Case: 2:18-cv-00115-CMR As of: 01/22/2019 09:20 PM EST 1 of 7
CLOSED,STANDARD
United States District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:18−cv−00115−CMR

HAROLD et al v. RICHARDS et al Assigned to: HONORABLE CYNTHIA M. RUFE Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 01/10/2018 Date Terminated: 09/25/2018 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 950 Other Statutes: Constitutional − State Statute Jurisdiction: Federal Question

RUSSELL HAROLD

represented by ZAK T. GOLDSTEIN Goldstein Mehta LLC 1221 Locust St PHILADELPHIA, PA 19107 267−225−2545 Email: zaktgoldstein@gmail.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

CATHERINE SEVCENKO EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW 4007TH STREET NW, SUITE 602 WASHINGTON, DC 20004 202−643−7227 Email: catherine@equaljusticeunderlaw.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

MARISSA HATTON EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW 400 7TH STREET NW, SUITE 602 WASHINGTON, DC 20004 202−838−6709 Email: mhatton@equaljusticeunderlaw.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

PHIL TELFEYAN EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW 400 7TH STREET NW, SUITE 602 WASHINGTON, DC 20004 202−505−2058 Email: ptelfeyan@equaljusticeunderlaw.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

REBECCA RAMASWAMY EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW 400 7TH STREET NW, SUITE 602 WASHINGTON, DC 20004 202−643−0340 Email: rramaswamy@equaljusticeunderlaw.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
SEAN WILLIAMS ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED

represented by ZAK T. GOLDSTEIN (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

CATHERINE SEVCENKO (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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MARISSA HATTON (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
PHIL TELFEYAN (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
REBECCA RAMASWAMY (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
LESLIE RICHARDS IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION OF THE PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

represented by STEPHEN R. KOVATIS OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL 1600 Arch Street PHILADELPHIA, PA 19103 (215) 560−2940 Fax: (717) 772−4526 Email: skovatis@attorneygeneral.gov TERMINATED: 03/13/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY
A. MICHAEL PRATT PEPPER, HAMILTON & SCHEETZ 18TH & ARCH STS. 3000 TWO LOGAN SQUARE PHILA, PA 19103 215−981−4386 Email: prattam@pepperlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
BARAK BASSMAN PEPPER HAMILTON LLP 3000 TWO LOGAN SQ 18TH & ARCH STS PHILADELPHIA, PA 19103 215−981−4771 Fax: 215−981−4853 Email: bassmanb@pepperlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
HEDYA ARYANI SHOOK, HARDY & BACON L.L.P. TWO COMMERCE SQUARE 2001 MARKET STREET SUITE 3000 PHILADELPHIA, PA 19103−2799 215−981−4011 Email: aryanih@pepperlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
JANINE P. YANIAK PEPPER HAMILTON 3000 TWO LOGAN SQ 18TH & ARCH STS PHILADELPHIA, PA 19103 215−961−4810 Email: yaniakj@pepperlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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JOSEPH ZAFFARESE AHMAD ZAFFARESE LLC ONE SOUTH BROAD ST SUITE 1810 PHILADELPHIA, PA 19107 215−496−9373 Fax: 215−496−9419 Email: jzaffarese@azands.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

KAY KYUNGSUN YU Ahmad Zaffarese LLC One South Broad Street Suite 1810 PHILADELPHIA, PA 19107 215−496−9373 Fax: 215−496−9419 Email: kyu@azlawllc.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
LEO BAGLEY IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF THE PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

represented by STEPHEN R. KOVATIS (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/13/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY
A. MICHAEL PRATT (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

BARAK BASSMAN (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

HEDYA ARYANI (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

JANINE P. YANIAK (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

JOSEPH ZAFFARESE (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

KAY KYUNGSUN YU (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
KURT MYERS IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS DEPUTY SECRETARY FOR DRIVER AND VEHICLE SERVICES OF THE PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

represented by STEPHEN R. KOVATIS (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/13/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY
A. MICHAEL PRATT (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

BARAK BASSMAN (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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HEDYA ARYANI (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

JANINE P. YANIAK (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

JOSEPH ZAFFARESE (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

KAY KYUNGSUN YU (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
TOM WOLF IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS GOVERNOR OF PENNSYLVANIA

represented by STEPHEN R. KOVATIS (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/13/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY

A. MICHAEL PRATT (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

BARAK BASSMAN (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

HEDYA ARYANI (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

JANINE P. YANIAK (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

JOSEPH ZAFFARESE (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

KAY KYUNGSUN YU (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 01/10/2018
01/10/2018 01/10/2018 01/11/2018

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against LEO BAGLEY, KURT MYERS, LESLIE RICHARDS, TOM WOLF ( Filing fee $ 400 receipt number 171681.), filed by RUSSELL HAROLD, SEAN WILLIAMS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Civil Cover Sheet)(jwl, ) (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/11/2018: # 6 Complaint Signature Page) (jwl, ). (Entered: 01/11/2018)
Summons Issued as to LEO BAGLEY, KURT MYERS, LESLIE RICHARDS, TOM WOLF. Four Forwarded To: Counsel on 1/11/18 (jwl, ) (Entered: 01/11/2018)
DEMAND for Trial by Jury by RUSSELL HAROLD, SEAN WILLIAMS. (jwl, ) (Entered: 01/11/2018)
2 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by RUSSELL HAROLD, SEAN WILLIAMS.Motion. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit 4)(GOLDSTEIN, ZAK) (Entered: 01/11/2018)

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01/11/2018 01/11/2018
02/21/2018 02/22/2018 02/26/2018 02/26/2018 02/26/2018 02/26/2018 02/28/2018
02/28/2018
02/28/2018
02/28/2018
03/08/2018 03/08/2018

3 MOTION to Certify Class filed by RUSSELL HAROLD, SEAN WILLIAMS.Motion. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit Exhibit 6)(GOLDSTEIN, ZAK) (Entered: 01/11/2018)
4 ORDER THAT THE ABOVE−CAPTIONED CASE IS REASSIGNED FROM THE CALENDAR OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT F. KELLY TO THE CALENDAR OF THE HONORABLE CYNTHIA M. RUFE. SIGNED BY KATE BARKMAN, CLERK OF COURT ON 1/11/18. 1/12/18 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED AND MAILED TO UNREPRESENTED PARTIES.(kw, ) (Entered: 01/12/2018)
5 NOTICE of Appearance by STEPHEN R. KOVATIS on behalf of LEO BAGLEY, KURT MYERS, LESLIE RICHARDS, TOM WOLF with Certificate of Service(KOVATIS, STEPHEN) (Entered: 02/21/2018)
6 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by SEAN WILLIAMS, RUSSELL HAROLD. Waivers sent to All Defendants on 1/31/2018, answers due 4/2/2018. (GOLDSTEIN, ZAK) Modified on 2/26/2018 (tjd). (Entered: 02/22/2018)
7 First MOTION for Pro Hac Vice Admission of Catherine Sevcenko filed by RUSSELL HAROLD, SEAN WILLIAMS.Application.(GOLDSTEIN, ZAK) (Filing fee paid on 2/27/18) Modified on 2/28/2018 (kw, ). (Entered: 02/26/2018)
8 First MOTION for Pro Hac Vice Admission of Marissa Hatton filed by RUSSELL HAROLD, SEAN WILLIAMS..(GOLDSTEIN, ZAK) (Filing fee paid on 2/27/18) Modified on 2/28/2018 (kw, ). (Entered: 02/26/2018)
9 First MOTION for Pro Hac Vice Admission of Rebecca Ramaswamy filed by RUSSELL HAROLD, SEAN WILLIAMS..(GOLDSTEIN, ZAK) (Filing fee paid on 2/27/18) Modified on 2/28/2018 (kw, ). (Entered: 02/26/2018)
10 First MOTION for Pro Hac Vice Admission of Phil Telfeyan filed by RUSSELL HAROLD, SEAN WILLIAMS..(GOLDSTEIN, ZAK) (Filing fee paid on 2/27/18) Modified on 2/28/2018 (kw, ). (Entered: 02/26/2018)
11 ORDER THAT APPLICATION OF MARISSA HATTON, ESQ., TO PRACTICE IN THIS COURT PURSUANT TO L.R.C.P. 83.5.2(b) IS GRANTED. SIGNED BY HONORABLE CYNTHIA M. RUFE ON 2/28/18.3/1/18 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED AND E−MAILED.(kw, ) (ECF FORM MAILED TO COUNSEL ON 3/1/18) (Entered: 03/01/2018)
12 ORDER THAT APPLICATION OF REBECCA RAMASWAMY, ESQ., TO PRACTICE IN THIS COURT PURSUANT TO L.R.C.P. 83.5.2(b) IS GRANTED. SIGNED BY HONORABLE CYNTHIA M. RUFE ON 2/28/18.3/1/18 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED AND E−MAILED.(kw, ) (ECF FORM MAILED TO COUNSEL ON 3/1/18) (Entered: 03/01/2018)
13 ORDER THAT APPLICATION OF CATHERINE SEVCENKO, ESQ., TO PRACTICE IN THIS COURT PURSUANT TO L.R.C.P. 83.5.2(b) IS GRANTED. SIGNED BY HONORABLE CYNTHIA M. RUFE ON 2/28/18.3/1/18 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED AND E−MAILED.(kw, ) (ECF FORM MAILED TO COUNSEL ON 3/1/18) (Entered: 03/01/2018)
14 ORDER THAT APPLICATION OF PHIL TELFEYAN, ESQ., TO PRACTICE IN THIS COURT PURSUANT TO L.R.C.P. 83.5.2(b) IS GRANTED. SIGNED BY HONORABLE CYNTHIA M. RUFE ON 2/28/18.3/1/18 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED AND E−MAILED.(kw, ) (ECF FORM MAILED TO COUNSEL ON 3/1/18) (Entered: 03/01/2018)
15 NOTICE of Appearance by BARAK BASSMAN on behalf of LEO BAGLEY, KURT MYERS, LESLIE RICHARDS, TOM WOLF with Certificate of Service(BASSMAN, BARAK) (Entered: 03/08/2018)
16 NOTICE of Appearance by HEDYA ARYANI on behalf of LEO BAGLEY, KURT MYERS, LESLIE RICHARDS, TOM WOLF with Certificate of Service(ARYANI, HEDYA) (Entered: 03/08/2018)

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03/08/2018 03/08/2018 03/12/2018
03/13/2018 03/22/2018 03/22/2018 03/27/2018 03/27/2018 03/27/2018 03/29/2018 04/05/2018
04/06/2018 04/16/2018 04/16/2018

