Case 3:05-cv-00419-KRG Document 1 Filed 11/04/05 Page 1 of 21

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
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LINDA ALEXANDER by her guardians and next friends

FRANCESALEXANDERANDMARY ALEXANDER;KATHIE

CENTI by her guardians and next friends AUGUST CENTI AND

WINIFRED CENTI; RICHARD EMERICK by his guardians and

next friends DEWEY EMERICK, VIRGINIA MERRITT

(Guardianship in process.); CONSTANCE FOX

by her

guardian and next friend NATALIE FOX; MARY JANE KIES

by her guardian and next friend FRANCES IRVIN (Guardianship

in process.); ROBERT LUCIANO by his guardian and next friend

FRANK LUCIANO; MARY ELLEN MARTIN

by h e r

guardian and next friend CLARA LINDSEY; MICHAEL

MASSIMO by his guardians and next friends JO-ANNE

OVERDORF AND RICHARD OVERDORF; ROBERT MINOR

by his guardian and next friend DIANNE FOX; GERTRUDE

MILLS by her guardian and next friend WILLIAM MILLS;

KATHLEEN MONTGOMERY by her guardian and next friend

WILLIAM V. MONTGOMERY, JR.; RONALD REPLOGLE by

his guardian and next friend BONNIE WOOD (Guardianship in

process.); JOHN SHEA by his guardian and next friend MARY

ANN BOYLAN (Guardianship in process.); MARGIE SPORY by

her guardian and next friend HATTIE WILLIAMS; ROBYNE

WHEELER by her guardian and next friend BEVERLY

WHEELER; MARGARET WYLAND by her guardians and next

friends

EDWARD WYLAND AND MARIAN WYLAND;

RICHARD BARTLEBAUGH by his sister and next friend RENEE

HOOVER; MELISSA BROADBENT by her father and next friend

LARRY R. BROADBENT; LINDA BRONDER by her next friend

KENNETH BRONDER; BARBARA DEBELLO by her next friend

JULIO DEBELLO; PATRICK GAVIGAN by his next friend ANN

LANDEFELD; GARY GOSNELL by his father and next friend

GARY GOSNELL; EDWARD HAMPTON by his next friends

DORA HAMPTON AND LLOYD HAMPTON; SHARON

HARRISON by her next friend FRED HARRISON; PEGGY

KELLY by her next friend

LARRY KELLY; JACK

KIRSCHBAUM by his next friend DARLENE SALTSGIVER;

LORNA KUHN by her next friend ARLENE DEARMENT; ROSE

LONG by her next friend MARY JONES; ROGER LOSEY by his

next friend RODNEY LOSEY; PHILIP MCGANN by his next

COMPLAINT

Case 3:05-cv-00419-KRG Document 1 Filed 11/04/05 Page 2 of 21
friends PAUL MCGANN AND MARY JANE MCGANN; FRANCESNEIBURG byhernextfriendESTHER GORDON; WANDA PABIAN by her next friend LOUISE PABIAN; JOHN SHEA by his sister and next friend MARY ANNE SHEA BOYLAN; DORIS STEWART by her next friend JOSEPH STEWART; LEE ANN STIFFLER by her next friend LORNA CLARK; VADA STRAIT by her next friend LYNN STRAIT; RONALD LEE SVEDA by his next friend JOSEPH SVEDA, JR.; ED THEARLE by his next friend DAVID R. THEARLE; GEORGE WILLIAMS, JR. by his next friend BETTY SMITH; DARREN WINELAND by his next friends DAVID WINELAND AND ALTA WINELAND; DIANNE ZVONKOVICH by her next friend DOROTHY ZVONKOVICH; on behalfofthemselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
-against-
EDWARD G. RENDELL, as Governor ofthe Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; ESTELLE B.RICHMAN, as Secretary of the Department of Public Welfare of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; and KEVIN T. CASEY, as Deputy Secretary of the Pennsylvania Office of Mental Retardation.
Defendants.
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Plaintiffs, by their undersigned attorneys, upon information and belief, allege as follows for their Complaint herein:
I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1. This is an action for harm about to be inflicted on plaintiffs by state defendants, under
color of law, occurring as a result of defendants' decision to close the Altonna
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Center, a state-run institutional interim care facility for the mentally retarded ("ICF/MR"), announced 22 December 2004 and effective, on information and belief, on or about 1 July 2005. It arises under: (a) the Civil Rights Act, 42 USC § 1983; (b) the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 USC§ 12132; (c) § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 USC§ 794 ("§ 504"), and the waiver of state sovereign immunity enacted in 42 USC § 2000d-7(a)(l ), and (d) various Medicaid federal statutes and regulations incorporated into Pennsylvania law. 2. By virtue of the foregoing, this Court enjoys subject matter jurisdiction under 28 USC§§ 1331; 1343(a)(3), and 1367(a). 3. All defendants are sued in the venue of Altoona Center, where a substantial part of defendants' activities giving rise to the claims alleged herein occurred. 4. By virtue of the foregoing, venue is properly placed in this District pursuant to 28 usc§ 1391(b)(l-2).
II. THE PARTIES
5. All named plaintiffs are residents of the Altoona Center who appear by their guardians; statutory decision makers, or family member/next friends.
6. Ten plaintiffs were transferred to Altoona from Ebensberg Center, and wish to
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remain at Altoona Center (the "Ebensberg Plaintiffs'). They are:

Individual

Representative(s)

(a) Kathleen Montgomery

William V. Montgomery, Jr.

(b) Ed Thearle

David R. Thearle

(c) Patrick Gavigan

Ann M. Landefeld

(d) Michael Massimo

Jo-Anne Overdorf; Richard Overdorf

(e) Darren Wineland

David Wineland; Alta Wineland

(f) Lorna Kuhn

Arlene DeArment

(g) Philip McGann

Paul McGann; Mary Jane McGann

(h) George Williams, Jr.

Betty Smith

(i) Ronald Lee Sveda

Joseph Sveda, Jr.

7. Other plaintiffs are residents of Altoona Center, and have communicated a wish to remain there. They are:

Individual (a) Robyne Wheeler (b) Constance Fox (c) Edward Hampton (d) Linda Alexander

Representative(s) Beverly Wheeler Natalie Fox Dora Hampton; Lloyd Hampton Frances Alexander, Mary Alexander
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(e) Elizabeth Babcock (f) Paul Carroll (g) Kathie Centi (h) Helen Ruth Clark (i) Stacy Dodson
U) Richard Emerick
(k) Glenna Fishel (I) Gary Gosnell (m) Nancy Gustafson (n) Sharon Harrison (o) Peggy Kelly (p) Mary Jane Kies (q) Jack Kirschbaum (r) Rose Long (s) Roger Losey (t) Robert Luciano (u) Marianne Marino (v) Mary Ellen Martin (w) Edmond McAlee (x) Charles McConnell

Raymond Babcock, Virginia Babcock Catherine Carroll August Centi, Winifred Centi Gertrude Schreyer Annetta Gonsman Dewey Emerick, Virginia Merritt Darwin Fishel Gary Gosnell Susan Starr Fred Harrison Larry Kelly Frances Irvin Darlene Saltsgiver Mary Jones Rodney Losey Frank Luciano Elizabeth Marino Clara Lindsey Rosamund McAlee Richard McConnell, Barbara 5

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(y) Robert Minor (z) Gertrude Mills (aa) Frances Neiburg (bb) Wanda Pabian (cc) Kathy Jo Quinn (dd) Ronald Replogle (ee) Curtis Rheam (ff) Dean Santella (gg) Kimberly Schweitzer (hh) John Shea (ii) Jeane Slaven
Uj) Philip Smith
(kk) Sylvia Smith (ll) Margie Spory (mm) John Stevens (nn) Doris Stewart (oo) Ronald Stewart (pp) Vada Strait (qq) Margaret Wyland

McConnell Dianne Fox William Mills Esther Gordon Louise Pabian Kathryn Quinn Bonnie Wood Betty Heimbaugh Barry Singleton Elsie Kotapish Mary Ann Boylan James Slaven Nancy Hohl Lillian Smith Hattie Williams Mary Stevens Joseph Stewart Rick Stewart Lynn Strait Edward Wyland, Marian Wyland (G)
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(rr) Dianne Zvonkovich

Dorothy Zvonkovich

8. A number of other Class Member plaintiffs have no guardians or family

members/next friends to represent their interests.

a. Jeffrey Baldi

b. Helen Brown

c. Catherine Clark

d Jerome Crawford

e John Davis

f Anita DePeter

g Bernadette Ford

h Michael Harris

Luberta Hill

J Anthony Johnson

k Michael Lee

Norma Mumford

m Peter Proper

n Terry Smothers

9. The following are named as defendants herein: (a) Edward G. Rendell is Governor ofthe Commonwealth ofPennsylvania Governor Rendell is sued in his official capacity only. 7

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(b) The Department of Public Welfare of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ("DPW"). It receives federal funds under§ 504 ofthe Rehabilitation Act, 29 USC § 794. (c) Estelle B. Richman is Secretary ofDPW. Estelle Richman is sued in her official capacity only. (d) Kevin T. Casey is Deputy Secretary ofDPW for Mental Retardation. Kevin Casey is sued in his official capacity only. III. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS. 10. Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, 42 USC § 1983 ;the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 USC § 12132; § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 USC § 794 ("§ 504"), and the waiver of state sovereign immunity enacted in 42 USC § 2000d-7(a)(l ), various Medicaid federal statutes and regulations incorporated into Pennsylvania law and the Constitution of the United States, on behalf of a Class consisting of themselves and and all other persons who are residents ofthe Altoona Center as ofNovember 1, 2005. 11. Joinder ofthe entire Class is impracticable because the Class Members are severely or profoundly retarded persons unable to give their consent except through guardians or family members, and several of the Class Members have no known guardians or family members and hence can not consent to being individuallyjoined (The plaintiffs seek appointment of guardians for all such class members.)
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12. Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims asserted on behalf of the Class. 13. Plaintiffs do not have any interests that are adverse or antagonistic to those of
the Class. 14. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests ofthe members ofthe Class.
Plaintiffs are committed to the vigorous prosecution of this action and has retained counsel competent and experienced in this type of litigation. 15. Plaintiffs do not seek damages and hence, the burden and expense of prosecuting litigation of this nature makes it unlikely that members of the Class would prosecute individual actions. And if they did, such individual prosecution would be impracticable as well as inefficient. 16. Plaintiffs are not aware of any pending litigation concerning the claims herein. 17. This Court is the most appropriate forum for adjudicating the claims at issue, which arise under federal law. 18. Plaintiffs do not anticipate any difficulty in the management of this action as a Class action. 19. There are many questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions which may affect individual members. The predominant common questions of law and fact include, among others: (a). Whether Defendants are liable for violation of the Civil Rights Act, 42 USC § 1983;
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(b) Whether Defendants are liable for violation ofthe Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 USC§ 12132; (c) Whether Defendants are liable for violation of§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 USC§ 794 ("§ 504"), and the waiver of state sovereign immunity enacted in 42 USC § 2000d-7(a)(l ); (d) Whether Defendants are liable for violation of various Medicaid federal statutes and regulations incorporated into Pennsylvania law; (e) Whether Defendants are liable for violation of the Constitution of the United States; and (f) Whether Plaintiffs and the Class members are entitled to equitable and injunctive relief. 20. A Class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 21. Plaintiffs seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, attorneys' fees and expenses as permitted by law, on behalf of themselves and the Class.
IV. COMMON FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS. 22. All plaintiffs reside at the Altoona Center or resided there as of October 1,
2005.
23. The Altoona Center is an Intermediate Care Facility for the Mentally Retarded 10

Case 3:05-cv-00419-KRG Document 1 Filed 11/04/05 Page 11 of 21
("ICF/MR") operated by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. It is authorized to serve 120 Residents, though its current occupancy is approximately 88. The Altoona Center is the newest of Pennsylvania's ICF/MR facilities. The Altoona Center also has the lowest per capita operating cost of any Pennsylvania ICF/MR. 24. All plaintiffs are appropriately designated eligible for state run ICF/MR institutional level of care. 25. All plaintiffs are unwilling to be transferred to community placements of any type. 26. All plaintiffs are diagnosed as in need of state-run ICF/MR institutional care. 27. All plaintiffs are medically and developmentally inappropriate for community placement. 28. All plaintiffs are medically and emotionally fragile and inappropriate for transfer to community placement. 29. All plaintiffs are in need of continuous care by multi-disciplinary on-site staff. 30. All of the plaintiffs is severely or profoundly mentally retarded. In addition each of them has various other serious health problems which require constant monitoring and frequent attention. Specifically their average mental age is somewhere between 1.5 and 1.8 years. Of the 89 residents only 12 can walk by themselves. Only one can full speak. Only 12 can speak at all. 11 of them receive all their nourishment from tubes directly into their stomachs. 70 are completely dependent on others for all their care.
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30. All ofthe plaintiffs have been evaluated by their treating professionals within the last year and determined to be in need ofiCF/MR treatment. None has been determined by their treating professionals as appropriate for community placement.
31. The guardians and/or family members of all plaintiffs who have such persons have not given their consent to moving them from the Altoona Center.
32. Fourteen Class Members have no known family members and the defendants regard Alan Bellomo, Director of the Ebensburg and Altoona Centers as their substitute decision maker.
33. Scientific research demonstrates that mentally retarded persons in community placement are at approximately 75% greater risk of dying than similar persons in institutional care.
34. The Auditor General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has issued a report concluding the system of "community placements"that defendants seek to place plaintiffs and other class members in is seriously flawed; that employees of were woefully inadequate to ensure the health and safety of the residents, that DPW's investigation and oversight ofallegations ofabuse and unexpected deaths ofresidents in community placements and "that DPW failed to ensure that services were provided in a way that enhanced the health and well-being of residents" and that some such homes were not clean and safe.
35. All plaintiffs receive at the Altoona Center a high level of access to the normal
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activities of non institutionalized persons. All are given the opportunity to perform some sort of task that allows them to earn their own money, and have real, meaningful relationships with the community of Altoona. There are usually twice daily outings. Several plaintiffs have become members of area churches and participate in them. They regularly go shopping. Recently some of them visited the Humane Society and they go to baseball games at virtually every Altoona Curve home stand. The plaintiffs are also assisted and permitted to participate in various other community activities. Residents even participate in raising money for local charities for needy families. They recently had a week-long camping trip to a local state park. 36. On January 6, 2005 defendants Estelle Richman and DPW announced their decision to close the Altoona Center and transfer 45 plaintiffs to community placements and 45 plaintiffs to the Ebensburg Center, another state ICF facility located in remote Ebensburg Pennsylvania.At the same time defendants announce the closing of the Harrisburg State Hospital 37. The stated reasons for the closings were to "return the millions of dollars used to run more restrictive, costly services at the facilities to the community to develop and sustain support programs and continue to improve the mental health and disability service delivery system ofthe Commonwealth." However the services to the plaintiffs at the Altoona Center are less restrictive than those they are likely to receive
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elsewhere and providing service to them at Ebensburg or in so called community placements will be more expensive than providing them at the Altoona Center. 38. On or about January 6, 2005 defendant Kevin T. Casey wrote a letter discussing the closing of the Altoona Center. In which he stated that there were individuals and/or their families at the Altoona Center who have requested community placement He stated that the Office of Mental Retardation (OMR) plans to create community placement opportunities for those requesting placement from the Altoona and Ebensburg Centers. 39. A mere handful of residents or their families have voluntarily requested such community placements. However in contradiction to Mr. Casey's statement the defendants have ordered the placement ofapproximately 45 Altoona Center residents in community placements without their consent. 40. The defendants have also instructed various county Mental Health/Mental Retardation agencies to make placements of the 45 plaintiffs designated for placement in community settings. This decision was made without regard to the needs of the individual plaintiffs, their individual support plans or their rights to the least restrictive placements that their treating professionals find appropriate and the plaintiffs agree to. 41. All ofthe plaintiffs will in fact be forced into more restrictive placements as a result of defendants actions. None of the plaintiffs will have access to the same level of
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regular community participation and integration ifthey are transferred to community placements or to Ebensburg. 42. Defendants know or should know of the medical and mental condition of each plaintiff. 43. Defendants know or should know of the Individual Support Plans and the needs of each plaintiff. 44. Defendants know or should know ofthe extent ofcommunity contact and integration of each plaintiff at Altoona Center. 45. Defendants know or should know that the extent of community contact and integration available to the plaintiffs in the various locations to which they seek to transfer them are not equal to that available to the plaintiffs at Altoona Center. 46. Defendants know or should know ofthe increased danger ofdeath, abuse and neglect that the plaintiffs will be subjected to in a substantial number of community placements. 47. Defendants know or should know that some of the plaintiffs were transferred from Ebensburg Center because they were reportedly abused when they resided there in the past. V. COMMON ALLEGATIONS OF RIGHTS AND DUTIES. 48. Each plaintiff has a constitutional right life and liberty interest in, and statutory entitlement to, the least restrictive placement, appropriate placement and appropriate
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medical and therapeutic treatment from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 49. Defendants are under a constitutional and statutory duty to:
(a) effectuate the placement of plaintiffs in the " most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities" a setting that "enables individuals with disabilities to interact with nondisabled persons to the fullest extent possible." (28 C.F.R. pt. 35 app. A.); (b) not place plaintiffs in more restrictive placements than they currently enJoy; (c) effectuate appropriate institutional placement for each plaintiff; (d) propose a community placement appropriate for the plaintiff only where medically and therapeutically appropriate upon an impartial multidisciplinary evaluation; (e) obtain the input and consent of plaintiff, plaintiffs guardian or plaintiffs family for such transfers; (f) propose an institutional placement appropriate for the plaintiff only where medically and therapeutically appropriate upon an impartial multidisciplinary evaluation; (g) obtain the input and consent ofplaintiff, plaintiffs guardian or plaintiffs family for such transfers. VI. FOR A FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION.
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50. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege ,-r,-r 1-49. 51. Because the placements being forced upon the plaintiffs are more restrictive of their
ability to interact with non-disabled persons and the community and they are being made without the consent of the plaintiffs or their guardians or families and in spite of the fact that the treating professionals have not made individualized assessments that such placements would benefit the individual plaintiffs, such placements violate the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. 52. The plaintiffs are therefore entitled to injunctive and declaratory reliefproviding that the defendants shall not transfer them without meeting the requirements that:
(a) such placements will be no more restrictive oftheir rights than their current placement; (b) such placements will not be recommended unless the treating professionals conclude that such a placement is in the best interests of the individual plaintiffs; (c) the plaintiffs by their guardians or families wish such transfers. VII. FOR A SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION. 53. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege ,-r,-r 1-52. 54. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has voluntarily assumed certain obligations under federal law in return for federal fundingunder the Medical Assistance Program authorized by 42 USC 1396, et seq.
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Those obligations include: (a) choice of an ICF/MR institutional placement, subject to hearing, under 42 USC §1396n and 42 CFR § 441.302(d); (b) provision of ICF/MR services under 42 USC §§ 1396a(a)(IO) and 1396d(a)(15); (c) competent evaluation for placement in an institutional ICF/MR facility under 42 CFR § 483.440(b)(3); (d) a continuous active treatment program as defined m 42 CFR §483.440(a)(l).
55. All plaintiffs receive assistance under the Medical Assistance Program and are owed the duties alleged in the preceding paragraph.
56. Defendants' are violating their duties to the plaintiffs under the Medical Assistance Program by their acts and omissions alleged at 22 to 51, above. Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief: (a) directing that defendants abide by treatment plans m the required Multidisciplinary Evaluations ( known as Functional Assessments and Individual Support Plans at Altoona Center) previously performed on the plaintiffs until and unless such new Multidisciplinary Evaluations. (b) upon evaluations, permitting each plaintiff to choose: (i) to accept or reject the recommendation of the Multidisciplinary
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Evaluation; and (ii) to receive treatment in accord with the recommendations of the Multidisciplinary Evaluation either at a state-run ICF/MR or such other facility as the Multidisciplinary Evaluation and the plaintiff deem appropriate. VIII. FOR A THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION. 57. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege ,-r,-r 1-56. 58. The plaintiffs are all profoundly or severely retarded and have many other health problems. They are at the very low end of the spectrum of mentally ill and mentally retarded citizens. Their mental age averaged under two years. Very few ofthem can speak at all. They are unable to articulate and/or their medical and mental problems and needs. Most of them have very limited mobility, and some have none. They are unable to care for themselves in even the most basic ways. As a result they are very much at the mercy of the persons who provide them with care. They are defenseless against many forms of abuse and neglect which can lead to their injury or death. 59. Some of the plaintiffs were also previously transferred from Ebensburg because, as defendants employees indicated, there was at least a belief that they were being abused there. 60. Defendants know or should know that placing the plaintiffs in so called community placements will substantially increase their likelihood of injury and death from
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neglect, error and other causes. 61. Such a situation implicates the plaintiffs' constitutional right not to be deprived of
life or liberty without due process of law. IX. FOR A FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION. 62. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege ~~ 1-61. 63. By reason of their serious mental retardation all plaintiffs are incapable of giving or withholding their consent to the actions ofthe defendants except through a guardian or family member. 64. As to those individual plaintiff class members for whom defendants recognize no guardian or family member to speak on behalf of the plaintiffs, they have no ability to participate in decisions as to their placement or care, as required by federal law. 65. Plaintiffs therefore request the Court to appoint a guardian or guardians for them for purposes of participation in this action. X. CONCLUSION. WHEREFORE Plaintiffs seek: (a)declaratory and injunctive reliefas set forth herein for themselves and all members of the class; (b) court appointment of a guardian or guardians for those class members for whom defendants recognize no guardian or family member to speak on behalf of said plaintiffs;
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Case 3:05-cv-00419-KRG Document 1 Filed 11/04/05 Page 21 of 21 (d) such other and further interim and final relief as may be just. Dated: November 2, 2005 New York, New York
. Greene '"""~'"''lL~...,y for the Plaintiffs
all Street, Suite 2200 w York, New York 10005 (91 7) 543-9081 (Admission to the Bar of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania pending.)
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 Case 3:05-cv-00419-KRG Document 85 Filed 03/23/07 Page 1 of 34

