2:09-cv-10504-MOB-DAS Doc # 1 Filed 02/10/09 Pg 1 of 13 Pg ID 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN __________________________________________

KEVIN HOULE and HARVEY REESE,

Plaintiffs, v.
BARBARA SAMPSON, chair of the Michigan Parole Board, and the nine board members: JAMES ATTERBERRY, MIGUEL BERRIOS, CHARLES BROWN, PAUL CONDINO, STEPHEN DEBOER, ARTINA HARDMAN, ANTHONY KING, DAVID KLEINHARDT, and LAURIN THOMAS, in their official capacities,

File No. Hon. Mag. Judge

Defendants.

______________________________________________________________________________

Legal Aid of Western Michigan Reentry Law Project By: Miriam Aukerman (P63165) Attorneys for Plaintiffs 89 Ionia NW Grand Rapids, MI 49503 (616) 774-0672 ext. 114
American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan By: Michael Steinberg (P43085) Kary Moss (P49759) Attorneys for Plaintiffs 60 West Hancock St. Detroit, MI 48201 (313) 578-6800 ext. 814

Michigan Clinical Law Program By: Kim Thomas (P66643) Paul Reingold (P27594) Attorneys for Plaintiffs 363 Legal Research Building 801 Monroe Street Ann Arbor, MI 48109 (734) 763-4319
Matt Cronin and Katya Georgieva Student Attorneys on the Complaint

______________________________________________________________________________

COMPLAINT

Preliminary Statement

1. Plaintiffs Kevin Houle and Harvey Reese are Michigan parolees who, as a condition of

their parole, have been denied the right to have contact with their children and minor siblings,

have been prohibited from marrying or maintaining adult personal relationships, and have been

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restricted from the practice of their religion. The plaintiffs face re-imprisonment if they see, call, or write their children, if they marry or date their partners, or if they go to church.
2. By imposing these parole conditions on the plaintiffs, the Michigan Parole Board has violated the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution and the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
3. The plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief. Jurisdiction
4. This Court has jurisdiction over the claims presented in this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The plaintiffs’ federal claims are made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Declaratory relief is authorized pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202.
Parties Plaintiff Kevin Houle 5. Plaintiff Kevin Houle resides in Plymouth, Michigan, and is currently on parole. In 2002, he was charged with criminal sexual conduct for having oral sex with a teenaged step-daughter. He pled nolo contendere to Criminal Sexual Conduct III, and was sentenced to prison. See Declaration of Kevin Houle, Exh. I.1 6. Mr. Houle has a son, T.H.2, who is currently 13 years old. 7. There is no evidence to suggest that Mr. Houle poses an ongoing danger to young children generally, let alone to his own 13-year-old male child. 8. Before Mr. Houle was sent to prison, T.H. had lived with him, and they had established a close father-son relationship.
1 All exhibits are attached to the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction, which is being filed concurrently with this complaint. 2 The names and dates of birth of the children have been redacted in this complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(a).
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9. While incarcerated, Mr. Houle had regular contact with T.H., in the form of visits, phone calls, and correspondence.
10. Mr. Houle was paroled in June 2008. 11. Mr. Houle’s parole conditions prohibit him from having any contact with his son. Mr. Houle cannot see T.H., cannot call him, cannot e-mail him, cannot write to him, and cannot pass messages to him through a third party. 12. Mr. Houle is a loving and attentive father. It would be in his son’s best interests for Mr. Houle to continue to have contact with T.H., as Mr. Houle did while he was in prison, and as he will be able to do when he completes his parole. 13. Mr. Houle faces re-incarceration if he has any contact with T.H. while he is on parole. 14. Mr. Houle and T.H.’s mother divorced in 2005. She gave up custody of T.H. to Mr. Houle’s parents, and T.H. moved in with them. 15. T.H. and his grandparents regularly visited Mr. Houle while he was in prison. 16. Mr. Houle’s parents are elderly and are now disabled. Given the living arrangements, Mr. Houle cannot visit his disabled parents unless they can arrange to remove T.H. from the house for the entire period of his visit.
Plaintiff Harvey Reese 17. Plaintiff Harvey Reese resides in Lansing, Michigan, and is currently on parole. He pled guilty in 1999 to attempted Criminal Sexual Conduct III for having sexual contact with a 15year-old girl, and was sentenced to prison. See Declaration of Harvey Reese, Exh. A. 18. Mr. Reese is the father of four-year-old A.R. and nine-year-old T.M. Mr. Reese also has a minor brother, D.R., who is sixteen. 19. There is no evidence to suggest that Mr. Reese poses a danger to young children, let
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alone to his own children. There is also no evidence to suggest that he is a danger to his brother. 20. Mr. Reese had regular contact with his children and his brother while Mr. Reese was
incarcerated. 21. Mr. Reese was originally paroled in November 2002. His parole conditions prohibited
him from having any contact with minors. 22. Because Mr. Reese gave a ride to his girlfriend and her children, he was returned to pris-
on in 2004 for violating his parole conditions by having contact with minors. He served an additional 3.5 years in prison for that parole violation.
23. Mr. Reese was again paroled in May 2007. 24. His parole conditions prohibit him from having any contact with his children or brother. He cannot see them, call them, e-mail them, write them, or pass messages to them through a third party. 25. Mr. Reese is a loving and attentive father and brother. It would be in the best interests of Mr. Reese’s children and brother if he were able to continue to have contact with them, as he did while he was in prison, and as he will be able to do when he completes his parole. 26. Mr. Reese faces re-incarceration if he has any contact with his children or brother while on parole. 27. Mr. Reese was engaged to be married to A.R.’s mother, Tonja Parker. Mr. Reese and Ms. Parker have been a couple for approximately seven years. See Declaration of Harvey Reese, Exh. A; Declaration of Tonja Parker, Exh. G. 28. At one time Mr. Reese and Ms. Parker wanted to get married while Mr. Reese was in prison, and the marriage would have been permitted under prison regulations. They did not get married because of scheduling problems and Mr. Reese’s unexpected transfer to another prison.
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29. Now that he has been paroled, Mr. Reese’s parole conditions prohibit him from marrying, dating, or having any romantic involvement with Ms. Parker, because she has custody of minor children, including the couple’s daughter, A.R.
30. Mr. Reese faces re-incarceration if he marries, lives with, dates, or is romantically involved with Ms. Parker.
31. Mr. Reese’s parole agent has indicated that Mr. Reese may be in violation of his parole conditions simply by referring to Ms. Parker as his fiancé. See Letter from Agent Bowker to Miriam Aukerman, Exh. F.
32. Mr. Reese regularly attended Christian worship services while in prison. 33. Now that he has been paroled, Mr. Reese would like to attend services at the New Hope Church of God in Christ, in Lansing, Michigan. 34. Mr. Reese’s parole agent has refused to grant Mr. Reese permission to attend worship services at the New Hope Church, because children may be present at the services. See Letter from Agent Bowker to Miriam Aukerman, Exh. F. 35. Mr. Reese faces re-incarceration if he goes to church.
The Defendants 36. Defendant Barbara Sampson is the chair of the Michigan Parole Board. She is sued in her official capacity. 37. Defendants James Atterberry, Miguel Berrios, Charles Brown, Paul Condino, Stephen DeBoer, Artina Hardman, Dr. Anthony King, Dave Kleinhardt, and Laurin’ Thomas are members of the Michigan Parole Board. They are sued in their official capacities. 38. As the composition of the Michigan Parole Board changes periodically, this suit also includes as a defendant any person who subsequently becomes a member of the Michigan Parole
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Board. Such persons are sued in their official capacity. Parole Board Policy and Practice
39. The defendants, as members of the Michigan Parole Board, impose conditions of parole on individuals released from the custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) who are subject to parole supervision.
40. The Parole Board imposes certain standard conditions of parole on all parolees. Those standard conditions of parole are not at issue in this case.
41. The Parole Board also imposes certain “Standard Special Conditions of Parole,” which are keyed to a parolee’s underlying offense. See List of Default Conditions of Parole, Exh. Q.
42. Upon information and belief, the Special Conditions are computer-generated, so that individuals whose underlying offense is coded as having particular elements are automatically subject to any special conditions that are coded as relating to that offense. See List of Default Conditions of Parole, Exh. Q (produced by the MDOC in response to a Freedom of Information Act request asking for “all documents that address which conditions of parole are to be imposed on which offenders”).
43. The plaintiffs challenge the Special Conditions that affect their ability to have contact with their own children or minor siblings, to marry or maintain personal relationships, and to exercise their faith.
44. Plaintiffs Houle and Reese are subject, among other conditions, to Special Conditions 1.0, 1.1, 1.3, 1.6, 1.7 and 1.8. See Parole Conditions of Kevin Houle, Exh. J; Parole Conditions of Harvey Reese, Exh.B.
45. Special Condition 1.0 provides: “You must not have any verbal, written, electronic, or physical contact with any individual age 17 or under, or attempt to do so, either directly or
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through another person.” 46. Special Condition 1.1 provides: “You must not live in a residence where any individual
age 17 or under stays or is cared for. You must not provide care for any individual age 17 or under.”
47. Special Condition 1.3 provides: “You must not marry, date, or have any romantic involvement with anyone who resides with or has physical custody of any individual age 17 or under, without getting written permission from the field agent.”
48. Special Conditions 1.0, 1.1 and 1.3 contain the direct prohibition on contact with children, as well as the prohibition on marriage to or relationships with persons who have physical custody of children.
49. In addition, Mr. Houle and Mr. Reese are subject to additional parole conditions that would make it very difficult for them to parent their children, if this Court grants them the right to have contact with their children. Those parole conditions include: Special Condition 1.6 (“You must not reside, work, or be within 1,000 feet of the property of any kindergarten through 12th grade school, preschool, or child care center without first getting written permission from the field agent”); Special Condition 1.7 (“You must not go or be with 1,000 feet of parks, public swimming pools, playgrounds, arcades, or other places primarily used by individuals age 17 or under without first getting written permission from the field agent”); and Special Condition 1.8 (“You must not possess children’s clothing, toys, games, or videos without first getting written permission from the field agent”).
50. Upon information and belief, the Special Conditions prohibiting contact with minors are automatically imposed by the defendants on all parolees whose underlying conviction involves a sex offense, regardless of whether that offense involved children, regardless of whether
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that offense involved consensual sexual activity, and regardless of whether there is evidence to suggest that the parolee is likely to harm children.
51. Upon information and belief, the Special Conditions prohibiting contact with minors are automatically imposed by the defendants in cases where there is a victim or witness who was a minor, regardless of whether the parolee’s individual circumstances suggest that the parolee is likely to harm children in the future.
52. The defendants have interpreted the Special Conditions prohibiting contact with minors to apply to a parolee’s own children and minor siblings. Thus, a parolee who is subject to a restriction on contact with minors is also automatically barred from seeing his or her own minor children or minor siblings.
53. The defendants have interpreted the Special Conditions prohibiting marriage, dating, and romantic involvement with custodial parents to apply regardless of whether that parent and the parolee have had a long-term relationship, and regardless of whether they have children together.
54. The plaintiffs were not given notice of what parole conditions the Parole Board was considering imposing prior to the actual imposition of those conditions.
55. Upon information and belief, the Parole Board does not give notice to any parolees regarding the parole conditions to be imposed prior to actual imposition of those conditions.
56. The plaintiffs were not given an opportunity to be heard regarding the appropriateness of the parole conditions that were imposed on them.
57. Upon information and belief, the Parole Board does not give any parolees an opportunity to be heard regarding the appropriateness of the parole conditions that are imposed on them.
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58. Only parole agents can request the addition or deletion of special conditions of parole. According to the MDOC’s Operating Procedures, those requests are to be processed through the Parole Supervision Unit. The Parole Board then makes a decision about whether to add or delete a special condition. See Operating Procedure: Order for Parole and Amendment of Orders, 06.04.130G , Exh. R.
59. There is no process by which a parolee can request an individualized review of special parole conditions by the Parole Board if the parole agent refuses to make the request for modification of the special conditions, which is within the agent’s sole discretion.
60. Parolees are specifically prohibited from grieving a condition of parole. See Operating Procedure 06.04.100: Probation/Parole Orientation Checklist, Exh. S, at ¶12; MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130, Exh. T, at ¶ F.3.
61. For many parolees, including the plaintiffs, the challenged conditions of parole undermine rehabilitation and make it more difficult for the parolees to reintegrate into society. See Declaration of Thomas Fluent, Exh. M; Declaration of Arthur Marroquin, Exh. H; Declaration of John Simpson, Exh. O.
Claims for Relief I. Violation of Fundamental Rights: Children 62. The plaintiffs have been deprived of their fundamental right to maintain relationships with their children. 63. This deprivation is not directly related to advancing the plaintiffs’ rehabilitation or to protecting the public. 64. This deprivation is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. 65. The defendants’ refusal to allow the plaintiffs any contact with their children violates
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rights secured by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and is actionable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
II. Violation of Fundamental Rights: Minor Sibling 66. Plaintiff Harvey Reese has been deprived of his fundamental right to maintain a relationship with his minor brother, D.R. 67. This deprivation is not directly related to advancing Mr. Reese’s rehabilitation or to protecting the public. 68. This deprivation is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. 69. The defendants’ refusal to allow Mr. Reese any contact with his minor brother violates rights secured to Mr. Reese by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and is actionable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
III. Violation of Fundamental Rights: Marriage and Personal Relationships 70. The plaintiffs have been deprived of their fundamental right to marry and maintain personal relationships. 71. This deprivation is not directly related to advancing the plaintiffs’ rehabilitation or to protecting the public. 72. This deprivation is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. 73. The defendants’ refusal to allow the plaintiffs to marry or maintain personal relationships violates rights secured to the plaintiffs by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and is actionable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
IV. Violation of Fundamental Rights: Religion 74. Plaintiff Reese has been deprived of his right to practice his religion. 75. This deprivation is not directly related to advancing the plaintiff’s rehabilitation or to
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protecting the public. 76. This deprivation is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. 77. The defendants’ refusal to allow Mr. Reese to attend church violates rights secured to
Mr. Reese by the First Amendment to and the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution, and is actionable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
V. Violation of Procedural Due Process 78. The challenged conditions of parole were imposed upon the plaintiffs as computergenerated defaults without any individualized assessment or consideration of whether those conditions were appropriate in the plaintiffs’ cases. 79. The plaintiffs were not given notice of the challenged conditions of parole prior to their imposition. 80. The plaintiffs were not given an opportunity to be heard regarding the appropriateness of the challenged conditions of parole prior to their imposition. 81. No administrative procedure exists by which the plaintiffs can challenge the conditions of their parole, once those conditions are imposed, absent the cooperation of their parole officer. 82. The procedures used to impose the above-mentioned parole conditions violate rights secured to the plaintiffs by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and are actionable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
VI. Vagueness 83. As a matter of due process, a parole condition must be written with sufficient specificity that persons of ordinary intelligence need not guess at its meaning and will not differ as to its application. 84. The challenged parole conditions do not convey a sufficiently definite and precise
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warning as to what conduct is proscribed, making it extremely difficult for the plaintiffs to conform their conduct to these vague standards, and making it likely that different parole officers will enforce the conditions in different ways or will enforce them differently against different parolees.
85. The challenged parole conditions are void for vagueness, and therefore violate rights secured to the plaintiffs by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which violation is actionable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Lack of Legal Remedy 86. Upon information and belief, the defendants apply the Special Conditions of parole to all parolees who are similarly situated to Mr. Houle and Mr. Reese. 87. No remedy is available at law.
Request For Relief Wherefore, the plaintiffs request that this Court: a. issue a preliminary and permanent injunction barring enforcement of the challenged
conditions of parole as applied to the plaintiffs; b. issue a declaratory judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, finding that the chal-
lenged conditions of parole unconstitutionally deprive the plaintiffs of their fundamental rights (i) to maintain contact with their children, (ii) to maintain contact with siblings, (iii) to marry and maintain personal relationships with their partners, and (iv) to practice their religion; c. issue a declaratory judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, declaring that the special conditions of parole violate the plaintiffs’ rights to procedural due process, and are void for vagueness; d. award the plaintiffs their costs as permitted by law, including actual attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, for work performed in this case by the American Civil Liberties Union and the Michigan Clinical Law Program; and e. grant such other relief as the Court finds just and proper.
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Respectfully submitted,

