to sustain damages as aforesaid, and thereby deprived Plaintiffs of rights secured under the Racial Profiling Prevention Act of 2004.
VII. Prayers for Relief WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray that this Court grant the following relief: a. A declaratory judgment that the Defendants, in the manner described herein, violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, actionable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. $1983, 42 U.S.C. $1981, Article I, $2 of the Rhode Island Constitution, Article I, $6 of the Rhode Island Constitution, and the Racial Profiling Prevention Act of 2004 by causing Plaintiffs to be unlawfully searched and seized. b. An award of compensatory damages. c. An award of punitive damages. d. An award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs of litigation to Plaintiffs attorney pursuant to 42 U.S.C. $1988 and 31-21.2-4. e. Such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
VIII. Demand for Jurv Trial Plaintiffs hereby demand a trial by jury on all counts so triable.
IX. Designation of Trial Counsel Plaintiffs hereby designate V. Edward Formisano, Esquire, as trial counsel.
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Dated: Janua2'r0y07,

Plaintiffs, By their Attorneys,
Formisano (#5h2)
Civil Liberties Union, Rhode Island Affiliate Sinapi, Formisano & Co., Ltd. 100 Midway Place, Suite 1 Cranston, RI 02920-5707 (40l)944-9690 (40l)943-9040 (facsimile)

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 Case 1:07-cv-00010-ML-DLM Document 52 Filed 12/30/08 Page 1 of 20 PageID #: 951
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

ASTRID G. ESTRADA, WENDY M. ESTRADA, GUILFREDO E. MUNOZ, JOSE A. AQUINO, CRUZ F. RIVERA, CARLOS E. TAMUP, JOSE BURGOS, ABELINO M. URIZAR, ISRAEL TEBALAN,
ROLANDO NORIEGA, BORIS R. CRUZ, and ELSA
HERNANDEZ VILAVICENCIO, Plaintiffs,
v.
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, State Police Department, STEVEN M. PARE, individually and in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Rhode Island State Police; THOMAS CHABOT, individually and in his official capacity as a state trooper employed by the State of Rhode Island, JANE DOE, individually and in her official capacity as a state trooper employed by the State of Rhode Island,
Defendants

C.A. No. 07-lOML

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This civil matter is before the Court on the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to all claims and the Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the issue of liability for Counts II and VI. For the reasons set forth below, the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and the Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED.

I. Background A number of minor factual disputes exist regarding the events of July 11, 2006. For the
purposes of deciding these motions only, the Court accepts as true the facts as set forth by the
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Plaintiffs and views these facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, without regard to any contrary facts advanced by the Defendants.
On the morning of July 11, 2006, Plaintiff Carlos E. Tamup ("Tamup") was driving a passenger van in a southerly direction on Interstate 95 in Rhode Island. The other Plaintiffs rode as passengers on their way to work in Westerly, Rhode Island. During the commute that morning, the van was pulled over for failing to use its tum signal by Rhode Island State Police Officer Thomas Chabot ("Chabot"). Chabot was in a marked state police cruiser. The validity of this traffic stop is not in dispute.
Tamup produced his driver's license and the van's registration upon Chabot's request. In response to questions posed by Chabot, Tamup stated that his wife owned the van and that he was driving the Plaintiffs to work in Westerly, Rhode Island. Chabot also asked the front seat passenger, Guilfredo E. Camay Munoz ("Camay"), for his name and his birth date. Camay informed Chabot that his name was Willie Camay and provided his birth date.
Chabot then asked the passengers for identification. Tamup served as a translator for this request at least in part because a number of the Plaintiffs were not fluent in English. Plaintiffs Israel Tebalan, Cruz Rivera, and Rolando Noriega produced identification cards, including Guatemalan Consular identification documents, but the remaining passenger Plaintiffs did not produce any form of identification whatsoever. After speaking with the other Plaintiffs, Tamup informed Officer Chabot that the remaining passengers were unable to produce any documentation. Because the Plaintiffs failed to proffer identification documents, Chabot then requested immigration documentation. The Plaintiffs were unable to produce any documentation regarding their immigration status. Chabot then told Tamup to exit the vehicle, asked him why
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he was transporting undocumented persons, and conducted a pat-down search of him. Chabot then returned to his vehicle and conducted a background check on Tamup. The
criminal check was negative and Chabot learned that Tamup's license was valid. Chabot then contacted the Providence office oflmmigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") to report that he had pulled over a passenger van transporting individuals whom he suspected of being present in the U.S. in violation of federal immigration law. Shortly thereafter, ICE Officer Cort Burke returned Chabot's call and requested that Chabot detain the Plaintiffs for further investigation by ICE.
Chabot returned to the van, where he conducted another pat-down search ofTamup. Rhode Island State Police Officer Heather Donahue ("Donahue") then arrived to assist Chabot. Chabot told Tamup that it was Tamup's responsibility to follow his police car to the Providence ICE office. Three plaintiffs, Tamup, Astrid Estrada Cabrera, and Wendy Estrada Cabrera, testified at their depositions that Chabot stated that, if anyone tried to get out of the van, he would shoot them or that they would lose their lives.' (Tamup Dep. 21:24-22:5; 23:5-11, Mar. 31, 2008; Astrid Estrada Cabrera Dep. 27:12-15, Mar. 31, 2008; Wendy Estrada Cabrera Dep. 15:1-8, Mar. 31, 2008.) Chabot denies making any such statement. (Chabot Dep. 31:25-32:8 Oct. 29, 2007). Chabot, driving in front of the van, and Donahue, driving behind the van, escorted the van to the Providence ICE office, after making a brief stop at an exit off of Interstate 95 to reverse direction and to allow Chabot to check the locks on the van doors. After arriving at the office, ICE agents escorted the Plaintiffs into the building and detained them. Tamup received a ticket for changing lanes without signaling from Officer Chabot. Tamup subsequently
'Again, for purposes of deciding these motions, the Court credits Plaintiffs' accounts. 3