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LINDA ALEXANDER, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
EDWARD G. RENDELL, et al., Defendants.

)

)

) CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:2005-419

)

)

)

)

JUDGE GIBSON

)

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT GIBSON, J.
This matter comes before the Court on the proposed intervenors' Amended Motion to Intervene of Right as Plaintiffs (Document No. 44). For the reasons stated herein, this motion will be denied.
The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) and28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1)-(2).
The Plaintiffs allege violations ofthe Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act (RA), due process rights as protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and various Medicaid statutes resulting from the Defendants' decision to close the Altoona Center, the former residence ofthe Plaintiffs' wards which was an intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded (ICF/MR). All ofthe former residents are mentally retarded individuals whose "mental" ages generally range between one and two years, and who also are afflicted with various medical and developmental difficulties including incontinence and the inability to talk, walk, and feed themselves.
The Altoona Center itself does not currently house any residents and the former residents are

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either residing in private community-based care or the Ebensburg Center, a separate state operated
ICFIMR.1 See Minute Entries for September 26,2006 Status Conference (Document No. 70). The
former residents were transferred as a result oftwo court orders: the Memorandum Opinion and Order of Court dated January 30, 2006 (Document No. 25) denying the Motion for a Preliminary Injunction based upon the parties' agreement regarding a specific protocol for the transfer of the former Altoona Center residents; and the Memorandum Opinion and Order of Court dated March 9, 2006 (Document No. 42) granting the Defendants' Motion for Clarification (Document No. 38). The protocol set forth in the first order provided the former residents with the option to change their decision regarding their new placements within an eighteen month time-frame oftheir respective move dates from the Altoona Center.
The Court presently lacks information concerning which former residents reside at Ebensburg Center versus a community-basedcare facility. As part ofthat consensual protocol which obviated the need for a preliminary injunction, the Defendants have a continuing duty to monitor for eighteen months each of the former Altoona Center residents who is currently in community-based care from the date of transfer of that resident so as to allow each former resident to choose to return to residence within a state ICF/MR facility such as the Ebensburg Center if he/she prefers, or if the individual circumstances within the community-based care facility require his/her removal for safety or healthrelated reasons. Memorandum Opinion and Order of Court (Document No. 25), pp. 11-12, 13.
1Although Plaintiffs' counsel refers to the Altoona Center as "one part" ofthe Ebensburg Center, Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition, pp. 5, 6,11, the Court has not made such a recognition. See Memorandum Opinion and Order ofCourt dated January 30, 2006 (Document No. 25), pp. 2-5; Memorandum Opinion and Order ofCourt dated March 9, 2006 (Document No. 42), p. 6.
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According to the Court's calculation, at least ten of the eighteen months of this period has passed for
all of the former Altoona Center residents.
The proposed intervenors are eight individuals with similar mental disabilities and physical
impairments and eight disability organizations seeking intervention as a matter ofright or alternatively,
permissive intervention as plaintiffs in the case sub judice because "their statutory interest under Title
II ofthe Americans with Disabilities Act [("ADA")], Section 504 ofthe Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and
the state Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966, and their Constitutional liberty, property,
and equal citizenship interests under the Fourteenth Amendment in the subject ofthis action have been
and may be further impaired by the Preliminary Injunction issued herein on January 30, 2006, and would
be further impaired should that Preliminary Injunction be made final, and whose ability to protect their
interests has been and may be further impeded by this action...." Amended Motion to Intervene, pp. 2-
3.2 The proposed intervenors also claim that their "interests have not been and are not adequately
2There are some mischaracterizations made by the proposed intervenors in their motion that need to be clarified before continuing. First, no preliminary injunction was granted in the January 30, 2006 order issued by this Court. Compare Amended Motion for Intervention (Document No. 44), p. 3 with Memorandum Opinion and Order of Court dated January 30,2006 (Document No. 25), p. 13.
Second, the proposed intervenors refer in their motion to a "veto-power" given by the Court to guardians and other duly recognized representatives who are Plaintiffs in this matter representing the former Altoona Center residents whereby the guardians and representatives can choose to have their wards housed at the Ebensburg Center rather than a community based ICF/MR facility. This characterization seems to have its basis in the dissenting opinion ofJudge Pellegrini in the case of In re Easly, 771 A.2d 844 (Pa. Commw. 2001) where he used this phrase in characterizing the majority's finding that a court-appointed guardian could object to the scheduled release ofa mentally retarded, elderly patient ofthe Polk Center in Venango County committed there since the age offourteen to a community-based ICF/MR in Cambria County underthe ADAandthe Supreme Court's opinion in 0/msteadv. L.C., 527U.S. 581, 119 S.Ct. 2176, 144 L.Ed.2d 540 {1999). Easly at 846, 864. The Easly majority concluded, inter alia, that Olmstead's second requirement ofno opposition by the "affected person[]" regarding his/her transfer "from institutional care to a less restrictive setting" did not simply require the "nonopposition" ofan incapacitated individual. Easly at 850-851. The Commonwealth Court concluded that community placements must be "voluntary" which requires "'competent' nonopposition" and when the "affected person[]" is without the mental capability to make such a decision, the person's "guardian must be at least a participant in the decision concerning matters affecting the care and treatment of the incapacitated person." Specifically, in Easly's circumstances, the decision ofthat person's guardian to reject communityplacement, when based upon "well founded objections of[the] legal guardian was tantamount to moving [the affected person] over her objection." Easly at 852-853.
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represented by original plaintiffs or by Commonwealth defendants." Amended Motion to Intervene,
p. 3. Both Plaintiffs and Defendants oppose the intervention for various reasons which include the
argument that it is untimely and that the intervenors' interests are already adequately represented. See
Plaintiffs' Opposition (Document No. 82) and Defendants' Brief in Opposition (Document No. 50).
ANALYSIS
A motion to intervene is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 which reads in
pertinent part:
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute ofthe United States confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject ofthe action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute ofthe United States confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question oflaw or fact in common. When a party to an action relies for ground of claim or defense upon any statute or executive order administered by a federal or state governmental officer or agency or upon any regulation, order, requirement, or agreement issued or made pursuant to the statute or executive order, the officer or agency upon timely application may be permitted to intervene in the action. In exercising its
The Court's Order denyingthe preliminary injunction and Order granting the Motion for Clarification are consistent with the Easly holding as the decisions ofthe guardians and recognized representatives are to be considered and can amount to rejection ofcommunityplacementby the former residents ofthe Altoona Center themselves. As will be explained further herein, the Court does not view such a categorization of the guardians and representatives role in the case sub judice as affecting any intervenor so as to permit intervention.
Finally, the proposed intervenors in their motion refer generally to the "policy" or "policies of the Defendants," but this Court has already recognized prior to this motion in its Order ofJanuary 30, 2006 that the protocol being followed by the Defendants "is not an official written policy" of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, rather it is a case specific consensual agreement entered into as a method to reasonably address the circumstances at Altoona Center.
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discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication ofthe rights of the original parties.
Initially, the Court finds it necessary to address the contention that the proposed organizational intervenors must demonstrate standing to advocate on behalfoftheir members (associational standing) as well as whether their members may advocate for any of their clients who are mentally retarded or otherwise mentally impaired to some degree (third party standing). Although the Plaintiffs argue the proposed organizational intervenors possess no standing whatsoever, this Court recognizes that the Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue ofwhether district courts must satisfy themselves that Article III standing exists prior to granting a motion for intervention. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68-69, 106 S.Ct. 1697, 1707, 90 L.Ed.2d 48, 62 (1986). The District Court of the District of Delaware recognized this along with the lack of precedent from the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit with respect to F.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2) in Evans v. Buchanan, 130 F.R.D. 306, 310 n. 5 (D.Del. 1990). Subsequently, the Third Circuit cursorily addressed the standing issue with respect to a motion for permissive intervention under F.R.Civ.P. 24(b)(2) in Pansy v. Borough ofStroadsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 777 (3d Cir. 1994) where the court framed the issue as follows:
The appellees have not challenged the Newspapers' standing in this appeal. Nevertheless, we are obliged to consider whether the Newspapers have standing to intervene in this action to either obtain the sought-after Settlement Agreement under the right of access doctrine, or to attack the Order ofConfidentiality so that they may seek access to the document under the Pennsylvania Right to Know Act."
The Third Circuit concluded standing existed for the intervenors and ordered the matter remanded with direction that the intervention be permitted. /d. at 778-780, 792.
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The Court recognizes that the question of standing, whether arising from Article III of the
Constitution or from prudential concerns, as it affects intervention generally (of right or permissive)
has not been addressed in any precedential opinions binding on this Court. Therefore, until a
precedential appellate decision of this question is issued, the Court will assume that the existence of
standing, whether constitutional or prudential in its basis, is a requirement for either intervention as of
right or permissive intervention.
I. STANDING
The Third Circuit case of Pennsylvania Psych. Soc. v. Green Spring Health Services, Inc., 280
F.3d 278, (3d Cir. 2002) provides a thorough analysis of standing generally:
To satisfy the "case or controversy" standing requirement under Article III,§ 2 of the United States Constitution, a plaintiff must establish that it has suffered a cognizable injury that is causally related to the alleged conduct of the defendant and is redressable by judicial action. Friends ofthe Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envt/. Servs. (J'OC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (discussing Lujan v. Defenders ofWi/d/ife, 504 U.S. 555,560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)); The Pitt News v. Fisher, 215 F.3d 354, 359 (3d Cir.2000). Associations may satisfy these elements by asserting claims that arise from injuries they directly sustain. See, e.g., Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'/ Union, 442 U.S. 289, 299 n. 11, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979). Absent injury to itself, an association may pursue claims solely as a representative of its members. See, e.g., New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 108 S.Ct. 2225, 101 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988); Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Magnesium E/ektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111 (3d Cir.1997). By permitting associational standing, we "recognize[ ] that the primary reason people join an organization is often to create an effective vehicle for vindicating interests that they share with others." Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers v. Brock,477 U.S. 274,290, 106 S.Ct. 2523,91 L.Ed.2d228 (1986); see also Joint AntiFascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 187, 71 S.Ct. 624, 95 L.Ed. 817 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring) (noting purpose ofjoining an association "often is to permit the association ... to vindicate the interests of all").
The Supreme Court has enunciated a three-prong test for associational standing. An
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association must demonstrate that "(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit." Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977) (permitting state agency that represented apple industry to challenge North Carolina statute); see also Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. at 181, 120 S.Ct. 693; Hosp. Council v. City ofPittsburgh, 949 F.2d 83, 86 (3d Cir.l991 ).
***
Apart from the constitutional requirements for standing,FN8 courts have imposed a set of prudential limitations on the exercise of federal jurisdiction over third-party claims. Bennettv. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d281 (1997)("[T]he federal judiciary has also adhered to a set of prudential principles that bear on the question of standing.") (quotation and citation omitted); Warth, 422 U.S. at 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197; Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387,404 (3d Cir.1999). The restrictions against third-party standing do not stem from the Article III "case or controversy" requirement, but rather from prudential concerns,FN9 Amato v. Wilentz, 952 F.2d 742, 748 (3d Cir.1991 ), which prevent courts from "deciding questions ofbroad social import where no individual rights would be vindicated and ... limit access to the federal courts to those litigants best suited to assert a particular claim." Gladstone, Realtors v. Viii. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91,99-100,99 S.Ct. 1601,60 L.Ed.2d66 (1979); see also Sec'y of State v. Joseph H Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 955, 104 S.Ct. 2839, 81 L.Ed.2d 786 (1984).
FN8. Under standing doctrine, a plaintiff must satisfy three constitutional preconditions: (1) a cognizable injury that is (2) causally connected to the alleged conduct and is (3) capable of being redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130; see also supra pp. 282- 83.
FN9. The Supreme Court has consistently held that standing to assert third-party rights is a prudential matter:
[O]ur decisions have settled that limitations on a litigant's assertion ofjus tertii are not constitutionally mandated, but rather stem from a salutary "rule of selfrestraint" designed to minimize unwarranted intervention into controversies where the applicable constitutional questions are ill-defined and speculative.
Craigv. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 193-95,97 S.Ct. 451,50 L.Ed.2d397 (1976); see also Brown Group, 517 U.S. at 557, 116 S.Ct. 1529; Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984); Singleton v. Wu(ff, 428 U.S.
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106, 123-24, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976) (plurality opinion); Warth, 422 U.S. at 499,95 S.Ct. 2197; Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249,255,257, 73 S.Ct. 1031,97 L.Ed. 1586 (1953).
•••
[T]hird party standing requires the satisfaction of three preconditions: 1) the plaintiff must suffer injury; 2) the plaintiffand the third party must have a "close relationship"; and 3) the third party must face some obstacles that prevent it from pursuing its own claims. Pennsylvania Psych. Soc. v. Green Spring Health Services, Inc., 280 F.3d 278, 283, 287-289 (3d Cir. 2002)(citations omitted). Both the constitutional and "prudential principles" governing standing must be met before the requirement for standing may be determined to be met. Gladstone Realtors v. Village ofBellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 1608, 60 L.Ed.2d 66, 77 (1979). Turning first to the standing of the proposed individual intervenors, seven are in community based living or living in their familial or own homes and the eighth intervenor is institutionalized at the Defendants' Selinsgrove Center. Regardless, none ofthese intervenors are claiming an injury but only the potential for injury. As will be explained further with respect to intervention, the Court's Orders do not embrace any individuals outside of the finite group of former residents of the Altoona Center who resided there at the time ofthe announcement ofthat center's closure. This lack of injury as to the proposed intervenors dooms their asserted claim to standing. For those proposed organizational intervenors claiming injury to themselves, the Court also fails to find a basis for such a claim. Specifically, American Association on Mental Retardation, Pennsylvania Chapter (AAMR-PA) claims to sue on its own behalf, but fails to allege an injury caused by the Defendants' actions that this Court is able to adjudicate. See Proposed Complaint in Intervention, (Document No. 44, Exhibit 1), p. 6. PA-TASH presents its claims in order to "avoid economic injury by having to divert resources from other undertakings to refighting the long-past settled
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issues of guardianship and self-determination reopened by Defendant's policy here and this Court's Preliminary Orders." !d. at 8. ARC of Pennsylvania (ARC), The National Coalition on SelfDetermination (NCSD), Speaking for Ourselves (SO) and Vision for Equality, Inc. (VFE) assert the same interest on their own behalfand presumably Autism National Committee, Pennsylvania Chapter (ANC) does the same although it does not name its specific interests. Id at 10-14. Such an allegation clearly demonstrates no injury has occurred and, as will be discussed further below, no injury to this effect will occur as the Court's Orders reflect an agreement between only the current parties to this civil action and not a policy for the system-wide application by the Defendants. SO specifically claims it has already suffered economic harm from the Court's Orders and the Defendant's "policy complained ofhere." Id at 13-14. Although this claim of harm is in the past tense, the Court is without evidence concerning how that harm has come to this proposed intervenor from the Court's Orders. SO has not been a party to this litigation and has not been subject to any orders of this Court. Furthermore, the so-called "policy" ofthe Defendants was an agreement with respect to former Altoona Center residents only. The use ofthe past tense by SO might be a drafting error. Still, if it is not, the Court fails to see the claimed economic injury to SO for the purpose of establishing its standing as an organization attempting to intervene.
In contrast, Pennsylvania Protection and Advocacy, Inc. (PPA) asserts economic injury as a proposed intervenor claiming it directly served the residents ofAltoona Center and serves the residents of Ebensburg Center by supporting their integration into the community. Nevertheless, the Court cannot envision a possible injury to PPA because it has not yet advocated in this litigation and has not had to face a system-wide application ofthe "policy'' by the Defendants. The Court further concludes
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that any decision it may render, even if disfavored by the PPA, would not appear in any way to affect the amount ofthe PPA's resources spent on providing support for the integration ofthe former Altoona Center residents. Additionally, PPA's inclusion of all Ebensburg Center residents in its allegations in support of intervention broadens the attempt at quantifying the injury to PPA. However, PPA presumably was already supporting the integration ofEbensburg Center residents prior to the movement of former Altoona Center residents into the Ebensburg Center. Finally, not all of the former residents of the Altoona Center requested transfer to the Ebensburg Center. Therefore, the amount of PPA's resources used in attempting to integrate all ofthese former residents today would logically appear to be less than the amount ofresources that were needed prior to Altoona Center's closure because more individuals were institutionalized at that time. Therefore, it is the Court's conclusion that no proposed organizational intervenor possesses standing.
Those organizations claiming standing on behalf of their members, AAMR PA, PA TASH, ARC, ANC, NCSD, SO, and VFE, fail to establishassociational standing because their members cannot assert injuries individually. This is the first element necessary for associational standing set forth in Pennsylvania Psych. Soc., supra, at 283. Although discussion of this circumstance will also be addressed in the intervention analysis, it suffices to say once again that this Court's Orders do not affect anyone other than the former residents ofthe Altoona Center. Without the existence ofan injury to the members ofthe proposed organizational intervenors, the members themselves do not have standing to sue in their own right.
Finally, for AAMR PA and PPA, which claim third party standing on behalf of others, these claims also fail. First, PPA claims third party standing for residents of the Altoona Center and the
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Ebensburg Center. Clearly, PPA's claim of standing on behalf of Altoona Center residents can be translated into those individuals who are former residents of the Altoona Center now residing at the Ebensburg Center. These individuals are pursuing their own claims and the Court cannot allow PPA to claim standing for these individuals. Therefore, PPA does not meet the third requirement of third party standing on behalf of these residents. See Pennsylvania Psych. Soc., supra at 288-289. Those residents of Ebensburg Center who were not placed there because of the Altoona Center closure have not suffered any injury as a result of the Defendants' agreement with the Plaintiffs, and the Court's Orders do not concern their placements. Additionally, PPA does not allege that these individuals are unable to advocate for themselves in seeking community integration.
Finally, AAMR PA asserts third party standing on behalfofthe clients ofprofessional members of AAMR PA, through "derivative" standing which is permitted by the Third Circuit under Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society, supra at 291-293. However, AAMR PA fails to meet the requirements for this status. Derivative standing is achieved through satisfying the three requirements for associational standing, the first of which is that the associational members must possess standing themselves. !d. This first requirement for associational standing can be achieved through establishing all ofthe requirements ofthird party standing. ld These requirements are not met in that AAMR PA's members have not sustained an injury under the third party standing requirements and furthermore, it has not been demonstrated that the third parties to AAMR PA members, i.e., the residents of the Altoona Center and Ebensburg Center, are prevented from asserting their own claims. Therefore, third party standing is wanting, which in turn causes the first element ofthe associational/derivative standing requirements to be lacking. Therefore, the AAMR PA members fail to establish the requisites of
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derivative standing. Despite the finding that none ofthe proposed intervenors have standing to intervene, the Court
recognizes the possibility that the Court of Appeals may find that the law regarding intervention does not contain a requirement of standing, therefore, the Court will alternatively pursue the analysis for intervention as ofright and permissive intervention for the sake of completeness. We turn first to the question of intervention as of right. II. INTERVENTION AS OF RIGHT
It appears to the Court that there is no statutory right under federal law that would allow the proposed intervenors to intervene in this civil action. Therefore, the Court must determine if intervention of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) exists.
It is axiomatic that to intervene as a matter [of] right under Rule 24(a)(2) the prospective intervenor must establish that: "(1) the application for intervention is timely; (2) the applicant has a sufficient interest in the litigation; (3) the interest may be affected or impaired, as a practical matter by the disposition ofthe action; and (4) the interest is not adequately represented by an existing party in the litigation." Harris v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d 592,596 (3d Cir.1987). In re Community Bank ofNorthern Virginia, 418 F.3d 277, 314 (3d Cir. 2005). See also Mountain Top Condominium Assoc. v. Dave Stabbert Master Builder, Inc., 72 F.3d 361 365~366 (3d Cir. 1995). A proposed intervenor must satisfy each ofthese four criteria in order to successfully intervene as a matter of right. Mountain Top at 366. Applying this standard, the Court addresses the arguments of the Defendants and Plaintiffs in turn. A. Timeliness
Timeliness of an intervention request "is determined by the totality of the 12

