Leonard R. Berman 471 1 SW Huber St., Suite E-3 Portland, OR 97219 (503) 473-8787 OSB # 96040 Easyrabbi@]excite.com
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF(S1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

RILEY HINDS, both individually and on behalf of a class of : others similarly situated,

CV'07 -1677

A

4

Plaintiffs, v.

: Civil Action Number CV

MULNOMAH COUNTY, BERNIE GIUSTO, both individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Defendants.

INTRODUCTION This is a class action brought to redress the deprivation by Defendants of rights secured to the Plaintiffs and proposed Class by the United States Constitution and the laws of the United States of America. For at least the past several years, the Multnomah County Sheriffs Department has had a policy of strip-searching all individuals who enter

the Multnomah County Jail and are placed in jail clothing, regardless of the crime upon which they are charged. Upon information and belief, this policy is, in part, derived from the written procedures of the Multnomah County Sheriffs Department, and was promulgated by senior Department officials; specifically, Defendant Bernie Giusto.
It has been well established in this judicial circuit for many years that individuals charged with misdemeanors or violations cannot be strip-searched absent particularized suspicion that they possess weapons or contraband. In fact, several judges in this Judicial District, as well as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, have recently held that blanket strip search policies/practices like those in dispute in this case are unconstitutional. In short, the policy of Multnomah County and the Multnomah County Sheriffs Department of forcing those charged with minor crimes to undergo the indignities of a strip search upon entry into the Multnomah County Jail is not only clearly illegal, but is degrading, insensitive and unnecessary.
Riley Hinds brings this action on behalf of himself, and on behalf of a class of thousands of others who were strip searched after being charged with petty crimes, to vindicate the clear and unnecessary violation of his civil rights and those of the class members he proposes to represent. Mr. Hinds was taken in on a mistaken warrant for a purported probation violation on or about July 24,2006. Mr. Hinds was transported to the Multnomah County Jail and was at later dates subjected to multiple strip searches, in violation of his right against unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. He seeks monetary damages for himself and each member of the proposed class, a declaration that the Sheriffs Department's policies/practices are unconstitutional, and an injunction precluding Multnomah County and the Multnomah

County Sheriffs Department from continuing to violate the rights of those placed into their custody. With this as a background, Plaintiff Riley Hinds, through counsel, hereby complains;as follows:
JURISDICTION 1. This Court has jurisdiction over this action under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §$ 1331, 1341 & 1343 because it is filed to obtain compensatory damages, punitive damages, and injunctive relief for the deprivation, under color of state law, of the rights of citizens of the United States secured by the Constitution and federal law pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §$ 1981 & 1983. This Court also has jurisdiction over this action under the
provisions of 28 U.S.C. 9 2201, as it is filed to obtain declaratory relief relative to the
Constitutionality of the policies of a local government. 2. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(2) because the events giving rise
to Plaintiffs claims and those of proposed class members occurred in this judicial district.
PARTIES
21). Plaintiff Riley Hinds ("Hinds") resides in Multnomah County, Oregon. On or about July 24, 2006, the Clackamas County Sheriffs Office officers took Mr. Hinds into custody and transported him to the Justice Center (MCDC) where he spent four days on a wrongfully issued warrant for failure to report for bench probation that was incorrectly coded as formal probation on an underlying misdemeanor. He was strip and cavity searched on or about July 24,2006.

2c. Defendant Multnomah County (the "County") is a county government organized and existing under the laws of the State of Oregon. At all times relevant hereto, the County, acting through its Sheriffs Department, was responsible for the policies, practices, supervision, implementation and conduct of all matters pertaining to the Multnomah County Jail and was responsible for the appointment, training, supervision and conduct of all Sheriffs Department personnel, including those working in the Multnomah County Jail. In addition, at all relevant times, the County was responsib:le for enforcing the rules of the Multnomah County Jail, and for ensuring that Sheriffs Department personnel employed in the Jail obey the Constitution and laws of the United States and of the State of Oregon.
3. The Multnomah County Sheriffs Department (the "Sheriffs Department") is a County Sheriffs Department organized and existing under the laws of the State of Oregon. At all times relevant hereto, the Sheriffs Department was responsible for operating, organizing, overseeing and administering the Multnomah County Jail ("MCJ"). At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Sheriffs Department, together with Multnornah County was responsible for the polices, practices, supervision, implementation and conduct of all matters pertaining to the MCJ, and was responsible for the appointment, training, supervision and conduct of all Sheriffs Department personnel, including those working in the MCJ. In addition, at all times relevant hereto, Defendant Sheriffs Department, together with Multnomah County, was responsible for enforcing the rules of the Multnomah County Jail, and for ensuring that Sheriffs Department personnel employed in the MCJ obeyed the Constitution and laws of the United States and of the State of Oregon.

4. Defendant Bernie Giusto ("Sheriff Giusto") is the duly elected Sheriff of

Multnomah County, and, as such, is a policy maker with respect to the treatment of pre-

trial and other detainees over which the MCJ exercises custodial or other control. Sheriff

Giusto is made a Defendant in this action in both his individual and official capacities.

5.

Collectively, Sheriff Giusto will be referred to as the "Policy Making

Defendant."

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
6 . Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Rules 23(b)(l), 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly
situated individuals who were charged with misdemeanors or minor crimes and were strip
searched upon their entry into the Multnomah County Jail.
7. The class that Plaintiff seeks to represent is defined as follows:
All persons who have been or will be placed into the custody of the Multnomah County Jail after being charged with misdemeanors, violations, violations of probation or parole, traffic infractions, civil commitments or other minor crimes and were or will be strip searched upon their entry into the Multnomah County Jail pursuant to the policy, custom and practice of the Multnomah County Sheriffs Department and Multnomah County. The class period commences on November 8, 2005 and extends to the date on which the Multnomah County Sheriffs Department andlor the County of Multnomah are enjoined from, or otherwise cease, enforcing their unconstitutional policy, practice and custom of conducting strip searches absent reasonable suspicion. Specifically excluded from the class are Defendants and any and all of their respective affiliates, legal representatives, heirs, successors, employees or assignees.
8. This action has been brought and may properly be maintained as a class action
under Federal law and satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy
requirements for maintaining a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
9. The members of the class are so numerous as to render joinder impracticable.
Upon information and belief, there are hundreds of people arrested for misdemeanors and
violations who are placed into the custody of the Multnomah County Jail every month -
all of whom are members of the proposed class. Upon information and belief, the size of
the proposed class totals at least 3,000 individuals, some of whom have had their civil
rights violated on multiple occasions.

10.Upon information and belief, joinder of all of these individuals is impracticable because of the large number of class members and the fact that class members are likely dispersed over a large geographical area, with some members presently residing outside of Multnomah County and this Judicial District. Furthermore, upon information and belief, many members of the class are low-income persons, may not speak English, and likely would have great difficulty in pursuing their rights
individually .
11. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class, in that they all had their right to be free from unreasonable searches violated by Defendants7 conducting strip searches absent particularized suspicion. All members of the class were charged with misdemeanors or violations when placed into the custody of the Multnomah County Jail, and all were illegally strip searched in violation of the clearly established law in this judicial circuit.
12. Plaintiffs claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class. Plaintiff and all members of the class sustained damages arising out of Defendants' course of conduct. The harms suffered by the Plaintiff are typical of the harms suffered by the class members.
13. The representative Plaintiff has the requisite personal interest in the outcome of this action and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiff has no inrerests that are adverse to the interests of the members of the Class.
14. Plaintiff has retained counsel who has substantial experience and success in the prosecution of civil rights litigation.

15. Counsel for Plaintiff knows of no conflicts among members of the class, or between counsel and members of the class.
16. This action, in part, seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. As such, the Plaintiff seeks class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), in that all class members were subject to the same policy requiring the illegal strip searches of individuals charged with misdemeanor or minor crimes and placed into the custody of the Multnomah County Jail. In short, the County of Multnomah, the Multnomah County Sheriffs Department, the Policy Making Defendants and Multnomah County Corrections Officers acted on grounds generally applicable to all class members.
17'.In addition to certification under Rule 23(b)(2), and in the alternative, Plaintiff seeks certification under Rule 23(b)(3).
18. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class, and predominate over any questions that affect only individual members of the Class. These common questions of law and fact include, without limitation, the common and predominate question of whether the Defendants' written and/or de facto policy/practice of strip :searching all individuals charged with misdemeanors or minor crimes and committed to the Multnomah County Jail is a violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and whether such a written and/or de facto policy existed during the class period.
19. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, since joinder of all of the individual members of the class is impracticable given the large number of class members and the fact that they are dispersed over a large geographical area. Furthermore, the expense and burden of

individual litigation would make it difficult or impossible for individual members of the class to redress the wrongs done to them. The cost to the federal court system of adjudicating thousands of individual cases would be enormous. Individualized litigation would also magnify the delay and expense to all parties and the court system. By contrast, the conduct of this action as a class action in this District presents far fewer management difficulties, conserves the resources of the parties and the court system, and protects the rights of each member of the Class.
201. Upon information and belief, there are no other actions pending to address the Defendants' flagrant violation of the civil rights of thousands of individuals, even though the Defendants have maintained their illegal strip search regimen for the past several years.
21. In the alternative to certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), Plaintiff also seeks parfial certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).

FACTS Facts Applicable to the Class Generally 22. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits state officials, such as the Policy Making Defendants in this action and the Corrections Officers they supervise, from performing strip searches of arrestees who have been charged with misdemeanors or other minor crimes unless the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that the arrestee is concealing a weapon or contraband. 23. Upon information and belief, the County of Multnomah, the Multnomah County Sheriffs Department and the Policy Making Defendants have instituted a written andlor defacto policy, custom or practice of strip searching all individuals who enter the custody of the Multnomah County Jail (by forcing them to remove their clothing for a visual inspection of their bodies and/or forcing them to submit to a visua'l inspection of their bod:y cavities) and are placed into jail clothing, regardless of the nature of their charged crime and without the presence of reasonable suspicion to believe that the individual was concealing a weapon or contraband. For purposes of this Complaint, strip and visual cavity searches are collectively referred to as "strip searches." 24. The County of Multnomah, the Multnomah County Sheriffs Department, and the Policy Making Defendants know that they may not institute, enforce or permit enforcem.ent of a policy or practice of conducting strip searches without particularized, reasonable suspicion. This judicial circuit has stated repeatedly that state officials may not strip search individuals charged with misdemeanors or violations absent particularized, reasonable suspicion, with this principle being clearly established in Kennedy v. Los Angeles P.D., 901 F2d 702,711, (9thCir. 1990).

25 The Defendants' written and/or de facto policy, practice and custom mandating wholesale strip searches of all misdemeanor and violation arrestees has been promulgated, effectuated andlor enforced in bad faith and contrary to clearly established law.
26. Reasonable suspicion to conduct a strip search may only emanate from the particular circumstances antecedent to the search, such as the nature of the crime charged, the particular characteristics of the arrestees, and/or the circumstances of the arrest.
27. Upon information and belief, the County of Multnomah, the Multnomah County Sheriffs Department and Policy Making Defendants have promulgated, implemented, enforced, and/or failed to rectify a written and/or de facto policy, practice or custom of strip searching all individuals placed into the custody of the Multnomah County Jail and placed into jail clothing without any requirement of reasonable suspicion, or indeed suspicion of any sort. This written and/or de facto policy made the strip searching of pre-trial detainees routine; neither the nature of the offense charged, the characteristics of the arrestee, nor the circumstances of a particular arrest were relevant to the enforcement of the policy, practice and custom of routine strip searches.
28. Pursuant to this written and/or de facto policy, each member of the Class, including the named Plaintiff, was the victim of a routine strip search upon their entry into the A4ultnomah County Jail. These searches were conducted without inquiry into or establishrnent of reasonable suspicion, and in fact were not supported by reasonable suspicion. Strip searches are conducted for individuals arrested for, among other innocuous offenses, Driving While Intoxicated, Harassment and Trespassing.

