IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
AUGUSTA DIVISION

OR.I-G-JNAL
, i . C-! 1
2D Ears' I I A 8 : 59

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT )

C-

OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION , ) Civil Action NoC V 1+ O .0

Plaintiff, )

vs .

)

FEDERAL EXPRESS ) CORPORATION, ) JURY

Defendant.

)

TRIAL DEMANDED

COMPLAINT

This is an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and

Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to correct unlawful employment practices on the bases

of religion and retaliation, and to provide appropriate relief to the charging party, Mr . Khaleed Abdul-Azeez, a former employee of Defendant, and any other similarly situated

persons who applied for employment with, are now employed by, or will in the future be

employed by or seek employment with Defendant, as a class . Defendant discriminated against Mr . Abdul-Azeez based on his religion, Islam, in violation of Title VII by failing to

accommodate his sincerely held religious beliefs and by eventually discharging him .

Defendant also discharged Mr . Abdul-Azeez in retaliation for engaging in activity protected under Title VII .

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1 . Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U .S.C. §§ 451, 1331, 1337,

1343 and 1345 . This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to Section 706(f)(1) and (3)

of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 , as amended, 42 U .S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) and (3)

(Title VII) ; Section 707 of Title VII, 42 U .S.C . § 2000e-6 ; and Section 102 of the Civil

Rights Act of 1991, 42 U .S .C . § 1981a.

2. The employment practices alleged to be unlawful were committed within the

jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, Augusta

Division .

PARTIES

3. Plaintiff, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "Commission"), is the agency of the United States of America charged with the administration, interpretation

and enforcement of Title VII and is expressly authorized to bring this action by Section 706(0(1) of Title VII, 42 U .S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), and Section 707 of Title VII, 42 U .S.C. §

2000e-6 .

4 . At all relevant times , Defendant Federal Express Corporation (the "Defendant")

has continuously been a corporation doing business in the State of Georgia and the city of

Augusta, Georgia, and has continuously had at least 15 employees .

5 . At all relevant times , Defendant has continuously been an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce under Section 701(b), (g) and (h) of Title VII, 42 U .S.C.

2

§ 2000e(b), (g) and (h) . STATEMENT OF CLAIMS
6. More than 30 days prior to the institution of this lawsuit, Mr . Abdul-Azeez filed a charge with the Commission alleging a violation of Title VII by Defendant . All conditions precedent to the institution of this lawsuit have been fulfilled .
7. Since at least November 1998, Defendant has engaged in unlawful employment practices at its Augusta, Georgia facility in violation of Section 703(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S .C . § 2000e-2(a), by subjecting Mr . Abdul-Azeez (a courier/driver for Defendant) to religious discrimination . Specifically, Defendant has maintained a nation-wide policy and practice that prohibits the wearing of beards in customer contact positions . The policy contains an exception for persons who need to retain their beards for medical reasons . However, Defendant refused to make an exception to this policy to accommodate the sincerely held, Islamic, religious beliefs of Mr . Abdul-Azeez that require Muslim males to wear beards, despite Mr. Abdul-Azeez's requests to the Defendant that it accommodate these religious beliefs and despite the fact that Defendant could have provided such accommodations without undue hardship . Instead, Defendant discharged Mr . Abdul-Azeez.
8. Also in violation of Section 703(a) of Title VII, 42 U .S .C . § 2000e-2(a), and Section 707 of Title VII, 42 U.S .C. § 2000e-6, Defendant's nation-wide, no-beard policy discriminates against other similarly situated persons whose religious beliefs require them to wear beards and who applied for employment with, are now employed by, or will in the
3

future be employed by or seek employment with Defendant in customer contact positions, as a class
9 . Defendant also has engaged in unlawful employment practices at its Augusta, Georgia facility in violation of Section 704(a) of Title VII, 42 U .S.C. § 2000e-3(a), by discharging Mr . Abdul-Azeez in retaliation for engaging in activity protected under Title VII, including opposing what Mr . Abdul-Azeez reasonably and in good faith believed to be unlawful religious discrimination and participating in a proceeding under Title VII by filing a charge of discrimination .
10. The effect of the policy and practices complained of in paragraphs 7, 8, and 9 above has been to deprive Mr . Abdul-Azeez and any other similarly situated persons of equal employment opportunities, and to otherwise adversely affect Mr . Abdul-Azeez's status as an employee because of his religion and because he engaged in activity protected by Title VII .
11 . The unlawful employment practices complained of in paragraphs 7, 8, and 9 above were intentional and carried out with malice and/or reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of Mr . Abdul-Azeez and any other similarly situated persons .
PRAYER FOR RELIEF Wherefore, the Commission respectfully requests that this Court : A . Grant a permanent injunction enjoining Defendant, its officers, successors, assigns and all persons in active concert or participation with it, from (i) engaging in
4

religious discrimination, (ii) failing to reasonably accommodate the sincerely held religious beliefs of its employees and job applicants, (iii) terminating and/or refusing to employ individuals because of their religious beliefs, (iv) taking adverse employment action against employees because they engage in activity protected by Title VII, and (v) engaging in any other activity in violation of Title VII .
B . Order Defendant to institute and carry out policies, practices, and programs that prohibit its employees, officers, agents, and others working on its behalf from (i) engaging in religious discrimination, (ii) failing to reasonably accommodate the sincerely held religious beliefs of its employees and job applicants, (iii) terminating and/or refusing to employ individuals because of their religious beliefs, (iv) taking adverse employment action against employees because they engage in activity protected by Title VII, and (v) engaging in any other activity in violation of Title VII .
C . Order Defendant to make whole Mr. Abdul-Azeez and any other similarly situated persons who were adversely affected by Defendant's discriminatory and/or retaliatory conduct, by providing appropriate back pay with prejudgment interest, in amounts to be determined at trial, and other affirmative relief necessary to eradicate the effects of its unlawful employment practices, including but not limited to front pay and/or rightful-place reinstatement of Mr . Abdul-Azeez and any other similarly situated persons.
D. Order Defendant to make whole Mr . Abdul-Azeez and any other similarly situated persons by providing compensation for past and future pecuniary losses resulting
5

from the unlawful employment practices described above, including relocation expenses, job search expenses and medical expenses, in amounts to be determined at trial .
E. Order Defendant to make whole Mr . Abdul-Azeez and any other similarly situated persons by providing compensation for non-pecuniary losses, including emotional pain and suffering, anxiety, stress, depression, and humiliation, in amounts to be determined at trial .
F. Order Defendant to pay to Mr . Abdul-Azeez and any other similarly situated persons punitive damages for Defendant's malicious and reckless conduct described above, in amounts to be determined at trial .
G . Grant such further relief as the Court deems necessary and proper . H . Award the Commission its costs in this action .
JURY TRIAL DEMAND The Commission requests a jury trial on all questions of fact raised by its Complaint .
Respectfully submitted, C. GREGORY STEWART General Counsel Designate EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 1801 L Street, N .W. Washington, D .C. 20507
[signatures continued on following page]
6

S. ROBERT ROYAL Regional Attorney ,..Colorado Bar No. 9159
Q R ~MARIE RHODES Supervisory Trial Attorney Pennsylvania Bar No . 103 59
STEVEN M . TAPPER Senior Trial Attorney Georgia Bar No . 698018 U. S . EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION ATLANTA DISTRICT OFFICE 100 Alabama St., SW, Suite 4R30 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Telephone : (404) 562-6820 or 6932 Facsimile: (404) 562-6905
7

 
 ORIGINAL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

AUGUSTA DIVISION

V, J

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT ) OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION )

T
-', 3: _
ok- k- '__j0&

Plaintiff, )

and

)

Civil Action : CV100-50

KHALEED ABDUL-AZEEZ )

Intervenor, )

vs .

)

FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP . )

Defendant .

)

COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION
The above-named Intervenor files this Complaint In Intervention against the abovenamed Defendant , and says:
1 . Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the original Plaintiff , filed the complaint on March 17 , 2000, against Federal Express Corporation, for unlawful employment practices of Religious Discrimination and Retaliatory Discharge pursuant to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as amended by 1991 .
2 . Federal Express Corporation , the original Defendant , filed an answer in the original action on May 15, 2000, denying violations of Title VII, 42 U .S.C. §2000e-3(a) and Title VII, 42 U .S .C . § 2000e- 2(a)(1) of 1964 Civil Rights as amended by 1991 .
3 . Intervenor is a member of the Islamic religion . As such, he holds a sincere religious belief that as a practicing Muslim-male, he is required to wear a beard .
\k

4 . Intervenor began his employment with Defendant on November 1, 1998 as a Courier-Deliver in its public contact position .
5 . Intervenor had at all times relevant and in a timely fashion, sought to engage Defendant in a meaningful dialogue with respect to a reasonable accommodation for his religious need to continue to wear a beard .
6 . Defendant's only exception to its no beard policy is for medical purposes . Defendant asked Intervenor to assert a medical exception, but in light of Intervenor's religious convictions, he could not make a good faith and sincere assertion .
7 . Defendant, despite the mandatory obligation imposed by federal law, has failed, refused and neglected to make any reasonable accommodation whatsoever for the religious needs of Intervenor, despite the fact that such accommodation could have been made without any hardship, undue or otherwise, on the conduct of Defendant's business .
8 . In response to Intervenor's requests for reasonable accommodation, Defendant has denied any accommodation whatsoever .
9. Intervenor engaged in statutorily protected activity by filing a complaint of discrimination with the Augusta-Richmond Human Relations Commission and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and suffered an adverse employment action of retaliatory discharge .
10 . Defendant's unlawful conduct demonstrates a malicious and reckless disregard of Intervenor's federally protected rights .