Case 3:05-cv-00419-KRG Document 85 Filed 03/23/07 Page 13 of 34
circumstances." United States v. A/can Aluminum, Inc., 25 F.3d 1174, 1181 (3d Cir.1994). Among the factors to be considered are: (1) the stage of the proceeding; (2) the prejudice that delay may cause the parties; and (3) the reason for the delay. Mountain Top Condo. Ass'n v. Dave Stabbert Master Builder, Inc., 72 F.3d 361, 369 (3d Cir.l995).
In re Community Bank ofNorthern Virginia, 418 F.3d 277, 314 (3d Cir. 2005). Both the Defendants and Plaintiffs argue that the proposed intervenors' motion is untimely. The amended motion was filed on March 15, 2006, while the original motion was filed on March 9, 2006.
The Court's decision denying the preliminary injunction and approving the parties' agreement through a court order was rendered on January 30, 2006. The Defendants filed a Motion for Clarification on March 6, 2006 regarding the Court's order denying the preliminary injunction. The Court ruled on this motion on March 9, 2006. It appears to the Court that the motion to intervene was filed at an opportune time for the proposed intervenors when the Defendants sought to "clarify" the issues decided in the Court's denial of preliminary injunction.
According to the Defendants, the proposed intervenors were aware of this litigation on November 7, 2005, three days after this civil action was instituted. Yet the proposed intervenors sought to intervene at a time when the transfers of the Altoona Center residents to other facilities were to commence and the Court had twice reviewed and ruled upon the issues concerning the residents' ability to consent or reject community placement under Olmstead. Currently, the transfers have been completed and the Altoona Center is closed. The timing ofthe intervention, whether permitted one year ago or today is untimely. This is because since one year ago, when the residents began moving from the Altoona Center, the Plaintiffs' claims regarding the continued operation ofthe Altoona Center have been otherwise denied and the Plaintiffs' remaining claims were being accommodated by an order with
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which both the Defendants and Plaintiffs were in agreement. The current parties recently completed a mediation session, but no resolution was reached. Intervention, ifpermitted at this stage, would delay proceedings further and otherwise prejudice the parties' possible future resolution of this matter and would certainly prejudice those residents who have become settled in their respective placements. It has not been explained by the proposed intervenors why they awaited the decision denying the preliminary injunction, the implementation of the agreement of the parties that allowed for the denial of the preliminary injunction and the subsequent filing of a motion for clarification before they acted to seek intervention. In this Court's view, the last window for timely action would have been making application for intervention very shortly after the issuance of the Order denying the preliminary injunction and implementation ofthe protocol agreed upon by the parties.
Therefore, considering the totality of the circumstances of this matter, particularly their complexity, the Court finds that the amended motion to intervene is untimely.
For the sake of completeness, the Court will also address the additional arguments of the Plaintiffs and Defendants supporting the denial of the proposed intervenors' motion.
B. Sufficient Interest in the Litigation The Defendants cite the case of Harris v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d 592, 601 (3d Cir. 1987) for the proposition that the proposed intervenors lack a sufficient interest in the case sub judice that would allow for intervention. Pernsley presents a description of the parameters of the necessary interest:
We agree with the District Attorney that Rule 24(a)(2) directs the courts to consider the practical consequences of the litigation in passing on an application to intervene as of right. As one court has noted, "the court is not limited to consequences ofa strictly legal nature ... [but] may consider any significant legal effect on the applicant's interest...."
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National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 578 F.2d 1341, 1345 (lOth Cir.l978). Courts thus have found that an applicant has a sufficient interest to intervene when the action will have a significant
stare decisis effect on the applicant's rights, e.g., Smith v. Pangilinan, supra, 651 F·.2d at 1325, or where the contractual rights ofthe applicant may be affected by a proposed remedy, e.g., Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District, No. 1, 738 F.2d 82, 84 (8th Cir.1984); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., supra, 506 F.2d at 741-42.
At the same time, however, to have an interest sufficient to intervene as of right, ''the interest must be 'a legal interest as distinguished from interests of a general and indefinite character.' " United States v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1292 (D.C.Cir.1980), quoting RadfordIron Co. v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 62 F.2d 940, 942 (4th Cir.1933). In many cases, especially class action litigation, the disposition of the action will have some impact on the interests of third parties. To intervene as of right as a party to the litigation, however, the applicant must do more than show that his or her interests may be affected in some incidental manner. Rather, the applicant must demonstrate that there is a tangible threat to a legally cognizable interest to have the right to intervene. See, e.g. United States v. Perry County Board of Education, 567 F.2d 277,279 (5th Cir.1978).
Harris v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d 592, 601 (3d Cir. 1987).
The case sub judice concerns a specific legal interest, as opposed to an interest in property,
because it concerns the proposed intervenors' legal rights, not any claim to a specific piece ofproperty
or fund ofmoney. Most ofthe Third Circuit precedent regarding intervention addresses the latter. On
the other hand, Harris, supra and Brody by and through Sugzdinis v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108 (3d Cir.
1992) address instances of proposed intervention when the intervention is based upon a claim that
litigation will affect an intangible legal right as opposed to a tangible item of property. The Third
Circuit in Brody observed the nature of the necessary legal interest and the procedure for evaluating
it as follows:
To meet this prong ofthe test for intervention as ofright, the legal interest asserted must be a cognizable legal interest, and not simply an interest "of a general and indefinite
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character." Harris, 820 F.2d at 601 (quoting United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1292 (D.C.Cir.1980)). In assessing whether a proposed intervenor has stated a legally cognizable claim, it is appropriate in certain cases to conduct a two step examination, separately evaluating whether the applicant has a right to intervene at the merits stage and whether he or she may intervene to participate in devising the remedy. Id at 599.
Brody byandthroughSugzdinis v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108, 1116 (3d Cir. 1992). The Brody Court then proceeded to analogize that case with the Harris case and used a bifurcated analysis observing that when the district court resolved the merits of the matter, that resolution did not affect the rights ofthe proposed intervenors, but that the remedy set forth in the consent decree already entered did possibly affect persons, including proposed intervenors, not parties to the litigation. Brody at 1116-1122. The Third Circuit remanded the matter to the district court for purposes of further fact-finding to determine the nature of the forum at issue so that the proposed intervenors' related free-speech rights could be judged against the remedy set forth in the consent decree. Brody at 1125.
The Court sees no need to perform a bifurcated analysis in determining the nature of the legal interest asserted by the proposed intervenors because resolution ofthe instant litigation involves a finite number of former residents of the Altoona Center whose claims against the Defendants, and their requested remedies, concern their continued residence in Altoona Center or a similarly integrated state ICF/MR facility. The issues before the Court do not address, and the appropriate remedy will not stretch beyond, the enforcement of the rights of the former residents of the Altoona Center. As the Third Circuit in Harris indicated, litigation concerning correctional institutions where the acts of a limited number of officials would be the focus in the liability phase, but the remedial measures may stretch to affect more than those named parties, presents a situation where a bifurcated analysis of a
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proposed intervenor's interests would be appropriate to determine the existence and nature ofa possible intervention. Harris at 599. The parties do not seek a resolution ofthis matter that shall aifect parties outside ofthe finite group ofindividuals who formerly resided at the Altoona Center and the Court does not believe that any such resolution would be necessary or even proper.
Proceeding to the nature of the proposed intervenors' interest, the Court agrees with the Plaintiffs' position that the eight individual proposed intervenors are not former residents of Altoona Center and thus are not subject to the Court's order and clarifying order regarding the former Altoona Center residents' placement outside ofAltoona Center. The individual intervenors are concerned with a change in the Defendants' policy and a change in the present law that would cause them possibly to be subject to commitment to state institutions and denial of requests for community-based care. The Court's orders in the case subjudice are without effect upon these proposed intervenors and such orders have their basis in the agreement ofPlaintiffs and Defendants regarding the transition offormer Altoona Center residents only. As discussed above in footnote two, the Defendants do not have an official policy that is the basis ofthe protocol being carried out regarding the placement ofthe former Altoona Center residents. Specifically, Mr. Ennis, the only proposed individual intervenor currently residing in a state ICF/MR facility, is not bound by the Court's orders regarding transfer of Altoona Center residents to the Ebensburg Center, orders that are inaccurately seen by the intervenors as requiring wholesale continued institutionalization of those currently able to live in community-based facilities. It is further noted that Mr. Ennis has not alleged that his guardian or representative is preventing him from receiving community services that he seeks, a fact that further separates this litigation from any affect upon the proposed intervenors. See Proposed Complaint in Intervention, pp. 5-6.
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For the remaining proposed individual intervenors who are not residents ofa state ICF/MR, but seek intervention for the inability to obtain community services or concern for having the Defendants seek to implement a policy of re-institutionalization for those currently living in their respective communities, the Court re-iterates that its orders denying the preliminary injunction and memorializing the agreement between the parties do nothing to prevent further delivery of community services or sanction a policy ofre-institutionalization of those persons with mental retardation who are currently living in and integrated within their home communities. The previously recognized representatives, state-appointed guardians and the guardian ad litem, Dr. Thomas A. Burk, were given the power to choose the placement ofthe former Altoona Center residents within the Ebensburg Center or to choose community placement upon the closure of the Altoona Center.
Dr. Burk and the other representatives have not been empowered by the parties' agreement to make any choices other than the choice of placement for their respective wards after the wards were removed from the Altoona Center and to be able to change that choice within eighteen months should their original choice for their wards prove to be dissatisfying or harmful to their wards. This eighteen month period was agreed to by the parties to satisfy concerns that the former residents of Altoona Center may not be properly cared for within community-based facilities they chose to reside within and to permit them to return to state administered care at the Ebensburg Center, a facility with familiar personnel and a known record of providing care and community activities enjoyed by the former residents of Altoona Center. However, subsequent to the completion of this litigation, if the level of integration called for in the residents' ISPs cannot be met by the Ebensburg Center, the Defendants have a duty to comply with federal law and facilitate the necessary integration.
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It is clear that intervention into the case subjudice by any ofthe proposed individual intervenors
would inject unrelated issues in a matter that concerns only the closing ofone ICF/MR facility and the subsequent placement of its former residents. Furthermore, in consideration of the fact that the Defendants sought an appeal ofthe Court's clarification order, an order that was based upon conditions agreed to by the Defendants and which is now sought to be contested by the proposed intervenors, in
addition to the invitation by the Defendants to visit community residences (see Document No. 46), it
is readily apparent to the Court that the Defendants are dissatisfied with their agreement to permit the transfer of Altoona Center residents to the Ebensburg Center.
It is also apparent to the Court that the Defendants have been and are continuing a policy and system-wide process of closure of the ICF/MR facilities in Pennsylvania since the enactment of Pennsylvania's Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966. The Court is aware that the Plaintiffs are concerned with the possible future closure of the Ebensburg Center, but they were reminded by the Court during the status conference of September 26, 2006 that the instant litigation concerns only the Altoona Center and its former residents. Furthermore, Plaintiffs' counsel during that conference was directed to inform the Court whether he would continue to pursue class certification. The Court has not been so informed since that conference of six months ago regarding this issue. The Court can only assume from their inaction that the Plaintiffs do not wish to pursue class certification, a decision which negatively impacts upon the proposed individual intervenors' argument for intervention by further isolating any impact this Court's rulings would have beyond the current parties to this civil action.
Under these circumstances of very fact-specific court orders, the Court fails to see how the 19