Case 1:07-cv-00010-ML-DLM Document 52 Filed 12/30/08 Page 4 of 20 PageID #: 954
paid the fine. Plaintiffs filed a seven-count complaint against the Defendants on January 8, 2007.
Plaintiffs make claims arising under federal law including unreasonable search and seizure; unlawful discrimination; and deprivation of civil rights. They also make claims arising under state law including negligence; unreasonable search and seizure; unlawful discrimination; and unlawful racial profiling. Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment as well as monetary damages.
Defendants have moved for summary judgment on the grounds that reasonable suspicion supported Chabot's conduct and thus it was not unlawful. Defendants also invoke the doctrine of qualified immunity.
Plaintiffs, in turn, have moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of the Defendants' liability on Count II (Unreasonable Search and Seizure in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983) and Count VI (Unreasonable Search and Seizure in violation of Article 1, § 6 ofthe Rhode Island Constitution), contending that the pat-down searches ofTamup and/or the seizure of the Plaintiffs were without legal justification. They further contend that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the claim of failure to train on unreasonable seizures.
Both parties have complied with this Court's Local Rules, requiring that a motion for summary judgment "shall be accompanied by a Statement of Undisputed Facts that concisely sets forth all facts that the movant contends are undisputed and entitle the movant to judgment as a matter oflaw." D.R.I. Civ. R. 56(a)(l).
II. Standard of Review Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure
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materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and []the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). An issue is "genuine" if the relevant evidence is such that a rational factfinder could resolve the issue in favor of either party, and a fact is "material" if it "has the capacity to sway the outcome of the litigation under the applicable law." Nat'l Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 735 (1st Cir. 1995).
In a case where parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court must "determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law on facts that are not disputed." Barnes v. Fleet Nat'l Bank N.A., 370 F.3d 164, 170 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting Wightman v. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 100 F.3d 228, 230 (1st Cir. 1996)). In such a case, the Court "must rule on each party's motion on an individual and separate basis, determining, for each side, whether a judgment may be entered in accordance with the Rule 56 standard." Bienkowski v. Northeastern Univ., 285 F.3d 138, 140 (1st Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In so doing, the Court views all facts and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 924 F.2d 370, 373 (1st Cir. 1991). However, on issues where the nonmovant bears the ultimate burden of proof, the nonmoving party must present affirmative evidence to rebut the motion and to support the complaint. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256-57 (1986).
III. Analysis The Court considers Defendants' motion first, viewing the facts and drawing appropriate
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inferences in favor of the Plaintiffs.
Federal Claims Section 1983 Claims (Counts II and III)
Government officers may be held liable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("§ 1983") "for infringing on the constitutional rights of private parties." Hatch v. Dep't for Children, Youth and Their Families, 274 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 2001). Section 1983 creates a private cause of action for individuals denied a federally protected right. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146 (1979).
Count II In Count II, Plaintiffs contend that the Defendants violated § 1983 by conducting an
illegal search and seizure, thereby depriving the Plaintiffs of rights guaranteed by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Plaintiffs contend that Officer Chabot lacked reasonable suspicion to question them regarding their immigration status, to contact ICE, and to transport them to ICE's office, in violation of their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Plaintiffs further argue that their Fourth Amendment rights were violated when Chabot conducted multiple pat-down searches ofTamup. Plaintiffs do not contend that the initial stop, the request for Tamup's license and registration, and the request for identification from the passengers were improper. Instead, they argue that Chabot unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop beyond the scope of the original justification for the stop.
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The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. "Temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a 'seizure' of 'persons' within the meaning of this provision." Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996). As a result, a traffic stop entails a seizure of the driver as well as the passengers in the car, "'even though the purpose ofthe stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief."' Brendlin v. California, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 2406 (2007) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)). To comport with constitutional requirements, a seizure must be grounded by reasonable suspicion with a basis in "specific and articulable facts." United States v. Espinoza, 490 F.3d 41, 46-47 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985)). The reasonable suspicion analysis is a mixed question of law and fact, and requires an assessment of the "totality of the circumstances, on a case-specific basis, in order to ascertain whether the officer had a particularized, objectively reasonable basis for suspecting wrongdoing." Espinoza, 490 F.3d at 46 (quoting United States v. Coplin, 463 F.3d 96, 100 (1st Cir. 2006)).
During an investigative stop, a police officer may permissibly request an individual to identify him or herself. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court ofNevada, 542 U.S. 177, 185 (2004). "Asking questions is an essential part of police investigations." Id. Even if officers have no reason to suspect an individual, "they may generally ask questions of that individual; ask to examine the individual's identification; and request consent to search his or her luggage" without implicating the Fourth Amendment. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434-35 (1991).
In Muehler v. Mena, the Supreme Court held that an officer did not need independent
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reasonable suspicion to question an individual about her immigration status during the execution of a search warrant. Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005). Relying in part on Bostick, the Court found that the Fourth Amendment was not triggered by questioning the individual on her name, date and place of birth, or immigration status, because that line of questioning does not generally constitute a seizure and because the inquiry did not prolong the detention. Id., at 101.
Chabot's initial request for identification is unchallenged by the Plaintiffs; it is wellestablished that a request for identification from a vehicle's passengers is not generally beyond the scope of a valid stop and therefore is within the parameters of the Fourth Amendment. See Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984) (holding that questioning "relating to one's identity or a request for identification by the police does not, by itself, constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure"); see also United States v. Soriano-Jarguin, 492 F.3d 495, 500 (4th Cir. 2007) ("We believe a simple request for identification from passengers falls within the purview of a lawful traffic stop and does not constitute a separate Fourth Amendment event.").
The Plaintiffs do, however, challenge Chabot's subsequent action of requesting information regarding their immigration status. At the point that Chabot made this inquiry, all but four of the Plaintiffs had failed to provide any identification and Chabot's suspicions reasonably escalated. See United States v. Sakyi, 160 F.3d 164, 169 (4th Cir. 1998); United States v. Hooper, 935 F.2d 484, 493-94 (2d Cir. 1991). Furthermore, under Mena and Bostick, it is permissible for officers to inquire into the immigration status of individuals without triggering the Fourth Amendment or requiring independent reasonable suspicion. Therefore, Chabot did not violate the Fourth Amendment rights of the Plaintiffs by asking for immigration
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documentation. According to the facts set forth by the Plaintiffs, Chabot contacted ICE only after learning
that the majority of the passengers lacked identification or immigration documentation and that they were going to work. It was thus with reasonable and articulable suspicion that Officer Chabot contacted ICE for guidance. Based on how events unfolded, Officer Chabot's attention and his suspicion shifted from the original traffic citation to other concerns, namely to potential violations of federal immigration law. Such a shift in focus is neither unusual nor impermissible. See United States v. Sowers, 136 F.3d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 1998). Chabot's actions were founded on reasonable suspicion and thus the Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures was not violated.
Regarding the pat-down searches ofTamup, Defendants correctly argue that the other Plaintiffs do not have standing to bring this challenge, because the violation of an individual's rights cannot generally serve as the basis for another individual's constitutional challenge. See Sowers, 136 F.3d at 28-29 (holding that a pat-down search could not be challenged on Fourth Amendment grounds by an individual who was not himself subjected to the pat-down search).
Therefore, only Tamup has standing to challenge the pat-down search of his person by Chabot. A pat-down search is appropriate in a valid Thn:y_stop if "the officer is justified in believing that the person is armed and dangerous to the officer or others." United States v. McKoy, 428 F.3d 38, 39 (1st Cir. 2005) (internal quotation and citation omitted). The inquiry requires a consideration of"the totality of the circumstances to see whether the officer had a particularized, objective basis for his or her suspicion." McKoy, 428 F.3d at 39 (citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)). As discussed above, Chabot had reasonable
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suspicion to believe that the Plaintiffs had violated federal immigration law. There was a van with at least twelve passengers, and Officer Chabot made a number of trips between the van and his own vehicle. In his deposition, Chabot testified that, "once Mr. Tamup [was] in the van and he [came] out of the van, I [had] no idea what he might have brought with him from the van, whether it be a knife, whether it be a weapon of some sort, so for my safety I conducted a Terry pat." (Chabot Dep. 23: 16-21.) Chabot was in his cruiser, contacting ICE, and did not have visual contact with the Plaintiffs for a period of time. Due to the lack of identification proffered, Officer Chabot could not conduct criminal background checks on the passenger Plaintiffs, further supporting his escalated reasonable suspicion. The First Circuit has repeatedly held that, in the context of a Thrry stop, "officers may take necessary steps to protect themselves if the circumstances reasonably warrant such measures." Flowers v. Fiore, 359 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Lee, 317 F.3d 26,31-32 (1st Cir. 2003); United States v. AcostaColon, 157 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 1998); United States v. Trullo, 809 F.2d 108, 113 (1st Cir. 1987)). Under the totality of the circumstances that confronted him, Chabot's pat-down searches of Tamup were justified and therefore pass constitutional muster.
Chabot's request for identification documents and for immigration status from the Plaintiffs was permissible under Bostick and Mena. Having received no identification documents or information regarding the immigration status of most of the Plaintiffs, Chabot was justified in detaining the Plaintiffs for further investigation. Therefore, the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as it pertains to Count II is granted.
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Count III
In Count III, Plaintiffs contend that the Defendants violated § 1983 by engaging in racial discrimination and profiling in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants assume that Count III is an equal protection claim, requiring proof that Chabot exercised discretion to enforce the law in a race-based manner and that the Plaintiffs were treated differently than similarly-situated individuals who were not part of their protected class. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to produce any evidence of such unlawful discrimination.
Plaintiffs, in their Response to the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, concede that they have not brought an equal protection claim, but fail to further address Count III. This Court finds that the Plaintiffs' claim is unclear and that the Plaintiffs have failed to develop any argument to clarify and/or support this claim in response to the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Accordingly, the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as it pertains to Count III. See Cody v. United States, 249 F.3d 47, 53 n.6 (1st Cir. 2001) (stating that failure to develop a claim waives an issue).
Failure to Train Claim The Plaintiffs contend that the Defendants are liable for failing "to properly select, train,
instruct, supervise and discipline officers" of the Rhode Island State Police, "relative to the proper manner in which to effectuate a lawful search, seizure, detention, and motor vehicle stop." (Compl. ~ 39.) In their Objection to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, the Plaintiffs discuss this allegation as part of their negligence claim. (Pis.' Objection to Defs.' Mot. for
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Summ. J., at 15.) Yet in their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the Plaintiffs' discuss a claim brought under § 1983 for failure to adequately train police officers. In either case, because this Court has determined that no constitutional violation occurred, the Plaintiffs' claim of failure "to properly select, train, instruct, supervise and discipline officers" necessarily fails. See Rivera v. Rhode Island, 402 F.3d 27, 38-39 (1st Cir. 2005) ("Since the plaintiff has failed to state a constitutional claim at all, her claims against the other defendants for supervisory liability and for failure to train fail.") (citing Citv of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,391 (1989) and MaldonadoDenis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581-82 (1st Cir. 1994)).
Qualified Immunitv for Section 1983 Claims The Defendants have invoked the doctrine of qualified immunity as to the § 1983 claims
(Counts II and III). The doctrine of qualified immunity may shield government officials "performing discretionary functions ... from civil damages liability as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987). Qualified immunity "is a question oflaw, [and it] is an issue that is appropriately decided by the court during the early stages of the proceedings." Tatro v. Kervin, 41 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 1994).