WHEREFORE, Intervenor respectfully prays this Court :

(a) to order Defendant to reinstate him to the position from which he was terminated, with all benefits fully restored ;

(b) to order Defendant not maintain its policy of wearing beards for public contact positions for those who hold sincere beliefs that conflict with said policy ;

(c) to award him all back pay and lost benefits suffered as a result of Defendant's discriminatory discharge ;

(d) to award him compensatory and punitive damages for Defendant's malicious disregard for Intervenor's federal rights in the amount of $300,000 .00 ;

(e) to award him costs of this action and reasonable attorneys' fees ;

(f)

to award him such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

And that an answer is filed both by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the

original Plaintiff, and Federal Express Corporation, the original Defendant .

Respectfully submitted,

ZY& This

day of June 2000 .

orney for Intervenor John Batson P.O. Box 3248 Augusta, GA 30914 (706) 737-4040 (706) 736-3391 fax Georgia Bar No : 042150

orneV for Intervenor 7 Nathaniel D . Johnson (Pro Hac Vice) 410 W. Saginaw, Suite 31 East Lansing , Michigan 48823 (517)373-4652 (517) 332-5358 fax U .S . District Court for Michigan (Western District)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that the undersigned attorney did this date serve a copy of the within and foregoing pleading upon all counsel of record by one or more of the following method(s) :
Depositing the same in a properly addressed envelope with adequate postage thereon to the following address(es) :
Mr. James D . Hyder, Jr. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P .C . 1202 First Union Bank Bldg . 699 Broad Street, Suite 1202 Augusta, GA . 30901
Mr. Richard C . Paul Federal Express Corporation Legal Department 1980 Nonconnah Blvd . Memphis , TN. 38132
Mr . Steven M . Tapper EEOC 100 Alabama St ., SW, Suite 4R30 Atlanta, GA . 30303
Delivering a copy to counsel by hand to the following address(es) :
0 Faxing a copy of the same to the following Fax No(s). :
This 15`f day of June, 2000 .

Prepared by :
John P . Batson 303 Tenth Street P .O. Box 3248 Augusta, GA 30914-3248
(706) 737-4040

hn P . Batson Ga. Bar No . 042150 Attorney for Plaintiff

 
 ORIGINAL

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
AUGUSTA DIVISION

1 !L
U. ~'' T. ',OURT
DIV.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT )

OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, )
0
Plaintiff, ) Civil Action No .

CV 100-50

vs .

)

FEDERAL EXPRESS ) CORPORATION, )

Defendant .

)

CONSENT ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION

Pursuant to Fed .R .Civ . P . 41(a)(1), and for the reasons stated in the parties' Stipulation of

Dismissal of Complaint in Intervention, and for good cause shown, the Court DISMISSES the

Complaint in Intervention of Khaleed Abdul-Azeez . Hereafter, the caption of this lawsuit shall

be as stated in this Order . IT IS SO ORDERED, this3/day of

12000 .

DUDLEY H. WEN, JR.
CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DIST RICT COURT
Consented to by : C . GREGORY STEWART General Counsel S. ROBERT ROYAL Regional Attorney
[signatures continued on following page]

23

STEVEN M . TAPPER Senior Trial Attorney Ga. Bar Number: 698018
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 100 Alabama Street, SW, Suite 4R30 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 (404) 562-6820 (direct) (404) 562-6932 (general) (404) 562-6905 (fax) Counsel for Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

KHALEED ABDUL-AZEEZ 2027 Ellis Street Augusta, Georgia 30904 (706) 481-9792 Plaintiff-Intervenor

1 E D . HYI 1

( eor a p/ar Number 3814

4n45 ~ H

Maclean , Exley & ,n P .C .

Bu, 1 First Union Ba

ding

699 Broad Street , Suite 1202

Augusta, Georgia 30901

(706) 722-7062

(706) 722-7201 (fax)

Counsel for Defendant Federal Express Corporation

RICHARD C . PAUL Federal Express Corporation, Legal Department 3620 Hacks Cross Road , Building B-3rd Floor Memphis, Tennessee 38125 (901) 434-8556 (901) 434-9279 (fax) Counsel for Defendant Federal Express Corporation

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Southern District of Georgia

Case Number : 1 :00 - cv-00050

Date Served :

August 31, 2000

Served By :

Cindy M . Kellar

Attorneys Served :

S . Robert Royal , Esq .`'

Rosemarie Rhodes, Esq .

Steven M . Tapper,.E- sq
James D . Hyde r Jr ., ES~ . J

Richard C . Paul, Esq .

" 1rC lr. a `t e A

cl u \- A z -e_e Z ._

I Ga.,1 C \ S S-k .

PT C .A S c-r?

3a0% G' .-,

Copy placed in Minutes Copy given to Judge Copy given to Magistrate

 
 ORIGINAL
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA AUGUSTA DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

Plaintiff

vs .

FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, *

Defendant .

*

CV100-050

O R D E R

Before the Court in the captioned case is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment . A hearing took place on January 11, 2001 . For the following reasons, Defendant's motion is DENIED .

I . Background

Plaintiff ("the EEOC") filed this religious discrimination suit on behalf of Mr . Khaleed Abdul-Azeez ("Mr . Abdul-Azeez") . Defendant's personnel manual contains a written dress code . The dress code required Mr . Abdul-Azeez to shave his beard . For religious reasons, he asked for an exemption . Defendant refused this request . The EEOC contends that Defendant failed to reasonably accommodate Mr . Abdul-

DHB

(32)

CCC :

1

Azeez's religious beliefs in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act ("Title VII"), 42 U .S .C . §§ 2000e 2000e-17 .
Defendant delivers mail and packages nationwide . Mr . Abdul- Azeez , a Muslim , applied for a position as a courier . On November 2, 1998, he interviewed with two of Defendant's managers , Saundra Plunkett ("Ms . Plunkett") and Jenice Sullivan ("Ms . Sullivan") . (Sullivan Dep . at 2 .) At the interview, Mr . Abdul- Azeez wore a beard and a black "kufi," which is a large, round Muslim head covering . (Abdul-Azeez Aff . ¶ 5, attached to Doc . No . 40 .)
Ms . Plunkett told him that Defendant has a "no-beard" policy which forbids employees in "customer contact positions" to wear beards . ( Id . ¶ 6 .) A courier is a "customer contact position ." The policy exempts employees who cannot shave for medical reasons . (Def . ' s Ex . 1, attached to Doc . No . 30 .) To take advantage of this exception, an employee must obtain the approval of a senior manager and a statement from a companyapproved physician . ( Id . ) An employee must also keep his beard
neat and trimmed so that it is no longer than 1 inch in length around the face and does not extend more than 1/2 inch beyond the chin . ( Id . ) The written policy permits exceptions for other reasons only on a "case-by-case basis ." ( Id . ) An exemption for other reasons requires the approval of Defendant's legal department and personnel department . ( Id . )
2

Mr . Abdul-Azeez allegedly told his interviewers that he has a "shaving profile ." (Abdul-Azeez Aff . ¶ 6, attached to Doc . No . 40 .) In military parlance, a "profile" usually implies a medical exemption to a rule . Mr . Abdul-Azeez, who used to serve in the Army, claims that he understood the phrase "shaving profile" to refer to an exemption from a nobeard policy for any reason, religious or otherwise . ( Id . ) He testified in his deposition that he did not further explain this phrase . (Abdul-Azeez Dep . at 47 .) His interviewers tell a different story . Ms . Plunkett and Ms . Sullivan claim that he told them that he had a "medical profile" or a "medical condition ." (Sullivan Dep . at 13 ; Plunkett Dep . at 13-14 .)
Defendant offered Mr . Abdul -Azeez a job as a courier . He accepted this offer in writing on November 23, 1998 . The written offer explained that he would be "ineligible to apply for external positions for a period of twelve months ." (Def . ' s Ex . 2, attached to Doc . No . 30 .) He attended training sessions on the first day . (Abdul-Azeez Aff . ¶ 10, attached to Doc . No . 40 .) At the end of the day, Ms . Plunkett told him that he would have to shave before coming to work the next day . ( Id . )
According to the EEOC, Mr . Abdul-Azeez told Ms . Plunkett that his religious beliefs require him to wear a beard . (Id .) He reminded her that he had told her about his "shaving profile" in his job interview . ( Id . ) Ms . Plunkett showed him a copy of Defendant's "People Manual ." ( Id . ¶ 11 .) Ms .
3