17 NOTICE of Appearance by A. MICHAEL PRATT on behalf of LEO BAGLEY, KURT MYERS, LESLIE RICHARDS, TOM WOLF with Certificate of Service(PRATT, A.) (Entered: 03/08/2018)
18 NOTICE of Appearance by JANINE P. YANIAK, ESQ., on behalf of DEFTS LEO BAGLEY, KURT MYERS, LESLIE RICHARDS, TOM WOLF, Certificate of Service. (kw, ) (Entered: 03/09/2018)
19 STIPULATION AND ORDER THAT THE STIPULATIONS ARE APPROVED AS FOLLOWS: DEFTS SHALL RESPOND TO PLFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION NO LATER THAN 3/27/2017 & SHALL RESPOND TO THE COMPLAINT NO LATER THAN 4/16/2018, ETC. SIGNED BY HONORABLE CYNTHIA M. RUFE ON 3/12/18. 3/13/18 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED AND E−MAILED.(kw, ) (Entered: 03/13/2018)
20 NOTICE of Withdrawal of Appearance by STEPHEN R. KOVATIS on behalf of LEO BAGLEY, KURT MYERS, LESLIE RICHARDS, TOM WOLF(KOVATIS, STEPHEN) (Entered: 03/13/2018)
21 NOTICE of Appearance by KAY KYUNGSUN YU on behalf of LEO BAGLEY, KURT MYERS, LESLIE RICHARDS, TOM WOLF with Certificate of Service(YU, KAY) (Entered: 03/22/2018)
22 NOTICE of Appearance by JOSEPH ZAFFARESE on behalf of LEO BAGLEY, KURT MYERS, LESLIE RICHARDS, TOM WOLF with Certificate of Service(ZAFFARESE, JOSEPH) (Entered: 03/22/2018)
23 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery , MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification filed by LEO BAGLEY, KURT MYERS, LESLIE RICHARDS, TOM WOLF.Certificate of Service.(YU, KAY) (Entered: 03/27/2018)
24 Memorandum of Law in Opposition re 2 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by LEO BAGLEY, KURT MYERS, LESLIE RICHARDS, TOM WOLF. (Attachments: # 1 AFFIDAVIT OF KARAN. TEMPLETON, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B)(PRATT, A.) (FILED IN ERROR BY ATTORNEY; ATTORNEY REFILE AS DOCUMENT 25 )Modified on 3/28/2018 (nd, ). (Entered: 03/27/2018)
25 Memorandum OF LAW IN OPPOSITION re 2 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by LEO BAGLEY, KURT MYERS, LESLIE RICHARDS, TOM WOLF. (Attachments: # 1 AFFIDAVIT OF KARAN. TEMPLETON, # 2 A, # 3 B, # 4 C)(PRATT, A.) (Entered: 03/27/2018)
26 RESPONSE in Opposition re 23 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification filed by RUSSELL HAROLD, SEAN WILLIAMS. (HATTON, MARISSA) (Entered: 03/29/2018)
27 ORDER THAT DEFTS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO CONDUCT CLASS DISCOVERY & MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO RESPOND TO PLFFS' MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION [DOC. NO. 23] IS DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. DEFTS SHALL RESPOND TO MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION NO LATER THAN 4/16/2018, ETC. SIGNED BY HONORABLE CYNTHIA M. RUFE ON 4/5/18. 4/5/18 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED AND E−MAILED.(kw, ) (Entered: 04/05/2018)
28 REPLY to Response to Motion re 2 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by RUSSELL HAROLD, SEAN WILLIAMS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(HATTON, MARISSA) (Entered: 04/06/2018)
29 MOTION to Dismiss DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO STRIKE PLAINTIFFS CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT filed by LEO BAGLEY, KURT MYERS, LESLIE RICHARDS, TOM WOLF.Memorandum in Support, Certificate of Service. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(PRATT, A.) (Entered: 04/16/2018)
30 Memorandum of Law in Opposition re 3 MOTION to Certify Class filed by LEO BAGLEY, KURT MYERS, LESLIE RICHARDS, TOM WOLF. (PRATT, A.)

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04/16/2018 04/26/2018 04/30/2018 05/08/2018 05/14/2018 05/25/2018
09/25/2018 09/25/2018

Modified on 4/18/2018 (tjd). (Entered: 04/16/2018)
31 Defendants' Sur−Reply Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction by LEO BAGLEY, KURT MYERS, LESLIE RICHARDS, TOM WOLF. (PRATT, A.) (Entered: 04/16/2018)
32 REPLY to Response to Motion re 3 MOTION to Certify Class filed by RUSSELL HAROLD, SEAN WILLIAMS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit)(HATTON, MARISSA) (Entered: 04/26/2018)
33 RESPONSE in Opposition re 29 MOTION to Dismiss DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO STRIKE PLAINTIFFS CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT filed by RUSSELL HAROLD, SEAN WILLIAMS. (HATTON, MARISSA) (Entered: 04/30/2018)
34 Defendant's Sur−Reply Memorandum of Law in Opposition to 3 Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification. by LEO BAGLEY, KURT MYERS, LESLIE RICHARDS, TOM WOLF. (PRATT, A.) Modified on 5/9/2018 (tjd). (Entered: 05/08/2018)
35 Defendants' Reply Brief in Support of their Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, To Strike Plaintiffs' Class Action Complaint. by LEO BAGLEY, KURT MYERS, LESLIE RICHARDS, TOM WOLF. (PRATT, A.) (Entered: 05/14/2018)
36 Sur−Reply to Motion re 29 MOTION to Dismiss DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO STRIKE PLAINTIFFS CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT Sur−Reply in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss filed by RUSSELL HAROLD, SEAN WILLIAMS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit)(HATTON, MARISSA) Modified on 5/30/2018 (tjd). (Entered: 05/25/2018)
37 MEMORANDUM AND/OR OPINION. SIGNED BY HONORABLE CYNTHIA M. RUFE ON 9/25/18. 9/5/18 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(kw, ) (Entered: 09/25/2018)
38 ORDER THAT DEFTS' MOTION TO DISMISS [DOC. NO. 29] IS GRANTED. THE COMPLAINT IS DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, ETC. PLFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION [DOC. NO. 2] & MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION [DOC. NO. 3] ARE DISMISSED AS MOOT. THE CLERK IS DIRECTED TO CLOSE THIS CASE. SIGNED BY HONORABLE CYNTHIA M. RUFE ON 9/25/18. 9/5/18 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(kw, ) (Entered: 09/25/2018)

 
 Case 2:18-cv-00115-CMR Document 1 Filed 01/10/18 Page 1 of 36

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

__________________________________________

)

RUSSELL HAROLD and SEAN WILLIAMS, )

on behalf of themselves and others similarly

)

situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

Case No.

)

v.

)

CLASS ACTION

)

JURY DEMANDED

LESLIE RICHARDS, in her official capacity as )

Secretary of Transportation of the

)

Pennsylvania Department of Transportation;

)

LEO BAGLEY, in his official capacity as

)

Executive Deputy Secretary of the

)

Pennsylvania Department of Transportation;

)

KURT MYERS, in his official capacity as

)

Deputy Secretary for Driver and Vehicle Services )

of the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, )

TOM WOLF, in his official capacity as

)

Governor of Pennsylvania;

)

)

Defendants.

)

__________________________________________)

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Introduction

1. This case is about the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation operating a

discriminatory driver’s license suspension scheme that imposes additional and counterproductive

punishment on any person convicted of a drug-related offense. The Department of

Transportation automatically suspends the driver’s license of any person convicted of a drug

offense — even where the offense is unrelated to driving — for up to two years, affecting

virtually aspect of their lives and crippling their ability to successfully rehabilitate and care for

their families. For people already facing the harsh realities of living with a criminal conviction,

the ability to find and maintain gainful employment, pursue education, keep medical

1

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appointments, and care for dependent family members is essential to a stable post-conviction life. By imposing additional and debilitating measures against people with drug convictions, Defendants make successful post-conviction rehabilitation a near impossibility.
2. Pennsylvania’s animus toward people with drug convictions is evident: excluding offenses related to traffic safety, drug convictions are the only crimes for which the Department of Transportation suspends the driver’s licenses of adults over 21. See 75 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. § 1532(c). Defendants thus punish people found in possession of a small amount of marijuana (unrelated to driving) as harshly as those who have been convicted of aggravated assault while driving under the influence, vehicular manslaughter, or any other dangerous activity that results in the loss of one’s ability to drive. See 75 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. §§ 1532(a)-(c).
3. Drug convictions, in and of themselves, are wholly unrelated to traffic safety; Pennsylvania’s suspension policy can only be explained as state-sanctioned discrimination on the basis of a particular animus toward people with drug convictions.
4. An overwhelming majority of the states — 38 out of 50 — have abolished their analogous drug-related suspension policies in an effort to ensure successful rehabilitation of former drug offenders. Yet in Pennsylvania, over 149,000 people have lost their licenses due to a drug-related conviction since 2011.
5. Automatic and extended periods of license suspension for individuals who pose no demonstrated risk to traffic safety is irrational, counterproductive, and discriminatory. License suspension burdens virtually every aspect of a person’s life while undercutting the state’s interests in rehabilitation and decreasing recidivism. By and through their attorneys, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendants in their official capacities as officers of the Commonwealth of
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Pennsylvania and the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation to end this unconstitutional

license suspension scheme because it violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of

the United States Constitution.

Nature of the Action1

6. The Department of Transportation, at the direction of, or by and through

Defendants, automatically suspends the driver’s licenses of people who are convicted of “any

offense involving the possession, sale, delivery, offering for sale, holding for sale, or giving

away of any controlled substance” under Pennsylvania law, federal law, or the law of any other

state, regardless of whether the offense involved a vehicle or traffic safety or whether the offense

is considered a crime at all in Pennsylvania. 75 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. § 1532(c).

7. Defendants violate Plaintiffs’ equal protection rights because the state’s

suspension scheme lacks any rational basis and can be explained solely as animus against a

disfavored class of persons: people with drug convictions. On its face, § 1532(c) distinguishes

between those convicted of drug offenses and all other criminal offenders, targeting the former

for additional punishment. Automatically suspending the driver’s licenses of people who have

been convicted of drug offenses — and already punished by a criminal sentencing court —

satisfies no legitimate government interest and is in fact counterproductive.

8. Defendants violate Plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights because they have a

property interest in their drivers’ licenses that may not be deprived without due process of law.