Having concluded that no constitutional violation occurred, this Court need not address the issue of qualified immunity for the§ 1983 claims. See Flowers, 359 F.3d at 34 ("If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.") (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533
u.s. 194,201 (2001ll.
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Section 1981 Claim (Count IV) Plaintiffs have brought one claim under section 1981 ofTitle 42 ofthe United States
Code ("§ 1981 "), alleging that Defendants illegally searched and seized them and unlawfully discriminated against them on the basis of their race. Section 1981 guarantees that all persons enjoy "the full and equal benefit of all laws ..."and "be subject to like punishments" regardless ofrace. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). This provision is intended to "proscribe the misuse of governmental power motivated by racial animus." Wiggins v. Rhode Island, 326 F. Supp. 2d 297,310 (D.R.I. 2004) (citing Alexis v. McDonald's Restaurants ofMassachusetts, Inc., 67 F.3d 341, 348 (1st Cir. 1995)). Plaintiffs, in support of their§ 1981 claim, must demonstrate: "(1) that [they are] member[s] of a racial minority, (2) that the defendant[s] discriminated against [them] on the basis of [their] race; and (3) that the discrimination implicated one or more of the activities enumerated in the statute." Wiggins, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 310 (citing Garrett v. Tandy Com., 295 F.3d 94, 98 (1st Cir. 2002)).
Defendants contend that the Plaintiffs' claim of racial discrimination is wholly unsupported by evidence. Defendants argue, and Plaintiffs concede, that the initial stop was lawful and not racially motivated. Defendants further contend that Plaintiffs have failed to proffer any evidence of discrimination as to the requests for identification or for the pat-down searches ofTamup.
The first prong of the test is met, as each of the Plaintiffs identifies as Hispanic. However, to succeed on the second and third prongs, the Plaintiffs must sufficiently demonstrate
that Chabot discriminated against them because they are Hispanic. A finding of discriminatory
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intent "implies that the decisionmak:er ... selected ... a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group."' Coyne v. City of Somerville, 972 F.2d 440,445 (1st Cir. 1992) (quoting Pers. Adm'r ofMass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)). Here, Plaintiffs contend that Chabot "contacted ICE and questioned the Plaintiffs about their immigration status because he identified them as Hispanics." (Pis.' Objection to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J., at 14 (emphasis added).) However, they do not point to any specific acts or statements by Chabot to support this conclusory allegation. To reiterate the facts above, Chabot properly asked the passengers for identification, and, after the majority of the Plaintiffs failed to proffer any, questioned the Plaintiffs about their immigration status and contacted ICE. These actions are permissible under well-established case law. This Court, making all reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiffs as non-moving parties, does not find any competent evidence of intentional race-based discrimination. Therefore, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as it pertains to Count IV is granted.
State Law Claims Negligence (Count I)
Plaintiffs bring one count of negligence against the Defendants for breaching their duty of care owed to the Plaintiffs. As part of this claim, Plaintiffs allege that the State is liable under the doctrine ofrespondeat superior for the negligent acts of Defendants Chabot and Doe.2
2 The Complaint lists Jane Doe, individually and in her official capacity as a state trooper employed by the State of Rhode Island. The Complaint alleges that "Defendant Doe arrived at the scene and conferred with Defendant Chabot," after Chabot had requested identification information and immigration documentation and after he had conducted a pat-down search of Tamup. Compl ~ 34. The complaint also indicates that Doe assisted Chabot in escorting the
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To support a claim of negligence under Rhode Island law, a plaintiff must demonstrate the following: "a legally cognizable duty owed by a defendant to a plaintiff, a breach of that duty, proximate causation between the conduct and the resulting injury, and the actual loss or damage." Mills v. State Sales. Inc., 824 A.2d 461, 467 (R.I. 2003) (quoting Jenard v. Halpin, 567 A.2d 368, 370 (R.I. 1989)). The state of Rhode Island may be held liable for an employee's negligence under respondeat superior, subject to the monetary limitation set forth in Section 9-31-2 of the R.I. Gen. Laws. Saunders v. State, 446 A.2d 748, 751-52 (R.I. 1982).
The Plaintiffs fail to point with specificity to any acts or omissions of the Defendants that would constitute a breach of duty, nor do they allege which, if any, duties were breached. The Plaintiffs have failed to set forth any facts that would establish the essential elements of a general negligence claim or a negligence claim under a theory of respondeat superior. See Acosta v. Ames Dep't Stores. Inc., 386 F.3d 5, 12 (1st Cir. 2004). Accordingly, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as it pertains to Count I is granted.
R.I. Constitutional Claims (Counts V and Vll Count V
Plaintiffs to the ICE office. Id. at~ 36. The Plaintiffs have not filed an amended complaint, naming Jane Doe. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs have failed to serve this defendant pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4. Therefore, any claims against Defendant Doe are dismissed. See Tardiffv. Knox County, 567 F. Supp. 2d 201, 207 (D. Me. 2008) (dismissing a claim against an individual corrections officer, Jane Doe, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for lack of prosecution when the plaintiff failed to name the defendant); see also Ensey v. Culhane, 727 A.2d 687, 690 (R.I. 1999) ("[U]nless these John Doe defendants are named and served with process within a reasonable time after their identities become known, they may not be considered parties to the case.").
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The Plaintiffs bring a claim of unlawful discrimination in violation of Article 1, Section 2 of the Rhode Island Constitution. This constitutional provision provides, in relevant part, that:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws. No otherwise qualified person shall, solely by reason of race, gender or handicap be subject to discrimination by the state, its agents or any person or entity doing business with the state. R.I. Const. Art. 1, § 2. This claim is analogous to Plaintiffs' Count III claim, brought under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. These provisions provide similar protection, and thus "a separate analysis is unnecessary." Rhode Island Insurers' Insolvency Fund v. Leviton Mfg. Co.. Inc., 716 A.2d 730, 734 (R.I. 1998). The same result applies: the Plaintiffs have not sufficiently demonstrated unlawful discrimination under the Rhode Island Constitution. Accordingly, the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as it pertains to Count Vis granted.
Count VI In Count VI, the Plaintiffs claim that Chabot's conduct constituted a violation of their
rights guaranteed by Article 1, Section 6 of the Rhode Island Constitution. This provision protects an individual's right to be free from "unreasonable searches and seizures," R.I. Const. Art. 1, § 6, and is coextensive with the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Brousseau By and Through Brousseau v. Town of Westerly By and Through Perri, 11 F. Supp. 2d 177, 183 (D.R.I. 1998). Having determined that the seizure was justified by reasonable suspicion for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, the Court similarly disposes of the Plaintiffs'
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claim under the analogous state constitutional provision. Accordingly, the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as it relates to Count VI is granted.
Discrimination in Violation of the R.I. Racial Profiling Prevention Act (Count VII) Plaintiffs' Count VII claim is brought pursuant to the Rhode Island Racial Profiling
Prevention Act of2004 ("the Act"). This claim is one of first impression for the Court, thus meriting a discussion of the purposes of this statute and its history.
In July of2000, the Rhode Island General Assembly enacted the Traffic Stops Statistics Act, R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 31-21.1-1 et seq., which required state and local police departments to collect certain prescribed data for all traffic stops. A final report for the two-year statistical study was released in January of2004. The study revealed that non-white drivers are more likely to be searched and more likely to be arrested than white drivers as the result of a traffic stop. Northeastern Univ. Inst. on Race and Justice, Rhode Island Traffic Stop Statistics Act Final Report, at 174 (June 30, 2003). In response to the findings of the study, the Rhode Island General Assembly enacted the Racial Profiling Prevention Act of2004. R.I. Gen. Laws§§ 3121.2-1 et seq.
The preamble of the Act discusses the integral role played by law enforcement in protecting the public, acknowledging that "[t]he vast majority of police officers discharge their duties professionally and without bias." R.I. Gen. Laws§ 31-21.2-2(a). However, the Act states that "[i]n many communities nonwhite drivers in Rhode Island, subjected to discretionary searches, are twice as likely as whites to be searched." Id. at 2(c). Calling for a comprehensive solution, the statute explains that racial profiling "harms individuals subjected to it because they
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experience fear, anxiety, humiliation, anger, resentment and cynicism when they are unjustifiably treated as criminal suspects." Id. at 2(e). Furthermore, racial profiling "damages law enforcement and the criminal justice system as a whole by undermining public confidence and trust ... and thereby undermining law enforcement efforts and ability to solve and reduce crime." Id. at 2(f).
The Act prohibits "racial profiling" by law enforcement officers or agencies, defining the term to mean:
the detention, interdiction or other disparate treatment of an individual on the basis, in whole or in part, of the racial or ethnic status of such individual, except when such status is used in combination with other identifying factors seeking to apprehend a specific suspect whose racial or ethnic status is part of the description of the suspect, which description is timely and reliable. R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-21.2-3. A private cause of action for damages and equitable relief is statutorily provided for victims of racial profiling. R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-21.2-4. The statute mandates that, in the context of a traffic stop, no vehicle "shall be detained beyond the time needed to address the violation," unless "there exists reasonable suspicion or probable cause of criminal activity." R.I. Gen. Laws§ 31-21.2-5. If a law enforcement officer possesses a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the traffic stop does not trigger the Act or constitute a violation of the statute. R.I. Gen. Laws § 3121.2-5. The Act does not define "reasonable suspicion," nor has the term been judicially construed under this statute. For purposes of Article 1, Section 6 of the Rhode Island Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has held that an assessment of "reasonable suspicion" must be "based upon all of the circumstances," which should be analyzed "as understood by those versed in the field of law
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enforcement." State v. Foster, 842 A.2d 1047, 1051 (R.I. 2004) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)). Reasonable suspicion "means the detaining authority can 'point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant"' the brief detention of an individual. State v. Bjerke, 697 A.2d 1069, 1071 (R.I. 1997) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
This Court assumes that the Rhode Island General Assembly intended the term "reasonable suspicion" in the Racial Profiling Prevention Act to have the same meaning as the standard developed under the Rhode Island Constitution. Having determined that Officer Chabot had reasonable suspicion to take the actions that he did, Plaintiffs' statutory claims pursuant to the Act must fail.
State Law Claims and Qualified Immunity This Court has held that qualified immunity may be available to government officials for
claims under Rhode Island law, including negligence. See Hopkins v. Rhode Island, 491 F. Supp. 2d 266,275-76 (D.R.I. 2007); see also Hatch v. Town of Middletown, 311 F.3d 83, 89-90 (1st Cir. 2002). This doctrine under state law is analogous to the federal doctrine of qualified immunity. Hopkins, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 276. Again, having determined that no constitutional violation occurred, this Court need not consider the issue of qualified immunity for the Plaintiffs' state law claims.
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Plaintiffs submitted a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against the Defendants on
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the issue of liability on Count II (Unreasonable Search and Seizure in violation of§ 1983) and Count VI (Unreasonable Search and Seizure in violation of R.I. Const. Art 1, § 6). Plaintiffs argue that Chabot did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct pat-down searches ofTamup or to seize the Plaintiffs and transport them to ICE. Plaintiffs also contend that they are entitled to a judgment regarding the failure to properly train and supervise as it relates to Counts II and VI.
Plaintiffs argue that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding liability on Counts II and VI, and that they are entitled to a judgment on that issue as a matter of law. As outlined above, the Court has determined that the Defendants are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on each count, because Chabot's conduct was not unlawful in any respect. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is denied.
IV. Conclusion For the reasons set forth herein, the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED. The Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
~db.!{~
MaryM. Sl Chief United States District Judge
December ,3o , 2008
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United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 09-1149 ASTRID G. ESTRADA; WENDY M. ESTRADA; GUILFREDO E. MUÑOZ;
JOSÉ A. AQUINO; CRUZ F. RIVERA; CARLOS E. TAMUP; JOSÉ BURGOS; ABELINO M. URIZAR; ISRAEL TEBALAN; ROLANDO NORIEGA; BORIS CRUZ; ELSA HERNÁNDEZ VILAVICENCIO, Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, State Police Department;
STEVEN M. PARE, individually and in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Rhode Island State Police;
C. THOMAS CHABOT, individually and in his official capacity as a state trooper employed by the State of Rhode Island, Defendants, Appellees, JANE DOE, individually and in her official capacity as a state trooper employed by the State of Rhode Island, Defendant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. Mary M. Lisi, U.S. District Judge]
Before Lynch, Chief Judge, Torruella, and Howard, Circuit Judges.
V. Edward Formisano, with whom American Civil Liberties Union, Rhode Island Affiliate, Sinapi, Formisano, & Co., Ltd., was on brief for appellants.
John M. Moreira, Special Assistant Attorney General, with whom Patrick C. Lynch, Attorney General, James R. Lee and Brenda D.