Plunkett allegedly said that Defendant makes no religious exceptions to the no-beard policy . ( Id . ) Ms . Plunkett also purportedly failed to tell him that Defendant has a religious accommodation policy . ( Id . ) Under certain circumstances, this written religious accommodation policy permits exceptions to the dress code for religious reasons . (Exs . 18, 19 to Berry Dep .)
Mr . Abdul-Azeez maintains that on the next day, he showed Ms . Plunkett two Islamic books requiring Muslim males to wear beards . (Abdul-Azeez Aff . ¶ 12, attached to Doc . No . 40 .) Ms . Plunkett reportedly refused to review the books . ( Id . ) Ms . Sullivan wrote a memorandum to Gregg Taylor ("Mr . Taylor"), Defendant's senior personnel representative, asserting that during the November 2 interview, "nothing came up about religion from him or us ." (Ex . 1 to Sullivan Dep .) Later that day, Mr . Abdul-Azeez allegedly examined Defendant's Legal Manual and read the section on Defendant's religious accommodation policy . (Abdul-Azeez Aff . ¶ 13, attached to Doc . No . 40 .) He claims that he showed this policy to Ms . Plunkett and asked if he could trim his beard to the length required of employees who satisfy the medical exemption . ( Id . ¶ 14 .) According to the EEOC, Ms . Plunkett agreed to let him trim his beard before coming to work the next day . ( Id . )
When Mr . Abdul-Azeez came to work the next day, Ms . Plunkett told him that his beard should be shorter . ( Id . ¶ 15 .) Also, Ms . Plunkett referred him to Leah Berry ("Ms .
4

Berry"), one of Defendant's senior managers . ( Id . ) Ms . Berry told him that the company had scheduled an appointment for Mr . Abdul-Azeez to see a dermatologist . ( Id . ) Its purpose was to determine whether Mr . Abdul-Azeez satisfied the medical exception to the no-beard policy . (Plunkett Dep . at 24 .) Mr . Abdul-Azeez allegedly told Ms . Berry that he had no medical condition but instead wore a beard for religious reasons . (Abdul-Azeez Aff . ¶ 16, attached to Doc . No . 40 .) Ms . Berry nevertheless insisted that he see the dermatologist . ( Id . ) Mr . Abdul-Azeez asserts that he did not agree to see the dermatologist . ( Id . )
On November 30, Mr . Abdul-Azeez reported for work and told Ms . Berry that he did not visit the dermatologist . ( Id . ¶ 18 .) He says that he was "calm, respectful, and polite," ( id . ), but Defendant characterizes his attitude as "defiant ." According to Ms . Berry, he threatened legal action and warned that he would "get you just like we got Safeway . " (Berry Dep . at 66 .) Defendant contends that this was the first time Mr . Abdul-Azeez ever said that he wore his beard for religious reasons .
Ms . Berry suspended him without pay . (Def .'s Ex . 8, attached to Doc . No . 30 .) The reason given was that he refused to see the dermatologist . ( Id . ) Defendant gave Mr . Abdul-Azeez ninety days to "obtain a non-customer contact position . m ( Id . ) According to Defense counsel, when an employee cannot perform his job duties because of a disability
5

or some other reason, the company typically gives the employee ninety days to bid on positions that suit his needs .
At oral argument, Defense counsel explained that Defendant's managers were under the impression that Mr . AbdulAzeez had deceived them . ( E .g . , Berry Dep . at 66 .) Certain that he had claimed a medical exemption in his initial interview, they felt that Mr . Abdul-Azeez advanced his religious explanation only after the scheduled appointment with the dermatologist threatened to belie his representations . Defense counsel said that they were reluctant to reward his deception by allowing him a religious exemption to the no-beard policy . Defendant instead tried to find a position for Mr . Abdul-Azeez which would allow him to keep his beard .
On December 3, Mr . Abdul-Azeez again met with Ms . Berry and again asked to wear a beard for religious reasons . ( Id . at 61 .) Mr . Abdul-Azeez presented a typed request and asked Ms . Berry to complete one of Defendant's "Religious Accommodation Request Worksheets ." (Abdul-Azeez Aff . ¶¶ 2224, attached to Doc . No . 40 ; Ex . 18 to Berry Dep .) Ms . Berry explains that Defendant's accommodation was to try to place him in a non-customer contact position . (Berry Dep . at 28-29, 65-66 .) According to the EEOC, Ms . Berry said that if she had known that he wanted to wear a beard for religious reasons, she would never have hired him to be a courier . (Abdul-Azeez Aff . ¶ 25, attached to Doc . No . 40 .) The EEOC also claims
6

that Ms . Berry agreed to submit his request "'all the way up

through the chain .'" ( Id . )

Several weeks later, Mr . Abdul-Azeez filed a charge of

discrimination with the Augusta-Richmond County Human

Relations Commission . (Ex . 10 to Abdul-Azeez Dep .) In an

affidavit, he challenged Ms . Berry's assertion that he once

claimed a medical exemption . (Ex . 14 to Abdul-Azeez Dep .) He

also claimed that Defendant did not explain its dress code

(Id .) until after he took the job .

Defendant argues that

these sworn statements are false .

In an effort to help find a position for him, Defendant

sent Mr . Abdul-Azeez weekly career opportunities bulletins

for at least ten weeks . (Berry Dep . at 49 .) These bulletins

advertised job openings with Defendant . Defendant asserts

that he never responded to any of them . ( Id . ) The EEOC

counters that none of this material was useful . According to

the EEOC, the bulletins listed only two openings in the

Augusta area, both of which were "customer contact" positions

that forbid beards . (Abdul -Azeez Af f . ¶ 29, attached to Doc .

No . 40 .) Other positions were over 100 miles away or were

managerial positions for which he was not qualified . ( Id . )

Mr . Abdul-Azeez explains that he did not bid on any open

positions because none was suitable and because he had taken

an interim job at the Medical College of Georgia to assure

himself of some income . (Id .)

In January, Mr . Abdul-Azeez met with Mr . Taylor to

7

discuss the no-beard policy . ( Id . ¶ 30 .) Mr . Taylor said that he was investigating the charge of discrimination . ( Id . ) Mr . Abdul-Azeez says that he left the meeting "confident" that Mr . Taylor would allow him to work as a courier and wear his
beard . (Id . ¶ 31 .)
With only two weeks remaining in the ninety-day leave period, Defendant offered Mr . Abdul-Azeez a part-time position as a mail-handler in Columbia, South Carolina . ( Id . ¶ 32 .) The job paid less than a courier earns, and it was seventy miles from his home in Augusta . ( Id . ) Mr . Abdul-Azeez never accepted the offer . He explains that he was waiting to hear Mr . Taylor's decision on whether he could keep his beard . ( Id . ) He also submits that he was under the impression that because a charge of discrimination was pending, he did not have to take any action . ( Id . )
Ms . Berry wrote Mr . Abdul-Azeez on March 2, 1999 . (Ex . 12 to Abdul-Azeez Aff .) The letter explained that refusing the position in Columbia was considered a voluntary resignation . His employment with Defendant thus ended . The EEOC then brought this lawsuit on his behalf .
II . Requirements for Summary Judgment The Court should grant summary judgment only if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law ." Fed . R . Civ . P . 56(c) . Facts are "material" if they could affect the
8

outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law .

Anderson v . Liberty Lobby, Inc . , 477 U .S . 242, 248 (1986) .

The Court must view the facts in the light most favorable to

the non-moving party, Matsushita Elec . Indus . Co . v . Zenith

Radio Corp . , 475 U .S . 574, 587 (1986), and must draw "all

favor," justifiable inferences in [its]

United States v . Four

1428, 1437 Parcels of Real Property , 941 F . 2d

(11th Cir . 1991)

(en banc) (internal punctuation and citations omitted) .

The moving party has the initial burden of showing the

Court, by reference to materials on file, the basis for the

motion . Celotex Corp . v . Catrett , 477 U .S . 317, 323 (1986) .