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proposed individual intervenors have a specific legal interest within the instant litigation. Any eventual judgment by this Court will not touch upon or impact the residential status of any resident of any Pennsylvania ICF/MR facility or of any community-based care facility who was not a resident of the Altoona Center at the time of its closure. Therefore, it can be simply stated that the Court fails to see
any threat that stare decisis would pose to the separate legal interest of mentally retarded individuals
who are not former residents of the Altoona Center.
The proposed organizational intervenors, whether they are organizations advocating for the
integration of those with mental retardation into the communities of Pennsylvania or organizations advocating for their own members' personal rights as professionals to choose to help serve those with mental retardation, they are not linked to any negative impact the Court's ruling would have on the proposed individual intervenors or the current Plaintiffs.
Ifthe professional members ofthe proposed intervenors AAMR-PA and PA TASH are correct that they have a liberty interest to choose the profession they wish to engage in, like the jailed German
teacher in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923), they have failed to
relate this interest to the Court's orders.3 AAMR-PA and PA-TASH attempt to intervene out of a concern that their admirable, professional work with Pennsylvania's mentally retarded citizens will be inhibited by the past and future actions of this Court. Part of their concern is born of a fear that the
3The Court ofAppeals for the Third Circuit has questioned the extent ofthe Meyer decision because ofits particular circumstances in that Meyer was jailed thereby preventing his ability to teach and, additionally, the Supreme Court equally considered the rights of parents in their children's education; fmding that Meyer concerned a complete bar to the practice of one's occupation, the Third Circuit concluded that circumstances short of this bar would not suffice to invoke the substantive due process rights announced in Meyer. Boyanowski v. Capital Area Intermediate Unit, 215 F.3d 396, 404 (3d Cir. 2000). The professional members in the case sub judice are not prevented physically or legally from pursuing their profession and the rights of the former residents to reject community-basedresidential facilities under Olmstead presents a stronger competing legal right.
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Court's orders will result in the closing of community-based facilities and the forced reinstitutionalization of those mentally retarded citizens who are currently integrated within the community which, in tum, would affect the professionals of AAMR-PA and PA-TASH as these professionals work in capacities to develop among other things, ISPs and to facilitate the integration ofmentally retarded citizens into the community. Once again, like the individual proposed intervenors, these proposed organizational intervenors read into the Court's orders a broader effect than what exists.
These professionals are not being jailed like the German teacher in Meyer and their work with the
former residents of Altoona Center will continue beyond this litigation in respect to the continued evaluation of the former Altoona Center residents, wherever they may currently reside. Indeed, these professionals are necessary for the implementation ofthe Court's orders as the ISPs are an integral part
ofthe decision making process for the guardian ad litem and other representatives. No one is seeking,
and the Court is not pursuing, any course of action that would prevent these professionals from the continued pursuit of integration of the former Altoona Center residents.
To reiterate, the Court's orders do not provide the power to any representative to "lock away" the former Altoona Center residents into the Ebensburg Center or any community-based facility for their lifetimes. Circumstances can change in the future with regard to each of the former Altoona Center residents and the knowledge and skills ofthese professionals are necessary for the appropriate care and placement ofthe former residents. The orders ofthis Court, which were essentially based upon the agreement reached by the parties in open court cannot in any way be characterized as directing wholesale re-institutionalization that would in tum obviate the need for a whole class ofprofessionals who are on the "front lines" ofcompliance with the ADA and Rehabilitation Act as well as other federal
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statutes. These professionals know the former Altoona Center residents, have documented their needs and know the extent of services available. Their professions are not being eliminated~ let alone restrained in any way, by the Courts' orders permitting the representatives to choose the placement of their respective wards following the closure of the Altoona Center. Continued evaluation of these residents will be necessary and these professionals are integral to that mission.
PATASH, ARC, ANC, NCSD, SO, and VFE4 are attempting to intervene on their own behalf and their members' behalf claiming that they will suffer "organizational economic harm by virtue of having to divert ...[their] resources to again address issues of unlawful veto-power of community placement and guardian-admission of people to institutions." Amended Motion to Intervene, pp. 26, 29, 30, 31. These organizations believe there is a legal battle for community integration to be fought anew with the transfer ofthe former residents ofAltoona Center. The Court obviously does not share this view. In fact, as a result ofthe closure ofAltoona Center, to the Court's latest understanding forty percent ofits former residents have been placed in the community. Had the Altoona Center remained open, presumably all of its former residents would have remained institutionalized there. Had these groups wished to fight for the de-institutionalization ofthe former residents, they should have initiated this fight while they were residents of the Altoona Center and before plans to close that facility were announced. It is possible these groups did not contest the continued institutionalization of the former residents because Altoona Center provided a level of integration that was acceptable to all qualified
4Vision for Equality's activities appear to concern the monitoring of the provision of"community services and supports in Philadelphia County" along with training disabled individuals, their families and care providers as well as providing advocacy support. Such services, if confmed to Philadelphia County are difficult for the Court to relate to any interest in the case subjudice concerning the former residents now housed in the Ebensburg Center, in Ebensburg, Cambria County.
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mental health professionals monitoring its residents. However, as counsel for the parties are aware, there were no recommendations regarding community placement ofthe former residents until the Court ordered the evaluations that resulted in the recommendations.
It would seem to the Court that these organizations' advocacy would have sought the possible integration of the Altoona Center residents before the commencement of the instant litigation. Nevertheless, these organizations delayed their actions, waited for the Court to issue its orders and, thereafter, have read the Court's orders in the case sub judice as rekindling the policy questions regarding the proper placement ofmentally retarded citizens ofPennsylvnania. The Court's orders did not take such action. Rather, the Court memorialized the agreement of the parties to the instant litigation that provided for the placement options of the former residents of the Altoona Center as a result of its closure. Such placement decisions are not permanent and furthermore, such decisions do not impact anyone other than the former Altoona Center residents whose interests are adequately represented without the requested intervention ofthe proposed intervenors. Most importantly, the Court has provided for the only manner in which these individuals can have their consents provided for under Olmstead: consideration ofthe choices made by the former residents' guardians. This Court cannot say this enough: the continued compliance with the federal and state laws regarding the integration of the former Altoona Center residents is not compromised by the Court's orders.
As an additional basis for intervention, the members of AAMR-PA, PA-TASH, PPA, ARC, ANC, NCSD, and SO, whether professionals, family and friends ofthe mentally impaired or mentally retarded or the mentally impaired individuals themselves as members ofthese organizations or clients of the professional members, have a general concern for the wholesale reinstitutionalization and/or
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continued institutionalization ofmentally retarded and mentally impaired individuals into Pennsylvania ICF/MR facilities. This general concern is not a specific legal interest which justifies intervention by right. As outlined above, the Courts' orders are directed specifically to the former residents of the Altoona Center and do not mandate the permanent placement ofany such former residents, or any other mentally retarded citizens of Pennsylvania, within an ICF/MR but only provide a protocol to achieve placement of the former residents ofthe Altoona Center upon the closure of that facility. Therefore, the family and friends who are members concerned about their right to association with their mentally retarded or impaired family members and friends lack a specific legal interest that is the subject ofthis litigation, and the professional members need not divert resources back into a fight against the institutionalization of their clients and members.
The proposed intervenor PPA offers a different basis for its intervention: its role as the "Protection and Advocacy Agency for Pennsylvanians with developmental disabilities pursuant to the
Develomental Disabilities Assistance and Bill ofRights Act, 42 U.S.C. § § 15041, 15043." Amended Motion to Intervene (Document No. 44) p. 27. PPA argues that it has staffat both the Altoona Center
and the Ebensburg Center who work to fulfill the statutory duty of '"protection of, and advocacy for the rights of such individuals within the State who are or who may be eligible for treatment, services, or habilitation, or who are being considered for a change in living arrangements...' 42 U.S.C. § 15043(a)(2)(A)(i)." !d. First, the Court is not adjudicating the rights ofany Ebensburg Center resident who was not moved as a result of the closure of the Altoona Center. Second, PPA has a duty to advocate for the continued integration ofall institutionalized persons and it seems odd to the Court that the closure of the former Altoona Center appears to be the triggering event for this group's interest in
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the integration of the former Altoona Center residents rather than a change in underlying evaluations of the residents' ISPs.5 If the ISPs in place at the time prior to the commencement of this litigation
found community placement appropriate, PPA could have acted to place such individuals in that setting
at that time. PPA's legal interests in protecting the former Altoona Center residents and advocating for
them will not be impaired; as mentioned above, the power of the representatives to choose the
placement of the residents resulted from the closure of the Altoona Center and is not a permanent
institutionalization.
Some former residents have proceeded to community placement, others remain in the
Defendants' institutionalized care as they were in the Altoona Center. Should the former residents'
community integration through the Ebensburg Center be less than that of the Altoona Center, and/or
recommendations for community placement have been made, and such resources are available, PPA is free to carry on its important advocacy operations. It will be continually necessary for the
Defendants to comply with the individual ISPs and federal law concerning the integration ofthe former
Altoona Center residents. Nothing in the Court's orders prevents PPA from carrying out this mission.
5 The Court is somewhat puzzled as to why PPA did not advocate for integration of the former Altoona Center residents through seeking evaluations and recommendations as to the residents' abilities to integrate from the qualified mental health professionals prior to the commencement of this litigation; and the Court wonders how PPA performed its services without such recommendations prior to this Court's order denying the preliminary injunction. Now that evaluations and recommendations regarding community placement have been made as to the former Altoona Center residents pursuant to order ofthis Court, any recommendationsfor communityplacement must be considered in light ofthe resources necessary for community placement for a former resident along with a host of other fact-specific factors by the physicians, professionals, guardians and representatives. The Court does not attempt to place itself in a role ofdecision-makerfor each ofthe former residents, but leaves this duty to the physicians, professionals, guardians and representatives who must consider the recommendations set forth in the individual ISPs as well as the community's ability to meet the needs of the former residents with the resources in hand. Since a decision concerning appropriate placement had to be made for each resident due to the imminentclosure ofAltoona Center, the parties agreed upon a reasonable protocol which was incorporated into this Court's orders. The Court found the protocol to be in compliance with Olmstead and to be a reasonable solution to the problem of placement of the residents who were unable to make such a decision themselves.
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Furthermore, any concern ofPPA for Ebensburg Center residents who were not moved there as a result of the Altoona Center closure presents an interest outside of the scope ofthis litigation and cannot be a basis for PPA to intervene as of right here.
The Plaintiffs' primary interest was the continued operation of the Altoona Center, a facility whose integration of its residents within the community pursuant to the ADA and Rehabilitation Act was not questioned by any ofthe parties. In argument, the Plaintiffs conceded that the prevention of the Altoona Center's closure was unattainable. An alternative to that goal was to assume the maintenance ofthe well-being ofthe former Altoona Center residents who had to physically move from that facility, their continued integration with the communities of Pennsylvania through their new residences and the level ofpersonal care that they clearly needed, but feared was not best served for all former residents in community-based facilities. Therefore, the Plaintiffs cannot be said to be seeking remedies that would affect the separate legal interests of the proposed individual intervenors. See K/eiss/er v. United States Forest Service, 157 F.3d 964, 976 (3d Cir. 1998)(Becker, J. concurring). Indeed "[proposed intervenors] must demonstrate 'an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action"'Liberty Mutual Inc. Co. v. Treesda/e, Inc., 419 F.3d 216, 220 (3d Cir. 2005)(citing Mountain Top at 366).
C. Impairment The "proposed intervenors must also demonstrate that their interest might become affected or impaired, as a practical matter, by the disposition of the action in their absence." Mountain Top Condominium Assoc. v. Dave Stabbert Master Builder, 12 F.3d 361, 368 (3d Cir. 1995)(citing United States v. A/can Aluminum, 25 F.3d 1174, 1185 n. 5(3d Cir. 1994)). It is not sufficient that the claim be
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incidentally affected; there must be "a tangible threat to a legally cognizable interest." Harris, 820 F.2d at 601. Yet, this factor may be satisfied if, for example, a determination of the action in the applicants' absence will have a significant stare decisis effect on their claims, or if the applicants' rights may be affected by a proposed remedy. !d." Brody by and through Sugzdinis v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108, 1123 (3d Cir. 1992).
Although this Court has concluded that the proposed intervenors have no interest in the case sub judice, ifwe concluded to the contrary, the interests still will not be affected or impaired by the remedy sought by the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs primarily sought the continued operation ofthe Altoona Center because it was viewed as more fully integrated than any other community-based facilities or the Ebensburg Center and, therefore, the one facility that could comply with the statutory requirements of integration and services necessary for its residents. Complaint, (Document No. 1) ~~ 22-47. The Plaintiffs also requested class certification and appointment of guardians for certain unrepresented parties in order to achieve this goal. Complaint ~~ 10-21, 62-65. The Plaintiffs were concerned that an increased risk of abuse and/or death could arise if the residents were transferred to community facilities or the Ebensburg Center. Complaint ~ 22-47. It is clear that the continued operation ofthe Altoona Center is not an optional remedy at this point. Further, the appointment ofguardians for those former residents without representation of any type has been effectuated and such action does not impair any of the proposed intervenors' possible legal rights.
In regard to class certification, the Court has indicated above that the Plaintiffs have apparently abandoned this remedy. Therefore, with the parties' agreement in force regarding the placement ofthe
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former residents of the Altoona Center, the Court is left with the task of overseeing the continued compliance by the parties until the completion ofthe eighteen month period for such residents to change their residential selections. While the Plaintiffs may have possible concerns with regard to the integration of the former residents of the Altoona Center now residing in the Ebensburg Center, this issue along with attorney's fees appear to be the remaining issues in the case sub judice. Certainly, the Ebensburg Center must comply with the ISPs of the former Altoona Center residents, but such compliance is a matter addressed to a finite number offormer residents. Disposition ofsuch issues will not affect the Ebensburg Center or its residents who were not transferred there as a result ofthe Altoona Center closure, other state ICF/MR facilities or community-based facilities, their residents, the professionals working within them, or any professional organizations, family, friends and other individuals working for or with the mentally impaired generally or advocating for their rights. Upon completion ofthe eighteen month period allotted for the decision-making by the Plaintiffs for placement of the former Altoona Center residents, the Court will have a finite number of individuals who are former Altoona Center residents who reside in the Ebensburg Center. The only possible issue before the Court at that time under the Plaintiffs' Complaint will be such former residents' level ofcommunity integration required by federal and state law being accomplished by the Defendants at the Ebensburg Center. The resolution of this issue will clearly be confined to only these former residents and any Court order must ensure compliance with the goal of integration mandated by federal and state law.
The Court cannot order the re-institutionalization ofnon-parties or those parties who willingly left the Altoona Center for community placement, prevent the professionals and organizations advocating for the former residents' integration from performing their continued mission in seeking
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such integration, or order the continued institutionalization of former Altoona Center residents whose ISPs requirements cannot be met by the Ebensburg Center and who are approved for community placement. Therefore, the Court cannot envision in what way, assuming the proposed intervenors filed a timely motion and possessed sufficient legal interests within the instant litigation, the Court's final disposition of issues regarding the Ebensburg Center's compliance with the ISPs of former Altoona Center residents, now residing in the Ebensburg Center, will impair the legal interests ofthe proposed
intervenors. Much like the reasoning ofJudge Easterbrook in Bethune Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 863 F.2d
525, 531-532 (71h Cir. 1988), this Court views the proposed intervenors as lacking an interest in this litigation and only seeking to obtain a "favorable opinion" not a "favorable judgment" in litigation that will not impair any intervenors' alleged interest. Therefore, based upon the lack of an impairment of legal rights, the proposed intervenors' motions shall be denied.
D. Adequacy of Representation The final requirement to be evaluated is whether the interests of the proposed intervenors are adequately represented by the current parties. The Third Circuit has explained this requirement as follows: Under this final element of the test, "[t]he burden, however minimal ... is on the applicant for intervention to show that his interests are not adequately represented by the existing parties." Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 672 F.2d 1133, 1135 (3d Cir.1982). Representation will be considered inadequate on any ofthe following three grounds: ( 1) that although the applicant's interests are similar to those of a party, they diverge sufficiently that the existing party cannot devote proper attention to the applicant's interests; (2) that there is collusion between the representative party and the opposing party; or (3) that the representative party is not diligently prosecuting the suit. Jd
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Brody by and through Sugzdinis v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108, 1123 (3d Cir. 1992). Furthermore, a preswnption ofadequate representation generally arises when the representative is a governmental body or officer charged by law with representing the interests ofthe absentee. Com. ofPa. v. Rizzo, 530 F.2d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 1976)(citations omitted).
The Defendants clearly are charged under federal and state law to protect the interests of the individual proposed intervenors. The applicants for intervention have not demonstrated how the Defendants cannot perform this function. As for the proposed organizational intervenors, the Defendants are not charged with protecting their interests to the extent those interests are the exercise oftheir liberty interest to engage in an occupation of their choosing. Nonetheless, the Defendants are charged with protecting the interests ofthose mentally retarded clients and individual members ofthese organizations who seek the prevention oftheir re·institutionalization.
As for the interests of the organizations themselves and the interest of their professional members to pursue occupations of their choosing, the present parties appear to be representing or advocating "similar" interests. Still it is apparent to the Court that there exists a divergence of their respective interests in that the current parties to the litigation are devoted to other interests and issues specific to their clients and not those of the proposed organizational intervenors or their professional members as well as members who are family and friends of mentally impaired individuals generally.
However, in light of the fact that these proposed organizational intervenors have not met any of the other three requirements for intervention, intervention must be denied despite not having all of their interests adequately represented by the current parties to this litigation.
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Therefore, intervention as ofright is denied for all ofthe proposed intervenors. The Court must now explore the question of permissive intervention as it was alternatively requested by the proposed intervenors. Amended Motion to Intervene as of Right as Plaintiffs, p. 32. III. PERMISSIVE INTERVENTION
The Court does not fmd that any relevant statute permits a conditional right to intervention for any ofthe proposed intervenors. Therefore, the Court proceeds to the question ofwhether the proposed intervenors' claims or defenses raise a common question oflaw or fact with the case subjudice.
The Proposed Complaint in Intervention, names seven persons currently residing in the community who fear re-institutionalization because ''the policies ofDefendants here complained ofand the Court's Preliminary Orders according to legal guardians veto-power over community placement and the power to admit persons to State Centers, if made final and extended beyond the Altoona and Ebensburg Centers, threatens each of them with immediate and irreparable injury." Complaint in Intervention, p. 5. As repeatedly made clear above, through the Court's analysis ofintervention as of right, the Courts' Orders will not extend beyond those persons who were former residents of Altoona Center who were caused to moved from there as a result of the Altoona Center closure. No common question oflaw or fact exists between these proposed intervenors and the case subjudice. Additionally, the one proposed individual intervenor, Mr. Adam Ennis, who is currently institutionalized at the Selinsgrove Center but seeks community placement and wishes to intervene in order to seek redress because his "Constitutional liberty...and statutory interest are and will continue to be irreparably injured by his continued institutionalization under Defendants' policy and practices complained ofhere and the
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Court's Preliminary Order" also cannot obtain intervention. Mr. Ennis' issues concern release from the Selinsgrove Center not the Altoona Center, and he has not in any manner established that his continued institutionalization resulted from the current parties' agreement to avoid a preliminary injunction and the Court's Orders memorializing that agreement. His concern is not being given a community placement whereas the Plaintiffs' concern was the adequacy ofthe possible community placements and the desire to have the ability to return their wards to the ICF/MR at Ebensburg Center as an alternative to available, but possibly inadequate community-based facilities. The legal and factual issues presented by Mr. Ennis are clearly unrelated and would unduly confuse, delay and prejudice the rights of the former Altoona Center residents. To the extent any ofthe proposed organizational intervenors attempt to intervene on behalf of their members or clients, whether living in institutions or in the community, out ofconcern for continued institutionalization or re-institutionalization, for the same reasons as stated above, the proposed organizational intervenors' application for permissive intervention must also be denied.
The proposed organizational intervenors' interests generally concern their "professional and occupational interests" in their choice to continue with professions that provide advocacy and service to those mentally impaired citizens of Pennsylvania. Once again, the Court recognizes that its Orders and the instant litigation concern only the former Altoona Center residents forced to relocate because of that facility's closing. Nothing in the Court's Orders thus far impedes any mental retardation professional generally from engaging in his respective profession. These persons may seek to fulfill the former Altoona Center residents' needs for integration and community placement just as they were tasked to do when the Altoona Center was open. Furthermore, many of the proposed organizational
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intervenors seek intervention based upon a claim of "economic injury by having to divert resources from other undertakings to refighting the long-past settled issues ofguardianship and self-determination reopened by Defendant's policy here and this Court's Preliminary Orders." Proposed Complaint in Intervention, p. 8. Once again, as analyzed with respect to intervention as of right, the proposed organizational intervenors view the Court's Orders and the parties' agreement as opening a door closed long ago regarding the segregation of mentally retarded citizens in asylums. These intervenors view the Courts' Orders incorrectly in order to characterize their intervention as necessary to fight a supposed errant, illegal policy of Pennsylvania sought to be applied system-wide to each and every ICF/MR and mentally impaired citizen of Pennsylvania. The instant litigation sanctions no such policy and permitting these intervenors to inject issues regarding their unsubstantiated concerns for those with mental impairments who are integrated into Pennsylvania's communities would unduly protract this litigation and inject unrelated factual and legal issues that would be far afield ofthe issues surrounding the rights and concerns of the former residents ofthe Altoona Center.
In comparison with the other proposed intervenors, PPA presents somewhat different circumstances inthat PPA works with the former Altoona Center residents to advocate and support their further integration into the community. The former residents will certainly need PPA's continued support to ensure an integrated experience. The Plaintiffs are relying on PPA to ensure that the former Altoona Center residents are provided integration comparable to what they were provided at the Altoona Center. PPA fails to recognize that the Plaintiffs initially resisted placement in the Ebensburg Center as well as community-based facilities because of their concern that these facilities could not meet the level of integration achieved by the former residents of the Altoona Center at that facility.
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PPA is an integral part of any former resident's transition into the Ebensburg Center and from there their continued evaluation and placement in an appropriate facility. Regardless, allowing PPA permissive intervention would unduly delay this proceeding by replication of the efforts and goals of integration already sought by the Plaintiffs. Additionally, PPA seemingly seeks to advocate for all residents of Ebensburg Center. Such a group of individuals is beyond the parameters of the current controversy before the Court and to allow intervention by PPA in order to advocate on behalf of all Ebensburg Center residents, not just the residents who formerly resided at the Altoona Center would further delay this matter and possibly inject unrelated issues into the litigation that would cause the Court to rule on matters that would prejudice the adjudication ofthe former Altoona Center residents' rights.
Permissive intervention is thus inappropriate for all of the proposed intervenors. An appropriate Order follows.
AND NOW this 23rd day of March, 2007, in accordance with the foregoing Memorandum
Opinion, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the proposed intervenors' Amended Motion for Intervention of Right as Plaintiffs (Document No. 44) is DENIED.
BY THE COURT:
KIM R. GIBSON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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 Case 3:05-cv-00419-KRG Document 113 Filed 01/12/09 Page 1 of 11

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LINDA ALEXANDER, by her guardians and

)

next friends FRANCES ALEXANDER and

)

MARY ALEXANDER, et al.