29. As a direct and proximate result of the unlawful strip search conducted pursuant tlo this written and/or defacto policy, the victims of the unlawful strip searches each member of the class, including the named Plaintiff - has suffered or will suffer psychological pain, humiliation, suffering and mental anguish.
Facts Applicable to the Named Plaintiff 30. Mr. Riley Hinds' experience is representative of the class at large. He was strip and cavity searched on or about July 24,2006. 3 1. On the above-mentioned occasion, Hinds was moved into a shower area in the Multnomah County Jail and ordered to disrobe. As a Corrections Officer watched, Mr. Hinds removed all of his clothing, including his underpants. 32. On each occasion, a Corrections Officer then instructed Mr. Hinds to lift his testicles, turn around, bend at the waist, spread the lobes of his buttocks and squat while coughing., with the Corrections Officer conducting a visual inspection of Mr. Hind's genitals and rectal cavity. Mr. Hinds was then provided with a jail uniform after taking a shower. 33. On each occasion, there was no reasonable suspicion to believe that Mr. Hinds was concealing a weapon or other contraband. Indeed, no inquiry was made of Mr. Hinds that could have given rise to the requisite reasonable suspicion. 34. On several other occasions during the class period, Hinds was taken to the Multnomah County Jail on identical or nearly identical circumstances tc, that detailed
above.

35. As a direct and proximate result of the unlawful strip search conducted pursuant 'to County and Sheriffs Department policy, practice and custom, LM~H.inds has suffered and continues to suffer psychological pain, humiliation, suffering and mental anguish.

CAUSES OF ACTION AS AND FOR A FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS
Violation of Constitutional Rights Under Color of State Law
-- Unreasonable Search and Failure to Implement Municipal Policies to Avoid
Constitutional Deprivations Under of Color of State Law --
36. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every allegation stated in paragraphs 1 through 37.
37. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens from unreasonable searches by law enforcement officers, and prohibits officers from conducting strip searches of individuals arrested for misdemeanors or violations absent some particularized suspicion that the individual in question has either contraband or weapons.
38. The actions of Defendants detailed above violated Plaintiffs rights under the United States Constitution. Simply put, it was not objectively reasonable for Multnomah County Corrections Officers to strip search Plaintiff and class members based on their arrests for misdemeanor/violation charges. It was also not objectively reasonable for the Policy Making Defendants to orderldirect Multnomah County Corrections Officers to conduct such searches.
39. These strip searches were conducted pursuant to the policy, custom or practice of the County of Multnomah and the Multnomah County Sheriffs Department. As such, the County of Multnomah is directly liable for the damages of the named Plaintiff and members of the Class.
40. Upon information and belief, Sheriff Giusto is responsible for establishing the policies and procedures to be utilized in the operation of the Multnomah County Jail, and

is responsible for the implementation of the strip search policy questioned in this lawsuit. As such, Giusto is individually responsible for the damages of the named Plaintiff and members of the Class.
41. Sheriff Giusto knew that the strip search policy was illegal, and acted willfully, knowingly, and with specific intent to deprive Plaintiff and members of the Class of their Constitutional rights.
421. This conduct on the part of all Defendants represents a violation of 42 U.S.C. Cj 1983, given that their actions were undertaken under color of state law.
43. As a direct and proximate result of the unconstitutional acts described above, Plaintiff and members of the proposed class have been irreparably injured.

AS AND FOR A SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS
-- Demand for Declaratory Judgment --
44. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every allegation stated in paragraphs 1 through 45.
45. The policy, custom and practice of the Multnomah County Sheriffs Department, the County of Multnomah and the Policy Making Defendants is clearly unconstitutional, in that these entities and individuals are directinglconducting the strip searches of all individuals placed into the Multnomah County Jail without any particularized suspicion that the individuals in question have either contraband or weapons.
46. Plaintiff and members of the Class request that this Court issue a declaratory judgment, and that it declare the strip search policy of the County of Multnomah and the Multnomah County Sheriffs Department to be unconstitutional.
AS AND FOR A THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS
-- Demand for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction --
47. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every allegation stated in :paragraphs 1 through 48.
48. The policy, custom and practice of the Multnomah County Sheriffs Department, the County of Multnomah and the Policy Making Defendants is clearly unconstitutional, in that these entities and individuals are directinglconducting the strip searches of all individuals placed into the Multnomah County Jail without any

particularized suspicion that the individuals in question have either contraband or weapons.
49. Upon information and belief, this policy is currently in place at the Multnomah County Jail, with new and/or prospective members of the Class being subjected to the harms that have already been inflicted upon the named Plaintiff.
50. The continuing pattern of strip searching individuals charged with minor crimes will cause irreparable harm to the new and/or prospective members of the Class, an adequa.te remedy for which does not exist at law.
51. Plaintiff demands that the County of Multnomah, the Multnomah County Sheriffs :Department,the Policy Making Defendants and Multnomah County Corrections Officers immediately desist from strip searching individuals placed into the custody of the County Jail Multnomah absent any particularized suspicion that the individuals in question have either contraband or weapons, and seek both a preliminary and permanent injunction from this Court ordering as much.

DEMAND FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES 52. The actions of the Individual Defendants detailed herein are outrageous. in that they continue to propagate an illegal strip search policy even though they know for a fact that thieir actions are unconstitutional. 53. It is clear that the Policy Making Defendant, the County of Multnomah and the Multnomah County Sheriffs Department have no respect for the civil rights of individual citizens or for the rule of law. Consequently, an award of punitive damages is necessary to punish the Policy Making Defendants, and to send a message to them that the requirements of the United States Constitution also apply to governrncnt officials in Multnomah County.

DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY 54. The Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Riley Hinds, on behalf of himself and on behalf of a

class of others similarly situated, request that this Honorable Court grant him the

following relief:

A.

An order certifying this action as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.

B.

A judgment against all Defendants, jointly and severally on Plaintiffs First

Cause of Action detailed herein, awarding Compensatory Damages to each named

Plaintiff and each member of the proposed class in an amount to be determined by a Jury

and/or the Court on both an individual and a class wide basis.

C.

A judgment against Defendant Giusto on Plaintiffs First Cause of Action for

$1,000,00~0.00in punitive damages.

D.

A declaratory judgment against all Defendants declaring the County of

Mu1tnoma.h and the Multnomah County Sheriffs Department's policy, practice and

custom of strip and visual cavity searching all detainees entering the Multiromah County

Jail, regardless of the crime charged or suspicion of contraband, to be unconstitutional

and improper.

E.

A preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining Defendants from

continuing to strip and visual cavity search individuals charged with misdemeanors or

minor crimes absent particularized, reasonable suspicion that the arrestee subjected to the

search is concealing weapons or other contraband.

F.

A monetary award for attorney's fees and the costs of this action, pursuant to

42 U.S.C. tj 1988 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 23

Dated: November 8, 2007

Respectfully submitted by:

~.konax-dR. Berman, QSB-# 96040 ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF AND

I'

THE PROPOSED CLASS

 
 Leonard R. Berman 4711 SW Huber St., Suite E-3 Portland, OR 97219 (503) 473-8787 OSB # 96040 Easyrabbi@yahoo.com
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF(S)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

____________________________________

:

RILEY HINDS, SANDRA SILVIA,

:

ALAN HAKIMOGLU, THOMAS

:

MCCALLUM, AMY MUNSON,

:

MICHAEL B. MCMULLIN,

:

both individually and on behalf of a class of :

others similarly situated,

:

:

Plaintiffs,

:

:

v.

:

:

MULNOMAH COUNTY,

:

BERNIE GIUSTO,

:

both individually and in his

:

official capacity as Sheriff

:

:

:

:

:

Defendants.

:

____________________________________:

Civil Action Number CV -07-1677 PK
AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

INTRODUCTION

This is a class action brought to redress the deprivation by Defendants of rights

secured to the Plaintiffs and proposed Class by the United States Constitution and the

laws of the United States of America. For at least the past several years, the Multnomah

1

County Sheriff’s Department has had a policy of strip-searching all individuals who enter the Multnomah County Jail and are placed in jail clothing, regardless of the crime upon which they are charged. Upon information and belief, this policy is, in part, derived from the written procedures of the Multnomah County Sheriff’s Department, and was promulgated by senior Department officials; specifically, Defendant Bernie Giusto.
It has been well established in this judicial circuit for many years that individuals charged with misdemeanors or violations cannot be strip-searched absent particularized suspicion that they possess weapons or contraband. In fact, several judges in this Judicial District, as well as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, have recently held that blanket strip search policies/practices like those in dispute in this case are unconstitutional. In short, the policy of Multnomah County and the Multnomah County Sheriff’s Department of forcing those charged with minor crimes to undergo the indignities of a strip search upon entry into the Multnomah County Jail is not only clearly illegal, but is degrading, insensitive and unnecessary.
Riley Hinds, Sandra Silvia, Alan Hakimoglu, Thomas McCallum, Amy Munson, Michael B. McMullin bring this action on behalf of themselves, and on behalf of a class of thousands of others who were strip searched after being charged with petty crimes, to vindicate the clear and unnecessary violation of his civil rights and those of the class members he proposes to represent. Mr. Hinds was taken in on a mistaken warrant for a purported probation violation on or about July 24, 2006. Mr. Hinds was transported to the Multnomah County Jail and was at later dates subjected to multiple strip searches, in violation of his right against unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Alan Hakimoglu was strip searched on or about November
2

14, 2005 for Trespass 2 and February 25, 2008 for Trespass 2, Disorderly Conduct 2 charges. Sandra Silvia was strip searched December 11, 2006 on Theft and Forgery charges. Thomas McCallum was strip searched on March 25, 2008 , January 11, 2008 and January 5, 2007 on DUI and DWS charges each time. Amy Munson was strip searched on or about September 7, 2006 for DUI charges. Michael B. McMullin was booked and strip searched on June 14, 2006 and turned himself in on a probation violation on March 3, 2008 and was booked and strip searched for public protest charges of Trespass 2, Assault 4 and Disorderly Conduct. They seek monetary damages for themselves and each member of the proposed class, a declaration that the Sheriff’s Department’s policies/practices are unconstitutional, and an injunction precluding Multnomah County and the Multnomah County Sheriff’s Department from continuing to violate the rights of those placed into their custody. With this as a background, Plaintiffs Riley Hinds et al, through counsel, hereby complain as follows:
JURISDICTION 1. This Court has jurisdiction over this action under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1341 & 1343 because it is filed to obtain compensatory damages, punitive damages, and injunctive relief for the deprivation, under color of state law, of the rights of citizens of the United States secured by the Constitution and federal law pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 & 1983. This Court also has jurisdiction over this action under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2201, as it is filed to obtain declaratory relief relative to the Constitutionality of the policies of a local government.
3

2. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(2) because the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims and those of proposed class members occurred in this judicial district.
PARTIES
2b. Plaintiff Riley Hinds (“Hinds”) resides in Multnomah County, Oregon. On or about July 24, 2006, the Clackamas County Sheriff's Office officers took Mr. Hinds into custody and transported him to the Justice Center (MCDC) where he spent four days on a wrongfully issued warrant for failure to report for bench probation that was incorrectly coded as formal probation on an underlying misdemeanor. He was strip and cavity searched on or about July 24, 2006. . Alan Hakimoglu, a Multnomah County resident, was strip searched on or about November 14, 2005 for Trespass 2 and February 25, 2008 for Trespass 2, Disorderly Conduct 2 charges. Sandra Silvia, a Multnomah County resident, was strip searched December 11, 2006 on Theft and Forgery charges. Thomas MCallum, a Marion County resident, was strip searched on March 25, 2008 , January 11, 2008 and January 5, 2007 on DUI and DWS charges each time. Amy Munson, a Clackamas County resident, was strip searched on or about September 7, 2006 for DUI charges. . Michael B. Mcmullin, a Multnomah County resident, was booked and strip searched on June 14, 2006 and turned himself in on a probation violation on March 3, 2008 and was booked and strip searched for public protest charges of Trespass 2, Assault 4 and Disorderly Conduct.
2c. Defendant Multnomah County (the “County”) is a county government organized and existing under the laws of the State of Oregon. At all times relevant
4

hereto, the County, acting through its Sheriff’s Department, was responsible for the policies, practices, supervision, implementation and conduct of all matters pertaining to the Multnomah County Jail and was responsible for the appointment, training, supervision and conduct of all Sheriff’s Department personnel, including those working in the Multnomah County Jail. In addition, at all relevant times, the County was responsible for enforcing the rules of the Multnomah County Jail, and for ensuring that Sheriff’s Department personnel employed in the Jail obey the Constitution and laws of the United States and of the State of Oregon.
3. The Multnomah County Sheriff’s Department (the “Sheriff’s Department”) is a County Sheriff’s Department organized and existing under the laws of the State of Oregon. At all times relevant hereto, the Sheriff’s Department was responsible for operating, organizing, overseeing and administering the Multnomah County Jail (“MCJ”). At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Sheriff’s Department, together with Multnomah County was responsible for the polices, practices, supervision, implementation and conduct of all matters pertaining to the MCJ, and was responsible for the appointment, training, supervision and conduct of all Sheriff’s Department personnel, including those working in the MCJ. In addition, at all times relevant hereto, Defendant Sheriff’s Department, together with Multnomah County, was responsible for enforcing the rules of the Multnomah County Jail, and for ensuring that Sheriff’s Department personnel employed in the MCJ obeyed the Constitution and laws of the United States and of the State of Oregon.
4. Defendant Bernie Giusto (“Sheriff Giusto”) is the duly elected Sheriff of Multnomah County, and, as such, is a policy maker with respect to the treatment of pre-
5

trial and other detainees over which the MCJ exercises custodial or other control. Sheriff

Giusto is made a Defendant in this action in both his individual and official capacities.