Legal Aid of Western Michigan Prisoners’ Reentry Law Project Attorneys for Plaintiffs 89 Ionia NW Grand Rapids, MI 49503 (616) 774-0672 ext. 114
s/ Miriam Aukerman maukerman@legalaidwestmich.net (P63165)
American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan Attorneys for Plaintiffs 60 West Hancock St. Detroit, MI 48201 (313) 578-6800 ext. 814
s/ Michael Steinberg msteinberg@aclumich.org (P43085)
s/ Kary Moss kmoss@aclumich.org (P49759)

Michigan Clinical Law Program Attorneys for Plaintiffs 363 Legal Research Building 801 Monroe Street Ann Arbor, MI 48109 (734) 763-4319
s/ Kim Thomas kithomas@umich.edu (P66643) s/ Paul Reingold pdr@umich.edu (P27594)
Matt Cronin and Katya Georgieva Student Attorneys on the Complaint

Dated: February 10, 2009

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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN __________________________________________

KEVIN HOULE and HARVEY REESE,

Plaintiffs, v.
BARBARA SAMPSON, chair of the Michigan Parole Board, and the nine board members: JAMES ATTERBERRY, MIGUEL BERRIOS, CHARLES BROWN, PAUL CONDINO, STEPHEN DEBOER, ARTINA HARDMAN, ANTHONY KING, DAVID KLEINHARDT, and LAURIN THOMAS, in their official capacities,

File No. 2:09-cv-10504 Hon. Marianne O. Battani Mag. Judge Donald A. Scheer

Defendants.

_____________________________________________________________________________

Legal Aid of Western Michigan Reentry Law Project By: Miriam Aukerman (P63165) Attorneys for Plaintiffs 89 Ionia NW Grand Rapids, MI 49503 (616) 774-0672 ext. 114
American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan By: Michael Steinberg (P43085) Kary Moss (P49759) Attorneys for Plaintiffs 60 West Hancock St. Detroit, MI 48201 (313) 578-6800 ext. 814

Michigan Clinical Law Program By: Kim Thomas (P66643) Paul Reingold (P27594) Attorneys for Plaintiffs 363 Legal Research Building 801 Monroe Street Ann Arbor, MI 48109 (734) 763-4319
Matt Cronin and Katya Georgieva Student Attorneys on the Complaint

______________________________________________________________________________

PLAINTIFFS’ BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

TABLE OF CONTENTS Statement of Issues Presented................................................................................................iv Controlling Authority.............................................................................................................iv Index of Authorities ...............................................................................................................v Statement of Facts..................................................................................................................1 Standard of Review................................................................................................................1 ARGUMENT .........................................................................................................................2
I. THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE A STRONG LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS .....................................................................................................2
A. The Challenged Parole Conditions Unconstitutionally Deprive the Plaintiffs of Their Fundamental Rights..........................................................2
1. The Restrictions on Contact with the Plaintiffs’ Own Children Are Unconstitutional .......................................................................................3
2. The Restrictions on Marriage, Personal Relationships, and Contact with Minor Siblings Are Unconstitutional .................................5
3. The Restrictions on Religious Observance Are Unconstitutional ...........8
4. The Challenged Parole Conditions Are Not Narrowly Tailored to Serve a Compelling Governmental Interest.........................................9
5. Because the Challenged Conditions Would be Unconstitutional as Applied to Prisoners, They Are Necessarily Unconstitutional as Applied to Parolees ..................................................................................10
6. The Challenged Parole Conditions Undermine Rather than Support Rehabilitation ...........................................................................................12
B. The Plaintiffs are Entitled to Due Process Before Imposition of Parole Conditions that Deprive Them of Their Fundamental Rights ............13
C. The Challenged Parole Conditions are Void for Vagueness .........................16
II. THE PLAINTIFFS WILL SUFFER IRREPARABLE HARM IF PRELIMINARY RELIEF IS NOT GRANTED, AND THE HARM TO THE DEFENDANTS WILL BE MINIMAL ......................................................18
III. THE ISSUANCE OF A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION WILL NOT HARM OTHERS, BUT RATHER WILL SERVE THE PUBLIC INTEREST .................................................................................................18
ii

Conclusion .............................................................................................................................19 Proof of Service .....................................................................................................................20 Index of Exhibits....................................................................................................................21
iii

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 1. Can the Parole Board impose parole conditions prohibiting (a) contact with children, (b)
marriage or personal relationships, and (c) attendance at church, where the conditions are not directly related to rehabilitation or to the protection of the public? 2. Can the Parole Board impose such parole conditions without considering the plaintiffs’ individual circumstances, and without providing notice and an opportunity to be heard? 3. Are such parole conditions void for vagueness?
CONTROLLING AUTHORITY United States Constitution, Amend. I United States Constitution, Amend. XIV U.S. v. Ritter, 118 F.3d 503 (6th Cir. 1997) Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951)
iv

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Case Law

Page

Arciniega v. Freeman, 404 U.S. 4 (1971)..................................................................................................................17

Coleman v. Dretke, 395 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2004) ................................................................................................11

Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926)..............................................................................................................16

Connection Distributing v. Reno, 154 F.3d 281 (6th Cir. 1998) ................................................................................................18

Covino v. Patrissi, 967 F.2d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 1992)…………………………………………………..……….. 18

Croft v. Westmoreland County Children and Youth Services, 103 F.3d 1123 (3d Cir. 1997)................................................................................................9

Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972)..............................................................................................................12

Dawson v. Alaska, 894 P.2d 672 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995)...................................................................................7, 10

Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)..............................................................................................................6

Ellis v. State, 221 G. App. 103 (Ct. App. Ga., 1996)..................................................................................17

Everson v. Board of Education 330 U.S. 1 (1947)..................................................................................................................8

G & V Lounge v. Michigan Liquor Control Comm’n, 23 F.3d 1071 (6th Cir. 1994) ................................................................................................2, 18

Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984)..............................................................................................................11

Iowa v. Hall, 2007 Iowa App. LEXIS 939 (Ct. App. Iowa, Sept. 6, 2007) (unpub. op.) ...........................17

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Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951)..............................................................................................................16
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)..................................................................................................................5
M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996)..............................................................................................................3, 5
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)..............................................................................................................12
Oregon v. Martin, 282 Ore. 583 (1978)..............................................................................................................7, 15
Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003)..............................................................................................................12
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984)..............................................................................................................6
Six Clinics Holding Corp. v. Caf-comp Systems, Inc., 119 F.3d 393 (6th Cir. 1997) ...............................................................................................2
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)..............................................................................................................14
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000)................................................................................................................3
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)................................................................................................................5, 11,
12 U.S. v. Bortels, 962 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1992) ................................................................................................6
U.S. v. Brandenburg, 157 Fed. Appx. 875 (6th Cir. 2005) (unpub. op.) .................................................................6
U.S. v. Carter, 463 F.3d 526 (6th Cir. 2006) ................................................................................................5
U.S. v. Davis, 452 F.3d 991 (8th Cir. 2006) ................................................................................................3, 15
vi