CCaassee: 10:90-71-1c4v9-000D10o-cMumL-eDnLtM: 30DocPuamgen: t259 DFailetedF0i2le/d0:50/120/04P/2a0g1e02 of E2n8trPyaIgDe:ID54#1:5927584 Baum, Assistants Attorney General, were on brief for appellees. Larry James, General Counsel, Christina Corl, Crabbe, Brown & James, LLP, Michael M. Hethmon, Garrett R. Roe, and Immigration Reform Law Institute, Inc., as amicus curiae The National Fraternal Order of Police. February 4, 2010
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TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellants Astrid G. Estrada, Wendy M. Estrada, Guilfredo E. Muñoz,1 José A. Aquino, Cruz F. Rivera, Carlos E. Tamup, José Burgos, Abelino M. Urizar, Israel Tebalan, Rolando Noriega, Boris R. Cruz, and Elsa Hernández Vilavicencio were passengers in a van that was stopped for failing to signal when changing lanes. They filed this civil action in the District Court of Rhode Island challenging the actions of Officer Thomas Chabot of the Rhode Island State Police during the stop, namely, that he inquired into their immigration status, contacted Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") and transported them to ICE in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiff Tamup also challenges the two pat-down searches to his person performed by Officer Chabot. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the district court on all counts.
I. Background2 The events transpired in the early morning of July 11, 2006. Plaintiff-Appellant Carlos E. Tamup ("Tamup") was driving a fifteen-passenger van heading south on Interstate 95 in Rhode
1 Although the briefs in this case refer to a "Guilfredo E. Muñoz," at deposition, Mr. Muñoz explained that his first surname is Camay and his second surname is Muñoz. 2 The facts are drawn from deposition testimony of all parties, as well as exhibits submitted to the district court in support of the motions for summary judgment. Because this case comes to us after a grant of summary judgment, we present the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Fennell v. First Step Designs, Ltd., 83 F.3d 526, 534 (1st Cir. 1996).
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Island. The remaining eleven Plaintiffs were passengers in that van and were on their way to work in Westerly, Rhode Island. Somewhere near exit 4 in the Town of Richmond, Tamup failed to activate his turn signal as he switched lanes in the two-lane stretch of road. Rhode Island State Police Officer Thomas Chabot ("Officer Chabot") was stationed in a marked state police cruiser parked on the grassy median on Interstate 95. Upon observing that the van had failed to signal its lane change, Officer Chabot engaged his overhead lights to stop the van.3
At Officer Chabot's request, Tamup produced his driver's license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance. Responding to Officer Chabot's question, Tamup stated that his wife owned the van and that he and the other passengers were driving to work polishing jewelry in Westerly, Rhode Island. Walking over to the passenger's side of the van, Officer Chabot asked the front seat passenger, Plaintiff Guilfredo E. Camay Muñoz ("Camay"), for identification. When Camay stated that he did not have identification on his person, Officer Chabot asked for his name and birth date. Although there was an obvious language barrier, Camay was able to give his name and provide his birth date.
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Officer Chabot opened the front passenger door4 and
counted the number of people inside, stating that there were
fifteen persons.5 Using Tamup as a translator, Officer Chabot
asked the rest of the passengers to produce identification. Some
of the passengers produced various forms of identification: a gym
membership card, a non-driver's license identification issued by
the Rhode Island Division of Motor Vehicles, and two
identifications issued by the Guatemalan Consulate. Continuing to
use Tamup as a translator, Officer Chabot then asked the passengers
if they could produce documentation establishing their U.S.
citizenship.6 None of the passengers was able to produce such
4 A ball of some sort fell out of the van as Officer Chabot opened the door. In the videotape of the stop, Officer Chabot is seen picking up the ball and asking: "Ehh, make a good player huh?"
5 There appears to be a question as to how many passengers were in the van. In their brief, appellees assert that there were fourteen people in the van, but in the enhanced audio of the stop, Officer Chabot is heard saying there are fifteen people. In their briefs, Appellants contend there were only twelve people in the van, the total number of persons who now appeal. However, in his deposition, Tamup states that he was transporting fourteen passengers. In any event, this is not a material fact.
6 Plaintiffs argue that there is a material dispute as to when Officer Chabot inquired about the immigration status of the passengers. Plaintiffs note that Officer Chabot, Tamup, and at least one other Plaintiff testified in their deposition that Officer Chabot made such requests and inquiries prior to returning to his cruiser the first time and conducting the computer checks. However, other Plaintiffs testified that Officer Chabot gathered Tamup's license, returned to his cruiser, and did not ask for the identifications until he returned. Because this dispute is not material to our analysis, we present the facts as stated by both Officer Chabot and Plaintiff Tamup, who translated Chabot's requests to the passengers.
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documentation. According to Officer Chabot's deposition testimony, he did not observe any unusual or suspicious activity from Tamup or the van's passengers at this or any other time.7 Officer Chabot also testified, however, that he normally requested identification from passengers in vehicles he stopped, and that more than 99 percent of the passengers from whom he requests identification can supply it.
Officer Chabot then requested that Tamup step out of the van so that he could perform a pat-down search.8 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The search did not yield anything, but during the course of the pat-down, Officer Chabot asked Tamup if he and the rest of the passengers had green cards or work papers, and specifically requested that Tamup give him his social security number and green card. Tamup stated that he only had his driver's
7 Defendants cite to deposition testimony of Plaintiff that they were nervous during the encounter with Officer Chabot. All of the testimony cited, however, relates to the Plaintiffs' referring to their own state of mind. We have been unable to find any evidence in the deposition testimony of Officer Chabot that he observed or recognized any nervousness on the part of the passengers in the van. 8 The justification given by Officer Chabot for this pat-down at his deposition was that:
I had 14 people in the van. And then once Mr. Tamup is in the van and he comes out of the van, I have no idea what he might have brought with him from the van, whether it be a knife, whether it be a weapon of some sort, so for my safety I conducted a Terry pat.
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license and that the other passengers did not have any other
documentation.
Apparently, sometime before Officer Chabot returned to
his vehicle to run Tamup's license, many or most of the Plaintiffs
had essentially admitted being in the country illegally. While the
deposition testimony is sometimes less than clear on what exactly
Officer Chabot asked the passengers, and Officer Chabot himself
never testified that he understood the passengers to have stated
directly that they were in the country illegally, Plaintiffs Tamup
and Estrada both testified in their depositions that they had
admitted to Officer Chabot that they and the rest of the passengers
were not in the country legally.9
9 Tamup testified that he told Officer Chabot that no one in the van had a green card or work papers:
Q: Did he [Officer Chabot] ask you whether anyone else in the van had a green card? A: Yes. He said that if they were going to work, they had to have their papers, that if they worked here, they have to have a green card. Q: Did you tell him that there was -- no one in the van had a green card or work papers? A: We told him we didn't have anything.
While it is unclear whether the above exchange indicates that Tamup told Officer Chabot they were not carrying their green cards currently, or that they simply did not have them, Estrada testified as follows:
Q: You said that the trooper asked you all in the van whether you had permission or license to be in the country, and someone said no? A: No. When he asked, we all said no. Q: Everyone in the van said the word, no? A: No. Not everybody. Just with their faces.
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After Tamup sat back in the driver's seat in the van, Officer Chabot returned to his cruiser and conducted a background check on Tamup. Tamup's license came back as valid and his criminal background check was negative. Officer Chabot then contacted Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") and reported that he had pulled over a passenger van transporting individuals whom he believed might be illegal immigrants. Officer Chabot had to wait approximately three minutes to receive a return call from the ICE Providence office with instructions.
After speaking with someone at the ICE Providence office, Officer Chabot returned to the van and conducted a second pat-down of Tamup. A second state trooper, Officer Heather Donahue, arrived at the scene and conferred with Officer Chabot. Officer Chabot then informed Tamup that Tamup would have to drive the passenger van with all the passengers to the ICE Providence office. Tamup testified at his deposition that Officer Chabot told him it was his responsibility to take everyone to immigration and that "if anybody tried to escape, they could lose their life." Plaintiffs contend they did not consent to the detainment or the travel to ICE.10
Q: Okay. Some people in the van actually said the word, no? A: I don't remember. I know that I was one of those who said no. Q: So you said the word, no? A: Yes. 10 Officer Chabot testified at his deposition that the passengers voluntarily acquiesced to his request to drive to the ICE office in
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Plaintiff Camay testified that he himself heard Officer Chabot say "You lock the van or somebody's going to die."11 Other Plaintiffs testified that they heard Tamup translate the threat.
State troopers escorted the passenger van being driven by Tamup to the ICE Providence office without significant incident.12 All of the van's passengers were taken into custody upon arrival.
In January 2007, all the passengers filed a complaint in Rhode Island District Court. The complaint alleged an illegal search and seizure in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution as well as Article I, § 6 of the Rhode Island Constitution; unlawful discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, Article I, § 2 of the Rhode Island Constitution, and R.I. Gen. Laws 31-21.2 (the Rhode Island Racial Profiling Prevention Act of 2004); and a state tort claim of negligence.
At the conclusion of discovery, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment defending both on qualified immunity grounds
Providence. In his police report, Officer Chabot stated that he attempted to give Tamup directions to the ICE office, but was unable to do so due to the language barrier, at which point Officer Chabot agreed to escort the van to the ICE office. Because of the procedural posture of this case, we take the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs. 11 Officer Chabot denies these allegations but because of the procedural posture of this case, we take them as true. 12 The officers requested that Tamup stop the vehicle at one point during the drive so they could verify that the doors were locked, but this is not an issue in this case.
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and substantive grounds. Plaintiffs also filed a motion for partial summary judgment. The district court entered judgment in favor of defendants on all counts on December 30, 2008. Plaintiffs timely appealed.13
II. Standard of Review Summary judgment is appropriate if the record shows "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and [] the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). On a summary judgment motion, "[a] genuine issue exists where a 'reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the nonmoving party.'" Meuser v. Fed. Express Corp., 564 F.3d 507, 515 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Suárez v. Pueblo Int'l, Inc., 229 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir. 2000)). "A fact is material only if it possesses the capacity to sway the outcome of the litigation under the applicable law." Vineberg v. Bissonnette, 548 F.3d 50, 56 (1st Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where, as here, the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the court must "determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law on facts that are not disputed." Barnes v. Fleet Nat'l Bank, N.A., 370 F.3d 164, 170 (1st Cir. 2004). "It is not for the court on summary judgment to weigh the evidence 'but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 924 F.2d
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370, 373 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). Ruling on each party's motion, the court views all facts and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.