By creating an irrebuttable presumption against people with drug convictions — and

automatically depriving them of their liberty and property interests without any process

1 Where not cited, Plaintiffs make the allegations in this Complaint based on personal knowledge as to matters in which they have had personal involvement, and information and belief as to all other matters.
3

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whatsoever — Defendants violate Plaintiff’s procedural due process rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
9. Defendants violate Plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights because they have a fundamental right to both interstate and intrastate, or local, travel. Without meaningful alternatives to driving, a license suspension’s broad prohibition on all driving under all circumstances deprives people of their fundamental rights without being narrowly tailored to a significant government interest.
Jurisdiction and Venue 10. This is a civil rights action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201, et seq., and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. 11. Venue in this Court is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
Parties 12. Russell Harold Jr. is a 52-year-old resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Mr. Harold has a disability and lives with his father. He is the father of six children and grandfather of nine grandchildren. His license is suspended under § 1532(c) until approximately October of 2019. 13. Sean Williams is a 25-year-old resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He lives with his grandmother and is the father of a newborn son. His license is suspended under § 1532(c) until March of 2019. 14. Defendant Tom Wolf is the Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 15. As Governor, Mr. Wolf is the head of the executive branch of the Pennsylvania state government and is responsible for enforcing state law. He oversees and is responsible for
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the Secretary of the Department of Transportation as one of his executive cabinet members. Mr. Wolf is sued in his official capacity as the Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
16. Defendant Leslie Richards is the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (“PennDOT”).
17. Defendant Leslie Richards oversees and is ultimately responsible for all actions of PennDOT, which has exclusive authority to suspend or revoke driver’s licenses for drug convictions. See 75 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. §§ 102 and 1532. Ms. Richards is sued in her official capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Transportation.
18. Defendant Leo Bagley is the Executive Deputy Secretary of the Department of Transportation.
19. Mr. Bagley oversees and is responsible for the administration of PennDOT’s five lower departments, including Driver and Vehicle Services. Transportation Organizational Chart, Pennsylvania Office of Administration (Dec. 19, 2017).2 Mr. Bagley is sued in his official capacity as Executive Deputy Secretary of the Department of Transportation.
20. Defendant Kurt Myers is the Deputy Secretary for Driver and Vehicle Services of the Department of Transportation.
21. Mr. Myers oversees and is responsible for the actions of the Bureau of Driver Licensing, which includes the Driver License Division, the Driver Safety Division, and the License Control Division. Id. As Deputy Secretary for Driver and Vehicle Services, he “is responsible for the regulatory oversight of 97 facilities across the commonwealth that issue driver’s licenses.” Deputy Secretary for Driver and Vehicle Services, Pennsylvania Department
2 http://www.oa.pa.gov/Policies/Documents/Transportation.pdf
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of Transportation (last visited Jan. 3, 2018).3 Mr. Myers is sued in his official capacity as the Deputy Secretary for Driver and Vehicle Services of the Department of Transportation.
22. At all times relevant to the events, acts, and/or omissions alleged in this Complaint, Defendants have acted under color of state law, pursuant to their authority and responsibilities as officials of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
Factual Allegations 23. The State of Pennsylvania enforces, through state officials of the Department of Transportation, suspensions of driver’s licenses for any person convicted of possession, sale, delivery, offering for sale, holding for sale, or giving away of any controlled substance under the law of any jurisdiction, even when that conviction has no relation to traffic safety whatsoever, or is not even considered a criminal offense in Pennsylvania. 75 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. § 1532(c). 24. This targeted punishment is inflicted automatically in addition to the sentence already deemed appropriate and imposed through criminal adjudication of the underlying drug offense. 25. The clerk of the convicting court automatically notifies PennDOT of each drug conviction by sending a notification form to PennDOT’s Bureau of Driver Licensing. 26. Defendants do not credit time to an offender’s suspension period immediately upon suspension of a license; although it is illegal for them to drive at any point after a license suspension, people with drug convictions will not earn any credit toward their suspension period until they have surrendered their physical license and an affidavit to PennDOT.
3http://www.penndot.gov/aboutus/DepartmentExecutives/Pages/DeputySecretaryforDriverandVehicleServices.aspx
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27. To reinstate a suspended license, Defendants require people with suspended licenses to pay a restoration fee. As of September 2017, the restoration fee is $73, but is “subject to change” at PennDOT’s discretion. Ex. 1, PennDOT Letter to Sean Williams, p. 2.
28. Between 2011 and 2016, Pennsylvania suspended the licenses of nearly 149,000 drivers for drug convictions unrelated to traffic safety.
29. On information and belief, thousands of people in Pennsylvania currently have a suspended license for a drug-related conviction.
30. Defendants’ license suspension scheme is problematic not only for how it burdens, but whom it burdens. Pennsylvania’s impoverished neighborhoods and predominantly Black neighborhoods are more likely to be policed than affluent or white ones, and Black Pennsylvanians are more likely to be stopped, frisked, and arrested for drug possession than any other group. Instead of operating a scheme that targets dangerous drivers, Defendants’ scheme is based on drug convictions — a measure that disproportionately represents people living in poor or predominantly Black neighborhoods, thus disrupting family life and making employment, healthcare, and education substantially more difficult to access for a particular subset of targeted people.
31. Levying additional punishments against offenders who have already been sentenced by a court of law is irrational — license suspension only hinders former drug offenders from finding and maintaining lawful work, obtaining necessary medical care, supporting dependent relatives, and maintaining stabilizing social connections while dealing with the fallout of a drug conviction.
A. Plaintiffs’ Suspensions for Minor Drug Offenses Are Driving Them Further into Poverty, Preventing Them from Caring for Their Families, and Undermining Pennsylvania’s Interest in Having Working, Productive Citizens
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32. Plaintiffs are former drug offenders who have had their licenses automatically suspended until 2019 for drug-related convictions.
i. Russell Harold 33. Russell Harold is a 52-year-old resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Ex. 2, Harold Decl. 34. In 2017, Mr. Harold was found in possession of a small amount of marijuana and Xanax. Because he had two prior convictions over the span of his lifetime — including a conviction occurring thirty years ago, in 1988 — Mr. Harold lost his license for two years, a punishment that will endure until late 2019. 35. At the time of Mr. Harold’s first conviction, his offense was not punishable by automatic license suspension. Regardless, his current license suspension has been increased by a year as retroactive punishment for that offense, which occurred three decades ago before the license suspension law existed. 36. Mr. Harold’s conviction was unrelated to traffic safety and did not involve an automobile of any kind. 37. Mr. Harold has a diagnosed disability. His disability, along with other medical issues, requires him to see a doctor several times a month. 38. As a result of his license suspension and unreliable public transportation, Mr. Harold has missed several of his doctor’s appointments since his license was suspended. Mr. Harold’s disability has been exacerbated by his license suspension, making it difficult for him to schedule and attend new doctor’s appointments. He feels confined to his home and unable to properly care for himself.
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39. Despite his disability, Mr. Harold started his own home cleaning business and operated it successfully for over six years, using his personal vehicle for transportation to and from clients’ homes.
40. Because of his license suspension, Mr. Harold can no longer operate his cleaning business on his own; he can only work if his clients agree to transport him and his cleaning supplies to and from their houses. Mr. Harold has had to sleep at his clients’ homes when they could not bring him back the same day.
41. Many of Mr. Harold’s former clients are inaccessible by public transportation and unwilling to pick him up and drop him off each time their home needs to be cleaned. As a result, Mr. Harold has lost a substantial amount of business and income.
42. When Mr. Harold had a valid license, he made approximately $700 a week cleaning homes. Now that his license is suspended, if Mr. Harold can find work, he makes no more than $200 a week.
43. Mr. Harold often goes weeks without any work at all. 44. Mr. Harold is actively seeking work to support himself after the loss of his license. Because he cannot drive to look for work, he looks for jobs online and subscribes to text message notifications for job openings. 45. Mr. Harold has seen many job openings that he wants to pursue, but he cannot apply to them solely because he has no driver’s license. Mr. Harold has been forced to forgo several job opportunities that require driving, that are inaccessible by public transportation, or that require working hours outside public transportation’s operating hours. 46. Despite his best efforts, Mr. Harold has been unable to find a job since the loss of his license.
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47. Mr. Harold’s girlfriend has a medical condition in her eyes that requires frequent medical treatment. Because her treatments affect her ability to see, she cannot drive home from the doctor.
48. Now that Mr. Harold’s license is suspended, he cannot take care of his girlfriend by driving her to and from the doctor. Instead, all he can do is escort her home on public transportation because she is unable to see.
49. Mr. Harold is the father of six children and the grandfather of nine grandchildren. He cherishes time with his family, and when he had a driver’s license he saw his family members on a regular basis.
50. Mr. Harold’s children and grandchildren live outside of Philadelphia, inaccessible by public transportation.
51. Because of his license suspension, Mr. Harold has gone months without seeing his family.
ii. Sean Williams 52. Sean Williams is a 25-year-old resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Ex. 3, Williams Decl. 53. Mr. Williams is stopped and frisked nearly every time he leaves his home in west Philadelphia. 54. He has only been arrested three times, each in 2017 for marijuana-related offenses. Mr. Williams was found in possession of only small, personal amounts of marijuana each time. 55. As a result of his convictions, Mr. Williams’ license is suspended until March 2019.
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56. At the time of his suspension, Mr. Williams had been driving on a learner’s permit for approximately two years.
57. Mr. Williams’ permit is no longer valid as a result of his suspension. When his suspension period ends, he will have to complete the permitting process again — this includes paying additional fees, taking a written test, and paying for a doctor’s visit for a full physical exam.
58. None of Mr. Williams’ convictions were related to traffic safety or even involved an automobile. In fact, Mr. Williams has never been cited for a traffic- or car-related infraction of any kind. He has a perfect driving record.
59. Mr. Williams is looking for work to support himself and his newborn son. He cannot drive to look for jobs, but he searches for opportunities online.
60. Mr. Williams has seen many job openings that he wants to pursue, but he cannot apply solely because he cannot drive. Because of his driving suspension, Mr. Williams has been unable to apply for otherwise available jobs that require driving, that are inaccessible by public transportation, or that require working hours outside public transportation’s operating hours.
61. Mr. Williams was sentenced to probation for his drug-related offenses and must take public transportation to meet with his probation officer each month. Due to unexpected delays in public transportation, Mr. Williams has been late to meet with his probation officer several times, jeopardizing his probation status.
62. Mr. Williams lives with his grandmother, and he is her primary caretaker. Mr. Williams’ grandmother has Lupus disease, arthritis, and an eye condition that makes it difficult for her to see. She must see a doctor three to four times a month, and sometimes more often.
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63. When Mr. Williams had his permit, he drove his grandmother to and from her daily activities, including her doctor’s appointments.
64. Because of Mr. Williams’ driving suspension, his grandmother must now walk or take public transportation to her doctor’s appointments, despite the fact that she experiences difficulty with her eyesight and is often in severe pain.
65. Mr. Williams’ first child, a son, was born prematurely in April 2017. 66. Mr. Williams’ son has been in intensive care at the hospital for the past eight months. Mr. Williams takes public transportation every day to see him. 67. Mr. Williams’ son is coming home from the hospital soon. As a premature infant he will require frequent medical appointments, and because of his vulnerability, public transportation poses a hazard to his health. 68. Because Mr. Williams cannot drive, he will be unable to take his son to necessary doctor’s appointments or to visit family members. 69. If an emergency occurs with Mr. Williams’ son, he will be unable to drive him to seek emergency medical help. B. Pennsylvania Runs an Irrational License Suspension Scheme that Increases
the Chances of Recidivism and Inflicts Additional Hardships on Those Who Have Already Been Sentenced 70. A valid driver’s license is essential for people to secure and maintain employment, and the loss of a license often results in further financial hardship for individuals and their families. License suspension drastically lowers the chance of a person’s successful reintegration into society; indeed, it undercuts the state’s interest in preventing recidivism. 71. Research has consistently found that having a driver’s license can be necessary to maintain a job, pursue educational opportunities, and care for children and dependent relatives.
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See “Letter to Colleague” from Vanita Gupta & Lisa Foster, U.S. Department of Justice (Mar. 14, 2016).4
72. License suspension exacerbates poverty, trapping low-income people in an inescapable cycle: not only is loss of a license a direct barrier to finding employment, but many employers require the possession of a valid driver’s license before hiring in the first place. Alana Semuels, “No Driver’s License, No Job,” The Atlantic (June 15, 2016).5 A valid driver’s license is also essential to maintaining employment if it can be secured. Id.
73. Indeed, a rigorous study of New Jersey drivers found 42% of drivers lost their jobs after their driving abilities were suspended. Jon A. Carnegie, Ian M. Voorhees Transportation Center, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, Driver’s License Suspensions, Impacts and Fairness Study 56 (2007).6