U.S. v. Edgin, 92 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 1996) ..............................................................................................15
U.S. v. Hughes, 964 F.2d 536 (6th Cir. 1992) ................................................................................................2
U.S. v. Jacques, 321 F.3d 255 (2d Cir. 2003)..................................................................................................7
U.S. v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251 (3rd Cir. 2001) ................................................................................................4, 9,
12, 16 U.S. v. Modena, 302 F.3d 626 (6th Cir. 2003) ................................................................................................5
U.S. v. Myers, 426 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 2005)..................................................................................................2, 4, 9,
11, 15 U.S. v. Ritter, 118 F.3d 503 (6th Cir. 1997) ................................................................................................1, 2, 8
10, 13 U.S. v. Roberts, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55950 (July 31, 2007 E.D. Pa.).......................................................7
U.S. v. Schave, 186 F.3d 839 (7th Cir. 1999) ................................................................................................16
U.S. v. Voelker, 489 F.3d 139 (3rd Cir. 2006) ................................................................................................4, 15,
16 U.S. v. Worthington, 145 F.3d 1335 (6th Cir. 1998) (table) ...................................................................................6
State Regulations
Mich. Admin Code R. 791.7730(1) .......................................................................................2
Miscellaneous
Report of the Re-Entry Policy Council: Charting the Safe and Successful Return of Prisoners to the Community ...........................13
Urban Institute, From Prison to Home: The Dimensions and Consequences of Prisoner Reentry, 20 (2001)....................................13
Vera Institute of Justice, The Front Line: Building Programs, 1 (Sept. 2004) ......................13
vii

Statement of Facts Plaintiffs Harvey Reese and Kevin Houle were each separately convicted of criminal sexual conduct for having intimate relations with an underage girl. Both served time in prison and were then released on parole. There is no evidence that either Mr. Houle or Mr. Reese is a sexual predator of young children, or that either would be a threat to his own children. The plaintiffs’ facts are set forth in detail in the complaint and in the attached exhibits. See Complaint, ¶¶ 5-35; Exhs. 1-13. Notably, while in prison both plaintiffs were allowed to visit with their own children and to maintain phone and written contact with them. Nevertheless, the defendants have imposed Special Parole Conditions 1.0, 1.1, 1.3, 1.6, 1.7, and 1.8 on the plaintiffs upon their release from prison. See List of Default Conditions of Parole, Exh. Q. These parole conditions (a) bar them from having any contact with their children or minor siblings, whether in person, by phone, or in writing; (b) restrict them from marrying or maintaining personal relationships; and (c) forbid them from going to church. As set forth in the complaint and in the attached exhibits, the Michigan Parole Board imposed these conditions without considering the plaintiffs’ individual circumstances and without giving either plaintiff notice or an opportunity to be heard. See Complaint, ¶¶ 39-61; Exhs. 1, 2, 9, 10, 17-20. The plaintiffs challenge their conditions of parole under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a violation of their constitutional rights.
Standard of Review To be valid, parole conditions must be “directly related to advancing the individual’s rehabilitation and to protecting the public from recidivism.” U.S. v. Ritter, 118 F.3d 503, 505 (6th Cir. 1997). Moreover, if parole conditions result in deprivation of constitutionally-protected liberty interests, they will only be upheld “if the deprivation is narrowly tailored to serve a com-
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pelling government interest.” U.S. v. Myers, 426 F.3d 117, 126 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Ritter, 118 F.3d at 504 (stating that conditions implicating fundamental rights are subject to careful review); U.S. v. Hughes, 964 F.2d 536, 542 (6th Cir. 1992) (same). Thus, parole conditions affecting fundamental rights may not result in “a greater deprivation of liberty than is necessary” to promote rehabilitation and to prevent recidivism.1 Myers, 426 F.3d at 126.
ARGUMENT In ruling on a motion for a preliminary injunction, the Court must consider whether: (1) the movant is likely to prevail on the merits; (2) the movant would suffer irreparable injury if the Court does not grant the motion; (3) a preliminary injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) the injunction would be in the public interest. See G & V Lounge v. Michigan Liquor Control Comm’n, 23 F.3d 1071, 1076 (6th Cir. 1994). The Court is authorized to “exercise[e] its discretion to issue a preliminary injunction if the movant has … shown serious questions going to the merits and irreparable harm which decidedly outweighs any potential harm to the defendant if the injunction is issued.” Six Clinics Holding Corp. v. Cafcomp Systems, Inc., 119 F.3d 393, 399 (6th Cir. 1997). I. THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE A STRONG LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS A. The Challenged Parole Conditions Deprive the Plaintiffs of Fundamental Rights Parole Conditions 1.0, 1.1, 1.3, 1.6, 1.7 and 1.8, restrict the plaintiffs’ fundamental rights, including the right to have contact with their children and siblings, to marry and maintain personal relationships, and to exercise their faith. Because these conditions are not directly related
1 While the plaintiffs are bringing only federal claims, it is notable that under the Michigan Administrative Code parole conditions must be “reasonably necessary to assist a parolee to lead a law-abiding life. There shall be a reasonable relationship between parole conditions and both the prisoner’s previous conduct and present capabilities. All conditions shall be sufficiently specific to guide both supervision and conduct.” Mich. Admin. Code R. 791.7730(1).
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to advancing the plaintiffs’ rehabilitation or protecting the public, and because they are not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest, they must be struck down as applied.
1. The Restrictions on Contact with the Plaintiffs’ Own Children Are Unconstitutional
Parents have a fundamental constitutional right to maintain a relationship with their children. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000) (O’Connor, J.) (“the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children” is “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court”); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996) (“family life, and the upbringing of children are among associational rights this Court has ranked as of basic importance to our society, rights sheltered against the State’s unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or disrespect”).
The challenged parole restrictions prohibit the plaintiffs from having any contact with their children. The plaintiffs cannot live with, see, call, or write their children. They cannot pick up their children at daycare or at school, or take their children to a park. They cannot purchase toys or clothes for their children. They cannot even pass a message along that “Daddy loves you.” As long as they are on parole, they are cut off from their children’s lives entirely.
Courts have been highly critical of supervised release conditions that deprive parolees of the ability to maintain relationships with their children, even when the parolees’ convictions involve child pornography or molestation – crimes which are not at issue here. For example, in U.S. v. Davis, 452 F.3d 991, 995 (8th Cir. 2006), the court struck down a condition prohibiting a defendant convicted of child pornography from having unsupervised contact with his daughter. The court said:
[t]here is no evidence in the record that [the defendant] has ever sexually abused a child or that he would try to abuse his daughter once released from prison. Because no such evidence exists, a condition of supervised release that limits [the
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defendant’s] access to his daughter is not reasonably necessary either to protect [his] daughter or to further his rehabilitation.… Because the condition at issue here would interfere with [the defendant’s] constitutional liberty interest in raising his own child, the government may circumscribe that relationship only if it shows that the condition is no more restrictive than what is reasonably necessary. Similarly, in U.S. v. Myers, 426 F.3d 117, 120, 128 (2d Cir. 2005), a pedophile who had convictions for child pornography and sexual misconduct with young children was prohibited from spending time alone with his son, absent advance authorization. The court found that while it was reasonable to restrict the defendant’s contact with other children, the record did not show that the defendant was a danger to his own child. Thus even a pedophile may not be deprived of contact with his child, absent an individualized showing that the deprivation is narrowly tailored to meet the legitimate goals of advancing rehabilitation or protecting that child. In U.S. v. Voelker, 489 F.3d 139 (3rd Cir. 2006), the court considered a ban on parentchild contact in a case where the defendant had offered his three-year-old daughter for sex online. Given a factual dispute about whether the defendant was simply “role-playing,” the court remanded, and warned the district court to “proceed cautiously in imposing any condition that could impact [the defendant’s] parental rights absent sufficiently reliable supporting evidence.” Id. at 155. In other words, although the record suggested that the defendant might be capable of exploiting his own children, the court said that there must be sufficient evidence “to support a finding that children are potentially in danger from their parents.” Id. In U.S. v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 270 (3rd Cir. 2001), the court upheld a condition preventing a child pornographer from having unsupervised contact with minors, but construed that condition to exempt his own children. The court concluded that “[g]iven the severe intrusion on … family life” that would result if the condition were to apply to the defendant’s own children, the condition should be construed to apply only to other people’s children.
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Given that courts have struck down parent-child contact restrictions imposed on defendants with histories of child pornography or molestation, it is clearly unconstitutional to impose such restrictions where, as here, there is no evidence that the plaintiffs pose a danger to children at all, let alone to their own children. In fact, the evidence shows that Mr. Reese’s and Mr. Houle’s children might well be harmed by enforcement of these restrictions. See Rosenblum Declaration, Exh. P.
Where no evidence suggests that a parolee has a particular problem, a condition targeting that problem cannot be upheld. See U.S. v. Modena, 302 F.3d 626, 627 (6th Cir. 2003) (striking condition regarding alcohol/drugs because the defendant had no record of alcohol/drug problems); U.S. v. Carter, 463 F.3d 526, 530 (6th Cir. 2006) (condition requiring sex offender treatment not reasonably related to firearm conviction, and 17-year-old conviction for CSC was too remote to justify forced treatment). Given the lack of evidence that the plaintiffs are a threat to children, there is no justification for barring them from having contact with their own children, and certainly no justification for depriving them of a fundamental right.
2. The Restrictions on Marriage, Personal Relationships and Contact with Minor Siblings Are Unconstitutional
“The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness.” Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). See also M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 116 (“choices about marriage … are among association rights this Court has ranked as of basic importance in society, rights sheltered by the Fourteenth Amendment against the State’s unwarranted usurpation, disregard or disrespect”). The U.S. Supreme Court has protected this right even in the prison context, holding that a prison cannot forbid marriage because such a prohibition is not reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 99 (1987).
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Individuals have not only a fundamental right to marry, but also a fundamental right to intimate association:
[C]hoices to enter into and maintain certain intimate relationships must be secured against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme. In this respect, freedom of association receives protection as a fundamental element of personal liberty. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984). See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). The plaintiffs plainly have a fundamental right to marry or maintain personal relationships with their romantic partners. Associational parole restrictions are valid only if the association would undermine the parolee’s rehabilitation or endanger public safety. See U.S. v. Bortels, 962 F.2d 558, 559-60 (6th Cir. 1992) (restriction on defendant’s contact with fiancé valid because crime resulted directly from that relationship); U.S. v. Brandenburg, 157 Fed. Appx. 875, 879 (6th Cir. 2005) (unpub. op.) (finding restriction on cohabitation with females was “directly related to the dual goals of the defendant’s rehabilitation and the protection of the public” because the defendant had a lengthy history of domestic violence, had engaged in domestic violence against a cohabitant while under supervision, and was likely to abuse any female with whom he lived). In U.S. v. Worthington, 145 F.3d 1335 (6th Cir. 1998) (table), the Court struck down a condition prohibiting a drug offender from residing with unrelated females. It was “unclear what relation the condition bears to the nature and circumstances of the offense, rehabilitation of the offender, or protecting the public.” Id. at *51. The Court distinguished Bortels, where the defendant was barred from associating with “a particular person who had gotten her into trouble before.” Id. By contrast, the cohabitation restriction in Worthington was “poorly designed to accomplish” the government’s “speculative goals.” Id.
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Thus, in this circuit restrictions on marital or intimate relationships will only be upheld if the partner was involved in the defendant’s prior criminal activity, or if contact between the parties would endanger the public. Published cases from other jurisdictions go even further, striking down prohibitions on contact even when both partners were involved in criminality. See e.g., U.S. v. Jacques, 321 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 2003) (reading condition prohibiting contact with felons to exclude the defendant’s husband because “constitutional difficulties could arise if the associational condition were construed to interfere with [the defendant’s] relationship with her family”); U.S. v. Roberts, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55950, at *30 (July 31, 2007 E.D. Pa.) (striking down condition prohibiting contact between gay partners/co-defendants as violating right to intimate association); Dawson v. Alaska, 894 P.2d 672 (Alaska Ct. App.. 1995) (striking down condition requiring probationer’s contact with wife to be pre-approved because, although wife had been complicit in the crime, this condition unconstitutionally “delegates to [the] probation officer unconditional and unlimited authority to regulate [the probationer’s] marital relationship”); Oregon v. Martin, 282 Ore. 583, 588 (1978) (invalidating condition prohibiting probationer from having contact with husband who was allegedly responsible for involving her in criminal activities).
Here, the conditions prohibiting Mr. Reese from marrying Ms. Parker (see Parole Conditions of Harvey Reese, Exh. B) are not based on a shared criminal history, nor on any allegations that Mr. Reese is a danger to Ms. Parker, nor on any concerns that contact with Ms. Parker would be detrimental to Mr. Reese’s rehabilitation.
Finally, the constitutional right to maintain certain intimate relationships extends not just to romantic partners, but also to other family members, such as siblings. See U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 617-18. Because the restriction prohibiting Mr. Reese from having contact with his
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younger brother Derrick does not promote his rehabilitation or protect the public, it too is unconstitutional.
3. The Restrictions on Religious Observance Are Unconstitutional Mr. Reese’s parole conditions, as applied by his parole agent, bar him from attending his church. This violates Mr. Reese’s rights under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. As the U.S. Supreme Court held long ago in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947), under the First Amendment no state “can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance.” The prohibition on church attendance also violates the requirement in Ritter, 118 F.3d at 505, that parole conditions be directly related to rehabilitation and public protection. Church attendance would contribute to, rather than undermine, Mr. Reese’s rehabilitation. See Reese Declaration, Exh. A. Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest that Mr. Reese poses any danger to parishioners worshipping beside him in the sanctuary pews. Finally, while Mr. Reese’s parole conditions prohibit him from going to places primarily used by children under the age of 17 (such as playgrounds and public swimming pools), they do not prohibit him from going to other public places that are not primarily used by children, but where children may be present (such as grocery stores, shopping centers, or museums). See List of Default Conditions of Parole, #1.7, Exh. Q. Given that Mr. Reese can go to other venues where minors may be present, there is no justification for depriving Mr. Reese of his fundamental right to go to church just because children may also worship there.
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4. The Challenged Parole Conditions Are Not Narrowly Tailored to Serve a Compelling Government Interest
In order to survive constitutional scrutiny, any restrictions on the plaintiffs’ fundamental rights to have contact with their children, marry and maintain personal relationships, and exercise their faith must be “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.” Myers, 426 F.3d at 126. With respect to the restrictions prohibiting the plaintiffs from having contact with their children, the state undoubtedly has a compelling interest in protecting minors from abuse. But “a state has no interest in protecting children from their parents unless it has some reasonable and articulable evidence giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that the child has been abused or is in imminent danger of abuse.” Croft v. Westmoreland County Children and Youth Services, 103 F.3d 1123, 1126 (3d Cir. 1997) (child abuse investigator should not have removed father from home without objectively reasonable basis to do so). If there is not sufficient evidence “to support a finding that children are potentially in danger from their parents, the state’s interest cannot be said to be ‘compelling,’ and thus interference in the family relationship is unconstitutional.” Loy, at 269-70.
Here, there is no evidence that the plaintiffs are a threat to their children so as to justify restrictions on the parent/child relationship. Even if this Court were to find that the defendants do have a compelling interest in interfering with the plaintiffs’ family relationships, the challenged conditions are not narrowly tailored. The plaintiffs suffer under the same restrictive conditions as pedophiles who abused their own children for years. There was no effort to tailor the restrictions to the plaintiffs’ individual circumstances. Mr. Houle and Mr. Reese are not even allowed supervised parenting time, phone calls, or mail contact.
The restrictions on the plaintiffs’ ability to marry or maintain personal relationships also fail the test of narrow tailoring. For example, Mr. Reese is prohibited from marrying Ms. Parker
9