5.

Collectively, Sheriff Giusto will be referred to as the “Policy Making

Defendant.”

6

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
6. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Rules 23(b)(1), 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly
situated individuals who were charged with misdemeanors or minor crimes and were strip
searched upon their entry into the Multnomah County Jail.
7. The class that Plaintiff seeks to represent is defined as follows:
All persons who have been or will be placed into the custody of the Multnomah County Jail after being charged with misdemeanors, violations, violations of probation or parole, traffic infractions, civil commitments or other minor crimes and were or will be strip searched upon their entry into the Multnomah County Jail pursuant to the policy, custom and practice of the Multnomah County Sheriff’s Department and Multnomah County. The class period commences on November 8, 2005 and extends to the date on which the Multnomah County Sheriff’s Department and/or the County of Multnomah are enjoined from, or otherwise cease, enforcing their unconstitutional policy, practice and custom of conducting strip searches absent reasonable suspicion. Specifically excluded from the class are Defendants and any and all of their respective affiliates, legal representatives, heirs, successors, employees or assignees.
8. This action has been brought and may properly be maintained as a class action
under Federal law and satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy
requirements for maintaining a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
9. The members of the class are so numerous as to render joinder impracticable.
Upon information and belief, there are hundreds of people arrested for misdemeanors and
violations who are placed into the custody of the Multnomah County Jail every month –
all of whom are members of the proposed class. Upon information and belief, the size of
the proposed class totals at least 3,000 individuals, some of whom have had their civil
rights violated on multiple occasions.
7

10. Upon information and belief, joinder of all of these individuals is impracticable because of the large number of class members and the fact that class members are likely dispersed over a large geographical area, with some members presently residing outside of Multnomah County and this Judicial District. Furthermore, upon information and belief, many members of the class are low-income persons, may not speak English, and likely would have great difficulty in pursuing their rights individually.
11. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class, in that they all had their right to be free from unreasonable searches violated by Defendants’ conducting strip searches absent particularized suspicion. All members of the class were charged with misdemeanors or violations when placed into the custody of the Multnomah County Jail, and all were illegally strip searched in violation of the clearly established law in this judicial circuit.
12. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class. Plaintiff and all members of the class sustained damages arising out of Defendants’ course of conduct. The harms suffered by the Plaintiff are typical of the harms suffered by the class members.
13. The representative Plaintiff has the requisite personal interest in the outcome of this action and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiff has no interests that are adverse to the interests of the members of the Class.
14. Plaintiff has retained counsel who has substantial experience and success in the prosecution of civil rights litigation.
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15. Counsel for Plaintiff knows of no conflicts among members of the class, or between counsel and members of the class.
16. This action, in part, seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. As such, the Plaintiff seeks class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), in that all class members were subject to the same policy requiring the illegal strip searches of individuals charged with misdemeanor or minor crimes and placed into the custody of the Multnomah County Jail. In short, the County of Multnomah, the Multnomah County Sheriff’s Department, the Policy Making Defendants and Multnomah County Corrections Officers acted on grounds generally applicable to all class members.
17. In addition to certification under Rule 23(b)(2), and in the alternative, Plaintiff seeks certification under Rule 23(b)(3).
18. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class, and predominate over any questions that affect only individual members of the Class. These common questions of law and fact include, without limitation, the common and predominate question of whether the Defendants’ written and/or de facto policy/practice of strip searching all individuals charged with misdemeanors or minor crimes and committed to the Multnomah County Jail is a violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and whether such a written and/or de facto policy existed during the class period.
19. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, since joinder of all of the individual members of the class is impracticable given the large number of class members and the fact that they are dispersed over a large geographical area. Furthermore, the expense and burden of
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individual litigation would make it difficult or impossible for individual members of the class to redress the wrongs done to them. The cost to the federal court system of adjudicating thousands of individual cases would be enormous. Individualized litigation would also magnify the delay and expense to all parties and the court system. By contrast, the conduct of this action as a class action in this District presents far fewer management difficulties, conserves the resources of the parties and the court system, and protects the rights of each member of the Class.
20. Upon information and belief, there are no other actions pending to address the Defendants’ flagrant violation of the civil rights of thousands of individuals, even though the Defendants have maintained their illegal strip search regimen for the past several years.
21. In the alternative to certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), Plaintiff also seeks partial certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).
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FACTS Facts Applicable to the Class Generally 22. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits state officials, such as the Policy Making Defendants in this action and the Corrections Officers they supervise, from performing strip searches of arrestees who have been charged with misdemeanors or other minor crimes unless the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that the arrestee is concealing a weapon or contraband. 23. Upon information and belief, the County of Multnomah, the Multnomah County Sheriff’s Department and the Policy Making Defendants have instituted a written and/or de facto policy, custom or practice of strip searching all individuals who enter the custody of the Multnomah County Jail (by forcing them to remove their clothing for a visual inspection of their bodies and/or forcing them to submit to a visual inspection of their body cavities) and are placed into jail clothing, regardless of the nature of their charged crime and without the presence of reasonable suspicion to believe that the individual was concealing a weapon or contraband. For purposes of this Complaint, strip and visual cavity searches are collectively referred to as “strip searches.” 24. The County of Multnomah, the Multnomah County Sheriff’s Department, and the Policy Making Defendants know that they may not institute, enforce or permit enforcement of a policy or practice of conducting strip searches without particularized, reasonable suspicion. This judicial circuit has stated repeatedly that state officials may not strip search individuals charged with misdemeanors or violations absent particularized, reasonable suspicion, with this principle being clearly established in Kennedy v. Los Angeles P.D., 901 F2d 702, 711, (9th Cir. 1990).
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25. The Defendants’ written and/or de facto policy, practice and custom mandating wholesale strip searches of all misdemeanor and violation arrestees has been promulgated, effectuated and/or enforced in bad faith and contrary to clearly established law.
26. Reasonable suspicion to conduct a strip search may only emanate from the particular circumstances antecedent to the search, such as the nature of the crime charged, the particular characteristics of the arrestees, and/or the circumstances of the arrest.
27. Upon information and belief, the County of Multnomah, the Multnomah County Sheriff’s Department and Policy Making Defendants have promulgated, implemented, enforced, and/or failed to rectify a written and/or de facto policy, practice or custom of strip searching all individuals placed into the custody of the Multnomah County Jail and placed into jail clothing without any requirement of reasonable suspicion, or indeed suspicion of any sort. This written and/or de facto policy made the strip searching of pre-trial detainees routine; neither the nature of the offense charged, the characteristics of the arrestee, nor the circumstances of a particular arrest were relevant to the enforcement of the policy, practice and custom of routine strip searches.
28. Pursuant to this written and/or de facto policy, each member of the Class, including the named Plaintiff, was the victim of a routine strip search upon their entry into the Multnomah County Jail. These searches were conducted without inquiry into or establishment of reasonable suspicion, and in fact were not supported by reasonable suspicion. Strip searches are conducted for individuals arrested for, among other innocuous offenses, Driving While Intoxicated, Harassment and Trespassing.
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29. As a direct and proximate result of the unlawful strip search conducted pursuant to this written and/or de facto policy, the victims of the unlawful strip searches – each member of the class, including the named Plaintiff – has suffered or will suffer psychological pain, humiliation, suffering and mental anguish.
Facts Applicable to the Named Plaintiff Hinds 30. Mr. Riley Hinds’ experience is representative of the class at large. He was strip and cavity searched on or about July 24, 2006. 31. On the above-mentioned occasion, Hinds was moved into a shower area in the Multnomah County Jail and ordered to disrobe. As a Corrections Officer watched, Mr. Hinds removed all of his clothing, including his underpants. 32. On each occasion, a Corrections Officer then instructed Mr. Hinds to lift his testicles, turn around, bend at the waist, spread the lobes of his buttocks and squat while coughing, with the Corrections Officer conducting a visual inspection of Mr. Hind’s genitals and rectal cavity. Mr. Hinds was then provided with a jail uniform after taking a shower. 33. On each occasion, there was no reasonable suspicion to believe that Mr. Hinds was concealing a weapon or other contraband. Indeed, no inquiry was made of Mr. Hinds that could have given rise to the requisite reasonable suspicion. 34. On several other occasions during the class period, Hinds was taken to the Multnomah County Jail on identical or nearly identical circumstances to that detailed above.
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35. As a direct and proximate result of the unlawful strip search conducted pursuant to County and Sheriff’s Department policy, practice and custom, Mr. Hinds has suffered and continues to suffer psychological pain, humiliation, suffering and mental anguish.
Facts Applicable to the Named Plaintiff Hakimoglu 36. Mr. Hakimoglu’s experience is representative of the class at large. He was strip and cavity searched on or about November 14, 2005 and February 25, 2008. 37. On the above-mentioned occasions, Hakimoglu was moved into a shower area in the Multnomah County Jail and ordered to disrobe. As a Corrections Officer watched, Mr. Hakimoglu removed all of his clothing, including his underpants. 38. On each occasion, a Corrections Officer then instructed Mr. Hakimoglu to lift his testicles, turn around, bend at the waist, spread the lobes of his buttocks and squat while coughing, with the Corrections Officer conducting a visual inspection of Mr. Hakimoglu’s genitals and rectal cavity. Mr. Hakimoglu was then provided with a jail uniform after taking a shower. 39. On each occasion, there was no reasonable suspicion to believe that Mr. Hakimoglu was concealing a weapon or other contraband. Indeed, no inquiry was made of Mr. Hakimoglu’s that could have given rise to the requisite reasonable suspicion. 40. On several other occasions during the class period, Hakimoglu was taken to the Multnomah County Jail on identical or nearly identical circumstances to that detailed above. 41. As a direct and proximate result of the unlawful strip search conducted pursuant to County and Sheriff’s Department policy, practice and custom, Mr.
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Hakimoglu has suffered and continues to suffer psychological pain, humiliation, suffering and mental anguish.
Facts Applicable to the Named Plaintiff McCallum 42. Mr. McCallum’s experience is representative of the class at large. He was strip and cavity searched on or about March 25, 2008 , January 11, 2008 and January 5, 2007. 43. On the above-mentioned occasions, McCallum was moved into a shower area in the Multnomah County Jail and ordered to disrobe. As a Corrections Officer watched, Mr. McCallum removed all of his clothing, including his underpants. 44. On each occasion, a Corrections Officer then instructed Mr. McCallum to lift his testicles, turn around, bend at the waist, spread the lobes of his buttocks and squat while coughing, with the Corrections Officer conducting a visual inspection of Mr. McCallum’s genitals and rectal cavity. Mr. McCallum was then provided with a jail uniform after taking a shower. 45. On each occasion, there was no reasonable suspicion to believe that Mr. McCallum was concealing a weapon or other contraband. Indeed, no inquiry was made of Mr. McCallum that could have given rise to the requisite reasonable suspicion. 46. On several other occasions during the class period, McCallum was taken to the Multnomah County Jail on identical or nearly identical circumstances to that detailed above. 47. As a direct and proximate result of the unlawful strip search conducted pursuant to County and Sheriff’s Department policy, practice and custom, Mr. McCallum
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has suffered and continues to suffer psychological pain, humiliation, suffering and mental anguish.
Facts Applicable to the Named Plaintiff McMullin
48. Mr. McMullin’s experience is representative of the class at large. Michael B. Mcmullin was booked and strip searched on June 14, 2006 and turned himself in on a probation violation on March 3, 2008 and was booked and strip searched for public protest charges of Trespass 2, Assault 4 and Disorderly Conduct.
49. On the above-mentioned occasions, McMullin was moved into a shower area in the Multnomah County Jail and ordered to disrobe. As a Corrections Officer watched, Mr. McMullin removed all of his clothing, including his underpants.
50. On each occasion, a Corrections Officer then instructed Mr. McMullin to lift his testicles, turn around, bend at the waist, spread the lobes of his buttocks and squat while coughing, with the Corrections Officer conducting a visual inspection of Mr. McMullin’s genitals and rectal cavity. Mr. McMullin was then provided with a jail uniform after taking a shower.
51. On each occasion, there was no reasonable suspicion to believe that Mr. McMullin was concealing a weapon or other contraband. Indeed, no inquiry was made of Mr. McMullin that could have given rise to the requisite reasonable suspicion.
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52. On several other occasions during the class period, McMullin was taken to the Multnomah County Jail on identical or nearly identical circumstances to that detailed above.
53. As a direct and proximate result of the unlawful strip search conducted pursuant to County and Sheriff’s Department policy, practice and custom, Mr. McMullin has suffered and continues to suffer psychological pain, humiliation, suffering and mental anguish.
Facts Applicable to the Named Plaintiff Silvia 54. Ms. Silvia’s experience is representative of the class at large. She was strip and cavity searched on or about December 11, 2006. 55. On the above-mentioned occasion, Ms. Silvia was moved into a shower area in the Multnomah County Jail and ordered to disrobe. As a Corrections Officer watched, Ms. Silvia removed all of her clothing, including her underpants. 56. On this occasion, a Corrections Officer then instructed Ms. Silvia to turn around, bend at the waist, spread the lobes of her buttocks and squat while coughing, with the Corrections Officer conducting a visual inspection of Ms. Silvia’s genitals and rectal cavity. Ms. Silvia was then provided with a jail uniform. 57. On each occasion, there was no reasonable suspicion to believe that Ms. Silvia was concealing a weapon or other contraband. Indeed, no inquiry was made of Ms. Silvia that could have given rise to the requisite reasonable suspicion. 58. As a direct and proximate result of the unlawful strip search conducted pursuant to County and Sheriff’s Department policy, practice and custom, Ms. Silvia has
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suffered and continues to suffer psychological pain, humiliation, suffering and mental anguish.
Facts Applicable to the Named Plaintiff Munson 59. Ms. Munson’s experience is representative of the class at large. She was strip and cavity searched on or about September 7, 2006. 60. On the above-mentioned occasion, Ms. Munson was moved into a shower area in the Multnomah County Jail and ordered to disrobe. As a Corrections Officer watched, Ms. Munson removed all of her clothing, including her underpants. 61. On this occasion, a Corrections Officer then instructed Ms. Munson to turn around, bend at the waist, spread the lobes of her buttocks and squat while coughing, with the Corrections Officer conducting a visual inspection of Ms. Munson’s genitals and rectal cavity. Ms. Munson was then provided with a jail uniform. 62. On each occasion, there was no reasonable suspicion to believe that Ms. Munson’s was concealing a weapon or other contraband. Indeed, no inquiry was made of Ms. Munson’s that could have given rise to the requisite reasonable suspicion. 63. As a direct and proximate result of the unlawful strip search conducted pursuant to County and Sheriff’s Department policy, practice and custom, Ms. Munson has suffered and continues to suffer psychological pain, humiliation, suffering and mental anguish.
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CAUSES OF ACTION AS AND FOR A FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS
Violation of Constitutional Rights Under Color of State Law -- Unreasonable Search and Failure to Implement Municipal Policies to Avoid
Constitutional Deprivations Under of Color of State Law -64. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every allegation stated in paragraphs 1 through 63. 65. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens from unreasonable searches by law enforcement officers, and prohibits officers from conducting strip searches of individuals arrested for misdemeanors or violations absent some particularized suspicion that the individual in question has either contraband or weapons. 66. The actions of Defendants detailed above violated Plaintiff’s rights under the United States Constitution. Simply put, it was not objectively reasonable for Multnomah County Corrections Officers to strip search Plaintiff and class members based on their arrests for misdemeanor/violation charges. It was also not objectively reasonable for the Policy Making Defendants to order/direct Multnomah County Corrections Officers to conduct such searches. 67. These strip searches were conducted pursuant to the policy, custom or practice of the County of Multnomah and the Multnomah County Sheriff’s Department. As such, the County of Multnomah is directly liable for the damages of the named Plaintiff and members of the Class. 68. Upon information and belief, Sheriff Giusto is responsible for establishing the policies and procedures to be utilized in the operation of the Multnomah County Jail, and
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is responsible for the implementation of the strip search policy questioned in this lawsuit. As such, Giusto is individually responsible for the damages of the named Plaintiff and members of the Class.
69. Sheriff Giusto knew that the strip search policy was illegal, and acted willfully, knowingly, and with specific intent to deprive Plaintiff and members of the Class of their Constitutional rights.
70. This conduct on the part of all Defendants represents a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, given that their actions were undertaken under color of state law.
71. As a direct and proximate result of the unconstitutional acts described above, Plaintiff and members of the proposed class have been irreparably injured.
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AS AND FOR A SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS -- Demand for Declaratory Judgment --
72. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every allegation stated in paragraphs 1 through 71.
73. The policy, custom and practice of the Multnomah County Sheriff’s Department, the County of Multnomah and the Policy Making Defendants is clearly unconstitutional, in that these entities and individuals are directing/conducting the strip searches of all individuals placed into the Multnomah County Jail without any particularized suspicion that the individuals in question have either contraband or weapons.
74. Plaintiff and members of the Class request that this Court issue a declaratory judgment, and that it declare the strip search policy of the County of Multnomah and the Multnomah County Sheriff’s Department to be unconstitutional.
AS AND FOR A THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS -- Demand for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction --
75. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every allegation stated in paragraphs 1 through 74.
76. The policy, custom and practice of the Multnomah County Sheriff’s Department, the County of Multnomah and the Policy Making Defendants is clearly unconstitutional, in that these entities and individuals are directing/conducting the strip searches of all individuals placed into the Multnomah County Jail without any
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particularized suspicion that the individuals in question have either contraband or weapons.
77. Upon information and belief, this policy is currently in place at the Multnomah County Jail, with new and/or prospective members of the Class being subjected to the harms that have already been inflicted upon the named Plaintiff.
78. The continuing pattern of strip searching individuals charged with minor crimes will cause irreparable harm to the new and/or prospective members of the Class, an adequate remedy for which does not exist at law.
79. Plaintiff demands that the County of Multnomah, the Multnomah County Sheriff’s Department, the Policy Making Defendants and Multnomah County Corrections Officers immediately desist from strip searching individuals placed into the custody of the County Jail Multnomah absent any particularized suspicion that the individuals in question have either contraband or weapons, and seek both a preliminary and permanent injunction from this Court ordering as much.
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DEMAND FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES 80. The actions of the Individual Defendants detailed herein are outrageous, in that they continue to propagate an illegal strip search policy even though they know for a fact that their actions are unconstitutional. 81. It is clear that the Policy Making Defendant, the County of Multnomah and the Multnomah County Sheriff’s Department have no respect for the civil rights of individual citizens or for the rule of law. Consequently, an award of punitive damages is necessary to punish the Policy Making Defendants, and to send a message to them that the requirements of the United States Constitution also apply to government officials in Multnomah County.

DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY 82. The Plaintiffs hereby demand a trial by jury.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs Riley Hinds et al, on behalf of themselves and on behalf

of a class of others similarly situated, request that this Honorable Court grant him the

following relief:

A.

An order certifying this action as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.

B.

A judgment against all Defendants, jointly and severally on Plaintiff’s First

Cause of Action detailed herein, awarding Compensatory Damages to each named

Plaintiff and each member of the proposed class in an amount to be determined by a Jury

and/or the Court on both an individual and a class wide basis.

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C.

A judgment against Defendant Giusto on Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action for

$1,000,000.00 in punitive damages.

D.

A declaratory judgment against all Defendants declaring the County of

Multnomah and the Multnomah County Sheriff’s Department’s policy, practice and

custom of strip and visual cavity searching all detainees entering the Multnomah County

Jail, regardless of the crime charged or suspicion of contraband, to be unconstitutional

and improper.

E.

A preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining Defendants from

continuing to strip and visual cavity search individuals charged with misdemeanors or

minor crimes absent particularized, reasonable suspicion that the arrestee subjected to the

search is concealing weapons or other contraband.

F.

A monetary award for attorney’s fees and the costs of this action, pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1988 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 23

Dated: July 23, 2008

Respectfully submitted by:
S//S Leonard R. Berman
__________________________ Leonard R. Berman, OSB # 96040 ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF AND THE PROPOSED CLASS

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 AGNES SOWLE, COUNTY ATTORNEY FOR MULTNOMAH COUNTY, OREGON Stephen L. Madkour Assistant County Attorney 501 SE Hawthorne Blvd., Suite 500 Portland, Oregon 97214 Telephone Number: (503) 988-3138 Facsimile Telephone Number: (503) 988-3377 Internet E-mail Address: stephen.l.madkour@co.multnomah.or.us Oregon State Bar Number 94109
Of Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

RILEY HINDS, both individually and on behalf of a class of others similarly situated,

Civil Case No: CV 07-1677-PK

Plaintiffs, v.

DEFENDANTS’ MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MULTNOMAH COUNTY, BERNIE GIUSTO, both individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff,

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56

Defendants.

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, defendants Multnomah County and Sheriff Bernie Giusto

move this court for summary judgment against plaintiffs’ complaint.