III. Discussion In this appeal, Plaintiffs press four main issues. First, Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in ruling that Officer Chabot did not violate their Fourth Amendment rights by inquiring about their immigration status and contacting ICE. Second, Plaintiffs argue that Officer Chabot did not have reasonable suspicion to transport the Plaintiffs to the ICE Providence office. Third, Plaintiff Tamup individually argues that the district court erred in ruling that Officer Chabot had reasonable suspicion to conduct the two Terry pat-down searches of Tamup. Finally, Plaintiffs contend that the district court erred in ruling that Officer Chabot did not violate the Rhode Island Racial Profiling Prevention Act of 2004 ("the Act"). In this case, the district court ruled that Officer Chabot had reasonable suspicion to suspect immigration violations, to transport the Plaintiffs to ICE, and to twice pat-down Tamup. The court thus did not reach the issue of qualified immunity. We choose to answer the question of qualified immunity first, which makes it unnecessary to determine whether Officer Chabot had
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reasonable suspicion to take these actions. See Nelson v. Kline, 242 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2001).
"The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from 'liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Guillemard-Ginorio v. Contreras-Gómez, 585 F.3d 508, 526 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). To determine whether a particular officer is entitled to qualified immunity, "[a] court must decide: (1) whether the facts alleged or shown by the Plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) if so, whether the right was 'clearly established' at the time of the defendant's alleged violation." Maldonado v. Fontánes, 568 F.3d 263, 269 (1st Cir. 2009).14
This second step has two aspects: (1) "the clarity of the law at the time of the alleged civil rights violation" and (2) whether, on the facts of the case, "a reasonable defendant would have understood that his conduct violated the Plaintiffs' constitutional rights." Id.; see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483
14 Our Circuit had previously articulated this two-part test as a three-part test that remained faithful to the substance of the test articulated by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Bergeron v. Cabral, 560 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2009). However, we recently adopted the "[Supreme Court's two-part test and abandon[ed] our previous usage of a three-step analysis." Maldonado, 568 F.3d at 269.
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U.S. 635, 640 (1987) ("[To overcome qualified immunity, t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right."). After Pearson, we no longer have to take these two steps in "strict sequence." Bergeron, 560 F.3d at 7 (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009)). Thus if a reasonable official would not have understood that his conduct violated Plaintiffs' constitutional rights, we must grant him qualified immunity. "[T]his prong of the inquiry, while requiring a legal determination, is highly fact specific." Nelson, 242 F.3d at 35 n.2 (quoting Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1997)).
If an officer is found to be deserving of qualified immunity under federal law, he will also be granted qualified immunity for the same claim under Rhode Island law. See Hatch v. Town of Middletown, 311 F.3d 83, 89-90 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that Rhode Island law recognizes a qualified immunity defense under state law analogous to the federal doctrine of qualified immunity).
Turning to the facts of this case, we take each issue presented by the Plaintiffs in turn. A. The Inquiry About Immigration Status and Contacting ICE
Plaintiffs do not contest the validity of the traffic stop, nor do they argue that it was unlawful for Officer Chabot to request identification from all the passengers in the van, a
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question our Circuit has not conclusively decided.15 Instead, Plaintiffs argue that Officer Chabot's inquiry into their immigration status and subsequent call to ICE prolonged the traffic stop, converting it into an unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
We cannot say, however, that it was clear as a matter of law that Officer Chabot's brief line of questioning, nor the three minutes it took for him to receive a response from ICE, unreasonably prolonged the stop such that independent reasonable suspicion was necessary to support his inquiry into Plaintiffs' immigration status. The traffic stop at issue took place a year after the Supreme Court's decision in Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005). In that case, the Court held that a police officer does not need independent reasonable suspicion to question an individual about her immigration status during the execution of a search warrant, but that such inquiry constitutes "mere police questioning" so long as the detention was not prolonged by the questioning. Id. at 101.16
15 Compare United States v. Chaney, 584 F.3d 20, 27 (1st Cir. 2009) (finding that officer's inquiries into car passenger's identity did not violate passenger's rights) with United States v. Henderson, 463 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2006) (declining to decide whether an officer could demand a passenger's identification). 16 Plaintiffs contend that this case is distinguishable from Muehler because of the timing of Officer Chabot's questions. They allege that Officer Chabot did not ask about Plaintiffs' immigration status until after he had checked the status of Tamup's license and conducted a criminal background check, as well as
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Other courts have held that questioning that extends the length of detention "by only a brief time" does not "make the custody itself unreasonable." United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 949 (7th Cir. 2002) (en banc). See also United States v. Alcaraz-Arellano, 441 F.3d 1252, 1259 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Burton, 334 F.3d 514, 518-19 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274, 1280 (11th Cir. 2001). At the time of the traffic stop, our Circuit had not decided this question. Cf. United States v. Chhien, 266 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2009) (finding that officer's questions to the driver about his itinerary did not exceed the scope of the stop). In a more recent case, we rejected a defendant's argument that "police must limit a traffic citation stop to the narrow purpose of immediately preparing and issuing a citation." United States v. Dunbar, 553 F.3d 48, 56 (1st Cir. 2009) (finding that a delay of twelve minutes while officer prepared a traffic warning and questioned car's passenger about her itinerary did not unreasonably delay the stop).
We also note that by the time Officer Chabot asked about Plaintiffs' immigration status, he knew that: (1) Plaintiffs were
contacted ICE. When Officer Chabot contacted ICE, Plaintiffs argue, the purpose of the traffic stop was complete and the further questioning about immigration status unlawfully prolonged the stop. We note that by a number of witness accounts, including those of Tamup and Officer Chabot, Officer Chabot asked about Plaintiff's immigration status before running Tamup's license. But even if Officer Chabot did not pose the question until after returning Tamup's license, it was not clearly established law that the brief exchange unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop.
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headed to work; (2) most were unable to produce any identification, and of the four who did, two could produce only identifications issued by the Guatemalan consulate; and (3) they spoke little English. Officer Chabot also testified that passengers, of whom he requests documentation as a matter of routine, are able to produce valid identification more than 99 percent of the time. All of these facts combined may well have sufficiently heightened his suspicions for him to believe that he could shift his inquiry from the traffic stop to investigating other potential criminal activity. See Chhien, 266 F.3d at 6 ("[W]hile an officer's actions must bear some relation to the purpose of the original stop, he may shift his focus and increase the scope of his investigation by degrees if his suspicions mount during the course of the detention.").
In any event, the law was not and is not know clearly established, such that Chabot should have known that he could not investigate further. We thus conclude that Officer Chabot is entitled to federal and state qualified immunity for any possible constitutional violations that he may have committed in asking the van's passengers questions about their immigration status and in contacting ICE. B. Escorting Plaintiffs to ICE
After contacting ICE, Officer Chabot returned to the van and demanded that Tamup follow him to the ICE office in Providence.
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Plaintiffs contend that this prolonged the traffic stop and that Officer Chabot did not possess either reasonable suspicion or probable cause to detain and transport the Plaintiffs to ICE. On the other hand, defendant contends that the admission of undocumented status and the manner in which the events unfolded provided Officer Chabot with probable cause to believe Plaintiffs were violating immigration laws. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (harboring aliens); 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (improper entry by alien); 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) (personal possession of registration or receipt card).
Plaintiffs make much of the difference in testimony between Officer Chabot's characterization of the escort as voluntary and the testimony on the record from multiple Plaintiffs that Officer Chabot issued a bodily threat against Tamup and/or the Plaintiffs if they did not follow his vehicle to the ICE Providence office. Because we find that Officer Chabot's actions fall under the doctrine of qualified immunity, this contested issue is not material.17
Probable cause exists when the circumstances, "viewed from the vantage point of a prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer . . . guided by . . . experience and training" are sufficient to warrant a reasonable person to believe that the individual had committed or was committing a crime. United States
17 We are by no means condoning the type of threat alleged to have been made here -- one that for purposes of summary judgment, we take as true.
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v. Davis, 458 F.2d 819, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Reyes, 225 F.3d 71, 75 (1st Cir. 2000). The Supreme Court has made it clear that officers can "draw reasonable inferences from [the] facts in light of their knowledge of the area and their prior experience . . . ." United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 897 (1975).
Although Officer Chabot's police report and deposition testimony calls into question whether he himself believed he had probable cause to escort the Plaintiffs to ICE, "the Supreme Court has held that an officer's subjective belief is not dispositive of whether probable cause existed." United States v. Pardue, 385 F.3d 101, 106 n.2 (1st Cir. 2004); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 507 (1983) ("[T]he fact that the officers did not believe there was probable cause and proceeded on a consensual or Terry-stop rationale would not foreclose the State from justifying . . . custody by proving probable cause."). Rather, for the purposes of qualified immunity, we look to the objective perspective of a reasonable officer and inquire whether given all the facts in the record, that officer would have believed that he was not violating the Plaintiffs' Constitutional rights in taking the action at issue.
By the time that Officer Chabot demanded that Plaintiffs follow him to the ICE Providence office, two Plaintiffs had
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essentially admitted on their behalf and on the behalf of the rest of the passengers, that they were in the country illegally.
Given the undisputed facts as we find them in the record and the state of the law, we are compelled to find that a reasonable defendant in Officer Chabot's position would have believed he had sufficient evidence giving rise to probable cause to support the conclusion that the van's occupants had committed immigration violations. Officer Chabot is thus entitled to qualified immunity for alleged violations of state or federal laws surrounding the seizure of Plaintiffs and their subsequent escort to the Providence ICE office. C. Pat-down Searches of Plaintiff Tamup
Plaintiff Tamup challenges the district court's ruling that Officer Chabot had reasonable suspicion to conduct the two pat-down searches of his person.18 Tamup argues that Officer Chabot had neither a subjective nor an objective suspicion that Tamup was armed and dangerous.
The inquiry of whether an officer has reasonable suspicion to conduct a pat-down search requires a consideration of "the totality of the circumstances to see whether the officer had
18 At the district court, all Plaintiffs sought to challenge Tamup's pat downs. The district court correctly ruled that only Tamup had standing to challenge the pat-downs, and Plaintiffs do not challenge this ruling. See United States v. Sowers, 136 F.3d 24, 28-29 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that appellant who was not himself subjected to a pat down search did not have standing to raise a Fourth Amendment claim on the basis of said search).
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a particularized, objective basis for his or her suspicion."