even if they live in separate households. See Bowker Letter, Exh. F. Assuming for the sake of argument that the defendants have a legitimate interest in restricting contact between Mr. Reese and children to whom he is not related, the absolute prohibition on marriage is not narrowly tailored. For example, Mr. Reese could marry Ms. Parker, while still being prohibited from having unsupervised contact with any of Ms. Parker’s children to whom he is not related. See e.g., Dawson, 894 P.2d at 680 (to preclude association between spouses was an “extreme restriction of liberty,” and therefore it was necessary “to tailor a closer fit between the scope of the order restricting marital association and the specific needs of the case at hand”).
5. Because the Challenged Restrictions Would Be Unconstitutional as Applied to Prisoners, They Are Necessarily Unconstitutional as Applied to Parolees
Perhaps the most striking feature of the challenged parole restrictions is that they are not, and constitutionally could not be, imposed on prisoners. As parolees, the plaintiffs are absolutely barred from having any relationship with their children. While they were incarcerated, however, Mr. Houle and Mr. Reese had regular contact with their children. As a parolee, Mr. Reese is prohibited from dating or marrying his partner. While in prison, however, he was able to marry and maintain partner relationships. Indeed, Mr. Reese and Ms. Parker sought to marry while Mr. Reese was incarcerated, but could not only because of his unexpected transfer to another facility, and a scheduling problem. See Reese Declaration, Exh. A; Parker Declaration, Exh. G. Finally, as a parolee, Mr. Reese cannot attend church. While in prison, he exercised his right to attend worship services.
It is ironic that harsher restrictions are imposed on parolees than on prisoners, given that parole conditions are subject to a much higher level of scrutiny than prison conditions. Parole conditions must be “directly related to advancing the individual’s rehabilitation and to protecting the public from recidivism,” Ritter, 118 F.3d at 505, and must – if they involve the deprivation of
10

a fundamental right – be “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.” Myers, 426 F.3d at 126. By contrast, prison regulations need only be reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90.
Two factors account for the very different standards applicable to parolees versus prisoners. First, incarceration by its very nature must restrict prisoners’ rights in order “to accommodate a myriad of institutional needs and objectives…, chief among which is internal security.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 524 (1984). Prisoners cannot live with their families or attend community worship services. Prisoners, however, retain those rights “that are not inconsistent with [their] status … or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 95. Thus prisoners can visit, call, write, buy gifts, send messages, and remain otherwise fully involved in their children’s lives. They can marry and maintain personal relationships. And they can attend worship services in prison.
Because parolees are not incarcerated, the same institutional imperatives do not apply. The challenged parole conditions do not serve institutional security concerns, nor are they necessarily incident to being on parole. Indeed, most parolees reside with their families, interact with their children, marry, date, and go to church. Like prisoners, parolees should at a minimum retain those constitutional rights which are not inconsistent with their status. See Coleman v. Dretke, 395 F.3d 216, 222 (5th Cir. 2004) (if parole conditions depart dramatically from ordinary life, then procedural protections must be provided before imposition). Surely seeing one’s children, getting married, maintaining personal relationships, and going to church are not only consistent with being on parole, they are precisely the relationships and behaviors that parole should seek to foster. See Fluent Declaration, Exh. M; Marroquin Declaration, Exh. H.
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Second, parole conditions are subject to higher scrutiny than prison conditions because the status of parolees is fundamentally different from that of prisoners. As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), the
liberty of a parolee enables him to do a wide range of things open to persons who have never been convicted of any crime…. Subject to the conditions of his parole, he can be gainfully employed and is free to be with family and friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life. Though the State properly subjects him to many restrictions not applicable to other citizens, his condition is very different from that of confinement in prison. He may … be living a relatively normal life. Id. at 482. Thus, it is “patently without merit” to contend that just because a condition may be imposed in prison, it can be imposed on a parolee. Loy, 237 F.3d at 265. Here, the defendants cannot even argue that the conditions imposed on the parolees are imposed in prison. The conditions are not imposed in Michigan’s prisons, and would be unconstitutional if they were, since they would not survive the Turner test. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 8990 (striking down marriage prohibition as exaggerated response to rehabilitation and security concerns); Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 135 (2003) (DOC never questioned prisoners’ right to receive visits from their own children; court upheld restrictions on visitation by extended family members only because of institutional security concerns and because prisoners had an alternative means of communicating, such as calling and writing to those barred from visiting); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972) (requiring prisons to provide opportunities for prisoners to exercise their faith). Rather, the defendants are left to argue that they can impose more severe restrictions on parolees than could constitutionally be applied to prisoners. Since these restrictions fail the Turner test, they necessarily fail the more stringent Ritter/Myers test. 6. The Challenged Parole Conditions Undermine Rather than
Support Rehabilitation The validity of parole conditions depends in part on whether the conditions are “directly
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related to advancing the individual’s rehabilitation.” Ritter, 118 F.3d at 505. Here, the challenged restrictions actually undermine the plaintiffs’ rehabilitation. The restrictions deny the plaintiffs the opportunity to parent children, live with and marry their partners, and go to church – all activities that would knit them into a pattern of family life, provide community support, and promote spiritual growth. The challenged parole conditions are thus counterproductive to the goal of achieving rehabilitation. See Fluent Declaration., Exh. M; Marroquin Declaration, Exh. H. National research also demonstrates that family support is critical to successful reentry:
[S]trong family involvement or support was an important indicator of successful reintegration across the board. Returning prisoners who indicated that their families or friends were supportive of their efforts to rebuild their lives had lower levels of drug use, greater likelihood of finding a job, and less continued criminal activity. Urban Institute, From Prison to Home: The Dimensions and Consequences of Prisoner Reentry, 20 (2001). See also Vera Institute of Justice, The Front Line: Building Programs that Recognize Families’ Role in Reentry, 1 (Sept. 2004) (“family support can help make or break a successful transition from prison to community”). Because of the “connection between the stability of family networks and a returning prisoner’s outcomes,” it is counterproductive to limit a parolee’s contact with his family, absent evidence that that family contributes to the individual’s criminality. Report of the Re-Entry Policy Council: Charting the Safe and Successful Return of Prisoners to the Community, 319. B. The Plaintiffs Are Entitled to Due Process Before Imposition of Parole Conditions that Deprive Them of Their Fundamental Rights The challenged parole conditions not only violate the plaintiffs’ fundamental rights, but also deprive them of procedural due process. The Parole Board apparently imposes these conditions automatically on all parolees convicted of sex offenses or offenses with a child victim or witness. See List of Default Conditions of Parole, Exh. Q. Moreover, although the conditions
13