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:2005-419

)

v.

)

)

JUDGE GIBSON

EDWARD G. RENDELL, as Governor ofthe

)

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, et al.•

)

)

Defendants.

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER OF COURT GIBSON,J.
This matter comes before the Court on the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as Moot or, in the alternative, Pre-Discovery Motion for Summary Judgment (Document No. 97). The Plaintiffs oppose this motion arguing that this matter is not moot. The Court will grant the motion for summary judgment.
FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The Plaintiff-residents are former residents of the Altoona Center, a former state-operated intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded in downtown Altoona, Pennsylvania. The remaining Plaintiffs are recognized decision-makers or legal guardians for the Plaintiff-residents. The Plaintiffresidents' medical and mental conditions are sufficiently described in this Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law (see Document No. 25), but it suffices to state that the Plaintiff-residents' mental capacities are not above those of two year-old children. In late 2004, the Defendants, who are

Case 3:05-cv-00419-KRG Document 113 Filed 01/12/09 Page 2 of 11
government officials for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, announced the Commonwealth's intention to close the Altoona Center and relocate its residents. The Plaintiffs filed this civiJ action and eventually a motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to prevent the Defendants from transferring the residents of the Altoona Center to other care facilities without the consent of each Plaintiffresident's family or legal guardian. The Plaintiff-residents' concern was that no other institution or community-based care facility would be as integrated as the Altoona Center and placement ofthem into that community-based care may result in abuse, neglect or in the worst case, death. In its order resolving the Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Document No. 15), the Court adopted a protocol approved by the parties that set forth actions to be taken by the parties with respect to the Plaintiff-residents that would allow their transfer from the Altoona Center, their placement in the Ebensburg Center or a community-based care facility of their choice, and allow the Defendants to eventually close the Altoona Center. The Altoona Center has been closed as such a facility since May 2006. See Defendant's Concise Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ("Defendant's CSUMF")(Document No. 98). The Memorandum Opinion and Order of Court dated January 30, 2006 (Document No. 25) set forth this protocol and the Court subsequently clarified this protocol in a Memorandum Opinion and Order dated March 9, 2006 (Document No. 42) in response to a motion by the Defendants (see Document No. 38). The protocol permitted the Plaintiff-residents' guardians or decision-makers to choose the placement for each resident after the individual resident's treatment professionals evaluated and reported on the resident's condition in an individual support plan ("ISP"). For the benefit of the decision-makers, the ISPs were to include recommendations for an appropriate placement of the resident by a qualified mental health professional.
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In addition to class-action allegations, the Plaintiffs' Complaint set forth four causes ofaction: a claimed violation ofthe Plaintiff-residents' rights under the Americans with Disabilities A~t ("ADA") and the Rehabilitation Act unless the Plaintiff-residents are transferred to a placement outside of Altoona Center that is no less integrated than Altoona Center and only after such placement is permitted by the residents' ISP and consent of the residents' guardians or decision-makers is obtained; second, that evaluations of the Plaintiff-residents be completed and the choice of placement in "at a state-run ICF/MR" facility or another facility be made only if is consistent with the ISP and with consent of the Plaintiff-residents' decision-makers (Complaint (Document No. 1),~ 56); third, a due process claim based upon a concern that the residents' transfer by order of the Defendants from the Altoona Center to community-based facilities would result in possible injury or death; and fourth, the appointment of guardians "for purposes of participation in this action." Complaint, ~ 65.
ANALYSIS Before proceeding further, the Court must recognize the proper standard for analysis. As the title to the Defendants' motion indicates, they seek dismissal of the Plaintiffs' claims because of mootness or alternatively summary judgment. The Defendants have submitted a Concise Statement of Undisputed Material Facts consisting offive proposed facts: 1. The last resident of Altoona Center left in [sic] Altoona Center May, 2006. 2. The last community placement of an Altoona Center resident (after interim placement at Ebensburg Center) was in December, 2006. 3. All choices for either state center placement or community placement made by guardians or other legal representatives of plaintiffs were honored. 4. No Altoona Center resident has asked to return to Ebensburg Center. 5. Altoona Center was leased to a private entity in May, 2007. These five proposed facts were submitted on September 4, 2007. All five are based upon the Affidavit
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of David Fulton, the "official-in-charge of Ebensburg Center", which accompanies the Defendants' motion, briefand statement offacts. Consistent with Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 12(d),.the Court's consideration of Mr. Fulton's affidavit will most certainly convert any motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment because of a consideration of matters outside of the pleadings. See also Boyle v. Governor's Veterans Outreach & Assistance Center, 925 F.2d 71, 74-75 (3d Cir. 1991) and Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 339-340 (3d Cir. 1989). The Plaintiffs have opposed the Defendants' motion by submitting with their brief a Concise Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (Document No. 108) consistent with Local Rule 56.1 governing summary judgment motion practice. Clearly the Plaintiffs were aware and proceeded by taking the opportunity to respond in a fashion that recognized that the motion would be interpreted as a motion for summary judgment in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d). Thus any notice by the Court to the parties that it will treat the Defendants' motion as one requesting summary judgment is unnecessary. See DL Resources, Inc. v. FirstEnergy Solutions Corp., 506 F.3d 209, 223 (3d Cir. 2007)(requiring district courts to provide notice to parties before granting summary judgment sua sponte).
Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 56(c) requires that "[summary]judgment...should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Summary judgment is appropriate only when it is demonstrated that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-32, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 255257,91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). An issue ofmaterial fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, all reasonable
4

Case 3:05-cv-00419-KRG Document 113 Filed 01/12/09 Page 5 of 11
inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-movant. Oritani [Sav. and Loan Ass 'n v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 989 F.2d 635, 638]. Troy Chemical Corp. v. Teamsters Union Local No. 408, 37 F.3d 123, 125-126 (3d Cir. 1994).
As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted. See generally 1OA C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2725, pp. 93-95 (1983). This materiality inquiry is independent of and separate from the question of the incorporation of the evidentiary standard into the summary judgment determination. That is, while the materiality determination rests on the substantive law, it is the substantive law's identification of which facts are critical and which facts are irrelevant that governs. Any proof or evidentiary requirements imposed by the substantive law are not germane to this inquiry, since materiality is only a criterion for categorizing factual disputes in their relation to the legal elements of the claim and not a criterion for evaluating the evidentiary underpinnings of those disputes. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Proceeding with the understanding that the present motion is one for summary judgment, the
Court considers the Defendants' and the Plaintiffs' proposed undisputed material facts together. The
Plaintiffs' proposed facts include their verbatim adoption ofthe Court's findings of fact set forth in its
January 30, 2006 Order denying the Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. The Court may
judicially notice such a previous order, but it is prohibited from considering such facts unless it converts the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment. Lum v. Bank ofAmerica, 361 F.3d217, 222
n.3 (3d Cir. 2004). Having already converted the motion into one for summary judgment, the Court
considers the facts it has previously found and concludes that they are material and undisputed. Finally, the Plaintiffs in their proposed fact number 23 recognize that the Defendants' proposed fact 2 is correct
and in proposed facts 24 and 25 they offer that there is an eighteen month period (that ended in June
5

Case 3:05-cv-00419-KRG Document 113 Filed 01/12/09 Page 6 of 11
2008) in which transfer back into a state-run IGF/MR will be permitted for those who chose community placements. The Court adopts these three proposed material facts as well. Considering this record of undisputed facts, the Court turns to the question of mootness.
In a recent opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit observed that a party seeking to establish mootness carries a "heavy [burden]". DeJohn v. Temple University, 537 F.3d 301, 309 (3d Cir. 2008). The DeJohn court, citing the Supreme Court in Los Angeles County v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979), also recognized that a matter becomes moot when "(1) it can be said with assurance that 'there is no reasonable expectation... ' that the alleged violation will recur, and (2) interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects ofthe alleged violation." DeJohn at 309. The DeJohn opinion then proceeded to compare other instances ofthe cessation of challenged conduct and the application ofthe principles ofmootness. DeJohn itselfreviewed a policy enforced by Temple University on the matter of gender discrimination and its subsequent cessation of that policy before completion of the litigation and in spite of the university's continued support for the "constitutionality of' and "need for" the former policy. DeJohn at 309. The Third Circuit concluded that the matter was not moot because it was possible for the university to reinstate the policy after conclusion of the litigation. DeJohn at 310.
In contrast, the Court believes that the instant matter is more akin to the Eleventh Circuit case ofJews for Jesus, Inc. v. Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, 162 F.3d 627 (11th Cir. 1998). The Third Circuit found that Jews for Jesus reflected an instance where an airport policy prohibiting distribution of literature was reversed after the airport authority's "substantial deliberation" and continued application of the new policy for three years. DeJohn at 311 (citing Jews for Jesus at 629).
6

Case 3:05-cv-00419-KRG Document 113 Filed 01/12/09 Page 7 of 11
In the case sub judice, the Plaintiffs' allegations are based upon the closure of the Altoona Center. There is no dispute that the Altoona Center is no longer in operation and all of its former Plaintiff-residents reside in the Ebensburg Center (or another state-operated ICF/MR facility) or a community-based care facility. The Plaintiff-residents' transfers occurred only after the completion of the ISPs which detail, inter alia, the Plaintiff-residents' medical needs and functionality. Any transfers of Plaintiff-residents from the Altoona Center were made consistent with the information set forth in these ISPs and the decisions for transfer of the Plaintiff-residents were confirmed by the respective decision-makers or guardians. For those Plaintiff-residents without legal guardians, the Defendants recognized the decisions of family members or the court-appointed guardian ad litem, Thomas Burk, M.D. in processing these Altoona Center residents to their subsequent placements. The placements have been completed in accordance with the wishes of the guardians and decision-makers which was the relief that was requested under the first and second causes of action. The Plaintiff-residents have been evaluated and individual ISPs created for each ofthem-the reliefrequested in the Plaintiffs' second cause of action. Some of the Plaintiff-residents no longer reside in a state-run ICF/MR facility. The Court Order of January 30, 2006 adopted the parties' agreement that an eighteen month standby period be implemented, that permitted any Plaintiff-resident transferred to a community-based care facility to return to a state-run ICF/MR facility if such a transfer was desired. It is undisputed that this period expired in June 2008. Now, in January 2009, the Court considers the Defendants' motion for summary judgment after the Defendants' January 2006 agreement with the Plaintiffs was memorialized and enforced by the Court. The Plaintiffs are correct that the Defendants' actions were taken pursuant to their own decision, but the Defendants cannot annul the fact that ISPs were completed for the Plaintiff-
7

Case 3:05-cv-00419-KRG Document 113 Filed 01/12/09 Page 8 of 11
residents in 2006 prior to their transfers from the Altoona Center. The decisions for transfer made by the recognized decision-makers of the Plaintiff-residents also cannot be undone. The ei~teen month standby period is complete. The Plaintiff-residents who sought to avoid community placements for fear of abuse, neglect, injury or death had the opportunity to avoid such placements and their decisions for placement into a state-operated ICF/MR facility have been honored instead of being forced into community placement. There is no evidence that the Defendants are seeking to expel from state facilities those Plaintiff-residents who chose such placements.
In light of the closure of the Altoona Center, the Plaintiffs sought to prevent the placement of the Plaintiff-residents in community-based treatment facilities because they viewed such placements as contrary to their personal wishes, as well as their medical needs and personal rights. In effect, the Plaintiffs conceded the Altoona Center's closure when they agreed to placements of the Plaintiffresidents after completion of individual ISPs and the decision-makers' ratification of a placement consistent with the ISPs. Nevertheless, the Plaintiffs assert that the injunctive and declaratory relief they sought concerned their transfer from the Altoona Center andany subsequent transfor. Defendant's Briefin Opposition (Document No. 106), p. 3. The Court does not find a request for such reliefwithin the Complaint.
As acknowledged in the Complaint, the Plaintiffs feared the closure of Altoona Center would involuntarily force them into community-based facilities for their future care against the will of the Plaintiffs and contrary to or in the absence ofany ISPs that outline the objective medical needs and the level of integration the Plaintiff-residents enjoyed at the Altoona Center. Ultimately, the Plaintiffs feared placements of Plaintiff-residents into community-based treatment facilities could result in
8

Case 3:05-cv-00419-KRG Document 113 Filed 01/12/09 Page 9 of 11
physical injury or death. The Plaintiffs never alleged a continuing policy (official or unofficial) by the Defendants that intended to expel the Plaintiff-residents from the Altoona Center or any sUI:te-operated ICF/MR facility. Additionally, the Defendants cannot efface the fact that ISPs were completed for each ofthe Plaintiff-residents or that their decision-makers chose the facility in which they were placed. The imminent closure ofthe Altoona Center is a situation that no longer exists and therefore cannot impact the Plaintiffs' rights.
Finally, all transfers of Plaintiff-residents to community-based treatment facilities have clearly mooted their respective claims concerning violation of their rights in such transfers as alleged in the Complaint. Transfer ofall remaining Plaintiff-residents to state-operated ICF/MR facilities were made consistent with the ISPs and the wishes of the Plaintiff-residents' decision-makers. No concern for abuse ofthe Plaintiff-residents placed at the Ebensburg Center has been raised despite the fact that the Complaint noted prior suspicion of such abuse. See Complaint,, 47, 59. The Plaintiffs have not sought amendment of the Complaint at any time.
It is clear that the circumstances demonstrate that no live controversy exists with respect to the allegations of the Complaint.
CONCLUSION While the Court agrees with the Plaintiffs that a community-based facility should not automatically be considered the most integrated type of living arrangement under ADA standards and that institutional care may present a more integrated approach to living based upon the individual circumstances, it is undisputed that the Altoona Center is closed. The Plaintiffs believed it to be the most-integrated facility for their needs and that being forced into community-based care facilities would
9

Case 3:05-cv-00419-KRG Document 113 Filed 01/12/09 Page 10 of 11
violate their rights under the ADA and other federal laws. However, those Plaintiff-residents who are now residing in community-based facilities are only there because their ISPs indicated ~hat such a placement was approved for these Plaintiffs and these Plaintiffs consented to those placements through the assent of their guardian or recognized decision-maker. Those who remain in a state-operated ICF/MR placements are there consistent with their respective ISPs and choices of their guardians or decision-makers; they were not forced into community placements contrary to their personal needs and legal rights. With the closure ofthe Altoona Center, choice ofplacement by the Plaintiffs and a respect for such choices by the Defendants were the keys to the compromise agreement which was adopted by this Court, thereby obviating the need for a preliminary injunction. The Plaintiff-residents rights' under federal laws remain intact as they did prior to the closure of the Altoona Center. Should closure occur at any of their current residences, and a degradation of personal needs and rights be threatened in a potential subsequent transfer of the Plaintiff-resident, only then can the circumstances of the loss of integration required under the ADA and other federal rights be evaluated properly. The cause at issue in the case sub judice was the closure of the Altoona Center and an alleged attempt by the Defendants to disperse the Plaintiff-residents into facilities without their consent, in violation of their rights and contrary to their personal needs. The causes of action did not concern the practices of treatment and evaluation ofthe Plaintiff-residents by the Defendants, the continued maintenance ofa state-wide, stateoperated system of ICF/MR facilities or the presence or absence of protocols for every subsequent transfer ofresidents resulting from a closure ofa state-operated ICF/MR facility. Based upon the claims of the Plaintiff, the parties' agreement and the continuing actions of the Defendants in this matter, the cause of action is now moot.
10

Case 3:05-cv-00419-KRG Document 113 Filed 01/12/09 Page 11 of 11
The Plaintiffs will be given twenty days to submit a petition for attorney's fees and any written argument in favor ofthem being deemed a prevailing party in this matter. The Defendants ~ill be given an equal amount of time to respond.
An appropriate Order follows.
AND NOW this 12th day of January, 2009, in accordance with the foregoing Memorandum Opinion IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as Moot is DENIED but their alternative Pre-Discovery Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
The Plaintiffs shall have until February 2, 2009 to submit a petition in support ofany claim for attorney's fees and their status as a prevailing party, with an accounting of the proposed fees; the Defendants shall respond to any such petition on or before February 23, 2009.
The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in favor of the Defendants against the Plaintiffs in a separate order.
BY THE COURT:
KIM R. GIBSON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
11

 
 Case: 3:05-cv-419 As of: 03/12/2011 10:21 PM EST 1 of 25
U.S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania (Johnstown) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:05−cv−00419−KRG

CLOSED

ALEXANDER et al v. RENDELL et al Assigned to: Kim R. Gibson Case in other court: USCA 3rd Circuit, 06−02005 Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 11/04/2005 Date Terminated: 01/12/2009 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 446 Civil Rights: Americans with Disabilities − Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

LINDA ALEXANDER by her guardians and next friends Frances Alexander and Mary Alexander

represented by Robert L. Greene 67 Wall Street Suite 2200 New York, NY 10005 (917) 543−9081 Email: greene@storzerandgreene.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff FRANCES ALEXANDER

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff MARY ALEXANDER

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
KATHIE CENTI by her guardians and next friends August Centi and Winifred Centi

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff AUGUST CENTI

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff WINIFRED CENTI

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
RICHARD EMERICK by his guardians and next friends Dewey Emerick and Virginia Merritt (Guardianship in process)

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

Case: 3:05-cv-419 As of: 03/12/2011 10:21 PM EST 2 of 25

DEWEY EMERICK

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff VIRGINIA MERRITT

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
CONSTANCE FOX by her guardian and next friend Natalie Fox

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff NATALIE FOX

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
MARY JANE KIES by her guardian and next friend Frances Irvin (Guardianship in process)

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff FRANCES IRVIN

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
ROBERT LUCIANO by his guardian and next friend Frank Luciano

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff FRANK LUCIANO

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
MARY ELLEN MARTIN by her guardian and next friend Clara Lindsey

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff CLARA LINDSEY

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:05-cv-419 As of: 03/12/2011 10:21 PM EST 3 of 25

Plaintiff
MICHAEL MASSIMO by his guardians and next friends Jo−Anne Overdorf and Richard Overdorf

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff JO−ANNE OVERDORF

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff RICHARD OVERDORF

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
ROBERT MINOR by his guardian and next friend Dianne Fox

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff DIANNE FOX

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
GERTRUDE MILLS by her guardian and next friend William Mills

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff WILLIAM MILLS

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
KATHLEEN MONTGOMERY by her guardian and next friend William V. Montgomery, Jr.