74. Of those drivers, 45% were unable to find new employment. Id. 75. Not only do people often struggle to overcome past drug convictions when seeking work, but people like Mr. Harold — who has lost most of his work with the loss of his license — and Mr. Williams — who has been unable to find lawful employment without a license — face the prospect of extended and virtually inescapable unemployment as a result of Defendants’ license suspension scheme. 76. Ranking 38th out of the 50 states, Pennsylvania has one of the highest levels of unemployment in the country. “Unemployment Rates for States, Seasonally Adjusted,” U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.7
4 https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/832461/download 5 https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/06/no-drivers-license-no-job/486653 6 http://www.nj.gov/transportation/refdata/research/reports/FHWA-NJ-2007-020-V1.pdf 7 https://www.bls.gov/web/laus/laumstrk.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2017)
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77. Unemployment can, and often does, lead to recidivism — numerous studies show that obtaining and maintaining stable employment after a drug conviction is critical to successful social reentry. See, e.g., Mark Berg & Beth Huebner, Reentry and the Ties that Bind: An Examination of Social Ties, Employment and Recidivism, 28 Just. Q. 382 (2011).8
78. By making employment opportunities harder to access and maintain, license suspensions create economic uncertainty, increasing the chances of recidivism and decreasing the chances of successful social reentry. Former drug offenders with little to no chance of obtaining legal employment are often vulnerable to drug use and drug-related forms of economic survival. Ex. 4, Henin Decl., ¶ 11. On the other hand, dependable employment is a critically important tool for preventing this phenomenon.
79. Indeed, a five-year study conducted by Indiana’s Department of Corrections found that “post-release employment was the most important predictor of recidivism among drug offenders. In other words, drug offenders would likely become recidivists if they were unemployed after release from prison.” John M. Nally et al., Post-Release Recidivism and Employment among Different Types of Released Offenders: A 5-Year Follow-up Study in the United States, 9 Int’l J. Crim. Just. Sci. 16, 27 (2014).9
80. License suspension imposes a barrier to law-abiding behavior when it is needed the most: after a conviction, individuals placed on probation have a multitude of court-ordered obligations and constraints (critical to their post-conviction success) that become significantly more burdensome without reliable transportation.
81. Individuals on probation are required to report to their probation officer at regular intervals (or upon immediate request), and proof of a rigorous effort to secure and maintain
8 http://www.pacific-gateway.org/reentry,%20employment%20and%20recidivism.pdf 9 http://www.sascv.org/ijcjs/pdfs/nallyetalijcjs2014vol9issue1.pdf
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stable employment is a condition of probation throughout Pennsylvania. Failure to comply with these conditions can lead to arrest and incarceration. See, e.g., First Judicial Dist. of Pa., Adult Probation and Parole Department, Rules of Probation & Parole;10 see also Fifth Judicial Dist. of Pa., Adult Probation Rules;11 Montgomery County Adult Probation and Parole Department, Rules and Conditions Governing Probation/Parole and Intermediate Punishment.12
82. Thus, license suspension for former drug offenders creates a vicious cycle: a conviction automatically results in license suspension, which creates barriers to employment and probation compliance, which puts individuals at risk of incarceration and/or continued entanglement with the criminal justice system.
83. License suspension strips people with drug convictions of their ability to maintain important family ties and provide for their dependent family members. Numerous studies show that family ties deter recidivism by insulating former offenders from criminal influences and providing a sense of identity grounded in responsibility and law-abiding behavior. See, e.g., Mark Berg & Beth Huebner, Reentry and the Ties that Bind: An Examination of Social Ties, Employment and Recidivism, 28 Just. Q. 382 (2011).13
84. Former offenders like Mr. Harold and Mr. Williams are deprived of crucial postconviction stability when license suspension prevents them from seeing their families. For someone like Mr. Williams, who just became a father to a vulnerable infant, license suspension is particularly damaging as it prevents him from properly caring for his son and deprives him of a new and potentially stabilizing identity — being a reliable father.
10 http://www.appa-net.org/psn/docs/Phila_PP_Rules.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2017) 11 https://www.alleghenycourts.us/criminal/adult_probation/rules.aspx (last visited Sept. 22, 2017) 12 http://www.montcopa.org/DocumentCenter/View/721 (last visited Sept. 22, 2017) 13 http://www.pacific-gateway.org/reentry,%20employment%20and%20recidivism.pdf
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85. Because of the hardship of living without reliable transportation, it is estimated that 75% of those with suspended licenses break the law and continue to drive. American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, Suspended and Revoked Drivers Working Group, Best Practices 2013, p. 4.14
86. In Pennsylvania, individuals who drive with suspended licenses subject themselves to the possibility of a summary offense conviction, a $200 fine, and an additional year of license suspension. 75 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. §§ 1543(a) and 1543(c)(1).
87. Trapping people with drug convictions in a cycle of economic hardship, possible traffic-related infractions, and possible incarceration does not serve societal or government interests; instead, it simply hinders those attempting to reform their lives and increases the chances of recidivism.
C. Pennsylvania’s Irrational Drug-Related License Suspension Scheme Violates Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Rights
88. On its face, § 1532(c) distinguishes between those convicted of drug offenses and all other criminal offenders, singling out people with drug convictions for additional punishment.
89. In contrast, Pennsylvania does not suspend licenses for numerous offenses that pose a demonstrated threat to traffic safety, or for convictions that might indicate a proclivity for unsafe driving — such as public intoxication, speeding, failing to properly secure a child in a car seat, texting and driving, or failing to yield to a pedestrian.
90. Our criminal justice system should not target certain offenders to set them up for failure — but that is exactly what license suspension for a drug conviction does. Defendants’ scheme is irrational, counterproductive, and discriminatory.
14 http://www.aamva.org/Suspended-and-Revoked-Drivers-Working-Group/
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91. Pennsylvania’s practice is not rationally related to any legitimate government goal and serves no discernible government interests other than those motivated by bias. As a counterproductive relic of the failed war on drugs, Pennsylvania’s license suspension scheme discriminates against former drug offenders in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
i. Defendants’ License Suspension Scheme is Not Rationally Related to Any Legitimate State Interest
92. Defendants’ practice of singling out those convicted of drug-related offenses is an attempt to punish drug offenders beyond their lawful sentence and to burden virtually every aspect of their lives. Drug convictions in and of themselves are unrelated to traffic safety; Pennsylvania’s suspension policy can only be explained as state-sanctioned discrimination on the basis of a particular animus toward people with drug convictions.
93. Pennsylvania’s classification against those with drug convictions is unrelated to traffic safety bears no rational relationship to any legitimate state objective and is indeed counterproductive.
94. Suspension of a driver’s license for a non-traffic-related drug offense does nothing to advance the government goal of crime reduction. License suspensions create barriers to life necessities and rehabilitative opportunities, increasing a person’s likelihood of violating probation, recidivating, or breaking the law by driving on a suspended license. By stripping former offenders of meaningful opportunities, license suspension can increase involvement with the criminal justice system, increases the risk of recidivism, and undermines the substantial government goal of reducing crime. Ex. 4, Henin Decl., ¶ 5–6, 10.
95. Suspension of a driver’s license for a non-traffic-related drug offense does nothing to advance the government goal of deterrence. Ex. 4, Henin Decl., ¶¶ 7–9 (stating public defenders in Philadelphia “have noticed no decrease in the frequency or severity of drug-related
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arrests and convictions” since the Philadelphia courts began enforcing the drug suspension law). Imposing driving penalties for non-driving-related offenses does nothing to deter involvement with illegal drugs; indeed, the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators has found that “there is no evidence which indicates that suspending a person’s driving privileges for social non-conformance reasons is effective in gaining compliance with the reason for the original nondriving suspension.” American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, Suspended and Revoked Drivers Working Group, Best Practices 2013, p. 4.15
96. Moreover, retributive and deterrent government interests do not justify the Department of Transportation’s discriminatory scheme, as those interests must be — and indeed already are — properly addressed by the criminal court that handles drug offender sentencing.
97. Suspension of a driver’s license for a non-traffic related drug offense does nothing to advance a government interest in traffic safety. Because Defendants suspend licenses for offenses completely unrelated to traffic safety, their punitive scheme targets safe drivers like Mr. Williams — who has never been cited for a traffic-related offense of any kind — without improving road safety in any way.
98. Automatic license suspensions for drug offenses may actually jeopardize public safety. Safe drivers with suspended licenses often drive out of necessity even while their licenses remain suspended, requiring law enforcement to devote time to policing noncompliance rather than focusing on legitimate threats to traffic safety. A study of license suspensions and law enforcement conducted in Pennsylvania and seven other states found that “less traffic enforcement of highway safety violations occur[s] as suspensions for social non-compliance increase.” American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, Suspended and Revoked Drivers Working Group, Best Practices 2013, p. 9.
15 http://www.aamva.org/Suspended-and-Revoked-Drivers-Working-Group/
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99. Indeed, the study of suspended and revoked driver’s licenses in Pennsylvania found “[t]here is significant and increasing frustration in the law enforcement community as a result of the increased administrative workload and time and energy required for non-driving related offenses,” suggesting that non-traffic related license suspension burdens public safety resources rather than increases public safety. Id. at 13.
100. Defendants’ scheme is counterproductive and serves no legitimate state interest: increasing unemployment for those attempting to rebuild their lives after a drug conviction is not a legitimate state interest; preventing former drug offenders from obtaining lawful work is not a legitimate state interest; creating economic barriers for those most likely to be found in possession of drugs — those who are disproportionately targeted by law enforcement for minor drug crimes — is not a legitimate state interest.
101. Preventing people with drug convictions from obtaining or continuing to work in lawful occupations is unreasonable and does nothing to deter drug crime. In fact, erecting barriers to lawful employment may incentivize drug-related forms of economic survival taken out of necessity. Ex. 4, Henin Decl., ¶ 11.
102. Defendants’ targeting of drug offenders is an impermissibly broad classification that violates equal protection. There is nothing to suggest that drug offenders pose a greater risk to road safety than any other person with a criminal conviction, or for that matter, any other person in the general population. By arbitrarily expanding license suspension to affect drug offenders — who pose no verified risk to traffic safety greater than any other driver — Defendants create an over-inclusive classification in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
103. A classification that is over-inclusive undercuts any government claim that the classification is rationally related to the state’s interests.
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104. Any rational basis proffered for license suspension on the basis of deterrence or punishment for drug-related behavior is severely undercut by Pennsylvania’s suspension of licenses for convictions involving substances not criminalized or controlled by the state of Pennsylvania. See 75 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. § 1532(c). The state cannot claim deterrence as a justification for suspending licenses for convictions involving a substance that the State itself does not regard as illegal. It is logically impossible for Pennsylvania to assert as a legitimate state goal the deterrence of crimes which it has shown no interest in deterring or punishing.
105. All conceivable rational justifications for Pennsylvania’s discrimination against drug offenders are foreclosed; instead, Defendants’ license suspension scheme is a discriminatory and irrational measure that does nothing more than undermine former drug offenders trying to rebuild their lives.
a. Defendants’ License Suspension Scheme Discriminates Against People Who Are Unpopular Rather Than a Threat to Traffic Safety
106. The Equal Protection Clause requires states to refrain from classifications that are “arbitrary or irrational” or that are predicated on prejudice against a politically unpopular group. New Directions Treatment Serv. v. City of Reading, 490 F.3d 293, 301 (3rd Cir. 2007). Defendants’ practice of targeting any person convicted of a drug-related offense for license suspension is the result of a classification policy predicated on bias, enacted at the height of the country’s “war on drugs.”
107. In the early 1990s, Congress passed a series of bills threatening to withhold highway funding from any state that did not suspend licenses for certain non-traffic-related offenses. See Rebecca Beitsch, States Reconsider Driver’s License Suspensions for People with
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Drug Convictions, Pew Charitable Trusts Research & Analysis (Jan. 31, 2017).16 Pennsylvania’s practice of suspending licenses for drug convictions immediately followed. See Act No. 1993 — 33, S.B. No. 970 Vehicles, 177th Regular Session of the General Assembly, 1993 Pa. Legis. Serv. Act 1993-33 (S.B. 90).
108. This federal requirement was motivated by animus toward low-level drug offenders. When the first version of this eventual bill was introduced in the United States Congress, sponsoring Senator Frank Lautenberg lamented that “[too] few casual drug users will ever see the inside of a jail cell.” Drug Offender’s Driving Privileges Suspension Act of 1989: Hearing on S. 1804 Before the Subcomm. on Water Res., Transp., and Infrastructure of the S. Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works, S. Hrg. 101-472, 101 Cong. 2 (1989). Representative Gerald Solomon described casual drug users with loathing, and he claimed that “jail[ing] — and in some cases even execut[ing] — those involved in the sale of drugs” was “not enough.” Only “[t]aking away driver’s licenses in an automobile-oriented society will show that we are serious.” Id. at 12–13.
109. An overwhelming majority of the states — 38 out of 50 — have since abolished their drug-related suspension policies in an effort to ensure successful rehabilitation of former drug offenders. See Rebecca Beitsch, States Reconsider Driver’s License Suspensions for People with Drug Convictions, Pew Charitable Trusts Research & Analysis (Jan. 31, 2017).17