How to carry this burden depends on who bears the burden of

proof at trial . Fitzpatrick v . City of Atlanta , 2 F .3d 1112,

1115 (11th Cir . 1993) . If the movant bears the burden of

proof at trial, that party "must show that, on all the

essential elements of its case, . . . no reasonable jury could

find for the non-moving party ." Four Parcels , 941 F .2d at

1438 . On the other hand, if the non-movant has the burden of

proof at trial, the movant may carry the initial burden in one

of two ways--by negating an essential element of the non-

movant' s case or by showing that there is no evidence to prove

a fact necessary to the non-movant's case . See Clark v . Coats

& Clark, Inc . , 929 F .2d 604, 606-08 (11th Cir . 1991)

(explaining Adickes v . S .H . Kress & Co . , 398 U .S . 144 (1970)

and Celotex Corp . v . Catrett , 477 U .S . 317 (1986)) . Before

the Court can evaluate the non-movant's response in

9

opposition, it must first consider whether the movant has met its initial burden of showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . Jones v . City of Columbus , 120 F .3d 248, 254 (11th Cir . 1997) (per curiam) . A mere conclusory statement that the non-movant cannot meet the burden at trial is insufficient . Clark , 929 F .2d at 608 .
If--and only if--the movant carries its initial burden, the non-movant may avoid summary judgment only by "demonstrat [ing] that there is indeed a material issue of fact that precludes summary judgment ." Id . Again, how to carry this burden depends on who bears the burden of proof at trial I f the movant has the burden of proof at trial, the non-movant may avoid summary judgment only by coming forward with evidence from which a reasonable jury could find in its favor . Anderson , 477 U . S . at 249 . I f the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial, the non-movant must tailor its response to the method by which the movant carries its initial burden . If the movant presents evidence affirmatively negating a material fact, the non-movant "must respond with evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial on the material fact sought to be negated ." Fitzpatrick , 2 F .3d at 1116 . if the movant shows an absence of evidence on a material fact, the non-movant must either show that the record contains evidence that was "overlooked or ignored" by the movant or "come forward with additional evidence sufficient to withstand
10

a directed verdict motion at trial based on the alleged evidentiary deficiency ." Id . at 1116-17 . The non-movant cannot carry its burden by relying on the pleadings or by repeating conclusory allegations contained in the complaint . See Morris v . Ross , 663 F .2d 1032, 1033-34 (11th Cir . 1981) . Rather, the non-movant must respond by affidavits or as otherwise provided by Fed . R . Civ . P . 56 .
The Clerk has given the non-moving party notice of the summary judgment motion and the summary judgment rules, of the right to file affidavits or other materials in opposition, and of the consequences of default . (Doc . No . 34 .) Therefore, the notice requirements of Griffith v . Wainwright , 772 F .2d 822, 825 (11th Cir . 1985) (per curiam), are satisfied . The time for filing materials in opposition has expired, and the motion is ripe for consideration .
III . Analysis Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of religion . 42 U .S .C . § 2000e-2 (a) (1) . Title VII also prohibits retaliation against employees who file charges of discrimination . 42 U . S . C . § 2000e-3 (a) . The EEOC claims that Defendant violated both provisions . (Compl . ¶¶ 7, 9 .) There are thus two claims before the Court--a religious discrimination claim and a retaliation claim . Each will be considered in turn .
11

A . Religious Discrimination The EEOC claims that Defendant engaged in unlawful
religious discrimination by failing to reasonably accommodate Mr . Abdul-Azeez's request to wear a beard . ( Id . 1 7 .) At oral argument, counsel also asserted that Defendant violated Title VII by permitting some employees to wear beards for medical reasons while refusing to let any employees wear beards for religious reasons . On this religious discrimination claim, Defendant has moved for summary judgment on three grounds . First, Defendant has argued that Mr . Abdul-Azeez has unclean hands . Second, Defendant argues that the EEOC cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination . Third Defendant argues that it reasonably accommodated his religious beliefs .
Issues of fact preclude summary judgment on Defendant's unclean hands defense .' Mr . Abdul-Azeez swore in his EEOC affidavit that the company did not explain its dress code until after he began working . Defendant contends that this statement is false . Defendant also asserts that Mr . AbdulAzeez fraudulently dated a letter to Mr . Taylor and Ms . Berry in order to manufacture a record of asking for an accommodation . There is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mr . Abdul- Azeez acted with fraudulent intent when
'Whether unclean hands is an available defense in Title VII cases is unsettled . Calloway v . Partners Nat'l Health Plans , 986 F .2d 446, 451 n .4 (11th Cir . 1993) . I do not decide this issue .
12

he executed the affidavit and when he incorrectly dated the letter . Defense counsel candidly acknowledged as much at oral argument . The analysis now turns to Defendant's two remaining arguments .
1 . Whether the EEOC Can Establish a Prima Facie Case The EEOC can establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination by showing that : (1) Mr . Abdul-Azeez had a bona fide belief that
compliance with Defendant's policies would conflict with his religious beliefs or practices ; (2) he told Defendant about the conflict ; and (3) Defendant discharged or penalized him for failing to comply with its policies . Beadle v . City of Tampa , 42 F .3d 633, 636 n .4 (11th Cir . 1995) . The parties agree that the EEOC has established the first two elements . Defendant maintains, however, that Mr . Abdul-Azeez resigned voluntarily and cannot claim discrimination . An adverse action is an element of a prima facie case . Doe v . DeKalb County Sch . Dist . , 145 F .3d 1441, 1448 n .10 (11th Cir . 1998) . An employment decision can be adverse even though it falls short of an ultimate employment decision . Harris v . H & W Contracting Co . , 102 F .3d 516, 524 n .2 (11th Cir . 1996) . The EEOC has referred to evidence that on
13

December 1, 1998, Defendant suspended Mr . Abdul-Azeez for ninety days without pay . (Def . ' s Ex . 8, attached to Doc . No . 3 0 . ) Ms . Berry explained that she suspended him " [ b] ecause he had a beard and he needed to have a noncustomer contact position if he had a beard ." (Berry Dep . at 36 .) A suspension without pay is an adverse employment action . Doe , 145 F .3d at 1448 . A reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Defendant suspended Mr . Abdul-Azeez because he refused on religious grounds to shave his beard .
Furthermore, the EEOC disputes Defendant's claim that Mr . Abdul-Azeez resigned . In a letter dated March 2, 1999, Ms . Berry reminded him that she had placed him on a ninety-day personal leave without pay . Ms . Berry wrote :
Your failure to respond to a job offer by the end of the Personal Leave date is considered your voluntary resignation from FedEx . Effective March 1, 1999, I have accepted your voluntary resignation from FedEx . (Def .'s Ex . 12, attached to Doc . No . 30 .) The EEOC counters that Mr . Abdul-Azeez had asked Mr . Taylor in January whether he could work as a courier and keep his beard for religious reasons . (Abdul-Azeez Aff . ¶ 31, attached to Doc . No . 40 .) Mr . Taylor allegedly never gave him an answer as promised . The EEOC contends that Mr . Abdul-Azeez did not accept the job offer in Columbia because he was still waiting to hear from Mr . Taylor . ( Id . ¶ 32 .) Under these circumstances, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mr . Abdul -Azeez intended to resign .
14

Reasonable Accommodation Title VII requires employers to reasonably accommodate their employees' religious observances . Lake v . B .F . Goodrich Co . , 837 F .2d 449, 450 (11th Cir . 1988) . Defendant can avoid this burden by showing that it could not have accommodated Mr . Abdul -Azeez's religious beliefs without undue hardship . Id . ; 42 U .S .C . § 2000e(j) . If Defendant shows that it reasonably accommodated his religious beliefs, the inquiry is at an end, and the issue of undue hardship is irrelevant . Beadle , 42 F .3d at 636 . Mr . Abdul-Azeez is not necessarily entitled to an accommodation of his choice . Ansonia Bd . of Educ . v . Philbrook , 479 U .S . 60, 68 (1986) . Whether an accommodation is reasonable depends on the facts and circumstances of each case . Beadle , 42 F .3d at 636 . Defendant does not argue that accommodating Mr . AbdulAzeez would have imposed an undue hardship . ( See Doc . No . 26 .) Defendant argues that, as a matter of law, it reasonably accommodated his religious beliefs . Defendant points out that it waived the twelve-month ban on applying for other positions . ( See Def .' s Ex . 2 , attached to Doc . No . 30 .) Defendant offered Mr . Taylor's assistance and sent him weekly career bulletins . (Berry Dep . at 49 .) Defendant also offered him a job as a mail handler in Columbia . (Abdul-Azeez Aff . ¶ 32, attached to Doc . No . 40 .) By waiving the twelve-month period, by helping Mr . Abdul-Azeez find another job, and by offering him a job in Columbia, Defendant asserts that it
15

satisfied its statutory duty of accommodation .

The reasonableness of Defendant's proffered

accommodations is a question of fact . Proctor v . Consolidated

Freightways Corp . of Del . , 795 F .2d 1472, 1476 (9th Cir .

1986) ; Turpen v . Missouri-Kansas-Texas R .R . Co . , 736 F .2d

1022, 1026 (5th Cir . 1984) (referring to reasonable

accommodation as a factual determination) . The EEOC has

referred to evidence that the accommodations were of little or

no value . During the ninety-day leave period, Defendant

allegedly offered no job in the Augusta area which would have

allowed Mr . Abdul-Azeez to wear his beard . (Abdul-Azeez Aff .