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff WILLIAM V. MONTGOMERY, JR.

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
RONALD REPLOGLE by his guardian and next friend Bonnie Wood (Guardianship in process)

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:05-cv-419 As of: 03/12/2011 10:21 PM EST 4 of 25

Plaintiff BONNIE WOOD
Plaintiff JOHN SHEA by his guardian and next friend Mary Ann Boylan (Guardianship in process)
Plaintiff MARY ANN BOYLAN
Plaintiff MARGIE SPORY by her guardian and next friend Hattie Williams
Plaintiff HATTIE WILLIAMS
Plaintiff ROBYNE WHEELER by her guardian and next friend Beverly Wheeler
Plaintiff BEVERLY WHEELER
Plaintiff MARGARET WYLAND by her guardians and next friends Edward Wyland and Marian Wyland
Plaintiff EDWARD WYLAND
Plaintiff MARIAN WYLAND

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 3:05-cv-419 As of: 03/12/2011 10:21 PM EST 5 of 25

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
RICHARD BARTLEBAUGH by his sister and next friend Renee Hoover

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff RENEE HOOVER

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
MELISSA BROADBENT by her father and next friend Larry R. Broadbent

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff LARRY R. BROADBENT

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
LINDA BRONDER by her next friend Kenneth Bronder

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff KENNETH BRONDER

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
BARBARA DEBELLO by her next friend Julio Debello

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff JULIO DEBELLO

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
PATRICK GAVIGAN by his next friend Ann Landefeld

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff ANN LANDEFELD

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address)

Case: 3:05-cv-419 As of: 03/12/2011 10:21 PM EST 6 of 25

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
GARY GOSNELL by his father and next friend Gary Gosnell

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff GARY GOSNELL

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
EDWARD HAMPTON by his next friends Dora Hampton and Lloyd Hampton

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff DORA HAMPTON

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff LLOYD HAMPTON

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
SHARON HARRISON by her next friend Fred Harrison

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff FRED HARRISON

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
PEGGY KELLY by her next friend Larry Kelly

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff LARRY KELLY

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

represented by

Case: 3:05-cv-419 As of: 03/12/2011 10:21 PM EST 7 of 25

JACK KIRSCHBAUM by his next friend Darlene Saltsgiver

Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff DARLENE SALTSGIVER

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
LORNA KUHN by her next friend Arlene Dearment

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff ARLENE DEARMENT

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
ROSE LONG by her next friend Mary Jones

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff MARY JONES

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
ROGER LOSEY by his next friend Rodney Losey

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff RODNEY LOSEY

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
PHILIP MCGANN by his next friends Paul McGann and Mary Jane McGann

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff PAUL MCGANN

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:05-cv-419 As of: 03/12/2011 10:21 PM EST 8 of 25

Plaintiff MARY JANE MCGANN

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
FRANCES NEIBURG by her next friend Esther Gordon

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff ESTHER GORDON

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
WANDA PABIAN by her next friend Louise Pabian

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff LOUISE PABIAN

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
JOHN SHEA by his sister and next friend Mary Anne Shea Boylan

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff MARY ANNE SHEA BOYLAN

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
DORIS STEWART by her next friend Joseph Stewart

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff JOSEPH STEWART

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
LEE ANN STIFFLER by her next friend Lorna Clark

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:05-cv-419 As of: 03/12/2011 10:21 PM EST 9 of 25

Plaintiff LORNA CLARK
Plaintiff VADA STRAIT by her next friend Lynn Strait
Plaintiff LYNN STRAIT
Plaintiff RONALD LEE SVEDA by his friend Joseph Sveda, Jr.
Plaintiff JOSEPH SVEDA, JR.
Plaintiff ED THEARLE by his next friend David R. Thearle
Plaintiff DAVID R. THEARLE
Plaintiff GEORGE WILLIAMS, JR. by his next friend Betty Smith
Plaintiff BETTY SMITH
Plaintiff DARREN WINELAND by his next friends David Wineland and Alta Wineland

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 3:05-cv-419 As of: 03/12/2011 10:21 PM EST 10 of 25

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff DAVID WINELAND

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff ALTA WINELAND

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
DIANNE ZVONKOVICH by her next friend Dorothy Zvonkovich

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
DOROTHY ZVONKOVICH on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff ALL PLAINTIFFS

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff ATTORNEY ROBERT GREENE

represented by Robert L. Greene (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Intervenor Plaintiff
JOY BECQUET TERMINATED: 03/23/2007

represented by Michael J. Healey Healey &Hornack 1100 Liberty Avenue Suite C−2, The Pennsylvanian Pittsburgh, PA 15222 (412) 391−7711 Email: mike@unionlawyers.net LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas K. Gilhool Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia 125 S. 9th Street Suite 700 Philadelphia, PA 19107 (215) 627−7100 x224 Email: tgilhool@pilcop.org TERMINATED: 04/28/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 3:05-cv-419 As of: 03/12/2011 10:21 PM EST 11 of 25

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Plaintiff
KIM HOFFMAN TERMINATED: 03/23/2007

represented by Michael J. Healey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas K. Gilhool (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/28/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Plaintiff
MATTHEW LEONARD TERMINATED: 03/23/2007

represented by Michael J. Healey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas K. Gilhool (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/28/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Plaintiff
JOSEPH LONG TERMINATED: 03/23/2007

represented by Michael J. Healey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas K. Gilhool (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/28/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Plaintiff
LUIS MALDONADO TERMINATED: 03/23/2007

represented by Michael J. Healey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas K. Gilhool (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/28/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Plaintiff
TRACEY MARSHELUK TERMINATED: 03/23/2007

represented by Michael J. Healey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas K. Gilhool (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/28/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:05-cv-419 As of: 03/12/2011 10:21 PM EST 12 of 25

Intervenor Plaintiff CIAR SULLIVAN TERMINATED: 03/23/2007
Intervenor Plaintiff ADAM ENNIS TERMINATED: 03/23/2007
Intervenor Plaintiff AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL RETARDATION, PENNSYLVANIA CHAPTER TERMINATED: 03/23/2007
Intervenor Plaintiff PA TASH The Pennsylvania Chapter of TASH TERMINATED: 03/23/2007
Intervenor Plaintiff ARC OF PENNSYLVANIA TERMINATED: 03/23/2007
Intervenor Plaintiff

represented by Michael J. Healey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas K. Gilhool (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/28/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Michael J. Healey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas K. Gilhool (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/28/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Michael J. Healey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas K. Gilhool (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/28/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Michael J. Healey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas K. Gilhool (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/28/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Michael J. Healey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas K. Gilhool (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/28/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:05-cv-419 As of: 03/12/2011 10:21 PM EST 13 of 25

AUTISM NATIONAL COMMITTEE, PENNSYLVANIA CHAPTER TERMINATED: 03/23/2007

represented by Michael J. Healey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas K. Gilhool (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/28/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Plaintiff
NATIONAL COALITION ON SELF−DETERMINATION TERMINATED: 03/23/2007

represented by Michael J. Healey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas K. Gilhool (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/28/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Plaintiff
SPEAKING FOR OURSELVES TERMINATED: 03/23/2007

represented by Michael J. Healey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas K. Gilhool (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/28/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Plaintiff
VISION FOR EQUALITY, INC. TERMINATED: 03/23/2007

represented by Michael J. Healey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas K. Gilhool (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/28/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Plaintiff
PENNSYLVANIA PROTECTION &ADVOCACY, INC. TERMINATED: 03/23/2007

represented by Mark J. Murphy Disability Rights Network of Pennsylvania 1315 Walnut Street Suite 400 Philadelphia, PA 19107−4798 (215) 238−8070 Email: mmurphy@drnpa.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Plaintiff
PUBLIC INTEREST LAW CENTER OF PHILADELPHIA TERMINATED: 03/23/2007

represented by Michael J. Healey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 3:05-cv-419 As of: 03/12/2011 10:21 PM EST 14 of 25
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas K. Gilhool (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/28/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant EDWARD G. RENDELL as Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
Defendant DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
Defendant ESTELLE B. RICHMAN as Secretary of the Department of Public Welfare of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
Defendant KEVIN T. CASEY as Deputy Secretary of the Pennsylvania Office of Mental Retardation

represented by Howard Ulan Office of General Counsel Health &Welfare Building 3rd Floor Harrisburg, PA 17120 (717) 787−6398 Email: hulan@state.pa.us LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 11/04/2005

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against EDWARD G. RENDELL, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, ESTELLE B. RICHMAN, KEVIN T. CASEY ( Filing fee $ 250; receipt number 06000054.), filed by GARY GOSNELL, EDWARD HAMPTON, DORA HAMPTON, LLOYD HAMPTON, SHARON HARRISON, AUGUST CENTI, FRED HARRISON, PEGGY KELLY, LARRY KELLY, JACK KIRSCHBAUM, DARLENE SALTSGIVER, LORNA KUHN, ARLENE DEARMENT, ROSE LONG, MARY JONES, ROGER LOSEY, WINIFRED CENTI, RODNEY LOSEY, PHILIP MCGANN, PAUL MCGANN, MARY JANE MCGANN, FRANCES NEIBURG, ESTHER GORDON, WANDA PABIAN, LOUISE PABIAN, JOHN SHEA(by his sister and next friend Mary Anne Shea Boylan), MARY ANNE SHEA BOYLAN, RICHARD EMERICK, DORIS STEWART, JOSEPH STEWART, LEE ANN STIFFLER, LORNA CLARK, VADA STRAIT, LYNN STRAIT, RONALD LEE SVEDA, JOSEPH SVEDA, JR, ED THEARLE, DAVID R. THEARLE, DEWEY EMERICK, GEORGE WILLIAMS, JR, BETTY SMITH, DARREN WINELAND, DAVID WINELAND, ALTA WINELAND, DIANNE ZVONKOVICH, DOROTHY ZVONKOVICH, VIRGINIA MERRITT, CONSTANCE FOX, NATALIE FOX, MARY JANE KIES, FRANCES IRVIN, LINDA ALEXANDER, ROBERT LUCIANO, FRANK LUCIANO, MARY ELLEN MARTIN, CLARA LINDSEY, MICHAEL MASSIMO, JO−ANNE OVERDORF, RICHARD OVERDORF, ROBERT MINOR, DIANNE FOX, GERTRUDE MILLS,

Case: 3:05-cv-419 As of: 03/12/2011 10:21 PM EST 15 of 25

01/05/2006 01/05/2006 01/06/2006
01/06/2006 01/06/2006 01/06/2006 01/06/2006
01/09/2006 01/09/2006 01/10/2006 01/10/2006 01/11/2006
01/11/2006

FRANCES ALEXANDER, WILLIAM MILLS, KATHLEEN MONTGOMERY, WILLIAM V. MONTGOMERY, JR, RONALD REPLOGLE, BONNIE WOOD, JOHN SHEA(by his guardian and next friend Mary Ann Boylan (Guardianship in process)), MARY ANN BOYLAN, MARGIE SPORY, HATTIE WILLIAMS, ROBYNE WHEELER, MARY ALEXANDER, BEVERLY WHEELER, MARGARET WYLAND, EDWARD WYLAND, MARIAN WYLAND, RICHARD BARTLEBAUGH, RENEE HOOVER, MELISSA BROADBENT, LARRY R. BROADBENT, LINDA BRONDER, KENNETH BRONDER, KATHIE CENTI, BARBARA DEBELLO, JULIO DEBELLO, PATRICK GAVIGAN, ANN LANDEFELD, GARY GOSNELL(by his father and next friend Gary Gosnell). (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet # 2 receipt)(cen ) (Entered: 11/07/2005)
2 First MOTION to Dismiss complaint by LINDA ALEXANDER. Attachments: # 1 Proposed order; (Ulan, Howard) Modified on 1/6/2006 (cen ). (Entered: 01/05/2006)
3 BRIEF in Support re 2 First MOTION to Dismiss complaint filed by LINDA ALEXANDER. (Ulan, Howard) (Entered: 01/05/2006)
CLERK'S OFFICE QUALITY CONTROL MESSAGE. re 2 First MOTION to Dismiss complaint ERROR: The proposed order was not docketed separately as an attachment; CORRECTION: The proposed order was attached correctly by the Court. This message is for informational purposes only. (cen ) (Entered: 01/06/2006)
4 ERROR: NO S/ SIGNATURE; MULTIPLE RELIEF DOCUMENT FILED USING ONLY ONE RELIEF; This document has been removed from public view. (Greene, Robert) Modified on 1/11/2006 (cen ). (Entered: 01/06/2006)
5 ERROR: NO S/SIGNATURE; This document has been removed from public view. (Greene, Robert) Modified on 1/10/2006 (cen ). (Entered: 01/06/2006)
6 EXHIBITS in Support of 5 Brief in Support of Motion by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Greene, Robert) (Entered: 01/06/2006)
7 EXHIBITS in Support of 6 Exhibits in Support by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit D# 2Exhibit E# 3Exhibit F# 4 Exhibit G# 5 Exhibit H# 6 Exhibit I# 7 Exhibit J# 8 Exhibit K# 9 Exhibit L# 10 Exhibit M# 11 Exhibit N# 12 Exhibit O# 13 Exhibit P# 14Exhibit Q# 15Exhibit R# 16 Exhibit S# 17 Exhibit T# 18Exhibit U# 19 Exhibit V# 20 Exhibit W# 21 Exhibit X# 22Exhibit Y# 23Exhibit Z)(Greene, Robert) Modified on 1/10/2006 (cen ). (Entered: 01/06/2006)
8 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Kim R. Gibson: Motion Hearing held on 1/9/2006 re 4 First MOTION for Preliminary Injunction and TRO filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Court Reporter: Lisa Hand) (dlg) (Entered: 01/09/2006)
CLERK'S OFFICE QUALITY CONTROL MESSAGE. re 5 Brief in Support of Motion. ERROR: Typed name omitted by s/. CORRECTION: Attorney advised of signature requirements. Attorney to resubmit with signature, using Errata event. This message is for informational purposes only. (cen ) (Entered: 01/10/2006)
9 ERROR: NO S/ SIGNATURE; This document has been removed from public view. (Ulan, Howard) Modified on 1/11/2006 (cen ). (Entered: 01/10/2006)
10 NOTICE of Hearing: Preliminary Injunction Hearing set for 1/25/2006 and 1/26/2006, at 9:00 AM, in Courtroom A, 319 Washington Street, Johnstown, PA before Judge Kim R. Gibson. (dlg) (Entered: 01/10/2006)
CLERK'S OFFICE QUALITY CONTROL MESSAGE. re 4 First MOTION for Preliminary Injunction and TRO. ERROR: #1: Typed name omitted by s/. #2: Multiple relief document was filed using only one relief; CORRECTION: Attorney advised of signature requirements. Attorney to re−file this document using both reliefs (hold the control key to select multiple reliefs) and with proper s/ signature; This message is for informational purposes only. (cen ) (Entered: 01/11/2006)
CLERK'S OFFICE QUALITY CONTROL MESSAGE. re 9 Brief in Opposition to Motion. ERROR: Typed name omitted by s/. CORRECTION: Attorney advised of