110. By contrast, Pennsylvania not only adopted Congress’ discriminatory policy against drug offenders, but has renewed it at each opportunity for over two decades. See, e.g., 178th Regular Session of the General Assembly, 1994 Pa. Legis. Serv. Act 1994-143 (S.B. 143);
16http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2017/01/31/states-reconsider-driverslicense-suspensions-for-people-with-drug-convictions 17http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2017/01/31/states-reconsider-driverslicense-suspensions-for-people-with-drug-convictions
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see also 182nd Regular Session of the General Assembly, 1998 Pa. Legis. Serv. Act 1998-151 (H.B. 433); 183rd Regular Session of the General Assembly, 1999 Pa. Legis. Serv. Act 1999-23 (H.B. 10); 185th Regular Session of the General Assembly, 2002 Pa. Legis. Serv. Act 2002-114 (H.B. 2164); 187th Regular Session of the General Assembly, 2003 Pa. Legis. Serv. Act 2003-24 (S.B. 8); 188th Regular Session of the General Assembly, 2004 Pa. Legis. Serv. Act 2004-237 (H.B. 2873).
111. Pennsylvania’s animus toward drug offenders is evident in its continued renewal of the drug suspension law, even while most states abolish their discriminatory practice. During one legislative session, Pennsylvanian Senator Michael O’Pake described the vindictive purpose of § 1532’s suspension power as one that allowed the legislature to “[h]it them where it hurts, and that is their ability to drive a vehicle[.]” Pennsylvania Senate Regular Session, PA S. Jour., 199 Reg. Sess. No. 27, 183rd General Assembly (May 4, 1999) (statement of Senator Michael O’Pake).
112. Pennsylvania’s animus toward drug offenders is evident when assessing the pattern of how, and upon whom, the state’s license suspension power is used.
113. In many instances, Defendants suspend licenses for offenses that pose a serious threat to traffic safety, and even to human life, for periods equal to or shorter than those to which drug offenders are subjected.
114. For instance, first-time drug offenders will have their licenses suspended for the same amount of time as a person convicted of reckless driving, driving without lights on to avoid identification or arrest, or racing on highways. See 75 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. § 1532(b)(1).
115. A person who has two or three drug convictions, even if they span a period of thirty years, will have their license suspended for the same or a longer period of time than
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someone convicted of vehicular aggravated assault while driving under the influence, causing death or bodily injury while not licensed to drive, or committing a hit-and-run that results in death. See 75 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. § 1532(a)(3).
116. Pennsylvania’s practice of suspending licenses for drug offenses that do not threaten public safety, while permitting the same or more lenient treatment for offenses that imperil lives and public safety, is irrational and can only be explained as motivated by animus.
117. Pennsylvania uses its license suspension power specifically to target and punish drug offenders on the basis of prejudice against an unpopular group.
ii. Defendants’ Arbitrary Classification Captures a Group of People Not Rationally Related to State Interests, Exacerbating Economic and Racial Disparities
118. Defendants’ license suspension scheme is unconstitutional because it discriminates against people with drug convictions without any rational connection to legitimate state interests. The irrationality of Defendants’ scheme is demonstrated by the eligibility criterion used by Pennsylvania for suspensions — a drug conviction — which is not logically connected to state interests in driving regulation, and that perpetuates economic and racial disparities. While Plaintiffs do not challenge the license suspension scheme as racially discriminatory, they highlight the irrational nature of Defendants’ scheme through its reliance on a racially and economically skewed measure.
119. Nothing suggests that people with drug-related convictions pose a danger to traffic safety more than any other lawbreaker or any other person on the road — indeed, people with drug-related convictions do not necessarily even break the law more than any other person on the road. Because certain neighborhoods experience greater police presence than others, people living in poor or predominantly Black neighborhoods are more likely to be stopped, more likely to be found in possession of drugs, and more likely to be convicted of a drug-related
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offense — despite equivalent drug usage rates across people of all races for substances like marijuana. Cannabis Crackdown Report, ACLU of Pennsylvania (2017);18 see also Ex. 4, Henin Decl., ¶¶ 12–14.
120. Thus, the triggering event that Pennsylvania stakes its license suspension scheme on — a drug conviction — is inherently flawed. In the same way it does not necessarily capture those who pose a threat to public safety, it does not necessarily capture those who most often possess drugs or engage in unlawful behavior. Instead, it captures impoverished persons and racial minorities at a disproportionate rate.
121. Individuals living in poverty face a far greater risk of being fined, arrested, and targeted for minor drug crimes than other members of society. Karen Dolan & Judy Carr, The Poor Get Prison, Institute for Policy Studies 6 (2015).19
122. To compound this phenomenon, the racial wealth gap in Pennsylvania is one of the most drastic in the nation: the average Black Philadelphian lives in a neighborhood with a poverty rate of 24.8%, compared to an average neighborhood poverty rate of 8.4% for Whites. John Logan, Separate and Unequal: The Neighborhood Gap for Blacks, Hispanics and Asians in Metropolitan America, Brown University, p. 7 (2011).20 The racial wealth gap is not limited to Philadelphia; such inequality is found throughout the entire state.
123. In 2016, Black Philadelphians were 3.6 times more likely to be arrested for marijuana possession than white Philadelphians, despite equivalent usage rates across both populations. Cannabis Crackdown Report, ACLU of Pennsylvania (2017).21
18 https://www.aclupa.org/issues/criminaljustice/cannabis-crackdown/ 19 http://www.ips-dc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/IPS-The-Poor-Get-Prison-Final.pdf 20 https://s4.ad.brown.edu/Projects/Diversity/projects/authors_su.htm 21 https://www.aclupa.org/issues/criminaljustice/cannabis-crackdown/
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124. Across the entire state of Pennsylvania, data from 2010 to 2016 shows that Black adults are 6.1 times more likely to be arrested for marijuana offenses than Whites. Id.
125. Pennsylvania’s drug suspension scheme lacks a rational connection to legitimate state interests. Even worse, it does so using drug convictions as a triggering event, arbitrarily isolating a group of people that do not necessarily pose a risk to road safety or break the law more often than others. Pennsylvania’s scheme of targeting people with drug convictions for license suspension not only lacks any rational basis — it is based on a determination that has been filtered through systemic discrimination rather than one that captures unsafe drivers.
126. Defendants’ license suspension scheme is problematic because it discriminates against people with drug convictions in a way that is irrational and in fact counterproductive. Plaintiffs do not challenge the license suspension scheme as race-based discrimination; they do, however, note that the irrationality of Defendants’ scheme is underscored by its reliance on a functionally arbitrary and racially skewed measure.
D. Defendants’ Practice of Automatically Suspending the Driver’s License of Anyone with a Drug Conviction Violates Plaintiffs’ Procedural Due Process Rights
127. Plaintiffs have a property interest in their drivers’ licenses that may not be deprived without due process of law. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971). The Department of Transportation automatically deprives any person with a drug conviction of their property interest in their license without providing any process whatsoever — highlighting the irrationality and prejudice of Defendants’ scheme.
128. Defendants’ scheme cannot be logically justified by any state interest, because the state makes no attempt to determine which people with drug convictions fit criteria related to the state’s interest in regulating driving. Instead, the license suspension statute impermissibly
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creates an irrebuttable presumption that people with drug convictions meet some sort of unspoken criteria for license suspension that furthers the state’s interest.
129. For instance, if the state’s interest is in keeping dangerous drivers off the road, § 1532(c) creates an irrebuttable presumption that anyone convicted of a drug offense is an unsafe driver. Because the state provides no due process when making this determination, people with drug convictions are deprived of their liberty and property interests with no reasonable opportunity to show that their conviction was unrelated to traffic safety, that they have never driven under the influence, or that they pose no danger to traffic safety.
130. Whatever the state’s asserted interests in regulating driver’s licenses, drug convictions are an impermissible proxy for automatically determining deprivation of a license. Drug-related convictions, in and of themselves, have no relation to traffic safety. By creating an irrebuttable presumption against people with drug convictions — and automatically depriving them of their liberty and property interests without any process whatsoever — Defendants violate Plaintiff’s procedural due process rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
E. Defendants’ Debilitating License Suspension Scheme Violates Plaintiffs’ Substantive Due Process Rights Because It Deprives Them of Their Fundamental Right to Travel
131. Plaintiffs have a fundamental substantive due process right to local travel. Lutz v. City of York, Pa., 899 F.2d 255, 268 (3rd Cir. 1990) (holding that the Due Process Clause encompasses “the right to move freely about one’s neighborhood or town, even by automobile” as a fundamental right).
132. Plaintiffs have had virtually every aspect of their lives affected by license suspension: they have been deprived of their ability to reliably travel by automobile to make doctor’s appointments, care for loved ones, engage in previously-held lawful employment, attend
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court-ordered appointments, see their family members, or run errands and go about their daily activities in their neighborhood or town.
133. Plaintiffs are indigent and cannot afford to pay for taxis or other car services to maintain all their transportation needs for the extended duration of their license suspension.
134. Due to Pennsylvania’s weather conditions — and that Plaintiffs respectively must carry cleaning equipment to and from work, and must care for a vulnerable premature infant — public transportation and non-motorized modes of transport, such as walking or biking, are not feasible alternatives.
135. Thus, Plaintiffs’ only reliable form of transportation is to drive a personal vehicle — a right that has been entirely deprived under all circumstances by Defendants.
136. Plaintiffs have been deprived of their fundamental right to intrastate travel under a prejudiced policy that achieves no legitimate government interest.
137. Because it implicates a fundamental liberty interest, Defendants’ suspension scheme must be narrowly tailored to achieve compelling state objectives or must be a time, place and manner restriction narrowly tailored to achieve significant state objectives. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 269–70 (analyzing the due process right of localized travel under the time, place and manner doctrine, and holding that any law infringing the fundamental right to local travel “will be subjected to intermediate scrutiny, and will be upheld if it is narrowly tailored to meet significant city objectives”).
138. Crime deterrence and traffic safety are significant state interests, but automatic suspension of driver’s licenses for all people convicted of drug offenses is not rationally related, much less narrowly tailored, to those objectives. Forbidding former drug offenders (whose offenses are unrelated to traffic safety) from driving at all times in all locations under all
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circumstances is not narrowly tailored to any compelling government interest. Indeed, Pennsylvania’s suspension scheme is counterproductive.
139. Nor is Defendants’ scheme a neutral time, place and manner restriction on driving narrowly tailored to serve significant government interests.
140. Defendants’ scheme is not neutral: it specifically targets people convicted of drug offenses, with no consideration of or connection to traffic safety.
141. Defendants’ punitive suspension scheme is not a narrowly tailored time, place and manner restriction, as it is unlimited in scope: it is a broad prohibition on all driving in all locations at all times in all circumstances for anyone convicted of a drug offense, without exception, for up to two years.
142. Defendants’ scheme contains no exceptions for medical emergencies, family emergencies, or to allow a former drug offender to pursue lawful work. Indeed, Defendants specifically prohibit people whose licenses are suspended under 75 Pa. C.S.A § 1532(c) from obtaining an Occupational Limited License. 75 Pa. C.S.A. 1553(d)(10).
143. Erecting barriers to successful rehabilitation is not a significant state interest; increasing punishment for crimes already adjudicated is not a significant state interest; and keeping safe drivers off the road is not a significant state interest.
144. Accordingly, Defendants’ irrational suspension scheme is not narrowly tailored to any significant government interest and deprives Plaintiffs of their fundamental right to intrastate travel in violation of the Due Process Clause.
i. Pennsylvania’s Lack of Reliable Public Transportation Exacerbates the Deprivation of Plaintiffs’ Fundamental Right to Local Travel
145. The unreliability of Pennsylvania’s public transportation exacerbates the difficulties faced by people deprived of their right to intrastate and local travel. An analysis of
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hundreds of performance reports from the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) — the public transit system serving Philadelphia — found that SEPTA was “consistently unreliable.” Jared Whalen, SEPTA: It’s a Long, Long Ride, Philadelphia Inquirer (Aug 14, 2016).22
146. In 2015, 400,000 SEPTA trains — or one in five — were late, and another 1,283 were cancelled altogether. Id. The study concluded that “SEPTA’s unreliability is endemic across all lines and all times of day.” Id.
147. This phenomenon is not limited to Philadelphia; of the 290 cities providing public ridership data to the National Transit Database in 2013, the majority of Pennsylvania’s main urban areas rank in the bottom half. Reuben Fischer-Baum, “How Your City’s Public Transit Stacks Up,” FiveThirtyEight (July 31, 2014).23
148. Many impoverished persons have service-industry jobs that require irregular hours outside the typical nine-to-five work day, with no time flexibility or tolerance for consistent tardiness. For a poor person with a suspended license, relying on public transportation to consistently arrive on time to work can be extremely challenging and time consuming, if possible at all.
149. For individuals with medical needs, unreliable public transportation can impose severe hardship. Harsh weather conditions coupled with long wait times and cancellations can make accessing medical care extremely difficult or impossible, and may even pose a danger to the health of young children and elderly family members.
150. Deprivation of the fundamental right to intrastate travel not only burdens those with drug convictions, but also their family members. Preventing safe drivers from using an
22http://www.philly.com/philly/business/transportation/septa_regional_rail_trains_timetable_reliability.ht ml
23 https://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/how-your-citys-public-transit-stacks-up/ 29