¶ 29, attached to Doc . No . 40 .) According to the EEOC, other

openings involved jobs located far from Augusta and for which

he was not qualified . ( Id . ) Defendant has identified no

specific job for which Mr . Abdul-Azeez should have applied .

A reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Defendant

failed to reasonably accommodate Mr . Abdul-Azeez's religious

beliefs .

Defendant faults Mr . Abdul-Azeez for sitting idly during

the ninety-day suspension period . Mr . Abdul-Azeez must make

a good faith attempt to take advantage of any proffered

accommodations .

Beadle v . Hillsborough County Sheriff's

Dep't , 29 F .3d 589, 593 (11th Cir . 1994) . Defendant complains

that Mr . Abdul-Azeez never responded to any of the career

bulletins, to its job offer, or to offers of assistance from

Ms . Berry and Mr . Taylor .

16

Because a trier of fact could conclude that Defendant's proffered accommodations were not reasonable, Defendant's observations do not justify summary judgment . In any case, Mr . Abdul- Azeez met with Mr . Taylor in January to discuss the conflict . (Abdul-Azeez Aff . ¶ 30, attached to Doc . No . 40 .) Mr . Abdul-Azeez claims that he asked Mr . Taylor whether he could have a religious exemption to the no-beard policy and that Mr . Taylor promised him an answer . ( Id . ¶ 31 .) Mr . Abdul -Azeez says that he left the meeting "confident" that Defendant would let him keep his beard and work as a courier . ( Id . ) A reasonable trier of fact could conclude that he made a good faith attempt to take advantage of Mr . Taylor's assistance and to resolve the conflict . Defendant is not entitled to summary judgment on the religious discrimination claim .
B . Retaliation Defendant's summary judgment brief does not address the
retaliation claim . At oral argument, Defense counsel suggested that if the religious discrimination claim fails, the retaliation claim necessarily fails as well . A retaliation claim is separate from a disparate treatment claim . Even if Defendant did not violate Title VII's prohibition on religious discrimination, the EEOC could still obtain relief if it shows that Defendant terminated Mr . AbdulAzeez in retaliation for filing a charge of discrimination .
17

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the EEOC must show :
(1) that Mr . Abdul-Azeez engaged in statutorily protected activity ;
(2) that he suffered an adverse employment action ; and
(3) that there is a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse action .
Gupta v . Florida Bd . of Regents , 212 F .3d 571, 587 (11th Cir . 2000), cert . denied , No . 00-726, 2001 WL 12582 (U .S . Jan . 8,
2001) . If the EEOC establishes a prima facie case of
retaliation, the burden shifts to Defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action . Farley v . Nationwide Mut . Ins . Co . , 197 F .3d 1322, 1336 (11th Cir . 1999) . If Defendant satisfies this burden, the EEOC must come forward with evidence that Defendant's articulated nondiscriminatory reason is pretextual . Id .
Mr . Abdul- Azeez filed a charge of discrimination on December 22, 1998 . (Ex . 10 to Abdul- Azeez Dep .) Filing this charge is a protected activity . Wideman v . Wal-Mart Stores, Inc ., 141 F . 3d 1453, 1455 (11th Cir . 1998) . His employment ended on March 2, 1999 when Ms . Berry wrote that she considered his refusal to accept the job in Columbia a voluntary resignation . ( See Ex . 15 to Abdul-Azeez Dep .) A reasonable trier of fact could discern a causal connection between the charge of discrimination and the letter of March
18

2 . See Maniccia v . Brown , 171 F .3d 1364, 1369-70 (11th Cir . 1999) (discussing time gaps in retaliation cases) . Defendant has suggested that Mr . Abdul-Azeez's employment ended because he rejected the job offer in Columbia . A reasonable trier of fact, however, could conclude that this suggestion is a pretext for unlawful retaliation . Defendant is not entitled to summary judgment on the retaliation claim .
IV . Conclusion Upon the foregoing, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc . No . 29) is DENIED . This case will proceed to trial accordingly . ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia, this ? ' day of January, 2001 .
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT'/~dUDGE
19

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Southern District of Georgia

Case Number : 1 :00-cv-00050

Date Served : January 26, 2001 ~,~g

Served By :

Emmie S . Flanders

J
Attorneys Served :

V S . Robert Royal, Esq .

Esq ., Rosemarie Rhodes,

'

Steven M . Tapper , Esq .-/

James D . Hyder Jr ., Esq .

Richard C . Paul, Esq .,,

Copy placed in Minutes / Copy given to Judge
Copy given to Magistrate

 
 ORIGINAL
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
AUGUSTA DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT ) OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, )

Plaintiff, ) Civil Action No .

CV 100-50

vs .

)

FEDERAL EXPRESS ) CORPORATION, )

Defendant .

)

CONSENT DECREE

This action originated with a Complaint filed by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on March 17, 2000 . The EEOC alleged, inter alia, that Defendant Federal Express Corporation ("FedEx") violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by (1) discriminating against the charging party, Mr . Khaleed AbdulAzeez, because of his religion, including but not limited to failing to reasonably accommodate his sincerely held religious beliefs, and (2) ultimately discharging Mr . Abdul-Azeez in retaliation for having engaged in activities protected under Title VII, including filing an EEOC charge and otherwise opposing what he reasonably and in good faith believed to be unlawful religious discrimination by FedEx . This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action and over the parties to this action .
In its Complaint, the EEOC sought make whole relief, including, but not limited to, back pay relief, with interest, compensatory and punitive damages, and injunctive and other affirmative relief. FedEx filed its Answer on or about May 15, 2000, denying the allegations made by the EEOC . FedEx disputes and denies any liability in this matter .
The parties want to conclude fully and finally all claims arising out of the EEOC's
C<< .

Complaint and the charges of discrimination filed with the EEOC by Mr . Abdul-Azeez. They enter into this Consent Decree to further the objectives of Title VII and equal employment opportunity . This Decree is not to be deemed or construed to be an admission of liability or wrongdoing by FedEx but constitutes the good faith settlement of a disputed claim .
Now, therefore, this Court, being fully advised in the premises, it is hereby ORDERED , ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
I. DISCLAIMER OF VIOLATION It is understood and agreed that the negotiation, execution, and entry of this Consent Decree, and the undertakings made by FedEx hereunder, are in settlement and compromise of claims of alleged religious discrimination in employment and retaliation, the validity of which is denied by FedEx . Neither the negotiation, execution, nor entry of this Consent Decree shall constitute an acknowledgment or admission of any kind by FedEx that its officers, agents or employees have violated or have not been in compliance with Title VII or any other applicable law, regulation or order .
II. NON-DISCRIMINATION FedEx will continue to adhere to its longstanding policy against discrimination towards any employee or applicant in any aspect of employment on the basis of their religion and, further, asserts that it will not retaliate against any person because that person is a beneficiary of this Consent Decree, or has provided information or assistance, or has participated in any other manner, in any investigation or proceeding relating to this Consent Decree . FedEx agrees that it will not discriminate against any employee or
2

applicant with respect to the policies and practices alleged in any of the aforesaid charges which have been filed by Mr . Abdul-Azeez against FedEx . Further, FedEx will not retaliate or take any adverse action against any employee or applicant in the future because any such individual has filed a charge or opposed a practice believed to be in violation of Title VII .
III. NOTICE TO BE POSTED Upon entry of this Consent Decree and continuing until the expiration date specified in Section XII herein, FedEx will keep posted a copy of the Notice attached to this Consent Decree (as Attachment A) at FedEx's Augusta, Georgia facility . The posting required by this paragraph shall be made on bulletin boards or locations selected so that each employee at this facility shall have the opportunity to observe at least one such posting when at the facility . FedEx will fulfill the posting requirement within fifteen (15) days of the entry of this Consent Decree and shall certify, within thirty (30) days of such date, that posting has been accomplished . FedEx shall not withhold the right of the EEOC to enter upon FedEx's premises to monitor compliance with this Section . Should the Notice become defaced, marred, or otherwise unreadable, FedEx will ensure that a new, readable copy of the Notice is posted in the same manner as heretofore specified within five (5) working days of discovering the defective Notice .
IV. MANAGER TRAINING FedEx shall, at least one time per year for the term of this Agreement, in an appropriate location, hold a training session for FedEx managers employed at its Augusta, Georgia facility which shall address FedEx's and its employees' equal employment opportunity obligations pursuant to Title VII, including those obligations relating to preventing religious discrimination and retaliation . FedEx shall notify the EEOC at least five (5) days in advance regarding the date(s) and time(s) the training contemplated by this Section IV will be accomplished . FedEx shall provide written certification to the
3