Case: 3:05-cv-419 As of: 03/12/2011 10:21 PM EST 16 of 25

01/23/2006 01/23/2006 01/23/2006 01/23/2006 01/23/2006 01/24/2006 01/24/2006
01/24/2006 01/25/2006 01/26/2006 01/27/2006 01/27/2006 01/27/2006

signature requirements. Attorney to resubmit with signature, using Errata event. This message is for informational purposes only. (cen ) (Entered: 01/11/2006)
11 BRIEF in Opposition re 2 First MOTION to Dismiss complaint filed by ROBERT GREENE. (Greene, Robert) (Entered: 01/23/2006)
12 Errata to 5 Brief in support of 15 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction, and MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order by ROBERT GREENE; Reason for Correction: Signature Line. (Greene, Robert) Modified on 1/24/2006 (cen ). (Entered: 01/23/2006)
13 ERROR: DOCUMENT FILED IN ERROR (per conversation with Attorney Greene); this document has been removed from public view. (Greene, Robert) Modified on 1/23/2006 (cen ). (Entered: 01/23/2006)
14 BRIEF in Opposition re 15 First MOTION for Preliminary Injunction and Motion for TRO filed by EDWARD G. RENDELL. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Ulan, Howard) Modified on 1/24/2006 (cen ). (Entered: 01/23/2006)
15 First MOTION for Preliminary Injunction, First MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order by ROBERT GREENE. (Greene, Robert) {This document was originally filed as document no. 4 on 1/6/06] Modified on 1/24/2006 (cen ). (Entered: 01/23/2006)
16 STIPULATION For Preliminary Injunction Hearing by ROBERT GREENE. (Greene, Robert) (Entered: 01/24/2006)
17 ORDER that the Plaintiffs' Motion for an order compelling the Defendants to produce documentation regarding the basis for the decision to close the Altoona Center is Denied without prejudice; the Plaintiffs' Motion for an order compelling the Defendants to produce the individual support plans of the Altoona Center residents and former residents is Denied as Moot; the Plaintiffs' Motion for an order compelling the Defendants to produce the 24 hour reports has been withdrawn by the Plaintiffs; the Plaintiffs' Motion for an order compelling the Defendants to produce all communications between the Defendants and/or the Altoona Center and any county or private care providers who were sought out to provide a residence for the Altoona Center residents is Denied without prejudice; and as more fully stated in said Order. Signed by Judge Kim R. Gibson on 1/24/2006. (dlg) (Entered: 01/24/2006)
18 Exhibit List Additional Exhibits for Prel. Inj. by ROBERT GREENE.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit # 2 Exhibit BB# 3 Exhibit CC# 4 Exhibit DD# 5 Exhibit EE# 6 Exhibit FF# 7 Exhibit GG# 8 Exhibit HH# 9 Exhibit II# 10 Exhibit JJ# 11 Exhibit # 12 Exhibit LL# 13 Exhibit MM# 14 Exhibit NN# 15 Exhibit OO# 16 Exhibit PP# 17 Exhibit QQ)(Greene, Robert) (Entered: 01/24/2006)
19 ERROR: DISCOVERY DOCUMENTS NOT ACCEPTED FOR FILING BY THIS COURT; This document has been removed from public view. Expert Report by ROBERT GREENE Expert: T. Kastner, M.D., M.S.. (Greene, Robert) Modified on 1/26/2006 (cen ). (Entered: 01/25/2006)
CLERK'S OFFICE QUALITY CONTROL MESSAGE. re 19 Expert Report ERROR: Discovery documents not accepted for filing by this Court Pursuant to LR 5.3 CORRECTION: Document has been removed from public view. This message is for informational purposes only. (cen) (Entered: 01/26/2006)
20 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Kim R. Gibson: Telephone Conference on Motion to Compel held on 1/24/2006. (Court Reporter: Lisa Hand) (dlg) (Entered: 01/27/2006)
21 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Kim R. Gibson: Preliminary Injunction held on 1/25/2006. (Court Reporter: Lisa Hand) (dlg) (Entered: 01/27/2006)
22 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Kim R. Gibson: Preliminary Injunction Hearing held on 1/26/2006. (Court Reporter: Lisa Hand) (dlg) (Entered: 01/27/2006)

Case: 3:05-cv-419 As of: 03/12/2011 10:21 PM EST 17 of 25

01/27/2006 01/27/2006 01/30/2006 01/30/2006 02/02/2006 02/03/2006 02/07/2006 02/08/2006 02/14/2006 02/16/2006
02/24/2006 03/03/2006 03/03/2006

23 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Kim R. Gibson: Preliminary Injunction Hearing held on 1/27/2006. (Court Reporter: Lisa Hand) (dlg) (Entered: 01/27/2006)
24 ERROR: INCOMPLETE DOCUMENT ATTACHED; NO S/ SIGNATURE; This document has been removed from public view. NOTICE of Appearance by Howard Ulan on behalf of EDWARD G. RENDELL (Ulan, Howard) Modified on 1/30/2006 (cen ). (Entered: 01/27/2006)
CLERK'S OFFICE QUALITY CONTROL MESSAGE. re 24 Notice of Appearance ERROR: Incomplete document attached. Also s/ signature is missing; CORRECTION: Attorney advised to refile the document, using the Errata event and attach the correct document with s/ signature. This message is for informational purposes only. (cen ) (Entered: 01/30/2006)
25 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT denying 4 Motion for Preliminary Injunction; denying 15 Motion for Preliminary Injunction; denying 15 Motion for TRO; and as more fully stated in said Memorandum Opinion and Order of Court. Signed by Judge Kim R. Gibson on 1/30/2006. (dlg) (Entered: 01/30/2006)
26 MOTION to Extend Time to Move to Appoint Guardians by ROBERT GREENE. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Letter to Def'ts Counsel 1−31−06# 2 Exhibit Letter to Def'ts Counsel 2−2−06)(Greene, Robert) Modified on 2/3/2006 (jjg). (Entered: 02/02/2006)
27 ORDER granting 26 Motion to Extend Time to Move for Guardianship Appointment; further Ordered that the Plaintiffs shall move for appointment of the necessary guardians on or before 2/8/2006; and as more fully stated in said Order. Signed by Judge Kim R. Gibson on 2/3/2006. (dlg) (Entered: 02/03/2006)
28 Joint MOTION for Clarification of the list of persons requiring guardians by ROBERT GREENE. (Greene, Robert) (Entered: 02/07/2006)
29 MOTION to Appoint Custodian Guardians ad Litem by ROBERT GREENE. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order For Appointment of Guardians ad Litem# 2 Exhibit A− Thomas A. Burk, M.D.# 3 Exhibit B Stacey R. Brumbaugh, J.D.# 4 Supplement Cover Letter for Motion for Guardians)(Greene, Robert) Modified on 2/9/2006 (cen ). (Entered: 02/08/2006)
30 ORDER re 29 MOTION to Appoint Custodian Gaurdians ad Litem filed by ROBERT GREENE; it is hereby Ordered that Thomas A. Burk,M.D. is hereby appointed an officer of the Court to act as Guardian Ad Litem; and as more fully stated in said Order. Signed by Judge Kim R. Gibson on 2/13/2006. (dlg) (Entered: 02/14/2006)
31 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on 01/09/06 before Judge Kim R. Gibson. Court Reporter: Lisa Hand. The parties have five (5) business days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely, electronically available to the public without redaction. Any party needing a copy of the transcript to review for redaction purposes may purchase a copy from the court or the court reporter/transcriber. Request for Redaction of specific personal identifiers 3/3/2006. (jjg) (Entered: 02/16/2006)
32 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Kim R. Gibson: Status Conference held on 2/24/2006. (Court Reporter: Lisa Hand) (dlg) (Entered: 02/24/2006)
33 ERROR: S/SIGNATURE IS MISSING; MOTION for Clarification as to 25 Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Order on Motion for TRO, by EDWARD G. RENDELL. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Ulan, Howard) THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM PUBLIC VIEW. Modified on 3/6/2006 (cen ). (Entered: 03/03/2006)
34 ERROR: S/ SIGNATURE IS MISSING; BRIEF in Support re 33 MOTION for Clarification as to 25 Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Order on Motion for TRO, filed by EDWARD G. RENDELL. (Ulan, Howard) THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM PUBLIC VIEW. Modified on 3/6/2006 (cen ).

Case: 3:05-cv-419 As of: 03/12/2011 10:21 PM EST 18 of 25

03/06/2006
03/06/2006 03/06/2006 03/06/2006
03/06/2006 03/06/2006 03/06/2006 03/06/2006 03/08/2006 03/09/2006 03/09/2006 03/09/2006 03/15/2006

(Entered: 03/03/2006)
CLERK'S OFFICE QUALITY CONTROL MESSAGE. re 33 MOTION for Clarification as to 25 Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Order on Motion for TRO, 34 AND Brief in Support of Motion. ERROR: Typed name omitted by s/. CORRECTION: Attorney advised of signature requirements. Attorney to resubmit each document with s/ signature, by using the Errata event. This message is for informational purposes only. (cen ) (Entered: 03/06/2006)
35 ERROR: WRONG DOCUMENT ATTACHED: Errata re 33 MOTION for Clarification as to 25 Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Order on Motion for TRO, by EDWARD G. RENDELL; Reason for Correction: signature missing. (Ulan, Howard)This document has been removed from public view. Modified on 3/6/2006 (cen ). (Entered: 03/06/2006)
36 ERROR: WRONG DOCUMENT ATTACHED; Errata re 34 Brief in Support of Motion, by EDWARD G. RENDELL; Reason for Correction: missing signature. (Ulan, Howard) This document has been removed from public view. Modified on 3/6/2006 (cen ). (Entered: 03/06/2006)
CLERK'S OFFICE QUALITY CONTROL MESSAGE. re 36 Errata, 35 Errata ERROR: Incorrect document attached. Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support has been attached and not the Motion for Clarification and Brief in Support; CORRECTION: Attorney advised to refile the document, using the Errata event (separately for each entry) and attach the correct document (one per errata entry) signed with the s/ signature. This message is for informational purposes only. (cen ) (Entered: 03/06/2006)
37 DUPLICATE FILING: THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM PUBLIC VIEW; Errata by EDWARD G. RENDELL Reason for Correction: missing signature. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Ulan, Howard) Modified on 3/7/2006 (cen). (Entered: 03/06/2006)
38 MOTION for Clarification as to 25 Memorandum Opinion and Order by EDWARD G. RENDELL. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Ulan, Howard) This document was previously filed electronically. Modified on 3/9/2006 (cen ). (Entered: 03/06/2006)
39 BRIEF in Support re 38 MOTION for Clarification as to 25 Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Order on Motion for TRO, filed by EDWARD G. RENDELL. (Ulan, Howard) This document was previously filed electronically. Modified on 3/9/2006 (cen ). (Entered: 03/06/2006)
40 RESPONSE to Motion re 38 MOTION for Clarification as to 36 Errata Letter filed by ROBERT GREENE. (Greene, Robert) (Entered: 03/06/2006)
41 RESPONSE to Motion re 38 MOTION for Clarification as to 25 Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Order on Motion for TRO filed by ROBERT GREENE. (Greene, Robert) Modified on 3/9/2006 (cen ). (Entered: 03/08/2006)
42 ORDER granting 38 Motion for Clarification of the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order of Court dated 1/30/2006; and as more fully stated in said Memorandum Opinion and Order . Signed by Judge Kim R. Gibson on 3/9/2006. (dlg) (Entered: 03/09/2006)
CLERK'S OFFICE QUALITY CONTROL MESSAGE. ATTENTION: the following documents have been re−linked appropriately: 40 Response to Motion, 39 Brief in Support of Motion and 41 Response to Motion. This message is for informational purposes only. (cen ) (Entered: 03/09/2006)
43 MOTION to Intervene of Right as Plaintiffs by PUBLIC INTEREST LAW CENTER OF PHILADELPHIA. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Proposed Order)(Healey, Michael) (Entered: 03/09/2006)
44 Amended MOTION to Intervene of Right as Plaintiffs by PUBLIC INTEREST LAW CENTER OF PHILADELPHIA. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Proposed Order)(Healey, Michael) (Entered: 03/15/2006)

Case: 3:05-cv-419 As of: 03/12/2011 10:21 PM EST 19 of 25

03/17/2006 03/17/2006 03/17/2006 03/17/2006 03/20/2006 03/21/2006 03/21/2006 03/21/2006
03/21/2006

45 Order Response re 44 Motion to Intervene; Responses to the potential intervenors' amended Motion to Intervene due by 3/22/2006. Signed by Judge Kim R. Gibson on 3/16/2006. (dlg) (Entered: 03/17/2006)
46 NOTICE by EDWARD G. RENDELL Invitation to Court to Visit Group Homes (Ulan, Howard) (Entered: 03/17/2006)
47 ERROR: WRONG EVENT SELECTED; THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM PUBLIC VIEW. NOTICE by EDWARD G. RENDELL re 42 Order on Motion for Clarification Notice of Appeal (Ulan, Howard) Modified on 3/20/2006 (cen ). (Entered: 03/17/2006)
49 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 42 Order on Motion for Clarification by EDWARD G. RENDELL. Court Reporter Lisa M. Hand. The Clerk's Office hereby certifies the record and the docket sheet available through ECF to be the certified list in lieu of the record and/or the certified copy of the docket entries. The Transcript Purchase Order form will not be mailed to the parties. The form is available on the Court's internet site. (cen) (Entered: 03/20/2006)
48 OBJECTIONS to Letter concerning community visits by ROBERT GREENE. (Greene, Robert) (Entered: 03/20/2006)
50 BRIEF in Opposition re 44 Amended MOTION to Intervene of Right as Plaintiffs filed by EDWARD G. RENDELL. (Ulan, Howard) (Entered: 03/21/2006)
51 ERROR: TWO MOTIONS FILED USING ONLY ONE RELIEF; THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM PUBLIC VIEW. MOTION for Disclosure of Financial Relationships by ROBERT GREENE. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order For Disclosure by Proposed Intervenors and Extension of Time)(Greene, Robert) Modified on 3/22/2006 (cen). (Entered: 03/21/2006)
52 MOTION for Additional Disclosure by Proposed Intervenors and, MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 44 Amended MOTION to Intervene by GARY GOSNELL, EDWARD HAMPTON, DORA HAMPTON, LLOYD HAMPTON, SHARON HARRISON, AUGUST CENTI, FRED HARRISON, PEGGY KELLY, LARRY KELLY, JACK KIRSCHBAUM, DARLENE SALTSGIVER, LORNA KUHN, ARLENE DEARMENT, ROSE LONG, MARY JONES, ROGER LOSEY, WINIFRED CENTI, RODNEY LOSEY, PHILIP MCGANN, PAUL MCGANN, MARY JANE MCGANN, FRANCES NEIBURG, ESTHER GORDON, WANDA PABIAN, LOUISE PABIAN, JOHN SHEA(by his sister and next friend Mary Anne Shea Boylan), MARY ANNE SHEA BOYLAN, RICHARD EMERICK, DORIS STEWART, JOSEPH STEWART, LEE ANN STIFFLER, LORNA CLARK, VADA STRAIT, LYNN STRAIT, RONALD LEE SVEDA, JOSEPH SVEDA, JR, ED THEARLE, DAVID R. THEARLE, DEWEY EMERICK, GEORGE WILLIAMS, JR, BETTY SMITH, DARREN WINELAND, DAVID WINELAND, ALTA WINELAND, DIANNE ZVONKOVICH, DOROTHY ZVONKOVICH, VIRGINIA MERRITT, ALL PLAINTIFFS, CONSTANCE FOX, NATALIE FOX, ROBERT GREENE, MARY JANE KIES, FRANCES IRVIN, LINDA ALEXANDER, ROBERT LUCIANO, FRANK LUCIANO, MARY ELLEN MARTIN, CLARA LINDSEY, MICHAEL MASSIMO, JO−ANNE OVERDORF, RICHARD OVERDORF, ROBERT MINOR, DIANNE FOX, GERTRUDE MILLS, FRANCES ALEXANDER, WILLIAM MILLS, KATHLEEN MONTGOMERY, WILLIAM V. MONTGOMERY, JR, RONALD REPLOGLE, BONNIE WOOD, JOHN SHEA(by his guardian and next friend Mary Ann Boylan (Guardianship in process)), MARY ANN BOYLAN, MARGIE SPORY, HATTIE WILLIAMS, ROBYNE WHEELER, MARY ALEXANDER, BEVERLY WHEELER, MARGARET WYLAND, EDWARD WYLAND, MARIAN WYLAND, RICHARD BARTLEBAUGH, RENEE HOOVER, MELISSA BROADBENT, LARRY R. BROADBENT, LINDA BRONDER, KENNETH BRONDER, KATHIE CENTI, BARBARA DEBELLO, JULIO DEBELLO, PATRICK GAVIGAN, ANN LANDEFELD, GARY GOSNELL(by his father and next friend Gary Gosnell). (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(cen ) Modified on 3/22/2006 (cen, ). (Entered: 03/22/2006)
CLERK'S OFFICE QUALITY CONTROL MESSAGE. ERROR: re 47 Notice (Other) Wrong event selected. CORRECTION: Re−docketed as Notice of Appeal.

Case: 3:05-cv-419 As of: 03/12/2011 10:21 PM EST 20 of 25

03/22/2006
03/22/2006
03/22/2006 03/23/2006 03/23/2006 03/23/2006 03/27/2006 03/27/2006 03/30/2006 03/30/2006 04/06/2006
04/06/2006

This message is for informational purposes only. (cen) (Entered: 03/22/2006)
CLERK'S OFFICE QUALITY CONTROL MESSAGE. re 51 MOTION for Disclosure of Financial Relationships ERROR: Two motions were filed using only one relief CORRECTION: This document was re−docketed correctly by the Court; Attorney is advised that, in the future, multiple motion reliefs may be chosen by holding the "control" key while making selections. This message is for informational purposes only. (cen ) (Entered: 03/22/2006)
CLERK'S OFFICE QUALITY CONTROL MESSAGE. ERROR: re 51 MOTION for Disclosure of Financial Relationships Incorrect filer selected. CORRECTION: Correct filers properly linked to Motion. Attorney is advised that, in the future, multiple filers may be chosen by holding the "control" key while making selections. This message is for informational purposes only. (cen) (Entered: 03/22/2006)
53 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Opposition to Intervention by ROBERT GREENE. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Greene, Robert) (Entered: 03/22/2006)
54 ORDER granting 53 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response to the Motion to Intervene; Plaintiff's time to respond to the Motion to Intervene is hereby extended until three business days after filing of a decision on the pending motion for disclosure and an extension of time filed 3/21/2006. Signed by Judge Kim R. Gibson on 3/22/2006. (dlg) (Entered: 03/23/2006)
55 Remark − Corrrespondence to Estelle Richman from Judge Kim R. Gibson (dlg) (Entered: 03/23/2006)
56 BRIEF in Opposition re 52 MOTION for Disclosure MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 44 Amended MOTION to Intervene of Right as Plaintiffs filed by PENNSYLVANIA PROTECTION &ADVOCACY, INC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Murphy, Mark) Modified on 3/24/2006 (jjg). (Entered: 03/23/2006)
57 BRIEF in Opposition re 52 MOTION for Disclosure MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 44 Amended MOTION to Intervene of Right as Plaintiffs filed by PUBLIC INTEREST LAW CENTER OF PHILADELPHIA. (Healey, Michael) Modified on 3/28/2006 (cen, ). (Entered: 03/27/2006)
58 LETTER from Clerk re 49 Notice of Interlocutory Appeal, to pay appeal filing fee. (cen ) (Entered: 03/27/2006)
60 TRANSCRIPT REQUEST by EDWARD G. RENDELL before Judge Gibson, re 49 Notice of Interlocutory Appeal, Transcript due by 3/31/2006. (Ulan, Howard) (Entered: 03/30/2006)
61 USCA Appeal Fees received $ 255; receipt number 06000259 re: 49 Notice of Interlocutory Appeal, filed by EDWARD G. RENDELL. (cen) (Entered: 03/30/2006)
62 TRANSCRIPT of Preliminary Injuction held on 01/25/06 before Judge Kim R. Gibson. Court Reporter: Lisa Hand. The parties have five (5) business days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely, electronically available to the public without redaction. Any party needing a copy of the transcript to review for redaction purposes may purchase a copy from the court or the court reporter/transcriber. Notice of Intent for Redaction of Personal Data Identifiers due by 4/20/2006. (jjg) (Entered: 04/06/2006)
63 TRANSCRIPT of Preliminary Injunction held on 01/26/06 before Judge Kim R. Gibson. Court Reporter: Lisa Hand. The parties have five (5) business days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely, electronically available to the public without redaction. Any party needing a copy of the transcript to review for redaction purposes may purchase a copy from the court or the court reporter/transcriber. Notice of Intent for Redaction of Personal Data Identifiers due by 4/20/2006. (jjg) (Entered: 04/06/2006)