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automobile to move about their neighborhood or town does nothing to promote state interests; indeed, it lowers the chances of successful rehabilitation, jeopardizes public health, and increases the chances of recidivism.
151. Without reliable transportation alternatives, and having been dispossessed of their right to travel locally by automobile under any circumstances, Plaintiffs’ fundamental right to intrastate travel has been denied in violation of the Due Process Clause.
Class Action Allegations 152. The named Plaintiffs bring this action, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, to assert the claims alleged in this Complaint on a common basis. 153. A class action is a superior means, and the only practicable means, by which the named Plaintiffs and unknown Class Members can challenge Defendants’ unlawful suspension scheme. 154. This action is brought and may properly be maintained as a Class action pursuant to Rule 23(a)(l)–(4) and Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 155. This action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements of those provisions. 156. Plaintiffs propose one Class seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The Declaratory and Injunctive Class is defined as: All individuals whose Pennsylvania driver’s licenses are currently suspended or will be suspended due to conviction of any offense involving the possession, sale, delivery, offering for sale, holding for sale, or giving away of any controlled substance under the laws of the United States, Pennsylvania, or any other state. A. Numerosity — Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) 157. On information and belief, between 2011 and 2016, Defendants suspended the licenses of nearly 149,000 drivers for drug convictions.
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158. On information and belief, thousands of people in Pennsylvania currently have a suspended license for a drug-related conviction.
B. Commonality — Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) 159. The relief sought is common to all Class Members, and common questions of law and fact exist as to all Class Members. The named Plaintiffs seek relief concerning whether the suspension scheme violates the rights of the Class Members and relief mandating that Defendants end the scheme so that the constitutional rights of the Class Members will be protected in the future. 160. These common legal and factual questions arise from one scheme: Defendants’ automatic suspensions for all drug-related convictions. The material requirements of the suspension statute do not vary from Class Member to Class Member, and the resolution of these legal and factual issues will determine whether all Class Members are entitled to the relief they seek. 161. Among the most important, but not the only, common questions of fact are:
• Whether Pennsylvania has a policy and practice of punishing people with drug convictions more harshly than people with other types of convictions and
• Whether Pennsylvania, acting by and through Defendants, has a policy and practice of suspending the driver’s licenses of people who pose no demonstrated risk to traffic safety simply based on their drug conviction.
162. Among the most important, but not the only, common questions of law are:
• Whether fundamental principles of equal protection forbid Pennsylvania from treating people with drug convictions more harshly than people with other types of convictions;
• Whether suspending a person’s driver’s license for an offense not related to driving or traffic safety is lawful; and
• Whether principles of due process prohibit Defendants from automatically depriving individuals with drug convictions of their property interest in a driver’s license without any procedure;
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• Whether principles of due process prohibit Defendants from infringing on the fundamental right to travel by suspending the driver’s licenses of all individuals with drug convictions.
C. Typicality — Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3) 163. The named Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the other Class Members’ claims, and they have the same interests in this case as all other Class Members. Each Class Member has had or will have their driver’s license or driving capability suspended due to a drug-related conviction not involving traffic safety. The answer to whether Defendants’ suspension scheme is unconstitutional will determine the claims of the named Plaintiffs and every other Class Member. 164. If the named Plaintiffs succeed in the claim that Defendants’ policies and practices concerning drug-related suspensions violate their constitutional rights, that ruling will likewise benefit every other Class Member. D. Adequacy — Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) 165. The named Plaintiffs are adequate representatives of the Class because their interests in the vindication of the legal claims that they raise are entirely aligned with the interests of the other Class Members, who each have the same basic constitutional claims. They are members of the Class, and their interests coincide with, and are not antagonistic to, those of the other Class Members. 166. There are no known conflicts of interest among Class Members, all of whom have a similar interest in vindicating their constitutional rights in the face of Defendants’ suspension scheme. 167. Plaintiffs are represented by attorneys from Equal Justice Under Law and Goldstein Mehta LLC, who have experience in litigating complex civil rights matters and criminal matters in federal court and extensive knowledge of both the details of Defendants’ scheme and the relevant constitutional and statutory law.
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168. The combined efforts of Class counsel have so far included extensive investigation into Defendants’ suspension scheme, including interviewing attorneys in the region, statewide experts in the functioning of state and local courts, and national experts in constitutional law, law enforcement, judicial procedures, and criminal law.
169. Class counsel have a detailed understanding of local law and practices as they relate to federal constitutional requirements.
170. As a result, counsel have devoted enormous time and resources to becoming intimately familiar with Defendants’ scheme and with the relevant state and federal laws. The interests of the Class Members will be fairly and adequately protected by the named Plaintiffs and their attorneys.
E. Rule 23(b)(2) 171. Class action status is appropriate because Defendants have acted or will act in the same unconstitutional manner with respect to all Class Members. Defendants enforce a punitive and counterproductive suspension scheme by suspending the license of any person convicted of a drug offense — with no consideration of the seriousness of the offense or the offender’s traffic safety record. 172. The Class therefore seeks declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin Defendants from enforcing automatic license suspensions for drug convictions. Because the putative Class challenges Defendants’ scheme as unconstitutional through declaratory and injunctive relief that would apply the same relief to every Class Member, Rule 23(b)(2) certification is appropriate and necessary. 173. Injunctive relief compelling Defendants to comply with these constitutional rights will similarly protect each Class Member from being subjected to Defendants’ unlawful policies and practices. A declaration and injunction stating that Defendants cannot suspend driver’s
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licenses as a punishment for a drug conviction would provide relief to every Class Member. Therefore, declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the Class as a whole is appropriate.
Claims for Relief 174. Plaintiffs do not challenge the validity of their underlying criminal convictions; instead, they challenge Defendants’ policy of aggravating those convictions through a discriminatory and punitive license suspension scheme that is logically unrelated to their convictions or any legitimate government purpose. COUNT ONE: Defendants’ Counterproductive Suspension Scheme Violates Equal Protection Because It Discriminates Against People with Drug Convictions Without a Rational Connection to a Legitimate State Purpose 175. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and all of the previous allegations in this Complaint. 176. Plaintiffs have a right to be free from arbitrary and discriminatory government classifications. Defendants’ state-sanctioned policy discriminates between those convicted of drug offenses and those convicted of all other criminal offenses, prescribing additional punishment for the former. Because Defendants’ discriminatory policy is not rationally related to any legitimate government interest, it violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. COUNT TWO: Defendants’ Irrational Scheme of Automatically Suspending Licenses for Drug-Related Convictions Violates Procedural Due Process Because It Creates an Irrebuttable Presumption Against Plaintiffs, Depriving Them of Their Property Rights 177. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and all of the previous allegations in this Complaint. 178. Plaintiffs have a property interest in their drivers’ licenses that may not be deprived without due process of law. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971). The Department
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of Transportation automatically deprives them of their property interest in their license without
providing any process whatsoever, on the basis of an irrebuttable presumption that they are the
type of people whom the state is interested in keeping off the road. Because Plaintiffs have been
automatically deprived of their property rights without an opportunity to rebut the presumption
against them, Defendants have violated their procedural due process rights.
COUNT THREE: Defendants’ Vindictive Suspension Scheme Violates Substantive Due Process Because It Deprives Them of the Fundamental Right to Intrastate Travel Without Being Narrowly Tailored to Achieve a Significant Government Interest
179. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and all of the previous allegations in this
Complaint.
180. Plaintiffs have protected property and liberty interests in their driver’s licenses
and their ability to drive legally, and the Third Circuit recognizes their fundamental right to
intrastate travel under the Due Process Clause. Because Plaintiffs have no viable alternative to
driving, Defendants’ suspension of their licenses burdens their right to localized, intrastate travel
without being narrowly tailored to any significant government interest.
Requested Relief
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request that the Court issue the following relief:
a. A declaratory judgment that Defendants’ policies, practices, acts, and/or omissions as described herein are unlawful and violate Plaintiffs’ rights under the Constitution and laws of the United States;
b. An order and judgment preliminarily and permanently enjoining Defendants, their subordinates, agents, employees, representatives, and all others acting or purporting to act in concert with them or on their behalf from issuing or processing orders of driver’s license suspensions for drug offenses that do not involve traffic safety until such time as the State of Pennsylvania implements a system that complies with the United States Constitution;
c. An order and judgment preliminarily and permanently ordering Defendants to reinstate the Plaintiffs’ driver’s licenses (insofar as they are suspended based on conviction of a non-traffic related drug offense);
d. An order and judgment granting reasonable attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and any other relief this Court deems proper.
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Respectfully submitted, /s/ Phil Telfeyan Phil Telfeyan (pro hac vice pending) Catherine Sevcenko (pro hac vice pending) Rebecca Ramaswamy (pro hac vice pending) Marissa Hatton (pro hac vice pending) Attorneys, Equal Justice Under Law 400 7th Street NW, Suite 602 Washington, D.C. 20004 (202) 670-1004 ptelfeyan@equaljusticeunderlaw.org catherine@equaljusticeunderlaw.org rramaswamy@equaljusticeunderlaw.org mhatton@equaljusticeunderlaw.org /s/ Zak Goldstein Zak Goldstein (Pa. Bar No. 312128) Goldstein Mehta LLC 1221 Locust St. Philadelphia, PA 19107 (267) 225-2545 ztg@goldsteinmehta.com Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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 Case 2:18-cv-00115-CMR Document 37 Filed 09/25/18 Page 1 of 13