affect the plaintiffs’ fundamental rights, they were not given notice that the conditions would be
imposed, nor were they given an opportunity to be heard.
In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), the Court struck down a law that made child-
ren of unwed fathers wards of the state upon the mother’s death. The Court held that the statute
unconstitutionally presumed that unmarried fathers were unfit parents. While recognizing that
the state had a legitimate interest in protecting children, the Court held that the state could not
simply assume that certain parents were unfit:
What is the state interest in separating children from their fathers without a hearing designed to determine whether the father is unfit in a particular disputed case? We observe that the State registers no gain towards its declared goal when it separates children from the custody of fit parents. Indeed, if Stanley is a fit father, the State spites its own articulated goals when it needlessly separates him from his family….
[I]t may be argued that unmarried fathers are so seldom fit that Illinois need not undergo the administrative inconvenience of inquiry in any case…. Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than individualized determination. But when, as here, the procedure forecloses the determinative issues of competence and care, when it explicitly disdains present realities in deference to past formalities, it needlessly risks running roughshod over the important interests of both parent and child.
Id. at 652-57 (citations omitted).
The principles of Stanley are equally applicable to the challenged restrictions on contact
with children, personal relationships, and religious worship. While the defendants have an inter-
est in protecting children, that interest is not served by an automatic, irrebuttable presumption
that the plaintiffs should have no contact with their children, should not have marital/romantic
relationships with custodial parents, and should not attend church. While there may be cases
where such restrictions are appropriate, they are wholly unwarranted for many parolees, includ-
ing the plaintiffs here.
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Courts reviewing parole conditions have demanded robust procedural protections where conditions restrict parent/child contact. In U.S. v. Davis, 452 F.3d 991 (8th Cir. 2006), the defendant, who had a child pornography conviction, challenged a condition barring unsupervised contact with minors, including his daughter. The Eighth Circuit held that:
A court may not categorically impose such a condition in every child pornography case that comes before it; since the relevant statutory and constitutional considerations look to whether the condition is more restrictive than what is needed to satisfy the governmental interest in a specific case, the district court must decide whether to impose such a condition based on specific facts.… That inquiry must take place on an individualized basis; a court may not impose a special condition on all those found guilty of a particular offense. Id. at 995. Here, there was no such individualized assessment; the conditions were imposed based merely on offense classifications. See List of Default Conditions of Parole, Exh. Q; see also Voelker, 489 F.3d at 155 (remanding case to resolve a factual dispute about whether the defendant actually posed a threat to his own children); Myers, 426 F.3d at 128 (restriction on contact with own child required not just evidence of danger to children, but “develop[ment] of a record demonstrating danger to that child”); Oregon v. Martin, 282 Ore. 583, 588 (1978) (invalidating condition prohibiting contact with husband, because no record that the restriction on probationer’s marital privacy was needed for her rehabilitation). Parolees subject to restrictions that interfere with their fundamental rights are entitled not just to an individualized assessment, but also to notice and an opportunity to be heard. In U.S. v. Edgin, 92 F.3d 1044, 1049 (10th Cir. 1996), the district court had prohibited contact between the defendant and his son after the defendant was convicted of threatening the child’s mother. The court found error because the defendant had not been given notice or an opportunity to be heard,
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as well as because the lower court failed to make factual findings or provide any reasons for imposing the condition.2
No doubt it is more time-consuming for the Parole Board to consider cases individually, and to tailor restrictions to each parolee’s circumstances. But the Parole Board cannot evade its constitutional obligation to provide case-by-case consideration on the grounds of cost. See Voelker, 489 F.3d at 147 n.7 (overly broad parole restrictions that affect fundamental rights cannot be justified based on cost). Moreover, individualized consideration is clearly feasible, and there are clinical instruments available to help predict the risk of recidivism with some accuracy. See Fluent Declaration, Exh. M; Marroquin Declaration, Exh. H, Simpson Declaration, Exh. O.
C. The Challenged Parole Conditions Are Void for Vagueness A law that “either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application” violates due process. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). “The test is whether the language conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices.” Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 231-32 (1951). The same principle applies to parole conditions. See U.S. v. Schave, 186 F.3d 839 (7th Cir. 1999); Loy, 237 F.3d at 262. In other words, unclear parole conditions violate due process.
The challenged conditions are unconstitutionally vague. For example, condition 1.0, which prohibits contact with minors, does not require that the parolee be aware of the individual’s age, nor does it exempt incidental contact. Yet associational restrictions may not consti-
2 The situation of parolee Barbara Janoskey amply demonstrates the danger of failing to give parolees notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Janoskey Declaration, Exh. N. The Parole Board imposed a no-contact-with-children restriction based on inaccurate information in Ms. Janoskey’s file, forcing her to be separated from her children for eight months. Had Ms. Janoskey been given due process, the error might easily have been corrected.
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tutionally extend to incidental contacts. See Arciniega v. Freeman, 404 U.S. 4, 4 (1971) (condition prohibiting association with ex-convicts did not extend to incidental contacts at job since this “would render a parolee vulnerable to imprisonment whenever his employer, willing to hire ex-convicts, hires more than one”). Condition 1.3, which prohibits marrying, dating, or romantic involvement with persons having custody of minors, does not define those terms, leaving it unclear what level of friendship could result in re-incarceration. (Is flirting a parole violation? What about dinner and a movie, but no kiss?)
Courts have repeatedly struck down restrictions similar to those at issue here. In Iowa v. Hall, 2007 Iowa App. LEXIS 939, at *12-13 (Ct. App. Iowa, Sept. 6, 2007) (unpub. op.), the court invalidated a condition prohibiting the probationer from communicating with any child under the age of 18 because the provision did “not include an exception for incidental communication, such as with a minor grocery store clerk, movie ticket taker, or fast-food clerk,” and because “it is hard to imagine how one could function in modern society without communicating with any minors.” Similarly, in Ellis v. State, 221 G. App. 103 (Ct. App. Ga., 1996), the court invalidated conditions that prohibited a probationer from lingering at locations were children were present or working at a business that provides services to children. While restrictions on the probationer’s contact with children were reasonable, given his conviction for child molestation, “such conditions should be stated with reasonable specificity so that [the probationer] has notice of the groups and locations he must avoid and so that the conditions are not so broadly worded as to encompass groups and locations not rationally related to the purpose of the sentencing objective.” Id. at *2.
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II. THE PLAINTIFFS WILL SUFFER IRREPARABLE HARM IF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IS NOT GRANTED, AND THE HARM TO THE DEFENDANTS WILL BE MINIMAL The loss of constitutionally protected freedoms for even minimal periods of time con-
stitutes irreparable injury. See Connection Distributing v. Reno, 154 F.3d 281, 288 (6th Cir. 1998); Covino v. Patrissi, 967 F.2d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 1992). The challenged parole conditions deprive the plaintiffs of constitutionally protected freedoms, namely the right to contact with their children, the right to marry and maintain personal relationships, and the right to free exercise of their faith. The plaintiffs will continue to suffer irreparable harm unless preliminary injunctive relief is granted. The harm to the defendants will be minimal; they simply need to make narrowly tailored individualized determinations, as the Constitution requires. III. A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION WILL NOT HARM OTHERS,
BUT RATHER WILL SERVE THE PUBLIC INTEREST “It is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional rights.” G & V Lounge, 23 F.3d at 1079. Moreover, it is in the public interest for parents to have contact with their children, and for parents to marry or maintain relationships so as to provide a stable basis for raising their children. It is also in the public interest to release the plaintiffs to a family environment that provides support and fosters responsibility helpful to rehabilitation. And it is in the public interest for parolees to attend church, if practicing their faith will promote their rehabilitation. Failure to issue an injunction would substantially harm (1) the plaintiffs’ children, who cannot have contact with their parents; (2) Mr. Reese’s girlfriend, who cannot marry or maintain a personal relationship with the man she loves; (3) Mr. Reese’s younger brother, who at present cannot have any contact with him; and Mr. Houle’s disabled parents, who cannot invite their son into their home while his son and their grandson Travis (over whom they have custody) is present in the home. Finally, given the record in this case, there is no evidence
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to suggest that any harm would result to anyone from enjoining enforcement of the challenged

conditions.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the plaintiffs ask this Court to enjoin the defendants from

enforcing the parole conditions that prevent them from having contact with their children, from

marrying or maintaining personal relationships, and from going to church. Specifically, the

plaintiffs ask the Court to issue a preliminary injunction that:

a. bars the defendants from imposing the challenged parole conditions in their cases;

b. bars the defendants from imposing the challenged parole conditions without individualized determinations and narrow tailoring;

c. bars the defendants from imposing the challenged parole conditions without notice and an opportunity to be heard; and

d. grants such other relief as the Court deems appropriate.

Respectfully submitted,

Legal Aid of Western Michigan Reentry Law Project Attorneys for Plaintiffs 89 Ionia NW Grand Rapids, MI 49503 (616) 774-0672 ext. 114
s/ Miriam Aukerman maukerman@legalaidwestmich.net (P63165)
American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan Attorneys for Plaintiffs 60 West Hancock St. Detroit, MI 48201 (313) 578-6800 ext. 814
s/ Michael Steinberg msteinberg@aclumich.org (P43085)
s/ Kary Moss kmoss@aclumich.org (P49759)

Michigan Clinical Law Program Attorneys for Plaintiffs 363 Legal Research Building 801 Monroe Street Ann Arbor, MI 48109 (734) 763-4319
s/ Kim Thomas kithomas@umich.edu (P66643)
s/ Paul Reingold pdr@umich.edu (P27594)
Matt Cronin and Katya Georgieva Student Attorneys on the Brief
Dated: February 19, 2009

19

PROOF OF SERVICE The plaintiffs’ motion and brief for preliminary injunction were filed electronically using the Court’s ECF system, which will send copies by e-mail to all counsel of record. Because the case was just recently filed, a copy was also served directly upon the Office of the Michigan Attorney, Corrections Division, 525 West Ottawa, Fourth Floor, Lansing, MI 48913, both by email attachment and by pre-paid first-class mail.
/s Paul D. Reingold pdr@umich.edu – P27594 Dated: February 19, 2009
20

INDEX OF EXHIBITS

Exhibit Title/Description

A.

Declaration of Harvey Reese (12/15/08)

B.

Parole Conditions of Harvey Reese (04/05/07)

C.

DOC Visitation History for Harvey Reese (07/05)

D.

Psychological Report on Harvey Reese (12/10/03)

E.

Letter from Miriam Aukerman to Parole Agent Bowker (09/19/07)

F.

Letter from Agent Bowker to Miriam Aukerman (10/29/07)

G.

Declaration of Tonja Parker (02/10/09)

H.

Declaration and CV of Arthur R. Marroquin regarding Harvey Reese (12/12/08)

I.

Declaration of Kevin Houle (01/28/09)

J.

Parole Conditions of Kevin Houle (05/13/08)

K.

DOC Visitation History for Kevin Houle (10/01/08)

L.

Psychological Report on Kevin Houle (06/01/04)

M.

Declaration and CV of Thomas Fluent regarding Kevin Houle (01/15/09)

N.

Declaration of Barbara Janoskey (12/06/07)

O.

Declaration of John Simpson, M.A., L.L.P. (12/12/07)

P.

Declaration of Katherine L. Rosenblum, PhD (re Impact on Children) (02/05/09)

Q.

List of Default Conditions of Parole produced by Michigan Department of

Corrections in response to a Freedom of Information Act (2/21/07)

R.

Operating Procedure: Order for Parole and Amendment of Orders, 06.04.130G

(10/01/02)

S.

Operating Procedure 06.04.100: Probation/Parole Orientation Checklist

(10/01/05)

T.

MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130: Prisoner/Parolee Grievances (07/09/07)

U.

List of Unpublished Cases Cited in the Brief: U.S. v. Worthington, 145 F.3d 1335

(6th Cir. 1998); U.S. v. Brandenburg, 157 Fed. Appx. 875 (6th Cir. 2005); Iowa v.

Hall, 2007 Iowa App. LEXIS 939 (Ct. App. Iowa, Sept. 6, 2007)

21

 
 2:09-cv-10504-MOB-DAS Doc # 66 Filed 04/30/10 Pg 1 of 4 Pg ID 1066

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN _________________________________________

KEVIN HOULE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

File

v.

Hon.

BARBARA SAMPSON, et al.,

Mag.

Defendants.

_________________________________________

No. 2:09-cv-10504 Marianne O. Battani Judge Donald A. Scheer Consolidated Cases

T.H., et al., v.

Plaintiffs,

BARBARA SAMPSON, et al.,

Defendants.