EEOC of this training within thirty (30) days following completion of each training session . The certification shall include the name(s) and qualifications of the person(s) providing instruction, names and job titles of attendees, length of training, training topics and any other pertinent information about the training. If written training materials are utilized, the EEOC shall be supplied with a copy . All written certification required by this Section shall be addressed to S . Robert Royal, Regional Attorney at the EEOC's Atlanta District Office, 100 Alabama Street, Suite 4R30, Atlanta, Georgia 30303 .
V. INSTRUCTION TO MANAGEMENT
Within thirty (30) days from the entry of this Decree, FedEx shall certify, in writing, to the EEOC that all management personnel who are currently employed at its Augusta, Georgia facility have been instructed as to the terms of this Consent Decree, and the full meaning of the provisions of the Notice to be posted, and that FedEx has reaffirmed with these employees that employment decisions are not to be made on any basis that is prohibited by Title VII . All written certification required by this Section shall be addressed to the Regional Attorney in the EEOC's Atlanta District Office at the above-referenced address .
VI. REPORTING REQUIREMENT FedEx shall report in written affidavit form to the EEOC, on or shortly before September 15, 2001, March 15, 2002, September 15, 2002, and March 15, 2003, respectively, each and every report or complaint (whether made orally or in writing, formally or informally) of religious discrimination or retaliation received by FedEx at or relating to its Augusta, Georgia facility . For each such report or complaint, FedEx shall state in written affidavit form the following : (a) The date of the complaint or report, (b) The name of the person making the complaint or report,
4

(c) The name and title of the person against whom the complaint or report was made,
(d) The nature of the complaint or report, (e) The name and title of the FedEx official who learned of the complaint or report, (f) What, if any, action was taken by FedEx in response to the complaint or report (e.g. employee discipline), and (g) A detailed narrative of how the complaint or report was resolved by FedEx .
VII. MONETARY RELIEF FedEx will pay Mr. Abdul-Azeez a total of Seventy Thousand dollars ($70,000 .00) in monetary relief in settlement of this case, $14,000 .00 of which will be designated as back pay (less required withholdings) and $56,000 .00 of which will be designated as compensatory damages, in the form of two checks . FedEx will mail the original checks via certified or overnight mail to Mr . Abdul-Azeez at 713 West Madison Street, Plant City, Florida 33566 . Mr . Abdul-Azeez and the EEOC recognize that such payment is made without admission of liability on the part of FedEx . The above payment shall be made to Mr . Abdul-Azeez within seven (7) days of the Court's execution of this Consent Decree . FedEx shall mail a copy of the checks to the attention of S . Robert Royal, Regional Attorney at the EEOC's Atlanta District Office, 100 Alabama Street, Suite 4R30, Atlanta, Georgia 30303 within ten (10) days of the date it mailed the original check to Mr. Abdul-Azeez.
VIII. REFERENCES FedEx agrees that if it receives inquiries from persons or prospective employers seeking a reference or other employment related information regarding Mr . Abdul-Azeez, that it shall provide no less than a neutral reference, citing the dates of employment and the position(s) held . FedEx will make no mention to persons or prospective employers seeking a reference of the fact that Mr . Abdul-Azeez filed a charge of discrimination .
5

IX. RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION AND RETALIATION POLICIES FedEx asserts that it extends equal employment opportunity to all qualified
individuals including disabled persons, disabled veterans, and veterans of the Vietnam era without regard to race, color, religion, national origin, age, or sex . It is against FedEx policy to retaliate against any individual asserting his or her right to be free from discrimination .
FedEx agrees to clarify its current Personal Appearance Policy (Policy 2-80) to specifically provide that an employee with a sincerely held religious belief that prevents the employee from removing his beard, or requires a particular hairstyle, may request an exception to the policy .
The above referenced policy change will be published in the next edition of the People Manual ; highlighted along with other policy changes in the Revision Highlights section at the front of the People Manual ; and posted on the FedEx Personnel Department web site . Within thirty days of the entry of this Consent Decree, FedEx shall certify to EEOC's Regional Attorney, S . Robert Royal, at EEOC, Atlanta District Office, 100 Alabama Street, Suite 4R30, Atlanta, Georgia 30303 that these changes have been initiated, and will provide a copy of the revised policy at that time .
X. PROCEDURE FOR ENFORCING COMPLIANCE The EEOC will attempt to resolve any dispute regarding the enforcement of the Consent Decree by informal mediation and consultation . Before seeking enforcement through the judicial process, the EEOC will notify FedEx in writing by certified mail to Richard C . Paul, Esq., Federal Express Corporation, Staff Attorney - Litigation Department, 3620 Hacks Cross Road, Building B - 3rd Floor, Memphis, Tennessee 38125, if it has any reason to believe that any action or omission by FedEx is in violation of the Consent Decree . FedEx shall have thirty (30) days after the receipt of such notification to cure any such alleged deficiency, and to notify the EEOC, by written report
6

addressed to the Regional Attorney for the EEOC 's Atlanta District Office, of the measures taken to cure the alleged deficiencies . If upon receipt of FedEx's report the EEOC concludes that the deficiency has not been satisfactorily cured by FedEx, the EEOC shall seek to resolve the alleged deficiency through good faith conciliation or mediation. If the alleged deficiency is not resolved within thirty (30) days after the initiation of such good faith conciliation and mediation process, then the EEOC may seek enforcement of this Consent Decree through the judicial process . Notwithstanding any of the foregoing, nothing in this agreement shall be deemed to prohibit any matter which occurred during the term of this Decree and which constitutes a dispute as contemplated by Section X from being fully and completely processed in the manner described in Section X, even though the dispute is not resolved within thirty (30) days of the termination of this Decree .
XI. COMPLIANCE OFFICIAL FedEx shall designate a compliance official who shall be responsible for compliance with this Consent Decree, and also responsible for coordinating and overseeing FedEx's compliance with this Consent Decree .
XII . TERMS OF DECREE - PERIOD OF JURISDICTION
This Consent Decree shall continue to be effective and binding upon the parties to this action for a period of twenty-four (24) calendar months immediately following the entry of the Consent Decree and shall expire at the end of this 24-month period, provided that all remedial benefits required hereby have been received or offered prior to its expiration and provided further, that all required reports and certifications are submitted at least thirty (30) days before the expiration date of the Consent Decree . If required reports are not submitted within 30 days of the expiration date or if the remedial benefits

are not received or offered, the Consent Decree will be automatically extended until these provisions are completed .
This Court shall retain jurisdiction over this action for the purposes of clarifying and enforcing this Consent Decree and for any other appropriate or equitable purposes for the term of this Decree, unless the Court acts or the EEOC has, prior to the expiration of said term, moved to enforce compliance with the Consent Decree . If this Court acts or the EEOC has moved to enforce compliance with this Consent Decree within this period, this Court shall retain jurisdiction of this action until all issues relating to all such motions which are made during the term of this Decree have been resolved . Thereafter, this Court shall dissolve this Consent Decree and shall dismiss this case with prejudice .
XIII. OTHER ACTIONS
The EEOC shall not commence or prosecute against FedEx any action or other proceeding based upon any claims, demands, causes of action, obligations, damages or liabilities which arise out of EEOC Charge Number 11 A990062, or the investigation of this charge or this lawsuit . This Consent Decree in no way affects the EEOC's right to process any pending or future charges that may be filed against FedEx or its owners in accordance with standard EEOC procedures, and to commence civil actions pursuant to Section 706 (f) of Title VII on any such charge . Nothing in this Consent Decree shall be construed to limit or reduce FedEx's obligation to fully comply with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended ; the Equal Pay Act of 1963, as amended ; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended ; the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ; or the regulations promulgated pursuant thereto . Nothing herein shall preclude the EEOC from bringing an action to enforce the provisions of this Consent Decree .
8

XIV. COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES The EEOC, FedEx, and Mr . Abdul-Azeez shall each bear their own respective costs and attorney's fees for this action . The parties hereto and undersigned attorneys of record for the Plaintiff and FedEx in the above-styled action hereby consent to the entry of the foregoing Consent Decree .
Consented to by :
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
GWENDOLYN REAMS Associate General Counsel
kv
S. ROBERT LOYAL Regional Attorney ROSEMARIE RHODES Supervisory Trial Attorney STEVEN M. TAPPER Senior Trial Attorney Georgia Bar No . 698018 Atlanta District Office 100 Alabama St ., SW, Suite 4R30 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Telephone : 404) 562-6820 Facsimile : (404 562-6905 Attorneys for Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
RICHARD C . PAUL Federal Express Corporation, 3620 Hacks Cross Road, Building B-3rd Floor Memphis, Tennessee 38125 (901) 434-8556 (901) 434-9279 (fax)
9

JAMES D. HYDER, JR. Georgia Bar Number 381459 Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P .C. 1202 First Union Bank Building 699 Broad Street, Suite 1202 Augusta, Georgia 30901 (706) 722-7062 (706) 722-7201 (fax) Counsel for Defendant Federal Express Corporation APPROVED AND ENTERED THIS day of
DUDLEY BOWEN, JR.
CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
10

Attachment A

FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION NOTICE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION AND NON-RETALIATION

TO: ALL EMPLOYEES AT FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION'S AUGUSTA, GEORGIA FACILITY

responsible The United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is

for

employment enforcing several federal

discrimination statutes : Title VII of the Civil

origin ; Rights Act of 1964 , as amended, which prohibits employment discrimination

based on race, color, religion , sex, or national

the A ge Discrimination in

Em loyment Act, as amended ; the Equal Pay Ac as amended ; and the Americans

with Disabilities Act .

against Federal law also prohibits retaliation

any employee or applicant who files a

charge of discrimination, who cooperates with an investigation of a charge, or who

benets from a charge settlement .

respects FedEx fully supports and complies with federal laws in all

and it will not

take any action against employees or applicants because they have exercised their

rights under the law .