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RUSSELL HAROLD and SEAN WILLIAMS, :

on behalf of themselves and others similarly :

situated

:

Plaintiffs,

:

:

v.

:

:

LESLIE RICHARDS, in her official capacity as :

Secretary of Transportation of the Pennsylvania :

Department of Transportation; LEO BAGLEY, :

in his official capacity as Executive Deputy

:

Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of :

Transportation; KURT MYERS, in his official :

Capacity as Deputy Secretary for Driver and :

Vehicle Services of the Pennsylvania Department :

of Transportation; and TOM WOLF, in his :

official capacity as Governor of Pennsylvania :

Defendants.

:

CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-115

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Rufe, J.

September 25, 2018

Plaintiffs have filed a proposed class action on behalf of Pennsylvania residents whose

driver’s licenses are suspended upon conviction of any offense involving controlled substances,

under Pennsylvania law, federal, law, or the law of any other state, regardless of whether the

offense involved a vehicle or traffic safety.1 Defendants, sued in their official capacities, are the

governor of Pennsylvania and officials of the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation

(“PennDOT”), which has the exclusive authority to suspend or revoke driver’s licenses.

Plaintiffs allege that the suspension of their driver’s licenses violates equal protection

because it discriminates against people with drug convictions without a rational connection to a

legitimate state purpose (Count One); violates procedural due process because it creates an