Plaintiffs Riley Hinds, Sandra Silvia, Alan Hakimoglu, Thomas McCallum, Amy

Munson, and Michael McMullin allege that in 2006 they each were processed into the

Multnomah County Detention Center (“MCDC”), and as part of the process, they were subjected

to a strip search. (Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 2b, 30-63). Plaintiffs contend that the strip searches

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were unconstitutional because they were performed pursuant to a “written and/or de facto policy” of performing strip searches on all inmates admitted to MCDC. (Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 22, 25, 27, 28, 29). As a result, plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages, in addition to declaratory and injunctive relief.
Defendants Multnomah County and Sheriff Bernie Giusto now move pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 for summary judgment against plaintiffs’ claims in their entirety. Summary judgment should be granted because contrary to plaintiffs’ assertions, Multnomah County does not have either a written or a de facto policy of performing strip searches on all individuals who enter MCDC. In the absence of such a blanket policy, plaintiffs’ claims must fail as a matter of law. Consequently, defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
A. Standard of Review Summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c). “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). At summary judgment, the court’s function is not to make credibility determinations or to weigh conflicting evidence. T.W. Elec. Service, Inc v. Pacific Elec. Contractors, Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). The court must view the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. However, if the moving party “meets its initial burden of showing ‘the absence of material fact,’ the burden then moves to the opposing party, who must present
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significant and probative evidence tending to support its claim or defense.” Intel Corp. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d 1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Richards v. Neilson Freight Lines, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). If the non-moving party fails to make this
showing, the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
I. Plaintiffs’ Complaint Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 Plaintiffs claim that
Multnomah County and Sheriff Giusto2 have “instituted a written and/or de facto policy, custom
or practice of strip searching all individuals who enter the custody of the Multnomah County Jail
. . . and are placed into jail clothing, regardless of the nature of their charged crime and without
the presence of reasonable suspicion to believe that the individual was concealing a weapon or
contraband.” (Amended Complaint, ¶ 23). Plaintiffs bring their claims under the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. (Id. at ¶ 22). Plaintiffs caption their Complaint
as a class action claim brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. However, no class has been
certified.
As set forth below, plaintiffs either misconstrue or grossly mischaracterize the
Multnomah County Sheriff’s Office’s policy relative to strip searches at MCDC. Multnomah
1 42 U.S.C. § 1983 states, in relevant part:
“Every person who, under color of any statute, or dinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisd iction thereof to the de privation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . . ” 2 Defendant Bernie Giusto no longer is Sheriff of Multnomah County. The current Sheriff is Bob Skipper. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P 235( d), the public officer’s successor is “automat ically substituted as a party.”
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County does not have a blanket and/or de facto strip search policy. Consequently, the County’s strip search policy survives plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge.
A. Multnomah County Sheriff’s Office’s Strip Search Policy Multnomah County, through the Multnomah County Sheriff’s Office (“MCSO”), operates the following detention facilities: the Multnomah County Detention Center (MCDC), located in downtown Portland; Inverness Jail (IJ), located in Northeast Portland; and the Multnomah County Courthouse Jail (MCHJ), located on the 7th floor of the County Courthouse. The County also owns the Wapato Jail in North Portland, which currently is not operational. (Declaration of Ron Bishop, ¶ 3). During 2007, the Multnomah County Sheriff’s Office processed approximately 40,000 inmates through the County’s detention facilities. (Declaration of Ron Bishop, ¶ 4). All bookings and releases take place at MCDC, which is the County’s maximum security, short-term incarceration facility. Id. All individuals booked at MCDC are subjected to a pat-down search at the booking counter. Id. The Sheriff’s Office has established written policies concerning strip searches and cavity searches of inmates at the County’s custodial facilities. (Declaration of Ron Bishop, ¶ 5; Declaration of Andrew Brosh, ¶ 4; Exhibits 101, 102, and 103). The objective of the strip search policy is to detect and intercept the introduction of contraband into the jail facility. (Declaration of Ron Bishop, ¶ 5; Declaration of Andrew Brosh, ¶ 5). Such contraband usually includes weapons, narcotics, tobacco, and cigarettes. Id. Preventing the introduction of contraband is necessary to maintain institutional order and security, and to protect jail personnel and the inmate population. Id. /// /// ///
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The introduction of weapons, drugs and other contraband into MCDC presents a serious threat to the orderly operation of the facility and the safety of inmates and jail personnel. (Declaration of Andrew Brosh, ¶ 6). Often, it is just the mere presence of the contraband within the facility, not its actual use, that causes a disruption and presents a serious risk to the security of the facility. Id. Contraband is sought after, bartered for, and its mere presence can lead to violence among the jail population. Id.
Not all inmates booked and processed into MCDC are subjected to a strip search. (Declaration of Ron Bishop, ¶ 5; Declaration of Andrew Brosh, ¶ 14). Consequently, despite the effective implementation of the MCSO’s strip search policy, contraband continues to make its way into the facility. Id. The ability to perform strip searches on those inmates that meet the reasonable suspicions standards set forth in the MCSO policy is imperative to detect and eliminate the transport of drugs, weapons and contraband into the jail environment and to maintain the safety and security of the jail facility, its staff, and the general inmate population. Id.
The Sheriff’s Office has implemented a series of policies and procedures for the booking, intake, and searching of arrestees and inmates at each of the County’s custodial facilities, including MCDC. Id. Included within those policies is a detailed procedure for performing strip searches and body cavity searches on inmates. (Exhibits 101 and 102). Those policies and procedures were in existence in 2006, when plaintiffs were processed into MCDC. Id.
The County’s strip search policy is set forth in sections CD 07.109.10 et seq. and DC 12.100.040 et seq. of the Multnomah County Sheriff’s Office Corrections Division Operations
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Manual.3 (Exhibits 101 and 102). The purpose of the Sheriff’s search policy is to “prevent the introduction or possession of contraband into a Facility, to ensure the safety and security of staff, inmates, the public and the Facility.” (CD07.109.020; Ex 101). Under the policy, a strip search is defined as “[t]he visual inspection of a nude person to detect contraband or medical conditions. It includes a visual exam of all body cavities, including genitals and anus. The person is not touched in any manner during the search unless it is a forced search.” (CD 07.109.040; Exhibit 101).
The policy also distinguishes between an arrestee and an inmate. An inmate is defined as a person “who has been lodged in the jail for arraignment, trial or transfer. A person arriving on a transport for lodging in the jail. A person serving a sentence while in custody of the Sheriff.” (CD 07.109.040; Exhibit 102, p 2). An “arrestee,” by contrast, is defined a “person who has just entered a Multnomah County Sheriff’s Office Corrections Facility for booking. The person has reasonable pretrial release options still available.” Id.
The sheriff’s policy applicable to strip searches was amended on May 28, 2003 by adoption of Special Order 03-25. (Exhibit 102). Pursuant to that amended policy, inmates are subject to strip searches in a number of particular situations.
“CD07.109.053 Inmate/Arrestee Strip-Searches shall be conducted in a professional manner, so as not to harass the inmate, under the following conditions: 1. During the initial booking process if there is reasonable suspicion the arrestee or inmate is or may be carrying or concealing contraband; 2. When there is a determination of reasonable suspicion between the booking process and the dress-in process based on the criteria outlined in DC12.100.111;
3 The MCSO’s strip search policy has been revised through adoption of Special Orders 03-08, 0325, and 04-08. Those special orders are included in Ex 102.
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3. During the dress-in process if there is reasonable suspicion the arrestee or inmate is or may be carrying or concealing contraband, using drugs, is concealing a medical problem that may need treatment, or has been taken into custody for a probation or parole violation;
4. When entering the facility from a transport from another correctional or detention facility;
5. When entering the facility from an outside appointment and/or overnight hospital stay;
6. When returning to the facility from a pass;
7. When reporting to serve a sentence;
8. When being held in-transit for another law enforcement or correctional agency;
9. When returning from temporary custody with an outside agency;
10. After a contact visit;
11. Before returning to a housing area when assigned as an inmate worker;
12. At random if the inmate is performing inmate worker responsibilities;
13. Upon entering Disciplinary Segregation, unless the inmate has been strip-searched before the move and has not been out of the sight of the Escorting Deputies.”
(Exhibit 102, pp 4-5).
A strip search may also be performed based on the corrections officer’s reasonable
suspicion. (Declaration of Ron Bishop). Pursuant to policy, a strip search may take place during
the “initial booking process if there is reasonable suspicion the arrestee or inmate is or may be
carrying or concealing contraband,” or when there is a “determination of reasonable suspicion
between the booking process and the dress-in process based on the criteria outlined in DC
12.100.111.” (CD07.109.053(1), (2); Exhibit 102, p 4). The strip search policy was further
amended on May 29, 2003, by adoption of Special Order 03-08, which is attached as Ex 101, and
provides:
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Multnomah County Attorneys 501 SE Hawthorne Blvd., Suite 500
Portland, Oregon 97214 (503) 988-3138

“Deputies may assume reasonable suspicion based on the following criteria to include information provided by the Classification Unit and or the Deputies[’] observations of arrestee.
1. Current arrest for drug offense(s), violent felony/misdemeanor offense(s), or use of weapons felony charge;
2. History of drug offenses, violent offenses or use of weapons felony crime arrests;
3. History of escape;
4. History of arrests of either charges that indicate a significant probability that the arrestee would possess or traffic in contraband;
5. The odor of alcohol, drugs, or chemicals;
6. When the criminal history cannot be established because the arrestee refuses to reveal their identity.” (DC12.100.111; Exhibit 101, p 4).4
Over the course of the years in which the policies have been implemented, the Sheriff’s
Office has observed that the visual strip searches are effective both in detecting contraband and
weapons, and in deterring inmates from bringing contraband and weapons into the jail.
(Declaration of Ron Bishop, ¶ 11; Declaration of Andrew Brosh, ¶ 15). The strip search is
successful because it reveals items that are not identified with the standard pat-down search.
(Declaration of Andrew Brosh, ¶ 15). The ability to perform strip searches on those detainees
who meet the reasonable suspicions standards set forth in the MCSO policies is imperative to
maintaining the safety and security of the jail facility, its staff, and the general inmate population.
(Declaration of Ron Bishop, ¶ 12; Declaration of Andrew Brosh, ¶ 14). Despite these policies,
however, contraband continues to make its way into the secure jail facility. (Declaration of
4 The str ip search polic y was further am ended on March 22, 2004 by S pecial Order 04-08. That amendment concerned the manner in which the searches were performed.
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Multnomah County Attorneys 501 SE Hawthorne Blvd., Suite 500
Portland, Oregon 97214 (503) 988-3138

Andrew Brosh, ¶ 14). Overall, the MCSO strip search policy successfully fulfills the safety and security objections for the jail facility, either through active detection and interception, or as a deterrent, with the least amount of inconvenience or affront to the inmate. (Declaration of Andrew Brosh, ¶ 16).
B. Multnomah County’s strip search policies are constitutional. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” This right has been applied to prisoners; however, the “reasonableness of a particular search is determined by reference to the prison context.” Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 332 (9th Cir. 1988). In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 US 520, 561, 60 LEd2d 447, 99 SCt 1861 (1979), the Supreme Court considered for the first time the constitutionality of a jail’s strip search policy under the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, the court considered whether a jail’s blanket policy of performing strip searches after a pretrial detainee had a contact visits was constitutional. The court initially noted that “a detention facility is a unique place fraught with serious security dangers” where the “[s]muggling of money, drugs, weapons, and other contraband is all too common an occurrence.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 559. Accordingly, the Court extended “wideranging” deference to the decision making of jail officials, especially on matters concerning “the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.” Id. at 547, 559. In upholding the jail’s policy as constitutional, the Court cautioned that the “test for reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical
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Multnomah County Attorneys 501 SE Hawthorne Blvd., Suite 500
Portland, Oregon 97214 (503) 988-3138

application.” Bell, at 559. The Court established a test that requires “a balancing of the need for
the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must
consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.” Id. at 558. 5
The Ninth Circuit has since applied the balancing test set forth in Bell v. Wolfish to a number of cases. In Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 471 U.S. 1053
(1985), the court considered the constitutionality of a county jail’s policy of strip searching
persons booked into the county jail on minor traffic offenses. In assessing the county’s strip
search policy, the court balanced “the security needs of local jail facilities against the private
interests of arrestees charged with minor offenses.” Giles, 746 F.2d at 617.
The court, in concluding that the blanket strip search policy was unconstitutional, stated,
“we hold that arrestees charged with minor offenses may be subject to a strip search only if jail
officials possess a reasonable suspicion that the individual arrestee is carrying or concealing
contraband.” Id. The court did provide guidance, however, in identifying factors sufficient to
establish reasonable suspicion. “Reasonable suspicion may be based on such factors as the
nature of the offense, the arrestee’s appearance and conduct, and the prior arrest record.” Id. at
618. Later, in Kennedy v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 901 F.2d 702, 713 (9th Cir. 1990),6 the
court considered the Los Angeles Police Department’s blanket policy requiring all those arrested
on suspicion of having committed a felony to be subject to a strip search. The plaintiff in 5 Conversely, in Turner v. Safley, 482 US 78, 89 (198 7), the Supreme Court employed a different test, holding that “ when a pr ison regulation impinges on inmates ’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interest.” 6 Reversed on other grounds by Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 971 F.2d 298 (9th Cir 1992).
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Multnomah County Attorneys 501 SE Hawthorne Blvd., Suite 500
Portland, Oregon 97214 (503) 988-3138