United States v. McKoy, 428 F.3d 38, 39 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing

United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)). The Supreme

Court has recognized that "[t]he risk of harm to both the police

and the occupants [of a stopped vehicle] is minimized . . . if the

officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of the situation."

Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414 (1997). "[D]anger to an

officer during a traffic stop is [also] likely to be greater when

there are passengers in addition to the driver in the stopped car."

Id. at 415; see also United States v. Cruz, 156 F.3d 22, 26 (1st

Cir. 1998) (finding that during a Terry stop, the number of

suspects compared to the number of officers is a relevant factor in

assessing an officer's safety concerns).

This Court has

consistently held that, while engaging in legitimate investigative

conduct, "the police may take reasonable steps to protect

themselves by searching a suspect for weapons or taking other

protective measures." United States v. Taylor, 162 F.3d, 12, 17

(1st Cir. 1998); see also Flowers v. Fiore, 359 F.3d 24, 30 (1st

Cir. 2004). "Furthermore, the Court has recognized that traffic

stops are 'especially fraught with danger to police officers.'"

Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781 (2009).

As to the first pat-down search, Tamup argues that

Officer Chabot's reasons evince that he lacked subjective suspicion

that Tamup was armed and dangerous. Tamup also argues that a

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reasonable officer presented with the same circumstances would not have believed that his welfare was in jeopardy because Chabot did not point to having observed Tamup making any remarkable, sudden, or threatening movements while he was seated in the van.
Tamup makes similar arguments with regards to the second pat down, which occurred when Officer Chabot returned to the van after calling ICE and verifying that Tamup's paperwork was in order. Tamup points to Officer Chabot's articulation of the reason why he conducted the second pat down: that Officer Chabot believed that Tamup "could have picked up a weapon while he got back in his vehicle." Tamup argues that this does not amount to an articulable suspicion that Tamup was armed and dangerous. According to Tamup, if Officer Chabot had a concern that Tamup could access a weapon inside the van, he should have searched the van, the van's compartment, and the other passengers prior to permitting Tamup to return to the vehicle, or alternatively separated Tamup from the van and the passengers by placing him in the back of his police cruiser. Further, Tamup argues that no reasonable officer in Officer Chabot's position would have believed his safety was in danger, and conducted the second pat down under the circumstances, because there were no sudden or furtive movements, this was not a high crime area, it was not late at night, and there were no suspicious circumstances or criminal activity, or bulge in his clothing that would suggest that he was carrying a weapon.
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Defendants argue that Officer Chabot's inability to obtain identifying information from most of the van passengers contributed to his reasonable belief that his interactions with Tamup could be dangerous. Defendants argue that due to the lack of identification presented, Officer Chabot could not conduct criminal background checks to dispel any safety concerns he had about the passengers. Defendants also add that the number of occupants in the van was also a significant factor in Officer Chabot's safety concerns. See Cruz, 156 F.3d at 26 (holding that officer's frisk was justified in part because of the number of occupants in the vehicle, "who outnumbered the police officer five to one"). With regards to the second pat down, defendants contend that it was even more reasonable for Officer Chabot to have concerns for his safety because he could not see Tamup while conducting the check and the situation had escalated since Plaintiffs had admitted to not having documentation of their legal status in the United States. Defendants argue that all these circumstances justified a second pat down.
Given the state of the law and the facts in this case, we cannot say that a reasonable officer, confronted with a similar situation as Officer Chabot, would have believed he was violating the Plaintiff's constitutional rights by conducting the two pat down searches. Before the first pat down, Officer Chabot was confronted with a fifteen-passenger van full of individuals who
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were by their own admission heading to work, most of whom did not speak English, and who mostly lacked any identification. Two of the pieces of identification that were provided were issued by the Consulate of Guatemala. None of the passengers was able to provide proof of U.S. citizenship, and after Officer Chabot asked for such identification, he alerted the passengers to his belief that they were not in the country legally. The likely consequence of discovery of unauthorized entry or unauthorized stay in this country -- forced deportation -- is a serious matter with harsh consequences. Under these circumstances, it was not unreasonable for Officer Chabot to conclude that he was entitled to pat down Tamup to assert control over the situation and for his safety.
The second pat down occurred after Officer Chabot had conferred with ICE and had received confirmation that his suspicions as to the passengers were likely correct, as well as after some of the passengers had admitted to lacking proof of legal status. During this period of time, Officer Chabot lost visual contact with Tamup and the passengers. Although Officer Chabot did not testify that he himself observed nervousness on the part of the passengers, most of the passengers themselves testified that they had been nervous throughout the whole encounter.
It was not unreasonable for Officer Chabot to proceed as he did. Tamup's suggestion that Officer Chabot should have instead searched the van, its compartments, and all of the passengers
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before allowing Tamup to return to the vehicle would have involved a greater intrusion and unquestionably increased risk. The suggestion that having all the passengers exit the van to allow Officer Chabot to inspect each of them in turn, requires little comment or analysis. The further suggestion that Officer Chabot should have separated Tamup from the van by placing him in his police cruiser was a plausible alternative, but it was not unreasonable for Officer Chabot to decline to do so.
In the totality of the circumstances, we cannot say that a reasonable officer in Officer Chabot's position would have understood that his conduct violated Tamup's constitutional right. We thus hold that Officer Chabot is entitled to qualified immunity for both pat down searches under federal and state law. D. Rhode Island Racial Profiling Prevention Act
Plaintiffs also brought a state law claim of prohibited racial profiling under the Act. In prohibiting racial profiling, the Act states that "[u]nless there exists reasonable suspicion or probable cause of criminal activity, no motor vehicle stopped for a traffic violation shall be detained beyond the time needed to address the violation." R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-21.2-5. A private cause of action for damages and equitable relief is statutorily provided for victims of racial profiling. R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-21.2-4.
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The Act does not define "reasonable suspicion," nor has the term been construed under the statute. However, we agree with the district court that the Rhode Island legislature intended the term to have the same meaning as the standard developed under the Rhode Island Constitution. State v. Foster, 842 A.2d 1047, 1051 (R.I. 2004) (holding that "reasonable suspicion" is the same for purposes of the Rhode Island Constitution and the United States Constitution, that is, that it must be "based upon all of the circumstances") (quoting United States v. Cortéz, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).
Because we find that Officer Chabot could reasonably have believed that he had sufficient facts to warrant first reasonable suspicion, and later, probable cause of immigration violations, we find that he is entitled to qualified immunity for all of the challenged actions with respect to the Act.
For the reasons stated, the judgment is affirmed.
"Concurring opinion follows"
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LYNCH, Chief Judge, concurring. I join in Judge Torruella's well-done opinion. As he states, this case raises no issue as to whether police officers may ask for the identification of all other passengers in a vehicle that is stopped for a minor traffic violation (failing to signal before changing lanes) by the driver. Cf. United States v. Soriano-Jarquin, 492 F.3d 495, 500 (4th Cir. 2007). Nor does this case involve whether a police officer may detain and escort to the immigration authorities a vehicle containing persons who do not speak English and appear to be foreign, based on no more than the officer's "hunch" that the passengers may be aliens who entered or remained in the country illegally.
Rather, on the facts of this case, plaintiffs' claims must fail because a reasonable officer would have had no basis in existing law to conclude that his actions violated any constitutional rights, and so Officer Chabot is entitled to immunity. Maldonado v. Fontánes, 568 F.3d 263, 268-69 (1st Cir. 2009). The initial stop of the van and the two pat downs were plainly reasonable for safety reasons and provide no basis for any claim of constitutional violation.
In my view, the specific facts of this case also require the conclusion that the officer is entitled to immunity on all claims related to the detention and escorting of the vehicle and its passengers to the immigration authorities. Officer Chabot had
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more information at his disposal than merely the Hispanic appearance of the passengers and their inability to speak English. He knew from the driver that all plaintiffs were on their way to work. He also knew that when asked for some form of identification, most plaintiffs produced none, two offered Guatemalan consular identification cards,19 and one a Sports Fitness club I.D. card with no birth date on it. None of the passengers produced proof of United States citizenship when asked, nor did anyone produce a green card.
This information raised the real prospect that there were violations of criminal law by the driver, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1) (A)(ii), possibly by the employer, id. § 1324(a)(3)(A), and by the van's passengers, id. §§ 1304(e), 1306(a). Employers are required to review documents from the individuals they employ. Id. § 1324a(b)(1)(A)-(D). These materials include both employment authorization and identity documentation, id., such as a resident alien card or an alien registration card, id. § 1324a(b)(1)(B)(ii). Accordingly, if the passengers were employed as they said, they likely would have had, at a minimum, some form of identity documents. If they were not American citizens, a reasonable officer had grounds to believe they were violating the requirement
19 Consular identification cards are issued by several foreign governments, including Guatemala's, and identify their bearers as citizens of the issuing country. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. 108-804, at 97-98 (2005).
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to carry their registration, id. § 1304(e), or lacked registration because they had entered illegally, id. § 1306(a). Either situation was a violation of law.
Thus, there was a reasonable basis20 for the officer to contact Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The ICE representative called back three minutes later and noted that the agency wanted to identify the passengers and their status, "due to the lack of identification and strong possibility that the [van's] occupants were illegal immigrants."
This was enough to raise a serious question, warranting further investigation of whether plaintiffs were in violation of immigration laws. A reasonable officer would believe this evidence was sufficient to merit extending the period of detention for the next one-to-two hours to accompany the van to the ICE office, whether the passengers consented or not. Indeed, federal law gives the authority to arrest for violations of § 1324 to all "officers whose duty it is to enforce criminal laws." Id. § 1324(c).
Plaintiffs' claims were properly dismissed.
20 The majority opinion's reliance on plaintiffs' own admissions that they told Officer Chabot they were illegal aliens is proper, but I do not rely on it because Officer Chabot did not testify they said so and because the admission is not contained in the police report.
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 American Civil Liberties Union : ACLU Files Racial Profiling Lawsuit Against Rhode Island Sta... Page 1 of 2

URL: http://www.aclu.org/racialjustice/racialprofiling/27933prs20070108.html
ACLU Files Racial Profiling Lawsuit Against Rhode Island State Police (1/8/2007)
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE CONTACT: media@aclu.org
PROVIDENCE, RI - In a federal lawsuit filed today, the American Civil Liberties Union of Rhode Island charged that state police engaged in racial profiling and acted unconstitutionally when they detained 14 people on Interstate 95 and transferred them to immigration officials. The individuals, all Guatemalans, were stopped in a van after the driver changed lanes without using a turn signal.
The ACLU brought today's lawsuit on behalf of 11 of the individuals, arguing that the actions by the state police violated the state's Racial Profiling Prevention Act, as well as the driver and passengers' constitutional rights to be free from discrimination and from unreasonable searches and seizures.
According to the ACLU lawsuit, the individuals were detained even though Thomas Chabot, the state trooper who stopped the van, confirmed that the license and registration of driver Carlos Tamup were valid, and that Tamup had no criminal record. Chabot nonetheless proceeded to open the doors of the vehicle and, by utilizing Tamup as a translator, requested all the passengers to also provide identification. When some did not produce any ID, Chabot asked them if they possessed any documents demonstrating their U.S. citizenship, which none were able to produce. After some further delays, the trooper advised them that they would all be escorted to the Office of Immigration and Customs Enforcement in Providence. According to the complaint, Chabot instructed Tamup that if any passenger attempted to escape from the van en route to Providence, that passenger would be shot.
"Since the license and registration papers of the van's driver were valid and there was never any suggestion of criminal activity, the questioning and detention of the passengers was clearly based on one element: their ethnic appearance. This is the essence of racial profiling," said ACLU of Rhode Island Executive Director Steven Brown. "That state police officials have unequivocally supported these actions demonstrates the need for legislation to restrict these problematic law enforcement practices."
The ACLU of Rhode Island issued a detailed report last week calling for such legislation after documenting the continuing problem of racial profiling on the state's highways. That report is online at www.riaclu.org/documents/RacialProfilingReport0107_000.pdf
In today's lawsuit, the ACLU charges that the state police "knew or should have known" that the search, seizure and detention of the 14 individuals were without reasonable or probable cause and were therefore unlawful. The lawsuit seeks a declaratory judgment that the defendants violated the constitutional rights of the driver and passengers, and an award of damages and attorneys' fees.
In a related action, last month the ACLU filed an open records lawsuit against the Rhode Island State Police after the agency refused to release copies of its traffic enforcement policies or the videotape of the van stop that was recorded on the police cruiser's camera.