1 Compl. [Doc. No. 1] ¶ 6 (citing 75 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. § 1532(c)).

Case 2:18-cv-00115-CMR Document 37 Filed 09/25/18 Page 2 of 13
irrebuttable presumption against Plaintiffs, depriving them of their property rights (Count Two); and violates substantive due process because it deprives them of the fundamental right to intrastate travel without being narrowly tailored to achieve a significant government interest (Count Three).2 Plaintiffs request declaratory and injunctive relief barring the suspension of driver’s licenses for drug offenses that do not involve traffic safety and ordering the reinstatement of Plaintiffs’ driver’s licenses.3
Plaintiffs move for a preliminary injunction and to certify the following class: All individuals whose Pennsylvania driver’s licenses are currently suspended or will be suspended due to a conviction of any offense involving the possession, sale, delivery, offering for sale, holding for sale, or giving away of any controlled substance under the laws of the United States, Pennsylvania, or any other state, pursuant to 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1532(c).4 Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. For the following reasons, the Court will grant the motion to dismiss and dismiss as moot the motions for a preliminary injunction and for class certification. II. LEGAL STANDARD Dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is appropriate where a plaintiff=s “plain statement” does not possess enough substance to show that plaintiff is entitled to relief.5 A court may look to the facts alleged in the complaint, its attachments, and documents incorporated into the complaint by reference or explicitly relied upon in the complaint, but may not consider
2 Compl. at 34-35. 3 Compl. at 35. 4 Pls.’ Mot. Class. Certif. [Doc. No. 3] at 1. 5 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007).
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matters extraneous to the pleadings.6 In determining whether a motion to dismiss should be
granted the Court must consider those facts alleged in the complaint, accepting the allegations as
true and drawing all logical inferences in favor of the non-moving party.7
Something more than a mere possibility of a claim must be alleged; plaintiff must allege
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”8 The complaint must set
forth “direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain
recovery under some viable legal theory.”9 The court has no duty to “conjure up unpleaded facts
that might turn a frivolous . . . action into a substantial one.”10 Furthermore, courts are not bound
to accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations.11
III. DISCUSSION
Under Pennsylvania law, PennDOT:
shall suspend the operating privilege of any person upon receiving a certified record of the person's conviction of any offense involving the possession, sale, delivery, offering for sale, holding for sale or giving away of any controlled substance under the laws of the United States, this Commonwealth or any other state or any person 21 years of age or younger upon receiving a certified record of the person’s conviction or adjudication of delinquency under 18 Pa. C.S. § 2706 (relating to terroristic threats) committed on any school property, including any public school grounds, during any school-sponsored activity or on any conveyance providing transportation to a school entity or school-sponsored activity.
6 Winer Family Trust v. Queen, 503 F.3d 319, 328 (3d Cir. 2007); U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002); Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O=Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). 7 ALA, Inc. v. CCAIR, Inc., 29 F.3d 855, 859 (3d Cir. 1994); Fay v. Muhlenberg Coll., No. 07-4516, 2008 WL 205227, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2008). 8 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 9 Id. at 562 (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984)). 10 Id. at 562 (citing O’Brien v. DiGrazia, 544 F.2d 543, 546 n.3 (1st Cir. 1976)). 11 Id. at 555, 564.
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(1) The period of suspension shall be as follows: (i) For a first offense, a period of six months from the date of the suspension. (ii) For a second offense, a period of one year from the date of the suspension. (iii) For a third and any subsequent offense thereafter, a period of two years from the date of the suspension.12 In addition to imposing suspensions for certain traffic offenses, the statute also provides for suspensions of those convicted of certain non-driving related alcohol offenses, including the use of false identification cards.13 The challenged part of the statute stems from a federal law that provides that federal funds will be withheld from a state unless the 1) the state has enacted or enforced a law requiring the suspension of an individual’s driver’s license for at least six months upon conviction of “any drug offense;” or 2) the governor of the state submits a written certification of the governor or an adopted resolution of the legislature expressing opposition to the enactment or enforcement of such a law.14 Plaintiffs do not challenge the federal statute in this case, but allege that 38 states no longer pursue license suspensions for drug offenders.15 Plaintiffs argue that the statute is invalid on its face.16 They allege that the law disproportionately affects “people living in poor or predominantly Black neighborhoods, thus disrupting family life and making employment, healthcare, and education substantially more difficult to access.”17 Plaintiff Russell Harold, after a drug conviction in 2017 that was unrelated to driving, lost his license for two years because he had two prior convictions, including one in
12 75 Pa.C.S. § 1532(c). 13 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 1532(b), (d). 14 23 U.S.C. § 159(a). 15 Compl. ¶ 109. Plaintiffs also allege that the federal statute “was motivated by animus toward low-level drug offenders.” Compl. ¶ 108. 16 Pls.’ Opp. Mot Dismiss [Doc. No. 33] at 2. 17 Comp. ¶ 30.
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1988, before the suspension law existed.18 Plaintiff Sean Williams alleges that he “is stopped and frisked nearly every time he leaves his home in west Philadelphia.”19 Mr. Williams was arrested three times in 2017 for carrying small amounts of marijuana.20 Mr. Williams had a learner’s permit, not a driver’s license, at the time of his suspension.21 The Complaint compellingly alleges the hardships that Mr. Harold and Mr. Williams and others suffer as a result of being unable to drive, and allege that it leads to unemployment and consequently to recidivism.
A. Equal Protection The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”22 Plaintiffs allege that because drug convictions “in and of themselves” are not related to traffic safety, the only reason for the law is animus against those with drug convictions, and therefore bear no rational relationship to any legitimate state objective.23 Plaintiffs allege that the law “singl[es] out people with drug convictions for additional punishment” without suspending licenses for numerous offenses that pose a threat to public safety, “such as public intoxication, speeding, failing to properly secure a child in a car seat, texting and driving, or failing to yield to a pedestrian.”24 Plaintiffs further allege that the law does not reduce or deter crime, which are properly the subject of criminal law in any event, and instead decreases public safety by diverting law-
18 Compl. ¶¶ 34-36. 19 Compl. ¶ 53. 20 Compl. ¶¶ 54-55. The Complaint does not specifically allege that each arrest resulted in a conviction. 21 Compl. ¶ 56. 22 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 23 Compl. ¶¶ 92-93. 24 Compl. ¶ 88-89.
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enforcement attention from driving offenses.25 They allege that targeting drug offenders is an
impermissibly broad classification, and targets an unpopular group. 26 Moreover, Plaintiffs
allege that drug convictions capture “impoverished persons and racial minorities at a
disproportionate rate.”27
Although Plaintiffs argue that certain groups are disproportionately affected by the law,
they specifically “do not challenge the license suspension scheme as racially discriminatory,”28
and the law does not classify individuals based upon “inherently suspect distinctions such as
race, religion, or alienage.” 29 Therefore, rational basis review applies, which “is a very
deferential standard. It is met if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could
provide a rational basis for the differing treatment.”30 As the Supreme Court has explained:
[R]ational-basis review in equal protection analysis is not a license for court to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices. Nor does it authorize the judiciary to sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations made in areas that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect lines. For these reasons, a classification neither involving fundamental rights nor proceeding along suspect lines is accorded a strong presumption of validity. Such a classification cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose. Further, a legislature that creates these categories need not actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classification. Instead, a classification must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.
A State, moreover, has no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory classification. A legislative choice is not subject to
25 Compl. ¶¶ 98-99. 26 Compl. ¶ 102, 106. 27 Compl. ¶ 120. 28 Compl. ¶ 118. 29 Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Multijurisdiction Practice v. Castille, 799 F.3d 216, 219 (3d Cir. 2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 30 Newark Cab Ass’n v. City of Newark, 901 F.3d 146,156 (3d Cir. 2018).
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courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data. A statute is presumed constitutional, and the burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it, whether or not the basis has a foundation in the record. Finally, courts are compelled under rational-basis review to accept a legislature’s generalizations even when there is an imperfect fit between means and ends. A classification does not fail rational-basis review because it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality. The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations – illogical, it may be, and unscientific.31
Thus, as long as the standard of rationality “finds[s] some footing in the realities of the
subject addressed by the legislation,” it will be upheld.32 Plaintiffs argue that the suspension law
is invalid as motivated by animus against people convicted of drug use, and that a desire to harm
a politically unpopular group is not a legitimate governmental interest. But the cases cited by
Plaintiffs do not support an argument that the law violates equal protection. The law does not,
for example, regulate, proscribe, or otherwise interfere with where or with whom Plaintiffs may
live33 or with whom they may enter into intimate relationships. 34 Instead, the law bars Plaintiffs
from operating a motor vehicle for a defined period, and does so as a result of Plaintiffs’ actions
in violation of the relevant criminal statutes, for which they have been convicted in a court of law
(the suspension being triggered by PennDOT’s receipt of a certified record of the person’s
31 Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-21 (1993) (quotations, alterations, and citations omitted). 32 Id. at 321. 33 United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (invalidating law making ineligible for certain benefits any household containing individuals unrelated to each other, which was apparently targeted at hippies). However, the Supreme Court upheld a zoning ordinance limiting the number of unrelated persons who may occupy a single-family dwelling as bearing a rational relationship to a permissible state objective. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974). 34 United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 770, 772 (2013) (invalidating law that “identif[ied] a subset of statesanctioned marriages and ma[d]e them unequal”).
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conviction).35 In other words, the Pennsylvania statute “does not circumscribe a class of persons
characterized by some unpopular trait or affiliation, [and] it does not create or reflect any special
likelihood of bias on the part of the ruling majority.”36
Plaintiffs allege that they are similarly situated to all people convicted of crimes but are
treated differently because of legislative animus against drug crimes.37 But even if this is so,
Plaintiffs offer no support for the idea that a legislature cannot treat different crimes differently,
and of course the criminal statutes set forth different penalties for different crimes and different
degrees of culpability within the same crime. It is worth noting that the legislative history
reflects not a purpose to discriminate, but to impose a suspension upon all those convicted of
drug offenses as a message to young people of the consequences of drug use and as a meaningful
penalty upon people who could afford to pay a fine and would not be at risk of imprisonment for
a small amount of narcotics.38
35 Plaintiffs also argue that the statute is irrational because by including suspensions for convictions under the laws of other states, it “was written to punish drug activity not considered illegal by the Commonwealth.” Pls.’ Opp. Mot. Dismiss at 7. Plaintiffs do not allege that they have such convictions from other states, or that other states criminalize activity related to illegal narcotics that Pennsylvania does not. 36 New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 593 (1979) (holding that the transit authority did not violate equal protection by barring methadone users from any employment). The Court notes that Plaintiffs cited to the dissent in this case, without stating that it was not the holding of the Court. Pls.’ Opp. Mot Dismiss at 8. 37 Pls.’ Opp. Mot. Dismiss at 3. Plaintiffs analogize the classification to a zoning ordinance barring a group home for those with mental disabilities struck down by the Supreme Court in City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). In that case, the discrimination was based on the status of the residents, whereas Plaintiffs here have been convicted of criminal actions that directly relate to the basis for the suspension. In other words, to analogize the case to Moreno, also relied upon by Plaintiffs, the plaintiffs in Moreno could not be denied food stamp benefits because they were hippies (as “it is not a crime to be a hippie,” Hughes v. Rizzo, 282 F. Supp. 881, 884 (E.D. Pa. 1968)), but if they committed acts that were generally disqualifying for benefits, their status would not be the basis for the negative action. 38 Pennsylvania House of Representatives Regular Session, Reg. Sess. No. 76, 173 General Assembly at 2101-05 (Dec. 12, 1989) (rejecting proposed amendment to allow discretion in imposing suspensions despite concerns of some legislators that the suspensions would be more burdensome upon those in rural areas without access to public transportation). The legislative history cited by Plaintiffs with regard to a 1999 amendment to the statute related only to the suspension of licenses for threats at schools. Pennsylvania Senate Regular Session, PA. S. Jour., 199 Reg. Sess. No. 27, 183rd General Assembly (May 4, 1999).
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The “legislative classification must be sustained, if the classification itself is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.”39 The governmental interests in receiving full federal funding and discouraging the violation of narcotics laws are unquestionably legitimate, even if the law is not the only or most desirable way to achieve these goals. The Court is limited to determining whether there is a rational basis for the legislation, not if it is wise or even necessarily effective. The statute meets this deferential standard.40
B. Due Process The Fourteenth Amendment also provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”41 Due process can be procedural or substantive. In analyzing a procedural due process claim, the first step is to determine whether the nature of the interest is one within the contemplation of the “liberty or property” language of the Fourteenth Amendment.42 If it is, “the question then becomes what process is due to protect it.”43 Substantive due process “limits what the government may do regardless of the fairness of the procedures that it employs to guarantee protection against government power arbitrarily and oppressively exercised.”44
1. Procedural Due Process Plaintiffs allege that they have a property interest in their ability to drive, that the license suspension occurs automatically, without any process at all, and that the suspension does not
39 Moreno, 413 U.S. at 533. 40 Shoul v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Transp., 173 A.3d 669, 681 (Pa. 2017). The Court does not rely on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s analysis of federal constitutional issues, but it offers useful perspective on the interpretation of state laws and lawmaking. 41 U.S. Const. amend. XIV. 42 Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 143 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). 43 Id. (citation omitted). 44 Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 272, 292 (3d Cir. 2018) (quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted).
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determine “which people with drug convictions fit criteria related to the state’s interest in regulating driving.”45 The law is clear that Plaintiffs do have a protected property interest.46
[T]he Due Process Clause applies to the deprivation of a driver’s license by the State: “Suspension of issued licenses . . . involves state action that adjudicates important interests of the licensees. In such cases the licenses are not to be taken away without that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment.”47
The amount of process that must be afforded depends upon the circumstances, and the
Supreme Court has held that a pre-revocation hearing is not required where the licensee “had the
opportunity for a full judicial hearing in connection with each of the traffic convictions on which
the [revocation] decision was based,” and had not “challenged the validity of the those convictions or the adequacy of his procedural rights at the time they were determined.”48
Plaintiffs here do not argue that they were denied due process in their criminal cases that led to their convictions, and the Court therefore holds that a pre-suspension hearing was not required.49
With regard to the suspension process itself, Pennsylvania law provides that any person
“whose operating privilege has been . . . suspended . . . shall have the right to appeal” to the Pennsylvania state courts.50 The “filing and service of a petition for appeal . . . shall operate as a
supersedeas until final determination of the matter by the court vested with the jurisdiction of such appeals.”51 Drivers are entitled to a de novo hearing before the trial court.52 In certain
45 Compl. ¶¶ 127-128 (emphasis omitted). 46 The Court notes that Mr. Williams had a learner’s permit, not a license, but will assume for purposes of the motion to dismiss that he had a protected property interest. 47 Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112 (1977) (quoting Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971). 48 Id. at 113. 49 The law provides for a stay of suspension upon request while an appeal from a criminal conviction is pending. 75 Pa. C.S. § 1555. 50 75 Pa. C.S. § 1550(a). 51 75 Pa. C.S. § 1550(b)(1)(i).
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circumstances, the Pennsylvania courts have reinstated the operating privileges suspended under § 1532(c).53 The right to appeal was included in the notices of suspension sent to Plaintiffs.54 Plaintiffs do not allege that they attempted to appeal the suspensions.55 As Plaintiffs had the opportunity to appeal the suspensions, and to stay the suspension while the appeal was pending, and as there are grounds upon which such appeals may succeed, they have not alleged a claim for violation of procedural due process.56
2. Substantive Due Process Plaintiffs allege they have a fundamental substantive due process right to local, or intrastate, travel, and have been “deprived of their ability to reliably travel by automobile” to accomplish essential tasks, which cannot feasibly be done by other modes of transportation.57 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has recognized a substantive due process right to intrastate travel in the form of “the right to travel locally through public spaces and roadways.” 58 Although “the contours of this right are not clearly defined,” it generally has been held to be “coextensive with the right to interstate travel.”59 And while “the law with respect to the constitutional implications of the right to travel is unsettled and in need of clarification,”60 the
52 Rutkowski v. Commonwealth of Pa., 780 A.2d 860, 862 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001). 53 See Degrossi v. Commonwealth of Pa., 174 A.3d 1187, 1190 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017). 54 See Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss [Doc. No. 29] Exs. A-B. The Court may consider the notices of suspension as they were expressly referenced in the Complaint. 55 Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2000) (“In order to state a claim for failure to provide due process, a plaintiff must have taken advantage of the processes that are available to him or her, unless those processes are unavailable or patently inadequate.”) 56 McDaniel v. Collins, 615 F. App’x 91, 93 (3d Cir. 2015). 57 Compl. ¶¶ 131-34. 58 Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 268 (3d Cir. 1990). 59 McCool v. City of Phila., 494 F. Supp. 2d 307, 312, 313 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 60 Maldonado v. Houstoun, 157 F.3d 179, 185 (3d Cir. 1998).
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case law is consistent in holding that the denial of a driver’s license does not violate the fundamental right to interstate travel, and that there is no fundamental right to drive.61 Plaintiffs have not alleged a basis for differentiating between the right to travel intrastate and the right to travel interstate in this regard.62 Thus, the right to intrastate travel is not infringed because Plaintiffs are unable to drive themselves in a car during the limited term of a suspension.63
IV. CONCLUSION The Court in no way minimizes the burdens imposed by the suspension of a driver’s
license, and Plaintiffs raise strong policy arguments against continued enforcement of the Pennsylvania statute that they may raise with the Governor and the legislature.64 But as the late Honorable Louis H. Pollak wrote, “[i]t is not, however, the province of a federal court to guard states from unwisdom unless that unwisdom transcends constitutional limitations. A state law that ‘may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought’ is not thereby unconstitutional. In the strong words of Justice Frankfurter, ‘[m]uch that should be rejected as illiberal, because repressive and envenoming, may well be not unconstitutional.’”65 This Court does not make policy decisions and takes no position as to whether the current framework is wise or socially beneficial. That is a decision to be made by the Pennsylvania legislative and executive branches in the first instance. The Court only determines that as a
61 Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 1999). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, citing Miller, has held that the denial of a driver’s license does not implicate the right to interstate travel. Abuhouran v. Social Sec. Admin., 291 F. App’x 469, 473 (3d Cir. 2008). 62 Indeed, although they focus on intrastate travel, Plaintiffs allege in the Complaint that the statute impinges upon their right to both interstate and intrastate travel. Compl. ¶ 9. 63 Fowler v. Johnson, No. 17-11441, 2017 WL 6379676, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 14, 2017). 64 It appears that the Pennsylvania General Assembly is considering legislation on these issues See Pennsylvania House Bill 163 and House Resolution 76 (text and history available at http://www.legis.state.pa.us). 65 Brian B. v. Commonwealth of Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 51 F. Supp. 2d 611, 636 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) and Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 517, 556 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)), aff’d, 230 F.3d 582 (3d Cir. 2000).
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