Kennedy was arrested on a grand theft felony charge for withholding her roommate’s personal
property items as collateral for unpaid rent.
The court held that the department’s blanket policy of strip searching all felony arrestees
violated the Fourth Amendment. Significantly, the court found that the non-violent nature of the
felony charge did not constitute reasonable suspicion for the search. Moreover, the Department’s strip search policies under review were particularly intrusive.7 The court
continued by noting that the strip search of a felony arrestee for contraband or weapons may still be justified based on a “reasonable suspicion” standard.8 Id. at 715.
The inmate’s status within the custodial facility may also determine the precise
parameters of the search. The courts have “consistently recognized a distinction between
detainees awaiting bail and those entering the jail population when evaluating the necessity of a
strip search under constitutional standards.” See Cottrell v. Kaysville City, Utah, 994 F.2d 730, 735 (10th Cir. 1993); Fuller v. MG Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 1448 (9th Cir. 1991); Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007, 1013 (4th Cir. 1981). For example, courts have upheld blanket strip search policies in prison settings. See Michefelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328 (9th Cir.
1988)(holding that frequent routine strip searches in maximum security unit were constitutional); Rickman v. Avaniti, 854 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1988)(holding that prison’s blanket policy strip search with visual body cavity inspection was constitutional); Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694 (9th
Cir. 1997)(holding that unannounced visual body cavity strip search based on drug disciplinary
7 The Department’s policy was essentially a perfunctory body-cavity search of all fel ony arrestees. Kennedy, 901 F.2d at 711. 8 Interestingly, the court in Kennedy cited to Turner v. Safley, 482 US 78, 89 (1 987), and implicitly endorsed the Turner court’s holding that the strip search policy must be “reasonably related to the penal institution’s interest in maintaining security.” Kennedy, at 713.
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Multnomah County Attorneys 501 SE Hawthorne Blvd., Suite 500
Portland, Oregon 97214 (503) 988-3138

history was constitutional). Accordingly, the status of the individual subjected to the search is yet another aspect of the reasonable suspicion analysis.
The reasonableness of the strip search is further based on the manner and place in which it is conducted, and the justifications for initiating it. Bell, 441 US at 559. The courts have held that the scope of a strip search is “frightening and humiliating” despite “all due courtesy.” Way, 445 F.3d at 1160, quoting Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1984). The Multnomah County Sheriff’s Office is cognizant of the intrusive nature of the strip search. To accommodate those concerns, the County’s policy directs that all strip searches take place in a private area at MCDC, in a separate stalled area.9 In the present case, plaintiffs take no issue with the manner in which the strip searches were performed.
Under Bell, the final inquiry is whether the intrusion was justified. The reasonableness of a particular search is determined by legitimate government interests such as “maintaining jail security, and effective management of [the] detention facility.” Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 933 (9th Cir. 2004). In the present case, plaintiffs claim that they were each charged with misdemeanor or minor crimes, and that those charges do not support the level of reasonable suspicion required to perform the strip search. The gravamen of plaintiffs’ claim, however, is that the County has “a written and/or de facto policy, custom or practice of strip searching all individuals who enter the custody of the Multnomah County Jail . . . regardless of the nature of the charged crime.” (Amended Complaint, ¶ 23). Plaintiffs’ blanket-policy claim obviates the need to evaluate each claim on a case-by case basis. Accordingly, the particularized facts unique
9 The portion of the policy pertaining to the manner the search is performed was amended in March 22, 2004 by Special Order 04-08. (Ex 102).
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Multnomah County Attorneys 501 SE Hawthorne Blvd., Suite 500
Portland, Oregon 97214 (503) 988-3138

to each plaintiff and the County’s resultant justification for conducting the strip search are not at issue.
Plaintiffs were not subjected to a strip search based on a blanket written or de facto policy. To the contrary, the County’s strip search policy is tailored to undertake strip searches only in those situations when the deputies are presented with facts or circumstances – either historical or present – in which the arrestee or inmate presents with risk factors that may result in the introduction of weapons or contraband in the secure jail facility. Those facts, considered collectively or standing alone, constitute the individualized level of reasonable suspicion to justify the strip search of the particular individual.
A search based on an individualized suspicion will pass constitutional muster if it is based on an objectively reasonable belief that the particular inmate is carrying or concealing contraband or weapons. Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 1447 (9th Cir. 1991). Reasonable suspicion may be based on a number of factors, such as the nature of the offense, the arrestee’s appearance and conduct, and any prior arrest or criminal records. Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d at 615 (emphasis added).
The County’s strip search policy includes the factors that amount to reasonable suspicion. The enumerated bases to justify a strip search are factors that are incorporated in the County’s strip search policies. These factors further a legitimate security interest, and weigh heavily in favor of protecting the jail facility, its inmates, and staff from the perils associated with the introduction of contraband and weapons. “Reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment must afford police the right to strip search arrestees whose offenses posed the very threat of violence by weapons or contraband drugs that they must curtail in prison.” Watt v. City of Richardson
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Multnomah County Attorneys 501 SE Hawthorne Blvd., Suite 500
Portland, Oregon 97214 (503) 988-3138

Police Dept, 849F.2d 195, 198 (5th Cir. 1988). The County’s policy is reasonable. Moreover, consistent with the Supreme Court’s direction in Bell, deference should be given to law enforcement authorities when construing the strip search policies. See also Block v. Rutherford, 468 US 576, 584 (1984)(prison officials are to be afforded wide-ranging deference in adoption and exercise of policies to preserve internal order).
The Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Way v. County of Ventura, 445 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2006), does not alter the analysis or the outcome of the present case. In Way, the Ninth Circuit held that the strip search of a pre-trial detainee on a misdemeanor drug charge of visible intoxication was unconstitutional. The search was performed pursuant to the County’s blanket policy of performing searches of all persons arrested on fresh misdemeanor drug charges.
Way is distinguishable and does not control the disposition of the present case. First, the strip search in Way was performed during the booking process on an arrestee facing a misdemeanor charge of visible intoxication. The court found that there existed no facts to support reasonable suspicion. Moreover, the arrestee was not processed and admitted into the general jail population. Rather, she was booked and then released. See also Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d 614, 615 (9th Cir. 1984)(suspicionless search during booking of individual arrested on minor traffic offenses violated Fourth Amendment). Lastly, the court concluded that the policy failed to be linked in any way to legitimate security concerns. Way, 45 F.3d at 1161.
Recently, the Ninth Circuit ruled that a blanket policy of performing strip searches of all inmates classified into the general jail population was unconstitutional. Bull v. City and County of San Francisco, 2008 U.S. App LEXIS 18026 (August 22, 2008). The court’s holding in Bull, however, does not alter the analysis or the outcome of the present case. Specifically, the policy
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Multnomah County Attorneys 501 SE Hawthorne Blvd., Suite 500
Portland, Oregon 97214 (503) 988-3138

at issue in Bull was described by the court as a “blanket policy of strip searching all individuals who were classified for housing in the general jail population, regardless of the crime for which they were charged.” Id. at 4. The court’s decision in Bull is perhaps the Ninth Circuit’s most far-reaching ruling pertaining to strip searches. As in most strip search cases, however, its holding is based on “case-specific circumstances.” Id. at 17.
In the present case, as discussed above, no such blanket policy of performing strip searches exists. Strip searches are performed based on individualized and case-specific factors set forth in the MCSO’s policies. Moreover, the MCSO’s policies are designed to ensure the safe and orderly operation of the facility and protect inmates and jail staff from the disruptions that occur by the introduction into the jail of contraband or weapons. The Ninth Circuit has “acknowledged the difficult security problems present in some local jail facilities,” and in deference has recognized that the court is “not free to substitute our views on proper jail administration for that of the jails’ actual administrators.” Giles, 746 F.2d at 617 (citing Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984). The MCSO’s policy of performing strip searches based on the exacting criteria enumerated by the courts does not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Because Multnomah County does not have a written or de facto blanket strip search policy, plaintiffs cannot meet their burden necessary to survive summary judgment. Accordingly, defendants are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Consequently, the court does not need to consider the issue of qualified immunity or any claims brought pursuant to Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 US 658, 98 SCt 2018, 56 LEd 2d 611 (1978). Aguilera v. Baca, 510 F.3d 1161, 1167 (9th Cir. 2007).
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Multnomah County Attorneys 501 SE Hawthorne Blvd., Suite 500
Portland, Oregon 97214 (503) 988-3138

The MCSO policy speaks for itself. No genuine issue of material fact is in dispute. Accordingly, defendants Multnomah County and Sheriff Giusto are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, defendants Multnomah County and Sheriff Giusto respectfully request that this Court grant Summary Judgment in defendants’ favor, and that plaintiffs’ complaint be dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this 3rd day of September, 2008. AGNES SOWLE, COUNTY ATTORNEY FOR MULTNOMAH COUNTY, OREGON
s/ Stephen L. Madkour __________________________________________ Stephen L. Madkour, OSB No. 94109 Assistant County Attorney
Of Attorneys for Defendants Multnomah County, Bernie Giusto
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Multnomah County Attorneys 501 SE Hawthorne Blvd., Suite 500
Portland, Oregon 97214 (503) 988-3138

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on September 3, 2008, I served the foregoing DEFENDANTS’
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT on:
Leonard R. Berman Attorney at Law 4711 SW Huber St., #E-3 Portland, OR 97219
Attorney for Plaintiffs
by the following method or methods as indicated:
( X ) by Electronic Court Filing (LR 100).

_____________

s/ Nora McConnell _____________________
Nora McConnell Paralegal

Page 17 – CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Multnomah County Attorneys 501 SE Hawthorne Blvd., Suite 500
Portland, Oregon 97214 (503) 988-3138

 
 FllED'08 NITv' 1913(J6USnc·QRP

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

RILEY HINDS, et aI.,

)

)

Plaintiff(s),

)

)

v.

)

)

MULTNOMAH COUNTY, et aI.,

)

)

Defendant(s).

)

Civil No. 07-1677-PK
ORDER OF DISMISSAL AS TO PLAINTIFFS HlNDS,BAKIMOGLU, MCCALLUM, MUNSON AND MCMULLIN (ONLY)

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Voluntary Motion to Dismiss Individual Plaintiffs [29] is GRANTED. Plaintiffs Riley Hinds, Alan Hakirnoglu, Thomas McCallum, Amy Munson and Michael B. McMullin are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice.

Dated this 19th day ofNovember, 2008.

by S.~I4r~ United States District Judge

 
 Case 3:07-cv-01677-PK Document 37 Filed 12/08/08 Page 1 of 6 Page ID#: 218
Leonard R. Berman 4711 SW Huber St., Suite E-3 Portland, OR 97219 (503) 473-8787 OSB # 96040 Easyrabbi@yahoo.com ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

____________________________________

:

SANDRA SILVIA,

:

:

Plaintiff,

:

:

v.

:

:

MULNOMAH COUNTY,

:

BERNIE GIUSTO,

:

both individually and in his

:

official capacity as Sheriff,

:

DEPUTY DIAMOND, Personally,

:

DEPUTY TOWERS-PICTON, Personally, :

:

Defendants.