http://www.aclu.org/racialjustice/racialprofiling/27933prs20070108.html

10/30/2007

American Civil Liberties Union : ACLU Files Racial Profiling Lawsuit Against Rhode Island Sta... Page 2 of 2
The July 11 van stop has generated significant controversy in the civil rights community. In September, more than a dozen organizations sharply criticized State Police Superintendent Steven Pare's response to the incident, in which he rejected any suggestion of racial profiling, and instead claimed that the police "acted professionally and appropriately" in conducting the stop. Among other things, the groups noted that Pare never explained why the trooper, who was on speed radar patrol, chose to leave his post to pull over the driver, whose only infraction was failing to use a turn signal, not speeding; or why the trooper demanded identification, as well as citizenship papers, from the passengers when there was no suspicion of criminal activity.
The civil rights groups also noted that Pare's support of the trooper's actions in calling immigration officials came less than a month after a state police representative misleadingly told a large community forum that the state police do not seek to enforce immigration laws. The groups have further claimed that Pare's approval of the detention has encouraged a "chill" in the Latino community, where residents are fearful of contacting the police to report crimes lest their own immigration status be investigated.
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http://www.aclu.org/racialjustice/racialprofiling/27933prs20070108.html

10/30/2007

 
 Case: 1:07-cv-00010-ML-DLM As of: 07/13/2012 11:16 AM EDT 1 of 7
U.S. District Court District of Rhode Island (Providence) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:07−cv−00010−ML−DLM

Estrada et al v. State of Rhode Island,et al Assigned to: Chief Judge Mary M. Lisi Referred to: Magistrate Judge David L. Martin Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act Plaintiff Astrid G. Estrada
Plaintiff Wendy M. Estrada
Plaintiff Guilfredo E. Munoz
Plaintiff Jose A. Aquino
Plaintiff Cruz F. Rivera
Plaintiff Carlos E. Tamup
Plaintiff Jose Burgos
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 01/08/2007 Date Terminated: 12/30/2008 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by V. Edward Formisano Sinapi Formisano &Company, Ltd. 100 Midway Place Suite 1 Cranston, RI 02920−5707 944−9690 Fax: 943−9040 Email: edf@sfclaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by V. Edward Formisano (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by V. Edward Formisano (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by V. Edward Formisano (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by V. Edward Formisano (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by V. Edward Formisano (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by V. Edward Formisano (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:07-cv-00010-ML-DLM As of: 07/13/2012 11:16 AM EDT 2 of 7

Abelino M. Urizar

represented by V. Edward Formisano (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Israel Tebalan

represented by V. Edward Formisano (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Rolando Noriega

represented by V. Edward Formisano (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Boris Cruz

represented by V. Edward Formisano (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Elsa Hernandez Vilavicencio

represented by V. Edward Formisano (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
State of Rhode Island State Police Department

represented by Brenda D. Baum Attorney General's Office 150 South Main Street Providence, RI 02903 274−4400 x 2294 Fax: 222−3016 Email: bbaum@riag.ri.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James R. Lee Attorney General's Office 150 South Main Street Providence, RI 02903 274−4400 Fax: 222−2995 Email: jlee@riag.ri.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John M. Moreira RI Attorney General's Office 150 South Main Street Providence, RI 02903 274−4400 Fax: 222−2995 Email: jmoreira@riag.ri.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:07-cv-00010-ML-DLM As of: 07/13/2012 11:16 AM EDT 3 of 7

Defendant
Steven M. Pare individually and in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Rhode Island State Police

represented by Brenda D. Baum (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James R. Lee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John M. Moreira (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Thomas Chabot individually and in his official capacity as a state trooper employed by the State of Rhode Island

represented by Brenda D. Baum (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James R. Lee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John M. Moreira (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 01/08/2007
03/09/2007 04/02/2007 04/02/2007 04/02/2007 04/03/2007 04/06/2007 04/09/2007 04/20/2007

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against State of Rhode Island, State Police Department, Steven M. Pare, Thomas Chabot ( Filing fee $ 350 receipt number 65082.) filed by Cruz F. Rivera, Carlos E. Tamup, Jose Burgos, Abelino M. Urizar, Israel Tebalan, Rolando Noriega, Boris Cruz, Elsa Hernandez Vilavicencio, Astrid G. Estrada, Wendy M. Estrada, Guilfredo E. Munoz, Jose A. Aquino. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet)(Barletta, Barbara) (Entered: 01/08/2007)
Summons Issued (3) (Jackson, Ryan) (Entered: 03/09/2007)
2 NOTICE of Appearance by Brenda D. Baum on behalf of State of Rhode Island, Steven M. Pare, Thomas Chabot (Baum, Brenda) (Entered: 04/02/2007)
3 ANSWER to Complaint with Jury Demand by State of Rhode Island, Steven M. Pare, Thomas Chabot.(Baum, Brenda) (Entered: 04/02/2007)
4 NOTICE of Appearance by James R. Lee on behalf of State of Rhode Island, Steven M. Pare, Thomas Chabot (Lee, James) (Entered: 04/02/2007)
5 MOTION to Compel More Responsive Answers to First Request For Production of Documents Propounded to Defendant State of Rhode Island by all plaintiffs. Responses due by 4/20/2007 (Formisano, V.) (Entered: 04/03/2007)
6 AMENDED ANSWER to Complaint with Jury Demand by State of Rhode Island, Steven M. Pare, Thomas Chabot.(Baum, Brenda) (Entered: 04/06/2007)
7 NOTICE of Hearing: Rule 16 Conference set for Wednesday, 5/16/2007 09:30 AM in Chambers 310 before Chief Judge Mary M Lisi. (Barletta, Barbara) (Entered: 04/09/2007)
8 RESPONSE in Opposition re 5 MOTION to Compel More Responsive Answers to First Request For Production of Documents Propounded to Defendant State of Rhode Island With Supporting Memo filed by State of Rhode Island. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit: Summons and Proof of Payment; # 2 Exhibit: Affidavit of Acting

Case: 1:07-cv-00010-ML-DLM As of: 07/13/2012 11:16 AM EDT 4 of 7

04/23/2007
04/24/2007
05/03/2007
05/09/2007 05/10/2007 05/16/2007 05/17/2007 11/08/2007 11/09/2007
01/11/2008 01/14/2008 01/14/2008 01/14/2008 01/14/2008 01/14/2008 01/14/2008 01/14/2008

Superintendent Steven G. O'Donnell)(Baum, Brenda) (Entered: 04/20/2007)
5 MOTION to Compel More Responsive Answers to First Request For Production of Documents Propounded to Defendant State of Rhode Island REFERRED to Magistrate Judge Martin for determination (Barletta, Barbara) (Entered: 04/23/2007)
NOTICE OF HEARING ON MOTION 5 MOTION to Compel More Responsive Answers to First Request For Production of Documents Propounded to Defendant State of Rhode Island: MOTION HEARING SET FOR 5/3/2007 10:00 AM in Courtroom B before Magistrate Judge David L. Martin. (Saucier, Martha) (Entered: 04/24/2007)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge David L. Martin : Motion Hearing held on 5/3/2007 re 5 MOTION to Compel More Responsive Answers to First Request For Production of Documents Propounded to Defendant State of Rhode Island filed by Jose Burgos, Astrid G. Estrada, Wendy M. Estrada, Guilfredo E. Munoz, Jose A. Aquino, Cruz F. Rivera, Carlos E. Tamup, Abelino M. Urizar, Israel Tebalan, Rolando Noriega, Boris Cruz, Elsa Hernandez Vilavicencio. Edward Formisano for the plaintiffs; Brenda Baum for the defendants. Attorneys argue; Court takes matter under advisement; Court to issue an order. (Courtroom Courtroom B at 10:27.) (Saucier, Martha) (Entered: 05/03/2007)
9 RULE 16 STATEMENT by Astrid G. Estrada. (Formisano, V.) (Entered: 05/09/2007)
10 ORDER denying 5 Motion to Compel Production . So Ordered by Magistrate Judge David L. Martin on 5/10/07. (Saucier, Martha) (Entered: 05/10/2007)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Mary M Lisi : Rule 16 Conference held on 5/16/2007; all counsel of record present (Barletta, Barbara) (Entered: 05/16/2007)
11 SCHEDULING ORDER: Discovery due by 11/16/2007; Motions due by 11/30/2007; Pretrial Memorandum due by 12/17/2007 −− So Ordered by Chief Judge Mary M Lisi on 5/17/07. (Barletta, Barbara) (Entered: 05/17/2007)
12 Joint MOTION for an Extension of Time for Pretrial Order Deadlines by all plaintiffs.Responses due by 11/26/2007 (Formisano, V.) (Entered: 11/08/2007)
TEXT ORDER granting 12 Motion for Extension of Time ; Reset Scheduling Order Deadlines:Discovery due by 2/16/2008; Motions due by 3/1/2008; Pretrial Memorandum due by 3/17/2008 − So Ordered by Chief Judge Mary M Lisi on 11/9/07. (Barletta, Barbara) (Entered: 11/09/2007)
13 NOTICE to Take Deposition by Astrid G. Estrada of Trooper Donohue (Formisano, V.) (Entered: 01/11/2008)
14 NOTICE to Take Deposition by State of Rhode Island, Steven M. Pare, Thomas Chabot of Astrid G. Estrada (Baum, Brenda) (Entered: 01/14/2008)
15 NOTICE to Take Deposition by State of Rhode Island, Steven M. Pare, Thomas Chabot of Wendy M. Estrada (Baum, Brenda) (Entered: 01/14/2008)
16 NOTICE to Take Deposition by State of Rhode Island, Steven M. Pare, Thomas Chabot of Carlos E. Tamup (Baum, Brenda) (Entered: 01/14/2008)
17 NOTICE to Take Deposition by State of Rhode Island, Steven M. Pare, Thomas Chabot of Guilfredo E. Munoz (Baum, Brenda) (Entered: 01/14/2008)
18 NOTICE to Take Deposition by State of Rhode Island, Steven M. Pare, Thomas Chabot of Jose A. Aquino (Baum, Brenda) (Entered: 01/14/2008)
19 NOTICE to Take Deposition by State of Rhode Island, Steven M. Pare, Thomas Chabot of Cruz F. Rivera (Baum, Brenda) (Entered: 01/14/2008)
20 NOTICE to Take Deposition by State of Rhode Island, Steven M. Pare, Thomas Chabot of Jose Burgos (Baum, Brenda) (Entered: 01/14/2008)

Case: 1:07-cv-00010-ML-DLM As of: 07/13/2012 11:16 AM EDT 5 of 7

01/14/2008 01/14/2008 01/14/2008 01/14/2008 01/14/2008 01/30/2008 01/31/2008
03/14/2008 03/19/2008 03/19/2008 03/19/2008 04/15/2008 04/21/2008 04/22/2008 05/05/2008 05/07/2008 05/08/2008 05/22/2008
05/22/2008