FedEx has a religious accommodation policy and an anti-retaliation polic , and FedEx abides by the terms of those policies to ensure that employees not be subjected to religious discrimination or retaliation in the workplace .

This Notice will remain posted for twenty four (24) months .

Signed this day of

92001 .

For : Federal Express Corporation
Michael Saladino
Managing Director DO NOT REMOVE THIS NOTICE UNTIL

11

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Southern District of Georgia
Case Number : 1 :00-cv-00050 Date Served : May 24, 2001 Served By : Emmie S . Flanders)'
Attorneys Served :
S . Robert Royal, Esq Rosemarie Rhodes, Esq/ Steven M . Tapper, Esq ." James D . Hyder Jr ., Esq . Richard C . Paul, Esq~

Copy /

Placed in Minutes

Copy given to Judge

Copy given to Magistrate

 
 Southern District of Georgia CM/ECF 3.05 - Docket Report

https://ecf.gasd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?512239172620651-L_3...

U.S. District Court Southern District of Georgia (Augusta) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:00-cv-00050-DHB

CLOSED

Equal Opportunity v. Federal Express Assigned to: Judge Dudley H. Bowen Demand: $0 Cause: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Race) Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Intervenor Plaintiff

Date Filed: 03/17/2000 Date Terminated: 05/24/2001 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Plaintiff
represented by Rosemarie Rhodes Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 100 Alabama St., SW Suite 4R30 Atlanta, GA 30303 404/562-6817 Fax: 404/562-6905(fax) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
S. Robert Royal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 100 Alabama St., SW Suite 4R30 Atlanta, GA 30303 404/562-6817 Fax: 404/562-6905 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven M. Tapper Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 100 Alabama St., SW Suite 4R30 Atlanta, GA 30303 404/562-6817 Fax: 404/562-6905(fax) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Southern District of Georgia CM/ECF 3.05 - Docket Report

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Khaleed Abdul-Azeez TERMINATED: 08/31/2000
V. Defendant Federal Express Corporation
Intervenor Defendant Federal Express Corporation TERMINATED: 08/31/2000

represented by John Paul Batson P.O. Box 3248 Augusta, GA 30914-3248 706/737-4040 Fax: 706/736-3391 TERMINATED: 07/24/2000 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by James D. Hyder, Jr. Burke Cty. Board of Education 789 Perimeter Rd. Waynesboro, GA 30830 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard C. Paul Federal Express Corp. Legal Dept. 3620 Hacks Cross Rd. Third Fl., Bldg. B Memphis, TN 38125-8800 901/434-8556 Fax: 901/434-9279(fax) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by James D. Hyder, Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/31/2000 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard C. Paul (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/31/2000 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 03/17/2000

#

Docket Text

1 COMPLAINT (cmk) (Entered: 03/17/2000)

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03/17/2000 03/17/2000 03/17/2000 03/31/2000 05/05/2000 05/15/2000 05/15/2000 05/15/2000
05/23/2000 05/23/2000 05/23/2000
06/13/2000
06/14/2000
06/15/2000 06/21/2000 07/06/2000
07/06/2000

2 ANSWER to Local Rule 26.3 Interrogatories by Equal Opportunity; jury demand (cmk) (Entered: 03/17/2000)
3 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance for Equal Opportunity by Steven M. Tapper (cmk) (Entered: 03/17/2000)
** Set Jury Trial Flag. (cmk) (Entered: 03/17/2000)
4 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed as to Federal Express 3/22/00 Answer due on 5/21/00 for Federal Express (esf) (Entered: 03/31/2000)
5 SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS to Local Rule 26.3 Interrogatories by Equal Opportunity (esf) (Entered: 05/05/2000)
6 ANSWER to Complaint by Federal Express (Attorney James D. Hyder Jr.), (esf) (Entered: 05/15/2000)
6 CERTIFICATE pursuant to Local Rule 3.2. by defendant Federal Express (esf) (Entered: 05/15/2000)
SCHEDULING NOTICE setting Joining of parties,amending of pleadings by 7/14/00 ; Expert witness report by plaintiff due by 7/14/00 ; Expert witness report by Defendant due by 8/13/00 ; Discovery cutoff 9/12/00 ; Motion Filing deadline on 10/2/00 ; Summary Judgment deadline on 10/12/00 ; copies served. (esf) (Entered: 05/15/2000)
7 MOTION by Federal Express for attorney Richard C. Paul to Appear Pro Hac Vice. with brief in support. (esf) (Entered: 05/23/2000)
Pro Hac Vice paid by Richard C. Paul for defendant Federal Express Receipt # 189838 Date: 5/23/00 (esf) (Entered: 05/23/2000)
8 ORDER granting [7-1] motion for attorney Richard C. Paul to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Attorney added to case. ( signed by Chief Judge Dudley H. Bowen Jr ); [EOD Date 5/23/00 copies served. (esf) (Entered: 05/23/2000)
9 MOTION by Federal Express for leave of absence for James D. Hyder Jr. for dates of July 10, 2000 through July 14, 2000 for defendant Federal Express with brief in support. (esf) (Entered: 06/13/2000)
10 ORDER granting [9-1] motion for leave of absence for James D. Hyder Jr. for dates of July 10, 2000 through July 14, 2000 for defendant Federal Express ( signed by Chief Judge Dudley H. Bowen Jr ); [EOD Date 6/14/00 copies served. (esf) (Entered: 06/14/2000)
11 MOTION by Khaleed Abdul-Azeez to Intervene as a Plaintiff with brief in support. (esf) (Entered: 06/15/2000)
12 Litigants' Bill of Rights filed by Equal Opportunity (esf) (Entered: 06/21/2000)
13 ORDER granting [11-1] motion to Intervene as a Plaintiff ( signed by Chief Judge Dudley H. Bowen Jr ); [EOD Date 7/6/00 copies served. (esf) (Entered: 07/06/2000)
14 Intervenor's COMPLAINT by against Federal Express (esf) (Entered: 07/06/2000)

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07/17/2000 07/17/2000 07/19/2000 07/19/2000 07/24/2000 07/24/2000
08/30/2000 08/30/2000 08/30/2000 08/31/2000 08/31/2000
08/31/2000 10/10/2000 10/20/2000 11/13/2000

15 MOTION by Khaleed Abdul-Azeez for John P. Batson to Withdraw as Attorney with brief in support. (cmk) (Entered: 07/17/2000)
16 ANSWER to Local Rule 26.3 Interrogatories by Federal Express; jury demand (cmk) (Entered: 07/17/2000)
17 AMENDED MOTION by Khaleed Abdul-Azeez for John P. Batson to Withdraw as Attorney with brief in support. (cmk) (Entered: 07/20/2000)
18 AMENDED MOTION by Khaleed Abdul-Azeez for Nathaniel Johnson to Withdraw as Attorney with brief in support. (cmk) (Entered: 07/20/2000)
19 ORDER granting [18-1] motion for Nathaniel Johnson to Withdraw as Attorney ( signed by Chief Judge Dudley H. Bowen Jr ); [EOD Date 7/24/00] copies served. (esf) (Entered: 07/24/2000)
20 ORDER granting [17-1] motion for John P. Batson to Withdraw as Attorney (Terminated attorney John Paul Batson for Khaleed Abdul-Azeez, granting [15-1] motion for John P. Batson to Withdraw as Attorney (Terminated attorney John Paul Batson for Khaleed Abdul-Azeez ( signed by Chief Judge Dudley H. Bowen Jr ); [EOD Date 7/24/00] copies served. (esf) (Entered: 07/24/2000)
21 STIPULATION of dismissal of Complaint in intervention (cmk) (Entered: 08/30/2000)
22 MOTION by Equal Opportunity, Federal Express, Khaleed Abdul-Azeez, Federal Express to Extend Time for discovery up to and including November 30, 2000 with brief in support. (cmk) (Entered: 08/30/2000)
Motion(s) referred: [22-1] motion to Extend Time for discovery up to and including November 30, 2000 referred to Magistrate Judge W. Leon Barfield (cmk) (Entered: 08/30/2000)
23 ORDER granting [21-1] dismiss/dismissal stipulation ( signed by Chief Judge Dudley H. Bowen Jr ); [EOD Date 8/31/00] copies served. (cmk) (Entered: 08/31/2000)
24 ORDER granting the extension until 10/12/00 for discovery cut-off [22-1] motion to Extend Time for discovery up to and including November 30, 2000. The clerk is instructed to issue a new scheduling notice reflecting the adjusted deadlines. Further extensions must be directed to the District Judge. ( signed by Magistrate Judge W. Leon Barfield ); [EOD Date 8/31/00] copies served. (cmk) Modified on 08/31/2000 (Entered: 08/31/2000)
SCHEDULING NOTICE setting Discovery cutoff 10/12/00 ; Motion Filing deadline on 11/1/00 ; Summary Judgment deadline on 11/11/00 ; copies served. (cmk) (Entered: 08/31/2000)
25 NOTICE of Change of Address of attorney Richard C. Paul, Esq. by Federal Express (esf) (Entered: 10/10/2000)
26 NOTICE of Stipulation by Federal Express (esf) (Entered: 10/20/2000)
27 JOINT MOTION by Equal Opportunity, Federal Express to Extend Time in which to file motions for summary judgment (esf) (Entered: 11/14/2000)