:

:

____________________________________:

Civil Action Number CV 07-1677 PK
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 4th Am. Violation, Monell Claim

JURISDICTION 1. This Court has jurisdiction over this action under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1341 & 1343 because it is filed to obtain compensatory damages, punitive damages, and injunctive relief for the deprivation, under color of state law, of the rights of citizens of the United States secured by the Constitution and federal law pursuant to 42
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 1

Case 3:07-cv-01677-PK Document 37 Filed 12/08/08 Page 2 of 6 Page ID#: 219
U.S.C. §§ 1981 & 1983. This Court also has jurisdiction over this action under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2201, as it is filed to obtain declaratory relief relative to the Constitutionality of the policies of a local government.
2. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(2) because the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims and those of proposed class members occurred in this judicial district.
PARTIES 2b. Defendant Multnomah County (the “County”) is a county government organized and existing under the laws of the State of Oregon. At all times relevant hereto, the County, acting through its Sheriff’s Department, was responsible for the policies, practices, supervision, implementation and conduct of all matters pertaining to the Multnomah County Jail and was responsible for the appointment, training, supervision and conduct of all Sheriff’s Department personnel, including those working in the Multnomah County Jail. In addition, at all relevant times, the County was responsible for enforcing the rules of the Multnomah County Jail, and for ensuring that Sheriff’s Department personnel employed in the Jail obey the Constitution and laws of the United States and of the State of Oregon. 3. The Multnomah County Sheriff’s Department (the “Sheriff’s Department”) is a County Sheriff’s Department organized and existing under the laws of the State of Oregon. At all times relevant hereto, the Sheriff’s Department was responsible for operating, organizing, overseeing and administering the Multnomah County Jail (“MCJ”). At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Sheriff’s Department, together with
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 2

Case 3:07-cv-01677-PK Document 37 Filed 12/08/08 Page 3 of 6 Page ID#: 220
Multnomah County was responsible for the polices, practices, supervision, implementation and conduct of all matters pertaining to the MCDC, and was responsible for the appointment, training, supervision and conduct of all Sheriff’s Department personnel, including those working in the MCDC. In addition, at all times relevant hereto, Defendant Sheriff’s Department, together with Multnomah County, was responsible for enforcing the rules of the Multnomah County Jail, and for ensuring that Sheriff’s Department personnel employed in the MCJ obeyed the Constitution and laws of the United States and of the State of Oregon.
4. Defendant Bernie Giusto (“Sheriff Giusto”) is the duly elected Sheriff of Multnomah County, and, as such, is a policy maker with respect to the treatment of pretrial and other detainees over which the MCJ exercises custodial or other control. Sheriff Giusto is made a Defendant in this action in both his individual and official capacities.
5. Deputy Diamond and Deputy Towers-Picton are employees of Multnomah County.
6. Sandra Silvia, a Multnomah County resident, was strip-searched December 11, 2006 on Theft and Forgery charges.
FACTS
7. Ms. Silvia came in to custody on assorted charges including Theft 1 and a history of Burglary 1. Classification Deputy Tamara Towers-Picton, mistakenly believed that Theft 1 and Burglary 1 were violent crime charges and authorized a strip search of Ms. Silvia by Deputy Diamond. She was later informed by her superior Sgt. Johnson that Theft 1 and Burglary 1 are not violent charges per se and that Silvia should not have been strip searched.
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 3

Case 3:07-cv-01677-PK Document 37 Filed 12/08/08 Page 4 of 6 Page ID#: 221
8. Multnomah County Policies , practices, customs, procedures, manuals, memoranda, and trainings do not delineate in thorough or exhaustive fashion which felonies are strip search eligible and which are not.
9. On December 11, 2006, Ms. Silvia removed all of her clothing, including her underpants. On this occasion, a Corrections Officer Diamond then instructed Ms. Silvia to turn around, bend at the waist, spread the lobes of her buttocks and squat while coughing, with the Corrections Officer conducting a visual inspection of Ms. Silvia’s genitals and rectal cavity. Ms. Silvia was then provided with a jail uniform.
10. On this occasion, there was no reasonable suspicion to believe that Ms. Silvia was concealing a weapon or other contraband.
11. As a direct and proximate result of the unlawful strip search conducted pursuant to County and Sheriff’s Department policy, practice and custom, Ms. Silvia has suffered and continues to suffer psychological pain, humiliation, suffering and mental anguish.
CAUSE OF ACTION AS AND FOR A FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS
(Fourth Amendment Violation)
12. The Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury. 13. Defendant Multnomah County had a custom, policy or practice not to train deputies in the distinction between strip search eligible and non-strip search eligible felonies, and did not maintain a posted policy or directive instructing which offenses
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 4

Case 3:07-cv-01677-PK Document 37 Filed 12/08/08 Page 5 of 6 Page ID#: 222
were eligible for strip search, which was the proximate cause of Sandra Silvia receiving an unconstitutional strip search on or about December 11, 2006.
14. Defendant Towers-Picton violated Silvia's rights to be free of unreasonable search and seizure by authorizing her for a strip search absent reasonable suspicion that she was secreting weapons or contraband.
15. Defendant Diamond violated Silvia's rights to be free of unreasonable search and seizure by conducting a strip search absent reasonable suspicion that she was secreting weapons or contraband.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF A. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Sandra Silvia, requests that this Honorable Court grant her the following relief: B. A judgment against all Defendants, jointly and severally on Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action detailed herein, awarding Compensatory Damages to Plaintiff and in an amount to be determined by a Jury and/or the Court . C. A judgment against Defendant Giusto, et al on Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action for punitive damages. D. A declaratory judgment against all Defendants declaring the County of Multnomah and the Multnomah County Sheriff’s Department’s policy, practice and custom of strip and visual cavity searching all detainees entering the Multnomah County Jail, regardless of the crime charged or suspicion of contraband, to be unconstitutional and improper. E. A monetary award for attorney’s fees and the costs of this action, pursuant to 42
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 5

Case 3:07-cv-01677-PK Document 37 Filed 12/08/08 Page 6 of 6 Page ID#: 223

U.S.C. § 1988 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. Dated: December 8, 2008

Respectfully submitted by:
//S// Leonard R, Berman
__________________________
Leonard R. Berman, OSB # 96040 ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 6

 
 Case 3:07-cv-01677-PK As of 05/10/2013 07:52 AM PDT Page 1 of 6 Page ID#: <pageID>
PARTCONS,PR1983,TERMINATED
U.S. District Court District of Oregon (Portland (3)) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:07−cv−01677−PK

Silvia v. Multnomah County et al Assigned to: Magistrate Judge Paul Papak Cause: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights
Plaintiff Riley Hinds both individually and on behalf of a class of others similarly situated TERMINATED: 11/19/2008
Plaintiff Sandra Silvia both individually and on behalf of a class of others similarly situated
Plaintiff Alan Hakimoglu both individually and on behalf of a class of others similarly situated TERMINATED: 11/19/2008
Plaintiff Thomas McCallum both individually and on behalf of a class of others similarly situated TERMINATED: 11/19/2008
Plaintiff Amy Munson both individually and on behalf of a class of others similarly situated TERMINATED: 11/19/2008
Plaintiff Michael B. McMullin both individually and on behalf of a class of others similarly situated TERMINATED: 11/19/2008

Date Filed: 11/08/2007 Date Terminated: 05/12/2009 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 550 Prisoner: Civil Rights Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Leonard Randolph Berman Law Office of Leonard R. Berman 4711 SW Huber Street Suite E−3 Portland, OR 97219 (503) 473−8787 Fax: (503) 473−8787 Email: easyrabbi@yahoo.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Leonard Randolph Berman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Leonard Randolph Berman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Leonard Randolph Berman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Leonard Randolph Berman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Leonard Randolph Berman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Multnomah County

represented by Stephen Lewis Madkour Clackamas County Counsel 2051 Kaen Road

Case 3:07-cv-01677-PK As of 05/10/2013 07:52 AM PDT Page 2 of 6 Page ID#: <pageID>

Oregon City, OR 97045 503−655−8362 Fax: 503−742−5397 Email: smadkour@co.clackamas.or.us LEAD ATTORNEY

Agnes Sowle Clackamas County Counsel 2051 Kaen Road Oregon City, OR 97045 (503) 655−8362 Fax: (503) 742−5397 Email: asowle@co.clackamas.or.us

Defendant
Bernie Giusto both individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff

represented by Stephen Lewis Madkour (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Agnes Sowle (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Deputy Diamond personally

represented by Stephen Lewis Madkour (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Defendant
Deputy Towers−Picton personally

represented by Stephen Lewis Madkour (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 11/08/2007
11/08/2007
12/06/2007 12/13/2007 01/22/2008 01/23/2008

# Docket Text
1 Complaint. Filing Fee in amount of $350 collected. Receipt No. 18357 issued.Filed by Riley Hinds against Multnomah County, Bernie Giusto. (eo) (Entered: 11/09/2007)
2 Discovery and Pretrial Scheduling Order and Notice of Case Assignment to the Honorable Paul Papak. Discovery is to be completed by 3/7/2008. Joint Alternate Dispute Resolution Report is due by 4/7/2008. Pretrial Order is due by 4/7/2008. Ordered by Judge Paul Papak. (eo) (Entered: 11/09/2007)
3 Waiver of Service of Summons Returned Executed by Multnomah County waiver sent on 12/6/2007. Filed by all defendants. (Sowle, Agnes) (Entered: 12/06/2007)
4 Notice of Association of Attorney.Filed by Multnomah County, Bernie Giusto. (Madkour, Stephen) (Entered: 12/13/2007)
5 Answer to Complaint with Jury Demand and Affirmative Defenses. Filed by Multnomah County, Bernie Giusto. (Madkour, Stephen) (Entered: 01/22/2008)
6 CIVIL MINUTES: Record of Order by Judge Paul Papak: Rule 16 Conference set for 2/19/2008 at 1:30PM in Chambers. Local Rules 16.2(b) and 26.1(a)(b) require that counsel confer prior to the conference. At the conference, counsel should be prepared to discuss the status of the case, relevant dates and deadlines, and any other significant issues. If consents are going to be filed, it is helpful if they are filed prior to the time of the conference, particularly if a firm trial date is desired. (gm) (Entered: 01/23/2008)

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02/19/2008
06/19/2008 06/19/2008 06/20/2008 06/23/2008 06/23/2008 07/21/2008 07/21/2008 07/23/2008 07/23/2008
07/28/2008 09/03/2008 09/03/2008 09/03/2008 09/03/2008

7 CIVIL MINUTES: Record of Proceedings before Judge Paul Papak: Rule 16 Conference held 2/19/08. Order Resetting the following deadline: Discovery to be completed by 8/8/2008. Order: Setting a further Telephone Scheduling Conference for 8/4/2008 at 10:00AM in Chambers. The Court will initiate the call to counsel. Leonard Berman present as counsel for plaintiff(s). Stephen Madkour present as counsel for defendant(s). Court Reporter: (None). (gm) (Entered: 02/20/2008)
8 Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint/Petition. Filed by all plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Proposed Amended Complaint) (Berman, Leonard) (Entered: 06/19/2008)
9 Declaration of Leonard Berman. Filed by all plaintiffs. (Related document(s): Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint/Petition 8 .) (Berman, Leonard) (Entered: 06/19/2008)
10 CIVIL MINUTES: Record of Order by Judge Paul Papak: Setting Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint 8 on the under advisement calendar of 7/21/2008. (gm) (Entered: 06/20/2008)
11 Response to Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint/Petition 8 Oral Argument requested. Filed by Multnomah County, Bernie Giusto. (Madkour, Stephen) (Entered: 06/23/2008)
12 CIVIL MINUTES: Record of Order by Judge Paul Papak: Resetting Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint 8 from the Under Advisement Calendar of 7/21/2008 to the Oral Argument Calendar of 7/23/2008 at 10:00AM in Courtroom 10−B. (gm) (Entered: 06/24/2008)
13 Motion for Leave To File Revised Amended Complaint. Oral requested. Filed by all plaintiffs. (Berman, Leonard) (Entered: 07/21/2008)
14 Declaration of Leonard Berman. Filed by all plaintiffs. (Related document(s): Motion for Leave 13 .) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A) (Berman, Leonard) (Entered: 07/21/2008)
15 Amended Complaint.Filed by Riley Hinds against all defendants. (Berman, Leonard) (Entered: 07/23/2008)
16 CIVIL MINUTES: Record of Proceedings before Judge Paul Papak: Oral Argument held 7/23/08. Order: Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint 8 and Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Revised Amended Complaint 13 are Granted. Plaintiff will have until 7/25/2008 to file his revised amended complaint. Order Resetting the following deadlines: Discovery is to be completed by 9/22/2008. Dispositive Motions are due by 9/22/2008. Written consents, if any, should be submitted by 9/22/2008. Pretrial Order deadline will be reset at a later date, if necessary. Order: Striking the Telephone Scheduling Conference of 8/4/2008 at 10:00AM. Leonard Berman present as counsel for plaintiff(s). Stephen Madkour present as counsel for defendant(s). Court Reporter: Dennis Apodaca. (gm) (Entered: 07/23/2008)
17 Answer to Amended Complaint. Filed by Multnomah County, Bernie Giusto. (Madkour, Stephen) (Entered: 07/28/2008)
18 Motion for Summary Judgment. Oral Argument requested. Filed by Multnomah County, Bernie Giusto. (Madkour, Stephen) (Entered: 09/03/2008)
19 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. Filed by Multnomah County, Bernie Giusto. (Related document(s): Motion for Summary Judgment 18 .) (Madkour, Stephen) (Entered: 09/03/2008)
20 Concise Statement of Material Fact in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. Filed by Multnomah County, Bernie Giusto. (Related document(s): Motion for Summary Judgment 18 .) (Madkour, Stephen) (Entered: 09/03/2008)
21 Declaration of Chief Deputy Ron Bishop in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. Filed by Multnomah County, Bernie Giusto. (Related document(s): Motion for Summary Judgment 18 .) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibits 101, 102 and 103) (Madkour, Stephen) (Entered: 09/03/2008)