Case: 3:05-cv-419 As of: 03/12/2011 10:21 PM EST 21 of 25

04/06/2006
04/19/2006 08/11/2006 09/19/2006 09/19/2006 09/20/2006 09/22/2006 09/26/2006
09/26/2006 11/27/2006 11/27/2006 11/28/2006 01/03/2007

64 TRANSCRIPT of Preliminary Injunction held on 01/27/06 before Judge Kim R. Gibson. Court Reporter: Lisa Hand. The parties have five (5) business days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely, electronically available to the public without redaction. Any party needing a copy of the transcript to review for redaction purposes may purchase a copy from the court or the court reporter/transcriber. Notice of Intent for Redaction of Personal Data Identifiers due by 4/20/2006. (jjg) (Entered: 04/06/2006)
65 REPLY to Response to Motion re 52 MOTION for Disclosure MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 44 Amended MOTION to Intervene of Right as Plaintiffs filed by ROBERT GREENE. (Greene, Robert) Modified on 4/20/2006 (cen ). (Entered: 04/19/2006)
66 Certified copy of ORDER of USCA as to 49 Notice of Interlocutory Appeal, filed by EDWARD G. RENDELL, granting Appellees motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. (lc3, ) (Entered: 08/11/2006)
67 NOTICE of Hearing: Status Conference set for 9/25/2006, at 10:00 AM in Room 104, Penn Traffic Building, 319 Washington Street, Johnstown, PA before Judge Kim R. Gibson; the parties may, upon request, participate by telephone.(dlg) (Entered: 09/19/2006)
68 First MOTION to Continue Status Conference of Sept. 25 by ROBERT GREENE. (Greene, Robert) (Entered: 09/19/2006)
CLERK'S OFFICE QUALITY CONTROL MESSAGE re 68 First MOTION to Continue Status Conference of Sept. 25; ERROR: Proposed Order was made part of main document. CORRECTION: Attorney advised that in the future, proposed orders are to be made attachments to the main document. This message is for informational purposes only. (cen) (Entered: 09/20/2006)
69 ORDER granting 68 Motion to Continue Status Conference; Status Conference rescheduled for 9/26/2006, at 10:00 AM; both counsel may participate by telephone. Signed by Judge Kim R. Gibson on 9/21/2006. (dlg) (Entered: 09/22/2006)
70 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Kim R. Gibson: Status Conference held on 9/26/2006; Judge only discussed Motion for Clarification/Guardians and Motion to Dismiss. Mediation before a Magistrate Judge sought. Judge to appoint a mediator and stay discovery during this process. The Court will proceed on the decision for the Motion to Dismiss. (Court Reporter: Lisa Hand) (dlg) (Entered: 09/26/2006)
71 ORDER denying without prejudice to present the same issues again by means of a summary judgment motion or other appropriate method 2 Motion to Dismiss; and as more fully stated in said Order. Signed by Judge Kim R. Gibson on 9/26/2006. (dlg) (Entered: 09/26/2006)
72 ERROR: WRONG DOCUMENT ATTACHED; THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM PUBLIC VIEW. DEFENDANTS' ANSWER to Complaint AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES by EDWARD G. RENDELL.(Ulan, Howard) Modified on 11/28/2006 (cen ). (Entered: 11/27/2006)
73 ERROR: NO S/ SIGNATURE; ATTORNEY ADVISED VIA TELEPHONE TO RE−SUBMIT USING ERRATA EVENT; DEFENDANTS' ANSWER to Complaint AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES by EDWARD G. RENDELL.(Ulan, Howard) Modified on 11/28/2006 (cen ). (Entered: 11/27/2006)
74 Errata re 73 Answer to Complaint and affirmative defenses by EDWARD G. RENDELL Reason for Correction: signature. (Ulan, Howard) (Entered: 11/28/2006)
75 ORDER that this case is referred to Magistrate Judge Amy Reynolds Hay for purposes of mediation, but all pending motions, including document numbers 43, 44, 51 and 52 and any later filed motions, shall remain before Judge Gibson for his rulings; it is further Ordered that all discovery shall be stayed pending the completion of mediation proceedings. Signed by Judge Kim R. Gibson on

Case: 3:05-cv-419 As of: 03/12/2011 10:21 PM EST 22 of 25

01/03/2007 01/10/2007 01/11/2007 01/11/2007
01/19/2007 01/22/2007 01/23/2007 03/01/2007 03/02/2007 03/12/2007 03/23/2007 03/23/2007
04/09/2007 04/23/2007 04/23/2007

1/3/2007. (dlg) (Entered: 01/03/2007)
CASE REFERRED to Magistrate Judge Amy Reynolds Hay. Text entry only. No PDF document attached. (jjg) (Entered: 01/05/2007)
76 NOTICE of Hearing: Telephone conference re mediation planning set for 1/11/2007 at 02:00 PM before Judge Amy Reynolds Hay. Chambers staff will initiate the telephone call. (klh) (Entered: 01/10/2007)
77 ORDER denying 52 Motion for Disclosure, granting 52 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response re 44 Amended MOTION to Intervene of Right as Plaintiffs; Responses due by 1/22/2007; and as more fully stated in said Order. Signed by Judge Kim R. Gibson on 1/11/2007. (dlg) (Entered: 01/11/2007)
78 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Amy Reynolds Hay: TelephoneConference to Schedule Mediation held on 1/11/2007. Mediation is scheduled for 3/9/2007 at 09:00 AM before Judge Amy Reynolds Hay. Those individuals who possess full settlement authority shall be available by telephone for the duration of the mediation. By 3/6/2007, the parties shall provide the Court with position papers, which will be held in confidence; accordingly, candor is expected. (Court Reporter: none) (klh) (Entered: 01/11/2007)
79 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 44 Amended MOTION to Intervene of Right as Plaintiffs by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Greene, Robert) (Entered: 01/19/2007)
80 Errata re 79 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 44 Amended MOTION to Intervene of Right as Plaintiffs by ALL PLAINTIFFS. Reason for Correction: Incorrect Proposed Order attached to Motion. (Greene, Robert) (Entered: 01/22/2007)
81 ORDER granting 79 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response as to 44 Amended MOTION to Intervene of Right as Plaintiffs; Plaintiffs shall respond to the pending Motion to Intervene by 3/1/2007. Signed by Judge Kim R. Gibson on 1/23/2007. (dlg) (Entered: 01/23/2007)
82 BRIEF in Opposition re 44 Amended MOTION to Intervene of Right as Plaintiffs filed by ROBERT GREENE. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E)(Greene, Robert) (Entered: 03/01/2007)
83 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by ALL PLAINTIFFS re 82 Brief in Opposition to Motion (Greene, Robert) Modified on 3/5/2007 (cen ). (Entered: 03/02/2007)
84 Hearing memo on mediation held before Magistrate Judge Amy Reynolds Hay on 3/9/2007. The parties were unable to resolve this case. (dgg) (Entered: 03/12/2007)
85 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT denying 44 Amended Motion for Intervention of Right as Plaintiffs, and as more fully stated in said Memorandum Opinion and Order of Court. Signed by Judge Kim R. Gibson on 3/23/2007. (dlg) (Entered: 03/23/2007)
86 ORDER that an Initial Rule 16 Scheduling Conference is set for 4/26/2007, at 1:30 p.m., in Room 104, Penn Traffic Building, 319 Washington Street, Johnstown, PA; Disclosures required by Rule 26(f) are due by 4/5/2007; a Rule 26(f) Report is due by 4/19/2007, and as more fully stated in said Order. Signed by Judge Kim R. Gibson on 3/23/2007. (Attachment: # 1 Letter of Instruction)(dlg) (Entered: 03/23/2007)
87 ORDER REFERRING CASE BACK to Judge Kim R. Gibson. Signed by Judge Amy Reynolds Hay on 4/9/2007. (klh) (Entered: 04/09/2007)
88 MOTION for Discovery Conference Adjournment by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Greene, Robert) (Entered: 04/23/2007)
89 ORDER granting 88 Motion for Continuance; the Initial Rule 16 Scheduling Conference is rescheduled for Tuesday, 5/29/2007, at 10:30 a.m. Signed by Judge Kim R. Gibson on 4/23/2007. (dlg) (Entered: 04/23/2007)

Case: 3:05-cv-419 As of: 03/12/2011 10:21 PM EST 23 of 25

05/03/2007 05/30/2007
05/31/2007
05/31/2007 06/01/2007 08/21/2007 08/21/2007 09/04/2007
09/04/2007 09/04/2007 09/04/2007 09/05/2007

90 NOTICE of Hearing: Initial Rule 16 Scheduling Conference rescheduled for 5/30/2007, at 3:00 PM before Judge Kim R. Gibson. The parties may, upon request, participate by telephone. Counsel are responsible for coordinating the call to the Judge's Chambers.(dlg) (Entered: 05/03/2007)
91 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Kim R. Gibson: Initial Rule 16 Scheduling Conference held on 5/30/2007. Plaintiffs wish to proceed directly to summary judgment; Defendants seek discovery of Plaintiffs. Court will issue an Initial Scheduling Order which permits filing of dispositive motions. Court will entertain objections of Plaintiffs as to discovery sought by Defendants when raised. (dlg) (Entered: 05/30/2007)
92 INITIAL SCHEDULING ORDER: Amended Pleadings due by 6/20/2007; Joinder of Parties due by 6/20/2007; Fact Discovery due by 8/31/2007; Expert Discovery to be completed by 10/19/2007; the parties shall make their disclosure of experts required by Rule 26(a)(2) by 9/14/2007; Dispositive Motions that are appropriate prior to the close of discovery are due by 9/3/2007; the nonmoving party's response to any such motion is due within 30 days following the filing of any dispositive motion; Expert Depositions to be completed by 10/5/2007; the parties shall designate this case for arbitration, mediation, appointment of a special master, or other special procedure, if appropriate, by 7/31/2007; a Post−Discovery Status Conference set for 10/26/2007, at 10:00 AM before Judge Kim R. Gibson, and as more fully stated in said Initial Scheduling Order. Signed by Judge Kim R. Gibson on 5/31/2007. (dlg) (Entered: 05/31/2007)
CASE DESIGNATED to Track 1. (dlg) (Entered: 05/31/2007)
93 NOTICE of Hearing:Post−Discovery Status Conference rescheduled for 10/29/2007, at 10:00 AM before Judge Kim R. Gibson. The parties may, upon request, participate by telephone. Counsel are responsible for coordinating the conference call to the Judge's Chambers.(dlg) (Entered: 06/01/2007)
94 MOTION to Extend Time to complete fact discovery by EDWARD G. RENDELL. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Ulan, Howard) (Entered: 08/21/2007)
95 ORDER granting 94 Motion for Extension of Fact Discovery; Fact Discovery closes on 9/30/2007. Signed by Judge Kim R. Gibson on 8/21/2007. (dlg) (Entered: 08/21/2007)
96 ERROR: DOCUMENT FILED IN ERROR: THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM PUBLIC VIEW; RE−FILED CORRECTLY BY THE CLERK. MOTION to Dismiss or, in the alternative, pre−discovery motion for summary judgment by EDWARD G. RENDELL. (Attachments: # 1 Concise Statement # 2 Affidavit # 3 Brief # 4 Exhibit # 5 Proposed Order)(Ulan, Howard) Modified on 9/5/2007 (cen ). Modified on 9/5/2007 (cen). (Entered: 09/04/2007)
97 MOTION to Dismiss 1 Complaint, or in the alternative, MOTION for Summary Judgment by EDWARD G. RENDELL. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) This document was previously filed electronically.(cen) (Entered: 09/05/2007)
98 STATEMENT OF FACTS in support of 97 Motion to Dismiss, Motion for Summary Judgment, by EDWARD G. RENDELL. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of David Fulton) This document was previously filed electronically.(cen) (Entered: 09/05/2007)
99 BRIEF in Support re 97 MOTION to Dismiss re 1 Complaint or, in the alternative, MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by EDWARD G. RENDELL. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(cen) This document was previously filed electronically. (Entered: 09/05/2007)
CLERK'S OFFICE QUALITY CONTROL MESSAGE re 96 MOTION to Dismiss or, in the alternative, pre−discovery motion for summary judgment; ERROR #1: Document should have been filed as three separate documents. CORRECTION: Attorney is advised that, in the future, documents of that nature are to be filed as separate documents. Clerk of Court re−docketed Motions, Concise Statement of Material Facts and Brief in Support. This message is for informational purposes only. ERROR #2: MULTIPLE Relief Motion Filed as One Relief. CORRECTION: Attorney is advised that, in the future, Motions of this nature are to be filed using

Case: 3:05-cv-419 As of: 03/12/2011 10:21 PM EST 24 of 25

09/24/2007 09/24/2007 09/24/2007 09/25/2007
09/25/2007 10/18/2007 10/31/2007
11/13/2007 11/14/2007 12/03/2007 12/12/2007 01/12/2009
01/12/2009

the Motion Event and choosing all the Reliefs requested by holding the Control Key down and clicking all the reliefs sought in said motion. Clerk of Court docketed Motion to Dismiss or in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment. This message is for informational purposes only. (cen) (Entered: 09/05/2007)
100 MOTION to Continue status conference by EDWARD G. RENDELL. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Ulan, Howard) (Entered: 09/24/2007)
101 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply by EDWARD G. RENDELL. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Ulan, Howard) (Entered: 09/24/2007)
102 RESPONSE to Motion re 101 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply, 100 MOTION to Continue status conference Letter Response filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Greene, Robert) (Entered: 09/24/2007)
103 ORDER granting 101 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response, and the commencement of time for any response by defendants which otherwise would begin between 9/27/2007 and 11/1/2007 shall begin instead on 11/1/2007 and Plaintiffs shall also be granted equivalent extensions of time. Signed by Judge Kim R. Gibson on 9/25/2007. (dlg) (Entered: 09/25/2007)
104 ORDER granting 100 Motion to Continue; the Post−Discovery Status Conference is rescheduled for 11/8/2007, at 11:00 AM before Judge Kim R. Gibson. Signed by Judge Kim R. Gibson on 9/25/2007. (dlg) (Entered: 09/25/2007)
105 NOTICE of Hearing:Post−Discovery Status Conference rescheduled for 12/12/2007, at 11:30 AM before Judge Kim R. Gibson. The parties may, upon request, participate by telephone. Counsel are responsible for coordinating the conference call to the Judge's Chambers.(dlg) (Entered: 10/18/2007)
106 BRIEF in Opposition re 97 MOTION to Dismiss re 1 Complaint, MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A Preliminary Injunction Decision # 2 Exhibit B Motion for Clarification Decision)(Greene, Robert)Statement of Material Facts will be re−filed separately by attorney. Modified on 11/1/2007 (cen). (Entered: 10/31/2007)
109 MOTION for Leave to File reply brief by EDWARD G. RENDELL. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Ulan, Howard) (Entered: 11/13/2007)
110 ORDER granting 109 Motion for Leave to File a Reply Brief; Defendants may file a reply to the brief filed by Plaintiffs on 10/31/2007, on or before 12/3/2007, not to exceed 10 pages. Signed by Judge Kim R. Gibson on 11/14/2007. (dlg) (Entered: 11/14/2007)
111 REPLY BRIEF by EDWARD G. RENDELL re 106 BRIEF in Opposition re 97 MOTION to Dismiss re 1 Complaint/MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by EDWARD G. RENDELL. (Ulan, Howard) Modified on 12/4/2007 (cen). Modified on 12/10/2007 (cen). (Entered: 12/03/2007)
112 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Kim R. Gibson: Post−Discovery Status Conference held on 12/12/2007. Parties spoke of status of this case. Motions are pending and parties agree no further scheduling is necessary until resolution of motions. (dlg) (Entered: 12/12/2007)
113 MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER OF COURT denying 97 Motion to Dismiss and Granting the alternative 97 Pre−Discovery Motion for Summary Judgment. The Plaintiffs shall have until 2/2/2009 to submit a petition in support of any claim for attorney's fees and their status as a prevailing party, along with an accounting of the proposed fees. The Defendants shall respond to any such petition on or before 2/23/2009. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in favor of the Defendants and against the Plaintiffs in a separate order, and as more fully stated in said Memorandum Opinion and Order of Court. Signed by Judge Kim R. Gibson on 1/12/2009. (dlg) Modified on 1/13/2009. (cen) (Entered: 01/12/2009)
114 JUDGMENT is hereby entered in favor of the Defendants, Edward G. Rendell, as Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, et al., and against the Plaintiffs, Linda Alexander, by her guardians and next friends Frances Alexander and Mary

Case: 3:05-cv-419 As of: 03/12/2011 10:21 PM EST 25 of 25

05/29/2009 05/29/2009

Alexander, et al. Signed by Judge Kim R. Gibson on 1/12/2009. (dlg) (Entered: 01/12/2009)
115 ORDER AUTHORIZING DESTRUCTION OF EXHIBITS − it is hereby Ordered that all trial and hearing exhibits as well as paper copies of matter submitted directly to chambers for in camera inspection and/or courtesy copies of matters under seal in the above−captioned matter will be destroyed by the Court on June 30, 2009 and any party wishing to have said exhibits preserved shall file a motion with the Court indicating their preference for preservation and make any further arrangements to take possession of said exhibits. It is further Ordered that a failure by any party to file a motion with the Court indicating its desire to preserve said exhibits or copies by June 30, 2009 will in the above−captioned matter be deemed a consent to destruction of all remaining trial and hearing exhibits as well as paper copies and courtesy copies of matters in the Court's possession. Signed by Judge Kim R. Gibson on 5/29/2009. (dlg) (Entered: 05/29/2009)
Remark − copy of Order Authorizing Destruction of Exhibits forwarded by regular and Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested, to Thomas K. Gilhool, Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia, 125 S. 9th Street, Suite 700, Philadelphia, PA 19107 on 5/29/2009. Text−only entry; no PDF document will issue. This text−only entry constitutes the Court's order or notice on the matter. (dlg) (Entered: 05/29/2009)