21 NOTICE to Take Deposition by State of Rhode Island, Steven M. Pare, Thomas Chabot of Abelino M. Urizar (Baum, Brenda) (Entered: 01/14/2008)
22 NOTICE to Take Deposition by State of Rhode Island, Steven M. Pare, Thomas Chabot of Israel Tebalan (Baum, Brenda) (Entered: 01/14/2008)
23 NOTICE to Take Deposition by State of Rhode Island, Steven M. Pare, Thomas Chabot of Rolando Noriega (Baum, Brenda) (Entered: 01/14/2008)
24 NOTICE to Take Deposition by State of Rhode Island, Steven M. Pare, Thomas Chabot of Boris R. Cruz (Baum, Brenda) (Entered: 01/14/2008)
25 NOTICE to Take Deposition by State of Rhode Island, Steven M. Pare, Thomas Chabot of Elsa Hernandez Vila Vicencio (Baum, Brenda) (Entered: 01/14/2008)
26 Joint MOTION to Extend Discovery Deadlines by all parties.Responses due by 2/19/2008 (Baum, Brenda) (Entered: 01/30/2008)
TEXT ORDER granting 26 Motion extend deadlines; Set/Reset Scheduling Order Deadlines:Discovery due by 4/16/2008; Motions due by 5/1/2008; Pretrial Memorandum due by 5/16/2008 − So Ordered by Chief Judge Mary M Lisi on 1/31/08. (Barletta, Barbara) (Entered: 01/31/2008)
27 NOTICE to Take Deposition by Astrid G. Estrada of Trooper Donahue (Formisano, V.) (Entered: 03/14/2008)
28 NOTICE to Take Foreign Deposition from Wendy M. Estrada., filed by State of Rhode Island, Steven M. Pare, Thomas Chabot.(Baum, Brenda) (Entered: 03/19/2008)
29 NOTICE to Take Foreign Deposition from Abelino M. Urizar., filed by State of Rhode Island, Steven M. Pare, Thomas Chabot.(Baum, Brenda) (Entered: 03/19/2008)
30 NOTICE to Take Foreign Deposition from Astrid G. Estrada., filed by State of Rhode Island, Steven M. Pare, Thomas Chabot.(Baum, Brenda) (Entered: 03/19/2008)
31 NOTICE by Astrid G. Estrada To Take Deposition of Trooper Donohue (Formisano, V.) (Entered: 04/15/2008)
32 Assented MOTION for an Extension of Time For Defendants to file Summary Judgment Motion by State of Rhode Island, Steven M. Pare, Thomas Chabot. Responses due by 5/8/2008 (Baum, Brenda) (Entered: 04/21/2008)
TEXT ORDER granting 32 Motion for Extension of Time ; Reset Deadlines: ( Motion for Summary Judgment due by 5/15/2008.)− So Ordered by Chief Judge Mary M Lisi on 4/22/08. (Barletta, Barbara) (Entered: 04/22/2008)
33 NOTICE of Appearance by John M. Moreira on behalf of all defendants (Moreira, John) (Entered: 05/05/2008)
34 Second MOTION for an Extension of Time To File Motion for Summary Judgment by all defendants. Responses due by 5/27/2008 (Baum, Brenda) (Entered: 05/07/2008)
TEXT ORDER granting 34 Motion for Extension of Time ; Reset Deadlines: ( Motions for Summary Judgment due by 5/22/2008.)− So Ordered by Chief Judge Mary M Lisi on 5/8/08. (Barletta, Barbara) (Entered: 05/08/2008)
35 MOTION for Summary Judgment With Supporting Memo by all defendants. Responses due by 6/9/2008 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K, # 12 Exhibit L, # 13 Exhibit M, # 14 Exhibit N, # 15 Exhibit O, # 16 Exhibit P−1, # 17 Exhibit P−2, # 18 Exhibit Q, # 19 Exhibit R, # 20 Exhibit S, # 21 Errata T, # 22 Exhibit U, # 23 Exhibit V, # 24 Exhibit W)(Moreira, John) (Entered: 05/22/2008)
36 STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS by all defendants re 35 MOTION for Summary Judgment. (Moreira, John) (Entered: 05/22/2008)

Case: 1:07-cv-00010-ML-DLM As of: 07/13/2012 11:16 AM EDT 6 of 7

05/22/2008 05/22/2008 05/22/2008 06/04/2008 06/05/2008
06/06/2008 06/09/2008
06/27/2008 06/27/2008
06/30/2008 06/30/2008 07/09/2008 07/10/2008 07/17/2008
07/17/2008 07/31/2008 08/01/2008

37 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment by Astrid G. Estrada. Responses due by 6/9/2008 (Formisano, V.) (Entered: 05/22/2008)
38 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT by Astrid G. Estrada in support of 37 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit)(Formisano, V.) (Entered: 05/22/2008)
39 STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT by Astrid G. Estrada. (Formisano, V.) (Entered: 05/22/2008)
40 MOTION for an Extension of Time to File Response/Reply TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by Astrid G. Estrada. Responses due by 6/23/2008 (Formisano, V.) (Entered: 06/04/2008)
TEXT ORDER granting 40 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply re 35 MOTION for Summary Judgment ; Reset Deadlines: Responses due by 6/30/2008− So Ordered by Chief Judge Mary M Lisi on 6/5/08. (Barletta, Barbara) (Entered: 06/05/2008)
41 Assented MOTION for an Extension of Time to File Objection and Memorandum to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment by all defendants. Responses due by 6/23/2008 (Baum, Brenda) (Entered: 06/06/2008)
TEXT ORDER granting 41 Motion for Extension of Time to respond to 37 MOTION for Summary Judgment ; Reset Deadlines: ( Responses due by 6/30/2008)− So Ordered by Chief Judge Mary M Lisi on 6/9/08. (Barletta, Barbara) (Entered: 06/09/2008)
42 RESPONSE in OPPOSITION re 37 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Supplemental Exhibit M)(Moreira, John) (Entered: 06/27/2008)
43 STATEMENT OF DISPUTED FACTS re 42 Response in Opposition to 37 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by all defendants. (Moreira, John) Modified on 6/27/2008 to correct document description, and to add link to Deft's Response in Opposition. (Duhamel, John). (Entered: 06/27/2008)
44 RESPONSE in Opposition re 35 MOTION for Summary Judgment With Supporting Memo filed by all plaintiffs. (Formisano, V.) (Entered: 06/30/2008)
45 MOTION to Strike Affidavit of Cort Burke With Supporting Memo by all plaintiffs. Responses due by 7/17/2008 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Formisano, V.) (Entered: 06/30/2008)
46 Joint MOTION for an Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 44 Response in Opposition to Motion, 42 Response to Motion for Summary Judgment; by all parties. Responses due by 7/28/2008 (Moreira, John) (Entered: 07/09/2008)
TEXT ORDER granting 46 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply ( Replies due by 7/31/2008.); − So Ordered by Chief Judge Mary M Lisi on 7/10/08. (Barletta, Barbara) (Entered: 07/10/2008)
47 RESPONSE in Opposition re 45 MOTION to Strike Affidavit of Cort Burke filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Baum, Brenda) SEE Document 48 for corrected Response in Opposition. (Duhamel, John). (Entered: 07/17/2008)
48 CORRECTED RESPONSE in Opposition re 45 MOTION to Strike Affidavit of Cort Burke filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Baum, Brenda) (Entered: 07/17/2008)
49 Assented MOTION for an Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 35 MOTION for Summary Judgment by all defendants. Responses due by 8/18/2008 (Baum, Brenda) (Entered: 07/31/2008)
TEXT ORDER granting 49 Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply re 37 MOTION for Summary Judgment ; Reset Deadlines: Reply due by 8/4/2008− So Ordered by Judge Mary M Lisi on 8/1/08. (Barletta, Barbara) (Entered:

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08/04/2008 08/05/2008
08/18/2008 12/30/2008
12/31/2008
01/23/2009 01/26/2009 01/27/2009 01/27/2009 03/25/2009 02/05/2010 02/05/2010 03/01/2010

08/01/2008)
50 REPLY to Response to Motion re 44 Response in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit M)(Baum, Brenda) (Entered: 08/04/2008)
Motion Forwarded to Chambers 35 MOTION for Summary Judgment, 45 MOTION to Strike Affidavit of Cort Burke, 37 MOTION for Summary Judgment FORWARDED to Chambers of Chief Judge Mary M. Lisi. (Barletta, Barbara) (Entered: 08/05/2008)
51 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 45 Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Cort Burke− So Ordered by Chief Judge Mary M Lisi on 8/18/08. (Barletta, Barbara) (Entered: 08/18/2008)
52 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting Defendants' 35 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying Plaintiffs' 37 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. So Ordered by Chief Judge Mary M. Lisi on 12/30/2008. (Duhamel, John) (Entered: 12/31/2008)
53 JUDGMENT in favor of State of Rhode Island, Steven M. Pare, Thomas Chabot against Abelino M. Urizar, Astrid G. Estrada, Boris Cruz, Carlos E. Tamup, Cruz F. Rivera, Elsa Hernandez Vilavicencio, Guilfredo E. Munoz, Israel Tebalan, Jose Burgos, Jose A. Aquino, Rolando Noriega, Wendy M. Estrada. Entered by Deputy Clerk on 12/31/2008. (Duhamel, John) (Entered: 12/31/2008)
54 NOTICE OF APPEAL by Astrid G. Estrada et al. Appeal Record due by 2/23/2009. (Formisano, V.) (Entered: 01/23/2009)
57 USCA Appeal Fees received $ 455 receipt number 14670000319 re 54 Notice of Appeal filed by Astrid G. Estrada (Farrell Pletcher, Paula) (Entered: 03/25/2009)
55 CLERK'S CERTIFICATE Re: 54 Notice of Appeal filed by Astrid G. Estrada, et al. (Duhamel, John) (Entered: 01/27/2009)
56 Certified and Transmitted Record on Appeal to US Court of Appeals re 54 Notice of Appeal. Forwarded case file; certified docket. (Duhamel, John) (Entered: 01/27/2009)
58 Supplemental Record on Appeal transmitted to US Court of Appeals re 54 Notice of Appeal (Farrell Pletcher, Paula) (Entered: 03/25/2009)
59 SLIP OPINION of USCA as to 54 Notice of Appeal filed by Astrid G. Estrada. (Duhamel, John) (Entered: 02/05/2010)
60 USCA JUDGMENT (entered 2/4/2010) as to 54 Notice of Appeal filed by Astrid G. Estrada. −− The judgment of the district court is affirmed. (Duhamel, John) (Entered: 02/05/2010)
61 MANDATE of USCA (USCA Judgment entered 2/4/20100 as to 54 Notice of Appeal filed by Astrid G. Estrada. −− Judgment of the district court is affirmed. (Duhamel, John) (Entered: 03/01/2010)