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09/03/2008 09/03/2008 09/17/2008 09/18/2008 09/18/2008 09/18/2008 09/22/2008
11/18/2008 11/19/2008
11/25/2008 11/25/2008 11/26/2008
12/02/2008 12/02/2008

22 Declaration of Lieutenant Andrew Brosh in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. Filed by Multnomah County, Bernie Giusto. (Related document(s): Motion for Summary Judgment 18 .) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 104) (Madkour, Stephen) (Entered: 09/03/2008)
23 CIVIL MINUTES: Record of Order by Judge Paul Papak: Setting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 18 on the Oral Argument Calendar of 10/14/2008 at 10:30AM in Courtroom 10−B. (gm) (Entered: 09/03/2008)
24 CIVIL MINUTES: Record of Order by Judge Paul Papak: Setting a Telephone Conference for 9/22/2008 at 11:00AM in Chambers. The Court will initiate the call to counsel. Order: Counsel shall submit brief e−mail summaries of disputed issues (using the Courtroom Deputy's e−mail address) no later than noon on 9/19/2008. (gm) (Entered: 09/17/2008)
25 Motion for Extension of Discovery &PTO Deadlines Re Rule 56 (F) Motion. Oral Argument requested. Filed by all plaintiffs. (Berman, Leonard) (Entered: 09/18/2008)
26 Declaration of Leonard Berman. Filed by all plaintiffs. (Related document(s): Motion for Extension of Discovery &PTO Deadlines 25 .) (Berman, Leonard) (Entered: 09/18/2008)
27 Memorandum in Support. Filed by all plaintiffs. (Related document(s): Motion for Extension of Discovery &PTO Deadlines 25 .) (Berman, Leonard) (Entered: 09/18/2008)
28 CIVIL MINUTES: Record of Order by Judge Paul Papak: Telephone Conference held 9/22/08. Order: Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time 25 is Granted as follows and as modified: Discovery is to be completed by 11/17/2008. Responses to Dispositive Motions are due by 12/5/2008. Order: Setting another Telephone Conference re: dispositive motion briefing schedule for 12/8/2008 at 10:30AM in Chambers. The Court will initiate the call to counsel. Order: Striking the Oral Argument of 10/14/2008 at 10:30AM re: Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 18 . This motion will be reset at a later date. Leonard Berman present as counsel for plaintiff(s). Stephen Madkour present as counsel for defendant(s). Court Reporter: (None). (gm) (Entered: 09/22/2008)
29 Unopposed Motion to Dismiss Select Plaintiffs Voluntarily. Filed by all plaintiffs. (Berman, Leonard) (Entered: 11/18/2008)
30 ORDER OF DISMISSAL AS TO PLAINTIFFS HINDS, HAKIMOGLU, MCCALLUM, MUNSON AND MCMULLIN (ONLY): Plaintiffs' Voluntary Motion to Dismiss Individual Plaintiffs 29 is Granted. Plaintiffs Riley Hinds, Alan Hakimoglu, Thomas McCallum, Amy Munson and Michael B. McMullin are hereby Dismissed without prejudice. Signed on 11/19/08 by Judge Ancer L. Haggerty. (gm) (Entered: 11/19/2008)
31 Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint/Petition 2D. Oral Argument requested. Filed by Sandra Silvia. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A) (Berman, Leonard) (Entered: 11/25/2008)
32 Declaration of Leonard Berman. Filed by Sandra Silvia. (Related document(s): Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint/Petition 31 .) (Berman, Leonard) (Entered: 11/25/2008)
33 CIVIL MINUTES: Record of Order by Judge Paul Papak: Granting Plaintiff's unopposed Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint 31 . Plaintiff shall promptly file the amended complaint entitled "Second Amended Complaint." The case caption shall reflect the second amended complaint and any future filings shall reflect the new caption Silva v. Multnomah County, et al. (gm) (Entered: 11/26/2008)
34 Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint/Petition Revised. Oral Argument requested. Filed by Sandra Silvia. (Berman, Leonard) (Entered: 12/02/2008)
35 CIVIL MINUTES: Record of Order by Judge Paul Papak: Setting a Telephone Conference re: Plaintiff's pending Revised Motion for Leave to File Second

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12/03/2008 12/08/2008 12/08/2008
12/11/2008 12/12/2008 02/04/2009 02/25/2009 03/04/2009
03/10/2009 03/10/2009 03/10/2009 03/10/2009 03/20/2009 03/20/2009
04/29/2009

Amended Complaint 34 for 12/8/2008 at 10:30AM in Chambers (at the time set for a conference re: dispositive motion briefing schedule). The Court will initiate the call to counsel. (gm) (Entered: 12/03/2008)
36 Response to Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint/Petition Revised 34 . Filed by Multnomah County, Bernie Giusto. (Madkour, Stephen) (Entered: 12/03/2008)
37 Second Amended Complaint.Filed by Sandra Silvia against all defendants. (Berman, Leonard) (Entered: 12/08/2008)
38 CIVIL MINUTES: Record of Proceedings before Judge Paul Papak: Telephone Conference held 12/8/08. Order: Plaintiff's Revised Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint 34 is Granted. Plaintiff shall promptly file the Second Amended Complaint. Order Resetting the following deadlines: Discovery to be completed by 4/10/2009. Dispositive Motions are due by 4/30/2009. Leonard Berman present as counsel for plaintiff(s). Stephen Madkour present as counsel for defendant(s). Court Reporter: (None). (gm) (Entered: 12/08/2008)
39 Motion to Withdraw Motion for Summary Judgment. Filed by Deputy Diamond, Deputy Towers−Picton, Multnomah County, Bernie Giusto. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Allowing Defendants to Withdraw Motion for Summary Judgment) (Madkour, Stephen) (Entered: 12/11/2008)
40 ORDER: Granting Defendants' Motion to Withdraw Motion for Summary Judgment 39 : Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 18 is Withdrawn. Signed on 12/12/08 by Judge Paul Papak. (gm) (Entered: 12/12/2008)
41 Answer to Amended Complaint Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Second Amended Complaint. Filed by Deputy Diamond, Deputy Towers−Picton, Multnomah County, Bernie Giusto. (Madkour, Stephen) (Entered: 02/04/2009)
42 CIVIL MINUTES: Record of Order by Judge Paul Papak: Setting a Telephone Conference re: fees dispute for 3/4/2009 at 10:30AM in Chambers. The Court will initiate the call to counsel. (gm) (Entered: 02/25/2009)
43 CIVIL MINUTES: Record of Proceedings before Judge Paul Papak: Telephone Conference held 3/4/09. Order: Plaintiff shall file a formal motion for fees by 3/10/2009. Leonard Berman present as counsel for plaintiff(s). Stephen Madkour present as counsel for defendant(s). Court Reporter: (None). (gm) (Entered: 03/04/2009)
44 Motion for Attorney Fees. Filed by all plaintiffs. (Berman, Leonard) (Entered: 03/10/2009)
45 Memorandum in Support. Filed by all plaintiffs. (Related document(s): Motion for Attorney Fees 44 .) (Berman, Leonard) (Entered: 03/10/2009)
46 Declaration of Leonard R. Berman. Filed by all plaintiffs. (Related document(s): Motion for Attorney Fees 44 .) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1. Billing statment) (Berman, Leonard) (Entered: 03/10/2009)
47 CIVIL MINUTES: Record of Order by Judge Paul Papak: Setting Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees 44 on the under advisement calendar of 4/13/2009. (gm) (Entered: 03/11/2009)
48 Memorandum in Opposition (Defendants' Objections) to Motion for Attorney Fees 44 . Filed by Deputy Diamond, Deputy Towers−Picton, Multnomah County, Bernie Giusto. (Madkour, Stephen) (Entered: 03/20/2009)
49 Declaration of Stephen L. Madkour in Support of Defendants' Objections to Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees. Filed by Deputy Diamond, Deputy Towers−Picton, Multnomah County, Bernie Giusto. (Related document(s): Motion for Attorney Fees 44 .) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 101, # 2 Exhibit 102, # 3 Exhibit 103, # 4 Exhibit 104) (Madkour, Stephen) (Entered: 03/20/2009)
50 OPINION &ORDER: Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees 44 . Plaintiff's counsel may recover $3,975.00 in fees. Signed on 4/29/09 by Judge Paul Papak. (gm) (Entered: 04/29/2009)

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05/08/2009 05/12/2009
05/13/2009
07/28/2009 07/28/2009 07/30/2009 07/30/2009
07/30/2009 08/12/2009 08/19/2009

51 Accepted Offer of Judgment. Filed by Deputy Diamond, Deputy Towers−Picton, Multnomah County, Bernie Giusto. (Madkour, Stephen) (Entered: 05/08/2009)
52 Judgment: It is Ordered and Adjudged that judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants Multnomah County, Bernie Giusto, Deputy Diamond and Deputy Towers−Picton in the sum of $5,001.01, plus reasonable, legally recoverable attorney fees and costs incurred by the Plaintiff through the date of service of their accepted Offer to Allow Judgment. Recoverable costs and attorney fees shall be determined by the Court in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 54, and LR 54. Pending motions, if any, are Denied as Moot. Signed on 5/12/09 by Judge Ancer L. Haggerty. (gm) (Entered: 05/12/2009)
53 Amended Judgment: It is Ordered and Adjudged that judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants Multnomah County, Bernie Giusto, Deputy Diamond and Deputy Towers−Picton in the sum of $5,001.01, plus reasonable, legally recoverable attorney fees and costs incurred by the Plaintiff through the date of service of their accepted Offer to Allow Judgment. Recoverable costs and attorney fees shall be determined by the Court in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 54, and LR 54. Pending motions, if any, are Denied as Moot. Signed on 5/13/09 by Judge Ancer L. Haggerty. (Original judgment amended to correct spelling of Plaintiff's last name.) (gm) (Entered: 05/14/2009)
54 Motion for Leave To File Untimely Cost Bill. Filed by Sandra Silvia. (Berman, Leonard) (Entered: 07/28/2009)
55 Declaration of Leonard R. Berman. Filed by Sandra Silvia. (Related document(s): Motion for Leave 54 .) (Berman, Leonard) (Entered: 07/28/2009)
56 Response in Opposition to Motion for Leave To File Untimely Cost Bill 54 . Filed by Deputy Diamond, Deputy Towers−Picton, Multnomah County, Bernie Giusto. (Madkour, Stephen) (Entered: 07/30/2009)
57 Declaration of Stephen L. Madkour in Support of Defendants' Objections to Motion for Leave to File Untimely Costs Bill. Filed by Deputy Diamond, Deputy Towers−Picton, Multnomah County, Bernie Giusto. (Related document(s): Motion for Leave 54 .) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibits 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108) (Madkour, Stephen) (Entered: 07/30/2009)
58 CIVIL MINUTES: Record of Order by Judge Paul Papak: Setting Plaintiff's Motion for Leave To File Untimely Bill of Costs 54 on the under advisement calendar of 8/17/2009. (gm) (Entered: 07/30/2009)
59 Reply to Response to Motion for Leave To File Untimely Cost Bill 54 . Filed by Sandra Silvia. (Berman, Leonard) (Entered: 08/12/2009)
60 OPINION &ORDER: Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File an Untimely Bill of Costs 54 is Denied. Signed on 8/19/09 by Judge Paul Papak. (gm) (Entered: 08/19/2009)