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11/14/2000
11/15/2000 11/15/2000 11/15/2000
11/15/2000 11/15/2000 11/15/2000 12/05/2000
12/07/2000 12/07/2000
12/07/2000 12/07/2000 12/07/2000 12/07/2000 12/07/2000 12/07/2000 12/07/2000

28 ORDER granting [27-1] joint motion to Extend Time in which to file motions for summary judgment setting Summary Judgment Deadline to 11/15/00 ( signed by Magistrate Judge W. Leon Barfield ); [EOD Date 11/14/00] copies served. (esf) (Entered: 11/14/2000)
29 MOTION by Federal Express for Summary Judgment with brief in support. (esf) (Entered: 11/15/2000)
30 MEMORANDUM by Federal Express in support of [29-1] motion for Summary Judgment by Federal Express (esf) (Entered: 11/15/2000)
31 STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS by defendant Federal Express in support of [29-1] motion for Summary Judgment by Federal Express (esf) (Entered: 11/15/2000)
32 NOTICE of Filing Original Depositionby Federal Express (esf) (Entered: 11/15/2000)
33 DEPOSITION of Khaleed Abdul-Azeez taken on 7/25/00 Re: [29-1] motion for Summary Judgment by Federal Express (esf) (Entered: 11/15/2000)
34 NOTICE issued re: [29-1] motion for Summary Judgment (esf) (Entered: 11/15/2000)
35 CONSENT ORDER directing that the plaintiff's response time to defendant's motion for summary judgment is extended Response to Motion set to 12/7/00 for [29-1] motion for Summary Judgment ( signed by Chief Judge Dudley H. Bowen Jr ); [EOD Date 12/5/00] copies served. (esf) (Entered: 12/05/2000)
36 RESPONSE by Equal Opportunity to [29-1] motion for Summary Judgment by Federal Express (esf) (Entered: 12/07/2000)
37 RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS by plaintiff Equal Opportunity to [31-1] material facts statement by Federal Express (esf) (Entered: 12/07/2000)
38 MEMORANDUM by Equal Opportunity in support of [36-1] motion response by Equal Opportunity (esf) (Entered: 12/07/2000)
39 REQUEST for Production of Documents by Equal Opportunity (esf) (Entered: 12/07/2000)
40 NOTICE of Filing Original Discovery by Equal Opportunity (esf) (Entered: 12/07/2000)
41 DEPOSITION of Leah E. Berry taken on 7/19/00 Re: [29-1] motion for Summary Judgment by Federal Express (esf) (Entered: 12/07/2000)
42 DEPOSITION of Jenice Medora Sullivan taken on 9/21/00 Re: [29-1] motion for Summary Judgment by Federal Express (esf) (Entered: 12/07/2000)
43 DEPOSITION of Saundra Jeanne Plunkett taken on 9/21/00 Re: [29-1] motion for Summary Judgment by Federal Express (esf) (Entered: 12/07/2000)
44 DEPOSITION of Gregory Jacob Taylor taken on 7/25/00 Re: [29-1] motion for Summary Judgment by Federal Express (esf) (Entered: 12/07/2000)

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12/07/2000 12/07/2000 12/07/2000 12/08/2000 12/08/2000 12/08/2000 01/09/2001 01/11/2001 01/12/2001
01/26/2001
02/14/2001 02/14/2001
02/28/2001
04/10/2001 04/13/2001
04/13/2001
04/23/2001 04/23/2001

45 EXHIBIT 1 to Affidavit of Helen Garrett (esf) (Entered: 12/07/2000)
46 EXHIBIT 2 to Affidavit of Helen Garrett (esf) (Entered: 12/07/2000)
47 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Equal Opportunity (esf) (Entered: 12/07/2000)
48 NOTICE of Filing Original Discovery by Equal Opportunity (esf) (Entered: 12/08/2000)
49 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Equal Opportunity (esf) (Entered: 12/08/2000)
50 DEPOSITION of Michael Saladino taken on 9/29/00 Re: [29-1] motion for Summary Judgment by Federal Express (esf) (Entered: 12/08/2000)
Motion hearing re: [29-1] motion for Summary Judgment by Federal Express set at 2:30 1/11/01; telephonic notification 1/08/01. (esi) (Entered: 01/09/2001)
51 Defendant Federal Express Corp's Amendment to its responses to plaintiff EEOC's first set of interrogatories to deft (esf) (Entered: 01/11/2001)
Motion hearing held re: [29-1] motion for Summary Judgment by Federal Express ; ruling reserved. Court Reporter: D.Dueringer (esi) (Entered: 01/12/2001)
52 ORDER denying [29-1] motion for Summary Judgment. This case will proceed to trial accordingly ( signed by Chief Judge Dudley H. Bowen Jr ); [EOD Date 1/26/01] copies served. (esf) (Entered: 01/26/2001)
SCHEDULING NOTICE setting Pretrial Order deadline 3/12/01 ; copies served. (esi) (Entered: 02/14/2001)
53 ORDER directing parties to submit a consolidated request for jury instructions setting Pretrial Instructions deadline to 3/12/01 ( signed by Chief Judge Dudley H. Bowen Jr ); [EOD Date 2/14/01] copies served. (esf) (Entered: 02/14/2001)
54 CONSENT ORDER granting the parties request for extension of the pretrial order deadline setting Scheduling Order Deadlines: Pretrial Order due by 4/13/01 ; ( signed by Chief Judge Dudley H. Bowen Jr ); [EOD Date 2/28/01] copies served. (esf) (Entered: 02/28/2001)
Oral extension of Pretrial Order deadline to 4/23/01; telephonic consent of counsel. (esi) (Entered: 04/10/2001)
55 MOTION by Equal Opportunity for leave of absence for Steven M. Tapper for dates of April 26, 2001 through May 8, 2001 for plaintiff Equal Opportunity with brief in support. (esf) (Entered: 04/13/2001)
56 ORDER granting [55-1] motion for leave of absence for Steven M. Tapper for dates of April 26, 2001 through May 8, 2001 for plaintiff Equal Opportunity ( signed by Chief Judge Dudley H. Bowen Jr ); [EOD Date 4/13/01] copies served. (esf) (Entered: 04/13/2001)
57 CONSOLIDATED PROPOSED PRE-TRIAL ORDER (esf) (Entered: 04/23/2001)
58 PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF AUTHORITIES (esf) (Entered: 04/23/2001)

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04/23/2001 04/23/2001 04/25/2001 04/25/2001 05/21/2001
05/24/2001
05/24/2001

59 REQUEST TO CHARGE by Equal Opportunity, Federal Express (esf) (Entered: 04/23/2001)
60 'STIPULATED FACTS' (esf) (Entered: 04/23/2001)
Pre-Trial Conference set for 10:30 5/24/01 before Chief Judge Dudley H. Bowen Jr (esi) (Entered: 04/25/2001)
Jury selection and trial assignment set for 9:00 5/29/01 before Chief Judge Dudley H. Bowen Jr (esi) (Entered: 04/25/2001)
61 ORDER directing that, this case having been settled, is dismissed. Should the parties wish for the Court to retain jurisdiction to enforce settlement, they must file a 'Notice of Filing Under Dismissal Order' within 10 days of service of this Order. This case shall be closed 15 days hence ( signed by Chief Judge Dudley H. Bowen Jr ); [EOD Date 5/21/01] copies served. (esf) (Entered: 05/21/2001)
62 ORDER/SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT directing Dft to pay Pla a total of $70,000.00 in monetary relief; further directing that this Court shall retain jurisdiction over this action for the purposes of clarifying and enforcing this Consent Decree with each party to bear their own respective costs and attorney's fees ( signed by Chief Judge Dudley H. Bowen Jr ); [EOD Date 5/24/01] copies served. (esf) (Entered: 05/24/2001)
Case closed (esf) (Entered: 05/24/2001)

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