STIPULATION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL The parties, by counsel, stipulate as follows: Plaintiff Kevin Houle 1. The defendants shall amend Kevin Houle’s parole conditions as follows: a. Conditions 1.1 and 1.8 shall be removed. b. Existing condition 99.1 shall be replaced with a condition that reads:
99.0 You must not have verbal, written, electronic, or physical contact with any individual age 17 or under or attempt to do so either directly or through another person, unless you are with an adult responsible for that individual and approved by the field agent. This restriction does not apply to contact with your son T.H.1 c. Condition 1.6 and 1.7 shall be replaced with a condition that reads: 99.1 You must not reside, work, or loiter within a student safety zone,
1 This order contains the child’s initials. The actual parole conditions will contain the child’s full name.
1

2:09-cv-10504-MOB-DAS Doc # 66 Filed 04/30/10 Pg 2 of 4 Pg ID 1067
defined as 1,000 feet of school property (developmental kindergarten through 12th grade school), unless you meet a statutory exemption. You may go to the school of T.H. only for purposes related to your child’s education. While at the school of T.H., you must not be alone with, nor initiate contact with, any other minor.
You must not go to parks, swimming pools, playgrounds, or other places used by minors, unless you are with your son, T.H., and are supervised by an adult. You must not initiate contact with any other minor.
2. This stipulation and order shall not be entered until Kevin Houle receives written con-
firmation of the parole modifications set forth above.
3. The parties agree that the conditions, as amended, allow Kevin Houle and T.H. to have
unrestricted, unsupervised contact with one another. The parties further agree that there are no
limitations on Mr. Houle’s ability to transport T.H. or to travel with him, unless prohibited by
another condition of parole (e.g., no travel out of state).
Plaintiff Ken Levy
4. The defendants shall amend plaintiff Ken Levy’s parole conditions as follows:
a. Conditions 1.1 and 1.8 shall be removed.
b. Existing condition 1.2 shall be replaced with a condition that reads:
99.0 You must not have verbal, written, electronic, or physical contact with any individual age 17 or under or attempt to do so either directly or through another person, unless you are with an adult responsible for that individual and approved by the field agent. This restriction does not apply to contact with your daughter R.L.2
c. Condition 1.6 and 1.7 shall be replaced with a condition that reads:
99.1 You must not reside, work, or loiter within a student safety zone, defined as 1,000 feet of school property (developmental kindergarten through 12th grade school), unless you meet a statutory exemption. You may go to the school of R.L. only for purposes related to your child’s education. While at the school of R.L., you must not be alone with, nor initiate contact with, any other minor.
2 This order contains the child’s initials. The actual parole conditions would contain the child’s full name.
2

2:09-cv-10504-MOB-DAS Doc # 66 Filed 04/30/10 Pg 3 of 4 Pg ID 1068

You must not go to parks, swimming pools, playgrounds, or other places used by minors, unless you are with your daughter, R.L., and are supervised by an adult. You must not initiate contact with any other minor.

d. Condition 1.3 will be replaced with a condition that reads:

99.2 You must not marry, date, or have any romantic involvement with anyone who resides with or has physical custody of any individual age 17 or under, without first getting written permission from the field agent. This restriction does not apply to your wife, Kristy Levy.

5. This stipulation and order shall not be entered until Ken Levy receives written con-

firmation of the parole modifications set forth above.

6. The parties agree that the conditions, as amended, allow Ken Levy to have unrestricted,

unsupervised contact with R.L. and with Kristy Levy.

Dismissal of Claims and Waiver of Costs and Fees

7. The Court having been notified by the parties that the plaintiffs’ parole conditions have

been revised in writing as set forth above, the claims of the two plaintiffs against the defendants

are dismissed. This is the final order in the case.

8. The dismissal is with prejudice and without costs or attorneys’ fees to either side.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 30, 2010

s/Marianne O. Battani Marianne O. Battani United States District Judge

Approved as to form and content:

s/ Paul D. Reingold pdr@umich.edu – P27594 s/ Miriam Aukerman – P63165 maukerman@legalaidwestmich.net Counsel for Plaintiffs Houle and Levy

s/ Kim Thomas kithomas@umich.edu – P66643 s/ Mike Steinberg msteinberg@aclumich.org – P43085 Counsel for Plaintiffs Houle and Levy

3

2:09-cv-10504-MOB-DAS Doc # 66 Filed 04/30/10 Pg 4 of 4 Pg ID 1069

s/ Vivek Sankaran vss@umich.edu – P68538 Counsel for Plaintiffs T.H. and R.L.

s/ Kevin Himebaugh himebaughk@michigan.gov – P53374 Assistant Attorney General Counsel for the Defendants

Certificate of Service
This stipulated order of dismissal was filed using the Court’s ECF system, which provides same-day e-mail service to all counsel of record.
s/ Paul D. Reingold pdr@umich.edu – P27594

4

 
 Case: 2:09-cv-10504-MOB-DAS As of: 05/15/2012 11:12 AM EDT 1 of 9
CLOSED, CONSOL
U.S. District Court Eastern District of Michigan (Detroit) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:09−cv−10504−MOB−DAS

Houle et al v. Sampson et al Assigned to: District Judge Marianne O. Battani Referred to: Magistrate Judge Donald A Scheer Cause: 28:1983 Civil Rights
Plaintiff
Kevin Houle

Date Filed: 02/10/2009 Date Terminated: 04/30/2010 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Michael J. Steinberg American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan 2966 Woodward Avenue Detroit, MI 48201 313−578−6814 Email: msteinberg@aclumich.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Miriam J. Aukerman American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan West Michigan Regional Office 89 Ionia NW Suite 300 Grand Rapids, MI 49503 616−301−0930 Fax: 616−456−1450 Email: maukerman@aclumich.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Paul D. Reingold University of Michigan 801 Monroe Street 363 Legal Research Bldg Ann Arbor, MI 48109 734−763−4319 Email: mclp@umich.edu ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Harvey Reese TERMINATED: 06/08/2009

represented by Paul D. Reingold (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
TH a minor child by Rose Houle, Next Friend − Consolidated from 09−10535

represented by Paul D. Reingold (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Vivek S. Sankaran University of Michigan Law School, Child Advocacy Law Clinic 625 S. State Street, 319 Legal Research Building Ann Arbor, MI 48109−1215 734−763−5000 Fax: 734.647.4042 Email: vss@umich.edu

Case: 2:09-cv-10504-MOB-DAS As of: 05/15/2012 11:12 AM EDT 2 of 9

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
AR a minor child by Tonja Parker, Next Friend − Consolidated from 09−10535 TERMINATED: 06/08/2009

represented by Paul D. Reingold (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Vivek S. Sankaran (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Rose Houle Next Friend of TH, a minor − Consolidated from 09−10535

represented by Paul D. Reingold (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Vivek S. Sankaran (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Tonja Parker Next Friend of AR, a minor − Consolidated from 09−10535

represented by Paul D. Reingold (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Vivek S. Sankaran (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff RL

represented by Vivek S. Sankaran (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Kristy Levy

represented by Vivek S. Sankaran (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Kenneth Levy

represented by Paul D. Reingold (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
Barbara S Sampson chair of the Michigan Parole Board, and the nine board members

represented by Kevin R. Himebaugh Michigan Department of Attorney General P.O. Box 30217 Lansing, MI 48909−7717 517−335−7021 Email: himebaughk@michigan.gov

Case: 2:09-cv-10504-MOB-DAS As of: 05/15/2012 11:12 AM EDT 3 of 9

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant James Atterberry

represented by Kevin R. Himebaugh (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Miguel Berrios

represented by Kevin R. Himebaugh (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Charles Brown

represented by Kevin R. Himebaugh (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Paul Condino

represented by Kevin R. Himebaugh (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Stephen DeBoer

represented by Kevin R. Himebaugh (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Artina Hardman

represented by Kevin R. Himebaugh (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Anthony King

represented by Kevin R. Himebaugh (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant David Kleinhardt

represented by Kevin R. Himebaugh (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Laurin Thomas

represented by Kevin R. Himebaugh (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Jodi Deangelo

represented by Kevin R. Himebaugh (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Lisa Gettys

represented by Kevin R. Himebaugh (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant

Case: 2:09-cv-10504-MOB-DAS As of: 05/15/2012 11:12 AM EDT 4 of 9

David Fountain

represented by Kevin R. Himebaugh (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant John Sullivan

represented by Kevin R. Himebaugh (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Soni Amos Warchock

represented by Kevin R. Himebaugh (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 02/10/2009
02/10/2009 02/10/2009 02/11/2009 02/13/2009 02/13/2009 02/17/2009 02/18/2009 02/19/2009 02/19/2009

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT filed by Kevin Houle, Harvey Reese against Anthony King, David Kleinhardt, Laurin Thomas, Barbara S Sampson, James Atterberry, Miguel Berrios, Charles Brown, paul condino, Stephen DeBoer, Artina Hardman. Plaintiff requests summons issued. County of 1st Plaintiff: Wayne − County Where Action Arose: Wayne − County of 1st Defendant: Wayne. [Previously dismissed case: No] [Possible companion case(s): None] (Reingold, Paul) (Entered: 02/10/2009)
2 APPLICATION to Proceed In Forma Pauperis by Kevin Houle. (Reingold, Paul) (Entered: 02/10/2009)
3 APPLICATION to Proceed In Forma Pauperis by Harvey Reese. (Reingold, Paul) (Entered: 02/10/2009)
4 NOTICE of Appearance by Michael J. Steinberg on behalf of Kevin Houle. (Steinberg, Michael) (Entered: 02/11/2009)
5 ORDER granting 2 Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and denying request for service by the U.S. Marshal as to Kevin Houle. Signed by District Judge Marianne O Battani. (BSoc) (Entered: 02/13/2009)
6 ORDER granting 3 Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and denying request for service by the U.S. Marshal as to Harvey Reese. Signed by District Judge Marianne O Battani. (BSoc) (Entered: 02/13/2009)
7 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE: Miriam J. Aukerman appearing on behalf of Kevin Houle and Harvey Reese (Aukerman, Miriam) (Entered: 02/17/2009)
8 SUMMONS Issued for *Anthony King, David Kleinhardt, Laurin Thomas, Barbara S Sampson, James Atterberry, Miguel Berrios, Charles Brown, Paul Condino, Stephen DeBoer, Artina Hardman* (SSch) (Entered: 02/18/2009)
9 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Kevin Houle, Harvey Reese. (Reingold, Paul) (Entered: 02/19/2009)
10 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF re 9 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Kevin Houle, Harvey Reese. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Ex. A Declaration of Harvey Resse, # 3 Exhibit Ex B Parole Conditions of Reese, # 4 Exhibit Ex C DOC Visitation History for Reese, # 5 Exhibit Ex D Psy. Report on Reese, # 6 Exhibit Ex E Letter from Aukerman to Parole Agent Bowker, # 7 Exhibit Ex F Letter from Bowker to Aukerman, # 8 Exhibit Ex G Declaration of Tonja Parker, # 9 Exhibit Ex H Declaration and CV of Marroquin re Reese, # 10 Exhibit Ex I Declaration of Houle, # 11 Exhibit Ex J Parole Conditions of Houle, # 12 Exhibit Ex K Doc Visitation History of Houle, # 13 Index of Exhibits Ex L Psy Report on Houle, # 14 Exhibit Ex M Declaration and CV of Fluent re Houle, # 15 Exhibit Ex N Declaration of Janoskey, # 16 Exhibit Ex O Declaration of Simpson, # 17 Exhibit Ex P Declaration of Rosenblum, # 18 Exhibit Ex Q List of Default Conditions of Parole by Mi Dept., # 19 Exhibit Ex R Operating Procedure: Order for Parole, # 20 Exhibit Ex S Operating Procedure 06.04.100: Probation/Parole Orientation Checklist) (Reingold,

Case: 2:09-cv-10504-MOB-DAS As of: 05/15/2012 11:12 AM EDT 5 of 9

02/19/2009 02/19/2009 02/25/2009 02/25/2009 02/25/2009 02/25/2009 02/25/2009 02/25/2009 02/25/2009 02/25/2009 02/25/2009 02/25/2009 03/10/2009 03/12/2009
03/12/2009
03/13/2009
04/03/2009

Paul) (Entered: 02/19/2009)
11 EXHIBIT re 10 Supplemental Brief,,,, by Kevin Houle, Harvey Reese (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex T MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130) (Reingold, Paul) (Entered: 02/19/2009)
12 EXHIBIT re 10 Supplemental Brief,,,, 11 Exhibit by Kevin Houle, Harvey Reese (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex U Unpublished Cases Cited in the Brief) (Reingold, Paul) (Entered: 02/19/2009)
13 CERTIFICATE of Service/Summons Returned Executed. Laurin Thomas served on 2/19/2009, answer due 3/11/2009. (Reingold, Paul) (Entered: 02/25/2009)
14 CERTIFICATE of Service/Summons Returned Executed. David Kleinhardt served on 2/19/2009, answer due 3/11/2009. (Reingold, Paul) (Entered: 02/25/2009)
15 CERTIFICATE of Service/Summons Returned Executed. Anthony King served on 2/19/2009, answer due 3/11/2009. (Reingold, Paul) (Entered: 02/25/2009)
16 CERTIFICATE of Service/Summons Returned Executed. Artina Hardman served on 2/19/2009, answer due 3/11/2009. (Reingold, Paul) (Entered: 02/25/2009)
17 CERTIFICATE of Service/Summons Returned Executed. Stephen DeBoer served on 2/19/2009, answer due 3/11/2009. (Reingold, Paul) (Entered: 02/25/2009)
18 CERTIFICATE of Service/Summons Returned Executed. Paul Condino served on 2/19/2009, answer due 3/11/2009. (Reingold, Paul) (Entered: 02/25/2009)
19 CERTIFICATE of Service/Summons Returned Executed. Charles Brown served on 2/19/2009, answer due 3/11/2009. (Reingold, Paul) (Entered: 02/25/2009)
20 CERTIFICATE of Service/Summons Returned Executed. Miguel Berrios served on 2/19/2009, answer due 3/11/2009. (Reingold, Paul) (Entered: 02/25/2009)
21 CERTIFICATE of Service/Summons Returned Executed. James Atterberry served on 2/19/2009, answer due 3/11/2009. (Reingold, Paul) (Entered: 02/25/2009)
22 CERTIFICATE of Service/Summons Returned Executed. Barbara S Sampson served on 2/19/2009, answer due 3/11/2009. (Reingold, Paul) (Entered: 02/25/2009)
23 NOTICE of hearing on 9 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction. Responses due by 4/7/2009 Replies due by 4/24/2009 Motion Hearing set for 6/3/2009 02:00 PM before District Judge Marianne O Battani. (CMot) (Entered: 03/10/2009)
24 NOTICE of Appearance by Kevin R. Himebaugh on behalf of Anthony King, David Kleinhardt, Laurin Thomas, Barbara S Sampson, James Atterberry, Miguel Berrios, Charles Brown, Paul Condino, Stephen DeBoer, Artina Hardman. (Himebaugh, Kevin) (Entered: 03/12/2009)
25 MOTION to Dismiss and/or, MOTION for Summary Judgment by Anthony King, David Kleinhardt, Laurin Thomas, Barbara S Sampson, James Atterberry, Miguel Berrios, Charles Brown, Paul Condino, Stephen DeBoer, Artina Hardman. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit 1 − OTIS Profile of Kevin Houle, # 3 Exhibit 2 − OTIS Profile of Harvey Dale Reese, Jr., # 4 Exhibit 3 − Special Conditions for Harvey Reese, # 5 Exhibit 4 − Affidavit of John Rubitschun) (Himebaugh, Kevin) (Entered: 03/12/2009)
26 NOTICE of hearing on 25 MOTION to Dismiss and/or MOTION for Summary Judgment. Responses due by 4/7/2009 Replies due by 4/24/2009 Motion Hearing set for 6/3/2009 02:00 PM before District Judge Marianne O Battani. (CMot) (Entered: 03/13/2009)
27 RESPONSE to 9 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Anthony King, David Kleinhardt, Laurin Thomas, Barbara S Sampson, James Atterberry, Miguel Berrios, Charles Brown, Paul Condino, Stephen DeBoer, Artina Hardman. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Aff of Sampson) (Himebaugh, Kevin) (Entered: 04/03/2009)

Case: 2:09-cv-10504-MOB-DAS As of: 05/15/2012 11:12 AM EDT 6 of 9

04/06/2009 04/07/2009 04/07/2009 04/20/2009 04/24/2009 04/24/2009
05/28/2009
05/28/2009 06/03/2009

30 STIPULATION AND ORDER to Consolidate Cases Signed by District Judge Marianne O Battani. Associated Cases: 2:09−cv−10504−MOB−DAS, 2:09−cv−10535−MOB−MKM (BSoc) (Entered: 04/07/2009)
28 RESPONSE to 25 MOTION to Dismiss and/or MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Kevin Houle, Harvey Reese. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Index, # 2 Exhibit Ex A Dec. of Harvey Reese, # 3 Exhibit Ex B Dec of Kevin Houle, # 4 Exhibit Ex C Dec of Tonja Reese, # 5 Exhibit Ex D Dec of Rose Houle, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit Ex F Dec of Brandon Wilson) (Reingold, Paul) (Entered: 04/07/2009)
29 EXHIBIT Updated Signed copy re 28 Response to Motion, by Kevin Houle, Harvey Reese (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex E Signed Dec.) (Reingold, Paul) (Entered: 04/07/2009)
31 REPLY to Response re (8 in 2:09−cv−10535−MOB−MKM) MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by TH, AR. Associated Cases: 2:09−cv−10535−MOB−MKM, 2:09−cv−10504−MOB−DAS (Sankaran, Vivek) (Entered: 04/20/2009)
32 REPLY to Response re (9 in 2:09−cv−10504−MOB−DAS) MOTION for Preliminary Injunction, (8 in 2:09−cv−10535−MOB−MKM) MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Kevin Houle, Harvey Reese, TH, Rose Houle, Tonja Parker. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex 1 Revised Conditions)Associated Cases: 2:09−cv−10504−MOB−DAS, 2:09−cv−10535−MOB−MKM (Reingold, Paul) (Entered: 04/24/2009)
33 REPLY to Response re (25 in 2:09−cv−10504−MOB−DAS, 25 in 2:09−cv−10504−MOB−DAS) MOTION to Dismiss and/or MOTION for Summary Judgment, (21 in 2:09−cv−10535−MOB−MKM, 21 in 2:09−cv−10535−MOB−MKM) MOTION to Dismiss and/or MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Anthony King, David Kleinhardt, Laurin Thomas, Barbara S Sampson, James Atterberry, Miguel Berrios, Charles Brown, Paul Condino, Stephen DeBoer, Artina Hardman, Barbara Sampson, Charles Brown. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits List of EXhibits, # 2 Exhibit 1 − Case Report for Kevin Houle, # 3 Exhibit 2 − Case Report for Harvey Reese)Associated Cases: 2:09−cv−10504−MOB−DAS, 2:09−cv−10535−MOB−MKM (Himebaugh, Kevin) (Entered: 04/24/2009)
34 MOTION to Intervene Ken Levy by Kevin Houle, Harvey Reese, TH, Rose Houle, Tonja Parker, AR. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Index of Exs, # 2 Exhibit Ex A Levy's Declaration, # 3 Exhibit Ex B Special Conditions of Parole for Levy, # 4 Exhibit Ex C Kristy Levy Declaration, # 5 Exhibit Ex D SOT Termination Report, # 6 Exhibit Ex E Psy Report of Dr Rosenberg)Associated Cases: 2:09−cv−10504−MOB−DAS, 2:09−cv−10535−MOB−MKM (Reingold, Paul) (Entered: 05/28/2009)
35 MOTION to Intervene R.L. by TH, AR. Associated Cases: 2:09−cv−10535−MOB−MKM, 2:09−cv−10504−MOB−DAS (Sankaran, Vivek) (Entered: 05/28/2009)
Minute Entry −Motion Hearing held on 6/3/2009 re (9 in 2:09−cv−10504−MOB−DAS) MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Harvey Reese, Kevin Houle, (25 in 2:09−cv−10504−MOB−DAS, 25 in 2:09−cv−10504−MOB−DAS) MOTION to Dismiss and/or MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Miguel Berrios, David Kleinhardt, Anthony King, Stephen DeBoer, Paul Condino, Charles Brown, James Atterberry, Artina Hardman, Barbara S Sampson, Laurin Thomas, (8 in 2:09−cv−10535−MOB−MKM) MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by AR, TH, (21 in 2:09−cv−10535−MOB−MKM, 21 in 2:09−cv−10535−MOB−MKM) MOTION to Dismiss and/or MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Barbara Sampson, Miguel Berrios, David Kleinhardt, Anthony King, Paul Condino, Stephen DeBoer, Charles Brown, James Atterberry, Artina Hardman, Laurin Thomas before District Judge Marianne O Battani. (Court Reporter Allen Burnham) Associated Cases: 2:09−cv−10504−MOB−DAS, 2:09−cv−10535−MOB−MKM (CMot) (Entered: 06/04/2009)

Case: 2:09-cv-10504-MOB-DAS As of: 05/15/2012 11:12 AM EDT 7 of 9

06/08/2009
06/08/2009
06/08/2009 07/08/2009 07/28/2009 08/03/2009
08/05/2009
08/05/2009 08/05/2009 08/05/2009 08/06/2009 08/06/2009 08/12/2009 08/12/2009

36 ORDER denying (25) Motion to Dismiss; denying (25) Motion for Summary Judgment in case 2:09−cv−10504−MOB−DAS; denying (21) Motion to Dismiss; denying (21) Motion for Summary Judgment in case 2:09−cv−10535−MOB−MKM. (REFER TO IMAGE FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS). Signed by District Judge Marianne O Battani. Associated Cases: 2:09−cv−10504−MOB−DAS, 2:09−cv−10535−MOB−MKM (BThe) (Entered: 06/08/2009)
Set/Reset Deadlines as to (9 in 2:09−cv−10504−MOB−DAS) MOTION for Preliminary Injunction, (8 in 2:09−cv−10535−MOB−MKM) MOTION for Preliminary Injunction. Motion Hearing set for 8/17/2009 02:30 PM before District Judge Marianne O Battani Associated Cases: 2:09−cv−10504−MOB−DAS, 2:09−cv−10535−MOB−MKM (BThe) (Entered: 06/08/2009)
37 ORDER of Dismissal as to: Harvey Reese and AR terminated. Signed by District Judge Marianne O Battani. Associated Cases: 2:09−cv−10504−MOB−DAS, 2:09−cv−10535−MOB−MKM (BThe) (Entered: 06/08/2009)
38 RESPONSE to 34 MOTION to Intervene Ken Levy filed by Anthony King, David Kleinhardt, Laurin Thomas, Barbara S Sampson, James Atterberry, Miguel Berrios, Charles Brown, Paul Condino, Stephen DeBoer, Artina Hardman. (Himebaugh, Kevin) (Entered: 07/08/2009)
39 STIPULATION AND ORDER Granting Leave to Amend re 1 Complaint. Signed by District Judge Marianne O Battani. (BThe) (Entered: 07/28/2009)
40 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF re 27 Response to Motion, filed by Anthony King, David Kleinhardt, Laurin Thomas, Barbara S Sampson, James Atterberry, Miguel Berrios, Charles Brown, Paul Condino, Stephen DeBoer, Artina Hardman. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit 1−−−Deposition of Barbara Sampson (Relevant Pages), # 3 Exhibit 2−−−Community Supervision of the Sex Offender (Jan 2000 Article), # 4 Exhibit 3−−−Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research and Treatment) (Himebaugh, Kevin) (Entered: 08/03/2009)
41 AMENDED COMPLAINT filed by RL, Kristy Levy, TH, Rose Houle against Jodi Deangelo, Lisa Gettys, David Fountain, John Sullivan, Soni Amos Warchock, Anthony King, David Kleinhardt, Laurin Thomas, Barbara S Sampson, James Atterberry, Miguel Berrios, Charles Brown, Paul Condino, Stephen DeBoer, Artina Hardman. (Sankaran, Vivek) (Entered: 08/05/2009)
REQUEST for SUMMONS for Jodi Deangelo, Lisa Gettys, David Fountain, John Sullivan, Soni Amos Warchock. (Sankaran, Vivek) (Entered: 08/05/2009)
42 AMENDED COMPLAINT of plaintiffs Houle and Levy filed by Kenneth Levy, Kevin Houle against all defendants. (Reingold, Paul) (Entered: 08/05/2009)
REQUEST for SUMMONS for Jodi Deangelo, Lisa Gettys, David Fountain, John Sullivan, Soni Amos Warchock. (Reingold, Paul) (Entered: 08/05/2009)
43 SUMMONS Issued for *Jodi Deangelo, Lisa Gettys, David Fountain, John Sullivan, Soni Amos Warchock* (DeSa) (Entered: 08/06/2009)
44 SUMMONS Issued for *Jodi Deangelo, Lisa Gettys, David Fountain, John Sullivan, Soni Amos Warchock* (DeSa) (Entered: 08/06/2009)
45 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by TH. (Sankaran, Vivek) Modified on 8/12/2009 (NHol). [NOT A MOTION − DOCUMENT IS A SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF] (Entered: 08/12/2009)
46 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF re 9 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Kenneth Levy, Kevin Houle. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit V − Follow−Up Declaration of Harvey Reese, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit W − Follow−up Declaration of Kevin Houle, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit X − Kevin Houle Special Condition 99.0, # 5 Exhibit Exhibit Y − Declaration of Rose Houle, # 6 Exhibit Exhibit Z − Follow−up Declaration of Rose Houle, # 7 Exhibit Exhibit AA − Declaration of T.H., # 8 Exhibit Exhibit BB − Declaration of William Starnes, Ph.D., # 9 Exhibit Exhibit CC − Declaration of Ken Levy, # 10 Exhibit Exhibit DD

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08/12/2009
08/14/2009
08/14/2009 08/17/2009 08/17/2009 08/18/2009 08/25/2009 08/27/2009 09/17/2009 09/24/2009 09/24/2009 09/25/2009 02/12/2010

− Parole Conditions of Ken Levy, # 11 Exhibit Exhibit EE − Declaration of Kristy Levy, # 12 Exhibit Exhibit FF − Psychological Report of Matthew Rosenberg on Ken Levy, # 13 Index of Exhibits Exhibit GG − Declaration of Brandon Wilson, # 14 Exhibit Exhibit HH − Declaration and CV of Jill Levenson, Ph.D., # 15 Exhibit Exhibit II − OMNI Case Notes for Kevin Houle, # 16 Exhibit Exhibit JJ − Default Special Conditions Chart, # 17 Exhibit Exhibit KK − Deposition of Sandra Simmons, # 18 Exhibit Exhibit LL − Deposition of Barbara Sampson, # 19 Exhibit Exhibit MM − Deposition of Michael Glynn, # 20 Exhibit Exhibit NN − Deposition of John Rubitschun, # 21 Exhibit Exhibit OO − Declaration of David Taylor) (Reingold, Paul) (Entered: 08/12/2009)
47 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF re 46 Supplemental Brief,,,,, filed by Kenneth Levy, Kevin Houle. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit PP − Parole Condition Authorization of Kevin Houle, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit QQ − Declaration of Ronnie Shackleford, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit RR − Declaration of Mark Prater) (Reingold, Paul). [DOCUMENT IS EXHIBITS PP, QQ AND RR IN SUPPORT OF SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF]. Modified on 8/13/2009 (THal). (Entered: 08/12/2009)
48 DECLARATION by Houle and Levy re 42 Amended Complaint, 41 Amended Complaint, filed by Kenneth Levy, Kevin Houle (Attachments: # 1 Document Continuation, # 2 Document Continuation, # 3 Document Continuation) (Reingold, Paul). [IMAGE CONTAINS SOME PAGES SCANNED SIDEWAYS − ATTORNEY INSTRUCTED TO REFILE CORRECTLY]. Modified on 8/14/2009 (THal). (Entered: 08/14/2009)
49 DECLARATION by Houle and Levy re 42 Amended Complaint, 41 Amended Complaint, filed by Kenneth Levy, Kevin Houle (Attachments: # 1 Document Continuation, # 2 Document Continuation, # 3 Document Continuation) (Reingold, Paul) (Entered: 08/14/2009)
Minute Entry −Settlement Conference held on 8/17/2009 before District Judge Marianne O Battani. (CMot) (Entered: 08/17/2009)
Reset Deadlines as to 9 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction.( Motion Hearing reset for 9/17/2009 10:00 AM before District Judge Marianne O Battani), Set Scheduling Order Deadlines:( Settlement Conference set for 9/17/2009 10:00 AM before District Judge Marianne O Battani) (CMot) (Entered: 08/17/2009)
50 EXHIBIT re 1 Complaint,, 31 Reply to Response to Motion, 10 Supplemental Brief,,,, 9 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction, 41 Amended Complaint, by TH (Sankaran, Vivek) (Entered: 08/18/2009)
51 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE: Kevin R. Himebaugh appearing on behalf of Lisa Gettys, David Fountain, John Sullivan, Soni Amos Warchock with Certificate of Service (Himebaugh, Kevin) (Entered: 08/25/2009)
52 NOTICE of Appearance by Kevin R. Himebaugh on behalf of Jodi Deangelo. (Himebaugh, Kevin) (Entered: 08/27/2009)
Minute Entry − Settlement Conference held on 9/17/2009, ( Status Conference set for 2/23/2010 02:00 PM before District Judge Marianne O Battani) before District Judge Marianne O Battani. Disposition: HELD AND CONTINUED (BThe) (Entered: 09/17/2009)
53 MOTION to Withdraw 9 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Kevin Houle. (Reingold, Paul) (Entered: 09/24/2009)
54 NOTICE by Kevin Houle of withdrawal of 53 MOTION to Withdraw 9 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction, 9 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction. (Reingold, Paul) (Entered: 09/24/2009)
55 NOTICE by TH, RL of withdrawal of Plaintiffs' motion for Preliminary Injunction. (Sankaran, Vivek) (Entered: 09/25/2009)
56 Renewed MOTION to Intervene and, Renewed MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Kevin Houle. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Ex A Letter Himebaugh, # 3 Exhibit Ex B Letter, # 4 Exhibit Ex C Himebaugh, # 5 Exhibit Ex D Letter Himebaugh 10.14.09, # 6 Exhibit Ex E Letter

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02/19/2010 02/22/2010 02/22/2010 03/11/2010
03/25/2010
03/25/2010 03/26/2010 04/08/2010 04/09/2010 04/14/2010
04/14/2010 04/30/2010

Himebaugh 9.24.09, # 7 Exhibit Ex F 2nd follow up, # 8 Exhibit Ex G Follow up, # 9 Exhibit Ex H Four Letters Alexander, # 10 Exhibit Ex I follow up, # 11 Exhibit Ex J Declaration of Clever, # 12 Exhibit Ex K Declaration Forgue, # 13 Exhibit Ex L Dec Poynter, # 14 Exhibit Ex M Decl Griffith, # 15 Exhibit Ex N Decl Perry, # 16 Exhibit Ex O Decl Hammonds, # 17 Exhibit Ex P Witaker v perdue, # 18 Exhibit Ex Q North Caroline v Demaio) (Reingold, Paul) (Entered: 02/12/2010)
57 MOTION to Intervene, MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by TH. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Declaration of Debra LeBlanc (2/10/10), # 3 Exhibit Declaration of Z.L. (2/10/10)) (Sankaran, Vivek) (Entered: 02/19/2010)
58 EXHIBIT R Supplemental Exhibit re 56 Renewed MOTION to Intervene andRenewed MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Kevin Houle (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex R Supplemental Ex. Declaration of LeBlanc) (Reingold, Paul) (Entered: 02/22/2010)
ReSet Hearings: Status Conference reset for 3/25/2010 02:00 PM before District Judge Marianne O Battani (CMot) (Entered: 02/22/2010)
59 EXHIBIT re 57 MOTION to Intervene MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by TH (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Supplemental Exhibit D. Declaration of Hannah Noland (2/23/10), # 3 Exhibit Supplemental Exhibit E. decl. of Sarah Griffith (2/22/10), # 4 Exhibit Supplemental Exhibit F. Decl. of D.G. (2/22/10), # 5 Exhibit Supplemental Exhibit C. Declaration of Samantha Houston (2/22/10)) (Sankaran, Vivek) (Entered: 03/11/2010)
60 RESPONSE to 56 Renewed MOTION to Intervene andRenewed MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Anthony King, David Kleinhardt, Laurin Thomas, Jodi Deangelo, Lisa Gettys, David Fountain, John Sullivan, Soni Amos Warchock, Barbara S Sampson, James Atterberry, Miguel Berrios, Charles Brown, Paul Condino, Stephen DeBoer, Artina Hardman. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit 1 − E−mail to Shipman, # 3 Exhibit 2 − Parole Recommendations, # 4 Exhibit 3 − Case Report for Houle, # 5 Exhibit 4 − Screen Shot of Agent Note, # 6 Exhibit 5 − Case Report for Levy) (Himebaugh, Kevin) (Entered: 03/25/2010)
Minute Entry − Status Conference held on 3/25/2010 before District Judge Marianne O Battani. (CMot) (Entered: 03/25/2010)
61 SCHEDULING ORDER/BRIEFING SCHEDULE: Dispositive Motions filed by 4/26/2010; Responses due by 5/20/10; Replies due by 6/04/10; Oral Argument 6/17/10 at 3:00 p.m. Signed by District Judge Marianne O Battani. (CMot) (Entered: 03/26/2010)
62 NOTICE TO WITHDRAW 56 Renewed MOTION to Intervene and Renewed MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Kevin Houle. (Reingold, Paul) [DOCUMENT WAS FILED USING INCORRECT EVENT] Modified on 4/8/2010 (VLun). (Entered: 04/08/2010)
63 NOTICE TO WITHDRAW 59 Exhibit, 57 MOTION to Intervene MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by TH. (Sankaran, Vivek) [DOCUMENT WAS FILED USING INCORRECT EVENT] Modified on 4/9/2010 (VLun). (Entered: 04/09/2010)
64 TRANSCRIPT of Civil/Motion Hearing held on 6/3/2009. (Court Reporter/Transcriber: Allen T. Burnham) (Number of Pages: 60) Redaction Request due 5/5/2010. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/17/2010. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/13/2010. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date, the transcript is publicly available. (Burnham, A) (Entered: 04/14/2010)
65 Notice of Filing Transcript. (Burnham, A) (Entered: 04/14/2010)
66 STIPULATED ORDER DISMISSING CASE With Prejudice and Without Costs. Signed by District Judge Marianne O Battani. (BThe) (Entered: 04/30/2010)